

New Europe College Yearbook 2015-2016



LORENZO M. CIOLFI
ERIN CORBER
ÁGNES GAGYI
UKU LEMBER
JAMES MADAIO
CRISTIANA OGHINĂ-PAVIE
BLAKE SMITH
ALIX WINTER

New Europe College
Yearbook 2015-2016

Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

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NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

New Europe College (NEC) is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997–1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 700 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary

dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:

- ***NEC Fellowships (since 1994)***

Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- ***Ștefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)***

The Fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the *Odobleja* Fellowships are integrated.

- ***The Pontica Magna Fellowship Program (since October 2015)***

This Fellowship Program, supported by the VolkswagenStiftung (Germany), invites young researchers, media professionals, writers and artists from the countries around the Black Sea, but also beyond it (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine), for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows,

the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of this region. This program is therefore strongly linked to the former *Black Sea Link* Fellowships.

- ***The Pontica Magna Returning Fellows Program (since March 2016)***

In the framework of its *Pontica Magna* Program, New Europe College offers alumni of the *Black Sea Link* and *Pontica Magna* Fellowship Programs the opportunity to apply for a research stay of one or two months in Bucharest. The stay should enable successful applicants to refresh their research experience at NEC, to reconnect with former contacts, and to establish new connections with current Fellows. The *Pontica Magna Returning Fellows* Program targets young researchers, media professionals, writers and artists from the countries around the Black Sea: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

- ***The Gerda Henkel Fellowship Program (since March 2017)***

This Fellowship Program, developed with the support of Gerda Henkel Stiftung (Germany), invites young researchers and academics working in the fields of humanities and social sciences (in particular archaeology, art history, historical Islamic studies, history, history of law, history of science, prehistory and early history) from Afghanistan, Belarus, China (only Tibet and Xinjiang Autonomous Regions), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

- ***How to Teach Europe Fellowship Program (since April 2017)***

This Program, supported by the Robert Bosch Foundation and a Private Foundation from Germany, introduces a new and innovative Fellowship module at the Centre for Advanced Study (CAS), Sofia, and the New Europe College (NEC), Bucharest. Beyond the promotion of outstanding individual researchers, the Program focuses on the intersection of fundamental research and higher education. The joint initiative seeks to identify and bring together bright and motivated young and established university professors from South-eastern Europe to dedicate themselves for a certain amount of time to research work

oriented toward a specific goal: to lend the state-of-the-art theories and methodologies in the humanities and social sciences a pan-European and/or global dimension and to apply these findings in higher education and the transmission of knowledge to wider audiences.

The goal of the proposed program is to use this knowledge to improve the quality of higher education in the humanities and social sciences and to endorse its public relevance. A tangible output will be the conceptualization of a series of new courses or, ultimately and ideally, the development of innovative curricula for the universities of the participating scholars.

- ***The Spiru Haret Fellowship Program (since October 2017)***

The *Spiru Haret* Fellowship Program targets young Romanian researchers/academics in the humanities and social sciences whose projects address questions relating to migration, displacement, diaspora. Candidates are expected to focus on Romanian cases seen in a larger historical, geographical and political context, in thus broadening our understanding of contemporary developments. Such aspects as transnational mobility, the development of communication technologies and of digitization, public policies on migration, ways of employing transnational communities, migrant routes, the migrants' remittances and entrepreneurial capital could be taken into account. NEC also welcomes projects which look at cultural phenomena (in literature, visual arts, music etc.) related to migration and diaspora. The Program is financed through a grant from UEFISCDI (The Romanian Executive Unit for Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation Funding).

Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of New Europe College:

- ***RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)***

The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual

allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach activities involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

- ***The NEC–LINK Program (2003 - 2009)***

Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj–Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

- ***The GE–NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)***

New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10-month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend, and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE–NEC Yearbooks series.

- ***NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)***

In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South–Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one–month research trip abroad. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

- ***The Britannia–NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)***

This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

- ***The Petre Țuțea Fellowships (2006 – 2008, 2009 - 2010)***

In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government through its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College's community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Țuțea* Program publications.

- ***Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)***

This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*,

Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South–Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

- ***Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)***

This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

- ***The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (2009 - 2013)***

This program, supported by the Getty Foundation, started in 2009. It proposed a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows. As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program also included a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence was meant to ensure a comparative dimension, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

- ***The Black Sea Link Fellowships Program (2010 - 2015)***

This program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, supported young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they had the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomed a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organized within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of the Black Sea region.

- ***The Europe next to Europe Fellowship Program (2013 - 2017)***

This Program, supported by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden), invites young researchers from European countries that are not yet members of the European Union, or which have a less consolidated position within it, targeting in particular the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia), Turkey, Cyprus, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

Beside the above-described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

In the past:

- ***The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)***

Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in

the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different confessions within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

- ***The Septuagint Translation Project (2002 - 2011)***

This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul*. Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

- ***The Excellency Network Germany – South–Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***

The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South–Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

- ***The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research***

An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources (2006-2008)

The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von

Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for Education and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility, connectedness and exploitation of some of the most prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the “Constantin Brăiloiu” Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin..

- ***Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances.*** This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled ***Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and eastern Europe***, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (December 2009 – November 2012)
- ***The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon*** (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (December 2009 - November 2014)
- ***The EURIAS Fellowship Program***, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-financed by the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar. (October 2011 – July 2014)

Research programs developed with the financial support of the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, through the *Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation – UEFISCDI*):

- ***DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (2011)
- ***UEFISCCDI – CNCS (PD – Projects): Federalism or Intergovernmentalism? Normative Perspectives on the Democratic Model of the European Union (Dr. Dan LAZEA); The Political Radicalization of the Kantian Idea of Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense (Dr. Áron TELEGDI-CSETRI)*** (August 2010 – July 2012)
- ***Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (March 2011 – September 2012)
- ***TE-Project: Critical Foundations of Contemporary Cosmopolitanism***, Team leader: Tamara CĂRĂUȘ, Members of the team: Áron Zsolt TELEGDI-CSETRI, Dan Dorin LAZEA, Camil PÂRVU (October 2011 – October 2014)
- ***PD-Project: Mircea Eliade between Indology and History of Religions. From Yoga to Shamanism and Archaic Religiosity (Liviu BORDAȘ)***
Timeframe: May 1, 2013 – October 31, 2015 (2 and ½ years)
- ***IDEI-Project: Models of Producing and Disseminating Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: The Cartesian Framework***
Project Coordinator: Vlad ALEXANDRESCU
(1 Project Coordinator, 2 Researchers, 2 Research Assistants)
Timeframe: January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2016 (5 Years)

- **TE–Project: *Pluralization of the Public Sphere. Art Exhibitions in Romania in the Timeframe 1968-1989***
Project Coordinator: Cristian NAE
(1 Project Coordinator, 1 Researcher, 2 Research Assistants)
Timeframe: October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016 (1 Year)
- **Bilateral Cooperation: *Corruption and Politics in France and Romania (contemporary times)***
Project Coordinator: Silvia MARTON
(1 Project Coordinator, 7 Researchers)
Timeframe: January 1, 2015 – December 31, 2016 (2 Years)
- **TE–Project: *Museums and Controversial Collections. Politics and Policies of Heritage Making in Post-colonial and Post-socialist Contexts***
Project Coordinator: Damiana OȚOIU
(1 Project Coordinator, 5 Researchers)
Timeframe: October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2017 (2 Years)
- **TE–Project: *Turning Global: Socialist Experts during the Cold War (1960s-1980s)***
Project Coordinator: Bogdan IACOB
(1 Project Coordinator, 2 Researchers, 2 Research Assistants)
Timeframe: October 1, 2015 – November 30, 2017 (2 Years and 2 Months)

ERC Grants:

- **ERC Starting Grant**
(Grant transferred by the Principal Investigator to the University of Bucharest)
Record-keeping, fiscal reform, and the rise of institutional accountability in late medieval Savoy: a source-oriented approach – Castellany Accounts
Principal Investigator: Ionuț EPURESCU-PASCOVICI
Timeframe at the NEC: May 1, 2015 – March 31, 2017 (1 Year and 10 Months)
Timeframe of the Grant: May 1, 2015 – April 30, 2020 (5 Years)

Ongoing projects:

ERC Grants:

- **ERC Consolidator Grant**

Luxury, fashion and social status in Early Modern South Eastern Europe

Principal Investigator: Constanța VINTILĂ-GHIȚULESCU

(1 Principal Investigator, 8 Researchers)

Timeframe: July 1, 2015 – June 30, 2020 (5 Years)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

Focus Groups

- *Culture in Murky Times*
- Focus Group on Education and Research
- *New World Disorder*

The Focus Groups are financed by two grants of the *Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation* – UEFISCDI, within the *Prize for Excellence in Research* awarded to Romanian Host Institutions of research projects financed by European Research Council in 2014 – 2016.

Research Groups

- Reflections on the Political History of the 18th and 19th Century in Romania
- The Bible in Linguistic Context: Introduction to the Biblical Hebrew
- The Bible in Linguistic Context: Introduction to the Coptic Language

Present Financial Support

The State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation of Switzerland through the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University of St. Gallen

The Ministry of National Education – The Executive Agency for Higher Education and Research Funding, Romania

Landis & Gyr Stiftung, Zug, Switzerland

Private Foundations, Germany

Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Köln, Germany

VolkswagenStiftung, Hanover, Germany

Gerda Henkel Stiftung, Düsseldorf, Germany

Robert Bosch Stiftung, Stuttgart, Germany

European Research Council (ERC)

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
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LORENZO M. CIOLFI

Born in 1986, in Roma

Doctorant/chercheur in Byzantine Civilisation, EHESS – Paris (France)

*Dissertation: John III Vatatzes' Βίαι and the problem
of Byzantine imperial sainthood*

A.G. Leventis Foundation Fellow (2012-2015)

Participation to international conferences and symposia in Austria, Belgium,
Canada, France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom and U.S.A.

Articles and translations published in the fields
of Byzantine Studies and Pseudepigraphy

Leader of the project for a new critical edition
of Michael and Arsenius Apostolis' *Violarium*

Member of the editorial board of *Porphyra*,
an international e-journal in Byzantine Studies

NOT ANOTHER CONSTANTINE. RETHINKING IMPERIAL SAINTHOOD THROUGH THE CASE OF JOHN III VATATZES

Abstract

It has been generally assumed that the Byzantine emperor John III Doukas Vatatzes – today venerated as a saint by the Orthodox Church – was formally canonized soon after his death in the second half of the thirteenth century. This paper aims to challenge this widely accepted notion by exploring the phenomenon of Byzantine imperial sainthood through the extraordinary case of Constantine I and the presence of emperors in the *Synaxarium* of Constantinople. By looking into accounts that offer literary representations of John III, the paper then moves towards a contextualization of the canonization of this Byzantine sovereign, with a particular focus on his ‘reappearances’ during important historical moments for the Greek communities.

Keywords: John III Vatatzes, Constantine the Great, Byzantine Imperial Sainthood, Constantinopolitan *Synaxarium*, Modern Greek Identity.

John III Doukas Vatatzes (1222-54) is the only Byzantine emperor – apart from Constantine I (306-37) – still venerated as a saint by the Orthodox Church. Not only does he have a church dedicated to him in Didymoteicho, but since 2010 he is also celebrated every November 4, during the *Vatatzeia* festivals organized there by the local metropolitan. It has been largely assumed, probably as a result of John III’s reception today, that this Nicene emperor, who was venerated for his charity and philanthropy locally, also obtained his saintly recognition by the Church in the years immediately after his death. However, as I will demonstrate in this paper, the phenomenon of Vatatzes’ canonization was a complex process and, as such, it needs to be reconsidered.

A discussion on the saintly recognition of Vatatzes is important not merely because we have to clarify the status he held soon after his death,

but also because his case can throw more light on the question of Byzantine imperial sainthood in general.

In order to better understand the dynamics of Vatatzes' canonization, his long-lasting presence in political-social-historical issues, and also to clarify some aspects of his representations that have been hitherto misunderstood, I will briefly refer to the case of Constantine the Great and of his successors listed in the Constantinopolitan *Synaxarium*. Against this background I will reevaluate a few, rather neglected texts on Vatatzes and move towards the reconstruction of the important stages of Vatatzes' trajectory and his continuous reappearances, from the margins of the Byzantine Empire to the center of the modern Greek nationhood: from sovereign to heavenly protector, from patron saint to identity symbol, from patriotic manifesto to living politicized legend.¹

Constantine the Great: a special status for an extraordinary figure

May 22, 337: Constantine died not far away from the city of Nicomedia. Eusebius of Caesarea, the first Christian biographer, at the end of the prologue of his work on that emperor tells us that the ruler could be openly considered blessed for his deeds only after his death:

“τοῦ καιροῦ λοιπὸν ἐπιτρέποντος ἀκωλύτως παντοίαις φωναῖς τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς μακάριον ἀνυμνεῖν, ὅτι μὴ τοῦτο πράττειν ἐξῆν πρὸ τούτου, τῷ μὴ μακαρίζειν ἄνδρα πρὸ τελευτῆς διὰ τὸ τῆς τοῦ βίου τροπῆς ἄδηλον παρηγγέλθαι”

*the occasion demands that I offer unrestrained praises in varied words of the truly Blessed One. It was not possible to do this in the past, for we are forbidden to call any man blessed before his death in view of the uncertainty of life's changes.*²

During Constantine's lifetime, various forms of veneration of the first Christian emperor had already been initiated, although traces of these phenomena subsequently disappeared – more or less intentionally – from ancient historiography. However, problems in the definition of Constantine's saintly status emerged suddenly after his death. In Rome, during the funeral held *in absentia*, the senatorial tradition bestowed deification on Constantine through the customary *relatio in numerum divorum*.³ In Constantinople, on the other hand, Christian liturgical practice

needed to develop a completely new ritual for a Roman sovereign who had been baptized. This innovative protocol fused together several different elements: a senatorial procession led by the successor Constantius II (337-61), the celebration of a Mass, and the burial in the Constantinopolitan Church of the Holy Apostles – built by Constantine himself likely as his own tomb. This aspect of the Eastern ceremony, especially, was intended as the emperor's co-optation among the Apostles, as points out the introduction of the epithet "ἰσαπóstολος" (*equal to the Apostles*), or even as his identification with Christ. Such a situation bestowed on Constantine an organic blend of apotheosis and sanctification.⁴

The sanctification grew between the fourth and fifth centuries at the expense of apotheosis, a Roman institution that was naturally and gradually phased out. The events that marked the history of the Mediterranean during Late Antiquity, then, led Constantine's reception to a slow but inexorable divergence. In the West, the Church established ethical and religious rules which were no longer compatible with some aspects of Constantine as a historical figure;⁵ in the East, instead, his cult took root, albeit slowly and mainly for the reason to prevent the overflow of the secular power onto the spiritual one, even though the ecclesiastical hierarchy did not accept the cult fully and attempted to prevent its spread in favor of newer models.⁶

During the fifth century, there was a general rethinking of Constantine's figure and his role in history. From this period onward, Constantine becomes unequivocally *Saint Constantine*. However, we know only a little about the earliest forms of his veneration.⁷ If his feast date was immediately set to May 21, almost coinciding to that of his death as recorded in the *Synaxarium*,⁸ the physical location of his cult seems more uncertain: Philostorgius' *Ecclesiastical History* indicates as the cult center the porphyry column that Constantine erected at the center of his Forum when he founded the city,⁹ while Theodoret reported a cult linked directly to the emperor's burial site.¹⁰ From these brief references, we can probably assume that, from its imperial origin, this cult developed in the capital of the Empire as that of a patron saint and spread throughout Byzantium in the beginning of the tenth century, when the liturgy of Constantinople spread in the provinces of the empire.

On closer inspection, the image of Constantine, which was imposed from the representation that Eusebius sketched out, is actually quite removed from the historical figure.¹¹ In fact, it is focused mainly on Christian themes and is inextricably linked to the figure of Helena, Constantine's mother: the emperor is presented as the defender of the true

faith against pagans and heretics; he is concerned with the founding of churches and basilicas in honor of God and with the collection of relics; moreover, he was responsible for the discovery of the Holy Cross and the convention of the Council of Nicaea.¹² Any sense of continuity with the Roman tradition recedes into the background, giving place to the idea that Constantine was the *first emperor*, as we can see in the *Typikon* of the Great Church.¹³ From history, we have now arrived to a legend.¹⁴

It is therefore not by chance that any renewal, actively desired or merely advertised by Byzantine emperors, was accompanied by the concept and title of “νέος Κωνσταντῖνος” (*new Constantine*). So it was with Heraclius (610-41), victor over the Persians and avenger of the abduction of the Holy Cross, as well as with Michael VIII Palaiologos (1261-82), who ripped the capital from the hands of the Latins in 1261 and inaugurated a new dynasty.¹⁵ The last Byzantine emperor, Constantine XI (1449-53), also takes part in this tradition by the fact that his name in itself symbolizes the hope of the Empire’s resurrection, as it appears in the so-called legend of the “μαρμαρωμένος βασιλιάς” (*petrified emperor*).¹⁶

The name of Constantine the Great was, and it still is, widely spread in Greek onomastics; countless churches and places of worship are dedicated to him; his image is perfectly crystallized in the iconography; and many events and folklore festivals are associated with him, among which the *Anastenaria*, a traditional fire-walking ritual.¹⁷ All this led him to play a unifying role between the official and the popular spheres of medieval Greek civilization, with the result that this social phenomenon is perhaps one of the hallmarks of Byzantium throughout the course of its history.

On the base of these considerations, it seems fair – as K. Pitsakis already has pointed out – to correct R. Janin’s statement:

“Constantin, premier empereur chrétien, fut considéré comme saint par l’Eglise grecque, malgré toutes les réserves qui s’imposaient”.¹⁸

In fact, no misgivings about Constantine’s holiness seem to have ever existed.

Emperors in the Constantinopolitan *Synaxarium*

Constantine’s sainthood and cult remained an anomaly in Byzantium, except for the cases of several empresses – which are beyond of the scope

of this paper. His attributed holiness was not a hereditary element for his successors, who did not have the honor of true veneration, another characteristic which clearly distinguished them from their Western counterparts.

It should be remembered that, as it was in the early Church tradition, in Byzantium an official protocol of canonization never existed except, perhaps, in the very last years of the Empire.¹⁹ In fact, the concept of 'saint' and/or 'sainthood' was not a juridical category for the Byzantines: all Orthodox are considered equally as 'saints to be', and given that God perfectly knows his own saints, there need be no demarcation between the dead and the saints. The memory of some particular figures then is only intended to be exemplary and educational. In contrast to the impositions that the Papacy regulated in the tenth and eleventh centuries,²⁰ the Eastern Church was generally content with the recognition of personalities, whose cult was already acclaimed locally by smaller communities and around whom a set of liturgical texts was already built up, adding their names in the local Church *Synaxarium*, "the liturgical book that contains the collection of hagiographical notices arranged in accordance with the Byzantine civil calendar".²¹ In any case, it is worth noting that this latter was not only the container of a list of saints. The inclusion of events such as earthquakes and eclipses, which have nothing to do with religion and liturgy, points toward a different role than a sort of ratifying tool for sainthood: most likely, the celebration of the history of the Church and of human life through the Church, similarly to the one which J. Le Goff proposed as one of the basis of Jacobus de Voragine's *Golden Legend* for the Western cultural tradition.²²

Nevertheless, almost every Byzantine emperor until the first iconoclasm – and the reasons of the following change in the tradition remain to be explained – has been included in the *Synaxarium* of Constantinople, regardless of their virtues or personal merits, on the day of their burial. Apart from the sovereigns who were manifestly guilty of heresy, usurped the throne, or exercised their legitimate power in a tyrannical manner, we find the names of the following emperors and empresses (listed here in chronological order):²³

- May 21: *Constantine* (324-37) and *Helena* (ca. 250-ca. 330);
- Nov. 9: *Theodosius I* (379-95);
- Sep. 14: *Aelia Flacilla* († 386; Theodosius I's first wife);
- Jul. 30: *Theodosius II* (408-50);
- Aug. 13: *Aelia Eudocia* (ca. 401-60; Theodosius II's wife);

- Feb. 17: *Marcian* (450-7) and *Pulcheria*;
- Sep. 10: *Pulcheria* (398/9-453);
- Jan. 27: *Aelia Marcia Euphemia* (Marcian's daughter and Anthemius' wife);
- Jan. 15: *Leo I* (457-74);
- Aug. 22: *Aelia Ariadne* (ca. 450-515; Zenon and Anastasius I's wife);
- Aug. 2: *Justin I* (518-27);
- Nov. 14: *Justinian I* (527-65) and *Theodora* (ca. 500-48);
- Jul. 15: *Justin II* (565-78);
- Nov. 28: *Tiberius II Constantine* (578-82);
- Nov. 28: *Maurice* (582-602) and his children;
- Sep. 3: *Constantine IV* (668-85);
- Aug. 7: *Irene* (797-802) and *Pulcheria*;
- Feb. 11: *Theodora* (ca. 815-after 867; Theophilus' wife);
- Dec. 16: *Theophano Martiniake* († 893; Leo VI's first wife);
- Aug. 13: *Irene of Hungary* (1088-1134; John II Komnenos' wife).

In this respect, it is important to add that the imperial couple Justinian-Theodora is also celebrated as founders in the monastery of St. Catherine in the Sinai Peninsula, while Nikephoros II Phokas (963-9) and John I Tzimiskes (969-76), who are not included in the *Synaxarium*, are remembered for the same reasons, respectively, in the Great Lavra and the Iviron monasteries on Mount Athos.²⁴

We report here three of the entries from the liturgical book just to have a general idea of their style and content – so far from the form of an official recognition of sainthood:

- Theodosius I: “καὶ μνήμη τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοδοσίου τοῦ βασιλέως ἐν τοῖς Ἁγίοις Ἀποστόλοις”, and remembrance of the emperor Theodosius the Great, in the Church of the Holy Apostles;
- Justin I: “καὶ τοῦ ἐν εὐσεβεῖ τῇ μνήμῃ γενομένου βασιλέως Ἰουστινιανοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις Ἀποστόλοις”, and [remembrance] of the emperor Justin of happy memory, in the Church of the Holy Apostles;
- Constantine IV: “καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις βασιλέως Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ νέου ἐν τοῖς Ἀποστόλοις” and [remembrance] of Constantine the young, who is among the saints, in the Church of the Holy Apostles.²⁵

Editing the *Synaxarium*, H. Delehayé has already questioned the value of the imperial mentions in the collection: he believed that these should be interpreted rather as “commemorationes liturgicae an vero necrologicae” (*liturgical or funerary memories*), without any reference to sanctioned

holiness; he also remarked that, in a special commemoration of Justinian and Theodora in the codex Sinaiticus gr. 285's *Typikon*, the τροπάριον referring to the ruling couple was inserted directly and normally into the common liturgy for the dead. Moreover, to confirm this reconstruction, A. Luzzi records the scarcity of other liturgical literature, such as hymns and hagiographies, devoted to the Byzantine sovereigns.²⁶

The use of the term “ἅγιος” in reference to the emperors, thus, remains to be justified. Even if this appears equally *in vita* in the official titles and *in morte* in the introduction of the *synaxis*, it seems not to have connection with holiness. There would be, among others, two possible explanations for this. On one hand, in the first instance, the term “ἅγιος” (*saint*) not only provided the crowd's acclamation “Holy! Holy! Holy!” during the official coronation ceremony since the tenth century, but it may also have had a direct connection with the ritual of anointing, as of Old Testament kings;²⁷ on the other hand, in the second case, where the formula “ἐν ἁγίοις” often appears, there seems to be a direct reference to the office for the dead, when believers prayed that God place the soul of the deceased “μετὰ τῶν ἁγίων” (*among the saints*).²⁸

Finally, two failed attempts at sanctification demonstrate that imperial holiness did not exist in Byzantium or, at least, it was not an automatic attribute for the rulers. Firstly, the cult of Constantine, the eldest son of Basil I (867-86) who died prematurely, which was pursued by his father with the help of Patriarch Photios (858-67 and 877-86);²⁹ secondly, the establishment of a cult of Justinian I, during the reign of Alexius I Komnenos (1081-118) and the patriarchate of John IX Agapetus (1111-34).³⁰

The case of John III Vatatzes

In order to further discuss the phenomenon of John III Vatatzes as an emperor-saint of Byzantium, it is necessary to explore his canonization and the ways in which his worship took shape throughout the centuries. Let us begin by outlining the main steps of John III's afterlife, reevaluating some of the neglected literature on him.³¹

It is said by the chronicler George Akropolites that, perceiving the arrival of his own death, John III Vatatzes hastened toward his beloved imperial residence of Nymphaeum, a few tens of kilometres inland from the city of Smyrna.³² He died there on November 3, 1254, at the age of sixty-two, and his coffin was buried in the nearby monastery of Sosandra,

which the emperor himself had founded on the heights overlooking the city of Magnesia *ad Sipylum*.³³

Already in the second half of the thirteenth century, two different but complementary representations of Vatatzes' figure derived from his historical profile.³⁴ The first was created by and for court propaganda and aimed to overcome the complicated events that followed the prosperous years of John III. In fact, his son and successor Theodore II (1254-58) not only seemed to neglect the government affairs, preferring literature and culture, but also died suddenly after a brief four-year reign. Moreover, left in the hands of the young John IV (1258-61), the throne immediately attracted the attention of those who strived for power at all costs. Among those was the future emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos, a member of the aristocracy and figurehead of the Nicene court: he acted immediately, during Theodore II's funeral itself, killing the guardian of the royal scion, George Mouzalon (1220-58), and obliging patriarch Arsenios Autoreianos (1255-60 and 1261-7) to crown him as co-emperor at the end of the same year.

Those faithful to the Laskarid dynasty raised their voices, especially when the new ruler decided to replace that patriarch with the most condescending Nikephoros³⁵ and ordered the blinding of John IV, who was at that point definitely out of power games. By propaganda, then, the "new Constantine"³⁶ – as we have seen – tried to gain the favor of his subjects, a support that neither the overwhelming victory at Pelagonia (1259) nor the recapture of the capital (1261) had granted him. The Palaiologos, who had already attempted to marry Vatatzes' young widow, Anna/Constance of Hohenstaufen, so as to legitimize his aspirations, worked to connect himself to the Laskarids in the court's literary products, depicting himself as the direct descendant and heir of the Nicene sovereign.³⁷ Hereafter, even the burial and the promotion of John IV's veneration in the Constantinopolitan former imperial monastery of St. Demetrius, near Kontoskalion, during Andronicus II's kingdom (1282-1328) seems to be part of Palaeologan long-lasting strategy to please their political opponents through the public recognition of the virtues of their own favorite.³⁸

At the same time, however, the exaltation of John III's philanthropy and mercy enveloped his figure in a mythical aura, making him a legendary character close to the figure of a saint.³⁹ In the reconquered Constantinople, for example, Nikephoros Blemmydes and George Akropolites referred to these extraordinary characteristics of his, albeit with mild tones and

completely different purposes. Encomiastic for Blemmydes, for whom the Nicene sovereign outclassed all his predecessors:

“Ἰωάννης οὗτος ἦν ὁ δεδοξασμένος ὑπὲρ πολλοὺς βασιλέας ὑπὸ Θεοῦ”
*it was John, the one that God glorified above many other emperors;*⁴⁰

polemic for Akropolites, who used Vatatzes’ image to criticize his weak progeny in Michael VIII’s eyes:

“τοιούτος γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ὑπηκόους ἐφάνη καὶ οὕτως τοῖς ὑπὸ χεῖρας ἐχρήσατο, ὥς πάντας τὸν πατέρα μακαρίζειν καὶ βασιλεῖα”
*[Theodore II] was so bad to his subjects and he treated those under his control in such a way that they all called his father, the emperor, blessed.*⁴¹

More than this, the same kind of devotion inflamed by his legend gave birth to a deep worship in Lydia.⁴² It is easy to imagine that the veneration of John III, known probably already *in vita* with the nickname of “the Merciful”,⁴³ developed in a short time into liturgical celebrations on the occasion of his death anniversary and into devotional acts at his tomb. When the emperor’s coffin was transferred to Magnesia under the increasing threats of Ottoman campaigns, that city definitely became the center of Vatatzes’ veneration.

The first and only witness to the beginning of this local cult dates to the end of 1303. Magnesia was abandoned to its fate by Michael IX (1294/5-1320) when, during a siege, the brother of the *kastrophylax* Philanthropenos – anonymous for us –, deaf-mute from birth, received a revelation by which he was miraculously healed: the lamp that was frequently spotted at night wandering along the city walls was in fact the Nicene emperor. George Pachymeres reported:

“βλέπει οὖν ἐκεῖνος προσμένωνν οὐ λαμπάδα ἡμμένην, ἀλλ’ ἄνδρα βασιλικῶς ἐσταλμένον, τὰς μὲν αὐτῶν φυλακὰς οἷον ἐξουθενοῦντα αὐτὸν δὲ τὴν τῆς φυλακῆς ἐπιτροπὴν ἔχειν λέγοντα. [...] Προσπαίει δὲ πᾶσιν, ὅπερ καὶ ἀληθὲς ἦν, ἡ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐλεήμονος Ἰωάννου, καθὼς ἂν ὁ Λυδὸς εἴποι, ἐπιστασία, ἐν ᾗ παρὰ Θεοῦ φυλάττεσθαι ἐπιστεύοντο”

while waiting, the boy saw not only a lighted torch but also a regally dressed man, who regarded the guard as rather useless and said that the task of guarding was up to him. [...] The attention – a term that the Lydian might

have used – of the famous emperor John the Merciful, in whose protection they were entrusted by God, shocked everyone – and this was true indeed.⁴⁴

Vatatzes was considered then the divine protector of Hermus Valley, the patron saint of those defenseless subjects. However, this does not mean that in the meantime there was some kind of official recognition of his cult by the Church hierarchy; we do not have documents attesting his canonization during the Byzantine period.⁴⁵

Notwithstanding, in George of Pelagonia's *Life of the emperor St. John the Merciful*, which turned out to be a political pamphlet, a fierce critique of the contemporary ruling class, and a manifesto of the author's propositions for reform,⁴⁶ it is still possible to detect between the lines a substrate derived from the cult materials on John III, which were gathered over time in Magnesia and circulating throughout the Eastern provinces of the Empire. This appears in the recurring references to the religiosity of the sovereign, who was concerned not only about his own spirituality but also about the patrimony of the Church; it also emerges in the account of the miracle with which the *Bios* ends: Vatatzes' body, thrown contemptuously from the walls of Magnesia by his enemies, healed the paraplegia of a naive Muslim boy who had touched it while searching for treasure, and finally led him to the Orthodox faith:

“τοῦ δὲ τιμίου σώματος θίξαντι – ἡγνόει δὲ ὅτι εἶη – εὐθύς ἦτε πάσχουσα χεὶρ ἐκινήθη τό τε πρόσωπον εἰς τὸ καθεστηκὸς μετηνέχθη καὶ ὁποῦς εὐκίνητος ἦν. Ἄρτιος δὲ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπανελθὼν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς διηγεῖται. Καὶ μαθὼν ὅτου εἶη τὸ σῶμα, τῆς ἐκείνου γίνεται πίστeweς, πολλὴν ἀβελτηρίαν τῆς πατρῴας κατεγνωκῶς”

as he touched the venerable body, though ignorant of what it was, his afflicted hand moved immediately, his face returned to its proper form, and his foot became able to walk. Healed, he returned to his family and told them what had happened. And once he learned whose body it was, he converted to the ruler's religion, condemning the great folly of his fathers' beliefs.⁴⁷

A pious woman then rescued the emperor's body, around which formed the nucleus of a small place of worship. Two elements must be remarked upon: the consideration for the emperor's remains as a sort of relics already at this point and the presence of a little chapel dedicated exclusively to

John III, which survived until 1922 along the right aisle of Turkish Manisa St. Athanasius cathedral.⁴⁸

From the evidence offered so far, we can assume that the official recognition of John III's was a phenomenon which took place outside the time and spaces of Byzantium.⁴⁹ In order to determine the dynamics and purposes of this phenomenon it is important to explore the position of the Christian communities of Western Anatolia under Ottoman rule.

Between late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, problems in the Byzantine western provinces averted the emperors' attention away from Asia Minor, where the Ottoman armies advanced easily and consolidated their positions. According to Pachymeres' *History*, the consequent dangers in everyday life then pushed the native subjects who survived the slaughters to abandon their land:⁵⁰ grabbing the bare essentials, some fled to the West and to the Aegean islands facing the coast (Tenedos, Lesbos and, above all, Chios); others, outraged by the lack of protection from their rulers and inspired then by an anti-Constantinopolitan feeling, decided to voluntarily pass over to the enemy.⁵¹ The invasion of Tamerlane at the end of the century (1370-1405) was a further contribution to this migration.

Those Byzantines who remained in Lydia were firstly part of the Beylik of Saruhan, in which, however, they could live without major deprivation and participate in the urban revival that occurred in the Sixties and Seventies of fourteenth century;⁵² then they passed under the Ottoman Turks, who captured this area of Anatolia during the years of Mehmed I (1413-21). Notwithstanding, Magnesia continued to enjoy a certain wellbeing and privileged position in the region, and so did the few local Christians, who, having joined their metropolis to that of Ephesus, took a leading role towards their neighboring coreligionists in Smyrna (1469-70).⁵³

Together with those Greeks, John III's memory continued to survive after Byzantium. To this historical moment, a new starting point for their community in Asia Minor both on islands and in mainland, is linked the November 5 *akolouthia* dedicated to the martyrs St. Galaktion and St. Episteme and to St. John the emperor, copied over fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by an anonymous hand on the ff. 38v-47r of the Lesbiacus Leimonos 124 (*Menaion* for November).⁵⁴ In the thirty-five sections dedicated to the Nicene sovereign, in fact, the bond with his land appeared clearly by persistent references to the miraculous healings which took place at his tomb. The three fragments of the same liturgical hymns at f. 219v of the *British Library* Burney 54 (*Euchologion*) make this connection

even more obvious:⁵⁵ not only was this manuscript mainly penned by the metropolitan of Ephesus Sebastianos Argyropoulos (he left his subscription on May 19, 1573), but also the title associates clearly the text to the main center of Lydia.⁵⁶

More closely to the insular background is linked an anonymous post-Byzantine *Life of Vatatzes*, put together after June 29, 1659 and published without any indication regarding origin and provenance by another metropolitan of Ephesus, the erudite Agathangelos (1818-78). The narrative of this text, based on the same dossier of that of George of Pelagonia's Βίος, reserves a section – the final one – to a miracle story, which takes the cue from an icon of John III kept on the island of Tenedos.

During the entire seventeenth century, a new wave of migration started, but this time in the opposite direction: due mainly to an economic revival in the mainland, Greek populations from Thrace and the Aegean islands came back to western Anatolia and settled along its fertile valleys.⁵⁷ Magnesia was the perfect landing point for the newcomers and, thanks to a peculiar tax exemption, it soon became a densely populated commercial hub, primarily for the textile and tanning industries, then also for the emerging tobacco and cotton trade. Its growth was prevented only by the development of Smyrna as a colonial port, together with the increasing decline of activities in the inner region, generated by the arrival of merchants from abroad. Consequently, Greeks moved towards the coastline, where they specialized in the service industry: according to a 1640-1 Ottoman census, their community in the city was by far the most numerous among those of non-Muslims.⁵⁸

It was only in this context, when Patriarch Parthenios IV was in office (1657-62), that Vatatzes, whose figure was well established both in that territory and in the hearts of those Greeks, came to be canonized and entered the liturgical calendar of Constantinople. Unfortunately, the document relating to this decision has not been preserved and the only witness on this event is a brief mention by M. Gedeon.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, a further element supporting the strong relationship between Vatatzes and the Lydian region is the fact that, a century later, Nicodemus the Hagiorite (1749-1809) composed another *akolouthia* as well as the *Synaxarium* entry for the sanctified emperor: before moving to Mount Athos, he studied at the Evangelical School in Smyrna.

The reasons that determined the canonization of the Nicene ruler are of course varied and complex. From the point of view of the Magnesian community, in a minority and subordinate condition, canonization could

have contributed to creating a symbol with which to identify and in which to be recognized, from the foreigner but also from other neighboring groups of Christians: who in fact could combine love of country, economic success, military forcefulness – and this against the Turks too! – and religious devotion better than their local hero John Vatatzes? The pressure of the community on the Patriarchate to recognize an emblem, an identity symbol of cultural, ethnic and religious origins, might have also been catalyzed by the influence of the many Western representatives of the emerging European nations who, attracted there by both collective exotic imagination and fortune-making possibilities, had arrived in Smyrna with their backgrounds and revolutionary ideas, with their new political vocabulary and innovative worldviews.⁶⁰

But not simply this. Behind the patriarchal decision one can glimpse the logic of a purely political act, a resolute stance at a time of deep tensions between center and periphery within the Orthodox world. Christian elites far from the Bosphorus, who had acquired some economic power in trading and established a new range of values imbued by the Western European model,⁶¹ were pressing to have greater weight in decision-making and greater independence, while the Constantinopolitan patriarchate tried to keep the predominant role attributed to it by Gennadius Scholarius (1454-64).⁶² That this tension existed and involved directly the actors of Vatatzes' story is proved also by the fact that Parthenios IV, tied by strong interests to Asia Minor provinces, had to fight strongly to assert his authority and, in his attempt to ascend to the patriarchal throne for the fourth time, faced the opposition of Dionysius IV Muselimes, who in contrast had Constantinople as his main power-base. The canonization of Vatatzes could therefore be thought as a possible *trait d'union* between these two realities, a sort of peace-maker solution, in a double perspective: for the Constantinopolitan hierarchy, it offered an opportunity to reinforce that it was the only party to make decisions for the Orthodox world; for the community of Magnesia, instead, it could offer recognition for its distinctive characteristics through the official sanction of its 'patron saint'.⁶³

While moving towards a conclusion, it is worth recalling some aspects of the modern life of St. John Vatatzes which can clearly demonstrate the vitality and impact of this topic on the present and future research.

In fact, the Nicene emperor has become even more important to Greek identity and cultural memory since the second half of nineteenth century, when Greek historians exalted him as one of the major figures of their past and a vital junction in the survival of their roots, pivoting on the paternal

role already present in the Byzantine sources on him.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, the exact reasons of this exaltation still need to be investigated, even if it is predictable why Vatatzes' martial successes – among the latter recorded for the Byzantine era – and his contribution in safeguarding the Greek world after its fragmentation in 1204 were reinterpreted in such patriotic manner.⁶⁵ The power and the modernity of John III's legacy, however, is clearly demonstrated by the attempt of K. Amantos (1874-1960), a member of the Academy of Athens, who proposed an idea to depict John III in the Athenian Parliament.⁶⁶ In addition to this, several are the general public booklets and now websites dedicated to the Nicene emperor and sensationally entitled "St. Vatatzes" or "Father of the Greeks".

Moreover, a final return of the Nicene emperor dates to the beginning of the twenty-first century when, moving from the patriotic figure we just defined, some Greek nationalistic and right-wing circles reinterpreted Vatatzes' legacy in order to create a new version of the aforementioned legend of the "petrified emperor": after so many centuries, then, Vatatzes was brought back to life by nationalists combining hagiographic literature and the story of his aforementioned posthumous appearance in Magnesia, together with various apocalyptic legends as those of Leo the Wise and Ps.-Methodius, "to which the superstition [...] gave credence" since ever.⁶⁷ According to them, the person destined to wake up and scare away the 'infidels', giving back freedom to the Greeks, was indeed John III, and not Constantine XI Palaiologos, who is majestically celebrated in this role by A. Kaldaras' and S. Spanoudakis' songs as well as by K. Palamas' and O. Elytis' literary works.

A new starting point...

It should be apparent, even from the few examples presented here, that Constantine the Great was the only certain case of an emperor-saint during the whole Byzantine millennium. His exclusive sanctity may be explained firstly with the mythical role attributed to him as a founding 'father'; secondly, it is likely that his saintly status and peerlessness may have been used by other authorities as a mechanism for marking the gap and controlling the imperial power of his successors. Moreover, the fact that other Byzantine sovereigns have their names accompanied by the epithet "ἅγιος" in their own titles and in the *Synaxarium's* entries does not allow us to consider them as emperor-saints *stricto sensu*.

In light of these considerations and by relying on the aforementioned evidence, then, we can claim that Vatatzes did not constitute an exception within the Byzantine tradition: his official sanctification and the final recognition as emperor-saint were a rather local and post-Byzantine phenomenon.

Ruler by adoption during the years of the Empire of Nicaea, bridge towards the dynasty of the Palaiologoi, and emperor-saint *sui generis* for the Orthodox Church, John III Doukas Vatatzes is among the most significant and meaningful figures of Byzantium. Moreover, his symbolic repertoire has played an important role in the formation of the Greek national identity and, as such, paves the way for a new wave of scholarship, which would open up a broader debate on Byzantine imperial sainthood.

