The aim of my paper is to demonstrate that the phenomenology of intersubjectivity can complement and inform – both at the descriptive and at the theoretical-conceptual level – the ongoing work in the field of embodied social cognition in a more productive way than “theory of mind”-approaches in analytical philosophy of mind. I thereby follow those recent proposals, which are arguing that phenomenology can contribute significantly to current empirical research in cognitive science and the scientific study of consciousness, and are trying to establish a mutual exchange between phenomenology, cognitive science and analytical philosophy of mind. Phenomenology is understood here not just as the textual corpus of one of the dominant philosophical movements of the last century, but also as a philosophical methodology for discovering the invariant structures of various types of experience as experienced in the subjective or first-person point of view, and then intersubjectively corroborated. The methodological assumption of the research is that the biobehavioral processes discovered in the cognitive sciences can also be experienced and described from the phenomenological perspective of first-person experience