New Europe College Yearbook
Pontica Magna Program
2017-2018

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Pontica Magna Fellowship Program is supported by VolkswagenStiftung, Germany.

ISSN 1584-0298

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PROBLEMS AND PRECONDITIONS OF THE COSSACK SERVICE REFORM: LATE EIGHTEENTH – EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Abstract

The traditional narrative on nineteenth century cossacks in the Russian Empire portrays this period as a time of "unification" and "regularization". Still, the preconditions that led to the 1820s-1840s homogenizing reforms of irregulars' military service are often omitted or oversimplified. Thus, as a step towards better understanding of the later period, in this article I will overview the problems encountered by Russian imperial officials regarding the organization and administration of cossack units that, presumably, largely influenced the course of later reforms.

Keywords: Cossacks, Russian Empire, Russian Imperial Army, Irregular Units, Eastern European History, Nineteenth Century

The death of Prince Grigorii Potemkin can be seen as one of the major turning points in the history of the Pontic Steppe cossacks. Under his direction, great authority over irregulars was concentrated in the hands of the all-powerful proconsul who was often present in the south. Even if cossack rights were not adequately defined in the Russian legislation in the late eighteenth century, Potemkin's penchant for cossackdom provided local cossacks with another rationale for securing their place in the imperial structure.

Much changed with the death of Potemkin indeed. After 1792, cossacks were obliged to correspond with the College of War in St. Petersburg. Nikolai Saltykov, Vice President of the College of War, and Platon Zubov, General Governor of New Russia, then began to work out new regulations for irregular units, bringing a certain degree of order into what

had become an ad-hoc militarized population. Yet, with these projects far from being complete, new revisions were introduced into all-imperial policies towards the cossacks once again upon the death of Catherine in 1796, and ascension to the throne of her son Paul.

Paul's attitude to the cossacks was contradictory at best. On the one hand, he treated cossacks of traditional units favorably: cossack delegates were allowed to be present at coronation festivities; the number of cossack units in the imperial guard increased; Ural cossacks were pardoned after a period of disfavor, during Catherine's reign, and introduced into the Life Guards. Even if Paul himself was a proponent of Prussian style warfare emphasis on discipline — contrary to Potemkin's, Suvorov's, and Rumiantsev's emphasis on personal courage and initiative — he understood the limitations of regular units and relied on Don cossacks as an uniquely suited mobile force to ride across half of Asia, reach India, and attempt to undermine the British rule there.[1] On the other hand, Paul's policies towards smaller and temporary cossack units were far less sympathetic. Almost immediately upon his ascension, he disbanded the Bug cossacks, Greek, and Tatar irregulars and brought to a halt the formation of the Voznesensk cossacks.

Nevertheless, on September 22, 1798 Paul issued an important decree affecting the crucial problem of standardization of cossack units, "On the equality of Don Host ranks with regular army ranks."[2] The equality between cossack ranks and ranks in the regular army finally enabled cossack elites to obtain officially recognized noble standing in the empire. Many benefits were associated with regular army officer rank: higher salary, social prestige, and the opportunity to be ennobled. Yet, there were drawbacks as well. Once having obtained regular army rank and taken the oath of office, it was no longer possible to bargain further or to cite traditional rights; in fact, these actions could be treated at the very least as insubordination. The practice of awarding regular ranks to cossacks was not new — after all, both Potemkin and Zubov rewarded numerous cossack officers from Zaporizhia, Don, and other units personally or collectively, in order to ensure their loyalty. Paul's vision to link officers' promotions directly to the favor of the monarch, however, led to a situation where several promotions previously made by Zubov were simply nullified.[3]

The 1798 decree, which consisted of only one sentence and dealt with only one cossack unit, caused much confusion and was open to competing interpretations. These stemmed from the fact that many irregular units had been identified as "organized according to the Don Host model" in their

statutes or rosters. Thus, an interpretation that 1798 decree could also be applied to other hosts was perfectly viable. A stricter reading would, however, limit the application of the decree to Don officers only. The legal loophole that resulted is another illustration of the uncertainties of cossack status during the transitional period of the late eighteenth – early nineteenth centuries.

Different interpretations of the decree led to different assessments in the historiography. For instance, Aleksandr Soklakov is skeptical towards the real impact of the decree and emphasizes that it was applied only to the Don Host, while Sergei Volkov argues that the decree meant an elevation of status for almost all cossack officers in the Russian Empire.[4] My approach to this debate is to analyze petitions of that time, keeping two questions in mind: whether Paul's decree was applied to other units in practice? Moreover, if yes, did it work retroactively? In other words, could *starshyna* and *chinovniki* of already disbanded units, say Bug or Ekaterinoslav, be granted equal rights with retired regular officers?

Hoping for the best, *starshyny* from Siberia Cossack Host submitted a collective petition in order to get army ranks in 1803; General Glasionov asked for clarification regarding the status of Caucasus line cossacks in 1805; *Sotnik* Kukhtin from the disbanded Ekaterinoslav Host petitioned in 1808 for a noble status for his child on the basis of Kukhtin's previous service.[5] These are just several examples out of many. While petitioners from non-Don units hoped that the decree would work for their unit as well, officials of the College of War preferred a strict reading that the decree applied only to the Don.

On the other hand, the College of War, as a response to Kherson provincial administration, in 1807 produced an obscure wording regarding the former officers of Ekaterinoslav Host:

> Even if [such cossack officer] will not be granted a real army rank [...] he should be generally treated as if he had it ... both when having been awarded according to his services and merits and when having been punished for his vices.[6]

This was an overcomplicating answer to a simple question: "how did ranks of these cossacks correspond to the civil service ranks?" In the end, it seems that the Don decree was not easily applicable to other units, even if they were organized on the model of Don Host as the empire continued the practice of dealing with each cossack unit separately.

The next reversal in cossack policies occurred as a consequence of the palace coup of 1801 and the regicide of Paul. The first years of Alexander's reign can be characterized by greater attention to cossack units and attempts to unify their terms of service and establish a common denominator for the status of all cossacks.[7] Taking into account the multitude and diversity of cossack forms that existed in the late eighteenth century, such imperial policy seems logical and consistent. Nevertheless, the form of these regulations that were issued separately for each unit requires close examination. The idea of a unified cossack estate, supported by legislation applicable to all cossacks in the empire, was, for the time being, either neglected or postponed; at the same time the policy of treating each cossack unit individually only prolonged the situation, in which cossacks and officers of different units retained vastly different status.

It is a speculation, however, what the cossack reforms of Alexander's early reign would have produced if they had been put in place. The challenge of new wars in Europe diverted both attention of government and resources thus ending the ambiguous transitional period between the death of Potemkin and the Patriotic War of 1812. Different circumstances influenced and changed the further evolution of cossackdom. Consequently, in the following article I will review and reconsider these factors that had an effect on imperial policies towards the cossack hosts in the early nineteenth century in order to better understand Russian military reforms of this period.

