New Europe College Yearbook 2014-2015

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New Europe College
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Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

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CONTENTS

NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION
NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

New Europe College (NEC) is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997-1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 500 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong

7

international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:

- *NEC Fellowships (since 1994)*
  Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- *Ştefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)*
  The fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the Odobleja Fellowships are integrated.

- *The Black Sea Link Fellowships Program (since October 2010)*
  This program, sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung, invites young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they

have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of the Black Sea region.

- ***The Europe next to Europe (EntE) Fellowships Program (starting October 2013)***
  This program, sponsored by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden), invites young researchers from European countries that are not yet members of the European Union, targeting in particular the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia), Turkey, Cyprus, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of New Europe College:

- ***RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)***
  The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one–month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach actives involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

- **The NEC–LINK Program (2003 - 2009)**
  Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj–Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

- **The GE–NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)**
  New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10–month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend, and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE–NEC Yearbooks series.

- **NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)**
  In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South–Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova,

Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one–month research trip abroad. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

- ***The Britannia–NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)***
  This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

- ***The Petre Ţuţea Fellowships (2006 – 2008, 2009 - 2010)***
  In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government though its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College's community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Ţuţea* Program publications.

- ***Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)***
  This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*, Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South–Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

- **Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)**

  This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

- **The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (2009 - 2013)**

  This program, supported by the Getty Foundation, started in 2009. It proposed a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows. As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program also included a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence was meant to ensure a comparative dimension, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

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Beside the above–described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

In the past:

- ***The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)***
  Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different confessions within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

- ***The Septuagint Translation Project (2002 - 2011)***
  This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul.* Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

- ***The Excellency Network Germany – South–Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***
  The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South–Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of

the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

- **The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research**
  An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources **(2006-2008)**
  The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for

  Education and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility,

  connectedness and exploitation of some of the most prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the "Constantin Brăiloiu" Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

- **Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances**. This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled **Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and eastern Europe**, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (December 2009 – November 2012)

- *DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology* (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (2011)

- *UEFISCCDI – CNCS (PD – Projects): Federalism or Intergovernmentalism? Normative Perspectives on the Democratic Model of the European Union (Dr. Dan LAZEA); The Political Radicalization of the Kantian Idea of Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense (Dr. Áron TELEGDI-CSETRI),* Timeframe: August 1, 2010 – July 31, 2012 (2 Years)

- *Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development* (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (Mar. 2011 – Sept. 2012)

- *The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon* (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (December 2009 - November 2014)

- *The EURIAS Fellowship Program*, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-sponsored by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar.

- *UEFISCCDI – CNCS (TE – Project) Critical Foundations of Contemporary Cosmopolitanism,* Team leader: Tamara CĂRĂUŞ, Members of the team: Áron Zsolt TELEGDI-CSETRI, Dan Dorin LAZEA, Camil PÂRVU (October 5, 2011 – October 5, 2014)

Ongoing projects

Research programs developed with the financial support of the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, The Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education and Innovation, National Council of Scientific Research (UEFISCDI – CNCS):

- **PD – Project***: Mircea Eliade between Indology and History of Religions. From Yoga to Shamanism and Archaic Religiosity* **(Liviu BORDAȘ)**
  Timeframe: May 1, 2013 – October 31, 2015 (2 and ½ years)

- **IDEI-Project***: Models of Producing and Disseminating Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: The Cartesian Framework* **(Vlad ALEXANDRESCU)**
  Timeframe: January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2015 (4 years)

- **Bilateral Cooperation:** *Corruption and Politics in France and Romania (contemporary times)*
  Silvia MARTON – Project Coordinator, Constanta VINTILĂ-GHIȚULESCU, Alexandra IANCU, Frederic MONIER, Olivier DARD, Marion FONTAINE, Benjamin GEROME, Francais BILLOUX
  Timeframe: January 1, 2015 – December 31, 2016 (2 years)

ERC Starting Grant:

- *Record-keeping, fiscal reform, and the rise of institutional accountability in late medieval Savoy: a source-oriented approach – Castellany Accounts*
  Ionuț EPURESCU-PASCOVICI
  Timeframe: May 1, 2015 – April 30, 2020 (5 years)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

Present Financial Support

The State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation of Switzerland through the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University of St. Gallen

The Federal Ministry for Education and Research of Germany

The Federal Ministry for Science, Research and Economy of Austria

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Landis & Gyr Stiftung, Zug, Switzerland

Private Foundation, Germany

Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Köln, Germany

VolkswagenStiftung, Hanover, Germany

Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden

European Research Council (ERC)

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New Europe College -- Directorate

Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Andrei PLEȘU, President of the Foundation
   Professor of Philosophy of Religion, Bucharest; former Minister of Culture and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania

Dr. Valentina SANDU-DEDIU, Rector
   Professor of Musicology, National University of Music, Bucharest

Dr. Anca OROVEANU, Academic Coordinator
   Professor of Art History, National University of Arts, Bucharest

Lelia CIOBOTARIU, Executive Director

Marina HASNAȘ, Consultant on administrative and financial matters

18

OLGA BARTOSIEWICZ

Née en 1987, en Pologne

Doctorante, Section des Littératures Romanes, Institut de Philologie Romane,
Université Jagellonne de Cracovie
Thèse : *Tożsamość niejednoznaczna. Historyczne, literackie i
filozoficzne konteksty twórczości Beniamina Fundoianu (1898-1944).*
*[L'identité non-unique. Les contextes littéraires, historiques et philosophiques
de l'œuvre de Beniamin Fundoianu (1898-1944)]*

Chargé d'enseignement, l'Institut de Philologie Romane,
Université Jagellonne de Cracovie
Correspondante pour la Pologne dans *l'Association Benjamin Fondane*

Bourse *Seton-Watson* pour des chercheurs étrangers en Roumanie,
Institut Culturel Roumain (2014)

Participation à des colloques, conférences et écoles d'été en Pologne et en
Roumanie

Plusieurs articles scientifiques dans le domaine de la littérature française et
roumaine du XXe siècle (la modernité littéraire au XXe siècle, les avant-gardes,
littérature et philosophie, les études juives, les écrivains francophones roumains)

« NOUS MASSACRERONS LES RÉVOLTES LOGIQUES »[1]. BENJAMIN FONDANE – ÉCRIVAIN MODERNE, PENSEUR EXISTENTIEL.
AUTOUR DE
BAUDELAIRE ET L'EXPÉRIENCE DU GOUFFRE

Beniamin Fundoianu (né Beniamin Wechsler/Wexler, Jassy [Roumanie] 1898- Auschwitz-Birkenau 1944), poète, essayiste, critique littéraire, penseur existentiel et metteur en scène roumain d'origine juive, est connu du grand public en tant qu'auteur français – Benjamin Fondane[2]. Il a pris ce pseudonyme artistique après son départ pour Paris, en 1923. En France, il est considéré surtout comme disciple et continuateur de la pensée existentialiste du philosophe russe Léon Chestov, et comme l'auteur d' essais sur Arthur Rimbaud (*Rimbaud le voyou*, 1933) et sur Charles Baudelaire (*Baudelaire et l'expérience du gouffre*, posthume, 1947). *Le Dictionnaire des Philosophes de l'Antiquité au XXᵉ siècle* sous la direction de Maurice Merleau-Ponty l'inscrit dans le domaine de la *philosophie et littérature*, à côté de noms tels Jean Paulhan et Maurice Blanchot[3]. Par contre, en Roumanie, il est connu notamment en tant que poète, l'auteur du recueil *Priveliști* (*Paysages*), publié en 1930 à Bucarest.

Dans mon étude, j'essayerai d'analyser l'horizon existentiel de la lecture fondanienne de l'œuvre baudelairienne. En outre, mon analyse se penchera sur le dialogue de Fondane avec sa judéité et avec l'existentialisme de Chestov. En plus, j'essayerai de détecter les traces de la crise de la modernité retrouvables dans le texte de Fondane. Mes concepts-clés pour approcher l'auteur roumain, sont justement : 1. sa *judéité* – réalisée et comprise différemment dans les périodes roumaine et française de la création; 2. la manière dont son œuvre répond à la crise de la modernité – 3. la manière dont il introduit et interprète les principaux problèmes de l'existentialisme de l'inspiration chestovienne dans ses ouvrages. Ainsi, je voudrais créer un portrait intellectuel d'un Juif roumain immigré en France en 1923 dont la carrière coïncidait tellement

avec « l'esprit de son temps » (*Zeitgeist*), tout en restant dans le même temps indépendante et extrêmement individuelle.

Le volume *Baudelaire et l'expérience du gouffre*, auquel j'accorderai une attention particulière, est un recueil de 34 essais consacré à l'auteur des *Fleurs du Mal*. Les essais ont été écrits dans un contexte historique difficile – pendant les années de l'Occupation, durant l'hiver 1941-1942[4.] La première version a été plusieurs fois repensée, pour être enfin publiée à titre posthume en 1947 dans l'édition Pierre Seghers[5]. Il vaut la peine de mentionner que dans les processus de publication a été engagée non seulement sa femme, à qui il a incombé cette tâche, mais aussi Boris de Schloezer, Emil Cioran, Stéphane Lupasco et Claude Sernet[6]. Ils ont tous vivement discuté quels textes sélectionner et dans quel ordre les faire entrer dans le volume. Néanmoins, les indications les plus importantes concernant la publication provenaient de l'auteur lui-même, puisqu'il a réussi à envoyer à sa femme son testament littéraire à la veille de sa déportation pour Auschwitz.

Mais, en fait, les passages sur Baudelaire pourraient être lus dans n'importe quel ordre, formant une sorte de collection de différents essais centrés autour de la thématique baudelairienne et de « l'expérience du gouffre »[7], notion introduite par l'écrivain roumain. Malheureusement, notre auteur ne verra jamais son travail publié. Le volume aura le statut d'un « projet inachevé » publié à titre posthume, ce qui le rend, à mon avis, encore plus intéressant pour ses commentateurs. Je le considère comme un texte crucial pour la compréhension de la pensée fondanienne dans son intégrité.

Dans le sillage des chercheurs se penchant vers la théorie culturelle de la littérature[8], qui considèrent la littérature comme quelque chose de plus qu'un système autonome ou un ensemble des procédés littéraires codifiant le message d'une manière particulière, j'ai décidé de me servir dans mon étude du répertoire des instruments de recherche se trouvant à la croisée de l'anthropologie culturelle, de la philosophie et de la théorie littéraire. La plus grande difficulté de la recherche de l'œuvre de Fondane repose non seulement dans la pluridisciplinarité de son projet artistique, mais aussi dans le fait de son bilinguisme entraînant ses deux identités langagières, et, en conséquence, culturelles – la roumaine et la française, auxquelles s'impose encore son identité juive, la plus importante et la plus significative d'après moi. Il ne deviendra jamais un Juif pratiquant (en 1929, dans l'article *Un philosophe tragique : Léon Chestov*, il va même écrire : « Sur le mot ; Dieu. Nous sommes loin d'être un mystique : le

sentiment religieux jamais n'a voulu de nous »[9]) et pourtant, il va essayer de redécouvrir et de redéfinir sa judéité surtout dans sa poésie des années trente et quarante du XXe siècle, en pleine période d'intensification des mouvements antisémites, de la progressive exclusion politique, économique et culturelle des Juifs sur le Vieux Continent et au seuil de la tragédie imminente de l'Holocauste. Sa femme, Geneviève Fondane (née Tissier), a même avoué dans une lettre à Jean Ballard[10] : « Ce côté d'homme de l'Ancien Testament (sans aucune observance rituelle d'ailleurs) que j'ai profondément partagé avec lui, est d'une importance primordiale pour la compréhension de son œuvre »[11].

Le comportement de Fondane fait d'après moi partie d'une plus large tendance remarquable dans les milieux d'intellectuels juifs de l'époque : plus la vague d'antisémitisme inondait l'Europe, plus forte était leur nécessité de définir, de concrétiser leur judéité et de s'identifier avec elle[12].

J'ai aussi l'impression que la disparition tragique de Fondane et le fait qu'il ait été longtemps oublié de la scène culturelle française et roumaine[13], nous font parfois négliger le contexte dans lequel il créait son œuvre et auto-créait sa personnalité d'artiste, sa *persona artistique*. Et pourtant, il faisait partie de la bohème parisienne, il connaissait Man Ray, André Breton, Louis Aragon[14], Pablo Picasso, Antonin Artaud et beaucoup d'autres noms que l'histoire de la culture moderne nous a rendus tellement familiers. Comme l'avance Michael Finkenthal, après la parution du livre *Rimbaud le voyou* en 1933, Fondane devient assez connu dans les milieux intellectuels français[15], ce qui ne reste pas pour lui sans importance. Il n'est pas donc un écrivain anonyme, mais un membre actif et reconnaissable des débats intellectuels de l'époque. Il a mené sa carrière très consciemment, en publiant dans plusieurs revues françaises, belges, suisses et roumaines[16], travaillant ainsi assidûment à son nom et à sa position.

Dans les années vingt, il fréquente les cercles de l'avant-garde parisienne, tandis que dans les années trente il participe vivement à l'éclosion de la pensée existentialiste en France, en suivant pourtant l'un de ses chemins moins évidents – celui de l'irrationalisme chestovien. D'un côté il semble donc traditionaliste repensant le judaïsme au travers des catégories chestoviennes, de l'autre – il est au cœur des changements modernistes, qui influencent visiblement la composition de ses textes. Il est très sensible au développement de la cinématographie et de la photographie, il est en dialogue constant avec l'esthétique de l'avant-garde.

Par sa pluridisciplinarité, l'œuvre de Fondane essaye consciemment de traverser les frontières formelles entre les disciplines imposées par le XIXᵉ siècle et fixées dans le XXe siècle – l'époque qui, selon l'auteur moldave lui-même, commence à tout systématiser, définir et enfermer dans des cadres très étroits. Évidemment, cette rationalisation générale dérange ce chantre de l'irrationnel, disciple le plus fidèle de Léon Chestov, philosophe russe dont l'œuvre peut être située en marge de la littérature, de la philosophie et même de la mystique, dans sa dernière étape. Dans son *Faux traité…*, Fondane se plaindra « qu'il n'est rien, actuellement, dans notre folle Europe, qui ne soit un produit – ou un sous-produit – de la raison. La déraison même… »[17].

Les traces de l'existentialisme d'inspiration chestovienne Fondane-philosophe ?

La poésie comme expérience[18]

« Nous massacrerons les révoltes logiques »[19] – ce passage des *Illuminations* d'Arthur Rimbaud pourrait bien servir de devise pour toute création essayiste de Fondane. Puisque la leçon la plus importante que le jeune auteur apprend des rencontres avec son maître, Léon Chestov, c'est justement la remise en cause de la primauté de la raison et de la pensée logique et rationnelle dominant le monde contemporain. Aussi le caractère rebelle de cette phrase reflète bien le style fondanien, qui se sert d'armes telles que l'ironie et le sarcasme, en effectuant de petits « massacres » des arguments de ses adversaires. Fondane lui-même utilise cette citation comme devise de l'un des chapitres de son livre sur *l'enfant terrible* de la littérature française, intitulé *Rimbaud le voyou* (1933). C'est une pratique caractéristique du style de l'auteur roumain : il commence par une citation pour développer et soutenir ses propres idées. Il se réfère à une citation ou introduit un aphorisme, en les évoquant hors contexte et le plus souvent en les citant tout simplement de mémoire, sans en donner la source. De telles devises visent à donner le ton à toute la lecture ultérieure du texte, à représenter son « mini méta-commentaire ». Cette habitude a été déjà relevée par Emil Cioran dans son esquisse *Benjamin Fondane, 6, rue Rolllin* de 1978, publiée dans le volume *Exercices d'admiration. Essais et portraits* :

> Tout comme Chestov, il aimait partir d'une citation, simple prétexte auquel il ne cessait de se rapporter et d'où il tirait des conclusions inattendues […] En général, il ne savait pas s'arrêter – il avait le génie de la variation – on aurait dit en l'écoutant qu'il avait horreur du point. Cela éclatait dans ses improvisations, cela éclate dans ses livres, dans son Baudelaire surtout[20.]

C'est sans doute un diagnostic pertinent du style d'écriture de Fondane, caractérisé par la phrase libre, comparaisons inattendues, nombreuses digressions, l'érudition, l'implication dans le texte principal des citations dont l'auteur n'a effectivement pas vérifié la source et les introduit sous une forme légèrement modifiée par sa propre mémoire. Son mode d'expression favori, celui qu'il choisit pour créer son *Baudelaire…*, est l'essai, ce qui lui garantit un espace de liberté discursive et lui permet de verbaliser ses doutes, renforçant en même temps l'aspect subjectif de son point de vue et ne lui imposant aucune discipline formelle.

Monique Jutrin dans son article sur *Baudelaire…*, pour décrire le style de Fondane se sert de la très vive et précise métaphore de la spirale : « Dès la première approche, le lecteur se trouve plongé dans une œuvre touffue et dense : trente-quatre chapitres dépourvus de titres, d'exergues, *ou se développe une pensée en spirale, revenant inlassablement sur elle-même* ! »[21]. Et, justement, dans le *Baudelaire…* fondanien, les mêmes idées reviennent plusieurs fois, les mêmes citations sont évoquées dans des contextes différents et, parfois dans langues différentes. Ce « développement de la pensée en spirale » est aussi un trait caractéristique de l'écriture de Chestov. Albert Camus y attire l'attention dans son essai *Les murs absurdes*. Il y voit à la fois la force et l'intensité du message philosophique du penseur russe:

> Chestov de son côté, **tout le long d'une œuvre à l'admirable monotonie, tendu sans cesse vers les mêmes vérités, démontre sans trêve que le système le plus serr**é**, le rationalisme le plus universel finit toujours par buter sur l'irrationnel de la pensée humaine**. Aucune des évidences ironiques, des contradictions dérisoires qui déprécient la raison ne lui échappe[22].

Fondane rencontre Chestov peu après son arrivée à Paris, en 1924, dans le salon de Jules de Gaultier. Cependant, leur relation de maître à disciple ne commence à prendre forme que deux ans après leur première rencontre. Comme le mentionne le jeune Benjamin lui-même : « Ce fut en

1926 qu'un premier contact sérieux s'établit entre lui et moi ».[23]. Depuis ce temps-là, les deux penseurs entretiennent une correspondance vivante.

Le philosophe russe eut un réel impact sur les travaux de Fondane : il lisait et critiquait ses œuvres, en étant en même temps son guide dans le monde de la philosophie et sa principale autorité intellectuelle. « Vous me faites non seulement comprendre Nietzsche, Tolstoï, etc., mais aussi des hommes auxquels vous n'avez pas pensé, Rimbaud, Baudelaire »[24] – cette phrase célèbre, souvent citée par les chercheurs étudiant l'œuvre de Fondane, se trouve dans sa lettre au maître du 17 Janvier 1927. En effet, la pensée chestovienne est la principale source d'inspiration de deux essais de l'artiste roumain, mentionnés déjà plusieurs fois ci-dessus, *Rimbaud…* et *Baudelaire…* . Après la rencontre avec Chestov, Fondane commença à s'intéresser à la philosophie de manière « professionnelle » : il commença à lire Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Freud, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, et commença à travailler sur les essais, qui ont vu le jour sous la forme d'un volume, *La Conscience malheureuse,* en 1936. Ce volume, ainsi que *Le Lundi et le dimanche existentiel de l'histoire* et *L'être et la Connaissance ou essai sur Lupasco* (tous deux écrits dans les années quarante et publiés à titre posthume) sont les trois livres philosophiques les plus importants de Fondane. Néanmoins, bien qu'il se soit converti sous l'influence de Chestov à la philosophie et qu'il soit considéré comme un penseur intéressant par ses contemporains, comme l'atteste l'estime dont il bénéficie auprès d'Henri Lefebvre qui compare Fondane à Sartre (pour déprécier ce dernier bien évidemment) : « Benjamin Fondane posséda la rigueur philosophique, cette qualité qui manque tellement à M. Sartre. Il est allé jusqu'au bout de lui-même et de sa philosophie[25] […] Fondane était un philosophe honnête, une intelligence profondément honnête »[26], dans mon interprétation il restera toujours et avant tout un poète. C'est pourquoi je tiens pour si important ces livres sur Rimbaud et Baudelaire, puisqu'il y analyse non seulement l'impact de leur poésie sur les temps modernes, mais aussi sa propre condition de poète. C'est à la poésie qu'il va confier ses plus grands déchirements et où il veut essayer d'enfermer la vérité sur l'existence.

Le fil principal qui lie tous les textes de *Baudelaire…* se réfère à la déconstruction de la raison et de la pensée rationnelle dans le contexte de la création poétique. Comme je le montrerai dans ce qui suit, à la source de l'acte poétique se trouvent selon Fondane l'expérience affective et des émotions extrêmes qui s'opposent par leur nature à tout ce qui est rationnel. Nous y apercevons donc de très visibles traces de la philosophie

chestovienne appelée parfois par certains chercheurs même « fidéisme »[27], grâce à son enracinement profond dans l'irrationnel qui fait appel à Dieu.

Bien qu'à l'époque Chestov échangeait ses idées avec plusieurs philosophes français et allemands célèbres (entre autres avec Henri Bergson, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Martin Buber), après sa mort en 1938 et puis après la guerre, son irrationalisme commencera à être oublié et les salons européens vont être conquis par Albert Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir ou encore Martin Heidegger. Ramona Fotiade nomme ce phénomène « la vague triomphale de l'existentialisme athée »[28], qui contribuera au fait que « la pensée existentielle de Chestov et Fondane sombre dans l'oubli des années d'après-guerre »[29].

La structure de *Baudelaire…* peut nous faire penser (dans une certaine mesure, et tout en maintenant quelques différences, bien évidemment) à *Paris, capitale du XIXe siècle. Livre des passages* de Walter Benjamin[30] – les deux possèdent le statut d'œuvres inachevées, fragmentées, et en même temps se caractérisent par une tentative ambitieuse d'interprétation globale du XIXe siècle, dans le cas de Benjamin, et de la nature humaine, de l'homme et du poète moderne du XXe siècle qui fait l'expérience du gouffre et de l'ennui, dans le cas de Fondane. En plus, les deux auteurs entretiennent une relation riche et complexe avec la langue et la littérature françaises. Chacun d'eux a besoin d'un intermédiaire pour exprimer sa pensée : ainsi Benjamin arrive à ses diagnoses et étend sa vision à travers l'exemple de Paris, c'est cette métropole qui lui sert de fond pour ses considérations ; Fondane par ailleurs utilise le personnage et la poésie de Baudelaire pour lancer sa bataille finale contre la raison. D'ailleurs, Baudelaire serait aussi une figure significative dans les écrits de Benjamin, en constituant une clé de voûte pour la compréhension de la capitale moderne – sa figure du *flâneur* correspond parfaitement au projet décrivant les transformations dans les rues et artères de la ville moderne. Ce qui paraît important, c'est le fait qu'aussi bien Fondane que Benjamin, les deux très attentifs et sensibles aux changements technologiques et idéologiques dans le monde moderne[31], voient dans le statut d'aliéné du poète la force de la poésie baudelairienne, qui expose ainsi l'hypocrisie de la société moderne. Kathleen Kerr-Koch résume l'intérêt de Benjamin pour le *poète maudit* français de façon très convaincante:

> Baudelaire is important to Benjamin in that his work carries a certain honesty about the experience of modernity [...]. This is the profound experience of alienation and dullness where a single desire is so overwhelming that it

is experienced as shock. The poet becomes the material upon which the violences of the modern world stamp themselves on his body. His poetry is scandalous because it registers the cold and dry contours of commodity fetishism[32].

Chez Fondane, on peut parler plutôt d'un *fétichisme de la raison et de l'esprit critique* grâce auquel « l'humanité se sent rassurée » et qui lui permet de mener la bonne vie bourgeoise et calme. La culture rationaliste occidentale conduisit à la civilisation scientifique et technologique, qui se concentre sur « les relations de l'utilité » et sur l'adaptation de l'homme au monde environnant, en identifiant des catégories existentielles à tout ce qui est terrible et effrayant :

> S'il n'y avait pas, avec le don poétique, un esprit qui le règle, en dispose, le tient en mains, la poésie leur paraîtrait la plus insipide des choses. C'est ce qu'ils disent ; mais, au fond d'eux-mêmes, ils pensent : la plus terrible. Pourquoi « terrible » ? personne ne l'a jamais dit ; mais on pense à la folie, au désordre, à l'ivresse. À quelque chose qui n'est pas « humain ». Ce n'est qu'avec l'esprit critique que l'humain descend vers nous, apaisant, pacifiant, rassurant. Il met entre la poésie et nous une barrière, une digue, une rampe. A présent, on peut, sans risquer, boire à son calice[33].

Ainsi le penseur roumain revient ici à son idée de « l'écran opaque de la rationalité », présenté plus tôt dans le *Faux traité…* . La poésie de Baudelaire brise cet écran dans l'acte de *participation-inspiration* et devient une preuve d'une vraie expérience vécue, ce qui peut choquer, scandaliser, mais en même temps émouvoir le public vivant dans un monde limité par la pensée rationnelle. Et, dans l'interprétation fondanienne (et chestovienne, évidemment), c'est la raison qui conduit le monde contemporain vers la catastrophe.

Notamment le chapitre XXIX de *Baudelaire…* parle de cet aspect apocalyptique des temps modernes. Au centre de cette vision se trouve le sentiment de l'ennui, exprimé parfaitement par Baudelaire dans l'interprétation de Fondane: « L'ennui de Baudelaire n'est pas un ennui personnel, mais l'ennui dans la civilisation et peut-être l'ennui dans le cosmos : c'est pourquoi qu'il prend, chez lui, des proportions aussi immenses que significatives »[34].

Cette « l'Apocalypse de l'ennui », qui « engendre en chaîne, poussé par le besoin de 'se sentir exister', d'inimaginables forces de destruction,

de violence, de vengeance »[35], voit ses origines dans la conscience et la pensée, donc dans le péché originel d'avoir mangé le fruit de l'arbre de la connaissance. C'est bien la raison qui a commencé la lutte contre toute affectivité et qui nourrit sans cesse le conflit entre logique et affectivité. Fondane, dans le sillage de Chestov, y voit « l'hymne triomphal » dans la sentence de Spinoza : *non ridere, non lugere, necque detestari, sed intelligere*[36] :

> C'est l'ennui qui est la source des changements soudains, des guerres sans motifs, des révolutions meurtrières ; il n'est pas de cause plus opérante que lui. Un besoin se fait jour de se sentir exister, de rompre la monotonie de l'être, du pur pensable ; le meurtre, la vengeance, la joie de détruire pour détruire […] Les historiens diront après que des causes politiques, économiques, sociales, expliquent cette éruption ; évidemment, mais ils n'auront pas vu ce fait élémentaire que ce peuple s'ennuyait[37].

Ainsi, Fondane remonte à l'idée la plus importante de Chestov qui identifie toute connaissance au péché originel et oppose l'arbre de la science à l'arbre de vie :

> La connaissance n'est pas reconnue ici comme le but suprême de l'humanité, la connaissance ne justifie pas l'être, c'est de l'être, au contraire, qu'elle doit obtenir sa justification. L'homme veut penser dans les catégories dans lesquelles il vit et non pas vivre dans les catégories dans lesquelles il est accoutumé à penser. L'arbre de la science n'étouffe plus l'arbre de vie[38].

L'écrivain roumain, qui va essayer de transplanter les idées de Chestov dans le domaine de la poésie, va constater : « L'art ne cesse que là où commence la pensée réfléchie »[39]. Ainsi, au centre de son « herméneutique existentielle »[40] il va placer l'expérience affective, « une autre réalité plus vraie que celle du réel rugueux »[41]. Il développe son étude avec l'intention antiphilologique et il s'oppose à la critique littéraire aussi bien dans l'esprit biographique sainte-beuvien (Fondane révèle le caractère relatif d'une telle approche : « si l'idée est le fruit de l'évènement exceptionnel [comme maladie, bagne, folie], elle est aussi fruit de l'évènement banal [santé] »[42]), que dans l'esprit formaliste ou structuraliste qui ne se réfère qu'au texte. L'interprétation fondanienne se donne pour but de puiser en dehors de la réalité matérielle et en dehors de l'art « pur », inconditionné. Elle se réfère à la dynamique de l'expérience, à la profondeur de l'existence.

Selon le critique roumain, dans le cas de Baudelaire, l'expérience qui va animer toute sa création, et va se trouver à la source de son acte poétique de la *participation-inspiration*, serait le moment du remariage de sa mère avec un officier. Alors, après avoir pris cette décision, elle a reporté la tendresse réservée jusque-là à son fils, à un autre homme :

> Inutile d'aller chercher l'origine des idées de Baudelaire chez les romantiques, ni chez ses maitres à raisonner, ni dans la tradition religieuse ; il ne ferait, au fond, que développer dans la chambre obscure de son âme, encore et toujours, les images déposées en lui par ce premier choc reçu. L'homme qui a perdu le paradis – qu'importe à quel moment et par quel concours d'évènements ! – est transformé pour la vie[43].

La métaphore qui va servir à Fondane pour décrire la création baudelairienne, la métaphore que je considère comme l'une des métaphores centrales de tout le livre de *Baudelaire…*, provient d'un des poèmes en prose du poète français – *Le joujou du pauvre* (1862). C'est l'histoire de deux enfants se trouvant de deux côtés de la grille – l'un est riche et possède un joujou « splendide », tandis que l'autre, un pauvre, lui montre son « joujou » – un rat vivant. Ce dernier représente pour Fondane le symbole de l'expérience fondamentale pour Baudelaire: « Quoi qu'il fasse, tout se ramène en dernière analyse à cet instant traumatique ou le jouet de l'enfant riche qu'il avait été se transforma en ce rat vivant de l'enfant paria qu'il devint »[44]. Le remariage de la mère de Baudelaire l'a donc fait passer de l'autre côté des barreaux, de quitter le « paradis » et commencer la vie dans le monde souillé par le péché originel. « Un événement que la pensée de l'enfant croyait pur, se trouva exposé soudain à la lumière crue du jour logique. Ce drame […] va conduire le poète à la découverte du gouffre »[45]. Dès cet évènement-là ce serait donc la tentation de Baudelaire de revenir au paradis perdu de son enfance, à cet état d'un enfant innocent qui n'a pas encore goûté de l'arbre du savoir, qui va animer toute la création poétique de l'auteur des *Fleurs du Mal*, qui va être source de l'inquiétude baudelairienne selon Fondane. « Nous craignons tous d'admettre que ce ne sont pas les hommes qu'il faut expliquer par les idées, mais les idées qu'il faut expliquer par les hommes »[46], va conclure le critique roumain en montrant encore une fois son appartenance au courant philosophique chestovien, où la priorité est toujours accordée à l'existence et à l'expérience affective qui en résulte,

qui ne se soumet jamais à la pensée rationnelle, mais qui est rebelle, qui s'éprouve dans la tension et le déchirement.

En même temps, dans son étude, Fondane s'oppose aux critiques psychanalytiques (plus particulièrement, à l'interprétation de René Laforgue, discutée à l'époque), selon lesquels suite à l'événement de l'enfance, Baudelaire aurait eu le désir « de consommer avec sa mère l'acte sexuel » :

> Mais ce qu'il veut [Baudelaire], ce n'est pas « consommer l'acte sexuel » avec sa mère, c'est retrouver le paradis perdu où il n'y a ni péché, ni remords, ni repenti, et où le Savoir n'a pas encore souillé l'innocence[47].

> Et ce que les psychanalystes ignorent, mais que déjà saint Paul enseignait, c'est que la peccabilité de l'acte sexuel n'existe qu'à partir de la Loi, du Savoir qui transforma un acte naturel, voire un acte divin, en une « honte intime »[48].

Toujours donc dans l'esprit chestovien, Fondane repousse la morale, qui est « la fille » du Savoir et de la Loi, donc, finalement, de la Raison. Dans les fragments ci-dessus, le penseur roumain reprend d'une manière plus sophistiquée et basée sur l'exemple baudelairien, ses idées qu'il avait présentées dans son article *Léon Chestov, à la recherche du judaïsme perdu*, publié à l'occasion du soixante-sixième anniversaire de la naissance du philosophe russe, en 1936. Il y avance que

> la position morale du Judaïsme, le long de ces derniers siècles a été tournée contre la position métaphysique de ce même Judaïsme ! (l'orgueil de nos valeurs morales nous a coûté toute notre tradition religieuse. Nous avons été les premiers – avec Mendelssohn et Spinoza en tête – à démanteler L'Ancien Testament de sa vérité, de sa portée, de son message. Il est temps à présent de céder la morale « autonome » à ceux qui l'inventèrent – et sans la moindre hésitation ; c'est ainsi que le Judaïsme se pourra retrouver. Et, s'il n'a guère envie de retourner à la Bible – par-dessus la raison, la science et le progrès – il serait temps de reconnaître, honnêtement, que nous ne sommes plus qu'une forme vidée de contenu, des rejetons tout au plus d'Aristote et non point des prophètes ! Ce n'est pas le péché de savoir qui, nous ayant chassés du paradis, nous y ramènera[49].

La morale est donc une invention purement humaine, dépourvue de l'élément métaphysique. Fondane suit ici le chemin de Nietzsche dont

le criticisme, comme le souligne Leo Strauss, peut être réduit à la seule proposition : « l'homme moderne a essayé de préserver la moralité biblique en abandonnant la foi biblique »[50]. Fondane conclut que la soumission à cette moralité égale la soumission à la raison et un tel comportement ne nous ramènera jamais au « paradis perdu ».

D'après Fondane la grandeur et l'importance de Baudelaire consiste donc en ce fait que le poète français veut donner à la poésie le droit à l'excessif, à l'absolu et au profond, qu'il la nourrit de sa propre fascination du mal, du désir de violenter sa propre nature, de toutes les extrémités qui résultent de son expérience nue, du désir de s'opposer à la structure artificielle de la morale. Sa poésie surgit donc sur fond d'une crise intime et c'est là son moteur conducteur.

La métaphore du jouet sert encore à Fondane pour placer Baudelaire dans la hiérarchie des poètes du XIXe siècle. L'enfant-paria et son jouet – le rat vivant, Fondane les rapproche à l'homme-paria, « l'homme blessé dans sa volonté de vivre, pour qui le paradis s'est transformé en une « honte intime », et qui, incapable de se faire au monde du péché, se trouve traîner sur les pavés des villes son impuissance secrète et radicale – physiologique, spirituelle »[51] – Baudelaire. Il lui oppose Hugo, Gautier et Banville qui sont des « enfants riches et jolis », qui « écrivent avec une facilité heureuse, abattent un travail considérable, en se jouant »[52]. Tandis que pour Baudelaire « l'accouchement d'un poème est long et laborieux »[53]. Mais, essaye de nous convaincre Fondane, c'est la poésie baudelairienne qui est plus émouvante et plus bouleversante, puisqu'elle puise dans l'expérience.

Le critique roumain ne fait pas de différence entre Baudelaire-poète et Baudelaire-homme – dans son étude ces deux destins sont complémentaires. Il analyse aussi bien les poèmes, que la correspondance de Baudelaire avec sa mère, parce que les deux trouvent leur origine dans l'expérience de l'extrême, « l'expérience maîtresse de Baudelaire »[54].

Cette lecture de la « poésie comme expérience » que Fondane applique dans l'étude sur Baudelaire, deviendra encore plus puissante et significative quelques années plus tard, avec la lecture de la poésie de Paul Celan[55]. L'œuvre de ce poète, provenant d'un cercle culturel très proche de celui de Fondane[56], élaborée sur une expérience vécue, va devenir le lieu où se manifestera la plus tragique et la plus traumatique l'expérience du XXe siècle – l'expérience de l'Holocauste[57]. Mais, ce qui me semble encore plus important, c'est que cette herméneutique existentielle de Fondane peut être appliquée à ses propres poèmes, surtout au recueil *L'Exode.*

Super Flumina Babylonis, écrit et réécrit pendant les années d'Occupation. Ces poèmes ont été composés dans le même temps que *Baudelaire…*, ce qui met encore une fois à la croisée les destins de Fondane poète et de Fondane essayiste-penseur existentialiste, et rend la réception des idées et des motifs récurrents dans ces deux ouvrages encore plus émouvante si on entreprend leur lecture en parallèle.

Les références à la tradition judaïque

La présence des éléments provenant de la tradition judaïque est visible dans la création fondanienne dès ses écrits de jeunesse en langue roumaine. Son *Iudaism și elenism* (*Judaïsme et hellénisme*) de 1919, inspiré par *Vom Geist des Judentums* (1916) de Martin Buber, en est l'un des premiers exemples. Il y entreprend une interprétation courageuse de ces deux civilisations fondamentales pour le développement de la pensée européenne, en analysant leur perception différente de la divinité, de la philosophie, de la morale et de l'art. Dans son étude, la culture judaïque est identifiée avec le temps, la culture grecque avec l'espace. Pour mieux expliquer la différence principale entre ces deux cultures, il se sert du dualisme de la philosophie bergsonienne qui lie l'espace à la substance et le temps à l'esprit. En publiant ce volume, Fundoianu ne connaissait pas encore l'œuvre cruciale de la pensée de Chestov exprimant un point de vue similaire, *Athènes et Jérusalem* (1938), dont il écrira plus tard : « Pour Chestov, il n'y a pas de paix possible entre Jérusalem et Athènes, entre la raison et la foi, entre la science et la métaphysique »[58].

Cette tension entre « le grec » et « le judaïque » exprimée pour la première fois dans *Judaïsme et hellénisme,* est aussi présente dans *Baudelaire…*, ce qu' illustre minutieusement et amplement Dominique Guedj dans son article sur les visages du malheur grec et juif dans la pensée de Fondane[59], en se basant, en grande partie, sur le chapitre XXVIII consacré au *Procès* de Kafka. Le procès et la condamnation absurdes de K. constituent pour Fondane un bon point de départ pour les réflexions sur l'Histoire et la Nécessité historique, qui ont choisi K. « pour ses expérimentations »[60] et qui le font se confronter lui-même « à pareille perspective, [puisqu'il] écrit ces lignes si peu de temps avant que la même Nécessite historique ne vienne réclamer en lui son dû »[61]. Mais, comme le souligne Guedj, aussi bien K. que Fondane, ou bien encore que Baudelaire, Nietzsche et Dostoïevski « se signalent par cette audace commune de 'continuer à questionner', d'objecter à l'Histoire les droits de l'homme

qui veut vivre' »[62]. C'est donc l'une des majeures différences entre la pensée grecque et juive – dans le cadre de cette première, l'individu ne peut disputer avec le Destin[63], tandis que cette deuxième lui offre la possibilité de révolte et donne à son malheur une dimension individuelle, « en se rapportant à un sujet souffrant et pensant, la pensée juive chargée de dire le malheur dans l'Histoire en offre une vision subjective (et non plus, comme chez les Grecs, cosmique, pérenne et spatiale). »[64]

Fondane se réfère plusieurs fois au Dieu de l'Ancien Testament – à Dieu d'Abraham, de Job, et de Chestov. Il va suivre le chemin de Pascal, qui « confesse sa foi dans le 'Dieu d'Abraham, d'Isaac et de Jacob', non le dieu des philosophes et des savants »[65]. Notamment la figure de Job sera extrêmement importante pour notre écrivain. Comme le souligne Monique Jutrin, l'auteur moldave énonce « la morale ouverte de Job » selon laquelle ce n'est pas la nécessité, « mais la liberté qui régit les rapports de l'homme à Dieu »[66]. Dans l'interprétation de Guedj, « chez lui [Fondane], comme dans la Bible, parole prophétique et parole poétique coïncident. En un mot, les prophètes y sont souvent des poètes et le malheur comme l'échec personnel constituent leur expérience privilégiée »[67]. Ce sont les poètes qui parlent avec Dieu, qui n'ont pas peur de transgresser les frontières de la raison. Dans leur œuvre se reflètent encore les traces de cette première rencontre fondamentale, à la suite de laquelle Moïse a reçu le texte provenant « du doigt de Dieu » :

> Pourquoi donc nous pencherions-nous si avidement, si anxieusement, sur ces hommes [Baudelaire. Shakespeare – OB] et les trouverions-nous plus « importants » que les autres, sinon pour lire en eux le reflet presque effacé, mais qui brille encore sur leur peau et dans leur œuvre du contact prolongé avec cette chose *extrême*, cet *apeiron* qui, jadis, au retour de la montagne, rayonnait si fort le visage du Prophète que le peuple – comme nous autres aujourd'hui – avait dû supplier : « Va et parle avec Lui, à notre place, de peur que nous ne mourrions. »[68]

La citation ci-dessus est celle qui termine le dernier chapitre, et donc tout le livre sur Baudelaire. Et même si nous savons que ce volume constitue un projet inachevé, cette dernière phrase semble avoir la puissance d'une pointe, dont le contenu ne veut pas être discuté ou mis en question. Il s'étend donc devant nos yeux une vision romantique, voire prométhéenne du poète, comme un élu, qui, grâce au fait d'avoir transgressé toutes les limites de la raison, a touché cet illimité, indéfini et indéterminé, qui forme le principe de notre existence.

Fondane et les crises de la modernité

Bien que dans ses recherches Fondane s'appuie souvent sur la tradition de l'Ancien Testament et profite de l'épaisseur et la diversité des genres et des textes bibliques (comme entre autres *Livre de Job, Psaume Super Flumina Babylonis, Festin de Balthazar*[69]), ce qui le situe au sein de l'ancienne tradition juive, il est en même temps l'écrivain et l'artiste moderne, fortement influencé et sensible aux mouvements et changements de l'époque. En fait, ses articles tels que mentionné déjà ci-dessus *Léon Chestov* à *la Recherche du judaïsme perdu,* peuvent être considérés comme sa réponse au progrès et à la modernisation de la société juive qui, dans les temps de l'assimilation, devait soit se résigner à la foi, soit choisir une voie plus radicale du progrès, comme celle du sionisme. Et Fondane voulait « se forger sa propre vision du judaïsme, […] tentant de le redéfinir dans le contexte de son époque »[70], en s'inspirant de la pensée chestovienne et en reprochant aux Juifs « d'avoir trahi la tradition biblique au profit de la morale autonome héritée des Grecs. […] Pour lui, la filiation entre la pensée biblique et la pensée existentielle est évidente »[71]. C'est dans la Bible qu'il cherche une alternative à la pensée rationnelle de l'Occident, en séparant le judaïsme de la *pensée juive*, en avançant que « beaucoup de Juifs, nés Juifs : un Bergson, un Freud, un Einstein, ne le sont guère « essentiellement » ; ils le sont moins qu'un Pascal, ou un Kierkegaard, l'un exigeant le Dieu d'Abraham, d'Isaac et de Jacob, l'autre quittant Hegel avec éclat pour les « penseurs privés », Job ou Abraham »[72].

Comme l'avance Andrei Cornea, « à la fin du XIXe siècle et au début du XXe siècle, les Juifs sont modernes *pour deux raisons,* si nous assimilons la modernité à la rupture radicale avec la tradition : premièrement en tant que représentants de l'époque qui veulent échapper à leurs principes ancestraux de la tradition judéo-chrétienne et gréco-romaine, et deuxièmement – en tant que Juifs qui veulent fuir leur judéité, ou, dans le meilleur des cas, la diluer au maximum »[73]. Contrairement par exemple à ses collègues juifs – membres des cercles de l'avant-garde roumaine (Brauner, Tzara, Voronca etc.) – qui ne parlent guère de leurs origines, Fondane réalise consciemment et sans complexes son *yiddishkeit,* ne la cache pas et cherche souvent la réponse à la crise de la modernité dans la tradition judaïque justement.

Un autre critique roumain, Mihai Mîndra, détecte dans la figure de l'artiste juif moderne:

Une sublimation esthétique de son altérite ethnique, découlant de l'historie existentielle marquée par l'expérience du déplacement culturel et de l'isolement. Artiste hérite en quelque sorte de ses ancêtres la condition d'éternelle émigration / immigration, de l'itinérance et de la spiritualité transitoire[74].

« Tu sais, je te l›avais dit, il est dans la figure de notre destin des choses que l›on ne peut changer. **Le voyageur n'a pas fini de voyager**, ai-je écrit[75]. Eh bien ! J'avais raison, je continue. C'est pour demain et c'est pour de bon[76]. », écrira Fondane dans la dernière lettre à sa femme, envoyée de Drancy. Ainsi, il confirme la condition de l'éternel voyageur qui est inscrite dans le destin du peuple élu. De nouveau, ses angoisses du poète vont se matérialiser dans son destin d'homme.

Heinrich Heine a appelé la Torah « la patrie portable des Juifs, la Jérusalem portable » – et c'est avec cette identité juive « de poche » que Fundoianu/Fondane voyage à travers l'Europe, en l'habillant dans la langue du pays dans lequel il vit à un moment donné : à Jassy et Bucarest, il crée en roumain, et à Paris, il passe automatiquement au français. La langue n'est donc pour lui qu'un moyen de communication, puisque c'est l'expérience se trouvant au-delà du texte qui compte. La langue, en tant que système rationnel des signes, n'est qu'un instrument qui sert à transmettre l'inspiration profonde du poète. Et le français est meilleur et plus adéquat que le roumain puisqu'il possède un public plus large et fait circuler les idées plus vite.

Je risquerais aussi l'hypothèse qu'à la source du malaise existentiel profond chez Fondane, décelable entre autres dans les longs passages de *Baudelaire…*, se trouve *un changement dans la perception de la relation entre l'homme et la réalité de l'homme de l'époque moderne,* comme le présente Richard Sheppard dans son essai *The Problematics of European Modernism*[77]. Le critique roumain exprime donc sa crise de la modernité dans les visions apocalyptiques du monde (« Si Dieu n'existe pas, alors, tout est permis », crie le vieux Karamazoff ; si Dieu n'existe pas, alors, homo hominis lupus : brûlons Rome, exterminons les Juifs, sacrifions les types les plus élevés de notre humanité ! Dieu, le péché, ne recouvrent rien de pensable ; l'intelligere n'a pas fini de nous dire qu'il n'y a rien de bon pour nous là-dessous. C'est la preuve de Dieu par l'absurde et nous y sommes tous engagés. Le règne de la cruauté ne fait que commencer. Telle est, me semble-t-il, l'apocalypse de l'Ennui »[78]), dans la critique de l'intellect et de la pensée rationnelle et dans le retour à la pensée magique

et prélogique[79], celle de « l'avant le péché originel », donc opposée aux structures de la culture rationaliste occidentale.

Le choix de Baudelaire en tant que symbole du poète exceptionnel, « porteur d'une pensée nouvelle et terrible, qui déborde le cadre littéraire du temps, […qui est] en dehors de n'importe quel temps »[80], situe Fondane dans le même paradigme de la réflexion moderne avec entre autres T.S. Eliot ou Walter Benjamin, les auteurs intéressés dans la même mesure par l'œuvre de l'auteur des *Fleurs du Mal (1857)* et du *Peintre de la vie moderne (1863)* – ces titres étant considérés comme deux textes fondamentaux pour notre compréhension contemporaine de la modernité.

La lecture fondanienne de Baudelaire est marquée par ses propres lectures des philosophes, intellectuels et écrivains largement discutés à l'époque, comme mentionnés déjà ci-dessus, Nietzsche, Lévy-Bruhl, Bergson ou encore Kafka. On peut y détecter aussi l'expérience de Fondane lecteur de Freud – bien qu'il accuse souvent sa méthode d'être trop rationnelle (il utilise cet argument dans sa lutte contre les surréalistes : « Il n'est que de lire les Vases Communicants de M. André Breton pour s'apercevoir que l'on ne s'est aventuré dans le rêve qu'avec le baedeker de Freud à la main »[81] et il nomme même Freud « philosophe qui n'est pas attitré », en ajoutant pourtant immédiatement que « l'influence qu'il exerce sur nos contemporains est plus grande, plus profonde que celle de la plupart de nos philosophes professionnels »[82]), on peut cependant le considérer déjà comme « l'enfant » d'une époque post-freudienne qui se penche sur l'exploration de la psyché humaine. « Il ne proteste pas contre les entraves externes de l'esprit classique – règles, unités, vocabulaire, mais contre ses entraves internes : mesures, prudence, obéissance, sérénité. »[83] – constate Fondane à propos de la création baudelairienne, en s'inscrivant ainsi dans l'hypothèse d'Astradur Eysteinsson, que « Modernism is felt to signal a radical 'inward turn in literature, and often a more thorough exploration of the human psyche than is deemed to have been probable or even possible in pre-Freudian times »[84]. On peut donc supposer que la conception de Fondane est née d'un côté de l'inspiration de la création freudienne, et de l'autre elle se développe en opposition avec elle. L'horizon de lecture de Fondane suppose également ce tournant « à l'intérieur » de Baudelaire en puisant dans l'expérience affective du poète, il a pourtant une dimension plus existentielle et moins réductionniste et déterministe que la psychanalyse[85].

La méthode d'interprétation de Fondane ne donne donc pas d'autonomie au texte, il cherche le sens « en dehors » du texte, dans

l'existence qui cache toutes les crises de l'homme moderne. Comme le constate Mircea Martin, « [Fondane] ne semble pas croire à l'existence d'un poème indépendant de son auteur. Ce qui le préoccupe, c'est la vision de l'auteur – déduite de l'ensemble de ses écrits et de ses expériences »[86].

Conclusion

Probablement l'un des plus importants projets de Benjamin Fondane, commencé dans les années trente du XXᵉ siècle, consistait en l'application des éléments d'une philosophie d'inspiration chestovienne à sa propre méthode d'interprétation et de lecture de la littérature. C'est un *ars poetica* à rebours, qui est loin de la poétique normative et de ses indices techniques, mais qui nous invite à suivre la poétique existentielle. « Émergeant de l'expérience poétique, la pensée existentielle […] est toute pareille à celle du poète, une pensée de passion, de dilatation »[87], avance Fondane dans sa *Conscience malheureuse* (1936), pour confirmer finalement ses mots et les mettre en pratique avec le volume *Baudelaire et l'expérience du gouffre.*

Toute l'œuvre fondanienne, aussi bien philosophique que poétique et (anti)théorique, est subordonnée à la lutte contre la raison et à la recherche de la vérité existentielle dans l'expérience affective, dans les émotions extrêmes et absurdes, totalement irrationnelles. Le climat spécifique de l'Europe de l'entre-deux-guerres, sa condition de Juif roumain et de disciple de Chestov, s'entremêlant avec sa condition d'intellectuel moderne, influencé fortement par la pensée révolutionnaire des Nietzsche, Bergson, et Freud, la littérature de Kafka et de Dostoïevski, ont nourri encore son angoisse et ont constamment illuminé son chemin conduisant vers l'espace où « deux fois deux ne font plus quatre »[88].

En guise de conclusion, je voudrais citer Michael Finkenthal qui a bien résumé la concomitance continue des activités du poète et du philosophe dans la création fondanienne, en montrant l'impossibilité de la séparation de ces deux destins collaborant et s'influençant sans cesse au sein de la biographie artistique de l'auteur : « Enfin, Benjamin Fondane était un poète, et le poète est plus ouvert que quiconque à l'immédiat, à l'accessoire, au concret. Comme l'existence et la pensée rationnelle évoluent sur des pistes séparées, lui, il est resté sur celle de l'existence. Selon Fondane, le poète ne peut pas être que philosophe existentiel. »[89]

NOTES

[1]   A. Rimbaud, *Démocratie*, [in] *Poésies. Une saison en enfer. Illuminations*, Première parution en 1973, Préface de René Char, Édition de Louis Forestier, Gallimard, Paris 1999, p. 242.

[2]   Pour la clarté de mon article, je vais utiliser le pseudonyme roumain de l'auteur (Fundoianu) en écrivant sur son œuvre roumain, et, respectivement, le pseudonyme français (Fondane), en mentionnant les textes crées après son émigration pour la France.

[3]   Voir *Les Philosophes de l'Antiquité au XXe siècle. Histoire & Portraits*, sous la direction de M. Merleau –Ponty, nouvelle édition révisée et augmentée sous la direction de J.-Fr. Balaudé, Le Livre de Poche, Paris 2006, pp. 1417-1418.

[4]   M. Jutrin, *Benjamin Fondane, lecteur de Baudelaire : « l'expérience du gouffre »*, Site Présence de la littérature – Dossier Baudelaire©SCÉRÉN-CNDP, 2009, consulté le 20.10.2014, p. 3.

[5]   Seghers réédita le *Baudelaire…* en 1972, puis il fut encore publié aux Éditions Complexe, en 1994. Récemment, en 2013, en Roumanie, on a publié une complexe édition critique du *Baudelaire…* dans la traduction en roumain, avec un excellent commentaire critique, préface, étude introductive, postfaces, annexes avec des fragments inédits et notes explicatives dans le texte principal : B. Fondane, *Opere XIV. Baudelaire și experiența abisului,* Traducere din limba franceză de I. Pop și I. Pop-Curșeu, Ediție critică de I. Pop, I. Pop-Curșeu și M. Martin, Studiu introductiv și sinopsis al receptării de M. Martin, Prefață de M. Jurtin, Postfețe de I. Pop-Curșeu și D. Guedj, Editura Art, București 2013. Il vaut aussi la peine de mentionner le numéro 13/2013 des *Cahiers Benjamin Fondane* consacré à *Baudelaire et l'expérience du gouffre.*

[6]   M. Jutrin, *Geneza cărții, structura și lucrarea ei secretă*, [in] B. Fondane, *Opere XIV. Baudelaire și experiența abisului*, ed. cit., p.41.

[7]   Baudelaire est d'ailleurs l'auteur du poème *Le gouffre*, qui fait partie du receuil *Les Fleurs du mal.*

[8]   Je m'appuie ici sur les travaux des chercheurs polonais, voir : Markowski Michał Paweł, Nycz Ryszard (sous la rédaction de), *Kulturowa Teoria Literatury. Główne Pojęcia i problemy*, Universitas, Kraków et Nycz Ryszard, Walas Teresa (sous la rédaction de), *Kulturowa Teoria Literatury 2. Poetyki, Problematyki, Interpretacje*, Universitas, Kraków 2012.

[9]   B. Fondane, *Un philosophe tragique : Léon Chestov*, « Europe », n° 73, 1929.

[10]   Jean Ballard fut directeur des *Cahiers du Sud*, revue marseillaise à laquelle Fondane collabora entre 1932 et 1944.

[11]   Une lettre de Mme Fondane à Jean Ballard, 21 mars 1947, [in] Jutrin M., Has G., Pop I. (éd.), *Benjamin Fondane et les Cahiers du Sud. Correspondance*, Éditions de la Fondation Culturelle Roumaine, Bucarest 1998, p. 294.

[12] Dans ses *Réflexions sur la question juive* de 1946, Jean-Paul Sartre soutient même que « ce n'est pas le caractère juif qui provoque l'antisémitisme mais, au contraire, c'est l'antisémite qui crée le Juif ».

[13] Nous devons son retour aux plusieurs chercheurs parmi lesquels je ne mentionnerai que quelques noms : Monique Jutrin, (fondatrice des *Cahiers Benjamin Fondane* et de la *Société d'Etudes Benjamin Fondane*, http://benjaminfondane.com), Michel Carassou (président de *l'Association Benjamin Fondane* (http://benjaminfondane.org), Dominique Guedj, Olivier Salazar-Ferrer, Ramona Fotiade, Michael Finkenthal, Paul Daniel, Mircea Martin (professeur de l'Université de Bucarest qui a (re)introduit l'œuvre de Fundoianu/Fondane sur la scène culturelle roumaine), Roxana Sorescu, Mihai Șora et Luiza Palanciuc (les fondateurs de *l'Institut Fondane*, http://fondane.net), John K. Hyde.

[14] Ses relations avec le surréalisme se caractérisaient par un dynamisme vivace. D'abord, il est un admirateur de l'esthétique surréaliste, mais avec le temps il accuse Breton et ses collaborateurs d'un engagement politique trop affectif et de « l'exploitation rationnelle de l'irrationnel » (*Faux Traité d'esthétique. Essai sur la crise de réalité,* Ed. Denoël, Paris 1938, p. 38)

[15] Voir M.Finkenthal, *Benjamin Fondane. A Poet-Philosopher Caught Between The Sunday Of History And The Existential Monday*, Peter Lang, 2012, p. 3. [Toutes les traductions de l'anglais et du roumain, sauf si mentionné autrement, OB]

[16] Entre autres : *Les Cahiers du Sud (Marseille), Revue Juive de Genève*, *Integral* (Bucarest), *Cahiers de l'étoile* (Paris), *Le Journal des Poètes* (Bruxelles), *Le Rouge et le Noir* (Bruxelles), *Cahier bleu* (Paris), *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger* (Paris).

[17] B. Fondane, *Faux traité…*, ed. cit., p. 24.

[18] Cette notion provient du livre de Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, « La poésie comme expérience » (Christian Bourgois Editeur, Paris 2004).

[19] A. Rimbaud, *Démocratie…*, ed. cit. p. 242.

[20] É. Cioran, *Benjamin Fondane, 6, rue Rolllin*, [in] Idem, *Exercices d'admiration. Essais et portraits*, Gallimard, Paris 1986, p.154-155.

[21] M. Jutrin, *Benjamin Fondane, lecteur de Baudelaire : « l' expérience du gouffre »*, ed. cit. [Mon soulignement, OB]

[22] A. Camus, *Les Murs absurdes*, [in] *Le Mythe de Sisyphe, Œuvres complètes. I. 1931-1922,* Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, Paris 2006, p. 236. [mon soulignement – OB]

[23] B. Fondane, *Rencontres avec Léon Chestov*, Plasma, Paris 1982, p. 42.

[24] *Ibid.*, *Lettre de Fondane à Chestov*, p. 176.

[25] H. Lefebvre, *L'irrationalisme et la lutte pour la raison* (Toulouse, septembre 1945 - février 1946), [in] Idem, *L'existentialisme*, 2e édition, Anthropos, Paris 2001, p. 206

[26] *Ibid.*, p.208.

27   Voir *Ibid.*, p. 205.

28   R. Fotiade, *Léon Chestov et la pensée du dehors,* « Europe » n°960, avril 2009 : Léon Chestov/Jean-Luc Nancy, p. 5.

29   *Ibid.*

30   W. Benjamin est aussi l'auteur de l'étude sur Charles Baudelaire. Pour voir des études présentant la perspective comparatiste associant Benjamin et Fondane : I. Pop-Curşeu, *Expérience religieuse et contraintes du marche : Benjamin Fondane et Walter Benjamin, penseurs de la modernité de Baudelaire*, [in] « Lendemains », 146/147, Narr Verlag, 2012, pp. 184-193 ; M. Teboul, *Walter Benjamin et Benjamin Fondane devant l'Histoire et le temps*, « Cahiers Benjamin Fondane », n°14.

31   Voir W. Benjamin, *L'œuvre d'art à l'époque de sa reproductibilité technique* [in] Idem, *Sur la photographie*, préface de Yannick Haenel, trad. De l'allemand par Jörn Cambreleng, Éditions Photosynthèses, 2012. ; B. Fondane, *Écrits pour le cinéma. Le muet et le parlant*, Textes réunis et présentés par M. Carassou, O. Salazar-Ferrer et R. Fotiade, Éd. Non lieu, Verdier/poche, Paris 2007.

32   K. Kerr-Koch, *Romancing Fascism : Modernity and Allegory in Benjamin, De Man, Shelley,* Bloomsbury Academic, USA 2013, p. 75.

33   B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…*, ed. cit., p. 33.

34   *Ibid.*, p. 325.

35   E. van Ittebeek, *Le Baudelaire de Benjamin Fondane*, Cahiers de Louvain, 2003, p. 30.

36   « Ne pas rire, ni se lamenter, ni haïr, mais comprendre », B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…*, ed. cit., p. 330. Chestov, et Fondane en suivant sa pensée, a paraphrasée cette sentence de Spinoza et la citait fréquemment sous sa nouvelle forme et en faisant d'elle le noyau de son irrationalisme : « Ridere, lugere, detestari, non intelligere » (rire, lamenter, haïr et ne pas comprendre).

37   B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…*, ed. cit., p. 331.

38   L. Chestov, *Athènes et Jérusalem*, Aubier, 1993, trad. B. de Schloezer, p. 34.

39   B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…*, ed. cit., p. 29.

40   Voir O. Salazar-Ferrer, *Benjamin Fondane et la révolte existentielle. Essai*, Éditions de Corlevour, Paris 2008.

41   Voir M. Finkenthal, op. cit., p. 118.

42   B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…*, ed. cit., p. 117.

43   *Ibid.*, p. 127.

44   B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…*, ed. cit., p. 127.

45   *Ibid.*, p. 184.

46   *Ibid.*, p. 132.

47   *Ibid.*, p. 131

48   *Ibid.*, p. 130

49   B. Fondane, *Léon Chestov, à la recherche du judaïsme perdu*, « Revue juive de Genève », IV, 1936, p. 327-328.

50   L. Strauss, *The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilisation*, [in] Strauss Leo, Green, Kenneth Hart, *Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity : Essays and Lectures in Modern Jewish Thought*, p.99

51   B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…*, ed. cit., p. 133.

52   *Ibid.*, p. 137.

53   *Ibid.*, p. 138.

54   *Ibid.*, p. 163.

55   C'est Norman Manea, dans son livre *Laptele negru* (Hasefer, București, 2010), qui a essayé d'esquisser un essai comparatif de Celan et Fondane.

56   Il est né en 1920 dans une famille juive de Cernăuți en Bucovine qui durant l'entre-deux-guerres a fait partie de la Grande Roumaine.

57   Voir U. Baer*, Remnats of Song. Trauma and the Experience of Modernity in Charles Baudelaire and Paul Celan*, Stanford University Press, 2000, 360 pp. // Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe, *La poésie comme experience*, Christian Bourgois Editeur, Paris 1986.

58   B. Fondane, *Rencontres avec Leon Chestov*, ed. cit., p. 35.

59   Voir D. Guedj*, Visages du Malheur dans la pensée de Fondane et « importance » de Baudelaire*, [in] M. Jutrin et G. Vanhèse (éd.), Actes du colloque de Consenza, 30 septembre-2 octobre 1999, Rubettino, Soverio, Manelli, 2003.

60   *Ibid.*, p. 123.

61   *Ibid.*, p. 124.

62   *Ibid.*, p. 124.

63   Nous y détectons encore une fois l'influence de Chestov et de la catégorie aristotélicienne de la nécessité, à laquelle il s'oppose constamment dans son œuvre.

64   *Ibid.*, p. 124.

65   B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…, ed.* cit., p. 306.

66   M. Jutrin, *Introduction aux Écrits de jeunesse en langue française : pensée biblique et pensée existentielle* [in] *Entre Jérusalem et Athènes. Benjamin Fondane à la recherche du judaïsme*, Textes réunis par M. Jutrin, Parole et Silence, 2009.

67   D. Guedj, *Visages du Malheur…,*op. cit., p. 123.

68   B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…*, op. cit. p. 383.

69   *Le Festin de Balthazar* est un poème dramatique, rédigé vers 1932, sous-titré *Auto-sacramental*, qui s'inspire du Livre de Daniel et du texte de Pedro Calderon de la Barca.

70   M. Jutrin, *Introduction* aux *Ecrits de jeunesse en langue française…,* ed. cit.

71   *Ibid.*

72   B. Fondane, *Léon Chestov à la recherche du judaïsme perdu*, ed. cit.

73 A. Cornea, *Exista un „spirit evreiesc" în revoluțiile culturale, științifice și politice ale secolului XX?*, [in] A. Oișteanu (ed.), *Identitatea evreiască și antisemitismul în Europa centrală și de sud-est*, Editura META, București 2003, p. 81.

74 M. Mîndra, *Felix Aderca : jewishness and modernism*, Studia Hebraica, nr. 1, București 2001, p. 105.

75 Fondane cite un vers qui figure dans son poème *Titanic* (Voir B. Fondane, *Le Mal des fantômes*, Plasma, Paris 1980., p.185 [Mon soulignement – OB]

76 Une lettre de Mme Fondane à Jean Ballard, 21 mars 1947, ed. cit., p. 294.

77 Voir R. Sheppard (1993), *The Problematics of European Modernism*, in Steve Giles, ed. Theorizing Modernism, Routledge, London, New York, pp. 1-51.

78 B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…*, ed. cit., p. 337.

79 Fondane est aussi un lecteur assidu et fortement inspiré des ouvrages de Lucien Lévy-Bruhl.

80 B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…*, ed. cit., p. 56.

81 B. Fondane, *Faux Traité…*, ed. cit., p. 87.

82 B. Fondane, *La Conscience malheureuse*, Editions Denoël, Paris 1936, p. 141.

83 B. Fondane, *Baudelaire…*, ed. cit., p. 46.

84 A. Eysteinsson, *The Making of Modernist Paradigms*, p. 306 [in] *Modernism. Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studie*s, Edited by Tim Middleton, Volume IV, 1985-1991, Routledge, London and New York.

85 Il vaut la peine de mentionner qu'en 1947 parait un essai sur Baudelaire écrit par Jean-Paul Sartre. Le philosophe y applique une analyse existentielle au cas de Baudelaire, qui peut être aussi considéré en tant qu'alternative à la théorie freudienne. J'oserai poser une question que s'il n'y avait pas eu ce tragique contexte historique, le livre de Fondane – aurait-il pu se réjouir d'une plus grande popularité que l'étude de Sartre, largement connue et commentée ?

86 M. Martin, *Studiu introductiv* [in] B. Fondane, *Opere XIV*, ed. cit., p. 21.

87 B. Fondane, *La Conscience Malheureuse*, ed. cit., p. 38.

88 Voir F. Dostoïevski, *Les Carnets du sous-sol* (1864), Trad. en français : J. Wladimir Bienstock , Paris, Éditeur Gustave Charpentier, date de parution : 1909.

89 Michael Finkenthal, ed. cit., p. 113.

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OLGA BUDARAGINA

Born in 1968, in Ukraine

Ph. D., St. Petersburg State University
Thesis: *Portrayal of Nature in Later Latin Language Poetry: Claudius Claudianus*

Assistant Professor, St. Petersburg State University, Department of Classics

Fellowships and grants:
Visiting scholar (Faculty of Classics, Cambridge), 2009, 2010, 2013
Collegium Budapest ("Communism and Classics – GNÔTHI SEAUTON!"
international project), 2010
Fondation Hardt pour l'étude de l'antiquité classique, 2001

Conferences in Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden

Articles on Latin literature, history of Classical scholarship, translation from
Latin (C. Cornelius Fronto)

Book:
Latin Inscriptions in St. Petersburg, Kolo, St. Petersburg, 2010, ^{2}2014

M. CORNELIUS FRONTO – A MAN OF LETTERS AND HIS LETTERS

Abstract

The article touches upon literary tastes of a prominent orator of the second century C. E. M. Cornelius Fronto, which are reflected in the correspondence with his two royal pupils – Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. After discussion of literary canons in antiquity, the reading list of Fronto is compared to the most famous canon of Greek and Latin authors compiled by Quintilian at the end of the first century C. E. The main difference between these two lies in neoclassical tastes of Quintilian and pre-classical of Fronto who is guided by his archaist interests. A separate section studies Fronto's account of Cicero in the light of these predilections.

Contemporary readers do not know M. Cornelius Fronto, and there are two objective reasons for this. The first has to do with the fact that he was not an outstanding Latin author – at least, on the grounds of the preserved literary heritage. Even the last editor Michel van den Hout, who dedicated the whole life to studying Fronto, calls him "only a third-class writer".[1] The other reason for oblivion can be explained by the late discovery of his only manuscript, which occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The more surprising for us looks extremely high appraisal of Fronto in antiquity, who was called the best orator of his time[2] and "non second but another one glory of Roman oratory"[3] (obviously, in comparison to Cicero). Unfortunately, Fronto's speeches, so highly estimated in antiquity are almost lost today: the only extant fragment of considerable size comes from a letter of Marcus Aurelius, his student, who is quoting his teacher's text.[4] So the largest part of Fronto's heritage, as we have it today, is his correspondence with the members of the Antonine dynasty – Marcus Aurelius, Lucius Verus and Antoninus Pius (altogether ca 250 letters are preserved).

The present article intends to focus upon the question of Fronto's literary tastes in the light of his interest in archaic literature as an important source of vocabulary. Though this point has already been given some scholarly attention, it seems to me that it needs serious revision: the most detailed study of this subject matter was undertaken by René Marache[5] in the 1950s and it became quite antiquated by now (not in the least owing to the fact that the scholar had at his command the first – far from perfect – edition of Fronto's works by M. van den Hout)[6]. I shall try to imply holistic approach to Fronto's literary preferences and to investigate the way they contribute towards making a literary canon (or rather reading list) of his own.

Cornelius Fronto's Life and the Text of His Letters

The orator was born at the very end of the first century C. E. between 90 and 95 in Numidian Cirta, which is now Constanta in Algeria,[7] and became the fist famous Latin writer to come from the Northern Africa[8] – as later Apuleius, Tertullian, and St. Augustine. His rhetoric studies began at Alexandria in Egypt and were continued in Rome. Fronto's brilliant political and oratory career, which peaked in 142[9] C. E. after his appointment as consul, was closely connected with the Antonine dynasty: Emperor Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Lucius Verus. It fell to Fronto's lot to live during one of the most peaceful periods in the history of the Roman Empire with almost no war conflicts inside and outside the country.[10] Fronto was born into a wealthy family and was a very well-to-do man: he owned a villa at Surrentum (modern Sorrento), which previously belonged to the Emperor Augustus. But his main pride and glory was, of course, a famous house on the Esquiline Hill in Rome facing the Colloseum: the villa was once owned by Maecenas and remained a property of Fronto's descendants at least till the end of the third century.[11] This house became the center of an elite literary community where Fronto was meeting his friends and pupils.

Fronto was a man of high reputation, and this led to his appointment as a tutor of the two adoptive sons of the Emperor Antoninus Pius – Marcus Aurelius (122–180 C. E.) and some time later of his younger brother Lucius Verus (130–169 C. E.). This puts Cornelius Fronto into a wider context of famous teachers and their royal pupils – such as Aristotle and Alexander the Great or Seneca and Nero. Fronto taught Marcus for approximately

six years between 139 and 145 C. E. until the latter became a co-regent of his father. This time turned out to be very happy for both the teacher and pupil because they became passionate friends (though Fronto could not approve of Marcus' growing interest in Stoic philosophy vs. rhetoric). Teacher's attitude to Lucius was more ambivalent: "on the one hand, he refused with Marcus to denounce the poor qualities of the man [such as dissipation and extravagance – OB]; on the other hand, we see that they did not hit it off too well."[12] So this correspondence is of vital historical importance because it gives us a unique chance to look into private lives of the best orator of the second century and two future emperors.

However, this could have not happened at least for two reasons: first, the correspondence was not intended for "publication"[13] by Fronto during his lifetime, and this was, probably, done only in the fourth century C. E.[14] Secondly, Fronto's works were considered to be completely lost until the beginning of the nineteenth century. Another birth to his literary heritage was given by an accidental discovery of Angelo Mai (1782–1854), a famous Italian philologist and paleographer, who in 1838 was ordained a cardinal. His hunting for manuscripts began in 1811 when he was appointed custodian of the Ambrosian Library in Milan and eight years later of the Vatican Library. During twenty years he brought back to life more than 350 names of Ancient Greek and Latin authors, which can be compared only to achievements of Italian Humanists. But the most famous event associated with Mai's activities was his discovery of a large fragment of the considered to be lost Cicero's dialogue "On the State" ("De re publica"). The clamor aroused by the announcement was so great that at the beginning of 1820 G. Leopardi composed a poem "Ad Angelo Mai" for the occasion.

Discovery of Fronto's text, which occurred several years before and whose writings became a disappointment to the most of contemporary scholars,[15] did not bring Mai the same fame, but it was a sort of detective story per se. The scholar paid attention to the manuscript[16] of "The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon" ("Acta Concilii Chalcedonensis")[17] kept in the Ambrosian Library and after careful examination found out that there was something below this text. The script turned out to be a triple palimpsest (a very rare case in codicology) with the writings of Fronto being inside of this paleographical "sandwich." The second part of the same manuscript was discovered by Mai in the Vatican Library several years later.[18] In order to read and publish the parchment, Mai used strong chemicals made of gallic acid. This organic matter is received from gallnuts, which are slight

protuberances on tree caused by insects. These "nuts" were used since antiquity for making ink, but Mai made a discovery of a different kind: he found out that gallic acid when put on a parchment reveals the text underneath. However, this working method badly damages the manuscript because later its pages grow black and become unreadable. Among other aggravating factors was Mai's reluctance to permit any other scholar to study the codex until his death in 1854. The chance was lost, which resulted in an inevitably unsatisfactory quality of later Fronto's editions. Even the standard modern edition (Liepzig, 1988), carried out by M. van den Hout, who spent more that forty year studying Fronto, is far from being perfect because the scholar did not consult the manuscript and used only notes and conjectures of his predecessors. So there is no doubt that a new modern-technology based edition of Fronto's works is needed: in this connection I would like to mention a successful interdisciplinary attempt undertaken recently by *The Archimedes Palimpsest Project* (http://archimedespalimpsest.org/about/).

In spite of textual problems, Fronto's letters can and should be studied because they are a unique documentary of vivid historical and literary importance, which in a very informal way bring back to life voices of the most important political and intellectual figures of the second century, such as Marcus Aurelius and his teacher.

Literary Canons in Antiquity

The term 'literary canon' is used widely today of a group of literary works that are considered the most important of a particular time period or place. Or in other words: "In modern literary studies [...] the term normally refers to a more or less authoritative or standard list of works representing the best literary products of a specific culture or era".[19]

"The Greek κανών is of Semitic origin and has a meaning «measuring rod» or «measuring stick»."[20] In Ancient Greek it was used as a technical word for a straight rod or bar, for a riddled line of masons or – in Plural – reeds of a wind-organ.[21] The word could also have a metaphorical meaning, such as 'rule' or 'standard' (of law, for example, or Attic dialect)[22], and in art it could define a 'model'.[23] In Classical Latin the word 'canon' is very rare: in the literary texts up to the second century C. E. there are only two occurrences of it: in Vitruvius (X, 8, 3) it means "the sound-board of a water-organ"; and in Pliny the Elder, who is talking about certain rules of

art introduced by the Greek sculptor Polyclitus, the meaning is "model" or "standard" (NH XXXIV, 55).[24] The earliest examples of modern meaning of 'canon' can be traced in Latin ecclesiastical texts of the fourth century C. E., which imply a corpus of sacred writings of the Old and New Testament approved by the church.[25] So what is important for us, neither in Classical Greek nor in Latin does the word apply to literature. This seems to be a reason that not all modern scholars approve of using the term 'canon' for the selections of Ancient Greek and Roman authors: Rudolf Pfeiffer, for example, calles this usage "catachrestic", but states, at the same time, that "the expression is sanctioned by its age and convenience" and believes that it will "never disappear".[26]

In Ancient Greek the words to describe the process of selection are the verb ἐγκρίνειν (to select, admit) and the participle ἐγκριθέντες (selected, included).[27] Latin parallels from Quintilian's "Institutes of Oratory" are 'excerpere' (Inst. X, 1, 45), 'recipere' (Inst. X, 1, 59) or 'redigere' (Inst. X, 1, 54; I, 4, 3), while the corresponding nouns are 'ordo'[28] and 'numerus' (Inst. X, 1, 54).[29] But regardless of the name, "the tendency to select the best writers for various reasons is a very old one"[30] – one can recall, for example, a hot debate in the "Frogs" by Aristophanes on the greatest tragic poet question. We know that literary lists of the best authors existed since Hellenistic period of time, being especially associated with Alexandrian grammarians Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus.[31] Probably, the most famous Classical list is the so-called "Canon of the Ten Attic Orators", which is dated to the period between the third century B. C. E. and the second century C. E.[32] In 1768, a celebrated German classical scholar David Ruhnken "set in motion an important shift in the modern history of a 'canon' by applying the word to the editorial activities of Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus"[33] and he called their list of ten orators a 'canon'.[34]

If the concept of canon is at all applicable to the Classical world, I will stick to the definition of Amiel Vardi who talks about "(a) a list (b) of selected literary works, (c) which are regarded as sharing a special value (being the only ones extant, the best, the most representative, or the most suitable for a specific purpose); in addition such a list should also be (d) more or less standard and generally known, as well as (e) authoritative, in the sense that it is generally accepted or at least acknowledged when it is rejected".[35]

At the same time, Ancient Greece was already well acquainted not just with selective but also with comprehensive lists of writers, so-called

"Pinakes".[36] The first one is ascribed to the famous Alexandrian poet and scholar of the third century B. C. E. Callimachus of Cyrene who arranged all Greek literary works according to subject and genre.[37] It is probably more accurate not to call these catalogues "comprehensive canons"[38] because canons are a priori selective. The difference between two types of records is well attested in our sources. Thus Quintilian makes a conscious distinction between 'indices'[39] (lists) and 'ordo/numerus'[40] (canon). He mentions these extensive catalogues in connection with the fact that he realises the existence of many poets not included in his canon and assumes that some profit may be derived from every author. At the same time, according to him, it is better to wait "till our powers have been developed and established to the full before we run to these poets"[41] (Inst. X, 1, 57).

Before going into a discussion of more specific details we should look at the basic difference between Ancient Greek and Latin canons on the one hand and the Biblical canon on the other. As distinct from Jewish and Christian texts, Classical do not refer to a sacred scripture.[42] I would agree with Tomas Hägg who argues that "a religious canon aims at drawing a definite borderline between books that are in and books that are out, the literary canon is mostly a priority list without such intentions of censorship, and with an open or arbitrary end."[43] That is why Karl Sandnes seems to be right assuming that "the literary canon in the Graeco-Roman world is certainly more open and less religious. It is utilitarian rather than aimed at drawing definite borderlines".[44] At the same time, one must not overestimate the openness of Classical canons. One of the main features of such lists is their quite conservative nature, which could be best of all illustrated by a very similar structure of the Greek authors' lists compiled by Greeks and Romans at different time periods and kept to the established order of genres and personalities.[45]

To what criteria did authors of such canons stick? Unfortunately, we know very little about this. Quintilian mentions the custom introduced by Alexandrian grammarians Aristarchus and Aristophanes of Byzantium that later became a rule – not to include contemporaries in the canon: in such a way they excluded, for example, Apollonius of Rhodes, the author of the "Argonautica." The same approach was adopted in the "Roman History" by Velleius Paterculus (1st B. C. E. – 1st C. E.), who argues that though "we admire the living writers greatly, it is difficult to evaluate them" ("Nam uiuorum ut magna admiratio, ita censura difficilis est" – II, 36).

Another criterion mentioned by Quintilian is personal judgment (iudicium), which Aristarchus was using in approving of three iambic

poets[46] selected for the canon (Inst. X, 1, 59): this personal approach, as we shall see later, is very true as regards Quintilian himself. Glen Most who discusses other possible grounds for selection argues: "We can only surmise that popularity, multifunctionality, ideological serviceability, and the personal taste of certain key figures may have played a role, together of course with estimates of quality and, sometimes at least, claims for moral utility."[47] Nevertheless, even the fact that the text was well known and read did not necessarily mean that it would be included into the canon – none of the preserved lists mention, for example, epigrammatic poetry,[48] which was very popular in antiquity.[49] At the same time, moral guidelines indeed could be taken in consideration at least by some compilers. The canon that Quintilian has in mind in the first book of "Institutes of Oratory" is, of course, of a didactic type and is intended for younger students, so there is no surprise that he talks about strict treatment of the reading canon by the old school teachers of grammar and literature (grammatici).

It seems important to comment here upon two distinctive canon types in the ancient world, which were marked out by Amiel Vardi.[50] The first one was introduced by the Alexandrian grammarians and included names of the best representatives in a particular genre. The purpose of these canons is stated by George Kennedy: "The point of such lists was to indicate, sometimes in order of quality, the writers of a particular genre whom a librarian or grammarian approved and recommended and whose works belonged in a library."[51] I find it hard to except the argument of Neil O'Sullivan who asserts that "this of course is something quite different from a 'canon'; it is merely a list and need carry no authority at all."[52] These canons do not seem to be directly associated with the school tradition: they rather created guidelines for issuing copies of the authors selected and thus were aimed at the preservation of the Greek literary heritage for future generations. In short, they were canons for eternity.

The second variety also arose in the Hellenistic Greece in an important centre of Pergamum, which, unlike Alexandrian school, was much interested in rhetoric. These didactic canons appeared in a more practical context, being associated with the compilation of lists of authors who could become models of style for future orators. Though didactic lists had a different goal, they "were often compiled on the basis of Alexandrian canons".[53] One can observe that most of the preserved canons are of a didactic type. The only exception here is the list of the best Latin comic writers provided by a Roman literary critic Volcatius Sedigitus (ca 100 B. C. E.), which is extant owing to the fact that Aulus Gellius quotes a

passage from the book of the former "De poetis" written in iambic senarii (XV, 24). Volcatius Sedigitus does not give any grounds for his selection, except once when he explains the last, tenth, place given to Ennius by his "antiquity" (*causa antiquitatis*).

As was said above, such selections cannot be compared to censorship lists, but the fact is that very few works of ancient authors survived having been not included into canons, though the opposite is also quite true: such lists could not a priori guarantee preservation of texts.

In the present article I can only briefly touch upon the question of school actual reading lists, which were guided by didactic canons of some types. Our evidence is a scattered one and incomplete, but it seems quite obvious that neither in Greece nor in Rome there was a state institution of any kind willing to control the syllabus.[54] Teresa Morgan in her comprehensive study of school-text papyri from Egypt, which focuses mainly on lower levels of education,[55] speaks of the "core" authors and variable "periphery" studied at schools.[56] The core had to be rather stable, as it was based on a long tradition that governed education in antiquity. In such a way Pliny the Younger, who is writing to his junior friend Fuscus Salinator in order to improve his literary skills, advises him about a reading list, which is, according to him, fixed, well known and does not need specification (Pliny does not even mention whether he has in mind Greek literature, Latin or both – Epist. VII, 9, 15–16).

At the same time, the school reading lists were likely to differ at some points owing to personal predilections of a teacher, time, and place – as it was observed by Peter J. Parsons, "there is a world between Quintilian and the Egyptian market town."[57] But even in Rome one cannot be sure that an extensive canon by Quintilian, who discusses all stages of education[58] but whose primary concern is the *schola rhetoris*, could really affect the schools' "curriculum", because an allowance should be, of course, made "for the normal discrepancy between theory and practice."[59] The future tendency in education was quite obvious though. If one compares Quintilian's list with the later ones, it is easy to see how the syllabus narrowed by the time of the late Empire:[60] We have a piece of evidence from the fourth-century rhetorician Arusianus Messius who in the "Exempla Elocutionum"[61] picks out examples of expressions and phrases from Vergil, Terence, Cicero, and Sallust:[62] this choice attests that they were the four main Latin authors believed to be the best representatives of a specific genre. In the sixth century this "quadriga Messii" was adopted by Cassiodorus (Inst. I, 15, 7).

M. Fabius Quintilianus' Canon of Greek and Latin Authors

Now let us shortly look at the most famous literary canon compiled at the end of the first century C. E. by a prominent rhetorician and teacher M. Fabius Quintilianus (c. 35–c. 100 C. E.). His opus magnum, an impressive twelve-volume treatise called the "Institutes of oratory" ("Institutio oratoria"), discusses theory and practice of Roman school training. In the tenth part of the textbook Quintilian gives an account of his canon of Ancient Greek and Latin writers, which is the most extensive in the Roman tradition and for this reason cannot be omitted in the discussion.

