

New Europe College Yearbook  
*Europe next to Europe* Program  
2013-2014  
2014-2015



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ANA ACESKA  
DRAŽEN CEPIĆ  
EDA GÜÇLÜ  
SOKOL LLESHI  
SLAVIŠA RAKOVIĆ  
IOANNIS TRISOKKAS

OZAN ARSLAN  
ČARNA BRKOVIĆ  
SRDJAN JOVANOVIĆ  
ANDREJ MITIC  
RAMAZAN HAKKI OZTAN

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Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

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# NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

*New Europe College (NEC)* is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997–1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 700 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary

dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

### **Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:**

- ***NEC Fellowships (since 1994)***

Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- ***Ștefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)***

The Fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the *Odobleja* Fellowships are integrated.

- ***The Pontica Magna Fellowship Program (since October 2015)***

This Fellowship Program, supported by the VolkswagenStiftung (Germany), invites young researchers, media professionals, writers and artists from the countries around the Black Sea, but also beyond it (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine), for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows,

the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of this region. This program is therefore strongly linked to the former *Black Sea Link* Fellowships.

- ***The Pontica Magna Returning Fellows Program (since March 2016)***

In the framework of its *Pontica Magna* Program, New Europe College offers alumni of the *Black Sea Link* and *Pontica Magna* Fellowship Programs the opportunity to apply for a research stay of one or two months in Bucharest. The stay should enable successful applicants to refresh their research experience at NEC, to reconnect with former contacts, and to establish new connections with current Fellows. The *Pontica Magna Returning Fellows* Program targets young researchers, media professionals, writers and artists from the countries around the Black Sea: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

- ***The Gerda Henkel Fellowship Program (since March 2017)***

This Fellowship Program, developed with the support of Gerda Henkel Stiftung (Germany), invites young researchers and academics working in the fields of humanities and social sciences (in particular archaeology, art history, historical Islamic studies, history, history of law, history of science, prehistory and early history) from Afghanistan, Belarus, China (only Tibet and Xinjiang Autonomous Regions), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

- ***How to Teach Europe Fellowship Program (since April 2017)***

This Program, supported by the Robert Bosch Foundation and a Private Foundation from Germany, introduces a new and innovative Fellowship module at the Centre for Advanced Study (CAS), Sofia, and the New Europe College (NEC), Bucharest. Beyond the promotion of outstanding individual researchers, the Program focuses on the intersection of fundamental research and higher education. The joint initiative seeks to identify and bring together bright and motivated young and established university professors from South-eastern Europe to dedicate themselves for a certain amount of time to research work

oriented toward a specific goal: to lend the state-of-the-art theories and methodologies in the humanities and social sciences a pan-European and/or global dimension and to apply these findings in higher education and the transmission of knowledge to wider audiences.

The goal of the proposed program is to use this knowledge to improve the quality of higher education in the humanities and social sciences and to endorse its public relevance. A tangible output will be the conceptualization of a series of new courses or, ultimately and ideally, the development of innovative curricula for the universities of the participating scholars.

- ***The Spiru Haret Fellowship Program (since October 2017)***

The *Spiru Haret* Fellowship Program targets young Romanian researchers/academics in the humanities and social sciences whose projects address questions relating to migration, displacement, diaspora. Candidates are expected to focus on Romanian cases seen in a larger historical, geographical and political context, in thus broadening our understanding of contemporary developments. Such aspects as transnational mobility, the development of communication technologies and of digitization, public policies on migration, ways of employing transnational communities, migrant routes, the migrants' remittances and entrepreneurial capital could be taken into account. NEC also welcomes projects which look at cultural phenomena (in literature, visual arts, music etc.) related to migration and diaspora. The Program is financed through a grant from UEFISCDI (The Romanian Executive Unit for Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation Funding).

## **Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of New Europe College:**

- ***RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)***

The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual

allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach activities involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

- ***The NEC–LINK Program (2003 - 2009)***

Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj–Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

- ***The GE–NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)***

New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10-month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend, and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE–NEC Yearbooks series.

- ***NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)***

In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South–Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one–month research trip abroad. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

- ***The Britannia–NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)***

This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

- ***The Petre Țuțea Fellowships (2006 – 2008, 2009 - 2010)***

In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government through its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College's community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Țuțea* Program publications.

- ***Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)***

This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*,

Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South–Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

- ***Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)***

This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

- ***The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (2009 - 2013)***

This program, supported by the Getty Foundation, started in 2009. It proposed a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows. As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program also included a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence was meant to ensure a comparative dimension, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

- ***The Black Sea Link Fellowships Program (2010 - 2015)***

This program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, supported young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they had the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomed a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organized within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of the Black Sea region.

- ***The Europe next to Europe Fellowship Program (2013 - 2017)***

This Program, supported by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden), invites young researchers from European countries that are not yet members of the European Union, or which have a less consolidated position within it, targeting in particular the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia), Turkey, Cyprus, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

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Beside the above-described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

### **In the past:**

- ***The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)***

Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in



the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different confessions within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

- ***The Septuagint Translation Project (2002 - 2011)***

This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul*. Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

- ***The Excellency Network Germany – South–Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***

The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South–Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

- ***The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research***

*An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources (2006-2008)*

The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von

Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for Education and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility, connectedness and exploitation of some of the most prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the “Constantin Brăiloiu” Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

- ***Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances.*** This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled ***Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and eastern Europe***, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (December 2009 – November 2012)
- ***The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon*** (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (December 2009 - November 2014)
- ***The EURIAS Fellowship Program***, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-financed by the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar. (October 2011 – July 2014)

Research programs developed with the financial support of the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, through the *Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation – UEFISCDI*):

- ***DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (2011)
- ***UEFISCCDI – CNCS (PD – Projects): Federalism or Intergovernmentalism? Normative Perspectives on the Democratic Model of the European Union (Dr. Dan LAZEA); The Political Radicalization of the Kantian Idea of Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense (Dr. Áron TELEGDI-CSETRI)*** (August 2010 – July 2012)
- ***Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (March 2011 – September 2012)
- ***TE-Project: Critical Foundations of Contemporary Cosmopolitanism***, Team leader: Tamara CĂRĂUȘ, Members of the team: Áron Zsolt TELEGDI-CSETRI, Dan Dorin LAZEA, Camil PÂRVU (October 2011 – October 2014)
- ***PD-Project: Mircea Eliade between Indology and History of Religions. From Yoga to Shamanism and Archaic Religiosity (Liviu BORDAȘ)***  
Timeframe: May 1, 2013 – October 31, 2015 (2 and ½ years)
- ***IDEI-Project: Models of Producing and Disseminating Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: The Cartesian Framework***  
Project Coordinator: Vlad ALEXANDRESCU  
(1 Project Coordinator, 2 Researchers, 2 Research Assistants)  
Timeframe: January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2016 (5 Years)

- **TE-Project: *Pluralization of the Public Sphere. Art Exhibitions in Romania in the Timeframe 1968-1989***  
Project Coordinator: Cristian NAE  
(1 Project Coordinator, 1 Researcher, 2 Research Assistants)  
Timeframe: October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016 (1 Year)
- **Bilateral Cooperation: *Corruption and Politics in France and Romania (contemporary times)***  
Project Coordinator: Silvia MARTON  
(1 Project Coordinator, 7 Researchers)  
Timeframe: January 1, 2015 – December 31, 2016 (2 Years)
- **TE-Project: *Museums and Controversial Collections. Politics and Policies of Heritage Making in Post-colonial and Post-socialist Contexts***  
Project Coordinator: Damiana OȚOIU  
(1 Project Coordinator, 5 Researchers)  
Timeframe: October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2017 (2 Years)
- **TE-Project: *Turning Global: Socialist Experts during the Cold War (1960s-1980s)***  
Project Coordinator: Bogdan IACOB  
(1 Project Coordinator, 2 Researchers, 2 Research Assistants)  
Timeframe: October 1, 2015 – November 30, 2017 (2 Years and 2 Months)

#### **ERC Grants:**

- **ERC Starting Grant**  
(Grant transferred by the Principal Investigator to the University of Bucharest)  
***Record-keeping, fiscal reform, and the rise of institutional accountability in late medieval Savoy: a source-oriented approach – Castellany Accounts***  
Principal Investigator: Ionuț EPURESCU-PASCOVICI  
Timeframe at the NEC: May 1, 2015 – March 31, 2017 (1 Year and 10 Months)  
Timeframe of the Grant: May 1, 2015 – April 30, 2020 (5 Years)

## Ongoing projects:

### ERC Grants:

- **ERC Consolidator Grant**

***Luxury, fashion and social status in Early Modern South Eastern Europe***

Principal Investigator: Constanța VINTILĂ-GHIȚULESCU

(1 Principal Investigator, 8 Researchers)

Timeframe: July 1, 2015 – June 30, 2020 (5 Years)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

### Focus Groups

- *Culture in Murky Times*
- Focus Group on Education and Research
- New World Disorder

The Focus Groups are financed by two grants of the *Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation* – UEFISCDI, within the *Prize for Excellence in Research* awarded to Romanian Host Institutions of research projects financed by European Research Council in 2014 – 2016.

### Research Groups

- Reflections on the Political History of the 18th and 19th Century in Romania
- The Bible in Linguistic Context: Introduction to the Biblical Hebrew
- The Bible in Linguistic Context: Introduction to the Coptic Language

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Private Foundations, Germany

Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Köln, Germany

VolkswagenStiftung, Hanover, Germany

Gerda Henkel Stiftung, Düsseldorf, Germany

Robert Bosch Stiftung, Stuttgart, Germany

European Research Council (ERC)

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
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## ANA ACESKA

Born in 1981, in Skopje, Macedonia

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Dissertation: *"We" and "They" in a Divided City: Boundary-Work and Identity-Formation in Post-War Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina*

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Grantee of Marie Curie ILV Foundation, Central European University  
(2009, Budapest, Hungary)

Grantee of DAAD - German Academic Exchange Service,  
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Grantee of Foundation for Urban and Regional Studies FURS  
(2013-14, United Kingdom)

Grantee of Humboldt Graduate School, Humboldt Post-Doctoral Scholarship  
(2013-14, Berlin, Germany)

Participation at international conferences in Germany, Portugal, Hungary,  
Poland, Northern Ireland, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Author of research papers and book reviews published the area of urban sociology



# BRANDING THE ETHNICALLY DIVIDED CITY: BETWEEN METAPHORS AND SOCIAL REALITIES

## Abstract

The post-war ethnically divided cities are often subjects of highly political attempts to glorify their pre-division and pre-war pasts, both in the scholarship and in the common thinking. In this paper I write that this “idealisation” of the past of an ethnically divided city is problematic as it does not include the understanding that the ethnically divided cities are – like all the other cities – to some extent “normal” places where people work, shop and pray. They are not loci of “ideal” versions of ethnic cohabitation or ethnic divisions, but they are places where ethnic cohabitation is, like elsewhere, happening somewhere between the extreme ends of the scale. I base my study on a research conducted in the ethnically divided city of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**Keywords:** ethnically divided cities, metaphors, representational images, Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina

## Introduction

Since the beginnings of the thinking about cities and until today, cities are seen as global or globalizing, or as part of global networks and global flows of information, goods and people. Unlike the villages, cities are seen as offering much more opportunities to the various ethnic “others”. As a result, the ethnic spatial segregation in cities – even though it has a long history – is seen as a problem or an anomaly both in the common thinking and in the scholarly works. Thus, Jerusalem, Nicosia, Beirut, Mostar, Sarajevo and numerous other cities across the world that for decades and more are divided on east and west, or north and south, are often subjects of metaphoric qualifications and mystifications in both scholarly studies and in the common thinking.

One of those metaphoric qualifications and mystifications is the often extreme celebration of their pre-division past. This paper will focus on

this in particular and will discuss the case of the ethnically divided city of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mostar, for example, has often been described as a microcosm of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, both in the scholarship, as Bose concludes (Bose 2002: 98), as well as in the local press and literature (eg. Maslo 2001). The Bosnian cities and Mostar in particular were especially viewed as pluralistic concentrations of ethnic and religious difference since their populations typically included multiple large minorities and lacked a true majority. What is more, statements that cities like Mostar were predominantly destroyed after the war particularly because they embodied the visual image of the ethnic and religious diversity before the war are quite common. For Radovic, moreover, places like Sarajevo and Mostar “were attacked and destroyed because they were cities, because they embodied the pluralist, cosmopolitan, inclusive culture that ridiculed the narrow particularism and xenophobia of nationalistic exclusiveness.” (Radovic 1997, quoted in Makas 2007: 172), and for Bogdanovic the events in Bosnia are “the ritual murder of the city”, and for him the destruction was an attack on the very concept of cities because “Sarajevo and Jerusalem are not exceptional cities; rather they are the very embodiment of the ideal.” (Bogdanovic 1994, quoted in Makas 2007: 172, see also Coward 2002, Charlesworth 2006: 99-113). Among the many sites, the Old Bridge in Mostar has served as most exposed metaphor of the Mostarian ethnic diversity (for more see Coward 2002, Makas 2007, Kemerli 1995, Vladic 1997, for example of local press and literature see Serdarevic 2003a,b, Humo 2004, Pekovic 2006, for more on the Old Town see Bilanovic 2004, Katz 1997, Kreshevljakovic 1991). Kemerli for example argues that “the aim of such a barbaric act as the deliberate destruction of a unique cultural monument was the unequivocal destruction of a symbol of the presence of Muslims in Herzegovina and a brutal attempt to change the fundamental identity of the town” (Kemerli 1995: 470).

Indeed, part of this is true: in the pre-war and pre-division times Mostar has been quite ethnically mixed. Before the last Yugoslav war, and mainly during the decades of Yugoslavia (1943-1992), there were indeed only mixed housing zones on both sides of Mostar. According to the last pre-war census in 1991, of the approximately 126,000 people who lived in the city and its suburbs, approximately 35 percent declared themselves as Bosnian Croat, 34 percent as Bosnian Muslims, and 20 percent declared themselves as Bosnian Serbs. The remaining 11 percent chose to identify themselves as “Yugoslav”. The data of that census also show

that of the six republics that constituted the Yugoslav federation, Bosnia-Herzegovina was by far the most multiethnic. According to the data, 43,7 percent of the Bosnian population declared themselves as Muslims, 31,4 percent as Bosnian Serbs, 17,3 percent declared themselves as Croats and 5,5 percent declared themselves as “Yugoslav”, a supranational category favoured by mostly younger and educated citizens of the former Yugoslavia (Bose 2007). The numbers in Mostar were slightly different, as the entire twentieth century was a time of steadily increasing urban growth in Mostar, the city’s population had doubled at the beginning of the twentieth century, then doubled again by the 1950s, and then continued to increase until the war (Bollens 2003). The numbers show that none of the three peoples living in Mostar before its division were a majority in the city (nor in the country). Within Yugoslavia, Mostar also had statistically higher percentages of intermarriage and larger self-identification as Yugoslav (rather than Serb, Croat, or Muslim). Throughout history, too, Mostar and Bosnia-Herzegovina were the border regions of many political and ideological divisions in Europe. The territory was the border between Byzantium and Rome, between the Eastern and Western Christianity, later in history it was the border region between the Christian Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Muslim Ottoman Empire, and it is one of the very few territories in the Balkan Peninsula which were under the rule of both empires. Within Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the federal state located between the Catholic Slovenia and Croatia and the Orthodox Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The proximity of buildings reflecting different religious and other traditions in Mostar physically and visually reinforced the idea of the city being multicultural.

And yet, in this paper I argue that this “idealisation” of the past of an ethnically divided city is problematic on many levels. One of them is that that kind of idealisation does not include the understanding that the ethnically mixed and the ethnically divided cities are – like all the other cities – places where people work, shop, pray and worship. They are not loci of “ideal” versions of ethnic cohabitation or ethnic divisions, rather they are places where ethnic cohabitation is also, like in other cities, happening somewhere between the extreme ends of the scale.

In this paper I, thus, look at local and international accounts published in media and scholarly efforts both in pre-war and post-war Mostar in order to begin to understand the question about the extent to which we can talk about ideally mixed cities. Indeed, the metaphoric qualifications vastly present in media that I outlined at the beginning are constructed in

a special context in which the city was struggling to redefine itself during the many turbulent events in the years after the wars, and as such they are highly political. And yet, they dominated the media in times when scholars of various disciplines and academic backgrounds, as well as journalists and other writers, were trying to deconstruct the history of the ethnic relations in the city and were pointing at various specific aspects of the urban change that did not really fit in the overall story of Mostar as an “ideally mixed city in the past”. Thus, in this paper I will give space to those studies. In this paper I want to bring together the “smaller” accounts about the ethnically mixed pre-war Mostar. I will not cover all periods and all aspects of the ethnic relations in the past of Mostar, due to the temporal and spatial limitations of this study.

I will, thus, look at two interlinked processes: (1) the ethnic relations in the city and (2) the urban design and urban logic of the city before the 1990. In terms of methodology, I use only secondary sources: historical accounts, mainly local, but also international, both scholarly and journalistic, which focus on specific aspects of the ethnic relations and urban logics in the city before the war.

In that respect, the goal of the paper is to point to the need to rethink the tendency towards such metaphoric qualifications of the city both in the common thinking as well as in the scholarly and professional responses to the ethnically divided city. The aim is, thus, not to deconstruct the politically constructed narrative of Mostar as a “microcosm of Yugoslavia”, but rather to point to the understanding that these dualistic images like “pre-war ideally mixed” city and “post-war firmly divided” city are overlooking many social processes that are happening across and beyond these dichotomies and they offer a limited image of the ethnic relations and urban design in the city. In terms of the organisation of the paper, I will first give an account on the context in which the division of the city happened. Then, in the second and third sections I will separately address the questions of the ethnic relations within the city and the urban design and urban logic in the city before the 1990s.

## **Dividing a city: the context**

The Bosnian war began in April 1992 and ended with the signing of the Dayton Agreement in December 1995. It was characterized by extreme violations of the international humanitarian law. It is particularly mystified

in the studies not only because it happened in post-World War II Europe in the midst of wide international surveillance, but also because it was a war of door-to-door neighbours who share a grand portion of history, language, territory, culture. The seclusion of every former Yugoslav country from Yugoslavia was followed by violent conflicts and warfares, but this one was particularly problematic as Bosnia-Herzegovina is a land of three ethno-national groups: Bosnian Serbs (Orthodox), Bosnian Croats (Catholics) and Bosniacs (Muslims) and none of them was a majority in the country.

Mostar was one of the most heavily damaged cities during the Bosnian war. Thousands people were killed and almost everything in the central areas was ruined. During the war the historic center of the city, including the famous Old Bridge and most of the mosques, churches and representative sites were reduced to ruins. Many people left the city and the country and the demographic structure of the city changed a lot. The city first came under attack by the Serbian army after the republic declared its independence from Yugoslavia. In that first siege of Mostar, the later opponents, Bosniacs and Croats, in a joint venture defended the city against the Serb forces. The second part of the war started in May 1993 when Croatia declared a war on Bosnia. Then the two allies became enemies who turned their guns to one another. Families were forcibly evicted from their homes overnight and were enforced to move to their side of the city. A frontline between the two military forces and civilians was formed in the middle of the city – that was the beginning of the divided city, as that same line later became an administrative border between east/Bosniac/Muslim and west/Croat/Catholic Mostar.

The administrative division of the city was established during the post-war reconstruction processes. The Washington Agreement of March 1994 ended the armed conflict between the Bosniac and Croat armed forces after which a complex project of political and administrative rule was implemented in the already divided city. The Council of Europe formally decided in May 1994 to carry out a major Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) joint action. The challenge was to develop new strategies of conflict management and resolution, the result of which was the formation of the European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM). The EUAM was also envisaged by the Washington Agreement (for more see Yarwood 1999). The EUAM team started working in difficult conditions including destroyed residential and representative sites, collapsed local and regional economy, as well as sporadic shelling and local violent

conflicts. Their goals included the creation of a reconstruction of the buildings and infrastructure, freedom of movement across the front line, unified police force as well as new urban planning and housing matters particularly in relation to the establishment of conditions suitable for the return of refugees and displaced persons, as well as the restoration of the public services such as electricity and water (Yarwood 1999:7). However, as many argued, the final result of the EUAM mandate was a de facto partition of the city (see Bollens 2007, 2008 for more). In 1996, at the end of the EUAM's mandate, Interim Statute of the city was reached according to which seven municipal districts were formed within the city, three with a Croat majority in the west and three with a Bosniac majority in the east and one smaller jointly controlled Central Zone. Each of the sides and the central administration established their own separate urban planning institutions and proceeded to restore and develop the city simultaneously, but in isolation from one another (for more see Bollens 2007, 2008). The three municipal districts on each side had separate city administrations, as well as a separate mayor until 2004.

The city was, thus, divided during and after the Bosnian wars on a Bosniac-dominated east and Croat-dominated west part of the city. The year for which there are reliable statistics is 1998 when 99,5% of Mostar Croats lived in the west side of the city, and 89% of the Bosniacs lived in the east side (Bollens 2007). Since then there are no mixed neighborhoods on any side, even though since 2004 there is no administrative border and some city dwellers are returning to their pre-war residence. The people that are returning to their pre-war place of residence or the people that just choose to live on the other side are still very few.

The partition line that in the post-war times separates the municipal districts with a Croat majority and the municipal districts with a Bosniac majority is the same line that was formed in May 1993 when the Bosniac and Croat army pointed their guns at each other after the joint battles against the Serb forces. From that moment, only limited movements were allowed across the line. Massive crossings were happening in that spring of 1993 when all Muslim citizens departed in a forced or voluntary way from the west to the east side of the city. When this process was completed, only occasional crossings, most of which westwards, were happening for reasons of consumption of food or seeing relatives and all of them could be accomplished only in the short periods of relative peace. The separating of the housing zones was completed in several phases. The two ethno-religious groups were living only in mixed housing zones until



the war. The first mass migrations from one side to the other happened during the war when families were forcibly evicted from their homes overnight and were enforced to move to their side of the city. After the war, many people sold their property to city dwellers from the other side and bought a property on “their” side of the city. According to Bose, in the immediate post-war times only thirty-five Croat city dwellers were living on the Bosniac side (Bose 2007).

The partition line as such is a composition of several streets that run north-south in the middle of the city. The longest of them that separates in the central parts of the city is the Bulevar Narodne Revolucije, or just the *Bulevar* (boulevard) as locals call it. It runs roughly north-south parallel to the Neretva River. The full length of the line begins at the base of the Hum Hill and runs north along the *Bulevar* coinciding with its length, and then it turns a bit eastward and follows Santiceva Street northward. The entire length of the border was militarized throughout the whole war and there were checkpoints at several spots where the movement of the city dwellers from one side to the other was controlled and administered. The checkpoints were removed when the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was formed (March 1994); at that time the crossings became officially allowed, but yet, very rare at the beginning.

The implemented changes included, as well, establishing a “Central Zone”. The idea of the team of planners was to create a zone which would be the basis for a future unification of the city and which would support the planning of joint urban spaces and institutions. The aim was to use planning and urbanism that would contribute to bridging the ethnic divisions. It was thus planned that the “Central Zone” should to be administered by an ethnically balanced city council and administration. It was planned as a place of neutral planning strategies and it consists of a common strip of land along the partition line that was created in the war-time (Makas 2007, Bollens 2007, 2008).

The size and the borders of the Central Zone together with the plans about what should or should not be part of it were vastly debated by all sides included (see Wimmen 2004, Makas 2007). As the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and united Mostar were an inconvenience to the Croat community on the whole, the Central Zone was altogether an unwanted solution for them and they propagated no Central Zone at all and instead only a confirmation of the war-time border between the two sides (Makas 2007). The final solution was an intermediate one, which largely displeased the Croat community (see Makas 2007). It also provoked

violent protests and riots of the Croat ultranationalists on February 7, 1996, after which the car of the president of the EUAM mandate, Hans Koschink, was sprayed with gunshots (Udovički 2000: 283). This final suggestion included a "Central Zone" that is not as big as the Bosniac community suggested, but one that is only half size of the one wanted which includes also sites that are significant for the two communities equally (see Makas 2007). There were many controversies in the processes of the rebuilding of the city too: it happened in a situation in which economic and religious actors from the two sides were using architecture and monumentality to achieve the separation in the city (Wimmen 2004, Makas 2007, see also Bollens 2007, 2008). Bollens further argues that urbanism and urban governance in post-war Mostar have been the primary means by which war profiteers have reinforced ethnic divisions; "war by means other than overt fighting has been carried out in Mostar for 10 years after the open hostilities of 1992–1994" (Bollens 2007:247).

The Interim Statute from 1996, created as a temporary solution only, governed the city until 2004 when a new Statute was implemented. Supervised by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) this time, the new Statute united the two city administrations. This decision was hardly suggested by the city dwellers themselves; it was, much like all other urban planning and policy work initiatives a resolution suggested and implemented by the international planning committees. A new commission of Mostar was formed for these reasons and a new mediator was elected in the attempts to reunify the city and reorganize the local governance. This process, as well, was followed by local riots, protests, public insults, durable negotiations and major disagreements between the two sides.

Thus, to what degree the city "reunified" is very hard to assess. The people, for example, that are returning to their pre-war place of residence or the people that just choose to live on the other side are still a few individual cases. There is no official statistics on this matter, yet it is common among the city dwellers today to think that there are more returnees from East to West (more Bosniacs return to or chose to live in West Mostar). The demographic structure of the city has significantly changed in the post-war times too. Many refugees to other countries did not return to Mostar after the war, and many people from the surrounding or more distant villages and cities moved to Mostar after the war. According to this last official census in 1991, 4.3 million people were living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by the estimates in 2001 there were only 3.5 million (Babic 2001). Today there are city dwellers that cross the border

that physically divides the city and actively use both sides, yet there are also many that do not cross the border at all. The barriers of cooperation in economic terms emerged after the war, too. Interethnic economic cooperation and trade decreased in the immediate years after the war as the ethnic politicians on both sides imposed illegal taxes and obstructed the repair of telephone lines and the operation of cargo traffic (Udovicki 2000). The companies became “ethnic” and the employees of the other ethnic groups were expelled from work. The limited research on the post-war city shows that for some the life in the divided post-war city is not easy. Kukic, for example, conducted a research among the students in the university in west/Croat Mostar in which he concluded that the political situation, the insecurity, the fear of the revival of the war tensions, and the conviction that Croats in Mostar cannot expect to live in a democratic society where all the nations and religions can live in equity and peace makes these students possible emigrants in other countries. The results of his research further show that a majority of the students stated that they would leave the city if it was possible (Kukic 2006).

This peculiar context, in which the division of the city happened, gave space to many forms of representing of the pre-war past as the “ideal” times of the city. And yet, as many have argued, the urban logics in the city before the war were not as “ideal”. In the two sections that follow, I look at local and international accounts published in media and scholarly efforts both in pre-war and post-war Mostar in order to question the extent to which we can talk about ideally mixed cities. In the section that follows I look at the different urban logics in the city, and in the one after that I look at the ethnic relations within the city.

### **The “mixed” city in history: different urban logics**

The studies on the different urban logics within the city suggest that Mostar was not always as “mixed” as in the decades of Yugoslavia and throughout the twentieth century. The different urban logics within the city – the Muslim Ottoman and the Christian Austro-Hungarian urban logic – were relatively divided much before the last Yugoslav wars.

The historians, for example, mostly agree that the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia, which started in 1463 and was completed in 1483, brought Islam into the kingdom of Bosnia (Banac 1993, Donia and Fine 1994, Malcolm 1994 and Velikonja 2003). The Islamization happened to a

larger extent there in comparison to the other neighboring regions as the kingdom of Bosnia was by that time religiously divided and there was no single dominating church in the region (for more see also Fine 1975). Since the 13<sup>th</sup> century the Bosnian Church was dominant on the land of today's Bosnia-Herzegovina – which was probably a mix of Catholic Church organizations and neo-Manichean doctrine, as Banac (1993) argues, and it was a weak and inconsistent church that lacked priests and infrastructure. Malcolm argues that on the territory of Bosnia proper there were two Churches: the Bosnian Church and the Catholic Church (Malcolm 1994:57), and that neither was exclusively supported by the state policy nor had a proper territorial system of parish churches and priests. Thus, many villages were out of reach of both. Thus, Donia and Fine (1994) argue that the term “conversion” is inappropriate and the phenomena that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina was “acceptance” (in Ramet 2005:245). The heretical reputation of the Bosnian Church, as Banac puts it, was overstated by the Christian neighbors of Bosnia which resulted in interventionist crusades particularly from Catholic Hungary-Croatia (1993:130). As Banac further argues, before the Ottoman conquest the Catholic Church from the west of Bosnia was stronger than the Orthodox from the east as they were the only possible source of aid against the Turks, yet, in today's eastern Bosnia the Orthodox Church continued its agency. However, as historians argue, much like in the whole Empire Ottomans did not try to bring Islam to the conquered territories by force nor did they expel the non-Muslim population, even though they assumed and practiced superiority of Islam over the other monotheistic religions by giving various privileges to the converted population (see for example Malcolm 1994). Thus, the acceptance of Islam proceeded slowly and gradually. Malcolm (1994), for example, offers the analyses of the ottoman “defters”, or tax-registers, which recorded property ownership and the classified people by religion and suggests, that the process by which Bosnia gained a majority population of Muslims lasted approximately 150 years, took many generations and was slow only at start (Malcolm 1994:53).

The city, in opposition to the village, played an important role in the processes of Islamisation. Velokonja (2003) writes that the Bosnian nobility converted to Islam in order to keep their property and privilege positions, while the peasants did that in order to avoid the taxes that were mandatory for Christians. Islam, thus, was associated with the upper class and to accept Islam meant to be willing to belong to the dominant class (Ramet 2005:245). The cities and towns were, thus, more quickly Islamicized,

because of the better infrastructure that the Ottomans built in the cities, mainly by providing mosques in the residential areas and the pre-existing shortage of Christian churches (Ramet 2005). Thus, starting from these early Islamisation times, many cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina became predominantly Muslim. The more Catholic towns were Islamicized later, due their resistance (Malcolm1994: 67), yet, they were also Islamicized at the end. Consequently, the towns that were more important for the Ottoman administration and served as seats of the local administrative units were more quickly transformed. Sarajevo, for example, developed only after the Islamization of its population and the Ottoman conquest. Over the decades it slowly became the biggest and most important Muslim city in the region. Today's center of the city, the location of the the most representative sites that tourists see and take to stand for the whole, was built in the first decades of Ottoman Sarajevo. Its population was almost entirely Muslim and it grew in a big city by becoming important market center and by attracting people from the surrounding villages. By the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century there were also a number of Christians and Jews, yet, out of ninety-three *mahalas* (quarters) only two were Christian (Malcolm1994:68). With a majority of Muslim population, adequate infrastructure and quick development, it became a big urban center of that time which population enjoyed good urban life, less taxes and many privileges, as Malcolm argues.

Mostar was a predominantly Muslim city at the first years of the settlement. Soon after conquering the medieval Bosnian Kingdom in the 1460's, the Ottomans declared the site of today's Mostar as the seat of one of their new administrative districts. At that time, there was no settlement, only a wooden bridge spanning the Neretva River. Besides the Old Bridge, they included numerous monumental architectural structures in today's Mostar's historical center such as mosques, baths, residential houses. The first medresa (Muslim school) was build before 1570 (see Hasandedic 2000, 2005). Hodzic writes that out of seventeen *mahala*, fifteen were Muslim in the 16th century (Hodzic 2000). Other historical data show that all mayors in the period of the Austro-Hungarian occupation (1878-1918) were Muslims (see for example Miletic 1997). Scholars write that the built environment was also predominantly Muslim in those times. Cirkovic, for example, argues that in all cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Ottoman imprint is the oldest part of the town (Cirkovic 1987). She writes that that is an outcome of a discontinuity of the urban life between the late antiquity and the medieval times in the Balkan Peninsula, as shown

by the archeological analyses of the ruins of the old pre-medieval cities. Thus, she adds, in the early seventh century when the Slavic peoples inhabited the peninsula not even one single case of survival of urban life from the late antiquity could be found.

Yet, the more Islamic image of the city changed during the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Mostar (1878-1918). Scholars mostly described it as a period of economic and cultural upsurge which changed not only the urban design, but also the way of living in the city: banks and publishing houses were built then including the famous Mostar gymnasium (see Celebic 1985, Peez 2002 [1891], Vego 2006a, b), as well as a major bridge (Tito bridge) which now links the largest square on the east side with the other side of the city (see Hasandedic 2005). This urban change included a different model of urban planning too: for the first time in history the planning principles included streets, squares, blocks as planned urban forms, in opposition to the unplanned expansion of the city before that (see Celebic 1985, Vego 2006a,b). The new urban concept meant that squares were connected into a unity and created a new form – the town promenade (Vego 2006). The fronts of the buildings, mainly the representative buildings, were arranged in a line which created new uses of the space. This principle of “linear” urban design, as the local architect Vego writes, was purposely used in the planning of the western part of Mostar in the building of the new circle square with a round traffic circle (today’s Rondo Square), a square comprised of many promenades Vego (2006a,b). Some of the interventions in the city done by the Austro-Hungarian administration were directed to the well-being of the Austro-Hungarian soldiers: Miletic (1996), for example, argues that like the new plumbing system was first initiated to make the stay of the Austro-Hungarian soldiers and officials more pleasant (Miletic 1996:93). During this time the first bikes appeared in the city; the first public bath was built too.

These two dominant urban logics in Mostar, namely the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian one, are also partly divided along today’s division line in Mostar, too. The Austro-Hungarian architecture and urban logic can be found in both sides of the city, and the Ottoman architecture and urban design are almost fully included in the east/Muslim part of the city. Thus, these divisions of architectural styles as well contribute to the image of the divided city in the local press and literature. Some of the data on these matters can be found in the travel notes of the Austrian soldiers who worked in Mostar that time (see for example Michel 2006 [1908], Peez

2002 [1891]). While for the earlier decades of the 19th century the notes of the British travellers serve as source of data for today's researchers (for more see Hadziselimovic 1989), the data from the diaries and published works of the Austro-Hungarian travellers and soldiers tell a lot about the on-going fast urban change at that time. In his book written in 1891 that was inspired by his short visit to Mostar during Austro-Hungarian times, the writer Carl Peez, for example, describes the east side of the city (today's Bosniac Mostar) as the home of the past and the present and the West Mostar as the section of the city where "the future lies" (Peez 2002 [1891]: 17), meaning that, as he adds, that is the side of the city where many new buildings and institutions can be built unlike the other one which is already dominated by Ottoman imprint. Peez writes that by the middle of the 19th century today's west side of the city (Croat Mostar) was only a suburb and the city was located mainly on the east side.

These accounts on the different urban logics throughout history point to the understanding that even though there were only mixed housing zones on both sides of Mostar, throughout history Mostar was not always as "mixed" as in the decades prior to the division. The following section will focus on the ethnic relations within the city in the same context.

### **The ethnic relations in the pre-war times: not so "ideal" either**

Historians say that throughout history there were also various periods of conflicts besides the periods of peaceful living (see for example Velikonja 2003). Kamberovic, for example, writes that the three peoples in Mostar had relatively good relations by the middle of the 19th century (Kamberovic 1997). Brkic writes about the relationships between the students in the Mostar gymnasium at the beginning of the 20th century (Brkic 1969). He writes that the students from all three ethno-religious groups were studying in mixed classrooms and as religious practices were mandatory for all of students, the Catholics were going to the church on Sundays and the Muslim students were going jointly to a mosque on Fridays. Miletic and Cubela, on the other hand, write that the associations of musicians created in the 1880s were not joint but divided on a Serbian one and a Croatian one (see Miletic and Cubela 1979). One more example is the account of Serdarevic who writes about the use of the beaches of the river in Mostar. In a study in which he is mapping the Mostarian families and the parts of the river that they occupied one can understand that all three

ethno-religious groups had an equal access to the river beaches (Serdarevic 2007). In a wider Bosnian context, scholars have also studied whether the houses of Christians and Muslims throughout the county, as well as in Mostar, differed or not. Researchers have different claims on this. While some, as Bukarski (2005) has researched, claim that no difference in the design of houses can be noticed through centuries, others argue that, for example, only the Muslim houses had *chardaci* (local types of balconies) (Filipovic 1930 in Bukarski 2005:121), or that often in the history the Christian houses had only one floor and they were usually smaller than the Muslim houses, as that design would make them less visible and, thus, less known to the Ottoman tax-collectors who imposed different tax rates to the Muslim households (Filipovic 1951 in Bukarski 2005: 121).

The ethno-religious groups that lived in Mostar before the war had also different legal status within Yugoslavia, among which is the right of the Bosniacs (Muslims) to declare themselves as a separate *narod* (peoples, nation) in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav historiography laid its principle stress upon socio-economic developments, like class struggle, feudal institutions and revolutionary movements (Vucinich 1955) and the questions of ethnicity and nationalism were raised only gradually (for more see Redzic 2000:61-87; Kurtovic 1975). In Yugoslavia there was a clear distinction between the six constituent peoples (*narodi*) of the Yugoslav federation – Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Slovenes – and the minorities living in the country (*nacionalnosti*). Yet, the Muslims got an equal status with the other five constituent peoples a bit later in history. The name “Muslim” (Musliman, with a capital “M”) has been used to designate the Slavic-speaking Muslims of Bosnia since the end of the 19th century (Bougarel et al 2007: 1). Yet, it became their official national name only in 1968. In 1993, the Bosniac Assembly declared “Bosniac” (Bosnjak) to be the new national name and in 1995, “Bosniac” was introduced in the new Bosnian Constitution. The initial position was that the problem would solve itself as Muslims will just continue to identify themselves with Serbs or Croats (Malcolm 1994). At the first post WWII congress it was stated that: “Bosnia cannot be divided between Serbia and Croatia, not only because Serbs and Croats live mixed together on the whole territory, but also because the territory is inhabited by Muslims who have not yet decided on their national identity” (Hoepken 1989:194, quoted in Malcolm 1994); this “decision” meant that they still haven’t decided whether they are Croats or Serbs. This is visible in the national censuses



in the decades after World War II. In the first Yugoslav national census in 1948, for example, the Muslims could choose between three options: Muslim Serbs, Muslim Croats or “Muslims, nationally undeclared”. This changed several times in the next censuses when finally in 1963 the new Preamble of the Bosnian constitution recognized that “Serbs, Croats and Muslims allied in the past by a common life” and in 1965 the Bosnian League of Communists listed people as Serbs, Croats or Muslims (Malcolm 1994: 199). Yet, the Muslims were recognized as a separate nation within Bosnia-Herzegovina finally at the census in 1971, when they could declare themselves as “Muslims, in terms of a nation”. This kind of Bosnian Muslim socialist nationhood caused various peculiarities and somewhat bizarre situations in which, for example, one could be a Muslim by nationality and Jehovah’s Witness by religion, which was, for example, present in the Bosnian town of Zavidovici (Banac 1994).

These many accounts thus show that throughout history there were various periods of conflicts as well as peaceful living. But what is more important, they point to the idea that these dualistic images of the re-war “mixed” city – pre-war ideally mixed city and post-war firmly divided city – are overlooking many social processes that are happening across and beyond these dichotomies and they offer one-sided image of the ethnic relations in one city.

## Conclusion

The city of Mostar, in Bosnia-Herzegovina – or more precisely its pre-1991 past – has often been described as a microcosm of Yugoslavia, both in the scholarship as Bose concludes (Bose 2002: 98), as well as in the local press and literature (eg. Maslo 2001). It is also often argued, both in media and in the scholarly accounts, that cities like Mostar were destroyed after the war particularly because they embodied the visual image of the ethnic and religious diversity before the war. Among the many examples is the one of the Old Bridge in Mostar – the bridge has served as most exposed and highly politicized metaphor of the pre-war Mostarian ethnic diversity and post-war ethnic divisions.

In this paper I looked at the local and international historical accounts, both scholarly and journalistic, which focus on two interlinked aspects of ethnic cohabitation in cities: first, the ethnic relations and second, the different urban logics within the city before the Yugoslav wars. Before the

wars there were only mixed housing zones on both sides of Mostar. And yet, the various studies on the ethnic relations and demographic structure of the city show that throughout history the city was not always as “mixed” as in the years before the war. Regarding the ethnic relations, these studies also show that throughout history there were various periods of peaceful living as well as various periods of conflicts. In terms of the urban logic, they pointed to the understanding that the two different urban logics within the city, the Muslim Ottoman and the Christian Austro-Hungarian one, were divided much before the ethnic division of the city in the post-war times. The conclusion is, thus, once again, that the many representational images of the history of the city that include the “romantic” notion that Mostar was always a peacefully “mixed” city should remain what they are – just metaphors – and their misuse for political and other purposes must be questioned.

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# FRIENDSHIP AND SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES IN POSTSOCIALISM: THE CASE OF CROATIAN UPPER MIDDLE CLASS

## Abstract

The paper explores the emergence of class boundaries in postsocialism in the realm of sociability. The goal was to observe class dynamics through qualitative, experience-near approach, providing a dynamic account of the ways Croatian upper middle class draw symbolic boundaries toward people of different social status. Two main patterns of symbolic boundary maintenance are described and observed in their historical trajectories. The issue of symbolic boundaries is then explored in case of private schooling, in order to follow the process of institutionalization of class inequalities. Finally, an opposite trend of boundary transgression is demonstrated on the case of cross-class friendships.

**Keywords:** symbolic boundaries, friendship, postsocialism, upper middle class, private schooling

## Introduction

Several factors made it reasonable to assume that the class structure in Eastern Europe would be rather different from the one in capitalist societies of the West. Firstly, much of Eastern Europe experienced belated modernization, which made class differentiation appear much later than in their Western counterparts. Secondly, in order to create classless societies, state-socialist regimes sought for decades to implement the process of destratification. Finally, two decades of postsocialist transition might have had a significant effect on class transformations: given that the social structure in Eastern Europe, as Eyal, Szélenyi and Townsly noticed, is in a flux, any class analysis in this context would in fact be an analysis of class formation (Eyal, Szélenyi, and Townsley 1998). Therefore, the question emerged of how and in which direction will the class formation continue to develop? In the empirical research which is presented here, the issue

of class boundaries in postsocialism was addressed through perspective of symbolic boundaries.

Tables, graphs and abstract models have for decades been identified with sociological exploration of social structure. Even though qualitative, experience-near methods have earned a place in sociological analysis already during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (most famously at the Chicago school), the issues related to class inequalities and social stratification remained reserved for macro scale approaches. Since the 1980s, however, a number of social scientists with a background in qualitative sociology became engaged in meaning-oriented study of social inequalities, exploring how categories of class are being “lived” in real life. Instead of perpetuating old cultural clichés based on class labels used in a stereotypical fashion (“bourgeois”, “worker”, “petit bourgeois”), these scholars sought to fill the empty categories with meaning by engaging in the empirical fieldwork. The body of work on symbolic boundary maintenance represents one of the most well known attempts of that sort.

In a series of empirical studies Michèle Lamont explored how social actors categorize objects, people, and practices. These conceptual distinctions by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality, were called symbolic boundaries. Examining these tools, Lamont showed, “allows us to capture the dynamic dimensions of social relations, as groups compete in the production, diffusion, and institutionalization of alternative systems and principles of classifications” (Lamont and Molnar 2002: 168). Instead of regarding culture as coherent and integrated, Lamont therefore embraced the toolkit model of new cultural sociology, directing the search for sources of stability and consistency in the sphere of beliefs and representations – both regarding the schematic organizations which make some ideas or images more accessible than others, and the cues embedded in the physical and social environment (DiMaggio 1997: 267). In the research presented in this paper, the aim was to explore the cues specific for the postsocialist environment in which Croatian upper middle class lived and worked.

This research is based on 60 in-depth interviews carried out in Zagreb from 2009 to 2011 with representatives of four typical upper middle class professions (financial professionals, doctors, architects, cultural specialists).<sup>1</sup> Even though a controversial sociological notion, in this qualitative, small-scale study there was freedom to operationalize the oftentimes confusing concept of class, with less rigor than is usually required in quantitative investigations. When sampling respondents, a

simple occupation-based sample was employed where four groups of professionals and managers represented the well-off, educated part of society characterized by high social status and a high degree of autonomy in the work place.<sup>2</sup> The respondents were found through professional associations, online registries and snowball sampling.

I will start by spelling out two main patterns of drawing symbolic boundaries found among the respondents. After I have elaborated these two types of boundaries, as well as traced their historical origins, the issue of physical boundaries to sociability that emerged in the new social setting will be explored on the case of private schooling. In the final section, I will demonstrate how, thanks to the egalitarian cultural resources, symbolic boundaries in Croatia are transgressed through cross-class friendship making.

### **Culture and Entrepreneurs: Types of Boundaries**

The concept of social class in different social settings hardly refers to an identical set of social phenomena. Even though class terminology everywhere serves to denote groups or collectivities with unequal access to valued resources, its content, as well as the mechanisms of allocation, varies greatly across different geographical settings. Notwithstanding the structural socio-economic features of class inequalities, the extent of contextual variations is perhaps the most salient in the dimension of meaning. In order to explore these differences various authors explored how the group membership is conceived and performed by the actors, or more specifically in the case of symbolic boundary approach, by scrutinizing how the group membership influenced, and was reflected in the metrics of worth employed when assessing other people. In the case of Croatian upper middle class, this had to do with two main patterns: culture and entrepreneurial values.

Culture is an obvious suspect in the social class research. Ever since Weber and Veblen, but most notably from Bourdieu's studies of French society, it has been unsurprising to explore the intersection between culture and social inequalities. In the symbolic boundary approach, however, culture is used in a narrower sense. In contemporary societies, according to Bourdieu, groups and collectivities are formed primarily in the sphere of consumption (Weininger 2005). Everyday acts of consumption serve as a way of symbolizing social similarity, with cultural capital playing

an important role in this process. However, as critics argued, due to Bourdieu's abstract and mechanical model, culture, working through habitus, operates more as a dependent than independent variable; more of a gearbox, then an engine (Alexander and Smith 2002). Rather than simplistically assuming that people's positions in social space will automatically reflect on their identities, Lamont therefore explored how culture is used as a legitimizing principle in making broader value claims.

As in other empirical studies, various expressions of cultural boundaries could be observed in my research. This aspect referred to a broad semantic field of practices mutually related only in a very loose way: boundaries built on high culture, on culture as a resource of intellectual stance and independent thinking, or culture as a guarantee of cosmopolitan values. Even though not completely following the dichotomic logic, these patterns roughly corresponded with classic Bourdieu's typology of culture, presented in his seminal work "Distinction" (Bourdieu 1986). The dominant tastes were thereby divided along two basic streams, which itself continued a chain of Durkheimian oppositions on sacred and profane, existing in various levels of cultural worlds (Velthuis 2005). Yet what proponents of different conceptions of culture shared was the importance given to cultural practices – regardless whether classical or avant-garde, bourgeois or revolutionary. Thus, what by convention is called culture represented one of the unifying patterns with potential to explain variations in the processes of constructing subjective and objective boundaries between classes.

Economic liberalism, individualism, materialism and ideology of productivity belong to the second main criterion used to shape the group patterns of inclusion and exclusion among the respondents (primarily financial professionals, but also from other sectors, such as medical doctors). Although representing, if not contradictory, then perhaps potentially incompatible combinations of values, all of these segments have been united by the, roughly speaking, entrepreneurial worldview. The representatives of this type varied from advocates of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship, or in the more profane form, people who admired those who achieved financial success, to the libertarian adversaries to policies of solidarity and redistribution. However, as with the previous pattern, this set of values appeared too broad to be defined and bounded in a pure geometrical fashion, again encompassing practices mutually related, sometimes, only through the "family resemblances".

The mention of neither patterns comes as a surprise in qualitative exploration of class boundaries. Money and success – scarce resources by definition – seem as an obvious point of symbolic demarcation, with a fairly simple logic: if you are doing well economically, it is very comforting to assume that this must be due to your own talent and hard work, rather than due to favoritism and unfair advantages. As for the culture and arts, on the other hand, numerous historical and sociological accounts have documented attempts to ground the class identity in the sphere of taste – the domain of subjectivity with a unique characteristic to represent the very paradigm of naturality, spontaneity, and therefore objectivity (Eagleton 1990: 2). However, in order to take into account the full significance of the observed phenomena, each of the two patterns needs to be analyzed in the empirical and historical frame in which they were encountered – that is, within the system of semantical system in which they only can acquire meaning.

In order to pursue this goal, it is necessary to reveal the diachronical context in which both class patterns emerged in the, officially, classless state-socialist society – rather than providing solely snapshot perspective. In the next section, I show that the two patterns differ not only in their content, but also regarding the moment of their historical appearance. This, I show, had an impact on the contesting views on past, different experiences of present, and therefore conflicting visions of future, between these two social groups.

## **Origins of Boundaries**

A diachronical approach to cultural and symbolic aspects of social inequalities has been long present in sociological and anthropological tradition. From Bourdieu's analysis of French class structure (Bourdieu 1986), inspired by Elias's figurational sociology (Elias 1982), to Lamont's exploration of cultural differences between France and the USA in the context of specific national histories (Lamont 1992, 2000b), and Ortner's analysis of the phenomenon of upward mobility within specific territorially bounded ethnic enclaves (Ortner 2003), various authors observed the symbolic distinctions as a result of specific historical trajectories. Yet if the set of cultural cues standing at the disposal of individual actors indeed is determined by intergenerational transmission of class-specific practices

and rituals, the case of class boundaries in Croatian society offers an interesting comparative perspective.

### ***Old Boundaries***

As a result of the militant state intervention during period of state-socialism, Eastern European countries conducted an overall project of industrialization, generating high capital accumulation and levels of industrial investment. Yet surpassing the capitalist countries on the economic level, for the communist ideologues, represented only half of the story; Eastern Europe was to be modernized in a different way, with egalitarianism constituting a central point of its agenda. However, the efficiency of destratification measures, as well known, was rather dubious. What, according to numerous critics, differentiated social stratification in socialism from the Western model were simply the patterns which served for transmitting the inequalities, not the existence of inequalities itself. Due to the limited options for direct social reproduction, cultural reproduction operated as a major alternative route for the transmission of inequalities (Kraaykamp and Nieuwbeerta 2000: 100).

Unable to help their children maintaining the family social trajectory through material means (*i.e.*, as the consequence of the abolition of private property, limited income dispersion and other destratifying measures), knowledge, education and aspiration towards academic success, according to Kraaykamp and Nieuwbeerta, became even more important for transmission of inequalities. The case of a young professional, interviewed for the purpose of this research, can be considered indicative. His family, for centuries part of Croatian landed nobility, has for generations been educated in bourgeois liberal professions. Long after the times when their power was avouched by the monarch, his ancestors converted their status and position into safer modes of symbolical capital, as well as educational credentials.

Art and culture have always played an important part of his life: as a small boy he would go for music lessons, and attend foreign language courses, thanks to which today he fluently speaks several languages. Nowadays, he does not play musical instruments any more, but he is interested in collecting antiques. This education has also left an impact in the creation of his social circle.

I originate from...ok, now it's gonna sound like I live somewhere, like, in the skies, but I originate from a noble family. I was raised in a special way. Since early on I have been surrounded by...hmmm...well I lived in a specific setting. I don't know, I have lots of relatives even outside Croatia which also aren't well, how should I put it...which aren't frivolous. They share a long history, and a certain legacy, too. So, I don't wanna say this limited the type of people who can enter my circle, but in any case I *choose* people. I mean, OK, due to the circumstances I live a normal life, just like anybody else, so I cannot choose people according to this line only, but this definitely has conditioned with whom I will socialize more.

While he is surrounded by people of higher social standing, when asked who are the people that could never enter the list of the "important people", he says:

It's not that I won't hang out with someone who is not from this milieu, or who didn't finish college. But I don't know, when I see someone in a track suit and sneakers... or, I don't know how to put this... who chews a chewing gum and who starts to talk to me... I won't say differently, but who starts to 'howl'<sup>3</sup> [laughter]... I mean unrelated to the regional context, but you know, when it becomes obvious that this guy doesn't have something *behind* him... some sort of culture, then this guy will hardly manage to enter the group of my intimate friends.

People to whom he refers, and to whom a number of other interviewees referred when describing their "other", are "seljačine", which approximately could be translated as "hillbilly" or "redneck", but unlike these terms, is not geographically determined. Although it is, in a literal sense, augmentative of the word "peasant", this is not an adequate English translation, since it refers also to people who live in urban areas – or primarily to them. But the main layer of meaning relates to people who though living in urban areas, have not accepted urban values – whatever these are – combining both ethical and aesthetical connotations.

### ***New Boundaries***

Although state-socialist regimes – in theory more than in practice – sought to eradicate any form of class divisions, social inequalities in the socio-economic sense were perceived as particularly suspicious. Any kind of divergence from the common standard of living was bound to be

denounced as amoral, and seen as subversive. The first ones to feel this were private entrepreneurs – class of parasites extracting the surplus value from the exploited and alienated activity of the working class. With the decline of socialism and the rise of the market economy, however, the situation turned upside-down. Entrepreneurs suddenly received a warm welcome, as those with a potential to bring Eastern European countries along the road of success, with notions of success and meritocracy replacing consecrated ideas of equality and “uravnilovka”.

True, the ideas of entrepreneurialism and private initiative to some extent existed even before 1990. How could one otherwise, as Yurchak observes, explain the dynamics of entrepreneurial activity in the final years of the Soviet Union: having been raised in a society in which private business was practically non-existent, the new generations were not supposed to be good at inventing and running private businesses – and yet, great numbers of young people quickly adjusted (Yurchak 2002: 278). These people, Yurchak continues, acquired particular entrepreneurial knowledge and skills long before the collapse of the communist regime, whether as managers in industry, dealers on the black market, or communist youth activists. Yet, notwithstanding the historical continuities between the two periods, as for the entrepreneurial activities the 1990 indeed had signified a watershed, the beginning of a new life. In words of my interviewee, an auditor in her early 50s:

Well...I could say...I feel as if I had amnesia to this whole socialism past...as if my world and my life...my business life...began with the market economy.

After graduating in economics, my respondent was employed in a big socialist enterprise, with, as she admits, little ambition in life. After 1990, however, she left her job and decided to start on her own. Since then she developed her own business, running both the accounting, and training seminars for auditors. Asked whether her material status has risen since the breakup of Yugoslavia, despite ups and downs, she answers euphorically:

Yes! Yes! Now look, the system in which we live, despite the corruption and current defects...so this system, which if you insist I can call capitalism... induces the capable to have more. While the socialism induces less capable to have more, because it makes people equal, capitalism stimulates the capable ones to have more. And by all means, I belong to the ones to which capitalism opened all the doors...and in this system I simply blossomed! (...)



"I'm totally in favor of a *fierce* capitalism", she says, demonstrating a cultural framework which oftentimes accompanied postsocialist transition and its alleged neoliberalism, making way for a reduction of welfare programs by narrowing definitions of their respective symbolic communities (Lamont 2000a: 605). "The ones who are capable should go forward", she says, "and the less capable take the place that belongs to them. Why would a capable person ride a bicycle, while an incapable person drives a Mercedes?" The cure for the illnesses of postsocialism, according to her, is "more capitalism", rather than "return to socialism". In capitalism, she says, if you work you can earn. "And for me... *for me, this is paradise!*"

She characterizes her and her group of friends, as mostly consisting of entrepreneurs: "Our value system is work and order. (...) Principally, we are honest and decent...we are the honest and hardworking part of this nation." In a country still very much struggling with the difficulties of the postsocialist transition, and which only until recently had still been trying to catch up with the pre-1990 levels of economic performance, entrepreneurs oftentimes seemed prone to ground identity and feeling of self-worth in their role in overcoming these hardships by making a better society.

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In this section it was shown how two main types of symbolic boundaries provided separate types of resources that the respondents used for grounding their feelings of self-worth, as well as assessing the worth of the people around them. However, the cases of my interviewees at the same time indicated deeper political and societal divides emerging as symptom and outcome of the contesting metrics of worth. In the case of Croatia, this revolved around different political attitudes, and more broadly, the ways in which the respondents interpreted the nation's turbulent history.

A certain form of nostalgia for socialism has been noticeable among many respondents, yet few of the interviewees advocating entrepreneurial values seemed to share the sentiment. Asked again about her reminiscences about the times before 1990, the auditor quoted in the previous section answered: "socialism? I don't think of unrealistic things. Regardless of the good sides, biology does its own part. It's like two pine trees, where one is growing, and the other is puny. Socialism is simply evaporated out of my head." Some of the respondents from this group have had the experience of

state-socialism, while some of them, too young for that, got to know only its offspring, yet what all of them agreed was that only in capitalism would they get rewarded for their effort. This group of people therefore seemed to support libertarian idea of capitalism by referring to the genuinely moral principles, meritocracy and justice, which state-socialist aspirations towards egalitarianism and redistribution could not fulfill.

Even though not necessarily nostalgic for the time of socialism, for the “cultural” group of my interviewees, the emphasis was very different. Instead of pointing their criticism at heritage of state-socialism, it was what followed after which bothered them the most. Phenomena ranging from marketization and political radicalization (remarks more noticeable in the case of intellectual strands of upper middle class), to the lamentations about recent social upheavals, the rise of the *nouveaux riche*, and the ever lesser role of culture within dominant scale of values (motifs common among the cultural bourgeoisie), were understood as true problems of the society in which they lived. The issue of symbolic boundaries, in this way, rather than revealing solely the shape and content of “personal communities” (Pahl and Spencer 2004), uncovered more serious social divisions.

After analyzing symbolic aspect of boundary maintenance, in the next section I turn to the issue of institutional boundaries. The topic of private schools in postsocialism, as I propose, represents an interesting analytical point for exploring how the symbolic boundaries between classes intersect with physical boundaries to sociability. This subject will also be presented in a longer diachronical perspective, juxtaposing contemporary trends to the case of comprehensive reform of the secondary education from the 1970s.

## **From Destratification to Private Schools: Institutionalization of Boundaries**

Educational policies in state-socialist societies after World War II, as described by Prokić-Breuer, had been guided by three primary considerations: firstly, acknowledging the importance of educational expansion for economic prosperity; secondly, recognizing its ideological potential; and thirdly, identifying education as one of the mechanisms of social reproduction (Prokić-Breuer 2011: 18). In order to achieve the third goal, and to assure the equal opportunities in access to schooling,

state-socialist regimes implemented various policies. Despite the only partial success of such actions in the Yugoslav context and elsewhere, the (in)famous educational reform called “Šuvarica” from the mid 1970s, gives a telling example.

“Šuvarica”, called after Stipe Šuvar, at the time one of the leading Yugoslav communist leaders, and a minister of education and culture of the socialist republic of Croatia, represented one of the most thorough attempts to eradicate the influence of class inequalities in the educational attainment through the system of “directed education”. Why was the reform deemed necessary in the eyes of the Yugoslav educational experts? Similarly to its counterparts in other Eastern European countries the educational system in Yugoslavia had been modeled after the Soviet blueprint: eight years of comprehensive compulsory education were followed either by a technical high school, or the more academically rigorous gymnasium, forming a two-track system (Prokić-Breuer 2011: 18). The type of secondary school attended by adolescents, Prokić-Breuer explains, therefore played a significant role in their subsequent educational career, with entrance into gymnasias creating a highly competitive bottleneck.

It is true that by promoting educational opportunities for children from lower socio-economic backgrounds and hindering those coming from high social positions, communist governments made a tremendous effort to ensure accessibility. Reserving a large number of seats in prestigious high schools for children from working class families, as well as providing them with the financial aid, represented only some of the measures intended to encourage students to continue schooling rather than enter the labor market following their compulsory education (Prokić-Breuer 2011: 19). And yet, despite succeeding in diminishing the effects of social background, according to Stipe Šuvar, this system simply replaced one form of inequality with another, producing a new pattern of class differentiation.

Rather than organizing a truly egalitarian society, such a system, Šuvar objected, did nothing more than provide a higher level of equality of chances. Even in the ideal situation where it would diminish the importance of social background, which was, as he admitted not always the case, the existing system helped to maintain the separation between “intellectual” and “physical labor”. In order to change this, the Yugoslav educational system planned to pass a comprehensive reform, radically changing its structure, replacing the two-track system with the one-track arrangement. Instead of dividing the 15-year-olds into, respectively, the

future college graduates, and prospective workers, the new secondary schooling system ensured equal education for all.

Curriculums containing knowledge in general culture and science were no longer reserved exclusively for students attending gymnasiums – thereby providing every student with an equal opportunity to continue their educational process by enrolling in a university. The new system of education was, however, at the same time “directed”. Instead of providing only general knowledge necessary for academic scholarship, all students were supposed to finish a practical instruction, traditionally associated with vocational training. The first two grades being taught in schools were therefore being followed by the practical part of the curriculum, conducted in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> grade, in various industrial enterprises. This enabled every student, including the bulk of those who would later enroll in a university, to get acquainted with manual labor. The labor and education, “the school and the factory” – both of them, supposedly, being a product of bourgeois society – were therefore meant to be re-embedded into the social process of production (Šušvar 1977: 61).

Amongst the general public, the “directed education” scheme had been met with great revolt. True, this was partly due to the extremely sloppy ways the reform had been implemented: lacking fully elaborated curricula and necessary textbooks, as well as mostly relying on improvisation by the teaching staff, the new educational system seemed chaotic to almost everyone. Formal problems, however, represented only one side of the problem: a decision to abolish the system of gymnasiums – traditionally key educational institution of the central European intelligentsia – was crucial in causing such a broad-sweeping, angry response.<sup>4</sup> In vain Šušvar’s figures revealed an overall increase of students gaining knowledge of classical languages, history of art and literature. “Šušvarovka” has since then been kept in the public memory as “uravnilovka”, a reform responsible for shattering the knowledge of general culture among Croatians, bringing nothing but ignorance.

The story of the “Šušvarica” reform matters for the topic of this paper in two ways, confirming at the same time the continuity and the discontinuity of the contemporary trends with what was before. On the one hand, the opposition to the reform shows that in socialist Yugoslavia educational system was used (or sought to be used) as a mechanism for intergenerational transmission of inequalities, just as it did in Western capitalist countries. The fact that the class distinction existed even back in the days can be concluded not only from the consciousness about the

advantages and disadvantages associated with different levels of education (*i.e.*, the university track high schools), but also from the symbolic importance given to the idea of spatial separation, as seen from the case of a medical doctor in her 50s interviewed for this research.

The respondent, whose daughter attended a private school, explained to me that this was not a matter sudden decision. Even though during state-socialism her children were not yet in the school age, she recalls, “my husband was always saying how his children would attend a private gymnasium, if it ever opens here in our hometown”. Living in Yugoslavia, they had no clue what private schools exactly were and how they functioned, and yet her husband, she recalls, “he just... well, had this sentiment.” However, the case of the “Šuvarica” school reform demonstrates the narrow limits under which these sentiments, during the state-socialism, were tested. It namely shows that, if the symbolic boundaries between classes during state-socialism did exist, this unquenchable thirst of human desire for excelling above the rest and providing the same for the generations of their descendents, was institutionally bounded.

After 1990 things started to take new forms, bringing the possibility of class divisions to a whole new level: not only was the old two-track high school system immediately restored – therefore allowing, relatively speaking, early separation of the pathway for the intelligentsia on the one hand, and the manual workers on the other – but it was also “enriched” by the various new private schools, which enabled people like my interviewee and her husband to fulfill their dreams. Being the most selective and producing the highest scores in the state competitions, as well as internationally, elite examples of public gymnasiums in Croatia (for example, schools offering an IB program) still hold the most prestige. However, since the mid 1990s, the private gymnasiums started taking over their share of the market. Out of approximately 400 secondary schools, nowadays about twenty-five of them are private.<sup>5</sup>

In order to gain inside information about private schooling, I talked to a head of a private gymnasium specialized in art and culture, and curiously enough, until 1990 a close collaborator of Stipe Šuvar.<sup>6</sup> In contrast to public schools, private institutions, as she explains, offer flexibility and more possibilities to meet students’ interests. In her school, as she proudly declared, students can attend courses in a number of foreign languages, workshops in film production, as well as classes on calligraphy. Thanks to its pedagogical resources, number of different workshops, greater ratio

of teachers and students, as well as highly motivated teaching staff – not least due to the generous financial incentives – the school principal waxed lyrical about the high results of her students achieved in the previous year's state exams.

The advantages of attending a private school leave no ambiguities: in contrast to the bureaucratization of public school, congestion and overcrowding, bad organization and lack of interest in the students' needs and wishes, private gymnasiums offer everything without these problematic features. However, in the discourse dominated by notions of freedom and values of humanist education, one aspect remains conspicuously hidden: the concept of class. Notwithstanding the value of humanist education, the question emerges, who are the ones actually benefiting from this? In contrast to the system in which she herself once worked, a system that sought to introduce art, classical languages and general culture to children from all social strata, the rules of the game changed. Ironically, once working on a project aiming to eradicate class differences, since 2001 when she founded a private gymnasium, my respondent gave her fair contribution to the process of institutionalizing class boundaries, managing to adjust to the new conditions rather well.

