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RECONTEXTUALIZING *PHILIA*: TWO VERBAL ECHOES OF CRITO'S ARGUMENT IN THE SPEECH OF THE LAWS IN PLATO'S *CRITO*

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the recontextualization in the 'speech of the personified Laws' of two phrases in the argument of Socrates' interlocutor Crito. We will see that through this recontextualization, these two phrases are (1) invested with a new meaning, and (2) through acquiring this new meaning, disarm the original force of Crito's words. Since both of these phrases are part and parcel of the ancient Greek ideology of *philia*, the relation to one's kin and the obligations and loyalties this entails, this paper will first highlight how Crito's argument is indebted to *philia*-ideology, and proceed to show that, whilst upholding the overall importance of *philia* as loyalty *per se*, the same phrases become part of a different *philia*-relation in the Laws' speech: not between biological parent and son, but between the laws as parents and citizens as offspring.

Keywords: ancient Greek philosophy, Plato, Plato's *Crito*, 'minor Socratics', historiography of philosophy, Greek popular morality, *philia*-ideology, rhetoric, legal obligation

1. Introduction

In his biography of Socrates, the 3rd century AD intellectual historian Diogenes Laertius relates the report of another source, Demetrius of Byzantium, to the effect that it was Crito who took Socrates out of the workshop (Socrates' father was a sculptor) and 'educated' him (παιδεῦσαι, *paideusai*), being attracted by the grace of his soul.[1] Diogenes Laertius wrote biographies of the most reputable philosophers of antiquity; although it should be kept in mind that he wrote some six centuries after Socrates and Plato lived. Crito, who was of roughly the same age as Socrates, is

one of the closest companions; he is present at Socrates' deathbed in the *Phaedo* and Socrates refers to him in Plato's *Apology* as one of the friends who have promised to stand surety and cover the penalty of thirty *minae* that Socrates proposes.

The Platonic dialogue named after Crito, the *Crito*, is part of a Platonic tetralogy set against the backdrop of the historical events of the accusation, conviction, and death of Socrates. In the order of absolute chronology, these texts are: *Euthyphro*, *Apology of Socrates*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*. Each of these four texts links the philosophical topic under discussion with the fate that befell Socrates and led to a premature death – the just individual in an unjust society, Athens. In the *Euthyphro*, the topic discussed is the nature of the virtue of piety (ὁσιότης, *hosiotēs*), and the conversation takes place in the portico (or *stoa*) – that is, not inside but in front of the entrance – of the building of the *archōn basileus*, the 'king magistrate' who presided over the preliminary hearings of possible trials. The dialogue ends with Socrates having to cut the conversation short because he has to go inside for hearing the formal charge of impiety which has been brought against him: this is a good example of how the setting of a Platonic dialogue is often "rich in significance" for the topic discussed.[2] Plato's *Apology of Socrates* purports to be Socrates' defence speech before the court of Athenian (lay) judges, in which he defends himself, in typically Socratic manner, against the charges of impiety (introducing new gods into the city) and against corruption of the youth. In the *Crito*, the convicted Socrates who awaits his death in his prison cell is confronted with the opportunity to save himself, but sees himself compelled to abide by the verdict and undergo his death sentence. Finally, in the *Phaedo*, Socrates and his followers discuss Socrates' topic of the immortality of the soul against the background of Socrates impending death by the drinking of hemlock. All of these texts in one way or another demonstrate the futility of practical, human concerns in the light of the pursuit of philosophy.

2. The Socratic Authors, Crito, and Plato's *Crito*

The provocative and unconventional intellectual attitude of the 5th century B.C. Greek philosopher Socrates inspired an entire new genre among those who were part of his circle. The 'Socratic discourse' (Σωκρατικὸς λόγος, *Sōkratikos logos*), referred to by Aristotle in his *Poetics* as if it was well-known and established, is now commonly referred to as 'Socratic literature'

or the 'Socratic dialogue'. Besides Plato, writers such as Antisthenes, Phaedo, Xenophon, Aeschines, Eucleides began to write philosophical dialogues in the aftermath of Socrates' trial and execution, modelled on Socrates' habitual conversation practice. In these dialogues, Socrates engages with one and sometimes two interlocutors in a conversation about a particular moral question, such as the definition of virtue or of a specific virtue (such as courage, moderation, or justice). These authors are now commonly known as the 'minor Socratics'; that they are called 'minor' is the corollary of the fact that their works are preserved in a very fragmentary form: in contrast to Plato, whose entire oeuvre was (by way of exception for an ancient author) preserved, of the works of the other Socratic authors the remains are rather scanty.[3]

Crito, who was about the same age as Socrates and one of his closest friends, also wrote dialogues. Such, at least, we are told in the short biography of Crito written by Diogenes Laertius.[4] In the brief chapter about Crito, we furthermore read that Crito was a citizen of Athens, from the same deme as Socrates; that he had a great affection for Socrates; and that he displayed so much care for him that nothing of his needs were left unmet (he was a wealthy man, who wished his wealth to help Socrates, as we hear in the *Apology*, 38b).[5] Moreover, Diogenes reports that Crito's own sons (Critobulus, Hermogenes, Epigenes and Ctesippus) were themselves pupils of Socrates. What is most interesting is that Crito himself is also reported to have written dialogues (διάλογους γέγραφεν, *dialogous gegraphen*),[6] as many of Socrates' pupils, including Plato, did: seventeen in sum, dealing with topics that were part of the standard repertoire in the Socratic circle as well as in Athenian intellectual circles more broadly: for example, 'That those who are good are not so from learning' (ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μαθεῖν οἱ ἀγαθοί), 'About amassing things' (περὶ τοῦ πλέον ἔχειν), 'About the good / beautiful' (Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ), 'About doing ill' (Περὶ τοῦ κακουργεῖν) and, interestingly in view of the plot of the *Crito*, a dialogue entitled 'About the law' (Περὶ τοῦ νόμου).[7] Since none of these dialogues survives, we can unfortunately only speculate as to their erstwhile contents.

In Plato's eponymous dialogue, Crito visits Socrates in his prison cell only days before his death, in a final and desperate attempt to persuade Socrates to accept the offer of his friends to escape from prison (and Athens) and thereby save himself. Socrates' wealthy friends are willing and ready to bribe the prison guards to let Socrates out, as, at an earlier stage of the trial, his wealthy friends were ready to pay a fine of thirty *minae* if that would have been Socrates' punishment.[8] It is obvious from Crito's plea

that any Greek in Socrates' situation would have jumped at this chance: Crito insists that no one who hears about Socrates' death will understand why Socrates would have refused such an opportunity if he were offered one, and that, therefore, the common assumption will be that his friends have not taken any effort to save Socrates – and have thus failed to act as loyal friends (*philoi*) ought to have acted. They would incur the reputation of being the sort of people who value money over friends, *Crito* 44b6-c5:

> ὡς ἐμοί, ἐὰν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία συμφορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου οἷον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μή ποτε εὑρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὡς οἷός τ› ὢν σε σῴζειν εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελῆσαι. καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.
>
> "… since, if you die, for myself it isn't just a single disaster but, apart from being deprived of such a companion, the like of whom I shall never find again, in addition many people who don't know me and you well will think that, as I would be in a position to save you if I were willing to spend my money, I have deserted you. And what more shameful reputation could there be than appearing to value money more than one's friends? For the majority of people won't believe that you yourself were unwilling to get out of here despite our insistence." (Transl. C. Emlyn-Jones, slightly modified)

In order to make this point even clearer, Crito proceeds by affirming that money is really not more important to him and their friends than Socrates' life, as they would be prepared to run the risk of losing huge sums of money, or even their entire livelihood. If Socrates is deterred from escaping by worries about the trouble so-called informers (*sukophantai*) might cause for his friends, by starting a legal case against them for smuggling Socrates out,[9] which, if they would lose such a trial, might result in losing all their property or at least a large sum of money, he should forfeit all such worries. It is just for them to run this risk, and even a greater risk, if such actions can save Socrates.[10]

Besides the values of *philia* ('friendship'[11]) and considerations that centre around the obligations one has to friends (*philoi*), there is a second major strand or argument in Crito's plea: justice. Knowing Socrates' lifelong attachment to justice, Crito argues that it is not just to betray himself by forfeiting the possibility to save himself. He is thereby not advancing his own interests, but the cause of his adversaries who wish to get rid of

him. Moreover, Socrates is not only betraying himself, but also his sons; for while he is offered the chance to save his life and contribute to his children's upbringing and education, he surrenders them to whatever chance may befall them, *Crito* 45c8-d6:

> πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς ὑεῖς τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχήσῃ καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο πράξουσιν· τεύξονται δέ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιούτων οἷάπερ εἴωθεν γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας ἢ συνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα, σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥᾳθυμότατα αἱρεῖσθαι.
>
> In addition to this I think you're letting down your sons whom you're deserting, and when you could bring them up and educate them you're leaving them in the lurch, and as far as you're concerned their fortune will be whatever comes their way. It's likely that they'll experience the sorts of things that usually happen to orphans when they lose their parents. Why, either one shouldn't have children, or one should get involved in the troublesome task of rearing and educating them as long as it takes; but you seem to me to be choosing the easiest way out. (Transl. C. Emlyn-Jones)

Crito goes on to insist that Socrates, who has all his life professed to care about nothing but virtue (*aretē*), might now be deemed a coward by those who hear of this inexplicable turn of affairs; if not because of his friends' greed, people might still assume that Socrates' failure to escape is to be blamed on cowardice. Crito warns Socrates that he should be careful that this failure to escape will not reflect negatively on them all, and have some harmful consequences.[12]

Crito's argumentation reflects Greek cultural preoccupations revolving around a nexus of concerns grounded in responsibility, loyalty, and reputation, that in the scholarship has become known as Greek 'popular morality' (that is, popular, in the sense of conventional, used in contrast to our philosophical sources). This notion of popular morality was first discussed in Dover's seminal book (1974) *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle*: it is the morality that we find in Greek tragedy, in Greek comedy, in ancient biographies, as an initial point of departure in Aristotle's ethical treatises, and as an *in*sufficient understanding of justice in Plato. Greek popular morality is usually summed up with the adage that moral excellence (*aretē*) consists in 'helping one's friends, harming one's enemies'. This ideology requires that one assists one's friends and

defends one's own and their interests whenever that is possible or called for; conversely, one has the obligation to hinder one's adversaries, or those who promote a different course than oneself or one's friends, from achieving their purposes.[13]

The arguments Crito is made to bring forward have often been considered selfish, betraying that Crito is only concerned with his own reputation. Moreover, some interpreters have held that they are in any case not very philosophical, and that Crito's worries about what others will *think* (in *Crito* 44b9-c5 44d1-5, 45d9-46a4) show that Crito has after all not learned much from his decade-long friendship with Socrates. His fear of losing face in the eyes of others is taken to demonstrate that he has failed to take to heart one of the most fundamental tenets of Socratic philosophy, namely that the opinion of the mass (and whether one is thought to be shameful in the yes of others) is completely irrelevant. The only thing that matters are the demands and exigencies of philosophy: from the perspective of 'the largest concerns' (τὰ μέγιστα, *ta megista*) of philosophy, what others may think are mere trivia.

Other interpreters, however, have justly pointed out that this is an unfair portrait of Crito. In addition, it might be remarked that the image of Crito as unphilosophical may be somewhat biased in favour of Plato, if we take into account the fact, mentioned above, that sheer fact that Crito himself was highly engaged in philosophy and wrote (at least) seventeen dialogues himself.[14] And as far as Crito's arguments are concerned, which revolve around *philia* and popular morality that may be summed up in the axiom 'help one's friend, harm one's enemies', we may refer to another Socratic author, Xenophon. Xenophon has often been dismissed as a dry and unphilosophical author; but it is striking that the utterances of Xenophon's Socrates (in Xenophon's *Apology* and in his *Memorabilia*, 'memoirs' of Socrates) are much closer to Greek popular morality briefly sketched above than those of Plato's Socrates. Instead of dismissing Crito's argumentation as unphilosophical because it is not in line with what we hear *Plato*'s Socrates state, it seems preferable to assume either of two things: either Plato was the only one of Socrates' circle (as far as we have the means to ascertain, at least) who *truly* understood what Socrates meant and who truly realised the extent to which this was at odds with contemporary Greek norms and values; or the portrait of Socrates offered in Xenophon (and Crito (?)) came closer to the historical Socrates than Plato's, and Plato has used the controversial reputation of Socrates and to advance some views that, rather than a representation of the views of the

historical Socrates, were supposed to advance a particular philosophical agenda – after all, the only work by a contemporary of Socrates with the express purpose of being biographical is Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. Plato's works are (with the exception of the *Apology* of Socrates) all set up as dialogues and written in the 4th century, that is, after Socrates' death; their historicity and the extent to which they present a more or less faithful portrait of some conversations Plato happened to witness is highly debatable, and powerfully called into question by, first and foremost, a number of blatant anachronisms.[15] The issue of the extent to which it is possible to reconstruct the person and the convictions of the historical Socrates on the basis of the sources that mostly post-date him, and which of the Socratic authors might be the most authoritative source for his life and thought, is known in classical scholarship as the 'Socratic problem'.[16] Charles Kahn has called attention to the "optical illusion" of the Platonic dialogues: Plato's accomplishment as a writer of philosophical dialogues is so immense, that it is all too easy to be misled and to take him for an historian.[17] In the history of philosophy, this optical illusion has led to presenting Socrates' philosophy on the authority of Plato rather than of other Socratic authors, such as Xenophon. The predominant assumption is that Socrates is more or less faithfully preserved in Plato's portrayal of him.

In this paper, I shall not be concerned with the historicity of the discussions portrayed in the Platonic corpus, or with the historicity of the event and conversation portrayed in Plato's *Crito*, nor with the 'Socratic problem'.[18] The Socrates we see portrayed in Plato's *Crito* is, for the purposes of this paper, taken to be *Plato*'s Socrates. What I shall be concerned with here is the rhetoric deployed by Crito and Socrates, and specifically with the question of how the argument of Socrates, who personifies the Athenian laws, engages with the arguments that Crito brings forward in favour of escape.

3. Two Verbal Echoes of Crito's Argument

After Crito's speech, which was briefly discussed above, Socrates does what he is usually portrayed as doing: by way of a question and answer method, commonly referred to as the 'Socratic method', Socrates confronts Crito with a number of questions which, as any reader familiar with the Platonic dialogues will know and expect, ultimately should lead Crito to affirm a proposition that is inconsistent with what he has claimed in his

own speech, thus being forced to admit that one of these two positions must be false – since the basic assumption underlying the Socratic method is that the truth is *consistent*.

Socrates (in his own person) challenges two aspects of Crito's plea: first, he criticizes the fact that Crito is so worried about what other people will think about him if Socrates does not accept their offer to escape: Crito had been worried that he might incur the reputation of being a worthless friend. Yet Socrates asserts that the opinion of those who do not know anything about what happened should not count what counts is only that which is just. The way in which he sets out to 'prove' this claim is by reference to a mode of argumentation that is typical for the Socrates as we see him portrayed in the Platonic dialogues: he resorts to the example of the expert, the one who possesses the *tekhnē* ('skill' or 'craft') in a certain field of specialization.[19] In this case, the specialization he refers to is that of physical training: to whose opinion does the professional athlete pay heed? To the recommendation, proscription, and opinion of every lay man, or to those of a single person only, namely the one who is a trainer and doctor?[20] To this, of course, Crito can only reply that the athlete will listen to the opinions of that one man only. From this it follows easily that the athlete ought to fear the criticism and welcome the praise of this one professional, and not that of the multitude. Contrariwise, if the athlete would pay heed to the multitude, and would pay regard to the words of the many who have no special knowledge, he would surely come to harm? Crito, again can only reply in the affirmative.[21]

Socrates then asks Crito what the nature is of the harm that befalls the athlete who listens to the opinions of the uninformed mass rather than to the opinion of the specialist trainer. Clearly, this is bodily harm: the mass may recommend all sorts of things that are unhealthy, and that may harm the body. Arrived at this point, Socrates makes a crucial argumentative step, which – again – is a procedure typical of the Platonic Socrates: he *assumes*, that is, without arguing for this point, that there exists an analogy between the body and the soul, and between the condition of the body, and the condition of the soul. As the body can be healthy or ill, a soul can be 'healthy' (that is, just, virtuous), or ill (unjust, with the stain of unjust acts committed). Therefore, when it is about moral matters, matters of right and wrong, and disgrace and nobility and good and bad (περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, *peri tōn dikaiōn kai adikōn kai aiskhrōn kai kalōn kai agathōn kai kakōn*, *Crito* 47c9-10), the

same holds true: only the view of the one person who is knowledgeable about such matters should be considered, not that of the multitude.[22]

By way of necessary brief clarification of the above, it may be noted that the notion of 'soul' is a moral notion: one's soul is a kind of 'balance sheet' of the quality (just or unjust) of the actions performed during one's life. That unjust actions harm the soul is one of the central tenets of the Platonic Socrates – hence it is that he can insist, as he does in Plato's *Gorgias*, that it is *in one's own interest* to undergo the just punishment for an action of injustice: only then can one's soul be purified from the stain of injustice. What is more, Socrates considers it to be the sign of a true friend if that friend does not help you to escape a criminal sentence, but ensures that you receive your just punishment. In his view, the friend who makes sure that his friend undergoes his deserved punishment shows a true concern for the quality of his friend's soul. Of course, this stands in a notable contrast to Crito's insistence in the *Crito* that it would be just to escape, and with his assumption that it is the sign of a good friend to keep one's friend from having to suffer any harm, humiliation or punishment.

The second line of argument that Socrates follows is equally based on the importance of not committing any act of injustice. This significantly includes committing an act of injustice *in return for* an injustice suffered. The return of harm for the suffering of injustice according to popular morality could be construed, and would be readily perceived as, an act of justice. By contrast, in Socrates' view, *any* act of harm is an act of injustice, including committing harm as a requital for an injustice suffered. This is important, because this is an essential component of why Socrates can maintain that it would be wrong to disobey the law in spite of the fact that the verdict that condemned him to death was unjust. In his view, no injustice suffered justifies committing an injustice oneself. Significantly, his view of not committing any wrongdoing includes observing just agreements: to break a just agreement is an example of wrongdoing (which is here being treated as standing on a par with injustice).

At the end of this short dialogue between Socrates and Crito, Socrates asks Crito whether, by escaping from prison and running away from Athens without its consent, he would not be committing harm, to those whom they should harm least of all, and whether he would abide by his just agreements (*Crito* 49e9-503):

> ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὓς ἥκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὔ; καὶ ἐμμένομεν οἷς ὡμολογήσαμεν δικαίοις οὖσιν ἢ οὔ;

> So. "Then consider what follows [from that]: if we leave this place without first persuading the state, are we harming certain people and those whom we should do least harm to, or not? And do we stand by what we agreed to be just, or not?" (Transl. C. Emlyn-Jones)

Unsurprisingly, Crito is not able to answer ("I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand", *Crito* 50a5-6). Naturally, since Crito has agreed that one should never commit harm and that one should keep one's just agreements, the answer that Socrates question requires would be affirmative – and therefore be the opposite of what Crito had argued for himself. Socrates has here, as so often, forced his interlocutor to assert to something that is the opposite of, or at least inconsistent with, the thesis which the interlocutor originally defended (in this case: that it was just for Socrates to escape). Since Crito's answers to Socrates' previous questions logically commit him to answering 'yes' (and therefore to agree with Socrates' point of view) to the present question, but since, at the same time, agreeing with Socrates here would be inconsistent with his own original position, the discussion here reaches a stalemate. It is at this point, when there is no way forward, that Socrates introduces a rhetorical device: that of impersonating the laws of Athens in order to represent their point of view (which, of course, coincides with his own position that it would be unjust to escape from prison). In the *persona* of the Athenian laws, Socrates gives a speech, that supposedly demonstrates why escaping from prison, and thus disobeying the law, would be unjust.

This 'speech of the Laws' has received a lot of discussion in the scholarship, especially in the period between the 1960s and 1990s. Apart from the fact that this speech of the Athenian laws contains a number of argumentative obscurities and seemingly debatable claims, which have raised questions about the philosophical seriousness of the speech, what appears to be the main claim of this speech, that the law of the state should *always* be obeyed, puts this speech in blatant contradiction with Socrates' other great speech, namely the speech in Plato's *Apology of Socrates*. For in his defence speech in front of the Athenian judges, Socrates claims that he would disobey an order from the court if it were to hinder him in what he there calls his 'divine mission': pursuing philosophy. This means that, if an order from the law or the court (both part of the state) would have imposed on him to stop philosophizing, he would have disobeyed the state. A number of ways to resolve this consistency has been proposed; most recently, a tendency to conceive of this speech as purely rhetorical

has emerged. According to such a reading, the speech cannot be credibly attributed to Socrates, but merely serves to *convince Crito*. Although the assumptions underlying a purely rhetorical interpretation of the speech of the Laws appear to be open to question, here I shall not be concerned with discussing these. Rather, my purpose for the remainder of this paper will be to chart and analyse a set of notable correspondences between Crito's arguments and the speech of the Laws. For, on closer inspection, it becomes clear that, in a number of cases, the Athenian laws / Socrates engage with Crito's arguments in a very direct way: they are made to use the exact same wording as Crito had done in his own speech. In the rhetorical context of the Laws' speech, however, these phrases acquire a distinctly new meaning. The Laws two times pick out a significant phrase from a part of Crito's speech and embed it in their own logic, by that very act investing it with increased significance and turning its original meaning upside down. In the remainder of this paper, I shall look closely at two key phrases that the Laws take from Crito's speech, and analyse the effect of these verbal echoes of Crito's speech by the Athenian laws. It will turn out that these phrases are of central importance for the argument of the speech of the Laws.

3.1. "Generation, nurture, education": The laws as parents

Let us start by looking at the first phrase. In his own speech,[23] Crito had accused Socrates of betraying his sons, who would run a severe risk of becoming orphans (also in the legal sense) without their father alive, if Socrates just 'took off' (to the life after death, that is) and would leave them behind without any male protector.[24] The poignant fact about Socrates' envisaged refusal to escape from prison and to save himself is that Socrates is thereby betraying his sons *while it would have been possible for him to oversee the full process of rearing and of educating them* (καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι, *kai ekthrepsai kai ekpaideusai*). One could not beget children at all; but if one does, Crito argues, one should 'stick it out with them' (συνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν, *sundiatalaipōrein*) during everything that raising and educating them involves. In other words, Socrates, according to Crito, is hardly *forced* to give up his role as a father, and therefore in an important respect forsakes his main objective social role.

This argument, and Crito's particular choice of words, gains special significance by the very fact that the impersonated Laws / Socrates use the

exact same words in their own argument – but to argue for the opposite case. Let us therefore look closer at this part of the speech of the Laws.

Giving their view of the relation between them (or the state) and Socrates as its citizen, the Laws claim that Socrates has been begotten, nurtured and educated under the authority, and thanks to, the laws of Athens. The Laws claim that it was because of the laws that Socrates was born, raised, and educated. In an imaginary dialogue between Socrates and the Laws (performed by Socrates, of course), the Laws of Athens claim that it was the marriage laws that allowed his parents to marry and have children, thus making it possible that Socrates could be born at all, and then, that it was because of the laws about the rearing and education of children that Socrates could be educated, *Crito* 50c9-e1:

> τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μέν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἔλαβε τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφῃ τι ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν;" "Οὐ μέμφομαι," φαίην ἄν. "Ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἐν ᾗ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἢ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν;" "Καλῶς," φαίην ἄν.
>
> "Come on then, what blame do you attach to us and the city, that you are attempting to destroy us? Wasn't it we who gave you birth in the first place, and your father married your mother through us and gave you life? So tell us: would you have some complaint against those of us here who are the laws of marriage because they're faulty?" "I have no complaint", I would say. "Well what about those related to the nurture and education of the child by which you too were brought up? Or did those of us Laws who are responsible for this not carry out our instructions properly when we exhorted your father to train you in the arts and physical exercise?" "You did it well", I'd say. (Transl. C. Emlyn-Jones)

As this passage shows, the argument of the laws hinges on the triplet of (1) generation (begetting: the Laws / being born: Socrates), (2) nurture (raising: the Laws / being raised: Socrates), and (3) education (educating: the Laws) / being educated: Socrates). The Laws claim that *they* are the ones who have begotten, raised and educated Socrates, and therefore, Socrates *owes* his existence, nurture and education to the Laws of Athens. In fact, the argument of the Laws especially seems to make much of the fact that by creating the possibility for all of these, they themselves are the ones who *accomplished* them.

The verbal correspondences between Crito's argument and the argument of the Laws (Socrates) are clear: to the nurturing (the verb *trephein*, the noun *trophē*) and education (the verb *paideuein*, the noun *paideia*) of citizens, the Laws themselves add the 'generating' of Socrates (*gennān*) and the 'being born' (*gignesthai*). The Laws now turn Crito's logic around. Whereas Crito had insisted that a father has the obligation to oversee the entire nurture and education of his sons until they are adults, the Laws now insisted that, since they have already begotten, nurtured and educated Socrates, and that they are now technically his parents and even more than his parents, because they made all of this possible in the first place. Therefore, the bonds of loyalty and obligation between parents and children that on the one hand oblige a parent to take care of his child also hold the other way: a child is also obliged to respect and take care of his parent – in fact, the indebtedness of children to parents because all of the sacrifices that parents have made for them, and the obligations this puts children under to respect and be grateful to parents is a very powerful and recurrent motive in Greek literature. It is important to note here that the bonds between parents and children were, like the bonds between friends, part of a network of *philia*-relations, which, as was already observed above, includes not only friends but also kin, especially parents (this is why 'friends' as a translation for the Greek term *philoi* only works in certain contexts, not in all). Indeed, parents could be seen as the best *philoi* one has, because, without knowing you and without knowing whether they would ever be repaid for all the benefits they gave you and all the toil it took to raise you, they have given you everything that you have. The Laws even go so far as to assert that, since Socrates came into existence, was nurtured and educated by the laws, he is not only their offspring, but their slave.[25]

The Laws therefore draw on the same cultural paradigm as did Crito, that of the bonds between parents and children. While the relationship between parents and children imposes obligations on either side, the Laws suggest that, since Socrates has enjoyed his entire upbringing and education under (and by the hands of) the Laws, whereas Socrates has not yet invested that much in his own sons, who have not reached the end of that process yet, they now have a stronger claim on him than his own sons, who have not been raised and educated completely yet. Moreover, incidentally (or perhaps less incidentally), from the argument of the Laws it also follows that the role of the biological parents is relatively limited, because in fact, the upbringing and education of children is the work of the

state and the laws. This means that Crito's incrimination that Socrates by departing (that is, death) would abandon his own sons, and the accusation of exposing them to the risk of becoming orphaned carries much less weight: the Laws claim that children are raised and educated by the laws themselves anyway. From that perspective, orphanage is not a relevant category anymore, and therefore, whether or not a living biological parent is still alive and present is far less relevant.

3.2. "For your part": Individual and state

The Laws appropriate another phrase from Crito's speech for their own argumentative purposes, thereby giving it a new meaning. This is the phrase 'for your part' (τὸ σὸν μέρος, *to son meros,* literally meaning 'for your part'), equally used in the excerpt from Crito's speech cited above. Let us first look in more detail at what this phrase means in its original context. Crito's argument here has already been recapitulated in the previous section, so a brief elucidation of the function of this phrase suffices. Crito states that Socrates is leaving his sons "in the lurch" (leaving one without assistance in a difficult situation) and "as far as you're concerned their fortune will be whatever comes their way", only to add "It's likely that they'll experience the sorts of things that usually happen to orphans when they lose their parents". Rather than making sure that they are protected and offered good schooling and the best opportunities on their way to adulthood, "as far as you're concerned their fortune will be whatever comes their way".

The phrase *to son meros* is actually taken up by the Laws / Socrates. It occurs right at the beginning of the Laws' speech to Socrates. Imagining that he would be on the verge of escaping, Socrates imagines how the laws and the common interest of the city (οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως) would come up to him and reprimand him, *Crito* 50a8-b5:

> Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς διανοῇ τούς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ ἂν αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύωσιν ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίγνωνται καὶ διαφθείρωνται;
>
> "Tell me, Socrates, what are you intending to do? By this action you're undertaking are you planning to do anything other than actually destroying us, the Laws, and the whole state in as far as it's in your power to do so?

> Or do you think that that state can continue to exist and not be overturned in which legal judgments have no force but are rendered invalid and destroyed by private individuals?" (Transl. C. Emlyn-Jones)

The Laws here claim that by escaping from Athens and hence ignoring the sentence to which the court of Athenian judges sentenced him, Socrates can have no other intention than 'destroying the laws and the entire city for his part'. This claim of the Laws has been the subject of some controversy: it may be considered exaggerated to state that the disobedience to a court sentence of one individual does not 'destroy' the laws and 'the entire city'; moreover, it might be considered somewhat hyperbolic of the Laws here to speak in the plural of a state which cannot continue to exist in which legal judgments have no force but are being destroyed by private individuals. The Laws claim that ignoring the sentence (and hence the law that states that court sentences are authoritative) is tantamount to denying the existence of the laws and the authority of the *polis*. This claim has been repeatedly criticized: the existence and the authority of the entire legal system of the *polis* does not depend upon the obedience or disobedience of a single individual.

Furthermore, it is important to realize that this is *the Laws' interpretation* of Socrates' supposedly planned act of escape: by having the Laws say this, Socrates is in effect saying that *from the perspective of the laws* and the legal order of the *polis* as a whole, his action can only be taken as a deliberate attempt to destroy the laws. Instead of the pragmatic perspective that the disobedience of a single individual will not mean the end of the existence of the legal order, the Laws make it seem as if there exists a direct relationship between each citizen and the laws of his city; from such a perspective, the disobedient act of one individual is a direct rebellion against the laws.

When Crito applies this phrase to Socrates, he construes Socrates' escape in a different way: according to Crito, Socrates' abandoning of his sons and departing his life means that, as far as he is concerned, he does not care about the fate of his sons. As the Laws see Socrates' escape, however, Socrates leaving his prison cell and ignoring the verdict is construed as an intention to compromise the legal order. There is an important difference between these two contexts: in the first, Socrates is the primary, or perhaps the only, person responsible; in the second case, it would seem that Socrates rather is part of a larger whole, and that his actions cannot possibly bear such consequences. Yet this should not

obscure from our view that there is a clear hierarchy: for, if Socrates were to depart to the afterlife and leave his sons behind, they would be entrusted to the state – the same state which is supposed to take care of them and which his escape would render invalid and powerless. Whereas Crito accuses Socrates of not caring about what will happen to his sons if he dies and cannot take care of them, the Laws accuse Socrates of not caring what will happen to them after he escapes. And whereas Crito accuses Socrates of abandoning those who need him most and whom Socrates is obliged to help due to his *philia*-bond between a parent and his child, the Laws here accuse Socrates of forsaking not his children, but a larger duty.

We have looked at the recontextualization of two phrases that Crito used in his argument, the cluster of nurturing and educating, and 'for your part'. We have seen that through the recontextualization in the speech of the Laws, these two phrases are invested with a new meaning, and in that way succeed in disarming the original force of Crito's words. In Crito's own argument, these phrases were elements in an argument for the obligations of *philia* that require Socrates as father to take care of his sons. While upholding the overall importance of *philia* as loyalty *per se*, in their new context, these phrases become part of a different *philia*-relation: not between biological parent and son, but between the laws as parents and citizens as offspring.

NOTES

1 D.L. 2.121.

2 See for an analysis of the significance of the setting of the *Euthyphro* in relation to the discussion on piety Klonoski (1985/6).

3 The minor Socratics are discussed in Kahn 1996, Chapter 1. Collections of the fragments of the Socratics are offered in Giannantoni 1990; Boys-Stones & Rowe 2013.

4 D.L. 2.121. The Greek text and the English translation can be consulted in the bilingual Loeb-edition (see under bibliography, sources).

5 D.L. 2.121. On Crito, Boys-Stones & Rowe (2013), 309. The Socratic author Euclides of Megara is also reported to have written a dialogue *Crito*: D.L. 2.108.

6 See Beversluis 2000, 60, who also mentions Crito's authorship of 17 dialogues. "This is more than a little surprising. As portrayed by Plato, Crito is not the sort of man who writes philosophical dialogues". In D.L. *ibid.*, the report is followed by the remark that Socrates practiced ethical philosophy (τὰ ἠθικὰ φιλοσοφεῖν) 'in the workshops and the marketplace' (ἐπί τε τῶν ἐργαστηρίων καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ); for similar testimonia: Wycherley 1957, 628-631 ("tables"). Cf. D.L. 2.25: Often when he looked at the multitude of wares exposed for sale, he would say to himself 'How many things I can do without!'

7 Although Diogenes Laertius had access to a myriad of works that are now lost to us, it should be observed that Diogenes still wrote six centuries after Socrates and Plato lived.

8 Plato, *Apology* 38b7-8. Thirty *minae* was a considerable sum. One *mna* equaled 100 *drachmae*, and thirty *minae* was half a *talent*. In the Athenian legal system, the accused was allowed to suggest a punishment himself (as Socrates does in *Apology* 38b8-9), and Socrates therefore could have suggested to pay a fine rather than be sentenced to death. The jurors were offered the choice between voting for no punishment / not guilty, or voting for punishment.

9 'Informers' or sycophants (*sukophantai*, deriving from *sukos* (meaning 'fig') and *phantēs* (from *phainein*, meaning 'to make plain, show'), hence 'fig-revealers'). In classical Athens, for most offenses there were no public prosecutors, and therefore anyone who wished was allowed to prosecute in public action. Some people tried to exploit this for their own financial gain, and started making a habit of bringing prosecutions in order to try to harvest a financial reward: either a financial reward "given to successful prosecutors in certain actions (…), or to gain money by blackmailing a man who was willing to pay to avoid prosecution, or to earn payment from someone who had reasons for wanting a man to be prosecuted, or to make a political or oratorical reputation" (OCD, *s.v.* sycophants).

10 Plato, *Crito* 45a1-3.

11 Usually translated as 'friendship', *philia* is in fact a more complex Greek concept, including not only friends, but also kin (one's parents, for example, are one's *philoi par excellence*, because they have given one life, and invested so much in one's education and upbringing that we remain indebted to them for the rest of our lives). In general, one's *philoi* are those people to whom one is bound by ties of loyalty and obligation. For a brief discussion of the Greek notion of *philia*, see further Bartels (2017*a*).

12 Plato, *Crito* 45d8-46a4.

13 See Dover (1974), especially 177, 180-184, 273, 276-278, 283, 304-306 on popular morality and helping friends, harming enemies. On a possible conflict between private and public interests, see *ibid.* 301-309.

14 Beversluis 2000.

15 Socrates in Plato is for example portrayed as entering into conversations with individuals he could never have met, such as the philosopher Parmenides. See for considerations about the historicity of Plato, Kahn (1996), 3: "By this [*sc.* optical illusion] I mean Plato's extraordinary success in recreating the dramatic atmosphere of the previous age, the intellectual milieu of the late fifth century in which Socrates confronts the sophists and their pupils. It is difficult but necessary to bear in mind the gap between this art world, created by Plato, and the actual world in which Plato worked out his own philosophy. That was no longer the world of Protagoras and Gorgias, Hippias and Thrasymachus. With the exception of Gorgias (who was unusually long-lived), these men were probably all dead when Plato wrote. Protagoras, in particular, must have died when Plato was a child, and the dialogue named after him is situated before Plato's birth."

16 For a recent sketch of the Socratic problem and its history, see Dorion (2011).

17 Kahn (1996), especially 3-4. He also notes the "striking diversity" to be found in the portraits of Socrates given by such different writers as Aeschines, Phaedo and Xenophon.

18 The offer of escape made by his friends is also mentioned in Xenophon's *Apology*, 23. See also Dorion (2018), 488-489.

19 For a more detailed exposition of the conceptual framework of *tekhnē* in Plato and the indebtedness of this framework to the contemporary and pre-Platonic debate in intellectual circles of the 5th century B.C., see Bartels (2017*b*), 40-46, with further references.

20 Plato, *Crito* 47a13-b3.

21 Here, it may be noted that, whilst Socrates is simply drawing the natural and consistent inferences from the original position that the athlete would do well to pay more attention to the recommendations and opinions of the professional trainer than to those of the multitude, the conclusion that he would actually be harmed if he listened to the multitude already goes some

steps further than the original position that the opinions of the multitude can simply and safely be ignored.

22 It is left open who the person who is knowledgeable in moral matters is, what his qualifications are, or how he could be identified. A clear example of such a person is the philosopher-king in Plato's *Republic*.

23 See above.

24 For the status of orphans after the death of the father, see the study of Cudjoe (2010).

25 Plato, *Crito* 50e2-4: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου τε καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχοις ἂν εἰπεῖν ... ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦλος …; "Well then, since you were born, brought up and trained, could you say (…) that you were not both our offspring and slave (…)?" (Transl. C. Emlyn-Jones).

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Book

"Desilo se to što se desilo". Govor, život i vrijeme u Sarajevu nakon opsade'
("It happened, what happened": Speech, Life and Time after the Siege of Sarajevo), Orion Art, Belgrade, 2017

PARADOXES OF PROJECT SUBJECTIVITY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION AND RECONFIGURATIONS OF WORK

Abstract

This paper analyses the relationship between international intervention in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reconfigurations of labor. Positioned primarily against permanent publicly-funded jobs, still widely regarded as a norm, short-term project-based employment under the umbrella of a postwar humanitarian, peacebuilding, democratizing intervention is marked by specific forms of precarity, living from project to project (along with certain degree of privilege). Based on qualitative research amongst people engaged in internationally funded projects, the study asks: what changes has such employment produced in understandings of work as such, life trajectories and subjectivity?[1]

Keywords: project-based employment, international intervention, precarity, post-fordist affect, yearning for 'normal life', neoliberal agency

> "IT'S BEAUTIFUL. FIRST, WHAT SHALL I SAY, REALLY, I think everybody needs to find courage to forfeit certain things in order to feel benefits." (Sara).[2]

> "IT'S GENERALLY A BIG PROBLEM THAT A SIGNIFICANT PART OF CIVIL SOCIETY (4s) ASKS ITSELF EVERY DAY if it's time to quit. Really! Now, now, to leave behind what I'm doing, it doesn't matter that I do great things, that I need to quit, since I can't bear it anymore, I don't have patience any more, AND ALSO BECAUSE my family and my friends, and all around me DON'T HAVE ANY PATIENCE FOR ME ANYMORE, BECAUSE THIS WAY OF LIFE AFFECTS ALL AROUND US... I mean, I don't have, I don't have (...) our risk has an expiry date." (Sara).[3]

Multiple and fast changes across the globe during the last couple of decades have not left the domain of work untouched. Deregulation,

flexibilization and transformation of traditional work relations have inspired social scientists to address this topic from a variety of perspectives, primarily that of the precarization of work. Still, precarization does not mark work only, but life in general and forms of subjectivity, producing what Annalisa Murgia calls *social precariousness* (2015: 14).

In her study about local interpreters who used to work for international agencies during war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (1992-1995) Catherine Baker (2014) pointed out how employees of international agencies make up a rather underrepresented and unrecognized sector of workers both in studies and in public policies. Baker locates the reason for this in the dominant approach to BiH as a postconflict country instead of one that is characterized, at least in parallel, by postsocialist transformations. Within that dominant approach this group of people is actually overrepresented in wider terms in peacebuilding studies, where they are taken as a voice of 'the local', 'the international' or both of them. The lack of any approaches to them as workers could be additionally ascribed to the transitory and temporary dimension of their work. But what when this temporariness lasts for decades, when some people who used to work in this sector have meanwhile even retired? It is on this group of people, local workers on internationally funded short-term projects under the umbrella of peacebuilding, democratization and EU integration that my research focuses.

Clearly, changes in employment relations and their impact on social life and social processes are not particular to BiH. They shape up as part of global processes that are particularly visible in Sarajevo, the capital of BiH, characterized by multiple formal transitions within the last twenty-five years, offering us the possibility to study these changes within specific temporal determinations of 'before' and 'after'. Thus, this paper analyses short-term project-based employment in a specific Western-funded 'civil sector' and in international governmental organizations (IGOs) in Sarajevo from the perspective of those local workers in light of several anthropological discussions: those of precarity, of post-fordist affect, of yearnings for 'normal lives' and of neoliberal subjectivity. With some people working and living in that way for twenty-five years, my study asks: What changes did project-based employment produce in understandings of work as such, of life trajectories and of subjectivity? How do these people deal with work insecurity? Should we consider local workers in this sector, both in NGOs and in international organizations, a distinct social group? How did international intervention come to be inscribed

into their lives over the years? And finally, have they become used to insecurity and readapted their life according to some new trajectory, or do they attempt to follow 'normative' patterns of social reproduction? Have they perhaps developed back-up strategies and innovative adaptations to deal with precarity?[4]

Elaborating on Baker's study, broadening the research population and the length of their engagement, which in my study mainly encompasses post-war years, my primary data consist of in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted in 2017 with people in Sarajevo who had by then worked for more than ten years on internationally-funded projects, mainly in managerial and specialist positions.[5] I targeted managerial or specialist positions rather than (more numerous) administrative/support staff mainly because their expertise and experience makes these people well-qualified for certain permanent jobs in public institutions. In this way this crystallizes the perceived differences between the two sectors. The age of my interlocutors was 36 to 60, with majority of them in their mid-forties. Additionally, I rely on my own experience of 22 years of project-based employment in Sarajevo, mainly outside of this particular sector, but still sharing many similarities.

As illustrated by the introductory quotations, throughout this paper I will emphasize *tensions* and how these people identify them, deal with them, when giving meaning to their work and lives in these conditions. Sara whose quote I used in the epigraph is in her late thirties and moved to Sarajevo fourteen years ago. She did her MA in Sarajevo, worked at a university on a project basis for a couple of years and then established a human rights NGO which she runs until today. She now considers her previous work in academia, also on casual contracts, to be maximally secure in comparison to her current work. The tension in the opening quotes between positive and negative sides of precarious work can be found in almost all interviews I collected.

After a sketch of the historical conditions in which this sector emerged and contextualization of post-fordist affect within BiH, the paper is organized around so-called 'positive' and 'negative' sides of this kind of work from the perspective of my interlocutors. At the end, I explore their strategies to 'survive' and 'flourish' in this sector.

Historical Conditions in which this Sector of Employment Emerged in Contemporary BiH

Up to 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the republics of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Its declaration of independence was followed by a war that lasted 1992 to 1995. The conflict ended, militarily, but not politically, with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, mediated by the international community. The presence of the international community in post-war life took many forms: from military troops, over humanitarian missions, to development agencies and political representatives within the Office of High Representative in BiH (OHR). OHR is the leading organization for civilian aspects of peace implementation in the country which, due to its mandate and its way of acting, has often been perceived as enacting a kind of protectorate in BiH.

Accordingly, for the last twenty-three years, post-war reconstruction through democratization, peacebuilding and EU accession processes has been led by the very present international community in BiH. Numerous local NGOs were funded through international donations, expanding particularly from 2000 onwards.[6] Enormous amounts of money, or to be more precise, the highest amount per capita ever (Puljek-Shank and Verkoren 2017: 185) have been spent on post-war reconstruction, in particular, human rights, return, reconciliation, free media, rule of law and judicial reform, physical reconstruction, gender equality, youth programs, etc. On the whole this followed neoliberal ideology and was geared towards a market economy. What was largely neglected, and largely left unregulated, is the field of labor (and social welfare). This, of course, is the basis on which people usually build their lives. Indeed, BiH is not only going through post-war reconstruction, but also through post-socialist transformations. This happened in parallel and is rarely addressed as such, although at least half of those previously employed in now destroyed, looted and technologically obsolete enterprises lost their jobs, or were kept in a status of 'waiting' for decades with minimum, irregular or no salaries. As a consequence, BiH has a huge unemployment rate, more than 40% (or 27% according to ILO). Thus, overall, the results of intervention are considered unsatisfactory not only by the BiH population, but by much of the international community and civil society as well.

The recruitment of local people in international agencies and the promotion of the development of civil society started quite early (during the war) and was intensified from the early post-war years onwards. Some

locals kept working there until today, moving from one international organization to another, or remaining in the same one. After a while, a significant part of them moved to local NGOs, or took part in founding them. These NGOs were often initiated by some international agency and secured funding from them for a certain period. As Samson (2003) notes, the development of civil society in the Balkans is both an *aim* and a *tool* to convey democracy (with the NGO projected as a model of democracy). My study thus focuses on a social group that is a product of (Western) funding for civil society building, including the promotion of neoliberal subjectivities in contrast to a socialist 'legacy'.[7]

Short-term project-based employment is the rule in this civil sector. And this is in contrast to a widespread aspiration to attain secure contracts. People remember such secure employment from SFRJ and, still today, permanent contracts are widely present in the public sector, which is still the most desirable domain for employment for most people in BiH.

Specificities of Post-fordist Affect in BiH

As a consequence of the global, neoliberal precarization of work during the last couple of decades yearning for lost job security and life predictability seems universal. Not only did many people actually lose security, predictability and lives they were used to, but this dire prospect has now become a threat for many more people: almost everyone could potentially 'fall' into the group that Guy Standing (2011) calls the 'precariat'. Standing defines the 'precariat' as a broad and growing group of people who share a precarious/insecure mode of living, from those nostalgic for previous forms of work and life to those moving and searching for new forms of it.

Anthropological critiques show that precariousness is not some novel situation – this impression of novelty is in significant measure a product of the global North, while many people in the global South always lived in forms of precarity. Catherine Baker also points out that degrees of precarity (or degrees of privilege) are not fully shared, but determined by gender, race, ethnonational belonging, migrational status etc. What is still often shared, according to Baker, is "a sense of disruption to the life course and an inability to predict our future" (Baker, 2014: 95). This resonates with Muehlebach and Shoshan's conception of 'post-fordist affect' (2012) that in their view is not specific to western economies, as it is often perceived. While it is often associated with western middle classes, they state that it

can be found much beyond that, even in places where fordism as such never existed.

No matter whether fordism is taken as a rule or exception of capitalist economies (Neilson & Rossiter 2009), my previous research demonstrated that in post-socialist BiH many features of such post-fordist affect can be found (Čengić 2017). It can be said that in BiH fordism provides an imaginative field in which dreams of 'normal life' (Jansen 2015) and social reproduction (as it used to be or is supposed to have been before) are invested. Of course, such investments, and indeed the way in which current working and living conditions are defined as 'precarious', are context- specific. The standards of what a 'normal life' should be are still to a large degree drawn from recollections of pre-war socialist life, a life that people feel was taken away from them during the war. Twenty-three years later, they still feel it has not returned. As Maček (2009) shows, even during the war, where everything was 'abnormal' people used to imitate 'normal life', resisting the war and trying to 'remain human'. In my previous research I traced how regaining 'normal life' is considered as a kind of minimum debt to be paid to BiH citizens (Čengić 2017), something they feel entitled to as human beings. Some elements that constitute 'normal life' include: "secure employment, living standards, social welfare, relative social equality, socializing connected to travel and leisure, consumption, inter-ethnic co-existence, and particularly importantly, an expectation of unproblematic reproduction of such a life" (Jansen 2014: S76–S77). The fact that the past is possibly idealized in these accounts, or that these standards of living were not achieved in the same measure by all, or that such a life never even existed, does not undermine the status of 'normal life' as an aspirational standard for most people in BiH.

Negative Side: Contractual or *de facto* Precarity?

At first sight, it may seem that post-fordist affect or yearning for 'normal life' is not applicable to locals working for at least a decade on internationally funded short-term projects. What is specific to this experience of precarity of my interlocutors in internationally supervised BiH? What kind of post-fordist affect do they display (if any)?

It can be said that the lives of my interlocutors are marked by either contractual or de facto precarity. Let's first take a close look into the kind of contracts they have.