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Several important factors influenced the evolution of the Russian military — and of the cossacks as part of it — in the early nineteenth century. First, it was the experience of wars with Napoleonic France and the reassessment of the functions that various types of troops had to fulfill in the new era of warfare. Second, it was a matter of expenses, since the Russian treasury struggled mightily in order to finance the biggest army in Europe. The coincidence of these two factors led the Russian military and civilian officials to reassess the importance of the cossack hosts and to search for ways to preserve and perpetuate them. The need to perpetuate cossackdom, in turn, led to the recognition of the existing problems facing cossack units: the passing of frontier in some areas; the growing population and a shortage of arable lands; the corruption of cossack elites. On the other hand, the long-lasting Caucasus War and the need to use the cossacks for their traditional roles, acted to prevent some of the more radical reform projects from being implemented.

Since cossacks were a military society, the first factor in influencing the evolution of cossack communities in early nineteenth century Russia was the changes in warfare. Under the impact of the French Revolutionary wars, improvements in armament, the introduction of new battlefield tactics, techniques of mobilization, and supply challenged the traditional attitudes.[8] One of the most profound changes was the nation-in-arms concept that yielded mass armies, well exceeding several thousands of men. For comparison, in 1789 Potemkin estimated the potential conflict with Prussia and indicated that in total the enemy army would be around 235,000 men – Prussian, Saxon, and Polish forces included.[9] In 1812, during the French invasion in Russia, the army of Napoleon, supported by French satellite-states, was around 600,000 men.[10] The total size of the Russian regular army in the first years of the nineteenth century is estimated as 446,000.[11] By 1812, this figure grew up to 622.,000, 480,000 of which were stationed on the western border. Still, serious weaknesses loomed behind these impressive numbers. The events of 1812 vividly exposed the great vulnerability of large armies: their supply lines exposed to raids by light cavalry where cossacks excelled. These raids on supply columns, together with guerilla activities, scorched earth, and maneuvers over greatly expanded operational areas could easily exhaust the enemy well before the crucial battle.

Therefore, as in any large conflict, the war of 1812-1814 as well as preceding coalition wars caused a boom in literature on military affairs. Russian officers eagerly published their reflections both on the successes of 1813-1814 and on the earlier defeats of Austerlitz, Friedland, and during first days of 1812. These works ranged from memoirs to treatises on the conduct of war in general. Partisan leaders like Denis Davydov, Ferdinand Vintsengerode, Aleksandr Seslavin, Petr Chuikevich quickly became legendary figures due to numerous articles and books dedicated to their heroic — even if exaggerated — exploits.[12]

A number of senior cavalry officers also shared similar visions on the importance of partisan-like warfare combined with deep raids performed by light cavalry. Aleksandr Chernyshev, for instance, already in 1815 argued that the new age of warfare required a reassessment of the role of cavalry.[13] Composed from several to a dozen regiments, light cavalry units supported by mobile horse artillery could easily conduct both independent and supporting operations while at the same time maintaining contact with the central command, so that they could be recalled to join the main force on the eve of a full-scale battle. It was outside the battlefield, however,

where light cavalry could display its true strength. It could operate in advance of the main force; serve as recon; seize objectives deep in the enemy rear. Besides, it could also serve as a mobile strike force engaging in large-scale raiding operations. Relentless, these operations would keep the enemy distracted while isolated units, lines of communications, and sources of supply, would be destroyed. According to Chernyshev – who naturally based his observations on his own experience of 1812 – small light cavalry detachments could demonstrate a military value greatly exceeding their size. Indeed, the events of 1812 proved that small mobile detachments could easily deny large enemy formations provisions and forage.[14]

Besides, Chernysev was not alone in such thoughts. Konstantin Benkendorf presented ideas on the importance of the cossacks, similar to Chernyshev's, in his memoirs of 1816.[15] A bit later, Ivan Vitt agreed on the growing importance of light cavalry and the need to bolster cossack hosts by solving problems that had arisen in their employment.[16] Moreover, Antoine Henri Jomini in his "Art of War" stressed the importance of cossacks or similar units acting en-masse, raiding enemy supply lines, and gathering intelligence as well.[17]

What is more important, however, is the fact that all these men occupied high offices in government during the second half of Alexander's and Nicolas' reigns and could turn their ideas into state policies, thus shaping the cossacks according to their vision. For instance, Chernyshev became the Minister of War in 1827 and the Head of the State Council in 1848. Vitt was the commander of the Southern Settled Cavalry — a post that even allowed him to approach the Tsar directly, without the intermediation of Arakcheev — chief of all settled units.[18]

Naturally, cossacks were perfectly fit for the operations envisioned by military theorists. Mobility, lightness, and speed were all traits that they had fostered because of previous centuries of frontier raids and counterraids. After 1815, the same qualities became virtues according to the new roles established for light cavalry. Indeed, focus on light cavalry operations can be treated as a response of the Russian military establishment to the creation of European mass armies. In the early nineteenth century, the total mobilization of cossacks could provide Russia with more than 100.000 men. These numbers enabled Russia to surpass the ability of other European powers to quickly mobilize considerable masses of cavalry.[19]

At the same time, cossacks were still needed in their traditional roles. In 1817, Russian forces advanced deeply into the Caucasus, fighting local

Circassians and Chechens. This was a typical frontier campaign, with some local tribes joining the Russians, while others fiercely resisted. Therefore, the nature of the fighting required light, usually self-sustained, units capable of operating in low-supply environments. The Ottoman Empire got involved as well, readily supplying weapons and supplies to those who opposed the Russians. This practice continued into later decades, even if formally the Ottoman Empire had to withdraw its protectorate over mountaineers' tribes as the result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829. The Caucasian war, at a certain point having become a religious one, raged well until 1864 with many cossacks participating in the pacification of the Caucasus.[20]

In addition to the needs of the campaigning in the Caucasus, the deployment of cossacks was essential in operating on the vast open steppe between the Orenburg and Siberian defense lines exposed to raiding by Kirgiz and Turkmen nomads, who were enslaving Russian colonists. The colonization of Transbaikal region was far from being complete as well.[21] Unlike other European powers, except for the Ottomans, the Russian Empire had to defend different types of borders, those which were more or less stable facing regular European armies in the West and the open frontiers to the South and to the East, which were subject to persistent raids, pillage, and other acts of everyday warfare, by local tribes. Creating a military system capable of performing well in two vastly different theaters was a challenging task.[22] Ideally, in the eyes of imperial officials, cossack hosts could be shifted from one frontier to another, filling both functions, preserving reservoirs of skilled manpower for the wars in the West while colonizing and protecting the borderlands in the East.

