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MINORITY POLITICAL AGENCY AND ORBÁN’S MONO-PYRAMIDAL RULE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF HUNGARIAN KINSTATE POLICIES IN ROMANIA AND UKRAINE AFTER 2010

Abstract

My comparative analysis focusing on Hungarians in Romania and Ukraine tries to describe how Viktor Orbán’s kinstate policy affected minority political agency, e.g., strategies of ethnic bargaining and institutions governing minority elites. I investigate security-oriented approaches within the framework of international relations (IR) and I propose a broader analytical model for mapping kinstate policy effects on minority groups. I have in view the changes that occurred after May 2010, when the second Fidesz government was elected. Post-2010 Hungarian kinstate policies foster a homogeneous concept of the nation and try to integrate minority Hungarians into the mono-pyramidal rule of Orbán’s increasingly authoritarian regime. This process, although detrimental to intra-ethnic democratic functioning, cannot be described properly through IR related models focusing on macro-political aspects and programmatic elements of ethnic bargaining. Therefore, I employ a more nuanced concept of minority political agency including meso-level strategies of governing minority institutions and building networks of political patronage. Based on quantitative analysis of kinstate subsidies and semi-structured interviews conducted with key minority actors, I conclude that effects of Hungarian kinstate policy are the most visible at meso-level, as Hungarian communities were incorporated into Orbán’s regime through minority institutions. The comparison between the cases proved to be useful because I was able to distinguish between two different models of incorporation, a more monolithic local level intra-ethnic autocracy in Ukraine and a more decentralized patronage-based incorporation in Romania. The dissimilarities are due to initial differences in the organization of the two minority fields on the one hand, and the path-dependent relationship between Fidesz and the dominant minority elite faction, on the other.

Keywords: kinstate policy; ethnic politics; security; political patronage; minority institutions; extraterritorial nation building; Transylvanian Hungarians; Hungarians in Ukraine
Introduction

My aim is to map the effects of Hungary’s post-2010 kinstate policy on Hungarians in Romania and Ukraine, two minority communities connected simultaneously to the institutional and political fields of their home-states and kinstate. My paper focuses on the institutional level, on how the kinstate policy reshaped the strategies of community organization and political negotiation of the minorities’ actors “caught between” their kinstate and home-state.

In 2010, when Viktor Orbán’s right-wing Fidesz party won with a two-thirds majority, the event constituted an important historical juncture in Hungary’s political history that turned the country from a frontrunner of Western-type democratization in the CEE region into an increasingly authoritarian political system called illiberal democracy by Orbán himself and by political scientists a plebiscitary leader democracy (Körösényi et al. 2020) or an externally constrained hybrid regime (Bozóki-Hegedűs 2017). Henry Hale’s (2015) concept of mono-pyramidal rule can also be applied, as patronage structures of the dominant Fidesz captured institutional structures of a formerly more pluralistic society (Vangelov 2018). Orbán’s landslide victory was a major turning point in the kinstate involvement too. After two decades of political battle, the new parliament modified the citizenship legislation making possible for Hungarians living in neighboring countries to obtain citizenship without having residency in Hungary. This act created strong personal-bureaucratic linkages between the Hungarian state and individual members of Hungarian minority communities. Institutional subsidies have also increased considerably, creating a growing cross-border coherence at institutional meso-level.

Scholars in nationalism studies and international relations warned that more assertive kinstate policy would trigger sovereignty and security constrains on the side of neighboring countries that ultimately might harm Hungarian minorities (Pogonyi-Kovács-Körtvélyesi 2010; Pogonyi 2011; Salat 2012; Liebich 2019). It was another widespread presumption that kinstate involvement might lead to radicalization of Hungarian minorities, deteriorating interethnic relations and initiating a spiral of conflict (Jenne 2007; 2015). My paper takes seriously these reasonings, but it also argues that, in order to understand properly the negative effects of Orbán’s kinstate policy, we need to develop a more complex and empirically grounded concept of minority political agency going beyond the IR framework that
perceives minorities mostly as conventional actors and focuses primarily on explicit programmatic aspects of ethnic bargaining.

My paper is composed of five broad parts. In the first part of the paper, I present the conceptual framework guiding my empirical investigation. I begin with the two widespread hypotheses connected to the IR framework, namely that kinstate involvement triggers security threat on the part of residence states and radicalization on the part of kin minorities. I argue that these hypotheses explain only partially the effects of Orbán’s kinstate policy on strategies of Hungarian elites in Romania and Ukraine. Further on, I propose a two-dimensional concept of minority political agency (MPA), distinguishing between ethnic bargaining (e.g., negotiating with majority actors) on the one hand, and community organizing (e.g., building and governing minority institutions), on the other. I argue that, when analyzing kinstate policy effects on MPA, both dimensions should be taken into account and, moreover, patronage related aspects of ethnic bargaining should also be considered. In the second section I turn toward Hungary’s kinstate policy. This proved to be a quite divisive issue before 2010, when disagreements between left and right revolved around three key issues, namely (1) how the Hungarian nation (divided by state borders) should be redefined; (2) how Hungarian minority institutions should be subsidized; and (3) how should be treated the process of ethnic bargaining and, especially, the minority elite factions that accommodate with the actors of the majority. After 2010, the right-wing approach toward the Hungarian minority communities has gained a hegemonic position, nevertheless, the governing Fidesz has gradually ceased to back more radical factions of minority elites (as they became dominant and had to begin negotiations with majority actors in Ukraine and failed to gain electoral success in Romania). The third section of the paper presents meso-level institutional strategies of minority elites and focuses on how the kinstate involvement affected them. Strengthening separate minority institutions and institutionally sustained ethnic parallelism proved to be a common element across the cases, as well as the fact that minority institutions have become increasingly incorporated into Orbán’s mono-pyramidal rule. Nevertheless, models of incorporation demonstrated to be different. In Ukraine, Hungary’s kinstate involvement has led to a centralized rule of intra-ethnic autocracy organized around KMKSZ (Hungarian Cultural Alliance in Transcarpathia) and its leader László Brenzovics. In Romania, on the contrary, incorporation led to a more decentralized intra-ethnic institutional structure and strengthened the already existing (religious,
regional, ideological or simply network-based) internal pillarization of the Transylvanian Hungarian community. I argue that diverging outcomes are due to differences of the internal organization of the minority field on the one hand, and the path-dependent evolution of Fidesz’s relations with different Hungarian elite factions, on the other. In the fourth part of the paper, I turn toward ethnic bargaining and I ask how kinstate involvement affected this process. It is at this level of analysis, where I discuss in more details the relevance of securitization and radicalization hypotheses. I present how securitization and backlash in minority policy has diminished bargaining capacities of Hungarian elites in Transcarpathia. Nevertheless, I also argue that these have appeared as a side effect of East-West divide and then of ther brutal Russian aggression against Ukraine and have not been a consequence of Hungary’s (putatively) more assertive kinstate policy.

In Romania, the securitization of minority policies and a backsliding in minority rights protection has not occurred, but the radicalization hypothesis and ethnic outbidding (Rabushka-Sheppsle 1972; Horowitz 1985) had some relevance before 2014. I maintain, however, that these security-oriented questions should be also answered by taking into account the two-dimensionality of minority policy and patronage (instead of programmatic) orientation of ethnic bargaining in Romania.

My analysis is based on two empirical pillars. On the one hand I reconstructed quantitatively kinstate subsidies for minority institutions included into Hungary’s state budget for the period between 2010 and 2020. A significant part of these subsidies is allocated through so called unique requests for support (egyedi támogatási kérelem) that are calls not announced publicly and available only to previously selected and invited minority institutions. Decisions concerning individual support requests, however, are publicly available in PDF documents at the site of the Bethlen Gábor Fund (BGA ZRT), a public agency delivering significant part of kinstate support. Using these documents, we constructed a database containing all kinstate spendings through BGA unique requests. The original documents contained the name of the recipient, the amount and the destination of the subsidy and the date of the decision. We included all this information into the database and completed it with the activity domain of the recipient and the organizational/political network the institution belonged to. Dominant or non-dominant ethnic parties (KMKSZ and UMDSZ in Ukraine, RMDSZ, EMNP and MPP in Romania), churches (Hungarian Reformed, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Unitarian, Lutheran-Evangelic) several educational institutions
(especially universities) might be founded as institutional superstructures, larger interest groups or intra-community pillars having many minority institutions in their orbit. When categorizing individual organizations, we looked at political or larger organizational belonging of their leadership/board members. In several cases we consulted external experts in order to decide the belonging of the organization. The database contains a total number of 8,194 positively evaluated unique financial requests targeting minority institutions in Ukraine and 3,027 minority institutions in Romania. This database made possible to identify major beneficiaries of kinstate subsidies. On the other hand, effects of kinstate subsidies on ethnic bargaining and governing minority institutions were investigated through semi-structured interviews conducted with key actors of the Hungarian minority fields in Romania and Ukraine. A total number of 40 interviews were conducted, 17 of them in Ukraine and 23 in Romania with leading representatives of political organizations, churches, universities, schools, and other minority institutions receiving financial support from Hungary.