NOTES

- ¹ The present paper offers a general overview of some of the conclusions of my current Ph.D. research, focused both on the *Life of the Emperor St. John the Merciful* and on the life and works of George of Pelagonia (to the thesis I refer for any further detail). I would like to express my gratitude to Ch. Messis, K. Nikolovska, P. Odorico, S. Papaioannou and T. Shawcross for their encouragements, guidance and priceless suggestions. Unless otherwise mentioned, all translations are my own.
- ² EUSEBIUS CAESARIENSIS, *Life of Constantine*, 1.11.2 (ed. WINKELMANN; translation by CAMERON and HALL, p. 72). This idea was already present in the Roman tradition, as evidenced in Tacitus' *Ann.* 15.74.3: "deum honor principi non ante habetur, quam agere inter homines desierit", *the emperor is not granted a deity epithet before he has ceased to live among mortals* (ed. HALM, p. 365 ll. 2-4); as well as in Tertullian's *Apol.* 34.4: "maledictum est ante apotheosin deum Caesarem nuncupare", *it is a execration giving the name of God to an emperor before his apotheosis* (ed. DEKKERS, p. 144 ll. 17-8). See also SANSTERRE 1972.
- ³ However, it should be noted that in the Roman tradition the *divi* are different in nature from the *dii*, as evidenced in a brief comment of Servius (*In Aen.* 5.45): "divum et deorum indifferenter plerumque ponit poeta, quamquam sit discretio, ut deos perpetuos dicamus, divos ex hominibus factos, quasi qui diem obierint: unde divos etiam imperatores vocamus", *the poet [i.e. Virgil] usually employs 'of the divi' [divum] and 'of the dii' [deorum] indifferently, although there should be a distinction in that we call the immortals dii, whereas divi are created from men, inasmuch as they have ended their days, which is why we likewise call emperors divi* (ed. STOCKER and TRAVIS, p. 483 ll. 5-8).
- ⁴ See BONAMENTE 2011.
- ⁵ And this was one of the reasons why the Byzantine emperor did not officially enter in the liturgical celebrations of the Church of Rome but kept on been venerated till nowadays as a saint in marginal areas; due to the immigration of Greek communities over the centuries starting from the Late Antiquity, the cult is present only locally in Sardinia, Calabria, and Sicily (see SPADA 2013). Pietro Natali, a Western hagiographer living in the fourteenth century, showed how this phenomenon was perceived as something peculiarly Eastern: "Constantinus Magnus imperator sanctissimus quamvis a pluribus Latinorum iustus et sanctus reputetur a Graecis tamen in sanctorum catalogo expressius nominator", *the holiest emperor Constantine the Great, even if he is considered by most of Latins as just and saint, is mentioned unequivocally by the Greeks in the group of saints* (p. 26).
- ⁶ Perhaps this is revealed in [a] the removal of the imperial sarcophagus from the Holy Apostles in 358-59 (transferred to St. Acacius church; the body of

- the emperor returned to its original resting place only in 370, when the new mausoleum linked to the church was completed) and [b] the recognition of Theodosius the Great, welcomed in the *sanctorum consortia*, as a new imperial prototype.
- 7 Note that the first occurrence of Constantine in liturgical celebrations dates back to the period between 417 and 439, and refers to the Jerusalem ritual (see ZANETTI 1992-3).
- 8 See LUZZI 1992-3. Considering that the foundation of Constantinople was celebrated on May 21, and that in the same period we find different religious festivities, K. Pitsakis rightly speaks of “le mois de mai constantinopolitain” (PITSAKIS 2011, p. 179). It is also important to note that, even today, May 21 is a day of great social importance for Greece.
- 9 See PHILOSTORGIUS, *Kirchengeschichte*, fr. 17 ed. WINKELMANN.
- 10 Theodoretus (*Kirchengeschichte*, 34.1-3 ed. PARMENTIER) associates in the same sentence the cult to Constantine’s “ἀνδριᾶς” (*statue*), which should be interpreted as the one in the Forum (see the representation of the column in the Peutinger map). On the column “of Constantine” wrote John Malalas (7, ed. THURN) and, in a similar way to the chronicler’s, Anna Komnene in her *Alexiad* (12.4.5, ed. REINSCH and KAMBYLIS). This last passage shows that, although this was the intent, the attempt to Christianize the statue on top of the column never succeeded. After the fall of the statue, it was replaced with a simple cross (see, for example, the famous map of Constantinople in Cristoforo Buondelmonti’s narrative). Certainly before the accession of Leo VI (886-912), at the base of the column a chapel was built (see MANGO 1980-1, p. 108). Several relics were kept there: their identification and number are remembered, although with some hyperboles, only by popular rumours and by *Patria* tradition. Constantine VII’s *Book of Ceremonies* illustrates the liturgy that took place in that chapel. See now OUSTERHOUT 2014.
- 11 As Eusebius already did in his biography, the death sentence pronounced against his first-born son Crispus in 326, the mysterious ‘suicide’ of his second wife Fausta, the murder of the Neoplatonist philosopher Sopater of Apamea, and the adhesion to the Arianism were purposely hidden and lost in Constantine’s propagandistic representations.
- 12 Some of the questions here mentioned are carefully treated, with ample bibliography, in DRIJVERS 1992 and BARDILL 2012.
- 13 Here Constantine is namely “our first emperor” (ed. MATEOS, p. 296 l. 9); we find the same consideration in the hymnography (see GASSISI 1913).
- 14 “Le souvenir de Constantin, comme le fondateur de l’Empire chrétien, mais aussi comme le saint empereur par excellence, exemple de piété et de justice, protecteur de l’Eglise et de l’orthodoxie, a fait de lui le modèle du souverain chrétien orthodoxe” (PITSAKIS 2011, p. 183).
- 15 See the contributions collected in MAGDALINO 1994. On the case of Michael VIII refer to footnote 36.

- 16 For an overview the petrified emperor refer to NICOL 1992.
- 17 See KAKOURE 1965 and DANFORTH 1986. Graduate student at the *EHESS* (Paris), E. Nonveiller is currently working on this topic under the supervision of P. Odorico.
- 18 In JANIN 1969, p. 295; see also PITSAKIS 2011, p. 200.
- 19 See MACRIDES 1981, pp. 83-6 and PITSAKIS 2011, pp. 219-20.
- 20 In the West, until the regulations imposed by Pope Gregory VII (1073-85), the title of 'saint' was generously given to kings and members of their families, especially as a reward for their Christian virtues and actions of evangelization (refer, for instance, to J. Le Goff's study on Louis IX of France and to Francesco D'Angelo's recent research on Olaf II of Norway). In the Western panorama a special case was represented by the cases of the 'miracle worker kings', for which see BLOCH 1924.
- 21 In LUZZI 2014, p. 197. To the establishment of a local cult on the death anniversary, the composition of a liturgical *dossier* (an hagiography, an *akolouthia* and the entry in the *Synaxarium*) we should add the important role played by relics and icons.
- 22 See LE GOFF 2011 and, in particular, pp. 11-2: "l'ouvrage de Jacques de Voragine est bien, comme l'a voulu son auteur, une somme, mais c'est une somme sur le temps. [...] Original est le rôle essentiel attribué aux saints, celui de marqueurs du temps. Au total, notre dominicain veut montrer comment seul le christianisme a su structurer et sacraliser le temps de la vie humaine pour amener l'humanité au salut". See also CIOLFI 2018.
- 23 In LUZZI 1996, pp. 47-51. An exception to this trend is represented by the praise of Constantine V (741-75) in the Neapolitan *milieu*, even if it finds an explanation in the adhesion of that city to the Byzantine iconoclasm (see ACCONCIA LONGO 2012).
- 24 On the strange dynamics which determined the sanctification of the latter 'couple' see PATLAGEAN 1989.
- 25 Respectively, ed. DELEHAYE: pp. 205, 866 and 12.
- 26 On the references quoted in this paragraph see LUZZI 1996, pp. 48-9.
- 27 Refer to DAGRON 1996, p. 166.
- 28 This ritual was in use also in the West; in Latin, the corresponding formula is "cum sanctis tuis in aeternum", *with your saints forever*. See once again PITSAKIS 2011, p. 219.
- 29 See Nicetas David Paphlagon's *Vita Ignatii* 94: "καὶ εὐθὺς μὲν τότε τῷ Βασιλείῳ τέθηκε Κωνσταντῖνος ὁ τριπόθητος καὶ πρωτότοκος υἱός, ὃν καὶ ἅγιον ὁ τολμητίας οὗτος εἰς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς χάριν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ χειροτονῶν μοναστηρίους τε καὶ ναοὺς ἀνθρωπαρεσκία τιμῶν οὐκ ἡύλαβεῖτο", *straightaway Constantinus, Basil's much-longed-for and firstborn son, died, and that reckless Photius did not fear either to consecrate him as a saint on his own initiative in order to win his father's favor or to honor him with monasteries and shrines in*

- order to be sycophantic* (ed. and trans. SMITHIES and DUFFY, p. 130-31 ll. 5-9). Consider also FLUSIN 2001.
- 30 See Xanthopoulos' *Ecclesiastical history* 17.31 (ed. MIGNE, CXLVII, col. 301 A-B). The emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (963-9) was in a way also granted a saintly status in the middle Byzantine period. To the best of my knowledge, his case (on which Lynn Jones from Florida State University is currently working) does not change the argument of my paper: the strictly political use of this imperial cult and the limited diffusion of this phenomenon both in time – about 150 years – and in space – the region of Cappadocia, where he originated from – are perfectly in line with Vatatzes' case.
- 31 The texts considered in this study are George of Pelagonia's *Βίος τοῦ ἁγίου Ἰωάννου βασιλέως τοῦ Ἐλεήμονος* (BHG 933; ed. HEISENBERG), the anonymous post-Byzantine *Βίος τοῦ ἁγίου βασιλέως Ἰωάννου τοῦ Βατάση τοῦ Ἐλεήμονος τοῦ ἐν Μαγνησίᾳ* (ed. AGATHANGELOS), and Nikodemos the Hagiorite's *Μνήμη τοῦ ἁγίου, ἐνδόξου, θεοστέπτου βασιλέως Ἰωάννου Βατάση τοῦ Ἐλεήμονος, τοῦ ἐν Μαγνησίᾳ*, whose new critical editions lie at the heart of my current research. See also CIOLFI 2017.
- 32 *History* 52: “μόγις γοῦν ἀνέπνευσεν, ἡλλοιωμένος τὸ χρῶμα. Καὶ ἔσπευσε καταλαβεῖν τὸ Νύμφαιον πρὸ τῆς βαΐοφόρου κυριακῆς”, *he breathed with difficulty and regained consciousness, but his complexion had changed. He sought then to reach Nymphaion and to arrive before Palm Sunday* (ed. HEISENBERG and WIRTH, I, p. 102 ll. 7-9; trans. MACRIDES, p. 270).
- 33 A new, convincing identification of the monastery's ruins is in MITSIOU 2011.
- 34 The different literary representations of Vatatzes are analyzed in CIOLFI 2014.
- 35 Despite many attempts, Michael VIII was not able to suppress that discontent. The so-called 'Arsenian schism' between Arsenites and Josephists (from the name of the patriarch who gave absolution to the ruler for his crimes) lasted until 1315, when patriarch Nephon I proposed a definitive reconciliation; as it has been pointed out, it was perceived “as part of the political opposition to the upstart Palaiologan dynasty by Laskarid supporters” (TALBOT 1991).
- 36 See MACRIDES 1980. The new emperor was concerned also by the architectural renovation of the reconquered capital, as pointed out in TALBOT 1993.
- 37 Refer to CIOLFI 2014, pp. 280-5.
- 38 The grave was visited and kissed by the Russian traveler Stephen of Novgorod in 1349: he mentioned it in his diaries as that of “holy Emperor Laskariasaf” (18, ed. MAJESKA, pp. 38-39). As I. Ševčenko opined, that name could preserve the monastic name, Joasaph, chosen by John IV when becoming monk (MAJESKA 1984, p. 267).
- 39 The most recent contribution in this area is an article by PAPAYIANNI 2004-5: she only briefly locates the canonization of Vatatzes in the post-Byzantine period (p. 30) focusing on the sovereign's Orthodoxy (p. 27). Both CONSTANTELOS 1972 and MACRIDES 1981, pp. 69-71 reported the early development of Vatatzes' cult and its connection to Constantinople. Notwithstanding, I

- believe that connection to the Capital is more relevant for the case of John IV (MACRIDES 1981, pp. 71-3 and – more extensively – SHAWCROSS 2008).
- 40 *Autobiographia* 1.12 (ed. and trans. MUNITIZ; respectively, p. 8 ll. 8-9 and p. 49).
- 41 *History* 52 (ed. HEISENBERG and WIRTH, I, p. 105 ll. 12-14; trans. MACRIDES, p. 271).
- 42 Strong ties existed between John III and that region and its inhabitants, and in particular: his ancestors had demonstrated there their military abilities during the Komnenian military campaigns and, since then, the Thrakesian theme had been the main political support for that aristocratic family from Adrianople; for that strategic area Vatatzes had such interests and a personal inclination that he moved his court from Nicaea to the winter palace of Nymphaeum as well as promoting the activities of Magnesia's mint, to which he also transferred the imperial treasury.
- 43 Two notes written by one of the anonymous readers in the margins of *Akropolites' History*, transmitted in the fourteenth-century manuscript Vat. gr. 166, demonstrated the success – and probably the wide diffusion – of this nickname. These are: at *History* 19, “† Ἰω(άν)νου τοῦ Ἐλεήμονος :” (f. 50v, external margin); at *History* 21, “† ἀρχ(ῆ) Ἰω(άννου) τοῦ Ἐλεήμονος” (f. 51v, external margin).
- 44 *History* 11.15 (ed. FAILLER, IV, p. 441 ll. 4-6 and 11-3).
- 45 In fact, the *Eortologion* of Constantinople does not include the emperor's name in his feast day (see GEDEON 1899, pp. 184-5).
- 46 Although modern scholars tend to interpret the *Βίος τοῦ ἁγίου Ἰωάννου βασιλέως τοῦ Ἐλεήμονος*, composed by George of Pelagonia in the third quarter of the fourteenth century, as one of the key-elements for ratifying the cult of Vatatzes, this work is not a hagiography at all. This *Βίος* only served to present Vatatzes as a reference model of excellence for George's political goal (see CIOLFI 2013 and 2015). Beyond its aesthetic and literary value, the importance of the *Life* resides also in the fact that it has survived in the autograph author's draft, as I have demonstrated through the comparison of its script with another note by George, whose writing was certified also by the attentive paleographical eye of John Chortasmenos (1370-1437): the version by George of Pelagonia's hand is in Vat. gr. 579, ff. 229r-250v; the note used for the paleographical comparison is in the Aristotle Ambr. gr. 512 (f. lv), already pointed out by PRATO 1981.
- 47 *Life of St. John* 43 (ed. HEISENBERG, p. 232 l. 36 – p. 233 l. 3).
- 48 The only reference I was able to find is in VATIDOU 1956, p. 39; see also CONSTANTELOS 1992, pp. 64-5.
- 49 As it has already been implied by G. Dagron. Even if arguing that Vatatzes was almost assimilated to a saint, the French scholar softens his claim, pointing out that “son éloge ressemble à un panégyrique impérial, que sa *Vie* fut écrite au XVIII^e siècle, que son office, composé par Nicodème

- l'Hagiorite, est plus récente encore, et qu'il s'agit d'un empereur de Nicée, non de Constantinople" (DAGRON 1996, p. 163). As D. Constantelos pointed out (1972, pp. 94-5), there were some obstacles – immoral behavior and disobedience towards the Church hierarchy – which could have prevented an official sanction of the cult.
- 50 *History* 10.18: "καὶ ὁ λαὸς ὁ μὲν κατεσφάπτετο, ὁ δ' ἀπανίστατο φθάνων, καὶ οἱ μὲν πρὸς νήσους τὰς ἐγγιζούσας, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν δύσιν διαπεραιούμενοι, διεσώζοντο", *some people were butchered, some other fled earlier: they saved themselves, a group moving to the opposite islands the other to West* (ed. A. FAILLER, IV, p. 345 ll. 11-2).
- 51 See in particular ZACHARIDOU 1987, pp. 228-9.
- 52 See LINDNER 2009, pp. 110-1.
- 53 For instance, sultan Murad II decided to retire himself in Magnesia, after having yielded the scepter to his son Mehmed II in 1444; moreover, the role of the city as traditional training center for Ottoman princes granted its inhabitants the presence of royal retinue and exemption from some taxes. For the condition of the Christians see PAPADOPOULOS-KERAMEUS 1885.
- 54 The edition of this text has been announced to be a part of the forthcoming study by C. Dendrinos and A. Spanos, *An Unpublished Akolouthia on the Emperor John III Vatatzes*; the hymnographic dossier on the emperor has been recently published in DIMITRAKOPOULOS 2016. Here I restrict myself in dating the codex on the base of both paleographic and watermarks comparisons.
- 55 See D. POLEMIS 1983. The *apopytikion* (except for the last two verses which, out of the prosody, seems to be a posterior addition) and one *oikos* are identical to those of the Lesbos manuscript (here, respectively, on ff. 40r and 44rv); the other *oikos* seems instead to represent another version of the same *akolouthia* (probably due to the composition preferences of the compiler).
- 56 Given that the same title refers to John III as to "the new Merciful", we can suppose an effort to distinguish the saint from other homonymous characters ("the Merciful" was in fact an honorific epithet associated also with other Byzantine saints; see I. POLEMIS 1973, pp. 31-3), with the particular effort to make him a counterpart of a 'hero' of the city of Nicaea, St. John the Merciful the Younger (for this saint refer to I. POLEMIS 1973).
- 57 Mainly from Chios, conquered by Ottomans in 1566. There lived 406 Greek families and about 7000 Greek villagers (see *Tapu-Tahrir Defterleri* in Turkish Prime Ministry's Archives, 363).
- 58 See GOFFMAN 1990, p. 85.
- 59 See GEDEON 1890, p. 464.
- 60 See GOFFMAN 1990, p. 91.
- 61 Refer to CLOGG 1981.
- 62 All the question is treated in MASTERS 2006.
- 63 At the same time, Vatatzes' canonization could have had also a role to unite Orthodoxy, increasing its power and influence in the so-called '*millet wars*':

this was a positive strategy after all, if we consider that “by the mid-eighteenth century [...] the guardians of ‘tradition’ against the innovation of Catholicism and the traditions of local autonomy that had emerged in the absence of a centralized Mother Church” reported the final success (MASTERS 2006, p. 280). For a similar case study, dealing with a different context – historical and cultural –, see REY 2008.

⁶⁴ According to George Akropolites, John III acted as a “father” to his people (*Epitaph* 21; ed. HEISENBERG and WIRTH, II, p. 28 ll. 22-6), while from Pachymeres’ point of view he could be rightly praised as the “father of the Romaioi” (*History* 1.23; ed. FAILLER, I, p. 99 l. 5).

⁶⁵ Those were the traditional features Vatatzes was carrying with him since his lifetime. See, for example, Theodore II’s *Enkomion* 14: “ἀλλ’ ὁ γε τοῦ Χριστωνύμου λαοῦ βασιλεὺς, ὑπὸ τῆς Λατινικῆς καὶ Περσικῆς καὶ Βουλγαρικῆς καὶ Σκυθικῆς καὶ ἐτέρας πολυαρχίας ἐθνικῆς καὶ τυραννικῆς τὴν Αὐσονίδα γῆν μερισθεῖσαν μυριαχῶς, εἰς ἓν ταύτην συνήγαγε, καὶ τοὺς ἄρπαγας ἐμασίγωσε καὶ τὸ λάχος τούτου ἐφύλαξε, καὶ δόρατί τε καὶ φασγάνῳ καὶ εὐβουλία καὶ ἀγχινόϊα τὸν ἀρχαῖον ὄρον ἡμῶν ἀνήγειρε καὶ ἀνώρθωσε, καὶ τρόπαιον ἀρετῶν ἀνεστήσατο”, *the emperor of Christians made united Ausonia, which the domination of the Latins, of the Persians, of the Bulgarians, of the Scythians and of other nations, hostile and usurpers, had divided into many parts; he lashed looters, safeguarded the possessions and, by the spear and the sword, by wisdom and sharpness, restored and re-established our ancient border, raising a trophy of virtue for himself* (ed. TARTAGLIA, p. 69 l. 608 – p. 70 l. 614).

⁶⁶ Native of Chios and interested in the Greek-Turkish relations in the Aegean and Asia Minor, K. Amantos discovered a post-byzantine manuscript of George of Pelagonia’s *Life of St. John*, the Sinait. gr. 2015, and also studied the origin and composition of Vatatzes’ family.

⁶⁷ See MILIARAKIS 1898, pp. 416-7.

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LA MARSEILLAISE AND THE MOB : RE/DECONSTRUCTING ANTISEMITISM AND PROTEST AT THE UNIVERSITY OF STRASBOURG, 1937

Abstract

This case study of a provincial protest at the University of Strasbourg is an early reflection on the value of microhistory in understanding antisemitism in late interwar France, a topic which has hitherto remained poorly theorized. The article begins to set up a framework for a broader project studying the social life of antisemitism, too often relegated to the realms of ideology, culture, and national politics – worlds located in Paris. It attempts to move beyond clichéd formulations of a “wave of antisemitism” sweeping across Europe, formulating more interesting and complex proposals regarding perception, behavior, and quotidian interactions in a diverse urban community in a volatile borderland between France and Germany. In exploring holistic visions of ideas’ “lives” in a particular socio-economic context, this approach may also lend insight into the mechanics of the expression of other kinds of prejudice – words and acts – we continue to see across Europe and other societies today.

Keywords: Antisemitism, France, Jews, Economics, Culture, Alsace, Lorraine, Microhistory, Student movements, Protest, University, Strasbourg, Refugee crisis, interwar, 1930s, Leon Blum, Cécile Brunschvicg.

Pierre Auer Bacher, who grew up in a fully integrated Alsatian Jewish family between the world wars, remembered that throughout the 1930s, his parents were active members of social and cultural circles with their Jewish and non-Jewish neighbours. Antisemitism did not impact his everyday world. He wrote in his memoirs that at the time, he believed “nothing [bad] could happen to the sons of a nation that sung *La Marseillaise*.”¹

In the afternoon of 25 February 1937, when a large group of students gathered in front of the Palais Universitaire at the University of Strasbourg to protest the appearance of government minister at a conference on campus, the crowd chanted anti-Jewish slurs and threw firecrackers and stink bombs, and sung the hymn of the French Republic, the battle cry of the Revolution, a call to arms to protect liberty, brotherhood, and equality – *La Marseillaise*.

The following case study of a provincial protest in the late 1930s is an early reflection on the value of microhistory and local/regional histories in understanding antisemitism in late interwar France, a topic which has hitherto remained poorly theorized, depicted with broad “elite strokes,” and using exclusively “Parisian paints.” This case study begins to set up a framework for a broader project studying the social life of antisemitism, too often relegated to the realms of ideology and culture, and in the case of France in particular, to the realm of high and radical politics – worlds located in the capital. It attempts to move beyond clichéd formulations of a “wave of antisemitism” sweeping across Europe, formulating more interesting and complex proposals regarding perception, behavior, and quotidian interactions in a diverse urban community in a volatile borderland between France and Germany. In exploring holistic visions of ideas’ “lives” in a particular socio-economic context, this approach may also lend insight into the mechanics of the expression of other kinds of prejudice – words and acts – we continue to see across Europe and other societies today.

This essay will first lay out a very basic background on the general and French historiographies of antisemitism, and endeavor to piece together productive theoretical models for understanding its everyday life. In addition to helping overcome vague formulations of ideology, this study posits that microhistory can promote a rethinking of the transnational Jewish narrative by embedding Jews – regardless of provenance – in their local contexts.

Next, this paper will examine documents from the departmental prefectures of the Lower and Upper Rhine to suggest the degree to which antisemitism in the Franco-German borderlands of Alsace and Lorraine during the Popular Front was shaped by authorities’ official understandings of and practical approaches to the refugee crisis in its earlier days. Read against the grain, reports and recommendations on refugee requests can help begin to paint a basic backdrop of the authorities’ attitudes toward Jews and other refugees in the 1930s differing considerably from the

anti-Jewish rhetoric increasingly espoused by Alsatian autonomists, and informed heavily by local experiences and considerations.

Against this backdrop, this essay will describe in detail the protest at the Palais Universitaire in February 1937, and attempt to draw out the meanings of the event and its expressions of antisemitism for participants, targets, opponents, and even onlookers. The local authorities' attitudes toward the influx of largely educated and employed Jewish professionals from Germany legitimized the conflation between "Jewish," "refugee," and variety of other perceived threats to order in a moment of acute and multiple crises in the borderlands. This attitude resonated at the University of Strasbourg. Students' utterances and acts drew on more general local vocabularies of antisemitism to articulate frustration with Popular Front policies that they understood as destabilizing to their academic and social environments. Rather than performances of Royalist fascism or Germanophile Alsatian autonomism, expressions of antisemitism could draw from local anxieties about the visible and acute impact of the crises of the 1930s on their frontier community.

In this reflection on approaches, methods, sources, and routes for further inquiry, I will suggest that the "antisemitism" of grand transnational or even national narratives ascribed to the 1930s was often part of a more complex matrix of words and actions best understood in local context, and, when possible, from the ground. An "anatomy" of this story will serve as a case study for the use of deep, descriptive, and local histories to supplement national and transnational narrative, demonstrating the importance of understanding not only *what* happened, but also why it happened as it did. This is the first part of a larger project aimed at this end.

A Vague Wave

"Antisemitism" is often described as a wave, sweeping over vast territories, borders, communities and contexts. This is a powerful image of a force of nature with its own momentum, the mechanics and meanings of which are invisible to those it envelops until after the deluge, which, in the context of the twentieth century, is inevitably the destruction of European Jewry.

There are problems with this metaphor. First, the characterization of the range of ideas and actions comprising "antisemitism" as a "wave" (appropriately translated into French as *vague*) overlooks the multiple

locales in which these ideas and actions develop, and obscures the quotidian experiences, interactions, and vocabularies of ordinary people that may help scholars – as well as activists and policymakers today – understand how prejudice and racism operate in thought, practice, and politics. Second, ‘antisemitism’ has been plucked from a particular historical context and now subsequently serves modern scholars, activists, and policymakers to refer to a range of notions on which these individuals and groups hardly agree.

On the first point, scholars have tended to use the “wave” to describe other broad phenomena in modern Jewish and European histories. For instance, the image of a wave can more accurately employed when referring to a series of violent pogroms against Jews during the 1848 revolutions, gathering momentum and motivated by diverse anxieties about the disintegration of traditional group identities and the formation of new ones.² Waves of migration often follow, constituting patterns of movement and dispersion motivated by the pull of multiple factors but pushed by brutality and bloodshed. In these cases, this metaphor can enlighten rather than obscure.

In the case of antisemitism the metaphor fails to recognize the multiple locations from and within which these ideas germinate and the different ways they are employed. While typically understood as a product of the Right; of nationalism, conservatism, and chauvinism, the metaphor of a singular force of nature fails to accommodate the emergence of antisemitism on the Left. Brustein emphasizes the complex matrix of ideas that constitute antisemitism as we understand it, while simultaneously enlarging the scope of inquiry to include broader impacts of “modernity” on European societies.³ Further inquiry into case studies like this one demonstrate antisemitism’s range and use in politics and positions in between Left and Right: an important corrective to more general understandings of Right wing nationalism and French variants of fascism.

Next, while I choose to use the term *antisemitism* to refer (for the sake of simplicity) to a cultural and political language of words and acts characterized by negative perceptions of Jews and Judaism, this study and its models also build on crucial insight offered by critics of the study of antisemitism as a historical object. In a significant example of this literature, David Engel critiques the broad efforts on the part of scholars to define it, to locate its roots, and to understand its expression. How can antisemitism be treated as a historical object of study when its architects, adherents, and victims described it (and continue to describe it) in such

diverse ways? Engel's answer is that antisemitism serves as one of many conceptual "filing systems" we (and those in the past) invented and employed to understand complex and seemingly repetitive phenomena. However useful it may be, "antisemitism" has come to impose blinders on great number of interactions, "specific incidents, texts, laws, visual artifacts, social practices, and mental configurations," that don't necessarily fit into this "ready-made category," but that may actually help us build more holistic understandings of the past.⁴

Further complicating its definition are the cleavages between "ideas," "words," and "actions." A recent ADL survey reported that over a billion adults "now harbor antisemitic attitudes." Yet given these enormous numbers, Kenneth Marcus suggests most antisemites are actually *not* "acting on their aversions."⁵ That is to say – while there is a noted rise in violence directed against Jews and Jewish communities in many places in Europe, and in France in particular, these violent acts alone are not sufficient to gauge or understand antisemitism's range of resonances or expressions.

This observation signals the importance of looking *back* to social history of ideas – how notions are accepted, then translated, and articulated in quotidian settings, which may mean a sharp shift away from thinking about culture. In more developed discussions about the sources of German antisemitism, scholars have turned from socio-economic interpretations to cultural and ideological ones, following the 'linguistic turn,' a convention that privileges words over actions.⁶ In his work exploring regional and local debates over east European Jewish immigration and of Jews' place in public schools in Breslau, Till Van Rahden calls to reexamine the complex dynamics of the political and social worlds of antisemites and antisemitism – a project that questions "how antisemitic ideology translated into antisemitic practice" at a local level.⁷ The larger project from which this case study is drawn builds on Van Rahden's approach in attempting to reshuffle the 'moving parts' of antisemitism to discover the connections between words and actions, ideology and practice.

These observations neither diminish the gravity of what the prefect called an "antisemitic protest," nor do they excuse the actions of those who participated in it.⁸ Quite the opposite: by breaking down a blanket understanding – an overwhelmingly (and increasingly singular) vision of ideological and cultural definition – this approach may contribute to a deeper understanding of social, cultural, and political life on the eve of the Second World War. This approach aims to illuminate how ordinary people embraced, employed, experienced, and even resisted against whats

scholars and more popular understandings tend to associate exclusively with the violent rhetoric of Right Wing leagues and abstract intellectuals in Paris. This approach also suggests the degree to which antisemitism in France's tumultuous interbellum period demands a more holistic vision of Jews and other Frenchmen.

Microhistory

My central methodological intervention is that both national and transnational historical narratives are too broad to understand crucial details of the social history of an idea, much less the diverse histories of the relationships between Jews and gentiles. I choose to employ a microhistorical approach that will allow for the recognition of the diversity of ideas, persons, and relationships, and the impact of urban and political space on all three. Microhistory fits well into functionalist interpretations of the Holocaust, but also builds on insight on the diversity of Jewish community. Selecting a microscope instead of a telescope will illuminate relations and experiences within increasingly diverse communities that help us understand how complex and incoherent ideas of antisemitism were often grafted onto particular readings of local situations to give them meaning.⁹

This case builds on the developments in Holocaust historiography. As the intentionalist school of interpretation of the Holocaust has given way to more functionalist visions of the genocide, scholars have come to terms with the question of how exactly six million Jews (and at least another five million others, including Roma, homosexuals, disabled persons, Communists, priests, Jehovah's witnesses, and others) were systematically murdered in a ghettos, prisons, death camps, concentration camps, and killing fields across Europe and the Balkans. Collaboration and resistance became central pieces of a more diffuse picture of violence stretching beyond Nazi Germany and across the continent. Under impacts of approaches deconstructing Nazi hegemony, the discovery of new archives, and broader trends in the field, scholars are increasingly stressing the diverse contexts for antisemitism that made possible collaboration, resistance, and everything in between. This has inevitably resulted in a more complex history of communities and cultures, and moreover, diverse incarnations of Jewish-gentile relations – antipathies, tensions, tolerations, cooperations, and so on.¹⁰

It is from this angle that microhistory will prove enlightening for the purposes of this project. Magnussen and Szijarto ask, "how can we deal with a world which is so complex and multifaceted that it is hard to get a grip of history?" One way is through approaching the past with an eye to fragments and with a slower pace. This set of tools and methods reimagines the picture of the past offered by "investigations about nations, states, or social groupings, stretching over decades, centuries, or whatever *longue durée*," by reducing the scale from which the historian observes.¹¹ In doing so, one may choose to contribute to the grand narrative, or as Magnussen urges, to ignore it. In the case of the Holocaust, scholars frequently make use of local and individual case studies to add nuance to, supplement, and further understand the grand narrative of genocide.¹² Either way, "if we stick to small units [...] we are likely to gain a better grasp of our subjects, and gain insight into a lost world which would otherwise have remained closed to us."¹³

Eschewing a top-down narrative, microhistory illuminates the voices, perspectives, and events in and of everyday life for ordinary people who lived within and beyond normative "systems." In the particular case of the anti-Brunschvicg demonstration in Strasbourg in 1937, students evoked Jews in what amounted to hate-speech, but for more complex reasons than are evident from a distance, from Paris, or within a broader narrative of decline of Jewish-gentile relations into the depths of racial persecution. This observation speaks to what Giovanni Levi has argued about the practice of microhistorians, whose "work has always centred on the search for a more realistic description of human behavior [...]" recognizing man's freedom "beyond, though not outside, the constraints of prescriptive and oppressive normative systems."¹⁴ Levi's approach, clearly shaped by Clifford Geertz's methodology of thick description, brings ethnography to the practice of history in order to uncover "microscopic observations" that would offer new facets of the past hitherto unseen.

Diversifying stories about antisemitism will give greater depth and clarity to events and their meanings in actual time and concrete space. In the context of the global history of Jews, the transnational people *par excellence*, this is of great significance. When met with broad transnational narratives of decline and destruction, the tools and approaches of microhistory have allowed scholars to tell different stories of Jewish life. As more local studies uncover a rich diversity in Jewish community and identity in the years before the Second World War, so do more local studies of spaces, places and peoples have the potential to enrich our

understandings of Europe and antisemitism during the same period. I submit that microhistory will play a vital role in the process of bringing Jewish and European historical narratives closer together for a more accurate picture of the past.

French Antisemitism or Antisemitism in France? Rephrasings, Reconceptualizations

While on the one hand I argue for contracting the scope of observation, I simultaneously suggest for an expansion of the category I utilize for this study by calling to reorient the discussion about French antisemitism to one about antisemitism *in France*. More than a semantic move, this proposition broadens research questions from a constructed “national” case to one that addresses a more complex zone, in this case a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and long-contested borderland. While indigenous French antipathies and hatreds toward Jews did exist, in this case, a moment of globalization, rapid transfer of ideas, and massive migration across a volatile frontier, it makes more sense to broaden the language addressing the phenomena at hand. The second proposition takes inspiration from critiques leveled against the use of “antisemitism” for lack of uniform definition, anachronism, and general insufficiency. Such critiques look closely at “the wave,” and force us to consider what words and actions constitute the idea.

Scholars often frame antisemitism in a discussion of national politics. Because France was the first European nation to emancipate its Jews, there was no long systemic tradition of discrimination as in Imperial Germany or Russia. Rather, because of the gifts it offered to them, Jews built a committed relationship to the Republic and developed new ways of assimilating into French culture while maintaining their Jewish identities secondary or private (*israélitisme*).¹⁵ This explains a virulent antisemitism in political culture at the time of the Dreyfus affair as a set of discourses mobilized by Right Wing conservatives critical of Liberalism and the Third Republic’s secularizing institutions.¹⁶ Jews became a stand-in for the failures of parliamentary politics, bourgeois decadence, the transnational forces of both capitalism and socialism, and military impotence. On the other hand, some scholars of postmodernism have also interpreted antipathy toward Jews as a problem on the French Left. Hertzberg asserted that in secularizing the Jewish question, the architects of the French Revolution “invented” modern antisemitism; and Horkheimer and Adorno famously

argued that the Enlightenment created the very categories of inclusion, exclusion, and regularization, the modes of thinking of “instrumental reason,” and the structures of violence that made the Holocaust possible.¹⁷

Some of the most interesting work on French antisemitism has reframed it within broader discussions of culture, an approach that takes seriously vernacular articulations of antipathy, discrimination, prejudice, and hatred in the public sphere. Attacks on Jews through Dreyfus served as fodder within what Forth dubs “a crisis of French manhood,” and allowed French culture to respond to broad anxieties about national decline.¹⁸ Significantly, antisemitism served as a cultural language that transcended party politics at a critical moment of national and international crisis.¹⁹ In spite of these intriguing new ways of approaching the topic, “French antisemitism” as a historical object of study tells us very little about France beyond the capital. After all, as David Garrioch points out “Paris is not France.”²⁰ Apart from Birnbaum’s work on the Dreyfus affair in the provinces, antisemitism in provincial contexts has remained largely overlooked.²¹

Also noteworthy in this respect are the differences some scholars have revealed among Jewish attitudes toward antisemitism. This work points out that Jewish responses to antisemitism varied from place to place, reflected both in Jews’ varied assessments of their own safety and in the networks they built to counter antisemitism. While this essay does not cover the responses of the local Jewish community, my larger project will. I am indebted to perspectives that underline the utility of local studies for understanding difference within broad phenomena.²²

Alsace-Lorraine between the Wars

This case is uniquely intriguing in a number of respects: first, its identity and status as a contested territory between France and Germany from 1871-1918; and second, its location along the border during the refugee crisis in the 1930s. First, the region had developed uniquely around its experience as Reichsland Elsaß-Lothringen, an Imperial territory annexed to the German Empire after the Franco-Prussian War until the end of the First World War, frequently referred to by French pro-Republican voices and early Alsatian autonomists, like the Abbé Wetterlé, as a period of survival “under the German yoke.”²³ Second, during these years, and after the region’s reincorporation into the French Republic after 1918,

a powerful regionalist autonomist movement emerged, often led by prominent Catholics like Wetterlé, seeking the “preservation, expression, and development” of their distinct cultural traditions and identities associated with the status of the Church.²⁴ Having escaped the 1905 concordat that separated Church from State in the rest of France, they fought tooth and nail to retain their traditions through the interwar years.²⁵

Autonomism, which developed out of Alsace’s historical and cultural context, also provides us with a background for understanding the development of some forms of Fascism. Goodfellow argues that as a borderland, Alsace figured as one of many European “flashpoint” communities where contested visions of national identity were debated and, and consequently, where fascists could “test their mettle.”²⁶ Significant here is how complex French, German, and Alsatian identity battles ultimately benefited fascist movements generated from either side of the Rhine – groups which advocated “the most simple and accessible answers.”²⁷ Equally important is the history of broader strands of political and cultural regionalism “representing a deep dissatisfaction with their respective rule.” ‘Alsace to the Alsations,’ Fischer reminds us, was a phrase that held different meanings for a variety of people.²⁸ In the interwar years, Alsatian regionalism developed among many groups of locals as an acrimonious reaction to Paris’ heavy handed cultural and administrative policies designed to assimilate Alsace into the French fold. In the 1930s, this array of autonomist political movements and attitudes often veered into pro-German positions, contributing in the most extreme case to the development of an Alsatian Nazi party.

There were differences in the ways that urban and rural communities were shaped by Alsace-Moselle’s experiences as a Germany territory. Relationships between Catholics, Protestants, and Jews in the Alsatian countryside were variable and highly situational.²⁹ Recent scholarship has underlined the unique degree to which the Catholic clergy in Alsatian rural world, in supporting agricultural credit banks for small farmers as a form of a Christian socialism increasingly widespread under the empire, played a vital role in aggravating antisemitism among their communities.³⁰ Yet, strong ties to tradition appeared in Jewish communities outside the capital industrial cities.³¹ Paula Hyman showed how middle class Jews assimilated less into their secular surroundings than their lower-class coreligionists because of the strictness of religious customs and social conventions existing in these more bourgeois circles, Jewish and non-Jewish. Hyman points out these groups did acculturate – they adopted

German language and Alsatian dialects and also often sent their children to public schools.³²

Jews in the newly-reincorporated departments quickly became an almost exclusively urban community. While many Jewish families chose to leave the new Imperial German territories in order to retain French citizenship, contemporary studies show that after 1871, many Jews moved from villages and towns into Alsatian urban and industrial centres, particularly the capital cities of Mulhouse and Strasbourg, a phenomenon characterized by as “essentially Jewish.”³³ Imperial German investments in urban infrastructure in the Alsatian capital of Strasbourg had transformed it from a medieval city to a modern metropolis, ripe for internal immigration. With a modern university, transit systems, housing, and a brand-new synagogue on the Quai Kléber, Strasbourg continued to attract Jewish migration after 1918. Jewish businesses and homes were found in many parts of the new German urban extensions.³⁴ While postwar narratives about the First World War emphasized Jews’ patriotism and enduring commitment to Republican France, Jewish economic and cultural life in Strasbourg actually experienced considerable development during the Reichsland era, which laid a solid groundwork for the flourishing of the community in the 1920s and 30s.

