

New Europe College Yearbook
Ștefan Odobleja Program
2021-2022

Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

This volume was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for the Scientific Research and Innovation, CNCS/CCCDI – UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P1-1.1-BSO-2016-0003, within PNCD III

EDITORIAL BOARD

Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Andrei PLEȘU, President of the New Europe Foundation, Professor of Philosophy of Religion, Bucharest; former Minister of Culture and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania

Dr. Dr. h.c. Valentina SANDU-DEDIU, Rector, Professor of Musicology, National University of Music, Bucharest

Dr. Anca OROVEANU, Academic Coordinator, Professor of Art History, National University of Arts, Bucharest

Dr. Irina VAINOVSKI-MIHAI, Publications Coordinator, Professor of Arab Studies, “Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University, Bucharest

Copyright – New Europe College, 2022

ISSN 1584-0298

New Europe College

Str. Plantelor 21

023971 Bucharest

Romania

www.nec.ro; e-mail: nec@nec.ro

Tel. (+4) 021.307.99.10, Fax (+4) 021. 327.07.74

New Europe College Yearbook
Ștefan Odobleja Program
2021-2022

ANDRU CHIOREAN
TAMÁS KISS
IULIUS-CEZAR MACARIE
(JULIUS-CEZAR MACQUARIE)
MARA MĂRGINEAN
MIHNEA ALEXANDRU MIHAIL
IULIA NIȚESCU
ALEXANDRU PĂTRUȚI
BOGDAN POPA
HAJNALKA TAMÁS

CONTENTS

ANDRU CHIOREAN

CENSORS AND CENSORIAL RELATIONS
IN COMMUNIST ROMANIA:
CUSTOMS, CONVENTIONS, AND PRACTICES

7

TAMÁS KISS

MINORITY POLITICAL AGENCY AND
ORBÁN'S MONO-PYRAMIDAL RULE:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF HUNGARIAN
KINSTATE POLICIES IN ROMANIA AND UKRAINE AFTER 2010

43

IULIUS-CEZAR MACARIE

(JULIUS-CEZAR MACQUARIE)

ROADIES:

AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF DIGITALISATION OF INEQUALITIES
AND PRECARISATION IN FOOD COURIERS

91

MARA MĂRGINEAN

THE VALUE OF A CALORIE:
FOOD POLICIES AND THE MAKING OF STANDARDS
OF LIVING IN MID-20TH CENTURY ROMANIA

129

MIHNEA ALEXANDRU MIHAIL

BOUND TO THE COLUMN:

ANTICHRIST ICONOGRAPHY IN THE LAST JUDGMENT
SCENES IN THE MEDIEVAL KINGDOM OF HUNGARY

161

IULIA NIȚESCU

IDENTITY, SECRECY, AND WAR:
THE LETTERS OF IVAN III OF MOSCOW TO HIS DAUGHTER,
ELENA OF LITHUANIA

201

ALEXANDRU PĂTRUȚI
KEYNES AND HAYEK:
COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN
BUSINESS CYCLE THEORIES

229

BOGDAN POPA
PATHWAYS OF KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE:
THE DISSEMINATION OF ROMANIAN PUBLICATIONS IN EUROPE
(SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY - UNTIL
THE FIRST WORLD WAR)

257

HAJNALKA TAMÁS
PRACTICE AND FUNCTION OF ECCLESIASTICAL
RECOMMENDATION IN LATE ANTIQUITY
(FOURTH – FIFTH CENTURIES AD)

285

NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION
NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

317



ANDRU CHIOREAN

Born in 1984, in Romania

Ph.D. in history, University of Nottingham (2020)

Thesis: *Censorship and Cultural Revolution. Political Change and Ideological Control in Postwar Socialist Romania, 1945-1953*

Fellowships and grants

Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington, DC.
(2018-2019)

Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University (2013-2014)

University of Nottingham (2012-2016)

Central European University, Budapest (2009-2010)

Has presented his work at conferences in many countries such as UK,
United States, Romania, Germany, Italy, and Belgium

Several papers published in scholarly journals

CENSORS AND CENSORIAL RELATIONS IN COMMUNIST ROMANIA: CUSTOMS, CONVENTIONS, AND PRACTICES

Abstract

The communist state monopolized and directed the cultural sphere but, in opposition to traditional accounts, I maintain that it was not a domination based on destruction. As I show, communist censorship did not emerge in a vacuum but drew on local traditions, institutional continuities and historical particularities, as much as on ideological improvisation and practical expediency. Whereas the censorial system was certainly effective in defending the state's cultural monopoly, it is an overstatement to cast the socialist culture as the offspring of the censor's pencil. The institutional censorship seems often trapped between its ambition to engage actively in cultural production and the supervisory powers granted by its charter.

Keywords: censorship, cultural control, cultural construction, East-European communism

The communist state developed a vast web of institutional structures to turn the cultural producers into both subjects and objects of the new socialist culture. The Agitprop possessed nearly complete authority to ideologically monitor the cultural production of the Ministry of Culture, various creative unions and publishing houses, trade unions, and the Radio Station. Because the state culture was thought to express the people's latent cultural productivity, it was assumed that it would be correctly consumed.

In a cultural system decidedly oriented towards production, the state censorship offered an additional level of supervision. Characteristically, the General Directorate for Press and Printed Materials (GDPPM) was not designed as an ideological-advisory board for the media and cultural institutions, but operated as a government agency of restrictive control ideologically subordinated to the Agitprop. As one of the officials of

the censorial agency explained at an internal meeting, the institutional censorship did “not deal with the artistic realization but with the political rightfulness of a manuscript.”¹ However, he admitted, “the artistic realization itself could be a political problem too ... like, for instance, when a novel which explores the socialist transformation of agriculture is poorly written, this novel becomes a political issue because it does not serve the collectivization campaign.”² As we will see later in this article, such paradoxes not only problematized the institutional boundaries of formal censorship, but they also often rendered its work and institutional jurisdiction ambiguous in practice.

To be clear, I am not arguing that censorship, in its institutional dimension, operated as a purely negative, thus repressive force. Parts of its workings had always been “productive” by helping to create, partly deliberately, partly circumstantially, a consensus on what was socially and politically acceptable. In the broad context of the socialist culture, censorship also acted in tandem with creativity: not only as a reason and precondition for it, but also as an agent of creativity (self-censorship).

It would be counterproductive, indeed impossible, to understand how communist censorship functioned if the analysis were to privilege the Party-state’s thirst for power for the sake of power. In using the potential of the modern administrative state apparatus for erecting a cultural state, the Party-state posited itself as the antithesis of the bourgeois type of politics. Cultural creativity mattered but only to the extent to which it helped bring about a new society and polity.

The opening of the former communist party archives offers both an excellent opportunity to gain insight into the functioning of the state censorial mechanism – often subject to more mythologization than analysis – and the possibility to place the censorial body on an historical continuum. Not only does it offer a practitioner’s perspective, but it also offers an invaluable window into the cultural transformation of the first decade of communist rule.³ Of course, I further argue, in speaking of censorship we should transcend its bureaucratic undertakings and consider the whole context of the state-directed process of cultural production and distribution. A focus on the Romanian communist censorial agency – the GDPPM in the first decade of its existence – offers a new lens for the analysis of what is traditionally considered, in the literature, as the most important aspect of the cultural policy, the Party-state control of cultural sphere.

I will argue that after the war the official censorial body, building on the previous interwar experience, embarked on an ambitious program to monitor and regulate the various media outlets and literary forums. Its “proscriptive” agenda, however, was complemented by a “productive” one, as the censorial agency’s mission went beyond correction and standardization to the all-encompassing goal to educate the masses in the new orthodoxies and contribute to the creation of the communist new man. Progress in both directions, however, was impeded by the structure of the censorial agency itself and its position in the cultural mechanism. Long before self-censorship or external opposition made censorship either obsolete or ineffective, the tenuous relation between rival communist cultural organizations with overlapping competencies, the ambiguity of the censors’ tasks, and their occasionally conflicting goals considerably limited the reach and efficiency of censorship.

Conventions, Customs and Continuities in Institutional Censorship

The General Directorate for Press and Printing Materials (GDPPM) was established in May 1949 in an attempt to coordinate and centralize the censorial functions of the state, previously divided between a cross-ministerial network of agencies. Like other institutions of the cultural system, the censorship agency drew extensively on practices rooted in its prewar tradition. The centralized institutional structures for overseeing the cultural and informational sphere were central to the inter-war nation-building process and no less so for the wartime propaganda and surveillance. Thus, they predated the communists.

The first constitution of Greater Romania (1923) was generous in proclaiming the defense of civil liberties and freedom of expression. It contained provisions forbidding any form of prophylactic censorship, such as, for example, the state’s attempts towards silencing the media.⁴ In practice, however, the control of the printed word was exercised by the state in both post- and pre-publication forms. Built on the structure of the Ministry of the Interior’s Press Agency, the first unified censorial body, the Directorate for Press, was set up in 1926. During the interwar period, the Directorate for Press found itself under the jurisdiction of several ministries, such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Council of Ministers but its main functions remained largely the same:

the supervision of foreign publications and the regulation of the domestic book market and press.⁵

Predicated on a nationalist myth of territory, Greater Romania envisaged itself as a homogenous ethnic state.⁶ For its “progressive and normal development”, an organic relationship with the public sphere was key. The authorities drew heavily on the cultural vocabulary of biopolitics, biologization of national belonging, and a self-perceived unfinished ethnic revolution in their definition of the “state interest.”

In defining the acceptable, they defined the undesirable too. The “desirable” publications would, ideally, feature “nothing offensive or injurious to the Romanian people or state.”⁷ On the other hand, it was common for censors to adopt a harsh line in dealing with socialist literature and other “undesirable” literature, constructed as “acts of disrespect towards the nation and its ruling elite.”⁸ In the newly acquired provinces, where a state of siege was proclaimed for extended periods of time, the military tribunals and courts administered both the daily press censorship and a licensing system, as well as assuming pre-publication censorial powers. They could close down newspapers and withdraw undesirable books, and granted special licenses for newspaper articles.⁹

By and large, two major paradigms of governmental censorship operated. First, to defend the state both at home and abroad, censorship suppressed what was deemed as damaging to the “state interest”. Second, by restricting public access to various media products and books, censorship assumed a role in the moral education of society. In other words, censorship was wielded when, by cultivating a disharmony between political culture and public culture, the media was perceived as having a potentially dangerous influence on the nation. The interwar Directorate for Press developed practices later adopted and refined by the communist censorship agency: the licensing of all foreign publications, such as newspapers, books, magazines, and the editing and licensing of domestic publications. When these practices fell short of expectations, the authorities relied on the judicial process to take journalists and authors to court. A Directorate for Press review report on “the press and political offences committed by journalists pertaining to the ethnic minorities from Transylvania” is also indicative of the level of harshness displayed by the authorities. Between 1919 and 1934, the report reads, the authorities investigated 308 alleged “agitations against the unity of the state” and handed final convictions to 314 journalists, that is, to almost 60% of those investigated.¹⁰

The fast-paced decline of the already feeble democratic experiment in the 1930s abruptly moved the country towards far-right politics.¹¹ In 1938, King Carol II proclaimed a royal dictatorship by disbanding the institutions of the parliamentary system and by abolishing the old Constitution of 1923. Echoing the fascist turn in Europe, the King outlawed all political parties and allowed the existence only of his own mass party, the National Renaissance Front (*Frontul Renasterii Nationale*).¹² In parallel, steps towards the monopolization of the mass media and cultural production were also taken. The cohabitation between a single party and the state administration institutionalized new techniques of surveillance and control. For a tighter calibration of the media message alongside propaganda, a General Directorate for Press and Propaganda was established in March 1938 under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministries. It unified the former Directorate of Press, the Radio Station, the newswire agency, Rador, and the Directorate for Cinematography.¹³

When the war broke out, the newly set-up Ministry of Propaganda incorporated both the propagandistic and censorial structures.¹⁴ It became instrumental in the tightening of press monitoring, to the extent that only the news compiled and distributed by the central newswire agency could be published. Prior to publication, newspapers were assessed for ideological and political errors by commissions set up in ministries.¹⁵

More radical practices of control, such as the daily press advisories (*normativul*), further tied the media to the government. Stretching from instructions requiring the media to prioritize or avoid certain topics, to doctored news articles compiled by the General Directorate for Press, the advisories constituted both orders and guidelines for the media.¹⁶ The censorial body often worked in concert with the similarly chartered military censorship to implement the government advisories in practice.¹⁷

During the war, the mass media representatives were required to attend periodical review sessions at the Ministry of Propaganda. In a striking similarity with the later practices of the communist censorship, the General Directorate for Press compiled periodical reports to assess how newspapers were complying with the official advisories.¹⁸ Thus, the publishing became inextricably linked to the state. Such practices illustrate the wartime government's political ethos to shape the boundaries of the people's political thinking and secure their loyalty. But in conjunction with this use of propaganda they also redefined the social role of the media as an appendix of the government.

In the aftermath of 23 August 1944, the censorship agency reported to multiple ministries, from the Ministry of Propaganda (1945), to the Ministry of Information (1946), and the Ministry of Arts and Information (1948).¹⁹ However, until the Allied Commission of Control (ACC) was disbanded in September 1947 following the Paris Peace Treaties, the Directorate for Press shared censorial competencies with other agencies. Local censorship offices, headed by county prefects, would completely merge with the Directorate for Press only in late 1946, while a censorial office, administrated by the Allied (Soviet) High Command, also functioned on the basis of the Armistice Agreement. The latter issued all publication licences, approved films and artistic performances, and assumed unrestricted post-publication powers to censor and to withdraw and suspend licences.²⁰

After the proclamation of the Republic on 30 December 1947, the Directorate for Press was made part of a larger institutional reconfiguration which integrated the cultural bureaucracy in the dualistic Party-state system. As a governmental agency under the aegis of the Council of Ministers, the new GDPPM was created in 1949 to centralize the censorship of the media. By coordinating all censorial activities, the GDPPM transcended the Party-state dualism to become a major player in the cultural sphere. Yet, given its authority as a regulatory body to oversee the media and cultural production, it did not have jurisdiction in ideological counselling. In the words of one of the deputies, the GDPPM was “a state agency which oversees the activity of agencies and institutions with ideological character. Under no circumstances should it have a guiding role.”²¹ Reflecting on the lessons of the Paris Commune of 1871, Marx warned “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes. The political instrument of their enslavement cannot serve as the political instrument of their emancipation.”²² One can see the almost verbatim revamping of the wartime organizational design as confirming Marx’s prediction. Although the official reports highlighted a purportedly transformative dimension of the censorial apparatus, “a transformation from an old instrument of propaganda into a state organ of proletarian dictatorship,” in practice the transformation was less remarkable. However, I do not argue that the communist regime was not ideologically distinct in the way it engaged in censorship and other surveillance practices. Due to their revolutionary ideology, the communists were more prone to employ a more drastic censorship at times. Yet, far from marking a break with the interwar tradition, the communist power, as

Peter Holquist has written of the Russian Revolution, “represented only the most forceful and successful implementation of the new view of politics.”²³

In the broad context of cultural revolution, the inherited institutional design rather limited the social transformative aims of the censorial body. Instead of the vehicle for social transformation communists so often held it to be, the censorial body was itself part of what needed to be transformed.

How Institutional Censorship Functioned

According to its charter, the communist censorial agency was established to oversee and regulate all printed publications and printing distribution licensing system.²⁴ In the early 1950s the GDPPM implemented censorship through four major directorates. The Directorate for the Central Press and Periodical Publications and the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces oversaw the central and provincial press, the Official Gazette, as well as the Radio Station’s news bulletins. Foreign literature, such as newspapers, books, and academic journals, were censored and licenced by the Sub-Directorate for Foreign Press. The fourth directorate, the Directorate for Printed Materials, supervised the book market through its two sub-directorates, the Sub-Directorate for Book Licensing and the Sub-Directorate for Book Supervision. Whilst the latter sub-directorate dealt primarily with the literature banned by the de-fascization laws, the former licensed the new literary production.²⁵ In 1952 the GDPPM was endowed with new powers which extended its authority over all radio programs, public exhibitions, museums, and cinemas.²⁶

By 1954, the GDPPM cemented its position in the administration of the publishing market.²⁷ To cope with the booming state cultural production, the officials broadened the jurisdiction of the censor’s office, whilst implementing a censorial system based on the censor’s specialization by topic expertise. Before the 1954 changes, the censors within the Sub-Directorate for Book Licensing fulfilled their tasks by working in rotating shifts. The new system introduced specialist subjects such as book licensing, and control of the libraries and bookshops.²⁸ Consequently, it was expected that the institutional censorship would achieve a more centralized and more geographically uniform character.

Like all the other institutions belonging to the cultural bureaucracy, state censorship was subject to planning and standardized guidelines. But, unlike them, its activity was top secret. A public admission of censorship

not only would have violated the 1948 and 1952 constitutions (they proclaimed the freedom of the press and free speech),²⁹ but it would have also questioned the Party's ability to act as a cultural mediator in the interest of the people. Riddled with such tensions, the work of the censorship board was officially formulated in terms of "regulation," "overseeing," and "advisories," rather than plain interdictory language.

In practice, neither the authors nor the publishers were permitted to discuss their submissions or interact in any way with the censors. Abstract and impersonal, censorship had to express the commitment of a conscious cultural producer, not a personal affair. The officials feared that the development of interpersonal relations between censors and producers would have threatened the integrity of the censorial act. Thus, inter-institutional communication was exclusively carried out by the heads of the directorates, the deputies, and by the chief censor. After a publisher had submitted a manuscript, the censor's report was merely the first step in the censoring process. Censors would deliver their final report only after refining their ideological critique of the manuscript's weaknesses and omissions in informal meetings with senior censors. Upon approval, the report was finally forwarded to the publisher. During the process the author of the manuscript could neither intervene nor dispute the report.

Censoring a newspaper was as much a matter of political abilities as it was one of bureaucratic rigour. Censorship started with the censors checking the typesets. Before an issue went to press, another and final check-up was conducted at the printing house. To use the official terminology, the newspaper was "censored in page."³⁰ Time mattered too: the censors were expected to read and proofread a newspaper in less than an hour and a half.³¹ An error, be it ideological, political, spelling error, or a factual inaccuracy on the part of the censor could have significant consequences. In addition to exposing the censors to sanctions, the errors could also lead to newspaper issues being withdrawn from the market.³²

The GDPPM central office in Bucharest set up uniform national standards and presided over a network of semi-autonomous local branches. At its most prominent directorate, the Directorate for Central Press and Periodical Publications, the censors monitored and licensed the press, radio news bulletins and programmes, the news bulletins of the state news agency (the Agerpres), advertisements, street posters, and various other printed materials.

The censors within the central agency divided their working time between the central office and their dedicated offices at the printing

houses. To serve both as proof of accomplishment at work and educational material for fellow censors, the most important censorship were recorded in special registers. The encounters between journalists (especially *Scântea*'s) and censors at the printing presses, where the censors asked for last-minute changes, were often charged.

The Party's flagship newspaper, *Scântea*, served as a crucible for the dissemination of the Party-line. By embodying the Leninist *dictum* – collective propagandist, agitator, and organizer – it set the agenda for the entire press.³³ The censors themselves were required to read *Scântea* as part of their ideological enlightenment. Given that *Scântea* was recognized as an "authoritative organ" of the communist leadership, the censors found themselves caught in a paradox: assigned to censor the newspaper, in practice they merely checked it out for spelling errors and factual inaccuracies.³⁴ In the editorial offices of the central newspapers, well connected to political circles and sites for aspiring Party politicians, the censor's red pencil was often regarded as a personal offense.³⁵ Whereas the journalists denounced censorship as "inimical," the censors perceived their criticism as weakening the logic of the institutional censorial act.³⁶

For example, in 1951, feeling humiliated by a journalist from the *Scântea Tineretului* (The Youth's Spark), a censor petitioned to Iosif Ardeleanu, the censor chief. In his letter he complained about the mockery he suffered at the hands of the journalist whilst on his night shift at the galley at the printing house. The censor reported that he was doing his routine work. Checking the next day's issue proof sheets, he ordered the copy-editor to remove parts of the text on the grounds that they revealed industrial production figures, which had recently been added to the regularly updated "secret lists" of the GDPPM. Infuriated, the copy-editor used mockery to rebut the censor. He picked up a red pencil from the desk, handed it to the censor and ironically asked him to mark off the numeral "1946," a number chosen from the newspaper issue at random. "The numeral can be an industrial production figure too and, you know, it is deadly dangerous to let such figures pass into the printed issues", the copy-editor parroted the censor.³⁷ As the exchange intensified, the copy-editor reportedly went as far as calling the censorship agency a "bureaucratic state apparatus." Although the censor reported the incident to Ardeleanu claiming that it had undermined his authority at the printing press, the GDPPM could do little to vindicate him.³⁸ Most likely, this was not an isolated incident within the Directorate for Central Press. It

frustratingly exposed the limits of authority of the GDPPM as well as its ambivalent status as a state agency exercising political control.

Replicating the duties of the main office in Bucharest, the local branches in the provinces also supervised the press, the radio programmes, and the literary production. They functioned under the double jurisdiction of Bucharest's Directorate for the Press in the Provinces and of the local Party's regional branches.³⁹ To assert its authority over the local branches, the Bucharest Office employed a variety of authoritative means, the most common one being the regular assessment of local censors' work.

Censorial interventions had to be approved, customarily via telephone, by the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces in Bucharest.⁴⁰ In addition, the local branches filed periodical reports to keep track of the most important censorial interventions, suggestions to editors, and forms of hostility or resistance to censorship.⁴¹

When the Bucharest censors conducted periodical inspections in the provinces, they evaluated the local censors' work against these reports.⁴² The locals were paired with, and shadowed by, monitors from Bucharest as a means of having their ideological skills supervised and assessed. The supervising reports, almost without exception, criticized the poor political training of the local censors. For example, a report reviewing a two-month tour through twelve cities in the spring of 1951, worryingly concluded that "the work of censorship is not being taken as seriously as it should be taken."⁴³

Because of limitations in terms of staff, the local branches lacked specialized offices. Thus, the local censors dealt with all aspects of the censoring process, from controlling the printing houses and checking the foreign literature, to reading newspapers and literary magazines. Concerns in Bucharest regarding poor training in the provinces led to the decision not to award full authority over sensitive topics, such as the local literary reviews and radio scripts, to local branches. Instead, the central office used to double-check the censorships undertaken by its local censors (*post-control*).⁴⁴

To build a professional expertise in censorship, the GDPPM established in 1952 a Directorate for Professional Training. The Directorate ran tutorials with censors and organized regular (usually quarterly) seminars with censors in Bucharest and multiagency meetings where censorial matters were discussed. For its role in training the censors, the censorial body administrators regarded the Directorate for Professional Training as pivotal in professionalizing the act of censorship. Yet, it was not until 1957

that the officials could claim to have established a body of professional censors. Whereas previously the censors organised the materials according to a system based on the frequency and types of publications (daily, periodical, book etc.), the new system ("professionalisation of censorship") assigned the publication to censors by topic.⁴⁵

A third major directorate of the GDPPM, the Directorate for Foreign Publications, censored the daily foreign press, the foreign literature, the academic journals, and all the other various foreign publications, at the port of entry into the country. The censors delineated the foreign publications according to three rubrics. First, the literature considered as having "an outright or a masked hostile line, anti-democratic, anti-communist, instigating to war," was classified under the "strictly prohibited" rubric. Second, when the censors decided that publications might occasionally touch upon, but not feature the topics prohibited by the first rubric, they would licence them as "secret." According to regulations, only the Council of Ministries could grant licenses to the strictly prohibited publications.⁴⁶

Publications licenced as "secret" and "strictly prohibited" were barred from circulation. They were either stacked in special library repositories, or shipped to individuals and institutions who received prior special approval (usually granted for research purposes). The Directorate for Foreign Publications held the formal right to grant "special permission" to institutions and individuals, but, at times, informal agreements between high ranked academics and seniors from the Agitprop superseded its authority.

For example, in 1951, in a letter to Ardeleanu, a member of the Romanian Academy of Science claimed that, although an "authorized" subscriber to a scientific French magazine, he had not received the publication for five months in a row. As it turned out, the academic was not in possession of a formal GDPPM licence, but cited a verbal agreement with the head of the Agitprop: "I discussed the matter with comrade Răutu and he assured me that I should encounter no problems in receiving magazines from France and Belgium for the purpose of my research."⁴⁷ Ardeleanu had tacitly complied and forwarded the letter to his deputy with the request to release the withheld issue. The handwritten note intimates that this was not an isolated case.⁴⁸

Third, the only foreign publications exempted from licensing were those imported from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc.⁴⁹ The reason was twofold. As publications from "fellow socialist countries" they were "credible" and "trusted". At the same time, a considerable degree of control

had been achieved through editorial agreements with countries from the Eastern Bloc. For example, in November 1951, Romania concluded an editorial agreement with Hungary which established mutual assistance and the coordination of their editorial plans.⁵⁰

By handling the pre-publication and post-publication mechanism, a fourth major directorate of GDPPM, the Directorate for Book Publishing, oversaw the book market. Its two main sub-directorates, the Sub-Directorate for Book Licensing and the Sub-Directorate for Book Supervision, both licensed book manuscripts and conducted the purging of fascist literature, as defined in the de-fascization laws.⁵¹

Of course, book manuscripts had already undergone various forms of control and alterations before they finally reached the censor's desk. For instance, before it was included in the yearly editorial plan, a book proposal was a matter of a double negotiation, first between the author and the publisher and then between the publisher and the Agitprop.⁵² The Directorate for Book Publishing could neither review editorial plans nor intervene in the writing process. It could only assess the book manuscript in its final form. Alterations in content and form were negotiated only between publishers and the Agitprop's Sector for Literature. A part of the state publishing sector, including the Party's publishing house and the Romanian Academy, were exempted from sending manuscripts to the GDPPM. In these institutions the key editorial positions were controlled by members of the Central Committee, hence there was a high level of trust in them.⁵³

The censors reviewed the manuscripts and the editorial plans of publishing houses according to internal guidelines which established boundaries of expertise and the reading pace.⁵⁴ The censors were required to keep up with a reading time, following which they were expected to write a report underlying the errors they spotted as well as the reasons for their censorial interventions. As a senior censor explained, in the censorial work there were two types of interventions, mandatory and comments. Whereas the mandatory interventions aimed to remove the "serious political-ideological errors," with comments censors would ask for textual improvements.⁵⁵ This classification was implemented to deter the censors' practice of distinguishing between "lesser" and "fuller" errors. "Such misguided distinctions," a senior censor pointed out, "render the act of censorship unstructured since one cannot distinguish between errors at all ... it invites compromises which invites errors."⁵⁶ For example, in June 1952 the Directorate received for reviewing 520 manuscripts (books and

brochures) which amounted to a reading volume of almost 80,000 pages. The censors made 148 annotations and demanded 120 censorships.⁵⁷

On the basis of the censors' reports, the senior censors decided whether the publication would receive the license.⁵⁸ If corrections were required, the manuscript, together with a standardised form outlining the changes to be made, was returned to the publisher.⁵⁹ Yet, in practice, the censors often took a self-serving approach to censorship. They feared that failing to spot all political errors would result in disciplinary actions against them, so they censored whatever might have been regarded as suspicious.⁶⁰

To ensure that only works deemed necessary for the spreading of socialist culture circulated required not only the establishment of a state system of print production but also the removal of the literature which might hamper this goal. The censors within the Sub-Directorate for Book Supervising both built on and broadened the scope of the de-fascization legislation to include "[all books] which promote the rotten bourgeois culture ... an ideological barrier which the working class must break down on its way towards socialism."⁶¹ According to the GDPPM's guidelines for book purges, that meant "all printings with hostile and obsolete character."⁶² Far from being distinctly communist, such practices built on an established interwar and wartime tradition. For example, only a few years before the communist book purges, the wartime Directorate for the Press had employed similar practices to target Jewish writers as well as films and theatrical performances starring Jewish actors.⁶³

In the 1950s the GDPPM's control over the printing industry was more limited than it would later become. In particular, the censorship agency lacked power to actively meddle in the publishing industry. The GDPPM's sense of incomplete power over the state publishing system resulted in frequent complaints to the Agitprop about institutions disregarding the censorship protocols. For example, in late 1951, the GDPPM wrote to the Agitprop to complain about the institutional behaviour of the State Publishing House which, allegedly, printed materials without the censor's stamp of approval. Similar accusations were also levelled against the Agerpres, the state newswire agency. To reassert the GDPPM's authority, the Agitprop stepped in and called a multi-agency meeting at its main office. Both "offenders" were reprimanded for neglecting to respect the GDPPM's authority.⁶⁴

This complex and elaborate mechanism of formal censorship was closely supervised by the Party's Agitprop agency. With resounding priority in all matters having a "Party character", the Agitprop had its

own sectors for press, literature, and printed materials which provided regular instructions to the analogous departments of the GDPPM.⁶⁵ In meetings at the Agitprop office, through telephonic notes, and through written memos, the GDPPM received guidelines ranging from how to conduct an inspection of a large library, to advice on how to assess the censors' reports.⁶⁶

The daily activities of the GDPPM and the Agitprop were even more intertwined in the provinces. The local branches of the GDPPM often shared buildings with the local Agitprops, whilst the latter also supervised the recruitment of censors.⁶⁷ The censorship body's discontent with the recruitment process and with the part-time nature of the censorial work in the provinces would often lead to tensions with the Agitprop.

However, as the next section of this article illustrates, given its lack of systematic power, the GDPPM's influence in the publishing system remained largely a negative one.

Modes of Restrictive Control

The example of the newspaper copy-editor who ridiculed the arbitrariness of censorship's taboos can be seen as more than a conflict over symbolic status in the state publishing sphere. The incident also draws attention to the limits of authority and effectiveness of the formal censorship mechanism. The censorial act, like all state acts, can be performed only by people in a recognized relationship with the "official". To be effective, the censorial act has to materialise in a dual dimension – as a disciplinary set of norms and formal regulations (objective dimension) and in "things and minds", in the processes which permeate and mediate the mental structures and identity (subjective dimension).⁶⁸

The restrictive control of the GDPPM focused primarily on the circulation of information. At the infrastructural level, the media and the publishing system were reconfigured into a system of centralized production and distribution. In order to advance the development of the socialist culture, a cultural project had to have social utility. The Agitprop coordinated the institutions of the cultural bureaucracy and acted as the Party's authority in defining aesthetic and professional standards, as well as the ideological nature of a cultural product.

The cultural system was designed to ensure the realization of cultural products deemed necessary, whilst excluding those deemed harmful. Yet,

the GDPPM's position was not designed to be at the "productive end": "it is essential that the censors understand that we are not an institution which guide the newspapers, but an institution which reviews the newspapers to prevent errors."⁶⁹ The head of the Directorate for Book Publishing made a similar remark: "let us not forget that we are defending our state ... we are soldiers who defend the state secret and the ideological purity."⁷⁰

Fighting the "errors" of newspapers and printed materials was the main responsibility of the GDPPM in the 1950s. The censorship agency distinguished between three main categories of errors: political errors, errors related to breaches of "state secrets", and formal or general errors.⁷¹ The early guidelines issued in 1949 were concerned primarily with the prevention of "incorrect" political messages, i.e. messages "instigating against our government, undermining the class-struggle ... instigating to racial hatred against minorities".⁷² A political error denoted a difference between a textual representation and the relevant interpretation of the topic by the Party (Party-line). For example, in an article entitled "We are showing our enthusiasm for the global peace movement," published in a daily newspaper in Bucharest, the author wrote: "everywhere we go, we hear rumours about the imminence of a new war; these rumours determine us, the working people, to look with great concern at the future of our children and brothers." By assessing it as being contrary to "the interest of our republic," the censor removed the phrase from the body of the article on the grounds that it "instilled unnecessary pessimism which could lower the spirits of the working class."⁷³

The Agitprop regularly updated the censorial body with lists of "state secrets." Lengthy prohibitions referred to news or print materials deemed to endanger the national security. Such errors were defined under the umbrella term of "state secret" to include military and economic matters, and, indeed, anything which was considered politically sensitive. When the initial guidelines were released in 1951 they delineated categories of state secret such as military, economic, agricultural and zootechnics, transportation, state investments and constructions.⁷⁴ The guidelines covered a broad array of topics, from references to the geographical location of different factories, touristic maps, statistical information to names of products and pictures of industrial sites.⁷⁵ In developing the guidelines, the officials acknowledged the Soviet influence: "as a general rule, as regards the defending of the state secret, the press will have to follow the Soviet example."⁷⁶

The guidelines on state secrets were further compiled into booklets (*caiete de dispoziții*) which became an important work tool for censors after 1953.⁷⁷ It featured mainly economic taboos, but at the same time it targeted public representations or lexical constructions potentially detrimental to linguistic unity. The interdictions varied and included: “nothing about chess, crosswords, sports camps, joint training of our athletes with foreign athletes, foreign trips of our sport teams” [they could awake the people’s interest in foreign countries], “nothing about financial benefits and bonuses, prizes, etc.”⁷⁸ [people will become envious] “do not disseminate pictures with peasants still working in traditional peasant sandals.”⁷⁹

The guidelines similarly prohibited news critical of the government or of the Soviet Union and its leaders, as well as news and articles popularizing cultural events from a non-Marxist position. Condensed under the rubric of state secret were also the references to religious values, to various images and information supposedly revealing state secrets to “imperialist countries,” and the publishing of news about certain disasters which could potentially instil panic in the population.⁸⁰

Yet, in the beginning, dealing with articles about industry and industrialization – industrial outputs, references to the number of people in the workforce, product names, production costs, units location etc. – posed the greatest challenge for censors. The skills showed in handling economically sensitive information gave the measure of a trained censor. By offering “crucial information to the enemy,” too many details on economic issues could have breached the orders regarding the state secret. On the other hand, by overshadowing the Party’s achievements, an unwarranted intervention by the censor was considered to weaken the strength and the quality of the propaganda. In the words of the head of the Directorate for Central Press: “when the figures and the industrial outputs do not serve the internal and external enemies ... we just weaken the power of our propaganda and agitation work [if we censor them].”⁸¹

As essential tools in the construction of socialism, the newspapers had to present, in a convincing manner, the achievements of state policies. An overzealous or superficial censor, the senior censors claimed, could have inflicted “hardships on newspapers ... and prejudices against our institutional reputation.”⁸² As a senior censor of the Directorate for Central Press put it, “the way the state secret issues were handled [by the Directorate] showed a mechanical attitude which betrayed a poor

understanding of the Party's political line ... which placed a great burden on newspapers and impaired our institutional prestige."⁸³

This type of taboo construction should be seen as acting as a pedagogical technique in tandem with a "language ideology" – it assumed that without public representation, neither the image nor the actual object of reference of a lexical construction would be significant.⁸⁴

A correct censorial interpretation of the censors would "enrich, not hamper the realization of our regime of popular democracy", the senior censors highlighted.⁸⁵ Yet, despite of the latter's claims to a unified system of knowledge control, the wealth of advice and updates sometimes contradicted one another. Of course, it was tempting for censors to take the easiest path, namely, when in doubt, to request the outright removal of all the economic and industrial related outputs. But, for the GDPPM's leadership, such an approach epitomized "leftist excesses," and a "mechanical attitude towards work and political ignorance."

For example, in 1952, in the midst of the First Five-Year Plan, a censor flagged a newspaper article on the grounds that it disclosed economically sensitive information related to the national electrification process. Because it contained economic figures, the censor reacted instinctively by asking for the removal of the entire article. To his hierarchical superiors, however, his decision revealed no more than a "bureaucratic attitude towards work". The censor should have known that the figures had already been circulated in a report delivered by the Party's general secretary, Gheorghiu-Dej, therefore they were no longer a matter of secrecy.⁸⁶ From the reprimand we also learn that the mishandling of economic information was a recurrent problem and the censorial board regularly petitioned the Agitprop for counsel.⁸⁷ However, because the majority of updates and advisories were delivered verbally it is difficult to fully grasp the Agitprop's scale of control.

Supervised by the ACC, the censorial agency had already begun its purges of the "fascist" literature from libraries and bookshops in 1945.⁸⁸ Yet, the subsequent instructions, compiled in book indexes, expanded the purges to almost all undesirable political topics. Whereas the GDPPM gave the final approval, the initial purges were conducted by librarians. The printed materials fell into three categories. All literature printed after 23 August 1944 received authorization, as did publications printed before this date but which were nevertheless deemed "progressive for the times when they were published". In the second category, the censors placed the printings "with obsolete character but not openly hostile ...

necessary for research,” whilst the third category referred to “all hostile materials, anti-democratic, anti-communist ... authors who are enemies of democracy, peace, and socialism.”⁸⁹

The GDPPM oversaw the libraries and bookshops’ compliance with the regulations governing the book trade. For example, the “non-hostile” printed materials (in the first category) were placed in the general collections of the libraries, whilst the publications in the other two categories were banned to the public and were held in special repositories with access restricted to authorized readers. By the end of 1951, to extend their control over the purged printings, the authorities established special regional repositories where printings in the third category made up the so-called “secret collection.”

As was the case with the guidelines compiled for the state secrets, the Party also issued regularly updated instructions to assist the censors with the book purges. The instructions classified the printed materials both chronologically – books published before the Russian Revolution, between the wars, and after August 1944 – and by topic.⁹⁰ For example, among the topics barred from publication were religious, occult, Zionist, mystical, and pornographic publications. With other topics censors had discretionary powers to purge. In the case of the “nationalistic literature,” for instance, the guidelines stated that it “would be purged gradually.” But the censors were expected to rely on their political training and to “approach the national question using an internationalist standpoint.” In the same vein, erotic literature was permitted only if it depicted “a healthy, optimistic, and life-affirming kind of love.”⁹¹

The censors would be at times caught between inconsistent directives overriding guidelines adopted previously. For example, during an inspection in 1952, the censors ordered the librarians of the University Library in Bucharest to remove all technical books published between 1918-1944 from the general collection (works of general interest). The internal guidelines of GDPPM stipulated that the books had to be removed and restricted to “research purposes.” However, by the time the librarians implemented the order, the GDPPM’s guidelines had once more been updated. The new instructions requested that only the books “permeated by cosmopolitanism” but not all technical books from the interwar period, were to be removed from general collection. Overtaken by events, the censors returned to the library and demanded that the librarians reverse the previous order and comply with the new directives.⁹²

The GDPPM's teams of censors conducted inspections at libraries (public and university libraries), bookshops and checked whether recent books incorporated had complied with the revisions demanded by censors before publication. Since cultural consumption became both a matter of state interest and a tool for social change, the non-state institutions diminished in importance and, to a certain extent, ended up discredited. Culture was evaluated by political utility, and the censors from the Sub-Directorate for Book Control often clashed with the private booksellers: "private book selling is just a commercial pursuit, thus it is straightforwardly against the interests of the working class ... it only facilitates the spreading of the bourgeois poisons."⁹³ Used booksellers were banned in late 1950, but the censors still focused on the used book market. Their searches for "black marketeers" sometimes took them to unconventional places such as the flea markets on the outskirts of Bucharest.⁹⁴

The GDPPM's regulations for the overseeing of the foreign news required that the media outlets covering foreign policy incorporate, most often verbatim, the news bulletins released by the official news agency, the Agerpres.⁹⁵ Of course, the censors checked how the media carried out the task. However, external offices at different ports of entry in the country managed the censorship of the foreign press, foreign literature, the academic journals requested by libraries and private individuals, and other printed publications. The removal of the "negative" content followed a familiar pattern: the Directorate for Foreign Publications decided which individuals and libraries could receive foreign publications, it censored articles, and, in some cases, banned newspapers and magazine issues. Even if an individual or institution were granted a license to receive foreign literature, this was not necessarily a guarantee that, for example, they would receive all the issues of a foreign magazine.

To pick an example, in 1951 several issues of an Austrian magazine, licensed to a local scientist, were retained by GDPPM. The censors questioned the "scientific character" of the magazine and cancelled its authorization. In the report, the censor underlined the "covert capitalist propaganda" of the magazine, as well as its "commercial character, featuring articles laudatory of the United States and the Marshall Plan."⁹⁶ Another magazine, this time from the UK, was similarly refused by the censors. Although it was a specialized academic magazine (forestry industry) the censors turned it down for "its biased comments about the Soviet forestry industry."⁹⁷

When the elaborate pre-publication system of censoring could not prevent “bold political errors,” the GDPPM reacted by withdrawing from the market the “erring” newspapers, books and other printed materials. Instead of the phrase “we must reduce the *consumption* of raw materials,” a local newspaper mistakenly printed on its front page “we must reduce the *communism* of raw materials.” The censors reacted by withdrawing the offending issue, but, in spite of their efforts, 80 copies sold before the ban came into force remained to be found.⁹⁸ Similarly, at the construction site of the Danube-Black Sea Canal, a newspaper issue was withdrawn in 1952 because the censors spotted a discrepancy between the front-page picture and the person it was supposed to portray.⁹⁹

But regardless of how rigorous these surgical operations upon language were, the spectre of the double entendre was present: “long live comrade Stalin! The war instigators are falling and collapsing everywhere and this is because of the *battle* which the Soviet Union carries on in the *peace camp*” (my emphasis).¹⁰⁰

In practice, actual socialism seemed rather “unwilling” to follow the theoretical direction imposed onto it, and therefore a sense of semantic indeterminacy pervaded the work of censorship. In his attempt to grapple with this sense of indeterminacy, one senior censor defined censorship as “not a spontaneous act of free will but a permanent knowledge of everyday political problems.”¹⁰¹ The “political error” represented the most important error for censors and it was defined broadly enough to designate a mismatch between a media representation and the Party-line. The seniors took the hardest line on them: “dozens of prevented errors cannot compensate for a serious political error which makes it into print.”¹⁰²

Indeed, the distinction between the various types of “errors” was more blurred in practice. One journalist told me that his worst ever error was a misspelling. While working for a local newspaper, the journalist wrote an article with a standard-mobilizational title “To the battle for people’s bread” (in Romanian, *La luptă pentru pâinea poporului muncitor!*). However, during the printing process a scribal error erased the letter “r” from the word *popor*, the Romanian for *people*, and replaced it with the letter “u”. Since *popou* means booty in Romanian, the title acquired a lethal-subversive connotation. Further complicating the matter, the error was treated as a political one and the local Party branch and the Securitate investigated the case as an “act of sabotage.” The authorities were alarmed that the media text could have been picked up by the anti-communist media from abroad (i.e. Radio Free Europe) in order to shame communist Romania.¹⁰³

After being subjected to weeks of investigation and multiple declarations to the Securitate, the journalist was cleared of any counterrevolutionary intent. He got off with a verbal reprimand.¹⁰⁴

In 1953, Iosif Ardeleanu, the chief censor, admitted to the “indeterminacy” of censorship: “the work we are doing here at the censorship [agency] depends pretty much on meaning.”¹⁰⁵ As will we see in the next section, institutional censorship was trapped between the ambition to provide systemic meaning to the cultural signifiers of the socialist cultural order and its limited, mainly restrictive, powers granted by its charter.

Productive Textual Practices

Besides monitoring the daily media and cultural production, the censors also sought to proactively refine the language of the cultural products: they negotiated argumentation, inserted the latest pronouncements of the Party, and, not least, suggested new ways to increase the efficiency of cultural production and its mass reception.

As we have already seen, in spite of the GDPPM’s overall “negative” influence over the state sector (text suppression, bans, book purges), in helping to create a kind of consensus around what was or should be socially acceptable, state censorship also acted “productively.” On the other hand, assuming a “too positive” role, i.e. an active involvement in the ideological content of a cultural product, fell beyond the rather limited powers of the institutional censorship. For example, in late 1949, while on duty at the Radio Station in Bucharest, a censor convened a meeting with a group of editors. According to the GDPPM’s report on the case, in his speech to the editors the censor delivered both criticism and advice on dealing with ideological sensitive issues. When the superiors learnt about the censor’s undertaking they reacted with indignation. Making ideological observations, the report stressed, went beyond the scope of a censor’s work, namely to “check on the Party and state agencies and not to offer political and ideological guidance.”¹⁰⁶

But one can find similar cases across all the directorates and offices of the GDPPM. For example, in 1949, censors from the Directorate for the Central Press took it upon themselves to rephrase sentences of the Agerpres news bulletins. A news release reporting the visit of a Soviet delegation to Romania stated that the visit “sparked a *genuine* manifestation of the

masses' love." However, the censor felt that only a rephrasing could prevent the lurking danger of a double meaning. Hence his intervention: "it should have said: generated an *enthusiastic* manifestation of *love from* the masses ... and why does the author say 'genuine'? Only these particular manifestations of love were genuine?"¹⁰⁷

The censors working in book censorship faced the greatest challenges in accommodating these tensions. As the head of the Sub-Directorate for Book Licensing stated, "we find ourselves in a vicious circle because too often the principle we are led by – to be a supervisory body – is distorted."¹⁰⁸

A newspaper picture, a reportage, or a book could warrant pages of comments, stretching from evaluations of the correct incorporation of the political line to interpretative judgements of a particular character's behaviour and clothes. For example, an article published in a previously approved French magazine debated the life expectancy in the United States to conclude that it had risen since the end of the war. The censor in charge with reading the issue promptly intervened and banned the article on the grounds that "private health insurance, which is nothing more than a tool of oppression, is depicted as an advantage in the article."¹⁰⁹

Another censor, echoing socialist realism's aim to create, not just to reflect, reality turned down a novel arguing that although the plot fitted the accepted paradigm – it was about the British colonial exploitation in India – "it is virtually impossible to find a single positive character in the entire novel ... also there is not any mass movement to take on the bloody slayers ... today, after the war, this type of prose can no longer be accepted."¹¹⁰ Through literary works, the cultural officials aimed to shape the taste of the public and not necessarily to satisfy them. As the censor report's concluding remarks put it: "the novel is of no help for the reader, it does not help the reader to understand the real situation in today's India, and in general, the political situation in the colonies."¹¹¹

Often, censoring was very close to copy-editing. A censor reviewing an article which discussed the political situation in the Balkans struck out the most problematic passages and asked the author for a rephrasing. The article, due to be published in a literary magazine, argued that "in the Balkans there are still two states which continue the role of the lighter of the *powder keg of Europe*, namely Greece and Yugoslavia ... they rely on provocations which are *also* aimed at the countries of popular democracy in the region" [censor's emphasis].¹¹² Adopting a condescending tone, the censor gave his reasoning: "first of all, today we can no longer speak

of the Balkan region as being the *powder keg of Europe*. It is a mistake because in the Balkan Peninsula there are three popular democracies, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania ... the Titoist provocations aim exclusively and not *also* at the countries of popular democracies." But the censor was equally concerned with the ambiguity of the text: "the author is ambiguous, one can assume that the Titoist provocations are aimed at other Balkans countries too, whereas the fascist monarchy of Greece and Turkey are in reality Tito's allies."¹¹³

In some cases, the censors were advised by the Party officials not only to consider the political stakes of a text, but to assess its aesthetic realisation as well. The censors assessed the quality of translations in news bulletins and books and in problematic cases they would flag "errors in translations" by making comments such as "the translation of the book is inaccurate in parts and, thus, can be confusing."¹¹⁴ They also often objected to outdated information in texts. One censor demanded that an article from a literary magazine be eliminated so that "such an outdated article would not jeopardize the overall quality of the issue."¹¹⁵

A self-assumed pedagogical mission made the censor get involved in matters which went beyond correcting ideological flaws. The manuscripts received by the censors often featured stylistic shortcomings, faulty grammar or logical contradictions. Sometimes censors could not resist the temptation to offer advice in the margins but their hierarchical superiors took care to remind them of the limits of their role.¹¹⁶

In their reports on newspapers, the censors would sometimes comment on the quality of graphic design composition and on the employment of "political weapons" such as photography and caricature. For example, a censor criticized the *Scântea Tineretului* (The Youth's Spark) newspaper for not doing enough to popularize the Party's achievements: "photography and caricature are leading instruments of agitation and propaganda but they are not used in a creative way ... only the issues 220 and 221 feature pictures depicting the work of our Party ... the comrades from the Central Committee are photographed giving lectures ... the caricatures are too few and only one of them can be considered as being a creative one."¹¹⁷

The level of politicization of a text demanded the most attention. For example, in stylistic constructions such as "socialism will reconstruct the world devastated by capitalism," the censors saw a "weak politicization" and asked for a rephrasing.¹¹⁸ Other constructions were deemed to suggest a sense of political uncertainty, and again, revisions were required. In a phrase such as "at this crucial moment in history, the great Stalin...",

the censor would sense “uncertainty”: “why *at this moment?* Change, it suggests uncertainty.”¹¹⁹ Overall, such errors were assessed by the censors as reflecting the publications’ treatment of political “matters in a lukewarm manner ... not with the commitment of the class spirit.”¹²⁰

Characteristically for the communist handling of the formal censorial mechanism, even when the censors conducted purges of libraries and book shops, their work extended beyond the disciplinary dimension. For example, Flaviu Schäffer, a high-achieving censor in the Sub-Directorate of Book Supervision, always included in his reports a special section to discuss the “proletarian literary talents” he encountered during his inspections of libraries. Schäffer’s punctiliously written reports reveal that the censor spent part of his time in discussion with librarians about amateur writers with working-class background in their regions.¹²¹ Back in Bucharest, Schäffer would forward his recommendations to the Agitprop.¹²²

The abundance of instructions, advisories, and updates received from the Agitprop aimed at framing the censors’ work and action within tight political boundaries. The quality of a censor’s report, the censorship seniors believed, reflected both the censors’ performance and their ideological training.¹²³ The reports featured rubrics for essential and minor censorship, political and state secret related interventions, and miscellaneous interventions. It was meant to embody what was called “the new superior censorship”, which was realized in “careful support given to all publications.”¹²⁴ Channelled properly, the adequate support offered by censorship would only bring more linguistic effectivity to a newspaper or a book, thus sometimes “salvaging the prestige of a publication.”¹²⁵ Conversely, the supporting mission of censorship failed to materialize when the censors’ interventions were unwarranted, which ran the risk of delivering weak ideological products to the public. As a report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Authorizing instructed its censors: “after every article, poem, and novel read the censor must pause and think about the main argument of the text, its political and ideological implications. A censor must always ask himself the question: who benefits from the text?”¹²⁶

The RCP leadership’s greatest concern was that its capacity to control the production of meaning would be overshadowed by the residual “bourgeois” language in public space. As Michael Holquist aptly argued, the essence of all censorship resides in a “monologic terror of indeterminacy.”¹²⁷ In order to overcome this indeterminacy, the RCP

invested notable resources and time for an exact “calibration of the referential properties of language” in order to protect the people from other types of cultural mediations.¹²⁸

Conclusion

The establishment of the communist censorship agency marked not a revolutionary “moment” but rather a “fusion” with the prewar and wartime traditions. The communists relied on established practices, although they employed them in a more radical fashion in pursuit of a more radical political end. The censoring of “inimical” and “dangerous” foreign publications, the various pre-publication censorial interventions, the daily advisories sent to the press, and the doctored materials which the media was constrained to publish on behalf of the government, were all practices which predated the communist takeover. The war and the Ministry of Propaganda redefined the role of the media in relation to the state, while it also gave legitimacy to state intervention in media and culture.

Considered within the broad spectrum of cultural institutions the censorial body reveals certain limits of action. The Central Committee’s Agitprop, as the main organ for cultural change, developed, established and transmitted downwards the standards of ideological quality. It did so through a vast network of institutions and mass organizations which transmitted regular and obligatory guidelines. The Agitprop relied on the work of its own ideological instructors to oversee newspapers, periodicals and the literary field. Both complementing and drawing “inspiration” from the Agitprop, the creative unions, the Ministry of Culture and the state mechanism of publishing and planning also mediated the form of the cultural product.

As all censorial systems across history, the system of cultural control operated under a twofold function. On the one hand, the censorial system was sometimes brutally repressive of what it considered as harmful or dangerous. On the other, its design facilitated a “productive” dimension. The censorial body was expected to shape the cultural artefacts that the Party considered necessary for the enlightenment of the masses, the building of socialism and for the forging of a consensus on issues of what was culturally acceptable. Of course, this dual stance impacts on how we should understand communist censorship. To overcome the limited

understanding of censorship as negative suppression one must consider the GDPPM in the broader context of cultural production. It is too simple to state that the centrally planned formal system of censorship was just a cynical exercise in controlling, manipulating, and infantilizing the population.

Paramount for the Party-state's cultural production was the control over the production of the collective consciousness.¹²⁹ However, to consider the official culture as the offspring of the censor's pencil, as has often been suggested, means not only to assume the existence of "two cultures" but also to overestimate the role played by the censorial agency. True, the GDPPM's system of regulation was to some extent effective in defending the state cultural monopoly, or in reshaping different cultural products. But to assign it a main role in constructing the communist cultural hegemony goes beyond its rather limited means of action. As its modern bureaucratic design suggests, the GDPPM acted more like a regulatory agency, concerned with the distribution and the incorporation of the Party-line knowledge.

NOTES

- ¹ Arhivele Naționale ale României (hereafter ANR), Fond Comitetul pentru Presă și Tipărituri (hereafter CPT), file 24/1957, 27; report of the Directorate for Literature covering the period October to December 1957.
- ² ANR, Fond CPT, file 24/1957, 27; report of the Directorate for Literature covering the period October to December 1957.
- ³ Dominic Boyer, "Censorship as a Vocation: The Institutions, Practices, and Cultural Logic of Media Control in the German Democratic Republic," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 2 (2003): 514.
- ⁴ Law no. 282, Constituția României, *Monitorul Oficial*, 29 March, 1923.
- ⁵ Marian Petcu, *Puterea și Cultura. O Istorie a Cenzurii* (Iași: Polirom, 1999), 132-33.
- ⁶ The broad consensus across the political spectrum was that the Romanian nation had special rights in relation to the territory it inhabited. In repairing the damage of the past, the nation needed protection from corrupting political influences. See Vladimir Solonari, *Purifying the Nation. Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 18-19.
- ⁷ ANR, Fond Ministerul Propagandei Naționale (hereafter MPN), file 2/1924, 13; a censor's report submitted to the head of the Directorate for Press, 20 September 1924.
- ⁸ ANR, Fond MPN, file 14/ 1926-38, 36-37; letter of the head of the Directorate for Press to the Minister of National Defense, 20 January 1934.
- ⁹ During the interwar period the state of siege was only briefly suspended by the first National Peasant Government in 1930, to be reinstated in 1933 and again in 1938, when King Carol II assumed dictatorial powers. For example, Bessarabia had been under martial law since its annexation in 1918 and given the purportedly "Bolshevik menace" and internal vulnerabilities, the state of siege was never to be entirely suspended in the province. But as much as it was a reaction to external threats such as the Bolshevik revolution and the irredentism of neighbouring states, the state of siege was a preferred disciplinary and powerful tool in dealing with internal disturbances labelled conveniently as "socialist agitation and propaganda".
- ¹⁰ ANR, Fond MPN, file 285/1934, 2-5; report about the political offences committed by journalists from Transylvania pertaining to ethnic minorities during the period between June 1919 and 1 August 1934.
- ¹¹ Keith Hitchins, *Rumania, 1866-1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 416.
- ¹² Ibid., 423.
- ¹³ Decree-Law no. 3599, *Monitorul Oficial*, 11 March, 1938.
- ¹⁴ Mioara Anton, *Propagandă și război. Campania din Est, 1941-44* (Bucharest: Tritonic, 2007), 67.

- 15 For example, the Ministry of Interior demanded a newspaper remove from its front page a picture portraying a group of people in top hats: "no other communist propagandistic pictures like these must be allowed from now on" (it implied that the top hat might be read as a critique of the upper class). Cited in Ioan Lăcustă, *Cenzura veghează, 1937-1939* (Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2007), 95.
- 16 For example, an advisory from 19 February 1939 read: "All newspapers are obliged to publish daily until 27 February the joint statement of the bishops of Transylvania ... the bishops' signatures on the statement must appear clear on the left and on the right of the first page". Cited in Lăcustă, 235.
- 17 When censorship was ordered after the newspapers' issues had been finished, in lieu of the purged articles the published issues would feature rectangular black boxes. See Alexandru Băciu, *Din însemnările unui secretar de redacție. Pagini de jurnal, 1943-1978* (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1997), 27.
- 18 ANR, Fond MPN, file 385/1938-43, 84-85; report of the General Directorate for Press for the period 6 September 1940-15 August 1941.
- 19 See Decree-Law no. 462 for the Disbanding of the Minister of National Propaganda, *Monitorul Oficial*, part I, no. 218, 21 September 1944; Decree-Law for the Re-Establishment of the Ministry of National Propaganda, *Monitorul Oficial*, 24 March, 1945.
- 20 The Soviet-led Allied High Command extended its protection to the RCP publications and during the political struggles between the RCP and the traditional parties would often censor the opposition's publications. See Mihaela Teodor, *Anatomia cenzurii. Comunizarea presei din România, 1944-1947* (Târgoviște: Cetatea de Scaun, 2012), 47-50.
- 21 ANR, Fond CPT, file 13/1949, 8; internal decree issued by the GDPPM's Collegium, 23 September 1953.
- 22 Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France," in *Writings on the Paris Commune*, ed. H. Draper (London: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 196.
- 23 Peter Holquist, "What's So Revolutionary about the Russian Revolution? State Practices and the New-Style Politics, 1914-21," in *Russian Modernity. Politics, Knowledge, Practices*, eds. David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 91.
- 24 ANR, Fond CPT, file 13/1950, 57-58; copy of the decree no. 218/20 May 1949 for the establishment of the GDPPM.
- 25 GDPPM's directorates and offices, June 1949. See also ANR, Fond CPT, file 10/1949, 2-3; copy of the decree 461/28 May 1951.
- 26 ANR, Fond CPT, file 4/1952, 19-21; the GDPPM's organizational structure in 1952.
- 27 Three "sectors" – the Press, the Book, and the Propaganda and Visual Agitation – each headed by a deputy, took over the traditional directorates. At the same time, a new Directorate for Staff Training and Supervision was established to oversee the ideological education of the censors. See ANR,

Fond CPT, file 10/1949, 18-21; copy of the decree no. 267/1954 issued by the Council of Ministries.

Ibid.

For the 1948 Constitution see *Monitorul Oficial*, no. 87 bis, 13 April, 1948; for the 1952 Constitution see *Buletinul Oficial*, no. 1, 27 September, 1952.

ANR, Fond CPT, file 1/1950, 280; monthly work report of the central office of the GDPPM, December 1950.

ANR, Fond CPT, file 18/1951, 153-55; minute of a meeting between the GDPPM, the Agerpres, and representative of journalists held at the Agitprop central office, 20 November 1951.

For example, in September 1951, the authorities withdrew from the market two newspaper issues amounting to 250,000 (see ANR, Fond CPT, file 1/1950, 281; monthly work report of the GDPPM, December 1950).

ANR, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Propagandă și Agitație (hereafter Secția PA), file 1/1945, 102-104; speech by Ilie Zaharia at the first Party national conference on agitation and propaganda. See also Emilia Șercan, *Cultul secretului. Mecanismele cenzurii în presa comunistă* (Iași: Polirom, 2015), 45.

ANR, Fond CPT, file 3/1949, 5; report of the Directorate for the Central Press, September 1949.

Conversation of the author with Pavel Țugui, 22 July 2013.

ANR, Fond CPT, file 6/1952, 150; minute of a meeting of the Directorate for the Central Press, 18 January 1952.

ANR, Fond CTP, file 1/1951, 388; letter of the censor Tarnovschi Ludovic to Ardeleanu in which the author reported that he was disrespected by a journalist, 14 December 1951.

When the censor's report ended up on Ardeleanu's desk, the censor chief called for immediate sanctions against the offender. The lack of any subsequent follow-ups in the archives deprives us of the outcome of the story. Yet, even if the story could have been reconstructed, it would have added little to the central aspect of it. Confrontations like this between censors and copy editors, we learn from the censor's petition, were by no means singular.

In the cities without GDPPM offices the licences were granted by the local popular councils. (see ANR, Fond CTP, file 7/1951, 139; report compiled by an instructor of the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces, 11 December 1951). The local branches received powers to censor the printed materials yet no right to issue publication licences, which remained in the jurisdiction of the central branch (ANR, Fond CTP, file 14/1949, 14-22; minute of a GDPPM Collegium meeting, April 1950).

ANR, Fond CTP, file 14/1949, 14-22; minute of a GDPPM Collegium meeting, April 1950.

ANR, Fond CTP, file 7/1951, 27; work report of the instructors of the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces, November 1951. In 1951 the GDPPM concluded that the regular work reports sent by the local branches

- were too “formalistic”. As a consequence, the interval of submission was changed from one to three months (ANR, Fond CTP, file 16/1951, 30; memoranda sent by the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces to the local censorship branches, 26 April 1953).
- 42 When the central office double-checked the Hungarian-language newspapers published in December 1951, it spotted 39 “political errors” and just over 100 stylistic errors. ANR, Fond CTP, file 20/1951, 19; report of the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces, December 1951.
- 43 ANR, Fond CTP, file 2/1950, 9; report of the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces, May 1950.
- 44 ANR, Fond CTP, file 2/1952, 4-11; report of the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces, July 1952.
- 45 ANR, Fond CPT, file 24/1957, 95-96; work report of the Directorate for Book Publishing, July 1957.
- 46 ANR, Fond CPT, file 10/1949, 41-42; guidelines regarding the import of foreign press and publications, 15 March 1952.
- 47 ANR, Fond CPT, file 2/1951, 119; letter of Mihail [Buduru] to Iosif Ardeleanu, 1951.
- 48 Ibid., 119.
- 49 ANR, Fond CPT, file 10/1949, 40; guidelines regarding the importation of foreign press and publications, 15 March 1952.
- 50 For the text of the agreement see ANR, Fond CPT, file 2/1951, 180-85; Agreement between the Romanian People’s Republic and the Hungarian People’s Republic Concerning the Coordination of the Editorial Process, 15 November 1951.
- 51 Every printed material had to have two stamps of approval. One certified that the publication passed the censor – “approved for printing” (*bun de imprimat*) – while the second one gave the final clearance at the printing house, “approved for distribution” (*bun de difuzat*).
- 52 The editorial plan stated in advance the number of books to be published in the forthcoming year; therefore, the censors knew, for example, that in the third quarter of 1951 they would deal with 700 new titles coming in from publishers. ANR, Fond CPT, file 1/1950, 151; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Licensing, October 1950.
- 53 For example, in 1949 the Party’s publishing house had its own internal censorship office, with censors provided by the GDPPM. After the office was disbanded, in early 1950s, the publishing house would no longer be subjected to GDPPM oversight. ANR, Fond CPT, file 4/1949, 17; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Authorizing, October 1949.
- 54 For training purposes, the book manuscripts assigned to recently hired staff were also assessed by a second, more experienced, censor.
- 55 ANR, Fond CPT, file 24/1953, 55; report of the GDPPM’s Collegium, July 1953.
- 56 ANR, Fond CPT, file 23/1952, 74; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Licensing, November 1952.

- 57 ANR, Fond CPT, file 5/1952, 99-101; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Licensing for the third quarter of the year 1952, June 1952.
- 58 ANR, Fond CPT, file 6/1952, 45; meeting of the Sub-Directorate for Book Licensing, 2 September 1952.
- 59 Liliana Corobca, *Controlul cărții. Cenzura literaturii în regimul comunist din România* (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 2014), 149-50.
- 60 ANR, Fond CPT, file 5/1952, 106; work report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Licensing, 1 October-15 January 1952. The guidelines also required that a censor's stamp of approval be applied on the first fly leaf of a book, whilst in the case of pictures on the back of each picture (ANR, Fond CPT, file 14/1953, resolution of Ardeleanu, December 1953).
- 61 ANR, Fond CPT, file 14/1950, 25; report on the activity of the Directorate for Book Control, 20 September 1950.
- 62 ANR, Fond CPT, file 4/1953, 20; guidelines for the classification, preservation, and circulation of the printed materials.
- 63 Petcu, 154.
- 64 ANR, Fond CPT, file 18/1951, 25-33; meeting at the Agitprop central office between the GDPPM, the Book and Printing Distribution Agency, and the Agerpres, November 1951.
- 65 To use institutional language, the Agitprop "oversaw how the Party-line was translated into practice by the GDPPM" (ANR, Fond CC al PCR, Secția PA, file 3/1950, 33-34; the Agitprop charter).
- 66 ANR, Fond CPT, file 50/1951; Agitprop's instructions about how to conduct inspections of libraries, 15 May 1952.
- 67 ANR, Fond CPT, file 4/1949, 8-9; report on the activity of the GDPPM for the period 1 July-1 October 1949; ANR, Fond CPT, file 1/1950, 282; report on the activity of the GDPPM for the year 1950, December 1950.
- 68 Pierre Bourdieu, *On the State. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1989-1992*, trans. David Fernbach (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), 35.
- 69 ANR, Fond CPT, file 7/1951, 83; minute of a meeting of the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces, 11 May 1951.
- 70 ANR, Fond CPT, file 4/1952, 101; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Supervising, 2 September 1952.
- 71 For example, a report of the Directorate for the Central Press from April 1952 mentions that out of a total of 1, 080 censorship carried out in the central newspapers in April, 486 were political and 247 prevented the violation of state secret in the press (ANR, Fond CPT, file 5/1952, 284-85; report of the Directorate for the Central Press, April 1952).
- 72 ANR, Fond CPT, file 13/1949, 41-42; guidelines for the censoring of the press and printings, May 1949.
- 73 ANR, Fond CPT, file 3/1953, 76; report of the Directorate for the Central Press, August 1951.

- 74 ANR, Fond CPT, file 3/1954, 62-71; copy of the decree no. 34 from 1951 – guidelines for defining state secrets in the press, books, printings, brochures, radio broadcasts, films, theatres, exhibitions, museum, conferences etc.
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 ANR, Fond CPT, file 18/1951, 76-77; guidelines for defending the state secret in the press.
- 77 The *Perechen'* or the Talmud, as the censors sometimes called it, was a list of information which constituted state secrets and it was the main tool of the Soviet censors to enforce orthodoxy. It was a top-secret list comprising lists of authors and texts banned from circulation. See Jan Plamper, "Abolishing Ambiguity: Soviet Censorship Practices in the 1930s," *Russian Review* 60, no.4 (2001): 351; Martin Dewhirst and Robert Farrell, eds., *The Soviet Censorship* (Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1973), 55; Marianna Tax Choldin and Maurice Friedberg, eds., *The Red Pencil: Artists, Scholars, and Censors in the USSR* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 18-19.
- 78 ANR, Fond CPT, file 14/1949, 47; lists featuring terms and expressions banned from publication.
- 79 Emilia Șercan, "Instituația cenzurii în perioada comunistă. Instrumente și proceduri de lucru în 1965," in *Revista Română de Istorie a Presei* no. 10 (2011): 100.
- 80 ANR, Fond CPT, file 1/1950, 237-238; guidelines for the censoring of the press and printings.
- 81 ANR, Fond CPT, file 13/1949, 7; transcript of a GDPPM board meeting, 19-20 August 1953.
- 82 ANR, Fond CPT, file 5/1952, 3; minute of a meeting of the Directorate for Central Press, 17 November 1951;
- 83 ANR, Fond CPT, file 11/1951, 3; minute of a meeting of the Directorate for the Central Press, 17 November 1951.
- 84 Boyer, "Censorship as a Vocation," 134; Schiffelin et al., *Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
- 85 ANR, Fond CPT, file 5/1952, 83; meeting of the Sub-Directorate for Book Authorizing, November 1952.
- 86 ANR, Fond CPT, File 5/1952, 106; work report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Authorizing, 15 January 1952.
- 87 ANR, Fond CPT, file 5/1952, 83; minute of a meeting of the Sub-Directorate for Book Approval, November 1952.
- 88 In the early postwar period the purges were conducted by the cultural counsellors from the Ministry of Propaganda, which later became the Ministry of Arts and Information. See Liliana Corobca, *Epurarea cărților în România (1944-1964)* (Bucharest: Tritonic, 2010), 38-40; See also Decree-Law no. 2, *Monitorul Oficial*. 2 May, 1945.
- 89 ANR, Fond CPT, file 4/1953, 20; guidelines for the classification, preservation, and circulation of the printed materials.

- 90 ANR, Fond CPT, file 50/1951, 9-10; guidelines for conducting inspections of libraries.
- 91 ANR, Fond CPT, file 8/1949, 197-98; guidelines for conduction de-fascization of public libraries and book shops, July 1949.
- 92 ANR, Fond CPT, file 6/1952, 29-30; minute of a meeting of the Sub-Directorate for Book Supervising, 11 November 1952.
- 93 ANR, Fond CPT, file 14/1950, 25; Activity report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Supervision, 20 September 1950.
- 94 ANR, Fond CPT, file 1/1950; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Supervision.
- 95 Since the RCP monopolized all the news production through a single news agency, the Agerpres, strict orders prohibited the sourcing of the news from alternative sources. This does not mean that the "official" news did not go through censorial control.
- 96 ANR, Fond CPT, file 2/1951, 74; weekly report of the Directorate for Foreign Publications, 20 April 1951.
- 97 Ibid., 76.
- 98 ANR, Fond CPT, file 7/1951, 98; report of the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces, February 1951.
- 99 ANR, Fond CPT, file 14/1952, 5; report of the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces, February 1952.
- 100 ANR, Fond CPT, file 1/1950, 30; report of the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces, 10 October 1949.
- 101 ANR, Fond CPT, file 2/1950, 11; activity report of the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces, June 1950.
- 102 ANR, Fond CPT, file 13/1953, 21; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Authorizing. September 1953.
- 103 Conversation with Tănasache, 5 August 2018.
- 104 Ibid.
- 105 ANR, Fond CPT, file 4/1954, 85; Ardeleanu's speech at a board meeting of the GDPPM.
- 106 ANR, Fond CPT, file 13/1949, 8; resolution of the GDPPM Collegium, 23-25 September 1953.
- 107 ANR, Fond CPT, file 3/1949, 2; memorandum on the activity of the Agerpres, compiled by the Directorate for the Central Press, August 1949.
- 108 ANR, Fond CPT, file 6/1952, 19; minute of a performance assessment meeting in the Directorate for Books (speech by Flavius Schäffer, the head of Directorate), 11 December 1952.
- 109 ANR, fond CPT, file 2/1951, 74; weekly report of the Directorate for Foreign Press, 20 April 1951.
- 110 ANR, Fond CPT, file 3/1951, 166; censor's report (from the Directorate for Book Licensing) about the Hungarian language novel "Frunza de ceai" (The Tea Leaf), 27 February 1952.

- 111 Ibid.
- 112 ANR, Fond CPT, file 7/1951, 108; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Authorizing, July 1951.
- 113 Ibid.
- 114 ANR, Fond CPT, file 6/1951, 8; internal memorandum about an impending re-organization of the GDPPM, 27 November 1951.
- 115 ANR, Fond CPT, file 3/1951, 108; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Authorizing, 12 December 1951.
- 116 ANR, Fond CPT, file 32/1950, 78; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Authorizing, October 1950.
- 117 ANR, Fond CPT, file 5/1950, 44; report on the newspaper *Scântea tinerețului* for the period 15 December 1949 – 1 January 1950.
- 118 ANR, Fond CPT, file 59/1951, 53; report regarding the book manuscripts sent by the State Publishing House in June 1951.
- 119 ANR, Fond CPT, file 3/1951, 96; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Supervision for the period 1-8 December 1951, 8 December 1951.
- 120 ANR, Fond CPT, file 7/1951, 79; activity report of the Directorate for the Press in the Provinces, 1 May 1951.
- 121 ANR, Fond CPT, file 7/1948, 151-52; report of Schäfer about an inspection of the libraries of the city of Ploiești, December 1948.
- 122 Ibid.
- 123 ANR, Fond CPT, file 6/1952, 22.; minute of a meeting held on 12 December 1952 in the Office for Book Licensing.
- 124 ANR, Fond CPT, file 11/1951, 16; memorandum of I. Rusu, the head of the Directorate for the Central Press, discussing the improvement of the work in the Directorate, 8 December 1951.
- 125 ANR, Fond CPT, file 2/1956, 32; work report of the Directorate for the Central Press for the period July-December 1956.
- 126 ANR, Fond CPT, file 13/1953, 22; report of the Sub-Directorate for Book Authorizing; September 1953.
- 127 Michael Holquist, "Corrupt Originals: The Paradox of Censorship," *PMLA* 109, no. 1 (1994): 14.
- 128 Dominic Boyer, *Spirit and System. Media, Intellectuals and the Dialectic of Modern German Culture* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 136.
- 129 A point made by Domic Boyer in "Censorship as a Vocation: The Institutions, Practices, and Cultural Logic of Media Control in the German Democratic Republic," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 2 (July 2003): 521.