Two main things should be said about this canon. First, this list was part of Quintilian's didactic program: that is why he deals with the authors "from the standpoint of their appropriateness in the training of aspiring orators and in shaping their styles."[63] Various genres of literature are seen by him as means for improving oratory skills. Secondly, he is highly concerned about making comparison between Romans and Greeks. From his point of view, both Greek and Latin literature have reached "a certain plateau"[64] with their summits of glory in the past. So it was time to sum up highs and lows and to define merits and deficiencies of Roman literature vs. Greek. Quintilian evaluates ancient authors according to genres and keeps to the same order, when talking about Greeks and Romans. The scheme he makes use of is a traditional one, and it is borrowed from the Greek sources[65] where poetic genres precede prose works. If to look at Quintilian's further division, epic is discussed as number one genre in poetry, which is followed by lyric (elegy, iambic poetry, and lyric in a narrow sense), and drama (old comedy, tragedy, and new comedy). In prose section he discusses history at first, then oratory and gives the last place to philosophy. Quintilian's judgments of Latin literature seem to be much more independent than of Greek.[66] He believes, for example, that Virgil "most nearly approaches to Homer" (Inst. X, 1, 85) and that he excels all other Greek or Roman epics. Quintilian also believes that the Romans "challenge the supremacy of the Greeks in elegy" (Inst. X, 1, 93) and that satire is totally a Roman invention ("satire […] is all our own" – Inst. X, 1, 93). It is worth to note a different approach towards Latin prose and poetry in the canon: Quintilian does not name any prose author before Cicero but gives many names of those who lived after him; in poetry it is vice versa: he mentions many Republican poets but only a few of post-Augustan date.[67] In his canon Quintilian makes one peculiar exception to the rule that none of the living authors should be included

in the list: this lucky man is an epic poet called Germanicus Augustus, but, of course, he is better known as Emperor Domitian (51–96 C. E.) – so it is clear that this "exception" is nothing but flattery to the mighty ruler. Sometimes the orator comments upon authors not just in the framework of their utility for future orators, but he also tends to share his personal literary judgments[68] – this point will be discussed later in connection with Fronto. If to define Quintilian's literary preference in the most general way, he could be called a neoclassicist and his motto is: "Back to Cicero!"

Pupils of Cornelius Fronto

We know that Fronto was a teacher two future Emperors, which is mentioned in the inscription dedicated to his great-grandson: it describes Fronto as "orator, consul, magister imperatorum Luci et Antonini" (CIL XI, 6334). Such an appointment could have happened only due to Fronto's high reputation as an orator and the fact that he was a man of rank (already a senator who was close to his consulship).[69] It is quite possible to reconstruct from the correspondence the course in Latin rhetoric given to Marcus and Lucius:[70] it included "thorough familiarity with the ancient poets and orators, the composition of verse, incessant practice in the invention and use of *similes* and *sententiae*, translations between Latin and Greek, and finally the composition of various exercises in rhetoric".[71] The teacher guided his pupils' reading by sending certain excerpts from Latin authors or encouraged them to extract themselves.[72]

But besides two royal students, Fronto had a number of other disciples, and he began to give guidance to them some time before Marcus and Lucius. This means that his teaching program took shape prior to the time when he became a tutor at the imperial palace and that is was intended for a wider circle of followers of his doctrine. What kind of community was it and what did Fronto teach? Unfortunately, our evidence is very scarce and unspecific. But what is quite certain is the fact that Fronto was not a professional teacher[73] like Quintilian, which means that most probably he did not accept payment[74] and that he did not associate himself with any formal educational institution.[75] Quintilian, on the other hand, gives his clear preference for school training over home education.[76]

Fronto calls the circle of his disciples 'contubernium', which means 'a band, crew, or brotherhood', and he speaks of them not as 'pupils' (*discipuli*) but his 'followers' (*sectatores*) or 'fellows' (*contubernales*).[77]

In the correspondence one can find about ten names of people who could be more or less safely referred to as members of '*contubernium*'. They are usually mentioned by Fronto in the letters of recommendation sent to his friends and acquaintances, and he refers to participation in his '*contubernium'* (obviously, not without pride) as one of the reasons for such a recommendation. How old were Fronto's '*contubernales*'? Some of these people definitely belonged to a younger generation than the orator, while others were older and not inexperienced.[78]

It is even more difficult to answer the question about the type of instruction Fronto was giving to his 'contubernium'. His own references are exactly of the same kind and very brief – Fronto says that he taught them '*bonae artes*' (one can translate this general expression as 'liberal arts'). At the same time, this saying very well corresponds to a passage from a letter to Marcus in which he praises his student for being "perfect and complete in all liberal arts, before adolescence a good man, before manhood a practised speaker" (Ad Marc. Caes. IV, 1, 2). There is no use, of course, as some do,[79] to see Fronto's '*contubernium*' as a school with formalized curriculum: it was rather a community that shared literary tastes and views.[80] So one can surmise that Fronto's private '*contubernium*' included a number of young people who were taught rhetoric in order to be trained for forum[81] and that the program of such training was similar to the one offered to Marcus and Lucius.

"Archaizing Movement" of the Second Century C. E.

Fronto, a "literary lion",[82] was the leading figure of Roman letters of the mid second century. Being a highly educated and wealthy man, he made his house the center of an elite community, which consisted not only of his disciples but also of friends with whom he could discuss topics he was interested in. In the history of literature Fronto is associated with most significant trend of the period which can be defined as archaism.[83] The term, dating back from the end of the nineteenth century, was introduced by Eduard Norden,[84] and it implies an interest in the Latin pre-classical authors, i. e. those who lived in the third – early first centuries B. C. E. In the second century such a tendency was peculiar to the Emperor Hadrian,[85] Fronto himself, and later to Aulus Gellius and Apuleius.

At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that nature and origin of this phenomenon are still under dispute. Archaism can be defined in

two possible ways: it was either a movement with a distinct ideology oriented towards the past or just a matter of personal predilections of a number of literates. The first definition also implies a strong personal role of Fronto as archaism's champion and protagonist. Besides the earlier literary historians,[86] this approach is adopted by Eduard Champlin in his important book on Fronto:[87] he believes that though the orator was not progenitor of this taste for old authors, it can be said that Fronto and "the dominion of archaism arose simultaneously"[88] and his "magisterial obsession with archaism affected the taste of an age".[89] The second approach is applied by Ulrich Schindel who doubts the possibility to mark archaism as the second century "*Epochenbegriff*" and argues that neither Fronto nor Aulus Gellius had any conscious archaistic program.[90] Though our literary evidence from this period is rather scarce, one can be sure, at least, that Fronto did not gain his interest in archaic literature at school: this is mentioned in a letter to Marcus Aurelius, in which the teacher praises his student's achievements and adds that at his age (the future Emperor was twenty two at that moment) he had hardly any knowledge of old Latin authors (Ad Marc. Caes. II, 2, 4). So one should date this tendency from the lifetime of Fronto who was sensitive to the turn literature was taking and who became genuinely interested in the use of archaism.[91] But whatever serious his attraction to old writers was, I would prefer with A. D. Leeman, U. Schindel, and others[92] not to speak of an "archaizing movement" because we are not aware of how deep Fronto's personal impact on literature of the period really was. It seems to me that it is better to talk about a literary tendency, which was in the air and which was followed by at least a number of men of letters.[93]

Here we come to the second question concerning this tendency – the question of its origin. Did this interest in early authors come from a purely Roman context, as R. Marache and some other scholars believe?[94] Or was it influenced by a similar process in Greek culture?[95] The answer is not that simple, of course, and I tend to agree with Leonfranc Holford-Strevens, who weights up both "internalist account" and "fortuitous resemblance between Greek Atticism"[96] and Roman archaism. What is, of course, strikingly similar between Greek and Roman culture of the second century is a strongly marked turn to the past,[97] but besides formal similarities, there is a gap between Greek and Latin way to treat it. On the Greek side this interest in old authors was practiced by the so-called Second Sophistic.[98] The Greeks of the period were writing their works in the Attic dialect which was associated with acme of the Greek oratory style in the first – fourth

centuries B. C. E. (hence the name 'Atticism'). The champions of archaic Latin, on the other side, in spite of its "wild beauty"[99] never actually tried to imitate the style of archaic authors, such as Cato the Elder or Gaius Gracchus. What they took from the past was an occasional use of rare and obsolete words in order to embellish their works and to give them a touch of variety.[100] The reason for this was probably the fact that they could well understand the inferiority of archaic Latin literature in comparison with that of the "Golden age" and such authors as Cicero. This imitation of the authors of the earlier period, which is limited to the use of specific vocabulary, makes the term "archaism" somewhat misleading, and that is why I would agree with Eduard Fraenkel who proposed to call its champions not "archaists" but rather "mannerists".[101]

Fronto's Reading List and Quintilian's Canon

Now we are turning to the reading list of Cornelius Fronto. I would not call it 'canon' for one main reason: as far as we know, he did not write treatises or textbooks on the topic, and private letters are not the most suitable place for a systematic discussion of the issue.[102] At the same time, it makes sense to look at his literary preferences because he, like Quintilian, had fixed didactic principles and, as was shown above, had opportunities to implement them.

What authors did Fronto believe to be a new standard for those who would like to achieve success in the field of rhetoric and what criteria of choice did he apply in his list making? Though the discussion of literary issues is spread through the whole body of correspondence with Marcus and Lucius, detailed accounts are not numerous,[103] so it is not appropriate to talk about a fixed 'list' as such. Nevertheless, Fronto's literary preferences can be detected from his observations and comments. One can see that he favored pre-classical authors, which included prose writers prior to Cicero and poets before Virgil. This is very true in general, but the chronological criterion was not the only one: Fronto, for example, has a very high opinion of the historian Sallust, who was twenty years younger than Cicero. This means that stylistic account was also taken into consideration because Sallust was known for an abundant use of archaism. Besides Sallust, Fronto's list of favorite authors included such name as Ennius, Cato the Elder, Plautus, Lucretius, and a number of others known to us only in fragments.[104] Although Ennius and Cato seem to be number ones to Fronto

in poetry and prose respectively,[105] he never recommends his pupils to follow one particular model and believes that a speaker should be able to use various styles.[106] One can see from the correspondence that the teacher was very effective in sharing his taste for old authors with his students and that his ideas commanded their respect.[107]

What is really striking about Fronto's reading list in comparison to Quintilian's canon and the later tradition (including Fronto's admirer Aulus Gellius) is the omission of certain names considered to be "classical". In his letters Fronto never refers to the greatest Latin epic Virgil to whom he prefers the mentioned above author of the "Annals" Quintus Ennius (239–169 B. C. E.).[108] Another outstanding poet Horace is mentioned only in one letter: he is called, at least, a "remarkable poet" ("*poeta memorabilis*"), but then Fronto jokingly says that he has a connection with Horace "through Maecenas" and his (Fronto's) "«gardens of Maecenas»" (Ad Marc. Caes. II, 2, 5) having in mind his villa at the Esquiline Hill.[109]

Here we approach the main criterion of Fronto's list making. Unlike Quintilian, he does not select best representatives in a particular genre, but he makes instead a sort of stylistic hierarchy established according to the ability of writers to find suitable and appropriate words that should be looked for in pre-classical authors. He distinguishes, of course, between poets and prose writers,[110] but otherwise in his didactic letters he easily compares and recommends those who wrote epic, tragedy, and comedy: thereby Fronto states, for example, that an epic Ennius was more careful about word selection than a writer of comedies Plautus (Ad Marc. Caes. IV, 3, 2).

It is highly probable that Fronto should have known Quintilian's "Institutes of Oratory", but he never demonstrates his acquaintance with the text. I think that this case resembles that of Virgil where we also have to do with implicit knowledge. Still, there are a few ideas shared by both authors – first, the concept that a perfect orator should be "a good man speaking well" (vir bonus dicendi peritus). At the same time, we know that this ideal was, of course, quite vague, and the phrase in its aphoristic form comes from Cato the Elder,[111] so I tend to believe that Fronto rather borrowed it directly from one of his favorite archaic writers than from Quintilian.

Secondly, Fronto and Quintilian share attitudes towards Cicero and Seneca. They similarly find limitations and imperfections of Seneca's the Younger style (Quint. Inst. X, 125–131; Fronto De orat. 2–3), but this does not necessarily mean that Fronto was influenced by Quintilian's judgment.

Seneca was a symbol of postclassical trend[112] in Latin, and Quintilian, who promoted neo-Ciceronianism, could not approve of him. At the same time, we see that he leaves his account of Seneca till last and the discussion is only "the second longest devoted to a single author".[113] This can be explained by the fact that Seneca was a major figure of the period and a very attractive one for the students of oratory. This is the reason why Quintilian could not ignore his influence and he chose to discuss not only Seneca's stylistic defects but also his merits. In the second century, Seneca's impact was not as strong as in the first century, nevertheless Fronto still realizes its danger for Marcus and alerts about drawbacks of this "effeminate" style: he talks about "soft and hectic plums of Seneca" ("Senecae mollibus et febriculosis prunuleis" – De orat. 2). Though Fronto acknowledges occasional lucky expressions in Seneca (De orat. 3), writings of the latter become an object of ruthless criticism for saying the same thing over and over again (De orat. 4).[114] In comparison to the complex account of Quintilian Fronto's is much more straightforward and one-sided because of his unconcealed dislike for "modernist" style of Seneca.[115]

Cicero has received the longest account of all in Quintilian's discussion of Greek and Latin writers, having been treated in two sections (though, according to the author of the canon, he "is great in any department of literature" – Inst. X, 123): Cicero is spoken of as an orator, been compared to Demosthenes (X, 105–112), and as a philosopher who can rival Plato (X, 123). To Quintilian "the name of Cicero has come to be regarded not as the name of a man, but as the name of eloquence itself" (X, 1, 112).

In the following section I shall compare this purely panegyric discussion of Cicero with Fronto's attitude, which is more diverse and mixed.

Fronto's Account of Cicero

In this article I will speak of Fronto's and Marcus' attitude to Cicero together because the pupil does not seem to deviate from his teacher's preferences and guidelines. In whole, they mention the name of Cicero and discuss him in more than twenty passages. How is the orator called? The most official variant of his name (M. Tullius) occurs in one of the earliest letters to Marcus, which dates ca 139 C. E. when Fronto has just become his tutor.[116] Otherwise he is referred to as 'Tullius', 'pater Tullios', and most frequently as 'Cicero'. The adjectives 'Tullianus' and 'Ciceronianus' are also used: the latter in Fronto's letters (not in Marcus, though) always

has a possessive meaning – "belonging to Cicero" while 'Tullianus' is "typically Ciceronian".[117]

Whatever Fronto's personal literary tastes were, he could not, of course, omit Cicero in his teaching program.[118] What is more, he underlines his good knowledge of Cicero's writings and states that "he has most attentively read all his works" ("[…] qui scripta omnia studiosissime lectitarim" – Ad Marc. Caes. IV, 3, 3). So in a number of letters Cicero is spoken of – in a quite Quintilian's manner – as the main Latin orator, and Fronto calls him "the head and source of Roman eloquence" ("caput atque fons Romanae facundiae" – Ad Marc. Caes. IV, 3, 3).[119]

Now let us look at two more examples of Cicero's appraisal in Fronto. In a consolatory letter written to Marcus in 161 C. E. at the beginning the Parthian War when the political situation was quite hopeless Fronto encourages the Emperor and sends him a letter which contains a real praise of Cicero's rhetorical art (*De bello Parthico* 10): Fronto states that no one was ever praised in a more "eloquent" way (*facundius*) than Pompeius was praised by Cicero and that his cognomen 'Magnus' owns a lot not only to personal virtues of the former but also to the mastery of the latter. This letter is a very rare example when a certain work by Cicero is recommended not just for stylistic purposes but because of it contents and ideas.

In a letter to his former student and future son in law Aufidius Victorinus, which dates presumably from 162–163 C. E.,[120] Fronto modestly asks for comparison of his (unpreserved) speech "Pro Bithynis" and Cicero's "Pro Sulla" delivered about a year after the Catilina's conspiracy. In this case one can see how Fronto's personal feelings are involved: "Not that you should compare us as equals, but that you should recognize how far my mediocre talent falls short of that man of unapproachable eloquence" ("Non ut par pari compares, sed ut aestimes nostrum mediocre ingenium quantum ab illo eximiae eloquentiae viro abfuat" – Ad amic. I, 14, 2). I would say that this way to present his work is quite significant of Fronto: on the one hand, he pays a due tribute to his predecessor, but on the other, this shows his high aspirations and implies that his only rival would be the greatest ever Roman orator.

Apart from this favorable account of Cicero in general, one can find traces of more detailed discussion and use of his rhetorical art. Among them is the way of presentation and elaboration of arguments. Between 140 and 142 C. E. Fronto took part as a prosecutor in a trial against the famous sophist Herodes Atticus,[121] who sometime later also became one of Marcus' tutors. There is a series of letters dedicated to this occasion in

the body of correspondence.[122] Marcus acts in a conciliatory manner and hints Fronto that he should not be too sharp on Herodes. Fronto – though unwillingly – yields to this request and assures Marcus that he will put his arguments "*singillatim*", "ut Ciceronis modum proferamus" (Ad M. Caes. III, 6), which means "point by point, to follow Cicero's way". The adverb '*singillatim'* is opposed to '*perpetuis orationibus*' below in the text. These two ways of argumentation were perfectly known to Cicero who in the "De oratore" (III, 201) distinguishes between "*in perpetua oratione*" and "*in singulis verbis*". In Herodes Atticus' case the choice of "*singillatim*" was, obviously, less dangerous because it meant that the arguments were presented "in smaller units" and were "interrupted by hearing of witnesses and reading of documents", while uninterrupted speech would have asked for strong emotions.[123]

The question of Latin prose rhythm is an extremely difficult one and much ink has been spilt on this subject. What I would like to mention at the moment is that Cicero's rhythm was quite different from that of Fronto with his short and abrupt sentences and abundant asyndeton.[124] This does not mean though that Fronto did not take care of the subject – on the contrary, he was very sensitive of rhythmical structure of his text.[125] That is why, I think, he deliberately points out to Marcus cases when he follows a dissimilar, i. e. Ciceronian, way: once Fronto quotes a passage from his future speech in honor of Antoninus Pius and tells Marcus that he is going to use a "Ciceronian clausula" ("Tulliana conclusio" – Ad Marc. Caes. II, 4, 1).[126] As he does not cite the end of the sentence, we are left to guess what particular type of clausula[127] he was going to put there. In another letter Fronto writes in an even more vague way: he praises Marcus' speech about the earthquake in Cyzicus and emphasizes that in the subordinate clause he is using "formam sententiae Tullianae." To draw Marcus attention, he repeats the whole clause:

> Do you recognize the Ciceronian turn of the sentence? "So that not more suddenly or more violently was the city stirred by the earthquake than the minds of your hearers by your speech".
> (Ecquid adgnoscis formam sententiae Tullianae: "ut non ocius aut vehementius terra urbem illam quam animos audientium tua oratio moverit"? – Ad Ant. Imp. I, 2, 6).

Some believe[128] that 'forma' here also means 'clausula', but this can hardly be true at least for three reasons: first, because clausula as such is

not of a Ciceronian type;[129] secondly, it does not make sense to repeat the whole sentence for the sake of its rhythmical ending; thirdly, the word, according to *Theasurus Linguae Latinae*, never has such a meaning.[130] It seems to me that Fronto was using '*forma*' in this context in a more general and wider sense having in mind "a Ciceronian turn of phrase."

Does Fronto always approve of his great predecessor? On the one hand, Cicero is more than once mentioned among Fronto's beloved prose authors, such as Cato, Sallust, and Gaius Gracchus,[131] which proves his high opinion of the famous orator. On the other, he does not seem to be Fronto's favorite in the art of oratory: the latter explicitly says that he prefers Cicero's letters to his speeches:

> All Cicero's letters, however, should, I think, be read in my opinion, even more than his speeches. There is nothing more perfect than Cicero's letters. (Omnes autem Ciceronis epistulas legendas censeo, mea sententia vel magis quam omnis eius orationes: epistulis Ciceronis nihil est perfectius – Ad Ant. Imp. III, 8, 2).

This was an answer to Marcus' request to provide him with a selection of Cicero's letters, either in full or in parts. Fronto sends what he had himself excerpted on the matter of eloquence, philosophy, and politics, as well as some expressions that seemed to him elegant and remarkable. At the end of his epistle – and this is a sign of sincere adoration – he says that **all** Cicero's letters are worth reading. To describe Cicero's epistolary style, which he wants Marcus to study and follow, he uses an adjective '*remissus*' (relaxed) (Ad Marc. Caes. II, 2, 4). This very well coincides with Cicero's own definition of epistolary style as "intimate and full of jesting" ("familiare et iocosum" – Fam. II, 4, 1). His unsurpassed epistolary skill is mentioned once more in a letter addressed to Lucius Verus: Fronto discusses at length the importance of rhetoric for the ruler – a subject of great importance for him – and states the preference of a letter-form for some treatises. In this connection he discusses a non extant today work of Cicero "De consiliis suis", which was posthumously published by his son and which dealt with accusations against Crassus and Caesar.[132] From Fronto's point of view, the whole thing would have become better if compiled in a letter form in order to make it "shorter, more readable, and compact"[133] ("brevius et expeditius et densius" – Ad Ver. Imp. II, 1, 15).

Fronto was very careful about selection of words and, one can say, even obsessed with word hunting: no wonder that this was the main

criterion he used in his judgment about other authors and this was his guiding star in compiling of the list of favorite writers. In his discussion of Fronto's aesthetic principles A. Leeman even speaks about "a word-crazed generation".[134] Because of the importance of the subject, it is scattered through the correspondence, and this is the point Fronto wants to teach his students in the first place. One of the earliest letters about the right choice of words is addressed to Marcus Aurelius and presumably dates from 139 C. E. when Fronto was appointed a royal tutor.[135] The letter discusses his didactic principles and contains the longest passage ever dedicated to Cicero by Fronto: the teacher intends to express and share with Marcus his non-classical stylistic values. Fronto focuses upon the danger of half-knowledge, which, according to him, can be easily concealed in almost all arts but for selection and arrangement of words (Ad Marc. Caes. IV, 4, 1).[136] He argues that even among old authors not all paid due attention to the choice of words, citing as good examples Cato, Sallust, Ennius, Plautus, and some others. A whole paragraph below is devoted to Cicero's word usage: on the one hand, Fronto acknowledges that the orator spoke "the most beautiful words" ("verba pulcherrima" – *ibid.* 3), but on the other, he believes that Cicero was not always careful in his choice of words. For this three possible reasons are given that are a) greatness of mind, b) a wish to escape toil, c) or confidence that he does not have to look for the words and the right one will come up without searching (*ibid.*). This observation obviously contradicts with Fronto's call for "unexpected and unlooked for words" ("insperata atque inopinata verba"– *ibid.*) expressed in the text below. Fronto puts a special emphasis on the fact that these words should be assiduously searched for and the source for them is to be found in old Latin authors.

Without any doubt, Fronto was neither the first one nor the only one to criticize Cicero's style.[137] Mannerist aspirations of Fronto should be discussed not only against a background of the second century's C. E. tastes but also in a wider context of earlier literary theories. Though the importance of correct word usage was always an essential part of oratory training, its implicit value still remained a matter of discussion. The core of this dispute was a disagreement on content vs. form supremacy. The former approach can be best illustrated by an aphorism of Cato the Elder: "grasp the subject, the words will follow" ("rem tene, verba sequentur" – fr. 15 Jordan). This is really striking, but Fronto, who rates Cato among his favorite authors, fails to understand the essence of his literary priorities. On the other hand, Cicero, who – in spite of Fronto's

assertion – was never careless about word selection, nevertheless, backs up Cato's opinion and uses it as an argument[138] in his polemics with the so-called Atticists, C. Julius Caesar and C. Licinius Calvus being among them. In the first century C. E., Quintilian, a true follower of Cicero, talks about '*res*' (contents) and '*verba*' (words) as mutually complementary (Inst. X, 1, 4) and mocks those who can never stop to hunt for something better and archaic to the detriment of sense (Inst. VIII, praef. 31). As was wittily observed by E. Fantham,[139] by saying this he could have predicted Fronto's appearance.

The Word '*Classicus*' and Cornelius Fronto

We have just looked at the importance of a well chosen word for Fronto, and now I would like to discuss one more word, which is associated with him – '*classicus*'. Many modern languages have derivatives from this Latin adjective – such as 'classical', '*klassisch*', '*classique*', '*classico*', '*clásico*', '*clasic*', etc. The meaning of all these words is foreseeable and implies something standard and exemplary. In Latin '*classicus*', obviously, comes from the noun '*classis*', which denotes a class of people on the basis of their property; so the adjective originally was a technical term and meant someone belonging to the highest class of citizens.

It is noteworthy that the first figurative use of '*classicus*' as 'classical' is associated with the name of Cornelius Fronto. The evidence comes from Aulus Gellius, a Latin writer who was born one generation after Fronto.[140] In his younger years, Gellius studied in Rome and was acquainted with most outstanding teaching figures of the time, such as philosopher Favorinus and grammarian C. Sulpicius Apollinaris. When Gellius met Fronto the orator was still Marcus' and Lucius' tutor. We cannot say that Gellius was Fronto's student in a strict sense of the word, but he was given honor to be accepted at Fronto's place and had a chance to participate in the talks of "*sociabilité savante*".[141]

At mature age, Gellius compiled his famous "Attic Nights", which is a collection of various notes on grammar, history, literature and which preserves fragments from the works of Latin authors otherwise unknown. In this book he gives several accounts[142] of Fronto and speaks of his scholarly talks and discussions with admiration and respect. At the meeting we are going to look at[143] the topic of discussion, in which Fronto commented

on the words of one of the guests present,[144] was of little significance, having to do with a minor point of Latin vocabulary. The question was the possibility of usage of two Latin words in Singular and in Plural ('quadrigae' and 'harena'). Fronto gives his judgment on the question and calls upon his audience to look for rare words:

> So go now and inquire, when you chance to have leisure, whether any orator or poet, provided he be of that earlier band – that is to say, any classical or authoritative writer, not the one of the common herd – has used 'quadriga' or 'harenae'. Now Fronto asked us to look up these words, I think, not because he thought that they were to be found in any books of the early writers, but to rouse in us an interest in reading for the purpose of hunting down rare words. (Transl. by J. C. Rolfe)
> (Ite ergo nunc et, quando forte erit otium, quaerite, an "quadrigam" et "harenas" dixerit e cohorte illa dumtaxat antiquiore uel oratorum aliquis uel poetarum, id est classicus adsiduusque aliquis scriptor, non proletarius. Haec quidem Fronto requirere nos iussit uocabula non ea re, opinor, quod scripta esse in ullis ueterum libris existumaret, sed ut nobis studium lectitandi in quaerendis rarioribus uerbis exerceret – Gell. XIX, 8).

Initially all three words – 'classicus', 'assiduus', and 'proletarius' – were linked to property qualification:[145] 'classicus', as was said above, means 'belonging to the highest class of citizens'; 'assiduus' is 'land-owning, wealthy'; and 'proletarius' – 'belonging to the lowest class of citizens'. But Fronto in Gellius' account is the first to apply these definitions to literature and writers[146] and in case of 'classicus' to describe authors of high standard and to distinguish between classical and colloquial.[147] On the one hand, there is no indisputable evidence that Gellius is citing Fronto word-for-word, so we cannot be sure that this expression does not belong to the author of the "Attic Nights" himself, but on the other hand, mnemonic skills of the ancients were surprisingly good and it is very tempting and plausible to assume that Fronto is the father of modern usage of the word 'classical'. It is also important that 'classical' for Fronto agrees neither with Quintilian's canon nor even with Gellius' list of favorite authors,[148] but implies writers of the "pre-classical" period.

Conclusions

The aim of the present article was to study the correspondence of the greatest orator of the second century C. E. Cornelius Fronto with Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus from the point of view of the tutor's teaching program and literary preferences. In order to see their peculiar character, it was important to look at the notion of literary canon in antiquity and to compare Fronto's account with the comprehensive canon of Quintilian, compiled at the end of the first century C. E. I believe that on the one hand, one should not speak of a 'canon' in Fronto's case because he does not discuss the subject in a form of a treatise or textbook, but on the other, his reading list is comparable to that of Quintilian because it is also based on fixed didactic principles. The most striking difference between Quintilian's canon and Fronto's reading list is the preference of the latter for the pre-classical Latin authors, such a Cato the Elder, which should be seen against the background of archaizing tastes of the second century in general. However, what is characteristic exclusively of Fronto is his almost obsessive concern about the right choice of words. In this context a special section is dedicated to Fronto's account of Cicero, who enjoys the fame of a great orator but does not, at the same time, meet Fronto's main criterion of careful word selection.

NOTES

1   HOUT VAN DEN, M. P. J., *A Commentary on the Letters of M. Cornelius Fronto*, Brill, Leiden; Boston; Köln, 1999, p. X.

2   Which was the second century C. E. Dio LXIX, 18, 3.

3   Eum. Pan. Lat. 8 (V), 14.

4   Ad Marc. Caes. I, 6, 2–8. The numeration follows that of the edition: HOUT VAN DEN, M. P. J. (ed.), *M. Cornelii Frontonis Epistulae* schedis tam editis quam ineditis Edmundi Hauleri usus ed. Michael P. J. van den Hout, Teubner, Leipzig, 1988.

5   MARACHE, R., *La critique littéraire de langue latine et le développement du goût archaisant au IIe siècle de notre ère*, Plihon, Rennes, 1952 and MARACHE, R., *Mots nouveaux et mots archaïques chez Fronton et Aulu-Gelle*, Press Universitaires de France, Rennes, 1957 [*Travaux de la faculté des letters de Rennes*, Serie I. Vol. 1].

6   HOUT VAN DEN, M. P. J., *M. Cornelii Frontonis Epistulae*, Brill, Lugduni Batavorum, 1954.

7   CHAMPLIN, E., *Fronto and Antonine Rome*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, p. 5; HOUT VAN DEN 1999, VII.

8   In the second and third centuries "Latin literature is represented almost exclusively by African authors" (MATTIACCI, S. "Apuleius and Africitas", in LEE, B. T., FINKELPEARL, E., GRAVERINI L. [eds.], *Apuleius and Africa*, Routledge, New York; London, 2014, p. 88).

9   Traditionally it was believed that Fronto was a consul of 143 C. E. (based on Ad Marc. Caes. II, 2, 4). Due to the new archaeological findings, the date of Fronto's consulship was successfully re-examined by W. Eck and M. Roxan (ECK, W., "M. Cornelius Fronto, Lehrer Marc Aurels, consul suffectus im J. 142", in *Rheinisches Museum*, 141, 1998, S. 193–196 and ECK W., ROXAN M., "Two Military Diplomas", in FREI-STOLBA, R., SPEIDEL, M. A. (Hrsgs.), *Römische Inschriften: Neufunde, Neulesungen und Neuinterpretationen: Festschrift für Hans Lieb zum 65. Geburtstag dargebracht von seinen Freunden und Kollegen*, F. Reinhardt, Basel, 1995, pp. 55–99 (on Fronto: pp. 79–99).

10   With an exception of the Parthian War (161–166).

11   CORPUS INSCRIPTIONUM LATINARUM XV, 7398.

12   HOUT VAN DEN 1999, 256.

13   By 'publication' I mean issuing of multiple manuscript copies of the collection intended for public reading.

14   The idea that Fronto had an intention to publish his letters was proposed by Th. Mommsen and later supported by D. A. Russel (MOMMSEN, Th., "Die Chronologie der Briefe Frontos", in *Hermes* 8, 1874, S. 198–216; RUSSEL, D. A., "Greek and Latin in Antonine Literature", in RUSSEL, D. A. (ed.), *Antonine Literature*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 13 ("One

can hardly believe that […] their letters were not meant for publication"). Against see: CHAMPLIN 3 ("There is no hint that Fronto himself ever contemplated any collection of his correspondence") and GOODYEAR, F., "Rhetoric and Scholarship: Fronto", in KENNEY, E. J., CLAUSEN W. V. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, Vol. 2 (Latin Literature), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 676–677 ("These letters were probably never meant for publication or published by Fronto").

[15] With an exception of Leopardi's account: LEOPARDI, G., Discorso sopra la vita e le opere di M. Cornelio Frontone, Roma, 1816 (= *Biblioteca Italiana*, Roma, 2008). CHAMPLIN 2.

[16] Bibliotheca Ambrosiana E. 147 sup. The manuscript dates from ca 700 C. E. (HOUT VAN DEN 1988, 12).

[17] A church council held in 451 C. E. at Chalcedon, a city of Bithynia in Asia Minor, known in modern times as Kadiköy in Istanbul.

[18] Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 5750.

[19] VARDI, A. D., "Canons of Literary Texts in Ancient Rome", in FINKELBER, M., STROUMSA, G. G. (eds.), *Homer, the Bible, and Beyond: Literary and Religious Canons in the Ancient World*, Brill, Leiden; Boston, 2003, p. 131 [*Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture*, Vol. 2].

[20] MCDONALD, L. M., SANDERS, J. A., "Introduction", in McDonald, L. M., SANDERS, J. A. (eds.), *The Canon Debate*, Hendrickson Publishers, Peabody, 2002, p. 11.

[21] LIDDLE, H. G., SCOTT, R., JONES, H. S. (eds.), *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, [9]1940, s. v. (repr. 1996).

[22] Dionysius of Halicarnassus calls Lysias "the perfect model of the Attic dialect" (τῆς Ἀττικῆς γλώττης ἄριστος κανών – Lys. 2) (MONTANARI, F., "Kanon", in CANCIK, H., SCHNEIDER, H., LANDFESTER, M. (Hrsgs.), *Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike*, Bd 6, J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart; Weimer, 1999, Sp. 249–250). In the 9th century Photius speaks of writers who can be a 'canon' (standard) for others in a particular genre: Thucydides is, for example, a model for Cassius Dio (Bibl. 35 b 33) (EASTERLING, P., "Canon", in HORNBLOWER, S., SPAWFORTH, A. (eds.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, [3]2005, p. 286).

[23] On canon in art see also: GEBHART, E., "Canon", in DAREMBERG Ch., SAGLIO, M. E. (éds.), *Le Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines*, T. 1, 2, Librairie Hachette, Paris, 1877, pp. 891–892.

[24] For the history of the term also see: OPPEL, H., "Κανών, Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes und seiner lateinischen Entsprechungen (regula–norma)", in *Philologus*, Suppl. 30, 4, Dieterich, Leipzig, 1937, S. 1–108.

[25] THESAURUS LINGUAE LATINAE s. v. 7. MCDONALD, L. M., SANDERS, 7. See this volume for a profound discussion of the term 'canon' applied to collections of the Holy Bible books.

[26]   PFEIFFER, R., *History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age*, Vol. 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968, p. 207.

[27]   PFEIFFER I, 206; MONTANARI 249.

[28]   Quintilian's term, 'ordo', transferred from the terms of social ranks into the literary sphere, was not favored by later authors (PFEIFFER I, 206).

[29]   Terms for selected authors are also discussed in: CURTIUS, E., TRASK, W. R. (transl.), *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, Harper Row, New York, 1953, p. 249.

[30]   PFEIFFER I, 204. See one of the first discussions of the term in: RADERMACHER, L., "Kanon", in PAULY, A. F., von, WISSOWA, G., KROLL, W., WITTE K. (Hrsgs.), *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Bd 10, J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 1919, s. v.

[31]   Preserved canons of Ancient Greek writers and grammarians are discussed at length, for example, by O. Kroehnert (*Canonesne poetarum, scriptorium, artificum per antiquitatem fuerunt?*, Diss., Officina Leupoldiana, Regimonti Pr., 1897). He also briefly touches upon earlier scholarly tradition (pp. 1–3).

[32]   This later date was proposed by Alan E. Douglas ("Cicero, Quintilian, and the Canon of Ten Attic Orators", in *Mnemosyne*, 4 Series, 9, 4, 1956, pp. 30–40). But see also Ian Worthington for an earlier dating: "The Canon of the Ten Greek Orators", in WORTHINGTON, I. (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*, Routledge, London, 1994, p. 244. The author argues that the compilation of the canon "can be placed in the period between Cicero and Quintilian" and believes that an Atticist Caecilius of Caleacte, a contemporary of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the author of the treatise "On the style of the Ten Orators," would be the most plausible author (p. 259). Amiel Vardi hesitates between the version of a Pergamene provenance (in the second century B. C. E.) and I. Worthington's proposal (VARDI 141).

[33]   GORAK, J., *The Making of the Modern Canon: Genesis and Crisis of a Literary Idea*, Athlone Press, London, 1991, p. 51.

[34]   "Ex magna oratorum copia tamquam in canonem decem dumtaxat rettulerunt" [sc. Aristarchus et Aristophanes Byzantius] (RUHNKEN, D. (ed.), *Rutilii Lupi De figures senttentiarum et elocutionis duo libri*, Luchmans, Leiden, 1768, p. XCV).

[35]   VARDI 131.

[36]   PFEIFFER I, 205.

[37]   See a discussion of preserved fragments in: WITTY, F. J., "The *Pinakes* of Callimachus", in *The Library Quarterly*, 28, 2, Apr., 1958, pp. 132–136. Also: WITTY, F. J., "The Other *Pinakes* and Reference Works of Callimachus", in *The Library Quarterly*, 43, 3, Jul., 1973, pp. 237–244.

[38]   VARDI 134.

[39]   TLL, s. v. II, c, 3. Cicero also mentions an 'index' of tragedians (Hort. fr. 8 – Grilli), while Seneca that of philosophers (Epist. 39, 2).

[40] Mentioned in Inst. X, 1, 54.

[41] Passages of Quintilian are quoted from H. E. Butler's translation: QUINTILIAN, BUTLER, H. E. (transl.), *The "Institutio oratoria"*, 4 Vol., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1920 [*The Loeb Classical Library*].

[42] HÄGG, T., "Canon Formation in Greek Literary Culture", in THOMASSEN, E. (ed.), *Canon and Canonicity: The Formation and Use of Scripture*, Museum Tusculanum Press, Copenhagen, 2010, p. 109.

[43] HÄGG *ibid.*

[44] SANDNES, K. O., *The Gospel "According to Homer and Virgil": Cento and Canon*, Brill, Leiden, 2011, p. 45, n. 53 [*Supplementum to Novum Testamentum*, 138].

[45] See tables in: VARDI 151–152.

[46] These were Archilochus, Simonides of Amorgos, and Hipponax.

[47] MOST, G., "Canon Fathers: Literacy, Morality, Power" in *Arion*, 3rd Series, 1, 1, 1990, pp. 35–60, p. 55.

[48] Marcus Aper in Tacitus' "Dialogue on oratory" (Dial. 10, 4) mentions epigrams among other literary genres that should be practiced by poetry, which is, according to him, a part of eloquence. On this wider sense of 'eloquentia' as "artistic language" see: BERG, C. S., VAN DEN, *The world of Tacitus' "Dialogus de Oratoribus": Aesthetics and Empire in Ancient Rome*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 146.

[49] Vardi reasonably explains this by the fact that epigrams "came to be a significant literary fact type after the generic scheme of canons was established" (VARDI 145).

[50] VARDI 140.

[51] KENNEDY, G., *Quintilian*, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1969, p. 106 [*Twayne's World Autors Series* 59].

[52] O'SULLIVAN, N., "Caecilius, the 'Canons' of Writers, and the Origins of Atticism", in Dominick, W. J. (ed.), *Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature*, Routledge, London, New York, 1997, p. 27.

[53] VARDI 135.

[54] VARDI 141.

[55] CRIBIORE, R. "Review of: Morgan Teresa «Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds», Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998", in *Bryn Mawr Classical Review*, 1999.05.22.

[56] MORGAN, T., *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 67 ff. (especially 71–73).

[57] PARSONS, P., "Review of: Ιμπραχημ, Μ.-Χ. Ἡ Ἑλληνορωμαϊκή Παιδεία ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ […] Ἀθῆναι, 1972", in *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, 61, 1975, p. 301.

[58] Problems concerning formal organization of school education under the Empire are thoroughly discussed by KASTER, R. A., "Notes on «Primary»

and «Secondary» Schools in Late Antiquity", in *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 113, 1983, pp. 323–346. See especially P. 337 (for the scheme) and P. 339 (for Quintilian's account).

[59] KENNEY, E. J., "Books and Readers in the Roman World", in KENNEY, E. J., CLAUSEN, W. V. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, Vol. 2 (Latin Literature), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, p. 7.

[60] KENNEY *ibid.*; VARDI 142.

[61] Until 1815 they were erroneously ascribed to M. Cornelius Fronto.

[62] KEIL (ed.), *Grammatici Latini*, VII, 449–514.

[63] DOMINIK, W. J., "The style is the man: Seneca, Tacitus and Quintilian's canon", in DOMINIK, W. J. (ed.), *Roman Eloquence. Rhetoric in Society and Literature*, Routledge, London, 1997, p. 42.

[64] KENNEDY 1969, 106.

[65] There is only one treatise preserved that dates before Quintilian and that discusses merits of Greek literary genres – "De imitatione" by Dionysius of Halicarnassus who flourished during the reign of Augustus.

[66] KENNEDY 1969, 108.

[67] FARREL, J., "Apuleius and the Classical Canon", in LEE, B. T., FINKELPEARL, E., GRAVERINI L. (eds.), *Apuleius and Africa*, Routledge, New York; London, 2014, p. 78, n. 10 [*Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies*].

[68] DOMINIK 42.

[69] CHAMPLIN 119.

[70] HAINES I, XXXV–XXXVII; KENNEDY 1969, 599; STEINMETZ, P., *Untersuchungen zur römischen Literatur des zweiten Jahrhunderts nach Christi Geburt*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1982, S. 174–175.

[71] CHAMPLIN 118.

[72] See, for example, Ad Marc. Caes. III, 13, 2; Ad Marc. Caes. IV, 2, 6; Ad Marc. Caes. III, 19, 2; Ad Ant. Imp. III, 8, 2 etc.

[73] See, for example, G. Kennedy: "Fronto was not a sophist, nor a professional teacher but a Roman orator who was interested in sophistry and rhetoric and became a tutor" (KENNEDY 1969, 594; see also 597: "[…] Fronto was not a rhetorician, in the sense that Quintilian, for example was").

[74] "If a salary was involved, allusions to it are discreetly veiled" (KENNEDY 1969, 599).

[75] As Fronto, Quintilian was made tutor at the imperial palace and in 90 C. E. he began to teach Domitian's two grand-nephews and heirs. But unlike Fronto's, Quintilian's pupils "vanished into exile" (MURPHY, J. (ed.), *Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing: Translations from Books One, Two, and Ten of the "Institutio Oratoria"*, Southern Illinois University Press, Edwardville, 1987, p. XX).

[76] Inst. I, 2, 1 ss.; II, 3, 10.

[77]   On Fronto's 'contubernium' see: JOHNSON, W. A., *Readers and Reading Culture in the High Roman Empire: A Study of Elite Communities*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 137–156; RICHLIN, A., "Old Boys: Teacher–Student Bonding in Roman Oratory", in *The Classical World*, 105, 1, Fall 2011, pp. 98–99.

[78]   Such as Cornelianus Sulpicius (Ad amic. I, 2) and Licinius Montanus (Ad amic. I, 3).

[79]   HAINES I, XL.

[80]   KENNEDY 1969, 602; JOHNSON 145.

[81]   JOHNSON *ibid.*

[82]   KENNEDY, G., *A History of Rhetoric: The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World (300 B. C. – A. D. 300)*, Vol. II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1972, p. 592.

[83]   See, for example: SCHANZ, M. (bearb. v. C. HOSIUS und G. KRÜGER), *Geschichte der römischen Literatur bis zum Gesetzgebungswerk des Kaisers Justinian, 3 Teil: Die Zeit von Hadrian 117 bis auf Constantin 324*, Beck, München, ³1922, S. 88–100; TEUFFEL, W. S. (bearb. v. W. KROLL und F. SKUTSCH), *Geschichte der römischen Literatur: Die Literatur von 96 nach Chr. bis zum Ausgange des Altertums*, 3 Bd, Teubner, Berlin, ⁶1913, S. 73–77; D'ALTON, J. F., *Roman Literary Criticism: A Study in Tendencies*, Russell & Russell, New York, 1931, p. 318; LEEMAN, A. D., *Orationis ratio: The Stylistic Theories and Practice of the Roman Orators, Historians, and Philosophers*, Vol. 1, Adolf M. Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1963, p. 366; KENNEDY 1969, 598; WILLIAMS, G., *Change and Decline: Roman Literature in the Early Empire,* University of California Press, Berkley; Los Angeles; London, 1978, p. 307; KASULKE, Chr. T., *Fronto, Marc Aurel und kein Konflikt zwischen Rhetorik und Philosophie im 2. Jh. n. Chr.*, Saur, München; Leipzig, 2005, p. 280 [*Beiträge zur Altertumskunde* Bd 218] and others.

[84]   NORDEN, E., *Die antike Kunsprosa*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, ⁵1958, S. 361.

[85]   Scriptores Historiae Augustae, VH 16, 6.

[86]   See note 83.

[87]   CHAMPLIN 52.

[88]   *Ibid.*

[89]   CHAMPLIN 59.

[90]   SCHINDEL, U., "Archaismus als Epochenbegriff: Zum Selbverständnis des 2. Jhr.", in *Hermes*, 122, 1994, S. 327–341.

[91]   At the same time, we know that an interest in old authors was not a total novelty for the Roman society and its traces could be found already in Augustan literature. On archaist tastes of the first century B. C. E. and first century C. E. see, for example, Suet. Gramm. 24; Sen. Epist. 58, 3–4; 108, 33–34; Plin. N. H. praef. 22; Plin. Epist. I, 16, 2); LEEMAN I, 182; JOCELYN, H. D., "Studies in the Indirect Tradition of Plautus' «Pseudolus». III The

«Archaising Movement», Republican Comedy and Aulus Gellius «Noctes Atticae»", in HORSFALL, N. (ed.), *Vir bonus dicendi peritus: Studies in Celebration of Otto Skutsch's 80th Birthday,* pp. 60–62 [*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, Suppl. 51, 1988]

92   LEEMAN I, 62; SCHINDEL 327–341; SWAIN, S. "Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Antonine Rome: Apuleius, Fronto, and Gellius", in *The Worlds of Aulus Gellius*, HOLFORD-STREVENS, L., VARDI, A. D. (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 17–18.

93   L. Holford-Strevens speaks about "an atmosphere" that attracted Fronto to early writers (HOLFORD-STREVENS, L., *Aulus Gellius: An Antonine Scholar and his Achievement*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 356).

94   MARACHE, R., *La critique littéraire de langue latine et le développement du goût archaisant au IIe siècle de notre ère*, Plihon, Rennes, 1952, 119; 8, n. 1. See also: HERTZ, M., *Renaissance und Rococo in der römischen Literatur: Ein Vortrag im wissenschaftlichen Verein zu Berlin am 25. März 1865 gehalten*, W. Hertz, Berlin, 1865, S. 29; BOMPAIRE, J., *Lucien écrivain: imitation et création*, Boccard, Paris, 1958, pp. 110–111; BOWIE, E., "Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic", in FINLEY, M. I. (ed.), *Studies in Ancient Society*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London; Boston, 1974, p. 167.

95   This was first proposed by E. Norden (⁵1958, I, 361). See also: RUSSEL, D. A., "Greek and Latin in Antonine Literature", in RUSSEL, D. A. (ed.), *Antonine Literature*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 13.

96   HOLFORD-STREVENS, 2003, 361.

97   HOLFORD-STREVENS, L., *Aulus Gellius: An Antonine Scholar and his Achievement*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 3.

98   On the term see, for example: BOWERSOCK, G., *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969 and others.

99   HOLFORD-STREVENS 1988, 3.

100   See, for example, Fronto "De eloquentia" 2, 19 ("ut […] prisco verbo adornares, colorem vetusculum adpingeres").

101   He uses the term 'Manierismus' (FRAENKEL, E., *Kleine Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie*, Bd 2. Edizioni di storia e letteratura, Roma, 1964, S. 340). Fraenkel's interpretation is followed by Holford-Strevens (2003, 6; 354). Already in the nineteenth century M. Hertz compared Fronto's age with "rococo" (HERTZ 26).

102   One can say though that "De orationibus" and "De eloquentia", in which Fronto discusses rhetoric principals, take intermediate position between letters and theoretical works.

103   See especially Ad Marc. Caes. IV, 3; Ad Ant. Imp. III, 1; Ad Ver. Imp. II, 1, 14; "De orationibus"; "De eloquentia".

104   Such as C. Gracchus, Accius, Naevius, Lucilius, Caecilius, Laberius, and some others.

105   Fronto calls Ennius "many sided" (multiformis – De eloq. I, 2).

[106] STEINMETZ 185.

[107] See, for example, Ad Marc. Caes. II, 5, 1; 8, 5; Ad Marc. Caes. III, 19; Ad Ant. Imp. IV, 1, 3 etc. In a few preserved letters from Lucius Verus to Fronto the former does not mention his teacher's favourite authors, but it seems plausible to imply that his literary tastes could hardly vary from that of his tutor and brother.

[108] This demonstrative rejection contrasts with a later account of Aulus Gellius who describes Fronto quoting Virgil (N. A. II, 11–12; 18). But this can be, of course, a reflection of Gellius' own adoration for Virgil (HOLFORD-STREVENS, L., "M. Cornelius Fronto", in HORNBLOWER, S., SPAWFORTH, A. (eds.), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, ³2005, s. v.).

[109] Fronto's praise of Horace is over exaggerated by D'Alton (321).

[110] At the same time, he mentions historian L. Coelius Antipater among poets (Ad Marc. Caes. IV, 3, 2).

[111] The quotation "Orator est, Marce fili, vir bonus dicendi peritus" is preserved in Sen. Con. 1, praef. 9. The popularity of Cato's saying can be well illustrated by its reverse form applied by a certain Herennius Senecio to an Asianist M. Aquilius Regulus: "Orator est vir malus dicendi imperitus" (Plin. Epist. IV, 7, 5).

[112] DOMINIK 47.

[113] *Ibid.*

[114] A poet M. Annaeus Lucanus, Seneca's nephew, is charged with the same faults (De orat. 6).

[115] At the same time, Seneca and Lucan are the only "moderns" ever discussed by Fronto.

[116] The same variant occurs in a letter to Aufidius Victorinus (Ad amic. I, 14, 2).

[117] VAN DEN HOUT 1999, 52.

[118] HAINES I, XXXI–XXXII.

[119] One can compare the gloss belonging to m^2, which specifies that "iam M. Tullius summum supremimque os Romanae linguae fuit" (Ad Ver. Imp. II, 1, 14).

[120] VAN DEN HOUT 1999, 420.

[121] For details of this trial see: VAN DEN HOUT 1999, 94–97 and RICHLIN, A., *Marcus Aurelius in Love: Marcus Aurelius and Marcus Cornelius Fronto*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006, p. 55.

[122] The trial is discussed in Ad Marc. Caes. II, 2–6.

[123] VAN DEN HOUT 1999, 106.

[124] BROCK, M. D., *Studies in Fronto and His Age*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911, p. 141.

[125] For rhythm in Fronto see an old but still valuable article: BELTRAMI, A., "Il numerus e Frontone", in *Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica*, 36, 4, 1908, pp. 545–566.

[126] On Ciceronian clausulae see: ZIELINSKI, Th., *Das Clauselgesetz in Ciceros Reden*, Dieterichsche Verlag-Buchhandlung, Leipzig, 1904; WILKINSON, L. P., *Golden Latin Artistry*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1963, pp. 148–149; 156.

[127] By 'clausula' I mean here "the metrical pattern of the word(s) or part of a word ending a rhythmical colon, a rhetorical colon, or a sentence" (HABINEK, T. N., *The Colometry of Latin Prose*, University of California Press, Berkley; Los Angeles; London, 1981, p. 203 [*Classical Studies* 25].

[128] VAN DEN HOUT 1999, 232.

[129] (tua oratio) moverit ($\smile\smile$) $- - \smile \smile - \smile -$

[130] Fronto's passage is treated as "de iis, quae litteris, verbis concipiuntur" (TLL s. v. forma).

[131] De eloq. I, 2; II, 12; IV, 4. See also Marcus' letter: Ad Ant. Imp. IV, 1, 3.

[132] On this work see, for example: SCHANZ, M., *Geschichte der römischen Literatur bis zum Gesetzgebungswerk des Kaisers Justinian*, Teil I, C. H. Beck, München, [4]1927, p. 533; STONE, A. M., "A House of Notoriety: An Episode in the Campaign for the Consulate in 64 B. C.", in *The Classical Quarterly*, NS 48, 2, 1998, pp. 487–491.

[133] These are to be implicitly understood as Fronto's requirements which a good letter should meet.

[134] LEEMAN I, 368.

[135] HOUT VAN DEN 1999, 150.

[136] He is also of opinion that it is better not to study philosophy at all than to be a half-baked expert (Ad Marc. Caes. IV, 1).

[137] On Cicero's polemics with Atticists see: HENDRICKSON, G. L., "Cicero's Correspondence with Brutus and Calvus on Oratorical Style" in *The American Journal of Philology*, 47, 3, 1926, pp. 234–258 and GRUEN, E. S., "Cicero and Licinius Calvus" in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 71, 1967, pp. 215–233.

[138] See the words of Crassus in "De oratore" (III, 93): "Verborum eligendorum et conlocandorum et concludendorum facilis est vel ratio vel sine ratione ipsa exercitatio; rerum est silva magna […]"

[139] FANTHAM, E., "Latin Criticism of the Early Empire", in KENNEDY, G. A. (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the Literary Criticism*, Vol. I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 293.

[140] According to L. Holford-Strevens, he was born between 125 and 128 C. E. (HOLFORD-STREVENS 1988, 12).

[141] JACOB, C., "«La table et le cercle»: Sociabilites savantes sous l'Empire romain", in *Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 3, 2005, pp. 507–530.

142 II, 26; XIII, 29; XIX 8; 10; 13.
143 XIX, 8. Titles of chapters of the book XIX are not preserved.
144 He is described as "a well-educated man and a famous poet of the time" ("Bene eruditus homo et tum poeta inlustris" – XIX, 8, 1).
145 Compare note 27.
146 The passage was first discussed by: CURTIUS, E., TRASK, W. R. (transl.), *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, Harper Row, New York, 1953, pp. 249–250). See also HOLFORD-STREVENS (2003, 135, n. 35). On this chapter in general: PUGLIARELLI, M., "Aulo Gellio, Cesare e due morfemi desinenziali", in *Civiltà classica e Cristiana*, 14, 1993, pp. 293–312.
147 SCHINDEL 335.
148 On the difference between Fronto's and Gellius' literary tastes see: HOLFORD-STREVENS 2003, 135–136.

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MARCO CASSIOLI

né en 1973, à Asti (Italie)

Docteur en Histoire, Université d'Aix-Marseille (France) et Université de Turin (Italie)

Thèse : *Uno spazio di confine tra Liguria e Provenza: la Val Nervia nel basso medioevo e nella prima età moderna (secoli XII-XVII)* / *Une vallée frontière entre Provence et Ligurie : la Nervia au Moyen Âge et dans le premier Âge moderne (XIIᵉ-XVIIᵉ siècle)*

Chercheur associé au Laboratoire Telemme de l'Université d'Aix-Marseille

Participation à séminaires, conférences et colloques internationaux en France, Italie, Roumanie et Suisse

Articles d'histoire, d'anthropologie et de linguistique dans des revues universitaires, comme *Provence Historique*, *Rives Méditerranéennes*, le *Bollettino storico-bibliografico subalpino* et le *Bollettino dell'Atlante Linguistico Italiano*

Livre :
Ai confini occidentali della Liguria. Castel Vittorio dal medioevo alla Resistenza, Imperia, Comune di Castel Vittorio, 2006

UNE VILLE MARCHANDE AUX BOUCHES DU DANUBE : KILIA, DE LA DOMINATION GENOISE A LA CONQUETE OTTOMANE (XIVe-XVe SIECLE)[1]

Résumé

L'article se propose de reconstituer le rôle de Kilia dans la vie économique de l'Europe orientale au bas Moyen Âge. Il considère plus précisément le devenir de ce comptoir de la deuxième moitié du XIVe siècle, quand il se trouve aux mains de la commune de Gênes, à son intégration à l'Empire ottoman, sur la fin du XVe siècle (1484). Pendant la période envisagée, la vocation marchande de la ville évolue considérablement. Sous la domination génoise, Kilia devient l'un des comptoirs où les esclaves, le grain, la cire et le miel des rives septentrionales de la Mer Noire sont embarqués vers Péra, Constantinople et Gênes. Sous le gouvernement moldave, elle se transforme en marché international du poisson, exporté avant tout en Pologne, mais aussi en Transylvanie. La conquête ottomane, si traumatisante, favorise toutefois énormément l'économie locale : à la fin du XVIIe siècle, Kilia est devenue le plus important lieu de pêche le long du Danube. Sur le marché de la ville, on peut trouver chaque jour au moins mille deux cents grands esturgeons et silures glanes, ainsi que du caviar. Les acheteurs viennent de Constantinople, de la Pologne, de la Hongrie et de la Moldavie.

Mots clefs : Europe orientale, Moyen Âge, Gênes, Empire ottoman, Mer Noire, Péra, Constantinople, Pologne, Transylvanie, Hongrie, Moldavie.

Introduction

Kilia, port du delta du Danube, aujourd'hui ukrainien, a été pendant des siècles l'un des plus importants centres commerciaux de l'aire danubienne. Habitat byzantin, comptoir génois, place forte moldave puis ottomane, Kilia a joué, de l'époque médiévale aux temps modernes, un rôle de premier plan dans la vie économique de l'Europe orientale.

Il n'y a pourtant aucune étude récente qui reconstitue, de manière exhaustive, son histoire. L'unique monographie disponible demeure celle du grand historien roumain Nicolae Iorga, donnée en 1899[2]. Pour contribuer à combler cette lacune, mon article se propose de restituer une image vivante de Kilia au bas Moyen Âge. Il s'étend plus exactement de la deuxième moitié du XIVe siècle, quand le comptoir se trouvait au pouvoir de la commune de Gênes, à la fin du XVe, lorsqu'il fut conquis par l'armée de Bayezid II, soit en 1484. La présente recherche vise, en particulier, à mettre en lumière la vocation marchande de l'habitat et à suivre son évolution au cours du temps.

Pour situer et comprendre l'histoire de Kilia, il a été nécessaire de croiser les sources génoises –les plus nombreuses– avec celles byzantines, moldaves et bulgares. Leur analyse a été accompagnée par un travail sur le lexique : du latin médiéval, comme du grec byzantin et du slavon. Cet effort a permis de proposer, dans certains cas, une nouvelle interprétation des documents. La bibliographie, assez vaste et en plusieurs langues, a été rassemblée auprès des bibliothèques italiennes, roumaines et bulgares[3]. Mes lectures sont parties des ouvrages de Laura Balletto et de Geo Pistarino, deux historiens qui ont dédié une partie significative de leur production scientifique à l'Orient génois et, donc, aux colonies du delta danubien. Sur la base des actes de Kilia publiés par Geo Pistarino et Michel Balard[4], Laura Balletto a parfait, avant tout, notre connaissance de l'activité du port et de la typologie des navires. Elle a ensuite considéré la carrière des consuls et d'autres fonctionnaires actifs dans l'administration du comptoir, et enfin la personnalité du notaire qui a rédigé les actes qui nous sont parvenus : Antonio di Ponzò, originaire de la Ligurie du Levant[5]. À partir des mêmes sources, Geo Pistarino a reconstitué en détail la vie sociale, économique et financière de Kilia à l'époque génoise[6].

D'un point de vue méthodologique, les suggestions majeures me sont venues des travaux sur la ville médiévale dans le bassin pontique et dans la Mer d'Azov. J'adresse surtout aux essais de Michel Balard sur Caffa, de Natalia Mikhaïlovna Bogdanova sur Cherson et de Lorenzo Pubblici sur Tana[7]. Des comparaisons ont été effectuées tant sur le plan synchronique (entre Kilia et d'autres colonies génoises de la Mer Noire) que sur le plan diachronique (entre la Kilia génoise et celle moldave). Au total, l'attention prêtée aux structures n'est pas plus grande que celle accordée aux protagonistes de la vie économique et sociale : marchands, prêteurs, courtiers, notaires et interprètes, pour l'époque génoise ; princes, boyards

et pêcheurs, pour l'époque moldave. De fait, comme Gabriella Airaldi l'a écrit, *fare la storia della città è fare la storia degli uomini*[8].

Avant de procéder à l'étude de la ville, il faut reconstituer, en quelques mots, le contexte dans lequel les acteurs de notre histoire ont vécu : celui du Danube et de son delta, espace frontière entre les cultures grecque, latine, slave et turque.

Le Danube, frontière de la chrétienté

Le *Danubius fluvius* marquait dès l'époque impériale la limite entre le monde gréco-romain et celui des « étrangers » (en latin, *barbari*)[9]. Il devint, après l'invasion tatare de 1241-1242, l'une des frontières de la chrétienté. Les sources hongroises et polonaises sont, à ce propos, fort éloquentes. Dans une lettre de Béla IV au pape Innocent IV, que l'on peut dater entre 1247 et 1254, le roi magyar souligne que les Mongols menacent non la seule Hongrie, mais tous les pays catholiques. En bref, le Danube paraît la dernière barrière entre le monde païen et le monde chrétien. L'historienne Nora Berend conclut de fait son analyse de la missive du monarque hongrois de la sorte :

> Il est révélateur que le roi ne parle pas des montagnes des Carpates, ni des *gyepű* (marches), zone de défense située dans la partie orientale de la Hongrie, mais choisisse ce fleuve qui coule au milieu du royaume. Sans doute l'expérience récente, mentionnée par Béla IV, de la halte momentanée des Mongols aux rives du Danube contribua-t-elle à ce choix. Mais il y avait là, également, une liaison symbolique permettant de renforcer l'effet de menace que le roi voulait mettre au centre de sa lettre. Attila avait eu jadis sa capitale sur le Danube ; c'est là un point que le roi ne laisse pas d'exploiter. L'évocation du seul nom de ce chef hun, en effet, ne manquait pas de résonances en Occident. Comme Béla IV le souligne, Attila était venu de l'Est pour soumettre l'Ouest, et il avait choisi de s'établir dans des terres qui devinrent ensuite partie du royaume hongrois[10].

L'image du fleuve comme limite entre le monde chrétien et celui des nomades émerge aussi de la *Chronica Poloniae maioris*. Au chapitre 71 de ce texte anonyme qui remonte au XIVe siècle, on lit que le khan Batu se retira au-delà du Danube, après avoir dévasté la Hongrie et cruellement massacré ses habitants[11].

Au XIVe siècle, à la suite de la conversion des Tatars de la Horde d'Or à la religion musulmane, cette importante voie fluviale devint une frontière entre la chrétienté et l'islam[12]. Elle continua de jouer ce rôle après la conquête turque des Balkans[13], à savoir de la chute du Second Empire bulgare en 1396 à 1878 quand, grâce à l'énième guerre entre les Russes et les Ottomans, un État bulgare se reconstitua[14].

Du XVe au XIXe siècle, les sources qui représentent le Danube comme une frontière entre la croix et le croissant se multiplient : lettres, chroniques et mémoires, cartes et descriptions géographiques, dessins, estampes et tableaux, jusqu'aux premières photographies. Les documents sur les opérations militaires de part et d'autre du fleuve sont sans doute les plus éloquents. Retenons, par exemple, ceux qui concernent les campagnes des princes de Transylvanie et de Valachie contre les Turcs, à la fin du XVIe siècle, depuis leurs préparatifs. À ce propos, dans un discours daté de 1595, le gentilhomme ragusain Paolo Giorgi suggère au prince de Transylvanie, Sigismond Ier Báthory, la saison la meilleure pour envahir la Bulgarie. Il s'agit, pour lui, de l'hiver, après l'embâcle du Danube par les glaces :

> Però se l'Altezza Vostra ha voglia d'aquistare la Bulgaria, che stende dalla bocca del Danubio sino alle radici del monte Emos, che serra detto regno, et rovinare il Paese del Turco, quale gé di là dal monte, penetrando sino a Andrinopoli […], ordini e comandi alla sua gente che con quella maggior prestezza sia possibile si incamminino a quella parte del Danubio mentre vi è la commodità del diaccio[15].

Ce conseil n'était pas si original. En 1474, le Danube totalement gelé avait été traversé par l'armée ottomane, en marche vers la Moldavie d'Étienne le Grand[16]. Un autre document n'est pas moins suggestif. Il s'agit d'une lettre, datée de 1596, dans laquelle Sigismond Báthory décrit au grand-duc de Toscane, son allié, une incursion de mercenaires valaques en Bulgarie :

> Hogi è venuto un corriere di Valachia che porta nuova che 1200 haiduchi erano passati il Dannubio, et passati alquanto inanzi havevano preso la città di Plevia[17] menando pregione la moglie del governatore di essa città con molti altri turchi di qualità e iudei molto richi, mettendo a sacco e fuoco ogni cosa. Et se bene nel ritornare furono affrontati da' turchi di Nicopoli, tuttavia sono restati superiori, con haver tagliato a pezzi buon

numero di loro. Et si sono tornati con preda in Valachia, havendo persi delli suoi non più che quatro soli[18].

Sur les mêmes lieux trois siècles plus tard, les armées russe et roumaine, d'un côté, et l'armée turque, de l'autre, réglaient l'avenir des Balkans. Un artiste, cette fois, nous donne une image saisissante du Danube comme fleuve frontière : Nikolaï Dmitriev-Orenbourgski (1837-1898), professeur à l'Académie Impériale des Beaux-Arts de Saint-Pétersbourg et spécialiste de scènes de batailles. Dans un tableau, peint en 1883 et conservé aujourd'hui au Musée de l'Artillerie de Saint-Pétersbourg, il représente la dangereuse traversée du fleuve par l'armée russe, le 15 juin 1877 [**Fig. 1**]. D'autres œuvres célèbres de Dmitriev-Orenbourgski sont dédiées au siège de Pleven et à la capitulation des Turcs à Nikopol, événements cruciaux de la guerre de 1877-1878[19]. Dans les Balkans « poudrière de l'Europe », où le passé semble se répéter, les mêmes lieux deviennent le théâtre de faits chaque fois plus dramatiques. À la suite de l'ascension de la Russie, championne de l'Orthodoxie et Troisième Rome, au XIXe siècle, la traversée du Danube se lie indissolublement à l'ambition tsariste de libérer Constantinople des Turcs[20].

Néanmoins, hors les périodes de guerre, le fleuve ne représentait pas une barrière mais, au contraire, une voie de communication majeure entre l'Europe centrale et la Mer Noire, un axe d'échange pour les marchandises de l'Orient et de l'Occident[21]. À l'échelle locale aussi, il jouait un rôle essentiel pour l'économie des régions situées le long de ses rives, où la population vivait principalement de commerce, de pêche et d'agriculture. Le premier document valaque qui mentionne le Danube comme frontière, daté de 1497, est à cet égard significatif. En exemptant de toute taxe le monastère Saint-Nicolas de Târgșor, le prince Radu le Grand citait, en particulier, les octrois sur les tonneaux de vin que les moines auraient achetés soit aux vignobles, soit à Târgoviște (la capitale du pays) ou au-delà du Danube :

Și după acéia, i-am slobozit domniia mea în țara domnii méle, orice vor cumpăra sau ce vor vinde, nicăiri vamă ca să nu plătească, nici la un loc: nici la cîmpu vamă, nici la vaduri, nici la plaiuri vame, nici la tîrguri, nici la un lac, și de la Severin pînă la Brăila. Și după acéia, ori cîte buți vor cumpăra, ori dă podgorie, ori dă la Tîrgoviște sau dă păste Dunăre, nimeni, nici la un loc, nimic să cutéze a-i bîntui, nici dă părpăr, pentru că i-am ertat domniia mea, ca pă niște rugători ai domnii méle și ai părinților domnii méle, fiind la biserica domnii méle[22].

En ce qui concerne l'importance du fleuve pour l'économie du sud-est de l'Europe et du bassin de la Méditerranée, l'un des dossiers les plus riches est certainement représenté par les 211 actes que le notaire génois Antonio di Ponzò a rédigés à Kilia entre 1360 et 1361[23]. Le médiéviste Robert-Henri Bautier, auquel on doit la découverte de ce fonds, le jugeait en 1948 comme le « plus important dossier d'actes privés qui nous soit parvenu de la Roumanie médiévale ».[24] À travers ces documents, il est possible de reconstituer la physionomie d'une petite ville fluviale à la confluence des mondes byzantin, latin et tatare, de l'Europe orthodoxe, catholique et musulmane, à la veille de la conquête turque des Balkans.

Du comptoir génois à la ville ottomane

D'après les actes d'Antonio di Ponzò, la Kilia des Génois se trouvait le long d'un bras du Danube qui prenait son nom de la ville : *sumaria* ou *flumen Chili*[25]. Il peut se reconnaître comme le cours le plus septentrional du delta, qui conserve aujourd'hui le nom de « Bras de Kilia ». Selon une tradition, l'habitat se dressait où demeure actuellement le village de Chilia Veche, c'est-à-dire sur la rive roumaine du fleuve, face à la ville devenue ukrainienne de Kilia (en roumain, Chilia Nouă), de l'autre côté du Danube. Cette ville aurait été construite, selon une autre tradition, par Étienne III (1433-1504), prince de Moldavie, dit « Le Grand »[26]. Toutefois, les fouilles entreprises par les archéologues roumains à Chilia Veche n'ont pas identifié de vestiges médiévaux[27]. Au reste, les chroniqueurs qui relatent les événements du temps d'Étienne le Grand n'écrivent pas que le prince avait bâti une ville neuve, mais qu'il avait simplement entouré Kilia d'une enceinte (1479)[28]. L'habitat, par conséquent, existait déjà. De plus, un document original, conservé aux Archives Nationales de la Roumanie et daté de 1446, montre que la ville était contrôlée par la Moldavie avant l'ascension au trône d'Étienne le Grand, en 1457 [**Fig. 2**][29]. Pour toutes ces raisons, il est probable que l'ancien comptoir génois, qui n'était pas fortifié, se trouvait où se tient aujourd'hui la Kilia ukrainienne[30]. Les premières fortifications du lieu auraient été construites par les Moldaves, afin de protéger leur frontière méridionale contre l'avancée ottomane.

Pour ce qui concerne la topographie de l'habitat à l'époque génoise, les actes d'Antonio di Ponzò mentionnent :

- une place (*platea*)
- une ruelle (*carubeus*)
- vingt-cinq maisons d'habitation (*domus, domus habitacionis*)
- quatre cours (*cortigium domus*)
- l'atelier d'un tailleur (*apotheca sartorie*)
- quatre bancs de prêteurs d'argent (*banchum bancherii*)
- trois dépôts de marchandise (*magassenum*)
- la loge des Génois (*logia communis Ianue, logia Ianuensium*)
- la cour de justice du consulat (*curia consulatus, curia Ianuensis*)
- l'église Saint-Jean « des Grecs » (*ecclesia Sancti Iohannis Grecharum*)
- un four (*furnum*)
- un abattoir (*macelum*)
- un moulin (*molendinum*)
- le fleuve (*sumaria, flumen*)
- un petit chantier naval (*uscharium*)
- les quais pour le chargement et le déchargement des marchandises (*ad sporzorias*)

Les bancs des prêteurs, les dépôts et les quais sont révélateurs de la vocation marchande du lieu. Elle trouve une parfaite confirmation dans les trois mots les plus fréquents dans nos sources : *banchum* (banc de prêteur), *lignum* (bateau) et *sumaria* (fleuve). Ils figurent respectivement dans 124, 97 et 81 des actes rédigés par Antonio di Ponzò[31]. L'église orthodoxe dédiée à saint Jean montre combien l'élément grec de la population était important, aux côtés des Ligures.

Du point de vue juridique, l'habitat dépendait, probablement, de la plus grande ville de Licostomo qui, d'après les actes génois, se trouvait le long d'un autre bras du delta. Comme celui de Kilia, ce bras aussi prenait son nom de la ville : *sumaria* ou *flumen Licostomi*[32]. L'existence d'une liaison étroite entre les deux lieux émerge des expressions *actum in Chili Licostomi* et *actum Chili Licostomi*, contenues dans les actes[33]. Elles rappellent les formules à travers lesquelles, dans la Ligurie médiévale et moderne, on indiquait la dépendance d'un village à l'égard d'un centre plus grand. Par exemple, dans les sources de la Riviera du Ponant, les hameaux de Vintimille étaient appelés *ville Vintimilii* ; et le village de Coldirodi, qui se situait sur la commune de Sanremo, se nommait *Colla Sancti Romuli*[34]. L'emploi du génitif laisse donc croire à la subordination de Kilia par rapport à Licostomo.

En effet, cette ville était un centre majeur. Quand Kilia se contentait d'un consul, elle était résidence d'un gouverneur. Sa physionomie émerge

d'ailleurs des 16 actes rédigés sur place par les notaires Domenico da Carignano (1373) et Oberto Grassi da Voltri (1383-1384). Ils mentionnent l'île (*insulla Licostomi*) où se trouvait l'habitat fortifié (*castrum Licostomi*), avec sa porte et son fossé (*extra portam castri Licostomi intra fossum*). Apparaissent également la voie publique (*via publica*), six maisons (*domus, domus habitacionis*), la loge de la commune (*logia communis*), la chancellerie des gouverneurs (*cancellaria dominorum gubernatorum*), la résidence du consul avec sa cour (*in curtilio communis habitacionis domini consulis*), l'église Saint-Dominique (*ecclesia Sancti Dominici de Licostomo*), l'église Saint-François (*ecclesia Sancti Francisci de Licostomo*)[35]. La présence d'une galère pour la défense de l'île (*gallea ad custodiam insulle Licostomi deputata*) nous révèle que l'habitat conservait la fonction de port militaire qu'il assurait dès l'époque byzantine[36].

Les églises appartenant aux ordres mendiants des dominicains et des franciscains, à côté des édifices qui accueillaient les représentants de la métropole (le gouverneur, le consul) faisaient de Licostomo un centre de pouvoir à la fois civil et religieux. L'ensemble de ces bâtiments, y compris la loge de la commune, montre que le gouvernement génois avait modifié sensiblement la physionomie de l'habitat originaire : en fonction de ses exigences administratives, avant tout, mais aussi des nécessités liées au culte et à la propagation de la foi.

La présence de missions franciscaines sur le littoral de la Mer Noire est documentée à partir de la deuxième moitié du XIIIe siècle. Elle visait la conversion des Tatars[37]. Comme une célèbre étude de Gheorghe Brătianu nous le révèle, dans les années vingt et trente du XIVe siècle les Frères Mineurs possédaient un couvent à Vicina (autre ville byzantine dans le delta du Danube où les marchands génois s'étaient installés)[38]. À la même époque, dominicains et franciscains étaient pareillement présents à Caffa, la plus importante colonie génoise de la Mer Noire. Là, comme à Licostomo, il y avait une *ecclesia Beati Dominici, Fratrum Predicatorum* et une *ecclesia Beati Francisci, ordinis Minorum*[39].

Le *castrum Licostomi* resta sous le contrôle de Gênes jusqu'au début du XVe siècle[40]. Ensuite il fut probablement englobé dans la principauté de Valachie : d'après l'historien byzantin Doukas, le port était habité en 1461 par des Valaques (οἱ οἰκοῦντες ἔν τε τῷ Λυκοστομίῳ Βλάχοι)[41]. Puis, sa trace disparaît des documents et les archéologues n'ont pas encore réussi à localiser le site où il se dressait. Comme Laurențiu Rădvan l'a écrit, *geografia foarte dinamică a zonei deltei Dunării a modificat permanent peisajul, astfel că în epoca modernă nu mai rămăseseră la suprafață decât*

ruine ale cetății de la Chilia Nouă [**Fig. 3**][42]. La présence de Licostomo dans la cartographie d'époque moderne ne serait donc pas l'indice d'une survivance de l'habitat, mais plutôt un héritage des portulans médiévaux [**Fig. 4**][43].

Au contraire, Kilia disparaît certes des sources génoises après 1361, mais se retrouve dans les documents « roumains » en 1446. À cette époque, l'habitat était sous l'autorité d'Étienne II, prince de Moldavie. En effet, non seulement il nommait les commandants de la garnison (пръкалаби), choisis parmi ses boyards, mais il exerçait aussi le contrôle sur la route qui faisait communiquer Kilia (Келїа) et le reste du pays[44]. Ensuite, la ville fut occupée par des « païens ». De Nicolae Iorga à nos jours, l'idée qu'il s'agissait des Hongrois –ennemis jurés des Roumains– s'est profondément enracinée dans l'historiographie[45]. Peu importe si le chroniqueur Grigore Ureche dit, assez clairement, que les Turcs tenaient le lieu[46] ! En 1462, une première tentative pour reprendre la ville échoua et Étienne le Grand lui-même fut blessé avec une arquebuse ou une bombarde (cela dépend de la signification attribuée au terme slavon пꙋшка)[47]. Kilia ne fut reconquise par la Moldavie qu'en 1465. Après avoir fêté la victoire, le prince plaça les boyards Isaia –son beau-frère– et Buhtea à la tête de la garnison locale[48]. Dans la décennie suivante, précisément du 22 juin au 16 juillet 1479, Étienne le Grand dotait la ville (градъ) d'une enceinte. Elle fut défendue en vain par les commandants Ivașco et Maxim, contre l'assaut des Turcs, en juillet 1484[49]. Le choc de la conquête revit dans un texte bulgare, contemporain de l'événement, découvert et publié par le slaviste roumain Ioan Bogdan. D'après cette source, une partie de la population fut déportée en Anatolie et une autre fut massacrée[50]. Kilia devint alors ottomane. La Sublime Porte conserva la possession du lieu jusqu'au 1812 quand, à la suite du traité de Bucarest, il fut annexé à l'Empire russe[51].

Selon un dessin conservé aux Archives du Palais de Topkapi (Istanbul), dans la première moitié du XVIe siècle la Kilia ottomane se composait de deux parties : l'une encerclée par des fortifications, l'autre ouverte [**Fig. 5**][52]. L'habitat se développa ensuite beaucoup vers l'ouest, comme il apparaît dans les représentations du XVIIIe siècle. Une gravure autrichienne, réalisée durant la guerre russo-turque de 1787-1792, montre que la vieille ville et les nouveaux quartiers étaient protégés par des bastions [**Fig. 6**][53]. À cause des dommages subis pendant le siège de 1790 puis de la rénovation urbaine effectuée par le gouvernement russe au XIXe siècle, l'ancien habitat a presque disparu. L'édifice le

plus ancien présent aujourd'hui à Kilia est l'église Saint-Nicolas, rebâtie en 1647-1648[54].

Du comptoir génois à la ville ottomane, la transformation du tissu urbain a été accompagnée de changements aussi considérables dans la vocation marchande du lieu. Comme on le sait, la suprématie de Gênes en Mer Noire fut le résultat de ses guerres victorieuses contre les Tatars et les Vénitiens, mais aussi de son alliance avec la Hongrie angevine[55]. À une date que nous ne connaissons pas, la Superbe avait obtenu le contrôle du port de Licostomo et de l'habitat de Kilia, qui dans les premières décennies du XIVe siècle appartenaient encore à Byzance[56]. Sous le pavillon de saint Georges, Kilia devenait l'un des comptoirs où les esclaves, le grain, la cire et le miel des rives nord de la Mer Noire étaient embarqués vers Péra, Constantinople et Gênes[57]. La présence des marchands « italiens » aux bouches du Danube nuisait aux intérêts économiques d'une puissance locale, la principauté de Dobroudja, née de la fragmentation du Second Empire bulgare[58]. C'est pourquoi la flotte de ce petit État commença à donner la chasse aux navires génois (1360)[59]. La galère de Licostomo fut elle aussi capturée et Gênes dut en armer une autre (1373)[60]. Cette guerre est, peut-être, à l'origine de l'abandon de Kilia par les Génois. Selon Nicolae Iorga, l'habitat aurait été conquis par la Dobroudja, avant de devenir moldave[61]. Son hypothèse, accueillie par les médiévistes bulgares Elisaveta Todorova et Vasil Gjuzelev[62], a été récemment rejetée par un autre historien bulgare, Ivan Biliarsky. Selon ce dernier, la Dobroudja ne possédait pas les moyens nécessaires pour accomplir une telle entreprise[63]. Mais, nous l'avons vu, Kilia n'avait pas la taille de Licostomo. Sans l'appui d'une galère, elle pouvait être occupée.

Au XVe siècle, le rôle économique de la ville changeait du tout au tout. La Kilia moldave vivait de la pêche et du commerce du poisson, exporté avant tout en Pologne mais aussi en Transylvanie[64]. Il ne faut donc pas s'étonner que, le 19 février 1446, le prince Étienne II donne au monastère de Neamț, dans le nord-ouest du pays, deux mesures de poisson de Kilia[65]. Une génération plus tard, le port était l'un des lieux maritimes et fluviaux où les plus importants monastères de la Moldavie (Neamț, Pobrata, Voroneț) allaient s'approvisionner[66]. Les moines de Pobrata se rendaient par exemple à Kilia pour y vendre leur blé et leur miel et, au retour, ils rapportaient du poisson au monastère[67]. Au lendemain de la conquête turque, six pêcheries se pressaient autour de la ville[68]. Dans les années suivantes, la Sublime Porte y déporta un certain nombre de pêcheurs de Silistra, de ses environs et d'autres lieux. Comme le turcologue Nicoară

Beldiceanu l'a écrit, « cette colonisation forcée indique clairement l'intérêt porté par les Ottomans à la remise en valeur des pêcheries de la région de Kilia »[69].

Une société multiculturelle

Des changements majeurs, quant aux caractères ethniques de l'habitat, accompagnèrent aux derniers siècles du Moyen Âge les mutations économiques. En ce qui concerne l'époque génoise, les actes d'Antonio di Ponzò rapportent les noms de 50 personnes qui vivaient en permanence dans la ville, ce qu'on appelait les *habitatores Chili*. Cinq d'entre eux étaient aussi définis comme *burgenses Chili*, une expression qui distinguait sans doute les notables des simples habitants[70]. Les *burgenses* comptaient quatre Latins (dont au moins deux Ligures) et un Arménien. Parmi les autres habitants, 26 étaient des Occidentaux (notamment neuf Ligures, dont deux citoyens de Gênes, deux Vénitiens, un Astesan, un Placentin et un Hongrois) et 19 des Orientaux, dont au moins un Grec et trois Arméniens[71].

Aux côtés des Génois, il vaut de souligner la présence significative d'hommes d'Asti, en Piémont, et de Plaisance, en Émilie : les deux cités italiennes entretenaient des relations privilégiées avec la Superbe. De même que les habitants de Milan et d'autres villes de l'Italie du Nord, les Astesans et les Placentins étaient connus, en Europe, comme marchands et usuriers[72]. Au XIIIe et XIVe siècle, leur activité est encore documentée en Méditerranée orientale. Les Placentins, par exemple, s'étaient installés dans le royaume arménien de Cilicie, où Gênes avait obtenu des privilèges à partir de 1201. Ils vendaient au cœur dudit royaume, à L'Aïas, des draps qui arrivaient d'Occident et expédiaient en Occident des marchandises orientales[73]. La présence d'un marchand hongrois à Kilia devait être également liée aux excellents rapports entre la commune génoise et la Hongrie de Louis d'Anjou. L'alliance avec Gênes permettait à l'État angevin de trouver place dans le commerce pontique, sans entrer en conflit avec les Tatars ou les Bulgares[74].

Dans la petite ville danubienne, le Hongrois *Yagop* et le Placentin *Bartholomeus de Lando* étaient parmi les fournisseurs de l'Arménien *Sarchis* : un gros marchand de cire et de miel originaire de Caffa, lui aussi habitant Kilia[75]. Une partie des produits qu'il achetait arrivait *de Zagora*[76]. Dans les documents « italiens » du XIVe siècle, ce toponyme n'indiquait pas une région spécifique, mais la Bulgarie toute entière[77]. De

Kilia, les marchandises évoquées devaient prendre la voie d'autres ports. Elles étaient embarquées, peut-être, sur des bateaux appartenant à *Sarchis* lui-même. En effet, il possédait au moins la moitié de deux embarcations (*ciguta*) : l'une en copropriété avec *Fotis Orendis* de Trébizonde, puis avec *Iohannes Iambonus*, bourgeois de Péra ; l'autre avec *Branchaleo de Guisulfis*, citoyen de Gênes[78]. *Iohannes* et *Branchaleo* étaient aussi parmi les fournisseurs de *Sarchis*[79]. Le réseau d'affaires de ce marchand dépassait donc largement les confins de la Mer Noire.