1. Conceptual Framework and Ethno-political Processes before 2010

1.1. Security oriented hypotheses and their relevance in Romania and Ukraine

Security approaches regarding IR framework and emphasizing negative consequences of kinstate involvement represented an important starting point of my research (van Houten 1998; Thyne 2009; Grigoryan 2010; Jenne 2007; 2015; Mylonas 2012). In this literature, kinstate involvement is mostly perceived as potentially dangerous and conflictual, triggering sovereignty and security threats in the resident states of minorities. Concerning the relation between kinstate involvement and MPA, two interlinked hypotheses are of key importance. According to the securitization hypothesis, majoritarian states usually respond to perceived security threat triggered by kinstate involvement with more repressive (rather than accommodative) minority policies, especially if interstate relations are also antagonistic (Mylonas 2012). Thus, kinstate involvement has the, often unintended, consequence – or “boomerang effect” to cite Alexandra Liebich (2019) – of narrowing the space of maneuver of minority elites. In a modified version, restrictive minority policies are not
(necessarily) consequences of kinstate involvement but this latter is used by majority actors to frame and legitimate already existing (restrictive) policy preferences (Csergő 2013; Schulze 2018; Schulze 2021). In both versions however, kinstate involvement harms claim-making and bargaining capacities of minority elites and narrows political space for running minority institutions.8

The radicalization hypothesis is another widespread presumption among both the majority public and the security-oriented scholars. According to Erin Jenne (2007: 40), there is a continuum between integrationist and secessionist minority claims, beginning with affirmative action that is participation on equal footing in institutional structures shared with the majority through cultural rights and then territorial autonomy, ending with irredentism that openly threatens territorial integrity of the residence state of the minorities. Minority elites go up and down on this continuum, while more assertive kinstate policies inform minority actors, who – backed by a committed external patron – address more radical ethnic claims toward their state of residence. This – in a similar vein as in the securitization hypothesis – prompts security concerns, which might induce backsliding in minority accommodation and might be conducive to a spiral of conflict. The obvious policy proposal connected to these hypotheses is that for a conflict resolution (or in order to avoid a potential dispute) the kinstate leverage should be ruled out or at least regulated and diminished.

Further on, I also focus mostly on negative consequences of Hungary’s kinstate involvement, but I argue that the above-mentioned hypotheses have only limited relevance in understanding how Hungarian minority strategies and MPA have evolved in Romania and Ukraine following the year 2010. Securitization of minority policies has occurred in Ukraine, while it has not taken place in Romania. In Ukraine, indeed, securitization was not a consequence of Hungary’s more assertive kinstate policy, but rather a side effect of Russia’s brutal aggression beginning with 2014. Backsliding in minority policies were centered around more repressive language policies targeting Russophones, but actually affecting negatively all other minority communities. The Hungarian community used to be quite compact in terms of MPA, having a well-developed system of minority institutions and elites organized in ethnic parties. In Orbán’s Hungary, they also had a quite committed external patron. Repressive measures and the relatively strong objection of Hungarians (most importantly raising concerns at international fora) have led to a spiral of soft political conflict
and to the deterioration of interstate relations. Interestingly, this has not happened in the case of the far more numerous Romanian minority in Ukraine. Romanians were more fragmented in terms of MPA (divided in three distinct Romanian speaking groups lacking common identity, strong ethnic parties and well-functioning minority institutions) and their kinstate was far less devoted to back minority claims (Iglesias 2014).

The radicalization hypothesis has also some relevance, especially in analyzing kinstate policy effects before 2014. As already mentioned, relation to minority factions compromising with majority actors was a divisive issue between right- and left-wing actors in the Hungarian kinstate policy. The right-wing Fidesz accused RMDSZ, the dominant ethnic party of Transylvanian Hungarians since 1989, and UMDSZ, the stronger ethnic party of Transcarpathian Hungarians having a considerable bargaining power in Ukrainian politics between 2008 and 2014, of being opportunistic and too compromising. As a sustained strategy, Orbán’s party tried to push the minority Hungarian elites toward the so-called “autonomist scenario”, by baking KMKSZ in Ukraine and more radical factions inside RMDSZ and the then challenger parties of MPP and EMNP in Romania. Nevertheless, after 2014, the Hungarian kinstate policy has changed its focus and the “autonomist scenario” was effectively neglected by Fidesz.

1.2. A two-dimensional model of MPA: Ethnic bargaining and community organizing

My main argument is that in order to understand properly the effects of Orbán’s kinstate policy we need a more complex and sociologically grounded concept of MPA compared to the one used by the IR scholars. The latter usually focus on minority claims as they appear in public declarations and formal political programs. At this programmatic level, autonomy (perceived as a rather radical demand by majority political actors) plays an important role. Autonomy claims were even called the Holy Grail of Transylvanian Hungarian politics (Kiss–Toró–Székely 2018: 138). This objective was present in RMDSZ programs since the early 1990s and it returned to the political agenda following 2003, in the context of intra-ethnic split and political competition. In more concrete terms, different political organizations representing Transylvanian Hungarians have elaborated no less than 16 autonomy plans during the last 30 years, RMDSZ being the main actor in the drafting process during the mid-1990s
and, after 2003, its challenger parties (Salat–Székely–Lakatos 2021). Among Romanian political actors, however, a broad consensus has been kept that Hungarian autonomy claims are not desirable and constitute a symbolic red line in minority protection endangering the unitary character of the Romanian nation state. This consensus has been renewed periodically through several Hungarian-related political scandals, the last one being the infamous April 19, 2020 speech of president Klaus Iohannis alarming of Hungarian irredentism on the occasion of tacit adoption of one of the autonomy-plans drafted by Hungarian political organizations (Kiss–Toró–Jakab 2021).

In Transcarpathia autonomy claims took an even more concrete and elaborated form. On December 1, 1991, simultaneously with Ukraine’s referendum for independence, two additional referenda were held. One at the level of Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia oblast) for a multi-ethnic administrative autonomy initiated by (dominantly Rusyn/Ukrainian) regional elites and one at the level of Berehove/Beregszász raion, where a Hungarian Autonomous District was proposed (Stroschein 2012). To understand the context of these referenda, the Soviet legacy of ethnic relations and territorialized language rights should be taken into account. The “Soviet order of things” (Hirsch 2004) was radically different from the contemporary nationalizing institutional order and it was based on a multi-level hierarchy of various nationalities (Gorenburg 2003). Russians were at the top of the hierarchy, their mother tongue being the de facto language of administration, it served as a lingua franca, and was taught compulsorily throughout the Soviet Union. At the next level were titular nations having their own republics, including the right to leave the Union. Within the republics, Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs (districts) could be established, serving also as territorial bases of linguistic rights for smaller nationalities. Several other nationalities, among them Hungarians, did not have autonomous territories and, consequently, they could use their native language only in informal settings and inside minority institutions. The Berehove/Beregszász raion referendum, aimed at the creation of an autonomous okrug having many pairs throughout the Soviet Union and was not necessary seen by majority group members as a radical ethnic claim. This was shown by the fact that 81 percent of the raion, among them many non-Hungarians, backed the initiative that was not conductive to interethnic tension in the region (Solchanyc 1994). Nevertheless, the results of the two autonomy referenda have never been implemented and in the discursive and
institutional order of the newly created increasingly nationalizing state autonomy claims (ruled out in 1996) represented an intolerably radical ethnic claim.

The failure of Hungarian autonomy movement in Romania and Ukraine meant that MPA could not be institutionalized at macro-level, as a constitutionally or legally granted form of ethnic power sharing. This has not mean, however, that minority Hungarian elites have lost their capacity to act collectively. In the context of Romanian and Ukrainian minority policies a two-dimensional MPA has evolved, having its components in (1) community organizing (ethnic boundary maintenance, reproduction of groupness) through a dense and strong net of formal meso-level minority institutions; (2) political claim raised through ethnic parties and sustaining an often informal and *ad hoc* political bargaining with majority political actors.

Figure 1. Dimensions of MPA and increasing institutional parallelism of Hungarian minority communities in Romania and Ukraine

My model of two-dimensional MPA is similar to the dual task performed by elites of different societal pillars in consociational democracies. According to the literature (Lijhart 1968; 1977; Tsebelis 1990), they have to balance between two principles. One the one hand, they have to organize their followers in an intra-ethnic (or intra-pillar) institutional arena, while on the other hand they have to bargain and compromise with elites of other societal segments in an inter-ethnic (or inter-pillar) political arena. Differences lie in the fact that in consociational democracies financing of minority institutions and decision-making competences of minority
elites are underpinned by segmental autonomy, while rules of political bargaining are constitutionally regulated. This is however, not the case of Romania and Ukraine. Firstly, there is no rule of proportionality in financing of minority institutions, consequently, minority institutions are severely underfinanced. Secondly, minority elites do not have strong formal decision-making competences in state-financed segments of minority institutions (most importantly the educational system), but they should navigate in a centralized institutional structure. Thirdly, terms of political bargaining depend on actual and ad hoc political settings and, consequently are highly unstable.

I argue that by using this two-dimensional concept of MPA one might go beyond security approaches connected to the IR framework. Firstly, community organizing constitutes a less visible aspect of MPA. Establishing, maintaining, and governing minority institutions ranging from schools to churches, mass-media organs, cultural and charity organizations often fall under the radar of security-oriented analysts. Certainly, this is not always the case and it depends also on minority policies of the resident countries of minorities. For instance, in case of Russophone minorities in the Baltic states (especially in Latvia) there is an ongoing political debate about Russian “soft-power”, meaning gaining geopolitical leverage through cultural and other (seemingly) non-political activities. This debate puts (often automatically) Russian language schools, the Russian Orthodox Church and minority NGOs into a security framework (Schulze 2021). In Romania and in Ukraine (at least prior to 2014), however, minority policies were more permissive to meso-level minority organizations and their very existence was rarely interpreted as a security concern. I will try to show that the effects of Orbán’s kinstate policy are the most obvious at this meso-level of minority institutions. Institutional meso-level is important to understand both continuities and changes of MPA. As for continuities, the notion of institutionally sustained ethnic parallelism is of central importance (see Kiss–Kiss 2018). As a primary definition, this is an implicit political program of Hungarian minority elites who, lacking any form of ethnic power sharing, they perform MPA through meso-level minority institutions and aim at organizing different societal domains (education, politics, cultural consumption, social care, leisure time activities, etc.) through linguistically separate institutions. These institutions provide a framework for the reproduction of ‘groupness’ and play a crucial role in boundary maintenance. After 2014, the Hungarian kinstate policies abandoned (tacitly) the “autonomist
scenario” and turned toward strengthening minority institutions. This was in line with existing (implicit) strategies of minority elites who had already abandoned autonomy claims in the mid-1990s and turned toward the dualistic form of MPA we discuss now. Thus, Hungary’s new focus on meso-level institutions has led to the “deepening” and “widening” of the already existing ethnic parallelism in both Romania and Ukraine. Nevertheless, next to this obvious layer of continuity, a new direction of institutional processes has also followed. Namely, as a side effect of increasing kinstate subsidies, minority institutions and elites became increasingly incorporated into the semi-autocratic mono-pyramidal rule of Orbán (Hale 2014; Vangelov 2018). Models of incorporation differ in Ukraine and Romania, but as we will see kinstate leverage reduced in both cases intra-ethnic pluralism, led to growing ideological uniformity and conformity and, ultimately, harmed collective capacities of minority elites to maintain independent MPA.

