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ALBANIA'S GLOBAL RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST ACTORS AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS DURING THE 1960S: GOALS, MODELS AND SELF-STAGING STRATEGIES

Idrit Idrizi

Abstract

This paper examines the complex interactions between politics, ideology, propaganda and identity, as well as between local, regional and global contexts during the Cold War, using Albania's relations with communist actors and revolutionary movements worldwide as a case study. The study first analyzes the context and character of the relations. Second, it examines the goals, expectations, and inspirational models of the Albanian regime. Finally, it examines how and why the regime sought to stage its global contacts in foreign and domestic propaganda. The paper hypothesizes that the country's global contacts and their staging were deeply shaped by the domestic context, decisively enabled by global developments, and significantly influenced by regional developments.

Keywords: Albania, Cold War, international relations, internationalism, Southeast Europe, Third World

1. Introduction

After the break with the Soviet Union (1961), in the context of isolation from the Eastern Bloc and alliance with Mao's China, communist Albania established links with numerous leftist groups and revolutionary movements in the Third World, as well as with Western Marxist-Leninist individuals and splinter groups.¹ Many of these ties faded after the 1960s. Until the late 1980s, however, the small country of less than three million inhabitants maintained a small but worldwide network of "sympathizers" and continued to present itself as a beacon of the international communist movement, while remaining one of the most isolated in the world.²

The focus of this research project is on communist Albania's global relations, which have been scarcely researched and mostly either completely ignored or only casually mentioned and presented as an absurdity, as well as their propagandistic presentation. The study first analyzes the character of the relations and the conditions under which they were established. Second, it examines the goals, expectations, and inspirational models of the Albanian regime in pursuing such an internationalist policy. Finally, it examines how and why the regime sought to stage its global contacts in domestic and international propaganda. The focus is thus on the considerations and strategies of the Albanian regime's leadership. As the project is at an early stage, the aim of the paper is to formulate initial hypotheses.

The study also takes into account the impact of global and regional developments, in particular the competition for leadership of the communist world between the People's Republic of China (Albania's main ally in the 1960s to late 1970s) and its ideological arch-enemy, the Soviet Union,³ the internationalist tendencies in the Eastern bloc in the post-Stalin era,⁴ and the very active presence on the international stage of Yugoslavia, but also of Romania and, in the 1970s and 1980s, even Bulgaria. Through his leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement and his worldwide visits, Tito achieved global political prominence. Nicolae Ceaușescu tried to make a name for himself as a mediator in world politics and pursued a very active visiting diplomacy. Lyudmila Živkova, the influential daughter of the Bulgarian ruler, pursued a highly ambitious cultural diplomacy worldwide and was also active in the UN for the rights of women, children, and Third World countries.⁵

Overall, the study examines the complex interactions between politics, ideology, propaganda, mentality, identity, and culture, as well as between national, regional, and global contexts during the Cold War, using Albania as a case study. It holds the hypotheses that the country's global contacts and their staging were an important feature of the domestic Cold War culture, deeply intertwined with domestic politics, decisively enabled by global developments, and significantly influenced by the regional context.

2. State of the art

Research on Albania's communist history is mainly in its infancy. Foreign policy has received comparatively more attention. However, studies

conducted during the Cold War (by Western scholars and commentators) were based solely on (propaganda) material published by the Albanian regime, and thus on speculation. Most publications after the political change – to the extent that they are based on archival sources at all – are predominantly descriptive in style, focusing on a few topics and almost exclusively on the period before the break with China.⁶

The subject of this study represents an almost empty space in research. The first archival-based and theoretically reflected monograph on Albania's international activities during the Cold War, published in 2017, examines exchanges with the Soviet bloc and the People's Republic of China. Relations with leftist groups in the Third World and in the West are only touched upon in a few places.⁷ However, the book provides important insights into the Cold War considerations and mentalities of the Albanian leadership until the break with China, and thus serves as a solid starting point. In an article published in 2019, the same author, Elidor Mëhilli, also offers some insightful suggestions on how to open up Albanian historiography to new perspectives. Among other things, he points to the regime's propaganda activities abroad, even during the so-called "isolation period," and argues that studying perceived "anomalies" such as the Albanian case can prove useful in testing general explanatory frameworks.⁸

The most relevant study for this research project is Ylber Marku's doctoral thesis on Albanian-Chinese relations. A subchapter of Marku's study deals with the joint efforts of Albania and China to attract communist actors in the Third World and Western left-wing groups in the wake of the conflict with the Soviet Union, illustrating them with two examples.⁹ Nicola Pedrazzi's monograph on relations between the Italian Left and communist Albania until 1976 is also relevant. Pedrazzi examines in detail the activities, expectations, and interests of Albanian and Italian communists, contextualizing them against the backdrop of the Sino-Albanian alliance and the global Cold War.¹⁰ Finally, also noteworthy is an article published in 2017 that provides a brief history of the "Albanian Committee for Cultural and Friendly Relations with Foreign Countries", the institution responsible for the so-called "friendship associations."¹¹

3. Sources, methodology and theoretical framework

The project is based primarily on sources from the archives of the Party of Labor of Albania (PLA), the fund "Central Committee of the PLA – Relations

with Communist Parties and Marxist-Leninist Groups”, especially the section “Relations with the Communist Party of China”, and the fund “The Leading Organs” (the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo, the Central Committee and the Central Committee Secretariat). Published propaganda material is used only occasionally for illustration. It is also noteworthy that a number of documents from the PLA archives on exchanges with the Communist Party of China (CPC) have been translated into English and published online.¹² These documents provide important insights into the inner workings of the alliance and the attitudes of the two leaderships. However, they should be viewed as snapshots of a highly turbulent period in which the actors had to adapt frequently to changing circumstances.¹³

State socialist archival documents are generally characterized by ritualization and ideologization. Like other sources, they follow a specific rationality and largely reflect the subjective interests of those who created and ordered them. In view of these methodological problems, the study aims to reflect critically on the content of the documents, to interpret them in the light of the above-mentioned research questions and hypotheses, and to place them in a broader context, rather than simply replicating information.¹⁴

The Albanian archives of the communist era contain a large number of documents in many foreign languages and writings by leftists and regime sympathizers from all over the world. However, the existence of documents alone is not sufficient proof that a phenomenon played an important role and is worth studying. In fact, as the paper will show, and as one might expect, Albania’s own resources were limited, its influence on politics in the Third World or in the West was almost non-existent, since the groups that maintained contact with Tirana were usually marginal ones. Beyond the search for such direct political interventions, however, a broader approach to such interactions and international activities is needed.