Dans le même temps, l'Astesan *Dominicus* faisait le courtier (*censarius*)[80]. Parmi les hommes définis comme *habitatores Chili*, ceux qui exerçaient cette activité étaient certainement onze, huit Occidentaux et trois Orientaux[81]. Les autres métiers devaient être beaucoup moins représentés. Nous ne relevons qu'un forgeron (*faber*), qu'un tailleur (*sartor*) et qu'un tavernier (*tabernarius*)[82]. La présence massive de courtiers est une preuve ultérieure du caractère éminemment commercial du lieu. En ce qui concerne *Dominicus de Ast*, on peut supposer qu'il avait séjourné à Tana, avant d'habiter Kilia : le 30 octobre 1359, dans la colonie vénitienne à l'embouchure du Don, un *ser Domenico di Asti* empruntait de l'argent à un marchand florentin[83]. Les parcours migratoires n'étaient pas toujours linéaires. L'émigrant pouvait demeurer quelque temps dans un endroit, avant de fixer sa résidence ailleurs[84].

Au sein de la société locale, un habitant semble jouir en particulier d'un prestige majeur par rapport aux autres. Il s'agit du bourgeois *Petrus de Cele*. Le titre de *magister* précédait son nom[85]. Or, en Ligurie comme dans d'autres zones d'Italie ou dans la Provence voisine, une telle appellation se réservait aux notaires et médecins ou aux maîtres artisans (cordonniers, menuisiers)[86]. Les sources ne révèlent pas si *Petrus de Cele* relevait de l'une ou de l'autre catégorie. Son village d'origine, Celle dans le Ponant ligure, était toutefois célèbre pour la pêche du corail et la production d'objets réalisés dans ce matériau[87].

À l'époque ottomane, le *Règlement concernant les pêcheries de Kilia*, daté de 1484, rapporte les noms des vingt pêcheurs actifs dans la ville peu après la conquête. Le document spécifie l'origine de six d'entre eux : cinq étaient Hongrois et le dernier Valaque. Les autres devaient être Moldaves[88]. Au début du XVIe siècle, deux ou trois seulement étaient des Turcs. En bref, la plupart des pêcheurs étaient chrétiens[89].

Combien de langues ?

La présence d'hommes d'affaires de nationalités diverses, la portée des échanges commerciaux, le nombre relativement grand de prêteurs et de courtiers faisaient donc de la Kilia génoise une véritable ville marchande sur la frontière entre Orient et Occident. Une telle constatation invite à un examen approfondi des langues parlées dans la ville. Une étude de ce genre s'impose, avant d'analyser le rôle de ceux qui permettaient au comptoir de fonctionner, à savoir les notaires et leurs auxiliaires : les interprètes qui permettaient les transactions entre individus ne pratiquant pas le même langage.

Selon les actes d'Antonio di Ponzò, les idiomes les plus répandus à Kilia étaient le latin (*lingua latina*) et le grec (*lingua gregescha*)[90]. Il ne s'agissait pas, bien sûr, du latin de César et de Cicéron, ou du grec de Périclès, mais des *volgari* parlés en Italie (les ancêtres des dialectes modernes) et du grec byzantin.

Après ces deux idiomes majeurs, la langue comane (kiptchak) était probablement la plus répandue. Peuple turcophone semi-nomade, les Comans avaient occupé un vaste territoire s'étendant de la Mer d'Aral à l'aire danubienne, avant d'être soumis en 1236 par Batu, fondateur de la Horde d'Or et son premier khan[91]. Aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles, leur idiome était une véritable *lingua franca* dans les comptoirs génois et vénitiens de la Mer Noire[92]. Nous connaissons une partie de son trésor lexical grâce au *Codex Comanicus*, une espèce de dictionnaire trilingue latin-persan-coman qui appartint à Pétrarque et qui se trouve aujourd'hui à la Bibliothèque Marcienne de Venise[93].

À Kilia, la *lingua comanescha* était parlée par les Arméniens et connue par les Occidentaux qui constituaient l'élite du lieu, ceux que les sources désignaient comme *habitatores et burgenses Chili*. Le 11 septembre 1360, l'un de ces bourgeois, *Oddoardus Framba*, fait ainsi office d'interprète *de lingua latina in comanescho et de comanescho in latina* entre un « Sarrasin » de Moncastro et un citoyen de Gênes, pour la vente d'une esclave tatare[94]. Trois jours plus tard, le bourgeois *Astelanus de Goano* servait d'interprète *de lingua comanescha in latina et de latina in comanescha* entre l'Arménien *Grigo*, lui aussi habitant et bourgeois de Kilia, et un Ligure provenant de Péra, lors de la vente d'une esclave mongole[95]. La connaissance du kiptchak par *Grigo* résultait sans doute de la présence séculaire d'Arméniens sur les rives de la Mer Noire. Ils étaient arrivés là par vagues successives, entre le XIe et le XIVe siècle, à la suite

des invasions, des pillages, des tremblements de terre et des famines qui avaient bouleversé leur pays d'origine[96]. En revanche, les Occidentaux pratiquaient la langue comane pour les nécessités du commerce avec les Arméniens et, surtout, avec les Tatars[97]. Après avoir conquis les steppes, ces derniers avaient été assimilés par les Comans. Avec le temps, ils avaient abandonné leur propre parler pour adopter celui des vaincus[98].

À côté du latin, du grec et du *comanescho*, une quatrième langue semble apparaître dans les documents concernant Kilia : la *lingua romecha*. Le 25 août 1360, *Costa Aga* fils de feu *Corso*, habitant de Kilia, reconnaissait avoir reçu en prêt d'*Angelus de Azano*, habitant et bourgeois de Péra, de l'argent qu'il promettait de lui rendre avant Pâques. Entre les témoins présents à la conclusion de l'acte, se trouvait *Oddoardo Framba, burgense Chili, interpretante inter dictos contrahentes de lingua latina in romecha et de romecha in latina*[99].

Michel Balard a vu dans ce fragment la première attestation connue de la langue roumaine. Dans un article paru en 1980, il déclare en conséquence :

> Constituant l'un des premiers témoignages écrits sur la langue roumaine, l'acte d'Antonio di Ponzò permet d'affirmer que vers 1360, dans les régions du Bas-Danube, cette langue, et donc l'ethnie qui l'utilise, tend à prendre une importance singulière au détriment du grec, au moment où se développe la principauté de Valachie. Kilia serait donc colonisée par les Valaques, avant de passer vers les années 1370 sous l'autorité du voïvode Vlaïcou[100].

L'analyse de l'historien français reste il est vrai controversée. Contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait croire, ses affirmations n'ont pas été toujours bien reçues en Roumanie. Par exemple, dans sa thèse de doctorat publiée en 2002, Vasile Mărculeț définit comme « sans fondement » la théorie d'une colonisation valaque de Kilia. Vers le même moment, Gheorghe Pungă, professeur à l'Université de Jassy, s'est dissocié de l'interprétation de Michel Balard et a vu dans la *lingua romecha* du grec[101].

Au-delà de toute polémique, il me semble juste de préciser que, dans les actes d'Antonio di Ponzò, il n'y a aucune référence à la Valachie, à la Moldavie ou à leurs habitants. Quant au terme *Romania*, il ne désigne pas le territoire correspondant à la Roumanie actuelle, mais la région autour de Constantinople. Ce toponyme apparaît en particulier au sujet de Péra, appelée *Peyra de Romania* dans 75 des actes rédigés par Antonio

di Ponzò[102]. Une telle désignation sert au notaire à localiser le faubourg de Constantinople où les Génois s'étaient établis à partir de 1267[103]. Il est donc bien possible que *lingua romecha* soit, dans le lexique de notre notaire, synonyme de *lingua gregescha*. Quant au passage de Kilia sous l'autorité de Vladislav Ier de Valachie, connu aussi, en Roumanie, sous le nom de Vlaicu Vodă, il ne trouve pas confirmation dans les sources. De plus, dans les documents valaques du XIVe siècle, Kilia n'apparaît pas. Le premier document slavo-roumain qui parle de ce lieu est l'acte, déjà cité, par lequel Étienne de Moldavie donnait deux mesures de poisson au monastère de Neamț (1446)[104].

Notaires, interprètes, pouvoir

L'examen des langues parlées à Kilia a mis en lumière le rôle déterminant joué par les interprètes avant et pendant la conclusion des contrats. Du moment que notre notaire parlait seulement le latin, il recourait à la médiation linguistique toutes les fois que l'une des parties contractantes ne connaissait pas cet idiome. La présence de personnes faisant office d'interprètes apparaît dans 36 des 211 actes rédigés par Antonio di Ponzò. Cela signifie que la plupart de ses clients étaient des Occidentaux.

Aussi, parmi les auxiliaires du notaire, trouvons-nous surtout des courtiers, comme les susdits *Astelanus de Goano* et *Oddoardus Framba*, mais encore des artisans, des taverniers et un prêteur[105]. L'unique femme est une certaine *Alterixia*, veuve de l'Astesan *Iacobus*. Le 21 septembre 1360, elle sert d'interprète *de lingua gregechescha* [sic] *in latina et de latina in gregescha* entre *Fidechia*, femme de *Chalo Iane*, et *Silvester della Porta* de Péra, habitant de Kilia[106].

Dans leur ensemble, les données précédentes sont capitales pour comprendre les mécanismes à travers lesquels Gênes exerçait et conservait son contrôle sur la ville. Comme Laura Balletto l'a écrit :

Attraverso i notai la Repubblica teneva saldamente in propria mano la struttura di queste colonie così lontane, soggette alle vicissitudini del momento, ma comunque sempre legate alla patria genovese attraverso l'organizzazione giuridica che fa capo al notariato locale[107].

On peut ajouter que, dans cette réalité multiculturelle, l'activité des médiateurs du droit et de l'écriture ne se serait pas épanouie sans le soutien de la population locale. Des bourgeois aux taverniers, tous les habitants du comptoir étaient appelés à s'improviser interprètes, pour faciliter le travail du notaire. Kilia était une colonie jeune et relativement petite. Il n'y avait pas sur place de *torcimani*, ces interprètes professionnels qui étaient présents dans les colonies majeures. Songeons ici à Caffa, où la cour de justice comptait trois truchements, à Licostomo, où un seul *torcimanus* est cependant attesté, et à Soudak, où l'interprète de la chancellerie consulaire devait savoir trois langues : le latin, le grec et l'idiome des Tatars[108]. À Kilia il fallait recourir aux capacités linguistiques de tous ceux qui parlaient le grec ou la langue comane.

Ces compétences étaient possédées surtout par les courtiers qui, grâce à leur travail, se trouvaient en contact continuel avec les Arméniens, les Byzantins et les Mongols. Certains devaient être bilingues, d'autres polyglottes : *Oddoardus Framba*, par exemple, connaissait la *lingua latina*, la *lingua comanescha* et la *lingua romecha*. Ce bourgeois était probablement originaire de Venise ou, plutôt, de la Terre Ferme vénitienne : les personnes qui portent aujourd'hui son patronyme vivent dans les provinces de Vérone et de Trente. En tout cas, il était l'héritier d'une tradition de contacts linguistiques entre l'Occident chrétien et l'Orient musulman qui, à partir du haut Moyen Âge, avait vu les « Italiens », et surtout les Vénitiens, en première ligne[109]. À ce propos, il est très significatif que, dans les actes de Kilia, le nombre des interprètes originaires de la cité lagunaire égalât celui des Génois : deux et deux. Il s'agissait des citoyens de Gênes *Nicolaus Castagna*, *habitator Chili*, et *Thomas de Via*, *habitator Ianue*, d'une part, et des Vénitiens *Iohannes de Clarencia*, *censarius* et *habitator Chili*, et *Petrus de Omnibono*, lui aussi *censarius* et *habitator Chili*, d'autre part[110].

On peut conclure qu'aux bouches du Danube le pouvoir de la Superbe s'appuyait non seulement sur la force des armes, mais aussi sur l'adhésion de ses sujets à un modèle de développement fondé sur l'échange, avant tout de connaissance et d'informations. Le dialogue entre cultures différentes précédait la transaction commerciale. Malheureusement, la documentation concernant Kilia au XVe siècle est trop réduite pour nous permettre d'approfondir le rapport entre l'État et sa périphérie danubienne à l'époque moldave. Au contraire, une recherche de ce genre est sans doute possible pour la période ottomane. Mais le médiéviste doit s'arrêter ici, pour céder la plume au turcologue.

Conclusions

L'histoire de Kilia au bas Moyen Âge est celle d'une ville qui trouve (ou retrouve) sa vocation pour ainsi dire « naturelle ». Pour une brève période de son existence, elle devient un comptoir où les produits des arrière-pays, danubien et balkanique, sont chargés pour être transportés vers la « capitale de la Méditerranée » (ainsi que Gênes a été définie par Geo Pistarino)[111]. Mais le destin de Kilia n'est pas tant lié à la mer qu'au fleuve. Sous le gouvernement moldave, elle se transforme en marché international du poisson. Ce changement ne peut s'être produit spontanément. Il résulte sans doute d'une intervention directe des princes dans la gestion et dans l'exploitation des ressources locales. Kilia atteint alors, enfin, sa dimension authentique, liée à son environnement naturel : le delta du Danube, avec ses pêcheries riches en esturgeons[112]. La conquête ottomane, si traumatisante pour les populations, favorise en revanche de façon décisive la maturation de cette vocation. À la fin du XVIIe siècle, Kilia est devenue le plus important lieu de pêche le long du fleuve. Sur le marché de la ville, l'on peut trouver chaque jour au moins mille deux cents grands esturgeons (*Huso huso*) et silures glanes (*Silurus glanis*), ainsi que du caviar. Les acheteurs viennent de Constantinople, de la Pologne, de la Hongrie et de la Moldavie[113]. L'image de Kilia comme localité en inexorable déclin à partir du XVIe siècle, dessinée par Nicolae Iorga, ne saurait plus s'accepter[114].

Les résultats les plus intéressants de la présente recherche regardent, précisément, l'histoire économique de la ville. À ce propos, la reconstitution du contexte social à l'époque génoise a mis en lumière la figure d'un marchand arménien, *Sarchis*. Aisé, copropriétaire de bateaux, il semble une exception, par rapport à ses compatriotes présents, à la fin du XIVe siècle, dans d'autres comptoirs du bassin pontique. À Caffa, par exemple, leur rôle est « insignifiant en ce qui concerne le grand commerce ». Il se limite « à l'exercice de métiers artisanaux ». Comme Michel Balard l'a relevé, les registres de la Massaria « ne mentionnent aucun homme d'affaires arménien, à l'exception de trois courtiers, aucun propriétaire de navire »[115]. La situation était pourtant fort différente à la fin du XIIIe siècle, quand les Arméniens de Caffa participaient à la vente d'esclaves, de maisons, de cuir et au transport du sel, de leur ville jusqu'à Trébizonde[116]. Cela veut-il dire que, dans la Mer Noire du XIVe siècle, l'axe du commerce arménien s'est déplacé de la Crimée jusqu'aux bouches du Danube ? Cette hypothèse est renforcée par la présence, à Kilia, d'un autre

homme d'affaires arménien, *Grigo*, marchand d'esclaves[117]. En outre, les deux Arméniens cités dans les actes de Licostomo, *Abram* et *Georgius*, sont, comme *Sarchis*, originaires de Caffa[118].

Ces indications, des plus significatives, offrent des suggestions supplémentaires à ceux qui voudraient étudier la Kilia ottomane. Elles incitent à vérifier, par exemple, le rôle économique qu'y jouait la communauté arménienne. Se liait-il encore au commerce de la cire, du miel et des esclaves, comme à l'époque génoise, ou s'était-il orienté, pour tout ou partie, vers la vente du poisson[119] ? De manière analogue, il conviendrait d'analyser, dans la mesure du possible, la physionomie des interprètes et leur activité dans le contexte d'une ville devenue musulmane[120].

Fig. 1 – Н. Д. Дмитриев-Оренбургский, *Переправа русской армии через Дунай у Зимницы 15 июня 1877 года*, 1883 г., из собрания Военно-исторического музея артиллерии, инженерных войск и войск связи, Санкт-Петербург, Россия, 586-178 [N. D. Dmitriev-Orenbourgski, *Le passage du Danube par l'armée russe à Zimnicea le 15 juin 1877*, 1883, collection du Musée historique militaire de l'Artillerie, du Génie et des Transmissions, Saint-Pétersbourg, Russie, 586-178].

Fig. 2 – Le premier document slavo-roumain qui mentionne Kilia, daté de 1446 (Archives Nationales de la Roumanie, Colecția Documente Selecționate Moldova, nr. 8 : Suceava, 19 février 1446 (6954), *Étienne II, prince de Moldavie, donne au monastère de Neamț deux mesures de poisson de Kilia*).

Fig. 3 – Les ruines des remparts moldaves de Kilia photographiées par Nicolae Iorga vers 1929 (Nicolae Iorga, « Cele două Chilii », dans *Buletinul Comisiunii Monumentelor Istorice*, 1929/4, p. 189).

Fig. 4 – Les bouches du Danube, dans l'Atlas de Mercator (Archives Nationales de la Roumanie, Colecția Hărți, B VII/85, *Walachia, Servia, Bvlgaria, Romania*, carte datable de 1600).

Fig. 5 – Kilia, dans un dessin de la première moitié du XVIe siècle, conservé aux Archives du Palais de Topkapi à Istanbul (Nicoară Beldiceanu, « La Moldavie ottomane à la fin du XVe siècle et au début du XVIe siècle », dans *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 1969/2, p. 239-266, planche XVIII).

Fig. 6 – Kilia, pendant le siège de 1790 (Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine, Cabinetul de Stampe, Dr-GSI 9 (498) 1787/1792 – 32716).

NOTES

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[2] Nicolae Iorga, *Studii istorice asupra Chiliei și Cetății Albe*, cu un studiu asupra Basarabiei de Gheorghe Buzatu, ediția I-a anastatică după lucrarea cu acelaşi titlu apărută la Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol Göbl din Bucureşti în anul 1899, Bacău, Vicovia, 2014.

[3] Bibliothèque Universitaire –Gênes ; Bibliothèque Nationale Universitaire –Turin ; Bibliothèque « Giovanni Tabacco » de l'Université de Turin ; Bibliothèque « Clarence Bicknell » de l'Institut International d'Études Ligures –Bordighera ; Bibliothèque « Astense » –Asti ; Bibliothèque Centrale Universitaire « Carol I » –Bucarest ; Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine –Bucarest ; Bibliothèque de l'Institut « Nicolae Iorga » –Bucarest ; Bibliothèque du New Europe College –Bucarest ; Bibliothèque Byzantine –Bucarest ; Bibliothèque de l'Institut d'Études Balkaniques –Sofia ; Bibliothèque Universitaire –Sofia.

[4] Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia da Antonio di Ponzò (1360-61)*, Bordighera, Istituto Internazionale di Studi Liguri, 1971 ; Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia du notaire Antonio di Ponzò 1360*, Paris, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1980. Les actes de Kilia sont conservés aux Archives d'État de Gênes, fonds *Notai antichi* et *Notai ignoti*.

[5] Laura Balletto, *Genova Mediterraneo Mar Nero (secc. XIII - XV)*, Gênes, Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1976, p. 144-154 ; *Eadem*, « Tra burocrazia e mercatura a Chilia nel secondo Trecento », dans Sante Graciotti (dir.), *Italia e Romania. Due popoli e due storie a confronto (secc. XIV-XVIII)*, Florence, Olschki, 1998, p. 41-62 ; *Eadem*, « Due notai lunigianesi fra Genova ed il Vicino Oriente nel secolo XIV: Antonio di Ponzò e Bernabò di Carpena », dans Rustam Shukurov (dir.), *Mare et litora. Essays presented to Sergei Karpov for his 60th Birthday*, Moscou, Indrik, 2009, p. 51-83.

[6] Geo Pistarino, *I Gin dell'Oltremare*, Gênes, Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1988, p. 247-362, 392-405 ; Ştefan Andreescu, « Geo Pistarino e la storia della presenza genovese nel bacino occidentale del Mar Nero », dans Laura Balletto et Edilio Riccardini (dir.), *Dall'Isola del Tino e dalla Lunigiana al Mediterraneo e all'Atlantico. In ricordo di Geo Pistarino (1917-2008)*, La Spezia, Accademia Lunigianese di Scienze "Giovanni Capellini", 2009, p. 29-35.

[7] Michel Balard, « Caffa "Ianuensis civitas in extremo Europe" », dans *Rivista di Bizantinistica*, 1993, p. 165-182 ; Н. М. Богданова, *Херсон в X–XV вв. Проблемы истории византийского города* // *Причерноморье в средние века*, под редакцией С. П. Карпова, Москва, Издательство Московского университета, 1991 [N. M. Bogdanova, « Cherson aux Xᵉ-XVᵉ siècles. Problèmes d'histoire de la ville byzantine », dans S. P. Karpov (dir.), *La Mer Noire au Moyen Âge*, Moscou, Presses Universitaires de Moscou, 1991], p. 8-172 ; Lorenzo Pubblici, « Venezia e il Mar d'Azov: alcune considerazioni sulla Tana nel XIV secolo », dans *Archivio Storico Italiano*, 2005/3, p. 435-483.

[8] Gabriella Airaldi, *Guerrieri e mercanti. Storie del Medioevo genovese*, Marene, Nino Aragno Editore, 2004, p. 264.

[9] Clavdii Ptolemaei, *Cosmographia*, tavole della Geografia di Tolomeo, presentazione di Lelio Pagani, Torriana, Orsa Maggiore, 1990, tabulae V, VI, X.

[10] Nora Berend, « Défense de la Chrétienté et naissance d'une identité. Hongrie, Pologne et péninsule Ibérique au Moyen Âge », dans *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 2003/5, p. 1011-1012.

[11] „*Великая хроника" о Польше, Руси и их соседях XI – XIII вв.*, под редакцией В. Л. Янина, Москва, Издательство Московского университета, 1987 [*« Grande chronique » de la Pologne, de la Russie et de leurs voisins XIᵉ-XIIIᵉ siècle*, éd. V. L. Ianine, Moscou, Presses Universitaires de Moscou, 1987], p. 155. Sur la campagne de Batu en Europe Centrale (1241) voir : Erik Hildinger, *Warriors of the Steppe. A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to 1700 A.D.*, New York, Sarpedon, 1997, p. 139-147.

[12] Boris Dmitrievič Grekov, *L'orda d'oro*, Milan, Edizioni Res Gestae, 2013 (édition russe : Б. Д. Греков, А. Ю. Якубовский, *Золотая Орда и её падение*, Москва-Ленинград, Издательство Академии Наук СССР, 1950), p. 221.

[13] Marian Coman, *Putere și teritoriu. Țara Românească medievală (secolele XIV-XVI)*, Jassy, Polirom, 2013, p. 248-305 ; Viorel Panaite, *Război, pace și comerț în Islam. Țările române și dreptul otoman al popoarelor*, Jassy, Polirom, 2013, p. 265-276.

[14] R. J. Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 29, 85.

[15] Archives d'État de Florence, Archivio Mediceo, filza 4469, fol. 30r. Le document a été consulté auprès des Archives Nationales de la Roumanie, Microfilme Italia, inventarul 1312, rola 55, cadrul 78.

[16] N. Iorga, *Istoria lui Ștefan cel Mare pentru poporul român*, Bucarest, Editura pentru Literatură, 1966 (première édition : Bucarest, Minerva, 1904), p. 128.

[17] Pleven.

[18] Archives d'État de Florence, Archivio Mediceo, filza 4469, fol. 112. Le document a été consulté auprès des Archives Nationales de la Roumanie, Microfilme Italia, inventarul 1312, rola 55, cadrul 285. Sur le retentissement,

en Italie, des campagnes anti-ottomanes à la fin du XVIᵉ siècle voir : Cristian Luca, « Échos européens des campagnes anti-ottomanes au Bas-Danube : quelques *avvisi* italiens moins connus (1595-1596) », dans *Istros*, 2007, p. 427-446.

[19] А. И. Сомов, *Дмитриев (Николай Дмитриевич) // Энциклопедический словарь*, издатели: Ф. А. Брокгауз, И. А. Ефрон, том Xᴬ, Санкт-Петербург, Типо-литография И. А. Ефрона, 1893 [A. I. Somov, « Dmitriev (Nikolaï Dmitrievitch) », dans *Dictionnaire encyclopédique*, éd. F. A. Brockhaus et I. A. Efron, t. Xᴬ, Saint-Pétersbourg, Typo-lithographie I. A. Efron, 1893], p. 781-782 ; *Дмитриев-Оренбургский, Николай Дмитриевич // Военная энциклопедия*, том 9, Петербург, Товарищество И. Д. Сытина, 1912 [« Dmitriev-Orenbourgski, Nikolaï Dmitrievitch », dans *Encyclopédie militaire*, t. 9, Saint-Pétersbourg, Société I. D. Sytine, 1912], p. 129-130.

[20] David Saunders, *Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform 1801-1881* (Longman history of Russia), Londres et New York, Longman, 1998, p. 175, 197-199, 305 ; John Sweetman, *Războiul Crimeii 1854-1856*, Bucarest, Corint Books, 2015 (édition anglaise : *The Crimean War 1854-1856*, Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2001), p. 17-20.

[21] Elisaveta Todorova, « River Trade in the Balkans during the Middle Ages », dans *Études balkaniques*, 1984/4, p. 44-45 ; Anca Popescu, *Integrarea imperială otomană a teritoriilor din sud-estul Europei. Sangeacul Silistra (sec. XV-XVI)*, Bucarest, Editura Muzeului Național al Literaturii Române, 2013, p. 159-160.

[22] *Documenta Romaniae Historica*, B. *Țara Românească*, vol. I (1247-1500), éd. P. P. Panaitescu et Damaschin Mioc, Bucarest, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1966, doc. 275. Le document est conservé, en copie du XVIIIᵉ siècle, aux Archives Nationales de la Roumanie, Manuscrise, nr. 718, fol. 128r - 129r.

[23] Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.* ; Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*

[24] Robert-Henri Bautier, « Notes sur les sources de l'histoire économique médiévale dans les archives italiennes (suite) », dans *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, 1948, p. 188.

[25] Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, p. 208 ; Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*, p. 198.

[26] Gheorghe Pungă, « Considerații privitoare la cetatea Chilia Nouă », dans *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "A. D. Xenopol"*, 1997, p. 366.

[27] Octavian Iliescu, « À la recherche de Kilia byzantine », dans *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, 1978/2, p. 229. Les deux Kilia, l'« Ancienne » et la « Nouvelle », figurent déjà dans la cartographie du premier Âge moderne. J'adresse, par exemple, au célèbre Atlas de Mercator, où les deux localités sont indiquées, respectivement, sous les noms de *Kilia* et *Kilia Noua*

(Archives Nationales de la Roumanie, Colecţia Hărţi, B VII/85, *Walachia, Servia, Bvlgaria, Romania*, carte datable de 1600). Cf. Fig. 4.

28 *„Letopiseţul de când s-a început Ţara Moldovei" - Letopiseţul lui Ştefan cel Mare*, éd. G. Mihăilă, Bucarest, Editura Academiei Române, 2006, partie III, paragraphe 24, p. 37, 47 ; Grigore Ureche, *Letopiseţul Ţării Moldovei*, éd. Dan Horia Mazilu, Bucarest, Gramar, 2009, p. 49.

29 Archives Nationales de la Roumanie, Colecţia Documente Selecţionate Moldova, nr. 8 : Suceava, 19 février 1446 (6954), *Étienne II, prince de Moldavie, donne au monastère de Neamţ deux mesures de poisson de Kilia*. Le document est publié dans *Documenta Romaniae Historica*, A. *Moldova*, vol. I (1384-1448), éd. C. Cihodaru, I. Caproşu et L. Şimanschi, Bucarest, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1975, doc. 262.

30 Cette opinion avait été déjà exprimée par le slaviste roumain Petre P. Panaitescu, au mobile que le lieu où se trouve Chilia Veche n'est pas favorable au chargement et au déchargement des marchandises (P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea cel Bătrân*, Bucarest, Casa Şcoalelor, 1944, p. 301-302).

31 Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, p. 196-198, 203, 208 ; Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*, p. 186, 193, 198.

32 Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, p. 208 ; Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*, p. 193.

33 Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, doc. 12, 14.

34 Gianni De Moro, *Ventimiglia sotto il Banco di San Giorgio (1514-1562). Vicende politiche e vita quotidiana ai confini occidentali del Dominio*, Parte prima (1514-1526), Pignerol, Alzani, 1991, p. 179 ; Archives Paroissiales de Castel Vittorio, Matrimoni 1600-1693, années 1669 et 1670.

35 Silvana Raiteri, *Atti rogati a Licostomo da Domenico da Carignano (1373) e Oberto Grassi da Voltri (1383-84)*, dans Giovanna Balbi et Silvana Raiteri, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Caffa e a Licostomo (sec. XIV)*, Bordighera, Istituto Internazionale di Studi Liguri, 1973, p. 229-230.

36 *Ibid.*, doc. 8 ; Vasilka Tăpkova-Zaimova, « Quelques observations sur la domination byzantine aux bouches du Danube – Le sort de Lykostomion et de quelques autres villes côtières », dans *Byzance et les Balkans à partir du VIe siècle. Les mouvements ethniques et les États*, Londres, Variorum Reprints, 1979, p. 79-86.

37 Toma Tanase, « Les Balkans et l'Europe dans le discours des Frères mendiants et de la papauté (XIIIe-XIVe siècle) », dans *Eurolimes*, 2006, p. 94.

38 G. I. Brătianu, *Recherches sur Vicina et Cetatea Albă. Contributions à l'histoire de la domination byzantine et tatare et du commerce génois sur le littoral roumain de la Mer Noire*, Bucarest, Universitatea din Iaşi, 1935, p. 58-60.

[39] Giovanna Balbi, *Atti rogati a Caffa da Nicolò Beltrame (1343-44)*, dans Giovanna Balbi et Silvana Raiteri, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Caffa e a Licostomo*, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

[40] Cf. Șerban Papacostea, « La fin de la domination génoise à Licostomo », dans *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol"*, 1985, p. 29-42 et Ștefan Andreescu, *Din istoria Mării Negre. (Genovezi, români și tătari în spațiul pontic în secolele XIV-XVII)*, Bucarest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2001, p. 51-53.

[41] Ducas, *Istoria turco-bizantină (1341-1462)*, éd. Vasile Grecu, Bucarest, Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Romîne, 1958, p. 427.

[42] Laurențiu Rădvan, *Orașele din Țările Române în Evul Mediu (sfârșitul sec. al XIII-lea – începutul sec. al XVI-lea)*, Jassy, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza", 2011, p. 508. Les ruines des remparts moldaves de Kilia furent photographiées par Nicolae Iorga. Ces images sont publiées dans son article « Cele două Chilii », dans *Buletinul Comisiunii Monumentelor Istorice*, 1929/4, p. 188-191. Je remercie Sergiu Iosipescu de m'avoir signalé l'existence de ces photos.

[43] Cf. Archives Nationales de la Roumanie, Colecția Hărți, B VII/85, *doc. cit.* et Galina Kustova, « The Danube Mouths in Medieval Portolans », dans *Analele Universității „Dunărea de Jos" Galați*, Istorie, 2006, p. 83-91.

[44] Archives Nationales de la Roumanie, Colecția Documente Selecționate Moldova, nr. 8, *doc. cit.* Sur les commandants de Kilia voir : I. Minea, « Primii pârcălabi moldoveni din Chilia – O interpretare a cronicii lui Ureche », dans *Ioan Neculce. Buletinul Muzeului Municipal din Iași*, 1923, p. 187-188 ; D. Nichita, « Contribuții asupra pârcălăbiei în Moldova până la sfârșitul secolului al XVI-lea », dans *Arhiva*, 1925, p. 90-98, 245-254.

[45] Cf. N. Iorga, *Istoria lui Ștefan cel Mare*, *op. cit.*, p. 74, 84, 86, 90-91 et *Istoria României în date*, éd. Dinu C. Giurescu, Bucarest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2007, p. 75.

[46] Grigore Ureche, *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei*, *op. cit.*, p. 36, 48.

[47] *„Letopisețul de când s-a început Țara Moldovei"*, *op. cit.*, partie III, paragraphe 3, p. 34, 44 ; p. 54, note 40. Grigore Ureche, *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[48] *„Letopisețul de când s-a început Țara Moldovei"*, *op. cit.*, partie III, paragraphe 5, p. 34-35, 44 ; p. 54, notes 44 et 45. Grigore Ureche, *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei*, *op. cit.*, p. 36-37.

[49] *„Letopisețul de când s-a început Țara Moldovei"*, *op. cit.*, partie III, paragraphes 24 et 32, p. 37-38, 47 ; Grigore Ureche, *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei*, *op. cit.*, p. 49, 51. Sur la conquête ottomane de Kilia voir : Nicoară Beldiceanu, « La conquête des cités marchandes de Kilia et de Cetatea Albă par Bayezid II », dans *Südost-Forschungen*, 1964, p. 36-90.

50 Ioan Bogdan, « Manuscripte slavo-române în Kiev », dans *Idem*, *Scrieri alese*, éd. G. Mihăilă, préface d'Emil Petrovici, Bucarest, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1968, p. 520.

51 *Килия // Энциклопедический словарь*, издатели: Ф. А. Брокгауз, И. А. Ефрон, том XV, Санкт-Петербург, Типо-литография И. А. Ефрона, 1895 [« Kilia », dans *Dictionnaire encyclopédique*, éd. F. A. Brockhaus et I. A. Efron, t. XV, Saint-Pétersbourg, Typo-lithographie I. A. Efron, 1895], p. 57-58.

52 Nicoară Beldiceanu, « La Moldavie ottomane à la fin du XVe siècle et au début du XVIe siècle », dans *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 1969/2, p. 239-266, planche XVIII.

53 Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine, Cabinetul de Stampe, Dr-GSI 9 (498) 1787/1792 – 32716. Cette gravure est publiée dans Mariana Şlapac, « Imaginea oraşului Chilia în lumina surselor documentare din secolele al XIV-lea – al XVIII-lea », dans *Historia Urbana*, 2002/1-2, p. 38.

54 Nicolae Iorga, *Studii istorice asupra Chiliei și Cetăţii Albe, op. cit.*, p. 229, note 5 ; *Idem*, « Cele două Chilii », *art. cit.*, p. 188-191 ; Mariana Şlapac, « Aspecte din evoluţia urbană a oraşului Chilia », dans *Historia Urbana*, 1994/2, p. 165-173.

55 Giovanna Petti Balbi, « Caffa e Pera a metà del Trecento », dans *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, 1978/2, p. 219-220 ; Ovidiu Cristea, *Veneţia și Marea Neagră în secolele XIII-XIV. Contribuţii la studiul politicii orientale veneţiene*, Brăila, Muzeul Brăilei et Editura Istros, 2004, p. 150, 161-162, 167-168 ; Șerban Papacostea, « Modificări geo-strategice la Dunărea de Jos la mijlocul secolului al XIV-lea », dans *Studia Universitatis Cibiniensis. Series Historica*, 2006-2007, p. 59-68.

56 Șerban Papacostea, « Bizanţul şi Marea Neagră: sfârşitul unei hegemonii », dans *Idem*, *Studii de istorie românească. Economie și societate (secolele XIII-XVIII)*, Brăila, Muzeul Brăilei et Editura Istros, 2009, p. 56. Kilia et Licostomo apparaissent parmi les possessions du Patriarcat de Constantinople dans un document datable de 1320 environ (*Documente privind Istoria României, B. Ţara Românească (1247-1500)*, Bucarest, Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Române, 1953, doc. 5). D'après l'archéologue roumaine Silvia Baraschi, il s'agit du plus ancien document connu qui se réfère avec certitude à la Kilia danubienne et non aux villes homonymes de Thrace et de Bithynie (Silvia Baraschi, « Les sources byzantines et la localisation de la cité de Kilia (XIIe-XIIIe siècle) », dans *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, 1981/3, p. 473-484).

57 Michel Balard, *La Romanie génoise (XIIe - début du XIVe siècle)*, Rome, École Française de Rome, 1978, t. I, p. 143-150, 398 ; t. II, p. 735, 753.

58 Alberto Alberti, *Ivan Aleksandăr (1331-1371). Splendore e tramonto del secondo impero bulgaro*, Florence, Firenze University Press, 2010, p. 77, 99, 109.

59 Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, doc. 100.

[60]   Silvana Raiteri, *Atti rogati a Licostomo, op. cit.*, doc. 6-9.

[61]   Nicolae Iorga, *Studii istorice asupra Chiliei și Cetății Albe, op. cit.*, p. 53.

[62]   Elisaveta Todorova, « Gli insediamenti genovesi alle foci del Danubio: Vicina, Chilia, Licostomo », dans *Genova e la Bulgaria nel Medioevo*, Gênes, Università di Genova, 1984, p. 447 ; Васил Гюзелев, *Политическа история на Добруджанското княжество (средата на XIV-началото на XV век)*. във: Васил Гюзелев, *Очерци върху историята на българския Североизток и Черноморието (края на XII –началото на XV век)*, София, Борина, 1995 [Vasil Gjuzelev, « Histoire politique de la principauté de Dobroudja (mi XIVe –début XVe siècle) », dans *Idem*, *Essais sur l'histoire de la Bulgarie nord-orientale et du littoral bulgare de la Mer Noire (fin du XIIe–début du XVe siècle)*, Sofia, Borina, 1995], p. 62 ; *Idem*, « Magnificus dominus Dobrotitza – pravus et crudelis inimicus Comunis Ianuae et omnium Ianuensium », dans Klaus Belke, Ewald Kislinger, Andreas Külzer et Maria A. Stassinopoulou (dir.), *Byzantina Mediterranea. Festschrift für Johannes Koder zum 65. Geburtstag*, Vienne, Böhlau, 2007, p. 200.

[63]   Ivan Biliarsky, « Pravus et crudelis inimicus Communis Ianue et omnium Ianuensium », dans *Studia Pontica*, éd. Ivan Biliarsky (= *Méditerranées*, n° 26-27), Paris, L'Harmattan, 2001, p. 131.

[64]   Ioan Bogdan, *Documentele lui Ștefan cel Mare*, Bucarest, Atelierele Grafice Socec & Co., Societate Anonimă, 1913, vol. II, doc. CXXVIII (1460) ; P. P. Panaitescu, « Legăturile moldo-polone în secolul XV și problema Chiliei », dans *Romanoslavica*, 1958, p. 95-96 ; Nicoară Beldiceanu, « La Moldavie ottomane », *art. cit.*, p. 250-251.

[65]   Archives Nationales de la Roumanie, Colecția Documente Selecționate Moldova, nr. 8, *doc. cit.*

[66]   Ioan Bogdan, *Documentele lui Ștefan cel Mare, op. cit.*, vol. I, doc. LXXXIV (1470), XCI (1471), XCVI (1472) ; Constantin C. Giurescu, *Istoria pescuitului și a pisciculturii în Romînia*, Bucarest, Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Romîne, 1964, vol. I, p. 88-90, 264.

[67]   Ioan Bogdan, *Documentele lui Ștefan cel Mare, op. cit.*, vol. I, doc. XCI (1471).

[68]   Nicoară Beldiceanu, « Kilia et Cetatea Albă à travers les documents ottomans », dans *Revue des Études Islamiques*, 1968/2, p. 237.

[69]   *Idem*, « La Moldavie ottomane », *art. cit.*, p. 255.

[70]   Cf. Sergio Aprosio, *Vocabolario ligure storico - bibliografico sec. X-XX*, Parte prima - Latino, vol. I, Savone, Società Savonese di Storia Patria, 2001, p. 184, *s. v. burgensem*.

[71]   Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, p. 198. De la liste rédigée par Balard il faut effacer *Iacobus Sparano de Gayta* qui, en réalité, habitait Constantinople (*ibid.*, doc. 99-101, 114) ; Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*, p. 187. À la liste des *habitatores* rédigée par Pistarino, il faut ajouter le Vénitien *Iohannes de Clarencia* (*ibid.*, doc. 47).

[72]   Luisa Castellani, *Gli uomini d'affari astigiani. Politica e denaro tra il Piemonte e l'Europa (1270-1312)*, Turin, Paravia, 1998, p. 146.

[73]   Pierre Racine, « Images de la colonisation placentine à L'Aïas et Caffa à la fin du XIIIᵉ siècle », dans *Rivista di Bizantinistica*, 1993, p. 327-354. Sur les Astesans au Proche-Orient et dans la Mer Noire voir : Laura Balletto, « Astigiani, alessandrini e monferrini a Caffa sulla fine del secolo XIII », dans *Rivista di Storia Arte Archeologia per le Province di Alessandria e Asti*, 1976, p. 171-184 ; *Eadem*, *Genova Mediterraneo Mar Nero, op. cit.*, p. 252-253 ; Geo Pistarino, « Monferrini e Piemontesi nel Vicino Oriente sulla fine del Duecento », dans *Stranieri in Piemonte e Piemontesi all'estero nel Medioevo*, Asti, Provincia di Asti, 1999, p. 54, 56-58.

[74]   Sur la politique balkanique de Louis d'Anjou voir : Claude Michaud, « The kingdoms of central Europe in the fourteenth century », dans Michael Jones (dir.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. VI : c. 1300-c. 1415, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 738-739.

[75]   Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, doc. 122 ; Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*, doc. 42. Sur la figure de *Sarchis* voir : *Idem, I Gin dell'Oltremare, op. cit.*, p. 333-344.

[76]   *Idem, Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*, doc. 16, 42, 44, 56.

[77]   G. I. Brătianu, *Recherches sur Vicina et Cetatea Albă, op. cit.*, p. 138-139 ; Atanas Iscirkov, « Il nome della regione di Zagorie o Zagora nel passato ed al giorno d'oggi », dans *Genova e la Bulgaria nel Medioevo, op. cit.*, p. 307-317. Sur l'exportation et le commerce de la cire bulgare au Moyen Âge voir : Vasil Gjuzelev, « Nuovi documenti sull'attività commerciale dei Genovesi nelle terre bulgare nel secolo XIV », dans *Genova e la Bulgaria nel Medioevo, op. cit.*, p. 403-412 ; Васил Гюзелев, *Cera Zagora*, Пловдив, Фондация Българско Историческо Наследство, 2011 [Vasil Gjuzelev, *Cera Zagora*, Plovdiv, Fondation Bulgare pour l'Héritage Historique, 2011].

[78]   Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*, doc. 6, 19, 55.

[79]   *Ibid.*, doc. 19, 56.

[80]   Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, doc. 118. Pour la signification de *censarius* voir : Sergio Aprosio, *Vocabolario ligure, op. cit.*, Parte prima - Latino, vol. I, p. 252.

[81]   Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, p. 197-198 ; Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*, p. 185, 187.

[82]   *Idem, Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*, p. 187.

[83]   Lorenzo Pubblici, « Venezia e il Mar d'Azov », *art. cit.*, p. 466.

[84]   Sur les migrations en Orient et dans la Mer Noire au Moyen Âge voir : David Jacoby, « The Migration of Merchants and Craftsmen: a Mediterranean

Perspective (12th-15th Century) », dans Simonetta Cavaciocchi (dir.), *Le migrazioni in Europa secc. XIII-XVIII*, Florence, Le Monnier, 1994, p. 533-560.

[85] Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia*, *op. cit.*, doc. 61.

[86] Marco Cassioli, *Uno spazio di confine tra Liguria e Provenza: la Val Nervia nel basso medioevo e nella prima età moderna (secoli XII-XVII) / Une vallée frontière entre Provence et Ligurie : la Nervia au Moyen Âge et dans le premier Âge moderne (XIIe-XVIIe siècle)*, thèse pour obtenir les grades de Docteur de l'Université d'Aix-Marseille et de Docteur de l'Università degli Studi di Torino, présentée et soutenue publiquement le 5 avril 2014, p. 87-88.

[87] *La conoscenza del territorio ligure fra medio evo ed età moderna*, éd. Massimo Quaini, Gênes, Sagep, 1981, p. 86.

[88] Nicoară Beldiceanu, « Kilia et Cetatea Albă », *art. cit.*, p. 237.

[89] *Idem*, « La Moldavie ottomane », *art. cit.*, p. 245.

[90] Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia*, *op. cit.*, doc. 22, 30, 41, 50, 56, 75, 77.

[91] Boris Dmitrievič Grekov, *L'orda d'oro*, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[92] Enrico Basso, « Il mercante e l'interprete: contratti, processi e falsi documentari nelle colonie genovesi », dans Piero de Gennaro (dir.), *La ricerca della verità*, Turin, Università degli Studi di Torino et Trauben Editrice, 2010, p. 237.

[93] Sévérien Salaville, « Un manuscrit chrétien en dialecte turc : le Codex cumanicus », dans *Échos d'Orient*, 1911, p. 278-286 ; Vladimir Drimba, *Codex Comanicus. Édition diplomatique avec fac-similés*, Bucarest, Editura Enciclopedică, 2000.

[94] Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia*, *op. cit.*, doc. 50. Dans les sources concernant les colonies génoises, le terme de *Sarracenus* semble désigner les musulmans en général et non un groupe précis, comme les Arabes, les Turcs ou les Comans (*Idem*, « "Infidèles" ou Comans ? À propos des "Sarraceni" de Caffa », dans *La storia dei Genovesi*, Gênes, Copy-Lito, 1988, t. VIII, p. 9-16 ; Catherine Otten-Froux, « Encore à propos des "Sarraceni" », dans Laura Balletto (dir.), *Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna. Studi in onore di Geo Pistarino*, Gênes, Glauco Brigati, 1997, t. II, p. 931-938).

[95] Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia*, *op. cit.*, doc. 56.

[96] Sergiu Selian, *Schiță istorică a comunității armene din România*, Bucarest, Ararat, 1999, p. 13, 16 ; Alexandr Osipian, « Trans-cultural Trade in the Black Sea Region, 1250-1700: Integration of the Armenian Trading Diaspora in the Moldavian Principality », dans *New Europe College, Black Sea Link Program, Yearbook 2012-2013*, p. 113 ; Gabriella Uluhogian, *Gli Armeni*, Bologne, il Mulino, 2013, p. 185.

[97] Silvia Baraschi, « Tatars and Turks in Genoese deeds from Kilia (1360-1361) », dans *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, 1987/1, p. 64.

[98] Boris Dmitrievič Grekov, *L'orda d'oro, op. cit.*, p. 47-48.

[99] Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, doc. 22.

[100] *Idem*, « Un document génois sur la langue roumaine en 1360 », dans *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, 1980/2, p. 236.

[101] Vasile Mărculeț, *Relațiile Imperiului bizantin și ale Republicilor Maritime italiene cu Țările Române până în secolul al XV-lea*, Sibiu, 2002, p. 192 ; Gheorghe Pungă, *Studiul izvoarelor. Științe speciale ale istoriei. Paleografia româno-chirilică*, Universitatea „Alexandru Ioan Cuza" Iași, Facultatea de Istorie, 2013-2014, p. 5. Sur le débat autour de la langue *romecha* voir aussi : Ștefan Andreescu, « Trois actes des Archives de Gênes concernant l'histoire de la Mer Noire au XVe siècle », dans *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, 1983/1, p. 35-36 ; Elisaveta Todorova, « Sur une nouvelle source dans l'histoire du Delta danubien au XIVe siècle », dans *Études balkaniques*, 1983/1, p. 124-127 ; Andrei Pippidi, « Romecha », dans *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, 1986/3, p. 287-288.

[102] Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, p. 205-206.

[103] *Idem*, « Habitat, ethnies et métiers dans les comptoirs génois d'Orient (XIIIe-XVe siècle) », dans Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur (dir.), *D'une ville à l'autre. Structures matérielles et organisation de l'espace dans les villes européennes (XIIIe-XVIe siècle)*, Rome, École Française de Rome, 1989, p. 107 ; Enrico Basso, *Insediamenti e commercio nel Mediterraneo bassomedievale. I mercanti genovesi dal Mar Nero all'Atlantico*, Turin, Marco Valerio, 2008, p. 49, 52.

[104] Archives Nationales de la Roumanie, Colecția Documente Selecționate Moldova, nr. 8, *doc. cit.*

[105] Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, doc. 22, 30, 41, 50, 56, 75, 77, 102, 117, 121-122 ; Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*, doc. 6-8, 15, 18, 20, 22, 24-25, 32, 39, 41, 46-47, 59-60, 63, 67, 71, 83, 85, 88, 93-94, 97.

[106] Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, doc. 77.

[107] Laura Balletto, « Tra burocrazia e mercatura a Chilia », *art. cit.*, p. 49.

[108] Gabriella Airaldi, « Note sulla cancelleria di Caffa nel secolo XIV », dans *Eadem*, *Studi e documenti su Genova e l'Oltremare*, Bordighera, Istituto Internazionale di Studi Liguri, 1974, p. 13 ; Silvana Raiteri, *Atti rogati a Licostomo, op. cit.*, doc. 1 ; Sergej Anatol'evič Sekirinskij, Oleg Vladimirovič Volobuev et Konstantin Konstantinovič Kogonašvili, « La fortezza di Sudak », dans Anna Prefumo (dir.), *Storici sovietici del Levante genovese*, Gênes, Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1985, p. 115. Sur les interprètes dans les colonies génoises du bassin pontique voir : Michel Balard, *La Romanie génoise, op. cit.*, t. I, p. 315-318.

[109]   Maria Pia Pedani, *Venezia porta d'Oriente*, Bologne, il Mulino, 2010, p. 34-35.

[110]   Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, doc. 41 ; Geo Pistarino, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chilia, op. cit.*, doc. 15, 18, 67, 71. Sur la présence des Vénitiens dans la Kilia génoise voir : Elisaveta Todorova, « Le relazioni di Dobrotiza con i Genovesi », dans *Genova e la Bulgaria nel Medioevo, op. cit.*, p. 238-239.

[111]   Geo Pistarino, *La capitale del Mediterraneo: Genova nel Medioevo*, Bordighera, Istituto Internazionale di Studi Liguri, 1993.

[112]   Sur la faune piscicole du delta voir : Sergiu I. Cărăuşu, *Tratat de Ichtiologie*, Bucarest, Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Române, 1952 ; Th. Buşniţă et I. Alexandrescu, *Atlasul peștilor din apele R.S.România*, Bucarest, Ceres, 1971. Je remercie le Professeur Dumitru Balinte pour avoir mis à ma disposition sa bibliothèque de biologie.

[113]   Iolanda Ţighiliu, *Economia Domanială. Creșterea animalelor în Ţările Române (secolele XIV-XVII)*, Târgovişte, Cetatea de Scaun, 2009, p. 74-75.

[114]   Nicolae Iorga, *Studii istorice asupra Chiliei și Cetății Albe, op. cit.*, p. 194-195.

[115]   Michel Balard, *La Romanie génoise, op. cit.*, t. I, p. 285.

[116]   *Ibid.*, p. 284.

[117]   *Idem, Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t. II : *Actes de Kilia, op. cit.*, doc. 56.

[118]   Silvana Raiteri, *Atti rogati a Licostomo, op. cit.*, doc. 1.

[119]   Sur la présence des Arméniens dans la Kilia ottomane voir : Nicolae Iorga, *Studii istorice asupra Chiliei și Cetății Albe, op. cit.*, p. 257-258.

[120]   Sur l'administration de Kilia à l'époque ottomane voir : Anca Popescu, *Integrarea imperială otomană, op. cit.*, p. 52-55, 63.

BEÁTA HUSZKA

Born in 1976, in Szeged (Hungary)

Ph.D. of Philosophy in Political Science, Central European University
Dissertation: *Secessionist Framing: The Role of Different Discourses in Creating Arguments for Self-Determination*

Assistant Professor, Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE, Budapest, Hungary), European Studies Department
Leader of Work Package 6 at ELTE: 'Regional partnerships and bilateral cooperation' in the EU's FP7 project: *Fostering Human Rights Among European Policies* (FRAME)

Fellowships and grants:
International Policy Fellowship (IPF), affiliated with the Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2006 – 2007
Doctoral research grant, European University Institute, Florence, Italy, 2006

Participation in international conferences:
Book panel at the CEU-ASN conference in Budapest, 2014
Presenter and panel chair at the ISA Annual Convention in San Diego, USA, 2012

Participation in research projects:

Leader of the Visegrad Plus project entitled "Increasing human security as an instrument of conflict resolution: the case of the Serbian minority in Kosovo" at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, Budapest, Hungary, 2012-2014

Researcher in the project coordinated by the European Policy Centre (Brussels) "EU member states and enlargement towards the Balkans", 2014-2015

Media researcher of CEU in Eurosphere European Consortium (EU FP6 framework program project), 2008 – 2009

Articles published on the role of human rights in the EU's external relations; human security of the Serbian community in Kosovo; Hungary's EU enlargement policy in the Western Balkans; political developments in Serbia; the settlement process between Serbia and Kosovo; discourse of independence movements in the former Yugoslavia; situation of minorities in the former Yugoslavia; decentralization of Serbia and ethnic minorities

Book:

Secessionist Movements and Ethnic Conflict: Debate-Framing and Rhetoric in Independence Campaigns, Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2014

THE EU'S HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (2000-2008)

Abstract

This chapter investigates how the EU's human rights conditionality operates in the enlargement context, and what is its real impact in the target countries on existing human rights practices. The fundamental question about the efficiency of conditionality is ultimately whether it can induce the transformation of existing norms and practices going beyond formal compliance. First, the various inconsistencies characterizing the EU's human rights promotion will be reviewed here, because the resulting lack of credibility seems to undermine this transformative effect. The second half of this chapter will demonstrate how these inconsistencies play out in an actual case through studying the EU's conditionality policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina before 2008. It will be shown that the credibility of conditionality policy was seriously compromised during this period as the EU practically accepted partial measures, which were never quite enough for putting the reforms in place as they were originally intended.[1]

The EU's enlargement policy is generally viewed as the EU's most efficient foreign policy instrument in terms of its ability to transform existing practices and institutional structures outside of its borders. Moreover, the EU's annual progress reports testify to a meticulous examination of the partner countries' record in meeting human rights and democratic standards, including minority rights. Therefore, it is worth investigating how the EU's human rights conditionality operates in the enlargement context, and what is its real impact in the target countries on existing human rights practices.

However, most authors studying enlargement seem to share the view that the EU's record is mixed at best in spreading democratic norms in a credible and effective fashion during the accession process.[2] It is worth to be noted here that experiences from the Central Eastern European enlargement have also revealed the limits of the EU's democratic conditionality especially when it comes to implementation and post-accession performance.[3] The fundamental question about the efficiency of conditionality is whether it can induce the transformation of existing norms and practices going beyond formal compliance. From this perspective, the various inconsistencies that characterize the EU's human rights promotion are important to consider, because the resulting lack of credibility seem to undermine this transformative effect. The EU defines itself as a normative power on the international scene, yet performance has been far below its rhetoric. As it is often being argued, the EU supports democracy and human rights in an opportunistic way: subordinates normative goals to wider strategic considerations, while applies double standards as to which countries it sanctions for the violation of human rights and democratic standards.[4]

This study therefore will first review the inconsistencies that were formulated by various scholars concerning the EU's human rights policy in the Western Balkans. The second half of this chapter will demonstrate how these inconsistencies play out in an actual case through studying the EU's conditionality policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia or BiH), by focusing on the process leading up to the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2008. During this period Bosnia was motivated by the prospect of receiving an SAA, which gave considerable leverage to the EU to push forward its own agenda, including on human rights. However, it will be shown that the credibility of conditionality policy was seriously compromised during this period as the EU practically accepted partial measures which were never quite enough for putting the reforms in place as they were originally intended. It is being argued here that Bosnia pursued the strategy of "reluctant compliance", by introducing some legal and institutional measures *just* not enough for reaching the originally desired effect of these reforms, thus falling short of implementation. Such tactics were applied concerning the broadcasting reform, which concerned the issue of media freedom, and was a key condition of the SAA.

A. Inconsistencies as Discussed by the Literature

There is a growing recognition not only among scholars but also within the EU institutions that the EU cannot live up to its own ideals in its foreign policy. A central question addressed by the existing works on enlargement is how to explain this underperformance.[5] While explaining the weak results of the EU in promoting human rights in the Western Balkans, authors, on the one hand, tend to point to the special historical, political and social characteristics of South East Europe that pose unusual challenges, mostly related to the legacy of the conflicts in the 1990s and the early 2000s. The criteria enshrined in the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs), which similarly to the Europe Agreements of the mid 1990s put a great emphasis on democratic conditions, also included additional requirements addressing issues related to state building and reconciliation, such as the return of refugees, ethnic and religious reconciliation, the requirement for regional cooperation and the extradition of war criminals.[6] Thus the Western Balkan countries face enhanced conditionality as compared to previous enlargements whereas their institutional capacity is much more limited than that of the Central and Eastern European countries during their pre-accession period.

Moreover, as the EU has been engaged in state building in the Western Balkans' post conflict environments, this resulted in the construction of "minimalist states" which hardly fulfil functions that states ought to carry out, illustrated best by the example of BiH. Bosnia's constitution originating in the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) violates individual human rights as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in 2009, and created a highly fragmented and dysfunctional state, yet it was meant to maintain power-sharing among the three constituent peoples thus preserving the stability of the country. This case reveals that assisting post-conflict reconstruction and building future member states at the same time proved to be a challenging task. Consequently, the EU has been unable to effectively apply accession conditionality to transform institutions and norms in the target countries.[7]

As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier concluded, conditionality policy which resembles a rationalist bargaining process seems to lead to adoption of EU rules where high and credible incentives go along with low domestic adoption costs.[8] However, while this "external incentive model" according to which external rewards help elites to overcome domestic costs worked effectively in Central and Eastern Europe, its application to the Western

Balkans is more problematic. Membership remains a relatively remote perspective, implying that the rewards of compliance in the present are limited. Moreover, the EU is interested in real rule adoption which goes beyond the mere transposition of rules and results in the transformation of values, norms and practices.

Such transformative effect captured by the notion of Europeanisation does not seem to follow if EU demands contrast with national identity, which has been the case in several countries in the region. Macedonia's unwillingness to compromise on the name issue, which hampers its NATO and EU accession is a case in point. Similarly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, meeting the EU's demands would have required constitutional changes, which would have undermined the power position of nationalist elites sustained by the current state structure. This significantly increases the costs of compliance thus weakening the chances of EU conditionality to succeed. The fragmented structure of BiH does not permit its institutions to function effectively and to adopt and implement EU legislation, which is why the EU has strongly promoted constitutional reform which would strengthen the state at the expense of the entities, albeit so far without any success.[9] Although the EU does not require a specific constitutional order, any state seeking membership should be able to formulate positions about how it intends to implement the acquis.

Between 2009 and 2014, compliance with the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the so called Sejdić and Finci case was one of the main requirements of EU integration for Bosnia, which would allow minorities to run for the highest state offices currently reserved for the three constituent peoples: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Without bringing the Bosnian constitution in line with this ruling, Bosnia could not become an EU candidate and also lost some of its EU funding. This is an exceptional case of directly tying EU candidacy to meeting a specific human rights condition. Yet, this particular human rights issue was elevated to this high position in the EU's conditionality policy because it would necessitate a change in the constitutional structure that the EU long has sought for. Thus promoting human rights became a tool of encouraging constitutional change and state building, which has been the highest priority on the EU's agenda. Yet, because this specific conditionality requirement cut to the heart of Bosnia's constitutional order and the power-sharing among the three constituent nations, it met the opposition of political elites.

There were further cases where formal adherence to the EU's expectations did not produce real compliance because of a clash between

the EU's norms and local values. Serbia's cooperation with the Hague Tribunal can be mentioned here as an example. Even though Serbia fulfilled the EU's expectations when it extradited the most wanted war criminals, its value system hardly changed, reflected by official rhetoric presenting the extraditions as necessary steps of getting closer to the EU.[10] Serbia's compliance in the area of LGBT rights presents a similar scenario. As Mikus in his case study about Serbia's 2010 Pride Parade explained, while "the state communicated it as something required by the EU, it avoided open ideological confrontation with the opponents by condemning and legally sanctioning the violence as such, not as homophobic or ideology-based". By this rhetorical strategy, state representatives distanced themselves from the values the Pride symbolized, at the same time formally met the EU's demands by securing the event by heavy police presence.[11] However, some positive trends can be also observed. Changes in the party systems in Croatia and Serbia testify to the marginalization of radical nationalism and an opening toward Europe. Namely, in Croatia the HDZ's endorsement of EU integration and democratization, while in Serbia the emergence of the Serbian Progressive Party from the Serbian radicals and their compliance with the EU's requirements suggest gradual value transformation even if it is mostly driven by instrumental rationality.[12]

While these reasons outlined above stem from the special characteristics of the Western Balkans, the EU itself is also being blamed for various inconsistencies, which weaken the credibility of its engagement and undermine its transformative potential during the integration process. There is an apparent discrepancy between obligations of Member States and conditionality towards EU candidates, both in terms of the scope of rights and the meticulousness of the monitoring process. The EU's fundamental rights acquis as presented in Chapter 23 of the accession negotiations is broader than the list of rights related to Article 2 of the Treaty of the EU (TEU) or the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (applying to Member States), illustrated by the issue of minority rights protection and media freedom. Moreover, the Charter constrains Member States only when they are implementing EU law, while in the case of candidates practically any act or policy can be checked on human rights' grounds by the EU. Although based on Article 7 TEU there is way to control Member States' conduct even when they act outside the scope of EU law, the process is fairly cumbersome as it requires unanimity from the European Council and support from the European Parliament. Importantly, it is a mechanism which has been never used.[13] By contrast, throughout the

whole accession process, the Council can suspend negotiations with a candidate by a qualified majority decision. A more rigorous monitoring of meeting fundamental rights standards than before was introduced at the start of accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey indicated by adding Chapter 23, a new chapter on judiciary and fundamental rights to the monitoring process. Furthermore, learning from the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU began to use opening, interim and closing benchmarks, which allow Member States to suspend the whole accession process if they see problems regarding this specific chapter. Moreover, in Croatia's case an annex was added to the Accession Treaty which allowed the European Commission to evaluate Croatia's compliance concerning fundamental rights and judiciary even after accession.[14]

A further discrepancy often pointed out is the one between values and interests; namely that the EU is being driven by security or other kinds of foreign policy goals, which tend to override human rights considerations.[15] The EU's asylum policy is an example where "Europeanization" hardly means improving human rights standards. On the contrary, the EU's external asylum and immigration policy in the Western Balkans (and elsewhere) has been mostly driven by the aspiration to keep immigrants away from its borders "with little concern for human rights and international standards of refugee protection".[16]

In the Balkan context, tension between norms-based rhetoric and security interests could be observed in conditionality applied in relation to issues of "state-ness". While addressing remaining challenges of statehood, the EU most often makes normative claims, yet it is often driven by security considerations. The conditionality applied on Bosnia and more specifically the demand for compliance with the Sejdić-Finci case illustrates this well.[17] As was explained above, the EU put this human rights condition so high on the agenda because of its potential for constitutional reform, which would be key to preserve unity of the state. At the end of 2014, faced with the lack of progress, the EU "postponed" thus practically dropped this demand from the list of essential conditions, which was a further sign that even the EU did not see the resolution of this issue as an urgent need from a human rights point of view. As Noutcheva pointed out, when the EU makes normative claims yet is obviously motivated by security considerations, fake, partial or non-compliance can be expected from the states which are subject to such conditionality policy.[18] Thus, the rhetoric of rigorous conditionality often comes into conflict with interests related

to security and the aspiration to keep the affected countries on the course of European integration.[19]

Moreover, conditionality can succeed in accomplishing its ultimate goal of member state building only if it is linked to credible prospects of accession into the European Union. However, the weaker political and institutional capacity of these states is coupled not only with greater conditionality demands but also with a growing enlargement fatigue in the EU.[20] This creates confusion and ambiguity with regards to EU conditionality thus reducing the chances for real compliance.

A further source of confusion relates to the lack of conceptual clarity regarding human rights conditionality. As Ridder and Kochenov concluded while studying the 2004 enlargement round, "the EU has never reached any conceptual clarity on what constitutes a consolidated democracy".[21] In practice, a distinction can be made between acquis conditionality, which involves the rather straightforward task of transposing the EU's acquis communautaire, and non-acquis conditionality, where the Union cannot legislate including democracy and human rights principles (even if the same principles are part of Article 2 of the TEU as the principles on which the EU is built).[22] Similarly, the accession criteria concerning democracy, rule of law and human rights as anchored in the Copenhagen criteria provide very general and vague guidelines as to what is being exactly promoted. Democratic conditionality as was actually applied during the Central Eastern European enlargement process, was ad hoc, inconsistent and unpredictable. It was often a political question on the EU's side whether a country managed to meet democratic standards. Part of the reason was that these issues fell outside of the scope of the acquis communautaire, thus the European Commission lacked clear benchmarks and indicators for serious assessment.[23] This points to a general problem of EU conditionality not constrained to human rights issues. Several empirical case studies revealed that the EU can promote reforms effectively in particular areas where it has a consensus about its own norms, which then allows it to make clear demands.[24]

In the area of minority rights the EU tends to rely on external anchors such as the Council of Europe's Framework Convention, or standards set by OSCE. Within this context the EU demands measures like anti-discrimination directives, inclusion strategies, and certain citizenship policies. Yet, it depends very much on the case what is being required exactly. For instance, as Kacarska demonstrated, the content of minority rights conditionality in Macedonia to a large extent was a

result of a dynamic interaction between national level policies and the EU. Macedonia adopted the law on the use of minority languages under informal EU pressure, yet initially this was not part of official conditionality. However, after the law's adoption in 2008, the EU regularly monitored its implementation.[25] Similarly, the EU applied minority protection conditionality both on Serbia and Romania, yet the content of requirements differed between the two cases. The EU supported cultural autonomy for Hungarians in Serbia but not in Romania, which can be explained by the difference in domestic dynamics within the two countries; namely that in Serbia a consensus emerged between the Serbian government and Hungarian minority parties about the desirability of cultural autonomy as opposed to Romania where such a consensus have been lacking. At the same time, the public use of minority languages and education in the minority's language were among the issues pushed by the EU in both states.[26] Thus these cases demonstrate that standards were an outcome of a negotiated process while compliance became a matter of political judgments in the absence of clear benchmarks.[27]

This points to the general problem of human rights conditionality; that is how to determine sufficient levels of performance. The EU tends to pay attention to the adoption of specific legal measures, which sometimes amounts to mere window dressing without meaningful implementation. A study commissioned by the European Parliament explained the European Commission's monitoring of human and minority rights in the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans.[28] Enlargement Strategy Papers, Progress Reports, European and Accession Partnerships, Stabilization and Association Agreements, IPA and EIDHR programs were analyzed in order to establish how the Commission defined the priorities within this issue area, and whether it consistently and adequately followed up on these during its monitoring process. According to this study's findings, it was unclear how and why the Commission chose some human rights and not others as its focus. Important rights were left out from the monitoring process, such as freedom of movement, right to privacy or right to education just to name few. In the area of minority rights, progress tended to be measured by adopting requested legislation or action plans, while monitoring rarely relied on numbers, statistics or assessment of minority organizations. Importantly, there were no clear indicators to measure progress, which is why the conclusions reached by the Commission could often seem as arbitrary. Connected to this problem, specific recommendations as to how political criteria of respecting minority rights

could be met were usually missing.[29] Many of these findings – specifically about the lack of conceptual clarity of the content of human and minority rights, clear indicators and adequate attention paid to implementation – echo the conclusions reached by Ridder and Kochenov about the Central Eastern European enlargement.

There is a further inconsistency which concerns the EU's credibility while keeping its own threats and promises. According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, this credibility of conditionality determines to a great extent whether compliance will follow.[30] This credibility suffers when candidates can get by with making formal changes without effective progress in the area of democratic norms and human rights, without any reprisal from the EU's side. Koinova enumerated the various institutional and legal steps Macedonia took regarding human and minority rights after signing the Ohrid Agreement, which could suggest a visible improvement in the human rights area. However, when measuring implementation based on monitoring of various human rights organizations, performance was just the same in the 2000s as in the 1990s, before the EU's engagement. In spite of this, Macedonia was awarded candidate status in 2005, and since 2009 the European Commission has recommended opening accession negotiations. This means that according to the EU, Macedonia fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, despite serious shortcomings in the field of human and minority rights.[31] The Macedonian case falls in line with the experience of other post-conflict states in the Western Balkans, where due to the legacy of ethnic conflict, security concerns were prioritized over human rights issues.

In Macedonia however, the situation further deteriorated after the 2000s. Recent revelations suggest that during the last few years grave human rights violations were committed by the government, among them the surveillance of 20.000 people, "direct involvement in election fraud, abuse of the justice system and media" and covering up murder cases.[32] Although the political scandal leading to the publication of these information broke out in February 2015, developments have been building up during the previous years. The EU's progress report as of October 2014 nevertheless considered "that the political criteria continue to be sufficiently met" and thus maintained "its recommendation to open accession negotiations". [33]

This case also sheds light on the confusion surrounding the Copenhagen criteria, which includes the respect of human rights and the protection of minorities. In principle, only if a candidate already met these criteria

can start accession negotiations. However, the thorough monitoring of meeting fundamental rights standards during the accession process suggests otherwise. Why would the EU need to monitor something so rigorously which has been fulfilled already? Macedonia's case shows that fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria does not mean that a country could not have serious shortcomings in the area of fundamental rights.

In the following the requirement for consistency related to the credibility of the EU's conditionality policy will be examined here in further detail, by looking at the EU's human rights conditionality towards Bosnia before 2008. It will be shown that during the analyzed time period, the credibility of the EU's conditionality policy was compromised concerning the broadcasting reform which concerned the issue of media freedom, and which was set as an essential condition of progress on Bosnia's European integration path. This section will look at the period 2000-2008 through analyzing the instruments the EU deployed under the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in Bosnia: the EU Road Map of 2000, the Feasibility Study in 2003, the 2004 and 2006 European Partnerships, CARDS and IPA documents, and the 2005 and 2007 EU progress reports. The focus will be on what human rights priorities these instruments revealed, how these priorities had changed over time and how consistent they had been with each other. It will be also considered what was the weight and place of human rights within the EU's overall conditionality policy at that stage. Whether human rights concerns become "make or break issues" is the ultimate measure that is whether failure to meet the requirements results in suspension of the Stabilization and Accession Process or the cutting of assistance funds. By tracing the EU's human rights policy through focusing on these various instruments, it will be also demonstrated that the EU prioritizes some human rights over others despite the claimed commitment to the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural.

B. The EU's Human Rights Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000-2008)

Peace-building and EU integration were the main goals the EU sought to accomplish in Bosnia by following an integrated strategy through employing instruments belonging to different parts of the EU's institutional

machinery. The EU acted in close cooperation with other international actors in Bosnia such as the High Representative (HR) and NATO, and also used other instruments such as those of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)/Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) besides the ones employed under the SAP, which is the focus of the present research.

The HR had a very defining role on political developments and institution building in Bosnia, and had a close division of labor with the EU while often pursuing the same agenda. The Dayton Accords established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and bestowed it with extraordinary powers to oversee the civilian aspect of peace implementation and coordination. In 1997 responding to mounting post-war tensions in Bosnia the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) at its Bonn conference endowed the OHR with great authority including dismissing elected officials and imposing legislation, which are generally called the Bonn powers. Owing to these strong competencies, the OHR has played a very influential if controversial role in Bosnia.[34] Although the OHR responds to the PIC including more than 50 donor countries, between 2002 and 2011 the HR became double hatted by assuming also the role of the EU Special Representative (EUSR). The two had separate mandates and the Bonn powers were bestowed only upon the High Representative and not on the EUSR, still in practice it is very difficult to disentangle the EU's agenda from that of the OHR given that the same person filled the two posts until 2011.

In 1999 the European Commission launched the *Stabilization and Association Process* (SAP) offering contractual relations to the Western Balkan states modelled on the Europe Agreements with Central and Eastern Europe. In 2000 the European Commission prepared the *Road Maps* which contained the necessary steps target countries had to take for opening negotiations on the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs). The CARDS program operating between 2000 and 2006 provided the financial basis of assistance of the SAP, which was replaced by the IPA program after 2006. Respect for fundamental principles such as democracy, rule of law and human and minority rights were conditions of accessing CARDS funds and autonomous trade measures which were both part of the SAP. Such aid programs also reinforced the EU's human rights strategy which was strongly geared towards security goals by placing emphasis on cross-ethnic civil society projects, refugee return or supporting moderate leaders.[35] Regional cooperation and good neighborly relations remained an important condition during the SAP as a significant share of

the CARDS funds – about 10 per cent – was dedicated to financing regional cooperation activities in areas such as integrated border management, infrastructure and institution building.[36]

The SAP process cannot be separated from enlargement policy to the Western Balkans, being "the European Union's policy towards the Western Balkans, established with the aim of eventual EU membership".[37] Thus the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) provide the contractual framework of relations between the EU and the Western Balkan countries until they reach EU membership. The agreements operate on a bilateral basis yet the SAP also promotes regional cooperation which was set as one of its conditions.[38] In the following the various instruments presented by the EU will be analyzed in chronological order with a special emphasis on their human rights component.

The first step of the SAP process was the presentation of the so call *EU Road Map* in 2000 that identified eighteen conditions which were necessary for opening negotiations on the SAA. A third of these concerned measures in the "Fields of Democracy, Human Rights and Rule of Law". The *Feasibility Study* published in 2003 examined whether Bosnia was prepared to start talks on the SAA by revisiting the conditions defined in the Road Map three years earlier. Among these the following touched upon human rights, besides "fully co-operating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY], notably in bringing war criminals to justice before the Tribunal":

- refugee return;
- "completing the transfer of human rights bodies to state control";
- resolving all outstanding cases of the Human Rights Chamber transferring the latter's responsibilities to the Constitutional Court;
- "assuming full national responsibility for the State Ombudsman and making progress in the merger of State and Entity Ombudsmen";
- "ensuring the long-term viability of a financially and editorially independent State-wide public broadcasting system whose constituent broadcasters share a common infrastructure".

It concluded that Bosnia was not yet ready for opening talks on the SAA and listed sixteen priorities that had to be further pursued. It is clear from the Road Map and the Feasibility Study, that the EU's human rights agenda for Bosnia during this early phase of the SAP was very much focused on the creation of human rights institutions, such as setting up the state level ombudsman office and the transfer of the Human Rights' Chamber's tasks to the Constitutional Court. The broadcasting reform strongly promoted by

the EU concerned the issue of media freedom, besides which thus refugee return, and ICTY cooperation were the expressed human rights priorities.[39]

However, the lacking functionality of the state able to negotiate an agreement with the EU and present a single, coherent national position was pointed out as the most important obstacle, as "BiH's core challenge". Originating from the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia has a highly decentralized state, made up by the two autonomous entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republica Srpska (Serbian Republic: RS). In the Federation power is further devolved to ten cantons that function as mini states with their own government, parliament, court and police. Out of the ten cantons in the Federation, five have Bosniak majority, three have a Croat majority while two cantons have a mixed population. The Republica Srpska is dominated by Serb majority. At the state level there is parity among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, while at entity and lower levels the three constituent peoples have guaranteed representation, and have the possibility to veto decisions that they see as detrimental to their vital national interests.

All this resulted in complicated mechanisms of power-sharing among the three constituent peoples, which often paralyzed the state. The European Commission admitted that every reform that Bosnia had achieved was due to engagement of the OHR, which questioned whether Bosnia would be able to sustain the SAA.[40] In the human rights area, the OHR was involved in war crimes prosecution, refugee return and the broadcasting reform matching general EU priorities. The OHR was preparing the conditions for domestic war crimes prosecution in Bosnia and supported the work of the Srebrenica Commission investigating the Srebrenica massacre. It was closely monitoring the return process and ensured the harmonization of entity laws with that of the state. Together with the European Commission, the OHR was "lobbying the Bosnia and Herzegovina parliament to address outstanding issues and to ensure the sustainability of public broadcasting in Bosnia and Herzegovina".[41]

Concerning the public broadcasting reform, the EU's goal was the "Assurance of the long-term viability of a financially and editorially independent single state-wide public broadcasting system for Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose constituent broadcasters share a common infrastructure allowing efficiency and quality improvements."[42] The Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) reform had become a major focus of the OHR and a central element of EU conditionality. Under pressure of the OHR, a state-level, cross ethnic broadcaster was created besides the two already

existing entity broadcasters, which started its operation in August 2004 covering almost the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina territory. Bosnia then had three broadcasting services – one at the level of the state and two at the level of the entities – which according to the EU's agenda were expected to cooperate in program production, asset management and to jointly establish a single public broadcasting system. The goal was to overcome ethnic divisions and achieve territorial integration in broadcasting services, not least to prevent political instrumentalization of broadcasting services. After 2002 the OHR slowly withdrew from the process which was taken over by conditionality policy led by the Commission. From 2003 PSB reform became an essential condition of the SAP, as will be shown in the subsequent sections. Thus media reform fundamentally aimed at overcoming the fragmentation of the broadcasting services along ethnic lines and creating a single public broadcaster.

In 2004 the EU presented the first *European Partnership* for Bosnia to assist the reform process by introducing mid-term priorities with specific deadlines and planned budgetary resources, which also served as the basis for CARDS assistance planning.[43] Altogether, the Partnership highlighted the following human rights issues: the prosecution of war crimes, minority rights, rights of the Roma, refugee return, fight against human trafficking, the consolidation of the ombudsman's office and the harmonization of laws with the European Convention of Human Rights. Support for the media was included as a sectoral thus not as a human rights priority, and focused on the broadcasting reform. The Partnership also indicated financial sources and required actions. While looking at planned financing sources, the reconstruction of refugee houses was the only human rights related action which was planned to receive CARDS assistance.[44] Considering the overall CARDS assistance dedicated to Bosnia between 2000 and 2006, in the category of democratic consolidation the return and re-integration of refugees and IDPs and support for the media and civil society were the two human rights causes that received CARDS financing. Overall one third of CARDS financing was dedicated to these two human rights issues during the whole period, however between 2001 and 2006 financing priorities shifted away to other fields, such as to institution building and economic and social development. Altogether only one of the Partnership's human rights priorities – refugee return – received financing from CARDS, while the media was supported as a sectoral partnership priority.[45]

In November 2005 the Commission recommended opening negotiations for the SAA, which officially started during the same month.

In its communication to the Council the Commission followed up on the requirements formulated in the Feasibility Study recognizing that Bosnia fulfilled a number of conditions outlined there. In the human rights field it found that Bosnia's compliance was satisfactory concerning the first four items:

> legislation necessary to support refugee returns has been adopted, and that a Bosnia and Herzegovina Refugee Return Fund has been established and is in operation. Human rights-related competencies have been transferred from the Entity-level to the State-level, as recommended by the CoE and other international bodies. The Human Rights Commission has been established; it is working within the Constitutional Court and is ensuring due follow up to human rights-related cases.

The Commission also approvingly noted that there has been progress regarding cooperation with the ICTY as a "substantial number of indicted war criminals has been transferred to The Hague in recent months". However, cooperation with the Tribunal was still not regarded as sufficient. Moreover, the Commission singled out three conditions that still had to be fulfilled by the deadline of February 2006 under the threat of suspending negotiations: police reform, the adoption of the law on public broadcasting service and ICTY cooperation.[46] In addition, a number of issues were listed that "the authorities should pay special attention to and achieve substantial progress on". Among these some were related to human rights such as the "implementation of the outstanding Council of Europe post-accession obligations, in particular in the areas of electoral law and education and adoption of the legislation necessary for the establishment of a single Ombudsman in Bosnia and Herzegovina". Adoption of the laws establishing the Data Protection Commission and the Information Society Agency were also mentioned.[47]

Altogether, among the still outstanding conditions, besides continuing ICTY cooperation and the requirement of media reform about broadcasting, no other human rights issue was highlighted as a strict essential precondition of opening negotiations on the SAA. Several human rights related requirements of the European Partnership were omitted from SAA conditionality, such as those concerning minorities and the Roma, while harmonization of legislation with the ECHR and creation of the state ombudsman office were highlighted as important but not essential conditions.

In 2006 Bosnia received its second European Partnership. Again, ICTY cooperation and the broadcasting reform were the only human rights related topics listed among key priorities in the Partnership. Among its short and medium term priorities the Partnership highlighted the following human rights issues:[48]

- granting full electoral rights to minorities in line with ECHR;
- abolishing the death penalty in Republica Srpska;
- meeting reporting requirements of international conventions;
- solving outstanding human rights cases;
- improving the legal framework protecting national minorities and its implementation;
- social inclusion of the Roma;
- refugee return and social and economic inclusion of returnees;
- anti-trafficking measures and protection of victims of trafficking.

The *European Commission's yearly progress reports* have been among the most important and comprehensive instruments of conditionality in the context of the SAP and enlargement policy. Yet, they usually present a rather general discussion of a wide range of issues while the partnerships have been much more strategic in setting out a clear "to do" list for the respective countries. Therefore, it is worth to look at which issues highlighted in the 2005 EU progress report were followed up in the Partnership, and which were omitted from it. The Partnership even though touched upon media freedom, yet only with regards to the broadcasting reform while other aspects mentioned in the progress report such as intimidation and political pressure on the media were not raised. Minority rights were addressed in the Partnership most specifically from the aspect of electoral rights. Other aspects of discrimination against minorities such as in education and employment and the phenomenon of ethnically motivated incidents discussed extensively in the progress report, largely remained un-addressed in the Partnership. Prison conditions, right to legal aid, religious intolerance, discrimination on other basis than ethnicity such as sexual orientation, women's rights, children's rights, the situation of civil society and access to social protection were further problems raised in the progress report, which were not included among the Partnership priorities. All this suggest that some human rights were more important for the EU than others, forming a first and a second order of human rights issues. Even though the EU did monitor a number of human rights problems in its progress reports, the lack of progress in most of these areas did not put an obstacle to Bosnia's advancement on

its EU integration path. In practice, only essential conditions mattered and even there partial measures sufficed for a positive evaluation as will be explained through the case of the broadcasting reform below.

After the CARDS program ended in 2006, *the Instrument for Pre-accession (IPA)* became the framework of EU financial assistance for SAP countries. Main priorities for the first three years were set in the so called Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2007-2009 for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which claimed to follow medium term priorities and key short term priorities of the European Partnership from January 2006.[49] Among political objectives, the following human rights areas were identified as priorities for EU intervention: civil society, media freedom, war crimes prosecution, refugee return and minority protection. Yet, expected results reveal more about the content of these human rights goals. Civil society development aimed at generating a permanent dialogue between authorities and the civil society so that NGOs "become better 'watchdog' and also stronger partners of the Government". Media freedom meant strengthening the broadcasting service thus it will "remain an independent, self-sustainable, technically efficient institution". Thus other challenges to media freedom such as violence, intimidation and political pressure against journalists stressed in the 2005 progress report were again left unaddressed. Reform of the judicial system implied more efficient prosecution of war crimes so that they "will be in line with international standards". Refugee return and protection of minorities and vulnerable groups primarily aimed at social inclusion of returnees, minorities, children and disabled persons, presenting potentially effective tools against various aspects of discrimination discussed in the progress report but less elaborated upon in the partnership document. The support for civil society became a financial priority that was completely left out from the partnership goals. Otherwise, importantly, key partnership priorities were matched with financial assistance.