For this reason alone, the cossacks were regarded as an essential arm of the Russian military forces. To be sure, Russia already used cossacks in Prussia during the Seven Years War 1756-1763. Similarly, the Habsburgs employed their grenzers in Europe on many occasions. Ottomans fighting European powers also made frequent use of irregulars as well. There were even cases of Western European powers bringing colonial troops to Europe.

However, the cossacks occupied a special place in these formations by virtue of their dual function, their permanent organization, and their growing reputation as formidable fighters among both European and Asian opponents. In sum, the cossack hosts were a specific answer given by Russian military officials as a response to both the new challenges posed by European mass armies and to the cossacks' earlier function as fighters against the Asian nomads, still viable in the nineteenth century.

The experience of early nineteenth century wars and the corresponding development of military thought were not the only factors directing the reform of cossackdom. Russian military, the largest standing army in Europe in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, frequently consumed more than half of the annual imperial budget.[23] The wars with Napoleonic France and its satellites brought numerous changes into the Russian military and required costly outlays of the State Treasury: the reorganization of the College of War, Ministry of War, and General Staff; the introduction of divisions and corps system; new drill-books; the development of topography schools; the unification of artillery calibers, etc. With all these innovations, measures had to be taken in order to decrease the expenses of maintaining a modern army.

After the 1815 Congress of Vienna, when the post-war dust started to settle, the Tsar and his advisors returned to the question of reforming military conscription as a measure to both optimize costs and to remove other drawbacks of the existing system. The State Council had already discussed this project in 1811, yet the war of 1812-1814 interrupted the process and this reform had not left the preliminary stage of discussion.[24] After the war, however, the eighteenth century conscription system was left intact.

The main problem was that any plan for introducing compulsory short-term service, followed by long-term reserve obligations — the alternative solution to the problem — was practically impossible to implement in a society with the serfdom system left intact. Abolition of serfdom, on the other hand, meant no less profound reforms dealing with many other aspects of the imperial society. As such, universal military service was introduced in Russia only in 1874, being part of the Great Reforms.

Besides general costs, another important issue with conscription was the low quality of conscripts. Since the whole agricultural community was a tax-paying unit, communities preferred to conceal from the recruiter their strongest and fittest men for agricultural work, while surrendering the less than fit to fill their quota for the army. Bribes, self-mutilations, desertions by those who did not wish to serve were also widespread.[25] Fresh efforts to reform cossackdom as a martial society in constant state of readiness, offered the possibility of a partial solution to both these issues.

Next, after the Decembrist Revolt of 1825, the question of ensuring loyalty among the regular army units became a worrisome question for the monarchy. The idea of creating a separate military estate loyally attached

to the Tsar gained prominence. Experiments with military colonies and reforms of cossack units were attempts to solve this problem as well.

The transfer of knowledge about the Habsburg Military Frontier also influenced Russian military thinking about reforms. While not new, these ideas began to appear more frequently in the early nineteenth century in Russian proposals as a source of emulation. References to the Habsburg Military Frontier appeared not only in projects of local importance like that one of Moldavian cossacks. Arakcheev, Barclay de Tolly, Chernyshev – all influential Ministers of War – at some point or another were exposed to information on the operation of the Habsburg Military Frontier, which they included in their projects.[26] Such transfers of knowledge should not be discounted as a general phenomenon of imperial rule. Still, while the mutual influences of Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian models of the borderland military organizations deserve further attention, the importance of the Habsburg model should not be overestimated either.

The principal difference between the Habsburg and Russian cases was that contrary to the generally static Habsburg Military Frontier, a number of Russian frontiers were movable. As imperial borders advanced, borderland communities – cossacks included – had either to resettle closer to new frontiers or to somehow adapt to the life in the internal provinces of the empire.[27]

The quantity of cossacks, who lived in stable regions like Don or Ural was growing. Without the daily threat of attack, these cossacks could easily lose their incentive to maintain a state of constant military readiness. Becoming, in fact, farmers and craftsmen, they might nevertheless cling to traditional rights and privileges granted to their ancestors for their previous service. Possible solutions, which had already been resorted to before, included resettlement of cossacks closer to the border or from stable regions to serve at frontiers; or imposition of regular-army-like training for these cossacks to enhance their skills without actual participation in frontier warfare. Still, in all these cases, the imperial policy had to be at least partially accepted by both rank-and-file cossacks and cossack elites.

On the one hand, no cossack rebellions broke out in the late eighteenth-nineteenth centuries. Cossack protests were limited to the outbreak of discontent among the Black Sea cossacks over the delay of their cash payments for serving on the expedition to Persia; the quickly contained revolt of Bug cossacks upon their transition into military colonists; some revolts of peasants settled on the land of Don officers in the 1820s; minor protests by Don and Ural cossacks – yet nothing

comparable to the revolts by Razin, Bulavin, or Pugachev. On the other hand, even if open revolt was no longer a viable option there were other ways to frustrate the will of St. Petersburg, most of which relied on various forms of everyday resistance.

Another endemic problem requiring a solution was the corruption and abuses of officers that plagued the Russian imperial army. In the case of cossack units, the problem intensified due to the remnants of cossack autonomy still in place. On the one hand, given the fact that cossacks were not allowed to elect their own leaders, many traditional mechanisms of deposing inefficient officers were rendered dysfunctional. On the other hand, the empire still relied on the rule of appointed atamans with little interest in interfering with the life of cossack hosts. Thus, the period of the late eighteenth – early nineteenth centuries provided cossack leaders — by that time appointed by imperial officials — with a unique opportunity. They could abuse common cossacks without fear of retribution from below and could easily embezzle funds assigned by the imperial treasury for cossack units into their own pockets without fear of punishment coming from above.

Besides traditional and well-known embezzlements of funds, the majority of cossack officers were officially ennobled in the early nineteenth century, which effectively meant they gained the right to acquire serfs.[28] This opened the way to various machinations, such as settling officers' own serfs on the communal cossack land or, vice versa, forcing cossacks to work on an officers' land as serfs. The appropriation of communal land for an officer's personal use, together with the natural growth of cossack population, led to the situation where rank-and-file cossacks increasingly often faced impoverishment and pauperization. Furthermore, rich cossacks often hired poor youth who were sometimes not proficient with weapons and horses, or worse, barely fit for service at all, to serve instead of the rich.[29]

The pauperization of common cossacks, in turn, could lead imperial officials to the questioning of the rationale behind cossack communities since the very idea of cossack obligations towards the empire relied on the principle of self-financed service. If the cossack could not maintain a weapon and a warhorse, of what use could he be? What would be the rationale for such cossacks' exclusion from tax-paying population and other — even though not to be exaggerated — still benefits? Naturally, such practices further decreased the fighting ability of cossack units, which, in cases of large-scale operations far from their homes would require

cossacks to be at least fit for prolonged service and to maintain their own horses and weapons during the campaign.

