

New Europe College Yearbook 1995–1996



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New Europe College
Institute for Advanced Study

Starting Point

The New Europe College is a small independent Romanian 'center of excellence' in the humanities and social sciences. It was founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, 1990/91 Romanian Minister of Culture, at present Minister of Foreign Affairs), as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Aims and Purposes

- to create an institutional framework with strong international links offering young Romanian scholars in the fields of humanities and social sciences working conditions similar to those in the West: individual grants enabling them to focus on their research projects, access to modern technical equipment, an environment that stimulates the dialogue between different fields of research and encourages critical debate;
- to cultivate the receptivity of scholars and academics in Romania towards methods and areas of research as yet not firmly established here, while preserving what might still be precious in a type of approach developed, against all odds, in an unpropitious intellectual, cultural and political context before 1989: this was, to be sure, a context that hindered the synchronizing of local scholars with the state of research in their disciplines in other parts of the world. But scientific life under the authoritarian regime also led — paradoxically, one might say — to original ways of questioning, to a long-term strategy of research that eluded intellectual, financial, and on occasion even political restraints; and such an approach deserves perhaps to be taken into account in a Europe undergoing a process of reshaping and confronting itself with unprecedented challenges.
- to promote contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide;

- to contribute to the forming of a core of promising young academics, expected to play a significant role in the renewal of Romania's academic, scholarly and intellectual life.

Academic Program: NEC Fellowships and RELINK Grants

Each year, ten **NEC Fellowships** for outstanding young Romanian scholars in humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. Fellows are chosen by an international Academic Advisory Board, and receive a monthly stipend for the duration of one academic year (October through July). The Fellows gather for weekly seminars, moderated by the Scientific Director, to discuss their research projects. Guest scholars from Romania and abroad are invited for talks, seminars and symposia, attended not only by the Fellows, but also by graduate students, academics and researchers from outside the College.

In the course of the year, the Fellows are given the opportunity to pursue their research for one month abroad, at a university or research institution of their choice. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows submit a paper representing the results of their research. These papers are subsequently published in the New Europe College Yearbook.

The RELINK Program targets preferably young, highly qualified Romanian scholars returning from studies abroad to work in one of Romania's universities or research institutes. Ten RELINK Fellows are selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local research milieu and to improve their working conditions, a modest support lasting for three years is offered, consisting of: funds in order to acquire scholarly literature; an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones; the use of a laptop computer and printer.

Financing

To date, the activities of the New Europe College have been financed by German and Swiss foundations ('Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft', 'Volkswagen-Stiftung', 'Zuger Kulturstiftung Landis & Gyr'), the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs and the 'Higher Education Support Program' of the Open Society Institute, Budapest.

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Some Eastern European Neuroses*

ANDREI PLEȘU

*Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Founder of
the New Europe College*

Neurosis is one of the favorite hobbies of the intellectuals. I understand by neurosis the capacity of identifying in any circumstance an irritating component, a toxic grain. Any genuine intellectual has the vocation of dissatisfaction, the talent of discontent. It would be pointless to ask ourselves now whether this has always been the case. What is certain is that this has been true in our times. And in former communist countries, the intellectual neurosis has a specific symptomatology, about which I can speak with some competence, not as a detached analyst but as a patient in a chronic situation. What seems intriguing is that the dividing line of 1989 intensified our neuroses instead of healing them. Before, the battlefronts were well defined: on one side there was the totalitarian power, on the other the resisting intellectual. On one side there was the 'socialist camp' as the secular version of hell, on the other 'the free world' as a secular version of paradise. There were no nuances, and where there are no nuances neurosis is held in check. After 1989, however, we found ourselves slowly suffocated by a throng of nuances. The acquired liberties numbed the feeling of necessity, stimulating instead a euphoria of the possible. The possible meant the opportunity to choose. And when an intellectual has to choose, neurosis is round the corner.

We first discovered that even though the totalitarian universe had been our great misfortune, our historic tragedy, we had managed to adapt to it: this was to us the face of destiny and a fact of life. **Our** destiny, **our** daily life. In other words, we were identifying ourselves with what we were living, as you identify yourself with **your** toothache, with **your** insomnia, or with **your** instinct for survival. This explains the existence of nostalgics, i.e. of those who speak of the experience of dictatorship as our grandfathers speak of war, captivity or hunger: bad memories would mingle tenderly with a kind of heroic conscience and with the satisfaction of having overcome them. Such memories are, moreover, the substance and background of our youth. We were moving expansively in an astringent environment, which was fortifying our vital sentiment. And 'resistance', more or less efficient, more or less illusory, was in itself voluptuous.

* This is the slightly shortened version of the speech Andrei Pleșu delivered at the Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft, Wiesbaden, Germany, on June 15, 1998.

In brief, you could live, and you could delude yourself with the idea that you had a difficult but interesting life. Now, after 'the great change', you are obliged to discover the darker shades of freedom (those usually referred to as 'the problems of transition'): the tedium of not being any longer harassed by censorship, of the disappearance of the traditional 'enemy', of the trivialization of travels abroad, of the multiplication of temptations coupled with the impunity of giving in to them, in a word, of the whole train of inconveniences usually associated with dreams come true. Normalization is soporific. Disappointing. What Timothy Garton Ash called 'the uses of adversity,' the uses of persecution, slides into oblivion. We must discover instead the inconveniences of free choice and of responsibility.

The intellectuals are now confronted with a new dilemma producing new neuroses. What are they to do? Take advantage of the newly found freedom enabling them to mind their own business at last, or postpone their calling in order to take part in the general effort of reconstruction? Obviously, any decision is soon felt as regrettable. The intellectual who refrains from getting involved is overcome by moral guilt; the one who does get involved discovers the promiscuity of politics and the precariousness of his pragmatic gifts. Both are liable to generate insomnia. The civic daemon comes into conflict with the spiritual daemon. Any attempt at reconciling them may be suspect of naïveté or vanity. In other words, by invoking the need for politics to be impregnated by moral concerns, or the duty of the intellectuals towards society, one may waver between utopian inadequacy and hypocritical ambition, resorting to lofty alibis as a cover-up for trivial careerism.

As for the 'new world' which opens in front of the inhabitant of the former 'socialist camp', it is full of virtues and tempting promises, but it is fundamentally different from the model we had in mind. It is undoubtedly a better world, but it is otherwise better than we had imagined it to be. And it is not, or does not seem to be 'better' in every respect. In any case, the relationship between our world, still dizzy from the tribulations of the five decades of totalitarianism, and the securely established world of Western Europe, a world where democracy, the rule of law, and prosperity are there as a matter of course, is not yet a settled one. For each of the two worlds, the 'other' one is a collection of common places, an admixture of false representations (including many *Wunschvorstellungen*), prejudice and ignorance. The situation reminds me of the beginning of a novel by Unamuno, in which we are told that when Pedro and Juan are talking to each other, in reality at least six persons talk to one another: the real Pedro and the real Juan, the image Pedro has of himself with the image Juan has of himself, and the image Pedro has of Juan with the image Juan has of Pedro. This is more or less what happens when Western Europe and Eastern Europe meet.

In its turn, the West started by feeling compassionate towards us (at the time when we were providing suffering and dissidence), then went through a brief episode of brotherly enthusiasm at the end of 1989 (we were heroes, we were breaking the chains, making bloody or velvet revolutions), and ended by being politely annoyed by our gloom, impotence and delays. The East is the impoverished and unsuccessful cousin, and one full of pretense at that; not even a failed *alter ego*, but rather an unmentionable miscarriage. Those who have to be helped always end by stirring a certain dislike. The citizens of 'developed' countries discover with some concern that, for the 'normalization' of the situation in Eastern Europe, they would have to give up part of their own normality. Why should they do that?

There is, however, also a *positive*, stimulating version of the relationships between East and West; not the reticence of the Western consular services in granting us visas, but the race towards European integration, the recovery of common standards. Having been left, due to communism, outside the mainstream, we are now offered the chance to recuperate, the promise of rejoining the great family from which we had been arbitrarily excluded, politically and economically, but from which we had never felt excluded historically, geographically and culturally. The topic of our European integration opens two large questions: 'How soon?' and 'According to what criteria?' The speed depends, to a great extent, on us. But what about the criteria? The first question refers to our vital capacity. We will prove, or not, that we are capable of accomplishments, that we still have regenerating energies. The only inconvenience is the perpetual threat of a vicious circle: we cannot be integrated unless we are assisted and we cannot be assisted unless we are being integrated, or at least appear to be. This is, however, largely a technical question. The second question, on the other hand — the one concerning criteria — is pure metaphysics. For the integration criteria depend on the image we have about the space in which we wish to integrate ourselves. The question which is being asked is, therefore, no more and no less than 'what is Europe?' I hope not to have raised your curiosity to such an extent as to make you wait for an answer. I cannot tell you what Europe is, nor do I intend to try to do this now. But I can tell you how it looks today to those who *want in*. More precisely, what its face looks like when it is being shown to us as a 'model', as an 'aim', as the ultimate requirement.

Seen 'from the outside', Europe is, first of all, a place where English is the most commonly spoken language: access to this place implies, for a candidate, a *screening*; it should have a *follow-up*; it is expected to be *all-inclusive*. However, in this anglophone sea, there also floats a prestigious French term: *acquis communautaire*. It means what the developed countries have in common as a result of a centuries-long economic, legal, social and political evolution: the community wealth, the quintessence of human progress, the foundations of

post-modern civilization. From laws and institutions to the required size of eggs and tomatoes. This is the promised land towards which every 'candidate' country must aspire. Consequently, the aspirant is confronted with a great number of requirements, including some that have a special relevance: ecology, human rights, respect for minorities and the suspension of ethnic and sexual discrimination. One is thus faced with a thousand priorities per second. *Everything* is a priority; or, to put it otherwise, there are *only* priorities for you.

Under such circumstances, you can only feel inhibited and stutter. You must solve at the same time the street holes, the legislative vacuum, water pollution, inflation, poverty, the homosexuals' rights, the prohibition of tobacco advertising, the renovation of prisons, the management of public garbage, discrimination against women, the health-care crisis, the precariousness of services, police reform, the cleaning of trains, the socialization of the retired, gypsies' schooling, the renaming of streets, theater financing, animal protection, the printing of new passports, the modernization of rest rooms, privatization, economic restructuring, moral reform, the renewal of personnel, the redesigning of the system of education, the change of ambassadors, the consolidation of civil society, the stimulation of NGOs, the renovation of hospitals, abandoned children, AIDS patients, new Mafia networks and so on. Everything is compulsory, everything is urgent. In this rush that tolerates no hierarchies, no patient scheduling and delays, a problem of mentality inevitably crops up. Confused by the hurdles he has to jump over, the man in the street develops a kind of 'ideological indigestion'. He does not understand any longer what exactly is expected of him, he feels harassed, misunderstood, pushed around. Europe acquires in his mind the frightening dimensions of an *Obersturmbannführer* and European integration appears to him as an exhausting race. He is told that discrimination is bad and he feels discriminated against; he is told that tolerance is good and he feels he is being judged with intolerance. He begins associating, neurotically, heterogeneous principles and values. Generalized exigency leads to a leveling of criteria. Everything is equally important. Becoming an European amounts to adopting a variegated garb in which ideas, money, intimate habits, religious convictions and beer quality have the same relevance. This gives rise to misunderstandings, both innocent and comical. When the Romanian Parliament started the discussion on the abrogation of the law incriminating homosexuality, there were many peasants, priests and tradesmen who believed that what was proposed was not just the legalization, but the obligation of homosexuality. Anyway, it is difficult to explain to the giddy citizen of transition that entry into Europe is directly linked to his sexual habits, or to his attitude towards the erotic preferences of others. The educated citizen is not exempt from certain confusions either. He believed he was free from taboos, and he now finds that he has to adopt new ones. Here is an example: before 1989, Romanian intellectuals were not

allowed to read Mircea Eliade, because communist censorship prohibited any reading of a religious nature. Now, Mircea Eliade tends to become again suspect, difficult to quote if not to read, because the extreme right orientation of his youth is being brought up again. At the same time, countries that sternly condemn the communist inertia of certain East European governments benevolently tolerate the rehabilitation of Communist commitments of some of their citizens, or at least tend to see them as being exempt from blame. Confronted with such difficulties of adjustment, the Easterner is always courted by chronic depression. Irked by the European Union, our Easterner may try his hand at a series of definitions in an ascending order: Europe means single currency, the common market, the stability of a way of life, a balance between rights and responsibilities, the sharing of similar values. At the end of Plato's *Hippias Maior*, the participants in the dialogue reach the conclusion that it is very difficult to define the beautiful. The way to truth peters out. We find ourselves today in a similar uncertainty: it is very difficult to define Europe. And some of us face an even more difficult problem: in the absence of an adequate definition, they must nonetheless find their way to integration.