As Katherine Verdery noted long ago in her famous book “What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?”, “(m)ore than simply a superpower face-off having broad political repercussions, the Cold War was also a form of knowledge and a cognitive organization of the world.”¹⁵ More recently, Theodora Dragostinova and Malgorzata Fidelis have also emphasized the importance of “shifting the focus to the production of knowledge and the transfer of ideas as important tools for shaping politics”.¹⁶

Furthermore, it is important to remember that the nature of the Cold War conflict endowed smaller states with outsized ideological

importance.¹⁷ Under such conditions, they were sometimes able to exert a disproportionate influence on international politics in various, sometimes indirect, ways. In the shadow of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the early 1960s, Albania, the smallest and most insecure country in the Eastern bloc, began to oppose the Soviet Union. This eventually led to the country's de facto expulsion from the Eastern Bloc. However, Laurien Crump, in an article entitled "The Balkan Challenge to the Warsaw Pact, 1960–1964," has impressively demonstrated how Albania's actions paved the way for Romania's successful emancipation from the Soviet Union a few years later and, ultimately, for the multilateralization of the Warsaw Pact. The same author has also co-edited a volume on margins of maneuver in Cold War Europe, which argues that the position of smaller powers vis-à-vis the superpowers was often an opportunity rather than a constraint.¹⁸ Overall, recent scholarship on the Cold War has paid increasing attention to smaller countries and peripheries and the ways in which their domestic and international activities shaped the global Cold War.¹⁹

The study follows research on the new culture of internationalism in the Eastern bloc in the post-Stalin era,²⁰ as well as more recent approaches in Cold War studies that emphasize the diversity of national cultures (discourses, mentalities, concepts of order, self- and world-views) and their complex interdependencies with the regional and global context.²¹ In doing so, the project also aims to contribute to the transnational and entangled history of Southeast European Cold War cultures.²²

4. Prehistory of Albania's Cold War internationalism: insecurity and exclusion

In 1944–1945, when the Communists took power, Albania was a very young and highly insecure state. It was almost completely excluded from international politics and was one of the most backward countries in Europe in terms of economic and technological development. The Albanian state, founded in 1912, was recognized by the Great Powers in 1919–1920. During the First World War, it was occupied by several foreign armies, including those of neighboring countries, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Italy. Even before the beginning of the Second World War, the country was invaded by Italy, which subsequently treated Albania as a colony. The economic development of the country was comparable to that of the colonies in Africa.²³ During the Second World War, the Albanian communist

partisans were under the total control of Tito's men. When the war ended, the future of the state was uncertain. Albania had been ignored in all the major Allied conferences, in Cairo, Tehran, Malta, Yalta and Potsdam. The same was true for the so-called "percentage agreement", which proved to be decisive for the fate of the Southeast European states during the Cold War. On 9 October 1944, during a meeting in Moscow, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin reached a secret, informal agreement to divide Southeast Europe, including Hungary, into spheres of influence. These talks, which Churchill did not reveal in his memoirs until 1953, had ignored Albania. The small country at the periphery did not seem important enough to be discussed at such meetings. Greece and Yugoslavia were the focus of Britain and the Soviet Union.²⁴

After the end of the war, the Albanian state struggled to gain international recognition. The Western powers refused for a long time, and it was not until 1955 that the country was admitted to the United Nations. Greece claimed that the country had been an ally of Italy and therefore considered it an enemy, while also claiming the so-called Southern Epirus, the southern part of the present Albanian state. No representatives of the Albanian state were allowed to participate in the peace conferences. Under these conditions, this role was taken over by Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia represented the Albanian state at international meetings, such as the Potsdam and Paris conferences in 1945 and the Paris Peace Conference in 1946–1947. In Paris, the Yugoslav ambassador announced that the Greek ambassador had secretly offered to divide the country between Greece and Yugoslavia. Worse, the Albanian state was also largely ignored by the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav communists represented the Albanian Communist Party in the Communist International (Comintern) and in the Cominform. In fact, the Albanian Communist Party was the only one in Eastern Europe that did not receive an invitation to the founding meeting of Cominform in September 1947.²⁵ When Enver Hoxha, the leader of the PLA, visited Stalin for the first time in 1947, he was made clear to him that the Soviets had left the country to the Yugoslavs. In fact, Stalin had given Tito his consent to integrate the Albanian state into the Yugoslav one. Tito openly planned to integrate Albania either as the seventh Yugoslav republic or, in any case, as part of a Balkan federation together with Bulgaria. In January 1948, during a meeting in Moscow with Milovan Đilas, a close confidant of Tito's, Stalin declared that he "didn't have any particular interest in Albania". "We are okay with Yugoslavia swallowing Albania", he assured.²⁶ Only a month later,

however, Stalin harshly criticized Yugoslavia for its Balkan federation plans and for failing to coordinate with the Soviet Union. In June 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform. Enver Hoxha, who in the previous months had risked losing his position to another leader favored by the Yugoslavs, took advantage of the Tito-Stalin split to emancipate Albania from Yugoslavia. All agreements were annulled, and from that moment on Yugoslavia became an archenemy.²⁷