The following episode dealing with the adventures of several Bug cossack officers helps to illustrate the abuses accruing in the internal life of cossack units at the turn of the centuries as a major factor influencing the necessity of reform from above. On September 12, 1801, Captain Vasilii Khmel'nitskii, former officer of the Bug cossacks and a rich landowner himself, submitted a petition regarding the restoration of the recently disbanded Bug Cossack Host. Having been endorsed by the New Russian military governor Ivan Michel'son, this petition, presumably written on behalf of common Bug cossacks, reached Alexander.[30] Khmel'nitskii, however, was not acting out of pure altruism. As other petitioners striving to create or to restore cossack units, Khmel'nitskii, quite possibly, envisaged himself as the new ataman.

Furthermore, there was another motive behind Khmel'nitskii's mission to St. Petersburg.[31] As for 1801, the state treasury still owed Bug cossacks 68.600 rubles for their previous military service in 1787-1789.[32] Being the first to locate this money would allow Khmel'nitskii, acting as representative of Bug cossacks, either to embezzle it for himself or to distribute it to the host, building popular support for future atamanship.

As it turned out, however, Khmel'nitskii was not the only one on this treasure hunt. Practically at the same time another competitor emerged, by the name of General V. Orlov. Orlov was an officer from Don, assigned to command Bug cossacks in 1789. He remained at this post until 1797 — the year of the dissolution of the unit. Upon the dissolution of the Bug cossacks and Orlov's reassignment, he took all the documentation on the host with him in an attempt to conceal his own corruption. Not surprisingly, a fire at Orlov's house followed soon and destroyed a wealth of documents valuable both for cossacks and for later historians.[33] These were important materials that could prove, among other things, the fact that, for instance, out of 58,487 rubles assigned by the College of War to Bug host in April 1787-April 1789, only 14,256 reached the cossacks. Orlov and his aides — other Don officers — embezzled the remaining 44,231.[34] The College of War also subsidized the purchase and restoration of saddles for Bug cossacks – the sum granted was about 9,600 rubles. This money, stored by Orlov, never reached the common cossacks at all.[35] If we add the sum, which the treasury still owed to the sum already seized by officers, it turns out that the cossacks received only 9,256 out of 131,687 rubles — even less then ten percent of the due sum.

Furthermore, the remaining 68,600 the treasury owed the Bug cossacks were of interest for Orlov as well. In 1802, Orlov and twelve other officers from Don who had previously served with the Bug cossacks forged a fake letter and were able to receive 63,600 rubles from the College of War.[36] Khmel'nitskii found out that Orlov had already received 63,600 and approached him in St. Petersburg. While it is not known what arguments Khmel'nitskii used and how persuasive they were, Khmel'nitskii managed to obtain 58,285 rubles from Orlov.[37] The rest — 5,315 together with 44,231 stolen earlier — remained in the hands of Orlov and his friends for the time being.

At this point Khmel'nitskii sent his assistant Poruchik Saltykovskii back to Bug in order to receive another letter. Exploiting the fact that both Saltykovskii and the majority of cossacks were illiterate, he composed the letter himself, not forgetting to add that he is to receive one third of the due sum for all his troubles, yet neglecting to mention that he had already received part of the due money. Besides, Khmel'nitskii sent 20,000 rubles to his brother in order to conceal them. When cossacks signed another letter and sent it, Khmel'nitskii brought a court claim against Orlov in order to get the remaining money for 1787-1789. At the same moment, he extracted from the treasury an additional 17,890 for the service of Bug cossacks in the period of October 1791-April 1792. Having enriched himself by 76,175 rubles, Khmel'nitskii stayed in St. Petersburg while his petition on the restoration of the unit was still under consideration. Wasting no time, the would-be ataman spent this money lavishly on presents and bribes in various departments and chancelleries. As a result, he gained access to a number of important officials including Viktor Kochubei, Minister of Interior.[38]

In the meantime, Emperor Alexander I requested the opinion of New Russian governors on the issue of Bug cossacks. Reports by both civilian and military governors were submitted on October 27, 1802, and contained two opposing points of view. Mikhail Miklashevskii, the civilian governor, was against the restoration of the Bug Cossack Host. He calculated that Bug cossacks — with household economies in their current state — would be able to field only one five hundred strong regiment. As peasants, however, they would be obliged to pay 14,872 rubles in annual taxes.[39]

Ivan Mikhel'son, the military governor, on the contrary, argued that the necessity of maintaining troops to patrol the border would outweigh the loss of revenue from taxes and Bug cossacks presence would help local

police in the vast steppe province. Moreover, in Mikhel'son's vision, Bug cossacks would be perfectly able to field not one, but three regiments.[40]

Minister of War Sergei Viazmitinov and Minister of Internal Affairs Viktor Kochubei considered these opinions and prepared a report on the restoration of the Bug Cossack Host, which was approved by Alexander on April 28, 1803. The decree of May 8, 1803, officially restored the Bug Cossack Host by ordering the transfer of 6,457 men and 5,673 women state peasants back into the cossack ranks.[41]

Anticipating this decision, Bug *starshiny* loyal to Khmel'nitskii petitioned to make their candidate an ataman. Yet, unexpectedly for them Ivan Krasnov – a general from Don – was appointed to lead the Bug Cossacks, with Khmel'nitskii remaining one of many petty officers. Among the possible reasons for such a surprise appointment, there are hints in Khmel'nitskii's correspondence that Krasnov might have been a protégé of the dowager Empress herself.[42] Other motivations are unclear – especially taking into account the previous assurances that in order to attract foreigners to serve in the unit, only local cossacks would be promoted to officer ranks. Apparently, arbitrary appointments like this further illustrate the insecure and vulnerable legal status of cossacks during the studied period.

With not many options left, Khmel'nitskii went all-out. He enlisted the support of Kochubei and other patrons, secured their recommendation letters addressed to Nikolaev governor Sergei Bekleshov, and returned to the Bug host. Upon his arrival to Bug in June 1803, he portrayed himself as a savior thanks to whom the host had got restored, while at the same time spreading the word about Orlov's previous exploits and the money which Don officers had previously stolen. Igniting anti-Don sentiments was a natural move against Krasnov, a Don general himself. Further rumors appeared — and it is difficult to say whether due to Khmel'nitskii or spontaneously — linking Krasnov and Orlov's schemes together and predicting hardship for Bug cossacks being exploited by ruthless Don officers.[43]

On July 9, at a cossack gathering in *stanitsa* Novopetrovskaia, Khmel'nitskii announced that Krasnov had been appointed only temporarily, while Khmel'nitskii had been promised a permanent appointment, succeeding Krasnov. To bolster his support, Khmel'nitskii also promoted a number of Bug officers and began to distribute 3,610 rubles money from the host chancellery among cossacks.[44]