To the neuroses I have depicted so far I have to add, in my own case, yet another one. In a country that must face new provocations, at a moment of explorations and identity crises, I found myself in the situation of accepting a position for which I had never prepared myself: that of Minister of Foreign Affairs. I assure you that it is more than stimulating to try carrying out a good foreign policy against the background of a precarious domestic policy. One feels like a merchant who has to make a profit out of selling virtual merchandise.

But beyond this experience, there is another one that might interest you more. I would like to share with you the lessons learned about diplomatic life by someone who found himself in its very core by entering it from the **outside**; someone who is (still) an amateur, but who has (still) managed to preserve his freshness. And this, precisely because, being an amateur, there was no time for him to be contaminated by the routine of the profession. The keywords I would invoke in order to characterize, from my point of view, contemporary diplomacy would be: acceleration, codification, banalization.

Acceleration. The working day of a diplomat is organized, particularly when he is on a mission, according to a daunting schedule. In a single day of an official visit, a foreign minister meets a president (or a monarch), a prime minister, a parliamentary group, two or three cabinet members (including his counterpart), representatives of the press and of the community of his co-nationals in the host country, businessmen, prominent public figures, etc. Add to this a working breakfast, a protocol lunch, a gala dinner and, sometimes, a conference. Such a program is not conceived in accordance with 'human scale'. The rhythms of a normal person, his mental capacities, his physical endowment cannot adapt

themselves for long to an effort of this kind. The only way out is stereotypy: you keep tenaciously repeating the same message, the same smile, the same set of gestures. You are the victim of a 'mechanical delirium'. You cross with increasing speed and with ever-weaker resources a predictable and anonymous corridor. Each international conference brings about additional ones; each meeting opens a circular ritual, where the topics, the terms and the decisions are ready-made. In a word, all these taken together could be named 'fast-food diplomacy'. To survive such an experience Talleyrand would have had to choose between insanity and melancholy.

Codification is — as I have already suggested — the welcome corollary of acceleration. Economy of time and energy is only possible by replacing real communication with codification, with formalization. The consensus, in reality, precedes the debates. The final declaration is the first document you receive before the beginning of a meeting. You know what you will say (the file is prepared by experts who have, moreover, the good taste of taking notes while you speak, though they are the authors of the text). I claim, however, the paternity of the text I am delivering now before you. You usually know (exceptions to this are exceedingly rare) how everything will end. What may remain to a certain extent unpredictable, are the comments of the journalists in the next-day papers.

Speaking of codification, I cannot resist invoking the swarm of international organizations and organisms expressed through a plethora of arcane initials. De Gaulle was fascinated by the mystery of the UNO initials (*Qu'est-ce que c'est que ce machin là?*). Today, he would have to speak about OSCE, BSEC, CEI, CEFTA, EAPC, MERCOSUR, PREPCOM, SFOR, TRACECA, UNPREDEP, etc. Every year the number of international organizations and commissions multiplies. Overlaps, parallels, and confusions are unavoidable. All sorts of meetings fill the agenda of the diplomatic circles, without necessarily leading to an improved dialogue. You often see the same people, without having thereby the chance of truly getting to know them. The moments of genuine 'contact' are reduced to the minimal interstices offered by the protocol: cocktail, official lunch (if it's not a 'working' one), 'family photo'. But even then, everything is reduced to an ineffable look, to the brief cordiality of an exchange, to small group solidarity. For the rest, the code remains overpowering. You are 'important' and null at the same time. Rather than being yourself, you are as much as your 'badge', the little card that marks your place at the negotiating table allows you to be. Even the language you speak becomes a mere signal, the indication of a preferential code, with political consequences. This is particularly true for a country like Romania, which cannot decide without careful consideration on how to express itself. If you speak Romanian, no one will understand you and nobody will translate you. If you speak English, the French will declare

themselves surprised that a representative of a francophone country could be guilty of such a faux pas. If you speak French, the anglophones will consider you old-fashioned. And if you speak German, no one will believe that you come from Romania. The dilemma is apparently minor, but contextually it may play an unexpected role.


Banalization. Earlier diplomacy did not thrive on the frequency of meetings. An international conference had all the chances of becoming 'historical', precisely because it occurred at long intervals, on the eve of major events. Today ministerial meetings have become an almost daily activity. The diplomat is no longer a symbol, a *plenipotens*, a solemn rank. He is a high official, absorbed by monotonous drudgery. The decision belongs, more often than not, to the institutions he represents (presidents, prime ministers, parliaments, parties) and its implementation to the teams of experts accompanying him. Routine, the conventional side of diplomatic work prevails. And he who transgresses it, he who contradicts the canon even by a quarter of a sentence, be it through imprudence, for reasons having to do with temperament, or out of sheer amateurism, produces immediately a public commotion with unforeseeable results. The interlocutor suddenly opens his eyes, sees you and, if you are lucky, concedes in private that you have brought a somewhat fresher tone to the current debate; if you are not, he puts this down to your 'exoticism', or to the clumsiness to be expected in an East-European.

The banalization of diplomatic life also comes from the fact that international meetings generally devote themselves to auxiliary problems. They settle questions of a more or less technical nature when they do not confine themselves to decisions concerning deadlines. Topics of real import remain untouched. None of the meetings of the European Union I attended discussed European 'identity', the meaning of the 'enlargement' of a civilization, the possible means of integrating difference. There is frequent talk about quotas, percentage, monetary and economic correlation, all of which are undoubtedly very useful, but only rare references to the real nature of these processes, to their substance and, I would venture to say, to the vision inspiring the steps being undertaken. I will be told that whatever else it may be, diplomacy is not a philosophical symposium. True; but nor can it be mere bureaucracy. We run the risk of thinking schematically, of losing the imagination, the idea, the enthusiasm behind it all. We run the risk of creating a colorless security, a flabby prosperity and an amorphous unity.

What is to be done? Were I not a minister at the moment I am talking to you (which I was not at the time when I was invited to deliver this speech), I might attempt to give an answer to this question. I would have the leisure to give some thought to it and the freedom to suggest a solution without sounding presumptuous. But as a minister I am in the role of the patient rather than in that of the therapist. I am part of the landscape I have just described. And I am unable

to identify in this landscape, for the time being, its redeeming feature. I prefer to draw for you a parallel landscape, one in which I used to live before attaining my present status. In former communist countries, we often survived through parallel solutions: a culture parallel to the official one, a parallel underground policy, a parallel economy. Having this experience in mind, I think now of the possibility of a parallel diplomacy. We do not have to invent it, it already exists. I became acquainted with it in 1992, at Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, and later in other institutes of advanced studies, in Wassenaar, in Budapest, in Vienna. I tried to establish such an institute in Bucharest and I cherish the hope that I have succeeded.

In these institutes, which do not adopt 'final documents,' which do not set up control commissions, nor send intervention forces, which do not establish or undo borders of the world, an elite — relaxed and at the same time responsible, rational but avoiding excesses of rationalization or ideological labels — carries out an intense dialogue about the world and the destinies of humankind. Coming from everywhere and from all fields, the members of these institutes possess, in addition to the endowments of their spirit and to their professional excellence, two virtues diplomats are wanting: inner freedom and time. When they meet, a genuine meeting takes place, when they speak to each other, they really communicate, when they quarrel, no embassy gets closed. In these institutes, debate is still something meaningful, and research is informal, daring, focused on fundamentals, rather than on contingencies. They have the style of good quality diplomacy, without its servitudes. Jean-Paul Sartre, an author not much loved in the East, once said that a good journal is made as if by dancing. I would say, in turn, that what I experienced and lived at Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin was the sober euphoria of dance. Diplomacy would be well advised to take this sober euphoria as a model. And European and planetary integration might become a good opportunity for people to learn anew how to dance.



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Du dualisme en théorie de l'énonciation

0. Préambule

Le point de départ de cet article a été de se demander comment est devenue possible la linguistique de l'énonciation, c'est-à-dire toute une branche de la linguistique ayant pour objet d'expliquer le rôle de l'utilisation de la langue dans la constitution du sens des énoncés. Même si l'on essaie de conserver la distinction méthodologique que Ferdinand de Saussure avait opérée entre la parole, conçue comme l'ensemble des faits observables que le linguiste prend pour données, et la langue, objet abstrait construit par le linguiste pour en rendre compte, c'est un fait acquis que l'on ne saurait attribuer aux mots et aux phrases, constituants de la langue, une signification qui ne fasse pas référence à l'événement de leur énonciation¹. Mais, contrairement aux démarches systématiques ayant le même but, je me suis livré ici à une tentative historique. L'idée qui m'a guidé, tout au long de cette réflexion, est que la linguistique de l'énonciation est solidaire de l'apparition, dans l'histoire de la pensée, d'un dualisme opposant le dire et le dit, l'activité de parole et le contenu ou résultat de cette activité, dans la constitution même du sens des énoncés. Ainsi formulée, il est important de distinguer cette première opposition d'une seconde qui a traversé aussi l'histoire de la philosophie du langage, à savoir l'opposition du mot et de sa signification, et qui fait apparaître un autre dualisme opposant le phonétique au sémantique, la matérialité du mot à sa signification².

Il s'agissait, pour ma part, de remonter aux sources de la première opposition, qui, à l'intérieur même du sémantique, a permis de penser le sens de l'énoncé comme un produit spécifique de l'activité qui le constitue. Si je me suis tourné du côté du scepticisme, c'est qu'il m'a semblé que ce courant de pensée, par opposition systématique à toute philosophie du contenu, qu'il fût ontologique, noétique ou sémantique, a privilégié une réflexion de l'acte. En sémantique, cette position revient à refuser la conception selon laquelle le locuteur trouve déjà le sens constitué dans l'énoncé qu'il produit, et à tenir, au contraire, qu'il constitue le sens, dans son acte d'énonciation, ou à tout le moins que l'effectuation est une partie du sens de l'acte. Que le locuteur constitue le sens à partir d'un matériau qu'il rassemble ou bien qu'il soit constitué lui-même dans l'acte de

cette effectuation, c'est une question qui ne pointera que bien plus tard, mais qui est solidaire, si je ne me trompe, du même horizon sceptique.