Since the SAA was initialed in December 2007 and signed in June 2008, it is worth to look into the 2007 progress report published in October 2007 in order to see what had changed as compared to 2005, to what extent Bosnia met the European Partnership requirements, and by the time of granting the signature what had remained outstanding in the human rights area. In the 2007 progress report police reform and full cooperation with the ICTY were spelled out as essential requirements, while the need for significant progress in broadcasting and public administration reform were also stressed. Thus, besides cooperation with the ICTY and

broadcasting reform which was meant to strengthen media freedom, no other human rights issue was turned into a make or break condition for signing the SAA.[50]

By comparing the 2005 and the 2007 progress reports, the lack of progress in the human rights field is apparent. There were very few improvements registered. As the 2007 report evaluated the situation, "some progress has been made as regards civil society organizations" explained by the fact that "the Council of Ministers signed an agreement on cooperation with the non-government sector and appointed a senior programming officer". However, it was added immediately that "civil society organizations continue to register mainly at Entity level, because the registration process at State level is perceived as more bureaucratic. Few NGOs are therefore active country-wide." The report similarly recorded "very limited progress" with regards to economic and social rights and minority rights, cultural rights and the protection of minorities. As the only clear success the securing of property rights for displaced persons and refugees and cooperation with the ICTY were mentioned.[51] Indeed, according to the report, "the process of repossession of property by displaced persons has been successfully completed". At the same time, the "limited progress" concerning minority rights referred to the improvement of the security situation for returnees, "although isolated incidents of violence have occurred". The report was basically silent about the general conditions of returnees, all we could learn was that "many refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) still not benefit from basic pension and health provisions". Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal was deemed generally satisfactory although still not reaching the level of full cooperation. Otherwise, concerning all the monitored human rights issues, the situation remained more or less the same as in 2005. Several problems that were emphasized in previous years, the report remained silent about, such as attacks on journalists and political pressure on the media.

The SAA was initialed in December 2007 and officially signed in June 2008 without Bosnia meeting even the essential conditions,[52] as even the formal conditions of the broadcasting reform remained unfulfilled. The State law on the public broadcasting system was adopted in October 2005 thus complying with a condition set in the Feasibility Study of *opening* negotiations on the SAA. Finishing this reform meaning the "adoption and implementation of all necessary public broadcasting legislation" was set as a criterion of closing SAA negotiations.[53] This meant that relevant

legislation also had to be adopted at the Entity level, while the ultimate goal was to bring together the three public broadcasters (the two Entity broadcasters and the nation-wide one) into a single legal entity managed through a single steering board. After SAA talks were opened in the end of 2005, continuing these legislative reforms was turned into an essential condition repeated also by European partnerships. Among the two entities the Republica Srpka passed the relevant laws, yet the Federation had not by the signing of the SAA in 2008, only a few months later. However, what had remained outstanding even after that was the harmonization of State and Entity level legislation, as well as full implementation, including the establishment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Corporation of the Public Broadcasting Services. As we saw from the discussion, the EU invested heavily into the broadcasting reform, not only its political energies but also financial means since supporting the PSB was one of the two CARDS human rights priorities, besides refugee return.

It is also worth to repeat here the original aspiration formulated in the Feasibility Study in 2003 concerning the broadcasting reform, which was "ensuring the long-term viability of a financially and editorially independent State-wide public broadcasting system whose constituent broadcasters share a common infrastructure". It can be argued that the initial, ambitious goal set in the Feasibility Study which in principle should have been met *by the start* of SAA negotiations, was moderated during the years by being replaced by demands for adopting specific legislation which served to reach this original goal. Although Bosnia passed the necessary laws thus complying with the formal conditions set for each stage, the overall goal of the reform was never reached. Going well beyond the analyzed period here, in 2014 the Entity laws on public broadcasting services still remained to be harmonized with State-level law, while "the adoption of the Public Broadcasting Corporation's statute was [still] pending". As the 2014 EU progress report concluded, "the Public Broadcasting System reform has not been completed".[54]

Regarding human rights issues monitored in the progress reports, the failure to improve them had no consequences. (The Stabilization and Association Agreement itself says nothing about human rights conditionality, it only states that the respect of human rights is among the general principles of the agreement.)[55] It seems that the most important human rights issue beside the prosecution of war crimes was refugee return. Success in this area was indicated by the fact that more than a million refugees returned by October 2006, and most received back

their property. This was a serious achievement even if the numbers were probably exaggerated since many returned temporarily just to sell their property.[56] This was an area where clear progress was registered and in which the EU invested heavily, although interestingly refugee return was not an essential condition after 2005.

C. Concluding remarks

Altogether, the human rights agenda of the EU during the SAA negotiations which is the initial stage of EU integration had limited ambitions. By looking at the period between 2000-2008 and focusing on the instruments the EU deployed under the SAP in Bosnia it is visible that the EU focused just on a few human rights topics, such as minority rights and the rights of the Roma, refugee return, broadcasting reform which was related to media freedom, the consolidation of human rights institutions and ICTY cooperation. Among these only two became essential conditions that were only indirectly related to human rights: ICTY cooperation and the broadcasting reform. By the end of this period, there was significant progress in the creation and consolidation of human rights institutions, in the area of war crimes prosecution and refugee return. EU influence played only a partial role in achieving these results, because the OHR's engagement was at least as important. The OHR and EU coordinated their actions among themselves in several issue areas, while several reforms were outcomes of the OHR's interventions. Yet in other areas which were not part of this "first order human rights issues", not much progress could be reported.

According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, the credibility of conditionality policy meaning that rewards will be withdrawn in the case of non-compliance, seriously affects the effectiveness of rule adoption. During the analyzed period, the credibility of the EU's conditionality policy was compromised concerning the broadcasting reform which concerned the issue of media freedom. Broadcasting reform was a condition set by the Feasibility Study – i.e. "ensuring the long-term viability of a financially and editorially independent State-wide public broadcasting system whose constituent broadcasters share a common infrastructure" –, which was a very ambitious requirement of *opening* negotiations of the SAA. This criterion was unmet not only by the start of negotiations in November 2005, but by the signing of the SAA in 2008. After 2008 the EU dropped

this issue from essential conditions even though it has not been fulfilled until today. Bosnia seems to have gotten away with this kind of approach of "complying without complying" with an essential condition while still reaping the reward, in this case getting an SAA. Although implementation of the SAA was delayed until June 2015, yet for other reasons such as the lack of harmonization of the state constitution with the ruling of the European Convention of Human Rights on the Sejdić-Finci case. The EU compromised on this condition faced with the political realities of Bosnia while trying to keep the country on the track of EU integration. Applying strict conditionality is difficult in a country where political leaders are not that keen on EU integration. This proved to be a challenge even before 2008 although this was the period when the EU still had considerable leverage over Bosnia demonstrated by its aspiration to get an SAA. After 2008 the EU's influence over Bosnia further diminished.

NOTES

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ANGELO MITCHIEVICI

Born in 1972, in Drăgășani (Romania)

Ph.D. in Philology, University of Bucharest

Esseist, writer, literary critic
Professor, "Ovidius" University, Constanța

Fellowships and grants:
Research stage, EHES-CNRS, France, 2012
Research grant, Institute of Russian Language and Literature, Moscow, 2005

Articles and reviews published in books and journals in
Italy, USA, and Bulgaria

Numerous papers on comparative literature, political and cultural studies,
film and visual art studies presented at conferences and symposia in UK, USA,
France, Italy, Bulgaria

EMIL CIORAN AND
THE IDEEA OF DECADENCE

Before looking at the way in which Cioran defines decadence, more precisely the concepts that he uses, we first need a specific thematic index. These themes are found in the decadent literature but also in the reflections regarding decadence and the decandent movement. And the themes are presented as opposite pairs. The decadent movement is defined not only by the respective theme but also the tension maintained through contrast. We can form a series of contrastive pairs: sterility vs creativity, artificiality vs naturalness, exhaustion vs vitality, rafinement vs primitivism, civilisation vs barbarity, superficiality vs profundity, form vs fond, anormality vs normality, pessimism vs optimism, hedonism vs activism, reactionary vs revolutionary. Many researchers of the decadent movement, for example Richard Gilman in *Decadence. The Strange Life of an Epithet*, David Weir in *Decadence and The Making of Modernism*, Liz Constable, Matthew Potolsky, Dennis Denisoff in *Perrenial Decay. On the Aesthetics and Politics of Decadence*, notice the difficulty in defining decadence. For Richard Gilman, decadence is "a chameleon changing colour while you stare at it.",[1] "an unstable word and concept whose signification and weights continually change in response to shifts in moral, social and cultural attitudes, and even technologies".[2] David Weir makes three fundamental observations:

a. We cannot talk about only one decadence. "What is decadence?" should be rephrased as "What are the varieties of decadence?": for example we can consider decadence as: *social decay*, *historical pessimism*, *racial degeneration*, *cultural refinement*, and so on. Even though these domains can be connected through the term decadence, there is a special type of decadence in art, including fine arts and music and another type of decadence in the area of epistemology for which the term of degeneration made a career. **b.** The instability of meaning is not found outside the decadent phenomenon, it constitutes one of its features. **c.** "Decadence

181

represents a generic antonym. One way of defining decadence in a relativistic sense is to say that the word functions as a general or all-purpose antonym."[3] For example: "When decadence is taken as an antonym of progress it connotes retrogression, decline, obsession with ancient, vanished civilizations".[4]

For Liz Constable, Matthew Potolsky and Dennis Denisoff, decadence is "a transdisciplinary concept", in any case, one which easily crosses frontiers between disciplines "settling in different contexts with distinct connotation and effects"[5] which demands an interdisciplinary approach "to track the term's relocations, recontextualizations, and redefinitions across historical and geographical boundaries"[6]. However, decadence threatens, attacks, is subversive regarding those boundaries, national, biological, cultural, etc., which have a founding nature for any culture and civilisation. It is what Richard Gilman refers to as a *sense of transgression.* This is what makes the three researchers to assert that there is a perpetual decadence, a *perenial decay* **-** David Weir called it *ongoing decadence.* "We see this 'perennial decay' of boundaries – the insistence on at once mobilizing and undermining boundaries and differences (…)"[7]

First we must admit an extension of the concept of decadence, starting from its aesthetic relevance in literature. Norberto Bobbio assimilated decadence and in the area of philosophy, more specifically philosophy of culture.

> (…) decadentism is not merely a literary movement, but a spiritual atmosphere, whose mark appears in poetry and art, thought and manners, and then by bringing out the special characteristic of the philosophy of existence through which it stands clearly – I would almost say schematically – revealed as a philosophy of poetic inspiration, with its emergence from a state of mind rather from a state of uncertainity, it is open and courageous acceptance of a style of language already compromised by poetic usage and therefore by the eminently aesthetic…[8]

Norberto Bobbio identifies two kinds of decadence, each becoming the expression of a decay. We avoid the term sterility, in this case, because the first decadence not necessarily evoke sterility, but a neurotic, anxious, agonizing vitality. Both meanings are present in Cioran's work. "There are, in fact, two ways in which essentially the effeteness of a culture is revealed; that of *decadentism*, in which the crisis is exalted, and that

of *mannerism* or rethoricism, in which the crisis is concealed in empty formulas which none believe."[9]

Considering the above observations, which represents a relevant selection from the numerous that exist, I place my research regarding the concept of decadence used by Emil Cioran starting from the following observations and premises:

Cioran operates with his own concept of decadence, but also with the *decadent vulgata*. It's about a series of specific themes which make up a paradigm of decadence and which open the possibility of a thematic criticism. At the same time, these themes help to identify and spread the decadence, especially because there is an important presence of this phenomenon in the consumer culture area, from literature to plastic arts, from theater to film. Inside the thematic baggage of decadence there is: the sexual pathology (sexual perversions), the morbidity, the ennui, the neurastheny, the refinement, the fascination for the splendor of antique cultures and civilizations, the artificiality, the progress as a destructive agent of modernity, Dadaism, Aestheticism, the stylization of all aspects of life, the cultivation of aestethetic eccentricity etc.. A series of symbolic, emblematic characters are recuperated in the decadent culture, characters such as Salome, Judith, Orpheus, Parsifal, Oedip etc.

Another current acceptance considers that the decadence characterizes the periods of cultural decline, mannerism, epigonism, absence of original notes, of contents in favour of formal aspects. The Kitsch and excessive stylization may also constitute the expressions of Decadentism in art.

> There it refers to specific periods and styles in art and literature that are supposed to have been marked by debility and lack of original force in comparison to the health of immediately preceeding epochs. All that could be named as Mannerist or epigone or kitsch. Applied this way the designation releases the ideea of excess, loss of vigour, a concern with manner at the expense of substance, a drive to the deviant as positive principle.[10]

In this way, starting from the second part of my assertion a multitude of identifications can be made, relatively easy, from the thematic registre to a type of sensibility which characterizes its discourse. In other words, Cioran repeats common places which belong to the decadent discourse but also to the one about decadence, be it Spengler's morphology of culture, or the traditional baggage of themes and tropes of decadence. My study

focuses on the way in which Cioran enriches and touches the concept of decadence, in fact his own offcut of decadence.

Regarding what Liz Constable, Mathew Potolski, Dennis Denisov call *drama of differenciation*, a phenomenon through which the researcher determines the sanitary distance towards the negative charge which the culture of decadence entails (sexual pervesions, degeneration, amorality, homeroticism etc), in the case of Cioran we are dealing with a *drama of identification*. Cioran considers himself a decadent, he metabolises decadence, just like Nietzsche metabolises disease. If it was noticed that Cioran is attached to the theme of decadence,[11] it assimilates the disease/ diseases as a prolific environment for philosophy,[12] an essential fact has not been noticed. Cioran internalises decadence up to a possible statement: "I am decadence" or otherwise "I understand France well through everything that is rotten in me."[13]

In order to get out of this trap which he notices, David Weir tries to solve it with an equally vague concept, that of *dynamics of transition* which he identifies in Ortega y Gasset as *dehumanization.*

> Again, Ortega y Gassets concept of dehumanization aptly describes the decadent element in the transition from romanticism to modernism. What it meant by dehumanization, according to Ortega y Gasset, is a distortion of natural forms, an obscuring of recongizable, human element in art, such as straitghforward, realistic presentations of human situations in the novel and drama.[14]

I gave a dialectical acception to the notion of decadence, assuming its founding ambiguity. Even Irina Mavrodin considers Cioran'style as "*a style of ambiguity and paradox*". Also, as I pointed out, a decadent feature acquires relevance only through the counter-weight of its opposite, only through a contradictory argument. This is what entitles me to talk about decadence in terms of metabolism of modernity, a way of administering *the negative categories* (Hugo Friedrich) of modernity from art to politics. In this way I depart from Matei Călinescu[15] for whom decadence is only a *face of modernity* and from Antoine Compagnon for whom decadence is a *paradox of modernity.*[16] Closer to the relevance of decadence as an extensive cultural phenomenon is the term *antimodernity*[17] which he proposes, this "anti" is not formed in the patrimonial sphere of traditions, but also in that of modernity. Or as Michael O'Meara defines this concept:

> Neither a reactionary nor an antiquarian, the anti-modernist is himself a product of modernity, but a "reluctant" one, modernity's most severe critic, serving as its foremost counter-point, but at the same time representing what is most enduring and authentic in the modern. This makes the *antimoderne* the modern's negation, its refutation, as well as its double and its most authentic representative. As such, it is inconceivable without the *moderne,* oscillating between pure refusal and engagement. The anti-modernist is not, then, anyone who opposes the modern, but rather those "modernists" at odds with the modern age who engage it and theorize it in ways that offer an alternative to it.[18]

From a literary point of view, a perspective which I did not take into account in this study, decadence can be discussed as being a *mutagen agent,*[19] developing at the crossroads of very important literary movements with their own poetics and aesthetics: Romanticism, Naturalism, Avantgarde, Expressionism, Symbolism.

I'll try to give a first answer to this question from the scale that Emil Cioran ranges cultures on Spenglerian basis. In *The Decline of the West*, Oswald Spengler starts from a series of observations including the following analogy: "Cultures are like organisms. Their general history is their biography."[20] A second key observation is that an organism like every culture has a series of ages corresponding to the biological ones: 1. Birth of a culture or its spring consists in a process of individuation and responds to an insight thorugh which a culture develops its "own physiognomy". 2. maturity culture's summer when it realizes their full potential 3. decline or decadence age, a culture becomes sterile, and is manifested only on a formal plan - in terms of styling or by means of what Spengler calls "recapitulation". It must be said that this is especially true with "high cultures". Spengler will introduce physiognomy as "the method of organic history and life, with everything it has as direction and destiny (…)" Every culture has its own destiny, another key concept to Spengler, destiny is "vague and reluctant for a primitive, clear and under the form of the intuitions of the universe (…) for a man within a high culture. "There is a soul of cultures, designated as the "idea of a being." Spengler is focused on high cultures only where all stages of development are present. Cioran is interested in both high cultures, "ripe" ones, as the French or the ancient Greek cultures, in the intermediate or medium ocultures as Spanish or German or Russian and low lesser cultures, such as that from which it comes. Each corresponds to a particular type of decadence. In *Invertebrate Spain*, Ortega y Gasset will illustrate the intermediate culture. In regard

185

to decadence of great cultures, Cioran will discuss the case of French culture. He, by comparison, will handle lesser cultures, or by its terms, with the "tragedy of small cultures", choosing as a case study Romanian culture, especially in volume *The Transfiguration of Romania*. Although Cioran remains more in the field of culture morphology, there are sufficient evidence in the theory to discuss a more extensive notion of the style of decadence and stylistic practices.

Another important fact, the term decadence is older, a cultural posession which from mythology to history is always present as the piece of evidence of each culture and civilisation. It becomes a major context and an important theme towards the end of the 19th century, with the appearance of the term *decadentism*, which represents a reconfiguration of decadence in the context of literature and fine arts. We can talk about an older specialisation of the term. A discussion of the term decadence in this context of this specialisation is beyond the scope of this study. It is worth remembering the moment when the term decadentism appeared, towards the end of the 19th century, *fin de siècle*. A new culture of decadence appears in this moment, whose tributary is not only Emil Cioran, but also Oswald Spengler, Ortega Y Gasset, Friedrich Nietzsche, Miguel de Unamuno, etc. The period of Emil Cioran's formation is when this culture of decadence has suffered a series of mutations, and the decadent literary movement has emerged from the circuit of debates. But not decadence. Cioran is in another historical period and has at his disposal a multitude of themes, stereotypes, theories, in one word, a library. His options, in this case, are representative, they shape decadence as thought by Emil Cioran.

To Cioran France is an opportunity to reflect on an exemplar model, that of the exhaustion of a great culture and civilization by achieving its full potential. The philosopher gives credit to Oswald Spengler's theoretical perspective on the decadence of the Western culture, presented in *The Decline of the West*, a book which Cioran read at the age of 18, and profoundly marked him. Actually, the latter attachment to the Spenglerian theory is also fully visible in Cioran's book *The Transfiguration of Romania*, published in 1936. This exhaustion within a large cultures and civilizations may best lead to one of the paradoxes of decadentism that puts progress and decadence in a dialectical relationship. In this respect, in *Five Facets of Modernity*, Matei Calinescu is even more direct: "Once again, progress means decadence and decadence means progress."[21]

The French Option

A very good speaker of German, a Humboldt scholarship grantee between 1933-1935, out loud attached to the legionary ideology, a position which he regretted later, Emil Cioran does not choose Germany but France as an adoptive homeland. Moreover, after a considerable period of literary gestation, Cioran reinvents himself as a French writer, as he is often perceived today. This is an existential choice with no reserve, which proves his affinity with the adopting culture. His first meeting with the Parisian environment occurs in 1937 when he receives a scholarship from the French Institute of Higher Studies in Bucharest; until June 1940 when the German troops enter Paris he will stay in France, and will thus become very familiar the French capital and its surroundings.

This option will mean a lifestyle with bohemian touches, but it will mostly remain a cultural option which cannot be read in the portrait he makes to this remarkable culture in his outstanding essay "On France". This essay is written in 1941 in German-occupied France, that reminds the French nation of their defeat in the 1870 war against Prussia, a defeat that triggered a strong wave of pessimism among the French intellectuals. Cioran is actually challenged by this defeat, but he will never mention this military failure in his writings. There are few words spread in one of his articles about the German invasion but the young philosopher see no connection between France decadence and German conquest, mostly a sincronicity in time and place.

One of the intimate springs for choosing France as a country of adoption is the very decline of France as a great political and cultural power, regarded, from the perspective of the philosophy of culture as a decline in culture and civilization, which becomes an expression of decadence. Among the features that define the decadence of the French culture and civilization is a Vulgate of Decadentism, perceived as a cultural phenomenon and its accompanying aesthetics specific to late nineteenth century. In the context of Emil Cioran's work, *On France* is a hinge text (*le livre charnière*), as Alain Paruit[22] called it, a liminal text which made the transition to another stage of Emil Cioran's existence, the one in which he wrote in French and was about to become a "French writer". It is at the same time an "exercise of admiration", the first in a series which he will dedicate to the French culture. Cioran was already an author whose work was written in Romanian, his volumes, *On the Heights of Despair (1934), The Book of Delusions (1935), The Transfiguration of Romania(1936),*

187

Tears and Saints (1937), and in 1940, *The Dawn of Thoughts* is published in Sibiu and it also then that he begins writing *The Passionate Handbook,* which he only finishes in 1945 and which, until the discovery of the present book, was considered to be his last book written in Romanian. At the same time, there is between this Spenglerian influenced book and the one that made him famous in the Romanian space, *Schimbarea la față a României* (*The Transfiguration of Romania*), a profound reading, an almost symbiotic relationship. Cioran's reflections regarding the destiny of the different European cultures and civilizations reveal here their point of support in the future adoptive culture, the French culture. If we were to weigh the two accents, we could notice that, by comparison with *The Transfiguration of Romania*, from the publication of which several years had passed, the relation between the two cultures became more nuanced. The Romanian messianism gave way to a reserve in one could read the gradual retreat of Cioran from the land of utopia and militancy to a solution which he now grasps as he evaluates the French culture and civilization, which, in his opinion, are in a crepuscular stage. If in *The Transfiguration of Romania*, Cioran evaluated a field of possibilities into the transformation of a "small culture", by identifying desirable cultural models among which the French one situated itself at a distance that made it intangible, this time the theme of the transfiguration of Romania gives way to the theme of the transfiguration of Emil Cioran, more specifically he introduces this theme through the French score. Before getting absorbed entirely into the metabolism of a large culture which unfortunately could not serve as a model to the much too young and irrevocably "small" Romanian culture, Cioran evaluates it with an extraordinary acumen. The choice he makes crosses this moment of his settlement in the mirror of French culture and civilization which he has a profound affinity with, an affinity that exceeds the simple adherence to a viable and prestigious model.

There are at least two articles which anticipate Emil Cioran's deep attachment to France and particularly Paris, "Fragments of a Latin quarter"[23] and "The Provincial Paris"[24]. What does Paris represent to Emil Cioran? In "The Provincial Paris", he assimilates it to a decadent topos, that of the metropolis of a great empire, the Ninive fortress and ancient Rome at the time of its dawn.

> On the banks of the Seine, I was thinking of the dawn of the Roman-Greek world and I anticipated with a pleasant disillusionment the inevitable shadows of the Fortress (…). And while I lingered for hours, during the day

or the night, on its dreamy bridges, I comforted myself with the thought that I hadn't lived during the demise of ancient Rome.[25]

The writer discovers in the Latin quarter this "irresponsible dawn", the decadent topos that Paris, "the point nearest to a melancholy Paradise" represents. In a way, Cioran who frequents the bohemian group consisting exclusively of "losers", an existential category that populates the decadent metropolis, is deliberately poisoned by this twilight urbanity.

> For as much a nuisance as the incurable of consciousness represents, here you are *pleasantly* unhappy. This is the entire secret of Paris, the whole poetry which binds the wandering cursed from café to café, possessed with an avid boredom, this is the perfumed void of Paris. (…) You don't come here to die, but to convey more poetry to boredom, to abandon yourself aesthetically to unhappiness, to tastefully slide onto the dimension of your own loneliness.[26]

And Cioran continues to accumulate new expressions, within the same register of a decadent sensitivity: "his pathetic twilight", "perfumed nihilism", "ruin of reflexes", "the supreme error of life" etc. Hedonism, flavor, plaisirism, aestheticism, and especially frenzy. Cioran absorbs through all his pores what Paris conveys to him, a "reflexive sadness", a *delectatio morosa*, a particular *état d'âme.* The abandon reclaims an essential fact for Cioran's state of emotions, forged at the school of the "Romanian prophetic", more specifically an instance of mediation, a distance from whatever is offered to the senses. To be "*pleasantly* unhappy", "to abandon yourself aesthetically to unhappiness", because everything *is savoured* here" constitute the premises of this aesthetic difference typical of the decadent sensitivity which introduces an *effect of sublimation.*

Before theorizing the specificity of French decadence, before radically changing the course of his existence, becoming a citizen of Paris for the rest of his life, herein lies a first explanation of a profound affinity, a first abandonment, an almost psychotropic intoxication. It is only with this article, "The Provincial Paris", that Cioran overcomes the stage of his eulogy to the bohemians of the Latin quarter and initiates a reflection regarding the decadence of the metropolis. The German presence in the city does not constitute for the writer the real motivation of the "demise" of Paris and implicitly, France. "Paris has *fallen* because it was meant

to fall. (…) For it has *existed* too much, it has been *too much.*"[27] The cause of the disaster lies not in a circumstantial, strategical, political error, but in decadence, which is a supreme form of error, a historical/ biohraphical one. And here, Cioran introduces one of the paradoxes of decadence to which we will come back later. From an exorbitance, an *excess of existence*, a surplus of abundance, the city crumbles. To this excess another one is added, the *excess of lucidity* which is identified with the "phenomenon of decadence". With these two articles, Cioran connects one of the fundamental themes of his philosophy, the theme of decadence, to the French culture and civilization and turns it into the motivation of a destiny option.

Indeed, the option which is configured now tackles an affinity for failure, a paradoxical one which makes a "barbarian" to adhere to and coincide with a culture that has reached a pinnacle of refinement and, at the same time, is in decline. Cioran formulates it in the note of a grandiloquent lyricism: "My wounds touching the wounds of France. What a *fatal* encounter (s.n)".[28] Here the word "fatal" should be read as a destiny meeting, in which the young Cioran is revealed his *fatum*. As to Cioran's approach to France in terms of a symbolical destiny equality, this fact speaks volumes about the ego of the writer. In fact, this common aspect, the profound affinity between France and Emil Cioran is revelaed throughout the entire text and it bears a name: decadence. The decadent sensitivity makes possible the reflection regarding the destiny of French culture and civilization which is at its dawn and it partially cloaks a relation of identification. What role does Emil Cioran eventually take on apart from the French culture? Another fragment is revelatory in this sense:

> My destiny is to envelop myself in the dross of civilizations. How could I prove my strength other than withholding in the midst of their mould? The proportion between barbarism and neurasthenia makes up the equilibrium of this formula. An aesthete of culture dawns, watching the dead waters of the spirit in storms and dreams… In the undisturbed silence of the Seine I suddenly reflect my lack of future, alongside the City, and I quench my shuddering tiredness in the empty river.[29]

Obviously, Cioran assumes the role of a decadent aesthete, a role which is highlighted with the phrase which rings of royal dignity: "an aesthete of culture dawns". In fact, he is not the only one, his gesture has nothing original, he is part of a typically decadent gesticulation and it is enough to

compare this gesture with a similarly prestigious and programmatic one. Paul Verlaine called himself in a poem which served as a decadent poetic art, the poem *Melancholy (Languer,* 1883), published in his volume *Jadis et naguère,* as "l'Empire à la fin de la décadence" :

> Je suis l'Empire à la fin de la décadence, /Qui regarde passer les grands Barbares blancs/En composant des acrostiches indolents/D'un style d'or où la langueur du soleil danse. L'âme seulette a mal au coeur d'un ennui dense./Là-bas on dit qu'il est de longs combats sanglants./O n'y pouvoir, étant si faible aux voeux si lents,/O n'y vouloir fleurir un peu cette existence![30]

Cioran inserts himself exactly in the middle of decadence, in his formulation of an expressiveness which will make him stand out, in "the middle of rot", in the "dross" of civilisations. Another significant identification, more concentrated, narcissistic gesticulation projected into a thanatic reverie, Cioran reverberates together with the City, that is Paris, the shadow, in the waters of the Seine, a shadow representing the absence of a future.

Cioran, the French culture and civilisation and Paris, the quintessence of decadence, this is the isotopy which the author proposes. These identifications also represent certain qualifications. Where does the author extract his competence regarding crepuscularism? What entitles Cioran to adopt the posture of a decadent, an "aesthete of the sets of culture"? We must say that Cioran is aware of the scandal which his affiliation encompasses, the contrast created by the barbarian who came from a province of Europe in the most refined context of culture and civilisation. *Nota bene*, Verlaine can afford the luxury of being bored and also an aesthete, he is French. But what happens with the "barbarian" Emil Cioran? In what way can he assume such a role?

> Coming from primitive lands, from the under-world of Wallachia, with the pessimism of youth into a mature civilisation, what stream of shivers in so much contrast! Without a past in an immense past; with the fear born in the final fatigue; with hubbub and vague longing in a country disgusted by the soul. From the fold to the saloon, from shepherd to Alcibiade! What jump above history and what dangerous pride! His ancestors crawled in tortures, the disdain seems action even to you, and irony, without the perfume of an abstract sadness, a vulgar concern.

191

Being able to live only in the country where each is touched by intelligence. A universe composed of agoras and saloons, an intersection of Elada and Paris, this is the absolute space of the exercise of the mind. The human becoming takes place between the two poles: sheperdness and the paradox. Culture means a sum of futility: the cult of the nuance, the complicity delicate with error, the subtle game fatal with abstraction, ugliness, the spell of dissipation. The rest is agriculture.[31]

I have given the entire fragment because it shows the complexity of such an option about destiny and aesthetics, option which incorporates a series of decadent themes. Cioran is deliberately situated at the core of a paradox constructed on the contingency or juxtaposition of a series of contrasts. The barbarian chooses the most refined formula of culture and civilisation, the spiritual exorbitance associates a *contemplatio morosa* to the rationalism deprived of touch, the absence of a prestigious past the overflow of past, cultural militancy, the devitalisation of the appeal to manner etc. The series of violent contrasts reclaims the formula of a decadent sensibility. The jump from the etnographic, pastoral, folcloric agrarian cultures to the very erudite ones, in a process generated by stylisation is huge.

Cioran situates himself in the middle of this scandal, in fact, he institutes it by assuming the competence of an authentic decadent regarding decline. Between the barbaric and the decadent there is otherwise a dialectic relationship. The first overthrows the second, being that which induces the necessary vitality for resuming the growth process of a new civilization which it will refine until extinction. However, Cioran is an atypical barbarian, because despite being unassimilated he is more faithful than anyone to the decadence to which he serves as a herald and secretary and which he lives with all the cells of his being, with an extraordinary fervor. Cioran professed, transposed in life what Ian Fletcher called an *aesthetics of failure*.[32] This fervor is articulated through a double failure, that of the culture and civilization where he comes from, which is incapable of creatively developping its vitality and that of the culture and civilization where he is integrated, which is incapable of providing the motivation for another burst of vitality. In other words, Cioran makes the leap from the inchoate state of a culture which didn't get to grow to an excess to that of a mannered, "effete" culture, which exhausted its vitality resources. What does such a specialization in decadence involve? In an interrogative-rhetorical manner, Cioran defines it thus: "But how many are

capable of tasting this over-fullness of decrease?! The overflowing void of the spiritual dawn, in order to spark it with vibration, demands not only an education of the historical sense, but also of our distance from the world, a certain neronian feeling with *no madness*, a propensity for great shows, rare and dangerous emotions and daring inpirations."[33]

Herein we have the portrait of a lucid contemplating man, who assumes the singularity of small series and the taste of pleasurable disasters. The distance from the world associated with the historical sense represents the adjustment of a relation between the stage, the show and the spectator, *a dramatization of history*. There is also in the "neronian feeling", devoid of pathological residue, a feeling of grandeur within disaster, "a propensity for great shows", for whose staging he is not responsible, but whose irresponsibility and hazard he fully tastes. To this one might add the dowry of an aesthete, which is the penchant for "rare and dangerous emotions", a penchant which, alongside the taste of historical mise-en-scenes lies at the border with the decadent sensitivity. However, there is a reserve in assuming this role which nuances Cioran's decadence.

> As much as you'd like the demise of a civilization, as long as your joints are still holding, you remain an aesthete with primary resources, because you're not ripe enough - only through your thoughts - to die and not rotten enough to sink, only proud enough to debase yourself with glorified enticements. Until you've laid down your weapons, until your vast look hasn't completely gnawed at your spine, you have the necessary strength for any show. A sort of dying fury lies in the aesthetes of decadence. But they love the sight of death better than death itself. The question is: how much are they chained to this fatal game, how much can they resist to its incurable attraction? [34]

This reserve comes from the fact that, on the one hand, the writer stands outside the dawning culture and civilization which he completes, even if he keeps up with its decadence, and on the other hand, he is not willing to go all the way, a disagreement which Ilina Gregori correctly apprehended in her book, *Cioran. Sugestii pentru o biografie imposibilă* (*Cioran. Suggestions for an Impossible Biography*). Longevity betrays Cioran, the prophet of decadence and, with the risk of making a tautology, he is a prophet of existentialist nihilism.

> A 'specialized' man from early on in the matters of death, who from the earliest youth was preoccupied by the same theme, which could be observed from adolescence, in any circumstance, already dead – even when he ate – a thanatologist of world renown doubled by an irretrievable thanatomaniac; and it is precisely one of these men who lives more than his common peers, despite his deathly lifestyle adopted early on and recommended to the entire mankind with strong arguments! Even to many of the admirers of Cioran's work the author's longevity poses many problems. [35]

In other words, Cioran doesn't welcome the Western decadence already worn out, drained, wilted, but with a vitality whose resources seem to be continually renewing. Inside the decadent there is the barbarian with his entire energy, a conqueror who does not accede to the assault of ramparts but the assault of culture, Cioran's wage, that of becoming one of the remarkable stylists of French language and culture, remaining valid. These energy supplies compromise the standard decadence formula which enacts heroes that are already worn out, mannerists, bored from too much knowledge, too much culture and last but not least, sterile. What characterizes Emil Cioran's decadence is the mixture of vitality and weariness, primitivism/barbarity and refinement. The psychological-cultural profile of the "barbaric" Cioran is retrievable from the volume who consecrated him in Romania and who subsequently brought about a huge scandal in the Western world, *The Transfiguration of Romania,* a volume which appeared in 1936 at Vremea Publishing House. The barbarity-refinement dialectic is constitutive of the decadent culture, but what makes of Cioran a special case is this coexistence of the two instances in one and the same person, which explains the Cioran's unbearable tensions and his permanent schizoid breaks; thus, Cioran is disputed by his energy tremendous cultural erudition and intellectual excellence. We could say that the writer illustrates and embodies the metabolism of decadence, internalizes the tensions and intensities present in a culture of decadence. In other words, according to Verlaine's formula, Cioran can call himself "the empire at the end of decadence". We can find this ineluctable tension, this paradox melted in revealing, memorable formulas. Cioran is a "aesthete with primary resources", to wit, with a considerable dose of vitality, which he addresses to a "transfiguration of Romania", the volume being comparable to a huge explosion of militant energy. Where could all that violence, both destructive and life-giving have been absorbed, when the project of a transfigured Romania crumbled

after the failure of the legionary movement and especially after Romania was given over to the Bolshevik barbarity? Another paradoxical assertion, taking into account the profile of the typical decadent, is that which associates the "aesthetes of decadence" with a sort of "dying fury". Not the fury, which denotes an involvement, a contamination with a form of activism, is that which characterizes the attitude of the typical decadent, but the distance of aesthetic contemplation, present in Verlaine's formula, a jouissance associated with disaster and the futile effort of a stylization, an aporetic exercise: *"I am the Empire in the last of its decline,/That sees the tall, fair-haired Barbarians pass,—the while /Composing indolent acrostics, in a style/ Of gold, with languid sunshine dancing in each line."*[36], the perspective of the end, or better said the ends, *fin du monde*, *fin d'empire*, *fin de siécle*, *fin de race*, *finis latinorum*, etc. does not necessarily imply the radical solutions, among which suicidal. Decadence knows forms of almost religious seclusion into spaces destined to art, temples of art, decorated as such. To the contemplative attitude evoked in Verlaine's poem one might add the cultivation of his own taste in hermetically closed and elitist environments, which suits the decadent aesthete. Cioran's intuition is fundamental: "But they love the sight of death better than death itself." Like the subsequent interrogation: "(…) how much are they chained to this fatal game, how much can they resist to its incurable attraction?"[37] Indeed there is an aesthetic distance between biology and the one that contemplates it and this aesthetic distance is converted into representation. All that has to do with the details of decline, biologically, physically, socially, morally is converted into a painting, in presentation or even more it is aesthetically sublimated. The question which troubles the writer is not one which could get an answer from a typical decadent. The distance is always that of the show, the typically suicidal form for a decadent is that of a radical form of narcissism, and not that of a revolutionary investment, an unleashing of energy. The question is, nonetheless, fundamental for the metabolism of decadence that the writer internalizes. What are the limits aimed by the destructive and self-destructive drives, how far can they go? Cioran didn't have the courage to go too far, his existence, his longevity betrayed him in order to maintain the purity of his doctrine he needed his own sacrifice. And Cioran sacrificed everything, the country, the language, the relatives, the "distant acquaintances", his own culture, but not so much his life, whose entire energy was aesthetically sublimated. Here is the paradox of a barbarian converted to decadence, with a twilight vocation a decadent *à outrance*, somehow *malgré soi*.

Decadence: Definitions, Interpretations

How does Cioran define decadence? Just like *Tratat de descompunere* (*A Short History of Decay*),[38] *On France* is exclusively dedicated to the theme of decadence as a phenomenon of the culture's morphology and not only. Let us isolate several phrases, which can be seen as definitions of decadence and which, unlike considerations where the circumscription basis is wider, try to catch in a simple manner a truth under the form of aphorisms or paradoxes. Many of them have decadence as a grammatical subject and are constructed on a formulation typical of a definition: "Decadence is/is not…" Here is a first example: "Decadence is nothing else than the inability to create in the circle of values which define you."[39]

Here, decadence is mistaken for sterility, a feature recognised through the caracteristics of decadence. In Cioran's writings the terms benefit from an ambivalence which force their permanent reappraisal, the relationship which the philosopher establishes between the opposite terms is a dialectical one, in the sense of using certain contradictory arguments in order to establish the truth. In this way sterility is a symptom of decadence, synonymous with devitalization, exhaustion and at the same time also a formal corrective. "One of France's depravity was the sterilization of perfection; (…)"[40] Synonymous with formal perfection, sterility becomes useful as a "school of limit", as a stifling of excess feelings, as a control on discourse. "(…) as a school of limit, common sense and good taste, as a guide not to fall in the derisory of great feelings and attitudes. Its measure is to heal us from pathetic and fatal wanderings. In this way, its *sterilized* action becomes salutary."[41]

> A nation is creative as long as *life* is not the only value, but *values* are its criteria. Believing in the fiction of liberty and dying for it; going on an expedition for glory; considering the prestige of your country *necessary* to humanity; substitute yourself to it through your beliefs, these are the values. To value yourself more than an idea; to think with your stomach, to oscillate between horror and sensuousness; to believe that *to live* is more than anything, this is *life*.[42]

"*To live* is a simple way for *to make*. In decadence it becomes a purpose. To live as such. That is the secret of ruin."[43] Another phrase seen as a definition is making of decadence the exclusive cult of life. "Their lack of vitality discovered their life. And Decadence is nothing but the exclusive cult of life."[44] Cioran uses a paradox, the lack of vitality is what

actually nourish life. The devitalization is one of the common features of decadence, it is associated with the ideea of finishing the spiritual, creative resources. Cioran introduces a shade. For him vitality is not only a release of creative energy, but to put the values, ideas, identity fictions before instinct, that is, before life. This is something which, nota bene, does not mean lucidity, another disruptive agent of decadence. The ideas, values, fictions set what Cioran in *Transfiguration of Romania* refers to as the vital myths of a nation: "The myths of a nation are its vital truths."[45] Their manifestation is irrational, and it cannot be seen as the result of lucidity. Before being "thought over" the ideas, values, fictions are "lived", put on stage. On the same key of lucidity, decadence is the equivalent of the process through which myths become concepts. "Decadence is the opposite process of the era of grandeur: it is the transformation of myths into concepts."[46]

The reflection regarding their rationale, the lucidity is counterproductive in Cioran's opinion and puts a culture under the sign of decadence. To live becomes the expression of decadence, when fervour is eliminated from experience, the commitment for a fiction, an idea. In this way we can understand why Cioran sees Don Quixote as an emblematic figure of decadence. "The seed of quixotism marks the inside possibilities of a nation."[47] Don Quixote represents, on a symbolic level, the irrational, the innocent source necessary for the assertion of a culture. Like most of the symbolic figures used by Cioran this one is an ambivalent one. In his heroic quest, he is followed by Sancho, a character who is a symbol of naivety and blind faith. Moreover, Don Quixote also stands for the transfiguration of reality, which Cioran proposes for a Romania ingrained in tradition, passivity, inertia, dominated by a regressive myth, that of Miorița.[48]

Cioran proposes a new pair of contrastive terms, lucidity vs instinct, which can be recomposed as rationalism vs myth. From the same area of definitions we quote this one: "Decadence means collective lucidity: an expiration of the soul. To not have a soul."[49] Cioran puts lucidity in opposition with the soul, this being a spenglerian concept. The soul of a culture lies in its myths. According to Cioran, lucidity is what blocks the whole investment in an idea, however risky it might be, lucidity is the enemy of "frenzy" foreseen by Cioran in *Transfiguration of Romania*: "I love the history of Romania with a heavy hatred",[50] "I cannot love but a delirious Romania".[51] There is another meaning which Cioran grants to life as an agent of decadence, that is leaving yourself to the senses which are culturally informed. It is not a regression to animalism, an expression

of an atavism, but exactly the opposite, of lifting the instinct, the nutrient and sexual ones, to a superior plan: "The second value of decadence in its relation with life lies in the 'cult of sensation' when 'the senses become religion'".[52] "The phenomenon of decadence is inseparable of gastronomy."[53] The culinary art, an important part of French culture represents for Cioran an symptom of decadence, not in itself, but by the significance granted in culture, as a major role in the construction of a new way of life.

In Cioran's opinion, the main decadent inversion which the French culture operates is that of raising the minor/ secondary and the minor/ secondary arts (ambient, decorative, entertaining, etc) to the dignity of the major or the major arts (architecture, etc).

> Since France sat down outside mission, the act of eating has reached the rank of ritual. What is revealing is not eating itself, but the act of contemplation, of speculation, to entertain for hours on it. The *consciousness* of this urge, the substitution of the *need* through *culture*, is a sign of weakening the instinct and attachment to values. (…) Nourishments replace ideas. The French *know* what they are eating for more than a century. (…) Turning an immediate need into a civilization phenomenon is a dangerous step forward and a serious symptom. The belly was the grave of the Roman Empire; it will be inevitably, the tomb of French intelligence.[54]

In this case, the lucidity regarding a natural act, the insertion of this act in a cultural circuit where it acquires aesthetic relevance represents a symptom of decadence. Although the term is not used, it is about the artificiality which the culture puts on stage hijacking what is natural in favour of civilisation. What the philosopher points out is the transfer from the unconscious act to the consciousness put in act through its transformation into discourse. A sophisticated way of cooking is not actually a sympton of decadence, but the discourses around this act represents its expression. It is another way of saying that we can talk about decadence when the minor arts become the priviledged expression of the soul of a culture.

As to existence itself, Cioran refers to a higher hedonism, a cult of pleasure, of the enjoyment, the empowerment through taste, which leads to a styling of everyday life, to a refinement of the banality, to writing their own gestures.

When a nation loves life, they implicitly give up their continuity. There is a total abyss between pleasure and family. The sexual sophistication means the death of a nation.

The maximum exploitation of instantaneous pleasure; its prolongation beyond nature; the conflict between the demand of the senses and the methods of intelligence are expressions of a decadent style (s.n.) which is defined by the individual's unhappy willingness to handle his own reflexes.[55]

Cioran updates a defining theme of decadentism, i.e., sexual ambiguity accompanied by erotic refinement, often a form of digressive eroticism as Mario Praz points out in *Romantic Agony* "best tipified by Sade."[56] The concern for life generates the styling of life, and goes as far as it records the smallest details subject to aesthetic conditioning. A certain sex drive refined to sterility and its transformation into pleasure and seduction, which means a style for which French eighteenth century provides all necessary references is accompanied by a gourmand spirit which put in theory accurately by Michel Onfray in *L'art de jouir: for hedonistic materialism.*[57] In this case, the subversion lies in a refinement through style of a biological necessity.

The Decadent Philosopher and the Disease

Constantin Noica identified six diseases of the contemporary spirit, the spirit being also able to be contaminated, or suffer like a true sick person. The diseases put forward by Constantin Noica had a spiritual body, but their physiological reflex was missing. It is essential that an important part of philosophy turns the experience of disease into profit.

Friedrich Nietzsche is perhaps the most representative, as he considers disease to be important for the philosophical knowledge, which he eloquently illustrates in his books *The Case of Wagner, Ecce Homo, On the Genealogy of Morality, The Antichrist* etc. Nietzsche also has a name for disease, *decadence*, and implicitly a philosophy of disease becomes a philosophy of decadence. Decadence is a central reflection theme in Nietzsche's philosophy, which the philosopher will reinterpret from different perspectives. Decadence piques Nietzsche's interest, insofar as it represents a theme of the epoque, and his contemporaries can fin dit everywhere. In this sense, Wagner's music constitutes a disease of the

199

German spirit also contaminating Nietzsche who, *nota bene*, manages to cure himself, since it represents the decadence of the spirit. Hence, Wagner's work, wagnerism itself is a decadent art and the philosopher goes through this stage of decadence which is also the moment of fighting against the disease.

In *The Rhetoric of Sickness from Baudelaire to D'Annunzio*, Barbara Spackman observes the existence of what she calls "a rhetoric of decadence" which is at the same time, "rhetoric of sickness", a type of discourse which cause the proliferation of various aspects of the disease, without the interest being exclusively clinical. In this sense, convalescence becomes a way of artistically and philosophically taking advantage of the experience of the disease. "Convalescence as the scene of artistic and philosophic creation is an ideologeme of decadent texts, a narrative that lies between texts."[58] We notice that the term convalescence as Barbara Spackman uses it does not refer to the period which follows the disease but to the whole process which leads up to healing. In the case of decadence as disease, convalescence is not just a state of transit which presages healing, but a state which perpetuates indefinitely a state of disease which has never fully stopped from evolution. However, it is one of the meanings that Nietzsche ascribes to decadence in *Ecce Homo*, a long period of convalescence which is actually never finished. Convalescence entails the existence of disease in a dwindled, controlled and metabolized form: "A long, all too long series of years signifies recovery for me — unfortunately it also signifies at the same time relapse, decline, periods of a kind of decadence."[59]

Nietzsche places decandence not on a physiological level with a weakened organism and also dissociates it from nervous diseases, from the degenerative phenomenon which is the key to the medical understanding of decadence at the end of the 19th century. Nietzsche intends to make decadence a disease in itself, a disease of philosophers but establishing that dialectics, for example, is "a symptom of decadence". The diseases that the philosopher suffers from are an environment favourable to philosophy, the power of thought, the refinement of ideas. Nietzsche calls himself a decadent, "I am a decadent", but at the same through a dialectical movement he declares himself its opponent.

The difference lies in the fact that unlike most decadents Nietzsche chooses to treat himself from "decadence" and in this way he picks the right treatment. In fact, his decadence is a particular one, aims only at a certain domain, it is not a comprehensive one. "My proof of this, among

other things, that I have always chosen the right means against bad conditions: while the décadent always chooses the means harmful to himself. As *summa summarum*, I was healthy, as an angle, as a specialty, I was décadent."[60]

A. E. Carter makes an interesting assertion about decadence which indicates even better the difference which Nietzsche draws between himself as a philosopher and actual decadents. It is about will, Nietzsche chooses to cure himself and can do it because *suma summarum* he is healthy, while decadents deliberately choose the blasphemous cult of decandence and their health is more often than not precarious.

The decadence which the philosopher claims for himself just like Cioran will claim it with the observation that Cioran does not want or cannot cure himself.

> After all that, must I say that I am experienced in questions of decadence? I have spelled them out forwards and backwards. Even that filigree-art of prehension and comprehension in general, that finger for nuances, that psychology of "seeing round the corner," and what ever else is characteristic of me, was acquired only then, is the true gift of that time in which everything became more refined for me, observation itself together with all the organs of observation. Looking out from a sick perspective toward healthier concepts and values, and again conversely, looking down out of the abundance and self-assurance of a rich life into the secret working of the instinct of decadence, that was my longest exercise, my true experience, if there be any at all in which I became master. I have it now in hand, I have a hand for it, reversing perspectives: prime reason why a "revaluation of values" is perhaps possible for me alone.[61]

Decadence teaches Nietzsche the art of nuance, the sophistication of thought, refinement, subtlety, features which characterise the decadent sensibility. The movement is doubly oriented, disease, "the sick person's optic" informs about these subtle registers as healing takes place and, conversely, vitality, the surplus of vitality constitutes a favourable vantage point for the investigation of decadence.

If this movement is metabolised, it describes the very metabolism of the decadent phenomenon. In the hypercivilised, hyperrefined, yet effete societies the surplus of vitality coming from the outside contributes to the quickening of their decline and offers the chance of the reconstruction of a new civilisation, a culture built on the ruins of the old one. The lack of vitality reclaims an "upending" caused by a revitalisation which

lies under the sign of the destruction of what is old and corrupt. The avantgardes assumed not just once this role in the European culture and civilisation much as the revolutions tried to play this role in the political arena. The metabolism of Nietzsche's philosophy simultaneously embraces decadence and dialectics as instruments that are necessary to the philosopher as long as he knows to implement them wisely.

Nietzsche makes Wagner an "artist of decadence", a "typical decadent", assimilating him to a disease, in relation to which the philosopher assumes a healing role. Wagner is one of the most representative "artists". Gilbert Durand chose the decadent subthemes from Wagner's work. Nietzsche brings into discussion some of the decadent themes from Wagner's work even if the chosen configuration is an individual one, hysteria, hypersensibility, hypersensitivity, neurosis, degenerescence, artificiality which he will also illustrate by making an interesting study on decadence in the art of Wagner.

The essential aspect is the association between modernity, decadence and pathology, a point in which Nietzsche makes from Wagner's work a paradigm of modernity where decadence, in Matei Călinescu's terms, is only a "facet".

I place this point of view first and foremost: Wagner's art is diseased. The problems he sets on the stage are all concerned with hysteria; the convulsiveness of his emotions, his over-excited sensitiveness, his taste which demands ever sharper condimentation, his erraticness which he togged out to look like principles, and, last but not least, his choice of heroes and heroines, considered as physiological types (— a hospital ward! —): the whole represents a morbid picture; of this there can be no doubt. Wagner est une névrose. Maybe, that nothing is better known to-day, or in any case the subject of greater study, than the Protean character of degeneration which has disguised itself here, both as an art and as an artist. In Wagner our medical men and physiologists have a most interesting case, or at least a very complete one. Owing to the very fact that nothing is more modern than this thorough morbidness, this dilatoriness and excessive irritability of the nervous machinery, Wagner is the modern artist par excellence, the Cagliostro of modernity. All that the world most needs to-day, is combined in the most seductive manner in his art, — the three great stimulants of exhausted people: brutality, artificiality and innocence (idiocy).[62]

From this point of view Nietzsche is a precursor regarding Cioran's vision on disease as a constituive part of a decadent sensibility but especially regarding the formation of a decadent philosophy.

Cioran – Decadence at its Beginnings

We must say that disease is an integral part of the decadent mode. The fact derives, in a first stage, from defining decadence as a final stage of an era, a historical moment, an artistic movement, etc. "Decadence is a moribund or late – not necessarily 'last' – corrupted stage of one or another aspect of civilized existence, a stage, also, in it widest apllication, of a civilization itslef/ a lesser movement that accentuates elements of the greater one (e.g. a late romanticism for Konrad W. Swart, an altered naturalism, David Weir)."[63]

The decadent incorporates the weaknesses, the exhaustion, devitalisation, the sterility, etc as an expression of decline. The lack of vital resources condemns him to sterility, to the grounding in mannerism, and extinction. Before he is diagnosed with a disease in the clinical sense, exhaustion represents the defining feature which accompanies all the other symptoms, an exhaustion which before being a disease of the body is a disease of the soul. Once identified, the disease becomes a fundamental trait which puts decadence into a clinical picture.

Not any disease confirms the decadent sensibility. Within this sensibility one can identify what Kraft-Ebbing names *pschycopatia sexualis* with the sublimated form of nervous diseases. The decadent literature (and the symbolist one by extention) is populated by anxious, neurotic, hysterical people and the decadent develops a hypersensibility correlated with a hypersensitivity which apper illustrated in the *fin de siècle* literature. The decadent heroes claim this hypersensibility which will become the correlate of an unusual artistic endowment.

Des Esseintes, Andreea Sperelli, etc, are part of this elite of neurotics for whom the neurotic disease develops a sixth sense connected to their artistic sensibility even if it is only exercised at the level of the collector. Moreover, there is the idea that the disease can accelerate the cerebral function producing an excitation which allows the use of the entire creative potential. Within this perimetre there is also the idea that syphilis can stimulate an artistic vocation to the level of genius and in the illustrative era

there is also the magazine *Venera. Mare revistă de popularizare științifică și profilaxie socială*[64] for the cultural imaginary which speculates this disease.

The fact that this sample of decadent fiction is still valid at the border with serious scientific research is demonstrated by young Cioran who counts on a positive response at the medical examination confirming that he has syphilis. Cioran had read *The Genius and the Syphilis* by Similianici and was hoping for a contamination which might offer the condition of the genius : "I wanted to be syphilitic. My mother forced me to do a check-up of my blood. (…) I was in a contradictory state ; on one side I would not have liked to miss this chance, on the other I wanted to miss it."[65]

The disease is in general profitable for philosophy, however not any type of disease claims a decadent sensibility. Nietzsche talks in medical terms but also in metaphors about disease. Wagner disease is, first of all, not a cultural-spiritual one. In this way the disease itself becomes a good conductor, a vehicle for philosophy.

In this sense, Marta Petreu makes a case study regarding Cioran and his relationship with the disease or, more accurately, with the diseases ; from rheumatism to rhinitis and neurosis we have a whole inventary of the diseases which the philosopher can handle. There is a qualitative difference between them. Roughly, the suffering caused by the disease becomes a stimulus for philosophy, but more closely, certain diseases influence Cioran's development as a philosopher. Insomnia is one of them and turns into neurosis. The condition of being a neurotic is found in one of Cioran's first writings, *Pe culmile disperării* (*On the Heights of Dispair)*, which Cioran claims it entirely from his convalescence experience and where we can notice a remarkable development of what Barbara Spackman calls *a rhetoric of sickness.*

Once again Cioran places himself in a cliche of the decadent vulgate when he considers himself as the offspring of a "degenerate stem". If the damned genius aspect, further authorised through syphilis or that of being the last representative of a race, or family is part of the decadent vulgate, the philosopher makes a leap towards a re-evaluation of decadence when he considers the disease to be an essential part for his training as a philosopher. Cioran goes further, considering that the disease is a part of anthropogenesis, the formation of man, so that "the spirit is the fruit of a life's disease, as man is nothing more than a sick animal."[66]

Cioran delves into this relationship between the disease and philosophy and implicitly with any authentic form of knowledge, including a type of knowledge which involves transcendence, a metaphysical knowledge.

> The real sickening states tie us to the metaphysical realities, which a sane man cannot possibly comprehend (…) It is obvious that there is a hierarchy between these diseases regarding their capacity to reveal themselves. (…) What is sure is that in this world the only authentic experiences are those coming from the disease.[67]

Authenticity has been regarded as an obsessive idea, a *latent myth*, as Roger Bastide, of the generation '27, calls it. Mircea Eliade will theorise it and will try to use it in his novels from *Șantier* (*Work in Progress*, an "indirect novel") to *Huliganii* (*The Hooligans*). Cioran gives it a metaphysical relevance. Essentially, Cioran rejects the aesthetic sublimation of the disease, even more he dissociates the aesthetic as not being authentic, artificial from the authenticity of the experience situated under the sign of the disease.

"The person who has the gracious feeling of life cannot realise or understand this torment of the supreme uneasiness which can only appear in a sickly environment. Everything that is profound in this world can only arise from disease. Which does not arise from disease has only an aesthetic, formal value. Being sick means living, willy-nilly on the heights."[68] Starting from *On the Heights of Dispair*, but also taking into consideration Emil Cioran's letters, Marta petreu considers that disease has played an essential role in the writing of his book/books, that "his poetic art is truly somatopsychic, (…) that he [Cioran] inspired himself from his body (…)"[69]

What is still the shape of Cioran's philosophy of life, what is the stylistics of this experience? There are two opposed terms, *grace* and *lyricism*. The former tackles in a formal way the detachment, harmony, legerity.

> The grace of humans does not lead to the climax of individuation, but to a harmonic feeling of naïve accomplishment, in which the human being never arrives to a feeling of loneliness and isolation. Formally, grace rejects loneliness, because the wavy movements through which they objectify express receptivity for life, an open and welcoming impetus for the seductions and the picturesque of the existence.[70]

The latter represents a way of life which tends towards climax. Cioran's lyricism is primarily an existential one, and only by pure chance aesthetic.

Melancholy and Sadness – Decadent Sensibilities

The way in which Cioran defines melancholy in *Pe culmile disperării* (*On the Heights of Dispair*) places us in the context of decadent sensibilities. As the symbolist-decadent writers and artists, the philosopher works with *états d'âme* starting from an essential observation: "Because there is an intimate correspondence in all big and deep states, between the subjective and the objective levels."[71] This system of correspondences allows for an interior, emotional "state" to find itself an expression, "a frame." Then, for Cioran there are "states", spiritually vitalistic experiences, manifestations of great intensity of life "a way of life", "an adundance of vitality": exuberance, enthusiasm, anger. Melancholy denounces a minus of vitality, whose expression is found in *fatigue*, doubled by the sensation of emptiness and dilatation towards nothings which originates in itself. Fatigue represents a key term for the decadent sensibility, associating a lack of vitality. Devitalization characterizes the decadent character who claims it genealogic as the last descendant of a race/family who has used his vital resources throughout centuries and has reached sterility and has aesthetically sublimated all the creative energies of the past. Des Esseintes, the character of a novel emblematic for decadence, *Á rebours* (*Against the Grain*, 1884), by Karl-Joris Huysmans represents the last offspring of a French noble family, whose first representatives are depicted in family portraits as vital and bloomingly robust. At the end of the family tree lies the opposite of vitality, the last offspring, the result of what seems to be a process of degeneration. Another perspective which the decadent sensibility offers to fatigue is that of *spleen, taedium vitae*, a state of the absence of will, disgust which life creates in all its forms, to lose one's interest for the world and its manifestations. Depending on its intensity, the spleen can be a sickly state as it condemns to an extended convalescence, to inactivity, to a *contemplatio morosa*. This "monstre délicat" as Baudelaire calls it, is considered by Gilbert Durant to be one of the decadent subthemes. [72]

The spleen is connected to this hypersensibility, to the neurosis which boosts the decadent sensibility, where we have a certain emotional pattern of the decadent: "resigned, indifferent, *blasé*, seeking, not a supreme emotion, but a new sensation; demanding not an ideal, but a fresh titillation for his jaded senses. Hence he is intellectual rather than sentimental, a creature almost logical in his manias."[73] The third decadent view of fatigue is represented by a state of incapacity (*impuissance*) which

translates through the incapacity to mobilize (itself) in order to pursue a purpose, through irresolution and sterility: "(…) that powerless sterility which plays such a role in the history of decadent sensibility and which later, when the doctors had looked at the pacient, was to be diagnosed as aboulie, a sort of spiritual paraplegia, an inability for any kind of action."[74]

Cioran transforms this fatigue in an instrument of knowledge opening the path of contemplation and offering a panoramic perspective: "Fatigue is the first organic determinate of knowledge, because it develops the indispensable conditions of a differentiation of man in the world; through it you get to that perspective which situates the world in front of man."[75] Fatigue associates itself a "prolonged reflection and a diffused reverie" and functions in a regime of vagueness. This reverie is the one which alleviates the "disproportion between the infinity of the world and the finiteness of man" which for Cioran represents the metaphysical conscience. For the philosopher, melancholy represents a form of aesthetically boosting the dismay, the metaphysical intensity, the conscience of nothingness.

Passed through the filter of melancholy, that is through a filter of dream, this revelation of the relation between human being and nothingness "ceases to be torturing, the world appearing in an eerie and sick beauty."[76] For Cioran, melancholy inscribes experience in an aesthetic dimension because it offers a detachment, because it inscribes the "revelations of pain" and puts it into perspective which is represented by the painting, the show and in a broad sense, of the representation. The aesthetic characteristic of melancholy is associated to a form of delight as it transforms life into a painting, show, representation. In this way, melancholy becomes a form of mediation, of aesthetically subliming the experience, through which it is eased, tamed, becoming more bearable.

> The loneliness of melancholics has a less deep meaning; it sometimes even has an *aesthetic* characteristic. Do we talk about a sweet melancholy, a voluptuous melancholy? But even the melancholic attitude itself, through passivity and consideration, isn't it aesthetically coloured ?

> The aesthetic attitude in front in life is characterised by a contemplative passivity which relishes from the real what is suitable for subjectivity, without any norm or criterion. The world is considered a show, and man as a spectator who passively assists as the display of some aspects. The spectacular conception of life removes the tragic and the antinomies inherent to existence, which once recognised and felt, catch you in a painful vortex in the drama of the world. [77]

207

In the poem *Melancholy* (*Langueur*), one of the decadent poetic arts, Paul Verlaine recalls this state as one of contemplative detachment in front of the world, of history transformed in a performance, a delightful disaster, an aesthetic reflex. Cioran sees this act as a reduction of life, as a reduction of living and through this an evacuation of the existential tragic, all the more, melancholy borrows delightness to the aesthetic perspective. "What is aesthetic in melancholy manifests itself in the tendency towards passivity, reverie and voluptuous delight."[78] Cioran inscribes melancholy on the coordinates of decadent sensibility, where experience is aesthetically sublimate, where life becomes an object of contemplation, where between the immediate experience or reality and subject an invisible screen interposes, characterised by Zola as *limpidité troublée*, which is that of aesthetic sensibility. The passivity used as a suspension of participation, of activism, of involvement, the revery as an expression of imprecision, the delight as a form of abandonment, of diminishing the conscience, represents forms of outdistance which create the aesthetic effect.

Having a good intuition, Cioran assimilates the melancholic state or certain "poetical virtue" correctly associating it to literature in the attempt to identify "a formal plan". "Formally, in the case of sweet and voluptuous melancholy, but also in the case of black melancholy, there are the same frames of elements: internal emptiness, vagueness of sensations, reverie, sublimation, etc."[79] The symbolist-decadent aesthetics resorts to the same elements which for Cioran define in a formal plan melancholy, the philosopher being close to make a poetics of melancholy. Two more associations send us the the symbolist-decadent profile of melancholy, the association with melancholic landscapes, and implicitly with painting and with femininity through grace, even if Cioran does not exceed the boundary of associations. In *Pitoresc și melancolie* (*Picturesque and Melancholy*), Andrei Pleșu noticed a constitutive ambiguity of melancholy: "It is simultaneously optical diligence and decommissioning, interest for things and a space out between them."[80] Andrei Pleșu sees this effect of outdistance as insolitude which melacholy presupposes, which generates a perspective effect. One of the differences which Andrei Pleșu establishes between sadness and melancholy is that the former comes as a reaction to fatigue, and the latter from the excess of leisure, one is the expression of exhaustion, the other is the fruit of contemplation, of a surplus which has not been consumed in a vital manner.

> Melancholy is the optical encounter between two loneliness: of that who contemplates and of the contemplated performance. Melancholy is the *sensitive space* between two loneliness: it is the only form in which they can report one to another. If *homo faber* cannot be melancholic is because he feels one with the world. He cannot be sad, as he becomes tired quite often, and sadness is only a form of fatigue. Melancholy is rest in excess, overdue leisure without need or finality.[81]

Even for the philosopher who is consumed by extremely intense feelings, a distinction between melancholy and sadness is imposed. The first is close to the relevance of an aesthetic phenomenon, being the result of a fatigue – as in the case of sadness for Andrei Pleșu – and it almost disposes a recognisable poetic, recoverable in the context of symbolist and decadent sensibility even if Cioran does not place the revelance of melancholy straight into literature and arts, while the second is connected more to a metaphysical dimension, the only one which is authentic for the philosopher as it puts him into contact with the tragic and the antinomies of existence.

French Culture and its Style

The decline is, in theory, the result of achieving all the theoretical possibilities offered by progress. Decay would characterize only value-saturated cultures. Emil Cioran also considers France a culture of successive accomplishments, the expression of the deep achievements. An expression of decadence in the cultural space is the phenomenon of mannerism, which highlights stereotypes as blocking forms detrimental to content and results in a more pronounced tendency towards stylization in a broad sense.

Here Cioran shows concern not only for cultural epidermis with a preference for the ornament illustrated by artistic, literary, musical, architectural styles, but also for a lifestyle defined by refining the senses of taste and education. The French identity, according to Cioran, can be sooner recovered from this interstitial superficial space of frivolity, rather than in the area of Pascal's or Descartes's reflections.

> One of the vices of France was the sterile perfection - which is nowhere more visible than in writing. The concern for the right phrasing, the care not to cripple the words and the song, to concatenate ideas in a harmonious

manner are all French obsessions. No other culture has shown greater concern for style and no other culture has provided more beautiful and flawless writings. No French citizen is able to produce irremediably bad writing. Everybody writes well, everyone can see the form before the idea. The style is a direct expression of culture. (…) Those who do not know how to find the best wording, despite having the best of intuitions, will be left at the outskirts of culture. Style represents the craftsmanship of the word. And this form of artistry is everything.[82]

We can read this passage as the author's personal faith. The concern for style becomes fundamental to Cioran, and the philosopher has a preference for *artistic writing* in philosophy in an eccentric manner. But before being put into a system, his philosophy can be shaped as a form that states an identity complex through its stylistic marks. His option for the French culture and civilization is based also on the affinity that Emil Cioran has with the style of the adopting culture, especially with the same increased concern, which is defining for the style in the context of this culture.

Decadence with Style and the Style of Decadence

In his essay about France, the considerations on the style go back regularly and they finally configure a brand identity. The association with the superficial and deep surface requires both a lack of depth, the respect for form and formality, and also a great way to limit the imbalance of the great affective combustion, the massy deviations from the norm. "France does not offer great prospects, it guides you toward a certain form, it gives the right formula, but not breath."[83]

In his study, *Style and civilization* (1957), A. E. Kroeber argues that the notion of style has the function of "concretization" of cultural totality, and great civilizations, (such as French civilization) are characterized by "super-styles", "style of style" or "total lifestyle". In his opinion

(…) La valeur totalisante du style resulte de la convergeance tendencielle de formes propres à une culture. Le style est porteur d'une dynamique extensive ou expansive partagée par toute une socièté ou incarnée par une categorie sociale ou un institution. (…) Cette temporalité close, cylclique et essentialiste du style est souvent placée au fondement de la dynamique comparée des cultures.[84]

A.E.Kroeber identifies three meanings, three ways to conceive style within a culture:

> 1. Des styles qu'il designe comme «basique » « along terme », soubassement infrastructurelles des réalisations fonctionnelles ou symboliques,
>
> 2. Des styles qui relevent de superstructures idéologiques, apprehendes comme des modeles, des normes ou des canons,
>
> 3. De styles plus circonscrits, concretement identifiable par des objets et des ouevres[85]

It is more than obvious that Cioran is interested in both the first and second category of styles.

What characterizes the identity profile of France does not regard a certain style, taxonomic registered, the Baroque, the Rococo's etc, but what Richard Shusterman calls lifestyle as an *individual style*. Shusterman carefully dissociates lifestyle as an individual style from the *taxonomy of style*, the use of a dedicated style, an artistic style, a style created by fashion.

> (…) il nous faut rappeler la distinction bien connue entre le concept taxinomique de style et le concept de style individuel. En un sens évident mais peut-être trivial, si un individu manifeste du style au sens taxinomique du concept (par exemple, s'il a un mode de vie stoïcien ou épicurien, s'il peint dans un style baroque ou écrit dans le style du XVIIe siècle), alors il fait montre d'un certain style. Mais lorsque nous disons qu'un individu a du style, nous entendons par là quelque chose de plus, quelque chose de plus spécifique ou plus personnel, et qui sert à distinguer l'artiste de ceux avec lesquels il peut avoir en commun un style général; il s'agit de quelque chose qui, telle une signature, sert à le distinguer en tant qu'individu.[86]

As far as Cioran is concerned, there is an apparent contradiction in the attempt to establish the marks of an identity complex not only to a certain style but to existence itself (behavior, gestures, habits, mind sets etc.), which requires complex stylization. Cioran does not refer to a particular individual style but to the characteristic tendency to ascribe a style to most mundane daily acts. In E. H. Gombrich's terms, this is identified with the analysis of a trend: "In judging a style, we judge a tendency."[87]

According to Cioran, we are dealing with some effort to stylize existence itself, everyday practices, and this is an identity brand.

Mediocrity has reached such a style that it is hard to find examples of stupidity in the current individual, the man in the street. (…) Therefore, France is great through small things. It may be that, after all, civilization is not something other than the refinement of the banal, the polishing of small things and maintaining a grain of intelligence in the daily accident."[88]

The concept of style put into everyday life reminds of one of Oscar Wilde's paradoxes: "I've put my genius into my life, I've put only my talent into my works."

Emil Cioran uses a paradox, too, when he invites us to appreciate the depth of the stylistics of the banal or the grandeur of small things. Superficiality is cited in fact as mere style, resulted after polishing and refining a prodigious culture that spreads the surface of existence: "Being superficial with style is harder than being deep. The former requires a lot of culture, the latter a simple imbalance of faculties."[89] The affinity Cioran has with the decadence of great empires corrupted by too much culture and civilization finds its reason in the philosopher's propensity towards styling, which he recognizes as an identity mark of the French culture. Regarding literature, decadentism advertises this very preeminence of style, artistic writing at the expense of plot and action.

Moreover, there is an effort to stylize even the decline as David Weir put it in *Decadence and the Making of Modernism*. In addition, decadentism manages at stylistic level what David Weir finds is true about Flaubert's novel *Salammbô* "makes the superficial substantial."[90]

Paul Bourget is the first to define a decadent style in *Essays in Contemporary Psychology*, as he notes that this style requires a dissolution of the text unity by means of successive focalization of the part at the expense of the whole. The sentence replaces the full text, the clause replaces the sentence, and the word replaces the clause.

One law governs both the development and the decadence of the organism which is language. A style of decadence is one in which the unity of the book breaks down to make place for the independence of the sentence, and in which the sentence breaks down to make place for the independence of the word.[91]

Paul Bourget has a styling effort that goes deeply into the text, disrupting the detail, the part, as an independent unit. Paul Bourget was perhaps the first to take a theoretical interest in literary decadence, establishing

"an analogy between the social evolution towards individualism and the individualistic manifestation of artistic language, which are typical of 'le style de decadence'". Writing in a similar way, Norberto Bobbio claims in *The Philosophy of Decadentism. A Study in Existentialism* that the style of decadence is characterized by a "triumph of the motif."[92]

Cioran identifies some features of decadent style, namely, highlighting the part at the expense of the whole, an excess of lucidity and this inner emptiness, which is both expressed and compensated in the concern for a stylistics of the existence, where the obstinate concern for the significant detail becomes a profession of faith. The stylization of existence is done around this existential emptiness, according to Cioran. "Collective lucidity is a sign of painstaking." (…) The drama of the lucid man is the drama of a nation. Every citizen becomes a small exception, and these exceptions put together total up the historic deficit of this nation."[93]

In *Spania nevertebrată* (*Invertebrate Spain*), Ortega y Gasset conceive the history of Spain byciclic: one of growth, defined by a triple action, obedience, unification, incorporation, and one of decrease, of decline, of decadence characterised by the weakening of the centre's power and the reappearance of secessionist forces. "The history of a nation is not that of its formative and ascending period: it is also the history of its decadence. And if that means rebuilding the lines of a progressive incorporation, the latter will describe the opposite process. The history of decadence of a nation is the history of a vast desintegration."[94] The philosopher calls this desintegration *particularism* which is opposed to the process of *totalization*. "Desintegration is a reverse manifestation: the parts of the whole start to live as separate totalities. I call this phenomenon of the historical life *particularism*, and if I am asked what is the most profound and serious characteristic of the Spanish present, I would answer with this word."[95] The definition which the Spanish philosopher gives to particularism evokes the definition which Paul Bourget gives to the decadent style as a rebellion, emancipation of the part agains the whole, of the cell against the entire organism, of the individual against society, of the mass against the elite. In particular, Cioran is surprised that the Spanish are aware of the meaning of their decadence and can identify with precision the moment when the decline starts, with the reign of Phillip the 3rd, in 1580. As he says in a discussion with Hans-Jurgen Heinrichs, Cioran's attachement towards Spain passes through his attachment to the obsession displayed by Spain for decadence. Spain is "the only country literally possessed by the obsession of decadence."

With reference to Decadent art, John Reed offers a range of nuances in the representation in *Decadent Style*. "But the Decadent style, while retaining a realistic mode of rendering images, violated formal conventions by breaking up compositions into independent, even contending parts, the order and significance of which could be recovered only through an intellectual effort and comprehension."[96] But what brings John Reed's reflection on decadent style closer to Cioran's considerations on a style of decadence as an identity reflex in the French culture is another statement: "Often heavily ornamented [the paintings] they employed this ornament to mask a central void. Moreover, they were intensely self-conscious."[97] "What did France love? The styles, the pleasures of intelligence, the saloon, ration, the small perfections. Which means: Expression before Nature. We are in front of a culture of form, which covers the elementary forces and which above any passionate outburst covers the tinsel of refinement."[98] It is noticeable that Cioran does not refer to a particular style, even though he makes an analysis of the French gotic comparing it with the German one to highlight o series of significant differences. He is not interested in a taxonomic style, but style as practice, as a way of life, the style introduced in the mundane practice. Therefore not a style, nor styles, but a stylisation effort imposed on the small facts of existence, translated as "small imperfections".

For Cioran this stylisation effort becomes an auto-stylisation effort, to quote Richard Sushterman, constitutes the founding element for a decadent inversion. Artifice before nature. Cioran uses a synonym for artificiality, Expression. Oscar Wilde in *The Decay of Lying*, Baudelaire in *Eloge du maquillage* (*Eulogy on make-up*), highlight the same thing "artificial life has replaced natural life" ("la vie factice a remplacé la vie naturelle"). Cioran does not go with this assessment beyond the 19th century, but we must mention that it does not have the voluntary power of the two in protecting the artificial against nature in order to develop what Camille Paglia in *Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson* calls excess or "toomuchness" as the "hallmark" of decadence" and he refers to decadence as "a style of excess and extravagance".[99]

The cult of the artificial recommends a decadent sensibility, but also a way of living in the middle of art descended in the details of modern life. Cioran introduces a nuance, a form which is particular to the decadent culture as a *culture of form*. Also, the philosopher and an essential contrast, the *cult of form* opposes to the *cult of passion*, of fervours and elementary forces. Cioran will also characterise the French culture as a

anti-dyonisiac culture. At the same time, this culture of form is, for Cioran, glued to the exercise of reflection, of the games of intelligence. What kind of intelligence is this and how can intelligence have a form, how does it acquire a style? We are talking about a saloon intelligence, a playful form which implies a dose of theatricality, artificiality, an intelligence of conversation. France is the country of dialogue (…)".[100] Hence the permission of the paradox in conversation, in discourse and the rejection of paradox as situation.[101] The paradox becomes a figure of discourse, a figure of style, but under no circumstance an experience. In this culture of form everything is exteriorized, everything excludes interiority, it is a culture of show, be it one of intelligence, having the saloon as a scene.

Decadence, Alexandrinism: Dying with Style

Emil Cioran uses two terms for decadence, that of decadence and that of alexandrinism. We can read in this term a synonym of the first, but, as Cioran is attentive at nuances, we identify in alexandrinism a tinting of the decadent movement especially toward the stylistic dimension of the phenomenon, in connection with the fact of style. Alexandrinism signifies the refined, subtle and erudite of art and philosophy in its periods of decline. But also a particular style, of the poets from the Alexandrine period, a style which is distinguished by obscurity, ornament, refinement, for example in Teocrit's romances. It is worth mentioning that for Cioran there are also vital negations, the ones proposed by the Russian culture. "The Russians can be negative, but they believe in negations, they do not taste them spectaculously."[102] What makes of alexandrinism an expression of decadence is not necessary a culture of negation, but one of its style, of negation for the sake of negation. Cioran is more straightforward when he considers alexandrinism a fact of style „Alexandrinism – which is a style of culture built on the heroic sense – (…)"[103] Alexandrinism is not only a style of culture but also a style of life which is translated in atitudes. To be alexandrian, meaning lyric and cold, participating with all your soul, but objective; to pour out spectaculously."[104] Cioran follows this apparently contradictory formula, of a symbiosis between contrasts and which defines the decadent sensibility. Lyric and cold, subjective in the affectionate and objective sense, meaning detached. Here lies a paradox of decadence which puts on stage the clash of some contrasts. In this

lies the spectacular character, and also decadent, in the strictly aesthetic relevance of the clash of these contrasts.

What Cioran suggests for France is "a stylish end". This movement from part to whole is defining, from being a stylish act to setting up a stylistic identity. At this point, decadence becomes more than just a style admitted individually, it becomes a lifestyle characterized by the *decadent* style of literature and art. Cioran proposes a utopian project of aesthetic behavior and existential gestures likely to lead to a stylistic unity. Cioran's apocalypse is aesthetic, but decadent aesthetics and the philosopher recommends respect for the exemplar model with the accompanying style.

> It cannot live up to the expectations other than by accepting a stylish end, building a culture of the West with artistry, dying out with intelligence and even grandeur - corrupting the freshness of the neighbors or of the world with decadent infiltration and dangerous insinuations. (…) France never missed a thing in its past. But by denying his Alexandrian destiny, it would miss its end.[105]

Decadence is, according to Oswald Spengler in *The Decline of the West*, the final stage for an organic evolution of every culture and civilization. For Cioran, culture and civilization of France is the perfect illustration of the theory. Alexandrianism would end a perfect cycle of a culture that never missed a thing. Moreover, this end does not only have its own style, but requires, like any mannerism, style as a purpose and the utmost expression of decline. "Alexandrianism is the period of scholarly denial, it means refusal as a style of culture."[106]

The paradox with Cioran reflects a feature of decadentism, namely, that decline is always fertile. 1. for smaller cultures, in full swing of vitality and for whom the cult of form leads to better management of dormant content, in the magma of the preformatted 2. for the culture that reflects it, because it offers styling, better calligraphy of the content which has reached a museum stage. "Alexandrianism can be considered as a successful form of culture when it represents a form of maximum decrease. There are forms of fruitful disintegration and forms of sterile disintegration."[107]

Put it other words, Cioran draws a conclusion concerning the preeminence of style in the decadence stage of a certain culture, but he also considers another paradox, the coexistence of a vital enthusiasm, dynamic with styling as a form of closure, of giving it a fixed norm. "We

can no longer extract content from France; it is but a universe of patterns (…) . Will the future lead to a culture of formal revelry?"[108]

Towards a Stylistics of Transfiguration

Cioran suddenly wonders about an identity stylistics that cannot be taken as a national style. Discussions on a national style had taken place in a frame increasingly theoretical since late nineteenth century. Architect Ion Mincu found in the NeoRomanian style a way to give value to folk elements within an architectural style that owed much to neoclassicism; theorists such as Leon Bachelin regarded the contribution that the folk element would bring to Art Nouveau[109] a style in vogue in Europe at the end of the century.

In terms of the morphology of culture that Cioran uses himself, philosopher Lucian Blaga prefigures a stylistic matrix of the Romanian identity in *Horizon and Style and the Mioritic Space* through what the philosopher calls "space of Miorita". The term is originally used in one of the most popular literary works emblematic for the definition of a Romanian identity, the *Miorita* ballad. Cioran refers to more than an artistic style, and vehemently refuses a new Romanian identity profile modeled after the model provided in this folk ballad.

First, the philosopher finds the absence of a particular style, of a stylistic identity that might allow it to be recorded in history.

> Romania's weakness is that it has been considered for too long to have potential, it has failed systematically to become actuality in history. Under such circumstances, how can they create a profile? Where is our style?

> Is there a single Romanian city with its own architectural brand? We stayed at farm level and we never knew that the village has never been recorded in history.[110]

The inaccuracies or omissions of the philosopher are less important than the ideas he transmits. Cioran excludes the possibility to have an identity profile out of the "profile" of popular culture as the philosopher Lucian Blaga, for example, does. He turns his back to most of his colleagues from the same generation, from Mircea Vulcanescu to Dan Botta, who praises the role played by the folk element and by the peasant society

217

in establishing an identity profile and a related stylistics. Instead, to the young philosopher, identity is circumscribed only to historical cultures.

Cioran operates with his own concept of style as a formal expression of existence, in other words, Cioran offers a definition of a lifestyle: "It [style] is an expression of the tendency of life to create form on a temporary basis, to become fixed in a limited structure, and to direct internal dynamism and raise a more understandable irrationality out of inner substance of life."[111]

The drawbacks formulating the terms of morphology of culture according to Oswald Spengler prove again Cioran's emphasis on setting a stylistic identity. The absence of the Gothic as style is less relevant than the absence from the conscience, because "the Gothic is the vertical spirit. (…) The Gothic is a style of rapid ascendance and momentum, but a focused style, of transcendent becoming."[112]

Cioran considers an ascending sense, which the Gothic perfectly illustrates, stylistically relevant to the growth of Romania, but he notices that "The formal scheme of our fate is only horizontal."[113] But the horizontal dimension has no matching style. Lucian Blaga will discover, in the harmonious alternation between hill and valley, a stylistic matrix that configures an identity profile. For Cioran, the horizontal transcribed in terms of abyssal psychology means "Passivity, skepticism, self-contempt, gentle contemplation, minor religiosity, year history, wisdom (…)"[114]

The considerations about identity stylistics go hand in hand with the reflection on decadence. The lucidity, that the philosopher will later regard as a symptom of French decadence, is considered as a way to block the vital momentum of small cultures and therefore vehemently rejected. Cioran distinguishes between "the inner conditions" which require a series of "formal pattern" or "the Romanian form of life" and a series of "specific psychological determinants" that generate "a brand and a certain individuality."

The last references are bequeathed from Radulescu-Motru's theories about energy personalism, published in *Romanian. The Catechism of a New Spirituality*[115] the same year that *The Transfiguration of Romania* came to light. Cioran recommends this vital momentum, which must carry with it a new identity stylistics. Most privileged are the peak moments of a culture as a means to relieve its entire energy.

From this perspective, the philosopher recommends small cultures the "force cult" as a tonic. Apocalyptic images are simultaneous with consuming fervor in human hecatombs in an angry and aggressive release of energy. But Cioran has finer nuances when he recommends things that

give a contour, a shape and hence a style to history, a "stylish assault", different from the barbarities unable to generate forms. One should note that the "stylish assault" that Cioran uses has its aesthetic counterpart in the avant-garde movements from early twentieth century, movements with a certain associated violence with old aesthetic canons, long established forms.

Marinetti's Futurism, and Tristan Tzara's Dadaism cultivate the same kind of destructive activism, the same aggressive energy. Cioran resorts to comparative stylistics, trying to identify the moment when it finds an identity complex and it gives universal value. The comparison with Russia, whose first generation of intellectuals "definitely marked the cultural style",[116] reveals a common starting point: messianism. This messianism takes the shape of transfiguration, changing the face of Romania the change of "our entire lifestyle" to impose a "cultural style." We are entering the area of the logic of decadence, when Cioran suggests that with decadent empires, the small cultures will play the role of barbaric acts in full vital momentum. At the end of the nineteenth century, the iconic image of decadence was given by the decline of the Roman Empire, undermined from outside by barbarian invasions, and from inside by luxury and excessive refinement correlated with the dissolution of those strict virtues that had been the basis of the empire.