TAMÁS KISS

Born in 1997, in Romania

Ph.D. in Cultural Studies, University of Pécs, Hungary (2010)

Thesis: *Administrative gaze? The origins, functioning and limits of Hungarian ethno-demography in Romania*

Researcher, Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities,
Cluj-Napoca

Research projects

Minority Civil Society, Interethnic Peace and Sustainable Democracy.
Methodological referent and Romanian investigator in comparative project led
by Zsuzsa Csergő at Graz University (2019-2021)

Hungarian language education in Romania from a minority rights perspective.
Project leader in the investigation financed by the Tom Lantos Institute
(2019-2020)

Migrant worker's perspective in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania.
Romanian team leader in the comparative investigation financed by
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (2019)

SEEMIG Managing Migration and its Effects in South-East Europe:
Transnational Actions Towards Evidence-Based Strategies. Project financed by
Interreg South Eastern Europe Transnational Program (2012-2015)

SocioRoMap Socio-graphic mapping of the Roma Communities in Romania
for a community-level monitoring of changes with regard to Roma integration.

Project was financed by the Norwegian Financial Mechanism 2009-2014.

Coordinator of an exhaustive survey targeting compact Roma communities
in Romania (2009-2014)

Papers published in scholarly journals

MINORITY POLITICAL AGENCY AND ORBÁN'S MONO-PYRAMIDAL RULE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF HUNGARIAN KINSTATE POLICIES IN ROMANIA AND UKRAINE AFTER 2010

Abstract

My comparative analysis focusing on Hungarians in Romania and Ukraine tries to describe how Viktor Orbán's kinstate policy affected minority political agency, e.g., strategies of ethnic bargaining and institutions governing minority elites. I investigate security-oriented approaches within the framework of international relations (IR) and I propose a broader analytical model for mapping kinstate policy effects on minority groups. I have in view the changes that occurred after May 2010, when the second Fidesz government was elected. Post-2010 Hungarian kinstate policies foster a homogeneous concept of the nation and try to integrate minority Hungarians into the mono-pyramidal rule of Orbán's increasingly authoritarian regime. This process, although detrimental to intra-ethnic democratic functioning, cannot be described properly through IR related models focusing on macro-political aspects and programmatic elements of ethnic bargaining. Therefore, I employ a more nuanced concept of minority political agency including meso-level strategies of governing minority institutions and building networks of political patronage. Based on quantitative analysis of kinstate subsidies and semi-structured interviews conducted with key minority actors, I conclude that effects of Hungarian kinstate policy are the most visible at meso-level, as Hungarian communities were incorporated into Orbán's regime through minority institutions. The comparison between the cases proved to be useful because I was able to distinguish between two different models of incorporation, a more monolithic local level intra-ethnic autocracy in Ukraine and a more decentralized patronage-based incorporation in Romania. The dissimilarities are due to initial differences in the organization of the two minority fields on the one hand, and the path-dependent relationship between Fidesz and the dominant minority elite faction, on the other.

Keywords: kinstate policy; ethnic politics; security; political patronage; minority institutions; extraterritorial nation building; Transylvanian Hungarians; Hungarians in Ukraine

Introduction

My aim is to map the effects of Hungary's post-2010 kinstate policy on Hungarians in Romania and Ukraine, two minority communities connected simultaneously to the institutional and political fields of their home-states¹ and kinstate. My paper focuses on the institutional level, on how the kinstate policy reshaped the strategies of community organization and political negotiation of the minorities' actors "caught between" their kinstate and home-state.

In 2010, when Viktor Orbán's right-wing Fidesz party won with a two-thirds majority, the event constituted an important historical juncture in Hungary's political history that turned the country from a frontrunner of Western-type democratization in the CEE region into an increasingly authoritarian political system called illiberal democracy by Orbán himself and by political scientists a plebiscitary leader democracy (Körösényi et al. 2020) or an externally constrained hybrid regime (Bozóki-Hegedűs 2017). Henry Hale's (2015) concept of mono-pyramidal rule can also be applied, as patronage structures of the dominant Fidesz captured institutional structures of a formerly more pluralistic society (Vangelov 2018). Orbán's landslide victory was a major turning point in the kinstate involvement too. After two decades of political battle, the new parliament modified the citizenship legislation making possible for Hungarians living in neighboring countries to obtain citizenship without having residency in Hungary. This act created strong personal-bureaucratic linkages between the Hungarian state and individual members of Hungarian minority communities. Institutional subsidies have also increased considerably, creating a growing cross-border coherence at institutional meso-level.

Scholars in nationalism studies and international relations warned that more assertive kinstate policy would trigger sovereignty and security constraints on the side of neighboring countries that ultimately might harm Hungarian minorities (Pogonyi-Kovács-Körtvélyesi 2010; Pogonyi 2011; Salat 2012; Liebich 2019). It was another widespread presumption that kinstate involvement might lead to radicalization of Hungarian minorities, deteriorating interethnic relations and initiating a spiral of conflict (Jenne 2007; 2015). My paper takes seriously these reasonings, but it also argues that, in order to understand properly the negative effects of Orbán's kinstate policy, we need to develop a more complex and empirically grounded concept of minority political agency going beyond the IR framework that

perceives minorities mostly as conventional actors and focuses primarily on explicit programmatic aspects of ethnic bargaining.

My paper is composed of five broad parts. In the first part of the paper, I present the conceptual framework guiding my empirical investigation. I begin with the two widespread hypotheses connected to the IR framework, namely that kinstate involvement triggers security threat on the part of residence states and radicalization on the part of kin minorities. I argue that these hypotheses explain only partially the effects of Orbán's kinstate policy on strategies of Hungarian elites in Romania and Ukraine. Further on, I propose a two-dimensional concept of minority political agency (MPA), distinguishing between ethnic bargaining (e.g., negotiating with majority actors) on the one hand, and community organizing (e.g., building and governing minority institutions), on the other. I argue that, when analyzing kinstate policy effects on MPA, both dimensions should be taken into account and, moreover, patronage related aspects of ethnic bargaining should also be considered. In the second section I turn toward Hungary's kinstate policy. This proved to be a quite divisive issue before 2010, when disagreements between left and right revolved around three key issues, namely (1) how the Hungarian nation (divided by state borders) should be redefined; (2) how Hungarian minority institutions should be subsidized; and (3) how should be treated the process of ethnic bargaining and, especially, the minority elite factions that accommodate with the actors of the majority. After 2010, the right-wing approach toward the Hungarian minority communities has gained a hegemonic position, nevertheless, the governing Fidesz has gradually ceased to back more radical factions of minority elites (as they became dominant and had to begin negotiations with majority actors in Ukraine and failed to gain electoral success in Romania). The third section of the paper presents meso-level institutional strategies of minority elites and focuses on how the kinstate involvement affected them. Strengthening separate minority institutions and institutionally sustained ethnic parallelism proved to be a common element across the cases, as well as the fact that minority institutions have become increasingly incorporated into Orbán's mono-pyramidal rule. Nevertheless, models of incorporation demonstrated to be different. In Ukraine, Hungary's kinstate involvement has led to a centralized rule of intra-ethnic autocracy organized around KMKSZ (Hungarian Cultural Alliance in Transcarpathia)² and its leader László Brenzovics. In Romania, on the contrary, incorporation led to a more decentralized intra-ethnic institutional structure and strengthened the already existing (religious,

regional, ideological or simply network-based) internal pillarization of the Transylvanian Hungarian community. I argue that diverging outcomes are due to differences of the internal organization of the minority field on the one hand, and the path-dependent evolution of Fidesz's relations with different Hungarian elite factions, on the other. In the fourth part of the paper, I turn toward ethnic bargaining and I ask how kinstate involvement affected this process. It is at this level of analysis, where I discuss in more details the relevance of securitization and radicalization hypotheses. I present how securitization and backlash in minority policy has diminished bargaining capacities of Hungarian elites in Transcarpathia. Nevertheless, I also argue that these have appeared as a side effect of East-West divide and then of their brutal Russian aggression against Ukraine and have not been a consequence of Hungary's (putatively) more assertive kinstate policy. In Romania, the securitization of minority policies and a backsliding in minority rights protection has not occurred, but the radicalization hypothesis and ethnic outbidding (Rabushka-Sheppsle 1972; Horowitz 1985) had some relevance before 2014. I maintain, however, that these security-oriented questions should be also answered by taking into account the two-dimensionality of minority policy and patronage (instead of programmatic) orientation of ethnic bargaining in Romania.

My analysis is based on two empirical pillars. On the one hand I reconstructed quantitatively kinstate subsidies for minority institutions included into Hungary's state budget for the period between 2010 and 2020. A significant part of these subsidies is allocated through so called unique requests for support (*egyedi támogatási kérelem*) that are calls not announced publicly and available only to previously selected and invited minority institutions. Decisions concerning individual support requests, however, are publicly available in PDF documents at the site of the Bethlen Gábor Fund (*BGA ZRT*), a public agency delivering significant part of kinstate support. Using these documents, we constructed a database³ containing all kinstate spendings through BGA unique requests. The original documents contained the name of the recipient, the amount and the destination of the subsidy and the date of the decision. We included all this information into the database and completed it with the activity domain of the recipient and the organizational/political network the institution belonged to. Dominant or non-dominant ethnic parties (KMKSZ and UMDSZ⁴ in Ukraine, RMDSZ⁵, EMNP⁶ and MPP⁷ in Romania), churches (Hungarian Reformed, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Unitarian, Lutheran-Evangelic) several educational institutions

(especially universities) might be founded as institutional superstructures, larger interest groups or intra-community pillars having many minority institutions in their orbit. When categorizing individual organizations, we looked at political or larger organizational belonging of their leadership/board members. In several cases we consulted external experts in order to decide the belonging of the organization. The database contains a total number of 8,194 positively evaluated unique financial requests 940 targeting minority institutions in Ukraine and 3,027 minority institutions in Romania. This database made possible to identify major beneficiaries of kinstate subsidies. On the other hand, effects of kinstate subsidies on ethnic bargaining and governing minority institutions were investigated through semi-structured interviews conducted with key actors of the Hungarian minority fields in Romania and Ukraine. A total number of 40 interviews were conducted, 17 of them in Ukraine and 23 in Romania with leading representatives of political organizations, churches, universities, schools, and other minority institutions receiving financial support from Hungary.

1. Conceptual Framework and Ethno-political Processes before 2010

1.1. Security oriented hypotheses and their relevance in Romania and Ukraine

Security approaches regarding IR framework and emphasizing negative consequences of kinstate involvement represented an important starting point of my research (van Houten 1998; Thyne 2009; Grigoryan 2010; Jenne 2007; 2015; Mylonas 2012). In this literature, kinstate involvement is mostly perceived as potentially dangerous and conflictual, triggering sovereignty and security threats in the resident states of minorities. Concerning the relation between kinstate involvement and MPA, two interlinked hypotheses are of key importance. According to the *securitization hypothesis*, majoritarian states usually respond to perceived security threat triggered by kinstate involvement with more repressive (rather than accommodative) minority policies, especially if interstate relations are also antagonistic (Mylonas 2012). Thus, kinstate involvement has the, often unintended, consequence – or “boomerang effect” to cite Alexandra Liebich (2019) – of narrowing the space of maneuver of minority elites. In a modified version, restrictive minority policies are not

(necessarily) consequences of kinstate involvement but this latter is used by majority actors to frame and legitimize already existing (restrictive) policy preferences (Csörgő 2013; Schulze 2018; Schulze 2021). In both versions however, kinstate involvement harms claim-making and bargaining capacities of minority elites and narrows political space for running minority institutions.⁸

The *radicalization hypothesis* is another widespread presumption among both the majority public and the security-oriented scholars. According to Erin Jenne (2007: 40), there is a continuum between integrationist and secessionist minority claims, beginning with *affirmative action* that is participation on equal footing in institutional structures shared with the majority through *cultural rights* and then *territorial autonomy*, ending with *irredentism* that openly threatens territorial integrity of the residence state of the minorities. Minority elites go up and down on this continuum, while more assertive kinstate policies inform minority actors, who – backed by a committed external patron – address more radical ethnic claims toward their state of residence. This – in a similar vein as in the securitization hypothesis – prompts security concerns, which might induce backsliding in minority accommodation and might be conducive to a spiral of conflict. The obvious policy proposal connected to these hypotheses is that for a conflict resolution (or in order to avoid a potential dispute) the kinstate leverage should be ruled out or at least regulated and diminished.

Further on, I also focus mostly on negative consequences of Hungary's kinstate involvement, but I argue that the above-mentioned hypotheses have only limited relevance in understanding how Hungarian minority strategies and MPA have evolved in Romania and Ukraine following the year 2010. Securitization of minority policies has occurred in Ukraine, while it has not taken place in Romania. In Ukraine, indeed, securitization was not a consequence of Hungary's more assertive kinstate policy, but rather a side effect of Russia's brutal aggression beginning with 2014. Backsliding in minority policies were centered around more repressive language policies targeting Russophones, but actually affecting negatively all other minority communities. The Hungarian community used to be quite compact in terms of MPA, having a well-developed system of minority institutions and elites organized in ethnic parties. In Orbán's Hungary, they also had a quite committed external patron. Repressive measures and the relatively strong objection of Hungarians (most importantly raising concerns at international fora) have led to a spiral of soft political conflict

and to the deterioration of interstate relations. Interestingly, this has not happened in the case of the far more numerous Romanian minority in Ukraine. Romanians were more fragmented in terms of MPA (divided in three distinct Romanian speaking groups lacking common identity, strong ethnic parties and well-functioning minority institutions) and their kinstate was far less devoted to back minority claims (Iglesias 2014).

The radicalization hypothesis has also some relevance, especially in analyzing kinstate policy effects before 2014. As already mentioned, relation to minority factions compromising with majority actors was a divisive issue between right- and left-wing actors in the Hungarian kinstate policy. The right-wing Fidesz accused RMDSZ, the dominant ethnic party of Transylvanian Hungarians since 1989, and UMDSZ, the stronger ethnic party of Transcarpathian Hungarians having a considerable bargaining power in Ukrainian politics between 2008 and 2014, of being opportunistic and too compromising. As a sustained strategy, Orbán's party tried to push the minority Hungarian elites toward the so-called "autonomist scenario", by baking KMKSZ in Ukraine and more radical factions inside RMDSZ and the then challenger parties of MPP and EMNP in Romania. Nevertheless, after 2014, the Hungarian kinstate policy has changed its focus and the "autonomist scenario" was effectively neglected by Fidesz.

1.2. A two-dimensional model of MPA: Ethnic bargaining and community organizing

My main argument is that in order to understand properly the effects of Orbán's kinstate policy we need a more complex and sociologically grounded concept of MPA compared to the one used by the IR scholars. The latter usually focus on minority claims as they appear in public declarations and formal political programs. At this programmatic level, autonomy (perceived as a rather radical demand by majority political actors) plays an important role. Autonomy claims were even called the Holy Grail of Transylvanian Hungarian politics (Kiss–Toró–Székely 2018: 138). This objective was present in RMDSZ programs since the early 1990s and it returned to the political agenda following 2003, in the context of intra-ethnic split and political competition. In more concrete terms, different political organizations representing Transylvanian Hungarians have elaborated no less than 16 autonomy plans during the last 30 years, RMDSZ being the main actor in the drafting process during the mid-1990s


and, after 2003, its challenger parties (Salat–Székely–Lakatos 2021). Among Romanian political actors, however, a broad consensus has been kept that Hungarian autonomy claims are not desirable and constitute a symbolic red line in minority protection endangering the unitary character of the Romanian nation state. This consensus has been renewed periodically through several Hungarian-related political scandals, the last one being the infamous April 19, 2020 speech of president Klaus Iohannis alarming of Hungarian irredentism on the occasion of tacit adoption of one of the autonomy-plans drafted by Hungarian political organizations (Kiss–Toró–Jakab 2021).⁹

In Transcarpathia autonomy claims took an even more concrete and elaborated form. On December 1, 1991, simultaneously with Ukraine's referendum for independence, two additional referenda were held. One at the level of Transcarpathia (*Zakarpattia oblast*) for a multi-ethnic administrative autonomy initiated by (dominantly Rusyn/Ukrainian) regional elites and one at the level of Berehove/Beregszász *raion*, where a Hungarian Autonomous District was proposed (Stroschein 2012). To understand the context of these referenda, the Soviet legacy of ethnic relations and territorialized language rights should be taken into account. The "Soviet order of things" (Hirsch 2004) was radically different from the contemporary nationalizing institutional order and it was based on a multi-level hierarchy of various nationalities (Gorenburg 2003). Russians were at the top of the hierarchy, their mother tongue being the *de facto* language of administration, it served as a *lingua franca*, and was taught compulsorily throughout the Soviet Union. At the next level were titular nations having their own republics, including the right to leave the Union. Within the republics, Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, autonomous *oblasts* and autonomous *okrugs* (districts) could be established, serving also as territorial bases of linguistic rights for smaller nationalities. Several other nationalities, among them Hungarians, did not have autonomous territories and, consequently, they could use their native language only in informal settings and inside minority institutions. The Berehove/Beregszász *raion* referendum, aimed at the creation of an autonomous *okrug* having many pairs throughout the Soviet Union and was not necessary seen by majority group members as a radical ethnic claim. This was shown by the fact that 81 percent of the *raion*, among them many non-Hungarians, backed the initiative that was not conducive to interethnic tension in the region (Solchanyc 1994). Nevertheless, the results of the two autonomy referenda have never been implemented and in the discursive and

institutional order of the newly created increasingly nationalizing state autonomy claims (ruled out in 1996) represented an intolerably radical ethnic claim.

The failure of Hungarian autonomy movement in Romania and Ukraine meant that MPA could not be institutionalized at macro-level, as a constitutionally or legally granted form of ethnic power sharing. This has not mean, however, that minority Hungarian elites have lost their capacity to act collectively. In the context of Romanian and Ukrainian minority policies a two-dimensional MPA has evolved, having its components in (1) community organizing (ethnic boundary maintenance, reproduction of groupness) through a dense and strong net of formal meso-level minority institutions; (2) political claim raised through ethnic parties and sustaining an often informal and *ad hoc* political bargaining with majority political actors.

Figure 1. Dimensions of MPA and increasing institutional parallelism of Hungarian minority communities in Romania and Ukraine



My model of two-dimensional MPA is similar to the dual task performed by elites of different societal pillars in consociational democracies. According to the literature (Lijhart 1968; 1977; Tsebelis 1990), they have to balance between two principles. One the one hand, they have to organize their followers in an intra-ethnic (or intra-pillar) institutional arena, while on the other hand they have to bargain and compromise with elites of other societal segments in an inter-ethnic (or inter-pillar) political arena. Differences lie in the fact that in consociational democracies financing of minority institutions and decision-making competences of minority

elites are underpinned by segmental autonomy, while rules of political bargaining are constitutionally regulated. This is however, not the case of Romania and Ukraine. Firstly, there is no rule of proportionality in financing of minority institutions, consequently, minority institutions are severely underfinanced. Secondly, minority elites do not have strong formal decision-making competences in state-financed segments of minority institutions (most importantly the educational system), but they should navigate in a centralized institutional structure. Thirdly, terms of political bargaining depend on actual and *ad hoc* political settings and, consequently are highly unstable.

I argue that by using this two-dimensional concept of MPA one might go beyond security approaches connected to the IR framework. Firstly, community organizing constitutes a less visible aspect of MPA. Establishing, maintaining, and governing minority institutions ranging from schools to churches, mass-media organs, cultural and charity organizations often fall under the radar of security-oriented analysts. Certainly, this is not always the case and it depends also on minority policies of the resident countries of minorities. For instance, in case of Russophone minorities in the Baltic states (especially in Latvia) there is an ongoing political debate about Russian “soft-power”, meaning gaining geopolitical leverage through cultural and other (seemingly) non-political activities. This debate puts (often automatically) Russian language schools, the Russian Orthodox Church and minority NGOs into a security framework (Schulze 2021). In Romania and in Ukraine (at least prior to 2014), however, minority policies were more permissive to meso-level minority organizations and their very existence was rarely interpreted as a security concern. I will try to show that the effects of Orbán’s kinstate policy are the most obvious at this meso-level of minority institutions. Institutional meso-level is important to understand both continuities and changes of MPA. As for continuities, the notion of institutionally sustained ethnic parallelism is of central importance (see Kiss–Kiss 2018). As a primary definition, this is an implicit political program of Hungarian minority elites who, lacking any form of ethnic power sharing, they perform MPA through meso-level minority institutions and aim at organizing different societal domains (education, politics, cultural consumption, social care, leisure time activities, etc.) through linguistically separate institutions. These institutions provide a framework for the reproduction of ‘groupness’¹⁰ and play a crucial role in boundary maintenance.¹¹ After 2014, the Hungarian kinstate policies abandoned (tacitly) the “autonomist

scenario” and turned toward strengthening minority institutions. This was in line with existing (implicit) strategies of minority elites who had already abandoned autonomy claims in the mid-1990s and turned toward the dualistic form of MPA we discuss now. Thus, Hungary’s new focus on meso-level institutions has led to the “deepening” and “widening” of the already existing ethnic parallelism in both Romania and Ukraine. Nevertheless, next to this obvious layer of continuity, a new direction of institutional processes has also followed. Namely, as a side effect of increasing kinstate subsidies, minority institutions and elites became increasingly incorporated into the semi-autocratic mono-pyramidal rule of Orbán (Hale 2014; Vangelov 2018). Models of incorporation differ in Ukraine and Romania, but as we will see kinstate leverage reduced in both cases intra-ethnic pluralism, led to growing ideological uniformity and conformity and, ultimately, harmed collective capacities of minority elites to maintain independent MPA.

SEcondly, I argue that neither ethnic claim making nor bargaining aspects of MPA can be properly understood by focusing solely on explicit and visible programmatic elements. Political elites do not only elaborate programs but also distribute resources. Modern party politics in general (Aldrich 1995; Kitschelt 2001) and ethnic politics in particular (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Laitin–Van der Veen 2012) are equally about programmatic aspects and resource allocation. Following the regime change, both Romania and Ukraine took cautious steps toward minority accommodation even if none of them guaranteed formal ethnic power sharing for minority elites. Next to allowing for meso-level minority institutions, support for ethnic party formation has become an important pluralist characteristic of Romanian and Ukrainian minority policies. Ethnic parties were recognized as legitimate representatives of minority communities (Biró-Pallai 2012) and empowered by both legislative (favorable electoral laws) and informal political (sustained bargaining) elements during the 1990s. In the emerging model of minority accommodation segmental autonomy was substituted by meso-level minority institutions, while elite bargaining has become *ad hoc* political and highly informal. Actually, ethnic parties gained a quasi-monopoly in redistribution of state funds allocated for minority institutions and minority inhabited areas leading to rather particularistic ways of doing politics. In other words, minority elites became included into post-socialist power-pyramid through ethnically segmented networks of patronage.

Before 2010, programmatic moderation was an obvious consequence of this incorporation. In Romania, demands for autonomy were pushed into the background already in 1996, when RMDSZ fielded a candidate of its own for presidency in the person of György Frunda, while in its 2000 electoral program there was no reference to it. This strategy of RMDSZ leadership deepened intra-ethnic division. The so-called moderates (who were busy with governmental and administrative work and controlled the resources that could be channeled to the community) succeeded in consolidating their majority within the organization. In the meantime, the “radicals” (who advocated a more intransigent position and wished to define clear conditions for the participation of RMDSZ in power) accused the former of excluding a considerable part of the organization from decision-making. In 2003, an internal opposition grouping around László Tőkés has left the party. In Ukraine there was a split between KMKSZ and UMDSZ already in the early 1990s, with KMKSZ having a more intransigent position and a stress on autonomy demands, while UMDSZ being far better embedded into the Ukrainian political field and more compromising. Erin Jenne’s (2007) model of ethnic bargaining focusing on kinstate’s effect on programmatic moderation and radicalization might be relevant at this level. Nevertheless, I argue that, especially after 2014, Hungary’s growing leverage should be interpreted as a reconfiguration of networks of political patronage in a context where – for different reasons in Romanian and in Ukraine – the capacity of minority elites to mobilize domestic public resources has decreased considerably.

2. Hungarian Kinstate Policies before and after 2010

As it is well-known, Hungary lost two thirds of its territories and one third of its Hungarian speaking population following World War I, as a consequence of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Border changes transformed suddenly Hungarians into a divided nation (O’Leary–McGarry 2013), while territorial revision has become the most important goal during the interwar period. In the state socialism period, however, Hungarian authorities not only renounced to territorial claims, but also fostered a redefinition of the Hungarian nation, which would include only the resident population of the country (Ludanyi 1995). Meanwhile, a routinization of the new state borders has begun (Örkény–Csepeli 1996) and during the 1970s a slight majority of native Hungarians did not consider minority Hungarians as part of the Hungarian nation (Lázár 2013).

2.1. Kinstate policy before 2010

Kinstate policy remained a rather controversial issue in Hungary between 1989 and 2010. A summary of the opposing views of left- and right-wing actors is useful in this regard, even if some readers might (rightly) find my description too schematic and not nuanced enough. Three general points of disagreement might be highlighted: (1) opposing definitions of the Hungarian nation; (2) disagreement concerning the subsidy policies for minority communities; and (3) different positions toward emerging models of minority incorporation in the neighboring states and, especially, moderate elite factions compromising with majority actors.

(1) Both right- and left-wing political actors strived to redefine the Hungarian nation following 1989. Without entering into details, it is suffice to say that while right-wing parties have been interested in “virtual” national reunification, to use Csergő and Goldgeier’s (2004) wording, left-liberals have been attracted by a rather pure form of civic nationalism, namely constitutional patriotism, modelled on German ideas. Clashes with the so-called Status Law in 2001 (Kántor et al. 2004) and external citizenship in 2004 (Csergő 2005; Saidemen and Ayres 2008: 120–123; Waterbury 2010: 123–128) are relatively well documented. Debates ended after the electoral collapse of the left-liberal block in 2010, when the new parliament – controlled by a two-thirds majority of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz – modified the law on citizenship and made possible for former Hungarian citizens and their descendants to obtain Hungarian citizenship without having residency in Hungary. The electoral collapse of the left-liberal block was certainly not caused primarily by debates concerning the status of transborder Hungarians. However, it put a definitive end to the expectations that constitutional patriotism might become a mainstream national discourse in Hungary and has led to the institutionalization of trans-sovereign nation building (Kántor 2014).

(2) Subsidy policies constituted another controversial issue. To put it simply, according to left-wing actors minority institutions should have been financed by the states of residence of minority communities, while right-wing actors were ready to initiate and finance institutional processes. In the vision of left-wing actors, Hungarian kinstate support might have a supplementary role only, while right-wing actors argued that minority institutions should be sustained and strengthened by kinstate subsidies. Before 2010, especially under left-wing governments, the left-wing concept of kinstate subsidies was dominant and they actually did not

have transformative effects on the structure of minority institutions. Some institutional initiatives of the first Orbán government (between 1998 and 2002), such as establishing Sapientia University in Romania and the Ferenc Rákóczi II College in Ukraine represent important exceptions.

(3) As a third point of disagreement, left- and right-wing actors took different positions toward the evolving models of minority accommodation in neighboring countries. Left-liberals – even if they did not deny the existence of a culturally defined Hungarian nation – thought that minority Hungarians should be part first of all of the political communities of their countries of residence. Consequently, as a rule, they backed attempts of Hungarian minority elites to integrate into the political field and power structures of the neighboring states. Right-wing actors took a contrary position, opposed governmental participation and coalescence with majority actors without receiving constitutional guarantees of ethnic power sharing. This meant practically that, at least before 2010, the Hungarian right-wing proved to be a long-term opponent of moderate elite factions compromising with majority actors and tried to push toward the so-called “autonomist scenario”.

2.2. Renewed kinstate policies after 2010: Human resource management and institutional incorporation

After 2010, however, important changes have occurred in kinstate policy. In its 2013 speech in Băile Tușnad/Tusnádfürdő, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán phrased the essence of the program of ‘virtual’ national reunification following 2010. In this new concept minority Hungarians constituted a human resource for Hungary that should be the subject of the national human resource-management developed by a Budapest-centered regime:

[...] The 20th century turned Hungary into a dispersed nation [...]. The question is how is it possible now to turn the dispersion into a strong World-nation [világnemzet] As it is now, the linkage between Hungarians cannot be created on a territorial base, but it should be created through the bonds of citizenship. Only through citizenship it is possible to synchronize the strengths of all Hungarians. Dual citizenship is an indispensable part of governmental policies aiming at sovereignty over our resources. [Hungarians living beyond the borders of Hungary] should be part of a system providing them with resources. Kinstate policy helps Hungarians to maintain their identity and to flourish in their native lands, to learn in

their mother tongue from kindergarten to university degree. But it is also an integral part of our national pursuits, of our economic policy. This is how Hungary will be able to transform itself from a dispersed nation into a strong nation.


This kind of reunification was based on individual-bureaucratic linkages between the Hungarian state and members of the Hungarian community on the one hand, and linkages with minority institutions, on the other. The 2010 modification of the 1993 Law on Citizenship¹² offering non-resident citizenship for Hungarians living abroad was only one step in establishing personal individual-bureaucratic linkages. The 203/2011 Electoral Law¹³ enfranchised non-resident citizens, allowing them to vote on party lists at national elections. Subsidies targeting individuals were also strengthened. This latter category was the most important in Ukraine where teachers, medical-care personnel and other professional categories have been targeted.

Institutional meso-level has become even more important. According to Zoltán Kántor (2014: 261-262), director of the Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad (NPKI): *“Short-term goal of kinstate policy is community building. The borders of the Hungarian nation are identic with the area of operation of minority institutions [...] Kinstate policy focuses on areas where a dense and well-functioning net of institutions makes possible for Hungarians to be in contact with the Hungarian language, culture, and community throughout their life”*. It was in the context of this new meso-level focus (e.g., initiating institutional programs instead of investing in an autonomy movement) that Hungary increased considerably institutional subsidies in such domains as sports or, arguably, also economy. Additionally, political leverage of Hungary has also increased. As already mentioned, before 2010 Hungarian elites were integrated into the political field through mechanism of a (*ad hoc* and often quite informal) political bargaining. In this system majority actors controlled to a great extent political processes inside the minority field, while Hungarian leverage was relatively marginal. Following 2010 – due to internal political developments that we will discuss below – and to increased Hungarian subsidies, ethnic minority parties became increasingly influenced by the Orbán government.

2.3. Kinstate subsidies after 2010

It is impossible to summarize quantitatively all forms of kinstate subsidies, nevertheless, concerning budgetary funds, closing accounts of the previous fiscal years¹⁴ are considered to be the most reliable source (Bányai 2020). These documents, contrary to laws on state budgets of the upcoming years, do not refer to planned but to incurred spendings. For the period between 2015 and 2020, there are separate tables at the end of the main volumes¹⁵ of closing accounts, summarizing spendings targeting Hungarian minorities abroad broken down by public bodies (ministries and other public institutions) administering these funds. For the period between 2010 and 2015, I relied on Bányai (2020) who, based on key-word search, carried out an analysis of both main volumes and annexes of closing accounts.

Figure 2. Budgetary funds allocated for minority Hungarian communities and kinstate policy between 2010 and 2020 (total amount in million euro)¹⁶




Source: <http://kfib.hu/hu/torvenyek-zarszamasok>

According to final accounts, kinstate subsidies have increased considerably in two consecutive waves: (1) during the third (2014-2018) and (2) during the fourth (2018-2022) Orbán government. Annual average of kinstate spending was 82 million euros during Orbán's second mandate,

269 million euros during his third one, and 572 million euros during the first three years of his fourth mandate, reaching the huge amount of 862 million in 2020. Closing accounts of the 2021 fiscal year were not available in July 2022 when I carried out my analysis, but most probably kinstate spendings have decreased considerably compared to the previous year.

Figure 3. Budgetary funds allocated for minority Hungarian communities and kinstate policy by ministries, 2010 and 2020 (amount in euro)*



Source: <http://kfib.hu/hu/torvenyek-zarszamasadasok>

* Not all public bodies distributing funds for Hungarians abroad were marked.

Ministries and other public bodies administering kinstate funds have also changed over time. Currently, the two most important channels are Bethlen Gábor Fund (*Bethlen Gábor Alap* or *BGA* in Hungarian) distributing 408 million and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs distributing 356 million euros in 2020 (see Figure 3). Next to them, the Prime Minister's Office also disposes over a significant amount of 54 million euros.¹⁷

In case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, economic subsidies constituted the most significant payments. This project has been launched in 2016, when small scale farms and businesses were supported first in Vojvodina (Serbia) and Transcarpathia. This type of subsidy was extended to a different region of Romania following 2018.¹⁸ Calls targeting large-

and medium-level enterprises were launched in 2019 in Romania and in 2020 in Ukraine. Data concerning the subsidies distributed in 2019 are partially available.¹⁹ According to the available documents 75 million euros were distributed between 66 large- and medium-scale enterprises in Covasna/Kovászna, Harghita/Hargita and Mureş/Maros counties, the subsidies ranging between 220,000 and 5.5 million euros. As one can notice (see Figure 3), economic subsidies have increased considerably in 2020, reaching 355 million euros. This amount however has not been entirely handled out for minority Hungarian enterprises, but transborder expansion of Hungarian firms was also financed.

As for the entire period, Bethlen Gábor Fund (BGA) was the channel disbursing most of the subsidies, especially in the case of finances targeting minority NGOs. In 2020, 48 percent of all budgetary payments flow through it. BGA was established in 2010, after Homeland Fund (*Szülőföld Alap*) founded by the previous socialist government was abolished. Beginning with 2012, it channeled around two thirds of all kinstate policy related payments. The proportion of payments running through BGA was constantly decreasing since 2016 due to the emphasis on economic subsidies administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In case of BGA, three types of spendings can be distinguished: individual subsidies, open calls for minority institutions, and the so-called unique requests (*egyedi támogatási kérelem*) that are available only for invited applicants.

At the beginning of the analyzed period, individual subsidies amounted for more than a half of the total payments distributed by BGA. This was due mostly to so-called Educational Allowances (*Oktatási-Nevelési Támogatás*) targeting pupils attending Hungarian language schools: a 20,000 Hungarian forints (HUF, then 100 euros) annual amount, introduced by the Socialist-Liberal government in 2004. In the case of Ukraine, educational support was completed by subsidies targeting teachers, medical-care personnel, and other categories working in the public sector or minority institutions.²⁰ In 2020 the total number of beneficiaries was 33,4 thousand (among them more than 8 thousand public employees) in Ukraine and 155 thousand in Romania (see Table 1). This type of subsidies amounted for 5.5 percent of the total budget of BGA. In Ukraine, however, it mattered more: almost one third of BGA payments were spent on individual level subsidies.

Table 1. Individual subsidies channeled by Bethlen Gábor Fund targeting Hungarians in Romania and Ukraine in 2020

Minority community	Targeted category	No. of beneficiaries	Amount euro	Annual per capita amount
Hungarians in Ukraine	Children learning in Hungarian language schools	19,077	982,408	51.49701
	Children attending Hungarian language kindergartens	6,368	503,339	79.04192
	Teachers in Hungarian language schools	5,044	4,577,246	907.4634
	Medical-care personnel	2,151	1,504,940	699.6467
	Auxiliary personnel in Hungarian language schools	338	193,413	572.2283
	Cultural organizations	181	93,234	515.1024
	Journalists	140	77,515	553.6784
	Personnel working in child's protection	106	526,946	4971.19
	Actors and other personnel in theatres	64	56,437	881.8301
	Sport trainers	12	5,749	479.0419
	Total in Ukraine	33,481	8,521,226	9710.72
Hungarians in Romania	Children learning in Hungarian language schools & kindergarten	155,076	7,985,950	51.49701

Source: BGA (online available documents issued by BGA Decision-making Committee)²¹

The overwhelming majority of subsidies targeted minority institutions instead of individuals and “unique requests” constituted the dominant form of distribution: in 2020, 87.6 percent of BGA’s budget was spent this way, for the period between 2012 and 2020 representing 32 to 59 percent of the total budgetary fund spent for kinstate policies.

Unique requests are subsidies targeting minority institutions (dominantly minority NGOs and Hungarian churches, in rare occasions public institutions or firms) that are distributed through calls that are not publicly available. Potential beneficiaries receive a request to apply for BGA funds, then they elaborate the application, and ultimately the Decision-making Committee of BGA takes a verdict about financing. Usually, only successful applicants are notified, those failing to receive financing are not even informed (as they in fact did not submit any publicly available application). In reality, the process of receiving the requests is preceded by intensive lobbying and negotiations, not necessarily through persons formally in charge (State Secretary for Hungarians Abroad, Deputy Prime Minister for Kinstate Policy, and two other members of the Committee), but through various and seemingly random political and institutional actors having certain leverage in Orbán’s kinstate policy:

Before the celebration of the anniversary we met the minister. At that time Zoltán Balogh has led the Ministry [of Human Capacities, having no formal decision-making competence in BGA] and we met him in [a village in the region]. The bishop was also there, as well as [XY] representing the presbyters. We discussed that our church would receive a significant support of around 2 billion forints [6.5 million euro] for the celebration and for the repairing of buildings belonging to us. Then we submitted this great application. We worked out all the details.
(Interview code: Kinstate 24, church representative)

Although “individual requests” are funds not announced publicly, the positive decisions are available on the site of BGA in downloadable PDF documents. During the investigation we²² processed all these files and elaborated a (hopefully) exhaustive database of individual requests containing the name of the applicant organization, the amount they received (in HUF) and the destination of the subsidy. Next to this directly available information, we also coded the applicants according to their main social domain of activity, residence, and the larger organizational structure or political interest group they belong to. This last information

proved to be vital in understanding the kinstate policy effects on the internal power structure of minority fields and on how different factions of minority elites became incorporated into Orbán's mono-pyramidal rule.

3. MPA at Meso-level: Institutionally Sustained Ethnic Parallelism

In order to understand meso-level effects of Orbán's kinstate policy, the notion of institutionally sustained ethnic parallelism is of key importance. This is well known in the literature of divided societies and it is rather similar to what Lijphart (1977) calls *pillars* or *pillarization*. Pillars constitute dense institutional networks, which make possible for group members to live their everyday lives among their "own", without considering too much the existence of other pillars. Both Transylvanian and Transcarpathian Hungarian cases might be regarded as ones of asymmetric pillarization, where minority institutions are embedded into a larger majority dominated structure.²³ Nevertheless, this minority institutions play a pivotal role in the reproduction of groupness that I perceive as a meso-level phenomenon (Lamont et al 2019). It is inside these institutions where Hungarians are socialized as Hungarians (Brubaker 2009: 210) and without the existence of separate institutional spaces ethnic boundary maintenance vis-à-vis the majority would also be jeopardized (Biró 1998; Brubaker et al. 2006). Consequently, establishing, maintaining, and governing separate meso-level institutional structures should be considered as an important dimension of MPA.

Following the meso-level turn of Hungarian kinstate policies, minority institutions became the most important target of subsidies targeting Hungarians abroad, while institutionally sustained ethnic parallelism was regarded by kinstate actors as a tool of stopping or slowing assimilation. However, one should emphasize (again) that ethnic parallelism, as a political program, was not the invention of the Orbán-regime but a taken-for-granted background of all political programs and community organizing projects of minority Hungarian elites (Lőrincz 2008; Kiss and Kiss 2018). Thus, at the level of minority elites, the major source of legitimacy of the post-2010 Hungarian kinstate policy is not the external citizenship, but subsidies that sustain and strengthen minority organizations:

It was fine to say for 100 years that we should hold on, fight and resist. But this cannot be done forever. If being Hungarian is always a disadvantage, if you are always beaten and if you are always going down, it won't work forever. We cannot be kept like this. It does not work that you are enrolled in a religious school and you live among ruins and you sit between moldy walls. If there is no progress, this should at least be kept at some level. But no one has been able to do this so far, nobody before, not even the previous Fidesz government. They gave a little here, they gave a little there. But that was just like watering with a drop of water in the 40-degree summer heat. We watered the flower a little in the morning, but it was gone by noon. There was no strategic plan, there was no real institution-building. This is the truth! But now there is a political will for it. There was one person who said that this is good and I want to do this. There was money, there was the European Union context. Because this could not have been done in the interwar period. Right? Not even during the 1990s. EU was needed for this. So, I think that this is a groundbreaking shift in the life of Hungarian institutions in Transylvania. Now there is a Hungarian government that says that this is good and I want to support it. Draw your circles, build your institutions, live in them and survive. If you would like to keep Hungarians in this region, you should provide them the opportunity to build their institutions. You can say many things about Viktor Orbán, but he was the only one who recognized this and who did this during the last 100 years. It is another question who got the subsidies and how subsidies were distributed. But we are building 400 Hungarian institutions simultaneously and this is a huge thing. I don't know if this will happen ever again.

(Interview code: Kinstate 32, RMDSZ leader)

At a programmatic and ideological level, the goal of minority elites was to build up a system of minority institutions covering all social domains, at the level of institutional realities minority Hungarians live their life in a combination of minority governed and majority dominated institutions. There are several social fields where ethnic parallelism and separation are not characteristic and, consequently, encapsulation of the Hungarian minority in its own institutional field is always imperfect. More importantly, the economic sector is basically not ethnically organized either in Transylvania or in Transcarpathia, even if there were some initiatives to strengthen Hungarian business networks or to develop ethnically marked economic sectors (Csata 2018). Nevertheless, several social domains might be identified where minority institutions are dominant, the most important being education, politics, religion, cultural activities,

mass-media, and several domains of social- and health-care. Sports and leisure time activities are also becoming increasingly organized through minority institutions, while in several (especially minority dominated) regions, institutions belonging to local administration might also be regarded as minority-governed. Minority Hungarian institutions are not necessarily defined as such by their constitutive act but they are defined by using Hungarian language in their daily affairs and having Hungarian as a default category inside their institutionally defined spaces.

The sectorial structure and financing of these institutions is also of key importance and in this respect Romania and Ukraine share similar legacies of the socialist state. In Romania, state socialism had rather complex consequences on the Hungarian minority institutions. Post-1989 historiographers tended to emphasize the process of nationalization of church, private and communal proprieties sustaining minority institutions during the interwar period (Bárdi–Kiss 2018). Nevertheless, Hungarians also became a recognized national minority having their state-financed (and obviously state-controlled) minority institutions ranging from media organs, schools and theatres to Hungarian language universities and even the Hungarian Autonomous Province granting some territorially based language rights in the ethnic block area of Székely Land. During the 1970s and the 1980s, Hungarian minority institutions were narrowing, but even in this period they constituted an important base for cultural and elite reproduction (Cercel–Toró-Kiss 2021). In Ukraine, the already mentioned Soviet hierarchy of nationalities was of central importance (Gorenburg 2003). Hungarians were neither titulars having their own republic, nor a nationality having an autonomous territory, but they – similarly to Romania – owned a wide range of meso-level cultural and educational institutions. Given the fact that state-socialist minority policies were based on institutional meso-level, it was obvious that broadening the array of minority institutions has become an implicit program of minority elites in both cases. The emerging structure was a combination of interwar and state-socialist realities with a robust sector of religious institutions and NGOs, completed by publicly financed Hungarian or Hungarian-dominated institutions.

During the left-wing governments, kinstate subsidies might be considered as supplementary and did not have visible impact on the above-mentioned institutional structure. This was not the case, however, during the subsequent Orbán governments. The availability to invest in the minority institutional system and to initiate institutional processes was

revealed already by the first Orbán government, which ruled between 1998 and 2002. As a rather important institutional investment, they established Sapientia University in Romania and Ferenc Rákóczi II College in Ukraine as Hungarian language universities financed exclusively by Hungary.²⁴ Kinstate institutional intervention has advanced, however, to a higher level during the third and fourth Orbán government, when an annual average of 269 million euros, respectively 572 million euros were spent.

Table 2. Budgetary funds allocated for minority institutions in Romania and Ukraine by the social domain of activity of the beneficiaries between 2011-2021

Social domain of activity of targeted organizations	Romania		Ukraine	
	euro	%	euro	%
Religious organizations	287,904,678	40.6	27,775,005	15.3
Higher education	179,093,298	25.3	102,364,776	57.6
Sports	82,371,045	11.6		
Primary and secondary education	45,620,775	6.4	24,934,626	13.7
Culture and arts	44,145,335	6.2	2,977,280	1.6
Political organizations	30,602,818	4.3	14,540,915	8.0
Mass media	15,257,330	2.2	530,523	0.3
Social services	11,025,032	1.6	1,717,197	0.9
Research	6,626,867	0.9	76,987	0.0
Economic, social, and community development	4,604,085	0.6	1,124,308	0.6
Environment	729,471	0.1	72,733	0.0
Healthcare	449,231	0.1	43,916	0.0
Elsewhere, not classified	252,694	0.0		
Business and professional	232,393	0.0	3,427,297	1.9
Total	708,915,051	100	182,085,564	100

Source: BGA (database of online available documents issued by BGA Decision-making Committee)

According to the database of BGA decisions concerning unique requests, in Transylvania the most important beneficiaries were religious organizations (40.6 percent of the total amount), among them the Transylvanian Bishopric of the Hungarian Reformed Church (*Erdélyi Református Püspökség* with 191.7 million euros), the Crişana Bishopric of the Hungarian Reformed Church (*Királyhágómelléki Református Püspökség* with 18.6 million euros), the Oradea/Nagyvárad and Satu Mare/Szatmárnémeti Bishoprics of the Roman Catholic Church (with 14.7 and 11.7 million euros, respectively), the Lutheran-Evangelic Church (Romániai Luteránus Evangélikus Egyház with 7.4 million euros), the Alba Iulia/Gyulafehérvár Archebishopric of the Roman Catholic Church (Gyulafehérvári Római Katolikus Érsekség, with 5.7 million) and the Hungarian Unitarian Church (with 4.6 million euros). 25.3 percent of the subsidies were spent in higher education, Sapientia Hungarian University in Transylvania receiving 164 million euros, while Studium Prospero Foundation, an NGO backing the University of Medicine in Târgu Mureş/Marosvásárhely receiving 10,1 million euros. It should be emphasized that NGOs backing tertiary education at Babeş-Bolyai University, which comprises by far more students and professors teaching in Hungarian than Sapientia or the University of Medicine, have received the incomparably smaller amount of 0,6 million euros divided among twelve organizations. Different sport clubs and academies received 11.6 percent of the total amount, the most important among them being Sepsi OSK²⁵ (with 30,1 million euros), Csíkszereda FC²⁶ (with 30,1 million euros) and Mens Sana Foundation²⁷ (with 18,8 million). Among the beneficiaries of more than 10 million euros there are the Association of Hungarian Teachers of Romania (RMPSZ²⁸ with 29,1 million), which administers the Educational Allowance targeting families with children enrolled in Hungarian language schools;²⁹ the School Foundation (*Iskola Alapítvány* with 24,7 million), an NGO run by RMDSZ; Transylvanian Mediascape Foundation (*Erdélyi Médiatér Alapítvány* with 14,9 million), a media-consortium running several Hungarian language news portals, local and regional radios. Between 2011 and 2021 a total number of 642 minority organizations were supported financially through BGA, with 56 of them receiving more than 1 million euro.

In Transcarpathia 58 percent of the subsidies were spent for higher education, The Ferenc Rákóczi II Hungarian College in Berehove/Beregszász (and its charity foundation) being the most important beneficiary, with 101,6 million received between 2011 and 2021. It was followed by religious institutions (15.3 percent), the Hungarian Reformed Church being granted 16,9 million, the Mukacheve/Munkács Diocese of

the Roman Catholic Church 5,9, the Berehove/Beregszász District of the Muchaceve/Munkács Diocese of the Greek Catholic Church 2 million euros. As for primary and secondary education, there were church-run schools like Sztojka Sándor Greek Catholic Lyceum in Karachin/Karácshalva or the Reformed Lyceum in Velyka Dobron/Nagydobrony. In addition to these organizations, the Charity Foundation of KMKSZ (13,5 million euros) and the Association of Hungarian Teachers of Transcarpathia (14,1 million) should be mentioned.

It should be mentioned that Table 2 does not contain economic subsidies administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hungary and distributed by Pro Economica Foundation in Romania and Egán Ede Foundation in Ukraine. As already mentioned, economic subsidies were launched in 2016 and reached 355 million euro in 2020.


Kinstate subsidies altered significantly MPA and the structure of the minority field. One might distinguish between three types of consequences: (1) deepening vertically; (2) broadening or expanding horizontally the ethnic parallelism; and (3) restructuring the minority field.

Interventions *deepening (vertically) the ethnic parallelism* target social domains that were previously organized through (ethnically separate) minority institutions. In this case kinstate subsidies increase the proportion of minority group members connected to minority institutions and/or push toward formal-organizational separation of minority and majority structures. Educational projects and investments in educational infrastructure represent this type of intervention. Beginning with 2015, which was declared the “Year of Hungarian Vocational Training”,³⁰ massive investments aimed short-term professional education. This was especially important in Transylvania, where, from a perspective of native language education, the situation was quite unfavorable in this domain. During the 1980s and the 1990s, only a tiny minority of Hungarian students could study in the vernacular, due to restrictive educational policies. Since 2000, the situation has somehow improved, but outside the Hungarian majority area of Székely Land the majority of Hungarian pupils were educated in Romanian language. An even more massive investment was the so-called Kindergarten Program. Targeting pre-primary education, it was launched in 2016. The goal was to build 77 new Hungarian language kindergartens and to refurbish other 200. These kindergartens are overwhelmingly arranged in separate organizational structures under the administration of Hungarian Churches.

Interventions *broadening or extending horizontally the ethnic parallelism* aim to establish ethnically integrated institutions in domains where formerly they did not exist or they did not dominate. Attempts of Orbán's kinstate policy to extend social domains where ethnic parallelism dominates are rather obvious. Economy and sports are the strategic spheres and the most visible examples. Economic subsidies were discussed earlier. According to Csata (2018: 348), strategic documents elaborated by kinstate actors often envision an ethnically separated enclave economy that might underpin the autonomous organization of Transylvanian Hungarians. Sport is considered by the Orbán regime as a major tool of nation-building and the obtaining of political legitimacy. This became explicit in the case of sport investments in Transylvania.

Hungary is the terrain of huge and often contested bids for sports infrastructure (Bozóki 2016). It is not accidental that minority Hungarian communities, among them those from Romania are also envisaged by such investments. As a consequence of these investments both mass- and professional sports might be regarded as relatively new domains of ethnic parallelism.

Figure 4. BGA subsidies targeting sport clubs and academies (million euros)



Source: BGA (database of online available documents issued by BGA Decision-making Committee)

4. Different Models of Incorporation: The Structure of the Minority Field, Path Dependency and Bargaining Capacities


Kinstate subsidies and the growing leverage of the Orbán government not only “deepens” and “broadens” institutionally sustained parallelism, but it also reshapes internal power structures inside the minority field, as well as it incorporates minority institutions into Hungary’s mono-pyramidal rule. Nevertheless, models of incorporating Hungarian minorities differ in Romania and Ukraine, a fact that has been revealed by both quantitative data on kinstate subsidies and qualitative interviews. In Ukraine a kind of intra-ethnic authoritarianism structured around MKKSZ and its leader, László Brenzovics, has evolved and substituted the previously bipolar institutional structure spilt between MKKSZ and UMDSZ. In Romania the minority field has remained more fragmented, none of the political poles being capable to dominate institutions across different social domains. In what follows, I will first describe these differences, as they appear in quantitative data, and then I will argue that differences are due to three factors. Firstly, there are differences between the internal organization of minority fields in Romania and Ukraine. In Ukraine various social domains are more interlocking at personal level and, consequently, direct political control was always far tighter. Among Transylvanian Hungarians institutional and elite structures are more fragmented and intensive intra-ethnic pillarization was characteristic already before 2010, RMDSZ being less able (and perhaps willing) to control all minority organizations. Secondly, path-dependency of Fidesz’s relations toward different minority organizations, especially those toward political organizations matters. As already mentioned, previously Fidesz used to be mistrustful to elite factions perceived as being too compromising with majority actors, among them UMDSZ and RMDSZ. Although such programmatic disagreements have lost their magnitude and there was a rapprochement between Fidesz and RMDSZ (and to a lesser extent UMDSZ), former alliances mattered and Fidesz remained more enthusiastic toward MKKSZ, as its long-term ally than to RMDSZ, as a newcomer in its orbit. Thirdly, bargaining capacities of minority organizations and resources received from states of residence have also mattered. Hungarian political organizations in Ukraine have lost almost all of their bargaining capacity in this country under the circumstances of increased securitization after 2014, while minority organizations were much more underfinanced compared to Romania. Bargaining capacities of RMDSZ has also weakened considerably after

2014, due to anti-corruption agenda, but they were largely reinserted in 2020, as RMDSZ gained formal governmental positions. Moreover, in Romania large segments of minority institutions are financed by the state, such as public education, Hungarian language education in state-run universities, public media, and a large array of cultural institutions. Neither public nor EU funds accessible through institutional structures of the residence state are negligible, thus Hungary's capacities to incorporate minority institutions become limited.

4.1. Institutional blocks and superstructures

As already mentioned, I coded minority organizations receiving subsidies by their belonging to different institutional supra-structures or political networks. In Transcarpathia I identified five political-institutional superstructures, namely the KMKSZ-Berehove College block, the UMDSZ-Uzhgorod University block and the institutional structures of the Hungarian Reformed, Roman Catholic and the Greek Catholic Churches.

Figure 5. Subsidies targeting Transcarpathia by the political/institutional affiliation of the recipients



Source: BGA (database of online available documents issued by BGA Decision-making Committee)

Crucially, Ferenc Rákóczi II Hungarian College in Berehove should be considered as a KMKSZ stronghold. It was founded and run by the Foundation for Hungarian College in Transcarpathia (*Kárpátaljai Magyar Főiskoláért Alapítvány*) whose president is László Brenzovics. There is an obvious overlap between the professors and the students of the college and those being members of KMKSZ:

Studying at the college and working in KMKSZ went in parallel. The College was established by KMKSZ, so we helped KMKSZ regularly. During the electoral campaigns we displayed the placards and went door-to-door. They asked and we did it with pleasure. Campaigning was fun for us. Many of us get close to the organization. If they needed help, we went willingly. We helped them also in organizing events. We, meaning the Students' Union of the college. When we graduated, the KMKSZ leadership suggested to establish a youth organization of KMKSZ. A whole team graduated at the same time: András Mester, Erzsébet Szvetkó, Andrea Bocskor [today Fidesz MP at EP, representing Hungarians in Ukraine], Karolina Darcsi. But upcoming generations also joined KMKSZ

(Interview Code: Kinstate 8, lecturer and KMKSZ activist)

Institutions belonging to KMKSZ-Berehove College block received 74,6 percent of subsidies running through BGA. This is completed by economic subsidies distributed by Egán Ede Foundation that is also (obviously) in the orbit of KMKSZ.

Minority institutions belonging to the rival UMDSZ-Uzhgorod University block received incomparably fewer funds. After 2014, some more resources were allocated for this block, including NGOs supporting tertiary education (of Hungarians) at Uzhgorod University. Nevertheless, the resource allocation for UMDSZ remained rather limited.


Churches should be considered separate institutional blocks that are not controlled by politics, even if there were attempts in this regard and an interlocking between churches and political organizations would facilitate such a development. Actually, churches became more independent from politics during the post-2010 period, partially due to Hungarian subsidies. Churches play a central role in the educational system, as a significant part of kindergartens built or refurbished by the Hungarian state are administered by them. A similar situation is that of several schools, especially in tertiary education.

Extra-block subsidies targeting organizations beyond direct political control count for only 3 percent of the total amount, Illyés Gyula Hungarian Theatre in Berehove being the most important beneficiary.

All in all, in Transcarpathia, minority organizations active in various social domains are under rather tight political control. This was the case even before 2010, when the split between KMKSZ and UMDSZ has run along the whole system of minority institutions. This situation was similar to what Lijphart wrote about the cohesion of political and social organizations in pillarized societies. According to the founding father of consociational theory, *“elites [of pillarized segments] are close-knit groups. Strong cohesion is partly the result of formal connections between the political parties, interest groups, newspapers within each group, but an even more important factor is the pattern of informal intra-block connections formed by interlocking directories of various block organizations”* (Lijphart 1969: 59). This informal pattern is strengthened in Transcarpathia by the scarcity of human resources affecting smaller minorities. As a consequence, many minority actors are active in various domains, like research, education, religion, politics, and various organizations, professionalization and differentiation by domains being at a rather low level.

In Transylvania, ethnic parallelism is not at a lower level, but (partially due to the greater number of Hungarians) the differentiation of social domains is much more evaluated. Consequently, some fields, such as higher education, religion or cultural production are less politicized and not under direct control of RMDSZ (or its challengers).

Figure 6. Subsidies targeting Transylvania by the political/institutional affiliation of the recipients



Source: BGA (database of online available documents issued by BGA Decision-making Committee)

In this instance we identified no less than 14 political/institutional supra-structures or networks. The Reformed Church has received 222,9 million euros (31.4 percent) with all its bishoprics, parishes, and charity organizations included. Sapientia Hungarian University has received 164 million or 23.1 percent of the funds, the Catholic Church 63,9 million or 9 percent, the Evangelic Lutheran Church 7,8 million or 1.1 percent, the Unitarian Church 5 million or 0.7 percent, the Baptists Church 1,4 million or 0.2 percent, the Greek Catholic Church 518 thousand or 0.1 percent. Among the other supra-structures, we already discussed RMPSZ (Hungarian Teachers Association in Romania) and the sport clubs. It should be mentioned that NGOs belonging to the Transylvanian Hungarian aristocracy have received 5,6 million, overwhelmingly during Orbán's fourth mandate. It is not mere curiosity that an interest-group with growing leverage lobbying – among others – came through Viktor Orbán's wife, Anikó Lévai.³¹ Organization that were not (closely) connected to any of the superstructures (some of them having their own patron in Budapest) have received 60,1 million or 8.5 percent of the total amount.

The main difference compared to Ukraine is that organizations connected to the dominant RMDSZ and its challengers (including to the


networks of those being active in different RMDSZ challenger factions) received 31.1 million or 4.1 and 24.6 million or 3.5 percent respectively. NGOs belonging to RMDSZ have received an annual average of 33,000 euros during the second Orbán government, Jakabbfy Elemér Foundation (belonging to non-mainstream RMDSZ executive vice-president, István Székely) being the most important beneficiary with an annual amount of 26.000 euro. RMDSZ subsidies have begun to increase only in 2016, when School Foundation (affiliated to RMDSZ top leadership and led by internal circles of RMDSZ president Hunor Kelemen) received 971.000, while Pro Regio Sicularum (belonging to Sfântu Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy mayor Árpád-András Antal) received 111.000 euros. Further significant increases followed, reaching an annual average of 6.9 million euros per year in the period of 2018-2021. School Foundation has remained by far the largest beneficiary followed by Eurotrans Foundation (belonging also to top leadership), Pro Regio Sicularum and Center for Public Policies (Közpolitikai Elemző Központ, also connected to top RMDSZ leadership). It should be added that BGA subsidies do not mirror exactly the weight of RMDSZ in resource allocation. Pro Economica, which distributes economic subsidies, is also led by Hunor Kelemen's close circle, while Eurotrans Foundation, which helps applicants for Hungarian citizenship, received funds from the Prime Minister's Office.

During the second Orbán government (2010-2014), organizations belonging to the orbit of RMDSZ-challenger factions have received somewhat more, compared to RMDSZ (an annual amount of 89,000 euro), but their share in total subsidies remained under 2 percent until 2018. Subsidies disbursed through BGA were completed with an average amount of 794,000 euro per year received by the PM's Office to sustain the so-called Democracy Centers helping applicants for Hungarian citizenship. Taken into account also this disbursements RMDSZ-challenger organizations have received far more funding compared to RMDSZ before 2016. BGA subsidies for RMDSZ-challenger organizations have begun to grow consistently only after 2019. The main recipient was Transylvanian Mediascape Foundation (*Erdélyi Médiatér Alapítvány*) receiving 14,9 million euro between 2019 and 2021. As already mentioned, this is a trust running more than 30 media organs and it is connected to Szilárd Demeter former chief of staff of László Tőkés.

All in all, Hungarian subsidies mirror a quite different organization of minority field compared to Ukraine. As for political organizations, RMDSZ-challengers received more funds before, compared to RMDSZ

during the second Orbán government and NGO's within the orbit of RMDSZ were almost completely omitted. After 2015, organizations connected to RMDSZ have been substantially financed, but in certain key areas, such as mass-media, Hungarian subsidies maintained the hegemony of RMDSZ-challenger networks. Moreover, at least in the case of financing run by BGA, the major beneficiaries are not directly connected to or dominated by political organizations. This is partially due to internal organizations in the minority field. Contrary to Ukraine, political elites are not able to dominate all social domains. According to Zoltán Biró (1995: 59) Transylvanian Hungarians could be characterized by a rather strong internal fragmentation and pillarization. Although, due to successful ethno-political mobilization and ethnic block-voting, Transylvanian Hungarians are perceived by outsiders as a homogeneous body, internal division based on religion, ideologies, regional belonging have been strengthened. RMDSZ has never been able to control all domains, not even in the periods when evidently dominated the politics. Actually, the dominant political organization of Hungarians is also rather fragmented, especially along regional lines and top leadership has never been able to exercise hegemonic control over its large territorial organizations. The process of "professionalization", which took place after 1989, has also increased fragmentation. Different groups of the Transylvanian Hungarian intelligentsia were engaged in building the institutional infrastructure of well-circumscribed disciplines, thus every interest-group having its own terrain and organizational background. The "professionalization" of the political class meant that a split has occurred between the larger strata of ethnic activists running different organizations on the one hand, and political leaders engaged in political bargaining, on the other. The political class, instead of trying to colonize other social domains (as in the case of Hungarians in Ukraine) tried to escape social control and accountability by keeping distance vis-à-vis other domains.

Figure 7. Networks of political patronage connecting Hungary and minority fields in Ukraine and Romania



4.2. Path-dependent Hungarian-Hungarian relations: From radical-moderate axis to clientelistic incorporation

Before 2010, the programmatic axis was particularly relevant in the processes of ethnic bargaining and in shaping the dynamics of the intra-ethnic political competition. Consequently, this period fits better to Jenne's (2007) arguments, focusing on programmatic issues and trying to explain the radicalization and moderation of minority claims through kinstate leverage. As I have previously pointed out, positions toward existing models of minority accommodation differed between left- and right-wing actors of Hungarian kinstate policy. Right-wing actors proved to be opponents of programmatic moderation and participation in the executive power (government in Romania and positions in regional administration in Ukraine) without obtaining formal-legal guarantees of ethnic power sharing.

In Romania the radical-moderate debate remained inside RMDSZ until 2003. During the early- and mid-1990s the party's explicit program was radicalizing, as autonomy and the model of "self-determination" came to forefront. Nevertheless, actual (often hidden) political strategies of RMDSZ top leadership became already increasingly detached from the formal program. Actually, they preferred negotiations with majority political actors along more tangible and attainable (thus more moderate) policy targets. After 1996, when RMDSZ was for the first time included in the governing coalition, RMDSZ top leadership increased and consolidated its intra-party majority, but the division inside the party has also deepened and the radical-wing around László Tőkés left the party in 2003:

[In early 1990s] in Romanian politics an important decision was taken. There was a dilemma: 100 years after Trianon, or it was only 75 years then, we still have the Hungarians. What to do with them? Anyway, we cannot do what in Yugoslavia or in the Soviet Union has been done. Because of the European perspective: we could not do [what in Yugoslavia has been done] if we wanted to integrate [into the EU]. Two alternatives were left. The first was that we give them the right of solving their own problems. That would mean some kind of autonomy. The second option was that we did not grant them such rights, but we included them into the governing structure and we recognized their political aspirations of taking some decisions regarding issues concerning them. Education is a concrete example. The first option is educational autonomy, meaning that – of course in the framework of the existing legislation – the minority's representative takes decisions in educational issues. What we have now? In the Ministry of Education we have a State Secretary for education in the languages of the minorities. He is nominated by RMDSZ. What does the State Secretary? He takes decisions regarding the schools of the minorities. What kind of classes will be initiated, how many students will be enrolled in a school or another... So, we do not have the right, but they completely accept that we solve our problems in the framework of the Romanian state apparatus. Well, here came the most important fault line for RMDSZ. Romanian politics made us an offer. I accept you in the government and you will be able to manage your problems through it, but I will not give you any constitutional right to manage them yourself. Now, some people accept this, some people do not. This is a kind of moderate-radical, autonomist fault line. The vast majority of RMDSZ said: at least there is an offer, please. The question was not whether I wanted autonomy or I wanted governing positions. Only one offer was made. We could accept and become part of the government or we could remain in opposition, but without bargaining positions in minority issues. The so-called Tőkés-wing said: no, we need autonomy. But the point is that each public opinion poll showed that people were interested in using the possibilities that had been given. They were interested in using the bargaining capacities of RMDSZ. Education was one of the major issues. They were interested in RMDSZ ensuring a proper system [of Hungarian language education] year by year. (Interview code: Kinstate 18, RMDSZ leader)

Before 2010, Hungarian right-wing political actors proved to be quite resolute in this debate, they backed internal opposition and the challenger parties at that time, trying to overthrow dominant elites and start a spiral of radicalization. This was why many analysts rightly thought that increasing kinstate leverage would endanger minority accommodation.

Before 2003, RMDSZ remained unimpaired and the clashes between different factions of the Transylvanian Hungarian political class were relatively temperate. However clashes became more visible after 2003. In 2007 Tőkés, once a charismatic leader and perceived as the hero of the Timișoara/Temesvár events of December 1989, ran as an independent candidate in the European parliamentary elections and became member of EP with approximately 36% of the votes cast by Hungarians. His campaign was sponsored by Fidesz and Orbán was personally engaged in the process. MPP was established in 2008, also under the tutelage of Fidesz (then in opposition). This logic was characteristic during the 2010-2014 period, too. After 2010, the subsidy system of the previous center-left governments was radically transformed and RMDSZ was almost completely squeezed out from the new structures. In 2011, the network of Status Offices collecting applications for the so-called Hungarian Cards was abolished, and the administrative apparatus for Educational Allowances was transferred to the Association of Hungarian Teachers of Romania. Both measures constituted important losses for RMDSZ. At the same time, a new network of offices (with a staff of approximately 150) was set up with the purpose of informing and assisting the population in the process of acquiring Hungarian citizenship. However, the new network was entrusted to EMNT, which formally was an NGO, but in reality constituted one of the main pillars of RMDSZ's opposition and the sister organization of the political party EMNP (founded in 2011, also under the tutelage of Fidesz). Notwithstanding these radical changes in the subsidy policy and the establishment of EMNP, Fidesz was unable to significantly restructure the Transylvanian Hungarian political field. MPP and EMNP, RMDSZ-challenger parties, lost both local and parliamentary elections in 2012. This was probably one of the main factors that led Fidesz to reevaluate its strategy and seek rapprochement to RMDSZ. As a result of this strategy shift, RMDSZ was invited in 2015 to participate in the naturalization process of Transylvanian Hungarians. Furthermore, RMDSZ also entered into electoral cooperation with MPP in 2016 (once again, not unrelated to the developments in Budapest), while the other more radical party, EMNP, had gradually lost the support of the Hungarian capital. The explanations for this rapprochement are manifold, but the most important one is that challenger parties failed to achieve an electoral breakthrough. This also casted doubts on their capacity to mobilize a sufficiently high proportion of the newly enfranchised Transylvanian Hungarian voters in Hungary's parliamentary election. Romania's increased interest in

the resumption of harmonious relations with Hungary after a relatively tense period also mattered. Hence, RMDSZ had the potential to act as an intermediary for Romanian mainstream parties.

In Ukraine intra-ethnic party split has occurred earlier. KMKSZ was established under the leadership of Sándor Fodó as early as 1989. It run in parliamentary and local elections in spite of the fact that it was registered as a cultural organization instead of an ethnic party. This was due to electoral legislation, which required parties to have local branches in at least two thirds of Ukraine's regions (*oblast*), while Hungarians in Ukraine were heavily concentrated in one *oblast*, namely Transcarpathia. UMDSZ was also initiated by Sándor Fodó in 1991, as a political party that would act in parallel (but in close cooperation) with KMKSZ. In order to cover enough regions, it was established as an umbrella organization of KMKSZ and several (obviously incomparably smaller) Hungarian regional cultural organizations, like those of Kyiv, Lviv, Harkiv etc. Immediately after its establishment, UMDSZ, as the nationwide organization of Hungarians, played legally only a formal role and KMKSZ remained their real political organization. The importance of UMDSZ increased after an intra-organizational split within KMKSZ. In 1992 and 1993, many of its leaders were pushed out or left the organization due to disagreements with Sándor Fodó. In 1994, former KMKSZ vice president Mihály Tóth won a parliamentary seat in the Hungarian majority Berehove/Beregszász district. Tóth became UMDSZ president in 1996, while UMDSZ representatives held relatively powerful positions in local administration and the public sphere. UMDSZ gradually became far better embedded in the politics and administrative structure of Ukraine compared to KMKSZ. This resembled the situation in Romania, where "moderates" were acting in Bucharest, while radicals were connected to local minority organizations, but without embeddedness and leverage in the Romanian political field. Fidesz has become an ally of KMKSZ already at an early stage, in the 1990s, and preferred this organization during its first mandate between 1998 and 2002. As the interviews reveal, this was not the case during the Socialist-Liberal governments in Hungary, when institutions connected to UMDSZ administered applications for Educational Allowances and Hungarian Cards (*Magyar Igazolvány*) introduced by the infamous Status Law in 2021. Following 2010, among its first moves, Fidesz took the administration of Educational Allowances and Hungarian cards from UMDSZ and gave them to KMKSZ. In helping applicants for Hungarian

citizenship none of the political organizations were involved, as dual citizenship was (at least theoretically) illegal in Ukraine.

5. Conclusions

Both securitization and radicalization hypotheses presume that the bargaining capacities of minority elites might decrease. This actually has happened in both cases, but not as a consequence of securitization or radicalization triggered by kinstate actors. After 2014, Hungarian kinstate actors actually ceased to push toward the “autonomist scenario” and, actually, have become far less interested in programmatic aspects of ethnic bargaining. At the level of political elites this has led to a cooptation of minority actors into the political patronage networks encompassing public institutions in Hungary. Three concepts (or phenomena) should be mentioned in this context: (1) material outbidding; (2) loyalty competition; and (3) the cross-border mobility and political carrier possibilities for (both higher and lower rank) minority Hungarian cadres in Hungary. These elements might potentially profoundly reshape both the power structures of the minority field and the structure of bargaining between minority and majority actors.

A patronage regime politics is less about programmatic issues and more about resource allocation and (particular) modes of policy implementation, while political influence depends on the configuration of patronage networks (Chandra 2004). Beginning with the mid-1990s, Transylvanian Hungarian elites were integrated into the Romanian political field resembling such a patronage regime. Consequently, both their legitimacy toward the Hungarian community and their accommodation toward the majority depended on their monopoly in resource allocation for minority institutions and Hungarian inhabited regions. As far as resources available through bargaining with Romanian actors exceeded by large those offered by the kinstate, the influence of the latter remained marginal. However, after 2014 this trend is no more evident. Kinstate subsidies have increased considerably, while the resource allocation capacity of RMDSZ (through bargaining with majority actors) decreased drastically. Kinstate subsidies cannot be perceived more as supplementary, as they initiate and alter institutional processes and have become the main promoters of ethnic parallelism. From this perspective, one might argue that, instead

of (programmatic) ethnic outbidding, kinstate actors seek for influence through material outbidding.

Loyalty competition is a structural characteristic of both the networks of patronage in Hungary and the processes of bargaining between kinstate and minority actors. In this regard, an important difference between majority and minority bargaining should be remarked. As mentioned before, the minority accommodation in Romania was preconditioned by the recognition of RMDSZ as a legitimate representative of the minority community and its formal leadership in the quality of the sole bargaining partner. This is no more the case in bargaining with kinstate actors, where RMDSZ leadership does not have any monopoly.

Loyalty competition takes place at certain levels. Due to the duplication of offices and the division of authority, kinstate actors compete among themselves. At the same time, minority actors compete for resources. Their success depends on the nature of their linkages toward kinstate actors and on the position of their patrons in the structure presented above.

Another important new development is that boundaries between the minority and kinstate political fields have become more diffuse and permeable. This also means that political carrier opportunities in Hungary have become open for higher and lower rank minority political actors. The most obvious examples are Jenő Szász and László Tőkés. The former became president of the Research Institute for National Strategy, while the latter was elected EP deputy on the list of Fidesz. Observers took for granted that these prominent figures of the intra-ethnic opposition were “removed” from the minority political field due to the rapprochement between RMDSZ and Fidesz. This might be true; however, these developments marked a more important phenomenon, namely the “trans-nationalization” of political carriers. The process has gained a new momentum following the 2018 elections, when several rather important cultural institutions in Hungary, considered too liberal and not loyal enough, were disciplined through Transylvanian Hungarian cadres.³² This permeability of the minority and kinstate political fields and possible carrier opportunities in Hungary may profoundly alter the horizon of minority political actors and might be conducting to the integration of minority elites into the Regime of National Cooperation.