All of them are engaged on project-dependent contracts. Some are on **casual contracts** without any social benefits; some are on **fixed-term contracts** with social benefits, but without redundancy payments; some are on **international fixed-term contracts** (e.g., with UN health and pension benefits); finally, some are on **permanent contracts** (with social benefits and redundancy payments), but even these are de facto dependent on a permanent search for project funding to actually implement them[8]. Interlocutors state that the maximum period of job security they have had was one to three years, while the average is six months in IGOs and one year in NGOs. Although most of them have an employment record of 15-20 years without any or any significant interruption, they actually moved between organizations on average 4-5 times (mostly from international organizations to local NGOs), or from project to project within an organization. This means continuous work on project writing (NGOs) or re-applications for jobs (IGOs). My interlocutors told me that the current rate of success with project applications is about 5-6%.

How do we interpret these figures? How do my interlocutors experience this? When asked to reflect on their work trajectories in interviews, they deplored the problems of contractual precarity. This was perhaps emphasized most of all by Haris, a man in his late forties, who has worked in international organizations for more than twenty years. Right after the war (in his mid twenties) he was a recently demobilized soldier and he started to work for an international organization in Sarajevo. First, he worked as a driver, then he moved to a position as project assistant, then he had the opportunity to work as an 'international' in Vienna. He returned to Sarajevo and continued his project-based work until today, changing many projects and international organizations during that period, every time subject to re-application. He says that his longest contract ever was for three years (once), while many of them were for three months. Haris expresses his concern in the following way:

> I was in constant fear of temporariness, I still am today… That became clearest to me in Vienna, where I lived for 6 and half years. I enjoyed it, but I always thought it was temporary… From buying furniture, not having a car, but I travelled a lot, that was a positive . . And the rest, it all was on a temporary basis . . today I would never . . but that experience, I learned that . . And a really important thing is that, after all, we live in BiH . . I always laugh when they ask me in a job interview where I see myself in 5 years . . are we talking about Bosnia or about Austria? . . In Bosnia I don't know where I see myself in 5 years, I don't know if I will prolong my contract, if I will have a job. .

At least two issues seem to me important here. First, Haris deploys a certain exceptionalism of BiH in relation to western countries when it is about predicting the future. Leaving aside how exceptional this really is, it has to be said that virtually everyone would agree that BiH really does not provide societal hope, in Ghassan Hage's terms (2003), where people would feel entitled to claim a part of it. This could partly be ascribed to changes on the global level, but also to the politically and economically fragile post-war and post-socialist life in BiH which does not provide any tools for the creation of continuity. Second, although this quote is about work and life precarity, in some measure it balances things out and hints at advantages of this kind of work as well. In this particular case, this is about visiting and experiencing foreign countries; in some other interviews some other advantages are mentioned. It is important to add here that Haris states that he never tried to find employment in some other sector.

For now, we can say that in the current conditions of BiH, with mass unemployment, my interlocutors perceive precarity as undesirable but largely inevitable. They deplore many problems of precarity, but what is striking is that they also identify a number of factors that, in their experience, 'compensate' for these problems, that 'make it worth it' to remain to work in this sector rather than try to get secure employment in the public sector[9]. In the next section I will focus on those factors.

Positive Sides for Remaining within the Sector

What makes it worth for my interlocutors to engage in such project-based employment, despite the problems they associate with it? I distilled from the interviews some positive factors that they identify in their project-based work, factors that they consider important to their motivation to remain in this sector (usually explicitly or implicitly compared to secure employment in the public sector). They are interrelated but I will group them here under three main headings: a) the qualities of the work itself; b) the value of the work; and c) the kind of social self it allows. Let's look at qualities first.

a) The qualities of the work itself

Let me introduce this topic with the story of Alma, a woman in her late forties whose professional path is rather specific. Namely, her NGO engagement started during the war, in her mid twenties, in her hometown

of Tuzla, where she worked for a newly established association working with women victims of war rape. After the war, she said, she was rather exhausted and suffered a lot of health problems. She moved to less stressful work in a government ministry. She worked there for 10 years, achieving a managing position in one of the branches of the ministry with a permanent contract. But in parallel she worked with a lot of civil society associations, completed a MA and in the mid-2000s decided to leave the ministry, saying that she realized that it did not allow her any creativity, that it was boring, that she could complete her job in a few hours. She joined some NGOs that she previously collaborated with. Today, she is the head of an NGO dealing with peacebuilding, she has a 'permanent' contract (but one dependent on projects) and she also collaborates with some local and foreign universities on an occasional basis (teaching and doing research work). Alma describes the quality of this kind of work in the following way:

> This informal education opened totally new horizons for me, new ways to get to know the world. Then I realized that what I knew before is actually... just one little bit, which more was limiting than providing me freedom. Only when I entered the non-governmental sector, only with this new knowledge, experiences, skills I learned, only then I realized that there is a whole range of other worlds that offer you extraordinary possibilities to work on yourself, first of all, and to use that capacity to strengthen capacities that you didn't even knew you had. You get an opportunity to show your ability in some situations in which you never thought you would… you would be so successful or you would know to do those things in that way.

In this way, other interlocutors too identify qualities in the work they did itself, on a day-to-day basis and over longer-term trajectories. They include, for example, facing challenges all the time (which push you further); professionalism by high standards; room for creativity; for freely expressing your opinion; to be 'what you really are'; possibilities for learning, professional development and self-realization; to discover many other worlds along this one and widen your horizons; to be able to perceive the world from the margins.

As we can see most of these qualities are about *self-realization*. Importantly, in today's BiH, each of them is implicitly understood as opposed to the public sector. Particularly the state administration is considered a place of non-creativity, rigidity, closedness, ethnonationalism, etc. This is very well illustrated in the continuation of Alma's quotation:

> I am really grateful for that opportunity since it opened the way for me to come out of that box, that box and that way of thinking in which we were 'molded' till then in our Bosnian and Yugoslav framework. So, it opened new horizons, new ways of thinking, ways to use what I knew from before, to combine it with other fields, that step forward was key, key to me.

As we can see, this experience of freedom is very much epistemological, dependent on access to specific knowledge and specific ways of explaining social reality.

Let us consider now which additional factors, related to the context of the work, contribute to the sense of freedom. These are: **time flexibility** (among other things this allowed some of my interlocutors to complete their studies while working (BA; MA; PhD), but also to combine many other engagements with 'their main job'), **important skills and knowledge** gained through trainings (often involving travel abroad), and something we could call **'being your own boss'**. And while more will be said about the first and the second below, let me now address the latter feature of this kind of work.

Most interlocutors see 'being your own boss' as a form of creativity while implementing all phases of a project cycle, from an idea to the realization. This kind of freedom/autonomy is actually based on one's own fundraising and self-responsibility for one's salary. This can be interpreted as a maximalization of self-responsibility for one's own future or, as Wendy Brown calls it, "the capacity for 'self-care'" (Brown 2006 in Gershon 2011: 539). Mirza, who is not formally in a managing position within a local NGO, does feel he is his own boss. He explains this in the following way: "before I always worked FOR SOMEBODY else, in projects that somebody else created. Now, I have freedom TO WRITE MY OWN PROJECTS and then to CHANGE them through its REALIZATION, and not to play according to rules." Asked whether he considers himself to be someone who works for foreigners, he says: "No, I think those who work for foreigners are those who work in American embassy, OSCE, UNDP etc. (…). I don't work for foreigners, I sell to them my product, I work only for myself."

What we find here is a kind of inverted capitalistic market logic, where donors are presented as customers and NGOs as sellers of their products. Anyhow, it seems to me that asymmetrical power relations between donors and NGOs are displaced/transformed or consciously subverted here, to create an opposite or at least *less* asymmetrical relation that seems

to provide dignity to the kind of neoliberal agency that Ilana Gershon describes as 'people as business' (2011:539).

Self-realization is maybe the most appreciated feature of this kind of work. Let's see what further makes it worth for people to be engaged in this sector.

b) Value of the work

A second positive dimension of project-based work concerns the VALUE that this work produces. They believe they can effect social change, help those who need it, and provide important services that are otherwise lacking in society.

A significant part of wider society would not agree with this. Indeed, many studies (e.g., IBHI 2012, Puljek-Shank and Verkoren 2017) demonstrate that this kind of work enjoys quite a low degree of local legitimacy. Criticisms (or self-criticisms) of civil society work is present amongst my interlocutors too. Demonstrating her disappointment with BiH civil society, Bojana said:

> I think I'm personally part of this lack of success as well, that I helped with our 'humanitarian assistance', our taking over what the state should do, that we actually prolonged the agony, and gave them (the political elite) the possibility to be what they really are. If we didn't do the work that the state should do, we would have had social unrest earlier, we would have fluctuations in the government earlier. But no, we are like a mother who doesn't allow her son to grow up, you know.

Like in some other cases, this account relies on a liberal perception of civil society, as opposed to the state.[10] And it is interesting to see that this critique targets exactly those kinds of activities that are actually favored by the general population. Indeed, the study by Puljek-Shank and Verkoren demonstrates that the highest level of local support is given to those NGOs 'solving concrete problems and addressing everyday needs' (2017: 192). In other words, the broader population appreciates NGOs that in significant measure take responsibility for activities that were previously conducted by public institutions, instead of being a watchdog of the state.

However, even if my interlocutors may be disappointed overall with "what has been achieved during the last twenty years", this does not mean they consider their work non-meaningful or socially irrelevant. Quite the

contrary! Bojana, the same person who previously expressed criticism of the functioning of civil society, says that if she would be born again, she would again make the same decisions.

Further, although their work is clearly their source of livelihood, of income, all those in local NGOs suggest that there is a part of their work that cannot be remunerated. We can guess that they allude to an activist dimension of their work, considered inherent to civil society. But what does this consist of in their accounts? It is mainly referred to as a level of commitment that lasts twenty-four hours a day, that does not know weekends, holidays, etc. In my impression this is always presented as valuable beyond any salary. It is precisely this 'working/commitment surplus' that made it so difficult to encourage interviewees to stop acting as representatives of NGOs and to start talking about their experiences as workers. From this perspective, questions about their livelihoods somehow trivialized something that is usually understood qualitatively as priceless. To a degree, this kind of work/commitment surplus resonates with what Muehlebach (2011) explores as 'affective labor' (unpaid voluntary work). In her case such work was promoted by the Italian government after early post-fordist job-losses. In BiH, in contrast, it is a product of international intervention and its ambiguous role in civil society building. Namely, there are numerous contradictions between the international discourse of expectations of civil society (to have a 'grassroots' civil society which would be corrective of the state, to promote voluntarism and activism) and its way of working and procedures which in significant measure depoliticize any kind of civil society work, threaten the sustainability of grassroots initiatives (through donor agendas, complex applications and reporting procedures), and focus on developing a professionalized NGO sector – a kind of substitute for missing social services.

c) Social self

I now move to the third characteristic of project-based work that 'makes it worth it' for my interlocutors. This concerns the SOCIAL SELF that such work allows them to develop/maintain. Let me identify some particularly important dimensions of this.

First, the civil sector and international organizations that I explored are seen as **non-contaminated by ethnonationalism** in terms of recruitment and day-to-day functioning. This is then opposed to the importance of ethnonationalism outside of it and serves as an important feature in the

reasons why my interlocutors feel good in this sector. Although, like in the rest of BiH, the demographic structure of Sarajevo has significantly changed, it can still be considered relatively multiethnic, at least in a spirit of togetherness and yearning for previous inter-ethnic coexistence. Two employment sectors are in fact still quite multiethnic: the state administration and international organizations/civil society. But there is a sharp contrast between them. We could say that within the first one – state administration—you are recruited primarily as a Serb, a Croat or a Bosniak (along required qualifications). In contrast, you enter the civil sector precisely in order *not* to be recruited in that way.

According to many of my interlocutors, ethnic-based recruitment in the state administration is 'shameful'. This, they say, is one of the major reasons why they never tried to get a job there. One of the youngest participants, who works for an international organization, says that his friend called him to be director in some state administration unit, saying: "We need a Croat." He tells me this with astonishment, saying he immediately refused, that he can't believe that they called him just because of that, when he is not qualified at all. He added that he would never like to work in the state administration, to get a job that way. When I asked if he thought that it was different in international organizations, he said yes. He thinks that there, even if ethnic identity is important to somebody, you do not express it, because a conflict or insult on that basis would be punished with job-loss. A similar kind of attitude can be found in local NGOs as well. Bojana, head of a local NGO, says that she and her husband consciously decided "not to be BUDŽETLIJE (people who are funded through public budget), even if they would go hungry". In her view this kind of employment, particularly employment in the state administration, supports and reproduces ethno-politics, perceived as major source of political problems.

Another way in which my interlocutors consider the project-based sector to facilitate a specific social self is through a **strong open-ness to influences from 'The World'**. The World, here, actually mainly means the West. This openness is then opposed to what they consider provincialism outside this sector.

Contrary to the stereotypical image of a closed socialist country, there is a dominant image among the BiH population that Yugoslavia was a very 'open country'. Many of my interlocutors even considered starting to work in the internationally-funded project-based sector a kind of 're-opening' to the 'world' after the war/siege of the city. Jasmina describes it in the following way:

> ...You know, you're not anymore, you've exhausted everything that you can pull out of yourself during 4 years of war, you know, that kind of struggle, as long as you're alive and you stay normal and now a new world arrives, and I have no idea what's happening, I mean, CDs, new films, music (sigh of excitement).

In addition, my interlocutors contrast the international context in which they work, often seen as a space of cosmopolitanism and openness, to ethno-nationalism and to the increasing closedness of post-war BiH society. In Jasmina's understanding Sarajevo is changing in very conservative directions that are unfamiliar to her. Her work in the UN, among other benefits, provides a kind of refuge from that, but in parallel also a kind of substitute for life as it once used to be. Jasmina said that somehow she remained in pre-war time or in the time right after the war, when there was huge optimism that society would be rebuilt and rehabilitated. Now, she says, she can see that the situation is even worse than in 1996.

Interlocutors display cosmopolitan lifestyles. They have colleagues and often friends around the world. They are in continuous contact with them through social media, both privately and professionally. Many are up-to-date on the political situation, locally and internationally. They like international cuisine and healthy food habits and try to integrate them in the lives as much as possible. What they like most is travel. They go abroad on both private and business trips, very often combining them, and get to know people and places. Many say that due to the war they have friends all around the world and they try to find opportunities to visit them. On the whole they do not mention problems with visa (as the rest of population would), and the 'world' appears as a place that is not only worth seeing (touristically, as before), but also as a place where you imagine yourself living. In that way, they are citizens of the world.

Some authors exploring civil society in neighboring Croatia and Serbia consider workers in this sector a part of a globalised middle class (Vetta 2012, Samson 2003, Stubbs 1997). They point to their globally shared cosmopolitan life style, cultural capital, language skills, networking. Also, they find significant measures of class continuity with the previous generation. Within this study, the latter is only partly true. And while the issue of their entry into this sector is a separate research topic, for now it can be said that in most cases information about available jobs came through friends, that according to many their English language skills at

that time were basic, that recruitment at that time (mid- to late-90s) was not so selective as it is today, and that their salary at that time fed and supported whole families since, in the public sector, there was no salaries at all during and just after the war.

To conclude this section, we can say that despite contractual insecurity, my interlocutors express strong valuations of forms of cultural and social capital that their work facilitates. In certain ways they perceive this lifestyle as a continuity of their imagined pre-war 'normal life', so yearned for by most of the population. But access to such a life style, activities and sense of social self is also restricted in terms of *economic* capital. So, what do interlocutors say about this?

Economic Aspect: Merit vs. Social Equality

Strikingly, in the interviews, my interlocutors only very rarely addressed the economic dimension of their work. Very few of them mentioned it spontaneously, even though all of them derived their entire income from this work. Although I did not pose direct questions about salaries, I rely on two interlocutors who disclosed them in the interviews, on my previous work on projects in BiH, and on three other studies, one in BiH and two in Serbia (Baker 2014; Vetta 2012, Marek 2015). I estimate that the average monthly net salary of my interlocutors (not counting additional engagements and contracts) ranges from a bit bigger to significantly bigger than the average salary in Canton Sarajevo. There are significant differences between those on permanent and fixed-term contracts on the one hand and those on casual contracts, whose monthly income is unsteady and often below the average. Asked what they can afford for themselves and their families with their income, most respond it allows them 'a normal ordinary life'. By this they refer to basic existence for their closer family and often support for parents, an apartment and a car (often bought on credit or with a private loan), holidays (several times during the year due to flexible work times), travels abroad, socializing, food and drink outside. Finally, some interlocutors say that they live in a rented apartment and they are not able even to afford basic survival (pay their bills), and some others say that they live very well in comparison to most of population.

It is important to note that, despite job insecurity, almost all interlocutors who had families formed partnership/marriages during their project work

and many of them have children. In half of these cases partners/spouses are engaged in project work as well. None of them state that this had been an obstacle for family plans, except for obtaining bank loans to buy an apartment, which they nevertheless still succeeded to do. Still, one director of an organization with casual contracts says that her colleagues do not have children and that those who do have them went somewhere else 'for a better life'.

One question I asked in the interviews concerned the perception amongst some in BiH society that those who work in NGOs and IGOs are privileged. Some participants found this a very provocative question. So how do different interlocutors reply to this 'provocation'?

Before being asked this question, Bojana spontaneously says that she just recently noticed how much working for foreign money changed people working in the civil sector. She adds:

> We are a caste in itself, you know, at some point some Norwegian, some American paid tax so that I could sit here and "tell you clever stuff" at half past nine, right. Who is checking my time sheet, who is asking me "where you are and why are you not in the office?" You know, it is privileged.

Two more participants compare themselves with the average person in BiH who lives a difficult life and they confirm the proposition that they were comparatively privileged.

Some interlocutors balance positive and negative sides of this kind of work, mainly immaterial advantages and insecurity. Many respondents from local NGOs reply by shifting this proposition to people working in international organizations, defining them as 'higher class', for example:

> People who rapidly changed after they got a job in international organizations: they speak great English, they have holidays in Indonesia, they live some kind of Western system of life and they look down at the rest of us as stupid Bosnians and Herzegovinians, I don't know, a few hundred or a few thousand such people have gotten really rich that way and they don't understand ordinary people anymore.

Some also say that this distinction is not fully tenable since there are people from international organizations who are also project dependent, and there are also people in the local sector who capitalized very well on the fact that they entered the market early (more than twenty years ago).

Some interlocutors say that they are not privileged in any case, expressing anger that society always pushes comparisons with those who live in worse conditions and saying that socially disadvantaged groups would not feel any better if they could not pay their bills. Some make comparisons to their previous lives, to how it used to be within their primary family, saying that in those days they had more than now. Finally, one interlocutor, the one who works in the private sector on a project-basis, angrily suggests that anybody who thinks he is privileged can try and compete on the market.

At least two issues seem important to me here: first, an implicit insistence that all they have was earned with 'blood, sweat and tears', and thus deserved, and second, a perception that only some 'minor, socially disadvantaged groups' have economic difficulties in BiH.

Although most of my interlocutors who started working right after the war say that this was mainly financially motivated and somehow accidental (from a professional point of view), they would not say that for their working trajectory today. Instead, they focus on their qualifications, achievements and development. They mention attending numerous capacity building trainings, which they consider extremely important for their professional development and orientation. Accordingly, particularly those employed in local NGOs see themselves and their organizations as professionals in a specific field. In addition, while they do not emphasize this, almost all of them have completed higher education. Ten hold MAs and two have PhD degrees. Overall, they suggest that they built an organizational and personal CV during the last 10-20 years, and are therefore deserving of funding. Additionally, the fact that you have to continually fundraise for your own job probably facilitates its perception as less secure, but more expensive. Finally, relying on my experience of project-work in this sector I would add that people may also consider their salaries relatively insignificant because they compare them with those of their international colleagues, who they occasionally criticize for lack of knowledge and qualifications ("they're just throwing us crumb"').

Some interlocutors mention that there are many disadvantaged groups in BiH who live badly (e.g., Dragan states: "particular groups of people WHICH WERE DISADVANTAGED, AND THEY ARE STILL DISADVANTAGED, if not even in the worse situation, like physically disabled persons, women, children, old people, minorities, citizens IN GENERAL are discriminated."). They explain how they try to help them as much as possible, either through their work or individually. However,

what they seem to fail to grasp is that structural disadvantage produces economic disadvantage. If we would put together all these so-called 'disadvantaged groups' and others beyond them, we are talking perhaps about 70% of the BiH population that is either already poor or on the verge of 'falling' into this group. Within and above this group are: those who keep up an image of 'normality' with remittances from abroad, those with multiple financial debts, who do not have money to pay their bills or are not heated at all, those who wait for specialist medical examination for a year in public health services since they do not have money to pay for private services. As Michael Pugh notes, the majority of poor people in BiH are not the unemployed, but those who are employed and have families and children, often without a salary (2005: 456). In BiH today, can we still talk in categories of 'disadvantaged groups'? And who says that only they are disadvantaged? Who produces that knowledge? It is not a coincidence that these questions are neglected in donor programs (see e.g., IBHI 2012), influenced as they are by neoliberalising agendas. Quite early on in Croatia, Paul Stubbs (1997) noticed that social equality, promoted so much during socialist times, was not part of any donor program and that the professionalization of NGOs imposed by international funding made it impossible for any grass roots initiative to survive.

To conclude this section, much of the reasoning of my interlocutors about the economic dimension of their work are also in line with precisely the kind of neoliberalising changes that the international supervision promotes in BiH. This includes an internalization of self-responsibility, a lack of awareness and of nuanced knowledge about social inequality within society, and/or an understanding that social inequality is *legitimate* if it is based on merit (i.e., a largely implicit meritocratic ideology).

Some authors exploring civil society in the Balkans see these workers as earning well above civil servant salaries in respective countries (Vetta 2012, Samson 2003). Marek Mikuš, on the basis of his research in Serbia, challenges this, referring to salary figures quite comparable to the ones that I provided as relatively unspectacular, and emphasizing that these people do not have economic resources of their own, but they are wage earners engaged on internationally funded projects. His further arguments against seeing these people as an economic elite are that these figures mainly relate to top positions, while the majority of NGO workers are on casual contracts, in permanent insecurity and earning close to the average salary in Serbia or often less (Mikuš 2015: 48). Although this is more or less true for civil society in BiH, as we have seen this permanent

insecurity is not what is prevailing in their narratives (at least not among the majority of them).

Due to internalized insecurity, with few exceptions, it would be difficult to see this group as some revolutionary class – a multitude in Hardt and Negri's terms (2004). This is not even what Standing (2011) refers as 'precariat', as a class in the making (at least not the majority of them). Sure, this group has elements of 'precariat', but also some elements even of 'proficians', quite high up in Standing's pyramid of working positions, just below the 'salariat' (2011). The most important feature that is missing to qualify them as a collective subject is any kind of collective organization around precarity. In my interpretation this is prevented by an internalization of self-responsibility for their own livelihood, which is not perceived as an imposition, but transformed, as we saw, to an advantage of this kind of work (within wider societal employment options). In a study of war-time interpreters working for international military forces in BiH and Kosovo, Catherine Baker comes to the rather similar conclusion. Questioning their 'precariat' status, she introduced, but also queried, an additional or alternative conception of them as 'projectariat' which is at the same time a privileged elite (2014: 92). Her analysis does not solve this tension, and nor does mine. What I can say in accordance with Mikuš's findings is that my interlocutors can be defined in terms of "precarization – an ongoing and uneven process rather than fixed condition – of a middle class faction defined by an articulation of the NGO organizational form, liberal political identity, high education, and global cultural capital." (2015: 49). My interlocutors have diverse contracts, levels and regularities of income, but what they share are risks, insecurity and an impossibility of long-term planning. As one of my interlocutors says: "..yes, normal life needs to go on, but ALL DECISIONS, EVEN THOSE THAT ARE NORMAL are actually risky decisions".

Let's see now how 'normal life' goes on for my interlocutors, or what they rely on in imagining their future.

Project Logic and Accumulated Continuity

Most interlocutors associate the kind of work they do with young age and state that when they started, they didn't think it would last so long. Still, meanwhile they accumulated 15 to 20 years of experience in this field with no or only very short interruptions. They found this exhausting, they

experienced and are still experiencing crises, and it remained insecure, but almost none of them plan to leave it. If neoliberal agency is "a collection of assets that must be continually invested in, nurtured, managed, and developed" (Martin in Gershon 2011: 539), how is this applicable to them, or, in other words, what factors does their 'accumulated continuity' rely on?

I found several mutually intersecting factors:

A first important factor consists of their **personal and organizational CV** (qualifications, skills and experience). Una, head of a human rights organization who for twenty years has worked on economic and social rights, says that the stable structure in her life is her CV. At the same time, that same CV is also that which prevents her from looking for a job in another sector. Others emphasized their organizational CV, so to say, establishing a profile for their organization in a certain field, which is an asset in application processes. To create security for a certain period, you also have to have good **project writing skills and you need to combine several projects at the same time**. Mirza perceives this sector like any other market and critically contemplates the project logic, but at the same time he uses it. He says: "You learn how to write and speak in that language. (…) And simultaneously, well, look, I succeeded to build in some internal distance in that very language, and then I critically appropriate it". Dragan says that you always need to combine several projects and to calculate them so that they do not start at the same time. And in order to be successful, project needs to be perfectly written, according to Damir. However, many say that the outcome is often determined less by the quality and more by geographical distribution and connections "from the local level to Brussels". With this we arrive at the asset of **social capital**, the importance of which all interlocutors emphasize and proudly display. This includes lobbying mechanisms with donors. Social capital also includes collaborators and often people who share a professional/educational backgrounds and value systems. Three interlocutors who previously didn't live in Sarajevo are particularly proud of the social capital they gained. Another factor mentioned by them is the **time spent in an organization or in the sector in general**. Haris considers his 6 years working for the same IGO abroad as a factor that prevented him getting a permanent contract and having a proper career in BiH. This is because he was absent in the early 2000s, when the transfer from international to national positions happened. So, Haris feels he came to the market with his qualifications too late. So does Ivan, one of the youngest interlocutors who in 1996 was just

15 years old. Finally, we have something that seems somewhat irrational, but important. It consists of **optimism that time will bring something good**. Sara, who has been working on casual contracts for years, says that there are often crises with funding, but they always somehow get solved. And knowledge about that helps her a lot. This was expressed in a similar way by Dunja, who says that within the sector some illusion of security has been created that some new project will be found, allowing continuation. She continues: "EVEN I HAVE IT AND ALWAYS THINK, well, something will turn up, and, the craziest thing is, something does always turn up".

While trying to produce continuity, many of my interlocutors experienced crises. In significant measure, circulating from one organization to another (on average four times, or from two to nine times) can be interpreted as transfer due to the end of the previous project or even the closure of the organization. Emina, a local NGO director looked back on fifteen years of relatively stable funding (with re-application every two to three years to the same donor). Recently she was suddenly confronted with the termination of funding. She explains this was a very difficult situation, with ten persons in the organization living off this work that believed in what they did and did not see themselves anywhere else in the future. She continues: "As if you wake up from a wonderful dream that you, that you, you know, first it was very hard, you climb to the third step up, and you fall back to the ground floor". Her husband, who had worked on a casual basis for 10 years, lost his job at the same time. And they had three outstanding bank loans.

The hopes of my interlocutors are often invested in a more secure job, mainly the existing one. Although most would like to be less dependent, for the foreseeable future they still count mainly on foreign funding. Some are developing plans to access other sources of possible funding: further professionalization and offering private services, finding individual donors, or minimal state funding (negotiations about which they are pessimistic about in advance due to non-transparent procedures and monopolies of some organizations (see IBHI 2012)). The key reason for these other plans is the decrease in available funding and the amount of work needed to secure any of it. But they also say they are tired of fitting into donor agendas, of being nice to people who often know less than they do, of starting all public appearances with the sentence "with the support of our donors". All this is articulated particularly strongly by some interlocutors who talk in the 'I' form more than others, and who demonstrate a concern with how project dependence and donor agendas are weakening their

activist role (failing to address 'real societal problems'). Some of them already invested some work in that direction (separating their 'project work' as a source of livelihood from pro bono engagement in very grass roots activities), while some hope to be able to do it. Some of their ideas are even less secure than their current engagement.

The temporal reasoning I have presented here relies to a large degree on the project logic, as well. This logic does not include complete closure. Projects exist in order to be continued, or to provide a basis for the next project. Thus, to return to the question of aspirations to 'normal lives', my interlocutors have a desire for a non-problematic reproduction of a life that improves over time, but, unlike in previous times, they have no expectation that the state will provide conditions for that.[11] Such expectations of the state do not belong to this newly created neoliberal agency – that of a flexible self-responsible person that should proactively ensure her or his life and existence.[12] To a significant degree, this resonates with Gershon's conception of neoliberal agency. Referring to Brown, she states:

> According to the neoliberal perspective, to prosper,[13] one must engage with risk. All neoliberal social strategies center on this. Managing risk frames how neoliberal agents are oriented toward the future. And it is implicit in this orientation that neoliberal agents are responsible for their own futures – they supposedly fashion their own futures through their decisions. By the same token, regardless of their disadvantages and the unequal playing field actors are maximally responsible for their failures. (Gershon 2011: 540).

Still, the lives that my interlocutors strive to reproduce do not rely on a cut with previous lives either. In their understanding, there should be a degree a continuation with previous lives, but in dramatically changed conditions.

Concluding Remarks: Paradoxes of 'Project' Subjectivity in Contemporary BiH

This paper analyzed short-term project-based employment in the specific Western-funded 'civil sector' and in international organizations in BiH from the perspective of their local workers and in light of anthropological discussions of precarity, post-fordist affect and yearnings for 'normal lives'.

It would seem that, unlike the majority of the BiH population, this group does not display much post-fordist affect or yearnings for 'normal lives', at least not in terms of its main component of secure employment. But this is only partly true. In fact, as I have shown throughout this paper, there is a tension.

To a large degree, the aspirations of my interlocutors do reflect broader standards of what would constitute a 'normal life' and they work hard to produce the kind of continuity that is supposed to be central to such a life. Yet the channels they use to try to achieve this imply that they have given up on real hopes for the fordist type of 'job security' that is widely perceived as the key element of remembered 'normal lives'.

A related tension emerges in terms of commitments to social change. On the one hand, my interlocutors project an 'activist' self, working beyond economic calculus to contribute to the betterment of society in ways that seem critical of neoliberalism. But on the other hand, their employment trajectories and orientations are *de facto* largely in line with neoliberal understandings of self and society.

Such tensions can be interpreted with wider societal conditions of BiH. However, they have to be also understood in the context of the foreign intervention/supervision of BiH, and its neoliberal forces, which themselves come with tensions. While promoting aspirations to prosperous and stable lives, this intervention simultaneously advances the notion that people should not feel entitled to them. While promoting altruistic and corrective values for 'civil society', it also fosters depoliticized, entrepreneurial subjectivities that are forward-looking, risk-taking, opportunity-creating, flexible, not relying on 'old' fordist guarantees of security. In the complex BiH political and social context, perhaps neoliberal templates of subjectivity are *seductive* to my interlocutors, particularly in terms of the self-realization they promise compared to remembered 'normal lives'. They present themselves as possibly more inclusive, more open than past fordist disciplining structures, and also more centered on the process of self-development, but in today's BiH they seem incapable to produce much actual (visible) social change.

We find an awareness of such (unresolved) tensions in the understandings and self-positionings of some of my interlocutors who do not display a dogmatic view of donor agendas or of the project logic in general. They are even critical about neoliberalising effects of the international intervention. Still, the actual strategies they employ *do* remain within the project logic. Sometimes they critically appropriate this for

their own meaningful purposes, sometimes they talk about it ironically, sometimes they use them for subversive purposes.

Finally, I identified strategies with which they handled their precarious employment status over the years. They developed their *assets*, such as CV building, learning skills, accumulating social capital, time spent in the sector, optimism etc. This leads to a paradox, because in that way, and very much in line with notions of neoliberal agency, they actively seek to produce, as far as possible, degrees of continuity (i.e., some degree of security) in conditions of that are marked by precarity / non-continuity / temporariness.

NOTES

1 I express my gratitude to Stef Jansen for fruitful conversations, useful comments while reviewing the draft version of this research paper and proofreading of it.

2 All personal names are pseudonyms.

3 Transcription of interviews followed symbols available at: EESE 7/98 Lingua Franca English Characteristics of successful non-native-/non-native-speaker discourse, Christiane Meierkord (Erfurt), http://webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/edoc/ia/eese/artic98/meierk/transc.html.

4 This text presents a preliminary, broad analysis of the empirical data, written in 2018, during the NEC Fellowship. A journal article based on this analysis, was published in 2022. in *Focaal. Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology*, https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2022.081804

5 I express my deep gratitude to my interlocutors.

6 In 2009 there were over 12,000 registered civil society organizations in BiH. 91% of them were founded after 1991 and an estimated 54% of them are active (Puljek-Shank and Verkoren 2017: 191). Still, it has to be noted that this overall number comprises many kinds of associations that this study does not focus on. 15,9 % of active associations are based in Sarajevo (IBHI 2012: 3).

7 It is necessary to note that Western funded NGOs are dominant, but are not the only ones active in BiH.

8 Locals on permanent contract in IGOs are an exception.

9 No statistics about those who left this sector for more stable work and lives are available.

10 On the basis of research in Serbia, Theodora Vetta warns that the work of NGOs can't be seen through that opposition anymore. The focus of neoliberal policies is on the privatization of state services (which the state itself promotes to meet EU conditionality) and NGOs are often seen as the best transitional carriers in situations of state withdrawal (2012: 174–177).

11 A least two interrelated factors need to be added to this: they consider the current BiH political context incompatible with their values (in particular ethnic based recruitment in the state administration) and they display low trust in the current state of the welfare system, which, despite major changes, is still formally 'public' (e.g., health care or pensions).

12 This template of agency can also be found in other sectors.

13 And I would add: in BiH today 'to survive'.

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INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN ROMANIA AND PORTUGAL: STRATEGIES AND TRANSITIONS AT THE (SEMI-)PERIPHERY

Abstract

Governments and higher education institutions see internationalization of higher education as one of the main factors that influence their strategic endeavours in the years to come. When looking at the national level, the drivers of internationalization are linked to economic and geo-political positioning, cultural influences, as well as international competitiveness for knowledge and human capital. Party politics, foreign affairs, economy and immigration policies also play a big role in shaping country level approaches. For universities, prestige factors, disciplinary or constitutive groups' interests and financial imperatives predominantly drive internationalization policies.

In this context, the paper will look at national and institutional strategic pursuits in the field of internationalization of higher education, in the case of two countries geographically (and perhaps economically) positioned at Europe's periphery: Romania and Portugal. The choice of these two countries relies on their recent transition from totalitarian regimes to democracies, coupled with similar trends of massification and underfunding of the higher education sector. The conclusion will include policy lessons for decision-makers, especially with a view on whether well-established global models of internationalization of higher education are fit for purpose for transitioning countries.

Keywords: internationalization, mobility, higher education, governance

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also based on field work conducted during the author's doctoral studies and parts of the findings were also presented at various research conferences attended as an early-stage researcher.

1. Introduction

The internationalization of higher education is, without a doubt, one of the undeniable trends that continues to (re)define governmental and university level strategies alike. In a world where knowledge is the key asset, brain circulation becomes one of the essential indicators of just how much countries and higher education institutions are willing to reshape their strategic pursuits in order to become globally competitive. In 2017, there were over 5.3 million international students, up from 2 million in 2000.[1] The five most successful countries in attracting foreign students (in absolute numbers) were: The United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia, France and Germany. Despite the fact that countries with a tradition in enrolling high numbers of foreign students still dominate at international level, it is clear that national economic development also correlates with academic attractiveness. Despite the strong position of the top tier countries, some European nations, in light of the challanges posed by demography and migration, have become aware of the opportunities presented by internationalization, with a focus on attracting mobile students for full degrees, rather than for credit mobility (Sin *et. al*. 2019, Deca 2015, Mosneaga and Agergaard 2012). However, generally, student mobility – both degree and credit – remains a priority, as well as the most frequent activity within the internationalization agenda of European higher education institutions (Sursock, 2015; EUA, 2013).

This paper compares the recent history of higher education internationalization in two countries situated simultaneously at the periphery of the European Economic Area and at the semi-periphery of internationalization efforts in the university sector. These two case studies share a recent history of transition from totalitarian regimes to functional democracy, in a wider context of accession to the European Union and the European Higher Education Area. This transition does start from different ideological standpoints (communism for Romania and fascism for Portugal) and at different points in time (1989 for Romania and 1974 for Portugal). The author will examine the internal and external drivers for internationalization of higher education in these two national contexts, as

well as how and whether their socio-economic and historical specificity influenced the way in which dominant models of internationalization have been translated at the national and institutional level.

The conclusion will include policy lessons for decision-makers and explore whether and how potential misalignments between national and institutional endeavours can pose obstacles in fulfilling strategic objectives at either level.

2. Methodological and Conceptual Considerations

The current article uses the empirical work done for the author's PhD thesis regarding the Romanian higher education system, defended in 2016 at the University of Luxembourg, as well as the interviews and research conducted in Portugal as a post-doctoral fellow at the New Europe College, in Bucharest. It is conceived as a qualitative analysis, using semi-structured interviews conducted in 2013-2015 and 2018 in both Romania and Portugal, with representative decision-makers on higher education, mainly at the national level.

The concept of periphery used in this paper is based on the Sin *et al.* (2019) translation of the Immanuel Wallerstein' theory of the "world system" (Wallerstein, 1974), which divides countries based on the structure of their economy in: core, semi-periphery and periphery. This taxonomy was then modeled on the more niche economy of international higher education, taking as a proxy inbound/ outbound mobility flows. For the purpose of this article, core countries are those that are considered net "importers" of degree seeking students (e.g. United States, the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, etc). Semi-peripheral are those countries with more balanced mobility flows, such as Poland or Portugal. And finally, those countries that are mainly "exporters" of mobile students are considered as peripheric (Romania, Bulgaria, etc.).

The working assumption for this article is that peripheral and semi-peripheral countries (should) use internationalization policies that are different from those of the core countries, in light of their different circumstances, capacities and challenges (Urbanovic *et al.* 2016). Additionally, some of these countries, such as those situated in Central and Eastern Europe, can be considered as a "privileged site for understanding the processes of Europeanization and internationalization" (Dakowska and

Harmsen, 2015: 5), since they design their policies in higher education using already existing models at supra-national levels, be it regionally (as in the case of the European Union or internationally). Despite there being no universal model for internationalization, "a correlation exists between the standing of the higher education system in the global arena and the influence of its internationalization model worldwide." (Deca, 2016:15). In general, systems with a de facto low standing such as those in a periphery or semi-periphery become net borrowers of policy practices in the real of internationalization.

As such, countries from the periphery or semi-periphery become pertinent models in analyzing the suitability of transposing established models of internationalisation to regions with different circumstances. Also, the observations made in the comparison can help identify how the internationalization of higher education could be pursued without reinforcing the status-quo, namely the divisions between higher education systems worldwide (Teichler, 1999), which makes more powerful actors its primary beneficiaries. De Wit *et al.* (2019) underline that countries with developing economies (and sometimes democracies) tend to adopt Western models of internationalization, focusing on incoming mobility, branding and prestige, while also suffering from political instability. Such national higher education systems would be better served by focusing on other internationalization dimensions (e.g. internationalization at home).

3. Romania – The Resurrection of the Internationalisation of Higher Education Agenda after Three Decades of Transition

Following its 1989 anti-communist regime Revolution, Romanian higher education and its policy framework changed according to perceived international and European trends, but was also shaped by the internal imperatives of democratic transition. According to Deca (2015), each of the three decades following 1990 have constituted a distinct phase of policy change. The 1990s, for example, were a time of massification and witnessed a search for external models in order to redefine higher education in the new democratic setting. The first decade of the new millenium constituted the Europeanisation phase, heavily influenced by the Bologna Process and Romania's new EU membership. Lastly, the past decade was one in which the internationalization discourse dominated, with various highlights – rankings, international cooperation and the fight to maintain institutional capacity by attracting foreign students.

Higher education was always seen as a sign of social status in Romania. In light of its previous elitist character, the first wave of change (1990s) was linked to massification and happened in a time when other higher education sectors in the world were going through similar changes. This was the decade when Romanian VET colleges were transformed in universities, while, at the same time, there was a dramatic increase in the number of private universities. These private providers started to offset the increasing demand for a higher education degree (Damian 2011:59). This rapid expansion of the capacity of the higher education sector came with a challenge to maintain the quality of provision, which is perhaps why Romania was the first country in Central and Eastern Europe to establish a governmental agency for quality control in this sector, in 1993 – the National Council for Academic Evaluation and Accreditation (CNEEA), following a UNESCO-CEPES study with support from Japan.

There was some resistance to this push for modernization, with some actors trying to revert to the model of the pre-communist academic community. In this sense, Romania has a strong academic heritage based on the centralised Napoleonic model, combined with a second wave of centralism in higher education governance during communism (Dobbins and Knill 2009; Dobbins 2011).

The European Union, together with the World Bank, also played an active role in redesigning the Romanian higher education landscape, which brought international trends close to those taking policy decision. A long-standing higher education expert in Romania pointed out that "the 1990s were the decade of Euro-Atlantic influence in the Romanian higher education system. The influence of Anglo-Saxon excellence models was predominant, especially in relation to university research reform" (Interview 2).

This so-called "Euro-Atlantic"[2] influence included, for example, the introduction of moderate tuition fees and an increasing focus on research outputs inspired by the US higher education system model, as well as the adoption of British inspired models of lump sum funding (Dobbins and Knill 2009, 416). This was coupled with the introduction of EU and Bologna Process inspired recognition instruments, such as ECTS, qualification frameworks and Diploma Supplement.

At the government level, the prevailing discourse seemed to be heavily influenced at the time by the World Bank (Interview 2), whose influence started to manifest itself around 1991/1992, potentially due to its status

as the main external funding source for higher education reform in this transition period (Cîrstocea 2014, 130).

The OECD also undertook a "Review of National Policies for Education" for Romania (OECD 2000), which became highly influential amongst Romanian policy makers (Interview 1). The focus of the OECD with regard to higher education was on the system governance and structural reforms, enhancing teacher training, as well as on fostering links between universities and the labour market.

As this first phase of transition closed, international norms were largely used by the government as a form of leverage for reform in conjunction with the strong presence of international organizations on the ground, while opponents of reform did not seek to move beyond a defence of the national status quo.

In the second phase (2000-2008), there seems to be an instrumentalization of the Bologna Process by the government in the context of the EU accession process, mostly looking at the structure of the higher education system and mainly using a negative legitimation strategy (i.e. invoking the perils of choosing a different path for the upcoming accession of Romania to the EU). In this phase, the government had the perhaps surprising help of one of the student national federations (ANOSR), which used the Bologna Process in a positive way, as a resource to establish itself and to promote student interests.

In the third phase (2008-2019), the government promoted a policy shift based on the need to increase Romania's international competitiveness in the discussions surrounding the National Law on Education (Law 1/2011), but other actors in higher education diversified their counter-arguments by including international references (such as the use of the Bologna Process for arguing in favour of maintaining a collegial system of higher education by students and academic staff representatives). In this timeframe, Romania also assumed the Secretariat of the Bologna Process (2010-2012) and organised the EHEA Ministerial Conference and Bologna Policy Forum in 2012. As an EHEA Vice-Chairing country, Romania was an influential player in the drafting of the EHEA Bucharest Communique.

Over these three successive moments, there is a clear evolution of the use of international norms by Romanian higher education actors. During the 1990s, the system and its actors were in search of relevant models and still heavily centralised. In the second "Bologna" phase, we can already see two interesting instances of strategic use of international norms. On the one hand, the government used the Bologna Process both as a resource

for its reform and as a constraint to limit opposition. In the third phase, we witness the government using international processes to legitimize national reforms, but also starting to "upload" national policy priorities within the areas where it played a significant role, such as the EHEA. Also, at this moment, actors displayed a diversified use of internationally inspired arguments for their policy positions, notably in the defence of the principle of stakeholder consultation itself.

In the Romanian case, according to Deca (2016:130)

> internationalization was initially a wider concept, including mediation by the Government of international policy processes in support for domestic reform, but also a way to ensure "belonging" to the European community. In recent years, internationalization evolved towards an independent policy area, in connection with the desire to increase economic competitiveness in a knowledge-based society.

At the same time, internationalization of higher education as a policy process has resurfaced in the past decade as a central concern for universities, after a relative lack of attention in the 1990-2010 timeframe. In the 1980s Romania was among the top 15 countries worldwide in terms of attracting foreign students (10% of the total student number), due to the strategies employed by the communist government, which included special student support services, lowering tuition fees, providing government scholarships for priority countries, etc (Pricopie and Nicolescu, 2011).

In light of the decreasing number of foreign students starting with the late 1980s and continuing towards year 2000, Romania decided to increase its competiveness and align its higher education system structure with the perceived "European model", which meant adopting the Bologna Process structures (three cycles, ECTS, Diploma Supplement, QF) between 2004-2007 (Deca *et al.*, 2015). Following the adoption of Law 1/2011, a growing concern for internationalization as a distinct policy endeavour was evident at both national and institutional level, perhaps augmented by the rankings shock.

As previously noted, international organizations were key actors in promoting internationalization either via technical/ financial assistance or through thematic reports. Also, the support of specialized agencies was essential. One such example is the Executive Agency for Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation Funding (UEFISCDI), which developed and implemented the "Internationalization, equity

and university management for quality higher education in Romania" (IEMU) project, in 2014-2015, in partnership with the International Association of Universities (IAU) and the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA). This project produced a strategic framework for internationalization, helped twenty Romanian universities to develop their own strategic plans for internationalization and created the "Study in Romania" portal. Another valuable deliverable was a Blueprint for developing a structure for the promotion of Romanian higher education aborad. However, these documents never translated into a nationally endorsed policy. One obstacle for internationalization policies to overcome their current ad-hoc and fragmented status is the legal and political instability. The fast paced change in ministers poses real challenges to design a coherent national policy fo higher education in general and for internationalization of higher education in particular. Also, the lack of national investment in internationalization could not be fully offset by European programs, even though some European calls prompted the Education Ministry to provide matching funding (e.g. the European Universities Inititative call).

Despite the discursive prioritization of internationalization of higher education (Government of Romania, 2019), the internationalization of higher education as a distinct policy never reached policy formulation phase. The relative lack of alignment between general higher education (and general education) policy, internationalization and other policy areas (immigration, foreign policy, economic policy) also impinges on materialising a national approach. It is clear that in a national case where a significat level of historical centralism is present, without a clearly formulated national policy on internationalisation of higher education, which would include general objectives, responsibles, priorities, targets and financial allocations, no significant progress can be made in advancing the national potential in this area. (Deca, 2016)

4. Portugal – How a Former Empire Strikes below its Weight

The Portuguese higher education system has its roots in the Middle Ages, with the first higher education institution being set up in Lisbon, alter moving to the city of Coimbra – University of Coimbra (1290). Its evolution was later influenced by the needs of the Portuguese Empire, with engineering and medical higher education institutions being set up

in various colonies (South-America, Asia, etc.), in order to support the needs of those societies. The links between the former Portuguese Empire territories and the Portuguese universities are very relevant still when looking at how internationalization of higher education is conceptualized in national and university level strategic documents. The establishment of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa – CPLP) in 1996 was an added driver to the intense existing intense academic links with these territories.

Mobility statistics prove that Portugal welcomes more than 60% of its international students from its former territories: Brazil, Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea Bissau and East Timor. All countries except Brazil and East Timor gained their independence in the 1970s, almost at the same time with the Carnation Revolution, which makes Portugal a particular case of transitioning country, as the country still retained close and multi-faceted links with a number of emerging new states. The Portuguese government materialised its interest in maintaining its influence in these territories by offering scholarships to prospective students from CPLP countries (Veiga, Rosa & Amaral, 2006). In addition, there was another driver to increased mobility from these countries – the lack of capacity of higher education systems in these countries –, which became a real push factor for students to seek tertiary education in Portugal (França, Alves & Padilla, 2018).

With the incentive of the increased demand for higher education, in the 1980s and 1990s, a flurry of private higher education institutions tried to offset the two trends – the democratisation of higher education in Portugal and the intake from former collonies. At the same time, culturally and historically CPLP students were not seen as "foreign", even in the legal sense, since universities could not impose extra fees and with special quotas allotted for their enrolment in Portuguese universities.