Despite underlining the humanist education and its student-oriented perspective in order to conceal its, undoubtedly, elite status, private schools in Croatia therefore represented an obvious class marker. However, in my research this marker, to conclude, became contested. Despite the prestige associated with attending a private gymnasium, several students, as a teacher employed in the school led by my earlier respondent informed me, reported a feeling of shame. Instead of using the fact of attending a private school as a point of pride and self-worth, they sought to hide this from their friends from the neighborhood.<sup>7</sup> The controversy surrounding the attendance of private institution, in this respect, implied the existence of an egalitarian order of worth, prohibiting classist isolation. In the final section of this paper, I focus on the egalitarian legacy by analyzing the topic of cross-class friendships encountered in my research.

## **Transgression of Boundaries: Cross-class Friendships**

Research of friendship patterns in the Western countries established class homogeneity as one of the most important factors in explaining non-kin sociability. Numerous research projects proved the homogenous

content of personal networks (Louch 2000; Williams 1959; Wong, Pattison, and Robins 2006; Wright and Cho 1992), whereas homophily, as a "principle that a contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people" (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001: 416) comprised various demographic and psychological characteristics: age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, intelligence, attitudes, aspirations. In a world distinguished by professionalization, division of labor, and all other forms of specialization, this can seem intuitively acceptable: "Given the social and economic barriers to socializing", Degenne and Forsé observed, "two people need a good number of common traits to stand any chance of establishing a relation" (Degenne and Forsé 1999: 35). With whom shall we relate if not with people who are closest to us in social space? The question yet remained, what are these common traits.

On the one hand, it seems rather obvious to expect people to prefer persons with whom they share common values or interests, that is, a belonging to the same symbolic community. The way we see ourselves, and appreciate our own worth will, as assumed by Lamont, most likely have a similar influence on the way we evaluate people around us. On the other side, these expectations risk the neglect of real-life possibilities. As conceptual distinctions by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality, symbolic boundaries are essentially imagined and exist in minds, rather than in physical space. Symbolic boundaries, however, never exist in vacuum, but are always drawn in frame of an "activity space" (Horton and Reynolds 1971) in which different people meet and interact. In order to analytically approach these issues, Feld coined a term "focus of activity", which he defined as any "social, psychological, legal or physical entity around which joint activities are organized" (Feld and Carter 1999: 136).

The symbolic boundaries between classes no doubt existed even in, allegedly, classless Yugoslav society. The transition, however, laid the ground for expanding these inequalities in several ways. While the income dispersion between occupational strata has expanded, social status differences between manual and non-manual occupations has risen drastically. The possibility for grounding class distinctions in the domain of consumption was increased (Fehérváry 2002), helping the newly rich "to establish new networks of relations among those who can afford to sponsor and attend their ceremonies" (Creed 2002: 65). Through these processes upper classes have acquired new possibilities and mechanisms of social

closure, enabling spatialization of inequalities in various dimensions of sociability.

While in state-socialism the symbolic boundaries could not enhance further social divides, the postsocialist transformations brought significant changes. Private schools, marketization of nursery homes, gated communities and exclusive social clubs, in this respect represented only some of the ways in which the symbolic boundaries between classes resulted in physical separation. Yet, despite the new possibilities of social closure, this trend in Croatia has been far from ubiquitous. Surprisingly, patterns of sociability among a number of interviewees did indeed transgress class boundaries, therefore refuting a hypothesis on the complete dominance of homophilic ties. The case of a museum curator from Zagreb is indicative.

My respondent is a museum curator in his late 50s, currently finishing his PhD thesis, and married to a high school teacher. His hobbies are mountaineering and speleology, while a lot of his free time constantly goes towards further education. As a scientist and an intellectual he frequently socializes with his colleagues with whom he shares common interests. However, one of the people on the interviewee's affective map is his neighbor, a metal worker. Despite being a recent friendship (my respondent moved to the neighborhood only a short time ago), the two of them have already established some common rituals, for instance a regular Saturday evening card game, which they conduct together with their wives.

Being a biologist and a speleologist, my respondent's work depends crucially on fieldwork in remote wild areas, and there the choice of people is certainly not limited only to people with graduate degrees like him: "speleology just as mountain hiking is a hobby not limited to a certain educational range, you know. You have guys who finished only primary school, to guys who have a PhD." In these remote areas he meets farmers and villagers, who oftentimes turn out to be of essential importance for survival in wilderness – and he certainly knows to appreciate it:

Well, the interests are certainly different, of course. They are different. But, as I said, you can always find a mutual language. If you can find something in common, you organize part of your life around that. One makes many acquaintances, when you do fieldwork. And when you go to a field, it's crucial to establish a contact with people in the field (...) because it's easier to get the information you need that way, it's easier to gather material.



These guys will lead you...if you meet a person, you'll get to places in the territory where you on your own wouldn't find a way that easily.

However, even if it may seem that these relations remain at a merely instrumental level, he objects, and gives an example of a friendship he made with one of the people he met during his fieldwork adventures:

When you meet this person, then this doesn't end with some superficial contact, you deepen it. You don't go to the field only once, usually, you go there several times. For instance, I'm very close to a man who works as a janitor and as a weatherman at the hiking station (...) and this goes over many years now. We have spent a lot of time [there] and we made a contact with people who live there (...). And then, as I said, this is not just a superficial acquaintance; this is a much deeper relation. (...) For instance, this hiking station is separated in two parts, you have beds for hikers, but these friends of mine who run it have also their private part, and we of course sleep in the latter, not in the former. So that's something completely different, because we sleep at their place, we have lunch together. And there are lots of such contacts.

His friends from the field therefore include people with different profiles and jobs: "one works on his land, the guy from the hiking station finished only high school (...), there is one forester, one of them also works at a bus station. But you know them, you know their children...this friendship then goes through generations and generations. Your kids get to know their kids, and so this develops further". True, many of his friends belong to the educated milieu, either as his fellow biologists, or his classmates, "but this isn't necessary, it's not necessary...because, as I said, socializing with people who aren't on the same educational level can be equally nice and very interesting. You learn from them, they learn from you, and this is all very nicely intertwined." As a professional speleologist whose life oftentimes depended on others – especially during the war in Croatia from 1991-1995 when he served in a special army unit located in hard-to-reach mountain areas – he learnt how to appreciate, what he sees as real human values.

In Lamont's study of French and American upper middle class, the domain of morality constituted one of three main patterns of symbolic boundary maintenance. Yet in the case of my respondent, morality played a different role than among Lamont's respondents. Whereas Lamont's interviewees used moral grounds to distinguish themselves from

the people below them, on the contrary, individuals presented in this section employed them, exactly in order to transgress these boundaries. Hard work, work ethics as well as the basic moral qualities of honesty and sincerity appeared to these interviewees, namely, as properties attainable to everyone, and equally distributed among different classes, being therefore independent of education and social standing. Despite appearing important for building the identity of interviewees, morality therefore at the same time transcended class boundaries, demonstrating its inclusionary, rather than exclusionary function.

## Conclusion

Eastern European societies since the demise of state-socialism represented a huge social laboratory, where class differences constituted an essential part of the puzzle. In this study, the aim was to contribute to this discussion by analyzing symbolic boundaries. The research questions therefore revolved around various aspects of social life, including the realm of values, identity building, and friendship making, all regarded in their class dimension. How do people in postsocialist societies construct their identities? What criteria do they use when they evaluate people around them? To what extent are these criteria based on their class positions? How did this change with the transitional transformations, and how much are they still governed by the heritage of values borrowed from the communist ideological framework?

High culture, as well as its intellectualist denial, represented an ideal candidate which upper classes used in order to symbolically distinguish themselves from the ones below them, seeking to find their dominance in the subjective sphere, which would then in a magical way attain an attribute of objectivity *par excellence*. At the same time, the entrepreneurial values of success and meritocracy represented alternative order of worth, which seemed to emerge after 1990, as a correlate of the growing number of entrepreneurs, providing them ideology and moral economy needed for grounding their identity and feeling of self-worth. The historical period in which each of the patterns occurred, it was shown, had a strong impact on contesting visions of recent history: whereas the former demonstrated critical stance towards various features of transitional changes (rising inequalities, new elites), the latter tended to be more critical towards the previous regime whose ills have, supposedly, been cured by capitalism and market economy.

After spelling out the types of symbolic boundaries encountered in my research, as well as tracing their origins in recent Croatian history, the section of private schooling provided additional perspective on class inequalities in contemporary Croatia. The introduction of private schools, which replaced the socialist one-track system (designed to reduce the impact of parental background for school success), was described in order to demonstrate the recent trends. The institutionalization of class inequalities, in this way, helped expanded the boundary drawing from symbolic to spatial dimension, shifting the obstacles to cross-class sociability to a higher level. As the “communities in mind” began to be transformed into “communities on the ground” (Pahl 2005), the homophilic mechanism also changed the form from choice homophily to induced homophily (Kossinets and Watts 2009). Surprisingly, however, as was shown in the final empirical section, the opposite trend was also noticeable.

The principle of homophily, or in essence the rule that “birds of feather flock together”, which has been confirmed in so many different studies, undoubtedly played an extremely important role in sociability of many interviewees. However, a number of respondents had transgressed class boundaries and sustained close friendship ties with people of lower class background. Contrary to new, classist orders of worth, and despite spatialization of inequalities, the cross-class sociability has been facilitated by the contextual features of Eastern Europe and legacy of state-socialism: recent modernization (with most of the people still having living ancestors among the rural population), stages in life-course associated with low degree of institutional separation (e.g. school friendships), and other manifestations of spatial proximity (lack of residential segregation). Finally, egalitarian values played a crucial role, providing cultural resources needed for grounding the concept of similarity in class-neutral terms. In a society whose ruling ideologies for decades insisted on social equality as the primary value, and which condemned the idea of inequality as amoral, aversion toward any inclination to create the symbolic boundaries on the basis of someone’s socioeconomic status, education or occupation becomes perfectly understandable.

The structural context in which people live, Lamont argues, consists not only of the structural conditions, in the sense of a person’s market position, but also of cultural resources, consisting of “narratives made available by national historical and religious traditions and various sectors of cultural production and diffusion – intellectuals, the educational system,

the church, the mass media" (Lamont 2000b: 7). Egalitarian values, lack of classist prejudices, and an absence of structural barriers to cross-class sociability constituted an important part of these cultural resources, with state-socialist past representing an important source of such societal forces. However, as other stories illustrated, the question of how far back into history one has to go to identify this path dependency remains. In some cases very far, along the family trees of the noble or bourgeois families, while in some other cases, not too far as some agents turned out to be far more ready to adjust to the new "orders of worth".

Despite the expectation that people in postsocialism as rational choice actors will immediately adjust to the new social, economic and political conditions, these results showed a far more complex picture, confirming the view that social relations are profoundly governed by underlying social and cultural structures, which are, according to Sewell, multiple, overlapping, and composed simultaneously of different cultural schemas and modes of power (Sewell 1996). In this way, the demise of state-socialism can be seen as a transformative event which changed social structures and enabled new conditions in which agents created and manipulated new opportunities, without, however, discarding values and routines acquired in the old regime. The postsocialist transition should, my aim was to show, be regarded as a complex process containing multiple and overlapping social and cultural structures, and providing different motivations and means of action, enabling agency and allowing actors to be something more than a mere "effect of the structure".

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> In order to understand both sides of the class boundaries, in my research the working class population in Croatia were also interviewed, whereas for the sake of achieving a comparative perspective I also carried out field research in Vienna, where I interviewed Austrian upper middle class. In this paper, however, I will present results from interviews with Croatian upper middle class.
- <sup>2</sup> Instead of identifying the concept of class with proxy used for sampling (in this case, occupation), a broader ('umbrella') approach to defining social class was embraced. For more on the folk concept of class and kitchen-sink approach in sociological analysis of inequalities see Conley's piece in the volume he edited with Anette Lareau (Conley 2008).
- <sup>3</sup> In Zagreb slang, this word refers to the dialect of immigrants from the rural areas.
- <sup>4</sup> As an example of "humanist" critique, see work by Puhovski (Puhovski 1990).
- <sup>5</sup> Some of these are religious private schools, which do not require tuition fees, or carry social prestige, and in general do not seem to play any significant role in the processes of social stratification, at least in the Croatian context. As for the primary schools, the number of private schools is still insignificant: out of nearly 900, only two of them are privately run.
- <sup>6</sup> She was not chosen as a part of the original upper middle class sample, but for the purpose of the pilot interview of the research on private schooling in Croatia. Unlike other respondents quoted in this paper, the main topic of this interview dealt with the implementation of private schools in the contemporary Croatia, rather than with her personal network and friendship ties.
- <sup>7</sup> It is indicative that, despite her dreams about sending her children to a private school, even the doctor described in the beginning of this section did not manage to provide both of her daughters with a private education, with her older one having categorically rejected her mother's persuasions.

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# A “SPLENDID” CALAMITY AND *TANZIMAT* IN THE CITY: THE HOCAPAŞA FIRE OF 1865 AND PROPERTY IN DISASTER LAW

## Abstract

This article examines the Hocapaşa fire of 1865 and consequent planning activities in Istanbul within the frame of disaster law, demonstrating the impact of fires on law and property relations with a focus on the development of legally controversial practices, such as the *icarateyn* system. It reveals the change that the Hocapaşa fire brought about in disaster law and the notions of waqf property and argues that the Hocapaşa fire created an actual setting in which the waqf property was made into state property with reference to ‘public interest.’

**Keywords:** property, *tanzimat*, disaster law, *icarateyn*, ownership, public good, expropriation.

On Wednesday night at about five o’clock a fire broke out in Hocapaşa. After spreading throughout the neighborhood, it reached to the buildings of Çiftesaraylar and burned them down immediately. The conflagration became much larger and then spread into five-ten different directions decimating Hocapaşa, the vicinity of Babıali, different neighborhoods of Cağaloğlu, and both sides of the street from Sedefçiler to Sultan Ahmed square and then reached to the back side of Sultan Ahmed all the way to Kılıçhane, Kadirga, Kumkapı, Nişancı, and Çiftegelinler. The destruction of this fire is considered to be equal to that of the great fires of Cibali and Hocapaşa that devastated the capital in 1242 [1826] and 1246 [1830]. Such a conflagration in our lands has not been recorded ever since the emergence of non-official newspapers. A combination of the forces of the wind, the density of neighborhoods, and various other misfortunes made any attempts to contain this fire futile. Given all of the ineffective attempts and resources spent to contain this conflagration, it is hoped that in the future drastic measures will be taken to prevent another disaster like this to happen again.<sup>1</sup>

On the 6th of September 1865 the Ottoman capital woke up to smoke-filled skies. It was a day of dispossession and calamity for many who found themselves helpless against the merciless force of the fire. Centuries-old memory of blazes in wooden Istanbul probably did not help them to conceive the destruction that a spark in Hocaapaşa happened to outgrow. In less than twenty hours, about 1200 families were left in complete destitution.<sup>2</sup> Some more fortunate homeowners with means feared that they would have to become renters, whereas, others less fortunate faced the much more sobering prospects of not being able to afford to rent and having to live on the streets.<sup>3</sup> The fire exacerbated their misery because an epidemic of cholera had already raged through the city for some time. It was “a calamity as destructive to property as the epidemic has been to lives.”<sup>4</sup> A huge area on the historical peninsula was devastated: 2751 buildings in 27 neighborhoods burnt to ashes, including 1879 houses, 751 shops, 22 mosques, 3 churches, and other buildings.<sup>5</sup> The city, although “unique in the world except for its reflection on the sea,” lost a great deal of its charm and beauty.<sup>6</sup>

This time, the blaze was not understood as ‘divine punishment’ as had usually been the case in the past. For example, the Great Fire of Eminönü in 1660 that destroyed almost two-thirds of the capital was perceived by many as the wrath of God for the disappearance of moral rectitude in Istanbulite society.<sup>7</sup> The Hocaapaşa fire of 1865 did not evoke such fatalistic explanations. Rather, some people like one writer at *The Levant Herald* understood it as a “splendid opportunity” for urban reform since it gave the government a pretext to re-imagine and reshape a more ‘modern,’ ‘progressive’ Istanbul along the lines of its western sister-cities:

In view of the immense aggravation to this special peril of the place which the present system carries with it, the Government would have been more than justified in prohibiting wood-building altogether, and for doing so would have the precedent of every other capital in Europe. The reform would no doubt have at first worked hardly on individuals, but so does nearly every railway, drainage, and other public improvement Act which is yearly added to our own statute-book. The few must suffer, more or less, that the many may gain. In this instance, however, scarcely one of the objections to compulsory legislation applies, and a splendid opportunity therefore offers for initiating the reform on a scale that will virtually compel imitation in the case of all future re-erectments.<sup>8</sup>

The term *tanzimat* (reform, order, improvement)<sup>9</sup> was an already heavily entrenched ideology by the time of the fire that could be harnessed by the government immediately in its response to the disaster. On this particular occasion, the government could take advantage of the situation to erase the narrow and labyrinthine streets that prevailed throughout the city and decree that *kârgir* (stone and brick) must henceforth be used in lieu of the combustible, wooden building materials. In other words, the rebuilding of these districts could serve as a pilot project that would put all of Istanbul on par with its western contemporary cities. To be sure, such solutions to the disaster of fires were not unknown before 1865. Mustafa Reşid Paşa, one of the most influential reformers of the century, had already complained about foreign newspapers' comments on fires in the Empire as early as 1836. He was very taken aback by the fact that foreign writers dismissed Muslims as "stupid" or "backward" for their clinging to their long-established insistence on wood-building despite the fact that conflagrations consistently ravaged cities and towns throughout the realm.<sup>10</sup> Prompted by examples of western cities he visited during his diplomatic services in London, Paris and Vienna, he proposed to apply geometrical rules (*kavâid-i hendese*) to the city in order to create a uniform urban space with wide and straight streets and change the timber fabric of the capital into masonry.<sup>11</sup> Yet, no one seemed to heed his calls to revamp the city, and his proposal remained on paper until a fire broke out in the Aksaray district of Istanbul in 1856. It was then for the first time that the government attempted to implement a grid system by employing an Italian engineer, Luigi Storari. The result was not a complete grid system, though it marked a change in the determination of the state to play a larger role in urban planning.<sup>12</sup>

The scope of the calamitous Hocapaşa fire forced the government to find a decisive solution. Indeed, "the *tanzimat* that such a beautiful city like Istanbul deserves" was ironically dependent on urban disasters in the nineteenth century.<sup>13</sup> The timing and scope of planning was usually defined by the magnitude of fires. Beginning with the Aksaray conflagration, all major planning activities in the city were carried out in burnt-down areas. Likewise, all building regulations were designed for destroyed districts.<sup>14</sup> Fires were both the signs of 'underdevelopment' and the occasions for urban modernization. Although the Hocapaşa calamity ruined the imperial and historical core of the city, in the end it bore a 'success story' that inspired Osman Nuri Ergin (1883-1961), an urban historian,<sup>15</sup> to argue that "The Great Hocapaşa fire brought about

happiness for Istanbul rather than disaster.”<sup>16</sup> The signs of redevelopment are still present in the urban landscape of contemporary Istanbul, the most visible being the Divanyolu that was – and still is – the major thoroughfare of the peninsula that connects Topkapı Palace in the east to the gate of Edirne where many of the most important and glorious monuments of Ottoman architecture lie.<sup>17</sup>

As a part of its efforts to rebuild the area, the government initiated both a relief and a planning program immediately following the fire. In addition, the extensive character of the reorganization and property disputes necessitated the establishment of a special commission in 1866 under the name of *Islahât-ı Turûk Komisyonu* (the Commission for Street Reform). Its main task was to allocate the plots in the burnt-down area to their owners according to the rules and regulations that it laid out.<sup>18</sup> As a part of this duty, it also acted as the legal authority to oversee and resolve disputes between officials on the ground such as builders and engineers, and property owners.<sup>19</sup> Also noteworthy is that despite modern scholars’ emphasis on the *Tanzimat* as an era which the government trumpeted equality and filled its bureaucratic ranks with Christian bureaucrats, the composition of bureaucrats in this commission was unabashedly Muslim. The importance of this becomes even more obvious when one considers that many non-Muslim districts fell victim to the multiple paths of the fire. The members of the commission were composed of nine high-ranking officers appointed by the government: Refik Efendi, Subhi Bey, Mustafa Efendi, and Atif Bey, members of the Judicial Court; Kamil Bey Efendi, the Master of Ceremonies; Server Efendi, councilor of commerce; Ferid Efendi, a member of the Court of Inquiry; Mahmud Paşa, a military official; and Ahmed Muhtar Efendi, member of the Council of the Ministry of War.<sup>20</sup> Under the Commission’s command were also policing forces that could make sure that disorder did not prevail during the planning process.

The predominantly Muslim profile of the commission sits in contrast with the example of the Sixth District that had been chosen as the pilot among the fourteen districts in 1857 for the implementation of municipal reform. The Sixth District was composed of Pera, Galata and Tophane where powerful, non-Muslim figures in trade and finance were the leading agents of the urban planning.<sup>21</sup> This selection was not a coincidence, but a reference to the knowledge that non-Muslims and Europeans residing in the area were supposed to have in terms of municipal organization and city administration:

Since to begin all things in the above-mentioned districts [the other thirteen districts] would be sophistry and unworthy and since the Sixth District contains much valuable real estate and many fine buildings, and since the majority of those owning property or residing there have seen such things in other countries and understand their value, the reform program will be inaugurated in the Sixth District.<sup>22</sup>

The composition of the administrative body of the Sixth District was different from earlier municipal formations. For the first time, the government employed foreigners in urban planning.<sup>23</sup> A fire also shaped the experience of the Sixth District. The 1870 Pera fire gave a new impetus to the reordering of the area's urban landscape.<sup>24</sup> Although the example of the Sixth District was pioneering in many ways, the 'success' of the planning activities that were carried out by the Commission for Street Reform disproves the over-emphasis on the role played by non-Muslims and foreigners in the nineteenth-century urban development of the city.<sup>25</sup> The commission equally left its mark on the capital. This historiographical convention is of course part and parcel of the larger paradigm of modernization in Ottoman studies, within which most scholars of Istanbul focused on the state's desire and attempts to create 'a Western-style capital,' thus over-representing the role played by non-Muslims and foreigners. Mainstream historiography has therefore reduced the profound historical change informed by a myriad of historical actors to a handful of Ottoman reformers and their Christian 'advisors' whom they singled out as the agents of transformation.<sup>26</sup>

In what follows, I rather focus on social dynamics on the ground, and examine the contradictions, ambiguities, 'mistakes,' favoritism, negotiation and coercive 'persuasion' involved in the replanning process. In other words, I set out to explain the local, fluid and contingent – rather than generic and categorical – articulations of the *tanzimat* in the city within the context of property and disaster law that have been understudied in Ottoman urban and legal history. I take both property and law as a practice and social relation between various actors who defined and redefined their positions through varying discourses of ownership and usage rights. I approach the Hocaapaşa fire as a particular context in which property relations were reconfigured and reconsolidated. Yet, I do not consider it as a crisis and 'state of exception' that created its own law, nor as a 'suspension' of property laws.<sup>27</sup> I rather place the Hocaapaşa fire into a *longue durée* perspective by examining the development of legally

controversial practices due to the social and economic impact of recurrent fires. One of these practices that I focus on in this paper is the *icarateyn* system, a form of long-term leasing of waqf property.

I treat such systems more than a contingency in the legal corpus, a reflective of what can be called a continuous disaster law. My definition differs from what has been roughly addressed as 'disaster law' – "the legal and political structures that appear in the aftermath of crises such as earthquakes, floods, or fires" – in one respect.<sup>28</sup> I do not confine it to the immediate context of the Hocapaşa Fire in this study. Its temporal boundaries transcend centuries as in the case of the *icareteyn* system. Fires produced extraordinary situations that were translated into ordinary normative forms. The long-seasoned familiarity with fires, both legal and social, framed the shape of 'exception.' Thus, the disaster of 1865 was not really an exception for it was built on the past continuous experience.

However, in this particular occasion, there was a change in the character of disaster law. This change lies in the effort to break this very continuity. The conjunction of the nineteenth-century urban modernization, though not uniform, coherent, or wholesale, produced a particular socio-legal context for the Hocapaşa fire where the recurrent disaster of fires and its embeddedness in socio-legal culture was explicitly questioned. Fires came to be unacceptable which could have made them exceptions in the future if necessary measures against them had been comprehensively taken. This is why the government needed to make the victims of the Hocapaşa fire "accustomed"<sup>29</sup> to *kargir* construction with prohibitions on wood-building. It was an attempt to break the custom of wood-building, to decontextualize habits and traditions, as well as a backdrop for the extinction of the disaster itself with a reference to an imagined future where masonry and wide streets would be the guarantee against fires. The government complemented its efforts with the relief program, a form of persuasion which was not independent from expropriation laws and the discourse on 'public good,' nor completely voluntary on behalf of the sufferers or too explicit to be voluntary.

The roots of this change lie not only in the new notions of urban planning, but also in the kind of property regime in the making. Here my focus is on waqf property since most of the real estate in Istanbul belonged to various religious endowments. I argue that the Hocapaşa fire created a moment when the making of waqf property into state property was crystalized in an actual setting.



## The relief program as a form of coercive ‘persuasion’ and replanning

Immediately after the fire, the government provided food and shelter for the sufferers (*harikzedegân*). Those people who became homeless and had no place to stay were settled temporarily in unoccupied houses in the city without the consent of their owners.<sup>30</sup> A relief commission was formed in order to collect and manage the donations from all parts of the Empire, from the sultan and high-ranking statesmen to modest state officials and individuals in the provinces, both Ottoman and foreign. Although the collected sum was significant, it was not completely distributed to the sufferers. The relief commission decided to allocate half of the sum to the victims for their immediate needs. The other half was used to cover some expenses of the planning, especially for the cost reduction of construction materials in an effort to render “continuous prosperity.”<sup>31</sup>

The long lists of the donators were published in various newspapers with the amount of money they contributed. As the donations were made public the sufferers also expressed their gratitude publicly. The official newspaper of the state, *Takvîm-i Vekâyî* (The Calendar of Events), published two letters on the 27<sup>th</sup> of March 1866, one sent by the “Muslim population” (*ahâlî-i müslime*), and the other by the “Armenian community” (*Ermeni milleti*). Unfortunately, the letters’ authorship and indeed their collective nature remain unclear, though the form and vocabulary used in these letters suggest formal and bureaucratic affinities. Both praise the sultan for the degree of “mercy and grace” (*merhamet-i seniyye ve inâyet*) that was “unheard of” (*işitilmemiş*), and for which they would always be grateful.<sup>32</sup> Another newspaper, *Rûznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis* (Daily Newsletter), devoted some space to the letter sent by the dwellers of the Hüseyin Ağa neighborhood together with their *imam* (prayer-leader of the local mosque) and *muhtar* (headman of the quarter). The language they employed is much more vernacular, and they eulogized the grand vizier rather than the sultan for his efforts to extinguish the fire. Apart from expressing their gratitude, the publicity was too good an opportunity to pass up, and they also asked for a new carpet for the mosque of the neighborhood. Even more intriguing is that they did not miss the chance to mention some “disgraced persons” (*eşhâs-i erâzîl*) who gathered around coffee houses, barbershops, and taverns, and were careless enough to “throw their burning cigarettes here and there,” which caused fires.<sup>33</sup> This narrative of accusation employed by the residents of the Hüseyin

Ağa neighborhood reflects the multidirectional character of the relief program as a form of social control. It was not simply the state persuading its subjects through charity for *kargir* construction. Victims of the fire also used it to express their discontent with those they regarded as “disgraced.”

As the inventory of damage was prepared the relief program was defined on the basis of house ownership. Those who were in need of support were divided into three groups in order of priority, and each group was subdivided into three according to the size of the house they had.<sup>34</sup> The first group included widows, orphans, the old and disabled, and those who lost all their possessions and their only house. The second group was composed of those who were able to save some of their transportable properties, and the third group was lucky enough to pull all their portable possessions out of the fire. Shop owners were excluded from the relief program, together with those who had more than one house, and a salary above 1.500 piasters. The former Grand Vizier Mehmed Rüşdi Paşa, the Chief Secretary of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances Rauf Bey, and Fahreddin Efendi, the official representative of a provincial governor, and other high-ranking statesmen and officials who lost their *konaks* (mansion) were probably among this excluded group whose losses were regarded as worth mentioning in the pages of a newspaper.<sup>35</sup>

A temporal and qualitative distinction also shaped the relief program because the state sought to restore “continuous prosperity.” The amount the sufferers were given in cash was only for their urgent needs, not for the rebuilding of what was lost. This stress on “prosperity” echoes a wider discourse on welfare and “productive capacity” of society in the nineteenth century.<sup>36</sup> The target was the deep-rooted tradition of wood-building that was regarded to have drastically affected “the growth and progress of civilization and prosperity, and the protection of public wealth.”<sup>37</sup> Thus, the concern was to make the inhabitants of the capital “accustomed” to *kargir* building.<sup>38</sup> It was something to be forced otherwise everybody would construct a “fire temple” (*ateş-kede*) again if they had the freedom to build quickly and cheaply with wood as they wished.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, the government banned wood-building, as previously suggested in the columns of *The Levant Herald*. However, it was well aware that the ban could not be enforced unless it took some measures in order to facilitate stone construction. These measures revolved around the aim to make the cost of *kargir* construction more or less equal to wood-building. They included detailed calculations on the price of a single brick, special contracts with the producers of, and the abolition of taxes on, construction

materials, the opening of several streets to make the transportation of brick, stone, sand etc. easier and cheaper, and the withdrawal of taxes on building.<sup>40</sup>

These procedures, in addition to the direct intervention of the state in different facets of the relief ranging from providing money, materials, and new visions for the people of the districts together were the way in which the government talked the sufferers into *kargir* construction. The relief program as a whole was couched into a narrative that sought to persuade people of the harm that the existing material culture imposed on the public good. It was also coercive since it was accompanied by legal prohibitions. After all, wood-building would be nothing but “absurd” (*abes*) in Istanbul as the government and the Commission envisioned.<sup>41</sup> The ban was nevertheless difficult to be enforced. In spite of the relief program, some sufferers found it beyond their means to construct stone houses. Within a year of the fire, some residents of the Hocapaşa and Cağaloğlu neighborhoods were still homeless living in “cellars” (*mahâzin*) with their children and families.<sup>42</sup> Some inhabitants of these neighborhoods even wrote a petition collectively in order to gain permission for wood-construction in 1866. Although we do not know whether they were granted the liberty, it is clear that the wood-building continued.<sup>43</sup>

### The *icarateyn* system and property in disaster law

Within less than two weeks of the fire, an advertisement appeared in a newspaper. A Cemal Efendi wanted to sell his house in the Elvan neighborhood of the Hocapaşa district. The house itself was his freehold (*mülk*), and the land belonged to a religious endowment (*waqf*).<sup>44</sup> Apparently, his house was somehow spared by the fire. We are unfortunately unable to discern whether his decision to sell his property was related to the fire. If so, why was he so quick to post the sale notice? What is certain is that he differentiated two forms of property, *mülk* and *waqf*, and used only “for sale” (*satılık*), a term that refers only to the building, but not to the *waqf* land, since *waqf* property cannot be sold in principle according to Hanafite *waqf* jurisprudence, but can only be transferred. But the Ottoman term for ‘transfer,’ *ferâğ*, was not used in the advertisement probably for the sake of simplicity and space. A typical *qadi* registry of such a case of the *mukâta’a* system, a form of long-term leasing where the building in question is *mülk*, and the land is *waqf*, would use ‘sale’ (*bey*) for the house, and *ferâğ* for the

land. It would also indicate the name of the *waqf* and the permission of the *waqf*'s trustee. It is of course probable to expect a *qadi* registry involving sale of property to be much more specific in terms of terminology and details than a newspaper advertisement.

Such terminological distinctions were central to how property was classified and regulated by distinct as well as overlapping domains of law. *Mülk* (individual freehold) and *waqf* (holdings of religious endowments) regulated by sharia, and *mîrî* (state holdings) regulated by *qanun* (Ottoman administrative law) constituted the classical types of property in the Empire. *Waqf* property was especially important in the case of Istanbul where most of the real estate belonged to various religious endowments. As no clear-cut divisions existed between sharia and *qanun*, practical necessities on the ground usually produced controversial issues in *waqf* jurisprudence, issues for the solution of which the two legal doctrines usually merged into one, with a concern to keep *waqf* property as *waqf* property. The issue of long-term leasing was among the most frequently evoked questions contingent upon the legal stipulation that only a limited rental period was permitted, usually one, or at maximum three years.<sup>45</sup> The following remarks from a treatise on *waqfs* encapsulate the major concern:

After all, people would in the course of time no longer remember that a property is *waqf* and consequently give false statements in court. Since oral testimonies are the main category of legal evidence, this would endanger the legal status of *waqfs*. In the old days, this was not seen as a problem and there were no limits to the terms of the leasing of *waqfs*, but in these times people are prone to corruption and eager to appropriate what is not theirs.<sup>46</sup>

Although such concerns were expressed from time to time, actual necessities of life often made them difficult to maintain. As a form of long-term leasing, the *icarateyn* system, for instance, was a widespread practice similar the *mukâta'a* system in Cemal Efendi's case as cited above. *İcarateyn* literally means 'double rent' paid for immovable *waqf* assets. That it developed was mainly due to practical reasons: recurrent fires demolished not only freehold buildings, but also sources of *waqf* revenue, be it a house, shop or warehouse. For those many religious endowments that did not have sufficient revenues for reconstruction and renovation, leasing *waqf* possessions for a longer period of time appeared as a solution. The purpose of such practice was to cover the cost of reconstruction and regain lost sources of revenue to the *waqf*.<sup>47</sup>

Consequently, based on the justification that “necessity makes lawful that which is prohibited,”<sup>48</sup> long term leasing became an accepted practice from the sixteenth century onwards.

Furthermore, as the system developed it also provided a wide range of transactions that could be conducted on *waqf* property, including inheritance of usage rights (*intikâl*), transfer (*ferâğ*), subletting, exchange (*istibdâl*), and the physical separation of *waqf* assets (*ifrâz*). The *icarateyn* system also became the usual practice in the capital. As a matter of fact, during the discussions regarding the changes in the inheritance rules on *waqfs* run by this long-term form of leasing in 1867, the stress was on the scarcity of property in Istanbul other than *waqf*. This scarcity, as explained by the state, was the result of the gradual bending of the rules that regulated and limited the foundation of *waqfs*.<sup>49</sup> Yet, the state’s approach to the *icarateyn* system was flexible and pragmatic, contrary to the ‘*ulama*’s (the class of learned men) common opposition based on the assumption that “if the period [of lease by the same person] is long, this results in the annulment of the *waqf* (*ibtal al-waqf*), since whoever saw the person treating the property the way owners do, will, with the passage of time, consider him its owner.”<sup>50</sup>

Yet, the state’s pragmatism in the sense of responsiveness to social and economic necessities did not prevent it from reminding its title to property on occasion, whether *waqf* or *mîrî*. One such occasion came in 1826 with the foundation of the *Evkâf-ı Hümâyûn Nezâreti* (the Superintendancy/Ministry for Imperial Religious Endowments).<sup>51</sup> Its formation was an attempt to centralize *waqf* administration with new laws and regulations. The *Nezâret* was initially to control *waqfs* founded with the resources of the dynasty or subsidized by the central administration. Its primary task was to transfer revenues derived from *waqf* sources to the state treasury. In quantitative terms, the total number of the *waqfs* controlled by the *Nezâret* and its proportion to the overall number of *waqfs* in the Empire was/is unclear not only to us but also to the Ottoman state due to the lack of systematic surveys and the chaotic situation of *waqfs*. But, we know that the *Nezâret* was responsible for two categories of *waqfs*: *evkâf-ı mazbûta* controlled directly by the *Nezâret*, which included *waqfs* established by the sultans and their dependents, escheated *waqfs* transferred to the Ministry because of the extinction of the founder’s descendants, and *waqfs* that were under the supervision of the *Nezâret* but at the same time had trustees paid by the *waqf* treasury; and *evkâf-ı mülhâka* that were run by their trustees under the supervision of the *Nezâret*, which usually included

*waqfs* the administration of which was assigned to the chief dignitaries of the state.<sup>52</sup> The *Nezâret* also altered the role of the trustee who had been the chief agency in *waqf* administration to a great extent, making him/her dependent on state officials.

A crucial change accompanied the foundation of the *Nezâret*, which reconfigured the classical categories of property in the Empire. New property laws and regulations of the century treated *waqf* and *mîrî* property as almost one and the same category. But, the category of *waqf* to which these laws applied initially included *waqfs* controlled by the *Nezâret*. This resulted in the ever increasing assimilation of the *waqf* category into state property. The main innovations were the expansion of inheritance rights and the establishment of *waqf* and *mîrî* property as collateral to create an alternative money lending system.<sup>53</sup> The purpose behind this as expressed by Sadık Rifat Paşa, an influential statesman whose ideas marked the *Tanzimat* Edict and the developments thenceforth, was to increase agricultural production and enhance real estate values with an unlimited circulation of *waqf* and *mîrî* property in the economic sphere.<sup>54</sup>

The changes in inheritance rules suggest important interventions in the regime of ownership that the state endeavored to accomplish in the nineteenth century. These changes were the unification of inheritance rules regarding *waqf* and *mîrî* property, and the expansion of groups of individuals who could inherit within the family. What was expected from the broadened circles of inheritance was to persuade people that the *waqf* or *mîrî* property over which they had only usage rights would remain in the hands of their individual families. The logic of the state was straightforward: if holders of usage rights were convinced they would invest more capital and labor to improve the property in question:

... the imperial government decided on the procedures behind the inheritance [*intikâl*] of *mîrî* and *waqf* lands that have been used with title deed in order to increase and amplify the subject of agriculture and trade, and consequently, the wealth and prosperity of the domain one step further with the facilitation of transactions ...<sup>55</sup>

The state had a particular concern with the case of the capital where *waqf* property was the dominant form, which resulted in the enactment of a very Istanbul-centered regulation on inheritance in 1867. The stress was on the widespread practice of the *icareteyn* system in the city. As the practice developed from the sixteenth century onwards, it also introduced

a distinctive inheritance form: usage rights on property of a *waqf* run through *icareteyn* were inheritable between male and female offspring equally. With a reference to ‘public interest’ the regulation of 1867 entitled spouses, grandchildren and siblings to inherit:

... it is natural that a childless person [including those who lost their children] would grieve when he sees that his other dependents will be deprived of their house after his death. As a matter of fact it cannot be considered lawful that in the case of death without a child a man’s wife and grandchildren would be thrown in the street from the house that he built by working and regarding it as his own property without remembering that it is a *waqf*, and therefore as previously with the purpose of public interest, further modifications and extension in inheritance regulations came into existence ...<sup>56</sup>

The nineteenth-century political and economic interventions in property revolved around the rationale that the more usage rights were extended the more the holders would improve *waqf* and *mîrî* property with more labor and capital, which would result in greater wealth and production over which the state could impose more taxes. The regulation on inheritance was the product of this rationale, an attempt to create a new rent market. Therefore, the changes in property relations were much more complicated than a simple transition from multiple usage rights to individual property as conventionally assumed.<sup>57</sup> As it appears in the Ottoman case, private property was not perceived as the best way to increase productivity. The state did not withdraw its title to *waqf* and *mîrî* property. Instead, it expanded usage rights, not only on an individual but also familial basis, which had the potential to complicate further the chaotic character of ownership since these rights were not necessarily exclusive. This resulted, therefore, in multiplied claims – within the family for instance although familial disputes and their possible negative effects on investment were not addressed in the inheritance laws – and such regulations did not include all kinds of *waqfs* in the Empire, therefore added new layers to the multiplicity of property laws.

The expansion of usage rights on *waqf* and *mîrî* property was however not linear, nor was it always in conformity with the state’s renewed claim to *waqf* property in particular. As the differences between *mîrî* and *waqf* became blurred the line differentiating them from *mülk* was also thin on the level of practice. Even after the most comprehensive cadastral survey of the capital in 1874, a decree of Abdülhamid II in 1904 was addressing

the problem of the conversion of *waqf* and *mîrî* property into freehold especially in Istanbul with the violation of ownership regulations.<sup>58</sup> The earlier concern of keeping *waqf* property as it was, therefore the hesitation of some legal experts on systems like the *icarateyn*, came to have a new dimension on behalf of the state as the boundaries of state ownership enlarged with the centralization of *waqf* administration.

The Hocapaşa fire was another occasion for the state to reinforce its centuries-old claims to *waqf* property, which resulted in certain drawbacks in terms of legally defined usage rights. Let us look at the case of Necibe Hatun who was rendered homeless by the Hocapaşa fire. Her case is illuminating in many ways with regard to the ambiguity of *waqf* property.

### ***Tanzimat* and Necibe Hatun**

Unsatisfied with the land allotted to her during the reorganization of the area after the fire, Necibe Hatun presented a petition explaining her “misery” (*perîşâniyet*) and “victimhood” (*mağdûriyet*), which was reviewed by the Commission, and then handed over to the Judicial Court.<sup>59</sup> The petition concerns her house of approximately 689 square meters<sup>60</sup> with nine rooms in the Elvanzade neighborhood of the Hocapaşa district. This is quite a large home, most probably because it included a garden or courtyard as well. She informs that the half share of the house had belonged to her husband, Mustafa Ağa, who died sometime before the fire. Upon her husband’s death, his share became “*mahlûl*” (escheated), the only term in the petition indicating that the house was a *waqf* property. Although having limited means, she was able to transfer her husband’s share to herself by paying some money, most probably, to the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Since she did not have any income, she rented out some part of the house in order to make a living. However, she was unfortunate that the fire reduced her house to ashes. Nor was she able to keep the land that was also *waqf* property although it is not specified as such in the petition. The Commission first expropriated one-third of the land for street widening, an amount she was only “willing to sacrifice.”<sup>61</sup> Then, it allotted the remaining land to five persons whose identities are not noted in the document. Necibe Hatun was, however, given a completely new lot somewhere else which was in a much less valuable location (*şerefsiz mahal*) as she complained. She demanded that two of the five persons should be given land in another location, and that their land should be returned to her, whereas, she conceded that the



other three could remain. The Commission rejected her demand as the investigation that was carried out following her petition revealed that she was given new land in a decision that “abided by the rules and precepts of justice.”<sup>62</sup> The tone of the rejection also expresses the weariness of the Commission because “such cases came about every day.”<sup>63</sup>

What is significant in this case is that the legal status of Necibe Hatun as the renter of the *waqf* land through the *icarateyn* system was invalidated, a status that was clearly recognized by *waqf* jurisprudence. Let us look at an exemplary *fatwa* (legal opinion) from the early eighteenth century:

While the ground floor of a *waqf* house is being rented by Zeyd, and of the upper floor by ‘Amr through *icarateyn* the house burns-down and the land becomes empty, then Zeyd transfers the land to Bekir with the permission of [the *waqf*’s] trustee, then Bekir builds a room [the cost of which] is included in the down-payment, and in case ‘Amr wants to build a room on top of that [Bekir’s] room, is Bekir able to prevent [‘Amr]? The Answer: he is not.<sup>64</sup>

This fatwa illustrates two points: first, a renter of a *waqf* house could transfer his/her right of use even if the house was no longer there. In this case Zeyd’s usage rights on the house turns into usage rights on the land after the fire. Second, Amr is still able to keep his rights including constructing a new room for himself even after Zeyd transfers the land to Bekir. In short, the fire does not invalidate their usage rights contrary to Necibe Hatun’s situation. Then, what was the legal justification for Necibe Hatun’s case? Why did she not prefer to base her argument on this very legal right instead of employing the common narrative of “victimhood”?

The answers lie partly in the socio-legal discourse that the fire created, and partly in the state’s renewed claim to *waqf* property. The most important agent of this discourse was the Commission, an extraordinary body responsible for the difficult task of reconciliation with property owners, whereas the building regulations and expropriation laws of the century with reference to ‘public good’ embedded the justification of cases like Necibe Hatun’s partly, but not quite yet.<sup>65</sup>

It is in the context of expropriation laws that Necibe Hatun was only “willing to sacrifice” for the public good one-third of the land over which she had usage rights. In addition, she also consented that three other persons could maintain the plots given to them by the Commission. Her voluntariness and compliance was acting on the status of the *waqf* land

not as *waqf* but as state property. Therefore, she was not asking for what had belonged to her – depending on the usage rights defined by *waqf* jurisprudence – but simply for the remaining part of the land instead of what the Commission gave her in another location. This explains her narrative of victimhood, as well as her need to state in her petition that she did not receive any financial support from the relief commission as a way to reinforce her demand. She also added that the construction materials she purchased were becoming useless since she did not have the means to transport them to the other location.

This metamorphosis of *waqf* and state property which the fire crystalized was a lacuna in the building regulations and expropriation laws. The rate of expropriation without compensation for public good that materially meant wide and straight streets with proper pavements as well as sewage lines was set one fourth of the plot in question. If it exceeded that amount the owner would be compensated in cash.<sup>66</sup> This rule was valid for the category of *mülk*, leaving *waqf* property in a leeway about which the government and the Commission were completely silent.

Although the fire “swept away most of the difficulty” it was still hard for the Commission to arrange lots and replan the area.<sup>67</sup> The scope of the blaze was huge, yet it did not create a *tabula rasa* space where it would be much easier to build a city anew.<sup>68</sup> Even if it had done so the people on the ground were not a *tabula rasa*. The relocation of lots was the source of hardship. The opening, widening and straightening of streets sometimes necessitated the complete dislocation of some plots. Dwellers in areas with very narrow streets in particular were prone to be given new plots in new locations.<sup>69</sup> Most of the petitions written by the dwellers of the area revolve around the gap between pre- and post-fire value of their plots. The wording of these petitions resembles the terms that the Commission singled out to frame its discourse. *Şeref*, literally meaning ‘honor, pride, superiority, and distinction,’ was one of the most accentuated terms of the *tanzimat* in the city that they had in common. The Turkish conjunction, *emlâk-ı kesb-i şeref*, referred to the expected increase in real estate values after the reorganization. Necibe Hatun also complained about the *şeref* of her new plot that she found less valuable. After all, she was successful in playing the discourse on urban *tanzimat*.

For the Commission *emlâk-ı kesb-i şeref* was what justified expropriation, but for the dwellers it was not always their main concern. The calculation of the Commission was simple: a plot of 57.4 square meters (100 *arşun*) in Hocaapaşa would be priced at 3.000 piasters at maximum

before 1865; after the fire this value would increase to 5.000 piasters; for owners, the cost of expropriation for one quarter of 100 arşun would be 1.250 piasters. Accordingly even after the expropriation property holders would gain 7.50 piasters, “the profit of reforms” (*islâhât semeresi*), in the value of their houses. Therefore, they “came to reason” and “said nothing,” the Commission claimed.<sup>70</sup>

The curious practice was, however, that the Commission seems to have expropriated one quarter as a rule no matter whether all of it was actually necessary for the reorganization of streets. As a matter of fact, the Commission sold the left-over land from one quarter in order to yield extra revenue instead of giving it back to owners as one would expect.<sup>71</sup> Likewise, the owners of masonry buildings that were not affected by the fire and the consequent street organization had to pay some money in return for the value that their properties would gain as a result of the overall replanning.<sup>72</sup> As it was the practice “the profit of reform” was not free.

Apart from the physical changes, one also wonders how neighborly relations changed in this period of urban planning. What was the place of non-monetary, social, everyday relations in the *şeref* of a location that property holders usually underlined in their petitions? The fire and the consequent planning activities also brought out tensions between the neighbors. Boundary conflicts, for instance, were likely to happen. Borders in the absence of a written document were open to ‘mistakes’ as pseudo-negotiations took place following the destruction of all physical traces of a building. What were the terms of measurement and negotiation carried out by the Commission? How did individuals convince both their neighbors and the Commission, and be convinced by them? How did the Commission formalize the administration of border settlements? Above all, it published notifications in newspapers for the owners to be present during the measurement of their plots in order to prevent errors.<sup>73</sup> It was a critical moment for owners to define the boundaries of their property.

A boundary dispute between Tahir Ağa and Reşid Ağa illustrates some of the other dynamics that mediated property relations during the reorganization. Tahir Ağa was a resident of the Karaki Hüseyin Çelebi neighborhood in the vicinity of the Hocapaşa district. The fire consumed his house, and left him with a plot of 91.8 square meters which he subsequently claimed. However, according to the Commission, it was less than that. In his petition he asserts that first the engineers of the Commission determined the size as 88.9 square meters, but then they reduced it to 56.2 on the basis of a “mistake” (*sehv*) that they had made in the initial measurement.

Although the difference was 35.6 he only reclaimed 11.4, which indicates the possibility that some part of it might have been expropriated that he did not count. His petition consists of only numbers and alleged calculation errors until the point where he presents this “unjust” (*mugâyir-i a’dâlet*) situation as a result of his being “poor” (*fukara*). As he sees it, this was a case of favoritism. His neighbor, Reşid Ağa, was given “extra” (*ilâve*) land which had actually belonged to him.<sup>74</sup> Unfortunately, we do not know anything about the relations between Reşid Ağa and the officials of the Commission. It is possible that Reşid Ağa was favored over “poor” Tahir Ağa because of some personal interests or connections. It is also equally possible that a real “mistake” was involved given the uncertainty of boundaries in the absence of a written evidence such as a title deed or a cadastral registry in this particular case, and Tahir Ağa was acting on this uncertainty. But still, even if this were the case, who had what means to prove or disprove a mistake? The official response rejected Tahir Ağa’s claims in this case.<sup>75</sup> However, the Commission was aware of possible abuses to which officials on the ground measuring and allocating lots to owners were subject.<sup>76</sup> Indeed, the commission had to deal with “endless disputes” because of “all sorts of disorder” that its officials caused.<sup>77</sup> On one occasion, it dismissed Mehmed Efendi, the head functionary, with some other officials in his retinue because of their misconduct.<sup>78</sup>

Since the metamorphosis of *waqf* and state property only explains the expropriation – even though the term becomes inappropriate – not the relocation of Necibe Hatun’s land the case of Tahir Ağa might suggest a possible angle. It is possible that her initial land that was actually quite big might have attracted some others who found their way into a negotiation and deal with the Commission. But beyond speculation the crucial point is the making of *waqf* property into state property when it came to expropriation and public interest. Her legal subjectivity embedded in the rights shaped through a long period in disaster law became undefinable and unrepresentable. When fires became something irreconcilable with urban modernization the law they shaped also became unworkable not only in the immediate context of the conflagration of 1865 but also in the context of earlier and wider transformations in urban property. The Hocapaşa fire was only the moment when the assimilation of *waqf* to state property was crystalized in an actual setting. Therefore, the changes in the property regime of the long nineteenth century are not simply about normative rights whether multiple or individual but positions taken around them on a practical axis.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> *Tasvîr-i Efkar*, No. 328, 8 September 1865.
- <sup>2</sup> BOA. İ.DH. 542/37739; *Takvîm-i Vekâyi'*, 23 November 1866.
- <sup>3</sup> The common Ottoman idiom is "kira köşelerine düşmek."
- <sup>4</sup> *The Levant Herald*, 13 September 1865.
- <sup>5</sup> BOA. İ.DH. 542/37739. In another state document, the total number of the burnt-down buildings is 2879: BOA. İ.DH. 540/37356.
- <sup>6</sup> "Denizdeki aksinden başka dünyada eşi olmayan." BOA. İ.DH. 572/39882.
- <sup>7</sup> Mehmed Halife, *Tarih-i Gılmani* (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1976), p. 96; Andreasyan Hrand D., "Eramya Çelebi'nin Yangınlar Tarihi," *Tarih Dergisi*. Vol. 27 (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1973), p. 60; Marc David Baer "The Great Fire of 1660 and The Islamization of Christian and Jewish Space in Istanbul," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 36 (2004), pp. 159-181; Lucienne Thys-Şenocak, "The Yeni Valide Mosque Complex at Eminönü," *Muqarnas*. Vol. 15 (1998), pp. 58-70.
- <sup>8</sup> *The Levant Herald*, 13 September 1865.
- <sup>9</sup> The *Tanzimat* era in general refers to the period between 1839 and 1876 during which a set of administrative and legal reforms were initiated.
- <sup>10</sup> Cavid Baysun, "Mustafa Reşid Paşa'nın Siyasi Yazıları," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi* 11, no. 15 (1960), p.124.
- <sup>11</sup> Cavid Baysun, "Mustafa Reşid Paşa'nın Siyasi Yazıları," pp. 124-25. It is even possible to trace similar proposals back into the eighteenth century. For example, Tatarcık Abdullah Efendi (1730-97) recommended the same points in 1792 to Sultan Selim III. See Murat Gül and Richard Lamb, "Mapping, Regularizing and Modernizing Ottoman Istanbul: Aspects of the Genesis of the 1839 Development Policy," *Urban History* 31, no. 3 (2004), pp. 423-24.
- <sup>12</sup> Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 53-55.
- <sup>13</sup> "İstanbul gibi bir güzel beldenin lâıyk olduğu tanzimât" BOA. İ.DH. 572/39882.
- <sup>14</sup> Four major regulations were enacted between 1848 and 1882: the Building Regulation of 1848 and of 1849; the Street and Building Regulation of 1863; and the Building Law of 1882. For the transliteration of these regulations see Gül Güleriyüz Selman, "Urban Development Laws and their Impact on the Otoman Cities in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century." Unpublished MA thesis, METU, 1982, the Appendix.
- <sup>15</sup> Abdullah Taha İmamoğlu, "Osman Nuri Ergin: Cumhuriyet Döneminin İlk Şehir Tarihçisi," *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (2005), pp. 553-569.
- <sup>16</sup> "Hocapaşa harîk-i kebîri İstanbul için felâketten ziyâde sa'âdeti tevlîd etmiştir." Osman Nuri Ergin, *Mecelle-i Umûr-ı Belediyye*, vol. 3 (İstanbul:

- Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür İşleri Daire Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1995), p. 1222.
- 17 Maurice Cerasi, *The Istanbul Divanyolu* (Istanbul: Orient-Institut, 2004).
- 18 The Bill concerning the foundation of the Commission for Street Reform was published in the official newspaper, *Takvîm-i Vekâyi'*, 1 July 1866.
- 19 BOA. İ.MVL. 550/24667.
- 20 BOA. İ.MVL. 550/24667.
- 21 Christoph K. Neumann, "Marjinal Modernitenin Çatışma Mekanı Olarak Altıncı Daire-i Belediye," in 6. *Daire, İlk Belediye 1857-1913: Beyoğlu'nda İdare, Toplum, Kentlilik Sergi Kataloğu*, prepared by Beyoğlu Belediyesi and İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Toplum, Ekonomi, Siyaset Araştırma Merkezi (TESAR) Yerel Yönetimler Araştırma Birimi (İstanbul, 2004).
- 22 Osman Nuri Ergin, *Mecelle-i Umûr-ı Belediye*, 1:1314. Quoted in Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul*, p. 45.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul*, pp. 64-65; Lorans Izabel Baruh, "The Transformation of the "Modern" Axis of Nineteenth-Century Istanbul: Property, Investments and Elites from Taksim Square to Sirkeci Station." Ph.D. dissertation, Boğaziçi University, 2009, pp. 97-98.
- 25 For instance, Steven Rosenthal reduces the establishment of the first municipal body to the influence of 'modern' and 'secular' non-Muslims and foreigners as opposed to 'traditional' Ottoman Muslims in Istanbul. Steven Rosenthal, "Foreigners and Municipal Reform in Istanbul: 1855-1865," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 11, no. 2 (1980), pp. 227-245.
- 26 For the examples of this historiography see Steven Rosenthal, "Foreigners and Municipal Reform in Istanbul;" Zeynep Çelik, *The Remaking of Istanbul*; Murat Gül, *The Emergence of Modern Istanbul: Transformation and Modernization of a City* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009).
- 27 Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 2005); Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago, London: the University of Chicago Press, 2005).
- 28 Ruth Miller, *Law in Crisis: the Ecstatic Subject of Natural Disaster* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 1.
- 29 "halkı buna alıştırmak" BOA. İ.MMS. 31/1287.
- 30 *Rûznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, 11 September 1865.
- 31 "refâh-ı dâime" BOA. İ.DH. 542/37739.
- 32 *Takvîm-i Vekâyi'*, 27 March 1866.
- 33 "ellerindeki sigarayı yanar olduğu hâlde ortaya berüye atmakta oldukları" *Rûznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, 11 September 1865.
- 34 BOA. İ.DH. 542/37739.
- 35 *Rûznâme-i Cerîde-i Havâdis*, 9 September and 14 September 1865.

- 36 Nadir Özbek, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset, İktidar ve  
Meşruiyet, 1876-1914 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 47.
- 37 "medeniyet ve ma'mûriyetin tezâyüd ve terakkisi ile muhâfaza-yı servet-i  
'umûmiye" BOA. İ. MMS. 31/1287.
- 38 BOA, İ. MMS. 31/1287.
- 39 BOA, İ. DH. 572/39882.
- 40 BOA, İ. DH. 572/39882; İ. MMS. 31/1287; İ. MVL. 550/24667; İ. MVL.  
554/24866; A.}MKT. MHM. 356/78.
- 41 BOA. İ. MMS. 31/1287.
- 42 BOA. MVL. 504/143.
- 43 For the custom of wood-building and its existence until the 1920s in  
Istanbul see, Uğur Tanyeli, "İstanbul'un Ahşap Geleneği: Bir Tarihendirme  
Denemesi," *İstanbul*, No: 25 (April, 1998), pp. 52-57; Kemalettin Kuzucu,  
"İstanbul Konut Mimarisinin Şekillenmesinde Yangınların Rolü: Ahşaptan  
Kargire," *İstanbul*, No: 32 (January, 2000), pp. 41-49.
- 44 *Rûznâme-i Ceride-i Havâdis*, 14 September 1865.
- 45 Robert J. Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman  
Empire* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), p. 51; Richard van Leeuwen, *Waqfs and  
Urban Structures: The Case of Ottoman Damascus* (Leiden, Boston, Köln:  
Brill, 1999), p. 63.
- 46 Quoted in Richard van Leeuwen, *Waqfs and Urban Structures*, p. 63.
- 47 For examples of *fatwas* on the issue from the late seventeenth, early eighteenth  
and nineteenth centuries see Feyzullah Efendi, *Fetâvâ-yı Feyziyye ma'an-  
nukûl* (İstanbul: Dâru't-Tabâ'at el-Âmire, A.H., 1266); Abdürrahim, *Fetâvâ-yı  
Abdürrahim* (İstanbul: Dâru't-Tabâ'at el-Ma'mûre, 1827); Meşrepzâde Arif  
Efendi, *Fetâvâ-yı Câmi'ü'l-icârateyn* (İstanbul: Dâru't-Tabâ'at el-Âmire,  
1252/1837).
- 48 Ömer Hilmi Efendi, *İthâf-ül Ahlâf fi Ahkâm-il Evkâf* (Ankara: Vakıflar Genel  
Müdürlüğü, 1977), p. 54.
- 49 "Hayrât ve müberrâta dâir," 1284/1867. *Düstûr*, 1:1, p. 232; BOA, İ. MMS.  
34/1417.
- 50 Ibn 'Abidin, *Radd al-Muhtar*, vol. IV. 400. Quoted in Miriam Hoexter,  
"Adaptation to Changing Circumstances: Perpetual Leases and Exchange  
Transactions in Waqf Property in Ottoman Algiers," *Islamic Law and Society*,  
Vol. 4, No. 3 (1997), p. 326. For another example, see Ömer Hilmi Efendi,  
*İthâf-ül Ahlâf fi Ahkâm-il Evkâf*.
- 51 The term "*nezâret*" translates as "superintendancy" at the beginnings of its  
existence but then comes to mean "ministry."
- 52 Ali Himmet Berki, *Vakıflar: Vakıf Müessesesi İnsanların Düşünbildikleri  
Hukuki Müesseselerin en Hayırlısıdır* (İstanbul: Cihan Kitaphanesi, 1940),  
pp. 291-292; Ömer Hilmi Efendi, *İthaf-ül Ahlaf fi Ahkam-il Evkaf*, pp. 16-  
17. In a document concerning the transfer of waqf assets dated 1870 it is

stated that the number of *waqfs* directly controlled by the *Nezâret* (*evkâf-ı mazbûta*) was less than the number of *waqfs* that were not controlled by the *Nezâret* (*evkâf-ı gayr-i mazbûta*). “Musakkafât ve müstegallât-ı mevkûfede muvâza’t-ı ferâğ hakkında buyuruldu-i sâmi,” 1286/1870. *Düstûr*, 1:3, p. 164.

- 53 “Arâzî Kanûnnâmesi,” 1274/1858. *Düstûr*, 1:1, pp. 178-180; “Arâzî-i emîriyye ve mevkûfenin tevsî’-i intikâlâtına dâir nizâmnâme ve zeyli,” 1284/1867, *Düstûr*, 1:1, pp. 223-224; “Hayrât ve müberrâta dâir,” 1284/1867. *Düstûr*, 1:1, pp. 232-236; “Bî’l-icâreteyn tasarruf olunan musakkafât ve müstegallâtın usûl-ü intikâlâtı hakkında karargir olan müsâ’adat-ı seniyye,” 1285/1869. *Düstûr*, 1:1, p. 225-229; “Musakkafât ve müstegallât-ı mevkûfede muvâza’at-ı ferâğ hakkında buyuruldu-ı sâmi,” 1286/1870. *Düstûr*, 1:3, pp. 163-164; “Bî’l-icâreteyn tasarruf olunan musakkafât ve müstegallât-ı mevkûfe hakkında nizâmnâme,” 1292/1875. *Düstûr*, 1:3, pp. 459-461; “Emvâl-i gayr-i menkûle intikâlâtı hakkında kanun-ı muvakkat 1328/1910,” *Düstûr*, 2: 5, pp. 145-147; Halil Cin, *Osmanlı Toprak Düzeni ve Bu Düzenin Bozulması* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1978), pp. 17-18, 366.
- 54 Kemal H. Karpat, “The Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire,” in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2002), p. 345.
- 55 “Arâzî-i emîriyye ve mevkûfenin tevsî’-i intikâlâtına dâir nizâmnâme ve zeyli,” 1284/1867, *Düstûr*, 1:1, p. 223.
- 56 “Hayrât ve müberrâta dâir,” 1284/1867. *Düstûr*, 1:1, p. 233-234.
- 57 For an example of this historiographical convention see Huri İslamoğlu, “Property as a Contested Domain: A Reevaluation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858,” in *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East*, edited by Roger Owen (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 3-61; and “Towards a Political Economy of Legal and Administrative Constitutions of Individual Property,” in *Constituting Modernity: Private Property in the East and West*, edited by Huri İslamoğlu (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 3-34.
- 58 BOA. İ.ML. 95/66.
- 59 *Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı ‘Adliye*. BOA. MVL. 875/52.
- 60 1200 *arşun*.
- 61 “fedâ ederek teşekküründe iken” BOA. MVL. 875/52.
- 62 “nizâmına muvâfık olarak kemâl-i hakkâniyetle” BOA. MVL. 875/52.
- 63 “bu misûllü da’vaların küll-yevm zuhûruyla” BOA. MVL. 875/52.
- 64 Abdürrahim, *Fetâvâ-yı Abdürrahim*, p. 511.
- 65 The Regulation for the Expropriation of Land and Real Estate for Public Interest of 1856; the Expropriation Decree of 1879; and the Law of 1914 Concerning the Manner of Expropriation by Municipalities in Istanbul and Provinces. Osman Nuri Ergin, *Mecelle-i Umûr-ı Belediyye*, pp. 1756-68.
- 66 Osman Nuri Ergin, *Mecelle-i Umûr-ı Belediyye*, pp. 1756-68.