NOTES

- ¹ States of residence of minorities are called host-states by some authors (Brubaker 1996; 2000; Mylonas 2012). I use home-state for Romania and Ukraine because, from their own perspective, Transylvanian Hungarians (*Erdélyi magyarok*) and Transcarpathian Hungarians (*Kárpátaljai magyarok*) are autochthonous minorities having strong homeland narratives referring to territories they inhabit instead of being diaspora communities of Hungary.
- ² *Kárpátaljai Magyar Kulturális Szövetség* in Hungarian, *Tovaristvo Ugorskoya Culture Zakarpattia* in Ukrainian.
- ³ I am indebted to Ármin Lambing who was involved in setting up the database.
- ⁴ *Ukrajnai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség* in Hungarian, Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Ukraine in English.
- ⁵ *Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség* in Hungarian, *Uniunea Democratică a Maghiarilor din România* in Romanian, Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania in English.
- ⁶ *Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt* in Hungarian, *Partidul Popular Maghiar din Transilvania* in Romanian, Hungarian People's Party in Transylvania.
- ⁷ *Magyar Polgári Párt* in Hungarian, *Partidul Popular Maghiar din Transilvania* in Romanian, Hungarian People's Party in Transylvania in English.
- ⁸ For a more detailed analysis of the securitization-MPA nexus in five countries, including Romania and Ukraine see Csergő-Kallas-Kiss (2022).
- ⁹ The autonomy plan was submitted by József Kulcsár Terza, an MPP parliamentary deputy, elected on the list of RMDSZ.
- ¹⁰ From a constructivist perspective, group solidarity and identity are no more taken for granted, but they need to be reproduced (Brubaker 2004: 12). Minority institutions play a crucial role in this process (Brubaker et al. 2006; Lamont et al. 2016).
- ¹¹ See Barth (1969); Lamont and Molnár (2002); Wimmer (2013); Lamont et al. (2016).
- ¹² 44/2010 Law on the modification of the 55/1993 Law on Citizenship. See <https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1000044.TV>.
- ¹³ See: <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1100203.tv>
- ¹⁴ These documents (called *zárszámadás* in Hungarian) are available online for the period between 1989 and 2020. at July 14. 2022. See <http://kfib.hu/hu/torvenyek-zarszamasok> (accessed 14.07.2022).
- ¹⁵ Closing accounts are composed by a main volume (*főkötet*) summarizing all spendings and 10 Annex-volumes (*mellékkötet*) containing details about spendings of ministries and other public bodies.
- ¹⁶ In all the original documents I analyzed the amounts of subsidies available in forint (HUF) that I transformed into euro using the annual average exchange rates of the National Bank of Hungary.

- 17 Taken together with the Prime Minister's Cabinet and the State Secretary for
Hungarians Communities Abroad (see at Figure 3).
- 18 First the Western part of Mureș/Maros, then Cluj/Kolozs and Bistrița-Năsăud/
Beszterce-Naszód, and ultimately Covasna/Kovászna, Harghita/Hargita and
the rest of Mureș/Maros was targeted.
- 19 See [https://www.proeconomicaalapitvany.ro/uploads/adocs/Situatie%20](https://www.proeconomicaalapitvany.ro/uploads/adocs/Situatie%20Contracte%20Semnate%20Investitii%20Mari.pdf)
[Contracte%20Semnate%20Investitii%20Mari.pdf](https://www.proeconomicaalapitvany.ro/uploads/adocs/Situatie%20Contracte%20Semnate%20Investitii%20Mari.pdf).
- 20 In the case of these subsidies no direct ethnic selection is applied.
- 21 2020/85; 2020/88 and 2020/96 decisions of the BGA Committee. [https://](https://bgazrt.hu/tamogatasok/bizottsagi-hatarozatok/2020-evi-bizottsagi-hatarozatok/)
[bgazrt.hu/tamogatasok/bizottsagi-hatarozatok/2020-evi-bizottsagi-](https://bgazrt.hu/tamogatasok/bizottsagi-hatarozatok/2020-evi-bizottsagi-hatarozatok/)
[hatarozatok/](https://bgazrt.hu/tamogatasok/bizottsagi-hatarozatok/2020-evi-bizottsagi-hatarozatok/)
- 22 It was Ármin Lambing who helped me in processing all the decisions of the
BGA Decision-making Committee. I am thankful for his huge amount of
work.
- 23 See also Brubaker et al. (2006: 300) who proposed to use the notion
of *institutional archipelago* to describe this asymmetric form of ethnic
parallelism.
- 24 On the (perhaps unintended, but certainly un-reflected) negative
consequences of this step see Culic (2018).
- 25 Football academy and club performing in Romanian Liga I in Sfântu
Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy.
- 26 Football academy and club performing in Romanian Liga I in Sfântu
Gheorghe/Sepsiszentgyörgy
- 27 Hokey Academy run by a foundation connected to the Roman Catholic
Church.
- 28 In Hungarian: Romániai Magyar Pedagógusok Szövetsége.
- 29 Allowances are directly paid by BGA, so the amount received by RMDSZ
cover costs administering the applications or are destined to other programs
(among them establishing Hungarian language kindergartens).
- 30 See: <https://www.facebook.com/szakkepzeseve/>
- 31 See [https://atlatszo.hu/kozugy/2019/01/31/tovabb-omlik-a-kozpenz-levai-](https://atlatszo.hu/kozugy/2019/01/31/tovabb-omlik-a-kozpenz-levai-aniko-erdelyi-baratainak-kastelyara/)
[aniko-erdelyi-baratainak-kastelyara/](https://atlatszo.hu/kozugy/2019/01/31/tovabb-omlik-a-kozpenz-levai-aniko-erdelyi-baratainak-kastelyara/).
- 32 See [https://hvg.hu/kultura/201901__demeter_szilard__pim__eloretolt_](https://hvg.hu/kultura/201901__demeter_szilard__pim__eloretolt_helyorseg_uj_idoknek_ujdalnokai)
[helyorseg_uj_idoknek_ujdalnokai](https://hvg.hu/kultura/201901__demeter_szilard__pim__eloretolt_helyorseg_uj_idoknek_ujdalnokai).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aldrich, J. H. (1995). *Why parties? The origin and transformation of political parties in America. American politics and political economy series*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bányai, B. (2020). "Magyarország határon túli magyarokat érintő támogatáspolitikájának átalakulása 2010–2018". *Regio* 28 (1): 171–222.
- Barth, F. (1969). *Ethnic groups and boundaries: The social organization of culture difference*. Scandinavian University Books. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget; London: Allen & Unwin
- Bíró, Z. A. (1998a). "Intézményesedési folyamatok a romániai magyarság körében". In Z. A. Bíró (Ed.), *Stratégia vagy kényszerpályák? Tanulmányok a romániai magyar társadalomról* (pp. 16–47). Csíkszereda: Pro-Print.
- Bíró, A., & Pallai, K. (2011). *Public financing of national minority organisations: Policy paradigms, policy regimes and good practice. Study prepared for the Committee of Experts on Issues Relating to the Protection of National Minorities. Strasbourg: Council of Europe*.
- Bozóki, A. (2016). "Mainstreaming the Far Right." *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* 4 (47): 87–116.
- Bozóki, András, and Dániel Hegedűs. "An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union." *Democratization* Published online: 13 Apr 2018. DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2018.1455664
- Brubaker, R. (2009). "National homogenization and ethnic reproduction on the European periphery". In M. Barbagli & H. Ferguson (Eds.), *La teoria sociologica e lo stato moderno: saggi in onore di Gianfranco Poggi* (pp. 201–221). Bologna: Il mulino.
- Brubaker, R., Feischmidt, M., Fox, J., & Grancea, L. (2006). *Nationalist politics and everyday ethnicity in a Transylvanian town*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chandra, K. (2004). *Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India*. Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. Chandra 2004;
- Csata, Zsombor. 2018. "Economy and Ethnicity in Transylvania" In *Unequal accommodation of minority rights. Hungarians in Transylvania*. 1–37. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Csergő, Z. (2007). *Talk of the nation: Language and conflict in Romania and Slovakia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Csergő, Z. (2013). "Kosovo and the framing of non-secessionist self-government claims in Romania". *Europe-Asia Studies*, 65(5), 889–911
- Csergő, Z., & Goldgeier, J. M. (2004). "Nationalist strategies and European integration." *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(1), 21–37.
- Csergő–Kallas–Kiss (2022) *Journal of Global Security Studies* (in progress)

- Gorenburg, D. P. (2003). *Minority ethnic mobilization in the Russian Federation*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hirsch, F. (2004). "Towards a Soviet order of things: The 1926 census and the making of the Soviet Union". In S. Szreter, H. Sholkamy, & A. Dharmalingam (Eds.), *Categories and contexts: Anthropological and historical studies in critical demography* (pp. 126–147). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. (1991). *A democratic South Africa?: Constitutional engineering in a divided society perspectives on southern Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jenne, E. K. (2007). *Ethnic bargaining: The paradox of minority empowerment*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kántor, Z. (2014). *A nemzet intézményesülése a rendszerváltás utáni Magyarországon*. Budapest: Osiris.
- Kántor, Z., Majtényi, B., Ieda, O., Vizi, B., & Halász, I. (Eds.). (2004). *Beyond sovereignty: From status law to transnational citizenship?* Sapporo: 21st century COE program Slavic Eurasian studies.
- Kiss, Tamás , Toró, Tibor and Székely, István Gergő. 2018. "Unequal Accommodation: An Institutional Analysis of Ethnic Claim-Making and Bargaining." In. *Unequal accommodation of minority rights. Hungarians in Transylvania*. 37 –63. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 37-63.
- Bárdi, Nándor and Kiss, Tamás (2018). "Minority Political Agency in Historical Perspective: Periodization and Key Problems." In. *Unequal accommodation of minority rights. Hungarians in Transylvania*. 37 – 63. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kiss, Tamás and Kiss, Dénes. 2018. "Ethnic Parallelism: Political Program and Social Reality: An Introduction." In *Unequal accommodation of minority rights. Hungarians in Transylvania*. 227–249. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kitschelt, H. (2001). "Divergent paths of postcommunist democracies". In L. J. Diamond & R. Gunther (Eds.), *Political parties and democracy* (pp. 299–326). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Körösényi, András.2017. "Weber és az Orbán-rezsim: plebiszciter vezérdemokrácia Magyarországon." *Politikatudományi Szemle* 26 (4): 7 –28.
- Laitin, D. D., & Van der Veen, M. A. (2012). « Ethnicity and pork: A virtual test of causal mechanisms". In K. Chandra (Ed.), *Constructivist theories of ethnic politics* (pp. 341–358). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lamont, M., & Molnár, V. (2002). "The study of boundaries in the social sciences". *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28(1), 167–195.
- Lamont, M., Silva, G. M., Welburn, J. S., Guetzkow, J., Mizrachi, N., Herzog, H., & Reis, E. (2016). *Getting respect: Responding to stigma and discrimination in the United States, Brazil, and Israel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lijphart, A. (1969). "Consociational democracy". *World Politics*, 21(2), 207–225.
- Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Lőrincz, D. J. (2008). "A kolozsvári magyarok társadalma". *Regio*, 19(2), 240–256.
- Ludanyi, A. (1995). "Programmed Amnesia and rude awakening: Hungarian minorities in international politics, 1945–1989". In I. C. Romsics (Ed.), *20th century Hungary and the great powers* (p. vii, 391 p). Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs; Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications; New York: Distributed by Columbia University Press.
- Pogonyi, S. (2011). "Dual citizenship and sovereignty". *Nationalities Papers*, 39(5), 685–704
- Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rabushka, A., & Shepsle, K. A. (1972). *Politics in plural societies: A theory of democratic instability*. Merrill political science series. Columbus, OH: Merrill.
- Saideman, S. M., & Ayres, R. W. (2008). *For kin or country: Xenophobia, nationalism, and war*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Salat, L. (2011). "A politikai közösség kérdése a többség–kisebbség viszonyának a nézőpontjából". *Magyar Kisebbség*, XVI (3–4), 159–190.
- Salat, L., Székely, I. G., & Lakatos, D. (2022). "The Autonomy Movement of Hungarians in Romania", *European Yearbook of Minority Issues Online*, 19(1), 268–296. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/22116117_013
- Stroschein, S. (2012). *Ethnic struggle, coexistence, and democratization in eastern Europe*. Cambridge studies in contentious politics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tsebelis, G. (1990). *Nested games: Rational choice in comparative politics*. California series on social choice and political economy. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Waterbury, M. A. (2010). *Between state and nation: Diaspora politics and kinstate nationalism in Hungary* (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Wimmer, A. (2013). *Ethnic boundary making: Institutions, power, networks*. Oxford studies in culture and politics. New York: Oxford University Press.



IULIUS-CEZAR MACARIE
(JULIUS-CEZAR MACQUARIE)

Born in 1974, in Romania

Ph.D. in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University
(2018)

*Thesis: Invisible Migrants: Glocturnal Cities' 'Other Workers' in the
Post-Circadian Capitalist Era*

Night ethnographer and migration scholar

Fellowships, awards, and research grants

Postdoctoral Fellowship Grant, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (2022-2024)

Visiting Fellowship, Institute for Social Science for the 21st Century,
University College Cork (2022)

Research Affiliate, Democracy Institute, Central European University
(2021-2022)

Research Affiliate, Centre for Policy Studies, Central European University
(2017 – 2021)

STAR-UBB Fellow, Centre for Population Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University
(2020)

Visiting Fellow, Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex
(2014 – 2015)

Early-Stage Researcher Grant, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (2013-2016)

Internship Scheme Award, Centre for East European Language Based Area
Studies, University College London (2012)

Junior Researcher Forum Grant, European Institute, University College London
(2012)

Ratiu Foundation Award (2010)

Other grants

Inequalities in Siliconised Romanian Cities Project (2020)

Global Teaching Fellowship Program, CEU (2019)

Doctoral Thesis Write-up Grant for Social Sciences and Humanities, CEU
(2017)

Published research papers in refereed academic journals, book chapters,
working papers, policy documents, book reviews

Author of academic podcast and documentary production

Nocturnal ethnographies in Budapest, Istanbul, London, Milano, and Sofia

ROADIES: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF DIGITALISATION OF INEQUALITIES AND PRECARISATION IN FOOD COURIERS

Abstract

Food couriers working the evening and nighttime shifts are a special case of platform-mediated work, and an under-researched category of contracted workers in the digitalised platform economy. Drawing on a night ethnography, the paper focuses on the strategic role that migrant and non-migrant gig workers play in supporting communities in four cities: Bucharest and Oradea in Romania, and Cork in Ireland. London, the fourth locality, is the “glocturnal” city in Europe, with a long history of immigration and an exceptional status due to its high demand for migrant workers 24/7. This ethnographic account aims to impact the emerging field in the digitalisation of labour migration and contribute to debates on digitalisation of inequalities and precarisation of nightworkers.

Keywords: platform work, food couriers, night ethnography, inequalities, precarisation, Europe

List of abbreviations

CNCS – Consiliul Național al Cercetării Științifice (National University Research Council)

COVID-19 / SARS-CoV-2 – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2

DLMP – Digitalisation of Labour and Migration Project

PNCDI – Planul Național de Cercetare, Dezvoltare și Inovare (National Research, Development and Innovation Plan)

UEFISCDI – Unitatea Executivă pentru Finanțarea Învățământului Superior, a Cercetării, Dezvoltării și Inovării (Executive Unit for the Financing of Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation)

VC – Venture Capitalist

Platform cooperativism insists that we'll only be able to address the myriad ills of the sharing economy—that is to say platform capitalism—by changing ownership, establishing democratic governance, and reinvigorating solidarity.

Trebor Scholz (2016). *Platform cooperativism*.

Introduction

In roughly over a decade, performing gigs in the “sharing economy” or “platform capitalism”, has become a world-wide phenomenon that promised much and delivered little for the workers managed by platform algorithms (Schor 2020, Scholz 2016). Venture Capitalists (VC), the progenitors of the sharing economy, hijacked its potential for bringing about “a new way [to] work”, i.e., it clamped down on the freedom to determine when one works and how much, and (mis-)classified work contracts of “independent contractors” (Schor 2020: 148; Zia *et al.*, 2021). Schor (2020) explains how Big Tech platforms extract large amounts of labour from gig workers through dependence, disempowerment, and inequality — in stark contrast to what was initially promised. Digital platforms consist of algorithms or mathematical computations that connect buyers with sellers via monetary transactions. “Platform” or “gig” workers often hired as “independent contractors” in many countries around the world, intermediate such transactions on piece-by-piece fee basis paid by platform companies. The “piece” in this waged labour form is called a “gig” in the sharing economy.

In the United States (US) owners of and investors in widely used platforms such as Uber, Lyft, Postmates, and Airbnb make fortunes on the back of as in “gig workers”, many of whom are partially or totally dependent on these “platform parasites” (Schor 2020: 71). For example, US-based gig drivers, would work up to sixty hours per week and not break even with Uber. Postmates couriers reflected on the \$2.50 they made per hour “against the millions and billions made by [the company’s] owners and investors” (Schor 2020: 10). Platform work is thus, shown to magnify independent contractors’ precarity by several degrees: reproducing (as opposed to disrupting) entrenched inequality, precarious work, involuntary unpaid work, and structural discrimination. Schor (2020) highlights how the hashtag #AirBnBWhileBlack went viral after a Harvard study found that African Americans were 16 percent more likely than “whites” to be turned down by Airbnb hosts. Whatever the gig or platform promises, the

only ones to prosper from digitalisation of inequalities are capitalism and VCs. In this context, the current investigation begins from the premise that “sharing economy” involves little if any, actual sharing.

BoltFood, Glovo, Panda, Uber or Freenow are digital platform transport operators in Romania which in a very short time have become entrenched in the everyday and night life, and especially since the COVID-19 pandemic. From the initial design stage of my research, I was interested to find out how “new” this “new way to work”, i.e. being your own boss, the freedom and flexibility that ‘alternative transport’ (Bolt) and food delivery (Glovo) companies were advertising was really the case for digital platform workers experienced. The preliminary questions remained focused on who is working the unsociable hour? Who are the people working day or night doing food deliveries? Who was more likely forced into such work? And ultimately, what types of inequalities do they experience? And what do platforms demand of the workers?

Heiner Heiland (2020: 34), argues that food delivery couriers (thereafter, “couriers”) have a special place in platform-based work, for their possibilities to “reinvigorate solidarities” (Scholz 2016). While this is unarguably the case when compared with atomised cloud-based workers in “crowdwork”, both couriers and ride hailers for Uber or Bolt are place-bound (DLMP 2022), i.e. the street, a banal place, is the concrete space where the gigs take place. Hence, it seems reasonable that in this ongoing study to adopt an overarching field perspective that hosts the common subjectification modes in workers earning from either type of platform (food dispatch or ride hailing), who report similar pressures resulting from the demand-based algorithmic management. Starting with most visible of the demands that platforms, such as Bolt, put on digital platform workers, the main ones that contribute to exacerbation of inequalities are: a) 24/7 availability – working 24 hours per day and 7 days per week for the platform they are hired for (not employed, as promised); and b) rating system that measures workers’ service quality, on the one hand, by the users/customers, and on the other, by the platforms. Some of these demands are specific to platform-mediated work, others can be found in domestic work.

Fields of research

This ongoing investigation studies the effects that digitalisation of inequalities has upon precarious “gig workers”. Digitalisation not only changes inequalities, but it also changes the reproduction of inequalities. Hence, specific attention is given in this investigation to the gendered-based inequalities and division of labour of women (randomly included here). Reportedly, women are absent from worker-cantered studies within the platform economy or sharing economy research agenda (James 2021). In a recent study by Howcroft & Moore (2018) just one female is included in the study on parcel delivery courier; and Cant (2020) disproportionately discusses experiences of 15 males and only one female in her research on Deliveroo Brighton. In the latest count by Al James (in Press), “women working in the gig economy” get mentioned less than 1 per cent in the 9.7M publications on digital labour. How is this possible? Why does this happen?

One explanation withstanding is that empirical exclusion is embedded in the long-standing construction of economy as ‘male’ and ‘women’ economic activities devalued or excluded from the ‘essential’ categories. Yet, “over 64 million women worldwide find gig work through digital labour platforms, with many motivated by widely touted ‘emancipatory’ platform possibilities for reconciling paid work and family” (James 2021). Therefore, to understand the relationship between gender and the ‘gig economy ...discrimination’ (Barzilay and Ben-David 2017: 427), some of the gender specific questions about platforming women night workers’ experiences will be addressed later.

Design

Drawing upon inequalities, precarity and migration scholarship combined with anthropological and political economy perspectives, this ethnographic project impacts the emerging field in the digitalisation of labour migration, and contributes to debates on digitalisation of inequalities and precarisation of workers. Methodologically, I collect the empirical material via the *Researcher’s Nightworkshop* method, which I developed in my previous research on migrant night labour in London’s New Spitalfields market (MacQuarie 2021). To achieve a near-lived and on-the-ground experience, I employ non-participant observation

and listening, and I combine the following tools to engage with the participants: *schmoozing* or informal conversations with participants, following Jansen and Driessen's (2013) approach to the "hard work of small talk"; audio-video recording in the locations where wo/men (randomly selected for this piece) work – wait for orders or chat with other workers, or entering the site (dark kitchen or depo); *night walking* (with or without interviewing) along the streets where the outlets or depots are located; and *cyber-notes* (pedometer Pacer app to record distances and routes) – some of which I will refer to later in this paper

Out on the streets, day or night, the data collection methods included non-participant observations or "hanging out and doing stuff"; "schmoozing" with Bolt or Uber drivers, either as a customer or as an observer in restaurants or "waiting areas". "Doing the hard work of small talk" or having informal conversations with drivers or couriers (Jensen and Driessen 2013), is very useful to ethnographers when seeking for participants. I also collected ethnographic material via audio and video recordings. In-person and online, semi-structured interviews were carried out with couriers in all three cities, with activists and researchers of platform labour and migration. Except for one participant, all names have been anonymised to preserve their confidentiality.

More importantly, this ethnographic account offers thick descriptions that shift from the immediate, tangible, and on-the-ground life experiences, to the intangible, rendered as palpable relationships between humans and machines to make meaningful, but general claims about a culture, society, and human life more broadly (Geertz, 1973). Specifically, the mini-"impressionistic portraits" randomly selected here, offer high possibilities to connect through the particular of the "narratives of the immediate" (Gay y Blasco and Huon Wardle 2007: 76-95), to the larger issues concerning the relationship between humans and algorithms. In fact, the people who wield the algorithm managers are responsible for the daily and nightly experiences of precarity and inequalities of those at the receiving end – riders who are "totally or partially dependent on these platforms" (Schor 2020). Building on the scaffolding made of empirical insights, this bottom-up approach will lead to thematic analysis of gendered, invisibilised precariousness explored in the next phases of the investigation.

Analytically, in my paper I experiment with a novel perspective that grasps platform work as contingent to forms of work (e.g., domestic work or street-based day or night labour), that historically have been gendered,

and by and large performed by high segments of migrant populations arriving in countries with unequally distributed labour systems. Hence, in the initial phase of this investigation, I aimed to study platform-mediated workers in Romania from a relational perspective, i.e. to approach the IT sector as part of a larger and unequal labour system whereby couriers are essential in supporting the IT. Romania is a country where “the majority of the population still has problems achieving a decent minimum standard of living”, and every youth in the country desires to become an IT worker.¹ While not an exceptional player in the Eastern European IT landscape, following the Czech Republic, Romania is nonetheless an important player, leading ahead of Poland, Bulgaria, and Croatia, in terms of productivity and size of the sector. Yet, the Romanian IT sector relies on the multiplication of underpaid precarious labour in platform work via such support services, whereby in this larger and unequal labour system IT is celebrated, and the workers in other sectors of the Romanian economy remain marginal and invisible. Whereas the Romanian government proudly declared that “IT was the darling of the Romanian economy and the triumphant sector in the pandemic that hit in the first half of 2020”², there was no mention about the essential role that gig workers had during the pandemic in support of the entire Romanian nation under the lockdown.

As my fieldwork developed, I became acutely aware that couriers supported to great degree the entire Romanian society and not only the Romanian IT sector. Thus, my objectives broadened to capture those gig workers offering transport of persons (e.g., Uber or Bolt drivers) and food delivery services offered by platform companies (e.g., Deliveroo, Glovo, Panda or Tazz). As such, while I still consider the initial design and framing pertinent for this inquiry, given the methodological challenges (e.g., limited fieldwork conditions) to access opened locations in the late evenings or at night (curfew started at 22:00 during these latter lockdown phases of the pandemic), and to reach out to migrant riders on the streets of “smart cities” in Romania, I was forced to shift my focus, not only in terms of framing the research, but also in terms of locations and streets more abundant in migration histories (such as Cork, in Ireland, and London in the UK).

Food delivery is a special case of platform mediated work in the so-called sharing economy. Couriers have become visible in the public eye during the pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic context has brought to surface the reality of the ‘under-belly’ workers who became essential in supporting entire societies during this health crisis. Despite being exposed to health risks, couriers painstakingly carried out their work to

support the rest of the (less vulnerable) populations immobile in their own homes. During the two years of the pandemic everyone became more and more dependent on foods delivered fast to their doors, and as such the numbers of couriers at Deliveroo, Glovo, JustEat (or Takeaways), Panda and UberEats grew exponentially (Popan 2021). Consequently, my research advances three key messages:

a) platform mediated work offers new kinds of support to dependent food couriers, but only to merely hang on at the edges of the sharing economy;

b) the digitalisation of work through platform algorithms only exacerbates the existing inequalities through precarisation of working conditions and

c) the streets provide the couriers with both a workplace and space, yet they expose the symptoms of the digitalised inequalities experienced by them in terms of health inequities and lack of social worth.

More broadly, therefore, this study will contribute to the understanding of contemporary capitalism that attempts to discipline and extract labour from what may be called disposable bodies – this is a hugely important aspect of capitalism. This investigation builds on my previous anthropological work on capitalism and manual labour in London's food chain distribution. Then, my analysis focused on the mechanisms of destruction through labour extraction from the workers at night, in a wholesale market of fruits and vegetables, at the New Spitalfields market in East London (MacQuarie 2018). Now, the focus is on couriers, the next node in the food chain distribution, after grocery producers and other food products, the wholesale traders, and dispatchers. In this vein, today's capitalist working environment dispossesses the workers of their bodily and social capital contributing to their diminishing sense of social worth, lack of respect and fairness, and unfair allocation of resources. In short, increasing structural inequalities. For this broader scope a set of questions are to be asked: What does it mean to be a deliverer or 'carrier' when your manager is applies an algorithm that monitors your every move? And is it justifiable for the algorithms to rationalise decisions based on bad / good ratings to exclude workers off the platform or to extract maximum amount of labour from their exhausted bodies?

Boarding for Fieldwork

Once upon a time in Oradea

I boarded for fieldwork in Romania, while the COVID-19 pandemic social distancing measures were still in place throughout 2021 and early 2022 (e.g., lockdowns and curfews). As social distancing rules relaxed and travel was permitted again, I boarded a plane flying from Bucharest in southern Romania to Oradea, a city at Romania's western border. Bolt transport company registered its first hired drivers in Oradea, in July 2021. Like other parasite platform companies making unfulfilling promises to those onboarding, its activity grew exponentially and so the number of drivers, especially those "totally or partially dependent" of platform companies like Bolt (Schor 2020). Regardless the label, digital platform or gig worker or Ride hailer, are rented drivers on individual contracts with the platform company.

Drivers like Sara, are rented to drive customers travelling from A to B. One July morning, and days after Bolt opened for business in Oradea, I hired Sara to take a colleague and myself to a village nearby Oradea. As a Bolt customer, you hire the driver and not the car. As a Bolt customer renting Sara's service in Oradea, I travelled in her car to the villages nearby and parts of Oradea city where centres with adults with disabilities were placed. I was inspecting these centres for another project. This was my first encounter with a female driver offering "alternative transport". As I explained to Sara about my research plans, she agreed to participate in the study. After leaving Oradea we kept in contact over the phone. She has sent me several video materials, photographs, and screenshots of her Bolt application that she used to communicate with the Bolt platform and her customers. This is Sara's story as Bolt driver.

Sara, a woman in her 50s, appears pleasant and in control of her vehicle in the busy morning traffic. Between 2002-2020, Sara operated a "people transport" company together with her late husband. They transported Romanian migrant workers from Oradea, Romania to Milano, Italy on 15-16h journey. In the early part of 2020, when Sara's husband died, the company was handed over to their son. Her son, his wife and her grandchild leave separately, but Sara is not allowed to visit her grandchild after having had several altercations with her daughter-in-law. Instead, she drives to visit her 80 years old mother once a week in a nearby village. In July 2021, Sara was forced by her new circumstances to find alternative ways of living. Grieving for her late husband, and out of work, Sara learns

from her mechanic that someone in town is hiring new drivers. That is how Sara met John who registered her as a driver on his fleet approved under Bolt requirements.

Bolt drivers, like Sara offer an alternative method of transporting between taxing and car renting. The drivers register their car and if they pass the 45-point test by Bolt, they begin working as registered Bolt drivers, pay all the expenses needed to maintain his/her car and tax contributions. As a third party in this agreement, Bolt offers good discounts at the beginning to attract customers. For example, my first trips with Sara attracted me 20% discount per trip for being a new customer with Bolt; Sara received the full fee for the ride independent of my discount; Bolt deducted its 20% cut from Sara's earnings, for each ride we took. Each party seems happy. In this arrangement there is a hidden party. We call him John. In real terms, John takes 10% from Sara's earnings, deducted from her total number of rides at the end of each week. Bolt took 20% of Sara's earnings. From what was left, Sara needed to fuel up her car, support any immediate car expenses to keep the car on the road (e.g., car tax, road tax, insurance, tolls). No digital platform owns cars, bikes or restaurants. Yet, these companies control the people's ways to work, while the contracted workers, like Sara, provide their own goods – cars, push bikes or mopeds. Despite the top-down set of relationships between platforms and workers, the latter benefit from this kind of new support – digital training, payment, and opportunity to shape their income (Zia *et al.* 2021). As in Sara's experience, the transition she makes from long-route driver of a mini-bus transporting workers to Italy, to short rides in Oradea, has its advantages:

Bolt is easier compared to transporting passengers on long distance journeys, like I used to do. And I used to load my mind with all those stories that people freely off loaded during the 15-16h journey. The Bolt trips are short. Many young people use it and they're not into chit-chatting. I never had a customer older than 50. The young ones prefer Bolt because it's not like taxi. When they call the driver, they see the price. Unlike with taxi. They see the price, if they like it, they confirm the ride. Others said that prices for Bolt are the same as the usual taxi. At first Bolt was cheaper with 20% to 30% cheaper than your usual taxi fare.

Sara says, however, that John (the middle man) told her after four months that “both, my company and you will be fined by ITM (Inspekția Muncii),

the regulatory body of labour in Romania, if you work over the 4h. And we can't risk that. "In the first few weeks," Sara explains, "I could work as many hours as I wanted, but now I'm limited to 4h per day and maximum 24h per week. And this week, after working 4 months part of his fleet he tells me we need to stop next week. I don't know anymore..."

During one of our trips, Sara tells me, "I picked one male customer earlier, and I gave him my usual: Hello! He says, "do we know each other?" No, I say, but that's how I start my ride greeting everyone. He says, I thought you know me because I'm also a Bolt driver. So, this one owns his own fleet in Cluj. He said that I should open a SRL and work for him. So, I was blocked and did not know what to say. I don't understand why John told me I must stop working for him, but this guy says that I could work for him. Sara, it turns out, picked up a fleet owner from Cluj-Napoca (Cluj, thereafter). Sara says that he taught her "how she should open her own limited company and work for him". So, I was blocked and did not know what to say. I don't understand why John told me I must stop working for him, but this guy says that I could work for him." In November 2021, Sara's situation with her intermediary fleet owner she was registered with, changed even further. She explains:

My feeling is that if I open a limited company (SRL), I will [again] go through middle men like John and this other guy with the fleet in Cluj. They take their cut and it's still not OK. But, if I could work on my own (without an intermediary), that would be the best. These middle men and their fleets live on our backs. This guy from Cluj told me that he has even more people in his fleet than John, which is also confusing for me as John I must stop working for him. In the end, this guy comes here to recruit drivers from Oradea to work for him on his fleet registered in Cluj. I'll investigate how to obtain that code – CAEN – to see how I can start on my own so I really feel I am my own boss like before.

However, the capitalist adage, *compete or die striving*, is transformed by the platform algorithm into "permanent tracking and rating of work" of gaming, e.g., each task is a competition, each game is a prize.³ Put differently, the algorithms rate the workers' performance, and customers rate drivers and couriers independently. Mostly, the rating decides the fate of the workers resulting in unfair dismissals by the platforms without giving the worker the rights to appeal. On some occasions, Sara explains:

One customer cancelled her trip because she had to pay more than it showed on the app at the pick-up point. She gave me a bad rating. My rating went down from 5 to 4.5. Although it was not my fault – not the fault of the driver, but the app. The Bolt application picked a GPS route that was more expensive for the client. But I got the poor rating, not the Bolt app.

And in another scenario, Sara was to blame too because:

This customer complained that the price was so high; when there's demand, the algorithm raises the price of the same route. One said to me today that he can only pay by card and he's without options that's why he needs to ride with me, otherwise he would not, because the prices have gone up generally.

There is an agreement among the researchers like Juliet Schor (2020), who argue that sharing platforms can build bridges and not only walls. Yet it is up to the people creating and using these technologies to imbue them with these values. As one of her respondents says, "It's not the tool, it's the person that wields it, I promise" (p. 174).

Remote ethnography

After one month, I left Oradea, but I continued the conversation with Sara over the phone and the messaging service WhatsApp, to follow her real-time experiences and progress with her application as independent driver, and other entrepreneurial activities. Once established the WhatsApp communication, I was able to receive up-to-date information from Sara. This included her routes, prices, short films of the streets on the way to her customers – but never images or conversations with her customers. Doing the ethnography remotely, at times, allowed me to interact with my participant in real time. One day, when Sara's Bolt display was not red (signifying high demand in her area), we began talking about her experiences transporting customers during the pandemic. *Has this pandemic affected your relationships with the customers?* I ask her, this time over the phone.

No, I haven't had any problems. But I didn't have any long rides either. This makes it a bit simpler because I don't have the customers sitting in my car for long time. On average the ride takes about 10min or less. But

of course, the time I need to get to the customer is not paid. I take trips on a 2km radius. If a trip comes up 5km away from where I am, I refuse it. Working for the Bolt platform is easier compared to long distance transport of passengers that I used to do for many years.

Just like much of the life in Romania, was still on hold or reduced to minimal business activities due to lockdowns, so was my fieldwork reduced to online research or telephone conversations with Sara when I tried to learn more about her life behind the steering wheel. I asked her once: *can you tell me what happens when you're behind the wheel and you need the toilet?* Sara laughs and says:

It's a bit tricky. When I need the toilet... I ask the client, are you in a rush? If they say, yes, then I go on and wait till I finish the ride. If they say no, then I say that I really need to stop for toilet. Most say that it's OK. I used to stop for example, at Kaufland (a supermarket). But I can't anymore. They won't let us now unless we show the COVID certificate. I didn't do the vaccine. I wanted to wait and see. I did also an antibodies test, and I have plenty. So, I'll wait a little longer to get the vaccine. ... So, I now stop at petrol stations on the way to the customer's destination.

So, has the pandemic changed your way of work?

I'm not afraid. I wear the mask all the time. I have sanitiser all the time. For example, one customer said, she does not have the mask, so I gave a spare one. I have spare ones on me all the time. You know, just so things work.

What about your relationships with the customers during this pandemic? Have these been affected in anyway, I asked Sara?

No, I haven't had any problems. But I didn't have any long rides either. This makes it a bit simpler because I don't have the customers sitting in my car for long time. On average the ride takes about 10min or less. But of course, the time I need to get to the customer is not paid. I take trips on a 2km radius. If a trip comes up 5km away from where I am and the cost of the trip is small, I refuse it. So, it's between 5 -10 min journey. Look, this week, I picked up one ride after another ... so it worked out about 4 trips an hour. Five is rare – it means the city traffic needs to be quiet.

During ordinary times too, Sara faces occurred situations that could affect her rating. In the end, it is the driver who will be penalised, not the user/customer. She insists to share this one-time event. “Let me tell you what happened today”:

I went to pick up a girl. When I get there, I see a woman, but she is not looking at me. I let the customer know in the app that I arrived. She replies: ‘I am in the car’. I say, how come you’re in the car, when there’s no one in my car. I just arrived. The woman asks the driver that picked her up how is that possible? It turns out that the driver picked up the wrong customer. There were two orders for Bolt on the same street. My customer went into the wrong car because she did not check the number plate. While I am on the phone, she’s asking the driver: did you have an order for this address? And the driver says, yes, I did. Do you go to a wedding? She says no, I am going to Transylvania Street. At that point the driver turns around and drops my customer and picks up his customer. The woman was laughing, but I said to her, I don’t find it funny because you jumped into another car without checking the number plate. I should have let you go to the end of that trip, outside of town and see how you would like to come back to town from there and then see if it was still amusing. I got a bit annoyed here... Later, I posted in the group, to ask if it other drivers faced this situation – your customer to be picked up by another driver - but no one else had been in this situation before. I felt a bit embarrassed because I thought no one will believe me.

You’ve been telling me about your work in the day, but *do you work at night?*

No, we don’t get higher rates on the night shift, but there are areas where the demand is higher like in Nufărul district. The screen gets red, and colleagues say let’s go there. When we get the red code displayed on the Bolt device’s screen it means that in certain areas there is a high demand for drivers.

Sara’s story brings to the fore another type of parasites, the intermediaries or middlemen, those who get a percentage of workers’ earnings. They are the hidden part of this relationship between the platform, the worker and the customer. After all, Sara is not really her own boss, she can’t work as and when she likes, and she doesn’t get all her earnings. For me, her story opened a new direction of investigation on the functioning of the adjacent

sectors, like the food dispatch, that supported not only the IT sector in Romania, but the whole nation. Instead of concluding here with Sara's story, I reiterate Schor's (2020) proposal to reboot the sharing economy with new platform algorithms offering a fairer share to those marginalised workers like Sara. But the incorporation and activation of these values depends on the people who create and use these technologies. It is with the people who program the algorithms that change begins.

Intermediaries like John resemble less of bridges and more of parasites, taking shares to the disadvantage of platform drivers, and in favour of "parasite corporations", the only ones prospering from digitalisation of inequalities. Therefore, only a legislative overhaul in countries on the semi-periphery of globalisation could turn the work law to work in favour of "alternative transport". From a political economy perspective, this would mean that work laws would stall reproduction of inequalities, thus changing the way to work on digital platforms, which so far have "create[d] markets by exerting control over workers while denying these workers basic employment rights" (Barns, 2019). Political will would not only restore the gap between the promises and realities in platform work, but more importantly it would demonstrate that digital platform workers, otherwise hailed as "key" or "essential" workers would remain so, not only during crisis but also in ordinary times. However, there is an altogether different answer to preventing the widening of digital inequalities. In the eyes of a well-known Bucharest-based, Romanian political theatre director and academic (David Schwartz), who explains that unions might have the answer in their pocket (but is there anyone ready to listen?). In the next section, on the special case of couriers in platform mediated work, David Schwartz's position indicates that multiplicities are marked by digitalisation of inequalities exacerbated in different ways across borders whether in London, a global city, or Bucharest at the margin of globalisation.


On-the-ground ethnography in Bucharest

Figure 1. Nightscoping in Bucharest

This screenshot was taken from the mobile app Pacer © Pedometer application. It shows the nightwalking distance, average speed, duration. The 15.3 km is the equivalent of 19,397 steps took under 5 hours. An average walker registered with this mobile app takes 10,000 steps in a day.

Around January 2022, as less restrictive measures of social distancing were being introduced, this context allowed me to do nightscoping in Bucharest in the Romanian capital. The first nightwalking I took in Bucharest was on the 5th January 2022 and entailed 15.3 km of walking from 150 Mihalache Boulevard to 1 Calea Victoriei and back. During the 4 hour and 26 minutes return trip I took photographs of various sites, some were open challenging the lockdown regulations, while those in the hospitality sector being hit the hardest, were shut or working to limited

capacity. During nightscoping on streets of Bucharest, I encountered night workers soldering tram lines and saw messages on the doors of undertakers “open 24/7”. As per Figure 1 above, The Pacer Pedometer app monitored my nightwalk and measured the distance by the number of steps (19,397) and a loss of 1456 calories, at an average speed of 3.4 km per hour.

Digital work landscape is rapidly changing in Romanian “siliconised cities” like Cluj or Bucharest (McEnroy 2019), and more migrant food carriers can be seen on the streets of these smart cities (Popan 2021). However, during the pandemic one could hardly find any migrants on these streets, unless they were African students in Romanian universities visible on the streets of Cluj, or Chinese and Sri Lankan workers on construction sites, hardly visible behind the buses’ windows. The latter, manual workers are provided private modes of transport. Thus, they can be seen on the public roads in buses provided by the work agencies that employ them due to lack of local labour force. On the contrary, most riders on scooters flood the streets and pavements with a metallic green, red, yellow, orange or black boxes hanging on their backs taking shortcuts to clock the delivery within the promised time by the algorithms. While still affected by lockdown-inflicted immobility, I roamed the streets in the late evenings and at night to search for couriers working for Glovo, Panda or Takeaways (i.e., JustEat).

Moreover, in the last week of February 2022, the news that Russia invaded Ukraine has put a stop to ordinary life, and what followed ended many lives. The ukrainians lucky enough to flee their homeland found refuge in Romania, which became a transit country for many continuing to travel as far away as possible from the war. As the whole world became gripped by this unfortunate and sad event, business never returned to the “usual” because of the pandemic, and now (at the time of writing) because of the war in Ukraine.

Nonetheless, the advent of the “fourth industrialisation” or digitalisation of work has not, artificial intelligence may ease the workers’ lives, as David Schwartz, a political theatre director of Bucharest Dispatch, explains,

The Marxist vision, that industrialisation, digitalisation and [sooner or later] artificial intelligence will ease the life of workers, turns out to be a dystopic reality. Up to a point, perhaps it was true. The problem is who weilds the machine. More, in whose interest – who is it for? Corporates? If it is [for the interest of the latter], then it will definitely lead to exploitation. I have no doubts. It is happening. And it less and less veridic to think that machines will ease the lives of workers.

Even personally, say the application system that I use to apply for funding is based on digital platforms. We work three times more than when we did it on paper. The platforms breakdown. No one knows how to solve it. IT is outsourced. No one can reach out to the IT helpdesk. It's a bureaucratic nightmare. This shows that digitalisation does not necessarily mean progress or better life.

More, I did interviews with couriers for my show "Bucuresti Livrator" (Bucharest Dispatcher). I found out that their greatest nightmare is communication with platforms, like Glovo [widely operates Romania]. You cannot reach anyone unless it's to do with the order. It's a bit like dealing with the banks. When they call you, they find you immediately. When you call them, you wait for hours and cannot resolve the issue.

Interestingly, David Schwartz explains,

I don't know what was promised by the sharing economy VCs in the West. But in Romania, only the horror version of platform work arrived. For example, Glovo workers told me that when they start, they know it's going to make their lives miserable. Only the naive and the young take it lightly. Why?

Because Glovo subcontracts local firms. Many couriers start thinking they will open their own company. They have entrepreneurial dreams, if you think about it. They start with an illusion to escape their poverty. The more experienced take it as an emergency solution to make ends meet. But the rest have very low expectations.

Consistent with worker-centre studies on "women working in the gig economy" (Howcroft 2018; Cant 2020; James in press), David Schwartz also found that:

The number of women working on platforms grow. Slowly, their numbers grow, as I see them on the street. I only interviewed two women.

Furthermore, in line with my fieldwork observations in Oradea and Bucharest, David Schwartz also admits that there are very few migrants delivering food for platforms like Glovo or Panda.

There are many students; many are doing this only to complete their income; semi-dependent, as many are helped by families.

For Bucharest Dispatcher, I did not speak to migrants as my team included only white Romanians. The theatre wouldn't allow me to take

on collaborators. So, I could not explore this. But I see more and more migrants on the street.

An interesting and somewhat expected effect triggered by platform work promises is the growing rural-urban or internal work migration, which has grown exponentially during the pandemic. As David Schwartz found to be the case:

There are about 50% of the couriers who come by vans from the rural areas. For example, one came by train. They put the bike on the train, travel 2h by train and in the evening travel back to their village. For these people 2-3K RON is a lot. They could not make this money somewhere else.

Worthy to note, explains David Schwartz,

The couriers travelling from the nearby villages, perhaps think that their children could go to school or even high school if they make 3,000 RON⁴. We don't know that for sure. We need some sociological studies to collect this kind of evidence [to explain this surge in rural-urban labour migration].

David Schwartz makes the poignant observation that among the Glovo workers, "there are many of old age. Some are even pensioners. Some are working in security. And they complete earnings with [food] deliveries." Continuing, David Schwartz, draws parallels between the poor working conditions of platform workers, and the experiences of workers in supermarkets. Drawing from another political play from his repertoire, "Lucrător Universal" (Universal Worker), David Schwartz says that:

I took lots of interviews with workers and union reps. Also, with managers from Carrefour, Metro and Mega Image. The latter is described in worst terms by the employees I interviewed. Mega Image pays 70% less than Carrefour and has an anti-sindicate policy like Auchan). This was to compare conditions of work between the two companies.

First, explains David Schwartz:

The working conditions are terrible in supermarkets like Carrefour, Lidl or Auchan. For example, Lidl in Bucharest, you don't know where you work tomorrow. Tomorrow you might start in Pantelimon. The morning

after in Pipera and finish a late shift Voluntari, and so on. They don't know how many hours work where. As long as the hours mount to 40h, Lidl is within the contract terms. You also do not have an idea what work you'll be doing. You could carry pallets in one shop, be a cashier in the next or sweep floors.

Secondly, David Schwartz explains further:

Workers who do not belong to a union are on higher, slightly higher salaries but working conditions are inhumane. Auchan has an anti-sindicate view, declared openly. For example, it destructed the union of a food store chain, Real which had 3000 union members. The Lucrator Universal was about that exactly. How this happened! Dismantling a union. The life as a supermarket worker, working conditions and union role.

Thirdly, returning to the topic at stake, and on the backdrop of what David Schwartz has just shared about supermarket workers, I asked him if we can even consider *collective action among couriers* as a tool for resistance? In his reply, there was very little hope, if support from the union was not considered, because:

Unions are the last barrier in the face of capitalism (as no political parties exist yet [to take on the capitalists], and there are no chances for me to make one, I sought to engage with Unions. Unions are the source of resistance. Despite the [internal] problems, some corrupted and so on. ... I went to collaborate with one union. One Union director in the commerce sector, where salaries are miserable and working conditions are miserable, says that one way for the [platform] workers to ensure they have better working conditions is to take on only Union-backed jobs.

Concluding, David Schwartz reflectively and poignantly puts across a moment of repose:

We spend between a third or half of our lives at work. But we do not talk or watch films or plays about work. Love or home occupies less time in our lives, than we might think. I would like to show the public what happens at work. No matter what the profession or the job role.

Strikingly, the activist and political theatre director's poignant remark, raises awareness of the importance of time (with its (ine-)qualities) spent

in work, and provokes his public to think around the challenges and (dis-) pleasures of experienced by many while spending such big amount of time at work, and in particular of the precarious working conditions of those shelving our food in supermarkets or delivering the food to our doors, rain or shine. In the same vein, this paper invites social scientists researching problems with platform mediated work and inequalities surrounding this fast-changing field to look beyond the symptoms of inequalities noticeable on the street, to envision a future sharing economy that could improve the livelihoods of workers through a new, refreshing, re-booting approach to digital platform labour.

In Schor's (2020) words, however, her study's most significant and provocative intervention points at the sharing economy's democratic possibilities. The original dream of offering "a new way [to] work" can be a reality, Schor argues. Schor says that we can turn losers (workers) into winners, if we put the platforms into the hands of their users and workers via "platform cooperativism," a concept formulated by Trebor Scholz (2016). Schor says further, that "if we swap out the owners and investors and give their shares to workers" (Schor 2020, p. 148), then the "promise of a new way to work" can be realized because "cooperatives allow members to take control of their own work lives, with policy determined by democratic policies" (Schor 2020, p. 169). By this, Schor means that the future can be one of "democratic sharing."

Boarding for fieldwork in Cork (Ireland) via London

Around April 2022, international travel became possible again. I was able once again, to board a flight for Cork via London, to complete a Visiting Fellowship in Ireland. Cork and London became my next field sites. In each of these locations, I observed similar patterns in platform mediated work to the ones I knew in Oradea or Bucharest. The similar stories of precarious working conditions and inequalities that begun to surface offered more ground to infer that regardless which side of the channel I was, I became acutely aware that inequalities spread along the streets and in the public eye and across borders. Drawing on mounting evidence from various disciplines in the emerging field of digitalisation of labour and migration, the next section assesses the conclusions reached by social scientists researching in these areas.

Food dispatch, a special case in the sharing economy

Heiland (2020, p. 34) argues that platform mediated food delivery labour is a special case of platform labour. Unlike the online “crowdwork” or “microtasking” work that is mostly hidden, couriers are visible in the public and media, and thus spatial fragmentation is limited. Also, because couriers meet and talk during the waiting time at the frequented restaurants and while waiting to pick up orders made at the “ghost kitchens” or “dark stores”, i.e., warehouses set up by one of the largest food delivery platforms, Deliveroo. Despite the massive investments of these platform parasites, in the technology of micro-management and control on the ground by their algorithms, precarious workers can act solidarity that goes beyond advice and offers potentiality for “mutual urbanism” on the street (Hall, 2021), and during the long and unbearable weighting of waiting or as reported by other scholars in “painstaking immobilities” (Urry, 2017, in Popan 2021).

The majority of food delivery riders flooding the streets in developed countries are migrants. Their “precarious presence” in Suzanne Hall’s (2021) view is one of the “markers of marginalisation”, i.e., migrants live and work at the “edge territories” of cities. On the basis that “histories of migration landings in urban peripheries, and immersions in a fragmented labour market intersect to shape the marginal condition” (Hall 2021, p. 116), the focus of this section is to highlight the unheroic resistance of street-based couriers in the face of digitalisation of inequalities. Put differently, this article explains why food couriers’ case makes one “notice precarity differently” through assessment of lack of access to social, economic protection from the platforms, and diminished sense of self-worth and retribution by the “mainstream” society for the work they carry out during chronic and ordinary times (Precarity Lab 2018).

I met Johnathan, a courier from Brazil with Italian passport in a MacDonalds restaurant in South East London. He was waiting for an order. I was waiting for the right moment to speak to a migrant courier. Johnathan is in hi 30s, and out on his second shift, delivering food at night. “I work in two jobs”, says Johnathan.

In the morning, I prepare the bakery products for the restaurant. In the afternoons and late into the evenings, I deliver for Uber Eats or Deliveroo. ... Look, it's past midnight and I'm still in this McDonalds waiting for an order. It's been an hour since we spoke and [I'm] still waiting. I don't work [on] Sundays. That's for my family. But I am away from the family most days.

This way, it pays the bills. ... I buy my own insurance and I pay for the moped insurance. These companies don't pay anything for us.

Johnathan and other platform mediated food delivery workers are a “precarious presence” on the streets. Moreover, the streets are sites “from which to analyse [capitalism’s] violence and see varied social and economic reconfigurations.” The street, one of the most banal places, is where “encounters with capitalism” take place daily nightly in plain sight (Achille Mbembe, in Hall 2021).

Put different, these workers are not hidden behind factory walls or in warehouses. Yet, despite being so visible on the streets they seem to remain absent for the authorities, unless immigration raids are executed, as it has been the case in several cities in the UK. How can one not notice inequality from the side or edges of the street when it is so blatantly visible, yet ‘unnoticeable’ to city councillors, labour regulators and managing authorities? In the same vein as the Precarity Lab (2019, p. 80) scholarship, and that of geographers (James 2022) on worker-centred platform labour, this research invites scholars to “notice precarity differently” and the furthering inequalities. Their “engagement with the yearnings and lived realities” (Precarity Lab 2019, p. 80) of migrant platform workers, and especially of precarious women is yet to be reconned with.

However, platform mediated labour is very lucrative for VCs, and businesses like Deliveroo, UberEats or JustEat are worth billions of US dollars on the stock market. The platform growth is driven by the customers’ demand. As the markets’ demands grow, the VC prosper even more by expanding the business model into other (plat)forms. By continuing to explore other nodes in the food chain distribution (e.g., ghost kitchens), the fast-pacing and fast-expanding food delivery platform model is very noticeable. For example, companies like UK-based Getir, have been branching out into fruit and vegetables warehouse storage and on-demand deliveries, while Deliveroo has expanded its billion-dollar business through the creation of Deliveroo Editions or “dark kitchens”.

At the Dulwich site, in the London Borough of Southwark, Deliveroo Editions hosts five dark or ghost kitchens where food is prepared and delivered to customers who placed orders with these prestigious restaurants: Five Guys, Pho, Chilango, ShakeShack, and Honest. The would-be customers can only place orders online via the restaurants’ website. Deliveroo drivers pick up the food prepared within the walls of two units between 12:00 and 23:45. The five kitchens are separate,

and there is only one front desk. Each order is bagged and sealed with Deliveroo Editions sticker and placed on the shelf belonging to the respective kitchens. Each completed order is brought down to the front desk, and picked up by Deliveroo riders only. As I wait to speak to someone from the front desk, I observe through the window that all riders waiting on their motorbikes by the front entrance are men of different ethnicities chatting with one another.

JustEat, initially a Danish founded platform has relocated to the UK in mid 2000s and operates differently from the above. The couriers are employed and among the hierarchy there are “captains” whose role is to oversee the activity on the streets and in the restaurants where couriers wait for deliveries. The JustEat algorithm takes the decisions and observes every move of each of the workers assigned within a 5-mile radius. In April, at the same McDonalds restaurant in Camberwell Green, London where I talked to Johnathan, introduced earlier, I met a JustEat captain, Sacha who has a different story to tell.

On this Friday, Sacha is on duty to patrol on the 5-mile radius surrounding the depo near Oval, London. As I enter this McDonalds, she sits and looks at her phone app JustEat. As we begin to talk, she describes herself as an Indian woman from Mumbai, in her 40s, married and with two children (the boy is 14, and the girl is 6 years old). Sacha was an accountant in India, and now she is one of the only three women “Captains” out of 50 based at the Camberwell/Oval depo. As a woman, she says,

It's no different to do the job of a captain. But, women do not work on this job because there is a misconception about women that they should do housework. When you have a “can do” attitude, you can do anything. I can do anything.

I ask her: since there are only three women and 50 men captains, do you think this is a coincidence or because the top level management at JustEat perceive women not as capable as men on the same position? Sacha replies:

No, I think women can be as good captains as men are. In the JustEat hierarchy women also occupy senior positions, but the 3 women captains are the first to join the ranks above the bikers, since the company opened the Oval depo. More may follow?!

Sacha continues:

As woman, it's no different to do this job, says Sacha. But women do not work this job because there is a misconception about women, that they should do housework instead. But when you have a 'can do attitude' you can do anything. I can do anything. I work part-time, contracted for 20 hours per week. Yesterday, I worked ten hours. Today another ten. ... and tomorrow, Saturday, I instruct ten new comers! [sic]

Sacha discloses that a captain's pay rate is £10.15 per hour (just below the Living Wage⁵ rate for London), and she gets paid to ensure that orders are fulfilled, and if there are any problems signalled by the algorithms, she is the contact on the ground. She explains:

Today is my turn to oversee our couriers' activity in this McDonalds, at Camberwell. I ensure that orders are picked up smoothly; for this to happen, couriers must stay within their designated area ready to pick up the orders; I watch and resolve any problems with the food packages. Generally, things do run smoothly.

In Hall's (2021, p. 116) view, "streets accrue ... layers of ... complexity of a world of work." My research on the everyday inequalities in the street, is not unlike Hall's (2021), and it complements her research on migrants leading a marginal life on the edge territories of the street economies decided at the centre". As Hall (2021, pp. 5-6) does, this investigation questions:

Whether street self-employment and its precarities is different from recent articulations of a casualised urban labour market, sustained by technological platforms, such as Uber and Deliveroo that trades off the "entrepreneurialisms" required of marginalised cultures.

Moreover, in agreement with Hall's (2021, p. 5) argument, "street livelihoods in marginalised and ethnically diverse parts of the UK [as well as in other European] cities also reveal the human dimensions of the splintering of: a) an insecure labour market with its pronounced impacts on BAME⁶ groups; b) social disparities permeate these edge territories with surges in childhood poverty, steep cuts to public services, and growing practices of displacement associated with "regeneration"; c) on the streets

at this edge territories “laid bare the rise in inequalities and the punitive strike of austerity governance. In provision of Halls (2021) findings, the empirical material, and this preliminary analysis, supports the case for furthering the investigation into complexities of platform work, and the kind of precarity and inequalities intertwined with power relations that are not always immediately visible.

However, my last stop for data collection was in the Irish context, specifically the city of Cork. Situated in the south-west, Cork hosts one of the three oldest Universities in Ireland (Trinity College Dublin, Queens University Belfast, and University College Cork). Cork is the second largest city by population in Ireland and attracts very high numbers of international students every year, many who choose Ireland to study English in the language schools.

For example, a high number of Brazilian and Turkish citizens choose to study English in Ireland due to the bilateral agreements between the two countries, which facilitate student visas that allow them to work 20 hours per week. Among these, English language students, Yildirim, Ozcan and Ozgür of Turkish origins compensate the work they do in the daytime with evenings and late-night shifts on platforms like Deliveroo, UberEats or JustEat. Yildirim is a Turkish male with degree in data science from a prestigious Turkish university, but came to Ireland to study English. He works as a concierge in the daytime and wishes to further his education with a Masters’ degree in data science from Waterford Institute of Technology, Ireland. Deliveroo nevertheless, offers little-to-none support to its “independent contractors” like Yildirim, except for providing one-time, bare minimum equipment.

In three months, I did 5,000 km on my (electric) push bike; I got the clothes and the box for free for the first time, paid by Deliveroo. But after you have to pay; if the box tears up, which it does after a few months, from the rain and cold - you pay for it when that happens. (Yildirim)

Besides, “we are modern slaves, and we work unprotected. Also, Police knows that we are doing illegal work. If they want to collect us, they can do it anytime”, says Yildirim. Moreover, as a student on precarious wages, Yildirim, like Johnathan and many other food couriers, need to take a second job to break even. As a Deliveroo courier, Yildirim merely makes end meet, but he has no other choice but continue working, despite the

precarious conditions and sometimes poor physical health that he struggled with during the pandemic:

I had covid and still worked with 38° temperature; I covered my mouth and went on; I know the cover doesn't work, but who could stop working; I needed to pay the bills. So, I worked while infected with covid. What could I do? I pay 700EUR rent just for one room, and expenses on top. I told my landlord that it's too expensive and he said I can go if I don't like it. Everything is so expensive in this town. (Yildirim)

Another Turkish worker, Ozcan was an accountant by trade, in Turkey, where he returned by the time, I ended fieldwork in Cork. In Figure 3 below, the Deliverro device that Ozcan and other couriers are using shows the only available outlets open past midnight in the light purple colour and in hexagonal shapes. The device also displays the "Not busy" message sent by the algorithm-based system. These kinds of messages are updated every five minutes. The algorithm's advice to couriers in a "not busy" area is to try "exploring other areas nearby" with busier restaurants. He says to me one late night that:

You see where we are now. Waiting to pick up orders in an area where only Lebish kebab and Shake Dog diner are still open past midnight; but no one places any orders; everyone is out partying; it's not like in the pandemic. But you see, the app shows us the only places still open. If I get an order now, it pays 1.4 x per order. 3 orders in one hour and I make 10EUR. But no one placed any orders. I might have to call it a day. (The time when this talk took place shows 00:08 on his Deliveroo device. See Figure 3 below).




Figure 2. The Deliveroo device

The Deliveroo device indicates a 'Not busy' time of service. In light blue, it indicates that only three food outlets are still open to take orders at that hour of the night.

Uzgun is another Turkish male whom I spoke to, and he explains the "semi-illegality" aspects of their work and immigration status (De Genova 2018). Turkish migrants are allowed to work maximum 20 hours per week while studying English or any other undergraduate or graduate studies. But *"all of us work more to pay the bills. So, we have come to Ireland legally, but we are in illegality when it comes to work hours and for not*

paying the taxes. But that's the only thing that makes it worth for us to go on working like this. Otherwise, money is too thin". Furthermore, he explains, "we are not entitled to register with companies like Deliveroo because of our student status. So, we all work on borrowed accounts for which we pay between 40-60 Euro per week". You see, Uzgun continues,

The name displayed here (on this Deliveroo device) is not mine. I borrowed this device from another Turkish guy. He went on holidays in Turkey. He rents his device every time he goes away. It's not fair in a way, because he makes money while on holiday from renting a machine that I cannot even register for. It's not fair, is it?!



Figure 3. Three young males in Cork sitting on electric pushbikes

Building a scaffolding

The street, the most banal of all places, displays symptoms of inequalities in every city. Couriers are bound to concrete places (e.g., streets, restaurants, customers' house doors). During crisis they were the indispensables delivering hot food to entire communities. Yet, in ordinary times they have become expendable due to drop in customers' demand, which inevitable leads to platforms dismissing couriers unable to pick up orders. The couriers who participated in this preliminary study, and those whom I

observed speeding with, on hold or waiting for food orders, speak of their precarious presence at the edge of the digitalised economies. Irrespective of the city where I immersed in for fieldwork, either in Oradea and Bucharest, two Romanian “smart cities” on the semi periphery of globalisation, or in Cork, a small city in south-west of Ireland, commonalities of inequities are displayed in both terms, spatially (e.g., relentless waiting for orders) or temporally (e.g., deep into the night or lunching between two shifts or workloads back-to-back). London, as the “glocturnal” city (MacQuarie 2018), offers couriers (by and large migrants), more opportunities to swap the platforms that are greater in numbers and profiles (e.g., groceries stores, dark/ghost kitchens, food or alcohol). But conditions of work are equally precarious as found in small cities.

Digitalisation or the “fourth industrialisation wave” has changed not only production of work, but also how inequalities are being reproduced. Far from easing the working lives of platform mediated workers, according to activist and academic David Schwartz, in Romania, “only the horror version of platform work arrived”. The preliminary findings in this study, therefore indicate that: a) despite the positive outlook that platform mediated work promised (e.g., new kinds of support and training), the most dependent food couriers merely hang on at the edges of the sharing economy; b) the digitalisation of work through platform algorithms only exacerbates the existing inequalities through precarisation of working conditions and c) the streets provide the couriers with both a workplace and space, yet they expose the symptoms of the digitalised inequalities experienced by them in terms of health inequities and lack of social worth. The old, unfulfilled promises of the sharing economy (i.e., platform capitalism) need to be thrown, and a new set of values need to be programmed into the algorithm managers.

Out with the old, in with the new sharing economy

It goes without saying, that Schor’s proposal that “democratic sharing” or a form of “cooperativism” is possible in digital platform economies, but its implementation will be exceedingly difficult to carry out in practice. Compain *et al.* (2019) rightly identify three major challenges in the implementation of cooperativist platforms: finding long-lasting economic and financial models, uniting communities, and mobilizing supporters and partners. These second and third challenges, the authors add encouragingly,

could nonetheless become part of the solution. Moreover, Schor (2020, p. 150) does see a future for “democratic sharing” but also other options, such as “state regulation”. Yet, for that to happen, a “reboot of the sector is both desirable and possible” and that it “would need to go deeper into sharing” (Schor 2020, pp. 162-163). But how feasible are these reforms when cooperativism, sharing, and collaboration are mostly voluntary activities? Moreover, how far can someone stretch their external income, savings, and unemployment benefits to fund a cooperative endeavor, especially during the project’s precarious developmental phase? Schor’s dependent platform workers, after all, barely break even from their gigs.

This limitation rules out, in my view, the possibility of creating successful cooperatives (see Stocksy for an exception). Especially, for gig workers living on meager wages, when “cooperatives or associations are generally not particularly lucrative” and have difficulty paying salaries and attracting contributors (Boudes *et al.* 2019). Furthermore, the current lack of political attention and innovation have indirectly ensured domination by Big Tech and its lobbyist allies. For example, the *Platform Cooperativism Consortium* announced recently that it had received a \$1 million grant from the Google Foundation. While this development may be seen as a vote of confidence in cooperativisation, it can just as easily indicate the opposite: the lack of support for the movement, meaning that it must go against its very nature in accepting such donations.

It is also entirely possible that a tech giant such as Google could become the owner of this platform. Cooperative platforms already face dominant for-profit actors, low user commitment, overworked project leaders, and limited political will to enter a strong social dialogue. In this context, a future “sharing economy” without actual sharing seems almost inevitable. If, however, public-facing institutions (charities, foundations, service providers, and governments) and Social and Solidarity Economy organizations (SSE) were to form structures that actively support developing projects (Compain *et al.* 2019), then we could see the existing form of platform capitalism shaped into a legitimate, feasible, and democratic model of cooperativism. This new version of the “sharing economy” would be far closer to a mode of democratic control for platform members rather than those current arrangements facilitated by Big Tech. In the eyes of Schor (2020), sharing platforms can build bridges, not simply walls.

It is up to the human behind the machine to input a higher value into the algorithmic code. Hence, for the future of the sharing economy, like Schor, I believe that we need to reboot and reload a new trust-based,

peer-to-peer transactional algorithm, that sets rules for middleman-free and equities between parties (user-worker-platform), and democratic decision-making shared among comparativists of similar membership.

Onboarding new investigation avenues

This study goes beyond the intersecting categories of lived precariousness, wo/men migrant and working on digital platforms. Onboarding new methods, it will produce an inclusive analysis of the lack of ‘power and privilege’ (Crenshaw 1989), the forms of ‘oppression and inequality’ and differential inclusion that women face in platform work, a heavily masculinised environment. However, it is beyond the purpose of the current study, thus suggestions of further investigation avenues are proposed below.

Thematically, further investigation needs to address the gendered aspect of platform work, such as the “relationship between gender and the ‘gig economy’ ... discrimination” (Barzilay and Ben-David, 2017: 427). This inquiry will thus focus on the next stage of the research, on women’s contribution to this “new way of working” on platforms and included in equal measure to their male counterparts more comprehensive worker centred analysis. Therefore, building on the Researcher’s Nightworkshop (2021), the next steps will continue with day and night observations of women riders to apprehend various aspects of platform mediated food delivery.

Analytically, it will be supported by intersectional theory, as it seeks to capture not only bodily experiences but also identity processes, language, and gender norms in their every day and night encounters between men and women riders (Collins and Bilge 2016; Anthias 2012). Moreover, Wacquant’s (2015) flesh and blood sociological approach will be employed to objectify the sensorial, emotional, and intellectual, in the future stages as the analysis aims also to make palpable and visible night-to-night embodied issues of abuse, physical exhaustion, stress, and lack of child nursing experienced by women migrant workers. More broadly, the investigation will contribute to conversations that had been taking place, by adding an analytical nightwork lens in the fields of migration and precarity. In this vein, the inquiry will build on the literature that has already addressed female subjectivities in migration and precarity, such as: migration scholars applying gender lens to show

growing concerns about migrant women in the paid care work sector (Fedyuk, Bartha & Zentai 2014); also, the causes related to the unequal gender distribution of childcare and household duties that underscores the role of working mothers in the labour market (Fedyuk 2015); and last but not least, the reason behind migrant women's experiences of abuse is that they cannot easily move out of precarious work into employment that guarantees access to decent work (Pillinger 2006, 2007), which impacts negatively on their mental and physical health (Costa 2006). The next stage of this ethnography envisions high possibilities for solutions to the growing invisibility of women migrants working the night shift in a male-dominated in digital platform work.

NOTES

- ¹ Guga, Ș., & Spatari, M. (2021).
- ² Translation by the author from Romanian. "IT-ul a fost vedeta economiei românești și sectorul-câștigător al pandemiei în prima jumătate din 2020. IT-ul a crescut, pe volum, cu 12,4% în primele 6 luni din 2020, prin comparație cu aceeași perioadă din anul precedent" Online at: <https://www.zf.ro/banci-si-asigurari/it-ul-vedeta-economiei-romanesti-sectorul-castigator-pandemiei-prima-19654861> Accessed 02.07.2022
- ³ Digitalisation and Labour Migration. Humboldt University. Berlin. Online at: <http://platform-mobilities.net/en/start> Accessed 02.07.2022
- ⁴ RON or Romanian Leu is the Romanian currency. It's exchange value is €1 = 4.94 RON. Available at <https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=EUR&To=RON> Retrieved 04.07.2022.
- ⁵ The real Living Wage is an hourly rate of pay set independently and updated annually (not the UK government's National Living Wage). London Living Wage rate has recently been increased to £10.85.
- ⁶ BAME is the bureaucratic acronym for Black, Asian and other Minority Ethnic used to describe other groups who are non-white. BAME also includes "other white", such as Eastern Europeans working and living in the UK).

References

- Anthias, F. "Transnational mobilities, migration research and intersectionality." *Nordic Journal of Migration Research* 2, no. 2, 2012: 102-110.
- Barns, S. *Platform urbanism: negotiating platform ecosystems in connected cities*. Springer Nature: Rotterdam. 2019.
- Barzilay, A. R. "Platform Inequality: Gender in the Gig-Economy." *Seton Hall law review*. 2017
- Boudes M., Compain G., Ozman M. *Another approach to online platforms is possible: cooperation*. 2019. Online at: <https://theconversation.com/another-approach-to-online-platforms-is-possible-cooperation-126328> Retrieved 09.07.2020.
- Cant, C. *Riding for Deliveroo: Resistance in the New Economy*. Polity Press: Cambridge. 2020.
- Compain G., Eynaud P., Morel L., Vercher-Chaptal C. *Alternative Platforms and Societal Horizon: Characterisation and Strategies for Development*. SASE 31st Annual Meeting, New York City, United States. 2019. Online at: <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02140104> Retrieved 09.07.2020.
- Costa, G., Sartori, S. and Åkerstedt, T. "Influence of flexibility and variability of working hours on health and well-being." *Chronobiology international* 23, no. 6, 2006: 1125-1137.
- Digitalisation of Labour and Migration Project (DLMP). Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). Online at: <http://platform-mobilities.net/en/ueber> Retrieved 09.07.2022.
- Driessen, H., and Willy J. "The hard work of small talk in ethnographic fieldwork." *Journal of anthropological research* 69, no. 2, 2013: 249-263.
- Fedyuk, O. "Growing up with migration: shifting roles and responsibilities of transnational families of Ukrainian care workers in Italy." In *Migrant Domestic Workers and Family Life*, pp. 109-129. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015.
- Fedyuk, O., Bartha, A. and Zentai, V. "Migrant domestic care workers: state and market-based policy mix." *New Jobs Working Paper no. 164*. 2014.
- Gay y Blasco, P., and Wardle, H. *How to read ethnography*. Routledge: London. 2007.
- Geertz, C. "Thick Description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture." *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. Basic Books: New York. 1973.
- De Genova, N. "The "migrant crisis" as racial crisis: Do Black Lives Matter in Europe?" *Ethnic and racial studies* 41, no. 10, 2018: 1765-1782.
- Guga, Ș., and Spatari, M. *The exception that proves the rule: Evolutions in Romanian IT*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Bucharest. 2021.
- Hall, S., M. *The Migrant's Paradox: Street Livelihoods and Marginal Citizenship in Britain*. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. 2021.