In this context, Law 62/2007 which addressed the Juridical Regime of Higher Education acted on two fronts – enacted new provisions related to quality assurance and provided the opportunity for higher education institutions to change their legal regime in order to become autonomous foundations, with an increased level of institutional autonomy. Interestingly, only three higher education institutions opted for this possibility at the time – the University of Porto (the largest institution in Portugal by number of students at the time), ISCTE Lisbon and the University of Aveiro. Other higher education institutions later chose the same path – University of Minho, Nova University, etc.

The financial crisis in 2008/2009 hit in a dramatic way the Portuguese economy, with drastic cuts to the higher education sector (Teixeira, 2012). In addition, this prompted increased levels of labour migration, coupled with declining demographic trends. Portuguese higher education institutions became highly motivated to increase their revenues in this time and attracting foreign students was seen as one such avenue (Sin, Veiga & Amaral, 2016).

In February 2014, the Portuguese Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry for Regional Development joined forces in order to develop a strategy for the internationalisation of Portuguese higher education (MADR/MEC, 2014). In July 2015, the Portuguese Government adopted this strategy (Council of Ministers Resolution 47/2015). This document provided guidance and political priorities in what was an area of interest for most, if not all, higher education institutions in Portugal. The strategy included as a clear priority the promotion of the national higher education system and its institutions (universities and polytechnics). It also designated priority regions for further cooperation, going beyond EU and CPLP countries. It aimed to improve the provision of information for prospective international students and to remove some of the red tape associated with visas, residence, financial operations, etc. This was partially achieved by creating the "via verde" – a fast way – for the admission of international candidates in Portuguese higher education institutions and for their settling in the country. Lastly, the strategy aimed to augment the number of higher education programmes offered in English.

Responding to a similar demand for clarifying the national framework for internationalization of higher education, in the same year of 2014, the Statute of the International Student (Decree-Law 36/2014) was adopted. This piece of legislation defines international students as those originating from other countries than the EU/EEA members. The main objective of the law is to define a new admission regime for students that can be treated differently compared to national students, according to EU law. More autonomy was thus given to higher education institutions in setting admission practices for international students, as well as for establishing tuituion fees that reflect the actual costs of higher education. As an exception, students from CPLP countries could benefit from a special scholarship, in order to maintain the links with former Portuguese Empire territories (with the exception of Brazil). However, this last provision is not yet implemented (França, Alves & Padilla, 2018).

If prior to the 2014 Student Statute, students coming from Portuguese speaking countries were not differentiated from national or EU/ EEA students when it came to tuition fees, the change in strategy has incentivised public higher education institutions to be interested in attracting more international students, similarly to private universities, especially in light of the dwindling numbers of national candidates (Sin, Veiga & Amaral, 2016: 185-186). Mainardes, Alves and Domingues (2012) point to an increasing tendency to look at internationalization of higher education in Portugal with a market logic, which is also signaled by the internationalization commission of the representative body of Portuguese public universities (CRUP): "There is a mentality to change and an idea to bear in mind: higher education is exportable" (Assunção, 2017: 7).

In this light, several initiatives were put in motion: one coordinated by CRUP – "Universities Portugal" – with the support of the Government, the Camões Institute, the Portuguese Agency for Foreign Investment and Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Affaires, etc. (Assunção, 2017); another one planned by polytechnic institutions for joint promotion abroad (Mourato, 2016) and a very recent one in 2019 – study-research.pt. The latter is in line with the 2016 Decree which emphasised the link between higher education and research for further internationalization efforts and encompassed the previous "Study in Portugal" portal. A clear focus of the Portuguese Government was attracting Portuguese researchers back to Portugal, by offering 50% tax deducations to those deciding to relocate back in the country. Finally, in 2019, 2500 more places for international students were awarded by the Portuguese Government to higher education institutions, in order to enhance their capacity to attract fee-paying students.

However, despite efforts made in the past decade to rise the profile of Portuguese higher education institutions, the OECD was critical of the strategic endeavours in its Review of Portuguese Higher Education report (OECD, 2019). Even if separate initiatives exist, there is little coherence between them, as well as between higher education, research and innovation policies. In terms of percentages of the overall student body in Portugal, foreign students represented around 6%, with 4% of all bachelor students being international, as well as 8% of all Master students and 27% of PhD students.[3]

Similar to other countries, the strategy for the internationalisation of higher education (and research, to some extent) in Portugal is linked with the country's foreign policy interests. In this case, it attempts to

consolidate the role of Portugal as an education and science hub for Portuguese speaking communities across the world, while relying on the brain gain phenomenon that might be boosted by the country's EU membership. Indeed, Portugal frequently refers to itself as a gateway to Europe (Almeida, 2008). A special interest is seen in relation to the Chinese market of potential degree-seeking students, as Portuguese is the language of several African and Asian countries in which China currently shows clear economic and strategic interest (e.g. Angola, Macao, etc.). One prominent former Portuguese expert underlined the win-win strategy that Portugal and Chinese authorities pursue in this respect – China sends students to Portugal in order to have a European higher education degree and to learn Portuguese and then deploys these graduates in Portuguese speaking countries, in order to make sure it has the human resource to further its interests there (Interview 3).

Portugal's internationalization efforts are declaratively in line with its main foreign policy goals. However, the oversized focus on attracting degree seeking students and its lack of continuity in following its strategic policy documents (mainly due to political and economic changes) makes this former empire strike well below its weight in terms of higher education internationalization (Interview 4). Despite its strengths, it displays a similar tendency to imitate models of internationalization characteristic to economically developed countries, while not fully taking advantage of its unique strengths in the global setting.

5. Comparative Analysis and Conclusive Remarks

Portugal and Romania navigated a historically recent transition from totalitarian regimes to democracy (from the Salazar and Ceausescu regimes respectively). They are both EU members and have been heavily influenced by efforts to harmonise higher education systems in Europe. And they have definitely been impacted by worldwide transformations, such as the 2008/2009 financial crisis or the post-2010 rankings shock. As such, internationalisation of higher education has definitely been, in the case of Romania and Portugal, a "driver for policy change" (Enders, 2004).

In general terms, in the Romanian case, internationalization did not yet reach the stage of policy formulation at the national level, despite commendable efforts made in the IEMU project, where a strategic framework for internationalization was developed, together

with the "Study in Romania" portal and with 20 university strategies for internationalization. Portugal is ahead in terms of national level policy formulation, with a framework developed and adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2015 and subsequently adapted and developed. However, political instability affected a concrete translation of this strategy in a monitored work-plan, especially since no targeted funding was provided for its implementation.

A similar push for internationalization in the two countries was generated by internal structural drivers: rural/urban (Romania) vs coastal/inland (Portugal) divides, resource scarcity due to decreasing public investment and demographic downturn, as well as a noticeable impact generated by the 2009/2009 financial crisis. However, different academic traditions and history may have had an impact on the potential for internationalization at the institutional level. The oldest university in Portugal, the University of Coimbra was founded in 1290, while the oldest university in Romania, the University of Iasi was set-up in 1860. Since those moments, the development of the two countries in terms of geographical spread, political influence and economic prowess influenced the ability to attract and retain both national and foreign students. Both countries have a large amount of their foreign students coming from territories in which Portuguese and Romanian are spoken, which has something to say about the influence of foreign policy and of language proficiency of the academia over internationalization policies. Also, in the early 2000s, both countries were heavily influenced by the structural changes of the Bologna Process and the EU policies (modernization of higher education agenda, Erasmus and Erasmus+, research cooperation, etc.).

Despite their different historical evolution, many traits are common to the two countries, which share their relative peripheric position in the global internationalization of higher education arena. Firstly, both systems retain numerous obstacles related to administrative red tape, foreign language barriers (especially at the level of administrative and teaching staff), financial support for internationalisation, internal resistance. Importantly, the non-alignment of discourse and action is very present in the perception of the university leadership (e.g. in terms of immgiration procedures – despite a formal focus on attracting international students, the number of student visa requests being refused is still high in areas declared as important recruitment markets).

A key role of individual policy entrepreneurs can be observed in both cases, especially when talking about the actors who pushed the

internationalization agenda ahead. They were generally educated abroad via programs such as Fulbright, socialized in European structures and have changed multiple hats, from rectors to decision-makers and from NGO leaders to ministers. Historical links remain of great significance for the two countries, with clear national policies favouring academic links and inward mobility related with territories in which the same language is spoken or that were in the same political alliance at some point in time (Moldova and east of the Iron Curtain for Romania and the CPLP countries for Portugal).

Despite their different trajectory and the diverse points in time when the transition from autocratic regimes to democracy began, as well as despite the different availability of EU funds for higher education projects (due to different EU accession years), Romania and Portugal share similar selling points when marketing HEIs or the entire national higher education system abroad. These include EU membership, safety, quality of life, low cost of living, tourist attractions/ lifestyle, with the extra langauge highlight for Portugal. This can be interpreted as a sign of the emergence of a European brand for higher education marketing, despite modest pan-European efforts in this sense.

There is an interesting comparison to be made regarding the way in which the diffusion of international norms happens in the context of transitions from different ideological totalitarian regimes. A neo-liberal and marketization logic is quite common in the way in which internationalization of higher education is perceived and even mainstreamed in various higher education systems. Romania and Portugal are no exception and the race for more international, fee paying students and for a better place in international rankings is a clear indication. This shows that there is less current ideological underpinning of internationalization efforts than it could have been expected, in light of the distinct history of the two countries.

However, there is a discussion to be had regarding the usefulness of using "big player" tactics when a higher education system is in fact more suited for a "niche" strategy for internationalization. Trying to attract as many international degree-seeking students as possible in order to boost your international standing and to offset the depleated university budget is perhaps not the best strategy, especially if the overall goal of the higher education system is to help in reducing regional divides or to offset shortages in key sectors such as health. Furthermore, in terms of higher education marketing, it is clear that not all countries can or should

successfully target China or South-East Asia, since strong links between higher education systems are hard to build and promising when they already exist.

To sum up, both Romania and Portugal have been making recent efforts in order to boost the international profile of their higher education systems and institutions. State and university efforts seem to converge and the drivers that push the internationalization agenda are less different than what could have been expected. Portugal has, in part, very similar drivers to Romania in its efforts for internationalisation than it one might have expected from countries with a more visible profile in the global higher education market and a colonial legacy. With this in mind, one possible research avenue for the future could be a more in-depth analysis of what constitutes a national internationalization strategy and whether all types of higher education systems actually need a coordinated internationalization effort in order to support the individual efforts of higher education institutions.

NOTES

1 http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx?queryid=172

2 Euro-Atlantic is a term used to capture the desire of the Romanian policy makers to become compatible with both EU and US norms, broadly seen as 'Western' influences. The Romanian efforts towards both EU and NATO integration at the time is also an influencing factor in this regard.

3 https://www.oecd.org/education/education-at-a-glance/EAG2019_CN_PRT.pdf

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RETURN MIGRATION OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MEDICAL PRACTICES: BULGARIA AND ROMANIA IN FOCUS

Abstract

This paper analyses the category of returning health professionals in the field of maternal and child health in Bulgaria and Romania. It looks at the motivations, trajectories and experiences of return migrants on one hand, and on the effects their return migration has on the ways they themselves practice medicine at an individual level and the efforts and steps they take for bringing in transformations at a systemic level. The concept of "medical habitus" is used to grasp the reflexive move that medical professionals are compelled to make when shifting between different medical systems. The result of this shift is transfer of knowledge and transformative effects on the medical system that is framed as "professional remittances".

Keywords: high-skilled return migration, medical transformations, maternal and child health, Eastern Europe

Ten years after Romania and Bulgaria became members of the European Union, out-migration of high-skilled medical professionals continues to be high and to trigger public fears of "brain drain". Migration has been blamed as one of the main causes for the growing shortage of health professionals in Eastern Europe (e.g. Karanikolos *et al.* 2013, Rohova 2017, Sechet and Vasilcu 2015, Wismar *et al.* 2011).[1] Indeed, EU accession brought about free labor mobility and open labor markets, synchronizations and recognition of qualifications, simple professional transfers across the EU, all of which facilitated already intensive high-skilled labor mobility and continuing education/specialization mobility in the European Union among Eastern European health professionals (Glinos 2015). Competitive

wages, bigger opportunities for professional development, and the shortage of medical professionals in Western European countries, have been identified as the main factors for Eastern European professional medical migration (Boncea 2014, Séchet and Vasilcu. 2015, Eurofund 2013).

Economic and social conditions as of 2018 have only recently started to improve for health professionals in Romania and have not significantly changed in Bulgaria. Nonetheless, there seems to be a growing niche for returning medical specialists to engage in a variety of activities that create both profitable and professional development opportunities. This small, but influential category, has been overshadowed by the analysis of "brain drain" and their attempts for re-integrating in their home countries' health systems have remained unnoticed. The vectors of this "return migration" are far from simple or unidirectional. Some return after several years of education, others have migrated with the sole purpose of specialization unavailable at home, yet others have worked abroad for a number of years, before deciding to restart practicing at home. A diverse group, return migrants vary from classical examples of long-term settlement in the home country, through educational fixed-term mobility, to novel patterns of mobility which involve circular movements, highly intensive, short-term regular mobilities, and sometimes simultaneous professional incorporation in more than one country, which is transborder in its character (Krasteva 2015, Roman and Goshin 2015, Tjadens *et al.* 2012).

This chapter focuses on the category of returning health professionals in the field of maternal and child health in Bulgaria and Romania. It looks at the motivations, trajectories and experiences of return migrants on one hand, and on the effects their return migration has on the ways they themselves practice medicine at an individual level and the efforts and steps they take for bringing in transformations at a systemic level. These two dimensions are analyzed through looking at:

1. The structural factors that enable and motivate return migration and the individual experience of re-integration of return migrants;

2. The transformative steps taken by returning health professionals to advance medical knowledge and practice in their home countries both at individual and at systemic level.

In what follows I first outline my methodological and conceptual choices. Then I present the conceptual framework of medical habitus and transformation as applied to the medical field and introduce the concept of "professional remittances". I then move on to a discussion of

the regulatory framework and the factors that enable and facilitate return or circular migration. Next, I present the profile of the returning medical professionals, their diverse professional trajectories, as well as their motivation for return. Finally, I discuss two main aspects of how return migratnts engage in transformative practices:

1. Transformation of individual practices of the return medical professionals;

2. The redefinition of relations and redistribution of roles between different medical and non-medical professionals.

My main argument is that by experiencing ruptures in their medical habitus, return migrants have the potential of being drivers of change both in the individual medical practice and at the systemic level of medical standards, hospital regulations, and state policies. By doing this, however, the medical professionals I interviewed face numerous challenges, tensions, and difficulties to practice their profession. The successful strategy most commonly used to overcome these tensions is to build a strong cooperative network of like-minded colleagues and to choose a niche and a workplace which is welcoming such initiatives and mode of practicing. At the same time, working in such a niche, which also most commonly means working in a private setting in a large city, also poses limitations to the potential scope and outreach of the transformations at this moment in time. My respondents provided diverging solutions for solving these tensions, varying from volunteering in disadvantaged areas, organizing free trainings for other medical professionals, organizing public information campaigns, and finally, influencing the development of new standards and protocols.

Methodological and Conceptual Choices

The research has focused on medical professionals working in the field of maternal and child health. The reason to limit it to only one field is founded in the need to understand better the particular practices and standards in this field in order to grasp the transformative efforts of medical professionals in a more in-depth way. Widening the study to all medical fields would provide a bigger sample but would make more difficult to analyze medical practices in various fields. Medical standards and protocols, guidelines, and concrete everyday ways of practicing

and relating to patients, tend to differ between health systems. These divergences manifest themselves sharply in the field of pregnancy, child birth, and neonatal care, when comparing Eastern European countries with countries like Germany, France, or the UK, which are the main destination countries for migration of health professionals from Bulgaria. In terms of maternal and child morbidity and mortality Bulgaria and Romania score higher than the EU average (http://www.europeristat.com/). High numbers of unmonitored high-risk pregnancies, complications, resulting in high numbers of neonatal mortality, almost three times higher than recommended rates of C-sections (above 40 per cent both for Bulgaria in 2014 and for Romania and growing, with WHO recommendations of 10-15 percent),[2] unnecessary and outdated medical interventions during physiological births, insufficient or non-existent postpartum care, and poor neonatal care (data is available in the National Health Strategies for Bulgaria and Romania). The international medical community has repeatedly criticized such medical practices as outdated and out of line from the latest developments of evidence-based medicine (see WHO guidelines, Byrom and Cooper 2016). While the factors leading to this situation are multifarious, there is a clear divergence between medical standards, hospital protocols, standard procedures, and in the roles and responsibilities of the medical staff (doctors, midwives, nurses) as compared to other EU countries scoring above the average (Miteniece 2017).

The empirical material for this paper was collected in four localities in Bulgaria and Romania. I have interviewed returning medical professionals in the two capital cities, Sofia and Bucharest, and in two other large cities in each country. At this stage of the research and in a context of very little secondary literature available, the empirical material is not sufficient for a full-fledged comparative analysis that would explain potential differences and similarities between the two countries. The sample is too small and the analysis of the context and structural conditions in the two countries is yet to be developed to provide a sound comparative framework. Yet, I have decided to analyze the cases from both countries here for two reasons. First, this allows a bigger number of examples of return medical professionals, given the limitations posed by the narrow field I have defined and the small numbers of returnees overall. Second, and more importantly, the study builds on the similar profile of Bulgaria and Romania as the poorest new EU member states with high numbers of out-migration of health professionals and emerging patterns of return migration and

as countries facing similar challenges in the field of maternal and child health. I aim to go beyond the national specificities of each country case, and to lay the foundations for future in-depth comparative analyses of the state of the maternal and child health in the two countries and the role that return migrants play.

For the purposes of this research, the term "return migration" will be used widely to denote a variety of professional mobilities that involve exposure to a different health system and medical practice, that is followed by some form of re-incorporation into the home labor market, be it full time and long-term, circular, or temporary. The sample is relatively small, given that the numbers of returning health professionals are still low. I have interviewed obstetricians, pediatricians, and midwives, who currently practice in two cities in Bulgaria and two cities in Romania. In total, I have interviewed 18 return medical professionals, I have also interviewed other actors active in this field who are not return migrants: other doctors and midwives, doulas, birth educators, a lawyer, and a journalist. The return migrants have professional or educations experience in Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

I have also interviewed women who gave birth in Romania or in Bulgaria, some of whom have experience with return medical professionals. While I do not explicitly analyze their experience in this paper, I have used it to confirm stated practices, behavior and approaches. The larger part of the return migrants I interviewed are doctors. In addition, I have interviewed three midwives in Bulgaria and Romania, who have short (up to two months) experience from other countries, which were part of their education or professional development and informed their way of practicing. The question of low numbers of returning midwives can be explained through the structural conditions and will be addressed in the second part of the paper.

The research methods for collecting the empirical material for this paper are qualitative. I have conducted qualitative in-depth semi-structured interviews. My selection of respondents was based on the definition of return migration I have given above. The sample was build using snowball effect, networks, and personal contacts in the field. The sample is not exhaustive, there are other return migrants in this field whom I have not reached. Yet it is representative, as explained above, because the people interviewed work in major hospitals in the two countries, are all well connected in their field, and are influential with their opinions. Many of them also either participate actively in public discussion on social networks

groups and through their profiles, or have their own blogs or facebook pages, where they share their personal opinions on medical development, but also reshare studies and research in their field. In this sense, most of the people I interviewed are also running a public profile as professionals in addition to their strictly medical activities and relations with colleagues. In the empirical examples that I give below, I have chosen to not specify whether the respondent is from Romania or from Bulgaria in order to protect their anonymity, which some of the respondents explicitly asked for. Due to the small sample and the narrow field, specifying the country and the city would make it much easier to identify concrete individuals. For the same reason, I will explicitly avoid mentioning names of hospitals or medical centers where these professionals practice currently.

I have also interviewed other active people, working in this field, like journalists, lawyers, activists, birth educators, doulas, lactation consultants, some of whom have also professional experience outside Bulgaria and Romania, others do not. I have also interviewed women who gave birth recently and were in touch in one way or another with some of the medical professionals discussed here. I will not analyze specifically the material from these interviews here, but I have used the information gathered to better grasp the transformative trends discussed by the medical professionals themselves.

In addition to the interviews, I have also analyzed the policy documents like the National strategies on Maternal and Child health of the two countries, available medical standards, professional qualification standards, the publicly available statistical data, and the regulatory framework for professional mobility, for educational and professional recognition of certificates and qualification, and policies for re-integration.

Medical Habitus and the Transformation of Medical Practices

Medical systems are conservative and hierarchical institutions that follow rigorous protocols, assign strict distribution of tasks and roles, and require from their practitioners the adoption of a certain habitus and establishing of authoritative knowledge through certainty (Luke 2003), of certain modes of being and acting, and of relating to other actors (including patients) (Holmes and Ponte 2011). The concept of medical habitus (Luke 20013) builds on Bourdieu's theorizing (1991) and allows to clarify how the medical profession reproduces itself in the forms of

durable dispositions. Practicing in different systems creates the potential for a rupture and requires more than a simple readjustment, it requires a profound transformation of professional habitus. Through various types of migration (labor or professional specialization) health professionals are exposed to alternative models of medical practice in their field. This could result in a disruption of their professional habitus and requires a reflexive move outside the knowledge and practice system in which they have been professionally socialized and educated. This may trigger crises and ruptures in the individual professional practice of the medical specialist, but it may also transform the system itself. Having gained experience from different medical systems and practices, and/or further medical specialization, the return health professionals bring back not only their labor force, but the potential for advancement in knowledge and innovation and to trigger change in their home health systems.

The transfer of new practices and different ways of doing has been called in another migration context "social remittances" (Levitt 2001). In the case of professional practices, we can describe this phenomenon as "transfer of knowledge" or indeed "professional remittances". I use the concept of "professional remittances" to describe the process of transforming medical practices back in the home country as a result of gaining experience and practicing in a different medical system abroad. Transformation of medical practice in relation to return migration is a highly unexplored field, both theoretically and empirically. Studies of health professionals' mobility almost exclusively examine outmigration and the related labor shortage for the country of origin, or integration in the destination country (e.g. Connel 2007, Ognyanova et al 2012, Schah 2010, Schultz and Rijks 2014, Wismar et al 2011). Return migration of health professionals is rarely addressed and mostly through a policy perspective or through analysis of intentions. Specifically, on Bulgaria and Romania, the main interest has been to identify novel forms of return migration (Krasteva 2015) intentions to return (Roman and Goshin 2014), and a more general analysis of return migration policies (Ivanova 2012). None of these studies is concerned with the effects of return migration on the health systems, the return migrants' experience of different labor regimes and medical practices/medical habitus, or how medical practices are transformed by return migrants. In the field of medical sociology and anthropology that is concerned explicitly with medical transformations in the area of child birth, the focus is primarily on long-term historically oriented studies or on ways of promoting change in areas considered

problematic. (e.g. Browner et al 1997, Davis-Floyd 2001, 2004, Kitzinger 2006). The role of health workers mobility is marginally addressed as having the potential for knowledge transfer, without explicit analysis of the actual effects on the system (Williams and Balaz 2008). In this context, studying in-depth the experiences and the efforts of medical professionals to transform the medical practices, is an attempt to better understand the effects of intensified mobility of high-skilled professionals on the wider society.

In the field of medical sociology and anthropology that is concerned explicitly with medical transformations, the focus is primarily on long-term historically oriented studies or on ways of promoting change in areas considered problematic (e.g. Davis-Floyd 2004, de Vries *et al.* 2002, Duden 1993; Kitzinger 2004; Oakley 1980, 1984, Van Hollen 2003). Surprisingly, the field remains largely unaffected by studies of health workers mobilities. The other empirical field that remains underexplored is the field of maternal and child health, especially prenatal, natal, and neonatal care. In Bulgaria, this field is only examined by a handful of current medical practitioners from a practical point of view and a limited scope. In Romania, while more numerous, the sociological studies have been tackling other aspects of reproductive health, more specifically tracing the effects of the highly restrictive abortion policies of the Romanian socialist state (Anton 2009, Kligman 1998, Pop 2015, Sijpt 2017).

My study aims to shed light on this unexplored interconnection between professional mobility and transformation of medical practices and to set the basis for further research and analysis in other fields, but also with other methods, in order to understand the wider scope of the potential for transformation and positive change.

Structural and Individual Factors for Return and Circular Migration

EU freedom of mobility, high-skilled labor regimes, and recognition of education and professional qualification

Freedom of mobility as one of the principles of the European Union is one of the main factors that allows circulation of medical professionals. Yet, conditions for the out-migration of high-skilled professionals already existed before Bulgaria and Romania EU accession and the restriction to

access to the labor market which some countries applied after 2007, did not affect these categories of skilled and high-skilled migrants. While access to the labor market was not a major barrier, the process of recognition of education and skills required more time and efforts, both in the case of finding employment in another EU country and in the case of returning to Bulgaria and Romania. Until 2007 education and qualification gained abroad had to be recognized through a complex multi-step procedure.

Currently, within the European Union recognition of education and professional qualification for medical professionals like doctors, nurses, and midwives is not fully automatic. These professions fall in the category of regulated professions and they need to follow a certain procedure for recognizing the educational certificates, diploma, specialization and professional position, in order to be granted the right to practice the same profession in another country. The procedures are simplified and there are generally no extra exams (except a local language exam in some cases). Nonetheless, each EU country has different procedures for recognizing professional education and further specializations obtained in another EU country. The documents requested might include diplomas and certificates, programs of study, certificates for good behavior issued by the national professional organization. Mobile medical professionals who are returning to Bulgaria or Romania to practice medicine are required to recognize any diploma or further professional training that they obtained abroad. Compared to the period before 2007 when both countries joined the EU, the procedure are much simplified, faster and straightforward. While there is a need of submitting documentation, the recognition is considered "automatic" in most of the cases. My aim here, however, is not to discuss in detail the different steps of this recognition process, but to see how the returning medical professionals experienced it and thought about it.

All the respondents have returned after the two countries joined the European Union in 2007. Educational and professional recognition has been simplified since the entry in the EU and this has affected the regulated professions (see NACID for Bulgaria, CNRED for Romania). Within the EU, the procedures have been simplified both for qualification acquired in Romania and Bulgaria, and for qualifications acquired in other EU countries and recognized in Bulgaria and Romania. My respondents did not consider qualification recognition as a major barrier. On the contrary, many explicitly mentioned that it was a simple and easy procedure, both for leaving the country to continue their education/specialization or to work,

and for returning back with foreign diplomas and experience. The cases differ widely, ranging from gaining basic medical education in another EU country, through making a specialization, or parts of it, practicing for an extended period abroad, or spending part of the mandatory internship in a hospital in a different EU country.

The private sector in Romanian and Bulgarian healthcare

The emergence and flourishing of private hospitals and the possibilities to register private medical centers is another important structural factor that makes return migration more attractive. Over the last decade private hospitals gained stable grounds in both countries. Arrangements with the National health insurance companies allow some procedures in the private hospitals to be covered by the state health insurance. In addition, private health insurance companies gained momentum and provide additional insurance for extra procedures in private hospitals. The result of these developments is that the number of patients in private hospitals grew steady over the last decade. In all locations studied, the private obstetrical hospitals have a steady flow of patients. Pregnancy monitoring with additional tests and examinations also flourished outside of what is guaranteed under the national health insurance. Fetal morphology is also gaining popularity as a test and is performed by specially trained doctors in private clinics or medical centers. All of these factors contribute to the widening opportunities for successful re-integration of return migrants in settings with better financial conditions, better facilities and more advanced equipment.[3]

Simultaneous professional incorporation

Another factor, contributing to the return mobility of medical professionals, is the opportunity to be professionally engaged in more than one location across the EU. Practicing in more than one country and commuting between locations on a regular basis is an emerging pattern, called "fluid migration", "circular migration" or "pendulum migration" (Gozdziak 2015, Krasteva 2015). Practicing simultaneously in more than one place is made possible by the regulatory framework for medical specialists, but also by the structural context of freedom of mobility within the EU, regular and affordable transport, and flexible hospital regulations on full-time/part-time contracts. The possibility to continue to be professionally engaged in a work place abroad has both

professional and financial implications. On one hand, the financial benefits from sustaining a life in Romania or Bulgaria while also generating income in Western European country are obvious. But in addition to that, there are also professional development aspects that make such divided lives attractive. Finally, the decision to relocate permanently or to keep practicing abroad is bracketed when a professional can be simultaneously incorporated in two sites. In this sense, the structural opportunity that allows simultaneity is a contributing and enabling factor for return, or in this case a type of circular migration of high-skilled professionals.

A good example of such simultaneous professional incorporation is one of my respondents. A well-established doctor with years-long experience in several countries abroad, he came back to Romania[4] about 10 years ago, while keeping his practice in Germany. Every month he spends one week in Germany, and the rest of the time in Romania, where he changed several positions in the meantime. He is actively practicing medicine in both places, but also participates in the management process and organizational decisions in both places. This simultaneous professional engagement in different locations, different countries with different health systems contributed to his continuing reflexive comparison between ways of practicing, ways of organizing healthcare, ways of interacting with patients and colleagues, and distributing tasks among different medical positions. After an extended period of working in Germany, he was reluctant to terminate his practice there and relocate permanently back to Romania. At the same time, he was invited to return by a colleague and help with developing better medical practices in Romania in a prestigious hospital. The regulatory framework of the European Union allowed him to take the decision to return, without giving up his work in Germany. What is more, this simultaneity of practicing affects the ways of doing medicine and will be addressed in detail in the final section.

Motivation and Profile of the Return Migrants

The main category of returning health professionals is doctors. There are hardly any noted cases of returning midwives or nurses. I have managed to identify returning obstetricians and pediatricians in both countries and they were my main scope. The midwives that I have included in this sample, have been professionally abroad either for short exchange trips, or for several months long internships. Nonetheless, I have decided to

include them in the analysis, because first, they are exceptional in their attempts to gain a different kind of professional experience and then apply it back home, and second, because they have established close cooperative working relations with some of the other return doctors and play an important role in the redefinition of relations between professionals, and of redrawing the lines of professional autonomy, as I will discuss below. That said, the majority of the returnees are highly skilled doctors, most of them coming back after a specialization abroad or after having practiced as doctors for an extended period of time (i.e. more than 6 months). With a few exceptions, the returnees got full-time resident positions in large private hospitals, or alternatively, opened their own private practice for consulting, while partnering with a hospital for additional procedures, or for being present during their patients' birth. Those who studied abroad, returned after finishing their specialization or after having practiced for a while abroad. Only two of the doctors I interviewed came back to finish or to do their specialization in Bulgaria or Romania. Two others have acquired their specialization in the country of origin and have practiced as residents abroad, before returning.

The financial factor, while not the first to be mentioned, was something that respondents acknowledged as a base line. The conviction that a doctor can actually make a decent living in Bulgaria or Romania, if working in the private sector, was the necessary condition in order to consider return in the first place, despite the fact that it was not regarded as a sufficient condition. Almost all of the respondent are currently working in the private sector - whether opening their own private practice for monitoring pregnancy and providing special tests, fetal morphology, etc., or working in a private hospital. The financial side of this decision is certainly not the only one, but it is worth mentioning it in view of the discussion on out-migration and brain-drain where one of the major motivations quoted is the financial benefits that medical specialist get in more economically advanced countries in the EU and elsewhere. In addition to working in the private sector, more recently in the case of Romania, the salaries of doctors working in state hospitals have been substantially raised and have become competitive/ comparable to the private sector. While none of my respondents mentioned this aspect, because they have returned before this raise, it is a significant change that might offer more attractive conditions for future return migrants.

The decision to return after a period of studying or practicing out of the home country is usually interpreted as a desire to come back and bring in

something new, to change the system, to contribute to the development of new practices and to improve the health care system as a whole. This is in line with the analysis of motivation for out-migration of Romanian doctors by Irina Boncea (2015), who demonstrates that the financial aspect is only one and not the most important factor for medical professionals to leave. The main reasons behind the decision to emigrate are the undesirable working conditions and the state of the facilities. In this sense, identifying an opening for practicing medicine in a way that will contribute to improving these conditions is of major significance. For all return migrants I have interviewed, identifying a place and a team where they can work in a professional environment that corresponds to their gained experience in other settings, was extremely important. This meant on one hand to be able to work in an establishment which maintains a high level of material and technological basis, which would allow them to use their gained experience fully. In the case of birth giving for example, this means having separate birthing rooms for women, sophisticated birthing chairs/beds, monitoring devices, as well as a number of advanced equipment, most of which is available in some of the private hospitals. At the same time, improving the equipment and the facilities is only one side. Equally important is the team and the relations with colleagues (hierarchies and the skills and approach of their colleagues), the arrangement of work duties (how much administrative work, for example, how are shifts arranged)

This demonstrates two things. One is that raising salaries, while important, needs to go hand in hand with improving facilities, allowing more opportunities for research, encouraging more internal trainings for practicing medical professionals would be an important step for attracting further return migrants. The other point is that return migration is not an individual trajectory, but a move that is conditioned by the networks that medical professionals are able to mobilize upon return for a better re-integration and a way of practicing. In this sense, return migration does not happen in a vacuum and is it not motivated solely by the person's trajectory, individual skills, personal preferences, financial situation. All of my respondents identified at least one other colleague with whom they knew they could partner or turn to upon return, and in most cases, more than one. For most, though, it was more than direct partnering in the form of working together or for someone. It was about identifying the potential of finding a network of like-minded people and the structure to apply their ideas and ways of doing. In the last part of this chapter I will

return to this point by discussing further this establishing of cooperative strategic networks between like-minded professionals.

Two key issues emerged while discussing differences between health systems and the effort to bring in transformation at home: medical practices during labor and delivery, and the redefinitions of roles and relations between medical professionals for building a network of cooperative actors. The rest of the chapter is devoted to these two issues.

Transformation of Individual Medical Practices: Doctors in the Delivery Room

The professional trajectories of returning medical professionals vary. While some obstetricians continued practicing in the labor and delivery wards, others preferred to specialize in pregnancy monitoring, fetal morphology, or new reproductive technologies. Two of the obstetricians changed their track after attempting to work in labor and delivery for a while, while another three only attend births as an exception. I will come back to these cases in the next section. The midwives I interviewed started off as lactation consultants, birth educators and provided monitoring of low-risk pregnancies, before moving to a hospital and attending deliveries. Two of the pediatricians who studied or specialized abroad, also did not start off working in hospitals straight away upon return. I will discuss these winding trajectories and the reasons given in the next section on the redefinition of roles and relations with other actors in the field. In this section, I will focus on those doctors who attend deliveries on a regular basis and the ways in which they assess the system and act as agents of change.

Regarding medical procedures, the respondents chose to address in most details the topics of recommendations for scheduled c-sections, approaches during physiological vaginal birth, and ways of treating the newborn babies during the first hours and days after birth. All doctors agreed that their involvement with a low-risk physiological birth has to be minimal and has to be attended mainly by midwives. This was their experience while practicing abroad in three different countries: Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland. They also discussed relations with other colleagues-obstetricians and how trust and being on the same page is crucial when introducing new ways of practicing. Two out of the three also discussed the relations with neonatologists and the possible tensions that arose in their own practice.

I will illustrate this with the case of Dr. Atanassov.[5] He left Bulgaria in the early 1990's after gaining his specialization in obstetrics and practiced in Germany until his return 9 years ago. He was invited by a former colleague to head the maternity ward in a private hospital. Since then, he changed his position several times, until he found a team and a hospital where he feels he can apply his own methods and practice in a way that he learned in Germany and he thinks is better. In Germany, he worked in an environment where doctors were encouraged to read and apply evidence-based medicine. Sometimes, this means, changing your ways of practicing and learning a new skill, he said. In Germany, he attended annually mandatory trainings organized by the hospital on updating his knowledge and discussing new approaches, he also regularly attended international conferences and went to special trainings to update his skills several times (for example on vacuum extraction). His opinion is that most of his in Bulgaria are not encouraged to develop in their professional knowledge and skills and that this results in using outdated approaches. This is particularly true for low-risk vaginal births, he thinks. In the course of the interview, we discussed different things that he does differently, following what he observed and practiced for many years during his active time in Germany. He is famous among women who are interested in giving birth naturally and without unnecessary interventions. He is also active in public discussions about birth giving being highly critical of the high rates of c-sections in the country, promoting evidence-based medicine as an approach, and arguing about the important of placing women in the center of care.

During our interview Dr. Atanassov explained that he works differently than most of his colleagues-obstetricians in the country. He thinks that many of his colleagues continue to follow recommendations and practices from the 1980s or even earlier. He feels that Bulgarian medicine in the field of birth has frozen since the years when he was a student in the 1970s and has not adjusted to up-to-date research and recommendations. His own experience in Germany has thought him new approaches and the ability to adjust to new recommendations based on on-going research. He emphasized the need of evidence-based medicine:

> Medicine is changing all the time. New things are being discovered all the time, new technologies, new drugs. We need to follow what others develop and apply it in our practice. We have access to research nowadays. We can go to international conferences, read medical journals online…. But what

> is happening in the field of birth giving, is that on one hand there are new techniques, new drugs, new instruments for precise monitoring etc. But .. there is also a move to step back, to relax, to give way to the natural process to evolve. Hands down approach, so to say. So, the progress sometimes means stepping back from interventions for example. And this is difficult to live with, to accept. In Germany this has happened long ago, this move away from medicalizing a natural process, when it is not necessary. Now we need to learn it here as well.

He gave examples with three issues: the rate of c-sections, practices during vaginal birth, and the approach to newborn babies during the hospital stay. He also discussed at length the role of other medical and non-medical specialists during birth and the importance to be able to work well in a team, rather than to feel threatened and think of others as competition. He explicitly referred to the role of midwives and the differences between his experience with midwives in Germany and in Bulgaria. These issues were also key for the other respondents practicing in the delivery room. I will summarize here the main points that were highlighted by Dr. Atanassov and mentioned by my other respondents. The observations made by him have been confirmed by the other interviews I made with midwives, the interviews with women, and the discussions in media, blogs, and social media forums like Facebook. In this sense, this is not an exceptional opinion, but rather describes the wide-spread practices in Bulgarian and Romania hospitals.

First, performing c-sections on a much higher rate than it is recommended by the WHO is common for Bulgaria and Romania (close to 50% as compared to 15%). Dr. Atanassov says that the extremely high rates as compared to other countries in the EU demonstrate a wrong approach from the start. He thinks many of his colleagues find performing a c-section easier, more predictable and easier to control, and less time consuming, than attending a physiological birth which is often unpredictable and certainly longer. However, the benefits for both mother and baby are much higher, he acknowledges, and the risks from unnecessary c-sections are serious. In his practice, he follows recommendations that he followed in Germany and his scheduled c-sections rate is much lower than the average. He makes sure to weigh all the risks of a c-section and present them clearly to the women. His aim is to not downplay the risks, as he thinks is the case often in Bulgaria. In addition, when he does think that the c-section is the safest option for both mother and baby, then he advices

for waiting when possible for the birth to start, before operating, if the case allows it, rather than scheduling it prior the due date, as many other doctors typically do.

Second, Dr. Atanassov discussed at length the concrete practices during vaginal birth that he thinks he does differently compared to most other places. In his view, the reason why so many vaginal births end up often as emergency c-sections or with complications and unnecessary interventions, is lack of understanding of the way the natural process evolves.

> The way natural birth happens in a hospital here is in a very controlled way. The way it used to be done in the 1970's or even the 1960's in other countries. The woman used to enter the hospital with some contractions and the doctors would start procedures on her: a drip with oxytocin to make the contractions regular and stronger, anesthesia to ease the pain from the oxytocin, constant fetal heart tones monitoring, a drip for hydration, a drip for glucoses… then telling the woman how to push, when to push, how to lye down, then - an episiotomy, to make things faster, then pulling the baby, pressing the belly, then pulling the placenta, stitches… The baby is taken for cleaning, for checkups… does not meet the mother for hours… Etc etc.

To this he also added:

> All of this looks like the doctor is in control, regulates the process, even dictates how it will happen. But in fact, it often completely confuses all-natural processes that take place in the body and leads from one intervention to the next, leaving the woman fully exhausted, out of control, in a panic often… We end up with women who are scared, do not know what is happening to them, tired from the effects of all the synthetic drugs that do not allow the body to follow its own rhythm. And often it is the doctor's fault that we end up with an emergency c-section.

As opposed to this practice, he enumerated what happens differently during vaginal births that he supervises: He allows and encourages women to move freely, to change positions often, to drink or eat light food and he only works with anesthesiologists who are comfortable with this approach. He is ready to wait as long as needed for progress as long as the baby's heart-rate tones are good, and the mother is in a good shape. He feels this is a great difference between him and other obstetricians. He also encourages different positions during the second stage. Regarding interventions, Dr. Atanassov thinks that in Bulgaria it is common to use

interventions routinely, without clear indications: routine induction on the 8th day after the due date, routine membrane rupture, routine augmentation of contractions with oxytocin upon hospital admission, routine use of methods that are considered dangerous like the Kristeler maneuver (or fundal pressure), routine episiotomy. He also discussed the common practice to offer epidural anesthesia early and routinely, especially in private hospitals, which he is also against. The active management of the second stage of labor with directed pushes is also a practice that he finds outdated and counterproductive. All of these interventions, he says, might be needed and lifesaving in certain cases, but they should not be used routinely, and the risks of each intervention must be clearly discussed with the women before birth and once more, when they are proposed.

Third, he thinks that the common practices in the immediate period after the birth have to be renegotiated with the neonatologists in the hospitals. He suggests delayed cord clamping, instead of immediate clamping as it is usually done. After the baby is born, he insists that there is "first contact" and the baby stays as long as two hours on the mother's breasts. This means delayed check-up of the new born, or an immediate check-up while the baby is lying on the mother. Something that neonatologists are not easily convinced. He strongly supports breastfeeding and thinks that it is crucial for women to get assistance and advice from a midwife or a lactation consultant in the first days after birth. *"All of this I saw in practice in Germany. This is how things are done there. Here, I have to negotiate and fight with many of my colleagues and even sometimes to convince women that this is better for them."*

This topic intersects with his discussion of the distribution of roles between medical professionals, and the role of midwives in particular. Having practiced in Germany, where midwives are the key actors in low-risk physiological vaginal deliveries, Dr. Atanassov has great trust in the midwife he most often works with.

> When I say I supervise a natural birth, I actually mean I supervise my midwife. She is there, with the woman, she knows what to suggest, what to be attentive to. And I expect her to call me only when there is a problem and I need to intervene. That's what the German midwives were doing, and how things should be. I come every once in a while, to monitor, examine, discuss the progress. But I'm there at all times, ready to intervene immediately if things go wrong, to suggest a different course of action, if there is no progress.

He thinks that there is a shortage of skilled midwives who can attend low-risk vaginal births confidently and skillfully. He himself works with a midwife that he trusts, and he thinks this is crucial for having good outcomes.

The different protocol that Dr. Atanassov follows echoes what the other obstetricians shared. The midwives that I interviewed also try to follow the same recommendations, albeit not always successfully, because of their limited power in certain situations where their decisions or recommendations get overwritten by the doctor on duty. The understanding of what are good practices is shared between these different medical professionals who live in different countries and different cities. In all these cases, the medical professionals were using guidelines, that were also applied in the places where they had the chance to practice. What is important here is the value that respondents place on the opportunity to practice in a different way before returning to their home country. Practicing in a different setting and observing other colleagues following different protocols and medical standards, gave them the confidence to apply these differences upon return. What is more, all these professionals were exposed not only to different protocols and standards but also to a model of adjusting to new recommendations based on evidence-based medicine.

In the next section I continue the discussion of the role of midwives through the lens of relations with other colleagues, distribution of roles between professionals, trust and cooperation – all issues that came up as crucial for future positive transformations of the health care system beyond the individual transformations of medical practices.

Relations with Other Actors in the Field: Obstetricians, Midwives, Doulas, Neonatologists

Good cooperation with other medical and non-medical professionals is a topic that came up in all in the interviews. The role of midwives for monitoring pregnancy and attending physiological uncomplicated births is a theme that both midwives and obstetricians discussed in view of their experience practicing in other countries. Another theme is the relationship with neonatologists and the potential conflicts that arise in Bulgarian and Romanian hospitals between the neonatologists and the obstetricians or midwives. Finally, the issue of cooperation with birth workers without

medical degree like doulas and lactation consultants as crucial support both for women and for the medical professionals was addressed as a contentious point.

The role of the midwives kept coming up in discussions about the distribution of roles among medical professionals. All respondents who practiced or had practiced in a labor and delivery unit, doctors and midwives alike, emphasized the discrepancy between the roles of midwives in Bulgaria and Romania, and the roles of midwives elsewhere. In Bulgaria and Romania midwives and delivery nurses have little autonomy and work under the close supervision of the obstetricians on call. In Romania the midwife profession ceased to exist for a long period since the late 1970s. It was reinstated only in 2004 when under the pressure of EU accession regulations, medical universities re-opened a separate specialization for midwives. In the meantime, the role of the midwife was taken by the delivery nurses, who are still the majority of medical personnel in the delivery wards. Midwives are hired only occasionally. Recently, there have been discussion of closing down the specialization track in the Medical University of Bucharest, I was told in two of the interviews, which, if effective, will leave only to places which offer higher education for midwives: in Galati and in Craiova.

While in Bulgaria, the midwifery profession and education were never interrupted, the actual role of midwives in hospitals is limited to that of nurses. They have auxiliary functions and almost no autonomy in taking decisions. When they do, it is exceptional and depending on the individual arrangements with particular doctors or the shift they end up in (night shifts for example), rather than an institutionally established practice. The education was upgraded in 2004 from vocational training of two years to a BA program of four years with one-year internship included. However, my respondents commented that the academic syllabi, the courses, and the materials used are outdated, in some cases based on textbooks from 1950s, without any access to recent studies, evidence-based approaches, or practical training that involves actual participation of the student or intern. In comparison, the training that the three midwives I interviewed received in other institutional settings was, according to them, much more up-to-date both theoretically and in practice. All this suggests that the skills and the role of midwives are more limited as compared to other countries discussed in this research. When midwives are used in the delivery room as auxiliary personnel, instead of autonomous professionals,

their decision-making capacity and responsibility is often shifted to the obstetrician on call.

These specificities of the education and the status of the midwives in the two countries have resulted in two problems, according to my interviewees. The distribution of roles between doctors and midwives, and the approach to physiological birth. Both midwives with experience in other countries (Estonia and the UK) and obstetricians who worked with midwives in other countries (Belgium, Germany, Slovakia, Switzerland, the UK) confirmed that the role of midwives is more autonomous and that they are the main actors during an uncomplicated physiological birth. They are also the ones monitoring low-risks pregnancies. Midwives have more skills and are allowed to do more interventions than in Bulgaria and Romania. Doctors, on the other hand, step in when there is a need of a higher-level intervention, there is a complication, or a need of surgical skills. Because of this autonomy as medical professionals, midwives in the countries listed above, also learn more skills on how to attend a physiological birth and at the same time also learn how to assess the need of an obstetrician's intervention.

A midwife who works with a doctor, who has practiced for many years in the UK, explained that his approach was to let her attend the birth and only interfere if called by her.

> When I called him, he usually came running, holding an instrument ready for an intervention. That's how he was used to step in the UK. He trusts the midwives fully and knows that he is only needed, if a complication arises. It is not how it work here [in Romania] though. Doctors take the lead in all circumstances and midwives need to follow their suggestions.

Several of the obstetricians interviewed mentioned this discrepancy in the roles of midwives and doctors. They felt, that upon return, practicing in the delivery room meant taking on the job of the midwife, because midwives themselves were not taught how to attend births independently or did not have the authority to negotiate with doctors, being positioned lower in the hierarchy.