Dans ce même programme destiné à expliquer l'apparition du concept d'énonciation et son rôle à l'intérieur d'une théorie sémantique, après avoir réfléchi sur la contestation sceptique, il m'a paru indispensable de donner une analyse du tournant qu'a représenté la philosophie de Descartes, particulièrement en ce qu'il prétend avoir donné une réplique au scepticisme. Car si les sceptiques ont attaché de l'importance à l'énonciation en la prenant régulièrement en compte dans l'explication du sens de l'énoncé, ce fut Descartes qui, pour la première fois, tenta de l'isoler de l'énoncé dont elle est porteuse et en fit une catégorie à part.

Descartes s'est en effet illustré dans l'histoire de la pensée pour avoir converti une métaphysique essentialiste en une théorie de la connaissance et, de ce fait, renversé l'ordre de la réflexion philosophique. Suite à ce renversement, le sujet connaissant reçoit non seulement une place éminente dans l'édifice de la pensée, puisque c'est de par l'idée d'infini qui se trouve dans le sujet réfléchissant que l'on peut reconnaître l'existence de Dieu et, par la suite, la garantie des vérités éternelles, mais il se voit accorder un rôle crucial dans le cheminement de la pensée, qui, à partir de Descartes, sera constitutif de tout projet philosophique.

L'aspect qui m'a retenu à ce propos c'est précisément le rôle dévolu au sujet connaissant, dans l'exercice de la pensée, qui fait explicitement du *je* réfléchissant à la fois un narrateur et un personnage de l'itinéraire philosophique. Par rapport à cette histoire autobiographique que sont les *Méditations*, dont l'exemplarité consiste non en dernier lieu dans le fait qu'elle peut être à tout moment racontée, on a pu à juste titre parler de narrativité et, par conséquent, opérer avec les catégories d'une théorie du récit. Sans entrer ici dans la polémique qu'a pu susciter cette démarche de fictionnalisation du discours philosophique, je me limite à faire remarquer l'enjeu de cette méthode. En expliquant Descartes à l'intérieur d'une théorie du récit, on arrive à faire jouer des catégories telles que auteur, narrateur, personnage, intrigue, etc., que l'on suppose être, au moins dans un horizon théorique déterminé, des catégories ultimes et dont on attend par conséquent une vertu explicative générale.

Pour ma part, je me suis efforcé de rabattre le texte cartésien sur un autre horizon théorique, celui de la linguistique de l'énonciation. La visée d'un tel projet est double: de même que pour la narratologie, il y a d'abord l'idée que dans les catégories qu'elle fournit, il y a un enjeu fondamental; d'autre part, et surtout, j'attends de ce parallèle une mise en perspective des catégories linguistiques mêmes. Mon hypothèse, en effet, consiste à dire, d'une part, qu'il y a un rapport de filiation entre le renversement de la métaphysique essentialiste par Descartes et l'apparition de la théorie de l'énonciation, et, d'autre part, qu'éclairer l'histoire des réactions au scepticisme est profitable pour dégager l'arrière-plan philosophique

des catégories linguistiques à l'intérieur d'une tradition philosophique qui ne cesse de les informer.

Je montrerai, à titre d'exemple, que ce fut au XVII^e siècle, par la transformation radicale opérée par Descartes, dans sa reformulation de la maxime sceptique *Tout est incertain*, que l'émergence de la catégorie linguistique moderne de locuteur devint possible. Ce qui est intéressant de voir, à la lumière de cet exemple, c'est que le locuteur rendu possible par cette révolution est supposé représenter une énonciation pure, séparée de l'énoncé qu'elle produit. Cette possibilité contenue dans la notion même, telle qu'elle sortait de l'horizon cartésien, a pour la première fois été explorée par Émile Benveniste, qui a jeté les bases de la théorie de l'énonciation. L'école française, illustrée notamment par Oswald Ducrot, Alain Berrendonner, François Récanati, a ensuite approfondi cette voie, en élaborant une linguistique où l'énonciation s'est vu reconnaître de plus en plus de poids à l'intérieur de la constitution du sens. En définissant le sens de l'énoncé comme une image de son énonciation³, Oswald Ducrot entend faire de l'énonciation une composante du sens, introduisant dans la langue, comprise comme objet de la linguistique, ce que les linguistes en excluaient généralement, à savoir des éléments prévoyant son usage. Ducrot entend ainsi décrire une réalité linguistique qui pose d'emblée et à la fois le problème de l'énoncé et celui de l'énonciation et élaborer une linguistique, non plus de l'énoncé, comme ses prédécesseurs, mais de l'activité de parole à l'intérieur de laquelle les possibilités de l'usage se retrouvent dans la description du matériau linguistique lui-même. Qu'advient-il, à l'intérieur de ces théories nouvelles, de la vieille opposition du dire et du dit, c'est ce que je me propose d'exposer, une fois plantés les principaux jalons historiques.

1. Émergence du dualisme

1.1. Appareil sceptique — Le fait d'avoir décidé de prendre en considération la position des sceptiques en philosophie ne s'explique pas seulement par l'attrait que cette attitude extrême exerça constamment sur les penseurs de toutes les époques, comme si c'était de là qu'est venue la contestation absolue de toute pensée. A condition de penser le scepticisme⁴ selon une catégorie assez large, dont les traits deviendront, j'espère, plus distincts à la fin de cette étude, on ne manquera pas de remarquer que le défi sceptique fut pris en compte dans tous les grands moments de la philosophie. En même temps se développa aussi, imbriquée dans la réflexion métaphysique, une réflexion sur le langage dont le rapport à la théorie moderne de l'énonciation fait l'objet de la présente étude. Ainsi, la seconde raison de s'intéresser au scepticisme est de déterminer le noyau de cette attitude philosophique pouvant intéresser la philosophie du langage et les formes selon lesquelles il apparaît dans les théories du langage l'ayant pris en compte.

J'ai montré ailleurs⁵, de manière bien plus détaillée, en quoi consistait l'itinéraire sceptique. J'y ai défini le paradoxe sceptique, comme méthode d'opposer des énoncés contraires, afin d'en arriver à la suspension du jugement. J'ai montré quel était le statut des expressions sceptiques, et le corrélat de ces expressions dans des dispositions psychologiques et non dans une quelconque réalité des choses extérieures.

J'évoquerai seulement ici la découverte sceptique de la non-assertion, à savoir, selon la typologie que j'ai proposée⁶, de l'énonciation distanciée d'un énoncé. Selon Sextus Empiricus, « *assertion* admet deux acceptions, l'une générale, l'autre particulière. Pris généralement, ce terme désigne une affirmation ou une négation, par exemple: *il fait jour, il ne fait pas jour*. Pris particulièrement, il désigne seulement l'affirmation, de sorte qu'en ce sens la négation ne saurait être désignée par le terme d'assertion. Par conséquent, la non-assertion est la suspension de l'assertion entendue généralement, dans le sens où précisément elle enveloppe à la fois l'affirmation et la négation; de telle sorte que la non-assertion est l'état de notre âme qui nous pousse à ne rien affirmer non plus que nier⁷. »

Ainsi l'énoncé sceptique est-il sous-tendu par une énonciation distanciée. On dirait, en termes modernes, que son référent est un contenu psychologique, sans rapport connu avec le monde extérieur: « Soulignons encore fortement que, lorsqu'il énonce une proposition, le sceptique se contente de décrire la représentation sensible qui est la sienne, et d'énoncer l'état de sa sensibilité (*παθος*) sans y ajouter son avis (*αδοξαστως*) et en se gardant bien de préciser quoi que ce soit touchant la nature des réalités extérieures⁸. » Ce manque d'adhérence de l'énoncé aux choses est visible précisément dans l'énonciation distanciée, qui assure une composante du sens de cet énoncé. Autrement dit, l'incertitude quant à une correspondance réelle des contenus représentés est reprise sous la forme d'une énonciation distanciée, et, par ce biais, devient une partie du sens de l'énoncé.

Les sceptiques sont arrivés au bout de leur parcours à formuler un certain nombre de maximes du type *pas plus ceci que cela, rien de plus, tout est incertain, je suspends mon jugement, etc.*, par lesquelles ils justifiaient l'introduction du paradoxe sceptique, et ils amenaient la réflexion dans leur voie propre⁹.

Le problème du statut de ces maximes à l'intérieur du discours sceptique apparut tôt. Arcésilas, fondateur de la Nouvelle Académie, qu'il dirigea de 264 à 241 av. J.C., adopta le pyrrhonisme et l'enrichit d'un certain nombre d'éléments. C'est lui qui, à en croire Cicéron¹⁰, se mit à reprocher à Socrate, après l'avoir loué d'avoir dit qu'il ne savait rien, d'avoir ajouté qu'il savait au moins cela, qu'il ne savait rien. L'objection d'Arcésilas est à considérer comme un élément de la polémique qu'il menait contre les stoïciens. Il prenait à tâche d'éliminer tout dogmatisme et la plupart de ses arguments visaient divers concepts positifs utilisés par l'école rivale.

Le stoïcien Chrysippe, qui, jeune, avait fréquenté la Nouvelle Académie, releva le défi, en formulant l'argument de ce que j'ai appelé l'*aporie du doute*¹¹, qui retournait contre Arcésilas l'objection que celui-ci faisait à Socrate. Celui qui dit que tout est incertain ou bien le tient pour incertain et alors il se contredit lui-même, ou bien il le tient pour non assuré, et alors la maxime est dénuée de valeur.

Selon le même Cicéron, Antipater reprenait, dans la génération suivante, l'objection de Chrysippe, en disant: « Celui qui affirme que rien ne peut être perçu doit dire, pour être conséquent, qu'une chose au moins peut être perçue, c'est que les autres choses ne le peuvent pas. » Mais Carnéade, successeur d'Arcésilas à la tête de l'Académie, s'en tenant à la position de son prédécesseur, affirmait: « Tant s'en faut, que ce soit là être conséquent; c'est bien plutôt se contredire; en disant que rien ne peut être perçu, on n'excepte rien; ainsi il est nécessaire que cette proposition même, n'ayant pas été exceptée, ne soit en aucune manière comprise et perçue¹². »

On trouve chez Sextus la même réponse, amenant à faire porter la maxime sur elle-même: « Le sceptique comprend que, de même que la proposition *Tout est faux* laisse entendre qu'elle est elle-même fautive aussi bien que le reste et qu'il en va ainsi de *rien n'est vrai*, de même l'expression *pas plus ceci que cela* déclare qu'elle-même aussi bien que le reste n'est pas préférable et que pour cela elle s'englobe dans le reste. Il en est de même des autres expressions des sceptiques¹³. »

1.2. Examen des rapports de l'énoncé et de l'énonciation dans la maxime sceptique — On vient de voir comment s'est développée la réflexion au sujet de la maxime sceptique à travers les disputes qui opposèrent sceptiques et stoïciens au III^e et II^e siècles av. J.C. Ce que je voudrais montrer ici, c'est l'incidence, sur une linguistique de l'énonciation, de ces positions respectives par rapport à la proposition que les sceptiques prenaient comme maxime.

D'un point de vue sceptique, il faut comprendre la maxime sceptique *Tout est incertain* comme un **résumé métadiscursif de toutes les énonciations**. On se rappelle qu'une proposition, quelle qu'elle fût, n'était pour le sceptique qu'une simple expression (*φωνη*) à laquelle celui-ci n'engageait pas sa foi. L'essentiel de la position sceptique peut se résumer par le fait qu'une distanciation doit frapper toute assertion, de manière à protéger son locuteur des obligations énonciatives qu'elle pourrait engendrer. Dans *Tout est incertain*, tout a le rôle de marquer la place de tout énoncé virtuel, et *incertain* est une expression destinée à marquer la nature distanciée de l'énonciation accompagnant l'énoncé¹⁴.