Secondly, I argue that neither ethnic claim making nor bargaining aspects of MPA can be properly understood by focusing solely on explicit and visible programmatic elements. Political elites do not only elaborate programs but also distribute resources. Modern party politics in general (Aldrich 1995; Kitschelt 2001) and ethnic politics in particular (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Laitin–Van der Veen 2012) are equally about programmatic aspects and resource allocation. Following the regime change, both Romania and Ukraine took cautious steps toward minority accommodation even if none of them guaranteed formal ethnic power sharing for minority elites. Next to allowing for meso-level minority institutions, support for ethnic party formation has become an important pluralist characteristic of Romanian and Ukrainian minority policies. Ethnic parties were recognized as legitimate representatives of minority communities (Biró-Pallai 2012) and empowered by both legislative (favorable electoral laws) and informal political (sustained bargaining) elements during the 1990s. In the emerging model of minority accommodation segmental autonomy was substituted by meso-level minority institutions, while elite bargaining has become ad hoc political and highly informal. Actually, ethnic parties gained a quasi-monopoly in redistribution of state funds allocated for minority institutions and minority inhabited areas leading to rather particularistic ways of doing politics. In other words, minority elites became included into post-socialist power-pyramid through ethnically segmented networks of patronage.
Before 2010, programmatic moderation was an obvious consequence of this incorporation. In Romania, demands for autonomy were pushed into the background already in 1996, when RMDSZ fielded a candidate of its own for presidency in the person of György Frunda, while in its 2000 electoral program there was no reference to it. This strategy of RMDSZ leadership deepened intra-ethnic division. The so-called moderates (who were busy with governmental and administrative work and controlled the resources that could be channeled to the community) succeeded in consolidating their majority within the organization. In the meantime, the “radicals” (who advocated a more intransigent position and wished to define clear conditions for the participation of RMDSZ in power) accused the former of excluding a considerable part of the organization from decision-making. In 2003, an internal opposition grouping around László Tőkés has left the party. In Ukraine there was a split between KMKSZ and UMDSZ already in the early 1990s, with KMKSZ having a more intransigent position and a stress on autonomy demands, while UMDSZ being far better embedded into the Ukrainian political field and more compromising. Erin Jenne’s (2007) model of ethnic bargaining focusing on kinstate’s effect on programmatic moderation and radicalization might be relevant at this level. Nevertheless, I argue that, especially after 2014, Hungary’s growing leverage should be interpreted as a reconfiguration of networks of political patronage in a context where – for different reasons in Romanian and in Ukraine – the capacity of minority elites to mobilize domestic public resources has decreased considerably.

2. Hungarian Kinstate Policies before and after 2010

As it is well-known, Hungary lost two thirds of its territories and one third of its Hungarian speaking population following World War I, as a consequence of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Border changes transformed suddenly Hungarians into a divided nation (O’Leary–McGarry 2013), while territorial revision has become the most important goal during the interwar period. In the state socialism period, however, Hungarian authorities not only renounced to territorial claims, but also fostered a redefinition of the Hungarian nation, which would include only the resident population of the country (Ludanyi 1995). Meanwhile, a routinization of the new state borders has begun (Örkény–Csepeli 1996) and during the 1970s a slight majority of native Hungarians did not consider minority Hungarians as part of the Hungarian nation (Lázár 2013).
2.1. Kinstate policy before 2010

Kinstate policy remained a rather controversial issue in Hungary between 1989 and 2010. A summary of the opposing views of left- and right-wing actors is useful in this regard, even if some readers might (rightly) find my description too schematic and not nuanced enough. Three general points of disagreement might be highlighted: (1) opposing definitions of the Hungarian nation; (2) disagreement concerning the subsidy policies for minority communities; and (3) different positions toward emerging models of minority incorporation in the neighboring states and, especially, moderate elite factions compromising with majority actors.

(1) Both right- and left-wing political actors strived to redefine the Hungarian nation following 1989. Without entering into details, it is suffice to say that while right-wing parties have been interested in “virtual” national reunification, to use Csergő and Goldgeier’s (2004) wording, left-liberals have been attracted by a rather pure form of civic nationalism, namely constitutional patriotism, modelled on German ideas. Clashes with the so-called Status Law in 2001 (Kántor et al. 2004) and external citizenship in 2004 (Csergő 2005; Saidemen and Ayres 2008: 120–123; Waterbury 2010: 123–128) are relatively well documented. Debates ended after the electoral collapse of the left-liberal block in 2010, when the new parliament – controlled by a two-thirds majority of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz – modified the law on citizenship and made possible for former Hungarian citizens and their descendants to obtain Hungarian citizenship without having residency in Hungary. The electoral collapse of the left-liberal block was certainly not caused primarily by debates concerning the status of transborder Hungarians. However, it put a definitive end to the expectations that constitutional patriotism might become a mainstream national discourse in Hungary and has led to the institutionalization of trans-sovereign nation building (Kántor 2014).

(2) Subsidy policies constituted another controversial issue. To put it simply, according to left-wing actors minority institutions should have been financed by the states of residence of minority communities, while right-wing actors were ready to initiate and finance institutional processes. In the vision of left-wing actors, Hungarian kinstate support might have a supplementary role only, while right-wing actors argued that minority institutions should be sustained and strengthened by kinstate subsidies. Before 2010, especially under left-wing governments, the left-wing concept of kinstate subsidies was dominant and they actually did not
have transformative effects on the structure of minority institutions. Some institutional initiatives of the first Orbán government (between 1998 and 2002), such as establishing Sapientia University in Romania and the Ferenc Rákóczi II College in Ukraine represent important exceptions.

(3) As a third point of disagreement, left- and right-wing actors took different positions toward the evolving models of minority accommodation in neighboring countries. Left-liberals – even if they did not deny the existence of a culturally defined Hungarian nation – thought that minority Hungarians should be part first of all of the political communities of their countries of residence. Consequently, as a rule, they backed attempts of Hungarian minority elites to integrate into the political field and power structures of the neighboring states. Right-wing actors took a contrary position, opposed governmental participation and coalescence with majority actors without receiving constitutional guarantees of ethnic power sharing. This meant practically that, at least before 2010, the Hungarian right-wing proved to be a long-term opponent of moderate elite factions compromising with majority actors and tried to push toward the so-called “autonomist scenario”.

2.2. Renewed kinstate policies after 2010: Human resource management and institutional incorporation

After 2010, however, important changes have occurred in kinstate policy. In its 2013 speech in Bâile Tușnad/Tusnádfürdő, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán phrased the essence of the program of ‘virtual’ national reunification following 2010. In this new concept minority Hungarians constituted a human resource for Hungary that should be the subject of the national human resource-management developed by a Budapest-centered regime:

[…] The 20th century turned Hungary into a dispersed nation […]. The question is how is it possible now to turn the dispersion into a strong World-nation [világnemzet] As it is now, the linkage between Hungarians cannot be created on a territorial base, but it should be created through the bonds of citizenship. Only through citizenship it is possible to synchronize the strengths of all Hungarians. Dual citizenship is an indispensable part of governmental policies aiming at sovereignty over our resources. [Hungarians living beyond the borders of Hungary] should be part of a system providing them with resources. Kinstate policy helps Hungarians to maintain their identity and to flourish in their native lands, to learn in
their mother tongue from kindergarten to university degree. But it is also an integral part of our national pursuits, of our economic policy. This is how Hungary will be able to transform itself from a dispersed nation into a strong nation.

This kind of reunification was based on individual-bureaucratic linkages between the Hungarian state and members of the Hungarian community on the one hand, and linkages with minority institutions, on the other. The 2010 modification of the 1993 Law on Citizenship\textsuperscript{12} offering non-resident citizenship for Hungarians living abroad was only one step in establishing personal individual-bureaucratic linkages. The 203/2011 Electoral Law\textsuperscript{13} enfranchised non-resident citizens, allowing them to vote on party lists at national elections. Subsidies targeting individuals were also strengthened. This latter category was the most important in Ukraine where teachers, medical-care personnel and other professional categories have been targeted.