This distribution of professional roles in which obstetricians feel they take up the role of the midwife is one of the reasons some of my respondents gave up on practicing in the labor and delivery units. The case of Dr. Mitescu is illustrative. He specialized in Slovenia and took up a job in a big maternity hospital upon return. He was one of the famous doctors

looked after by women who were interested in giving birth naturally with fewer interventions. He was comfortable working with doulas and with student midwives. At the same time, he continued attending international trainings on developing his techniques and knowledge on specific types of interventions. After 4 years of practicing in the labor and delivery unit, he decided to change his professional track to new reproductive technologies. To me, he explained this move with the following words:

> I had enough being a midwife. Not even a midwife, but a security guard who stays at the door of the delivery room and guards it from other colleagues, so that the woman and the midwife can do their job in peace. Most of my practice has to do with waiting and sending colleagues away – the other doctors, the neonatologist, the anesthesiologist who all impatiently kept coming and asking why is it taking so long, why am I not intervening (a Kristeler, an episiotomy, some extra oxytocin)… I was doing something that is not a doctor's job, it is a well-trained midwife's job. I want to sit in my office, do research, read articles, give consultations, and to be called in the delivery room only when there is a need of an intervention. I want to practice my learned skills in complex cases, in high-risk deliveries.

Dr. Mitescu also referred to the tensions with the neonatologists in the hospital, who thought he puts the babies at risk with his approach and often "punished" his patients by keeping the babies longer under observation, administering unnecessary medication, and commenting about his approach. He did not find a team with whom to work in a comfortable way and decided to change his track to a field where he feels more useful as a doctor.

Another obstetrician who is considering returning to Romania but is currently practicing in Germany shared that she does not see how she can practice in Romania unless she finds midwives to trust and work with.

> I have no place in the delivery room during a normally proceeding labor. I am needed when there is a complication. This is my job. The midwives are full-fledged professionals who should know what they are doing and we need to work together.

The role of the midwife, the autonomy, the trust between different medical professionals (obstetricians, neonatologists, midwives) came up in many of the interviews. Not simply as a distribution of tasks, but also as a certain

set of skills that are missing, when the role of midwives is restricted to that of nurses.

The skills that my respondents' midwives gained during their educational exchanges and continuing trainings are not skills that they learned in the university or during their internships in the state teaching hospitals. These are techniques that aim to avoid an interventionalist approach.

One of the midwives who attended an educational exchange in the UK said:

> A lot of what I saw during my internship is a hands-off approach. Waiting. Suggesting different positions. But mostly, being there and making sure everyone is ok. If there is something worrying, then make an assessment and call the doctor. But often the whole birth was only attended by midwives. They even do the stitching at the end, and before that, the episiotomy, if deemed necessary,

She thinks that Romanian midwives and nurses have lost these skills over time. At the same time, doctors learn an interventionalist approach and as the opinion of Dr. Mitescu shows, they prefer not to take up the tasks of the midwives. This is in line with the analysis of the medicalization of birth across the world and the authoritative knowledge which has been shifted in many places from women and midwives to doctors.

In light of the above, the returning medical professionals, midwives and doctors alike, play a crucial role not only in the transformation of their own individual practices, but also in the process of redistribution and redefinition of medical roles. The tensions that often arise between obstetricians or midwives and neonatologists also add to this. In addition, there are other non-medical birth workers who also could play an important role in labor and delivery and the subsequent stage of breastfeeding and caring for a newborn. Far from all obstetricians in Romania and Bulgaria feel comfortable with the presence of a doula during labor. In many hospitals in both countries the access of doulas is restricted. In others, doctors agree reluctantly, but try to convince women not to go with a doula. In contrast, during my interviews, the question of the presence of doulas was regarded in a positive way both by doctors and by midwives. Some of them in fact recommended explicitly to the women to hire a doula if they can, because this facilitates their own work as well. One of the doulas I interviewed told me that the only doctor who

explicitly encourages women to hire a doula in fact has also practiced in Switzerland. While this might be a coincidence, it demonstrates a trend also confirmed by my other respondents. The medical professionals quoted their own positive experience with doulas, but also the most recent studies which demonstrate that the presence of doula improves the outcomes for both mother and baby. IN this sense, there is a collaboration that stretches beyond the categories of medical professionals, to include other birth workers.

The attitude towards lactation consultants was similarly positive. While in certain hospitals, visits from lactation consultants are undesirable, if not forbidden, the medical professionals I interviewed were confident in their usefulness for women in the current distribution of medical roles. In countries like the UK or Germany it is common for the midwife to provide additional consultations on breastfeeding. In Bulgaria and Romania midwives and nurses have contradictory knowledge and skills in this field, some using outdated methods and recommendations. For this reason, the category of lactation consultants is gaining momentum. Some are certified as paid IBLCE (https://iblce.org/) consultants, others work voluntarily and are certified by organizations like La Leche Ligue (https://www.llli.org/). My respondents, the pediatricians more particularly, felt very strong about the importance of lactation consultants and saw how cooperation with them results in better outcomes for breastfeeding mothers.

A good team of an obstetrician, a midwife, a doula, a neonatologist, and a lactation consultant represent a network of professionals that can guarantee a holistic care for women and babies. Such cooperative networks are yet to be developed fully. Currently, in Bulgaria there is an association called Modern Maternity Care Network (https://modernmaternitycarenetwork.wordpress.com/), whose members are actively working in this direction. This is just one example of a formalized network of professionals and activists who aim at triggering a positive change by cooperative efforts. The midwives in this study all work in private settings with certain doctors and doulas who trust each other. Unlike the experience of Dr. Mitescu, these teams manage to support each other in their efforts to practice in a way that is still different than the average in the two countries. Their examples show how the individual changes in the medical practice need to be placed in the context of a network in order to bring about consistent and long-lasting change.

Conclusion and Future Directions

The two issues discussed above – changes in the individual medical practices during labor and delivery and the question of relations between colleagues, more specifically between obstetricians and midwives—emerged as key themes in the interviews with returning medical professionals. They are at the core of organized efforts to transform the model of maternal and child care in Bulgaria and Romania. As I have illustrated medical professionals with practical experience in other medical systems are consciously changing their own way of practicing and making further steps to bring about change at a systemic level. I have argued that the experience in a different medical system bring ruptures to the medical habitus established through education and medical socialization. Switching from one system to another requires a reflexive move. My respondents critically appraise their position of re-entering a system while doing things differently than it is established. All of them are actively and consciously engaged not only in applying different practices, but also in pushing further for changes at a meso and macro level.

The divergent and multi-level efforts made towards transformations of the health system as a whole need further exploration. Three issues came up during my interviews, which I could not address here due to lack of space: the need to change the interactions with patients, the re-definition of hierarchical relations between colleagues, and the involvement in systemic changes at policy and normative framework level.

The first issue is particularly crucial when discussing birth giving women. Whether women are treated as passive patient to whom medical specialists perform intervention, or are treated as active participants in the process, makes a huge difference in the outcome, my respondents maintained. What is more, the autonomy of the patient, the right to be informed in a clear and simple manner and the right to take decisions over one's body and treatment is still a problematic question in both Romania and Bulgaria, and needs to be addressed further. The differences of experience between practicing abroad and practicing in their home countries, were striking for my respondents.

The second, the relations between colleagues and the lack of environment for professional development, was something that several of my informants found problematic as compared to their experience in other places. They are all actively working towards fostering fruitful conditions for further professional growth, for incorporating international standards

and guidelines into their hospital protocols, and for developing a learning environment in their institutions. What is more, some of my respondents have organized free training and continuing education workshop with international lecturers for the wider medical community providing an avenue for learning new skills and for further professional development.

Finally, the active involvement in policy making at the level of re-writing medical standards, guidelines, and protocols, but also at the level of public awareness raising through various campaigns, are steps that some of my respondents are taking towards a systemic change that will affect a wider group of people than just their own patients.

To conclude, medical habitus is not only about concrete medical practices, but also involves a structure of hierarchical and collegial relations, trajectories for professional development, interactions with patients, and position within a network of professionals working together. These different levels of being and becoming a medical professional are informed by being part of a health system. My research has demonstrated that being incorporated in more than one health system and being thus exposed to different ways of doing medicine and relating to colleagues and patients, might lead to transfer of knowledge, to transformations of practices, and ultimately to transformations of the system as a whole. In this way, migration that involves return and circular mobility, contributes to these multiple incorporations and brings about change in the form of "professional remittances".

NOTES

1 This paper builds on a long-going research in Bulgaria and Romania. Besides the generous funding I received as a NEC fellow, I have also used materials from my research conducted during my fellowship at the Centre for Advanced Studies in Sofia in 2018.

2 See https://www.europeristat.com/images/EPHR2015_Euro-Peristat.pdf Data in this report is from 2014 with 43 percent for Bulgaria and 46.9 for Romania. Bulgaria and Romania are both in the section of highest share of c-sections in Europe together with Cyprus and Poland. Since then these numbers keep growing.

3 In some cases, equipment in state hospitals is more sophisticated, especially for critical cases, like premature births etc. In this sense, I do not claim that private setting have better equipment in all spheres. However, private settings do invest in new and advanced technology for pregnancy monitoring on a much higher rate than state hospitals can afford to do, according to my respondents, which is considered a beneficial factor.

4 For the sake of keeping the respondents' anonymity I use interchangeably Bulgaria and Romania as countries of origin, without matching them to the actual examples.

5 All names have been changed for the purpose of anonymity.

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SECRETS AND PRIVACY

Abstract

Secrecy is an interesting topic in contemporary epistemology, because whilst there has been a lot of work on issues to with how we understand what it is to be private there has been little work on the attendant issues of secrecy. In part this is because secrecy and privacy are often thought to be, if not cut from the same cloth, similar enough that understanding privacy entails understanding secrecy. However, I argue that we cannot mop up issues to do with secrecy in the same way we think we can deal with similar issues to do with privacy; secrecy and the revelations of secrets pose very different issues to privacy and the protection of our privacy.

Keywords: secrecy; privacy; social epistemology

Introduction

In the introduction to *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Boethius admits that there are errors in his work, but they have been put there *deliberately* for the discerning reader to discover (Boethius, 1969). So, if you happened to find fault or contradiction in the work, Boethius could smile knowingly and say "Yes, I know" as if you and he had been let in on a special secret.

In the spirit of Boethius, let me start by saying that there are a few things I am not telling you. That is, I am going to be keeping secrets from you. Indeed, I am doing this in order to illustrate an interesting aspect of secrecy, which is that you can know something is being kept secret from you without knowing what the propositional content of the secret is. This is, I think we should agree, interesting.

In the same spirit, there are also certain things I am not telling you, but these are not secrets. Rather, they are private concerns; they are things I do not think you need to know (nor do I think you have the right to pry into). Unlike the secrets I am keeping from you, which I have to actively conceal, if you pry into my privacy, then I am simply entitled to ask you not to pursue the matter any further.

Sitting somewhere between my secrets and my private matters are the things which seem like they should be secret, yet are somehow either well-known *but nonetheless treated as secret*, or are the kind of thing we simply do not ask after *so are effectively secret* despite not being private matters.

Given all of this, it is curious that there has been little talk amongst philosophers—particularly we epistemologists who are interested in the study of knowledge—on the specific topic of secrecy. Rather, most of the philosophical literature has focussed on the notion of privacy, and analogies between privacy and secrecy. It has been assumed in these discussions that an analysis of privacy will automatically inform our understanding of secrecy. However, I argue that when we talk about privacy, then we are often concerned with *protecting* the privacy of citizens. But when we talk about secrecy, much of our interest surrounds talk on the *revealing* of secrets. As such, our interest in privacy is often phrased in terms of protecting our privacy from prying interests, whilst our interest in secrecy is not necessarily so virtuous. We are allowed to be private, but it is not so clear we are entitled to our secrets. Or, if we are entitled to them, it is not obvious we can easily condemn those who want to pry into them regardless.

Understanding what is secret, secret-like, and what is private should be of great interest to many of us. Not just because we sometimes suspect friends or colleagues to be keeping secrets from us. No, because many of us are concerned about claims of influential organisations, like governments and businesses, either secretly doing things they should not, or hiding behind claims of privacy to get away with acting secretively.

Definitions (and Definitional Issues)

In previous works I have argued that despite people thinking they knew what constituted conspiratorial activity, and what the domain of these things called "conspiracy theories" are, it turns out theorists were working with different definitions, and thus the diverging and increasingly disagreeable findings of research programmes into conspiracy theories were the product assuming everyone was working with the same concepts when they were not. (Dentith, 2014; Dentith, 2018.; Dentith & Keeley, 2018) It is my contention that the discussion of secrecy suffers from the same kind of problem: we all think we intuitively know what a secret is,

and what constitutes secretive activity, but when we start trying to sort out the issues it turns out that we are not all on the same page.[1]

Indeed, this is hinted at by the philosophical literature. Martijn Blaauw, in his introduction to a special issue of *Episteme* states that there is not yet an epistemology of secrecy (Blaauw, 2013a, p. 99). As he points out, this is unusual, and I would argue that it speaks to the fact there are certain concepts we all think we know the definitions of, despite it being the case that when these concepts are examined, there is disagreement about both the definitions and what falls under them.

Here is an example from the literature on privacy. David Matheson, for example, writes:

> Just from the fact that I have no privacy with respect to my spouse and information about my life savings, it doesn't follow that I have no privacy with respect to you and that personal information about me. Nor does it follow from the fact that I lack this privacy relative to my spouse that I lack other privacy relative to her – say, about the amount of cream I habitually consume with my coffee at the office, or about my plans to surprise her with a gift next month. (Matheson, 2013, p. 193)

Matheson here talks about keeping private from his spouse the amount of cream in his coffee, and the organisation of a surprise gift for her. Presumably he has too much cream in his coffee, something his spouse would be concerned about. This does not seem to be a private concern. Rather, this is something he is keeping *secret* from his partner. The surprise gift is also something which suits better the notion of secrecy than it does privacy. One does not keep private the fact you have bought someone a gift. No, you keep that secret if it is meant to be a surprise. As such, neither of Matheson's examples seem to comfortably suit the idea of being private concerns. Instead, they are secrets he is keeping from his partner. So why talk about them as private?

Well, maybe it is because Matheson thinks that privacy is just a special kind of secret, the kind of secret which concerns personal information. After all, whether we are keeping secrets or being private we are—in some sense—controlling who has access to certain information that only we are privy to. If that is all there really is to privacy (keeping personal information from others), then privacy would turn out to be a subset of secrecy generally. As such, a fulsome account of secrecy should also provide us with an account of privacy (and conversely the literature on a

particular kind of secrecy, privacy, should lead us—with some work—to the development of an epistemology of secrecy).

Part of the problem as to why there has been no development of a specific epistemology of secrecy might also stem from the fact that secrecy and privacy are hard to disentangle. Martijn Blaauw, for example, claims there is an "intuitive connection between 'privacy', 'secrecy' and 'knowledge'" (Blaauw, 2013a, p. 99). This similarity between secrets and privacy is understandable; there is, after all, something similar about how we keep secrets and how we act in a privative fashion. Part of this is a language issue: how we talk about privacy and how we talk about secrets (at least in English) is similar. For example, take the phrase "not being privy to." When one is not privy to some information that can apply to information which is private or secret. For example, I am not privy to my mother's voting record (a private matter) or the trade negotiations of my government (a secret). "Privy'' here refers to both secrets and privacy, which either speaks to their commonality, or serves to confuse the matter.

However, Sissela Bok argues in her book *Secrets* that secrecy and privacy are often confused:

> In secularised Western societies, privacy has come to seem for some the only levitate form of secrecy; consequently, the two are sometimes mistakenly seen as identical. (Bok, 1982, p. 7)

"Seen to be identical" is crucial here. Whilst both acting privately and being secretive consist of controlling information, there is a crucial difference between being private and the keeping of secrets. So, let us look at privacy and secretly independently.

Privacy

When you act privately, you are keeping information about yourself to yourself because there are certain things people do not necessarily need to know about you. A private person can *appear* secretive, but private people are not necessarily *concealing* things from others. Rather, they are *not sharing* information with them for a variety of personal reasons (for example, a lack of comfort or trust in the people they are dealing with).

To keep some information about yourself private, one need only—in many cases—keep quiet about it. For example, someone might keep their

gender or sex life private because these are things only people they trust ought to know.

Of course, whilst someone who is private is not necessarily secretive, they may *look* that way to someone else. It is easy to perceive someone acting in a private fashion with them keeping secrets from you. This is especially the case if we are curious or actively engaged in trying to find out details about someone, or we think we are in a better relationship with that person than we actually are. So, there is a tension between what you consider privative behaviour and what others consider secretive.

Privacy, then, is about control of personal information, namely controlling what information we want people to know about ourselves.

As Martijn Blaauw argues:

> We don't want just anyone to know just anything about us: we want to be able to control which persons obtain knowledge of which private or secret facts about ourselves in which contexts. Put differently: we don't want to be known to the same degree by just anyone in any old situation. (Blaauw, 2013a, p. 99)

Blaauw conflates secrecy with privacy here. Now, as I argued earlier, it is true that in both cases information is being controlled. It is also true that we can be privative about personal facts and also secretive about the same facts. Take, for example, the aforementioned privacy of gender. Gender identity is a typically a personal matter, given that no matter what biological characteristics you physically present, the sense of what gender you identify with is something only you can experience. That is, it is a private experience, and thus it is entirely up to you whether you share that with others.

However, you might also choose to conceal your gender identity; that is, keep it secret. For example, if you live in an oppressive regime where not identifying with the gender marker on your birth certificate is a problem, you might decide that your gender isn't just something you want to be private; you might have to actively keep it secret from certain authorities.

Then there are some things *you* might think should be private that *others* will treat as secret. For example, being privative about your partner's gender is considered secretive in some—perhaps most—situations because there is an expectation that this is the kind of information people should not be reluctant to share.

The fact we can keep private details about our lives secret does not mean they are no longer private nor does it tell us that privacy and secrecy are the same. It merely tells us that privacy and secrecy concern controlling information; they share a common feature, but this common feature does not necessarily tell us that one is a sub-set of the other. Indeed, we see this in Blaauw's definition of privacy:

> [A] three-place relation between a subject (**S**), a set of propositions (**P**) and a set of individuals (**I**). **S** is the subject who has (a certain degree of) privacy. **P** is composed of those propositions the subject wants to keep private (call the propositions in this set 'personal propositions'). And **I** is composed of those individuals with respect to whom **S** wants to keep the personal propositions private. ***S** has privacy about **P** with respect to **I**.* (Blaauw, 2013b, p. 168)

Blaauw defines privacy with respect to a set of "personal propositions" and this seems right; privacy concerns the personal. Secrecy, however, does not necessarily concern the personal (although it can), and this, I will argue, makes secrecy and privacy different in kind.

Secrecy

We know people keep secrets. As I stated in the introduction, you know I am keeping secrets from you in this article, and you also know something about the content of those secrets; namely that they are illustrative of secrecy generally. This puts you into an interesting position, because if you are attentive to my examples, then, like the keen reader of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, you might be able to work out what I am keeping secret from you.

Secrecy, like privacy, is also a three-place predicate: (**S**) keeps a set of propositions (**P**) secret from (**I**).

Unlike privacy, however, which is mostly passive (in that being private is attitudinal), secrecy is active: one needs to actively conceal something to be engaged in keeping secrets.

Now, keeping secrets by simply never telling people about them is relatively easy task, but things get interesting, at least epistemically, as soon as someone decides to share a secret with someone else. If someone shares a secret, but still wants to keep said secret concealed from the wider

population, then they are obliging the person with whom they shared the secret to keep it secret as well. As such, as soon as anyone swears another to secrecy (which is to say get them to help keep something secret), then they have to also work out how to manage who knows (and who should never know) the secret. This can be as easy as knowing they can trust a certain person with said secret, or as hard as ensuring—say, via blackmail—that said secret never gets out.

As such, we can ask how S knows *p* is being kept secret from I? That is, when someone has a secret, how do they know it is still secret (especially if said secret has been shared with others). Keeping something private is fairly easy, given that privacy concerns personal matters, but secrecy, as we will see, can concern anything, and thus there is a greater chance someone else might know what it is you are keeping secret.

Also, no matter how well or badly someone keeps a secret, there is always the chance people will suspect them of *keeping secrets*. If someone, for example, avoids talking about what the "X" in their set of middle names refers to, then people might well think there is some secret around what that X refers to. If someone avoids all discussion about a certain family member, then others may well think some secret is being kept about that family member (perhaps concerning some sinister event in that person's family history).

This tells us something interesting about secrets: you can know secrets are being kept *without knowing what those secrets are*, and you can—in some cases—work out the likely "shape" of those secrets *even if you never come to know their actual specifics*. Thus, we can ask whether I knows S is keeping some secret *p* from them.

There is, then, I would argue, a distinction between knowing our own secrets are being kept, and knowing that someone's secrets are being kept from us.

The first case concerns how I might know that some piece of information I know is being kept secret from you; i.e., what epistemic considerations would justify my belief that a secret of my own is kept safe. This is a separate consideration to the worry that secrets are being kept from us which invokes a different set of epistemic considerations, given we are inferring the existence of information which we suspect is being intentionally concealed from us.[2]

Why We Keep Secrets

Being privative simply requires that we keep personal information to ourselves, but secrecy requires intentionally concealing something from others.

You can keep a secret for any old reason. For example, I can keep secret what I ate for breakfast if I want to, or the title of the last book I read. There is no restriction as to what can be kept secret. As such, just because you are being secretive that doesn't mean what you are keeping secret is of interest to someone else.

But when we move from talk of keeping our own secrets to talk of what others are keeping secret from us, there is a suspicion that the likely reason someone would keep a secret is to intentionally conceal information which, if revealed, would be deleterious to the secret-keeper.

Now, the harm, so to speak, might be to the person keeping the secret (for example, should my murderous ways become known you might enact vigilante justice upon me) but as secrets are sometimes shared, the harm might also be to someone else (if my friend's infidelity I was sworn to keep secret was revealed my friend might well be ostracised from their community).

Harms here can range from physical harm to mere embarrassment. I might keep my inability to sing secret because the rest of my family can sing well, and my lack of singing ability is embarrassing. Or I might keep my role as a double-agent secret because I am rightfully worried the leader of some nation will order my assassination.

However, another motivation behind keeping a secret is not necessarily harm but, rather, control of information. Not all secrets need be harmful (or even embarrassing). They may just be things we don't want people to know for a variety of social, political or pragmatic reasons.

For example, the former Prime Minister of New Zealand, John Key, claims to not remember which side he was on during the notorious unrest over the Springbok Tour of 1981. This is despite his claims to have always been a rugby fan, and the fact he was in his early twenties at the time. We know he was interested in rugby and we have no reason to think he would have had some cognitive deficit at the time which would have led him to forget where he stood on the matter. (O'Brien, 2017) Many members of the New Zealand public thought John Key was keeping his stance at the time of the tour secret because no matter which side of the debate he was on, there would be significant political downsides to expressing an

opinion. If he came out as having opposed the Springbok Tour he would have become unpopular with certain right-wing voters, whilst if he said he had supported the Springbok Tour he would have become unpopular with centrist voters. As such, for the Prime Minister and leader of the National Party, stating either position would be bad, so it was better to keep his past views secret.

Sometimes you have to keep secrets for work purposes, or to ensure you will have work (spies both must keep secrets and be seen as being able to keep secrets, for example). People working in the medical profession must protect their patient's privacy but might also act secretly as well in order to reveal as little information as possible (i.e., they may err on the side of secrecy in order to ensure their patient's privacy, and thus refuse to reveal information which is not necessarily private to some patient). Jurors must keep secret what they hear in court, and trade negotiators will want to keep critical information about what their country or firm is willing to concede secret in order to achieve the best deal, and so forth. Historically, stonemasons kept their practices secret in order to prevent rivals from competing with them; in order to become a stonemason you had to apprentice to another stonemason and swear yourself to secrecy about masonic practices. As such, secrets were necessary to both ensure work and eliminate competition.

Then there is the matter of why we might want to appear to be secretive. After all, one can appear to be secretive without actually keeping secrets; you might want to cultivate the idea you can keep secrets (by both claiming to know secrets but never talking about the content of those secrets) so you will be let in on secrets.

In some situations it might even be necessary to show (or come to be known) that you know, or have access to secrets in order to prove your worth as a secret-keeper. Take, for example, the political fixer, or chief spy in a royal court; it is necessary for their job that it be known they both have secrets and can keep secrets. As such, it would be weird to not suspect such a person of keeping secrets (even though they might not be keeping anything particularly secret from you).

Becoming known as a secret keeper might also make some people be more likely to entrust secrets to you, because someone who knows secrets but does not reveal secrets could be considered more trustworthy than someone who appears to know no secrets (and thus cannot be reliably judged to be able to keep secrets) even if it turns out they both know secrets and are the kind of person who will not even reveal that they know secrets.

The Suspicion of Secrecy

There is something interesting about what happens when we suspect someone of keeping secrets. Take, for example, what is sometimes called "lying by omission." Consider the adulterer, who claims "If you had asked me if I was sleeping with someone else, then I would have told you." Or the salesperson who claims "You should have asked where I got the goods from" when you discover the vehicle they sold you was originally stolen.

In each of these cases you have not been explicitly lied to, but important information you think you ought to have known was kept from you. A lie by omission suggests someone would have told you the truth had you simply asked pertinent questions (like "Are you having an affair, darling?" or "Is this car I am about to buy stolen"). That is, the notion of the lie by omission relies upon the idea that there is information you *ought to know* but are not being told. That is, what you ought to know is being kept (secret) from you.

As such, one way to distinguish between what is secret, and what is private might be to explore the way in which information which is either secret or private transitions from being unknown *in some sense* to being known.

Private information is *relatively* unknown; it is, of course, known to the person to whom it is private (thus it is not *totally* unknown), but its known-ness beyond that will be limited. If someone is privative about their gender, then they are not sharing it with others, making it relatively unknown. Yet the mechanisms a private person might employ to keep their privacy will often appear to be the same as that of the secretive person. Secrets also require that information is relatively unknown (once again, the person or people keeping the secret will know it). However, secrecy is *directed* in a way that privacy is not: private people simply do not share personal details with just anyone; secretive people, however, intentionally conceal some information from others. That is to say, secrecy is targeted, whilst being privative turns out to be a general attitude.

Indeed, with regards to private information, the final arbiter of who exactly needs to know what is being kept private is the person the information is personal to. If I decide to share private information with you, then I have decided that you need to know it. If I decide to keep it private from you, then my personal information is something I have decided you do not need to know.

However, when it comes to secrecy, the argument for someone else *needing to know* shifts. When something is personal, then it is my right to say "You do not need to know this'', which should suffice as a reason on its own.

But when something is secret, then claiming that someone does not need to know it typically requires further argument.

Of course, sometimes secrets are things it turns out we do not need to know after all. It is not uncommon to find out that someone has been keeping some unimportant or trivial matter secret, such that when it gets revealed your first thought is "Why did they bother to keep that secret?" This speaks to the fact that we can keep anything secret, and what we keep secret might be something that we want to conceal from others, even if it turns out no one cares when the secret comes out. Perhaps the best example of this comes from Dan Brown's novel "The Lost Symbol", where it turns out that the ancient secret the Freemasons have been keeping from outsiders from time immemorial is the King James translation of the Bible, a book which is widely available (Brown, 2009). Even Brown's protagonist cannot quite understand why the Freemasons are keeping this particularly commonplace book secret from outsiders.[3]

But the "Why bother?" aspect of some secrets is interesting, because it points to a curious feature of secrecy: anything can be kept secret no matter its truth or importance. If I want to keep secret the brand of soy milk I most prefer, I can. It does not matter that no one cares about my soy milk preferences; I can keep it secret if I really want to.

The idea that some things we might want to keep secret turn out to be things no one thinks is worth keeping secret has a sometimes sinister analogue in what is known as the "open secret". The open secret is an example of a claim which is known to most (if not all) but is treated as if it were a secret nonetheless.

Examples of the open secret are varied. Perhaps someone's partner is adulterous, but it turns out that all their friends know. However, not only does no one talk about said adultery, but people will act surprised if it is ever mentioned. That is, they act as if the adultery is some kind of secret despite it being widely known *but seldom discussed*.

Certain political practices or institutional activities are often also examples of open secrets. The fact that the president routinely stuffs the ballot box to win re-election might be an open secret in your society. Police brutality, or the regular fitting up/planting of evidence to secure the conviction of "known" criminals might be another. It might even be

the case that having to bribe officials to get paperwork done is an open secret in your society.

How is the open secret a secret? Well, because despite it being common knowledge amongst a significant portion of the population, it is ostensibly unknown to a select few. That is, the information is treated as unknown (and thus concealed from them) by someone or some set of people. Despite almost everyone knowing it, the fact at least one person does not know it (and probably ought to) makes it secret.

Compare, then, the open secret with the "feigned secret". Sometimes we discover that something most people know would normally be the kind of thing we ought to consider secret. Sometimes these things will be talked about, but not necessarily openly. Thus, they are treated as if they were secret, despite it being obvious most people know. Indeed, when it comes to feigned secrecy, you might even be surprised to find that someone did not know about it.

Feigned secrets and open secrets tend to exist in societies in which there is known corruption or systemic injustice, often in cases where said corruption and injustice is perpetuated on a minority (or minority-treated) population.

Now, you might dispute that open or feigned secrets are actually secret. Open secrets are well-known, and feigned secrets are only treated as secret. Whilst they have the appellation "secret" they might be similar in kind to the conflation and confusion of secrecy with privacy.

Yet open secrets and feigned secrets are presumably still secret to at least one person. What makes them unusual as secrets is just how widely known the secret is to others. This, then, speaks to the idea that secrecy is targeted. You do not need to keep secrets from everyone. You simply need to keep them from the people you do not want to know about them. Open secrets are usually not shared (so they keep that aspect of secrecy) or, if they are shared, they are marked as something which should not be shared further.

Sometimes it is also said we hide secrets in plain sight. That is, we conceal information simply by making it obscure or difficult to access. From putting details on plans on slides but never speaking to those points in your talk, to summarising details of an event in a report you know people will never read, information can be obscured via its selective presentation.

For example, in 1981 a New Zealander named Christopher Lewis tried to assassinate the Queen of England whilst she was on tour in Aotearoa New Zealand. This became newsworthy only several years later; at the

time the New Zealand public were completely unaware that not only had someone taken a shot at Queen Elizabeth II, but he had been tried and convicted for the crime in open court. So, why did New Zealanders not know? Well, for one thing, the New Zealand Police Force decided to not charge him with treason (which was still a capital offence at the time). Rather, he was charged and convicted for the lesser crime of discharging a gun in public (thus making his trial less noteworthy to the press). The other thing is that whilst the police did publish details of his arrest and conviction, they published this information in a report they knew would not be widely read. (Roy, 2018) Which is to say, the New Zealand Police Force, in order to prevent an embarrassing situation, concealed the information in plain sight, knowing that people would not know to look for it.

Here are two further, gruesome examples of the form.

In 1990 Richard Klinkhamer killed his wife, Hannelore; he beat her to death with a wooden bat, and then proceeded to dig a hole in the shed in their backyard, where he dumped the body. The hole was filled with concrete and the shed was then filled with compost, to hide the smell of his wife's rotting corpse. Six days later he reported her missing.

The police suspected he had murdered her, given that the person most likely to kill someone is the person they are in a relationship with, but as there was no body, no criminal charge could be laid against him. A year later he approached a publisher with a book he had written, *Woensdag Gehaktdag* (which translates to "Wednesday Mince Day"), which was grisly rumination on seven ways in which he could have killed his wife. The book was never published, but had it been the police would have likely discovered Hannelore's body. Indeed, Klinkhamer, who became a minor celebrity due to the persistent rumours not just about *Woensdag Gehaktdag's* content, and his role in his wife's disappearance, would also cryptically comment about Hannelore's fate. However, he was only caught when his minor fame saw him move away from the house in which he killed his wife; the new owners discovered his wife's body whilst renovating the backyard (Woodward, n.d.).

Klinkhamer's book was never published, but Krystian Bala's book *Amok* was. *Amok* concerns the murder and torture of a woman by the main character. In the book the victim's hands were bound behind her back, with the rope then looped around her neck to form a noose. A detective investigating the murder of Dariusz Janiszewski, whose body had been found in a lake, noticed the similarities between the victim in *Amok* and

the murder he was investigating. This led to the investigation of Krystian Bala as a potential suspect and his eventual arrest. As the lawyer for the prosecution argued in court, Bala's book contained details that only the murderer of Janiszewski would know, which lead to his subsequent conviction (Purvis, n.d.).

Hiding salient information in plain sight is a way of keeping information from others: the information is effectively concealed in that it has been intentionally placed or presented in a way that people are unlikely to discover it or—in the case of Klinkhamer or Bala—make it seem unlikely to be true; no *true* murderer will detail how they committed their crimes in manuscript they wanted to publish, surely? Hiding secrets in plain sight also tells us something interesting about secrecy, in that information can be concealed by the very act of how it is shared or not shared. In the case of hiding in plain sight information is shared in a way which means it should not be noticed. That is, information you would like to be secret but is already out in the world (or you are obliged to share) is intentionally presented or placed in such a way that people will not easily find out about it or believe it.

Sharing vs. Concealing

Let us analyse a little more the notion of sharing or not sharing information, as this tells us something interesting, I would argue, between how we act privately and how we act secretively.

When you are private you do not share information which is considered both true and personal with people that you do not trust. That is, when you act in a private fashion you are keeping personal information from others.

Secrets, however, are concealed. Whilst both secrecy and privacy concern cases where we intentionally do not pass on information to those we do not trust, when we act privately we keep personal facts from people we do not trust nor who we consider need not to know said information, whilst in the case of secrecy we intentionally conceal information from people for what turn out to be a variety of reasons.

As Bok argues:

> Why then are privacy and secrecy so often equated? In part, this is so because privacy is such a central part of what secrecy protects that it can easily be seen as the whole. People claim privacy for differing amounts of

> what they are and do and own; if need be, they seek the added protection of secrecy. In each case, their purpose is to become less vulnerable, more in control. (Bok, 1982, p. 11)

Herein lies the problem of perception, which I think confuses talk of privacy and secrecy, and is one of the reasons why the two are so often conflated: from an outside perspective the private individual can look secretive, and vice versa.

Whilst being privative may look like someone is restricting access to some information about themselves from others, this is different in kind and intent from concealing it from others.

Of course, from an outside perspective this difference in intent is hard to discern. I can know the difference between what I keep private and what I keep secret, but you may not, especially since the role of trust in both privacy and secrecy is central to our personal understanding of who we share information with.

As mentioned earlier, private matters concern things you would not normally tell someone you do not trust. Yet the same is typically true of secrets: the people you share secrets with are typically the kind of people you think are trustworthy.

Thinking someone is trustworthy is different from them being trustworthy; this, at least, is an issue for both the privative individual and the person who keeps secrets. Not only can we get that judgements about trust wrong, but we might also be in trusting relationships with others which trump our duties with regard to certain privacy or secrecy cases. For example, you might think a parent should keep their children's secrets, but if that secret is "Alex is a murderer'', then said parent might think they are obliged to reveal that fact to the authorities because of their duties to others.

Guarding someone's privacy can also make you look like you are acting secretively, but when you protect the privacy of another (in the case where you know what is being kept private) you are not being secretive. You are simply respecting that certain personal information you are privy to should not be shared with others.

Of course, this perception or appearance can be abused because one can appear secretive by being private, and someone who is keeping a secret might claim to be privative in order to cover up the fact they are intentionally concealing something from you. The difference is that private matters are the kind of thing which should never become well-known.

Privacy is also very much an individual thing: *I* am private. However, keeping a secret can be a group activity: *we* keep what we did last summer a secret. Whilst you can respect someone's privacy, and also not share personal details that someone wants to keep private, you are not being privative but, rather, respecting someone else's privacy. However, keeping someone's secret requires one act secretively oneself; you have yourself become secretive.

So, while we can distinguish privacy from secrecy in certain cases (information which is not shared and is neither personal nor true), but—in a range of cases—it will be hard for someone to know whether what is being concealed from them is private or secret. This, though, is a problem of perception, and not, I argue, a result of privacy being a kind of secret.

Telling the Difference

So, how can we tell the difference between someone being privative and someone acting secretively? After all, someone can be private without necessarily keeping secrets, and someone who is utterly public when it comes to their personal affairs may well harbour a lot of secrets. Not just that, as we have seen, it is easy to confuse someone acting privately with someone acting secretly, or someone acting secretly simply appearing to be private.

What we can say is that privacy always concerns information which is personal and also true. You do not keep falsehoods private, and things which are not personal do not end up being in the domain of privately keep information. You can also comfortably predict what is kept private (in a given context), but you cannot easily predict what is likely kept secret. In part this is because secrecy need not necessarily concern the personal (although it can), secrets can be things people don't feel they need to know, and secrets need not even be true.

The first is worth noting: I can keep things secret that do not concern me, or things which I have no personal connection to.[4] The second we have already discussed: not every secret is important. More interestingly (and perhaps controversially) I also argue that whilst it makes no sense to say private information can be false, we can keep falsehoods secret from others.

This is straightforwardly denied by Martijn Blaauw who writes:

> One cannot, for instance, keep a falsehood secret (of course, one can think that one is keeping a false proposition secret if one (mistakenly) thinks this proposition to be true). Secrecy has to do with hiding facts. Likewise, one cannot reveal a falsehood (again, one can think that one is revealing a false proposition if one (mistakenly) thinks this proposition to be true). Revelation has to do with revealing facts. (Blaauw, 2013b, p. 169)

However, there is nothing inherently contradictory about keeping some falsehood secret. For example, I can try to keep gossip which happens to be false about me secret because even though it is not true, people might still believe it if they heard it. Perhaps I have gone out of my way to appear as an amoral character, and thus people are liable to believe the worst of me. As such, I hear some gossip about me which paints me in a good light and thus I intentionally conceal it from you.[5] That would be a case of me at least *trying* to keep a falsehood secret. It might be an unusual thing to do, but it is still a case of me keeping something secret from you.[6]

Indeed, as Bok says:

> I shall take concealment or hiding, to be the defining trait of secrecy. (Bok, 1982, p. 6)

Blaauw is right that what we keep private is by definition true, but to reveal a secret is not necessarily about revealing facts, but, rather, what was *concealed*. Blaauw is once again conflating privacy with secrecy here.

This speaks to another interesting aspect of secrecy: we can (at least) try to keep anything secret, including things which are relatively well-known. Take, for example, former U.S. President Donald J. Trump trying to keep his affair with Stormy Daniels a secret[7]; it turns out you do not have to be good at keeping something secret to be secretive. However, it is hard to imagine someone being described as privative who fails to keep things private.[8]

Our Duties to the Secretive and the Privative

We tend to think that protecting our privacy is good but keeping secrets is suspicious. In this respect our differing attitudes indicates a difference in kind, but this difference, admittedly, might just concern how we distinguish between whether someone is *merely* acting privately or being secretive.

After all, it is difficult to tell without some inside information whether the thing you are not being told is *merely* a private matter, or something which is being kept secret from you. Most of us accept that we have no right to pry into personal matters. However, keeping secrets is, at the very least, suspicious, if not sinister.

Unlike privacy, what is secret is clearly linked to someone intentionally *concealing* some information, as opposed to keeping it to themselves. Not just that, but if you are told a secret, you are usually told to keep it secret. That is, secrets are typically explicitly marked, whilst private matters are not (in that there are certain things you can assume should be considered private, and thus not to be shared).

Breaching privacy is also taken to be, at the very, least morally suspicious, if not in most cases a morally sinister thing to do.[9] However, it is not clear that breaching secrecy is necessarily bad. This is because secrecy is typically considered to be, at the very least, suspicious (even though in some cases we might have very good grounds to keep secrets) and thus seeking to reveal the secrets of others is (depending on your culture) is often seen as a public good.[10]

Maybe the difference between privacy and secrecy is not only are private matters personal, but you can reasonably expect to keep certain matters private for the sheer fact people will not ask after them, and a reasonable response to someone asking after them is to point out that they are prying and thus breaching etiquette. Indeed, we often think of privacy as a right; I have the right to keep my personal matters private.

Now, if there is a right to privacy, then there will be an associated duty; if we have the right to be private, then there is an expectation that others have a duty to respect that right. David Matheson talks about this (in moral terms) with respect to a duty of ignorance with respect to the private concerns of others.

> Privacy(ignorance) S_1 has privacy relative to p and to S_2 iff S_2 does not know p. If Privacy(ignorance) is true and S_1 has a moral right to privacy relative to p and to S_2, then S_1 is morally entitled to S_2's not knowing p. But rights generally entail corresponding obligations for those against whom right-bearers hold the rights. Hence if S_1 is morally entitled to S_2's ignorance of p, S_2 has a moral obligation of ignorance with respect to p. Thus, if Privacy(ignorance) is true and there is such a thing as a moral right to privacy, there is such a thing as a (moral) duty of ignorance. (Matheson, 2013, p. 194)

So, if we accept that someone has a right to privacy, then we must accept that we have a duty or obligation to be ignorant of what they keep private, which is to say that we should not pry into private affairs.

The difference here between secrecy and privacy is this: we generally take it that it is morally permissible to be privative.[11] However, it is not clear that secrecy is

a. permissible, and

b. even in cses where it is permissible, that we have a duty to be ignorant of secrets.

This is not to deny that keeping secrets is immoral, or never permissible. But whereas privacy is allowable (even laudable in some circumstances) keeping secrets is, at the very least, suspicious, if not sinister.

We see this if we adapt Matheson's duty of ignorance to be about secrecy(ignorance) rather than privacy.

> Secrecy (ignorance) S_1 has secrecy relative to p and to S_2 iff S_2 does not know p. If Secrecy (ignorance) were true and S_1 had a right to secrecy relative to p and to S_2, then S_1 would be entitled to S_2's not knowing p. But to claim that S_1 is entitled to S_2's not knowing p) seems strange. If we allow that there is a right to being secretive, this does not entail a corresponding duty that S_2 must be ignorant and thus not pry into p.[12] After all, even if we grant we have the right to secrecy, others might have the right to know what we keep secret if it is either of import to them or knowing p would change our behaviour. After all, finding out that the car we want to purchase has been stolen may very well change our minds about buying said vehicle.

If there is a corresponding duty to secrecy, then it is, surely, the duty of keeping secrets you have been told or found out about, although this duty seems to be easily trumped. If I find out about some secret, p, I might, upon finding out the content of p, be obliged to also keep p secret *if I am made aware as to why p is being kept secret.* Learning that the car I want to buy is stolen might lead me to keep that secret if I think the price is low enough. Finding out that my country has a secret nuclear weapons programme might lead me to keep that secret from foreign nationals if I think it protects my country's interests.

Then again, if the reason behind the secret is not to my liking, I may decide to reveal the secret to someone else. But in the case of privacy, where we think that as the information being kept private is personal, breaking privacy is typically considered sinister.[13] However, breaking

secrecy or revealing secrets does not have the same stigma.[14] Indeed, the suspicion something is being kept secret might oblige some of us to investigate said secrets, which is yet another case where privacy and secrecy come uncoupled; we might be obliged to look into someone's secret for a variety of reasons (suspected malfeasance, lying, etc).

Of course, one way to straightforwardly deny a right to privacy is to classify certain private matters as being secretive instead (which speaks once again to privacy being a different concern to that of secrecy). This, arguably, is something influential organisations do, whether it be businesses which require that you give them private information for their everyday business (take, for example, Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg's claim that there is no privacy on the Internet), or governments which erode privacy through the expansion of the panopticon and the like. In these cases, wanting to protect your own privacy is taken to wanting to be secretive, and there is an interesting discussion to be had here as to how what counts as private is primarily a legal or a moral category.

This, then, speaks to a difference between secrecy and privacy; our duties towards them are fundamentally different, and the kind of justification required to defend secrecy requires a further level of argument we do not associate with privacy.

From Private to Secret (and Back Again?)

A further difference between privacy and secrecy might be the lack of reciprocal transitivity. You can easily imagine that some personal fact about yourself might be private at some time, not private at another, and private again later on in your life. I might have treated my gender identity as private in the past, be public about it now, but conceivably could become privative about it in the future. This will either be due to changing circumstances (perhaps I become a celebrity and decide I need to protect my personal information in the way that was never necessary when I was not famous[15]). Or perhaps I move from one culture to another and either out of respect for the different cultural norms (or as a reaction against them), what I consider to be public or private information changes.

You can also imagine that some private fact about yourself could become secret. My gender identity as a celebrity was private but that privacy is then broken by a media organisation that promises to publicise a deeply personal fact about myself. So, I instruct my lawyers to put an

injunction upon the publisher in order to keep them quiet; at this point my gender identity, whilst still private in some sense, is now also a secret.

Furthermore, some private information might shift to being entirely a secret; perhaps the illness I suffer from becomes a public health hazard and a notifiable disease, but I continue to keep that information to myself. However, once the health crisis abates, I find that I no longer need to keep my illness secret, and some the matter returns to being merely a private concern.

Is this a fundamental difference between secrecy and privacy? Well, maybe not. Private matters can become secret, and once-private-now-secrets can return to being private. But this raises the question: can a secret which was never private become a private matter? Presumably yes: if the secret also concerns a personal matter, then a change in circumstance could then result in something you had to keep secret become private (i.e., it goes from something you had to conceal to something you are not obliged to share with people you do not trust). As such, what is private can become secret and what is secret can (in cases of the personal) become private.

Conclusion

From the perspective of an outsider, it can be hard to distinguish between what someone keeps secret and what they consider to be private.

A secret is some piece of information which is intentionally concealed from someone else. Privacy, however, is very much an individual thing; I am private. Whilst you can respect someone's privacy and also not share personal details someone wants to keep private; you are not being privative but, rather, respecting privacy. However, keeping someone's secret requires one act secretively oneself.

Whilst there are cultural norms which dictate what is reasonably considered private information and what people are allowed to ask you, these norms might not apply when it comes to individuals. I will happily divulge very deeply private details of my life to people I have only just met, for example, yet there are somethings most people would not consider private that I do not think you ought to pry into. I may happily tell you intimate details of my life whilst also refusing to confirm the gender of my partner.

So, despite surface similarities, you cannot expect to mop up issues surrounding secrecy by reference to issues about privacy; being private is

an attitude, whilst being keeping secret is something you choose to do. It would be a mistake, then, to think we can resolve issues about secrecy via an analysis of the issues of privacy alone. Secrecy and privacy are different ways of keeping or controlling the flow of information from others. Whilst both rely on keeping information from others, privacy concerns not sharing personal information generally, whilst secrecy concerns concealing information from particular persons. The fact we associate different duties with respect to them both speaks to them as different kinds of knowledge (or, perhaps more properly, weird lacuna of relatively unknown things), and thus in need of their own, separate analyses.

NOTES

1 See also my paper with Martin Orr, which analyses what we mean by "secret" when we talk about conspiracy (Dentith & Orr, 2018).

2 There is also an ethical component to secrecy. Keeping secrets about your private life is one thing, but members of influential institutions keeping secrets from the public is typically taken to be suspicious, if not sinister. Whilst there are a range of views on whether it is appropriate for, say, governments, to keep secrets from its citizenry, there is little work as to when such secrecy might be obligatory. After all, some secrecy might be a "necessary evil" for the functioning of the kind of open societies in which we live.

3 The only reason why it makes any sense is when you consider that Dan Brown was troubled by allegations he was anti-Christian due to the contents of his previous book, "The Da Vinci Code" (Brown, 2003) which lead him to make Christianity front-and-centre to his next book.

4 Admittedly, much of this can all be parsed as personal as the information still is information about me, my friends, or my fellow citizens. It might also be the case that my partner agrees that their gender should not be shared but will also happily introduce themselves as my partner, which means the information is something I consider to be private, but they have the right to waive that privacy in a way that I do not.

5 You might still learn it through other sources, and thus I might go further and intentionally conceal it via disinformation and the like.

6 It's true in this case you have no real guarantee that said falsehood will be kept secret, given the fact someone already knows it (although disinformation or blackmail might help stop its spread you might not be able to expose the gossipers as liars, but you might be able to stop them from talking if you find the right kind of leverage…

7 This paper was written in 2018, when this was considered one of the bigger scandals of Trump's life…

8 That being said, many things a private person wants kept private might become well-known should someone they trust betray them. In that case they have lost their privacy but are still privative. However, in the case of secrecy one can be bad at keeping secrets and yet still be considered secretive. One cannot be bad at being private and still be considered privative, however.