- Heiland, H. *Workers' Voice in platform labour: An Overview*. Hans-Böckler-Stiftung: Düsseldorf. 2020.
- Hill Collins, P., and Bilge, S. *Intersectionality*. Polity Press: Maiden, MA. 2016.
- Howcroft, D., and Jill, R. Gender equality prospects and the fourth industrial revolution. *Praise for Work in the Digital Age*. Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd: London. 2018: 63.
- James A. "Women in the Gig Economy: Feminising 'Digital Labour'". *Work in the Global Economy* (In Press). Forthcoming online at: <https://bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/journals/work-in-the-global-economy>
- MacQuarie, J.-C. "While Others Sleep: The Essential Labor of Migrant Nightshift Workers." *Exertions*. 2020. Online at: <https://doi.org/10.21428/1d6be30e.fb029d9b>
- MacQuarie, Julius-Cezar. "The Researcher's Nightworkshop: A Methodology of Bodily and Cyber-Ethnographic Representations in Migration Studies." *Visual Methodology in Migration Studies*. Springer Nature: Rotterdam. 2021: 293.
- McElroy, E. "Digital nomads in siliconising Cluj: Material and allegorical double dispossession." *Urban Studies* 57, no. 15, 2020: 3078-3094.
- Pillinger, J. "The feminisation of migration." *Dublin: Immigrant Council of Ireland*. 2007.
- Popan, C. "Embodied Precariat and Digital Control in the "Gig Economy": The Mobile Labour of Food Delivery Workers". *Journal of Urban Technology*. Online at: [10.1080/10630732.2021.2001714](https://doi.org/10.1080/10630732.2021.2001714)
- Precarity Lab. "Digital Precarity Manifesto." *Social Text* 37, no. 4, 2019: 77-93.
- Scholz, T. *Platform Cooperativism: Challenging the corporate economy*. Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. 2016.
- Schor, J. *After the gig: How the sharing economy got hijacked and how to win it back*. University of California Press: San Francisco. 2021.
- Urry, J. *Mobilities*. Polity Press: Cambridge. 2007.
- Wacquant, L. "For a sociology of flesh and blood." *Qualitative sociology* 38, no. 1, 2015: 1-11.
- Zia, S., Gupta, A., Lalvani, S., Rath, A., Tandon, A. "Platformisation of Ride Hailing, Food Delivery and Domestic Work". Panel presented at AoIR 2021: The 22nd Annual Conference of the Association of Internet Researchers. Virtual Event: AoIR. 2021. Online at: <https://doi.org/10.5210/spir.v2021i0.12129>. Retrieved from <http://spir.aoir.org> 09.07.2022



MARA MĂRGINEAN

Born in 1980, in Hunedoara

Ph.D. in History, Romanian Academy (2013)

Thesis: *Procesul de urbanizare în centrele industriale Hunedoara și Călan, 1945-1968* [Urbanization Process in Hunedoara and Calan, 1945-1968]

Participated to conferences and workshops in Germany, Hungary, Austria, UK, France, Italy, Spain

Published several scholarly articles and book chapters

Book:

Ferestre spre furnalul roșu: Urbanism și cotidian în Hunedoara și Călan, 1945-1968 [Windows to the Red Furnace. Urbanization Process and Daily Life in Hunedoara and Calan], Iasi: Polirom, 2015)

THE VALUE OF A CALORIE: FOOD POLICIES AND THE MAKING OF STANDARDS OF LIVING IN MID-20TH CENTURY ROMANIA

Abstract

My paper proposes a historical account of the genealogy of nutritional standards in Romania from the 1930s until the late 1950s, documenting the strategies behind turning “food” into “nutrition” and “nutrition” into a domain of political concern and governmental intervention. Using archival information, I argue that while central to the socialist state’s effort to recalibrate planning and distribution programs and ground industrialization and urbanization, these nutrition policies echo social outcomes of development worldwide and flesh out multiple possibilities of scaled analysis (global, regional, and national) in the context of the Great Depression, WWII, postwar food rationing, and postwar welfare. Consequently, instead of substantiating the interwar and the postwar as two distinctive political systems, my paper aims to show that postwar approaches to food policies should be linked with a political economy of the workforce that first became transparent in 1930s Europe.


Keywords: nutrition, food, science, Romania, development, postwar reconstruction.

“Fiat panis” [*Let there be bread*], the motto of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) chosen by its first Director General, Sir John Boyd Orr, perfectly sums up the international community’s vision of the elimination of hunger and malnutrition in the post-1945 world. More than before, experts and policymakers seemed to agree that alleviating poverty in vulnerable areas would depend on „periodic appraisals of the prospective production, exports, imports, and consumption of major agricultural commodities in all countries, and contrast these with world

needs for improved nutrition as indicated by consumption goals set by the authorities of each country.”¹ Against this background, FAO launched an ambitious project in 1946 to map daily food consumption in more than seventy countries on every continent. The experts studied several basic food categories: Cereals, Roots, Meat, Fruits and Vegetables, Milk, Eggs, Beans, and Sugar. The study had two objectives. First, they wanted to gather information about dietary habits in the regions. Second, they aimed to determine the extent to which the caloric intake of the population corresponds to physiological needs and the type of activity performed.

Aside from the inherent limitations of a project of this scale - in many cases, aggregate data provided information not only on average consumption but were reconstructed based on sales figures, so homegrown food was not quantified in the official data - the approach provided for the first time a detailed picture of the food situation on a global scale. The data showed that nations in Europe, North and South America, and Oceania had optimal consumption of more than 2,500 calories per day. In the rest of the world, nutrient levels were significantly lower. Of concern, however, was that more than one-third of the world's population consumed less than 2,000 calories per day, equivalent to malnutrition. But even in those countries where the diet seemed quantitatively adequate, the food did not meet the quality standards recommended by physicians. For example, while in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, more than two-thirds of total calories came from grain products, average sugar consumption in the United States was already reaching alarmingly high levels. Aware that many of these data also masked a range of cultural realities, the international experts proposed adapting standards to local conditions and developing programs to ensure a gradual improvement in dietary structure by 1960. Among the solutions offered was to increase the consumption of milk, meat, and vegetables while reducing the consumption of cereals, especially corn.

Pre-war food supplies and nutritional targets in 18 areas of the globe



Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
 "First Annual Report of the Director-General to the FAO Conference,"
 Washington, 5 July 1946, p. 13.

In many ways, FAO's efforts were about finding solutions to alleviate poverty, which was already far too present in various corners of the world. However, the international community's mobilization to problematize nutrition in the postwar period must be linked to a more complex development agenda of nation-states, which became transparent in the aftermath of WWII. The reformation ethos that took shape against the backdrop of the extraordinary optimism of those years was the foundation of a new vision of global social modernity that imagined the human subject "as a universal subject whose needs, prospects, and norms could be discovered, interpreted, and fixed by science,"² and the future of humanity as necessarily egalitarian and scientific. In this context, nutrition was not simply an element that belonged to the broader realm of daily well-being but rather „a matter of problems related to the development of the civilization itself." As convincingly further stated one FAO document, „these problems were part of the field of social medicine; they were a result of the rapid change in living conditions under the combined influence of various sociological factors, among which we may mention the increase in population, the phenomenon of urban concentration, industrial development, the prolonging of the human life span."³

A significant number of academic contributions have shown that in the immediate post-war historical context, visions of global social welfare ascertained the belief that "the bureaucratic nation-states"⁴ consolidation was interlinked with renewed population policies,⁵ which made it imperative for grounding organizational modernization initiatives into a new domain of "the government of life."⁶ Since the controversial publication of Thomas McKeown's book (1976) that argued that population growth and mortality's decline owed more to improved nutrition than to medicine's progress,⁷ academics have analyzed food policies in relation to the first and the second globalization,⁸ trans-national food supply chains,⁹ (bio)ethics,¹⁰ or the changing work-regimes.¹¹ Recent interest in international organizations' activities has produced several significant scholarly contributions that flesh out the practices of experts and non-state actors in problematizing national development strategies. In this respect, researchers problematized bio-politics in Eastern and Central European countries. With a focus on the late 19th century and the interwar period, these contributions address some of the significant issues about the government of life of the period, including the involvement of the medical profession.¹² However, these narratives are not linked with the major transformation processes of the early postwar period, particularly

those related to the histories of the making of the industrial workforce, practices, and experiences.¹³

My contribution wants to take a first step towards solving this historiographical deficiency. I propose a historical account of the genealogy of nutritional standards in Romania from the 1930s until the late 1950s, documenting the strategies behind turning “food” into “nutrition” and “nutrition” into a domain of political concern and governmental intervention. The approach starts from the premise that for (semi-) peripheral states like Romania, although they had been well connected to the epistemic communities around international organizations since the interwar period, their inclusion in the Soviet sphere of influence led to a rather brutal rupture with the UN agencies that would determine a series of institutional resettlements in national expert environments. In the 1930s, Romanian experts relied on the international knowledge base to propose solutions for national growth. However, the coming to power of the communist regime meant that additional changes in the food policies would occur along with state industrialization, urbanization, and the collectivization of agriculture. More concretely, mass mobilization and improved productivity required a new approach to workforce nutrition that the state would sustain with the available financial resources at hand. In this regard, as I show below, the official approaches to nutrition gradually evolved from a solution to eradicate poverty to a means to improve labor productivity.

In my own approach, I argue that while central to the socialist state’s effort to recalibrate planning and distribution programs and ground industrialization and urbanization, these nutrition policies echo social outcomes of development worldwide and flesh out multiple possibilities of scaled analysis (global, regional, and national) in the context of the Great Depression, WWII, postwar food rationing, and postwar welfare. Consequently, instead of substantiating the interwar and the postwar as two distinctive political systems, my paper aims to show that postwar approaches to food policies should be linked with a political economy of the workforce that first became transparent in 1930s Europe. I find instrumental here Nicolas Rose’s concept of “the politics of life itself.”¹⁴ He pointed out that because of the development strategies over the last decades, the malleability of human life increased not only because of individualization and human and economic capital flexibilization but also because of “our growing capacities to control, manage, engineer, reshape, and modulate the very vital capacities of human beings as living

creatures". This encounter led to significant international debates about labor and everyday, industrial workforce, planning and provisioning, uneven territorial development, and how issues of governmentality and nutrition came to life in conjunction with actors' practices and individual aspirations, hopes, and novel ways of thinking about oneself. It further problematized how states could reconsider their strategies of social mapping and intervention through new technologies of statistical data gathering and analysis, macro-economic planning, and social forecasting. In doing this, my work could be relevant not only for a better understanding of Romania's particular experience in making food standards immediately after the end of WWII but could also contribute to a growing body of scientific contributions to global history.

When science meets politics ...

Nutrition is a relatively young science. For a long time, doctors believed that as long as the body consumed an adequate amount of food, no causal relationship could be established between a poor diet and a person's bad health. Then, in the late 19th century, experts developed more efficient methods for studying the energy needs of the human body, particularly the intake of carbohydrates, proteins, and fats. It was not until vitamins were synthesized at the beginning of the 20th century (1910-1933) that physicians realized the importance of the quality and variety of nutrients for the optimal functioning of the human body. In this context, the years following World War I saw an unprecedented mobilization of physicians in the service of scientific progress. A series of studies by British and Austrian researchers emphasized the importance of "protective foods" - milk, fresh vegetables, meat, fish, and fruit - in strengthening the body. Other studies conducted in schools also emphasized the importance of milk consumption for children's growth, while several social surveys showed that the consequences of poor nutrition include extremely low life expectancy, high infant mortality, increased morbidity in vulnerable populations, especially in light of the rising incidence of tuberculosis, pellagra, and endemic goiter, or low labor productivity.

Building on the intellectual mobilization of the previous years, in 1929, the Geneva Physiology Commission, which operated under the League of Nations, recommended a daily intake of 2400 calories for an adult at rest. According to these standards, "physiological energy value (total calories

consumed daily, per CPU), expressed in calories, is provided by protein in a ratio of 10-15%, fat 27-30%, and carbohydrate the remainder up to 100% of total calories, with 1 gram of protein providing 4 calories, 1 gram of fat providing 9 calories, and 1 gram of carbohydrate providing 4 calories.”

The first institutional attempts by nation-states to assess the quality of life against these standards date back to the early 1930s, when several countries - Czechoslovakia, Poland, Germany, Switzerland, France, England, and the United States - studied the quality of the population's diet. Then, in 1935, a joint effort of the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization established recommended nutrition standards for workers. For the first time in modern times, an institutional initiative relied on a body of scientific evidence and set a minimum daily intake of 2500 calories for moderate physical exertion. In addition, the experts argued that nutritional regulations should also consider other aspects such as gender, age, physical constitution, and type of work.¹⁵ Later, between 1938 and 1941, the United States National Research Council drew on the League's scientific data and proposed combining energy values - calories - with other components such as minerals and vitamins. The Recommended Dietary Allowance (RDA), completed in 1941, was later adopted by many other countries. The nutritional scheme in this document formed the basis for a modern approach to nutrition in the decades to come.¹⁶ To this end, knowledge has emerged as an excellent means of empowering the authorities. By converting food into figures, a somewhat abstract idea, such as redistribution of food, has suddenly become palpable, and “a hypothetical limit of the human need has been synthesized into a political problem that had scientific and organizational solutions.”¹⁷

However, the immediate impact of the “new science of nutrition” on the quality of the population's diet proved extremely limited. The failure was not necessarily due to the unwillingness of policymakers to transform medical knowledge into instruments of social intervention but rather to a complex of macroeconomic factors that were exacerbated by the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. On the one hand, many people continued to be undernourished despite unprecedented advances in agriculture in the 1920s. The press of the time is replete with information about the inability of national markets to absorb all the food supplies due to low labor incomes, the disorganization of the processing industry, and fluctuations in the economic system. On the other hand, by the late 1920s, countries had drastically restricted food trade to reduce their dependence on foreign markets. Instead of working together to organize an international food

market by regulating tariffs, technologizing processing lines, and linking national freight networks, most national governments have mandated the reduction of food surpluses through harsh production restrictions.

Against this background, in the late 1920s, as the first signs of the global crisis began to emerge, the League of Nations undertook an ambitious effort to mobilize international expertise in food, nutrition, and mass food processing. The League of Nations experts' solutions aimed - in a manner that was if not utopian, at least overly optimistic - at creating a networked system for assessing the nutritional needs of populations, revising social standards, and implicitly formulating effective mechanisms for the circulation of products among countries and regions according to availability and need. The League's goal was to stop the increasing prevalence of "poverty and under-consumption in the midst of potential plenty"¹⁸ and, more importantly, to mobilize international expertise to create practical solutions for economic planning, labor force management, and social rationality. Specifically, the League was concerned with reducing food surpluses by providing food on a transnational scale and formulating a more equitable vision of social welfare that met the standards of European modernity of the time. Based on these contributions, the League of Nations proposed in 1935 to regulate the maximum price of commodities (milk, meat, bread).

Likewise, the League built on existing medical knowledge and proposed a series of solutions to improve the nutritional quality of the population. Among the first programs launched in this regard were the provision of milk in schools, the organization of home economics courses, and access to surplus food at affordable prices for low-income people. As a result, several European countries have established nutrition research programs and public hygiene institutes.

In the academic literature, the fact that the food issue has turned into a domain of intervention for international organizations is described as an example of the moment when food has become a key element in maintaining global macroeconomic balance. In spite of the difficulties of the League of Nations in getting states to cooperate for the common good (by the 1930s, the entire League project had already lost its credibility), the old agenda of the international community was resumed after 1945.

In many ways, World War II enabled the international community to develop more effective levers for producing, transporting, and distributing food to needy populations. A paradox is that the rationalization strategies adopted by numerous nations at war actually reduced producers'

food stockpiles, led to a somewhat more balanced diet, and improved agricultural labor productivity. However, after the end of hostilities and the termination of the wartime economy, more and more actors became aware that without concrete measures further to facilitate access to necessary food for vulnerable populations, the critical situation of the interwar period would soon be reached again. In general, it was necessary to make the production, distribution, and marketing of food more efficient, improve the population's economic situation, and educate them on better eating habits and healthy principles of food preparation. In particular, improving the nutritional condition of the needy population required the mobilization of the authorities, not only to provide food in sufficient quantities but, above all, to organize the distribution system in such a way that the population benefited from the optimal combination of necessary nutrients from the food available nearby.¹⁹ Unlike the interwar period, when the protectionist policies of many countries blocked trade exchanges and condemned a large part of the population to live in poverty, after 1945 the international community seemed more determined than ever to develop "a genuine, long-term coordinated production plan for the best use of its resources on a world scale."²⁰ In this sense, the realization of the new welfare vision became the object of the joint effort of several international organizations, such as FAO, WHO, and ILO, which aimed at transforming welfare standards into transnational and trans-ideological solutions for economic growth.

Catching up with the West

At a time when the international community was struggling to find feasible solutions to facilitate universal food access, the authorities in Bucharest faced an extremely complicated situation. Heavily affected by the political instability and economic blockages caused by the war years and the harsh peace conditions, Romania had to provide food to a population that was already malnourished and demoralized by too many trials. The situation was aggravated by the prolonged drought that hit much of the country's agricultural regions immediately after 1945 and rampant inflation that doubled prices overnight.²¹ As wheat froze and corn spoiled, Bucharest decision-makers had to admit that domestic food production could provide only about 1695 calories, which was by far the lowest level in Europe that

year. The social impact was dramatic. In the words of a British diplomat who visited Romania in 1947,

The population crawled in crowded trains from one district to another, constantly searching for food and more food. They were hungry, homeless, and without clothes. Naked children, it was a familiar sight. The famine was omnipresent. The appearance of the newborn children bore little resemblance to a human being. They were walking skeletons, with protruding bones and bloated bellies, their skin stretched like gray parchments, like a spider's web. They never laughed, and one rarely saw a smile. Death caught up with entire families. Last year 400,000 children were born, today, only 300,000 are alive, and the mortality rate is 25%.²²

In such a context, solutions proposed by international organizations could have provided national policymakers with a good model for institutional practice, not only in terms of turning nutrition standards into food planning and distribution, but also in terms of transnational food trade. However, as would soon become apparent, the local applicability of the trans-national ideas was further complicated by the lack of a coherent professional vision of the role of nutrition as a driver of economic development.

Of course, many ideas that grounded the international expert community effort to reshape the postwar nutritional policy were already known in Romania since the interwar period. Quite important in this respect were the research activities of several social physicians from the institutes of hygiene in Bucharest, Cluj, and Iași. In the 1930s, particularly, they relied on a corpus of Western knowledge to problematize various issues pertaining to public health and nutrition. Perhaps the best known among them was Gheorghe Banu, hygienist, Minister of Health during the Goga government (December 1937-February 1938), and, from 1942, Director of the Institute of Hygiene in Bucharest. In the late 1930s, Banu started working on a monumental 9 volume editorial project entitled *Tratat de medicina sociala* [Treatise on Social Medicine].²³ The harsh conditions during World War II prevented Banu from fully completing his work, and in 1944 only the first four volumes saw the light of day. Nonetheless, the proposed methodology and the effectiveness of this knowledge for instrumentalizing social reform at the Romanian state level remain noteworthy to this day.²⁴

Banu argued that there was a strong interdependence between (in)adequate nutrition and the dynamics of social progress. In a number of articles published in the late 1930s, he showed that nutrition-related morbidity was directly influenced by etiological factors such as occupational status, class, educational level, or income. The vision proposed by Banu and his colleagues was therefore based on an euthenic perspective, that is, on the search for levers to improve the functioning of the human body by improving general living conditions. This would have included, among other things, the implementation of the so-called „metoda a sănătății dirijate” [directed health method], which was nothing more than a collection of ideas about social protection, adequate nutrition, provision of universal medical assistance, and state interventionism in implementing public policies and programs. Or, in Banu’s words, as long as public policies do not take into account the norms of social medicine, their results will remain “empirical and undirected.” Specifically, Banu sought to mobilize nutrition knowledge to achieve two goals. First, he wanted to implement a coherent program to improve child nutrition. His research on child education has already shown that adequate food in the first months of life plays a crucial role in raising healthy children who have the chance to become the nation’s elite. With this in mind, the Romanian physician advocated for introducing nutrition education, maternal education, and milk distribution programs in schools, as was being proposed in international circles at the same time. On the other hand, Banu hoped to reduce social ills that became more and more frequent despite visible agricultural modernization and partial industrialization immediately following World War I. The increasing incidence of tuberculosis, typhoid fever, and pellagra was a worrisome signal of the real benefits of recent economic progress to the welfare of the population, especially of the labor force.²⁵


Building on this ideas, by the end of WWII, Romanian authorities acted quickly to improve vulnerable populations’ nutritional situation. The experience of the medical profession during the interwar period played an important role. Unlike in the 1930s, when most initiatives remained in the project phase after 1945, the government decided to make use of the institutional infrastructure of the Ministry of Health. They also took advantage of the international community’s interest in global intervention programs to eradicate poverty, malnutrition, and social diseases. Since 1945, representatives of the Ministry of Health have established cooperative relationships with FAO, WHO, ILO, and UNICEF

to mobilize the scientific knowledge produced in these transnational environments for national social reform projects. In this way, policymakers in Bucharest created the conditions for a scientific and integrated approach to population nutrition.²⁶

One such example was a study jointly conducted by FAO and WHO in the mid-1940s, which showed that many poor populations in countries like Romania, Mexico, and Venezuela ate corn primarily for much of the year.²⁷ The experts believed that the high consumption of this cereal was a direct result of the population's ignorance of nutritional issues, but also that "the extensive consumption of maize is typical of poor, rural areas, which is why maize is also called the poor man's cereal."²⁸ Unlike some Central American countries, where the consumption of beans and vegetables met the need for vitamins and proteins, in Romania, the maize-based diet was supplemented by consuming herbs and other products with low nutritional content. Protective foods such as meat, fish, or milk hardly landed on Romanians' tables.²⁹ This structure of the daily diet puts Romania in last place in the ranking of countries monitored by the FAO in terms of daily intake of niacin and vitamin D. These data provide a convincing explanation for the extremely high number of pellagra cases registered among peasants in Muntenia and Moldova.

Consequently, as early as 1945, the Ministry of Health ordered a national health census for the "national reorganization and reconstruction of the country." The authorities aimed to collect data on the movement of epidemics and social diseases, morbidity due to nutritional problems, and the need for medical personnel in each health district. However, the data collected confirmed several already-known facts to decision-makers. Perhaps the most disturbing of these concerned the identification of more than 300,000 pellagros cases, many of which had not been previously recorded. Although more than 40% of the identified cases were reported from Tecuci, Corvului and Tutova counties, pellagra was present in most counties outside the Carpathians.

Pellagra incidence in Romania in 1948



Source: Arhiva Ministerului Sănătății, Direcția Igienă (Archive of the Ministry of Health, Department of Hygiene), file 336/1948.

On this occasion, the Ministry of Health experts also pointed out that there was a close relationship between the high level of pellagra and the occurrence of cases of infant mortality. In particular, the health experts pointed out that pellagra affected significantly more women than men and, to a much greater extent, young and middle-aged women than older females. These facts were mainly the result of deeply rooted practices in the domestic economy of traditional Romanian families. A series of studies conducted as early as the interwar period showed that family members' access to food varied because of the insufficient quantities available in rural households. For pragmatic reasons, much of the food went to the breadwinners (usually husbands) and young men. Another, somewhat smaller portion went to the children, while the women had to make do with what little was left.³⁰ The poor nutrition of pregnant women and mothers of young children would affect the newborn's health and reduce its chances of survival. According to the statistics, Romania had the highest infant mortality rate in Europe in the immediate post-war years - about 17-19 per thousand.³¹

After summarizing health census data and identifying at-risk areas, authorities launched several epidemiological investigations to get a more accurate picture of conditions on the ground. Using a methodology already patented in the interwar period, the Ministry sent interdisciplinary teams of physicians, sociologists, and statisticians from the Institute of Statistics.

Social scientists' involvement in assessing the population's health status had a pragmatic background. Moreover, the high rates of out-migration during the great drought made it difficult for doctors to record the state of health and forced them to use complex methods to assess social dynamics.

Later, the authorities launched a broad public education campaign about the negative effects of improper nutrition. The local and national press was used to educate the population about the symptoms of pellagra and the means of preventing the disease. For example, a leaflet distributed in Prahova County painted an extremely graphic picture of pellagra:

It is a serious disease that demoralizes people's health; it completely weakens the human body and leads the patient to eye disease or insanity. The disease appears in spring, with red rashes on hands and feet, heartburn, and nervous disorders. The disease is due to the improper diet of the villagers. In order not to get pellagra, it is necessary to consume animal foods: milk, eggs, meat, fat, fish, butter, cheese, as well as fresh vegetables.³²

Although the number of pellagra cases decreased by 40% in 1949 compared to 1948, the Ministry of Health has proposed and implemented a complex plan of action to solve identified problems and prevent new ones. The first step was the establishment of canteens for the pellagros in the rural areas, where rations of protective foods such as bread, milk, meat, and fats would be distributed. The goal of these campaigns was to ensure adequate food rations: 300 grams of whole-grain bread, 1000 grams of milk (100 grams of powdered milk and 900 grams of clean water from a good drinking water source), 25 grams of fat and 200 grams of canned meat every other day. The campaign began each year in February, the period considered most vulnerable after the harsh winter months.

A second step was to draw government programs to reduce infant mortality, which had reportedly peaked "appalling" [*înspăimântătoare*] levels. Beginning in 1947, the Ministry of Health held discussions with WHO on establishing an expert committee on maternal hygiene to address issues related to pellagra and nutrition. Childcare centers became functional in 1947, on the recommendation of UNICEF, providing mothers and children with a network of support. The aim was to determine the regional characteristics of diseases, study the working woman's biology, and set up programs for the scientific organization of health care. In this sense, nutrition became one of the key elements of the whole process. Like the canteens for the pellagros, the childcare centers served as the

state infrastructure for distributing sugar and flour rations to young children and their mothers. In addition, dairy products were to be distributed free of charge in the rural target areas through these networks.³³

However, such a program proved highly complicated, not only because of the rudimentary infrastructure for food transportation and storage but also because of the lack of capacity to produce powdered milk. According to government data, Romania did not own a single milk powder factory in 1947. It was not until 1949 that Bucharest authorities acquired technical documentation from France to construct milk factories in poor rural areas. In the absence of these technologies, the supply of milk powder depended on the reserves of UNICEF. As a result, the number of milk rations dropped from 750,000 in November 1947 to less than 400,000 two years later, when Romania's relations with Western Europe deteriorated, and access to the reserves of international organizations became increasingly difficult. There were few alternative solutions. However, the authorities tried to compensate for the decrease in milk calories with bread and jam rations, relying on them as an additional source of another 5-600 calories per day.³⁴

The program envisioned the establishment of diet kitchens and milk centers to operate near industrial factories and regions with high infant mortality or where milk production was usually low due to challenging economic conditions (Moldova, Eastern Muntenia, Dobruja). Although more than two-thirds of the total milk rations were distributed in rural areas, the state also cared for needy children in urban areas. Children in schools and kindergartens of workers in industrial enterprises were given priority.

Falling behind: pragmatic choices and unhealthy nutrition strategies after 1948

According to FAO and the Romanian National Institute of Statistics estimates, the average consumption of the Romanian population in 1938 was 2766 calories per day. A decade later, in 1947, the average was only 1,700 calories, which was proof enough for the authorities to declare that the country was sinking into a "national calorie deficit." However, the seizure of power by the communist regime (December 1947) and the immediate adoption of an ambitious development program involving heavy industrialization and urbanization required a new vision of nutrition policy. In particular, policymakers had to find a mechanism to provide the industrial workforce with the food it needed without worsening vulnerable populations' already precarious nutritional situation. In short, after

The experience with rationing in the first years after World War II served as a good model. In May 1945, through Decree-Law 348 on the regulation of wages and the operation of the treasury, the State Undersecretariat of Supply legislated the differentiated consumption of the urban and rural population. City dwellers had the right to consume about 300 grams of bread daily or the equivalent in flour (231 grams extract 90) or wheat (256 grams). Industrial workers received a daily supplement of 0.5 to 2 rations, depending on the type of work performed. On the other hand, the rural population received 600 grams of wheat daily. Two years later, in August 1947, cards for food and necessities were introduced, a measure that was maintained until December 1954. Under these new regulations, a maintenance standard of 2500 calories per day was established for adults who did not engage in intense physical activity. Depending on the type of work performed, workers were divided into six hierarchical levels: 3000 calories for clerks, watchmen, and tailors; 3200 calories for upholsterers, dyers, and printers; 3500 calories for tinkers, machinists; 4000 calories for blacksmiths and stonemasons; 4500 calories for farm laborers; 5000 calories for stonemasons and lumberjacks; and 5500 calories per day for those doing hefty work. Children under 7 were to receive up to 1,600 calories per day.³⁵

However, the ideological radicalization brought by the political regime change in Romania after 1948 led to a re-symbolization of medical knowledge. According to official data, the calculation of the daily caloric needs of the different categories of workers was based on a methodology developed by the Soviet physician S. V. Moiseev and contained no references to the League's findings.³⁶ Such an option fleshed out a complicated context. The Romanian authorities relied on Soviet scientific literature to assess the living standard of "the working class" and made a case for taking a step back from non-socialist models. Moreover, research on Romanian workers' daily nutrition should have become part of an East European approach to building a socialist science and a political project about social equity. However, a closer look at the methodologies used at the time in Romania shows that nutrition was a universal science, hardly influenced by ideological or political agendas. For example, the methodology used by Romanian and Soviet specialists in assessing the dietary needs of the population mobilized the same scientific categories as those proposed by the League's experts only a few years ago: differentiation between age, gender, occupation, and professional activity; correlating caloric intake with vitamins and minerals, or balancing protein and carbohydrate intake.

The structure of the daily food of a ration of 5500 calories

Food	Quantity	Calories	Proteins	Fats	Hydrocarbs.
Bread	0,960	2025	49,9	1,9	444,5
Wheat flour	0,035	110	29	0,3	23,4
Corn flour	0,143	480	11,4	3,1	98,9
Pasta	0,055	187	5,7	3,3	39,1
Rice	0,030	103	1,8	0,1	23,1
Sugar	0,080	320	-	-	62,5
Beef	0,150	222	28,9	10,9	6,6
Fats	0,025	216	-	23,3	-
Oil	0,045	391	-	41,9	-
Milk	0,250	162	8,0	8,5	11,7
Butter	0,035	259	0,2	27,6	0,2
Feta	0,050	160	12,6	12,3	
Canned fruits	0,040	105	0,2	-	25,6
Beens	0,050	120	9,0	0,2	20,1
Potatoes	0,300	279	4,8	0,6	62,1
Eggs	1 piece	70	5,4	5,0	9,2
Onion	0,050	18	0,4		4,0
Carrots	0,100	38	0,8	0,2	7,8
Cabbage	0,123	21	1,0	0,2	3,6
Vegetables	0,600	104	10,0	1,2	32,4
Fruits	0,100	55	0,3	-	12,7
TOTAL	3,248	5526	148,3	140,6	787,7

Source: Arhiva Institutului Național de Statistică, fond Nivel de trai (Archive of the National Institute of Statistics, Standard of Living fund) file 508/1953.

The methodology for calculating daily caloric needs contained detailed information on the structure of recommended food intake. For example, a ration of 5,500 calories should have a maximum of 40% portions of cereal, while the rest of the nutrients should come from consuming protective foods such as meat, milk, eggs, vegetables, and fruits. Based on these projections, the authorities envisioned introducing nutrition programs in company cafeterias and revising recipes already used in mass catering. At the macroeconomic level, such methods were intended to rationalize both the planning of agricultural production and the transportation of food and distribution policies between the country's different regions, depending on the demand and availability of products.

Needless to say, such visions were far too ambitious for the actual capacity of the Romanian state to manage the population's diet. A series of data compiled by the National Institute of Statistics after 1950 confirms this hypothesis. For example, an analysis of the nutritional structure of the population in Romania during the first decade of the communist government shows that caloric intake did not approach the 1938 level until 1960. Of course, the industrialization of food production and the efficiency of the transportation infrastructure contributed significantly to the gradual increase in the population's diet compared to the interwar period. In addition, there was a gradual increase in the purchasing power of the labor force, which was accompanied by a decrease in the share of food expenditures in family budgets from 65% in 1950 to 37% in 1960. We can also assume that the information from the late 1950s offered much more comprehensive information on the country's entire population than in 1938 due to the improvement in the methods of collecting statistical data. However, compared to the nutritional norms recognized by nutritionists, calorie intake by nutrient categories was still inadequate for a long time. In 1965, experts still claimed a deficit of 400 calories per day. Even in 1975, cereals still comprised 55% of the diet, while the maximum recommended amount was 40%, and milk and meat were consumed in insufficient quantities.

Nutritive values in 1950, 1955, and 1960 compared with 1938 when daily intake averaged around 2766 calories

	1950						1955						1960					
	Kg/ year	Gr/ day	Cal.	Prot.	Lip.	Gluc.	Kg /year	Gr/ day	Cal.	Prot.	Lip.	Gluc.	Kg /year	Gr/ day	Cal.	Prot.	Lip.	Gluc.
Products of vegetal origin																		
Flour	67.5	185	657	21.1	2.8	133	103.5	283	1005	32.5	4.2	207	163	291	1033	33.5	4.4	212
Corn	55.8	153	545	12.2	4.6	110	88.2	242	862	19.4	7.3	174	84.3	231	822	18.5	6.9	166
Rice	0.7	2	7	0.2	-	2	1.5	4	14	0.3	-	3	1.9	5	18	0.4	-	4
Sugar	6.9	19	78	-	-	19	10.2	28	115	-	-	28	11.0	30	123	-	-	30
Veggies	65.6	180	58	3	0.4	11	86.3	236	76	3.3	0.5	14	91.0	249	80	3.5	0.5	8
Potatos	50.3	138	124	2.8	0.3	28	69.7	191	172	3.8	0.4	11	5.9	16	51	3.7	0.3	8
Fruits	20.7	57	37	0.4	-	9	36.6	100	65	0.7	-	15	39.9	109	71	0.8	-	16
Total net			1390	36.0	14.1	274			2157	56.3	12.8	424			2214	56.1	25.8	427
%			80.2	67.7	38.4	95.1			85.0	73.8	41.3	95.8			82.5	69.9	44.4	96.4
Products of animal origin																		
Meat	16.7	46	97	8.3	6.4	-	20.3	56	118	10.1	7.8	-	26.7	73	153	13.1	10.2	-
Milk	107.6	295	198	10.3	10.3	14.8	111.1	304	204	10.6	10.6	15.2	123	342	229	12.0	12.0	17.0
Eggs	3.0	8	14	1.1	1.1	-	4.1	11	19	1.5	1.3	-	5.5	15	26	2.1	1.8	-
Total net			342	17.2	22.6	14			380	20.0	25.3	14			469	24.2	32.3	16
%			19.8	32.3	61.6	4.9			15.0	26.2	58.7	3.2			17.5	30.1	55.6	3.6
Total v+a			1732	53.2	36.7	288			2537	76.3	43.1	438			2683	80.3	58.1	443

Source: Arhiva Institutului Național de Statistică, fond Nivel de trai (Archive of the National Institute of Statistics, Standard of Living fund), file 3/1960.

**Nutritional structure of daily food intake in Romania
between 1950 and 1975**

Product	Physiological Standard	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975
Total calories (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Milk	15	11,4	8,0	8,5	6,8	7,5	8,5
Meat and fish	8,0	4,2	3,7	4,4	4,3	5,2	5,3
Eggs	2,0	0,8	0,7	0,9	0,9	0,9	1,2
Fruits and Veggies	15	9,1	8,8	9,4	7,7	7,6	10,4
Cereals	40	62,4	67,3	63,0	64,3	60,4	55,0
Sugar	8,0	4,5	4,5	4,6	6,0	7,4	7,9
Fats	12,0	7,6	7,0	9,2	10,0	11,0	11,7

Source: Arhiva Institutului Național de Statistică, fond Nivel de trai (Archive of the National Institute of Statistics, Standard of Living fund), file 2/1959.

These methodological similarities visible on both sides of the Iron Curtain problematize how expert knowledge was recovered by the communist regime's project to reconfigure social hierarchies in post-war Romania. More concretely, when scrutinized through social lenses, the nutritional schemes employed to determine the population's food requirements in the 1950s unveil some pragmatic decisions. In this respect, after years of recession, the country faced economic difficulties; improving food quality without mobilizing significant financial resources made it imperative for alternative un-expensive solutions that would have produced effects shortly in a society otherwise incapable of reforming its structural backwardness. To this end, improved sugar consumption and other industrial food products would serve as the first step in later nationwide dietary renewal.

According to the time's official regulations, the Romanian workers' daily food ration varied between 2500 calories for an average physical effort and 5500 calories for intense physical effort. Industrial workers and miners generally belonged to the last category. When analyzed thoroughly, the official nutritional scheme flesh out that the more calories were needed the higher the amount of sugar provided. An energy source with benefits similar to meat for the body, the latter lacking almost entirely from the Romanians' table until the late 1950s, sugar offered decision-makers the possibility to increase industrial workers' output with minimal financial resources.³⁷ However, in the long run, the change in consumption had negative implications - aggravated diabetes in industrial environments, most likely caused by the lack of minerals and vitamins from daily food. Medical research conducted in urban industrial environments in the early 1960s showed an increased incidence of diabetes among workers over 30. From a demographic point of view, they were most likely the group of young people of rural origin who first took an industrial job in the early 1950s. Taken out of their home environment, lacking knowledge of food preparation, and without too many financial resources at hand, they have been exposed to somewhat problematic feeding policies. The main problem was the lack of correlation between nutrition change and food education in the new workforce.

Besides scientific knowledge and professional interactions of various kinds, increasing sugar consumption in Romania required bureaucratic coordination. The adoption of centralized planning by the late 1940s could have provided the state with the means to carry out this task successfully.³⁸ The institutional building, centralized decision-making processes, and

long-term planning would have secured economic predictability in a country that aimed to develop through industrialization. However, as many researchers have already pointed out, the discontinuities of socialist planning have reversed the relationship between the state and the citizens.

For instance, after 1948, sugar was supplied primarily to heavy industry employees. In 1951, the most significant quantities of sugar were distributed in the Hunedoara and Stalin regions. However, the products' presence on the stores' shelves did not guarantee that the population afforded them. Until the mid-1950s, the wages earned by urban industrial workers were insufficient to cover the rationed bread, while products commercialized outside the rationing system often remained unsold. Statistical data on workers' and office men's comparative consumption shows that the latter consumed 25% more sugar than the former. In this respect, sugar turned into a precious commodity, easy to store and accumulate in times of crisis, almost a promise of personal safety against macroeconomic shifts. The sugar issue landed on the public agenda when social tensions escalated: the 1952 monetary reform, the abolition of ration cards in 1954, or the bad agricultural harvest of 1956.

Moreover, in 1955, when the authorities cut prices for clothing, household appliances, and books, workers complained that sugar and other industrial foodstuff remained excessively high. Their dissatisfaction persisted amid panic about possible recent monetary reforms and the state's attempts to reduce the labor force's purchasing power.³⁹ To this end, a closer look at how sugar was included in the Romanian planning and provisioning mechanism in the early postwar period could excellently illustrate the many facets of the state's construction. It could also reframe socialist urban and rural spaces by extracting the "bare need" of sugar from a marginalized domain of personal experience and bringing it to the core of complex processes like labor force's mobility, spatial hierarchies articulation, social status negotiations, financial transactions, or every day socialization. In this respect, I argue that socialist planning may be regarded as an outcome of successive decisional adjustments fueled by the population's rising expectations to access products like sugar, products that had been initially used as body strengtheners but which, once included in the daily diet, continued to be demanded by the population despite prices and provisioning fluctuations.⁴⁰

Additionally, to nuance the workings of socialist planning in Romania, one should look at how the relationship between urban and rural areas has been reconfigured since the late 1940s. The post-war Romanian

city became not only a perimeter defined by administrative boundaries but a space where both interactions between inhabitants and various daily practices were adjusted due to the social sensitivities that emerged from the need for a food product like sugar. With the transition from self-consumption to the acquisition of goods and services, the accelerated process of collectivization, and the nationalization of most commercial infrastructure, the population of the cities was advantaged. The inhabitants of these localities had access to a service supply infrastructure that was almost non-existent in the rural areas. For a long time, the communist authorities lacked sufficient financial resources to improve the peasantry's situation. The efforts made to increase sugar production as soon as the communist regime took power were insufficient to cover the villages' needs. In fact, in those years, nutrition standards established by experts could hardly be fulfilled. In 1949, compared to a recommended 10% of the total daily sugar intake, the authorities were able to distribute quantities to meet regulated needs only in the urban environment and only for the rationed system. This product was still almost unknown in the villages, with daily consumption not exceeding an average of 0.5%.⁴¹ If in 1951 the urban/rural consumption ratio was 12 kg to 1.5 kg, in 1954, the average in rural areas was still below that of 1938.

The gap between urban and rural has been maintained until the end of the decade. Between 1951 and 1959, the consumption fund in Romania recorded an annual growth of 4.5%, it was significantly lower than in other socialist countries like GDR (9.0%) or Poland (8, 8%). However, sugar consumption in 1959 was 200% higher than in 1938 and 120% higher than in 1951, even though not all social categories had equal access to such products. Compared to an annual average of 11 kilograms, the rural population consumed 7.9 kilograms, while an average of 19.9 kilograms was reached in urban areas.⁴²

The poor distribution of sugar in rural areas was aggravated not only by the limited provisioning capacities but by other aspects as well. Firstly, making coherent nutrition programs and their subsequent transposition into the planned system was hampered by numerous changes in the professional sphere and the fragmented operation of a central and local bureaucratic apparatus. For example, research into family budgets in rural areas began only after 1952; this deprived the authorities of important information about needs and expectations. As such, distribution was made outside of predictable order. For many years, large amounts of sugar were directed to different regions, sometimes even twice as necessary.

In others, the product was missing from store shelves for long periods. Secondly, the economic difficulties have worsened the interactions between a bureaucratic apparatus and the population. The “choices” made by people through mobility, change of residence, or ignoring laws and legal provisions stifled attempts to administer the state. For example, according to the official regulations, the industrial products that were subject to the state monopoly, such as sugar, would have been directed to cooperatives by centralized planning. The agricultural products collected from the peasantry had to follow the same route in the opposite direction. The problem is that such supply levers could not counteract the peasants’ opposition to renouncing agricultural products in exchange for industrial goods. Unhappy with the quality of the products in the village cooperatives system, those with some financial resources opted to purchase the necessary foodstuff from the big cities’ stores. Thus, the city has become a place marked by the interpenetration of sugar distribution routes and the routes followed by the rural population to capitalize on their products. Intersection points were the places where the most significant quantities of sugar products were sold at unsubsidized prices. For example, in the case of Cluj, the statistical data collected by the authorities indicate significantly higher quantities of sugar marketed in the shops in the city center, especially those close to the food markets, compared to the workers’ quarters.⁴³

Concluding remarks

Despite this rather impressive mobilization of the international community, Romania remains a particular example, favored on the one hand by the institutional changes brought by the new regime and on the other by a series of economic and social conditionalities. However, Romania, classified by the FAO as an advanced country on the basis of average caloric intake, had serious problems in ensuring adequate nutrition for all its inhabitants. Unlike Western countries, where food production and nutrient consumption reached pre-war levels in 1950, this did not happen in Romania until the end of the sixth decade. From this point of view, the Romanian reality after 1948 cannot be isolated from the pre-1948 economic and social realities: the lack of modernization of agriculture, the widespread illiteracy, the low level of industrialization, the exports based mainly on wheat and unprocessed natural resources that brought

financial profits to the industrial elites but had almost no social impact on the population. After 1948, when the authorities launched an extensive industrialization program, the impact was delayed because of the limited resources available for development. There are, of course, many explanations for the way the food situation of the Romanian population developed after 1948. One of them concerns the fact that food production and the restoration of international transportation routes did not reach quickly enough the levels estimated at the end of the war. Another cause was the increased birth rates. A third, and probably the most important, was related to the extremely difficult-to-predict medium-term consequences of the 1946-7 drought, especially in the Eastern European countries.

NOTES

- ¹ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "First Annual Report of the Director-General to the FAO Conference," Washington, 5 July 1946: 9-10.
- ² Gilman, N. *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, p. 10.
- ³ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Nutritional education in six Western European countries: Report of an FAO/WHO mission*, Rome, 1961, p. 3.
- ⁴ Bruckweh, K., Schumann, D., Wetzell, R., and Ziemann, B. (eds.). *Engineering society: the role of the human and social sciences in modern societies, 1880–1980*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Porter, T. M., Ross, D. (eds.). *The Cambridge History of Science. Volume 7. The Modern Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- ⁵ David, H. P., McIntyre, R. J. *Reproductive behaviour: Central and Eastern European Experience*. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1981.
- ⁶ Foucault, M. *Securitate-Teritoriu-Populație*. Cluj: Ideea, 2009.
- ⁷ McKeown, T. *The Modern Rise of Population*. London: Edward Arnold, 1976.
- ⁸ Gant, S. (ed.). *Russian and Soviet Health Care from an International Perspective. Comparing Professions, Practice and Gender, 1880-1960*. New York: Palgrave, 2007.
- ⁹ Hanjra, M. *Global Food Security: Emerging Issues and Economic Implications*. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2013.
- ¹⁰ Turolto, F. "The Cannibals That We Are: For a Bioethics of Food". *Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics: CQ: the international journal of healthcare ethics committees*, vol. 29 (2), (Apr) (2020), p. 268-275.
- ¹¹ Pittaway, M. *The Workers' State: Industrial Labor and the Making of Socialist Hungary, 1944–1958*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2012; Siefert, M. *Labour in state socialist Europe, 1945-1989*. Budapest: CEU Press, 2019.
- ¹² Turda, M. *Eugenism și antropologie rasială în România: 1874-1944*. București: Cuvântul, 2008; idem, "To End the Degeneration of a Nation:" Debates on Eugenic Sterilization in Interwar Romania", *Medical History*, 53 (1) (2009), pp. 77-104; idem, "The Nation as Object: Race, blood and biopolitics in interwar Romania", *Slavic Review*, 66 (3) (2007), p. 413-441.
- ¹³ Marginean, M. *Ferestre spre furnalul roșu: Urbanism și cotidian în Hunedoara și Calan*. Iasi: Polirom, 2015.
- ¹⁴ Rose, N. *Politics of life itself: biomedicine, power, and subjectivity in the twenty-first century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

- 15 McDonald, B. L. *Food Power. The Rise and Fall of the Postwar American Food System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 24. See also Young, G. "The Use and Abuse of Dietary Standards", *Canadian Journal of Public Health / Revue Canadienne de Santé Publique*, Vol. 40, No. 8 (August 1949), p. 327-331
- 16 Murphy, S., Yates, A., et. al., "History of Nutrition: The Long Road Leading to the Dietary Reference Intakes for the United States and Canada." *Advances in Nutrition. An International Review Journal*, 2016, 7, p. 157–68. See also National Research Council, *Recommended Dietary Allowances*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1941 <https://www.nap.edu/read/13286/chapter/2> (30 June 2022).
- 17 Cullather, N. *The Hungry World: America's Cold War battle against poverty in Asia*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010, p. 12.
- 18 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "First Annual Report of the Director-General to the FAO Conference," p. 27.
- 19 World Health Organization Technical Report Series, no. 16: Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Nutrition. Report on the First Session, Geneva, 24-28 October 1949, p. 18.
- 20 Ibid, p. 10.
- 21 Alexandrescu, I. *Economia Romaniei in primii ani postbelici: 1945-1947*. Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1986.
- 22 Arhiva Ministerului Sanatatii, Directia Igiena, file 115/1947, not numbered.
- 23 At the beginning of the first volume, Banu explains in detail his view on nutrition implications upon social progress. Banu, G. *Tratat de medicina sociala. Vol. I. Medicina sociala ca stiinta – Eugenia – Demografia*. Bucharest: Casa Scoalelor, 1944, p. 3-18.
- 24 Sahleanu, V. *Inceputurile medicinei sociale in Romania: Gheorghe Banu*. Bucuresti, 1979.
- 25 Issue discussed at large in: Arhiva Ministerului Sanatatii, Directia Igiena, files 850/1939; 852/1939; 858/1939; 860/1939 and 872/1939.
- 26 See for instance: Arhiva Ministerului Sanatatii, Directia Igiena, files 1/1946; 2/1946, 3/1946; 13/1946; 17/1946; 21/1946; 39/1946.
- 27 Food and Agriculture Organization. "Maze and maize diets: A nutritional survey." FAO Nutritional studies, no. 9. Rome, 1953, p. 5.
- 28 Ibid., p. 28.
- 29 Ibid., p. 76.
- 30 Benetato, G. *Problema alimentației pentru individ și colectivitate*. Cluj: Cartea romaneasca, 1939, p. 146-170.
- 31 Arhiva Ministerului Sanatatii, Directia Igiena, files 24/1947; 25/1947; 26/1947 and 35/1947.
- 32 Arhiva Ministerului Sanatatii, Directia Igiena, file 115/1947, not numbered.

- 33 Arhiva Ministerului Sanatatii, Directia Igiena, files 29/1948, 53/1948 and 305/1948.
- 34 Arhiva Ministerului Sanatatii, Directia Ocrotirea mamei si a copilului, files 406/1949, 407/1949 and 409/1949.
- 35 Gonțea, I. *Bazele alimentației*. București: Editura Medicală, 1963, p. 220-221.
- 36 ANIC, fond Comitetul de Stat al Aprovizionării, Direcția Agro-Alimentară, file 2/1951, f. 1-30.
- 37 ANIC, fond CC al PCR, secția Economică, file 220/1959, f. 16-17.
- 38 According to the official regulations, the planning was the responsibility of the Central Planning Committee. Established in 1948 under the leadership of Miron Constantinescu, a Marxist sociologist with strong political connections in the communist party since the interwar period, the institution oversaw the entire economic activity in the country. It coordinated the activity of the government departments, the economic sectors within the national economy plan, of ministries and institutions. It monitored and controlled the execution of the national economy plan, and coordinated the statistical and planning activity.
- 39 ANIC, fond CC al PCR, secția Economică, dosar nr. 76/1955, f. 2.
- 40 ANIC, fond CC al PCR, secția Economică, file 34/1954, f. 71-75.
- 41 ANIC, fond CC al PCR, secția Economică, dosar nr. 40/1949, f. 16-17.
- 42 ANIC, fond CC al PCR, secția Economică, dosar nr. 220/1959, f. 5 și 33.
- 43 ANIC, fond CC al PCR, secția Economică, dosar nr. 114/1952, f. 15; dosar nr. 34/1954, f. 44.

Bibliography

- Anton, M. „Cultura penuriei în anii '80: programul de alimentație științifică a populației”. *Revista istorică* (2015), nr. 3-4.
- Ban, C. *Dependență și dezvoltare. Economia politică a capitalismului românesc*. Cluj: Tact, 2014.
- Baloutzova, S. *Demography and Nation. Social Legislation and Population Policy in Bulgaria*. Budapest: CEU Press, 2011.
- Bărbulescu, C. *România medicilor. Medici, țărani și igienă rurală în România de la 1860 la 1910*. București: Humanitas, 2015.
- Bucur, M. *Eugenics and modernization on interwar Romania*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002.
- Beissinger, M. *Scientific Management, Socialist Discipline, and Soviet Power*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988.
- Blum, A. *L'Anarchie bureaucratique. Statistique et pouvoir sous Staline*. Paris: La Découverte, 2004.
- Bockman, J. *Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- Bruckweh, K., D. Schumann, R. Wetzell, B. Ziemann (eds.). *Engineering society: the role of the human and social sciences in modern societies, 1880–1980*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
- Campbell, T. *Improper Life: Technology and Biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben*. Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 2011.
- Campeanu, P. *România: Coada pentru hrană*. Bucharest: Litera, 2004.
- Chiot, D (ed.). *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe: Economic and Political Change from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
- Conrad, S. *What Is Global History?* Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016.
- Cotoi, C. “The geopolitical turn in interwar Romanian sociology and geography: From social reform to population exchange plans”, *History of the Human Sciences*, 32 (2) (2018): pp. 76-100.
- Cotoi, C. “Cholera, Health for All, Nation-Building, and Racial Degeneration in Nineteenth-Century Romania”, *East Central Europe*, 43(1-2) (2016): 161-187.
- Counihan, C., Penny Van Esterik. „Why Food? Why Culture? Introduction to the Third Edition.” In Carole Counihan, Penny Van Esterik (eds.), *Food and Culture. A Reader*. Third Edition. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.
- David, H. P. (eds.). *From Abortion to Contraception. A Resource to Public Policies and Reproductive Behaviour in Central and Eastern Europe from 1917 to the Present*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2019.
- David, H. P., Robert J. McIntyre. *Reproductive behaviour. Central and Eastern European Experience*. New York: Springer Publishing Company, 1981.
- Escobar, A. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

- Esposito, R. *Bios. Biopolitics and Philosophy*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 2008.
- Fehér, F. „Biopolitics on the Ruins of Communism.” In Ágnes Heller and Sonja Puntischer Riekmann (eds.). *Biopolitics. The Politics of the Body, Race and Nature*. Aldershot: Avebury, 1996.
- Foucault, M. *Securitate-Teritoriu-Populație*. Cluj: Ideea, 2009.
- Gant, S. (ed.). *Russian and Soviet Health Care from an International Perspective. Comparing Professions, Practice and Gender, 1880-1960*. New York: Palgrave, 2017.
- Greenhalgh, S, Edwin A. Winckler. *Governing China's Population. From Leninism to Neoliberal Biopolitics*. California: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Hanjra, M. *Global Food Security: Emerging Issues and Economic Implications*. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2013.
- Kind-Kovács, K., S. Bernasconi, H. Karge (eds.). *From the Midwife's Bag to the Patient's File. Public Health in Eastern Europe*. Budapest: CEU Press, 2011.
- Lampland, M. *The value of labor: the science of commodification in Hungary, 1920-1956*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2016.
- Marginean, M. *Ferestre spre furnalul roșu. Urbanism și cotidian în Hunedoara și Călan, 1945-1968*. Iasi: Polirom, 2015.
- McKeown, T. *The Modern Rise of Population*. London: Edward Arnold, 1976.
- Murgescu, B. *România și Europa. Acumularea decalajelor economice*. Iasi: Polirom, 2010.
- Pittaway, M. *The Workers' State: Industrial Labor and the Making of Socialist Hungary, 1944–1958*. Pittsburg: Pittsburg University Press, 2012.
- Porter, T. M., Dorothy Ross (eds.). *The Cambridge History of Science. Volume 7. The Modern Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Promitzer, Ch., S. Trubeta and M. Turda (eds). *Health, Hygiene and Eugenics in Southeastern Europe to 1945*. Budapest: CEU Press, 2011.
- Rose, N. S.. *Politics of life itself: biomedicine, power, and subjectivity in the twenty-first century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.
- Siefert, M. (ed.). *Labour in state socialist Europe, 1945-1989*. Budapest: CEU Press, 2019.
- Tomka, Bella. *Austerities and Aspirations: A Comparative History of Growth, Consumption, and Quality of Life in East-Central Europe since 1945*. Budapest: CEU Press, 2020.
- Turda, M. *Eugenism și antropologie rasială în România: 1874-1944*. Bucharest: Cuvântul, 2008.
- Turda, M. “The Nation as Object: Race, blood and biopolitics in interwar Romania”, *Slavic Review*, 66 (3) (2007), pp. 413-441.
- Scarboro, C. *The Socialist Good Life: Desire, Development, and Standards of Living in Eastern Europe*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020.
- Sen, Amartya. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999.



MIHNEA ALEXANDRU MIHAIL

Born in 1991, in Romania

Ph.D, National University of Arts, Bucharest (2018)

Thesis: *Iconographic Transfers and the Geography of Art in the Hungarian Kingdom. 14th-15th Centuries*

Assistant Professor, History and Theory of Art Department, National University of Arts, Bucharest

Fields of interests include medieval iconography and the relationship between liturgy and space, particularly in the Hungarian Kingdom

Grant

Research Assistant, ERC Starting Grant project *Art Historiographies in Central and Eastern Europe. An Inquiry from the Perspective of Entangled Histories* (2018 – 2021)

Participated to international conferences in Spain, Portugal, Paris, Italy, Croatia, and the Czech Republic

Published articles and chapters in edited volumes concerning medieval art history and art historiography

BOUND TO THE COLUMN: ANTICHRIST ICONOGRAPHY IN THE LAST JUDGMENT SCENES IN THE MEDIEVAL KINGDOM OF HUNGARY

Abstract

This study aims to investigate the relationship between visual culture and theological disputes during the pre-Hussite and Hussite eras. By looking at fourteenth-century Last Judgment scenes from the Hungarian Kingdom that contain an image of a demon bound to the column inside Leviathan's jaws, I analyze the connections between this figure and the eschatological and Antichrist-related discourse used by both Church representatives and preachers of the Reformation in Bohemia.

Keywords: wall paintings, iconography, Antichrist, demon, column, Last Judgment, Leles, Poprad, Hussite, reformation, Kingdom of Hungary

Introduction

Upon entering through the south portal of the church of the Holy Spirit in Žehra (Germ. *Schigra*, Hung. *Zsegra*) (present-day Slovakia) one is confronted with a display of architecture and wall paintings (Fig. 1). The church has at its center a large pillar, installed with the occasion of the medieval rebuilding of the church sometimes around 1380, and which bears the coat of arms of the Sigray family, who were patrons of the estate from the thirteenth century and up until the middle of the fifteenth century.¹

The tree-like pier is aligned with a mural that depicts the so-called Living Cross, an image of the crucified Christ surrounded by images of the Fall, symbols of the Church and the figures of *Ecclesia* and *Synagoga* (Fig. 2). This image, modelled in northern Italy and circulating in Central Europe in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, presents the Jews as perpetrators against the Body of Christ and the Catholic Church as triumphant over anti-ecclesiastical threats.² The Living Cross in Žehra was painted shortly

after the late fourteenth-century changes to the space interior and is almost contemporary to similar depictions that can be found in the churches in Batizovice (Germ. *Botzdorf*, Hung. *Batizfalva*) (present-day Slovakia) and Poniky (Hung. *Pónik*) (present-day Slovakia) (Fig. 3).³ This iconography has been linked with the Church crisis that crossed most of the fourteenth and the first half of the fifteenth century. The fear caused by the Great Western Schism was amplified beginning from the second half of the fourteenth century by the ascending Prague reformers, who paved the way for the claims of Jan Hus and his followers. According to Achim Timmermann, after the death of Jan Hus in 1415 “the Hussite cause soon began to spread beyond Bohemia, both through peaceful missionizing and through a series of successful military expeditions (...). The areas immediately affected included Upper Hungary (present-day Slovakia), Silesia, the western parts of Poland and the southern German-speaking lands”.⁴ Both the paintings in Žehra and Poniky might have been inspired by the virulent Franciscan anti-Hussite sermons delivered in the nearby city of Levoča (Germ. *Leutschau*, Hung. *Lőcse*) (present-day Slovakia), a flourishing town situated midway between the two churches.⁵ While the patron in Žehra cannot be securely ascertained, the figure of a donor in the scene of the Scourging of Christ, on the eastern wall of the chancel, might offer some clues regarding his identity. The ecclesiastical garments and tonsure suggest that this figure could be a member of the Sigray family and an educated canon of Spišská Kapitula (Germ. *Zipser Kapitel*, Hung. *Szepeshely*) (present-day Slovakia), an identification that would explain the complex iconography of the church and, in particular, the presence of the theme of the Living Cross.⁶ An inscription on the southern wall of the sanctuary, placed beneath the window, reminds one of the troubles of the Church at the beginning of the fifteenth century. The text mentions a twenty-days’ indulgence to the visitors of the church in Žehra granted by the Pisan antipope John XXIII (1410–1415).⁷

In 1453, the church in Žehra passed from the Sigray family to the Lordship of Spiš Castle, and around the same time a monumental Last Judgment was painted on the triumphal arch (Fig. 4). Additionally, the northern nave wall was decorated with Marian scenes and with the legend of St Ladislav.⁸ The visual presence of the Hungarian holy king has been interpreted as an ideological tool against the Hussite threat, which was still present at the middle of the fifteenth century.⁹ The Last Judgment placed on the triumphal arch follows a three-tier scheme. The Christ-Judge, surrounded by the apostles, the Virgin Mary and St John the Baptist, sits

at the center of the composition with his hands raised, thus rendering his wounds visible. The middle section presents the Resurrection of the dead, while the bottom register places the Heavenly Jerusalem and the Leviathan (symbolizing Hell) on the northern and southern halves of the chancel arch.

When taking a closer look at the Leviathan one can notice, amid the hellish fiends that are torturing the sinners, a demon tied to what seems to be a column inside the jaws of the biblical monster (Fig. 5). This column-bound demon is a rather common appearance in fifteenth-century illustrated copies of the *Speculum humanae salvationis*, in manuscripts and block-books of the novel-like *Das Buch Belial*, or in monumental sculpture, such as the Western portal Last Judgment of the church in Esslingen. However, in the fourteenth century the situation differs greatly and my study will analyze the peculiar uses of this motif in two wall paintings in the former Hungarian Kingdom.

The cases that I will concentrate upon are both part of Last Judgment scenes. The first occurrence can be found in the St Michael chapel belonging to the Premonstratensian monastery in Leles (Hung. *Lelesz*) (present-day Slovakia), while the second instance is part of a large-scale Last Judgment placed on the chancel arch of the St Aegidius church in Poprad (Germ. *Deutschendorf*, Hung. *Poprád*) (present-day Slovakia). Both murals are almost contemporary, the former being dated in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, while the latter is dated around 1400.¹⁰ What makes these two demon representations so intriguing? Firstly, their scale. If we compare the paintings in Leles and Poprad with the much later one in Žehra, one can immediately notice the visibly larger bodies of the shackled demons. The murals in Leles are damaged by later building campaigns, but the massive silhouette of the devil tied to a column overshadows the mouth of the monster Leviathan and dwarfs the fiends that are delivering sinners. The Last Judgment in Poprad is even more spectacular. The devouring mouth of the Leviathan was separated from the rest of the Last Judgment scene and placed on the southern nave wall, thus highlighting and isolating the Hell entrance and the demon bound to the column (Fig. 6). In addition, the devil in Poprad received a crown, so as to emphasize his prominent position in the infernal court. The second intriguing aspect is the Christ-like position of the demon's body. One cannot escape the way in which these images recall the tortured body of Christ, flagellated at the column. To a medieval viewer, this particular rendering of a demon

presented the shackled devils as figures that mimicked and mocked the Saviour's Passion.

While the demon in Poprad received no attention in scholarly literature, the one in Leles has been identified as Lucifer.¹¹ However, representations of Lucifer are quite specific in the Middle Ages and the image of a demon bound to a column seems to be absent from the known depictions of the fallen angel.¹² Nonetheless, I believe that identifying this demon is crucial for understanding the role of this iconography. Therefore, my objective is twofold. On the one hand I will explain why this rare demonic figure can be identified as a hybrid character that combines standard representations of devils with attributes that can be more specifically linked to the Antichrist. As I will argue, the column plays an especially significant role as an anti-hagiographic attribute. On the other hand, my aim is to interpret this iconographic motif in the context of the upheaval of religious disputes in the second part of the fourteenth century. The pre-Hussite era and the Bohemian reformation offer a relevant context for this analysis, not only for being a melting pot of apocalyptic expectations and end-time prophecies, but also in terms of possible visual analogies.

Searching for the Demon Bound to a Column

It is surprising to notice that despite the great interest that historians and art historians alike took in the figure of the devil, the Antichrist and the modelling of the Apocalypse in the Middle Ages, the demon bound to a column never caught the attention of researchers.¹³ Moreover, the mouth of hell, represented by the biblical monster Leviathan, has also been in the focus of art historians and historians of medieval staged performances.¹⁴ To be sure, the use of Leviathan as a container of the Devil has been in use at least since the tenth century. One of the first instances in Western imagery that depicts the Leviathan as the holder of a demonic figure can be found in the earliest surviving painted cycle dedicated to Lucifer. The Caedmon manuscript, probably produced in Canterbury between 950 and 1000, presents the punishment inflicted upon Lucifer, the highest-ranking angel, as a result of his ambition to seize the throne of God.¹⁵ The three-tiered illustration of the Fall of the Rebel Angels pictures Lucifer trying to occupy God's throne, followed by his expulsion and, in the lower register, his chaining inside Hell's devouring jaws. The throne and crown are two of the key iconographic motifs of prelapsarian representations of Lucifer,

which stress his failed attempt to take hold of divine power and equate himself with God.¹⁶ The chaining of the fallen angel inside the mouth of hell indicates that already in the late 10th century Leviathan enters Christian iconography as a suitable receptacle for antitype figures.

If placing an arch-fiend inside Hell's mouth seems easy to explain, accounting for the presence of the column is a more difficult task. During the Middle Ages, the column has been a multifaceted sign. The use of the column, with its deeply-rooted implications related to paganism, was one of appropriation, rather than a straight forward condemnation of a visual motif that had remnants of its heathen, antique, origin.¹⁷ This strategy was already present in the sixth century, when Pope Gregory the Great advised in relation to the conversion of Britons that, rather than destroying their idols, alien forms of representation should be appropriated so that visual similarities could lead to a steadier acceptance of Christianity.¹⁸ This task seems to be fulfilled in 13th century manuscripts when, as Michael Camille argued, "to place Christ on a column has a different inflection, announcing the Saviour as the conqueror of paganism and its image replacement".¹⁹ Therefore, in parallel to its use in wicked contexts, the column became a symbol of steadfast ecclesiastical and Christian authority. This can be witnessed in the case of the thirteenth-century Bible of William of Devon.²⁰ In this case, the image was conceived in accordance with the text of the first epistle to Timothy (1 Timothy 3:15), presenting the Church as the pillar and the ground of truth, which can never uphold error, nor bring in corruptions, superstition, or idolatry. Thus, the column becomes a symbol of conquest that represents the strength and power of the universal Church. Nonetheless, this was never a complete and total replacement, the persistence of understanding column-associated images in light of their idolatrous and sin-ridden meaning providing a visual ambiguity that impressed itself on sacred images and Church teaching alike.

In light of the versatility of the column motif, it comes as no surprise that the earliest use of the demon bound to a column that I have been able to trace was paired with the image of the Tree of Vices. The image is part of a *Speculum Humanae Salvationis* manuscript, produced in the second quarter of the fourteenth century for the Premonstratensian monastery in Weissenau, near the lake Constance.²¹ This codex is considered to be one of the earliest bilingual texts in the *Speculum* category of manuscripts, and also one of the most richly illustrated. As previously mentioned, the demon bound to a column is part of the larger iconographic theme of the Tree of Vices, placed at the beginning of the manuscript after two short

vice-related treatises, the *Summa vitiorum* and the *Prologus de fructu carnis et spiritus*.²² Structured on a vertical axis, with Pride (*Superbia*) at its root and Lust (*Luxuria*) at the top, this arboreal composition is framed in the upper right corner by the image of two demons. One of the devils is presented in the act of crowning *Luxuria*, while the other, a generic, non-distinguished demon, shackled to a column, observes the crowning ritual from within a hell-like cavity. The position of the Tree of Vices before the beginning of the *Speculum humanae salvationis* is intriguing, as well as its coupling with the prologue, which warns against the perils of interpreting signs that, depending on the context, can refer to either Christ, or the devil. As Susanne Wittekind argues, this disclaimer provides “a critical view of the interpretation and legibility of signs” that can be considered when one recalls the posture similarity between the chained demon and the Flagellation of Christ.²³

Up until the fifteenth century, there is a dearth of examples that use the motif of the column bound demon, not restricted to a particular iconographic theme. Almost contemporary to the Weissenau manuscript, the wall paintings of the St Remigius church in Nagold house a poorly-preserved Christological cycle on the southern nave wall.²⁴ The demon tied to a column is present in the scene depicting de Harrowing of Hell, but this time he was placed inside Leviathan’s jaws. Another representation can be found in the parish church in Murau, but this time as part of a Last Judgment composition.²⁵ Painted on one of the central nave pillars, the composition follows a common scheme, with the Christ-Judge being approached by the blessed, while the cohort of sinners is being pulled by a devil towards the demon tied to a column, although the Leviathan beast is absent.

Therefore, with the exception of the few examples mentioned above, the motif of the devilish figure chained to a column was used on a narrow scale. One must bear in mind that inventorying any medieval images and iconographic types is subject to further revisions. Wall paintings are being constantly restored and manuscripts are continuously studied, so similar fourteenth-century images might resurface in the future. Nevertheless, when compared to the cases in the Hungarian Kingdom, the demons in Murau, Nagold, or the Kremsmünster have a rather generic character, lacking specific attributes or visual cues that could single them out. In the following section I will return to the churches in Leles and Poprad in order to detail the context of the paintings’ commission.

The Peculiar Cases of Leles and Poprad and the context of their production

It is quite surprising that in the former Hungarian Kingdom the demon bound to a column was rarely used, despite the popularity of the Last Judgment scene. About forty scenes were painted between the fourteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries in churches belonging to the medieval Kingdom of Hungary, and with only one exception, the Leviathan as a symbol of Hell is always present.²⁶ This suggests that the examples scrutinized in the present study are cases where the patron/patrons or the iconographer used this motif on purpose. Expounding the context of their production might offer some explanations.

Poprad was a small Saxon town mentioned in sources beginning with the thirteenth century.²⁷ The St Aegidius parish church in Poprad was first painted between 1330 and 1350, when the sanctuary and the intrados of the chancel arch were decorated with various Christological scenes, devotional images and the busts of prophets alongside the figures of Saints Stephen and Ladislav, two of the Holy Kings of Hungary.²⁸ The painting in the sanctuary features the two donors, identified as John and Henry of Deutschendorf (Nemecká Ves) by a petition for the granting of indulgences to the visitors of the church (Fig. 7).²⁹ The petition was addressed to the Avignonese Pope John XXII in 1326, and it has been noticed that one of the donors was painted with the cross of the Knights Hospitaller, indicating the possibility that one of the donors had connections with this knightly order.³⁰

The Last Judgment, painted towards the end of the 14th century, occupies the whole surface of the chancel arch (Fig. 8). The upper register comprises the Apostle's celestial court and the Christ-Judge, while the middle register presents the Resurrection of the dead. The lower register survives only fragmentarily, while the paintings of the northern half of the arch have been almost entirely lost. Fortunately, the representation of Hell is well preserved (Fig. 9). The right-hand lower register of the arch features St Michael who pushes the damned into Leviathan's devouring mouth. The painting representing the beast's head continues on the southern nave wall, where the column-bound demon is also depicted (Fig. 6). Secluded, visually as well as spatially, from the rest of the torturing devils, this demon is a crowned figure, marking his status and prominence in the kingdom of Hell.

The foundation of the Premonstratensian monastery in Leles has a turbulent history due mainly to internal political disputes. The Premonstratensians, also known as the Norbertines or White Canons, were invited into the Kingdom of Hungary by king Stephen II (r. 1161–1131).³¹ The members of the first communities, arriving from the mother abbey in Prémontré, were regular canons, having the right to preach and to exert pastoral care activities.³² The establishment of the monastery in Leles was the result of the endeavour of bishop Boleslaus of Vác in the late twelfth century.³³ Around 1190, the bishop invited canons of the Premonstratensian order to Leles and founded the monastery, with its church dedicated to the Holy Cross, as a subsidiary of the Prémontré abbey (*filia Premonstrati – Agrinensis dioc.: Sancta Crux de Lelez*).³⁴ Because of his loyalty towards king Béla III (r. 1172–1196) and his firstborn son, king Andrew II (r. 1205–1235), Boleslaus attracted the fury of Emeric of Hungary (r. 1196–1204), Andrew's brother, who annulled the bishop's rights over Leles.³⁵ Emeric's dispute with Boleslaus was critiqued by Pope Innocent III, who in a letter to the Hungarian king requested the immediate settling of this conflict.³⁶ Suffice it to say that with this matter solved, Boleslaus's last will was respected by king Andrew II, the monastery received judicial and ecclesiastical privileges, and was consecrated in 1214 by the Bishop of Eger, Katapán.³⁷ During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the convent in Leles acted as one of the most important places of authentication (*locus credibilis*) in medieval Hungary.³⁸ The new church dates to the middle of the fourteenth century, while the chapel of St Michael, situated to the north of the church, was built during the priory of Dominicus Pálócai (1378–1403) and embellished with murals around the year 1400.³⁹

The wall paintings in the St Michael chapel garnered the attention of researchers mainly because of the extensive cycle representing the kings of Hungary. As Zsombor Jékely emphasized, the presence of this cycle, unique in the Kingdom of Hungary, and the choice to place emperor Sigismund of Luxemburg at its incipit prove that the Premonstratensian abbey had close connections to the royal court.⁴⁰ The Last Judgment, which is at the center of my analysis, has a complex structure. The core of the Judgment scene consists of two registers with the upper half depicting Christ surrounded by the apostles and the two intercessors, the Virgin and John the Baptist, while the lower half is dedicated to the Resurrection of the dead. The other scenes associated with the final judgment were placed in the lunettes created by the rib vaults and they present the angels with the

Arma Christi, the archangel Michael with his scales, and the representation of Hell. The latter is inhabited by a vast array of devils who carry the souls of the sinful towards a gigantesque figure of a demon who is bound to a column inside Leviathan's jaws. Only a fragment of the beast is still visible today, but one can notice with ease the difference between the ordinary demons and the enormous figure that they serve.