For the comparative scholar Jean de Palacio, the end of the nineteenth century decadence is fully Latin: "Décadence, à la fin du XIXe siècle, est essentiellement conçue comme *latine.*"[117] The easternization of the Roman world is seen as a cause of the decadence of the empire, and for the Romanian culture the role of the eastern world is played by Byzantium and by its heritage of culture and civilization. According to Marie-France David-de Palacio, Byzantine decadencemeans a continuation and refinement of the Roman one: "C'est que la Décadence trouve en Byzance une décadence de la décadence romaine, une principe d'éclatement, d'hétérogénéité poussé à l'extrême."[118]

Barbaric acts are regarded as the main instrument of extinction for a civilization that once it had reached its peak it went into a slow decline by corrupting morals and devitalizing its citizens. The Romanian philosopher sees the emancipation of Romania or its transfiguration possible by acquiring a hard identity, by assuming the role of the barbarian against these devitalized cultures. This model is identical to that of expansioned and messianic Russia, a model that Cioran reveals in *Istorie şi utopie* (*History and Utopia*). "They are the last primitive people of Europe, and

they may give it a new impetus, which will mean a final humiliation."[119] But the difference is crucial and it resides in the "stylish assault". In this case, barbaric acts advertise a certain form, a certain style, a cultural style able to give shape to violent actions, but to also confer a cultural identity to the "aggressor". "The affirmation of historically young people must affect the outward form of barbarism, but the exuberant burst of energy must obscure the germinal cult of an idea, the passion to individualize through a spiritual meaning. Otherwise, their aurora is not worthy of the others' decadence."[120]

Conclusions

The works of Emil Cioran integrate a tradition of decadence and develops a reflection upon decadence. The specific themes of decadence are reinvested by the Romanian philosopher with new meanings in various contexts, nuanced and reevaluated from a perspectivewhich reflects the destinal options of Emil Cioran. One of the fundamental works which will have marked the ulterior evolution of Emil Cioran is Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of The West*, point in which he inserts himself inside the tradition of a reflection of decadence. An essential fact for the way in which the philosopher approaches decadence is that Cioran melts it in his own metabolism, integrates it in his own body before he turns it into an idea. Another element that confers particularity to the way in which Cioran analyzes the decadent phenomenon is represented by his confrontation with the theological fact. Another dimension of decadence, as Cioran interprets it, resides in the way he treats it as a fact of style from the perspective of the morphology of culture but as well as a way of life where Cioran considers himself a decadent. For the philosophical work of Emil Cioran, decadence is not a secondary fact but a fundamental theme, creational, thus his work may be systemized to a certain extent. From this perspective, Cioran integrates himself inside a prestigious series of decadent philosophers with an essential contribution in understanding the decadent phenomenon.

NOTES

[1]   Richard Gilman, *Decadence. The Strange Life of an Epithet,* Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1979, p.9.

[2]   *Ibidem*, p.19.

[3]   David Weir, *Decadence and The Making of Modernism*, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1995, p.10.

[4]   *Ibidem*, p.11.

[5]   Liz Constable, Matthew Potolsky, Dennis Denisoff (edited by), *Perrenial Decay. On the Aesthetics and Politics of Decadence*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998, p.21.

[6]   *Ibidem*, p.21.

[7]   *Ibidem*, p.21.

[8]   Norberto Bobbio, *The Philosophy of Decadentism*, translated by David Moore, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1948, p.15.

[9]   *Ibidem*, p.8.

[10]   Richard Gilman, *op.cit.*, p.15.

[11]   See Ion Vartic, *Cioran naiv și sentimental* (*Cioran Naïve and Sentimental*), Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2011.

[12]   See Marta Petreu, *Despre bolile filosofilor. Cioran*, (*On Philosophers' Deseases. Cioran*) Ediția a II-a, revăzută, Editura Apostrof, Cluj-Napoca; Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2010.

[13]   Emil Cioran, *Despre Franța*, Text setting, Foreword and notes by Constantin Zaharia, Editura Humanitas, Bucharest, 2011, p.50.

[14]   David Weir, *Decadence and The Making of Modernism*, p.15,16.

[15]   Matei Călinescu, *Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1987.

[16]   Antoine Compagnon, *The Five Paradoxes of Modernity*, Translated by Franklin Philip, Columbia University Press, New York, 1994.

[17]   Antoine Compagnon, *Antimodernii. De la Joseph de Maistre la Roland Barthes*, translated by Irina Mavrodin and Adina Dinițoiu, Foreword by Mircea Martin, Editura Art, Bucharest, 2008.

[18]   Michael O'Meara, "We Anti-Moderns" in http://www.toqonline.com/archives/v7n4/747OMearaonCompaganon.pdf

[19]   See Angelo Mitchievici, *Decadență și decadentism în contextul modernității românești și europene*, (*Decadence and Decadentism in the Context of Romanian and European Modernity*) Editura Curtea Veche, Bucharest, 2011.

[20]   Oswald Spengler, *Declinul occidentului*, vol.I și II, traducere Ioan Lascu, Editura Beladi, Craiova, 1996. All the quotations are excerpts from this edition, in my translation.

[21]   Matei Călinescu, *Cinci fețe ale modernității. Modernism, avangardă, decadență, kitsch, postmodernism*, translate by Tatiana Pătrulescu and Radu Țurcanu, afterword by de Mircea Martin, Editura Univers, Bucharest 1995,

p.135; original ed. M. Călinescu, *Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism*, Duke University Press, Durham 1987.

22 Emil Cioran, *De la France*, translated by Alain Paruit, Édition de l'Herne, Paris, 2011, p.8.

23 Published in *Cuvântul*, year XV, no.3130, 31 ian. 1938, p.4.

24 Published in *Vremea*, year XII, no.581, 8 dec. 1940, p.3.

25 Emil Cioran, *Revelațiile durerii (Revelations of Sorrow)*, edited by Mariana Vartic and Aurel Sasu, Forword by Dan C. Mihăilescu, Editura Echinox, Cluj, 1990, p.193.

26 *Ibidem*, p.182.

27 *Ibidem*, p.193.

28 Emil Cioran, *On France*, p.67.

29 *Ibidem*, p.72.

30 http://poesie.webnet.fr/lesgrandsclassiques/poemes/paul_verlaine/langueur.html.

31 Emil Cioran, *On France*, p.72,73.

32 Ian Fletcher, *Decadence and the 1890s*, Holmes and Meyers Publishers, Stratford-Upon-Avon-Studies, vol.17, 1980.

33 *Ibidem*, p.82,83.

34 *Ibidem*, p.89.

35 Ilina Gregori, *Cioran. Sugestii pentru o biografie imposibilă (Cioran. Sugesstions for an Impossible Biography)*, Editura Humanitas, Bucharest, 2012, p.24.

36 The phrase has a tautological note which we can read between the lines, no decadent lacks the aesthetic component, whereas not any aesthete is necessarily a decadent, even if his aesthetic condition opens up to this possibility.

37 Emil Cioran, *Despre Franța*, p.46.

38 Emil Cioran, *Tratat de descompunere*, traducere din franceză de Irina Mavrodin, Editura Humanitas, Bucharest, 2011.

39 Emil Cioran, *Despre Franța* (*On France*), p. 34.

40 *Ibidem*, p. 36.

41 *Ibidem*, p. 42.

42 *Ibidem*, p. 48, 49.

43 *Ibidem*, p. 49.

44 *Ibidem*, p. 49.

45 Emil Cioran, *The Transfiguration of Romania*, p.46.

46 Emil Cioran, *Despre Franța*, p. 53.

47 *Ibidem*, p. 96.

48 Ion Vartic, *Cioran naiv și sentimental*, Editura Polirom, Iasi, 2011.

49 Emil Cioran, *Despre Franța*, p. 50.

50 Emil Cioran, *Schimbarea la față a României* (*Transfiguration of Romania*), Editura Vremea, Bucharest, 1936, p.42.
51 *Ibidem*, p.88.
52 Emil Cioran, *Despre Franța*, p. 67.
53 *Ibidem*, p. 67, 68.
54 *Ibidem*, p.68.
55 *Ibidem*, p.52.
56 Mario Praz, *The Romantic Agony*, translation by Agnus Davidson, Foreword by Frank Kermode, Oxford Paperback, 1978.
57 Michel Onfray, *L'art de jouir: pour un matérialisme hédoniste,* Paris, Grasset, 1991.
58 Barbara Spackman, *The Rhetoric of Sickness from Baudelaire to D'Annunzio*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1989, p. ix.
59 Friedrich Nietszche, *Ecce Homo & The Antichrist*, in a new translation by Thomas Wayne, Algora Publishing New York, 2004, p.12.
60 *Ibidem*, p.13.
61 *Ibidem*, p.12.
62 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Case Of Wagner, Nietzsche Contra Wagner, and Selected Aphorisms*, translated by Anthony M. Ludovici Third Edition T. N. Foulis13 & 15 Frederick Street Edinburgh and London 1911, p.32.
63 Richard Gilman, *Decadence. The Strange Life of an Epithet,* Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1979.
64 See the chapter "Venera decadentă și geniul luetic" in Angelo Mitchievici, *Decadență și decadentism în contextul modernității românești și europene* (Editura Curtea Veche, Bucharest, 2011).
65 Cioran, a dialogue with Gerd Bergfleth in *Convorbiri cu Cioran*, Editura Humanitas, Bucharest, 1993, p.104.
66 Cioran, *Pe culmile disperării*, Editura Humanitas, Bucharest, 2008, p.59.
67 *Ibidem*, p.31.
68 *Ibidem*, p.68.
69 Marta Petreu, *Despre bolile filosofilor. Cioran*, Ediția a II-a revăzută, Editura Apostrof, Cluj-Napoca, Polirom, Iasi, 2010, p.23.
70 Emil Cioran, *Pe culmile disperării*, p.67.
71 *Ibidem*, p.34.
72 Gilbert Durand, *Figuri mitice și chipuri ale operei. De la mitocritică la mitanaliză*, Nemira, Bucharest, 1998.
73 A.E.Carter, *The Idea of Decadence in French Literature. 1830-1900*, University of Toronto Press, 1958, p.29.
74 *Ibidem*, p.35.
75 Cioran, *Pe culmile disperării*, p.35.
76 *Ibidem*, p.36.
77 *Ibidem*, p.37.

78   *Ibidem*, p.37

79   *Ibidem*, p.39.

80   Andrei Pleșu, *Pitoresc și melancolie. O analiză a sentimentului naturii în cultura europeană*, Humanitas, București, 2003, p.74.

81   *Ibidem*, p.73,74.

82   Emil Cioran, *Despre Franța*, p.36.

83   *Ibidem*, p.42.

84   A.E.Kroeber, "Style and Civilization", apud. Bruno Martinelli, *L'interrogation du style – Anthropologie, technique et esthétique*, Aix-en-Provence, Presses de l'université de Provence, 2005, pp. 30,31. "1. styles designated as basic styles, based on the infrastructure of functional or symbolic achievements 2. styles that reveal ideological superstructure, understood as patterns, paradigms or canons 3. More circumscribed styles, identifiable by means of object and works of art."

85   *Ibidem*, p. 31.

86   R. Shusterman, *Style et style de vie*, «Littérature», nr.105, 1997, p. 103.

87   E.H. Gombrich, *The Sense of Order: A Study in the Psychology of Decorative Art*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1979, p.213:

88   E. Cioran, *Despre Franța*, p.43.

89   *Ibidem*, p.45.

90   David Weir, *Decadence and the Making of Modernism*, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst (USA) 1995, p. 24.

91   Paul Bourget, *Essais de psychologie contemporaine*, Alphonse Lemerre, Paris, 1883, p. 25.

92   Norberto Bobbio, *The Philosophy of Decadentism. A Study in Existentialism*, translated by David Moore, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1948, *apud* J. Reed, *Decadent Style*, Ohio University Press, Athens (Ohio) 1985, p.11.

93   E. Cioran, *Despre Franța*, p.46.

94   José Ortega y Gasset, *Spania nevertebrată*, traducere Sorin Mărculescu, Editura Humanitas, Bucharest, 1997, p.33.

95   *Ibidem*, p.47.48.

96   J. Reed, *Decadent Style*, Ohio University Press, Athens (Ohio) 1985, p.129.

97   *Ibidem*, p.129, 130.

98   Emil Cioran, *Despre Franța*, p.23.

99   Camille Paglia, *Sexual Personae: Art and Decadence from Nefertiti to Emily Dickinson*, Yale University Press, United States, 1990.

100   Emil Cioran, *Despre Franța*, p.44.

101   *Ibidem*, p.24.

102   *Ibidem*, p.90.

103   *Ibidem*, p.66.

104   *Ibidem*, p.66.

105   *Ibidem*, p. 57.

[106]   *Ibidem*, p.68.
[107]   *Ibidem*, p.81.
[108]   *Ibidem*, p.92.
[109]   Cf. A. Mitchievici, "Art and Nation: Romanian Arts and Crafts", *Studia Philologia*, nr.2, 2012.
[110]   E. Cioran, *Schimbarea la față a României*, p.85.
[111]   *Ibidem*, p.20.·
[112]   *Ibidem*, p.63.
[113]   *Ibidem*, p.63.
[114]   *Ibidem*, p.63
[115]   Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, *Românismul. Catechismul unei noi spiritualități (Romanian. The Catechism of a New Spirituality)*, Editura Semne, Bucharest, 2008.
[116]   E. Cioran, *Schimbarea la față a României*, p.45.
[117]   J. de Palacio, *Figures et formes de la décadence*, Séguier, Paris 1994, p. 19.
[118]   M.-F. David de Palacio, *Les «nacres de la perle et de la pourriture»: Byzance*, Alain Montandon, *Mythes de la décadence*, Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal, Clermond-Fernand 2001, p.166.
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VIKTOR PÁL

Born in 1980 in Görömböly, Miskolc (Hungary)

Ph.D., University of Tampere, Finland

Lecturer, WU Vienna University of Business and Economics, Austria

Visiting researcher, Tallinn University, 2014
Visiting researcher, University of Antwerp, 2013
Visiting researcher, University of California Los Angeles, 2007, 2010-2011

Participated to conferences in Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany,
Hungary, Portugal, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States

THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF EXTENSIVE GROWTH IN WESTERN– AND EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN 1850 AND 1960

Abstract

In this paper, I investigate how industrialization and urbanization changed Western— and East-Central Europe between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth. I aim to analyze the relationship between economic development and their environmental consequences in Great Britain, Germany, and Hungary. I aim to point out the connection between extensive economic development and environmental pollution, and to show the uniformity of industrial and urban changes and their environmental consequences, whether they unfolded in Western–, or in East-Central Europe.

Keywords: economic development, extensive growth, environmental pollution, urbanization, environmental problems, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary.

1. The Environmental Impact of the Industrial Revolution in Britain

Prior to the complex set of changes we label today as the "Industrial Revolution", much of the population was engaged in rural agricultural work. After a long build up process new agricultural techniques appeared in North Western Europe, most particularly in the North Low Countries and Britain. This enabled a growing number of people to work in non-agricultural industries by the 19th century. According to Jan de Vries evidence suggest that a build up process for accelerated changes have began centuries earlier. The fruits of these changes ripened in front of the eyes of contemporary observers at the end of the eighteenth century. After the hegemony of the Mediterranean (Venice, the Spanish and the

Portuguese), the stress of economic development relocated to the North Low Countries and later to Britain.

There has been a rich scientific discussion whether the notion of the Industrial Revolution was justified or not. Whether one accepts the concepts of Marx, Lewis, Rostow or Schumpeter, there is little doubt about the change in our civilization since then. New technologies spread in manufacturing and transportation by the extensive use of fossil energy sources, and these technological changes interacted with social and environmental tendencies.

England was often regarded as the most well-prepared land in mid-eighteenth century Europe to adapt industrial structural changes. Coal and iron ore were widely available in Britain; hence, steam power could be utilized. There was a fairly reliable infrastructure and stable government, which created the background for business and stressed the pivotal role of private initiative.[1]

Industrialization and urbanization rapidly transformed Great Britain. By the mid- nineteenth century there were nine British cities that had more than 100,000 inhabitants. For example, Manchester grew from a small-scale town to a merchant metropolis in about 70 years by 1830. Urbanization and industrialization triggered coal use, and Britain's domestic coal consumption grew from 10 million tons of coal in 1800 to 189 million tons by 1914. Industry was an important user of coal, and source of smoke pollution. In large cities such as London, Manchester, and Sheffield a great number of homes were heated with coal during the winter months which worsened all-year around pollution from industrial chimneys.[2]

Business interests and pollution control did not fit well together, and only after decades of industrialization and pollution was that legislators began to pass the first effective pollution control laws in Britain. This was because in general businesses were focusing on profitability and output, whereas their activities endangered the environmental and public health condition of the local communities. For example, when a parliamentary investigation began about the control of industrial smoke pollution of the Dowlais Ironworks in Merthyr Tydfil in South Wales, Sir John Guest, the proprietor, explained to the parliamentary inquiry that for certain production processes, such as rolling rails, full power steam capacity was needed, which led to more intensive smoke from factory chimneys. The reduction of steam power would have reduced the production capacity of the plant.

Even though the efficiency of steam engines improved, their numbers were growing faster, hence they produced more pollution. For example, in the previously mentioned Dowlais Ironworks, the number of steam engines grew from 23 to 63 between 1837 and 1856.[3]

Water pollution had already been well known in Britain before the nineteenth century. In London, and in other populous areas, domestic sewage and commerce had negative impact on river flows. In the long run, safe and adequate drinking water supplies of large urban centers were not in particular danger, because most cities' water sources were upstream, in environments safe from pollution by the late nineteenth century. Fish, however, were less lucky and by the acceleration of industrial pollution, salmon and other species of fish began to deplete, for example in the river Thames, Severn, Avon and Trent. The growing problem of fish stock loss was acknowledged by the 1824 and 1836 parliamentary committees. The investigations of such committees, however, were only focused on the prohibition of mass fishing techniques, and did not consider the regulation of water pollution sources.[4]

British economic growth in the first half of the nineteenth century received a new impetus from infrastructure construction. After two brief and bustling periods of railway construction between 1835 and 1837, and again between 1845 and 1847, the core of the present-day railway network of the United Kingdom was constructed. Coal, iron, steel, and railways also meant new markets, and the emergence of new industries to supply these markets. Steel production, for example, was revolutionized by the Bessemer converter, which was a new and enhanced method of steel production. Simultaneously, new technologies revolutionized the chemical industry and gave birth to new industries, such as electro-engineering. Those who could not keep up with the increasing speed of technological change in the nineteenth century soon had to close down their operations. For example, the Cyfarthfa Iron Works in Merthyr Tydfil, was one of the first large iron works in Britain, established in 1765. When the eccentric owner, Robert Thompson Crawshay refused to convert the factory from iron to steel production, the factory's sales were in decline, and the plant eventually was closed down in 1874.[5]

Smoke remained one of the main environmental concerns in late nineteenth century Britain. Not only industrial pollution, but in the case of large cities domestic coal consumption prevailed. In this matter, the Sanitary Act of 1866 marked a significant milestone, because local authorities were required to prosecute owners of "smokey" factories.

Limits of regulations and measurement were rather primitive, utilizing the "Paris Smoke Scale", which judged the appearance of the chimney top from very thick to "faint" smoke. Civil society, concerned about pollution, was also on the rise in Britain. By 1910, the Coal Smoke Abatement Society began monitoring programs and encouraged other citizens to be active members of their observation groups.

Water protection legislation also improved in late nineteenth century Britain. In 1876, the Rivers Prevention Pollution Act required the neutralization of sewage before it was discharged to watercourses. Such standards, however, proved to be impossible to meet, and sanitary authorities normally gave exemptions to polluters.[6]

Despite its inevitable environmental problems, late nineteenth century Britain, was probably a safer, more livable, and more pleasant place than ever before for much of the British society. Initial features of the industrial mode of production, such as extremely long working hours, child labor, the shortened life span of the working class, high child mortality, and horrifying living conditions disappeared gradually, at least in part.[7]

By World War I, British wastewater controlling methods grew more sophisticated. This country was loosing importance in economic terms, but still exported about 30 per cent of the world's industrial products in 1914. However, Germany closed the gap during previous decades and exported nearly as much as Britain: 27 per cent.[8]

Britain's steady loss of economic importance paralleled the general shrinking of Europe's share in the world market. Between 1913 and 1926, the North American share of the world economy rose from 14 to 19 percent. Asia's share grew even faster, from 12 to 19 percent and, Europe shrank from 58.5 to 48 percent.[9]

Water quality protection changed in the latter part of the nineteenth century in the United Kingdom. At that time, organic content of river flows generally determined the degree of pollution for authorities. By the beginning of the twentieth century, a growing number of engineers argued that relying solely on organic compounds was insufficient and the absorption of dissolved oxygen should be included in water quality monitoring. To make water quality monitoring more reliable, the November 1912 report of the Royal Commission supported the inclusion of oxygen absorption into the water quality monitoring process. It was, however, not until the interwar era when the professionalization of wastewater issues reached a higher level of complexity on a local level. For example, in response to the central government's aim to control pollution with greater

efficiency, the Nothinghamshire County Council's Public Health and Housing Committee set up a Rivers Pollution Prevention Subcommittee in July 1923. This subcommittee was responsible for any pollution of watercourses county-wide, and received its first full time "Rivers Pollution Officer" in May 1927.[10]

In the United Kingdom in the latter part of the nineteenth century, sanitary engineers "emphasized, the most important, in any case, was the state of the river, once the discharge had been mixed with its water". The British system inspired other dilution and dilution-based wastewater discharge fines, and dilution-based calculating methods became the basis for Hungarian wastewater discharge fines between 1962 and 1968.[11]

2. Late Coming Industrialization and it Environmental Impact in Germany

Germany was in the first wave of industrialization, but due to the late adaptation of industrial changes, the Germans were "late comers" to the Industrial Revolution. This position contained several positive elements. For example German industrialists adopted modern production technologies faster than already established producers in Britain and Belgium.

German industrial development were based on the typical branches of industry of late nineteenth century Europe: coal, iron, and steel. Between the 1830s and 1870s, German industries grew at an enormous rate. During this period, Krupp shot out from a manufacturing firm of 60 men to an industrial giant of 16,000 employees. In the 1860s, the rising star of the German chemical industry appeared in the horizon. Future leading companies, Hoechst, Bayer and BASF were born in this period.[12]

Besides the heavy industries, apparel and food production, such as the manufacturing of shoes, clothes, hats, meat, beer, and sugar produced success stories. Another similarity to the British and Belgian way of industrialization was in Germany, that one of the facilitators of the German industrial "revolution" was the construction of an extensive rail network. The opening of the first line in 1833 was followed by the rapid expansion. The rail network in the German lands reached 6,500 km in 1852. Growth continued in unified Germany and the rail network reached 50,000 km in 1873, and 61,000 kilometers by 1910.[13]

Prussia facilitated the growing rail network with direct and indirect state investments. A large number of industrial plants and mines in unified Germany were state controlled. Even a supposedly private institutions, such as the German chambers of commerce were heavily affected and partly controlled by the state.[14]

Parallel with industrialization, rapid urbanization unfolded in formerly agricultural and rural Germany. During the second half of the nineteenth century Berlin's population grew from 412,000 to 2 million inhabitants. Hamburg's population was close to 1 million by the First World War.[15]

Industrialization and urbanization combined in one of its most extreme form in the Ruhr, in the vicinity of Europe's largest bituminous coal and lignite fields. Even if local iron deposits were inadequate for large-scale iron and steel production, the Rhine, Western Europe's foremost transportation route served as a channel of imported iron and of export for Ruhr products. Large Western European markets were situated within easy reach of this industrial area. In addition to the privileged geographic preconditions of the *Ruhrgebiet*, the Bismarck government supported the coal-based heavy industry with growing military orders.[16]

Even though coal made the Ruhr area one of the largest concentrations of heavy industries in the world, the switch from charcoal to coal and from small-scale to large-scale iron and later steel manufacturing took quite a while for the Germans. As late as 1825, the total annual production of Rhineland and Westphalia was 17,000 tons, produced in charcoal-fueled furnaces. Less than 20 years later, in 1844, nearly two-thirds of the total 51,800 tons of annual regional iron production came from coal-fueled production plants. Production growth accelerated from 1850 and several large coke-fueled plants opened in the 1850s, utilizing by the *fettkhole* of Westphalia.[17]

Table 1. Coal production in the Ruhr region, 1774-1996 (Tons/Year)

1774	70,000
1826	455,000
1871	13 million
1913	115 million
1938	130 million
1950	120 million
1996	56 million

Source: Cioc, *The Rhine*, 83.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, new impetus for industrialization in East-Central Europe came from the West. From 1800 to the eve of World War I, Europe's population skyrocketed. The population in Great Britain almost quadrupled from 10.9 million to 40.8 million. Belgium, Holland, Germany and Austria-Hungary's population doubled. The populous West needed more imports, especially foodstuffs. Workshops and factories were set up to supply the growing volume of Western and domestic demand. A steady stream of foreign investment found its way to the region, and during the second half of the nineteenth century, production and pollution scale of new East-Central European plants were considerably larger than before.[18]

Other costly but profiting investments such as railroads, mines, and banks were also set up by foreign money. In the Czech lands the engine of economic and industrial development were mostly of German origin. Also, the Czech nobility was more eager to set up enterprises than its Hungarian counterpart. For example, in 1829 the Archbishop of Olomouc established Rudolfshütte,[19] the predecessor of the giant Vitkovice steel mills in Ostrava. In 1843, these works were overtaken by the Rothschilds who modernized the plant. In 1873, the *hütte* and mines merged into the largest steel production plant in Austria-Hungary and operated until World War I under the name of Witkowitzer Bergbau und Eisenhüttengesellschaft (Vitkovice Mine and Ironkworks Company).

By 1900 in the Czech lands the rate of the industrial workforce in the total population grew rapidly and was similar to Germany's. (35.5% in 1882 and 42.8% in 1907). Companies in Bohemia and Moravia dominated the empire's heavy industrial capacities: 60 percent of its metal and 75 percent of its chemical output was produced there. The localities of Most, Duchov and Teplice grew to be the centers of production in the brown coal region of the north. Ústí nad Labem was the center for the chemical industry. Machine building was represented by successful companies such as the Ringhoffer in Smíchov, Prague; the Škoda Works in Plzeň; the Daněk in Karlín, and further works in České Budějovice and Kladno. Fusion made large companies even bigger. For example, the Ruston Company merged with the Bromovský Schulz & Son Company, which concern later acquired the Ringhoffer Company and soon became part of the large Škoda.[20]

3. The Interwar Era and Environmental Conditions

During the interwar period, extensive development in Europe stopped. Defeated countries such as German and Hungary struggled in the early 1920s and then were hit hard by the depression years. It was the rearmament programs which triggered industry again in the late 1930s, but eventually led to a devastating war. After the war, defeated Gemany suffered under war reparations and the discharge of pollutants decreased for a brief period. In the weak and slowly stabilizing Weimar Republic, industrial production began to rise steadily after 1924 and it surpassed pre-war levels by 1928. Waste waters from the German industrial plants affected the Dutch section of that river severly.[21]

In 1917, a water quality investigation of the river Elk near Rotterdam by the Government Institute for Hydrographic Fisheries Research (Rijksinstituut voor Hydrografisch Visserijonderzoek) found severe organic pollution, "fungi" in deeper layers of the Rhine. Such organic pollution was assumed originate from the numerous German paper and pulp factories, which discharged their wastewaters to the Rhine. Organic pollution from cellulose plants was periodic. Fungi accumulated in the vicinity of German cellulose plants, and in periods of high water, normally in the Spring, fungi was swept downstream from Germany. "Flushing" fungi down the river Rhine was followed by accumulation periods, in which fungi-type organic pollution did not appear in the Rhine with such severity, until it was swept downstream again by high water.[22]

It was not only German industry that threatened the quality of the Rhine, however. The gigantic industrial conglomerate in the French-controlled Ruhr area was the major polluter of the river. In 1931, French authorities granted concessions for potash mines to dump waste salts to the Rhine. In the 1920s and '30s potash was an important ingredient for chemicals, medicines, soaps, matches, glass, paper, aniline dye, bleaching agents, explosives, and fertilizers. In the late 1920s, potash mining was an important business in Germany and France, and about 95 per cent of the world's production originated from there. The French deposits accumulated in the area around Mulhouse in the Upper Rhine Valley. Potash was discovered around Mulhouse in 1904 and developed into a major business, accounting for around 30 percent of all international sales. Unlike the German potash fields which were extensive in geographical location, the Mulhouse potash mining area was concentrated and compact. This is why dumping salts was so concentrated.[23]

The Dutch feared that if dumping started, it would decrease the already low water quality in the Middle and Lower segments of the Rhine. Dumping potash, and hence increasing the waste levels of the Rhine, was considered a threatening international issue in Holland. The Dutch attempted to resolve the issue diplomatically, but eventually the French dismissed Dutch claims as "overreactions" to potash dumping. Obviously, the French might have seen it differently if the Netherlands was upstream and France downstream.[24]

The Great Depression hit Germany particularly hard. Economic struggles and social issues aided Hitler to gain power with a populist, Nazi agenda in 1933. Once in power, the Nazis began to work to fulfill their election promises, which included the rapid elimination of unemployment. Initially, employment was fueled by the first and second Reinhardt Programs, which facilitated infrastructure construction, especially autobahn (freeway) building. Later, war related industrial production became the key element of Hitler's economic vision of Germany.[25]

After World War I, the overall structure of the Czechoslovak industry remained unchanged. Czechoslovakia's large industrial potential and prestigious producers such as Škoda made it the leading industrial country in East-Central Europe. Czechoslovak iron and steel manufacturers remained concentrated in Ostrava and Kladno, where about 90 percent of the total Czechoslovak steel output was produced in 1936.

Polish heavy industries also remained very much concentrated in one area, Upper Silesia. Here, most production plants were state-owned, and similarly to Czechoslovakia, a handful of works produced a major share of the output. In 1936, the state-owned Wspólnota Interesów Górniczo-Hutniczych S.A. and the Huta Pokój merged, and combined they produced about 75 percent of the steel output of Poland. [26] When the Allies began air raids in German industrial centers, large defense production capacities were built up in the East instead of in jeopardized Germany. Hence, the industrial workforce in Poland nearly doubled from 808,000 to 1.5 million between 1938 and 1945. On the approach of the Soviet army, the Wehrmacht began to transport or damage industrial plants in occupied territories. What remained was soon dismantled and transported to the U.S.S.R. by the Red Army.[27] Dismantling, aerial raids, and surface fights eventually devastated Polish industry.[28]

Contrary to Czechoslovakia and Poland, which mostly benefited from the period following World War I, Hungary was one of the losers in the post-World War I changes.[29] Normalization of social and economic

conditions was slow compared to Czechoslovakia and Poland.[30] After the First World War, large infrastructural investments lagged behind regional levels, and began only after Hungary was able to access considerable foreign loans after 1925. Such loans financed water supply and wastewater system improvements for example in Miskolc in 1927, when a second 400 mm water main was constructed from Tapolca to the city, and in 1937, when a water tunnel was constructed under the Avas hill. During the interwar period, the water supply network grew considerably in Miskolc, from 39.4 km to 59.8 km, and supplied a growing number of neighborhoods.[31]

4. Post-World War II Recovery and Environmental Destruction

A second long period of extensive industrial and urban development followed World War II in Europe between 1950 and 1973. This was the period when heavy industrial production reached its climax in Western Europe and various large-scale heavy industries and urban development projects began to dominate East-Central European countries. As a result, water pollution skyrocketed both in Western and East-Central Europe during the 1950s and 1960s.

In 1945, it was clear that the economics and international politics of the interwar years could not be continued. Europe was dominated by right-wing, authoritarian regimes between the two-world wars, communism and socialism became popular ideas throughout Europe after World War II. The Left did not only attract the masses, but also enticed intellectuals. And the communists formed popular parties not only in the Soviet Union dominated East-Central Europe but throughout the entire continent. In Italy, for example, over two million people joined the Communist Party, which was one of the most radical communist parties in the West.[32] Also the socialist idea was very popular in France and in the United Kingdom, which eventually led to a series of nationalizations in both countries. The Christian Democratic movement, which, also saw a large growth after 1945, and the socialists agreed with the rise in state intervention, believing it was necessary to achieve prosperity and economic growth. It was of foremost importance for all major political powers in Europe to avoid the catastrophic spiral of populism and rearmament that lead to the inferno of World War II.

These ideals and a focus on larger state intervention in national economies resulted the nationalization of key economic sectors throughout Western Europe. Renault, the auto manufacturer, along with several banks, was nationalized in France in 1945. A year later private coal mines and the main electricity and gas providers, Electricite de France and Gaz de France were nationalized. In the United Kingdom after the nationalization of the coal industry in 1946, electricity providers, rails, water transport and some local gas suppliers were nationalized. In 1951 the state acquired the national iron and steel industry, which later was denationalized by the following conservative government.[33]

Heavy industry was the flagship industry at this time in Europe. The growth of heavy industries was typical in Western Europe between the two world wars, and continued briefly after 1945. Heavy industry's share of gross national product was 32 per cent before the First World War in Great Britain and it grew to 49,5 per cent in 1938. Similar tendencies were typical in Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway and Italy.[34]

While the socialist idea was popular in Western Europe after the war, an extreme form of communism, Stalinism was implemented in East-Central Europe, as a result of the political and military supremacy of the Soviet Union in the eastern part of the continent. Communism, however, was not rejected by the entire population in East-Central European countries. Local communist parties enjoyed relative, yet minor popularity hence the military presence and political pressure of the Soviet Union was essential to seize power.

But even without the massive political weight of the USSR after the World War II the communist ideology was enticing somwhat. This was because, in theory, communism was believed to create more favorable preconditions for economies, and would provide better production results than capitalism. It would eliminate the anarchy of the market and fluctuations in supply and demand. Workers would be freed from exploitation and would work more enthusiastically. Communism was believed by many of its followers to be a purer and nobler system than capitalism. According to them, communism would ensure social justice and equality. These ideals were vital in a war torn continent where the brutal memories of one of the worst economic crises in the world and the horrors of World War II lived long.[35]

In reality communism arrived brutally to East-Central Europe. After the war, Moscow-backed communists seized power in most East-Central European countries. In Poland, the script of establishing a dictatorial

regime was similar to Hungary and the German Democratic Republic. The Moscow-backed Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robortnicza, PPR) eliminated political opponents gradually. Geopolitical factors also facilitated central planning in postwar Poland. After 1945, borders were restructured, and the country's territory shrunk by 20 percent, and "shifted" to the West. Her new 110,000-square-kilometer Western territory was rich in coal and iron deposits, and had advanced infrastructure that fitted well for Stalinist-type industrialization.

In Czechoslovakia, the communist party operated legally between the two world wars. Therefore, in 1945, the KSČ (Komunistická strana Československa) had a strong basis of support. The party was established already in 1921, and within four years it acquired 350,000 members, with 41 parliamentary deputies and 13.3 percent of the votes in state election.[36] During the war, both Czechs and Slovaks had important communist underground movements, which identified themselves with national liberation. After the war, the Czechoslovak Communist Party produced the fastest growth in the region among communists and had more than 1,000,000 party members by 1947. Without much support from Moscow, the Czechoslovak communists gained 38 percent of votes at the country's first postwar election in March 1946. The communist candidate, Klement Gottwald, was named Prime Minister (1946-48). Gottwald slowly changed his initial tactic of political cooperation and coalition government, and by February 1948, communists forced all non-communist ministers to resign.[37]

In Hungary, Allied air raids destroyed significant production capacities all around the country. During the war, hundreds of thousands of Hungarian soldiers and civilians died, and over half a million Jewish Hungarians were deported and murdered by the Hungarian police and German occupational forces.[38] In November 1945, the Smallholders' Party won the election with 57 percent of the vote, while the communists and the social democrats received 17 percent of votes.[39] Between 1945 and 1948, Hungarian Muscovites eliminated their rivals aggressively by slicing them up one by one.[40] The final cut of the salami was in 1947-48 when several important political figures, including Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, were charged with conspiracy. During the plot, Nagy was on holiday in Switzerland and decided not to return to face charges.[41]

Western and East-Central European countries developed controversial political systems after World War II, however the economic foundation of both the capitalist and communist modes of production were the same: growth. Because of both the capitalist and communist system was clinging on economic growth, and without growth they stagnate and decline environmental destruction has been inseparable from both capitalism and communism.

The period between 1950 and 1973 was characterized by on the one hand by a long period of uninterrupted economic growth, on the other hand unprecedented environmental pollution that tainted every larger areas on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

According to Barry Eichengreen western European state interventionist industrialization, and East-Central European centrally planned economic systems showed a number of similarities in their strengths and weaknesses. Eventually they were both excelling in economic catch-up, at least initially. Bridging the large gap between Western Europe and the USA in the postwar era was aided by the cooperation of trade unions, employers' associations, and growth-minded governments. These groups of decision makers conjointly mobilized savings to secure investment and full employment. Full employment was especially crucial in Western Germany in the late 1940s and in the 1950s, where the memories of mass unemployment and hyperinflation were well remembered.

Table 2. Growth of real gross domestic product per capita, 1820-2000 (Average annual compound growth rate)

	1820-1870	1870-1913	1913-1950	1950-1973	1973-2000
Austria	0,7	0,5	0,2	4,9	2,2
Belgium	1,4	1	0,7	3,5	2
Finland	0,8	1,4	1,9	4,3	2,2
France	0,8	1,5	1,1	4	1,7
Germany	1,1	1,6	0,3	5	1,6
Italy	0,6	1,3	0,8	5	2,1
Netherlands	1,1	0,9	1,1	3,4	1,9
United Kingdom	1,2	1	0,8	2,5	1,9
Greece	NA	NA	0,5	6,2	1,7
Ireland	1,2	1	0,7	3,1	4,3
Portugal	NA	0,5	1,2	5,7	2,5
Spain	0,5	1,2	0,2	5,8	2,6
Bulgaria	NA	NA	0,3	5,2	0,7
Czechoslovakia	0,6	1,4	1,4	3,1	1
Hungary	NA	1,2	0,5	3,6	0,9
Poland	NA	NA	NA	3,4	0,3
Romania	NA	NA	NA	4,8	0,6
USSR	0,6	0,9	1,8	3,4	0,7
Yugoslavia	NA	NA	1	4,4	1,6

Source: Based on Angus Maddison, The world economy: a millenial perspective (Paris: OECD, 2001). and Eichengreen, The European Economy since 1945.

Postwar reconstruction was followed by a period of extensive growth in both the Western and East-Central parts of the continent that worsened environmental conditions in the West and introduced industrial and urban environmental pollution on an unprecedented scale in countries of East-Central Europe. Here, especially in rural areas, such levels of pollution had been unknown until the introduction of communist central plans.

During the 1950s and to a lesser extend in the 1960s, the major goals of industrial development in Western and East-Central Europe were similar. During the same period of time, the management of environmental

resources resembled each other in both the Western and East-Central parts of the European continent.

5. Extensive Growth and the Economic Policy Debate in Hungary in the 1950s

During the brief Stalinist period in East-Central Europe from 1949-56, industrial capacity focused on iron and steel manufacturing, and to some extent on chemical production. The core aim of Stalinist industrial policy was identical to post-war Western European: to produce more. After Stalin's death, the need for political reform swept through East-Central Europe.

Stalinism in Hungary produced a social and economic crisis as early as 1951-52. In 1953, Hungarian Stalinist leader Mátyás Rákosi, was summoned to Moscow and forced to resign. His successor, the reform-minded communist Imre Nagy exercised small economic policy corrections and relaxed the Stalinist terror.

State investment budget was decreased from 16.8 to 11.8 billion Forints between 1953 and 1954. The industrial budget of the First Five Year Plan (FFYP) was slightly decreased from 47 to 41.5 per cent, therefore the share of heavy industry in the FFYP was somewhat lowered, from 43 to 36.5 per cent. Hence, more was invested in agriculture, its share rose from 13 to 24 per cent, and housing which rose from 6 to 11 per cent. Although, pressure on industrialization was eased somewhat, the overall structure of industry did not change radically.

After 1953, economic reform discourse emerged in the pages of the *Economic Review* (*Közgazdasági Szemle*), a professional journal for theoretic economics. A large proportion of economists in Hungary agreed that Stalinist planning had to be altered.[42] György Péter, head of the National Statistical Office, pointed out in the *Economic Review* that rigidly planned production goals were the reason behind issues such as low-quality products. György Péter argued that companies should be interested, not only in the qualitative fulfillment of main indicators in the plan, but companies should have a "financial interest" in the production process. Péter's radical reform ideas proposed that socialist companies should actually operate in an environment with real prices and in quasi market conditions. Péter believed that a reform economic environment would facilitate "economical management" and "profitability", which he

saw as key components for economic success under state-socialism. Less radical visions of economic reforms, for example an "Imre Nagy-backed special committee report", was assessed by the end of November 1954. This document was less critical, but also called for "prices to reflect true costs". The young János Kornai's ideas on economic reform were very formative during the reform process of the late 1950s and 1960s. Kornai defended his doctoral dissertation just before the revolution in September 1956. Therefore, scientific debate on his work was postponed by the outbreak of armed resistance. Discussions were halted during the 1956 Revolution, but after hostilities stopped, economic debate was renewed.

After November 1956, the leadership of János Kádár and his new Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP) sought legitimization and consolidation following a period of terror. Kádár understood the need for economic reforms, but dismissed radical approaches to secure wide support for his course. As a result, the Hungarian planned economy did not strategically change in 1957. In theory, Stalinism was proclaimed to be a thing of the past. Economic incentives in the early Kádár-era focused on "economical planning", "thriftiness", and the production of "profitable products" which required limited energy and raw material input. New economic plans aimed to enhance productivity and to reduce production costs.

Kádár and his new communist party supported István Friss' study, that was conducted for the Department of Economic Policy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. Friss called for moderate reforms and "minor corrections of the mechanism".

Friss' study was based on data collected in thirty industrial companies in the spring of 1957.

Kádár's Second Three-Year Plan (1958-60) criticized "the pursuit of quantitative development (which) became predominant (in earlier years). Meanwhile, thriftiness, quality improvement, production cost reduction and international cooperation were pushed into the background".[43] Theoretically, the new economic policy under Kádár acknowledged that Hungary was poor in raw materials and energy resources. The Second Three-Year Plan emphasized the development of competitive, export-oriented, and profitable industries. In line with modernization goals, the regime started a diesel engine program, but that proved to be a fiasco. Communication engineering projects were run at the Csepel Iron and Metalworks (Csepel Vas- és Fémművek) with very limited success. In reality, the Second Three-Year Plan and ambitiously envisioned new

technologies did not challenge the dominating position of the iron and steel industry in the 1950s. The development of large, heavy industrial capacities remained pivotal in Hungary in the 1960s and to some extent in the 1970s.

Partial modernization efforts of heavy industry provided some successes. In the iron and steel industry, priority was given to investments which aimed to increase production efficiency.[44] For example, a modernized coke manufacturing plant was added to the Danube Ironworks (Dunai Vasmű, 1956-) in Dunaújváros in 1961.[45] In the Ózd Metallurgical Factory's furnaces were modernized. The construction of a nationwide natural gas supply grid provided more environmentally-friendly fuel for industrial energy generation and opened the door to more energy-efficient technologies in heavy industry.

The natural gas project was a success and was ahead of its time by Western European standards. By the end of the 1960s, a large number of industrial plants in Hungary shifted from the use of coal to natural gas. The introduction of natural gas-based energy generation reduced production costs and significantly enhanced energy efficiency. When heavy industrial plants shifted their source of energy from coal to natural gas, phenols, some of the most dangerous metalworking industrial pollutants, disappeared from industrial wastewater.

As a result of accelerated development plans in East-Central Europe, the waste water situation became critical by 1958: only 22 percent of the population had access to local sewage systems. Regional variations were huge. For example, 53 percent of the total 3373 km long national wastewater grid were built in Budapest, the capital. Fifty-six percent of the nation's user connected to waste water systems lived in Budapest. The capacity of the Budapest waste water pipes were also disproportionate, they carried 83 percent of discharged wastewater nationally![46] Further regional variation among non-metropolitan counties was also significant.

In 1958, in some of most rural parts of Hungary, such as Békés, Tolna, and Szolnok Counties, the share of the population serviced by sewage pipes was as low as 1-5%. The situation was somewhat better in the centrally located Pest County where coverage was 5-10%. Hungary's industrial counties performed only slightly better than Pest, with 15-20% in Borsod, Komárom and Veszprém Counties and 20-25% in Baranya, Győr, and Fejér Counties.[47] Wastewater systems almost exclusively covered urban settlements in 1958. In villages where 5.9 million Hungarians, or

nearly 60 percent of the population lived, sewage systems were virtually nonexistent, serving only 1.5% of the rural population.[48]

According to László Szitkey, a water engineer specializing in wastewater treatment in 1958, found the threat posed by untreated and discharged wastewater very dangerous: "Discharged wastewater is causing at least as large a public health problem as the absence of sewage networks." [49] Szitkey condemned the quality of existing wastewater treatment plants in 1958: "Most wastewater pipe networks lacked wastewater treatment systems. On the one hand, existing wastewater treatment plants do not provide adequate cleaning results. On the other hand, they are overloaded and operate with low efficiency or without any results."[50]

6. Economic Policy in East-Central European Countries in the 1950s

Czechoslovakia (especially Bohemia and Moravia) and East Germany have already witnessed notable degree of industrialization before the implementation of the extensive Stalinist growth. Therefore the relevance of primitive accumulation was even less in these countries than in Hungary. This was because initial accumulation in Stalinist state-socialist states were mostly the result of the increased workforce and the most intensive production of already existing production units. Most of the new and reconstructed plants took years to build in ideal circumstances. However notable delays were commonplace throughout the region. Developers did not yet have the experience for such large scale production units, substantial materials were often lacked because of the shortage or because they were hard to obtain from the West. Because new industrial plants were about to began their operations later, and the initial ambitious targets of industrialization were further increased several times in the plan period it was impossible to reach the required targets. Despite of the economic reform attempts, Stalinist investments were carried on and build up with substantial delays. The abandonment of key projects could have harmed the regime even more.

Poland, similarly to Hungary, was less industrialized in general than the Czech lands and Eastern Germany. After the already initially ambitious First Six Year Plan targets, plan revisions were made in 1951-52. The total output was increased by almost 17 per cent. Most of the new targets were relocated for the favor of the war industries. As a result, between 1949

and 1955 the output of the metal-working industries almost tripled. There was an over 130 per cent growth in chemical production and construction materials as well. Only 23 per cent of the total output came from new enterprises, that was because of most investments were not operational by the end of the 1950s. Similarly to other ECE countries during the early planning period, economic policy and its main institutions have changed a number of times. This made construction and planning even harder. The main reason for changes were often the search for effective organizational structure. Therefore most of production growth was initiated by working old plants more intensively and with more workers.[51] In this first period of industrialization productivity was still lagging behind pre-war levels. These tendencies were similar to what was happening in Hungary and to some extend Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

Unemployment was targeted to be ended, and women were encouraged to take full time jobs. This put dual pressure on women under the 'cover' of gender equality, because now they had to fulfill expectations both at home and in work. In addition, political prisoners, students and pupils were also involved in the production process.

In Poland the number of workers dramatically grew. Between 1948 and 1953 it went up from 308,000 to 771,000 in construction, and from 220,000 to 515,000 in machine building. Most new workers moved to growing cities where construction could not keep up with the demand. Overcrowded and deteriorated housing conditions were commonplace.

Poland's half-war economy was not dissolved after the death of Stalin. Compared to Hungary, where Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers relaxed oppression and began a new course of somewhat more livable communism, in Poland the Stalinist regime was not shaken until the Polish October. The plan changed somewhat however, the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the United Workers' Party in September 1953 scaled down the total plan budget, but only took a few half-finished plants off the list for an unspecific period of time, and decided to finish most of the investments with a few or more years of delay.

One of the flagship investments of the era was the steel plant and city of Nowa Huta. Here a steel plan and workers' housing units were initially planned to be constructed by the Reyn Engineering Company based in Chicago before the Second World War. In the new Communist era 'Nowa Huta' was destined to be the seat for Poland's new metallurgical combine. It has been discussed to be built on the meeting of the Central United Metallurgical Industry in 1945. The Central Administration for

Metallurgical Industry formed on 17 May 1947 and the government decreed the construction of the works and the housing estates on 26 January 1948. Work on Nowa Huta began simultaneously to other gigantic investments in ECE in mid-1949. It took five years to put the first stage of the plant into operation and it was opened in 1954.[52]

Central planning was introduced in East Germany during the second half of 1948, which was followed by the First Two Year Plan (1949-50) and the First Five Year Plan (1951-55). Similarly to Hungary key sectors of the industry were nationalized. By 1950, 68 per cent of industrial production came from the public sector and agriculture was not yet collectivized. [53] Parallel to the First Two Year Plan a Soviet-style Stakhanivite movement was introduced in East Germany in 1948. Adolf Hennecke, who was a symbolic figure of this production enhancement movement increased his daily output of coal by 380%, and was pledged by the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) as the hero of labor.[54] During the implementation of the planning system fundamental changes took place in the East German flow of trade. Whereas in 1947 75 per cent of trade was with West Germany and only 7 per cent was with other socialist countries, next year trade with socialist countries (44%) already suppressed West German trade slightly (43%). This trend continued and by 1951, 76 per cent of GDR's trade was with socialist countries, and West German trade shrank to a mere 7 per cent.[55]

International tensions in Korea, Yugoslavia and especially with West Germany drove military spending up. In 1 July 1952 the People's Police in Barracks, *Kasernierte Volkspolizei, KVP* was created and plans were laid out to increase the total number of KVP troops up to 200,000 in a short period of time. This force was the basis for the East German People's Army.[56] Soviet-type industrialization and a growing pressure for larger armed forces played a major role in the outline of the First Five Year plan in 1950. As a result 1.8 million tons of iron ore, over 210 million tons of various types of coal were to produced with a new merchant fleet of 22 ocean-going vessels during the five year planning period.[57] During the planning period outstanding achievements were recorded. Steel production for example rose from 999,000 tonnes in 1950 to 1,517,000 tonnes in 1955 and similar success was reported in coal mining and the chemical industry. These successes, similarly to Hungary were achieved to the expense of light industry and living standards. Most consumer goods were in short supply and butter, meat and sugar were still rationed. Wages hardly rose and the collectivization of agriculture discriminated

many of the private farmers. Prices were escalating, and the government decided to control its growing deficit by raising production norms. More and more decided to leave the country. According to the statistics 165,648 fled the GDR in 1951, a year later this figure grew to 182,393. The year of the death of Stalin hold the record with 331,390 leaving the GDR due to growing hardships of the economy. [58]

The path for Czechoslovakia was very similar. It was soon integrated to the socialist bloc and its industries were developed to supply provide heavy industrial outputs. Also the agriculture was neglected and the revision of the Czechoslovakia First Five Year plan (1949-1953) in 1951. Czechoslovakia's foreign trade was redirected to the socialist bloc and her exports grew to socialist countries from 40 per cent in 1948 to 78 per cent to 1953.[59] As a result of the new forced structure of industry Czechoslovakia shifted from exporting mostly consumer goods and some raw materials such as coal to the export of machinery and also raw materials. Between 1948 and 1953 the export of machinery grew from about 20 % of the total exports to 42 per cent, while the export of consumption goods decreased from 30 per cent to 12 per cent. The 1951 version of the plan targeted even more unrealistic outputs the original 1949 version. Some of the main products such as iron ore, cement, motor vehicles, meat had to be more than doubled by the end of the plan period. Other products such as coal, steel, fabrics had to reach a "mere" 40-70 per cent growth in five years period. Naturally the plan was failed to fulfilled in Czechoslovakia as well. Even the original 1949 targets were hardly accomplished in many segments. Shortage was commonplace in all major raw materials and work force as well. Industry used to be already an important sector in Czechoslovakia the number of workers increased from about 1.5 million to over 2 million between 1948 and 1958. Industry was rather developed and also energy wasting, and as a result Czechoslovakia had one of the highest energy consumption per capita in the world by the second half of the 1950s, approximately on the level of the United Kingdom and approximately double of other ECE states such as Poland and Hungary.[60]

Growing tensions finally escalated into the 17 June uprising in which over 500,000 workers were involved and which was ruthlessly crushed by the Soviet army. All together over 200 people were executed after the uprising and about 1,400 people received life sentences. As a result, the East German government was forced to alter the plan as a result of the June

1953 demonstrations following Stalin's death, and gave higher priority to consumer goods and and food rationing in 1954.

After the death of Stalin possibilities of economic reforms were investigated throughout ECE. Already planned and constructed production units were not shut down, but were extended and amended in the coming period. Soon the acceleration of industrialization and urbanization led to similar environmental issues that had been witnessed in Great Britain and Germany earlier in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Concluding Remarks

Rapid economic, industrial, and technological changes had tremendous impact on the environment in Europe after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. First negative environmental consequences were observed in Britain, and when economic development accelerated in Germany, similar negative environmental trends appeared there.

East-Central European countries did not have to battle with widespread pollution until the introduction of Stalinist economic policies in the late 1940s. These policies immediately triggered industrial production in old plants and initiated a large number of new industrial units. Enhanced production was soon followed by the rapid rise of pollution.

Both Western-, and East-Central European countries battled with environmental pollution in the 1950s. The somewhat flexible economic structure of state controlled capitalist countries however predestined Western European countries to be more successful when targeting environmental problems.

In East-Central Europe, reform attempts after Stalin's death failed, and were only partly and not adequately implemented later. As a result, the structure of the economy was on the one hand dependent on growth, on the other it was too rigid to be able to combat with its environmental pollution effectively. This led to the massive destruction of the environment. A problem that was seriously targeted by many of the state-socialist regimes, but in the long run could not be solved.

NOTES

1   Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire. An Economic History of Britain since 1750* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), 14.

2   Stephen Mosley, *The Chimney of the World. A history of Smoke Pollution in Victorian and Edwardian* Manchester (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 2.

3   Brian.W. Clapp, *An Environmental History of Britain since the Industrial Revolution* (London-New York: Longman, 1994), 16.

4   *Ibid.*, 72.

5   *Archives Wales, Glamorgan Archives, Cyfarthfa Iron Works records*, http://www.archiveswales.org.uk/anw/get_collection.php?inst_id=33&coll_id=2104&expand= (accessed August 21, 2014).

6   Peter Thorsheim, *Inventing Pollution. Coal, Smoke, and Culture in Britain since 1800* (Athens: Ohio University, 2006), 126.

7   Kenneth O. Morgan, *The people's peace: British history, 1945-1989* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

8   Brian. R. Tomlinson, "The British Economy and the Empire, 1900-1939," in *A Companion to Early Twentieth Century Britain,* ed. Chris Wrigley (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 198.

9   Chris Wrigley, "The Impact of World War I," in *A Companion to Early Twentieth Century Britain,* ed. Chris Wrigley (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) 506.

10 John Sheail, *An environmental history of twentieth-century Britain* (Basingstroke: Palgrave, 2002), 51.

11 *Ibid.*, 48.

12 David Blackbourn, *Fontana History of Germany, 1780-1918: the Long Nineteenth Century* (London: Fontana, 1997), 178-180.

13 *Ibid.*, 362-370.

14 *Ibid.*, 185.

15 Volker Berghahn, "Demographic growth, industrialization and social change," in *19th century Germany. Politics, Culture and Society 1780-1918,* ed. John Breuilly (London:Arnold, 2001), 185-186.

16 Pages between 21 and 24 are based on: Cioc, *The Rhine*.

17 For example the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Hütten in Mülheim, Eintrachütte in Hochdahl and the Hütte von Détilleux in Bergeborbeck. Mark Cioc, *The Rhine. An Eco-Biography 1815-2000* (Seattle: Washington University Press), 86.

18 Andre Armengaud, "Population in Europe 1700-1914," in *The Fontana Economic History of Europe. volume 3. part 1.* ed. Carlo M. Cipolla (London: Fontana/Collins, 1973), 29.

19 The "Rudolf's Works" iron mill.

[20]   Friedrich Prinz, *Geschichte Böhmens, 1848-1948* (Hamburg: Langen Müller, 1988), 208.

[21]   Hans-Joachim Braun, *The German Economy in the Twentieth Century* (London-New York: Routledge, 1990), 48.

[22]   *Ibid.*, 391.

[23]   George S. Rice, John A. Davis, *Potash Mining in Germany and France*, Bulletin 274, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Mines, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1927. 1-7.

[24]   Disco, "Accepting Father Rhine? Technological Fixes, Vigilance, and Transnational Lobbies as "European" Strategies of Dutch Municipal Water Supplies 1900-1975," 395.

[25]   The Fontana Economic History of Europe, Volume 6. Contemporary Economies, Part 1, ed. Carlo M. Cipolla, Collins-Fontana: London. 1976. 200-201.

[26]   In Czechoslovakia: Vítkovické horní a hutní těžířstvo (Ostrava), Bánška a hutní společnost (Třinec), Pražská železářská společnost (Kladno). In Poland Syndykat Polskich Hut Żelaznych. Alice Teichova, "Industry," in: *The Economic History of Eastern Europe, 1919-1975. Vol. 1. Economic Structure and Performance between the Two Wars*, ed. Michael C. Kaser and Edward.A. Radice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 303-305.

[27]   Seizure of complete production lines was a typical procedure of the Red Army, and was witnessed in all occupied ECE countries. From the Soviet point of view seizure of industrial plants was a part of wartime reparation processes.

[28]   Polish GNP fell to 38 per cent of pre-war levels in 1945. Anita Prazmowska, *Poland: A Modern History* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 170-171.

[29]   Mária Ormos, *Padovától-Trianonig 1918- 1920 (From Padua to Trianon 1918-1920)* (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1983), 6-9.

[30]   Ivan T. Berend and György Ránki, *The Hungarian Economy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 46.

[31]   Oszkár Vincze, "A miskolci vízmű (Miskolc Waterworks)," *Vízgazdálkodás* 5., no. 5. (1965). 141.

[32]   Similar tendencies were true for both France and the United Kingdom, where the French Communist Party and the British Labour Party attracted a large share of the population.

[33]   See more on contemporary debates of nationalization in Western Europe at: Mario Einaudi, Nationalization of Industry in Western Europe: Recent Literature and Debates, *The American Political Science Review*, 44, no. 1 (1950). 177-191.

[34]   Iván Berend T., *Gazdaságpolitika az első ötéves terv megindításakor 1948-1950 (Economic Policy during the First Three Year Plan 1948-1950.)* (Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1964), 13.

35   Janos Kornai, *The State Socialist System, The Political Economy of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 49-54.

36   Joseph Held, *Dictionary of East European History since 1945.* (London: Mansell, 1994), 138 ("Communist Party of Czechoslovakia").

37   Jaroslav Krejčí and Pavel Machonin, *Czechoslovakia, 1918-92. A laboratory for Social Change* (London: Macmillan, 1996), 78.

38   About 90 per cent of industrial plants were damaged, 40 per cent of the rail network and 70 per cent of rolling stock were lost. Iván T. Berend, *A szocialista gazdaság fejlődése Magyarországon (The development of socialist economy in Hungary)* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974), 10-11

39   Charles Gati, "From Liberation to Revolution, 1945-1956," in: *A history of Hungary* eds. Peter F. Sugar, Péter Hanák, Tibor Frank, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1990), 370.

40   Peter Kenez, *Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviets. The Establishment of the communist Regime in Hungary, 1944-1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 133.

41   Ibid., 262-263.

42   The crisis of the economic system was marked with "disruption of food supplies, the collapse of the energy system, frequent power cuts and widespread shortages" both in Hungary, and in East-Central Europe. Ivan T. Berend, *The Hungarian economic reforms, 1953-1988* (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 17.

43   Preface: "Uralkodóvá vált a mennyiségi fejlődés hajszolása, közben a gazdaságosság, a minőségjavítás, a termelés költségeinek csökkentése és a nemzetközi együttműködés követelményei háttérbe szorultak."
      1958. évi II. törvény az 1958-1960. évi hároméves népgazdaságfejlesztési terv irányelveiről (Act. II. in 1958 on on the guidelines of the 1958-1960 three year people's-economy development plan.) Enacted in Budapest, Hungary.

44   I. FEJEZET. "A hároméves terv fő feladatai." (CHAPTER I. "Main goals of the three year plan") 9.§ Ibid.,

45   The iron-, and steel works in Stalintown (Sztálinváros) were named as Stalin Ironworks (Sztálin Vasművek) and was renamed to Danube Ironworks (Dunai Vasmű) in 1956, and Stalintown was renamed to Dunaújváros in 1961.

46   László Szitkey, "Szennyízcsatornázásunk helyzete 1958. év végén (The Level of Waste Water Management at the end of 1958 in Hungary)," *Vízügyi Közlemények* 41, no.3 (1959). 315.

47   *Ibid.*, 330. Figure 6. Magyarország megyéinek csatornázottsága (Waste water coverage in the counties of Hungary).

48   *Ibid.*, 328. Figure 5. Városi, falusi és az összlakosság szennyvízcsatorna ellátottsága (Waste water coverage in villages, towns and in general in Hungary).

[49]   "A szennyvízcsatornázás hiánya miatt keletkező közegészségügyi ártalmak mellett legalább ugyanolyan mértékű károkat okoznak a *tisztítás nélkül kibocsátott szennyvízek is.*"
       Ibid., 327.

[50]   "Szennyvíztisztító-telepek viszont csatornaműveink többségénél hiányoznak. A meglévő tisztítóberendezések részben nem biztosítják az előírt tisztítást, részben túlterheltség miatt alacsony hatásfokkal, vagy gyakorlatilag eredménytelenül működnek."
       Ibid., 328.

[51]   John Michael Montias, *Central Planning in Poland* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 62.

[52]   Henryk Makarewicz and Wiktor Pental, *802 procent normy,* Pierwsze (Kraków: Lata Now: Without publication year), Description of photo 114 in Appendix, without page number,

[53]   Adrian Webb, The Longman Companion to Germany since 1945, Longman:New York, 1998. 222.

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CĂTĂLIN PAVEL

Born in 1976, in Bucharest

Ph.D.

An archaeologist who excavated in Romania, Germany, France, Morocco, Israel, and the UK, and particularly in Turkey (Miletus, Troy, and Gordion)
Taught Classical art and archaeology at the University of Bucharest and at Kennesaw State University, Georgia, USA

Doctoral Chevening Fellow in Oxford, 2005-2006
Post-doctoral Andrew Mellon Fellow in Jerusalem, 2010

Several articles in scholarly journals and chapters in edited volumes

Scholarly book:
Describing and Interpreting the Past - European and American Approaches to the Written Record of the Excavation, University of Bucharest Press, Bucharest 2010

Novels:
Aproape a șaptea parte din lume, Humanitas 2010
Nicio clipă Portasar, Cartea Românească 2015

TRANSLATING OBJECTS INTO WORDS AND IMAGES: METHODOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE BLENDING OF EXCAVATION AND TEXTUAL DATA

This article focuses on issues of knowledge migration across disciplinary borders, and represents an extended case study in "mode 2" knowledge production (Gibbons et al. 1994), which presupposes multi-disciplinary teams working to solve a specific research problem. Within this theoretical framework I am analyzing the metamorphoses of archaeological knowledge when incorporated into historical narratives and blended with historical knowledge, and when used, together with the latter, to produce so-called "realistic" visual models of ancient monuments. I attempt to redefine archaeological epistemology from two different, but converging perspectives, with similar underpinning issues of knowledge transfer and compatibility. The aim is to produce a theoretical device that may help to bridge the conceptual gap between different categories of data, between e.g. marble tesserae found in the trench, the talk of luxury in literary sources, and reconstructions of baths with opus sectile decoration. The urgency of the topic also comes from archaeology's new approach to outreach, as well as from the heated debate around the impact of interdisciplinarity on archaeology today. Importantly, the two paradigms, textual and artefactual, must be analyzed in terms of commensurability. It is often assumed that they are directly comparable, where in fact they speak different languages. A middle-range theory is needed to overcome the issue of the perceived incommensurability between them. The main case study used is that of the ancient site of Troy.

1. The Problem

Tourists feel edified when they see in a museum room dedicated to Bronze Age Troy an array of loom-weights, clay hanging weights to keep

261

the threads taut, accompanied by captions reminding them of the scene in the Iliad where Helen is found weaving by the goddess Iris. There is a hidden dimension to this kind of "brilliant match" between archaeological and literary sources. Indeed, archaeologists read Homer long before they get to put the spade in the ground, and may be already convinced that there was a tradition of weaving at the site. Under the pressure of fieldwork, and of prestigious literary texts, is it possible that the artefacts called loom-weights somehow have more visibility for them, that they involuntarily look for them or privilege retrieval of fragmentary ones? And then historians, hearing about these archaeological discoveries, might in turn also become convinced Homer was vindicated, and Helen weaving was not just a rhetorical common-place for assigning gender roles…

2. *Status Quaestionis*

When creating a methodological framework for blending archaeological and literary data, one draws on a conspicuously fragmented body of literature. The very existence of a problem, namely that the integration of artefactual and documentary data is fraught with uncertainties (biases, circularity, self-fulfilling prophecies) was not duly acknowledged until comparatively recently. It has seemed for long self-understood that the much younger discipline, archaeology, should be a handmaiden to age-old history, and merely illustrate it (Hume 1964, Moreland 2006). A perception of archaeology as ancillary to history is in fact perhaps the most enduring misconception throughout the development of the discipline, and archaeologists repeatedly protested against this "tyranny of the historical record" (Champion 1990, Small 1999). It may be that revolutionary texts such as Rostovtzeff's *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (1926), which used, on a scale perhaps never encountered before, archaeological artefacts to illustrate a narrative still culled primarily from written sources, may have, as a side-effect, confined archaeology to playing this role in perpetuity. Indeed, the use of archaeology in a majority of ancient history books and journals still does not go substantially beyond this view, as Lloyd (1986), Martin (2008), and Hall (2013) have shown. Kemp (1984:21) pointed out that archaeology still supplies "garments, baskets, razors, sandals – all the props needed for the costume reconstruction of ancient life". Among explanations for this we should count the fact that archaeologists are still "trapped by the

agenda set by historians" (Austin 1990), and in general that the questions asked of the material remains are in fact those normally asked of texts (Allison 2001:181). Classical archaeology's reluctance to indulge in theory-building regarding the relationship between "word" and "dirt", of course, did not help the situation.

It is Cambridge scholars who initiated a debate that was to bring about a loss of innocence in this respect, starting with Finley's (1971) disappointment in archaeology not having made much progress since Rostovtzeff. The former denounced the academic creed according to which statements in literary or documentary sources are to be accepted unless they can be disproved, and that material culture matters mainly in so far as it can support or falsify the literary tradition (Finley 1985, Hall 2013:207-9). In turn, A.M. Snodgrass (1987) exposed archaeologists' "positivist fallacy", a tendency to mechanically equate what appears to be significant in the archaeological record with what appears to be significant in the textual evidence. A layer of ash must be due to the Dorian invasion, some Cimmerian raid, or attack of the Goths. This is tantamount to making archaeological and historical prominence interchangeable. This fallacy is particularly easy to perpetrate given the fragmentary nature of both the archaeological record and of the historical sources.

The dissatisfaction with this state of affairs resulted in a desultory quest for solutions, although those found were rarely incorporated in actual research programmes. Summarizing an array of disparate suggestions in the literature, it could be said that the main solution, appeared to be a two-pronged approach. Firstly, one would make sure to analyze archaeological and historical sources independently (Leone 1988:29, Miller 1991, Andrén 1998, Storey 1999:232, Galloway 2006, Hurst 2010; Hall 2013:208). While this hopes to avoid circularity in argumentation (Kosso 2001, 81-90), the question as to what guidelines to follow in order to know when can the confrontation between the two lines of evidence begin remained unanswered. In a second phase, one would bring together the strands of evidence (pursued separately so far) and confront them. The priority for investigation would then become those aspects of the human past for which the archaeological and literary evidence contributed contradictory statements. Such contradictions have been in turn named inconsistencies (Allison 2001) contrasts (Andrén 1998), incongruities (Little 1992), ambiguities (Leone 1988), disjunctions (Carmack and Weeks 1981), deviations (Leone and Potter 1988), and dissonances (Hall 1999). Overall however, the insistence on degrees of independence between what,

263

since Hawkes (1954), was called text-free and text-aided archaeology (cf. Little 1992, and Young 1992 "text-misled"), did not really escape this reasoning loop. Subsequently, apart from the model above, a plethora of suggestions were published as to how to bridge the great divide between artefact and text, necessarily reflecting various habitus-bound research agendas. Occasionally, we find gut-feeling solutions, advocating a focus on a certain area of study, perceived as privileged for the deconstruction the dialogue between archaeological and literary data, such as the study of ancient materials and technologies (Martinón-Torres 2008) or that of cult and religion (Dever 1991). The type of instinct needed to identify them is not further elucidated. On a more general level, Andrén (1998:146 sqq.) and Martinón-Torres (2008) have argued that in order to sidestep a philosophically unrewarding study of concepts (artefacts, texts), we could analyze best-practice strategies, in other words how concentric contexts for each of the two are crystallized in practices. Others yet have found redemption in bringing into the limelight long-term quantifiable change, since that is precisely what texts cannot do (Hurst 2010), in using one category of evidence for deriving hypotheses to be tested within the other category (Little 1992), and in a sort of "formation process" analysis, geared towards understanding how texts and artefacts come to be and how they come to shape society (Galloway 2006, Moreland 2006, Martinón-Torres 2008). Some of the solutions on the other hand further obscured the original problem, such as the idea that archaeology and history speak "different languages" (e.g. Ahlström 1991), when in fact the two types of evidence are rather incommensurable, in Kuhn's sense.

A more metaphorically-minded cohort of archaeologists drifted away from the archaeological arena in search of solutions. For example, Martin (2008) proposed to achieve a proper "dovetailing of text and objects" by using cultural semiotics and thick-description ethnography, while Galloway (2006) resorted to Bruno Latour and Appadurai for actor-network theory and the social life of things to help construe the relationship between texts, artefacts, and society. Finally, where processual archaeologist spearheaded an increased, at times indeed total, independence from written sources (Arnold 1986), post-processual approaches then focused on hermeneutics (Leone 1988, Dyson 1995 on the archaeological site as an Urtext; also post-ironic perspectives in Isayev 2006).

The wide geographical and chronological coverage of the works tackling the subject must be underscored. If they did not build up to the critical mass needed for a problem specific methodology, they still testify to

tectonic movements through the whole of archaeology today. Such works deal with medieval archaeology (Austin 1990, Fehring 1991:229–237 focusing on Germany, Young 1992, and Tabaczyński 1993), prehistory (Bennet 1984 and Snodgrass 1985a for LBA Aegean), Classical (Storey 1999, Snodgrass 1985b, Lloyd 1986), Biblical (articles in Levy 2010 and Vikander 1991), and North American archaeology (Leone 1988). Granted, the debate is not so developed in areas where traditionally written texts have had a crushing impact (Egypt, Kemp 1984, Mesopotamia, Ellis 1983). As for Anatolia, it incited texts which, despite their fine scholarship on e.g. the Trojan War (Vanschoonwinkel 1998, Benzi 2009, Rose 2013), did not set methodology as their primary goal. Despite the substantial number of contributions then (although this is still small compared to most other provinces of theoretical archaeology), they are not yet articulated in a coherent whole. The concern remains that many only pay lip service to what promises to be a noble critical stance, and moreover, they reiterate a relatively small number of tenets – hence an overall sense of quixotic effort.

Currently, the most promising avenue of investigation, as reflected in the literature, seems to be to revisit the relevance of multidisciplinarity for the issue at stake. The term multidisciplinarity remains oddly uncomfortable when discussing archaeology and history, as if digging in the ground and reading Tacitus was in fact done with fundamentally similar methods and objectives (cf. Martinón-Torres 2008). As D. Austin (1990:13) put it, whenever archaeologists attempt to deliver an independent historical narrative, they are accused by historians of "at best, irrelevance or lack of scholarship, and at worst of uttering jargonistic claptrap". Nevertheless, there are now enough voices pleading for the integrated production of historical knowledge, and even though the multi-disciplinary approach is "the most difficult, the most susceptible to superficiality, […] it is still the most productive" (Carver 2002:490; Austin 1990). Blending archaeological, historical, and scientific knowledge is championed among others by Martinón-Torres (2008: 33) with the rationale that thereby the ability of the respective specialists to understand past societies is "multiplied exponentially". Despite the reservations of Isayev (2006), the so-called mode 2 knowledge production (Gibbons 1994) is bound to offer the best understanding of the phenomenon. Some archaeological applications of it exist already, as in the multidisciplinary project (not without its own cautionary tales) described by Rankov (2004).

In conclusion, what Arnold (1986) noted in the eighties is still true today: researchers piously advocate the integration of the categories of

evidence, but a few are doing it and fewer are explaining how it should be done. The majority endorses (tacitly) the view that after all archaeological evidence is mute and cannot be understood without written texts, or a variant of this view (Allison 2001), and that the role of archaeology will never be more than marginal in the historical reconstruction (e.g. Lloyd 1986:42). Small (1995) deplored that the archaeological record is still seen as a "subordinate dynamic context for viewing textually-adduced reconstructions", and sure enough some archaeologists still claim (notably Rainey 2001:148) that one ought not to use "subjectively interpreted archaeological data" to contradict written sources. The problem is not that the same archaeological data is invoked for antagonistic interpretations (Miller 1987) – plurality of interpretations has never been the problem – but that scholars proceed with a "forced harmonization" of archaeological and historical data (Ahlström 1991:119).

For a couple of decades prehistoric and Classical archaeology have been increasingly unhappy with this forced harmonization, but the situation remains that described by G.R. Storey at the turn of the millennium, namely that "a balanced, dependable method for integrating textual and archaeological data is still lacking" (Storey 1999:206).

3. (In)commensurable Paradigms

Matching excavation and textual data to produce historical reconstructions can easily result in circularity or in coalescing data that may be in fact incommensurable. This article stresses the future opportunities in the dialogue between the fields. As Stefan Hauser (2005, 94) put it, this collaboration between archaeology and history "is not a mere reconciliation of two accidentally and wrongfully separated components of classical and ancient studies, but an interdisciplinary negotiation between two theoretically and methodologically mature disciplines" (my tr.).

As an extended case study in "mode 2 knowledge production", this article will showcase the complex interplay between archaeological and historical data. Compared to the sophistication with which ancient historians discuss literary data, their approach to archaeological reports in order to harvest usable knowledge is often perfunctory and reductionistic (Carver 2002, Moreland 2006). Indeed, a whole catalogue of judgment errors with respect to the simultaneous use of archaeological and historical

data could and should be compiled, and this could be the basis for establishing a set of guidelines for the integration of such data.

Above all, archaeologists and historians must address the need to epistemologically legitimize the corroboration of archaeological and literary data. Partial solutions must be sought at the level of theory formation. The research hypothesis here is that contrasting, rather than merging strands of evidence is the more productive approach. It is not sound method to employ texts to understand what archaeological finds mean, at the very moment when one is using artefacts to understand what the texts are referring to. The idea that archaeology simply fills in the gaps in the historical record remains superficial. The building blocks of archaeological narratives ought not to be expressed in terms borrowed from a textual paradigm. The solution to the incommensurability of archaeological and historical data is twofold.

Firstly, one can begin to match two different categories of evidence, and evaluate possible discrepancies, only when satisfactory, if perhaps incomplete, explanations can be given of either category solely on its own terms. These discrepancies between archaeological and historical data can then be used to prioritize research topics. Curiously, there is no in depth discussion as to how such "contrasts", to use Andrén's terminology, can be used as markers and catalysts of further rapprochement between archaeological and historical narratives.

Secondly, the solution resides in a change of approach to historical reconstruction. Instead of merging these categories of evidence in the fabric of an omniscient narrative, one would be best advised to constantly tell two intertwining stories, an archaeological and a historical one, each one using the other as foil. One would make sure to analyze archaeological and historical sources independently (Leone 1988:29, Miller 1991, Andrén 1998, Storey 1999:232, Galloway 2006, Hurst 2010). This is not to say that inscriptions found by archaeologists should not be used by historians. The point is that a purely archaeological reconstruction of occupation phases at a site is fundamentally a stranger to the same reconstruction culled from written sources. The objective here is tantamount to a reconceptualization of historical reconstructions, emphasizing the role of archaeology in holistic historic narratives, as well as the kudos and caveats of visual models of past monuments (v. infra).

I argue that history and archaeology can be re-cast as "science in the context of application" (Carrier and Nordmann 2011), where objectives are formulated from the outset within a dialogue between

scientific stakeholders. In so doing, one should investigate not only how society-specific knowledge claims are raised, but for whom knowledge is in fact produced. The main hypothesis here is that the study of the collaboration between historians and archaeologists, often joined, e.g. during experimental archaeology projects, by scientists is a multidisciplinary effort best understood as "mode 2" knowledge production (Gibbons 1994). Researchers negotiate and produce knowledge in a non-hierarchical manner. None of the disciplines dictates the framework. Quality control is a function of disciplinary rigor combined with social accountability, consensus formation, and constant negotiation of the results (Nowotny *et al.* 2001, 2003). Reflexivity is a characteristic of this process since the result is not scientific truth, but rather socially-viable knowledge: not objectivity as a view from nowhere, but a network of views managed by knowledge brokers. The literature offers various examples of case studies of multi-disciplinarity involving also scientists and not just historians and archaeologists, from re-building a Roman bath (2003) to the re-building of a Greek trireme (Rankov 2004). A secondary hypothesis of interest is that knowledge is actually shaped by the process of knowledge dissemination. Outreach will have to be considered as one of the new important resources for the creation of archaeological knowledge, articulating an epistemological interface between archaeology and history. In the future, teams of archaeologists could envisage a pilot programme with the avowed goal of critically monitoring for pressure from literary sources during fieldwork; in this direction, anthropologists have supplied a starting point in the "ethnography of the dig".

4. Case Study: Troy and the Trojan War: Between the Tyranny of the Text and the Archaeological Bias

The central case study for creating a methodological framework for the corroboration of archaeological and textual data will be in this article the site of Troy (Hisarlık) sung by Homer and excavated since the 1870s. The question I ask is how can scholars make use, in an epistemologically legitimate way, of textual data to obtain and interpret excavation data, and conversely, how can they make use of archaeological information to contextualize literary sources. This is important because, as outlined above these two sets of data are, at best, conflicting, and at worst, belong to incommensurable paradigms. For major sites such as Troy, literary

information (in this case mainly the Homeric epics) appears to actually bend archaeological data in a force field, while the biases which have traditionally characterized the archaeologists' work seem more acute than elsewhere. To locate Troy in Finland, or, as done by Schrott in 2008, to make Homer a eunuch scribe writing about the Assyrians, cannot be explained simply by the so-called underdetermination of theory by data in social sciences in general. Such attempts must be seen as pertaining to fringe archaeology. But even academic archaeology, in the city on the Dardanelles, suffers under "the tyranny of the text" (Small 1999). Without the knowledge of, and reverence for, Homer's text, Schliemann, Blegen, and even Korfmann in the past decades would never have argued, solely on the basis of material remains, that the site was burnt and sacked by the Mycenaeans. Indeed, they would have never been interested in excavating the site.

As already seen, the traditional approach was to posit that archaeology is ancillary to history: history gives us the framework, archaeology fills in the details. Not only does this result in unacceptable biases, but, as is well known, the archaeology of provinces and the results of regional surveys are often at odds with texts produced by the elites of the center. Historical sources on provinces, interfaces and "contested peripheries", caught between larger states (such as Troy and the Aegean-Anatolian Interface between the Mycenaeans and the Hittites) are the locus for the creation of otherness and therefore notoriously distorted. Troy is by no means unique in this respect. Another example among many is the site of Gordion in Central Anatolia, whose chronology was previously built around classical and Neo-Assyrian literary sources, and made to depend on events such as the reign of Midas and the invasion of the Cimmerians. Recent excavations in Gordion, however, have determined that the Gordion Iron Age was in fact up to two hundred years earlier than originally thought (Rose and Darbyshire 2013).

From an archaeological point of view, Troy must be liberated from the obligation to answer Homeric questions. Troy's importance in modern research is given not by its role in Homer, but quite simply by its uninterrupted bi-millenary Bronze Age sequence, fundamental for reconstructing the life of settlements in the Interface. Archaeologists are made to approach Troy with questions which are external to the site: has there been a Trojan war as described by Homer? But prehistoric archaeology's answer to this question is, by and large: it doesn't matter. What matters is to give answers to more valuable related questions

whether site-specific (what were the funerary rites of the Trojans), or more general (why did the Hittites not attempt to expand further West into the Aegean-Anatolian Interface, and what drove the Mycenaeans' expansion there?). However, while we cannot look at Troy through Homeric glasses, we should also not shun a periodical confrontation between our archaeological models and information from literary sources. Ideally, one would also be able to see how archaeological evidence bears on Homeric issues, but without making this an overwhelming priority. The problem is that whenever Homer describes events, our assumptions begin to be rooted in both literary and material sources, with the danger of circularity.

Tentatively, improvements in how we produce this final narrative at the junction between archaeological and historical data can probably be brought about by exposing archaeologists to theories of scientific reasoning, including bias literature and epistemic rationality studies. Also, studies of "bounded rationality" suggest that our heuristics "in the field" must be frugal in what they take into account, fast in their operation, and fit to reality (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996). Field archaeologists, even more than other social scientists, are indeed quite prone to use "fast and frugal heuristics", often under the guise of biases. Biases, in turn, can be defined as recurring cognitive errors with epistemic value, cognitive adaptations for decision making (Tweney and Chitwood 1995). In the paradigm of fast and frugal heuristics, biases are perceived as having the potential, under certain circumstances, to make one a more effective decision maker. Such biases are exercised both under the pressure of actual excavation, "at the trowel's edge", and, much less justifiably, in the publication of final results. Among a score of examples: the clustering illusion, accounting for the perception of patterns where in fact the data has been randomly generated (Pavel 2011). If we have a better understanding of how archaeologists think, we should be better equipped to make sense of their data and integrate it with literary data. Designing the much-needed methodology of this encounter, in fact a real data clash, archaeological vs. literary, is again hampered by the problem described above: the unsound method of employing texts to understand what archaeological finds mean, at the very moment when one is using the artefacts to understand what the texts are referring to. And how can we make sure that our biases are at least not cumulative? Clearly, evidence of one type might be put to better use in constructing modes to be tested within the confines of the other type.

The Destruction Layers in Troy

How does one treat archaeologically a war which has been dubbed "la guerre fantôme" (Benzi 2009)? If no real event should actually be imagined behind Homer's war stories (as wanted by Carpenter 1946, Finley 1964, Hertel 2008), then archaeology must "limit" itself to describing the very general context of war techniques, psychology etc. in the Aegean and W Anatolian world, with further SE European and Near Eastern ramifications in the four centuries that separate Homer from the war he purports to describe, since all and none may have played a part in his description.   Homer's story of the Trojan War may incorporate echoes of any of the fighting done around Troy and anywhere on the coast between Mycenaeans (together with some of the Sea Peoples?) and the Arzawans or Hittites or their (former) vassals, including the conquest of Mycenaean Miletus by Mursili II. But if Homer was speaking of a real war fought in a real city, and if that war left recognizable traces in the archaeological record, then archaeology should be able to identify them as destruction layers.

In the present state of our knowledge, Troy exhibits a number of destructions from the end of the 14th c. to the end of the 10th which would be potential candidates for such a Trojan war (for an excellent introduction on the archaeology of the Trojan war, Vanschoonwinkel 1998, Wiener 2007, and Benzi 2009). I will present here the situation for the Late Bronze Age.

Troy VIh, the largest Trojan citadel, came to an end in a severe destruction (archaeological indications and interpretation in Blegen, Caskey and Rawson 1953, 89-92, 98, 262, 329-332; 1963, 143-145, 147; Hiller 1991; Mountjoy 1999a). The upper part of the fortification wall as well as the superstructures of the large houses that stood inside the fortress collapsed, and damage to towers VIh and VIi, as well as subsidence of the fortification wall is noted. No house appears to have burned and no human victims have been found.