With the liberation from Yugoslav tutelage, a new era began in the history of the Albanian state, from isolation to integration into the new world order and international politics. For the first time in its history, this state became part of a multilateral alliance. For the first time in its history, with the support of a superpower, its territorial integrity seemed guaranteed. Albania's alliance with Moscow also brought it greater prestige and much-needed economic and technological aid. Now the Albanian Communists could appear as allies of the powerful Soviet Union, as Stalin's allies against Tito. On the island of Sazan in Vlora, 30 kilometers from NATO country Italy, the Soviets built a naval base. The Soviets were also a strong and indispensable promoter of the interests of the country, which had extremely limited means to promote itself internationally. During this period, there was a comprehensive exchange in all fields (ideology, propaganda, economy and technology, culture, etc.) with the Soviet Union and Soviet satellites.²⁸ As a rule, these exchanges were highly unbalanced, with the Albanian side mainly receiving aid or sending people for education and specialization. In this context, the PLA leadership attached great importance to measures to popularize the country in the Eastern bloc, first and foremost in the Soviet Union.²⁹ In January 1949, the Secretariat of the Central Committee (CC) of the PLA issued a "Platform for Popularization of the Country," which was aimed primarily at the Soviet Union.³⁰ In 1950, the "Albanian Committee for Cultural and Friendly Relations with Foreign Countries" was established as the "leading and coordination organ for the propaganda and cultural relations with the foreign world".³¹ Two years later, the Politburo decided to publish a political magazine called "New Albania" in order to strengthen the propaganda work towards foreign audiences.³² The latter was considered to be "an instrument of high importance to strengthen the friendship with other peoples of the socialist camp, to bring peoples of non-socialist countries closer to the Albanian people, to popularize the successes of the Republic of Albania, and to disseminate socialist ideas to the world and thereby strengthen peace".³³

With the change of patron from Tito to Stalin, Albania was upgraded from a satellite to a direct satellite of the Soviet Union. This partly contradictory development shaped the country's later internationalist engagement. On the one hand, under Soviet hegemony, Albania's status was clearly strengthened and the benefits were enormous. On the other hand, the country was still a satellite, completely dependent on the Soviet Union and, more specifically, on its political leadership. When Khrushchev initiated de-Stalinization, Enver Hoxha's power was seriously threatened.³⁴ The Soviet leadership provided Albania with an enormous amount of aid, but largely denied the Albanian regime's desire to build heavy industry. Albanian representatives often had to endure Soviet arrogance and imperial behavior. This had started with Stalin, but became more and more exaggerated during Khrushchev's rule. On a number of occasions, the Albanian leadership felt humiliated by the Soviet leadership. For example, Khrushchev could not bear to consult with Enver Hoxha about the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, but instead held talks with his arch-enemy, Tito.³⁵ The Soviets also planned to popularize Albania as a model for the Muslim world, which Khrushchev saw as a "precious gem that would attract the rest of the Muslim world toward Communism, especially in the Middle East and Africa"³⁶. The Albanian leaders could not refuse, but they felt insulted because they were trying to get rid of religion and their aim was to strengthen relations with the Second World, not with African countries, which they perceived as a step backwards.³⁷ Nevertheless, Khrushchev's proposals show that the country, despite its marginal position and weakness, was perceived as having some potential that could be useful in the conditions of the Cold War. The PLA leadership also made use of this potential, especially later during the alliance with Mao's China.

5. Entering the stage of world politics

In 1960, at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow, Albanian leader Enver Hoxha attacked Khrushchev in an unprecedented manner. Hoxha's outburst was deliberately staged as a spectacle. It attracted great international attention. Although many communist leaders harshly criticized him and eventually Albania was excluded from the Eastern bloc, this was the moment when the country entered the stage of world politics for the first time in its history.³⁸ A few

months earlier, Hoxha had made the following statement to the Albanian Politburo, which demonstrates the transformation of the Albanian regime under the conditions of the Sino-Soviet conflict, from a submissive small state to a self-confident actor. It shows how this conflict enabled a highly insecure small state on the periphery of Europe to challenge a great power. It also reveals the central importance of ideology in the conditions of the Cold War. The leadership of a small country with extremely limited resources used ideology as a credit:

“We used to be young but we are older now, and I am not talking about us as individuals but the party as a whole. We are no longer a one- or two-year-old party but a party that will soon count twenty years. We have not spent all this time lying on a bed of roses but in a bloody war against Fascism, the National Front, the English, the Americans, the Trotskyites, the Yugoslavs, the Greek monarcho-Fascists and all kinds of other enemies. We have thus learned Marxism from books, from war, from life.”³⁹

The alliance with China brought great benefits to the country and greatly expanded its room for maneuver in international relations. With the change of patron, Albania went from being a weak satellite to a strategic ally. It gained the support of a powerful country willing to honor it much more than the Soviets and willing to spend much more resources to promote its interests on the international stage. China did not hesitate to fulfill most of the demands of its strategic partner in Europe. It provided Albania with an enormous amount of economic and technological aid and helped the PLA leadership realize its dream of building a heavy industry. Albania was also able to persuade China to provide it with an enormous amount of armaments, although the CPC leadership refused to sign a military treaty.⁴⁰ Exclusion from the Eastern bloc gave Albania flexibility in international relations. China’s need for an ally against the Soviet Union⁴¹ and in the end in the United Nations, where it was not present until 1971, gave the Hoxha regime strong leverage over Beijing.⁴² It was precisely these conditions that gave rise to Albania’s highly active internationalism in the 1960s and shaped its character.

Before getting to the core of these activities, it is also important to look at the general context of the 1960s, which shows that Albania’s internationalism was indeed a major trend of the time. Stalin had a Eurocentric foreign policy. Things changed in the Khrushchev era, when the Soviet Union discovered the Third World as an arena for the global

prosecution of the Cold War. Events there, such as decolonization and revolutions, had a strong echo in the Second World, but also in Western Europe. In the communist countries, the leadership undertook extensive measures to popularize these events, to stage them as proof of the fulfillment of Marx's prophecy of the decline of imperialism. The Eastern European communisms also tried to present themselves as countries that shared similar experiences with the decolonized peoples of the Third World. They too had been oppressed by empires and had liberated themselves. Therefore, they could serve as a model for these revolutionary movements. Several countries also undertook ambitious development aid programs, among which Czechoslovakia and East Germany were very active. East Germany pretended to be the first non-imperial German state and was supported exclusively by the Soviet Union to attract African countries. Communist leaders tried to encourage solidarity with the peoples of the Third World, for example by donating extra salaries. All in all, the Second World has discovered the Third World since the late 1950s.⁴³ In the case of Albania, it was mainly from the early 1960s, under the alliance with China.