Following the visual emphasis that these devilish beasts received in the above-mentioned cases, one might ask what eschatological figure was intended for portrayal in these murals? It can be safely assumed that one of the possible interpretations recognizes these figures as images of the Devil. The beast-like appearance was frequent when representing Satan and it was also used in the Kingdom of Hungary. Two Last Judgment compositions, unrelated to one another, but both dated to the second half of the fourteenth century, present Satan as a notable character. The Judgment scene in Chimindia (Hung. *Kéménd*) (present-day Romania) (Fig. 10) survives only through the figure of Hell represented by the Leviathan. In this case, Satan rides the biblical beast while holding in his arms a child-like human figure that has been variously identified as Judas or Antichrist.⁴¹ In the second example, the Last Judgment in Čerín (Hung. *Cserény*) (present-day Slovakia) (Fig. 11), the Leviathan was omitted from the Hell-scene (a unique case in the Hungarian Kingdom).⁴² Instead, a demon that seems enthroned, but has no throne, receives the silhouettes of the damned. It is noteworthy to mention that this demon is shackled, his neck, hands and feet being chained, albeit the column is missing.

I believe that the scale and details of the Satan figures in Poprad and Leles is relevant. More than being an iconographic stage prop used for diversifying the representations of the denizens of Hell, the column is a detail that transforms these particular imaginings of Satan into an antitype of Christ. And the most debated, written about and present antitype of Christ in the Middle Ages was the Antichrist. In the following sections my objective is to prove that the column is a visual detail that can be linked to the representations of the Antichrist cycle in the fourteenth century and with the interest that the Son of Perdition garnered in mid-century Bohemia and with the end time craze that dominated Prague during the second half of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century.

Christ and Antichrist: the Antitype and its Antinarrative

Until the twentieth century the Antichrist didn't harness to much attention. The seventeenth-century *De Antichristo* treatise by the Dominican Tomás Malvenda and the works of Wilhelm Bousset were the main sources that scholars had to rely upon.⁴³ The works of Bernard McGinn, Richard K. Emmerson, Rosemary Muir-Wright and Robert Lerner represented fundamental contributions to the topic and help extend our knowledge by taking an interdisciplinary approach and accounting for the relationship between literary sources, visual production, historical events and changing mentalities.⁴⁴ Despite their differences, most authors agree upon two points that are relevant for my topic. Firstly, the spectacular growth in interest for the figure of the Adversary in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Secondly, the creation, during the Middle Ages, of what McGinn called an Antichristology, with its aim to present Antichrist's life as a reversed parallel to that of Christ.⁴⁵ If the relatedness between the Antichrist and biblical beasts, such as Behemoth and Leviathan, were already inaugurated by Gregory the Great's *Moralia in Job*, humanlike representations of the Adversary appeared only beginning with the tenth century.⁴⁶ This iconographic development has been explained in light of the contemporary, famous *De ortu et tempore Antichristi*.⁴⁷ Written by abbot Adso of Montier-en-Der for Gerberga, wife of Louis IV of France, the treatise stands out as one of the earliest efforts to systematize previous information and to compile it in the form of a *vita*.⁴⁸ Moreover, the portrayal of Antichrist as an anti-saint was strengthened by the clear intention of lampooning the narrative of the life of Christ.⁴⁹ Adso's biography of Antichrist was mediated to later centuries by the *Compendium theologicæ veritatis*, a work previously ascribed to Bonaventure, Albert the Great or Thomas Aquinas, and that is now recognized as the work of a thirteenth-century monk from the Dominican monastery in Strassbourg, named Hugo Ripelin.⁵⁰

The biography of the Antichrist written by abbot Adso had a long-lasting impact on late medieval life-cycles of the Devil's son, but by the fourteenth century competing images of the Adversary were in action. A question frequently raised in mostly, but not restricted to, theological debates regarded the most suitable way of identifying the Antichrist. Was he a historically recognizable person, or was he a generic outline of evil? Already since the fourth century, the African donatist Tyconius described the Antichrist as a composite body of the Church's evildoings,

claiming that the *corpus Antichrist* was part of the *Corpus Christi*.⁵¹ In the twelfth century, the Benedictine exegete Rupert of Deutz defined the Antichrist as the *corpus diaboli* that was comprised of the legendary Gog and Magog, as well as jews, heathens and heretics.⁵² A temporary problem-solving contribution was made by one of the most important medieval commentators of the Apocalypse, the Cistercian monk Joachim of Fiore. For Joachim, history consists of three eras, the first being that of the Father (Old Testament), the second corresponding to the Son (New Testament), and the last one, pertaining to the Holy Spirit, initiating the thousand years kingdom.⁵³ The conclusion of the second status would mark the seventh head of the dragon, i.e. the Antichrist and his earthly activity. Robert Lerner argued convincingly that for Joachim of Fiore, humanity, pervaded by sin, housed a lot of antichrists, but only one Antichrist was the true one, who will arrive at the end of times.⁵⁴ In addition to previous theories that regarded the Antichrist as a tyrant, Joachim supports the idea that he will act as a leader of heretic movements, fulfilling the role of both king and priest.⁵⁵ According to the Calabrian monk, this final Antichrist was to have two forerunners, an evil king and a false pope. To complicate matters even further, the expectation that two highly placed evil doers will set the stage for the advent of the true Antichrist was atoned by hope expressed through the notions of the *Pastor angelicus*, the Angel Pope, and the Last World Emperor.

As once again, McGinn argued, medieval apocalyptic beliefs in the papacy were always dialectical, the messianic Pope being coupled with the Papal Antichrist.⁵⁶ The tradition of the Angel Pope, which was never officially endorsed by papal propaganda, was reflected in the so-called *Vaticinia* manuscripts.⁵⁷ The *Vaticinia*, written somewhere between 1294 and 1305, were short illustrated prophecies concerning the future popes up to the arrival of the Antichrist.⁵⁸ Prophetic or not, the expected papal duo proved to be of renewed relevance in the troubled 14th century. The Black Death, social unrest and the loss of confidence in Rome, fostered a great number of fears that were seemingly associated with signs of the Last Days.⁵⁹ However, few events were to have such a profound impact as the Great Western Schism.⁶⁰ The crisis of the institutional Church led to the transfer of the Apostolic See, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, to Avignon, where it came under the encompassing influence of French policies.⁶¹ As Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski demonstrated, the weakening of Rome's uncontested centrality in the Catholic world set the stage for two strands of commentators, mainly Church representatives and mystics,

which argued in favor or against the return of the Pope to the city that was supposed to symbolize the unity of Latin Christendom.⁶² The French sojourn of the papacy culminated with the outbreak of the Schism in 1378, when the Church and Christianity as a whole were divided by the election of two popes, Urban VI in Rome and Clement VII in Avignon. This time of distress was amplified by the rising of popular lay movements and the aspirations of medieval fringe groups that put pressure on the church hierarchy in order to obtain greater autonomy in spiritual matters.⁶³ The uneasiness caused by this state of affairs proved to be fertile grounds for mystics and visionaries who criticized the Church for its unorthodoxy and lack of leadership, while at the same time warning against the signs of impending doom. Hence, the double papal election provided a real concern in light of the prophetic Angel Pope – Papal Antichrist duo.⁶⁴ It also paved the way for a renewed interest in the arrival of the Last World Emperor. The Emperor of the Last Days was believed to be a Great Monarch who after conquering all the enemies of Christ, will travel to Jerusalem and relinquish his crown on the Mount of Olives.⁶⁵ This legend had a great currency during the Middle Ages, providing the opportunity for kings and emperors to fashion themselves as the eschatological defenders of Christianity. For that reason, my attention will now turn to one of the most renowned examples of eschatological self-fashioning, that of Charles IV.

The Court of Charles IV, the Velislav Bible and Antichrist Concerns

At the middle of the fourteenth century, the imperial court in Prague was a crucible of Antichrist beliefs and the emperor Charles IV, keen on promoting his relic-acquiring policy, was hailed by his subjects as the long-awaited Emperor of the Last Days.⁶⁶ The emperor organized public processions for the display of relics, and he even received papal permission for celebrating the Feast of the Conveyance and the Feast of the Holy Lance and Nail.⁶⁷ At the same time, end time visions and prophecies found great currency amid fourteenth-century elites in Bohemia. Charles himself owned a copy of the *Liber Scivias*, Hildegard of Bingen's vision of the last days that also offered a representation of the Antichrist.⁶⁸ The merging of Charles's relic oriented devotion and his interest in eschatological subjects is nowhere as clearly expressed as in the mural program decorating the St Mary chapel in the Karlštejn castle.⁶⁹ The frescoes, probably painted

by Nikolaus Wurmser of Strasbourg between 1356 and 1358, integrated Charles's veneration of Passion relics within a monumental cycle dedicated to the Apocalypse. The placing side by side of Christ's Passion relics and John's Revelation transformed the St Mary chapel in a symbol of the Holy Sepulchre, of death and renewal, and projected for the devotee a spiritual image of the Heavenly Jerusalem.⁷⁰ The self-fashioning of Charles IV as the Last World Emperor was also supported by text produced at his imperial court in Prague. The *Cronica Boemorum*, written between 1355 and 1358 by the Italian Franciscan Giovanni da Marignolli at the emperor's request, recounts the history of the world and grants the Kingdom of Bohemia, and its messianic ruler, a leading position in humanity's salvation.⁷¹ Unfortunately, the chronicle, which was supposed to end with the legend of Antichrist, was never completed.

The circle of Charles IV also produced one of the most extended illustrated narratives of the Antichrist's life that have survived to the present day. The *vita* of the Son of Perdition was included in a manuscript known as the Velislav Bible, a parchment manuscript containing 188 folios and around 747 illustrations.⁷² The codex, probably created between 1340 and 1346, is currently named after its presumed donor, Velislav or Welko, a protonotary and notary that was in service of emperors John of Luxembourg and Charles IV during the second quarter of the 14th century.⁷³ Although the intended audience of this Bible is still a subject of debate, the prevailing opinion is that the manuscript belonged to a community of clerics that had strong ties with the royal court and that it served an educational purpose, the numerous *exempla* indicating its possible use for theological instruction.⁷⁴ The life of the Antichrist occupies an unusual place in the overall structure of the Bible. Instead of being positioned before the Apocalypse of John, the illustrated *vita* follows the Book of Judith and is continued by gospel passages narrating the life of Christ, thus enhancing the Christomimesis underpinning the Antichrist's life, a unique feature that was also visually emphasized through the extraordinary similarity between the depiction of Christ and the Adversary.⁷⁵ This focused interest in representing Christ and Antichrist as antagonistic figures can be explained through the sources that the scribe used, in particular the aforementioned *Compendium* of Hugo Ripelin, which survives in about thirty fourteenth-century copies in Prague alone.⁷⁶ The Velislav Bible was also endowed with iconographic innovations. In keeping close with Christ's infancy, the manuscript provides representations for the

annunciation and birth of the Antichrist, scenes unknown before the production of this manuscript.⁷⁷

Scholars previously notice that in the case of the Velislav codex, more than a tyrant, the Antichrist was portrayed first and foremost as a deceiver, an impostor that will dazzle the masses and will trick them into becoming his followers.⁷⁸ In order to succeed in creating such a charismatic figure, the iconographer endowed Antichrist with the power of performing miracles, a trait that wasn't common prior to the fourteenth century.⁷⁹ The feral prowess and intense violence that characterized the Adversary in the previous centuries was replaced by deceit and fraud, attributes that might reflect the growing distress caused by the fracture of the Church beginning with 1309.⁸⁰ Among the many miracles worked by the Antichrist, some are more common, Christological or saint-like wonders, as in the case of resurrecting the dead. Others were specifically tailored for the Son of Perdition, such as making a giant sprout forth from an egg or hanging a castle from the skies.

However, there is one particular miracle that displays the Antichrist's power to prophesize. This marvelous act was molded on the commentary on John's Revelation from the *Glossa ordinaria* and it relates how the Antichrist transforms inanimate matter into a living statue that has the capacity to foretell the future.⁸¹ What is truly intriguing is the iconography that was used in order to represent this scene. Instead of being represented in the form of an idol that tops a pillar, as with countless examples in Christian imagery, the prescient statue was rendered as a free-standing column. This miracle was depicted for the first time in the Velislav Bible, and one can observe how the composition is centered around the column, separating a very Christlike Antichrist, joined by his followers, from the flock that is about to be subdued through his wonderworking.⁸² The talking statue/column is coupled here with a reversal of the Descent of the Holy Spirit, wherein the sky pours forth fire and demons over the earth. The text inscribed on this folio adds a new dimension to the image because, aside from recalling the statue's capacity to talk and to predict the future, it also mentions its wicked laugh (*statuam ridere*), calling to mind texts that portray the sin of Idolatry depicted as a laughing statue.⁸³

To my knowledge, the miracle of the talking statue was repeated in only two later examples. In the fifteenth-century Wellcome Apocalypse, one of the folios presents all the miracles performed by Antichrist, the prophetic column being coupled with the blossoming of trees and the raising of waters.⁸⁴ The second example, more closely-related to the Velislav Bible,

can be found in the stained-glass windows belonging to the parish church in Frankfurt an der Oder.⁸⁵ The south facing window of the church details the life of the Antichrist, including some of his miracles. Surprisingly, in contrast to the self-standing column in the Velislav manuscript or the later Wellcome Apocalypse, the Frankfurt scene discloses the deceiving nature of the Antichrist. The column is supported by a devil who embraces it with his arms, mimicking the prayer gesture. Narratively, the devil is the engine that enlivens the statue in an artificial manner, showcasing the miracle as the exploit of a trickster. Nonetheless, from a visual point of view, the joining together of his hands bound the demon to the column in a similar fashion to the motif encountered in the Last Judgment scenes in the Hungarian Kingdom. The Frankfurt cycle was repeatedly linked with the Prague court of emperor Charles IV. The presence of the painter Nikolaus Wurmser in both Karlštejn and Frankfurt provided scholars with a connection that helped date the stained-glass windows in the time of the Luxembourg dominion over the margraviate of Brandenburg, thus offering a timespan between 1373 and 1415 for the creation of the Antichrist cycle.⁸⁶

As an intermediary conclusion, the circle of Charles IV was imbued with apocalyptic concerns and two of the most important Antichrist cycles that can be linked to the Luxembourg dynasty resemble each other closely. More specifically, and related to my topic, they both provide a visual depiction of the wonderous statue. On a more general level, both narratives act as pictorial devices that stress the antithesis between Christ and his enemy. At the same time, this enmity wasn't exploited only by members of the imperial court in Prague, but also by the pre-hussite reformers.⁸⁷ Their piercing sermons and eager cries for renewal touched upon the fear of the arrival of Antichrist in many ways and offered alternative interpretations of the Adversary, which will be explored in the following section.

Of Preachers, Hussites, and the Coming of the Antichrist

While the Velislav Bible did not lead to a development of Antichrist-related imagery in the Bohemian Kingdom, its comparison between Christ and Antichrist, between the *Corpus Christi* and the *Corpus Antichristi* most certainly marked the periods that came to be known as the pre-Hussite and Hussite eras, sometimes working against the emperor's constructed messianic role. The relationship between the actions of Charles IV, the

precursors of Jan Hus and the later Hussite reformers is the object of an ongoing, heated debate in Czech historiography.⁸⁸ Without trying to formulate an answer to these questions, I believe, together with Stephen Lahey, that the interest in the Antichrist in both Charles's circle and in the writings of the pre-Hussite reformers helped shape later Hussite theology.⁸⁹ To give a full account of the apocalypticism that helped shape the theology of the Bohemian reformation is far beyond the scope of my research, but in what follows I will concentrate on two of the reformers that were at the heart of Antichrist debates in the second half of the fourteenth century.

Fourteenth-century Prague was a city studded with zealous preachers, and the emperor was instrumental in inviting some of them to the capital city of the empire. In 1359, at the imperial diet in Mainz, Charles delivered a strong critique of the secular clergy, denouncing their vicious lifestyles and simoniac practices.⁹⁰ In his anti-clerical stance, the emperor found a kindred spirit in one of the most famous preachers of the time, Conrad Waldhauser, whom he invited to Prague, probably in 1363.⁹¹ This proved to be a controversial decision, for although the German theologian became rapidly popular, his sermons direct at the mendicant orders led to complaints forwarded to the archbishop of Prague by the Franciscans, Dominicans, and Carmelites.⁹² Nonetheless, archbishop Arnošt of Pardubice sided with Waldhauser, who was appointed at the parish church of the Virgin in Týn, later to become the spiritual center of the Reformation movement.⁹³ Preaching at the same time with Waldhauser was John Milíč of Kroměříž, a highly intriguing figure who, after leaving the service of chaplain to Charles IV and renouncing all of his belongings, dedicated his life to preaching and reform activities.⁹⁴ The sermons of John Milíč deal extensively with eschatological themes, the Last Judgment and the arrival of the Antichrist. Moreover, in his biography written by Matthias of Janov, John Milíč is recounted as having denounced Charles IV as the Antichrist.⁹⁵ Although we cannot be sure of the historical accuracy of Matthias's narrative, the preacher hailed as a second Elijah wrote two very popular treatises, the *Sermo de die novissimo* and the *Libellus de Antichristo*, which, as their names suggest, deal with the Antichrist at length.⁹⁶ Acting as the charismatic preacher with prophetic capacities that he believed was needed for the renewal of the Church and in preparation for the Last Judgment, John Milíč, somehow in opposition with Matthias's story, distances himself from the practice of securely identifying the Antichrist in contemporary figures and instead argues for a composite nature of the Adversary, his body being designated as the sum of all evils

(*multitudinem malorum*).⁹⁷ John Milíč's *Sermo de die novissimo* mediated the knowledge found in Hugo Ripelin's *Compendium* and the *Elucidarium* of Honorius of Autun, which were both copied in fourteenth-century Bohemia.⁹⁸ Nonetheless, the Velislav Bible was also used as a source. Two of the events included by the preacher, the burning of the Gosepls and the rebuilding, with the help of the Jews, of the temple destroyed by Vespasian and Titus, can be found together only in the Velislav codex, a fact that is not surprising given John Milíč's connections to the imperial court.⁹⁹ According to Phillip Haberkern, the message preached in Prague during Charles IV reflected the belief that Christians have to cultivate a more intense personal devotion to the Eucharist and to use the sermons that they attended as means to renew their morality. The eschatological overtones added to these issues by Conrad Waldhauser and John Milíč of Kroměříž rendered them as powerful spiritual weapons in battling the Antichrist.¹⁰⁰ These undertakings were continued and developed by the so-called Parisian Master, Matthias of Janov.

As his reputation already indicates, Matthias was schooled at the university in Paris and, upon his return to Prague, he became one of the most important theologians of the pre-Hussite and Hussite eras and his call for reform was centered around the arrival of Antichrist.¹⁰¹ In addition to that, Matthias was one of the most important theoreticians of the Hussites, claiming that images shouldn't be mistaken for living representations of God.¹⁰² Developing further John Milíč's writings, the Parisian-trained theologian wrote the *Tractatus de Antichristo* in which he provided an 'organological model' of the Antichrist's body, describing every fragment as belonging to a beastlike devil and symbolizing the vices and sins that will bring forth damnation.¹⁰³ Matthias of Janov uses the term *Antichristus mysticus*, borrowed from the early fourteenth-century Franciscan John Peter of Olivi, referencing the *corpus mysticum* used to describe the Church as the living body of Christ on earth.¹⁰⁴ This type of *Anatomia Antichristi* was also followed in an early fifteenth-century Bohemian treatise entitled *De antichristo & membrorum eius anatomia*. As Lawrence Buck explains, this treatise "conflates the tradition of the historical/personal/incarnate Antichrist with the tradition of the composite/collective/mystical Antichrist, using the former as a basis for anatomical metaphors to elucidate the latter".¹⁰⁵ This means, and Buck continues, that "writers could often speak of the Antichrist meaning a 'collective evil within Christendom' but use corporeal terms, as if describing a person or animal".¹⁰⁶ The *De antichristo* treatise even tackles the issue of the

Adversary's crown, which represents "leadership or dominion and is the 'most central and most powerful part of the host of the Antichrist'".¹⁰⁷ The anatomy of the evil incarnate receives an ecclesiological dimension during the first decades of the fifteenth century. As Lahey argues "describing the body of Antichrist in its relation to the body of Christ is ecclesiology, and the Hussite movement was very much defined by its position in the ecclesiological arguments then ongoing in the fifteenth century".¹⁰⁸ Even though Jan Hus dealt with the figure of the Antichrist in some of his writings, the matter was systematically approach by Jacob of Mies, one of his supporters and member of the University of Prague. In his *Posicio de Antichristo* and *Tractatus Responsivus*, Jacob of Mies uses Matthias of Janov and Augustine in order to assert that the last Antichrist will be a pope and that all his followers create the mystic body of the Son of Perdition.¹⁰⁹

So, as a conclusion, it seems quite clear that, for the second half of the fourteenth century and the first three decades of the fifteenth century, in the region of Central Europe, the Kingdom of Bohemia and the imperial and university circles in Prague were the most active in terms of end time expectations and Antichrist debates. Moreover, one can witness a transition from the humane representation of the Adversary in the Velislav Bible to the writings of the pre-Hussite and Hussite reformers, which incorporate a more hybrid and collective description of his anatomy. The Antichrist could be a beast, could wear a crown and his limbs could be analyzed in spiritual as well as communitarian terms. Just as in the Hungarian murals, his human incarnation no longer deceives the beholder who can contemplate him in his true form, but the parallel to Christ remains central in understanding his actions and manifestations. In the concluding part of this article I will offer some arguments in order to explain how these concerns could have been relevant in the Hungarian Kingdom.

Conclusion

Returning to the wall paintings in the Kingdom of Hungary, one has to ask whether sources indicate any means of transmission that can explain why murals could reflect the spiritual disputes that were flaming up in Bohemia and causing international concern. Were the patrons of the churches in Poprad and Leles preoccupied with Hussitism or the Antichrist? Did news about the ascending religious conflicts reach them? A tentative answer

will be given, based on the general information that we have regarding the spread of reformist ideals in the Kingdom of Hungary.

In an article dedicated to the paintings of the monastery in Leles, Lilla Farbakyné Deklava identifies one of the representations in the St Michael chapel as that of Urban V, suggesting that the patron, Domokos Pálóci, encountered the pope's cult during his journey to Rome, where he was appointed chaplain of the Holy See.¹¹⁰ As the author argued, this indicates an iconographic transfer from the Italian peninsula. However, as it was previously demonstrated, both Last Judgment scenes from Leles and Poprad indicate that the workshops that created the paintings were accustomed with examples of illuminated manuscripts.¹¹¹ In the second half of the fourteenth century, Prague became the leading center of manuscript painting in the region. With the advent of the Hussite wars and the lack of contracts, some of the masters trained in the premises of the capital travelled to the Kingdom of Hungary in search for work.¹¹² So it is possible that Bohemian models were imported and employed by artists working in the Hungarian Kingdom towards the end of the fourteenth century.

When it comes to Hussitism, nuances have to be taken into consideration. Evidence is scarce for the end of the fourteenth century, but it starts to appear in the first decades of the following era. A turbulent episode took place at the Hungarian court in 1410, and the main character of this event was Jerome of Prague, one of the most important followers of Jan Hus.¹¹³ Jerome arrived at the royal court in Buda on his way to Vienna, and his travel was announced by a letter sent by Archbishop Zbyněk of Prague to Sigismund of Luxemburg, who denounced the Czech reformer as a dangerous heretic.¹¹⁴ On the 20th of March, Jerome addressed King Sigismund, together with bishops and prelates of the Hungarian church, in the royal chapel at Buda. Although his speech was in favor of the intervention of royal power in matters of reform, Jerome was arrested and imprisoned by Jan of Kanisza, bishop of Esztergom. After the burning of Jan Hus in 1415 at the council of Constance, it was Jerome's turn to burn at the stake in 1416, convicted of heresy.

The turmoil caused by the council of Constance and the execution of the leading figures of the Hussites led to a spread of reform ideals outside of Bohemia. Older literature regarded the first half of the fifteenth century as a time when Hussite beliefs reached the northern parts of the Hungarian Kingdom and were adopted by most of the local population.¹¹⁵ More recently, Martyn Rady called for a more cautious approach to the matter. It is certain that Hussitism reached the Kingdom of Hungary in the fifteenth

century, but it did not imbue every level of society. Most of the mercenaries in the region were most probably Hussites, some of them following the more radical branch of the Taborites, but there is little evidence that the larger population tended to these religious beliefs.¹¹⁶ The situation was more serious in Bratislava and in the region of Slavonia, around present-day Zagreb, where students that were educated at the university in Prague took a stance against clerics.¹¹⁷ Indeed, Prague university was one of the most attended by Hungarian students from the middle of the fourteenth century up until 1526, being overcome only by Vienna and Krakow.¹¹⁸ Even though I do not want to suggest that the paintings in Leles and Poprad are the outcome of a student trained at Prague and engaged in the religious controversies of the time, I believe that this is a possible path of knowledge transfer and that it could have worked as a means of mediating some of the heated debates of the period, the figure of the Antichrist included.

In conclusion, in my interpretation the peculiarity of the demon bound to a column in the examples that I analyzed can be explained by the hybridization of common devil iconography and Antichrist representations towards the end of the fourteenth century. Although there are no written sources at the moment that can prove a direct relationship between the wall paintings in the Hungarian Kingdom and the Antichrist debates during the pre-Hussite and Hussite eras, I believe that the images can be discussed in relation to the textual and visual production in Prague. This is but a starting point that can be further developed by taking a closer look to the allegiances that Leles and Poprad had to specific institutions. As mentioned above, Poprad has been linked with the Hospitallers, whereas Leles was a Premonstratensian monastery. Expanding upon these aspects could lead to a better understanding of the iconography used in these cases. The demon bound to a column is an iconographic oddity but it showcases how theological disputes and spiritual beliefs were adapted and integrated in the visual production of the Late Middle Ages.

ANNEXES



Fig. 1 – General view of the nave with the central pillar and the coat of arms of the Sigraý family, church of the Holy Spirit in Žehra (photo by the author).



Fig. 2 – The Living Cross, northern nave wall, church of the Holy Spirit in Žehra, ca. 1400 (photo by the author).



Fig. 3 – The Living Cross, triumphal arch, church of St Francis in Poniky, 1415 (photo by the author).



Fig. 4 – Last Judgment, triumphal arch, church of the Holy Spirit in Žehra, ca. 1453 (photo by the author).



Fig. 5 – The demon bound to a column, Last Judgment scene, triumphal arch, church of the Holy Spirit in Žehra, ca. 1453 (photo by the author).



Fig. 6 – The demon bound to a column, Last Judgment scene, southern nave wall, church of St Aegidius in Poprad, ca. 1400 (photo by the author).



Fig. 7 – The Massacre of the Innocents and The Flight into Egypt with Donors, northern wall of the sanctuary, church of St Aegidius in Poprad, ca. 1330-1350 (photo by the author).



Fig. 8 – Last Judgment, triumphal arch, church of St Aegidius in Poprad, ca. 1400 (photo by the author).



Fig. 9 – Hell, Last Judgment Scene, triumphal arch and southern nave wall, church of St Aegidius in Poprad, ca. 1400 (photo by the author).



Fig. 10 – Satan with Antichrist/Judas, Hell scene, Reformed church in Chimindia, second half of the fourteenth century (photo by the author).



Fig. 11 – Satan, Last Judgment scene, northern wall of the sanctuary, church of St Martin in Čerín, second half of the fourteenth century (photo by the author).

NOTES

- ¹ For the paintings of the church in Žehra, with the relevant bibliography, see Togner and Plekanec 2012, 226–46.
- ² Timmermann 2001.
- ³ Togner and Plekanec 2012, 231; Timmermann 2001, 141. For the Living Cross in Poniky see Buran 2002, 143–50.
- ⁴ Timmermann 2001, 152.
- ⁵ Timmermann 2001, 153.
- ⁶ For the image of the donor see Togner and Plekanec 2012, 227. The wall paintings in the sanctuary are dated around 1370–1380.
- ⁷ Togner and Plekanec 2012, 227.
- ⁸ Togner and Plekanec 2012, 234–38. The legend of king Ladislav is preserved only fragmentarily because of the restoration campaigns which uncovered the older layer comprising the Living Cross and the Pieta.
- ⁹ Togner and Plekanec 2012, 238. For the representations of St Stephen and St Ladislav on the interior of the chancel arch see Năstăsioiu 2018, 190–192, 440–44.
- ¹⁰ For Leles see Jékely 2009. For Poprad see Togner and Plekanec 2012, 270–84. I will return to the context of patronage of these two churches later.
- ¹¹ Jékely 2009, 156.
- ¹² Mittman and Kim 2015; Guest 2017.
- ¹³ The bibliography on the subject is extensive. See especially McGinn and Emmerson 1992; Emmerson 1981, 2018; McGinn 1979; 1994; Wright 1995; Link 1995;
- ¹⁴ Lima 2005, 13–47; Schmidt 1995.
- ¹⁵ The manuscript is Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Junius 11, fol. 3. See Guest 2017, 122; Mittman and Kim 2015. A digital reproduction of the manuscript is available here: <https://digital.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/objects/d5e3a9fc-abaa-4649-ae48-be207ce8da15> (accessed 06.07.2022).
- ¹⁶ Guest 2017, 115–17.
- ¹⁷ Camille 1989, 197–203.
- ¹⁸ Camille 1989, 197.
- ¹⁹ Camille 1989, 198. For a different, but very eloquent example of the use of a column in order to symbolise the power of Christianity, see the beautiful article regarding the bronze column in Hildesheim written by Weinryb 2018.
- ²⁰ The manuscript is London, British Library, Royal MS 1 D I, fol. 1, c. 1250–1275. See Camille 1989, 199; Branner 1972, 24, 26; Bennett 1986, 24. A digital reproduction of the folio in question is available here: <https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/drawing-of-mendicant-friars-on-columns-from-the-bible-of-william-of-devon> (accessed 06.07.2022).

- 21 The manuscript is Kremsmünster, Library of the Convent, Cod. 243, fol. 3, c, 1325–1330. The ownership of this codex is disputed. Considerd originally as belonging to a Dominican convent, the manuscript is now attributed to the Premostratensian order based on the replacement of St Dominic with St Norbert of Xanten. See Wittekind 2014.
- 22 Wittekind 2014, 123–25.
- 23 Wittekind 2014, 121. The author doesn't mention the visual similarity to the image of the Scourging of Christ.
- 24 Heye 1965.
- 25 Lanc 2002, 272–89.
- 26 For a comprehensive and thorough analysis of Hungarian Last Judgment scenes see Lionnet 2004, 213–97.
- 27 Togner and Plekanec 2012, 270, with further bibliography.
- 28 Togner and Plekanec 2012, 270–73.
- 29 Togner and Plekanec 2012, 274.
- 30 Prokopp and Méry 2009, 64; Togner and Plekanec 2012, 274.
- 31 Bencze 2020, 40.
- 32 Bencze 2020, 40–2.
- 33 Érszegi 2003; Jékely 2009, 154; Kovács 2017, 105.
- 34 Érszegi 2003, 18; Jékely 2009, 154.
- 35 Jékely 2009, 154.
- 36 Thoroczkay 2018, 357–58.
- 37 Érszegi 2003, 19.
- 38 Jékely 2012, 175.
- 39 Jékely 2012, 176.
- 40 Jékely 2012, 175–86, with the relevant bibliography.
- 41 For Chimindia see Jékely 2008, 140–54.
- 42 For Čerín see Lionnet 2004, 228–30.
- 43 For a useful historiographic survey of Antichrist studies see Ryan 2009.
- 44 Ryan 2009, 1583–84.
- 45 McGinn 1988, 9. The early attempts to mirror Antichrist's life through that of Christ can be followed in time down to the year 200, when Hippolytus of Rome wrote the treatise *De Christo et Antichristo*, see also Cermanová 2018, 142–43.
- 46 McGinn 1988, 13. For the connection with the beast in Job see Poesch 1970.
- 47 McGinn 1988, 15–16.
- 48 Emmerson 1979, 175–77.
- 49 Emmerson 1979, 181, 184.
- 50 Kernbach and Panušková 2018b, 46.
- 51 Bostick 1993, 41.
- 52 Bostick 1993, 43.

- 53 For the writings of Joachim of Fiore see Wannenmacher 2016; Riedl 2017.
 54 Lerner 1985, 554.
 55 Lerner 1985, 566.
 56 McGinn 1978, 155.
 57 McGinn 1978, 164.
 58 McGinn 1978, 164.
 59 For the Fifteen Signs that precede the Last Judgment and their use in medieval
 images see Wagner 2016.
 60 The literature on the Great Schism is extensive. For comprehensive accounts
 with further bibliography see Rollo-Koster 2008; Rollo-Koster and Izbicki
 2009.
 61 For the Avignon Papacy, see Rollo-Koster 2015.
 62 Blumenfeld-Kosinski 2006.
 63 See the classic account in Cohn 1957.
 64 McGinn 1978, 170–71.
 65 Beiting 1990.
 66 The literature on Prague and Charles IV is huge and exceeds by far the aims
 of this study. I will only reference the sources that I used directly in my article.
 For the interest in the figure of Antichrist in fourteenth-century Bohemia, see
 more recently Lahey 2021. For Charles IV and his policy regarding relics
 see Crossley and Opačić 2005; Mengel 2010. For Charles IV as Last World
 Emperor, see Cermanová 2010a, 162.
 67 Mengel 2010, 20.
 68 Cermanová 2010a, 162. For the *Liber scivias* of Hildegard of Bingen, see
 Emmerson 2002.
 69 See most recently Toussaint 2019. See also Cermanová 2010a, 164.
 70 Cermanová 2010a, 164.
 71 Cermanová 2010a, 165. See also Malfatto 2015.
 72 For the Velislav Bible, see most recently Panušková 2018.
 73 Kernbach and Panušková 2018a, 30.
 74 Horníčková 2018, 181, 189.
 75 Cermanová 2010a, 169, 173; Cermanová 2018, 149; Horníčková 2018,
 169.
 76 Cermanová 2018, 146–47. See also Cermanová 2016, 245.
 77 Cermanová 2018, 150.
 78 McGinn 1988, 19; Cermanová 2018, 154.
 79 McGinn 1988, 20. Although more common in the fourteenth century, the
 miracles of Antichrist aren't absent in older traditions, such as in the ninth
 century writings of Haymo of Auxerre, which was used as a source by Adso
 of Montier-en-Der, see Emmerson 1979, 180.
 80 Boyer 2020, 242.

- 81 The miracle is also included in the *Compendium* of Hugo Ripelin, see
Cermanová 2010a, 171.
- 82 Horníčková calls this image an ‘iconographic anomaly’ and argues that
the use of a fourteenth-century German translation of the *Compendium
theologicae veritatis*, where the word *säul* is used in this episode, might
account for the visual transformation, see Horníčková 2018, 172–73. For
this talking statue miracle see also McGinn 1988, 20.
- 83 Horníčková 2018, 174. For representations of idols, see Camille 1989, 241,
294.
- 84 Most of the authors mentioned above refer to the Wellcome Apocalypse.
The manuscript was produced in Thuringia and is now dated towards the
middle of the fifteenth century, see more recently Palmer 2018, 147. The
manuscript can be consulted online here: [https://wellcomecollection.org/
works/du9ua6nd/items](https://wellcomecollection.org/works/du9ua6nd/items) (accessed: 14.07.2022).
- 85 Cermanová 2010a, 171–73; Horníčková 2018, 170–73; Cermanová 2018,
155–59.
- 86 Cermanová 2010a, 173; Horníčková 2018, 171.
- 87 Cermanová 2010a, 149.
- 88 For a brief summary of the issue see Herold 2015, 69–70.
- 89 Lahey doesn’t include Charles IV in his study, see Lahey 2021.
- 90 Herold 2015, 71.
- 91 Herold 2015, 71; Mengel 2010, 25.
- 92 Mengel draws attention to the fact that more than being an attitude that
announces later Reformation politics, Waldhauser’s actions were rather
conventional, see Mengel 2010, 25–7. See also Herold 2015, 72.
- 93 Herold 2015, 72–3. For the importance of Týn in the fifteenth century, see
Horníčková 2016, 76–7.
- 94 Mengel 2010, 22; Herold 2015, 75.
- 95 Herold 2015, 77.
- 96 Kolář 2004. For John Milíč as a second Elijah, see Cermanová 2016, 252.
Both writings are dated between 1367 and 1370.
- 97 Cermanová 2010a, 167. For the role of the prophet in fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, especially in Bohemia, see Cermanová 2010b; Lahey 2021, 30.
- 98 Kolář 2004, 59.
- 99 Kolář 2004, 61.
- 100 Haberkern 2015, 15.
- 101 Lahey 2021, 21.
- 102 Bartlová 2016, 60–1.
- 103 The manuscript is dated between 1385 and 1390. See Lahey 2021, 25–6.
- 104 Lahey 2021, 26. John Peter Olivi describes this concept in his *Lectura in
Apocalypsim*, see McGinn 1988, 23.
- 105 Buck 2011, 350.

- ¹⁰⁶ Buck 2011, 350.
¹⁰⁷ Buck 2011, 355.
¹⁰⁸ Lahey 2021, 28–9.
¹⁰⁹ Pjecha 2018, 81–2.
¹¹⁰ Farbakyné Deklava 2009; Jékely 2009, 157.
¹¹¹ Lionnet 2004, 233–37.
¹¹² Studničková 2006.
¹¹³ Fudge 2016, 112–15.
¹¹⁴ Fudge 2016, 114.
¹¹⁵ Székely 1956, 583–84.
¹¹⁶ Rady 2010, 69.
¹¹⁷ Rady 2010, 69–70.
¹¹⁸ Borbála 2017.

Bibliography

- Beiting, C. J., *The Last World Emperor and the Angelic Pope: Eschatological Figures as Representative of the Medieval Struggle of "Sacerdotium" and "Imperium"*, unpublished MA thesis, Western Michigan University, 1990.
- Bencze, Ü., *On the Border: Monastic Landscapes of Medieval Transylvania (between the Eleventh and Sixteenth Centuries)*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Central European University, 2020.
- Bennett, A. L., "A Late Thirteenth-century Psalter-Hours from London", in W. M. Ormrod (ed.), *England in the Thirteenth Century: Proceedings of the 1984 Harlaxton Symposium*, Boydell, Woodbridge, 1986, pp. 15–30.
- Blumenfeld-Kosinski, R., *Poets, Saints, and Visionaries of the Great Schism, 1378-1417*, Penn State University Press, University Park, 2006.
- Borbála, K., "Students from the Medieval Hungarian Kingdom at the University of Vienna. Additional Data to Their Studies: Faculties and Graduation", in Á. Fischer-Dárdai, I. Lengvári and É. Schmelcz-Pohánka (eds.), *University and Universality. The Place and Role of the University of Pécs in Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present Day*, Pécs, 2017, 193–213.
- Bostick, Curtis van, *The Antichrist and the "trewe men": Lollard apocalypticism in late medieval and Early Modern England*, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Arizona, 1993.
- Boyer, T., "The Miracles of the Antichrist", in E. R. Hintz and S. E. Pincikowski (eds.), *The End-Times in Medieval German Literature. Sin, Evil, and the Apocalypse*, Boydell & Brewer, London, 2019, pp. 238–54.
- Branner, R., "The Johannes Grusch Atelier and the Continental Origins of the William of Devon Painter", in *Art Bulletin*, vol. 54, 1972, 24–30.
- Buck, L. P., "Anatomia Antichristi: Form and Content of the Papal Antichrist", in *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, vol. 42, no. 2, 2011, 349–68.
- Buran, D., *Sudien zur Wandmalerei um 1400 in der Slowakei. Die Pfarrkirche St. Jakob in Leutschau und die Pfarrkirche St. Franziskus Seraphicus in Poniky*, VDG, Weimar, 2002.
- Camille, M., *The Gothic Idol. Ideology and Image-making in Medieval Art*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.
- Cermanová, P., "Die Erzählung vom Antichrist und seine Funktion in der religiösen und politischen Imagination im luxemburgischen Böhmen", in W. Brandes and F. Schmieder (eds.), *Antichrist. Konstruktionen von Feindbildern*, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2010a, pp. 159–78.
- , "Il profeta Elia e l'Anticristo nell'apocalittica boema fra XIV e XV secolo", in *Annali di Scienze Religiose*, 2010, 189–214.
- , "Gog and Magog. Using Concepts of Apocalyptic Enemies in the Hussite Era", in W. Brandes and F. Schmieder, *Peoples of the Apocalypse. Eschatological Beliefs and Political Scenarios*, De Gruyter, Berlin and Boston, 2016, pp. 239–56.

- , “The Life of Antichrist in the Velislav Bible”, in L. Panušková, *The Velislav Bible, Finest Picture-Bible of the Late Middle Ages*, ed. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2018, pp. 141–63.
- Cohn, N., *The Pursuit of the Millenium*, Fair Lwan, New Jersey, 1957.
- Crossley, P. and Zoë Opačić, “Prague as a New Capital”, in B. D. Boehm and J. Fajt (eds.), *Prague. The Crown of Bohemia, 1347-1437*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2005, 59–75.
- Emmerson, R. K., “Antichrist as anti-saint: the significance of Abbot Adso’s *Libellus de Antichristo*”, in *The American Benedictine Review*, vol. 30, 1979, 175–90.
- , *Antichrist in the Middle Ages: a study of medieval apocalypticism, art, and literature*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1981.
- , “The Representation of Antichrist in Hildegard of Bingen’s *Scivias*: Image, Word, Commentary, and Visionary Experience”, in *Gesta*, vol. 41, no. 2, 2002, 95–110.
- , *Apocalypse Illuminated. The Visual Exegesis of Revelation in Medieval Illustrated Manuscripts*, Penn State University Press, University Park, 2018.
- Emmerson, R. K. and Bernard McGinn (eds.), *The Apocalypse in the Middle Ages*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1992.
- Érszegi, G., “A leleszi monostor alapítóleveléről (1214)” [The Foundation Charter of the Monastery in Leles (1214)], in Á. Henszel (ed.), *Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg Levéltári Évkönyv XVI*, Debreceni Akadémiai Bizottság, Nyíregyháza, 2003, pp. 13–28.
- Farbakyné Deklava, L., “A két apostolfejedelem fejemeklyéjének ábrázolása Leleszen – Adalékok egy ritka ikonográfia magyarországi előfordulásához” [Representation of the Head Relics of Two Apostles in Leles – Additions to the apparition of a rare Iconography in Hungary], in *Műemlékvédelem*, vol. 53, no. 3, 2009, 122–29.
- Fudge, T. A., *Jerome of Prague and the Foundations of the Hussite Movement*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016.
- Guest, G. B., “The Beautiful Luceifer as an Object of Aesthetic Contemplation in the Central Middle Ages”, in *Studies in Iconography*, vol. 38, 2017, 107–41.
- Haberkern, P., “The Lands of the Bohemian Crown: Conflict, Coexistence, and the Quest for the True Church”, in H. Louthan and G. Murdock (eds.), *A Companion to the Reformation in Central Europe*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2015, pp. 9–39.
- Herold, V., “The Spiritual Background of the Czech Reformation: Precursors of Jan Hus”, in O. Pavlicek and F. Šmahel (eds.), *A Companion to Jan Hus*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2015, pp. 69–95.
- Heye, E., “Die mittelalterlichen Wandmalereien in der Remigius-Kirche von Nagold (Kr. Calw)”, in *Nachrichtenblatt der Denkmalpflege in Baden-Württemberg*, vol. 8, no. 3, 1965, 78–83.

- Horníčková, K., "Images and Visual Culture in Bohemian Utrquauism", in K. Horníčková and M. Šroněk (eds.), *From Hus to Luther. Visual Culture in the Bohemian Reformation (1380-1620)*, Brepols, Turnhout, 2016, pp. 71–105.
- Horníčková, K., "The Antichrist Cycle in the Velislav Bible and the Representation of the Intellectual Community", in L. Panušková, *The Velislav Bible, Finest Picture-Bible of the Late Middle Ages*, ed. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2018, pp. 163–91.
- Jékely, Z., "Kéménd", in T. Kollár (ed.), *Középkori falképek Erdélyben*, Teleki László Alapítvány, Budapest, 2008, pp. 140–54.
- , "Leles", in T. Kollár (ed.), *Falfestészeti emlékek a középkori Magyarország északkeleti megyéiből*, Teleki László Alapítvány, Budapest, 2009, pp. 136–53.
- , "A magyar királyok genealógiai ciklusa a leleszi premontrei kolostorkápolna középkori falképein" [Genealogical Cycle of Hungarian Kings on the Medieval Frescoes at the Premonstratensian Abbey of Lelesz], in *Művészettörténeti Értesítő*, vol. 61, 2012, 175–86.
- Kernbach, A. and L. Panušková, "Studying the Velislav Bible. An Overview", in L. Panušková, *The Velislav Bible, Finest Picture-Bible of the Late Middle Ages*, ed. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2018a, pp. 15–35.
- , "Image and Text in the Velislav Bible. On the Interpretation of an Illuminated Codex", L. Panušková, *The Velislav Bible, Finest Picture-Bible of the Late Middle Ages*, ed. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2018b, pp. 35–69.
- Kolář, P., "Milíč's Sermo de die novissimo in Its European Context", in *Bohemian Reformation and Religious Practice*, vol. 5, 2004, 54–63.
- Kovács, V., "Lelesz patrónusai" [The Patrons of Lelesz], in *Történelmi Szemle*, vol. 59, nr. 1, 2017, pp. 103–27.
- Lahey, S., "Antichrist in Bohemia: A Theme in the Genesis of Hussite Theology", in *Essays in Medieval Studies*, vol. 35, 2021, 21–37.
- Lanc, E., *Die mittelalterlichen Wandmalereien in der Steiermark*, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 2002.
- Lerner, R., "Antichrists and Antichrist in Joachim of Fire", in *Speculum*, vol. 60, no. 3, 1985, 553–70.
- Lima, R., *Stages of Evil. Occultism in Western Theater and Drama*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2005.
- Link, L., *The Devil. A Mask without a Face*, Reaktion Books, London, 1995.
- Lionnet, M., *Les peintures murales en Hongrie à la fin du Moyen âge (v. 1300-v. 1475): la transmission des traditions iconographiques et les formes originales de leur appropriation locale sur les deux thèmes majeurs: la Mère de Dieu et le Jugement dernier*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Paris X – Nanterre, 2004.
- Malfatto, I., "John of Marignolli and the Historiographical Project of Charles IV", in *Acta Universitatis Carolinae*, vol. 60, no. 1, 2015, 131–40.

- McGinn, B., "Angel Pope and Papal Antichrist", in *Church History*, vol. 47, no. 2, 1978, 155–73.
- , *Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1979.
- , "Portraying Antichrist in the Middle Ages", in W. Verbeke, D. Verhelst, and A. Welkenhuysen (eds.), *The Use and Abuse of Eschatology in the Middle Ages*, Leuven University Press, Leuven, 1988, pp. 1–47.
- , *Antichrist: Two Thousand Years of the Human Fascination with Evil*, Harper San Francisco, New York, 1994.
- Mengel, D. C., "Emperor Charles IV (1346-1378) as the Architect of Local Religion in Prague", in *Austrian History Yearbook*, vol. 41, 2010, 15–29.
- Mittman, A. S. and Susan M. Kim, "Locating the Devil *Her* in MS Junius 11", in *Gesta*, vol. 54, no. 1, 2015, 3–25.
- Năstăsioiu, D., *Between Personal Devotion and Political Propaganda: Iconographic Aspects in the Representation of the sancti reges Hungariae in Church Mural Painting (14th Century–Early-16th Century)*, unpublished doctoral thesis, Central European University, 2018.
- Palmer, N. F., "The Coming of the 'Antichrist': The Fifteenth-Century Blockbooks and the Transition from Manuscript to Print", in J. F. Hamburger and M. Theisen (eds.), *Unter Druck. Mitteleuropäische Buchmalerei im 15. Jahrhundert*, Michael Imhof, Petersberg, 2018, pp. 142–56.
- Panušková, L. (ed.), *The Velislav Bible, Finest Picture-Bible of the Late Middle Ages*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2018.
- Pjecha, M., "Taborite Apocalyptic Violence and its Intellectual Inspirations", in *The Bohemian Reformation and Religious Practice*, vol. 11, 2018, 76–97.
- Poesch, J., "The Beasts from Job in the *Liber Floridus* Manuscripts", in *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, vol. 33, nr. 1, 1970, 41–51.
- Prokopp, M. and Gábor Méry, *Középkori falképek a Szepességben* [Medieval mural paintings in the Szepes region], Méry Ratio, Šamorín, 2009.
- Rady, M., "Jiskra, Hussitism and Slovakia", in E. Doležalová and J. Pánek, *Confession and Nation in the Era of Reformations: Central Europe in Comparative Perspective*, Institute of History, Prague, 2010, pp. 59–72.
- Riedl, M. (ed.), *A Companion to Joachim of Fiore*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2017.
- Rollo-Koster, J., *Raiding Saint Peter: Empty Sees, Violence, and the Initiation of the Great Western Schism (1378)*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2008.
- , *Avignon and its Papacy, 1309-1417: Popes, Institutions, Society*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2015.
- Rollo-Koster, J. and Thomas M. Izbicki (eds.), *A Companion to the Great Western Schism (1378-1417)*, Brill, Boston, 2009.
- Ryan, M. A., "Antichrist in the Middle Ages: *Plus ça change...*", in *History Compass*, vol. 7, nr. 6, 2009, 1581–92.

- Schmidt, G. D., *Iconography of the Mouth of Hell: Eighth-Century Britain to the Fifteenth Century*, Susquehanna University Press, Selinsgrove, 1995.
- Studničková, M., "Böhmische Orientierung in der Miniaturmalerei – der Kreis der Meister von Gerona", in I. Takács (ed.), *Sigismundus Rex et Imperator. Kunst und Kultur zur Zeit Sigismunds von Luxemburg. 1387–1437*, Philipp von Zabern, Budapest and Luxembourg, 2006, pp. 529–39.
- Székely, G., "A Huszitizmus és a Magyar nép" [Hussitism and the Hungarian People], in *Századok*, 1956, 331–67, 556–90.
- Thoroczkay, G. (ed.), *Írott források az 1116–1205 közötti magyar történelemről* [Written Sources of Hungarian History between 1116 and 1205], Szegedi Középkorász Műhely, Szeged, 2018.
- Timmermann, A., "The Avenging Crucifix: Some Observations on the Iconography of the Living Cross", in *Gesta*, vol. 40, no. 2, 2001, 141–60.
- Tognér, M. and Vladimír Plekanec, *Medieval Wall Paintings in Spiš*, Arte Libris, Bratislava, 2012.
- Toussaint, G., "Endzeit auf Karlstein? Karl IV. und sein Heilsplan", in S. Ehrich and A. Worm (eds.), *Geschichte vom Ende her denken. Endzeitentwürfe und ihre Historisierung im Mittelalter*, Schnell & Steiner, Regensburg, 2019, pp. 215–39.
- Wagner, D., *Die Fünfzehn Zeichen vor dem Jüngsten Gericht. Spätmittelalterliche Bildkonzepte für das Seelenheil*, Reimer, Berlin, 2016.
- Wannenmacher, J. E., *Joachim of Fiore and the Influence of Inspiration: Essays in Memory of Marjorie E. Reeves (1905–2003)*, Ashgate, Farnham and Burlington, 2014.
- Weinryb, I., "Hildesheim Avant-garde. Bronze, Columns, and Colonialism", in *Speculum*, vol. 93, no. 3, 2018, 728–82.
- Wittekind, S., "Visualizing Salvation: The Role of Arboreal Imagery in the *Speculum humanae salvationis* (Kremsmünster, Library of the Convent, Cod. 243)", in P. Salonijs and A. Worm (eds.), *The Tree. Symbol, Allegory, and Mnemonic Device in Medieval Art and Thought*, Brepols, Turnhout, 2014, 117–43.
- Wright, R. M., *Art and Antichrist in Medieval Europe*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1995.



IULIA NIȚESCU

Born in 1990, in Romania

Ph.D., University of Bucharest, Department of Russian and Slavic Studies
(2017)

Thesis: *Political and Religious Myths and Symbols of the Russian State*

Researcher, Research Institute of the University of Bucharest,
Humanities Division

Fellowships and grants:

Fellowship, Interdisciplinary School of Doctoral Studies, University of Bucharest. Project title: *Negotiating Orthodoxy: Religious Disputes in 15th century Muscovy*, (2019 –2020)

Grant CNCS – UEFISCDI (PN-III-P1-1.1-PD-2021-0234), Principal Investigator, Project title: *Saint-Making and Institutional Consolidation: the Veneration of Metropolitans in 14th-16th Century Muscovy*, (2022 –2024)

Participation to international conferences in Austria, Portugal, Romania, United Kingdom

Articles on late medieval Muscovy, religious identities, Church-State relations

IDENTITY, SECRECY, AND WAR: THE LETTERS OF IVAN III OF MOSCOW TO HIS DAUGHTER, ELENA OF LITHUANIA

Abstract

This paper addresses the public Orthodox identity of the Muscovite ruling family during the late 15th century, by focusing on the case of Elena Ivanovna (1474/6–1513), daughter of Ivan III of Moscow and wife of Alexander Jagiellon of Lithuania. Through an analysis of the diplomatic correspondence between the grand prince of Moscow and his daughter, it discusses the implications Elena's religious identity had both on an individual level and for the image of the Muscovite dynastic identity.

Keywords: Ivan III of Moscow, Elena of Lithuania, Muscovite–Lithuanian Wars, religious identity.

The late 15th century emergent definitions of Muscovite dynastic identity incorporated this idea of the embodiment of the true Orthodox tradition. When describing events concerning the reign of Ivan III of Moscow (1462–1505), the chroniclers developed extensive arguments of political succession or justifications of military actions entrenched in the grand prince's role as defender of the faith. Such definitions are visible in discussions concerning dynastic marriages, in this particular case the marriage of Elena Ivanovna (1474/6–1513), Ivan's eldest daughter from Sof'ia Paleolog, to Alexander Jagiellon, grand prince of Lithuania. From a diplomatic perspective, this event was meant to complement a peace treaty. However, due to Ivan's requests regarding his daughter's Orthodox identity at the Latin Lithuanian court, turned into a permanent source of tension between the two neighboring polities. When negotiations started, in 1494, Ivan's main request from Alexander was to not pressure Elena to convert to the Roman faith.¹ She was supposed to remain Orthodox and

profess her faith publicly. Since the marriage, in 1495, until his death (in 1505), Ivan kept sending her instructions through letters, envoys, and gifts, with the explicit intention of consolidating her position as an Orthodox patron. The main purpose is considered to have been political. Elena was supposed to gather around her possible supporters of Ivan's policies and act as her father's agent, by providing him with valuable information from the Lithuanian court. Ivan envisioned Elena's public identity as the rallying point for the Orthodox nobility of Western Rus', who had previously been under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Moscow-based metropolitan.

Elena's case offers a unique perspective into the Orthodox self-identification of the Muscovite ruling family. It is one of the rare instances when this identity goes beyond the formulaic explanations offered by chronicle writing, where usually the good Orthodox Muscovites fight the bad Pagan Mongols. This was an identity that was supposed to be actively asserted outside an Orthodox community. It was meant to transform Elena into a patron of Orthodox believers in Lithuania and a symbol of Ivan's legitimate rulership over all the Rus' lands. Thus, the scope of this article is twofold, addressing Elena's individual religious identity and the contribution this identity was supposed to have to the definitions of Muscovite dynastic power. The analysis will focus on the diplomatic correspondence between Muscovy and Lithuania, as kept in the Russian archives and published in collections of documents beginning in the 19th century.² Elena's identity was discussed in letters Ivan sent directly to her, in separate letters to Alexander reminding him of the terms of the marriage, and in peace negotiations with Lithuania and European political figures aiming to mediate peace between the two polities. Two separate stages can be identified. After the marriage until 1500 most of Ivan's instructions were directly for Elena and usually comprised performative advice, on how to act, what to say, on what topics to intervene. After 1500, when Ivan started a new war, the instructions regarding Elena's identity were more often used as political arguments in negotiations and better reflected the Muscovite dynastic image.

Although the article promises to discuss the identity of an elite Muscovite woman, what it archives is an analysis of her father's expectations. This approach reflects the information available in the sources. The diplomatic correspondence carefully records Ivan's side of the conversation, while Elena's rare answers show much less agency. I aim to follow the development of Elena's personal religious identity, according to Ivan's instructions, in three stages, by identifying: (1) the elements which

were assumed to contribute to fashioning her Orthodox identity, (2) how was this identity supposed to be asserted and acknowledged publicly and (3) how was she supposed to navigate opposition. The instructions she received were not limited to the question of religious identity. They also offer glimpses of the political role she was expected to play and of the Muscovite diplomatic practices. Ivan asked for information on the activities of the Lithuanian Court, kept Elena informed of his negotiations with Alexander, and urged her to intervene on his behalf. She was told how to approach the discussions with her husband, which part of her father's messages to disclose, and even how to send secret letters back to Moscow.

From a dynastic perspective, this identity was closely related to Ivan's claims, namely defender of the Orthodox faith and "grand prince of all Rus'". These titles referred not only to Muscovy but to all the former territories of Kyivan Rus' under Lithuanian rule. It meant that Ivan could assert an active political role in relation to the Orthodox community living under Lithuanian suzerainty. Thus, Elena's faith was reflecting her father's patrimonial claims. At the same time, the instructions were just not passive explanations in support of a dynastic ideology but were meant to have an active use, balancing the religious identity with the realities of everyday life at a Latin court. The letters from Ivan focused more on performative aspects of Elena's identity, intended to be seen and acknowledged, rather than on theological justifications. As a result, her identity was represented only in relation to her Muscovite family, and no efforts were directed towards a genuine integration at the Lithuanian court.

Background

We know little about Elena prior to the marriage negotiations.³ The late 15th-century Muscovite chronicles recorded the birth of two daughters of Ivan III named Elena, the first one on 18 April 1474, and the second on 19 May 1476.⁴ Although there have been debates on which of them is the one who reached adulthood, usually the second one is considered to have become the grand princess of Lithuania.⁵ No direct information regarding her upbringing or education has reached us. Based on the scarce information we have regarding the lives of elite Muscovite women, one might speculate that she was raised together with her sisters and brothers in the separate living quarters for women, later known as the *terem*, and received an education focused on religion and household management.⁶

She might have witnessed the public activities of her mother, the Byzantine prince Sof'ia Paleolog, who was receiving foreign envoys, such as the Venetian Ambrogio Contarini, or ambassadors discussing marriage plans.⁷

When negotiating the 1494 peace treaty with Lithuania, the question of a dynastic marriage arose. During the initial visit of the Lithuanian embassy, between 17 January and 12 February 1494, the largest part of the negotiations revolved around Ivan's territorial claims. When the issue was settled, a dynastic union was proposed. The only request the documents mention on Ivan's part was for Elena to keep her Orthodox faith and he asked for a letter signed by Alexander, promising not to force Elena to convert to the Latin faith. The envoys agreed and an engagement by proxy took place in Moscow, with one of the envoys replacing Alexander. In October the final marriage treaty was concluded.⁸ In January 1495 Alexander's emissaries arrived to take the bride to Vilnius. Elena left her home accompanied by a large retinue of Muscovite noblemen and their wives, a considerable dowry, and a detailed plan on how the ceremonies should take place. Ivan wanted this wedding to be a completely Orthodox one, to take place in an Orthodox cathedral, and to be performed by Orthodox clergy. Elena was expected to dress like and follow all the customs of a Muscovite bride, and even the necessary garments for Alexander were provided. In Vilnius, however, Ivan's plans were not followed. This led to a mixed ceremony performed by both a Latin bishop, for Alexander, and an Orthodox priest, for Elena. After the ceremonies, most of the Muscovites were sent back to Ivan.⁹

The mixed ceremony was just the first sign that Alexander would not agree to Ivan's interference in the Lithuanian court's life. This prompted a series of letters from Ivan to both his daughter and his son-in-law restraining his requests. Their content with regard to Elena remained rather similar for the first four years. The situation changed in 1499 when Ivan was informed that both Elena and the Orthodox population from Lithuania were being pressured to convert. Arguing that it was his duty to defend the faith, Ivan attacked Lithuania in 1500.¹⁰ Elena found herself in a difficult situation, having to navigate her duties as Alexander's wife and her father's expectations.¹¹

Ivan's accusations turned into a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy in 1501. In an attempt to find allies against Muscovite aggression, Alexander sent an embassy to Pope Alexander IV. The pope asked for Elena's conversion, but the sources do not indicate whether Alexander acted on this request. In the same year, however, he was also elected king of Poland, after the

death of his brother, John I Albert. The crowning ceremony took place on 12 December 1501 and the Orthodox Elena could not be crowned together with her husband. In 1505 Ivan died but his son and successor, Vasiliï III, continued his father's policy towards Lithuania and Elena. Shortly after, in 1506, Alexander also died and the sources do not mention Elena as present at the funeral. The couple had no children. She was never permitted to return to Moscow and died in 1513. She was buried in the Orthodox Church of the Most Pure Mother of God in Vilnius, the same church where she was prepared alone to become the wife of the grand prince of Lithuania upon her arrival.¹²

The Muscovite- Lithuanian Diplomatic Correspondence

The letters between Ivan and Elena can be described as both diplomatic and personal correspondence. They were kept as part of the diplomatic records, together with all other discussions with the Lithuanian political power. The envoys carrying letters for Elena would, most often, have separate messages for Alexander or were in charge of conducting negotiations on Ivan's behalf. There were some instances when the envoys reached Vilnius expressly for Elena, but most often such a journey would be made only if there was a strong motivation behind it.¹³ But, at the same time, these were the only opportunities to talk (even with the help of mediators) to a daughter living in another kingdom. Some traces of parental care, such as questions about her health, everyday life, or gifts, offer some glimpses of family life. In this sense, the letters to Elena could be read together with the letters of Vasiliï III to his wife, Elena Glinskaia, as personal correspondence of the Muscovite grand princes.¹⁴

The perception of diplomatic encounters most likely changed during Ivan's reign, as a comprehensive Muscovite archive of diplomatic contacts with Lithuania beginning in 1487 (only 8 years before Elena's marriage) has survived to these days.¹⁵ Previously, most of the information regarding embassies, political or military activity, and negotiations would be recorded in chronicles. The structure of the entries is far more comprehensive than simply the letters exchanged. Under the date of a letter, one finds information on which envoys left and when, the text of the letters, how the letters or message were delivered, possible discussions between the envoys and the recipient, and even the answer received. At some points, the exchange of messages can have narrative interpolations, detailing events

connected to the debated topics. For example, the marriage negotiations contain separate entries for discussions taking place on separate days and a description of how Elena left Moscow. The exchange of letters was put into a context and, in the case of negotiations extended over a longer period of time, it recorded several meetings and events.

The messages were mediated through the envoys. Ivan's instructions were sent either as letters or as messages delivered orally by the emissaries when discussing with Elena, Alexander, or Alexander's own envoys. The texts largely document the means by which the message was transmitted, either in direct speech or by introducing the content of the letter. Some of Elena's answers were also delivered by the Muscovite envoys, but the degree to which the records of discussions documented her exact words can be debated.¹⁶ The audience of these letters does not seem to exceed the court of the grand prince. As Lur'e pointed out, not even the extensive letters Elena sent in 1503 seem to have been available outside the family circle.¹⁷ Language did not seem to be a hindrance in this exchange of letters. Just as Orthodoxy was widespread within Lithuania, so was the Ruthenian language at the court. Although at the turn of the 16th century several languages were in use in Lithuanian diplomatic practice, Ruthenian remained dominant.¹⁸ The diplomatic exchanges did not need the mediation of translators.

Within the 10 years between the marriage and his death, Ivan strived to have his requests regarding Elena carried out. Despite the extensive extant correspondence (43 entries varying in length from one page to over 20 pages, included in the *SIRIO* alone for the period January 1495 to April 1505), Ivan's requests sometimes strike as repetitive. The moment which offers a change in his discourse was the 1500-1503 war. Before 1500, his requests and instructions were mostly directed towards Elena herself and addressed religious issues and the way in which she was expected to act. After 1500, Elena and her identity became a much better-defined argument exploited in political negotiations, by transforming her into the representative of the entire Orthodox community in Lithuania.

Elements of a Personal Orthodox Identity

Ivan set up his expectations regarding Elena's identity beginning with the marriage negotiations. His requests remained largely the same afterward and were energetically reinforced through letters, mostly during the first

years after the marriage. These requests can largely be subsumed to three main issues: Elena should keep her Greek faith, an Orthodox church should be built for her at the court, and she should be given a retinue comprising of local Orthodox nobility. Sometimes the letters were accompanied by gifts, such as books, adding up to the considerable amount of objects Elena brought with her as part of her dowry. When connected to Ivan's instructions and expectations, these objects can be interpreted as a means of reinforcing a Muscovite cultural identity, as part of her religious heritage.

Elena's religious identity was negotiated for almost one year. The main guarantee for the enforcement of Ivan's terms was a letter with Alexander's seal. The Lithuanian attempt to specify that Elena could convert of her own free will was promptly rejected.¹⁹ Reminders regarding the issue left Moscow even while the bride was still on her way to Vilnius. In February 1495, Ivan sent Vasiliï Romodanovskii and his wife to serve Elena, together with a letter restating his requests concerning the marriage, in a shorter form. Elena was told to remember her father's instructions regarding the Greek faith and the "other issues" without further details.²⁰

These instructions did not receive many explanations even though they were a constant element of diplomatic correspondence. When addressed to Alexander, the letters reminded him of his promises, when addressed to Elena, her duties as a daughter of the grand prince of Moscow were emphasized. The religious issue was raised by Ivan while discussing with Alexanders' envoys two months after the events, in May 1495. Ivan pointed out that none of his requests were met. The wedding ceremony was not performed by the metropolitan Makarii, no church was built at the court, and his boyars were sent back, while Elena was surrounded by Alexander's people, all following the Roman faith.²¹ In a similar letter dated August 1495 Ivan complained that the ceremony was not performed in an Orthodox fashion, that Alexander sent back to Moscow a large part of Elena's retinue, and delayed the building of an Orthodox chapel at the court. At the same time, Elena was once more advised to keep her faith.²²

Faith alone, however, was not enough. According to Ivan's instructions, Elena was supposed to present herself as a Muscovite princess, as her considerable dowry suggested. The dowry contained a complete set of objects necessary for a Muscovite-style wedding, such as garments for both bride and groom, jewelry, furs, objects used for the wedding bed and the following ritual baths, and a significant number of religious objects, crosses, and icons.²³ Afterward, the gifts sent to Vilnius decreased considerably. A letter from March 1495 mentioned a sable fur sent by

Sof'ia, and gold coins known as *korabelnik*, sent by her father.²⁴ Envoys reaching Vilnius in November 1497 brought her thirteen books from Ivan. Unfortunately, the letters did not discuss the books in detail, but it could be assumed that they probably had religious content.²⁵ In May 1503 Ivan wrote to her about Sof'ia's death and sent her a golden cross with wood from the Holy Cross and relics, from her mother, and three black sable furs as a gift from him.²⁶

All the objects Elena received and was expected to use became a mark of her cultural identity. While Ivan was actively portraying himself as a defender of the Orthodox faith, his instructions to Elena reveal his understanding of her identity as primarily connected to her Muscovite ancestry, rather than to her new role as the grand princess of Lithuania. The Orthodox faith and the Muscovite cultural identity go together in forming Elena's relational identity not as a wife, but rather as a daughter. The gifts she received became an act meant to reinforce this identity and advance Ivan's political interests.

Already since leaving Moscow, Elena was forbidden by her father to enter Latin churches.²⁷ She was expected to pray in the already existing Orthodox church in Vilnius until Alexander kept his part of the bargain and built her a chapel at the court. However, the church issue became a constant debate in the correspondence, as a more and more impatient Ivan kept asking for his demands to be met. In a letter from March 1496, Alexander argued that a new church was not necessary, as there were Orthodox churches all over his kingdom, in all the towns Elena would visit, and she was free to pray in any of them.²⁸ Over time, this issue was connected to the importance of having Orthodox priests in Elena's retinue. Even previous disputes regarding ecclesiastical jurisdiction between the Moscow-based metropolitan of all Rus' and the Lithuanian-based metropolitan of Kyiv were forgotten in favor of asserting a public religious identity. Ivan had insisted that the metropolitan Makarii of Kyiv should perform the marriage ceremony. Since this proposal was rejected, the priest Foma, who had come with the princess from Moscow, became the center of Ivan's requests. Several letters addressed to members of Elena's retinue mention him and the need of having an Orthodox priest with the princess.²⁹

The political goals of this marriage could be reached only if Elena was to become a patron of Orthodoxy and an active link between her father and the Lithuanian nobility. The issue of Elena's retinue, which Ivan envisioned as comprising both Muscovite and Orthodox Lithuanian

nobility, would bridge the political and religious aims. In the instructions for the envoys sent to Vilnius in August 1495 Ivan argued that when it would be time to attend church service, the Latin members of the retinue would go to their own Latin churches while Elena would be left to travel alone, to a church far away from the court.³⁰ These unfulfilled promises soon became a source of tension between father and daughter. In a letter from November 1497, he expressed his discontent regarding Elena's lack of interest in his instructions. Since she had failed to keep him informed and had not described the situation properly, he had to conclude that Alexander did not keep his word and no local Orthodox nobility was assigned to her service. A short answer was also recorded, where Elena tried to defend herself by saying she discuss the issue with her husband. The same entry contained a letter from Sofi'a Paleolog, who was asking for news about her health and inquired about a possible pregnancy.³¹

Considering the importance Elena's faith had in the negotiations and the subsequent correspondence, the lack of theological arguments becomes surprising. There are no discussions regarding why the confessions professed by the Muscovites and the Lithuanians were different, no theological justifications for Ivan's instructions, or debates on what exactly was "wrong" with the Roman faith. The end of the 15th century was marked by the heresy of the "Judaizers", considered to have appeared in Novgorod and later spread to Moscow. According to their accusers, Orthodox priests had been converted to Judaism by a certain Jew from Kyiv arriving in Novgorod in 1470 with the prince Mikhail Olel'kovich.³² The movement prompted several local church councils and led to severe punishment for those considered heretics, and even to the first complete translation of the Bible into Slavonic.³³ Although considered to have originated in the Lithuanian-ruled Kyiv, the letters exchanged between Moscow and Vilnius do not indicate that the concerns regarding Elena's faith were connected to any contemporary theological debates, neither anti-heretic nor anti-Latin. In Lithuania, late 15th century discussions regarding the religious differences between the Latin and Greek rites revolved around papal primacy, the doctrine of the *filioque* (addition to the Creed, stating that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son), or the practice of baptism through immersion.³⁴ None of these topics were present in Ivan's letters. At the same time, there is no evidence that any Muscovite prominent religious figure (such as the metropolitan or a monk or priest) was involved in writing these instructions. Certainly, the possibility should still be considered, but any such discussions were not

disclosed in Ivan's letters. Given the political implications this marriage had, it is safe to assume this is the closest we can get to how a grand prince of Moscow actually envisioned a public Orthodox identity.

Only on one occasion, the instructions Ivan sent were clearly connected to possible dangers to Elena's immortal soul, rather than to elements meant to construct a publicly asserted identity. This happened when conversion actually seemed possible. In May 1499, Ivan received a letter from Boris Mikhailovich, prince of Viazma, stating that Alexander was pressuring Elena to convert to the "cursed Latin faith" (*v" latynskuiu prokliatuiu věry*) and she refuses out of loyalty to her father.³⁵ Ivan immediately sent an envoy to Elena, to find out whether these accusations were true. The letter explained the danger she faced and what was expected of her, as she herself should remember how she was advised by her father. She should resist any conversion attempt and if necessary, suffer for her faith with blood and even until death, as the soul was from God and this kind of disgrace had never been their way and it would never be. Finally, he asked whether all these accusations concerning her husband were true. A letter from Sof'ia was also sent, following closely the structure and the requests already included in Ivan's letter.³⁶ In return, an answer from Alexander arrived, claiming Elena was unwell and thus unable to receive the envoy.³⁷ Later, in another letter from December 1499, Ivan complained she did not answer. He restated the danger to her soul conversion would pose, together with her duty to obey the parental command.³⁸ The possible pressure to convert Elena to the Latin faith became one of the main grounds for the 1500 military campaign launched by Ivan.

How to Assert a Religious Identity Publicly

The public assertion of Elena's religious identity was mostly supposed to be ceremonial and performative. She was expected to be seen in public as a patron of Orthodoxy, to attend religious services and surround herself with Muscovite and Orthodox Lithuanian nobility, and avoid any association with the Latin faith. Later, her identity became intertwined with the one of the Orthodox community, as Ivan developed accusations of religious persecution as the reason for war.