- <sup>67</sup> *The Levant Herald*, 13 September 1865.  
<sup>68</sup> BOA. İ.DH. 572/39882.  
<sup>69</sup> BOA. İ. MVL. 555/24935.  
<sup>70</sup> “husûle gelen fevâid-i âdiyeyi arsaların sâhibleri dahi anlayarak hasbe’l-nizâm olunan % 25 zâyî’âtı vermekte hiç kimse tarafından artık bir şey denilmemiştir” BOA. İ.DH. 572/39882; BOA. İ.MVL. 550/24667.  
<sup>71</sup> BOA. İ.DH. 572/39882.  
<sup>72</sup> BOA. İ. MVL. 550/24667.  
<sup>73</sup> *Takvîm-i Vekâyi’*, 26 February 1866, 27 March 1866, 24 April 1866; *Tasvîr-i Efkâr*, 20 September 1865, 28 September 1865, 14 October 1865.  
<sup>74</sup> BOA. MVL. 541/85.  
<sup>75</sup> BOA. MVL. 541/85; MVL. 533/50.  
<sup>76</sup> BOA. İ.MVL. 550/24667.  
<sup>77</sup> “münâza’atın arkası alınamayup”; “türlü türlü uygunsuzluklar” BOA. İ.MVL. 571/25660.  
<sup>78</sup> BOA. İ.MVL. 571/25660.





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# LEGITIMATING THE DEMOCRATIC STATE IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA: MEMORY AS A CULTURAL GOOD

## Abstract

The fall of the communist regimes in the East Central Europe can be seen as a momentous historical juncture for reclaiming the 'repressed' memories' during the past regime. The revolutionary changes of 1989, which mark a multifarious transition could trigger a different representation of the past. Long after regime change, the emergence of Institutes of Memory in most of the countries of East Central Europe, constitute a new empirical reality, which continues to be addressed within the framework of politics of memory, or transitional justice. In this paper, I propose a different theoretical perspective and focus on the case of Romania, given that issues of the past since December 1989 have been central to different actors at different levels. On the other hand, it is a case that can help understand the shift from the symbolic politics of the 90s, to memory production as a legitimating frame of the new democratic regime.

**Keywords:** memory production; legitimization; democratic regime; post-communist condition; cultural good.

## Introduction

The fall of a non-democratic regime it is considered to mark usually an inauguration of a new narrative and a novel understanding of the past, especially if that past is deemed to be deplorable. Nonetheless, such a perspective reflects a common-sense view of the reality of radical regime change, which expresses mostly a wishful thinking than an objective scrutiny of the conditions, factors, structures and processes. I would agree that a state of transition is fraught with uncertainty rather than of radical transformation. Henceforth, imposing a certain linearity and normative conceptualization of regime change and transformations by the book, restricts as I said the objective reality that goes against the common view of a calamitous event. This perspective has implications on how to grasp

theoretically the recent 'unfinished' transitions, or 'unfinished' revolutions or the resurgence of the past in considerably unexpected situation.

Here I am referring to a concrete experience, or better say of a concrete phenomenon peculiar to democratic regimes of the post-1989 transformations in East Central Europe. Attempts to deal with the legacies of the past regime have been legion in East Central Europe. It is a region that have experienced numerous ruptures and discontinuities between different forms of regime, societal upheavals and occupations. One could say that it is a region that has produced rather a lot of memories on the past, some of which are conflicting, contradictory while others are shared presumably by the whole society. Apparently, there exists a blessed coincidence between the concrete experiences of revoking the past, memorializing, commemorating the past and the surge of scholarly work on memory, or what is considered to be as memory studies, a research practice that vacillates between praxis and proper disciplinary boundaries and traditions. I explain later in the text, how innocuous yet self-serving and secluded such an approach can be. That is to say, certain phenomena cannot simply be explained by recurring to existing patterns of theoretical lenses.

It seems quite difficult to deny the centrality of experiences of the past across different generations and through time, during a particular non-democratic regime and after. A paraphernalia of actors, perspectives, understandings, and even sensitivities is present in such situations. Different social actors create their narratives on the past. The narratives can encompass a particular individual history or as it is generally called in the literature life-story that emerges from a silenced past, or it is re-fashioned according to new conditions. This dimension of narrating the past is articulated and presented via the medium of testimonies, oral histories. By way of analogy, and including some degree of theoretical sophistication, a narrative includes a coherent story at the level of a community that shares the same social position. However, what memory studies (to mean: politics of memory) has found interesting is the interlocking and interplay between narratives, social actors, official institutions, at a particular time in search for a reappraisal of hegemonic representation, or of reinstating the hegemony.

There exist a certain premise or a tenet in the scholarship on memory, which says that memory can reemerge, even when considered as foreclosed, after a long time and that is to be seen as normal. That makes no distinction between memories conceived under democratic regimes,

and those under non-democratic regimes. However, one can imagine that under conditions of external shocks, memories are provoked and become provoking. The above-mentioned premise reflects the condition or the feature of memories as being contentious. Thus, at issue within this area of research is not whether memories would re-emerge, albeit that might explain partly a phenomenon, but how do they re-emerge. The theoretical move is to talk about memory using a concept such as 'memory-formation' and to delineate this process. I do consider that the theoretical purchase of the term 'memory-formation' is evident.

The second premise of this scholarship is that of providing a skeptical stance on focusing on the official memory, or on the state as the central actor of coming up with a dominant narrative when explaining 'memory-formation'. This position cautions the researcher for not falling prey of one-dimensionality and as such of not granting hierarchy and priority to representations and discursive constructions of the past emanating from the state. By doing this inappropriate move, the researcher has made the memory field bereft of any plurality and contestation. This kind of epistemological caution is considered as a useful tenet of memory studies researchers. Nonetheless, I would say that this principle reflects mostly the ambiguity of the memory studies research caught between continuous attempts to refine theoretical frameworks when explaining concrete phenomena, on the one hand, and practical considerations of contestation, silencing, domination of different narratives on the past, on the other hand. Therefore, the skeptical position on any attempted hegemony on the past limits and informs the boundaries and understandings of doing memory studies research. This feature makes the memory studies approach less useful, and limited if one wants to understand processes of a different scope and of a larger scale. The fall of the state socialist regimes, mostly designated by the main actors of the revolutions of the 1989, and of lay people as well as communist regimes, has unleashed a dual processes of memory. On the one hand there was the emergence of narratives that centered around the themes of suffering, victims, and repression, which became dominant through time, and at the periphery was the narrative centered on nostalgia, mostly as a reaction to disillusionment from the protracted economic transition. These two narrative representations or strategies of the past albeit of the differences between them are the ones that engaged the past experience compared to other strategies such as forgetting.

Although I am aware of the plurality of representations of the past, nostalgia being one of them, the focus of the research is not that of addressing the emergence of nostalgic representations, or the failure of a hegemonic discourse that could not curtail nostalgia. It is mostly the depiction of the narrative of the communist regime as inflicting repression, suffering on its citizens, that of creating a cultural regress by cutting of the links with Western tradition, or that of an alienated ideology which has been articulated by social actors and institutional sites. Yet, there exist crucial nuances within this domineering articulated narrative. Different social actors, representatives of social groups, researchers, or activists emphasize different temporalities of the state socialist regime as more valuable to be understood, to be remembered and more importantly as more central to explaining the nature of the previous regime.

The recent phenomena of the establishment of Institutes of Memory, a generic name given to particular institutional structures autonomous yet part of the bureaucratic field of the state, provides the empirical basis for investigating the linkage between the legacies of the state socialist regime, and recent political or societal projects of memory construction. This has implications as well in the transformation of the legitimating formula of the democratic regime and its ideology. The process of dealing with the communist past, due to the emergence of these institutional sites, is of a different type compared to memory politics that remains confined within ideological, identity-building or political rhetoric on a symbolic level.

The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, the intention is to reconsider the role of the legacies of the past regime in the process of dealing with the past. The second aim is to explain the process of institutionalization of memory, proposing a different perspective compared to politics of memory or transitional justice.

## **Practices, Materiality and Institutions of Memory**

Broadly speaking, one could conceive memory as understood through three different, sometimes overlapping perspectives. Acts of remembrance of past events or celebrations of the past are part of the understanding of social memory as a cultural practice reflecting a process of meaning making or narrative construction for a particular community or society. Emile Durkheim is credited to have linked commemorative rituals of pre-



modern societies as first and original instances of practices that maintain group cohesiveness.

Seeing the myth of origin as one of the most powerful means of establishing a community's unity also assumes the existence of connections between collective memory and institutions guaranteeing collective beliefs and identity. In early societies, it is the role of religion to express and affirm the shared beliefs and understandings that characterize a society.<sup>1</sup>

Durkheim seems to consider memory not only performed through practices of commemoration but also sustained or produced via social institutions, in this case religion. In modern societies he considers law and language as primary social institutions. However, the understanding of an institution is quite broad. One could make a distinction between social institutions and specific institutions, such as Institutes of Memory as particular institutional sites that have emerged at a certain structure and context of previous institutions dealing with the past or memory. Henceforth, rather than relying on the assumed function of Institutes of Memory, it is appropriate to scrutinize the process of their emergence and entrenchment, namely the presence of certain institutional recombinant practice or accumulation with previous organizations or institutions, and their link with traditional institutions in which memory is mediated such as museums, educational system, and social agents and the political class. It is a shared belief among researchers that issues of memory are interconnected with power.

Despite the broad understanding of power, such an approach has an analytical value, despite its underspecification sometimes.

Sociologists of memory have thus sought to specify at a more middle level how memory processes operate within specific social institutions. Here the quintessential sociological issues of power, stratification, and contestation are central.<sup>2</sup>

The nexus between collective memory and power relationships is one of the issues that sociological research has dealt with most.<sup>3</sup>

In order to respond to such exigency and commitment it is necessary to unravel how this link or interaction is being understood. As Susannah

Radstone claims, it is, generally understood in binary terms and more so as conflicting representations of memory.<sup>4</sup>

The intersecting point of representation and memory is that of identity. The type of public performativity of that memory is commemoration. Starting from a particular sociological perspective that take for granted group identities and group cohesiveness, the power and memory nexus is understood as a struggle between contestation of representations of the past at a given time. This type of argument is quite conducive to interest-based strategies of instrumentalizations of memory.

However, since identities cannot be taken for granted in the modern world, determining the content of the collective memory is a conflictual process. The collective representations of the social past are designed to give legitimacy to the society's beliefs and to inspire their projects, thus legitimizing the elites that represent them....The most important of these strategies, above all as regards the construction of national identity, are undoubtedly commemorative practices. These practices which include not only festivities and occasional ceremonies, but also monuments, exhibitions and museums, have been the focus of most sociologists' attention.<sup>5</sup>

If we consider, Durkheim's understanding of memory as a point of reference, then Jedlowski's perspective on memory as a process seems insufficient. Celebrations, festivities, museums and monuments are grouped under the category of commemorative practices. That might be the case for festivities or founding dates of commemorations, but considering museums as performing commemorative practices provides a restrictive view of this particular (social) institution of memory.<sup>6</sup> The other perspective is that of considering memory as expressed or manifested in certain materiality or localized in certain material formations.

A large body of cultural history has examined what Paula Hamilton has characterized as a cross-national 'memorial culture...characterized by the dominance of memory and commemoration as the prism through which we negotiate the past'. The focus of these historians is public commemoration and the active participation by large number of people 'doing the work of mourning and public remembering themselves...Alternatively, Alon Confino defined collective memory much more broadly, as the 'representation of the past and the making of it into shared cultural knowledge by successive generations in 'vehicles of memory', such as books, films, museums, commemorations an, and others'. In this definition every [material] representation of the past is potentially a form of collective memory.<sup>7</sup>

According to this perspective institutions are a vessel of containing the material representation of memory rather than as autonomous institutions pertaining to certain fields and of having their own effects or stakes in the game of 'memory work'. A more extreme version of this understanding of memory and institutions is given by Hewer and Roberts:

On the other hand, it could be argued that collective memory is located within the physical and technological spaces marked out by libraries, archives, museums, war memorials, street signs and the internet, sources from which the past is rehearsed and re-narrated in formal and informal social settings.<sup>8</sup>

A perspective that does not consider the dynamics of social memory as representations or enactments of certain narratives, and that does not consider institutions as material manifestation of memory or as functional practices of commemoration is provided by the juxtaposition and convergence of Radstone's conceptualization of memory as mediated and articulated, not just re-presented, Olick's and Robinson's historical sociology of memory approach, and Bourdieu's theory of the cultural field. Radstone conceives of mediated memory in this way:

In what follows I want to offer a critique of this tendency by drawing attention to an aspect of memory that has been less emphasized in research on memory to date: that is the mediation of already-mediated memory discourses, images, texts and representations by the institutions and discourses that may be articulated. But a focus on memory's specific articulation within the public sphere will also raise questions not only concerning whether-and if so, how- varieties of memory texts, practices and discourses may be mediated, articulated, assimilated, incorporated or co-opted by the various institutions and domains of the public sphere, but also concerning whether there may be aspects of memory that are inassimilable by those diverse institutions.<sup>9</sup>

The memory of the period under the communist regime is not re-presented via public acts of remembrance such as commemorations of 1989 Revolutions, or of constructing monuments or fixing a date for the commemoration of the victims of the communist regime but it is mediated and articulated through the interaction of Institutes of Memory, the political field of power, and the adjacent cultural field such as the institutions that have or exert symbolic capital within the emerging memory field. The

stability and accumulative dimension of institutions, in this case Institutes of Memory, and their personnel makes the mediating aspect of institutions on memory more effective than the public acts of remembrance such as festivities or commemorations. The discipline itself, says Radstone, suffers from anti-institutionalist bias to put it this way.

Rather, the slippage in theory that leads from an initial questioning of binaries to a focus on only one side of the pair may have its roots elsewhere than in the retreat from the sheer difficulty of the theoretical enterprise that is prompted by questioning binaries. The reluctance to attempt to reconceptualize the binary inner world/outer world arises in part from a resistance in memory studies that has its roots not in academic theory alone, but in a memory politics that stretches beyond the academy.<sup>10</sup>

It seems that the memory studies research has been reflecting the perspective of dealing with the past memory as seen from the positions of the political class that has a stake on the monopoly to legitimize a certain 're-presentation' of the past.

Too strict an understanding of memory would preclude the actual process of the articulation of social memory. This is the suggested methodological and theoretical position of Olick and Robbins.

Instead of trying to fix conceptual distinctions theoretically, many scholars have called for a historical approach to social memory, one that sees such distinctions as emerging in particular times and locations for particular purposes.<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore, the suggestion is to consider memory as a sensitizing concept rather than a fixed operationalized term as it is generally done. Olick and Robbins go further than Radstone with regard to the institutionalization of memory or of institutional production of memory. "Methodologically, Olick (n.d) and Schudson (1992) suggest specifying the different institutional fields that produce memory such as politics and the arts...".<sup>12</sup> Despite the appropriate theoretical framework of overcoming the binary conceptualizations and of historicizing and sensitizing the practices of memory, Olick/Robbins' approach and Radstone's approach need to be complemented or corrected by Bourdieu's understanding of the cultural field and by his theoretical toolkit.

What could be seen as happening since the emergence of the Institutes of memory is a process of the production of cultural goods or symbolic goods such as memory of the past within certain conditions of existence and broader institutional framework.

The effects of the production of memory as a symbolic good is to be reflected in the reversal of symbolic politics from a contestation of different representations to a contestation over the monopoly of legitimate consecration and ultimately of the exertion of symbolic violence in the public sphere, with the intention of giving shape to a memory field. Hence a process of closeness, and archiving albeit of the assumed openness and lack of restrictions of access. If we operate by analogy which is at the same time relational, Bourdieu's depiction and explication for the conditions of emergence or existence of the cultural field, we could extend this framework to the emergence of the memory field in the post-communist countries due to the specificity of the institutional structures.

....the sociology of art and literature [memory] has to take as its object not only the material production [narratives, representation, materiality of memory] but also the symbolic production of the work, i.e., the production of the value of the work, or what amounts to the same thing, of belief in the value of the work. It therefore has to consider as contributing to production not only the direct producers of work in its materiality [social groups representing a certain memory] but also the producers of meaning and value of the work [memory] – critics, publishers, gallery directors and the whole set of agents whose combined efforts produce consumers capable of knowing and recognizing the work of art as such, in particular teachers (but also families, etc.). So it has to take into account not only, as the social history of art usually does, the social conditions of the production of artists, art critics, dealers, patrons, etc., as revealed by indices such as social origin, education or qualifications, but also the social conditions of the production of a set of objects socially constituted as works of art [works of memory], i.e., the conditions of production of the field of social agents (museums, galleries, academies, etc.) which help to define and produce the value of works of art.<sup>13</sup>

The suggestion by Olick and Robbins of considering memory as a sensitizing concept converges with Bourdieu's cautious remark of not aiming to perform practices of operationalizations of concepts which are actually constantly defined and at stake, such as memory.

The boundary of the field is a stake of struggles, and the social scientist's task is not to draw a dividing line between the agents involved in it by imposing a so-called operational definition, which is most likely to be imposed on him by his own prejudices or presuppositions, but to describe a *state* (long-lasting or temporary) of these struggles and therefore of the frontier delimiting the territory held by the competing agents.<sup>14</sup>

One could notice first, that by not attempting to fix definitions, in this case, that of memory, the social researcher while investigating the effect of the Institutes of Memory, would see it as a dynamic processes that includes contestation and convergence between different actors or agents. Second, one notices that the theoretical framework of instrumentalization is more a normative perspective than a sociological or analytical one, given that it considers that the political agents or those operating within the political field should not be operating or positioning themselves as they do! Henceforth, by considering the field as a site of contestation or struggle, and by considering strategies as not stemming from ulterior motives but as positions within the 'game' we could better understand the process of institutional memory production in East Central Europe, recently, not to reduce the institutional effects simply to a mirroring of pet political projects.

Probably, I would qualify this statement by saying that under conditions of weak institutional structures or constraints, the degree of ideological mirroring of the political projects of certain members of the political class is more probable. And lastly, this brings us to the play of the homologies between the fields, especially between the fields.

The field of cultural production produces its most important effects through the play of the homologies between the fundamental opposition which gives the field its structure and the oppositions structuring the field of power and the field of class relations. These homologies may give rise to ideological effects which are produced automatically whenever oppositions at different levels are superimposed or merged.<sup>15</sup>

Stated differently, the alliances, convergences, or divergences and contestations between different field need to be mapped out, which would 'shape' the institutional memory production diffused in the public sphere and has as outcomes a certain legitimation or ideological effect.

## **The Case of Romania: Institutionalization Path, Civil Society, Multiple-Temporalities**

The Romanian case appears to be quite appropriate to investigate the process of memory production with regard to the communist past. Paradoxically, the absence of a shared foundation of the new democratic regime and the absence of a shared narrative of the December 1989 events, among the political groups and among the civil society has provided memory politics a center stage. In this section of the paper I delineate the differences between the post-transition period on constructing and claiming different representations of the past and the practices of institutionalizing the memory of the past regime starting from 2005. This part of the paper shows the battles for consecration between different groups and institutions, as well as the shift in the legitimation formula of the democratic regime based on memory as a cultural product.

I delineate the processes of memory institutionalization at the level of bureaucratic field, in the case of Romania. In order to understand this process I discuss the antecedent conditions that precede the establishment of the Romanian Institute of Memory (a reductionist term for the sake of the argument). Together with describing the antecedent conditions I explain the more 'remote' causes that relate to regime transition and what I would call the partial effects or legacies of the transition of the post-communist condition. Briefly stated, antecedent conditions include the relation between state and civil society, previous existing structures (institutional or societal less entrenched ones) that dealt with the past, the composition or the typology of the social group involved through time. Legacies of the transition are seen as the nodal points of unresolved problems of transition as they are understood by the actors themselves, in particular those nodal points that resonate and whose effect has continued long after regime change. It appears that in some cases the legacies to be confronted are twofold: the legacies of the past regime (that of state socialism) and the legacies of transition. There seems to be a concern with the unresolved dilemmas of the post-communist condition, which is a reflection or an inertia of the unfinished transition, or revolutions.

A transitional justice approach would consider the current phenomenon according to the general template that stipulates certain set of strategies for accomplishing the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. This set of strategies include : a) doing justice b) revealing the truth on the past c) recognition of the victims and those persecuted under an

authoritarian regime, d) symbolic measures. One could easily argue, within this framework, that the establishment of Institutes of Memory (which is a term used by the practitioners of TJ and of those working within these institutional sites) is a specific local response of post-communist states due to contingent and regime particularities of state socialism, within the broader universal model of truth-commissions and other ad hoc bodies or organizations.

I would say that this perspective is more indebted to a functionalist approach, and less sensitive to the embeddedness, or stability of a particular institutional site within a particular field (bureaucratic field) and the dynamics or consequences that follow. To be more precise, transitional justice perspective is quite useful when trying to explain why and how certain strategies of dealing with the past were chosen and what would be their effects in breaking with the past, as it is expected. It does help in identifying and delineating the main actors involved within the processes that they continuously and obstinately name (post)transitional justice. Nonetheless, it seems to be restrictive and less explanatory.

Romania belongs to those cases in East Central Europe in which no negotiated transition between the opposition and factions of the state socialist regime took place. This happening is mostly explained by certain scholars partly as a result of the absence of a clear and grouped dissidence, and partly as a consequence of the Stalinist aspect of the regime. It was the combination of these two factors that had an effect on the process of transition.

The events of December 1989, which remain disputed whether it was a genuine revolution, a transforming one, or a simple reversal of Ceaușescu (a coup d'état) without removing the structures and institutions of the past regime, produced a different configuration of actors. On the one hand there were the ex-communists like Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan who did not seem to question the communist ideology, still believing in the utopian dimension of socialism, but who opposed Ceaușescu and for doing so were marginalized during his rule. This group of people represented the so-called second or third layer of the nomenklatura of the previous regime.

A new organizational structure and leading structure appeared in the wake of the revolution, called the National Salvation Front. This organization in the beginning of its establishment included certain representatives of the public intellectuals, who were considered locally as dissidents of the regime of Ceaușescu. The National Salvation Front was not conceived of to be a political party, but soon it was transformed into



a political party, after the fissure and disagreement between Iliescu and the public intellectuals, who left NSF. It should be noted that regardless of the centrality of the events in Bucharest, the events of December 1989 have multiple-centers of societal action promoting and defending anti-communist strategies in the early days of the revolution. Among these main centers, were Timișoara, Cluj and Brașov.

The way the events of December 1989 happened in Romania provided a critical juncture in making possible a new configuration of actors, a different reconfiguration of the relation between the emerging power and civil society. One could argue that the absence of a shared understanding of what the events of December meant to the dissidents, to the new power structures, to the citizens created a political rift and unleashed a political struggle after 1989. On the one side were the public intellectuals, dissidents in cooperation with traditional anti-communist parties, which reemerged in 1990, and on the other side was what the opposition called Iliescu's regime, who was seen as the continuation of the past Leninist mentality and of following the past non-democratic practices. Under these conditions two main strategies or narratives of understanding the events, or if you wish discourses, appeared. The reformed communists, which obtained a landslide victory in May 1990, framed the events of December 1989 as a genuine revolution that put an end to Ceaușescu's rule and initiated the process of transition to democracy, its consolidation and to market economy. Thus, the legitimacy of the new regime was not based on a new reconsideration of the communist past of Romania, nor on a uni-linear temporality of the past regime as illegitimate and unpopular, but on the revolution of 1989. Regardless of the apparent contradictions between discourse and actual practices, the new power structures chose to stick to the narrative of revolution, political pluralism and consolidation of democracy. The communist past was barely articulated and discussed only as a reflection of nostalgia, or of a lost illusion.

The contenders and opponents of that particular narrative of the December 1989 events included anti-communist political parties, such as the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party and the National Liberal Party. These have been the traditional inter-war parties in Romania whose leaders were persecuted by the communist regime after the Second World War. Alongside these political parties were the individual dissidents of the past regime such as Mircea Dinescu, Doina Cornea, Radu Filipescu, representatives of the Timișoara Association, and December 21 Association. To these social groups and prominent public figures,

the new power structures lacked legitimacy. They considered the new governing power a regime, calling it Iliescu's regime. The revolution of December 1989, was considered unfinished given that it was not an anti-communist revolution as it was intended in the very beginning during the protests against the regime in Timișoara. It is during these first years after 1989, that one of the first civic initiatives was involved in promoting and sustaining the memory of the victims of the past regime, incorporating an anti-communist discourse.

In the first public statement of Civic Alliance, an important organization of civil society, which included in it the Group for Social Dialogue, the Timișoara Association, the Pro-democracy Association, and the Agora Society of Iași, one can discern the public discourse of civil society with regard to the past regime, the state-socialist regime's legacies, and the understanding of the transition.

An non-party forum... 'a linkage between associations and between people' this is how Civic Alliance is characterizing itself to the public. Civic Alliance aims to fight the new power instituted after 'revolution'. The battle against 'totalitarian structures' and 'political police' was the main objective of the intellectuals who founded this organization, seemingly when nothing has changed in the recent history of Romania.<sup>16</sup>

It seems that for the representatives of civil society, a break with the past regime entailed dismantling what they called totalitarian structures. In the first decade of the 1990s these debates and struggles have happened in conditions of absence of institutionalization of what later emerged as particular institutional sites, publicly supported and dependent on different factions of the political class. A politics of memory perspective that operates mostly with terms and analytical tools such as narrative, memory-formation, symbolic politics, inclusion/exclusion and official or counter-memory can explain to some extent what has happened during the 90s but less so what started to happen after the emergent of particular institutional sites that are part of the bureaucratic field and characterized by certain levels of embeddedness, structuration, stability through time and linkages with the previous regime's material legacies. There was an attempt by the representatives of the opposition, political parties and civil society organizations, to continue the revolution with other means. Surely, there was mistrust of the new power structures, due to their communist past, for not being real democrats albeit they were elected freely and the

elections were contested. Hence, even the emergence of political parties, and free elections did not constitute according to the political and civic opposition that the ruling government was legitimate.

Democratization was linked with and conditioned by the necessary response towards the state socialist past. This demand by the opposition included decommunization, lustration and condemnation of the communist regime. The legitimating framework and discourse of the civil society in confrontation with the political class in the 1990s has been evoked during the second decade, not only as a lamentable past or legacy of the transition, but also as competing memory to the strategy of forgetfulness. What seems more important, is that civil society, by exerting through the presence of public intellectuals, a symbolic capital in the public sphere, in terms of authoritative claim-making on the past, aims to change the discourse of power and partially transfers its discourse and narrative at the institutional level. The arrival in power of a coalition of center-right parties in 2004, provided the opportunity for the representatives of civil society, and other anti-communist organizations to put pressure for a break with the past regime.

It is in 2005 that the political class, or factions within the political class become responsive to the demands of civil society. It is at this time when groups of civil society ally with different factions of the political class, involving themselves in the new configuration of the field of power. However, the Romanian officials and representatives of the Romanian state in 2005 did not inherit a tabula rasa in issues of confronting non-democratic past of their country. In 2004 at the end of his mandate Ion Iliescu established the Institute of the Romanian Revolution, which indicates the understanding that the center-left in Romania had on the communist past. It seems that it clung to originating event of its power in December 1989, without addressing the whole communist legacy and the past regime. Another initiative of the center-left, and of Iliescu himself was to establish the Wiesel Commission on Romanian state's implication in the Holocaust.

The process of institutionalization of the memory of the state socialist past involves those features that are lacking in the case of the Wiesel Commission or the Institute of the Romanian Revolution. It should be mentioned that the environment in which the institutionalization emerges and is structured, is dependent on the social and political environment. More precisely, on the balance of forces between societal and political actors that bear an influence. Due to favorable internal conditions, the

removal from power of the center-left in 2004, civil society started to request from the new governing party to initiate a process of condemning the communist regime, and of distancing itself from the Iliescu's regime and its non-democratic practices. As a result of the internal competition within the center-right parties that between PNL (National Liberal Party) and the PDL (Democratic Party) on the monopoly of anti-communism and addressing the past, the President of the Republic entrusted Vladimir Tismăneanu (affiliated with the Group for Social Dialogue, a public intellectual and social scientists) to create the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Romanian Communist Dictatorship. This happened a few months after, Prime-minister Călin Popescu- Tăriceanu, belonging to the National Liberal Party took the initiative to establish the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes following the proposal of its adviser Marius Oprea. Prior to being appointed as head of IICCR, Marius Oprea was part of a non-governmental Institute of Recent Romanian History (IRIR).

### **Consecrating Struggles on the Memory of the Past: Institutional Divergence and Legitimacy**

The Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes of Romania, did not inherit or use any previous existing structures, organizations or state agencies. In 1999, the Romanian parliament decided to create a particular structure that would take charge of the screening processes and the study of the Securitate archive. This autonomous structure, called the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archive, seemed to produce a separate narrative and understanding of the past regime different from the narrative produced by IICCR, and later of IICCMER. The understanding of the past state socialist regime between these two competing institutions diverges due to different material basis on which the memory is founded. At CNSAS, the materiality on which the understanding or memory of the past regime is built is the archive of the Securitate. Whereas, at the IICCMER, the memory produced is a reflection of a different form of materiality: prisons of the communist regime that are considered to become memorials, forensic archeology with the intention to uncover the cadavers of people executed by Securitate, the archive of the activities and publications of the Romanian exile. The Institute for the Investigation of the Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile has been prone to political

influence and changes in its directorship. This is due to some extent of it being dependent on the government. There are two type of groups that have dominated the policies and the direction of the IICCMER through time. One of the groups includes (self-proclaimed) public intellectuals who proclaim liberal values and claim to be in position of neutrality, away from party politics.

This group of people are active civil society members, and critical of both non-democratic regimes that Romania experienced: fascism and communism. This group positions itself at the intersection of the educational and cultural field. They do possess a higher degree of symbolic capital compared to their contenders. The second group of people comprises historians, researchers who possess less symbolic capital rely. Their understanding of civic engagement is not based on the position of a public intellectual, as a claimant of universal truths and of universal or ideological values, rather of one of concrete attempts to provide a voice to victims of the past regime. On the other hand, due to their condition and their trajectory this second group has tended to bureaucratize more the profile of IICCMER than the first group. What I just delineated has repercussions on the consecration battles between different contending groups and configurations of representatives of political field, and civil society on the understanding and the discourse on the past. Situations of crisis of the 'legitimacy' of these type of particular institutions such as IICCMER or CNSAS help better understand the nature of the strategies for the monopoly on the past and divisive cleavages when trying to impose a convergent and domineering narrative. The removal of Marius Oprea and Dinu Zamfirescu from the directorship of the Institute in 2010 had unleashed a crisis and a fissure within the IICCMER.

The scandal at IICCMER has reached such levels and allegations that numerous supporters of Marius Oprea and he himself claim that the decision of the government to remove Marius Oprea has the intention to bury the investigations on communist crimes. In other words, the dominant idea is that the government aims to theorize the investigation of the communist crimes by transferring them into the library, so does Marius Oprea says and many others after him.<sup>17</sup>

The first group of public intellectuals is considered as not appropriate to fulfill a concrete task and obligation of which IICCMER was in charge of, the investigation of communist crimes. More precisely, this crisis that

happened in 2010 shows that there is a struggle about the legitimacy and monopoly to consecrate the proper understanding or narrative of the communist past. On the other hand, it shows the degree of politicization of the memory field, and political dependency of the Institute. What is at issue within these struggle of forces is the neutrality or claim-making regarding the protection and respect of the neutrality of the Institute.

## Conclusion

It is assumed that the condition of East Central European societies, which experienced a non- democratic regime such as state socialism, has always been that of post-communism. There exist a link to be made between the post-communist condition and transition, understood as a state of limbo, of uncertainty and change. The post-communist dimension of ECE societies can be observed by the importance that is given to ideology and discourses, and the continuous presence of transition. There is some grain of truth in this perspective, which is mostly due to the recurrence of problems that originate in the past, to be understood as state socialist past, and that are not completely over, even when a democratic regime change has followed. On the other hand the post-communist condition and perspective remains vague albeit fashionable. It seems to indicate the existence of a sort of cultural war waged between different representatives and proponents of how to understand the legacy of the past and how to go about completing the transition from state socialism to a democratic regime.

Probably it is time to dispute, to some extent, the utility of this framework and term being used with high frequency in the political science, history and transition literature. I would like to argue that the analytical value of this term that implies a particular understanding of a process is waning. In the very early stages of analyzing and understanding regime transformation in ECE there existed two broad approaches. One approach focused on the willingness of the political and cultural elites to transform the society by implementing a template of universal reforms, from a position of epistemological certainty and authority. This above-mentioned approach claimed that inherited structures, practices, institutional sites, are of less influence, and hence of less analytical value when explaining the transition to a democratic regime. There existed a certain revolutionary ethos that could make possible change at will,

due to the lack of legitimacy of the previous regime or due to favorable external conditions. However, one could argue that the time frame for understanding this perspective and how it emerged requires us to broaden the view. It requires an identification of the general debates that existed within the social groups that could exert influence or propose changes, and how the alliances were created.

Nonetheless, there is a fine distinction to be made between the articulation of certain discourses, policies and strategies on the verge of the radical transformation and the re-articulation of the same or somewhat different discourses and policies once the configuration of the actors and conditions changes long after regime change. Probably one could understand better the post-communist condition if the emphasis is not put on the ideational level but rather at a cluster of conditions, actors and practices that are part of the processes which happen at the level of regime, state and societal actors. To be more precise a strategy would be to disaggregate the post-communist condition into certain dimensions that pertain to a construction of the symbolic violence of the new democratic regime. For that, a close look at the conjunction of institutional trajectories, discursive representations underlying the narratives of the past, and the transformation facet of different traces of the materiality of the past regime, used for a different purpose nowadays, would do. The paper has tried to highlight the process in which a democratic regime aims to construct a new symbolic order.

One could pose the alternative explanation that stems from the theoretical approach known as politics of memory studies. It seems to me that this approach owns its emergence and episteme construction to the resurgence of memory as a social experience and later on as a valid category of analysis. This approach appears to be convincing when trying to explain certain phenomena that implicate political projects on the past, the influence and role of memory in political or symbolic battles. However it lacks the fine-tuned mechanisms of the micro-level effects of reproduction and stability. Representation, narratives and conflict among social groups are close to the empirical reality but they are not analytically anchored within a constrain of structures, and as such become rather fluid or not appropriate as tools.

This perspective has implications in understanding the transformations at the macro-level. It does explain the valence and the centrality of the politicization of the past as well as the conflicting representations between hegemonic/dominant narrative, and the less hegemonic narratives. I have

tried to indicate that including temporality as a valid dimension of looking at the so-called post-communist condition within the processes of dealing with the past, provides an added value to discuss theoretically continuities and discontinuities within different regimes. That is to say, considering actual divergences and conflicts regarding the representation of the past memories and the extent of politicization of this process would not provide a convincing understanding of the transformation of post-communist condition towards something completely new. Henceforth, the inertia of labeling the condition of new democratic states/regimes as post-communist has been mostly justified due to the incompleteness of reforms that make the new regime appear democratic and of having dismantled the command economy of the state socialist regime. I consider that the framework of 'transition to democracy' overlooks the phenomenon of legacies' effects on the democratic regime. To put it differently, the analytical tool of most use is regime and state rather than democracy and the transition from state socialism to democracy.

At another level of discussion, I have tried to explain the difference between a perspective such as memory studies approach that primarily looks at processes of memory formation and the perspective that explains not simply these processes and different forms of it, but also indicates a more macro- structural and temporal dimension of transformation in regard to the regime/state and the stability of institutions itself.



## NOTES

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- <sup>12</sup> Olick, Jeffrey, K., and Robbins Joyce, 112.
- <sup>13</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *The field of cultural production*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), 37.
- <sup>14</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, 42-32.
- <sup>15</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, 44.
- <sup>16</sup> Florin Mihai, "Alianța Civică, nucleul 'societății civile din România.", *Jurnalul.ro*, November. 2010 (<http://jurnalul.ro/special-jurnalul/alianta-civica-nucleul-societatii-civile-din-romania-558977.html> ).
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# SECULARISM AND IDENTITARIAN ORTHODOXY: TRAJECTORIES OF A GREAT DIVIDE OVER THE NOTION OF THE WEST<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

This paper presents an explorative thesis: it discusses the logic of discursive trajectories of power operations between, on one side, the Serbian Orthodox Church's involvement in politics and its hegemonic identity ideology promulgated by so called traditionalists, and on the other side the secularist politics of identity championed by progressivists who (re)present secularism as an epistemological truth and an analytical category for the interpretation of social life in Serbia as a society on a semi-periphery, i.e. as a society which is 'neither here nor there' in its comparison to the notion and image of the West. It is argued here that in their respective quests to define "the State", to vest it with power of determining public identity, and to shape worldviews of the citizenry in the public arena by defining appropriate and inappropriate scopes of reference, both secularist and identitarian ecclesiastic discourses perpetuate exclusivism in their strategies for advancement of their own worldviews.

**Keywords:** Serbian Orthodox Church, identitarian Orthodoxy, secularism, societal secularity, the West, politics of identity

Diverse sets of discourses about the role of religion in Serbia and about secularism as a social phenomenon of modernity and, as some claim, a value of truly democratic societies have come to the fore in Serbia as of the beginning of the post-communist crisis. These discourses coincide, intersect, intertwine, negotiate and challenge the discussions about the general course of the 'development' of Serbia upon the fall of communism (colloquially: 'Shall we go East or West?'; 'Are we making the state symbolically fit for the true Serbs only or for all its citizens?'; 'Tradition or Modernity?'; 'Pro-life or Pro-Choice'; 'Familism or Sexual Freedom'; 'Europe or isolation'; 'The SOC as a community of faith vs. the SOC as a guardian of Serbness/srpstvo/ etc.). The quests for directions of the Serbian society initiated social divisions and cleavages between different forces of

society, and facilitated the emergence of new social forces such as far-right extremist groups and political parties, paramilitary organizations, as well as groups inspired by political and nationalist Orthodoxy. Simultaneously, the Serbian political arena was enriched by civil society anti-war groups and networks, anti-nationalist political parties, and circles of public intellectuals and media houses not controlled by the state.

This divide between nationalist groups and antinationalist forces received a label that some believe is relevant to date: "*Prva i Druga Srbija*" (*First and Other Serbia*). Roughly, *Prva Srbija* represents isolationist forces that are seen to wish Serbia to engage in wars and conquer what they see as historical Serbian lands. *Druga Srbija* stands for civil society secularist antinationalist activists, independent media and public intellectuals, and some liberal civic political parties. It is noteworthy here that it is actually *Druga Srbija* which created the notion and image of *Prva Srbija*, i.e. these labels came to being by NGOs activists and opposition politicians in the 1990s. Such labels were a reaction to the overwhelming industry of hatred in Serbian society, which made the opponents of Milošević and his cliques start calling themselves *Druga Srbija*. However, those placed under the *Prva Srbija* label pay no attention to such labels. Instead, the binary divide of patriots/betrayers circulated among the supporters of wars and the inter-ethnic division in former Yugoslavia.<sup>2</sup>

Religion and the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church (here and after the SOC) in society have been regular themes of contention between *progressivists* and *traditionalists*. In this paper I aim to examine performatives<sup>3</sup> of both secularism and identitarian Orthodoxy as political styles of thoughts, i.e. as ideologies competing for control of the public discourse in Serbia yielding the notion of *the West* as the major point of departure for advancing their respective 'agendas' grounded in two oppositional, and inherently exclusive social ontologies. Throughout the paper I argue that *in their respective quests to define "the State", to vest it with the power of determining public identity, and to shape worldviews of the citizenry in the public arena by defining appropriate and inappropriate scopes of reference, both secularist and identitarian ecclesiastic discourses perpetuate exclusivism in their strategies for advancement of their own worldviews.*

Drawing from the legacy of Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, Oliver Roy, Edvard Said<sup>4</sup> (et al.) in this paper I base my arguments on the distinction between *secularism* as politics and a style of thought that generates socio-political identities, and *secularity* as a state of affairs (societal condition). I



also make a distinction between religiosity as an eschatological allegiance and as a basis for social and political self-understanding of collectivity ethnic/national assemblages of imageries. *Identitarian Orthodoxy* and *secularist worldviews* in this paper I read and interpret through a magnifying lense of the concepts of habitus by Pierre Bourdieu<sup>5</sup> as well as through the notion of imagined communities by Benedict Anderson.<sup>6</sup> My analysis and arguments in this paper are based on contemporary ethnographic and anthropological research by Serbian ethno-anthropologists and sociologists as well on my own research (ethnographic participant's observation) in this field.

### **Secularism and Religiosity: Serbia's Background**

In contemporary sociological theory secularity is associated with the process of the fading out of grand narratives as well as the process of differentiation and privatization of beliefs.<sup>7</sup> In secular Europe today, due to increased individualization and privatization of religious affiliations, politics and culture are seen as domains that are independent of any religious influence.<sup>8</sup>

Understandings of secularism and secularity are manifold. Seyla Benhabib writes that at its best secularism "can be understood as the public and manifest neutrality of the state toward all kinds of religious practices, institutionalized through a vigilant removal of sectarian religious symbols, signs, icons, and items of clothing from official public spheres".<sup>9</sup> Olivier Roy argues that secularization is a social phenomenon that requires no political implementation: it comes about when religion ceases to be at the center of human life, even though people still consider themselves believers. Roy writes that *laïcité* as a governmental praxis "is a political choice that defines the place of religion in an authoritarian, legal manner".<sup>10</sup> Roy's definitions may be coming from the French specific political experience since the claim that secularization does not require political implementation may be problematic in the sense that social changes do not take place independently from the modes of governance. Notwithstanding this remark, *laïcité* as a 'French way' of implementing secularism should be taken as an analytical notion that helps understand a specific thicker version of political implementation of secularist norms in a polity, in which case secularity as a name and label can be used for the description of dominant practices of citizenry when it comes to the doctrine, religious observance, and dominant moral ethos.<sup>11</sup> There are

authors that question these alleged ‘neutrality’ and ‘individuality’ traits of secularism, and who charge these terms and phenomena with political power. For example, Saba Mahmood argues that secularism is not only a doctrinal separation of the church and the state but also a “rearticulation of religion in a manner that is commensurate with modern sensibilities and modes of governance”.<sup>12</sup> Secularism in the understanding of Talal Asad acts as an organizing principle and politics that aims at transcending social particularities for the sake of advancing modern citizenship. Therefore, fading out of the grand narratives, as it is usual to describe the decline in affiliation with churches in the West, has to be distinguished from secularism as a designed (created) politics of societal management (be it of state or non-state origin).<sup>13</sup> In the Serbian case we can trace secularism back to the early 19<sup>th</sup> century with the introduction of the ideas of Enlightenment into the rebellious society still ruled by the Ottomans. In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century westernization of the state institutions and public services, and advancement of Western style of education together with the spread of anarchist and socialist ideas among some intellectuals and social activists did contribute to the secularization of society in the form of anti-clericalism.<sup>14</sup> However, secularism in Serbia had differed from secularism as the Western theory and socio-political practices know it. Namely, due to the specific history of the region, i.e. the position and the role of the SOC in ethnic imageries and self-understanding, secularism in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> had functioned, or rather has been used, as a tool in societal management without placing the SOC outside the public sphere.<sup>15</sup> To put it simply, the SOC has been present in politics more or less to the extent the state authorities have allowed it to be present.<sup>16</sup> *Laïcité* in its somewhat radical form came with the communists coming to power after WWII, which not only placed religious institutions outside the public sphere but also placed religion and religious narratives and identities fully outside the public discourse.

As I wrote in the introductory remarks, I distinguish secularism from secularity. Charles Taylor makes a distinction between the absence of an ultimate reality in the public sphere, on one side, and the condition in which people do not affiliate with organized religion, and in which God has become just one of many options of people’s attachments, on the other side.<sup>17</sup> Kosmin claims that “secularity involves individual actors’ personal behavior and identification with secular ideas and traditions as a mode of consciousness”.<sup>18</sup> Yet in the Serbian case, I would argue, we cannot strictly speak of secularity in the understanding of these definitions,

i.e. as an absence of an ultimate reality (God as one of the options), or as identification with secular ideas as political ideas since living a life not influenced by an eschatological doctrine or without major reference to God does not mean that people do not think of an ultimate reality or that they subscribe to secular ideas and traditions as modes of consciousness. If we take a look into the ecclesiastical practices of the 'common people' in Serbia in the past two centuries (before and after communism) we might come to the conclusion that there has been a long development of the de-churching of Serbian Orthodox ethnic customs and everyday life, but we might also see a pervasive presence of Orthodoxy as a collection of images through which the people build their narratives of belonging.<sup>19</sup> Having this particular Serbian case in mind, I find that Coleman's definition of secularity fits well here: Coleman sees secularity as a neutral term which "serves as a reference word for domains or aspects of life under direct human control or manipulation without particular regard for any sacred order, that does not assume the eventual demise of the sacred".<sup>20</sup>

Religion is in theory seen as a political fact that influences people's self-understandings and identity politics. Anthony Marx argues that social bonds of religion and faith as a form of identity may provide the basis for national cohesion.<sup>21</sup> Nationalism and religious belief often go together and tend to comprise complex systems of thought whose intricate webs of belief and values require a specific analytical effort at interpretation.<sup>22</sup> Religion, nationalism, ethnicity, and political strategies pertaining to identity mobilization based on religion, nation, and ethnicity provide „a powerful framework for imagining community, and a set of schemas, templates, and metaphors for making sense of the social world".<sup>23</sup> The SOC as an institution historically has been seen as an intricate part of the Serb ethnic consciousness and national ethos.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, Serbian nationalism neither of the past nor of the present can be thoroughly understood without understanding the position of the SOC and institutional Orthodoxy in the imageries of the Serb institutions and ethnic assemblages. Given the perceived role of the SOC as a guardian of Serb national identity, Kunovich's account on the relation that religion may have for creating the basis for national identity might help in the quest for a profound understanding of Serbian nationalism. Claiming that religion as an identity can overlap with national identity (which is true in the case of the Serbs), Kunovich avers that religion can also reinforce other objective and subjective characteristics that promote a common national identity, and has the power to facilitate group mobilization.<sup>25</sup>

Even a glimpse into the wars of the 1990s in the territories of the former Yugoslavia would detect a seamless fusion of Orthodoxy as a collective identity and a mobilization force with nationalist industry designed for the sake of bringing the Serbs together, thereby creating a habitus of ethnic self-understanding and a 'world' of mutuality.<sup>26</sup> What is interesting here is also is that as the SOC claims a more active role in daily politics and the overall management of the state, it becomes more vulnerable to political manipulation by conservative and right-wing political parties, and even by mainstream civic parties that use the SOC for the sake of political gains.<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, the SOC uses this connection with political parties and its privileged position in Serbia's public space together with its *moral* capital to further its own agenda.<sup>28</sup>

Faith as an identity and as a homogenizing factor in Serbia as of the beginning of the 1990s, and as a point of departure for collective imagining and for the creation of a habitus and of a joint 'world' of intra-ethnic understanding has been contrasted, as I mentioned above, with civic, anational, areligious activist groups and intellectual assemblages with strong *secularist* and *laicist* stands that have questioned the very foundations of the discourses on what the Serb collective identity is based upon.<sup>29</sup> A specific resistance with secularist/laicist argumentation has been directed towards the SOC's meddling into governmental affairs and its very presence in the public arena. However, these dissenting voices against nationalism and religious political radicalism often slip into arguing that the SOC (and its doctrine) is a 'backward' institution which prevents the country from modernization and jeopardizes Serbian societal *secularity* and constitutional *laïcité*. Furthermore, the undertones of such discourses view religion as a dogma that should not have a say in a condition of societal modernity. Such assemblages of self-viewed *progressivists* yield a 'world' of *Druga Srbija*, which imagines itself as a 'world' of civility that contrast *Prva Srbija* seen as a remnant of an oppressive past. The notion of the progressive *West* plays a crucial role in the creation of such secularist discourses.

## The Church in Serbian Society Today

The SOC is a national, autocephalous, independent Orthodox Church in communion with other Eastern Orthodox Churches, but with a long history of ethnically exclusive church polity.<sup>30</sup> The common perception in Serbia as regards the role of the SOC and Orthodox Christianity in the

historical preservation of the ethnic and national being and existence is that, had not the SOC been there to guard Serbness, people who label themselves as Serbs would have perished. This perception is advanced by the education system (via the Serbian language and literature curriculum, history textbooks, etc.) and the media, and it is overwhelmingly present in the political discourse that shapes Serbian cultural policy.

Censuses and public opinion surveys disclose that more than 90% of the Serbs label themselves as Orthodox, and that they believe in God.<sup>31</sup> This data differs to a great extent from the data from surveys and censuses conducted prior to the fall of the communist regime in former Yugoslavia, a period when SOC's political and social influence was significantly muted.<sup>32</sup> Surveys of religiosity in 1960, 1965, and 1968 carried out by the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade showed that the greatest number of those who declared themselves to be religious, despite the general trends of decline of religiosity, were Catholics and Muslims. In a 1970 homily, Patriarch Germanus lamented: "Our own statistics show that only an insignificant part of Orthodox population welcomes the priest to their homes, reads religious publications, and actively participates in church life."<sup>33</sup> Srđan Vrcan's survey from the 1980s reveals that 62,3 percent of all of his respondents, having identified themselves as Roman Catholics, declared themselves to be personally religious and 31,4 percent were not religious. At the same time 43 percent of all respondents who identified themselves as Moslems declared themselves religious, and 45,3 percent as nonreligious. Only 26.2 percent of all respondents, having identified themselves as Orthodox believers by religious affiliation, considered themselves religious, and 64 percent not so.<sup>34</sup>

However, the SOC was far from inactive during communism. The SOC structures and clergy coalesced with nationalist intellectuals in the quest for the mythmaking and homogenization of the Serbs, which contributed to the revival of institutional Orthodoxy among the Serbs upon the fall of communism. The SOC knew that the best way to attract its nominal followers that went astray from the doctrine was to employ reminders of past suffering should any political crisis in communism occur. Therefore, the SOC was aware that, as its historian Kašanin argued in 1969 at the occasion of 750<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the SOC autocephaly: religious revival in Serbia would be induced through a revival of ethnic and historical consciousness.<sup>35</sup>

Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, the industry of hatred run by the nationalist political parties in former Yugoslav republics paved the way for the shift in identification from a politically unifying, laicist regime towards

a *re-churching* of politics. This 'return' to the roots (Serbian: *povratak korenima*) simultaneously produced a qualitative change in worldviews of many Serbs, who had, since the end of World War II, either shown little interest in the SOC and/or Orthodoxy or officially disguised their real religious and cultural orientation. In the early 1990s, a significant number of people who never went to church during Communism got baptized, religious wedding ceremonies (almost inexistent in Communism) became very popular and church attendance increased.<sup>36</sup> These represent increases in participation in rituals – decisions which reflect personal identification (like the fact that more than 90% of the Serbs label themselves Orthodox) but in fact say little about the doctrinal strength of the SOC or the influence of Orthodoxy in the practice of the SOC. The question here is, actually: to what extent does Orthodox Christianity shape the worldviews and decisions of the followers of the SOC? No comprehensive exploration of this issue has, to date, been conducted. More general research, however, suggests that most of the SOC followers observe so-called *folk* Orthodoxy (*narodno pravoslavlje*), a phenomena that has more to do with folk customs and traditions than with the Christian doctrine. Furthermore, many people label themselves Orthodox because of the SOC's historical role as a strong ethnic identity marker, a *differentia specifica* distinguishing Serbs from other cognate South Slavic groups. This specificity makes it possible for one to label her/himself Orthodox without actually observing any Christian doctrinal requirement (*culturally Orthodox*).<sup>37</sup>

Serbian sociologist of religion Mirko Blagojević claims that, after the fall of Communism, religion gained more significance in the lives of Serbs both on the level of cultural religiosity as well as on the levels of religious consciousness and ritual practice. That said, Blagojević argues that conventional (doctrinal) religiosity is the weakest link in the Orthodox revival in Serbia.<sup>38</sup> The research findings of Dragoljub Đorđević, another sociologist of religion, also suggest that the vast majority of Serbs who label themselves as Christian Orthodox have little doctrinal knowledge about Orthodoxy, and that most of the rituals practiced by Orthodox Serbs are reduced to repetitive customs, without much thought about their meaning.<sup>39</sup> The work in the early 1990s of anthropologist Dušan Bandić explores *folk Orthodoxy* among the inhabitants of 30 villages throughout Serbia and comes to the conclusion that the vast majority of them knew very little not only about the Christian doctrine, but also had a very little knowledge and understanding of Serbian national myths.<sup>40</sup> Examining these realities, anthropologist Ivica Todorović has produced a

three-fold classification of Orthodox religiosity among the Serbs in Serbia. His approach delineates religious practices that intersect in the Serbian religious context and identifies them as within: *theological-ecclesiastical model* (regular attendance of church services, doctrinal awareness), *folk Orthodoxy model* (occasional attendance of church services, vague knowledge of the doctrine, Orthodoxy understood as an ethnic identity trait), and/or *alternative model* (influenced by non-Christian ideas, philosophies, lifestyles and spiritual orientations). All three models exist in correlation with each other, and at times they separate from each other, drawing a 'clear line' of demarcation between each other.<sup>41</sup>

There are many ways people observe Orthodox Christianity, and doctrinal *zealotry* differs from parish to parish, and diocese to diocese. The revival of nationalist Orthodoxy in the early 1990s was accompanied by a revival of spiritual doctrinal Orthodoxy, especially among the relatively young population (at the time younger than forty). As theological awareness in observing the Christian doctrine became more prevalent, some of these new or returning believers took an active role in educating themselves in Orthodoxy through books and SOC lectures and religious tourism and worked to develop trans-local networks of believers with strong ties with the clergy (especially monastic clergy) and Serbian monasteries. This resurgence of theological-ecclesiastical Orthodoxy in Serbia, therefore, brought about a somewhat novel theological consciousness among lay Serbs. Even though I find Todorović's classification useful, it does need to be reformulated and broadened. I would here propose that no model of practicing Orthodoxy in Serbia stands just for itself, but that it rather stands in relation or negotiation with other models or ways of being Orthodox. Having this in mind I see four ways of practicing or performing Orthodox self-understanding: folk orthodoxy (*narodno pravoslavlje* in the understanding of Dušan Bandić), popular orthodoxy (*popularno pravoslavlje*), doctrinal orthodoxy (*doktrinarno pravoslavlje*), and political orthodoxy (*političko pravoslavlje*).

Folk orthodoxy I see as a collective memory of belonging to Orthodoxy not only in ecclesiastical terms but also in terms of performing ethnic culture built upon Orthodox consciousness as a *differentia specifica* of Serbness. Folk Orthodoxy has to do with folk customs practiced by Serbs which are seen as genuinely Serb in their 'nature', i.e. as something which defines Us as Serbs. Popular orthodoxy is a public performance of Orthodoxy as a *differentia specifica* of Serbness by public personalities be they politicians, turbo folk stars, theater personalities, writers, journalists, athletes, etc. We see

the popularization of the 'way we do things' in mediatized church weddings, references to religion made by public personalities, publicized visits to churches and monasteries paid by politicians, media personalities making confessions about their religious experiences, etc. Doctrinal orthodoxy refers to lifestyles (beliefs and practices) of theologically informed and observing members of the Serbian Orthodox Church who embrace Orthodoxy as an eschatological identity first and foremost, and to whom ethnic belonging does not necessarily play an important role in their self-understanding. Doctrinally Orthodox people constitute a minority in the Serbian society. As of the end of the 1980s, the SOC and homogenizing discourses on Orthodoxy as a differentia specifica have been used in politics, and have served the purpose of narratives about both Serb historical alterity from neighboring groups and about Serb revival and the need for regaining their strength as a nation and of their statehood. Belonging to Orthodoxy has had many manifestations in politics, some of which have had to do with mere political performatives for the sake of political gains at elections (politicians attending church ceremonies, or political parties introducing the practice of celebrating patron saints of the party, etc.). Those performatives need to be distinguished from what I call political orthodoxy.

In sum, state-incentivized *laïcité* after WWII made a significant number of Serbs detach themselves from the SOC. After the revival of nationalism and national Orthodoxy in the 1980s and 1990s, a "return to our roots" came in significant numbers as many people again began to at least nominally affiliate themselves with the SOC. Nevertheless, non-theologically informed habits, i.e. habits we would nowadays call 'secular' worldviews and practices inherited from the ancestors who lived before communism, many researchers suggest, remain strong, meaning that only a minority of the faithful took a theological position in their beliefs. On the other hand, an imagined community of Serbness with Eastern Orthodoxy as a social identity came to the fore again upon the fall of communism, and has been getting stronger ever since.

## Secularist Interventions

Secularist politics and actions to put forward strategies aiming at organizing the state in such a way in which religious doctrine would not have a say have a long history among the Serbs. Historically, political systems in what is now Serbia exhibited somewhat cesaaropapist



tendencies, from the Middle Ages all the way up until the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Orthodox Church has usually been the weaker entity in the distribution of political power, often suffering direct meddling of state authorities into ecclesiastical matters. For example, it was only after World War II that the Serbian Orthodox Church could elect its patriarchs free of official state intervention (even though there are records that say that the communist regime paid close attention to SOC internal affairs and did interfere in church politics).<sup>42</sup> When it comes to the question of the doctrinal standing of the SOC among Serbs, it can be said, with some reservations, that at least from early 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, Eastern Orthodox doctrine and eschatological narratives have not been as strong as the role of the idea of belonging to Orthodoxy as a collective ethnic identity component. As I discussed in the previous pages, the specific position of the Church in the Ottoman Empire, its minoritarian position in the Habsburg Empire, uneducated citizenry and relatively poorly educated clergy, disenabled doctrinal education of the most of the Serbs, which did contribute to the planting of the seeds of secularity, or at least the de-churching of the everyday life of the Serb people.

As for secularism as a political style of thought in its modern sense, ideas of emancipation from religious doctrines in public affairs came to the territories inhabited by the Serbs relatively early. In the early 19<sup>th</sup> century Dositej Obradović (+1811), an Orthodox monk, man of letters, and the first minister of education for the Serbs, brought ideas of the Enlightenment to Serbia, and advocated education free of religious doctrine. The ideas of Obradović would prove to be the source of controversies over the role of the Church in Serbian society throughout much of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. His ideas did, however, prevail in the establishment and organization of the Serbian education system, which acquired a secular outlook.<sup>43</sup> Half a century after Obradović's death, the first socialist ideas were introduced to Serbia by Svetozar Marković, who was influenced by Nikolay Chernyshevsky. Those ideas had strong anti-clerical leanings, and were embraced by a certain number of intellectuals in Serbia at the time, though they did not make their way into mainstream politics. Vasa Pelagić was another socialist utopist activist from the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century whose ideas were anti-clerical.<sup>44</sup> At the turn of centuries (19<sup>th</sup>/20<sup>th</sup>) the socialist, anti-nationalist and anti-clerical ideas of Dimitrije Tucović would prove to be the avant-guard for communist activism between the two great wars, as well as after the Communists ascended to power at the end of WWII.<sup>45</sup>

These types of anti-clericalism and its secularist strategies of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century were practiced by political and social forces inspired by the transformative politics of socialist and anarchist internationalist movements for the liberation of the working class (and peasants), and for the elimination of oppressive modes of production and governance. In mainstream politics there were politicians and political parties that were inclined towards political secularity. At the end of WWI the multiethnic state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later named Yugoslavia) did not establish a state religious institution, which opened room for the laicization of political life. Finally, after WWII the communist politics of placing religion outside the public sphere, and even suppressing any sort of visible public activities of religious institutions, advanced secularism as a not to be questioned societal norm.

The fall of communism and the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, as I discussed above, opened up space for the return of religion into the public sphere (*identitarian Orthodoxy*), which paved the way for the reintroduction of the discussion on political secularism. However, in these renewed discussions about religion and secularism the notion of *the West* acquired a more prominent role. Just as identitarian Orthodoxy has come to represent Serbia's difference from *the West* within nationalist and far right discourses, secularism has come to represent a developmentalist linear *Western* orientated style of thought that posits imagined *West* as a model non modern societies should aspire to. The issue here is not the legitimacy of the critique of the role of the SOC structures in maintaining nationalist homogenization of the Serbs, its production and sustenance of discourses that build walls between the Serbs and their neighboring ethnic groups, the SOC institutional homophobia, and their readiness to forget Christian vows of forgiving and not judging others when, for example, the gay community is in question. The issue is the mode of representation of the SOC in the eyes and discourses of those who claim to be on the avant-garde of modernization, but who in turn are not able to see the strength of hegemony of the notion of the *West* in the discourses they themselves create.

In such discourses, as Talal Asad argued, secularism is believed to bring about transcendence of societal particularities;<sup>46</sup> it is seen as an epistemological tool for judging the stage of development of the society by the intellectual elite, certain politicians, and much of the pro-Western NGO scene. Identitarian positions of those who care about religion and ethnicity are seen as pre-modern and backward, whereas identitarian positions not linked to any particular ethnic/national/linguistic community

and cosmopolitan ways of life are seen as advanced forms of life. What we have here are political formations of modernist subjectivities that cast away 'backward' forms of social organization for the sake of joining the community of the so-called developed and leaving behind the mud of the previous Balkanized existence overwhelmed with false consciousness.

Such politics of imagining Serbia in developmentalist terms incarnates the views that religiosity among the faithful belongs to the past, and that it should have been outgrown for the sake of modernization, a position that is based on an assumption i.e. the idea of a modernity project. State imposed communist secularization is often valued that at times it resembles nostalgic myths that speak of the times when the SOC was not a public figure; those days are imagined as hey days of secularist social ethos, while the religious comeback is seen as flight from modernity, a step back into the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and corruption of mind that exclusively paved the way to grave war atrocities and human rights violations in the former Yugoslav territories. The SOC is seen as an unreformed institution of the past, which maintains outdated religious practices, and does not keep pace with the modern world. The question here, again, is not if such views are accurate or not since it would difficult to argue against the view that the SOC did take part in the nationalist homogenization of Serbs in the late 1980s to the present day. The question is what mode of alternative representation those views create, and to what extent those views create a hegemonic discourse of power that aims at winning the souls of the citizenry. It would take a long time to analyze the logic of developmentalist discourse in the Serbian secularist arena (academic and socio-political, i.e. NGO activist scene and so called public intellectuals interventions). One could just do a brief analysis of textual and speech interventions of activists from NGOs/ independent cultural institutions such as Civic Initiatives, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, the Center for Cultural Decontamination, or media such as E-novine, Republika, Pešcanik, or look at the activities of a number of Serbian public intellectuals, to see that the subtext of their critique of Orthodoxy both as an institutional and as a political doctrine as well as a kind of collective identity of many contemporary Serbs goes beyond mere criticism of nationalist exclusivity and often slips into exclusivist normativity, which aims at creating desired, abstract secular subjects who either do not subscribe to any eschatological narrative or keep those deeply inside their private lives.<sup>47</sup>

Here I will just briefly enlist a few of the most extreme cases of the secularist developmentalist views on the role of the SOC in Serbian Society:

- In 2007, nine NGOs, one magazine, and one political party publicized their “Manifest on Secularism” as a response to a problematic and discriminatory Law on Churches and Religious Communities. The Manifest read that “the awareness that a secular society is a legacy of the modern age that reaffirms secular values as a necessary precondition of maintaining and strengthening a democratic order based on respect for human rights”. The Manifest warned “the public that losing the secular character of the state entails serious consequences on peace, democracy, and human rights, especially women’s rights”.<sup>48</sup>
- The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia sponsored the publication of an analysis entitled: *What the Serbian Church should (not) be consulted about*. This thorough examination of the SOC’s politics of permeating the political sphere and taking part in shaping the worldviews of the population did not manage not to fall into a trap of representing secularism (dubbed a strict absence of religious narratives and religious institutions for the political sphere) as the cure for the alleged clericalization of society. In the introduction of the analysis the authors ask a rhetorical question: “If Serbia wishes to join the EU, is the SOC or any other community allowed to promote anti-European discourse, thereby causing rifts and confusion among its faithful, the citizens of the country”?<sup>49</sup>
- The Anti-Fascist Action, an NGO from Serbia, published the *Critique of the Clericalization of Serbia*. One of the authors in this publication stated that: “Because dehumanisation is one of the most important results of the degenerative influence church has on humans: by preaching a characteristic type as an ideal each believer should aim for, the Church plays its ideological role and thus realizes its function in a class society. Namely, by preaching the mentioned ideals to its believers, the Church practically directs its followers towards one passive-homosexual direction characterized by masochistic attitude and passivity, as the types of behavior that make up the mass-structural basis not only of Christianity but of any other patriarchal religion.....one can observe exceptional similarity between the Orthodox believers and their practice on the one hand and persons with a diagnosis of obsessive neurosis on the other”<sup>50</sup>
- In a discussion chaired by representatives of the Pešćanik independent radio show, Biljana Stojković, a biologist, stated that: „Religion is totalitarian. A state that goes down a totalitarian

road automatically gets into a coalition with religion...There is a correlation between the democracy level and diminishing of cognitive ability. Why? Because democracy is based on a rational model of human agency... I do not want to say that religious people are stupid.... But they are less intelligent in an academic sense."<sup>51</sup>

- Vesna Pešić, a politician and considered by some to be a public intellectual, once stated that: „Serbia is dominated by a very backward church, which is the Serbian Orthodox Church. This Church has not said anything new in 600 years. We need to strengthen atheism in our society simply because the dominant church is so conservative that it does not allow us to breathe.”<sup>52</sup>
- Atheists of Serbia, an association of citizens, wrote an official letter to the Basketball Union of Serbia, expressing their protest against religious performatives of young basketball players at sporting events (making the sign of the cross, raising a hand with three fingers stretched). The Atheists of Serbia called upon the constitutional definition of Serbia as a secular state in their outcry against, as they put it, the “Orthodoxization” of sports.<sup>53</sup>

The abovementioned Manifest on Secularism aimed at defending secular values without really defining what those values stand for in their own understanding. Furthermore, the Manifest failed to argue for a better understanding of the idea that the failure of societal secularity would jeopardize democratic order, and failed to explain how and why women's rights would be endangered. The Manifest, with all its good intentions, appeared to be a political pamphlet from those who believe they know the formula for successful democracy in which secularism stands as an indispensable and singular legitimate public policy and societal worldview. In a similar tone, the publication sponsored by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights defines not only what the SOC should not be consulted about, but also claims that the SOC should not be allowed to speak against the EU, which is clearly a censorship politics proposed by an organization tasked with the protection of human rights. In a radio show produced by journalists who claim that they wish to see Serbia become an open society, free of discrimination, a scientist brings a view that people believing in God are less intelligent. We see an anti-fascist organization claiming that the faithful dwell in this life in the position of passive homosexuals, which is a comparison that ridicules the lifestyle of those who were once persecuted by the fascist. We also witness a prominent Serbian politician expressing publicly her idea of the need to spread atheism; having in mind

that she is a politician it does appear concerning what strategies she might employ to make people become non-believers. An atheist organization in Serbia urges a sports association to teach their athletes not to express their identities at sporting events, whereas it is ok to write a public letter in which one openly comes out as an atheist. As I said above these are the most extreme cases; however they have remained uncontested by those who represent themselves as *progressive* pro-open society activists. What we see is an incarnation of a habitus of mutuality dwelled by those who see themselves on the opposite from the majority who employ secularism in developmentalist terms with the aim of advancing Serbia's journey towards modernity. These *progressivists* produce narratives of belonging to the 'world' of *Druga Srbija*, as alternative space of those who contest what they see as social backwardness of *Prva Srbija*. In those narratives the notion of *the West* for the most part plays the role of a major socio-political as well as cultural reference.