6. Enver Hoxha's Albania, Mao's China and world communism

In June 1962, about six months after the final Soviet-Albanian split, a high-level PLA delegation traveled to Beijing. During six long meetings, representatives of the two allied parties exchanged views on many issues, but the main focus was on the conflict with the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.⁴⁴ During the first meeting, Deng Xiaoping analyzed the attitude of communist parties around the world, from India to Australia, Brazil, Tunisia and Switzerland. He spoke of the need to create a "revolutionary nucleus" in the international communist movement, but remained vague, stressing that this was a long way off.⁴⁵ Remarkably, Deng attributed to the PLA a better knowledge of the internal situation of the European communist parties.⁴⁶ The Albanian delegation indirectly proved him right by detailing developments in these parties and claiming to have received letters from Western European communist groups. The PLA representatives then took up the question of creating a "revolutionary nucleus in every communist and workers' party of the world", and presented this as the (only) way out of the precarious situation created in the international communist movements.⁴⁷ Calling the CPC

“the most important force in the struggle against imperialism and anti-Marxism”⁴⁸ and a “colossal force that increases every day and exerts an in-depth influence on the development of the world revolution,”⁴⁹ they not only flattered their ally but also indirectly appealed for a more active approach. The Chinese counterpart, however, remained cautious, arguing that this was a long and complicated struggle.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, he appreciated the Albanian information on developments in various communist parties and groups as “helpful”.⁵¹

Overall, the CPC tried to walk a tightrope between mobilizing the PLA in an international struggle against the Soviet Union and moderating its radical approach. The Albanian communists, on the other hand, fully supported the idea of an international anti-revisionist movement led by the CPC and urged an aggressive struggle against the Soviets. In this context, they presented themselves as valuable fighters and interlocutors.

About a year later, the Albanian leadership approached the CPC with a strong and direct appeal to support anti-revisionist Marxist-Leninist groups around the world.⁵² Two PLA CC secretaries, Hysni Kapo and Ramiz Alia, requested a meeting with the Chinese ambassador in Tirana, Lo Shigao, specifically on this issue. According to them, Albania had received numerous letters and requests from Marxist-Leninist groups in Europe and beyond, asking for assistance with propaganda and other materials. In particular, Kapo and Alia discussed exchanges with Marxist-Leninists in or from Poland, Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, England and Greece.⁵³ In this context, they urged China to support such groups “in a more organized and concrete manner”⁵⁴. While proposing, among other things, to send propaganda material, Kapo and Alia claimed that a large number of Marxist-Leninist groups from “almost everywhere”⁵⁵ had approached the PLA about this. Moreover, numerous reliable PLA sources had allegedly proven that such material was highly effective.⁵⁶ The CPC response was again cautious and vague, emphasizing both the importance of a cautious approach and the interest of gathering “revolutionary forces”.⁵⁷ In fact, in the summer of 1963, Beijing was more concerned with bilateral talks with Moscow. When negotiations to defuse tensions failed, Sino-Soviet disputes escalated, and the CPC leadership resumed its plans to build an alternative international communist movement.⁵⁸

In September 1963, an Albanian delegation traveled to Beijing. After detailing the situation of many Marxist-Leninist groups around the world,⁵⁹ representatives of the Directorate of Foreign Relations of the CPC-CC promised their Albanian counterparts to help them build a foreign-

language publishing house and a powerful radio station.⁶⁰ Later that year, on 31 December, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai arrived in Albania for the first time and met with the country's leader, Enver Hoxha.⁶¹ Zhou's visit to Tirana was part of a long tour of many countries in Asia and Africa, which the Albanian media had covered extensively, and which Hoxha now praised. The Albanian leader was full of praise for "great socialist China" as "an invincible fortress, a lighthouse for world's Marxist-Leninists, for the enslaved peoples that fight for freedom, for the revolutionary and national liberation movements in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, for the whole world's proletariat."⁶² He presented his country and his party as capable of winning the sympathy of the Arab peoples in particular, arguing that Albania's Muslim background and its history as a small, poor semi-colony were favorable in this regard.⁶³ In this context, Hoxha pointed out that such propaganda activities required resources that Albania, as a poor country, did not have,⁶⁴ But he also stressed the need to support Marxist-Leninist groups worldwide and even to increase this support.⁶⁵

This time, Hoxha did not have to make much effort to convince the Chinese leadership to take a more active approach to building an international anti-revisionist movement. After the failure of the Sino-Soviet talks and Mao's comeback in Chinese politics, Beijing had embarked on a radical foreign policy in the early fall of 1963.⁶⁶ Mao's trustee, Zhou Enlai, responded to Hoxha's speech with affirmation and praise. He praised Albania for its great contribution to the struggle against imperialism and revisionism...⁶⁷ and its determination and fighting spirit.⁶⁸ He expressed full support for Hoxha's idea of intensifying propaganda activities toward Africa and further encouraged the targeting of Marxist-Leninist actors in Western Europe.⁶⁹ More broadly, Zhou Enlai expressed the determination to engage in propaganda activities worldwide, pointing in particular to the national revolutionary upheavals in Asia, Africa and South America.⁷⁰ He also elaborated on the struggle against revisionism.⁷¹ Zhou's words were received with great enthusiasm by Hoxha, who repeatedly emphasized that the views of the two parties were in complete agreement.⁷² Hoxha then turned his attention to Europe, arguing that this region was the epicenter of revisionism. In this context, he ascribed a key role to Albania, even calling it an emerging center of anti-revisionist struggle in Europe. Hoxha claimed that his party was intensifying contacts with Marxist-Leninist groups in Western Europe, including those in some countries where China did not have an embassy, such as France and Italy. He also claimed to be in possession of valuable confidential information about the internal life

of communist parties in the Eastern Bloc, mentioning that in Poland at least 30 groups opposed party leader Gomulka. Finally, Hoxha proposed the establishment of a special unit at the Chinese Embassy in Tirana to improve the coordination of Sino-Albanian aid to revolutionary groups.⁷³