Institutional meso-level has become even more important. According to Zoltán Kántor (2014: 261-262), director of the Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad (NPKI): “Short-term goal of kinstate policy is community building. The borders of the Hungarian nation are identical with the area of operation of minority institutions […] Kinstate policy focuses on areas where a dense and well-functioning net of institutions makes possible for Hungarians to be in contact with the Hungarian language, culture, and community throughout their life”. It was in the context of this new meso-level focus (e.g., initiating institutional programs instead of investing in an autonomy movement) that Hungary increased considerably institutional subsidies in such domains as sports or, arguably, also economy. Additionally, political leverage of Hungary has also increased. As already mentioned, before 2010 Hungarian elites were integrated into the political field through mechanism of a (ad hoc and often quite informal) political bargaining. In this system majority actors controlled to a great extent political processes inside the minority field, while Hungarian leverage was relatively marginal. Following 2010 – due to internal political developments that we will discuss below – and to increased Hungarian subsidies, ethnic minority parties became increasingly influenced by the Orbán government.
2.3. Kinstate subsidies after 2010

It is impossible to summarize quantitatively all forms of kinstate subsidies, nevertheless, concerning budgetary funds, closing accounts of the previous fiscal years\textsuperscript{14} are considered to be the most reliable source (Bányai 2020). These documents, contrary to laws on state budgets of the upcoming years, do not refer to planned but to incurred spendings. For the period between 2015 and 2020, there are separate tables at the end of the main volumes\textsuperscript{15} of closing accounts, summarizing spendings targeting Hungarian minorities abroad broken down by public bodies (ministries and other public institutions) administering these funds. For the period between 2010 and 2015, I relied on Bányai (2020) who, based on key-word search, carried out an analysis of both main volumes and annexes of closing accounts.

Figure 2. Budgetary funds allocated for minority Hungarian communities and kinstate policy between 2010 and 2020 (total amount in million euro)\textsuperscript{16}

Source: http://kfib.hu/hu/torvenyek-zarszamadasok

According to final accounts, kinstate subsidies have increased considerably in two consecutive waves: (1) during the third (2014-2018) and (2) during the fourth (2018-2022) Orbán government. Annual average of kinstate spending was 82 million euros during Orbán’s second mandate,
269 million euros during his third one, and 572 million euros during the first three years of his fourth mandate, reaching the huge amount of 862 million in 2020. Closing accounts of the 2021 fiscal year were not available in July 2022 when I carried out my analysis, but most probably kinstate spendings have decreased considerably compared to the previous year.

Figure 3. Budgetary funds allocated for minority Hungarian communities and kinstate policy by ministries, 2010 and 2020 (amount in euro)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Justice (Justice)</th>
<th>37.5</th>
<th>43.7</th>
<th>8.3</th>
<th>19.4</th>
<th>0.2</th>
<th>0.1</th>
<th>0.1</th>
<th>0.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Human Capacities (EMMI)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet (PM’s Office)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ForAff)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlen Gábor Fund (BGA)</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>203.5</td>
<td>252.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://kfib.hu/hu/torvenyek-zarszamadasok
* Not all public bodies distributing funds for Hungarians abroad were marked.

Ministries and other public bodies administering kinstate funds have also changed over time. Currently, the two most important channels are Bethlen Gábor Fund (Bethlen Gábor Alap or BGA in Hungarian) distributing 408 million and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributing 356 million euros in 2020 (see Figure 3). Next to them, the Prime Minister’s Office also disposes over a significant amount of 54 million euros.17

In case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, economic subsidies constituted the most significant payments. This project has been launched in 2016, when small scale farms and businesses were supported first in Vojvodina (Serbia) and Transcarpathia. This type of subsidy was extended to a different region of Romania following 2018.18 Calls targeting large-
and medium-level enterprises were launched in 2019 in Romania and in 2020 in Ukraine. Data concerning the subsidies distributed in 2019 are partially available. According to the available documents 75 million euros were distributed between 66 large- and medium-scale enterprises in Covasna/Kovászna, Harghita/Hargita and Mureș/Maros counties, the subsidies ranging between 220,000 and 5.5 million euros. As one can notice (see Figure 3), economic subsidies have increased considerably in 2020, reaching 355 million euros. This amount however has not been entirely handled out for minority Hungarian enterprises, but transborder expansion of Hungarian firms was also financed.

As for the entire period, Bethlen Gábor Fund (BGA) was the channel disbursing most of the subsidies, especially in the case of finances targeting minority NGOs. In 2020, 48 percent of all budgetary payments flow through it. BGA was established in 2010, after Homeland Fund (Szülőföld Alap) founded by the previous socialist government was abolished. Beginning with 2012, it channeled around two thirds of all kinstate policy related payments. The proportion of payments running through BGA was constantly decreasing since 2016 due to the emphasis on economic subsidies administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In case of BGA, three types of spendings can be distinguished: individual subsidies, open calls for minority institutions, and the so-called unique requests (egyedi támogatási kérelem) that are available only for invited applicants.

At the beginning of the analyzed period, individual subsidies amounted for more than a half of the total payments distributed by BGA. This was due mostly to so-called Educational Allowances (Oktatási-Nevelési Támogatás) targeting pupils attending Hungarian language schools: a 20,000 Hungarian forints (HUF, then 100 euros) annual amount, introduced by the Socialist-Liberal government in 2004. In the case of Ukraine, educational support was completed by subsidies targeting teachers, medical care personnel, and other categories working in the public sector or minority institutions. In 2020 the total number of beneficiaries was 33,4 thousand (among them more than 8 thousand public employees) in Ukraine and 155 thousand in Romania (see Table 1). This type of subsidies amounted for 5.5 percent of the total budget of BGA. In Ukraine, however, it mattered more: almost one third of BGA payments were spent on individual level subsidies.
Table 1. Individual subsidies channeled by Bethlen Gábor Fund targeting Hungarians in Romania and Ukraine in 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority community</th>
<th>Targeted category</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
<th>Amount (euro)</th>
<th>Annual per capita amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians in Ukraine</td>
<td>Children learning in Hungarian language schools</td>
<td>19,077</td>
<td>982,408</td>
<td>51.49701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children attending Hungarian language kindergartens</td>
<td>6,368</td>
<td>503,339</td>
<td>79.04192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teachers in Hungarian language schools</td>
<td>5,044</td>
<td>4,577,246</td>
<td>907.4634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medical-care personnel</td>
<td>2,151</td>
<td>1,504,940</td>
<td>699.6467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auxiliary personnel in Hungarian language schools</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>193,413</td>
<td>572.2283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural organizations</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>93,234</td>
<td>515.1024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>77,515</td>
<td>553.6784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel working in child’s protection</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>526,946</td>
<td>4971.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actors and other personnel in theatres</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>56,437</td>
<td>881.8301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sport trainers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5,749</td>
<td>479.0419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total in Ukraine</td>
<td>33,481</td>
<td>8,521,226</td>
<td>9710.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians in Romania</td>
<td>Children learning in Hungarian language schools &amp; kindergarten</td>
<td>155,076</td>
<td>7,985,950</td>
<td>51.49701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BGA (online available documents issued by BGA Decision-making Committee)\textsuperscript{21}
The overwhelming majority of subsidies targeted minority institutions instead of individuals and “unique requests” constituted the dominant form of distribution: in 2020, 87.6 percent of BGA’s budget was spent this way, for the period between 2012 and 2020 representing 32 to 59 percent of the total budgetary fund spent for kinstate policies.

Unique requests are subsidies targeting minority institutions (dominantly minority NGOs and Hungarian churches, in rare occasions public institutions or firms) that are distributed through calls that are not publicly available. Potential beneficiaries receive a request to apply for BGA funds, then they elaborate the application, and ultimately the Decision-making Committee of BGA takes a verdict about financing. Usually, only successful applicants are notified, those failing to receive financing are not even informed (as they in fact did not submit any publicly available application). In reality, the process of receiving the requests is preceded by intensive lobbying and negotiations, not necessarily through persons formally in charge (State Secretary for Hungarians Abroad, Deputy Prime Minister for Kinstate Policy, and two other members of the Committee), but through various and seemingly random political and institutional actors having certain leverage in Orbán’s kinstate policy:

Before the celebration of the anniversary we met the minister. At that time Zoltán Balogh has led the Ministry [of Human Capacities, having no formal decision-making competence in BGA] and we met him in [a village in the region]. The bishop was also there, as well as [XY] representing the presbyters. We discussed that our church would receive a significant support of around 2 billion forints [6.5 million euro] for the celebration and for the repairing of buildings belonging to us. Then we submitted this great application. We worked out all the details.
(Interview code: Kinstate 24, church representative)

Although “individual requests” are funds not announced publicly, the positive decisions are available on the site of BGA in downloadable PDF documents. During the investigation we\textsuperscript{22} processed all these files and elaborated a (hopefully) exhaustive database of individual requests containing the name of the applicant organization, the amount they received (in HUF) and the destination of the subsidy. Next to this directly available information, we also coded the applicants according to their main social domain of activity, residence, and the larger organizational structure or political interest group they belong to. This last information
proved to be vital in understanding the kinstate policy effects on the internal power structure of minority fields and on how different factions of minority elites became incorporated into Orbán’s mono-pyramidal rule.

3. MPA at Meso-level: Institutionally Sustained Ethnic Parallelism

In order to understand meso-level effects of Orbán’s kinstate policy, the notion of institutionally sustained ethnic parallelism is of key importance. This is well known in the literature of divided societies and it is rather similar to what Lijphart (1977) calls pillars or pillarization. Pillars constitute dense institutional networks, which make possible for group members to live their everyday lives among their “own”, without considering too much the existence of other pillars. Both Transylvanian and Transcarpathian Hungarian cases might be regarded as ones of asymmetric pillarization, where minority institutions are embedded into a larger majority dominated structure. Nevertheless, this minority institutions play a pivotal role in the reproduction of groupness that I perceive as a meso-level phenomenon (Lamont et al 2019). It is inside these institutions where Hungarians are socialized as Hungarians (Brubaker 2009: 210) and without the existence of separate institutional spaces ethnic boundary maintenance vis-à-vis the majority would also be jeopardized (Biró 1998; Bubaker et al. 2006). Consequently, establishing, maintaining, and governing separate meso-level institutional structures should be considered as an important dimension of MPA.