Par ailleurs, le paradoxe fait que ce résumé d'énonciation constitue à lui-même un énoncé. Ce qui a précisément fait avancer le débat, c'est la question de savoir si cette métaénonciation, au sens d'une règle des énonciations, était elle-même

convertible dans un énoncé. En la convertissant dans un énoncé, les stoïciens ont essayé, en utilisant la réduction à l'absurde, de montrer que la maxime était dénuée de sens. La contradiction qu'ils essayaient de construire était, d'une part, la contradiction entre un énoncé de la règle et une énonciation « forte » de cet énoncé¹⁵ et, d'autre part, celle entre un dire fort et un dire faible du même énoncé. Il importe de voir que, dans ce dernier type de contradiction, joue le présupposé stoïcien, d'origine aristotélicienne, qu'un vrai dire est un dire « fort », sur le modèle du dire fort qui fonde la démonstration du principe de non-contradiction donnée par Aristote dans la *Métaphysique*. Ainsi, par le biais de la construction d'une aporie du doute, et d'une contradiction de deux modes de dire le même contenu, les stoïciens visaient l'énonciation que la maxime sceptique ordonnait. Que toutes les énonciations fussent distancées, cela était, montraient-ils ainsi, faux.

Une fois abolie l'obligation de penser tout énoncé comme affecté d'une énonciation distancée, les stoïciens ne se sont plus souciés de l'énonciation et de son rôle comme composante du sens. La réflexion stoïcienne sur le langage demeure ainsi une réflexion centrée sur l'énoncé.

La réponse sceptique à l'argument de l'aporie du doute consiste à refuser la conversion de l'énonciation en énoncé. *Tout est incertain* est précisément une règle des énonciations et, à ce titre, un résumé énonciatif. Ce qui n'empêche pas que l'on puisse avoir un énoncé « Tout est incertain », qu'il s'agit de traiter de la même manière que tous les autres énoncés, à savoir en l'affectant d'une énonciation distancée. **Quand je précise qu'il y a refus de la conversion, je prends comme critère que la «traduction» de la position énonciative résumée par *Tout est incertain* dans l'énoncé *Tout est incertain* n'«épuise» pas la règle, au sens où l'énoncé ainsi obtenu sera ordonné par la même règle.** Cette conversion n'est pas totale, et, n'étant pas totale, ne peut donner lieu à une énonciation engagée de l'énoncé de la règle.

Le refus de la conversion de l'énonciation en énoncé vient, chez les sceptiques, du fait qu'ils demandent davantage que cette conversion. De par le caractère métaénonciatif de leur maxime, ils admettent le principe de la réflexion de la maxime en tant qu'énoncé sur l'énonciation de la maxime même. Ce faisant, ils admettent la première étape de la démonstration des stoïciens à leur encontre. Mais, à la différence de ces derniers, ils refusent d'épuiser la maxime, en tant que règle métaénonciative, dans une énonciation engagée d'elle-même en tant que contenu.

Qu'est-ce qui empêche les sceptiques de s'y résoudre? En dehors de leur parti pris épistémologique, et en ne me rapportant qu'à leur vue sur le langage, je pense qu'en l'acceptant, ils accepteraient, au moins dans un cas précis, d'évacuer l'énonciation du sens de l'énoncé. Ils tiendraient ainsi que l'énoncé *Tout est incertain* a un sens « objectif », où le sujet énonciateur n'aurait plus de place.

Je fais l'hypothèse, en effet, que dans l'évaluation de la position des sceptiques il faut tenir compte du fait que l'énonciation distancée est une modalité de marquer la présence de l'énonciation tout simplement comme composante du sens de l'énoncé. Qu'elle soit précisément distancée, cela relève d'un a priori épistémologique et d'un refus du métaphysique, que l'on peut interpréter, je pense, de manière analogue.

En conséquence, ils accepteraient que, pour ce cas précis, le locuteur ne constitue plus, dans son acte d'énonciation, le sens de ce qu'il dit, mais qu'il le trouve déjà constitué hors de cet acte. L'effectuation resterait ainsi extérieure au sens, au même titre que la connaissance déboucherait par exemple sur un savoir déjà constitué, ou bien la question de l'être déboucherait sur l'être.

Si mon interprétation du scepticisme est juste, l'originalité de ce courant consiste à privilégier une philosophie de l'acte et, corrélativement, à refuser une philosophie du contenu, quel qu'il soit. Dans cette interprétation, assez large, le scepticisme devient, on le voit, intimement lié au platonisme, au sens où on peut montrer dans les dialogues de Platon qu'il y a une tension entre le contenu de la pensée et l'exercice de celle-ci. C'est de cette tension, jamais résolue par Platon, au point qu'il a pu écrire un texte comme la *Lettre sept*, relativisant toute transmission de la philosophie par écrit, c'est-à-dire au moyen d'un seul corpus d'énoncés, qu'Aristote a hérité. L'affirmation est, pour celui-ci, un contenu actualisé sur le mode de la conviction du locuteur, donc avec une énonciation engagée faisant partie du sens de l'énoncé; seulement, comme cette conviction est « compliquée » du problème de la vérité, c'est-à-dire de l'adéquation de la proposition à l'état de choses, les contraintes du système aristotélicien font que l'énonciation se voit finalement réduite à un accord avec la vérité. Aussi son importance a-t-elle tendance à s'effacer derrière l'énoncé vu comme un tableau de la réalité. Néanmoins, il ne faut pas perdre de vue chez Aristote le rôle actif du locuteur, et de son équivalent sur le plan noématique, l'intellect agent, qui recrée à tout moment dans son effectuation, ce tableau, de sorte que toute interprétation figée du sens de l'énoncé est à proscrire¹⁶. Mais, puisque les sceptiques refusent de prendre en considération le problème de la vérité, cette orientation de l'activité de parole du locuteur vers la reconnaissance d'un état de choses n'est plus thématisée. L'énonciation est libre de toute correspondance avec le réel et, partant, elle se voit attribuer un rôle bien plus visible dans la constitution du sens.

Le refus de la conversion de l'énonciation en énoncé marque, dans cette perspective, le refus d'abandonner l'irréductibilité de l'effectuation devant la perspective d'un contenu qui serait déjà là. L'héroïsme et la situation limite du scepticisme lui viendraient du fait que, contrairement à toute autre position philosophique, il refuse de se reconnaître dans ses propres acquis, exprimés sous la forme de contenus, quels qu'ils soient. On notera que le sceptique ne

refuse pas de s'assumer, au sens où il est absolument cohérent sur la nécessité d'une énonciation distanciée (et d'une réserve équivalente sur la question de l'être et du connaître). Ce qu'il refuse est tout simplement de résorber cette énonciation dans un contenu dont il fasse une doctrine.

1.3. L'argument cartésien du cogito et ses rapports avec le scepticisme

— Que le projet cartésien doive être compris comme une réaction contre la vague de néo-scepticisme de la fin du XVI^e et du début du XVII^e siècle, il n'est plus nécessaire de le montrer. Il suffit de renvoyer le lecteur aux études historiques concernant les formes du scepticisme en France à cette époque¹⁷, ainsi qu'aux tentatives d'évaluation du cartésianisme par rapport à l'horizon philosophique où il est apparu¹⁸, pour saisir les enjeux d'une nouvelle fondation du projet philosophique. Ce qui intéresse la problématique de l'énonciation, c'est la manière dont Descartes propose de réfuter le scepticisme et les conséquences de cette opération sur la façon de comprendre l'énonciation. Ce n'est qu'en comparant la réponse cartésienne au scepticisme, d'une part, à la position aristotélicienne, d'autre part, que l'on peut comprendre les présupposés philosophiques de l'étude de l'énonciation.

L'originalité de Descartes, quant à cette problématique, consiste en tout premier lieu à reformuler la proposition *Tout est incertain* dans quelque chose d'équivalent à *Je doute de tout*. Ainsi, le sujet grammatical, l'expression du sujet parlant et celle du sujet connaissant coïncident, ce qui équivaut à mettre en position problématique explicite la subjectivité dans sa totalité. D'emblée, on voit que, à l'encontre de la démonstration stoïcienne, polémique et dialogale, celle de Descartes se donne pour un dialogue intérieur, et vise à faire des étapes de cette démonstration autant de stations dans la découverte de la certitude du *moi* pensant. Ce dialogisme rend possible un récit exemplaire et ancre par cela même toute la noologie cartésienne dans la structure temporelle de ce récit. Suivons ce récit, dans le déroulement de ses étapes, afin d'en donner ensuite une interprétation en termes d'énonciation.

C'est par la hantise de la fausseté du savoir humain que commence le récit des *Méditations*:

« Il y a déjà quelque temps que je me suis aperçu que, dès mes premières années, j'avais reçu quantité de fausses opinions pour véritables, et que ce que j'ai depuis fondé sur des principes si mal assurés, ne pouvait être que fort douteux et incertain; de façon qu'il me fallait entreprendre sérieusement une fois en ma vie de me défaire de toutes les opinions que j'avais reçues jusques alors en ma créance, et commencer tout de nouveau dès les fondements, si je voulais établir quelque chose de ferme dans les sciences¹⁹. »

Dans cet *incipit* il y a déjà tout le programme de l'attitude dogmatique, telle que je l'ai définie dans ma typologie des énonciations²⁰, en concurrence explicite

avec l'attitude sceptique maintenant la tension des contraires. Ce qui rend cependant impossible l'attitude dogmatique, c'est l'incertitude des fondements, qui va toujours se répercuter sur la consistance du savoir que l'on y bâtera. La question découlant de l'incertitude des fondements est donc la même que chez les sceptiques: *la réalité est-elle telle?*

Descartes aligne l'un après l'autre différents arguments de provenance sceptique, tels que la tromperie des sens, la conversion réciproque des états de veille et de sommeil, l'incertitude des sciences sur la réalité physique. Cette étape de son itinéraire est désignée dans l'exégèse cartésienne par l'expression « doute méthodique », et on peut avancer qu'elle épouse de près la tradition de l'interrogation sceptique. Avec l'hypothèse d'un Dieu trompeur ou celle de mon existence comme un effet du hasard, le doute sceptique atteint son comble:

« Toutefois, de quelque façon qu'ils supposent que je sois parvenu à l'état que je possède, soit qu'ils l'attribuent à quelque destin ou à une fatalité, soit qu'ils le réfèrent au hasard, soit qu'ils veuillent que ce soit par une continuelle suite et liaison des choses, il est certain que, puisque faillir et se tromper est une espèce d'imperfection, d'autant moins puissant sera l'auteur qu'ils attribueront à mon origine, d'autant plus sera-t-il probable que je suis tellement imparfait que je me trompe toujours²¹. »

La suspension du jugement est ainsi justifiée, mais, on notera les articulations, elle n'est de nouveau qu'une station dans l'itinéraire proposé.