In June 1964, the Sino-Albanian assistance to the Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary groups was institutionalized through the establishment of a monetary fund called “Solidarity fund”, with an initial contribution of 500,000 US dollars by China and 200,000 US dollars by Albania. From that year on, China continued to contribute half a million US dollars annually.⁷⁴ Who were the groups that received support? What kind of support did they receive and for what kind of activities? Contacts were established with dozens of parties and groups around the world, on every continent, from neighboring Italy to New Zealand. Some contacts, albeit very limited, also existed with small, illegal communist groups in Eastern Europe. Most of the aid went to Marxist and revolutionary groups in Western Europe and South America. China and Albania were mainly interested in using it to publish, disseminate, and publicize propaganda material in their own languages that promoted the CPC and PLA and attacked the Soviet Union and the United States.⁷⁵ Accordingly, much of the aid consisted of financial support for such activities. Sometimes, however, at least the Albanian authorities also provided these groups with various consumer goods, from cotton to cigarettes.

For example, in the first three months or so of the Fund’s existence, support included 3,750 US dollars to the Communist Party of Belgium for the salaries of two correspondents of the PLA newspaper “Zëri i Popullit” (Voice of the People); 1,870 US dollars to a Communist group in France for the salary of a “Zëri i Popullit” correspondent; 150 US dollars for each issue of the Italian newspaper “Nova Unita”; 5,000 US dollars as general support to the Marxist-Leninist Group of Franz Strobl in Austria and another 2,400 US dollars for the salary of a “Zëri i Popullit” correspondent and 200 US dollars to a member of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Australia.⁷⁶

Activists from the Third World also came to Albania to receive political and military training. The existence of such training is mentioned in archival sources. For example, in 1967, the PLA-CC Secretariat decided to accept a group of six Congolese fighters for 5–6 months of military training, along with eight children and two women accompanying them. The Congolese Liberation Movement also received 2,000 US dollars and 200 US dollars for a typewriter.⁷⁷ However, it remains to be seen who exactly participated in such training. After the fall of the regime, numerous

interviews and newspaper articles were published with sensational claims about prominent guerrillas who were said to have received military and political training in Albania, such as Yasser Arafat, the deputy head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, known under the pseudonym Abu Jihad, the president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the long-time head of state of Gabon, Omar Bongo, and the president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and so on. The elite of the Albanian army is said to have been at the guerrillas' disposal.⁷⁸ In fact, all foreign communist activists who received political and military training used code names and false identity documents. The real names were never used, and both the guerrillas and the Albanian state were eager to hide them as a protective measure. The archives of the Ministry of Defense, which may contain relevant information on this matter, are still in poor condition and their holdings have yet to be declassified. As for Western European communist activists, it appears that both Albania and China were opposed to any assistance with military equipment or training.⁷⁹ Political work with such groups was comparatively easier than with those from the Third World, many of whom risked their lives, and also easier than with activists in communist countries who were clearly working illegally and would be imprisoned if discovered. China and Albania were able to establish links with many Western leftist groups, but these were generally of marginal size and importance even within the leftist environment in their respective countries. Sometimes different and competing groups were supported within the same country, which occasionally led to alienation from China and Albania.⁸⁰

In 1960, during a conversation, Khrushchev warned Liu Shaoqi, then the third most powerful man in China: "We lost Albania, but we did not lose much; you won it, but you did not win much, either. The Party of Labour has always been a weak link in the international communist movement".⁸¹ In the years that followed, however, China and Albania formed a close alliance in which, despite some internal contradictions, they publicly praised each other in the highest terms. Clearly, being the closest ally in Europe of one of the most powerful countries in the world represented a high point in the foreign policy of the Albanian state. Accordingly, the PLA leadership appeared very confident in public. A popular saying at the time, based on a formulation by an Albanian party leader, Hysni Kapo, was: "If someone were to ask us how many people do we have, our answer is 701 million."⁸² Presenting itself as China's ally was of great benefit to the PLA leadership. On the one hand, it enhanced

its standing in the eyes of anti-Soviet Marxist-Leninist individuals and groups, thus increasing the chances of establishing contacts with them. Being an interlocutor, in turn, also meant a higher status vis-à-vis the CPC. Moreover, this rhetoric was clearly of great legitimizing value domestically. Thus, the rhetoric should be taken seriously, since the staged reality and the actual reality were closely intertwined.⁸³

While Hoxha accused both the Western powers and the Soviet Union of imperialism, it is noticeable that he made a special effort to emphasize that the Soviets were no lesser evil than the Americans. He accused them of behaving like “new Nazis” and likened the Eastern Bloc to an empire. Furthermore, “under the camouflage of socialism”, the Soviets were trying to gain a foothold in the Third World.⁸⁴ After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albania’s rhetoric against “Soviet imperialism” increased, and the country withdrew from the Warsaw Pact, a move that received widespread international attention. In addition, Albanian leader Enver Hoxha declared that his country was ready to assist Yugoslavia and Romania in the event of a Soviet invasion.⁸⁵ Although such an offer was clearly not based on a realistic assessment of Albania’s military capabilities, the power of rhetoric should not be underestimated. Such behavior corresponded to and reinforced the image that Albania wanted to convey to its target audience: first, its own population, and second, leftist groups around the world, especially in the Third World. This was the image of a small and poor country with a long history of foreign rule, but heroic and fearless in its determination to fight for socialism, justice and freedom.