Second, Alsace-Lorraine’s location on the borderland with Nazi Germany gave a refugee crisis more urgency and expediency than cities in the interior, particularly in its early years. Scholars have pointed out how in spite of increasing pressures imposed by the new Third Reich, many German Jews had difficulty imagining the real dangers posed by new legislation of exclusion and isolation, choosing instead to stay and weather the storm. But archives from as early as February 1933, early SS, SD, and Gestapo arrests and assaults on Jews in Germany under the auspices of the intentionally murky presidential decree for the protection of Volk and State, coupled with subsequent exclusionary decrees for the Law for the Restoration of the Public Service drove an increasing number of Jews with means and connections to seek temporary or longer-term living and working situations in the largely German-speaking French Rhineland.³⁵ Restrictions on Jewish enrollment in Romanian universities due to a Numerus clausus imposed in 1922 also fueled Jewish movement to French university towns, where young adults could pursue their studies. Results of the Saar plebiscite also put additional pressure on the region, making refugees – Communist, Jewish, and both – more present and visible in Alsatian cities than in most other places.

In the years before the Second World War, many French intellectuals, polemicists, and politicians turned toward the extreme Right to rethink the nation, embracing and building on virulent strains of existing xenophobia while articulating a variety of negative visions of Jews and Judaism.³⁶ A Popular Front government led by the Jewish Socialist Prime Minister Léon Blum offered hope for some, or even a villain for others.³⁷ But beyond parliamentary discussions, in “the historic crossroads of Western Europe,” a borderland between Republic and Reich, real antipathy, hostility, and general ambivalence toward Jews, and the idea of Jews, did exist in all kinds of social and professional spaces, exacerbated by the proximity and visibility of refugees, and the immediate local impacts of economic catastrophe.³⁸

While antisemitism was certainly present in political movements in the French Rhinelands – as a method or language for some, and as a central ideological tenet for others – it was also visible in other political positions and contexts. While authorities insisted that “Hitlerist” antisemitism was imported from Germany, it is difficult to ignore the ways in which authorities’ ambivalence toward Jewish refugees in the early years of the crisis set a tone for Alsatians throughout the decade looking to express frustration with the social and economic upheavals of their day. In this respect, antisemitic utterances – in both words and acts – have most to offer the researcher when they are interpreted as homegrown rather than implanted from abroad.

These negative perceptions, ideas, and their variants cultivated within a particular political, social, and economic context, and require careful examination at a close distance. While the image of the wave conjures up long-range communicable feelings and actions of long and monolithic hatreds, a microhistorical perspective can lend insight into local conditions and expressions of these antipathies. This method will suggest some ways in which certain vocabularies were generated, and why and with whom they resonated.

Upset and Upheaval in the Rhineland: Reports and Recommendations at the Departmental Prefecture

Scholars have noted the rise of anti-Jewish antipathy and more general expressions of xenophobia among Alsatian autonomist movements in the interwar period, but less is understood about the local social and

administrative contexts for the expression of these powerful political vocabularies. Official and popular cultures toward the refugee crisis emboldened more radical positions against foreigners, especially Jews, but rather than a singularly defined radical political ideology, antisemitism truly had an everyday life.³⁹ This study, as it will develop beyond this exploratory essay, will draw inspiration from Van Rahden's argument that imperial Germany must be understood as an ethnically and religiously diverse, multicultural society. His reframing of German history reconsiders the well-trodden categories of minority and majority, consequently revealing a range of interactions that transcend the binaries of inclusion and exclusion. A similar approach to interwar Alsace can help us understand the textures of relations between and across local established groups (including Alsatian groups) within a multicultural and, with the influx of refugees from the Saarland, Germany, and other parts of Eastern Europe, via Germany, a truly multinational borderland region.⁴⁰

The university protest took place on a backdrop of particular local experiences and responses to the refugee crisis after 1933, the 1935 Saar plebiscite, and their aftermaths. The discussions over foreign and interior policies reveal crisis in the Ministry of the Interior in Paris.⁴¹ However, along the borders, the Prefects of the Upper and Lower Rhine reported the receipt of great numbers of requests for work and stay authorizations from political refugees as well as those with "Semitic," "Hebrew," "Israélite" backgrounds.⁴² Many German-speaking refugees sought to relocate to nearby towns and cities in the French Rhineland to set up their families and businesses in German-speaking places with established connections.

While prevalent understandings of French refugee policy see it as increasingly restrictive and harsh over the course of the crisis, Vicki Caron cuts through these narratives to argue the respite of the Popular Front truly did make "a considerable difference," by introducing a more "humane tone" and reorienting harsh policies imposed in 1934 and 35 under more conservative Republican governments.⁴³ Caron's important argument about national policy opens up questions about the range of attitudes and implementations through the decade. In the early days of crisis, many reports in the departmental archives show resistance to refugees' entry, and offer insight into local concerns. The crisis was certainly seen by these local authorities in the borderland as potentially catastrophic from the very first requests for visas to settle. But why?

First, in a depressed economy, and mirroring concerns from Paris, local chambers of commerce were concerned with keeping economic

competition at a minimum. As early as 1933-34, local authorities sent reports on local industry and commerce to let the departmental prefect of the Upper Rhine know what kinds of workers were needed (or not needed) and where.⁴⁴ Furthermore, aside from concerns about the economic impact of a refugee influx during a major economic slump, local prefects saw their frontier position as particularly vulnerable, to political and cultural upset. Rather than a refined political ideology or cultural convention, this early vocabulary of economic, cultural, and geopolitical crisis helped lay a groundwork for muddled articulations of anti-Jewish attitudes embedded within other anxieties about local upheavals and crises.

Read against the grain, departmental reports on refugee requests for living and work visas reveal that while the authorities' approaches were hardly humanitarian, they don't seem to have been motivated by a unified and articulate vitriol toward Jews. First, although reports recognized the rise of oppression of certain groups in Germany, it is questionable that those writing the reports had a real sense or knowledge of the dangers faced by those fleeing the Third Reich. The local prefects often used statements about refugees' physical health and wellness to prove that the individual making the request for authorization to enter, work, or live in in the eastern French departments was not legitimately seeking asylum, but simply wanted to better themselves economically in a place where German language was still broadly used. Indeed, authorities envisaged the German-speaking Rhineland as especially desirable and convenient locations for refugees to set up shop permanently. Rather than open or assumed racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice, antisemitism operated as a set of attitudes and ideas that equated Jews with a variety of upsets to local equilibrium. This set of general and overlapping attitudes, and the context within which they germinated, is crucial to understanding the character and meaning of the student protest in 1937.

Reports tend to ruminate on economic and political impact. This perhaps reflected a poor understanding (or in the worst case scenario, a deliberate disregard) of the declining situation of so-called enemies of the new German regime. It may also show a generally negative attitude toward the plight toward the Jews as a persecuted ethnic/religious/racial minority. In one report, for instance, the refusal of the Chamber of commerce to grant residency to the "non-Aryan" (Jewish) Norbert Bier, from Frankfurt, to settle in Soultz (HR) in 1934 to set up his family's lingerie factory because "there are already similar industries in the region."⁴⁵ Apparently he had left Germany to flee the "antisemitic movement," but, the report was

sure to point out, "he had never been threatened or physically attacked, himself." The prefect agreed that because his life was not in danger, and his settlement would put pressure on the local economic situation, that this was not a legitimate visa request.

Similarly tone-deaf to the state of affairs only a few kilometers from the border, in March 1934, the same prefect signed another report for the minister of the interior, giving a negative assessment of the request of Erich Wertheimer, a Jewish German carpenter who had been living in France for since 1932 on a visa, to establish himself permanently in Huningue (HR) and set up a furniture factory. The report indicated Wertheimer claimed he had to leave Germany because of his "Semitic origins," but, like Bier, he had neither been threatened, nor physically harmed. "All this suggests that he had left his country of origin for purely economic motivations and that he is trying to use the situation of the Jews in Germany to establish himself in France."⁴⁶

It is curious that the report on Wertheimer recommended a refusal. After all, it points out very clearly that a factory of that kind could potentially benefit "a large number of local unemployed carpenters and give work to many wood artisans in the area," therefore contribute to the local economy. However, Leroy continues, the chamber of commerce of Mulhouse opposed the request, citing the large number of carpenters already established in the area. Furthermore, and to the point, the prefect concluded, "for reasons of *general order*, it would be preferable to refuse this foreigner the authorization to settle in a border region..." and, if anything, "invite him to settle instead in a department in the interior where he could practice his trade."⁴⁷ As a threat to "general order," we can guess from the repeated use of this phrase in other reports that it often had to do with the refugee as a foreigner and German-speaker. The department's need to create jobs was trumped by a generally negative attitude toward the Jewish refugee who was trying to benefit economically from a visa in France, and who may, vaguely stated, challenge "general order" on the already economically and political volatile borderland.

Others employ cultural and moral reasonings in their economic evaluations. In December 1933, the prefect of the HR reported that Hermann Meyer, "German political refugee," had opened up a lending library in Saint Louis (HR) containing only German language books. The bookstore was obviously a threat to local French commerce, where only a small number of bookstores and reading rooms were able to operate.⁴⁸ However, it stated, "Mr. Meyer does not even have the decency to offer

French publications." Library members were given library cards to loan German books that had been printed in Germany until the rise of Hitler. Furthermore, these included "immoral, pornographic, pro-German, and communist" tracts. Equating German influence with sexual promiscuity and deviance, the report expressed fear that some of these immoral commodities could find themselves in the hands of youngsters of both sexes, "provoking conflicts of conscience and facilitating a precocious and dangerous eroticism." The spread of immoral German language literature could very feasibly lead to the spread of "German propaganda" in Alsace, especially among centres where the "pro-German elements can be developed," and from which Germany can one day profit.

Strange that this German-speaking refugee, the report noted, would be so eager to propagate the culture in of the land that had rejected him! This statement suggests a strong possibility that Meyer was Jewish, but the report does not make it explicit. His request as a refugee seeking permission to work and settle permanently in the region was assessed among similar lines as were those submitted by explicitly noted Jewish persons, lumping refugees into the same category of seekers of opportunity, and offering little in terms of understanding of the situation of those fleeing the Third Reich and for what reason.

Joining Jewish students from Romania, where a *numerus clausus* had been pushing young men and women westward to France since the early 1920s, Jewish students unable to continue their studies in Nazi Germany applied to enter schools in the Rhineland departments. There were a range of student, faculty, and administrative responses to those who sought to transfer their course credits to institutions like the University of Strasbourg after April 1933, when the Third Reich made its first restrictions on Jewish attendance in public schools and universities. However, the departmental authorities treated these cases with similar trepidation. While relatively high numbers of Jewish refugees from East and East-Central Europe enrolled at institutions of higher learning like the University of Strasbourg, these were mostly in scientific research, medicine, and pharmacology.⁴⁹ Not offering even a visible potential benefit to the economy, assessments for those studying in not "practical" or "scientific" oriented fields had little hope of a positive response.

It is worth mentioning that recommendations often relied on vocabulary relating to physical health and wellness of the person making the request. These factors often figured as barometers for legitimacy. Regarding the 1934 case of Martin Hamburger and his wife, one report describes the

former as “corpulent,” and, perhaps jokingly, says “he would be filled with good intentions for all.”⁵⁰ While Hamburger is a fairly common name among Jews of Ashkenazi or Eastern European background, is not clear from the report that this particular Hamburger was Jewish.⁵¹ Still, in he certainly was assessed along the same lines as most of these applications for “Sémites,” “Israélites,” or “political refugees.” In addition to his big healthy body, Hamburger had supposedly never been physically attacked by the authorities in Germany, but the report indicated, he did not want to go back because at work he had made jokes about Hitler and his regime, and as a result, was under constant surveillance.

In the early summer of 1934, the prefect of the Upper Rhine received a request from Justin Ackermann, a German Jewish student of (Christian) theology living in Mulhouse since the summer of 1933, applying for a visa extension. But, as with the two examples above, Ackermann’s physical body/wellness “had never been threatened or assaulted. His life was never in danger in Germany since he was able to take ten days back in Germany during the Passover holidays, without being worried.” How the prefect knew that Justin Ackermann was not worried, we may never know. But the lack of evidence of physical threat to his safety allowed the prefect to judge that he “could not be considered a political refugee and that this authorization to stay is not justified.”⁵²

Reports from the first years of the refugee crisis offer a front row seat to eastern provincial authorities’ attitudes toward Jews during the early days of the refugee crisis, and the vocabularies they used to process them. Further research will offer more pointed observations about these attitudes, however for the purposes of this first foray into provincial microhistory, it is important to note how visa recommendations demonstrate the degree to which authorities, concerned primarily with maintaining local equilibrium in the borderlands, were able to generate and legitimize vocabularies of antisemitism that often had very little to do with Jews and Judaism, specifically. While it is of course possible that more vitriolic hatreds motivated individual decisions or the institutional “mood,” it is also at least as likely that eastern French authorities were more generally ambivalent toward Jews and other German-speaking refugees, which were typically understood as particular kinds of risks to cities in this borderland. These muddled attitudes toward Jews shaped vernaculars toward upheaval later on in the decade, under new pressures and under the Popular Front.

Alsations, Frenchmen, Antisemites: Words and Actions against Cécile Brunschvicg

Over the course of the 1930s, the international refugee crisis had escalated. The plebiscite in the Saar had resulted in its reincorporation into the Third Reich, and thousands of Saarland Jewish and/or Communist refugees, in addition to those already seeking asylum abroad, suddenly found themselves without a future. The French response to the influx of Saarland refugees was decidedly ambivalent, and debates raged at the national and transnational level over refugees' status in French society.⁵³ As part of what Caron describes as conservative "crackdown" in 1934-35, policies were articulated to halt German immigration completely and begin to drive refugees out, even those protected refugees with Nansen passports, and naturalization statistics dropped.⁵⁴ When the Popular Front came to power in 1936, more liberal and humanitarian policies were introduced, and inspired the Foreign Ministry's creation of a central committee for dealing with the European refugee crisis in 1938.⁵⁵

The protest at the university is an opportunity to examine a context beyond Paris that saw its own version of the upheaval of the 1930s, a story my project will, with more research, begin to tell. For the purposes of this essay, I will note that that the Rhineland departments were often the first to receive refugee requests for visas, or at least saw the situation in this way. One 1934 report noted approximately 30,000 refugees had arrived in Alsace-Lorraine since the end of the summer of 1933.⁵⁶ The proximity to refugees and visibility of strangers was also an important peculiarity, especially in a city like Strasbourg, home to a major refugee camp at the Lizé-Nord barracks. A week after the referendum, 640 refugees, mostly young men between the ages of 20 and 30, and mostly Communists (30 of which identified specifically as "Jews," but there may have been more who identified as Communist), were at Lizé-Nord.⁵⁷

It is worth noting that in spite of the drama of the protest, it escaped the purview of many of its contemporaries and, subsequently, historians. The event has received scant attention in nationally-focused histories, likely because of the enduring power of the image of the wave of antisemitism, or perhaps because of the emphasis on Right wing leagues or antisemitism in intellectual life, also in the capital.⁵⁸ In work specifically on Alsace-Lorraine, some scholars only briefly mention it. In an unpublished piece on the history of antisemitism in Alsace from 1789-1939, historian and Strasbourgeois Léon Strauss briefly makes note of the protest as the

“culmination of a campaign” waged by conservative Catholic elements against the Popular Front’s attempts to impose regulation on the education systems of Alsace-Lorraine that had previously been part of the former Imperial German Reichsland.⁵⁹ In Michele Audin’s book on Jacques Feldbau, the Jewish mathematician, the Brunschvicg affair appears simply as proof of the “advancement of antisemitism in 1930s France.”⁶⁰

More notable is how uniquely this event is labeled in the archives. Even the most cursory foray into the departmental archives can confirm a variety of local quotidian antipathies toward Jews and other refugees during the 1930s. However the folder from which these documents are drawn is one of the only ones in this particular *fonds* described as such. Thus to borrow the terms of microhistorians, this serves us here as a “normal exception” that can illuminate general trends and peculiar specific details that contribute to a better picture of this moment.⁶¹

Pierre Birnbaum’s work on “the antisemitic moment” of 1898, the height of the Dreyfus affair, serves as a model and provides inspiration and rationale for this approach. He writes:

“Ousted by historical consciousness, crushed by the history of the Affair itself, or later, by Vichy, buried in the deepest unsuspected archives that lie dormant, this moment has a few surprises. We know the power of propaganda, the creativity of artists and writers, the explosion of the press, and the fire of men of politics, the depth of prejudices that penetrate though the Republic’s borders. We know nothing about the street, the demonstrations, the parades [...] where celebrations meld into hateful derision, we know nothing about these vociferous human masses unleashed, their cries, their slogans, their songs, their violence [...]”⁶²

In an attempt to recover the “surprises” and details of our moment, this section reconstructs the events of the protest at the University of Strasbourg using a combination of sources prepared for and by the prefecture of the Lower Rhine, student press, and Jewish press: all local. In reconstructing, it also begins to *deconstruct* the words and acts reportedly involved in expressing the antisemitism with which the event was labeled. In doing so, this microstudy reveals the complex and layered nature of the monolithic “wave of antisemitism” of the interwar period.

At 3 o’clock PM on 25 February 1937, Cécile Brunschvicg, undersecretary of state for national education under the Popular Front, an assimilated Jew with an impeccable record of service to the French

state and nation, who had accepted an invitation to attend and present at the fifteenth anniversary of the School of social work, arrived at the Palais Universitaire in Strasbourg. Brunschvicg was not only one of the three female ministers in Léon Blum's Popular Front government in an era before female suffrage; she was also a militant activist for women's right to vote, member (with her husband Léon Brunschvicg) of the Ligue des droits de l'homme.

The report emphasized she attended as a *private individual*. The title of the presentation was "Eight months of social action in the Ministry." A report sent two days later by the Colmar court of appeals to the Guard of the seals two days later stated "... at three o'clock, with [governmental officials], Brunschvicg arrived at the hall, but was met by an assault of whistles and cries, accompanied by the detonation of firecrackers that the crowd was throwing in Brunschvicg's direction. The cries heard in the crowd of some two hundred students were the following: "Hou! Hou! À bas Brunschvicg! À Moscou! La France aux Français! À bas les juifs!"⁶³ Official reports are not clear on the size of the crowd: while a report provided by the Contrôleur Général de Surveillance du Territoire indicated the crowd was 100-200,⁶⁴ the rector of the Académie de Strasbourg reported about 50.⁶⁵ The prefect's report noted 150-200 students. The prefect's official report went on to describe how the dean of the faculty of law tried to shut the hall's doors once Brunschvicg had entered, "but the crowd of angry protesters, but could not. The students had removed one of the gates and the flood of people pushed through the hall singing *La Marseillaise*. More firecrackers were tossed [...] The dean and Gemaehling, law professor, tried to say a few soothing words that were drowned out by the clamors of 'pas chic, doyen!'

While the mob succeeded in disrupting the planned presentation the report did not necessarily characterize the protest as a successful one. Instead, it noted, the talk simply moved elsewhere. The prefect accompanied Brunschvicg over to the Maison des amis de l'Université on Rue Geiler, where she made presentation in front of a welcoming audience assembled for a reception organized by the Committee of the French Union for Women's. Classes resumed after the demonstration, reports indicated, "perfectly calmly."⁶⁶

The local Jewish press was correct to be concerned about the "successes of anti-Jewish propaganda," but may have been quick to categorize this kind of event as the result of misinformation that had somehow spread around Alsace. Antisemitism had its own life at the university, embedded

into students' responses to their rapidly transforming environments. If we take them at their word(s), these students employed antisemitism to articulate identification with the French nation, and protest against the French state. In focusing solely on expressions relating specifically to Jews, and drawing their similarities to foreign examples swept over on the "wave," we risk missing crucial pieces of antisemites' views of their world and how Jews fit into it.⁶⁷

The event is more complex when examined up-close from the perspective of those protesting. Antisemitism appears to have been part of students' expressions of rage at the intrusion of the government onto university spaces – resonating with longer local trends in frustration against redepartmentalization, and further, a fear of radical politics. Jews seemed to be involved with both: Bruncshwicg, a Jew, was part of this Socialist government led by a Jewish Prime minister. From the perspective of Alsatian educated elite, this was not only an administration representative of increasingly humanitarian approaches to immigration policy during the refugee crisis, but also at the centre of local debates regarding the prolongation of schooling in 1936.

Moreover, surveillance records reveal active relationships between Jews of local and foreign provenance, sparking fears of displacement and disorder in the university. Students' frustration and fear about the transformation of their educational space predated Blum's government, percolating since 1930. As far as the protesters were concerned, these phenomena were connected. Following general cues set by departmental attitudes towards Jews and other refugees in the crisis' early hours, xenophobia and antisemitism went hand-in-hand in these students' experiences of their local experiences of the crises of the mid-late 1930s.

"Not an Electoral Hall, not a Synagogue": Antisemitism and Student Opposition to the Popular Front

Perhaps unsurprisingly, an article supporting the protest in *L'Appel*, Strasbourg's student weekly, lists a bigger group of 300 protesters. While official reports described the crowd as angry and violent, *l'Appel* described it positively as "splendid bedlam."⁶⁸ Noteworthy are the words reportedly used by the crowd: along with the cries and tear gas, and the stink bombs noted above in the official reports at the prefecture, the newspaper article noted students from the massive crowd shouted to

Brunschvicg “À Jerusalem! À Moscou!” The article proudly reported that by these tactics the crowd was able to break up the audience “in good part, Jewish,” within fifteen minutes. In contrast to the official report, the student account announced the whole affair was a raging success. “Victory belonged to the students. This was perfectly visible,” after the room had been evacuated, “when they began singing a vibrant rendition of *La Marseillaise* from the balcony, for all spectators on the University square.”⁶⁹ Though the prefect’s report said things returned to normal, *l’Appel* reported that violence did break out afterwards. “On the stoop, a few antifascist troublemakers tried to protest, but that did not happen without a few well-aimed punches [...]”⁷⁰ The article’s author named a few of these persons, associating them with the arrival of the police. The article singled out a certain Dreyfuss leading the antifascists. The students of Strasbourg, however, had already shown their sentiments. The author signed the article, ironically, “a dirty fascist.”

While antisemitism is frequently swept into either the extreme conservative Right Wing leagues or into pro-German Alsatian autonomist and regionalist groups, words and acts that day in February were examples of neither. In spite of their protectiveness of their Alsace and their university, these students were likely not Alsatian regionalists. In describing the protesters as staunchly Alsatian and “French through our bone marrow!” the chronicler was not allying himself with the typical Alsatian regionalist sympathies commonly associated with regionalist chauvinism, nor with traditional Catholic anti-Jewish sentiments scholars associate with rural attitudes in the eastern departments. Furthermore, although the local Jewish press claimed the crowd was filled with Royalist fascists, there was no explicit evocation of royalism or fascism articulated in these accounts (beyond the self-designation of the journal article’s writer).⁷¹ All accounts reporting on the event describe rousing renditions of *la Marseillaise* outside the Palais Universitaire: a curious performance given the anti-Republicanism and anti-parliamentarianism of leading Far Right movements like *Action Française*.

In the absence of multiple participants’ testimony, this report provides some insight through the mouthpiece of a self-professed “dirty fascist.” A close reading suggests these students identified strongly as French and Alsatian, but were squarely protesting French state and Alsatian authority. In addressing “Alsace,” the article makes it clear that the protest was not only aimed at Brunschvicg, agent of the national government (who, according to the prefecture, was attending as a private individual).

Students were also directing their anger at local authorities. "Alsace" had allowed the Popular Front to enter into La Salle Pasteur, offering it a public voice.

This frustration may speak to the fiery debates that had swept across Alsace-Moselle a year earlier. While French chauvinists and nationalists across France had various reasons for attacking Léon Blum and his Left wing government, Alsatians had only to look to the recent history of redepartmentalization after 1918 that were amped up during the Popular Front. While much of Alsace's school curriculum remained the same as it had been under German rule – religious instruction, and bilingual instruction in German – Blum "felt these two factors slowed Alsatian youth's educational progress, leaving them without adequate proficiency in French."⁷² Propositions to extend required schooling by a year were met with fierce opposition articulated by Alsatians across the political spectrum eager to protect local custom. In a flurry of press coverage, Jewish became conflated with Bolshevik, "a central and antagonistic power," and "secular forces."⁷³ Blum let the matter go. The impact of these debates over the Popular Front's presence in local affairs, in particular, matters of education, were likely not easily forgotten by students in the region. According to the "dirty fascist," the faculty was neither a space for electoral politics, nor was it "a synagogue."

Curiously, the writer described how the crowd attacked Brunschvicg by shouting at her to return *both* to Moscow *and* to Jerusalem, a strange set of contradictory chants to direct at an assimilated Jew with a record of staunch French patriotism and opposition to Jewish nationalism.⁷⁴ It is difficult to draw a comprehensive vision regarding the Jews beyond an ill-articulated conflation between Communism, Jewish nationalism, and religion, but the peculiar recent history of Alsatian encounters with the Popular Front give us some insight into the meanings this vocabulary had for antisemites making sense of their unstable lives and futures as students. Antisemitism animated the crowd on the ground, giving protesters energy and ammunition, but the chronicler ultimately seemed more interested in denouncing the appearance of a governmental minister from Paris at the University of Strasbourg than in expressing an articulate racial, cultural, or economic complaint against the Jewish community in their city. In the article's description of the events, then, the utterances and practices of antisemitism may have functioned as as a code for opposition to the national government and local authority – neither needed, nor wanted, at the University of Strasbourg.

Jews, Friends, and Foreigners: Antifascism at the University of Strasbourg

Microhistory can illuminate another peculiar condition of the university that animated antisemitism in words and acts that day in February: the friendships and networks between local Jews, foreign-born Jewish students, and radical politics. While economic fears were likely not absent among students, antisemitism seems to have resonated among students like those at the protest because of the widespread conflation between Jews, foreigners, and radicals at the University – a microcosm of Strasbourg and of Alsace-Lorraine. That the university and prefecture kept detailed records on these individuals and their relationships demonstrates the degree to which authorities at different levels and many students with various (and potentially disruptive) political interests all shared concerns about Jews and foreigners at the university. The scope of this essay precludes a deep analysis of friendships and political relationships among students, but I want to make note of one particular example clarified by accounts of the Brunschvicg protest.

Without repeating what has already been stated, France's Jewish community doubled in size to over 300,000 between the two wars. While many settled in the capital, eastern European Jews also became a fixture of urban life in Alsace-Lorraine.⁷⁵ Polish Jews founded l'Association culturelle juive de Nancy in 1924, and the flourishing of Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian Jewish communities in Strasbourg prompted the establishment of an "Eastern Jewish" communal structure in 1926. In 1931, foreign-born Jews represented 39% of the total Jewish population of Strasbourg.⁷⁶

At the University of Strasbourg, East European students – especially Jews – were highly visible. *L'Appel* wrote in 1933 that "the University of Strasbourg is becoming a university of foreigners," that the number of foreign students was higher than ever in the sciences, while the total enrolment was dropping.⁷⁷ Special note was made of those (German or Yiddish-speaking) "Jewish students," who, "refused entry into universities in their own countries, come to Strasbourg which [...] offers them the ability to be understood more easily [...] it remains to be seen in what measure these students may prove a burden to the limited number of *stagiaires* or the program of study." Students responding to economic and geopolitical crisis clearly understood the arrival of masses of foreigners from across the border as destabilizing to an environment already under severe pressure. These frustrations percolated through the 1930s.

With the rise of (in the rector's words) "a veritable invasion," of enrolments in this borderland institution after 1933, many from Germany via eastern Europe, the university and the prefecture took measures to survey an ever-rising number of foreign student associations.⁷⁸ This included Zionist, Communist, and foreign students' aid groups of which many Jews were a part. Important to note in the context of student politics is that Jews of various provenances – Polish, German, Romanian, and Alsatian – often mingled and worked together, when they might have remained separate in religious and communal life beyond the university. Conservative-minded students perceived in these relationships destabilizing forces to their academic environment, embedded in a fragile local context. These destabilizing relationships between local and foreign Jews became increasingly visible, progressively irritating, and, judging by the urgency of their language, quite frightening. Antisemitism – pointed at foreigners, but catching broader sections of locals in its net – could be used as a strategy for restating Alsatianness and Frenchness in the face of visible social and political upheaval.

The reference to the antifascist activist "Dreyfuss" offers an example of relationships between locals and foreigner in radical student politics. In regional security archives, Marcel Dreyfuss, law student born in 1912 in Wissembourg (BR), appears in multiple surveillance reports alongside a handful of other local Jewish law students who were all part of the *Front Universitaire Antifasciste de Strasbourg*.⁷⁹ According to detailed surveillance records, Dreyfuss and his Alsatian Jewish law school comrades were all involved with the Jeunesses Communistes and other radical Leftist groups.

While antifascism was a central tenet of the electoral alliance of the Popular Front at the time of the protest, it was also a popular movement largely driven by the working classes.⁸⁰ Local concerns about the relationships between locals, foreigners, and more radical Leftist movements were acute in the Eastern provinces, on the heels of the Saarland plebiscite that brought thousands of refugees (both Jews and Communists) into Alsace and Strasbourg particularly.⁸¹ A departmental inquiry found that Dreyfuss et al was friendly and working on antifascist projects with foreign Jewish students also in the faculty of law: Szaja Kagan (Poland), and Max Gebuhrer and Beno Haimovici (Romania).⁸² Because the law school saw fewer foreign enrollments than departments of medicine and pharmacy, relationships between locals and foreigners are significant in their visibility, but not unique in their occurrence.

Further research on this surveillance will reveal more about the nature of relationships, how these networks were understood by students and administrators. Again – while more pointed Jewish hatreds were likely at work for some, it is also likely that antisemitism may have resonated with many students like those at the protest because it allowed them to articulate muddled frustrations about everyday life at the university - the same anxieties they shared with departmental authorities and university administrators: fears about constrained resources, lack of jobs and competition, anxieties about nearby geopolitical tensions with Germany, xenophobia and general antipathies toward difference. Jews – Dreyfuss and his friends, Brunschvicg, or the “synagogue” of the Popular Front - were the packaging of a more complex matrix of local problems rather than an ideology imported from abroad.

Although it was recorded officially as disruptive, and antisemitism (among other types of specifically “German” propaganda) condemned by authorities at regional and university levels, a closer look at combined surveillance occasionally reveal shared attitudes toward Jews, foreigners, and the state (and in its years, the Popular Front’s) handling of the refugee crisis. While regional surveillance was clearly concerned with the circulation of radical Right Wing antisemitism, fascism, and pro-Nazi German propaganda, the student protest in 1937 allows us to catch a glimpse of attitudes and interactions in French communities beyond the explicitly political realm.⁸³ Most students throwing stinkbombs, singing the *Marseillaise*, and shouting muddled anti-Jewish slurs were likely neither Royalist fanatics, Nazi sympathizers, nor were they Alsatian autonomists. Rather these people were expressing utterances from positions often considered to be legitimate, articulated first by authorities on the frontlines of the refugee crisis, as well as by the university administration throughout the Popular Front.

Conclusions

The protest’s aftermaths are as much a part of the story as the demonstration. They show how individuals and groups resisted or related to these forces. Scott-Weaver has contributed a major study on Jewish lobbyists and activists during the refugee crisis. However, resistance also took place in various forms the university level, among Jews and non-

Jews, who opposed the protest movement and took a variety of actions to voice this disapproval.

The protest politically galvanized students on the Left who, according to a report in the archives, immediately formed a loose “defense organization” of over 200 people.⁸⁴ Yet individual responses were also important. Georges Rennwald, president of the Student Federation in Strasbourg, spoke privately to the rector after the protest, declaring his disapproval the comportment of “a handful of his friends” that afternoon. In refusing to participate, and in issuing a statement denouncing partisan passions, he was given a vote of non-confidence in March. Within a few weeks, this handful of classmates had managed to oust Rennwald from his position, revealing more about the successes and resonances of antisemitism among the student body.⁸⁵ The rector lamented his departure, but did not intervene.

Perhaps it is fitting that our story ends nebulously. With microhistory, we can uncover more perspectives, angles, and additional stories that bring us closer to those for whom the words and actions of antisemitism held meaning. However it may not offer clear-cut answers, definitions, or simple solutions. For the purposes of this essay, this case study aimed to demonstrate that this approach to the past can help historians understand how and why ideology operates in everyday life, and among real people living, working, and studying in shared spaces.

Strasbourg offers a rich example of antipathies, fears, and hatreds that were shaped by the particular environment of a long-multicultural and rapidly transforming metropolis in a tense borderland between two major European powers on the eve of unimaginable catastrophe. Further work on Jewish responses will offer more insight into the experiences of those living through and witnessing the upheavals of the 1930s. In uncovering the stories of individuals whose utterances have become lumped into generic definitions of Jew-hatred, I hope this bigger project exploring the social life of antisemitism in the Franco-German borderlands will intervene in scholarly discussions about the sources, natures, and expressions of other forms of racisms and prejudice.

NOTES

- ¹ Pierre Auer Bacher, *Souvenirs d'une période trouble* (Le Manuscrit Eds, 2008).
- ² Manfred Gailus, trans. Fields, "Anti-Jewish Emotion and Violence in the 1848 Crisis of German Society," in Christhard Hoffmann, ed. et. al, *Exclusionary Violence: Antisemitic Riots in Modern German History* (University of Michigan Press, 2002); Sonja Weinberg, *Pogroms and Riots: German Press Responses to Anti-Jewish Violence in Germany and Russia, 1881-82* (Peter Lang, 2010).
- ³ William Brustein, Louisa Roberts, *The Socialism of Fools? Leftist Origins of Modern Anti-Semitism* (Cambridge University Press, 2015).
- ⁴ David Engel, "Away from a Definition of Antisemitism: An Essay in the Semantics of Historical Description" in Moshe Rosman, ed. et. al., *Rethinking European Jewish History* (30-53).
- ⁵ Kenneth Marcus, *The Definition of Anti-Semitism* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 8.
- ⁶ Shulamit Volkov's argument that antisemitism is best understood as a "cultural code." Volkov, *Germans, Jews, and Antisemites: Trials in Emancipation* (Cambridge UP, 2006).
- ⁷ Till Van Rahden, "Words and Actions: Rethinking the Social History of German Antisemitism, 1870-1914," *German History* vol 18, no 4 (2000), pp. 413- 438.
- ⁸ Prefet du Departement du Bas Rhin to Ministre de l'interieur, etc., 25 Feb 1937. Archives departementales du Bas-Rhin (henceforth ADBR) 98 AL 0412
- ⁹ Sygurdur Gylfi Magnusson, Istvan M. Szijarto, *What is Microhistory? Theory and Practice* (Routledge, 2013), 4
- ¹⁰ Signaling new directions in Holocaust studies, see forthcoming collection, Claire Zalc, Tal Bruttman, eds., *Microhistories of the Holocaust* (Berghahn, 2016).
- ¹¹ See Magnussen and Szijarto, introduction.
- ¹² Historians also use case studies to understand how resistance worked. For instance, Mark Roseman's study of an individual survivor's experiences illuminated the operation of rescue networks across Europe. Roseman, *A Past in Hiding: Memory and Survival in Nazi Germany* (Metropolitan, 2000).
- ¹³ Magnussen and Szijarto, 158.
- ¹⁴ Giovanni Levi, "On Microhistory," in Peter Burke, *New Perspectives on historical writing* (Polity Press, 1991), 93-113.
- ¹⁵ Pierre Birnbaum, *Les Fous de la République* (Fayard, 1992); Jay R. Berkovitz, *The Shaping of Jewish Identity in Nineteenth Century France* (Wayne State University Press, 1989); Michael Graetz, *The Jews in Nineteenth Century France* (Stanford University Press, 1996).

- 16 Larkin, *Church and State after the Dreyfus Affair: The Separation Issue in France* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1974).
- 17 Arthur Hertzberg, *The French Revolution and the Jews* (Columbia University Press, 1968); Horkheimer and Adorno, *The Dialectics of Enlightenment* (1944).
- 18 Christopher Forth, *The Dreyfus Affair and the Crisis of French Manhood*. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004)
- 19 That Dreyfus was not only Jewish but Alsatian certainly did not help matters: "Many Alsatian Catholics insisted on Dreyfus' guilt, notwithstanding the evidence of a massive cover-up by the French army or the incessant anti-Alsatian agitation that French antisemites [...] invoked to suggest that Alsations, like Jews, were all Prussians at heart and could never be trusted." Vicki Caron, "Alsace" in Richard S. Levy, ed. *Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution*, v 1 (ABC CLIO, 2005), 13-15.
- 20 David Garrioch, *The Making of Revolutionary Paris* (University of California Press, 2004), 7.
- 21 Pierre Birnbaum, *Le moment antisémite: un tour de France 1898* (Fayard, 1998).
- 22 Paula Hyman, *From Dreyfus to Vichy: The Remaking of French Jewry, 1906-1939* (Columbia University Press, 1979); Meredith Scott-Weaver, "Lobbyists and humanitarians: French Jewish Activism and Networking in Interwar Strasbourg, Nice, and Paris, 1919-1939" (PhD Thesis: University of Delaware, 2011)
- 23 See work published in the 1920s by Abbé Émile Wetterlé, an Alsatian priest, journalist, and local politician who also served as a deputy to the Reichstag.
- 24 Stefan Wolff, *Disputed Territories: The Transnational Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict Settlement* (Berghahn, 2003), 66-67
- 25 For the classic work on modernization in the Third Republic, see Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford University Press, 1967).
- 26 Samuel Goodfellow, *Between the Swastika and the Cross of Lorraine: Fascisms in Interwar Alsace* (Northern Illinois University Press, 1999).
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Christopher J. Fischer, *Alsace to the Alsations? Visions and Divisions of Alsation Regionalism, 1870-1939* (Berghahn, 2010), 18.
- 29 Alfred Wahl, *Confession et comportement dans les campagnes d'Alsace et de Bade, 1871-1939* (Coprur, 1980)
- 30 Vicki Caron, *Between France and Germany* (Stanford University Press, 1988), 124.
- 31 Because of its unique history, the rural and "economically fragile," Jewish community of Alsace, a community fiercely attached to its customs, had trouble transforming intellectually between the Restoration and 1940. The result of these local peculiarities was to leave Alsatian Jewry a community

that appeared to most to be the “most impoverished and backward.” Freddy Raphael et Robert Weyl, *Juifs en Alsace, Culture, société, histoire* (Editions Privat, 1977), 369

32 Paula Hyman, *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace* (Yale University Press, 1991).

33 Non-Jewish populations of villages and towns remained stable. E. Schnurmann, *La Population Juive en Alsace* (Sireil, 1936), 11-17.

34 Erin Corber, “The Kids on Oberlin Street: Space, Place, and Jewish Community in Late Interwar Strasbourg,” *Urban History* (October 2015)

35 Other Jews with means and interest sought new homes further afield. Palestine was one location of choice for those seeking “somewhere completely new.” HICEM, a network of international relief organisations aimed to help Jewish refugees find opportunities in different countries in Europe and the US. On diverse Jewish responses to the rise of the Nazis, see Jürgen Matthäus, Mark Roseman, *Jewish Responses to Persecution, 1933-1939* (Alta Mira Press, 2010).

36 Robert Soucy argues France’s variant of Fascism was not an import from Germany or Italy, but rather developed within its own nationalist and conservative circles. Interestingly enough, he uses the word “wave” to describe tendencies and trends in interwar politics. Soucy, *French Fascism, The First Wave: 1924-1933* (Yale University Press, 1986), and *French Fascism: The Second Wave: 1933-1939* (Yale University Press, 1997).

37 France’s Popular Front’s policy toward Jewish refugees was less harsh than it had been in 1933-34. For more on government policy responses to the refugee crisis, see Vicki Caron, *Uneasy Asylum*, especially 117-141.

38 Carole Fink, *Marc Bloch: A Life*, 79. In her biography of Marc Bloch, at the time a professor of medieval history at the University of Strasbourg, Fink argues after 1926, Strasbourg became “more aggressively Christian and Alsatian, causing discomfort to the unreligious and French speakers” like Bloch, who increasingly “oriented themselves toward the nation’s capital,” 100

39 Dominique Lerch’s research on the impact of national politics on local Alsatian society and antisemitism in 19th century print culture does help build a local context for the circulation of these ideas. Lerch, «Imagerie populaire et antisemitisme en Alsace au XIXe siècle» in *Revue des sciences sociales*, (2003 no. 31).

40 For this section I draw mainly from a large collection of copies of reports from the Prefecture of the Upper Rhine, were copied and kept by the Prefecture of the Bas Rhin.