9 As mentioned earlier, there might be some cases where breaching privacy is just suspicious but not actually ethically sinister, such as revealing someone's blood type or medication regime in the case of an emergency.

10 This is, of course, very cultural and temporally situated; to pry into the secrets of governments today is laudable. To pry into the secrets of the British government in the 1960s was not….

11 At least about certain things; this is cultural contingent, and even within a culture there are exceptions; parents in most Western cultures, do not like

their children being privative, for example, at least around them and at least when they are living at home

12 Matheson goes even further and argues that we have a duty (and the capacity) to become ignorant of things we have already learnt, which raises the interesting question (not answered in this paper) of whether we can forget secrets we have been told, and whether that might be a duty in some cases (such as issues of national security and the like).

13 As mentioned earlier, there will always be some exceptions.

14 At least at this point in contemporary Western or Western-style cultures.

15 Indeed, this is marked by the way in which we talk about public figures and private citizens; we recognise that it is harder for famous people to be private (and often express wonderment when they try).

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ECONOMIC MIGRATION IN THE EARLY LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Abstract

This article analyzes how economic migration was addressed in the technical institutions of the League of Nations and in the International Labor Organization (ILO), during the initial period of institutional genesis after the First World War. New archival material is used to integrate the fragmented scholarship on migration cooperation and establish dialogue with broader research on the development of international economic governance in the 1920s. This transversal analysis highlights commonalities and interactions that cut across institutional boundaries. Within the League system, different economic institutions carved out limited areas of cooperation in migration policy, while collectively reaffirming national sovereignty over borders and population.

Keywords: League of Nations, International Labor Organization (ILO), migration, international governance, economic cooperation

I. Introduction

In the early 1920s, migration was flagged as an issue of concern in nearly every branch of the young League of Nations. There were large volumes people on the move at a time when national governments were trying to control immigration more stringently. While governments had already begun to introduce migration restrictions in the late-nineteenth century to manage the expanding flows of people moving along railroad and steamship lines, the First World War marked a watershed because it produced sudden spikes in movement and a substantial reinforcement of border controls. Millions fled battle zones during the war, and the segmentation of the Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires into nation-states pushed millions more across new borders.[1]

After the war, governments sought to regulate access to domestic labor markets more tightly, reflecting a concern that demobilization would result in domestic unemployment and political unrest. The war had

strengthened organized labor and empowered working-class voters just at the moment when the Russian Revolution offered a radically destabilizing model of social and political change. Attempted communist coups in 1919 in Bavaria and Hungary fed anxiety about Bolshevik contagion. Across Europe, foreign economic elites were also distrusted as potential agents of a hostile power or potential allies of a hostile local minority. This negative attitude towards outsiders was in tension with the program of macroeconomic stabilization embraced by the League of Nations and the affiliated International Labor Organization (ILO).[2] In 1920, a short-lived postwar economic boom tipped into crisis. Commodity prices plummeted, unemployment rose across much of the industrialized world, and a turn to austerity provoked new social conflict.[3] Leaders in the ILO and the League took it for granted that general economic stability would not be restored unless workers, merchants, investors, and engineers could start moving again.

Throughout the League system, economic migration was flagged as an important and intractable issue that was repeatedly raised and then side-stepped. In the early 1920s a string of conferences and commissions met to discuss economic migration, but they all ended up focusing on narrow procedural questions and reaffirming national governments' undivided authority over fundamental immigration policies related to foreign nationals' admission and economic participation. The ILO, the League's Economic Committee, and its Organization for Communications and Transit all participated in this process of institutional compartmentalization, as they addressed different aspects of migration. The Economic Committee – the League's trade body – was concerned with the movement of commercial elites and firms as bearers of capital and expertise. It issued standards governing foreign commercial agents' legal rights and the operation of foreign subsidiaries. The Organization for Communications and Transit promulgated new passport and visa norms in order to ease physical mobility. The ILO approached migration as factor in unemployment, and it set up a temporary Emigration Commission and a permanent internal administrative unit to address the matter. Although these organizations pursued different objectives in their migration policies, they shared a common reluctance to address admission, the process through which governments grant entry to their territory. International debates also skirted questions of residency and labor-market access, which were sometimes handled during admission and sometimes through supplementary local permits. In sum, the League and the ILO refused to

tackle what was and still is commonly understood as core immigration policy. They agreed to incorporate a set of narrowly circumscribed issues into the international transit, trade, and labor agendas, leaving national governments free to manage the rest.

International efforts to facilitate economic migration during this period have not been systematically analyzed across the full League system. Historical studies of international migration policy have focused heavily on the issue of asylum.[4] There was an arm of the League of Nations that was specifically dedicated to this issue – the High Commissioner for Refugees. In contrast, work on economic migration was spread across the ILO, the Organization for Communications and Transit, and the Economic Committee. Migration was not a central priority for any one of these bodies and so it has not figured prominently in the otherwise rich new scholarship tracing the emergence of international economic and social governance in the 1920s.[5] Although migration was of secondary importance in the League's individual economic institutions, it was noteworthy in its ubiquity. It was a common thread that ran through international cooperation in commerce, labor, and transit, and there are good studies of international migration policy in each of these areas.[6] This article integrates this previous research and offers a new transversal analysis highlighting commonalities and interactions that shaped the systemic development of international economic governance during the crucial years of institutional genesis following the First World War.

The research on economic migration presented here is tied to scholarship on population politics and sovereignty in the League system. The transition from multi-ethnic empires to nation-states created large groups of minorities, stateless people, and mobile foreigners across Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, claims to territory and political authority were based on the demonstration of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity. [7] The League developed an array of institutions to manage the tension between unity and diversity, most notably a minority protection regime. The League's system of minority protection was widely resented by the states under its purview as an infringement on national sovereignty, although its practical efficacy was limited.[8] Several recent studies have emphasized that the League of Nations was not a club of equal and fully sovereign members but rather a framework to manage different forms of contested political authority in the long transition from a world of empires to a world of nation-states.[9] The authority to manage national population

through immigration controls became a central arena in which national sovereignty was defined and contested.

Scholars of international governance emphasize that nation-states have continued to dominate migration policy, even as binding multilateral regimes have developed in other areas. The 2000s brought a realization that there was, in fact, quite a lot of migration cooperation above and between states, but that it was often indirect and dispersed across many different treaty structures, agencies, and NGOs. Scholarly efforts to develop a more comprehensive analysis of "global migration governance" have accompanied a practical drive to create a more coherent multilateral framework, culminating in the UN's 2018 Global Compact for Migration.[10] Leading scholars of global migration governance today acknowledge that the core multilateral institutions were established during the interwar period.[11] However, historical scholarship on interwar international migration policy remains highly fragmented and uneven. A fuller analysis of this period of genesis shows that international institutions helped consolidate national sovereignty over migration even as they carved out limited areas of cooperation.

II. Passports

The League of Nations held a conference on migration before the League Assembly met for the first time, reflecting the sense of urgency attached to this issue.[12] In October 1920, the League's Committee for Communications and Transit hosted a Conference on Passports, Customs Formalities, and Through-Tickets. This was part of a broader effort to rebuild the infrastructural sinews of the world economy as the first step in postwar reconstruction. Transportation was a top priority for the nebulous web of organizations that bridged the Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations. The Committee for Communications and Transit reunited many of the experts who had served on the Commission of Ports, Waterways and Railways at the Peace Conference. Its first order of business was to lay plans for a permanent Organization for Communications and Transit in the League of Nations to coordinate the resumption of rail and fluvial traffic in Europe through a series of multilateral conventions.[13]

In 1920, passports figured on the League's transit agenda because they were seen as an obstacle to the resumption of European rail travel.[14] The original impetus for cooperation on passports came from the Conference

of Ambassadors, an association of Allied ambassadors that formed to supervise the execution of the Peace Treaties.[15] In June 1920, acting on reports that diplomatic personnel had been subjected to "excessive and arbitrary" customs and passport controls on the Paris-Warsaw train line, the Conference of Ambassadors demanded action from the League Secretary General.[16] After falling out of use in most of Europe in the nineteenth century, passports were reintroduced during the First World War in neutral and belligerent countries, alike. Wartime passport requirements were justified on security grounds, and many hoped that they would be lifted after 1918 as part of the return to civilian life.[17] Yet, in the face of postwar economic and political instability, governments clung to passports as a tool to exclude foreign nationals perceived as "undesirable" including "unemployed people, vagabonds, spies, political agitators, and people engaging in stock-market speculation."[18] Since passport and visa requirements could not be eliminated, the League Committee for Communications and Transit sought to standardize and streamline them. In interwar Europe, passport-holders generally had to obtain exit and entry visas for their point of departure and final destination as well as transit visas for all the countries they passed through. Transit visa requirements were onerous after 1919, as Central and Eastern Europe was crisscrossed with new national borders.[19]

The rationale behind the Committee for Communications and Transit's work on passports was largely economic.[20] In his opening speech at the League's 1920 conference on passports in Paris, the French Minister of Public Works declared:

> public opinion is impatiently awaiting, everywhere, the resumption of former and normal conditions, and you are fully cognizant of the fact that anything which hinders personal relations between producers of all countries, creates a grave obstacle, preventing the resumption of commercial exchanges. This obstacle ought to be removed as soon as possible.[21]

He suggested that the status of the conference attendees "as technical people" rather than diplomatic delegates should enable them to rise above political tensions to achieve cooperative solutions. In practice, this meant that the experts who gathered in Paris were not authorized to open international dialogue about the core questions of migration policy. Following this principle, the 1920 conference focused narrowly

on the transit phase of migration and avoided debate about labor-market participation. The conference emphasized procedural questions, pronouncing on the duration, price, and method of delivery for visas and passports. It established a template for an "international type" of passport, with four pages containing a standardized set of personal details and twenty-eight further pages for stamps and visas. [22] The conference did not, however, cover emigration for employment, except a brief discussion of fees. Robert Haas – the General Secretary of the conference and the head of the secretariat for the Organization for Communications and Transit – announced categorically that "all questions studied by the conference do not concern the passports of emigrants."[23]

The conference struggled to draw a clear line between travel and emigration. It passed a resolution stipulating that entry visas should ordinarily be valid for one year, so that frequent travelers need not seek re-authorization for each trip. This prompted a heated debate about whether an entry visa automatically implied a right to stay. Robert Haas argued that entry visas would be pointless without the right to stay in a destination for at least a few weeks. Yet, numerous other delegates insisted that the right to stay could not be addressed through international norms because it was an internal "police" regulation. Ultimately the conference could only agree to a negative formulation, specifying that a one-year travel visa did not entail the right to stay for an entire year.[24] Just how long a person could visit on a travel visa was left to the discretion of national governments.

The League's Organization for Communications and Transit developed extensive supervisory functions on the basis of the passport conference in 1920. Governments were asked to report whether and when they implemented the conference resolutions and to send updates about general changes in passport and customs formalities. The first collection of responses was published in 1922 and then a further batch in 1925, in preparation for a second passport conference. These surveys indicate that the most widely adopted innovation introduced at the 1920 conference was the uniform "international type" of passport. By 1925, over twenty countries reported that they were using the standard League format for their passports, while many others had adopted most of its features. [25]

The passport resolutions issued in 1920 affirmed the general principle that facilitating "personal relations between peoples of various countries" would aid in the "economic recovery of the world", but they included no specific measures concerning labor-market access or commercial

activity.[26] This pattern was replicated in the second passport conference that the League hosted in 1926. This gathering did cover "questions relating to emigrants", but, once again, discussion was limited to transit between states and not formal admission.[27] Thus, although the League's Organization for Communications and Transit approached passports as an economic problem, it introduced a novel model of internationally protected travel that was legally separated from economic participation.

III. The "Treatment of Foreigners"

While the Organization for Communications and Transit concerned itself only with travel between states in order to avoid thorny questions of admission and residency, the League Economic Committee took the opposite approach. The Economic Committee's work on the "treatment of foreigners" sought to protect foreign commercial agents who had already been admitted to a host country but largely disregarded how they got there. The Organization for Communications and Transit and Economic Committee shared a common legal foundation: Article 23(e) of the League Covenant. This was a pledge to "make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League."[28] This one line was the legal basis for all of the League's technical economic work, and formal responsiblity for explaining its meaning fell to the Economic Committee.[29]

The Economic Committee responded by creating a special Sub-Committee on the Equitable Treatment of Commerce, chaired by the British trade official Hubert Llewellyn Smith.[30] At the Paris Peace Conference, where he had served as Britain's top trade expert, Llewellyn Smith had attempted to define "equitable treatment" in a single comprehensive multilateral convention. Due to the complexity of postwar economic conditions, the Sub-Committee on Equitable Treatment decided against this course. Many states faced extreme monetary instability and were using trade restrictions to conserve hard currency, while others invoked concerns about security or domestic social relations.[31] In this context of upheaval, the Economic Committee decided to begin modestly "by enumerating various classes of practices, which, in their judgment clearly violated the principle of the equitable treatment of commerce" and then to define specific solutions for each category. The committee placed a heavy emphasis on feasibility, focusing on areas "which appear to offer

the best prospects of securing international agreement." These actionable priorities included the "treatment of foreign nationals and enterprises."[32]

The "treatment of foreigners" was on the agenda of the Sub-Committee on Equitable Treatment because it had been flagged as a key problem at the Genoa Conference of 1922. The Genoa Conference was an attempt by the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, to strike a comprehensive economic and political settlement that would complete the work left undone by the Paris Peace Conference. Germany, Austria, and Soviet Russia were all in attendance. One of the conference's central goals was to restore economic and commercial relations among the imperial successor states of Central and Eastern Europe. Its work on the "treatment of foreigners in the conduct of business" was a direct extension of the League's cooperation on passports. The Genoa Conference issued an exhortation to implement the League passport norms from 1920, as well as a new recommendation that foreign nationals and firms should be taxed at the same rates as locals.[33] Although limited in scope, these provisions provoked vigorous debate. The German delegation attempted to turn the provision on equal taxation into a much broader set of principles governing judicial protection of foreign nationals and firms, commercial samples, property rights, and shipping rights. A more limited Romanian proposal that focused specifically on taxation was adopted.[34] There was also lengthy discussion about whether the norms agreed upon should be implemented by means of a binding treaty or simple recommendations.[35] The Genoa Conference ultimately decided to adopt non-binding recommendations and authorized the Economic Committee to supervise their implementation.[36]

When the Economic Committee took over negotiations on the "treatment of foreigners" from the Genoa Conference, it considered converting the non-binding resolutions that had been agreed upon into a formal multilateral treaty. Daniel Serruys, the French member of the Economic Committee, had participated in the Genoa Conference and argued strenuously against a multilateral convention, recalling the "fiercely debated discussions at Genoa which had raged over this question." He observed that "for many of the new countries this question had an important political side. Moreover, many of these countries were in different stages, and there was no possibility of securing agreement."[37] They had strongly objected to "making super-laws over-riding national legislation" at the Genoa Conference, according to Serruys.[38] In response to Serruys's concerns, the Sub-Committee on Equitable Treatment agreed

to offer simple recommendations in lieu of a formal treaty. This procedural caution provoked renewed debate about the question of "admission," however. Shinjiro Matsuyama, the Japanese member of the Economic Committee, argued that since they were limiting themselves to mere recommendations, they could afford to be more ambitious in the substance covered – they should "look ahead to ultimate ideals." Notably, he argued that admission should be explicitly mentioned as "a vital aspect of the equitable treatment of commerce." In effect, this was a bid to use League's commitment to commercial "equality of treatment" to revive the unmet Japanese demands for racial equality from the Paris Peace Conference and thus create an international normative basis to contest anti-Asian immigration restrictions. At the Peace Conference, Japanese delegates had linked racial equality in migration to demands for free trade in the colonial world.[39] Serruys and Llewellyn Smith emphasized that the Sub-Committee on Equitable Treatment had adopted feasibility as a central criterion for its agenda and suggested that tackling a controversial question such as migrant admission would place the Economic Committee's broader work at risk. In the end, the Economic Committee decided to exclude admission from its recommendations, with the proviso that:

> The committee does not dismiss the extreme importance of this aspect of the problem. It is firmly convinced that the principles established in the Covenant, concerning the equitable treatment of commerce are no less applicable to the admission of foreigners for purposes of commercial activity than to the treatment to which they are accorded after their admission.

The Committee's report explained that "in the present circumstances" international norms concerning conditions of admission would "have little chance of being generally accepted" and might "endanger" the implementation of related measures.[40] In 1923, the Economic Committee issued a set of non-binding guidelines concerning the equitable treatment of foreign nationals and firms in taxation, property rights, and judicial protection. In 1925, it published further guidelines concerning access to certified professions. Both sets of norms were limited to foreign nationals and firms that had already been admitted to foreign territory.

In 1923, the initial decision to avoid the question of admission was presented as a temporary expedient to shield the fledgling Economic Committee from toxic controversy. Yet, this exclusion became a permanent

feature of the Economic Committee's work and a perennial source of conflict. When the Economic Committee decided to transform its early recommendations into a binding Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners in the context of the League's 1927 World Economic Conference, it once again excluded admission.[41] Populous states of emigration, especially Germany and Japan, continued to contest this omission. At a convention for Rotary International in 1931, Matsuyama described "the economic aspects of the movements of population" as "one of the greatest and most vital problems of today" and argued that it should be a central focal point for League cooperation. Matsuyama called for a comprehensive approach that would address migration in relation to both foreign trade and industrial employment, but by that time these questions had been separated by ten years of divergent legal and institutional practice in the Economic Committee and the ILO.[42]

IV. International Labor Standards

Scholarship tracing the ILO's origins in pre-war international social reform movements reveals the genesis of a distinctive approach to migration based on a scientific understanding of unemployment.[43] In the 1920s the ILO strove to produce a more integrated picture of world migration through a massive statistical survey at a time when intercontinental mass migration was declining, especially across the Atlantic.[44] The ILO primarily responded to this change by advocating bilateral treaties to stabilize new regional migration corridors, with multilateral cooperation limited to promoting migrants' access to social insurance in their host countries.[45] In its bilateral migration diplomacy, the ILO treated migration policy largely as a question of matching unemployed workers with job openings in foreign countries according to their specific skills. This model can also be linked to the ILO's role in the interwar movement for the scientific management of industrial production.[46]

Migration was discussed in the Unemployment Commission of the ILO's first annual International Labor Conference, held in 1919 in Washington, DC. The conference authorized the ILO to appoint an expert commission to study migration and to create a new unit dedicated to migration in its Geneva secretariat, the International Labor Office. The Washington Conference also sponsored a Draft Convention Concerning Unemployment that included provisions related to migration. This

agreement committed national governments to create public employment exchanges and to coordinate their operations internationally through the ILO. It also established the principle of reciprocity in unemployment insurance, specifying that states which provided unemployment insurance should negotiate agreements to grant foreign workers access to this benefit. The Washington Conference passed a broader non-binding recommendation advocating the "reciprocity of treatment of foreign workers" in all areas of social protection.[47]

Although the decisions of the Washington Conference were relatively limited in scope, they were hotly contested. The Canadian Secretary for External Affairs, Newton Rowell, declared:

> I think I speak for the sentiment of the nations on this continent, north and south, when I say they will control the character of their own population; they will do it fairly and honourably, but they will not accept any international determination as to who should compose their own population or be entitled to the rights of citizenship or the rights which citizens should enjoy within their own territory.[48]

Rowell warned that the future development of the fledgling ILO would be hampered if it adopted an excessively broad agenda embracing topics that many states considered to be internal matters. As discussed above, similar arguments about feasibility and institutional survival were used to limit the Economic Committee's work on the "treatment of foreigners" and the cooperation on passports in the Organization for Communications and Transit.

Within the ILO, there was concern among labor representatives in countries of immigration that reciprocity in the provision of unemployment insurance and other social benefits would undermine local protection for workers in the receiving countries. The Canadian Minister of Labor argued that a norm of reciprocity could discourage states, such as Canada, which did not yet provide comprehensive unemployment insurance, from doing so. He also suggested that the notion of "reciprocity" was not relevant to migration because there was not an even exchange of migrants but rather a large unidirectional movement from Europe to the new world.[49]

The Emigration Commission created by the Washington Conference exposed a conflict between the ILO's political leadership and its staff over the scope of international cooperation on migration. Harold Butler, the British deputy director of the ILO, argued that the Commission must be

circumscribed, declaring that "it will be necessary to define its terms of reference very carefully so as to avoid provoking national susceptibilities as far as possible." He quoted Rowell's admonitions at length to highlight the strong opposition of "American countries" to any international intervention in their migration policy. He was particularly worried about antagonizing the US government. Although the US Senate rejected League membership by refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, ILO leaders initially held onto hope that the United States might be willing to participate in some forms of labor cooperation. Butler questioned whether the Emigration Commission "can have any value without the assistance of the United States", given its political heft as a destination country.[50] In the 1920s US immigration policy underwent a dramatic shift that set the pace for other countries to adopt more restrictive measures. The United States had been a key destination for global mass migration in the nineteenth century. Following the First World War, it introduced a wide range of new restrictions that built on previous measures directed against Japanese and Chinese migrants, including a novel system of geographic quotas that reduced overall immigration rates to the country by more than one half.[51] In this context, ILO leaders went to great lengths to try to secure US participation in the Emigration Commission, but to no avail.[52]

While many ILO leaders hoped that the United States and other major immigration countries might eventually be persuaded to join a moderate program of international cooperation, the main official who was responsible for preparing the work of the Emigration Commission, Louis Varlez, was more ambitious. Varlez was a veteran Belgian social reformer who led the Migration Section of the ILO secretariat. He conducted a survey of thirty-one governments and outlined an expansive cooperative program.[53] Varlez proposed that the ILO establish a permanent "organ of international coordination" to centralize and distribute information about laws, labor-market conditions, recruitment practices, transportation, and colonization initiatives. It would arbitrate disputes between states of emigration and immigration and would also prepare multilateral conventions on a wide range of topics including social insurance, access to courts, remittances, and professional education. Varlez wanted the ILO to intervene directly in migration administration. He recommended that the ILO assess a tax on migrants to be paid directly by continental migrants and indirectly by shipping lines that transported inter-continental migrants. The funds obtained would finance the appointment of local agents who would supervise migration procedures in both sending and

receiving countries. He also proposed that migrants be required to fill out a statistical survey for the ILO as part of national passport control procedures. Significantly, Varlez supported the consolidation and not the removal passport restrictions. Indeed, he wanted passport requirements to be made universal in order to create a regulatory framework to collect migration data.[54] Varlez outlined the maximalist vision of international migration governance during the early years of the League and thus provides a useful benchmark to assess the institutional limits placed on cooperation in this area.

Albert Thomas, the Director-General of the ILO, did not directly discourage Varlez. Thomas was himself preoccupied with problems of "overpopulation" in Europe and was interested in developing international mechanisms to match unemployed workers to available jobs.[55] Yet he also did not want to take big risks that could damage the institutional authority of the ILO. He cautioned the president of the Emigration Commission, George Cave, not to exceed the bounds of political possibility. He argued that it was the "duty" of the commission to "prioritize very precisely the questions and to determine clearly up to what point governments can follow us." He signaled the danger of "provoking the apprehensions of all those who are afraid to see the formation in Geneva of a super-government."[56] Thomas allowed Cave, as the political leader of the Emigration Commission, to restrain Varlez's ambitious vision of international bureaucracy. Cave was intimately familiar with British migration administration having served as Home Secretary from 1916 to 1919. He was selected as commission president because it was thought that a British president would be able to serve as an honest broker between countries of emigration and immigration, since the British Empire included both. Significantly, Britain's imperial prestige was also seen as an asset because ILO leaders considered "colonization" to be an important path for the relief of Europe's unemployed.[57] When Cave had to withdraw a few months before the Emigration Commission was set to meet, he was replaced by another Briton, James Lowther.

Cave and Lowther devised a more modest agenda for the Emigration Commission than Varlez had originally proposed. They rejected Varlez's plan to invest the ILO with authority to intervene directly in migration administration and advocated reinforcing national regulations in many areas, calling for tighter restrictions on labor recruitment services and migration agents. They supported coordination between national governments, notably in the operation of labor exchanges, but they did

not assign the ILO an intermediary role in this process. They argued that the equality of workers' legal treatment should be handled through diplomatic negotiation at the ILO's annual conferences and not settled in a specialist inquiry. The only area in which they accorded the ILO an autonomous role was information, recommending that it facilitate the standardization and collection of migration statistics and also serve as a central repository for legal texts.[58]

When the Emigration Commission met in August 1921, it further winnowed down Lowther and Cave's plans. The commission simply advised governments to create public employment exchanges and make them available to immigrants but made no mention of coordination mechanisms. It suggested that international recruitment should be managed by individual states through bilateral treaties. This latter resolution was a compromise between countries of emigration (Germany and Italy), which favored uniform international standards to prevent exploitative recruitment practices, and countries of immigration (Canada, France, and South Africa), which demanded wide government discretion. The other key point of contention in Emigration Commission was the functions of the ILO itself. Here, the lines of cleavage were less clear-cut. A Brazilian delegate suggested that the Emigration Commission should be transformed into a permanent "organ of conciliation" between countries of emigration and immigration. Numerous delegates aligned against this proposal. They insisted it was sufficient to maintain a Varlez's small Migration Section within the ILO secretariat. They authorized this unit to "investigate the question of co-ordination of legislation" but left responsibility for this coordination to the ILO's political branches, namely its annual conference and its Governing Body. Significantly, Albert Thomas intervened personally and quite firmly to counter the Brazilian bid to extend the work of the Emigration Commission. He suggested that this would likely be ineffective and could undermine the overall authority of the ILO: "the real danger lay in the fact that the competence of this Commission might be seriously contested, and that matters might be placed before the Commission which it was powerless to settle." He recommended instead that the ILO form ad-hoc expert committees to focus on the least controversial areas of migration policy, such as hygiene during transit.[59]

The Emigration Commission sketched out the path that the ILO subsequently followed in 1920s. The ILO collected a vast store of information on migratory movements and national legislation and sponsored some narrowly targeted expert inquiries.[60] Its main task was

to establish uniform labor standards through international conventions, and this effort included some measures to ensure foreign nationals' equal access to social protection. Generally, however, the ILO promoted cooperation on migration through bilateral negotiations rather than international treaties.[61] In the 1920s, the ILO intervened more directly to support refugees than voluntary economic migrants.

V. Economic Migrants and Refugees

In the League system, refugees were not economic migrants, in formal legal terms. Indeed, this was a defining innovation of the interwar refugee regime – before 1918 governments rarely distinguished between different kinds of migrants based on their motivation for leaving their place of origin. Governments often gave asylum to those fleeing different forms of political turmoil but generally did so within the same legal and institutional framework that applied to all other migrants.[62] This changed during the interwar period. By 1938, a leading scholar on the subject who had participated in the League's refugee work wrote, "the refugee is distinguished from the ordinary alien or migrant in that he has left his former territory because of political events there, not because of economic conditions or because of the economic attraction of another territory."[63] Paradoxically, the ILO was able to provide more direct economic support to refugees than it did to ordinary workers on the move. When the ILO's Emigration Commission decided against a centralized system of job placement for industrial migrants, Albert Thomas was laying plans to provide this service for refugees.

The refugee crisis escalated after the end of the First World War with the defeat of the anti-Bolshevik White Russian forces in 1919-1920 and the onset of famine in Russia in 1921-1922. An estimated one million Russians fled to neighboring countries during this period. They included many White Russian soldiers and many civilians. There was also a large outflow of Jews, who faced violence from both sides of the Russian Civil War.[64] Russian refugees either lacked identity papers or carried passports from the defunct Russian Empire, and they were often unable or unwilling to obtain new passports from Soviet Russia. Thus, the International Committee of the Red Cross (hereafter, ICRC), which coordinated support for refugees in the immediate postwar period, concluded that they "no longer have any legal nationality."[65] This became a central criterion for

defining refugees during the interwar period; refugees were people who had lost the diplomatic protection of one government without acquiring a new nationality. Not all such stateless people, however, were given international assistance. Geographic, ethnic, and religious criteria also applied. Only certain groups from certain countries were legally protected in the League system, chiefly Russians, as well as Christians from the former Ottoman Empire. The refugee administration also helped manage the voluntary and involuntary population transfers that were undertaken to align nationalities with borders, for example the Greco-Turkish exchange of 1923.[66]

In League circles, the postwar refugee crisis was often analyzed in economic terms. In the early 1920s, refugees were heavily concentrated in countries neighboring Russia, which faced high unemployment and acute shortages of foreign currency, notably Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. These states had few resources to sustain large refugee populations and also offered limited opportunities for local employment. In Greece, the League used the leverage of an international loan to try to support the large-scale resettlement of Christians from Turkey by promoting local economic development.[67] The League sponsored more limited programs to foster economic activity among refugee populations elsewhere, while also working to move refugees onward to new destinations in Western Europe or overseas.[68]

In the early 1920s, Albert Thomas was centrally involved in efforts to establish a more unified institutional framework for the disparate postwar efforts to support refugees. In late 1920, the ICRC asked the ILO to set up an "Emigration Office" to help find employment for refugees. Thomas determined that the ILO could not itself sponsor such an agency but agreed to back any efforts in this direction that the ICRC wished to undertake.[69] In 1921, Thomas supported the creation of a League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a post given to the Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen. In the discussions leading up to the creation of the High Commissioner for Refugees, employment was flagged as a crucial issue.[70] At a meeting in February 1921 Gustav Ador, the head of the ICRC, affirmed that it was a top priority to "sort the capable and the incapable, to verify who wants to emigrate and who wishes to stay, in short to use the labor forces that remain unproductive in the Orient." "Incapable" individuals included the elderly, the sick, and orphans, and they were considered to have the strongest claim to philanthropic aid.[71] Indeed, Thomas suggested that many refugees were not in a condition to take up employment because their "morale and their energy" had been undermined by an excess of

"charity."[72] He argued forcefully that the League should appoint a central official to enforce "discipline" among the refugees and among the panoply of relief organizations. In practice, Nansen had to run his administration on a shoestring and relied heavily on independent philanthropic organizations.[73] After Nansen's appointment, the ILO worked closely with his office to try to find employment for refugees.

Many members of Nansen's staff shared Thomas's aversion to "charity." Thomas Frank Johnson, Nansen's personal secretary and later his assistant, complained of "lavish expenditure by Governments and private organizations on unconstructive – not to say destructive – lines, either in indiscriminate feeding or doles, which thoroughly demoralized the refugees."[74] Nansen and his team defined the problem of refugee resettlement largely as a matter of matching individuals with job openings. They also undertook various initiatives to encourage refugees to find local employment, in any line of work. Indeed, Johnson declared, with a fair bit of exaggeration, that "there was scarcely a restaurant or café in Constantinople where Russian women, of the most exalted families, were not serving as waitresses."[75] Johnson and his colleagues even advised the organizations that were providing food assistance that refugees should be "struck off the relief lists" if they did not accept a job that was offered to them.[76] Nansen negotiated with governments to resettle groups of refugees from specific professions.

The ILO provided many different forms of support for refugee employment. It used its network of affiliates to coordinate specific job placements, and it also undertook more systematic initiatives. Notably, in 1921-1922 it conducted a census of Russian refugees in different countries, by gender, marital status, profession, and religion and also asked governments to report job openings that could potentially be filled by Russian refugees.[77] The first census was a major organizational undertaking, but it only covered a small proportion of the refugees in Europe. The ILO counted 45,000 refugees, whereas League estimates at the time indicated that there were roughly 800,000 in Europe.[78] The low rates of participation in the ILO census can be explained by the fact that many governments did not differentiate between refugees and other categories of migrants in their internal statistics. Consequently, the ILO was often only able to count people who were in direct contact with aid organizations.[79] The census did help reduce the postwar refugee problem to relatively manageable proportions. It became a question of finding jobs for four hundred unemployed woodworkers or one thousand seamstresses instead of 800,000 undifferentiated refugees. In a context of general

economic crisis, the ILO focused on finding small skill deficits in countries experiencing general unemployment. For example, Austria agreed to accept 1500 farmers while Bulgaria accepted fifty-five teachers and their families. Alongside these relatively modest international job placements, the ILO also helped promote local employment through refugee labor exchanges in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. These exchanges were managed by Nansen's staff, but the ILO helped set them up.[80]

In 1925, the administration of the League's refugee work was actually transferred to the ILO in order to accelerate job-placement, although Nansen retained ultimate political authority.[81] Varlez and Thomas welcomed this move as an opportunity to try to implement plans for the management of global migration that had been stymied in the Emigration Commission.[82] In 1925, the ILO subsequently undertook a more extensive survey of refugees, counting one million including roughly 250,000 unemployed.[83] During the period when the ILO had primary responsibility for refugee administration, from 1925 to 1929, it resettled roughly 50,000 people. The largest share went to France, which experienced critical labor shortages during the first half of the 1920s and became the main European country of immigration. Thomas, Varlez and other ILO officials had close ties to the evolving French migration administration and to French-based associations promoting social reform. Their skills-focused, statistics-based approach aligned closely with the administrative practices and ideology that governed French migration policy during this period.[84] The ILO decided to give up its responsibilities for refugee work in 1928 because Thomas concluded that the ILO had reached the limits of its organizational capacity; the remaining unemployed refugees either could not work or had professional skills that were hard to place.[85]

In the League system, the problem of refugee employment was closely linked to passports. In 1921, the League Secretary General identified employment and "legal status" as the two key issues on Nansen's agenda.[86] Without identity papers, refugees could not travel to find work. To address this problem, Nansen convened a diplomatic conference in July 1922 to establish a special identity certificate for Russian refugees, which was later also later extended to Armenian, Assyrian, and Assyro-Chaldean refugees. This "Nansen Passport," as it was colloquially known, gave the holder the right to travel to other countries participating in the scheme but did denote citizenship. Forty-five governments agreed to implement the Nansen passport, and altogether they issued roughly 155,000 documents. The Nansen passport was a central component of the job-placement

program undertaken by the ILO and became a key constraint on its efficacy. Many of the refugees who were offered work in a foreign country were unwilling to renounce their Russian citizenship definitively in order to gain employment that often did not fit their skills, under a precarious legal status. The standardization of passports by the League of Nations Organization for Communications and Transit underscored the limitations of Nansen's version, which granted only the right to leave a host country for a new destination and not general freedom of circulation.[87] In sum, although refugees received more direct administrative support in the League system than voluntary economic migrants, they had markedly weaker legal protections, establishing a stark and novel differentiation between migrants and refugees. The relationship between humanitarian relief and economic autonomy has remained a highly contentious area of refuge policy.[88]

VI. Conclusion

Economic migration was widely debated across the League system during the formative postwar years. A transversal analysis of this issue highlights the linkages between the objectives of social conciliation advanced by the ILO, the program of postwar macroeconomic stabilization pursued by the League's trade and transit bodies, and the system of humanitarian assistance that developed under the High Commissioner for Refugees. The League's labor, trade, and transit institutions all sponsored early migration initiatives, producing new international standards governing passports, the legal treatment of foreign firms and commercial agents, and foreign workers' access to social insurance. Yet, although League bodies established some limited normative and institutional authority in these areas, they simultaneously reaffirmed national governments' undivided sovereignty over the core issues of migration policy: admission and workforce participation. This was part of a process of institutional genesis, as international officials sought to protect the young League of Nations by defining feasible policy objectives and side-stepping difficult problems. In this context, it is significant that League officials and collaborators did not avoid the topic of economic migration altogether. In fact, they discussed migration a great deal and deliberately decided not to tackle the more divisive aspects. This meant that over the course of the 1920s, new positive models of international economic order emerged in Geneva that specifically marginalized migration, while also establishing new legal and institutional distinctions between economic migrants and refugees.

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70 Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee,* 56.

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82 Johnson, *International Tramps,* 175.

83 Kévonian, "Enjeux de catégorisations et migrations internationales", 5.

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

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SHAPING THE PAST: THE FOUNDING OF HISTORY AS AN AESTHETICO-LOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT

Abstract

In this paper, I intend to study for the first time the role of demonstrations and fictions as key elements for the scientization of history in the early German Enlightenment. First, I analyze the debate about the role of demonstrative knowledge in the historical narration, with special regard to Thomasius and Heumann. Next, I explore the relationship between the knowledge of historical facts and the epistemology of sensibility, with special regard to Chladenius and the Baumgarten brothers. My conclusion is that history as a science arises out of a concurrence of logical and aesthetic features.

Keywords: Thomasiu, Baumgarten, Theory of History, Aesthetics, Fictionality

I. Introduction

The process of scientization of history is still to date a crucial topic in the investigation of the modern age.[1] While many scholars refer to the famous debate between Buckle and Droysen in the second half of the nineteenth century,[2] which has often been simplistically regarded as the opposition between positivism and historicism, the attempt to claim some form of scientificity for history dates back much further. As is asserted by Dreitzel, the widening of the medieval *trivium* through the introduction of the *studia humanitatis*, among them poetry and history, as well as the establishment of the first "lectio historica" at the University of Mainz (1504), fostered the acquisition of a new status for this discipline.[3]

A crucial step in this process was taken by Johann Jakob Beurer (1537-1605), who declared in his *Synopsis historiarum et methodus nova* (1594): "Historia est omnis vel divinitus patefacta, vel per sensus quoquo modo hausta et mente comprehensa singularum rerum cognitio".[4] History

thus consists in a specific kind of knowledge, that is, the knowledge of singular things, either divinely revealed or drawn through the senses and grasped by one's mind. The relationship between sensuous cognition and singular things had already been clearly stated by Aristotle, for example in his *Posterior Analytics*: "Sense-perception must be concerned with particulars, whereas knowledge depends upon recognition of the universal".[5] Mentioning Aristotle at the beginning of his *Synopsis*, Beurer agrees that any cognition, apart from anticipations and axioms, stems from the sensuous experience of individuals. Yet, the knowledge of individuals does not allow for any scientific knowledge in the Aristotelian tradition. In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle wrote: "When we come to the concrete thing, e.g., this circle – which is a particular individual, either sensible or intelligible […] of these individuals there is no definition" (1036a). Similarly, he declared in his *De Anima*: "Actual sensation is of particulars, whereas knowledge is of universals" (417b). While knowledge or science (*episteme*) concerns universals, history thus concerns individuals in their sensuous dimension.[6]

To be sure, our intellect too can venture into the reign of individuals, as asserted by the Aristotelian Gerardus Vossius (1577-1649), at least in order to abstract universal knowledge.[7] Beurer himself had attempted to claim the universalizability of the material of *historiae* into axioms, postulates, etc., on the basis of the model of the Euclidean geometry. However, all this does not lead to the conclusion that history is a science in the sense of a demonstrative body of knowledge.[8] Rather, history provides material for induction and for the elucidation of universal knowledge. To use the words of the Calvinist philosopher Bartholomaeus Keckermann (1572-1609):

> History is an explanation of singular things or of individuals, undertaken for the purpose of understanding and confirming universals more clearly [...]. From this it follows first of all that history is not a discipline, and therefore neither is it science, prudence, or art, since every discipline concerns general and universal things or precepts, and therefore genera and species.[9]

Such a conclusion does not come as a surprise if we consider the standpoint of the late German Aristotelianism, which takes as a basic assumption the identity between ontological necessity and epistemic certainty: this is to say that only the states of affairs which are enduring and not changeable, hence universal and abstract, can be legitimately known with certainty; by contrast, contingent things can be known just with a

certain degree of probability.[10] Drawing a distinction between apparently contingent and actually contingent states of affairs, the logician Joachim Jungius (1587-1657) goes into further detail in his *Logica Hamburgensis* (1638). If the natural states of affairs are not liable to scientific, hence demonstrative, knowledge – he claims – it is because the human cognitive power is too limited to know all their causes; conversely, human actions cannot be the subject of science because of the free will as well as of possible immediate interventions on the part of God.[11] Hence, it is an ontological rather than an epistemological reason that prevents one from the scientific knowledge of human deeds.

Despite the progressive opening of Aristotelianism to the possibility of a scientization of the knowledge of human actions, for example in the field of ethics and politics,[12] the repercussions for the scientific status of history will find a significant development only in the early eighteenth century, when the discussion will move from an ontological to an epistemological plane. The present paper intends to focus on a central element of this process of scientization,[13] that is, the admission of demonstrative knowledge in history in the early German Enlightenment – a topic on which appropriate research is still lacking. In parallel, my aim is to show that such a dimension does not run against the emphasis on the "sensuous individual", which was, as mentioned above, a distinctive mark of the knowledge conveyed by historical narrations. As a matter of fact, in the mid-Enlightenment context the sensuous knowledge of the individual becomes the subject of a new branch of philosophy, namely aesthetics.[14] Precisely the new aesthetic discourse about sensibility makes it possible to think of the role of *aisthesis* and fictions in historical narrations, without thereby jeopardizing the scientific status of the historical discipline. The thesis I want to defend is that the scientificity of history emerges from a fruitful interaction between these two developments, the logical-demonstrative and the aesthetic.

II. Demonstrations in History

In his *Introductio ad Philosophiam Aulicam* (1688), Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) argues that it is impossible to discuss history as a science.[15] According to Thomasius, science does not concern substances and necessary beings as in the Aristotelian tradition, but only accidents and contingent beings; the reason is that we can be certain only of what we know by our own sensuous experience, hence accidents and contingent

beings.[16] Thomasius thus relates demonstrations and science to sensory perceptions (as well as to the rational truths obtained through an "inductio scientiva" stemming from a few individuals), while the knowledge of substance and universal can only be probable.[17]

History must be framed in this picture. Since most of the things existing in this world last more than human life, very few things can be subject to our own senses. Therefore, it is necessary to assume that we derive knowledge about the origin of many things from the testimony of others; this process is commonly called history.[18] From these premises, Thomasius feels entitled to oppose history, based on probable historical faith, to demonstrative knowledge: "Cum enim fides historica tota, quanta est, in verisimilitudine fundetur […] demonstratio vero sit veritatum certarum, cuilibet evidens erit, fidem historicam sub demonstrationem non cadere".[19] The origin of things is therefore not an "object of demonstration", but only of a dialectical syllogism, that is, of an argument whose premises are only likely, and not certain as the science would require.[20] Unlike Jungius, Thomasius thus seems to reject the scientific status of history not for the contingency of the events it deals with, but for the way we know those events, which basically depends on the testimony of others rather than on one's own senses.

Precisely this new epistemological thrust, however, seems to be decisive in order to grant a scientific status to history. Working on this dimension, Johannes Eisenhart (1643-1707), to whom Thomasius takes exception, had already outlined in his *De fide historica commentarius* (1679) something like a "science exploring and investigating the historical faith".[21] In this case, the possibility of demonstrations in history no longer depends on the event, but on those reporting it. Eisenhart thus rehabilitates the ancient *locus ab auctoritate* as a central concept of the historical investigation.[22]

An important development of this discussion can be found in Christian August Heumann (1681-1764), the author of *De fide historica, oder Von der Glaubwürdigkeit in dieser Historie* (1715).[23] The problem discussed by Heumann in this dissertation precisely concerns the possibility to determine whether history only rests on uncertain knowledge or whether there can also be historical demonstrations. While acknowledging the significance of Eisenhart's work, Heumann is convinced that his argument on human authority is not sufficient, positively mentioning Thomasius's "rational objections" against this writing. Yet, Heumann cannot agree with Thomasius that there are no demonstrations in history. In fact, Heumann

argues, we know many facts with such a strong conviction that it is impossible to call them into question.

In order to make his point, Heumann suggests introducing a new distinction between two kinds of demonstrations: absolute demonstrations and hypothetical demonstrations. An absolute demonstration is a demonstration that proves that something either must necessarily exist or must have a certain quality, for example that there is God (*demonstratio a priori*), that virtues make humans happy (*demonstratio a posteriori*), that "socialitas" is not "primum principium justi" (*demonstratio indirecta*). By contrast, hypothetical demonstrations are not intended to demonstrate that something necessarily exists or has a certain quality; rather, they point to the fact that I can demonstrate in a fully certain way that something existed and it had this quality.

It is therefore not an absolute necessity that Luther was a professor in Wittenberg: it was not an absolute necessity, but *post factum*, after the fact, one can clearly prove that it was impossible that what happened could not have happened. To get to this conclusion, Heumann must grant value to testimony. In fact, while Thomasius asserted that history cannot have demonstrations because most events do not fall under our senses, Heumann equates the credibility of our sensuous perception to the testimony about the same event of many people from different places and times, following an axiom included in the Latin edition of the *Logique de Port Royal*:

> Res gestae de quibus sensus facile possunt judicare, si confirmentur testimoniis multorum hominum, diversarum aetatum, diversarum nationum, diversa consilia prosequentium, si de illis loquantur tanquam a se visis, neque suspicio fit eos conspiravisse ad mendacium stabilendum, non minus constanter credi debent, quam si visae fuissent a nobis propriis oculis.[24]

To elucidate the concept of hypothetical demonstrations, Heumann takes the example of his own baptism. Such a thesis ("I was baptized in my childhood") is historical; its subject does not have any absolutely necessary connection with the predicate, so that it cannot be proved through an absolute demonstration. However, it is possible to demonstrate it in a hypothetical way. For there are people who claim they had been his godfathers, and who can even show him the relevant document they all signed along with his father. Further, there are hundreds of people, who

are not friends to one another and who do not have anything to gain from lying, who state they were in town on the day of his baptism, and had partly witnessed the event, partly heard about it. Finally, if he had not been baptized, it would have been such a rare case that people would have remembered it. Given all these premises, the conclusion is that it is necessarily untrue that Heumann did go unbaptized. Therefore, he knows with certainty and demonstratively that he was baptized.

As was already patent with Eisenhart, the possibility of demonstrations in history takes a clearly epistemological turn. Precisely by connecting the problem of demonstrations with the way in which we can know an event, the scientific status of history begins to be recognized.[25] In this sense, the epistemology of testimony becomes essential, as we will see, insofar as it aims to determine whether or not the witnesses at issue are trustworthy. On this theme, Christian Wolff (1679-1754) elaborates a theory serving as the basis for the following development of the doctrine. As is known, Wolff distinguishes the concept of *cognitio historica* from that of *historia*: the former is the lowest degree of knowledge in a three-item list also comprising philosophical and mathematical knowledge. In short, while philosophical knowledge is based on causal knowledge and mathematical knowledge on quantitative knowledge, historical knowledge rests on the attention both to something we perceive by the external senses and to the internal states of things we know through our mind.[26] Since *cognitio historica* is here a general mode of knowledge and not the specific kind of knowledge we acquire through a historical narration, *cognitio historica* can have the same object as philosophical and mathematical knowledge. In this sense, we can know the same phenomenon in three different ways: we can know that the water flows in the riverbed (historical knowledge); we can know that this happens because of the slope of the riverbed and of the pressure exerted by the water lying above on the water lying below (philosophical knowledge); and we can know the quantity of the different elements involved (mathematical knowledge).[27]

On another level, Wolff distinguishes historical books and dogmatic books, the former dealing with *singularia* and the latter dealing with *universalia*. A *historia* in the strict sense is a narration of human events. In case we just intend to read *historia*, Wolff argues, we only need attention and concentration. Yet, our interest might not be simply to know *historiae*, but rather to judge the truth of such writings. In this case, attention is no longer sufficient; rather, it is necessary to observe the rules of faith,[28] through which we can analyze the authority of the narrator. For example, in

case the narrated things turn out to be false or contradictory, they are totally impossible; if they contrast with the usual inclinations of humans, they should be considered as morally impossible; if they collide with preceding or subsequent occurrences, they are hypothetically impossible.[29] Precisely the kind of intellectual investigation required by Wolff seems to prompt advancements in the philosophy of history of the age. For while Wolff does not speak about historical demonstrations, one of his most significant followers, Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700-1766), takes a step in this direction, by clearly admitting the possibility of demonstrations (*Beweise*) in the historical discipline (*Historie*): "Indess ist es gewiss, dass es auch in der Historie solche Beweise geben könne, daran man mit keinem Scheine der Wahrheit zweifeln kann".[30]

It was Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten (1706-1757), a Lutheran theologian influenced by Wolff, that provided more details about the theoretical background of this admission. In his preface to the German edition of the *Universal History* (1744), he points out the frequent confusion between the historical knowledge of the essential parts of sciences and the knowledge and insight into history. By alerting his readers not to take *cognitio historiae* for *cognitio historica*, Baumgarten explicitly claims that the former can be as rational and accurate as the knowledge of universal truths.[31] In fact, the painstaking proof of the grounds and different levels of probability and certainty, the discovery of the nexus of several events and their mutual influence, as well as the correct judgment about them "require, engage, and sharpen the human reflection to the same extent as any other science".[32] The possibility of rational knowledge in history here finds a clear-cut confirmation.