When Elena left Moscow, in January 1495, she received her first direct instructions from Ivan. The text recorded only the ban on visiting Latin churches (using the word *bozhnitsy*, as opposed to *tserkvi*, used

for Orthodox churches). She could, however, enter Latin churches or monasteries once or twice, if she were curious, but no more. The instructions also took into consideration practical aspects of Elena's future life at a Latin court. If her mother-in-law was to ask Elena to accompany her to church, she was not supposed to refuse; instead, she could go as far as the church's entrance. The text continued by adding that many other instructions were offered by Ivan, on how to maintain her faith. Unfortunately, these were not recorded.³⁹

Considerable attention was paid to the manner in which the bride was to present herself on her way to Vilnius. Before meeting Alexander, the Orthodox residents of the disputed border territories were to see a large retinue of Muscovites, accompanying their future grand princess, who was to stop in the most important towns, to visit and pray at the Orthodox churches and monasteries there. The list of these places of worship had been provided by Ivan.⁴⁰ In Zvenigorod, they were to stop at the church of the Virgin Mary, in Mozhaisk at the church of Saint Nicholas, in Smolensk at the church of the Virgin Mary, in cathedral church of Vitebsk, and in Polotsk at the Saint Sophia Cathedral.⁴¹ After the wedding, the boyars had to send back to Moscow a detailed report of the events. The description started from Viazma, where they were greeted by the local prince. The report carefully recorded the places visited, how they were received, by whom, and any gifts offered or celebrations. The report contained elaborate descriptions of how the local clergy received her, especially on Lithuanian territory, and of the religious ceremonies she attended.⁴²

New arguments concerning Elena's identity were developed beginning with the 1499 letter from Boris Mikhailovich of Viazma. At this point, all direct instructions on how to behave or how to assert her individual identity were no longer of interest to Ivan. The previous unfulfilled requests and an assumed attempt to convert Elena served as a justification for war.⁴³ In a sense, this was the moment when she embodied the role of leader of the Orthodox community living in Lithuania. According to Ivan's claims, a certain priest from Smolensk (together with the bishop of Vilnius, in later letters) who had renounced the Orthodox faith was sent to Elena, to persuade her to do the same. In a similar fashion, the same message reached the Orthodox political elite of Lithuania, despite Alexander's promises.⁴⁴ Another element of change was the context of these arguments. Apart from some initial letters sent to Elena, asking for her confirmation of the events, and a letter after the 1503 peace negotiations, Elena's religious identity, and alleged persecution turned into an almost

exclusive political argument. It was employed mostly in negotiations with Alexander or in answers to the pleas for peace and unity coming from other European rulers.⁴⁵ As the military conflict progressed, vivid images of religious persecution were invoked: Latin churches were being built in Rus' towns, wives were separated from their husbands, children from their parents and people were forcibly converted.⁴⁶ The gradual transformation of this argument over time can actually be traced, from an interest in Elena's individual situation, in 1499, to the general religious persecutions, forcing Ivan to intervene in his capacity as a defender of the Orthodox faith, after 1500.

Despite the lack of any evidence such persecution actually took place, Ivan turned the argument into his justification for breaching the 1494 peace treaty and accepting the allegiance of local princes under Alexander's rule.⁴⁷ Several events, such as the papal letters asking for Elena's conversion, might have been the basis of these accusations. However, no indications have been found that actual persecution took place. In 1498, the bishop of Smolensk sent a letter to the Patriarch of Constantinople asking for an opinion on the Union of Florence. In the same year he became metropolitan of Kyiv, but not even the confirmation from the Patriarch, in 1500, could convince the Muscovites of his Orthodox credentials and to stop the war.⁴⁸ Another famous letter was allegedly sent by the metropolitan Iosif of Kyiv to Pope Alexander VI in 1500, asking for the union of the Churches. The actual letter was lost and its content is known only from the Pope's interpretation of it. As Senyk pointed out, a careful analysis of the answer and of the political context indicates that the metropolitan was actually trying to obtain permission to build Orthodox churches in masonry (forbidden at that time in Lithuania), rather than a union.⁴⁹

During the negotiations from March-April 1503, Elena's situation, linked to the similar persecution of all Rus', remained central to the talks. At the request of her brother-in-law, the cardinal Fryderyk, Elena sent separate letters to her parents and brothers, urging them to conclude peace with Lithuania.⁵⁰ These letters received more scholarly attention for their extensive literary qualities, as they differ in content and length from other messages.⁵¹ She tried to convince her family that Ivan's claims were not based on facts and she extensively described how the situation affected her and her position. Elena wrote about the sadness the war caused her, of her husband's love and care for her, despite Ivan's constant demands, and explained how Alexander's family hoped that this marriage would secure peace, but it became a new reason for war.⁵² Elena's letters and

tears seemed to have little impact. Ivan showed a detailed knowledge of the letters Pope Alexander VI sent, concerning Elena's conversion, and could be convinced neither by his daughter's letter nor by Alexander's envoy addressing the issue directly, that no action was taken.⁵³ As part of the peace agreement, he wanted a new confirmation letter from Alexander, claiming he will not pressure Elena to convert. But this time, the letter was expected to have the seals of the archbishop of Krakow and of the bishop of Vilnius. Moreover, as Elena's mother-in-law was old, Ivan wanted Alexander to allocate his mother's possessions to his wife. Separately, he answered his daughter's pleas insisting on the reality of the persecution and accusing her of hiding the truth.⁵⁴ No answer from her brothers or mother was recorded.

How to Navigate Opposition and Diplomatic Secrecy

Elena's faith would concern not just Alexander, but his entire family. As the Jagellonians were one of the most powerful families of Central Europe, Ivan wanted to make sure they would attend the Orthodox wedding of his daughter. Elena was given information on how to behave around her mother-in-law, while the Muscovite boyars had to give details in their reports about the entire family. Elisabeth of Austria, Alexander's mother, and his brothers, the bishop (Frederick Jagiellon), the king of Hungary (Vladislaus Jagiellon), and Sigismund (the king of Poland) were expected to go to Vilnius for the wedding. But Ivan's fears turned out to be correct, as Alexander's mother arrived only after the ceremony.⁵⁵

During the first years after the marriage, Ivan seemed to hope his daughter would have a direct influence over Alexander's decisions. The correspondence with his daughter provides valuable insights into the manner in which Ivan actually envisioned this influence and his expectations. What is most striking about these letters is the extent of micromanagement (to put it in modern terms) and secrecy employed. He kept pointing out the issues Elena should bring up to her husband, from those concerning her faith to political decisions, and sometimes even offered the exact words she should say. Displeased with Alexander's decision to send back the Muscovite boyars after the wedding, in May 1495 Ivan wrote to Elena. The envoy used the pretext that word had reached Moscow that the grand princess was unwell. The letter, however, did not relate to that but rather dealt with the issue of her retinue. Firstly, Elena

was advised to speak to the envoys alone and to make sure no one read her messages to her father. Then, Ivan described the discussion he had with Alexander's envoy regarding her retinue and asked her to bring the matter up and outline all the promises made to Ivan. In case Alexander would not agree, Ivan's message should be delivered, namely that "(...) you did not marry a Latin, nor did he give his daughter to be converted to Latinism."⁵⁶ Even if Elena would not deliver the message herself, one might assume Alexander could read the letter and see his father-in-law's words. In May 1496, Ivan urged Elena to discuss with Alexander the question of authority over Kyiv, but as if it was her idea, not as coming from Ivan.⁵⁷

The letter from May 1495 opens up the question of the political expectations Ivan had from his daughter living at the Lithuanian court. In various letters, the separate instructions for the boyars delved into the manner in which communication should be ensured and who could be trusted. The grand princess was expected to wish to write „secret letters” (*gramota kakova tainaia*) to her father, and when that happened, the scribe Ivan Kotov was to be in charge of drafting the messages. Afterward, a list of four boyars was provided, to be presented to Elena as trustworthy. These four “trustworthy” boyars were to ensure the connection between Elena and Ivan after Vasilii Romodanvskii and Prokofii Skurat were to leave Lithuania.⁵⁸ Precautions were also taken when the envoys delivered messages aimed only at Elena's ears. They were instructed to speak to her alone, or with just one boyar in attendance. One might assume the boyar had to be from the “trustworthy” list.⁵⁹ Elena's presence at the Lithuanian court was perceived by Ivan as a diplomatic asset. At a time when diplomatic practice throughout Europe was starting to become institutionalized, Elena was expected to act almost as a permanent ambassador, providing valuable information that temporary envoys could not access.⁶⁰ As the one requesting the information was her father, she was also expected to act out of devotion to her family, a tie much more difficult to overcome than the changing loyalty of a subject. As Ivan put it in a letter from March 1497, he had sent her to Alexander in order to keep peace and good understanding between Muscovy and Lithuania.⁶¹

Elena seemed to be of the best politically informed Muscovite women of her time, at least from what the sources indicate. If she was to play an active role in her father's actions, she had to know what was going on. When Ivan's envoys reach Vilnius, in most cases separate letters were sent to her, detailing the negotiations with Alexander and Ivan's diplomatic intentions. Some instances of attempted mediation on her part were

recorded. A Lithuanian envoy reaching Moscow in July 1495 brought two letters from Elena, one for Ivan and one for Sofi'a, similar in content. She was asking about the health of her family and urged them to consider the issue the envoy would put before them, namely Alexander's request for help in a possible conflict with the Crimean Khan.⁶² Ivan answered, informing Elena that he had discussed with the Crimean envoys and told them of the treaty and friendship between Muscovy and Lithuania.⁶³

Before 1499, the messages for Elena regularly contained information on issues of interest to Ivan. He would detail his discussions with Alexander's envoys regarding her faith, the permissions for Muscovite envoys to pass through Lithuanian territory on their way to other polities, or the political alliances he was planning. For example, in a letter from May 1496, Ivan described to Elena his attempt to mediate a treaty between Alexander, the Crimean Khan, and Stephen of Moldavia. He continued by asking her about some rumors he was informed of, that Sigismund of Poland, Alexander's brother, would like to take Kyiv and some other towns from Lithuania under his authority. By pointing out the struggles with family members he himself faced, which Elena must have heard of or even remember, Ivan was asking whether the rumors were true. Separately, the boyars are instructed to find out from Elena which other foreign envoys reached the court of Vilnius.⁶⁴ Not even questions of internal administration were left out. In a letter from March 1498, Ivan informed Elena that he wrote to Alexander, asking him to grant his wife the lands traditionally held by the grand princesses of Lithuania, an issue he would bring up again in the 1503 negotiations.⁶⁵

Elena's position proved to be of value to Ivan on a matter where women's opinions seemed to be of interest. In May 1503, after Sofi'a Paleolog died, Ivan wrote to his daughter about a family issue. His sons and her brothers had reached the age of marriage and he would like to find a bride for Vasiliï, the eldest. Elena was asked to make inquiries regarding the daughters of Greek and Latin monarchs, their ages, and their mothers. The request was restated in a letter from November 1503.⁶⁶ Elena's findings were recorded on February 1504. A list of monarchs and their daughters was provided, including their ages, and information on whether the mothers are still alive. She had very little luck in finding an Orthodox princess and pointed out the difficulties in finding a Latin bride. Their Latin faith is so strong that they would not convert without a papal dispensation, a difficult task as they call them (those of Greek faith) non-Christians (*nekrestmî*).⁶⁷

Conclusions

The image of 15th and 16th century Muscovite grand princesses reaching us today is one highly idealized. They were mostly defined in religious terms, in their capacities as mothers and vessels of the future of the dynasty, or through their piety and saintly image.⁶⁸ This is due to the nature of the surviving sources, such as chronicles and religious writings. Thus, we know little of their public role, limited mostly to religious veneration. Elena, however, was different. Her portrait comes to us through the exchange of letters with her father, and later with her brother, the grand prince Vasili III. The letters were not concerned with her gendered and ideal role as grand princess of Lithuania, but with very practical current political affairs. Although the letters contained some formulaic expressions (mostly connected to the obedience she owed her father, health and greetings), Ivan employed them as a means to his political ends. During the first five years after the marriage, Ivan constantly strived to influence her public image in Lithuania, sending instructions to Elena and to Alexander on practical and performative aspects of a public Orthodox identity. A possible answer to the repetitive nature of Ivan's requests regarding faith, the existence of a church at the court, and the retinue of local Orthodox nobility might have been Elena's refusal to comply with her father's demands.

Ivan's instructions also reveal a different side of the roles elite women were expected to play in diplomatic exchanges and political life. Although Elena appears to be regarded as a pawn in complicated political and military strategies, at the same time, she seems to be one of the best politically informed Riurikid women. One might assume that Ivan discussed political issues with his wife, Sofi'a Paleolog, but no surviving sources can prove such speculations. Elena, on the other hand, received information through letters and envoys on how the negotiations between the two sovereigns were going, what Ivan's intentions were, and what kind of news she was expected to send to Moscow. This information was offered to her not from a sort of respect for her position, opinion or agency, but because it was deemed necessary for her to play the role Ivan envisioned. The closest analogy with other Riurikid women would be the position of the mothers of incumbent princes, like Mariia Iaroslavna, Ivan's mother and Elena's grandmother. She has constantly mentioned in the chronicle formulations of the council the grand prince sought on various matters, together with his brothers, the metropolitan, the boyars, and the

court. Another example of a powerful woman in her own right was Anna Vasilievna, Ivan's sister and regent of Riazan for her underage son.⁶⁹ It should be pointed out that such authority does not seem to appear in the sources connected to Ivan's wives, either Maria of Tver or Sof'ia Paleolog. Thus, a woman's political power within the ruling family was connected with either seniority or regency.

Ivan's instructions do not go beyond his own interests. The religious issue was never placed on theological grounds but rather focused on performative aspects, such as visiting churches. The aspects of domestic life revolve around formulaic greeting messages, sometimes including Elena's brothers and sisters, and questions about health. The gifts sent to her, such as books, furs, or coins, we connected to her cultural Muscovite identity and diplomatic practices. Only one such gift seems to have had an impact beyond Elena's life. One of the icons brought as part of her dowry seems to have been venerated as miracle-working in the Orthodox cathedral of Vilnius until the 17th century.⁷⁰ There is also little evidence of any interest in her life and integration at the Lithuanian court, beyond some of Sof'ia's questions regarding possible pregnancies. Even the letters exchanged by mother and daughter were rather similar in content to those sent by Ivan and reflect very little on family relations, focusing more on diplomatic expectations. One explanation might be that Elena's religious identity was first and foremost a tool for fashioning a dynastic identity.

As the daughter of one ruler and the wife of another, Elena was more than a simple member of the Orthodox community. Her identity was directly related to Ivan's patrimonial claims and reflected the emergent dynastic conceptualization of princely power. The best evidence in this respect was Ivan's insistence on being referred to as "sovereign and grand prince of all Rus'".⁷¹ From the beginning of the marriage negotiations, in 1494, Ivan's goal was to convince the Lithuanians to use this title when addressing him. As it referred to all the former territories of Kyivan Rus', under Muscovite and Lithuanian authority at that time, it was significantly based on previous Muscovite ideological developments, claiming to embody the true Orthodox tradition inherited from Vladimir the Great, the baptizer of Kyivan Rus'.⁷² The political circumstances forced the Lithuanians to accept it in 1494, but it was eliminated from official correspondence, as soon as the circumstances changed. The title would become a recurrent topic in future letters. Already after the marriage was concluded in Vilnius, the Muscovite envoys wrote to Ivan complaining Alexander refused to use "of all Rus'" when asked to write

to his father-in-law.⁷³ The issue would be discussed again in March 1498, and after the new Muscovite-Lithuanian war began, it became a constant argument for Ivan to breach the 1494 peace treaty.⁷⁴ Apart from the religious persecution, Ivan claimed Alexander was the one who did not comply with the terms, as he refused to use the title “sovereign and grand prince of all Rus’”, as convened in the treaty, did not allow free passage for Muscovite envoys going to other polities and maintained friendly relations with Ivan’s enemies.⁷⁵

An Orthodox dynastic identity, in this case, was at the same time a political one, and differentiating between the two might be misleading. During Ivan’s reign, we cannot discuss a coherent ideology of power actively enforced by Moscow, but rather an emerging image actively shaped by current events. Even if his requests regarding Elena’s faith might have been motivated by a real concern for her immortal soul, Ivan was aware of the political advantages the situation might bring. As the title “of all Rus’” indicates, the main goal of this identity-building process was claiming pre-eminence among the other Rus’ polities and appropriating the succession of Kyivan Rus’, including the territories of Western Rus’. As such a debate would not be defined in ethnic terms at that time, the Orthodox identity of the Muscovites as proof of their right became the main argument. Thus, Elena’s personal identity implied, most of all, a dynastic identity. She would represent Muscovy in Lithuania, thus she had to act and dress like a Muscovite princess, and surround herself with nobility loyal to Ivan.

The active interest in shaping a dynastic identity around Elena became more obvious in the letters and negotiations taking place after 1500. As she was portrayed as a representative of the Orthodox community, Ivan actively assumed the role of defender of the faith against the supposed Lithuanian Latin persecution. From this point on, Elena’s identity was not dealt with as personal, it became completely an element for political negotiations and a representation of her father’s claims. There were no instructions on how to act or what to say, and her pleas for the end of the war were ignored. Moreover, the letters display a gradual emergence of Ivan’s patrimonial claims. He was not just fighting for religious freedom, he was defending his *otchina*, the lands inherited from his ancestors, as the only legitimate Riurikid successor.⁷⁶

All of these discussions regarding dynastic identity were reflecting a change in the conception of Muscovite princely power during the reign of Ivan III. Roughly 80 years before Elena’s marriage to Alexander, another

dynastic union between the two polities took place. In 1390, Sof'ia Vitotovna, daughter of Vitautaus of Lithuania, married Ivan I of Moscow. Vitotovna was born in 1371, before her father renounced paganism and converted to Roman Catholicism, and probably had to convert to Orthodoxy to become the grand princess of Moscow. Although her religious identity could have attracted at least a mention in Muscovite chronicles, this was not the case. What was mentioned, however, was the close connection Sof'ia kept with her Lithuanian family, by describing her visits to Vitautaus' court in Smolensk, sometimes together with her son, the future Vasilii II, father of Ivan III.⁷⁷ The different approaches to religious identities during the reign of Ivan and the case of his Lithuanian grandmother show how much the dynastic conception changed. At the beginning of the 15th century, religious identities could be more fluid and less important than the political advantages such an alliance would bring. At the end of the 15th century, however, the Orthodox identity became a symbol of Muscovite political power.

NOTES

- ¹ Throughout this article I use the terms Orthodox / Greek faith for Eastern Christianity and Latin / Roman faith for Western Christianity, as these are the terms used in the sources.
- ² *Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* (hereafter *SIRIO*), Vol. 35 *Pamiatniki diplomaticeskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-Litovskim* (1487- 1533), Tipografiia F. Eleonskogo i K., Sankt Petersburg, 1882.
- ³ Elena's life attracted scholarly attention already from the end of the 19th century when her biography was published. Elena Tsereteli, *Elena Ioannovna, velikaia kniaginia Litovskaia, Russkaia, koroleva Pol'skaia*. Tipografiia I.N. Skorokhodova, St. Petersburg, 1898.
- ⁴ *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* [hereafter *PSRL*], 43 vols. to date, various publishers, St. Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad-Moscow, 1841–2004, vol. 25, 301, 308.
- ⁵ Giedrė Mickūnaitė, "United in blood, divided by faith: Elena Ivanovna and Aleksander Jagiellończyk", in *Frictions and Failures. Cultural Encounters in Crisis*, Almut Bues (ed.), Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2017, 181.
- ⁶ Although the sources detailing the seclusion of elite women in the 16th century, when presenting the meetings Alexander's envoys had with Sof'ia, Elena's mother, the records mentioned they went to see the tsaritsa separately. *SIRIO*, no. 24, 124. See also Nancy Shields Kollmann, "The Seclusion of Elite Muscovite Women", *Russian History*, 10 (2), 1983, 170-187, Natalia L. Pushkareva, *Women in Russian history from the tenth to the twentieth century*, Trans. Eve Levin, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., 1997, 62-64.
- ⁷ On Sof'ia's public engagements, Paul Bushkovitch, "Sofia Palaiologina in Life and Legend," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 52 (2-3), 2018, 158–180.
- ⁸ For an extensive description of the military events and the subsequent peace and marriage negotiations, see John L. I. Fennell, *Ivan the Great of Moscow*, Macmillan, London, 1961, 132-163.
- ⁹ Russell E. Martin, "Ritual and Religion in the Foreign Marriages of Three Muscovite Princesses", *Russian History*, 35 (3-4), 2008, 362–381.
- ¹⁰ For the context of the 1500 war declaration and its religious justifications see S.V.Polekhov, C. Squires "Casus belli. Gramota Ivana III ob ob"iavlennii voiny Aleksandru Iagellonu ot 24 iyunia 1500 g.", *Slověne*, 10 (1), 2021, 262–295.
- ¹¹ For a detailed analysis of the Muscovite-Lithuanian wars and the local border situation, see M.M. Krom, *Mezh Rus'iu i Litvoi. Pogranichnye zemli v sisteme rusko-litovskikh otnoshenii kontsa XV - pervoi treti XVI v*, Kvadriga, Moscow, 2010.

- ¹² On Elena's life in Lithuania, see Mickūnaitė, "United in blood, divided by faith", 181-200.
- ¹³ For example, in May 1499, when Ivan wished to find out from his daughter whether the rumors regarding pressures to convert her were true, *SIRIO*, no. 58, 275-276.
- ¹⁴ Vasilii's letters to his wife, sent between 1526 and 1533, revolved around health issues and they are the main sources of the future tsar Ivan IV's childhood illness. Glinskaia's answers were not recorded. These are considered to be the oldest extant private letters of a Muscovite ruler. Cornelia Soldat, "An Early Childhood Illness of Ivan the Terrible Scrofula or Tuberculosis? Chronic or Healed?", *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 52 (2-3), 2018, 312-326; Cornelia Soldat, "Chastnye pis'ma Vasilii Ivanovicha I Eleny Glinskoi. Issledovanie privatnoi sfery moskovskikh velikikh kniazei", in *Srednevekovia pis'mennost' i knizhnost' XVI-XVII vv. Istochnikovedenie*, Tranzit-IKS, Vladimir, 2016, 147-164.
- ¹⁵ The "ambassadorial book" (*posol'skie knigi*), a collection of diplomatic records containing these letters is estimated to have been compiled during the reign of Vasilii III, Ivan's successor. However, this was possibly connected to the systematization of the princely archives, without influencing the documents contained. L.V. Moshkova, "Russkii posol'skii knigi: nachalo formirovaniia", in *Velikoie stoyaniie na reke Ugre i formirovaniie Rossiiskogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva: lokal'nyie i global'nyie konteksty*, Kaluga, 2017, 238.
- ¹⁶ As this article focuses exclusively on Muscovite records, the possibility that the envoys would offer a version of the discussions expected to please the grand prince should be taken into consideration, although the practice is largely documented for the 16th and the 17th centuries, in the context of the Siberian expansion. Michael Khodarkovsky, "Four Degrees of Separation: Constructing Non-Christian. Identities in Muscovy", in *Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1359–1584*, A.M. Kleimola and G.D. Lenhoff (eds.), ITZ-Garant, Moscow, 1997, 250-253.
- ¹⁷ Ia.S. Lur'e, "Elena Ivanovna, koroleva Pol'skaia i velikaia kniagina Litovskaia kak pisatel'-publitsist" *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 13 (1–2), 1979, 111-120.
- ¹⁸ Jakub Niedźwiedz, "Cyrillic and Latin Script in Late Medieval Vilnius", in *Uses of the Written Word in Medieval Towns: Medieval Urban Literacy II*, Marco Mostert, Anna Adamska (eds.), Brepols, Turnhout, 2014, 104.
116. For a more in-depth analysis of Lithuanian diplomatic practice, see Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th-18th Century)*, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2011.

- 19 Ivan's demands regarding Elena's religious identity and the letter of confirmation from Alexander were already discussed when the peace treaty was concluded, in January – February 1494. *SIRIO*, no. 24, 123-133.
- 20 *SIRIO*, no. 32, 173.
- 21 *SIRIO*, no. 36, 191.
- 22 *SIRIO*, no. 40, 205-6.
- 23 A detailed analysis of Elena's dowry was done by Russell E. Martin, "Dowries, Diplomacy, and Marriage Politics in Muscovy", *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 38 (1), 2008, 119–145. As he pointed out, the political expectations Ivan had from this marriage were also visible through the value of the dowry, the inventory evaluated the complete value as 61,898 rubles. In comparison, the dowry received by Evdokiia, Elena's sister, when marrying the tsarevich Peter in Moscow was estimated at 2,580 rubles. Martin, "Dowries", 127.
- 24 The *korabelnik* was a gold coin issued during the reign of Ivan III. It was imitating the English noble and it had an image of the prince on a ship on one side (hence the name, from *korabl'*, ship). These coins are considered to have been minted for official ceremonies or for diplomatic purposes. Ivar Leimus, "Additional data about the period of and reasons for minting the 'Russian nobles' (*korabelniks*) of Ivan III", in *Pieniądz - symbol - władza - wojna - wspólne dziedzictwo Europy*. Polskie Towarzystwo Numizmatyczne, Warsaw, 2011, 92-97.
- 25 *SIRIO*, no. 34, 181, no. 49, 239.
- 26 *SIRIO*, no. 76, 415.
- 27 *SIRIO*, no. 31, 163.
- 28 *SIRIO*, no. 42, 216.
- 29 *SIRIO*, no. 40, 210, no. 49, 241.
- 30 *SIRIO*, no. 40, 211.
- 31 *SIRIO*, no. 49, 239-242.
- 32 Moshe Taube, "The Fifteenth Century Ruthenian Translations from Hebrew and the Heresy of the Judaizers: Is There a Connection?" in *Speculum Slaviae Orientalis Muscovy, Ruthenia and Lithuania in the Late Middle Ages*, Ivanov, V.V., Verkhohantsev, J. (eds.), Novoe izdatel'stvo, Moscow, 2005, 185-208. Taube discussed extensively the texts of Jewish origin translated into Ruthenian beginning with the 15th century and associated with the movement of the "Judaizers".
- 33 The complete Bible translation was finished in 1499, under the supervision of the archbishop Gennadii of Novgorod, one of the main accusers of the "Judaizers".
- 34 Stephen C. Rowell, "Whatever Kind of Pagan the Bearer Might be, The Letter is Valid. A Sketch of Catholic-Orthodox Relations in the Late-Mediaeval Grand Duchy of Lithuania", *Lithuanian Historical Studies*, 18, 2013, 50.

- 35 *SIRIO*, no. 57, 273.
- 36 *SIRIO*, no. 58, 275-276.
- 37 *SIRIO*, no. 59, 277.
- 38 *SIRIO*, no. 62, 292-293.
- 39 *SIRIO*, no. 31, 163.
- 40 *SIRIO*, no. 31, 167.
- 41 Ivan's list references some of the oldest Rus' churches and monasteries, still in use today. The Savvino-Storozhevsky Monastery dedicated to the Nativity of the Theotokos, in Zvenigorod was traditionally built at the end of the 14th century by a disciple of Sergius of Radonezh. The church of Saint Nicholas in the Mozhaïsk Kremlin (approx. 14th century) is famous for the depiction of Saint Nicholas as the protector of the town during the Mongol invasion. The 12th-century Assumption Cathedral of Smolensk was completely rebuilt in the 17th century. The 12th-century Church of the Annunciation of Vitebsk was destroyed in 1961 and rebuilt in 1996. The oldest of them, the 11th-century Saint Sophia Cathedral in Polotsk was one of the three cathedrals dedicated to the Divine Wisdom, together with the cathedrals from Kyiv and Novgorod.
- 42 *SIRIO*, no. 35, 182-184.
- 43 Fennell explained the alleged religious persecution towards Elena and the community as a *casus belli* Ivan was looking for already after all the preparation for an invasion were made, with territorial expansion as the real motivation. Fennell, *Ivan the Great of Moscow*, 215-216.
- 44 *SIRIO*, no. 57, 273-274.
- 45 February 1501, answer to the envoy of the Polish King, no. 67, 315, January 1503, answer to the envoys of the Hungarian king and the papal letters, no 73, 351-352.
- 46 *SIRIO*, no. 63, 294-295.
- 47 *SIRIO*, no. 63, 299.
- 48 Borys Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform. The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Genesis of the Union of Brest*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998, 52-53.
- 49 Sophia Senyk, *A History of the Church in Ukraine, Volume II 1300 to the Union of Brest*, Pontificio istituto orientale, Rome, 2011, 135 - 139.
- 50 Mickūnaitė, "United in blood, divided by faith", 194.
- 51 The literary qualities of these letters have been discussed in comparison with folkloric elements by Ia.S. Lur'e, "Elena Ivanovna, koroleva Pol'skaia", 111-120.
- 52 *SIRIO*, no. 75, 367-376.
- 53 *SIRIO*, no. 75, 407-409.
- 54 *SIRIO*, no. 76, 416-417, 422.
- 55 *SIRIO*, no. 33, 176.
- 56 *SIRIO*, no. 37, 198-199.

- 57 *SIRIO*, no. 43, 224-225.
- 58 *SIRIO*, no. 32, 173.
- 59 *SIRIO*, no. 37, 197.
- 60 For the connection between diplomatic practice and secrecy in medieval and early modern Europe, see Jean-Baptiste Santamaria, "Secrets, Diplomats, and Spies in Late Medieval France and in the Burgundian State: Parallel Practices and Undercover Operations", in *Beyond Ambassadors Consuls, Missionaries, and Spies in Premodern Diplomacy*, Maurits A. Ebben, Louis Sicking (eds.), Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2021, 159-184, Jonathan M. Elukin, "Keeping Secrets in Medieval and Early Modern English Government," in *Geheimnis am Beginn der europäischen Moderne*, J.M. Elukin, G. Engel, B. Rang, K. Reichert, and H. Wunder (eds.), Klostermann, Frankfurt, 2002, 111– 129.
- 61 *SIRIO*, no. 53, 255-256.
- 62 *SIRIO*, no. 38, 200.
- 63 *SIRIO*, no. 39, 203.
- 64 *SIRIO*, no. 43, 233-235.
- 65 *SIRIO*, no. 53, 250-256.
- 66 *SIRIO*, no. 76, 426-427, no. 77. 442-443.
- 67 *SIRIO*, no. 77, 452-453.
- 68 Isolde Thyrêt, *Between God and tsar. Religious symbolism and the royal women of Muscovite Russia*. Northern Illinois University Press, DeKalb, 2001.
- 69 Pushkareva, *Women in Russian history*, 24.
- 70 Mickūnaitė, "United in blood, divided by faith", 199.
- 71 For the usage of this title by the Muscovite rulers, see A.I. Filiushkin, *Tituly Russkikh gosudarei*, Al'ians Arkheo, Moscow, St. Petersburg, 2006, 152-192.
- 72 Previously, such arguments were extensively used to justify military actions against other Rus' polities, for example, the account of the 1471 campaign against Novgorod, *PSRL*, 25, 285-293. The Muscovite claims to the Kyivan inheritance developed in the second half of the 15th century and the 1490s negotiations with Lithuania are some of the oldest instances of a Muscovite grand prince claiming the title "of all Rus'" in diplomatic practice. Serhii Plokhyy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations. Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, 136-142.
- 73 *SIRIO*, no. 31, 170.
- 74 *SIRIO*, no. 53, 252-256.
- 75 *SIRIO*, no. 65, 304-305, no. 67, 318.
- 76 *SIRIO*, no. 75, 380.
- 77 *PSRL*, 25, 219 for the marriage account, 228, 245-246 for visits to her father, in Smolensk.

Bibliography

Primary sources

- Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (PSRL), 43 vols. to date, various publishers, St. Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad-Moscow, 1841–2004.
- Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva* (SIRIO). Vol. 35 *Pamiatniki diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Pol'sko-Litovskim* (1487- 1533), Tipografiia F. Eleonskogo i K., Sankt Petersburg, 1882.

Secondary sources

- Bushkovitch, P., "Sofia Palaiologina in Life and Legend," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 52 (2-3), 2018, 158–180.
- Elukin, J.M., "Keeping Secrets in Medieval and Early Modern English Government," in *Geheimnis am Beginn der europäischen Moderne*, J.M. Elukin, G. Engel, B. Rang, K. Reichert, and H. Wunder (eds.), Klostermann, Frankfurt, 2002, 111– 129.
- Fennell, J.L.I., *Ivan the Great of Moscow*, Macmillan, London, 1961.
- Filiushkin, A.I., *Tituly Russkikh gosudarei*, Al'ians Arkheo, Moscow, St. Petersburg, 2006.
- Gudziak, B., *Crisis and Reform. The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Genesis of the Union of Brest*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998.
- Krom, M.M., *Mezh Rus'iu i Litvoi. Pogranichnye zemli v sisteme russko-litovskikh otnoshenii kontsa XV - pervoi treti XVI v*, Kvadriga, Moscow, 2010.
- Khodarkovsky, M. "Four Degrees of Separation: Constructing Non-Christian. Identities in Muscovy", in *Culture and Identity in Muscovy, 1359–1584*, A.M. Kleimola and G.D. Lenhoff (eds.), ITZ-Garant, Moscow, 1997, 248-266.
- Kollmann, N.S., "The Seclusion of Elite Muscovite Women", *Russian History*, 10 (2), 1983, 170-187.
- Kołodziejczyk, D., *The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania International Diplomacy on the European Periphery (15th-18th Century)*, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2011.
- Leimus, I., "Additional data about the period of and reasons for minting the 'Russian nobles' (korabelniks) of Ivan III", in *Pieniądz - symbol - władza - wojna - wspólne dziedzictwo Europy*. Polskie Towarzystwo Numizmatyczne, Warsaw, 2011, 92-97.
- Lur'e, Ia.S., "Elena Ivanovna, koroleva Pol'skaia i velikaia kniagina Litovskaia kak pisatel'-publitsist" *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 13 (1–2), 1979, 111-120.
- Martin, R.E. "Ritual and Religion in the Foreign Marriages of Three Muscovite Princesses", *Russian History*, 35 (3-4), 2008, 362–381.

- Martin, R.E., "Dowries, Diplomacy, and Marriage Politics in Muscovy", *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, 38 (1), 2008, 119–145.
- Mickūnaitė, G., "United in blood, divided by faith: Elena Ivanovna and Aleksander Jagiellończyk", in *Frictions and Failures. Cultural Encounters in Crisis*, Almut Bues (ed.), Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2017, 181-200.
- Moshkova L. V., "Russkii posol'skii knigi: nachalo formirovaniia", in *Velikoie stoyaniie na reke Ugre i formirovaniie Rossiiskogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva: lokal'nyie i global'nyie konteksty*, Kaluga, 2017, 232–250.
- Niedźwiedz, J., "Cyrillic and Latin Script in Late Medieval Vilnius", in *Uses of the Written Word in Medieval Towns: Medieval Urban Literacy II*, Marco Mostert, Anna Adamska (eds.), Brepols, Turnhout, 2014, 99-116.
- Plokhyy, S., *The Origins of the Slavic Nations. Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.
- Polekhov, S.V., C. Squires "Casus belli. Gramota Ivana III ob ob"iavlennii voyny Aleksandru Iagellonu ot 24 iyunia 1500 g.", *Slověne*, 10 (1), 2021, 262–295.
- Pushkareva, N.L., *Women in Russian history from the tenth to the twentieth century*, Trans. Eve Levin, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., 1997.
- Rowell, S.C. "Whatever Kind of Pagan the Bearer Might be, The Letter is Valid. A Sketch of Catholic-Orthodox Relations in the Late-Mediaeval Grand Duchy of Lithuania", *Lithuanian Historical Studies*, 18, 2013, 47-65.
- Santamaria, J.-B., "Secrets, Diplomats, and Spies in Late Medieval France and in the Burgundian State: Parallel Practices and Undercover Operations", in *Beyond Ambassadors Consuls, Missionaries, and Spies in Premodern Diplomacy*, Maurits A. Ebben, Louis Sicking (eds.), Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2021, 159-184
- Senyk, S., *A History of the Church in Ukraine, Volume II 1300 to the Union of Brest*, Pontificio istituto orientale, Rome, 2011.
- Soldat, C., "An Early Childhood Illness of Ivan the Terrible Scrofula or Tuberculosis? Chronic or Healed?", *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 52 (2-3), 2018, 312-326
- Soldat, C., "Chastnye pis'ma Vasiliia Ivanovicha I Eleny Glinskoi. Issledovanie privatnoi sfery moskovskikh velikikh kniazei", in *Srednevekovia pis'mennost' i knizhnost' XVI-XVII vv. Istochnikovedenie*, Tranzit-IKS, Vladimir, 2016, 147-164.
- Taube, M., "The Fifteenth Century Ruthenian Translations from Hebrew and the Heresy of the Judaizers: Is There a Connection?" in *Speculum Slaviae Orientalis Muscovy, Ruthenia and Lithuania in the Late Middle Ages*, Ivanov, V.V., Verkholtantsev, J. (eds.), Novoe izdatel'stvo, Moscow, 2005, 185-208.
- Thyrét, I., *Between God and tsar. Religious symbolism and the royal women of Muscovite Russia*. Northern Illinois University Press, DeKalb, 2001.
- Tsereteli, E., *Elena Ioannovna, velikaia kniaginia Litovskaia, Russkaia, koroleva Pol'skaia*, Tipografiia I.N. Skorokhodova, St. Petersburg, 1898.



ALEXANDRU PĂTRUȚI

Born in 1987, in Romania

Ph.D. in Economics, Faculty of International Business and Economics,
University of Economic Studies, Bucharest (2015)

Thesis: *Capital Goods, Time Preference and Economic Cycles:
An Analysis of the Structure of Production*

Senior lecturer, Department of International Business and Economics,
University of Economic Studies, Bucharest

Researcher, International Economic Relations Research Center (CCREI),
Bucharest

Associated researcher at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Romania

Areas of interest: Economic Theory, History of Economic Thought,
International Trade, Macroeconomics

Grant and fellowship

Grant from the Richard Seth Staley Educational Foundation (2009)

Ph.D. scholarship from the Romanian government (2011-2014)

Participated to numerous international symposia and conferences
(US, Germany, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria)

Published a large number of research articles, book reviews, translations and press articles on economics

Book:

The Theory of the Structure of Production, 2nd edition, Liberalis, Iasi, 2021

KEYNES AND HAYEK: COMMONALITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORIES

Abstract

Nearly a century after the renown Keynes-Hayek debate, the two economists are still perceived as diametrically opposed. This is certainly not true in the realm of business cycle theory where for a period of time they both employed the Wicksell inspired savings-investment approach. The publication of Keynes's General Theory obscured these similarities and the IS-LM model disconnected all possible ties between the two cycle theories. However, I argue that Keynes did not succeed in the General Theory to offer a consistent interest rate theory and that his 1937 articles which were meant for further clarification were received even worse than the book itself. If Keynes's more nihilistic variant of the liquidity preference theory would be replaced which Leijohnhufvud's Z theory (i.e., the Treatise plus output modifications), Keynes and the Austrians would still have considerable theoretical points in common in the realm of business fluctuations. The two cycle theories would complement, rather than contradict each other.

Keywords: economic cycles; J. M. Keynes; F. A. Hayek; interest rate theory; liquidity preference; the Wicksell connection.

Introduction

To the economist who is not versed in history of economic thought, Keynes and Hayek are usually perceived as intellectual rivals. While this is certainly true in terms of political views, since one was an unyielding defender of laissez faire capitalism and the other a proponent of heavy state interventionism, the two economists share much more than it is commonly believed when it comes to business cycle theories.¹ Historians of economic thought generally do know better, but even here, the standard interpretation is that Keynes and Hayek *had* some similarities in the early 1930s, when Keynes wrote *A Treatise on Money*. After the publication of the *General Theory*, it is generally claimed that these similarities

disappeared. Moreover, Keynes's infamous 1937 articles are believed to have severed any remaining connection between the two authors regarding business cycle theories. After all, Keynes (1936, p. 121) himself did emphatically state in his magnum opus that he no longer believed that the concept of the natural rate of interest holds any validity anymore.

In the present paper I argue that (1) up to a certain point, there is no essential contradiction between the two economists since their theories apply to different scenarios, (2) Keynes did not manage in fact in the *General Theory* and in the 1937 articles to rid himself of the loanable funds theory (and, implicitly, Wicksell's influence) and (3) if we do not take liquidity preference seriously (as it should not be taken), similarities are still strong. In order to attempt to prove the main theses I will divide the analysis in three time periods. The first will be the early 1930s, which will generally be focused on Keynes's *Treatise* and Hayek's *Prices and Production*, the second will concern itself briefly with highlighting the modifications brought by the *General Theory* and the last will focus on Keynes's 1937 articles.

If the abovementioned claims are true ((1), (2) and (3)) in the realm of business cycle theory, Keynes and Hayek only presented specific scenarios and neither of them put forward a *general theory*.² Their subsequent theories are specific applications of the savings-investment approach.

Section 1 presents the *Treatise* period when the resemblances between the two business cycle theories were strong and rather obvious to the reader. In this sense we will compare the model employed by Keynes in *A Treatise on Money* (1937) with the one used by Hayek in *Prices and Production* (1931). Moreover, we will attempt to represent them graphically on the same diagram and show that rather than contradicting, they complement each other.³

1. The *Treatise* Period

All the present research was made possible by the existence of the works of professor Axel Leijonhufvud, especially "*The Wicksell connection: Variations on a theme*". I personally believe that his aforementioned work is one of the most underrated in modern economics and that its implications are much more far-reaching than originally anticipated. In this working paper, Leijonhufvud (1979) essentially argues there that the Swedish, Austrian and Cambridge schools of thought are united by a

common wicksellian heritage. For all these economists, business cycles were caused by divergences between savings and investments.

What I aim to show in this section is that at the time of the publication of the *Treatise on Money* both Keynes (1930) and Hayek (2008) used the same framework of analysis. Moreover, at this stage no fundamental contradiction could appear between them regarding the business cycle mechanism⁴ since they were referring to different scenarios. I will further briefly analyze both the Keynesian and the Hayekian scenarios, as presented in the original works, and later show they can be incorporated in the same framework.

Hayek (2008) has always considered, following Wicksell, that business cycles are generated when banks cease to be passive intermediaries between investors and savers and start to actively increase credit in an artificial way. This would lead to a situation where the market rate of interest would not correspond anymore with the equilibrium or pure rate of interest. The process would generate inflation and changes in relative prices. Sooner or later entrepreneurs would clash with consumers on the market and spark a squabble over real resources. Real capital would not be sufficient to support all the newly financed investments and some of them would have to be liquidated. Given that capital goods are not homogenous and that they cannot be reallocated without cost, society would clearly be worst off since a part of the country's capital stock would be destroyed in the process. To this day, the Austrian school of thought has not modified its theoretical position in any relevant way.⁵

This is nothing more than a *particular case* when *investment exceeds savings* in the savings-investment framework of analysis. Of course, in a fractional reserve banking system this can only happen if banks (orchestrated most likely by the actions of the central bank) expand credit. The scenario is similar with a standard case of maximum price fixing and it can be graphically represented as depicted in figure 1.




Figure 1. Hayekian Scenario, author's representation

The only difference between this and a standard graphical representation of price fixing is that the on the vertical axis we will have the quantity of *real* savings and respectively investment and on the vertical axis we have the *real* interest rate. In the Hayekian scenario the banking system will impose a monetary interest rate which is below the equilibrium interest rate ($r_0 < r_e$ in the graph). This will determine entrepreneurs to invest $I(r_0)$ while savers will only supply on the market $S(r_0)$. The difference between the two is artificial credit expansion. This situation is of course not compatible with equilibrium so market tendencies will be set in motion in order to correct it. The only way that the new artificially created investment structure can be perpetuated is if the banks continue to progressively decrease the market rate of interest roughly each production period. This status quo is unfeasible because at some point hyperinflation will step-in.⁶

On the other hand, Keynes focuses in the *Treatise* on another scenario, that of *deflation*. For him the situation is reversed. When there is, for whatever reason, a decrease in investment from a superior equilibrium position to an inferior one, like from I' to I , the system would normally respond with a consequent decrease of the equilibrium rate of interest from r' towards r'' .




Figure 2. Keynesian Scenario, author's representation

So far this is nothing more than the application of the savings-investment framework of analysis to a standard case of a decrease in investment. Banks are taken out of the picture in the sense that they abstain from either contracting or expanding credit. But now, in the Keynesian scenario, for whatever reason, financial speculators act against the market tendency. They start selling off their stock of old securities and arrest the movement of the interest rate somewhere around r_0 (Leijonhufvud, 1979, pp. 34-38). They are "hoarders" in the sense that they sell securities for cash, which they hold on to for speculative reasons. r_0 is obviously not an equilibrium position and it can be maintained only until the speculators deplete their old stock of securities. Sooner or later the system must move towards r'' .

If the way in which we presented the two business cycle theories is correct, there is no theoretical discrepancy between them and there need not be, since they refer to different scenarios. Hayek explains what happens when investment exceeds savings because of artificial credit expansion; Keynes explains what happens when the investment goes below savings because speculators are acting against the wishes of entrepreneurs. *Neither is a general theory*. The general theory is the savings-investment framework of analysis. If we would try to represent both scenarios on the same graph, it would look something like figure 3.




Figure 3. Keynesian and Hayekian scenarios in a savings-investment analysis framework, author's representation

Disregarding the many particular complexities of each individual theory,⁷ we could interpret the two scenarios in the following way: if the market interest rate is artificially fixed (by the fractional reserve banking system) above the equilibrium rate society would find itself in a Hayekian scenario and if the market interest rate is fixed below the equilibrium rate (by hoarders) a Keynesian scenario would prevail. Both cases represent disequilibrium models and both lack *direct* automatic equilibrating mechanisms (Laidler, 1999).⁸ However, this does not mean that the models are *incompatible* with economic equilibrium. As we saw above, in both cases pressure adds up on the economic actors who generate the disequilibrium. Hayek's banks are limited in their ability to expand credit by inflationary pressure and it is highly unlikely that they could continue to pursue their actions *ad infinitum*. In the same way, Keynes's speculators will be unable to go against the tide each time by selling securities since their accumulated stock must run out at one point in time.⁹ Austrian and Keynesian scenarios were both in the early 1930s transitory phases. The inconsistent beliefs based on which the economic agents act must converge at a certain point in time because market forces, although not instantaneously, will do their job.

2. The *General Theory* Period

When one argues that Keynesian and Austrian cycle theories *do* have common points and that they *are* relevant, the general reaction is: What about the *General Theory*? Did he not explicitly reject Wicksell and the concept of natural rate of interest? It is of course true that Keynes attempted to introduce a new interest rate theory, but that does not mean that he succeeded in his endeavor or that all his (rather bombastic) claims should be taken at face value.¹⁰ I argue in this second section, following Leijohnhufvud (1979), that liquidity preference theory of interest (in its full nihilistic form) should not be taken seriously and that, in its absence, Keynes's model remains a particular case of the loanable funds framework of analysis. Moreover, the reactions of Keynes's peers to the *General Theory* and to his later 1937 articles further supports this point.¹¹

Keynes himself would of course have objected to the present endeavor, since he considered liquidity preference one of the essential components of the *General Theory*.¹² He also did not make his book easy to read. The *General Theory* was not well received by the intellectual community of its age (Laidler, 1999) and some chapters of it, such as chapters 16 and 17 are particularly obscure. Ironically enough, these are exactly the chapters that describe the nature of capital and interest¹³ and many historians of economic thought consider them as mere detours which can be sacrificed without losing the central message (Hansen, 1953; Blaug, 1985).¹⁴ Keynes's inability to provide a coherent theoretic system in the *General Theory* and his failure to consistently defend his "new" interest rate theory in the 1937 articles are precisely the reasons for which liquidity preference ought to be rejected as the final determinant of the rate of interest and replaced with Leijohnhufvud's "doctrine historical fiction (1979, p. 3) entitled the *Z-theory*,¹⁵ which will be shortly discussed below.

There are, generally accepted, two main differences between the *Treatise* and the *General Theory*: the ability of the economic system to react to a decrease in MEC through an *adjustment in income* (i.e., variable output) and the *liquidity preference theory of interest* (Leijohnhufvud, 1976; Leijohnhufvud, 1979; Blaug, 1985).

Let us for the moment take liquidity preference out of the picture and assume that the *General Theory* would employ the same model as the *Treatise* plus variable output. In this case we would have the same scenario as the one explained above, where the initial point of departure from equilibrium would be when the system is confronted with a decrease

in the marginal efficiency of capital. Essentially, if we would represent it graphically, it would look exactly as figure 2 above. The money rate of interest moves down towards its new natural level, but it is arrested on its trajectory by the action of the speculators who, by selling securities, fix it at a level *above the equilibrium one*. But this time, instead of adjusting through price, the system will adjust by decreasing output and employment. Price adjustments are substituted by quantity adjustments. In this particular scenario the reduction in investment generates a decrease in income and moves the system towards a suboptimal position as compared to its full-employment value.

It is true that society is, so to speak, in the same point where it was in Keynes's *Treatise* scenario. However, the situation there was transitory. Pressure would build up on the ones acting based on inconsistent beliefs (i.e., the speculators) and equilibrium would sooner or later be achieved. The interest rate would eventually drop to its full employment equilibrium level. In the case of the *General Theory* the main difference is that this situation is stable and there is no more pressure on speculators to modify the behavior. The market "clears" at false prices.¹⁶

How exactly did society end up into a stable position with lasting involuntary unemployment? Leijonhufvud (1976, pp. 81-91) explains the process in some depth in his book *On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes*. The first phase of the Keynesian process takes off with a decrease in entrepreneur's expectations and hence the marginal efficiency of capital. They would, as in figure 2, decrease investment while the public would maintain its current level of savings. This would automatically lead to an *excess supply of commodities* coupled with an *excess demand for securities*.¹⁷ The former would be caused by the inability of businesses to sell off their inventories, while the latter would be caused by the fact that in the first phase, the income of households did not yet drop and hence their saving plans are roughly the same. Looking back at figure 2, businessmen would float securities to the point of $I(r_0)$, while households would be willing to buy securities up to $S(r_0)$. The demand for securities is compensated by the actions of the bearish speculators who exchange income earning assets for money, while the excess supply of commodities (and any residual excess demand for money) is swept away through a reduction in output. This would push society in a situation in which all other markets are in equilibrium except the labor market, which would exhibit in this case *excess supply*. Normally, in the classical models the excess supply of labor would put pressure on wages which, if they are

perfectly flexible, would act to absorb the unemployed. This would not happen in the short run Keynesian scenario since (1) wages *do* manifest rigidities and (2) even if they were flexible, the initial decrease in output would open the way for the multiplier to step in and generate a situation in which a decrease in the wage rate would only lead to further *pari passu* decreases in aggregate demand.¹⁸ Cumulative income-constraint processes are common in Keynes's models and they generally are deviation amplifying tendencies (Leijonhufvud, 1976).¹⁹

How would Keynes's model look *with* liquidity preference? Well, things are much more mechanical (and less complex) this time. If savings and investment are identical, there is no need for any type of graphical representation as presented before since no discrepancy could possibly develop between the two magnitudes. The reason for Keynes's premise is that he prefers to refer to observed (i.e. *ex post*) magnitudes and not planned (*ex ante*) ones. If savings and investment are by definition equal, they cannot possibly *determine* the rate of interest, which is now left without a (real) determinant. Productivity and thrift play no role in the formation of interest. The only thing left here is the speculative element, i.e., liquidity preference, which could set a level for the interest rate.²⁰ The causal chain is simple from there: interest determines investment/savings, investment then determines output and output determines the level of employment. As Leijonhufvud correctly points out (1979, p. 44-48), it does not make sense any more to talk about *the correct* level of interest.

Thus, in the *General Theory* model there is no unique natural rate of interest, but a multitude of interest rates, each corresponding to a predefined level of unemployment.²¹ Practically any interest rate is potentially "to high" since a lower one would imply greater investment and a superior employment level. Also, real forces are not ultimate causes in determining the interest rate, since speculators can just fix it at whatever level they agree.²²

3. The post- General Theory Period: The "Infamous" 1937 Articles

It is a known fact that the *General Theory*, which was published in 1936, was not well received by the economic community at the time and there was a lot of confusion regarding what Keynes actually wanted to prove with it (Laidler, 1999), especially regarding the determination of the interest rate.

Some of the most renowned economists, such as Hicks, Ohlin, Robertson or Hawtrey, wrote reviews on the book where they expressed their concerns regarding the different problems raised by Keynes's "radically new" interest rate theory. The British economist felt obliged to reply.

In 1937 Keynes wrote an article entitled *Alternative Theories of the Rate of Interest* which was meant to further elucidate his "liquidity preference theory of interest" and alleviate some of the concerns raised by his peers. In a certain sense, it can be argued that it created even more confusion than before.

In the article mentioned above, Keynes (1937, p. 242) went to great lengths to further differentiate himself from other schools of thought. He rejected the Swedish school's interpretation because he considers that it fell back on the classical position and also discarded Wicksell (again) for "trying to be classical". He wrote (1937, p. 245):

Thus we are completely back again at the classical doctrine which Prof. Ohlin has just repudiated—namely, that the rate of interest is fixed at the level where the supply of credit, in the shape of saving, is equal to the demand for credit, in the shape of investment.

He also contradicts his compatriots, Hicks, Robertson and Hawtrey, who were arguing that his theory is in no sense new, but just an alternative version of the loanable funds theory. Hicks (1936, p. 296), in reviewing Keynes's book, emphatically stated that: "*This looks a most revolutionary doctrine; but it is not, I think, as revolutionary as it seems*". Robertson (1936, p. 183) claimed that:

Ultimately, therefore, it is not as a refutation of a common-sense account of events in terms of supply and demand for loanable funds, but as an alternative version of it, that Mr. Keynes' account as finally developed must be regarded.

Hawtrey (1937) argued that Keynes's definitions of savings and investment are identical and that therefore they can be substituted for each other. Moreover, he even mentioned that identity so established does not prove anything:

The idea that a tendency for saving and investment to become, different has to be counteracted by an expansion or contraction of the total of incomes

is an absurdity; such a tendency cannot strain the economic system; it can only strain Mr. Keynes's vocabulary (Hawtrey, 1937, p. 186)²³.

Keynes found that none of the above-mentioned claims do justice to his theory. The reasons behind this are somewhat ambiguous. He argues that savings and investment are equalized not by the interest rate but through income. This is to a certain point understandable, but as Keynes (1937, p. 250) himself realized, it leaves the interest rate without a determinant. The answer we get in the article is in a way disappointing. Bluntly put, the supply and demand for "hoards" determine the interest rate, but it is unclear what Keynesian hoarding is. The reader's first instinct would be to associate hoarding to that part of saved cash that people are holding at present idle. But Keynes quickly points out, leaving the reader perplex again, that:

Moreover, no amount of anxiety by the public to increase their hoards can affect the amount of hoarding, which depends on the willingness of the banks to acquire (or dispose of) additional assets-beyond what is required to offset changes in the active balances.²⁴

It is true that Keynes (1937a, p. 252) added at the end of his article "*To speak of the "Liquidity-preference Theory" of the Rate of Interest is, indeed, to dignify it too much*", but even so, confusion persists in the article exactly at its core, namely the formation of the interest rate.²⁵

The reaction to Keynes's article was in a sense even worse than the feedback on the *General Theory*. It really has to be read in order to be fully grasped. For instance, Ohlin, Robertson and Hawtrey all wrote rejoinders which were published in *The Economic Journal* under the title *Alternative Theories of the Rate of Interest: Three Rejoinders* in 1937. Among other things, they claimed that Keynes did not understand the difference between ex-ante and ex-post concepts, that he did not understand the classics, that he used bad (and inconsistent) terminology and that he did not manage to differentiate himself from the loanable-funds theory (Ohlin, et al., 1937). Just regarding the last of these claims, Robertson (1937, p. 432) writes: "*Thus I remain of opinion that Mr. Keynes' apparatus and the "loanable funds" apparatus are not "radically opposed to one another" (p. 241), but are alternative pieces of machinery*".

Seeing all these negative reactions, even from his colleagues and friends at Cambridge,²⁶ Keynes came up later that year with another article

entitled *The “ex-ante” Theory of Interest*, which he published in the same journal and which clarified his position on the issue to some extent. He there correctly pointed out that from the moment an entrepreneur *decides* to make an investment to the moment the investment is actually *made*, he needs to be supplied with a stock of cash (or, in more general terms, liquidity). Keynes baptizes this fund “*finance*”. However, he argues that while ex-ante investment is a relevant phenomenon, ex-ante savings is not and, moreover, ex-ante investment *is not* financed by ex-ante savings. He writes (Keynes, 1937, p. 666):

[...] the finance required during the interregnum between the intention to invest and its achievement is mainly supplied by specialists, in particular by the banks, which organise and manage a revolving fund of liquid finance.

So essentially the interest rate is determined by the interplay between the supply of “finance”, i.e., the banks, and the demand for “finance”, which is represented by the need of the public for both active and inactive demand.²⁷ In that case any increase in economic activity, either *planned* or *actual*, must necessarily come about if the *ceteris* are *paribus* at an increase in the rate of interest. He (1937, p. 667) further mentions that this theory is superior to the loanable funds theory since the latter “*remains only half-a-theory, inasmuch as it allows for changes in the supply of money but not for changes in the liquidity-preferences of the lending public*”. So, for Keynes (p. 668): “*in general, the banks hold the key position in the transition from a lower to a higher scale of activity*”. He finishes his article with the bombastic claim that: “*The investment market can become congested through shortage of cash. It can never become congested through shortage of saving. This is the most fundamental of my conclusions within this field*” (ibidem). However, this is most likely just another terminological quibble since one never knows exactly how Keynes defines (or operates with) the notion of “savings”. Serious questions such as whether there is a physical stock of goods to which savings is attached in the long run and whether increasing aggregate demand puts pressure in the present on that available stock are not treated. His reformulation given in this article still focuses only on the monetary side of things and is *still* another variant of the loanable fund theory.²⁸

4. Conclusions

The similarities between Keynesian and Austrian business cycle theories are remarkable in the early 1930s. As section 1 shows, the two theories are neither conflicting, nor generally valid. They are applications of the saving investment framework of analysis to different scenarios. Keynes focuses on the case of deflation, when investment goes below savings, while Hayek focuses on the situation when banks artificially push investment above savings. In this sense, we can say that to a certain extent the two theories complement each other. Even more so, at this stage of their development, both scenarios were transient phases which would sooner or later be corrected by market tendencies.

The publishing of the *General Theory* in 1936 complicated matters substantially and blurred the similarities between the two. If Keynes's liquidity preference theory would be taken at face value, a rather mechanical chain of causation would govern the workings of the economy. Liquidity preference would determine the rate of interest, the rate of interest would determine investment which would further fix output and the level of employment. There would be no natural/real/equilibrium rate of interest and any interest level would be virtually too high, since a lesser level would correspond to lower unemployment. However, as previously argued in section 2, we strongly believe that Keynes's liquidity preference theory should not be taken at face value since it would be retrogressive as compared to the theoretical model presented in the *Treatise*. Instead, we would opt for Leijohnhufvud's "Z theory" of interest, case in which the *General Theory* would be only the *Treatise* plus modifications in output. The main difference between this position and the one presented by Keynes in his earlier book would be that now there is no more systemic pressure placed on speculators to revert their position and the economy is sucked in a rather stable position with persistent unemployment. The workings of the multiplier would be the main culprit for this situation where although the economy does not maximize output, unused resources (especially labor force) still exist.

Keynes himself would not agree with the Z theory and he would of course stress the importance of his liquidity preference theory of interest. However, we consider that the negative reaction of the economic community to the *General Theory* and the feeble attempt put forward by Keynes in 1937 to defend it are arguments which further sustain the idea that his claims should not be taken at face value. The two articles written

in 1937 to clarify his position on the issue of interest were not received any better than the General Theory. One could argue that they were actually received even worse. In this sense, his liquidity preference theory of interest could at best be seen as another variant of the loanable-funds doctrine or at worst as an untidy and partially incoherent piece of economic theory.

These are the reasons for which we consider that an Austrian-Keynesian synthesis in the realm of business cycle theory would be both possible and potentially beneficial and that the glue that could bring them together would be Leijohnhufvud's Wicksell connection. If we would stick to the *Treatise* version of Keynes (or even a variant of the Z-theory with output modifications), Keynesian and Austrian cycle theories could still complement (and not contradict) each other.

ANNEX

Keynes and Hayek in Romanian Economic Thought

A part of the work dedicated to the present research was targeted towards inquiring whether the Keynes-Hayek debate had any sort of repercussions in Romanian economic thought. Given the fact that the main thesis of the article was more or less an exercise in pure economic theory, while the above-mentioned research question calls for a more historically oriented approach, I choose to present these partial findings as an annex. Though the two pieces are obviously connected, the main article is of course self-standing and can be easily read without any reference to the present annex. However, both Romanian historians and economists could find the present section thought provoking, since it lays the foundation for further research that I believe was not yet done systematically in Romania.

Given the fact that most of the works of the world's renown economists have not even been translated into Romanian, it is of course highly unlikely to find such a specific topic as the Keynes-Hayek debate openly treated in a Romanian journal or book. There was an attempt made by the Romanian Academy to start a translation series of great economic books, but it was unfortunately stopped (Aligica, 2002).²⁹ The only option left available would be to see how the works of the two economists were received *in general* in Romania. Because the debate started, as mentioned in the article above, in the early 1930s, it is improbable that any traces of it would have been brought in the country before the beginning of the second world war. Though the Austrian school of thought was not unknown to the economic profession in the country, especially in Transylvania until the end of the first world war, since it was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire,³⁰ we found no direct reference to Hayek until after the communist period.

Because Keynes was the more renown economist at that time and he was also a highly active political figure,³¹ it is in this sense natural to see whether his influence reached in any way the Romanian territory. His *Treatise on Money* (1930), which was a highly technical book, was unfortunately not translated in Romanian. On the other hand, the *General Theory* was, but only as late as 1970.

The preface to this first edition of this Romanian translation, written by L. Stroja, proves to be an invaluable tool in order to gauge the way

in which Keynesianism was received in the country. According to this source, Keynes's technical economics started to be read and analyzed in Romania only in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Stroja, 1970, p. 5). It is actually invigorating to see the huge amount of work that the translator put in order to familiarize himself with the work of the British economist.³² However, given that the country was in full socialist swing, naturally the readings of the *General Theory* took place from Marxist-Leninist positions. This puts the translator in the strange position of viewing Keynes's theory as "western economic policy", with applicability only for the "bourgeois economies" of western Europe and the US (Stroja, 1970, p. 20). He seems to believe that the necessity of state interventionism in the west in the interwar period organically developed in parallel with the development of the socialist economy in the Soviet Union.

At least declaratively, Stroja (1970, p. 22) views Keynes's measures as futile in their effort to change the nature of the capitalist production system, which according to Marxist ideology is of course unsustainable.³³ There is a clear trace of sympathy for Keynes in Stroja's preface, but with a constant tendency to patronize the British economist for his alleged failure in supporting socialism. Stroja (1970, pp. 23-24) acknowledges that the *General Theory* is revolutionary, but he labels it as only "bourgeois revolutionary" and claims that Keynes only represented the interest of his class, i.e., the highly educated bourgeoisie. He even asks at the end of his preface why even after implementing all the interventionist measures prescribed by Keynes, the "ugly traits of capitalism" such as inequality or unemployment were not banished forever from the west.³⁴

While it is true that the impact of western economists was small in Romania before 1989, even in the case of Keynes who was extremely fashionable, it was not inexistent. Take for instance the case of the applied mathematician E. Balas, who attempted a Keynesian – Marxist-Leninist synthesis in 1957 (and who unfortunately lost his job after publishing his book and was accused of being a bourgeoisie revisionist (Benvenuti, 2013)). There are also claims that M. Manoilescu, probably Romania's most renown economist, was a proto-Keynesian, but these are, if not exaggerated, at least insufficiently documented in my opinion.³⁵

Even at present, the impact of the works of Keynes in Romania is somewhat ambiguous. To quote one researcher:

translations are generally used by the large public [...] or by the students who study Economics [...] yet the researchers, who, most of them, are

actually familiar with several foreign languages, make use – more often than not – of materials written abroad [...]. It is for this very reason that we cannot really talk about an impact of the translation of certain works, such as the work of Keynes, on the Romanian economy (Adam & Iacob, 2013, p. 1).³⁶

This is indeed true. While many, probably most, economists in key positions in Romania and eastern Europe do draw on Keynesian principles, it is highly questionable how many of them are actually hardcore Keynesians on a theoretical level.

Given his stark liberal views, Hayek only managed to permeate Romanian economic thought after 1989. Given the level of censorship in the country, especially within the economics profession, which was characterized by complete Marxist-Leninist dogmatism (Aligica, 2002), this is of course nothing to wonder at. The first Romanian translations of *The Road to Serfdom* and *The Constitution of Liberty* came only in 1993 and respectively 1998. The first translation of *Prices and Production*, one of Hayek's renown technical books, was done as late as 2017, thanks to the efforts of prof. G. Mursa and the Hayek Institute Romania.

Hayek and the Austrian school had many followers in post-communist Romania. The ideas had a great impact in academic circles and even some impact on public policy (Aligica, 2002; Cerna, 2012). However, a direct and well-structured clash between Hayekian and Keynesian ideas in Romania, as far as this research goes, never actually took place.

NOTES

- ¹ Keynes's political orientation is a subject of eternal debate. While Skidelsky (1994) pictures him as a liberal who intended to "save" capitalism, a recent article by Fuller (2019) convincingly argues that Keynes was in fact a full-blown non-Marxist socialist.
- ² This is particularly ironic given the fact that Keynes insisted that his magnum opus be named in this way.
- ³ The present work also includes an annex which explores the way in which the Keynes-Hayek debate was perceived in Romania. Given that this is not a theoretical contribution to the debate *per se*, I chose to present it as a self-standing annex.
- ⁴ Excluding here of course the controversy regarding which scenario is more relevant for real life situations. This is however an empirical question and is therefore outside the scope of our present research.
- ⁵ Among others, see for example Mises (1949), Rothbard (2009), De Soto (2020) and Thornton (2018).
- ⁶ Progressive artificial credit expansion will be efficient only if it is unexpected. If individuals will anticipate a future decrease in the purchasing power of the monetary unit, they will increase their current purchases and further devalue the currency. Such a panic would quickly cause the breakdown of the monetary system. Austrian writings vividly describe such scenarios, see for instance Mises (1949) and Rothbard (2009; 2010).
- ⁷ And I do not argue that additional (more complex) premises do not exist for each author, but I do believe that the present approach can prove to be fruitful in emphasizing the common core principles.
- ⁸ Empirical analysis could further guide us to see which scenario would be more relevant to a particular situation.
- ⁹ There are many reasons for which, at this stage, Hayek's theory is superior in the sense that the Hayekian scenario is much more probable to occur than the Keynesian one. In our current economic settings, banks have a huge capacity to artificially expand the money supply with very few checks imposed (basically, hyperinflation would be the only serious deterrent). Moreover, the central bank, if its management desires, can potentially back up the inflationary tendency of banks for a considerable period of time. Keynesian speculators are, on the other hand, highly limited in their capacity to go against the market. Sooner or later (and it is perhaps decent for us to assume sooner rather than later) they will run out of old securities that they can sell on the market. Their capacity to drive the interest rate away from its natural level is not institutionalized as compared to the banking system.
- ¹⁰ Including here, of course, his renowned paragraph where he stated that he had rid himself of Wickell's influence (Keynes, 1936, p. 121): "*I am now no longer of the opinion that the concept of a 'natural' rate of interest, which*

previously seemed to me a most promising idea, has anything very useful or significant to contribute to our analysis”.

¹¹ See Hicks (1936), Robertson (1936) and Hawtrey (1937).

¹² For Keynes the four key theoretical ingredients of the *General Theory* were *effective demand*, the *marginal efficiency of capital*, the *propensity to consume* and *liquidity preference* (Moggridge, 1973). It is obvious that he held the last of them in high regard. But if we would take, as Keynes does, savings and investment to be identical, liquidity preference would bear the full burden of determining the interest rate (even in the long run). In that case we would be left with an infinite amount of interest rates, each corresponding to a level of employment and none of them being the “natural” one. Moreover, there would be no tendency in the market process to push towards full employment and equilibrium in the classic sense (not Keynesian unemployment equilibrium!). In this case, the interest rate is practically what speculators decide it to be.

¹³ See chapter 16 *Sundry observations on the nature of capital* and chapter 17 *The essential properties of interest and money* in Keynes (1936)

¹⁴ Even more interesting, Keynes himself appears to hold the same belief (Moggridge, 1973).

¹⁵ There is here one notable exception, namely T. Goodspeed (2012). He claims in his book that the *General Theory* is still a Wicksellian variant *even with* liquidity preference. Even more unexpected is the fact that he attempts to use chapters 16 and 17 as the foundations for his claim, since he considers them relevant and attributes Keynes’s bad response to the critics of the *General Theory* to the ill health of the British economist’s last years of life (Goodspeed, 2012, p. 105). However, I am unable to see how exactly does his theoretical development add in any way to the analysis made by Leijohnhufvud in *The Wicksell Connection*, from which he clearly draws on. As far as I could understand there are only a few places in his 4.3 Chapter entitled *The cumulative process* where he diverges from Leijohnhufvud. One of them is: “*The multiplier, however, can only come into play if, and only if, relative money prices fail to adjust with sufficient speed. This is, in fact, precisely why it is valid to say that The General Theory still functions within the Wicksellian natural rate framework*” (Goodspeed, 2012, p. 121). But this is necessarily true given that the cycle theory is an analysis of a disequilibrium process. If relative prices would automatically adjust, society would be in equilibrium and no cycle theory of the kind described in the *General Theory* (or *Prices and Production* for that matter) would ever take place.

The second one is “*Certainly, once the multiplier gets a foot in the door, it is possible to conceive of multiple natural rates corresponding to different levels of employment. But there is still a natural rate associated with full employment [...] The key question—and this is where Keynes makes*

a decisive break from Wickcell—is whether that rate has any attractive durability once the market rate departs from it (Goodspeed, 2012, p. 124). But if this means what I understand, i.e., that there is an infinite number of “natural interest rates” (one for each employment position), and that there are no market forces which push towards the “natural interest rate with full employment”, isn’t this exactly the theoretical nihilism which Leijohnhufvud associates with Keynes’s liquidity preference theory of interest and the very reason that he rejects it?

I believe the readers of the above-mentioned chapter 4 of Goodspeed’s book may find the ending rather unclimactic when the author claims that (p. 125-126) *“Leijohnhufvud suggests that any theory incorporating liquidity preference “will attach a probability of zero” to a successful traverse from one full-employment growth path to another, “for the simple reason that the only price mechanism that might do it never gets into play to coordinate saving and investment decisions”*. Based upon our analysis of chapter 17, this conclusion is not entirely accurate; the probability *may be slight, but it is non-trivial*. In a certain sense, the paragraph can be interpreted as *it is not impossible* for the market rate of interest to land on its full employment value. I do not believe Leijohnhufvud would have a problem with such a statement.

16 There is probably no need to go further with the descriptive part of the process since it is presented at length in Leijohnhufvud (1979) under the name *“the Z-theory”*.

17 In Leijohnhufvud’s model an increase in savings manifests itself as an excess demand for securities. Households save by purchasing the securities floated by the business sector. (Any hoarding on behalf of the population is swept away. As I understand, only “speculators” may hoard and implicitly decrease the velocity of money.

18 To the question regarding why exactly doesn’t the system smoothly accommodate an excess supply of labor like in the classical model Leijohnhufvud (1976, pp. 89-90) writes: *“Clearly, because in that system all exchanges involve money on one side of the transaction. The workers looking for jobs ask for money, not for commodities. Their notional demand for commodities is not communicated to producers; not being able to perceive this potential demand for their products, producers will not be willing to absorb the excess supply of labor at a wage corresponding to the real wage that would “solve” the Walrasian problem above. The fact that there exists a potential barter bargain of goods for labor services that would be mutually agreeable to producers as a group and labor as a group is irrelevant to the motion of the system”*.

19 For a more detailed exposition regarding the concept of deviation amplifying tendencies and the so called “corridor hypothesis” see Leijohnhufvud (1976; 2009). The basic idea put forward by the author is that the market is generally

on a full-employment path to equilibrium. If the system is exposed to some external shock and it is displaced from its trajectory, but within some reasonable range from it, the market forces will push it relatively smoothly back on track. If the deviation is outside of the said range, the market forces are weak, sluggish and multiplier repercussions kick in. Shocks which push the market outside range will even be endogenously amplified, hence the term *deviation-amplifying tendencies*. Leijonhufvud's (1976) claim is that both the idea that the market tends smoothly and instantaneously towards equilibrium and, on the other hand, that the market does not tend towards equilibrium *at all* are essentially opposing *ideologies* and that the corridor hypothesis would be a possible alternative to them.