41 See Vicki Caron’s excellent study of the French government’s responses to the refugee crisis, which Caron argues laid the groundwork for Vichy’s anti-Jewish policies. Caron, *Uneasy Asylum*.

42 See prefect reports, ADBR 98 AL 688.

- 43 Vicki Caron, 4-5.
- 44 See for instance, letter from President of the Chamber of Commerce of Mulhouse to Prefect of Haut Rhin, 2 Mars 1934 in ADBR 98 AL 688.
- 45 Letter from Prefect du Haut Rhin to Minister of the interior, 19 Jan 1934, ADBR AL 688.
- 46 Ibid, 34 Mar 1934, ADBR AL 688.
- 47 Ibid.
- 48 The report notes each religious community – Catholic, Protestant, Jewish – had its own bookshop.
- 49 Lynda Khayat, «Les étudiants juifs étrangers à Strasbourg au tournant des années trente» in *Archives Juives* vol 38 (2005/2), 124-135.
- 50 Letter from Commissaire special of Saint Louis (HR) to Sub-Prefect of HR, Mulhouse, 28 May 1934, ADBR AL 688.
- 51 For more on the Jewishness of names, see “Names: What They Mean and How They Developed,” in Steven M. Lowenstein, *The Jewish Cultural Tapestry: International Jewish Folk Traditions* (Oxford University Press, 2000), 69-84.
- 52 Letter from Prefect du HR to Minister of the interior, 14 May 1934 in ADBR AL 688.
- 53 G. Burgess, *Refuge in the Land of Liberty: France and its Refugees, from the Revolution to the End of Asylum, 1787-1939* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 141-211
- 54 Caron, *Uneasy Asylum*, 43-63.
- 55 Caron, “Unwilling refuge: France and the Dilemma of Illegal Immigration, 1933-1939,” in Frank Caestecker, Bob Moore, eds., *Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European State* (Berghahn, 2010), 57-81
- 56 Report, 17 Feb 1934 from the *commissaire special de Sarreguemines* to the controller general of police services in Alsace-Lorraine. ADBR 98 AL 415 – Immigration et réfugiés sarrois, 1934-1938.
- 57 The minister of cults was granted a visit to determine if refugees at Lizé-Nord should be given a priest or rabbi. The report he generated indicated that the 30 refugees who identified as Jewish unanimously requested a rabbi for the camp. Report, 23 Jan 1935. ADBR 98 AL 688, boîte 3.
- 58 Excellent work produced on these topics has illuminated important aspects of French antisemitism. Sandrine Sanos’ excellent monograph on intellectuals of the Far Right, for example, demonstrates how these individuals cultivated a language and aesthetics that drew on race, gender, and sexuality to construct a modern French nationalism, and shows the close links between antisemitism and colonialism in these discourses. Sanos, *The aesthetics of Hate: Far Right Intellectuals, Antisemitism, and Gender in 1930s France* (Stanford University Press, 2012).

- 59 Léon Strauss, «L'antisémitisme en Alsace de 1789 à 1939» (unpublished, n.d.), shared with the author. Strauss identifies a unique local context for the rise of these ideas and expressions, and understands the rise of antisemitism in the interwar period as part of a longer historical arc of antipathies activated by the conservative tendencies in the Catholic Church and the development of social Catholicism through nineteenth century. For more on the history of the Catholic church in Alsace, see Claude Muller, *Dieu est catholique et alsacien: la vitalité du diocèse de Strasbourg au XIXe siècle* (PhD Thesis, Strasbourg 1986), On interconfessional relations in rural Alsace, see Alfred Wahl, *Confession et comportement ...* (1980); on Protestantism in Strasbourg, see Anthony Steinhoff, *The Gods of the City: Protestantism and Religious Culture in Strasbourg, 1870-1914* (Brill, 2008).
- 60 Michele Audin, Jacques Feldbau, *Topologe: Das Schicksal eines jüdischen Mathematikers 1914-1945* (Berlin: Springer Spektrum, 2010), pp. 38-39.
- 61 See the classic essay that discusses this term, coined by Edoardo Grendi, by Carlo Ginzburg and Carlo Poni, "The Name and the Game: Unequal Exchange and the Historical Marketplace," *Microhistory and the Lost Peoples of Europe: Selections from Quaderni Storici* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). Also see Grendi, "Microanalisi et storia sociale," *Quaderni Storici* 35 (1977) pp 506-20, and a more recent essay on the term, Edoardo Grendi, "Ripensare la microstoria?" *Quaderni Storici* 86 (1994), 539-49.
- 62 Pierre Birnbaum, *Le moment antisémite: un tour de France 1898*.
- 63 Report, Le Procureur General près la Cour d'appel de Colmar à Monsieur le Garde des sceaux, Colmar le 27 Feb 1937. ADBR 98 AL 0412.
- 64 Report 25 Feb 1937, "Manifestation à l'occasion de la venue à Strasbourg de Madame Léon Brunschvicg." ADBR 98 AL 0412
- 65 Letter from Recteur de l'Académie de Strasbourg to Monsieur le Conseiller d'État, Directeur Général des Services d'Alsace de Lorraine, 26 February, 1937. Report is blurred but probably reads either 1 or 200. ADBR 98 AL 0412.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Michael Mann employed similar techniques to understand the transnational nature of Fascism. Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge UP, 2004).
- 68 «Brunschwicq (sic.) – Aria ou La rosette de Gemaehling» in *L'appel: Tribune de l'étudiant français de Strasbourg* (v5, n2) ADBR 98 0412
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 The local Jewish press noted that the protesters even punched some women who looked like they were "the same race" as Brunschvicg. «Le quinzième anniversaire de l'école de formation sociale à Strasbourg ou le progrès de la propagande antijuive en Alsace,» in *La Tribune Juive*, 3/5/1937.
- 71 «Le quinzième anniversaire...» in *La Tribune Juive*, 3/5/1937.
- 72 William Shane Story "Constructing French Alsace: A State, Region, and Nation," (PhD Thesis, Rice University, 2001), 87-88.

- 73 Press sources in ADBR 98 AL 1083 / 1
- 74 In 1933, for instance, in loudly speaking out against international Jewish organizations as well as Zionism in her denunciation of WIZO (the Women's International Zionist organization), Brunschvicg demonstrated her commitment to her French identity above Jewish particularism. Cécile Formaglio, «Cécile Brunschvicg, femme, féministe, juive, face aux défis de l'intégration et de la neutralité religieuse» in *Bulletin archives du féminisme*, no 9 (Dec 2005). According to Muruel Pichon, she "hardly ever took her children to synagogue." Pichon, «Cécile Brunschvicg née Kahn, féministe et ministre du Front Populaire,» Archives Juives 2012/1 (v 45), 131-134. Also see Brunschvicg, "Français d'abord," *La Française*, 21 Oct 1933.
- 75 David Weinberg, *A Community on Trial: The Jews of Paris in the 1930s* (University of Chicago Press, 1977).
- 76 Jean Daltroff « L'accueil contrasté de Juifs de l'Europe orientale en Alsace 1870-1930), Charlotte Kraus, Ariane Lüthi, eds, «*Halb-Asien*» und *Frankreich: Erlebts und erinnertes Osteuropa in Literatur und Geschichte* (Lit Verlag: 2012) 51-68.
- 77 «Les étudiants étrangers à l'Université» in *l'Appel* no 1 (1933), see student movement surveillance in ADBR 98 AL 687.
- 78 Rector of the Académie de Strasbourg to the president of Faculty of Letters, 18 Jun 1938. ADBR 460 D 22.
- 79 See ADBR 98 AL 687, memos between the Rector of the Académie and the director of public instruction of Alsace and Lorraine, the prefect of the Lower Rhine, and the undersecretary of state, which all take issue with the activity of student interest groups of a political nature, including but not limited to the Front Antifasciste.
- 80 David Berry, " 'Fascism or Revolution!' Anarchism and Antifascism in France, 1933-39," *Contemporary European History* v 8, n1 (1999).
- 81 See for instance the enormous number of requests from Saar refugees in Lizé-Nord to be sent to the Soviet Union, a testament for a huge presence of committed Communists. ADBR 98 AL 688 boîte 3.
- 82 Police report for the Prefect of BR, shared with the Undersecretary of state in charge of Alsace-Lorraine affairs, 5 Aug 1935 in ADBR 98 AL 687.
- 83 This does not ignore the extremist positions – often articulated in regional journals like *La France de l'Est*, *Dernières Nouvelles de l'Alsace*, *Der Républicaner*, and *Der Elsaßer Kurier* – who used the Brunschwig affair to "poison" and "stir up" Alsatians with "hateful excesses." Local authorities were highly concerned with monitoring this kind of press and its effects on readership. letter to Paul Valot, 18 Feb 1937, ADBR 98 AL 0412,
- 84 *Ibid.*
- 85 Letters from rector and Rennwald, 19 Mar 1937, ADBR 98 AL 0412



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FROM ESTONIAN-RUSSIAN INTER-MARRIAGES TO “INTER-REGIONAL” MARRIAGES IN UKRAINE IN THE TIMES OF CRISIS

Abstract

This working paper discusses the issues with translating the research methodology and theoretical underpinnings from one inter-marriage situation in Estonia and to another in Ukraine. In my previous work, I researched “Estonian-Russian” intermarriages; my ongoing postdoctoral research focuses on the marriages between the people from different regions in Ukraine. In this paper I first offer an overview of my research methodology and theoretical framework. Second, I present an empirical illustration of some findings from Ukraine. In the end, I develop new reflections about my theoretical approach, directed towards rethinking the concept of “cultural world” and the meaning of “inter-marriage” in the diverse identification situation of Ukraine.

Keywords: Oral history, life-story, memory studies, Estonia, Ukraine, Soviet Union, Maidan.

Introduction

This working paper is about the problems of cultural identification in the Western borderlands of the former USSR at a time when the geopolitical conflict between the “West” and Russia is again captured in public in blunt Huntingtonian terms. In my doctoral dissertation I looked at the cultural divisions in the (Soviet) Estonian society and how this division reflected within individual inter-marriage situations: how “Russian newcomer” and “Estonian local” families connected to the Russian-Estonian cultural division in larger social terms. Prior to coming to New Europe College, I started a new research project about the oral histories of people in “inter-marriages” between different regions of Ukraine, discussing historical memory and personal trajectories of people whose family members come

from different parts of Ukraine. I spent the time from October 2015 to March 2016 in Kyiv and I will go back there in autumn 2016.

My approach to Ukraine has been based on the theoretical framework of my doctoral dissertation, but the complexity and spread of the country thirty times bigger than Estonia (population wise) has naturally challenged my original concepts and will potentially also shed new light on the interpretation of the Estonian data which I collected in 2009-11. In winter and early spring of 2016 I completed twenty interviews in Ukraine, which I transcribed in April-June. In this essay I trace the methodological and theoretical implications of changing the research paradigm from one Soviet borderland case to another. I will do it in three parts. First, I offer an overview of my research methodology and design; second, I discuss more thoroughly the theoretical underpinnings of my work; third, I develop some theoretical reflections that I have on my theoretical apparatus after conducting the Ukraine fieldwork; fourth, I present a preliminary empirical overview of my Ukraine research.

Methodology and Research

Many sociological and political science studies tackle unfolding inter-group relations and socio-cultural processes on the Western borderlands of the former USSR. In Estonia, the relocation of a soviet war monument which caused the Bronze Soldier crisis of 2007, started a boom of new studies of social representations, historical causes, and external actors in ethnic relations.¹ In the Ukrainian case, the cultural mixings and heritage of different historical experiences have received a fair amount of interest; however, the studies of ethno-linguistic and cultural relations have mostly focused on macro-level processes, and diverse identification patters from below are much less studied.²

My research takes a historical and biographical perspective³ through life-story narratives in inter-marriage settings.⁴ It is based on the coexistence of different patterns of ethno-linguistic heritage and memory cultures in Estonia (among "Estonian locals" and "Russian newcomers") and in Ukraine (varying regionally).

While there has been considerable work done in memory studies in Estonia,⁵ the studies of biographical processes among the Russian-speaking community in Estonia are scarce and inter-ethnic settings are unexplored altogether.⁶ Memory communities in Ukraine are currently in flux and

closer explorations of life-story perspectives and family narratives are absent. However, while tackling the Ukrainian case, studies of social origins and ethnic and class cultures will provide some useful background to this paper.

In my research of Estonia and Ukraine I focus on the “ordinary” people in families that bring together different cultural traditions and heritage. With oral history “from below,” I represent history and contemporary reality not at the level of the nation-state but rather through interactions, exchanges, and negotiations on the ground, building a “bottom-up,” historically minded ethnographic perspective to society. The main focus of the interviews was on the knowledge of family ancestry, related controversies, absences, migrations, and attachments to “great” historical events; an interview consisted of two parts: free and less guided life-story narration; and semi-structured follow up questions that built on the information received from the life-story narration.

In my Estonian research in 2009-2011, I conducted semi-structured life-story interviews with representatives from the families that brought together as spouses an “Estonian-speaking local” and a “Russian-speaking newcomer” in the Soviet period in Estonia (marriages from 1953 to late 1970s). I made ninety interviews with the people from different age cohorts, when possible interviewing various members of the same family, both the children and spouses. I attempted to meet with different social groups, but there is some overrepresentation of people with higher education due to easier access I had to their milieu. The majority of the interviews were in Estonian language, some were in Russian, and some were using both in a mixed manner.⁷

In my Ukrainian research in 2016, I conducted twenty semi-structured life-story interviews with regionally “inter-married” parents (marriages from 1960s–late 1980s) and their children who currently live in Kyiv, but whose relatives may live all around Ukraine. I used the snow-ball approach and internet advertisements contacts to find informants from various socio-economic backgrounds. Interview language was mostly Russian but some interviewees preferred English to it. Further interviews are scheduled for autumn and winter 2016-17 with, primarily, other members of the families whom I had already interviewed, with field trips to the Western and Eastern parts of Ukraine along the lines of family networks.

Theoretical Postulates

Marriage and family figure in my research primarily as heuristic micro-environments where options for social belonging are negotiated, helping to observe how human relationships and everyday practices transformed along with social changes and the passing of time. They make up the platform for looking towards the wider socio-cultural relations and borders. One of the underlying ideas of my research is that a cultural borderline situation in a marriage that connects different cultural realms opens up more possibilities to frame or give sense to one's own life-story narration. Hence, I aim to point towards the possible *macro* perspectives to society "from below" and "from within" personal life situations and *micro* perspectives to negotiation of social memory and belonging on the cultural "borderlands" of inter-marriage.

In Estonia, the idea of "inter-marriage" and "mixity" therein is quite straightforward: native Estonians were "locals" (present before WWII) and native Russian speakers were "newcomers" (arrived after WWII). In Ukraine, such clear-cut differences obviously do not exist; even if in macro view there are two possible "extremities" – Western Ukraine and industrialized towns of Eastern Ukraine – in real life situations they have been experienced quite differently, and even when looking at such polarization the linguistic border is fluid and much more penetratable than in Estonia. More generally: much more people in Ukraine live "in-between," inhabiting culturally diverse and not clearly bounded environments; there also appears quite a strong distinction between the worlds of countryside and city dwellers. After these short comments, I will turn to the discussion of the theoretical model of society.

First, about a macro-view of society. The basic cornerstone of my research in the case of Estonia has been *cultural world*, which I defined as a reproductive and structuring environment, a system of identification that offers people limited horizons of meaning, social action, future, and sense of belonging.⁸ Without delving too deep into theorizing culture, I would just distinguish between the contents and borders of cultural worlds. Contents could be understood as the "stuff" of culture – shared meanings and beliefs, histories, narrative templates, language – these are the elements that people socially identify with and through which they enact their social belonging.⁹ Borders, however, designate the surrounding and maintenance of the named cultural "stuff." Cultural borders result of human capacity to make distinctions and to externalize the unknown

and the unfitting, to distinguish between “one’s own” and the “others.”¹⁰ The students of culture have argued that attention to borders allows for a more dynamic look at the processual maintenance of cultural boundaries that round up individuals and personal identifications while designating where people should “belong.”¹¹

In my Ph.D. thesis I show that from the World War II onwards, the Estonian and Russian linguistic realms formed large clearly distinct *cultural worlds* in Estonia as their borders were defined quite solidly by the two mutually unintelligible languages and the local education system was arranged in two parallel linguistic tracks.¹² In these terms, Soviet Estonia was and contemporary Estonia remains a culturally dual entity, as both worlds offered different horizons of meaning, future perspectives, and sense of belonging; and they both functioned as reproductive and generative environments.¹³

But it should be said that, naturally, both cultural worlds offered diverse paths for socialization and personal identification; the worlds themselves were also intertwined and located within the other significant meanings constellations. In addition, “from below,” cultural worlds were perceived and lived in an asymmetric manner: the majority of the population lived primarily within one world and perceived the other “from outside,” however, Estonian-Russian inter-marriages were simultaneously placed within and between both worlds.

The Russian world and the Estonian world comprised two essentially different memory communities in Soviet Estonia.¹⁴ Personal experiences and communicative memories differed radically even if in the public realm many artefacts of the Estonian national memories were repressed and pushed aside by the all-encompassing “Soviet” narrative. The conflict between locals and newcomers was acutely felt by the local Estonians who carried immediate memories of the inter-war republic, Soviet annexation, and Stalinist terror – so that it has been claimed that within a single year “Russians turned into the main enemy of Estonians” – and none of this was openly discussed in Soviet Estonia.¹⁵ Such radical polarization appears to be true insofar as the annexation mobilized large parts of society and repressions were felt to be abusing the national body.¹⁶

Second, as for the micro views of society, while it seemingly deals with the manifold uses of the concept of “identity,” following Brubaker’s ideas, however, I suggest to rather use the concept of processual *identification* as this term enables to discuss how people see themselves and at times others in relation to the *cultural world* and public discourse more contextually.¹⁷

The patterns of identification that were available to individuals in the cultural worlds appeared both in permanent and situational ways. While paying attention to their generally situational, triggered nature, I also came to accept interviewees' stable understandings of their sense of belonging through the interviews. For example, in case of ethnicity, people would often wish to "possess" and "have" ethnicity – they identify themselves and others ethnically in a stable manner and they claim that it matters.

I study individuals within personalized webs of social identifications and cultural negotiation stemming from the sociological concepts of life-world and habitus. The notion of *life-world* designates how people build up their understanding of the world in relation to their personal dispositions, values, and habits; how they make sense of everyday life and their life-course.¹⁸ This phenomenological concept originates from the works of A. Schütz and bears similarity to P. Bourdieu's notion of *habitus* that is "an acquired scheme of values and disposition to action" which enables and restricts the personal horizon and perception of the world.¹⁹ Habitus draws attention to the fundamental dispositions (long-lasting identifications) that are often formed and fixed at a rather young age, mostly in the family environment, and that are resistant to later change; it stresses contingencies of the past, the relative stability of the adult self, and the limits to individual change. All in all, life-world and habitus take a holistic view of individuals; not only do they point to the irreducibility of life to social categories and to the contextuality of social identifications, but they also indicate stability and resistance to change in adult subjectivity.

In Estonian case, I showed that the inter-married spouses typically identify with the narratives of ethno-cultural belonging quite strongly by asserting in the interviews as being either "Russian" or "Estonian." However, they appear to have practically lived aside of the culturally conflictual identification patterns by not actualizing them in the marriage context; they rarely mention cultural conflicts in relation to their marriage. The spouses in my Estonian and Ukrainian research were and are mostly oriented to finding common grounds between cultural differences and making ways to participate in each other's lives. People shared with each other the things that could be shared, for which there were available words and suitable situations; but there were also cases in which social conflict entered the family realm all too powerfully (like in Ukraine since 2014 and in Estonia in 1989-92).

In short, I look at the macro- and micro-level cultural identification processes based on the oral histories with people whose marriages are located on the borderlands of the different cultural worlds. I use the idea of cultural world to describe socio-cultural divisions – including divided historical narration patterns – while trying to avoid singular determinisms, be they ethnic, linguistic, or ideological. As for individuals, I will discuss their patterns of identification with the available discourses, meanings, and dispositions – these could be either received through the public channels or from peers and through inter-generational transmission in the family.

Empirical Examples from Ukrainian Research

The Estonian inter-married spouses fit much more clearly into the binary division of Estonian and Russian cultural worlds – even if within these worlds the individual trajectories are naturally complex and the ways in which spouses and their children cross the boundaries vary. In Ukraine, the interviews attest to very complex cultural entanglements in relation to the pasts, ideologies, and migrations.

Here are just a few examples from among my interviews with middle-aged informants who ascribed to oneself to live in an “intermarriage” and to whom I talked in February-March 2016 in Kyiv. All the names are changed. First, **Anna’s** (1966) father was from Ternopil (towards Western Ukraine, but still central) and her mother was from Vinnytsia (central Ukraine), several of her relatives live today in Russia, she speaks mostly Ukrainian in her everyday life; she is married to a man whose parents also come from various regions of the country. Second, **Valentina’s** (1964) parental backgrounds are distinguished by other dimensions as her father is from a Ukrainian village and her mother is an ethnic Russian who lived her life in Lviv; her husband comes from a family of Russians in Kyiv, she speaks mostly Ukrainian in everyday life. Third, **Natalya’s** (1969) father is an ethnic German from Volga region who grew up as a deportee in Kazakhstan and her mother is Russian from a village in Russia (parents live today in Crimea); her husband is of Jewish origin, from Vinnytsa district; Natalya understands but would not speak Ukrainian. Fourth, the parents of **Lydia’s** (1975) father came to Ukraine from Siberia, one of her grandparents was originally from Kharkiv (North East) and the other was, as she says, “very Russian”; Lydia’s own mother is from central Russia. Lydia grew up with parents in Cherkasy (central Ukraine) but she herself identifies

mostly as Kharkovian, as she studied there. She speaks both languages and is in a relationship with a man from Dnipropetrovsk who has “very radical views” (in the interview these appeared to be pro-Ukrainian). Fifth, **Galyna** (1971) is from a Soviet military family; until the age of sixteen she “did not have a home town,” later they settled down in Zaporizhia (central Eastern Ukraine); she says that until 2014 she considered herself “Russian,” but now she is clearly “Ukrainian.” Sixth, **Aleksandr** (1979) explained his familial heritage to me already in his first e-mail, writing: “I am 1/4 Ukrainian, 1/4 Polish, 1/4 Czech, and 1/4 Jewish.” However, later in the interview it appeared even more complicated and the initially devised clear-cut four-dimensional division crumbled down. Seventh, **Sergei** (1977) is a Russian-speaker from Donetsk; his parents are Russians from Donetsk (moved to Kyiv in 2015) but Sergei considers himself clearly “Ukrainian” (“maybe a bit more now than before”). Sergei’s wife is also from Donetsk, and “probably she considers herself Russian” (but she herself did not agree to be interviewed). Eighth, **Ivan** (1947) and **Yulia** (1956) are clearly from different backgrounds: Ivan is from the countryside in Western Ukrainian borderlands and he calls himself the “Bandera’s guy”; Yulia is from a Russian military family and grew up in Kaliningrad; today they speak Ukrainian at home. As Ivan comes from the region of Ukraine that did not belong to the USSR prior to 1940, and many in his family fought against the Soviet Army, the story of Ivan and Yulia corresponds most to the differences in sociopolitical and cultural memory in the Estonian case.

Prior to starting my field-work in Ukraine I raised some research questions. Based on the data that I have gathered I would now offer some preliminary answers. First: How do the binary narratives of “East-West” and “Europe-Russia” fit with the identification patterns of people in geographically mixed marriages in Ukraine over their life-courses, when have such belongings gained significance? The people I interviewed in Lviv had quite clear and easy answers to this question: they would feel “European” and expect Kyiv and the rest of the country to follow the example. In return, the majority of interviewees in Kyiv were quite hesitant to choose between the two sides in such a dichotomy, most would dislike such binary discourse, in early 2016 it was easier to be “more European than Russian,” sometimes “being Ukrainian” would be a way out, sometimes it would be seen replicating the same problem with imaginary geography problem: where to place “being Ukrainian”?

Second: How do people relate to their own ancestral pasts vis-à-vis the politicized and conflictual historical interpretations? Which family

lineages and migrations would be stressed and which omitted? On the one hand, the references to distant history, for example to Holodomor, WWII, and the Soviet past, appeared biographically significant only when specially inquired by me in the second half of the interview, they were less important for most of my interviewees as they constructed their own life-stories and referred to ancestors. Sometimes, the ancestral pasts, which are located in Russia, were less well known than the pasts in Ukraine, but this was very systematic. On the other hand, the event which is often mentioned is the Chornobyl catastrophe of 1986, a clear milestone for Kyiv inhabitants that ties with the experiences of children who were sent out of town for the 1986-87 term. The collapse of the Soviet Union raised bright memories for some and was taken quite indifferently by the other interviewees; the same was the case for the 2013-14 events in Ukraine: very bright memories for some and quite indifferent for others, but in this case everyone had to take some stance.

Third: In which conditions are the family members able to live aside the societal conflict and when is the conflict “activated” in family life? How have family connections to relatives elsewhere (in Russia or in other parts of Ukraine) changed over time? It appeared that people often hid their active participation in Maidan in 2013-14 from some relatives who would not be supportive of it, but who would also just worry about their kin (this was most often the case with grandparents). By 2016, these situations had mostly been sorted out and discussed through. Most vivid stories in relation to the events in the last three years however pertain to the relationships with relatives in Russia. Two patterns were most significant here: either the family members stopped talking about politics but maintained otherwise “normal human communication” or the political conflict was overwriting all the themes and led to sometimes cutting the ties. Naturally, the reality often lied in between as people struggled to maintain some contact.

Fourth: How do age, class belonging, and gendered family roles influence changing identification patterns? These certainly matter, but it is yet too early to map these based on the twenty interviews that I have gathered. Many interviewees claim, in abstract, that they perceive a certain “generational gap,” the old are more pro-Soviet and the young are more pro-European. But when it comes to their own relatives and direct experiences, then they might be even reverse: I heard much about the growing frustrations and rather pessimist views of the future by the young

and middle-aged people, and the old people whom I spoke to were all supportive of the ideas and actions of Ukraine's revolutions.

Revisiting the Ideas of "Inter-Marriage" and "Cultural World"

The Russian-speaking community grew to a place of increasing importance during the Soviet Era and by the time the Soviet Union collapsed, the share of Russian-speakers had grown from ~5% (in 1944) to ~35% (1989) of Estonian total population. Ukraine is characterized by large population movements throughout the whole 20th century (famine of 1931-33, World War II, industrialization) and the number of Russian-speakers in many parts of the country grew significantly through migration and ethno-linguistic conversions. Whereas historical, contemporary and ethno-linguistic conditions in the Estonian and Ukrainian cases are very different, the political production of binary cultural belongings in public discourse and in the media is somewhat similar, as both enforce a normative identity choice between "East" and "West."

In Ukraine, the "borderlands turned into bloodlands"²⁰ in 2014 as Maidan shootings, Crimean annexation, and the military conflict forced people to take sides, depending on the place of living and on the followed media representations. At the same time, the publicly prevalent discourse of "two Ukraines" that has juxtaposed the "democratizing West" and the "authoritarian" and Soviet-nostalgic "East"²¹ has somewhat given way to the spread of civic identification with "Ukraine." Public discourse and its changing patterns certainly influence the domestic questions and problems and the study of the workings of social discourses on grass-root level insert shades and paradoxes to the formerly dominant discursive clash that has been portrayed as a struggle between the incommensurable agendas and also to the newly dominant hegemonic ideas of unifying civic Ukrainianness.

In short: my primary interest in both research cases has been to shift attention from the public conflict to the more private with the example of the family, while being still alert to differences that derive from ethno-cultural and linguistic heritage ("Estonian"- "Russian") or ("Ukrainian"- "Russian") and also from the socio-political contemporary experience ("local"- "newcomer" in Estonian case) or ("more Western" – "more Russian-leaning" in Ukrainian case) which create something of a "double mixity" in the familial setting.

Doing Ukrainian field work invited me, however, to revisit the idea of “inter-marriage” that had been easier to take as self-evidently grounded in Estonia, where the socio-cultural border was and is clearly linguistically marked. In Ukraine, I moved from the initial idea of “East-West” marriages inside the country (e.g., between a spouse from Lviv and one from Kharkiv) towards the idea of inter-marriage as “inter-regional” marriage, in order to acknowledge the complicated and diverse identification patterns and not to focus only on the conflictual “extremities.” However, the question still remains: what is really the cultural in-between quality in these family situations?

I position my research and aspirations in the field of oral history and this discipline stresses the role of individuals in connection with big History: “without violating that space [of encounter], [without] cracking the uniqueness of each spore with an arrogant need to scrutinize, to know, and to classify.”²² With this emphasis, oral history remains consciously on the borderlands of the scholarly endeavors that are so often brought together around the business of the “arrogant need to classify.” However, oral history does have the ambition not to remain in a vacuum but to somehow “connect life to times, uniqueness to representativeness, as well as orality to writing.”²³

There seems to be a tension between the theoretical design of my informant pool and the methodological approach to my interviewees and their stories. I refer to the tension between the focus on the sociologically determined “familial mixity” of categories and appreciating human lives as wholes; between looking at lives through the categories and looking at categories through the lives (analytically much more infinite process, emphasizing individual life-worlds in the making). This issue became more pronounced in the Ukrainian empirical setting.

I will touch now upon the contradiction of family-unit and individual life and then I will continue with the discussion of some silences in the interviews. The scholarly perspective on family, more precisely on the inter-generational transmission of knowledge and on the homely environment of growing up privileges potentially the dominant assumptions of familial normality. How to situate individual life-stories in the family context so that they would remain holistic; or should family in itself be seen holistically? A historically minded look at the “roots and origins” of biography somewhat downplays individual agency in favor of structure as the researcher is focusing on familial continuities. Even with attention to the “breaks” with the ancestral past that are rather normal in the post-

Stalinist biographies, these breaks would be observed at the background of the assumed familial transmission as a desired norm. In short, I have become increasingly aware that the desirable norms and “normalities” should be approached with utmost care both in the case of “family” and with regard to the harmonious “mixity” within it – in order to allow for individual voices to speak at the background of the persistence of social and scholarly hegemonic judgments.

Let’s now turn from the family unit to the silences in the life-stories that acted as an eye-opener about the potential over-ethnicization or conflictualization. Namely, it appeared that in the life-stories of people, the familial practices related to the cultural “mixity” were rather rarely mentioned, they were under-stressed from the Soviet period through the post-Soviet transformation until today. In reference to the Soviet era, I learned that the ideological background differences were very rarely discussed almost at all in the families (they were discussed a bit more in Estonia than in Ukraine). As for the time of interviewing – in Estonia in 2009-11 and in Ukraine in 2016 – the inter-cultural experiences were not particularly cherished and valued socially: apparently the nationalist “memory landscape” in Estonia and the ongoing war in Ukraine reinforced several silences. In terms of family life, silence or “avoidance” could also be seen as ways to keep the family intuitively closer; not meddling with the sources of potential endless misunderstanding, distrust, and conflict – as the process appears in the social realm, especially through the media. Whereas silence about in-betweenness and boundary-crossing could be appreciated as a functioning practical strategy in family life, it presents a rather un-reflected situation and as such, holds some explosive potential. Potential conflict and clash of meanings can be triggered by the same social forces that it should guard the family against.²⁴ This line of thought naturally shares an assumption that there has been an object for the silence in the first place, that there has been an inter-cultural aspect of family life – to be hidden, avoided, or reconfigured in the story told to me.

It should be worthwhile to take another look at the tension between the externally induced definition of “inter-cultural” situation and the oral history attempt to embrace lives holistically. In the end, two phenomena could be observed in parallel: inter-cultural position of marriage serves people both in the context-specific and experiential ways of perceiving and conceiving; and it also is socially used as a generic and nominal way of titling and naming.²⁵ When does “inter-cultural situation” then really

happen to the interviewees – and to biographies, to narratives, and to interview situations?

This approach is not so unique, of course. Perhaps it is just another way of bringing together *etic* concepts and *emic* research findings.²⁶ How and when are the markers of inter-marriage emically employed by the informants? Taking this path, however, would soften the violence, the ease with which I as a researcher had put my informants in that categorical box of inter-marriage in the first place; this move would create some space for meta-reflection about the researcher's role.

The construction of an "in-between" object of study draws attention to an important phenomena in social reality, but it is also a way to draw boundaries and divisions.²⁷ I am more cautious now about the interview setup and the ways in which to analyze them, as the interviews may also work as authoritative calls for informants to insert boundaries and divisions into their life-story and experiences. Thereby, silence is not only the lack of expected research findings and lack of cultural differences in "inter-marriages," but it is also about subtle resistance to academic authority and, as such, should be cherished.²⁸

NOTES

- ¹ Housden and Smith, *Forgotten Pages in Baltic History*; Mälksoo, "Liminality and Contested Europeanness: Conflicting Memory Politics in the Baltic Space"; Pettai, *Memory and Pluralism in the Baltic States*, Tamm and Petersoo, *Monumentaalne konflikt* (Monumental conflict); Wulf, "Politics of History in Estonia: Changing Memory Regimes 1987-2009."
- ² Some studies that touch upon social identification and historical influences in Ukraine are the following – all taking a more quantitative and political science perspective: Arel and Ruble, *Rebounding Identities*; Bassin and Kelly, *Soviet and Post-Soviet Identities*; Hrytsak, "National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk"; Hrytsenko, "Perspectives on Ukraine's Ethno-Cultural Diversity"; Kulyk, "Language Identity, Linguistic Diversity and Political Cleavages"; Pirie, "National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine"; Riabchuk, "One Nation, Two Languages, Three Cultures?"; Wilson, "Elements of a theory of Ukrainian ethno-national identities"; Zaharchenko, "Memory and Identity in Today's Ukraine"; Zhurzhenko, *Borderlands into Bordered Lands*.
- ³ See also: Bertaux, Rotkirch, Thompson, *On Living Through Soviet Russia*; Humphrey, Miller, Zdravomyslova, *Biographical Research in Eastern Europe: Altered Lives and Broken Biographies*.
- ⁴ For some other work on Eastern Europe, see: Buric, "Mixed Marriages of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Life and Death of Yugoslavia"; Edgar, "Interethnic Intimacy in Post-war Central Asia in Comparative Perspective."
- ⁵ Kõresaar, *Elu ideoloogiad*; Aarelaid, *Cultural Trauma and Life Stories*; Bennich-Björkman and Aarelaid, *Baltic Biographies at Historical Crossroads*; Jõesalu and Kõresaar, "Continuity or Discontinuity: On the Dynamics of Remembering."
- ⁶ A recent study about identification patterns in the Estonian town of Narva: Pfoser, "Between Russia and Estonia: Narratives of Place in a New Borderland."
- ⁷ It should be mentioned that I am an Estonian myself and I have been socialized into an Estonian milieu, and I bear an Estonian name. Among most of my social circles in Estonia there are no Russian-speakers.
- ⁸ I propose *cultural world* as a metaphor for stressing that such constellations contained most of people's day-to-day interactive spaces and experiences but that they were also limited, interconnected, and porous realms. "Cultural world" has less totalizing connotations than "culture," it appears less pre-existing and more resulting from human activities. Cultural worlds are not civic, political, ethnic or linguistic worlds, the latter constitute activated elements in them. There is no need to get involved here in the debate about "what is culture." However, I propose the following working definition of culture for the background of the discussion of "cultural worlds" by

H. Spencer-Oatey (*Culturally Speaking*, 3): "Culture is a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by a group of people, and that influence (but do not determine) each member's behaviour and his/her interpretations of the 'meaning' of other people's behaviour."

⁹ Looking only at the "contents" of culture has a primordializing tendency due to a danger of buying into the cultural narratives of its intemporality. This is exemplified by the debate around Clifford Geertz's "culturalist" account of ethnicity that discusses the "primordial" beliefs that actors have (Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 89; Geertz, *Primordial Loyalties and Standing Entities*).

¹⁰ A classical approach: Barth, "Introduction" to *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Brubaker's approach to ethnicity as cognition: Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamato, "Ethnicity as Cognition."

¹¹ The dichotomy of contents and border-maintenance has been criticised by pointing to their deep ontological interplay; but also by pointing to the essentialized conclusions that both approaches may result to. See: Jenkins, *Rethinking ethnicity*, 169.

¹² I should stress that these worlds contained the reservoirs of political and ethnic identifications, but they should *not* be understood as political or ethnic worlds. Political ideology and ethnic patterns should rather be seen as active elements within these cultural worlds. This distinction should help to pay attention to the wider social differences and plural identification patters.

¹³ As mentioned before and explained below, these worlds had and have strongly ethnic (and sometimes political) connotations at times, but at other times, they do not. These worlds contained ethnic identification reservoirs, but calling them automatically ethnic worlds would over-ethnicize them.

¹⁴ Aarelaid, *Cultural Trauma and Life Stories*; Bennich-Björkman and Aarelaid, *Baltic Biographies at Historical Crossroads*.

¹⁵ E.g.: Mertelsmann, "How the Russians Turned into the Image of the "National Enemy" of the Estonians."

¹⁶ However, in my work I show that many young Estonians identified with the late Soviet regime and that the former assumption clearly assumes greater a coherence of the Estonian national body than actually existed. Diversification of the memories of Estonians about the late Soviet period is also shown by Jõesalu and Kõresaar, "Continuity or Discontinuity."

¹⁷ For literature overview and some theoretical discussion of a similar proposal, see: Brubaker and Cooper, "Beyond "Identity."" "As a processual, active term, derived from a verb, 'identification' lacks the reifying connotations of 'identity.' It invites us to specify the agents that do the identifying. And it does not presuppose that such identifying (even by powerful agents, such as the state) will necessarily result in the internal sameness, the distinctiveness,

- the bounded groupness that political entrepreneurs may seek to achieve" (Ibid, 14). See also: Apitzsch, "Ethnicity as Participation and Belonging."
- 18 Alfred Schütz refers to *life-world* as "the world of everyday, governed by person's spatially distributed and temporally arranged natural attitudes"; this is the area of reality which is logical and structured for the person. Life-world presents itself "as normal and self-evident, ordered and objective, and as such unquestioned" (Wuthrow et al, *Cultural Analysis*, 32). See also: Schütz and Luckmann, *The Structures of the Life-World*.
- 19 Bourdieu, *Outline of A Theory of Practice*, 72. Habitus is individual's system of acquired schemes of perception, thought and action in relation to the field(s) as social arena(s) of personal struggles. An oft-quoted definition of habitus is the following: "The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at an end or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them."
- 20 Zhurzhenko, "From Borderlands to Bloodlands."
- 21 Zhurzhenko, "The Myth of Two Ukraines."
- 22 Portelli, "Introduction," viii.
- 23 Portelli, "Oral History as Genre," 6.
- 24 In addition to these discursive and intuitive elements, it also seems that, at large, social class matters in how people articulate ethnicity in their life. In general, as much as vocalizing life-experiences in relation to abstract notions is facilitated by the skills acquired through socializing and education, oral history as a method might contribute to the silence it has called to break in the first place.
- 25 This is related to Brubaker et al who call for looking at ethnicity "as a modality of experience, rather than as a thing, a substance, an attribute that one "possesses." [---] It happens at particular contexts. [---] Although we speak routinely of persons as having an ethnicity, we might more aptly speak of them doing an ethnicity at such moments." See: Brubaker et al, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*, 209-210.
- 26 E.g., see: Larin, "Conceptual Debates in Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration."
- 27 There is an analogy to sociologists "making classes on paper" articulated by Pierre Bourdieu in various occasions. E.g., Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," 14-25.
- 28 On the other hand, with this situational view it becomes clearer that the importance of silence should not be overstretched. The situations in which "inter-cultural" family conditions are relevant for individual biographies and life-stories are easier to outline. Some occasions when it happened were

the following: in relation to certain life-course events, e.g., when children chose their “passport ethnicity” at the age of 16 in the Soviet Ukraine or Estonia between their parents’ nominal ethnicities it is often memorized as an event; calendar holidays are sometimes designated as ethnic by informants – the familial celebration of Christmas during the Soviet years and the appreciation of the Red Army day are often, respectively, referred to as “Estonian” / “Ukrainian” and “Russian” / “Soviet.” There are some historical periods in which one’s sense of cultural belonging seems to have mattered more: for example it would happen in relation to the restoration of Estonian independence (Singing revolution, 1988-91), the Bronze soldier crisis in Estonia (April 2007), during the Maidan revolution of 2014 and in the events since 2013.