« Auxquelles raisons je n'ai certes rien à répondre, mais je suis contraint d'avouer que, de toutes les opinions que j'avais autrefois reçues en ma créance pour véritables, il n'y en a pas une de laquelle je ne puisse maintenant douter, non par aucune inconsideration ou légèreté, mais pour des raisons très fortes et mûrement considérées: de sorte qu'il est nécessaire que j'arrête et suspende désormais mon jugement sur ces pensées, et que je ne leur donne pas plus de créance, que je ferais à des choses qui me paraîtraient évidemment fausses, si je désire trouver quelque chose de constant et d'assuré dans les sciences²². »

La nouveauté de Descartes est, en effet, de transformer le doute méthodique, qui a été jusque là un doute sceptique, en un doute hyperbolique, grâce à l'artifice méthodologique du Malin Génie, ce qui va lui permettre de tout réputer pour faux. Le doute cesse ainsi d'être doute et devient une négation. C'est cette négation qui rendra possible le mouvement de radicalisation précédant la fondation du *moi* pensant. Regardons la justification de ce passage:

« Mais il ne suffit pas d'avoir fait ces remarques, il faut encore que je prenne soin de m'en souvenir; car ces anciennes et ordinaires opinions me reviennent encore souvent en la pensée, le long et familier usage qu'elles ont eu avec moi leur donnant droit d'occuper mon esprit contre mon gré, et de se rendre presque maîtresses de ma créance. Et je ne me désaccoutumerai jamais d'y acquiescer, et de prendre confiance en elles, tant que je les considérerai telles qu'elles sont

en effet, c'est à savoir en quelque façon douteuses, comme je viens de montrer, et toutefois fort probables, en sorte que l'on a beaucoup plus de raison de les croire que de les nier²³. »

C'est sur ce point que Descartes quitte l'itinéraire propre des sceptiques. Tandis que ceux-ci concluaient sur l'incertitude générale et débouchaient sur une théorie du sens des énoncés intégrant la distanciation de l'énonciation, Descartes poursuit son dessein de fonder une science dogmatique. Le probabilisme n'est, à cet égard, pas moins dangereux que le pyrrhonisme, et le pas suivant consiste à opérer une négation radicale.

« C'est pourquoi je pense que j'en userai plus prudemment, si, prenant un parti contraire, j'emploie tous mes soins à me tromper moi-même, feignant que toutes ces pensées sont **fausses et imaginaires**²⁴. »

Afin de ne pas se laisser abattre dans sa résolution héroïque, Descartes trouve le guide capable de le conduire dans pareille négation :

« Je supposerai donc qu'il y a, non point un vrai Dieu, qui est la souveraine source de vérité, mais un certain mauvais génie, non moins rusé et trompeur que puissant, qui a employé toute son industrie à me tromper²⁵. »

On remarquera que l'artifice méthodologique du Malin Génie, contrairement à ce qui en affirme Descartes, ne sert pas à l'*épokhè* (« Je demeurerai obstinément attaché à cette pensée; et si, par ce moyen, il n'est pas en mon pouvoir de parvenir à la connaissance d'aucune vérité, à tout le moins il est en ma puissance de suspendre mon jugement »), mais bien à la négation systématique et radicale de tout contenu de l'énonciation. Le fait que le génie soit malin assure le contre-poids souhaité afin de justifier l'évacuation de tout énoncé imaginable, non pas au moyen d'une distanciation, mais d'une opposition affirmée.

« Je penserai que le ciel, l'air, la terre, les couleurs, les figures, les sons et toutes les choses extérieures que nous voyons, ne sont que des illusions et tromperies, dont il se sert pour surprendre ma crédulité. Je me considérerai moi-même comme n'ayant point de mains, point d'yeux, point de chair, point de sang, comme n'ayant aucuns sens, mais croyant faussement avoir toutes ces choses²⁶. »

Ainsi la *Première Méditation* opère le passage d'une attitude proprement sceptique, où le doute s'exprime à travers des énonciations distancées, à une négation radicale débouchant sur des énoncés du type « la réalité n'est pas telle », ayant la structure de la négation engagée de tout contenu. Le doute hyperbolique reste dans un avant chronologique de cette négation, comme la justification toujours présente de la négation affectant tout contenu. De sorte que Descartes en arrive à tenir conjointement un doute premier, si j'ose dire, incarné dans l'artifice du Malin génie, et une énonciation engagée dans la négation de tout énoncé.

Quelques commentaires des *Méditations* cartésiennes soulignent le fait que, en se suscitant ce partenaire négatif qu'est le Malin Génie, Descartes pose à la

base de la découverte de la certitude du *cogito* un dialogisme fondamental. Pour Francis Jacques, ce *tu* est la marque du fait qu'à chaque fois que le sujet parlant s'auto-désigne en disant *ego*, il implique l'autre dans son énonciation²⁷. En interprétant de cette manière le Malin Génie, Jacques espère surmonter un certain solipsisme du *je* libre en ses actes noétiques et sémantiques, et fonder, de par la « rétro-référence » de l'énonciation, une interlocution transcendante. Dans un tout autre type de commentaire, Jean-Luc Marion voit dans ce partenaire du dialogue intérieur une première figure du Dieu de la *Troisième Méditation*²⁸.

Il me semble, pour ma part, évident que le Malin Génie est l'artifice méthodologique grâce auquel Descartes arrive à passer du doute sceptique à la négation radicale de tout contenu ou, en termes techniques, de l'énonciation distancée à l'énonciation engagée. La négation de tout énoncé est la voie choisie par Descartes afin de contrebalancer le doute hyperbolique justifié dans le récit par l'hypothèse du Malin Génie.

L'exigence du doute hyperbolique veut qu'on se demande si ce doute lui-même n'est pas faux. La même logique demanderait ainsi que soit niée l'expérience même du doute, indépendamment de tout contenu, déjà frappé de négation.

« Mais je me suis persuadé qu'il n'y avait rien du tout dans le monde, qu'il n'y avait aucun ciel, aucune terre, aucuns esprits, ni aucuns corps; ne me suis-je donc pas persuadé aussi que je n'étais point? Non certes, j'étais sans doute, si je me suis persuadé, ou seulement si j'ai pensé quelque chose²⁹. »

La tentative de nier cette conscience du doute, sous la forme proprement cartésienne de l'énonciation engagée dans la négation de tout énoncé, se heurte à l'impossibilité de frapper le *je* également de négation. Du parallélisme signalé plus haut du sujet énonciateur, et du sujet connaissant à l'intérieur du pronom personnel *je* occupant la place de sujet grammatical résulte la nécessité de traiter la subjectivité de manière globale. Dès lors, il me semble que c'est l'étude de l'énonciation qui permet de comprendre la certitude du *cogito*. Descartes présente explicitement son argument comme énoncé dans la langue :

« ...il faut conclure, et tenir pour constant que cette proposition: *Je suis, j'existe*, est nécessairement vraie, **toutes les fois que je la prononce**, ou que je la conçois en mon esprit³⁰. »

Si *Je suis* est vraie, c'est parce que je ne peux pas dire: *Je ne suis pas*. Mais pourquoi? Il me semble évident que, pour qu'elle soit démonstrative, la preuve ne peut pas concerner n'importe quelle nature de ma substance. En d'autres termes, la preuve ne vaut que pour le moi en tant qu'énonciation et, en vertu du parallélisme sémantico-noétique, en tant que visée noétique. C'est pour autant que je dis quelque chose, que je ne peux pas ne pas être. Mais ce n'est pas le contenu de mon dire que je ne peux pas nier (Descartes vient au contraire de le faire systématiquement, en s'autorisant de l'artifice d'un Malin Génie), mais ce *dire* même. En niant tout contenu, je me pose comme énonciation engagée,

je deviens un *dire* fort, et ce dire est, dans l'exercice de mon acte, irréductible. Par un parallélisme du dire et du penser, à ce dire fort correspondra une visée de ma propre pensée, en tant que celle-ci appréhende différents contenus, visée elle aussi irréductible.

Le dire constituant le je, il importe de bien le noter, est un dire engagé. En effet, la voie propre de Descartes est, on vient de le voir, de transformer le dire distancié correspondant au doute sceptique dans une négation de tout contenu, ce qui correspond à une énonciation engagée. De la sorte, ne pas pouvoir abolir l'acte de douter, par lequel s'exprime le sujet énonciateur, revient à devoir admettre un dire engagé. C'est à ce dire engagé qu'est limitée l'existence du je, dans la régression à la recherche de ses fondements.

1.4. Aporie du doute et cogito — Quel est le chemin parcouru par Descartes par rapport aux stoïciens ?

J'ai montré que la maxime *Tout est incertain* doit être comprise, dans l'horizon de la pensée sceptique, comme une règle d'énonciations, amenée par le constat de la possibilité de faire des énoncés contradictoires du type *La réalité est telle*. Tout énoncé doit, selon les sceptiques, être affecté d'un caractère commun, à savoir l'énonciation distanciée, composante de leur sens. Le prédicat *incertain*, apparaissant dans l'énoncé, résume l'incertitude caractéristique de l'énonciation de ces propositions et, dans la visée sceptique, la maxime n'est surtout pas une conclusion énoncée sur le mode de l'affirmation.

En examinant la réfutation du scepticisme par les stoïciens, on remarque que ces derniers adoptent un appareil démonstratif analogue à celui qu'Aristote avait déployé pour justifier le principe de non-contradiction. **A l'intérieur d'une procédure apagogique, l'idée principale consiste à prolonger la découverte sceptique des rapports mutuels de l'énoncé et de l'énonciation.**

Regardons de plus près. Comme toute réduction à l'absurde, la démonstration comporte deux parties. Si le sceptique dit *Tout est incertain*, il comprend que toute énonciation d'un énoncé portant sur la réalité doit être distanciée. La maxime *Tout est incertain* est en réalité une description de l'énonciation de tout énoncé et, par là-même, une description du locuteur qui l'énonce. Puisque le sceptique généralise l'énonciation distanciée, il est naturel de dire que le locuteur de tout énoncé, tel qu'il est conçu par le sceptique, est caractérisé par un dire faible. En prolongeant le raisonnement, on se demandera de quel dire est soutenue la maxime elle-même. Or, puisque le locuteur est caractérisé pour les sceptiques par un dire faible, il n'est pas abusif d'étendre l'énonciation distanciée à la maxime même.

La seconde partie de la démonstration reprend l'idée d'Aristote³¹ de mettre en demeure l'adversaire du principe de non-contradiction de dire quelque chose. Comme les sceptiques disent *Tout est incertain*, les stoïciens prennent la maxime

pour un énoncé que les sceptiques essaieraient d'assurer en général. Or, tenir à dire quelque chose, c'est bien l'énoncer d'une énonciation engagée. Le même énoncé se voit ainsi affecté d'une énonciation engagée, décrivant un locuteur « fort ». Cette situation conduit à ce que j'ai appelé plus haut aporie du doute. En outre, comme le locuteur ne peut être à la fois fort et faible, et le même énoncé ne peut être dit avec distanciation et engagement, il s'ensuit que la maxime *Tout est incertain* est fausse.

Quels sont les présupposés de cette réfutation du scepticisme par les stoïciens ? Comme elle consiste dans une démonstration apagogique, elle repose, d'abord, sur le principe du tiers exclu, qui est une forme du principe de non-contradiction. La première partie de la démonstration utilise le principe découvert par les sceptiques mêmes, selon lequel le dit, ayant une relation constante au dire, doit être toujours pensé en relation avec celui-ci. La proposition *Tout est incertain* est une manière d'intégrer au sens de tout énoncé portant sur la réalité l'incertitude de l'énonciation le présentant. La seconde partie utilise le présupposé aristotélicien selon lequel, pour avancer quoi que ce soit, il faut se résoudre à le signifier sans équivoque. La même « décision du sens³² » qui fonde le principe de non-contradiction soutiendrait le dire engagé et décrirait un locuteur « fort ». Ce présupposé est lourd de la réfutation dialectique d'Aristote et laisse apparaître comme seul locuteur possible du discours rationnel le locuteur « fort », soutenant son dit. Il n'y aurait ainsi qu'une énonciation engagée qui est susceptible de constituer à proprement parler le locuteur.