Krasnov arrived at the Host only in 1803, where he encountered well-prepared protests not only from pro-Khmel'nitskii starshyna, but also from common cossacks refusing to carry out Krasnov's orders and acknowledging only Khmel'nitskii as rightful ataman. At the same time, cossacks loyal to Khmel'nitskii sent another delegation to St. Petersburg, which was instructed to portray in vivid colors all the troubles caused by Don officers and to petition for Krasnov's resignation. The delegation did not reach Petersburg because in Vitebsk they were informed that a direct petition to the Tsar would have no chance to succeed and that they should first approach the military governor in Kherson. The problem was that the resident military governor, Bekleshov, died in September 1803, and the new one, Andrei Rozenberg, had not yet arrived. Krasnov, in turn, approached the commander of Sibir Grenadier Regiment stationed nearby, asking for help in dealing with the disobedient cossacks. It took the grenadiers ten days to restore order among the Bug cossacks. On October 11, 1803, Khmel'nitskii was arrested and delivered to St. Petersburg.[45]

To improve his administrative authority Krasnov readjusted the internal organization of the Host, reshuffled local elders (*stanichnye atamany*), greatly reduced the cossacks' mobility outside their settlements by strictly limiting the number of their travel documents and reserving the right to issue these documents only to the Host Chancellery; previously it belonged to the authority of stanitsa-level officers. Krasnov's aides ruled by fear and widely used beatings, confiscations, and other forms of coercion in order to prevent any further disobedience.

Cossacks, feeling themselves unjustly oppressed, submitted numerous complaints to various offices. At the point where the number of complaints had reached such embarrassing proportions that they could no longer be ignored, governor de Richelieu paid a personal visit to the Bug Cossack Host. After his inspection he suspended Krasnov's tenure and reported this situation to Emperor Alexander on September 1, 1806.[46] Krasnov and his associates were added to the list of suspects in the judiciary case, which already included Orlov and Khmel'nitskii.

In retrospect it turned out that Krasnov and his aides — Major Iuzefovich, Prosecutor Pokhitonov, and Titular Councilor Luzenov — were no better than their predecessors. In three years, they embezzled more than 44,000 rubles assigned to Bug cossacks. This sum included not only payment for cossack military service, but also 18,000 rubles, which treasury had returned to cossacks as part of unfairly collected taxes in 1797-1803, when the cossacks were turned into state peasants.[47] Besides

the embezzling of host money, the accused forced cossacks to work on their own land, practically as serfs, and to buy horses and ammunition directly from them at inflated prices. In this light, one may only wonder about the true motives behind Krasnov's letter to governor Rozenberg dated March 1, 1804, describing the poverty of Bug cossacks and requesting a 50,000 rubles loan to be given to the Host for twenty years. According to him, without such a loan the cossacks would be unable to field all three regiments required from them.[48] If such a loan was given, how much of it would have been stolen?

The investigation of the accused officers, however, was lengthy, and the final decision was reached only on March 12, 1813.[49] Krasnov was dismissed from service and had to return money which he had previously received from cossacks, i.e., he was not accused of direct stealing of money, but only of accepting the proposed bribes, a much lesser crime. Khmel'nitskii was tried for insubordination, deprived of both his noble status and military rank, and exiled. As for Orlov, he was found guilty, yet proof of his wrongdoings was considered inadequate to specify any punishment other than the partial recovery of the embezzled funds.

Such a prolonged ten year investigation can be interpreted in various ways: the cumbersome interaction between imperial institutions at the center and in the borderlands; the powerful patrons of the accused, who could delay the process; the unwillingness of imperial officials to intervene too much into the internal life of the cossack unit; the realization that corruption was the necessary cost to bear in order to maintain any high ranking officials as administrators in the remote and inhospitable borderlands.

After Krasnov's forced resignation in 1806, governor Richelieu appointed Colonel Nikolai Kantakuzin — his own protégé — as the ataman of Bug cossacks. Kantakuzin's activities were similar to those of the previous atamans': exploitation of cossacks on his own land, misappropriation of funds, and other acts of corruption. Due, however, to Richelieu's protection, Kantakuzin remained the ataman until 1817. Only the reorganization of the Bug cossacks into military colonists, and the Emperor's personal interest in this social experiment prevented Kantakuzin from remaining in office any longer.[50]

To obtain some idea of the scale of the sums embezzled by cossack officers, a comparison can be made with the remuneration paid to common cossacks in the unit. While officers could steal tens of thousands of rubles during their tenure, the payment of common cossacks during a campaign

was only twelve rubles per year. When not campaigning, a cossack had to sustain himself on his own. While officers could own tens of thousands of *desiatina* of land with hundreds of serfs, the average cossack household of Bug cossacks in the 1775 had around thirty *desiatina* per adult male which was barely adequate to sustain a family. Nevertheless, by 1817, the average had fallen to fifteen *desiatina* due to population growth on the one hand and the officers' practice of transferring communal land into their private estates on the other. This average, however, is only an arithmetic mean arrived at by juxtaposing several large landowners with the majority of cossacks having six *desiatina* or even less. For a further comparison, fifteen *desiatina* was standard state peasant's allotment in Kherson province.[51]

Thanks to surviving evidence, the case of Bug atamans may be studied in detail. The question, however, remains whether it is representative enough and can be used as a general phenomenon common to all or most cossack units? All the possibilities certainly existed; yet, the situation of the Bug host could easily be duplicated with that of other irregulars both in New Russia or other borderlands of the empire. If even large traditional hosts were not immune to the abuses of their officers, then smaller and short-lived cossack units proved to be especially vulnerable.[52]

The main factor, which influenced the scale of corruption, was the brief existence of units meaning they lacked the opportunity to form their own elites and were obliged to accept temporary appointments of officers having no previous connection to it. Thus, there were few restraints on these officers coming either from their superiors, who were often their patrons, or from below by the traditional mechanisms of communal regulations.

This was especially true when local landowners were assigned as atamans: as in the cases of Kantakuzin and to some degree of the first ataman of the Bug cossacks, Skarzhinskii. Indeed, local landowners often demonstrated keen interest in obtaining the rank of ataman. After all, cossack service being a form of military service was much more honorable and prestigious than civilian or administrative work in the Russian Empire. At the same time, it was much less demanding than serving in the Guards in far-away St. Petersburg, that required a long absence from one's estate or dealing with the hardships of the regular army. Moreover, the control of imperial institutions over irregular military units was notoriously loose. Cossacks could be used as cheap, or even free labor on private estates while serfs could be used to work on cossack communal land. The chance

to embezzle money and goods assigned to the host could be considered as an extra bonus. To be sure, Don officers assigned to command smaller units had no estates nearby, but being only temporary appointees they were in a good position to embezzle funds practically without fear of any punishment.