Albania was presented as a kind of natural and valuable ally of the peoples of the Third World.⁸⁶ For example, in a speech to the special session of the United Nations General Assembly in June 1967, the Albanian ambassador described a situation in the Mediterranean in which “American imperialists” and „Soviet revisionists” were fighting to „suppress us”, “the freedom-loving peoples of Albania and the Arab countries”, and to “put us in thrall”⁸⁷. Furthermore, he portrayed Albania as the voice of a worldwide anti-imperialist front of oppressed peoples who were about to fight heroically and eventually win:

“The imperialist powers that hear the delegate of a small but indomitable people speaking here openly, fearlessly, without kid gloves and not in carefully chosen diplomatic terms, declare that this is a hardline speech and that the Albanian delegate is preaching in the desert. (...) (G)entlemen,

I am not preaching in the desert. It is you who are isolated, not we. We are the majority here, we are the overwhelming majority in the world. We are those who smashed Italian and German fascism, we are the immortal heroes of Vietnam, Algeria, the Congo, Cuba, Latin America, China and Pakistan, the heroes of the Arab peoples, of the peoples of Asia and Africa, the heroes of the enslaved peoples of Europe and the whole world. Therefore we will triumph over you, you will never defeat us."⁸⁸

Hoxha also specifically drew comparisons between Albania's history and the situation in the Third World at the time, suggesting that because of this similar past, Albania could help with its experience. For example, he compared the crisis in the Middle East after the Six-Day War of 1967 to that in the Balkans before World War I, when "European imperialists had turned the Balkans into a field of intrigues" and then the "Balkan peoples, enslaved by and included in the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian Empires, launched their uprisings and wars both against the yoke of major occupiers and against the chauvinist-imperialist aims of local chauvinist cliques."⁸⁹

When interpreting Albanian propaganda, one must take into account the historical context and discourses of the 1960s. Stalin's communism was completely Eurocentric. But from the late 1950s, in the context of the acceleration of decolonization in Africa and the intensification of "anti-imperialist struggles" in South America and Southeast Asia, East European communists created a master narrative of a newly emerging global anti-imperialist space linking the Second and Third Worlds. According to this narrative, the contemporary anti-imperialist struggles in the Third World were of the same nature as those waged by Eastern Europeans against the Habsburg and Russian empires after the First World War. James Mark and Quinn Slobodian have argued that these analogies, "though sometimes tortured and riddled with their own blind spots, were nonetheless potent rhetorical idioms, enabling imagined solidarities and facilitating material connections in the era of the Cold War and nonalignment."⁹⁰

A special place in the Albanian propaganda against imperialism was occupied by the states in the region and especially their leaders, who were portrayed as servants of the American and Soviet imperialists. Obviously, this rhetoric was used, among other things, as a weapon in the competition for the sympathy of the Third World and China. The greatest attention was paid to Tito, Hoxha's arch-enemy throughout this period, who had in fact gained enormous worldwide popularity with his Non-Aligned Movement. Hoxha claimed that Tito, this "old agent of the

Anglo-Americans" had been commissioned by Washington to create a third force to subjugate the newly independent countries of the Third World politically, economically, and militarily.⁹¹ Whenever there was political turmoil, Hoxha would accuse American or Soviet imperialists, and often Tito, of being an "agent provocateur and organizer of putsches in favor of the Americans"⁹². Whenever Tito organized events within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement, Hoxha warned that this "Yugoslav agent of the Americans does not go into action without aims and objectives set by his patron."⁹³

Relations with Bucharest were more complicated. Romania was the only East European country to maintain diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level even after the Soviet-Albanian split, and at the 1966 PLA Congress, for example, the Romanian Communists were the only representatives of an Eastern Bloc Communist Party.⁹⁴ Romania also maintained good relations with Albania's ally, China. However, this made the two Southeastern European countries competitors. When, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albanian Defense Minister Beqir Balluku met with Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, who referred to Yugoslavia and Romania as "indirect allies," Hoxha and his men became furious. At a Politburo meeting devoted to this "incident"⁹⁵ the Albanian Minister of Defense worriedly reported about China's rapprochement with these two states. Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu described the Chinese actions as "anti-Marxist, hostile, and anti-Albanian"⁹⁶. Party leader Hoxha, in typical fashion, drew a broader connection, calling the Chinese positions "harmful to the international communist movement, to the revolution and to the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism."⁹⁷ Furthermore, raging against Zhou Enlai, concluding that he was a "total revisionist".⁹⁸ After the Sino-Albanian split, Hoxha and his men also stepped up their public attacks on the Romanian leadership. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was criticized as "a politician who turned with the political breeze, who followed the line of 'with this side and with that side', with Tito, with Khrushchev, and with Mao Zedong, indeed even with his successors and with American imperialism."⁹⁹ Ceausescu was portrayed as "one of the lesser minions of Dej [...] struggling to become 'a world figure' like Tito, to take his place, thanks to a certain hypothetical resistance to the insidious pressure of the Soviets",¹⁰⁰ but who in fact was "the offspring of revisionism, whom Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites have used and are still using for their own purposes."¹⁰¹ Finally, Hoxha also attacked Bulgarian leader Todor Živkov as an "element without

personality” who “came to the top with the aid of Khrushchev, and became his docile lackey”,¹⁰² allowing the “colonization of Bulgaria by the Khrushchevite Soviet Union”.¹⁰³

In the late 1960s, China began to shift from tension to expansion in international relations, abandoning its isolationist stance. A historic event took place in 1972. U.S. President Richard Nixon paid a seven-day official visit to China, ending an era of 25 years of no communication or diplomatic relations. Enver Hoxha wrote a letter directly to Mao, strongly opposing the Sino-American rapprochement and arguing, among other things, that such an action would also “gives strength to the revisionists to devalue all the struggle of China against the Soviet renegades.”¹⁰⁴ The Chinese leader never replied. The Sino-Albanian disagreements were not made public until 1977, and joint efforts to attract leftist actors around the world continued until at least the mid-1970s, but the golden age of the Sino-Albanian anti-Soviet front and its activities to build an international communist movement was over.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, in the 1960s, through its alliance with Mao’s China, Albania entered the stage of world politics for the first and only time in its history. In this context, Tirana made great efforts to win the sympathy of leftist individuals and groups around the world. Contrary to official PLA rhetoric, maintaining contacts with such marginal groups was hardly about contributing to world revolution. Rather, under the particular conditions of the Cold War in the 1960s, relations with leftist actors and highly aggressive anti-Soviet rhetoric constituted a kind of currency vis-à-vis a powerful state, Mao’s China. The latter honored the small country on the periphery of Europe with the status of the most important ally in Europe and public praise as a beacon of true Marxism.