Après avoir mis en évidence les préalables de la réfutation stoïcienne, on en comprendra mieux la portée. Le caractère absurde vient, en dernière analyse, de deux représentations opposées sur le locuteur. Du fait de la réduction à l'absurde, une fois les sceptiques muselés, leurs présupposés seront abandonnés. L'idée d'intégrer l'énonciation dans le sens de l'énoncé n'entrera plus en ligne de compte autrement que par le présupposé que tout énoncé « philosophique » est proféré avec la force de l'engagement. L'énonciation distanciée est bannie du langage philosophique et, avec elle, la représentation à l'intérieur de l'énoncé de la qualité de l'énonciation qui le présente.

Par rapport à la réfutation stoïcienne, j'ai montré que Descartes opérait une première modification, représentant dans l'énoncé l'image du locuteur, à travers le pronom *je*. Grâce à cette modification, il arrive à donner un statut à la catégorie du *je*, locuteur et sujet noétique, qui sera d'abord défini par l'énonciation (le dire). Au *je* en tant que dire, Descartes associera l'être, en lui donnant le statut philosophique de substance. A titre de confirmation, on verra dans les *Méditations* et dans le *Traité des passions de l'âme* que tout ce qui soutient l'énoncé se voit attribuer une dignité supérieure. Ainsi en est-il de l'idée *claire et distincte*, pour le plan épistémologique, et de la générosité, qui sur le plan de la philosophie pratique magnifie le rôle de la volonté.

Regardons dans le détail quel est le changement apporté par la mise en énoncé du sujet énonciateur. Dans les termes de la théorie de la polyphonie d'Oswald Ducrot³³, on pourrait parler du *je* sous un double angle : comme source de l'énonciation et comme être-du-monde. La reformulation cartésienne de la maxime sceptique a pour effet de faire coïncider les deux fonctions du locuteur, sous les traits du *je*. Si dans *Tout est incertain*, le locuteur restait en quelque sorte extérieur à l'énoncé, tout en le produisant, dans *Je doute de tout*, il est caractérisé par ce doute, selon l'énoncé même. Le rôle de l'énonciation est, à ce stade, selon qu'elle est engagée ou distanciée, de caractériser le *je*, en tant qu'être-du-monde, de manière plus ou moins précise. Toutes les caractéristiques présentes dans l'énonciation seront recueillies dans l'image de ce *je*, auquel Descartes attribue de l'être.

Voyons-en les étapes. En énonçant *Je doute de tout*, dans la première *Méditation*, Descartes se livre, comme nous l'avons vu, au doute sceptique. Le *je*, en tant qu'être-du-monde, est fait tout entier d'énonciation sceptique. Pour comprendre l'interprétation de cette étape, il est nécessaire de considérer la proposition *Je doute de tout* de la même manière que *Tout est incertain*, à savoir comme un résumé de positions énonciatives vis-à-vis d'énoncés du type *La réalité est telle*. Mais, de même que pour la maxime sceptique, le paradoxe fait que ce résumé énonciatif constitue à lui seul un énoncé. C'est là que Descartes développera sa seconde innovation par rapport aux stoïciens.

En passant du doute sceptique au doute hyperbolique, Descartes passe en réalité d'une énonciation distanciée de tout énoncé à une énonciation engagée par négation de tout énoncé. Le *je* est constitué, à ce stade, d'une énonciation engagée visant des contenus successifs, sur le modèle d'un dire fort du type aristotélien (on se rappelle la formule de la *Métaphysique* : « parler en soutenant la pensée de ce que l'on dit³⁴ »). Ce n'est qu'à l'étape suivante que Descartes arrive à déployer sa propre solution. En essayant de retourner le doute sur lui-même, Descartes arrive à évacuer tout contenu et essaie de transformer le dire engagé en contenu pour le nier aussi. S'il trouve qu'il est impossible de le nier, c'est qu'il le reconnaît comme un dire fort.

Le *je*, en tant qu'être-du-monde, est prêt à recueillir ce résultat. C'est lui qui se revendiquera de la certitude de l'énonciation engagée. Le *je* qui résulte de cette dernière opération est un dire fort, fait d'une énonciation engagée. Mais il n'est plus qu'une énonciation engagée, puisque le contenu de cette énonciation a pu être évacué. Ainsi, au bout de ces opérations, le dire seul est thématiqué comme catégorie apparaissant dans l'énoncé sous les traits du *je*. Aux côtés de l'acte équivalent, sur le plan noétique, il constitue ce que Descartes appelle l'âme ou la pensée.

De par les étapes successives de sa constitution, le *je* acquiert des caractéristiques précises. Dans la régression analytique entreprise afin de ruiner le scepticisme, Descartes brise avec la solution d'origine aristotélienne, déve-

loppée par les stoïciens. J'ai montré en effet que celle-ci consistait dans une réduction à l'absurde qui avait pour fin d'évacuer le rôle de l'énonciation dans la constitution du sens de l'énoncé. Descartes, tout en voulant réfuter le scepticisme, en accepte au contraire l'un des principes de base consistant à fonder le sens des propositions dans l'acte d'énoncer. Le *je doute donc je pense, je pense donc je suis* marque le passage de l'énonciation distanciée à la possibilité d'une énonciation engagée qui se soutient elle-même, de l'expérimentation d'un dire faible de tout à celle d'une certitude de soi du dire.

Ce passage de l'un à l'autre et l'autonomie que se voit conférer le dire à l'intérieur du projet cartésien sont, à mes yeux, des faits d'une importance capitale. Faut-il aussi rappeler que Descartes invite ses lecteurs à recommencer le cheminement du *cogito* toutes les fois que le besoin s'en présente ? Ce caractère itératif de la preuve montre bien qu'en arrachant l'énonciation à l'énoncé qu'elle porte, Descartes lui attribue non seulement une réalité à part, mais le degré le plus haut de réalité que nous puissions atteindre ici-bas. Voilà donc qu'une pensée de l'énonciation comme telle se fait jour, qui se fraiera son propre chemin dans la linguistique du XX^e siècle.

2. Les modèles de l'énonciation

2.1. Constitution du domaine — Lorsque Emile Benveniste introduisait le concept de sui-référence en linguistique³⁵, il le faisait afin de construire un domaine où la langue en tant qu'objet construit fasse intervenir la parole entendue comme activité de mise en fonctionnement de cette même langue, où le système puisse comprendre aussi des éléments de son propre usage. Un nouveau domaine venait de naître, la théorie de l'énonciation. Ce nouveau domaine permettait pourtant encore aux linguistes de conserver pour quelque temps la séparation saussurienne langue / parole pour le reste du champ linguistique³⁶. En effet, Benveniste assignait ainsi une place précise à la subjectivité, à l'intérieur de ce qu'il appelait lui-même l'appareil formel de l'énonciation, et rendait ainsi repérable, dans la matérialité du discours, les lieux que venait ainsi habiter de manière explicite le locuteur. Je me propose dans ces pages d'expliquer en quoi consiste cette sui-référence que Benveniste fut le premier à consacrer comme objet de la linguistique et quels en sont les fondements théoriques. Car en assignant à la subjectivité un lieu spécifique dans le texte, il en marquait aussi les limites et, par là-même, il niait une partie des présupposés philosophiques se trouvant à la base de sa démarche.

Si on tente une systématisation de la démarche de Benveniste dans son étude sur *Les relations de temps dans le verbe français*, en adoptant une proposition

générale de formalisation épistémologique d'Oswald Ducrot³⁷, on dira que le fait linguistique servant de point d'amorce est la concurrence du passé simple et du passé composé en français contemporain, soit, sur un exemple, la différence de sens entre les énoncés « il a fait un article » et « il fit un article ». Pour exploiter ce fait au service d'une théorie linguistique, il faut poser que l'apparition concurrente du passé simple et du passé composé fait apparaître une différence sémantique (ce qui est une hypothèse externe), qui, à son tour, est due à une opposition fonctionnelle du système de la langue, qu'il s'agit de mettre en évidence en formulant des hypothèses internes. Le modèle épistémologique que j'utilise ici a l'avantage de rendre possible une explication linguistique en termes de simulation d'un mécanisme supposé réel, mais inaccessible, ce qui, au stade de connaissance qui est le nôtre, permet un relativisme méthodologique plutôt agréable³⁸.

Fort de l'observation de ce fait à expliquer, Benveniste en arrive à poser son système d'hypothèses internes, à savoir l'existence d'un double régime du temps verbal, qu'il appelle mode de l'*histoire* et mode du *discours*, et dont l'intérêt consiste, entre autres, dans la construction d'un édifice formel impeccable, où les critères opérationnels sont les catégories du temps, de la personne et de l'aspect, subordonnés à la présence ou à l'absence de subjectivité comme trait marqué dans l'énoncé. Je n'insiste pas ici sur les beautés de cet édifice, dû à la fois à un grand linguiste et à un chef d'école; il me suffit de rappeler que pour Benveniste et pour ses continuateurs en théorie de l'énonciation, il existe deux imparfaits, selon que cette forme s'oppose au présent ou au passé simple, puisque dans le premier cas il y a une opposition de temps se manifestant à l'intérieur du mode du discours (régime où le trait subjectif est marqué), alors que dans le second il n'y a qu'une opposition aspectuelle, jouant à l'intérieur du régime de l'histoire, d'où les marques de la subjectivité sont absentes. Je rappelle enfin que, selon la même logique des deux modes d'énonciation, un énoncé tel que « je m'avançai et, au milieu des blés, je vis un épouvantail » est à interpréter comme une forme hybride, car associant un pronom personnel de première personne, réservé à la zone du discours, à l'emploi du passé simple, relevant du récit. L'explication dans les termes de la théorie de Benveniste en est que la forme *je* reprend, par une sorte de besoin d'identification de la personne, le *il* que, en mode du récit, le langage projette sur la personne que j'étais au moment où j'avais l'expérience visuelle en question. L'explication, dans les deux cas, du discernement de deux entités en une seule, et de l'unification de ce qui est double, est astucieuse. Toujours est-il qu'on peut se demander, avec Rivarol, si « le levier n'est pas plus lourd que le fardeau³⁹ ». Les coûts théoriques de cette explication ne sont-ils pas plus élevés que les faits dont elle permet de rendre compte? Le dédoublement des temps verbaux que l'on considérerait comme unitaires (l'imparfait, le plus-que-parfait, etc.) et la concentration

à l'intérieur du pronom personnel de 1^{ère} personne d'une référence à l'instance de l'énonciation et d'une référence tout court que l'on pourrait disjoindre à la faveur de l'articulation des deux modes ne sont-ils pas plus coûteux que ne l'est l'explication de la redondance de l'expression du passé défini?

On ne saurait répondre à ces questions en évitant de s'engager plus avant dans le système de Benveniste. Pour ma part, je me limiterai ici à évoquer un autre découpage qui me semble pertinent pour comprendre la manière de penser de Benveniste. Dans son article *Le langage et l'expérience humaine*, le fondateur de la linguistique de l'énonciation pose la fameuse tripartition conceptuelle du temps, comme temps physique, temps chronique et temps linguistique. Le temps physique n'est pas, selon Benveniste, objet de la linguistique; le temps chronique est une projection de l'axe propre du discours selon deux opérations fondamentales: l'avant et l'arrière.