## Concluding Remarks

As I discussed above, contemporary controversies and political discussions in Serbia related to the meddling of the SOC into Serbian politics revolve around the binary *modern-traditional* divide, which uses the imagined and essentialist *West* as a reference in the creation of "pro-modern" or "pro-tradition" discourses, thereby simultaneously creating both *Us* and *Them*, *the True Serbs* and *the Serb Westerners*, i.e. the *progressivist* and the *traditionalists*. *The West* stands as an indispensable entity and cultural norm in social ontologies of *modern-tradition* divide. In the case of *progressivists*, desired social ontology is imagined as *secular* in the 'Western' terms. On the other hand, however, it seems that, apart from the SOC itself, *traditionalists* do not constitute opposition to secularism per se, and that anti-secularism does not fare high on their agenda, if at all (i.e. anti-secularism is not a political ideal of *traditionalists*, nor do they, apart from a few far right organizations, aspire to question constitutional *laïcité* in Serbia). That said notwithstanding, certain *traditionalists* do pave the way to the SOC's challenging of constitutional *laïcité* and societal secularity. Even a brief analysis of political involvement of the SOC would indicate that the SOC does aspire to influence political structures, and does use its "moral authority" to advance its position in society. The opposition to such tendencies comes out through secularist discourses that call for the

*modernization* of society and the state in Serbia for the sake of integration into the realm of the developed societies and states.

Having the aforementioned insights and specific Serbian experience into account I aver that:

- a) In Serbia secularism and *identitarian Orthodoxy* are styles of thought and ideologies that are to be distinguished from quotidian secularity/religiosity;
- b) Secularity/ (*volk*) religiosity in Serbia are products of the development of a specific (different from 'Western') historical *volk* - (pseudo) – ecclesiastical 'consciousness' and state incentivized constitutional and public outward political *laïcité* that took place after WWII, and which finalized the de-churching of religious practices of much of the Serbs;
- c) Current secularism/identitarian Orthodoxy are discursively shaped political paradigms that in the Serbian case serve as ideological strategies employed with an aim to put forward identity politics to be employed for the creation of desired subjectivities.

The image and resonance of the SOC comes out of a hegemonic regime of self-representation that aims at homogenizing the worldviews of 'ethnically conscious' Serbs. Likewise, secularism promoted by *progressivists* in Serbia stems from a regime of power in which the powerful are able to validate and impose their own definitions of normality, and draw boundaries aiming at excluding others.

Definitions of normality such regimes of power incarnate put to the fore a defense of privilege either directly or through the operation of codes, or through the norms and rules that may appeal to universalism.<sup>54</sup> These norms in exclusivist versions of secularist/identitarian Orthodoxy discourses bring about oppositional, antagonistic social ontologies of mutually exclusionary *ways of being* which designate "various quotidian acts through which people live their lives" as well as *ways of belonging*, which represent "the realm of cultural representation, ideology, and identity through which people reach out to distant lands or persons through memory, nostalgia, and imagination".<sup>55</sup> The notion of the *West* (memorabilia, nostalgia, and imaginations pertaining to it) operates as a 'distant entity' in both sets of oppositional discourses presented in this paper: either positively, i.e. by remembering imagined times when we were close to it, when we were just like it (or by expressing a wish to get close to it); or negatively, i.e. by recalling the imagined times when we were independent of it, or superior to it.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> I thank New Europe College, Bucharest for hosting and sponsoring this research. I am also grateful to the Harriman Institute, Columbia University and CREES of the University of Kansas for hosting my research stays in New York City and Lawrence respectively.
- <sup>2</sup> On October the 5<sup>th</sup>, 2000 after mass-demonstrations throughout Serbia, the regime changed, and Serbia, as it is often iterated in political science scholarly works, took a path towards democracy. After the defeat of the old regime, Serbian political scene opened up a space for different political options which did exist when Milošević and his Socialist Party were in power, but their ideological foundations were not as clearly visible due to the authoritarianism of the regime (the control of the media). Moreover, diverse ideological foundations and political worldviews of the Milošević many opponents were at the time when Milošević was in power in a way put aside, meaning that the regime's opponents coalesced despite internal differences just for the sake of toppling down the power of the Socialist Party. Once Milošević was out of the picture, ideological and differences in political aspirations crawled out, disclosing that open multicultural society and pluralist democracy were not necessarily ideals of certain political actors who claimed that their dream was to see Serbia become a democratic country recovered from opportunist quasi socialism and from the remnants of authoritarian communism. The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) stepped up on the political scene, supported by and supporting certain political actors and political options championed both by those who are in power as well as by those in opposition. Even though Milošević's regime tried and at times succeeded to manipulate with institutional Orthodoxy for the sake of political gains, the SOC did not see the Socialist Party as a true guardian of the Serb national identity, but engaged in an anti-Milošević activism through pulpit sermons of low and mid-profile priests, and through the flirt with Milošević's opponents who had a strong identification with the Serb national heritage, and were socially conservative. Nowadays it seems that, apart from openly anti-clerical Liberal Democrats and ethnic minority parties, almost all major politicians and their parties cautiously act in way which would not offend the SOC. Moreover, it also seems that the politicians in power count on institutional Orthodoxy and the individual representative of the clergy by providing them with concessions in access to political power and in goods (financial support, in kind donations, advancing the visibility of the SOC's doctrinal agenda etc.).
- <sup>3</sup> Performative here refers to the social performance of the Self, which is "interactional in nature and involving symbolic forms and live bodies, provides a way to constitute meaning and to affirm individual and cultural values". See more at: STERN, C.S, and HENDERSON, B, *Performance Texts and Contexts*, New York, NY and London, 1993, 3.



- 4 ASAD, T, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2003; MAHMOOD, S, *Politics of Piety*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004; ROY, O, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, Hurst and Company, London, 2004; SAID, E, *Orientalism*, Vintage, New York, 1979.
- 5 Habitus: "Structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them". See at: BOURDIEU, P, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977.
- 6 Imagined community: "The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion". See at: ANDERSON, B, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London, 1991.
- 7 CASANOVA, J, *Secular Imagineries: Introduction*, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 21, No. 1/4, 2008; VOAS, D. and DOEBLER S, *Secularization in Europe: Religious Change between and within Birth Cohorts*, Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe 4 (1), 2011.
- 8 KOSMIN, B, and KEYSAR, A (Eds), *Secularism and Secularity: Contemporary International Perspectives*, Hartford, Institute for Study Secularism in Society and Culture, 2007.
- 9 BENHABIB, S, *The Return of Political Theology: The Scarf Affair in Comparative Constitutional Perspective in France, Germany, and Turkey*, Philosophy Social Criticism, 36:451, 2010 . 458.
- 10 ROY, O, *Secularism Confronts Islam*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2009, p. 7-8.
- 11 Secularity is an important object of analysis in influential works of normative political theorists, and stands for the most part as an indispensable factor in rational deliberation on the common good. For example, Habermas avers that "the constitutional state must not only act neutrally towards worldviews but it must rest on normative foundations which can be justified neutrally towards worldviews - and that means in post-metaphysical [that is, secular] terms". In cases in which citizens use religious narratives in the public sphere they need to "accept that the potential truth contents of religious utterances must be translated into a generally accessible language before they can find their way into the agendas of parliaments, courts, or administrative bodies". See more at: HABERMAS, J, *"The political": The rational meaning of a questionable inheritance of political theology*, In: *The power of religion in the public sphere*, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 15-33.
- 12 MAHMOOD, S, op.cit. p. 65.

- 13 In post WWII Yugoslavia secularism was perceived and taken for granted as an epistemological category for scientific socialism and as a politics around which state identity politics revolved. With an aim of creating a common social identity and a supra-ethnic communist ethos new state rulers after the WWII proclaimed God dead, and pursued a politics of secular development towards a society of equals. For that reason the socialist state established institutional *laïcité* and provided incentives and designed policies for the purpose of sewing secularism into the social fabric of the society to serve as grounds for the novel ethos of a socialist future.
- 14 PEROVIĆ, L, *Srpski socijalisti 19. veka: Prilog istoriji socijalističke misli*, Službeni glasnik SRJ, 1995.
- 15 RADIĆ, R, *Verska elita i modernizacija-teškoće pronalaženja odgovora*, In: *Srbija u modernizacijskim procesima 19. i 20. Veka*: Uloga elita, Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Belgrade, 2003, p.153-191.
- 16 See: FALINA, M, *Pyrric Victory: East Orthodox Christianity, Politics and Serbian Nationalism in the Interwar Period*. A dissertation in history submitted to and accepted by the Central European University in Budapest, 2011; For contemporary situation see: BUCHENAU, K, *Orthodox Values and Modern Necessities: Serbian Orthodox Clergy and Laypeople on Democracy, Human Rights, Transition and Globalization*, In: *Civic and Uncivic Values: Serbia in the Post-Milošević Era*, CEU Press, 2011.
- 17 TAYLOR, C, *A Secular Age*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2007.
- 18 KOSMIN, B, op.cit. p.1.
- 19 ČALIĆ, M. Ž, *Socijalna istorija Srbije 1815-1941*, Clio, Belgrade, 2004.
- 20 COLEMAN, J, *The Secular: A Sociological View*, 1990, p. 18.
- 21 MARX, A, *Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.
- 22 LANE, J.E. and ERRSON S, *Politics and Society in Western Europe*, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 1999.
- 23 BRUBAKER, R, *Religion and nationalism: Four Approaches*, In: *Nations and Nationalism* 18/1, 2012, p. 2-20.
- 24 Serbia is a small, economically developing country in Southeast Europe, struggling to become part of the European Union, while carrying a huge luggage of problems related to its relatively recent past (communism, dictatorship and the war in the 1990s, the loss of a part of territory-Kosovo), and symbolically divided around the issues of the past, present and future. In the beginning 1990s Serbia as a society swam out of a supranational federation, frustrated for not being able to maintain control over the Yugoslav federation, economically and politically shattered, engaged in wars against populations of its neighboring countries, trapped in narratives of historical victimhood, and ruled by an authoritarian opportunist nationalist who tried to pass of as a socialist (regime run by Slobodan Milošević). Destruction of old social capital together with insecurity of learnt cultural solution to

- social dilemmas has paved the way to the quest for new solutions within a changing setting of power. In this quest for new solidarities people may turn to radical solution to their problems.
- 25 KUNOVICH, R, *An exploration of the salience of Christianity for national identity in Europe*, Sociological Perspectives 49.4, 2006.
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<[http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/tema\\_sedmice\\_vjeronauka\\_u\\_skolama\\_srbija/24208039.html](http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/tema_sedmice_vjeronauka_u_skolama_srbija/24208039.html)>  
< <http://www.sekularizam.org/fundamentalizam-i-rodni-poredak.html>>  
< <http://www.e-novine.com/drustvo/87511-Pravoslavlje-kou.html>>  
< <http://www.republika.co.rs/444-445/20.html>>  
48 See at: < <http://pescanik.net/2007/10/manifest-o-sekularizmu/>>  
49 See at: < <http://pescanik.net/2005/07/o-cemu-crkva-nemoze-da-se-pita/>>  
50 See at: < <http://www.csi-platforma.org/sites/csi-platforma.org/files/publikacije/kritika-klerikalizacije-srbije.pdf>>  
51 See at: < <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BVTRQ2BofjY>>

- <sup>52</sup> See at: < <http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/272939/Vesna-Pesic-SPC-je-retrogradna-treba-da-pojacamo-ateizam-u-drustvu>>
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# DESCARTES' SOLITUDE THESIS: A NEGLECTED ASPECT OF THE CARTESIAN METHODOLOGY

## Abstract

Recent research has defended the surprising thesis that in many cases the search for truth is better off if the information exchanged between the members of an epistemic community is limited. This is what one may call the limited information thesis. There is, however, the possibility of an even more radical position than this: the thesis that any communication between peers has zero epistemic value and that the search for truth is better off if the truth-inquirer does not take into consideration the truth-claims of her peers. This can be called the solitude thesis. The paper defends the claim that Descartes is a supporter of the solitude thesis with respect to metaphysical inquiry. The defense is facilitated by means of interpreting textual evidence found in Descartes' essays *Discourse on the Method*, *The Search for Truth* and the *Meditations on First Philosophy*.

**Keywords:** solitude, Descartes, metaphysics, truth, the Other, learning, teaching, method

## 1. The Problem

Recent research in economic theory, social epistemology and philosophy of science has defended the surprising thesis that in many cases the search for truth is better off if the information exchanged between the members of an epistemic community is limited.<sup>1</sup> This is what one may call *the limited information thesis*. The thesis is 'surprising' because the currently dominant view in epistemic communities is that the more information about a relevant subject matter one receives from one's peers, the better one's chances of epistemic success are. As concerns the community of scientists in particular, the dominant view is clearly manifested in the common practice of scientific journals to demand that the authors should take into serious consideration the ideas of their peers and ignorance of 'what is going on in the literature' is considered a vice.

Despite their unorthodox position, however, the supporters of the limited information thesis do not take the full step of rejecting epistemic communication altogether. *Some* communication between peers is needed if the search for truth is to be realized. Taking that full step would make one a supporter of what may be called *the solitude thesis*. This thesis states that any communication between peers has zero epistemic value and that the search for truth is better off if the truth-inquirer does *not* take into serious consideration the ideas of her peers.

The present paper argues that Descartes is, in at least some of his writings, a fervent supporter of a version of the solitude thesis. In particular, the claim is that there is significant textual evidence in the Descartes corpus that he believed that as concerns *metaphysical* inquiry the quest for truth is better off if the one who produces metaphysical theory does not take into serious consideration the ideas of other metaphysicians. By the term ‘metaphysics’ Descartes understands the *a priori* inquiry into the fundamental determinations of being, what one may call ‘fundamental reality’. The metaphysician who produces metaphysical theory will be called *metaphysician-projector*, so as to distinguish her from the *metaphysician-receiver*, who is the metaphysician who takes into serious consideration a metaphysical theory or metaphysical ideas proposed by another metaphysician (the Other). Of course, the metaphysician-projector *can* be also metaphysician-receiver; but for the supporter of the solitude thesis the metaphysician-projector would be better off epistemically if she were *not* also metaphysician-receiver.

Descartes’ support for the solitude thesis has never been allowed to take central stage in Cartesian scholarship. Such great Descartes scholars as Cottingham, Kemp-Smith, Williams, Curley, Gaukroger and Wilson emphasize the philosopher’s intellectual struggle to avoid reference to authority and reach knowledge undogmatically, but they never emphasize (or even mention) that according to Descartes this entails that the inquirer into metaphysical truth should *never* take into serious consideration any truth-claims coming from her peers and that she can discover the whole metaphysical truth *all by herself*.<sup>2</sup> In fact, despite thorough research on the issue, I have not been able to discover even a single article that discusses Descartes as a supporter of the solitude thesis.<sup>3</sup> This in itself is curious enough to justify an investigation into the matter.

The aim, then, of the paper is to substantiate the claim that Descartes is, in at least some of his writings, a supporter of the solitude thesis. The injunction ‘in at least some of his writings’ clarifies that the evidence

looked for is *local*, not global. The distinction between local and global textual evidence is made with respect to the evidence found in the work of an author. Whereas local evidence is the one provided by a *part* of the whole work, global evidence is the one provided by the *whole* work. The local textual evidence for substantiating the claim in question will be found in Descartes' *Discourse on the Method* (hereafter 'DM'), *The Search for Truth* (hereafter 'ST') and the *Meditations on First Philosophy* (hereafter 'MFP'), all of which cover a period of writing between 1635 and 1641.

Descartes' method does not apply only to metaphysical knowledge; it is envisioned to pervade also the fields of empirical and mathematical knowledge. There is a general methodological structure that repeats itself in each of these cognitive fields. Although the question of the identity of the method across disciplines is fascinating, what is more important for our purposes is the fact that Descartes *distinguishes* metaphysical from empirical and mathematical knowledge. It is quite evident from certain passages found in the works we have proposed to investigate that Descartes' *scientia* has a part that corresponds solely to metaphysics.<sup>4</sup> Even though mathematical and part of empirical knowledge can have foundational roles in the system of all knowledge,<sup>5</sup> it is metaphysical knowledge that is considered the ultimate foundation of such a system.<sup>6</sup> While mathematical and empirical knowledge cannot have validity unless being grounded on metaphysical knowledge,<sup>7</sup> the latter grounds itself. Metaphysics, which Descartes sometimes calls simply 'philosophy',<sup>8</sup> has as its subject matter concepts deriving directly from rational thought (reason, *ratio*), such as 'thought' and 'existence', transcendent objects, such as God and the soul and, as ST reveals, universal determinations of the fundamental structure of *all* objects in general ("[the determinations of] all the things in the world, *considering them as they are in themselves*"<sup>9</sup>), such as extension, space and motion.

The present paper is interested *only* in substantiating the claim that Descartes is a supporter of the solitude thesis with respect to inquiry in *metaphysics* – that he cancels out the epistemic contribution of the Other in the context of such an inquiry. Of course, the question whether his support of the solitude thesis stretches to cover also the fields of empirical and mathematical knowledge is vastly important: what exactly is, according to Descartes, the epistemic role of the Other in an inquiry in mathematics or physical science? Despite its significance, the question will not be discussed in this paper. Suffice it to say that there are two passages in DM where Descartes undoubtedly *denies* the truth of the

solitude thesis regarding that part of *scientia* which requires elaborate empirical observation and conduct of experiments.<sup>10</sup>

## **2. Discourse on the Method**

Descartes' *Discourse on the Method*, first published in 1637, but being written over the winter of 1635-36, contains one of the most powerful expositions of the solitude thesis in the history of philosophy. DM functions as an introduction to the Cartesian system of *all* knowledge and aims at specifying the basic, most general attributes of the proposed method. As already pointed out, the method has a general core that runs through all cognitive disciplines, but has also features that are peculiar to each discipline. In this section we will discuss Descartes' presentation of his method in DM *insofar as it applies to metaphysical knowledge*.

The basis of his argument is the belief that the discovery of metaphysical truth, as well as of any other truth,<sup>11</sup> is purely a matter of method – it is not a matter of 'special powers' possessed by certain individuals. Each and every metaphysician is able to disclose metaphysical truth as long as she or he follows the right method,<sup>12</sup> since "reason [...] exists whole and complete in each of us."<sup>13</sup> Descartes, then, is anxious to establish from the outset an 'equality' among the members of the community of metaphysicians: they all have the same and an equal amount of cognitive power (reason) and what will distinguish the one from the other is whether or not one follows the right method.

Descartes next moves on to comment on the speed of metaphysical inquiry; as he puts it, "those who proceed but *very slowly* can make much greater progress [...] than those who hurry [...]."<sup>14</sup> It is evident from the context that the progress he is referring to is 'progress in knowledge', i.e. epistemic progress. He also mentions that it is essential requirement for succeeding in acquiring "knowledge of truth"<sup>15</sup> that the metaphysician "increase[s] [his] knowledge *gradually* and raise[s] it *little by little* to the highest point."<sup>16</sup> These two epistemic attributes, slow pace and gradual development, play a key role in the arguments of the supporters of the limited information thesis. Kevin Zollman, for example, has argued that a truth-inquirer who proceeds with slow pace and develops her inquiry gradually has higher positive probability to achieve epistemic success *if the information she receives from her peers is decreased* than if this information is increased.<sup>17</sup> This is why Zollman advises not only that truth-inquirers

must be given sufficiently long time to work on their projects, but also that “when we want accuracy [i.e. the truth] above all else, we should prefer [epistemic] communities made up of more isolated individuals.”<sup>18</sup> The crucial question, for us, is this: Does Descartes hold a similar view with respect to metaphysical inquiry?

In order to answer this question we must turn our attention to an attribute of the Cartesian method that is peculiar to metaphysical inquiry. This, together with ‘the Cogito’, is the attribute Descartes’ metaphysical part of *scientia* is most famous for: the quest for metaphysical truth should *begin* with the act of leaving aside – that is to say, the act of no longer taking into serious consideration – *any metaphysical truth-claim whatsoever*. The reason for this, Descartes explains in a Pyrrhonian fashion,<sup>19</sup> is that there was not even a single idea he *received from other metaphysicians* which was not a matter of dispute.<sup>20</sup> All the process of receiving metaphysical ideas has offered him hitherto is that he “came to think [that he] had gained nothing from [his] attempts to become educated but increasing recognition of [his] ignorance”<sup>21</sup> and that “there was no knowledge in the world such as [he] had previously been led to hope for.”<sup>22</sup> Due to this ‘universal doubt’, Cartesian metaphysics begins with a retreat to the *solitary* self – this is not a self who is *unable* to communicate with others (solipsism), a brain-in-a-vat, but rather a self that *chooses* to isolate herself in order to increase her chances of epistemic success in the realm of metaphysics. The isolation of the self has here the specific meaning of an act of (a) removing the value of truth from each and every truth-claim contained in the metaphysician’s mind and (b) terminating the influx of truth-claims proposed by other metaphysicians into that mind. Thus, to the question we raised earlier the following preliminary response must be given: Descartes takes a much more radical stance than Zollman concerning the connection between slow pace and gradual development, on the one hand, and the transmission of information between peers, on the other, for he maintains that such a slow pace and gradual development must *begin* from a state of affairs in which *all* receptivity of information has vanished (whereas Zollman demands only that the received information be *limited*).

Nevertheless, this does not *yet* entail that metaphysical practice<sup>23</sup> will be forever shut to information coming from other metaphysicians – hence the preliminary character of the response above. Indeed, there is still the possibility that it begins from a non-receptive state of affairs and then reaches a stage at which the reception of truth-claims from other metaphysicians is allowed to be reintroduced. As noted, Descartes’ idea

of *empirical* inquiry (namely that inquiry which is based upon empirical observations and experiments) seems to permit an empirical scientist's receiving ideas from other empirical scientists. Metaphysics provides the ultimate ground of the sciences,<sup>24</sup> but there where metaphysics ends the empirical scientist is allowed to start communicating with her peers and taking into serious consideration their ideas and empirical findings.<sup>25</sup>

But what holds for the empirical part of *scientia* does not hold for its metaphysical part. The metaphysician-projector should develop her metaphysical theory from beginning to end without at any stage incorporating truth-claims from other metaphysicians. For Descartes, not only the beginning, but also the development and completion of the metaphysical theory must take place in a context of absolute epistemic solitude (in the specific sense of one's *not* taking into serious consideration the truth-claims of other metaphysicians). He writes that the metaphysician must "direct his thoughts in an *orderly* manner, by beginning with the simplest and most easily known objects in order to ascend little by little, step by step, to knowledge of the most complex [...]."<sup>26</sup> This 'orderly' construction denotes a *necessary interconnection* between each stage in the development and the one that follows it,<sup>27</sup> as it happens in "those long chains" of geometrical reasoning.<sup>28</sup> For Descartes, the necessity of a metaphysical content has its ground on the fact that its generation is owed *solely* to the metaphysician-projector's 'clear and distinct' reflection upon the metaphysical content that precedes it.<sup>29</sup> Like Hegel, Descartes believed that *all* metaphysical content must emerge in an orderly fashion from the thinking of the *solitary* self.<sup>30</sup> In the remainder of the present section I provide textual evidence in support of this particular claim (the claim, namely, that the Other makes absolutely no contribution to metaphysical inquiry).

On what grounds does Descartes maintain that the metaphysician-projector is able to generate a complete and true metaphysical content based solely upon her own thoughts, without receiving any information from other metaphysicians? The justification of this claim rests upon three fundamental beliefs: first, that in principle each and every metaphysician's mind contains the same complete rational powers as any other;<sup>31</sup> second, that the whole truth about a 'rational' subject matter is fixed and expressible (as Descartes puts it, "since there is only one truth concerning any [rational] subject-matter, whoever discovers this truth knows as much about it as can be known"<sup>32</sup>); and third that the orderly, systematic application of complete rational powers upon a 'rational' subject matter can disclose the whole truth about that subject matter.



The systematic significance of epistemic solitude for the Cartesian system of metaphysical knowledge explains Descartes' immensely strong language when he describes the beginnings of his own metaphysical practice. He informs us that he broke free "from the control of [his] teachers" and "*entirely* abandoned the study of letters."<sup>33</sup> Recalling his thoughts before he began his metaphysical quest, he tells us that he resolved "to seek no knowledge other than that which could be found in [himself] or else in the great book of the world;"<sup>34</sup> given what he has already told us, it should not surprise us that he does *not* here refer to any 'knowledge found in or received from others'. He emphatically stresses that the revolution in his thinking came when he isolated himself in "quarters where, finding *no conversation* to divert [him] [...], [he] stayed all day shut up *alone* in a stove-heated room, where [he] was completely free *to converse with [himself] about [his] own thoughts*."<sup>35</sup> And when he refers to the moment when he finally decides to write down his metaphysics, he stresses his "resolve to move away from any place where [he] might have acquaintances [...] [and] lead a life *as solitary and withdrawn as if [he] were in the most remote desert*."<sup>36</sup> I think it cannot be denied that the significance of solitude, of the absence of communication with other metaphysicians could not be conveyed more emphatically.

But maybe one would object at this juncture that the autobiographical character of the above extracts does not permit their function as theoretical support for the solitude thesis. This, of course, is true, but given that they describe the conditions under which Descartes began formulating a theory he himself believed to be epistemically successful, they most certainly give out his hostile sentiments about the epistemic value of the communication with other metaphysicians. Additionally, they help the reader vouch for the solitude thesis when they are combined with the purely theoretical remarks that follow, most of which specify reasons why allowing the ideas of others to influence you is epistemically harmful in the domain of metaphysics.

To begin with, consider the following remark:

[...] There is not [...] so much perfection in works composed of several parts and produced by various different craftsmen as in the works of one man.<sup>37</sup>

This passage expresses the view that (a) the involvement of more than one person (or, if you will, the involvement of the ideas of *others*) in the creation of a work and/or (b) mixing up various external elements to create

a work *reduces the amount of perfection* one could find in it. Descartes supports this view by reference to various paradigmatic examples, some of which are particularly interesting: He tells us that “buildings undertaken by a single architect are usually *more attractive and better planned* than those which several have tried to patch up by adapting old walls built for different purposes;”<sup>38</sup> that “ancient cities which have gradually grown from mere villages into large towns are usually *ill-proportioned*, compared with those orderly towns which planners lay out as they fancy on level ground;”<sup>39</sup> and that “if Sparta was at one time very flourishing, this was not because each of its laws in particular was good [...], but because they were devised by a single man and hence *all tended to the same end*.”<sup>40</sup> All these examples show, according to Descartes, “how difficult it is to make something perfect by working [...] on what others have produced.”<sup>41</sup> He then carries the analogy from ‘craftsmanship’ to metaphysical practice, providing thereby justification for the solitude thesis:

[...] Since the [metaphysical] science contained in books [...] is compounded and amassed little by little from the opinions of many different persons, it never comes so close to *the truth* as the simple reasoning which a man of good sense naturally makes [...].<sup>42</sup>

He repeats a similar view a few lines farther:

[...] A majority vote is worthless as a proof of truths that are at all difficult to discover [such as the metaphysical truths]; for a single man is much more likely to hit upon them than a group of people.<sup>43</sup>

The general idea here is that allowing the ideas of other metaphysicians to influence the construction of a metaphysical theory decreases the perfection of that theory: this can only mean that it decreases its chances of epistemic success. Descartes is quite explicit: a metaphysical theory that takes into serious consideration the ideas of others “never comes so close to the truth” as the metaphysical theory that develops properly from the thought of a single metaphysician (and the ‘proper’ character of the method entails, as the examples make quite clear, that the metaphysician begins from a single idea, not from a multiplicity of ideas). The involvement of the ideas of others has a distorting or disorienting function, as it takes metaphysical thought out of its course by bringing into it a variety of ends and a plethora of unnecessary complications and difficulties. This variety of

ends and complications do not spring from the same source and, therefore, do not have that unity that is so essential for developing an epistemically successful metaphysical theory. Thus, the solitude of the inquirer is preferable because it increases the perfection of the constructed theory, unifies it into a single purpose, and reduces the amount of unnecessary and irrelevant complications in it.

Descartes ends his supportive remarks on the solitude thesis in DM by considering the objection that the debates among metaphysicians help the metaphysician-projector sharpen the details of her position and correct her mistakes:

It may be claimed that such controversies [between peers] would be useful. Not only would they make me aware of my mistakes, but also they would enable others to have a better understanding of anything worthwhile that I may have discovered; and, *as many people are able to see more than one alone*, so these others might begin to make use of my discoveries and help me with theirs.<sup>44</sup>

This is an objection most contemporary philosophers would be sympathetic to; in fact, I would insist that it comprises the essence of our modern conception of scientific practice. Surely, they would argue, engaging in dialogue with our peers would make us aware of our mistakes and help us and others understand our theory in a better way. The development of a theory, the search for truth, requires group effort (i.e. the involvement of the ideas of *many*) in order to lead to epistemic success.

It is, though, more than evident from what Descartes has already told us and from what follows the above cited extract that the thesis that “many people are able to see more than one alone” may be a thesis espoused by his contemporaries but certainly not by Descartes himself (at least as regards metaphysical practice).<sup>45</sup> Indeed, in what follows the passage Descartes expresses his belief that the communication with others has *absolutely no epistemic value* in the domain of metaphysics:

[...] My acquaintance with the objections that may be raised prevents me from expecting any benefit from them. For I have already had frequent experience of the judgments [of others]. But it has rarely happened that an objection has been raised which I had not wholly foreseen, except when it was quite wide of the mark. Thus I have almost never encountered a critic of my views who did not seem to be either less rigorous or less impartial

than myself. *Nor have I ever observed that any previously unknown truth has been discovered by means of the disputations practiced in the schools.*<sup>46</sup>

Any objection raised by other metaphysicians, any ‘critical’ observation made by them does not offer anything substantial to the search for truth, so Descartes, as long as, of course, the inquirer follows the right method. Any contribution by the Other is, we would say, *superfluous*, since the Cartesian metaphysician can reach and express metaphysical truth all by herself. Moreover, it is not only that the communication with others is of no help with the search for metaphysical truth – it is also that it is *disruptive* of and *harmful* to this search:

[...] As for the observations that others have already made, even if they are willing to communicate them to [the metaphysician-projector] [...], they are for the most part bound up with so many details or superfluous ingredients that it would be very hard for him to make out the truth in them.<sup>47</sup>

And he concludes with the following two astonishing passages, a crystal-clear affirmation of the solitude thesis:

I think I can say without vanity that if anyone is capable of making [...] additions [to my metaphysics] it must be myself rather than someone else – not that there may not be many minds in the world incomparably better than mine, but because no one can conceive something so well, and make it his own, when he learns it from someone else as when he discovers it himself. This is especially true in the case under consideration [i.e. metaphysics].<sup>48</sup>

In short, if there was ever a task which could not be accomplished so well by someone other than the person who began it, it is the one on which I am working [i.e. metaphysics].<sup>49</sup>

Given the above discussion and cited passages, I think the reader would find it extremely difficult not to agree that DM offers undisputed textual evidence for the claim that Descartes is a supporter of the solitude thesis. He certainly holds that the community of metaphysicians is better off epistemically if a metaphysician who produces metaphysical theory (a metaphysician-projector) does not take into serious consideration the ideas of other metaphysicians. The reasons for this are not discussed in much

detail in DM and have a rather simplistic form, but are nevertheless stated quite explicitly: Descartes believes that the reception of ideas from other metaphysicians is both *harmful* and *superfluous* to the metaphysician-projector's effort to produce an epistemically successful metaphysical theory. It is harmful because it distorts and disorients the development of the metaphysical theory, it destroys its unity and simplicity; it is superfluous because the proper application of the right method enables the solitary self to generate a complete and true metaphysical theory. These may not be compelling reasons for the *truth of the solitude thesis*; the present essay, however, is not concerned with this issue – it is concerned only with the truth of the claim that *Descartes is a supporter of the solitude thesis*.

### 3. *The Search for Truth*

DM is not the only work of Descartes in which we find explicit support for the solitude thesis. In *The Search for Truth*, an incomplete essay in a dialogue form published posthumously, but being written most probably in 1641, Descartes not only confirms what he wrote in DM, but also provides important new material in support of the solitude thesis. The protagonists are Epistemon, Polyander and Eudoxus – the latter is the mouthpiece for Descartes' own views.<sup>50</sup>

The essay has a short introduction, in which Descartes gives out hints for his support of the solitude thesis. He begins with a theme familiar from DM – he claims that “a good man is not required to have read every book or diligently mastered everything in the Schools;”<sup>51</sup> in fact, he continues, “it would be a kind of defect in his education if he had spent too much time on book-learning.”<sup>52</sup> The use of one's reason suffices for one being a ‘good man’.<sup>53</sup> Although Descartes here refers specifically to the subject of practical, not theoretical, reason, it soon becomes clear that what he says about the ‘good man’ holds (even more) for the metaphysician (the inquirer into metaphysical truth) as well: the use of one's reason suffices for acquiring complete knowledge of metaphysical truth. It is thus important to keep in mind that for Descartes the value of learning, the value of reading and studying the works of others is limited to learning certain concepts' meaning, the clarification in the receiver's mind of what the various words and linguistic symbols mean. Learning (to wit, *receiving* ideas from *others*) does not have the epistemic significance of the learner's receiving true propositions. Only one's own reason (what Descartes calls ‘the natural light’<sup>54</sup>) can determine the truth-value of truth-claims.

Even this kind of learning from others (learning the meaning of certain concepts) is underplayed by Descartes. He later notes that the inquirer can arrive at the truth only if she knows the meaning of such terms as 'existence', 'doubt' and 'thought'.<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, neither is this a knowledge we gain exclusively from our peers nor need we follow any 'scientific' method in order to arrive at it.<sup>56</sup> As metaphysical truth can be *fully* expressed by using terms that have everyday use, any 'moderate intelligence' has already known the meaning of *all* the required terms (but not the truth of the propositions that contain them). If one tries to define these terms 'scientifically' (to wit, in terms of 'the Porphyry tree'), one will make them obscure and thereby unusable.<sup>57</sup> The terms used in a complete and true metaphysical theory "are very simple and clear" and because of that "they are perceived and known just on their own, and there is no better way of knowing and perceiving them."<sup>58</sup>

In the second paragraph of the introduction Descartes is even more explicit in his support of the solitude thesis:

I shall bring to light the true riches of the soul, opening up to each of us the means whereby we can find within ourselves, *without any help from anyone else*, all the knowledge we may need for the conduct of life, and the means of using it in order to acquire *all the most abstruse items of knowledge that human reason is capable of possessing*.<sup>59</sup>

Two things should be noted here. First, Descartes moves beyond the context of ethics and refers to metaphysical inquiry: He tells us that the essay we are discussing will clarify not only the search for acquiring "the knowledge we may need for the conduct of life," but also the search for acquiring "all the most abstruse items of knowledge that human reason is capable of possessing." The latter phrase undoubtedly signifies the contents of metaphysics. Second, Descartes could not really be more straightforward about the value of the reception of others' truth-claims in both of these inquiries: Each of us, if she follows the right method,<sup>60</sup> can find within herself the truth *without any help from anyone else*. This demand for solitude, then, holds not only for the discovery of how to be a 'good man' but also for the discovery of fundamental reality (metaphysical truth).

If you recall, in DM Descartes referred to the necessary interconnection between items of metaphysical knowledge as a reason why the ideas of others are superfluous in the process of metaphysical inquiry. Since each of us is in principle fully equipped with rational powers, the application

of the right method will inevitably lead the inquirer to metaphysical truth. But this is itself possible precisely because the elements that are known, the fundamental constituents of reality, are interconnected “by a marvelous bond.”<sup>61</sup> In the third paragraph of the introduction Descartes repeats this idea:

[...] I must tell you that what I am undertaking is not so difficult as one might imagine. For the items of knowledge that lie within reach of the human mind are all linked together by a bond so marvelous, and can be derived from each other by means of inferences so necessary, that their discovery does not require much skill or intelligence – provided we begin with the simplest and know how to move stage by stage to the most sublime.<sup>62</sup>

Beginning with the simplest, then, and applying the right (Cartesian) method should lead the inquirer to the acquisition of metaphysical truth, precisely because the “items of knowledge,” the elements that become known through this method are in themselves inferentially linked. So, Descartes’ statement that the success of metaphysical inquiry is not owed to one’s ‘special’ intelligence or skills should not come as a surprise, even though it does conflict with our contemporary view of inquiry in general: If the elements of fundamental reality are inferentially interconnected and if the proper application of the rational powers *that in principle each of us has* can indeed disclose the full scope of this interconnected reality, then each and every metaphysician (namely each and every human being that is interested in having knowledge of fundamental reality) should be able to discover metaphysical truth. A certain modesty, humbleness and anti-elitism, then, underlies the Cartesian conception of metaphysical inquiry and Descartes himself appears as a true precursor of the Enlightenment. At the same time, however, this conception goes against our bedrock belief that all inquiry is collective inquiry.

It is in this context that we should understand Descartes’ relation to his readers. He is not teaching metaphysical truth to them; they are not learning the truth from him. He is only describing what he has come to know through the application of the right method and each of his readers must reapply this method in the domain of his or her own case.<sup>63</sup> Even the fact that he has come to know the right method does not mean that he is more intelligent than any of his peers, that he has greater rational powers and skills: Indeed, he was the one who discovered this method and not the others, simply because he “accidentally stumbled upon [it].”<sup>64</sup>

In DM Descartes observed that the (standard) procedure<sup>65</sup> of collecting the insights of various researchers in numerous massive volumes does not have cognitive value and should not be considered an essential part of metaphysical inquiry. He repeats the same here. This procedure, he tells us, is a risky one, as the result cannot be but a “mingle” of truths and falsehoods “scattered haphazardly through such a pile of massive tomes.”<sup>66</sup> We are expected, Descartes continues, to navigate our way to knowledge by “picking out” the truths from such massive collections of ‘collective’ inquiry.<sup>67</sup> But, he immediately adds, this is a nonsensical thing to do, since, at least in the domain of metaphysics, we can discover the whole truth purely on our own. This, in fact, would be much more economical in terms of time spent and intelligence exercised, as well as more effective in terms of actually acquiring “knowledge of truth.” The solitary search for truth offers both a more effective and “an easier path.”<sup>68</sup> It is this persistent belief in the superiority of epistemic solitude that allows him to express a statement that does not ring well to our contemporary ears: “I do *not* wish to consider what *others* have known or not known.”<sup>69</sup>

I have now established that in the introduction to ST Descartes takes a strong stance in favour of the solitude thesis. This support continues in the dialogue that follows. In fact, the dialogue begins with the exact theme of the epistemic value of learning from others. Polyander, who “has never studied at all”<sup>70</sup> because his parents believed that “the pursuit of learning enfeebls the spirit,”<sup>71</sup> is presented as someone who is eager to receive knowledge from Epistemon (and later from Eudoxus as well), who “has a detailed knowledge of everything that can be learned in the Schools.”<sup>72</sup> Eudoxus, by contrast, who is “a man of moderate intellect but possessing a judgment which is not corrupted by any false beliefs and a reason which retains all the purity of its nature,”<sup>73</sup> enters the scene disagreeing with his interlocutors about the value of learning from *others*: he believes that an “orderly soul” can discover “enough truth” from within herself “to satisfy amply [her] curiosity [for knowledge]”<sup>74</sup> and that in fact he himself “no longer feel[s] any passion to learn anything at all” because he is “happy with what little knowledge [he has].”<sup>75</sup> This “little” but “enough” “knowledge of truth” brings Eudoxus to the point of enjoying “the same tranquility as would a king if his country were [...] *isolated and cut off from others*.”<sup>76</sup> He himself, in fact, has acquired his knowledge when he “retire[d] to [a] remote place.”<sup>77</sup> Eudoxus, then, is a clear example of a supporter of the solitude thesis.



Epistemon takes up Eudoxus challenge and points out to him what he considers an indisputable fact – that “there are so many things to be known” and that no one can believe “that anyone ever knows so much that he cannot have good reasons to desire to know more.”<sup>78</sup> As it becomes apparent later, Eudoxus takes Epistemon’s response to imply that the process of knowledge-acquisition must involve the other inquirers as well because the amount of possible knowledge available to one is so huge that it is simply impossible for a human being, who is finite with regards both to her life span and her intellect, to arrive at it solely on her own. Eudoxus “readily grants that one man could not live long enough to acquire first-hand experience of everything in the world,”<sup>79</sup> and that therefore in this respect the discoveries of others should be allowed to play a role in this ‘never-ending’ process of learning. But he immediately adds that the knowledge he was referring to is not one which rests on experience (which indeed never stops providing us with new data), knowledge of “all the marvels of nature,”<sup>80</sup> but rather one founded purely on the rational powers of a ‘moderate intelligence’, as these are applied to “the ordinary facts” of reason.<sup>81</sup> Such knowledge exists both in the realm of ethics and in the realm of metaphysics (Polyander refers to such propositions “as those concerning the deity, the rational soul, the virtues and their rewards, etc.”<sup>82</sup> but Eudoxus adds that it is “about all the things in the world, *considering them as they are in themselves*”),<sup>83</sup> is finite in scope and thereby learnable within a life span, and provides the foundation for the possibility of ethical and scientific inquiry in general.<sup>84</sup>

In the remainder of the essay Eudoxus/Descartes proceeds to flesh out his philosophical program in the terms specified. It is a familiar one: it is quite the same as the one carried out in the *Meditations on First Philosophy* and Part I of the *Principles of Philosophy*. As the execution of this program will be the focus of the next section, let us brush it aside for the moment. What is important to note at this point is that throughout the whole discussion of the program *in ST* Descartes reminds us again and again of his support for the solitude thesis – his belief, that is, that the success of the inquiry does not require the involvement of the ideas of others, that the exchange of information with one’s peers has zero epistemic value.

He tells us, for example, that his method is one “which enables someone of average intelligence to discover *for himself* everything that the most subtle minds can devise”<sup>85</sup> and that “a man with a good mind, *even one brought up in a desert* and never illuminated by any light but the light of nature [i.e. reason], could not have opinions different from

[the one that follows the right method].”<sup>86</sup> This last extract is an obvious affirmation of the solitude thesis: a man brought up in a “desert” (a symbol of isolation, solitude, remoteness), without receiving information from other metaphysicians, can acquire complete knowledge of metaphysical truth. Even when Epistemon tries very hard to make Eudoxus admit the epistemic value of one’s peers, the latter will have none of it. When the former describes the intellect as “an excellent painter who is called upon to put the finishing touches to a bad picture” painted by others,<sup>87</sup> Eudoxus immediately objects:

[...] It seems to me that your painter would do far better to make a fresh start on the picture; rather than wasting time in correcting all the lines he finds on the canvas, he should wipe them off with a sponge.<sup>88</sup>

Descartes here repeats what he so powerfully expressed in DM, that the discovery of metaphysical truth requires absolutely no epistemic input from others. All metaphysical truth-claims contained in the mind of the metaphysician-projector must be ‘wiped off with a sponge’ at the beginning of her inquiry: the discovery of metaphysical truth requires a fresh start and a solitary (one is tempted to say ‘hermetic’) road.

That the establishment of the significance of the metaphysician-projector’s epistemic solitude is the real goal of the essay becomes especially apparent when it increasingly acquires a *Meno*-like character. As in Plato’s *Meno*, where an uneducated slave-boy arrives at sophisticated mathematical knowledge (allegedly) all by himself,<sup>89</sup> so here Eudoxus aspires to show Epistemon that Polyander, a simple, uneducated man, with no knowledge of philosophy or science, can arrive at proven knowledge of the fundamental structure of reality (metaphysical truth) all by himself, with absolutely no epistemic help from others. Eudoxus wraps the essence of the Cartesian attitude to metaphysical inquiry up when he tells Polyander that “all I need do [...] is to leave you to get on with the job on your own, after taking care to set you [methodologically] on your course. [...] All we need for discovering the truth on the most difficult issues [i.e. metaphysical issues] is, I think, common sense [i.e. the rational powers of a ‘moderate’ intelligence].”<sup>90</sup> Indeed, Eudoxus projects the (unknown to us) ending of the essay by telling us that Polyander will “suddenly and effortlessly end up a learned man” all by himself and without ever “studying or delving into the works of the philosophers.”<sup>91</sup> And the theoretical conclusion from this ‘performance’ is that “when this light [of reason] operates on its own, it is

less liable to go wrong than when it anxiously strives to follow the numerous different rules, the inventions of human ingenuity and idleness, which serve more to corrupt it than render it perfect."<sup>92</sup> The expression "the inventions of human ingenuity and idleness" signifies nothing but the truth-claims of *others*; thus, the inquirer into metaphysical truth is better off *without* them, as their involvement 'corrupts' rather than 'perfects' her inquiry.

#### **4. *Meditations on First Philosophy***

The two texts we have examined have provided us with affirmative evidence that Descartes is, in at least some of his writings, a supporter of the solitude thesis. Why, then, is there a need to consider a third text? This is so because the objection may be raised that what Descartes declares in theory fails to be materialized in the actual construction of his metaphysics. The claim, that is, is that even though Descartes believes that his metaphysical thought is independent of the ideas of others, his actual metaphysical inquiry shows signs of dependence. In order to respond to this objection one must take a close look at one of Descartes metaphysical works, these being the *Meditations on First Philosophy* (published in 1641) and the *Principles of Philosophy* (published in 1644). In this paper we focus (sketchily) on the first text, which is temporally more adjacent to the texts we have already examined than the second.

Firstly, it should be noted that the very beginning of Descartes' construction of his metaphysics – the very first 'meditation' – functions as an affirmation of the solitude thesis. He emphatically argues for the epistemic need to "demolish everything completely"<sup>93</sup> and thereby place himself in a situation of 'being alone'.<sup>94</sup> This 'loneliness' denotes the *epistemic* distanciation from both all beliefs and those who express them. What remains from this act of epistemic isolation is the pure I; the Other has vanished.

Secondly, the knowledge that initially emerges from the affirmation of the doubting I (the *cogito*) is not the result of an affection from the outside, precisely because the external world (including one's own body) is still in doubt. The determination of the I as a thinking thing and the proof of the existence and nature of God are the result of a priori deliberations. But the same holds for the fundamental universal determinations of all objects in general, such as 'existing', 'being something', 'being extended', 'being temporal', 'being a substance', 'having modes', etc.<sup>95</sup>, which impose their

necessity on the intellect of the inquirer.<sup>96</sup> It is made clear, then, that, for Descartes, metaphysical inquiry is intimately connected to epistemic solitude, in the sense that metaphysical knowledge progresses from the standpoint of the epistemically isolated I.

Thirdly, and more importantly, Descartes makes reference neither to the Other as a subject that epistemically influences *the I* nor to the Other as a peer of *him* (Descartes). It is evident that Descartes does not simply neglect or ignore the presence of the Other in his metaphysical inquiry; he rather *deliberately* refrains from giving the Other any role to play in the construction of his metaphysics. Whenever a difficulty appears in the rational deduction of the fundamental determinations, Descartes does not look for an idea coming from one of his peers, but rather looks back into his own mind ("I will converse with myself and scrutinize myself more deeply"<sup>97</sup>) and concentrates even more carefully than before ("if one concentrates carefully, all this is quite evident by the natural light"<sup>98</sup>).

Fourthly, it is not only that Descartes does not *refer* to the Other; it is also that, *judged from a neutral standpoint*, the Other makes absolutely no epistemic contribution to the argument of MFP. This holds for the Other conceived both as an epistemic subject and as a peer of Descartes. The latter develops an argument following faithfully the directives of DM and ST: the language he uses is simple and unsophisticated and every argumentative step follows directly from the one that precedes it. Nothing of what Descartes writes requires previous knowledge of any other philosopher in order to be *fully* understood.<sup>99</sup> Even the criterion he employs in order to establish the truth of metaphysical knowledge, namely clear and distinct perception (the 'natural light'), is evidently conceived in solely personal terms: a metaphysical idea is true if, and only if, it is perceived clearly and distinctly by *the* truth-inquirer, *not* by a *community* of truth-inquirers: "whatever *I* perceive very clearly and distinctly is true."<sup>100</sup> The I, with which the search for metaphysical truth began, never becomes a We. Given these features of Cartesian metaphysical inquiry, features that promote its absolute autonomy, one is intrigued to ask whether the Other *could* offer anything to such an inquiry. The answer seems to be a negative one.

## 5. Conclusion

The present essay has defended the claim that Descartes is a supporter of the solitude thesis. It has done so by providing and interpreting local

textual evidence in favour of the claim, taken from the *Discourse on the Method*, *The Search for Truth* and the *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Given that the presence of the solitude thesis in the Descartes corpus is not even acknowledged in Descartes scholarship, presenting and interpreting *textual* evidence in its favour is the first thing one should do. The solitude thesis is an extreme methodological position. It does not assert simply that the inquirer into metaphysical truth must be 'critical' of the truth-claims of her peers or that she must judge any such claim with her own 'reason'; it rather asserts much more radically (and, judging with our contemporary standards, counter-intuitively) that the metaphysician-projector should *never* take into serious consideration any of the truth-claims proposed by *other* metaphysicians.

Descartes' ground for so shockingly rejecting the epistemic value of the contributions of others in metaphysics is twofold. On the one hand, such contributions *harm* metaphysical inquiry by hindering the fulfilment of its task, the acquisition of metaphysical truth. This occurs because the epistemic reception of the others' truth-claims destroys the unity of the inquiry by incorporating a plethora of disparate (and often conflicting) ends and concepts into it. This has the immediate consequence that the inquirer (or a community of inquirers) literally loses herself in a forest of myriad conceptual distinctions and spends her whole life trying to find a way out – usually by patching some ideas up and dogmatically rejecting or accepting others. This, of course, reminds us of the situation which more often than not contemporary epistemic communities (in particular scientific and philosophical communities) find themselves in.

On the other hand, the reception of the ideas of others in metaphysics must be rejected because it is *superfluous*. Descartes insists again and again that an inquirer of 'moderate intelligence' can acquire complete knowledge of metaphysical truth all by herself (thus understanding this to be no "divine prerogative"<sup>101</sup>), as long as she follows the right method. This is possible because such knowledge has a finite interconnected structure that the 'rational powers' of even a non-learned man such as Polyander can inferentially discover. There is, of course, possible knowledge beyond the fundamental structure of reality, knowledge that is endless and contingent. One is obliged to listen to what the others have to say in such a case of possible knowledge (the knowledge of the empirical sciences). But as concerns metaphysical knowledge, knowledge of the fundamental structure of all things, a solitary road suffices (and is recommended) for "knowing everything in the universe."<sup>102</sup>

The only value Descartes ascribes to the ideas of others in the field of metaphysics is that they can illuminate the *meaning* of some of the terms used in metaphysical inquiry (especially those with which the inquiry begins), they can help the inquirer understand better what some concepts mean. But this is no privilege of one's *peers* – in fact, Descartes seems to believe that it is the everyday environment that initially generates and elucidates meanings in the metaphysician's mind. The meaning of the term 'existence', for example, is not known through the application of the Porphyrian tree, but simply by opening one's eyes and hearing people talking to one another. The 'standard' meaning of the basic metaphysical terms will simply appear in the metaphysician's mind through the process of everyday life.<sup>103</sup> This, however, does not entail that the reception of ideas from others has, strictly speaking, epistemic value, so Descartes; these ideas do not determine what is true and false in a metaphysical theory. Only the application of the right method and one's own reason can do that.<sup>104</sup> Moreover, as seen, the metaphysician is advised *not* to take into consideration the *truth-claims* of others when she searches for the truth.

The details of Descartes' support of the solitude thesis determine the process of *teaching and learning* in the domain of metaphysics. What should be taught is never a collection of metaphysical doctrines, which students are expected to 'choose' from. Learning metaphysics should never be a question of following one or another metaphysical theory. The sole subject matter of teaching must be the right method, and even this ought to be done in a descriptive mode. But Descartes is confident that the properness of his own method will become immediately apparent to the attentive student. As soon as the right method is accepted by the learner, she will soon find out that she is capable of acquiring complete knowledge of the fundamental structure of reality.

The exposition of Descartes' solitude thesis that the present paper has offered will cause unsettling thoughts to many of its readers. The motto 'many people are able to see more than one alone' represents a belief that has permeated our culture and is deeply entrenched in contemporary scientific and philosophical practice. Descartes' case shows that contrary to received opinion such a belief is not a *sine qua non*, a self-evident axiom. And if one succeeds in showing that other major philosophers have also been fervent supporters of the solitude thesis, one is allowed to speak of a thread in the history of Western philosophy that clearly and explicitly favors solitude in metaphysical inquiry.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See Bala and Goyal (1998: 597): “More information links can increase the probability that a[n] [epistemic] community gets locked into a suboptimal option;” Zollman (2011: 338): “In many cases a[n] [epistemic] community that withholds information from its members is more reliable than one that allows for fully informed individuals;” Zollman (2011: 342): “Communities made up of less-informed scientists might well be more reliable indicators of the truth than communities that are more connected;” Banerjee (1992: 798): “[...] Society may actually be better off by constraining some of the people to use only their own information;” Banerjee (1992: 811): “[...] The economy may be better off if the early decision makers are not allowed to observe the choices made by the other decision makers [...]. In other words, destroying information (in this limited sense), can be socially beneficial.” *All additions in brackets, justified by the original context, are mine; this applies to the whole paper.*
- <sup>2</sup> This holds for the following works: Cottingham (1986, 2008a, 2008b), Kemp-Smith (1953), Williams (1978), Curley (1978), Gaukroger (1980, 1989, 1995) and Wilson (1978).
- <sup>3</sup> This, of course, may be so because actually Descartes does not hold such a radical view as the solitude thesis; but it may be the case that no one has hitherto detected this fact. The present paper aspires to provide compelling local evidence in support of the latter possibility.
- <sup>4</sup> AT VI 31 / CSM I 126 (my emphasis): “I do not know whether I should tell you of the first meditations that I had there, for they are perhaps too *metaphysical* [...]” AT VI 38 / CSM I 130 (my emphasis): “[...] Although we have a moral certainty about these things, so that it seems we cannot doubt them without being extravagant, nevertheless when it is a question of *metaphysical* certainty, we cannot reasonably deny that there are adequate grounds for not being entirely sure about them.” See also AT VII 580 and AT VII 574 / CSM II 387 (my emphasis): “But as long as he merely attacked my views on physics or mathematics, I was not too concerned. But in his essay he undertakes to subvert the *metaphysical* principles by means of which I demonstrated the existence of God and the real distinction between the human soul and the body.” It is *only* with respect to metaphysics that Descartes’ method can be characterized as purely *a priori* – this characterization, in other words, does not apply to the method *in general*. When the method has as its subject matter empirical knowledge (e.g. the “nature of the magnet” [AT X 427]), empirical observations and experiments are elements of its structure. Even since the time of the *Regulae* (1619-1628) Descartes had allowed for “two ways of arriving at knowledge of things – through experience and through deduction” (AT X 365 / CSM I 12; see also AT X 368; cf. Hatfield (1988)). Thus, both Koyré (1939), who describes Descartes’ method as being purely

- a priori*, and Clarke (1982), who describes it as being fully empiricist, are off the mark; the Cartesian method, as Alves (2012) correctly points out, is flexible (in his words, ‘minimal’), being purely *a priori* only in metaphysics, which is only a *part* of *scientia*. Other scholars who, like Alves, have taken a *via media* on the issue of the character of Descartes’ method are Beck (1952), Buchdahl (1969), Garber (1978, 1988, 1998), Williams (1978) and even Gaugroger (1995: 14).
- 5 This variety of foundational knowledge has to do with the fact that for Descartes there are many kinds of *intuition* (*a priori*, mathematical and empirical), which is exactly the element that grounds each and every cognition; see AT X 374, 383.
- 6 AT VI 8-9, 21, 31. Cf. Garber (1998: 239) and Hatfield (1988: 250-251).
- 7 This is made clear in the First Meditation in MFP; see AT VII 17-23.
- 8 It should, however, be noted that the term ‘philosophy’ is sometimes identified, not with metaphysics, but rather with the whole of *scientia*.
- 9 AT X 504 / CSM II 404. As AT VI 43 makes clear, Descartes conceives of the fundamental determinations of reality as elements that have a presence in all possible worlds.
- 10 AT VI 63, 65.
- 11 AT VI 21 / CSM I 121: “[...] Since I did not restrict the method to any particular subject-matter, I hoped to apply it as usefully to the problems of the other sciences as I had to those of algebra.”
- 12 AT VI 2 / CSM I 111: “[...] The power of judging well and of distinguishing the true from the false – which is what we what we properly call ‘good sense’ or ‘reason’ – is naturally equal in all men, and consequently [...] the diversity of our opinions does not arise because some of us are more reasonable than others but solely because we direct our thoughts along different paths and do not attend to the same things. For it is not enough to have a good mind; the main thing is to apply it well.”
- 13 AT VI 2 / CSM I 112.
- 14 AT VI 2 / CSM I 111, my emphasis.
- 15 The term ‘knowledge of truth’ is Descartes’; see AT VI 27, 30, 67 and AT VII 597.
- 16 AT VI 3 / CSM I 112, my emphasis.
- 17 Zollman (2010) and Zollman (2011).
- 18 Zollman (2011: 348).
- 19 Cf. AT X 512, 519-520. For a systematic presentation of the Pyrrhonian problematic see Trisokkas (2012: 11-42) and Lammenranta (2008). For an evaluation of Descartes’ response to Pyrrhonian scepticism see Westphal (1987).
- 20 AT VI 8 / CSM I 114-115: “Regarding philosophy, I shall say only [that] [...] it has been cultivated for many centuries by the most excellent minds and



yet there is still no point in it which is not disputed and hence doubtful [...]. And, considering how many diverse opinions learned men may maintain on a single question – even though it is impossible for more than one to be true – I held as well-nigh false everything that was merely probable.” The retreat to the solitary self is also present in the *Meditations on First Philosophy* – there, however, the cause for it is located not so much in Descartes’ personal educational experience, but rather in the infamous ‘dreaming argument’ and ‘argument from the evil God’ (AT VII 17-23). It is important to note that independently of the cause of the retreat, such an act entails the termination of the self’s *receiving* truth-claims from other metaphysicians (at least at the beginning of the inquiry).

21 AT VI 4 / CSM I 113; see also AT X 516.

22 AT VI 5 / CSM I 113.

23 The term ‘metaphysical practice’ denotes simply the process of constructing a metaphysical theory (i.e. a theory about the fundamental determinations of being). Metaphysical practice is the activity of the metaphysician-projector.  
24 AT VI 8-9, 21.

25 See especially AT VI 63 / CSM I 143: “[...] By building upon the work of our predecessors and combining the lives and labours of many, we might make much greater progress [in the science or knowledge of nature] working together than anyone could make on his own.” See also AT VI 65 / CSM I 144: “[...] The advances I make in the knowledge of nature will depend henceforth on the opportunities I get to make more or fewer [...] observations. [...] This would oblige all who desire the general well-being of mankind [...] both to communicate to me the observations they have already made and to assist me in seeking those which remain to be made.”

26 AT VI 18 / CSM I 120, my emphasis.

27 This, according to Descartes himself, holds even for the first and the last stage: “[...] I take my reasonings to be so closely interconnected that just as the last are proved by the first, which are their causes, so the first are proved by the last, which are their effects” (AT VI 76 / CSM I 150). See also AT X 526-527 / CSM II 419-420: “[...] All truths follow logically from one another and are mutually interconnected;” and AT VII 577. This reminds us the well-known passage from Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (WdL I 70 / SL 71): “[...] The whole of science [Hegel here means ‘metaphysics’ (I.T.)] forms within itself a circle, wherein the first becomes the last and the last the first.”

28 AT VI 19 / CSM I 120. As Larivière (2009: 483) notes, this feature of the Cartesian method was in line with the tradition: “Descartes’s notion of science is as deductive as its traditional predecessor. [...] Indeed, the model in the *Discourse* is geometrical or mathematical demonstration: systematic deduction from primitively true propositions.”

- 29 AT VI 19; AT VI 20-21 / CSM I 121: "[...] beginning with the simplest and most general and using each truth I found as a rule for finding further truths [...]."
- 30 Cf. Houlgate (2006: 31): "The path of 'universal doubt' that leads into Hegel's science of logic is clearly very similar to that taken by Descartes. Hegel's conclusion, however, is not 'I think, therefore I am' but rather 'thinking, therefore *is*'. From this pure being of thought, Hegel believes, the necessary categories of thought have to be derived." See also Houlgate (2005: 30).
- 31 AT VI 2.
- 32 AT VI 21 / CSM I 121.
- 33 AT VI 9 / CSM I 115, my emphasis. See also AT VI 42 / CSM I 132: "[...] I wished to be free to say what I thought about [these matters] without having either to follow or to refute the accepted opinions of the learned."
- 34 AT VI 9 / CSM I 115.
- 35 AT VI 11 / CSM I 116, my emphasis.
- 36 AT VI 31 / CSM I 126, my emphasis.
- 37 AT VI 11 / CSM I 116.
- 38 AT VI 11 / CSM I 116; see also AT X 509 / CSM II 407.
- 39 AT VI 11 / CSM I 116.
- 40 AT VI 12 / CSM I 117.
- 41 AT VI 12 / CSM I 116.
- 42 AT VI 12 / CSM I 117, my emphasis.
- 43 AT VI 16 / CSM I 119.
- 44 AT VI 68 / CSM I 146, my emphasis.
- 45 Cf. AT VII 578-579.
- 46 AT VI 68-69 / CSM I 146 (my emphasis); see also AT VII 575 and AT VII 578 / CSM II 390 (my emphasis): "[...] Their hope is that the truth will be discovered, since most of them are convinced that it will eventually emerge out of all these debates and arguments. And *even if long experience has taught them that the truth is rarely discovered in this way*, their zeal for the truth is such that they think that even the smallest hope of discovering it should not be neglected."
- 47 AT VI 73 / CSM I 148.
- 48 AT VI 69 / CSM I 146.
- 49 AT VI 72 / CSM I 148.
- 50 CSM II 399.
- 51 AT X 495 / CSM II 400.
- 52 AT X 495 / CSM II 400.
- 53 AT X 495-496 / CSM II 400.
- 54 For an attempt to determine what Descartes precisely means with the term 'natural light' see the excellent paper by Morris (1973). Cf. AT VII 598 / CSM II 394: "[...] In philosophy I deal only with matters that are known

very clearly by natural reason [...];" and AT VII 38 / CSM II 27: "Whatever is revealed to me by the natural light [...] cannot in any way be open to doubt."