The dating of this destruction is based on Mycenaean pottery, the chronology of which is constantly being refined. The most recent thorough reassessment was done by P. Mountjoy (1999a), who dates this destruction to the end of LHIIIA2, around 1300 (a little earlier for Benzi 2002, 352). Blegen, Caskey and Rawson (1953) and Mountjoy (1999a) are definitely for the earthquake interpretation, and so was Korfmann (occasionally with some reserve, e.g. 1995). They often use the fact that Troy is not

impoverished after this destruction and its culture remains the same in the ensuing phase VIIa, when also relationships with the Mycenaeans are maintained, as an argument against the interpretation of the destruction as a result of war (with the Achaeans). For Rose (1998) however there is no uniform agreement whether this was due to an earthquake, an invasion or both. Other researchers see Troy VIh as destroyed by war (Allen 1994, Bryce 2005), either by the Achaeans (Mellink 1986, 100) or by the Hittites and their allies (Basedow 2007).

Troy VIIa came to an end with another important destruction following a period of "tell-tale" changes in the life of the settlement (archaeological indications and interpretation in Blegen *et al.* 1958, 10-13, 51; Blegen 1963, 147-164; Hiller 1991; Korfmann 1996, 2002, 2003; Vanschoonwinkel 1998).

Before describing the destruction layer, it is appropriate to note in the archaeological record some signs of a potential threat or "emergency". These may include the substantial additions to the fortification wall, especially by the East gate. Small houses are now crowded closely together abutting the inside face of the wall, where streets used to run before. Unprecedented in VIIa is that almost every house (e.g. 730 and 731) had numerous *pithoi* sunk to their full height (1.75 - 2m) in the floors, with the rim covered with stone slabs. They maximized the storage capacity to the point of honeycombing the floors on which people walked. It would thus appear that the acropolis was obliged to shelter a larger population than in Troy VI. The excavators of 1932-38 argued that in this period the quantity of imported Mycenaean material plummeted. In addition to these findings by Blegen's team, the excavations after 1988 showed that the SW gate VIU, found in 1995, the largest gate in the wall of Troy VI, was blocked before the destruction, at the same time when a little street running up the East gate VIS is dismantled, and when a mudbrick bastion is reinforcing the area around the NE bastion.

As to the destruction proper, Blegen mentions great masses of stones and crude brick along with burned debris found in a destruction deposit up to 1.5m high. A man, considered a war victim, was covered by debris on the western slope of the hill outside the acropolis wall, and the bones of another individual appeared to be found in house 700 as well as outside in the street, with other victims being suggested by a lower jaw bone in house 741, skull fragments in street 711, etc. Blegen found almost no weapons in the citadel (the bronze arrowhead in street 710 was Finley's

object of ridicule), but Korfmann's excavations have added to this picture more victims, for example the hasty burial of a girl with burnt feet. Also, the so-called *Terrassenhaus* outside the citadel, the only house of VIIa which could be almost completely excavated, was destroyed at the end of this period. All its rooms burnt in a "devastating fire". The excavators found arrow points and spearheads (Koppenhöfer 1997 dates them rather in VIIb1), and many sling stones in almost all rooms. But most importantly, in the burnt layer on the street South of the *Terrassenhaus* 180 sling stones were found in piles, of which one pile of 121 ("deposits of unused weapons", Korfmann 2002, 216; problems with the interpretation, Benzi 2002, 354-5, Hertel 2008, 199 n. 23, Vanschoonwinkel 1998, 244 n. 93, the latter noting that the Mycenaean arrowhead found by Blegen is attested in Pylos, "mais aussi, exceptionellement, à Alishar [Hüyük]").

Mountjoy (1999b) reanalyzed Blegen's Mycenaean pottery, which had not been reexamined since 1958, and dated the destruction of VIIa to "late LHIIIB and probably in transitional LHIIIB2-IIIC early, but not later", around 1190/1180 (similarly Mellink 1986, 94, Vanschoonwinkel 1998, 243: second quarter of the 12th c.). While the interpretation as war is upheld by a majority of researchers, Blegen (1958; 1963) was decidedly for the Trojan War. But the fact that the invaders could have been Mycenaeans is neither confirmed nor contradicted in any way by the archaeological record. No Mycenaean weapons have ever been found at Troy. In fact, the closest location with Mycenaean weapons South of Troy is Pergamon (Niemeier 2006, 54). Mountjoy (1999b) and Mellink (1986) attribute the VIIa destruction to the Sea Peoples (along the same lines, Finley 1964, 4-6, further discussion in Vanschoonwinkel 1998, 250).

A similar analysis can be done for the three partial destruction layers of Troy VIIb (Pavel 2014).

It should however be borne in mind that we lack general criteria to determine when a destruction will appear serious enough in the archaeological record to be considered a lost war, and equally one cannot import criteria from somewhere else, e.g. expect to see Troy's VIIa record replicate exactly the destruction of Beycesultan in mid-12th c. or the Achaemenid destruction of Sardis in 546. Some of the destruction layers in Troy presented above are not reported from large enough (by archaeological standards) areas of the site, most of them cannot be safely (also by archaeological standards) associated with war, and none of them can be, on archaeological evidence alone, suggested to be the result of war with the Mycenaeans. In fact, for at least one of them, the Trojans

seem to be something other than the Anatolian people Homer is talking about. Thus, for all we know, one of the Trojan Wars may have been fought between the Sea Peoples and the Anatolian Trojans, or between Achaeans and Thracian immigrants.

It is only for the general public, that the most important thing in the Iliad is the Trojan War, or what is left of the real Trojan War in the Iliad. For the historian, almost every word in Homer, even the emotions of his gods and goddesses, is something that is "left", only from different historical strata. Homer was not a Dadaist poet or a Cubist painter. There was no intrinsic merit for Homer or his audiences in lack of logic or random invention, as there may have been much later for only a handful of ancient writers such as Lucian. Deformations must certainly be reckoned with in the Iliad, but only meaningful ones underpinned by a rhetoric or ideological rationale. In that sense, the problem becomes one of identifying what triggers these deformations (primarily the task of the historian, Petre 1982), and being able to map, with a reasonable chance of success, what material culture elements stem from which time period and geographical area (as shown by the work of Lorimer as well as of Matz and Bucholtz). Most probably, an analysis of the Trojan war must begin to take shape at the intersection of the two.

5. Visual Models in Archaeology – From Piranesi to Google Earth

The analysis of the interplay between archaeological and historical sources must be complemented by a discussion of how digital models of ancient sites draw on both categories of sources. A good example of this could be the media hype surrounding the 2001 Troy exhibit "Dream and Reality" in Stuttgart, Germany (Troia-Ausstellung, Traum und Wirklichkeit), which was both a success to judge by the number of visitors (almost a million) and an occasion for controversy and scandal. M. Korfmann, the excavator of Troy and initiator of the exhibition, was at that time accused to have presented reconstructions that were not entirely backed by excavation results, and to have gone beyond the liberties any reconstructed model was entitled to. In the present article I will however not be dwelling on the details of this controversy, but rather present the larger theoretical framework for such analyses.

Behind the popularity of digital models of ancient monuments there is more than just an interest in the past and a fancy for elegant design.

As scientists, we are indeed dealing rather in the past-as-reconstructed, than in that utter stranger, the past-in-itself. But science-aided (virtual) experiences are today marketed as the only ones which can impart the feeling of authenticity. The displaced materiality of the models is promoted to be the only one capable of doing justice to the mathematical manifold that nature has become. This is rooted both in Husserl's phenomenological analysis of the crisis of science and in the neopositivist conception of science, and is allegedly pushed to the extreme by a compulsive drive to show off computer capabilities. The current conception of virtual reality has as a result a disembodied viewer who has become ubiquitous and omniscient. This seems a vindication of Husserl's conception of the model achieving a higher ontological status than the reality (the Lebenswelt). At the same time it paradoxically illustrates another philosophical stance, Baudrillard's view that reconstruction is a simulacrum, "a truth concealing that there is none", reflecting the "characteristic hysteria of our time: the hysteria of production and reproduction of the real" (1988, 166, 180). Digital models in archaeology may have become Baudrillard's (id. 166) "maps that precede the territory", in a world of scientific illustrations where original monument and its reconstruction are mutually constitutive. In an age of simulation, witnessing the liquidation of all referentials, models have become more real than real, and indeed their hyperreality is the only reality that past monuments can enjoy. In the recent philosophy of science, N. Gray further argues that virtual reconstructions are generally perceived as erring on either side of reality, either almost but not quite real, or, on the contrary, more concentrated than real (i.e., perceiving either the model's "deficiency" or its "intensity", Gray, 1995 (with n. 1, p. 347).

Key in the discussion of visual reconstruction in archaeology today is the notion of realism. The dominant view in archaeology today is that digital models "bring the past back to life". The proponents of this view would be of course otherwise bound to dismiss as naïve any historian who set about showing history "how it really was". What are the underpinnings of this generous naivety when it comes to digital reconstructions? Models have become indeed increasingly convincing over a very short while since the advent of computers, and it is easy to forget that the same reservations that applied to the historical narrative should now be applicable to such visual reconstruction. No epistemological vaccine was ready in time to protect against the sudden rise of astonishing and compelling computer models. The graphic pizzazz of such models downplays or completely conceals that any number of educated guesses or pro domo choices go

into such models (Kantner 2000), and that visual reconstruction is not the restitution of the past, but a present theory of the past (Moser and Gamble 1997). Moreover, if the public is expecting to be walked through the past, they will always be disappointed by the model's inability to ever breathe actual life into the model. It has been pointed out that the authenticity of a model is not about verisimilitude, but rather about process, biography and embeddedness (Gillings 2005, also Mesick 2013, 66). In fact, the realism of such reconstructions is judged against photography, so in fact it should be called photorealism, reifying vision as the means to evaluate the world (Gillings 2005). Architects such as J. Pallasmaa have criticized the hegemony of vision in the appreciation of built (reconstructed) structures. Realism as a criterion for evaluating success should be discarded if understood as mere visual, photorealistic (as opposed to plurisensorial, contextual, and functional) agreement between original and reconstruction, without considering "the life for which the original was intended" (Yegül 1976, 171-172)). One of the ensuing paradoxes is that the more realistic the model, the less it helps towards research questions (cf. Kantner 2000, 52). Moreover, accuracy, verisimilitude, or realism can in fact only be assessed as a function of purpose, and often this involves the consideration of the intended audience. Is the reconstruction focusing on the building's earthquake resistance, or its daylighting analysis; accompanying a traveling exhibition; being used in undergraduate courses; or currying the favor of excavation sponsors? Between consumption, teaching, and research, it is goals which restrict the infinite task of reconstructing, and modelers must choose how their restrictive interpretation will operate. The aspiration to be realistic has also resulted in models using real photos of dramatic skies over the digital Roman Forum model, or real water videos in Hadrian's pool, while at the same time having the viewer fly through the model on a Wimbledon serve trajectory, certainly unlike anyone's experience of these sites, now or then.

Barthes argued in his "L'effet de réel" (1968) that the use of very concrete details can well remain a mere rhetoric device, driven not by the need for accuracy, but by the art of persuasion. Audiences are actually used as arenas to build disciplinary prestige, with less regard for knowledge formation. C. Mesick further argued that models ought to self-sabotage their in-your-face realism, suggesting they could signal to the viewer that they are just conjectures, by means of "angled contours of the landscape", "deliberately [...] garish colors", or "obviously «fake» textures onto roofs" (2013, 81). The intentional introduction of conspicuously non-realistic elements in

archaeological reconstruction is an interesting avenue of research. The seductive realism of images of the past may also give ideology better tools for manipulation (Smiles 2013); data is often scant and/or ambiguous and deductive reasoning can only take the archaeologist so far.

As Yegül put it, to rebuild all ancient buildings to their last roof tile, would be very disappointing, if not totally irresponsible (and financially impossible). But while the question whether to restore and/or reconstruct even individual monuments is very difficult, no harm is done in creating an academic model of it. In an ideal world, it would be mandatory for any archaeological publication to include a visual reconstruction of the site's architecture, indeed alternative reconstructions of the same monument. Not in order to wow the public, let alone to encourage handsome reconstructions piggybacked on poor data (cf. Favro 2013, 164), but simply because reconstructions (visual, as well as narrative) are the crucial test for the archaeologist's understanding of the site and therefore a direct fosterer of knowledge. The costs in money and time are probably the cause why alternative reconstructions are not offered. At best, it is suggested (Kantner, 2000, 52) that all reconstructions be accompanied by written text and description of the original archaeological material. The very definition of academic reconstructions presupposes, apart from the authors being qualified experts, the full disclosure of the metadata on which the work is based. Alternative reconstructions are, to be fair, recommended in the 2007 ICOMOS "Ename" charter for the Interpretation and Presentation of Cultural Heritage Sites (par. 2.4; language such as "the most probable reconstruction" was significantly left out from a previous draft, and the idea was altogether absent from the 1964 Venice charter). The authors of such a model would be perhaps best advised to present two reconstructions, at the opposite ends of what they consider the range of the possible.

Another counterproductive trend is correlating increased realism with decreased human presence. Realistic appears to have to mean dehumanized, cold, scientific, and numb: building models, streets in digital cities are generally shown with no people, little if any vegetation, no graffiti, construction materials with no signs of age and wear (Kantner 2000, Favro 2010, 32, n.5). While this is likely due to the additional computational difficulties rather than being a statement about society, it is bound to permeate public opinion and, in time, give new generations a quite eerie impression of how ancient places must have looked like. Experiential depth of these models, in sum, remains very shallow (Favro 2013, 168, Gillings 2005). The object's aura, lost, in Benjamin's view,

during (mass) reproduction, seems to have a correspondent in the loss of experiential depth from original to digital model. An additional problem is that models make a point to be rich in details, clear and easy to view – that is, after all, what makes them valuable, according to the common creed. But what if the original monument was dark, elusive, intentionally confusing, labyrinthine, awe-inspiring? What if the visitor was supposed to feel lost, or dwarfed (as already understood by Kantner 2000, 50). Instead, the modern visitor of virtual ancient environments is in control, a domineering consumer of science as entertainment.

In conclusion of this section, if he could watch this 3D digital model of Ancient Rome, produced by international experts, previously on Google Earth, now here http://vimeo.com/32038695 (last accessed Aug. 26, 2015), Flavio Biondo, the Renaissance father of archaeological topography, would be amazed; Piranesi, probably, disappointed. The vagaries of assessing the success of a model point towards disciplinary ruptures between archaeology and history, and their societal insertion, but also to the opportunities for reconciliation in the future. Analyzing the production of models in the framework of mode 2 knowledge production has the advantage to emphasize the potential of non-hierarchical interpretative decisions, of reflexivity, and of the conception of scientific truth as also having a strong social dimension.

6. Methodological suggestions

A number of methodological suggestions can be put forward. The departure point should be the typical mistake of seeing archaeology's potential as a way of proving or refuting textual evidence (Hall 2013:210). Archaeology must be juxtaposed to texts as a fully viable alternative, structured along independent force lines, and only partly translatable into the textual paradigm. A key idea is the use of contradictions (disjunctions, etc., v. supra) between archaeological and historical data to design research questions and delineate areas of promising further investigation. It is perhaps not intrinsically justified to state that a discrepancy between what literary sources and excavations teach us necessarily warrants a priority investigation into that particular aspect. But for the construction of research question and topics, the search for harmonizing inconsistent data is a valid and pragmatic approach. The identification by zooarchaeologists of some *sus* bones in Islamic settlement areas (residual?) certainly deserves

further study, even though the study of eating habits per se does not contribute more to our understanding of a past society than the study of funerary ritual, built space etc. It becomes apparent that such topics are more important because, apart from giving insight into past societies just like the study of any other topic, they have the additional benefit of fine-tuning our archaeological and historical methods. This is an aspect that has not received the attention it deserves. It concerns the fact that certain research topics can also serve to "sharpen the tools" by which we do research, by leading to the identification of factual errors and reasoning fallacies, and by promoting re-assessment of the theoretical platform from which we conduct such operations. Ultimately, I propose that the great research potential offered by a contradiction between historical and archaeological data resides not in the possibility of some spectacular discovery about a past society, but in the opportunity it offers to investigate how the hermeneutic spiral unfolds between the study of material culture and the study of literary sources. In other words, when it is proposed (e.g. by Carmack and Weeks 1981) to see such a contradiction (called a "disjunction" or an "ambiguity") as one of the most meaningful issues archaeologists can focus on when exploring past societies, it should be emphasized that it is in fact key to exploring archaeology itself, especially in relationship with history. Finally, the problem itself of the "contradictions" between archaeological and literary data is insufficiently theorized. Inherent in the idea of a contradiction is the belief of commensurability, the conviction that we are able to establish instances where the archaeological and historical discourses have the same referent. But since assertions based on either archaeological or literary evidence are always qualified, and in the absence of middle-range theories, can we ever point to an actual antagonism between these data categories? How exactly are contradictions constructed in an interdisciplinary dialogue? Researchers must be reasonably sure they brought the data to a common denominator. For this very reason, we ignore the fact that most discrepancies between archaeological data and historical sources are before our eyes and we ignore them because we explained them away in our quest for presenting a consistent interpretation. Once ensconced into persuasive narratives, most of these contradictions will never be revealed again for what they are.

Archaeologists must also advocate the obligation to entertain multiple interpretations at the same time when merging archaeological and historical data and when creating visual models. Clearly this is not a

comfortable thing to do. Juggling with alternative interpretations requires not only scholarly effort, but a kind of flexibility that many years of specialization tend to stifle. Even researchers who start off by considering several hypotheses end up soon committing to one of them, and namely even before a critical mass of evidence, pointing in this or that direction, had been reached.

Another suggestion is to reconsider the knowledge production "mode". Mode 2 knowledge production (Gibbons et al. 1994, Nowotny et al. 2001, 2003) brings with it great advantages, such as the specificity of the problem and the diversity of approaches brought forward to tackle it. There are also a few hitches with mode 2, which may be outlined. Mode 2 is a short-time intervention which may be unable to establish branch cohesion and common epistemological routines. From the point of view of the sociology of science it is impossible to conceive of "outbedded" science, science without social continuity. Mode 2 has an intense, but short-term social correlative, and best practices are slow to emerge. The solution to this may be to have a network of mode 2 think tanks, working on specific questions, with scholar mobility and inter-core communication. In the absence of such a network and such a rhythm, best practices will not be established. Institutionalized interdisciplinary dialogue takes time to learn. Another concern is that research funds are driven by applicability, and while mode 2 caters to applicability, it still struggles with wider generality. In other words, we aim to produce socially-viable knowledge, but the warning is that this, while indeed socially "viable", ought not to be "short-lived" knowledge. Again, imagining networks of diverse interdisciplinary think tanks may ensure that the results from one are fed back in the cycle. This will make not only for social permanence but will give true meaning to the idea of consensus formation and negotiation of results.

In turn, archaeological outreach has changed dramatically over the past few decades. Outreach often constitutes now a separate branch of major archaeological projects, governed by ever more specific and independent laws concerning information processing, packaging, and presentation. The way this leads to the production of new archaeological knowledge is understudied. An explanation for this may be the fact that many archaeologists are still too concerned of asserting their scholarly status to allow themselves to become unequivocally involved with "simplifying" outreach activities. But outreach can be seen, rather than as a downgrade, as a fertile arena for producing archaeological interpretations. Firstly, because of the results, secondly because of the methods deployed.

Outreach has translation as the avowed central part of its methodology, the translation of excavation and literary data into a product with the largest impact on the general public. The experience of outreach experts is paramount for advances in this field. Outreach specialists are much aware that they are translating knowledge from a paradigm to another, whereas archaeologists use historians' data (and the other way around) as if this was a self-understood process requiring no conversion.

Additional work is needed to map out the periods and type of sites for which merging archaeological and literary information works best. It would seem only logical that archaeological evidence is most needed where literary sources offer only meager coverage of a specific historical period. There is however an embedded historiocentrism in this suggestion. In fact archaeological evidence is needed as badly, if for different purposes, there where texts are abundant and (apparently) trustworthy. Indeed, it can be counterintuitively suggested that we need archaeology especially where texts offer a mass of information that is bulky enough for us to winnow out inconsistencies, judged by internal (not archaeological) Quellenforschung criteria, and thereby also create the possibility to compare them with the archaeological narrative. Clearly, however, there is a point after which the benefits of archaeology in addition to texts become minimal, such as in the case of post-medieval archaeology. On the other hand, where prehistory and history merge, and texts are scant and political, the idea of merging the two categories is almost meaningless. Importantly, an exclusive focus on periods that are both well excavated and well documented by historical sources (such as Roman Italy, or the Greek Aegean) risks not only to perpetuate a knowledge paradigm that is both Eurocentric and conservative, but also to obliterate the process through which blending the two categories of data is done. It is likely where texts are more lacunose and archaeology has not already tackled most key sites that the way this works can be observed more successfully. From this point of view, epistemological advances are therefore to be expected rather from the archaeology of fringe areas, interfaces, provinces, and melting pots.

Related to this, it is to be desired that archaeological and historical information be clustered around fundamental issues of general import. Specific questions, such as whether Alexander the Great was buried in Babylon or if the depas amphikypellon pottery type was used by the heroes of the Trojan war, risk to result in circular answers. Merging archaeological and literary evidence functions best when the historian strives for regional syntheses and wide-ranging evaluations. That way patterns emerge from

both the historical and archaeological sources, and they can be overlapped or confronted. The drawback here is that syntheses appear to be very unappealing to academic authors, although they are supposed to be the ultimate goal – in archaeology even more so than in history. Archaeologists are often hard to convince to publish their excavations of a villa in the countryside, let alone produce an analysis of a whole province.

An important avenue of research, anticipated by Little (1992), is the use of one category of evidence (e.g. textual) to derive hypotheses to be tested within the other category (e.g. archaeological). Subjects such as the trade between the Roman Empire and India, or of cultural influences between Greeks and the Phrygians, lend themselves well to such an operation. However designing hypotheses to be tested is not a straightforward process. It is perhaps not the falsifiability of hypotheses that matters, but that they be carefully selected to be refutation-effective or confirmation-effective, according to the scenario at hand.

Finally, it is important that both archaeologists and historians understand that the others' conclusions are just as provisory as theirs. It is understandable that a historian would want a clean-cut judgment from the conclusion of an archaeology book on her topic. To be able to put it to use, all "probably", "possibly", "partly", "apparently" will as a rule be removed from the conclusion. In a recent book J. Hall (2013:209) spoke in this respect of "unidimensionality". While there is a continuum of knowledge between archaeology and history, the danger remains that the choice between conflicting interpretations is made by an archaeologist based on a historical interpretation, itself perhaps privileged by the historian because of an archaeological tentative conclusion. Interdisciplinarity does not mean picking up a book from within another discipline and quoting its conclusions. It is rather a fine understanding of the workings of the other discipline, of its accomplishments and doubts, and of its potential to reach back and borrow in turn from one's discipline. How archaeology and history can work together on a safe epistemological basis is what is at stake now and this paper tried to offer a few avenues of investigation. I am certainly not advocating herein that archaeology should constantly strive to prove literary sources wrong, and thus assert its epistemological independence. And in this sense I will conclude with a cautionary tale. It is a scenario that later A. Snodgrass has popularized in the Anglo-Saxon world, and which in turn is attributed by Ducrey to Christiane Dunant. It gives archaeological "proof" that Switzerland was actually not neutral during the second world war: "[u]n archéologue de l'an cinq mille après

J.-C., fouillant la ville de Genève, tombe sur les ruines du Grand-Théâtre de Genève, détruit par un incendie le 1er mai 1951. Fouillant un autre secteur situé à 250 mètres de là à vol d'oiseau, il tombe sur une seconde couche d'incendie, non moins importante: il s'agit des vestiges du Bâtiment Electoral, anéanti par un autre incendie, le 4 août 1964. Une conclusion possible serait la suivante: contrairement à ce qu'apprennent les sources littéraires, la ville de Genève a été bombardée au cours de la guerre mondiale de 1939 à 1945 et a été partiellement incendiée. Un archéologue plus audacieux encore pourrait estimer, sur la base des même fouilles, que Genève, et qui sait la Suisse tout entire, a été directement touché par le conflit" (Ducrey (1977, 13).

7. Conclusion

I am interested in the transferability of knowledge from one theoretical framework to another. I feel this boils down to a multi-step negotiation of this knowledge between archaeological, written sources and visual reconstructions. I attempted to make some progress in deconstructing the two-way transfer of knowledge between history and archaeology, and in generating a model of how this is done now and how it should be done, in other words in producing the epistemic map of this transfer. The process of translating archaeological results in historical narratives and visual illustrations helps to filter out inconsistencies, fosters reflexivity and multivocality. Above all, this process, rather than creating mere copies or equivalents, actually generates archaeological knowledge. Moreover, the creation of historical narratives and visual models of sites and monuments does much more than communicate results. It is a heuristic device to test the archaeologist's understanding of a site and help them find out more about it. This is a proof that true interdisciplinarity helps to also reinforce disciplinary excellence and integrity, rather than posing the threat of relaxing disciplinary standards. It also stresses that historical reconstruction, including its visual avatars, can benefit enormously in the future from truly accepting what archaeology has to offer in terms of identifying and explaining the processes of interaction, acculturation as well as the creation and meaning of images.

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ANNA G. PIOTROWSKA

Born in Kraków, Poland

Ph.D., Jagiellonian University, Kraków Poland
Dissertation: *The Idea of National Music in the Works of American Composers
in the First Half of the 20th Century*

Associate Professor, Institute of Musicology, Jagiellonian University,
Kraków, Poland

Eranet Fellowship, 2013
Fulbright Fellowship, 2010
Mellon Fellowship, 2005

Participation in numerous international conferences and symposia, among
which in Austria, Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, Slovakia, Czech Republic,
Georgia, Israel, Russia

Author of numerous scientific articles in Polish, English, and German

Books:

(in English) *Gypsy Music in European Culture*, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2013

Several books in Polish, among which: *O muzyce i filmie. Wprowadzenie do muzykologii filmowej* (On Film and Music: An Introduction to Film Musicology), Kraków: Musica Iagellonica, 2014

'DOUBLE IDENTITY' OF CONTEMPORARY GYPSY MUSICIANS IN EASTERN EUROPE OR WHY "THE ROMA [STILL] WISH TO BE HEARD"[1]

In this paper I am dealing with the issue of 'double identity' of Gypsy musicians – their concurrent identification as Gypsies and as musicians.[2] I claim that this 'double identity' enables them playing music of specific traits, music that is referred to as 'Gypsy music' or alternatively as music performed in a Gypsy style. It can be claimed that music not only serves as a means of expressing this 'double identity' of Gypsy musicians, but is – in fact – a reflection of this specific duality.

The Notion of Identity – Problems and Issues

While "it is difficult to escape the word identity in contemporary science",[3] the notion of identity is – at the same time, and perhaps exactly because of its spreading popularity – one of the most controversial terms used in today's world. The very word identity can be encountered across various disciplines where it is assigned with slightly different meanings. For example the problem of a personal identity as well as self-fashioning has been the subject of investigation by, among others, such luminous academicians as Locke, Hume, Diderot, Kant, Herder, Humboldt, Goethe, Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger, as well as many others.[4] Depending on the school of thought or the field – be it psychology, sociology, philosophy as well as depending on the preferences of particular authors the issue of identity is gaining on new definitions.[5] But also, in many areas of research, identity is still seen as problematic. For example in the realm of phenomenological philosophy identity can be equalled with ego and defined as "the unity pole of the stream of intentionalities"[6] while in anthropology – especially in the recent times – identity is being discussed in terms of its crisis, alienation, etc., and is characterised as

291

uncertain, fractured, hyphenated or multiple. Michel Maffesoli (b. 1944) maintains that contemporary mass culture has disintegrated the sense of self-identity since today's social existence is conducted through fragmented tribal groupings, organized around the catchwords, brand-names and sound-bites of consumer culture.[7]

Having said that it needs to be stressed that in the light of these observations an attempt to describe the identity of today's Gypsy musicians of eastern Europe (e.g. Romania or Poland) is not an easy one, for their situation is conditioned by the ethnicity, as well as economic, cultural and political circumstances. However, I will try to outline the identity of contemporary Gypsy musicians relying on their own opinions as expressed in guided interviews. This methodological approach was inspired by a Romanian ethnomusicologist Costin Moisil (b.1970) who conducted interviews in order to show whether, and if yes then how, music can be treated not only as an element reflecting personal preferences but also as a manifestation of identity, as well as an important factor contributing to its building.[8] The stimulus came also from the words of another Romanian musicologist/ethnomusicologist – Speranța Rădulescu (b.1949) who said that Gypsies' standpoints need to be taken into consideration when talking about their music.[9] The materials for this paper were predominantly gathered during my stay as an International Fellow at New Europe Collage in Bucharest (2014-2015), but also in my native city of Kraków (Poland) in summer 2014. Furthermore, in this article I am resorting to several chats conducted with Romanian Gypsy musicians as presented by Speranța Rădulescu in her valuable book *Taifasuri despre muzica țigănească/Chats about Gypsy Music* (2004).

There exists different types of identity: collective, e.g. referring to a group and personal, referring to the characteristic of an individual, who constructs his/her own narratives of identity by assuming certain roles to play.[10] In this paper I am talking about the identity of an individual, particular Gypsy musician, however I am also trying to generalize by pinpointing similarities and parallels between musicians' attitudes and behaviours, as revealed in their interviews. In fact I see any person, a given Gypsy musician, as "a product of interactions and relations" of social character.

> Thus individuality is dependent on the social context of reference and can be not considered as an absolute attribute, it is dependent on the

circumstances in which individual and collective identity are a matter of perspective of analysis and not two distinct forms by means of which individuals represent themselves as part of their social environment.[11]

Hence for me identity not only is closely associated with "particular circumstances and role frames"[12] but also "rather than being seen as fixed, homogenous, immutable" I treat identity as "fluid and in the state of flus, as performed rather than given, hybrid, and transgressive in norms".[13] I strongly agree with those researchers who talk about identity as an unceasing process, or "as spatiotemporal continuity"[14] that results in the sense of

> coherence to individual experience, places incident, episode and the routine of particular biographies in the flow of historical time; it is an ongoing endeavour that has as main points of reference the parameters of the discourse that manipulate and integrate the various categories that make sense of social reality.[15]

Following that route of thinking it needs to be reminded that identities can emerge from various reasons, among other they can be elective – i.e. chosen, affectual – i.e. stemming from feelings, or can be tribal in character (the sense of belonging being a dominant).[16] Hence it can be stated that "every person has a multitude identity, since everyone who lives in society belongs simultaneously to several groups. Most people have an ethnic affiliation, geographic one, but also a familial affiliation, a professional one, an age one, and so on".[17] However, for me two most important factors determining the identity of Gypsy musicians, shaping their ego, are: their ethnicity and job. I have adapted this dualistic approach from contemporary anthropologists like Sandra Wallman and sociologists like Kevin Hetherington. Sandra Wallman for example talks about work and locality as two powerful, often overriding factors decisive when it comes to the identity potential. She concludes that "in matter of locality, it is normal for people to identify to some extent with the area in which they live" while "identification with work and the products or rewards of work is not new, but it became more salient in these times".[18] Similarly Kevin Hetherington argues that mostly two factors determine the expression of identity: everyday life and spatiality. While identity is about communication who you are (or who you think you are) because everyday life is connected with a 'job' – performed tasks, and spatiality is

connected with the neighbourhood, principally people you are surrounded by and thus can be associated with ethnicity.[19] Accordingly, I propose to tag the identity of contemporary Gypsy musicians as 'double' and as I will try to show their identification is primarily concerned with them feeling that they are Gypsies and that they are musicians rather than simply being Gypsy musicians.

Disputes over Gypsy Ethnicity

Similarly to the word identity, the term ethnicity is considered as "an emotional issue" since it revolves around personal experiences and touches upon the most intimate questions people ask themselves: 'who I am?'.[20] Despite its wide use, the concept of ethnicity "conceived as a designating universal form of groups identity, shaped in […] different entities" continues to raise fundamental problems, and "its capacity to cluster realities of the same order has been contested".[21] Ethnicity – never being "a singular identity locus"[22] – has often been defined as the character or quality of a given group, but various authors adopted different definitions. For example for a historical and cultural sociologist, Orlando Patterson (b. 1944) ethnicity is "the conscious awareness" – a kind of choice made every day by all people, the decision which manifests itself by a declaration: first admitting to oneself and then proclaiming the same to the rest of the world. This declaration should be further reinforced by commitment and finally overtly expressed.[23]

Yet the understanding of one's own ethnicity bases predominantly on perceiving the "identity as difference and as recognition" (of this difference).[24] Obviously these "differences are established and performed in multiple ways",[25] especially visible during a meeting of different individuals being not only a moment of encounter but also an occasion for an emergence of a relation between people.[26] But despite the fact that differences play an extremely vital role in constructing the sense of identity by helping to define the ethnic belonging, they are more than problematic to explain. The essence of the difference is not to delineate central from marginal but is often linked with creating the feelings of tension, resistance, and empowering everyday choices.[27]

And indeed in case of Gypsies given the diversity of their communities and various strategies of self-identification their own identity has always been constructed on the basis of the clear division: the difference between

Gypsy and non-Gypsy world.[28] "Any investigation of Gypsy ethnicity must begin with a discussion of boundaries. […] The Gypsy worldview is lodged in the dichotomy between insider and outsider, or Rom […] and gazhe".[29] It can be even repeated after Fredrik Barth that "the critical focus of investigation […] becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff it encloses".[30] It is valid to underline this fact as it is easy to confuse ethnicity with "cultural behaviour or cultural awareness", or simply link it with "collective actions".[31]

Especially Gypsies who become musicians may "manipulate boundaries between themselves and others in order to associate themselves with the socially powerful, disassociate themselves from the powerless, and enhance their market niche and status".[32] They actively play out their position and negotiate their identity often being "agents in the making of cultural difference as they seek both to blur as well as to clarify the boundaries between themselves and other groups in society".[33]

Gypsies as Musicians

Some authors would argue that Roms have virtually monopolized certain occupations,[34] and have been mostly associated with some crafts but especially musicianship. This seems the result of the "cultural division of labor based on color and ethnicity [that] facilitated the confounding of occupation, ethnicity, race and class".[35] As commonly known Gypsies – able to accommodate to situations and economies dominated by other groups[36] – offered their services as fortune tellers, acrobats, jugglers, etc. already in medieval times. Soon they found and willingly occupied an economic niche as itinerary musicians. For example in Romania and Bulgaria, the early mentions of professional Gypsy musicians can be traced back to the 14th century. Thus in eastern as well as south-eastern Europe Gypsies became strongly associated with their excellent musical talents and perceived as wandering (often street) performers. Soon many "Gypsy musicians often travelled to the big cities to seek employment either voluntarily or under orders from the lord of the house. Gradually, increasing numbers of Gypsies – musicians as well as those from other professions – came to settle in these large cities".[37] Since "the Rom have adapted extremely well to urbanization",[38] in the city settings of central and south-eastern Europe Gypsy musicians started to perform for remuneration in public, often in beer gardens, restaurants, during dances, etc. soon becoming an indispensable element of an urban landscape.

It was Hungarian Gypsies who quite early on began to organise their own musical groups to perform in cities: these bands were referred to as Zigeunerkapellen. The initial phase in their formation coincided with the end of the 18th century, the subsequent stage ended around the mid-19th century, while the final development of the Zigeunerkapellen was to commence in the second half of the 19th century. The flowering of these orchestras was stimulated by the increasing recognition enjoyed by Gypsy musicians within Habsburg Empire. For example in the fin-de-siècle Budapest everyone listened to Gypsy music as it was "the fashion in the 19th century".[39] From a simple two-instrument line up the Gypsy bands rapidly started to grow: they were composed of three or four instrumentalists, chiefly fiddlers, as well as a musician playing the dulcimer. Zigeunerkapellen did not perform music for their own use but treated music making as a source of income and played in the gardens and cafés of the large towns of the empire. Also an important line of division in the repertoire was drawn across the music played by bands in villages and in the cities. The stylistic features of music performed by Gypsies in the Hungarian countryside did not contain the factors widely identified with so-called 'Gypsy music', among other things, the interval of an augmented second. Their performance style did not display the predilection for overt ornamentation, alien to this type of music were polyphonic solutions. The above elements, associated as standard for the Gypsy bands playing at the estates of aristocratic patrons, were to become characteristic for the music performed by Gypsy musicians in urban areas. Not only was a knowledge of musical score often met amongst Gypsy musicians but also the level of their musical education, particularly during the course of the 19th century grew notably, which resulted consequently in the generating of a sizeable group of professional Gypsy musicians. Musically educated Gypsies, wandering from town to town in search of an opportunity to earn money, brought with them musical innovations from the artistic musical current.

In Hungarian areas music performed by urban Gypsy bands became so popular throughout the 19th century that when Franz Liszt tried to define Gypsy music he "discovered what he called and believed to be gipsy music, which was however Hungarian urban music propagated by gipsy bands".[40] While basing himself on what appears one of the most encountered ethnological antinomy between 'urban-rural'[41] another researcher of Gypsy music Béla Bartók in the early 20th century shifted in the direction of opposing urban practices in the performing of Gypsy music to that of folk

music. Around 1920 the category of rusticity dominated his writing and he sketched the rural versus urban dichotomy emphasising an association of a rural character and rusticity with natural beauty, while that of the urban popularity with commercial vulgarity.[42] Despite this scrutinizing tone Bartók also recognised the high position of Gypsy musicians cherished in the cities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Indeed, for example in the multicultural Polish city of Kraków (belonging in the late 19th century to the territory occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire) Gypsies constituted an integral part of urban cultural colourfulness. Gypsy bands were very popular there at the turn of 20th century as attested by eye witnesses, among others a man of letters – Stanisław Przybyszewski. The author was reminiscing on his first encounter with a Gypsy band on his arrival in Kraków in 1898:

> One time I saw a group of Gypsies – never before have I heard dulcimer in my life – and their music got me so excited that all [around] were astonished by my behaviour and the absolute silence ensued when I'd taken the lead of this small orchestra – the whole world seized to exist to me – there was only dulcimer and I, the conductor.[43]

Needless to add that the line up of the band strictly reminded the one of the famous Zigeunerkapellen.

On Romanian territories the Gypsy musicians were known as *lăutari*. These were professional or semi-professional (i.e. following oral tradition),[44] usually urban (although not necessarily so), Gypsy musicians singing and playing on demand with extraordinary "virtuosity of the executions and with up-to-the minute hits and musical styles".[45] Sometimes they organized in a small band called taraf and their repertoire would be commonly referred to as "muzica lăutărescă" or simply as music of the "*lăutars*".[46] Gypsy musicians in Romania have provided musical services at least since the late 14th century[47] and they became especially celebrated in the age of romanticism. Also in the early 20th century as well as later they were present in the streets of Bucharest and "in almost every tram station you could see groups of gypsy musicians, barefooted, with their violin, dairea (a kind of tambourine) and cobza begging for a penny", or in suburban taverns "where peasants and inhabitants of the slums meet".[48] Those street musicians, especially Gypsy ones were visible in the urban spaces of eastern European cities up to the beginning of the 20th century and enjoyed the great popularity, yet the situation was about to change later in the 20th century.

> Their gradual disappearance was due to a lowering of urban soundscape fidelity (the invention of the automobile) and to the advent of new means of musical reproduction: this equipment succeeds where innumerable legal actions against them, over several centuries, have failed. Street musicians did not disappear completely but lost much of their musical and social relevance until the sixties, when the cultural-political turmoil, primarily involving the younger generation, led to a rebirth of the "folksinger" as a popular stereotype, able to attract many of the new anti-conformist expectations.[49]

However, in Romania, *lăutari* prospered quite well, and during the interwar years they even managed to organize societies like "Junimea Muzicală" [Musical youth] in Bucharest.[50] Still worse times were to come with communist rule after WWII when, by the late 1950s when social and economic discrimination against Romany people began. In eastern Europe the general policy towards the Roma included efforts aimed at assimilating them. For example in Romania Gypsy urban performers were hired in state music ensembles and "all performances reflected officially sanctioned 'pure' Romanian folklore".[51] With the fall of communism in 1989 the political and social climate in eastern Europe changed facilitating new cultural activities to be undertaken by Gypsies. This coincided with the general tendency to bring back music to the streets. Gypsy musicians seized more opportunities and willingly started to play in the urban spaces. For example in Kraków new Gypsy bands were organized boldly appearing in the most representative city squares rather than playing in restaurants or pubs and being (or not) merely tolerated there as it had used to be in the communistic times.

Becoming a Gypsy Musician

The case of Gypsies willingly becoming musicians may illustrate the manner in which pariah peoples accommodate themselves – both spatially and functionally – to economies dominated by groups of higher status, other than their own.[52] Gypsy musicians promote themselves with their job and aspire to be enjoying more prestige than their peers as well as to be more respected.[53] Most importantly Gypsy musicians have learned how to use music as a means of "the social elevator" enabling them to increase their status and economic security. While serving its "primary social function [...] to define the communal self, which includes redefining it

when the community is changing"[54] music (as generally art does), not only helps them to form their ethnicity as Roms, but also facilities the formation of their identity as working people, those who possess a job (*der Beruf*). Indeed, Costin Moisil even argued that "music can provide components for ….identity, just as dress, hairdo, diet, the economic system and many other such aspects do".[55] I would add that in case of Gypsy musicians the music gains an additional asset as a constituent of identity performed towards non-Gypsies as well as among Gypsies themselves. In other words, even today in the view of Gypsies *lăutari* are generally well appreciated in the large society[56] and hailed by other Roms as persons who not only earn money, often being the main bread winners of the family, but also are praised for having achieved a certain level of (self)education. Yet, the trade of *lăutar* is customarily hereditary, carried on from generation to generation and passed along the male kinship line in Gypsy families .[57] For example, Aurel Ioniţă, a Gypsy violinist and composer who formed in the early 2000s a Bucharest based group called Mahala Rai Banda says that he is a musician just like his father, and he prides in being musically trained at home. Actually, he stresses he feels a *lăutar*, i.e. someone who became musician as an autodidact, while – he adds – *muzicant* is someone who was taught at schools.[58] The spontaneity of musical education among Gypsies was already important, as a matter of fact, for the 19th century commentators, who saw Gypsies as naturally born musicians, who would predominantly make a living with their music.[59] But there is more to it: Ioniţă not only is proud to call himself *lăutar*, but he stresses it would be unwise, even stupid, if he named himself a musician (*muzicant*).[60] Other Gypsy musicians also willingly talk about this division between *lăutar*s versus *muzicant*s, saying that "the latter knows (or knows better) musical notation, and does not go to weddings on regular basis".[61] For all of them it is clear that musicians play by the score, but *lăutari* play by the ear, or – more precisely – by soul. Thus they end up playing well-known tunes just as they hear them, adding something, changing, since they do not read scores. Furthermore, they take delight in being capable to play without music sheets and to learn very quickly any piece of music, only by hearing it.

Although *lăutari* seem solidary when it comes to talking about their musical abilities, yet they are competitive between themselves because finding a job, for example to play at a gig, or perhaps to secure a contract for recording an album, is perceived as a difficult task. The consequent rivalry among musicians can lead to misunderstandings, jealously or can

even produce bitterness. There is a tendency to treat "music as grounds for competition"[62] and the reason to constantly improve the technique because "after all, a lăutar's survival depends on music-making, which in turn depends on work – "engagements".[63]

As mentioned appreciating their musical mastery is extremely important for *lăutari*, especially when it comes from professional, i.e. trained in conservatoires, non-Gypsy musicians. Hence they actively seek any forms of boasting by professional musicians: alleviating (in their own eyes) their own position as musicians *lăutari* willingly play then with non-Gypsy musicians during official concerts. Also the stories about non-Gypsy instrumentalists praising Gypsy musicians have been widely spread. Such famous instances of acknowledging *lăutari*'s musicianship by non-Gypsy virtuosos have been known since the 19th century. For example, the story has it that when in 1847 Franz Liszt (1811-1886) was touring Transylvania and Moldova, he was taken aback and impressed by a Romanian *lăutari* band under the lead of the violinist Barbu. Apparently when in Iaşi Liszt improvised a song on the piano, and Barbu Lăutaru – having heard the tune for the very first time in his life –was able to repeat it without any modifications on his violin. Supposedly marvelled Liszt was only able to exclaim: "Drink Barbu, my master, drink. For God made you an artist and you are greater than me!".[64] The story was especially popularized in the interwar period by several Romanian authors.[65] More than one hundred years later a similar story was perpetuated in Kraków in respect to a Gypsy blind violinist Stefan Dymiter called Corroro (1938-2002), who played in the city streets with his band. The well – known anecdote has it that during a visit to Kraków a famous violinist Yehudi Menuhin (1916-1999) was stunned by Corroro's virtuosity and wanted to play on his violin but apparently could not – due to the tricks done to his violin by the Gypsy. The meeting of two great violinists of the 20th century – one performing in concert halls, the other one in the streets, one being Jewish, the other Gypsy, apparently resulted in Menuhin's remark: "Well, Stefan does not know Menuhin, but Menuhin knows Stefan".[66]

As shown them being a Gypsy musician is, in a sense, connected with a privileged position not only because they are appreciated by their own community but also since they are usually "treated with respect by all also by non Roma".[67]

'Double Identity' of Gypsy Musicians

Gypsy musicians remain active agents in the constructing their own identity, constantly being aware both of their ethnic and musical identification. This 'double identity' helps them to negotiate their own position as they are engaging "in a variety of discourses of cultural difference with others both outside and within their own ethnic group in their presentation of self".[68] In fact construction of their Gypsy identity is connected with their attempts to stress "cultural difference as they seek both to blur as well as to clarify the boundaries between themselves and other groups in society".[69] For example on the one hand Gypsyness is manifested, e.g. in the name of the groups, like Mahala Rai Banda (rai stands for a master, a man proud to be Gypsy), but on the other hand even the members of this particular band never dress in a Gypsy way for their concerts, but simply try to wear nice clothes in respect for the listeners, as any musicians would do. The position of Gypsies as musicians is then never assumed once for all, fixed and immutable, but rather constantly in the state of flux, almost fluid, "performed rather than given, hybrid, and transgressive in norms".[70] The 'double identification' – as Gypsies and as musicians enables them to associate with those more socially powerful and distance from those with less power, as well as "enhance their market niche and status".[71] Furthermore, as revealed among others in interviews, Gypsy musicians "attempt, through diverse types of communication and social posturing, 'to control the impression' that others have of them",[72] including their listeners as well researchers.

Accordingly not only *lăutari* but also people close to them, their friends "explain that professional success in the lăutărie involves the same principles as negotiating, repairing and inventing".[73] Hence one of the most treasured trait of their personality is an agility of mind, described sometimes as cleverness.[74] Astutely exercised cultural difference communicated through diverse means and behaviours enables Gypsy musicians to take control of their image and helps them manipulate the impression that others might have of them.[75] Thus achieved marginality is clearly "embedded in power relations, whether symbolic or real"[76] because Romani musicians play with the borders of ethnicity in order to sustain their position as musicians, but they also haze the boundaries between themselves and other Gypsies. For example they allow non-Gypsy members to enter their bands as Gypsy urban musicians define their Gypsyness not only vis-à-vis the outside world, but also try to establish

limits and relations within their own group. Gypsyness is negotiated between Romany themselves as they usually acknowledge members of Zigeunerkapellen as exceptional musicians. Gypsy musicians find themselves in a situation when they need to answer the question who (at least for them) constitutes their own emotional community (to draw on the idea developed by Max Weber): the Romany community or gadze musicians they play with? While contemporary people choose who they want to be linked with and thus create neo-tribes based on the sense of affectual spatiality, I would argue that for Romany the most important role is still played by the emotional community indebted in their extended family and circles of relatives and friends. But in case of Gypsy musicians this becomes more complicated. They often say in public: "We are not Gypsies", because they do not wish to be identified with the stereotypical image of dirty, lazy or begging Gypsies, although they are still extremely proud to say that they are Gypsies referring to their ancestors[77] and talk about their Indian heritage.[78] In Romania, *lăutari* sometimes try to "keep under wraps the fact that they are Roma" and actually deny being Roma (unconvincingly) justifying themselves with their inability to speak Romany. Sometimes, they differentiate between being Roma and Gypsy saying that they are Gypsies (but not Roms).[79] Speranța Rădulescu concludes that "the lăutari refuse to be called Roma, definitely preferring the appellative 'Gypsies'".[80]

The Question of Gypsy Style: Musical Identity of Gypsy Musicians

The double identification of Gypsy musicians can be, perhaps to the best degree, explained by their musical choices: the repertoire, and style of execution that are both thought of as emanations of Gypsy (ethnic) character, and at the same time of purely musical virtuosity. I will argue that the 'double identity' is indeed revealed in the music played by Gypsy musicians, i.e. in the way they comprise their repertoire and approach musical components, finally how they interpret musical compositions combining, as if in the light of their 'double identity', elements of Gypsyness and musicianship.

Gypsies easily adapt various cultural codes and "cultivate multiple cultural repertoires"[81] not only in the realm of music but also in reference to clothing or linguistics, etc. Gypsies have always tried to adjust to

local environments, by accepting such 'extrinsic' cultural traits[82] without internalizing them. These qualities would essentially remain "products of the historical vicissitudes [...] external to the core of the group's cultural heritage".[83] As musicians they have predominantly been supplying entertainment to the general public. Hence Gypsy musicians have traditionally resorted to already known tunes, reusing familiar melodies stemming either from popular songs or artistic compositions, basing on well- established musical structures and easily recognizable rhythms. Gypsy musicians have learnt how to adjust swiftly to the needs of dominating societies. Consequently the music they perform by no means can be called avant-garde as "its purpose is no longer that of inventing a code but rather that of checking it".[84] For example in eastern Europe Gypsy bands happily play Johannes Brahms' renowned *Hungarian Dances* that became associated with Gypsy culture already in the 19th century.[85] In Spain – where flamenco is assigned the privileged, almost an iconic position – Gypsy musicians have willingly performed it in the streets, and their culture became even treated as flamenco's "clearest symptoms".[86] So it can be said that Gypsy musicians attune to the needs of their listeners, skilfully choosing their repertoire in line with their status as entertainers but at the same time they craftily play out their ethnic associations by selecting compositions linked by non-Gypsy listeners with the imagined, highly romanticised Gypsy world.

Following this principle, Gypsy urban musicians have mastered the art of seducing their public by playing musical pieces already appreciated by the listeners. They have learned how to engage in the art of flirting with their audience as revealed in the choice of their repertoire. The success of the above mentioned Zigeunerkapellen enjoying huge popularity in the 19th century eastern European cities, resulted from, amongst others, phenomenal talent of Gypsy musicians to adapt themselves to the varied tastes of the recipients of this music. In fact it was already a well-known fact within Hungary already in the 18th century[87] that having monopolised (as performers) the music market, Gypsies easily assimilated popular forms, adapting themselves to the public expectation. Working under pressure as well as being stimulated by the ambience of the moment Gypsies were able to live up to the demands placed before them and to fulfil the requests of their audience. Combining fashionable fragments of works loved by the public with creative fantasy, Gypsies transformed old melodies into something of their own fashion, quite often improvising.[88] Many Gypsies gave these ad hoc created compositions makeshift titles derived from

the surnames of the individual who had hummed its main motif, etc. In fact Gypsy musicians have always drawn from a mixture of sources: not only certain elements come from various geographical locations but they can be traced over the past at least two hundred years. This results in the specific amalgam of elements that is sometimes described as 'Gypsy music' – i.e. multi instrumental or vocal-instrumental music attributed to Gypsy musicians performing mainly in urban spaces of eastern Europe often in festive situations, (e.g. concerts). It differs depending on the region, for example the entire repertoire of the urban Gypsies of Romania is most often referred to as muzica lăutărească or music of the lăutărs. And also *lăutari* "continuously remodel their music, either form the impulse to bring it into line with their own modernized aspect, or (especially in the recent times) out of their professional necessity to satisfy all those who expect them to perform it in one fashion or another".[89] For example Mahala Rai Banda plays a whole array of styles and genres, combining the sound of violins with accordions and a brass section.[90] It can be said that the repertoire this band plays meets the external needs and is, in fact, the immediate answer to them. However, it is the contemporary sponsors – producers who create the demand, thus shaping the modern sound of present-day Gypsy bands. The pressure comes from technology, and it is now not rare that *lăutari* play with loud amplifications, they try to adapt to new market situation by "frantically searching through their inventory of solutions taken from lăutărească music, pan-Balkan mongrel musics, Gypsy movies soundtracks, western pop and world bands….".[91] They are often associated with manele music considered as not advanced, even simplistic.[92] But some Gypsy musicians, like Ioniță would argue that manele – music commonly met across the Balkans (Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Albania) and debated for the last ten years alas with no definite conclusion – should be looked at as purely musical phenomenon rather than being associated with the folklore of criminal suburbia. He says that this type of discourse on manele as performed by Gypsies only feeds the negative stereotype of a Gypsy as a bandit. And again Ioniță is ready to blame producers, not musicians, for promoting such a pejorative image of this music, saying that sustaining certain status quo helps producers and DJs earn more money.[93] But a similar situation can be found in Poland: Gypsy musicians of 21st century adopted for example the style called Disco Polo: a sub-genre of Euro Disco, modelled upon Italo Disco, but deeply rooted in Polish folk tradition. Disco Polo is heavily criticized by many opponents (mainly media), who say that it has little to do with

folk music despite claims to the contrary, and represent rather bad taste aiming to please the masses. Performed by Gypsy musicians, with lyrics referring to Gypsy camp life, it is sometimes known as Gypsy Disco Polo and mercilessly mocked at despite its significant popularity.

As the cases of manele and Gypsy Disco Polo prove for Gypsy musicians it is still extremely important to adapt to new styles and fashions, to interact with the listeners, but also to be progressive. Gypsy musicians are always open to news and novelties because as Ioniță says they know that "the fashion comes from Milan".[94] In other words they understand they have to be innovative and flow with the mode in order to be competitive.

While caring about their musicianship, Gypsy musicians never forget about their Gypsyness. But since Gypsy music – as already mentioned – is drawn from a mixture of sources, tracing these elements is a very complex task because the process of their mixing has occurred over the last more than one hundred and fifty years. Moreover, "Gypsies attach great importance to the style of interpretation", something they call "Gypsy style".[95] Yet it is extremely difficult to determine what 'style' would mean here: the choice of the repertoire as such, or rather its execution, to be precise the manner in which it is performed.[96] I propose to interpret Gypsy style as both deviation, i.e. "one of the possible interpretations of particular features" and as a choice, where particular musical features and gestures are combined according to the preferred taste of a given Gypsy musician, where the selection of these elements ultimately stands for the name 'Gypsy style'.[97] For example, Gypsy musicians carefully choose tunes they play only to treat them later as a starting point for further elaboration: they perceive the melody as a combination of small segments which they freely reassemble depending on several factors such as to what degree given motifs can appear catchy to listeners, or whether certain passages are too difficult to play, or take into consideration their compatibility with motifs taken from other sources, etc.

While it is almost impossible to determine what Gypsy style means, there are some characteristic features of music performed in Gypsy style. For example, in case of *muzica lăutarescă* the melodic quality draws from a number of sources but

> the formal and rhythmic structure of this music, and consequently of the dances, appears to draw mostly from Romanian folk sources which, again, may have already been heavily influenced by a combination of Gypsy, Turkish, Western European, and Romanian folk elements. Added

to this is the particular style of melodic as well as rhythmic phrasing and expression which seems to have been retained from elements in the music of the nomadic Gypsies.[98]

The harmonic system that provides the substructure for these melodies is a unique adaptation of the Western European harmonic system which accommodates the very special requirements of a melodic system heavily influenced by Turkish melodic types.[99] Not only is then Gypsy music "full or ornaments, with intricate, chiefly minor harmonics",[100] but also these harmonies are often described as unconventional, yet warm and delicate in character. Ioniță – himself a *lăutar* par excellence – says that a lot of harmonies heard in romantic music of Frederic Chopin can be compared to those encountered in muzica *lăutarescă*.[101] To sum up, what generally characterizes music performed by Gypsies – according to Gypsies themselves – is

> profuse ornamentation, shocking harmonization, rich in minor chords, free recombination of musical segments of various origins, substantial remodelling of the melodic outline of the executed pieces, insertions of elements from Balkan and Oriental styles, an excessively 'poignant' interpretation.[102]

However, what both Gypsies and non-Gypsies would underline about Gypsy style of playing is the emotional character of the performance. For Gypsy musicians music enables them to interact with other people – Gypsy and gadze alike. For example for Ioniță the Gypsy style equals with the attitude to music making, which is not only hidden in the repertoire, but in the way it is performed: music making must be joyful both for the performers and listeners as Gypsy musicians are always playing with their souls.[103] Moreover, Gypsy musicians see themselves as "emotion makers".[104] Yet, as long as "to an etic culture, it seems reasonable, even normal" to play music full of most intimate emotions to listeners coming from other cultures, "to a traditional emic mentality there may be something shocking about making goods for cultures other than one's own".[105] Are then Gypsy musicians "soul –vendors" or is playing in Gypsy style more a strategy adapted by Gypsy musicians to sustain the sense of authenticity in the music they perform?

Authenticity, or in fact the search for authenticity, is one of the central categories to be considered while talking about identities. As everyday life

becomes so "stretched and fragmented" to the degree that it is impossible to define which processes and routines create the identity, it is essential for Gypsy musicians to maintain the sense of their own identity.[106] Bearing in mind that "one of the main issues associated with expressive identities is the idea that the contemporary world does not allow sufficient room for self-expression and development in the context of some form of supposedly authentic communal belonging",[107] authenticity of Gypsy musicians who possess 'double identity' as Gypsies and as musicians becomes of crucial importance. They are authentic to the degree they are allowed – both as musicians limited by being Gypsies (e.g. in their choice of repertoire) and as Gypsies who are musicians (e.g. enjoying better social status, etc).

The Future of Gypsy Musicians

My proposal concerning the 'double identity' of Gypsy musicians takes into consideration the "play of difference within identity position which are articulated through a dialogue between their constituent parts" and acknowledges the fact that identities can be defined against others, or in relation to them, as well as "across an uncertain gap between identity and non-identity and in the recognition of that gap".[108] Gypsy musicians seem to embrace their own ethnicity and the sense of everyday job as musicians playing at the same time with both – they paradoxically "keep themselves distinct while appearing to assimilate".[109] They even adapt this strategy during interviews conducted with them by researchers: on the one hand they avoid the straightforward answers to the questions concerning their ethnicity and their musicianship, yet they also – already unasked – repeat and perpetuate certain positive clichés about Gypsies and Gypsy musicians.[110] Most importantly though, it seems to me that being a Gypsy musician is still considered today prestigious enough for the next generations of Gypsies to continue this tradition of music making. Aurel Ioniță, for instance, not without real father pride, talked to me about his sons attending musical Academy in Bucharest.[111] Also in Hungary or Poland there are more and more Gypsy musicians who graduate from music conservatoires and successfully pursue professional careers as musicians. Perhaps the 'double identity' of Gypsy musicians is a key factor enabling them resilient adaptation to various conditions and changing circumstances. And indeed these young, highly educated musicians of Romany origin not only "wish to be heard"[112] literary, i.e. musically but also want their voice to be heard in the larger context.

NOTES

1   An expression "The Roma wish to be heard" is cited from: Garth Cartwright, 'Among the Gypsies', *World Literature Today*, Vol. 80, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2006), p. 53.

2   I am predominantly using in my paper the word 'Gypsy' rather than 'Romany' for at least two reasons. First of all musicians simply identify themselves as Gypsies (not Roms), and secondly while using the denomination 'Gypsy' I want to stress the continuity of Gypsy music making tradition, the one that came to fame in Europe in the late 18th century exactly under the name 'Gypsy'.

3   Kevin Hetherington, *Expressions of identity. Space, Performance, Politics*, London: Sage, 1998, p. 21.

4   See for example Jerrold Seigel, *The Idea of the Self*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

5   Costin Moisil, 'Problems of identity in the Orthodox Church Music in Transylvania', *New Europe College Ștefan Odobleja Program Yearbook 2012-2013* (2014), p. 129.

6   Mihai-Vlad Niculescu, 'Emphatic Meeting. From ad intentional to and Exceptional Model of Phenomenological Intersubjectivity", *New Europe College Yearbook 1998-1999* (2001), p. 249.

7   Michel Maffesoli, *The Time of the Tribes*, London: Sage, 1996.

8   Costin Moisil, 'Problems of identity in the Orthodox Church Music in Transylvania', op. cit., pp. 125-146.

9   Speranța Rădulescu, *Taifasuri* despre *muzica țigănească*/*Chats about Gypsy Music* (versiunea engleza Adrian Solomon) Bucuresti: Paideia, 2004, p. 185.

10 Ervin Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, New York: Anchor Books, 1959, pp. 17-71.

11 István Horváth, 'State, Minorities and Identity Aspects Related to Romania's Hungarian Minority', *New Europe College Yearbook 2000-2001* (2003), p. 275.

12 Sandra Wallman, 'Identity options', in: Charles Fried (ed.), *Minorities: Community and Identity*, Berlin: Springer, 1983, p. 75.

13 Gary Bridge, Sophie Watson, 'City Difference', in: Gary Bridge, Sophie Watson (eds.) A *Companion to the City*, Oxford, UK; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, p.256.

14 Carline Walker Bynum, *Metamorphosis and Identity*, New York: Zone Books, 2001, p. 164.

15 István Horváth, 'State, Minorities and Identity Aspects Related to Romania's Hungarian Minority', op. cit., p. 276.

16 Kevin Hetherington, *Expressions of identity. Space, Performance, Politics*, op. cit., p. 49.

17 Costin Moisil, 'Problems of identity in the Orthodox Church Music in Transylvania', op. cit., p.129.

18 Sandra Wallman, 'Identity options', op. cit., p. 76.

19 Kevin Hetherington, *Expressions of identity. Space, Performance, Politics*, op. cit., p. 62.

20 Orlando Patterson, 'The Nature, Causes, and Implications of Ethnic Identification', in: Charles Fried (ed.), *Minorities: Community and Identity*, Berlin: Springer, 1983, p. 26.

21 Gheorghe-Alexandru Niculescu, 'The Material Dimension of Ethnicity", *New Europe College Yearbook 1997-1998* (2000), p. 217.

22 Sandra Wallman, 'Identity options', op. cit., p. 76

23 Orlando Patterson, 'The Nature, Causes, and Implications of Ethnic Identification', op. cit., pp. 27-28.

24 Kevin Hetherington, *Expressions of identity. Space, Performance, Politics*, London: Sage, 1998, p. 25.

25 Gary Bridge, Sophie Watson, 'City Difference', op. cit., p. 258.

26 Mihai-Vlad Niculescu, 'Emphatic Meeting. From ad intentional to and Exceptional Model of Phenomenological Intersubjectivity", *New Europe College Yearbook 1998-1999* (2001), p. 256.

27 Kevin Hetherington, *Expressions of identity. Space, Performance, Politics*, op. cit., p. 21.

28 Gábor Fleck and Cosima Rughinis (eds.), *Come Closer: Inclusion and Exclusion of Roma in Present-Day Romanian Society*, Bucharest: Human Dynamics, 2008, p. 9-10.

29 Carol Silverman, "Negotiating "Gypsiness": Strategy in Context', *The Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. 101, No. 401, 1988, p. 263.

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31 Orlando Patterson, 'The Nature, Causes, and Implications of Ethnic Identification', op. cit., p.26.

32 Margaret H. Beissinger, 'Occupation and Ethnicity: Constructing Identity among Professional Romani (Gypsy) Musicians in Romania', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Spring, 2001), p. 26.

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35 Margaret H. Beissinger, 'Occupation and Ethnicity: Constructing Identity among Professional Romani (Gypsy) Musicians in Romania', op. cit., p. 28.

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37 Robert Garfias, 'Dance among the Urban Gypsies of Romania', *Yearbook for Traditional Music*, Vol. 16, 1984, p. 87.

38   Carol Silverman, 'Negotiating "Gypsiness": Strategy in Context', op. cit., p. 269.

39   Markian Prokopovych, 'From Gypsy Music to Wagner without a Transition? The Musical Taste of the Budapest Urban Public in the Late Nineteenth Century', in: Sven Oliver Müller, Philipp Ther, Jutta Toelle and Gesa zur Nieden (eds.) *Oper im Wandel der Gesellschaft: Kulturtransfers und Netzwerke des Musiktheaters im modernen Europa*, Vienna, Cologne and Weimar: Oldenbourg and Böhlau, 2010, p. 69.

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42   Julie Brown, 'Bartók, the Gypsies and the Hybridity in Music', in: Georgina Born, David Hesmondhalghm (eds.), *Western Music and its Others. Difference, Representation, and Appropriation in Music*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, p. 130.

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46   Robert Garfias, 'Dance among the Urban Gypsies of Romania', op. cit., p. 87.

47   Margaret H. Beissinger, *The art of* the *lăutar. The epic tradition of Romania*, op. cit., p. 17

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50   Viorel Achim, *Tiganii in istoria Romaniei* [Gypsies in the history of Romania], Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 1998, p. 128.

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54   Thomas McEvilley, *Art and Otherness. Crisis in Cultural Identity*, New York, McPherson & Company, 1992, p. 57.

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56   C a group of Gypsy musicians from Romania (2003). See: Speranța Rădulescu, *Taifasuri* despre *muzica țigănească /Chats about Gypsy Music*, op. cit., p. 234.

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58   An interview with the leader of Mahala Rai Banda – Aurel Ioniță (violinist and composer) conducted by Anna G. Piotrowska on 10th November 2014 in Bucharest (translation Olga Bartosiewicz).

59   Oscar Comettant, *La musique, les musiciens et les instruments de musique chez les différents peuples du monde*, Paris: Michel Levy Freres, 1869, p. 283.

60   He actually said he would an ass/donkey to call himself so.

61   An interview with Constantin Fărâmita from Bucharest, a Gypsy fiddler and bassist (2002). See: Speranța Rădulescu, *Taifasuri* despre *muzica țigănească /Chats about Gypsy Music*, op. cit., p. 227.

62   Victor Alexandre Stoichita, *Fabricants d'émotion* [Emotions makers], Nanterre: Société d'ethnologie, 2008, p. 216.

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65   See: Constantin Bobulescu, *Lăutarii noștri. Din trecutul lor* [Our lăutari. From Their Past], București: Tip. Națională Jean Ionescu & Co, 1922 and Octavian Beu, *Franz Liszt în țara noastră* [Franz Liszt in our country], Sibiu: Kraft și Dortleff, 1933, p. 23.

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68   Margaret H. Beissinger, 'Occupation and Ethnicity: Constructing Identity among Professional Romani (Gypsy) Musicians in Romania', op. cit., p. 26.

69   Ibidem, p. 26.

70   Gary Bridge, Sophie Watson, 'City Difference', op. cit., p. 256.

71   Margaret H. Beissinger, 'Occupation and Ethnicity: Constructing Identity among Professional Romani (Gypsy) Musicians in Romania', op. cit., p. 26.

72   Ibidem, p. 26.

73   Victor Alexandre Stoichita, *Fabricants d'émotion*, op. cit., p. 213.

74 Sharon Bohn Gmelch, 'Groups that Don't Want In: Gypsies and Other Artisan, Trader, and Entertainer Minorities', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 15, 1986, p. 314.

75 See: Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959, pp. 8 and 15.

76 Gary Bridge, Sophie Watson, 'City Difference', op. cit., p. 257.

77 Speranța Rădulescu, *Taifasuri* despre *muzica țigănească*/*Chats about Gypsy Music*, op. cit., p. 195.

78 An interview with the leader of Mahala Rai Banda – Aurel Ioniță, op. cit.

79 An interview with an elderly Gypsy musicians (2000). See: Speranța Rădulescu, *Taifasuri* despre *muzica țigănească*/*Chats about Gypsy Music*, op. cit., p. 220.

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83 Carol Silverman, 'Negotiating "Gypsiness": Strategy in Context', op. cit., p. 267.

84 Paolo Prato, 'Music in the Streets: The Example of Washington Square Park in New York City', op. cit., p. 151.

85 Anna G. Piotrowska, *Gypsy music in European culture: from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century* (translated by Guy R. Torr), Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2013, pp. 217-218.

86 Jaume Martí-Olivella, 'Textual Screens and City Landscapes: Barcelona and the Touristic Gaze', *Chasqui*, vol. 34, Special Issue no. 2: Cinematic and Literary Representations of Spanish and Latin American Themes, 2005, p. 81.

87 Bence Szabolcsi, *A Concise History of Hungarian Music*, Budapest: Corvina Press, 1964, p. 56.

88 Bálint Sárosi, *Folk Music. Hungarian Musical Idiom* (translated by Marina Steiner), Budapest: Corvina Press, 1986, p.152.

89 Speranța Rădulescu, *Taifasuri despre muzica țigănească*/*Chats about Gypsy Music*, op. cit., p. 214.

90 An interview with the leader of Mahala Rai Banda – Aurel Ioniță, op. cit.

91 Speranța Rădulescu, *Taifasuri despre muzica țigănească*/*Chats about Gypsy Music*, op. cit., p. 207.

92 Manele is a pseudo-oriental musical style popular in the Balkan countries especially often performed by non Roma artists and enjoyed by many people but also heavily criticised especially for the lyrics.

93 An interview with the leader of Mahala Rai Banda – Aurel Ioniță, op. cit.

[94] Ibidem.

[95] Speranţa Rădulescu, *Taifasuri despre muzica ţigănească/Chats about Gypsy Music*, op. cit., p. 212.

[96] Valentina Sandu-Dediu, 'Common Subjects in Musical Rhetoric and Stylistics. Aspects and Proposals', *New Europe College Yearbook 1996-1997* (2000), pp. 381 and 385. Since the 16th century style in music has been conceptualized as "the manner", but a new understanding of the idea of style was suggested by Guido Adler (*Der Stil in der Musik*, 1911) as he treated style as "an assemble of those features that bring together works of a certain historical period".

[97] Ibidem, pp. 377 and 380.

[98] Robert Garfias, 'Dance among the Urban Gypsies of Romania', op. cit., p. 86.

[99] Ibidem, p. 86.

[100] An interview with a group of Gypsy musician form Cluj (2003). See:Speranţa Rădulescu, *Taifasuri despre muzica ţigănească/Chats about Gypsy Music*, op. cit., p. 237.

[101] An interview with the leader of Mahala Rai Banda – Aurel Ionita, op.cit.

[102] An interview with Costică Lupu, a Gypsy fiddler from Botoșani (2003). See: Speranţa Rădulescu, *Taifasuri* despre *muzica ţigănească/Chats about Gypsy Music*, op. cit., p. 241.

[103] An interview with the leader of Mahala Rai Banda – Aurel Ionita, op. cit.

[104] Victor Alexandre Stoichita, *Fabricants d'émotion*, op. cit., p. 215.

[105] Thomas McEvilley, *Art and Otherness. Crisis in Cultural Identity*, op. cit., p. 91.

[106] Kevin Hetherington, *Expressions of identity. Space, Performance, Politics*, op. cit., p. 69.

[107] Ibidem, p. 70.

[108] Ibidem, p. 25

[109] Carol Silverman, 'Negotiating "Gypsiness": Strategy in Context', op. cit., p.273.

[110] Speranţa Rădulescu, *Taifasuri* despre *muzica ţigănească/Chats about Gypsy Music*, op. cit., pp. 195 and 198.

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TINCA PRUNEA-BRETONNET

Née en 1976, à Cluj-Napoca, Roumanie

Doctorat de philosophie, Université Paris IV-Sorbonne
Thèse : *L'avènement de la métaphysique kantienne. Recherche sur l'interprétation ontologique de Kant*

Chercheur en philosophie, CERPHI ENS Lyon et IRH, Université de Bucarest

Bourse post-doctorale, IZEA, Halle-Saale, 2015
Bourse ENSAFE, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, 1999 - 2001
Bourse d'étude *Tempus* à l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, département de sciences politiques, 1997

Participation à des colloques et congrès de philosophie en France, Italie, Allemagne, Canada, Luxembourg, Roumanie

Auteur d'articles et études sur la philosophie de Kant, les Lumières allemandes (Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, l'Académie de Berlin, Maupertuis), la philosophie allemande au XXe siècle (Heidegger, la réception de la philosophie critique, la phénoménologie)

ACQUISITION DE LA VERTU ET ÉDUCATION DE LA RAISON. KANT ET CRUSIUS SUR LA PHILOSOPHIE MORALE

Résumé

Cet article se propose d'interroger l'influence de la pensée de Ch. A. Crusius sur la philosophie pratique de Kant. En partant du concept de raison commune et partageant la conviction que la vertu peut et doit être enseignée, les deux auteurs élaborent une doctrine éthique où la raison pratique prime explicitement sur la raison théorique et l'acquisition de la vertu est considérée comme le but la vie de l'homme. Kant se familiarise assez tôt avec la morale crusienne, détaillée surtout dans l'ouvrage *Instruction pour une vie raisonnable*, et elle jouera un rôle déterminant dans l'articulation de sa propre conception, tant dans la période précritique, qu'après 1781. Afin de situer plus précisément cette parenté, nous avons choisi comme fil conducteur la question de la formation à la vertu qui permet de mettre en lumière les points communs, les affinités, mais également les différences irréductibles entre les deux penseurs.

Mots clé : philosophie pratique, raison pratique, vertu, éducation, morale, révélation, autonomie.

Kant prend connaissance assez tôt des écrits du philosophe et théologien Christian August Crusius (1715-1775). Très connu à l'époque, ce dernier est le plus redoutable et prolifique adversaire du wolffianisme. Il provient du courant anti-mathématisant de Ch. Thomasius (1655-1728) et A. Rüdiger (1673-1731), tout en ayant un penchant revendiqué pour la théologie chrétienne à laquelle il se consacre entièrement après 1752.

Crusius connaît en profondeur les oeuvres de Wolff et la polémique contre ce dernier décide de l'articulation même de ses propres écrits – il élabore un système dirigé thème par thème contre Wolff. Ce qui lui permet, certes, de saisir les faiblesses et les contradictions de ce dernier

et de trouver de nouveaux angles d'attaque, mais qui, en même temps, influence profondément sa propre manière de penser : post-wolffien tout autant qu'anti-wolffien, Crusius apprend de Wolff, au moins autant que de ses maîtres, la rigueur et l'exhaustivité dignes d'une doctrine philosophique solide et déterminante. L'on peut sans doute parler aussi d'une indiscutable « contamination » au niveau doctrinal, et l'étude passionnante de cet aspect de leur relation reste encore à faire[1]. Les exégètes s'accordent à considérer le rôle de la critique crusienne de Wolff comme décisive pour le déclin du wolffianisme[2]. Elle représentera une alternative à ce dernier pendant de longues années et jouira d'une longévité indiscutable dans l'enseignement universitaire (à Königsberg, par exemple, jusqu'à la fin des années 1770[3]).

Kant vient en contact assez tôt avec les écrits de Crusius et sa réflexion philosophique en reçoit l'influence déjà en 1755. À l'époque il fréquente et connaît précisément un texte crusien paru à Leipzig en 1743, *Dissertatio philosophica de usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis, vulgo sufficienti*[4]. La *Nova Dilucidatio* discute en détail les thèses développées par Crusius dans cet écrit et reprend la critique de la suprématie du principe de contradiction dans la philosophie wolffienne. Au début des années 1760, Kant prend connaissance également des grandes oeuvres de Crusius qui constituent la *philosophische Enzyklopädie*, à savoir l'*Éthique* (*Anweisung vernünftig zu leben*, Leipzig, 1744), la *Métaphysique* (*Entwurf der nothwendigen Vernunft-Wahrheiten, wiefern sie den zufälligen entgegen gesetzet werden*, Leipzig, 1745) et la *Logique* (*Weg zur Gewissheit und Zuverlässigkeit der menschlichen Erkenntniss*, Leipzig, 1747). À partir de 1752, Crusius, devenu deux ans plus tôt professeur *ordinarius* de théologie à Leipzig, se consacrera exclusivement à la théologie et, à l'exception de quelques allusions ou brèves reprises de ses thèses philosophiques dans des écrits exégétiques – et surtout de sa critique plus dure cette fois du wolffianisme, décrit comme « *eine verkehrte Philosophie* » –, il ne s'intéressera plus à la philosophie en tant que telle. Il continuera en revanche de jouer un rôle considérable sur la scène philosophique de l'époque. Par exemple, sa doctrine est recompensée indirectement par l'Académie de Berlin, au moins à deux reprises, d'abord en 1755 quand son disciple fidèle A. F. Reinhard reçut le prix pour un mémoire sur l'optimisme, et en 1764 quand fût distingué le texte kantien sur la question de l'évidence[5].

Dans une lettre à Borowski de 1760[6], Kant écrit vouloir garder la *Métaphysique* de Crusius encore quelque temps, pour en approfondir

la lecture, avant de se procurer un exemplaire. Il est légitime de situer la fréquentation plus assidue et plus complète des oeuvres de Crusius au début des années 1760 et de lier étroitement le développement de la réflexion kantienne de l'époque à certains postulats centraux qu'il y rencontre. La pensée de Crusius et ses prémisses lui étaient familières grâce à la lecture antérieure de la dissertation *De usu*, mais l'image d'ensemble et les articulations plus fines et plus diversifiées de cette philosophie alternative au wolffianisme lui deviennent accessibles et cohérentes uniquement à partir de 1760. À l'impulsion et à l'inspiration crusiennes, s'ajoute désormais une distance critique plus marquée et un regard plus autonome philosophiquement. Toutefois, son admiration pour Crusius reste presque intacte en 1762, et Kant, qui avait l'habitude de le nommer depuis la *Nova Dilucidatio* (1755) « l'illustre Crusius », « ce grand homme », « le très célèbre Crusius », un des « philosophes les plus perspicaces de notre temps »,[7] lui rend un hommage appuyé dans une note de la *Preisschrift de 1764* :

> J'ai trouvé nécessaire de faire mention ici de la méthode de cette nouvelle philosophie. Elle est en peu de temps devenue si célèbre, elle a aussi, par rapport à une meilleure explication de bien des connaissances, rendu un service si incontestable, que cela aurait été une grave lacune de la passer sous silence, là où il est question de la métaphysique en général [8].

L'accent tombe ici sur la méthodologie, où la doctrine de Crusius joue en rôle considérable à l'époque. Toutefois, plusieurs de ses thèses influencent profondément et durablement Kant, et cela dans des domaines aussi différents que la morale, la métaphysique, la théologie naturelle ou la philosophie de la religion, ainsi que la méthodologie philosophique. C'est probablement à Crusius que Kant emprunte trois des thèses les plus constantes et décisives de sa pensée : la limitation constitutive de l'entendement humain, qui ne saurait dépasser ses bornes en direction de la connaissance des choses telles qu'elles sont, le statut à jamais secondaire de la raison théorique par rapport à la raison pratique, et la distinction radicale entre l'ordre logique et l'ordre réel et l'impossibilité de passer du premier au deuxième.

Nous voulons ici regarder de plus l'éthique crusienne et son importance dans la formation de la doctrine critique. Certaines idées de Crusius sont déterminantes pour Kant non seulement dans la période précritique quand ce dernier, philosophe éclectique indépendant, qui analyse

différentes doctrines de son temps et élabore une synthèse non dépourvue d'originalité, lit, s'approprie et se situe par rapport au système crusien ; mais également après 1781, quand paraît la première édition de la *Critique de la raison pure* et même juqu'à la fin des années 1790. Nous avons choisi pour cela le fil conducteur de l'instruction ou de la pédagogie morale telle qu'elle est pensée par les deux philosophes. Précisons d'emblée que si l'on peut parler chez Kant d'une véritable doctrine pédagogique, élaborée selon des étapes précises propres à la formation du petit homme et ordonnée au but ultime qui est l'atteinte de l'autonomie pratique, la conception de Crusius sur cette question ne constitue pas l'objet d'une réflexion unitaire et explicitement structurée en vue de l'éducation des enfants. Néanmoins, son principal ouvrage d'éthique se présente comme une instruction positive en vue d'une vie vertueuse, comme un manuel destiné au perfectionnement moral de l'homme, et, plus précisément, comme un cours de philosophie pratique. Aussi, la visée de nos deux auteurs, certaines de leur convictions profondes, et parfois les moyens employés sont comparables, voire similaires. Crusius est avec Wolff[9] l'un des maîtres décisifs du jeune Kant et plusieurs aspects de cette influence indiscutable demeurent présents dans toute la pensée critique.

I. Crusius

Raison saine et révélation

L'ouvrage de Crusius consacré à la morale porte le titre *Instruction pour une vie raisonnable* (*Anweisung, vernunftig zu leben*)[10] et est publié en 1744 à Leipzig. Premier tome de son sytème philosphique, cet ouvrage est en fait un manuel, destiné autant à l'enseignement universitaire qu'à l'instruction personnelle.

Élaboré à partir de ses cours et situé explicitement dans le prolongement des doctrines de Rüdiger et Hoffmann[11], il propose une synthèse des perspectives contemporaines propres aux « sciences morales ». Malgré la modestie affichée, cette synthèse est significative pour l'époque, et Crusius démontre, dans ce domaine aussi, son don pour la systématisation des théories existantes dans un tout cohérent, clairement exposé et assez novateur : « Les vérités morales sont toutes aussi vielles que le monde. Il est vain de vouloir en dire quelque chose de tout à fait nouveau », mais il y a toutefois des « points sur lesquels je me flatte d'apporter aussi, par

ce texte, une contribution à l'amélioration et au perfectionnement des inestimables sciences morales » (*Préface*, 42)[12].

Crusius prend comme point de départ le concept central de « raison saine », *gesunde Vernunft* ou encore *recta ratio*. Commun à l'époque et présent encore chez Kant, ce concept désigne ici une raison consciente de ses limites, qui se fonde sur l'expérience et évite de se lancer dans des spéculations métaphysiques[13]. Assez répandue à l'époque est également l'idée que cette raison est capable de distinguer ce qui est vrai et utile dans différentes doctrines et de négliger ce qui ne l'est pas, en synthétisant les points positifs. Ce sera le concept privilégié par la *Populärphilosophie*. Crusius, tout en partant de ce concept, parle dans l'*Anweisung* aussi d'une raison « purifiée »[14] ou *gereinigt* qui se fonde sur la vertu.

La morale est, selon lui, une partie de la « sagesse naturelle » propre à l'homme, mais on ne saurait se contenter de cet état premier. En effet, chez la plupart des hommes, qu'ils soient éduqués ou non, régit une grande confusion à propos des règles utiles, des vérités morales, des lois naturelles ou civiles, des devoirs et autorisations. On remarque ici la distinction entre l'érudition – qui n'est pas d'un grand secours en morale – et la philosophie pratique qui relève d'abord d'une faculté autre que l'intellect. Comme Kant plus tard, Crusius cite ici les savants qui ne sauraient se dispenser de consulter et de s'approprier tel ouvrage d'éthique :

> Quel être d'intelligence simplement moyenne n'exprime pas, de temps à autre, les plus belles pensées morales, les sentences et les règles les plus utiles ? Rassemblons en même temps en notre esprit toutes ces vérités morales exprimées de façon isolée : tout ce que les sages sont capables de dire dans un système moral s'y retrouvera certainement une million de fois. Seuls la clarté, l'ordre, la certitude et la complétude, l'intelligence des fondements et la cohérence des vérités morales se retrouvent à un degré très inférieur chez la plupart des hommes ; et ceci se rencontre même dans les écrits des personnes les plus savantes, à un point tel qu'on peut encore constamment y ajouter beaucoup de choses (*ibid.*).

D'où le but explicitement pédagogique de son ouvrage, subordonné à cette exigence méthodologique qui, par des concepts tels l'ordre, la clarté, la certitude, la complétude et la mise en lumière des raisons premières, s'inscrit sans nul doute encore dans le projet wolffien – ou plutôt dans la réélaboration par Wolff du projet cartésien – dominant toute la moitié du XVIIIe siècle :

Le but de mon livre, d'après lequel sa publication doit être jugée, est le suivant : il faut qu'on puisse en retirer une vue d'ensemble claire et convaincante sur tout le système de la philosophie morale et sur ses fondements vrais et immuables ; *qu'un débutant puisse, avec son aide, arriver pour ainsi dire, à penser moralement et à progresser sans maître ;* que ceux qui auraient lu, çà et là, beaucoup d'écrits sur la morale sans y avoir distingué le vrai du faux, le douteux du certain, l'obscur de l'évident, puissent aussi bien ordonner leurs pensées que découvrir les sources de leur conviction (*ibid.*, 42-43, je souligne).