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BIOLOGIE ET AGRONOMIE EN ROUMANIE SOUS L'EMPRISE DU LYSSENKISME (1945-1965). QUESTIONS DE MÉTHODE

Résumé

La biologie et l'agronomie intègrent une véritable Guerre froide scientifique menée par l'agronome soviétique T. D. Lyssenko à l'encontre de la génétique. Cet article propose une méthodologie pour étudier l'histoire du lyssenkisme en Roumanie entre 1945 et 1965. L'exposé synthétique du lyssenkisme, de l'historiographie et des grandes étapes du lyssenkisme en Roumanie sert de cadre général pour formuler une approche centrée sur les sciences du végétal et pour analyser l'apport des sources imprimées et des fonds d'archives mobilisés pour appréhender lyssenkisme roumain dans toute sa complexité.

Mots-clé: lyssenkisme; histoire de l'agronomie; histoire de la biologie; histoire du végétal; intellectuels; Roumanie; régime communiste

Introduction

« Il existe deux mondes, deux idéologies dans la biologie¹. » Par cette affirmation, prononcée en 1948, l'agronome soviétique Trophym Denissovitch Lyssenko (1898-1976) signifie le début de la Guerre froide dans les sciences de la vie. Son système est basé sur un ensemble de postulats à forte connotation idéologique qui concernent les techniques agricoles, les concepts fondamentaux de la biologie et la théorie de l'évolution. Il fonde une opposition radicale avec la génétique, considérée comme une science bourgeoise, stérile et fausse. Cela marque l'installation d'un nouveau régime de la science, soumise à l'autorité politique, non seulement dans son fonctionnement institutionnel, mais aussi dans ce qu'elle a de plus fondamental, c'est à dire la construction de la connaissance. La pensée scientifique, les modalités de validation de la vérité, les procédés expérimentaux sont soumis à l'autorité politique et idéologique. Par conséquent, le statut de la science et des scientifiques dans la société est profondément bouleversé.

Le lyssenkisme est imposé dans tous les pays du bloc de l'Est lors de la stalinisation, en 1948-1949, jusqu'au rétablissement graduel de la génétique comme discipline académique au début des années 1960. Cet épisode de l'histoire des sciences de la vie montre, dans chaque situation nationale, des modalités particulière d'importation et d'adaptation du modèle soviétique. L'histoire du lyssenkisme en Roumanie a été jusqu'ici peu explorée. Notre objectif est de concevoir une approche susceptible d'appréhender le cas roumain, depuis les premières évocations de Lyssenko en 1945 jusqu'aux dernières manifestations du lyssenkisme vers 1965. Pour cela, nous avons élaboré une méthodologie qui, tout en restant attentive aux suggestions venues de l'historiographie, accorde la priorité aux sources. Comment aborder le lyssenkisme en tant que phénomène complexe dans un cadre national ? Quelles archives et sources imprimées exploiter pour pouvoir discerner l'influence du lyssenkisme sous ses multiples formes ? Comment articuler cette diversité de sources dans une approche cohérente et intelligible ? Cet article propose de répondre à ces questions de méthode. Un aperçu du lyssenkisme en URSS nous semble nécessaire en préliminaire d'un exposé synthétique des grandes étapes du lyssenkisme en Roumanie. Nous proposons ensuite d'interroger ce cadre général par le biais d'une approche centrée sur les sciences du végétal et, enfin, de montrer la complémentarité des sources mobilisées pour comprendre ce phénomène dans toute sa complexité.

1. Lyssenko et le mitchourinisme

Pour comprendre la dimension qu'a prise le lyssenkisme dans la science roumaine, il est utile de décrire ici brièvement les éléments qui le composent, leur agencement progressif, ainsi que le soutien politique qui a permis à Lyssenko la mainmise sur les sciences biologiques en URSS, dans les décennies précédant 1948.

L'ascension de Lyssenko en URSS

À ses débuts, T. D. Lyssenko est un praticien de l'agronomie. Il se fait connaître en 1927 par une série d'expériences et de techniques destinées à favoriser la culture des végétaux dans des régions menacées de disette. Il propose de contrôler l'influence de la température sur le cycle végétatif des pois et du blé, ce qui permettrait de semer au printemps

des végétaux habituellement semés à l'automne. Déjà expérimentée par d'autres agronomes, cette technique est popularisée par Lyssenko sous le nom de *vernalisation* ou *iarovisation* et imposée dans les fermes d'État soviétiques dans les années 1930. Cela assure le succès de Lyssenko, qui publie un *Bulletin de vernalisation* dans lequel sont diffusés les conseils pour l'application de sa méthode. Il est nommé chercheur, puis directeur de l'Institut de sélection et de génétique d'Odessa.

Dans cette nouvelle position institutionnelle, il élabore « la théorie de sa technique »², un moyen explicatif des phénomènes physiologiques impliqués dans la vernalisation par le développement en stades des organismes. Selon lui, les végétaux parcourent des étapes pendant lesquelles leurs exigences envers les conditions de milieu (température, humidité, lumière, nutrition) sont différentes. Aussi imprécise et lacunaire qu'elle soit, cette ambition de théorisation de la pratique agricole est importante car Lyssenko s'autorise par cela à dépasser le domaine agronomique et à proposer des arguments concernant les aspects fondamentaux de la biologie. Il affirme que la vernalisation doit intervenir dans les premiers stades de développement des végétaux. Ainsi, elle exerce une influence décisive non seulement sur les stades ultérieurs de la physiologie de la plante, mais aussi sur les caractères que la plante adulte transmettra à sa descendance. Etablissant ainsi le lien entre la physiologie de l'individu et la descendance³, Lyssenko argumente la possibilité d'intervenir dans l'hérédité des organismes vivants. C'est la théorie de l'hérédité ébranlée, selon laquelle il est possible de briser la transmission héréditaire des caractères spécifiques et de diriger la descendance vers l'acquisition de caractères nouveaux. Il convoque en appui de cette conception les travaux de I.V. Mitchourine (1855-1935), jardinier habile, obtenteur de nouvelles variétés d'arbres fruitiers, auquel il adresse un hommage au Congrès de génétique de 1929. De ses propres travaux expérimentaux et des observations effectuées par Mitchourine, Lyssenko en retire une théorie générale de l'hérédité et une explication globale du monde vivant.

À celle-ci, il adjoint à partir de 1935, avec l'aide de l'académicien Present, un nouvel élément : le matérialisme dialectique. Dès lors, la dimension pratique, puis théorique de sa doctrine s'inscrit à la fois dans un système explicatif du monde, qui se veut scientifique, et dans un système idéologique et politique, qui annexe la science au pouvoir. Le lyssenkisme, que Lyssenko lui-même intitule « biologie mitchourinienne » ou « nouvelle biologie », a dès lors une portée générale et combative, comme étant la science appropriée aux conditions économiques et sociales soviétiques,

opposée à la génétique mendélienne autant par son contenu que par son rôle dans la société. Selon Lyssenko et Prezent, la génétique classique est une spéculation, une science stérile, dépourvue d'applications pratiques, puisqu'elle ne permet pas de concevoir l'intervention humaine pour diriger l'hérédité des plantes. Elle est aussi contraire à la dialectique, par son caractère mécaniste et formel, puisqu'elle attribue l'hérédité aux seuls chromosomes, sans tenir compte de l'influence des conditions de milieu. La génétique mendélienne est donc présentée comme une forme de science bourgeoise qu'il convient de démasquer et de combattre. Lyssenko se forge ainsi une arme efficace pour mener l'offensive contre la génétique et les généticiens, qu'il attaque ouvertement dès 1936 et que Prezent accuse de sabotage contre l'agriculture soviétique. Le congrès international de génétique prévu à Moscou en 1937 est ajourné et plusieurs généticiens soviétiques sont arrêtés, y compris, en 1940, le plus prestigieux d'entre eux, Nikolai Vavilov, qui décédera en prison trois années plus tard.

A la session du d'août 1948 de l'Académie pan-soviétique des sciences agricoles « V. I. Lénine », qu'il préside depuis 1938, Lyssenko présente un rapport sur « la situation dans les sciences biologiques ». Comme son nom l'indique, ce rapport vise les sciences de la vie dans leur ensemble, non seulement l'agronomie. C'est un long réquisitoire de la biologie mendelo-morganienne, cible d'un argumentaire critique dans lequel s'entrecroisent des éléments théoriques, idéologiques, philosophiques et pratiques destinés à justifier l'arrêt des recherches en génétique⁴.

Cette session de l'Académie des sciences agricoles marque la rupture entre les « deux mondes en biologie », le début de la Guerre froide dans les sciences de la vie. Cette guerre comporte trois volets. Le premier est celui des sciences de la vie en URSS. Le rapport de Lyssenko et ses conclusions sont imprimés, diffusés dans *Pravda* et dans des brochures à grand tirage ; les académies de sciences, de sciences pédagogiques et de sciences médicales, les ministères et leur réseaux, les cercles d'études et jusqu'aux sovkhozes organisent des réunions pour « débattre » les conclusions de ce rapport. Les laboratoires de génétique sont fermés, les manuels et cours destinés à l'enseignement secondaire et supérieur sont tous transformés selon les préconisations de la « biologie mitchourinienne ». Le deuxième volet est mené dans les pays « de démocratie populaire » où les préceptes de Lyssenko sont imposés rapidement, en 1948-1949, comme une des multiples composantes de la stalinisation. Enfin, le troisième volet est la réaction déclenchée par la session de l'Académie « V.I. Lénine » dans les pays occidentaux. Cet épisode, connu sous l'appellation *Affaire*

Lyssenko, consiste en une série des réactions contre Lyssenko dans la presse française⁵, italienne, américaine, britannique, etc. et la prise de position de quelques communistes occidentaux pour le défendre. Le phénomène Lyssenko est porté à la connaissance des milieux scientifiques et au public le plus large par cette controverse internationale. Apparaît dans ce contexte le terme « lyssenkisme », employé pour désigner ce qui est qualifié de pseudo-science communiste totalitaire dans la presse occidentale, tandis qu'en URSS et dans les pays satellites, la propagande véhicule le mot que Lyssenko lui-même propose, celui de « mitchourinisme »⁶. Cette opposition terminologique est l'expression des attitudes contradictoires, accusation d'une part, promotion de l'autre part, de la nouvelle vision des sciences de la vie. Elles marquent la chronologie du mitchourinisme/lyssenkisme pendant la guerre froide. Lyssenko conserve son autorité en URSS et dans les pays communistes jusqu'en 1954, quand, pour une courte période, il est éloigné de la présidence de l'Académie des sciences agricoles. Les critiques exprimées par les scientifiques soviétiques envers ses méthodes expérimentales et agronomiques affaiblissent le mitchourinisme, sans toutefois lui mettre fin car Lyssenko revient au pouvoir de 1958 à 1965 mais, pendant ces dernières années, le retour de la génétique se fait progressivement dans tout le bloc de l'Est.

Les étapes de la « biologie mitchourinienne » en Roumanie

En Roumanie, la promotion du lyssenkisme apparaît dès 1945 dans la propagande pro-soviétique, pendant ce qu'Ana Selejan identifie comme étant la première étape de la guerre culturelle, la « culturalisation des masses »⁷. L'espace scientifique proprement dit n'est pas directement concerné dans cette première étape et les programmes de recherche ne subissent pas de modifications importantes censées reproduire le modèle soviétique. On constate la continuation ou la reprise des programmes de recherche antérieurs, dans les conditions matérielles et organisationnelles difficiles de l'après guerre⁸. Les premières mentions de l'activité de Lyssenko sont associées à la description plus générale des réalisations de la science soviétique et de la technicisation de l'agriculture. Ces thèmes sont abordés dans des conférences et des brochures⁹ réalisés par des scientifiques, membres de l'Association pour le resserrement des liens avec l'Union Soviétique (ARLUS), qui est le principal vecteur de la

propagande pro-soviétique aux cotés des propagandistes et agitateurs du parti communiste.

Les références à Lyssenko sont reprises et approfondies dans le cadre de l'offensive idéologique qui promeut le marxisme-léninisme en 1946-1948. Le matérialisme dialectique est présenté comme le fondement de la méthode scientifique. À cette dimension épistémologique s'ajoutent les orientations données par le marxisme sur le rapport entre la théorie et la pratique, sur le statut des savants comme catégorie d'intellectuels, aussi bien que sur la formation de l'homme nouveau. En ce qui concerne la biologie, si les références à l'Union soviétique sont prédominantes, on constate en Roumanie la persistance en parallèle des modèles occidentaux et, parmi eux, celui proposé par le biologiste communiste français Marcel Prenant. Ses livres *Biologie et marxisme* et *Darwin* traduits en roumain en 1946¹⁰ et les conférences qu'il donne à Bucarest en 1948¹¹ alimentent les argumentations en faveur de la biologie marxiste. Les travaux de M. Prenant et sa conception de la biologie sont déjà bien familiers à une grande partie des biologistes roumains. Ce lien avec la France crée un terrain singulier pour l'introduction du lyssenkisme en Roumanie. Le néo-lamarckisme, qui coexistait avec le néo-darwinisme dans la première moitié du XX^e siècle, sous l'influence des écoles scientifiques française et respectivement allemande, avait été renforcé par la présence d'Emile Racovitza à Cluj après 1922¹². La défense d'une biologie marxiste par Marcel Prenant, qui avait déjà visité la Roumanie entre les deux guerres et qui connaissait personnellement de nombreux biologistes roumains, a un impact considérable car elle rattache le marxisme non seulement à la science soviétique, que les scientifiques roumains connaissent mal, mais aussi à la science française, qu'ils connaissent parfaitement. De surcroît, cette proposition est soutenue par un savant aussi réputé que Marcel Prenant, membre du Comité Central du Parti Communiste Français, donc faisant partie de la catégorie de plus en plus réduite d'occidentaux « acceptables » aux yeux du régime. Ceci pouvait donner momentanément l'illusion d'une continuité avec la science d'avant la guerre.

Sur ce terrain, un changement radical intervient après la session d'août 1948 de l'Académie pan-soviétique des sciences agricoles « V.I. Lénine ». Les instruments de la stalinisation de la science se mettent en place au même moment, par la dissolution de l'Académie roumaine et son remplacement par l'Académie de la République Populaire de Roumanie (RPR), suivant la réforme de l'enseignement, les épurations opérées dans les institutions de recherche et les universités. L'artisan de

l'introduction du lyssenkisme est Traian Săvulescu (1889-1963). Biologiste réputé, formé en Roumanie, spécialisé dans la botanique systématique et la phytopathologie, il est professeur à l'université de Bucarest, directeur de l'Institut de recherches agronomiques (ICAR), membre de l'Académie roumaine depuis 1936. Participant actif à l'organisation de l'ARLUS¹³, il fait partie de la délégation de celle-ci en Union Soviétique en 1945¹⁴ et il occupe ensuite les postes de sous-secrétaire d'État (1946), puis ministre de l'Agriculture (1946-1948) et vice-président du Conseil des ministres et, enfin, président de la nouvelle Académie de la RPR. Traian Săvulescu est donc impliqué dans tous les domaines concernés par le lyssenkisme : biologie, agronomie, agriculture et propagande.

Entre novembre 1948 et juin 1949 la « biologie mitchourinienne » devient une science officielle. Le rapport présenté par Lyssenko en août trouve un écho immédiat dans la presse roumaine. Dès la campagne de semailles de l'automne 1948, les travaux agricoles dans les fermes d'État appliquent les méthodes soviétiques : semis en croix, vernalisation des semences, variétés importées d'Union soviétique (dont le tournesol 'Jdhanov' et des variétés d'arbres fruitiers obtenus par Mitchourine). L'effet du lyssenkisme se propage de l'agriculture vers l'agronomie et la biologie. En janvier 1949, la session annuelle de communications de l'ICAR est dédiée aux réalisations soviétiques dans les sciences agronomiques¹⁵. En sa qualité de directeur de l'ICAR, T. Săvulescu définit les priorités de la recherche en conformité avec ces méthodes soviétiques, qu'il présente comme étant la seule voie d'accroissement de la production agricole¹⁶. La résolution du 3-5 mars du Parti communiste prévoit le début de la transformation socialiste de l'agriculture : la création des fermes collectives (GAC) et l'introduction des techniques soviétiques de culture agricole. Les 29-31 mars 1949, à la Conférence pour la paix et la culture des intellectuels roumains, T. Săvulescu, en sa qualité cette fois de président de l'Académie RPR, prend position contre la génétique occidentale et bourgeoise et affirme sa confiance en cette nouvelle biologie mitchourinienne, dialectique, étroitement liée à la pratique et confiante dans la puissance de l'homme, transformateur de la nature. Après l'agronomie, la politique et la philosophie, la réunion plénière de l'Académie RPR du 30 mars 1949 marque l'adoption officielle du lyssenkisme dans la science. Ici, T. Săvulescu approfondit les aspects biologiques de la théorie lyssenkiste, dans un très long rapport¹⁷ dont 50 pages sont consacrées à la reprise fidèle des thèses de Lyssenko et les 20 pages restantes sont « une modeste contribution personnelle concernant les principes essentiels de la biologie

en rapport avec l'hérédité, l'adaptation et l'évolution des êtres vivants, telles qu'ils ont été suggérés par l'agrobiologiste soviétique Lyssenko et l'œuvre majestueuse du génial Mitchourine¹⁸. » L'Académie vote ce rapport sans débat. Précisément le même jour, le président de l'Académie polonaise, Jan Dembowski, lui aussi biologiste et directeur d'un institut de recherche en biologie expérimentale, prononce un rapport similaire¹⁹. Cette simultanéité laisse supposer une démarche orchestrée par Moscou. Enfin, une dernière étape parachève l'institutionnalisation du lyssenkisme pendant l'été 1949, quand T. Săvulescu affermit encore davantage la critique de la génétique mendélienne dans le cadre de la campagne jdanoviste contre le cosmopolitisme en science. Roland Barthes, jeune attaché culturel de la légation de France à Bucarest, saisit le sens de cette transformation :

Avec quelques mois de retard, la Roumanie vient de s'aligner sur la Russie Soviétique en ce qui concerne un domaine jusqu'ici relativement indépendant, la science. Cet alignement se conforme aux prises de position adoptées par l'Union Soviétique à propos de la récente affaire Mitchourine, et la campagne de presse roumaine reproduit fidèlement, dans sa structure et sa terminologie, la campagne de presse soviétique. (...) L'idéologie marxiste est grossièrement présente dans le vocabulaire ; elle ne l'est pas dans le fond, qui n'est en réalité qu'une mise au pas toute politique, celle des savants roumains, sommés à leur tour de se placer sous le joug de la science d'État soviétique²⁰.

En effet, la science perd sa relative autonomie. Elle se transforme en science d'État et tous les domaines scientifiques sont soumis à un processus similaire d'adoption du modèle soviétique : Marr en linguistique, Makarenko en pédagogie, Pavlov en médecine, etc. Pour faire connaître ce modèle sont utilisés plusieurs canaux : les traductions du russe d'ouvrages et brochures de propagande ; les visites de délégations roumaines dans les institutions de recherche soviétiques ; la venue en Roumanie de savants soviétiques ; l'envoi d'étudiants de toutes les disciplines pour poursuivre leurs études à Moscou ou dans d'autres villes ; l'organisation d'expositions sur les réalisations de la science en URSS et de très nombreuses réunions et conférences à l'occasion des semaines roumano-soviétiques et divers anniversaires. Ces relations sont supervisées directement par la sous-section « Science et culture » de la section « Propagande et agitation » du Comité Central du Parti communiste (PMR) qui distribue et contrôle l'accomplissement des tâches qui reviennent à l'Académie RPR, aux

ministères, aux universités, aux comités de propagande, à la myriade des commissions, cercles, comités, propagandistes et activistes chargés d'appliquer la politique du parti. Le lyssenkisme fait partie de ce schéma général d'intrusion politique et idéologique dans le champ de la science, avec une particularité significative : il ne se cantonne pas à la science, mais atteint également un domaine vital pour le régime, celui de l'agriculture.

Entre 1949 et 1956, les effets de l'introduction du lyssenkisme en biologie et agronomie sont visibles à tous les niveaux : enseignement, théorie, expérimentation, applications, vulgarisation. L'enseignement de la biologie générale intègre la nouvelle conception de l'espèce et de l'hérédité, ainsi que le « darwinisme créateur ». La recherche planifiée comporte des volets explicitement destinés à l'étude expérimentale des préceptes lyssenkistes et à leur application, dans les conditions de climat et de sol de chaque région de la Roumanie. Certaines deviennent obligatoires pour les fermes d'État : l'application du « complexe Dokoutcheav-Costatchev-Williams » (variante du lyssenkisme dans le domaine de la gestion des sols, dénommé plus communément « complexe Williams »), les rideaux forestiers, la vernalisation, les engrais, la sur-pollénisation, etc. D'autres formes du lyssenkisme se situent plus en amont, étant réservées aux stations expérimentales de l'ICAR : des programmes de croisements inter-spécifiques, hybridations végétatives, éducation des jeunes plants par la méthode du mentor. L'ICAR et les institutions d'enseignement supérieur agronomique reçoivent également la mission de guider l'agriculture par des missions de conseil auprès des « cercles agro-techniques » créés dans les fermes collectives qui étudient les méthodes soviétiques, et par des missions de diffusion auprès des publics les plus larges. Le lyssenkisme se déploie ainsi de l'Académie RPR jusqu'aux écoles, des laboratoires de recherche jusqu'aux villages.

Les premiers signes de distanciation apparaissent dès 1954, quand une partie des techniques agronomiques lyssenkistes sont rejetées et notamment le complexe « Williams » en pédologie. Cependant, d'autres aspects du lyssenkisme sont maintenus, et même renforcés, comme les programmes d'hybridations végétatives à la station expérimentale pomologique de Cluj, créée spécialement pour permettre à un jardinier local, Rudolf Palocsay, de développer ses recherches michthourinistes²¹. À partir de 1954 également, les relations entre les agronomes du bloc de l'Est sont régies par une convention signée à Berlin, sur la base de laquelle les représentants des instituts de recherche de chaque pays engagent des recherches sur une liste de thèmes²². Des conférences sont organisées annuellement, les

scientifiques circulent d'un pays à l'autre et échangent des publications, des comptes rendus font l'état de l'avancement des thèmes de recherche qui sont renouvelés chaque année. Ce système collaboratif, contrôlé par les représentants soviétiques, a un double effet. D'une part, il met en contact des communautés scientifiques qui ont un rapport différent au lyssenkisme et à la génétique. Les chercheurs est-allemands entreprennent plus tôt des expérimentations sur les mutations induites par rayons X²³ et ils sont à l'origine d'une impulsion des recherches dans ce sens dans les autres pays, y compris en Roumanie²⁴. D'autre part, les thématiques annuelles imposées par cette convention comportent un volet « étude mitchouriniste de l'hérédité des plantes » jusqu'en 1964, ce qui contribue à maintenir les approches lyssenkistes dans un secteur de la recherche agronomique. Le lyssenkisme perd toutefois du terrain car les relations institutionnelles et personnelles avec l'Ouest deviennent plus aisées. Les livres, les personnes, les techniques, les plantes circulent et constituent des vecteurs d'un nouveau changement conceptuel, cette fois dans le sens du retour à la génétique. Mais l'abandon du lyssenkisme n'est que lent et progressif. Les approches mitchourinistes coexistent, jusqu'en 1962-1964, avec des travaux sur les mutations induites par la radioactivité, ou avec des travaux de sélection du maïs, par exemple, entièrement exempts de l'influence lyssenkiste. La génétique est officiellement reconnue comme discipline académique, et même comme une priorité de la recherche, en 1964, quand est organisé à Bucarest le premier congrès de génétique.

Cette chronologie pose les repères du lyssenkisme en Roumanie. Elle ouvre la possibilité d'intégrer l'histoire du cas roumain dans l'historiographie générale du lyssenkisme.

L'historiographie du lyssenkisme

Le lyssenkisme fait l'objet d'études qui s'intéressent à ses trois dimensions - le lyssenkisme en URSS, le lyssenkisme dans les pays satellites et l'Affaire Lyssenko dans les pays occidentaux - dont l'ampleur et la chronologie sont différentes. Les premières analyses ont été des prises de position contemporaines consécutives à l'Affaire Lyssenko par lesquelles les biologistes occidentaux démontaient les arguments mobilisés à l'encontre de la génétique et dénonçaient le caractère non-scientifique de la doctrine de Lyssenko²⁵. Les débuts d'une approche à caractère historique restaient marqués par cette dimension dénonciatrice véhémente, mais apportaient aussi un matériau documentaire²⁶, enrichi par la suite par la

publication aux USA d'un premier témoignage écrit par le biologiste et dissident russe, Jaurés Medvedev²⁷. Ce témoignage paraît la même année en France avec une préface de Jacques Monod qui conserve en 1971 la même position critique qu'il avait adoptée publiquement en 1948. Pour J. Monod, le personnage de Lyssenko, ses méthodes agronomiques et ses théories ne présentent aucun intérêt scientifique. Ce qui importe, en revanche, est de comprendre comment la science a pu être annexée au pouvoir politique et à l'idéologie, rendant possible un tel phénomène :

Qu'un charlatan autodidacte et fanatique ait pu, au milieu du XX^e siècle, obtenir dans son pays l'appui de tous les pouvoirs : le Parti, l'État, la presse (sans compter les tribunaux et la police), pour imposer en biologie une théorie inepte et, en agriculture, des pratiques inefficaces, parfois catastrophiques ; que cet illuminé soit en outre parvenu à faire jeter l'interdit officiel sur l'enseignement comme sur la pratique d'une des disciplines biologiques les plus fondamentales, la génétique, voilà qui passe l'imagination²⁸.

La même année, l'ouvrage de Lauren Graham²⁹ montrait l'impact de la politique scientifique stalinienne et le triomphe de dogmes dans tous les domaines scientifiques, y compris en biologie. Le philosophe Dominique Lecourt propose un angle d'approche différent, dans un livre préfacé par Louis Althusser³⁰, où il s'attache à distinguer, parmi les composantes du lyssenkisme, ce qui tient de la technique agricole, de l'épistémologie, de l'idéologie et de la politique et en étudiant la manière dont elles s'articulent, dans le temps, avec les projets staliniens de transformation de la nature.

La vaste bibliographie postérieure à ces premières analyses, et notamment celle des deux dernières décennies, est sans cesse renouvelée par l'accès à de nouvelles sources³¹ et par des questionnements nouveaux³². Une tendance actuelle chez les historiens des sciences consiste à montrer les voies de détournement ou d'évitement qu'ont empruntés les biologistes des différents pays de l'Est pour continuer à faire leurs recherches³³. Mais la principale nouveauté méthodologique de cette historiographie récente réside en la prise en compte de la dimension internationale du lyssenkisme. Il est particulièrement intéressant d'observer comment l'étude du lyssenkisme s'élargit sous l'influence des courants historiographiques actuels, pour s'intéresser aux contacts³⁴, réseaux, échos, réactions ou transferts³⁵ entre les deux blocs³⁶, mais aussi à l'intérieur du bloc de l'Est³⁷.

Deux rencontres internationales, organisées par William deJong Lambert et Nikolai Krementsov à New York (2009) et à Vienne (2012)³⁸ définissent le lyssenkisme et la controverse qu'il a suscitée comme un phénomène global. Ceci donne un nouveau relief aux études des campagnes pro et contre le lyssenkisme dans les différents pays car elles permettent de saisir l'ampleur géographique et chronologique du phénomène ainsi que sa complexité dans chaque contexte particulier. Ils incitent à explorer « les mitchourinismes » officiels dans les pays communistes non plus seulement comme autant des formes identiques d'importation d'une doctrine soviétique, mais comme des processus dynamiques, impliquant des acteurs, des cultures scientifiques, des intérêts politiques et des significations nationales.

Le cas roumain est presque entièrement absent de cette reconfiguration. Il fait l'objet de mentions rapides³⁹ dans des travaux s'intéressant à des sujets plus larges concernant l'histoire de la période communiste, bénéficiant d'une attention plus soutenue chez Lucian Boia qui l'intègre parmi les composantes de la « mythologie scientifique »⁴⁰ nationale. Touchant également à notre sujet, la question du statut des intellectuels dans les différentes périodes du régime communiste a été, au contraire, abondamment traitée. Une proposition historiographique intéressante est celle selon laquelle le régime communiste a eu, à ses débuts, une attitude différente envers les intellectuels « humanistes » et « techniciens ». Ces derniers, chercheurs et professeurs en sciences expérimentales et exactes, médecins, ingénieurs, etc., auraient bénéficié d'un pacte tacite avec le nouveau régime qui ne pouvait pas remplacer rapidement leur savoir-faire, indispensable d'un point de vue technique et économique⁴¹. Si cette distinction se vérifie sous l'aspect de la répression⁴², elle ne tient pas entièrement compte de la pression idéologique et politique exercée non seulement sur les individus et institutions scientifiques⁴³ mais aussi sur le statut même de la connaissance⁴⁴. Il nous apparaît donc comme nécessaire de concevoir une approche du lyssenkisme en Roumanie sur des bases nouvelles, de formuler des questionnements plus adaptés à la nature de ce phénomène et de mobiliser des sources susceptibles d'apporter des réponses plus approfondies.

2. Le lyssenkisme en Roumanie, une proposition méthodologique

Une approche centrée sur les sciences du végétal

L'étude du lyssenkisme en Roumanie, telle que nous la proposons ici, s'inscrit dans le courant historiographique qui fait des cas nationaux autant de sujets de recherche à la fois autonomes et connectés au phénomène global. La chronologie roumaine est similaire à celles établies pour les autres pays de l'Est : l'institutionnalisation en 1948-1949, l'affaiblissement après 1956 et l'intégration progressive de la génétique, jusqu'à l'abandon définitif du lyssenkisme vers 1965.

La concordance entre ces jalons chronologiques et les évolutions du régime communiste laisse penser qu'il s'agit d'un exemple parmi d'autres, un abus de la période stalinienne et post-stalinienne, d'un fait aberrant et anecdotique de pseudo-science au pouvoir. Cette affirmation est juste, mais elle n'explique en rien de quelle manière le lyssenkisme modifie profondément le statut de la connaissance dans la société communiste. Comment la science roumaine est-elle contrainte de s'organiser, fonctionner, fournir des résultats théoriques et pratiques, produire, enseigner et populariser des connaissances, en s'adaptant à une doctrine officielle dénuée de rationalité scientifique ? Par quels biais la science est-elle contrôlée politiquement, entre la prise de décision, la nomination des dirigeants, la surveillance et la répression ? Comment l'intrusion du politique et de l'idéologique marque-t-elle la position des scientifiques et de la science dans la société ? Quels acteurs, individuels et institutionnels, ont été mobilisés dans cette transformation, avec quelles conséquences sur les réseaux scientifiques et sur leur intégration dans la nouvelle société ? Dans quelle mesure recompose-t-elle les rapports entre les disciplines scientifiques, les hiérarchies de valeurs, les modalités de conduite et de validation des résultats scientifiques ? Au-delà de l'acceptation officielle et formelle du lyssenkisme, les scientifiques intériorisent-ils l'injonction idéologique au point de mobiliser dans leur travaux de nouveaux concepts ? Ces questions font écho à une histoire qui s'intéresse autant à la dimension épistémologique qu'à la dimension sociale et politique de la science. Elle accorde une égale attention à la science vue de l'intérieur, comme fait intellectuel, et de l'extérieur, comme fait social car c'est précisément l'interaction interne-externe qui nous est apparue comme étant l'aspect le plus significatif de l'histoire du lyssenkisme. Nos choix méthodologiques ont l'ambition de saisir la complexité de cette interaction

en proposant une perspective originale d'analyse qui nous a guidée dans la sélection des sources.

Nous avons choisi les sciences du végétal comme objet d'étude. La raison de ce choix tient à la place centrale qu'occupe le végétal dans les écrits de Mitchourine, le jardinier, et de Lyssenko, l'agronome. La construction théorique du lyssenkisme prend appui sur des exemples tirés de la culture des végétaux horticoles et des plantes de grande culture. Ce sont des observations effectuées dans le jardin et des essais agronomiques qui servent à Lyssenko de points de départ pour les généralisations qui donnent cohérence à son système, dont le liant idéologique est fondé sur les principes du matérialisme dialectique. Au cœur du lyssenkisme, le végétal n'est pas seulement l'objet d'étude de la biologie végétale, mais aussi et surtout, le moyen de production de l'agriculture. Les productions végétales concentrent des enjeux essentiels d'un point de vue économique, social et politique et le lyssenkisme promet de soutenir la transformation socialiste de l'agriculture par une rationalisation de la production selon des méthodes qui garantissent, selon Lyssenko, une rentabilité élevée. En Roumanie aussi, cette promesse apporte au lyssenkisme une forme de légitimation, car il est imposé comme une des composantes de la transformation de l'agriculture, avec la vocation d'apporter la solution aux crises agricoles. Sous la pression exercée par cette promesse, il se propage de l'agriculture vers l'agronomie, qui expérimente, conseille et contrôle l'application des méthodes mitchourinistes. Les effets atteignent également la biologie végétale qui doit être subordonnée aux applications pratiques. L'agronomie est ainsi notre point d'observation privilégié, par son caractère intermédiaire entre les concepts et les techniques, par son double ancrage dans le monde de la recherche et dans celui de l'agriculture, ainsi que par la composition très diversifiée du personnel de recherche, formé de biologistes, ingénieurs, techniciens encadrés dans des instituts centraux et stations expérimentales distribuées sur tout le territoire. Le continuum agriculture-agronomie-biologie, que Lyssenko nomme « agrobiologie », introduit un rapport nouveau entre la science et la pratique. Argumenté en termes marxistes-léninistes, ce lien n'est pas un simple slogan. Au contraire, il acquiert la force d'un principe qui autorise la subordination de la recherche aux résultats concrets et confère à la technique le statut de critère de vérité pour la validation des résultats scientifiques. La figure de Mitchourine, jardinier autodidacte, érigée par Lyssenko en modèle du savant prolétaire, est utilisée comme exemple pour contester et renverser les hiérarchies de prestige et d'autorité entre

les praticiens et les scientifiques. Le critère ultime de la pratique fragilise la position des chercheurs qui doivent justifier, d'une part, leur activité de recherche par des résultats immédiatement applicables dans l'agriculture et, d'autre part, leur adhésion au régime par l'implication dans les activités de propagande.

Aborder le mitchourinisme en Roumanie par le biais du végétal permet donc de suivre le fil rouge qui relie la biologie, l'agronomie et l'agriculture, fil tendu par la contrainte idéologique et politique qui s'exerce sur la science. Cette option méthodologique incite à aller au-delà de la simple constatation du fait que l'agronomie et la biologie végétale sont, parmi les sciences de la vie, les domaines les plus exposés à l'impact du mitchourinisme. L'hypothèse sous-jacente de cette approche est qu'à l'intérieur même des sciences du végétal, certains domaines sont plus sensibles à la distorsion lyssenkiste. Au premier plan se trouvent, bien entendu, la génétique et son pendant agronomique, l'amélioration des plantes. Mais, même dans ce domaine, il convient de trouver des unités de mesure, comme l'hybridation végétative, pour évaluer la mise en œuvre du mitchourinisme, en analysant la manière dont les concepts sont exposés théoriquement, mais aussi la manière dont ils sont mobilisés dans l'expérimentation et dans l'analyse des résultats. Pareillement, les questions de physiologie et d'hérédité - qui concernent le rapport entre la plante et son milieu, le développement stadial des organismes, l'hérédité ébranlée et la transmission des caractères acquis - se déclinent à tous les niveaux, du plus concret au plus théorique. Ces thèmes apparaissent dans l'argumentaire technique qui accompagne les « complexes agricoles » liés aux sciences du sol, ainsi que dans la justification des plans quinquennaux de recherche des instituts de biologie et d'agronomie. Leur incidence peut également être observée dans des disciplines comme la systématique et la pathologie végétale. Ces domaines sont *a priori* plus éloignés des terrains idéologiques les plus sensibles, mais ils subissent les effets de la remise en question des aspects théoriques de la définition de l'espèce et de la conception de la phylogénie. Plus encore, ces thèmes lyssenkistes sont associés au « darwinisme créateur » qui est enseigné dans les facultés de biologie et les lycées et qui fait l'objet des vastes campagnes de propagande, expositions et livres de vulgarisation à l'intention de toute la population.

Cette concentration sur les sciences du végétal n'exclut pas un regard plus large sur d'autres disciplines scientifiques concernées dans le champ de la biologie animale et de la médecine. Quand il s'agit d'étudier, par

exemple, les distorsions du darwinisme, le domaine du végétal apparaît comme restrictif car les auteurs étudiés sont des biologistes de tous horizons. De même, l'étude de l'implication politique des scientifiques et du contrôle et de la répression dans l'enseignement supérieur et la recherche ouvrent nécessairement vers une approche plus élargie que le périmètre végétal. Celui-ci reste toutefois un outil de problématisation du sujet et un cadre d'analyse privilégié.

Les sources du lyssenkisme en Roumanie

Le choix du végétal comme principe méthodologique a guidé la sélection des sources que nous avons explorées pour cette recherche. Sans faire ici leur présentation détaillée, il nous semble utile de décrire ce corpus documentaire. Il se compose de deux volets complémentaires.

La dimension politique et idéologique du lyssenkisme constitue le premier volet de ce corpus. Il comporte des documents issus de la gouvernance politique de la science, entendue ici comme étant l'expression des relations entre l'État et le Parti communiste (PMR puis PCR) d'une part, et les institutions scientifiques, d'autre part. Les dossiers conservés dans les archives du Comité Central du Parti Communiste Roumain, dans les sous-séries *Chancellerie*⁴⁵, *Section Propagande et agitation*⁴⁶ et *Section Agraire*⁴⁷ documentent l'attitude des autorités centrales envers la science. En complément, les fonds de la présidence du Conseil des ministres⁴⁸ et les quelques fonds ministériels conservés aux Archives Nationales de Roumanie (notamment la direction Horticulture et Viticulture du ministère de l'Agriculture⁴⁹) permettent de comprendre les décisions concernant la science dans le contexte large de l'évolution du régime. Il est ainsi possible situer le lyssenkisme dans le cadre général de la stalinisation en précisant la nature de son institutionnalisation et le rôle joué par des personnalités scientifiques engagées dans les structures dirigeantes du nouveau régime. Ces fonds d'archives montrent que le lyssenkisme n'est pas un phénomène isolé, qu'il fait partie d'une transformation globale et profonde de la science dans ses formes institutionnelles, sa mission et son contrôle par les organes du pouvoir.

Ils révèlent également le fait que le lyssenkisme ne se cantonne pas au strict domaine scientifique. Au contraire, il est intégré dans la propagande orchestrée en direction des intellectuels, qu'il faut convaincre d'adhérer aux modèles soviétiques, en direction des milieux ruraux, qu'il faut instruire dans l'application des techniques agricoles lyssenkistes, en

direction de toute la population et de la jeunesse en particulier qu'il faut éduquer dans l'admiration des réalisations de la science en URSS. Ces différentes composantes de la propagande sont richement documentées dans les archives du Comité Central. Elles sont complétées par les fonds des associations et organismes satellites du parti communiste. L'Association pour le resserrement des liens avec l'Union Soviétique (ARLUS)⁵⁰, la Société pour la diffusion de la science et de la culture (SRCS)⁵¹ et l'Institut roumain pour les relations culturelles avec l'étranger (IRRCS)⁵² contribuent à la diffusion du lyssenkisme par des publications, conférences, expositions, cercles de jeunes mitchourinistes etc. A travers ces actions, on peut suivre l'incidence du lyssenkisme dans les campagnes de propagande sur l'anti-cosmopolitisme, la transformation socialiste de l'agriculture, l'anti-mysticisme, l'homme transformateur de la nature, etc.

La presse participe aussi à cette diffusion. Parmi les journaux et revues de la période, nous avons choisi *Contemporanul*, dont la nouvelle série publiée à partir de 1946 porte le sous-titre « hebdomadaire politique, social et culturel ». Le journal fonctionne officiellement comme l'organe du parti communiste s'adressant aux intellectuels et les articles concernant le lyssenkisme sont plus approfondis que dans d'autres publications grand public. En éditorial « à la Une », dans les pages consacrées à la science et à l'agriculture ou bien dans des numéros spéciaux, ces articles exposent largement les thèmes principaux de l'idéologie qui font le lien entre le lyssenkisme et le matérialisme dialectique, les rapports entre la science et la pratique ou le statut des scientifiques comme une catégorie particulière d'intellectuels.