55 AT X 523-524.

56 AT X 523-524.

57 AT X 523-524; see also AT X 522 / CSM II 418: "There is no need here for a definition, which would confuse rather than clarify the issue."

58 AT X 523-524 / CSM II 417.

59 AT X 496 / CSM II 400.

60 AT X 497.

61 See the passage below.

62 AT X 496-497 / CSM II 400-401; see also AT VII 579 / CSM II 391: "What has perhaps helped me is that I have no great confidence in my own intelligence, and so I have followed only those paths that are easy and straightforward. It is hardly surprising that, by keeping to such simple routes, a person can make more progress than others of greatly superior intelligence, who follow rugged and impenetrable pathways."

63 See especially AT X 525 / CSM II 419: "It was never my intention to prescribe to anyone the method which he should follow in his search for truth, but simply to describe the method which I used myself: if it should be thought to be defective, it would be rejected; if good and useful, others would use it too." See also AT VI 4.

64 AT X 497 / CSM II 401.

65 See Brockliss (1995: 5): "[...] Early seventeenth-century professors of philosophy were [...] concerned first of all about the mechanics of organizing and relaying an authoritative body of knowledge." See the whole paper for further discussion.

66 AT X 497-498 / CSM II 401.

67 AT X 498 / CSM II 401.

68 AT X 498 / CSM II 401.

69 AT X 497 / CSM II 401.

70 AT X 499 / CSM II 401.

71 AT X 499 / CSM II 402.

72 AT X 499 / CSM II 401.

73 AT X 498 / CSM II 401.

74 AT X 500 / CSM II 401.

75 AT X 501 / CSM II 402.

76 AT X 501 / CSM II 402.

77 AT X 501 / CSM II 403.

78 AT X 500 / CSM II 402.

79 AT X 502 / CSM II 403.

80 AT X 503 / CSM II 404.

81 AT X 503 / CSM II 404.

82 AT X 504 / CSM II 404; see also AT X 510.

83 AT X 504 / CSM II 404; see also AT X 515 / CSM II 409: "[...] From this universal doubt, as from a fixed and immovable point, I propose to derive the knowledge of God, of yourself, and of everything in the universe."

84 AT X 503-504.

85 AT X 506 / CSM II 405.

86 AT X 506 / CSM II 405.

87 AT X 507-508 / CSM II 406.

88 AT X 508 / CSM II 406.

89 Plato, *Meno* 82a-86a. The 'slave-experiment' is Plato's proof of his claim that all mathematical and metaphysical knowledge is recollection. Descartes comes very close to Plato's view on AT VII 64 / MFP 44: "And the truth of these matters is so open and so much in harmony with my nature, that on first discovering them it seems that I am not so much learning something new as remembering what I knew before [...]."

90 AT X 518 / CSM II 412.

91 AT X 519 / CSM II 413.

92 AT X 521 / CSM II 415.

93 AT VII 17 / CSM II 12.

94 AT VII 18.

95 This is made particularly clear by the conclusion of 'the wax example'(AT VII 31 / CSM II 21): "I must therefore admit that the nature of this piece of wax is in no way revealed by my imagination, but is perceived by the mind alone. [...] The perception I have of it is a case not of vision or touch or imagination – nor has it ever been, despite previous appearances – but of purely mental scrutiny [...];" see also AT VII 34 / CSM II 22: "I now know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being understood [...]. For more items on the list see AT VII 43, 45, 65.

96 AT VII 67.

97 AT VII 34 / CSM II 24; see also AT VI 56 / CSM II 39: "Next, when I look more closely into myself [...]."

98 AT VII 47 / CSM II 32. See also: AT VII 42 / CSM II 29: "The longer and more carefully I examine these points, the more clearly and distinctly I recognize their truth;" AT VII 55 / CSM II 38: "As I reflect on these matters more attentively, [...];" AT VII 68 / CSM II 47: "Some of the things I clearly and distinctly perceive are obvious to everyone, while others are discovered only by those who look more closely and investigate more carefully [...]. On this process of personal reflection as a process of justification see the brilliant essay by Beyssade (2008).

- <sup>99</sup> Even the scholastic distinction between the objective and the formal reality of ideas, which Descartes makes use of in the Third Meditation, does not signal the presence of the Other; this is so because Descartes explains the distinction fully and simply and in the context of his current personal discussion ('meditation') alone. Moreover, Descartes explicitly declares that the distinction "is manifest by the natural light" (AT VII 40 / CSM II 28). In other words, a man of moderate intelligence could discover the distinction purely by himself, without heeding the words of an Other. The same holds for the other principles that Descartes employs in his argument, such as the principle that "something cannot arise from nothing" (AT VII 40 / CSM II 28) and the principle that "what is more perfect cannot arise from what is less perfect" (AT VII 40-41 / CSM II 28), both of which are "transparently true" (AT VII 41 / CSM II 28) and "clear to me by the natural light" (AT VII 42 / CSM II 29).
- <sup>100</sup> AT VII 35 / CSM II 24 (my emphasis); see also AT VII 70 / CSM II 48 (my emphasis): "[...] I am incapable of error in those cases where *my* understanding is transparently clear."
- <sup>101</sup> Glouberman (2011: 877).
- <sup>102</sup> AT X 515 / CSM II 409. It is sometimes the case that in his replies to his contemporaries' comments on his metaphysics or in his letters to prominent figures of his time Descartes explicitly asks for their critical opinion and advice – an attitude that does not square with the demands of the solitude thesis. Nevertheless, in all these cases the continuation of Descartes' prose makes it clear that he makes such a statement only out of courtesy. Take, for example, the *Letter to Father Dinet*. Descartes begins by making a statement that obviously undermines the solitude thesis (AT VII 564 / CSM II 384: "[...] My dearest wish is to test the certainty of my opinions by having them examined by distinguished men, in the hope that they will be unable to discover any element of falsity in them; and failing that, my next wish is to be advised of my mistakes so that I can put them right." But he then goes on to make claims that unambiguously contradict this statement. He tells us that his metaphysical arguments in DM "possessed incontrovertible certainty" (AT VII 575 / CSM II 388), that the publication of his philosophy signals the uncovering of truth (AT VII 575 / CSM II 388), that "although many people have [...] tried to refute [his writings] by every possible means, no one [...] has been able to find in them anything that is not true" (AT VII 579 / CSM II 391), that he proved that his metaphysical beliefs are true (AT VII 582 / CSM II 392), that it is clearly perceived that his metaphysical beliefs are true (AT VII 582 / CSM II 392) and, finally, that "if [he] were to be frank," he has no doubts about the truth of his metaphysics (AT VII 603 / CSM II 397).
- <sup>103</sup> Descartes believed that the basic concepts of metaphysics are "naturally implanted in the human mind" (AT VII 580 / CSM II 392), that they are

"innate" (AT VII 37 / MFP 26, AT VII 51 / MFP 35); cf. Voltaire (1733: 63): "[Descartes] maintained [...] that the soul comes into the body already endowed with all the metaphysical notions, knowing God, space, the infinite, having every abstract idea, in short full of learning, which it unfortunately forgets on leaving its mother's womb."

- <sup>104</sup> See AT VI 77 / CSM I 150: "I do not boast of being the first to discover [these ideas], but I do claim to have accepted them not because they have, or have not, been expressed by others, but solely because reason has convinced me of them."

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# THE BLACK SEA AND THE GREAT WAR, THE NAVAL FORCES AND OPERATIONS OF THE OTTOMAN AND RUSSIAN EMPIRES

## Abstract

When the Ottoman Empire entered into the ongoing Great War in Fall 1914, the Euxine Sea became a new theater of naval operations in WWI. The struggle between the Imperial Russian and Ottoman navies (this latter reinforced by the German Mediterranean Naval Division) was heated in the following years of WWI, with Bulgaria joining the Central Powers in 1915 and Romania siding with the Entente in 1916 albeit the former two empires and their naval forces remained as the principal actors of operations. Based on a multi-national documentation, this article aims to analyze, compare and assess the naval assets, capabilities and strategies of the Ottoman and Russian empires in the Black Sea in WWI.

**Keywords:** naval operations in the Black Sea in WWI; Imperial Russian Navy Black Sea Fleet, 1914-17; Ottoman Navy in the Great War; *Mittelmeerdivision*

## Imperial Ottoman Navy at the onset of WWI: An Introduction

During the long reign of 33 years of the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II, the Imperial Ottoman Navy, assumingly a formidable fighting force under his uncle, Sultan Abdülaziz, was badly neglected and consequently its ageing and shrinking war fleet was in poor state of combat power and readiness. The absolutist monarch, well-known for his suspicious nature and skepticism about the loyalty of the imperial armed forces, still remembered well the participation of the navy in the dethronement of his uncle in 1876 and kept in mind that his palace of Yıldız on the Bosphorus could be a perfect target for the guns of his very own navy in a next *coup* attempt. As long as Abdülhamid II ruled, that is between the years of 1876-1909, the Ottoman war fleet was almost constantly stationed in the Golden Horn with very low maintenance and battle readiness and ceased to be a significant instrument of power for the Sublime Porte. The short Greco-Ottoman War of 1897 was a manifestation of the poor condition

of the Sultan's navy, although the outcome of the war was decided on land rather than on the seas, and the conflict ended with an Ottoman victory. In the decade following this limited Balkan war, very few and modest warships were to join the navy of the Sultan, the protected cruisers *Hamidiye* and *Mecidiye*<sup>1</sup>, the first one built in Britain and the second in the USA and both commissioned in 1903; the small torpedo cruisers *Berk-i Satvet* and *Peyk-i Şevket* both built in Germany and commissioned in 1907 and four tiny destroyers of French *Durandal*-class commissioned in 1908.

Following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the dethronement of Abdülhamid II a year later, the new Young Turk cabinets, vocal supporters of the preservation of the Empire against Balkan nationalisms and Great Power encroachments, saw the need for the reform and the reinforcement of the war fleet.

On one hand, the foundation of the "Association for National Solidarity with the Ottoman Navy (*Donanma-i Osmani Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti*)"<sup>2</sup> in 1909 and fundraising campaigns were encouraged as a part of the new quest for a modern and powerful navy. This effort was followed up by the publication of a "Navy Review (*Donanma Mecmuası*)" in 1910.<sup>3</sup> Even the Sultan himself donated his allocation of a month from the imperial budget to the Navy Association. Considerable donations were rewarded with a medal (with the relief of a dreadnought battleship on one side and that of the seal of the Sultan on the other - "*Donanma İlane Madalyası*"). Fundraising activities of the Society went beyond the Ottoman borders, from Sudan to India, from Egypt to the Russian Transcaucasus, Crimea and even to Kazan,<sup>4</sup> rather successfully. Since the Ottoman Empire did not possess any modern warship-building capability, buying vessels from established naval powers, or, giving orders to major European or American shipyards were the only ways to procure warships. The Sublime Porte opted initially for the first strategy and, in 1910, two old Imperial German Navy sister ships, the *Brandenburg*-class pre-dreadnought battleships SMS *Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm* and SMS *Weißenburg*, both deemed obsolete by the *Kaiserliche Marine* and up for sale, were acquired from Germany<sup>5</sup>, accompanied by four modern and large torpedo boats. The old battleships were named respectively *Turgut Reis* and *Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha* (after the two 16<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman privateers and admirals of almost legendary status in the navy) and the four *Großes Torpedoboot 1906-class* torpedo boats were classified rather ambitiously as destroyers (*muhrib* in Ottoman Turkish) in the Sultan's fleet.

On the other hand, the new constitutional regime invited also a British “naval reform mission (*Islah Heyeti*)” to Istanbul in order to reform and to strengthen the long-neglected Ottoman navy. In early 1909, Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble arrived at the head of a British naval mission. However, his rather short stay at the Ottoman service was hampered by constant frictions with the Ottoman officials. He was against the Ottoman quest for modern capital warships such as dreadnought battleships or battlecruisers and advocated for the acquisition smaller ships, at maximum 10.000 tons of displacement. His training was also that of a basic level and he actually taught to the Ottoman naval officers and crews only “how to cruise properly”, no combat training, no formation maneuvers or gunnery practices were part of the practice and drills. After constant disagreement with the Ottoman naval and political authorities, he left Istanbul in January 1910 and was replaced by Admiral Williams arriving in May 1910.<sup>6</sup> Yet, this latter Royal Navy officer also had to leave after a short service of less than a year in January 1911, and was succeeded by Admiral Limpus at the head of the British Mission in early May 1912. However, British naval mission’s advices and “strategy” on having a coastal defense force, a fleet composed of smaller warships and not of the ships-of-the-line such as dreadnought battleships or battlecruisers, was to fail soon miserably against the Royal Italian and Hellenic navies in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Aegean Sea between 1911 and 1913.

At the beginning of the second decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman war fleet was still largely obsolete and poorly maintained and it failed to defend the Dodecanese against the Italian Navy during the War of Tripolitania in 1911 and 1912 and the rest of the eastern Aegean islands against the Hellenic Navy during the first Balkan War in 1912. The only tactical success of the Sultan’s navy in these wars was the brilliant commerce raiding (*guerre de course*) of the protected cruiser *Hamidiye* (setting arguably an example to the later campaigns of SMS *Emden* in WWI and to those of *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Bismarck* in WWII) against Greek shipping in the Aegean, in the Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean.

## **Pre-WWI Naval Armament Program of the Sublime Porte, the Ottoman Quest for Dreadnought Battleships**

Just prior to the Italian invasion of Libya and the outbreak of the Tripolitanian War in 1911, the Ottoman government decided to speed up the naval armament program and this time to procure also brand-new capital ships (unlike the old *Brandenburg*-class pre-dreadnoughts bought in 1910) through orders to major foreign shipyards. The most important orders were to be placed (one of them for a battleship already under construction), not surprisingly, to Vickers and Armstrong-Whitworth shipyards of Britain, the leading naval power of the age and an ally of the Ottoman Empire in the Eastern Mediterranean since the Crimean War (1853-1856).

The first dreadnought-type battleship order was placed to Vickers for an improved and enlarged version of the British *King George V*-class and subsequently a large man-of-war (to be named *Reşadiye*) was laid down in August 1911.<sup>7</sup> In December 1913, another large dreadnought battleship, the *Rio de Janeiro* already under construction by Armstrong-Whitworth in Newcastle upon Tyne, was bought by the Sublime Porte from the Brazilian government (due to be delivered by Armstrong-Whitworth in the summer of 1914).

The huge building and acquisition costs of the two juggernauts were a heavy burden for the already quasi-bankrupt Ottoman treasury during and after the Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars and they were partially paid for by public subscriptions in Istanbul<sup>8</sup> and in several provinces of Anatolia.<sup>9</sup> The imposing dreadnoughts were named after two Ottoman monarchs. The first battleship was named *Reşadiye* after the then reigning sultan, Mehmed V Reşad and the former *Rio de Janeiro* became *Sultan Osman-ı Evvel* (Sultan Osman I) after the founder of the Ottoman dynasty and state.<sup>10</sup>

The latter of these juggernauts was carrying a record number of 14 big guns of 305 mm on seven turrets accompanied by an impressive secondary armament of 20 pieces of 152 mm naval artillery making her arguably one of the most powerful warships in the pre-WWI world. The *Reşadiye* was an equally powerful and large battleship, similarly at almost 28.000 tons of displacement carrying fewer but even larger guns (ten main guns of 343 mm and 16 pieces of 152 mm) making her indeed one of the very first examples of “super-dreadnoughts”. A hand-picked Ottoman crew was sent to Britain to collect the two dreadnoughts in the summer of 1914 in the midst of the “Sarajevo Crisis” in continental Europe.

After several delays in delivering the ships to their Ottoman crews in July and receiving the vast majority of payment, the British Admiralty ordered in August 1914 the seizure of both dreadnoughts for the Royal Navy, “requisitioning” them in the words of the then First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill.<sup>11</sup> The *Sultan Osman-ı Evvel* was renamed HMS *Agincourt* and the *Reşadiye* HMS *Erin* and both were commissioned into service in the Royal Navy. Ottoman naval and diplomatic authorities, present in London, and, the Ottoman government in Istanbul protested, to no avail.<sup>12</sup>

The seizure of the two Ottoman dreadnought battleships by the British government in early August 1914, without any immediate financial compensation, and the subsequent irritation of the Ottoman decision-makers and the public as well as the impending arrival of the two German warships was just one factor among many helping the German efforts to form a functional military alliance (converting eventually the secret alliance treaty of August 2, 1914 into a working partnership<sup>13</sup>) and to make a common cause with the Sublime Porte in the ongoing and expanding European “Great War”, nonetheless a significant one.

**Table 1. Ottoman dreadnought battleships built and seized in Britain in 1914**

Dreadnought	Commissioned in	Displacement (t.)	Speed (kn)	Main Armament
<i>Sultan Osman I</i> (ex <i>Rio de Janeiro</i> ) / HMS <i>Agincourt</i>	1914 [Royal Navy]	28.300	22	14 x 305 mm; 20 x 152 mm
<i>Reşadiye</i> / HMS <i>Erin</i>	1914 [Royal Navy]	27.940	21	10 x 343 mm; 16 x 152 mm

## The Imperial Ottoman Navy in World War I

Due to the British seizure of the two Ottoman dreadnoughts in early August 1914, the Imperial Ottoman Navy possessed no modern capital ships at the time of the outbreak of the Great War in Europe. The war fleet had three old pre-dreadnought battleships – one of which was an obsolete former central-battery ironclad; two relatively more modern protected

cruisers; two small torpedo cruisers; eight relatively modern destroyers – all of which were of very modest tonnage; ten torpedo boats and 34 gunboats of different ages and sizes. The arsenal of this modest navy had also six armed yachts.<sup>14</sup> Among the armament of the old battleships, the main artillery of the obsolete British-built (former central-battery ironclad) battleship *Mesudiye* was still in Britain for repairs at the end of the summer of 1914,<sup>15</sup> with almost no prospects of delivery. While waiting for her principal armament to arrive (since the summer of 1913), barrels of the two main gun turrets were replaced in Istanbul, somewhat embarrassingly for the Ottoman sailors, by wooden dummy guns.<sup>16</sup>

However, this unimpressive naval force received an unexpected and highly welcome reinforcement less than two weeks after the British seizure. After their impressive escape from the French and British squadrons throughout the Western and Eastern Mediterranean, the mighty *Moltke*-class battlecruiser (*Schlachtkreuzer*) of 23,000 tons (armed with 10 pieces of 280 mm in five gun turrets) SMS *Goeben* and her escort, the *Magdeburg*-class light cruiser SMS *Breslau* of 4.550 tons – forming together the Mediterranean naval division (*Mittelmeerdivision*) of the Imperial German Navy since the Fall of 1912,<sup>17</sup> reached the Dardanelles and were given refuge in the Marmara Sea by the Ottoman authorities.<sup>18</sup> The two German warships officially joined the Ottoman navy with their new names, *Yavuz Sultan Selim* and *Midilli*, on August 16, 1914 after the declaration of purchase (through a bogus sale in order to appease Entente protests) by the Ottoman government.<sup>19</sup>

Despite the great joy of the Ottoman public, the addition of the two German cruisers (a battlecruiser and a light cruiser) to the Imperial Ottoman Navy was no substitution for the loss of the two dreadnought battleships seized by Britain (although the two former German vessels were now to be the most modern warships present in the Black Sea in the Fall of 1914). Indeed, the CUP leaders and the ministers of war and navy, Enver and Cemal Pashas asked Austria-Hungary (their yet unannounced ally since the secret Ottomano-German treaty of alliance of August 2, 1914) during the same days to send dreadnought battleships from Pola in the Adriatic to the Bosphorus in order to reinforce the Imperial Ottoman Navy against the Russian Black Sea Fleet.<sup>20</sup> The request was not accepted.

Nevertheless, the arrival of the German cruisers helped to strengthen the Black Sea defenses of the imperial capital against the menace posed by the Russian Black Sea Fleet. On August 15, Admiral Limpus and the officers of the British Naval Mission were withdrawn from the



Ottoman war fleet<sup>21</sup> The commander of the Mediterranean division of the *Kaiserliche Marine*, Vice Admiral Anton Wilhelm Souchon (a Saxon officer of Huguenot ancestry) was appointed on August 16, 1914 the overall commander of the Imperial Ottoman Navy although the German naval officer did not officially enter into the Ottoman service until the end of September.<sup>22</sup> Assisted by an ever-increasing number of German naval officers and specialists arriving in Istanbul by rail via still-neutral Romania and Bulgaria, Souchon started immediately to re-organize the Ottoman naval forces and facilities.<sup>23</sup> German specialists at the Ottoman service started by the end of August 1914 to build and erect radio stations and antennas in Istanbul and around the Bosphorus region (Okmeydanı, Tarabya, and Prince Islands in the Marmara Sea) as well as to equip all ships operated by German servicemen with radiotelegraphy (to be sold to the Ottoman government at the end of the war). There were between 50 and 70 German servicemen as “specialists” and/or “advisers” on each Ottoman capital ship and cruiser (the two pre-dreadnoughts plus *Hamidiye* and *Mecidiye*), slightly less German sailors on torpedo cruisers and destroyers.<sup>24</sup>

Following the re-organization, the Imperial Ottoman War Fleet’s new order of battle was the following.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Naval Division grouped the capital ships together and thus consisted of the battlecruiser *Yavuz Sultan Selim*<sup>25</sup> (SMS *Goeben* of the *Kaiserliche Marine*), pre-dreadnought battleship *Turgut Reis* (formerly SMS *Weißenburg* of the *Kaiserliche Marine*) and her sister *Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha* (formerly SMS *Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm* of the *Kaiserliche Marine*) and the obsolete battleship *Mesudiye* (originally built in 1874 and re-constructed in 1899-1903).

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Naval Division consisted of five cruisers of different ages and sizes, the modern light cruiser *Midilli*<sup>26</sup> (SMS *Breslau* of the *Kaiserliche Marine*); the protected cruiser *Hamidiye* whose First Balkan War exploits were very much publicized in the Ottoman Empire and in the world under the command of Hüseyin Rauf (later Orbay) Bey; the protected cruiser *Mecidiye* built in 1903 in the USA, and the two small German-built torpedo cruisers, the *Berk-i Savet* and the *Peyk-i Şevket*.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Naval Division consisted of eight small destroyers which could have been more appropriately called “torpedo boats” in another navy of the era. Four of them were modern vessels of *Großes Torpedoboot 1906*-class, recently acquired from Germany while the remaining smaller four were of French *Durandal*-class.

**Table 2. Imperial Ottoman Navy at the onset of the hostilities in the Black Sea**

<b>Battlecruiser</b>	<b>Commissioned in</b>	<b>Displacement (t.)</b>	<b>Speed (kn)</b>	<b>Main Armament</b>
<i>SMS Goeben / Yavuz Sultan Selim</i>	1912 <sup>27</sup>	23.000	28	10 x 280 mm; 12 x 150 mm
<b>Battleship</b>				
<i>Barbaros Hayreddin</i> (ex-SMS <i>Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm</i> )	1893 [+1915]	10.500	17	6 x 280 mm; 6 x 105 mm
<i>Turgut Reis</i> (ex-SMS <i>Weißenburg</i> )	1894 <sup>28</sup>	10.500	17	6 x 280 mm ; 6 x 105 mm
<i>Mesudiye</i>	1875 [+1914]	9.250	16	2 x 230 mm <sup>29</sup> ; 12 x 150 mm
<b>Cruisers</b>				
<i>SMS Breslau / Midilli</i>	1912 [+1918]	4.550	25	12x105 mm <sup>30</sup>
<i>Hamidiye</i>	1903	3.760	22	2 x 152 mm; 8 x 120 mm
<i>Mecidiye</i>	1903 [+1915] <sup>31</sup>	3.800	22	2 x 152 mm; 8 x 120 mm
<b>Torpedo-cruiser<sup>32</sup></b>				
<i>Berk-i Satvet</i>	1907	775	21	2 x 105 mm; 3 torpedo tubes
<i>Peyk-i Şevket</i>	1907	775	21	2 x 105 mm ; 3 torpedo tubes
<b>Destroyer<sup>33</sup></b>				
<i>Muavenet-i Milliye</i>	1910	765	26	2 x 75 mm; 3 torpedo tubes
<i>Gayret-i Vatanıye</i>	1910[+1916]	765	26	2 x 75 mm; 3 torpedo tubes

<i>Yadigar-i Millet</i>	1910[+1917]	765	26	2 x 75 mm; 3 torpedo tubes
<i>Numune-i Hamiyet</i>	1910	765	26	2 x 75 mm; 3 torpedo tubes
<i>Samsun</i>	1908	290	27	1 x 65 mm; 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Yarhisar</i>	1908[+1915]	290	27	1 x 65 mm; 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Taşoz</i>	1908	290	27	1 x 65 mm; 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Basra</i>	1908	290	27	1 x 65 mm; 2 torpedo tubes

The torpedo boat and gunboat flotillas had some dozens of older, smaller and/or under-armed vessels, with little or no combat value for a modern naval warfare in 1914. As for the shipbuilding and ship repair facilities, the only Ottoman military naval yard was the one in Golden Horn with three dry docks and one small floating dock<sup>34</sup>, all too small for docking the *Goeben*.

After a period of procrastination of almost three months following the Ottomano-German secret alliance treaty, the most influential members of the Ottoman cabinet gave their consent for a sortie of the Ottoman war fleet into the Black Sea, spearheaded with the two former German vessels and with the aim of attacking the Russian Black Sea Fleet and bases in Sevastopol, Odessa, Feodosia, Novorossiysk.<sup>35</sup> The Ottomano-German naval task force bombarded the aforementioned ports on the northern shores of the Black Sea and mined the Kerch Strait sinking in the process the Russian minelayer *Prut* and the old gunboat *Donets* as well as five Russian steamers and capturing another steam merchantman.<sup>36</sup> Souchon sent immediately a report to Istanbul and falsely claimed that Russian naval forces had engaged hostile activity and actions against the Ottoman fleet during this latter's exercises in the Black Sea thus resulting in the opening of hostilities.<sup>37</sup> Although the raid of October 29, 1914 by Admiral Souchon, did not end in a decisive action such as the destruction of a significant portion or the whole of the Russian war fleet and/or its bases, yet it definitely created the necessary conditions for a Russian declaration of war against the Sublime Porte and for a final Ottoman-Romanov war.

Thus, albeit its rather unimpressive military results, the raid had served, on the diplomatic front, the primary objective of Enver Pasha and the German military-diplomatic colony in Istanbul: bringing the Ottoman Empire into war on the side of the Central Powers against the Entente. Yet, once at war against the Entente Powers' navies, the modest Imperial Ottoman Navy found itself facing several disadvantages, shortcomings and geo-strategic weaknesses. British and French fleets had the "command of the sea" in the Aegean, in the Mediterranean, in the Red Sea and in the Persian Gulf, all around the still-vast lands of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Ottoman naval operations were confined to the inner sea of Marmara and to the Black Sea.

However, the Ottoman navy lacked adequate harbors and bases for operations in the north of the Turkish Straits. The southern part of the peninsula of Sinop<sup>38</sup> formed the only natural harbor in the Ottoman Black Sea coast. The only artificial harbor was in Zonguldak and it was built in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to ship coal to the Ottoman capital from the mines in the region. Anchorages of Amasra, Rize, Samsun and Trabzon were not protected from the winds, waves and storms. At the beginning of World War I, the Ottoman coastal defenses in Zonguldak (coal mines) and Trabzon (main shipping port for the Ottoman III Army on the Caucasian front) had few and old artillery pieces to protect the port facilities and moored vessels – as well as the town itself – against naval attacks and the situation did not improve much during the war. Under these circumstances, all the vessels of the small Ottomano-German war fleet had to operate from the Bosphorus throughout WWI.

A crucial disparity between the two belligerent littoral empires of the Black Sea, effecting and even to some extent shaping the naval operations in the Black Sea in WWI, was the nature of their respective land communications around the Caucasian borderland. Taking into consideration the complete lack of railroads in the Eastern Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, unlike the Russian Caucasus<sup>39</sup>, and, the very poor state of the land communications of the former in the mountainous topography of the region bordering the Russo-Ottoman war zone, establishing a secure maritime connection between Istanbul and Trabzon was crucial for the Ottoman High Command's land operations in the South Caucasus and Northwestern Persia.<sup>40</sup>

Thus, the Black Sea was of major geo-strategic importance for the Ottoman military operations against the Russian Empire and constituted a vital space for the Caucasian front of the Ottoman Empire, first, for

the defense of the left flank of the Ottoman III Army and second, for an alternative route of supplying and reinforcing the Ottoman forces fighting on the Caucasian Front. Again, considering the complete lack of a railroad network and the very primitive nature of land communications in Eastern Anatolia, shipping war material, provisions and troops directly from the Bosphorus to Trabzon was the best way to supply the Ottoman III Army. However, the smaller size of the Ottomano-German naval forces compared with the swiftly expanding Russian Black Sea Fleet made it very difficult for Admiral Souchon's Naval Staff to protect and to secure the Ottoman shipping lanes in the Black Sea in WWI and III Army suffered consequently throughout the period of 1914-17.

Another major importance of the Northern Anatolian shipping lanes for the Ottoman Empire in WWI was that these former were the best available route for supplying the Ottoman capital as well as the Ottoman navy and the merchant fleet with the much needed coal of Zonguldak,<sup>41</sup> since there was no railroad connection between the Zonguldak coal basin and Istanbul. Yet again, because of the superior naval forces of the Russian Empire attempting to blockade the port of Zonguldak with mine barriers and patrolling warships by 1915 (claiming eventually dozens of Ottoman colliers and cargo ships of all size), there was a chronic shortage of coal for civilian, military and naval use in Istanbul and this precious fuel had to imported to the Ottoman Empire from Germany on already overburdened railways.<sup>42</sup>

The presence of the powerful and fast battlecruiser *Goeben* in the Black Sea was a temporary leverage for the Ottoman forces fighting in Northeastern Anatolia at the beginning of the war, yet except for the primary phases of the Caucasian Campaign, the Russian Black Sea Fleet gave a much more significant support - in the form of transfer of troops and supplies as well as amphibious operations – to the Russian Caucasian Army's operations in the Transcaucasus, Southeastern Black Sea littoral and Eastern Anatolia in 1916 and 1917, prior to the Russian revolutions. Even after a reinforcement in the form of the German *Mittelmeerddivision*, the "command of the Black Sea" was not to be a luxury that the Ottoman navy could enjoy during WWI.

By December 1914, the *Goeben*, the only modern capital ship of the Ottoman navy was damaged in operations against the Russian war fleet in the Black Sea, and as the shipyards of Istanbul were not able to maintain and repair her, her combat effectiveness was gradually reduced and her greatest advantage compared to the Russian capital ships in the Black

Sea, that is her speed, was decreased as well. At the end of 1915, after the commissioning of two newly built Russian *Imperatritsa Mariya*-class dreadnought battleships, the Russian Black Sea had the upper hand in the Black Sea. Although the presence of SMS *Goeben* in the Marmara Sea, consolidated to some extent in 1915 the defenses of the Turkish Straits against the British, French and Russian war fleets, the Unionist oligarchy ruling the Empire and the Ottoman High Command (and also German diplomatic and military colony in Istanbul) paid utmost attention not to lose this capital ship in any major engagement in the Black Sea. The main role that the juggernaut played throughout WWI was “fleet in being”.

On the eve of the First World War, the size of the Ottoman merchant fleet was very modest despite the fact that the Empire’s territories were surrounded by seven seas: the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, the Aegean Sea, Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. The total tonnage of the Ottoman merchant fleet was around 110,000 tons,<sup>43</sup> of which the majority belonged to the “State Department of Navigation (*Seyr-i Sefain İdaresi*)” and only six ships had displacements of over 3,000 tons. The private shipping sector was also severely underdeveloped and no Ottoman ship owner possessed ships with a higher displacement than 1,000 tons. Due to the attacks of the British, Australian, French submarines in the Sea of Marmara during the Gallipoli Campaign and the raids and minelaying operations of the Russian warships against the Ottoman ports and shipping lanes in the Black Sea<sup>44</sup>, the size of the Ottoman merchant fleet was to decrease to 50,000 tons at the end of the Great War.<sup>45</sup>

With the beginning of the naval blockade of the Ottoman Empire by the British and French navies following the entry into WWI of the Sublime Porte alongside the Central Powers, the Ottoman navigation in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea ceased almost completely. As for the Ottoman navigation in the Black Sea, despite the arrival of the two German warships in August 1914, naval superiority, though incomplete, remained at the hands of the Russian war fleet and consequently the Ottoman merchant fleet suffered substantial losses in the Black Sea between the years of 1914 and 1917.

## Russian Naval Forces in the Black Sea at the onset of the Great War

Following the consecutive defeats and destructions of the Imperial Russian Far Eastern and Baltic Fleets by the Imperial Japanese Combined Fleet (*Rengo Kantai*) during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Saint Petersburg launched a major naval re-armament program. This “post-Tsushima” naval policy envisaged also the expansion and modernization of the Black Sea Fleet.<sup>46</sup> Between the end of the war in the Pacific and the outbreak of the Great War of 1914 in Europe, this southern fleet of the Romanov Empire commissioned two more battleships into its ageing battle line (although they were both of older design and not that of dreadnoughts) as well as 13 new destroyers.

At the beginning of the First World War, the Russian war fleet in the Black Sea, commanded by Admiral Andrei Agostovich Eberhardt, an Imperial Russian officer of Swedish origins and former naval attaché at the Romanov Embassy in Istanbul (1894-1896), consisted of six pre-dreadnought battleships; three protected cruisers; 26 destroyers of different size and capabilities; six old gunboats armed with 203 and 152 mm naval artillery; four submarines; two mine layers, and some dozens of smaller torpedo and patrol boats and minesweepers of 100 to 200 tons of displacements.

A particular comparative strength of Eberhardt’s fleet over the Ottoman navy was the former’s significant network of facilities around the Russian Black Sea littoral. The Russian Black Sea Fleet had several well-fortified naval bases and ports and besides Sevastopol, the home port of the Fleet, Odessa, Batumi, Feodosia, Novorossiysk, Rostov, Nikolaev, Taganrog, Kerch, Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy offered operational bases to the Russian warships.

Admiral Eberhardt had also three dreadnought battleships (*Imperatritsa Mariya*-class, each more heavily armed than the battlecruiser *Goeben* although slower than this latter) under construction at the time the hostilities started in the Black Sea, thus reinforcing considerably his battle line of six pre-dreadnought battleships. The Russian Black Sea Fleet possessed in 1914 a flourishing naval air arm as well.<sup>47</sup>

The Russian Black Sea Fleet mustered also larger flotillas of destroyers, minelayers and auxiliary ships and a considerable fleet of transports (around 120 steam merchantmen) compared with the modest Ottoman-German naval force stationed in the Bosphorus. Russian destroyers were larger and

more numerous than the Ottoman destroyers (who could probably be more appropriately classified as “large torpedo boats” as the original naming for the German-built *Muavenet*-class vessels had put it clearly: “*Großes Torpedoboot 1906*-class”), thus offering a considerable asset to the Russian fleet for naval raids and interceptions. A particularly striking component of the Russian flotillas were the very recently commissioned and powerful *Derzky*-class destroyers. Unlike most destroyer classes of the navies of the era, these vessels were burning oil rather than coal and were capable of cruising at speeds reaching 34 knots (nautical mile per hour) making them the fastest warship class in the Black Sea in WWI. Nine of these modern destroyers were commissioned in 1913 and 1914 into the Black Sea Fleet and they were to be very instrumental in patrolling, blockading and mining first the Ottoman and later also the Bulgarian shores as well as in escorting other Russian vessels throughout the period of 1914-1917.

The Russian navy in the Black Sea operated from the harbor of Sevastopol (*Akyar* in Turkish), the main base of operations, and from the ports of Odessa, Batum, Novorossiysk, Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy (*Akkerman* in Turkish), Nikolayev, Rostov, Taganrog, Feodosia (*Kefe* in Turkish and Crimean Tatar) and Kerch. Among all these port cities, Sevastopol, Batum, Kerch and Nikolayev had fortifications with heavy coastal artillery as well as protective mine barriers. Sevastopol, situated “almost in the geographical center of the Black Sea”<sup>48</sup>, constituted a formidable harbor and naval base in the natural harbor-poor body of water. Against these Russian naval bases, the Ottomano-German naval forces were to attempt some raids in 1914 and 1915 until the commissioning of the two new Russian dreadnoughts in 1915. These raids, largely inconclusive, ended in the loss of the Ottoman protected cruiser *Mecidiye*, sunk after striking a Russian naval mine in April 1915 near Odessa.

While the Russian Black Sea Fleet had the capability of building warships at the size of dreadnought battleships of more than 20.000 tons displacement at the naval yards in Nikolayev<sup>49</sup> the Ottoman Navy had no capacity of building any large warships in its smaller naval yard in Bosphorus and did not possess a dry or floating dock large enough to maintain and repair its only capital ship *Goeben/Yavuz Sultan Selim* (reducing gradually the operational capability of this modern naval asset). The smaller Russian shipyard in Kherson had also the capacity of building smaller war vessels such as destroyers.



## The Imperial Russian Black Sea Fleet in World War I

The strike force of the Russian Fleet, sizeable but not very modern, was initially composed of its six pre-dreadnought battleships. Among these battleships of older design, the most powerful and relatively more modern vessels were the two sister ships *Evstafii* ("[Saint] Eustace") and *Ioann Zlatoust* ("[Saint] John Chrysostom"). Both commissioned in 1906 and at 12,840 tons of displacement, they were rather medium size battleships but had four pieces of 305 mm<sup>50</sup> naval guns in two turrets, large caliber guns that no Ottoman or German vessels were to possess during the naval operations in the Black Sea throughout WWI, in addition to their secondary armament of 203 mm and 152 mm guns. The *Panteleimon* ("[Saint] Pantaleon") was a third and older battleship of 12,582 tons, commissioned in 1900, and was armed with the same number of 305 mm guns accompanied with 16 pieces of 152 mm. The *Rostislav* (named after Rostislav [Mstislavich] I of Kiev) was the smallest battleship of the fleet at 8,880 tons of displacement. She was commissioned in 1896 and armed with a main artillery of four 254 mm guns and a secondary one of eight pieces of 152 mm. The old battleship *Tri Sviatitelia* ("Three Holy Hierarchs") commissioned in 1893 was the largest war vessel in the fleet in 1914 at 13,318 tons, armed with four of the same 305 mm guns mounted on the *Evstafii* and the *Ioann Zlatoust*, and with a secondary armament of 14 pieces of 152 mm. The last and oldest battleship of the Russian fleet was the *Sinop*, named after the Russian naval raid to Sinop in 1853. This old man-of-war at 11,230 tons was armed with six pieces of 203 mm and eight of 152 mm naval guns, and, commissioned in 1887 she was completely obsolete by the start of the Great War in 1914. The common and main weakness of all the battleships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was their speed of 16-17 knots. This was to be the major reason for their inability to completely interdict the Black Sea to the Ottomano-German naval forces in World War I, but in spite of the arrival of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, the Russian Navy would still maintain its naval supremacy – albeit not that easily - in the Black Sea during the Great War.

**Table 3. The principal vessels of the Imperial Russian Navy in the Black Sea at the beginning of the war<sup>51</sup>**

<b>Battleship</b>	<b>Commissioned in</b>	<b>Displacement (t.)</b>	<b>Speed (kn)</b>	<b>Main Armament</b>
<i>Evstafii</i>	1906	12.840	17	4 x 305 mm; 4 x 203 mm; 12 x 152 mm
<i>Ioann Zlatoust</i>	1906	12.840	17	4 x 305 mm; 4 x 203 mm; 12 x 152 mm
<i>Panteleimon</i>	1900	12.582	17	4 x 305 mm; 16 x 152 mm
<i>Rostislav</i>	1896	8.880	16	4 x 254 mm; 8 x 152 mm
<i>Tri Sviatitelia</i>	1893	13.318	17	4 x 305 mm; 14 x 152 mm
<i>Sinop</i>	1887	11.230	16	6 x 203 mm; 7 x 152mm
<b>Cruisers</b>				
<i>Pamiat Merkuria</i>	1903	6.675	23	12 x 152 mm
<i>Kagul</i>	1902	6.675	23	12 x 152 mm
<i>Almaz</i>	1903	3.300	19	5 x 120 mm
<b>Destroyers</b>				
<i>Pylki</i>	1914	1.100	34	3 x 100 mm; 10 torpedo tubes; 80 mines
<i>Bystry</i>	1914	1.100	34	3 x 100 mm; 10 torpedo tubes; 80 mines
<i>Pospeshny</i>	1914	1.100	34	3 x 100 mm; 10 torpedo tubes; 80 mines

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<i>Derzky</i>	1914	1.100	34	3 x 100 mm; 10 torpedo tubes; 80 mines
<i>Pronzitelny</i>	1914	1.100	34	3 x 100 mm; 10 torpedo tubes; 80 mines
<i>Schastlivy</i>	1914	1.100	34	3 x 100 mm; 10 torpedo tubes; 80 mines
<i>Gromki</i>	1913	1.100	34	3 x 100 mm; 10 torpedo tubes; 80 mines
<i>Gnevny</i>	1913	1.100	34	3 x 100 mm; 10 torpedo tubes; 80 mines
<i>Bespokoiny</i>	1913	1.100	34	3 x 100 mm; 10 torpedo tubes; 80 mines
<i>Capt Saken</i>	1906	680	26	2 x 120 mm; 3 torpedo tubes
<i>Lt Zatzarenniy</i>	1906[+1917]	680	26	2 x 120 mm; 3 torpedo tubes
<i>Lt Chestakov</i>	1906	680	26	2 x 120 mm; 3 torpedo tubes
<i>Capt-Lt Baranov</i>	1906	680	26	2 x 120 mm; 3 torpedo tubes
<i>Jarky</i>	1905	420	27	2 x 75 mm; 1 or 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Jivoy</i>	1905	420	27	2 x 75 mm; 1 or 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Joutky</i>	1905	420	27	2 x 75 mm; 1 or 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Jivoutchy</i>	1905[+1916]	420	27	2 x 75 mm; 1 or 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Zavetny</i>	1905	420	27	2 x 75 mm; 1 or 2 torpedo tubes

<i>Zavidny</i>	1905	420	27	2 x 75 mm; 1 or 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Zvonky</i>	1905	420	27	2 x 75 mm; 1 or 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Zorky</i>	1905	420	27	2 x 75 mm; 1 or 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Lt Poustchin</i>	1905[+1916]	420	27	2 x 75 mm; 1 or 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Strogy</i>	1901	310	26	2 x 75 mm; 1 or 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Svirepy</i>	1901	310	26	2 x 75 mm; 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Smetlivy</i>	1901	310	26	2 x 75 mm; 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Stremitelny</i>	1901	310	26	2 x 75 mm; 2 torpedo tubes

The “battle line” (that is the heavily armed and armored battleships and cruisers forming the core of the combat power of the fleet in an engagement) of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, could combine in 1914 a naval artillery of 127 large caliber guns (of 150 mm and above) and thus overwhelmingly outgunned the Imperial Ottoman Navy which could field only 50 of such guns even after its reinforcement with the German *Mittelmeerdivision*. The Russian navy in the Black Sea had a budget of about 800 million rubles for the year 1914<sup>52</sup> and the immense disparity in fleet size and firepower was to increase even further during the war by the commissioning of three new *Imperatritsa Mariya*-class dreadnought battleships between 1915 and 1917, the Russian Black Sea Fleet fielding 151 large caliber guns by 1917 versus even a smaller Ottoman-German naval artillery park of 36 Ottoman-German guns mainly due to the Ottoman battleship and cruiser losses in 1915. However, the Russian battle squadron was inferior in speed and in design to the vessels of the former German *Mittelmeerdivision* and risked a “*defeat in detail*” against SMS *Goeben*/*Yavuz Sultan Selim* and could theoretically fall prey to her ten 280 mm guns and speed of 28 knots in unexpected encounters, especially prior to the commissioning of the three *Imperatritsa Mariya*-class battleships<sup>53</sup>. These new Russian dreadnoughts, each singularly better armed than the

*Goeben* with 12 pieces of 305 mm guns, and joining the Russian fleet in the Black Sea between 1915 and 1917 were namely the *Imperatritsa Mariya* (named after the then Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna of Russia), the *Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya* (named after the Empress Catherine [II] the Great of Russia) and the *Imperator Aleksander III* (named after Emperor Alexander III of Russia, father of the then reigning Nicholas II of Russia). The lead ship of her class, the *Imperatritsa Mariya*, was to be lost for the Russian Black Sea Fleet, under mysterious circumstances and suspicions of sabotage, by an internal explosion at anchor in Sevastopol in the fall of 1916.<sup>54</sup> She was the single battleship and the largest and the most important vessel to be lost in the Black Sea in WWI.

**Table 4. Russian dreadnought battleships built in the Black Sea during WWI**

Dreadnought	Commissioned in	Displacement (t)	Speed (kn)	Main Armament
<i>Imperatritsa Mariya</i>	1915 [+1916]	23.800	21	12 x 305 mm; 20 x 130 mm
<i>Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya</i>	1915	25.000	21	12 x 305 mm; 20 x 130 mm
<i>Imperator Aleksander III</i>	1917	23.800	21	12 x 305 mm; 20 x 130 mm

**Table 5. A Chronological Outline of the Operations in and around the Black Sea in WWI**

<b>October 29, 1914</b>	Germano-Ottoman naval raid against the Russian ports and bases in the Black Sea.
<b>Early November 1914</b>	Russian bombardment of Zonguldak port and coal mines and interception and destruction of an Ottoman convoy sailing from Istanbul to Trabzon.
<b>November 18, 1914</b>	Short and inconclusive engagement off Cape Sarych between the battleships <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Evstafii</i> (the latter leading the Russian pre-dreadnought battle line).

<b>Nov. 1914 – June 1917</b>	Russian minelaying operations off the Bosphorus and the Ottoman western Black Sea littoral.
<b>December 23/24, 1914</b>	Failed attempt of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to blockade the Zonguldak harbor with blockships.
<b>December 25, 1914</b>	<i>Goeben</i> damaged seriously after hitting Russian mines in the Black Sea, out of action for three months during which she was imperfectly repaired inside a “cofferdam” (due to the absence of a large dry dock) in Istanbul.
<b>Dec. 1914 - Apr. 1915</b>	Ottoman convoys to Trabzon and naval raids on Batumi, Tuapse, Yalta and Odessa (December 1914 – April 1915). Loss of the Ottoman cruiser <i>Mecidiye</i> off Odessa.
<b>Jan. – May 1915</b>	Russian raids and naval bombardments along the Northern Anatolian coast disrupting the Ottoman communications. The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s diversionary attack and reconnaissance in force against the Ottoman Bosphorus forts in order to support the Entente naval operations in the Dardanelles.
<b>Summer 1915-1917</b>	German submarine warfare against the Russian Black Sea merchant and war fleets.
<b>December 10, 1915</b>	Action off Kefken island near the Anatolian coast between Ottoman gunboats and Russian destroyers ending in the destruction of two Ottoman gunboats.
<b>January 8, 1916</b>	Short and inconclusive engagement between <i>Goeben</i> and <i>Imperatrítsa Ekaterina Velikaya</i> in the mid-way between Bosphorus and Zonguldak resulting in the only naval action between dreadnought-type warships in the Black Sea in WWI.
<b>February 1916</b>	<i>Goeben</i> ’s sortie for Trabzon to rush most urgently required war material and personnel to the Ottoman III Army hard-pressed by the Yudenich Offensive.

<b>Feb. – July 1916</b>	The Russian Black Sea Fleet's successful amphibious operations between Rize and Giresun supporting the Yudenich Offensive of the Russian Caucasian Army.
<b>October 20, 1916</b>	Destruction of <i>Imperatritsa Mariya</i> by a magazine explosion at anchor in Sevastopol.
<b>June 1918</b>	The Russian Black Sea Fleet no more a fighting force due to the revolutions of 1917. Ottoman transfer of troops from Constanta to Batumi (in order to form an expeditionary corps to be sent to Azerbaijan and Dagestan) after the Treaty of Bucharest of May 7, 1918.
<b>Summer 1918</b>	German transfer of troops (three brigades in total) from the Ukrainian client-state (the "Hetmanate") to the nascent "Georgian Democratic Republic" (over which the German Empire was to establish a similar "protectorate")

## Conclusion

The war in the Black Sea is an understudied page of WW I albeit the three empires involved. Although a secondary theater of operations for both of the Entente and Central Powers, the Black Sea and the adjacent Caucasian front revealed gradually certain opportunities of "power projection" to the belligerent powers of both camps, such as the invasion of a considerable part of Northeastern Anatolia by the Romanov Empire in 1916, or, the control of the revolutionary Transcaucasus for the Ottoman and German empires towards the end of WWI.

With the Ottoman entry into WWI in late October 1914, the Black Sea became a new scene of naval operations in the Great War. The struggle between the Imperial Ottoman and Russian navies to obtain a naval mastery in this sea was heated in the following years of the conflict, with Bulgaria joining the Central Powers in 1915 and Romania siding with the Entente in 1916 albeit the former two empires and their naval forces remained as the principal actors of operations.

Naval operations in the Black Sea during WWI displayed some good examples of early modern warfare. The Black Sea witnessed a constant

struggle of the joint Ottoman and German naval forces to keep the maritime routes open between Istanbul, on one side, and the coal-producing Zonguldak and the main shipping port for the Ottoman III Army, Trabzon, on the other. A flotilla of German U-boats, either transported to the Ottoman capital via railroad in pieces and assembled there or breaking the Entente navies' blockade in the Adriatic Sea and cruising from the Austro-Hungarian naval base of Pola to the Dardanelles, operated from the Golden Horn to deter the actions of the Imperial Russian Navy against the North Anatolian coastline, the allied port city of Varna or even the very capital of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian Black Sea Fleet responded with a strategy of "commerce raiding" and submarine warfare of its own by 1915. There were several minelaying and minesweeping operations of the rival navies with purpose-built minelayer submarines as well as the operations and engagements of dreadnought-type warships from both sides. At the onset of the war, the Ottoman war fleet was reinforced by a state-of-art warship for its age, the German Imperial Navy *Moltke*-class battlecruiser SMS *Goeben*, renamed *Yavuz Sultan Selim* at her Ottoman service, escorted by a *Magdeburg*-class modern light cruiser SMS *Breslau* (later *Midilli* at the Ottoman service). Besides her role of "fleet in being" throughout the war inside the Turkish Straits, *Goeben* engaged in some naval actions against the Russian Black Sea Fleet and escorted several Ottoman convoys in the Black Sea. The Russian Empire built between 1915 and 1917 in Nikolayev three large dreadnought battleships of *Imperatritsa Mariya*-class and tried to obtain a "command of the sea" by 1916, first under the command of Admiral Eberhardt and later by his young and energetic successor Admiral Kolchak. The Russian Black Sea Fleet engaged in several actions against the Ottomano-German naval forces, bombarded Ottoman Black Sea ports and fortresses (outer defenses of the Bosphorus included) and assisted some successful amphibious operations of the Russian Caucasian Army on the Eastern Black Sea littoral of the Ottoman Empire in 1916. However, this newly obtained superiority in material and leadership of the Imperial Russian Black Sea Fleet by 1916 was not to last long. This last Russo-Ottoman War was to pause at the end of 1916 on land and in the first half of 1917 on the seas<sup>55</sup>, never to resume again and just before the respective collapses of the Romanov and Ottoman empires.



## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The two cruisers were apparently named after the then reigning Ottoman monarch, Sultan Abdülhamid II, and, his father Sultan Abdülmecid I.
- <sup>2</sup> The Association was founded on July 14, 1909 in Istanbul and was led by one of the notable Muslim merchants of the Ottoman capital, Yağcızade Şefik Bey.
- <sup>3</sup> The *Navy Review* was published first monthly later weekly. Between March 1910-February 1914 (monthly, 48 issues in total), in WWI era it became weekly and was published until 1917 (190 issues in total).
- <sup>4</sup> Undated letter from a Unionist Ottoman diplomat working at the Imperial Ottoman Embassy in Saint Petersburg to the Ottoman Finance Minister, Cavid Bey [Letter No. 46, pp. 122-124] cited in Bardakçı, Murat İttihadçı'nın sandığı: *İttihat ve Terakki liderlerinin özel arşivlerindeki yayınlanmamış belgeler ile Atatürk ve İnönü dönemlerinde Ermeni gayrimenkulleri konusunda alınmış bazı kararlar* (The Chestbox of the Unionist: Previously unpublished documents from the personal archives of the CUP leaders and some decisions taken during the terms of Atatürk and İnönü concerning the Armenian property), Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014, p. 123.
- <sup>5</sup> The former *Kaiserliche Marine* vessels were purchased for a total payment 1.070.000 gold Ottoman pounds lira and they arrived at the Golden Horn, Istanbul on August 21, 1910 (between the North Sea and Dardanelles sailed with a German crew and under the command of a German admiral, at Dardanelles the ships were delivered to Ottoman crews).
- <sup>6</sup> See Miller, Geoffrey, *Superior Force: The Conspiracy Behind the Escape of Goeben and Breslau*, Hull: Hull University Press, 1996, p. 406 note 20.
- <sup>7</sup> Later a second *Reşadiye*-class dreadnought, the *Fâtiḥ Sultan Mehmed*, was ordered to Vickers in April 1914, never to be completed. Although the authoritative 1914 edition German handbook of the war fleets of the era is correct about the time of the Ottoman order for a second *Reshadiye*-class dreadnought, this second order was also placed on Vickers and not on the "united Vickers-Armstrongs shipyards (*"vereinigte Werften von Vickers und Armstrong"*)" which, in fact, did not exist until the eventual merger of these two major British shipbuilding companies in 1927 (see *Handbuch der Kriegsflotten von Deutschland, Oesterreich-Ungarn, Italien, Türkei und England, Frankreich, Rußland, Japan* [Handbook of the War Fleets of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Turkey and England, France, Russia and Japan], (Berlin, Verlag L. Gschwing [sic] Pössneck i. Th., 1914), p. 28.
- <sup>8</sup> André Antoine, director of the Odeon Theatre in Paris and founder of the Ottoman State Conservatory and the Municipal Theatre in Istanbul in the summer and autumn of 1914 and present in the spectacles organized by the "[Ottoman] National Committee for the fleet" noted in his memoirs, first published in extracts of the Marseilles daily *Soleil du Midi* in September

1915 and then in Turkey under the title “*Chez les Turcs*” in 1965 that the amount raised through public donations reached the figure of 75-80 million French francs in the summer of 1914 (Antoine, *Chez les Turcs*, pp. 21-22 and pp. 39-41).

- 9 The acquisition and construction of the two large dreadnoughts boosted the national pride of the Ottomans, especially in the aftermath of the recent humiliations of the Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars and the two battleships’ photographs and postcards were circulated all over the Ottoman lands already in 1913. Large individual donations were rewarded with a “Navy Donation Medal”.
- 10 See Öke, Mim Kemal and Mütercimler, Erol, *Sultan Osman*, İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1991, p. 20 and p. 56; Çakmak, Fevzi, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Doğu Cephesi* (The [Ottoman] Eastern Front in WWI), Ankara: Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2005, p. 5; see also Chatterton, E. Keble, *Dardanelles Dilemma, the story of the naval operations*, London: Rich and Cowan, 1935, p. 9.
- 11 See Tuchman, Barbara W., *The Guns of August*, New York: Presidio Press, 2004, p. 164.
- 12 The two Ottoman dreadnought battleships were confiscated on August 2, 1914, before the declaration of the Ottoman mobilization (see the telegram of the captain of the ship, Hüseyin Rauf (later Orbay) Bey, from the Imperial Ottoman Embassy in London to the Imperial Ministry of the Navy in İstanbul, August 2, 1914, cited in Öke and Mutercimler, *Sultan Osman*, p. 13). For the confiscation of the battleships and the subsequent Ottoman irritation and anti-British sentiment see also Chatterton, *Dardanelles Dilemma*, p. 9.
- 13 For the Ottomano-German secret alliance treaty see Trumpener, Ulrich, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918*, New Jersey: Princeton, 1968, p. 16.
- 14 *Atakan, Rauf*; Koral, Necmi; Önal, Remzi; Baycan, Nusret and Kızılırmak, Selahattin (eds.), *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Cilt X, Osmanlı Devri, Birinci Dünya Harbi, İdari Faaliyetler ve Lojistik* (History of Turkish Armed Forces, Volume X, First World War, Administrative and Logistic Activities), Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1985, p. 96.
- 15 See the cable of the British embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office in London providing a French-language copy of a memorandum of information of the Greek naval attaché in İstanbul, 7 November 1914 (The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA / former Public Record Office - PRC), Foreign Office Files, FO 371/2147).
- 16 See Kopp, Georges, *A bord du Goeben*, (On board the *Goeben*) (trans. from German-language edition by Renée-Marie Jouan), Paris : Payot, 1931, p. 70.
- 17 The other two ships of the German Mediterranean Division, the light cruisers SMS *Dresden* and SMS *Straßburg* were detached from the squadron of Vice Admiral Souchon before the outbreak of hostilities between the Entente and

the Central Powers in the summer of 1914 (see Souchon, Wilhelm, “Der Durchbruch SM Schiffe ‘Goeben’ und ‘Breslau’ von Messina nach den Dardanellen (The Breakthrough of His [Imperial German] Majesty’s Ships *Goeben* and *Breslau* from Messina to the Dardanelles)” in *Auf See unbesiegt. Erlebnisse im Seekrieg erzählt von Mitkämpfern*, Vol. I (ed. Eberhard von Mantey), Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1922, p. 17).

- 18 After frequent and intensive negotiations with the German ambassador Hans [Baron] von Wangenheim in Istanbul following the signing of the Ottoman-German secret treaty of alliance of August 2nd, 1914, the Ottoman Minister of War had ordered the Command of Dardanelles Fortifications to let the German ships into the Marmara Sea (Cable of Enver Pasha to the Command of Dardanelles Fortifications, August 7, 1914 Turkish General Staff Directorate of Military History and Strategic Studies Archive (*Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivi* – ATASE), First World War Collection (*Birinci Dünya Harbi Koleksiyonu* - B.D.H.), Archive 6/1666, Cabinet 4611, File 10, Index 1-22).
- 19 For the transfer of SMS *Goeben* and SMS *Breslau* to the Imperial Ottoman Navy see also Arslan, Ozan “Lyudi, korabli i oruzhiye dlya sultana personel suda i vooruzheniye, postavlennyye Germaney turetskoy armii i flout (Men, Ships and Arms to the Sultan: German Military Mission and Transfer of Personnel, Vessels, and Weapons to the Ottoman Army and Navy during World War I)” in *Porokh, Zoloto i Stal’, Voyenno-tekhnicheskoye sotrudnichestvo v gody Pervoy mirovoy voyny*, (ed. Andrey Pavlov), Saint Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo RKHGA, 2018, pp. 119-121.
- 20 Belen, Fahri, *Birinci Cihan Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, 1914 Yılı Hareketleri* (Turkey’s War in WWI [Volume I] Operations of 1914), Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1963, pp. 41-42.
- 21 Miller, *Superior Force: The Conspiracy Behind the Escape of Goeben and Breslau*, p. 215. A month later, on September 16, 1914, the British Naval Mission left the Ottoman Empire (see Koçer, Özdem (ed.), Şanlı Yavuz (The Glorious Yavuz), Istanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 2008, p. 36).
- 22 The Ottoman government requested officially on September 23, 1914 (and successfully obtained soon after), via its ambassador in Berlin, Mahmud Muhtar (later Katircioğlu) Pasha, the entry of Souchon into the Ottoman naval service (for the Ottoman official request see letter of [the German Undersecretary of State, Arthur] Zimmermann to [the Secretary of State Gottlieb von] Jagow, September 23, 1914 (The Political Archive of the German Foreign Office (*Politisches Archiv / Auswärtiges Amt*) PA/AA, R 22402, No. 533))
- 23 For the arrival of German naval officers and specialists – as well as a limited amount of much-needed German war material – in the Ottoman Empire via Austria-Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in August and September 1914 see Arslan, “Lyudi, korabli i oruzhiye dlya sultana personel suda i vooruzheniye, postavlennyye Germaney turetskoy armii i flout”, pp. 123-125.

- 24 Cable of the British embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office in London providing a French-language copy of a memorandum of information of the Greek naval attaché in Istanbul, 7 November 1914 (TNA, Foreign Office Files, FO 371/2147).
- 25 The battlecruiser was thus renamed after the Ottoman emperor, Sultan Selim I (1501-1520), the conqueror of Syria, Palestine, Egypt and the Hijaz; the first "caliph" from the Ottoman dynasty whose nickname "Yavuz" meant "the Ferocious". He was the father of Süleyman I "The Magnificent".
- 26 The light cruiser was named after the island of Lesbos/Mytilini in the Northern Aegean (*Midilli* in Turkish), lost to Greece at the end of the Balkan Wars and an Ottoman *terra irredenta* in 1914.
- 27 Commissioned in 1912 in the *Kaiserliche Marine*, SMS *Goeben* was announced "purchased" from the Imperial German government together with SMS *Breslau* upon the two ships' arrival at the Dardanelles on August 11, 1914 (see the cable from the Ottoman Ministry of Interior to the Command of the Dardanelles Fortifications, 11 August 1914, (The Ottoman Archives of the Office of the Prime Minister [of the Republic of Turkey] (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arsivi* - BOA), DH. KMS, 27/2).
- 28 William Edward David Allen and Paul Muratoff wrote that these two pre-dreadnought battleships were built in 1874, in the same year with the *Mesudiye* (Allen, William Edward David and Muratoff, Paul, *Caucasian Battlefields, A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828–1921*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953, p. 227). The latter, an obsolete battleship that was to be sunk by a British submarine in December 1914 at the Dardanelles, was indeed built in 1874, even before the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, but as for the year of commissioning of the other two battleships, the British and Russian authors are mistaken.
- 29 At the start of the hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente Powers, the *Mesudiye* was still waiting for the delivery of her two pieces of 230 mm, sent earlier to Vickers in Britain for overhauls. She never received her main guns again.
- 30 Upgunned during WWI with eight pieces of 150 mm, just like the rest of her sister-ships still in the Imperial German Navy service.
- 31 The *Mecidiye* struck a Russian mine and sank on April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1915 near Odessa in shallow water. She was later salvaged, repaired and joined the Russian Black Sea Fleet on October 29, 1915 (on the anniversary of the Ottoman-German naval raid of 1914) as Prut after the Russian minelayer Prut sunk by the *Goeben* on October 29, 1914. Following the Russian revolutions of 1917, she was captured in Sevastopol on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 1918 by the German army which returned her to the Ottoman Navy on May 13, 1918 and she was immediately re-commissioned into this latter under her original name *Mecidiye*.