III. Fictions in History

As is known, the word "history" is etymologically related to the Indo-European root *weid, to see. It seems that history, at least in the beginning, was in some way connected to the act of gathering information through autopsy or by actual perception, in other words, by means of *aisthesis*. Accordingly, Thomasius, as we have seen, claims that there could be demonstrations in history if it were possible to just rely on the knowledge of the senses. In this way, the lack of certainty attributed to history is due to the lack of *aisthesis* and the appeal to testimonial reports. More information about this issue is provided by Johann Martin Chladenius

(1710-1759) in his *Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft* (1752), where the scientific status of history is already stated in the title. In the preface of this work, Chladenius complains about the little space typically devoted to the historical books in the volumes of logic of his time and calls for more attention.[33] As a matter of fact, such increased attention should focus in particular on an epistemology of *aisthesis*.

Indeed, Chladenius pinpoints that the *aisthesis* on which historical and empirical knowledge in general hinges depends on perspective. To be sure, events do not need any observer to exist.[34] However, when one wants to study the knowledge of events and the narration stemming from it, the observer, that is, the one who feels something as present, becomes as paramount as the thing itself.[35] For it is undeniable that the bodies assume a different configuration depending on how the observer relates to them, e.g. on how close he is, on how attentive he is, etc.[36] Thus, the fixed stars would be suns for a close observer, while they are just small celestial lights for us on Earth.[37] As is evident, the theory of the viewpoint is strictly linked with the sense of sight.[38] Along with sight and its condition, e.g. its sharpness, the viewpoint also involves the other senses of the historian (including his being healthy or sick, for instance),[39] as well as his social condition. In fact, the social condition can modify the historian's perception, in particular the perception concerning the moral beings, which take shape, unlike most concrete objects, only in the eyes of the beholder.[40]

The historical knowledge, in this sense, is influenced both by the nature and the psycho-physiological condition of the gaze and by the standpoint of the historian within his community. The perspective dimension, astronomically indebted to Copernicus and metaphysically to Leibniz, is placed at the core of the historical explanation.[41] While Lucian of Samosata (ca. 125-after 180) affirmed in his *How to write history* that the mind of a historian must be "like a mirror, clear, gleaming-bright, accurately centered, displaying the shape of things just as he receives them, free from distortion, false coloring, and misrepresentation",[42] now that mirror is no longer a univocal tool, but can have different models, positions, and sizes.[43] In the light of the theory of the viewpoint, the connection between historical cognition and sensibility thus seems to be less one-sided than Thomasius had expected.[44]

Yet, there is something more. In fact, Chladenius argues, the historian actively modifies the data of his perception in order to remember them and share them with others through his narration in a process called

"transformation of history" (*Verwandelung der Geschichte*).[45] It is thus important to understand the internal grammar of this transformation, in order to correctly appraise the productive role of the observer in his own stories. First of all, Chladenius remarks, many things are represented at the same time in our sensation, which cannot be expressed at the same time in a story. Although I see the face of a person all at once, I have to describe it one part after the other.[46] Further, in the sensation everything is perfectly determined as for length, size, breadth, number, color, etc. All this is not only difficult to describe, but also extremely long, so that the description of a short visit could take a few hours to read. Consequently, the observer has necessarily to leave out a series of individual circumstances by merely omitting certain aspects and, more surreptitiously, by employing general terms, so as to avoid listing all the determinations of the individuals, or by replacing specific facts (e.g. the exact amount of a person's richness) with general notes (e.g. this person is rich).[47] Moreover, it often happens that the historian mixes up some internal characteristics of the things he describes with the affects provoked by these characteristics, since the narration does not express the event itself but its representation retained in memory.[48]

Ambiguity increases even more when the historian makes reference to ideas such as beauty, on which there is no agreement.[49] Also, historians use concepts like "large"; "big"; "high", which tend to enlarge or shrink certain details,[50] in relation to the goal of the historical narration: for the attention is directed to very different aspects if we write a thorough record, a joke, or a personal story.[51] In writing their experience, the eyewitnesses therefore give shape to an image which is necessarily different from their sensuous perception, insofar as it entails "constructive" features, that is, features linked with the act of witnessing and narrating a testimony rather than with the event. Hence, the metaphor of the mind of the historian as a mirror not only undergoes a process of multiplication, but also acquires specific indexes of distortion, which are inherent in the genesis of narration and cannot be removed in the name of objectivity.

If constructive aspects are crucial for eyewitnesses, they are also seminal for historians who did not witness the event being narrated. This issue was highlighted by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762), Siegmund Baumgarten's younger brother as well as the founder of philosophical aesthetics. In the first volume of his *Aesthetica* (2 voll., 1750-1758), Baumgarten claims: "That which we have not perceived with the same number of ideas with which we think it, and which nevertheless

must be known sensitively, we must invent by an act of fiction. Hence, we define as fictions in a broad sense the perceptions formed by the combination and separation of phantastic images (*phantasmata*)". From this point of view, any sensuous idea which does not hinge on an immediately acquired sensation, hence on experience in the strictest sense,[52] is a fiction. Insofar as the historian does not usually experience directly, i.e. through his senses, the events narrated, the *aisthesis* whereby he works is not sensation, but fiction, hence a blend of perceptions of the imagination.[53] Our representations of e.g. the Second Punic War, no matter how accurate they are, are thus technically fictions.

How is it possible, though, to piece together fictions and demonstrations in history? A hint is offered by Baumgarten himself. For the employment of the term *fictio*, Baumgarten rushes to remark, does not imply that such representations are not endowed with truth. To this end, Baumgarten introduces the phrase of "fictiones strictissime verae",[54] including all the past things which I did not experience directly, but which are narrated according to the standards of historical credibility (*fides historica*).[55] These standards include first of all the requirement that the fictions be verisimilar. According to Baumgarten verisimilitude falls into the domain of aesthetic truth, of which it represents the main element.[56] In his search for verisimilitude, the historian must therefore adhere to the principles of aesthetic truth.[57] Such a truth requires first of all the possibility of the subjects,[58] and secondly their connection with their grounds and consequences in the eye of the analogue of reason, i.e. of sensibility.[59] Not by chance, Baumgarten exemplifies the requirement of the aesthetic truth with the episode of Coriolanus narrated by a historian such as Livy, who accounts for the ground of the single occurrences so that they can be easily grasped in their link by the analogue of reason.[60]

That such a nexus of occurrences is crucial for history was already stated by Alexander's brother Siegmund in the discussion of the so-called internal verisimilitude, which, along with the principle of non-contradiction, constitutes the internal ground of reliability of a *historia*.[61] The reference of the verisimilitude of *historiae* to aesthetic truth, however, allows for a broader understanding of the doctrine, insofar as it makes it possible to unearth the proximity of history with the poetic domain.[62] Significantly, Alexander Baumgarten uses the term "verisimilitudo interna"[63] in reference with the heterocosmic fictions, in particular with those fictions that are not based on existing myths and legends, and that can therefore be made credible only by virtue of the coherence of the internal structure. This can

well be the case of the "beautiful and rational novels", which, according to Meier, "are so verisimilar that sometimes it would be difficult for a philosopher to provide a sufficient ground of why he did not want to consider them as a true story".[64] Aesthetic truth thus seems to provide a common principle for that internal verisimilitude which will be at the basis of both history and novel theory in the Late Enlightenment.[65]

Precisely this commonality, though, makes it necessary to add another constraint in order to distinguish the fictional activity of the historian from that of a poet or a novelist. As we have seen, Alexander Baumgarten remarks that in constructing their fictions, the historian must stay true to *fides historica*[66] and is not entitled to insert beings from another universe or to take advantage of popular credulity in his narration.[67] Similarly, his brother Siegmund asserts that, along with internal verisimilitude, historical fictions must comply with external verisimilitude, which includes an epistemology of the testimony, or, with the term used by Alexander Baumgarten, a "martyrocritique", provided that one can apply to the historian what can be said of the witness.[68] Insofar as the testimony relies on faith, that is, on the assent given to a testimony,[69] it is necessary to investigate if witnesses are worthy of trust,[70] in particular with regard to their dexterity and sincerity, hence to their inclination to report truth,[71] in order to check the degree of probability of the evidence provided.[72] The preliminary criterion is undoubtedly that of rejecting one's assent to the things that run against experience and reason, and are therefore in themselves unlikely or unbelievable.[73]

The concurrence of internal credibility and the higher or lower probability of the testimony determines in Alexander Baumgarten "historical certainty, probability, and improbability".[74] Baumgarten thus does not hesitate to admit of the possibility of something like "historical certainty", which had remained outside of Wolff's conception.[75] The thesis is even clearer in the second part of his *Aesthetica* (1758). While his brother Siegmund took issue with the textbooks of logic that guiltily overlooked such a relevant subject as historical certainty under the pretext that it rested on evidence irreducible to mathematical certainty,[76] Alexander claims: "Philosophers have a [kind of] solidity and mathematicians have another one, but historians, orators, poets have one too, albeit of a different kind".[77]

Precisely the acknowledgement of this epistemic peculiarity allows for the admission of possible demonstrations in history. In fact, while the knowledge of history is grounded on the sensuous representations of memory and imagination, the role of reason and demonstrations avoids

the arbitrariness of fictions on the basis of the body of evidence accepted at a certain moment in a certain context. Fictions are consequently entitled to hand down sound, albeit not objective, knowledge, insofar as the rational assessment of the sources rules out all the elements which historical fictions are not allowed to include.[78]

In this way, the old adagio opposing fiction and truth, poignantly summarised by the Swiss scientist Theodor Zwinger (1533-1588) in the statement: "Fictio Veritati est contraria. Si fingat, peccat in Historiam: si non fingat, peccat in Poësin" ("Fiction is opposite to truth. He who invents violates the writing of history; he who does not, violates poetic art"), must be profoundly revised.[79] In fact, fictions now become necessary to historians precisely to the extent that they intend to narrate accurately: to put it bluntly, *res fictae* are here the epistemic premise for the knowledge of *res factae* rather than their opposite.[80] It is in this convergence between epistemology of *aisthesis* and epistemology of testimony that history claims its scientific status in the German mid-eighteenth century.

NOTES

1 On the scientization of history in the eighteenth century, there is a wide range of literature, see at least A. Kraus, *Vernunft und Geschichte. Die Bedeutung der deutschen Akademien für die Entwicklung der Geschichtswissenschaft im späten 18. Jahrhundert*, Freiburg/Basel/Wien, 1963; H. Dreitzel, "Die Entwicklung der Historie zur Wissenschaft", *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 8/3 (1981), pp. 257-284; W. Hardtwig, "Die Verwissenschaftlichung der Geschichtsschreibung und die Ästhetisierung der Darstellung", in R. Koselleck, H. Lutz and J. Rüsen (eds.), *Formen der Geschichtsschreibung*, München, 1982, pp. 147-191; P.H. Reill, "Die Geschichtswissenschaft um die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts", in R. Vierhaus (ed.), *Wissenschaften im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, Göttingen, 1985, pp. 163-193; K. Jarausch, "The Institutionalization of History in Eighteenth-Century Germany", in H.E. Bödeker, G.G. Iggers, J.B. Knudsen, and P.H. Reill (eds.), *Aufklärung und Geschichte: Studien zur deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen, 1986, pp. 25-48; H.W. Blanke and D. Fleischer, "Artikulation bürgerlichen Emanzipationsstrebens und der Verwissenschaftlichungsprozeß der Historie. Grundzüge der deutschen Aufklärungshistorie und die Aufklärungshistorik", in H.W. Blanke and D. Fleischer (eds.), *Theoretiker der deutschen Aufklärungshistorie*, vol. I, *Die theoretische Begründung der Geschichte als Fachwissenschaft*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1990, pp. 19-102; the various articles included in W. Küttler, J. Rüsen, E. Schulin (eds.), *Geschichtsdiskurs*, vol. II, *Die Anfänge des modernen historischen Denkens*, Frankfurt am Main, 1994; D. Fulda, *Wissenschaft aus Kunst. Die Entstehung der modernen deutschen Geschichtsschreibung 1760-1860*, Berlin-New York, 1996. See also in general F. Wagner, *Die Anfänge der modernen Geschichtswissenschaft im 17. Jahrhundert*, München 1979; N. Hammerstein, *Jus und Historie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des historischen Denkens an deutschen Universitäten im späten 17. und im 18. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen, 1972; P.H. Reill, *The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1975; G.G. Iggers, "The University of Göttingen (1760-1800) and the Transformation of Historical Scholarship", *Storia della storiografia* 2 (1982), pp. 11-37; U. Muhlack, *Geschichtswissenschaft im Humanismus und in der Aufklärung. Die Vorgeschichte des Historismus*, München 1991; F.C. Beiser, *The German Historicist Tradition*, New York, 2011, especially the Introduction and the first three chapters.

2 J.G. Droysen, "Die Erhebung der Geschichte zum Range einer Wissenschaft" [a review of H.T. Buckle's *History of Civilization in England*], *Historische Zeitschrift*, 9, 1863, pp. 1-22.

3 Dreitzel, "Die Entdeckung der Historie zur Wissenschaft", p. 261.

4 J.J. Beurer, *Synopsis historiarum et methodus nova*, Hanoviae, 1594, p. 1. For a comment on this, see A. Seifert, *Cognitio historica. Die Geschichte als Namengeberin der frühneuzeitlichen Empirie*, Berlin, 1976, p. 94.

5 Aristotle, *Posterior analytics*, 87b37-9.

6 This includes both the immediate perception of the concrete individual and the knowledge of human facts and events, see Dreitzel, "Die Entdeckung der Historie zur Wissenschaft", p. 263. On history as empirical knowledge, see in general Seifert, *Cognitio historica*.

7 G.J. Vossius, *Ars historica sive de historiae et historices natura historiaeque scribendae praeceptis commentatio*, Lugduni Batavorum, 1623, p. 19: "Si intellectus non intelligit singularia, quomodo ab iis abstrahit universalia?"

8 As J. Jungius wrote in his *Logica Hamburgensis* (1637), ed. by R.W. Meyer, Hamburg, 1957, pp. 2; 29: "Scientia proprie dicta est habitus mentis, quo cognoscimus ea, quae ex primis principiis per demonstrationem deducuntur".

9 B. Keckermann, *De natura et proprietatibus historiae Commentarius*, Hanovia, 1621, p. 8. Those who entertain the idea that history is an art are under the fire of peripatetical criticism, see Vossius, *Ars historica*, p. 17: "At eidem Maccio assentire non possumus, cum histioriam putat ad artem posse referri. Nec enim historia universalium est, nec proprie dici potest poiein. Quare haec sententia homine Peripatetico, qualem se Maccius profitetur, plane est indigna".

10 Dreitzel, "Die Entdeckung der Historie", pp. 262-263.

11 Jungius, *Logica Hamburgensis*, pp. 20ff.

12 For a survey, see Dreitzel, "Die Entdeckung der Historie", pp. 264-265.

13 Among the indispensable prerequisites for "scientific history", the need for a homogeneous, omnipresent and pervasive time has often been mentioned. In the light of this "new time", the juxtaposition of the history of individual peoples as in the ancient *historia universa* was replaced with a single secularized time continuum. Koselleck famously traced this transformation back to the so-called *Sattelzeit* (1750-1850), with the transition from the concrete singular "das Geschichte" (event; incident) to the plural "die Geschichte(n)" up to the collective singular "die Geschichte". History (*die Geschichte*) thus becomes the complex of human actions and their knowledge rather than a mere record of exemplary facts. See R. Koselleck, *Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historic Time* (1979), New York, 2004, pp. 32-34. In my paper, the point will not so much be "scientific history" as the scientization of the historical discipline, and will thus concern only the epistemological side. The period analyzed, in which the discussion on the epistemic presuppositions of history as a discipline begins to emerge, is immediately preceding the *Sattelzeit*, hence the early Enlightenment.

14 On the relationship between history and aesthetics in their link with the individual, see A. Baeumler, *Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und*

Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft (1923), Darmstadt, 1967, in particular p. 15. In an attempt to point out the commonalities between history and aesthetics in this period, Karl Friedrich Flögel considered these two sciences as two parts of special logic, one dealing with the rules of common historical knowledge and the other with the rules of beautiful knowledge, see K.F. Flögel, *Einleitung in die Erfindungskunst*, Breßlau/ Leipzig, 1760, § 194.

15 Ch. Thomasius, *Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam*, Lipsiae, 1688, p. 155.

16 *Ibidem*, p. 160: "Ego contra Philosophorum infimus dico, Accidentium esse scientiam, non Substantiae, quoniam hactenus demonstravi, Accidentia incurrere in sensus, at formas substantiales ignorari ab homine".

17 Ch. Thomasius, *Einleitung zu der Vernunfft-Lehre*, Halle, 1691, pp. 235-236.

18 Thomasius, *Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam*, p. 155. For a similar thesis in Leibniz, see W. Conze, *Leibniz als Historiker*, Berlin, 1951, p. 55.

19 Thomasius, *Introductio ad philosophiam aulicam*, p. 155.

20 *Ibidem*.

21 J. Eisenhart, *De fide historica commentarius*, Helmstadii, 1702[2], pp. 6-7.

22 See Seifert, *Cognitio historica*, p. 152. Seifert writes: "Während sich aber die scholastischen Dialektikkommentare zumeist damit begnügten, wie die *probabilitas* im allgemeinen, so auch die *auctoritas* im besonderen negativ gegen die Gewißheit von Wissenschaft und Offenbarung abzuheben, beginnt nun mit Melchior Cano der Versuch, jene Ungewißenheit der dialektischen Prämissen (des *probabile per se*) aus einem vorgeschalteten Argument zu berechnen und dadurch von den niederen Graden des Zustimmens abzusetzen, für die Tradition mit *suspicio* und *aestimatio* nicht mehr als Nomenklaturen besessen hatte" (pp. 156-157). It is evident that what is scientific is not *Historie*, but *Historik*, see *ibidem*, p. 151. In this sense, scientificity does not depend on regularity and consequentiality in history, but on the way of analyzing witnesses and sources.

23 Ch.A. Heumann, "De fide historica, oder Von der Glaubwürdigkeit in dieser Historie", *Acta philosophorum* 1 (1715), 3. Stück, 381-462, in particular pp. 384-390, which I will comment.

24 *Logica sive Ars cogitandi* (e tertia apud Gallos editione recognita et aucta in Latinum versa), Londini, 1682, p. 279.

25 In this sense, the problem of historical method, already highlighted by Thomasius through the distinction between probable and improbable stories, becomes essential, see Ch. Thomasius, *Höchstnöthige Cautelen Welche ein Studiosus […] zu beobachten hat*, Halle im Magdeb[urgischen], 1713, p. 97.

26 Ch. Wolff, "Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere", in Ch. Wolff, *Philosophia rationalis sive Logica*, Francofurti et Lipsiae, 1728, §§ 3; 21; see also G.B. Bilfinger, *De triplici rerum cognitione, historica, philosophica, et mathematica*, Ienae 1722, § 13.

27 Wolff, "Discursus praeliminaris", §§ 6; 7; 14. Both for Wolff and for Bilfinger, the collaboration between the three different ways of knowledge is paramount. On the one hand, the knowledge we obtain through experience is the basis for any knowledge; on the other hand, the collaboration between the two forms of rational knowledge, the philosophical and the mathematical, makes sure that the philosopher is stimulated to perfect his own knowledge through quantitative measurements and that the mathematician is pushed to relate his calculations with *scire per causas*, see in particular Bilfinger, *De triplici*, §§ 11 and 48ff. It must be noted that *cognitio historica* in Wolffianism is no longer primarily defined as knowledge of singular things, but as a *modus cognoscendi*. On the contrary, singular things, as we will see, will be entitled to become the subject of rational analysis, provided that the rational analysis concerns the knowability of their contingent happening.

28 Wolff, *Philosophia rationalis*, § 803; §§ 613ff.

29 *Ibidem*, § 804.

30 J.Ch. Gottsched, *Erste Gründe der gesamten Weltweisheit. Erster, Theoretischer Theil*, Leipzig, 1733, § 113; on Gottsched, see Michael Ermarth, "Hermeneutics and History. The Fork in Hermes' Path through the 18th Century", in Bödeker, Iggers, Knudsen, and Reill (eds.), *Aufklärung und Geschichte*, pp. 193-221, here pp. 198-201.

31 See S.J. Baumgarten, "Vorrede", in *Uebersetzung der Algemeinen Welthistorie. Erster Theil*, Halle, 1744, p. 36.

32 *Ibidem*. Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten thus takes exception not only to the skepticism coming from France, which spread a systematic suspicion towards historical studies, but also to the diffidence towards history descending from the Wolffian assumptions. See M. Schloemann, *Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten. Theologie und Geschichte in der Theologie des Übergangs zum Neuprotestantismus*, Göttingen, 1974, pp. 140-143. Schloemann deals in detail with Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten's attempt to overcome the neglect of history on the part of the Wolffian system, without blatantly breaking with the principles of Wolffian philosophy, see pp. 135-156. On his relationship with skepticism, see also M. Völkel, *"Pyrrhonismus historicus" und "fides historica". Die Entwicklung der deutschen Methodologie unter dem Gesichtspunkt der historischen Skepsis*, Frankfurt am Main, 1987, pp. 229-253.

33 J.M. Chladenius, *Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft*, Leipzig, 1752, "Vorrede".

34 *Ibidem*, ch. 5, § 1.

35 *Ibidem*.

36 *Ibidem*, ch. 5, § 2.

37 *Ibidem*.

38 See *ibidem*, ch. 5, § 3.

39 *Ibidem*, ch. 5, §§ 3-4.

40 *Ibidem*, ch. 5, § 13.

41 See J. Nieraad, *Standpunktbewußtsein und Weltzusammenhang. Das Bild vom lebendigen Spiegel bei Leibniz und seine Bedeutung für das Alterswerk Goethes*, Wiesbaden, 1970, pp. 77ff.

42 Lucian, *How to write history*, 50.

43 Chladenius, *Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft*, ch. 6, § 1.

44 Historical knowledge is therefore strictly linked with a theory of sensuous cognition, see Ch. Friedrich, *Sprache und Geschichte. Untersuchungen zur Hermeneutik von Johann Martin Chladenius*, Meisenheim am Glan, 1978, p. 215.

45 Chladenius, *Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft*, ch. 6, § 1: "Wenn die wahre Beschaffenheit der Geschichte, oder vielmehr der Erzehlungen recht einsehen will, so ist nicht genug, daß wir wissen, wie die Begebenheiten denen Zuschauern auf verschiedene Weise, gleichsam als in Spiegeln von verschiedener Gattung und Stellung vorgstellet werden […]; sondern wir müssen auch noch eine andere Handlung der Seele, welche vor der Erzehlung vorhergeht, bemercken, welche wir die *Verwandelung der Geschichte* nennen wollen; weil die Begebenheit niemahls *vollkommen so*, wie sie empfunden worden, erzehlet wird, sondern vielmehr *nach* einem gewissen Bilde, welches aus der Empfindung und deren Vorstellung durchs Gedächtniß herausgezogen wird. Denn wir erzehlen die Sachen nicht in der Empfindung, und währender Vorstellung, sondern nach derselben: und richten uns also nach dem Bilde, welches durch die Empfindung in unsere Seele ist eingepräget worden".

46 *Ibidem*, ch. 6, § 2.

47 *Ibidem*, ch. 6, §§ 3-4; 7.

48 *Ibidem*, ch. 6, § 5.

49 *Ibidem*, ch. 6, § 6.

50 *Ibidem*.

51 *Ibidem*, ch. 6, § 9. Chladenius records other aspects of the transformation which I omit for space reasons.

52 A.G. Baumgarten, *Acroasis logica*, Halle, 1761, § 163; see also Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, § 482. According to Baumgarten experience in a broader sense includes the collection of cognitions in which some elements of sensation are involved. See P. Pimpinella, "Experientia/Erfahrung in Wolff e Baumgarten", in M. Veneziani (ed.), *Experientia*, Firenze, 2002, pp. 367-397; A. Nannini, "*Aesthetica experimentalis*. Baumgarten and the Aesthetic Dimension of Experience", in K. de Boer; T. Prunea (eds.), *The Experiential Turn in Eighteenth-Century German Philosophy*, London, 2021, pp. 55-78.

53 A.G. Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, Traiecti cis viadrum, 1750, § 505. According to Baumgarten, the term "sensitivum" does not refer to the perceptions of the senses alone, but also to the perceptions of the other lower powers of the mind (imagination, memory, taste, wit, etc.). The representations of past

events are fictions, insofar as they grasp the individual, unlike the abstract notions of the intellect, but not by direct experience, unlike the perceptions of the senses. For his part, Chladenius explicitly rejected the term 'fiction' (*Erdichtung*), insofar as fiction is for him connected with lies and falsehood, see Chladenius, *Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft*, ch. 6, § 36.

54 Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, § 506. In the wide set of fictions in a broad sense, the most strictly true fictions and the fictions which include some elements of possibility are called historical fictions in the strictest sense: "Historical fictions in the broadest sense embrace the knowledge of this universe of those who think in a beautiful way, without their having directly derived it from experience. They, as strictly true fictions, propose, at least to those who have no experience of them, strictly real events in this universe, or they propose such things that, provided that all events and their circumstances are known to us through the senses in this universe, could have taken place or could take place: and these are, even if thought by poets, strictly historical fictions" (§ 509). When the latter are used by historians, it is clear that the element of possibility must be used with caution, in particular to bridge the gaps in the sources with suitable conjectures (see for instance the case of Coriolanus, in which Livy inserts the speech of Coriolanus' mother, in order to account for his emotion, § 438) and must not be abused (for example, the storms in Virgil are historical fictions but are not appropriate to the historian, because they are possible, but without any evidence).

55 The "fictiones strictissime verae" also include the things temporarily present but spatially outside the scope of my sensations, which I however know through my sensibility; and the future things which I anticipate, as a tower in the mind of an architect, see Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, § 506.

56 Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, § 483. The aesthetic truth is *a potiori* defined as verisimilitude, which can be thought of as truth to the analogue of reason. I have already developed this argument in A. Nannini, "In the Wake of Clio. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten on History", *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, 93\1 (2019), pp. 1-41, here pp. 32-35.

57 Verisimilitude in the strictest sense or historical verisimilitude is one of the two kinds of aesthetic verisimilitude. In this case, even the perception of falsehood in a broader sense is banished. The other kind of aesthetic verisimilitude is the heterocosmic verisimilitude, see Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, § 530.

58 Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, § 431; A.G. Baumgarten, "Kollegium über die Ästhetik", in B. Poppe, *Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. Seine Bedeutung und Stellung in der Leibniz-Wolffischen Philosophie und seine Beziehungen zu Kant*, Borna-Leipzig, 1907, § 431. Such a possibility entails the compliance with the non-contradiction principle, see Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, § 431; also, it includes both natural and moral hypothetical possibility, see

Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, §§ 432-436; Baumgarten, "Kollegium über die Ästhetik", §§ 433-435.

59 Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, § 437. The reference to the principle of reason and of consequence is clear, see also Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, § 426.

60 Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, §§ 437-438.

61 S.J. Baumgarten, "Vorrede", pp. 9-10. The internal verisimilitude of an occurrence therefore increases if it is possible to show its nexus with the following occurrence, see p. 18. On the contrary, external reasons rest on the reliability and the number of witnesses, see p. 11.

62 The proximity of poetics and history in the eighteenth century was highlighted by Koselleck, see Koselleck, *Futures Past*, p. 204.

63 See Nannini, "In the Wake of Clio", pp. 33-34, note 232.

64 G.Fr. Meier, *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften*, vol. I, Halle im Magdeburgischen, 1748, § 106.

65 See Scharloth, "Evidenz und Wahrscheinlichkeit", pp. 264ff.

66 Chladenius also remarks the role of impartiality for witnesses. The fact is that impartiality does not rest on the impossible overcoming of the limited perspective of the historian, but on the attempt to adhere as fairly as possible to evidence. See Chladenius, *Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft*, ch. 6, § 34: "*Unpartheyisch* erzehlen kan daher nichts anders heissen, als die Sache erzehlen, ohne daß man das geringste darin vorsetzlich verdrehet oder verdunckelt: oder sie nach seinem besten Wissen und Gewissen erzehlen: so wie hingegen eine *partheyische* Erzehlung nichts anders als eine Verdrehung der Geschichte ist". To quote Baumgarten's colleague in Frankfurt on the Oder Simonetti: "Ein Geist den die Vorurtheile des Ansehns, der Gewinsucht, des Volks, des Landes, der Lebensart, der vermeinten Religion plagen, kann unmöglich die Wahrheit schreiben", see Ch.E. Simonetti, *Der Character des Geschichtsschreibers*, Göttingen, 1746, p. 25. For the concept of impartiality in this period, see K. Murphy, A. Traninger (eds.), *The Emergence of Impartiality*, Leiden, 2014.

67 Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, § 584.

68 Baumgarten, *Acroasis logica*, § 430.

69 Baumgarten, *Acroasis logica*, § 357. If the assent given to testimony rests on sufficient grounds, faith is called rational, see A.G. Baumgarten (*praeses*); G.Ch.W. Bütow (*auctor*), *Dissertatio inauguralis de fidei in philosophia utilitate*, Francofurti ad Viadrum, 1750, § 4. For a comment, see C. Schwaiger, "Philosophie und Glaube bei Christian Wolff und Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten", *Aufklärung* 23 (2011), pp. 213-228.

70 Baumgarten, *Acroais logica*, § 363.

71 Baumgarten, *Acroasis logica*, § 361: "Dexteritas testis est sufficientia virium eius ad proponendum eius, quod testator, veritatem, eiusque propensio ad testandum, quae testanda novit, est sinceritas".

72 Baumgarten, *Acroasis logica*, § 362. The highest certainty is given by a testimony which is recognized as divine, see § 371.

73 Baumgarten, *Acroasis logica*, § 380. This means that one should not accept by faith what is in contradiction with experience or reason.

74 Baumgarten, *Acroasis logica*, § 381. Taking up Wolff's distinction between *necessitas absoluta* and *necessitas hypothetica*, Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten distinguished the internal and the external necessity, so as to grant a form of certainty to the knowledge of history too (in this case, as external necessity), S.J. Baumgarten, "Vorrede", p. 19; see on this Schloemann, *Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten*, pp. 148-150.

75 In his *Deutsche Logik*, Wolff does not use the term "certainty" in this context, see Ch. Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von den Kräfften des menschlichen Verstandes*, Halle, 1713, ch. 7, §§ 5ff. Even if he introduces the term "certainty" in the *Logica latina*, this is still linked with a subjective sphere (Wolff, *Philosophia rationalis*, § 614); see Schloemann, *Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten*, p. 144, note 220. I developed this aspect in A. Nannini, "In the Wake of Clio", pp. 10-11.

76 S.J. Baumgarten, "Vorrede", p. 19. See already F.W. Bierling (*praeses*); G. Patje (*respondens*), *Dissertatio de pyrrhonismo historico*, Rinthelii, 1707, 4. On the rules to determine on a case-by-case basis the degree of certainty in history according to S.J. Baumgarten, see Schloemann, *Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten*, pp. 146ff.

77 A.G. Baumgarten, *Aestheticorum pars altera*, Francofurti cis Viadrum, 1758, § 842.

78 See Koselleck, *Futures Past*, pp. 111-112. Given that historians are not obliged to narrate a certain event in a single way, there may be potentially infinite sound fictions of the same historical event.

79 Th. Zwinger, *Theatrum humanae vitae*, vol. 6, Basileae, 1586, p. 1581. As is well known, the claim that historical cognition might rely on fictions runs against the established assumption that fictions have to do with poetry. To quote the great medieval etymologist Isidore of Seville: "Histories are true matters that happened" (*Historiae sunt res verae quae factae sunt*) (*Etymologiae*, 1.44/5); on the contrary "Poets have named 'fables' from 'speaking' (*fando*), since they are not things that happened (*res factae*) but only fictions by speaking (*loquendo fictae*) (*Etymologiae* 1.40.1). The opposition between history and poetry goes back to the ninth chapter of Aristotle's *Poetics*: "The difference between the historian and the poet is not between using verse or prose; Herodotus' work could be versified and would be just as much a kind of history in verse as in prose. No, the difference is this: that the one relates actual events, the other the kinds of things that might occur" (1451b). Hence, history, in its privileged relation to *res singulares* is different not only from the *episteme* of science, but also from poetry, insofar as the latter deals with universals (although not in the

same way as science). Compared to history, poetry is thus more philosophical for Aristotle; see Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, 7.17a38-b1; *Metaphysica*, 1.2.982a24-5. As Koselleck pointed out, this assumption gave rise to two traditions in the West, one of which stayed true to Aristotle's teaching, the other one advocating the superiority of history to poetry because of poetry's mendacity, see Koselleck, *Futures Past*, pp. 205-206. For the relationship between poetry and history in the Western tradition, see K. Heitmann, "Das Verhältnis von Dichtung und Geschichts[s]chreibung in älterer Theorie", *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 52 (1970), pp. 244-279.

80 Koselleck spoke about the relationship of *res factae* and *res fictae* in Koselleck, *Futures Past*, pp. 205ff.

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ELENA BACALOGLU AND THE *MANIFESTO NAZIONALE FASCISTA ITALO-ROMENO*: ANALYSIS OF UNCONSIDERED RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Abstract

This contribution aims at rediscovering a truly original figure of intellectual and trait d'union between Romanian and Italian culture sensibility during the interwar period. Elena Bacaloglu, born in Bucharest in 1878, moved to Italy in 1906. Here she began to frequent Benito Mussolini, founder of the Fascist Party and the most popular artistic and literary environment of the time, maturing her political-literary interest for the Italian fascist movement. The goal is to analyze the idea of patriotism of the most important literary work by Elena Bacaloglu The Italian-Romanian Fascist National Manifesto: Creation and Government. Written in a perfect Italian, the work is presented as the manifesto around which Romanian people should have tightened up to enhance the common cultural roots with Italy, trying to propose an ideological model extremely similar to the Italian fascist movement.

Keywords: Italian-Romanian National Fascio; Fascism; Italy; Romania; interwar period; Elena Bacaloglu; Literature; Mysticism; History; Fascist Women.

1. Foreword: An Idea of Patriotism in Elena Bacaloglu before the First World War and the work *Il Manifesto nazionale Fascista italo-romeno*

The idea of patriotism for Elena Bacaloglu is essentially linked to two elements: the figure of King Charles I of Romania and the conquest of Transylvania by the Old Romanian Kingdom characterized by Wallachia and Moldova. This concept emerges above all in the book *Per la Grande Romania* which acts as a prologue to *Il Manifesto nazionale Fascista italo-romeno* in 1923.

In the book *Per la Grande Romania*, dated 1914, the writer affirms that it is necessary that Romania becomes great, then great materially as it is great spiritually and according to the image of the King that is above all a practical man, a professional man of ideality.[1]

King Charles I died in 1914 and this book was written by Elena Bacaloglu in the occasion of the King's death. What Immanuel Kant defined ideal with King Charles I became fact: with his reign was born a independent and united Romania built on the ideal of national soul to collect the breath of Romanians living everywhere.[2]

The death of the King seems to the writer a magnificent apotheosis of a great artist who disappears before the twilight.[3] King Charles I before being a great leader was a *superman* but not the superman of Nietzsche even if he was German of origin and therefore by nature directed to be an intellectual who through the brute and absolute brain force bases his existence on the megalomaniac faith of a race that wants to build their own empire and dominate the world. In the opinion of the Romanian writer, however, this unilateral and consequently partial subjective superman of Nietzsche is rather an incomplete God and so destinated to fall. The King Charles of Romania is not a superman in the Nietzschean sense, but more accurately he represents what good and beautiful and great the Hohenzollern lineage could have operated.[4]

According to Bacaloglu, he with his greatness rehabilitated his German family also because – this was not known in Italy, she said – the King was half of German origin and half of French origin.

> The mother of his father was Princess Antonia Maria daughter of King of Naples Gioacchino Murat's brother, and the mother of our King, Princess Giuseppina was daughter of the Grand Duchess Stefania De Beauharnais adopted daughter of Napoleon I. Grandson, therefore, of two French princesses then add that the mother of the King of Belgium Albert I (King of heroic and poetic essence together) is the Countess of Flanders sister of King Charles and who received the throne of Romania by Napoleon III who loved her so much that so effectively took the Danubian nation to heart.[5]

Romania represents the Latin civilization on the banks of the Danube and the Black Sea and because of that, also the nation with the burden to contribute to the historical development of Central and Eastern Europe. For this reason, great qualities were required to lead it, above all a methodical, disciplined and balanced force. The *superiority* of King Charles resided

precisely in equilibrium and his wisdom was proverbial and his very high ideality could become positive in practical applications. He was exactly what served to Romania nation, noble but young.[6]

The future King came to Romania with a falsified passport, traveling like any other person who went to Odessa on business to prevent Austrians from blocking and arresting him.

> The prince, under these false sheets, traveling in second class, fulfilled the romantic adventurous journey arriving to the Danube in Romania on May 29, 1866. The hospitality was enthusiastic and the new sovereign eager to know all the people went everywhere for the country. After three years of a very difficult government, he returned to Germany to his family; then he met the princess of Wied, the future Carmen Sylva and he married her. The marriage took place in Neuwied. Returning together to Bucharest, the newlyweds were welcomed with indescribable joy. The bells rang out in a relaxed way, and the voice of the celebrating people gave to the joyful clamor the note proper of the popular Latin enthusiasm.[7]

The prince and princess entered their palace, a modest palace compared to what they left in their native places. However they knew how to adapt and love Bucharest and its people. The King was a model husband and an admirable sovereign. The army and the school were his priorities, he created the one and encouraged the other.[8]

In 1877 the war broke out between Russians and Turks, Prince Charles I decided that this was the right time to free Romania from the Turkish yoke and make it an independent nation. "This is perhaps one of the most glorious pages in the history of King Charles and the nation".[9]

In 1877, Romania obtained its independence and the Kingdom of Charles I of Romania was born, "which after fifty years of incessant work made Romania the greatest Balkan power. Militarily, politically and economically, its preponderance over the Eastern countries is evident. It had a stable internal and external balance since the beginning of the European war".[10]

The King's greatness was precisely that of using his German origins as a positive influence on the Latin character of the Romanians, guaranteeing national independence and their Latin roots by merging with them. In fact, having to choose between his native homeland, Germany, and the will of the Romanian people to unify, he chose the latter. Here is the priestly

character of King Charles I and his superiority. "He left behind a unique political and moral heritage in the history of the Romanians".[11]

The process of unification of Romania began in 1912 when King Charles I decided to participate in the Balkan war to avoid the loss of the Dobrogea region, on the border with Bulgaria. This was the first step for the meeting of all the peoples of Romania including Transylvania. "Transylvania has always been the Carpathian nest that has protected the existence of Romanians over the centuries from all invasions".[12] And then – on the eve of the First World War, stated Elena Bacaloglu – "what other war could we want if not that against the Hungarians? The dilemma itself is inexorable. It and not the will of the country has perhaps killed our King. But always this problem will kill or enlarge Romania".[13]

The question of Transylvania is closely linked to the question of religion as a means of political propaganda. "Italy has a duty to know the problem in which so much of the responsibility belongs to the Vatican".[14] The Hungarians in fact used against Romanians a despotic chauvinism by means of religious propaganda.

> At the beginning of our life our ethnographic origins are confused with the Romanity (Latinness) of the Church. But the invasions and remoteness of Rome did not allow the normal development of Romanian religious life in relation to its essence and its Roman (Latin) character. In any case, the Eastern Latins managed to operate the miracle of a Romanian church with its own language and customs appropriate to their Latin character, affirming their religious conscience.[15]

Leo XIII in 1850 satisfied the desire of the Romanians of Transylvania building the metropolis of Alba Iulia maintaining the ritual and traditions of the Eastern church. Three years later, in 1853, with the *Bull Ecclesia Christi*, Pius IX created the Greek-Catholic united Church of Romania, recognizing the Romanian language as the official language. But the Hungarians imposed their language, publishing liturgical books and rituals in Hungarian, forbidding Romanians the Catholic use of their national language. Thus, through language and religion, Hungarians try to *magyarize* Romanians.[16]

All this was subsidized by the Austro-Hungarian government which, with enormous expenses, published liturgical books of the Eastern Church in Hungarian.[17]

> Hungarians prefer the Greek-Catholic rite because they might thus escape celibacy in the future. The Magyar Greek Catholic diocese must be implemented in order to penetrate the masses and disperse their own ecclesiastical organizations.[18]

The idea of Hungarians is to assimilate all nationalities through language and religion and free themselves from the Habsburgs, from Austria, repeating the gesture of 1849.

> Hungarians would like to imitate the Roman power that knew how to romanize entire regions. But this wisdom, or more truly this power, is rather the prerogative of those who descend from the Romans: namely Romanians!.[19]

This is why Transylvania must be conquered, because Romanian people are saved from the *magyarization* pursued by Hungarians.[20]

We are on the eve of the First World War and Elena Bacaloglu already spoke of Great Romania.

2. Historical Framework

Giovanni Terranova, an Italian journalist and correspondent in Romania during the Fascism, collected in a book entitled *Romania in marcia*, a new reconstruction of Romania of the interwar years and its relations with Italy. In the preface of the volume he states:

> hope, in this way, the reader can get an idea of the current Romanian state, fervent of reconstructive activity, as I have seen it. I was lucky enough to see a new, healthy, industrious, axial Romania, as I had not seen before on previous journeys.[21]

It is a realistically Latin and sincerely friendly Romania of the new order established by Mussolini, first of all, and only in second time, by Hitler.

In the same book, the poet Nichifor Crainic, one of the most important exponents of the Romanian thought of the interwar period and director of the magazine *Gândirea*, around which the literary excellences of the era gathered, states:

> On your great leader I have had several occasions to write, remembering the impressions I felt directly after each interview. I compare Mussolini to St. Francis of Assisi, because he gives everything to Italy with the same love, with the same passion with which St. Francis gave himself to God.[22]

In the interwar period the Romanian intellectual and political class rediscovers its own latinity and tries to get closer to Italian culture. Alexandru Marcu, Dean of the Faculty of Languages of the University of Bucharest, and first teacher of Italian Language and Literature at the same University, in an interview for the *Roma* newspaper, affirms this need for Romanian culture to join Italy to rediscover the identity integrity of its origins. Romania is a miraculous Latin island in a Slavic sea, which has been preserved in the Balkans as proof of Roma imperial greatness. Romania is seen like a Roman island in a non-Roman sea.[23]

Cavour himself sensed the cultural, but also geostrategic, importance of Romania, when he stated that

> Romanian nationality is a counterweight which, with the advantage of the Porta and with the advantage of Europe, faces the dangerous development of panslavism".[24] Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, head of the Iron Guard said in one of his speeches to the people: "the sun rises in Rome and not in Moscow.[25]

In the twenties with the leadership of Romania by Marshal Alexandru Averescu, considered an enthusiastic admirer of Italy and Mussolini, the cultural relations between the two countries received a remarkable impulse. After the *March on Rome* and the appointment of Mussolini as Head of Government, and the benevolence shown by Romania towards the new Italian government, on the political relations of the two countries loomed the atmosphere of coldness that had followed the Conference of Versailles.

Romania belonged to the Little Entente coalition together with Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, an alliance headed by France. This greatly reduced the political influence of Italy in the Danube-Carpathian region. Moreover, on the relations between Italy and Romania weighed the non-ratification of the 1920 Treaty of Paris, with which Great Britain, France, Japan and Italy recognized the conquest of Bessarabia by the Romanian side in 1918.[26]

With Mussolini, from the first months of his government, the intention was felt to resolve these issues with Romanian government. Romanian Foreign Minister Ion Duca arrived in Rome in January 1923 to resolve the question of credits so the issue of repayments of some Romanian Treasury bills in possession of Italian citizens and of loans granted by the Italian State and private companies to the Romanian government throughout the war. During the conversation Mussolini and Ion Duca also talked on the need to reach a political agreement between Rome and Bucharest. The first step was the creation of the Italian-Romanian Institute in Rome and the Institute of Italian Culture in Bucharest, inaugurated the following year. The cultural relations between the two countries seemed to follow a parallel path to the attempt to strengthen also political contacts.[27]

Some attempts to imitate the movement led by Mussolini also occurred in Romania. An Italian-Romanian national fascio was formed by an admirer of Mussolini, Elena Bacaloglu. Indeed, it is in this pro-Italian framework that we can include the literary work of the Romanian writer, which in 1906 moved to Italy.

Elena Bacaloglu was born in Bucharest on December 19, 1878, from a bourgeois family of Turkish origin, established in Wallachia from 1826. Compared to other women from *fin de siècle*, the Romanian writer was highly educated. She obtained a degree from the Faculty of Letters of Bucharest and one from the Collège de France.[28] Her interests in studies were for French literature, art history and philosophy. She studied for a period in Paris and here she met her future husband, the poet Ovid Densușianu.[29]

Really, her first husband was Radu D. Rosetti, a famous lawyer for the Romanian capital and an emerging neo-romantic poet. A daughter was born from their short marriage. In fact, only the year following the celebration of the wedding, Rosetti abandoned them. Elena Bacaloglu attempted suicide by shooting herself in the chest, but she was saved by emergency surgery on her right lung.[30] On 7 August 1902 she married Densușianu, an exponent of Romanian symbolism. In 1904, from their union, was born Ovid O. Densușianu Jr. In the same year the marriage was broken and the Romanian writer began to travel to Western Europe, especially in Italy.

Elena Bacaloglu was one of the most important women in Europe to lead the fascist movements of the interwar period.[31] After her divorce with the poet Ovid Densușianu, she left for Italy. Here she began to frequent Benito Mussolini, founder of the Fascist Party, and the most popular

intellectual class of the time such as Matilde Serao, Roberto Bracco, Ernesto Murolo, Gabriele D'Annunzio and Salvatore Di Giacomo, until she attended the literary salons of Benedetto Croce.[32] Here the Romanian writer and journalist gained her political and literary interest for the Italian fascist movement.[33]

3. The Manifesto: Creation and Government

Il Manifesto nazionale fascista italo-romeno is the most important literary work[34] by Elena Bacaloglu, written in a perfect Italian, it is presented as the manifesto around which Romanian people should have tightened up to enhance the common cultural roots with Italy, trying to propose an ideological model very similar to the Italian fascist movement. The work, developed between 1919 and 1922, takes up the themes addressed by the same author in the works *Preuves d'amour*,[35] and *La Romania*, the latter published by the *Eroica* House Publishing from Milan, during the war years, together with Carla Cadorna and the Belgian painter Charles Doudelet, who took care of the drawings of the book.[36]

The manifesto is divided into three parts:[37] the first section is dedicated to the poems for the Duce and to an exchange of letters between the writer and the members of the *Fasci di Combattimento*; the second one is dedicated to the foreign policy of the Italian-Romanian fascist movement, to its creation and development; while the third part is dedicated to the role of women during the years of Fascism and it is linked to the issue of universal suffrage, which also appears among the political points of the *Manifesto dei Fasci di Combattimento*, published on the newspaper *Il Popolo d'Italia*, on June 6, 1919.