Le deuxième angle de notre approche vise à saisir le lyssenkisme à l'œuvre dans la biologie et l'agronomie roumaines. Indissociable du premier, qui documente les conditions politiques, idéologiques et culturelles, cet angle « de l'intérieur » apporte un éclairage différent. Il s'intéresse aux effets de la pression politique sur les thématiques des programmes de recherche et vise à suivre la modification des concepts scientifiques, des méthodes expérimentales, des schémas d'analyse et de validation des résultats obtenus. Pour cela, nous analysons les publications à caractère scientifique et technique, en veillant à intégrer dans le corpus des écrits dont la nature et le niveau de généralité sont diversifiés : les annales de l'Académie RPR et des instituts de recherche agronomique, les monographies, les manuels universitaires de biologie générale et spécialisés sur un domaine, les livres et brochures de conseils techniques, les manuels pour l'enseignement secondaire général et

technique, les brochures et articles de vulgarisation, etc. Parmi les périodiques à caractère technique, nous avons choisi de faire une étude systématique de *Livada, via și gradina*, revue spécialisée dans le domaine de l'arboriculture et la viticulture et d'y adjoindre des sondages dans les périodiques agricoles, comme *Agricultura noua* et *Agricultura socialista*. Cette palette large d'écrits reflète les niveaux d'intériorisation du lyssenkisme sous l'injonction politique pour analyser ses répercussions sur les outils conceptuels et la méthode scientifique. Les écrits à caractère historique nous intéressent également : livres retraçant l'histoire de la biologie en général et en Roumanie, préfaces des rééditions ou traduction d'ouvrages anciens ou étrangers, articles commémoratifs. Rédigés par des scientifiques, ces écrits offrent à ces acteurs de la science l'occasion de s'exprimer sur des aspects épistémologiques, d'une toute autre manière que celle employée dans les publications scientifiques. Ils explicitent, par exemple, leur positionnement dans la lignée néo-lamarckienne de la pensée biologique.

Si les publications sont le résultat de la recherche, il est nécessaire, dans la mesure du possible, de s'intéresser aussi aux modalités de construction de ces résultats. Ceci est d'autant plus important que, dans les conditions de contrôle politique des publications, celles-ci peuvent donner une image tronquée, celle d'une adhésion sans réserves au lyssenkisme. Pour aller plus loin, il faut étudier les archives des organismes de recherche. Ces archives sont plus difficilement accessibles car nous ne disposons que d'un seul fonds réellement consistant versé aux Archives Nationales de Roumanie. Il s'agit de la section de phytopathologie de l'ICAR, section intégrée par la suite dans l'Institut pour la protection des plantes⁵³. Volumineux mais peu structuré, ce fonds fournit des éléments qui contrastent fortement avec l'image donnée par les publications. Que ce soit dans les protocoles expérimentaux ou dans les relations avec les scientifiques occidentaux, l'activité concrète de recherche apparaît comme relativement autonome par rapport aux impératifs lyssenkistes. Cette distance tient, en partie, aux caractéristiques de la phytopathologie. La phytopathologie subit, certes, l'incidence de la conception lyssenkiste de l'espèce, de l'hérédité, du rapport entre les organismes vivants et leur milieu. Cependant, appelée à apporter des solutions à des problèmes souvent urgents posés par les parasites et maladies des plantes de culture, la phytopathologie semble bénéficier d'une moindre pression idéologique. Pour ne pas introduire un biais disciplinaire dans l'analyse de ce contraste

entre science officielle et science en laboratoire, nous avons besoin de réaliser une étude approfondie sur d'autres domaines de l'agronomie.

Les Archives Nationales de Roumanie conservent le fonds de l'Académie des sciences agricoles et de sylviculture « Gh. Ionescu-Sisesti »⁵⁴ dans lequel se trouvent des dossiers de l'ICAR pour la période qui nous intéresse. Ce sont des documents qui, peu nombreux et strictement administratifs, n'apportent pas la matière nécessaire à notre étude. Fort heureusement, l'Académie des sciences agricoles conserve dans ses propres locaux un important fonds d'archives comprennent des documents datant depuis la création de l'ICAR en 1928 jusqu'à nos jours. Par la bienveillance de son président, Acad. Gh. Sin, nous avons pu accéder à ce fonds d'archives dont 23 mètres linéaires concernent la période 1945-1965. Ils touchent à des aspects fondamentaux pour l'étude du lyssenkisme : la planification de la recherche sous toutes ses formes, des grands thèmes jusqu'aux protocoles d'expérimentation ; des comptes-rendus mensuels, trimestriels, annuels et quinquennaux, la correspondance avec les stations expérimentales ; la correspondance avec les tutelles (Académie RPR, ministère de l'Agriculture) et les autres instituts de recherche ; les relations internationales par le biais de visites, échanges de publications, intégration dans les structures internationales de recherche agronomique, échanges de matériel vivant ; l'activité de la bibliothèque et les commandes de livres à l'étranger ; les sessions de communications et procès verbaux des discussions ; la gestion du personnel, vérifications, promotions, déclassements, etc. En l'absence d'un inventaire, nous avons entrepris un dépouillement intégral pour la période qui nous intéresse car ce fonds constitue la pièce maîtresse dans l'architecture de notre sujet de recherche. Il apporte une vision beaucoup plus complexe et nuancée du lyssenkisme que celle que nous attendions à la lecture des publications scientifiques. On constate ainsi l'introduction des préceptes mitchourinistes dans les études expérimentales en 1948-1949 et leur persistance jusqu'au milieu des années 1960 dans l'amélioration des plantes, l'agro-technique, les sciences du sol. Mais on comprend également que cette dimension strictement lyssenkiste n'est pas unitaire. Même à l'intérieur de ces domaines se déploient des thématiques de recherche en stricte continuité avec la recherche d'avant 1948, ou, pour les périodes plus tardives, en relation étroite avec la recherche réalisée dans les autres pays de l'Est ou de l'Ouest. Il est par ailleurs possible de saisir les cas - plutôt rares, mais significatifs - de perplexité des chercheurs devant une expérimentation menée selon les injonctions politiques et dont

les résultats sont en flagrante contradiction avec le lyssenkisme (techniques de culture en nids, « complexe Williams », hybridation végétative) et les subterfuges adoptés pour rédiger des comptes rendus d'activité sur ces aspects. On peut aussi identifier l'attitude différente que les chercheurs (et plus particulièrement ceux qui ont des responsabilités d'équipes ou des fonctions politisées) adoptent à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de l'institut de recherche, la manière dont ils intériorisent les différents degrés de contrôle. Enfin, l'image d'une recherche coupée du monde occidental est aussi infirmée par les informations concernant la circulation des personnes, des plantes et des livres comme vecteurs d'une connaissance, certes partielle et contrôlée, mais cependant bien réelle, de la science occidentale.

D'autres institutions détiennent probablement des fonds qui peuvent contribuer à compléter et approfondir cette perspective sur la science : l'Académie roumaine, l'institut de Biologie, les facultés de biologie et d'agronomie de Bucarest, Iasi, Cluj, etc. Nos démarches restant sans réponse de la part de ces institutions, il nous a été, pour l'instant, impossible de les consulter. Une exception toutefois est celle du fonds de l'Institut agronomique de Iasi⁵⁵, conservé à la filiale départementale Iasi des Archives nationales, qui nous a permis d'étudier la présence du lyssenkisme dans l'enseignement supérieur agronomique.

Le rôle des individus peut être appréhendé à travers ces sources imprimées et fonds d'archives de manière très partielle. Nous n'avons pas identifié de fonds d'archives personnelles des principaux acteurs de la recherche dans le domaine de la biologie végétale et de l'agronomie. Pour suppléer cette absence, nous avons consulté le fonds appartenant à Constantin I. Parhon⁵⁶ et Stefan Milcu⁵⁷, médecins ayant occupé des fonctions importantes dans l'État et dans les structures institutionnelles de la science. Ce sont deux exemples de carrières scientifique et politiques à travers lesquels il est possible de mieux comprendre les communications et négociations établies entre la science et les cercles du pouvoir ainsi que sur les réseaux dans les milieux scientifiques, en Roumanie et à l'étranger. S'ils ne renseignent pas précisément sur le domaine qui nous intéresse, ces fonds permettent toutefois de faire une comparaison entre lyssenkisme et le pavlovisme imposé dans les sciences médicales. Aussi intéressant, ils apportent des informations de nature plus personnelle, permettant de suivre les évolutions individuelles depuis le moment de la formation de ces scientifiques, avant la deuxième guerre mondiale, jusqu'aux travaux réalisés pendant la période communiste. Les carnets de notes de Stefan Milcu montrent, par exemple, l'énergie déployée pour adopter la science

soviétique, l'engagement politique et personnel en faveur du régime communiste, mais aussi les doutes, les difficultés intellectuelles et morales que cet engagement suscite.

À l'égard des biologistes et des agronomes, les biographies publiées pendant la période communiste, ou plus récemment, apportent des éléments factuels utiles. Nous constatons toutefois que les auteurs éludent souvent l'épisode lyssenkiste dans les biographies des personnalités ayant occupé des responsabilités scientifiques ou politiques pendant cette période. Ils le considèrent soit insignifiant d'un point de vue scientifique, soit l'expression d'un compromis inévitable, et généralisé pendant la période stalinienne, avec le pouvoir. Les biographies des scientifiques victimes de la répression évoquent aussi le lyssenkisme. Sans nier la résistance au lyssenkisme dans les milieux scientifiques, nous avons tenté de vérifier cette hypothèse par l'étude des archives de la police secrète, conservées au Centre d'étude pour les archives de la Securitate (CNSAS). Dans l'état des instruments de recherche pour la série « documentaire » et en l'absence de répertoire communicable pour la série « informative », un dépouillement systématique était illusoire. Nous avons procédé par sondages, effectués dans les dossiers concernant l'*état d'esprit* de la population rurale, des intellectuels, des étudiants et les enseignants. Les directives émanant des services centraux ciblent les questions sur lesquels les organes régionaux et locaux doivent envoyer des rapports détaillés. Nous n'avons pas identifié jusqu'ici de directive spécifique concernant précisément la question du mitchourinisme. Les dossiers de surveillance individuelle de quelques biologistes nous ont été également accessibles. Des formules comme : « il a adopté et mis en application la biologie mitchourinienne » ou « il n'a adopté que de manière formelle et superficielle la nouvelle biologie » viennent caractériser l'activité scientifique des personnes surveillées. Néanmoins, il est difficile, dans l'état actuel de nos recherches, d'appréhender une véritable résistance. Dans les dossiers des biologistes exclus ou emprisonnés, les éventuelles critiques exprimées envers le lyssenkisme ne sont par incriminées explicitement. Les réquisitoires portent sur l'activité politique antérieure à 1944, sur les relations personnelles avec des personnes condamnées ou suspectées par le régime et sur les rapports avec des l'Occident. Pareillement, dans la surveillance des étudiants, ingénieurs agronomes et paysans, le refus d'apprendre et d'appliquer les méthodes soviétiques en agriculture ne sont mentionnés qu'occasionnellement. Il serait toutefois hasardeux d'en tirer une conclusion car les chefs d'accusation, les motifs des dénonciations et

les raisons officielles données pour l'ouverture des dossiers de surveillance sont formulés de manière à correspondre aux crimes prévus dans la loi : ennemi du peuple, sabotage de l'économie socialiste, attaque à l'adresse du régime. Derrière chacune de ces formules peut se cacher une forme de résistance au lyssenkisme, qu'il faudrait prouver par une étude plus approfondie des dossiers de la Securitate et de la justice.

Ces sources imprimées et fonds d'archives n'épuisent certainement pas la documentation de notre sujet. Il serait notamment intéressant de compléter l'étude avec les fonds des institutions de recherche et d'enseignement et les archives personnelles des scientifiques non seulement à Bucarest, mais aussi à Iasi, à Cluj et à Timisoara. D'autres périodiques et ouvrages scientifiques, techniques et grand public pourraient également apporter de nouveaux éclairages. Enfin, les quelques entretiens que nous avons eus avec des personnes qui ont vécu le lyssenkisme dans les années 1950 et/ou le retour de la génétique dans les années 1960, nous incitent à penser que des sources orales seraient un complément intéressant⁵⁸. Sans avoir donc une prétention d'exhaustivité, notre corpus est suffisamment vaste et diversifié pour offrir une vision globale sur la complexité de la biologie végétale et de l'agronomie roumaines pendant la période 1945-1965.

Conclusion

Cette proposition méthodologique nous guidera dans nos travaux ultérieurs qui fourniront une étude plus ample et plus approfondie du lyssenkisme en Roumanie. Nous avons choisi de nous limiter ici à ces aspects de méthode pour deux raisons. La première tient à la difficulté de concevoir une approche historique suffisamment équilibrée et cohérente sur un sujet qui suscite encore des controverses et des tensions dans le monde scientifique⁵⁹. Cette approche étant le fruit d'une recherche déjà avancée, il nous a paru opportun de la livrer ici car le silence de l'historiographie sur le cas roumain nous semble provenir moins d'une volonté d'occulter cette période trouble de l'histoire de la science nationale que d'une relative faiblesse des débats épistémologiques et méthodologiques sur la manière de concevoir et de faire l'histoire des sciences pendant le régime communiste. La seconde raison de notre choix est donc le souhait d'attirer l'attention des chercheurs sur la documentation très riche qui peut servir de support aux études sur l'histoire des sciences de la vie, et de la science en général, à l'époque contemporaine.

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Sigles

Académie RPR - Académie de la République Populaire de Roumanie
ANIC - Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale/ Archives nationales historiques centrales

ARLUS Asociația pentru strangerea legăturilor cu Uniunea Sovietică / Association pour le resserrement des liens avec l'Union Soviétique

CC du PCR - Comitetul Central al Partidului Comunist Român / Comité central du Parti Communiste Roumain

CC du PMR - Comitetul Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Român / Comité central du Parti Ouvrier Roumain

CNSAS Centrul național pentru studierea arhivelor securității / Centre national pour l'étude des archives de la Securitate

GAC - Gospodăria agricolă colectivă / Coopératives agricoles

ICAR - Institutul de cercetări agronomice al României / Institut de recherche agronomiques de Roumanie

IRRCS Institutul român pentru relațiile culturale cu străinătatea/ Institut roumain pour les relations culturelles avec l'étranger

SRCS - Societatea pentru răspândirea științei și culturii / Société pour la diffusion de la science et de la culture

NOTES

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- ² Lecourt, D., *Lyssenko: histoire réelle d'une « science prolétarienne »*, Presses universitaires de France, coll.« Quadrige », Paris, 1981, p. 53.
- ³ Roll-Hansen, Niel, *The Lyssenko Effect. The Politics of Science*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1994.
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- ⁵ Tirard, S. « Les biologistes et l'affaire Lyssenko à l'automne 1948 », *Historiens & Géographes*, n° 358, 1997, p 95-106.
- ⁶ deJong Lambert, W., Krementsov, N., « On labels and issues: The Lysenko Controversy and the Cold War » in *Journal of the History of Biology*, 45 / 2012, p. 373-388.
- ⁷ Selejan, A., *România în timpul primului război cultural (1944-1948). Trădarea intelectualilor*, Sibiu, Transpres, 1992.
- ⁸ Arhivele Academiei de științe agricole și silvice « Gh. Ionescu-Sisești » - sans cote, dossiers des années 1945-1947.
- ⁹ Les premières conférences faisant explicitement mention de Lyssenko sont données par Ing. Vlahuță, « Lyssenko și opera lui », Traian Săvulescu, « Agricultura în URSS » et Simion Oeriu « Știința în URSS ». Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (par la suite ANIC), CC al PCR - Secția Propaganda și agitație, 96/1945. Aussi Traian Săvulescu, *Academia de științe în URSS în diferite timpuri*, Coll. ARLUS, n° 1, 1945.
- ¹⁰ Prenant, M., *Biologie și marxism*, trad. E. Fronescu, Pygmalion, Iași, 1946. Prenant, M., *Darwin*, trad. E. Fronescu, Ed. de Stat, Biblioteca de buzunar, București, 1946. Prenant, M., « Materialismul dialectic, explicație și instrument al cunoașterii », *Contemporanul*, n°30 / 18 Avril 1947.
- ¹¹ Marcel Prenant fait partie de la délégation du Comité central du Parti Communiste Français au VIe Congrès du PMR qui a lieu en février 1948. Il est invité par l'Institut roumain pour les relations culturelles avec l'étranger à se rendre en Roumanie quelques jours avant le début du congrès. Sa réception par les plus hautes autorités de l'État et par les représentants des institutions scientifiques, l'attribution du titre de docteur *Honoris causa* de l'Université de Bucarest, l'audience de ses conférences, font de cette visite une célébration du résistant et du communiste français, mais aussi du scientifique marxiste. ANIC - IRRCS I/3, I/6.
- ¹² Loison, L., « 1968. Fêter le centenaire du biologiste Emil Racovitza », communication au colloque *Science et politique dans la Roumanie communiste*, Bucarest, décembre 2012.
- ¹³ Les motivations de cet engagement sont difficiles à cerner. T. Săvulescu peut correspondra à plusieurs des catégories proposées par Adrian Cioroianu :

- les communistes par vocation, les sympathisants social-démocrates, ceux qui ont peur ou bien les naïfs et les faibles. (Cioroianu, A., *Pe umerii lui Marx. O introducere in istoria comunismului românesc*, Ediția a II-a, Curtea Veche, București, 2007, p. 107-148). Lucian Boia conclut à l'opportunisme mais cette explication, donnée explicitement dans le dossier de surveillance, ne nous semble pas plus satisfaisante car trop vague. (Boia, L., *Capcanele istoriei. Elita intelectuală românească între 1930 și 1950*, Ed. a II-a revăzută și adăugită, Humanitas, București, 2012, p. 309).
- 14 ANIC, Propaganda și agitație, 96/1945; ANIC C. I. Parhon, IV/1953; voir aussi Anonyme, *Moscova vazută de Mihail Sadoveanu, Prof. Mitriță Constantinescu, Prof. Traian Săvulescu*, București, Cartea Rusă, 1945.
- 15 « Cuceririle științei sovietice pe tarâmul agriculturii în desbateri la Institutul de cercetări agronomice », in *Studii. Revista de știință și filozofie*, An II, n° 2, aprilie-iunie 1949, p. 64-132. Le titre du compte rendu de ces journées est quelque peu trompeur car il n'y a pas eu un réel « débat ».
- 16 Arhivele Academiei de științe agricole și silvice « Gh. Ionescu-Sisești » - sans cote, dossiers des années 1945-1947.
- 17 Traian Săvulescu, « De la practica domesticirii plantelor la principii biologice generale. Reflexiuni pe margineau raportului lui T.D. Lîsenko » in *Analele Academiei R.P.R. Secția de Științe biologice*, Seria A, Tom 2, București, Academia RPR, 1949, 70 p.
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ANQUETIL DUPERRON'S SEARCH FOR THE MUGHAL PUBLIC SPHERE: ORIENTALISM AS POLITICAL ECONOMY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE

Since the concept of the 'public sphere' entered historians' conceptual tool-kit some decades ago, scholars have debated whether or not public spheres exist, or have existed, in various moments of non-European history.¹ Such debates seem to have high stakes, given the association often made between the emergence of a public sphere in eighteenth-century Europe and the coming of cultural, economic and political modernity. For scholars working on contemporaneous societies outside Europe, demonstrating that Qing, Safavid and Mughal societies, possessed public spheres constituted by networks of gazette-readers or tea-house patrons appears to vindicate them as bearers of an autochthonous, authentic 'modernity' or 'early modernity'.² Such approaches challenge the historical narrative articulated by Jurgen Habermas in which the modern, 'bourgeois' public sphere emerged first, and perhaps could have emerged only, in Enlightenment Europe. Yet, ironically, the search for a public sphere outside of Europe was a feature of the eighteenth-century European intellectual scene Habermas sought to describe. It was pioneered by the French Indologist Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1731-1805), who gathered diverse forms of evidence to demonstrate that various Asian states possessed a form of public life, and of political-economical discourse, akin to that of Europe.

Anquetil's study of the Mughal empire in particular anticipated much of the late twentieth- and twenty-first century scholarship on this question. Anquetil, like present-day scholars such as Margit Pernau, Yunus Jaffrey, Farhat Hasan and others, pointed to the existence of gazettes (*akhbarat*), and Persian-language works of history and statecraft (court histories and *akhlaqi* texts) as signs that Mughal politics was performed before an interested, informed public whose members measured the behavior of political actors against a set of shared norms. His study of the South Asian public sphere, long ignored even by the specialists who study Anquetil's

career as an Orientalist, spotlights neglected dimensions of the meaning and scope of the notion of the public sphere in the Enlightenment. Seen from Anquetil's vantage, the latter appears both more contentious and more globally-minded than its historians have imagined.

Against Montesquieu

Anquetil began his investigation of the Mughal public sphere in his 1778 *Législation Orientale*, a rebuttal to Montesquieu's 1748 *l'Esprit des Loix*, which had offered a complex and influential theory of public-ness, although without explicitly giving a name to the 'public sphere'. Among other claims, Montesquieu claimed that public life not exist in South Asia. His understanding of public-ness demonstrates the close connections between the economic and political thought of the European Enlightenment on the one hand, and the study of non-European societies on the other.³ Of course, it is by no means news to scholars that Montesquieu's descriptions of world outside Europe were critical parts of his analysis of three ideal-type regimes, each with their own distinct characteristics: republics, monarchies, and despotisms. Montesquieu identified this last category with Asian states, particularly the Mughal empire.⁴ He argued that a host of beneficent and inter-connected institutions, including private property, economic dynamism, and public life, were missing from 'Oriental despotisms'. Such positive structures were said to be incompatible with the absolute, unconstitutional power of an individual ruler. These economic and political phenomena, Montesquieu claimed, fell and rose together; one could not exist without the others. His analysis of South Asia as a region bereft of all of them thus incorporated real and imagined facts about the Subcontinent into a cogent vision of the way in which economic life was embedded in, and indeed inseparable from, political, social, and cultural forces.

This grand vision was unsatisfactory for Anquetil on at least two counts. First, it violated what the Orientalist knew (and what increasing numbers of present-day scholars know) about the Mughal state and the eighteenth-century South Asian economy. To describe the Mughal polity as 'constitutional' would be a stretch, but it is nevertheless the case that its rulers and agents were bound by semi-bureaucratic administrative structures, as well as norms of political culture embodied in diverse genres of texts. It is more difficult for contemporary historians to make

unambiguously well-substantiated claims about economic life in the Subcontinent during this period, but it is undeniable that diverse forms of property, both formal and informal, regulated the production, exchange, and use of goods.⁵ From his time in the port of Surat (1758-1761), a commercial hub on the Subcontinent's west coast, Anquetil was able to acquire deeds, contracts, and other economic documents testifying to how wrong Montesquieu was about the absence of property in the region. The Subcontinent, simply put, was not the Oriental despotism Montesquieu described.

If *Législation Orientale* (1778) is Anquetil's answer to Montesquieu's empirical claims about South Asia, the Orientalist seems to have been equally (albeit less explicitly) concerned about some of the theoretical and epistemological implications of the *Esprit des lois*. Montesquieu insisted that economic and political life were not timeless expressions of human nature governed by unchanging laws, but a historically contingent function of various cultural, social, and political factors. The economics and politics of Asian societies were to him radically incomparable with those of European ones. Montesquieu and those he influenced, such as the abbé Guillaume Raynal (1713-1796), the historian of colonialism, and the abbé Ferdinando Galiani (1728-1787), the political economist, followed their mentor's lead by focusing more on the differences among various human populations in particular times and places than in determining the universal features of humanity as such.⁶ They refused to treat economic activity as a domain bound by its own laws, or to separate distinctly 'economic' sorts of psychological motivations (e.g., self-interest or utility) from 'non-economic' ones (glory, virtue, passion, etc.) shaped by local cultures. Central to their analysis was Montesquieu's claim that the most powerful and beneficent sort of economic motives were tied to specific institutions present in 'constitutional' regimes (monarchies and republics) but absent in unconstitutional despotisms.

By the 1760s and 1770s, many thinkers were contesting Montesquieu's formulation that forms of economic life varied in the presence of absence of specific institutions. *Laissez-faire* thinkers and Physiocrats often tried to articulate economic 'laws,' which they understood to be founded in nature and therefore not to change from one society to another. Many argued, in contrast to Montesquieu, that peoples all across the world engaged in trade, owned property, and responded to the same sort of economic incentives. The classic expression of this burgeoning confidence in the existence of a trans-historical economic dimension to human nature is

Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776), but it also appeared in a range of French texts that are today known only to specialists. These include the debate between the Montesquian abbé Galiani and the liberal economist André Morellet (1727-1819; he translated *Wealth of Nations* into French the year of its publication, and who is himself cited therein on a number of occasions) over the merits of the deregulation of the French grain trade.⁷ As Steven Kaplan observes, the French state's shift toward a *laissez-faire* policy on this all-important commodity opened a rift among the 'party of Enlightenment', bringing once-abstract arguments about the nature of economic life into the center of political contention.⁸ These arguments would only grow more intense in subsequent decades, peaking during the first years of the Revolution.

Bringing his Indological expertise to bear in these economic debates, Anquetil offered a liberal alternative to the vision of Asian despotism developed by Montesquieu. Where the latter had used stereotypes of the Mughal empire to buttress theories about the variability of forms of economic life across space and time, Anquetil used his detailed knowledge of Mughal administration and South Asian commerce to support the proposition that all societies, whatever their culture and form of government, fostered property rights, markets, and emulation. Still more daringly, on the eve of the French Revolution he would offer the Subcontinent as a model for the economic and social reforms in his own country. Such timely contributions might have been welcomed by political economists pleased to see their theories on the universality of economic law confirmed by the evidence amassed by France's leading Orientalist. Instead, Anquetil's *Législation* and subsequent works on political economy were ignored, and have continued to be neglected by historians of the eighteenth-century who have not integrated the claims about Asian societies made by Montesquieu, Anquetil, and others into the history of economic thought. For Montesquieu, the study of political economy was inseparable from Orientalist knowledge about ostensibly non-economic institutions such as the public sphere, but, by the late eighteenth-century, it was increasingly unclear how facts (even true ones) about non-European societies might be relevant to liberal thinkers who conceived of political economy as a domain of universal laws. Anquetil's search for the Mughal public sphere, along with his efforts to make his findings speak to contemporary debates in French politics, reveal the growing tensions within the late Enlightenment between universalism and the study of the world.

Despotism and the Public Sphere

Montesquieu's vision of Oriental despotism terrified French readers, inspiring them both to disparage Asia and to be on perpetual watch against signs of despotism in their own country. Of course, these readers did not always agree on what exactly it was they were to watch out for, or what exactly they were trying to defend. Montesquieu himself identified resistance to despotism with the preservation of the French monarchy's 'constitution,' *i.e.*, the prerogatives of nobles such as himself and the *parlement* of which he was a member. More radical opponents of despotism believed that the nobles and their privileges were themselves despotic; by 1789 it seemed to many that only the abolition of the nobility could save France from the menace of despotism as bad as that of Asian states. If the fear of despotism structured the political culture of late-eighteenth century France, defining 'public enemy number one' for a wide range of political activists (from conservative nobles to republican radicals), it was equally important for economic thought, because it described a set of connections among political and social institutions on the one hand, and economic life on the other. Among the most important, but at present least-studied, of these connections is that between the public sphere and the set of economic motives termed 'emulation.' Montesquieu argued despotic societies lacked public-ness and therefore could not sustain emulation, the inter-subjective psychological and social phenomenon he and other late eighteenth-century *philosophes* imagined to lay at the heart of economic dynamism.

The notion of emulation had been a part of the Western intellectual tradition since Classical Antiquity. Until the 1740s, it was generally understood as a form of competition-cum-comradeship experienced among soldiers fighting on the same side in war, or among artists working in the same medium.⁹ In the middle of the eighteenth-century, a circle of French intellectuals, economists, and politicians associated with Vincent de Gournay (1712-1759) began to promote the idea that emulation was also felt by economic actors.¹⁰ Thus, rather than being an expression of self-interest, which challenged the solidarity of existing communities, economic competition could be seen as a kind of team-building exercise. The Gournay circle and its followers, both in France and Britain, argued that *laissez-faire* policies and a robust public sphere, underwritten by a free press, were the best means of awakening emulation. While a nation-wide press would bind individuals together culturally, morally,

and politically, deregulated markets would provide the incentives for economic competition and therefore for growth. Montesquieu did not endorse the specific policy recommendations of the Gournay circle, but his work was instrumental in promoting the idea that emulation and economic growth depended on a public sphere, which in turn could only flourish under specific political conditions. Thus the purported absence of a public sphere in 'Oriental despotisms' seemed to explain what he, and many thinkers following him, took to be the relative stasis of Asian economies as compared to European ones.

Each of the three basic forms of political regimes identified by Montesquieu was associated with a certain psychological profile that he imagined to be common to individuals living under it. Inhabitants of despotic states, for example, were marked by fear born of their powerlessness to resist or predict the whims of their absolute ruler. They were particularly vulnerable in economic matters, because, as a matter of course, despots do not recognize their subjects' right to private property.¹¹ According to Montesquieu, the insecurity that subjects experience "strikes down courage and snuffs out the least feeling of ambition," including emulation.¹² Since the despot would always be capable of seizing the property of a wealthy individual or taking the life of any potential rival for power, there was no reason for individuals to work to distinguish or enrich themselves. Because "knowledge is dangerous there, and emulation baleful," they lead lives of isolation, unknown to each other and ignorant of the world.¹³ It is only logical, then, that insofar as it brings people into contact and promotes the exchange of ideas and examples, "commerce itself contradicts its [despotism's] laws."¹⁴ In an anticipation of present-day historiographical debates over the 'divergence' thesis (explaining why European economies experienced steady growth in the Industrial and perhaps early modern eras, while those of Asia did not), Montesquieu suggested that the presence of despotism in Asia explained why European trade was dynamic, while Asia stagnated.¹⁵

Besides being a theory of global economic divergence *avant la lettre*, Montesquieu's theory of Oriental despotism was also a theory of the public sphere. As Sharon Krause observes, in despotic societies, "while there is no private sphere from the standpoint of the subject, neither is there a public sphere. Indeed everything is private in despotism for everything is the private property of the despot." Because the despot does not recognize subjects' property rights, and capriciously expropriates their possessions, the inhabitants of despotic states lack the material and psychological

wherewithal to sustain a public sphere through their participation in institutions of civil society such as voluntary associations, corporations, etc. They are a “population ill-equipped for the deliberation and disputation that animate politics and that make the public sphere political.”¹⁶

Montesquieu’s claims about the correlative absences of the public sphere, private property, emulation and economic vitality in South Asia were critical parts of his intellectual project. Besides setting Europe in the pilot seat of history, they undermined the possibility of economic laws that could transcend the radical divisions among different sorts of political regimes and different sorts of human communities. As Céline Spector notes, “the differential anthropology of Montesquieu” rules out the discovery of such “universal human needs” as might offer a foundation for economic theory.¹⁷ For Montesquieu, the study of particular states such as the Mughal empire highlights at once the embeddedness of economic activity in politico-social institutions, as well as the wide range of variation among the economic life in different parts of the world. Anquetil challenged Montesquieu’s characterization of the Mughal empire as despotic, and seeking to prove that it possessed a public sphere, property rights, robust circuits of exchange, and emulation. In doing so, he too hoped to upend Montesquieu’s vision of economic life, revealing that there was a universal human nature from which a set of generally applicable economic norms could be derived.

News from Court

By Montesquieu’s logic, if the Mughal empire was not despotic, then it must have a public sphere. In his attempt to disprove this unflattering vision of South Asia, Anquetil therefore argued that Mughal emperors embraced and sustained a public sphere which they and their subjects understand as a forum in which political actions could be judged. He pointed to the existence of “schools and public libraries” throughout the Subcontinent, showing that such institutions were filled with Persian-language works of history (Persian was the language of South Asian elites, and the only regional language Anquetil read with ease).¹⁸ Among the most important of these was the *Akbarnama*, a account of Akbar’s reign (1556-1605) written by that emperor’s chief minister Abu’l Fazl (1574-1602). Anquetil translated passages that listed the functions of various officials, with the aim of showing that Mughal government’s workings were public knowledge.

He was impressed that Abu'l Fazl recommended officials to read works of history, politics and ethics, so that administrators themselves would be well-informed, as well as committed to moral norms of governance. While Anquetil did not mention the genre of *akhlaq* by name, he seems, like Muzaffar Alam today, to have observed that such texts informed Mughal political culture, providing a set of standards against which political actors could be measured, and constituting part of the textual and normative foundation of the South Asian public sphere.¹⁹

The heart of the Mughal public sphere, Anquetil argued, was not so much in these texts as in the emperor's meetings with his ministers, the *darbar*, as well as the gazettes, or *akhbarat*, that reported on these meetings to readers across South Asia. Anquetil had never been to court himself, but relying on the reports of East India Company ambassador Thomas Roe (1581-1644) and traveler François Bernier (1620-1688), reported that "the most important resolutions are taken and registered in public." He described these *akhbarat* in which news of the *darbar* was transmitted as *nouvelles publiques* (public news), which expressed in plain, direct language what had transpired at court: "not in this inflated style for which Asians are reproached."²⁰ Anquetil compared these gazettes with French newsletters, distinguishing them from mere *registres* (registers) that might only circulate among members of the court. Mughal gazettes were sent out to "subscribers... as in France" and went even to the edges of the empire.²¹ The gazettes began by noting what ministers were present at court, allowing readers to know who was in and who was out of the *conseil d'état* (counsel of state; the name of the French king's group of advisors). They then listed the requests presented to the ministers, and the ministers' responses: goods were bought and sold, *fakirs* (religious mendicants) given grants, armies raised, etc. Where Montesquieu's imaginary Asian despot was "uneasy" about public surveillance of his actions, the Mughal emperor pursued it.²² Readers of *L'Esprit des lois* had never heard of anything like *akhbarat* existing in an 'Oriental despotism'; Anquetil noted: "what I am saying here is new."²³ In order to verify his novel claims, he attached a translation of a gazette that he had come across while in Surat. Dating from 1742, this document was not particularly significant in its content, which mostly conveyed information about the number and quality of elephants and lions at court.²⁴ In its very everydayness, however, this document may have made Anquetil's case better than a more spectacular document.

Anquetil's interpretation of the *akhbarat*, *darbar* ceremonial, *akhlaqi* texts, and Mughal court histories played on Montesquieu's own logic.

Since the Subcontinent could be shown to possess historiography, libraries, and gazettes, the Mughal empire must have a public sphere, and could not be despotic. In light of the intimate connections Montesquieu had drawn between such political and social institutions on the one hand and economic life on the other, it followed that, if there was a public sphere in South Asia, there would also be civil society, property rights, emulation, and economic dynamism. Anquetil furthered the point by appending translations of bill of sale and deeds to *Législation Orientale*, showing that contracts (and thus property) were indeed known in South Asia. This was by no means a simple act of setting the record on the Subcontinent straight. Throughout his career, Anquetil was deeply concerned by economic questions, and sought to prove that liberal economic policy was founded in human nature, which gave rise to markets, property, and emulation in all societies throughout the world. Anquetil's search for the public sphere in South Asia was inseparable from his advocacy of *laissez-faire* in France.

Caste, Estate and Emulation

Having demonstrated, at least to his own satisfaction, the existence of a public sphere in South Asia, Anquetil turned in the following decade to a new kind of comparative project: using the Subcontinent as a model for France. In 1789, as a through-going reform of French society appeared to be imminent, he published *Dignité du commerce et de l'état du commerçant*, which called for the end to nobles' privileges and promoted commerce as a legitimate occupation for all individuals, whatever their station in society.²⁵ This document was in some ways a late-comer to an argument which had peaked in the 1750s.²⁶ Known as the *noblesse commerçante* (commercial nobility) debate, it had hinged on the question of whether or not to continue a long-standing ban on noble participation in retail trade. Nobles involved in the latter could find themselves faced with *dérogance*: the loss of their privileged legal status. Theoretically, they were to be prevented from engaging in trade in order to focus on military service, which was said to be their primary function in French society. The notion that the clergy (First Estate) prayed, the nobility (Second Estate) fought, and everyone else (Third Estate) worked, however, seemed increasingly out-of-date by the mid-eighteenth century; national wealth was coming to be seen as at least as important as military service to the security of the state.²⁷

Nevertheless, traditionalists won the day, at least initially, preserving the law of *dérogance* and, with the Ségur Ordinance of 1782, tightening the nobles' hold on upper-level officer positions in the French military. Yet just seven years later *dérogance*, the theory of the three estates, and survival of a privileged nobility were in doubt. Anquetil updated the debate of the 1750s for the revolutionary era by calling for an end to noble's financial privileges in language approximating the Abbé Sieyès' (1748-1836) fiery pamphlet "What is the Third Estate?," also published in 1789.²⁸ But he was still on familiar ground. In fact, confronting the major arguments in favor of nobles' privileges and *dérogance* meant revisiting Montesquieu, whose *l'Esprit des Lois* had grounded the defense of a privileged, non-commercial nobility in a complex, inter-locking set of arguments about the public sphere, emulation, and Asiatic despotism.

The institution of a privileged nobility, Montesquieu claimed, was a spur to the emulation of non-nobles. Merchants who amassed a great deal of wealth might see their descendants ennobled by state service, the purchase of venal office, or through marriage into titled families. Entering the Second Estate, they would have to forgo the commercial activity that had enriched them, but they would gain as a reward the most esteemed sort of public visibility, enjoying proximity to the monarch whose gaze was the center of the French public sphere during the Old Regime. Non-noble merchants would not work as hard to amass wealth if they could not hope at some point to purchase their way into a more honorable and more public status. In support of his argument that social climbing was the foundation of commerce, Montesquieu pointed to the counter-example offered by despotic societies such as India. There rulers had put in place a caste system through "laws that force individuals to remain their professions, and pass these on to their children, are not and cannot be useful except in despotic state, in which no one can or should have any emulation."²⁹

For Anquetil, as for so many observers in 1789, this was nonsense. The privileges held by nobles were inherently unjust, composed of "feudal rights" on peasant labor, and tax exemptions that were nothing more than a hidden tax on non-nobles.³⁰ Such privileges were a drag on the economy. Nobles, Anquetil argued, should work for the material benefit of the nation just like everyone else in French society, and should stop hindering the economic activity of non-nobles. In spite of his strident language, however, Anquetil sought to preserve the Second Estate, albeit with diminished privileges and with an end both to *dérogance* and the

ennoblement of bourgeois families. The possibility of becoming noble had distracted members of the Third Estate from their own professions, making them dissatisfied and unfocused. Rather than investing their capital in business affairs that might contribute to the growth of the national economy, they frittered it away trying to keep up “the retinue of a captain of the cavalry.”³¹

These arguments echoed those of Sieyès', the radical priest whose pamphlet 'What is the Third Estate?' also lambasted the uselessness of the nobility. As William Sewell notes, Sieyès' political thinking was anchored in the principles of post-Smithian political economy; he was convinced that the division of labor was the key to economic and social progress, and that all members of society should contribute through their work to the general good. Nobles' traditional roles as military officers and members of the court did not count as useful labor in Sieyès' schema (although the abbé held that bourgeois politicians were performing 'representative labor').³² Anquetil, too, stood by the principles of utility and the division of labor as a means to progress; he grounded them, however, not only in the abstractions of political economy but also in empirical studies of South Asian society. In opposition to Montesquieu's vision of the economics of the Subcontinent's caste system, Anquetil insisted that South Asia had a bustling economy, under-girded by property rights and a public sphere. Where Montesquieu had used Orientalist knowledge drawn from the reports of travelers to prop up a theory of political economy that justified noble privilege, Anquetil invoked his own Indological expertise to advance a peculiarly Orientalized political agenda, transforming France into an enlightened caste society.

Caste, according to Anquetil, was the model of a healthy civil society. Individuals born into a caste, and thus a profession, could not hope to advance to a more honorable estate; their economic activity was not motivated by such non-economic considerations. Rather, they were prompted solely by an “emulation,” detached from honor, to improve their products, increase their yields, and enrich themselves. This honorless emulation was concerned solely with material advancement were expressions of an economic psychology common to all human beings, for “emulation should be found and in fact is found in more or less all states.”³³ Precisely because this emulation was natural and universal, it did not require encouragement by the state in the form of social gradations through which ambitions individuals could pass to greater and greater levels of public esteem. In a reformed French society where individuals

from the Third Estate could no longer hope to attain nobility and abandon useful work, emulation would not wither as Montesquieu had foreseen. The case of South Asia proved that whether or not individuals are free to change their professions (through ennoblement or through other means), emulation pushes them to “succeed” by amassing personal wealth and contributing to their nation’s prosperity.³⁴

This effort to present emulation as a basic feature of human psychology (rather than as an affect tied to particular institutions present in some societies but not in others) might have been appealing to fellow liberals, yet Anquetil’s parallels between caste and estate would have been scarcely palatable for potential readers. The South Asian caste system and the division of Old Regime society into three estates were often compared in the late 1780s, but these comparisons were always made in order to attack the existence of separate estates. Commentators both famous and obscure, writing in erudite treatises or fly-by-night pamphlets, condemned the clergy and especially the nobility as ‘castes.’ The most important of these was doubtless Sieyès, who insisted on the inherent dignity of commercial activity, seeing it as the source of the nation’s strength. Both thinkers called on nobles to abandon their prejudices against trade and become useful members of French society. Unlike Anquetil, however, Sieyès had no patience with the “exclusive caste, separated from the Third which it despises”; he doubted whether this caste could be considered part of the nation it did so little to serve.³⁵

Whether or not Anquetil was right (as some present-day historians of South Asia suggest) to describe early modern caste as a kind of civil society that structured rather than stifled economic life in the Subcontinent, his comments were hardly what the Old Regime’s critics wanted to hear.³⁶ Moreover, Anquetil made no effort to explain why the nobility should continue to exist as a separate estate even as its members were to become indistinguishable in practice from the commercial Third Estate. Sieyès’ denunciation of the noble ‘caste’, however wrong-headed its grasp of the caste system in South Asia may have been, was clear and consistent, which is more than can be said for Anquetil’s desire to preserve the Second Estate while depriving it of all the specific qualities that made it what it was.