Following the meso-level turn of Hungarian kinstate policies, minority institutions became the most important target of subsidies targeting Hungarians abroad, while institutionally sustained ethnic parallelism was regarded by kinstate actors as a tool of stopping or slowing assimilation. However, one should emphasize (again) that ethnic parallelism, as a political program, was not the invention of the Orbán-regime but a taken-for-granted background of all political programs and community organizing projects of minority Hungarian elites (Lörincz 2008; Kiss and Kiss 2018). Thus, at the level of minority elites, the major source of legitimacy of the post-2010 Hungarian kinstate policy is not the external citizenship, but subsidies that sustain and strengthen minority organizations:
It was fine to say for 100 years that we should hold on, fight and resist. But this cannot be done forever. If being Hungarian is always a disadvantage, if you are always beaten and if you are always going down, it won’t work forever. We cannot be kept like this. It does not work that you are enrolled in a religious school and you live among ruins and you sit between moldy walls. If there is no progress, this should at least be kept at some level. But no one has been able to do this so far, nobody before, not even the previous Fidesz government. They gave a little here, they gave a little there. But that was just like watering with a drop of water in the 40-degree summer heat. We watered the flower a little in the morning, but it was gone by noon. There was no strategic plan, there was no real institution-building. This is the truth! But now there is a political will for it. There was one person who said that this is good and I want to do this. There was money, there was the European Union context. Because this could not have been done in the interwar period. Right? Not even during the 1990s. EU was needed for this. So, I think that this is a groundbreaking shift in the life of Hungarian institutions in Transylvania. Now there is a Hungarian government that says that this is good and I want to support it. Draw your circles, build your institutions, live in them and survive. If you would like to keep Hungarians in this region, you should provide them the opportunity to build their institutions. You can say many things about Viktor Orbán, but he was the only one who recognized this and who did this during the last 100 years. It is another question who got the subsidies and how subsidies were distributed. But we are building 400 Hungarian institutions simultaneously and this is a huge thing. I don’t know if this will happen ever again.

(Interview code: Kinstate 32, RMDSZ leader)

At a programmatic and ideological level, the goal of minority elites was to build up a system of minority institutions covering all social domains, at the level of institutional realities minority Hungarians live their life in a combination of minority governed and majority dominated institutions. There are several social fields where ethnic parallelism and separation are not characteristic and, consequently, encapsulation of the Hungarian minority in its own institutional field is always imperfect. More importantly, the economic sector is basically not ethnically organized either in Transylvania or in Transcarpathia, even if there were some initiatives to strengthen Hungarian business networks or to develop ethnically marked economic sectors (Csata 2018). Nevertheless, several social domains might be identified where minority institutions are dominant, the most important being education, politics, religion, cultural activities,
mass-media, and several domains of social- and health-care. Sports and leisure time activities are also becoming increasingly organized through minority institutions, while in several (especially minority dominated) regions, institutions belonging to local administration might also be regarded as minority-governed. Minority Hungarian institutions are not necessarily defined as such by their constitutive act but they are defined by using Hungarian language in their daily affairs and having Hungarian as a default category inside their institutionally defined spaces.

The sectorial structure and financing of these institutions is also of key importance and in this respect Romania and Ukraine share similar legacies of the socialist state. In Romania, state socialism had rather complex consequences on the Hungarian minority institutions. Post-1989 historiographers tended to emphasize the process of nationalization of church, private and communal proprieties sustaining minority institutions during the interwar period (Bárdi–Kiss 2018). Nevertheless, Hungarians also became a recognized national minority having their state-financed (and obviously state-controlled) minority institutions ranging from media organs, schools and theatres to Hungarian language universities and even the Hungarian Autonomous Province grating some territorially based language rights in the ethnic block area of Székely Land. During the 1970s and the 1980s, Hungarian minority institutions were narrowing, but even in this period they constituted an important base for cultural and elite reproduction (Cercel-Toró-Kiss 2021). In Ukraine, the already mentioned Soviet hierarchy of nationalities was of central importance (Gorenburg 2003). Hungarians were neither titulars having their own republic, nor a nationality having an autonomous territory, but they – similarly to Romania – owned a wide range of meso-level cultural and educational institutions. Given the fact that state-socialist minority policies were based on institutional meso-level, it was obvious that broadening the array of minority institutions has become an implicit program of minority elites in both cases. The emerging structure was a combination of interwar and state-socialist realities with a robust sector of religious institutions and NGOs, completed by publicly financed Hungarian or Hungarian-dominated institutions.

During the left-wing governments, kinstate subsidies might be considered as supplementary and did not have visible impact on the above-mentioned institutional structure. This was not the case, however, during the subsequent Orbán governments. The availability to invest in the minority institutional system and to initiate institutional processes was
revealed already by the first Orbán government, which ruled between 1998 and 2002. As a rather important institutional investment, they established Sapientia University in Romania and Ferenc Rákóczi II College in Ukraine as Hungarian language universities financed exclusively by Hungary.\textsuperscript{24}

Kinstate institutional intervention has advanced, however, to a higher level during the third and fourth Orbán government, when an annual average of 269 million euros, respectively 572 million euros were spent.

Table 2. Budgetary funds allocated for minority institutions in Romania and Ukraine by the social domain of activity of the beneficiaries between 2011-2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social domain of activity of targeted organizations</th>
<th>Romania euro</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Romania %</th>
<th>Ukraine euro</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Ukraine %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious organizations</td>
<td>287,904,678</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>27,775,005</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>179,093,298</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>102,364,776</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>82,371,045</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and secondary education</td>
<td>45,620,775</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>24,934,626</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and arts</td>
<td>44,145,335</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2,977,280</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political organizations</td>
<td>30,602,818</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>14,540,915</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass media</td>
<td>15,257,330</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>530,523</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>11,025,032</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1,717,197</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>6,626,867</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>76,987</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic, social, and community development</td>
<td>4,604,085</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1,124,308</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>729,471</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>72,733</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>449,231</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>43,916</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere, not classified</td>
<td>252,694</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business and professional</td>
<td>232,393</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3,427,297</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>708,915,051</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>182,085,564</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BGA (database of online available documents issued by BGA Decision-making Committee)
According to the database of BGA decisions concerning unique requests, in Transylvania the most important beneficiaries were religious organizations (40.6 percent of the total amount), among them the Transylvanian Bishopric of the Hungarian Reformed Church (Erdélyi Református Püspökség with 191.7 million euros), the Crișana Bishopric of the Hungarian Reformed Church (Királyhágómelléki Református Püspökség with 18.6 million euros), the Oradea/Nagyvárad and Satu Mare/Szatmárnémeti Bishoprics of the Roman Catholic Church (with 14.7 and 11.7 million euros, respectively), the Lutheran-Evangelic Church (Romániai Luteránus Evangélikus Egyház with 7.4 million euros), the Alba Iulia/Gyulafehérvár Archepiscopal of the Roman Catholic Church (Gyulafehérvári Római Katolikus Írénéség, with 5.7 million) and the Hungarian Unitarian Church (with 4.6 million euros). 25.3 percent of the subsidies were spent in higher education, Sapientia Hungarian University in Transylvania receiving 164 million euros, while Studium Prospero Foundation, an NGO backing the University of Medicine in Târgu Mureș/Marosvásárhely receiving 10.1 million euros. It should be emphasized that NGOs backing tertiary education at Babeș-Bolyai University, which comprises by far more students and professors teaching in Hungarian than Sapientia or the University of Medicine, have received the incomparably smaller amount of 0.6 million euros divided among twelve organizations. Different sport clubs and academies received 11.6 percent of the total amount, the most important among them being Seppsi OSK25 (with 30.1 million euros), Csíkszereda FC26 (with 30.1 million euros) and Mens Sana Foundation27 (with 18.8 million). Among the beneficiaries of more than 10 million euros there are the Association of Hungarian Teachers of Romania (RMPSZ28 with 29.1 million), which administers the Educational Allowance targeting families with children enrolled in Hungarian language schools;29 the School Foundation (Iskola Alapítvány with 24.7 million), an NGO run by RMDSZ; Transylvanian Mediascape Foundation (Erdélyi Médiatér Alapítvány with 14.9 million), a media-consortium running several Hungarian language news portals, local and regional radios. Between 2011 and 2021 a total number of 642 minority organizations were supported financially through BGA, with 56 of them receiving more than 1 million euro.

In Transcarpathia 58 percent of the subsidies were spent for higher education, The Ferenc Rákóczi II Hungarian College in Berehove/Beregszász (and its charity foundation) being the most important beneficiary, with 101.6 million received between 2011 and 2021. It was followed by religious institutions (15.3 percent), the Hungarian Reformed Church being granted 16.9 million, the Mukacheve/Munkács Diocese of
the Roman Catholic Church 5,9, the Berehove/Beregyszász District of the Muchaceve/Munkács Diocese of the Greek Catholic Church 2 million euros. As for primary and secondary education, there were church-run schools like Sztójка Sándor Greek Catholic Lyceum in Karachin/Karácshalva or the Reformed Lyceum in Velyka Dobron/Nagydobrony. In addition to these organizations, the Charity Foundation of KMKSZ (13,5 million euros) and the Association of Hungarian Teachers of Transcarpathia (14,1 million) should be mentioned.

It should be mentioned that Table 2 does not contain economic subsidies administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hungary and distributed by Pro Economica Foundation in Romania and Egán Ede Foundation in Ukraine. As already mentioned, economic subsidies were launched in 2016 and reached 355 million euro in 2020.

Kinsate subsidies altered significantly MPA and the structure of the minority field. One might distinguish between three types of consequences: (1) deepening vertically; (2) broadening or expanding horizontally the ethnic parallelism; and (3) restructuring the minority field.