The Manifesto is dedicated to Queen Margherita of Savoy, Queen Elena of Italy and Queen Maria of Romania and opens with a poem, in French, by the Romanian writer addressed and dedicated to Benito Mussolini: "Deux temps d'arrêt sur un sol tremble, le sol de l'Europe. Au coer de l'Italie, nous sommes face à face et en double. Femme et homme, sexe contre sexe. Ame contre âme. Vie contre vie".[38]

The poem closes with a prayer to God, so that he may hold by hand the man and the woman in their universal mission.[39] In this case it emerges the mystical, universal and religious aspect of the fascist movement. An aspect that we also find in the *Manifesto degli intellettuali fascisti di tutte le nazioni* by Giovanni Gentile, published on the newspaper *Il Popolo*

d'Italia on April 21, 1925, the day of the birth of Rome, and in which we can read:

> Fascism therefore at its origins it was a political and moral movement. Politics felt and advocated as a training of self-denial and sacrifice of the individual to an idea in which the individual can find his reason for life, his freedom and all his rights; idea that is Homeland, as a historical and eternal, idea like historical tradition determined and identified in the conscience of citizen, far from being dead memory of the past, it becomes a purpose to be implemented, therefore tradition and mission.[40]

In the same way in the Manifesto by Elena Bacaloglu, written three years earlier, it comes to light this theme of the sacrifice, the task of man, or Mussolini, and of the woman herself, to carry on in a Europe distraught by war and Versailles Conference, the idea of the fascist movement, which must be not only national, but of a universal and religious nature.[41]

And it is on the "religious character" of Fascism that hurted Benedetto Croce, who wrote the *Manifesto degli intellettuali anti-fascisti*, published on *Il mondo* newspaper on May 1, 1925, in which he stated:

> The mistreatment of doctrines and history is a minor thing compared to the abuse that is made of the religion word; because, in the sense of the fascist intellectual lords, now in Italy we would be gladdened by a war of religion, by the deeds of a new gospel and a new apostolate against an old superstition, which relapses to death which is above it and to which it must while bending; and they test the hatred and rancor that burn, now as never before, between Italians and Italians.[42]

In the Italian-Romanian Manifesto, Bacaloglu states that there are three subjects[43] whom the world must rely to fulfill the mission to: the woman herself; the peasant, then Duce; the poet, who correspondent to Gabriele D'Annunzio.[44] Judaism and Bolshevism, by creating an "international camorra"[45] have turned the tables of European peace favoring France in Eastern Europe and Yugoslav in Italy, betraying the war agreements.[46]

The main difference between the Italian-Romanian Manifesto and the *Fasci di Combattimento* was the question of the Jews. While the manifesto was clearly anti-Semitic, that of the Fasci was originally not.[47] However, it is useful to underline, to be intellectually honest, that the anti-Semitic agenda of Elena Bacaloglu's movement was "moderate" if

compared to other anti-Semitic movements that were created later, just like the Iron Guard, led by Corneliu Codreanu. The anti-Semitism of the Italian-Romanian Manifesto is rather a populist anti-industrialism, a version of nationalism strongly inspired by the *Action française*. [48]

The Italian-Romanian fascist national movement does not mean only Romania or Italy, but both together and one. It is the first concrete, living, inebriating pillar of a truth that differs from the others and which is not yet well understood: the truth that an Italian-Romanian Empire is the only one that it is possible, admissible, fundamental, for Italy and which is not just a word, but it lives, exists and manifests itself already and overwhelmingly in this movement.[49] Italy will not be strong except through an Italian-Romanian block, which would embrace an Adriatic, Danube and Balkan policy. Balkans are the main road for the conquest of the world. And Romania, the most civilized country, the only Latin in the Eastern peninsula, which in the past was naturally at the head of the Balkan countries, will have to be re-established in this position and in this function of leverage and equilibrium.[50]

At the same time, Romania will serve itself when it no longer wants to be economically and spiritually, through its politicians, like Take Ionesco,[51] colonized by foreigners, but become *One* with Italy to unify Latinity in its center of Rome and boost universal civilization. The movement has the task of serving the Latin Idea in its absolute and its immortality, fighting on the Romanian, Italian, French soil an international and holy war, and according to Bacaloglu "our volume - this red flower and this ray of sunshine - it may have been one of its purest and most hardened weapons" for the Latin cause.[52]

These words lead back to the mystical and universal purpose of the fascist movement, the Hegelian Absolute of which man and woman are puppets and whose ultimate goal is pan-Latinism.[53] The concept of Latin imperialism, the reference to Rome, are also present in the *Fasci di Combattimento*, whose symbol incorporates the *sheaf emblem* of the Roman Empire.

The objectives of the Italian-Romanian movement, set out in the second part of the *Manifesto*. They are a creation of common national directives and policies in the two countries; to eliberate the two countries from economic slavery from abroad through the exchange of research and labor. Italy has a flourishing industry, Romania has the raw materials, if they joined in a fraternal way, as daughters of the same wolf,[54] would put in check the enemies of Latinity, guided by the greed of Jewish finance.

In this way they could solve the question of Smyrna and Thrace, Albania, Montenegro and Dalmatia, including the issue of Fiume, bringing together all the Latin peoples of the Adriatic and fighting the plutocratic agreements that allowed the realization of the mutilated victory in Italy and the Little Entente in Eastern Europe. And finally, the last aim of the movement is to organize Latin-overseas expansion diplomatically and spiritually, creating an Italo-Romanian empire that involves, therefore, all Italian and Romanian communities abroad.[55]

Then it arises the idea of the use of culture as a means of conquest, as stated by the Duce in an article on *La Tribuna*, on February 4, 1926:

> to be implemented through the development and dissemination of ideas by the intellectual class, which has the task of spreading Italian ideas abroad, of Italian culture as an instrument of expansion or conquest, spreading the effectiveness of fascist ideas beyond Italian borders, through a communion of intellectuals.[56]

This is a concept also taken up by Giuseppe Ungaretti, who signed the *Manifesto Gentile*, hoping "an action aimed to reinvigorating the Italian spirit to across the border, to induce foreigners to love our civilization, to make known the work of fascism in a more systematic and less superficial way".[57]

4. The Woman's Role in the Fascist Movement

The *Manifesto nazionale Fascista italo-romeno* by Elena Bacaloglu dedicates the third part to the role of women in fascism in particular she attached her report to the IX International Congress for Women's Suffrage held in Rome on May 14, 1923. The issue of female suffrage was one practical and precise aim of the International Alliance chaired by an American, Miss Chapman Catt, who, through the Congress, in which Elena Bacaloglu also took part, as a representative of the Italian-Romanian fascist movement, asks all the women of Europe to unite to ask for justice and equal rights, through the vote's right achievement.[58]

> And since in Europe only the Latin group does not yet have female suffrage (and this is significant in both the race and the Latin spirit) we take advantage of this instinctive and reasoned hesitation of our Latin men in

> our regard, as well as information and illumination that this world Congress offers us to speak *clearly* to speak *loudly* to speak *right*.[59]

According to Elena Bacaloglu, the question of universal suffrage is only one aspect of the woman's movement which is a phenomenon of nature and universe, a movement that is not only historical but also cosmic and religious. It can be individual, collective, national and universal. "When an individual is the expression of a new phenomenon based on the historical instinct of peoples and on that of moral force, this means that this individual possesses all the above-mentioned representative attributes concentrated in himself".[60] The movement is therefore a synthesis that manifests itself both through this being that represents it and through his soul by means of which it is reflected on the masses. This explains why universal suffrage is only one aspect of the feminine movement, which is a historical and spiritual movement, a *moral* question, and for this reason universal.[61]

At the Conference of universal suffrage also participated Benito Mussolini and he presented the right to vote for women as one of the objectives of Fascism. In 1925 a law guaranteed the candidacy for local administration also for women. As Elena Bacaloglu stated in the public announcement of the *IX International Congress Pro feminine suffrage*:

> given the originality of creation and its moral force these conquests could be possible only through the very *revolutionary* and *brilliant spirit* of Benito Mussolini, who for his *superior gestures*, he has also established himself, also on the female point of view, as a *forerunner* of the men of the modern age.[62]

However in a speech on May 26, 1927, Mussolini said that women were responsible of the growth and the power of the nation. Thus he began a pro-natality policy that led to considering abortion a crime, to impose taxes on bachelorhood, to reward the most prolific mothers, to celebrate mothers and girls and in 1933 to the *Sagra della nunzialità* (Celebration of the Marriage). Thus it emerges a dichotomous view between two types of women during fascism: a militant and progressive woman and a mother woman who is entrusted with the task of the fascist government's greatness and power.[63]

In 1921 in Milan were born the *Fasci femminili*, led by Elisa Mayer Rizzoli, from Fiume, and by Margherita Sarfatti, a Jewish woman from Venice, a very cultured woman who helped the rise of Mussolini. She is

author of the *Dux* biography of 1925, translated into 18 languages. Among these militant women we remember Ines Donati, from San Severino Marche, nicknamed *La Capitana*, one of the 100 women who participated at the March on Rome and who died of tuberculosis, in 1924, and was buried at the Chapel of fascist Heroes at the Verano cemetry in Rome.[64]

So we have the figure of a *new woman* who coexists with another figure that of the *mother woman*. Elena Bacaloglu declared about it:

> the good seed of all the hearts of married mothers who showed themselves in war and were always true patriots of true souls of sincerity. But in general Italians want to see these women solely as a function of love, not also as a function of national and universal life and do not use them socially in this sense, leaving them to act in the shadows or inactive. Too much good energy is lost like this! D'Annunzio, who knows how politically important are women's literary salons, especially in Paris, understood in Fiume the part that could be drawn for the National cause by the virgin and infinite forces of women. And the women of Fiume were the firmer base of its resistance to the Adriatic political foundation ideal.[65]

During the war, the Italian women had taken over the reins of the family and had replaced their husbands, fathers, brothers in their work and to these rights they no longer wanted to give up. Particularly in the wave of nationalism new figures of bourgeois asked for emancipation of women. So the women of Fascism are purely women belonging to the bourgeoisie, therefore women highly educated as Elena Bacaloglu was herself.

In Romania, following the feminist mouvements led by Dora D'Istria,[66] Valentina D. Focșa organized in 1919, the *Asociația pentru emanciparea civilă și politică a femeii*, and other women such as Martha Lahovary Bibescu, Alexandrina Contecuzino, leader of *Consiliul Național al Femeilor*, in 1921, led a Feminin Mouvement in Romania asking equal rights in literature and in politics.[67]

But Elena Bacaloglu distrusted this kind of very cultured but artificial women at the service of their men from the political point of view. She said in her manifest:

> Certainly Fascism must abhor by the first, the intellectual type of the artificial and immoral woman, and the cultural and sociological deformations of the soul of this woman. But it must learn at the same time to distinguish between the women who carry the intrigues and gossip of her home, outside, on the square, in the newspapers, in books – and those women

> (who are much more numerous than what is believed) which without failing to their duties as a mother, and without losing anything of the grace and the poetry of their femininity, they know how to create new forms of life and defend just as much, even more than men, the spiritual values of the Homeland, and of the human race.[68]

Italians will have to renew their mentality and their attitude towards women, because beyond sex, they can give more and represent more. She herself in the female expression of the Manifesto represents the revolution of fascism with regard to women. "For this reason, concluding and summarizing I say that I have the sensation of having been, even unconsciously, the *first fascist woman* of Italy, who first crossed the borders of the peninsula with this fascist spirit".[69]

So the idea of fascism is inherent to National fascist Italian-Romanian movement represented by a woman who is its creator and president and who in herself represents the new woman. A new woman who is far from the cultural clubs "supported by the press, generally formed by many evil persons that move in the shadows to better bite and weave the conspiracy of silence".[70]

"The unconscious or conscious agents of the high Jewish bank or of the military and industrial imperialism of the other great nations are represented by the world in the first place by two ultra-modern means:

a) the wives or lovers - when they are not all at once - of the main statesmen or politicians

b) of all forms of culture, in every country, such as the Press, the Magazines, Institutes and Circuits *self-styled* cultural, artistic, musical, touristic, or of propaganda without forgetting certain associations, including Freemasonry, and its dependencies such as Dante Alighieri, Lega Navale, Colonial Institute, even certain worldly, aristocratic, or literary salons, and so on.

But the reviews *La Donna* and *Coltura e Mondanità* are those that most fruit and will serve the vampires of humanity and the unconscious men in the past and present war. Precisely because they are the means of correction or misleading disguised under the largest and most attractive forces of life that act on the instincts of man and those of the masses: love and spirituality, such as *La Donna* and *Coltura* they are the most direct and powerful forms and expressions".[71]

And for these ideas, she affirmed: "I am a person who isolate herself and an isolated for my own visions of healthy values. Or if you want, a kind of spiritual earthquake of which I am practically the first victim".[72]

Given her leading by a woman, the Movement revealed itself for what it essentially is, "a double revelation: of Nature as a genius of Sex; and of Spirit as a divinized Humanity to the human God".[73] So,

> *Il Manifesto nazionale fascista italo-romeno* embraces all the issues of Italian fascism, but in double. The importance is greater, and it gives the original Fascio a vast breath, multiplying by hundred its strength. It should be the double Fascio of a single action. Or the same action, in two countries, for the same objective: to save the Latin civilization.[74]

And she concluded "Romania will have to end up being – because, substantially, it is – Eastern Italy".[75]

5. Recongnition and Negation of Elena Bacaloglu's Work

The Italian-Romanian National Movement was established in Cluj, on September 24, 1921, at the University of the city.[76] The rector of the University and other professors from Romanian universities and distinguished members of the Romanian Academy took part in the movement.[77]

The constitution stated: "The movement is born as a movement above the parties, based on the creation of a healthy current of ideas and spiritual elevation, on an economic and cultural activity,[78] with an exclusively national-patriotic character".[79] The manifesto thus presents itself as a national directive in the two countries based "on a strict control and education of the upper classes, as the popular masses",[80] through the instrument of cultural propaganda.

In Italy the Italian-Romanian movement was inaugurated on 21 April, on Rome's birthday,[81] at the Campidoglio, at the presence of Elena Bacaloglu, Pietro Bolzon, president of the *Arditi* Association, Mario Angiolini, member of the *Fasci di Combattimento* and Giuseppe Bottai, president of the Press Association. In the deed of incorporation we read:

> The Italian Fascist and Arditi Italo-Romanian Movement addresses an appeal in which it is said among other things: at the Convention of the

> *Fasci di Combattimento* and the *Arditi*, in the capital city of Italy, the day of the foundation of Rome, the Italian-Romanian national fascist movement brings its deep meaning with its greeting and its participation. Created since 1917, as one of the first civil and political manifestations of new Italy and of great Romania, this movement on the eve of new Italian legislature, has in itself the throbbing of our great deaths, and the iron will of the resurrection and defense of all the values. At the same time, the avant-garde of true life represents the two nations united in the Christmas of Rome, and in the name of the youths. It is for the first time in their national history that Italy and Romania meet in the ancient spring and in the advent of their sublime lives, to consecrate this inevitable fusion, and to swear on the Campidoglio their common faith.[82]

The prime minister Paolo Boselli granted Romanian writer the opportunity to hold conferences on the topic in thirty Italian villas, starting from Rome, where the mayor Prospero Colonna granted her the aristocratic Argentine Theatre. Benedetto Croce and Salvatore Di Giacomo[83] sent letters to *Treves*, an important publishing house in Milan, to ensure the publication of the work of Mrs. Bacaloglu *La Roumanie*, a work that first crossed the borders of the peninsula with the fascist spirit, even in the French language, given the success that the work had in Italian.[84] The Minister of Education Baccelli also granted her a loan of 4000 lire for the publication of the second edition of *La Romania*, in Italian, "being a good propaganda book to increasingly tighten the traditional relationship between Italy and Romania to whom she has dedicated tireless activity and faith for twelve years".[85]

Baccelli also turned to the Ministry of the Interior and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to grant also from them a contribution to the book of the Romanian writer, for "the high patriotic end which aims to facilitate our traditional good relations with Romania (...) since it is of great importance, also for the start-up of our businesses, to create closer ties with the Romanian nation".[86] In 1918, the Minister of Education, Agostino Berenini, in homage to the literary and artistic activity of the Romanian writer to the advantage of the two Latin nations, Romania and Italy, granted to Bacaloglu's son, Ovidio Densușianu Jr., a free accommodation at the Naples national boarding school for the entire duration of the secondary education.[87]

Despite these initial acknowledgments of the literary and political work of Elena Bacaloglu, her movement did not succeed with her compatriots. Romanian government forbade her to approach Romanian citizens in Italy

and to make political propaganda in Romania. In fact, as she reported, Luigi Federzoni wrote in a letter dated on 6 August 1920 to the Romanian Prime Minister and to the Foreign Minister to

> know if they can say the reason why eminent Romanian writer Elena Bacaloglu, a person of high respectability, for many years faithful and generous advocate of a firm friendship between her homeland and Italy, was arrested on the morning of 28 July a few hours before the arrival in Rome of a delegation of professors and students of her country.[88]

The episode was repeated in Genoa, where the writer escaped "with her protector general Cadorna"[89] when the military disaster of Caporetto took place.[90] Here she was housed in an apartment of the Fascio Party in Genoa,[91] continuing her work of propaganda of the Italian-Romanian movement, whose goal was to create "the natural way out of Italy to weigh on the East".[92]

In Genoa she also tried to be received by the Romanian Prime Minister Brătianu, on an official visit in Italy, but a few hours before the meeting

> Mrs. Bacaloglu just got off a tram in piazza Corvetto, was approached by two public security officers, who invited her with a pretext to follow them to the police station (...), where she was interrogated for long hours (...) Meanwhile, having been so detained, Mrs. Bacaloglu could not go to the interview with Brătianu.[93]

The police headquarters in Genoa intervened following a complaint by the Romanian delegation asking for the internment of the writer in a nursing home and her removal from Italy.[94]

After this episode Romanian writer remained alone with her ideas of propaganda of the Italian-Romanian fascist movement, as she herself denounced in her manifesto:

> I had here, and on this occasion, the perfect vision of the fascist force, but also of its, how will I say? Youth unconsciousness. It is not only a lack of preparation for foreign policy that is the characteristic (explainable by the way) of Italian people including the ruling class, but it is that *moral immaturity* so harmful in the serious moments, which struck me once more on this occasion.[95]

In the paragraph of her work entitled *La rivoluzione mondiale e la donna,* Elena Bacaloglu wrote in a fragment addressed to Benito Mussolini:

> You yourself unwillingly spiritually loved and fought me, defended and betrayed, what was the maximum of success, of *neutralization* of evil forces with the good, that my irrepressible soul could get from you in the midst of so much hostility that came to us *both* on all sides. A maximum of success, apparently passive, but that corresponded with our maximum, *imperial* political program. And it was enough in the past that at least the Roman imperial Idea *lived* – so that the Idea could be realized. It was enough that I did not die or did not erase from your spirit and heart (or from the crime of suicide of the Italians themselves, expelled or murdered) so that the very idea of this *Movement* was confirmed and consecrated, in me accomplished before of the effective Italian Force, of the only Roman Imperialism, *historical, logical, natural* that forms and is *inherently* formed, realistically by the *Eastern Italian-Romanian Empire*.[96]

In 1923, the younger brother of Elena Bacaloglu, Alexandru, known as Sandi Bacaloglu attacked the staff of Adevărul, killing the Jewish director Iacob Rosenthal, guilty of having published articles defamatory against his sister.[97] The Fascia Națională Română Party (FNR), founded in 1922 and led by Titus Vifor, and which collected most of the members of Bacaloglu's movement, distanced itself from the act, stating that Sandi Bacaloglu, like her sister's movement, they were not recognized by the Romanian nation as fascists.[98]

Sandi Bacaloglu wrote to Mussolini a letter in French language, dated on 13 November 1922, in which he said that the Duce was just people of Italy and Europe needed:

> Quand le monde étais plongé dans le désespoir, vous étez apparu pour reveiller le courage de tous. Vous avez mis en lumière les vérités qui se cachaient, et donné eur emplois à toutes le bravoures. Vous ressuscitez en vous tous ceux qui son morts pour l'Italie (…) Garibaldi et Cavour vous donnet l'accolade. (…) Permettez de vous présenter mon admiration et mon respect que ma soeur vous les portera à vos pieds.[99]

Nevertheless, Mussolini, after the Adevărul affair and the position took by the official fascist Romanian party, declared Elena Bacaloglu *persona non grata* and she was removed from Italy. When she returned to Romania, she lived the last years of her life in obscurity.[100] During her

stay in Bucharest she wrote several letters to distinguished politicians of the time such as Ion I. C. Brătianu, Savel Rădulescu, Nicolae Titulescu, in which she asked could have financial help because she was in a very serious material situation.[101] In a letter addressed to the writer Liviu Rebreanu she asked for 4 million of lei, since he was a member of the Romanian Academy, for her cultural work she had developed during the twenties between Italy and Romania.[102]

On 22 October 1947, she wrote her last letter addressed to the literary historian, Ilie E. Torouțiu, in which she asked him to interface with the Romanian Academy President, Gala Galatacion, to sell her cultural heritage to the Romanian Academy in exchange for money.[103] She sold all the letters that she received from Italian intellectual class, today kept at the Romanian Academy Library. Eight months later she died.

Despite her excessive personality, sometimes extremely ambitious and self-centered, her ideas for better or for worse anticipated some movements that they then took shape in the interwar period both in Italy and in Romania. The purpose of this contribution is to remove from oblivion this original intellectual figure of a Romanian woman writer and bridge-builder between the Italian-Romanian relations during the interwar period.

NOTES

1 E. Bacaloglu, *Per la Grande Romania. Rumeni e Ungheresi in Transilvania*, Il Messaggero Roma, 1914.
2 Ivi.
3 Ivi.
4 Cfr., ibidem, p. 7.
5 Ivi.
6 Cfr., ibid., p. 8.
7 Ibid., p. 9.
8 Ibid., p. 10.
9 Ibid., p. 11.
10 Ibid., p. 12.
11 Ibid., p. 14.
12 Ibid., p. 18.
13 Ibid., p. 19.
14 Ibid., p. 26.
15 Ibid., p. 27.
16 Ibid., p. 29.
17 Ibid., p. 32.
18 Ibid., p. 34.
19 Ibid., p. 36.
20 In this regard, it is interesting to note – as we will see later – Elena Bacaloglu will choose Cluj-Napoca, as the city where to set up the Italian-Romanian National fascist Movement. A Transylvanian city symbolizing Romania's greatness and unity.
21 Cfr., Terranova, G., *Romania in Marcia*, Cremonese, Roma, 1941, p. 8.
22 Ibidem, p. 140.
23 Ibid., p. 147.
24 Ibid., p. 23.
25 Ibid., p. 27.
26 Cfr., Santoro, S., *L'Italia e l'Europa Orientale. Diplomazia culturale e propaganda 1919-1943*, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2005, pp. 107-122.
27 Cfr., Santoro, S., "Relazioni italo-romene fra le due guerre mondiali: i documenti di Bucarest", in *Storia e futuro*, 12, November 2006, p. 15.
28 Cfr., Nastasă, L., *Intimitatea amfiteatrelor. Ipostaze din viața privată a universitarilor "literari"(1864–1948)*, Editură Limes, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, p. 51.
29 Cfr., Calangiu, A., Vatan, M., Negraru, M., *Ovid Densușianu 1873-1938. Biobibliografie*, Central University Library, Bucharest, 1991, p. XXI.
30 The news is read in the article "Diverse. Din Capitală. Drama din strada Lucăci", in *Epoca*, 18 June, 1898, p. 2, the author of the news is not marked.

31 Cfr., Bucur, M., *Romania*, in Passmore, K. (ed.), *Women, Gender and Fascism in Europe, 1919-45*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003, p. 77.

32 Elena Bacaloglu translated into Romanian *Assunta Spina* by Salvatore Di Giacomo for the magazine *Convorbirii Critice* in the August 1909 edition. The Romanian writer also dedicates to the poet an essay in the French language *Naples et son plus grand poète*, Ed. Consul, Naples 1911. During the national exhibition at Castel Sant'Angelo, Elena Bacaloglu gave a talk on Di Giacomo, reviewed with honors by Alberto Cappelletti on *Il Giorno.*

Cfr, Sallusto, F., *Itinerari epistolari del primo Novecento: lettere e testi inediti dell'archivio di Alberto Cappelletti*, Luigi Pellegrini Editore, Cosenza, 2006, p. 175.

Regarding the relationship between the Romanian writer and Salvatore Di Giacomo, see also the volume edited by Toni Iermano, *Lettere a Elena*, Osanna Edizioni, Venosa, 1998. In which the epistolary exchange between the two writers is carefully collected, giving us an interesting unpublished reconstruction of the relationship between Elena Bacaloglu and the Italian intellectual class of the time.

33 Cfr., Sallusto, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

34 The first literary works of Elena Bacaloglu appeared in 1908. The writer's first novel is of psychological nature and it is titled *În luptă: două forțe*. The work is badly reviewed by Romanian critics. Her first novel is even accused of being unreadable. The review to which we refer is P. N., "Recenzii. Elena Bacaloglu. În luptă", in *Viața Românească*, 4, 1908, pp. 175-176. While the writer's first work in Italian is a monograph on the love story between the Romanian poet Gheorghe Asaki, whose works inspired the development of a national conscience in Romania, and his muse, Italian patriot and writer, Bianca Milesi.

Cfr., Bacaloglu, E., *Bianca Milesi e Giorgio Asaki*, Direzione della Nuova Antologia,1912, pp. 81-101.

35 Bacaloglu, E., *Preuves d'amour*, Institut des arts graphiques, Bucarest, 1914.

36 Cfr., Bacaloglu, E., *La Romania*, Rivista Eroica, Milano, 1918.

37 The style used is very reminiscent of Giacomo Leopardi's *Lo Zibaldone*, a collection of poems, political ideas and ideological movements kept together in a single manuscript.

38 Cfr., Bacaloglu, E., *Il Manifesto Nazionale fascista italo-romeno: creazione e governo*, Pirola, Milano, 1923, p. 10.

39 Ibid., p. 11.

40 Gentile, G., "Il Manifesto degli intellettuali fascisti di tutte le nazioni", in *Il Popolo d'Italia*, 21 aprile 1925, pp. 9-11, (available on internet: www.maat.it).

41 Cfr., Bacaloglu, op. cit., 1923, p. 12.

42 Cfr., Croce, B., "Il Manifesto degli intellettuali antifascisti", in *Il Mondo*, 1 May, 1925, pp. 12-14, (available on internet: www.maat.it).

43 Cfr., Bacaloglu, op. cit., p. 14.

44 Just Gabriele D'Annunzio should have been the president of the Italian-Romanian Fascio, as Elena Bacaloglu explains in the manifesto: "As early as June 1919, when greatness and goodness of the Idea moved to propose to the greatest poet of Italy and the greatest Italian of today, Gabriele D'Annunzio, the Presidency, offering him my services and my devotion for the Italian-Romanian cause". Cfr., Bacaloglu, op. cit., 1923, p. 67.

45 This word appears often in the Bacaloglu's work. Cfr., ibid., pp. 15, 58, 72.

46 Cfr., Heinen, A., 2006, *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail": o contribuție la problema fascismului internațional*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 102-103.

47 Veiga, F., *La mística del ultranacionalismo. El Movimiento legionario rumano, 1919-1941*, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, 1989, p. 140.

48 Cfr., Costantini, E., *Nae Ionescu, Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran: antiliberalismo nazionalista alla periferia d'Europa*, Morlacchi Editore, Perugia, 2005, p. 20.

The movement *Action française* arose in France in 1899, created by Maurice Pujo and Henri Vaugeois, as a nationalist reaction to the support of the left-wing intellectual class at the Dreyfus Affair. Soon Charles Maurras became the main ideologist of the movement. Under his influence it assumed a monarchic, counter-revolutionary, anti-democratic connotation and closely linked to Catholic principles. During the First World War it became the main nationalist movement, even if starting from the 1930s it was gradually supplanted by the rise of fascism, also due to the break with the Catholic Church. During the Second World War, the movement supported the Vichy government, led by Marshal Philippe Pétain. After the fall of the latter, the movement broke up, and Maurras was arrested and imprisonned. However, even today his ideas are influential in the French right.

49 Cfr., Bacaloglu, op. cit., 1923, p. 15.

50 Ibid., p. 24.

51 Take Ionescu was Romanian Foreign Minister in 1920 and Prime Minister in 1921. He often moved to Italy, in fact he died in Rome in 1922. Take Ionesco is the archenemy of Elena Bacaloglu, he is accused by the latter of being a puppet in the hands of Jewish finance, led by Pasic in Romania and Toeplitz in Italy, agents of high finance who according to Bacaloglu had turned the table of European peace. Ionesco, which Bacaloglu defines golden throats, as spokesman of the banks and for high rethorical talents, as a professional lawyer, was tied to the Bank Marmarosch Blanc, and because of this in close contact with the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau. According to the Romanian writer, they were planning a massive penetration of France into the socio-economic fabric of Romania, betraying the agreements of the Paris Conference. Cfr., ibid., p. 51.

52 Ibid., p. 26.

53 Sometimes the ideas expressed by Elena Bacaloglu in her manifesto, regarding the mystical and religious aspect of the fascist movement, seem

close to the concept of Theosophy, an esoteric movement created in 1875 in New York by a Russian woman Helena Petrovna Blavatsky and her friend Henry Steele Olcott. The movement presented itself as once universal religion essential truth, whose purpose was to lead people to join the universal brotherhood. Today some notions of this movement could be found in the New Age movement.

54 The reference is to the Capitoline Wolf. And then to the Roman Empire. Romania was the last Eastern conquest of the Empire, led by Trajan. The Trajan column, which stands imposing in Imperial forums street in Rome, is the symbol of the ancient Dacia conquest and tells, carved, the story of the birth of Romania, the Eastern last frontier of Latin Empire.

55 Cfr., Bacaloglu, op. cit., 1923, pp. 78-79.

56 Cfr., Mussolini, B., "Caratteri e compiti dell'Accademia d'Italia nella relazione del Primo ministro", in *La Tribuna*, 4 April, 1926, p. 1.

57 Cfr., Gennaro, R., "Il Manifesto degli intellettuali fascisti e l'espansione culturale all'estero", in *Nuova Storia Contemporanea*, XVII, 1, 2013, p. 81. For further information we recommend Giuseppe Ungaretti, "For cultural expansion abroad", published in three sections on *Il Mattino* from Napoli, between October and December 1926, and today in Id., 1997, *Fantastic Philosophy. Prose of meditation and intervention (1926-1929)*, UTET, Torino, pp. 72-80.

58 Cfr., Bacaloglu, op. cit., 1923, p. 12.

59 Ibid., p. 13.

60 Ivi.

61 Ibid., p. 14.

62 Ibid., p. 141.

63 Ibid.,

64 To learn more about the role of the Italian woman in fascism we suggest reading, De Cespedes, A., *Nessuno torna indietro*, Mondadori, Milano, 1938.

65 Cfr., Bacaloglu, op. cit., 1923, p. 80.

66 Dora d'Istria, born Elena Ghica, was a Romanian Romantic writer and feminist of Albanian origins. She was born in Bucharest in 1828, from the Albanian family of princes. She studied in Suisse, Germany and in Russia and she travelled a lot in Europe and Asia, working towards the emancipation of her gender. Finally, she moved in Italy and she lived in a villa in Florence in Leonardo da Vinci street, where she died in 1888.

To know about her life and works, look at, D'Alessandri, A., *Il pensiero e l'opera di Dora d'Istria fra Oriente europeo e Italia*, Roma, Gangemi, Roma, 2007.

67 Cfr., Bucur, op. cit., 2003, pp. 57-60.

68 Cfr. Bacaloglu, op. cit., 1923, p. 81.

69 Ibid. p. 83.

70 Ibid., 136.

71 Ibid., p. 137.

During the fascism in Italy rose a series of magazines for women, we remember *La piccola italiana*, *Il giornale della Donna* who became *Donna Fascista* in 1935, *Cordelia*, *La Donna* on which also wrote Sibilla Aleramo and Matilde Serao and also fashion magazines, such as *Moda* and *Lidel*, this last founded by Lydia de Liguoro and on which wrote Margherita Sarfatti but also Grazia Deledda, Luigi Pirandello. Elena Bacaloglu turns against these magazines, because according to her they betrayed the fascist ideal of the new woman, who essentially therefore lives in her and in her *Manifesto nazionale fascista italo-romeno*.

To know more about these magazines for women and by woman during the fascism see also: Turrini, E., "L'Almanacco della donna italiana: uno sguardo al femminile nel ventennio fascista", in *Storia e Futuro*, 46, March 2018, p. 4.

72 Cfr., Bacaloglu, op. cit., 1923, p. 137.

73 Ibid., p. 138.

74 Ibid., p. 84.

75 Ivi.

76 On the same day that the Italian government donated to the city of Cluj, and to other cities like Bucharest, Chișinau, Timișoara and Târgu Mureș, a copy of the statue of the Capitoline Wolf, to symbolize the unity of Romanians from all over the country with their latinity. And on the same day, Elena Bacaloglu gave a speech of panlatina union right in front of "the *Lupa* and for the *Lupa*".

Cfr., Bacaloglu, op. cit., 1923, p. 127.

77 The constitution of the Italian-Romanian National Movement in Romania was signed by Elena Bacaloglu; Sextil Pușcariu, first Dean of the University of Cluj and member of the Romanian Academy; Di Călugăreanu, Chancellor of the University of Cluj for the year 1921-1922; Adriano Ostrogovich, Italian, Dean of the Faculty of Science of the University of Cluj; Vasile Bogrea, professor at the Faculty of Letters of the University of Cluj and member of the Romanian Academy; Alexandru Lapedatu, dean of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Cluj; D.P. Voitești, professor of the Faculty of Sciences; Marin Ștefănescu, professor of Philosophy at the University of Cluj; Ion Agârbiceanu, writer and editor of the newspaper *La Patria*, official organ of the Transylvanian National Party; N. Banescu, professor at the Faculty of Letters of the University of Cluj and member of the Romanian Academy; Iosif Papovici, University professor; Romul Boila, professor of constitutional law at the University of Cluj; G. Iahoda, industrial; Gheorghe Bacaloglu, artillery colonel, former prefect, founder and director of the *Great Transylvanian Culture Meeting* and *Cele Trei Crișuri* magazine. The list of names is faithfully reported from the deed of incorporation of the movement. Cfr., ibid., p. 85.

78 The two terms were added during the session, the movement became, therefore, the Italo-Romanian economic and cultural National-Fascist Movement. Cfr., ibid., p. 88.

79 Ibid., p. 86.

80 Ibid., p. 87.

81 Gentile choosed on the same date to announce the "Manifesto degli intellettuali fascisti di tutte le nazioni". The symbolic reference to Roman Empire, to its greatness and to the Latin pride, is perspicuous.

82 Ibid., p. 92.

83 The letters date back to 1918. Both intellectuals will then move away from the fascist movement led by Benito Mussolini.

84 Ibid., p. 36.

85 Ibid., p. 38.

86 Ibid., p. 39.

87 Ibid., p. 35.

At the National Library of Romanian Academy there is kept a document in which Benedetto Croce as Minister of Education (1920-1921) certified the allocation of funding for the payment of the fee to the boarding school in Naples of Elena Bacaloglu's child.

Cfr., *Scrisoare: Elena Bacaloglu – Benedetto Croce, 1910-1920*, Biblioteca Academiei, 21 agosto 1920.

88 Ibid., p. 101.

89 Ibid., p. 102.

90 Elena Bacaloglu had become, during the years of the Great War, a protected of the general, when her activity in Italy met the association "Latina Gens", whose purpose was to unite all the Latin peoples of the world, creating a Latin Federation of the States. Cfr. Tomi R., "Italieni în slujba Marii Uniri. Mărturii inedite", in *Revista Istorică*, 3-4, 2010, pp. 280-282.

General Cadorna and Italian Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino also took part in this organization. Cfr., Epure, N., "Relațiile româno-italiene de la sfârșitul Primului Război Mondial la Marșul asupra Romei (noiembrie 1918 – octombrie 1922). Geneza unor contradicții de lungă durată", in *Analele UCDC - Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University,* seria Istorie, 1, I, 2010, pp. 112–117.

Elena Bacaloglu participated in the war in northern Italy, alongside General Cadorna, trying to bring the cause of Romanian latinity among the fighting troops, but following the defeat of Caporetto she was forced to take refuge in Genoa. Here she participated in the creation of the "Romanian Legion in Italy". According to Victor Babeș: "Elena Bacaloglu was the largest propagandist of Romania abroad, and particularly in Italy". Cfr., V., *Răspuns rostit de D-l Prof. Dr. Victor Babeș*, in Bacaloglu, G., "Ardealul ca isvor cultural: Discurs de recepțiune rostit la Ateneul Român", in *Cele Trei Crișuri*, 10, 1 June, 1924, p. 12.

Here, the work *La Romania* had a resounding success in sales, 2,000 copies were sold, as can be deduced from a letter written by Doudelet on 30 June 1917 to Bacaloglu in order to establish the regulation of design rights. Cfr., Bacaloglu, 1923, op. cit., p. 40.

In fact, the authors had problems with the publisher, Ettore Cozzani, for the division of revenue and for the artistic property of the work. Even General Cadorna had to intervene in the dispute between the authors and the editor of the magazine *Eroica*, sending a letter to the Member of the Parliament Ubaldo Comandini, president of the federated works for internal propaganda. Ibidem, p. 33.

91 In Italy she used to spend her time in Fascio's apartments or in hotel paid by fascist government, like highlighted in a letter that she wrote to the Duce: "I am in Milan, in this same hotel where I am now e this time with your budget, from the Italian State, officially, that Maffeo Pantaleoni gave me like a principle of demand of my 100.000 spent with the cause of defense of my sacrosanct work and with national and international struggles unleashed around; now in short as a principle of national justice and ideal that I want whole – Whole – do you understand? whole and above all spontaneously from *You* the *Latin Chief, The Roman Chief, my only Chief, Pupil and Master*".

Ibid., p. 136.

92 Ibid., p. 123.

93 Ibid., p. 109.

94 Cfr., Lantini, F., "Un sopruso poliziesco in danno della signora Elena Bacaloglu", in *Il Popolo d'Italia*, 25 May, 1922, p. 3, in Ibid., pp. 109-111.

95 Ibid., p. 105.

96 Ibid., p. 138.

97 The news is reported in the "Buletin Politic" of the daily *Vestul României*, 1, 32, 4 October 1923, p. 3 (available on internet). And from the first page of the weekly *Clujul*, with the title "Martirul Rosenthal", 1, 31, November 4, 1923, p. 1 (available on internet).

98 Cfr., Payne, S.G., 1995, *A History of Fascism, 1914-1945*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1995, p. 135.

99 Cfr., Bacaloglu, op. cit., 1923, p. 139.

100 Cfr., Burcea, C., "Propaganda românească în Italia în perioada interbelică", in *Revista de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale*, 1, 2005, pp. 101-106.

101 *Scrisoare: Elena Bacaloglu – Brătianu*, 17 Septembrie 1926, Biblioteca Academiei, București.

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102 *Scrisoare: Elena Bacaloglu – Rebreanu*, 11 Februarie 1931, Biblioteca Academiei, București.

103 *Scrisoare: Elena Bacaloglu – Torouțiu*, 22 Octombrie 1947, Biblioteca Academiei, București.

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'THE TRAVELLER FROM A LESSER COUNTRY': HUBERT BUTLER AND YUGOSLAVIA

Abstract

This essay explores the writings of Irish essayist Hubert Butler (1900-1991) on Yugoslavia, where he lived for three years in the 1930s and by which he remained preoccupied for the rest of his life. It focuses on his search for connections and analogies between Ireland and Yugoslavia, examining this within wider patterns of deinsulation of Irish cultural and political discourse around the time of the Second World War, a phenomenon which involved both imaginative attempts to understand Irish questions with reference to international analogues and precedents, and sometimes sinister translations of matters of global consequence into local political debates.

Keywords: Hubert Butler, Yugoslavia, Second World War, nationalism

> I have always believed that local history is more important than national history. There should be an archive in every village […]. Where life is fully and consciously lived in our own neighbourhood, we are cushioned a little from the impact of great far-off events which should be of only marginal concern to us.[1]

These lines from Hubert Butler's 1984 essay "Beside the Nore" have been quoted by John Banville and N.J. McGarrigle to assert Butler's fidelity to the local and to his Irish "home place" – but these assessments risk effacing his profound commitment to inter-community and international dialogue, evident in texts explored in this essay, all of which are rooted in interactions and discussions occasioned by his travels in south-east Europe.[2] Butler's localism, therefore, might be apprehended not only as an approach to historiography but also as a gesture anticipating the transnational field

of world literature, promoting the idea that focusing on local rather than national concerns, paradoxically, enables easier and more productive engagement with the rest of the world. As David Damrosch has observed: "The provincial writer is […] at once cut off but also free from the bonds of an inherited tradition, and in principle can engage all the more fully, and by mature choice, with a broader literary world: Joyce and Walcott are far more cosmopolitan writers than Proust and Woolf."[3] Damrosch's call for scholars of world literature to work collaboratively across national boundaries is also anticipated by Butler's active pursuit and promotion of trans-European cultural engagement and encounters.[4]

Hubert Butler (1900-91) occupied an eccentric position in relation to the mainstream of the society in which he lived, and since his death arguably remains marginal to Irish literary and cultural studies, despite some valuable recent critical interventions.[5] This can, in part, be explained by the form in which he worked – the essay's position in the canon, as determined by literary study and pedagogy (or indeed by commercial success), is far less established and secure than the places of drama, fiction, or poetry. Butler's writings tended to appear in journals and magazines with relatively small circulations, and were not collected and published in book form until the 1980s and 90s.[6] As we shall see, the subjects on which Butler fastened also drew him away from the cultural and political mainstream, often resulting in apathy and sometimes in opprobrium. This essay focuses on his writings on Yugoslavia, where he lived for three years in the 1930s and by which he remained preoccupied for the rest of his life, describing it as "the foreign country I know best".[7] Butler's concern with the crimes committed during the Second World War by the fascist Ustaše regime in the Independent State of Croatia, and in particular with the extent to which the Catholic Church colluded in these, made him unpopular with many in Ireland, although more recently he has been hailed as "Ireland's George Orwell" due to his willingness to speak uncomfortable truths.[8] His search for connections and comparisons between Ireland and south-eastern Europe and specifically Yugoslavia is unusual and significant, suggesting a means of supplementing or circumventing postcolonial approaches to the study of Irish history and culture; in viewing Ireland as one of several "small states" in Europe Butler poses a challenge to historiography and cultural studies which too often remain bound by an exceptionalism which prioritises lines of enquiry with the former colonial ruler, Britain, or with the United States, the destination of many Irish emigrants since the nineteenth century.

Butler was also aware of the malign possibilities of comparative strategies however – material in his archive, held in Trinity College Dublin, shows how Irish-Croatian comparisons were drawn upon to inflame the politics of grievance in Northern Ireland. Drawing on research in this archive, this essay examines Butler's search for comparisons in the context of the wider desinsulation of Irish cultural and political discourse around the time of the Second World War, a phenomenon which can be observed across the political spectrum, involving both imaginative attempts to understand Irish questions with reference to international analogues and precedents, and sometimes sinister translations of matters of global consequence into local political debates.

Hubert Butler was an Anglo-Irish Protestant and a member of what is often called the Ascendancy – his ancestors had arrived in Ireland in the twelfth century after Henry II's invasion and Butler's father was a landowner, farmer and High Sherriff of Kilkenny. Like many sons of Ascendancy families Butler was educated in England, first at a preparatory school, then at the elite boarding school Charterhouse, and then, from 1919-22, at the University of Oxford. During youth, adolescence and early adulthood, therefore, he found himself observing the convulsions in revolutionary Ireland from outside, and was transfixed by these. According to Robert Tobin, Butler neglected his studies at Oxford and instead "immersed himself in the culture of contemporary Irish life", finding that Irish nationalism, a seemingly remote concern at the family's ancestral home of Bennettsbridge, became more vivid and compelling when viewed from England.[9] These years were sometimes uncomfortable for Ascendancy families in Ireland – their properties were targeted by republican guerrillas and many big houses burned down. This distressed Butler – in his essay "Divided Loyalties" (1984) he bemoaned revolutionary "self-destruction" and mourned the loss of buildings and records, suggesting that amidst the upheavals the rebels had been "sawing away the branch on which they were sitting" and arguing that "a new and more suffocating ascendancy, that of international commerce" had replaced the ancien regime.[10] The new Free State established in 1922 also proved uncongenial to Protestants accustomed to an elevated status under colonial rule: public service positions often previously filled by Protestants now required proficiency in the Irish language, while the Catholic Church began to dominate the management of education and health provision, and its influence was also felt in legislation banning divorce. As a result of this new environment

many Protestants left the new state, travelling north across the newly created partition to Northern Ireland, or east to Britain.

Butler returned to Ireland after his studies in Oxford, and worked for a while as a librarian in Northern Ireland. In the late 1920s and early 1930s he travelled widely, teaching English in Alexandria and Leningrad (his time in the Soviet Union is described in the 1984 essay "Peter's Window"). From 1934-37 he taught in Zagreb, supported by a scholarship from the School of Slavonic Studies in London. Butler arrived in the city in October 1934 to the news that the Yugoslav King Alexander had been assassinated by Croatian nationalists in Marseille on the orders of their leader-in-exile Ante Pavelić; a few days later he observed the King's body lying in state at Zagreb railway station, prayed over by the Catholic Primate Archbishop Bauer and his Auxiliary Monsignor Stepinac. This episode was a harbinger for the next decade of Croatian and Yugoslav history and, as we shall see, is of critical importance to Butler's own later preoccupation with Yugoslavia and its ethnic and religious histories.

In 1938-39 Butler worked in Vienna with a Quaker organisation, helping Austrian Jews to escape persecution, a period he later recalled as "one of the happiest times of my life".[11] Aware that his linguistic skills and experiences of travelling and living in Europe could be of use in the fight against Nazism, on the outbreak of war he offered his services to the states of both belligerent Britain and neutral Ireland, but neither found a role for him.[12] In 1941 he inherited and took over the family farm and house at Bennettsbridge, where he remained for the rest of his life, pursuing studies which combined a deep and earnest interest in local history and archaeology with a profound concern for developments in global and European affairs (when possible he also continued to travel widely).

Butler first arrived in Yugoslavia in 1934, but as he recalls in his introduction to the collection of essays *Escape From the Anthill* (1985), he had become aware of the establishment of the Succession States in eastern and south-eastern Europe after the end of the First World War while he was at university.

> Yugoslavia had been born in 1918 after the defeat of Austria-Hungary and the rise of the Succession States. For the Southern Slavs it was the fulfilment of an ancient dream of harmony between four neighbouring and kindred peoples. I was at Oxford then and there was springtime in the air. There were Serbs, Croats and Czechs, there were Irish too, all rejoicing in their new-found freedom. We all had minority problems and I was surprised

> that Ireland, least scarred by war, did not identify herself with the other small new states more warmly, share experiences and take the lead for which she was qualified. The Croats knew about Ulster and some of them talked of Croatia, ruefully, as "the Ulster of Yugoslavia." This needed a readjustment of roles, but one knew what they meant.[13]

Imaginative leaps such as the one made by Butler's Croat friends, aligning Croatia with the industrial north of Ireland, are characteristic of Butler's own distinctive deployment of the essay form: a talented writer, curious analogies such as this propel many of his writings on this subject. Sometimes these leaps are glib and verge on essentialism – four decades earlier in "Report on Yugoslavia" (1947), for example, he wrote that "The Yugoslavs are, like my own nation the Irish, among the least pacifist people in Europe and at the best of times it would not be easy to persuade them that liberty could be won or maintained except by fighting".[14] A moment of this kind, particularly given its martial emphasis, shows that the pursuit of comparisons and analogies is a fraught and complex means of constructing narratives, and hints at the possible recourse to international conflicts as a means of inflaming local disputes.