- 32 For the technical features of these two torpedo cruisers of the Ottoman war fleet see Besbelli, Saim, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi*, VII. Cilt, Deniz Harekâtı (Turkey's War in WWI, Volume VIII, Naval Operations), Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1976, Appendix I ; see also the cable of the British embassy in Athens to the Foreign Office in London providing a French-language copy of a memorandum of information of the Greek naval attaché in Istanbul, 7 November 1914 (TNA, Foreign Office Files, FO 371/2147).
- 33 See Çakmak, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Doğu Cephesi*, p. 257.
- 34 See Koçer, Şanlı Yavuz, p. 41.
- 35 For the raid of October 29, 1914 see Firle, Rudolf, "Meine erste Kriegsfahrt nach Odessa. Türkische Philosophie. Die Vernichtung von Donetz und Kubanetz (My first naval expedition to Odessa. Turkish philosophy. The destruction of the *Donetz* and the *Kubanetz*)" in *Auf See unbesiegt. Erlebnisse im Seekrieg erzählt von Mitkämpfern*, Vol. II (ed. Eberhard von Mantey), Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1922, pp. 243-250 and also Danilov, Youri, *La Russie dans la guerre mondiale (1914-1917)* (Russia in the world war, (1914-1917)), Paris: Payot, 1927, p. 338.
- 36 The Ottomano-German naval forces sank some smaller sailing vessels and damaged several other merchantmen as well as the port of Novorossiysk during the raid of October 29, 1914.
- 37 For Souchon's report of October 29, 1914 see Aksakal, Mustafa, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914, The Ottoman Empire and the First World War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 179.
- 38 This port was the scene of the naval battle of Sinop on November 30, 1853 which was the *casus belli* for the eventual declarations of war of the French and British empires against Russia, on March 27, 1854.
- 39 At the onset of WWI, the Russian Empire had a significant railroad network on its Transcaucasian dominions. There were three main axes built at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries: the line of Baku-Elizavetpol (today Ganja)-Tbilisi-Alexandropol (today Gyumri)-Kars, the line of Tbilisi-Batumi, and, that of Alexandropol-Erevan-Julfa. The Transcaucasian network was connected to the main Russian railroad system by the line of Baku-Derbent-Petrovsk-Rostov (Allen and Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields*, p. 224). Russians had extended, between 1910 and 1913, their Transcaucasian rail line 60 km (standard Russian gauge of 1,534 mm) further in the direction of the Russo-Ottoman border, from Kars to Sarıkamış (see Badem, Candan, *Çarlık Rusyası yönetiminde Kars vilayeti* (The Province [Oblast] of Kars under the Tsarist Russian Administration), Istanbul: Bîrzamanlar Yayıncılık, 2010, p. 235 and see also Yavuz, Mehmet and Tavukçu, Ali Yalçın, "Doğukapı-Akyaka-Kars-Sarıkamış-Erzurum Eski Demiryolu Hattı ve Mimari Yapılanması (Doğukapı-Akyaka-Kars-Sarıkamış-Erzurum Old Railway Line and Architectural Formation)" in *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 29 (1), 2012, p. 295). They had

already, in 1885, completed the line of Baku-Batumi (see King, Charles, *The Black Sea, A History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 196 and also King, Charles, *The Ghost of Freedom, A History of the Caucasus*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 123). Thus, when WWI broke out, the termini of the Russian Transcaucasian railroads on the Ottoman border were Batumi on the Black Sea coast, and, Sarıkamış, 60 km west of Kars. During WWI following the Russian capture of Erzurum, the Caucasian Viceroyalty built also a narrow gauge (750 mm) line first between Sarıkamış and Erzurum - 170 km - (see Kobro, Georg, *Das Gebiet von Kars und Ardahan Historisch-landeskundliche Studie zu einer Grenzregion in Ostanatolien, Transkaukasien* (The region of Kars and Ardahan: Historical and regional studies on a border region in Eastern Anatolia and Transcaucasus), Munich: Neimanis-Verlag, 1989), p. 153) and later between Erzurum and Karabıyıká - today in Aşkale district of Erzurum province and 46 km west of Erzurum - (Murat Küçükugurlu and Gürkan Fırat Saylan, Şimendiferin Erzurum Yolculuğu (Journey of Railroads to Erzurum) in *Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 15 (38), 2008, p. 326).

40 An early Ottoman attempt to supply III Army in war materials and troops via the Istanbul-Trabzon maritime route was to meet a disaster on November 6-7, 1914. Three of the largest transport ships available to the Ottoman Navy were intercepted and sunk by the Russian Black Sea Fleet at large of Zonguldak with great loss of life and material for the Ottoman army (see Kır, Naci and Altınbilek, Hakkı (eds), *Birinci Dünya Harbî'nde Türk Harbi, Kafkas Cephesi, 3. Ordu Harekâtı, I. Cilt* (Turkey's War in WWI, the Caucasian Front, Operations of III Army, Vol. I), Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993, p. 62 and also the memoirs of the Imperial Russian Navy Lieutenant commander - and later White Russian émigré and naval historian - Nestor Alexandrovich Monasterev (Monasterev, N[estor], *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Karadeniz Cephesi* (The Black Sea Front [Theater] in the First World War), (trans. by Naval Captain Afif Ertuğrul from the 1928 French-language edition entitled « *Dans la mer Noire (1912-1924)* »), Ankara: Deniz Basımevi, 1948, p. 16).

41 "Zonguldak coal basin-Bosporus" lane was actually a short sailing distance of only 120 nautical miles (see Monasterev, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Karadeniz Cephesi*, p. 15)

42 See the report of Hans von Seeckt to the German Imperial High Command (*Oberste Heeresleitung*) on "The Reasons of Turkey's Debacle" dated 4 November 1918 (cited in Kurat, Akdes Nimet, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye'de Bulunan Alman Generallerinin Raporları* (Reports of German Generals Who Were in Turkey During WWI), Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1966, pp. 57-58), and also the report of Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorf to the German Imperial High Command on "Turkish military operations" dated 15 December 1917 (cited in Kurat, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye'de Bulunan Alman Generallerinin Raporları*, p. 34)

- 43 *Atakan et al. (eds.), Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi*, p. 89.
- 44 For the Russian naval raids and minelaying operations against the Ottoman ports and shipping lanes between the late 1914 and mid-1917 see Stébline-Kamensky, Ivan Egorovich, *1914-1918 Karadeniz'de Mayn Harbi* (The [Naval] Mine Warfare in the Black Sea, 1914-1918), (trans. from the French-language edition by Sermet Gökdeniz), İstanbul: Deniz Matbaası, 1938, pp. 5-29; Nekrasov, George, *North of Gallipoli: the Black Sea Fleet at war, 1914-1917*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, pp. 26-126 and Monastarev, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Karadeniz Cephesi*, pp. 16-33.
- 45 See Ahmed Emin (later Yalman), *Turkey in the World War*, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1930, p. 90.
- 46 For the "post-Tsushima" reforms, restructuring and expansion of the Imperial Russian Navy see Nekrasov, *North of Gallipoli*, pp. 6-16.
- 47 The Black Sea was to witness during WWI several operations of naval aviation and of the first "aircraft carriers" in the form of "hydro-cruisers", "hydro-avia- transports" and "sea plane tenders" of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
- 48 See Nekrasov, *North of Gallipoli*, p. 1.
- 49 See Çakmak, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Doğu Cephesi*, p. 256.
- 50 During his conferences given at the Turkish Military Academy in 1935, the Field Marshal Mustafa Fevzi Çakmak gave the number of Russian battleships armed with 305mm guns ("30 and 50 cm" in the text, apparently because of a typing mistake) as six (*Ibid.*, p. 5). This statement of the chief of the Turkish General Staff was not accurate, the naval guns of 305 mm were mounted only on four battleships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet before WWI and until the commissioning of the first *Imperatritsa Mariya*-class dreadnoughts in 1915.
- 51 See Graf, Harald, *La Marine russe dans la guerre et dans la révolution, 1914-1918* (The Russian Navy during the [First World] War and [the Russian] Revolution), (trans. from Russian-language edition by August Thomazi), Paris: Payot, 1928, pp. 413-414. For the composition of the Imperial Russian Navy Black Sea Fleet at the beginning of WWI see also *Handbuch der Kriegsflotten von Deutschland, Oesterreich-Ungarn, Italien, Türkei und England, Frankreich, Rußland, Japan*, pp. 40-41 and Çakmak, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Doğu Cephesi*, p. 5 and pp. 255-256.
- 52 See Stone, Norman, *The Eastern Front*, London: Penguin, 1998, p. 31.
- 53 Stébline-Kamensky, *1914-1918 Karadeniz'de Mayn Harbi*, p. 3.
- 54 The loss of the *Imperatritsa Mariya* was most probably due to negligence rather than sabotage as argues John N. Westwood in his article "The End of the *Imperatritsa Mariia*: Negligence or Sabotage?" (Westwood, John N., "The End of the *Imperatritsa Mariia*: Negligence or Sabotage?" in *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 1979, pp. 66-75).
- 55 Stébline-Kamensky, *1914-1918 Karadeniz'de Mayn Harbi*, p. 29.

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# BEING CAUGHT BETWEEN “ANTHROPOLOGY AT HOME” AND “ANTHROPOLOGY ABROAD”: AN OVERVIEW OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITIONS OF ETHNO-ANTHROPOLOGISTS IN THE BALKAN AT THE TURN OF THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

This paper explores the epistemological vantage points used by ethno-anthropologists at the semiperiphery, by focusing on the discussion of *zadruga* (a large cooperative household in the mountainous regions of the Balkan, which existed during the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries). Starting from Strathern's (1987) distinction between “anthropologists abroad” and “anthropologists at home”, which is based on different ways of learning from socio-cultural differences, the paper demonstrates that ethno-anthropologists from the Balkan could occupy either of these two positions, as well as those of a nationalist intellectual, or a combination and reversal of these positions. Such multiplicity of epistemological choices for the scholars in the Balkan is probably the result of working in the semiperiphery (Blagojević 2009; Blagojević and Yair 2010). While it is potentially enriching, it also means that ethno-anthropology in the Balkan is difficult to capture as a distinct epistemological standpoint.

**Keywords:** ethnology, anthropology, ethnography, semiperiphery, nativity, *zadruga*

## Introduction

Do ethnology and anthropology constitute the same discipline or not (Prca 1998/1999, Milenković 2008)? What about social anthropology and cultural anthropology? Is “ethnography” the name of a discipline, or the name of a research approach? The responses to these, and similar, questions largely depend on whom you ask, when, and where. For

instance, “ethnography” has been the name of a dominant approach to fieldwork in the Anglo-Saxon socio-cultural anthropology since the First World War, but it was also used as the name of a whole discipline in the former Soviet Union (Hann et al. 2007). To make things more complicated, socio-cultural anthropology is nowadays faced with calls to abandon the term “ethnography” in favour of “participant observation”, in order to distinguish long term anthropological research from qualitative research conducted by sociologists, international relations scholars and other social scientists who also claim to do ethnography (Ingold 2014). What about anthropology? While several decades ago, the distinction between “social anthropology” and “cultural anthropology” seemed to be “irksome” (Levi Strauss 1963: 354), these terms are today predominantly understood as equivalents. “Social anthropology” and “cultural anthropology” are largely perceived as the same discipline, with certain differences in emphasis and historical trajectories in different countries.

In the last several decades, ethnology and anthropology started to refer to the same discipline across Eastern Europe. The contemporary theoretical, methodological, and empirical issues in ethnology can, but do not have to, differ from those in anthropology. However, if we take into account institutional set ups, ethnology and anthropology still seem to be different, in an important way (Buchowski 2004, 2012). Namely, doing ethno-anthropology at one of its centres means that one usually can avoid dealing with, or reflecting upon, this multiplicity of names and ideas concerning what constituted a discipline. A socio-cultural anthropologist fully educated in the US, for instance, could potentially spend her whole anthropological career without ever getting in close touch with ethnological departments, journals, book series, and other elements of disciplinary infrastructure of ethnology. However, an ethno-anthropologist educated in Serbia, for instance, would be enrolled in a department of “Ethnology and Anthropology”, where she would learn different disciplinary histories and how they converged towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, from certain positions, ethnology and anthropology are clearly different kinds of endeavour, while from some other perspectives they refer to the same discipline.

In this paper, I will use the term “ethno-anthropology” as an umbrella term for socio-cultural anthropology, ethnography, ethnology, and their variations. From this short overview of disciplinary names, we can see that ethno-anthropology does not have a sense of distinctiveness on a global level. Broadly speaking, the trajectories of the terms “ethnology”,

“ethnography”, “anthropology” have been shaped by different intellectual traditions and disciplinary canons, as much as by unequal power relationships between disciplines and socio-political conditions of knowledge production. The concept of “world anthropologies” (Restrepo and Escobar 2005) is useful for thinking about ethno-anthropology as a polycentric discipline with multiple histories, origins, methodological assumptions, and political implications. It focuses on “the multiple and contradictory historical, social, cultural and political locatedness of the different communities of anthropologists and their anthropologies” (Restrepo and Escobar 2005: 100).

Bearing this in mind, this paper looks at how ethno-anthropologists in different positions produced knowledge and to whom they directed their criticisms. More specifically, the paper explores some of the arguments developed during the discussion of *zadruga* (a large cooperative household in the mountainous regions of the Balkan, which existed during the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries). It focuses on the epistemological strategies of producing ethnological and anthropological knowledge on the Balkan at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially by the so-called native scholars. It suggests that, while there is no need to distinguish ethnology and anthropology as separate disciplines, there are important specificities in the ways of learning from and about socio-cultural differences which are employed by anthropologists at home, anthropologists abroad, and ethno-anthropologists (cf. Strathern 1987). Starting from Strathern’s distinction between anthropologists abroad (who aim to learn from the “non-Western” specificities in order to critically reflect upon “our, modernist, Western” ways of doing things), and anthropologists at home (who aim to discover difference and strangeness in the “Western” worldviews, as the social context in which anthropological analytical tools were developed in the first place), the paper demonstrates that ethno-anthropologists from the Balkan could occupy either of these two positions, as well as two others. An ethno-anthropologist from the Balkan, who ethnographically explores the Balkan, could occupy the position of an “anthropologist abroad”, an “anthropologist at home”, she could be a nationalist intellectual (who does not attempt to learn from socio-cultural difference at all), or she could combine and reverse the positions. Such multiplicity of epistemological choices for the scholars in the Balkan is probably the result of working in the semiperiphery (Blagojević 2009; Blagojević and Yair 2010). While it is potentially enriching, it also means that ethno-anthropology in the Balkan is difficult to capture as a distinct epistemological standpoint.

## Ethnology and anthropology

The relationship between “ethnology” and “anthropology” has had a complex history and geopolitics. Namely, in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century the distinction between ethnology and anthropology seemed to be relatively straightforward and clear cut – although there were different criteria for distinguishing them. For instance, Mihailescu (2007) suggests that “anthropology” referred solely to the field of physical anthropology in Romania – and something similar was the case in other Eastern European countries (see Turda 2010). In France, Levi Strauss has suggested that ethnography, ethnology, and anthropology “are in fact three stages, or three moments of time, in the same line of investigation, and preference for one or another of these only means that attention is concentrated on one type of research, which can never exclude the other two” (1963: 356). In his reading, ethnography “corresponds to the first stages in research - observation and description, field work” (Levi Strauss 1963: 354). Ethnology is a second stage, characterized by a comparative perspective, since it:

represents a first step toward synthesis. Without excluding direct observation, it leads toward conclusions sufficiently comprehensive to preclude, or almost to preclude, their being based solely on first-hand information. The synthesis may be of three kinds: geographical, if information about neighboring groups is to be collated; historical, if the purpose is to reconstruct the past of one or several peoples; systematic, if one type of technique, custom, or institution is selected for special attention”. (Levi Strauss 1963: 355)

As the last stage of a research, social or cultural anthropology has the widest theoretical ambitions. In Levi Strauss’s reading, social and cultural anthropology is:

linked to a second and final stage of the synthesis, based upon ethnographical and ethnological conclusions. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, anthropology aims at a global knowledge of man – embracing the subject in its full historical and geographical extension, seeking knowledge applicable to the whole of human evolution from, let us say, *Hominidae* to the races of today, and leading to conclusions which may be either positive or negative but which are valid for all human societies, from the large modern city to the smallest Melanesian tribe. (1963: 355)



In the US, Hofer (1968) offered a different kind of a distinction, using researcher's nativity as a criterion. In his reading, ethnology (or European national ethnography) presents "the study of one's own culture", while anthropology is "the study of other cultures". While "national ethnographers" (ethnologists) are focused on accumulating data, anthropologists are more concerned with comparative perspective and therefore more mobile, conceptually as well as psychically:

This statement, I think, expresses the extreme mobility of American anthropologists, which is perhaps characteristic not only of their theories, but of their whole way of life. The theoretical orientation of the discipline as a whole, coupled with a continual search for the new, makes too long a cultivation of fields nonproductive and forces the anthropologist to slash and burn. These traits are in general missing from European ethnography. European ethnographers are not as mobile as their American colleagues. Geographically, their activities are confined for the most part to a single country, or perhaps only to a specific area of a country. They tend to make fewer theoretical statements, usually of a more limited range, than the anthropologists do. Scholars earn recognition with voluminous works that systematize great bodies of data. The period before obsolescence of scientific publications is by far longer than seems to be the case with anthropological literature. National ethnographers may be compared to granaries where generations of ethnographers, one after the other, hoard and preserve their knowledge. Ethnography is a cumulative discipline, like history. (Hofer 1968: 313–314)

After the end of the Cold War, ethnology and anthropology have started to be seen as the same discipline from some vantage points, but not from others. Whilst a sharp distinction between ethnology and anthropology is nowadays untenable, some of it shapes contemporary understandings of what constitutes fieldwork and of what constitutes an anthropologist in both Anglo-Saxon and Eastern European anthropologies and ethnologies (Prica 2001). For instance, since the aims, methods, theoretical and empirical scopes of ethnology and anthropology are taken to be the same in contemporary Serbia or Croatia, "ethnology" is there often used as a synonym with anthropology (Radojičić 2005, Milenković 2006, Čapo Žmegač et. al 2006). Yet, sometimes the term "ethnology" serves as a proxy for old-school, positivist, anti-theoretical collection of data about a "nation" or a "people", and then it is contrasted to theoretical and/or political aspirations of social anthropology (Buchowski 2004, Skovajsa 2008).

## **Ethnology and native anthropology**

The first departments, institutes, and publications in ethnology as well as anthropology were opened at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Mihăilescu, Iliev and Naumović 2005). Ethnology originated as an attempt to learn about the “internal Other”, that is, about peasants and other groups of people living within a nation-state, but outside of the urban centres (Ssorin Chaikov 2003). Since peasants were understood as “the embodiment of the nation” (Halpern and Hammel 1969: 18), early 20<sup>th</sup> century ethnology was perceived as a nation-building science (Stocking 1982).<sup>2</sup> Anthropology, on the other hand, originated as an attempt to learn about the “colonised Other”, that is about colonised populations which were presumably radically different from the European colonisers (Stocking 1982).<sup>3</sup>

The directions of the two traditions intersected towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. On the one hand, many departments of ethnology across Eastern Europe were renamed and changed curricula so as to incorporate topics, approaches, and bodies of literature produced in Anglo-Saxon anthropologies (Tužinská 2008). This has disturbed assumptions about what counts as ethnology/anthropology and who an ethnologist/anthropologist is (Kürti 1996). This issue remains open for negotiation (Hann et al. 2007), and is affected by various bureaucratic conundrums (Prica 1998/1999), new hierarchies of knowledge (Buchowski 2004), and various understandings of the meanings and uses of ethnography (Milenković 2008).

On the other hand, Anglo-Saxon anthropologies “returned home” and started researching places and topics in the West, including production of anthropology itself (Peirano 1998, Marcus and Fischer 1999). The concepts of “native anthropology” and “anthropology at home” have their roots in the historical development of the discipline in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, namely, in the relocation of anthropological interests towards the western countries in Europe and the North America (Peirano 1998). This relocation of intellectual interests was partly a consequence of wider socio- and geo-political changes, such as the end of colonial governance and the waves of migration to the Western Europe and North America (Ryang 1997). Although the concepts of “native anthropology” and “anthropology at home” illuminate some relations between a particular researcher and the people she worked with, they cannot be used as a straightforward explanation of a researcher’s position, since they require

further determination of a frame of reference: native to what? What kind of home is in question (Narayan 1993)?

As Ryang (1997) demonstrates, anthropologists are never simply “native”, but can be native to something. A large body of literature has discussed and criticised the relative importance and unimportance of nativeness for the anthropological learning process. While native anthropologists “are believed to write about their own cultures from a position of intimate affinity” (Narayan 1993: 671), strong anthropological criticisms of the notion of culture as a discrete, homogeneous whole (Wright 1998; Abu Lughod 1991; Kuper 1999) opened up many problematizations of this idea. For example, Abu Lughod wrote about *halfies*: “people whose national or cultural identity is mixed by virtue of migration, overseas education, or parentage” (1991: 137). Narayan goes a step further and claims that “two halves cannot adequately account for the complexity of an identity in which multiple countries, regions, religions, and classes may come together” (1993: 673). Instead, she argues for viewing “each anthropologist in terms of shifting identifications amid a field of interpenetrating communities and power relations” (Narayan 1993: 671). The “intimate affinity” with the field should not be read just in terms of citizenship, or national belonging. Intimate affinity can be the result of various shared social positions, including gender, sexuality, race, age, class, and so forth. Assuming that “anthropology at home” is, above all, anthropology conducted in one’s own country, or national group, reflects methodological nationalism, or “the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002: 301). Let us take a brief look at alternative accounts of the difference between “anthropology at home” and “anthropology abroad”.

### **Learning through contrivance versus producing self-knowledge**

Strathern (1987) argues that there is a significant difference between “anthropology abroad” and “auto-anthropology” (or “anthropology at home”), and that it has not much to do with nativity, intimacy, or familiarity of the researcher with the field in which she is conducting ethnographic research. Rather, for Strathern, the difference is epistemological: it stems from different approaches to the production and organization of knowledge. *Anthropology abroad* means trying to make sense of radical

socio-cultural difference, to learn through the strange and the awkward. In other words, the aim of anthropology abroad is to de-exoticize the non-Western people by demonstrating that non-modernist practices, which may seem weird and counter-intuitive to the observers used to modernist categories, actually present reasonable and logical actions in a particular socio-historical context. To show that “their” strangeness, awkwardness, and contrivance make sense in “their” specific socio-cultural and historical context suggests that “our” concepts, practices, and relationships which seem so natural to “us” are also artificial, socio-culturally constructed, and dependent on history (and thus, implicitly, that they can be changed for the better). This has been a classic move of anthropology understood as a cultural critique:

In using portraits of other cultural patterns to reflect self-critically on our own ways, anthropology disrupts common sense and makes us reexamine our taken-for-granted assumptions. (Marcus and Fischer 1999: 1)

The “we” of this sentence clearly refers to English speaking readership of socio-cultural anthropology in the West. This is not just a matter of a coincidence, or pragmatics. Anthropological thought developed in a particular modernist setting – that of Anglo-American and French intellectual traditions. Broad assumption that modernity has brought with itself a radical break with enchantedness and relatedness of the world has had a huge effect on anthropology: contemporary socio-cultural anthropology very often sees itself as an endeavour of translating between “their” enchantedness and relatedness and “our” [Western] neat, modernist, clear-cut, “purified” categories of ordering the world (Da Col and Graeber 2011). This is why Strathern claims that, as long as anthropologists are doing anthropology – that is, as long as anthropologists rely on anthropological analytical apparatuses and forms of thinking – it does not really matter whether they are “native” and where they come from:

Whether anthropologists are at home *qua* anthropologists, is not to be decided by whether they call themselves Malay, belong to the Travellers or have been born in Essex; it is decided by the relationship between their techniques of organizing knowledge and how people organize knowledge about themselves. (1987: 31)

To state it shortly, an anthropologist is doing anthropology abroad when she researches the non-modernist, “weird”, and “awkward” social practices by revealing their underlying social logics and principles. Anthropology at home, however, involves another way of dealing with socio-cultural difference and, therefore, another approach to creating knowledge. An anthropologist “at home” tries to find difference and strangeness in the social context that is familiar to her and her readers. The goal of anthropology “at home” is to expose the known and the intimate as artificial and socio-culturally produced, thus challenging the worldview which belongs both to the anthropologist and to the readers. The aim of making one’s own concepts awkward and unusual is the same as the aim of anthropology abroad: it is to show the inherent artificiality, contrivance, and socio-historical situatedness of all human concepts, practices, and relationships.

Since anthropology is closely related to Western modernist analytical categories, Strathern implies that anthropology at home can be conducted only by “Western” anthropologists working in the “West” – the social setting which produced the forms of reasoning and categorical apparatuses used in anthropology. She argues this means that auto-anthropologists are in a different position from, for example, Malay anthropologists working in a Malay society. A Malay anthropologist would employ analytical apparatuses and forms of thinking which did not stem from “Malay” intellectual traditions, but from the traditions of the Western modernity. Anthropologist at home, on the other hand, produces self-knowledge because she would use modernist knowledge practices (of anthropology) generated from the social setting that she studies (Western modernity).<sup>4</sup>

Strathern’s interpretation of the distinction between “auto-anthropology” and “anthropology abroad” is very useful for thinking about the relationship between anthropologists who conduct ethnographic research abroad and those who do fieldwork close to their place of residence. However, it raises an issue of knowledge practices of Eastern European ethno-anthropologists, especially those from the Balkan. How did Eastern European, and particularly Balkan, ethno-anthropologists learn from socio-cultural difference, if at all? When they ethnographically studied social practices in their own countries, did they attempt to de-exoticize the “weird” and the “unusual” practices of peasant groups? Did they attempt to find differences in the intimately familiar? Did they engage with differences in some third way? Eastern Europe has had its own alternative frameworks of modernity – most notably those of communist

and socialist modernities (Gaonkar 2001; Collier 2011). The assumptions and categories of the alternative modernities cannot be directly translated onto the assumptions and categories of the Western European modernity – there are many similarities, but there are also important differences. All of this has implications for the production of ethno-anthropological knowledge in the Balkan.

Taking into account Strathern's distinction, in the rest of the paper I will discuss how Balkan ethnologists working "at home" engaged with contrivance, when they did so. I would also like to suggest that asking such questions about ethno-anthropologists in the Balkan reveals the importance of the direction of the anthropological criticism and of its intended audience. The scope of the "we" in an ethno-anthropological account shapes its line of argumentation and its way of learning from socio-cultural difference. As we have seen so far, social anthropology / cultural anthropology / ethnology / ethnography is not a singular body of knowledge. Different intellectual anthropological/ethnological traditions allow researchers to engage with different questions, while leaving aside some others. Besides the researcher's positions in the "field" and her educational background, the kind of "we" that she uses – to whom her analysis and criticism is directed – affects how she engages with contrivance, and thus how she organizes knowledge in an ethno-anthropological account.

### **Depending on who they write for, ethno-anthropologists engage with difference in different ways**

By "ethno-anthropologists from the Balkan" I refer to people who have completed at least an element of their professional career in a scientific institution which is located somewhere in the Balkan. The criterion for an "ethno-anthropologist from the Balkan" in this discussion is whether a person had to fulfil requirements posed by a scientific institution in the Balkan in order to successfully complete some part of their professional life – this may be undergraduate or postgraduate studies, postdoctoral fellowship, a lectureship, professorship, and so forth. Therefore, in this discussion the citizenship or ethno-national senses of belonging of a researcher are irrelevant (i.e. an "ethno-anthropologist from the Balkan" is not necessarily someone who has, for instance, Serbian citizenship, or someone who feels ethno-nationally like a Bulgarian, unless they

completed undergraduate studies in Serbia, or they were promoted to the associate professorship by an ethno-anthropological institute in Bulgaria). Taking that into account, let us consider several different ways of engaging with socio-cultural difference which are employed by ethno-anthropologists from the Balkan with respect to the institution of *zadruga* (a cooperative).

### ***Anthropologists abroad: Law versus ethnography***

First, ethno-anthropologists may take the position of anthropologists abroad, if they aim to demonstrate that modernist categories oppress and fail to capture relationality and messiness of everyday life and local knowledge (often for the English speaking audience). This is the epistemological move of anthropology abroad: it learns about ("their") small-scale, grassroots, locally grounded relationships in order to criticize ("our") modernist concepts and dominant academic or political discourses. This is probably why ethno-anthropological works which employ this approach communicate well with ethnographic works conducted in other places. A case in point is the work of Milenko Filipović.

*Zadruga* is a neologism coined by Vuk Karadžić in 1818 (*Serbian Dictionary*), to refer to large family households which consisted of several families, counting from 7-8 to 100 people in certain cases. *Zadruga* was practiced in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries in parts of contemporary Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia, and western Bulgaria. There is an enormous body of ethno-anthropological, legal, sociological, and other kind of scholarly works about *zadruga* from the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which focus largely on the origins, functions, and characteristics of *zadruga* (Novaković 2005; Byrnes 1976; Vittorelli 2002). Nowadays more or less accepted views suggest that *zadruga* is not a *longue duree* institution present among all "South Slav" groups. In historical terms, *zadruga* can be traced back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century and any discussion about its earlier origins remains in the domain of speculation. In geographic and geopolitical terms, *zadruga* is not related to a particular religious denomination or ethno-national group, but presents a context specific response to the mountainous life style (Todorova 1993).

Filipović (1991) asserts that the legal definition of *zadruga* which is used in the Civic Law in Serbia from 1844 does not correspond to the everyday practices: the Law ratifies „the regulations on inheritance and property which have created a confusion and much damaged *zadruga*

as an institution" (cited in Miljković Matić 2012: 165). Namely, the Law considers *zadruga* as a community founded upon three categories: kinship, property, and residence.<sup>5</sup> Filipović's ethnographic work, on the other hand, demonstrates that in everyday life and from villagers' perspectives, *zadruga* did not have to be a community of kin, or a community of residence. Some *zadruga* (plural of *zadruga*) consisted of families which were not directly related by kinship (Filipović calls this a non-kinship cooperative, or *nesrodnička zadruga*), while in other *zadruga*, families lived in two or more places (a divided cooperative, or *predvojena zadruga*). Additionally, while property was shared among members of all *zadruga*, there were several principles which regulated how property should be used and inherited. Therefore, in Filipović's view, a *zadruga* was a community of shared subsistence – its main characteristic is that all its members worked together to secure their shared livelihoods. Since the Civic Law from 1844 was still in force in 1945, when Filipović was writing his study, he used ethnographic data to criticize "the adaptation of people's understandings and institutions to the legal regulations" which has occurred during the past hundred years.

Filipović's intervention presents a case of what Stathern calls "anthropology abroad" – it demonstrates that there is a fine logic and sensible reasoning behind an institution which was often perceived as "the manifestation of a lower civilization" (see Rakitsch 1914, in Vittorelli 2002). Understood as a "cultural other" to the urban nuclear family, *zadruga* was often taken as an indicator of impeded modernization of people who live in the Balkan (*ibid.*). By demonstrating that *zadruga* was founded upon clear economic principles of shared subsistence, Filipović finds economic rationality in the practice which seems "backward" from modernist vantage points. Furthermore, he offers a cultural critique of rigid modernist legal definitions, by contrasting them to the everyday forms of knowledge and practice. In his reading, the 1844 Civic Law in Serbia, written under the strong influence of Western European legislature, fails to understand the principles of local non-modernist categories of family life and subsistence. Thus, as a social scientist who also published in English, Filipović engaged in ethno-anthropology as a cultural critique: he used "portraits of other [villagers'] cultural patterns to reflect self-critically on our own [urban modernist] ways" (Marcus and Fischer 1999: 1), disrupting common sense in the process and making political and legal elites in the country and abroad to re-examine their taken-for-granted assumptions about what a family is, or what it should be.



***Anthropologists at home: Finding difference in what seems to be the same***

Second, ethno-anthropologists may take the position of anthropologists at home, if they write for the audience in a Balkan country, with the aim to find something strange and counterintuitive in the known and the familiar. Since these works are usually not written in English language and since they are directed primarily for the audience in the Balkan, their relevance is often judged as local and area specific – although if geopolitical constellations were different, some of these works may be judged as having global anthropological relevance. As Blagojević reminds us: “an innovation in the social and political change has a very similar destiny as innovation in science: the location determines the appropriate timing and recognition, as feminist critique has convincingly shown” (2009: 37). Let us take a look at Valtazar Bogišić’s discussion of *zadruga*.

Bogišić’s (1884) analysis focuses on similarities and differences in family types which are called the urban family (*varoška porodica*), large rural family household (*zadruga*), and rural nuclear family (*inokoština*). Many authors, including Vuk Karadžić, defined *zadruga* as an “antithesis” to a nuclear family (Bogišić 1884: 20). Nuclear family was often understood as urban, modern, and European, while *zadruga* was largely perceived as specific to a village life, *longue duree*, and South Slav. In light of such oppositions, it does not surprise that *inokoština*, or a village family which consisted only of parents and their children, was understood as more or less the same type as an urban nuclear family. However, Bogišić demonstrates that “everywhere where we can find *zadruga*, we can also find *inokoština* as its correlative” (Bogišić 1884: 13-14).

Namely, Bogišić looks at the property rights in these three family types which were practiced in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. First, in an urban nuclear family, father had an unlimited right to use the whole property without consulting any other family member; in *zadruga*, the head of the household had no right to use property without an explicit approval of all adult members; in *inokoština*, the father had no right to use property without an explicit approval of his sons.

Second, in an urban nuclear family, the father could draft a will to regulate the property inheritance after his death; the heads of *zadruga* and *inokoština* households could not do that (since here property belonged to a family, rather than to an individual).

Third, even after he got sick or incapacitated, the father of the urban nuclear family (or his representative) remained the manager of the family matters; the head of the *zadruga* household could be replaced at any point when all other *zadruga* members saw it fit; father of *inokoština* household could be replaced by one of his sons if he proved to be incapable to fulfill his duties.

Fourth, no one but the father in an urban nuclear family had the right to decide upon dividing property; in *zadruga*, any male adult member could request his share of *zadruga* property whenever he liked; in *inokoština*, sons could ask for their share whenever they wanted (which is usually after they got married), and the father got an equal share with his sons.

Fifth, after the death of the father of an urban nuclear family, property was divided among other family members, which means that with his death, the family household also came to an end; in *zadruga*, after the household head died, another one was elected and *zadruga* continued to function as before; *inokoština* also continued to exist as before after the father's death, if his sons decided to remain in the cooperative (which they were free to leave during father's life).

Taking into account these qualities of social relationships, Bogišić argues that *zadruga* and *inokoština* present two different points in the cyclical development of the same rural family type, rather than an antithesis of one another. Depending on a variety of circumstances, including wars and poverty, the number of people in *zadruga* could drop to those of *inokoština* (parents and their children). And *vice versa* – *inokoština* easily transforms into a *zadruga* when sons get married. The quality of social relations in *zadruga* and *inokoština* is the same in Bogišić's view, which is why they present two points in the cycle of a same family type. Furthermore, although it may look the same as urban nuclear family, *inokoština* is drastically different from it: "In our opinion, it is illogical to *a priori* deduce the sameness of the principle from the similarity in the external form" (Bogišić 1884: 13).

If we look at Bogišić's work through the lens of Strathern's terminology, we could say that he was doing "anthropology at home". In demonstrating that social relationships in *inokoština* were not the same as social relationships in the urban nuclear family (although they looked the same), Bogišić found something counterintuitive and unusual in the known and familiar. His analytical insight that *inokoština* presents a point in the cyclical development of *zadruga* household, and not a version of urban nuclear family, was also intended as a cultural critique of the existing

legislature (Bogišić 1844: 7-12; 22-35). However, Bogišić's analysis of similarities and differences of family types was not the same as Filipović's. Filipović found a difference between the modernist legal definition and the ethnographic knowledge of non-modern practice of *zadruga*, and he claimed this difference was oppressive. Bogišić found a difference in what looked the same to many domestic and foreign scholars – *inokoština* and the urban nuclear family – and argued this perceived similarity was oppressive.

***Nationalist intellectuals: No attempt to learn from socio-cultural differences***

Third, ethno-anthropologists may take the position of nationalist intellectuals, if they do not attempt to learn from socio-cultural difference and, therefore, do not criticize, but rather celebrate the everyday life and concepts in the Balkan. Probably the majority of ethnological works in the Balkan produced in the 20<sup>th</sup> century could be placed in this category. For instance, a lawyer Ivan Strohal (1909) discussed *zadruga* as an institution which reflects the ethno-national character of South Slavs. He criticized romanticist interpretations of *zadruga* as a practice which originated thousands years ago, in India. He contended that such attempts to make a link with the "golden past" have hurt *zadruga* in the eyes of the Western observers, who then assumed that these are "primitive, cruel regulations that exist only among the people at the lowest stage of cultural development" (Strohal 1909: 228). He asserts that *zadruga* demonstrates South Slav altruism: "It is a fact that Slav peoples have two legal regulations that could exist only among the people with a strong sense of altruism" (Strohal 1909: 229).

***Combining and reversing positions***

Fourth, ethno-anthropologists from the Balkan may attempt to combine and reverse the positions. They may decide to critically engage with locally specific, non-modernist forms of knowledge and practice on the basis of political exclusivity, elitism, or oppressiveness. For instance, this could mean exploring gender-based differences and inequalities in *zadruga*, and thus taking the position of a critically engaged scholar.

Something similar was attempted by Rakitsch (1914, in Vittorelli 2002), who criticized patriarchal "backwardness" of *zadruga* by contrasting it

to the “civilized” modernist nuclear forms of family. The potential for feminist criticism of *zadruga* was thus significantly weakened, because it was framed in evolutionary terms. Rakitsch placed the modernist, middle class, Western European family as the desirable goal of family transformation in the Balkan, disregarding forms of oppression which characterized the middle class family at the time. Had Rakitsch managed to frame the criticism of gender inequalities and patriarchal character of *zadruga* without such yearning for modernity, she would have offered a radical critique of the existing political and economic frameworks of family life, and opened up possibilities for creating alternative ones, which would have been useful both for the Balkan and for Europe more broadly.

However, the combination and reversal of epistemological positions is perhaps more adequate to describe the work of contemporary ethno-anthropologists, than those at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For instance, today they may decide to look at the differences between socialist and post-socialist practices, where it is unclear which one would be “theirs” or “more local”, and which one would be “ours”, or “more modern”, and in what way. Or they may decide to critically approach neoliberal experimentation in their countries, by looking at how new forms of economy and governance get translated into the existing forms of sociality and relatedness, directing the criticism both towards the “more local” and towards the “more global” actors. And so forth.

As we can see, there is a variety of epistemological options for ethno-anthropologists from the Balkan. The same person can employ several of these options in different publications or research projects. This multiplicity of perspectives is the result of the semi-peripheral status of the Balkan.

## **Producing ethno-anthropology in the Balkan**

Blagojević (2009) suggests that production of knowledge at the semiperiphery is a process usually subsumed under two larger, already existing discourses. It is either subsumed under discussions of knowledge production at the core (in comparison to which it appears to be slow and unoriginal), or it is subsumed under postcolonial discussions of creating knowledge at the periphery (where it seems to be too specific and, therefore, useful only for comparisons). Focusing on knowledge production in gender studies, Blagojević argues that the semiperiphery needs its own specific standpoint epistemology “in order to become part of conversation

and exchange, and not just a poor copyist of theory produced elsewhere". The "core" in her discussion refers largely to the former Western European colonial centers, while the "periphery" refers to the former colonies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The semiperiphery is, then, the space of "Non-'White' Whites, Non-European Europeans" (Blagojević 2009: 27). It has characteristics of both the core and the periphery, which makes it a large scale social hybrid: "In a comparison to the core, the semiperiphery is in a condition of 'being different, but not being different enough', while from the perspective of the periphery, the semiperiphery is 'different, and not similar enough'" (Blagojević 2009: 37). Blagojević suggests that the hegemonic interpretations of differences between the core and the periphery rely on racial or cultural terms; however, the differences between the core and the semiperiphery are hegemonically understood in temporal terms. Namely, semiperiphery is assumed to be struck by slow, impeded, and never fully achieved modernization: "It is essentially shaped by the effort to catch up with the core, on one hand, and to resist the integration into the core, so not to lose its cultural characteristics, on the other hand" (Blagojević 2009: 33-34).

This sense of temporal stagnation forms of the basis of hegemonic discourse on the Balkan as well. The Balkan is most often presented as semi-developed, semi-modern, and inherently ambiguous: if orientalism is a discourse about imputed opposition, balkanism is a discourse about imputed ambiguity (Todorova 2009). While balkanism is most powerfully present in journalist accounts, travelogues, fine literature and other elements of cultural history of the Balkan, it does not just affect how things seem, but also how they are. This hegemonic view has become internalized and today it shapes a lot of self-understanding of the Balkan *vis a vis* the hegemonic categories of the West and the East (Bakić Hayden 1995; Jansen 2001; Obad 2012).

The reason for this sense of temporal stagnation and of the need to "catch up" with the core is largely structural. The semiperiphery:

is in its essence transitional, in a process of the transition from one set of structures to another set of structures, and therefore, it is unstable, and often has characteristics of the void, chaos, or the structurelessness. (...) The social change at the semiperiphery is either too fast or too ambivalent, or both at the same time, to enable creation of the stable structures. Often it is not even the real social change, as much as it is 'eventfulness', an illusion of change created on the very surface of the social life, while in

deeper layers things remain the same, unchanged. (...) Semiperiphery often find itself in a condition of 'permanent reform', which in reality means that one reform is following the other while the previous has not been finalized, nor its effects explored (...) A gaze from a historical distance (...) could reveal an overall repetition of unfinished reforms, constant cyclical trials which end up often at a lower level than where they started from. (Blagojević 2009: 34-36)

This structural condition of repetition of unfinished reforms in the Balkan means that different modernist and non-modernist frameworks enter unpredictable assemblages, in which the meanings and practices of a number of concepts is negotiable, including "the everyday", "legality", "modern", "traditional", "socio-cultural sameness", "socio-cultural difference", "historical difference", and so forth. This is why Blagojević argues that studying the semiperiphery implies almost a different epistemic approach: "it is the search for the nucleus of social change which really is an issue" (2009: 39). As the result, producing the semiperiphery offers a variety of possibilities to engage with and to learn from socio-cultural difference. While this is potentially enriching, it also means that ethno-anthropology in the Balkan is difficult to capture as a distinct epistemological standpoint. This may be a task for any future thinking about ethno-anthropological knowledge in the Balkan.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The text includes excerpts from the article 'Epistemological Eclecticism: Difference and the 'Other' in the Balkans and Beyond' published in the journal 'Anthropological Theory', November 20, 2017.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499617741063>
- <sup>2</sup> Naumović suggests that native Balkan ethnological researchers were in the position of double insiders: "they in principle belong to the group they study, and share its language, traditions, dominant values, and interests, while simultaneously belonging to the special social subgroup of their group, whose task is to study, consolidate, invent, and eventually, defend the 'cause' of their group" (1998: 101). In many different contexts, the task of ethnologists was to collect pieces of the 'puzzle' of how the modernised, urbanised members of a nation presumably lived in past, which means that ethnology was expected to "confirm that there really existed a nation (by enforcing cultural and linguistic unity upon heterogeneous peasant populations)" (Naumović 1998: 108).
- <sup>3</sup> At first, the radical difference was explained temporally – the colonized populations presumably embodied the past stages of human evolution and therefore, indicated what Europeans used to be like in the past. Later on, the radical difference between the anthropologist and people she researched was explained by evoking the concept of culture and socialization (see Mihailescu 2007).
- <sup>4</sup> However, a number of contemporary ethno-anthropologists claim they are doing auto-anthropology, because their research is "carried out in the social context which produced it" (Strathern 1987: 17). For instance, Gulin Zrnić suggests that in her research "the process of 'going native' takes a new orientation – 'going strange'" (2004: 4)
- <sup>5</sup> Serbian Civic Law, article 507 defines that "*Zadruga* is where there is a mixture of shared residence and property, related by kinship or adoption, by nature established and confirmed" (*Zadruga je onde, gde je smesa zajedničkog života i imanja svezom srodstva ili usvojenjem po prirodi osnovana i utvrđena*). Available at: [https://sr.wikisource.org/sr-el/%D0%A1%D1%80%D0%BF%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8\\_%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%92%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8\\_%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA\\_-\\_D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB](https://sr.wikisource.org/sr-el/%D0%A1%D1%80%D0%BF%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8_%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%92%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8_%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA_-_D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB)

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# PASSPORTISM: XENOPHOBIA FROM DISCOURSE TO POLICY

## Abstract

The beginning of the twentyfirst century has brought an intensifying rise of what is commonly known as xenophobia on a worldwide scale. Xenophobic sentiments are nowadays commonly used in a propagation of a discriminatory discourse, commonly as a means to achieving electoral support, eventually reaching the status of official state policy. This article explores several discursive cases regarding contemporary xenophobia, as well as xenophobic policy. In addition, it argues a lack of an appropriate designation referring to policies of discrimination based on a person's citizenship – that is, passport – offering the term *passportism* as a viable solution.

**Keywords:** passportism, xenophobia, immigration, migrants, refugees, discourse, policy

*Als die Nazis die Kommunisten holten, habe ich geschwiegen; ich war ja kein Kommunist. Als sie die Sozialdemokraten einsperrten, habe ich geschwiegen; ich war ja kein Sozialdemokrat. Als sie die Gewerkschafter holten, habe ich geschwiegen; ich war ja kein Gewerkschafter. Als sie mich holten, gab es keinen mehr, der protestieren konnte.<sup>1</sup>*

Martin Niemöller

On April 20, 2015, an article by Peter Walker in The Guardian spoke about “Europe’s worsening migrant crisis” after a boat of approximately seven hundred “would-be illegal immigrants” from Libya capsized, resulting in what is commonly designated by the euphemism “humanitarian catastrophe”.<sup>2</sup> *Migrant Voice* reported that EU kept “turning a blind eye to refugees”.<sup>3</sup> This instance, however, is one of those in which the EU, due to its policies (or lack thereof) towards migrants sat on the side. Other cases are, nevertheless, much more troubling. On February 5,

2015, Helena Maleno Garzón wrote an article for the *Open Society* (*Why Violence is Flaring at Europe's Border Crossings*).<sup>4</sup> The article wrote about several hundreds of migrants from Africa embarked upon a journey via the Mediterranean sea in order to reach Europe, when they were attacked by the Moroccan armed forces, resulting in fifteen deaths.<sup>5</sup> The report clearly stated that the would-be migrants were killed by Moroccan security forces. However, there was more to the story about what happened when some of the migrants actually succeeded in reaching Spain, that is, the European Union. They reported meeting "violence and brutality ... and then ... the bodies of the dead floating in water". The Spanish Minister of the interior spoke about migrant groups "as the enemies".<sup>6</sup>

In short, the migrants were maltreated both by the Moroccan and the Spanish government. Needless to say, this is only one example of today's treatment of immigrants; the United Nations Refugee Agency stated that a staggering number of at least 3500 immigrants perished at sea in 2014,<sup>7</sup> with an increase of deaths rising after Thomas de Maiziere revoked the *Mare Nostrum* rescue policy. The phenomenon can be dubbed as "xenophobic policy", with the ever increasing iteration of the phrase "Fortress Europe" (Polly Toynbee wrote that if "Europe becomes a fortress against migrants, it fails humanity"<sup>8</sup>).

In addition to policies that directly or indirectly either fail to help immigrants or, on the other side, function against them, there is an ever growing discriminative *discourse* aimed against immigrants arriving to the EU, or simply against "foreigners", immigrants who have already settled down. The press iteratively represents "the alarming figure ... of almost 900,000 irregular immigrants"<sup>9</sup> in the UK, the French Front National speaks up against immigration more often and often, while the German PEGIDA attracts a rather fair number of followers. It is more than common to represent immigrants as "swamping" or "besieging" either Europe, or a particular country.

Xenophobic discourse(s) and policies are related, as discourse leads to the creation of policy. This article will explore some of the contemporary European immigration/xenophobia discourse, as well as some policies of/against immigration.

## The topic

From the point of view of party politics, it can be said that every political party or individual intent on gaining social and political power (or, if they are *in power*, on *keeping* it) enters a particular *discourse* through which his/their main ideas – that should, once in power, become policy, i.e. method(s) of governance) – are propounded and expulsed. After all, from the point of view of political science, the very definition of a political party (at least one of the definitions) is that it represents a group of people intent on gaining political and social power. This discourse is then accepted by like-minded individuals and often put forth vigorously through the media, most commonly the press, television and the Internet.

In the words of Van Dijk, “politicians participate in more subtle forms of elite racism when they present immigration and minority relations as essentially problematic, if not threatening, while defining refugees, immigrants, or minorities as a main cause of many societal problems.”<sup>10</sup> In other words, they promote a particular type of derogatory, exclusive and discriminatory discourse that is presented as the mode of governance/policy. According to Van Dijk, we are talking about “a complex societal system of inequality in which immigrants and other ethnic/racial minorities (mostly from the South) systematically have less access to, or control over, society’s power resources such as adequate conditions of residence, housing, employment, welfare, education, safety, knowledge, and status”<sup>11</sup>, which is a problem that many have pointed out.<sup>12</sup>

## Nominal issues

*Xenophobia* is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as “fear or hatred of strangers or foreigners”. Xenophobic sentiments are often, however, referred to as “racist”, in both academic and public discourse, as there is a clear problem with terminology. Similar to *homophobia*, the term *xenophobia*, however, fails to properly denote the phenomenon. Namely, the use of the Greek stem “phobia” *primarily* denotes *fear*, while in reality we tend to analyze and combat the *hatred* towards foreigners and immigrants.

The subject, the ontological ground on which racism – as a mode of discrimination – is being founded upon, *skin color*, is nonetheless being replaced with one’s place of origin, that is, one’s *citizenship*, the primary

means of identifying which is nowadays the *passport*. In other words, instead of “racism”, for the sake of lucidity and clarity, I propose another term in addition – *passportism*.

*Passportism* can thus be broadly defined as the *speech, policy or act of a discriminative nature, in which an individual or a group of individuals are discriminated against on the basis of their citizenship, i.e. passport*. Poetically said, whilst racism discriminates on the basis of the color of a person’s skin, passportism discriminates on the basis of the person’s “passport color”. The importance of having such a term and studying it is further backed by the very fact that there is an increasing number of “passport evaluation” texts that categorize passports by their “power”. The Independent published a piece on the “most powerful passports in the world”, where the passports were “deemed the most valuable with (the) access to countries” they can provide. In addition, the time spent in applying and going through the visa process, depending on one’s citizenship, was also taken into consideration. For instance, “Afghan passport holders must also work 183 hours before they can obtain the document, compared to the one hour of work required in Sweden. British passport holders need to have 11 hours of work under their belts before they can apply,”<sup>13</sup> making the British passport more “powerful” than the Afghan. The transport search comparison site, GoEuro, created an “Ultimate passport ranking”, accounting for visa-free access to countries, the price, and required hours worked at minimum wage to purchase.<sup>14</sup> Sweden made the top of the list, followed by Finland, Germany, United Kingdom and the USA, while countries such as Afghanistan, Liberia and Iraq were positioned at the bottom, indicating that possessing such a passport (citizenship) will disable its holder from travel much more efficiently. In other words, the Afghan passport/citizenship is the most discriminated one in the world – a classic instance of extreme passportism. Passport holders were also asked about what – in their opinion – makes a passport powerful; 75% replied by stating a “visa-free access to countries”, while 25% saw the cost of the passport as the most important instance.<sup>15</sup>

The necessity of such a nominal endeavor is further backed by the fact that the very term “xenophobia” is very often (in academic research as well) used interchangeably with the term “racism”, which is the practice of discriminating on the basis of skin color. Tonči Kuzmanić wrote about “racism (xenophobia) / understanding racism and xenophobia” by simply putting the two as synonyms, claiming also how “in order to produce racist difference today, it is no longer necessary to be of ‘different colour’”.<sup>16</sup>



Even Van Dijk often puts the two together, often within the very same semantic field (“xenophobia and/or racism”<sup>17</sup>). Reisigl and Wodak even ask whether it is at all “possible to distinguish racism from adjacent or possibly overlapping discriminatory phenomena like antisemitism, nationalism, ethnicism and sexism” in a volume where several chapters are dedicated to xenophobia.<sup>18</sup> Albert Memmi defines *racism* in a very broad sense,<sup>19</sup> referring to the “generalised and absolute evaluation of real and fictitious differences ... advantageous to the the ‘accuser’ and detrimental to his or her victim”.<sup>20</sup> However, “in this characterisation, the meaning of racism in the very strict sense is lost”, and the same goes to xenophobia.<sup>21</sup> His own neologism – *heterophobia* – on the other hand (coined in analogy to the term “xenophobia”), “is designated to denote all ‘phobic’ and aggressive constellations that are directed against others, and that are legitimised by different psychological, cultural, social or metaphysical arguments”.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, the problem with the term “heterophobia”, as noticed by Reisigl and Wodak, is exactly the “phobia” contained within, as

the literal meaning of the term ‘heterophobia’ – and this critique is valid for terms like ‘xenophobia’ as well – is rather problematic. First, it neglects the active and aggressive aspect of discrimination and, second, it pathologises racism (and all the other forms of discrimination covered by ‘heterophobia’) through the ‘disease metaphor’ of ‘phobia’, which, as such, plays down racism and, at least implicitly, exculpates racists.<sup>23</sup>

Even “Teun van Dijk does not neatly distinguish between ethnicism, racism, and adjacent forms of discrimination, as he believes these are fuzzy and overlapping concepts”.<sup>24</sup> Jager’s own view somewhat equates Memmi’s heterophobia with a general view of racism, stating that

We always then call something racism when persons who look differently and practice different customs and traditions and/or speak a different language – they are, all in all, considered to be different from the majority of the population – are judged negatively, and if, in addition, this judgement is in accord with the hegemonic discourse of the respective society.<sup>25</sup>

## A discourse analytical perspective

In the words of Žagar, “there is still an ever-widening gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The only forum of analyzing how ‘they’ are seen by ‘us’ involves speech, language, tongue.”<sup>26</sup> This is why a discourse analytical approach might be one of the more efficacious ways in addressing these issue. After all,

what is strikingly absent from conventional studies of politics is attention to the fact that the micro-level behaviours ... are actually kinds of linguistic action – that is, discourse. Equally, the macro-level institutions are types of discourse with specific characteristics – for example, parliamentary debates, broadcast interviews. And constitutions and laws are also discourse – written discourse, or text, of a highly specific type.<sup>27</sup>

Habermas already wrote about the language as a “medium of domination and social force”, one that can “legitimize relations of organized power”.<sup>28</sup> Drawing on Hague and Miller, Chilton concluded that there is a need to explain “how use of language can produce the effects of authority, legitimacy, consensus”, instances all “intrinsic to politics”.<sup>29</sup> In such a manner, there is only one rung on the ladder that leads from discourse to policy, which we will confront further on.

The *discourse historical approach* may be one of the more successful ways in approaching the issues at hand, as it dissects “written and spoken language as a form of social practice”,<sup>30</sup> that is, discourse *and* the policies it creates. A discourse will be defined as “a way of signifying a particular domain of social practice from a particular perspective”,<sup>31</sup> as well as “a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts that manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as ‘texts’”.<sup>32</sup> These texts can be found in the public and political arenas, from political speeches and agendas to critical articles and media coverage of passportism.

## Passportist discourse and the media

The media are nowadays “for most people the only way in which they ever encounter politics”.<sup>33</sup> The interplay and high connectedness

between the media and the political – having in mind that the majority of the political and social discourses are promulgated through the media – has been analyzed aplenty.<sup>34</sup> What is more,

media discourse can be seen as one of the centres for formulating the ‘reality’ of an immigrant ‘policy’, and immigrant politics in the broadest sense. It does not set the tone merely for the state and institutional attitude towards immigrants, but also the ‘policy’, conceived as a web of established and emerging relationships between people with regards to the issue of their general framework, it is not the only one and is not independent of other public discourses which make up the content of political consensus.<sup>35</sup>

In short, the discourse promulgated by the media has a strong tendency of becoming “popular opinion”; without the severe effect the media possess over the population, passportist discourse would probably not be as potent as it is. The discourse is promulgated often by professionals (lobbyists, publicists, PR specialists), after which it enters the public sphere and becomes all-permeating. As Chilton noticed,

political parties and government agencies employ publicists of various kinds, whose role is not merely to control the flow of, and access to information, but also to design and monitor wordings and phrasings, and in this way to respond to challenges or potential challenges. The terms ‘spin’, ‘put a spin on’ and ‘spin doctor’ are terms that reflect the public belief in the existence of and significance of discourse management by hired rhetoricians. The proliferation of mass communication systems has probably simply amplified the importance of a function that is found not only in contemporary societies but in traditional societies also.<sup>36</sup>

That is why the media are nowadays more often seen as the so-called “fourth power”,<sup>37</sup> as they “media people act according to their own interests and, for different reasons, very selectively pick out events thought to be worth communicating to the public, thereby strongly influencing the perception and activities of all social actors involved in the system of public communication.”<sup>38</sup>

In other words, the media create a solipsistic problem, a separate “version” of reality in which immigrants and immigration are presented as “problematic”.

The media construction of reality, which signifies the active creation of a public and political agenda, does not here simply formulate the dominant public opinion and the apparent consensus on the subject, but also – in the mutual complementing of media and other discourses – actively lays down the foundation, the primary principles and the legitimacy for the implementation of national and local policies. The media *poiesis*, one of the main components for creating public policy, acts as a motor for the discourse of ‘normality’ and the normalization of certain problematic methods of public acting. Through methods of differentiation and distinction it successfully delineates the boundaries of ‘acceptability’ for the main line of collective political acting – both by individuals and institutions.<sup>39</sup>

In such a manner did a plethora of ways by which foreigners and immigrants are discriminated against enter not only public and political discourse, but also *policy*, which we are going to concentrate on in the pages to come.

The phenomenon of racism is even more threatening today, as one follows the development of populist parties throughout Western Europe and collects the slogans and arguments that are used to create or reinforce fears in the population. Fear of unemployment, of criminality, of drug abuse, of ‘inundation by foreigners’, of ‘overforeignisation’ are prevalent and are exploited successfully by the media and by politicians.<sup>40</sup>

### **Passportist discourse example – the case of Slovenia**

In a volume about xenophobia in Post-Socialist European countries, Vlasta Jalušić gave a collection of discursive elements regarding immigrants in Slovenia, collected from the press. Among other iterations, there was talk about immigrants “crowding”, “escaping”, “swamping”, “pressing”, “besieging” and “flooding”. From a discourse critical perspective, it is useful to observe the powerful connotation play in such a discourse. The abovementioned lexical choices are laden with primarily negative connotation. *Flooding*, for instance, denotes an extremely uncomfortable (in its weakest intensity) or highly pernicious (at its worst) event – people die in floods. Insinuating that the immigrants are “flooding” a country implies, on the level of the subconscious, that they are no better than an elementary disaster. “Besieging”, on the other hand, has a strong

implication of the existence of an *attack*, its primary meaning being “occupation”. Attackers besiege, after which “defense” is needed. And indeed, an article by K. Klanjšek stated that the local residents should “resist occupation”.<sup>41</sup> The word “swamping”, again, possesses a strong negative connotation, similar to “flooding” (that this is a perennial discursive instant in *mysoxenia* worldwide can be seen in the Australian documentary about Australia’s border patrol, where it was called “Australia’s first line of defense”, implicating that somewhere, there is an “attack”).

That such discourse creates policy is even linguistically visible, such as in the example of the Slovenian “Centre for the Removal of Aliens”. As Žagar wrote, “we usually eliminate or remove insects, filth, litter or garbage, stains, heaps of snow, peels, pips, stalks, tumors and other malfunctioning body parts”. Once again, passportist discourse (similar to almost any other discourse of exclusion) thrives on connotation. Nevertheless, “to remove or eliminate people is hardly acceptable for any society that wants to be called or calls itself ‘civilized’”.<sup>42</sup> There is, in addition, a clear parallel between passportist discourse and Anti-Semitism in the use of derogatory lexemes referring to “dirt”.<sup>43</sup> Discourse analysts have already noticed that, among other discriminatory discursive instance, those of *natural disasters* (immigration and migrants as avalanches or floods), *water* (as a “flood that has to be damned”<sup>44</sup>) and *growth* (“increasing immigration and increasing conflict as growing”) are very common.<sup>45</sup> After all, “the naturalising reference “flood of immigrants” implicitly carries at least two conclusion rules. If something is a flood, it is dangerous and threatening. If something is dangerous and threatening, one should do something against it (the *topos* of danger or threat, and this is an example of it, will be discussed as the next *topos*). The conclusion goes as follows: one should prevent the flood from inundating the endangered area. To be precise: one should take measures in order to prevent the immigrants from becoming too many.”<sup>46</sup>

The Slovenian case alone can yield myriad examples more. The refugees from the 1990 wars of the Yugoslav secession were said to “cause more and more disorder”, described as “potential law breakers”.<sup>47</sup> This is yet another common discursive practice within the realm of *mysoxenia* – see in the foreigner as “aggressive and criminal. They endanger public order and security and tend to have fraudulent marriages”.<sup>48</sup> News articles and snippets in which a person’s criminal activity is reported often concentrates on the fact that the crime was perpetrated by a foreigner. One would, however, seldom put the title “blond person robbed a kiosk”,

indicating that there is a criminal background in the very fact that someone is a foreigner.

Besides “connotation play”, a second prominent discursive instance in discriminative speech is its very *denial*. As Van Dijk wrote, a typical discursive moment in racist discourse is very commonly the denial of racism itself.<sup>49</sup> In racist discourse,

given general social norms that prohibit explicit discrimination and outgroup derogation, white group members usually do not want to be seen as racists. When they want to say something negative about minorities, they will tend to use denials, disclaimers or other forms that are intended to avoid a negative impression with their listeners or their readers. That is denials have the function of blocking negative inferences of the recipients about the attitudes of the speaker or writer.<sup>50</sup>

The same discursive practice is found in passportist, that is, xenophobic discourse. The Slovenian example can again be used.

The *Mag* journalist, I. Guzelj, wrote about the “absence” of xenophobia in Slovenia.<sup>51</sup> In his view, the protests of the local population against the immigrants from the Yugoslav wars were justified, as they “testify to the healthy logic that the maintenance of the current level of security and order” can be described as “a basic civilizational right of any member of an ordered society”.<sup>52</sup> Instead, there is a “so-called xenophobia” promulgated by “certain sociologists”.<sup>53</sup> Such individuals, according to deniers of xenophobia, claim that they are “scared someone might accuse us of chauvinism, racism and whatever else is in that package”.<sup>54</sup> As Jalusic explained, deniers of xenophobia claim that it has “been produced by the “self-proclaimed”, “free-spirit” and “progressive” civil society and self-proclaimed scientists.”<sup>55</sup> In other words, “we” are not passportists, “we” are just reacting to a societally detrimental instance.

## **Contemporary passport policies – the case of Austria**

As David Wearing wrote about the death of the (over) seven hundred migrants in April 2015, these “deaths in the Mediterranean were directly linked to xenophobic politics in Britain.”<sup>56</sup> And indeed, there is but a single step from discourse to practice, as discourse serves as a tool for social and political promotion of myriad sociopolitical practices, such as “the political

administration of social exclusion, the attempt to legitimise as well as to delegitimise institutional manners of ration control – strictly speaking the expulsion of ‘aliens’ ... within the framework of modern nation-states”.<sup>57</sup> In short, discourse, according to Fariclough, can be seen as a series of social practices that are related to various forms of social activities.<sup>58</sup>

#### Discursive practices

play a decisive role in the genesis and production of certain social conditions. This means that discourses may serve to construct collective subjects like ‘races’, nations and ethnicities. Second, they might perpetuate, reproduce or justify a certain social status quo (and ‘racialised’, ‘nationalised’ and ‘ethnicised’ identities that are related to it). Third, they are instrumental in transforming the status quo (and ‘racialising concepts’, nationalities and ethnicities related to it). Fourth, discursive practices may have an effect on the dismantling or even destruction of the status quo (and of racist, nationalist and ethnicist concepts related to it). According to these general aims one can distinguish between constructive, perpetuating, transformational and destructive social macro-functions of discourses.<sup>59</sup>

Another instance that is too large to fit within this framework of research is strictly policy-oriented, and comes from the point of view of law, as laws are being made to match policies that have been promoted by discourse. In an ideal world, according to Habermas, legality needs to be based on legitimacy<sup>60</sup> – yet the proverb attributed to Cicero, *summum jus, summa injuria* (the highest law may be the greatest injustice), often describes reality. Nevertheless, this aspect of passportist policies cannot be adequately described and analyzed here. Yet at least a nod towards the policy-oriented analyses needs to be mentioned. As Habermas wrote,

the unobjectionable manner in which a norm comes into being, that is, the legal form of a procedure, guarantees as such only that the authorities which the political system provides for, and which are furnished with certain competencies and recognised as competent within that system, bear the responsibility for valid law. But these authorities are part of a system of authority that must be legitimised as a whole if pure legality is to be able to count as an *indication* of legitimacy. In a fascist regime, for example, the legal form of administrative acts can have at best a masking function. This means that the technical legal form alone, pure legality, will not be able to guarantee recognition in the long run if the system of authority cannot be legitimised independently of the legal form of exercising authority.<sup>61</sup>

It is exactly these “indications of legitimacy” that are promoted via public/political discourse, presented and promulgated by the media that we need to take into consideration.

Austria was home to an intense passportist campaign in 1992/3, when the question of “Überfremdung” was put forth by the Austrian Freedom Party. A significant discourse historical instance was noticed already here by Reisigl and Wodak, pointing towards Nazional-Socialist propaganda administered by Joseph Goebbels, who himself used the term “Überfremdung”. A strong reminiscence of the Nazi period was also seen in the stupendous discourse that ensued, with “leaflets with incredible racist statements, like the infamous claim that female foreigners were obtaining free hormone treatment in Viennese hospitals in order to be able to produce more children than ‘real Austrians’, and that they would thus ‘take over’, whereas the hormones were, in fact, being administered for therapeutic reasons to severely traumatised women who had been victims of rape during the war in Kosovo”.<sup>62</sup> In 1999, Jörg Heider and his FPÖ won 26.92 per cent of the votes.