The scale of corruption in cossack units can be ascribed also to the transitional nature of the period in question. During the heyday of cossackdom — say in seventeenth century — the common practice among cossacks was to elect their own leaders. If, however, elected leaders did not live up to cossacks' expectations they could be quickly and efficiently deposed by the decision of the assembly (*rada* or *krug)*. This hallowed tradition of forcing the resignation of inefficient or corrupt leaders by executing them did not survive the early modern period; it was no longer in use in the early nineteenth century, when atamans became appointed officials of the state.

On the other hand, the empire was still looking for a proper solution to the cossacks problems. It has been argued that cossack elites were in no way modern public servants and it was tolerated, even expected, that they would use their station for enrichment.[53] There is some truth here. Yet three other factors should be taken into account in explaining the different standards applied to these abuses. First, if abuses of Don officers within the Don Host could, to a certain degree, be tolerated, the abuses of temporary appointed Don officers in other units would be perceived through the us-them divide and would only promote rivalry if not hatred between separate cossack units.

Second, the scale of abuses mattered a great deal in the level of their acceptance. A certain degree of self-enrichment and embezzlement of public funds could be easily tolerated. However, abuses that created real hardship and even starvation among the lower orders of the community were grounds for resistance.[54] Unchecked abuses could result in a decline in the military effectiveness of cossack units, both in economic terms by depriving cossacks of the means to properly arm themselves. and in terms of unit morale and willingness to fight. Therefore, as the imperial officials acknowledged the growing importance of cossack units both for the Western theater and in the wild frontiers, it became an increasingly pressing need to solve the problem of corruption within the units one way or another.

Finally, the process of incorporating cossacks in the institutions of the central government undergoing reforms under Alexander I argued

for greater restraint on arbitrary and, indeed, illegal actions by cossack officers. As the Russian administrative and legal traditions were moving from Colleges to Ministries and from vague charters of the 1780s to the digests of laws of the 1830s, the place of cossacks in the Russian society was gradually becoming more rationalized within the legal structure.

This process was given an additional impetus by the changing character of the New Russia. With the return of Transdanubian cossacks to the Russian Empire, less ad-hoc decisions were needed. If previously cossack units were created or reformed just to attract more migrants, in the 1820s-1830s the evolution of cossackdom became part of the all-imperial development of legislation. Here we have Speranskii's tradition, which culminated both in the Digest of Laws and in the Complete Collection of Laws. As the all-imperial current was towards formalization of social groups boundaries, cossackdom, previously vaguely defined and extremely diverse in its forms, could finally become a distinct social category — with all the benefits and drawbacks such a formalization could bring for cossacks themselves.

To summarize, the experience of Napoleonic wars led Russian officials to reassess the value of cossackdom for the empire: as light cavalry reserve for the West, as frontier force for the East, and as relatively cheap irregulars in general. This reassessment, in turn, led to the recognition of problems which plagued the internal life of cossack hosts — including the crossing of frontier in such units as Don and corruption that was especially rampant in smaller cossack units. Consequently, Russian officers were actively searching for the best solution and proposed a range of options more or less viable both for specific cossack units and for cossackdom in general. This search coincided with the effort of Russian civilian administrators to properly clarify and formalize many pending legal issues with various social groups inhabiting the Russian Empire. In this vein, cossackdom was moving towards becoming a defined and distinct social group instead of being an umbrella-concept applicable to almost any irregular force.

NOTES

1 For more on the Russian military thought of the eighteenth century in general and outlooks of Potemkin, Rumiantsev, and Suvorov see V. S. Lopatin, *Potemkin i Suvorov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1992). On Paul's praise of Don cossacks and his planned invasion of India see OR RNB, fund 73, inventory 1, file 328, fols 1-2.

2 PSZ, vol. 25, no. 18673.

3 GAKK, fund 249, inventory 1, file 359, fol. 1.

4 Cf. S. V. Volkov, *Russkii Ofitserskii Korpus* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993), 42–44; Aleksandr Soklakov, "Komplektovanie Kazach'ikh Formirovanii i Poriadok Sluzhby Kazakov Rossiiskoi Imperii v 19 – Nachale 20 v." (Candidate of Sciences diss., Voennyi Universitet, Moscow, 2004), 90.

5 RGVIA, fund 13, inventory 2/110, bundle 178, file 128, fols 1-3; inventory 3/111, file 46, fol. 1.

6 RGVIA, fund 13, inventory 3/111, bundle 181, file 42, fols 7-8.

7 On February 25, 1801, new host chancelleries were introduced to administer Don and Black Sea cossacks – PSZ, vol. 27, no. 20508. On September 29, 1802, new regulations of officers' promotion were introduced to Don – PSZ, vol. 27, no. 20436. On November 13, 1802, the internal administration of Black Sea cossacks was slightly revised and reconfirmed – PSZ, vol. 27, no. 20508. A similar decree dealing with Orenburg cossacks appeared on June 8, 1803 – PSZ, vol. 27, no. 20786. On August 31, 1803, new staff tables for cossack regiments were issued – PSZ, vol. 27, no. 20921. On November 2, 1803 the administration of Stavropol Kalmyk cossacks was readjusted – PSZ, vol. 27, no. 21025. The same went for Ural cossacks on December 26, 1803 – PSZ, vol. 27, no. 21101. Besides, decrees equating elites of other, non-Don, hosts to army officers were issued separately for Ural, Black Sea, Stavropol', Orenburg, as well as for the recently reorganized Bug Cossacks. All in all, these decrees can be treated as an attempt to bring a degree of uniformity both into the administration of cossack settlements and the organization of cossack military units.

8 On the warfare of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars see: Janet Hartley, Paul Keenan, and Dominic Lieven, eds., *Russia and the Napoleonic Wars* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Dominic Lieven, *Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814* (London: Penguin Books, 2017); Gunther Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).

9 O. I Eliseeva, *Geopoliticheskie Proekty G.A. Potemkina* (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 2000), 244–72.

10 Modest Bogdanovich, *Istoriia Otechestvennoi Voiny 1812 Goda, Po Dostovernym Istochnikam*, vol. 1 (Sankt Petersburg: Tipografiia Torgovago

Doma S. Strugovshchikova, G. Pokhitonova, I. Vodova i Ko, 1859), 59-60, 512-513.

11 Walter Pintner, "The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725-1914," *The Russian Review* 43, no. 3 (1984): 246.

12 John Keep, "From the Pistol to the Pen: The Military Memoir as a Source on the Social History of Pre-Reform Russia," *Cahiers Du Monde Russe et Sovietique* 21, no. 3–4 (1980): 295–320.