Interventions deepening (vertically) the ethnic parallelism target social domains that were previously organized through (ethnically separate) minority institutions. In this case kinsate subsidies increase the proportion of minority group members connected to minority institutions and/or push toward formal-organizational separation of minority and majority structures. Educational projects and investments in educational infrastructure represent this type of intervention. Beginning with 2015, which was declared the “Year of Hungarian Vocational Training”, massive investments aimed short-term professional education. This was especially important in Transylvania, where, from a perspective of native language education, the situation was quite unfavorable in this domain. During the 1980s and the 1990s, only a tiny minority of Hungarian students could study in the vernacular, due to restrictive educational policies. Since 2000, the situation has somehow improved, but outside the Hungarian majority area of Székely Land the majority of Hungarian pupils were educated in Romanian language. An even more massive investment was the so-called Kindergarten Program. Targeting pre-primary education, it was launched in 2016. The goal was to build 77 new Hungarian language kindergartens and to refurbish other 200. These kindergartens are overwhelmingly arranged in separate organizational structures under the administration of Hungarian Churches.
Interventions *broadening or extending horizontally the ethnic parallelism* aim to establish ethnically integrated institutions in domains where formerly they did not exist or they did not dominate. Attempts of Orbán’s kinstate policy to extend social domains where ethnic parallelism dominates are rather obvious. Economy and sports are the strategic spheres and the most visible examples. Economic subsidies were discussed earlier. According to Csata (2018: 348), strategic documents elaborated by kinstate actors often envision an ethnically separated enclave economy that might underpin the autonomous organization of Transylvanian Hungarians. Sport is considered by the Orbán regime as a major tool of nation-building and the obtaining of political legitimacy. This became explicit in the case of sport investments in Transylvania.

Hungary is the terrain of huge and often contested bids for sports infrastructure (Bozóki 2016). It is not accidental that minority Hungarian communities, among them those from Romania are also envisaged by such investments. As a consequence of these investments both mass- and professional sports might be regarded as relatively new domains of ethnic parallelism.

Figure 4. BGA subsidies targeting sport clubs and academies (million euros)

Source: BGA (database of online available documents issued by BGA Decision-making Committee)
4. Different Models of Incorporation: The Structure of the Minority Field, Path Dependency and Bargaining Capacities

Kinsate subsidies and the growing leverage of the Orbán government not only “deepens” and “broadens” institutionally sustained parallelism, but it also reshapes internal power structures inside the minority field, as well as it incorporates minority institutions into Hungary’s mono-pyramidal rule. Nevertheless, models of incorporating Hungarian minorities differ in Romania and Ukraine, a fact that has been revealed by both quantitative data on kinstate subsidies and qualitative interviews. In Ukraine a kind of intra-ethnic authoritarianism structured around KMKSZ and its leader, László Brenzovics, has evolved and substituted the previously bipolar institutional structure split between KMKSZ and UMDSZ. In Romania the minority field has remained more fragmented, none of the political poles being capable to dominate institutions across different social domains. In what follows, I will first describe these differences, as they appear in quantitative data, and then I will argue that differences are due to three factors. Firstly, there are differences between the internal organization of minority fields in Romania and Ukraine. In Ukraine various social domains are more interlocking at personal level and, consequently, direct political control was always far tighter. Among Transylvanian Hungarians institutional and elite structures are more fragmented and intensive intra-ethnic pillarization was characteristic already before 2010, RMDSZ being less able (and perhaps willing) to control all minority organizations. Secondly, path-dependency of Fidesz’s relations toward different minority organizations, especially those toward political organizations matters. As already mentioned, previously Fidesz used to be mistrustful to elite factions perceived as being too compromising with majority actors, among them UMDSZ and RMDSZ. Although such programmatic disagreements have lost their magnitude and there was a rapprochement between Fidesz and RMDSZ (and to a lesser extent UMDSZ), former alliances mattered and Fidesz remained more enthusiastic toward KMKSZ, as its long-term ally than to RMDSZ, as a newcomer in its orbit. Thirdly, bargaining capacities of minority organizations and resources received form states of residence have also mattered. Hungarian political organizations in Ukraine have lost almost all of their bargaining capacity in this country under the circumstances of increased securitization after 2014, while minority organizations were much more underfinanced compared to Romania. Bargaining capacities of RMDSZ has also weakened considerably after
2014, due to anti-corruption agenda, but they were largely reinserted in 2020, as RMDSZ gained formal governmental positions. Moreover, in Romania large segments of minority institutions are financed by the state, such as public education, Hungarian language education in state-run universities, public media, and a large array of cultural institutions. Neither public nor EU funds accessible through institutional structures of the residence state are negligible, thus Hungary’s capacities to incorporate minority institutions become limited.

4.1. Institutional blocks and superstructures

As already mentioned, I coded minority organizations receiving subsidies by their belonging to different institutional supra-structures or political networks. In Transcarpathia I identified five political-institutional superstructures, namely the KMKSZ-Berehove College block, the UMDSZ-Uzhgorod University block and the institutional structures of the Hungarian Reformed, Roman Catholic and the Greek Catholic Churches.

Figure 5. Subsidies targeting Transcarpathia by the political/institutional affiliation of the recipients

Source: BGA (database of online available documents issued by BGA Decision-making Committee)
Crucially, Ferenc Rákóczi II Hungarian College in Berehove should be considered as a KMKSZ stronghold. It was founded and run by the Foundation for Hungarian College in Transcarpathia (Kárpátaljai Magyar Főiskoláért Alapítvány) whose president is László Brenzovics. There is an obvious overlap between the professors and the students of the college and those being members of KMKSZ:

Studying at the college and working in KMDSZ went in parallel. The College was established by KMKSZ, so we helped KMKSZ regularly. During the electoral campaigns we displayed the placards and went door-to-door. They asked and we did it with pleasure. Campaigning was fun for us. Many of us get close to the organization. If they needed help, we went willingly. We helped them also in organizing events. We, meaning the Students’ Union of the college. When we graduated, the KMKSZ leadership suggested to establish a youth organization of KMKSZ. A whole team graduated at the same time: András Mester, Erzsébet Szvetkó, Andrea Bocskor [today Fidesz MP at EP, representing Hungarians in Ukraine], Karolina Darcsi. But upcoming generations also joined KMKSZ

(In Interview Code: Kinstate 8, lecturer and KMKSZ activist)

Institutions belonging to KMKSZ-Berehove College block received 74,6 percent of subsidies running through BGA. This is completed by economic subsidies distributed by Egán Ede Foundation that is also (obviously) in the orbit of KMKSZ.

Minority institutions belonging to the rival UMDSZ–Uzhgorod University block received incomparably fewer funds. After 2014, some more resources were allocated for this block, including NGOs supporting tertiary education (of Hungarians) at Uzhgorod University. Nevertheless, the resource allocation for UMDSZ remained rather limited.

Churches should be considered separate institutional blocks that are not controlled by politics, even if there were attempts in this regard and an interlocking between churches and political organizations would facilitate such a development. Actually, churches became more independent from politics during the post-2010 period, partially due to Hungarian subsidies. Churches play a central role in the educational system, as a significant part of kindergartens built or refurbished by the Hungarian state are administered by them. A similar situation is that of several schools, especially in tertiary education.
Extra-block subsidies targeting organizations beyond direct political control count for only 3 percent of the total amount, Illyés Gyula Hungarian Theatre in Berehove being the most important beneficiary.

All in all, in Transcarpathia, minority organizations active in various social domains are under rather tight political control. This was the case even before 2010, when the split between KMKSZ and UMDSZ has run along the whole system of minority institutions. This situation was similar to what Lijphart wrote about the cohesion of political and social organizations in pillarized societies. According to the founding father of consociational theory, “elites [of pillarized segments] are close-knit groups. Strong cohesion is partly the result of formal connections between the political parties, interest groups, newspapers within each group, but an even more important factor is the pattern of informal intra-block connections formed by interlocking directories of various block organizations” (Lijphart 1969: 59). This informal pattern is strengthened in Transcarpathia by the scarcity of human resources affecting smaller minorities. As a consequence, many minority actors are active in various domains, like research, education, religion, politics, and various organizations, professionalization and differentiation by domains being at a rather low level.

In Transylvania, ethnic parallelism is not at a lower level, but (partially due to the greater number of Hungarians) the differentiation of social domains is much more evaluated. Consequently, some fields, such as higher education, religion or cultural production are less politicized and not under direct control of RMDSZ (or its challengers).
In this instance we identified no less than 14 political/institutional supra-structures or networks. The Reformed Church has received 222.9 million euros (31.4 percent) with all its bishoprics, parishes, and charity organizations included. Sapientia Hungarian University has received 164 million or 23.1 percent of the funds, the Catholic Church 63.9 million or 9 percent, the Evangelic Lutheran Church 7.8 million or 1.1 percent, the Unitarian Church 5 million or 0.7 percent, the Baptists Church 1.4 million or 0.2 percent, the Greek Catholic Church 518 thousand or 0.1 percent. Among the other supra-structures, we already discussed RMPSZ (Hungarian Teachers Association in Romania) and the sport clubs. It should be mentioned that NGOs belonging to the Transylvanian Hungarian aristocracy have received 5.6 million, overwhelmingly during Orbán’s fourth mandate. It is not mere curiosity that an interest-group with growing leverage lobbying – among others – came through Viktor Orbán’s wife, Anikó Lévai.\(^{31}\) Organization that were not (closely) connected to any of the superstructures (some of them having their own patron in Budapest) have received 60.1 million or 8.5 percent of the total amount.