In the 1990s, Austria saw the resurgence of an extremely discriminatory discourse that introduced the attempt to “satisfactorily resolve the foreigner question”, strongly reminiscent of the “Jewish question”.<sup>63</sup> “The populism of the FPÖ is a complex mixture of anti-governmental opposition, an attempt to influence the law-making procedure as well as the formation of public opinion, and of propagandist political advertising that aims at canvassing as much voter support as possible – and all of that on the back of the scapegoat of ‘foreigners’.”<sup>64</sup>

A petition entitled “Austria first” was launched in January 1993, signed by 417,278 people – more than a marginal group. Austrian immigration laws were severe even beforehand; among other instances, immigrants were required to “integrate” (a vague idea almost never fully explained; even the Global Commission on International Migration defines “integration” in a more than equivocal manner: “a long-term and multi-dimensional process, requiring a commitment on the part of both migrants and non-migrant members of society to respect and adapt to each other, thereby enabling them to interact in a positive and peaceful manner”<sup>65</sup>), as well as “required to file their application for residency in Austria from their native land, irrespective of where they currently resided. Moreover, the application, filed from abroad, had to show proof of permanent employment in Austria, and that one had already arranged for housing sufficient to provide a minimum of 10 square



metres per person.”<sup>66</sup> This is problematic from several points of view. First of all, applying for a residence permit from one’s native land can oftentimes be either impossible (in times of war and strife) or financially daunting, time-consuming and exhausting, provided that the immigrants was already in Austria or a neighbouring country. Secondly, “proof of permanent employment” is yet another discriminative passportist measure that holds only for immigrants, having in mind that there are numerous citizens of Austria that cannot provide it (the unemployed), yet it is asked only of immigrants. Additionally, housing of at least “ten square meters per person” is also not something required by the state of Austria for its own citizens. As Reisigl and Wodak noticed, “the provision concerning the size of flat was particularly ironic: not only were thousands of ‘guest workers’ affected; thousands of indigenous citizens lived, and still do live, in apartments with an area of fewer than 10 square metres per person”.<sup>67</sup>

In addition, even mistakes and/or lack of efficiency of *Austrian* authorities fell onto the backs of foreigners, as

according to the 1993 law, if the Austrian immigration authorities failed to complete work on the request by the end of six weeks after the expiry of the current permit, the applicant lost her or his authorisation to remain in the country, even if the delay was due only to the slowness or inefficiency of the immigration authorities. And with no legal right to remain in the country, he or she could be expelled at the discretion of the authorities.

What ensued was, among other policy instances, the so-called Alien Act, which made changes to the then legal system by subjecting foreigners who have already lived in Austria for years, as well as their children and step-children (*sic!*) to the exact same requirements as current, “new” immigrants.

The most vocal within the Austria First petition were the FPÖ.

This party has, more than any other Austrian party, persuasively set the ‘xenophobic’ anti-foreigner tone in Austrian domestic policies and, for a decade, has almost always made electoral profit out of the populist business of sowing uncertainty and irrational ‘xenophobic’ anxieties, which, for different reasons, were and are harboured or willingly adopted by a considerable proportion of voters.<sup>68</sup>

Scapegoating immigrants has become a common instance, as a “well-known example is governmental and/or media discourse about immigration and immigrants, so that ordinary citizens blame the bad state of the economy, such as unemployment, on immigrants and not on government policies”.<sup>69</sup>

Numerous moments within the *Austria first*<sup>70</sup> petition beg for clarification and analysis. Even the very subtitle speaks volumes, as it “justifies and elaborates the aims of the petition: legal measures are needed, which secure the “right to a fatherland/home” for all Austrian citizens and which also ensure a reluctant Austrian immigration policy. The evaluative, polysemous and, very often, geographically localised notion of “fatherland/home” (*Heimat*) woos much more emotional connotations – not least from before and during the Nazi era – and for specific conservative addressees it is much more evocative and solidarity-promoting than the terms “nation” or “state”.<sup>71</sup> The whole document pleads the conclusion that Austria is not – or that it should not be – a land of immigrants. However, as Mitten stated, “its initial provision ... was not only demagogic, but also unmitigated nonsense. As the studies of the Austrian demographers Heinz Faßmann and Rainer Münz have shown, Austria has always been a country of immigration and emigration”, and the population and economy would stagnate and decline without immigration.”<sup>72</sup>

The whole petition draws heavily from a forced binary opposition of Austrian versus non-Austrian, it is a “dichotomous black-and-white portrayal [that] implicitly and explicitly constructs a two-part world and insinuates a rather clear frontier between an Austrian world of “law and order” and a non-Austrian world of “crime and disorder”. Foreigners are depicted as aliens who are illegal and criminal and who do not speak or understand German.”<sup>73</sup>

The Austria First petition serves as a clear duality of discourse and policy, in which policy is promoted via a certain discourse, in this case, of a passportist orientation.

## Other instances of passportism

The examples above were just a few among a panoply of similar ones in contemporary Europe. The United Kingdom, for instance, sports a very strict immigration policy which gets even stricter as the time goes by. In other words, “Britain’s immigration policy is bureaucratic, costly and

difficult to navigate, and a visa application can take months to process.”<sup>74</sup> Visitors who wish to enter the UK need to submit applications for visitor’s visas as well as to give their biometric data (a facial image and fingerprints scan).<sup>75</sup> The sheer immensity of the number of visa types is mind-boggling, as one can apply under a *visitor* scheme, *work* scheme or a *student* visa scheme. All the different visa types – indicating different documents and fees that vary – are the following: *standard visitor visa*, *marriage visitor visa*, *permitted paid engagement visa*, *parent of a Tier 4 child visa*, *visa to pass through the UK in transit*, *entrepreneur visa*, *exceptional talent visa*, *general Tier 1 visa*, *general Tier 2 visa*, *general Tier 4 visa*, *graduate entrepreneur visa*, *investor visa*, *intra-company transfer visa*, *minister of religion visa*, *sportsperson visa*, *charity worker visa*, *creative and sporting visa*, *government authorised exchange visa*, *international agreement visa*, *religious worker visa*, *youth mobility scheme visa*, *domestic workers in a private household visa*, *representative of an overseas business visa*, *Turkish businessperson visa*, *Turkish worker visa*, *UK ancestry visa*, *Croatian national registration certificate visa*, *short-term study visa*, *child visa*.<sup>76</sup> The very fact that there are special types of travel certificates for some Turkish and Croat citizens open up an immense new area of interest – for which there is no space in this analysis – in racism. In a state with such a complex, chaotic and discriminatory passportist policy, it is of small wonder that extreme passportist, such as UKIP’s Nigel Farage, ever so often utter statements such as:

I actually want us to have an immigration policy that is non-discriminatory, because at the moment we discriminate in favour of people from Poland, or Romania, or Bulgaria, regardless [of] who they are, and we discriminate against people from New Zealand ... or from India, or Canada, or whatever else it may be. We’ve got our, I think, our priorities completely wrong here. And we should not be discriminating on grounds of nationality.<sup>77</sup>

To make the situation worse, the forced UK attempt to diminish immigration has landed on the backs of *students*:

In 2010, the prime minister pledged to cut net migration from around 216,000 to below 100,000 a year by 2015 - an ambitious goal. The Home Office can’t stop residents in the European Union coming and going as they please, so it has targeted non-EU workers and foreign students to achieve its current tally of 180,000.<sup>78</sup>

At the beginning of the summer of 2015, Hungary has proposed a daunting “solution” to its own “immigrant problem”, as Péter Szijjártó, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, unveiled Hungary’s plan to physically separate Hungary from Serbia by building a four-meter wall on the borders with its southern neighbor. In his own words, “the Hungarian government has instructed the interior ministry to physically close the border with Serbia”.<sup>79</sup> Daniel Nolan of the Guardian wrote:

Leaching voters to the far-Right party Jobbik, the government has increasingly lost patience with efforts in Brussels to reach a solution to the surging inflows into the EU. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has said that a proposal to distribute migrants evenly throughout the 28 member states ‘borders on insanity’, while Mr Szijjártó dismissed the EU’s ‘rather long and time-consuming’ negotiations as he announced the Hungarian move on Wednesday. But the fence plan drew immediate condemnation at home and abroad, evoking memories of the days of the Iron Curtain. The United Nations Refugee Agency said it would ‘place too many barriers’ to the ‘inalienable human right’ to seek asylum.<sup>80</sup>

### **Instead of a conclusion**

(Im)migration is, and ever has been, a reality. People have been wandering around the globe since the dawn of mankind, and it is safe to say that most people are at least offsprings of immigrants, having in mind the first human wandering tribes left from Easter Africa and populated the world. Migration has recently come under the spotlight due to the rise of passportist policies worldwide, as well as a generally increasing populist discourse commonly related to the Right Wing in which immigrants are scapegoated for the sake of electoral support.

As passportism increasingly becomes a grim reality of the twentieth century, so does the interest in immigration and xenophobia – both discourse- and policy-wise – is bound to rise. Nevertheless, more detailed analyses that will propose the means to combat such discourses and policies of discrimination are yet to come. They are a necessity, lest we soon add a whole new verse to pastor Martin Niemöller’s short poem – “*then they came for the immigrants, but I did not speak out, for I was not an immigrant*”.

## NOTES

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- <sup>6</sup> "According to N., another of the migrants, 23 of them actually made it onto the El Tarajal beach in Ceuta that day. "We had already reached the Spanish beach, and we thought they would attend to us and we would stay in Spain," he says. "I thought I had reached the Europe of rights, but no. I was only met with violence, brutality, and then ... the bodies of the dead floating in the water and strewn over the beach." The chaos that day at Ceuta exemplifies the increasing violence occurring on Europe's southern border as externalization agreements take effect between Europe and its so-called partner countries. These agreements seek to outsource the responsibility for enforcing border control to North African countries with dubious human rights records such as Morocco and Algeria. "We are subjected to ongoing

institutional violence when we reach the border,” says M., a female refugee from Liberia who has tried to scale the fence surrounding Melilla. “This can range from denial of access to basic rights, to torture, physical abuse, and even sexual violence. What you see on the Melilla fence is only a fraction of what we suffer in transit.” An example of this suffering took place on October 15, 2014, when Spanish border authorities again employed excessively violent tactics. During an attempt by about 200 people to cross the 20-foot razor-wire fence into Melilla, border guards beat at least one man unconscious. Social organizations that work on the southern border are concerned with the deterioration of human rights in the zone, where migration control takes precedence over respect for basic rights, even the right to life. This lack of respect can be seen in the way the Spanish government has portrayed the events at El Tarajal. Spain’s Interior Minister has normalized the violence by describing the southern border as being in a state of emergency, with migrant groups as the enemies.” At: MALENO GARZÓN, H, *Why Violence is Flaring at Europe’s Border Crossings*, Open Society Foundations, 2015, at: <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/why-violence-flaring-europe-s-border-crossings>

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# THE CRISIS AND THE NATION: “CONSERVATIVE PALINGENESIS” IN INTERWAR SERBIA

*Torn, to become whole again, after long seeking for what is lost...*

D.H. Lawrence

## Abstract

This paper discusses one representative segment of the Serbian interwar conservative identity discursive formation. Being transposed to the Serbian interwar context, European spiritual, cultural and socio-political crisis frames such a discursive configuration that implies diverse programmatic strategies for its overcoming. The analysis of this “conservative palingenesis” permutation in Serbian context would be organized around the set of rhetorical figures and would-be analytical devices, such as: *counter-adamism*, *doubled-liminality* and *substance without form*.

**Keywords:** Conservatism, Nationalism, Antimodernism, Crisis

## Introduction

This paper discusses one representative segment of the Serbian interwar conservative identity discursive formation that was situated in the immediate-national, broader-(meso)regional and general-paneuropean, after World War I context of *crisis*. It is the conceptualization of the spiritual, cultural and socio-political aspects of this crisis that provides the historical context and interpretative framework for the analysis of this discursive field.

The broadest theoretical and methodological frame for our analysis is defined by different existing researching interests: national, regional and European. Firstly, this research greatly benefited from the *oeuvre* of Milan Subotic on Serbian and Russian intellectual tradition,<sup>1</sup> then Misa Djurkovic’s work on conservatism,<sup>2</sup> and Bosko Obradovic’s special interest on Milos Crnjanski and “new nationalism” between the two wars.<sup>3</sup> Secondly, this analysis is greatly indebted to the recent regional scientific

interest in “entangled histories” and the “discourses of collective identity in Central and Southeast Europe”.<sup>4</sup> Finally, the impetus comes from the broad intellectual tradition of the “history of ideas” developed through several, well known, schools of thought.<sup>5</sup>

The very conceptual frame that we apply is built on the theoretical models set by Roger Griffin on *modernism*<sup>6</sup>, Sorin Antohi’s and Balazs Trencsenyi’s “working heuristic model” of *antimodernism*,<sup>7</sup> and Marius Turda’s conceptual device of *conservative palingenesis*, that was introduced in his analysis of the Romanian “cultural-modernists ideas of national renewal” from the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>8</sup>

Roger Griffin’s indepth analysis of the phenomenon of modernism showed that *modernism* is “the generic term for a wide variety of countervailing palingenetic reactions to the anarchy and cultural decay allegedly resulting from the radical transformation of traditional institutions, social structures, and belief systems under the impact of western modernization (...)”,<sup>9</sup> and that “this matrix is usefully seen as the search for transcendence and regeneration, whether confined to a personal quest for ephemeral moments of enlightenment or expanded to take the form of a cultural, social, or political movement for the renewal of the nation or the whole Western civilization. The drive towards renewal may even seek to regenerate an entire historical epoch experienced as ‘decadent’ (...) by identifying a portal within linear time that opens onto the prospect of rebirth”.<sup>10</sup> He demonstrated that this narrative strategy relies on the rhetorical figures and modes of representation which include concepts such as “new dawn” or “new beginning”, among many other tropes.<sup>11</sup> This “generational mood” condensed in the concept of modernism, from his perspective aims at inaugurating “an entirely new socio-political order” (...) conceived as an alternative modernity which holds out the prospect of putting an end to political, cultural, moral and/or physical dissolution, and sometimes looks forward to the emergence of a new type of ‘man’”.<sup>12</sup>

In trying to broaden Griffin’s interpretative framework, Sorin Antohi and Balazs Trencsenyi are, pacing Antoine Compagnon,<sup>13</sup> introducing the heuristical distinction between *modernism* and *antimodernism*.<sup>14</sup> For our introductory purpose here it is useful to emphasize that they define antimodernism as: “a) the negative double of modernism and b) the critique of modernism *within* modernism, not *outside* of or *separate from* it”.<sup>15</sup> In underlining the “dark” side of the interwar antimodernism,<sup>16</sup> and its “negativity”,<sup>17</sup> they understand it as: “a neo-palingenetic, revolutionary, transfigurative, future oriented alternative that pervades and shapes



every realm of the human experience, from belief systems to aesthetics, from ideology to politics, from individual and collective (speculative) anthropology to cosmology and metaphysics".<sup>18</sup>

Starting from Marius Turda's analysis of a Romanian case of the "conservative palingenesis", we would like to deploy this concept in the slightly broader sense, as an umbrella concept which subsumes heterogeneous elements produced by different analytical devices, such as "Konservative Revolution", "New Nationalism" or "Political Romanticism".<sup>19</sup> Besides, we emphasize that we use the word "palingenesis" in its value-neutral, etymological sense, as the *rebirth* or *regeneration*. We do not imply by its use any ideological content.

Being transposed to the Serbian interwar context, European spiritual, cultural and socio-political crisis frames such a discursive configuration that implies diverse programmatic strategies for its overcoming. Formed through polemical subjects by which interwar discourses of national identity were framed, we will analyze this "conservative palingenesis" permutation in Serbian context through the following units of analysis: First, the conceptualization of the sense of crisis and second: the strategies of its overcoming by conservative identity discourses.

The proposed conceptual frame we would try to apply in the analysis of the programmatic, although not fully-fledged "canonical" texts of Serbian conservatism,<sup>20</sup> of the three representative authors of the epoch. That is: Milos Crnjanski (1893-1977), Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic (1895-1976) and Vladimir Vujic (1886-1951). We would try to situate their work into the emphasized broader modernist/antimodernist framework and to reconstruct their attitudes regarding above mentioned units of analysis.

In what follows, we will firstly present the historical and discursive context in which our three "cases" developed their ideas. Then, we will proceed to the analysis of the conservative-palingenetic discourses of the proposed three case studies. Finally, we would present the concluding remarks.

## **1. Context: The Generational "Structure of Feeling" – The Sense of Crisis and Liminality**

The general context for (anti)modernists rethinking of conservative models of national self-identification and self-presentation is paneuropean "structure of feeling",<sup>21</sup> constructed by the sense of crisis and dramatic

identity disorientation after World War I. Being the formative generational experience,<sup>22</sup> WWI opened the space for the new generational wave of reaction to modernity and modernization process. In the Western core the normative project of modernity was problematized from the different perspectives since the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. As Griffin demonstratively showed, the loss of the transcendental shelter turned the "myth of progress" into the trope of decadence.<sup>23</sup>

Not only the breakdown of the "ontological continuity" with Christianity, but the losing of the utopian energies created by the normative project of Enlightenment too, provoked the modernist reaction through different aesthetic responses which expressed the existential despair of the modern European. This longing was radicalized during the interwar era when ambiguous sense of the ongoing crisis and the liminality,<sup>24</sup> the sense of living in the "interregnum", in-between epochs, "sense of ending and beginning" - was transformed into several different bids for transforming and re-rooting the society.

As was identified by Sorin Antohi and Balazs Trencsenyi, the "meso-regional" adaptation of this discourse, through "the entanglement of modernism and anti-modernism may well be one of the most authentic (...) East European responses to modernization and modernity (i.e., the "West")."<sup>25</sup> This ironic and "paradoxical Europeanization"<sup>26</sup> of this meso-region, created the space for the individual and collective, "epiphanic and programmatic"<sup>27</sup> visions of creating new authentic sense of community and national regeneration.

The Serbian interwar conservative discursive formation, by which the very concept of nation was being reconstructed, stems from the specific "diagnosis" of the "crisis". Namely, the immediate historical context for analysis of the Serbian variation of this discourse is provided by the creation of the new state-"Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" in 1918. Thus, the *conservative turn* in Serbian self-identification and self-presentation, was framed by exogen, broader European crisis context, and endogen (supra)national context of the newborn state. The conservative identity discourses in interwar Serbia presented here could be understood as representing the point of the intersection of the genre of "crisis literature"<sup>28</sup> and the genre of "national metaphysics".<sup>29</sup> What follows are the three famous "cases" of Serbian cultural critic circle that can be linked to the above emphasized theoretical debate.

## 2. Milos Crnjanski: The Serbian Attitude

Although not chronologically, “the case of Milos Crnjanski”, “logically” precedes and frames the terms of the debate that follows.<sup>30</sup> Being one of the most significant Serbian writers, the leading avant-garde poet, and one of the most complex intellectual figures in the interwar period in Serbia, the personality of Milos Crnjanski and his opus have always been demanding hermeneutical task. To analyze his complete *Weltanschauung* would go beyond the aim of this article. Here, we will focus only at the one segment of his, more than stratified, *oeuvre*.

The reconstructing of the conservative-palingenetic impulses in the thought of Milos Crnjanski, we center around the rhetorical figure of the “Serbian attitude”<sup>31</sup> developed in the series of his famous texts published in the periodical “Ideje” 1934-1935.<sup>32</sup> In the life and work of Milos Crnjanski a critical turn should be emphasized. Namely, up to this shift, parallelly with the thematization of the “Slavic idea” one can find his enthusiastic “integral Yugoslavism”, as an ideological and cultural attempt of explicating unity of the three people which constituted Yugoslavian state at the time. But just before and especially after the assassination of the King Alexander I Karadjordjevic on October 9, 1934 in Marseilles, the conservative reaction of Crnjanski came to the fore. The catalyst effect of that tragic event was transformed into his programmatic vision of the “New Nationalism”,<sup>33</sup> or to the more clear call for the rebirth of the Serbian nation as the solution to the interwar identity crisis - what he simply called the “Serbian attitude”.

For our analytical purpose, we reconstruct his discursive strategy on the two interconnected planes. Firstly, through his “crisis discourse” in which we discern three recurring motifs: anticommunism, antiseparatism and anti pseudo-pacifism. Secondly, through his attempt of the conservative palingenesis through the “culture of memory” discourse and rejuvenating Serbian identity through the restoring of its traditional values, especially the values of the Serbian Medieval golden age of the Nemanjics dynasty.

First impulse in describing the parameters of the national identity crisis Crnjanski gets from the growing influence of the marxist worldview. In analyzing this nuance of discourse we find the specific conservative-revolutionary trope of “*uberfremdung*” useful. The critique of superimposing of the foreign values was brought to paroxysm by Milos Crnjanski’s contribution to the discourse, by sharp stressing of the “colonial” position of Serbian culture, especially literature. The main target

of Crnjanski's critique is especially communist ideology imports in the so called "social literature" form. The key message not only of his essay called: "Mi postajemo kolonija strane knjige" (Vreme, 1932) ("We are becoming the colony of foreign literature"),<sup>34</sup> but from the later publicist efforts from the time of the editing the periodical "Ideje" (1934-1935), is that the "foreign spirit" destroys national feelings. It is especially visible in imported marxist literature, which in his interpretation, by simulating the care for the rights of the proletariat, actually aims at deepening the crisis of identity into which Serbia entered just after the World War I. His strong opposing to the imposed "aping" of foreign attitudes<sup>35</sup> is represented in this clear anticommunist position.

The other sources of crisis Crnjanski sees in the post-WWI separatist tendencies which were connected with the relativizing of Serbian moral and factual victory in WWI, in the "pseudo-pacifist" manner. In the series of articles, where "Oklevetani rat" ("The Slandered War")<sup>36</sup> and "Otrovni pauk" ("The Poisonous Spider"), have the most prominent place, he argues against the so called "pacifistic propaganda".<sup>37</sup> His argument is that, the discursively constructed pacifism that comes from the western side of the country, is nothing but a "pseudo-pacifism", that it doesn't have anything against the wars, but the Serbian victory in wars. This debate, which most famous expression was his "polemics with Miroslav Krleža",<sup>38</sup> had been led along the lines of Crnjanski's perception that: "(...) For years, in our regions a sabotage against everything that is state, and in intellectual circles against everything that is national, takes place".<sup>39</sup>

In his perception, the congruence of the communist, separatist and pseudo-pacifist factors substantively contributed to the crisis of the "Kingdom of Yugoslavia", and called for the prompt answer in order of its rescuing. In trying to show "the spiritual resistance"<sup>40</sup> he calls for the cultural and spiritual reawakening of the Serbian nation. That was the reason why Crnjanski, through his periodical "Ideje" starts the defense of tradition and formulates an attitude filtered from Yugoslavism, with a clear Serbian tonality:

I feel like I am coming back (...) after fifteen years of bitter self-deception (...) to the Serbanness (...). Maybe today I am alone, but I am sure that soon there will be millions of us who will say: (...) let's leave aside the nebulousness immediately. Let's look at the things from the clear Serbian perspective.<sup>41</sup>

In constructing new “Serbian attitude”, Crnjanski uses the discursive strategy which we would name *counter-Adamism*.<sup>42</sup> As a working heuristic concept it includes, as one of its aspects, the emphasis on the purpose of Serbian history developed by ancestors, historical and ontological continuity with the normative concepts of past, which implies that Serbs do not start “from the scratch”, but have the hard task to keep up with standards already achieved. Its first pillar is the strategically used memory for the constructing of identity. In Crnjanski’s discourse is for the first time clearly visible the “cultural memory” in Serbian conservative-palingenetic form.<sup>43</sup> To consolidate Serbian identity Crnjanski refers to the great victim of the ancestors, especially in Balkan wars and the World War I. In its relativizing from the western parts of the state and in its forgetting from the Serbian side, Crnjanski sees the biggest malaise of the time. In emphasizing the scope of the victim of Serbian ancestors for forming the state, in the way of *counter-Adamism*, he uses the past, memory and history, “the space of experience” of the Serbian nation to formulate its “horizont of expectation”.<sup>44</sup> He develops this topics in several articles, pointing to the moral capital of the Serbian wars, the pride and chastity of the Serbian warrior and his sacrifice for the liberation of the country.<sup>45</sup> In the text called “Tragedija Srpstva” (“The Tragedy of Serbianness”), he points to this long line of the ancestor’s sacrifice, from the centuries long Turkish occupation to the modern times, culminating with the assassination of the “King-Martyr” Alexander I Karadjordjevic.<sup>46</sup> Thus, Crnjanski sees in the cultivation of the memory the *conditio sine qua non* of the survival of the Serbian nation.

The second pillar of his counter-Adamism is, after pointing to the Serbian warrior tradition and sacrifice, the restoring of the Serbian spiritual and cultural tradition. He is openly against “aping” any foreign political or ideological movements, being “Italian, German or Russian”.<sup>47</sup> In his own words: “For the good of this country, the Serbian element to be powerfull as it used to be doesn’t need any other help, but to return to his own ways (...)”.<sup>48</sup>

That silent return is guaranteed because Serbs have “the thousand years old culture”,<sup>49</sup> which core could be identified in the personality and work of Saint Sava and Nemanjic’s dynasty as an eternal regenerative source. Crnjanski stylizes Serbian past exactly through the founding act of Saint Sava in forming the national identity “so early in the Medieaval times”, forming the Serbian normative concepts of “social justice” and “national ethics”.<sup>50</sup>

In Crnjanski's understanding, "after Saint Sava's life, the people introjected powerful features of his character".<sup>51</sup> In the call for the rebirth of this spirit, Crnjanski expresses the "sense of beginning" and sees the new dawn for the Serbian nation.

Thus, after full circle which started by afterwar melancholy, avanguard breakthroughs in poetry, Slavism and Yugoslavism, Crnjanski understands Serbian future as a return, an *anamnesis* from the 'Odyssey of Spirit' to use this Hegelian term, but not to some petrified past, but to the eternal values guaranteed and affirmed by Serbian Orthodox spirituality and eternal disposition of Serbian spirit towards freedom. In the spirit of Saint Sava he sees "the hidden strength of Serbianess", the one which could "feeble, but which have not disappeared and which regenerates itself".<sup>52</sup>

In this frame he insists on "reorganizing" of Serbian nationalism, asserting that "without one truly nationalistic epoch in Serbian politics (...) Serbian questions will not be solved. Never",<sup>53</sup> and adds: "Otherwise, this boring comedy will last still, and it will end, once again, as Serbian tragedy".<sup>54</sup>

### 3. Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic: "The Belgrade Man"

The representative interpretative model of national regeneration expressed in the Serbian interwar context in which the conceptualization of the crisis united with the discourse of "new man" can be unambiguously found, is the work of Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic.<sup>55</sup> In analyzing Velmar-Jankovic's narrative on existential crisis and identity-crisis in interwar Serbia, the concept of "liminality" could prove to be a useful heuristical device. This sense of living between two epochs, to live in-between, in the period of an ending and a new beginning too, can be actually understood as the very symptom of crisis.

In the interpretation that he offers, the structure of crisis in Serbian interwar context is determined by both external and internal factors. In analyzing the Serbian post-WWI moment of crisis, Velmar-Jankovic is explicit:

"First and fundamental ground of our crisis, both spiritual and material-and these two cannot be separated- lyies in the fact, that the power of faith in a grand leading idea, the kosovian one, has lost its strength, - and the new ideal hasn't been found yet".<sup>56</sup>

In interpreting Serbian history he emphasizes a certain paradox, that, just in the moment of fulfilling its "covenant", the idea of liberation and unification, Serbian spirit entered the state of fatigue, started to lose its *raison d'être*, and to "run away from itself", to feeble its Christian Orthodox faith and that in that way had actually opened the space for the "Western materialism" which conquered that space immediately.<sup>57</sup> The context of crisis is formed on the one side from the exogenous factor: in his words, this is the time when Europe itself started to be "deeply sick".<sup>58</sup> But endogenous factors are more important: the very foundations of Serbian identity were shaken after war in the making of a new state and in losing the traditional system of values. The system of Serbian values tested by centuries he summarizes as follows:

The complex of spiritual foundations of Serbian national community consist of: Christianity through Orthodoxy, St.Sava's folk church, patriarchal and heroic worldview, respect for ancestors and the ideas of the old Serbian state, humanity expressed in epic poetry and the whole oral tradition preserved through family life and peasant home, nurtured by folk's language...<sup>59</sup>

Cutting himself off from this value-system, a Serb in Velmar-Jankovic's view becomes "pure colonial object, a false European, last westernizer from the periphery, foreign to others and to himself, too".<sup>60</sup> The noticeable Serbian "tiredness" of himself comes not just from the size of sacrifice in World War I and previous Balcan Wars,<sup>61</sup> but from the question: was all this sacrifice vane? This question raises from the general feeling in Serbia that the new state, with Croats and Slovenes shows no respect that Serbia invested its "independence, its name of the state, its national name of the Serb"<sup>62</sup>. In sum, the combination of the exogenous and endogenous factors produced the deep identity crisis, crisis in cultural orientation, loss of enthusiasm and historical fatigue without precedent in Serbian tradition.

In his descriptive and normative projection of 'the Belgrade man', this author searches for the way out of the identity crisis which he perceives and explicates. New man, the "Belgrade man" is at the same time an old one, the Serb which have to testify the historically affirmed canon of values in the new context- if he aims to survive. It is the context in which, in his view Serbia is becoming "colonial pseudoculture".<sup>63</sup> He rejects that path of development.Why?

As axiomatic he takes the attitude that “the Serb” is essentially “uneuropean”.<sup>64</sup> What are the arguments that he gives to support such a thesis? His answer is very direct: Because Serb was never submitted to Rome. Velmar Jankovic perceives that neither in spiritual, nor in the military or civic sense, the Serb never felt nor admitted Roman power as superior”.<sup>65</sup> This fact determines very serious consequences regarding to Serbian history and identity. As such, in Velmar-Jankovic’s vision the Serb is, although geographically situated in Europe, “paradigmatic antipode of the “homo europaeus” which is the product of the “caesarian Rome” and “catholic Rome”.<sup>66</sup> In his interpretation, Serbs had different learning curve:

Spiritually, the Serb didn’t feel neither Caesar, nor Gaius, nor Virgil, Aristotle nor Plato, nor Thomas Aquinas. He had his Saints and his Orthodoxy, but didn’t with his national features deny the universal character of Christianity.<sup>67</sup>

Velmar-Jankovic quotes a German historian Leopold Ranke, that “Serbs are self-made”.<sup>68</sup> It is exactly that kind of consciousness, that they are “self-made”, and that they payed for the freedom extremely high a price, that created a specific mentality of resistance to every imposed rule. That “agonic” life, life “beyond ones strength” made this type of man, man of “Belgrade orientation”.<sup>69</sup>

But right after the physical liberation from the Turkish rule, Serbs came under “spiritual occupation” of the West. It culminated after 1918, when enormous sacrifice and loss weakened the nation and brought to disorientation, melancholy, and historical fatigue.

That’s why he insists that Serbs should *return* to themselves, once more in history. Not to be influenced by European *taedium vitae* which always comes at the end of life. In his vision, Serbs are young nation, with the old tradition-“the future nation”.<sup>70</sup> That means that that tradition was cut off by Turkish centuries long cruelty. But, paradoxically, it was also saved and conserved in that way. Serbian tradition is a tradition of suffering, and as such, in his understanding is capable to “compensate all other experiences of modern man”.<sup>71</sup>

Velmar-Jankovic’s key message is that this kind of spirit the Serbs should keep, and with it they can continue to live. In addition, he emphasizes that Serbian history was modeled by three kind of man: saints, leaders and enlighteners.<sup>72</sup> Saint Sava is the embodiment of these three virtues.<sup>73</sup> In this vision, Serbs have to live up and catch up to these, not imposed



European standards. In that sense Serbs don't have to "wait on anybody, nor to any gifts, promises, but creatively to make their own tradition alive. To make a renaissance of its own".<sup>74</sup>

#### 4. Vladimir Vujic<sup>75</sup>: The Return to Saint Sava

Starting from the spenglerian "morphology of cultures", which roots can be found earlier, in the Russian 19<sup>th</sup> century thought of Nikolay Danilevsky(1822-1885) and Konstantin Leontiev(1831-1891)-, Vujic searches for an abandonment of situating the Serbian culture within the division West-East, and claims for independent (South Slavic culture) which in his terms, has its own right on specific "spiritual style" and cultural expression.<sup>76</sup>

By criticizing attitudes by which this culture should be subsumed under historical constructs of either "West" or "East", he pleads, in his own words, for a "new romanticism", one without complexes, one which has its own right to exist.<sup>77</sup> Because it is not some "sad" remembrance of an old nation about its days of youth, but it comes from a "young nation" par excellence, one which has its "Middle ages" ahead.<sup>78</sup>

In that sense Vladimir Vujic is very critical towards schematic apriori western historiographic linear-progressist conception which assumes the line "Ancient times-Middle Ages-Modern age", and emphasizes asynchronicity of spiritual and historical rhythms between West and South Slavic history, which is being oversimplified by that scheme.<sup>79</sup> By accepting this historical scheme, in his view, this culture is posited in the state of belethedness, sentenced to eternal catching-up with "progressive" Western world. That's the reason why he claims, without complex: "No, we are not Europe".<sup>80</sup> By legitimizing this "neoromantic" impulse which had to have liberating effect from foreign cultural patterns, he rejects, in Spengler's style, Western "faustian" culture, decadent one, which lives its last days through its civilizational hypostasis. In a palingenetic manner Vujic asserts that: "we just have to be born for the second time".<sup>81</sup>

Therefore, new enthusiasm, historical youth, almost mystical expectation of the new cultural and spiritual rebirth-all these are markers of a conservative-revolutionary impulse which frame a new narrative in the Serbian discursive field. Vujic addresses serious remarks to any attempt of "transplanting" of the "European spiritual fatigue" to "us" which are in

the phase of finding our own, young expression of the autochthon culture. He tries to make his argumentation stronger by asserting that:

All features of one civilization: a loss of faith and genuine religiosity, an importation of all possible Eastern sects, theo-spirito-anthroposophy, moral vagueness, the development of decadent professionalism, sex as the basis of life and of its understanding, lies, brutality and perfect hypocrisy—all that clearly testifies that the life of the contemporary West is for us an impossible spiritual content.<sup>82</sup>

He repeats, once more: “No we are not Europe, and it is just as good”.<sup>83</sup> But he adds immediately, that “we” are not the “East” neither—especially not that one with which the “orientalizing” stereotypes of laziness, indolence, belatedness ...are connected to.<sup>84</sup> He rejects especially the “moralizing type” of Easternism which comes from the perspective of Western moral and spiritual crisis and which sees in East cure for all its maladies<sup>85</sup>, because, in his interpretation, we who are not West, should not look for the cures on the East.

West is attracted to East by its “wish for the rejuvenation”, there he goes for salvation and cure, as he lost its spiritual substance.<sup>86</sup> Serbs just don’t have any need to repeat this way. Serbs are “young people”, and should look in their own national ethos for the “formulae” of its own “cultural style”.<sup>87</sup> In sum, neither West, nor East, but constructing an authentic Serbian Weltanschauung, Vujic sees as the imperative of the time.

Vujic’s conception of culture is an “organic” one:

Every culture has its spirit, its soul...” he asserts and adds: “Every folk, every people becomes *nation* only when it fulfills a duty, a task, agency, mission of the soul of one culture, when creates stylistic expressions of culture. Otherwise it represents nothing more than animal material, whose existence means nothing...”<sup>88</sup>

So, where Vujic sees the basis of the Serbian culture? By rejecting, not only the imitating of West and East, but the possibility of their synthesis too, he nevertheless takes the Spengler’s starting point, the projection of the great future of Slavic people..<sup>89</sup> He stresses the central message of the Dostoyevsky’s speech in the front of the Pushkin’s monument: “Humble yourself, proud man”.<sup>90</sup>

Therefore, it is in "Slavic thought" where Vujic finds that regenerative spiritual force which represents value antipode to the general European fall, and which stems from its exploitative materialistic urge. In his perception, although Slavic thought is the Orthodox Christian thought, and in crisis itself, it differs from the European crisis because it is in the faze of "rising" of the spirit, while European is in the faze of "decadence", of leaving the historical scene.<sup>91</sup> "Slavic thought" in his interpretation is nothing else but panhuman "vision of salvation", which goes beyond any projection of "social progress or material plane".<sup>92</sup> But for one who is thinking this kind of thought, in this time, it represents a great burden and responsibility. In his words:

Today this Idea is an Idea-martyr. Belonging to it is martyrdom. Accompanied by poverty and mocking. Slavic thought is today a donquixotian endeavour, the spiritual one (...).<sup>93</sup>

By making this "Slavic thought" more concrete, applying it to the Serbian cultural context, Vujic offers one of the most illustrative formulations of Serbian culture. In his famous text: "Return to Saint Sava", in analyzing spiritual markers of Serbian culture, Vujic asserts:

Saint Sava's<sup>94</sup> escape to the monastery and Dositey's<sup>95</sup> escape from the monastery are two great symbols of our spiritual culture: the right way and the left way (...) First one, St. Sava's founded that spiritual direction which presupposes Christlikeness as a model of living; the other one started that spiritual direction which leads to rationalism (...).<sup>96</sup>

In that way, in a great palingenetic arch, which goes from the reconstruction of the idea of Europe, through Slavic tradition, Vujic comes to the quintessence of Serbian identity- "Svetosavlje"<sup>97</sup> and Serbian epic tradition as to eternal source of renaissance. Saint Sava was the first one who defines Serbian identity as the one who possess the power not only to understand both West and East, but to take its own authentic position towards them. Saint Sava's dictum: "To be East to the West and West to the East" is the categorical imperative of Serbian ethos to which was addressing Vladimir Vujic, in his search of overcoming the Serbian national identity crisis.

## Concluding remarks

Although differing in nuances, accents and rhetorical strategies in their narrative patterns, the structural similarity in the discourse of the three representative cases of conservative-palingenetic reconstruction of Serbian interwar identity is evident. What stems from the presented segment of the interwar Serbian conservative-palingenetic identity discourse, we would try to summarize as follows.

The above discussion should have shown that this discourse is *conservative*. It (re)formulates the tradition in the language of the Modern age. It represents the discursive reconstruction of a tradition. Conservatism is always a reaction—it is activated when the tradition is endangered. Being a reflexive reaction either/or a reactive reflexion, the very appearance of the rational argumentative defense of tradition is the symptom of the *crisis* of that particular tradition. In a paradoxical attempt to conserve the tradition on the reflexive plane, this discourse reflects *the crisis of Serbian identity* in interwar period.

Thus, on their *descriptive* level, the analyzed discourses are centered around *diagnostication of crisis*. Starting from the general and *generational* traumatic experience from the World War I, and the paneuropean interwar “structure of feeling” reflected in the sense of existential crisis, these authors conceptualize specific Serbian configuration of the crisis, pointing not only to the external, but to the internal factors, too. Among them the emphasis on the scope of the Serbian sacrifice in the World War I, historical “fatigue” that it provoked and the distancing from the transcendental shelter of the Orthodox Christianity, conjoined with social and political crisis of the political system which culminated in the assassination of the King Alexander I Karadjordjevic—are the context-specific factors that were catalyzing this conservative discourse. The central trope of not only the Serbian victory in the WWI, but of the transgenerational sacrifice for the freedom of the ancestors which culminated in that war led to the specific conceptualization of Serbian history in this discourse, which we would name *counter-Adamism*.

In addition, the conceptualization of the Serbian aspects of crisis is done in the cultural critic (anti)modernist manner, reflecting the conservative-revolutionary trope of “interregnum”, liminal *inbetweenness in time*, between “sense of ending” and the mystical expectation of the “new beginning”. The palingenetic moment, using this concept in its ideologically neutral sense, is evident in recurring calls for a rebirth, reawakening and regeneration of the nation.

On the *prescriptive* level, this “new beginning” was developed through different identity-narratives and explanatory “strategies of recovery”, or the solutions to the perceived state of crisis. In that sense, this debate can be read as an “autochtonist” discourse in Serbian context. It is a “nativist” answer given to the “eternal” problematic situation posed by the modernity when society faces its belatedness and marginality facing the European achieved standard.<sup>98</sup> That situation produced new metaphysical energy and the strive for transcendence. In this discourse it includes organic conception of the nation defined by the concept of *Svetosavlje* with its normative historical and ontological status. The two essential values that stem from this concept are: Orthodox Christianity and national freedom expressed in the authentic Serbian “Neither East nor West” (geo)political *inbetweenness in space*. So, in this *doubled liminality*, in the sense of *inbetweenness in time and space*, we localize the source of Serbian interwar discursive habitus and metaphysical drive that make the constitutive part of this attempt of making a “positive Sonderweg” conservative identity reconstruction. Thus, the (re)essentialization of Serbian identity was being constructed through the Serbian Sonderweg thesis: “our crisi”s is different from the European one-marked by the different causes and results of WWI and “our solution” to it, marked by the distinctive normative ideals localized in the golden age of the Nemanjić’s dynasty, especially in the concept of *Svetosavlje*-is different.

In the reconstruction of the Serbian identity in this discourse, Europe (i.e. West) has the privileged status of the “significant Other”, as a negative normative concept. The resentment and disenchantment with the Western domination was the source of reprogramming the identity and formulating the alternative normative projections of the nation by producing the binary oppositions between “us” and “West”. This discursive strategy is marked by the “paradoxical Europeanization”.<sup>99</sup> Through the irony of history of the interwar period, by being anti-European, these authors were being European, *par excellence*. Being contrasted to the liberal and left-radical world-views on the one side, and to the European totalitarian ultranationalistic projections on the other, the system of values of the Serbian “New Nationalism”, its conservative palingenesis could be read not only as a reaction to the European modernization and westernization, but as a specific *reaction to reaction* to the European conservatism in its totalitarian mode, too. Its dual axiological discursive structure perfectly reproduces itself in problematizing the relation between Serbia and Europe making of antiwesternism one of its key structural elements.

The paradox, which is meso-regional specificity, is that this discourse of national uniqueness was constructed by the appropriation of the “transeuropean antimodernization discourse”, as was showed by Roumen Daskalov and Diana Mishkova:

The univerzalization of the nation and the discourse of national uniqueness and the existence of a narrative of national authenticity available and utilized across Europe drew its authority precisely it applied transnationally, and national uniqueness was conveyed to the international audience through common ‘European’ language. It was thus the transnational discourses, exchange and entanglements that shaped and legitimated nations and established their supposed differences.<sup>100</sup>

The key intellectual figures which critical reactions were discussed, present the paradoxical type of “westernized antiwesternizers”, which search not only for the rejecting of West, but its *Aufheben* in Hegelian sense of the term. We find the Sorin Antohi’s and Balazs Trencsenyi’s heuristic concept of “conservative anti-totalitarianism” useful and adaptable in understanding the cases studied above.<sup>101</sup>

The discussed attempt of conservative palingenesis in interwar Serbia proved not to meet its aims. By preserving the modernist/antimodernist ambiguity reflected in paradoxical conceptual dynamics of degeneration/regeneration, status quo/revolution, past/future, negativity/positivity, end/beginning, pessimism/optimism, the reflexive reconstruction in the discourse of the three cases discussed, proved to be more of a symptom, than the solution to the identity-crisis. The discursive shift marked by turning from (Yugo)slavism to the more conceptually clear “Serbian attitude” seem to come too late. By the World War II, the identity crisis was amplified by the civil war in Yugoslavia and another circle of enormous number Serbian victims-and the solution to it was postponed, once again. But, although the discourse they brought up was put aside and marginalized by the communist regime, it still represents the metapolitical disposition, which still preserves relevance in the Serbian identity crisis which is not solved till today.

These three authors had tragic life trajectories, marked by emigrant lives in the exile.

Their conservative-palingenetic programme wasn’t successful in explicating and formulating the social and political system that would reflect their system of values. In sum, it remained *substance without form*.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Milan Subotic is one of the leading Serbian social scientist who works in the "history of ideas" paradigm. Among his most important works are: *Sricanje slobode: Studije o pocecima liberalne misli u Srbiji XIX veka*, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Institut za filozofiju i drustvenu teoriju, Gradina-Nis, 1992; *Tumaci ruske ideje: Studije o ruskim misliocima*, Zavod za udzbenike i nastavna sredstva, Beograd, 2001; *Put Rusije: Evroazijsko stanoviste*, Plato, Beograd, 2004; *Na drugi pogled: prilog studijama nacionalizma*, Institut za filozofiju i drustvenu teoriju, Filip Visnjic, Beograd, 2007; *Ruske teme: Mesijanstvo, Inteligencija, Nacija*, Logos, Beograd, 2013.
- <sup>2</sup> See Misa Djurkovic's, pioneering in Serbian scientific context, effort in understanding the phenomenon of conservatism: *Konzervativizam i konzervativne stranke*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2007.
- <sup>3</sup> See Bosko Obradovic's work: *Milos Crnjanski i Novi Nacionalizam*, Hrisanska misao, Beograd, 2005.
- <sup>4</sup> In this sense, among the many other regional contributions, the most important are the projects led by Diana Mishkova and Balázs Trencsényi. From their long substantive contributions to the debate, one of the most recent works instructive for this research were: *Entangled Histories of the Balkans, Volume Two: Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions*, Edited by Roumen Daskalov&Diana Mishkova, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2014 and *Anti-Modernism:Radical Revisions of Collective Identity*, Edited by Diana Mishkova, Marius Turda and Balázs Trencsényi, CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2014.
- <sup>5</sup> These three distinguished scientific paradigms are the British "Cambridge School", German "Begriffsgeschichte" approach and the French "post-Annales" school.
- <sup>6</sup> See: Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
- <sup>7</sup> The concept was developed in: "Introduction: Approaching Anti-modernism", in: *Anti-Modernism:Radical Revisions of Collective Identity*, Edited by Diana Mishkova, Marius Turda and Balázs Trencsényi, CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2014.
- <sup>8</sup> See: Marius Turda, "Conservative Palingenesis and Cultural Modernism in Early Twentieth-century Romania", *Totalitarian Movements and Political religions*, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 437-453, December, 2008. The religious, philosophical and scientific aspects of the concept are explained in : Constantin Iordachi, "God's Chosen Warriors: Romantic palingenesis, militarism and fascism in modern Romania", in: *Comparative Fascist Studies: New perspectives*, Constantin Iordachi (ed.), Routledge, 2010. We use the concept "palingenesis" in its value-neutral, etymological sense of a word,

- as the *rebirth* or *regeneration*. We do not imply by its use any inherent ideological content.
- 9 Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 54.
- 10 *Ibid.* pp. 39- 40.
- 11 *Ibid.* p. 53.
- 12 *Ibid.* p. 55.
- 13 See: Antoine Compagnon, *Les Antimodernes: de Joseph de Maistre a Roland Barthes*, Gallimard, Paris, 2005.
- 14 See the discussion in: "Introduction: Approaching Anti-modernism", in: *Anti-Modernism: Radical Revisions of Collective Identity*, Edited by Diana Mishkova, Marius Turda and Balázs Trencsényi, CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2014, pp. 1-43.
- 15 *Ibid.* p. 3.
- 16 *Ibid.* p. 8.
- 17 *Ibid.* p. 4.
- 18 *Ibid.* p. 3.
- 19 For the conceptual nuancing of these analytical tools, see : Balázs Trencsényi, "Bunt protiv istorii: konservativnaia revoliutsiia I poiski natsionalnoi identichnosti v mezhoennoi v Vostochnoi i Tsentralnoi Evrope", In: *Prokhorova I, Dmitriev A, Kukulin I, Maiofus M, editors: Antropologija Revoliutsii*, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie (Nauchnaia biblioteka), Moskva, 2009, pp. 207-241.
- 20 As "canonical" in this sense, and forming the conservative meta-discourse inside which the ideas of those three authors were developed, are works of Sveti Vladika Nikolaj Velimirovic and Sveti Justin Celijski.
- 21 As Ekaterina Kalinina showed, the concept of "structure of feeling" was developed by the cultural theorist Raymond Williams, and it "denotes the culture of a particular historical moment: a common set of perceptions and values shared by a particular generation" (Ekaterina Kalinina, *Mediated Post-Soviet Nostalgia*, Södertörns högskola, Elanders, Stockholm, 2014, p. 25).
- 22 Starting from the Williams' concept of 'commonly experienced time' as "crucial to the concept of cultural generation", Kalinina adds to her analysis that "central to such a notion of generation is the shared experience of the same 'formative events (such as wars, revolutions or social movements) or shared new experiences (...) Different experiences and formative events should be seen among the major reasons why a structure of feeling cannot be learned" (*Ibid.* pp. 28-29).
- 23 Roger Griffin, *op.cit.*, p. 45.
- 24 In analyzing Arnold van Gennep's and Victor Turners concepts of "liminality" or "inbetweenness", Roger Griffin emphasizes that: "the liminal stage (...)



- enables human beings to nourish themselves with metaphysical energy unavailable in 'normal' phases of reality, and thus refuel society with transcendence on their symbolic return to it" (Roger Griffin, *op. cit.*, p. 104).
- 25 Sorin Antohi, Balazs Trencsenyi, *op.cit.*, p. 14.
- 26 *Ibid.* p. 23.
- 27 Roger Griffin makes the distinction between these two kinds of modernism, defining the 'programmatic modernism', as such a movement "in which the rejection of Modernity expresses itself as a mission to change society, to inaugurate the new epoch, to start time anew. It is a modernism that lends itself to the rhetoric of manifestos and declarations, and encourages the artist/intellectual to collaborate proactively with collective movements for radical change and projects for the transformation of social realities and political systems (Roger Griffin, *op. cit.* p. 62). On the other side he proposes "to call the type of artistic modernism that gravitates around unexpected and unsustainable experiences of the lightness of being 'epiphanic' (...)" (*Ibid.* p. 63).
- 28 Sorin Antohi, Balazs Trencsenyi, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
- 29 *Ibid.* p. 32.
- 30 The "case" of Crnjanski was thoroughly explained in: Bosko Obradovic, *Milos Crnjanski i Novi Nacionalizam*, Hriscanska misao, Beograd, 2005, pp. 49-111.
- 31 This notion was firstly introduced by him in his text: Milos Crnjanski, "Do tog mora doci", *Ideje*, No.30, 1935, Beograd, in: Zoran Avramovic, *Milos Crnjanski, Poliiticki spisi*, Sfairos, Beograd, 1989, pp. 63-66.
- 32 As was shown by Obradovic (*Ibid.* p. 31), the discursive strategy Crnjanski had developed through several texts, mostly "introductions" to his periodical "Ideje", which first number appeared just few days before assassination of the King Alexander I Karadjordjevic, in Marseilles, in 1934. In all of them one can notice that he was firmly determined to actively participate into the public field already occupied by the proponents of communism and separatism.
- 33 The concept of "New Nationalism" was introduced and developed, primarily by Milos Crnjanski and Vladimir Vujic who explicitly use the term. Bosko Obradovic was the first who notices this fact and who identified and analyzed this paradigm of thought, and the one who made the model of "New Nationalism" as the heuristical device for understanding this tradition of thought in Serbian culture. See: Bosko Obradovic, *op. cit.* p. 114.
- 34 Milos Crnjanski, "Mi postajemo kolonija strane knjige", *Vreme*, XII/3659, Beograd, 9.III 1932, p. 2 and *Vreme* 3662, Beograd, 12.III 1932, in: Bosko Obradovic (ed.), *Precutani Crnjanski* (1932-1935), Dveri Srpske, casopis za nacionalnu kulturu i drustvena pitanja, no. 25, 1/2005, Beograd, 2005, pp. 6-8.

- 35 "That doesn't mean, and it goes without saying, that we want to make the Chinese wall from the whole foreign literature, nor that we are looking to favorize every banality only because it is ours, but we want to point to a certain speculation which is going against our writers and our literature as such" (*Ibid.* p. 8).
- 36 Milos Crnjanski, "Oklevetani rat", *Vreme*, XIV/4379, Beograd, 16.III 1934, p. 5 in: : Bosko Obradovic (ed.), *Precutani Crnjanski* (1932-1935), Dveri Srpske, casopis za nacionalnu kulturu i drustvena pitanja, no. 25, 1/2005, Beograd, 2005, pp. 26-28.
- 37 Milos Crnjanski, "Otrovni pauk", *Ideje*, no.10, Beograd,1935, in: Zoran Avramovic, *Milos Crnjanski, Politicki spisi*, Sfairos, Beograd, 1989, pp. 112-116.
- 38 See: Milos Crnjanski, "Miroslav Krleža kao pacifista", *Vreme*, XIV/4442, Beograd, 22.v 1934, p. 3 in: : Bosko Obradovic (ed.), *Precutani Crnjanski* (1932-1935), Dveri Srpske, casopis za nacionalnu kulturu i drustvena pitanja, no. 25, 1/2005, Beograd, 2005, pp. 28-33.
- 39 Milos Crnjanski, "Otrovni pauk", *Ideje*, no..10, Beograd,1935, in: Zoran Avramovic, *Milos Crnjanski, Politicki spisi*, Sfairos, Beograd, 1989, p. 114.
- 40 *Ibid.* p. 115.
- 41 Milos Crnjanski: "Do tog mora doci", *Ideje*, No. 30, 1935, Beograd, in: Zoran Avramovic, *Milos Crnjanski, Politicki spisi*, Sfairos, Beograd, 1989, p. 66.
- 42 The concept of "Adamism" was developed by Emil Cioran in his seminal work "The transfiguration of Romania" (Emil Cioran, *Schimbarea la față a României*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1990). Being critical to the passivity and lack of historical purpose, he suggested that "Adamism in culture does not mean anything else other than that every spiritual, historical and political problem is tackled for the first time, that everything we do is determined by new values, in an incomparable order and manner" (the translated excerpt is from: Emil Cioran, "The Transfiguration of Romania", in: Diana Mishkova, Marius Turda and Balázs Trencsényi,(eds.), *Anti-Modernism:Radical Revisions of Collective Identity*, Edited by CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2014, p. 360.
- 43 Jan Assman's concept of "cultural memory" (Jan Assman, "Collective Memory and Cultural Identity", *New German Critique* 65, pp. 125-133, 1995), Ekaterina Kalinina interpretes in a way that "a group build its understanding of unity and uniqueness upon this preserved knowledge and is able to reproduce its identity" (Ekaterina Kalinina, *op. cit.* p. 31).
- 44 These notions are introduced by Reinhart Koselleck. See: Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, Translation and introduction Keith Tribe, Columbia University Press, New York and Chichester 1985/2004.

- 45 Such "lieux de memoirs" he treats in the texts, such as: Milos Crnjanski, "Krf, panteon nase ratne slave" ("Corfu, the Pantheon of Our War Glory"), *Vreme*, 7.10.1933, in: Bosko Obradovic (ed.), *Precutani Crnjanski* (1932-1935), Dveri Srpske, casopis za nacionalnu kulturu I drustvena pitanja, no. 25, 1/2005, Beograd, 2005, p. 49, or "Dvadesetogodisnjica bitke na Kumanovu 1912-1932" ("Two decade Anniverasry of the Kumanovo battle 1912-1932") ("Two decade Anniversary of the Kumanovo battle 1912-1932"), *Vreme*, 23.10.1932), in: *Ibid.* p. 44-45.
- 46 Milos Crnjanski, "Tragedija srpstva" , *Ideje br. 24*, 4.5.1935, in: Zoran Avramovic, *op.cit.* pp. 75-79.
- 47 Milos Crnjanski, "Ideje Milosa Crnjanskog", *Ideje* no. 1, 1934., in: Bosko Obradovic (ed.), *Precutani Crnjanski* (1932-1935), Dveri Srpske, casopis za nacionalnu kulturu I drustvena pitanja, no. 25, 1/2005, Beograd, 2005, p. 5.
- 48 Milos Crnjanski, "Tezai antiteza", *Ideje*, No..28, 1.6.1935, in: Zoran Avramovic, *op.cit.* p. 70.
- 49 Milos Crnjanski, "Nasa hiljadugodisnja kultura", *Ideje*, No.7, 1934, in: *Ibid.* pp. 125-129.
- 50 *Ibid.* p. 127.
- 51 *Ibid.* p. 128.
- 52 Milos Crnjanski, Spaljivanje mostiju Svetog Save, *Ideje*, No. 25, Beograd, 1935, in: Zoran Avramovic, *op. cit.* p. 61.
- 53 Milos Crnjanski: "Social basis of our nationalism", *Ideje*, No. 20, 1935, in: *Ibid.* p. 94.
- 54 Milos Crnjanski: "Do tog mora doci", *Ideje*, No. 30, 1935, Beograd, in: Zoran Avramovic, *Milos Crnjanski, Poliiticki spisi*, Sfairos, Beograd, 1989, p. 64.
- 55 Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic (1895-1976), Serbian writer, critic, psychologist. Editor of the periodical "Novi vidici" (Belgrade/Sarajevo 1928-1929). Between wars (1918-1941) worked in the Ministry of Education. In the three year period (1941-1944), worked as the assisitant of the Minister of Education, in the government of Milan Nedic. From 1944, lived in emigration, in Italy and Spain. Died in a car accident in Barcelona in 1976 (See more on the biographical data in: Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, *Ogledi o knjizevnosti i nacionalnom duhu, Igraci na zici*, Zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, Beograd, 2006, pp. 425-426). In the interpretation of his ideas here, we are using his texts: Vladimir Velmar Jankovic: "Za prvu orijentaciju", *Novi vidici*", no.1, Beograd, 1928, pp.1-2 in: Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, *Ogledi o knjizevnosti i nacionalnom duhu, Igraci na zici*, Zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, Beograd, 2006, pp. 35-37; Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, "Duhovna kriza danasnjice", in: *Ibid.* pp. 37-57; Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, "Istorijski idealizam srpskog naroda", in: *Ogledi o knjizevnosti nacionalnom duhu, Igraci na zici*, Zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, Beograd, 2006, pp.

- 249-257; Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, "Otadzbina i inteligencija", in: *Ogledi o književnosti I nacionalnom duhu, Igraci na zici*, Zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, Beograd, 2006, pp. 225-248; Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, *Pogled s Kalemegdana: Ogled o beogradskom coveku*, Biblioteka grada Beograda, 1991 (Firstly published in 1938).
- 56 Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, "Duhovna kriza danasnjice", in: *Ogledi o književnosti I nacionalnom duhu, Igraci na zici*, Zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, Beograd, 2006, p.40.
- 57 *Ibid.* pp. 43-44.
- 58 Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, *Pogled s Kalemegdana: Ogled o beogradskom coveku*, Biblioteka grada Beograda, 1991 , p. 91.
- 59 *Ibid.* p. 58.
- 60 *Ibid.* p. 131.
- 61 And the sacrifice was immense. According to Velmar-Jankovic, Serbia lost in Balcan wars and the World War I around 1.500.000 of people (*Ibid.* p. 112).
- 62 *Ibid.* p. 114.
- 63 Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, "Duhovna kriza danasnjice", in: *Ogledi o književnosti I nacionalnom duhu, Igraci na zici*, Zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, Beograd, 2006, p. 52.
- 64 Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, *Pogled s Kalemegdana: Ogled o beogradskom coveku*, Biblioteka grada Beograda, 1991, p. 82.
- 65 *Ibid.* p. 83.
- 66 *Ibid.* p. 82.
- 67 *Ibid.* p. 84.
- 68 *Ibid.* p. 47.
- 69 *Ibid.* pp. 47-57.
- 70 Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, "Duhovna kriza danasnjice", in: *Ogledi o književnosti I nacionalnom duhu, Igraci na zici*, Zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, Beograd, 2006, p. 49.
- 71 Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, "Duhovna kriza danasnjice", in: *Ogledi o književnosti I nacionalnom duhu, Igraci na zici*, Zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, Beograd, 2006, p. 60.
- 72 Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, "Istorijski idealizam srpskog naroda", in: *Ogledi o književnosti I nacionalnom duhu, Igraci na zici*, Zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, Beograd, 2006, pp. 250-251.
- 73 *Ibid.* 251.
- 74 Vladimir Velmar-Jankovic, "Otadzbina i inteligencija", in: *Ogledi o književnosti I nacionalnom duhu, Igraci na zici*, Zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, Beograd, 2006, p. 239.
- 75 Vladimir Vujic (1886-1951), Serbian philosopher, mathematician, cultural critic. The Translator to Serbian language of the Oswald Spengler's "Der

- Untergang des Abendlandes" ("The Decline of the West). Died, practically forgotten in the emigration, in Brasil. The year of his death was not known until recently, when thanks to the research effort of Vladimir Dimitrijevic, is now verified.
- 76 See: Vladimir Vujic, "Oslobodjena misao", in: Vladimir Vujic, *Sputana i solobodjena misao*, zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, 2006, pp. 231-238. In this context it would be interesting to refer to the concept of the "stylistic matrix" developed by the Romanian poet and philosopher Lucian Blaga. In applying his theory of culture to philosophy and literature, his attitude was that "every cultural creation followed a certain pattern, a matrix composed of three essential elements: material life, spirituality and 'style' (uniting the first two elements)" (Diana Mishkova, Marius Turda and Balázs Trencsényi (eds.) *Anti-Modernism: Radical Revisions of Collective Identity*, CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2014, p. 206.
- 77 Vladimir Vujic, "Oslobodjena misao", in: Vladimir Vujic, *Sputana i solobodjena misao*, zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, 2006, p. 268.
- 78 *Ibid.* p. 247.
- 79 *Ibid.* pp. 232-233.
- 80 *Ibid.* p. 247.
- 81 *Ibid.* p. 246.
- 82 *Ibid.* p. 254. (Translation cited according to: Zoran Milutinovic, *Getting Over Europe: The Construction of Europe in Serbian culture*, Rodopi, Amsterdam-New York, 2011, p. 107).
- 83 *Ibid.* p. 258.
- 84 *Ibid.* pp. 258-262.
- 85 *Ibid.* pp. 260-261.
- 86 *Ibid.*
- 87 *Ibid.*
- 88 Vladimir Vujic, "Stvarne reci o nasoj kulturi, *Narodna odbrana*, Beograd, 1932, in: Milan Radulovic, *Modernizam I srpska idealisticka filozofija*, Institut za knjizevnost I umetnost, Beograd, 1983, pp. 215-217. In this passage is recurring reference to the similarity with Lucian Blaga's concept of "stylistic matrix" obvious.
- 89 Vladimir Vujic, "Oslobodjena misao", in: Vladimir Vujic, *Sputana i solobodjena misao*, zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, 2006, pp. 269-274.
- 90 *Ibid.* p. 271.
- 91 *Ibid.* pp. 272-273.
- 92 *Ibid.* p. 273.
- 93 *Ibid.* p. 269. The mentioning of Don Quixote by Vujic here is not accidental. He was one of the best connoisseurs of the Spanish literature and thought, especially Miguel de Unamuno (More on this see in his text: Vladimir

- Vujic, "Lik Kihota", *Narodna odbrana*", Beograd, 1929, in: Vladimir Vujic, "Oslobodjena misao", in: Vladimir Vujic, *Sputana i solobodjena misao*, zaduzbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, 2006, pp. 201-227.
- 94 Saint Sava, first archiepiscopal of the Serbian Orthodox Church (1219), Saint and enlightner. The founding father of the Serbian nation with his father Sveti Simeon Mirotočivi. His work *Nomokanon* is the constitutional act of Serbian Church and the central pillar of Serbian identity.
- 95 Dositey Obradovic (1739-1811), first Serbian minister of education, modern enlightner.
- 96 Vladimir Vujic, "Povratak Savi Svetitelju", *Svetosavlje*, god.III, sveska 2, 1934, pp.97-108, in: Bosko Obradovic (ed.), *Tajna Svetosavlja: nepoznati pogled na licnost Svetog Save*, Catena Mundi, Beograd, 2013, p. 65.
- 97 The normative concept of *Svetosavlje* represents the substantial value-core of the ideas of national identity and regeneration in interwar period.
- 98 This topic was broadly discussed in: Roumen Daskalov&Diana Mishkova (eds.) *Entangled Histories of the Balkans, Volume Two: Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions*, Edited by, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2014. As Milan Subotic competently put it in elaborating the two "ideal-type"positions of "nativist" and "westernizers": "the most famous case of these sort of discussions-the well known polemics of the Russian 'Slavophiles' and the 'Westernizers' represents the paradigm which has been reproduced until our days in the different intellectual milieux of the EasternEuropean societies. Its long vitality does not stem from the complexity and the 'openess' of the argumentation, but from the problematic situation which is being reproduced in different temporalities in the societies which are confronted with the feeling of its own marginality in relation to the historical *mainstream*" (Milan Subotic, "Mirca Elijade: Bekstvo od 'terora istorije'", *Treci program Radio Beograda*, no.151-152, *LETO-JESEN*, Beograd, 2011, pp. 147-148.
- 99 The notion used by Sorin Antohi and Balazs Trencsenyi, *op.cit.* p. 23.
- 100 Roumen Daskalov&Diana Mishkova (eds.) *Entangled Histories of the Balkans, Volume Two: Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions*, Edited by, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2014, p. 11.
- 101 They competently argue that : "One cannot simply equate conservative anti-modernism with some sort of radical nationalism or totalitarian propensities. While the interwar attempts at reviving conservatism started out from the criticism of the preceding liberal epoch and of political modernity as such, it could also be critical of the Nazi and Fascist models (...) A possible ideological outcome of all this was conservative anti-totalitarianism as mentioned above-the rejection of totalitarianism exactly as a manifestation of modernity" (Sorin Antohi, Balazs Trencsenyi, *op.cit.* pp. 37-38.