13 "Dokladnye Zapiski i DonesenieA. I. Chernysheva Imp. Aleksandru I 1814-1815 Gg.," *SIRIO* 121 (1906): 291–93. For more on Chernyshev's views see: Bruce Menning, "Military Institutions and the Steppe Frontier in Imperial Russia, 1700-1861," *International Commission of Military History* 8, no. 5 (1981): 10–17. Bruce Menning, "G. A. Potemkin and A. I. Chernyshev: Two Dimensions of Reform and the Military Frontier in Imperial Russia," in *The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850: Proceedings 1980*, ed Donald Howard, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Athens, 1980), 237–50; Bruce Menning, "A.I. Chernyshev: A Russian Lycurgus," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 30, no. 2 (1988): 190–219; David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and Bruce Menning, *Reforming the Tsar's Army Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 273-291; Ol'ga Evgen'evna Khmel'nitskaia, "A. I. Chernyshev - Gosudarstvennyi Deiatel' Rossii Pervoi Poloviny 19 Veka" (Candidate of Sciences diss., Tomskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, Tomsk, 2003).

14 "Dokumenty, Otnosiashchiesia k Voennoi Deiatel'nosti A. I. Chernysheva v 1812, 1813, i 1814 Godakh," *SIRIO* (Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva) 121 (1906): 235-37.

15 C. De Benkendorff, *The Cossacks. A Memoir, Presented to H.M. the Emperor of Russia in 1816*, trans. George Gall (London: Parker, Furnivall and Parker, 1849).

16 RGVIA, fund 405, inventory 6, file 392, fols 1-4.

17 G. Zhomini, *Analiticheskii Obzor Glavnykh Soobrazhenii Voennago Iskustva i Ob Otnosheniiakh Onykh c Politikoiu Gosudarstv* (Sankt Petersburg: Tipografiia Vremennago Departamenta Voennykh Poselenii, 1833), 269–90; Antoine Henri Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill, reprint (Westport: Lanham: Start Publishing LLC, 2012). For more on Jomini see John Shy, "Jomini," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, eds. Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 143–85. Besides, as an illustration of certain a continuity in the Russian military thought cf. Petr Chuikevich, *Podvigi Kazakov v Prussii* (Saint Petersburg, 1807); Petr Chuikevich, *Strategich. Rassuzhdeniia o Pervykh Deistviiakh Rossian za Dunaem* (Saint Petersburg, 1810); Denis Davydov, *Opyt o Partizanakh* (n. p., n. d.). For the Russian miltary thought of this period in

general see Frederick Kagan and Robin Higham, eds., *The Military History of Tsarist Russia* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

18 In the early nineteenth century, the ministerial reform took place in the Russian Empire. Previously, the Cossack Expedition of the College of War oversaw cossack units. From the 1810s as departments within the War Ministry replaced expeditions of old, there was no specific office to deal with cossacks and several various departments dealt with irregulars. Only in 1835 the Department of Military Colonies took over the centralized control over irregular troops in the empire. As for Vitt, he stood behind the transformation of the Bug cossacks into military colonists – it was his idea to create military colonies not on the basis of regular units like Arakcheev envisioned, but on the basis of the already existing cossack households. Under Vitt's guildance the Bug Cossack Host quickly underwent regularization dreadful for many cossacks – even if some coercion had to be applied.

19 Menning, "A.I. Chernyshev: A Russian Lycurgus," 199. Noteworthy, this figure almost equals to the number of Habsburg grenzers – see Gunther Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia 1740-1881. A Study of an Imperial Institution* (Chicago: Universiy of Chicago Press, 1988), 108–9. Still, grenzers were not able to actively participate in the later Napoleonic wars as according to the Treaty of Schonbrunn, 1809, Croatia on the right bank of Sava River was ceded to Napoleonic Italy. Who knows what could be the assessment of grenzers performance and its influence on the military thought of Central Europe if Habsburgs were able to use manpower from their Military Frontier in the later campaigns.

20 For the classical works on the Caucasian War see: Rostislav Andreevich Fadeev, *Shest'desiat Let Kavkazskoi Voiny* (Tiflis: Voenno-Pokhodnaia Tipografiia Glavnago Shtaba Kavkazskoi Armii, 1860); Vasilii Aleksandrovich Potto, *Kavkazskaia Voina v Otdel'nykh Ocherkakh, Epizodakh, Legendakh i Biografiiakh*, 5 vols. (Sankt Petersburg: Tipografiia E. Evdokimova, 1887).

21 A. I. Nikol'skii, *Stoletie Voennago Ministerstva: Voinskaia Povinnost' Kazach'ikh Voisk*, ed. D. A. Skalon, vol. 11, part 3, (Sankt Petersburg: Tipografiia Postavshchikov Dvora Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Tovarishchestva M. O. Vol'f, 1907), 225-422.

22 Consequently, contrary to previous policy directions of the cossacks, future reforms of cossack hosts in the Russian Empire were influenced not only by the defense of extended, practically transparent borders, but also — and in some cases even primarily — by changing strategies for the anticipation of warfare with European powers. Furthermore, while studying the development of military systems, one should not discard the tasks set for this system influenced by geography, culture, neighboring countries, etc. For instance, from the perspective of the Western European warfare, a focus on cavalry was becoming obsolete already in the seventeenth century. Still, in the Steppes cavalry reigned supreme much longer – i.e. armies of

Poland, Russia, or Crimean Khanate of the eighteenth century with their large cavalry detachments should not be considered backward compared to Europe. For more on this see Carol Stevens, *Russia's Wars of Emergence, 1460-1730* (New York: Longman, 2007); Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History* (London: Routledge, 2004).

23 According to calculations presented by Bogdanovich in various places, the total proportion of army expenses fluctuated between nineteen and sixty-eight percent of Russian annual budget. The peaks were 1810 with sixty-seven percent, 1813 and 1814 with fifty-eight percent per year, 1815 with fifty percent, 1816 with fifty-four percent. On this see also Anzhelika Iur'evna Kovalenko, "Voennye Reformy v Rossii v Pervoi Chetverti 19 Veka" (Doctor of Sciences diss., Rossiiskii Universitet Druzhby Narodov, 2004), 305.

24 RGIA, fund 1164, inventory 1, file 1, fols 1-25.

25 Janet Hartley, *Russia, 1762-1825 Military Power, the State, and the People* (London: Praeger, 2008), 25–47. As per Arakcheev's calculations, Russian Army was losing 24.000 men every six months due to illness and desertions – i.e. the army was losing one sixth of its size every year due to these reasons alone. See A. F. Lanzheron, "Zapiski Grafa Lanzherona: Voina Rossii s Turtsiei 1806-1812 g.," *Russkaia Starina* 131, no. 7–9 (1907): 575.