The main difference compared to Ukraine is that organizations connected to the dominant RMDSZ and its challengers (including to the

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### Figure 6. Subsidies targeting Transylvania by the political/institutional affiliation of the recipients

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<td>Other</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMDSZ challenger NGOs</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMDSZ NGOs</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport Clubs</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sapientia University</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>25.5</td>
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**Source:** BGA (database of online available documents issued by BGA Decision-making Committee)
networks of those being active in different RMDSZ challenger factions) received 31.1 million or 4.1 and 24.6 million or 3.5 percent respectively. NGOs belonging to RMDSZ have received an annual average of 33,000 euros during the second Orbán government, Jakabbfy Elemér Foundation (belonging to non-mainstream RMDSZ executive vice-president, István Székely) being the most important beneficiar with an annual amount of 26,000 euro. RMDSZ subsidies have begun to increase only in 2016, when School Foundation (affiliated to RMDSZ top leadership and led by internal circles of RMDSZ president Hunor Kelemen) received 971,000, while Pro Regio Siculorum (belonging to Szântu Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy mayor Árpád-András Antal) received 111,000 euros. Further significant increases followed, reaching an annual average of 6.9 million euros per year in the period of 2018-2021. School Foundation has remained by far the largest beneficiary followed by Eurotrans Foundation (belonging also to top leadership), Pro Regio Siculorum and Center for Public Policies (Közpolitikai Elemző Központ, also connected to top RMDSZ leadership). It should be added that BGA subsidies do not mirror exactly the weight of RMDSZ in resource allocation. Pro Economica, which distributes economic subsidies, is also led by Hunor Kelemen’s close circle, while Eurotrans Foundation, which helps applicants for Hungarian citizenship, received funds from the Prime Minister’s Office.

During the second Orbán government (2010-2014), organizations belonging to the orbit of RMDSZ-challenger factions have received somewhat more, compared to RMDSZ (an annual amount of 89,000 euro), but their share in total subsidies remained under 2 percent until 2018. Subsidies disbursed through BGA were completed with an average amount of 794,000 euro per year received by the PM’s Office to sustain the so-called Democracy Centers helping applicants for Hungarian citizenship. Taken into account also this disbursements RMDSZ-challenger organizations have received far more funding compared to RMDSZ before 2016. BGA subsidies for RMDSZ-challenger organizations have begun to grow consistently only after 2019. The main recipient was Transylvanian Mediascape Foundation (Erdélyi Médiatér Alapítvány) receiving 14,9 million euro between 2019 and 2021. As already mentioned, this is a trust running more than 30 media organs and it is connected to Szilárd Demeter former chief of stuff of László Tőkés.

All in all, Hungarian subsidies mirror a quite different organization of minority field compared to Ukraine. As for political organizations, RMDSZ-challengers received more funds before, compared to RMDSZ
during the second Orbán government and NGO’s within the orbit of RMDSZ were almost completely omitted. After 2015, organizations connected to RMDSZ have been substantially financed, but in certain key areas, such as mass-media, Hungarian subsidies maintained the hegemony of RMDSZ-challenger networks. Moreover, at least in the case of financing run by BGA, the major beneficiaries are not directly connected to or dominated by political organizations. This is partially due to internal organizations in the minority field. Contrary to Ukraine, political elites are not able to dominate all social domains. According to Zoltán Biró (1995: 59) Transylvanian Hungarians could be characterized by a rather strong internal fragmentation and pillarization. Although, due to successful ethno-political mobilization and ethnic block-voting, Transylvanian Hungarians are perceived by outsiders as a homogeneous body, internal division based on religion, ideologies, regional belonging have been strengthened. RMDSZ has never been able to control all domains, not even in the periods when evidently dominated the politics. Actually, the dominant political organization of Hungarians is also rather fragmented, especially along regional lines and top leadership has never been able to exercise hegemonic control over its large territorial organizations. The process of “professionalization”, which took place after 1989, has also increased fragmentation. Different groups of the Transylvanian Hungarian intelligentsia were engaged in building the institutional infrastructure of well-circumscribed disciplines, thus every interest-group having its own terrain and organizational background. The “professionalization” of the political class meant that a split has occurred between the larger strata of ethnic activists running different organizations on the one hand, and political leaders engaged in political bargaining, on the other. The political class, instead of trying to colonize other social domains (as in the case of Hungarians in Ukraine) tried to escape social control and accountability by keeping distance vis-à-vis other domains.
4.2. Path-dependent Hungarian-Hungarian relations: From radical-moderate axis to clientelistic incorporation

Before 2010, the programmatic axis was particularly relevant in the processes of ethnic bargaining and in shaping the dynamics of the intra-ethnic political competition. Consequently, this period fits better to Jenne’s (2007) arguments, focusing on programmatic issues and trying to explain the radicalization and moderation of minority claims through kinstate leverage. As I have previously pointed out, positions toward existing models of minority accommodation differed between left- and right-wing actors of Hungarian kinstate policy. Right-wing actors proved to be opponents of programmatic moderation and participation in the executive power (government in Romania and positions in regional administration in Ukraine) without obtaining formal-legal guarantees of ethnic power sharing.

In Romania the radical-moderate debate remained inside RMDSZ until 2003. During the early- and mid-1990s the party’s explicit program was radicalizing, as autonomy and the model of “self-determination” came to forefront. Nevertheless, actual (often hidden) political strategies of RMDSZ top leadership became already increasingly detached from the formal program. Actually, they preferred negotiations with majority political actors along more tangible and attainable (thus more moderate) policy targets. After 1996, when RMDSZ was for the first time included in the governing coalition, RMDSZ top leadership increased and consolidated its intra-party majority, but the division inside the party has also deepened and the radical-wing around László Tőkés left the party in 2003:
[In early 1990s] in Romanian politics an important decision was taken. There was a dilemma: 100 years after Trianon, or it was only 75 years then, we still have the Hungarians. What to do with them? Anyway, we cannot do what in Yugoslavia or in the Soviet Union has been done. Because of the European perspective: we could not do [what in Yugoslavia has been done] if we wanted to integrate [into the EU]. Two alternatives were left. The first was that we give them the right of solving their own problems. That would mean some kind of autonomy. The second option was that we did not grant them such rights, but we included them into the governing structure and we recognized their political aspirations of taking some decisions regarding issues concerning them. Education is a concrete example. The first option is educational autonomy, meaning that – of course in the framework of the existing legislation – the minority’s representative takes decisions in educational issues. What we have now? In the Ministry of Education we have a State Secretary for education in the languages of the minorities. He is nominated by RMDSZ. What does the State Secretary? He takes decisions regarding the schools of the minorities. What kind of classes will be initiated, how many students will be enrolled in a school or another... So, we do not have the right, but they completely accept that we solve our problems in the framework of the Romanian state apparatus. Well, here came the most important fault line for RMDSZ. Romanian politics made us an offer. I accept you in the government and you will be able to manage your problems through it, but I will not give you any constitutional right to manage them yourself. Now, some people accept this, some people do not. This is a kind of moderate-radical, autonomist fault line. The vast majority of RMDSZ said: at least there is an offer, please. The question was not whether I wanted autonomy or I wanted governing positions. Only one offer was made. We could accept and become part of the government or we could remain in opposition, but without bargaining positions in minority issues. The so-called Tőkés-wing said: no, we need autonomy. But the point is that each public opinion poll showed that people were interested in using the possibilities that had been given. They were interested in using the bargaining capacities of RMDSZ. Education was one of the major issues. They were interested in RMDSZ ensuring a proper system [of Hungarian language education] year by year.

(Interview code: Kinstate 18, RMDSZ leader)

Before 2010, Hungarian right-wing political actors proved to be quite resolute in this debate, they backed internal opposition and the challenger parties at that time, trying to overthrow dominant elites and start a spiral of radicalization. This was why many analysts rightly thought that increasing kinstate leverage would endanger minority accommodation.
Before 2003, RMDSZ remained unimpaired and the clashes between different factions of the Transylvanian Hungarian political class were relatively temperate. However clashes became more visible after 2003. In 2007 Tőkés, once a charismatic leader and perceived as the hero of the Timișoara/Temesvár events of December 1989, ran as an independent candidate in the European parliamentary elections and became member of EP with approximately 36% of the votes cast by Hungarians. His campaign was sponsored by Fidesz and Orbán was personally engaged in the process. MPP was established in 2008, also under the tutelage of Fidesz (then in opposition). This logic was characteristic during the 2010-2014 period, too. After 2010, the subsidy system of the previous center-left governments was radically transformed and RMDSZ was almost completely squeezed out from the new structures. In 2011, the network of Status Offices collecting applications for the so-called Hungarian Cards was abolished, and the administrative apparatus for Educational Allowances was transferred to the Association of Hungarian Teachers of Romania. Both measures constituted important losses for RMDSZ. At the same time, a new network of offices (with a staff of approximately 150) was set up with the purpose of informing and assisting the population in the process of acquiring Hungarian citizenship. However, the new network was entrusted to EMNT, which formally was an NGO, but in reality constituted one of the main pillars of RMDSZ’s opposition and the sister organization of the political party EMNP (founded in 2011, also under the tutelage of Fidesz). Notwithstanding these radical changes in the subsidy policy and the establishment of EMNP, Fidesz was unable to significantly restructure the Transylvanian Hungarian political field. MPP and EMNP, RMDSZ-challenger parties, lost both local and parliamentary elections in 2012. This was probably one of the main factors that led Fidesz to reevaluate its strategy and seek rapprochement to RMDSZ. As a result of this strategy shift, RMDSZ was invited in 2015 to participate in the naturalization process of Transylvanian Hungarians. Furthermore, RMDSZ also entered into electoral cooperation with MPP in 2016 (once again, not unrelated to the developments in Budapest), while the other more radical party, EMNP, had gradually lost the support of the Hungarian capital. The explanations for this rapprochement are manifold, but the most important one is that challenger parties failed to achieve an electoral breakthrough. This also casted doubts on their capacity to mobilize a sufficiently high proportion of the newly enfranchised Transylvanian Hungarian voters in Hungary’s parliamentary election. Romania’s increased interest in
the resumption of harmonious relations with Hungary after a relatively tense period also mattered. Hence, RMDSZ had the potential to act as an intermediary for Romanian mainstream parties.