20 The easiest way to interpret Keynes's model from the *General Theory* is to follow Hawtrey (1937) and state that the money mass would be split in two categories, the money necessary for active circulation and the money necessary for speculative reasons. Interest rate would be formed in the latter money sphere based on liquidity preference.

21 *The General Theory* is also the reason for which I previously claimed in another article that the Keynes-Hayek debate, in the way it is usually presented, does not have an *a priori* solution, see Patruți (2018). If one takes liquidity preference theory seriously, as in the case of the *General Theory*, no tendency towards equilibrium can develop. This is of course incompatible with the Hayekian framework of analysis which focuses precisely on the coordinating role which prices play in an economy. Moreover, this conclusion is reinforced by the fact that for a considerable period of his life, Hayek was an adept of strong *a priori* tendencies towards equilibrium, as I explained in the aforementioned article. Further empirical research on the issue would be required in order to argue which of the two ideologies is more relevant for the present state of affairs.

22 Leijonhufvud (1979, p. 4) goes as far as claiming (and his position is actually sensible) that "*Keynes 'obfuscated' the workings of the interest rate to such a degree with his theoretical endeavor that later Keynesians completely lost track of the saving-investment framework of analysis*".

23 Hawtrey makes one of the best attempts in my opinion to elucidate the tangled web of Keynes's work. He points out that for Keynes the money supply can be divided into two parts, M1 and M2. M1 is required for the actual working of the economy and M2 for what Keynes called the *speculative motive*. Hawtrey goes on to argue that *active* and *passive balances* would have been better terms for these two categories. It is on the latter market, the one for idle balances (M2), where the interest rate is formed based on liquidity preference. Thus, the interest rate further determines the level of investment (and consequently savings) and investment goes on to determine income through the multiplier effect (and consequently employment if the wage level is more or less fixed).

However, Keynes mentions at the end of the article that this is *not* what he claims. "There is a deep-seated obsession associating idle balances, not with the action of the banks in fixing the supply of cash nor with the attitude of the public towards the comparative attractions of cash and of other assets, but with some aspect of current savings. Even so careful and candid a reader of my recent book as Mr. Hawtrey begins his discussion of it (*in spite of my repeated explanations that this is not what I say*) [emphasis added]" (Keynes, 1937, p. 251).

24 This is in my personal opinion an example of a bad violation of the *ceteris paribus* clause. I understand the need of a dynamic theory, but the above-mentioned claim is just dazzling. Of course that in a fractional reserve banking system where (commercial) banks can create money the system can offset increased demand for hoarding from the population. But if we formulate the problem like this, we have two factors simultaneously influencing the same magnitude in different directions.

25 Goodspeed (2012) argues in his book that the bad defense put up by Keynes was a consequence of the ill health of the British economist.

26 Let us not forget that for example Ralph Hawtrey was a personal friend of Keynes and also a member of the same intellectual society at Cambridge, "the apostles".

27 Keynes appears to the present researcher to go back and forth on the issue of whether the demand for active balances is relevant or not for the formation of the interest rate. After reading the *General Theory*, the reader gets the impression that only inactive balances, i.e., hoards, are relevant for the determination of the interest rate. This is also the opinion of Hawtrey (1937, p. 166). However, in the article cited above Keynes explicitly mentions that active balances *are* relevant in the formation of the interest rate, although unclear in exactly what way. If more details would have here been given, a relatively structured comparison between Keynesian liquidity preference and Austrian time preference could have been made.

The role played by the general public with regard to hoarding is also unclear to the present author. If only "specialists" determine the relationship between investment and hoarding, do consumers actually play any role if they decide to postpone consumption?

28 It is interesting to note that in some cases Keynes (p. 668) belabors the obvious. For instance, he repeatedly emphasized that "*completed activity, whether the proceeds of it are invested or consumed, is selfliquidating and makes no further net demands on the supply of liquid resources*". This is of course true. Hayek would not disagree with this. But in myriad cases Hayek and the Austrians have stressed the fact that it is precisely *unfinished* production that causes trouble and transforms into "malinvestment", because consumers pull the resources away from these industries towards the ones closer to consumption.

- ²⁹ The only authors who got translated were A. Smith, D. Ricardo, F. List and, fortunately, Keynes. However, the impact of western economics in Romania was unsurprisingly small (Aligica, 2002).
- ³⁰ In order to see references regarding the Austrian School in economic thought in Transylvania before 1918 see Valeanu et al (1981). However these annotations refer to rather well-known Austrian figures at that time, such as Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (who also served as the Minister of Finance for the Empire) or Carl Menger and his marginalist revolution in economics.
- ³¹ Let us not forget that his book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919) was a resounding success throughout Europe. Keynes argued there that the measures imposed on the losing countries after the first world war, especially Germany, were exaggerated and that they would drive these countries to desperate actions. This book was translated in Romanian under the heading "*Urmările economice ale păcii*" as early as 1921.
- ³² There is even a reference to Keynes's *Treatise* and to the disequilibrium between savings and investment. Stroja (p. 18) writes: "*In December 1930 A Treatise on Money appeared, a work in two volumes which is considered the most academic and scientific of Keynes's writings, a work of professorial attire, with no polemical attacks, but also without relevant innovations as compared to the authors previous statements. [...] However, the problem of the relationship between investments and savings appears, treated in line with the overall body of the work [...] Historians tend to believe that the impact of this book was undeservedly low [...]*" [own translation]. Although explicitly pointing this out, when talking about the *General Theory* Stroja unfortunately does not mention anything regarding saving and investment, which reinforces our above statement that the theoretical makeover made by Keynes in the *General Theory* completely obscured the Wicksellian theme.
- ³³ In the same note, Stroja (1970, pp. 22-23) criticizes Keynes's attack on Marxist theory, claiming that Keynes was not even familiar with the writings of Marx. This is most probably true, since numerous renown economists have often criticized Keynes for the fact that he had read pretty much nothing else except Cambridge and Marshallian economics, see for instance Samuelson (1970) or Hayek (Rosten, 1975).
- ³⁴ The rest of the preface is unfortunately for us rather unusable. Stroja (1970, 24-33) oddly chooses to talk about the dispute between neo-Keynesians and monetarists, instead of actually discussing the *General Theory*. I believe this is somewhat explicable by the fact that most of the world's non-Marxist economists were in the 1970s Keynesians, but monetarism was rising fast as the new dominant economic doctrine. The Marxist-Leninist training of the Romanian economists at that time did not permit them to contribute productively to the discussion, transforming them at best into skeptical observers. This would justify Stroja's claim regarding the fact that Keynesian measures essentially only prolonged the agony of capitalism while the rise

of monetarism could be seen only as “a re-emergence of nostalgia typical in general to economic liberalism in the conditions of monopoly capitalism [own translation] (Stroja; 1970, p. 31)”.

35 See for example Enache (2019) who calls Manoilescu the “Keynes of the poor”. He writes “Although the connection is rarely made, his theory shares more in common with that of John Maynard Keynes than with previous protectionist thought” (Enache, 2019). The author argues that both Keynes and Manoilescu dealt with the problem of *unused resources*, albeit in different circumstances. Moreover, he further claims that Manoilescu dealt with trade because agrarian exports from Romania to the industrialized west were necessary for monetary stability. In Enache’s (2019) view, Manoilescu’s import substitution scheme had a considerable monetary component, fact which would bring him considerably closer to Keynes.

36 The same author, goes on stating that: “What we can really analyze is the impact of Keynes’ theories on the Romanian economy, and in this paper we will focus on the impact of Keynes’s ideas on the Romanian economy, highlighted for *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*”. However, if I have understood correctly, the work only points out towards the role of nominal (and real?) rigidities in current macroeconomics and mentions that these are inspired from the *General Theory*.

Bibliography

- ADAM, A. & IACOB, S. E., *The impact of the translations of Keynes' works on the Romanian economy*, Pisa, EET, 2013
- ALIGICA, P., *Economics - Romania*, Berlin, Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 152-167, 2002
- BENVENUTI, C., *The impact of the translation of Keynes' work on the Romanian economic thought*, Pisa, EET, 2013
- BLAUG, M., *Economic Theory in Retrospect*, 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- CERNA, S., Gandirea Economica Romaneasca in Perioada Post-Comunista, *Revista OEconomica*, Issue 2, 2012
- FULLER, E. W., Was Keynes a socialist?, *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 43(6), p. 1653–1682, 2019
- GOODSPEED, T., *Rethinking the Keynesian Revolution*, New York: Oxford, 2012
- HANSEN, A. H., *A Guide to Keynes*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1953
- HAWTREY, R. G., *Capital and employment*, London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1937
- HAYEK, F. A. von, *Prices and Production and Other Works*, Auburn:Alabama: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008
- HAYEK, F. A. von, *Drumul către servitute*. Bucharest: Humanitas, 1993
- HAYEK, F. A. von, *Constituția libertății*. Iași: Institutul European Iași, 1998
- HICKS, J. R., Keynes' Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. *The Economic Journal*, 46(182), p. 238–253, 1936
- KEYNES, J. M., *Urmările Economice ale pacii*. Bucharest: Viata Romaneasca, 1921
- KEYNES, J. M., *A Treatise on Money*. London: Macmillan and Co., 1930
- KEYNES, J. M., *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, London: Macmilan, 1936
- KEYNES, J. M., Alternative Theories of the Rate of Interest, *The Economic Journal*, 47(186), pp. 241-252, 1937
- KEYNES, J. M., The "Ex-Ante" Theory of the Rate of Interest, *The Economic Journal*, 47(188), pp. 663-669, 1937
- KEYNES, J. M., *Teoria generala a folosirii mainii de lucru, a dobanzii si a banilor*, Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica, 1970
- LAIDLER, D., *Fabricating the Keynesian Revolution: Studies of the Inter-war Literature on Money, the Cycle, and Unemployment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999
- LEIJONHUFVUD, A., Effective Demand Failures, *The Swedish Journal of Economics*, 75(1), pp. 27-48, 1973
- LEIJONHUFVUD, A., *On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes*, 6th ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1976

- LEIJONHUFVUD, A., *The Wicksell Connection: Variations on a Theme*, Working Paper #165 ed. Los Angeles: UCLA, Department of economics, 1979
- LEIJONHUFVUD, A., Limits to the equilibrating capabilities of market systems, *Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination*, p. 173–182, 2009
- MISES, L. von, *Human Action: A Treatise on Economics*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949
- MOGGRIDGE, J. D., *Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, London: Macmillan, 1973
- OHLIN, B., ROBERTSON, D. H. & HAWTREY, R. G., Alternative Theories of the Rate of Interest: Three Rejoinders, *The Economic Journal*, 47(187), pp. 423-443, 1937
- PATRUTI, A., Why the Keynes-Hayek Macro Debate Cannot be won by either Side, *History of Economic Thought and Policy*, Issue 2, pp. 113-125, 2018
- ROBERTSON, D. H., Some Notes on Mr. Keynes' General Theory of Employment, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 51(1), pp. 168-191, 1936
- ROSTEN, L., *Types of Mind - Encounter (Part II)* [Interview] (September 1975), 1975
- ROTHBARD, M. N., *Man, Economy and State with Power and Market*, The Second Edition ed. Auburn: Alabama: The Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2009
- ROTHBARD, M. N., *What Has Government Done to Our Money?*, Auburn: Alabama: Mises Institute, 2010
- SAMUELSON, P. A., *The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul Samuelson, Vol. 2 Second Edition*, Second edition ed. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1970
- SKIDELSKY, R., *John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Savior, 1920-1937*, New York: Viking, 1994
- SOTO, J. H. de, *Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles*, 4th ed. Auburn: Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2020
- STROJA, L., Foreword. In: Keynes, J. M. *Teoria generala a folosirii mainii de lucru, a dobanzii si a banilor*, Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica, 1970
- THORNTON, M., *The Skyscraper Curse: And How Austrian Economists Predicted Every Major Economic Crisis of the Last Century*, Auburn, Alabama: Mises Institute, 2018
- VALEANU, I. N., IONESCU, T. & PRINCZES, I., *Gindirea Economica din Transilvania (1784-1918)*. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1981
- WICKSELL, K., *Interest and Prices*, New York: Sentry Press, 1989



BOGDAN POPA

Born in 1978, in Romania

Ph.D., Faculty of History, University of Bucharest (2009)

Thesis: *Physical Education, Sport, and Society in Interwar Romania*

Researcher, Nicolae Iorga Institute of History, Romanian Academy, Bucharest

Grant

CNCSIS-UEFISCDI Grant, „Baze de date istorice. Proiectarea, gestionarea și analiza statistică a unei baze de date privind călătoriile străini care au străbătut spațiul românesc în secolul al XIX-lea” [Historical databases. Design, management, and statistical analysis of a database regarding the foreign travelers in the Romanian lands during the 19th century], Nicolae Iorga Institute (2009-2011)

Participation to conferences in Germany, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, Great Britain, Romania

Books

Educație fizică, sport și societate în România interbelică [Physical education, sport, and society in interwar Romania], Cluj-Napoca, Eikon, 2013

Comerțul cu carte în România. Proiect național și proiect economic (a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea — începutul secolului al XX-lea) [The book trade in Romania. National project and economic project (second half of the 19th century – the beginning of the 20th century)], Cluj-Napoca, Academia Română, Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2015

PATHWAYS OF KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE: THE DISSEMINATION OF ROMANIAN PUBLICATIONS IN EUROPE (SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY - UNTIL THE FIRST WORLD WAR)

Abstract

In this article, I explore the ways and means publications written and printed in Romania were circulated abroad, mainly in Europe. I aim to identify, analyze and contextualize the transnational networks of individuals, learned societies, and commercial companies involved in this process, by looking at gifts, purchases, and exchanges. My thesis is that the study of these networks is a test of the actual depth of the modernizing process, as it reveals both the ability to connect to the actual transnational, not short of capitalistic, trade flows, as well as the individual relations between scholars.

Keywords: Book Trade; Transnational Networks; Scholar Networks; Learned Societies; Modernization in Romania

In the summer of 1879, Alexandru Socec (1859-1928) wrote in his private diary that he repelled becoming a tradesman. The young man decided not to follow in the footsteps of his father, the most important Romanian bookseller and publisher of the 19th century, Ioan V. Socec (1830-1896). Instead, Alexandru Socec decided to study law in Paris, only to settle later for a military career. The publishing house, the printing press, the bookstore and the other family affairs were to be inherited by his younger siblings. The esteemed father's personal and political networks proved essential in all these choices. Even so, the diary of Alexandru Socec is an important source for the history of Romanian book trade. As presumptive heir, he was sent to study in Leipzig and Paris. There

Alexandru Socec met several publishers, booksellers, or commissioners. Too young to care, or to bother, with the actual flows of the transnational book trade, Alexandru Socec sometimes mentioned only names, without revealing business details. One exception occurred in 1879. A certain Mr. Marechal, from Hachette & Cie., who at some point in the past had travelled for business to Bucharest, asked Alexandru Socec for a list of Romanian writers. Not a translation and publication offer were in hand, but the intention to send bookstore catalogues directly to interested buyers.¹

Mr. Marechal was following an established business pattern. The idea to directly approach fellow publishers and booksellers from all over Europe occurred to Michel Lévy (1821-1875). In 1847, Lévy travelled through France and then crossed Europe from West to East, and back. His aim was to negotiate in person and in different centers the direct sale of the titles published by the Paris-based house he had founded together with brothers, Calmann Lévy and Nathan Lévy. Bucharest was part of this long journey. Michel Lévy was apparently in touch with a fellow French tradesman, but the only indication given was the name Jules. Given the scarcity of the business correspondence kept during this journey, it is difficult to say precisely who were the probable partners among the few booksellers active in Bucharest. There was a good reason for such a long and difficult business trip: to eliminate the mediation of the German commissioners of book trade from Leipzig, Frankfurt/Main, and Vienna.²

There were nevertheless major differences between the Bucharest of 1847 and that of 1879. By 1847, Bucharest was the capital of Wallachia, a principality under Ottoman indirect rule and Russian protectorate. In 1879, Bucharest was the capital of the united (in 1859 with neighboring Moldova) and independent (1877-1878) Romania. Two years later, the Kingdom of Romania was proclaimed. These political changes owed much to the cultural transformations. The 19th century is generally acknowledged by the Romanian historical writing as an era of modernization. Cultural, political, educational, economic, social, socialite, literary and scientific patterns, either inspired, or simply copied from the Western and Central Europe, were essential for this conscious process, however imperfect.³ Co-ordinated and individual efforts were made in order to close first the literary, later also the scientific gaps, between Romania and Western Europe. This was nothing short of a national project, as unprecedented political measures, cultural activities, and scientific research aimed for structural changes in the society.

The prevalence of the Western culture in Romania during the 19th century was generally studied as a 'one-way road'. This is difficult to contradict. A major change occurred in the public role of thinkers. During the 17th and 18th centuries they were characterized by solitude.⁴ Only during the 1820-1830s, arguing the need to reform and change the society became a public debate. Historians Elena Siupiur, Andrei Pippidi, Alex Drace-Francis, and Lucian Boia argued that Western trained intellectuals were an important part of the political and cultural establishment, thus defining the structure and the actions of the Romanian elite on the long term. After earning a diploma or simply attending lectures at Western universities, intellectuals usually returned home and became part of broader elites, as demonstrated by Elena Siupiur. The cultural and political role the intellectuals equaled the economic force of the middle class in the process of nation building, argued Andrei Pippidi. Lucian Boia calculated the ratio of the new chairs created at the universities of Bucharest (established 1864) and Iași (1862) for the holder of doctor diplomas earned in France or Germany. Alex Drace-Francis discussed the role of the publishers and booksellers, and also challenged the idea that intellectuals were major decision-takers, despite being part of the political establishment.⁵ The Romanian society was in a changing process even before the 1859 Union. The economic changes were reflected by transformations in the entire tissue of the society, demonstrated Constanța Vintilă.⁶

Book trade developed against this background of emerging modernity. From a political point of view, the decade between 1856 (Treaty of Paris, which paved the way for the 1859 Union) and 1866 (coup removal of elected prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza and enthronement of a foreign dynasty, later that year of a modern, daring, however equivocal Constitution) was pivotal in the making of the modern state. Coincidentally, the first Romanian modern publishing houses were founded around 1856-1859. They were established by general tradesmen who found a niche in the professional bookselling and must be understood as part of a capitalistic business model. This included book trade, publishing, printing, sale of stationery, and of other wares (toys, music instruments, fashion items, wines). Such beginnings were not particular to the Romanian case.⁷ These capitalistic entrepreneurs were formally called "bookseller-publishers" (*librari-editori*) by their contemporaries. The term mimicked the French concept, at the same time pointing out towards the fact that very few booksellers were economically strong enough to venture as publishers

as well. Uncoincidentally, in the few months between the dethronement of Alexandru Ioan Cuza (11 February 1866) and the arrival of the foreign prince Carol I (10 May 1866), an Academic Society was formed. This became the Romanian Academy of Sciences in 1879. One defining feature of the Academy was that its ranks were open to ethnic Romanians from all the territories, including those under Austrian (later Austro-Hungarian), Russian, or Ottoman rule.

Aims, Sources, Thesis, and a Caveat

Intellectuals, booksellers-publishers, and the Romanian Academy of Sciences are important actors in the study of the 'pathways of knowledge exchange', in other words of the establishment, growth, and entanglement of the networks dealing with the dissemination of Romanian publications abroad. In this study, I aim to understand *if* and *how* books, journals, and scientific bulletins published in Romania were circulated abroad, particularly in Europe. In order to do so, I shall analyze the transnational networks of individuals with an academic background, learned societies (in this case, the Romanian Academy of Sciences), and professional booksellers involved in this process. My approach leaves deliberately outside the boundaries of this study the translations, government propaganda (increasingly active during the First World War), as well as the books published by Romanians abroad. As horrendous as it may be, scientific or literary merits are marginal for this research. Several names of authors and works must be mentioned, yet I shall discuss neither their 'perennial' value, nor the sometimes out-of-places reviews or private opinions expressed by contemporary peers. For this research, the central point of interest is the circulation of publications itself, by means of trade, exchange, or gift. The strategies of the authors and institutions, the subsequent role of the booksellers, publishers, and commissioners in connection to, or creation of new, transnational networks of book trade must be taken into account. The coherence or ineffectiveness of such strategies answers the question of the real capacity of Romanian authors and institutions to make their works known abroad. This also raises a different problem. Written in Romania and in the mother tongue, many publications had, apparently, a restricted public.

The major source for my contribution is the large correspondence available from the second half of the 19th century. The letters exchanged

between academics across Europe provide valuable insights into the circulation of books. The growth of institutional libraries through formalized exchanges is another issue to consider. In this respect, the administrative proceedings of the Romanian Academy of Sciences are very useful. Different archive materials complete the broader image of the international dimension of the book circulation.

My thesis is that, by looking at the dissemination of publications abroad, one gains a better understanding of the actual position of the Romanian culture and intellectual life within the European frameworks. I challenge the deep-rooted idea of the 'unknown or misunderstood Romania' by analyzing the capacity of intellectuals, institutions, and capitalistic entrepreneurs to connect and act within the transnational networks of the book trade. Being able to produce and export knowledge and thus enter into the exchange of ideas defines the depth of the modernization process. Therefore, one better understands the deep and the shallow changes brought upon by the mental, economic, and political process rightfully, however conventionally, defined as 'modernization'. The caveat of this approach is not to be understood as a nationalistic reaction to the modernization as westernization, a phenomenon which must be neither denied, nor minimized.

A word on political geography and one on chronology are also necessary. As mentioned before, the Romanian state emerged in 1859. Subjected to different legislations, the publishing houses and learned societies from the territories united with Romania in 1918 must be considered, as I shall argue below, as part of different other national markets.

Transnational Book Trade and the Difficulties of its Romanian Connections

The exchange of ideas, critique, counter-critique, praise or mockery, was crucial in the rise of the Republic of Letters. Book trade, with its almost inbuilt transnational networks of professional sellers and buyers was perhaps less ostentatious, yet equally important.⁸ Robert Darnton described this elaborated "communications circuit" for the 18th century, but his suggested method may be well extrapolated to the next centuries as well.⁹ Further research has emphasized the transnational dimension of the book trade, citing the influential work of Benedict Anderson in the understanding of "print capitalism".¹⁰ Gary D. Stark defined the booksellers and

publishers as “cultural entrepreneurs”, a vital category for the circulation of ideas.¹¹ The “network approach”, with “imprint evidence” as a tool, was employed as the most suitable analytical method, considered John Hinks.¹² Foremost for those book traders doing business in the economic peripheries, connecting to the already existing networks was a safe way to increase the chances of survival and success.¹³ In order to understand whether Romanian publications were part of transnational book trade, the both the study of personal, commercial, and institutional networks, as well as the “imprint evidence” are central. Romanian book trade and book dissemination were, when this aspect is taken into consideration, more dependent on the foreign contacts established by authors, than their inspiration or work capacity.

There is, I reckon, another important point. The book trade of the 19th century must be seen as part of the different national economies and markets. As a consequence, the production and circulation of books and other publications were subjected to uneven economic fluctuations¹⁴ and state regulations, including here different forms of censorship.¹⁵ During a century defined by ideologically self-centered nation states, book trade had to overcome the harsh rules of both economic protectionism and censorship. For such reasons, Romanian book trade should be researched by taking the political borders of the modern state, from 1859 and until the First World War into account. Buying or selling paper or books in the Austro-Hungarian territories from the so-called ‘Old Kingdom’ was subjected to strong and at times conflictual bilateral trade regulations.

Book trade was generally characterized by several common aspects. Already during the previous century, the interest for reading, either for pleasure, or for the improvement of professional skills, was on the rise, co-existing with high rates of illiteracy. Isolated individuals and reading societies¹⁶ alike were in search of new books and topics. Important progress was made in the technology of printing, with cheaper paper, the steam press¹⁷ and the lithography¹⁸ among the breakthrough innovations. The construction of railways and the interconnectivity between regions and states meant faster transportation between different centers of the book trade. At the same time, train travel gave individuals a certain amount of time to be spent reading.¹⁹ Less obvious for the general public, but of the highest interest in the academic milieu, scientific journals started to increase in number, importance as a communication tool between academics, and ultimately as a profitable investment for specialized booksellers and commissioners.²⁰ Since the middle of the century,

international copyright agreements and subsequent national regulations started to govern the global book market.²¹

A significant characteristic of the book trade was the rise of the business model based on the commission (*Kommissionsbuchhandel*). The main center was Leipzig, joined by Vienna and Frankfurt/Main on a smaller, yet as much effective position. This type of trade, with a (sometimes highly specialized) commissioner as an intermediary between a publisher anywhere in Germany, later all over Europe, and a bookseller akin overcame the hard borders faced by commerce. According to Thomas Keiderling, by the end of the 19th century 95% of the German book trade was handled by the Leipzig commissioners.²²

Researchers have pointed out toward the speed with which the above-mentioned features generalized. Wallachia and Moldova, later Romania, were not an exception. From the few printing presses, both religious and civil, and hard to grasp bookbinders of the early 19th century, one may certainly notice the establishment of bookstores from Bucharest and Jassy. German or Swiss emigres were among the first to uncover a new potential market in a society at the dawn of its modernization as Westernization. Importing books was, in the beginning, more important than publishing new titles. The few booksellers active in the Romanian Principalities during the 1840s were relying on the import of French literature, regardless if this was published in Paris or Brussels. The number of bookstores grew despite the impact of economic crises. Passed in order to control the freedom of the word, the 1862 Law of the Press, an adapted version of the French revolutionary act from 1793, set up the rules for the relation between authors of all kinds and their publishers, by regulating the so-called "literary proprietorship", e. g. the copyrights. Authors used to sell these rights for better or smaller fees (depending on name, previous success, and the generosity of the bookseller-publisher), but none was able to make a living solely from professionalized writing. Reading and literary societies, at times converting their agendas to different political ideas, were established. Some of the important booksellers-publishers were part of the group of politicians and entrepreneurs, which pushed in order to create a new (and vital) industry from scratch: the modern wood pulp paper factories. The thin group of high-cultured intellectuals, able to respond to the newest scientific or literary discoveries and trends, co-existed with the mass of a population subjected to a huge rate of illiteracy.²³

A history of 19th century Romanian transnational book trade and publication exchanges should not avoid Dinicu Golescu's travelogue,

describing three 1824-1826 journeys to Central and Western Europe. The Wallachian boyar described a state of affairs, turned gradually into a state of complaint, familiar to many present-day scholars: the deafening absence of books in the Romanian language, or written by Romanian authors, from the Western public libraries.²⁴ The well-intended aristocrat did not remain an exception. Foreign travelers aiming to arrive somehow familiarized with the realities of Wallachia and Moldova decried the lack of any local literature, save for the early 18th century works of Dimitrie Cantemir.²⁵ Romanian students abroad asked to have books from the personal libraries at home sent to Western Europe, especially when they tried to acquire academic titles with motherland connected topics.²⁶ From the point of view of the Western scholars, the situation was not much different. Hugo Schuchardt (1842-1927) felt obliged to let fellow linguist Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu know that, a too warm review of Romanian publications would be met by the German-speaking academic peers with mistrust and disbelief, as the knowledge on the country was limited.²⁷ Wilhem Rudow started his 1892 controversial *Geschichte des rumänischen Schrifttums bis zur Gegenwart* by bluntly accusing the absence of Romanian books from the German libraries, as well as from the general bookstores, a fact that hindered his documentation.²⁸ In addition to these assertions, a history of Romanian book trade, written by an insider during the 1940s, does not mention the external trade for the modern era.²⁹

Such baffling statements suggest, that Romanian publications lay outside the usual continental trade channels. They rather strengthen the idea of the 'one-way' circulation of books and deny the ability of the Romanian book traders and authors to be part of a global market.

Let us return to the admittedly partial information provided by Alexandru Socec's diary. Though running his business from Bucharest, a continental periphery in both geographical and economical terms, the bookseller-publisher Ioan V. Socec was connected to the major European and transcontinental book trade hubs. Among his correspondents one finds Heinrich Kessler, a commissioner bookseller from Leipzig; Eduard Kanitz, an important tradesman from Vienna; Louis Breton, partner and later successor of Louis Hachette. Moreover, Alexandru Socec admired his father's efforts to publish in the Romanian language for a readership partial to the native literature, in contrast to the French or German novels.³⁰ Of course, it was the social elite he had in mind, but import remained an important part of the bookselling business in Romania during the 19th century. In an 1872 letter, Ioan V. Socec himself wrote that he was able to

import books from “any part of Europe, even from the Americas”, besides having a correspondent in Constantinople, able to supply Arabic prints.³¹

Another deterring element was a more likely answer to the above-mentioned complaints. Most publications printed in Romania during the 19th century were written in a national tongue undergoing an almost uninterrupted process of transformation, from the alphabet (Cyrillic to transitional to Latin), to the lexical elements themselves, not to forget the puzzling debates on orthography (phonetic versus Latin-inspired).³² Given this context, there should not be a surprise that linguists were among the first to be interested in acquiring dictionaries, grammars, glossaries, academic or literary publications from Romania.

Establishing Networks: Foreign Scholars Demand Romanian Publications

Once an interest into the Romanian language or history was established, the ordering of books or journals was apparently not problematic. The commission-trade was part of the answer. Even before setting into contact with a colleague from Romania, academics were able to order publications either through their usual local booksellers, from Bucharest booksellers, or from household names of the Leipzig commission trade. Several examples support this idea. It was possible to buy Romanian publications in this way in Paris (as Roma-specialized ethnographer Paul Bataillard or M.P. Dashkevich, the latter studying in the French capital, while preparing to occupy a literature chair at the Kyiv University), Florence (linguist Napoleone Caix), or Budapest (Paul Hunfálvy, linguist and politician).³³ European intellectuals were thus following the pattern they already knew and held as efficient. This was an established behavior and must be understood as normal, and not as a Romania-linked exceptionality. On the contrary, this information confirms the force and the depth of the transnational book trade networks.

To work directly with a Romanian bookseller, and thus eliminate intermediaries, would not only have simplified the international flow of publications, but would have also cut some of the associated costs, one may read in a letter from Napoleone Caix to Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu.³⁴ Kristoffer Nyrop must have had a similar point of view, as he decided to subscribe directly with the Soccec publishing house, entrusted with the printing of Hasdeu's dictionary of the Romanian language. A complaint

may be identified in this case, as the Danish linguist once received twice the same fasciculus.³⁵

The exchange of books and offprints was not a matter of ritualistic relations within the academia. Historian Ioan Bogdan (1864-1919) got a glimpse in the personal laboratory of linguist Franz Miklosich (1813-1891); the founder of the modern Slavic philology quoted the 1885 work of Lazăr Șăineanu, *Elemente turcești în limba română*, due to the good impression made.³⁶ The prestige enjoyed by Miklosich was so great, that Ioan Bianu (1856-1935, the long-time outstanding secretary-general and librarian of the Romanian Academy), sent him in 1889 a special manuscript of the posthumous work of M.G. Obedenaru (1839-1885), *Texte macedo-române. Basme și poezii populare de la Crușova*, printed in Bucharest two years later.³⁷

The correspondence between scholars based in different centers exposes another important dimension of the knowledge exchange: the bibliographical inquiry. Asking for opinions and advises from Romanian colleagues made a difference in the decision to purchase or not a book, to start or to abandon an article.³⁸ Certainly, the answers must be filtered through the looking glass of the internal scientific debates, nevertheless also of friendships or enmities, which need not be discussed here.

Widely celebrated as the founder of the Romanian studies in the Czech lands, later in Czechoslovakia, Jan Urban Jarník (1848-1923) represents an excellently documented case-study.³⁹ His biography and oeuvre are well known. I shall hence focus below on the methods he employed in order to gather a personal library of Romanian titles. In the beginning, Jarník was, just as any other young aspiring scholar anywhere, in search of an original, less, if not entirely, unexplored topic. This proved to be Romanian philology. The 1874 fortunate encounter with Constantin Georgian (1850-1904) – the two were studying together Sanskrit in Paris – unquestionably shaped Jarník's entire career and life. When separated by geographical distance, the two devised a special teaching method. Letters were exchanged only in Romanian, with Georgian correcting and explaining the mistakes Jarník still made. The Czech scholar later extended this convention to all his Romanian correspondents. Reading and paying attention to the "academic" versus the "popular" nuances was the other essential part of the learning process. Georgian recommended *Covorbiri Literare* to Jarník, who also made use of the Romanian newspapers he was able to find in Vienna.⁴⁰

The correspondence of Jan Urban Jarník reveals his academic and personal networks. Before becoming a professor in Prague (1882), he taught in Vienna. Jarník visited Austro-Hungarian Transylvania in 1876, and Romania for the first time in 1879. By 1877, Jarník was already in possession of a good library of Romanian books and periodicals. He boasted of the richness of his private collections in a letter to Hugo Schuchardt: "this is in any case little, but still more than could offer the University Library of Vienna in this respect".⁴¹

Biographers insisted upon the humble origin of Jan Urban Jarník, born in a modest family from the village of Potštýn. When aiming to understand the acquaintances made while in Bucharest in 1879, this turns to be an advantage. In contrast with the many intellectuals and politicians met, the relation with Petre Ispirescu (a self-taught typographer, collector and editor of folk tales), developed into a close friendship. In acquiring a specialized library, the local networks of the Bucharest typographer were actively put to work. Ispirescu purchased books according to lists compiled by his friend. Also, when asked by different authors, Ispirescu was happy to oblige and send their works to Jarník.⁴²

Just as Caix and Nyrop were implying, Jarník was aware of the financial pressure represented by the international acquisition of books. His letters, again, disclose several financial settlements. For once, there was the reluctance to open a credit line with the Viennese bookseller Gerold. There are hints towards different sums of money Jarník gave or sent to Ispirescu in Bucharest in order to purchase and send needed, or simply suitable, titles. As the latter's son spent some time in Vienna, lived with Jarník and his family and went there to school, this kind of arrangement might have been more complicated. The linguist also relied on the books, articles, or periodicals sent directly by fellow authors. Jarník felt obliged to distribute to his students in Prague copies of a folklore collection he co-edited (*Doine și strigături din Ardeal*). Otherwise, students would have had to order from Bucharest.⁴³ Indirectly, this provides the researchers today with an indirect information on the elusive readers of Romanian works.

Few names of booksellers seem to appear in the correspondence between the authors who use to send each other their works. From a certain point of view, it was redundant. The growth of a continental railway network allowed the gradual concluding of special arrangements that made the sending of books easier per regular post. But this was an issue of international relations between states and the companies administrating the railways. The absence of such agreements made the transportation

of heavier and larger volumes not only more expansive, but also more bureaucratic.⁴⁴

But the publishers and booksellers could not be fully taken out of the arrangements between authors and foreign readers. Booksellers-publishers were in position to produce offprints from journals at the request of the authors. In the early stages of their impressive careers, historians Ioan Bogdan and Dimitrie Onciul wanted to personally send articles to peers, at home or abroad. A financial argument was again used: for a publisher like Ioan V. Socec, the separata were not a major investment.⁴⁵ Living at his country estate in Moldova, poet and politician Vasile Alecsandri preferred to entrust his publisher, the same Ioan V. Socec, with sending books to those interested abroad.⁴⁶

From Institutional Exchanges to the Transnational Commission-Trade

Besides an interest in Romance or Slavic philology, there was another connection between many of the scholars mentioned in the previous paragraph. They were members of the 1879 re-organized Romanian Academy of Sciences. Most members were, traditionally, professors at the two universities of the country and also at other important institutions of higher education. The existence of the Academy did not eliminate important difficulties. One was internal: the precarious infrastructure for research in humanities and sciences, of properly organized libraries, laboratories, and museums.⁴⁷ Another issue was the reduced number, oldness, and lack of consistence of the historical, linguistic, or literary works on Romania available abroad. Indirectly, this was a hint towards the circulation of Romanian publications out of the country. To commission or financially encourage foreign authors, by prizes or subsidies, was taken into consideration. As opposed to this, “larger and more serious” works could have been written in Romania. Yet, as it was maintained during internal debates, a main task of the Academy was to cultivate the Romanian language.⁴⁸

The initial Academic Society tried in 1872-1873 to set up an own network of commissioners, willing to distribute its few publications in Vienna (Gerold), Paris (booksellers Frank; Durand; Auguste et Perdonne; Laurel; Dumoulin), London (Henri Sotheran), Madrid (Baily-Baillière), Berlin (Ascher), and Saint Petersburg (Isacoff). These were supposed to

work both ways, as the literary, historic, and scientific sections were entitled to purchases for the own needs. The actual negotiations were not detailed.⁴⁹ The intention might have been stronger than the actual interest of the readers. A better solution was the establishment of one-time or recurrent exchanges with other learned societies. This did not mean, that buying books from the market or receiving donations ceased.

Numerous academies or specialized scientific societies, editing own journals and proceedings, were established all over the world during the 19th century. Making knowledge available was still more important than making a profit by selling scientific publications.⁵⁰ Also, a way to overcome the language barrier was discovered. The language dictionaries endorsed by the Romanian Academy were included in the exchange packages. These further included the published members' lectures, volumes of historical documents (the eclectic "Hurmuzaki Collection"), critical editions of Wallachian and Moldavian mediaeval chronicles, the works of Nicolae Bălcescu (the major ideologue of the 1848 Wallachian revolution), alongside series of meteorological observations.⁵¹ The dominance of the philological and historical works, when compared to applied sciences, reflects the actual divisions within the Romanian Academy.

Even so, the first attempts to use languages of international communication may be linked with the field of meteorology. Ștefan Hepites (1851-1922, an engineer and physicist whom later founded several meteorological and seismological observatories), listed in 1880 thirty-seven possible international institutes and observatories for the Romanian Academy to consider exchanging the published collected data. Though himself concerned with humanities, D.A. Sturdza (1833-1914, historian and numismatics collector, also a leading liberal statesman) insisted to have the column titles printed in French. This was the first initiative of this kind.⁵²

On the long term, this policy had two effects: the constant growth and diversification of the institutional library; and, most important, the dissemination of Romanian produced knowledge worldwide. Due to the publication of the administrative decisions, the extend of the circulation of publications between learned societies becomes clearer. Exchange initiatives were put forward from either part. From 1879 until the First World War, the Romanian Academy partnered with learned societies, academies, university chairs or libraries, and museums from France, Sweden, Serbia, Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary (including here Transylvania, Banat and Bucovina, since 1918 part of Romania), Spain,

Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, United States of America. When coming from abroad, the reasons for initiating an exchange or request a donation of publications varied. Historical and linguistics seminars and chairs seemed willing to complete their collections⁵³ and perhaps to avoid the intermediaries.

The most effective way to become part of the transnational and transcontinental circulation of academic publications was the further development of the co-operation with the representatives of the commission-trade. In 1883, the Romanian Academy decided to entrust the Leipzig-based company founded in 1875 by Otto Harrassowitz with the international distribution of its publications.⁵⁴ A catalogue from 1887 listed several works published by the Romanian Academy, some with clarifications in regard to the number of volumes already available and the promise to deliver those due to appear.⁵⁵ How the negotiations unfolded is still unclear, yet this was not random choice. As an antiquarian and publisher, Otto Harrassowitz (1845-1920) followed his own passions and interests: linguistics, Orientalia, library science. He was not only intellectually gifted, but a careful businessman in relation to his highly specialized, academic customers. Since 1882, Harrassowitz worked with the American Library Association. By 1897, North American libraries were already Harrassowitz's main buyers.⁵⁶ The extent to which Harrassowitz went in order to please his American clients is demonstrated by a letter sent to Artur Gorovei. The bookseller was trying to find a book published in Transylvania in 1873 (though the data might have been erroneous) and asked the Romanian folklorist for his advice.⁵⁷ Unfortunately, the entire archive of Harrassowitz was destroyed during an Allied air raid on Leipzig, on 4 December 1943.⁵⁸ This tragic war loss makes the reconstruction of the relationship between Otto Harrassowitz and his Romanian correspondents impossible for the time being. One must add that, the proceedings of the Academy, generous in respect to the decisions and deliberately discreet in regard to the actual debates, do not clear this aspect also.

Besides exchanges, the sale of the works published by the Romanian Academy was also possible. The editions of historical documents were the most sought-after publications of the decade 1882-1892, however without important financial returns,⁵⁹ which indicates a small number of interested readers outside the exchange system.

At the turn of the 20th century, generational and structural changes occurred within the Academy. More scientists were elected than in the previous half of the century. Newer members, including the representatives

of the humanities, owed in a great number their academic careers to scholarships abroad, mostly in Western Europe. More important, a new stance towards the issue of language occurred. What seems to have been a shy proposal in 1905 – to start a “Bulletin” in German and French “in order to make known to the learned world the activity of the academy”⁶⁰ – was reiterated four years later. Two were the reasons behind the idea of printing only the abstracts: additional costs and, surprisingly, an expected limited impact.⁶¹ The peer-pressure of the newer members of the historical and scientific sections increased significantly. The Scientific Section decided on 16 November 1912 to commence a “Bulletin de la Section Scientifique de l’Académie Roumaine”, with papers or abstracts in English, French, German, Italian, and Latin. Authors were supposed to be paid a small retribution. The distribution of the Bulletin was free for universities, institutes, and major publications in and out of the country.⁶² A similar approach had the historical section. “Bulletin de la Section Historique”, under the guidance of Nicolae Iorga, appeared under similar circumstances since 1912.⁶³ These initiatives must be understood as complimentary to the bulk of publications, which remained in the national language.

Commission-trade proved once more its utility and importance. Besides the already established relation with Otto Harrassowitz, in the field of humanities, new partners for the scientific publications were approached. Again, the actual negotiations are difficult to re-construct. But the names on the title pages were those of the most important German, Austrian, and French commissioners in the scientific book trade. They were certainly familiar to the Romanian academic milieu. Established in 1912 and interrupted in 1916 (when Romania entered the First World War on the Entente side), these partnerships demonstrate a pragmatic approach towards the dissemination of the research results. The extraordinary efficiency of the German book trade made the impact of the scientific discoveries even stronger.⁶⁴

The “Bulletin” published by the Scientific Section offers a case-study in respect to transnational book trade, for the title page reunited the names of Friedländer from Berlin, Gauthier-Villars from Paris, and Gerold from Vienna. Socec was the main Romanian commissioner, as the company remained the major player of the book market after the death of its founders, under Ioan I.V. Socec and Emil Socec. Raphael Friedländer&Sohn, established by Raphael Friedländer as a side job in 1828 in Berlin, was a leading name in the antiquarian and commission-trade for natural sciences. At the beginning of the 20th century, though the name

of the founders were kept, the owners became Ernst Buschbeck and Otto Budy, the pair expanding the business from antiquarian trade to publishing and commissioning. Just as Harrassowitz, Friedländer lost the entire archive in a fire.⁶⁵ The publishing house of Jean-Albert Gauthier-Villars (1828-1898) was entrusted by the Paris Academy of Sciences to print and distribute its publications.⁶⁶ Several scientists, who studied in France, were already published by Gauthier-Villars before becoming members of the Academy in Bucharest.⁶⁷ Gerold was one of the first commissioners to accept works published by the Romanian Academy in 1872. The Viennese company traced its history back to the 18th century. Since 1856, the already major position in the Austrian book trade became stronger, as Gerold were appointed booksellers of the Imperial Academy of Sciences.⁶⁸

An important input in the expansion of the pathways of knowledge exchange came from the diplomats manning the few legations Romania maintained abroad. When in need, and perhaps following an own agenda, they were asking for help from the Academy. This sent anyway its own publications to members, whom were also in the foreign service, at the same time to the libraries of the legations.⁶⁹ At times, diplomats acted as intermediaries in the exchanges of publications or requested texts to be published by foreign journals. This was the case of Nicolae Mișu (1858-1924), whose mediation allowed better relations between Romanian and Bulgarian intellectual institutions and journals.⁷⁰ Appointed in London and asked to act directly under the guidance of prime-minister D.A. Sturdza, George Moroianu (1870-1945) identified Scotus Viator and supplied him with data and books on the Romanian interests concerning Austria-Hungary and the nationalities issues there.⁷¹

Intersecting Pathways: Conclusions

Frustrating losses of entire archives, as it was the case of Harrassowitz and Friedländer, and the division of others (e. g. Soccec) between different institutional holders, are an undisputed tragedy. And yet, re-creating the networks involved in the dissemination of Romanian publications abroad during the second half of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, is possible. Corroborated information allows a re-construction in which institutional proceedings and private correspondence are crucial. Imprints, a type of evidence otherwise ‘hidden in plain sight’ do play a vital role.

Divided between at times conflictual economic and cultural desiderata, Romanian book trade was an undisputed part of the modernization process, embodying a mixture of cultural, hence national, ideals, with an economic agenda. Booksellers switched gradually from a business based on the import of foreign titles to becoming publishers for the Romanian authors. As proved by the case of Ioan V. Socec, several times mentioned in this paper, they were excellently connected with the European trade hubs (Leipzig, Paris, Vienna), hence undoubtedly part of the transnational book trade. However, the booksellers-publishers from Romania were more discrete, though equally important, in the dissemination of publications abroad. Despite those many different voices expressing their disappointment in the lack of writings from Western libraries and bookstores, a one-way circulation of books is, for the timeframe studied here, out of question and of place.

The virtually unknown Romanian language, the first barrier one might consider, was gradually, yet unconsciously, transformed from an obstacle into an advantage. From academic, but private, linguistical interests, institutional co-operations derived. Personal networks doubled the already existing habits of ordering from local booksellers and thus put the entire mechanisms of transnational commerce to work.

Though learned societies were able to exchange directly their publications, transnational and transcontinental commissioners, in particular, and booksellers and publishers, in general, could not be taken out of the book circulation. This was, to all extents and purposes, never in the intention or the interest of the authors and readers. The Romanian Academy was not an exception. It rather served as a study case of entangled networks, as the exchange of publications proved a good pathway of dissemination, but perhaps less effective than the complicated transnational bookselling networks set up in decades by Otto Harrassowitz, R. Friedländer&Sohn, Gerold, or Gauthier-Villars. Affected by the lack or archival sources are aspects such as lists of clients and financial earnings or losses. Those would paint a better image of the actual interest on the Romanian publications out of the country and out of the territories still under foreign rule under 1918.

Even if decades were needed, the initial approach to write and publish in the national tongue of a national state in the process of build-up, was finally eased and works in other languages were permitted. At this point, one might say that the assumed 'national' representation made way for a cool-headed approach, especially in the field of sciences. Dialogue and

knowledge exchange predominated in this manner, in an era far from today's scientometrics approach.

As demonstrated in this article, the existence of individual, institutional, and commercial networks dealing with the dissemination of Romanian publications abroad proves that national, cultural, and economic aspects must be analyzed as interconnected elements of the modernization. The circulation of ideas was at the core of this process, and book trade, as a capitalistic venture dealing with perennial values, cannot be ignored. The construction of the pathways of knowledge exchange was possible, in the Romanian case, only by integrating the networks booksellers-publishers and commissioners had developed and kept open.

NOTES

- ¹ National Archives of Romania (ANIC), Fund Alexandru Sococ 1877-1951, file 3/1879-1880, f. 26v.
- ² Jean-Yves Mollier, "Les réseaux de libraires européennes en milieu du XIXe siècle: l'exemple des correspondants de la maison d'édition Michel Levy frères, de Paris", in Frédéric Barbier (ed.), *Est-Ouest: Transferts et réceptions dans le monde du livre en Europe (XVIIe-XXe siècles)*, Leipziger Universitätsverlag, Leipzig, 2005, p. 128-131.
- ³ Bogdan Murgescu, *România și Europa. Acumularea decalajelor economice (1500-2010)*, Polirom, Iași, 2010; Lazăr Vlăsceanu; Marian-Gabriel Hâncean, *Modernitatea românească*, Paralela 45, Pitești, 2014.
- ⁴ Leon Volovici, *Apariția scriitorului în cultura românească*, Junimea, Iași, 1976; Ștefan Lemny, *Sensibilitate și istorie în secolul XVIII românesc*, Meridiane, Bucharest, 1990.
- ⁵ Elena Siupiur, "The Role of European Universities in Shaping the Romanian and South-East European Political Elites in the Nineteenth Century", in *Analele Universității din București. Seria Științe Politice*, 1/2014; Andrei Pippidi, "Identitate națională și culturală. Câteva probleme de metodă în legătură cu locul românilor în istorie", in *Revista de Istorie*, 38, 12, 1985, p. 1190-1191; Alex Drace-Francis, *The Making of Modern Romanian Culture. Literacy and the Development of National Identity*, London, New York, Tauris Academic Studies, 2006, p. 197-199; Lucian Boia, „Germanofilia”. *Elita intelectuală românească în anii Primului Război Mondial*, Bucharest, Humanitas, 2009, p. 62-64.
- ⁶ Constanța Vintilă, *Evgheniți, ciocoi, mojici. Despre obrazele primei modernități românești 1750-1860*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2013.
- ⁷ John Feather, "Book trade networks and community contexts", in John Hinks, Catherine Feely (eds.), *Historical Networks in the Book Trade*, Routledge, London, New York, 2017, p. 23.
- ⁸ Jeffrey Freedman, *Books without Borders in Enlightenment Europe. French Cosmopolitanism and German Literary Markets*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2012, p. 1.
- ⁹ Robert Darnton, "What is the History of Books?", in *Daedalus*, 111, 3, Summer 1982, p. 67.
- ¹⁰ Sidney Shep, "Books without Borders: The Transnational Turn in Book History", in Swapan Chakravorty, Abhijit Gupta (eds.), *New World Order. Transnational Themes in Book History*, Worldview Publications, Delhi, 2011, p. 25, 31.
- ¹¹ Gary D. Stark, *Entrepreneurs of Ideology. Neoconservative Publishers in Germany, 1890-1933*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1981, p. 249.

- 12 John Hinks, "Introduction. Beyond metaphor: A personal view of historical networks in the book trade", in John Hinks, Catherine Feely (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 1-2.
- 13 Jyrki Hakapää, "Internationalizing Book Distribution in the Early Nineteenth Century. The Origins of the Finnish Bookstores", in *Book History*, 5, 2002, p. 39-66; Alison Rukavina, *The Development of the International Book Trade 1870-1895. Tangled Networks*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2010.
- 14 Élisabeth Parinet, *Une histoire de l'édition à l'époque contemporaine (XIX^e – XX^e siècle)*, Seuil, Paris, 2004, p. 153, 187.
- 15 György Kóka, *Geschichte des Buchhandels in Ungarn*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1990, p. 81, 89, 102.
- 16 Dirk Hempel, *Literarische Vereine in Dresden. Kulturelle Praxis und politische Orientierung des Bürgertums im 19. Jahrhundert*, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 2008, p. 21-36.
- 17 James Raven, "The Industrial Revolution of the Book", in *The Cambridge Companion to the History of the Book*, edited by Leslie Howsam, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 147-148.
- 18 Natalie Soulier, "Die Verwendung der Lithographie in wissenschaftlichen Werken zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts", in *Gutenberg-Jahrbuch*, 72, 1997, p. 154-182.
- 19 Norbert Bachleitner, Franz M. Eybl, Ernst Fischer, *Geschichte des Buchhandels in Österreich*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 2000, p. 190-191, 225; Élisabeth Parinet, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
- 20 A.J. Meadows, *Science Publishing in the Twentieth Century*, in *Thornton and Tully's Scientific Books, Libraries, and Collectors. A Study of Bibliography and the Book Trade in Relation to the History of Science*, edited by Andrew Hunter, Ashgate, Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sidney, 2000, p. 273-274, 288.
- 21 Alberto Gabriele, "Copyright law, transnational book trade, and the counter-discourse of the global in the Belgian market of cheap reprints", in Hinks, Feely (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 171-184.
- 22 Thomas Keiderling, *Die Modernisierung des Leipziger Kommissionsbuchhandel von 1830 bis 1888*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2000, p. 34-35, 217-219.
- 23 I have summarized here my earlier work: Bogdan Popa, *Comerțul cu carte în România: proiect național și proiect economic (a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea – începutul secolului al XX-lea)*, Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj-Napoca, 2015.
- 24 Dinicu Golescu, *Scrieri*, Minerva, Bucharest, 1990, p. 4.
- 25 Geographer Johann Georg Kohl was only one of the most important names; cf. *Călători străini despre țările române în secolul al XIX-lea. Serie nouă, IV (1841-1846)*, coordinated by Paul Cernovodeanu and Daniela Bușă, Editura Academiei Române, Bucharest, 2007, p. 102.

- ²⁶ Mihail Kogălniceanu, *Scrisori 1834-1849*, Minerva, Bucharest, 1913, p. 74, 90; Constantin Georgian, *Opere asiatice inedite. Paris-Leipzig-Berlin-București 1872-1904. Partea I*, Institutul de Istorie a Religiilor, București, 2017, p. 282-283.
- ²⁷ "Hugo Schuchardt to Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu (15-1171). Graz, 22. 10. 1877", in Bernhard Hurch (ed.): *Hugo Schuchardt Archiv*. <https://gams.uni-graz.at/o:hsa.letter.4471>, accessed 7 July 2022. Handle: hdl.handle.net/11471/518.10.1.4471.
- ²⁸ Wilhelm Rudow, *Geschichte des rumänischen Schrifttums bis zur Gegenwart*, Wernigerode, 1892, p. 3.
- ²⁹ Nicolae Th. Ionnițiu, *Istoria editurii românești*, Cartea Românească, Bucharest, 1943.
- ³⁰ ANIC, Fund General Alexandru Socec, 1877-1951, file 5/1883-1888, f. 67.
- ³¹ *Timotei Cipariu. Corespondență primită*, Editura Academiei Române, Bucharest, 1992, p. 237-238.
- ³² Ștefan Cazimir, *Alfabetul de tranziție*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2006; Gheorghe Bulgăr, "Despre limba și stilul primelor periodice românești", in *Contribuții la istoria limbii române literare în secolul al XIX-lea*, II, Editura Academiei RPR, Bucharest, 1958, p. 75-113; Jan Urban Jarník, *Între români. Scrisori din călătoria unui filolog*, Sibiu, 1917, p. 24.
- ³³ *B.P. Hasdeu și contemporanii săi români și străini (corespondență primită)*, I, Minerva, Bucharest, 1982, p. 58, 156-157, 278.
- ³⁴ *B.P. Hasdeu și contemporanii săi*, p. 139.
- ³⁵ *Scrisori către Ioan Bianu*, III, Minerva, Bucharest, 1976, p. 32, 36.
- ³⁶ *Scrisori către Ioan Bianu*, I, Minerva, Bucharest, 1974, p. 140.
- ³⁷ *Scrisori către Ioan Bianu*, II, Minerva, Bucharest, 1975, p. 263. The letter Miklosich sent to Bianu was dated 9 January 1889. In 1882, M. Obedenaru-Gheorghiad asked Bianu to oblige and send some handwritten corrections to linguists Miklosich, Picot, and Ascoli; *Scrisori către Ioan Bianu*, III, p. 47.
- ³⁸ *Scrisori către Ioan Bianu*, III, Minerva, Bucharest, 1976, p. 33 (Nyrop on the value of Elena Sevastos's *Nunta la români*); *Scrisori către Nicolae Iorga*, I, 1890-1901, Minerva, Bucharest, 1972, p. 427 (Charles Langlois inquiring on printed bibliographies of historical sources and works from Romania).
- ³⁹ Jiřina Smřková, "Ioan Urban Jarník, primul românist, romanist și albanolog ceh", in *Limba Română*, XIX, 5, 1970, p. 435-441.
- ⁴⁰ Constantin Georgian, *Opere asiatice inedite*, I, p. 285-286, 305.
- ⁴¹ "Johann Urban Jarnik to Hugo Schuchardt (01-05065). Wien, 09. 12. 1877". Edited by Luca Melchior (2015). In: Bernhard Hurch (ed.): *Hugo Schuchardt Archiv*. Online <https://gams.uni-graz.at/o:hsa.letter.2497>, accessed 15. 07. 2022. Handle: hdl.handle.net/11471/518.10.1.2497.
- ⁴² Traian Ionescu-Nișcov, "Jan Urban Jarník și românii sau 'dialogul marii prietenii'", in *Memoriile Secției de Științe Istorice*, IV, VIII, 1983, p. 13;

- Traian Ionescu-Nișcov, "Correspondența dintre Jan Urban Jarník și Petre Ispirescu", in *Studii și Cercetări de Istorie Literară și Folclor*, XII, 3-4, 1963, p. 639-682.
- 43 Jan Urban Jarník, *Cum am învățat românește*, Oradea Mare, 1898, p. 17; Jan Urban Jarník, *Correspondență*, I, edited by Traian Ionescu-Nișcov, Minerva, Bucharest, 1980, p. 13, 29, 35.
- 44 *Scrisori către Ioan Bianu*, III, p. 57.
- 45 See the letters sent by historians Dimitrie Onciul and Ioan Bogdan to Iacob Negruzzi, concerning articles published by *Convorbiri Literare*; I.E. Torouțiu, Gh. Cardaș, *Studii și documente literare. I. "Junimea"*, Institutul de Arte Grafice "Bucovina", Bucharest, 1931, p. 216-218, 227. Bogdan envisaged foreign Slavic studies specialists, hence the request. *Convorbiri Literare* was a seminal periodical, but published literature, linguistics, essays, and history indiscriminatory.
- 46 I.E. Torouțiu, *Studii și documente literare. III. "Junimea"*, 1932, p. 30.
- 47 *Analele Academiei Române. Partea Administrativă și Desbaterile. Seria II* (further quoted: AAR-PAD), București, 1882, p. 105.
- 48 AAR-PAD, 1881, p. 5-9.
- 49 *Analele Societății Academice Române. Sesiunea anului 1873*, Bucharest, 1874, p. 6-7.
- 50 Allan Cook, "Academic Publications before 1940", in Einar H. Fredriksson (ed.), *A Century of Science Publishing. A Collection of Essays*, IOS Press, Amsterdam, Berlin, Oxford, Tokyo, Washington DC, 2001, p. 17-20.
- 51 On the titles under the aegis of Romanian Academy, see D.A. Sturdza, "Raportu asupra activității Academiei Române cu ocasiunea serbării de 25 ani a existenței sale, 1866-1891", in AAR-PAD, 1892, p. 197-220.
- 52 AAR-PAD, 1882, p. 70.
- 53 AAR-PAD, 1892, p. 43, 118.
- 54 Hans Harrassowitz, *Otto Harrassowitz und seine Firma. Eine Skizze. Zum Tage des 50jährigen Bestehens der Firma Otto Harrassowitz*, Leipzig, 1922, p. 77. This reference was kindly suggested by dr. Barbara Krauß.
- 55 *Antiquarischer Katalog 134 von Otto Harrassowitz in Leipzig*, 1887, p. 97-102.
- 56 Erich Carlsohn, *Lebensbilder Leipziger Buchhändler. Erinnerungen an Verleger, Antiquare, Exportbuchhändler, Kommissionäre, Gehilfen und Markthelfer*, List&Francke, Meersburg, 1987, p. 105-106.
- 57 Library of the Romanian Academy, Manuscripts Section, S 233/MCII.
- 58 Barbara Krauß, Steffen Schickling, "150 Jahre Harrassowitz Verlag – 150 Jahre im Dienst der Wissenschaft. Ein Blick zurück", in Barbara Krauß (ed.), *150 Jahre Harrassowitz Verlag. Katalog der lieferbaren Titel 2002. Mit Beiträgen zur Verlagsgeschichte und zum Programm*, Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2022, p. 13.
- 59 AAR-PAD, 1893, p. 108, 110.

- ⁶⁰ AAR-PAD, 1905, p. 282.
- ⁶¹ AAR-PAD, 1909, p. 143.
- ⁶² AAR-PAD, 1913, p. 67.
- ⁶³ AAR-PAD, 1913, p. 61.
- ⁶⁴ Heinz Sarkowski, "The Growth and Decline of German Scientific Publishing 1850-1945", in Fredriksson (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 26.
- ⁶⁵ Erich Carlsohn, "Antiquar Raphael Friedländer und seine Nachfolger", in *Börsenblatt für den deutschen Buchhandel. Frankfurter Ausgabe*, XV, 68, 1959, p. 1017-1020.
- ⁶⁶ "Jean-Albert Gauthier-Villars", in *La Nature, Paris*, 1898, p. 190-191.
- ⁶⁷ Georges Bengesco, *Bibliographie franco-roumaine depuis le commencement du XIXe siècle jusqu'à nos jours*, Ernest Leroux, Paris, 1907, *passim*.
- ⁶⁸ Carl Junker, *Zum Buchwesen in Österreich. Gesammelte Schriften (1896-1927)*, Praesens, Wien, 2001, p. 226.
- ⁶⁹ *Scrisori către Ioan Bianu*, III, p. 55, 58.
- ⁷⁰ *Scrisori către Ioan Bianu*, II, Minerva, Bucharest, 1975, p. 267, 269.
- ⁷¹ *Scrisori către Ioan Bianu*, II, Minerva, Bucharest, 1975, p. 358-359, 373, 426; *Corespondența lui George Moroianu (1891-1920). I. Scrisori primite, în limba română*, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1981, p. 30, 254-255.

Bibliography

- ***, Library of the Romanian Academy, Manuscripts, Fund Artur Gorovei.
- ***, National Archives of Romania (ANIC), Fund Alexandru Sococ 1877-1951.
- ***, *Analele Academiei Române. Partea Administrativă și Desbaterile. Seria II*, Bucharest, 1882-1916.
- ***, *B.P. Hasdeu și contemporanii săi români și străini (corespondență primită)*, I, Minerva, Bucharest, 1982.
- ***, *Timotei Cipariu. Corespondență primită*, edited by BOTEZAN, L.; BOTEZAN, I.; CUIBUS, I., Editura Academiei Române, Bucharest, 1992.
- BACHLEITNER, N.; EYBL, F.M.; FISCHER, E., *Geschichte des Buchhandels in Österreich*, Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 2000.
- BOIA, L., „Germanofilii”. *Elita intelectuală românească în anii Primului Război Mondial*, Bucharest, Humanitas, 2009.
- BULGĂR, GH., „Despre limba și stilul primelor periodice românești”, in *Contribuții la istoria limbii române literare în secolul al XIX-lea*, II, Editura Academiei RPR, Bucharest, 1958, p. 75-113.
- CARLSOHN, E., „Antiquar Raphael Friedländer und seine Nachfolger”, in *Börsenblatt für den deutschen Buchhandel. Frankfurter Ausgabe*, XV, 68, 1959, p. 1017-1020.
- CARLSOHN, E., *Lebensbilder Leipziger Buchhändler. Erinnerungen an Verleger, Antiquare, Exportbuchhändler, Kommissionäre, Gehilfen und Markthelfer*, List&Francke, Meersburg, 1987, p. 105-106.
- CAZIMIR, Ș., *Alfabetul de tranziție*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2006.
- CROICU, M. and CROICU, P. (eds.), *Scrisori către Ioan Bianu*, I-V, Minerva, Bucharest, 1974-1980.
- DARNTON, R., „What is the History of Books?”, in *Daedalus*, 111, 3, Summer 1982.
- DRACE-FRANCIS, A., *The Making of Modern Romanian Culture. Literacy and the Development of National Identity*, London, New York, Tauris Academic Studies, 2006.
- FREDRIKSSON, E.H., (ed.), *A Century of Science Publishing. A Collection of Essays*, IOS Press, Amsterdam, Berlin, Oxford, Tokyo, Washington DC, 2001.
- FREEDMAN, J., *Books without Borders in Enlightenment Europe. French Cosmopolitanism and German Literary Markets*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2012.
- Georgian, C., *Opere asiatice inedite. Paris-Leipzig-Berlin-București 1872-1904*, edited by CIURTIN, E., Institutul de Istorie a Religiiilor, Bucharest, 2017.
- GOLESCU, D., *Scrieri*, edited by ANGHELESCU M., Minerva, Bucharest, 1990, p. 4.
- HAKAPÄÄ, J., „Internationalizing Book Distribution in the Early Nineteenth Century. The Origins of the Finnish Bookstores”, in *Book History*, 5, 2002, p. 39-66.

- HARRASSOWITZ, H., *Otto Harrassowitz und seine Firma. Eine Skizze. Zum Tage des 50jährigen Bestehens der Firma Otto Harrassowitz*, Leipzig, 1922.
- HEMPEL, D., *Literarische Vereine in Dresden. Kulturelle Praxis und politische Orientierung des Bürgertums im 19. Jahrhundert*, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 2008.
- HINKS, J.; FEELY, C. (eds.), *Historical Networks in the Book Trade*, Routledge, London, New York, 2017.
- HURCH, B., (ed.): Hugo Schuchardt Archiv. Online <https://gams.uni-graz.at>.
- IONESCU-NIȘCOV, T., "Correspondența dintre Jan Urban Jarník și Petre Ispirescu", in *Studii și Cercetări de Istorie Literară și Folclor*, XII, 3-4, 1963, p. 639-682.
- IONESCU-NIȘCOV, T., "Jan Urban Jarník și românii sau 'dialogul mării prietenii'", in *Memoriile Secției de Științe Istorice*, IV, VIII, 1983.
- IONNIȚIU, N. TH., *Istoria editurii românești*, Cartea Românească, Bucharest, 1943.
- JARNÍK, J.U., *Correspondență*, I-II, edited by IONESCU-NIȘCOV, T., Minerva, Bucharest, 1980.
- JARNÍK, J.U., *Cum am învățat românește*, Oradea Mare, 1898.
- JARNÍK, J.U., *Între români. Scrisori din călătoria unui filolog*, Sibiu, 1917.
- JUNKER, C., *Zum Buchwesen in Österreich. Gesammelte Schriften (1896-1927)*, Praesens, Vienna, 2001.
- KEIDERLING, T., *Die Modernisierung des Leipziger Kommissionsbuchhandel von 1830 bis 1888*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2000.
- KOGĂLNICEANU, M., *Scrisori 1834-1849*, edited by HANEȘ, P.V., Minerva, Bucharest, 1913.
- KÓKAY, G., *Geschichte des Buchhandels in Ungarn*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1990.
- KRAUSS, B. (ed.), *150 Jahre Harrassowitz Verlag. Katalog der lieferbaren Titel 2002. Mit Beiträgen zur Verlagsgeschichte und zum Programm*, Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2022.
- LEMNY, Ș. *Sensibilitate și istorie în secolul XVIII românesc*, Meridiane, Bucharest, 1990.
- MEADOWS, A.J., *Science Publishing in the Twentieth Century*, in *Thornton and Tully's Scientific Books, Libraries, and Collectors. A Study of Bibliography and the Book Trade in Relation to the History of Science*, edited by HUNTER, A., Ashgate, Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sidney, 2000.
- MOLLIER, J.-Y., "Les réseaux de libraires européennes en milieu du XIXe siècle: l'exemple des correspondants de la maison d'édition Michel Levy frères, de Paris", in BARBIER, F., (ed.), *Est-Ouest: Transferts et réceptions dans le monde du livre en Europe (XVIIe-XXe siècles)*, Leipziger Universitätsverlag, Leipzig, 2005, p. 125-139.
- MURGESCU, B. *România și Europa. Acumularea decalajelor economice (1500-2010)*, Polirom, Iași, 2010.

- PARINET, E., *Une histoire de l'édition à l'époque contemporaine (XIX^e – XX^e siècle)*, Seuil, Paris, 2004.
- PIPPIDI, A., "Identitate națională și culturală. Câteva probleme de metodă în legătură cu locul românilor în istorie", in *Revista de Istorie*, 38, 12, 1985.
- Polverejan, S. (ed.), *Correspondența lui George Moroianu (1891-1920). I. Scrisori primite, în limba română*, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1981.
- POPA, B., *Comerțul cu carte în România: proiect național și proiect economic (a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea – începutul secolului al XX-lea)*, Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj-Napoca, 2015.
- RAVEN, J., *The Industrial Revolution of the Book*, in *The Cambridge Companion to the History of the Book*, edited by HOWSAM, L., Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- RUDOW, W., *Geschichte des rumänischen Schrifttums bis zur Gegenwart*, Wernigerode, 1892.
- RUKAVINA, A., *The Development of the International Book Trade 1870-1895. Tangled Networks*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2010.
- SHEP, S., "Books without Borders: The Transnational Turn in Book History", in CHAKRAVORTY, S.; GUPTA, A., (eds.), *New World Order. Transnational Themes in Book History*, Worldview Publications, Delhi, 2011, p. 13-41.
- SIUPIUR, E., "The Role of European Universities in Shaping the Romanian and South-East European Political Elites in the Nineteenth Century", in *Analele Universității din București, Seria Științe Politice*, 1/2014;
- SMRČKOVÁ, J., "Ioan Urban Jarník, primul românist, romanist și albanolog ceh", in *Limba Română*, XIX, 5, 1970, p. 435-441.
- SOULIER, N., "Die Verwendung der Lithographie in wissenschaftlichen Werken zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts", in *Gutenberg-Jahrbuch*, 72, 1997, p. 154-182.
- STARK, G.D., *Entrepreneurs of Ideology. Neoconservative Publishers in Germany, 1890-1933*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1981.
- TOROUȚIU, I.E.; CARDAȘ, GH., *Studii și documente literare. I-III. "Junimea"*, Institutul de Arte Grafice "Bucovina", Bucharest, 1931-1932.
- VINTILĂ, C., *Evgheniți, ciocoi, mojici. Despre obrazyele primei modernități românești 1750-1860*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2013.
- VLĂSCEANU, L.; HÂNCEAN, M.G., *Modernitatea românească*, Paralela 45, Pitești, 2014.
- VOLOVICI, L., *Apariția scriitorului în cultura românească*, Junimea, Iași, 1976.



HAJNALKA TAMÁS

Born in 1983, in Romania

Ph.D. in Theology and Religion, KU Leuven, Belgium (2014)

Dissertation: *Pannonian Martyrs of the Great Persecution and the Construction of Christian Identity in the Late 4th and Early 5th Century Middle Danube Area*

Associate member, Center for Patristic Studies and Ancient Christian Literature,
Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

Fellowships and grants:

Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship, University of Exeter, UK (2016-2018)

Fritz Thyssen Stiftung Research Fellowship, KU Leuven, Belgium (2014-2016)

Participation to conferences in Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, UK, USA,
Hungary

Publications and research domains: Latin literature, early Christian history
and literature, hagiography, regional Christianity; translation from Latin to
Romanian and English of Patristic and Medieval Christian texts

Participation to research projects:

The conservation-restoration, publication and exhibition of the “Good Shepherd” Tomb discovered in Sremska Mitrovica in 2016

Book:

Hagiography, The Cult of Martyrs, and the Formation of Christian Identity in Late Antique Pannonia, Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2022

PRACTICE AND FUNCTION OF ECCLESIASTICAL RECOMMENDATION IN LATE ANTIQUITY (FOURTH – FIFTH CENTURIES AD)

Abstract

In the ancient world, recommendation was an important expression of patronage, effecting introduction, mediation, problem-solving. Christianity took over and adapted Roman models to suit new realities of Christian travel and hospitality, pastoral care, recruitment, career advancement (clerical as well as ascetic), the articulation of communion and orthodoxy, among others. This paper explores the functions of late antique Christian recommendation practices, its complex and often ambiguous typology, with particular emphasis on the correspondence – or discrepancy – between evidence collected from extant papyri, canonical prescriptions, and examples from epistolary corpora of known authors.

Keywords: *commendatio*, epistolography, letter-carriers, early canons, Basil of Caesarea, Ambrose of Milan, Augustine of Hippo, Jerome, Zosimus, Leo I, letters in papyri

Introduction: Recommendation in the Late Roman and Early Christian World

In contemporary use, a letter of recommendation ascertains that a candidate meets certain expectations in terms of character, qualifications and skills; it is based on the personal experience of its author with the recommended candidate; and it has a determined addressee (whether a person, institution, board or committee). In ancient times, however, recommendation was practiced on a much larger scale, being an inherent mechanism of social interaction.

Roman imperial society was polarised based on gender and age, and dimensioned by vertical connections. The master – slave and patron – client relationships system sanctioned structures of hierarchical dependence, with

the landed elite, and imperial bureaucrats in centre-place. Setting aside the legal dependence of women and children, these structures of dependence and interconnectivity meant that the socially inferior – whether private persons or entire communities – had to defer to their masters, respectively, patrons, for a wide array of actions: personal advancement (e.g., securing a position), legal representation, financial support, obtaining an exemption or a privilege, often of existential importance.

In this context, recommendation (*commendatio*) played a pivotal role. It could refer to a person, much like contemporary practices of recommendation; entrust a person or object for safekeeping; or delegate a legal matter to be settled by someone else (usually a client's patron).¹

By the same token, travel and relocation also often relied on *commendatio*. For instance, students who wished to study in cities outside their native province were required to present recommendation letters from the municipal and / or provincial authorities. As C. Grey noted, qualified labourers travelled also by recommendation.² At a more basic level, a letter of recommendation secured means of transportation and hospitality on the road to the person who wished to avoid the financial burden and inconveniences of putting up at inns or hostels in the course of a journey.³

The advent of Christianity brought but little disruption in this system. Instead, Christians extended the practice of *commendatio*, adding several other uses to the already existing ones. An immediately apparent domain is ecclesiastical communication and hospitality.