26 For Barclay de Tolly appealing to the Habsburg example see RGVIA, fund 405, inventory 1, file 507, fols 25-26. For Chernyshev's note on the same issue see "Diplomaticheskaia Missiia A. I. Chernysheva v Vene v 1816 g.," *SIRIO* 121 (1906): 342–46. For reports on the Habsburgs model presented to Arakcheev see RGVIA, fund 154, inventory 1, file 115, fols 9-15. As a side note, approximately at the same time, in the 1830-1840s, the French experimented with the military colonization of Algeria, presumably borrowing the Habsburgs model as well. Speaking of the transfer of military knowledge between the empires, one should also mention the Prussian conscription reform by Gerhard von Scharnhorst. If in Prussia this was a step towards the universal military conscription, the Russians could adopt certain points regarding the establishment of a trained reserve of manpower as well. For more on possible Prussian influences see A. N. Petrov, "Ustroistvo i Upravlenie Voennykh Poselenii v Rossii," in *Graf Arakcheev i Voennye Poseleniia 1809 - 1831*, ed. Mikh. Semevskii (Sankt Petersburg: Pechatnia V. I. Golovina, 1871), 88.

27 Habsburg and Ottoman borders were movable as well, however, the scale matters – one situation is the Habsburg-Ottoman competition over the relatively small Bosnia, the other is the Russian advance into Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia. Therefore, if in the Habsburg case it was just a matter of adding several settlements to the existing military system, in Russia whole areas were transforming from frontiers to borderlands and later to hinterland – a situation unique for Europe yet similar to colonial frontiers

worldwide. Besides, it was the experience of New Russia at this point, as with the additions of Bessarabia and advance into Caucasus the province was gradually becoming less of a borderland. On the issue of cossack hosts left in internal provinces see also Brian Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 239.

28 PSZ, vol. 25, no. 18673.

29 Vitt's comments on this issue: RGVIA, fund 405, inventory 6, file 392, fols 5-18.

30 RGIA, fund 1286, inventory 1, file 219a, fols 15-20v. The petition is also mentioned in the introductory part of PSZ, vol. 27, no. 20754.

31 For the primary source – a meticulously detailed court case – serving as the basis for the story below see RGVIA, fund 801, inventory 77/18, file 4, parts 1-12. For another take on the reconstruction of these events see I. A. Khioni, "Bugskie Kazaki i ikh Bor'ba Protiv Feodal'no-Krepostnicheskogo Gneta: Posledniaia Chetvert' XVIII - Pervaia Chetvert' XIX Vv." (Candidate of Sciences diss., Odesskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet imeni I. I. Mechnikova, 1973), 107–30.

32 RGVIA, fund 801, inventory 77/18, file 4, part 10, fols 90-91. The debt owed to the Bug cossacks for their service from September 16, 1787, till April 16, 1789, 122,087 rubles in total. Of this sum only 53,487 were allocated, thus the debt was 68,600 rubles.

33 RGVIA, fund 801, inventory 77/18, file 4, part 5, fol. 217; part 10, fol. 95.

34 RGVIA, fund 801, inventory 77/18, file 4, part 10, fol. 13.

35 Khioni, "Bugskie Kazaki i ikh Bor'ba," 104.

36 RGVIA, fund 801, inventory 77/18, file 4, part 5, fol. 217; part 10, fol. 95.

37 RGVIA, fund 801, inventory 77/18, file 4, part 10, fols 90-92.

38 Khioni, "Bugskie Kazaki i ikh Bor'ba," 108-13.

39 A copy of the report can be found at RGIA, fund 1286, inventory 1, file 219a, fols 1-10 or at ORRNB, fund 859, cardboard no. 2 (I.VI.14), fols 22-29. Noteworthy is the fact that at the same time Miklashevskii was a proponent – to a certain degree – of cossack autonomous rights in the Little Russia region.

40 RGIA, fund 1286, inventory 1, file 219a, fols 1-10.

41 PSZ, vol. 27, no. 20754.

42 RGVIA, fund 1, inventory 1, file 523, fols 25-27. If one is to believe court rumors of that time Orlov, being a commander of Life Guards at this point, approached Count Valerian Zubov, who in turn approached Prince Palatin, who in turn approached Maria Fedorovna in order to secure an appointment for Krasnov.

43 Khioni, "Bugskie Kazaki i ikh Bor'ba," 114.

44 RGVIA, fund 801, inventory 77/18, file 4, part 5, fols 51, 198.

45 Khioni, "Bugskie Kazaki i ikh Bor'ba," 119-20.

46 RGVIA, fund 801, inventory 77/18, file 4, part 4, fol. 1.

47 RGVIA, fund 801, inventory 77/18, file 4, part 8, fols 8-9.

48 RGVIA, fund 846, inventory 16, file 341, fols 154-155.

49 RGVIA, fund 801, inventory 77/18, file 4, part 8, fols 235-239.

50 For Kantakuzin being a protégé of Richelieu see Lozheshnyk, "Otamany Buz'koho Kozats'koho Viis'ka: Prosopohrafichnyi Portret," 57. This thesis stems in turn from Lanzheron's memoir, where Lanzheron describes Kantakuzin as follows: during the whole 1806-1812 campaign Kantakuzin was in Chisinau under the pretext of preparing crusts (*sushki sukharei*) for the army, leaving his cossacks and volunteers far from himself … in 1788 Kantakuzin pretended to serve, yet during this war he did not even pretend. He equipped his volunteers very poorly, yet increased the size of his own herds. See A. F. Lanzheron, "Zapiski Grafa Lanzherona: Voina Rossii s Turtsiei 1806-1812 g.," *Russkaia Starina* 130, no. 4–6 (1907): 600.

51 Khioni, "Bugskie Kazaki i Ikh Bor'ba," 83-84.

52 For corruption on Don see S. G. Svatikov, *Rossiia i Don, 1549-1917: Izsledovanie po Istorii Gosudarstvennago i Administrativnago Prava i Politicheskikh Dvizhenii na Donu* (Belgrade: Izdanie Donskoi Istoricheskoi Komississ, 1924), 264–74; A. P Pronshtein, *Zemlia Donskaia v XVIII Veke* (Rostov-na-Donu: Izdatel'stvo Rostovskogo Universiteta, 1961); Bruce Menning, "The Emergence of a Military-Administrative Elite in the Don Cossack Land, 1708-1836," in *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century*, eds. Walter Pintner and Don Rowney (London: Macmillan, 1993), 156–57; Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries: Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great*, 187–207. For the Black Sea cossacks see V. A. Golobutskiii, *Chernomorskoe Kazachestvo* (Kiev: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk Ukrainskoi SSR, 1956), 372–80. On Bug cossacks see Khioni, "Bugskie Kazaki i ikh Bor'ba"; Lozheshnyk, "Otamany Buz'koho Kozats'koho Viis'ka: Prosopohrafichnyi Portret."

53 On the popular acceptance of a certain degree of embezzlement see Shane O'Rourke, *Warriors and Peasants: The Don Cossacks in Late Imperial Russia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 118–19.

54 On pre-modern economy in general and its idea of providing at least some sustenance for all community members see E. P Thompson, *Customs in Common* (London: Merlin Press, 1993).

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