Ainsi, alors que le dire du temps linguistique ne se fait qu'au travers de l'auto-référentialité de la parole, le temps chronique fixé dans la langue se constitue en l'éliminant et en posant à sa place une dimension mesurative, faite d'unités discrètes, dont la caractéristique principale est d'évacuer toute fluidité temporelle. Selon cette ligne de partage entre temps chronique et temps linguistique, *avant-hier* et *il y a deux jours* s'opposent l'un à l'autre selon qu'ils font ou non apparaître l'auto-référentialité de la parole. Benveniste fait remarquer le fait que le temps chronique est figé, car composé d'unités distinctes et immobiles, et qu'il n'est pas plus *temps* que le dénombrement des matières n'est lui-même matière, mais uniquement une suite de nombres.

Le véritable temps humain est, pour Benveniste, le temps linguistique et, par suite, le dire du temps ne se fait qu'au travers de l'auto-référentialité de la parole. C'est cette auto-référentialité qui fonde le temps linguistique, temps qui se spécifie à partir du présent fondateur — coïncidence de l'événement et de la parole — dans un système de temps verbaux, où le passé est projection du présent vers l'arrière, et le futur, projection du présent vers l'avant, dire de ce qui n'est plus ou dire de ce qui n'est pas encore.

Le dire du temps n'est donc qu'une projection, selon deux procédés différents, du temps du dire. Premièrement, le dire du temps peut se faire à partir du temps du dire. Il est alors soit le temps même du dire — le présent — soit des vues sur le temps projetées en arrière ou en avant. Deuxièmement, le dire du temps se fait en utilisant comme repère un moment du temps chronique, doté, par analogie avec le temps présent, d'un avant et d'un arrière, d'où cette fois-ci toute allusion à la coïncidence de l'événement et du discours est absente. Mais, on le voit, c'est toujours le présent qui fonde *in absentia* le récit. Ce dernier se constitue toujours grâce à l'évocation d'un avant et d'un arrière, mais rapportés à un moment qui figure, transféré dans le passé, le moment de la parole et qui devient le temps de l'événement narré. Dès lors le récit se trouve

sous le signe de l'analogie et de l'artifice, analogie, car l'avant et l'après opérant dans le discours structurent aussi le champ du récit; artifice, car la sui-référence n'emprunte plus les différentes séries de déictiques, mais apparaît masquée par le texte.

Ainsi, tout le problème du temps se ramène, pour Benveniste, à une manière propre de concevoir la subjectivité. Qu'est-ce que le sujet linguistique, puisque c'est l'apparition explicite de celui-ci dans le texte qui est responsable du clivage discours / récit et du partage temps linguistique / temps chronique? Au-delà de la *présence* de la subjectivité, alléguée par Benveniste, il faut se demander ce que c'est que se poser en sujet. C'est, me semble-t-il, *renvoyer à soi-même par le biais de son activité* (de parole ou autre). Le discours est le mode d'énonciation où le locuteur s'indique lui-même dans sa parole. Le *je* est fait de sui-référence. Le *je* (et non le moi) est source du temps, mais le *je* lui-même n'est rien d'autre, pour Benveniste, que renvoi à soi-même à travers l'exercice d'une activité. L'origine de cette manière de comprendre le *je*, et par là-même la subjectivité, le temps, et le discours se trouve, ainsi que je l'ai montré, dans le *cogito* de Descartes. *Je doute, je suis*: je suis en tant que, dans l'exercice de ma pensée, je renvoie à cet exercice; mon être est fait de renvoi et c'est la certitude de cette opération qui fonde la certitude du *je* en tant qu'instance transcendantale⁴⁰.

Seulement, et cet infléchissement est important, pour Benveniste il faut que ce renvoi se fasse dans des formes propres. C'est ce qu'il appelle *l'appareil formel de l'énonciation*. Le *je* se donne à voir dans le corps même du texte dans des endroits que le linguiste se doit de connaître. La sui-référence devient ainsi un problème de visibilité et c'est en dernier recours la possibilité de montrer ces lieux de manifestation qui, dressant la ligne de faille de l'énonciation, autorise le linguiste à camper le sujet dans l'avant et l'après d'une parole présente à elle-même, ou à l'évacuer de l'artifice d'un texte d'où ce même sujet semble être absent tout en le produisant.

Benveniste a eu le privilège de fonder une linguistique que j'appellerai dualiste, au sens où, par analogie avec le modèle cartésien du corps habité par l'âme, il a le premier essayé de mettre en évidence les lieux de ce corps par le biais desquels l'âme en modifie l'apparence. Le sujet se donne tout entier dans son discours au travers de toutes les catégories relevant directement de l'énonciation. Benveniste en dresse le répertoire, espérant ainsi assigner l'énonciation à son domicile, si on nous permet cette métaphore juridique.

Mais de même que le troisième régime dont parle Descartes dans une lettre à Elisabeth du 28 juin 1643, qui est le régime de l'union de l'âme et du corps, ne se connaît ni par l'entendement seul, comme on en ferait d'une pensée, ni par l'entendement aidé par l'imagination, comme est connue la substance étendue, de même il sera insuffisant de loger l'énonciation dans le seul appareil formel, sous peine de perdre de vue ce qui constitue son apparition originale. Descartes

pensait que la connaissance de l'homme était en quelque sorte contre nature, car précisément la nature de l'homme n'est pas simple, mais union. Ce que l'homme pouvait, à proprement parler, connaître était d'une part les corps, d'autre part la nature intellectuelle⁴¹. Quant à la possibilité de mener de front une réflexion sur le régime de l'union, son œuvre témoigne d'une hésitation que d'aucuns considèrent comme constitutive.

De retour à présent sur les oppositions élaborées par Benveniste, et sans en contester la pertinence opérationnelle, qu'il me soit permis de formuler les limites de cette approche. On conviendra de cette manière de concevoir l'être du sujet comme renvoi à soi par l'exercice d'une activité. Il me semble que c'est là un trait du cartésianisme dont la linguistique moderne ne pourrait se déprendre. Benveniste en a donné une expression scientifique bien distincte. Cependant il y a ajouté un ingrédient, inspiré peut-être d'une des solutions cartésiennes, contestable, au problème de l'union de l'âme et du corps. L'appareil formel de l'énonciation serait *mutatis mutandis* l'équivalent de la glande pinéale, c'est-à-dire d'un endroit du corps, qui donnerait passage à la pensée, mais dont le propre est l'extériorité et la visibilité. C'est cet ingrédient qui inspire à Benveniste une opposition nette entre discours et récit, entre temps linguistique et temps chronique, compte tenu du fait que le second terme de ces couples antinomiques ne laisserait pas voir l'énonciation dans des formes propres et distinctes.

J'ai essayé de montrer qu'il n'en était pas ainsi, même si le récit et le temps chronique sont à placer d'un cran plus loin sur une échelle qui prendrait son origine dans la sui-référence absolue. La linguistique de l'énonciation, une fois créée sur la base de la définition de la subjectivité comme renvoi à soi par l'exercice d'une activité, était lancée dans la voie des recherches concernant cette étrange union de l'énoncé et de l'énonciation.

Son identité profonde l'oblige à creuser la pensée de l'auto-référentialité de la parole, productrice, selon l'analyse proposée ici, de subjectivité. Oswald Ducrot et Alain Berrendonner ont mis chacun au point une théorie de l'interdépendance de l'énoncé et de l'énonciation, se proposant d'élargir l'étude des incidences de l'une sur l'autre, par rapport aux simples « traces » benvenistiennes de la subjectivité dans le langage. Il devient urgent de réfléchir pourquoi « le sens de l'énoncé est une représentation de son énonciation⁴² », pourquoi le corps entier de l'énoncé désigne l'acte de sa production, pourquoi il n'y a pas d'énoncé devant lequel on puisse gommer la question de son apparition.

2.2. Énonciation et actes de langage — Descartes serait ainsi à l'origine d'un dualisme de la linguistique moderne de l'énonciation. Benveniste fut le premier à essayer de lui assigner un contour plus précis. J'ai montré qu'il avait décidé de donner un « corps » à la sui-référence au moyen de l'appareil formel de l'énonciation.

2.2.1. Subjectivité et illocutoire — Un point intéressant qui éclaire le choix de Benveniste est sa position vis-à-vis de la théorie des actes de langage. Cette théorie fut connue en France grâce à un volume collectif publié en 1962⁴³, qui reproduisait les interventions lors d'un colloque ayant eu lieu à Royaumont. C'est en prenant connaissance de ces textes, plus précisément de la conférence du philosophe anglais J.L. Austin, intitulée *Performatif: constatif*, que Benveniste réagit, en 1963, par un article consacré à *La philosophie analytique et le langage*⁴⁴.

La conférence de Austin était une présentation de la première étape de sa théorie, à savoir de la découverte des énoncés performatifs. Il y définit l'énoncé performatif, par opposition à l'énoncé constatif, comme ayant la fonction d'effectuer une action. « Formuler un tel énoncé, c'est effectuer l'action, action, peut-être, qu'on ne pourrait guère accomplir, au moins avec une telle précision, d'aucune autre façon⁴⁵. » Les exemples qu'Austin prend pour illustrer les énoncés performatifs sont tous des performatifs explicites, c'est-à-dire des énoncés où l'acte réalisé au moyen de l'énoncé est inscrit dans l'énoncé même :

- (1) *Je baptise ce vaisseau Liberté.*
- (2) *Je m'excuse.*
- (3) *Je vous souhaite la bienvenue.*
- (4) *Je vous conseille de le faire.*

Ce type d'énoncé performatif permet d'identifier la nature de l'acte accompli en le prononçant, d'après la formule figurant en tête de l'énoncé à la première personne de l'indicatif présent. Ainsi « dire : *je promets de*, formuler, comme on dit, cet acte performatif, c'est là l'acte même de faire la promesse⁴⁶ ».

Mais, dans cette même conférence, Austin proposait d'élargir la catégorie de performatif aux énoncés ne présentant pas cette forme régulière, tels que :

- (5) *Fermez la porte.*

ou même

- (6) *Chien!*

inscrit sur un écriteau fixé sur un portail, argumentant que ces énoncés accomplissent, au même titre que les premiers, des actes, par exemple, un ordre et un avertissement. « Pour rendre performatif notre énoncé, et cela sans équivoque, continue Austin, nous pouvons faire usage, au lieu de la formule explicite, de tout un tas d'expédients plus primitifs, comme l'intonation, par exemple, et le geste. « Ces énoncés performatifs non explicites, Austin les appelle « performatifs primaires⁴⁷ ». La conclusion de Austin est que « nous ne pouvons attendre aucun critère verbal du performatif. Tout au plus pourrions-nous espérer que chaque énoncé qui est en effet performatif pourra être réduit (dans un sens quelconque de ce terme), à un énoncé dans l'une ou l'autre de nos formes normales (explicites)⁴⁸ ».

La réponse de Benveniste au texte de Austin est très éclairante pour sa conception de l'énonciation. Ainsi accepte-t-il tout de suite la distinction que Austin fait entre performatif et constatif, en l'intégrant dans ses propres vues. « En décrivant, il y a quelques années, les formes subjectives de l'énonciation linguistique, nous indiquions sommairement la différence entre *je jure*, qui est un acte, et *il jure*, qui n'est qu'une information⁴⁹ ». En effet, dans l'article cité, il écrivait : « L'énonciation *je jure* est l'acte même qui m'engage, non la description de l'acte que j'accomplis. En disant *je promets, je garantis*, je promets et je garantis effectivement. Les conséquences (sociales, juridiques, etc.) de mon jurement, de ma promesse, se déroulent à partir de l'instance de discours contenant *je jure, je promets*. L'énonciation s'identifie avec l'acte même. Mais cette condition n'est pas donnée dans le sens du verbe; c'est la "subjectivité" du discours qui la rend possible. On verra la différence en remplaçant *je jure* par *il jure*. Alors que *je jure* est un engagement, *il jure* n'est qu'une description, au même titre que *il court, il fume*⁵⁰. »

La notion de performatif, en effet, croise au plus près la notion benvenistienne de subjectivité. On se souvient que pour Benveniste, la subjectivité est la capacité du locuteur à se poser comme « sujet », donnant lieu ainsi à « l'émergence dans l'être d'une propriété fondamentale du langage⁵¹ ». Si celui qui accomplit un acte performatif est tenu à une responsabilité quelconque, c'est, pour Benveniste, en vertu d'une sui-référence de l'instance d'énonciation⁵².