Toutefois, plusieurs concepts sont particulièrement mis en lumière, car c'est autour d'eux que s'articule la philosophie pratique de Crusius : il s'agit en premier lieu de la liberté, de l'obligation et de la conscience. Leur importance est décisive et l'auteur insiste sur la nécessité de bien clarifier leur emploi, ainsi que les preuves ou démonstrations de leur concept et de respecter les limites de notre entendement qui ne peut pénétrer les raison dernières des choses. Avant de procéder à l'exposition de sa doctrine, Crusius élabore un dernier point, peut-être le plus significatif ici et celui qui le séparera à jamais de Kant. Il identifie les devoirs qu'impose la morale avec les devoirs et les vérités de la religion chrétienne. Les deux types de vérités sont fondés en la raison saine, mais à cause de la nature déchue de l'homme – et l'auteur invoque ici sa « corruption » (*ibid.*, 47) –, il s'avère nécessaire de les répéter, de les ordonner de manière systématique. Les Écritures jouent toutefois dans sa conception un rôle primordial et indispensable : c'est uniquement grâce à la révélation que l'on obtient l'accès aux vérités fondées en raison. La raison humaine n'est nullement autonome chez lui, mais a donc besoin du préalable de la révélation pour discerner les devoirs moraux : « sans la révélation divine, les hommes ne parviendraient même pas aux plus importantes vérités parfaitement fondées en raison. […] Cela fournit plutôt une preuve puissante de l'origine divine de l'Écriture sainte et que ses auteurs exposent l'édifice le plus parfait de la morale rationnelle, en dépit de l'absence fréquente de preuves et de cohérence systématique » (*ibid.*) C'est pourquoi toute doctrine païenne ne saurait être plus qu'un « commencement » de philosophie pratique, un avant-goût de ces vérités « les plus importantes » et « les plus démontrables par la raison » que seul le christianisme ouvre à l'homme.

Nous rencontrons ici l'une des thèses fondamentales de Crusius : la compatibilité de la morale rationnelle avec la révélation, donc la cohérence de la foi et de la raison et l'accomplissement de cette dernière

dans une foi raisonnable par excellence. Cette homogénéité se fonde, on le constate, sur la révélation qui joue le rôle premier tant selon la *ratio essendi* que selon la *ratio cognoscendi*. Elle rend possible non seulement l'intelligence des vérités morales, mais donne aussi – fait crucial – la force de respecter les devoirs, de mettre en pratique les exigences morales.

Si la foi dépasse et accomplit la démarche de la raison, elle ne le fait nullement *contre* celle-ci, « puisque aussi bien les vérités de la raison que les révélées cohabitent dans l'entendement divin, elles ne peuvent pas se contredire. Encore moins peuvent-elles contredire le penchant de la conscience qui est une sorte de révélation naturelle de la volonté divine » §278 254/342. La foi et la raison avancent ensemble jusqu'au point où, ses limites atteintes, la raison s'arrête, sans heurt, sans dépossession ni humiliation. Le passage est doux, homogène, car ce qui dépasse la raison, ne s'y oppose pas, mais l'achève :

> la révélation doit cependant aller plus loin que la raison. C'est pourquoi on ne doit y voir aucune difficulté quand elle comporte des mystères insondables, parce que dans la philosophie elle-même la connaissance de Dieu et toute la doctrine des esprits, la doctrine de la nature elle-même, se dissolvent en fin de compte dans le mystère et apparaissent ainsi les limites de notre raison (§ 279, 255/343).

La philosophie pratique crusienne est donc d'emblée intimement liée à la religion et le développement de sa pensée renforcera et approfondira cette communauté où, selon la sensibilité véritablement théologique de l'auteur, Dieu est le commencement et la fin de toute « vie raisonnable » : il est « source et fidèle soutien de la vertu » (*ibid.*, 54). Ces « instructions » en vue d'atteindre la vertu et de la perfectionner ne feront qu'élaborer et ordonner cette conviction.

Sans pouvoir entrer dans tous les détails de son manuel d'éthique, dont l'exposition exigerait une étude à part, rappelons brièvement sa structure, afin de pouvoir ensuite regarder de plus près quelques thèmes centraux qui se rapportent directement à la conception kantienne. L'opposition à Wolff se manifeste d'emblée dans la composition de l'éthique qui est divisée de cinq parties : la thélématologie ou théorie de la volonté, l'éthique au sens restreint, la théologie naturelle, le droit de la nature et la doctrine de la prudence.

Vertu et éducation de la volonté

Crusius fixe comme but principal de la vie humaine l'acquisition de la vertu. En cela il se démarque non seulement de la tradition qui le précède et qui considérait la félicité (*Glückseligkeit*, *Wohlsein*) comme le but de la moralité, mais aussi de la doctrine de Wolff pour lequel l'atteinte de la perfection était la vocation de l'homme. Crusius reconfirme l'importance des deux autres fins mais leur confère un rôle secondaire, subordonné à la vertu comme seule « fin principale » de notre existence et, en cela, anticipe la doctrine kantienne : « La fin de Dieu dans cette vie est la vertu. […] nous tomberions dans des difficultés insolubles si nous voulions accepter une autre fin de la vie humaine visée par Dieu que la *formation, le renforcement et l'exercice de la vertu* » (§§213, 216, 204-206/257-260, je souligne). Le bonheur est pour lui, tout comme pour Kant plus tard, une espérance en ce don libre de Dieu, un état dont il faut se rendre digne[15], et nullement un effet mécanique de l'accomplissement du devoir.

Nous venons au monde avec des dons non développés, à l'état potentiel, avec des facultés qui sont « brutes et non élaborées » (§216, 206/261). La nature aurait caché à l'homme ses trésors et ses secrets, et c'est pourquoi il est nécessaire de fournir « des dures peines et labeurs », des efforts soutenus afin d'affirmer ses facultés, d'acquérir des connaissances et surtout de former sa volonté afin de parvenir à la vertu. Il définit la vertu comme étant « un accord de l'état d'esprit moral avec la loi divine ; elle consiste donc, d'après son concept exhaustif, en une aptitude à observer tout ce qui est conforme à la perfection essentielle de Dieu, de nous-mêmes et de toutes les autres choses par obéissance à la volonté de Dieu » (§175, 182/218). Si le fait de fonder la vertu sur la volonté et le commandement de Dieu transforme cette conception en une « *theologische Moralphilosophie* », comme la nommera plus tard Kant qui s'en démarque à cause de son hétéronomie, Crusius établit une distinction cruciale pour l'articulation ultérieure de la pensée pratique kantienne. Il s'agit de la distinction entre la forme et la matière d'une action : est moral ce qui est accompli par pure obéissance à Dieu. C'est donc l'intention profonde qui représente la *forme* et fonde ou non la moralité. Elle nous permet de qualifier de morale une action : si la *forme* est l'intention d'obéir à la volonté de Dieu, on a affaire à un act moral, tout autre mobile reste en dehors de la vertu, quelle que soit le contenu de l'action elle-même, à savoir la *matière* constituée des « faits et gestes considérés en eux-mêmes ».

Crusius partage donc la conviction que la vertu s'enseigne et s'acquiert, même s'il peut y avoir des données de départ qui sont inées, et c'est pourquoi il élabore cette *Instruction*. Sa doctrine morale se fonde sur la primauté de la volonté qui est, selon lui, la faculté ou le pouvoir fondamental (*Grundkraft*) en l'homme. La volonté prime aussi sur l'entendement qu'elle peut motiver, guider, obliger à trouver des mobiles ou au contraire des excuses pour soutenir la direction qu'elle aura décidée d'elle-même[16]. C'est pourquoi la formation de la volonté est le but de notre vie ; c'est par elle que la vertu peut être acquise. Sans entrer dans le détail des classifications assez élaborées que Crusius propose, précisons seulement qu'au sein de la volonté nous distinguons une « faculté fondamentale » en l'homme, à savoir la liberté. Pure spontanéité et activité, et parfaitement capable de dominer les désirs et les passions en vue d'obéir au commandement divin, la liberté est définie comme : « le plus haut degré de l'activité grâce à laquelle cette volonté peut d'elle-même commencer une action, l'orienter et l'interrompre de nouveau » (§41, 85/50). Elle est censée devenir la faculté dominante en l'homme, selon le plan originel de Dieu, ordonner aux autres facultés – dont l'entendement – et s'en servir afin de mener une vie vertueuse.

Il est essentiel de rappeler ici la différence radicale qu'institue Crusius entre la causalité à l'oeuvre dans la nature et le type de causalité qui régit la vie morale. L'établissement de cette distinction cruciale a toujours été l'un des buts principaux de son oeuvre philosophique et a fait l'objet de sa première dissertation, très connue à l'époque, *De usu et limitibus principii rationis determinantis, vulgo sufficientis* (Leipzig, 1743). Il s'agissait de limiter l'emploi du principe de raison suffisante[17] tel que défini par Leibniz et Wolff à la causalité naturelle, sous peine de tomber dans le déterminisme et dans le fatalisme. Crusius rebâptise ce principe « le principe de raison déterminante » et l'accuse de nouveau dans l'*Instruction* d'introduire « une nécessité absolument invariable en toute chose » (§ 47, 90/59). D'où la véhémence avec laquelle il combat son usage dans la philosophie pratique et l'insistance sur la liberté comme étant la caractéristique essentielle de l'homme – des thèses que Kant étudie et s'approprie dès les années 1750 et qui influeront de manière décisive sur sa pensée : la chaîne causale qu'amorce tout acte libre demeurera radicalement différente de ce qui se produit dans l'ordre phénoménal.

Si Crusius parle d'une formation à la liberté, d'une maîtrise des désirs et d'une éducation de la volonté, cela doit s'accompagner également d'une éducation de l'entendement, sans lequel la volonté serait aveugle

(§5, 58/7). De même, livré à lui-même, l'entendement devient le jouet des désirs. Dans l'homme toutes les facultés doivent donc concourir à la réalisation de la volonté de Dieu et cela sous la direction de la liberté. On ne retrouve pas chez Crusius la tension, voire le conflit, que discernera Kant en l'homme, entre, d'un côté, ses penchants charnels et, de l'autre, le devoir moral qui s'y oppose radicalement tout en devant être choisi pour lui-même, contre les désirs. Crusius n'est pas le penseur de la dualité dans l'anthropologie, mais celui de l'harmonisation et de la moralisation des facultés et des désirs grâce à l'exercice de la vertu. Les désirs et les passions seraient « accidentels » par rapport à la nature raisonnable propre à l'homme en tant que créature à l'image de Dieu ; ils peuvent et doivent être transformés[18] au sein d'une vie raisonnable grâce au pouvoir de la volonté vertueuse[19].

Toute éducation morale part toutefois d'un penchant fondamental, qu'il appelle « le penchant à la conscience morale » et qu'il identifie à « une sorte de révélation naturelle de la volonté de Dieu » (§§132-135). Grâce à ce penchant, qui constitue le « fondement de la conscience morale », nous savons à chaque fois qu'elle décision serait morale et nous reconnaissons une loi morale divine. Cette immédiateté de la loi morale se retrouvera d'une certaine manière dans le « fait de la raison » que postule Kant. Toutefois, il demeure nécessaire, selon Crusius, d'affirmer notre volonté, de l'habituer à toujours choisir le bien afin de mener une vie « raisonnable ». Et cela uniquement par amour et obéissance envers Dieu, à l'exclusion de tout autre mobile : « Toute notre volonté et nos actions doivent être par conséquent subordonnées à l'obéissance et à l'amour de Dieu. […] On peut donc concevoir le concept déterminé de la vertu comme une faculté d'aimer Dieu par-dessus tout comme notre Seigneur suprême et reconnaître que nous y sommes tenus » (§§240-241, 225/295).

Les conseils pratiques qu'indique Crusius dans l'*Instruction* ne sont pas nombreux. S'il postule, comme dans sa métaphysique, la nécessité de prendre en compte l'expérience et la sensation, le rapport aux situations concrètes et aux cas précis demeure assez vague. Il pointe une nécessité plus qu'il n'élabore lui-même la manière de s'y conformer. Mentionnons toutefois le rôle important consacré aux considérations morales à propos des événements déjà produits, dans les livres ou bien dans la vie quotidienne (§289, 261/353). La réflexion et l'analyse des cas précis, permettent, selon lui, d'éduquer notre entendement et notre imagination, ainsi que notre discernement moral qui devient capable de mobiliser des mobiles adaptés quand la situation se présente à nous. Kant insistera à son

tour sur l'utilité de réfléchir sur des exemples d'actions et se prononcer sur leur caractère moral.

Néanmoins, on constate ici que le rôle du maître ne revêt aucunement la même importance que chez Kant dans la formation morale de l'homme. L'*Instruction* en revanche est explicitement pensée et structurée de telle manière qu'elle permette la formation morale et l'acquisition de la vertu par l'éducation de la volonté sans le concours d'un maître.

II. Kant et l'acquisition de l'autonomie

Kant affirme à plusieurs reprises la nécessité d'apprendre aux enfants à penser et cela dès un âge relativement jeune. De quoi s'agit-il exactement ici ? Il ne saurait parler en premier lieu de la spéculation abstraite, de la philosophie théorique, car elle est à peine accessible aux étudiants. En effet, la pensée par soi-même pose, selon lui, des difficultés redoutables même pour le jeune adulte qui entre à l'Université, car « au terme de sa scolarité, [… il] était habitué à *apprendre* » (*ibid.*). C'est ce qui entraîne parfois l'échec de l'enseignement universitaire et explique le vernis de sagesse qui cache l'immaturité de l'entendement et le manque d'autonomie d'un diplômé qui n'a acquis au cours de ses études qu'un semblant de science, à savoir une connaissance *historique* de cette science – selon une distinction célèbre que Kant emprunte à Wolff – et non une connaissance rationnelle, philosophique qui mobilise l'usage de ses propres facultés[20]. D'où aussi la difficulté de s'émanciper des diverses tutelles qui gardent l'homme dans la commodité trompeuse de la minorité[21]. Bien que l'instruction de l'entendement demeure l'une des visées de l'éducation, l'enjeu principal, pour Kant, se situe ailleurs : dans la moralisation de l'homme, qui s'accompagne ou non de l'érudition. Même très savant, l'homme est susceptible de passer à côté de sa destination véritable, de ne pas devenir une personne morale.

La tâche principale de la pédagogie – qui comprend et dépasse l'instruction – sera donc de former le petit homme à l'autonomie, non seulement celle de la pensée théorique, mais d'abord celle de l'agir moral. Elle doit lui enseigner la vertu, non comme on enseigne un savoir tout prêt ou un savoir-faire, mais en amorçant la réflexion et le mouvement d'introspection par lesquels on prend en souci son devenir moral et l'on accède à la liberté. Si l'accomplissement de cette tâche est confié à l'espèce et s'étend sur des générations, sa mise en oeuvre revient dès maintenant

au maître qui forme – et non seulement informe – les enfants, les aide à désirer être meilleurs et à le devenir. L'éducation seule fait que l'homme devienne homme et selon Kant, « il n'est que ce que l'éducation a fait de lui »[22]. Or l'enjeu principal est de parvenir à penser par soi-même. C'est ce cheminement kantien dans lequel une liberté se conquiert que nous voulons regarder de plus près ici, et plus précisément l'échange rationnel par lequel le maître guide le petit homme vers l'apprentissage de la vertu.

Raison commune et agir moral

La réflexion kantienne consacrée à la pédagogie du penser par soi-même est plurielle et se trouve élaborée dans plusieurs textes, parfois assez hétérogènes, dédiés explicitement soit à l'éducation, soit à la philosophie morale, soit plus particulièrement à la discipline nouvelle qu'est à l'époque l'anthropologie. D'où la difficulté de regrouper et d'analyser ensemble des pensées qui s'originent sans doute dans une inspiration unique et relèvent d'une conception cohérente, mais revêtent néanmoins des formulations distinctes, sinon à première vue contradictoires. Elles sont parsemées dans des écrits au statut divers : soit publiés par Kant dès son vivant dans les *Druckschriften*, soit édités par ses proches, tel le cours de pédagogie édité par Rink en 1803, soit demeurés à l'état manuscrit, à l'exemple des réflexions du *Nachlaß*. Toutes convergent en revanche pour soutenir qu'il est nécessaire d'aider les enfants à penser par eux-mêmes et font de cet apprentissage l'étape essentielle, voire le but même, de l'éducation.

Cette étape se fonde sur plusieurs moments préalables que Kant détaille dans ses leçons de pédagogie traduites en français sous le titre *Réflexions sur l'éducation*. Sans pouvoir entrer ici dans le détail, on se doit néanmoins d'en parler brièvement. Malgré des frontières quelque peu mouvantes et pas toujours limpides, comme les commentateurs l'ont souligné[23], Kant distingue trois parties principales de l'éducation : les soins, la discipline et l'instruction avec formation. Les deux dernières sont parfois réunies sous le nom de « culture » et comprises comme ses dimensions négative et, respectivement, positive. Les soins assurent la survie et sont dispensés dès la naissance afin d'éviter que les enfants fassent « un usage nuisible de leurs forces » (*RE*, 441, 93). La discipline doit elle aussi commencer « très tôt » et a un rôle simplement négatif bien qu'absolument indispensable : fixer des bornes et aider l'homme à s'arracher à ses penchants animaux et à accéder ainsi à son humanité. D'où les célèbres formules : « la discipline transforme l'animalité en humanité », et sa définition comme

« l'acte par lequel on dépouille l'homme de son animalité » (*RE*, 94-95). Elle s'applique aussi bien à l'entendement qu'à la volonté.

L'instruction, enfin, est positive et comprend l'éducation physique (qui comporte également une dimension négative, liée au soin), l'éducation intellectuelle (qui ne saurait se passer de discipline) et la culture morale. Il est intéressant de rappeler que d'autres textes, telle l'*Anthropologie Friedländer*, séparent cette dernière de l'instruction et en font une quatrième étape, qui reprend d'une certaine manière toutes les autres, à savoir celle du développement de la raison et de son pendant le caractère[24]. On pourrait ordonner de manière chronologique les trois moments de l'instruction, qui présupposent dans une certaine mesure aussi l'avancement en âge et le développement progressif et concerté des facultés : à l'éducation du corps, dispensée en premier, s'ajoute à l'âge scolaire, la « culture de l'âme », dans sa double dimension intellectuelle (appelée aussi « culture physique de l'esprit ») et morale. Toutefois, et Kant le souligne, ces moments s'interpénètrent : tout comme l'éducation du corps se poursuit après le début de l'école, la culture morale proprement dite doit elle aussi commencer « tôt », voire « dès le début » selon les leçons de pédagogie, en tout cas en même temps que l'éducation physique. La *Critique de la raison pratique* conseille de dispenser l'enseignement moral dès « la première jeunesse » (*frühe Jugend*), à savoir dès l'âge de dix ans[25]. Son terme est fixé vers la seizième année, quand l'éducation en général perd de son efficacité[26].

Sans sa dimension morale, l'éducation ne saurait être complète[27], affirme Kant. L'enfant doit devenir non seulement un être instruit, habile et prudent ou civilisé, mais également, voire par-dessus tout, un être moral, c'est-à-dire capable de discerner les raisons de l'action et de choisir le bien pour lui-même. Kant est ferme sur ce point :

> L'homme peut ou bien être simplement dressé, dirigé, mécaniquement instruit, ou bien être réellement instruit. L'éducation n'est pas encore à son terme avec le dressage ; en effet il importe avant tout que les enfants apprennent à penser (*RE*, 450/112).

Avant de pouvoir penser par lui-même en matière de philosophie théorique, le petit homme peut et doit commencer à réfléchir aux questions morales, aux principes dont devraient découler ses actions ; en somme, il doit s'engager dans ce cheminement vers l'autonomie de l'agir moral.

La possibilité de faire appel à la raison de l'enfant – avant et même indépendamment du développement de l'entendement et de sa capacité à spéculer – est justifiée grâce au concept de « raison humaine commune ». Cette dernière est propre à tout homme, abstraction faite de son instruction, et cela dès son enfance. Elle permet, en principe, à l'homme de distinguer ce qui est bien de ce qui est mal et pourrait presque se passer de toute considération philosophique :

> L'on pouvait même bien supposer déjà d'avance que la connaissance de ce qu'il appartient à tout homme de faire, et par conséquent encore de savoir, doit être aussi le fait de tout homme, même du plus commun. Ici l'on ne peut point considérer sans admiration combien, dans l'intelligence commune de l'humanité, la faculté de juger en matière pratique l'emporte en tout point sur la faculté de juger en matière théorique[28].

Ce qui ne veut toutefois pas dire que l'on peut se contenter du discernement spécifique à la raison commune et la laisser se développer seule, sans intervention extérieure, et à son rythme. Selon Kant, on ne saurait aucunement s'en tenir là : l'innocence de la raison commune, aussi louable qu'elle soit, n'est pas en mesure de se prémunir contre les séductions extérieures, ni surtout de résister aux puissants penchants charnels[29]. Bien au contraire, l'homme sent en lui « une puissante force de résistance » face aux règles du devoir, et va jusqu'à élaborer des arguments sophistiques pour justifier son opposition, de sorte que la raison humaine commune, si elle veut agir en accord avec la moralité, se voit obligée de « sortir de sa sphère et faire un pas dans le champ d'une philosophie pratique » (*FMM*, 109). Son but est alors de « recueillir sur la source de son principe, sur la définition exacte qu'il doit recevoir en opposition avec les maximes qui s'appuient sur le besoin et l'inclination, des renseignements et de claires explications, de sorte qu'elle se tire d'affaire en présence de prétentions opposées et qu'elle ne coure pas le risque, par l'équivoque où elle pourrait aisément tomber, de perdre tous les vrais principes moraux » (*ibid.*).

C'est donc grâce à la philosophie – pratique – que l'on parvient à éveiller l'attention de la raison quant aux principes moraux, qui bien que se trouvant déjà en elle, doivent toutefois être discernés. Il est donc nécessaire de *cultiver* cette faculté : la réponse appropriée au besoin légitime, entièrement pratique et décisif de la raison est en fin de compte donnée grâce à la philosophie : « Ainsi se développe insensiblement

dans l'usage pratique de la raison commune, quand elle se cultive, une *dialectique* qui l'oblige à chercher secours dans la philosophie » (*ibid.*).

Ce secours, l'éducateur se doit déjà de l'apporter à l'enfant d'une manière bien précise et adaptée à son âge et c'est dans ce sens que l'on peut parler d'un « philosopher avec l'enfant ». Tel Socrate, affirme Kant dans les *FMM*, le maître devrait « rendre la raison attentive à son principe », sans y rajouter rien de nouveau. De plus : on peut constater très tôt un vif intérêt pour les problèmes pratiques, un penchant, voire un plaisir à justement « cultiver » sa raison quant aux questions morales. Il s'avère par conséquent déterminant de tirer profit de cette tendance à examiner des exemples concrets et à exercer ainsi son jugement, même quand ils sont très subtiles. Avant d'être mûrs pour la spéculation (*Speculation*), dès l'âge de dix ans (*CRPr*, 155), les enfants sont capables de réfléchir sur des problèmes pratiques et même de devenir, selon Kant, « très perspicaces » dans le discernement des degrés d'importance morale que revêtent certaines actions précises. Précisons bien qu'il s'agit ici d'une raison « qui n'a pas encore été guidée » et qui avance prudemment en réfléchissant uniquement sur ce qui se produit. Par conséquent, non d'une raison spéculative, mais « d'une raison pratique dans son économie et dans sa direction ».

Le deuxième concept déterminant que Kant mobilise dans ce contexte est celui de disposition naturelle. L'homme aurait en lui des dispositions naturelles qui ne se développent pas spontanément, d'où l'importance cruciale de l'éducation. Sa tâche serait de développer ces « germes » ou dispositions au bien[30] et de « déployer » ainsi « l'humanité », c'est-à-dire, selon Kant, « de faire en sorte que l'homme atteigne sa destination ». Toutes les dispositions au bien seraient données à l'homme dans une sorte de latence, de potentialité ; il lui appartient de les développer, de les achever. Selon une conviction que l'on retrouve chez Rousseau, l'homme – contrairement à l'animal doté d'instincts – doit se faire lui-même : « Il n'est que ce que l'éducation fait de lui » (*RE*, 443/98). D'où la grandeur et la difficulté de la tâche de l'éducateur :

> S'améliorer lui-même, se cultiver lui-même, et s'il est mauvais, développer en lui-même la moralité, c'est là ce que doit faire l'homme. Or quand on y réfléchit mûrement, on voit combien cela est difficile. C'est pourquoi l'éducation est le plus grand et le plus difficile problème qui puisse être posé à l'homme[31] (*RE*, 446/104).

Comment éduquer la raison

Comment faut-il alors s'y prendre ? Malgré quelques hésitations ou flottements, sur lesquels nous allons nous arrêter, la pédagogie du penser par soi-même est intimement liée à la figure de Socrate. Et cela dès les *FMM*, qui invoquent déjà la manière « socratique » de procéder (« comme le faisait Socrate », *FMM*, 106). Il y est question, comme on l'a vu, « de rendre attentive » la raison au principe qui se trouve déjà en elle, « sans y rajouter rien de nouveau ».

Dans le même sens, Kant met l'éducation de la raison en relation avec ce qu'il nomme le procédé socratique dans ses leçons de pédagogie. Ce texte a l'avantage d'en donner une image générale en énumérant les traits essentiels ; c'est pourquoi il est intéressant de le citer plus longuement :

> Il faut procéder socratiquement dans l'éducation de la raison. Socrate en effet, qui se nommait lui-même accoucheur des connaissances de ses auditeurs, nous donne dans ses dialogues […] des exemples de la manière dont on peut, même s'il s'agit de gens âgés, conduire l'élève à tirer beaucoup de choses de sa propre raison. Il n'est pas nécessaire en beaucoup de points d'exercer la raison des enfants. Ils ne doivent point ratiociner sur toutes les choses. Ils n'ont pas à connaître les principes de tout ce qui doit les éduquer convenablement ; en revanche dès qu'il s'agit du devoir, les principes doivent être portés à leur connaissance. Mais il faut ici bien prendre garde de ne pas leur inculquer des connaissances rationnelles, mais de faire en sorte qu'on les tire d'eux-mêmes (*RE*, 477/160-161).

On le constate, Kant fait sienne uniquement la dimension maïeutique de la démarche socratique et rejette la théorie de l'anamnèse[32]. S'il s'agit bien pour le petit homme de retrouver en lui-même des connaissances aptes à diriger l'agir moral, de rendre conscients et agissants des principes et des concepts métaphysiques, ceux-ci ne sont nullement innés ni ne doivent être arrachés à l'oubli.

On retrouve donc ici les caractéristiques de la méthode détaillée dans les *FMM* : ne pas introduire de nouvelles connaissances, mais amener l'enfant à découvrir en lui-même le principe de l'action et à réfléchir par lui-même au devoir. Kant restreint le procédé à la moralité, seul domaine où l'enfant peut « extraire » de sa propre raison toutes les connaissances nécessaires. Il est inutile, voire nuisible, qu'il raisonne à propos de beaucoup de sujets, ainsi qu'à propos des principes éducatifs qui dirigent

l'action du maître, et il s'impose d'éviter d'anticiper sur les capacités de son âge. Ce n'est donc pas un entendement exercé et érudit qui est requis, mais une raison attentive à ce qui l'« habite ».

Kant poursuit en introduisant une distinction importante pour toute sa méthodologie éthique en général. Sans s'attarder sur la question, il distingue la méthode socratique de ce qu'il appelle la « méthode catéchétique » ou « catéchétique-mécanique » adaptée à l'enseignement « historique ». Ce dernier est fondé, on le sait, sur la transmission d'un contenu de connaissances devant être apprises – mécaniquement – sans la nécessité de les comprendre parfaitement, d'en expliquer les raisons et l'enchaînement, de les démontrer et sans bien entendu la possibilité de les déduire de sa propre raison. C'est à propos de la religion révélée que ce procédé catéchétique serait adapté, mais non, par exemple, de la religion universelle, rationnelle, où il est judicieux, selon lui, d'employer le procédé socratique. On le constate donc, la méthode catéchétique n'est pas ici considérée comme apte à apprendre à l'enfant à penser par lui-même, mais plutôt à acquérir des connaissances « extérieures » qui entraînent tout au plus la mémoire. En ce qui concerne le devoir moral, la meilleure manière de « porter à la connaissance » de l'enfant le principe de l'action demeure donc dans ce texte le procédé socratique.

C'est dans la deuxième partie de la *Métaphysique des moeurs*, dans la *Doctrine de la vertu*, que Kant revient sur ces deux méthodes et explicite leurs caractéristiques, même si d'une manière insuffisamment cohérente. Dès la *Préface*, il rapproche la méthode catéchétique du procédé employé par Socrate et les associe à la formation morale de l'élève : « [Le maître] s'efforce de former son élève de manière cathéchétique, socratiquement, au sujet de l'impératif du devoir et de son application à l'appréciation morale de ses actions »[33]. Plus loin, en revanche, au § 52, il opère plusieurs distinctions qui séparent les deux démarches et leur confère des tâches différentes.

Il appelle d'abord « *acroamatique* » ou, plus loin, *dogmatique*, l'exposé où seul le maître parle et les élèves écoutent, et « *érotématique* » l'enseignement où le maître pose des questions à propos des sujets qu'il souhaite apprendre aux enfants. Ce dernier procédé se divise à son tour en *dialogique* ou *socratique*, quand le maître « s'adresse à la raison » de ses jeunes disciples et qu'ils « échangent *réciproquement* questions et réponses »[34] (*MM*, 478/354), et en *catéchétique*, quand le maître fait appel uniquement à leur mémoire. Selon Kant, on ne saurait s'adresser à la raison d'une personne d'une manière autre que dialogique, et ici le

maître, dans son rôle « d'accoucheur des esprits » guide, tel Socrate, ses élèves à l'aide de questions. Sans leur donner de solutions toutes faites, il leur propose des cas précis qui leur permettent de découvrir en eux-mêmes la réponse appropriée. Cela rappelle la méthodologie éthique décrite dans la *CRPr* où il s'agissait d'examiner des exemples de conduite morale, des biographies en l'occurrence, afin d'exercer son jugement pratique (*Crpr*, 154/164). Par les questions qu'il pose à son tour, l'élève apprend au maître uniquement comment le guider de manière plus adaptée. Il ne fait que l'aider à perfectionner sa *méthode* et non à sonder ou à exercer à son tour sa raison. Le dialogue n'est donc jamais mené depuis des positions égales, et les questions du disciple ne sauraient avoir une signification et des conséquences comparables à celles du maître. Il est à noter que, d'après Kant, cette méthode peut être considérée comme apte à conduire la réflexion également dans d'autres domaines, telle la mathématique, car elle concerne aussi les jugements préliminaires et la logique.

L'instrument le plus important, et le premier, que le maître met à disposition de son élève est selon Kant le « catéchisme moral ». Ce catéchisme s'adresse à la raison commune et doit se plier aux exigences requises par un premier enseignement, c'est-à-dire tenir compte de l'âge de l'enfant[35], de l'état encore immature (« encore inculte ») de son esprit et éviter les formulations difficiles et trop subtiles. Toutefois – et ce fait pourrait étonner – la méthode socratique ne serait pas adaptée dans ce cas précis, affirme Kant, qui, afin d'illustrer son propos, propose un exemple textuel d'instruction morale positive, sous le titre *Fragment de catéchisme moral*. Comme l'élève n'est pas en mesure en définitive de poser des questions au maître et ne fait que répondre à celles qui lui sont posées, on ne saurait parler d'un procédé socratique. D'un autre côté, puisque, par ses questions, le maître s'adresse tout de même à la raison de l'enfant et en « dégage méthodiquement » les réponses, il ne s'agit pas non plus d'un procédé dogmatique. Kant semble élargir ici, en contradiction avec ses affirmations antérieures, la méthode catéchétique en lui conférant outre l'appel à la mémoire, la capacité à accéder aux principes mêmes de la raison de l'élève et à les en dégager – donc à apprendre à l'enfant à penser par lui-même et à l'éveiller à son autonomie, ce qui était auparavant, dans la *Doctrine* comme dans les leçons de pédagogie, la prérogative de la méthode socratique[36].

Il semble en fait plus approprié de parler ici, avec C. Piché, d'une « méthode mixte »[37], plus adaptée au commerce rationnel avec l'enfant, et moins d'un « mode d'enseignement catéchétique » comme le fait Kant, qui

de facto combine des éléments provenant des deux méthodes distinguées auparavant. Le fragment inséré dans le §52 de la *Doctrine* justifie cette approche. Kant commence en précisant que le maître « demande à la raison de l'élève ce qu'il veut lui enseigner », lui suggère au début les réponses et guide sa raison tout au long de l'échange (*MM*, 480/357). Il s'agit ici d'apprendre à l'enfant qu'il est en mesure de limiter et de maîtriser ses penchants par la raison et que c'est précisément en cela que réside sa liberté. Il parvient peu à peu à saisir que le mensonge est dégradant et rend indigne d'être heureux, que le bonheur ne saurait être préféré au devoir, mais qu'il faudrait s'en rendre digne et le transformer en espérance, en accomplissant son devoir et en obéissant à l'impératif moral[38]. Le but principal de ce catéchisme est de mettre en lumière la dignité de la vertu et le respect du devoir pour cette dignité même, et non pour d'autres mobiles. Quand cela a été développé à partir de la raison, le petite homme, soutient Kant, ne peut pas ne pas éprouver « la plus grande admiration pour les dipositions originelles qui sont inscrites en lui et dont l'impression ne s'estompe jamais » (*MM*, 483/361).

Par la suite, les pensées ainsi obtenues grâce aux questions devraient être « résumées[s] et consignée[s] en des formules bien précises qui ne puissent être facilement modifiées, et par conséquent il faut qu'elles soient confiées à sa *mémoire* » (*ibid.*, 479/356). C'est ce dernier requisit qui appartenait, on s'en souvient, à la méthode catéchétique au sens restreint et qui est ainsi repris dans la méthode mixte illustrée dans ce fragment de catéchisme. Kant revient de nouveau, et de manière appuyée, sur l'utilité décisive des examens casuistiques, dont l'effet le plus remarquable[39] serait le suivant : « ainsi, par de tels exercices, l'élève est amené, imperceptiblement, à prendre de l'*intérêt* à la moralité » (*ibid.*, 484/362). On voit ici Kant faire un pas de plus que Rousseau : le maître ne doit pas simplement déployer les dispositions naturelles, mais également dispenser une instruction morale, au contenu positif, qui permette à l'élève de saisir les principes et leur obéir.

Kant apporte ici une précision supplémentaire déterminante concernant la disposition que les leçons de pédagogie nommaient simplement « naturelle ». La *Doctrine de la vertu* parle d'une « disposition à certains concepts » (*MM*, 478/354) ou d'une « disposition rationnelle » (*MM*, 376/213) qui, développée par l'action du maître, fait prendre conscience à l'élève qu'il est capable de penser par lui-même. Et cette disposition est d'ordre métaphysique, affirme Kant. Ainsi, même si l'enseignement ou la méthode employée ne mobilisent pas des concepts métaphysiques ou

« scolastiques », le dialogue initié par le maître guide la raison vers des principes et des concepts métaphysiques qu'elle doit dégager et mettre au jour :

> Seulement, aucun principe moral ne se fonde en réalité, comme il arrive qu'on se l'imagine, sur un quelconque sentiment, mais il n'est en fait rien d'autre que de la métaphysique, obscurément conçue, qui, chez tout homme, est inscrite dans sa disposition rationnelle […]. L'exposé (la technique) peut fort bien ne pas en être métaphysique et il n'est pas nécessaire que la langue en soit scolastique, à moins qu'il ne veuille faire de son élève un philosophe. Mais la pensée doit nécessairement remonter jusqu'aux éléments de la métaphysique sans lesquels on ne saurait attendre, dans la doctrine de la vertu, ni sûreté, ni pureté, ni même espérer d'elle une quelconque influence (*ibid.*, 376/213).

En ce qui concerne le devoir, par conséquent, on ne saurait se passer de métaphysique, car il s'agit de purifier la loi morale de tout élément empirique, donc aussi de tout sentiment. L'enseignement de cette « remontée » jusqu'aux premiers principes est explicitement confié au maître. Kant invite même les « prétendus philosophes » à « commencer par s'asseoir sur les bancs de l'école » de la métaphysique s'ils souhaitent comprendre l'impératif du devoir et l'appréciation d'une action du point de vue moral.

La vertu est, comme on a pu le voir, susceptible d'être enseignée et nous avons là l'une des thèses fondamentales de la philosophie pratique de Kant. La vertu n'est pas innée, elle doit être acquise, et c'est précisément la raison pour laquelle elle peut et doit être enseignée. Ainsi, sa moralisation est la tâche la plus importante qui ait été confiée à l'homme. Toutefois, il ne suffit pas de l'exposer, d'en présenter les règles de manière dogmatique à un auditoire censé simplement les mémoriser mécaniquement. Dans l'apprentissage de la vertu, précise Kant, ni le dressage, ni la simple instruction ne sauraient suffire. La grandeur de la tâche du maître réside d'abord dans cet éveil à soi de la raison : à l'aide des questions, l'élève est guidé vers les principes de sa propre raison, il apprend à remonter par lui-même vers les mobiles de ses actions et vers la loi qui devrait en décider. Non seulement il prend par là conscience qu'il peut penser par lui-même, qu'il est un être autonome, puisque ces principes se trouvent déjà en lui ; mais aussi, par l'examen répété des différentes actions

morales, actuelles ou passées, siennes ou non, il exerce son jugement et par dessus tout, selon Kant, sa volonté[40]. La vertu se présente comme une science, affirme-t-il, et doit être enseignée systématiquement comme une doctrine, car « la faculté morale de l'être humain ne serait pas vertu si elle n'était pas produite par la *force* de la résolution dans le conflit qu'elle entretient avec des penchants qui font preuve d'une telle puissance pour s'opposer à elle ».

Cet échange rationnel avec le maître doit encourager l'enfant à cultiver et à exercer pratiquement sa vertu – à l'exemple des stoïciens que Kant convoque ici (*MM*, 477/353). Le rôle premier, insigne du maître dans la formation morale est bien résumé dans les *Réflexions sur l'éducation* : « Dans l'éducation tout dépend de ceci : il faut partout établir les bons principes et les rendre susceptibles d'être compris et admis par les enfants » (*RE*, 492/190). Il incombe maintenant à l'enfant d'appliquer de manière courageuse, vigoureuse et surtout – aspect malheureusement fort peu soulignée – *joyeuse* la vertu[41], car en cela consiste la seule voie d'obtenir la force[42] d'obéir au devoir et de suivre les règles que lui dévoile sa raison : « on ne *peut* pas derechef tout ce que l'on *veut*, si l'on n'a pas auparavant essayé et exercé ses forces » (*MM*, 477/354). Mais, en dernier ressort, il lui appartient de parcourir seul ce chemin et de fournir les « efforts pour combattre […] l'ennemi intérieur (de manière ascétique) » (*MM*, 477/353). Le maître guide sa raison vers les principes, lui propose des exemples et des cas précis qui exercent le jugement et affinent le discernement, mais une fois l'autonomie de sa raison mise au jour et affermie, le disciple est appelé à prendre en souci sa stature morale.

Revenons en conclusion au rôle – central chez Crusius – que doit jouer Dieu dans l'éducation morale. Selon Kant, il est indispensable de séparer les deux catéchismes, moral et religieux, et d'enseigner d'abord aux enfants le catéchisme moral en tant qu'instruction explicitant la doctrine « fondamentale des devoirs de vertu » (*MM*, 355/479). Ce n'est qu'une fois les principes moraux acquis, que l'on puisse passer à l'enseignement de la religion. La religion et la théologie se situent pour lui décidément au-delà des limites de l'éthique et c'est la raison pour laquelle elles ne sont pas incluses dans son ouvrage de philosophie pratique. Kant prend ici le soin de se démarquer de la tradition qui le précède immédiatement et affirme qu'il entend ne pas procéder à ce propos « comme c'était jusqu'ici l'usage » (*MM*, 369/488).

Dans les *Réflexions*, il est encore plus explicite et précise qu'il est « infiniment important d'apprendre aux enfants […] à haïr le vice non point seulement pour la raison que Dieu l'a défendu, mais parce qu'il est en lui-même haïssable »[43] (*RE*, 112/450). C'est donc la moralité qui doit précéder la théologie et Kant ne dérogera jamais de cette exigence. L'autonomie ne saurait être atteinte autrement qu'en accomplissant la loi morale pour la seule raison qu'il s'agit de la loi morale, immédiatement transparente à la raison. Aucune autorité extérieure à la raison pratique n'est acceptée. Néanmoins, afin de mieux saisir la complexité et les nuances de la pensée de Kant, et peut-être aussi, de relativiser la distance qui le sépare de Crusius, relisons également ici deux affirmations des *Réflexions sur l'éducation* qui font très probablement référence à l'*Instruction* : « Dieu est l'être le plus saint ; il ne veut que ce qui est bon et il exige que nous pratiquions la vertu en raison de la valeur qui lui est propre et non parce qu'il l'exige. […] La véritable manière d'honorer Dieu consiste à agir selon sa volonté et c'est ce qu'il faut enseigner aux enfants » (*RE*, 112/451, 194/495). Si le rapport à son prédécesseur semble ici critique et si Kant rejette au fond l'hétéronomie dont il accuse Crusius, on pourrait peut-être néanmoins se demander si une affinité plus profonde, une sensibilité commune ne sont pas en même temps mises en lumière dans ce passage.

Dans une conclusion audacieuse qui clot ses analyses consacrées à la morale kantienne dans la période précritique, J. Schmucker avoue son étonnement à la lecture de l'*Instruction* et affirme retrouver chez Crusius « presque toutes » les pensées fondamentales de l'éthique kantienne tardive, de même que des énoncés et des concepts que l'on considère d'habitude comme étant spécifiquement kantiens[44]. Si cette affirmation va peut-être trop loin, il est néanmoins certain que la philosophie pratique de Crusius a profondément marqué la pensée de Kant, qui gardera pour de longues années non seulement la trace de ses lectures crusiennes, mais également une parenté indiscutable avec la perspective morale de son prédécesseur.

NOTES

[1]   Cf. S. Carboncini-Gavanelli, « Ch. Aug. Crusius und die Leibniz-Wolffsche Philosophie », dans J. École (éd.), *Autour de la philosophie wolffienne*, Wolff G.W., III/65, Hildesheim, 2001, pp. 263-278.

[2]   Cf., par ex., l'introduction de G. Tonelli dans C. A. Crusius, *Die philosophische Hauptwerke*, t. I, Hildesheim, 1999, p. XX.

[3]   Cf. M. Oberhausen, R. Pozzo (éd.), *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse der Universität Königsberg (1720-1804)*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1999.

[4]   Ce texte sera traduit en allemand en 1744 par Chr. Fr. Krause et sera republié en 1766 avec des ajouts de Crusius et une préface de Chr. Fr. Pezold. Il a été réédité par S. Carboncini-Gavanelli et R. Finster dans C. A. Crusius, *Die philosophische Hauptwerke*, t. IV : *Kleinere philosophische Schriften*, Hildesheim, 1987.

[5]   Trois autres mémoires proposés pour l'année 1764 (No. 2, No. 13 et No. 25) font référence implicitement ou explicitement aux doctrines crusiennes, pour les soutenir ou s'en démarquer. Je remercie Paola Basso de m'avoir attiré l'attention sur ces écrits.

[6]   La lettre de Kant à Ludwig Ernst Borowski, du 6 juin 1760, *Correspondance*, p. 34.

[7]   Ak. I, 396 ; OP, I, 128.

[8]   Ak. II, 293n ; OP, I, 239.

[9]   Voir à ce propos, J. B. Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy : a History of Modern Moral Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1998, surtout le chapitre « Perfection and will : Wolff and Crusius », pp. 431 *sq.*

[10] Cet ouvrage a été traduit en français par L. Sosoe sous le titre *Instruction pour une vie raisonnable*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2007.

[11] Pour l'inscription de l'anthroplogie et de la philosopie morale de Crusius dans la lignée Thomasius-Rüdiger-Hoffmann, voir W. R. Jaitner, *Thomasius, Rüdiger, Hoffmann und Crusius. Studien zur Menschenkunde und Theorie der Lebensführung im 18. Jahrhundert*, Bleicherode a. H., 1939.

[12] La *Préface* est non-paginée dans l'édition allemande, c'est pourquoi le numéro indiqué renvoie ici uniquement à la page de la traduction française. Quand nous indiquons deux numéros, le premier renvoie à la version allemande, le deuxième à la traduction.

[13] Voir à ce propos l'excellent article de R. Ciafardone, « Ueber das Primat der praktischen Vernunft vor der theoretischen bei Thomasius und Crusius mit Beziehung auf Kant », *Studia Leibniziana*, 14/1982, pp. 127-135.

[14] L. Sosoe traduit ici « raison pure », ce qui nous met peut-être trop près du terme kantien ultérieur.

[15] Pour des détails, voir Schneewind, *op. cit.*, p. 453.

[16] Sur la distinction entre la volonté et l'entendement, voir Ciafardone, *art. cit.*, p. 133.

[17] Voir à ce propos, l'analyse que propose M. Benden dans son ouvrage *Christian August Crusius. Wille und Verstand als Prinzipien des Handelns*, Bonn, 1972, surtout pp. 21 *sq.*

[18] Voir à ce propos, Benden, *op. cit.*, pp. 224 *sq.*

[19] « l'homme est une fin ultime de Dieu dans le monde dans la mesure où il est une créature raisonnable, on ne prend pas en considération les pulsions animales, pour autant que d'autres raisons ne l'exigent pas, parce qu'elles sont accidentelles par rapport à la nature raisonnable », §181, 186/227.

[20] « C'est la raison pour laquelle il n'est pas rare de rencontrer des savants (à proprement parler des gens qui ont fait des études) qui montrent peu d'entendement, et c'est pourquoi les académies envoient par le monde plus d'esprits insipides que n'importe quel autre corps social », AK II, p. 306 ; OP I, p. 514.

[21] *Qu'est-ce que les Lumières ?*, AK VIII, p. 35 ; OP II, p. 209.

[22] *Réflexions sur l'éducation*, trad. A. Philonenko, Paris, 2000, p. 98. Il s'agit de la traduction des leçons de pédagogie de Kant publiées par Rink en 1803. Citées désormais *RE* ; conformément à l'usage, le premier chiffre renvoie à la page du tome IX de l'*Akademieaugabe* (AK), le deuxième à cette traduction.

[23] Sur les problèmes posés par les leçons de pédagogie publiées par Rink, voir W. Stark « Vorlesung - Nachlass - Druckschrift ? Bemerkungen zu *Kant über Pädagogik* », *Kant-Studien*, 91/2000 (*Sonderheft* 1), pp. 94-105, et L. Vincenti, *Éducation et liberté. Kant et Fichte*, Paris, 1992, p. 114 *sq.*

[24] L'*Anthropologie Friedländer* propose quatre étapes : « Die Erziehung der Kinder kann in 4 Epochen eingetheilt werden, dahin gehört die Entwickelung der Natur, die Leitung der Freiheit, die Unterweisung des Verstandes, und die Entwickelung der Vernunft und des Charackters », AK XXV.1, p. 723.

[25] *Critique de la raison pratique* (citée désormais *Crpr*), AK II, 277. Citée dans la traduction française de F. Picavet, Paris, 1997, p.165.

[26] « Combien de temps doit durer l'éducation ? Jusqu'à l'époque où la nature a voulu que l'homme se conduisît lui-même […] : c'est-à-dire environ jusqu'à la seizième année. Passé ce temps on peut bien mettre en oeuvre encore les ressources de la culture et une discipline secrète, mais on ne peut plus donner une éducation bien ordonnée », *RE*, 453/117.

[27] Voir à ce propos l'ouvrage de R. Aulke, *Grundprobleme moralischer Erziehung in der Moderne : Locke-Rousseau-Kant*, Berlin, 1999, pp. 140 *sq.* On y trouve une analyse détaillée du cours kantien de pédagogie publié par Rink, ainsi qu'une mise en perspective au XVIIIe siècle, comme son titre l'indique.

[28] *Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs* (cité désormais *FMM*), trad. fr. par V. Delbos, Paris, 1989, pp. 106-107.

[29] « C'est une belle chose que l'innocence ; le malheur est seulement qu'elle sache si peu se préserver, et qu'elle se laisse si facilement séduire. […] L'homme sent en lui-même, à l'encontre de tous les commandements du

devoir que la raison lui représente si hautement respectables, une puissante force de résistance : elle est dans ses besoins et ses inclinations, dont la satisfaction complète se résume à ses yeux sous le nom de bonheur. Or la raison énonce ses ordres, sans rien accorder en cela aux inclinations […]. Mais de là résulte une *dialectique naturelle*, c'est-à-dire un penchant à sophistiquer contre ses règles strictes du devoir, à mettre en doute leur validité, tout au moins dans leur pureté et leur rigueur, et à les accomoder davantage, dès que cela se peut, à nos désirs et à nos inclinations, c'est-à-dire à les corrompre dans leur fond et à leur faire perdre toute leur dignité, ce que pourtant même la raison pratique commune ne peut en fin de compte, approuver » *FMM*, 168.

30 Nous n'allons pas entrer ici dans le détail concernant la question de savoir si ces « germes » ou dispositions naturelles sont bons ou mauvais du point de vue moral. Précisions simplement que les *Réfléxions sur l'éducation* ne tranchent pas la question : elles semblent poser dans la première partie qu'il n'y a dans l'homme que des dispositions au bien, pour soutenir dans la dernière partie la thèse de la neutralité morale initiale de l'homme, voire la présence d'« impulsions menant à tous les vices » : « On pose la question de savoir si l'homme est par nature bon ou mauvais ? Il n'est ni l'un, ni l'autre, car l'homme par nature n'est pas du tout un être moral ; il ne devient un être moral que lorsque sa raison s'élève jusqu'aux concepts du devoir et de la loi. On peut cependant dire qu'il contient en lui-même à l'origine des impulsions menant à tous les vices, car il possède des penchants et des instincts qui le poussent d'un côté bien que la raison le pousse du côté opposé. Il ne peut donc devenir totalement bon que par la vertu, c'est-à-dire en exerçant une contrainte sur lui-même, bien qu'il puisse être innocent s'il est sans passion », *RE*, 492/189. Sur l'évolution du point de vue de Kant à propos de cette question, voir M. Kuehn, « Kant on Education, Anthropology, and Ethics », in K. Roth, C. W. Surprenant, *Kant and Education. Interpretations and Commentary*, NY/Londres, 2012, pp. 57 *sq.*

31 Pour une analyse générale de la conception kantienne de l'éducation et plus précisément de la pédagogie, ainsi que pour son intégration dans la pensée de l'époque, voir. J.-F. Goubet, *Des maîtres philosophes ? La fondation de la pédagogie générale par l'Université allemande*, le chapitre « Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) », Paris, 2012, pp. 171- 249 ; et M. Lausberg, *Kant und die Erziehung*, Marbourg, 2009.

32 Sur Socrate en tant qu'éducateur, voir l'excellente étude désormais classique de W. Jaeger, *Paideia. Die Formung des griechischen Menschen*, vol. II, Berlin, 1954, pp. 74 *sq.*

33 *Métaphysique des moeurs* (citée désormais *MM*), AK VI, p. 376 ; trad. fr. par A. Renault, Paris, 1994, p. 213.

34 Kant emploie aussi le terme de « dialogue méthodique », cf. *Réflexion* 3379, AK XVI, p. 806. Voir également à propos de cette classification les *Réflexions* 3381, 3382, 3384-3386, *ibid.*, pp. 807-808.

35 Ce point est particulièrement important pour Kant : il faut scrupuleusement tenir compte du fait que l'enfant ne saurait être traité comme un adulte à aucun moment de son éducation. Cf. *Anthropologie Friedländer*, « Man muß in der Erziehung nicht den Jahren voreilen, sondern den Jahren gemäß in der Erziehung verfahren. Die Jugend Jahre müßen nicht geopfert werden, um den Nuzten des männlichen Alters zu erreichen. Man muß der Jugend die Ergötzlichkeiten nicht nehmen, man muß ihnen die Kenntniße die sie als Männer haben sollen, nicht zu früh beibringen », *loc. cit.*, p. 725. Voir aussi à ce propos, AK XXVII.1, p. 88.

36 La *Réflexion 3383* offre probablement la trace de ce flottement ou hésitation de Kant et témoigne des différentes tentatives successives de définir et de nommer cette méthode. Elle constitue une étape intermédiaire : « Der sokratische dialog ist kein Gesprach, weil immer einer als Lehrer betrachtet wird. Im Gesprach ist keiner Lehrer oder Schüler, sondern sie sind *in commercio* der Gedanken ». Cette compréhension du dialogue socratique est de toute évidence plus proche de la réalité des textes platoniciens que la resignification proposée dans les §§ 50-52 de la *MM*.

37 Cf. C. Piché, « La méthodologie éthique de Kant », dans S. Goyard-Fabre, J. Ferrari (éd.), *1797 - Kant. La métaphysique des mœurs*, Paris, 2000, p. 114.

38 Pour une description des étapes suivies par Kant dans ce catéchisme moral, voir C. W. Surprenant, « Kant's Contribution to Moral Education », in K. Roth, C. W. Surprenant, *op. cit.*, pp. 5 *sq.*

39 « Ce n'est pas simplement que cet exercice constitue une *culture* de la raison qui est pleinement adaptée à la capacité d'un esprit encore inculte (dans la mesure où, en ces questions qui concernent ce que c'est que le devoir, la raison peut décider beaucoup plus aisément qu'à propos des questions spéculatives) et que l'on dispose ainsi du moyen le plus approprié d'aiguiser en général l'entendement de la jeunesse : en fait, si c'est là la meilleure façon de procéder, c'est avant tout parce qu'il est dans la nature de l'être humain d'*aimer* ce à quoi il a travaillé et qu'il a porté juqu'au rang d'une science (à l'égard de laquelle il est maintenant compétent), et qu'ainsi, par de tels exercices, l'élève est amené, imperceptiblement, à prendre de l'*intérêt* à la moralité » *MM*, 484/362.

40 « Que la vertu puisse et doive être enseignée, cela résulte d'emblée du fait qu'elle n'est pas innée ; la théorie de la vertu est donc une doctrine. Mais parce que par la simple doctrine exposant comme on doit se conduire pour se conformer au concept de la vertu, la force n'est pas encore obtenue de mettre en pratique les règles » *MM*, 477/354.

41 Voir à ce propos le § 53 de la *MM* intitulé « L'ascétique éthique », pp. 484-485/363-365. Aussi, C. Piché, *art. cit.*, p. 116 *sq.*

42   « La vertu est la force morale de la volonté d'un *homme* dans l'accomplissement de son *devoir* » *MM*, 405/251.

43   De même : « l'homme est à ses propres yeux méprisable lorsqu'il est vicieux. Ce mépris est fondé dans l'homme lui-même et il n'existe pas seulement du fait que Dieu a défendu le mal », *RE*, 193/494.

44   Selon lui, on peut affirmer que Crusius a déjà anticipé « fast alle wesentlichen Grundgedanken der späteren Ethik Kants, in dieser oder jener Form […]. Das geht soweit, daß […] viele charakteristische Formulierungen und Begriffe, die gemeinhin als spezifisch Kantisch gelten, durchaus doch bei Crusius schon vorgebildet sind », J. Schmucker, *Die Ursprünge der Ethik Kants in seinen vorkritischen Schriften und Reflexionen*, Meisenheim/Glan, 1961, p. 81.

BRIAN SHAEV

Born in 1984, in the United States of America

Ph.D., Modern European History, University of Pittsburgh, 2014
Dissertation: *French Socialists, German Social Democrats, and the Origins of European Integration, 1948-1957*

Postdoctoral researcher, Centre for European Studies at the University of Gothenburg (CERGU)

Participation to conferences and workshops in Gothenburg, Berlin, Paris

Several papers published in scholarly journals

FLOWERS BUT NO BOUQUET: THE COMMON ASSEMBLY'S RELATIONS WITH THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY UNDER PRESIDENTS JEAN MONNET AND RENÉ MAYER, 1952-1956

Abstract

In 1956, the Socialist faction in the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community put forth a wide-ranging and unprecedented critique of the High Authority, the Community's executive body. The faction's move elicited harsh rebukes from the assembly's Christian-Democratic and Liberal factions and was the first instance of overt and coordinated transnational partisanship. This article argues that this bitter exchange would have been unthinkable under the High Authority's previous president, Jean Monnet, who was widely admired by all factions. The Socialist critique encompassed a range of Community policies. Yet the personality of the new High Authority President, René Mayer, proved an important factor in this first exercise in transnational partisanship in the early history of European integration.

Keywords: European Coal & Steel Community (ECSC), European integration, European Parliament, Jean Monnet, Socialist, transnational history

1. Introduction

René Mayer was no Jean Monnet. So thought at least the Socialist deputies in the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first parliamentary body of a supranational Europe. And they let High Authority President Mayer know it. A new atmosphere took hold of the assembly in 1956. Mutual recriminations and reproaches

between deputies and members of the High Authority, and among deputies themselves, heralded a period of partisanship unthinkable during Monnet's tenure as President of the High Authority from 1952 to 1955.

Though there is a major historical work on the High Authority of the ECSC,[1] historians have neglected the politics of the ECSC's Common Assembly. Most literature to date focuses on the European Parliament in later decades, and is written by political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists rather than by historians. This article represents a first attempt at writing a history of supranational democracy and of its limitations during the inaugural phase of the European Communities. It analyzes in particular how the second figure to take the helm of the Community's executive gave impetus to a contentious form of politics between the three political groups of the Common Assembly: the Christian-Democratic, Liberal, and Socialist party groups. Utilizing the parliamentary records of the ECSC, we explore here how personality and policies blended into a mixture under Mayer's stewardship. The previously harmonious relationship among the political groups came to an end, at least for a while, as conflict broke out between the High Authority and the assembly's Socialist deputies.

A reading of the Common Assembly's protocols suggests that personality mattered a great deal in the transposition of partisanship to the supranational parliamentary level. Christian-Democratic and Liberal deputies regretted the attendant loss of decorum and spirit of mutual good will damaged by this first coordinated attack against the High Authority within the Common Assembly. The Socialist practitioners of this partisanship responded that their blunt appraisals and criticism were healthy for the Community. By refusing to offer the customary bouquet of rhetorical flowers to the High Authority President, they considered themselves to be at the *avant-garde* of efforts to supranationalize the exercise of parliamentary democracy.

2. Technocracy and Democracy: The Formation of the ECSC's High Authority and Common Assembly

When crafting what became known to the world as the Schuman Plan, Jean Monnet had not envisioned a European parliamentary body. He was faithful to what historians would later call "technocratic internationalism," a belief that technocrats, due to their common expertise, ethos, and

experience, could bypass the dirty world of politics and diplomacy and construct the world anew in their image.[2] At the same time, Monnet's plan for a European Coal and Steel Community would satisfy a number of pressing French economic and geopolitical problems. It would allow the French government to re-seize the international initiative after five years of back-peddling and confusion on the "German question," the question of how to integrate and tame the new state of West Germany within a Western bloc whose war with the Communist bloc seemed to be turning from cold to hot in 1948-50.

The French Socialist Party (SFIO), however, insisted on the inclusion of a European parliamentary body to oversee the actions of the High Authority executive and to thereby ensure that the first supranational community would be built on a democratic foundation, as incomplete as that foundation admittedly was. The French government had little domestic political room for maneuver. With a powerful Communist Party criticizing the regime from the "left" and a growing Gaullist movement from its "right," SFIO votes were essential for the passage of the Treaty of Paris, which established the supranational community charged with constructing a common market of coal, steel, and iron.

A Common Assembly was included in the Community's institutional framework. It rubbed shoulders with an executive High Authority, an advisory Consultative Committee representing producers, workers, and consumers, a European Court of Justice, and an intergovernmental Council of Ministers, which in practice shared executive powers uneasily with the High Authority. The Common Assembly did not rub shoulders with its sister institutions as an equal. A legal pigmy, the Common Assembly had the pretense but not the legal authority of a true parliamentary body. It did not have the right to propose Community directives, nor was the High Authority obliged to inform it in advance of making formal decisions for the Community. Its only real legal power was that it could force the resignation of the entire High Authority (not that of a single commissioner) with a two-thirds censure vote. It was unlikely that the assembly would ever take such a draconian step, at least not in the short term.

Belgian Socialist deputy Fernand Dehousse described the ECSC Common Assembly's limited powers in these terms:

> We are not a real parliament for three reasons that stand out in my eyes. We do not have positive powers, we do not vote for laws. Even within the area of competence…of the Coal-Steel Community, we do not have

351

this right. We do not have a budget either. …Finally and above all, may I say that we are not a parliament because we are not elected? …What are we? A sort of information meeting. The High Authority communicates its information to our committees before our sessions meet. Then our committees report on this information and we discuss it…[3]

Yet the Socialist deputies of the Common Assembly had the ambition of converting it into a real parliamentary body and of effectively exercising supervision over the executive High Authority. In the same speech, Dehousse gave the following "homage" to the Community's executive and, in doing so, provided an implicit rebuke of ideas especially popular among Gaullist deputies in France:

The High Authority has often been object, in certain circles, of criticism that it tends to represent a technocratic institution, that is the formulation currently in style. I am pleased to say that the High Authority has behaved as true democrats [sic] in its conception and in its practice in its relations with the Common Assembly.

Jean Monnet, used to a career operating behind the scenes, sympathized with the deputies' ambitions. He saw the Assembly as an ally in his struggle to secure independence for the supranational community against the irksome intergovernmental Council of Ministers. This tacit alliance, begun almost as soon as the Community opened, set a precedent for a defining feature of the relationship between the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the executive European Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC) and, later, of the European Union (EU). In a long series of steps from the late 1970s up to the recent Treaty of Lisbon, the powers of what was first known as the European Parliamentary Assembly of the EEC and then as the European Parliament, grew to match many of the ambitions of their predecessors from the 1950s. It is worth examining these early years of the Community to uncover how this dynamic striving toward democratic control at the European level began.

3. A Love Affair: Jean Monnet's Common Assembly

Although the Common Assembly was not part of Monnet's original institutional design for the Community, he embraced it from its inception

as an open forum in his crusade for European union. Monnet already had excellent relations with French governing elites due to his tenure as head of France's postwar planning commission for reconstruction and economic modernization. Despite his tenacious stances in negotiations for the Treaty of Paris in 1950-51 in defense of many French interests, he earned the respect, admiration, and even friendship of many of his negotiating partners.

Monnet's network of contacts, supporters, and friends grew impressively as a result of his interaction with deputies representing six nations in the Common Assembly. A flirtatious anecdote during a discussion of an assembly resolution on its relations with the High Authority represents well the atmosphere prevailing in the infant Common Assembly. The Belgian socialists Fernand Dehousse, Paul-Henri Spaak, the latter of whom was the assembly's president, and Belgian Christian-Democrat Pierre Louis Wigny discussed the wording of the resolution with the German liberal Viktor-Emanuel Preusker and with Monnet. The protocol reads:

[Spaak]: Mr. Wigny, eliminating the word "working" concerning the relations between the High Authority and the Assembly seems difficult to me.

Mr. Dehousse: If we eliminate the word "working," the term "relations" becomes extremely large and may exceed the intentions of the authors of the text. …

[Spaak]: I wonder what relations we might have with the High Authority that would not be working relations. (Smiles in the Assembly). It is a worry that occurs to me.

M. Wigny: There are political relations.

[Spaak]: Mr. President of the High Authority, would you like to have relations with us that are not working [relations]?

Mr. Jean Monnet…: We have often had very happy relations with you outside of the context of work.

[Spaak]: I accept then that the word "working" is not essential.[4]

Shortly thereafter, the Common Assembly approved Wigny's amendment.

Praise for Monnet was a constant feature of the Common Assembly in its opening years. The French Liberal, Roger de Saivre, expressed a collective view when he thanked Monnet for his "clearness and loyal precision" in

laying out the situation of the Community in 1954.[5] Belgian Socialist Max Buset declared that, "As I see it, during the negotiations and the work that made possible the opening of the common market, the High Authority has used a method of remarkable subtlety that is, in my view, one of the fundamental reasons for the success it has found."[6] In the Assembly's second session, Preusker said, "permit me first to express my thanks to the President of the High Authority, Mr. Monnet for the spirit of decision and for the courage with which he has attacked the difficult problem of creating a common market for coal and steel."[7] A few months later, the Italian Christian Democrat Armando Sabatini "congratulate[d] the High Authority for the work it has accomplished during the first phase of its activity and above all for the spirit with which it carried out its task."[8]

A quasi-mystical aura of purpose and meaning permeated the early community. The otherwise rather mundane tasks of regulating coal and steel prices, and resolving disputes over transport costs and scrap metal were imbued with a sense of mission by the High Authority and the Common Assembly's deputies alike. Kiran Klaus Patel has argued that this aura of meaning was what actually distinguished the supranational community, whose powers in practice were far more limited than they were legally, from its intergovernmental counterparts such as the Council of Europe and the Organization of European Economic Cooperation. This sense of purpose comes out in Wigny's January 1953 comment that, "I had a great pleasure in reading [the High Authority's report] because the High Authority has demonstrated a truly European spirit. We have made a revolution in the texts, you are now in the process of realizing it by [your] acts."[9]

Assembly deputies praised Monnet for representing the ideals and spirit of the Community. By this they meant that Monnet, and by extension the High Authority, put into practice a supranational ethos by shedding national loyalties in favor of a loyalty to the well-being of the six member-state nations conceived as a whole. Preusker, in delivering the report of the Assembly's common market committee, said that, "the committee has gained the conviction that the High Authority is making a real effort to become in effect a European supranational organ."[10] Wigny waxed praise on the High Authority in the same session: "You have succeeded in giving the impression, from the debut, that the High Authority is neither French, nor German, nor Dutch…nor Italian, but is rather truly European."[11]

That there was near unanimity in this impression of the High Authority emerges from comments of deputies who had either opposed or been suspicious of the creation of the Community within their domestic politics. Satisfaction that their previous fears of the executive High Authority were not coming to fruition are evident in the comments of Günther Henle and Joachim Schöne, on opposite ends of the West German political spectrum. The Christian Democratic Party (CDU) that emerged from the Second World War had a powerful Christian labor wing, spearheaded by the Minister-President of North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Karl Arnold. This labor wing favored alliances with the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) on the model of the 1946-50 CDU-SPD government in NRW. It was open to supporting socialization and had a lot of common ground with the SPD on methods of organizing industrial relations.

Henle of the Klöckner firm, on the other hand, represented a growing influence of Ruhr industrialists, rather than workers, within the national Christian-Democratic party. Industrialists funded the CDU and the party quietly abandoned its 1947 socialist-leaning *Ahlener Programm* in favor of the "social market economy" concept of Ludwig Erhard, the liberal Economics minister under CDU Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's government. Ruhr industrialists like Henle distrusted Monnet's application of technocratic internationalism to heavy industry, as they considered it an unwarranted, and certainly unwanted, intervention into what had historically been their sphere of affairs.[12] The industrialists would have preferred to re-create the private international cartels of the interwar period, cartels German companies had dominated. The Schuman Plan was in part a French endeavor to prevent the recreation of such cartels, which, in their view, would reproduce the subordinate interwar status of French heavy industry in postwar industrial Europe. Before the Common Market had even opened, though, Henle was already praising the High Authority with an enthusiasm one would have thought unlikely given his opinion of just a few years before. It is worth quoting his January 1953 comments at length, as they encapsulate well the accommodation industrial circles achieved with the High Authority executive:

> Before, when the Schuman Plan had not yet reached the negotiations stage, certain milieu: the management of industrial and economic enterprises, felt some worry in thinking that the future Community and High Authority might become a vast bureaucratic system that, above its prerogatives and without real contact with the living economy of our countries, would

attempt to impose on this economy an orientation inspired by purely doctrinal considerations. I admit that I myself was not exempt from such apprehensions.

But, today, five months after the coming together of the High Authority, I have the pleasure to note in light of the report that has been presented to us that we feel much more at ease and such is without doubt the present spirit of a number of representatives of economic branches…

I believe it to be my duty, as a participant in the first tasks, to congratulate the President of the High Authority for the circumspection with which he has created this organization, succeeding in this way in creating the atmosphere necessary for a European collaboration.

It is necessary to add that in the matter of organization—and I believe that everybody will agree in recognizing that it is so—the Hugh Authority has made a particular effort to maintain the dimensions of its official apparatus within rational limits. So, these two factors, the immediate coming into contact with the living economy and an unmistakable effort to maintain the administrative services within fair proportions, are signs revelatory of the spirit that has reigned during this European honey moon.[13]

Six months later Henle applauded the High Authority again for its "courage and resolution."[14]

Schöne, a SPD representative from the Ruhr territory, was a vigorous opponent of Henle within German domestic politics. If he and his party had had their way, Henle and his industrial friends would have been expropriated and Ruhr coal and steel would have come under socialized management. His party had opposed the creation of the ECSC. During its 1951 campaign to defeat the Treaty, SPD leaders argued that the High Authority executive was a dictatorship in the making and that Monnet and representatives of other states would not rise above national interests. Rather, the party argued that Monnet would use executive powers to systematically discriminate against German industry, and to undermine the position of workers in the Ruhr.[15]

SPD deputes initially made this same critique in the Common Assembly.[16] But, even as Schöne argued in January 1953 that the High Authority was discriminating against German businesses, he remarked that, "I am far from thinking that it is intentional." Though his party retained its critical attitude, Schöne said that,

> I must say that…in general the High Authority has accomplished its task well. It had to, in many cases, conciliate complex statistics that are difficult to compare, to make holistic evaluations and to develop a common line of action. I am happy to be able to note that, in my view, the High Authority has completely succeeded.[17]

In 1954, Schöne's German counterpart Hermann Pünder, a Christian Democrat, spoke second-hand of Schöne's acclaim for the High Authority:

> All things considered, I rally without reservation, as it concerns the loan [that the High Authority negotiated with the U.S. government], to the words of recognition and gratitude that my colleague from the German Parliament, Mr. Schöne, current President of our Investment Committee, addressed to you, Mr. President Monnet, fifteen days ago, in Luxembourg, when he was still vice-president of this committee. He spoke then of the great political success that has contributed in a large manner to consolidate the prestige of the European Coal and Steel Community as a whole and more particularly that of the High Authority, adding that it was particularly significant that America has shown its confidence in a precise way in this first European supranational organization.[18]

This positive tone towards the executive prevailed even when deputies criticized Monnet's High Authority. Schöne and the French Christian Democrat François de Menthon complained about repeated delays in responses to assembly requests that the High Authority develop reports and submit information to the Common Assembly.[19] Nevertheless they showed an appreciation for the challenges facing the newly constituted executive in fulfilling such tasks. Reflecting his party's broader negative attitude, Gerhard Kreyssig of the SPD made a far-ranging critique of the new common market as it opened in June 1953. He said that, "this opening of the common market, above all of steel, has generated more unhappiness than satisfaction."[20] Kreyssig was responding to a downturn in the German steel sector and a rise in Community prices, the latter of which contradicted the stated intention of the common market.

Kreyssig then stated that certain claims by the High Authority were "contradicted by reality." Nonetheless, Kreyssig softened his critique by saying that, "We all know how vast and important the task of the High Authority is." He urged "the President and members of the High Authority to not interpret [his] reflections as a crushing critique of their activity." He even encouraged the High Authority to be proactive in stemming potential

criticism of their actions by publishing reports that would precisely distinguish between negative trends in the European market that *were* and *were not* results of the Community's activities, so that it could "defend itself against such reproaches." Considering that his party had spared no effort in denouncing the ECSC's creation, Kreyssig's comments demonstrate the constructive approach adopted by the SPD deputies within the assembly.

Several ECSC deputies objected when the High Authority published decisions before consulting the Common Assembly, presenting the deputies with, in their view, *faits accomplis*. Yet the deputies generally viewed Monnet's executive as an ally in their efforts to gain effective parliamentary powers to supervise the High Authority and to influence the decisions of the Council of Ministers. Dehousse, who lamented the assembly's paucity of powers as quoted above, said that, "we have considerably ameliorated in practice the theoretical rules [about the assembly's powers] of the Treaty." He "rendered homage" to the High Authority because "we owe this evolution also to the great comprehension with which the High Authority has shown proof in regard to the Common Assembly."[21]

Wigny said that, "I was particularly struck…[when] the President of the High Authority spoke of the sovereign supervision of our assembly."[22] Further, Schöne told the assembly in May 1955 that, "we are also a bit bothered by the Treaty" because "the attributions of the assembly are not as precise and wide as would be desired."[23] Nonetheless, he blamed not the High Authority, but the Council of Ministers, for the strictures placed upon them. He and his SPD colleague Heinrich Deist supported an expansion of the High Authority's powers so that the "High Authority can oppose the dynamic of economic expansion, which we all respect, with its own dynamic."[24]

4. A New, for Some, Unwanted Partner: René Mayer Takes the Reins of the High Authority

The French government, though, formally opposed any expansion in the power of the supranational High Authority or of the Common Assembly. The supranational nature of the Community was a French invention but a shift of politics occurred in France when liberals and Gaullists ascended to government. The pro-supranational French Socialist and Christian-Democratic parties were retreating electorally, and the

Radical party was split between pro-integration deputies like Maurice Schumann and more skeptical leaders such as Pierre Mendès-France. French ministers were annoyed that Monnet treated their representatives in the Council of Ministers in a "cavalier fashion" and even "hint[ed] at the Ministers' lack of importance."[25] The bitter fight over proposals for a supranational European Defense Community and its defeat by the French National Assembly in August 1954 further dampened enthusiasm in governing circles for Monnet's brand of supranational governance.

Angry that his vision of European integration was defeated in the French Assembly, Monnet announced his resignation in late 1954 from the presidency of the High Authority so that he could openly agitate for European unity. Adenauer "was both moved and shaken by the decision" and urged Monnet not to resign.[26] The Common Assembly shared Adenauer's distress. In a December resolution, it "expresse[d] to the President of the High Authority its gratitude for the work he accomplished, thank[ed] him specially for contributing to the assurance of a constant collaboration between the Assembly and the High Authority and to the efficiency of parliamentary control." Moreover, it "makes its own the homage and regret expressed to the President of the High Authority by the President of the Assembly…and wishes as well that it may be possible that Mr. Monnet modify his decision."[27] French Socialist leader Guy Mollet spoke of a "debt of recognition for Jean Monnet, whose precise intelligence, firmness, and personal rigor have marked our work and greatly helped our assembly, like the other institutions of the Community, to affirm its supranational character."[28]

The deputies differed in their views of the consequences of Monnet's departure for "this great heritage" left by Monnet and his collaborators, in the words of a left-republican Italian deputy, Ugo La Malfa. The French liberal Alfred Chupin praised Monnet for his "disinterest" and evoked Monnet's contention that the ECSC institutions were not just "a personal work" of one man. Though he expressed his "regrets," he struck a hopeful note:

> …will this compromise the future? I think not. The message that Mr. Monnet gives to us in leaving is a message of faith in our institutions.[29]

Though a few months later he attempted to renege on his resignation, the French government seized on Monnet's misstep to replace him with a figure more to its liking. In May 1955 French Premier Edgar Faure

nominated René Mayer, a liberal politician representing French Algeria and formerly a deputy within the ECSC Common Assembly. In spring 1955 Mayer took the reins of the High Authority. Later that year, many ECSC deputies, including German Social Democrats, joined Mollet's new non-governmental organization, the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, dedicated to pressuring national governments to establish a European atomic energy community.

After Mayer's nomination, Dehousse struck a pessimistic and prophetic counter-note to Chupin's optimism. He lamented that, "For me, for many democrats, for many Socialists, Mr. Monnet is, among other things, what made all of the difference within the European Coal and Steel Community between a democratic government and a capitalist cartel."[30] His remark reflects at once the devotion of the Socialist party group to the figure of Jean Monnet, and its worry about the future of the Community in the hands of a less able, or less amenable, President.

All speakers welcomed Mayer and praised his first speech to the assembly. The transnational party groups of the supranational assembly co-existed harmoniously with each other in 1952-55, unlike what was often the case between parties in national domestic politics. Consensus was still the *modus operandi* of the Common Assembly. Enrico Carboni gave a warm but not particularly enthusiastic speech for the Christian Democrats. For its part, the French Socialist Party disliked Mayer within French national politics, and voted against his investiture as Prime Minister in 1949, though it later did vote for him in 1951.[31] The protocol of the Socialist parliamentary group's 1949 meeting with Mayer shows that a large swath of the party personally detested him, even though they actually supported much of his proposed platform.

The Socialists' rhetorical welcome of President Mayer was cautious from the start. Mollet told Mayer that,

> The course of French affairs has at times led us to cooperate within the same governmental majority, and often to oppose each other as well. In what concerns European policy, however, we have always been in accord on the objectives as well as the methods. …the Socialist group is happy about the general tone of your declaration. …It is therefore with a favorable prejudice that we wait to observe the High Authority begin work with its new President.[32]

Mayer responded,

> Turning now to Mr. Guy Mollet, I want to give him my thanks for the welcome that he and the members of his group have expressed for the European who has become President of the High Authority…
>
> I was touched by the words of his welcoming speech. I also understand the conditions to which remain, of course, subordinated the confidence of the Socialist group for the High Authority and for its new President. My previous career has given me in these matters an extremely fine ear (laughter) and I do not need recourse to the gadgets that are placed here on the tables nor of a translator to understand well what some of these words meant.
>
> But something at least has given me joy, and that is that my hope is the same as that expressed by Mr. Guy Mollet, that is to say that I may conserve for a long time and if possible until the end the confidence of Mr. Guy Mollet and of his friends.[33]

As it turned out, Mayer's honeymoon with the assembly would last less than a year.

5. The Honey Moon is Over: Supranational Partisanship in Mayer's Common Assembly

On 21 June 1956, High Authority Commissioner Paul Finet rose to defend the executive against a coordinated Socialist attack outlined in a scathing report written by French Socialist Émile Vanrullen. Finet told the assembly,

> I admit that at first I was overjoyed. At the beginning of his oral report Mr. Vanrullen sent some flowers to the High Authority for its action in the field of social policy and I thought to myself that we were going to receive, at the end of the oral report, a beautiful bouquet. Unfortunately the few flowers never came together into a bouquet and the end of the speech was more a severe arraignment that caused me and my colleagues to ask ourselves…whether we earned these reproaches…[34]

This session of the Common Assembly was the first in which a real, sustained conflict between the party groups, and between a party group and the High Authority, broke out. The Belgian Socialist Roger Gailly responded to Finet's metaphor the next day by saying that, "It is time

to end this overly facile game that consists of permanently exchanging flowers and not having at times the courage to say what one truly feels."[35]

The previous month, the Dutch Labor deputy Gerard Marinus Nederhorst complained that in his speech to the assembly Mayer "did not pronounce a single word in response to the grave criticism of my friend Mr. Schöne." The President's responses "gave the impression as if we had thrown nothing but flowers on the path of the High Authority." The Christian-Democratic speaker, he said, "played perfectly well this role," but the Socialist group would do this no longer. While Emja Sassen for the Christian Democrats praised the "realism" of Mayer's speech, Nederhorst considered it "the argumentation of an excellent technocrat." He asked of Mayer, whose speech was loaded with statistics and figures, "is this really the essence of the common market?" He announced that, "It is very consciously that my political friends and I want to trouble this atmosphere of political weddings."[36]

The Socialist group accused Mayer's executive of abandoning the spirit of the Community and of breaking the tacit alliance between the Common Assembly and the High Authority. In this speech, Nederhorst denounced Mayer in particular for his absence from the debate and for letting the executive be represented by civil servants, which "no national parliament would have allowed." He considered Mayer's absence to be indicative of Mayer's entire approach to interacting with the assembly:

> His predecessor, Mr. Jean Monnet, had the commendable habit of attending the committee meetings each time that the agenda contained points of some importance. I regret to note that we have never been able to meet Mr. René Mayer in committee, not when we discussed the important question of cartels, nor when we examined the important question of coal policy, nor during the exchange of views with the High Authority on the important question of [the] re-training [of displaced workers].

Nederhorst accused Mayer of neglecting the supervising function of the Common Assembly, of keeping it in the dark on issues essential to the Community's success, and of refusing its help in applying the treaty.[37] He and other Socialists argued that Mayer was overseeing the "disintegration of [the executive's powers], a transfer of powers to national governments and to producers, when [the High Authority] should be conserving and exercising them itself."[38] The Socialist faction went on to make a series of criticisms of specific policies enacted by Mayer's High Authority, in

particular of issues related to prices, cartels, and social policy. Mayer's policies, in the view of French Socialist Jean Charlot was guided by "a strange will to be liberal in spite of everything."[39]

Liberal and Christian-Democratic deputies were also at times critical of Mayer and the High Authority. The Belgian Christian Democrat Alfred Bertrand, for instance, expressed concern that, "in the last months, a certain stagnation, a certain indecision appears in the action of the High Authority as concerns the ultimate evolution in the social field…"[40] Nonetheless, his speech and those of other non-Socialist deputies sprinkled together praise and criticism. Most notably, their tone in addressing High Authority Commissioners remained deferential, appreciative, and sympathetic.

Not so with the Socialists. In June 1956, they decided to turn their displeasure with Mayer into a broad-side attack on the executive. They introduced partisanship and acidity for the first time into the assembly's debate. In doing so, they provoked the contempt of their surprised Liberal and Christian-Democratic counterparts. A tempestuous row between speakers then led to a momentary breakdown of inter-group civility.

The Socialists' attack was foreshadowed by speeches in May 1956. At that time, Nederhorst warned that the Socialist group did not accept the Christian Democrats' view that a censure motion against the High Authority would be "inopportune and even completely impossible in the present circumstances":

> Our group, Mr. President, does not share this view, which is not to say that we have decided to submit a censure motion on the policies of the High Authority. I must nevertheless tell you that this idea appears to us, alas, much more seductive than [it did] last year.[41]

The next month, the Socialist group went a step further. At the end of the session, after the Community had approved a series of resolutions, some of which Socialists voted for and others against, Kreyssig took to the floor to make a declaration in the name of his group. He enumerated a series of points on which his group "regret[ted]" the High Authority's attitude and position. According to him, the High Authority "has persisted in its passive attitude [by] delay[ing] social progress," it "has weakened… the supranational character [of the Community] by not making use of some of its powers, thereby permitting national governments and groups of producers to exercise powers that belong to the High Authority," and "the attitude of the High Authority has not always had as a result the

facilitating of the exercise of parliamentary control." He concluded that, "the Socialist group expresses in a most formal manner the concern that the development of the High Authority's political direction causes it."[42]

Stung, Mayer asked Kreyssig whether the Socialists were making a declaration or proposing a resolution. The Belgian Christian Democrat Paul Struye said that, "this is a camouflaged censure motion." His colleague Werner Dollinger thought that, "this declaration is a mixture of massive attacks and censure motion." The Christian-Democratic spokesperson was clearly angered by the Socialist group's maneuver. He said he was "shocked" and declared that if this was the attitude of the group, "it is its duty to draw the logical conclusion (*tirer les conséquences*) and submit a censure motion." He went on to say that of course "there is not a shadow of chance that such a censure motion would be adopted by the Assembly," since a censure motion required a two-thirds majority. The Christian-Democratic and Liberal groups would certainly not vote with the Socialists against Mayer.

Struye was angry as well. He denounced the, "in my view, deplorable procedure adopted" by the Socialists. It placed the other groups in an ignoble position because they could only "formulate improvised responses" to "a declaration [that was] very clearly and carefully prepared." He urged Mayer not to proceed with his suggestion that the assembly adjourn so that the presidents of the groups could discuss the declaration with him. "To do so," Struye thought, "is to grant too much honor to this declaration."