Anquetil's Unpopularity

Twenty-first century scholars would no doubt find that Anquetil's vision of caste as a means of organizing something like a civil society is closer to the truth than the views of Montesquieu or Sieyès. His sense of *akhbarat* and other Mughal institutions as pillars of public life has likewise reemerged in contemporary studies of early modern South Asia. Margit Pernau and Yunus Jaffrey echo Anquetil when they place *akhbarat* at the center of the "creation of knowledge and of the public sphere."³⁷ Jaswant Lal Mehta, in his otherwise scathing critique of the Mughal empire as an Oriental despotism straight out of Montesquieu, says that by permitting the circulation of *akhbarat*, "though despotic rulers, the imperial Mughals... placed the entire monarchical apparatus to the full gaze of their subjects."³⁸ Anquetil's claims about the South Asian economy also seem increasingly verified, as scholars like Prannan Parthasarathi and Tirthankar Roy point to the security of peasant tenure, workers' rights, and urban property in seventeenth and eighteenth-century South Asia. Yet, in their own day, *Législation Orientale*, *Eloge du commerce*, and Anquetil's other political writings had little impact. Why did his work fail to inspire his contemporaries?

Scholars have argued that Anquetil was an anti-Eurocentric radical, an untimely thinker who could not find an audience because he strayed too far from the prejudices of his day.³⁹ Henry Laurens, for example, argues that Anquetil's "ideas were scarcely heard, because they did not correspond to the dominant current of liberalism."⁴⁰ Given Anquetil's investment in the liberal economic thought of his day, and his explicit yoking of fashionable political causes to his study of South Asia, this explanation is untenable. What seems to have condemned Anquetil's writings to obscurity is their own conceptual confusion, which is particularly glaring in his engagement with Montesquieu.⁴¹ Anquetil sought to discredit the notion of Asiatic despotism, but he failed to understand the concept he attacked, eliding some of the issues most important to Montesquieu and his readers. Anquetil posited that the Mughal state was a monarchy akin to that of France, which, of course, had a powerful groups of hereditary officials: the nobles of the robe and sword.⁴²

In trying to assimilate the Mughal state to the French monarchy Anquetil ignored the difference between them that vexed Montesquieu: the relative weakness of Mughal elites *vis-à-vis* the emperor. In contrast to French nobles, who enjoyed hereditary titles and access to institutions

like the *parlements*, Mughal elites held their offices, titles and lands only at the emperor's pleasure.⁴³ Since the mid-sixteenth century, the Mughal state had been moving toward a more bureaucratic model of government, converting elites from semi-feudal nobles into salaried officials. This process of state-building defied Montesquieu's prescriptions for proper monarchical government. Indeed, the relationship between the ruler and elites is the crux of Montesquieu's distinction between monarchies and despotisms: the former accept elites' hereditary privileges as part of the constitution of the realm, the latter assault those privileges. Anquetil does not seem to have grasped this central point, making his attacks on the theory of 'Oriental despotism' to a certain extent moot.

Here Anquetil wavers between two propositions. On the one hand, he argues that the Mughal empire conforms to Montesquieu's model of a monarchical state, as evidenced by the existence of a set of specific institutions in South Asia (gazettes, public councils, property rights, etc.). On the other, he argues that there is and can be no such thing as despotism anywhere in the world; it is "a government that exists nowhere."⁴⁴ Montesquieu's effort to classify states by type is bound to fail, Anquetil insists, because human beings everywhere live in basically similar sorts of society, organized by common forms of public-ness and economic life. Perhaps these two propositions are not ultimately incompatible. In his sympathetic interpretation of Anquetil as a cosmopolitan liberal, Siep Stuurman observes that the Orientalist alternately employed an "anthropological and historicist" mode of an analysis and a "moral and universal" one.⁴⁵ Stuurman does not see these two strands of Anquetil's thought as contradictory; the *a priori* conviction that "all peoples of the world have the same basic needs and faculties" and the specific empirical claim that they live in the same basic sort of communities is simply confirmed by a rich variety of cases.⁴⁶ Stuurman does not attend, however, to the effects that Anquetil's employment of universalist and historicist discourses would have had on readers who had their own expectations about the way concrete 'facts' about particular societies ought to relate to laws of human behavior.

The tension between these modes was particularly acute in late eighteenth-century French political economy. Historians have long noted a marked contrast between the epistemological assumptions of the *laissez-faire* thinkers that descended from the Gournay Circle, and the more nebulous group of their opponents, influenced by Montesquieu, who included the abbé Galiani, Jacques Necker, and Denis Diderot. The former

emphasized the systematic, *a priori* quality of economic knowledge. Their thought, as Jean-Claude Perrot notes, was centered on “the notion of the individual... with universal, invariable attributes.”⁴⁷ The latter, hewing to an older mercantilist tradition, saw such knowledge as a body of facts, cases, and rules of thumb rather than a set of general principles.

For such liberals as André Morellet, an influential member of the Gournay Circle, individual cases were of little importance, provided one had correctly understood human nature and the economic laws that emerged from it. In a 1771 letter to the Italian *laissez-faire* economist Pietro Verri, Morellet dismissed the idea (promoted by Montesquieu, Raynal, and, from a liberal perspective, Anquetil himself) that the French government could not determine the proper policy for trade between India and France unless it carefully studied the facts of economic life in South Asia. Morellet knew *a priori* that the *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* was inefficient and that deregulated “private trade” would work better, because he understood the universal principles of political economy. Why test these principles against specific cases? Even when the former “are belied by some particular facts, that is not, in my judgment, a reason to put them in doubt.”⁴⁸

Who, then would be the audience for Anquetil’s facts about political institutions and economic life in South Asia? Liberals who shared his belief in a universal human nature with economic attributes had little epistemic imperative to search for “certain particular facts” in the archives of Surat. This tension between what Stuurman calls “anthropological and historicist” fact-gathering and the liberal belief in ‘economic man’ hangs over Anquetil’s failure. His late eighteenth-century search for the Mughal public outside of Europe was a response to, and continuation to Montesquieu’s project of an anthropological, historicist, and global political economy. It seems that such a project, however revised, could not be coupled with the principles of liberal political economy. By the century’s end, the Orientalist knowledge Anquetil provided no longer seemed reconcilable with the economic knowledge embodied in his allies’ principles.

NOTES

- ¹ Debates over the existence of a non-European public sphere peaked at different moments in different regional fields, and each of the latter had its own peculiar contours. The China field turned to this question quite early, with a special issue of *Modern China* devoted to this question in 1993. See Philip C.C. Huang, "Public Sphere /"Civil Society" in China?: The Third Realm between State and Society" *Modern China*, 01/1993, 19(2): 216-240; Mary. Rankin, "Some Observations on a Chinese Public Sphere" *ibid.*: 158-182; Frederick Wakeman "The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate" *ibid.*: 108-139. The debate remains generative of important scholarly works, e.g. Eugenia Lean *Public Passions: the Trial of Shi Jianqiao and the Rise of Popular Sympathy in Republican China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

On the Islamic public sphere, see Miriam Hoexter, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Nehemia Levtzion, *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications*, ed. Nils Butenschon, Uri Davis, and Manuel Hassassian, (Syracuse: University Press, 2000); Ellen McLarney, "The Islamic Public Sphere and the Discipline of 'Adab" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Aug. 2011) , pp. 429-449; Armando Salvatore, *The Public Sphere: Liberal Modernity, Catholicism, Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). The 'classic' scholarly disavowal of the very possibility of an Islamic public sphere (and of civil society, secular modernity, and so on) is Ernest Gellner *Muslim Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

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- 13 Montesquieu, p. 265.
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- 23 *Législation*, p. 41. Anquetil was not, strictly speaking, the first European to discuss the *akhbarat*. Nicola Manucci, a seventeenth-century traveler to South Asia, mentioned them in his writings, but did not see them as having

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33 *Législation*, 32.

34 *Législation*, 33.

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- 36 Nicholas Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Susan Bayly, *Caste, Society and Politics in India from the Eighteenth Century to the Modern Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). See also Arjun Appadurai, "Is Homo Hierarchicus?," *American Ethnologist*, vol. 13 (1986): 745-61.
- 37 Pernau and Jaffrey, p. 2.
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- 42 Anquetil, p. 40.
- 43 Bernier infamously claimed that there was no private property in South Asia. This misunderstanding emerged from his observations of the Mughal court's practice of paying nobles in official service by assigning them specific domains (and the taxes attached to them) for life; upon their death these lands were supposed to revert to the emperor, who would assign them to another official. This system began to gradually break down in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, as imperial authority weakened and nobles converted their revenue-domains into hereditary fiefdoms. See John Richards, *The Mughal Empire*, Cambridge New History of India, I, 5, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). The status of non-noble land is an entirely separate question. South Asian peasants enjoyed varying degrees of security of tenure, through a number of different arrangements by which cultivators, village organizations, landlords, and agents of the state shared rights to the revenue of a given area. These arrangements were only rarely concerned with establishing property over the land itself, creating confusion for European observers. Bernier and his readers incorrectly drew the conclusion that there was no right to property in South Asia: a mistake with profound consequences for Orientalist thought and colonial practice. For late eighteenth-century British efforts to understand, and alter, South

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HANDEL UND STAAT. EIN VERSUCH ZUM WIRTSCHAFTSTHEORETISCHEN DENKEN AUGUST LUDWIG SCHLÖZERS

Abstract

Zum ökonomischen Denken deutschsprachiger Aufklärer des 18. Jahrhunderts ist nach wie vor kaum geforscht worden. Auch die Schriften des bekannten Göttinger Professors August Ludwig Schlözer sind bislang nicht für seine ökonomischen Stellungnahmen bekannt, was nicht zuletzt daran liegen mag, dass er bisweilen in ein und demselben Text verschiedenen sich grundsätzlich widersprechenden Theorien zustimmte. Dies hat in der Forschung dazu geführt, dass Schlözers Wirtschaftstheorie sowohl vom Liberalismus, der Physiokratie oder dem Merkantilismus beeinflusst dargestellt wurde. Der vorliegende Artikel zeigt auf, dass Schlözer dagegen viel mehr von empiristisch argumentierenden und praxisnahen Autoren beeinflusst war und theorieimmanente, vom historischen und sozio-ökonomischen Kontext abstrahierende Argumentationen explizit verwarf. Sein ökonomisches Denken und insbesondere seine Auffassung vom Handel und dessen Verhältnis zum Staat werden im Kontext seiner Geschichts- und Staatstheorie verständlich.

1. Einleitung

In den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten ist die Bewegung der Aufklärung im 18. Jahrhundert von der Forschung vermehrt in ihren transnationalen Dimensionen veranschaulicht worden.¹ Ja, es wurde gar vom „globalen achtzehnten Jahrhundert“ gesprochen und viele Studien legen ihren Fokus auf weltweite Netzwerke, gegenseitige Einflüsse und Rückwirkungen zwischen Europa, seinen Kolonien und anderen außereuropäischen Ländern.² Vor dem Hintergrund dieser ‘globalen Öffnung’ scheinen Studien, die sich ausschließlich mit Europa befassen beinahe, als ‘eurozentrisch’ und damit überholt. Zwar ist das Projekt der Aufklärung in seinem kommunikativen Charakter nur als transnationaler Prozess verständlich. Die innereuropäischen Transferprozesse sind jedoch bei Weitem nicht erschöpfend untersucht. Und so scheint die Perspektivierung der

Aufklärung als globales oder europäisches Phänomen regionale und lokale Dynamiken bisweilen zu verwischen. Damit aber werden paradoxerweise überkommenegegläubte Kategorisierungen – gewissermaßen durch die Hintertür – wieder eingeführt. So führen an bestimmten Thematiken orientierte Untersuchung etwa unwillkürlich dazu, dass die ältere Einteilung nach ‘nationalen’ Ausprägungen der Aufklärung – wie die „ökonomische“ schottische Aufklärung, die „antireligiöse“ und „politische“ französische Aufklärung, die „rechtstheoretische“ italienische und die „literarische“ deutsche Aufklärung – wieder aufscheinen. Mit einem thematischen Ansatz zur Untersuchung *der* Europäischen Aufklärung (etwa über die Kirchenkritik, die Pädagogik oder das ökonomische Denken), reduziert sich der Blickwinkel teilweise auf die ‘wichtigsten’ europäischen Autoren, die sich zu diesen Themen geäußert haben.

Auf diese Weise konzentrieren sich Studien zum ökonomischen Denken der Aufklärung oftmals ausschließlich auf britische oder französische Autoren.³ Und hierbei wurde vor allem die Herausbildung der liberalen Wirtschaftstheorie im 18. Jahrhundert betont, welche frühere ökonomische Konzepte wie den staatspraktischen sogenannten Merkantilismus oder die landwirtschaftsbasierte Physiokratie abgelöst hätten. In Abstraktion vom gegebenen historischen Kontext werden die Schriften von Montesquieu, Hume, Turgot, Condillac oder Smith gemeinhin in eine auf die klassische liberale Wirtschaftstheorie des 19. Jahrhunderts zulaufende ideengeschichtliche Linie gestellt.⁴ Um derartige Teleologien zu vermeiden und die ökonomische Ideengeschichte in den sozio-politischen und kulturellen Kontext ihrer Entstehung zu stellen, müssen scheinbar „zweitrangige“ Texte zur ökonomischen Theorie mit in die Betrachtung einbezogen werden, wie dies bereits in einigen Studien erfolgreich unternommen wurde.⁵ Denn das ökonomische Denken der Aufklärungsepoche ist keineswegs auf einige Hauptfiguren aus Westeuropa reduzierbar.

Die ökonomischen Texte deutschsprachiger Aufklärer wurden in der Historiographie zur Ideengeschichte der Wirtschaft weitgehend ausgeblendet. Während das Bild einer unpolitischen, literarischen Öffentlichkeit im Deutschland des 18. Jahrhunderts von zahlreichen Studien widerlegt wurde, bleiben deutschsprachige Autoren meistens weiterhin aus der Thematisierung ökonomischer Aspekte der Aufklärung ausgeklammert.⁶

Zwar gibt es inzwischen zwei Zugänge zur Wirtschaftstheorie in der deutschen Aufklärung. Zum einen existieren einige Studien zur

sogenannten Volksaufklärung, die sich mit der Verbreitung des Wissens über wirtschaftliche und technische Verbesserungen für das tägliche Leben der unteren Gesellschaftsschichten befassen.⁷ Zum anderen wurden Forschungen zum Bereich des Literaturmarktes und der ökonomischen Semantik in der Romanliteratur unternommen.⁸ Doch eingehende Forschungen zum ökonomischen Denken in der deutschsprachigen Aufklärung fehlen bislang.

Der vorliegende Artikel ist ein Versuch, exemplarisch das ökonomischen Denken eines deutschsprachigen Aufklärers herauszuarbeiten und es im Kontext der im 18. Jahrhundert geführten wirtschaftstheoretischen Debatten im Spannungsfeld verschiedener theoretischer Ansätze zu verorten.

Es kann nicht verwundern, dass August-Ludwig Schlözer für sein ökonomisches Denken wenig bekannt ist. Und es hat sicher deutschsprachige Autoren gegeben, deren wissenschaftliches Arbeiten deutlicher und intensiver ökonomischen Themen gewidmet war als das des Linguisten, Historikers, Journalisten, Statistikers und Staatsrechtlers Schlözer.⁹ Doch war der Göttinger Professor in der deutschsprachigen Öffentlichkeit des 18. Jahrhunderts aufgrund seiner Vorlesungen und Publikationen sowie der Zeitschriften, die er herausgab, eine bedeutende Stimme zu Fragen des Staats- und Völkerrechts und politischer Theorie, welche ökonomische und wirtschaftstheoretische Themen miteinschlossen.

In der Forschung wurde Schlözers ökonomisches Denken den widersprüchlichsten Theorien zugeordnet: So findet man die Behauptung, Schlözer hätte seine ökonomische Theorie an Adam Smiths *Wealth of Nations* ausgerichtet,¹⁰ ebenso wie die Betonung seiner Verbundenheit mit dem Kameralismus.¹¹ Schlözer hat kein wirtschaftstheoretisches Werk geschrieben und hat auch keine eigene ökonomische Theorie entwickelt. Und dennoch sind ökonomische Themen ein zentraler Teil seines Werkes. Er war einer der Hauptvertreter der Göttinger Universitätsstatistik¹² und seine „statistischen“ und historischen Veröffentlichungen zu einzelnen Ländern befassten sich stets mit den ökonomischen Verhältnissen und deren Entwicklung. Auch in seinen Periodika behandelte und kommentierte er immer wieder ökonomische Themen.¹³ Darüber hinaus umfasst seine politische Theorie, welche niedergelegt ist in seinem Werk über *Allgemeines Stats-Recht und StatsVerfassungslere* von 1793, auch Wirtschaftstheorie. Die ausführlichste Darlegung ökonomischer Theorie findet sich jedoch in seiner Vorlesung zu Statistik, Politik und Ökonomie, die als Vorlesungsmitschrift von 1784 eines seiner ungarischen Studenten,

Ladislaus von Teleki, überliefert und bislang von der Forschung nicht berücksichtigt worden ist.¹⁴

In dieser Hinsicht ist Schlözer durchaus beispielhaft für die deutschsprachige Publizistik der Zeit, die insgesamt wenig explizit wirtschaftstheoretische Schriften und keinen herausragenden, international bekannten theoretischen Beitrag hervorgebracht hat. Dies darf aber keineswegs als fehlendes Interesse und fehlende Behandlung ökonomisch-theoretischer Fragestellungen gedeutet werden. Denn die deutschsprachige Öffentlichkeit setzte sich sehr wohl mit ökonomischer Theorie und Wirtschaftspolitik auseinander. Sie diskutierte und übernahm die Theorieansätze, die sich im 18. Jahrhundert gegenüberstanden und ihr eigener Beitrag ist nicht nur der Kameralismus als deutschsprachige Spielart des Merkantilismus. Vielmehr ist die ökonomische Debatte von einem empiristischen Anspruch geprägt, der theoretischen Systembildungen entgegenwirkte. Schlözer zumindest, so die Argumentation dieses Artikels, verwehrt sich bewusst der kontextunabhängigen Anwendung einer ökonomischen Theorie und konnte sich dabei auf einzelne empiristische Autoren beziehen. So wie er in der Geschichtsforschung ein System der historischen Entwicklung ablehnte, oder doch gegenüber der empirisch-kritischen Faktensuche zurückstellte, war ihm auch in ökonomischen Fragen nicht an einer Systembildung gelegen.¹⁵

Wie zu zeigen sein wird, lässt sich im ökonomischen Denken Schlözers ein theoretischer Ansatz aufzeigen, der von den klassischen Positionen (west-) europäischer ökonomischer Theorie des 18. Jahrhunderts abweicht. Er vertrat einen essentiell empiristischen, kontextbezogenen Standpunkt und verweigerte sich der spekulativen Suche nach allgemeingültigen ökonomischen Regeln. Die daraus resultierende mehrdeutige Haltung und die sich teilweise zu widersprechen scheinenden Standpunkte zu ökonomischen Fragen können jedoch nicht als Defizit seines wirtschaftstheoretischen Denkens abgetan werden, sondern werden im Kontext seines Geschichtsbegriffs und seiner politischen Theorie und als unabhängige und, wenn man so möchte, „pragmatische“ Position erkenntlich.

Diese Position soll im Folgenden anhand des im 18. Jahrhundert vieldiskutierten und umstrittenen ökonomischen Problems des Handels und seines Verhältnisses zum Staat veranschaulicht werden. Zunächst soll anhand von Schlözers historischem Ansatz geklärt werden, welche Auffassung dieser von theoretischen Zugängen zu wissenschaftlichen

Fragestellungen hatte (2.). Anschließend wird sein ökonomisches Denken näher betrachtet und zwar erstens hinsichtlich seines Systembegriffs (3.1). Dann wird sein ökonomisches Denken mit den zentralen ökonomischen Lehren des 18. Jahrhunderts ins Verhältnis gesetzt (3.2). In einem dritten Schritt wird seine Haltung zu ökonomischen Fragen anhand der im 18. Jahrhundert viel diskutierte Frage des freien Getreidehandels profiliert (3.3). Und schließlich soll erläutert werden, welche Konsequenzen sein theoriekritischer Ansatz für sein ökonomisches Denken insgesamt hatte (3.4).

2. Historisches Entwicklungskonzept

Martin Peters konnte zeigen, dass Schlözer als Historiker je nach Genre und Adressat unterschiedliche Zugänge zur Geschichte wählte.¹⁶ So bezog sich Schlözers historischer Systembegriff nicht auf den Inhalt der Geschichte, sondern auf die Betrachtungsweise des Historikers. Er wählte einen genuin relativistischen und damit aktuellen historiographischen Ansätzen näheren Zugang zur Geschichte: Für Schlözer hing es vom Untersuchungsinteresse des Geschichtsforschenden ab, welche Themen und Strukturierungen für die Geschichtsschreibung relevant waren. In der *Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie* beschreibt er den „Begriff der systematischen Weltgeschichte“ als das Unterfangen, „die Geschichte der Menschheit [...] in ihrer sukzessiven Entstehung, Veredlung und Verschlimmerung [...] im Zusammenhange durchzudenken“.¹⁷ Das System entstand somit aus der zusammenhängenden Betrachtung durch den Geschichtsforscher und war nicht aus einer inneren Entwicklung des Geschichtsprozesses auf einen bestimmten Telos hin begründbar. „Er beschrieb also die Universalhistorie als Prozeß von der in den Anlagen vorhandenen natürlichen Gleichheit zur vielfältigen Verschiedenheit aus den überlieferten Quellen, ohne Freiheit, Autonomie oder Humanität an ihr Ende zu setzen. Da die historische Entwicklung in Schlözers Geschichtsbild nicht auf ein bestimmtes Ende hin ausgerichtet war, war sie kein emanzipatorischer Prozeß.“¹⁸ Eine teleologische historische Entwicklung lehnte Schlözer ab, indem es neben der „Perfektibilität“ stets auch „Deteriorabilität“ in der Geschichte gebe. Entwicklung entstand Schlözer zufolge nicht nur aus dem Menschen selbst heraus, der zwar die Anlage zur „Veredlung“ in sich trage, ohne äußeren gesellschaftlichen und später staatlichen Zusammenhang jedoch auf der Stufe des Tieres

verharre.¹⁹ Vor der Entstehung der „bürgerlichen Gesellschaft“, wie Schlözer den vorstaatlichen sozialen Zusammenhang von Menschen nannte, gab es demnach keine zivilisatorische und damit historische Entwicklung.²⁰ Wenn sich eine Grundentwicklung in der quellenbasiert nachweisbaren Geschichte beobachten lasse, so war dies eine Zunahme an Komplexität. Die Entstehung zivilisatorischer Errungenschaften erwuchs dabei aus menschlichem Erfindungsgeist ebenso wie Zufällen. „Das ist einmal der Lauf der Welt: Kleinigkeiten: bloße Grillen der Menschen bringen oft die größten und ernsthaftesten Wirkungen hervor; die Welt wird mehr durch Thorheit und Capricen, als durch Weisheit und Syllogismen, regiert.“²¹ Menschliche Entdeckungen bedurften dabei eines gesellschaftlichen Rahmens, der diese nutzbar machen konnte. Indem für Schlözer in der Geschichte sowohl Fortschritt als auch Rückschritt vorherrschten, gab es keinen mit allgemeinem Fortschritt identifizierten gesamthistorischen Entwicklungsprozess.²² Ungleich schottischer und französischer Geschichtsmodelle, die dem historischen Prozess auf der gesellschaftlichen Wirtschaftsbasis fußende Stufeneinteilungen zugrundelegten²³, findet sich bei Schlözer demnach auch keine ökonomische Triebfeder der Geschichte. Er verwehrt sich ausdrücklich gegen geschichtsphilosophische Zugänge zur Geschichtsforschung. Beide wollte er klar getrennt wissen und maß der Geschichtsforschung durchaus die wichtigere Rolle bei.

Aber Facta brauchen wir, um jene ausgemachte Lehrsätze auf unser deutsches Vaterland anwenden zu können: u. um diese Facta zu sammeln u. zu beschreiben, braucht man kein Montesquieu, kein Hume, kein Stewart zu seyn, sondern nur ein guter fleißiger Man, der schreiben kan [...]. So ein Man, auch ohne alle andre Talente, wäre uns Deutschen mehr werth, als das größte Genie, das mit den feinsten u. neusten Theorien schwanger geht. Was helfen uns Theorien, wenn wir sie nicht anwenden können; u. wie kann man eine auch völlig richtige Theorie auf ein Land anwenden, dessen Grund u. Boden man nicht kent?²⁴

Diese Skepsis gegenüber Theoriebildung bezog sich nicht nur auf die Historie, sondern auch auf andere Bereiche im Denken Schlözers, wie schon an den zitierten Autoren erkenntlich wird.

3. Schlözers ökonomisches Denken

3.1. *System als Modus der Betrachtung*

Schlözers Systembegriff ist, wie am Beispiel seines Geschichtskonzepts gesehen, kein im Wesen der Sache begründeter Zusammenhang, sondern ein Modus der Betrachtung. Ein Schlüssel zum Verständnis seiner Bewertung des Handels ist ein Artikel zum Ostindienhandel in Dohms *Encyclopädischem Journal*.²⁵ In den ersten elf Paragraphen, in die der Text geteilt ist, legt Schlözer die historische Entwicklung des europäischen Handels mit und nach Asien dar, wobei an einigen Stellen seine Haltung etwa gegenüber den gesteigerten Luxusprodukten als volkswirtschaftlich nachteilig oder die Infragestellung des intrinsischen Zusammenhangs zwischen wirtschaftlichem Austausch und Wissensverbreitung, welcher ein fester Topos in Aufklärungsdiskursen darstellte, aufscheint.²⁶ Die Relativität jeden endgültigen Urteils wird dann aber in den folgenden Paragraphen deutlich. Der „berühmte *Ostindische Handel*“ heißt es, sei neben dem amerikanischen unstreitig „das vornehmste Triebrad in der großen Maschine aller heutigen Welthandelschaft: von dem aber der von Actien trunkene *Kaufmann*, der vaterländische *Politiker* dieses und jenes Staats, der kosmopolitische *Politiker*, und der philosophische *Historiker* ganz verschiedene und einander entgegen laufende Vorstellungen machen.“²⁷ Die ersten Beiden, von egoistischem Gewinnstreben geleitet, befürworteten den Handel mit Asien unumschränkt, sofern sie oder ihr Land von diesem profitiere. Der kosmopolitische Politiker erscheint in Schlözers Darstellung als ein von protestantischer Enthaltsamkeit geprägter Merkantilist, der die Entbehrlichkeit, Schädlichkeit, den schnellen Verfall der asiatischen Waren und demgegenüber den Verlust an wertvollem Silber beklagt. Diesem hält Schlözer die volkswirtschaftliche Sterilität der Anhäufung von Edelmetallen aufgrund des Wertverfalls entgegen. Es besteht kein Zweifel, dass Schlözers Sympathie dem Historiker galt, der ohne Werturteil über den Handel dessen Bedeutung für die Weltgeschichte hervorhebt: „Und wäre der Ostindische Handel [...] noch so entbehrlich, noch so schädlich: so ist er doch einmal da, er hat seit 300. Jahren gewaltige Revolutionen [...] angerichtet“²⁸.

Für Schlözer hängt es demnach vom jeweiligen sozio-ökonomischen Standpunkt des Betrachters ab, wie die Wirkungen des weltweiten Handels eingeschätzt und bewertet werden. Der einzig wissenschaftliche und damit von privaten oder nationalen Interessen unabhängige Standpunkt aber kommt dem universalgeschichtlich geschulten Historiker zu, der

die Bedeutung (ökonomischer) Entwicklungen an ihrer Relevanz für die gesamte Weltgeschichte und Menschheit misst.²⁹

3.2. Schlözer und die zentralen ökonomischen Lehren des 18. Jahrhunderts

Wirtschaftstheoretische Fragen wurden im 18. Jahrhundert zwischen merkantilistischen und physiokratischen Theoretikern, später auch liberalen, verhandelt. Ziel aller theoretischen Bemühungen war es zu ergründen, was den Wohlstand eines Landes ausmachte und steigerte. Verbunden mit dieser Fragestellung waren gleichzeitig auch Vorstellungen von Frieden, Zivilisierung und allgemeiner Angleichung der Lebensverhältnisse. Die Suche nach der richtigen Wirtschaftspolitik zur Steigerung des Wohlstands war also stets verbunden mit der Hoffnung auf äußeren und inneren Frieden und einer Fortentwicklung der kulturellen Errungenschaften.

In seiner Staatstheorie, die Schlözer im *Stats-Recht* und in der Vorlesung über Statistik, Politik und Ökonomie darlegte, lässt sich seine Auffassung über den Wohlstand eines Landes erkennen. Schlözers Staatsauffassung ist dem wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Ideal verpflichtet³⁰ und wendet sich damit auch gegen die Bestimmung der Politik durch rein wirtschaftliche Rationalität und die ökonomisierende Konzeption der Lebensverhältnisse wie sie mit den Theorien der Physiokraten aufkamen. Das Staatsziel teilte Schlözer in ein negatives (Sicherheit des vierfachen Eigentums: Person, Vermögen, Ehre, Religion) und ein positives (Volksglück). Letzteres ist nicht zu verstehen als das abstrakte und von absolutistischen Regierungen instrumentalisierbare „salus publica“, sondern wurde von Schlözer mit konkreten Inhalten belegt: Ein Volk war glücklicher „wenn es reich, zalreich, und aufgeklärt“ war.³¹ Eines der zentralen positiven Staatsziele war es somit, Wohlstand zu erzeugen. Diese Hinweise allein mögen für eine antilibérale und antiphiokratische Wirtschaftsauffassung sprechen, da die Verantwortung für nationalen Wohlstand in letzter Instanz beim Staat lag. Und doch liegen die Dinge komplizierter.

Einen Anhaltspunkt zur Verortung von Schlözers ökonomischem Standpunkt können die Theoretiker sein, auf die er in der Darlegung seiner Wirtschaftspolitik³² explizit Bezug nahm. Im Vergleich mit den gedruckten Werken Schlözers erweisen sich seine Vorlesungen als sehr ergiebig hinsichtlich der Nennung von Autoren, die er rezipierte. In seiner Politik-Vorlesung von 1784 nennt er in der allgemeinen Darlegung der

Wirtschaftspolitik zunächst James Steuarts *An Enquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*.³³ Die Wirtschaftspolitik teilte er in die drei Bereiche „Ökonomie-Politik“ (Landwirtschaft), „Manufaktur-Politik“ (Industrie) und „Handlungs-Politik“. Bei der Behandlung der Landwirtschaftspolitik zitierte er Turgot und wiederum Steuart, sowie Galiani und Necker³⁴, im Zusammenhang der Manufakturpolitik nennt er Joseph von Sonnenfels sowie Lutterloh und Heineccius³⁵, bei der Handelspolitik verweist er auf Jean-Francois Melon sowie Johann Georg Büsch und Isaac de Pinto.³⁶

Schlözer zitiert namentlich also überwiegend Merkantilisten, einen Physiokraten und keinerlei Freihandelsdenker, obgleich er deren Theorien kannte.³⁷ Und hinsichtlich bestimmter Themen nahm er selbstverständlich einen merkantilistischen Standpunkt ein. So befürwortete er beispielsweise die Aufrechterhaltung von Zünften.³⁸ Merkantilistische Theorien identifizierten den monetären Reichtum als den Wohlstand eines Landes. Kriterium für ein wohlhabendes Land war es daher, mehr Waren – und zwar bevorzugt weiterverarbeitete Produkte (also Manufakturwaren) – zu exportieren als zu importieren, um so den Vorrat an Geld und Edelmetallen zu steigern, was sich in einer positiven Handelsbilanz quantitativ ausdrückte.

Schlözer folgte in Vielem diesen merkantilistischen Sichtweisen auf den Handel. So stellte er in seiner Vorlesung etwa eine positive Außenhandelsbilanz als ökonomischen Vorteil für ein Land dar:

Alle diese Handlungen sind vorteilhaft, aber der Exporto Handel ist der vorteilhafteste.

Handlungs Bilanz. Wenn ein Land eben so viel Produkte des Andern kauft als das von diesem so sagt man die Handlungs Bilence zwischen diesen ist gleich. Heut zu Tag hat Frankreich und Engelland die Handlungs Bilence für sich.³⁹

Und bei Schlözer kam, wie bereits angedeutet, dem Staat in den nationalen Wirtschaftsaktivitäten durchaus eine zentrale Rolle zu. „So ist die Schuldigkeit des Staats den Bürgern den Weg zu zeigen[,] die Hindernisse wenns möglich ist aus dem Weg zu räumen und wo einer durch seine Industrie dem ganzen Gemeinwesen schädlich [ist], zu verhindern.“⁴⁰ Unter der Kategorie „Spezielle Handelspolitik“ führte Schlözer in seinen Vorlesungen deren Regeln unter anderem in Bezug auf das Werk *Traité de la circulation et du crédit* von Isaac Pinto an, in welchem dieser die

eminente Rolle des Staates für die Volkswirtschaft herausstrich und soweit ging, die Staatsverschuldung als wohlstandsfördernd zu deklarieren. Schlözer bezog sich nicht allein auf die zentrale Rolle des Staates für die Wirtschaftsaktivitäten des „Privatus“, die dieser im Wechsel- und Geldgeschäften, Handelsverträgen und Postwesen spielte, sondern betonte auch seine Funktion als Garantiehälter für private Wirtschaftsgeschäfte wie Banken, Versicherungen oder Kolonien.⁴¹ Allerdings, und damit wich er von der merkantilistischen Sichtweise ein deutliches Stück ab, waren die drei Wirtschaftszweige „gewinnen, verädeln, und vertauschen“ Sache des „Particuliers“. Und so wird bei genauer Betrachtung deutlich, dass er sich intensiv mit der Physiokratie auseinandersetzte, die er kritisch evaluierte, die aber nicht allein von merkantilistischen Standpunkten aus angegriffen wurde.

Wertschöpfung geschah Schlözer zufolge sowohl durch die landwirtschaftliche als auch die Industrieproduktion und den Handel. „Bei weitem der größte Teil jeder Nation lebt vom eigentlichen Erwerb (auch Veredler und Vertauscher rechne ich dazu).“⁴² Abweichend von der physiokratischen Lehre hielt er fest: Der Kaufmann „verschafft dem Absetzer, und Annehmer die nöthigen Sachen. In dieser Hinsicht ist er ein wahrer Produzent.“⁴³ Und in Schlözers *StatsRecht* heißt es „Diese 3 ErwerbArten sind PrivatGeschäfte des Bürgers; die Reginung leitet sie nur.“⁴⁴ Diese Leitungsfunktion des Staates sollte sich auf das Allernötigste reduzieren und besonders in den Handel sollte er nicht eingreifen: „Der Staat soll so wenig als möglich den Handel genieren und wenig sich einmischen.“⁴⁵

Spätestens an dieser Stelle zeigt sich, dass Schlözers ökonomisches Denken sich nicht auf eine Theorie reduzieren lässt. Neben merkantilistischen lassen sich auch deutliche Einflüsse der physiokratischen bzw. liberalen Theorien erkennen.

3.3. Die Debatte um freien Getreidehandel

Um Schlözers Haltung und seinen Bezugsrahmen besser profilieren zu können, bedarf es der Einordnung seiner Standpunkte in den ökonomischen Debattenzusammenhang seiner Zeit. Im Folgenden soll dies anhand der Freihandelsproblematik unternommen werden. Freihandel existierte im 18. Jahrhundert nicht. Es gab lediglich Versuche, freien bzw. freieren (d. h. mit geringeren Zöllen belegte Außen- oder auch Binnen-) Handel zu etablieren. Beispiele waren das Edikt von 1764

zum freien Kornhandel in Frankreich und der Eden-Rayneval-Vertrag zwischen Frankreich und England von 1786. Diese Versuche, Freihandel einzuführen, blieben jedoch zeitlich und meist auf bestimmte Waren begrenzt. Freihandelstheorien des 18. Jahrhunderts konnten sich somit auf keinerlei empirische Belege stützen. Dies ist ein zentraler Punkt, der bei der Untersuchung der ökonomischen Ideengeschichte der frühen Neuzeit nicht außer Acht gelassen werden darf und unter anderem die Skepsis gegenüber liberalen Wirtschaftstheorien erklären kann.

Die Frage, ob freier Handel Wohlstand fördere und inwieweit er der Bevölkerung eines Landes zugutekam oder die Beziehungen zwischen Ländern befrieden könne, wurde im 18. Jahrhundert mehrfach debattiert. Ein zentraler Punkt in der Debatte betraf den Getreidehandel, der besonders in Frankreich anlässlich des königlichen Ediktes von 1764 diskutiert wurde, welches zu einem gewissen Maße den Export von Getreide erlaubte. Das Edikt war auf den Einfluss physiokratischer Theorien zurückzuführen. Die Physiokraten oder *Économistes*, wie sie im 18. Jahrhundert genannt wurden, hielten dafür, dass der freie Handel auch und besonders mit Rohstoffen wie Getreide unabdingbar war, um den Produzenten auskömmliche Preise zu sichern und dass der Abbau von Handelsrestriktionen innerhalb eines Landes wie auch ein freier Export zum Wohlstand der Bevölkerung und damit des Landes führen würde. Diese Thesen waren zu dieser Zeit unerhört und stellten frühere Annahmen wirtschaftspolitischer Vernunft infrage. Die Physiokraten machten die natürlichen Ressourcen des Landes als seinen Wohlstand aus: Alle Wertschöpfung gehe allein auf Agrarerzeugung zurück⁴⁶, weshalb die Wirtschaftspolitik auf die Möglichkeiten der Steigerung derselben abzielen müsse. Die Voraussetzung hierfür sahen sie in der Ermöglichung der Existenzsicherung der Erzeuger. Eine auskömmliche Existenzsicherung sei aber nur über gerechte Preise zu erzielen und diese ließen sich allein in einem von Binnen- und Außenzöllen und staatlicher Intervention freien Handel garantieren. Dieser wirtschaftstheoretische Ansatz führt somit die Ökonomisierung der Lebensgrundlage der Bevölkerung ein und läutet damit den Abschied vom paternalistischen Wohlfahrtsstaat ein.⁴⁷ Kriterium für den Wohlstand eines Landes war demnach eine hohe Agrarproduktion zu angemessenen Preisen, was in letzter Instanz die (wenngleich nicht durch politische Maßnahmen künstlich hergestellte, sondern gewissermaßen 'natürliche') Autarkie des Landes fördere. Die Abwesenheit von Außenhandel in einer Nation galt als Zeichen für deren Wohlstand, da sie bedeutete, dass der Konsum im Inland alle Produktion

zu absorbieren vermochte.⁴⁸ Vertreter waren Autoren wie Turgot, Le Trosne, Lemercier de la Rivière u. a., die mit ihren Schriften auf das königliche Edikt von 1764 hingewirkt hatten.

Um das ökonomische Misskalkül hinter dem Edikt aufzuzeigen, schrieben nun viele Autoren Gegenschriften gegen die physiokratische Lehre. Unter anderem Merkantilisten wie Jean-François Melon erklärten – obgleich sie Exporten allgemein einen wichtigen Beitrag für die Nationalwirtschaft zumaßen –, der Staat müsse mithilfe von Zöllen und Handelsrestriktionen dafür Sorge tragen, dass in erster Linie manufakturierte Produkte das Land verließen, die Rohstoffe aber nach Möglichkeit im Land selbst konsumiert oder weiterverarbeitet würden. Dahinter stand die Vorstellung, dass ein Staat Interesse daran habe, die monetär höher bewerteten verarbeiteten Produkte im Ausland abzusetzen, während Rohstoffe auf dem Weltmarkt nur geringen Absatz böten, die Abhängigkeit von Rohstoffimporten darüber hinaus eine außenpolitisch problematische Position besonders in Kriegszeiten schaffe.