As Christian communities sprang across the empire, some at considerable distances from one another, but still looked for guidance at their founders or at prestigious teachers of the faith, an intense epistolary activity developed. The letters of the apostle Paul illustrate the importance of this ministry. With few notable exceptions, Christians generally preferred to use private communication channels instead of the official imperial travel and post service. Letters were usually conveyed via close collaborators who acted as trusted messengers.⁴ It should be mentioned that these messengers were also usually recruited from socially exposed categories. In this sense, it was imperative to ensure that the letter-bearer found sufficient resources during his travel to reach destination safe and sound, and was well-received by the addressees. Many letters from this initial period contain a few sentences which recommend the messenger, entrusting him to the care of the addressees. Foundational Christian documents such as the letters of Paul offer ample material not just for recommending the bearer of the respective letter, but also other

collaborators, travellers that the recipients were to expect.⁵ Likewise, in a letter to the community in Philippi, Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna (ca 69 – ca 155 AD) extended his recommendation to the messenger, Crescens, and his sister, who was to visit at a later date.⁶

This type of recommendation served two main purposes. It ascertained the identity of the letter-bearer and it procured him / her hospitality on the road and at destination. To the modern eye, used to clearly determined, easily recognised identification documents and stately regulation of mobility, this might seem strange. But to ancient people, deprived of such commodities, these recommendations were the only confirmation that otherwise unknown messengers were indeed who they claimed to be, not to mention that the letter they delivered was indeed authentic. Polycarp's letter to the Philippians shows also a growing concern to ascertain that travellers were pious Christians, worthy of the care and hospitality of Christian communities elsewhere.

Soon enough, issuing letters of recommendation proper to Christian travellers with limited resources became a regular ecclesial practice. These recommendations functioned as travel documents akin to a Christian *passe-partout*, used to obtain food and lodging not only at one's destination, but also in various communities one travelled through.

Constantine's edict of toleration (313 AD) brought unprecedented freedom to Christianity, but also a set of concerns that went hand in hand with organising the Church as an institution. In particular, Christian hierarchy devoted considerable effort to bring about unity amongst the disparate Christian communities and confer a degree of stability to this new organism.⁷ No longer persecuted by a polytheistic majority, the Church now had to face internal crises in its quest for self-definition as orthodox and universal Church.⁸ Factionalism, competing theological schools, competing hierarchy were no stranger to the Early Church either. Disagreements arose in terms of doctrine, constitution, rite, bringing into focus the question of authority: Who were the keepers and teachers of the truth? To whom ought one look for guidance in living out their faith, and whose guidance ought to be rejected?

In response to these afflictions, the Church sought to appoint a clearly defined hierarchy and impose territorial and jurisdictional limits emulating imperial administrative structures. This process of delimitation corresponded with the definition of ecclesial communion and of patterns of inclusion / exclusion from the Christian communion. Recommendation became an integral part of documents attesting communion,⁹ the ultimate

aim of which was to keep “heresies” and the authority / undue influence of competing bishops at bay.

The imperial acceptance and progressive support of Christianity procured a set of privileges for the clergy (including privileges of economic and judicial kind). The clerical career became a coveted way to gain prestige and personal advancement. The Church attempted to curb personal ambitions by limiting the number of appointments to the strictly necessary; clergy were ordained for life and tied to the community they served (*stabilitas loci*).¹⁰ This guaranteed a measure of stability in the life of the community and pre-empted clergy to wander off to better-situated places. Clerical mobility was subject to episcopal authorisation and the law of communion.

But the Church was more than just a religious institution: it also had a social function – what would be denoted in modern terms “pastoral care”. To mention but a few aspects, the Church ministered to the sick and the socially vulnerable; it supported orphans and women who had no social, economic, and judicial protection;¹¹ it engaged in freeing captives, interceded on behalf of prisoners, and gave asylum to slaves and exiles; it offered relief aid in case of catastrophe. Bishops, now belonging to the local elites, were entrusted with significant Church properties: they became patrons for the workers and tenants on these domains, as well as for the members of their communities. As leaders, they engaged in extensive networking and patronage. These represented as many areas that implied some sort of recommendation letters.

Freedom of worship also gave impetus to Christian devotion. The sacralisation of space complemented the sacralisation of the apostolic and martyrial past, giving birth to pilgrimage centres scattered across the empire. Devoting one’s life to God replaced dying for the name of God in a sort of living martyrdom: this stood at the core of ascetic practices, withdrawal to the desert or in monastic communities. On a more mundane level, monasteries or urban ascetic communities ensured their members’ basic needs of food, lodging, clothing. The socially vulnerable sought more and more often entrance to these communities because it lifted existential insecurity. In this sense, the presentation of a character reference attesting the piety and zeal of the applicant became one of the many requirements of the entrance procedure to a monastery.¹²

A final aspect of interest for this paper is, again, travel. Although bishops on occasion were allowed to use the imperial post for a speedy arrival, a great deal of communication happened via private channels. Christianity transformed the Roman empire into a hub of communication and

hospitality: bishops visited neighbouring communities, went to councils or travelled to ordain other bishops; pilgrims visited the holy places or sought the guidance of inspirational teachers;¹³ the needy travelled for relief, the sick were visited (sometimes at considerable distance), news, books, relics of saints and martyrs were exchanged. The Church intervened on behalf of travellers by offering them lodging, food, and covering minimal expenses – provided they presented a recommendation that attested who they were, and what their status was within the communion.

As this brief overview suggests, the importance of recommendation in the context of hospitality, mobility and clerical networking entitles this category of documents to be studied in their own right. Given their special use in the broader game of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, ecclesiastical career, as well as late antique asceticism, their role in creating or defying patterns of identity, in recruitment practices and personal advancement deserves to be spelled out.

This contribution seeks to explore late antique Christian recommendation practices and types on the basis of information retrieved from early Christian synodal documents, select literary sources and papyri. Its chronological limits range from the early fourth century to the council of Chalcedon (451 AD). The period coincides with a major formative-normative stage in the life of the Church, which I sought to outline above. The councils held in the fourth and the fifth centuries mention several types of recommendation as prerequisites for mobility and clerical advancement. Given the prolific epistolography of the period, an exhaustive analysis would by far exceed the scope of this paper. For this reason, the corpus of analysed letters focuses on the epistolary collections of Basil of Caesarea (330 – 379 AD), Ambrose of Milan (ca 339 – 397 AD), Jerome (ca 342/7 – 420 AD), John Chrysostom (ca 347 – 407), and Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430 AD). These personalities were not only influential leaders who participated in doctrinal controversies and in organising ascetic practices, but were also intense networkers caring for large communities. It must be stated, however, that even within this limited selection, the material is of unequal proportions. The surviving ancient letter collections have been subject to various processes of editing, either by the authors themselves, or subsequent generations, processes that entailed the omission of material considered unimportant for the agenda of the editor. It is not by chance that the authors who furnish the majority of recommendations cited below are Basil of Caesarea and Augustine, both of whom kept quite extensive archives. Ambrose and Jerome both organised their letter collections

attempting to highlight certain aspects of their legacy, whether as exegete, ascetic teacher or controversialist, whereas John Chrysostom initiated the extant letter collection in his final years, when he was in exile, perhaps as an attempt to make up for the archives he had lost.¹⁴

Documentary papyri, in turn, offer complementary examples and information, immersing the scholar into everyday challenges faced by ordinary Christians, aspects less visible in the high-profile correspondence of famous Christian authors.

Recommendation Letters or Practices of Recommendation?

The *Typoi epistolikoi* of Pseudo-Demetrius, an ancient handbook of letter-writing, defines the recommendation letter – ἐπιστολή συστατική or *littera commendatoria*, *commendaticia* in its Latin equivalent – as a letter written “to a person for the sake of another, inserting (words of) praise, and speaking of those previously unacquainted as if they were acquainted.”¹⁵ Pseudo-Libanius, another epistolary theorist, this time writing closer to the period which interests us (later fourth / early fifth century), gives approximately the same definition: “The recommendation [letter] is the one through which we recommend [συνίστῳμεν] someone to somebody; it is also called introductory [παραθετική].”¹⁶

These definitions, cryptic at best, fail to convey the volatility and the scope of the concept of “recommendation” in ancient and Early Christian times. While both authors stress the fact that the beneficiary must be considered worthy of the introduction / recommendation, they tell us nothing of the finality of such letters. Recommendation was seldom gratuitous, and many surviving letters can be construed ultimately as (unofficial) requests or petitions. Oftentimes the συστατική and the πρεσβευτική – the petition – conflate into “letters of mediation”.¹⁷ Several extant letters also show that the recommended persons were previously known to the recipient. Basil of Caesarea’s *ep.* 305 was written on behalf of such a person.¹⁸ Basil does not name either the addressee or the beneficiary of this letter. Yet, evidently, in spite of his assurances, the carrier sought to obtain something from the addressee, perhaps a closer acquaintance, which the letter from Basil naturally provided.

Likewise, as mentioned before, recommendation could also refer to goods (e.g., a property) or legal matters.¹⁹ Requests for tax exemption that regularly pop up for instance in the correspondence of the Cappadocian

Fathers are at the same time recommendations.²⁰ The pen of Basil of Caesarea again left us excellent examples. *Ep.* 313, for instance, requests that the tax burden on the property of a magistrate, Ulpicios, be eased. More interesting is that Basil commends this property as if it were his own. Augustine, in turn, writes *ep.* 96 to Olympius on behalf of Boniface, a neighbouring bishop. Boniface had previously sought a solution to the financial troubles he inherited from his predecessor,²¹ and Augustine makes it clear that he had recommended Boniface to Olympius on that occasion too. In *ep.* 96 he took advantage of Olympius' promotion to a higher imperial office to raise the issue of the petition (not necessarily the person!) again: "I again commend to your kind consideration the petition of my brother and colleague Boniface, in the hope that what could not be done before may be in your power now. (...) I beg you to condescend to give your support to this petition, because he has resolved not to bring forward the decision in his favour which was formerly obtained, lest it should preclude him from the liberty of making a second application; for the answer then given fell short of what he desired."²²

Another complicating factor is that recommendation need not be the main subject of the letter. More often than not in surviving correspondence, recommendations amounted to a few sentences written into letters with an altogether different subject.²³ Personal relationships and social status, but also the urgency of the request and its nature, or whether the addressee was solicited in an official capacity or for private assistance determined the tone and the content of the recommendation. Educated correspondents, established friends or contacts wrote in different registers; the introductory paragraph of praise, as well as the mandatory assurances of repayment (in terms of loyalty, honour, or prayer)²⁴ could be shortened, eschewed altogether or expanded as the case required. Seen against the broader system of patronage, recommendation served a variety of purposes, from problem-solving to personal advancement, benefitting not just the recommended person, but also the sender and the addressee. Senders had the opportunity to discharge their obligations as patrons, to create new contacts or intensify existing links in their network; the addressees, in turn, also broadened their network of clients, thereby augmenting their social prestige and influence.

Taking into account this diffuse spectrum, this contribution refers to "recommendation" as a set of practices and a cultural phenomenon,²⁵ in so far as "practice(s) of recommending" represents a more inclusive term than the reductive "letter of recommendation". Of course, the ancient

letter remains the standard medium, at least the one we can access, for recommendation practices. However, even in relation to this standard medium, recommendation exceeded by far the scope of the *συστατική* and the *παραθετική* defined in epistolary handbooks. Of course, Christians had other examples to guide their use and understanding of recommendation. The paradigmatic text here is Paul's Letter to the Romans, cited above:²⁶ It recommends Phoebe as a collaborator of Paul, a messenger entrusted not only with delivering Paul's letter, but also expanding *viva voce* his message;²⁷ it specifies Phoebe's status as deaconess; it requests she be granted hospitality in the Roman community and that they sponsor her return journey. The stylistic register and terminology is also symptomatic for later Christian recommendations.

With its ambitions to universality and unity, post-Constantinian Christianity transformed the Mediterranean into a "networked world".²⁸ On the one hand, Christian letter-writing was deeply rooted in Graeco-Roman epistolography. Christians continued to write letters, recommendations, petitions, etc., much as their "pagan" contemporaries. But specifically Christian, and within this domain, specifically ecclesiastical patterns of communication began to emerge, in which the Christian letter played a pivotal role. For one thing, the sending and receiving of letters became an expression of communion, of the unity of faith and doctrine within a particular community as well as between various local communities and hierarchs. This implied the shaping of inclusion – exclusion patterns that accompanied, among others, the development of penitence, the discernment of orthodoxy vs. heresy, or the liturgical practice of reciting the names of bishops in the diptychs. In the context of enhanced Christian travel and communication, knowing who the bishop of a given community was and whether he was part of the ecclesial communion was paramount. As was the need to know if a traveller could participate in the Eucharist or, for that matter, if they could participate at all in the liturgy, as various stages of the penitential practice implied various degrees of exclusion. In other words, ecclesiastical recommendation became an instrument of communion.²⁹

Moreover, the development of Christian pilgrimage and pastoral care (especially of vulnerable social categories, such as widows, orphans, the destitute) rendered hospitality an integral part of the organisational structure of the Church. Bishops and monastic leaders promoted the creation of "trans-regional structural spaces".³⁰ The reciprocation of hospitality was extended to the entire social spectrum, meaning that hospitality was granted at community level. Gradually, hospitality practices

were differentiated according to the nature of membership in the Christian church and the position the traveller held in ecclesiastical hierarchy. Chapter II.58 of the *Apostolic Constitutions* (fourth century AD) prescribes that each traveller be received in the category to which they belong:

When a brother or a sister arrive from abroad with letters of recommendation, the deacon shall examine their situation, and shall ascertain if they are believers, if they are part of the Church, if they have not been tainted by some heresy, and again, in the case of a woman, if she is married or a widow. Informed in this way about them, knowing that they are truly believers and in communion of thought as regards the Lord, the deacon shall lead each [of them] to their rightful place. If a presbyter arrives from another region, the presbyters shall receive him in their college; if he is a deacon, he shall be received by the deacons; and if he is a bishop, he shall sit with the bishop.³¹

The passage implies that recommendation letters are mandatory only for the laity, and their reception should be subject to an additional examination by the deacon. But the *Apostolic Canons* of the same collection show that both clergy and laity were required to present recommendations. *Can.* 12 states that “[i]f a member of the clergy or a layperson, excluded or admitted [to communion] travels to another town and is there received without letters of recommendation, those who received him and he himself shall be excluded”.³² *Can.* 13 advises that those who were subject to some degree of exclusion and lied about their membership in the Christian community should have their exclusion prolonged.³³

Indeed, early Christian canonical sources consistently demand that travelers and those who wish to relocate present recommendations upon arrival; otherwise, they ought not to be received.

Recommendation in Canonical Sources of the Fourth and the Fifth Centuries

In this section I offer a brief overview of the canonical regulations concerning the use of recommendation established by the synods of the fourth and the fifth centuries. Since the majority of synods, both local and inter-regional, dealt with this issue, I selected only the more relevant examples for the purposes of this paper.³⁴

Can. 7-8 of the Council of Arles (314 AD) rule on the participation of secular officers in the life of the Church. According to these canons, for the duration of their tenure imperial office-holders who were Christians were required to submit to the authority of the bishop where they served their tenure, and were obliged to present mandating letters – that is, recommendation letters – from their own bishop:

Concerning governors who pursue a term in office as Christians, we deemed good that upon their promotion they receive ecclesiastical communion letters (*litteras communicatorias*), but to the end that, regardless where they exercise their function, they submit to the supervision of the bishop of that place; and if they start committing acts against Church discipline, they should be excluded from communion. The same applies concerning those who wish to engage in public service.³⁵

In other words, they were subject to the rules that applied to any itinerant Christian.

Can. 7 of the council of Antioch (341 AD) forbids the reception of foreigners who fail to submit *peace letters* (εἰρηνικά).³⁶ This type of recommendation letter has ample illustration amongst surviving papyri, as shall be discussed later. A similar provision, this time referring both to laity and clergy, was advanced at the council of Carthage (348 AD). *Can.* 7 states that foreigners (laypersons and clergy alike) may participate in the Eucharist on condition that they present letters from their bishop: "... no clergy or layperson should partake of communion in another place without letters from their bishop. (...) For when they are received with letters, concord between bishops is maintained".³⁷ The concern here is that persons on whom one bishop imposed some penalty should evade punishment by secretly taking refuge in another community. This is in line with *can.* 42 of the Council of Laodicea (end of fourth century),³⁸ or *can.* 33 of the *Apostolic Canons*, which states:

Do not receive any foreign bishop, priest, or deacon without recommendation letters (συστατικά γράμματα); if they bring such [letters], they shall be examined, and if they are preachers of the faith, they shall be received; otherwise, give them what they need, but do not receive them in communion.³⁹

Synodal documents dealt not only with the necessity of presenting recommendation letters, but also who was authorised to issue them. This is

the case of *can.* 8 of the council of Antioch (341 AD), which rules implicitly on extra-provincial travel: “Priests who serve in the country ought not to give canonical letters, let them address letters only to neighbouring bishops. But let unblemished country bishops issue pacific letters at will”.⁴⁰ The canon denies country priests the authority to issue any type of communion letter (ἐπιστολάς κανονικάς), including recommendation letters – except to bishops in the immediate vicinity, probably the closest chorepiscopus or town bishop. This offered some degree of protection to those forced to travel until they could appeal to a bishop. However, the council did recognise the authority and jurisdiction of country bishops,⁴¹ albeit limiting it to a specific type of recommendation (the *pacific letter*). At any rate, canonical sources consider recommendation of whatever type the province of bishops alone.⁴² *Can.* 7 of the Council of Carthage, cited above, includes also bishops amongst the personnel required to present recommendation letters. Presumably such letters were authored by the metropolitan or primate, as *can.* 27 of the Council of Hippo (393 AD) confirms: “Similarly, let no bishop travel overseas unless they consulted the primate of each province, so that they can obtain from him in advance a recommendation [letter] (*formatam uel commendationem*)”.⁴³ This seems to be a characteristic practice of Western provinces. From *ep.* 1 of pope Zosimus (417 – 418 AD) we learn that reception of clergy from Gaul depended on the successful presentation of a recommendation (*littera formata*) issued by the bishop of Arles.⁴⁴

A number of canons refer to clerical relocation, i.e., the permanent change of parish or ordination to a higher clerical office in a different place. Invariably, these relocations had to be authorised before by the bishop under whose jurisdiction the respective clergy originally belonged. Likewise invariably, the approval had to be granted in written form, by way of letter. *Can.* 16 of the council of Nicaea (325 AD) states:

Any presbyter, or deacon, or any other [person] enrolled among the clergy, who, not having the fear of God before their eyes, nor taking into account the ecclesiastical canon, recklessly and inconsiderately separate from their own church, must by no means to be received by another church; but they should be constrained by every means to return to their own parishes; and, if they persist [in staying away], they must be excommunicated. And if anyone shall dare surreptitiously to carry off and in his own Church ordain a man belonging to another, without the consent of his own proper bishop, from whom he has separated although enrolled [there] in the clergy, let the ordination be void.⁴⁵

Undoubtedly, there was substantial mobility amongst late antique clergy. As E. Wipszycka noted, ordination did not entail giving up one's previous occupation; depending on the category from which clergy were recruited, this often implied regular travel.⁴⁶ However, such enhanced mobility clashed with the Church's concern for stability, episcopal jurisdiction and authority. Councils sought to discourage prolonged absence from one's diocese, for pastoral as well as disciplinary reasons. Keeping accurate track of who was a member of the clergy and where had a practical side, too, considering that clergy were exempt from certain taxes, but that often they were recruited from dependent social categories. This is especially visible in the case of rural churches (situated in villages or on aristocratic domains). Their inhabitants were often tied tenants, included in the tax lists under the name of their landowners. Were they to wander off to other places, the landowner would incur tax losses. *Codex Theodosianus* 16.2.33 (July 27, 398 AD) orders that rural clergy should be recruited from among the inhabitants of the same village or domain, in order to pre-empt unnecessary fiscal burden on the landowners and clerical ordination for the sake of being exempted from tax.⁴⁷

In this sense, *CPR* V 11 is revealing.⁴⁸ This papyrus, dated to the early fourth century, preserves a contract between Aurelios Basis, newly ordained deacon, and his bishop, Ammonothion. Without particular juridical value, it is nonetheless a written engagement on the part of the deacon that he shall remain in Ammonothion's service. As per the terms of the agreement, Aurelios Basis was allowed to travel – or to relocate – if he could persuade Ammonothion and obtain his consent; or, in case he received a letter:

I agree by this document not to forsake you, nor to transfer to the service of another bishop or presbyter, unless you assent to it because these are the terms on which I made the agreement. If I want to leave without your consent or without even a letter, let me be unable to retain the diaconate under you but merely hold lay fellowship with dignity.⁴⁹

Although an atypical act, the contract echoes canonical efforts to tie clergy to their place of ordination. It also confirms that formal, written statements had to be obtained to enable clerical mobility (the "consent" and the "letter" that Ammonothion was supposed to give). It should be noted that the document had no judicial value, but functioned more by way of a pledge on the part of the deacon and an extra precaution on the

part of the bishop.⁵⁰ In essence, it repeats what the canons cited above and others sought to achieve: that clerical expats should have the authorisation of their bishop if they wished to retain the clerical rank; otherwise, their ordination should be invalidated.

An interesting case is *can.* 1 of the Council of Nîmes (396 AD). The council addressed abusive situations when strangers forged recommendation letters to pass as clergy. While the requirement to examine incomers even after they submitted recommendations is expressed in previous synodal documents, the council of Nîmes is the first to confirm the frequent occurrence of forgery:

... because many [men] travelling from the farthest parts of the East pretend to be priests and deacons, thrusting upon unsuspecting people recommendations (*apostholia*) signed by unknown [persons], and because, hoping as they are to exact financial support for expenditures and alms (*sumptum*), they abuse the communion of the saints under the pretext of a feigned religion: we decided that if there is anybody of that sort, and the general interest of the Church is not endangered, they should not be admitted to the service of the altar.⁵¹

The text is corrupted in places, which makes it quite difficult to interpret. But the gist is that pretend presbyters and deacons used recommendations signed by obscure names to get access to resources allocated to the clergy (board and food as well as stipend). Interesting is also that the canon makes circumstantial allowances. Persons discovered with forged letters are apparently allowed to retain their position if there was penury of clergy that would have caused disruption in ministry.

Finally, *can.* 11 of the Council of Chalcedon (451 AD) states that “the poor and those needing assistance shall travel, after examination, merely with pacific letters from the church (ἐπιστολίοις εἰρηνικοῖς ἐκκλησιαστικοῖς), and not with commendatory letters (συστατικοῖς), inasmuch as commendatory letters ought to be given only to persons held in high esteem”.⁵²

A Contested Typology

From an overview of ancient canons several technical denominations emerge for recommendation letters: εἰρηνική, συστατική, or their Latin equivalents, *pacifica*, respectively *commendaticia*, *communicatoria*,

formata, *epistolia* or *apostholia*.⁵³ As a result, scholarship identified three main types of ecclesiastical recommendation – and again, this classification is based not so much on formal grounds as on the purpose which these documents fulfilled: the pacific letter (*littera pacifica*), the recommendation for the use of the clergy (*littera commendaticia*, or, with a more technical term, *littera formata*),⁵⁴ and the dimissorial letter, which authorized clergy to be ordained in another province.

I shall devote the remainder of my paper to a discussion of these types. But first, two observations are in order. Firstly, these three types do not exhaust the arsenal of ecclesiastical recommendation. In his 2017 monograph *Monasteries and the Care of Souls in Late Antique Christianity*, Paul Dilley repeatedly mentions that ascetic recruitment involved often the presentation of recommendation letters.⁵⁵ Dilley admittedly does not cite examples; however, *ep.* 297 of Basil of Caesarea is just such a recommendation on behalf of a woman who wished to lead an ascetic life. The letter is addressed to an unnamed widow, probably engaged in domestic asceticism. After an elaborate introduction, Basil states the two purposes of the letter: to offer greetings to the widow; and to introduce the bearer of the letter, that is, the aspiring ascetic:

I present to you the daughter of whom I just spoke, so that you may receive her as my daughter and your own sister. Consider as your own all that she confides to your noble and pure heart, and take her into your care with the certainty that you shall be rewarded by the Lord, and then that you grant us a favour.⁵⁶

Likewise, Jerome commends a widow named Theodora to the spiritual care of the presbyter Abigaus.⁵⁷

Of similar import, but referring to clerical ordination is ch. 7 of Augustine's letter 31 to Paulinus of Nola – a letter of considerable breath, covering many subjects. In ch. 7, Augustine recommends Vetustinus, the carrier of the letter, who had suffered some affliction in Africa, for which reason he was fleeing to Italy:

I recommend to your kindness and charity this boy Vetustinus, whose case might draw forth the sympathy even of those who are not religious: the causes of his affliction and of his leaving his country you will hear from his own lips. As to his pious resolution – his promise, namely, to devote himself to the service of God – it will be more decisively known after some time has elapsed, when he is of stronger age, and his present fear is removed.⁵⁸

It seems Vetustinus wished to be ordained into the clergy. Augustine thus asked Paulinus to delay the ordination for some time to ascertain that the youth did not have an ulterior motive (namely to escape affliction). This passage represents an embedded introduction on behalf of a person seeking clerical advancement, attesting at the same time the fact that recommendations were not always self-standing documents.

Another aspect of pastoral care was education. Again, Basil's letters to Libanius on behalf of students he sent for training with the Antiochene master are illustrative.⁵⁹ At the end of letter 41 to Aurelius of Carthage, again on a different subject, Augustine recommends a physician.⁶⁰ Paulinus of Nola commended one of his former slaves who wished to obtain a property;⁶¹ Gregory of Nazianzus sought Themistius' support in procuring a position in Constantinople for the Cappadocian rhetor Eudoxius,⁶² and the list goes on. Thus, recommendation remained a diffuse phenomenon, encompassing mobility, career advancement, problem-solving, recruitment, participation in the life of the Church, etc.

Secondly, as I stressed before, recommendations could be inserted into wider letters. At times, they amounted to a few words singling out the letter-bearer, without ulterior motive. At times, they could commend persons for further action on the part of the receivers.⁶³ *P Oxy XXXI 2603* is essentially a letter of greeting, of widespread attestation in literary epistolography. Yet, the author took the opportunity to commend the carriers of the letter, who, it should be mentioned, were known to the addressee (Sarapion):

Now concerning the acquaintances of ours who are bringing down the letter to you, there is no need for me to write, (knowing as I do) your friendship and affection to all, especially towards our brethren. Receive them therefore in love, as friends, for they are not catechumens but belong to the company of Ision and Nikolaos, and if you do anything for them, you have done it for me. All the brethren here salute you. Greet also the brethren with you, both elect and catechumens. I pray you may be strong.

The author also emphasised that they were not simply catechumens, but rather in the final stages before baptism. A note was also inserted in the left-hand margin requesting that Sarapion write further recommendations for them, so they may be received *κατὰ τόπον*, in every place they go: "And if you can write to the others about (them) don't hesitate, that they may receive them in each place".⁶⁴ The carriers' journey obviously continued beyond the place where Sarapion lived. Admittedly, this papyrus comes

from Manichean circles. Yet, it is illustrative for the category of pacific letters, to which I now turn.

Self-standing pacific letters are well attested by papyri. Their common denominator is the formulaic redaction (generally introductory greeting; request to receive the beneficiaries *ἐν εἰρήνῃ* or *κατὰ τὸ ἔθος*, according to custom), with specification on the status of these beneficiaries, and final greetings. A total of ten such papyri have been published.⁶⁵ C.-H. Kim, and in his wake K. Treu identified them as recommendations,⁶⁶ of the type mentioned by Sozomen, Gregory of Nazianzus and Basil of Caesarea – all of whom refer to tokens, *συμβολαῖοι*, with which Christians travelled the world and found brotherly love and support everywhere.⁶⁷ The chief difficulty in studying these letters is that papyri cannot be dated with precision. At best, one can approximate the period based on palaeographic criteria.⁶⁸

P Oxy LVI 3857, dated to the fourth century, is addressed, in modern terms, to “whomever it may concern” – laity as well as clergy, which suggests it was used as a travel document. It identifies Germania as a person in need and as a “daughter”, meaning that she was a baptized Christian: “To my beloved brothers and fellow ministers, wherever they may be. Receive in peace our daughter Germania, who needs help and goes to you. Through her I and those who are with me greet you and those who are with you. Immanuel”.⁶⁹ Interestingly, the writer of *P Oxy* LVI 3857 does not identify himself – perhaps because Germania was expected to volunteer the information when questioned.⁷⁰ The absence of authors’ credentials would become a problem in time, as we have seen with *can.* 1 of the council of Nîmes.

The materiality of this papyrus is also telling. It has been folded from bottom to top six times, into a tiny object measuring ca 2-3 cm in width,⁷¹ and was carried probably in a pouch around the neck or attached to the belt. This gives us an idea of how precious these documents were for their beneficiaries, people of limited resources who depended on the support of the communities they stopped at in the course of their journey.

In *P Oxy* VIII 1162, likewise from the fourth century, a presbyter named Leon commends Ammonius, styled as “brother” (meaning he is a baptized Christian) to the clergy of whichever community Ammonius passes through:

Leon, presbyter, to fellow servants presbyters and deacons, beloved brothers in the Lord God, fullness of joy. Our brother Ammonius, who is

coming to you, receive him in peace; through him I and those (who are) with me affectionately greet in the Lord you and those (who are) with you. I pray for your welfare in the Lord God. Emmanuel is my witness. Amen.⁷²

Here the sender does identify himself, and mentions his clerical position. The community from which Ammonius came was probably recognized from lists of clergy and addresses local Churches must have had at hand.

Scholarship interprets these and similar papyrus letters as a separate category of recommendation letters on the basis of their formal and structural homogeneity, similar use of vocabulary, the care to mention the status of the beneficiaries,⁷³ who are invariably lay Christians or catechumens, their need for assistance, and the fact that none of these letters implied the solving of other problems.⁷⁴ More recently, Timothy Teeter also argued for setting the pacific letter apart from the recommendation letter (*littera commendaticia*, respectively *formata*). Teeter weighed these papyri against canonical sources, and maintained that pacific letters were issued to the laity only. Any members of the higher clergy (deacons, presbyters, bishops) could author such letters – here Teeter refers to *can.* 8 of the Council of Antioch, discussed above. He also argued that such letters were only meant to secure hospitality, without particular bearing on communion in the Eucharist.⁷⁵ Yet the careful emphasis of the beneficiary's credentials suggests otherwise. The main purpose of the pacific letter depended on the type of endeavour carriers undertook: if the carrier was a traveller, the letter was meant to secure hospitality along the way and/or at destination; if a displaced person, it could function as a "certificate of transfer of church membership".⁷⁶ One can assume that local ecclesiastical chancelleries dealt with this type of documents, both in terms of writing and of reception.⁷⁷ They may have also been produced in bulk, and the name and credentials of the beneficiary inserted later.

Amongst literary sources that mention pacific letters, a useful point of comparison, overlooked so far in scholarship, is Basil of Caesarea's *ep.* 258, addressed to Epiphanius of Salamis. In the introductory chapter, Basil refers to εἰρηνικά γράμματα, with which Epiphanius supplied his envoys. Basil thanks Epiphanius for having sent "brothers to visit us, carriers in good standing of pacific letters".⁷⁸ In determining, however, whether "letters of peace" refers to recommendation or has other technical meanings, the context is very important. For example, Leo I (bishop of Rome 440 – 461 AD), denotes as "letter of peace" the document of communion

he refused to Anatolios of Constantinople.⁷⁹ A similar understanding appears in Basil's *ep.* 203, addressed to the "bishops on the sea coast". Basil reproaches these bishops their silence, tantamount in his view with their refusal to acknowledge him as metropolitan. He then asks these bishops to "console" him "of the past with pacific letters and loving words".⁸⁰

In contrast, the ecclesiastical *littera commendaticia* or *formata* in later councils, was granted to clergy alone. Its author could only be a bishop, in later times, a metropolitan or primate. Teeter relies here on the distinction *can.* 11 and 13 of the council of Chalcedon make between pacific letters given to the needy and recommendations given to "persons of distinction". He seems to imply that this designates clergy.⁸¹ But this was not always the case. *Can.* 12 of the Council of Carthage (407 AD) states that any person (irrespective of belonging to clergy) wishing to appeal to the imperial court must present first a *formata* to the Church of Rome, and ask for a new *formata* from there lest they be deprived of communion.⁸² This is not the only council that seeks to control appeal to the emperor. A similar prohibition was made, for instance, at the council of Antioch.⁸³ Through such canons the Church attempted to discourage dissenting parties (be they schismatics, heretics, excommunicated or unsatisfied parties) from seeking a secular resolution to ecclesiastical matters. *Can.* 12 here does not discriminate between clergy and laity: both are obliged to present recommendations. In light of this, the persons "held in esteem" from *can.* 11 of Chalcedon should be understood to include lay Christians of some consequence, since anyone who could access the court must have had considerable wealth and influence.

If theoretically any travelling clergy should carry a recommendation of the second type, in practice this was not always the case. At any rate, we do not know in what way the content differed from the pacific letter. To give another example from the correspondence of Basil, at the end of his letter to the Western bishops (*ep.* 243), he commends the carrier thus:

By God's grace instead of many we have sent one, our very pious and very beloved brother Dorotheos, the fellow priest. He is fully able to supply by his personal report whatever has been omitted in our letter, for he has carefully followed all that has occurred, and is a zealous defender of the right faith. Receive him in peace (Ὁν προσδεξάμενοι ἐν εἰρήνῃ), and speedily send him back to us, bringing us good news of your readiness to support the brotherhood.⁸⁴

It is unlikely that Dorotheos carried separate recommendation letters; in this case, Basil's recommendation passage was sufficient – all the more so since the letter was meant to be circulated, so it could be read by ecclesiastical authorities that fell in Dorotheos' path. Moreover, Basil's turn of phrase is very similar to the pacific letters just discussed. The only difference is that Dorotheos was mandated to give a full report of the happenings in the East (the persecution of Nicene Christians, rifts within the Nicene party).

Within this category, a group apart are letters of delegation, by which bishops identified and mandated legates to attend official ecclesiastical business. Here we can cite several examples. In a petition to emperor Theodosius, Ambrose detailed the embassy he was sending and its mission.⁸⁵ In a letter to Jerome, Theophilus of Alexandria expounded the embassy he sent to the Holy Land and its mission.⁸⁶ Leo I wrote to Theodosius II and Pulcheria informing them who were the legates he appointed to the council of Ephesus.⁸⁷ But even here, *ep.* 30 to Pulcheria is rather concerned with the Eutychian controversy and Pulcheria's role in it, the recommendation of the legates being of secondary character and appears only at the end.

The distinction between the *commendaticia* or *formata* and dimissorial letters is even more difficult to extract from the documents of the time. Canonical sources do not use specific terms for dimissorial letters. At best, we find vague references to the "consent" and / or "authorization" of the ruling bishop for relocation and ordination elsewhere. If the dimissorial became an established type in the Middle Ages, it seems that in Late Antiquity the *commendaticia* was an umbrella-term that encompassed also recommendations enabling clergy to change parish. Augustine, for instance, speaks in *ep.* 78 of a certain Spes, who was pressuring the bishop either to ordain him into the clergy, or to write him a letter of recommendation so that he could be ordained elsewhere:

But when he was labouring most earnestly to obtain promotion to the rank of the clergy, either on the spot from myself, or elsewhere through letter of mine (*litteras meas*), and I could on no account be induced either to lay hands in the act of ordination upon a man of whom I thought so ill, or to consent to introduce him through commendation of mine to any brother, he began to act more violently (...).⁸⁸

This Spes had some sort of quarrel with a presbyter, Boniface, a conflict Augustine was unable to sort out, and decided, therefore, to send both to Nola, to the sanctuary of Felix, in the hope that a miraculous event would reveal the culprit.⁸⁹ He also mentions in the same letter that Boniface “humbly agreed to forego his claim to a letter by the use of which on his journey he might have asked what was due to his rank, so that both should stand on a footing of equality in a place where both were alike unknown”.⁹⁰

CPR V 11 seems to distinguish between “consent” and the receiving of “letters” (γράμμάτων), the latter evidently less authoritative than the former. “Letters” may be used here in technical sense, akin to *epistolia* in conciliar documents. It perhaps refers to a letter enabling Aurelios Basis to travel, without implying relocation. In contrast, the bishop’s “consent” would imply a document that authorized the deacon to relocate.

Generally, however, boundaries remained blurred. The same letter could be used to more than one end. The recommendation with which Jerome dispatched his deacon, Praesidius, to Augustine, is worth citing at length:

Last year I sent by the hand of our brother, the sub-deacon Asterius, a letter conveying to your Excellency a salutation due to you, and readily rendered by me; and I think that my letter was delivered to you. I now write again, by my holy brother the deacon Praesidius, begging you in the first place not to forget me, and in the second place to receive the bearer of this letter, whom I commend to you with the request that you recognise him as one very near and dear to me, and that you encourage and help him in whatever way his circumstances may demand; not that he is in need of anything (for Christ has amply endowed him), but that he is most eagerly desiring the friendship of good men, and thinks that in securing this he obtains the most valuable blessing. His design in travelling to the West you may learn from his own lips.⁹¹

One or two years later, Augustine requested a Praesidius to forward a letter to Jerome. This Praesidius is styled “brother and partner in the priestly office” (*consacerdos*), a term with which Augustine usually designates fellow bishops.⁹² If the two persons are identical,⁹³ we may suppose that Praesidius travelled to Africa to further his clerical career – in which case letter 103 served by way of dimissorial letter. Yet, Jerome was merely a priest, whereas the *commendaticiae* of this type should have been issued by bishops alone. Even if we see *ep.* 103 as a plain ecclesiastical recommendation, or even a private recommendation with

no “official” value, chances are small that Praesidius had documents that respected canonical prescriptions (i.e., issued by the bishop of the place and mandating his ordination elsewhere). At the time, Jerome was in full conflict with John of Jerusalem, the incumbent bishop.⁹⁴ The Origenist controversy notwithstanding, what sparked John’s animosity was that Jerome’s brother Paulinianus had been ordained by Epiphanius of Salamis without his consent. John treated the ordination as uncanonical. It is unlikely that he would have issued recommendations of any type for Praesidius. In this case, Jerome’s authority seems to have been sufficient.

Concluding Observations

If conciliar sources enable a theoretical distinction into pacific, commendatory and dismissorial letters, in practice ecclesiastical recommendation remained a fluid phenomenon, subject to processes of evolution, specialisation. Rules could be overlooked if the situation demanded. Boundaries were conflated, and one and the same document could serve multiple purposes. Moreover, there is a pronounced difference in practices of recommendation at a regional level. Western provinces, more focused on the authority of the Roman see, would develop a hierarchy of recommendations different from Eastern practices. The pacific letters used in Egypt did not necessarily coincide in form and especially function with the “letters of peace” used in Cappadocia. In many cases, the context determines the meaning and function of the recommendation. Thus, we should beware of constructing a linear development, although development did exist.

Amongst literary sources, embedded recommendations occur more frequently than self-standing letters. Letter-bearers were recommended in the body of the letter often for practical reasons: firstly, to authenticate the letter and, reciprocally, to identify its bearer. Several other factors influence the making of such recommendations: whether the letter was meant to be circulated (which would have made another recommendation superfluous); the length of travel, the availability of trustworthy messengers and of transportation, the relationship between author and messenger; the purpose of travel on the carrier’s part.

As I hope to have shown, the separation between clergy and laity is not as clear-cut as one would think at first sight. In certain situations *formatae* could be issued to laity. Rather, one should set apart the elite

from the rest of the congregation. Christians with limited resources depended on ecclesiastical referral to obtain assistance, whereas the elite and the aristocracy had ample resources for travel, their own networks of hospitality and people to vouchsafe for them in situ. The Paulas and Melanias of the time had no need to be recommended by their bishop when travelling to the Holy Land. Their aristocratic pedigree was a recommendation in itself.

Ecclesiastical recommendation, understood as recommendation issued by Church authorities in their capacity as authorities has a much broader scope than the three categories outlined above. While we know of these because they were mandatory, pastoral care and ecclesial patronage provided many more occasions for exercising recommendation: asceticism, intercession on behalf of supplicants and protégés, education, among others. Moreover, the recommendation did not always guarantee the good conduct of the beneficiary. Vigilantius, a priest who made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land and whom Jerome received in his monastery at Bethlehem, had been recommended by Paulinus of Nola. Soon, however, Vigilantius left the monastery and turned against Jerome, prompting him to exclaim bitterly: "I believed the letter of holy Paulinus, and I did not think that his judgment on your name could be wrong".⁹⁵

This being said, there still remain unanswered questions. Our sources remain silent, for instance, on the validity of these documents, or on how (if) they were archived, particularly the letters with collective address. Like in so many other aspects, any consideration we may advance is conditioned by the sources we have access to. Recommendations, being functional documents, had a smaller chance of survival in the epistolary collections designed to present their author in a certain light.

Abbreviations

ANF – Ante-Nicene Fathers

CChr.SL – Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina

CSEL – Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum

NPNF – Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers

PCBE – Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire

PL – Patrologia Latina

SC – Sources chrétiennes

NOTES

- ¹ Cf. GIZEWSKI.
- ² GREY 2004, 25-40.
- ³ An excellent illustration of how expensive, time-consuming, and cumbersome was travel in the ancient world is given by CASSON 1994, 115-218.
- ⁴ As CASSON 1994, 220, notes, since there was no institution that could approximate modern postal services, ancient letter-writers, Christian or not, struggled constantly to find suitable carriers of their missives. They often had to appeal to third parties, travellers or strangers going in the right direction. Cf. also HEAD 2009, 283-284. All this meant that the delivery of a letter was an exercise of trust on the part of the sender, and generally an unpredictable affair. Hence the many undelivered letters and the time-lapse between sending and reception, which could amount to anything between days and several years. For the importance of this chronological gap in the study of ancient letters, see EBBELER 2017, 247.
- ⁵ E.g., Rom 16:1-2: "I commend to you our sister Phoebe, a deacon of the church at Cenchreae, so that you may welcome her in the Lord, as is fitting for the saints, and help her in whatever she may require from you, for she has been a benefactor of many and of myself as well"; 1 Cor 16:10-11: "If Timothy comes, see that he has nothing to fear among you, for he is doing the work of the Lord just as I am; therefore let no one despise him. Send him on his way in peace, so that he may come to me; for I am expecting him with the brothers."
- ⁶ POLYCARP, ep. ad Phil. 14: "These things I have written to you by Crescens, whom up to the present time I have recommended unto you, and do now recommend. For he has acted blamelessly among us, and I believe also among you. Moreover, y[ou] will hold his sister in esteem when she comes to you." (tr. ANF 1, 36).
- ⁷ SLOOTJES 2019, 295-300.
- ⁸ For an overview of the doctrinal debates of the fourth and the fifth centuries, see the still influential analysis of GRILLMEYER 1974.
- ⁹ Apart from recommendation letters, communion was attested by letters of salutation written by clergy to one another, pastoral letters, synodal and canonical letters, letters informing on the ordination to and "taking possession" of a see, letters authorizing clerical mobility, etc. See CARR 2009, 815-832.
- ¹⁰ See SLOOTJES 2019, 298.
- ¹¹ Such as widows and virgins who rejected marriage and the social security it offered, to dedicate themselves to a religious life.
- ¹² DILLEY 2017, *passim*.
- ¹³ See, e.g., HUNT 1982.

- 14 On these letter collections and issues of editing, agenda, survival, see the following studies in SOGNO, STORIN and WATTS 2017: RADDE-GALLWITZ, 146-160; WASHBURN, 190-204; CAIN, 221-238; and EBBELER, 239-253. See also CAIN 2009.
- 15 Ps-DEMETRIUS, *Τύποι ἐπιστολικοί* 2 (ed. WEICHERT, 3.16-18); English tr. in KEYES 1935, 38. Keyes (pp. 28-30) asserts that, although the manual has been written in the first century BC, it was subject to multiple revisions and remained in use up to the fourth century AD.
- 16 Ps-LIBANIUS, *Ἐπιστολιμαῖοι χαρακτήρες* 4 (ed. WEICHERT, 16.2-3); English tr. in KEYES 1935, 38.
- 17 The term of BRAUCH 2010, 130.
- 18 BASIL OF CAESAREA, *ep.* 305 (ed. COURTONNE, vol. 3, 182): “This man is already known to you, as his very words show (...) So this man, who now goes back to you, asked for a letter [from us], not to inveigle himself in your close circle through our mediation, but to be of service to me and offer me an occasion to greet my friends. The Lord shall reward him for his good intention; as for you, repay as far as you can the debt of gratitude you owe him through your prayers and the goodwill you show to all (...)”. Unless otherwise specified, the English translations are mine.
- 19 BASIL OF CAESAREA, *ep.* 313 (ed. COURTONNE, vol. 3, 187-188).
- 20 In this sense, the law in *Codex Theodosianus* 16.2.15, exempting clergy from supplementary taxes, has been brought in relation to BASIL OF CAESAREA, *ep.* 83, 98, 213, 281, 284 and GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS, *ep.* 67-69. See SC 497, 151, n. 4.
- 21 Boniface’s case, as reconstructed from Augustine’s correspondence, is outlined in PCBE 1, Bonifatius 7, 148-149.
- 22 AUGUSTINE, *ep.* 96.2-3 (CSEL 34/2, 514.20-515.1, 516.1-4); English tr. in NPNF I/1, 405.
- 23 In fact, the majority of the examples cited here from amongst the letters of known authors are such “embedded” recommendations.
- 24 Cf. GIZEWSKI.
- 25 Cf. See LUIJENDIJK 2008, 103: “The duties of friendship entailed recommending friends to influential relations in order to help them to advance their lives”.
- 26 See n. 5 above.
- 27 For a discussion on the Pauline letter-bearers entrusted with such extended ministry, see HEAD 2009, 279-282. In the remainder of his paper (pp. 282-298), Head proceeds to corroborate this observation with documentary papyri which give the name of the respective letter-bearer.
- 28 MRATSCHEK 2019, 155.
- 29 See VIELLA MASANA 2009, 83-113, with a focus on communion letters in the context of travel.

- 30 MRATSCHEK 2019, 152.
- 31 *Apostolic Constitutions* II.58.1-2 (SC 320, 320-322).
- 32 *Apostolic Constitutions* VIII.47.12 (SC 336, 279).
- 33 *Apostolic Constitutions* VIII.47.13 (SC 336, 279).
- 34 A comprehensive treatment of canonical sources in relation to *stabilitas loci* can be found in DOCKTER 2013, 49-76, especially the section on recommendation letters and clerical mobility at 60-66.
- 35 COUNCIL OF ARLES, *can.* 7-8 (SC 241, 48-50).
- 36 COUNCIL OF ANTIOCH, *can.* 7 (ed. JOANNOU, 110.4-5, tr. NPNF II.14, 111): "No stranger shall be received without letters pacifical". The term "received" is to be understood here in the sense of being granted hospitality as well as being accepted into communion.
- 37 COUNCIL OF CARTHAGE, *can.* 7 (CChr.SL 149, 6.118-7.128).
- 38 COUNCIL OF LAODICEA, *can.* 42 (ed. JOANNOU, 148.4-6): "A presbyter or a clergyman should not leave without permission from [their] bishop."
- 39 *Apostolic Constitutions* VIII.47.33 (SC 336, 284). See also DOCKTER 2013, 60-61.
- 40 COUNCIL OF ANTIOCH, *can.* 8 (ed. JOANNOU, 110.9-14).
- 41 The term "unblemished" refers probably to the doctrinal stance of these bishops, since the council of Antioch was convened in the context of Christological controversies.
- 42 See, e.g., COUNCIL OF NÎMES (396 AD), *can.* 6 (SC 241, 128): "If any minister of the altar embarks on a trip for whatever reason, their letters should be signed by [their] bishops alone."
- 43 COUNCIL OF HIPPO, *can.* 27 (CChr.SL 149, 41.155-159). This canon also prescribes that the primate should write to overseas bishops in the name of the local council – presumably the traveller was to carry this letter too, in an attempt to maximise the benefits of an otherwise expensive and time-consuming endeavour.
- 44 ZOSIMUS, *ep.* 1.1 (PL 20, 642-643). See DOCKTER 2013, 63-64; VIELLA MASANA 2009, 98-99.
- 45 COUNCIL OF NICAIA, *can.* 16 (ed. MANSI, vol. 2, 676; tr. NPNF II/14, 35, modified).
- 46 WIPSZYCKA 1996, 180-184. For a study on the often mundane factors that prompted Christian mobility in late antique Egypt, see BLUMELL 2011, 239-247.
- 47 *Codex Theodosianus* 16.2.33 (SC 497, 186-187), with n. 3 on p. 187.
- 48 WIPSZYCKA 1996, 177-194; WIPSZYCKA 2001, 1310.
- 49 Greek text in WIPSZYCKA 1996, 178. Tr. HORSLEY 1981, 121, modified according to the translation of E. Wipszycka.
- 50 WIPSZYCKA 1996, 191.
- 51 COUNCIL OF NÎMES, *can.* 1 (SC 241, 126).

- 52 COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON, *can.* 11 (Greek text in TEETER 1997, 959.)
- 53 VIELLA MASANA 2009, 108, n. 140, considers that *apostholia* is a variation
on *epistolia*. It may also translate into Christian usage a type of authorisation
for grain shipment attested, e.g., in Egypt, albeit much earlier than the fourth
century. See BALAMOSHEV 2019, 1-16.
- 54 GAWLIK 1991, 2024-2025, distinguishes *formata* as part of the general
category of recommendation letters (*commendaticiae*), but referring to
itinerant clergy alone. See also FABRICIUS 1926, 39-86.
- 55 See n. 12 above.
- 56 BASIL OF CAESAREA, *ep.* 297 (ed. COURTONNE, vol. 3, 172.10-15).
- 57 JEROME, *ep.* 76.3 (CSEL 55, 36.12-20).
- 58 AUGUSTINE, *ep.* 31.7 (CSEL 34/2, 6.22-7.2; tr. NPNF I/1, 259-260).
- 59 E.g., BASIL OF CAESAREA, *ep.* 335 (ed. COURTONNE, vol. 3, 203.1-14);
ep. 337 (ed. COURTONNE, vol. 3, 204.1-205.15).
- 60 AUGUSTINE, *ep.* 41.2 (CSEL 34/2, 83.19-84.2).
- 61 PAULINUS OF NOLA, *ep.* 12.12. See GREY 2004, 33-34.
- 62 GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS, *ep.* 38.
- 63 Several of Augustine's letters recommend more than one person, making
it clear that the beneficiaries need not be also the carriers of the letter. See
AUGUSTINE, *ep.* 31.7 (CSEL 34/2, 6.22-7.18), 139.4 (CSEL 44, 154.2-
11), 212 (CSEL 44, 371.6-372.10). The latter commends two ascetic
ladies, mother and daughter, who also served as letter-carriers. Similarly,
AMBROSE's *ep.* 2.27 (PL 16, 886-887) commends to the care of Constantius,
a fellow bishop, an entire community. Constantius should oversee it until
a bishop could be ordained.
- 64 Ed. and tr. in BARNES *et al.* 1966, 174-175; NALDINI 1968, 212-215 (no. 47).
- 65 WIPSZYCKA 2001, 1312-3, gives the following list: P. Alex. 29 (Naldini 19,
3rd c.); PSI XV 1560 (Naldini 20, 3rd-4th c.); PSI III 208 (Naldini 28, 3rd-4th c.);
PSI IX 1041 (Naldini 29, 3rd-4th c.); P. Oxy. XXXI 2603 (Naldini 47, 4th c.); P.
Oxy. VIII 1162 (Naldini 50, 4th c.); SB III 7269 (Naldini 94, 4th-5th c.); SB XVI
12304 (3rd-4th c.); P. Oxy. XXXVI 2785 (4th c.); P. Oxy. LVI 3857 (4th c.).
- 66 KIM 1972; TREU 1973, 629-636. A synoptic overview of nine, on the basis
of Kim and Treu, is given in SIRIVIANOU 1989, 112-114. See also BLUMELL
2011, 244-245.
- 67 SOZOMEN, *hist. eccl.* 5.16.3; GREGORY OF NAZIANZUS, *Oration IV*
against Julian 1.11; BASIL OF CAESAREA, *ep.* 191 (ed. Courtonne, vol. 2,
145.23-27): "Such, indeed, was once the glory of the Church, that brothers
from each particular church travelled from one end of the world to the other
having been provided for the road with little tokens of recognition, found
all men fathers and brothers". See also TREU 1973, 636.
- 68 WIPSZYCKA 2001, 1313.
- 69 Ed. and tr. in SIRIVIANOU 1989, 115.

- 70 As HEAD 2009, 298, noted, in such cases “the bearer invariably has a crucial
71 role in explaining in person the generally fairly coded requests for help”.
72 SIRIVIANOU 1989, 114.
73 Ed. HUNT 1911, 266. NALDINI 1968, 223-224 (no. 50). Tr. of Hunt,
modified.
74 This is especially visible in earlier papyri, from the third century, P. Oxy.
XXXVI 2785 and PSI IX 1041, papyrus letters from the dossier of Sotas. See
75 LUIJENDIJK 2008, 102-124; BLUMELL 2011, 10.
76 KIM 1972, 101-118; LUIJENDIJK 2008, 109-110; WIPSYZYCKA 2001, 1312.
TEETER 1997, 958.
77 KIM 1972, 118: “It is quite possible that when a member of the church moved
from one place to another, the leader of the local church instructed him to
join another Christian congregation in his prospective residence area, and
gave him a letter of introduction and certification to take along”.
78 WIPSYZYCKA 2001, 1314: “Il est probable que les lettres de ce genre étaient
redigées au niveau des collaborateurs d’un évêque et étaient destinées aux
collaborateurs d’un autre évêque.”
79 BASIL OF CAESAREA, *ep.* 258 (ed. Courtonne, vol. 3, 100.7-9).
80 LEO I, *ep.* 111.1 (PL 54, 1021).
81 BASIL OF CAESAREA, *ep.* 203 (ed. Courtonne, vol. 3, 171.2-3).
82 TEETER 1997, 955-956.
83 COUNCIL OF CARTHAGE, *can.* 12 = COUNCIL OF CARTHAGE (419 AD),
can. 106 (ed. JOANNOU, 370.6-371.12).
84 COUNCIL OF ANTIOCH, *can.* 11 (ed. JOANNOU, 113.4-21): Clergy cannot
appeal to the emperor without “the consent and letters of the bishops of
the province, and particularly of the metropolitan bishops”. The penalty for
breaching the canon amounted to public excommunication and exclusion
from the clergy.
85 BASIL OF CAESAREA, *ep.* 243 (ed. COURTONNE, vol. 3, 73.7-15).
86 AMBROSE, *ep.* 62.3 (PL 16, 1188).
87 JEROME, *ep.* 87 (CSEL 55, 140).
88 LEO I, *ep.* 29-30 (PL 54, 782-790).
89 AUGUSTINE, *ep.* 78.3 (CSEL 34/2, 334.10-15); tr. NPNF I/1, 346, modified.
90 On this conflict, see PCBE 1, Bonifatius 5, 148.
91 AUGUSTINE, *ep.* 78.4 (CSEL 34/2, 337.9-12); tr. NPNF I/1, 346, modified.
92 JEROME, *ep.* 103.1 (CSEL 55, 237.5-15) = AUGUSTINE, *ep.* 39; tr. NPNF
I/1, 272.
93 AUGUSTINE, *ep.* 74 (CSEL 34/2, 279).
94 Cf. PCBE 1, Praesidius 1, 1814.
95 See HUNT 1982, 182-191.
JEROME, *ep.* 61.3 (CSEL 54, 580.7-8).

Bibliography

1. Primary Sources

- BARNES, J. W. B. et al. (eds.), *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri: Part XXXI*, Egypt Exploration Society, London, 1966.
- COURTONNE, Y. (ed. and tr.), *Saint Basile, Correspondance*, vols. 1-3, CUF, 2nd ed., Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2003.
- GAUDEMET, J. (introd., tr. and notes), *Conciles Gaulois du IV^e siècle, Texte Latin de l'édition C. Munier*, SC 241, Cerf, Paris, 1977.
- GOLDBACHER, A. (ed.), *S. Aureli Augustini Hipponensis episcopi epistulae*, vols. 1-5, CSEL 34/1-2, 44, 57-58, Tempsky, Vindobonae, 1895-1923.
- HILBERG, I. (ed.), *Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi epistulae*, vols. 1-3, CSEL 54-56, Tempsky, Vindobonae, 1910-1918.
- HUNT, A. S. (ed.), *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, vol. 8, Egypt Exploration Fund, London, 1911.
- JOANNOU, P.-P. (ed. and tr.), *Les canons des Synodes Particuliers, Discipline générale antique (IV^e - IX^e s.)*, vol I/2, Fonti 9, Grottaferrata, Pontificia Commissione per la redazione del codice di diritto canonico orientale, 1962.
- METZGER, M. (ed. and tr.), *Les constitutions apostoliques*, vols. 1-3, SC 320, 329, 336, Cerf, Paris, 1985-1987.
- MUNIER, C. (ed.), *Concilia Africae a. 345 – a. 525*, CChr.SL 149, Brepols, Turnhout, 1974.
- ROUGÉ, J. (tr.) and DELMAIRE, R. (introd. and notes), *Les lois religieuses des empereurs romains de Constantin à Théodose II (312-438)*, vol. 1: *Code Théodosien, livre XVI, texte Latin Theodor Mommsen*, SC 497, Cerf, Paris, 2005.
- Sancti Ambrosii Mediolanensis episcopi opera omnia*, vol. 2/1, PL 16, Paris, 1845.
- Sancti Leonis Magni Romani pontificis opera omnia*, vol. 1, PL 54, Paris, 1846.
- SIRIVIANOU, M. G. (ed.), *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, vol. 56, Egypt Exploration Society, London, 1989.
- WEICHERT, V. (ed.), *Demetrii et Libanii qui feruntur Τύποι ἐπιστολικοί et Ἐπιστολιμαῖοι χαρακτῆρες*, Teubner, Lipsiae, 1910.
- S. Zosimus, papa, *Epistulae et decreta*, in *Quinti saeculi scriptorum ecclesiasticorum opera omnia*, PL 20, Paris, 1845, 639-711.

2. Secondary Literature

- BALAMOSHEV, C., "SB V 8754: Apostoloi, Antapostoloi, and the Ptolemaic Grain Transport", in *Journal of Juristic Papyrology* 49, 2019, 1-16.
- BLUMELL, L. H., "Christians on the Move in Late Antique Oxyrhynchus", in P. A. HARLAND (ed.), *Travel and Religion in Antiquity*, Studies in Christianity and Judaism 21, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, ON, 2011, 239-247.
- BRAUCH, T., "Gregory of Nazianzus' Letters 24 and 38 and Themistius of Constantinople", in *Studia Patristica* 47, 2010, 129-134.

- CAIN, A., "The Letter Collections of Jerome of Stridon", in SOGNO *et al.* 2017, 221-238.
- CAIN, A., *The Letters of Jerome: Asceticism, Biblical Exegesis, and the Construction of Christian Authority in Late Antiquity*, Oxford Early Christian Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, NY, 2009.
- CARR, E., OSB, "KOINONIA: Cartas de comunión en la tradición oriental", in *Scripta theologica* 41/3, 2009, 815-832.
- CASSON, L., *Travel in the Ancient World*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD and London, 1994.
- DILLEY, P. C., *Monasteries and the Care of Souls in Late Antique Christianity: Cognition and Discipline*, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
- DOCKTER, H., *Klerikerkritik im antiken Christentum*, V&R Unipress, Göttingen, 2013.
- EBBELER, J. F., "The Letter Collection of Augustine of Hippo", in SOGNO *et al.* 2017, 239-253.
- GIZEWSKI, C., "Commendatio", in *Brill's New Pauly*, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e303510 (accessed on 09.07.2022).
- FABRICIUS, C., "Die litterae formatae im Frühmittelalter", in *Archiv für Urkundenforschung* 9, 1926, 39-86.
- GAWLIK, A., "Litterae formatae", in *Lexikon des Mittelalters* 5, 1991, 2024-2025.
- GREY, C., "Letters of Recommendation and the Circulation of Rural Laborers in the Late Antique Roman West", in L. ELLIS and F.L. KIDNER (eds.), *Travel, Communication and Geography in Late Antiquity: Sacred and Profane*, 2nd ed., Routledge, London and New York, 2004, 25-40.
- GRILLMEYER, A., S.J., *Christ in Christian Tradition*, vol. 1: *From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*, tr. J. BOWDEN, 2nd ed., John Knox Press, Atlanta, GA, 1974.
- HEAD, P., "Named Letter-Carriers among the Oxyrhynchus Papyri", in *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 31/3, 2009, 279-300.
- HORSLEY, G. H. R., *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity: A Review of the Greek Inscriptions and Papyri published in 1979*, vol. 1, 1981.
- HUNT, E. D., *Holy Land Pilgrimage in the Later Roman Empire, AD 312-460*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982.
- KEYES, C. W., "The Greek Letter of Introduction", in *The American Journal of Philology* 56/1, 1935, 28-44.
- KIM, C.-H., *Form and Structure of the Familiar Greek Letter of Recommendation*, SBL Dissertation Series 4, Society for Biblical Literature, Missoula, 1972.
- LUIJENDIJK, A.-M., *Greetings in the Lord: Early Christians and the Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Harvard Theological Studies 60, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008.
- MANDOUZE, A., *Prosopographie chrétienne du Bas-Empire*, vol. 1: *Prosopographie de l'Afrique chrétienne (303-533)*, CNRS, Paris, 1982.

- MRATSCHEK, S., "Crossing Boundaries: Networks and Manifestations of Christian Hospitality", in C. A. CVETKOVIĆ and P. GEMEINHARDT (eds.), *Episcopal Networks in Late Antiquity: Connection and Communication across Boundaries*, AKG 137, De Gruyter, Berlin and Boston, 2019, 149-177.
- NAUROY, G., "The Letter Collection of Ambrose of Milan", in SOGNO *et al.* 2017, 146-160.
- NALDINI, M., *Il Cristianesimo in Egitto: Lettere private nei papiri dei secoli II-IV*, Le Monnier, Firenze, 1968.
- RADDE-GALLWITZ, A., "The Letter Collection of Basil of Caesarea", in SOGNO *et al.* 2017, 69-80.
- SLOOTJES, D., "The Impact of Geographical and Administrative Boundaries on Late Antique Bishops", in C. A. CVETKOVIĆ and P. GEMEINHARDT, (eds.), *Episcopal Networks in Late Antiquity: Connection and Communication Across Boundaries*, AKG 137, De Gruyter, Berlin and Boston, 2019, 295-311.
- SOGNO, C., STORIN, B. K., AND WATTS, E. J., eds., *Late Antique Letter Collections: A Critical Introduction and Reference Guide*, University of California Press, Oakland, CA, 2017.
- TEETER, T. M., "Letters of Recommendation or Letters of Peace?", in B. KRAMER *et al.* (eds.), *Akten des 21. internationalen Papyrologenkongresses in Berlin 1995*, vol. 2, Archiv für Papyrusforschung, Beiheft 3, 1997, 954-960.
- TREU, K., "Christliche Empfehlungs-Schemabriefe auf Papyrus", in *Zetesis*, FS E. de Strycker, Antwerp, 1973, 629-636.
- VIELLA MASANA, J., "In alia plebe: Las cartas de comunión en las iglesias de la Antigüedad", in R. DELMAIRE, J. DESMULLIEZ, P.-L. GATIER, (eds.), *Correspondances: Documents pour l'histoire de l'Antiquité tardive. Actes du colloque international, Université Charles-de-Gaulle-Lille 3, 20-22 novembre 2003*, Collection de la Maison de l'Orient méditerranéen ancien. Série littéraire et philosophique 40, Maison de l'Orient et de la Méditerranée Jean Pouilloux, Lyon, 2009, 83-113.
- WASHBURN, D., "The Letter Collection of John Chrysostom", in SOGNO *et al.* 2017, 190-204.
- WIPSZYCKA, E., "Il vescovo e il suo clero. A proposito di CPR V 11", in *Etudes sur le christianisme dans l'Egypte de l'Antiquité tardive*, SEA 52, Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, Rome, 1996, 177-194.
- WIPSZYCKA, E., "Les papyrus documentaires concernant l'Eglise d'avant le tournant Constantinien: Un bilan des vingt dernières années", in I. ANDORLINI *et al.*, (eds.), *Atti del XXII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia (Firenze, 23-29 agosto 1998)*, vol. 2, Istituto papirologico G. Vitelli, Firenze, 2001, 1307-1330.

NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

New Europe College (NEC) is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997–1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 600 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong

international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

Academic programs organized and coordinated by NEC in the academic year 2021-2022:

- ***NEC Fellowships (since 1994)***

Each year, the NEC Fellowships, open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences, are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- ***Ștefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)***

The Fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research and are part of the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the *Odobleja* Fellowships are integrated.

- ***The Pontica Magna Fellowships (since October 2015)***

This Fellowship Program, supported by the VolkswagenStiftung (Germany), invites young researchers, media professionals, writers and artists from the countries around the Black Sea, but also beyond this area (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine), for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the

fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of this region. This program is therefore strongly linked to the former *Black Sea Link* Fellowships.

- ***The Pontica Magna Returning Fellows Program (since March 2016)***

In the framework of its *Pontica Magna* Program, New Europe College offers alumni of a previous *Black Sea Link* and *Pontica Magna* Fellowship Program the opportunity to apply for a research stay of one or two months in Bucharest. The stay should enable successful applicants to refresh their research experience at NEC, to reconnect with former contacts, and to establish new connections with current Fellows.

- ***The Gerda Henkel Fellowships (since March 2017)***

This Fellowship Program, developed with the support of Gerda Henkel Stiftung (Germany), invites young researchers and academics working in the fields of humanities and social sciences (in particular archaeology, art history, historical Islamic studies, history, history of law, history of science, prehistory and early history) from Afghanistan, Belarus, China (only Tibet and Xinjiang Autonomous Regions), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

- ***The Spiru Haret Fellowships (since October 2017)***

The *Spiru Haret* Fellowship Program targets young Romanian researchers/academics in the humanities and social sciences whose projects address questions relating to migration, displacement, diaspora. Candidates are expected to focus on Romanian cases seen in a larger historical, geographical and political context, in thus broadening our understanding of contemporary developments. Such aspects as transnational mobility, the development of communication technologies and of digitization, public policies on migration, the formation of transnational communities, migrant routes, the migrants' remittances and entrepreneurial capital could be taken into account. NEC also welcomes projects which look at cultural phenomena (in literature, visual arts, music etc.) related

to migration and diaspora. The Program is financed through a grant from UEFISCDI (The Romanian Executive Unit for Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation Funding).

- ***Lapedatu Fellowships (since June 2018)***

Thanks to a generous financial contribution from the *Lapedatu* Foundation, NEC invites to Bucharest a foreign researcher specialized in the field of Romanian Studies, who is currently conducting research in one of the world's top universities. On this occasion, he/she is expected to spend a month in Romania and work with a young Romanian researcher to organize an academic event hosted by the NEC. At this colloquy, the *Lapedatu* fellows and their guests present scientific papers and initiate debates on a theme that covers important topics of the Romanian and Southeastern European history in both modern and contemporary epochs. The contribution of the *Lapedatu* family members to the development of Romania is particularly taken into consideration.

- ***Porticus N+N Fellowships (since 2020)***

The 'Nations and Nationalisms' (N+N) Program, developed with financial support from the Porticus Foundation, aims to approach one of the main challenges faced by societies around the globe, but mainly in Central and Eastern Europe: a growing tension between nationalizing and globalizing forces in a world dominated by migration, entanglement, digitization and automation. The *Porticus N+N* Fellowships are open to international candidates working in all fields of the humanities and social sciences with an interest in the study of nations, varieties of nationalism and/or populism, and the effects of globalization on national identities. Fellowship criteria are aligned with those in the other programs hosted by the institute. NEC aims to use the expertise of the *Porticus N+N* fellows to encourage scholarship and critical thinking among targeted groups of students in Romania and the region.

- ***AMEROPA Fellowships (since 2020)***

Organized with financial support from Ameropa and its subsidiaries in Romania, and with academic support from the Centre for Government and Culture at the University of St. Gallen, this program aims to

investigate the conditions and prerequisites for democratic stability and economic prosperity in Romania and the neighboring region. The *Ameropa* Fellowship Program is open to early career Romanian researchers in history, anthropology, political science, economics or sociology. Their projects should focus on aspects relevant for the challenges to democratic consolidation, economic development and strengthening of civil society in Romania and the region. Conditions and selection criteria are similar with those specific to all NEC fellowships. Each year, an annual workshop will be organized in the framework of the *Ameropa* Program.

- ***DigiHum Fellowship Program (since 2021)***

The 'Relevance of the Humanities in the Digital Age' (DigiHum) Fellowship Program, proposed jointly by the Centre for Advanced Study Sofia and the New Europe College Bucharest and developed with the financial support of the Porticus Foundation, aims to underscore the cognitive functions of the Humanities and their potential as critical disciplines by opening them up to issues relevant in/for the contemporary digital world – issues that are “practical”, but also epistemological, ethical, philosophical, etc. The program is intended to accommodate a broad range of themes pertaining to Humanities and Social Science disciplines provided that they link up to contemporary debates about or major challenges to the human condition stemming from the technological advances and ‘digital modernity’. The program is guided by the belief that there is a considerable added value for Humanities scholars across the academe, whatever their field, to be encouraged to rethink their topics in terms of their broader contemporary relevance (be it political, ethical, religious or academic), yet necessarily of significance for the world we are living in. The program addresses international scholars.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

Financial Support

The State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation of Switzerland
through the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University
of St. Gallen

The Ministry of National Education – The Executive Agency for Higher
Education and Research Funding, Romania

Landis & Gyr Stiftung, Zug, Switzerland

VolkswagenStiftung, Hanover, Germany

Gerda Henkel Stiftung, Düsseldorf, Germany

Porticus Stiftung, Düsseldorf, Germany

Robert Bosch Stiftung, Stuttgart, Germany

Marga und Kurt Möllgaard-Stiftung, Essen, Germany

European Research Council (ERC)

Lapedatu Foundation, Romania

Ameropa and its subsidiaries in Romania

Administrative Board

Dr. Ulrike ALBRECHT, Head of Department, Strategy and External
Relations, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Bonn

Emil HUREZEANU, Journalist and writer, Ambassador of Romania to the
Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin

Dr. Romiță IUCU, Professor of Pedagogy and Educational Sciences at the
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, and Vice Rector of
the University of Bucharest

Dr. Dirk LEHMKUHL, Chair for European Politics, University of St. Gallen;
Director of Programmes International Affairs & Governance, Center for
Governance and Culture in Europe, University of St. Gallen

NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Dr. Antonio LOPRIENO, Professor of Egyptology and former Rector, University of Basel, President of the European Federation of Academies of Sciences and Humanities, ALLEA

Dr. Florin POGONARU, President, Business People Association, Bucharest

Dr. phil. BARBARA STOLLBERG-RILINGER, Professor of History, University of Münster, Rector of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin

Dr. Heinz–Rudi SPIEGEL, Formerly Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, Essen

Academic Advisory Board

Dr. Alex DRACE-FRANCIS, Associate Professor, Literary and Cultural History of Modern Europe, Department of European Studies, University of Amsterdam

Dr. Luca GIULIANI, Rector, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin; Professor of Archaeology, Humboldt University, Berlin

Dr. Béatrice Von HIRSCHHAUSEN, Researcher, Centre Marc Bloch, Berlin

Dr. Daniela KOLEVA, Permanent Fellow, Centre for Advanced Study, Sofia; Associate Professor of Sociology, St. Kliment Ohridski University, Sofia

Dr. Silvia MARTON, Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Bucharest; Corresponding Member, Centre Norbert Élias – CNE, Marseille

Dr. Thomas PAVEL, Professor of Romance Languages, Comparative Literature, Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago

Dr. Ulrich SCHMID, Professor for the Culture and Society of Russia, University of St. Gallen; Head of the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University of St. Gallen

Dr. Victor I. STOICHIȚĂ, Professor of Art History, University of Fribourg

NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Str. Plantelor 21, București 023971

Tel.: (+4) 021 307 99 10; Fax: (+4) 021 327 07 74;

e-mail: nec@nec.ro; <http://www.nec.ro/>