These statements by Christian-Democratic deputies infuriated the Socialists, if Gailly's reply is representative of the group as a whole:

> We told you that this was a declaration…The Socialist group is not satisfied. It has the right and the duty to say so, without asking anybody's permission.

> You spoke, Mr. Struye, of a lack of courage. I heard behind me one of your colleagues employ the word "disgusting" [*dégoutant*]. We do not accept your lessons about courage, nor your lessons about propriety…

> You spoke of a censure motion. If it had pleased the Socialist group to submit a censure motion, it would not have asked your permission. It did not believe it necessary to go that far. I believed that a warning [was sufficient] [and] later inquiries could be addressed to what I consider to be a government [the High Authority]…

> We wanted to ask it, to use a sports formulation, "to do better next time…"

> A censure motion, Mr. Struye? We will see at the proper time and, I repeat, without asking your permission, whether it is proper or not to submit one.
>
> As for me, I am perfectly indifferent as to whether the session is to be suspended. *Voilà* the only response that I have for you.

The session then suspended so that the group presidents could meet with Mayer. When it returned, Liberal and Christian-Democratic spokespersons made curt, terse declarations affirming their support for the High Authority. And then the June 1956 session of the ECSC Common Assembly, the most dramatic and temperamental to date, adjourned.

6. Conclusion

The role of political parties (in both their domestic and supranational forms) in the European integration process is an understudied field given their evident importance for European politics in general.[43] In the European Parliamentary Assembly and then European Parliament of the 1970s-early 2000s, the relations between the Christian-Democratic and Socialist party groups oscillated between periods of supranational consensus and partisanship.[44] There is vigorous disagreement among political scientists about whether the "Europarties" have now or in the past gained ideological coherence and whether they operate mainly on transnational, or on national lines.[45] There is also no consensus as to whether deputies sent to Strasbourg tend to internalize "European" values or not, and whether processes of transfer and learning among European deputies have a concrete impact on individual deputies' self-conception and, perhaps, on their patterns of voting.[46]

In addition, most of the literature on the European parliamentary bodies is written by political scientists. These works do not use historical archives, in part because they almost always write about the recent past. There are currently no historical studies of the Common Assembly of the ECSC, nor of the European Parliament of the EEC and EU, besides an edited series that focuses in part on the Christian-Democratic group.[47] This lack of attention may in part be the result of a presumption that, a) the Common Assembly and European Parliament did not matter in terms of their impact on the European integration process as a whole, and b) the Euro-deputies brought their domestic politics with them to Strasbourg and no real supranational parliamentary spirit developed in the early European

institutions. However, such views, though often repeated, have not been demonstrated using the methods offered by vigorous historical research.

The findings of this article about the exercise of partisanship in the first parliament of a supranational European community should give scholars pause before making such claims, in particular as concerns point b. The Socialist group did not submit a censure motion in 1956, but it came awfully close. Here I have argued that personality mattered in the attitude of the Common Assembly towards the High Authority. Of course one could argue that the Community had already been established in 1956, and therefore the deputies could reasonably have higher expectations of the executive than they had in 1952-55, which was indeed the case. Nonetheless, I argue that such a sweeping attack, and the bitterness of the debate that ensued, would have been unthinkable under President Jean Monnet.

The faith and trust that an overwhelming majority of deputies had in Monnet evaporated under President René Mayer. Despite the flowers thrown in Mayer's direction, he would never receive the unanimous bouquet representative of Monnet's relations with the assembly. Personality mattered indeed. It is not the contention here, though, that only personality mattered. Community policies on pricing, cartels, the migration of Community workers, and competition and social policy, and the general fortunes of national coal, steel, and iron industries vis-à-vis one another and of the Community's industries vis-à-vis the outside world, were subject to constant discussion and debate in the assembly and in its committees. The deputies sought to influence negotiations between the member-state governments, as well as those between the Commission and the Council of Ministers. How they did so, whether these areas were subject to trans-party group consensus or conflict, and their successes and failures in influencing developments in European integration, is a field now wide open for historical inquiry, research, and revision.

NOTES

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[2] Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, "Technocratic internationalism in the interwar years: building Europe on motorways and electricity networks," *Journal of Modern European History* 6, 2 (2008); Johan Schot and Wolfram Kaiser, *Writing the rules for Europe: experts, cartels, and international organizations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

[3] Journal Officiel de la Communauté Européen du Charbon et de l'Acier. Débats de l'Assemblée Commune. Compte Rendu in Extenso des séances (JO CECA DAC), 14 May 1954, Archive of European Integration (AEI), University of Pittsburgh.

[4] JO CECA DAC, 23 June 1953, AEI.

[5] JO CECA DAC, 15 May 1954, AEI.

[6] JO CECA DAC, 20 June 1953, AEI.

[7] JO CECA DAC, 12 January 1953, AEI.

[8] JO CECA DAC, 20 June 1953, AEI.

[9] JO CECA DAC, 13 January 1953, AEI.

[10] JO CECA DAC, 19 June 1953, AEI.

[11] JO CECA DAC, 20 June 1953, AEI.

[12] For Günther Henle's role in industry and West German politics before entering the ECSC Common Assembly, see S. Jonathan Wiesen, *West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 54-5; Werner Bührer, *Ruhrstahl und Europa: Die Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie und die Anfänge der europäischen Integration, 1945-1952* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), 35-45, 126-35; and Ursula Rombeck-Jaschinski, *Nordrhein-Westfalen, die Ruhr und Europe: Föderalismus und Europapolitik, 1945-1955* (Essen: Klartext, 1990), 45.

[13] JO CECA DAC, 13 January 1953, AEI.

[14] JO CECA DAC, 19 June 1953, AEI.

[15] Brian Shaev, "Estrangement and Reconciliation: French Socialists, German Social Democrats, and the Origins of European Integration," dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2014.

[16] Brian Shaev, "The French Socialist and German Social Democratic Parties and the Future of the Working Class in the European Coal & Steel Community, 1948-1954," *Diacronie. Studi di Storia Contemporanea* 9, 1 (2012).

17   JO CECA DAC, 12 January 1953, AEI.
18   JO CECA DAC, 13 May 1954, AEI.
19   JO CECA DAC, 12 January 1953; JO CECA DAC, 15 January 1954, AEI.
20   JO CECA DAC, 20 June 1953, AEI.
21   JO CECA DAC, 14 May 1954, AEI.
22   JO CECA DAC, 23 June 1953, AEI.
23   JO CECA DAC, 10 May 1955, AEI.
24   JO CECA DAC, 16 January 1954.
25   Spierenburg and Poidevin, p. 60.
26   Spierenburg and Poidevin, p. 229-236.
27   JO CECA DAC, 1 December 1954, AEI.
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36   JO CECA DAC, 9 May 1956, AEI.
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38   JO CECA DAC, 19 June 1956, AEI.
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42   JO CECA DAC, 22 June 1956, AEI.
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      6; Marc Abélès, *La vie quotidienne au Parlement Européen* (Paris: Hachette,
      1992), 153; Pridham and Pridham, 285-86; Simon Hix, "The Transnational

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ALINA VAISFELD

Born in Germany

Ph.D. candidate, Philosophy Department, New School for Social Research, New York City
Dissertation title: *The Meanings of Madness: Through Foucault to Husserl*

Fellowships and Scholarships:
Short-Term Fellowship, Marc Bloch Center for Historical Studies, Berlin, 2015
Dissertation Fellowship, New School for Social Research, 2015-2016
Reiner Schürmann Memorial Fellowship, New School for Social Research, 2014-2015
Ruth Westheimer Fellowship, New School for Social Research, 2013-2014
William W. Bradley Fellowship, New School for Social Research, 2009-2010
Summer Research Grant, Kierkegaard Library, Northfield, Minnesota, 2008
Richard J. Bernstein Prize Fellowship, New School for Social Research, 2007-2009

Papers published in scholarly journals and book chapters in edited volumes

THE MEANINGS OF MADNESS: THROUGH FOUCAULT TO HUSSERL

Abstract

This paper has three objectives: first, to propose that it is philosophically propitious to understand madness as a problem of the order of meaning. Second, to illustrate the intrinsic link between madness and meaning in Michel Foucault's *History of Madness*,[1] in which he suggests that the changing nature of madness renders impossible any talk of the meaning of madness. Third, to foreground the shortcomings of Foucault's account and to provide an alternative approach to the meaning of madness, drawing on a handful of key concepts from Edmund Husserl's work and centering on a notion of madness as meaning-distortion.

Keywords: Michel Foucault; Edmund Husserl; a phenomenological approach to madness; madness and meaning; meaning as constituted and meaning as form; meaning-rupture and meaning-distortion

I. Introduction

In this paper, I wish to lay out an approach to the question of madness that would render it possible to approach madness as a *philosophical problem*. Such approach, I will propose, would pivot around the solidarity between meaning and madness; it would enable us to understand the very possibility of madness as intrinsically tied to the possibility of meaning (as well as to the possibility of ruptures and distortions of meaning). I will first identify the intrinsic link between madness and meaning in Michel Foucault's groundbreaking *History of Madness*,[2] in which Foucault indicates not only the inherent relation between madness and meaning, but also how the meanings of madness are but unintended side-effects, resulting from historical practices both specific and random, which effectively forestall the possibility of tracing the meaning of madness in a historically cohesive way. I will juxtapose Foucault's emphasis on the

breaks and ruptures of the meanings of madness with a phenomenological approach to madness that puts a premium on madness as a form of meaning-distortion. To this end, I will rely on two key concepts of Husserlian phenomenology—the notion of meaning-externalization borrowed from Husserl's *Crisis of the European Sciences*[3] and the notion of the horizonal nature of experience.[4]

My paper will be composed of the following parts: first, "A Note on the Title by Way of Biography, Followed by a Confession", in which I aim to elucidate the relation between Foucault and Husserl, thereby also clarifying the title of my paper. Next, "Foucault's History of Madness: Madness without a Subject", in which I indicate the links between madness and meaning that Foucault traces in his *History of Madness* as well as the possible shortcomings of Foucault's approach. This section is followed by "Husserlian Tools: Meaning and Reduction", an introductory section, in which I delineate those core concepts of Husserl's phenomenological project which pertain to the phenomenological elucidation of the problem of meaning. Next, in "Madness as Meaning-Distortion: Three Examples", I seek to motivate an understanding of madness as meaning-distortion with the aid of examples drawn from a variety of sources, both fictional and non-fictional. Then, in "Madness and Phenomenology", I intend phenomenologically to account for the possibility of meaning-distortion, relying on two key ideas of Husserlian phenomenology, that of the possibility of "meaning-externalization" and that of the horizonal nature of experience. Lastly, in my "Conclusions", I will indicate a possible direction for future research.

II. A Note on the Title by Way of Biography, Followed by a Confession

When Michel Foucault was born in 1926, Edmund Husserl—who was by then almost 70 years old and was teaching at the University of Freiburg—had already established himself as one of Germany's most eminent philosophers. Husserl had done so by introducing a new mode of doing philosophy and thus founding a new philosophical movement: that of phenomenology. Not only within Germany but also internationally, the novelty and promise of Husserl's philosophy had begun to capture the attention of young philosophers who flocked to Göttingen and then to Freiburg to attend Husserl's lectures: Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg

Gadamer, Hans Jonas were among them, as was the Czech philosopher Jan Patocka and the Lithuanian-French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas who came to Freiburg at the age of 22 to study with Husserl and who would subsequently write the first book-length introduction to Husserlian thought in French.[5] It was Levinas' book—together with his translation of a series of lectures which Husserl gave in Paris in the late 1920s, the so-called *Cartesian Meditations*—which introduced Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, amongst others, to phenomenology, influencing both of them deeply.[6]

In 1926, the year Foucault was born, Husserl was also presented by one of his former assistants and collaborators with the public dedication of a forth-coming book: Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time*. Though Heidegger had read Husserl's most important published works closely, the two only met around 1916, when Husserl took a position at Freiburg where Heidegger was a non-tenured lecturer (*Privatdozent*). Soon, the two thinkers seemed to grow closer philosophically, and Husserl, who was thirty years Heidegger's senior, began to support Heidegger in his academic career and successfully petitioned for Heidegger to receive a tenured position at Freiburg. By 1926, the year of Foucault's birth, Heidegger had taken up a position at the university of Marburg, which he would leave in 1928 to succeed Husserl at Freiburg when Husserl had reached retirement age and was made an emeritus professor.[7] With the rise of National Socialism in the 1930s, life became increasingly difficult for the Jewish Husserl: his teaching license was revoked, he was no longer permitted to publish any new material and, eventually, he even lost his German citizenship.

In other words and to return to my topic, Foucault and Husserl never met. Foucault was 12 when Husserl died in 1938, (leaving behind approximately 40 000 pages of manuscripts written in shorthand), and when Foucault was entering the philosophical scene of France in the 1950s and 60s, Husserlian phenomenology was if not a thing of the past, at least in some way belonging to the establishment. Though originally taken with phenomenology, Foucault very soon turned against it, especially against its Sartrean version, which he thought mistaken in its subject-centeredness. We could even say that it was in part his critique of phenomenology that led Foucault to write his first major work, *The History of Madness*, which was published in 1961.[8] As we will see shortly, Foucault argues in *History of Madness* that the idea of the subject is untenable when it comes to the experience of madness. Instead, Foucault submits an alternative notion

of experience (and of meaning) that stresses the ruptures and breaks that constitute the history of a meaning (more on that soon).

To revert to the title of this paper, why then would I suggest that we return to Husserl through Foucault? First, what I do not propose: that Foucault, though explicitly stating otherwise, remained a phenomenologist at heart.[9] Rather, I suggest making a detour through Foucault and then coming back to Husserl because Foucault provides us with an important clue as to the connection between the meaning of madness and the formation of meaning in general. In this respect, I will follow Foucault's lead, although I will ultimately argue for the need of an alternative notion of meaning as more than just form in order to capture something about the meaning of madness.

Before I turn to Foucault, an important confession: Husserl had very little to say about madness. This leads to the question why I would turn from Foucault—who is one of the few recent philosophers to address madness—to Husserl. But though Husserl does not expand on madness, he gives us an intricate notion of meaning, and of the subjective achievement that meaning always is. In particular, we can find, within Husserl's philosophical projects, the resources to account for the possibility of meaning-distortion and thereby for a phenomenological understanding of madness. Moreover, since for Husserl, meaning is always both subjective and objective—not merely an achievement, but a potential presence in the world—, madness, from a Husserlian perspective, can never be reduced to mere subjective pathology, but must also have to do with the world that we live in.

III. Foucault's History of Madness: Madness without a Subject

If there is one thing that deeply troubled Foucault, it is our thoughtlessness and lack of critical attitude when it comes to the present. We accept the present as inevitably given, as the benevolent and orderly outcome of centuries of historical progress, through which the true nature of things and of ourselves is gradually revealed to us. Our unfounded belief in history comes out particularly clearly in the case of madness: for who would dispute that the modern notion of mental illness, with which madness entered the realm of positive diseases, was not a vast improvement over previous ideas of madness, which were saddled with prejudices and unscientific beliefs? Who would argue against the idea that

mental illness, the medicalized version of madness, was not a scientific, objective, presuppositionless idea—in other words, who would deny that mental illness was the truth of madness?

In *History of Madness*, Foucault wants to do precisely this. To this end, Foucault turns to the history of madness, in order to expose how throughout history, the meanings of madness have undergone so many shifts and breaks that it is impossible to uphold the idea that what we have today is the result of a linear progression of knowledge. Foucault contends that the meaning of madness does not somehow guide the process through which madness is further and further determined as what it truly is; rather, that madness is an effect, an outcome, of specific historical practices and discourses.

Thus change the questions that history seeks to answer. From "what are the essential structures of this historical object that are incrementally revealed by the movement of history?", the question now becomes: "what are the conditions of the specific historical appearance of objects?" A concern for essence is replaced by an investigation of the historical appearance of an object, not to indicate a schism between essence and (historical) appearance, but because this specific historical appearance is all that can be encapsulated by the meaning of an object as it emerges in discourse—for it is all there is to an object.

More precisely, *History of Madness* pivots around Foucault's inquiries into the meanings that come to accrue to the notion of madness in the historical period he designates as the "classical age", which spans roughly from 1650 to 1800. Foucault aims to show that the meanings of madness underwent a profound change in the classical age—or the age of reason—and that these changes paved the way for the modern understanding of madness as mental illness. Foucault's point is precisely that there is no underlying logic to this meaning-precipitation and that the representation of madness that resulted from the classical age was but the conglomeration of random bits and scraps of meaning, which we have come to mistake for madness's essence.

In *History of Madness*, Foucault identifies a number of key determinations, a series of what he will later designate as "discursive events,"[10] which were at work in the classical age and there began to produce and organize different forms of knowledge about madness, which then began to form "the face" of madness. One of these organizing practices was the establishment of an asylum structure, which I will use

as an example to illustrate how Foucault thinks historical meaning comes to be.[11]

In Foucault's view, one of the things that marked the classical age was the establishment of houses of confinement, in which the mad were locked away—importantly together with many other groups who were also considered disruptive such as the idle, the drunk, the money-squanderers. Houses of confinement, and this is crucial, were punitive places, not places for the sake of curing someone, with the objective of locking away those that were regarded as potentially disruptive for society. The end of the classical age saw the establishment of asylums, which came to replace houses of confinement, and which were reserved for the mad alone. Very often, the change from houses of confinement to asylums is seen as the liberation of the mad, as a major step towards a more humane, more scientific treatment of the mad. Again, Foucault's stance is to unhinge the comforting narrative of taking the opening of asylums as a sign for a more and more truthfully determined grasp of the meaning of madness. What he offers instead is an account that emphasizes the historical situation preceding the introduction of the asylum-structure, with an emphasis on the way in which madness became equated with physical disease.

According to Foucault, what lies at the root of the desire to establish an institution for the mad alone was not a humane impulse; it was a rumor. What preceded the construction of asylums was the "great fear" of the mad that in the middle of the 18th century seized the general population, a fear of contamination, both moral and physical, that in the form of "prison fever" would spread from houses of confinement to the city. Thus in their minds, people began to equate the mad with the almost mythical images of disease, rot and decay they had once associated with a very different group of outcasts: the lepers. It was in the realm of the fantastic, and not the realm of medicine, that a kinship was first suggested between madness and disease, between the pollution fermenting behind walls of houses of confinement and the contamination festering within leprosariums. The fantastic proved a fertile breeding ground for the kind of meaning-designation that would turn out to be the most determining: that madness is a form of disease of the mind.

The imaginative association between madness and disease that was forged in the time of the "great fear" in the mid-18th century put the first doctors to be called into houses of confinement—places, we should recall, that had been conceived not to cure the mad, but to lock them away—in a strange position. As Foucault writes:

> If a doctor was summoned, if he was asked to observe, it was because people were afraid—afraid of the strange chemistry that seethed behind the wall of confinement, afraid of the powers forming there that threatened to propagate. The doctor came, once the conversion of images was effected, the disease having already assumed the ambiguous aspects of fermentation, of corruption, of tainted exhalations, of decomposed flesh. What is traditionally called "progress" toward madness's attaining a medical status was in fact made possible only by a strange regression. (*HM*, p. 205)

Thus the question facing the authorities at the end of the classical age was not how to find a more suitable place for the mad, but how to reassure the general population that measures were being taken to neutralize the potential danger the mad represented. The great reform movement, which was soon lauded for charting a more humane way of treating the mad as mentally ill, began as a movement of purification: how to reduce the threat of contamination and pollution evading from houses of confinement and spreading throughout the city. As a solution, houses of confinement were to be more isolated; in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the declaration of the Rights of Man, they were also gradually depopulated, as more and more inmates were set free—with the exception of the mad and of convicted criminals. As the practice of confinement was scaled down with regards to those suspected of moral transgressions, and criminals and mad were increasingly separated, the space of confinement that had originally been carved out to remove from public life a wide range of transgressors now came to be the exclusive domain of the mad. Thus the liberation of madness that tends to be associated with the dismantling of houses of confinement and their conversion into asylums should not be taken as the triumph of a more objective, medical notion of madness over unscientific meaning-elements that had sprouted from the seedbed of fantasy and myth. It was precisely the classical age's obscure groundwork that made possible the prodigious postulate declared at the end of the 19th century and that was taken to set an end to all unscientific, stigmatizing notions of madness that had preceded it: "that madness, after all, was only madness" (*HM*, p. 277).

Although Foucault's approach is persuasive, especially in drawing attention to the historical plasticity of the meaning of madness, there are certain things it foregoes, to my mind, in its emphasis on both madness and meaning as the results of larger, anonymous processes. First, following Foucault's lead, we are bereft of any possibility of talking about the

experience of the mad subject (since all three—madness, experience, subjectivity—are considered as a non-intentional side-effect of rather than as central to the movements of history). Second, this leads to the question whether there is not more to meaning (and to madness), for is not meaning the way in which the world and things in the world come close to us? Husserl, to whom I will turn at present, will make precisely this point.

IV. Husserlian Tools: Meaning and Reduction

Before outlining a phenomenological approach to the meaning of madness, I will briefly delineate some of the basic ideas of Husserl's phenomenology necessary to my project. When Husserl began to lay out what would become a new philosophical method, he was deeply concerned with the way in which philosophical approaches to knowledge, meaning and the world remove us from the world rather than giving a truthful description of the way in which the world and things in the world are inextricably close or given to us. When we experience something, for Husserl, we experience something other than ourselves. When I experience a tree (when I perceive a tree), I perceive that tree—I do not perceive an idea of the tree that I have, I do not perceive a mental image, I do not perceive myself as a tree. I perceive this tree, which is other than myself. This seems to lead to two questions: how is it possible for me to experience something other than myself? How is it possible for me to somehow go outside of myself?

These questions presuppose two things: 1) that I (whatever I am) am first and foremost inside (my mind) and somehow need to get outside and 2) that as a result of this, there exists a gap between me and the world, a cleft I need to overcome if knowledge is to be possible. If I do not overcome this gap, then there is no guarantee and perhaps even no possibility that knowledge even refers to that which it is about. Husserl's answer to the questions: "how can I perceive something other than myself? How can I overcome the gap between myself and the world?" is to overcome the very presuppositions, which give rise to these questions in the first place. For Husserl, to assume that we are first and foremost inside of ourselves and somehow need to get out is a construction, and not a description of how we actually relate to the world because for Husserl, we are always already in the world. To describe this "being outside of oneself", Husserl uses the notion of "intentionality": by its nature, consciousness is intentional

(consciousness is the term which Husserl uses to describe what the subject most fundamentally is).

In an instructive and stunning essay on Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre expresses the sense of liberation awakened in him by Husserl's philosophical approach, in particular by his groundbreaking notion of intentionality:

> To know is to "burst out towards", to wrest oneself from moist, gastric intimacy and fly out over there, beyond oneself, to what is not oneself. To fly over there, to the tree, and yet outside the tree, because it eludes and repels me and I can no more lose myself in it than it can dissolve itself into me: outside it, outside myself. Don't you recognize your own exigencies and sense of things in this description? You knew very well that the tree wasn't you, that you couldn't take it inside your dark stomach, and that knowledge couldn't, without dishonesty, be compared to possession. And, in this same process, consciousness is purified and becomes clear as a great gust of wind. There is nothing in it any more, except an impulse to flee itself, a sliding outside of itself. (…) Imagine now a linked series of bursts that wrest us from ourselves, that do not even leave an "ourself" the time to form behind them, but rather hurl us out beyond them into the dry dust of the world, on to the rough earth, among things. Imagine we are thrown out in this way, abandoned by our very natures in an indifferent, hostile, resistant world. If you do so, you will have grasped the profound meaning of the discovery Husserl expresses in this famous phrase: "All consciousness is always consciousness of."[12]

As intentional, consciousness is always consciousness of. How are we to understand this? If we think about an experience, for instance, perception, then we notice that perception always involves the following structure: a perceiver who perceives something perceived. There is a structure of referring at play: every perceiving refers to something perceived just as every imaging refers to something imagined and every judging refers to something judged.

If you consider this an odd way of thinking about thinking, then Husserl would agree with you. He also thinks that paying attention not to what is perceived but rather to the relation between perceiver and perceived is unnatural. This is because we have a tendency to lose ourselves in things, and thereby to self-obscure. When we experience something, then we primarily pay attention to what it is we experience, and not to the act of experiencing it: when I imagine the great dinner I am going to have

383

tonight, I imagine the dinner and do not pay attention to my imagining the dinner although my imagining the dinner is the precondition for the dinner as imagined. This state of being immersed in things is what Husserl calls the natural attitude, which is the attitude that we live in in our everyday life and that we need to overcome or rather modify in order to do phenomenology.

There is yet another side to the natural attitude that we equally need to set aside in order for phenomenology to get off the ground, and which will have to do with meaning. If I were to ask you, my reader: "what is it that makes an object an object?", it is likely that you would respond: "what makes an object an object is that it exists". And if I then were to ask: "what is it to exist?", you might say: "to be out there in the world, as an actually independently existing object". Your responses reflect a tendency that pervades our everyday natural attitude: namely, the propensity to understand existence as actuality. When viewed from the natural attitude, for us and for things to exist then simply means "to belong to nature and to be subsumed under its categories,"[13] to exist independently from consciousness in a transcendent world. But the givenness of the world and things in the world does not imply that we are clear about the being of the world. The existence of the world is a conviction and a commitment, not any kind of self-evident knowledge. Thus the natural attitude is based on a commitment to the fact of the world, for which it is unable to account. Only the phenomenological attitude can account for the possibility of things and of the world given to me in experience.

Husserl's answer to the natural attitude and its problems is the so-called phenomenological epoché or bracketing, which is a methodological gesture that needs to be undertaken in order for phenomenological description to begin. What gets bracketed in the epoché? Existence understood as actuality. If in the natural attitude, we assume that all things around us exist independently from us, in the reduction, we suspend any assumptions that have to do with existence.

To get a firmer grasp on the concept of epoché and consider its ramifications, let us turn to a rather well-used but nonetheless instructive example from Husserl's *Ideas I*:

> Let us suppose that in a garden we regard with pleasure a blossoming apple tree, the freshly green grass of the lawn, etc. It is obvious that the perception and the accompanying liking are not, at the same time, what is perceived and liked. In the natural attitude, the apple tree is for us

something existing in the transcendent realm of spatial actuality, and the perception, as well as the liking, is for us a psychical state belonging to real people. Between the one and the other real things, between the real person or the real perception, and the real apple tree, there exist real relations. In such situations characterizing mental processes, it may be in certain cases that perception is "mere hallucination", the perceived, this apple tree before us, does not exist in "actual" reality. Now the real relation, previously meant as actually existing, is destroyed. Only the perception remains, but there is nothing actual there to which it is related.

Let us now go to the <transcendental> phenomenological standpoint. The transcendent world receives its "parenthesis", we exercise the *epoché* in relation to <positing> its actual being. We now ask what, of essential necessity, is to be discovered in the complex of noetic processes pertaining to perception and in the valuation of liking. With the whole physical world and psychical world, the actual existence of the real relation between perceiving and perceived is excluded; and, nonetheless, a relation between perceiving and perceived (as well as between liking and liked) remains left over, a relation which becomes given essentially in "pure immanence", namely purely on the ground of the phenomenologically reduced mental processes of perceiving and liking precisely as they fit into the transcendental stream of mental processes. (…) Here, in the case of perception and also in the case of any progressive concatenation of perceptions whatever (…), there is no question to be raised of the sort whether or not something corresponds to it in "the" actuality. This posited actuality is indeed not there for us in consequence of judging. And yet, so to speak, everything remains as of old. Even the phenomenologically reduced perceptual mental process is a perceiving *of* "this blossoming apple tree, in this garden", etc., and likewise, the reduced liking is a liking of this same thing.[14]

This is: in the natural, pre-phenomenological attitude, we would say that the apple tree exists out there in a transcendent spatial reality and that our perception of it and the feelings of pleasure it evokes in us are psychic states, which belong to us as real human beings. Between the real human beings that we are and our real perceptions, and the real apple tree exist real relations, the reality of which could however be called into question—we could find ourselves coming down from an acid trip and realize that the apple tree in the garden was but a hallucination and that all along we had been staring at a broom in an otherwise empty hallway closet, in which case the perception of the apple tree would appear to be reduced to itself, as unmoored from reality, there is nothing "real" it can fasten itself onto.

If we now suspend our belief in the actuality of the tree and of the world it forms part of, and thus also set aside any belief in us as actual human beings, then, Husserl surmises, we are in the position to ask what it is of the apple tree scenario that remains, untouched by the bracketing of actuality. What we find is that although the presumed actual relations between our perception of the tree and the tree are suspended, a correlation persists between perceiving and perceived, now thrown into sharper relief. The tree outside the window may or may not exist, but my perception of the tree remains a relation to something other than myself. This relation between perceiving and perceived stands at the heart of a phenomenological exploration of meaning.

It is thus within the phenomenological epoché that we discover certain possibilities of knowledge that have transcendental values when compared to other sources: it is the uncovering of a new sphere of investigation, of an inwardness that belongs to knowledge itself. To put it differently, then, even if we suspend existence, objects continue to be given to us in experiences. But how are they given to us? Husserl's answer is: they are given to us—they appear to consciousness—as or via their meanings. The reduction reduces things to their meanings.

What does this mean? And what is meaning? If we think of an object, or perceive it, or imagine it, or dream it, objects are always given to us in a determined way: the tree appears to us as tree; it is given to us as tree. This "as-structure" is the structure of meaning: the tree is given to us as or in terms of its meaning of being a tree; it is because the tree is in a determined way that it can appear to consciousness. As I perceive more of the object, more of its meaning is determined—potential meaning becomes actualized, knowledge is achieved. But this is something we only realize after the reduction. Thus after the reduction, the traditional question: "why is there something rather than nothing?" becomes transformed into the phenomenological question: "how is it that things are given to us?" And this then becomes the question of meaning: things are given to us in terms of their meaning and so how, then, is meaning possible? The answer to this question, for Husserl, must always be twofold: meaning is always both a subjective achievement and an objective possibility: the world, as potentially meaningful, beckons us to take it up in a meaningful manner. This means that meaning is never something that I impose (or construct) upon an otherwise meaningless entity; but it is also not something that is simply always already out there in the world.

We will return to meaning and its possibilities and impossibilities in the next sections. For now, let's note a few more things on Husserl's method: phenomenology is a descriptive method, returning us to the things themselves. Deploying description beyond its use in the empirical sciences, it is based on the claim that phenomenological description is capable of clarifying and bringing out meaning or sense. Yet in order for phenomenological description to find traction, we require reduction, not because meaning is formed in reduction, but because our view of meaning is obstructed in an unreduced, natural experience. Thus for Husserl, in appearing, things show themselves as what they are. This does not mean that things somehow show themselves all at once—appearance does not equal essence, but it is also not fundamentally divorced from it. This leads to a phenomenological notion of truth as evidence: evidence is the experience of something giving itself as what it truly is.

V. Madness as Meaning-Distortion: Three Examples

How do madness and meaning relate? To recapitulate, for Foucault, madness is an example of the external nature of meaning-formation, as madness is an effect of random patterns of meaning-formation. So the meaning of madness, in a way, is the madness of meaning. From my introductory remarks on Husserl's phenomenology, it should be manifest already that a phenomenological account of madness and meaning will be very different: meaning is not simply a husk which can be filled with more or less random content; meaning is the way in which we connect to the world, and in which things show themselves to us. But how do madness and meaning come together? What I suggest is that we could understand madness as a form of meaning-distortion.

Before sketching out a phenomenological account of how we could understand the very possibility of madness by understanding the very possibility of meaning-distortion, let me give you three descriptions of different mad states that I have gathered from a variety of sources, both fictional and non-fictional. In all three examples, I'll suggest, there is the idea, explicit or not, that madness manifests as a kind of meaning-distortion, or alternative meaning-formation.

Let me begin with a short passage from Nikolai Gogol's 1835 short story "Diary of a Madman".[15] Through his diary, we witness the descent into madness of Poprishchin, a minor civil servant, whose entries include

a conversation between dogs which he overhears (and later, a description of how he proceeds to steal the written correspondence between the two dogs). Until at last, on April 43rd in the year 2000, Poprishchin awakens to find himself a different man: the king of Spain, as we learn from the following passage:

> The year 2000: April 43rd.
>
> To-day is a day of splendid triumph. Spain has a king; he has been found, and I am he. I discovered it to-day; all of a sudden it came upon me like a flash of lightning.
>
> I do not understand how I could imagine that I am a titular councillor. How could such a foolish idea enter my head? It was fortunate that it occurred to no one to shut me up in an asylum. Now it is all clear, and as plain as a pikestaff. Formerly—I don't know why—everything seemed veiled in a kind of mist. That is, I believe, because people think that the human brain is in the head. Nothing of the sort; it is carried by the wind from the Caspian Sea.
>
> For the first time I told Mawra [the housekeeper] who I am. When she learned that the king of Spain stood before her, she struck her hands together over her head, and nearly died of alarm. The stupid thing had never seen the king of Spain before![16]

Here, we witness the delusion—the unfounded assumptions—of someone taking himself to be someone he is not and whose meaning-distortions collide with the meaning-assumptions of the people around him such as his housekeeper Mawra.

My second example is taken from Oliver Sacks's *The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat*.[17] Dr P., precisely the man who mistakes his wife for a hat, is an elderly musician of distinction who presents himself to the neurologist Sacks with a number of problems that we could describe as a form of blindness of the mind: an inability to see the world in its concreteness. Sacks proceeds to undertake a number of tests with Dr P., in the course of which he asks his patient to identify a handful of objects. Dr P. does very well when it comes to geometrical shapes, identifying dodecahedrons and more. But he curiously struggles when it comes to everyday objects:

"What is this?" I asked, holding up a glove.

"May I examine it?" he [Dr P.] asked, and taking it from me, he proceeded to examine it as he had examined the geometrical shapes.

"A continuous surface", he announced at last, "infolded on itself. It appears to have"—he hesitated—"five outpouchings, if this is the word".

"Yes", I said cautiously. "You have given me a description. Now tell me what it is."

"A container of some sort?"

"Yes", I said, "and what would it contain?"

"It would contain its contents", said Dr. P. with a laugh. "There are many possibilities. It could be a change purse, for example, for coins of sizes. It could…"

I interrupted the barmy flow. "Does it not look familiar? Do you think it might contain, might fit, a part of your body?"

No light of recognition dawned on his face.

No child would have the power to see and speak of a "continuous surface… infolded on itself", but any child, any infant, would immediately know a glove as a glove, see it as familiar. Dr P. didn't. He saw nothing as familiar.[18]

In the case of Dr. P., things have become drained of their meaning. For him, things no longer mean—to recognize a glove as a glove (i.e., in terms of its meaning) also includes knowing what a glove is for, how to use it, what function it fulfills in our life. From a phenomenological viewpoint, objects cut off from the movement of a life bear no meaning; they are reduced to mere form.

In my last example, a description taken from J.H. van den Berg,[19] an early proponent of phenomenological psychology, the meaning of the entire world is implicated in the experience of madness. In the following passage, van den Berg describes a patient suffering from hallucinations (i.e., perceptions that lack external stimuli) and delusions, (i.e., impossible or absurd beliefs held with certainty and incorrigibility). About his patient, van den Berg writes:

He said he was a student but for many months had not attended courses because he had been unable to go into the streets during the day. The one occasion on which he had compelled himself to do so had stayed in his

memory as a nightmare. He had had the feeling that the houses he passed were about to fall on him. They had seemed grey and decayed. The street had been fearfully wide and empty, and the people he had met had seemed unreal and far away. Even when someone passed him closely, he had had an impression of the distance between them. He had felt immeasurably lonely and increasingly afraid. Fear had compelled him to return to his room, and he would certainly have run if he had not been seized by such palpitations that he could only go step by step.[20]

Van den Berg proffers a description of how the meaning of the entire world shifts and changes; he illustrates how the world in its entirety becomes saturated with a fearful quality, marking the plenum of things of which the world is composed.

Their many differences notwithstanding, all three examples pivot around questions of madness, meaning and the changes, transformations, and breaks that meanings can undergo in an experience of madness; we witness how the meaning of who I am, the meaning of what are things in the world and, finally, the very meaning of the world become a contentious matter. This takes us to the following question: from a phenomenological perspective, how is it possible for meaning not to occur or perhaps to occur otherwise? From a phenomenological vantage point, how can there be madness?

VI. Madness and Phenomenology

I will begin with the following question: phenomenologically speaking, how can meaning fade away, as most explicitly in Sacks's glove example and less explicitly also in the other two examples? As stated earlier, phenomenologically, meaning is never mere form; what gives something its meaningfulness is its connectedness to the movement of a life. To understand the meaning of an idea, we must understand it in reference to the life in which this idea has been taken up and understood. Meaning is dependent on its articulation not first and foremost by an act of speech, but by an experience; it must be taken up into a movement of lived actualization. Lived experience, in turn, depends on its meaningfulness: an experience that articulates nothing (an experience that has no meaning) falls short of being an experience. To this, there is another side, the side of the world: meaning always has a hold on me because it is not something

that I can simply choose to engage with or not; things in the world beckon me to take them up meaningfully; I depend on them just as they depend on me for their meaningful articulation.

Here, we begin to see the outlines of a possibility of meaninglessness: a meaning that becomes cut off from lived experience, and thus morphs into mere form. We could imagine this to be the case in Sacks's glove scenario. A glove that is not connected to a life is no longer a glove; it is an abstract shape with five outpouchings. Yet how can we conceive of a meaning getting divorced from life? Here, particularly helpful proves Husserl's *Crisis of European Sciences*, in which he deals with the problem of meaning-distortion or what he calls meaning-externalization [*Sinnesveräußerung*].[21] In the *Crisis*, Husserl's explicit focus is on the issue of meaning-externalization or loss of meaning in the natural sciences, which have forgotten or overcome precisely their connection to subjective life that founded scientific achievement as meaningful. In this vein, he writes:

> Actually the process whereby material mathematics is put into formal-logical form, where expanded formal logic is made self-sufficient as pure analysis or theory of manifolds, is perfectly *legitimate*, indeed necessary; the same is true of the technization which from time to time completely loses itself in merely technical thinking. But all this can and must be a method which is understood and practiced in a fully conscious way. It can be this, however, only if care is taken to avoid dangerous shifts of meaning by keeping always immediately in mind the original bestowal of meaning [*Sinngebung*] upon the method, through which it has the sense of achieving knowledge about the *world*. Even more, it must be freed of the character of an *unquestioned tradition*, which, from the first invention of the new idea and method, allowed elements of obscurity to flow into its meaning. (*Crisis*, p. 47)

Yet what Husserl seems to indicate—and this is the thought perhaps most instructive when it comes to meditating on the possibility of meaning-distortion per se—is that such forgetting of meaning (as has occurred most manifestly in the natural sciences) is a human propensity; it is a human tendency because in our life, we rely on previous knowledge-accomplishments: for instance, we rely on philosophical traditions and use them as depositories of thoughts already thought, of problems already solved. In fact, this is how knowledge grows: we do not have to solve problems others have solved all over again, but we can use

solved problems to take them further, to build on them in order to think something new. This is why knowledge, for Husserl, is always a gradual cultural acquisition.

To put this differently, when becoming more determined (more worked out over the course of history), meaning also always becomes sedimented, for instance, in traditions.[22] Further meaning-determination goes hand in hand with the threat of meaning-externalization, in so far as meaning becomes separated from its source of vitality, namely, evidence (the experience of something giving itself as what it is). Thus Husserl writes in the *Crisis* (in reference to the scientist, but we can generalize this thought):

> What was lacking and what is still lacking, is the actual self-evidence through which he who knows and accomplishes can give himself an account, not only of what he does that is new and what he works with, but also of the implications of meaning which are closed off through sedimentation or traditionalization, i.e., of the constant presuppositions of his [own] constructions, concepts, propositions, theories. Are science and its method not like a machine, reliable in accomplishing obviously very useful things, a machine everyone can learn to operate correctly without in the least understanding the inner possibility and necessity of this sort of accomplishment? (*Crisis*, p. 52)

There is a thick layer of accomplishment—a crust of knowledge, of further and further determinations of meaning—that comes to accrue to things in the world, which we encounter precisely as things that have been thought through by others; these layers of accomplishment come to form part of the meaning of things. Yet, the history of a meaning becomes problematic when it threatens to cut us off from the movement of life, the moment of evidence, which makes a meaning meaningful.

To say that meaning-distortion is a human propensity at play in particular in the technization of the natural sciences and going hand in hand with knowledge acquisition of course leads to the following question: what separates the meaning-distortion of a madman from that of a scientist? One way to answer this is with Husserl who posits that for the scientist, it is possible, in principle, to reconnect a meaning with its lost vitality, for instance, through a historical investigation into the histories of a meaning. And this possibility—of a recovery of the meaning-giving accomplishment at the heart of meaning—seems to be closed off in the case of a mad meaning-distortion.

Earlier, I emphasized that meaning must always bear a two-fold structure: a "subjective" side and an "objective" side. Accordingly, the possibility of meaning-distortion must also possess two sides. If the propensity towards meaning-distortion inheres within the life of the mind, we must not forget to ask about the world: if there is a human tendency towards obfuscation of meaning, then the world must somehow lend itself to this obfuscation. If I can hallucinate about the world, the world must somehow be hallucinable. Madness, in other words, cannot be reduced to mere subjective pathology. But how can we conceive of the potential of the world to be itself something distorted?

This leads me to the second part of this section on a phenomenology of meaning-distortion. Let us recall what we earlier termed the natural attitude, which we said required modification through the phenomenological epoché. Yet, the epoché, it bears emphasizing, does not remove us from the world; it merely modifies our relation to the world. If anything, what we notice after the epoché is the extent to which our experiences are always already worldly, saturated by worldliness. Thus we realize the degree to which we rely on the world as something that is always already given to us (I will provide an example in an instant). However, and this is crucial, the pregivenness of the world and of things in the world does not imply that we are clear about the being of the world. (This unclarity is what necessitated the epoché). On the contrary, the world is a clarity that is always shot through with darkness and uncertainty; the evidence of the world is not that of illumination but pervaded with a certain obscurity that, however, continuously tries to illuminate us. Paradoxically, it is only against this backdrop of darkness or potential meaninglessness, I suggest, that meaning unfolds at all.

Let me try to make myself clearer by providing the following example: After the phenomenological epoché, we see how complicated seeing is. For instance, we begin to differentiate the foreground/background structure, which any perception always involves. Thus, when consciousness is thematically and intuitively aware of an object in the foreground, it is simultaneously aware, although non-thematically and non-intuitively, of the background as well. I see the tree in the garden precisely because I do not see the wall that is behind the tree, or rather, I see the wall in an empty or non-thematic way. Of course, I could turn my attention from the tree to the wall and I would thereby actualize the possibility of seeing the wall. But it is the potential to see the background, which structures and situates

the actual seeing (the foreground). The foreground, which is directly or originarily given to me, is situated within a network of empty seeing.[23]

Thus what we come to realize is that all experiences bear a horizontal structure: that every experience in which something is given to me is surrounded by a horizon or halo of potential experiences, in which things are given to me "blindly" or non-intuitively (i.e., as not yet originally given to consciousness). More, we become aware that the world is the horizon of all horizons, a horizon, which itself can never be fully present intuitively—which can never be given to us in an evident manner, for the world is inexhaustible experientially.

Yet the necessity of the horizonal structure of experience indicates the following: there is no end to seeing, and no end to knowing. The world is inexhaustible, and in this, it is at the edge of meaning, a kind of meaning before it is meaning, both potentially meaningful and potentially meaning-disrupted (as it lacks any sense of being intuitable, and thus of being available to the kind of experiences that make a meaning meaningful). Therefore, what serves as the foundation of meaning is itself not yet meaningful, only potentially so.

This suggestion is not only phenomenologically troubling, but it also lays the ground for the following thought-experiment: might it not be possible for someone to engage with the pockets of pre-meaning, with meaning before it is meaning, that make up the pattern of the world? Might not madness simply be the realization of the world's potential for meaning-distortion?

VII. Conclusions

If I have succeeded in arguing for the fruitfulness of connecting an understanding of madness with an understanding of meaning, a crucial question remains that I did not approach in this paper: the very possibility of experiencing another's madness. This lacuna (brought about by time and space constraints) is especially unfortunate because the question of the possibility of the experience of (any) Other stands at the heart of large parts of Husserl's writings, especially those on intersubjectivity.[24] As Husserl was keenly aware, the question of the experience of the Other is one of the most fundamental questions of phenomenology. This is so because the transcendence of the world, the irreducibility of the world to my experiencing it, which is one of the core tenets of the phenomenological

project, implies the possibility of *all* experiences, including also those of the lives of Others; as transcendent, the world also implies that others can experience it just as I can. Thus it is necessary phenomenologically to elucidate the experience of the Other so as to elucidate the transcendence of the world.

Phenomenologically, the question of intersubjectivity becomes the question of how the Other can draw her sense as Other (as that which I am not) *from* me. How can I constitute a sense in me (that of the Other) that goes so emphatically beyond me? Within the context of a meditation on madness, Husserl's notion of the experience of the Other indicates an interesting and crucial direction for future research: is it the case that the experience of the Other (any Other) as an alterity both other than me and constituted in me is different from the experience of the mad Other? If we continue along the lines of the theme of meaning-distortion, does this signify that the mad Other and I ultimately do not hold a world in common? And if this is so, and if it is the world that we hold in common that enables me to experience the (non-mad) Other, then can I never experience the mad Other? Is mad alterity an alterity that goes beyond phenomenological elucidation?

NOTES

1   Michel Foucault, *The History of Madness*, transl. by J. Murphy & J. Khalfa, London: Routledge, 2006 [1961]. Hereafter abbreviated in the body of the text as *HM*, p.

2   *Op. cit.*

3   Husserl's concern with the possibility of meaning-externalization (*Sinnesveräußerung*) finds its most thorough treatment in his late *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed. by W. Biemel, The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. Throughout this paper, I will be quoting from the English edition: E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*; trans. by D. Carr, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970. Hereafter abbreviated in the body of the text as *Crisis*, p.

4   The horizonal nature of experience (perception, in particular) is a common theme throughout Husserl's writings. It is emphasized in particular in *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis*, trans. by A. Steinbock, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 2001.

5   Emmanuel Levinas, *La théorie de l'intuition dans la phénomenologie de Husserl*, Paris : Librarie philosophique J. Vrien, 1930. On the impact of Levinas's *La théorie de l'intuition* on the French philosophical scene, see André Orianne's foreword to the second English edition of the work: E. Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, transl. by A. Orianne, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1995, "Translator's Foreword," pp. xxxiii-l. Throughout this paper, I will be quoting from the English edition.

6   For a more detailed account of Husserl's life and legacy, see, for instance, Dermot Moran, "Edmund Husserl (1859-1938): Life and Writings" in *ibid.*, *Edmund Husserl, Founder of Phenomenology*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, pp. 15-42.

7   For the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, I am here drawing primarily on Thomas Sheehan, "Husserl and Heidegger: The Making and Unmaking of a Relationship" in *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger*, ed. and transl. by T. Sheehan and R.E. Palmer, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1997, pp. 1-32.

8   On the historical and philosophical background of Foucault's *History of Madness*, see Jean Khalfa's "Introduction" in M. Foucault, *History of Madness*, *op. cit.*, pp. xiii-xxvii.

9   On Foucault's changing relationship to phenomenology, see Todd May, "Foucault's Relation to Phenomenology" in *Cambridge Companion to*

Foucault, ed. by G. Gutting, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 284-311.

[10] The term "discursive events" appears frequently in M. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language*, trans. by A.M.S. Smith, New York: Pantheon Books, 1971 [1969].

[11] In what follows, I will be relying primarily on the chapter "Experiences of Madness" in M. Foucault, *History of Madness*, *op. cit.*, Part One, Chapter IV, pp. 108-131.

[12] Jean-Paul Sartre, "Intentionality: A Fundamental Notion of Husserl's Phenomenology," trans. by J. Fehl, in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, no. 2, May 1970, pp. 4-5.

[13] E. Levinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[14] Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlage, 1913. I am quoting from the English edition: E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, *first book*, transl. by F. Kersten, The Hague: Martin Niijhoff Publishers, 1983, pp. 214ff.

[15] Nikolai Gogol, "Diary of a Madman" in *ibid.*, *Diary of a Madman and Other Tales*, transl. by C. Field, London: Sovereign Classic, 2014, pp. 7-24.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[17] Oliver Sacks, *The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales*, New York: Touchstone, 1970.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

[19] Jan Hendrik van den Berg, *A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1972.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[21] E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[22] On the problem of the forgetfulness that pervades the natural sciences, see James Dodd, *Crisis and Reflection. An Essay on Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences*, Phaenomenologica 175, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, especially Chapter Three, "Galileo and Modern Science," pp. 79-108.

[23] On the interplay between presence and absence that pervades perception and the horizonal structure of experience, see, for instance, Husserl's account of perception in E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Active and Passive Synthesis*, trans. by A. Steinbock, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 2001, Part 2, "Division I: Modalization," pp. 63-105. Two excellent secondary sources on Husserl's notion of horizon are Saulius Geniusas, *The Origins of the Horizon in Husserl's Phenomenology*, Contributions to

Phenomenology, Volume 67, Dordrecht: Springer, 2012 and Donn Welton, "Constructions: Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Contexts" in *ibid.*, *The Other Husserl. The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000, pp. 331-392.

24   I am referring to the three-volume Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Husserliana 13-15, ed. by Iso Kern, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973 as well as to Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation in E. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge,* ed. by S. Strasser, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. For an instructive discussion of the problem of the phenomenological experience of alterity, see Paul Ricoeur's "Husserl's Fifth Meditation" in *ibid.*, *Husserl: An Analysis of his Philosophy*, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1967, pp. 115-142.

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DIANA YÜKSEL

Born in 1975, in Romania

Ph.D., University of Bucharest, 2010
Dissertation: *Korean Confucian Orthodoxy in the Sixteenth Century:
The Ideal of Moral Accomplishment*

Assistant Professor, University of Bucharest, Korean Language and Literature
program

Scholarships:
Korean National Institute for International Education Division scholarship for
MA studies, 2000-2004
Korea Foundation Fellowship, 1997-1998

Participation in conferences and symposia in Germany, Austria, Slovenia,
Canada, Netherlands, Lithuania, Korea

Several articles published on Confucian ethics, Confucian metaphysics and
Korean language

CONFUCIANISM AND *JUCHE* IDEOLOGY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MANIPULATION OF CONFUCIANISM FOR THE CREATION OF A POLITICAL RELIGION

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show how the North Korean *Juche* ideology acquired a religious dimension through the manipulation of traditional concepts from the sixteenth century Neo-Confucianism of Yi Hwang. The study will bring together two of the most influential thought forms in the Korean Peninsula in a new approach from the perspective of religious and political studies, that will lead to their re-evaluation and re-contextualization.

That *Juche*, the political ideology of North Korea, is a good example of the sacralisation of politics there is no doubt. The process of turning the state ideology, initially based on Marxism, into a political religion was not one that happened spontaneously and naturally. My claim is that this was a programmatic political goal, for the fulfilment of which several steps were taken. One of this steps consisted in bringing elements of traditional Korean culture into the structure of *Juche* ideology. This paper is aimed at analysing various elements that led to the transformation of the *Juche* ideology of North Korea into a political religion (or a pseudo-religion) with a special focus on the manipulation of traditional Confucian concepts and elements of Confucian spirituality for creating a religious dimension for the state ideology and legitimizing the dynastic political power in North Korea. The choice is determined by a revival of *Juche*-related discourse in the North Korean academia and a recycling process of Confucianism in East Asia (especially at political level), doubled by a continuous emphasis

on *Juche* in the political discourse for justifying socio-political decisions and the growth of the personality cult in North Korea.

Emilio Gentile points out that the importance of the sacralisation of politics was recognized by Jean Jacques Rousseau in the 18th century, but that now the phenomenon is studied in relation with totalitarian regimes (and the terms 'political religion' are used when referring to the religious elements of totalitarian states) as opposed to the more general concept of civil religion that Rousseau had in mind,[1] and as a result, the sacralisation of politics is also a phenomenon that is recognized mainly in regimes with extreme ideology such as the Communist Soviet Union, Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany. Although the main regimes investigated by Gentile in many of his studies are past regimes, the *Juche* Communism of North Korea is still in power and continues to play the role of a political religion as state ideology. Having Rousseau's theoretical frame in mind, then the sacralisation of politics is not a phenomenon limited to the regimes of extreme ideologies, but it is a reality of modern societies and it "lies at the heart of modern politics".[2]

One crucial aspect in following the transformation of *Juche* ideology into a political religion is to see how and to understand why the North Korean regime has resorted to incorporating Confucian concepts into *Juche*, an ideology with a strong Marxist foundation and originally opposed to any tradition that predated socialist North Korea. For this, the following matters need to be investigated: the initiation of *Juche* ideology during Kim Il Seong's[3] era and its development during the reign of Kim Jong Il,[4] North Korean regime's relationship with Confucianism and how the latter came to be incorporated into the *Juche* ideology and how this scheme is legitimizing NK's regime as a political religion.

1. The Evolution of *Juche* Ideology – Initiation and Development during Kim Il Seong and Kim Jong Il's Eras

Juche is generally defined as North Korea's ideology of self-reliance, but it has many more nuances. Etymologically, the meaning of the term derives from the two components: *ju* (主), which means "the main principle" and *che* (體), which means "body" or "self". Thus the compound literally means "standing on its own" and it is often translated as "self-reliance" or "self-determination".[5] On a global level it also translates into "sovereign autonomy" *jajuseong*

(自主性), making reference to the detachment of Korean people from the long history of "serving the great" *sadaejuui* (事大主義) - The term was coined by Korean nationalists from the beginning of the 20th century by paraphrasing a Mencian saying for pejoratively describing the centuries long relation between various kingdoms in the Korean Peninsula and China and it also hints at the Japanese colonialism. It also alludes to North Korea's political independence, economic self-sufficiency and military self-reliance. The concept was launched by Kim Il Seong, during his political campaign of the '50s,[6] when he emphasized the importance of developing the nation by using its own resources and human potential in order to claim ideological and political autonomy (at that point from Moscow, later also from China), but also economic self-reliance and self-sufficiency and a strong national defence system (Tai, 1983):[7]

> Establishing *Juche* means, in short, being the master of revolution and reconstruction in one's own country. This means holding fast to an independent position, rejecting dependence on others, using one's own brain, believing in one's own strength, displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, and thus solving one's own problems for oneself on one's own responsibility under all circumstances. (Li, 1972)[8]

Being promoted as the creation of Kim Il Seong, it is also called 김일성주의 (*Kimilseongjueui*/ Kimilsungism). And because it was further developed by Kim Jong Il, it is also sometimes called 김종일주의 (*Kimjongiljueui*/ Kimiljongism). The institutions of *Juche* ideology are based on the principles of: political independence (*chaju*차주), economic self-reliance (*charip* 차립)[9] and self-defence (*chawi*차위).[10]

The development of this "new state ideology" followed a few stages. Most scholars identify three stages - the 50s, 60s and 70s,[11] but some also point at a later stage in 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.[12] There is also the "military first" (*seon gun*선군) politics, a guiding principle launched during the reign of Kim Jong Il and strongly enforced under Kim Jong Eun,[13] which can also be seen as an attempt at reformulating *Juche* in response to the change of global political conditions that have changed in the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, but this is not necessarily another stage in the evolution of *Juche*, but rather an expansion of its institutions.

It is obvious that in its early years, North Korea cultivated a pro-Soviet (almost *sadae jueui*) type of nationalism, where the Soviet Union was seen

as the liberator and which allowed them to point at South Korea as being still under the colonial domination of Japan and US:

> On August 15, 1945, the people of Korea were liberated from the long Japanese colonial rule by the great army of the Soviet Union […] The liberated Korean people now entered on a path of constructing an independent and democratic system under favourable international conditions. […] The stationing of the Soviet army in North Korea was a strong protection against new encroachments by the imperialist powers for the newly liberated Korean people. It was a favourable factor for the Korean people in building a new democratic Korea. (*Joseon tongsa*,1958).[14]

But this attitude changed with the beginning of the 50s, when Kim Il Seong changed his attitude towards the USSR after the death of Stalin. He started advocating for an ideologically independent *Juche* state, which would not be politically tributary to China or the Soviet Union:

> We are not conducting the revolution of any other country but our own Joseon revolution. […] In order to carry out the Joseon revolution, we must first know Joseon history, Joseon geography, and Joseon customs. (Kim Il Seong, 1967)[15]

The rise of *Juche* ideology goes along the revolutionary change and the expansion of state independence, while slowly diminishing the role of the Soviet Union in Korea's liberation. At the same time, while the establishment of *Juche* had "a tint of anti-foreignism in its language"[16] on the surface, in the subtext it was meant against Kim Il Seong's political opponents, who were supported by foreign powers (namely China and the USSR).[17]

The stages of development of *Juche* ideology:

In the first stage, 1950s, *Juche* is presented as opposing to the politics of serving the great (USSR and China) and imitating its ways, but in reality, it aims not at confronting the big external powers, but at eliminating the internal elements, political opponents of Kim Il Seong, who had the support of foreign powers (leftist intellectuals such as Choe Changjik and Baek Namun who were eliminated in the power struggles of the late 50s).

The second phase came in the 1960s, when *Juche* was used as a way of securing independence for the Korean Workers' Party and the North Korean regime. It is the stage when the party and the state become one

and when the idea of *Juche* is presented as being the creative application Marxism-Leninism, not just a mere copy of it.[18] It is also a stage when *Juche* ideology begins to be theorized and pushed towards acquiring a philosophical perspective.

From later 1970s on, *Juche* becomes a complete ideological system, with a logic and a methodology of its own and ready to be adopted as the state ideology. In 1972, the Supreme People's Assembly adopted a new constitution that declared the North Korea (Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea) to be an "independent socialist state" with *Juche* as a guiding principle, and elected Kim Il Sung president of the republic.[19] The climax of this step was Kim Jong Il's work *Juchesasange daehayeo* (*On the Juche Idea*) from 1982.[20] At this point, *Juche* ideology is not merely a creative application of Marxism-Leninism in Korea, but an independent philosophical thought created by the fathers of the nation: Kim Il Seong and Kim Jong Il. "From this point on, *Juche* ideology transformed itself from a mere response to and a way of achieving independence from foreign powers (China, USSR, Japan, USA) into a structural logic dominating the lives of a group of humanity." (Yi, 2000)[21]

I believe that we can identify here a parallel third stage, one that begins with Kim Jong Il's analysis on *Juche*, a stage in which the ideology is programmatically turned into an instrument of the legitimation of political power. One vital element to this stage is the promotion of *Juche* as an original and unique philosophy, created and owned by the North Koreans. The foreign Western powers[22] suggested that North Korea's political institutions were transplanted by the Soviet Union at the end of WWII, but North Korea's official history claims that its institutions were their own creations.[23] In order to establish this once and for all, it was important that the people of North Korea identified themselves with the idea of *Juche*, and this was not an easy task given the Marxist-Leninist foundation of the ideology. A logic bridge, a natural connection of the people to the ideological creation of the "fathers of the nation" was required. This was achieved by the exploitation of familiar elements of cultural heritage in the collective mentality, hence the employment and manipulation of traditional Confucian concepts, along with elements subtly borrowed from Cheondogyo[24] or Christianity. Out of all the elements borrowed in order to legitimize *Juche* ideology and its development into a political religion, Confucianism served best because it provided not only a model of political hierarchical organization (and the idea of the sovereign/ leader being

endowed with the Heaven's Mandate to rule), but also ethical elements that still govern Korean life, on both sides of the dividing border.

2. North Korean Regime's Relationship with Confucianism

Korean Confucianism was the ruling ideology of the Joseon kingdom (1392-1910). Adopted from China in the 1st century BC, Confucian ideas reached the peak of their theoretical development and the height of their application in the Korean Peninsula during the 16th and 17th centuries. This is the time when education is seen as ethical training and it is a mandatory asset for the makers of politics. Prominent Confucian scholars from the 16th century, Yi Hwang – Toegye[25] and Yi Yi – Yulgok[26] emphasised the importance of moral education for adequately fulfilling one's role in society and for correctly ruling the people. The ideal of moral accomplishment is the sage man (*seong in* 聖人) who understands the idea of moral self-cultivation and practices it for the greater good of the people. Mary Evelyn Tucker identifies four distinguishable "categories" of Confucianism:[27] political Confucianism, social Confucianism, educational Confucianism and economic Confucianism. Thinking of the highly theorizing Korean Confucianism of the 16th century we can add another one: the spiritual and philosophical Confucianism. An ethical element has attached to all of these categories and imposed a certain kind of rigor that had as starting point the process of self-cultivation, because the man is at the centre of the universe and the power of restoring and keeping the harmony in the phenomenal world is his alone.[28] This process has an inner aspect, which implied an effort for one's own self and an outer aspect, where the cultivation has as aim the greater good, so that the process of what Confucius calls *nei sheng wai wang* 內聖外王 (inner sage, outer king) could be completed. The inner process consists of rectifying and setting straight one's mind-heart (*xin* 心) so that one can complete the knowledge by investigating things, while the outer process consists of setting straight and ordering the things in one's family and in the country and re-establishing the global harmony. The Confucian classic *The Great Learning* (*Da Xue* 大學) points out that the self-cultivation (*xiu shen* 脩身) is one of the central stages in the human accomplishment in the two distinct directions: inner and outer. The Korean Confucians, and Yi Hwang Toegye in particular, advocate that the two dimensions of self-cultivation are not two separate elements, on the contrary, they are a twofold whole.

The Confucian masters call this process the sage learning (*sheng xue* 聖學) and for the Korean Confucians, sage learning, or learning to become a sage (*sheg ren* 聖人) means in the end systematizing the interpersonal relations through the self-cultivation and the governing of the others (*xiuji zhiren* 脩其治人) in a process in which putting the ethical theories into practice is vital and it is exemplified by the Confucian masters through their own conduct. The theories on self-cultivation and governing, although applicable for everyone, were meant for the ruling class and most of all for the ruler, but they soon became a defining part of the Korean cultural heritage on a global scale.

The idea appealed to the leaders of the North Korean society, in their revolutionary process of creating a new people, governed by the principle of the unity of thought and conduct. Kim Il Seong had a good intuition of the global strength of the Confucian humanism and the ethics of Toegye and Yulgok's thought and incorporated them in the autarkic state ideology, after a period of denial of Confucianism (and especially of Toegye) in the beginning of the North Korean regime.

The relationship between Confucianism and North Korean regime has not been a smooth one. The repudiation of Confucianism began before the separation of the two Koreas and the formation of the North Korean regime. It began with the fall of the Joseon kingdom in the beginning of the 20th century. Confucianism, which was blindly accepted during the Joseon era, began to be openly denied by new intellectuals such as Yun Chiho (1864 – 1945) and Yi Kwangsu (1892-1950) during the Japanese colonial period's process of modernization, one of the major critiques being that the Confucian social hierarchy ruined Joseon society.

On the other hand, new socialist intellectuals of the colonial period,[29] influenced by Soviet Russia's Marxism-Leninism, embraced Marxist materialism as a theoretical weapon to defeat imperialism and began attacking what they called pre-modern and backward Korean Confucianism.

Kim Gu (1931): "Confucianism is incapable of advancing on its own, and this incapability is inherent in its roots."[30]

By the third stage in the development of *Juche* ideology, traditional culture (including Confucianism) and history were widely criticised by the North Korean leadership,[31] but this complete alienation from tradition caused resentment among the masses, so it became clear that traditional ideologies, such as Confucianism had to be revived and some of their key elements had to be recycled into the *Juche* thought. This became even

more of a necessity after 1994, when, with the death of Kim Il Seong, he and the *Juche* ideology he created achieved a new level of sanctity (Kim Il Seong is seen as the father figure, his wife Kim Jong-Suk or the Party or the army is referred to as the mother figure),[32] so that the hereditary succession had to be justified.

3. How Confucian Ideas Were Incorporated into *Juche* Ideology

First of all, the Confucian idea that appealed to the North Korean leaders was that of the man being in the centre of the universe, not obeying the Heaven (as in pre-Confucian times), but being an equal partner to the Heaven in his capacity of moral cultivation upon the model of the Heaven, the ultimate moral instance. This is what Anne Cheng called Confucius' "bet on the man",[33] and it is what constituted the core philosophy of the Korean Confucians from the 16th century. The same logic can be seen in the understanding of humanity in *Juche* ideology:

> Man is regarded as the highest of all the elements that make up the universe. Humans are seen as the inevitable outcome of the logic of continuous development of matter. (Bak, 1977)[34]

> As material beings, humans also form a part of the material world. They also have many common features that a material being has. Especially as organic and live beings, humans have a lot of common features with animals. However, commonalities with the animals do not explain the position humans occupy in the material world. Above all, humans came to occupy the highest position in the material world over the animal world by becoming a social being. (*Id.*)

The man-centred perspective on nature and the placement of the human on the highest position in the universe due to the fact that he is endowed with ethical features can be traced to the Mencian theory of the human nature, followed by that of Zhu Xi and the Korean Neo-Confucians:

> Men and the other myriad things are likewise born into the world. Looking at *gi* (vital energy), there seems to be no difference between them. Looking at *yi* (Principle – governing the ethical conduct), the fact that men are born with human virtues differentiates them from the other beings. Man does not have evil characteristics, making him the lord of all creation. (Zhu Xi)[35]

Given its universal coordinates and at the same time its specificity, Confucian humanism was easily appropriated by the North Korean leaders and added into the mix of Marxist-Leninist ideas that set the foundation of the *Juche* ideology:

> The *Juche* idea is a new philosophical thought which centres on man. As the leader said, the *Juche* idea is based on the philosophical principle that man is the master of everything and decides everything. The Juche idea raised the fundamental question of philosophy by regarding man as the main factor, and elucidated the philosophical principle that man is the master of everything and decides everything. That man is the master of everything means that he is the master of the world and of his own destiny; that man decides everything means that he plays the decisive role in transforming the world and in shaping his destiny. The philosophical principle of the Juche idea is the principle of man-centred philosophy which explains man's position and role in the world. (Kim Jong Il, *On the Juche Idea*, Ch.2)[36]

Obviously, Confucianism is not the only thought form to claim a world model with the human at its centre. From a philosophical standpoint, there are obvious similarities with Western philosophy, but we are right to suspect rather a type of Confucian humanism since the *Juche* ideology sees man, the one that has the power of creation over all aspects of life, as the exponent of his social group and not as an individual.

The Korean Confucianism of Yi Hwang, once discarded as backward and opposed to the revolutionary goals, became once more interesting, as it could serve to further bring *Juche* closer to the traditional world view by re-creating the organic image of the society, where the leader is seen as the brain that guides the masses, which make up the body of the society:

> The party of the working class is the commanding headquarters of the revolution that carries out the will of the leader as well as the heart of the society that makes the whole society breath and move according to the will of the leader. (Ju, Yi, Ju 1994)[37]

For Yi Hwang Toegye: "The monarch is the head of the state, officials are his chest and commoners are its eyes and ears."[38] The organicist theory is further developed by Kim Jong Il, in his commentaries on the idea of *Juche.* The new ontological perspective that he adds to the theory

of the state as a socio-political organism is already beginning to add pseudo-religious elements to the state ideology:

> The political and ideological might of the motive force of revolution is nothing but the power of single-hearted unity behind the leader, the Party and the masses. In our socialist society the leader, the Party and the masses throw their lot with one another, forming a single socio-political organism. The consolidation of blood relations between the leader, the Party and the masses is guaranteed by the single ideology and unified leadership. (Kim Jong Il, 1990)[39]

Establishing *Juche* as the supreme state ideology is inevitably linked with legitimizing the leader as the unique ruler, the providential head of state that has the approval of the whole universe, and the capacity to restore universal harmony, having thus the same attributes as the sage kings of the past. This is probably the most obvious deviation of *Juche* ideology from the Marxist-Leninist theory on the relationship between the Party and the masses, the introduction of the Supreme Leader (*suryong*), which is endowed with the moral ability of the sage kings of the past, and thus possessed the Heaven's approval for governing the people. This process of deifying the leader serves at the same time at justifying the dynastic hold of political power. The ideology and its creators share a manifest destiny and are invincible, as we can see from Kim Il Sung's 1992 New Year's message:

> I take great pride in and highly appreciate the fact that our people have overcome the ordeals of history and displayed to the full the heroic mettle of the revolutionary people and the *indomitable spirit of Juche* Korea, firmly united behind the party [...] No difficulty is unsurmountable nor is any fortress impregnable for us when our party leads the people with the *ever-victorious Juche-oriented strategy and tactics* and when all the people turn out as one under the party's leadership.[40]

When the leader and the Party are destined to guide the people with the use of the "ever-victorious Juche-oriented strategy", the issue of loyalty and filial piety, fundamental Confucian concepts, towards the leader and the Party goes without saying: The issue of loyalty and filial piety to the party and the leader is crucial in carrying out the historical process of the revolution of the working classes,[41] since the leader takes upon himself

this almost messianic role of guiding the chosen people, the ones who are destined to prevail.

4. How this Scheme is Legitimizing North Korea's Regime as a Political Religion

Although officially *Juche* is a "revolutionary new atheistic philosophy" and any remote association with religion is strongly denied, it undoubtedly acquired a dimension beyond the realm of the secular, which is easy to identify if we take as reference the following:

> By taking over the religious dimension and acquiring a sacred nature, politics went so far as to claim for itself the prerogative to determine the meaning and fundamental aim of human existence for individuals and the collectivity, at least on this earth. A religion of politics is created every time a political entity such as a nation, state, race, class, party or movement is transformed into a sacred entity, which means it becomes transcendent, unchallengeable, and intangible. As such, it becomes the core of an elaborate system of beliefs, myths, values, commandments, rituals and symbols, and consequently an object of faith, reverence, veneration, loyalty and devotion, for which, if necessary, people are willing to sacrifice their lives. The resulting religion of politics is *a system of beliefs, myths, rituals and symbols that interpret and define the meaning and end of human existence by subordinating the destiny of individuals and the collectivity to a supreme entity.* (Emilio Gentile, 2006)[42]

In his commentaries on the idea of *Juche*, Kim Jong Il clearly states that *Juche* is not a religion and he denies the existence of a god, but at the same time he attaches spiritual qualities to the ideology. One such an element is the concept of an "immortal socio-political life": "The physical life of an individual person is finite, but the integrity of the masses rallied as an independent socio-political organism is immortal." (Kim Jong Il, 1987)[43]

This idea is used in relation to that of the "sage ruler" (of the past), especially after Kim Il Seong's death, in order to initiate the worship of the "sun leader" and father of the nation, who, like the sage kings of the golden past when the world was ruled by the power of ethical virtues, was endowed with Heaven's mandate to rule. The cult of personality is thus weaved into the philosophical commentaries on *Juche*, in a two-way strategy: the father (Kim Il Seong) made use of the Confucian concepts in

order to ensure the hereditary succession for the son, destined to rule over the new people (the socialist new man of North Korea), the son (Kim Jong Il) makes use of the same strategy in order to encourage the worshiping of the father and to create a "sacred history" for this new chosen people. This fits into the pattern of a classic process of sacralisation of politics (which is also broadly called secular religion or political religion of pseudo religion, ersatz Religion) that Emilio Gentile attaches to the creation of totalitarian regimes:

> This process takes place when, more or less elaborately and dogmatically, a political movement confers a sacred status on an earthly entity (the nation, the country, the state, humanity, society, race, proletariat, history, liberty or revolution) and renders it an absolute principle of collective existence, considers it the main source of values for individual and mass behaviour, and exalts it as the supreme ethical precept of public life. (E. Gentile, 2000)[44]

Seen from this perspective *Juche* ideology is a secular attempt to create a religious sense of state, of community in the same way Eric Voegelin sees Ancient Egypt pharaohs (namely Akhenaton)'s attempt to explain what he calls their little piece of reality divorced from the spiritual beyond, to which they reduced the human frame of reference.[45] Obviously the reference here is to National Socialism – the Führer and the people are almost spiritually chained together- but we can easily see its extent to Korean socialism, where the great leader- the people and the Party are one. In the good Confucian tradition, the leader has the task of "correctly guiding" the people, but towards the goal of building the socialist and communist society:

> The working-class party is the general staff of the revolution, and the leader of the working class is the foremost leader of the revolution. How the masses are awakened to consciousness and organized in a revolutionary way, and how they perform their revolutionary duties and historical mission, depend on whether or not they are given correct leadership by the party and the leader. Only when they receive correct guidance from the party and the leader, would the working class and the masses of other people be able to vigorously develop the deep-going and complicated revolutionary struggle to transform nature and society, achieve national and class liberation, build a socialist, communist society successfully, and run it properly. (Kim Jong Il, 1982)[46]

The successful creation of the communist society that Kim Jong Il states as final goal, under the guidance of a providential leader, results into a kind of "sacralisation of the collectivity",[47] which assumes in turn its providential destiny of following the providential leader that was "assigned" to it, making thus the hereditary transfer of power not only justified, but also "necessary".

Conclusions

Emilio Gentile claims that ideologies do not appear in cultural vacuum, but they spring from a culture, which precedes and predates any political ideology. The attempt to completely break away from any traditional thought and behavioural patterns is unrealistic and even stern ideologies such as *Juche* had to reconsider elements of traditional culture, such as Confucianism. At the same time, the ideologies and the institutions they create are affecting fundamentally the worldview of the societies that embrace them. In the case of North Korea, *Juche* ideology, the main tool in the process of the sacralisation of politics and the sacralisation of the collectivity gave additional birth to a form of defensive nationalism ("our own", "standing on our own") where any intersection with cultural elements from outside the *Juche* time or *Juche* space is perceived as an invasion and as such should not be allowed. The "martyrdom" of resisting the "foreign contamination" is best described in Kim Myong Ik's[48] poem *The People of Joseon* (조선사람들*Joseon saramdeul*):

> Even when we were tightening our belt
> We did not drink Coca-Cola.
> Even when we were drinking muddied water,
> At least we drank our own water.[49]

Juche ideology of North Korea is a religious system, "the guiding principle for all actions" as it is stipulated in the third article of North Korea's Constitution,[50] which fulfils all the criteria systemized by Gentile in his definition of political religions: "(a) define the meaning of life and ultimate ends of human existence; (b) formalize the commandments of a public ethic to which all members of this movement must adhere; and (c) give utter importance to the mythical and symbolic dramatization in their interpretation of history and reality, thus creating their own 'sacred

history', embodied in the nation, the state and the party and tied to the existence of a 'chosen people', which were glorified as the regenerating force of mankind." (Gentile, 2005)

Juche ideology is also an active institution, which evolves and adapts to times and to needs, and which serves its declared purpose of creating a socio-political theoretical frame for the advancement of the North Korean society, by using all means necessary, including resorting to elements of (common) Korean traditional culture for the legitimation of an "eternal" political power.

NOTES

[1]   Emilio Gentile, *Politics as Religion,* translated by George Staunton, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 2.

[2]   In the Introduction to *Political Religion beyond Totalitarianism. The Sacralization of Politics in the Age of Democracy* (2013), the editors found the role of the political religions at the heart of modern societies: "Any agent in modern politics, be it states, parties, politicians, pressure groups or newspapers, simply had to appeal to the masses and win their hearts and minds. This was done through messages that often used religious forms and language, providing meaning, coherence, identity, myths, rituals and a cleaner distinction between 'good' and 'evil'. While in many Western countries church and state were formally separated, ambitious political agents offered narratives which gave their adherents a feeling of belonging and a sense of meaning. Increasingly politics came to resemble belief systems which claimed to explain the purpose of human existence, thus creating what has been termed a 'secular religion'. Veneration and sacralisation became a characteristic of all forms of modern politics; of democracies, political leaders, the nation, the Aryan race and so on. Modern politics, it can be argued, has its own 'holy scriptures' (the American Constitution [1787], the *Communist Manifesto* [1848] or *Mein Kampf* [1925-26]), its own prophets (Karl Marx, Adam Smith or Abraham Lincoln) and its own martyrs (Martin Luther King, Horts Wessel or Mahatma Ghandi). In the western world, since the late eighteen century, people thus often came to experience 'politics as religion', pp. 1-2.

[3]   Kim Il-Sung or Kim Ir Sen (1912-1994), referred to by the North Korean Government as The Great Leader or Supreme Leader (위대한 수령, *widaehan suryeong*), assumed office between 1948-1994 and was named in the North Korean constitution "the Ethernal President of the republic" (공화국의 영원한 주석 *gonghwagukeui yeongwonhan juseok*) in 1998. As a result of the constitutional changes of 1998, the title of President of North Korea is no longer used, after the death of Kim Il Seong in 1994. Instead, the current head of state, Kim Jong Eun, has the title of Supreme Leader.

[4]   Kim Jong Il (1941-2011), Kim Il Seong's son and the Supreme Leader of DPRK between 1994-2011.

[5]   Hale (2002), Lee (2003), Shin (2007), etc.

[6]   According to Chung Young-Soon in *The Resurrection of Confucianism in North Korea* (2010) this was on December 28, 1955, in an address at a mass campaign organized by the communist party.

[7]   Tai Sung An, *North Korea in Transition: From Dictatorship to Dynasty*, Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1983.

[8]   Li Yuk Sa, ed. *Juche! The Speeches and Writings of Kim Il Sung,* Grossman, 1972, p. 157

9   Kim Il Sung first spoke about this two concepts on Feb. 8, 1963, at the 15th anniversary of the founding of Korean People's Army.

10   According to North Korean agencies, quoted by Bruce Cumings, Kim announced the idea of *chawi* on Oct. 5, 1963, at the graduating ceremony of Kim Il Sung Military Academy.

11   As identified by many scholars among which Chung Young Soon, 2012.

12   Cristopher Hale, for instance, in "Multifunctional *Juche*: A Study of the Changing Dynamic between *Juche* and the State Constitution in North Korea" in *Korea Journal*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Autumn 2002), pp. 283-308.

13   Kim Jong Eun or Kim Jong-un (according to the North Korean official sources born in 1982) is the grandson of Kim Il Seong and the son of Kim Jong Il and his successor to power. He assumed office in 2011.

14   *Joseon tongsa* in the collection of *Joseon Minjujueui Inmin Gonghwaguk Ryeoksa Yeonguso,* 1958, pp. 439-440.

15   Kim Il Seong, "Sasang saeopeseo gyojojeuiwa hyeongsikjueuireul toejihago juchereul hwakribhale daehayeo", in *Kim Il Seong jeojak jeonjip*, Pyeongyang, Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1967.

16   Chung (2010), p. 76.

17   *Id.*

18   Although there is much evidence of Kim Il Seong's ideological debt to Mao Zedong's political thought, Kim was never willing to acknowledge it, hence the recognition of the Marxist-Leninist tradition only. The alliance with China is a tense one, North Korea failing to be a grateful nation to its ally after the Korean War: China's assistance during the war is not celebrated in extravagant monuments like the ones dedicated to the Soviet Union, no statues are dedicated to Mao Zedong or Peng Dehui and Mao Anying (Mao's son who died during the Korean war)'s remains have not been returned to China (Han Hongkoo, "Colonial Origins of Juche. The Minsaengdan Incident of the 1930s and the Birth of the North Korea-China Relationship" in *Originis of North Korea's Juche*, Suh Jae-Jung, ed., Lexington Books 2013, p. 11.

19   Suh, Jae-Jung, "Making Self of North Korea's Juche as an Institution" in *id.*, p. 11.

20   *On the Juche Idea* - Treatise Sent to the National Seminar on the Juche Idea Held to Mark the 70th Birthday of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung March 31, 1982.

21   *Op. cit.* in Chung (2010), p.76.

22   Namely, the United States.

23   Suh (2013), p. 9.

24   The Religion of the Heavenly Way, originally called Donghak (Eastern Learning), "Korea's oldest indigenous organized religion, dating back to 1860", similar in its practices and terminology with aspects of Shamanism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Catholicism. Baker (2007), p. 449.

[25] Yi Hwang李滉(1501-1570) , known under his scholarly name Toegye 退溪 (Retreating Creek), is one of the most prominent Confucian scholars of the 16th century Joseon kingdom. Dubed the "Zhu Xi of Korea" he has massively synthetised, organized, made in-depth anylysis and theorized on the works of the Chinese master Zhu Xi (1130-1200).

[26] Yi I 李珥 (1536-1584), also called Yulgok 栗谷(Chesnut Valley), philospher and social reformer, is notoriously known as Toegye's ideological rival. He followed the teachings of the Chinese master Wang Yang Ming (1472-1529).

[27] Mary Evelyn Tucker, Introduction to the *Confucian Spirituality* (2004).

[28] This is what many scholars call "Confucian humanism".

[29] Socialism began in Korea around 1920s.

[30] Op. cit. in Chung (2010), p. 71.

[31] The writings of Toegye were considered in North Korea "backward and feudal" (Chung, 2010, p. 80).

[32] Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun,* 2005.

[33] "Le pari sur l'homme", Anne Cheng, *Histoire de la pensée chinoise*, 1997.

[34] Op. cit. in Chung (2010), p. 78.

[35] Zhu Xi, *id.*, p. 79.

[36] Kim Jong Il, *On the Juche Idea*, pdf, p. 7 on www.korea-dpr.com. In his speech *On the* Juche *Idea of Our Party from 1985, the idea is obsessively repeated:* "Late President Kim Il Sung created Juche idea after acquiring a deep insight into the requirements of a new era when the oppressed and the humiliated masses of the people became masters of their destiny. Thus he developed their struggle for *Chajusong* onto a higher plane and opened up the age of *Juche*, a new era in the development of human history… The revolutionary idea of the working class emerges as the reflection of the mature demand of history and the revolution in their development. In order to advance the revolution under the new historical conditions, the revolution in each country should be carried out responsibly by its own people, the masters, in an independent manner, and in a creative way suitable to its specific conditions. It is the essence of Juche idea. The Juche idea is a new philosophical thought which centres on man. It raised the fundamental question of philosophy by regarding man as the main factor, and elucidated the philosophical principle that man is the master of everything and decides everything .The philosophical principle of the Juche idea is the principle of man-centred philosophy which explains man's position and role in the world. That man is master of everything means that he is the master of [the] world and plays the decisive role in transforming the world and in shaping his destiny. Establishing Juche in ideology is the primary requirement of the masses' struggle for *Chajusong.* The revolution and construction are man's conscious activities. Establishing Juche in thinking, therefore, is the only way to establish Juche in politics, economy, defence, and all other domains. The

Juche idea was created by the late President Kim Il Sung and is developed and enriched by General Secretary Kim Jong Il." [KCNA]

37   *Op. cit.* in Chung (2010), p. 80.
38   *Id.*
39   Kim Jong Il, *Socialism of our country is a Socialism of our style as the embodiment of the Juche idea*, p. 7, on www.cnet-ta.ne.jp/juche/default. htm
40   "Political Ideology: The Role of Chuch'e", *Country Missing*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Library of Congress, 1993.
41   Chung (2010), p. 80.
42   Emilio Gentile. *Politics as Religion,* translated by George Staunton, Princeton University, Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2006, p. xiv.
43   Kim Jong Il, *On some problems of education in the Juche idea*, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987, p. 19.
44   Emilio Gentile, "The Sacralisation of Politics: Definitions, Interpretations and Reflections on the question of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism", in *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religion*, Vol. 1, No.1/ Summer 2000, p. 18.
45   Paraphrase from Eric Voegelin, *Religiile politice* (*The Political Religions*), trad. Bogdan Ivașcu, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2010.
46   Kim Jong Il, *On the Juche Idea*, pdf., pp.14-15.
47   Eric Voegelin in 1938, in *Political Religions*, with reference to Fascism.
48   Member of North Korea's Writers Federation.
49   http://tongilgs.org/board/view. php?&bbs_id=cu01&page=2&doc_num=21
50   *Juche – A Christian Study of North Korea's State Religion*, Thomas J. Belke, Living Sacrifice Book Company, Bartlesville, OK, 1999.

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