Butler published no fiction, but his archive contains two attempts to approach Anglo-Yugoslav and Irish-Yugoslav interactions of the early twentieth century in a fictional mode. "Memoirs of five years in Srednovendia" is a fifty-page handwritten draft of a story addressing a fictionalised Yugoslavia, with reference to earlier invented Balkan locales. From a war-time or post-war perspective (the time of composition is unclear) Butler's narrator, Janet, recalls time spent during the 1930s in Srednovendia, an invented state composed of a coastal region, Marsovia and an inland region, Ruritania. Sharing several characteristics with Dalmatia, Marsovia carries the same name as the fictional Balkan country in the revised version of Franz Lehár's comic operetta *The Merry Widow* (1905), while the name Ruritania is lifted from Anthony Hope's trilogy of popular novels. Butler adheres to some details from Hope's novels – the story addresses the contemporary reputation of the "immensely Anglophile" Queen Flavia, who remains on the Ruritanian throne at the end of *Rupert of Hentzau* (1898) – but by other turns seeks to emphasise how the modernised "Ruritania", incorporated into the federation of Srednovendia, differs from that of popular reputation.[15] Srednovendia is an invented state made up of two pre-existing invented countries, which bears considerable similarities to Yugoslavia and yet seemingly co-exists

with interwar Yugoslavia (we are told that the "famous cabarets" on the Marsovian coast "are run largely by Hungarian and Yugoslav gypsies and by Jews").[16] Butler's engagement with the Ruritanian precedent suggests that he was aware of the extent to which literary representations conditioned intercultural relations, and aware too of how perceptions of the Balkans had been constructed in Britain and Ireland.[17] The second story describes a Yugoslav living in London but deeply interested in Ireland, studying its history and culture intensively and feeling an affinity between fellow "small states":

> Five years ago Milan was very consciously a member of a small state and he was interested in other small states. He had learnt English at school so it was not altogether surprising that the small state he chose for his special and devoted study was Ireland. His knowledge was stupendous and accurate. No bye-election or border incident escaped his notice and his excited comment. He was able to correlate them all well enough with domestic problems. Ulster played the part of Croatia. In both lands there were the memories of an old imperial connection and a native culture to be resumed from the domination of a foreign one. In both there were land hunger and religious problems and political assassinations. There were the rich ranch-lands of Meath and Voivodina there were Connemara and Herzegovina full of rocks and ass-carts and tourists. There were the Chetniks, the Ustashe and the [Orangemen] and the IRA. Historically too Belgrade as Smigidunum had been a Celtic capital before Dublin.[18]

It is unclear when this was written, but probably during the Second World War.[19] The story establishes parallels between Ireland and Yugoslavia in terms of their shared experience of foreign domination by the Western European powers, but also through correspondences in landscape, rural economy and political activism. The correspondence here between Northern Ireland and/or Ulster and Croatia returns us to the phrase "the Ulster of Yugoslavia". According to Butler this parallel originated in Croatia itself – in "Yugoslavia: The Cultural Background" (1947) he relates an anecdote in which a Yugoslav professor travels to Ireland in the interwar period to deliver a lecture on his home country, before returning home to Dalmatia and giving a lecture on Ireland. The professor was then apparently taken to a police station and charged with subversion and separatism, on the grounds that his Yugoslav audience would understand that in discussing "Ulster" he intended to refer to "Croatia". In "Mr Pfeffer of Sarajevo" (1956), an essay recounting the Sarajevo plot to kill Franz

Ferdinand, Butler explicitly addresses the origins of the comparison in Croatia:

> Frequently you will hear an Irish nationalist lamenting the collapse of Austria-Hungary and explaining that Yugoslavia and the other succession states were mere puppet contrivances of the League of Nations, rag-bags of racial oddments, doomed to disintegrate. He ignores that these states all have living languages and often a more distinctive culture, a longer history of independence than our own. And since the Succession States owed their existence to England and France, their citizens often scoffed at Ireland's independence. The Croats used to call themselves "the Ulster of Yugoslavia" because they considered the Six Counties as progressive as themselves and in equal danger of being absorbed into the peasant economy of a more primitive people.[20]

These observations align industrialised Northern Ireland with Croatia as comparable provinces attempting to cling to more advanced and civilised economies or societies in the face of political change, in the first instance to Britain and in the second to Western Europe. Paradoxically, and by extension, this also serves to align Orthodox Serbia with the Catholic-dominated southern state in Ireland, while Catholic Croatia appears the double of Protestant-dominated Northern Ireland: the "readjustment of roles" mentioned by Butler above.

There are precedents for Butler's search for parallels and harbingers. In their introduction to *Ireland: East to West* (2013), Aidan O'Malley and Eve Patten cite the example of Arthur Griffith. In 1904 Griffith, the founder of Sinn Féin, published *The Resurrection of Hungary: A Parallel for Ireland*, in which he suggested that whereas sixty years previously Irish nationalism had presented an example for Hungarians fighting for greater autonomy, Hungary's gain in sovereignty following the 1867 compromise meant that it could now be seen as "Ireland's exemplar". Griffith's suggestion was of course simplistic, as Michael Laffan and Stipe Grgas have observed: Griffith ignored elements of Hungarian history which did not fit his case (significantly, as Grgas observes, he ignored the power subsequently wielded by Hungary in Croatia and the Balkans).[21] As O'Malley and Patten note, and as the inexactitude of the Croatia-Ulster analogy suggests, such parallels are necessarily built around blind spots, but the simplifications themselves offer useful illustrations of how apparently distant conflicts or movements can stimulate domestic political discourse.

The pursuit of comparisons also stimulated many of Butler's contemporaries. In 1941 Rebecca West published the vast modernist travelogue *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, which features strikingly similar expressions of romantic, nostalgic enthusiasm for the foundation of the Succession States, and also draws fraught and problematic connections between their histories and that of Ireland:

> Freedom was for these people an ecstasy. That I knew to be true, for I had seen it with my own eyes. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, they were all like young men stretching themselves at the open window in the early morning after long sleep. To eat in a public place in these countries, to walk in their public gardens, was to fill the nostrils with the smell of happiness. Nothing so fair has happened in all history as this liberation of peoples who, during centuries of oppression, had never forgotten their own souls, and by long brooding on their national lives had changed them from transitory experience to lasting and inspiring works of art.[22]

Black Lamb and Grey Falcon resulted from three journeys taken through Yugoslavia by West and her husband in 1936-38 and was published three years later, coinciding with the invasion of the country by Germany and its allies – it is dedicated "To my friends in Yugoslavia, who are all now dead or enslaved".[23] The shadow of impending conflict hangs heavily over the narrative. Early on she describes the handover of Croatians as "chattels" to Hungarian rule during the formation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy in 1867 and claims "I do not know of any nastier act than this in history." A footnote to this line reads "It must be remembered that this journal was written in 1937", implicitly invoking contemporaneous atrocities.[24] *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* is not, of course, a journal, but such moments of deliberate artifice call attention to the European war raging at the time of publication: in the following paragraph West writes that "I had come to Yugoslavia because I knew that the past has made the present, and I wanted to see how the process works."[25]

As the Anglo-Irish West attempts to make sense of the complex and interdependent convoluted histories and contradictory political identities that she encounters on her travels, she draws a number of comparisons between the respective courses of Irish and Yugoslav history.[26] In Croatia, for example, in the midst of a tense exchange between a Croatian former revolutionary who believes in Yugoslavian unity and a Serb who is

pro-Croat in politics, she detects "the authentic wail of poverty, in its dire extreme, that is caused by a certain kind of politics. Such politics we know very well in Ireland."[27] West goes on to draw an extended comparison between the political impasse in Croatia following its incorporation into interwar Yugoslavia and developments in the Irish Free State, identifying "obstinate solids" which linger after a "proud people" have "driven out their oppressors" and hinder political stability and progress.[28] Elsewhere and more contentiously, West suggests that "The nationalisms of Hungary and Ireland have always been intense, but Hungary has always been industrially ambitious and resolute both in maintaining a feudal land system and in oppressing the aliens within her frontiers while Ireland, though she desires to annihilate Ulster, wishes to be a peasant state with industries well within manageable proportions."[29] West's analogies are sometimes inexact and ill-advised and her language hyperbolic (apart from particularly fevered loyalists, who in 1941 would have suggested that Northern Ireland faced "annihilation" from the south?), but her desire to draw these connections bears comparison with approaches taken by Butler and others in Ireland around the time of the Second World War.

Despite the comparative isolation of north and south at this time, the war years encouraged many to explore connections and draw such parallels between the cultural and political histories of Ireland and those of states in central and Eastern Europe. In an article entitled "The Barriers", published in Dublin literary magazine *The Bell* in July 1941 Butler expressed depression at Ireland's isolation and the effect of this on its internal cultural politics, writing "To-day we are cut off completely from the outer world, and between north and south, between cities and provinces the barriers are rising. The war has forced on us a cultural self-sufficiency more complete than the most fervent Separatist could have imposed by law", and arguing that "Great cultures have always risen from the interaction of diverse societies."[30] In Butler's analysis, the attempted retreat to cultural self-sufficiency in Ireland following independence had failed, as it had failed for small states elsewhere: "Anglo-Irish culture, which should comprehend all literature from Swift to Edgar Wallace in translation, could never become the focus of a nation. The same might be said of the old Austrian civilisation, on which the Succession States of Eastern Europe tried to base their new national cultures. It was too strong and powerful to be assimilated."[31] In "The Barriers" he proposed a positive programme to overcome this, suggesting that since the cultural future of Europe was easier to influence through dialogue and exchange

than its post-war political structures, this was a process in which Ireland as a small state could and should participate, unhindered by imperial baggage (here Butler anticipated later notions of Irish cultural capital). Butler went on to describe small cultural clubs in Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania, where "life in the provinces is not unlike our own".[32] These offered spaces in which peripheral cultures could encounter each other away from official state nationalist discourse:

> The audiences were small and intimate and the visit was sometimes more like a party than a lecture. Once an Irish singer came and in the small clubs of Macedonia Irish songs alternated with Serbian ballads.
>
> That was not the only contact with Ireland, for the visit was returned some months later by a school-teacher from Novi Sad, who lectured, travelled and broadcast in Ireland.[33]

In Butler's account this was later spoiled by official patronage however – the concert halls became too big, state officials began to take an interest in the visits and "The faint smell of power politics pervaded the atmosphere; reciprocity gave place to rivalry, personal exchange to diplomatic courtesies." Butler argued that:

> The smaller peoples must take the lead once more and hold it tenaciously. Round the most ordinary British traveller there hangs an aura of wealth and Waterloo and the British navy, which either antagonises or enthrals. The traveller from a lesser country, rich in traditions but politically weak, can meet and mix fruitfully on a reciprocal basis, as himself alone.[34]

Butler's ideas can be read in the context of a wider political debate over Irish unity, in Ireland and in Britain, which often sought to draw connections and parallels between the partition of Ireland and ongoing developments in central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. An editorial by Seán Ó Faoláin in *The Bell* published in February 1944 again emphasises the perils faced by small states, and again draws parallels between Ireland and the Balkans, noting that "Yugoslavia, like ourselves, is a young state" and echoes Rebecca West in the suggestion that the demands by Croats for greater autonomy after 1919 were "much as if Ulster decided to secede from an united Ireland."[35] Ó Faoláin concedes that this analogy is incomplete, given that "No Northern counties in Yugoslavia have a sentimental pull towards Great Britain, or Germany, or, so far as has

hitherto been evident, to Russia, or to any country outside their own borders", but he continues to draw a further and more specific parallel between Northern Ireland and Albania, arguing, like Butler, that isolation for small states is neither desirable nor possible: "Balkan unity was blocked by the refusal of Albania and Bulgaria to co-operate in the Balkan pact of 1934. In practice Italy played Albania as a pawn to keep Yugoslavia from the Adriatic coastline. She was to Italy in the Adriatic what Cuba was to the United States in the Caribbean, and what the Six Counties are to Great Britain in the north Atlantic."[36] Comparisons with the Balkans were not drawn only by those who wished to see a united Ireland: a letter responding to Ó Faoláin in the August 1944 edition of the magazine asserted forcefully that Irish unity along Yugoslav lines would not have worked and would have had similarly unhappy results.[37]

Such exchanges can be read in the context of a wider political debate over Irish unity, in Ireland north and south and in Britain, which often sought to draw connections and parallels between the partition of Ireland and ongoing developments in central and Eastern Europe. In 1938, after Britain had acceded to German demands over the Sudetenland, anti-partition rallies were held in Glasgow, Manchester and London. As Robert Cole has noted, "The theme was that if the Sudeten Germans could have independence from Czechoslovakia, why not the Northern Irish from the United Kingdom?"[38] From a diametrically opposed position to such demonstrations and anxious about the future of the province, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland Lord Craigavon declared that "Ulster is nobody's Czechoslovakia".[39] To borrow a term used by Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, the events of the 1930s and war years "de-insulated" the political culture of Northern Ireland, and much would be heard about the Sudetenland in the years to come.[40]

After the Second World War Butler was much preoccupied both with what had happened in Croatia and what had not happened in Ireland, and continued to explore parallels and correspondences. In "Ireland and Croatia" (1948) he wrote that "I write as an Irishman, an Irish provincial, and it is the impact on our country of the events in Croatia that interests me, or, if one must widen the range, the impact on us of some external interpretations of those events." In one of his most celebrated essays "The Invader Wore Slippers" (1950) Butler raises the counterfactual spectre of a Nazi invasion of Ireland. The essay opens with these lines:

> During the war, we in Ireland heard much of the jackboot and how we should be trampled beneath it, if Britain's protection failed us. We thought we could meet this challenge as well as any other small nation, and looking into the future, our imagination, fed on the daily press, showed us a technicolour picture of barbarity and heroism.[41]

Characteristically Butler dissents from this "technicolour picture". He suggests that it never occurred to the Irish that "for ninety per cent of the population the moral problems of an occupation would be small and squalid", and would involve instead choosing between two "inglorious" courses of action.[42]

> We did not ask ourselves: "Supposing the invader wears not jackboots but carpet slippers or patent leather pumps, how will I behave, and the respectable Xs, the patriotic Ys and the pious Zs?" How could we? The newspapers only told us about the jackboots.

In this essay Butler attempts to debunk simplistic narratives of invasion and resistance promoted across Europe in the post-war period, with reference to three circumscribed occupied or semi-occupied zones in which "precedent and analogy" could be observed. These were the British territories of the Channel Islands, where "respectable Xs" were in the majority; the French province of Brittany, where the influence of romantically "patriotic Ys" was dominant, and "Croatia, where the Ys were reinforced by the fervently pious Zs."[43] Butler analyses the policies pursued by the German occupiers and their fascist acolytes and the responses of the occupied by examining newspapers published during the respective occupation periods, including extensive research in archives in Zagreb.[44]

Reading the *Guernsey Evening Post* Butler found that respectable middle class life continued untroubled by Nazi occupation, observing how reports of the torture of local shopkeepers and measures taken against Jews on the island were sandwiched on the newspaper pages between reports of table tennis matches, wedding anniversaries: "Lubricated by familiar trivialities, the mind glided over what was barbarous and terrible."[45] In Brittany the occupiers could make only "half-hearted" efforts to exploit the patriotism of the Ys and the piety of the Zs, largely due to the lack of Catholic support for Breton separatists.[46] In Croatia by contrast, according to Butler, these efforts had been triumphantly successful, largely due to the success of the Germans in "perverting piety".[47] As a result Pavelić's

Croatia "deserves the closest study" while Pavelić, he argued, "was the epitome, the personification, of the extraordinary alliance of religion and crime, which for four years made Croatia the model for all satellite states in German Europe."[48]

Butler's conclusions regarding counter-factual wartime Ireland are pessimistic: he suggests that due to the Germans' Protestant bias the "respectable Xs", identified as "Anglo-Irish *Herrenvolk* of Ulster and the Dublin suburbs" would have proved "satisfactory accomplices in establishing the German hegemony" over the Catholic majority.[49] Although the Ustaše regime was Catholic Butler suggests that even so Croatian Catholics "must have felt their position precarious", citing efforts made by Croatian scholars during the war to deny any Slavic ethnic or linguistic heritage.[50] Turning to the Breton precedent, Butler argued that as in Brittany, in Ireland "the Celtic nationalist would […] have been regarded as a valuable tool for undermining a non-German hegemony, but of decidedly less value for the reconstruction of a German one."[51]

Butler concluded that the Channel Islands and Brittany presented more persuasive analogies for Ireland, but in the course of his research discovered that the Ustaše themselves had sought to exploit cultural connections between Croatia and Ireland as part of a supposed German plan for Europe:

> In a Zagreb newspaper of 1942, *Deutsche Zeitung in Kroatien*, I read that Ireland, with Croatia and Slovakia, was to be one of the three model "allied" states in German Europe. In other papers too there was much of flattering intent about the common loyalty of Croats and Irish to Faith and Fatherland, our similar histories, romantic temperaments and literary gifts. Irish plays continued to be played in Zagreb, when English were tabu.[52]

Such post-war connections as existed between Ireland and Yugoslavia were largely mediated by the Catholic Church. Stridently anti-communist, the Church in Ireland was keen to highlight actions taken by Tito's regime against the Church in Croatia on foot of its activities during the Second World War under the Ustaše regime of the Independent State of Croatia. Stories of Titoist persecution of the church were promoted by the anti-communist print media in Ireland: Butler's archive includes cuttings of many reports in Catholic newspapers (specifically the *Sunday Independent* and the *Standard*) from the 1940s and 50s describing attacks on priests and confiscations of church property. The lead front page report in *The*

Standard on 17 August 1951 for example, is headlined "It Is Time The Truth Was Told In Yugoslavia", and credited to "A Correspondent in Central Europe". It describes the confiscation of church property, the occupation of churches by the army and claims that 400 priests have been jailed in Yugoslavia. The report concludes on the back page with an attack by the anonymous correspondent on other foreign newspaper correspondents who lack the "decency" to report this programme of persecution. The front page also features a report on national voluntary organisation Muintir na Tíre's "Rural Week", entitled "Parish Parliaments or State Octopus?" The report quotes the president of the organisation P.P. Bansha arguing that "We see already the growing octopus of the State gradually grasping everything and destroying the true independence of a people. To-day all over the world the power of the State is growing, finding its logical conclusion behind the bars of the Kremlin." Inside the newspaper an editorial entitled "Tito – No Convert" (p. 6) addresses the incarceration of Stepinac. It seems as though these reports had the desired effect with some readers at least: in an unpublished draft Butler mentions meeting the Yugoslav Nobel Laureate Ivo Andrić who had recently visited the Boyne Valley in Ireland and who told him that locals "were not very kind to us Yugoslavs […] and appeared to think we were always murdering priests".[53] It is striking that the *Standard* also sought to address the effects on Croatian peasants of the programme of collectivisation pursued by the Yugoslav state in the immediate postwar period, deploring this Soviet-style policy and declaring in a 1948 report that "small bourgeois" landowners would never submit to it.[54] Such reports must be read as appeals to a rural Irish readership of farmers and small business owners, and can also be interpreted in the context of a wider Church-sponsored campaign against state ownership, nationalisation, or provision of services in Ireland at this time.[55]

It was against this hostile context that Butler attempted to raise awareness of the Ustaše mass killings and campaign of forced conversions and, through the church, to address Ireland's "complicity" in what had happened. The figure of Aloysius Stepinac, the Monsignor whom Butler had observed praying over the body of King Alexander at Zagreb railway station in 1934, was central to his investigations.[56] In 1937 Stepinac had become Archbishop of Zagreb and remained so throughout the existence of the Independent State of Croatia, a matter of enormous and continuing controversy. After the war he was tried by the new communist authorities and imprisoned, as a result of which he attained considerable celebrity in

Ireland where he was seen as a martyr.[57] In parliament the leader of the Irish Labour party referred to the cleric as a "valuable divine exposed to the insults of the rabble for his devotion to Christ." On May Day 1949 a crowd of 150,000 (by some estimates the largest ever demonstration in Dublin) gathered in O'Connell Street in the centre of Dublin to protest against the imprisonment of Stepinac and that of Cardinal Mindszenty in Poland.[58] During the demonstration a young man suspected of handing out Communist leaflets was struck on the head and hospitalised.

Butler was deeply troubled by the pious portrayals of Stepinac, in the context of his apparent closeness to the regime which had committed mass killings, and role at the head of a church hierarchy which had cooperated with and implemented forced conversions. He recounts his involvement in the controversy in the 1952 essay "The Sub-Prefect Should Have Held His Tongue". Soon after his first post-war return visit to Yugoslavia in 1947 he gave a talk describing his impressions on Radio Éireann. He did not attempt to address the Communist persecution of Catholics, he writes, since in order to do so he would have had also to address 'the more terrible Catholic persecution which had preceded it, so I thought silence was best.'[59] Even this silence, however, incurred the wrath of *The Standard*, which published a lengthy editorial excoriating Butler and the broadcaster for his perceived sin of omission. Butler's subsequent legal battle with *The Standard* was unsatisfactory, and he "found it increasingly difficult to be silent" when the foreign editor of the newspaper, Count O'Brien, published to considerable acclaim the book *Archbishop Stepinac, The Man and his Case* (1947), complete with endorsements from the Archbishop of Dublin and many other senior clergy from Ireland, Britain and Canada.[60]

In response to such encomia, Butler translated a number of documents written by the archbishop, including a long letter from Stepinac to Pavelić which was published in the *Church of Ireland Gazette* in 1950, and which he also later self-published. In this letter Stepinac hailed Pavelić's leadership but deplored atrocities that had been committed, blaming these nevertheless on "irresponsible persons". Butler observed later that reaction to this had been non-existent on the part of Catholics since "They did not wish to think of Stepinac as a real man who wrote letters and made mistakes. They wanted him merely as a mascot in a campaign of hatred against communism and heresy."[61] Butler did see Stepinac as a real man and visited him in prison during his visit to Yugoslavia with a delegation of the National Peace Council in 1950, described in the essay "A Visit to Lepoglava" (1951). In the course of the visit Butler questioned Stepinac

over his choice to collaborate with the notorious Uniate clergyman Monsignor Shimrak, an avowed enthusiast for the forced conversion campaign, but received the same reply that Stepinac had given at his trial, "*Notre conscience est tranquille*".[62] Butler's essays on this subject are even-handed and dependent on careful research; he does not seek to attack Stepinac personally and in this essay describes him as "a figure who commands respect" who should be released in the interests of pursuing "a dispassionate enquiry into the tragic story of 1941" but whose cause "has been mishandled by ill-informed champions."[63] The reaction to Butler's interventions highlights the difficulties of pursuing these subjects in the political and intellectual climate of Cold War Ireland; his description here of the promoters of Stepinac's cause as "ill-informed" signals a liberal faith in enquiry and investigation rather than any interest in becoming involved in ideological conflict.[64] A manuscript entitled "On convincing the Americans about the persecution in Yugoslavia" further illuminates the zero-sum approach of the Cold Warriors whose convictions, swiftly entrenched after the end of the Second World War, Butler was attempting to unpick. If Tito was dismissed as a "godless communist", writes Butler, then Stepinac "must certainly be innocent". Few who did believe that people of Orthodox faith had been persecuted in Croatia thought Fascists were responsible or simply responded by asking "What else do you expect in the Balkans?"[65] Since Yugoslavia was communist and on poor diplomatic terms with the United States in the years immediately following the Second World War, both the religious and secular press in that country "almost without exception vied with each other in exalting Stepinac as a hero and martyr not only for the cause of Roman Catholicism, but for all religions, for freedom of conscience and for belief in God."[66]

In 1952 Butler attended a meeting at the Shelbourne Hotel in Dublin of a group called the International Affairs Association, at which the editor of *The Standard* read a paper entitled "Yugoslavia – the Pattern of Persecution". Butler was irritated that none of the speakers on the platform had ever visited Yugoslavia (except one who had once taken a cruise along the Dalmatian coast) and at the end got to his feet and attempted to raise the matter of mass killings and forced conversions. The Papal Nuncio, who was also in the audience, walked out before Butler had uttered more than a few sentences.[67] His peremptory exit caused uproar. Butler was castigated and smeared in the national press and removed from such small public offices as he held in Ireland: Kilkenny County Council expelled him from its ancient-monuments subcommittee. The

Kilkenny newspapers also printed attacks on him (Butler kept cuttings of these which are preserved in his papers). The *Kilkenny People* of the 8 November 1952 reported that the Nuncio had been "offended by a remark made by a Kilkennyman at a lecture on Yugoslavia" but claimed that "Irishmen and women of all denominations – are pained at the affront to the Papal Nuncio." Significantly the newspaper also noted that Stepinac had been born a peasant rather than (like Butler) "under the roof of the Big House – the Big House that we know so well in Ireland, to our cost."[68] The newspaper also gave thanks that "In Ireland we have no People's Court of the Tito calibre – pray God we may never have such – but we have another court, the charitable, well-informed democratic court of public opinion."[69] Reporting on Kilkenny County Council's insistence that Butler resign from his committee post two weeks later, the *Kilkenny Journal* records surprise that "a man who was born and reared in Kilkenny and a man who claimed to be Irish" would make such a statement, "trying to foist it over on the people, that those behind the Iron Curtain had religious liberty". The newspaper makes determined efforts to fold this into a broader narrative of Irish transgression across established Cold War lines, also deploring the landing of timber from Archangel in the Soviet Union, and the importation of million of pounds worth of barley from behind the Iron Curtain.[70]

Evident in these responses is a determination to silence Butler, and a desire to weaponise the politics of the Cold War in Irish domestic political debates. Attempts to do so were crude, and so too were attempts in Northern Ireland to harness the bloody recent history of Croatia in the services of anti-Catholic rhetoric. The Loyalist Protestant cleric and politician Ian Paisley's campaigns in the late 1960s and early 1970s raised the issue of Ustaše mass killings and forced conversions with the publication of a booklet entitled "It Could Happen Here". Following the pattern of debates in the interwar period and war years, here again we can observe the politics of the eastern European periphery imported into Ireland as a means of pursuing historic sectarian disputes newly reconfigured following partition. According to Butler, in speeches at this time Paisley raised the prospect of Catholic persecution of Protestants with reference to the actions of the Pavelić regime in the Independent State of Croatia. The characteristically intemperate tenor of these interventions can be gauged from an advertisement published in Paisley's newspaper the *Protestant Telegraph* in November 1968 for the London-based champion of the Serbian Orthodox Church Avro Manhattan's *Catholic Terror Today*, a

polemical account of Ustaše atrocities. The advertisement appears beside a photograph of Paisley in the act of punching his open left hand with the fist of his right:

> IT COULD HAPPEN IN ULSTER!
> If the R.C. bigots in our midst have their way
> The suppression of Civil Liberties ... The arrest of Protestant clergymen ...
> The closing down and burning of Protestant churches ... Roman Catholic
> padres as commanders of Protestant churches ... Long-term imprisonments
> without trial ... The execution of Protestant individuals and groups
> AND MORE HORRORS!
> Impossible ... Incredible ... Unbelievable?
> Then my answer to the Roman Catholic extremists is ... read
> *Catholic Terror Today*
> by Avro Manhattan
> These things happened – not long ago – in a country with the same religious
> and political problems as Ulster
> It is the most sensational
> the most dramatic
> the most revealing book ever![71]

The advertisement includes an order form and the recommendation to "Buy one for your Roman Catholic neighbour!" It is striking how this advertisement avoids all mention of the state of Croatia or indeed of the Second World War, and the summary of this book published in the newspaper similarly largely circumvents the wartime context of the events (there is one reference to Hitler, and one to the Nazi Party, but no direct reference to the war itself) and aims instead to emphasise the Catholic character of the Pavelić regime. Butler severely disapproved of such attempts to inflame tensions in Ireland, describing Paisley as "mentally arrested", "babyish", a "'wee cheeld' who takes notes", a boy "who said such rude things about the emperor's clothes", but who had "none of the innocence of children". "In such hands", Butler wrote, "the truth can be more dangerous than lies – and, in fact, much of what he says <u>is</u> true […] Pavelic was quite as wicked as the *Protestant Telegraph* makes out and it is quite true that he was sheltered by the Vatican after his defeat".[72] Butler feared that "By lying about ourselves, we put ourselves at the mercy of our enemies", meaning that the inability to confront clerical connivance in atrocities enabled these to be weaponised by malign forces such as Paisley's movement.[73] Drawing connections between Irish and European

historical narratives has destructive, as well as constructive potential, and references by Manhattan and Paisley to Ustaše atrocities in pursuit of their respective vendettas present extreme illustrations of the dangers of deploying uncontextualised international comparisons.

Following the nuncio scandal Butler largely withdrew from public life but continued to pursue his interests in Yugoslavia and its recent history – perhaps his most impressive piece of work is "The Artukovitch File", in which he painstakingly recounts his attempt to establish how the Ustaše Minister of the Interior, a desk murderer responsible for killings of Jews and Orthodox, had sheltered in Ireland for a year following his escape from Yugoslavia via Switzerland, before eventually making his way to California. Here too Butler uncovered Church complicity and immovable clerical anti-communism. The writer John Banville has identified Butler's preoccupation with "'epiphanies' which make currents of social and political change visible through the lens of some small accident or absurdity" – the pieces of writing by Butler that I have quoted here demonstrate how the form of the essay enabled Butler to use a relatively minor incident, episode or historical figure to address events of global consequence.[74] At the beginning of the 1980s, the decade in which his work was republished and reached a wider audience, Butler wrote that:

> There are two big drawers in my desk, one is full of my researches about the massacre of the Orthodox by the Roman Catholics of Croatia in 1941 to 2. The other contains some of my work on the early Irish Saints, a portion of which I published in Co. Kilkenny as "Ten Thousand Saints". What has appealed to me about both these subjects is just what makes normal people recoil from them. They are not dead issues but living ones, one cannot touch them without hurting someone emotionally or intellectually. To work on them is more like a necessary surgical operation than an exercise in history.[75]

Butler wrote in the introduction to *Escape from the Anthill* in 1985 that "even when these essays appear to be about Russia or Greece or Spain or Yugoslavia, they are really about Ireland".[76] His published and unpublished writings testify to the diversely productive and destructive ramifications of such a conviction.

NOTES

1 Hubert Butler, "Beside the Nore", in *The Eggman and the Fairies*, ed. by John Banville (London: Notting Hill Editions, 2012), pp. 195-204 (p. 204).

2 John Banville, "A much travelled thinker rooted in his home place", *Irish Times*, 1 December 2012, https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/a-much-travelled-thinker-rooted-in-his-home-place-1.392; N.J. McGarrigle, "Hubert Butler and a love of the local", *Irish Times*, 18 October 2016, https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/hubert-butler-and-a-love-of-the-local-1.2834099

3 David Damrosch, *What is World Literature?* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 186, quoted in O'Malley and Patten, *Ireland: East to West*, p. 12.

4 Published and unpublished writings testify to Butler's interest in Yugoslav literature and culture. See Hubert Butler, "Nazor, Oroschatz and the Von Berks" (1947), *Balkan Essays*, eds Chris and Jacob Agee (Belfast: Irish Pages Press, 2016), pp. 89-102; in Butler's archive, see "The arts in Croatia" (Butler Papers, 10304/342), "Yugoslav Literature: Address to the PEN Club Dublin" (Butler Papers, 10304/343), "I had hoped to have the carriage to myself…" (Butler Papers, 10304/369). Butler's late introduction to *Escape from the Anthill* (1985) suggests that his faith in provincial life in part derived from his reading of twentieth-century history: he writes that in Russia, Italy and Germany "totalitarian beliefs spread from the cities to the provinces where sharp antagonisms had been held in check by a long history of neighbourly interdependence" ("Escape from the Anthill" – Introduction to *Escape from the Anthill* (1985), *Balkan Essays*, pp. 313-26 (p. 319)).

5 See Robert Tobin, *The Minority Voice: Hubert Butler and Southern Irish Protestantism, 1900-1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), and essays by Aidan O'Malley, Michael McAteer and Stipe Grgas in Aidan O'Malley and Eve Patten (eds.), *Ireland: East to West* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2013).

6 Lilliput Press in Dublin published the essay collections *Escape from The Anthill* in 1985, *Children of Drancy*, in 1988 and *Grandmother and Wolfe Tone* in 1990. *The Sub-Prefect Should Have Held His Tongue*, edited by Roy Foster, was published by Penguin and Lilliput in 1990.

7 Hubert Butler, "Author's Proem" – from the Introduction to *Escape from the Anthill* (1985), *Balkan Essays*, pp. 51-56 (p.51).

8 Daniel McLaughlin, "Hubert Butler: Ireland's George Orwell", *Irish Times*, 10 September 2016, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/hubert-butler-ireland-s-george-orwell-1.2785734

9 Tobin, *The Minority Voice*, p. 26.

10 Hubert Butler, "Divided Loyalties", in Roy Foster (ed.), *The Sub-Prefect Should Have Held His Tongue, and Other Essays* (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 51-57 (p. 57).

11 Hubert Butler, "The Kagran Gruppe", in *The Invader Wore Slippers*, ed. by John Banville (London: Notting Hill Editions, 2012), pp. 255-272 (p. 255).

12 Clair Wills, *That Neutral Island: A Cultural History of Ireland During the Second World War* (London: Faber and Faber, 2007), p. 83.

13 Butler, "Author's Proem", *Balkan Essays*, pp. 51-2.

14 Hubert Butler, "Report on Yugoslavia", *Balkan Essays*, pp. 139-53 (p. 139).

15 Hubert Butler, "Memoirs of five years in Srednovendia [=Yugoslavia] and of Oxford", Butler Papers, 10304/585, p. 22.

16 Butler, "Memoirs of five years in Srednovendia", p. 22.

17 See Vesna Goldsworthy, *Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).

18 Hubert Butler, "An Irish-Yugoslav experiment: My friend Milan Stoiovich has an obsession: A Yugoslav in Torrington Square discusses Irish problems with Dr Paicek Čurćin editor of Novo Vreme Nova Europe", Butler Papers, 10304/585/51-55 (51).

19 The story opens with an ambiguous reference to "before the war": whether this is to the 1914-18 or 1939-45 conflict is not made explicit. The close correspondence between the descriptions of small cultural clubs in the Balkans in this story and those in his essay "The Barriers", published in Dublin magazine *The Bell* in July 1941 suggests that it was written during the Second World War.

20 Hubert Butler, "Mr Pfeffer of Sarajevo", *Balkan Essays*, pp. 57-70 (p. 68).

21 Stipe Grgas, "Hubert Butler's Non-Presence in Croatia", in Patten and O'Malley, *Ireland: East to West*, pp. 211-224 (pp. 212-213). Grgas also quotes from Hubert Butler's essay "Yugoslavia: The Cultural Background" (1947), showing that Butler himself was well aware of the inexactitude of Griffith's analogy.

22 Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* (London: Macmillan, 1942; repr. Edinburgh: Canongate, 2006), p. 1100.

23 As Tobin has discovered, West met Butler on one of these trips, giving him a lift in her car to his lodgings near Dubrovnik during heavy rain. Tobin, *The Minority Voice*, p. 62n.

24 West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, p. 54.

25 Ibid. Seamus O'Malley has suggested that *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* can itself be read as a work of propaganda: "Her work was a call to intervention against fascism, and it is striking to see modernist techniques, that for the most part were limited to literary circles of the European capitals, adopted for a text meant to galvanize several empires into action against the Nazi menace" (Seamus O'Malley, *Making History New: Modernism and Historical Narrative* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. xx).

26 West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, pp. 187-8.
27 Ibid., p. 82.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 1101.
30 Hubert Butler, "The Barriers", *The Bell*, 2/4 (July 1941: Special Ulster Number and The Abbey Theatre), 40-5 (p. 45, p. 41).
31 Hubert Butler, "The Barriers", p. 42.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Seán Ó Faoláin, "One World", *The Bell*, 7/5 (5 February 1944), 373-381 (p. 373).
36 Ó Faoláin, "One World", p. 375, p. 379.
37 John Ireland, "Eire and the Commonwealth Irish Confederation", *The Bell*, 8/ 5 (August 1944), p. 445.
38 Robert Cole, *Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War* (Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 7.
39 Hugh Shearman, *Northern Ireland: Its History, Resources and People* (Belfast: HMSO, 1946), p. 18.
40 Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson, *The State in Northern Ireland 1921-72* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979), p. 103. Several political pamphlets of this time drew explicit comparisons between Northern Ireland and the Sudetenland. See Henry Harrison, *The Neutrality of Ireland: Why It Was Inevitable* (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1942), p. 187; John Hawkins, *The Irish Question Today* (London: Victor Gollancz and Fabian Society, 1941), p. 47, p. 49; Jim Phelan, *Churchill Can Unite Ireland* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1940), p. 68, p. 69; "Ultach", *Orange Terror: The Partition of Ireland, a reprint from The Capuchin Annual, 1943* (Dublin: Capuchin Annual Office, 1943), p. 56.
41 Hubert Butler, "The Invader Wore Slippers", *Balkan Essays*, pp. 205-216 (p. 205).
42 Butler, "The Invader Wore Slippers", *Balkan Essays*, p. 205.
43 Ibid., p. 207.
44 Butler wrote that in the University Library in Zagreb "The assistants, at first very obliging, became a bit weary and suspicious as they brought out volume after volume. It was the most shameful period of their history I was investigating" (Butler, "The Invader Wore Slippers", *Balkan Essays*, p. 542).
45 Butler, "The Invader Wore Slippers", *Balkan Essays*, p. 209.
46 Ibid., p. 210.
47 Ibid., p. 213.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 211.

50 Ibid., p. 212.

51 Ibid., p. 211.

52 Ibid., p. 210.

53 Hubert Butler, "I had hoped to have the carriage to myself…", "When we crossed…", Butler Papers, 10304/369, p. 2.

54 A report published in *The Standard* on 2 July 1948 entitled "Did Peasants 'Ruin' Tito?" begins:

> One thing is obvious in the Yugoslav "crisis": the social revolution in Titoland has completely failed. The causes of the failure of this revolution, which was carried out mostly at the writing-desks of some young professor of political economy at the University of Belgrade, and not in the villages and farms in which 80 per cent of the Yugoslav population live, lie deep in the economic and social structure of Yugoslav society.

55 The successful campaign by the Church and others against the government attempt to introduce publicly provided healthcare for mothers and children in Ireland is the best example of this. See Lindsey Earner-Byrne, *Mother and Child: Maternity and Child Welfare in Ireland, 1920s-1960s* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).

56 After the war and the subsequent establishment of socialist Yugoslavia, Butler identified continuities between public reaction to the King's assassination and later displays in celebration of Ustaše and communist triumphs. Describing scenes of public mourning in Zagreb in 1934 he claimed that:

> There was not any evidence that anyone was being dragooned into the queues or that their emotion was faked. If the queues proved anything it was that the respectable classes, which modern bureaucracy has multiplied, very seldom have the courage of their convictions. They are incapable of those small unorganised departures from the expected through which the peaceful individual can make his feelings effective. They wait patiently for the assassin who they can repudiate publicly but welcome in their hearts. Seven years later 100,000 citizens lined the streets for a day and a half waiting for the arrival of Pavelitch, who had contrived the murder of the king. And four years later still they turned out with equal enthusiasm to welcome Tito, who, had it been possible, would gladly have carried out upon Pavelitch the death sentence which the monarchist government had passed on him.

(Hubert Butler, "I was three years in Yugoslavia before the war…", Butler Papers, 10304/351, pp. 1-2). Butler's apprehensions here anticipate later historiography which seeks to highlight continuities between the interwar and post-war iterations of Yugoslavia. See Vesna Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia: A Transnational History* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Sabrina P.

Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005* (Bloomington, Ind. & Washington D.C.: Indiana University Press & The Wilson Center Press, 2006).

57 Butler professed perplexity at this, writing in 1948 that "Croatia is a remote, little-known part of Europe, and this made it very strange that our press, our parliament, our county council, which had been silent when one country after another had been overrun by Germany, should suddenly pass resolutions of protest in the strongest and boldest language." (Hubert Butler, "Ireland and Croatia" (1948, 1988) 217-26, p. 217.

58 Butler, "Author's Proem", *Balkan Essays*, p. 55.

59 Hubert Butler, "The Sub-Prefect Should Have Held His Tongue", *Balkan Essays*, pp. 227-247 (p. 228). On his visits to Yugoslavia in the years after the war Butler refused either to be horrified or seduced by Tito's regime, although he viewed socialism as a temporary solution to Yugoslavia's inter-ethnic conflicts. Regarding Yugoslav-Italian tensions in Istria he wrote in 1947 that "The makeshift comradeship of Communism provides a temporary appeasement. In Fiume and Trieste on May Day thousands of Italian workmen marched contentedly behind Slav banners and slogans in the Slovene and Croat tongues." (Hubert Butler, "Maria Pasquinelli and the Dissolution of the Ego" (1947, 1979), *Balkan Essays*, pp. 373-380 (p. 379). He wrote in December 1951 that "Sean O'Faolain thinks incorrectly that I am a fanatical partisan about Yugoslavia. My impression is that friends are to-day more valuable to her than fanatics and that she does not want any love affairs with foreign nations. She has good reason for shrinking from their embraces." (Hubert Butler, untitled notes, Butler Papers, 10304/607/33) His archive shows that he corresponded several times with the Yugoslav embassy in London, but he cannot be considered an apologist for the regime, although he suggested that minorities in Yugoslavia were more secure under communism than might otherwise have been the case, writing that "I have not seen enough of the Voivodina to be sure but my experiences among the Bulgarian, Albanian and Macedonian minorities confirm [that] for the first time a man is not penalised for his race." (Butler Papers, 10304/607/33).

60 Butler, "The Sub-Prefect Should Have Held His Tongue", *Balkan Essays*, p. 228.

61 Hubert Butler, "Yugoslavia, Speech at Craigavad NSP [?IVSP]", Butler Papers, 10304/334.

62 Hubert Butler, "A Visit to Lepoglava", *Balkan Essays*, pp. 199-203 (p. 201).

63 Ibid., pp. 202-3.

64 Liberal outlets in Ireland remained uninterested in publishing Butler's dissenting views, however – he recalls being told by editors to "Write where you'll be understood, write in England, and write in some serious monthly

where people use their reason and not their primitive instincts." Hubert Butler, "Ireland and Croatia", *Balkan Essays*, pp. 217-226 (p. 218).

65 That dismissal of course gestures back to a long nineteenth and early twentieth-century Western perception of the Balkan countries as inherently barbarous, and also anticipates the shrugs of many in the West during the conflicts of the 1990s.

66 Hubert Butler, "On convincing the Americans about the persecution in Yugoslavia", Butler Papers, 10304/359, p. 3.

67 Butler, "The Sub-Prefect Should Have Held His Tongue", *Balkan Essays*, p. 230.

68 "Affront to Nuncio", *The Kilkenny People*, 8 November 1952.

69 "The West's Awake!", *The Kilkenny People*, 8 November 1952.

70 "Council's Strong Resentment: Mr H. Butler asked to resign from Committee", *Kilkenny Journal*, 22 November 1952.

71 *Protestant Telegraph*, 16 November 1968, p. 6. Cuttings from this newspaper are collected in a scrapbook in Butler's archive (Butler Papers, 10304/834/28).

72 Hubert Butler, "Behind the Purple Velvet Curtain / This is 'The Age of not-knowing' or… / On Paisley's revelations of the Croatian massacres", Butler Papers, 10304/391, p. 3.

73 Butler, "Behind the Purple Velvet Curtain", Butler Papers, 10304/391, p. 4.

74 John Banville, "The European Irishman", review of Hubert Butler, *The Independent Spirit*, *New York Review of Books*, 12 June 1997, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1997/06/12/the-european-irishman/. This approach may also be observed in the 1956 essay "Mr Pfeffer of Sarajevo", which addresses the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by focusing on the Sarajevan Croatian and Catholic magistrate who presided at the trial of the assassins.

75 Hubert Butler, untitled notebook, Butler Papers, 10304/532, p. 9.

76 Butler, "Escape from the Anthill", *Balkan Essays*, p. 314.

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Academic programs organized and coordinated by NEC in the academic years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019:

- ***NEC Fellowships (since 1994)***
  Each year, the NEC Fellowships, open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences, are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- ***Ştefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)***
  The Fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research and are part of the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the *Odobleja* Fellowships are integrated.

- ***UEFISCDI Award Program (since October 2016)***
  The outstanding scientific activity of the NEC was formally recognized in Romania in 2016, when the Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation organized a competition for institutions coordinating ERC projects. New Europe College applied for and won two institutional prizes for coordinating, at that time, two ERC grants. A part of this prize was used to create the UEFISCDI Award Program, consisting of fellowships targeting young

international researchers, also meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program.

- ***The Europe next to Europe Fellowship Program (2013-2017)***
  This program, sponsored by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden), supported young researchers from European countries that were not yet members of the European Union, or had a less consolidated position within it, targeting in particular the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia), Turkey, Cyprus, enabling us to invite them for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, to work on projects of their choice.

- ***The Pontica Magna Fellowships (since October 2015)***
  This Fellowship Program, supported by the VolkswagenStiftung (Germany), invites young researchers, media professionals, writers and artists from the countries around the Black Sea, but also beyond this area (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine), for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of this region. This program is strongly linked to the former *Black Sea Link* Fellowships.

- ***The Pontica Magna Returning Fellows Program (since March 2016)***
  In the framework of its *Pontica Magna* Program, New Europe College offers alumni of *Black Sea Link* and *Pontica Magna* Fellowship Programs the opportunity to apply for a research stay of one or two months in Bucharest. The stay enables successful applicants to refresh their research experience at NEC, to reconnect with former contacts, and to establish new connections with current Fellows.

- ***The Gerda Henkel Fellowship Program (since March 2017)***
  This Fellowship Program, developed with the support of Gerda Henkel Stiftung (Germany), invites young researchers and academics working in the fields of humanities and social sciences (in particular archaeology,

art history, historical Islamic studies, history, history of law, history of science, prehistory and early history) from Afghanistan, Belarus, China (only Tibet and Xinjiang Autonomous Regions), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

- ***How to Teach Europe Fellowship Program (since April 2017)***
  This Program, supported by the Robert Bosch Foundation and a Private Foundation from Germany, introduces a new and innovative Fellowship module at the Centre for Advanced Study (CAS), Sofia, and the New Europe College (NEC), Bucharest. Beyond the promotion of outstanding individual researchers, the Program focuses on the intersection of fundamental research and higher education. The joint initiative seeks to identify and bring together bright and motivated young and established academics from South-eastern Europe to dedicate themselves for a certain amount of time to research work oriented toward a specific goal: to lend the state-of-the-art theories and methodologies in the humanities and social sciences a pan-European and/or global dimension and to apply these findings in higher education and the transmission of knowledge to wider audiences.

- ***The Spiru Haret Fellowship Program (since October 2017)***
  The *Spiru Haret* Fellowship Program targets young Romanian researchers/academics in the humanities and social sciences whose projects address questions relating to migration, displacement, diaspora. Candidates are expected to focus on Romanian cases seen in a larger historical, geographical and political context, in thus broadening our understanding of contemporary developments. Such aspects as transnational mobility, the development of communication technologies and of digitization, public policies on migration, ways of employing transnational communities, migrant routes, the migrants' remittances and entrepreneurial capital could be taken into account. NEC also welcomes projects which look at cultural phenomena (in literature, visual arts, music etc.) related to migration and diaspora. The Program is financed through a grant from UEFISCDI (The Romanian Executive Unit for Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation Funding).

- ***Lapedatu Fellowships (since June 2018)***
  Thanks to a generous financial contribution from the *Lapedatu* Foundation, NEC invites to Bucharest a foreign researcher specialized in the field of Romanian Studies, who is currently conducting research in one of the world's top universities. On this occasion, he/she is expected to spend a month in Romania and work with a young Romanian researcher to organize an academic event hosted by the NEC. At this colloquy, the *Lapedatu* fellows and their guests present scientific papers and initiate debates on a theme that covers important topics of the Romanian and Southeastern European history in both modern and contemporary epochs. The contribution of the *Lapedatu* family members to the development of Romania is particularly taken into consideration.

ERC Consolidator Grant:

- ***Luxury, fashion and social status in Early Modern South Eastern Europe***
  Principal Investigator: **Constanța VINTILĂ-GHIȚULESCU**
  Timeframe: July 1, 2015 – June 30, 2020

ERC Starting Grant:

- ***Art Historiographies in Central and Eastern Europe, an Inquiry from the Perspective of Entangled Histories***
  Principal Investigator: **Ada HAJDU**
  Timeframe: October 1, 2018 – September 1, 2023

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New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic

sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

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Lapedatu Foundation, Romania

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