Endnotes

- 1 Cf. Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 119–133.
- 2 Grothusen, *Außenpolitik*, 134–145. On Albania’s self-depiction as vanguard of the European and worldwide Marxist-Leninist movement still in the 1980s see especially Sulstarova, “Eurocommunism is Anti-Communism”.
- 3 See especially Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*; Zofka/ Vámos/ Urbansky (guest eds.), *Cold War History* 18/3 (2018), *Beyond the Kremlin’s Reach?*.
- 4 See for instance: Mark/ Apor, “Socialism Goes Global”.
- 5 While there are numerous studies especially on Yugoslavia’s, but also on Romania’s and Bulgaria’s above-mentioned activities, due to space limitations, only two publications of general overview will be mentioned here: Brunnbauer/ Buchenau, *Geschichte Südosteuropas*, 295–296, 323–324, 337–338; Calic, *Südosteuropa*, 521–526, 529, 540.
- 6 The state of research into communist Albania in general and into the country’s international activities during the Cold War in particular is discussed in: Mëhilli, “Documents as Weapons”; Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 3–4; Idrizi, *Herrschaft und Alltag im albanischen Spätsozialismus (1976–1985)*, 31–40.
- 7 Mëhilli, *From Stalin to Mao*, 190–191, 206, 217–219, 224–225.
- 8 Mëhilli, “Documents as Weapons”, 92–95.
- 9 Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 119–133.
- 10 Pedrazzi, *L’Italia che sognava Enver*.
- 11 Teli (Dibra), “Diplomaci në kushtet e Luftës së Ftohtë”.
- 12 Lalaj/ Ostermann/ Gage, “‘Albania Is Not Cuba’: Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split”.
- 13 See Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*; Li/Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split*.
- 14 Concerning characteristics, methodological problems and ways of approaching State socialist archive documents see especially: Creuzberger/ Lindner (eds.), *Russische Archive und Geschichtswissenschaft*.
- 15 Verdery, *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?*, 4.
- 16 Dragostinova/ Fidelis, “Beyond the Iron Curtain”, 578.
- 17 Mëhilli, *From Stalin to Mao*, 9.
- 18 Crump, “The Balkan Challenge to the Warsaw Pact, 1960–1964”; Crump/ Erlandsson, *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe*.
- 19 See for instance Dragostinova/ Fidelis, “Beyond the Iron Curtain”; Pieper-Mooney/ Lanza(eds.), *De-Centering Cold War History*.
- 20 See among other publications: Mark/ Apor, “Socialism Goes Global”. See also the website of the research project „Socialism Goes Global“: <http://socialismgoesglobal.exeter.ac.uk/> (13.2.2020).
- 21 See for instance: Vowinckel/ Payk/ Lindenberger (eds.), *Cold War Cultures*.

- 22 See the discussion of transnational and entangled history perspectives on the history of communism, which is also useful for Cold War studies: *East Central Europe* 40/1–2 (2013), thematic issue: Studying Communist Dictatorships: From Comparative to Transnational History; *Divinatio* 44 (2017), thematic issue: Comparative History of Communism in Eastern Europe: Methods and Objects. An example of an excellent study employing a transnational approach to research the Cold War culture of a Southeast European State is Theodora Dragostinova’s project “The Cold War from the Margins: Bulgarian Culture and the Global 1970s”. Among her publications see for instance: Dragostinova, “The ‘Natural Ally’ of the ‘Developing World’”.
 23 Grothusen, “Außenpolitik”, 98–100. Cf., Mëhilli, “States of Insecurity”.
 24 Grothusen, “Außenpolitik”, 102–103.
 25 Ibid., 105.
 26 Ibid.
 27 Ibid., 107. On Albanian-Yugoslav relations see, furthermore, especially Danylow, *Die außenpolitischen Beziehungen Albaniens zu Jugoslawien und zur UdSSR 1944–1961*.
 28 See Mëhilli, *From Stalin to Mao*.
 29 Ibid., ft.17, 256.
 30 Teli (Dibra), “Diplomaci në kushtet e Luftës së Ftohtë”, 231.
 31 Ibid., 232.
 32 Ibid.
 33 Ibid., 233.
 34 Mëhilli, “Defying De-Stalinization: Albania’s 1956”.
 35 Mëhilli, *From Stalin to Mao*, 61, 95, 192-193; Grothusen, “Außenpolitik”, 120.
 36 Cited in: Mëhilli, *From Stalin to Mao*, 192.
 37 Ibid.
 38 On the Soviet-Albanian split see Danylow, *Die außenpolitischen Beziehungen Albaniens zu Jugoslawien und zur UdSSR 1944–1961*; Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet rift*. On Hoxha’s scandal in Moscow see, furthermore, especially Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 84–92.
 39 Cited in: Mëhilli, *From Stalin to Mao*, 200.
 40 See especially Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 133–157.
 41 See especially Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*; Li/Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split*.
 42 See especially subchapter “Mitigating China’s isolation. Surrogate diplomacy” in Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 216–228.
 43 Cf. Mark/ Apor, “Socialism Goes Global”.