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# TECHNOLOGIES OF REBELLION: OTTOMAN BALKANS AS A SITE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CONTESTATION, 1878-1912\*

## Abstract

In pursuit of their national histories, historians in the successor state of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and the Middle East have tended to identify neat paths of national development going back deep into the late Ottoman imperial context where they point out the intellectual 'roots' and politically significant moments—known as watershed moments—that have ostensibly contributed to the development of their national histories. Such an examination of the late Ottoman world from the perspectives of the post-World War I nation-states has accordingly carved a set of ethnic compartments out of late Ottoman history that came to embody neat analytic utilities in scholarship. One way of going beyond such nationalist teleology is to approach the late Ottoman history in a thematic manner rather than bowing to the appeal of ethno-centered categories of analysis. This study takes one such approach and examines the Ottoman Balkans right before and after the turn of the century as a site of technological contestation between revolutionary political actors and Ottoman state apparatus. In doing so, it shifts the unit of analysis to more global processes and locates revolutionary political conduct as deeply connected to transnational flow of commodities and technologies. Under the impact of modernist theories on nationalism, technologies such as print capitalism have often been framed as the vehicles of fulfilling ideological dissemination and cultivating ethnic and religious loyalties. Another strand of scholarship, on the other hand, frames technologies such as telegraph, railroads, and the steam engine as the tools with which the state apparatus extends its reach into otherwise uncontrollable territories. Critiquing such linear constructs, I argue that the late nineteenth century saw the democratization of the means of contention and violence. In the Ottoman Balkans, the major struggle between revolutionary actors and the Ottoman state apparatus had been that of establishing authority and monopoly on the technologies and commodities of violence. I therefore examine when and under what conditions new technologies empowered actors and when it made them vulnerable.

**Keywords:** Ottoman Balkans, revolutionary politics, technology, global commodities

## **Technology: Means of Transmission or Vectors of Competition?**

The existing literature often treats nationalism as an ideology that spreads like a virus, while failing to specify the exact process of its transmission. The literature instead assumes that nationalism spreads thanks to modern technologies such as newspapers, novels, radio or television, and it does so in an unbroken linearity since the French Revolution (1789).<sup>1</sup> In this regard, modern institutions like schools, factories, hospitals or army barracks have also been treated as hotbeds of this virus, as they function in our narratives as sites of ideological dissemination and circulation. These institutions somehow spreads the virus of the necessity of national sovereignty—a virus that boasts of a level of ability, agility, and strength to turn peasants into co-nationals after the immediacy of contact, and transform unassuming townsmen into willing executioners ready to sacrifice their lives for their co-nationals. In the words of Benedict Anderson, these modern mediums allow the undifferentiated masses of the dynastic communities that had so far remained ethnically blind to “imagine” themselves as part of a larger national community—one that is “inherently limited and sovereign.”<sup>2</sup> Likewise, as Ernest Gellner has come to theorize, modern institutions such as factory—with new labor relations embedded in it—required homogeneity of culture as a result of necessary labor specializations—leading to the emergence of a homogenous national culture that differs from the high clerical culture of the medieval times. Like Gellner’s modern factories, railways, army barracks, roads, and so on also embody the same capacity of transmission and transformation, as convincingly analyzed and detailed by Eugen Weber who showed how these institutions came to unify a nation by turning the passive peasants into Frenchmen.<sup>3</sup> Scholars from different fields and orientations have therefore continued to theorize the emergence of nation-states and nationalism as a logical outcome of such processes of nationalist socialization and sociability.

Even though the literature on nationalist socialization is vast and convincing, it does not explain why some co-nationals resisted in the past, or continue to do so today, to the appeal of the virus when in times of contact, why others find the virus of nationalism so appealing so far as to sacrifice their lives and livelihood in championing its cause or why similar processes of nationalist socialization continually provides contradictory results, with diverse geographic variations and fluctuations. Furthermore, if I borrow Keith Brown’s apt analogy, this modernist perspective, with emphasis on national socialization, reduces ‘pre-national’ communities to

“vessels either waiting to be filled, or already flowing, with the substance of national sentiment.”<sup>4</sup> It is this modernist tendency that explains why we lean towards explaining nation-state formation as a matter of the transition from an intellectual nationalism to a political nationalism—that is, when the national sentiment hits the brim of the vessel and starts overflowing with (now political) national consciousness. It is also this modernist tendency that highlights a set of points of transitions, shifts or watersheds on a linear historical canvas, thus creating linear and progressive histories. These historical turning points all anticipate ‘that’ key moment in a nation’s history—the moment when the nation finally broke the pre-national yoke, escaping from the “imperial prison” or colonial dungeon—boundaries that were unable to resist the power of national will, i.e. the flood of national zeal.<sup>5</sup>

As Clifford Geertz noted, it is this ultimate national moment when “it all has ‘finally’ come out,” the final outcome that dominates the way we relate to its immediate pre-present.<sup>6</sup> Previous historical episodes and historical figures in nation’s pre-history are thus valuable and relevant only as far as they relate to this final outcome of the long history of national struggle. In nationalist imaginings then, these episodes and forefathers became important because they proved crucial in filling the ‘vessel’ with national sentiment/zeal/consciousness, therefore leading up to the final national outcome. In evaluating such historical figures and breaking-points in nations’ histories, scholars certainly developed a more objective terminology—one that strives to steer away from the vocabulary of nationalist historiographies and official histories. Therefore, scholars often frame these ‘pre-national’ episodes and figures as ‘proto-national’ and specify ‘liminal’ phases in the linear development of nation’s history—a rather commonplace teleological terminology that is illustrative of the shockingly thin methodological and theoretical divide between academic scholarship and nationalist mythologies. In the end, both scholarship and nationalist mythology orders and theorizes the past in reference to the national outcome. Modernist views of nationalism do not just re-cycle such teleology but actually theorize and thus embed it, for it has become theoretically safe and sound to see nationalism as an ideology that has the viral capacity of transmission thanks to human to human contact—one that spread *only* in modern times because of modern advancements and institutions such as schools, conscript armies, newspapers, novels, and industrial labor.

This study focuses on the Ottoman Balkans, i.e. “Turkey in Europe” as Western contemporaries put it at the time—comprising of six Ottoman vilayets/provinces (i.e. Adrianople, Salonika, Manastir, Yanya, Iskodra, and Kosova provinces)—right before and after the turn of the century when, in the words of Mark Mazower, “a history of revolt and revenge stretching back almost a century” came to reach its climax in what one may frame as three decades of contention that lasted from 1878 to 1912—that is, from the Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia to the end of the Balkan Wars.<sup>7</sup> Even though this period saw the greater proliferation and circulation of newspapers, armies, schools, and other mediums that one would normally expect to foment national consciousness in theoretical terms, I frame technology and modern institutions such as schools not as a vehicle of disseminating and circulating ideology and a means of cultivating ethnic loyalties but rather treat technological mediums as vehicles that facilitated political contention on the ground. I argue that the importance of technology has not been its ability to spread ideological convictions and loyalties but in its ability to facilitate political competition and contention in proportions unimaginable before.

Unlike modernist views of nationalism, my approach frames nationalism as political competition based on identity markers. This form of political competition was not necessarily a phenomenon peculiar to modern times, but rather a process that gained unprecedented momentum from the late nineteenth century onwards because of the growing availability of the technological means of contention. In seeing technology as such, I try to move away from the outcome-centric methodology of modernist views of nationalism and instead highlight a dynamic process of contention that evolves as the means of contention continues to change. As the routes of contention are dependent on its technological and logistical environment, I construct a process-driven perspective that hopefully allows us not only to understand the history of national contention in the late Ottoman era but also the contentions that are constantly in-the-making today or tomorrow. Furthermore, by rejecting to frame technologies as vehicles of ideological dissemination where the receivers lack historical agency and instead seeing it as the axes of political competition for various actors, I reinstate historical agency to those actors who risked their lives in making political claims and frame them as active participants in history.

In what follows, I examine the way the revolutionaries in the Ottoman Balkans after the turn of the century came to utilize *new* technologies of rebellion such as dynamite, bombs, photography, and newspapers.



These new technologies proved vital to the revolutionary enterprise, as they embodied a capacity to shake off what remained to be weak vestiges of Ottoman legitimacy and prestige in the region. The regulation and containment of these new technological fields of contention proved a crucial process for the Ottoman state apparatus, however. The existing scholarship often frames technological advancements as directly contributing to the efforts of state centralization and modernization whereby they enable the state apparatus to reach out and penetrate into otherwise uncontrollable territories where the bureaucrat came to tame the uncivilized and unruly. This perspective is often reflective of our tendency to write histories from the perspective of imperial metropolises. I instead illustrate below that technological advancements were double-edge sword, as they not only strengthened the central state apparatus but also made it growingly vulnerable to the political contenders from below, for technological advancements of the late nineteenth century also democratized the means of violence and revolutionary contention.

### **Infrastructures of Power? Railroads, Telegraphs, and Postal System**

Spring was a time of rebellion across the Ottoman Balkans.<sup>8</sup> Steep rocky mountains perching high above the towns that remained nestled in the protective cover of forests and cliffs meant that the snow covered passes would guarantee safe passage neither to soldier, nor rebel. Those few who opted to carry out revolutionary struggle in winter could only do so on a very low scale.<sup>9</sup> Yet, once the spring came, snow melted, and nature relaxed its ways, arms buried last September would get dug up in preparation of the new season of rebellion.<sup>10</sup> The rebels would remain active throughout the whole spring and summer, with the partial exception of the harvest period when human labor became a valuable commodity in and of itself.<sup>11</sup> After the second half of the nineteenth century, however, the mountainous region of the Balkans that has thus resisted the reach of outside control began to encounter significant penetrations in the form of railroads and other means of transportation and communication. As the appropriation of the Balkans by the Ottoman state apparatus and capitalist ventures took place, a particular discourse of civilization also began to form on the side, legitimizing such ‘modernizing’ initiatives.

Approximately fifteen years later than the railroad boom of 1840s in England and more or less a decade after the Great Exhibit of London in 1851, it was the English companies that were awarded contracts to build railroads in the imperial domains of the Sultan. Accordingly, within a decade after the Crimean War of 1853-5, two short lines were constructed in the Ottoman Balkans, first stretching from Chernovo to Constanta (1860) and the second from Varna to Ruse (1865).<sup>12</sup> Yet, the Ottoman metropole remained to be unconnected to the European railroad grid. Therefore contracted in 1869 to the famous railroad tycoon of the time Maurice de Hirsch (1831-96), the duty to construct a line between Constantinople and Wien was given to his Chemins de fer Orientaux (*Rumeli Şimendiferi Kumpanyası*) but Hirsch's company instead ended up constructing two separate rail lines, the first stretching from Constantinople to Belova via Adrianople and Plovdiv, and the second from Salonica to Mitrovica via Skopje.<sup>13</sup> This was so not only because the military conflicts such as the Russo-Ottoman Wars of 1877-88 brought about territorial shifts that required revisions of original plans along new national borders but also such hefty contracts almost always unearthed intra-governmental competition that led to change of plans, as high investment costs included bribes rumored to be distributed among the deserving bureaucrats, which led to public scandals.<sup>14</sup>

Not always did the wars or bureaucratic lumps mean delays or obstacles in the face of technological advancements. As a matter of fact, quite the opposite since the wars often necessitated the greater implementation of technology as well as facilitated new innovations. The Crimean War of 1853-56, in this sense, when the Ottoman armies allied with Britain and France in the face of Tsarist Russia, occasioned the introduction of telegraph to the Ottoman domains due to wartime necessities. As the Western powers constructed telegraph lines for purposes of military communication, the Ottoman metropole also decided to connect itself to the war grid of telegraphs formed in war-zones up north by extending a line from the capital to Shumen via Adrianople. In 1857, Constantinople also got linked to the European grid thanks to a line that stretched from the metropole to Plovdiv, Sofia, and Niš.<sup>15</sup> By 1870s, the world was a better connected place, with submarine cables linking Europe with other continents such as the Americas, Asia, Africa, and Australia.<sup>16</sup> Around the same time the Ottoman Empire, too, was better connected, as telegraph linked most of its cities to one another, reaching 25,137 kilometers by 1869. In the end, the technology of telegraph proved much easier to

install and cheaper to expand, particularly when compared to railroad construction. The Hamidian period (1876-1909) would accordingly see the continued expansion of the service, with the opening of additional branch lines.<sup>17</sup> By 1869, the European provinces of the empire boasted of the highest number of telegraph offices—143 to be exact.<sup>18</sup> Better connectivity among the Ottoman towns meant that the Ottoman center was quicker in responding to provincial crises and smarter in distributing its coercive capacity across its domains from mountainous regions of the Balkans to the arid deserts of Yemen. “Defective enough,” wrote Henry Harris Jessup in 1874, “yet enabling the central power in Constantinople to move the whole empire like a machine.”<sup>19</sup> By 1874, the map of the Ottoman Empire was indeed literally dotted with telegraph offices in each and every city.<sup>20</sup>

Technology proved to be a double-edge sword, however, and no one knew this better than Sultan Abdulhamid II himself. Reigning over the Ottoman domains from 1876 to 1909, i.e. the most critical juncture of technological innovation and the increasing revolutionary opposition from below, Abdulhamid II certainly embodied a sense of awe towards technological developments of his time. As the sultan saw greater utility in railroads, telegraph lines, and institutions of education for the prosperity of the empire and happiness of his subjects, his reign accordingly witnessed the incredible expansion of these public services across the imperial domains.<sup>21</sup> Yet, technological advancements also instilled fear into the Sultan. The first telephone communication at the Ottoman capital took place in 1881, only five years after the first telephone call between Alexander Graham Bell and his assistant. Abdulhamid II rightfully feared that such a technology would essentially benefit the revolutionaries in tremendous ways, as it would enable them to communicate and organize secretly and effectively at the expense of state authority.<sup>22</sup> Accordingly, the Ottoman state began to issue bans against private initiatives that tried to install telephone lines, arguing that communication was a matter of state monopoly in the Ottoman Empire and such a technology presented some certain “handicaps.”<sup>23</sup> The official ban on telephones would only be lifted after the Young Turk revolution of July 1908.

Beyond the uncertain menace the telephone presented, Abdulhamid’s fears included the revolutionary prospects of any other possible innovation as well as those who could be held accountable for such technological novelties. Mehmed Nazım Pasha (1840-1926), for instance, a Hamidian bureaucrat who served in multiple posts as governor such as in Mersin,

Kayseri, Diyarbekir, Aleppo, Konya, Sivas, and Salonika, recalls an interesting anecdote after his encounter with Said Pasa the English (1830/1-96).<sup>24</sup> The latter then served as the governor of Konya but he was originally trained in artillery sciences for seventeen years in England. The result, according to Nazım Pasha, was that he was “a man of his word and a virtuous person who adapted English manners and methods” (thus his moniker).<sup>25</sup> Yet, at a time when Said Pasha’s skill set in artillery sciences was simply unmatched across the Ottoman domains the sultan decided not to utilize his services and skills in artillery, because, Nazım Pasha argued, the Ottoman Sultan feared that new advances in artillery technology could end up being used in toppling him from the Ottoman throne.<sup>26</sup> Sultan’s fears of coup d’états, however, had a higher toll than the unexploited skills of an artillery officer, as he would also ban “higher-unit maneuvers and all live firing exercises” in the Ottoman land forces, for he feared the military action to take him down.<sup>27</sup>

In retrospect, Abdulhamid II’s fears do not seem to be unfounded. To be sure, the Ottoman history had its own share of regicides such as that of Osman II in 1622 in what may be termed as a Janissary-style dethronement, or more recent but failed organized conspiracy, as in the Kuleli Incident of 1859 that tried to topple the Sultan Abdulmecid I (1839-61). These were certainly lessons learnt for Abdulhamid II as he grew up in the palace quarters. Only less than two years into his reign—just as if to refresh the memory of young Sultan—Abdulhamid II came to experience a small-scale conspiracy of his own—one that tried to reinstate his brother Murad V to the throne at his expense in what is known as the Çırağan Incident (1878).<sup>28</sup>

As Riedler argued, most of the conspiracies in the nineteenth-century Ottoman capital were in one way or another tied to the question of succession.<sup>29</sup> By the turn of the century, however, the axis of intra-state political competition was no longer a dynastic matter. Therefore, by July 1905, the rationale and the technology used to topple a monarch differed from its historical precursors. Remarkably similar to the assassination of the Russian Tsar Alexander II by the revolutionary organization Narodnaia Volia (People’s Will) in 1881 when the Tsar was on a routine military inspection in Saint Petersburg,<sup>30</sup> the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF hereafter) also chose a day when Abdulhamid II had developed a routine schedule and behavior: that of Friday prayer. In co-operation with the Bulgarian revolutionaries and some European anarchists, the members of the ARF planted 80 kilos of timed bombs into a carriage that would park by the mosque and detonate as the Sultan exited the Friday

prayer. According to the official report, the revolutionaries purchased the carriage from Vienna, the dynamite from Athens, the gadgets to make the bombs from Marseilles, thereby assembling a truly transnational “infernal machine” (‘dinamit makinesi’). As the soldiers were given the command ‘present arms’ in expectation of the sultan’s exit, the bombs exploded right at the time when the sultan was supposed to have stepped out of the yard but gotten caught up in a conversation with the head of the Religious Affairs, the Sultan remained unhurt. The attack instead killed twenty six others, wounded fifty eight, and destroyed sixteen other carriages together with their horses.<sup>31</sup> “The world was hardly prepared for such an evidence of the spread of ‘Western ideas’ into the Near East,” *the New York Times* reported about the failed assassination attempt, since “the use of dynamite suggests the modern Anarchist, the European ‘Red’.”<sup>32</sup>

Beyond such flashy instances of the use of technology in political violence, however, whether successful or abortive, technological advancements had actually gained broader utility in the Sultan’s realm from the late nineteenth century onwards. Technologies of rebellion such as dynamite, bombs, photograph, rifles, pistols, newspapers, and many others have all reached their prime time by the end of the nineteenth century when they became cheaply producible, easily transportable, safely handleable, and therefore gradually more available to the multiple revolutionary causes across the Ottoman Balkans. This was thus a time when the means of contention got democratized and the revolutionaries boasted of a technology better suited to fight off the state machineries in their hit-and-run or resistance tactics. Such technologies, however, were not simple disseminators of a clear-cut ideology from a circle of nationalist intellectuals and politicians to a passive illiterate peasantry ready to consume ideological dictates. Rather, these technologies would establish loyalties and trust by shaking off the Ottoman legitimacy in the region, thus offering alternative political futures to diverse constituencies. The technologies of rebellion were therefore crucial blocs of intra-state competition that began to reach its climax from the 1880s onwards when the availability of new technologies of rebellion coincided with more structural international and regional shifts in the Ottoman Balkans. The post-1880s in the region was when the intra-state competition not only attained necessary means of contention but also its more favorable geopolitical climate.

## Changing Geo-Politics of the Ottoman Balkans since 1878

The history of organized revolutionary politics in the Ottoman Empire goes back to the first decades of the nineteenth century when underground organizations such as the Filiki Etaireia (Friendly Brotherhood)—founded in Odessa in 1814 and Alexander Ypsilantis assuming the leadership by 1820—became an active participant in the earlier phases of the Greek Revolution (1821-30), even though the exact role of the organization in the uprisings remain a point of debate among historians.<sup>33</sup> Similar secret organizations, with diverse political agendas, also emerged in later decades. In 1859, for instance, Fedailer Cemiyeti (the Society of Martyrs) was formed featuring a broad coalition of discontented ulama (Islamic scholars), officers, and bureaucrats, complete with an oath and defined goal of overthrowing Abdulmecid I from the throne.<sup>34</sup> Mid-1860s also saw the development of a secret Bulgarian revolutionary organization in Bucharest, which drew members from the Bulgarian youth who had spent time in Russia for educational purposes. Such secret revolutionary committees actively sent bands across the Danube River into the Ottoman territories and were active in organizing the 1868 rebellion.<sup>35</sup>

The period from the mid-1880s onwards, however, witnessed the most significant developments in the late Ottoman history that would benefit greatly to the rise of such intra-state competitors to the forefront of Ottoman domestic politics. Up until the mid-1890s, for instance, England held the territorial protection of the Ottoman Empire very dearly, thinking that Russia could benefit the most from its scramble. In the end, the aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 was about to turn the entire Balkans “into a Slavic federation under Russian hegemony,” which was overturn thanks to the Congress in Berlin.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, such a scramble of the Ottoman territories could have translated very easily into a more direct Great Power confrontation, as it did in the Crimean War few decades earlier. Therefore, the British policy that favored the territorial integrity (‘tamamiyet-i mülukiyet’) of the Ottoman Empire was more reflective of London’s fears about the uncertain paths of a possible Great Power confrontation than an ideological affinity with Constantinople.

Yet, since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869—an initiative spearheaded by a French national, which was surely enough to keep London suspicious and on its toes, Egypt’s role in the way Britain calculated the global security of its most prized possession i.e. India began to alter. By 1875 London purchased the debt-ridden Egypt’s shares in the Suez

Canal but Egypt's debts continued to soar in the following decade, so did the concerns of those like Britain or France which were too invested in the region to lose simply because of a spendthrift khedive of Egypt.<sup>37</sup> As the British stepped in by 1882 to restore order to the rebellion-stricken Alexandria and Cairo, it was the Ottoman territorial integrity that had received yet another blow. Certainly, the Ottoman metropole did not enjoy a direct control over Egypt to begin with. In the end, Muhammad Ali (1769-49), an Ottoman captain of Albanian origin, began to assert his own authority over the region since the early 1800s and slowly came to establish himself first as the governor of Egypt and then acquiring by early 1840s an autonomous status to Egypt where his descendants would later exercise hereditary rule. But the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and its formal annexation a decade later in 1895 began to signal clear shifts in the otherwise traditional British attitude of favoring the Ottoman territorial integrity—a shift that would gradually push the Ottoman metropole to seek another Great Power ally in the following decades (thus the Ottoman-German rapprochement).

Such diplomatic turn of events and the gradual change in the British policy vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire was not devoid of a domestic political angle, however. The ways in which the Ottoman metropole responded to the Armenian revolutionary enterprise in Eastern Anatolia since mid-1890s had rekindled the negative Turkish imagery in the Western capitals, which contributed to the consolidation of British policies.<sup>38</sup> The emergence of Armenian revolutionary organizations abroad, together with the formation of Armenian *fedayeen* in the Eastern Anatolia since 1880s, resulted in a series of rebellions such as the Sasun Uprising in 1894 and that of Zeitun in 1895-6. The ruthless suppression of these rebellions by the Ottoman state, coupled with effective manipulation of the public opinion by the Armenian sympathizers in the West in an attempt to secure a foreign intervention, created an unfavorable climate towards the Ottoman Empire in the European capitals then under the liberal wave.<sup>39</sup> This lethal combination of growing diplomatic isolation and the dominance of negative European public opinion vis-à-vis Constantinople came to be tested out with the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897. After the Kingdom of Greece landed troops to Crete, then an Ottoman island with significant Greek population, in response to the Cretan revolutionaries' calls for union with the Greek mainland, the Ottoman armies quickly scored decisive victories against Greece but these advances meant very little, as the empire was forced to yield autonomy to Crete after the diplomatic intervention of the Great

Powers. As the *Harper's Weekly* put it, "the stake does not always go to the winner."<sup>40</sup>

While the Ottoman Empire suffered from growing international isolation and deteriorating European public opinion, developments in the region did not fare that much better, either. In 1885, the Principality of Bulgaria came to annex the province of Eastern Rumelia, an autonomous territory that owed its existence to the arrangements of the Treaty of Berlin (1878). Even though the annexation started a crisis among the Great Powers as well as their regional allies—complete with a military conflict between Bulgaria and Serbia, the Ottoman Empire, then devoid of military and financial means to confront the move, was forced to confirm the annexation a year later.<sup>41</sup> Such a territorial change in the Balkans therefore not only turned Bulgaria into a more eminent threat to reckon with for the regional governments including the Ottoman Empire, but also came to animate the political competition over the remaining Ottoman territories in the Balkans, which would pit Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Ottoman Empire against one another in the following two decades.<sup>42</sup>

Such increasing political competition in the region certainly announced further troubles down the road for the Ottoman metropole, because the Balkan states of Greece, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria had all spent the last quarter of the nineteenth century in modernizing their bureaucratic apparatus and building up military capacity, with the end result of each turning into formidable enemies capable of mobilizing large sectors of their populations for a possible military engagement.<sup>43</sup> By 1903, the Balkan neighbors of the Ottoman Empire indeed posed a significant military threat that Istanbul began to take seriously, as the Sultan would decidedly spend the rest of his tenure in making sure that any attempt at a Balkan alliance remained a stillborn move.

The Bulgarian annexation of Eastern Rumelia in 1885, however, brought about an interesting turn of events for the regional alliances, albeit briefly. With the annexation, the Principality of Bulgaria lost the diplomatic and military support of Russia and such a move-away from the Russian orbit in turn translated into warmer ties with the Ottoman capital. For the next decade, it was a former revolutionary Stefan Stambolov (1854-95) who remained in charge of the Bulgarian affairs. As he favored a pacifist policy to advance Bulgarian interests over the Ottoman Balkans in general and Macedonia in particular, Stambolov was thus able to negotiate concessions from Constantinople to extend Bulgaria's religious and educational reach further into Macedonia. Such concessions would



enable Stambolov to open Bulgarian schools even in places such as Kesriye (Kastoria in today's Greece) where no Bulgarian student existed, thus forcing the school authorities to transfer students from elsewhere.<sup>44</sup>

By 1894, however, Stambolov was pushed aside by his opponents, including King Ferdinand of Bulgaria who decided to act beyond the parameters of a figurehead monarch. As Stambolov was murdered in the streets of Sofia a year later, Bulgaria had already abandoned its pro-Ottoman policy and sided with the Tsar, clearly reflective of the more aggressive Bulgarian policy to brew over the Ottoman Balkans.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, when Russia got involved in war (1904-5) with Japan, the rising constitutional power of Asia, the Bulgarian dignitaries, both civil and military, together with a sizeable crowd, therefore flocked to the official religious ceremony where they prayed for the victory of Russia, their Great Power sponsor.<sup>46</sup>

Therefore, both international and regional political climate by mid-1890s had come to animate an environment favorable for the growth of political competition over the remaining Ottoman territories in the Balkans. The regional and international dynamics thus provided a number of political opportunities to diverse intra-state competitors who were to draw personnel, funding, morale, and weapons not only from the populations of the contested territories but also from a multiplicity of inter-state sponsors, whether in the region or in Western Europe—sponsors that had invariably developed preferences for the victory of certain factions over the others. Therefore, political competition over the Balkans was hardly ever a local or a national story devoid of regional and international contexts by mid-1890s. It was precisely this political climate that offered political opportunities to a number of revolutionary groups to take the center stage in the late Ottoman history. All (in)famous and major underground revolutionary organizations of the late Ottoman era thus date back to this period, with Hunchaks founded in 1887, Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889, Dashnaksutyun (aka ARF) in 1890, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in 1893, and the External Macedonian Organization founded in 1895. Yet, beyond the favorable shifts in the geo-politics of the Ottoman Balkans from 1890s onwards that would enable the rise of intra-state competitors in the region, the post-1890 era also witnessed another set of crucial developments—that is, the increasing availability of technologies that would become the staple of revolutionary action in the Ottoman Balkans.

## **Towards New Technologies of Rebellion**

As soon as night covered the land all was in a simmer of revolutionary activity: rifles, cartridges, bombs and dynamite were transported from place to place; agitators sowed the seed of rebellion; messengers carried news, warnings, and instructions hither and thither; and one by one the peasants stole out into the fields to meet and drill. It became a common saying that the day was to the Turk but the night to the *Komitadji* [committee men].<sup>47</sup>

Revolutionary political activism in the Ottoman Balkans, whether carried out in the name of Macedonians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians, Muslims, Vlachs, or Turks, has increasingly resorted to a similar tactic: the use of political violence and terror tactics, together with conspiracy, to advance an alternative political legitimacy at the expense of the existing legitimacies of competing factions. 'Propaganda by the deed', as popularized by the Russian anarchist literature since 1860s, thus intended to mobilize a target constituency and rally them behind a revolutionary program. The revolutionaries were aware, however, that they could not field armies that could match the coercive power of the Ottoman state apparatus. Even at the height of a concentrated attempt at challenging the Ottoman legitimacy militarily, for instance, as it would happen in the *Ilinden Uprising* of 1903, revolutionaries could hold onto power only very briefly up until the auxiliary Ottoman troops reached the scene.<sup>48</sup> It was this reality, for instance, that made the External Committee in Sofia to issue orders in the spring of 1903 to the bands roaming the villages in the southern Ottoman Balkans, telling them to avoid confrontations with the Ottoman forces, instead spread propaganda among the villagers, and wait until the time of the general uprising.<sup>49</sup>

Therefore, the revolutionary organizations functioned more than often as a state within a state, creating a parallel system of taxation, coercion, and representation, while avoiding a direct armed confrontation with regular armies. When the latter took place eventually, revolutionaries preferred to hit symbolic targets that were the emblems of the competing political legitimacies. In carrying out such 'legible' actions, revolutionaries invariably hoped to leverage the sympathies of the Great Powers by illustrating both the extent of chaos and the lack of authority in the Ottoman Balkans as well as positing themselves as the only truly appropriate political alternative that had popular backing in the region.<sup>50</sup> The Ottoman bureaucrats were well aware of such a contentious repertoire and reported it in what often amounted to formulaic statements that characterized their

daily correspondence: revolutionaries were “to commit acts of arson here and there and blow up government buildings and other structures with dynamite in order to agitate the Ottoman soldiers and Muslim inhabitants to commit acts of violence towards Christians, all geared towards drawing foreign intervention” that would hopefully support their cause.<sup>51</sup> Revolutionaries freely expressed such tactics to foreign observers too, as one revolutionary remarked that “a series of outrages by the Turks such as would horrify the civilized world was what they hoped for and intended to bring about.”<sup>52</sup>

Such a contentious repertoire was indeed put into practice, as illustrated by the manners in which the revolutionaries started off and carried out the Ilinden Uprising of 1903 in rather symbolic ways. In every town the revolutionaries attacked, they made sure to damage, if possible to destroy, the public buildings and cut off the lines of communications. In the town of Krusevo, for instance, where the revolutionaries would later declare a short-lived republic—yet another symbolic move, they immediately circled the city hall (*‘hükümet konağı’*), telegraph office, and the military residences, and burnt them all down, thus cutting off communications as well as destroying any other vestige of Ottoman legitimacy. Public buildings such as city halls were repeatedly targeted in other towns, as well. Setting the hay barns to fire was also part of the revolutionary pattern, as fires across the town certainly contributed to the revolutionary spectacle. For the revolutionaries, soldiers who were either out for training or roll-call were also favorite targets. They would repeatedly cut off telegraph lines, thus not allowing the state to re-establish communication with the center or the nearby administrative divisions. The revolutionaries would also target buildings such as bridges to delay the move of auxiliary troops from one trouble spot to the next. The authorities were therefore constantly forced to send large detachments to repair bridges and telegraph lines in an attempt to re-establish communication and restore authority.<sup>53</sup>

Therefore, technology such as telegraph lines that were to consolidate state authority presented a set of vulnerabilities for the state apparatus on a central and local level, as telegraph not only became the only means of communication but also the emblem of authority and legitimacy. Furthermore, technology was also the major material condition that enabled the revolutionary contention. In this sense, technology would begin to serve the revolutionaries not as the means with which they got their co-nationals socialized into the larger nation but rather as the vehicles with which they carried out their campaign of mounting, sustaining, and

publicizing alternative political legitimacies. One such technological innovation that proved crucial to the revolutionary enterprise in the Ottoman Balkans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was dynamite. Often being seen as the technology that enabled great progress in fields of mining, engineering and construction—breakthroughs that we often associate with the rise of modern state power (yet another linear and state-centric interpretation), dynamite was also the technology that has revolutionized the ways in which subaltern actors such as the revolutionaries and anarchists of the late nineteenth century came to operate.<sup>54</sup> In this sense, as the “secret societies opened a way to politics in a system that excluded many on account of their low rank or their group’s standing in the political system,”<sup>55</sup> technologies such as dynamite similarly democratized the manners in which revolutionaries could challenge the state monopoly on legitimate violence, which was the crux of what constituted statehood itself (à la Max Weber).

In 1866 Alfred Nobel’s discovery of the blasting cap as the detonator and his later addition of a stabilizing element into the dynamite’s mixture were indeed revolutionary steps that helped him harness the power of nitroglycerin—invented earlier in the century—in much safer ways.<sup>56</sup> Yet, this technology that Nobel sold to the mining and construction companies worldwide as well as the warring states of his time also found itself an unlikely bunch of underground customers: revolutionary and anarchist organizations. The 1890s would accordingly see the explosion in the use of dynamite and other high-impact explosives in politically-minded spectacles that would begin to ‘terrorize’ the larger populations across the world. As one Balkan revolutionary put it, “civilized methods” of fighting, “with certainty of defeat” was now cast aside.<sup>57</sup> In the end, dynamite offered to the late nineteenth-century revolutionaries “new vistas of power, not solely for its potential to wreak destruction, but also for its ability to terrify a public.”<sup>58</sup> Dynamite was indeed a great equalizer in the revolutionary struggle against the coercive means of a state apparatus, as the revolutionaries were now, as the Ottoman soldiers came to admit, able to carry “their cannon in their pockets.”<sup>59</sup>

To be sure, the know-how of manufacturing dynamite, bombs, and poisons was circulated across Europe by the emerging anarchist literature of 1880s.<sup>60</sup> Whenever the literature fell short, however, the revolutionaries in the Ottoman Empire traded their knowledge with one another. In 1897, for instance, Goce Delcev of IMRO traveled to Odessa to meet with Armenian revolutionaries to exchange such practical bomb-making

skills.<sup>61</sup> In the end, Armenian revolutionaries made it to the headlines a year earlier on August 29, 1896, with the first high-profile attack that took place in the Ottoman Empire. That day the members of the ARF entered the headquarters of the Ottoman Bank in Constantinople, held the people inside hostage, and planted bombs and dynamite, and threatened to blow up the building. Concurrently, other ARF members fired guns and threw bombs and dynamites in different parts of the imperial capital—all in an attempt to draw attention to the misery of the Armenians under the Ottoman rule, particularly the manners in which the Hamidian Cavalry Forces, a group of Kurdish irregulars, came to suppress the Armenian uprisings of the previous three years. As the European powers intervened and the revolutionaries were accorded a free passage to Europe, the imperial capital witnessed the massacre of few thousand Armenians in retribution by the Hamidian loyalists.<sup>62</sup>

After the turn of the century, the Ottoman Balkans saw the increase in the number of similar bombings and attacks which took place more frequently and on a wider scale, both in urban settings as well as across the countryside. On April 28, 1903, the city of Salonika came to witness the infamous *Gemidzii* (i.e. “Boatmen”) bombings that created a revolutionary spectacle so far unmatched in the Ottoman realms. First a French steamer ship was rocked by the explosion of twenty kilos of dynamite, followed by the detonation of another bomb laid on the rail tracks, which missed its main target, i.e. the Istanbul train, as the timer went off early, only damaging the locomotive and sparing the lives of soldiers on board. Next day, another bomb went off at dusk damaging the gas line, which immediately cut off the electricity across the city at dusk, signaling the rest of the conspirators to start throwing bombs at pre-determined cafes and bars, followed by the highlight of the entire plot—that is, the explosion of the dynamite-mined tunnel dug underneath the Ottoman Bank for the past forty days. These explosions were followed by an immediate crackdown by the Ottoman authorities, which actually prevented the next round of explosions which would have targeted a mosque, post office and military headquarters.<sup>63</sup>

As the revolutionaries in Salonika also came to target the symbols of European capitalism together with those of Ottoman sovereignty to guarantee an international publicity to their cause, the Ottoman authorities were therefore forced to extend protection to other private banks such as the *Crédit Lyonnais* to prevent such similar attacks.<sup>64</sup> The empire’s vast territories provided too many possible targets for the Ottoman

state to manage the security of its domains. Long stretches of railroads, gasworks, bridges, and water supply centers provided ample opportunities to strike, thus keeping the Ottoman officials increasingly alert for any suspicious behavior around these public landmarks, particularly by those of the 'suspect' ethnic group.<sup>65</sup> Thus, the state correspondence after the turn of the century constantly talk about the Bulgarian or Macedonian revolutionaries operating in disguise and with false identities and passports, looking for opportunities to commit acts of murder, arson, and poison. One representative correspondence from the Prime Ministry thus warned the Ministry of Interior, for instance, about a set of Bulgarian conspirators ('fesede') who came to Constantinople with the goals of setting certain neighborhoods to fire, murdering passengers on city ferries, and adding poison to the capital's water supplies.<sup>66</sup> Such threats led the authorities to appoint additional guards on the city ferries, and send in extra forces to scout the long stretches of rail lines and waterways.<sup>67</sup>

Such correspondence since the turn of the century was more of the rule than the exception, as the Ottoman bureaucrats kept receiving similar intelligence briefs and responded often through formulaic ways by highlighting the necessity of taking the necessary measures ('tedabir-i lazımenin ittihazi') against these sinister plots. Ad hoc state responses to such revolutionary contention since the 1890s, however, gradually gained its legal characteristics. As explosives and ammunition such as dynamites, hand bombs, cartridges, and gunpowder became the weapons of choice for the revolutionaries in the Ottoman Balkans, the state authorities accordingly added an addendum in October 1903 to the article 58 of the Ottoman criminal law, specifying fifteen years in prison for the production, sale, or smuggling of dynamite, lifelong imprisonment if done so in the name of a conspiracy, and the capital punishment if dynamite gets used by conspirators.<sup>68</sup> Article 166 of the criminal law also got a similar addendum for the illegal manufacture or smuggling of gunpowder and cartridges. August of 1910, a time of a concentrated military confrontation in the Albanian highlands, witnessed the expansion of the criminal law so as to include the individuals who carried these prohibited weapons for personal use as well as those who were engaged in the smuggling of guns within the imperial territories, thus removing any possible legal loopholes.<sup>69</sup>

## **Photography and Print Capitalism: Image Control and Market Regulation**

By the turn of the century then, technologies such as railroads and telegraphs that the Ottoman state continued to invest in to expand its central reach became a source of constant concern from the point of state security. On the other hand, as we have seen, some other technological innovations such as dynamite came to democratize the means of contention for the revolutionaries and challenged the state's authority on the legitimate use of violence. Yet, certain other technologies such as photography and print media continued to provide a certain degree of relief. The Hamidian regime accordingly began to utilize the power of newspapers and journals to inculcate loyalty among the Ottoman subjects, which required close monitoring and censorship of the Ottoman press.<sup>70</sup> According to Hanioglu, the Hamidian censorship, harsher and more repressive when compared to other conservative monarchies of the time, succeeded to create "a press entirely committed to the service of the regime."<sup>71</sup> Accordingly, the publications in the empire, whether in dailies or books, were closely monitored to see whether they fit the set standards and if, preferably, they came to contribute to the official imagery.

As print capitalism provided the Ottoman state a degree of soft power, the improving technology of photography allowed the Ottoman security officials to track down the suspect revolutionaries or anarchists more closely and effectively before they acted to implement their 'sinister' plans. To be sure, old methods persevered, as certain correspondence simply opted to report the facial features of the revolutionaries. For instance, the Ministry of Interior received intelligence from Sofia on December 20, 1903 about a certain revolutionary named Nikola Boyaceyf in his mid-thirties with blue eyes, blonde facial hair, and medium height, accompanied by two other revolutionaries, the first with darker features and ten years older and the second who was blonde and aged thirty seven—revolutionaries who were suspected of coming to Constantinople to blow up buildings with dynamite.<sup>72</sup> Yet, particularly when it came to the leaders, the Ottoman authorities began to make use of the 'carte de visite' photographs of the revolutionaries, to be distributed to the local authorities with the names of each revolutionary written below the photo prints—all in the name of facilitating their capture.<sup>73</sup>

Ironically such 'carte de visite' photographs were first taken by the palace photographers in mid-1860s, featuring the Sultan, the royal family,

high-profile commanders and bureaucrats. Yet, the court photographers two decades later by the Hamidian era also began to take the pictures of convicts in Istanbul.<sup>74</sup> Thus photography slowly emerged as yet another means of extending the central state's control over the criminals in the empire, which certainly included revolutionaries and anarchists. In 1872, for instance, the Ottoman police was able to capture some of the members of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee, including Vasil Levski, thanks to their photographs.<sup>75</sup> Similarly by the summer of 1876, two revolutionary leaders on a recruiting mission were rumored to be traveling on an Austrian postal ferry, and as an Ottoman official took their photographs and exposed their identity, the Ottoman authorities were able to intercept the ferry and capture the revolutionaries.<sup>76</sup> A correspondence that dates back to August 2, 1894, for instance, asked the authorities to take the mug shots of socialists and anarchists, before they got deported from the Ottoman Empire ("fotoğrafları aldırılarak heman defi ve teb'id edilmeleri")—a standard procedure for peoples of this sort "who even got deported from a country like France that is governed by republicanism."<sup>77</sup>

Yet such a technology in pursuit of the revolutionaries proved to be elusive, if not totally counter-productive. During the course of February of 1903, for instance, first the photographs of Boris Saratov, one of the leaders of IMRO, and then the copies of the photographs of fourteen revolutionaries from the pro-Sarafov camp were distributed—a total of 252 to be exact—to the provinces and sub-districts in the Ottoman Macedonia to facilitate their capture.<sup>78</sup> A month later by March 19, the sub-governor ('mutasarrıf') of Çatalca reported back, having taken the duty of finding Sarafov rather personally. The sub-governor apparently stormed the Bulgarian villages in his district with a retinue of 400 soldiers and gendarme, searched these suspect villages inch by inch ('karış karış'), and questioned the villagers in a commanding way ('suret-i hakimane') about the whereabouts of Sarafov and his companions, albeit to no avail ('bir emare alınamamış').<sup>79</sup>

As the whole villages started factoring into the Ottoman Empire's threat perception, it remained to be quite rare for the Ottoman authorities to catch revolutionaries to begin with, since the intelligence on the locations of the members and leaders of revolutionary groups kept pouring in proportions that were probably unmanageable by the bureaucratic standards of the turn of the century. Furthermore, the technology of photography seem to have other unintended consequences for the state security officials, as photographs were not only an amazing means of spreading anti-Ottoman



propaganda but they also succeeded to create a visual culture with which the larger populations came to romanticize revolutionaries and their tradition of resistance and wartime heroism against the state authorities, as reflected in common circulation of postcards with the pictures of diverse revolutionary figures. Such a popular market for photographs created yet another contentious realm that the state authorities struggled to regulate, as the photographs of revolutionaries as well as anti-Ottoman images became an important commodity in the market, both local and transnational.

One such instance dated back to February 28, 1903 when the cover of *L'Illustration* featured a famous photograph of Ottoman security forces posing with the severed heads of revolutionaries—not an unusual picture, as both the security officials and rebels often got such pictures taken as personal trophies.<sup>80</sup> Coming at a time as the Macedonian and Bulgarian revolutionaries were in preparations for a large scale uprising, the publication of such an anti-Ottoman image caused a great shock for the Ottoman authorities. In the end, one peculiar feature of the Hamidian state machinery was its obsession with image-management at home and abroad, leading it to produce daily clippings from hundreds of newspapers or journals, whether major or obscure, and issuing constant official denials of things that damaged the imagery of the empire and the sultan.<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, Abdulhamid II paid particular attention to the uses and misuses of photography, as he expected it only to report grand developments in the empire such as construction of schools, hospitals, and military barracks—all evidences of an empire on the path of progress in an equal footing to Europe.

Therefore, the appearance of such a picture in a major European journal came to shatter what little positivity that the Ottoman bureaucrats succeeded to cultivate in European public opinion. Such an image did not fare well for the domestic market, either. The authorities accordingly first determined the origins and whereabouts of the photograph, tracing it to Manastır (today Bitola) where two gendarme and a police officer posed with the severed heads of Greek brigands killed in the environs of Görice (Korçë). The local officials took immediately action as they first destroyed the original found in a studio in the city and then began to hunt down its prints in bookstores in Bitola and Salonika.<sup>82</sup> As technology increasingly contributed to the ways in which revolutionaries targeted the Ottoman state sovereignty in pursuit of their alternative vision for the future, technology thus became gradually a site of contestation for the state authorities.

## Conclusion

The existing literature has often treated technology either as the enabling factor of the consolidation and centralization of modern state apparatus or as the vehicles that socialized co-nationals into a larger nation, as technologies helped them imagine themselves to be part of a larger community. In this chapter I moved beyond such linear assumptions and interpretations, and argued that technological advancements by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century mattered significantly because they came to facilitate intra-state competition by endowing significant vehicles of contention to a diverse body of actors. In this sense, technological developments of the second part of the nineteenth century in a way democratized the means of violence, enabling revolutionaries and others to engage in meaningful political struggles against better-resourced central state apparatus. In this sense, the importance of newspapers, photographs, and other technologies has not rooted in their ability to increase nationalist sociability but rather in the way they unleashed intra-state competition.

As revolutionaries created parallel systems of legitimacy in their areas of operation and came to challenge the state conduct in gradually more effective ways, they essentially broke down the state's monopoly on legitimate violence. The state authorities in turn tried to restore their monopoly on violence by passing new regulations and increasing state's means and capacity of repression. No doubt, the reign of Abdulhamid II has often been portrayed as the reign of terror, with state repression, crackdown, and censorship—realities that certainly defined the daily lives of Ottoman citizenry before and after the turn of the century. Yet, the Hamidian autocracy was actually rooted not in the preferences of the Sultan but rather in the shifting meanings and changing vehicles of legitimate violence at a time when technology provided countless means and opportunities to a diverse body of intra-state competitors. Therefore, technology has not historically provided a linear trajectory of action to revolutionaries or bureaucrats. Similarly it should not yield such neat and linear analytic utility to scholars, either.

Framing technology as the enabler of inter- and intra-state competition provides a much more dynamic and process-oriented historical perspective rather than the existing explanations that often fixate upon outcome-centric approaches. The literature on nationalist socialization falls under the latter category, as it assumes that nationalist socialization is a definitive and final

historical process because the possibility of undoing such a socialization does not seem to be an option in theoretical terms. If we frame modern technological means as the facilitators of inter- and intra-state competition, however, and in doing so, see consolidation of identities as a result of political competition, it remains to be a possibility for later episodes of competition to politicize identities anew thanks to novel technological breakthroughs that the state mechanisms have not yet come to regulate.

## NOTES

- \* I would like to thank Peter Sluglett and Serhun Al for their comments and suggestions.
- <sup>1</sup> For a well-written and argued summary, see Joshua Barker and Sharon Kelly, "Technology and Nationalism," in *Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview*, eds. Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, vol.1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2008) pp.126-136.
- <sup>2</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006) 5-6.
- <sup>3</sup> Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).
- <sup>4</sup> Keith Brown, *Loyal unto Death: Trust and Terror in Revolutionary Macedonia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013) 21.
- <sup>5</sup> I am borrowing the term "empires as prisons of nations" from an article by Ellen Comisso, "Empires as Prisons of Nations versus Empires as Political Opportunity Structures: An Exploration of the Role of Nationalism in Imperial Dissolutions in Europe," in *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World*. Esherick, Joseph, Hasan Kayali, and Eric Van Young. Eds. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006) 138-66.
- <sup>6</sup> Geertz, "Review of Rudolf Mrázek's *Engineers of Happy Land: Technology and Nationalism in a Colony*," in *American Anthropologist*, 106:2 (2004), 420.
- <sup>7</sup> Mazower, *The Balkans: a Short History* (New York: Modern Library, 2000) xxviii.
- <sup>8</sup> This was so much so that "spring as a time of troubles" became a generic statement in the Ottoman bureaucratic framing of the rampant rebellions of the day. For instance, see: "İsa Bolatinin meşrutiyet idaresi aleyhinde avenesini tezyid etmekte olduğu ve mevsim-i baharın hulülünde mucib-i müşkilat ahval ifa edeceği" Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Prime Ministry's Ottoman Archives, BOA hereafter), DH.MKT. 2718 - 52 - 1327 M 2, lef 2.
- <sup>9</sup> The infamous revolutionary Boris Sarafov (1872-1907) from the Bulgarian Supremacist Committee, for instance, was in the opinion of a continued struggle year round. "Sarafof'un efkar-ı umumiyesi de hareket-ı iğtişaiyenin her zaman devam ettiği fikrini idame ve ibka etmek için bazı ufak tefek çeteler dahilde kışın hasarata devam eylemesi..." BOA. Y.PRK.MK. 17 - 36, 15 Teşrin-i sani 1319, lef 4.
- <sup>10</sup> Robert Elgood, *The Arms of Greece and her Balkan Neighbors in the Ottoman Period* (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2009) 37.
- <sup>11</sup> "Hasad mevsiminin takarrubu cihetiyle fesedenin muvakkaten tatil-i hareket ile ağustos avasıtına doğru tekrar icra-yı şekavete ibtidar..." BOA, TFR.I.A. 7 - 695, 29 Mayıs 1319. In this particular instance, it was Doce Delchev who insisted upon having the Ilinden Uprising of 1903 after the harvest

season. Duncan M. Perry, *The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movements, 1893-1903* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988) 127.

12 One should note that the British companies had already been awarded an earlier concession in the Ottoman Empire. Abbas of Egypt awarded a contract in 1851 to build a railroad between Alexandria and Cairo in what was by then the autonomous province of the empire.

13 Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi: Islahat Fermanı Devri (1861-1876)*, vol. 7 (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2003) 268-71.

14 For an account on the corruption charges around the construction of the line, including figures from the higher echelons of the reformist Ottoman bureaucracy such as Ali, Fuat, and Ziya Paşa, see Nazım Paşa, *Selanik Vali-i Sabıkı Nazım Paşa'nın Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1992) 18-24.

15 See Diren Çakılcı, "Osmanlı-Avrupa Telgraf Hatlarında Sırbistan Emareti'nin Rolü," in *OTAM*, 34/Fall 2013, pp.59-81.

16 Max Boot, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today* (New York: Gotham Books, 2006) 111.

17 Roderic Davison, "The Advent of the Electric Telegraph in the Ottoman Empire," in *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923: The Impact of the West* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990) pp.133-65, 137-8.

18 Tanrıkut, *Türkiye Posta ve Telgraf*, 539 and 614-5.

19 Qtd. in Davison, "The Advent of the Electric Telegraph," 147-148.

20 For the telegraph map by 1874, see <<http://www.midafternoonmap.com/2013/02/trains-and-telegrams.html>>.

21 Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004) 77-8.

22 Gökhan Akçura, "İhtilalci ve Çapkın bir Alet: Abdülhamit'ten Bugüne Telefon," in *Popüler Tarih*, Ağustos 2000, 36-41. Tanju Demir, *Türkiye'de Posta Telgraf ve Telefon Teşkilatının Tarihsel Gelişimi (1840-1920)* (Ankara: PTT Genel Müdürlüğü, 2005) 156.

23 BOA. DH.MKT. 1384/127, 17 Rabiulevvel 1304; DH.MKT. 1392/57, 20 Rabiulahir 1304.

24 For more information on Mehmet Nazım Paşa, see Fevziye Abdullah Tansel, "Bir Mevlevi Nasir ve Şairi Mehmed Nazım Paşa: Basılı Eserleri ve Yazma Şiir Mecmuası," in *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 14 (1966) pp. 155-74.

25 Nazım Paşa, *Selanik Vali-i Sabıkı*, 81.

26 "Topçulukta yeni terakkiler yapılacağından ve bu toplarla kendisinin iskat olunabileceğinden korkarmış." Ibid, 81-2. To be sure, things were more complex than Nazım Paşa's straightforward judgment. In the early years of Abdulhamid II's reign, Said Pasha actually served the Sultan as the head of the palace secretariat (i.e. Mabeyn Başkatibi) and then became a minister in different cabinets, yet only to fall from the Sultan's favor after the Çırağan conspiracy which led to his dismissal to rural administrative posts. For more

- details, see Burhan Çağlar, *İngiliz Said Paşa ve Günlüğü (Jurnal)* (İstanbul: Arı Sanat, 2010).
- 27 Mesut Uyar and Edward Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans* (Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO, 2009) 211.
- 29 For a systematic treatment of the Kuleli and Çırağan Incidents, see Florian Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire: Conspiracies and Political Cultures* (London: Routledge, 2011) 12-25, 58-70.
- 29 Ibid., 85.
- 30 Matthew Carr, *The Infernal Machine: A History of Terrorism* (New York: The New Press, 2006) 13-14.
- 31 Haluk Selvi, *Sultan'a Suikast: Sultan II. Abdülhamid'e Sunulan Bomba Hadisesi Fezlekesi* (İstanbul: İBB Kültür A.Ş. Yayınları, 2013) 117-20, 143.
- 32 "The Attempt on the Sultan," in *New York Times*, July 23, 1905, pg.6.
- 33 For more information on the formation of the society, see Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821-1833* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) 41-8.
- 34 Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy*, 23-5.
- 35 "Bulgar gençlerinden bir çoğu Rusya'da tahsil görüyorlar, istiklal hislerini vatandaşları arasında da neşr ve .... edebiliyorlardı. Bükreş'de muntazam teşkilatıyla bir komite teşkil etmişlerdi. Bu komite 'Tuna'dan' çeteler geçiriyor, Bulgarları Osmanlı İmparatorluğu aleyhine kıyama teşvik ediyordu." Ahmed Refik, "1284 Bulgar İhtilali," in *Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası*, 15:9/86 (İstanbul, 1341 [1925]) pp.137-164, 137. Also see Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, ed., *Mithat Paşa'nın Hatıraları: Tabsıra-i İbret*, vol.1 (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1997) 85-6.
- 36 Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 121.
- 37 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., *A Brief History of Egypt* (New York: Facts on File, 2008) 73-5, 84-9.
- 38 Hanioglu, *A Brief History*, 131.
- 39 Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1814-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) 191-202.
- 40 *Harper's Weekly: A Journal of Civilization*, vol. XLL, no. 2118, New York, July 24, 1897.
- 41 R. J. Crampton, *Bulgaria* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 122-5.
- 42 Hanioglu, *A Brief History*, 134.
- 43 Sinisa Malesevic, "Wars that Make States and Wars that Make Nations: Organised Violence, Nationalism and State Formation in the Balkans," in *European Journal of Sociology*, 53:1 (Apr.2012) pp.31-63, 40-1.
- 44 "...Kesriye kazası Bulgar cemaatinden hiç kimse olmadığı halde on dokuz sene evvel mekteb-i mezkur tesis ve küşad olunarak hariçden bir takım

etfal... tedris olunmakta..." BOA, TFR.I.MKM. 3-258, 14 Rabiülevvel 1321 (10 June 1903), Lef 258-6.

45 İpek Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878-1908* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2014) 25-9.

46 "Rusya ve Japonya hükümetleri beyninde ibtidar eden muhasamanın Rusya ordusunun tahliye ve muzaffariyetiyle neticelenmesi..." BOA, DH. MKT. 621-43, 30 Kanunsani 1319 (12 February 1904), Lef 193-19. One should note that the eventual victory of Japan over Russia in turn inspired the anti-imperialist discourse among the CUP revolutionaries who interpreted the Japanese victory as the triumph of constitutionalism.

47 Frederick Moore, "The Macedonian Committees and the Insurrection," in *The Balkan Question*, ed. Luigi Villari (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W, 1905) 192.

48 The Ilinden Uprising was indeed a time when the sheer number of the mobilized revolutionary bands across the Ottoman Balkans presented significant challenges to the existing Ottoman forces in the region. The archival documentation from this time period is full of instances when the Ottoman authorities constantly asked for auxiliary troops from nearby stations. In one representative instance on 4 March 1319 (17 March 1903) at a time when the bands were in the midst of preparations for a general uprising to come in the spring, the Office of Ottoman General Staff asked from the Prime Ministry for additional forces to be dispatched from the nearest post ('en yakın mevkiden kuvva-i kafi sevkine') since the two detachments ('müfreze') numbering 110 soldiers could not simply track down and tackle effectively a revolutionary band numbering over 120. BOA, DH. MKT. 621-43, Lef 193-131.

49 "Çetelere irsal olunan ta'limatda asker-i şahane ile müsademedin içtinab ve yalnız köyleri dolaşarak umum Bulgar ahalisinin ihtilale ihzar edilmesi..." BOA, TFR.I.A. 8-743, Sadaret'ten Rumeli Müfettişliği'ne, 1 Haziran 1319 (14 June 1903), Lef 1.

50 "...memalik-i şahanelerinde idaresizlik yüzünden bu gibi ahval-i müessifenin zuhur ve tevali ettiğini ve kıyam eden ahlinin teba-yı şahaneden olub idare-i devlet-i aliyyeden bizar kalan Bulgarlardan olduğunu..." BOA, Y.PRK.MK. 12-66, Şubat 318 (February 1903).

51 "...asker-i şahane ile ahali-yi islamiyyeyi hristiyanlar aleyhine tahrik ve bu suretle bir müdahale-i ecnebiyye celb edebilmek için ba'dema ötede bir yere ifa-yı harik ve dinamit vesaire ile emakin-i amireyi ve sair mebani-i cismiyyeyi bir heva eylemek..." BOA, DH. MKT. 621-43, Sadaret'ten Dahiliye Nezaretine, 14 Muharrem 1321/30 Mart 1319 (12 April 1903), Lef 193-147. In a letter to Shaik al-Islam dated 1877, Midhat Pasha had advanced exactly the same line of interpretation. Kocahanoğlu, ed., *Mithat Paşa'nın*, 345.

- 52 Moore, "The Macedonian Committees," 200.
- 53 These facts are compiled from two separate correspondence that reported the confusion on the part of the local Ottoman authorities on the first few days of the Ilinden Uprising and how they tried to control the situation. BOA, TFR.I.MN. 14-1398, 2 Ağustos 319 (15 August 1903) Lef. 1398-1 and 1398-9.
- 54 Richard Bach Jensen, *The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism: an International History, 1878-1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 6.
- 55 Riedler, *Opposition and Legitimacy*, 84.
- 56 Stephen R. Brown, *A Most Damnable Invention: Dynamite, Nitrates, and the Making of the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2005) 55-69.
- 57 Moore, "The Macedonian Committees," 205.
- 58 Sarah Cole, "Dynamite Violence and Literary Culture," in *Modernism/Modernity*, 16:2 (April 2009) 301-328, 302.
- 59 Moore, "The Macedonian Committees," 217.
- 60 The German anarchist Johann Most's publications were a case in point in this regard. See the following pamphlet by him originally published in 1885: *The Science of Revolutionary Warfare: a Handbook of Instruction regarding the Use and Manufacture of Nitroglycerine, Dynamite, Gun-Cotton, Fulminating Mercury, Bombs, Arsons, Poisons, etc* (El Dorado: Desert Publications, 1978).
- 61 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 62.
- 62 Ilkay Yilmaz, "Anti-Anarchism and Security Perceptions during the Hamidian Era," in *Zapruder World*, vol.1 (Spring 2014), <<http://www.zapruderworld.org/content/ilkay-yilmaz-anti-anarchism-and-security-perceptions-during-hamidian-era>>
- 63 Mazower, *Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims, and Jews 1430-1950* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005) 249-52. Moore, "The Macedonian Committees," 205-9.
- 64 "Dersaadette bulunan bank vesair gibi müessesat-ı maliyye aleyhine erbab-ı fesad tarafından dinamit istimali misullü mel'anet ve cinayet vukua geleceği hakkındaki istihbardan dolayı Osmanlı Bankası hakkında icra kılınacak tedabir-i muhafazakarının Kredi Liyone bankası hakkında dahi tatbikle..." BOA, DH.MKT. 621-43, Hariciye Nezareti'nden Dahiliye Nezaretine, 5 Safer 321/20 Nisan 319 (3 May 1903), lef. 193-81.
- 65 In one instance, ten revolutionaries were arrested, as they were scouting for possible targets that included gasworks and a rail bridge. "Dereköy mevkiindeki şimendifer köprüsünün orta ayağını dinamit ile tahrib ve Hüseyin Mustafa Paşa gazhanesini bir hava eylemek maksadıyla..." BOA, DH.MKT. 621-43, 26 Mart 319 (8 April 1903) lef.193-90.
- 66 BOA, DH.MKT. 760-7, 8 Cemazeyilahir 321 (1 September 1903) lef. 1 and 10.
- 67 BOA, DH.MKT. 793-58, 22 Şevval 1321 (11 January 1904).



- 68 "Hükümet-i seniyyenin müsaadesi olmayarak memalik-i devlet-i aliyyeye cüz'i ve külli dinamit idhal ve kabul ve ... ve imal edenler ve bunların bu halleri teshil eyleneyler on beş sene ve işbu efalin bir madde-i fesada .... olduğu sabit olursa mütecasiri müebbeden küreğe konur ve madde-i fesad faale çıkar ise idam olunur." BOA, DH.MKT. 637-15, 5 Şaban 1321/14 Teşrinvevvel 319 (27 October 1903), lef. 74.
- 69 "...esliha-yı memnua taşıyanlar ile dahil-i memalik-i Osmaniye'de bir mahalden diğer mahale esliha-yı memnua ve alet ve ecza-yı nariyye nakl ve idhal eyleyenler hakkında..." BOA, İ. DUİT. 79-8, 18 Şaban 1328 (25 August 1910).
- 70 or an insightful overview, see Muammer Göçmen, "II. Abdülhamit Döneminde Yabancı Basın Nasıl Takip Edilirdi?," in *Tarih ve Toplum*, 22:128 (Aug 1994) pp.18-24.
- 71 Hanioglu, *A Brief History*, 126
- 72 BOA, DH.MKT. 621-43, 30 Ramazan 1321 lef. 193-36.
- 73 "...kopya suretiyle adedi teksir olunarak lüzum-u mikdarının zirlerine isimlerinin tahririyle vilayet-i lazıma ve zabıta nezareti celilesine irsali..." BOA, DH.MKT. 621-43, Sadaret'ten Dahiliye Nezaretine, 2 Mart 1319/16 Zilhicce 1320 (16 March 1903) lef. 193-7. For the type of photographs known as carte de visite, see William C. Darrah, *Cartes de Visite in Nineteenth-Century Photography* (Gettysburg: W.C. Darrah Publisher, 1981).
- 74 Fulya Ertem, "Facing the 'Other': A Critical Approach to the Construction of Identity Narratives in the Early Photographic Practice of the Ottoman Empire," in *Early Popular Visual Culture*, 9:4 (Nov. 2011) pp.293-307, 296.
- 75 Martina Baleva, "Revolution in the Darkroom: Nineteenth-Century Portrait Photography as a Visual Discourse of Authenticity in Historiography," in *Hungarian Historical Review*, 3:2 (2014), pp.363-90, 366-7.
- 76 Kocahanoğlu, ed., *Mithat Paşa'nın*, 73-5.
- 77 "...Fransa gibi cumhuriyetle idare olunan bir memlekette bile tard edilmiş olan merhumun ve emsal-i sosyalist ve anarşistlerin..." BOA, DH. MKT. 2068-45, 21 Temmuz 1310/29 Muharrem 312.
- 78 BOA, DH. MKT. 475-28, lef. 69, 71, 83. 94.
- 79 Ibid., lef 97.
- 80 Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties*, 229. For the reproduction of the picture in question, see page 227 in Yosmaoğlu's book.
- 81 Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999) 136-8.
- 82 "...Görice taraflarında etlaf edilen Yunan eşkiyasının ser-i maktualları Manastır'a getirilerek iki jandarma ve bir polis..." and "...fotoğrafların Selanik ve Manastır'daki kitapçı dükkanlarında mevki-i fûruhte konulmuş olduğu..." TFR.I.A. 4-380, lef 16 (16 Şubat 318) and lef 9 (25 Şubat 318).

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