Die auf der physiokratischen Theorie aufbauende Freihandelstheorie, die ihren prägnantesten Ausdruck im 18. Jahrhundert im Werk Adam Smiths fand, verortete den Wohlstand eines Landes neben seiner Agrar- auch in seiner Industrieproduktion (d. h. vorwiegend Manufaktur-, aber zunehmend auch Fabrikproduktion). Dem Kriterium für den Wohlstand lag die Arbeitswerttheorie zugrunde. Die Steigerung des Wohlstands wurde demzufolge durch eine (auch internationale) Arbeitsteilung und damit effizientere Produktion hervorgebracht. Zur Sicherstellung einer profitablen Arbeitsteilung bedurfte es des freien Warenaustausches, vor allem und in erster Linie im Inland, aber zu einem gewissen Grade auch im Außenhandel. Freier Handel nicht nur mit Rohstoffen, sondern auch Manufakturwaren war daher oberstes Gebot. Der Außenhandel konnte und sollte besonders in Kriegszeiten jedoch durchaus staatlich kontrolliert werden und vor allem sollten private Akteure keine staatlichen Aufgaben im Außenhandel übernehmen.⁴⁹

Schlözer setzte sich intensiv mit der Debatte um die Ausfuhr von Getreide auseinander, wie u. a. an der ausführlichen Rezeption französischer Debattenbeiträge in seinem *Briefwechsel* erkennbar wird.⁵⁰ Man findet bei ihm hinsichtlich des Außenhandels, wie so häufig, widersprüchliche Aussagen. So heißt es an einer Stelle: „Man führe das Überflüssige aus. [...] Man bringe diesen Überfluß wenn möglich ist verarbeitet aus dem Lande. Die fremden Waaren bringe man ins

Land wenns möglich ist roher.“⁵¹ Eine derartige Aussage kann lediglich merkantilistischen Lehren zugeordnet werden und lässt vermuten, dass Schlözer durchaus von der Lektüre Steuards und Melons beeinflusst war. In Bezug auf den Getreidehandel folgt er dagegen zunächst physiokratischen Auffassungen:

Nicht der Staat sondern der Markt muß den Preiß der Frucht bestimmen, und dieß hängt von der *Concurrentz* der Käufer ab. Den allzu kleinen Preis der Naturalien zu verhindern [...] erlaube [man] nicht nur die Ausfuhr des Korns aus dem Lande sondern encourage vielmehr durch Prämien. Dieß hatten die Engelländer erst A[nn]o 1689 gewagt, sie versprochen Prämien denen[,] die Korn aus dem Lande ausführen würden, und seit darmal hörte die häufige Hungers-Noth in Engelland auf. Seit der Zeit hat man unzählige Schriften hierrüber, und izt ist es erwiesen daß nichts dümmers als die Korns-Sperre ist.⁵²

Schlözer hat demnach auch physiokratische Theorien nicht nur zur Kenntnis genommen, sondern dort, wo sie mit den von ihm hochgehaltenen historischen oder zeitgenössischen Fakten übereinstimmten, übernommen.

Und hier liegt denn auch der Schlüssel zum Verständnis von Schlözers Position. Abgesehen von der bloß numerischen Zitierung einzelner Autoren, bei der, wie gesehen, merkantilistische Schriften deutlich überwogen, lässt sich die Qualifizierung der Referenzen untersuchen. In seiner Vorlesung zitiert Schlözer nämlich zwei Schriften, die er mit der Bezeichnung „gute Bücher“ versieht (ein Etikett, das er in seiner Vorlesung keiner anderen Publikation gibt): *Dialogue sur le commerce des blés* vom Abbé Galiani und Neckers *Compte-rendu au Roi*. Beide Bücher sind Beispiele einer Argumentation, die sich der klaren Zuordnung zu einer ökonomischen „Schule“ entzieht. Galianis im unterhaltsamen Dialogstyl verfassten Schrift lag die zentrale Argumentation zugrunde, dass sich nicht von den konkreten politischen, ökonomischen, sozialen und kulturellen Eigenschaften eines Landes abstrahieren und Lösungen für ökonomische Probleme nicht von einem auf das andere Land übertragen ließen. Galiani weist ein System, das unabhängig von den spezifischen Bedingungen eines Landes allgemein gelten könne, zurück. Statt von konkreten Beispielen zu abstrahieren und allgemeine wirtschaftspolitische Ideen zu entwickeln, betont er die Erfahrungen aus den jeweiligen Umständen als Richtlinie für politische Maßnahmen. Neckers Schrift ihrerseits behandelte schon

aufgrund ihres Charakters eines Berichts an den König die konkrete finanzielle Situation im damaligen Frankreich. Die Debatte um den *Compte rendu au roi* von Necker, der gefordert hatte die französischen Staatsfinanzen zum Zwecke der Vertrauensbildung bei ausländischen Aktionären und Investoren offenzulegen, fand ihren Niederschlag ebenfalls in Rezensionen in den *Stats-Anzeigen*, welche ausnehmend positiv, ja, als Verteidigungen Neckers, ausfielen⁵³, denn die Offenlegung bis ins 18. Jahrhundert als Arkanum angesehener Informationen über Staatsfinanzen war eine der zentralen Forderungen des Aufklärers Schlözer, wodurch er bisweilen mit der Obrigkeit in Konflikt geriet.⁵⁴

Abgesehen von den schematischen Debattenpositionen zwischen Merkantilismus und Physiokratie wurde bei genauerer Betrachtung die Diskussion also auch in Frankreich differenzierter geführt. Deborah Cohen konnte zeigen, dass die Gegner der Physiokraten in der Debatte um den Getreidehandel insbesondere die Missachtung des Willens der Bevölkerung und der empirischen Fakten durch die Physiokraten anprangerten. Figuren wie der Abbé de Mably und der Abbé Galiani kritisierten die Abstraktion der Theorie von den gegebenen Umständen und die Enthistorisierung des wirtschaftspolitischen Systems.⁵⁵ Es stellte sich ihnen also nicht so sehr die Frage, welche Wirtschaftspolitik für den Wohlstand eines Landes die richtige sei, sondern welche Wirtschaftspolitik in welcher *Zeit* und unter welchen *Umständen* die richtige sei. Um dies zu entscheiden müssten die konkreten Gegebenheiten und Auswirkungen beachtet werden. Während die Physiokraten von den lokalen Auswirkungen in Form von Hungersnöten abstrahierten und an der generellen und auf lange Sicht sich erweisenden Richtigkeit ihrer Theorie festhielten, insistierte ihre Gegner in der Debatte darauf, dass eine aktuell und konkret hungernde Bevölkerung nicht zur Aufrechterhaltung eines theoretischen Systems bagatellisiert werden könne. Es sei, so Mably, zu wünschen, dass die *Économistes* Recht hätten und die Richtigkeit einer politischen Theorie einwandfrei aufgezeigt werden könne. Dann aber bedürfe es keinerlei Despotismus, d.h. dem von den Physiokraten vorgeschlagenen politischen Machzentrum, zur Durchsetzung der „richtigen“ Wirtschaftspolitik, im Zweifelsfall auch gegen den Willen der Bevölkerung. Denn in diesem Fall würde jeder die richtigen Lösungen ohne Zwang anerkennen. Doch die politische Wahrheit ließe sich nicht zweifelsfrei und allgemeingültig festlegen.⁵⁶

Schlözer nun fasste die Aussagen der Werke von Necker und Galiani folgendermaßen zusammen:

Aus diesen Schriften sind folgende Sätze: [1.] Man lasse dem Korn Handel freyen Lauf. Die Concurrentz der Kaufleute, wird schon dafür sorgen daß der Preis des Kornes fallen wird. 2. In dem Falle wenn die Einwohner den Handel gar nicht verstehen hingegen der Nachbar zu sehr darin bewandert ist, dann ist am besten von der Seite des Nachbars eine Korn-Sperre machen [...].⁵⁷

Zwar sind die von Schlözer vorgebrachten Annahmen eine recht eigenwillige Zusammenfassung der Argumente dieser Bücher, doch wird deutlich, dass beide Autoren sich dagegen aussprechen, freien Getreidehandel zu einer allgemeinen Regel für die Wirtschaftspolitik aller Länder und aller Zeiten zu machen.

Schlözer übernahm keineswegs alle Argumente der empiristischen (oder auch „sensualistischen“⁵⁸) Opposition der Physiokraten und unterschied sich von ihnen nicht zuletzt in seiner politischen Theorie deutlich. Doch Galianis „gutes Buch“ beinhaltet dieselben Forderungen, die auch Schlözer als Historiker und Statistiker aufstellte: Es ging ihm stets um die korrekte Wiedergabe von Fakten, dokumentierten Quellen, zuverlässigen Informationen und konkreten Beispielen. Es läuft auf das oben zitierte „Was helfen Theorien, wenn wir sie nicht anwenden können?“ hinaus.

3.4. Theorieskepsis

Wenngleich Schlözer also verschiedene ökonomische Positionen, darunter selbst liberale vertrat, erklärte er keine von ihnen zur allgemeinen Regel. Er rezipierte nachweislich auch Adam Smith, wie aus seiner Vorrede zur *Weltgeschichte für Kinder* hervorgeht, in welcher er aber neben Smith bezeichnenderweise in einem Atemzug auch James Steuart und Antonio Genovesi nannte.⁵⁹ Dieser besondere Zugang zur Wirtschaftspolitik, der nicht über ein theoretisches Gesamtsystem lief, sondern sich je nach Situation verschiedener Theorien bediente, lässt sich auch in seinen Zeitschriften verfolgen. So druckte Schlözer 1783 in seinen *Stats-Anzeigen* etwa den Artikel eines Hamburger Kaufmannes ab, der alle Argumente Adam Smiths ins Feld führt und explizit auf den britischen Politiker und Liberalen Lord Shelburne Bezug nahm. Da er in seinen Zeitschriften und Vorlesungen Smiths Theorie nie explizit besprach, kann dieser Artikel Aufschluss geben über seine Haltung zur liberalen Wirtschaftstheorie. Zunächst ist festzuhalten, dass Schlözer dieses sehr

lange und leidenschaftliche Plädoyer für Freihandel in den *Stats-Anzeigen* abdruckte und folglich dieser ökonomischen Position eine Stimme gab. Doch von Zeit zu Zeit streute er in seinen Fußnoten Kommentare ein, die seine Skepsis gegenüber der Theorie ausdrücken. So heißt es an einer Stelle:

Uneingeschränkte Handelsfreiheit (*libertas mercandi*), ist ein eben so auffallend widersinniges Ding, wie uneingeschränkte Freiheit zu handeln überhaupt (*libertas agendi*). Beide sind möglich, wenn in jenem Falle alle Kaufleute, in diesem alle Menschen, 1. hochehrwürdig, 2. grundehrlich, sind. Im erstern Falle ist keine HandelsEinschränkung, im letztern gar keine Regierung nötig.⁶⁰

Hier findet sich dieselbe Kritik am einseitigen Wahrheitsverständnis und Glauben in die Konsensfähigkeit einer umfassenden Theorie, wie sie auch Mably ausgedrückt hatte. Auch Schlözers Kritik an den Lehren der Physiokratie richtete sich besonders gegen deren Theorielastigkeit und fehlende Faktentreue, wie die Anmerkung zu einem Auszug aus einem Werk Lamervilles über Sully und Colbert in den *StatsAnzeigen* erhellt: „Aber viele *Facta* in diesem Aufsätze sind, wie viele andere im ganzen Buche, aus den KlagLiedern der Oekonomisten [Physiokraten] genommen, und teils noch immer unerwiesen, teils von dem Hrn Austrasier [Christian Friedrich Pfeffel⁶¹] längst widerlegt.“⁶² Schlözer betonte, dass die Überzeugungskraft einer Theorie nicht nur vom historischen Kontext, sondern, wie bereits in seinem Artikel zum Ostindienhandel gesehen, oft auch von der sozio-ökonomischen Situation oder den Interessen einer Person abhinge. Dies machte er etwa deutlich an der Uneinigkeit zwischen Kaufleuten und Wirtschaftspolitikern. Denn die Interessen eines Kaufmannes stimmten nicht in jedem Falle mit denen der Gesamtbevölkerung überein:

Die Hrn. Holzhändler in *Amsterdam* handelten völlig nach der CommerzWissenschaft, da sie den Feinden ihrer Alliierten Holz und Hanf aus der OstSee zuführten, und mit den Rebellen ihrer Alliierten *sub rosa* einen Tractat schlossen: denn auf beiderlei Weise war ein herrlicher Schmus zu machen. Aber die CommerzPolitik des FürstStatthalters in □s *Gravenhag* [*Den Haag*] sagte: Laßt das bleiben! Was euch par Dutzend HolzHändlern erträglich ist, kann ein par Millionen andern ehrlichen Holländern Schaden bringen; und sollen 2 Millionen Holländer, für 24 Holzhändler in Amsterdam, SündenBöcke werden?⁶³

Für Schlözer führte demnach das Eigeninteresse des Einzelnen nicht zwangsläufig zum Wohl der Gemeinschaft.⁶⁴ Aus diesem Grund legte er seine Hoffnung in eine aufgeklärte und kontrollierte, d. h. geteilte Regierung. Politik (Staat) müsse stets die Kontrolle (Aufsicht) über die ökonomischen Zusammenhänge behalten, den ökonomischen Aktivitäten der Individuen aber so viel Freiheit wie möglich gewähren und ausschließlich eingreifen, wenn – wie im obengenannten Beispiel gesehen – das Verhalten Einzelner die Gesamtheit gefährde. Diese Reduzierung staatlicher Eingriffe ist vor allem seiner kritischen Haltung gegenüber den Herrschenden geschuldet, deren Fehlverhalten er unermüdlich in seinen Zeitschriften öffentlich machte und damit zu kontrollieren hoffte. Seine Aufgabe als Aufklärer sah er besonders darin, die Obrigkeit im Staat als Menschen wie alle anderen kenntlich zu machen, mit eigenen Rechten, aber auch mit Pflichten und wie alle Menschen als fehlbar.

Die allgemeine Klage freilich der CommerzPraktiker ist: die Hern. CommerzPolitiker verstehn das Ding nicht. Und die allgemeine Klage der letzten ist: die Hrn CommerzPraktiker verschlagen nur für sich und ihren PrivatNutzen, sollte auch das ganze übrige Volk zu Grunde gehen. Wer nun von beiden Recht hat – oder ob alle beide Recht haben? - möchte in vielen Fällen schwer zu entscheiden seyn.⁶⁵

Dem Staat kam eine Regulierungsfunktion der privaten ökonomischen Aktivitäten zum Zwecke des Gemeinwohls zu. Der Primat des Staates ist, ob der Fehlbarkeit der Herrscher, der Komplexität ökonomischer Sachverhalte und der historischen und kulturellen Relativität der Problemlösung, aber an die Bedingung der Kontrolle der Regierung, d. h. der Gewaltenteilung, geknüpft.⁶⁶

Bernd Warlich formulierte als Defizit von Schözers politischer Theorie, dass die Normen des Naturrechts der staatlichen Wirklichkeit aufgeopfert würden.⁶⁷ Doch dessen gesamter Ansatz besteht gerade darin, die staatliche Wirklichkeit zu erfassen und systematisch darzustellen und nicht eine von der konkreten staatlichen Realität abstrahierende Theorie zu entwickeln. So formulierte Schlözer zwar Völkerrecht sei Naturrecht, doch bedeutet das in letzter Konsequenz, dass es, außer dort, wo positive Verträge vorhanden waren, im Grunde kein Völkerrecht gebe. Dies wird deutlich in seiner Darstellung des Seehandelsrechts. Es gebe, heißt es in einem Appendix zu seiner Politikvorlesung kein allgemeines Völkerrecht⁶⁸ und

daher auch „kein Sehandl.Recht in philosoph. Bedeutung, aus allgemein Natur Prinzipien: sondern nur historisch. Und die Historie lehrt daß die Na[tio]nen hier im[m]er contradictorisch verhalten haben.“⁶⁹ Es lassen sich naturrechtlich nur wenige allgemeine Regeln aufstellen⁷⁰, letztendlich seien Staaten aber durch nichts an diese Regeln gebunden. Schlözers Darlegung des Seehandelsrechts ist denn auch eine Aneinanderreihung historischer und aktueller Beispiele aus der Seehandelspraxis, die häufig selbst den eigenen Normen der Staaten widersprach. Diese Sammlung seehandelspraktischer Beispiele als Mangel und verfehlte Theoriebildung auszulegen, hieße, den Kern des Schlözerschen wissenschaftlichen Zugangs zu verfehlen. Ganz bewusst zitierte Schlözer in seiner Darlegung des Seehandelsrechts ausschließlich – und nur deutschsprachige – Autoren, die mit der Handelspraxis eng vertraut waren und deren Werk auf praktische Anwendbarkeit ausgelegt war.⁷¹ Denn die Notwendigkeit der ausführlichsten Theorie lasse sich in Zweifel ziehen, wenn sie mit den Fakten nicht übereinstimme.

4. Schlussbetrachtungen

Diese theorieskeptische Haltung Schlözers führte also dazu, dass sich für ihn aus dem Handel innerhalb oder zwischen Staaten keine allgemeinen politischen Schlüsse ziehen ließen. So sei Handel nicht in allen Fällen wohlstandsfördernd, noch sei er friedensstiftend oder ausgleichend und zivilisierend, wie dies besonders in den öffentlichen Debatten im frühen 19. Jahrhundert verstärkt behauptet wurde. Im 18. Jahrhundert lässt sich zwar der Topos des *doux commerce* finden, namentlich bei Autoren wie Montesquieu, Hume, Raynal oder Smith. Doch wird diese Vorstellung nicht in vergleichbarer Weise verabsolutiert wie im 19. Jahrhundert und die negativen Auswirkungen des Handels wurden von den Autoren der Aufklärung durchaus mitbedacht.⁷² Was Schlözers Zugang auszeichnete, war die grundlegende Relativität jedweden Urteils, d. h. dessen Abhängigkeit vom historischen, geographischen und politisch-sozialen Kontext. Die Frage, welchen Einfluss die wichtigen westeuropäischen Theorien auf einen Autor wie Schlözer ausgeübt haben, ist demnach letztlich falsch gestellt. Erstens lehnte er die Allgemeingültigkeit jeder Theorie grundsätzlich ab und zweitens berief er sich auf empiristische Autoren aus Frankreich und den Niederlanden (Galiani, Pinto) sowie auf (hauptsächlich deutsche) praxisnahe Persönlichkeiten (Büsch, Mertens,

Necker). Es handelt sich bei Schlözer also nicht um das Verfehlen einer systematischen Wirtschaftstheorie, sondern um die bewusste Ablehnung allgemeingültiger Lösungskonzepte. Dies bedeutete keineswegs, sich jedweden Urteils über wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen zu enthalten, was aus seinen klaren Positionen etwa zu Zöllen, zur Handelssperre für Getreide oder zu Monopolen hervorgeht. Doch ist seine Behandlung ökonomischer Fragestellungen in weiten Teilen eine Darstellung einzelner Themenfelder und bestimmter Positionen, die er sowohl merkantilistischen, physiokratischen oder liberalen Theorien entnahm. Erkenntlich bleibt dabei stets die Sorge um die Interessen auch der ländlichen Bevölkerung, welche dem harschen Kritiker der Leibeigenschaft Schlözer ein besonderes Anliegen war,⁷³ sowie um das Gemeinwohl, das er durch die Obergewalt des Staates über die ökonomischen Aktivitäten der Bevölkerung garantiert wissen wollte. Dies gilt in besonderem Maße für die Nahrungsmittelerzeugung: „Über alles Nahrungs-Wesen führt der Staat von Weitem die Obergewalt.“⁷⁴ Die Betonung liegt hier auf „von Weitem“, denn: „Der Ackerbau in einem Lande ist den Privat Leuten ganz zu überlassen, der Staat muß aber die Aufsicht darüber haben.“⁷⁵ Es lässt sich daher nicht aufrechterhalten, Schlözer habe nur in Krisenzeiten private Aktivitäten und die Risikobereitschaft einzelner befürwortet.⁷⁶

In Anbetracht der Komplexität wirtschaftlicher Zusammenhänge in einem Staat behauptet Schlözer zwar nicht (wie andere, z. B. Mably⁷⁷), wissenschaftliche Kenntnisse über ökonomische Fragen seien unmöglich, doch er warnt die Beamten im Staat davor, unbedacht eine allgemeine Theorie zu übernehmen und anzuwenden, sondern rät dazu, jeden Fall neu zu prüfen und zu entscheiden. Aus diesem Grund sei es besonders wichtig, dass eine verbindliche Wirtschaftswissenschaft (oder Industriewissenschaft, wie er es formulierte) mit verschiedenen Unterdisziplinen entstünde. Schließlich war Schlözer selbst einer der ersten, die an einer deutschen Universität Wirtschaft lehrten und unter seinen Studenten befanden sich einige Vertreter der späteren preußischen Verwaltungselite (Hardenberg, Freiherr vom Stein u. a.).⁷⁸ In dieser Hinsicht pflegte Schlözer letztlich ein emphatisches Verständnis von Aufklärung und vielleicht einen naiven Glauben in die menschliche Vernunft, die sich nicht an Theoriegerüsten, sondern an der empirischen Beobachtung schulen sollte.

Es erweist sich somit nicht als Mangel der deutschsprachigen Aufklärung, keine eigenständige ökonomische Theorie entworfen zu haben, sondern ist zumindest im Falle Schlözers Ausdruck einer kritisch-empiristischen Haltung gegenüber wirtschaftspolitischen Lösungsansätzen.

Für Schlözer musste ein ökonomisches Problem wie jede Fragestellung – sei sie politisch, sozial oder kulturell – in ihrem konkreten Kontext verstanden werden. Und keinerlei Theorie führe zu Wohlstand, Wachstum und Ausgleich unabhängig von der historischen, politischen, ökonomischen, technischen, sozialen, kulturellen, klimatischen Situation eines Landes. Schlözers Ansatz drückt, wenn man so möchte, einen grundsätzlich antiideologischen Standpunkt aus. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt ist es von Interesse, die ökonomischen Texte und Debatten des 18. Jahrhunderts neu zu lesen und spätere Interpretationen, welche diese frühen Diskussionen als überholt ansahen, zu hinterfragen.

NOTES

- ¹ Vgl. LÜSEBRINK, H.-J. (Hg.), *Das Europa der Aufklärung und die außereuropäische koloniale Welt*, Wallstein Verlag, Göttingen, 2006. Für eine kritische Neusichtung der jüngeren Forschung zu den globalen Aspekten der Aufklärung vgl. CONRAD, S., „Enlightenment in Global History. A Historiographical Critique“, in *The American Historical Review*, 117.4, 2014, S. 999–1027.
- ² Zu den globalen Aspekten des 18. Jahrhunderts vgl. NUSSBAUM, F., *The Global Eighteenth Century*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2003 und ROTHSCILD, E., „Globalization and the Return of History“, in *Foreign Policy*, 115, 1999, 106–116.
- ³ Dies trifft selbst für deutschsprachige Studien zu, vgl. bspw. KOPP, T., *Die Entdeckung der Nationalökonomie in der schottischen Aufklärung*, St. Gallen Universität (Dissertation) 1995 oder BROUWER, M., *Private vices, public benefits. Eine wirtschaftsphilosophische Untersuchung der Debatte über den Konflikt von privaten Interessen und öffentlichen Vorteilen im Vorfeld und während der englischen und schottischen Aufklärung*, Schellenberg, Winterthur 1997. Als lobenswerte Ausnahme, die gleichwohl die Bedeutung der schottischen und französischen Aufklärung betont, vgl. ASBACH, O. (Hg.), *Der moderne Staat und 'le doux commerce'. Politik, Ökonomie und internationale Beziehungen im politischen Denken der Aufklärung*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2014.
- ⁴ Vgl. SAKAMOTO, T./ TANAKA, H. (Hg.), *The Rise of political economy in the Scottish Enlightenment*, Routledge, London 2003; BERRY, C. J., *The Idea of commercial society in the Scottish Enlightenment*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2013.
- ⁵ Vgl. bspw. CHENEY, P., *Revolutionary Commerce. Globalization and the French Monarchy*, Havard University Press, Cambridge, 2010.
- ⁶ Es lässt sich jedoch ein wachsendes Interesse am deutschen Kameralismus feststellen, nicht zuletzt in der anglo-amerikanischen Forschung. Vgl. bspw. KURZ, H. D. (Hg.), *The dissemination of economic ideas*, Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011; RÖSSNER, P. (Hg.), *Economic growth and the origins of modern political economy. Economic reasons of state 1500-2000*, Routledge, London, 2016 oder SMALL, A. W., *The Cameralists. The pioneers of German social polity*, Batoche, Kitchener, 2001.
- ⁷ Vgl. bspw. SCHMITT, H. (Hg.): *Die Entdeckung von Volk, Erziehung und Ökonomie im europäischen Netzwerk der Aufklärung*, Édition Lumière, Bremen, 2011 oder HERGES, C., *Aufklärung durch Preisausschreiben? Die ökonomischen Preisfragen der Königlichen Societät der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen 1752–1852*, Verlag für Regionalgeschichte, Bielefeld, 2007.
- ⁸ Vgl. NIEBERLE, S./ NITSCHKE, C. (Hg.): *Gastlichkeit und Ökonomie. Wirtschaften im deutschen und englischen Drama des 18. Jahrhunderts*, De

Gruyter, Berlin/Boston, 2014 oder HEMPEL, D. (Hg.): „Denn wovon lebt der Mensch?“ *Literatur und Wirtschaft*, Lang, Frankfurt a. M., 2009.

⁹ Zu denken wäre etwa an den Kameralisten Johann Friedrich von Pfeiffer (1718-1787), den Physiokraten Johann August Schlettwein (1731-1802) oder den Arzt und Ökonom Johann Reimarus (1729-1814).

¹⁰ Vgl. HENNIES, W., *Die politische Theorie August Ludwig von Schlözers zwischen Aufklärung und Liberalismus*, tuduv-Verlagsgesellschaft, München, 1985, S. 258.

¹¹ Vgl. GARNER, G.: „Politische Ökonomie und Statistik an der Universität Göttingen 1760-1820“, in: BÖDEKER, H. E./ BÖTTGEN, P./ ESPAGNE, M. (Hg.): *Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen in Göttingen um 1800*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2008, S. 371-390, hier S. 383.

¹² Zur Universitätsstatistik in Göttingen vgl. KAUFHOLD, K. H./ SACHSE, W., „Die Göttinger ‘Universitätsstatistik’ und ihre Bedeutung für die Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte“, in: HERRLITZ, H.-G./ KERN, H. (Hg.), *Anfänge Göttinger Sozialwissenschaft. Methoden, Inhalte und soziale Prozesse im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1987, S. 72-95.

¹³ Schlözer brachte von 1776 bis 1782 den *Briefwechsel meist historischen und politischen Inhalts* und von 1792 bis 1793 die *Stats-Anzeigen* heraus.

¹⁴ SCHLÖZER, A. L. „*Statistik, Politik, Oeconomie*“, 1784, unveröffentlichte Vorlesungsmitschrift von Ladislaus Teleki, 1 r - 203 v, Bibliothek der ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Budapest, Signatur Jögt. Alt. 4° 2. Ladislaus (László) Teleki von Szék (1764-1821) war der Sohn von Graf Joseph (József) Teleki und Bruder von Stephan (István) Teleki. 1784 studierte er gemeinsam mit Letzterem in Göttingen u. a. bei Schlözer.

¹⁵ Vgl. zum historiographischen Ansatz Schlözers PETERS, M., *Altes Reich und Europa. Der Historiker, Statistiker und Publizist August Ludwig (v.) Schlözer 1735-1809*, LIT Verlag, Münster, 2005, Kap. VI, S. 159-206, hier S. 107.

¹⁶ Vgl. ebd., S. 159-206.

¹⁷ Vgl. SCHLÖZER, A. L., *Vorstellung seiner Universal-Historie*, Dieterich, Göttingen/Gotha, Bd. 1, S. 1-2.

¹⁸ PETERS, *Altes Reich und Europa* (wie Anm.15), S. 191.

¹⁹ Vgl. SCHLÖZER, *Universal-Historie* (wie Anm.17), S. 6.

²⁰ Vgl. SCHLÖZER, A. L., *Vorbereitung zur Weltgeschichte für Kinder*, Vandenhoeck, Göttingen, 1779, S. 66-79.

²¹ SCHLÖZER, A. L., „Ueber den Ostindischen Handel“, *Encyclopädisches Journal*, Bd. 1, 1774, S. 481-496. [Erstabdruck, in: Göttingische Gemeinnützige Abhandlungen, St. 67 und 68, Göttingen, den 10. Juli 1773, S. 529-540. Schlözer datierte den Aufsatz auf den 5. Juli 1773.], S. 494.

²² Vgl. PETERS, *Altes Reich und Europa* (wie Anm. 15), S. 181. Bernd Wahrlich dagegen interpretierte Schlözers Auffassung vom Prozess der Menschheitsgeschichte in einer Bewegung von Fort- und Rückschritten, die

aber insgesamt einen Fortschritt erkennen lasse; vgl. WARLICH, B., *Schlözer zwischen Reform und Revolution* (Diss. Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg 1972), S. 122-129. Dies lässt sich aber m. E. in Schlözers historiographischen Schriften nicht nachweisen.

- 23 Vgl. hierzu den nach wie vor grundlegenden Artikel von MEEK, R., „Smith, Turgot, and the ‘Four Stages’ Theory“, in *History of Political Economy*, H. 3.1, 1971, 9–27 sowie MAROUBY, C.: *L’économie de la nature. Essai sur Adam Smith et l’anthropologie de la croissance*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2004.
- 24 Schlözer-Nachlass in der Niedersächsischen Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen: Cod. Ms. A.L.Schlözer I,2:6 [zitiert nach PETERS, *Altes Reich und Europa* (wie Anm.15), S. 187, Anm. 831].
- 25 SCHLÖZER, Ueber den Ostindischen Handel (wie Anm.21).
- 26 Vgl. ebd. S. 484 u. 486.
- 27 Vgl. ebd., S. 492 [Herv. im Orig.].
- 28 Ebd., S. 494.
- 29 Vgl. auch SCHLÖZER, *Universal-Historie* (wie Anm.17), S. 3.
- 30 Vgl. MÜLLER, V., *Staatstätigkeit in den Staatstheorien des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1990, S. 130.
- 31 SCHLÖZER, A. L., *Allgemeines StatsRecht und StatsVerfassungsLere*, Vandehoek & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1793, S. 18-19.
- 32 Schlözer nennt die Wirtschaftspolitik „Industriepolitik“ im Sinne des lateinischen Ursprungs „Betriebsamkeit“ oder wie Schlözer sich ausdrückte „Erwerb“ und damit als übergeordneten Terminus.
- 33 Vgl. Schlözer, *Statistik, Politik, Oeconomie* (wie Anm. 14), S. 103 r.
- 34 Vgl. ebd., S. 106 r u. 111 r.
- 35 Vgl. ebd., S. 116 r/v u. 117 r. LUTTERLOH, Otto *Diss. de statutis collegiorum opificum*, Göttingen, 1759; HEINECCIUS, Johann Gottlieb, *Diss. de corporibus et collegiis opificum*, Halle 1723. Beide Werke behandelten die rechtlichen Grundlagen des Zunftwesens.
- 36 Vgl. Schlözer, *Statistik, Politik, Oeconomie* (wie Anm. 14), S. 118 v u. 121 v.
- 37 Er hat Montesquieu intensiv rezipiert und auch Smiths und Humes Schriften waren im bekannt.
- 38 Vgl. SCHLÖZER, *Statistik, Politik, Oeconomie* (wie Anm.14), S. 117 v.
- 39 Ebd., S. 120 r.
- 40 Ebd., S. 104 r.
- 41 Vgl. ebd., 121 r.
- 42 SCHLÖZER, *StatsRecht* (wie Anm. 31), S. 19, Anm. 11.
- 43 SCHLÖZER, *Statistik, Politik, Oeconomie* (wie Anm.14), S. 119 v.
- 44 SCHLÖZER, *StatsRecht* (wie Anm.31), S. 19.
- 45 SCHLÖZER, *Statistik, Politik, Oeconomie* (wie Anm.14), S. 119v.

- 46 „[L]es richesses naissent & renaissent continuellement de la terre, & ne
puissent naître que de là“ ; vgl. MIRABEAU, V. Riqueti Marquis de,
Philosophie rurale ou économie générale et politique de l'agriculture,
Libraires associés, [Amsterdam], 1763, S. 8.
- 47 Vgl. LARRÈRE, C., L'invention de l'économie. Du droit naturel à la
physiocratie, PUF, Paris, 1992, S. 220 ff.
- 48 „[L]e commerce extérieur [...] suppose toujours qu'une nation manque au-
dedans d'un nombre suffisant de consommateurs en état de mettre un bon
prix à ses productions“, vgl. LE MERCIER DE RIVIÈRE, P.-P., *L'ordre naturel
et essentiel des sociétés politiques*, Jean Nourse, London, 1767 [Ausgabe in
1 Band], Kap. 37, S. 350.
- 49 Vgl. SMITH, A., *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations* [1776], herausgg. von Edwin Cannan, 2 Bde. Methuen, London
1904, Buch IV.
- 50 Vgl. etwa „Umständliche Anzeige aller über den Kornhandel neuerlich
herausgekommenen französischen Schriften“, in *Briefwechsel meist
historischen und politischen Inhalts*, Bd. 1, H. 2, 1776, S. 125-128.
- 51 SCHLÖZER, *Statistik, Politik, Oeconomie* (wie Anm.14), S. 120r.
- 52 Ebd., S. 110 r-111 r.
- 53 Pfeffel, C. F., „Anleitung zum Verständnis des Compte Rendu und der
Administration des Finances von Hrn. Necker“, in *Stats-Anzeigen*, Bd. 11,
1787, S. 129-156; „Briefe aus Versailles vom Febr. 1789. Zur Erläuterung
der StatsKunde von Frankreich“, in *StatsAnzeigen*, Bd. 13, 1789, S. 133-163.
Der Autor reagiert auf Vorwürfe des *Politischen Journals* vom Dez. 1787,
S. 1241.
- 54 Vgl. BÖDEKER, H. E., „‘Ein Schriftsteller ... ist ein unberufener, unbesoldeter
Diener der Bürgerlichen Gesellschaft.’ Zum aufklärerischen Engagement
August Ludwig Schlözers 1735-1809“, in *Photoin. Mitteilungen der
Lichtenber-Gesellschaft*, H. 11/12, 1987, S. 3-18.
- 55 COHEN, D.: „Le débat sur le commerce du blé 1768-1775. Formes et
porteurs légitimes de la rationalité en question“, in *Révolution française.
net. Etudes*, 2. Dez. 2006, online unter: [http://revolution-francaise.
net/2006/12/02/85-debat-commerce-ble-1768-1775-porteurs-legitimes-
rationalite](http://revolution-francaise.net/2006/12/02/85-debat-commerce-ble-1768-1775-porteurs-legitimes-rationalite) [Stand: Juni 2016].
- 56 Vgl. MABLY, G. B. de: *Doutes proposes aux philosophes économistes sur
l'ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques*, Nyon/Durand, Den Haag,
1768, S. 56 u. 243.
- 57 SCHLÖZER, *Statistik, Politik, Oeconomie* (wie Anm.14), S. 110r-111r.
- 58 Deborah Cohen nennt Galiani, Mably u.a. die „sensualistische Opposition“
der Physiokraten, vgl. COHEN, D., *Le débat sur le commerce du blé* (wie
Anm.55).
- 59 Vgl. SCHLÖZER, *Weltgeschichte* (wie Anm.20), Vorrede unpaginiert, (S. v).

- ⁶⁰ K.: „Ueber die Ursachen der Größe der Brittischen Handlung“, in *Staats-Anzeigen*, Bd. 5, 1783, S. 129-169, Anm. S. 167.
- ⁶¹ Pfeffel (1726-1807) war Staatsrat und Diplomat in den Diensten Zweibrückens und Frankreichs. Er verfasste zahlreiche historische, politische, juristische Werke und war regelmäßiger Beiträger in den *Staats-Anzeigen*.
- ⁶² Lamerville, J. L. T. Heurtault Comte de, „Zur Statskunde von Frankreich“, in *Stats-Anzeigen*, Bd. 12, 1788, S. 201 – 208, hier S. 204 Anm.
- ⁶³ K., Größe des Brittischen Handels (wie Anm. 60), S. 164, Anm.
- ⁶⁴ Auch in Smiths Theorie ist dieser Zusammenhang keineswegs ein Automatismus.
- ⁶⁵ K., Größe des Brittischen Handels (wie Anm. 60), S. 164, Anm.
- ⁶⁶ Vgl. zur Gewaltenteilungslehre bei Schlözer in sieben Gewalten SCHLÖZER, *StatsRecht* (wie Anm. 31), S. 100. Zur Einordnung dieser Theorie vgl. WARLICH, B., Schlözer zwischen Reform und Revolution (wie Anm. 22), S. 321-322.
- ⁶⁷ WARLICH, Schlözer zwischen Reform und Revolution (wie Anm. 22), S. 431.
- ⁶⁸ SCHLÖZER, *PUBL. Lect. Ill. Schlötzeri. Appendix ad Polit[icam]*, 1793, Vorlesungsmitschrift von Sárvári [auch Sarvary], Pál: Bewaffnete Neutralität, 438r–450v, Reformétus Egyházkerületi Nagykönyvtár, Debrecen, Signatur R 79/3, S. 439v. Die Vorlesungsmitschrift Sárváris ist in der Forschung bislang ebenfalls nicht zur Kenntnis genommen worden. Sie weist zahlreiche orthographische und grammatikalische Fehler auf.
- ⁶⁹ Ebd., S. 443 v.
- ⁷⁰ Vgl. Ebd., S. 440 r: „Will man doch ein allgemeines Handelsrecht haben: so laßen sie sich aus Naturrecht ausziehen auf 3. Sätze. Ein Freyes Volk darf bestimmen, ob [es] ein anderes will mit sich handeln laßen. Es kann bestimmen die Art, wie [es] handeln will. Ein drittes Volk kann den Handel zwischen zwei freien Völkern nicht einschränken.“.
- ⁷¹ So sind seine wichtigsten Referenzen erstens Johann Georg Büsch, dem es als Direktor der Handelsakademie Hamburg, in der künftige Kaufleute ausgebildet wurden, um eine Kombination von theoretischem und praktischem Wissen ging und der auch eine Zeitschrift mit dem Titel *Handlungsbibliothek* (1784-1797) herausgab und als Autor aktuelle Themen des Seehandels behandelte und zweitens Georg Friedrich Mertens, der in seinen Schriften als erster einen Ansatz für ein positives Völkerrecht entwickelte: *Précis du droit des gens modernes de l'Europe*, Paris, Guillaumin 1789; *Recueil des principaux traités d'alliance, de paix, de trêve, de neutralité, de commerce, de limites, d'échange*, Göttingen, Dieterich, 1791-1801.
- ⁷² Die These des *doux commerce* von Albert O. Hirschman aus seinem Werk *The passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism before*

its Triumph, Princeton, 1977 muss also insgesamt relativiert werden. Vgl. dazu ASBACH, *Der modern Staat und 'le doux commerce'* (wie Anm. 3) und TERJANIAN, A. F., *Commerce and its Discontents in Eighteenth-century French Political Thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.

73 Siehe bspw. „Vor allen Dingen muß man solche Manufakturen anlegen, welche solche Sachen liefern, die auch der gemeinigte Mann brauchen kann.“; vgl. SCHLÖZER, *Statistik, Politik, Oeconomie* (wie Anm.14), S. 114 r.

74 Ebd., S. 106 r.

75 Ebd., S. 107 v.

76 Martin Peters führt diese Überlegung an; vgl. PETERS, M.: Das Alte Reich und Europa (wie Anm.15), S. 201. Allerdings scheinen mir die angeführten Beispiele für diese Hypothese nicht aussagekräftig. In seiner Vorlesung macht Schlözer seinen Standpunkt zur staatlichen Förderung explizit: In das private Wirtschaftstreiben solle nur punktuell eingegriffen werden, um beispielsweise die Etablierung bestimmter Industrien etwa durch Zölle zu fördern. Vgl., SCHLÖZER, *Statistik, Politik, Oeconomie* (wie Anm.14), S.116 r.

77 Vgl. COHEN, *Le débat sur le commerce du blé* (wie Anm. 55).

78 WARLICH, Schlözer zwischen Reform und Revolution (wie Anm. 22), S. 89 f.