In Ukraine intra-ethnic party split has occurred earlier. KMKSZ was established under the leadership of Sándor Fodó as early as 1989. It run in parliamentary and local elections in spite of the fact that it was registered as a cultural organization instead of an ethnic party. This was due to electoral legislation, which required parties to have local branches in at least two thirds of Ukraine’s regions (oblast), while Hungarians in Ukraine were heavily concentrated in one oblast, namely Transcarpathia. UMDSZ was also initiated by Sándor Fodó in 1991, as a political party that would act in parallel (but in close cooperation) with KMKSZ. In order to cover enough regions, it was established as an umbrella organization of KMKSZ and several (obviously incomparably smaller) Hungarian regional cultural organizations, like those of Kyiv, Lviv, Harkiv etc. Immediately after its establishment, UMDSZ, as the nationwide organization of Hungarians, played legally only a formal role and KMKSZ remained their real political organization. The importance of UMDSZ increased after an intra-organizational split within KMKSZ. In 1992 and 1993, many of its leaders were pushed out or left the organization due to disagreements with Sándor Fodó. In 1994, former KMKSZ vice president Mihály Tóth won a parliamentary seat in the Hungarian majority Berehove/Beregszász district. Tóth became UMDSZ president in 1996, while UMDSZ representatives held relatively powerful positions in local administration and the public sphere. UMDSZ gradually became far better embedded in the politics and administrative structure of Ukraine compared to KMKSZ. This resembled the situation in Romania, where “moderates” were acting in Bucharest, while radicals were connected to local minority organizations, but without embeddedness and leverage in the Romanian political field. Fidesz has become an ally of KMKSZ already at an early stage, in the 1990s, and preferred this organization during its first mandate between 1998 and 2002. As the interviews reveal, this was not the case during the Socialist-Liberal governments in Hungary, when institutions connected to UMDSZ administered applications for Educational Allowances and Hungarian Cards (Magyar Igazolvány) introduced by the infamous Status Law in 2021. Following 2010, among its first moves, Fidesz took the administration of Educational Allowances and Hungarian cards from UMDSZ and gave them to KMKSZ. In helping applicants for Hungarian
citizenship none of the political organizations were involved, as dual citizenship was (at least theoretically) illegal in Ukraine.

5. Conclusions

Both securitization and radicalization hypotheses presume that the bargaining capacities of minority elites might decrease. This actually has happened in both cases, but not as a consequence of securitization or radicalization triggered by kinstate actors. After 2014, Hungarian kinstate actors actually ceased to push toward the “autonomist scenario” and, actually, have become far less interested in programmatic aspects of ethnic bargaining. At the level of political elites this has led to a cooptation of minority actors into the political patronage networks encompassing public institutions in Hungary. Three concepts (or phenomena) should be mentioned in this context: (1) material outbidding; (2) loyalty competition; and (3) the cross-border mobility and political carrier possibilities for (both higher and lower rank) minority Hungarian cadres in Hungary. These elements might potentially profoundly reshape both the power structures of the minority field and the structure of bargaining between minority and majority actors.

A patronage regime politics is less about programmatic issues and more about resource allocation and (particular) modes of policy implementation, while political influence depends on the configuration of patronage networks (Chandra 2004). Beginning with the mid-1990s, Transylvanian Hungarian elites were integrated into the Romanian political field resembling such a patronage regime. Consequently, both their legitimacy toward the Hungarian community and their accommodation toward the majority depended on their monopoly in resource allocation for minority institutions and Hungarian inhabited regions. As far as resources available through bargaining with Romanian actors exceeded by large those offered by the kinstate, the influence of the latter remained marginal. However, after 2014 this trend is no more evident. Kinstate subsidies have increased considerably, while the resource allocation capacity of RMDSZ (through bargaining with majority actors) decreased drastically. Kinstate subsidies cannot be perceived more as supplementary, as they initiate and alter institutional processes and have become the main promotors of ethnic parallelism. From this perspective, one might argue that, instead
of (programmatic) ethnic outbidding, kinstate actors seek for influence through material outbidding.

Loyalty competition is a structural characteristic of both the networks of patronage in Hungary and the processes of bargaining between kinstate and minority actors. In this regard, an important difference between majority and minority bargaining should be remarked. As mentioned before, the minority accommodation in Romania was preconditioned by the recognition of RMDSZ as a legitimate representative of the minority community and its formal leadership in the quality of the sole bargaining partner. This is no more the case in bargaining with kinstate actors, where RMDSZ leadership does not have any monopoly.

Loyalty competition takes place at certain levels. Due to the duplication of offices and the division of authority, kinstate actors compete among themselves. At the same time, minority actors compete for resources. Their success depends on the nature of their linkages toward kinstate actors and on the position of their patrons in the structure presented above.

Another important new development is that boundaries between the minority and kinstate political fields have become more diffuse and permeable. This also means that political carrier opportunities in Hungary have become open for higher and lower rank minority political actors. The most obvious examples are Jenő Szász and László Tökés. The former became president of the Research Institute for National Strategy, while the latter was elected EP deputy on the list of Fidesz. Observers took for granted that these prominent figures of the intra-ethnic opposition were “removed” from the minority political field due to the rapprochement between RMDSZ and Fidesz. This might be true; however, these developments marked a more important phenomenon, namely the “trans-nationalization” of political carriers. The process has gained a new momentum following the 2018 elections, when several rather important cultural institutions in Hungary, considered too liberal and not loyal enough, were disciplined through Transylvanian Hungarian cadres.\(^{32}\) This permeability of the minority and kinstate political fields and possible carrier opportunities in Hungary may profoundly alter the horizon of minority political actors and might be conducting to the integration of minority elites into the Regime of National Cooperation.
NOTES

1 States of residence of minorities are called host-states by some authors (Brubaker 1996; 2000; Mylonas 2012). I use home-state for Romania and Ukraine because, from their own perspective, Transylvanian Hungarians (Erdélyi magyarok) and Transcarpathian Hungarians (Kárpátaljai magyarok) are autochthonous minorities having strong homeland narratives referring to territories they inhabit instead of being diaspora communities of Hungary.
2 Kárpátaljai Magyar Kulturális Szövetség in Hungarian, Tovaristvo Ugorskoya Culture Zakarpattia in Ukrainian.
3 I am indebted to Ármin Lambing who was involved in setting up the database.
4 Ukrajnai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség in Hungarian, Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Ukraine in English.
5 Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség in Hungarian, Uniunea Democratică a Maghiarilor din România in Romania, Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania in English.
6 Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt in Hungarian, Partidul Popular Maghiar din Transilvania in Romanian, Hungarian People’s Party in Transylvania.
7 Magyar Polgári Párt in Hungarian, Partidul Popular Maghiar din Transilvania in Romanian, Hungarian People’s Party in Transylvania in English.
8 For a more detailed analysis of the securitization-MPA nexus in five countries, including Romania and Ukraine, see Csergő–Kallas–Kiss (2022).
9 The autonomy plan was submitted by József Kulcsár Terza, an MPP parliamentary deputy, elected on the list of RMDSZ.
10 From a constructivist perspective, group solidarity and identity are no more taken for granted, but they need to be reproduced (Brubaker 2004: 12). Minority institutions play a crucial role in this process (Brubaker et al. 2006; Lamont et al. 2016).
11 See Barth (1969); Lamont and Molnár (2002); Wimmer (2013); Lamont et al. (2016).
13 See: https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1100203.tv
15 Closing accounts are composed by a main volume (főkötet) summarizing all spendings and 10 Annex-volumes (mellékkötet) containing details about spendings of ministries and other public bodies.
16 In all the original documents I analyzed the amounts of subsidies available in forint (HUF) that I transformed into euro using the annual average exchange rates of the National Bank of Hungary.
Taken together with the Prime Minister’s Cabinet and the State Secretary for Hungarians Communities Abroad (see at Figure 3).

First the Western part of Mureș/Maros, then Cluj/Kolozs and Bistrița-Năsăud/Beszterce-Naszód, and ultimately Covasna/Kovászna, Harghita/Hargita and the rest of Mureș/Maros was targeted.


In the case of these subsidies no direct ethnic selection is applied. 2020/85; 2020/88 and 2020/96 decisions of the BGA Committee. https://bgazrt.hu/tamogatasok/bizottsagi-hatarozatok/2020-evi-bizottsagi-hatarozatok/.

It was Ármin Lambing who helped me in processing all the decisions of the BGA Decision-making Committee. I am thankful for his huge amount of work.

See also Brubaker et al. (2006: 300) who proposed to use the notion of institutional archipelago to describe this asymmetric form of ethnic parallelism.

On the (perhaps unintended, but certainly un-reflected) negative consequences of this step see Culic (2018).

Football academy and club performing in Romanian Liga I in Sfântu Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy.

Football academy and club performing in Romanian Liga I in Sfântu Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy

Hokey Academy run by a foundation connected to the Roman Catholic Church.

In Hungarian: Romániai Magyar Pedagógusok Szövetsége.

Allowances are directly paid by BGA, so the amount received by RMDSZ cover costs administering the applications or are destinated to other programs (among them establishing Hungarian language kindergartens).

See: https://www.facebook.com/szakkepzeseve/


See https://hvg.hu/kultura/201901__demeter_szilard__pim__eloretolt_helyorszeg__uj_idoknek_ujdalnakai.
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