- 44 Records of the meetings between the PLA delegation headed by Hysni Kapo and the CPC delegation headed by Deng Xiaoping in Beijing, 9-26 June 1962, in Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror i Republikës së Shqipërisë [Central State Archives of the Republic of Albania] (henceforth: AQSH), Fondi 14 [Fund 14] (henceforth: F.14) / Arkivi i Partisë [Archive of the Party] (henceforth: AP), Marrëdhëniet me Partinë Komuniste Kineze [Relations with the Communist Party of China] (henceforth: MPKK), Viti [Year] (henceforth V.) 1962, Dosja [Dossier] (henceforth D.) 6. All translations of quotations from archival sources and the titles of archival files are by the author.
- 45 Records of the first official meeting between the delegations of the PLA and the CPC, Beijing, 11 June 1962, in *ibid.*, 7–23: 14.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 16. Cf. also: *ibid.*, 22–23.
- 47 Records of the second official meeting between the delegations of the PLA and the CPC, Beijing, 12 June 1962, in *ibid.*, 24–55: 53.
- 48 *Ibid.*, 42.
- 49 *Ibid.*
- 50 Records of the third official meeting between the delegations of the PLA and the CPC, Beijing, 13 June 1962, in *ibid.*, 56–75: 60.
- 51 *Ibid.*, 56.
- 52 Notes from the meeting of PLA CC secretaries Hysni Kapo and Ramiz Alia with the Chinese Ambassador to Albania Lo Shigao, Tirana, 6 July 1963, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V.1963, D.4, 1–48.
- 53 *Ibid.*, 12–21.
- 54 *Ibid.*, 6.
- 55 *Ibid.*, 10.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 9.
- 57 Notes from the meeting of PLA CC secretary Ramiz Alia with the Chinese Ambassador to Albania Lo Shigao, Tirana, 20 July 1963, in *ibid.*, 49–50.
- 58 Cf. Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 122–123.
- 59 Report of the meeting between the head of the Directorate of Foreign Relations at PLA CC Pirro Bitia and the vice head of the Directorate of Foreign Relations at CPC CC, Beijing, 11 September 1963, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V.1963, D.9.
- 60 Report of the meeting between the head of the Directorate of Foreign Relations at PLA CC Pirro Bitia and a representative of the Directorate of Foreign Relations at CPC CC, Beijing, 17 September 1963, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V.1963, D.10, 5–14.
- 61 The welcoming speech by Albanian Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu in Rinas airport (Tirana) on the occasion of the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, 31 December 1963, in AQSH, F.14, AP-MPKK, V.1963, D.31; Records of the talks between the Head of the Council of State of China Zhou Enlai

- and the PLA leadership, Tirana, 2–8 January 1964, in AQSH, F.14, APMPKK, V.1964, D.25–25/1.
- 62 Minutes of conversation between Zhou Enlai, Head of the Council of State of the PRC, vice Chairman of the CC of the CPC, and PLA leaders, first session, Tirana, 2 January 1964, in *ibid.*, 2–24: 5.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 12–13.
- 64 *Ibid.*, 13.
- 65 *Ibid.*, 19–20.
- 66 Cf. Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 117.
- 67 Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Head of the Council of State of the PRC, vice Chairman of the CC of the CPC, and PLA leaders, third session, 3 January 1964, in *ibid.*, 41–63: 44.
- 68 *Ibid.*, 55.
- 69 *Ibid.*, 59–60.
- 70 *Ibid.*, 45, 47.
- 71 Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Head of the Council of State of the PRC, vice Chairman of the CC of the CPC, and PLA leaders, fourth session, 3 January 1964, in *ibid.*, 64–79: 64–68.
- 72 Cf. for instance minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Head of the Council of State of the PRC, vice Chairman of the CC of the CPC, and PLA leaders, fifth session, 5 January 1964, in *ibid.*, 80–98: 82–84.
- 73 *Ibid.*, 85–90.
- 74 Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 124–125.
- 75 Cf. Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 125–126.
- 76 Suggestions on providing financial assistance to some Marxist-Leninist groups, in AQSH, F.14/AP, Organet Udhëheqëse [The Leading Organs] (henceforth: OU), Sekretariati [Secretariat], V.1964, D.26, 31–35: 31.
- 77 AQSH, F.14/AP, OU, Sekretariati, V.1967, D.20, Decision number 22 on 10.2.1967, Giving assistance to the Liberation Movement of Kongo, 11.
- 78 Molla, *Guerilas Made in Albania*.
- 79 Cf. Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 132.
- 80 *Ibid.*, 130–132.
- 81 Hoxha, *The Khrushchevites*, 434.
- 82 Cited in: Biberaj, *Albania and China*, 72.
- 83 Cf. Feinberg, *Curtain of Lies*.
- 84 For example, in an article commenting the political situation in the Middle East, Hoxha wrote that “the problem is to fight American, British, and French imperialism and their tools, one of which is the state of Israel; to fight Soviet revisionist imperialism which, under the camouflage of socialism, is seeking its place in the sun of the Middle East and the African continent.” (Hoxha, *Reflections on the Middle East, 1958–1983*, 94–95.)

- 85 Grothusen, "Außenpolitik", 132.
- 86 Cf. the same image propagated by Bulgaria later: Dragostinova, "The "Natural Ally" of the "Developing World".
- 87 Hoxha, *Reflections on the Middle East, 1958–1983*, 70.
- 88 *Ibid.*, 72–73.
- 89 *Ibid.*, 93. Regarding Hoxha's position towards the Middle East crisis, see: Bishku, "Albania and the Middle East".
- 90 Mark/Slobodian, "Eastern Europe in the Global History of Decolonization", 351.
- 91 Hoxha, *Reflections on the Middle East, 1958–1983*, 53.
- 92 *Ibid.*, 54.
- 93 *Ibid.*, 98.
- 94 Grothusen (ed.), *Albanien*, 130–131.
- 95 Records of the Politburo meeting on 26 October 1966, discussion point 4 "On a new incident with the Head of the Council of State of China, Zhou Enlai, during the visit of the Albania's party and state delegation headed by the Minister of Defense Beqir Balluku, that visited China during September-October 1968", in AQSH, F.14/AP, OU, V.1968, D.13, 225–243.
- 96 *Ibid.*, 232.
- 97 *Ibid.*
- 98 *Ibid.*, 234.
- 99 Hoxha, *The Khrushchevites*, 215.
- 100 *Ibid.*, 217.
- 101 *Ibid.*
- 102 Hoxha, *The Khrushchevites*, 212.
- 103 *Ibid.*, 210–211.
- 104 Letter of the PLA CC, (signed by Enver Hoxha), addressed to the CPC, to Mao Zedong, 6 August 1971, regarding the coming visit of the American President Nixon to China, quoted in: Marku, *Sino-Albanian Relations During the Cold War, 1949–1978*, 243.

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