Mais, de même que pour l'expression du temps, de l'espace ou de la personne, cette sui-référence engageant la responsabilité du locuteur se fera, pour Benveniste, dans des formes propres, c'est-à-dire dans un inventaire de formules performatives comprenant des verbes à l'indicatif présent, voix active, première personne. Par dérogation, Benveniste tiendra également pour performatifs les énoncés « implicitement mis au compte de l'autorité habilitée à les produire⁵³ », tels que :

- (7) *M. X est nommé ministre plénipotentiaire.*

En revanche, Benveniste n'accepte pas la proposition d'élargissement de la catégorie de performatifs, proposée par Austin, à des énoncés tels que (5) ou (6). De l'argumentation de Benveniste, structurée par plusieurs paliers, je retiens l'idée que ces deux énoncés (a) ne répondent pas à la condition d'un « modèle précis, celui du verbe au présent et à la première personne » et (b) « ne dénomment pas l'acte de parole à performer »⁵⁴.

Des analyses qui précèdent, je déduis **la nécessité, aux yeux de Benveniste, que la sui-référence se fasse dans des formes permettant de l'explicitier.** Dire *je* est, tout en renvoyant à soi-même, se désigner soi-même en tant que *je*. Utiliser le présent du discours, *je parle*, est, par la sui-référence de l'instance d'énonciation, créer le temps linguistique du présent. De même, dire *je te pro-*

mets est, utilisant le renvoi à sa propre parole, dénommer l'acte de langage que l'on accomplit.

Ce refus d'admettre les performatifs primaires comme performatifs est révélateur de la façon dont Benveniste comprend la sui-référence linguistique. En même temps qu'il renvoie à lui-même, le discours crée des images. Ces images caractérisent le locuteur, au sens où elles le *réalisent* dans le langage. Cette manière de voir est commune, me semble-t-il, à la linguistique de l'énonciation, tous représentants confondus. Ceux-ci se séparent, néanmoins, selon la manière dont ils comprennent ces images. Pour Benveniste, on voit qu'elles constituent un répertoire de formes bien définies. Ces formes ont en outre la qualité d'être des parties de l'énoncé. En d'autres termes, **dans le dualisme propre à Benveniste, l'énonciation se donne à voir dans une partie de l'énoncé.**

En réalité, Austin voulait aller beaucoup plus loin. Suivant son intuition originelle qui consistait à voir à l'œuvre dans les performatifs primaires le même principe que dans les performatifs explicites, il abandonna, à un second stade de sa réflexion, l'opposition entre performatifs et constatifs. À la place de celle-ci, il commença à parler d'une tripartition de tout acte de langage, selon les niveaux locutoire, illocutoire et perlocutoire⁵⁵. À ce stade, premièrement, tous les énoncés ont une composante illocutoire, c'est-à-dire, en les prononçant, on a l'intention d'opérer un changement dans le monde, intention qui est, d'une manière ou d'une autre, inscrite conventionnellement dans l'acte lui-même. Ainsi l'assertion devient une forme de l'illocutoire, utilisée pour faire comprendre au destinataire que l'on fait une assertion. Deuxièmement, les deux autres niveaux, le locutoire et le perlocutoire, n'en sont pas moins des actes, même si pour le perlocutoire il n'existe pas de convention régissant les différents effets que le locuteur pourrait obtenir. Troisièmement, l'acte locutoire se définit par un équilibre entre intention et convention⁵⁶ mais de par la nature de l'acte cet équilibre se fait autour d'expressions de la langue. Pour donner à comprendre que je veux exprimer le mot *chat*, je prononce le mot *chat*. Pour exprimer la voyelle *a*, je prononce la voyelle *a*. La réalisation de l'acte locutoire exige l'actualisation d'éléments de la langue, conformément à des conventions linguistiques. Une fois ces éléments actualisés dans l'acte locutoire, le sens produit est, pour Austin, le sens attaché précisément aux éléments actualisés.

Si Austin a abandonné l'opposition performatif-constatif et qu'il ait introduit le niveau illocutoire comme faisant partie de tout acte de langage, c'est en revanche parce qu'il n'estimait plus qu'il y eût, entre le contenu énoncé et ce que l'on fait en parlant, un rapport aussi étroit que le décrivait sa première notion de performatif explicite. À titre d'exemple, la même force illocutoire que l'on a dans le performatif explicite

(8) *Je te promets de venir.*

peut se réaliser, sous certaines conditions d'usage, dans des énoncés dont la forme est ambiguë, tels que

(9) *Je viendrai.*

ou

(10) *A demain!*

J'ai montré que pour Benveniste ces derniers énoncés ne sauraient être pris pour des performatifs. À mon sens, les raisons de Benveniste pour écarter les exemples de ce type ont trait à sa conception de la sui-référence. D'une part, il a tout de suite vu le caractère sui-référentiel des énoncés performatifs. D'autre part, en raison du dualisme caractérisant sa conception du sens, il limitait la sui-référence linguistique à des énoncés qui se dénommaient eux-mêmes au moyen d'une de leurs parties. **Mutatis mutandis, on peut dire qu'il comprend le fonctionnement de l'acte performatif sur le modèle de celui de l'acte locutoire.** Austin, en revanche, tout en soulignant le caractère sui-référentiel du performatif⁵⁷, assignait à cette sui-référence des limites plus larges.

2.2.2. Sui-référence et images de la sui-référence — Oswald Ducrot propose dans son interprétation de l'illocutoire une vision renouvelée de la sui-référence. Dans son article *Illocutoire et performatif*⁵⁸, il commence par montrer que la sui-référence benvenistienne reposait sur une illusion. Dans l'exemple

(11) *Je suis allé à Paris après toi,*

Je et *toi* sont certes des pronoms personnels de 1^{ère} et 2^e personne, mettant en relation les participants au dialogue. Cependant, ces personnages ne sont pas vus par l'énoncé en tant que tels, mais bien en dehors de leur activité de parole. La raison de l'emploi des pronoms personnels est, selon Ducrot, le principe d'économie. Il appelle ce type de formes *Je*² et *Tu*². En revanche, l'énoncé

(12) *Je te promets d'aller à Paris,*

en tant que promesse, met en relation le locuteur et le destinataire en tant qu'ils sont locuteur et destinataire de cet énoncé. Dans ce dernier exemple on dira que les pronoms représentent deux entités *Je*¹ et *Tu*¹, correspondant aux interlocuteurs en tant que tels⁵⁹.

À la faveur de cette distinction (dans *Le Dire et le dit*, il parlera de « locuteur en tant que tel » et « locuteur en tant qu'être-du-monde »), Ducrot arrive à introduire une ligne de faille entre le locuteur et le destinataire en tant que tels, représentant l'instance d'énonciation, et **leurs images dans l'énoncé.** C'est précisément cette ligne de faille qui lui permet de ne plus réduire la sui-référence à une réalisation dans le corps même de l'énoncé. « La valeur illocutoire de l'énoncé constitue donc une caractérisation juridique de l'énonciation, une prétention affichée à lui donner tel ou tel pouvoir. Dans la mesure où il a une valeur illocutoire, un énoncé a son énonciation pour thème: il la commente. Ce qui n'implique en rien que cette sui-référence ait un caractère explicite, littéral⁶⁰. »

Pour être conséquent avec ce partage entre énonciation et images que l'énonciation crée dans l'énoncé, il faudrait dire que dans l'énoncé

(8) *Je te promets de venir.*

il y a deux verbes *promettre* différents :

a) un *promettre*¹, qui est purement illocutoire, pour autant que l'énoncé

(9) *Je viendrai!*

prononcé dans des circonstances précises le contient aussi sans pour autant contenir la formule performative explicite et

b) un *promettre*², qui est le verbe performatif, et qui serait l'image projetée dans l'énoncé par le niveau illocutoire présent dans le *promettre*¹.

En séparant l'instance même de l'énonciation des images qu'elle peut projeter dans l'énoncé et, corrélativement, le commentaire par l'énoncé de sa propre énonciation des obligations juridiques qu'elle prétend engendrer, Ducrot en arrive à manier une conception beaucoup plus souple de la sui-référence. Celle-ci se spécifie désormais selon les modalités où le sens de l'énoncé comporte une allusion à son énonciation. Or l'appareil formel de l'énonciation en est une, naturellement, mais d'une manière plus indirecte que ne le croyait Benveniste. *Je* et *Tu* peuvent être utilisés dans le discours soit pour figurer les interlocuteurs en tant que tels, c'est-à-dire en tant qu'ils se définissent à partir du dialogue, soit leurs images en tant qu'êtres-du-monde.

La transformation que l'acte illocutoire accomplit concerne les interlocuteurs en tant que tels. Ainsi Ducrot peut-il affirmer : « un énoncé ne prend une valeur illocutoire que dans la mesure où il est sui-référentiel. Dire que l'énoncé E a servi à accomplir l'acte illocutoire A, c'est impliquer que dans le sens même de E, il y a une allusion à l'énonciation de E⁶¹ ». Dans

(13) *Je viendrai demain,*

par exemple, on peut voir, comme partie du sens de l'énoncé, une allusion, ou une description, dira plus tard Ducrot, dans *Le Dire et le dit*, de l'énonciation de cet énoncé. Si le sens de (13) est différent de celui de

(14) *Viendrai-je demain?*,

c'est en raison du fait qu'il est constitué par l'énonciation, à chaque fois différente, d'un même contenu, qui, dans certains cas, a la valeur de la promesse.

En posant la question

(15) *Qu'est-ce qu'a fait Pierre ce matin?*,

le locuteur en tant que tel présente sa parole comme créatrice d'obligations pour le destinataire en tant que tel. Mais, selon l'amendement que Ducrot fait à la formulation de Benveniste concernant la sui-référence des pronoms, ces obligations concernent uniquement les interlocuteurs en tant que tels, et non pas *Je* et *Tu* comme êtres-du-monde.

De cette conception de la sui-référence, il résulte :

1) que *Je* et *Tu* ne doivent pas nécessairement apparaître comme parties de l'énoncé pour se voir affectés d'obligations par suite de l'accomplissement d'actes illocutoires par le locuteur ;

2) que le langage ne fait que prétendre attribuer des obligations aux interlocuteurs, obligations que ceux-ci ont la liberté de ne pas relever. Si on tient par exemple la promesse qu'on a donnée autrefois, c'est qu'on s'identifie avec le rôle que l'accomplissement de l'acte de promettre a tracé au locuteur ;

3) que la sui-référence ne se fait pas toujours dans des formes propres, figurant comme parties de l'énoncé, mais peut concerner uniquement le locuteur et l'interlocuteur en tant que tels, même s'ils ne sont pas dénommés dans le discours ;

4) que les images benvenistiennes de la sui-référence, par exemple les formules performatives explicites, ne sont pas un phénomène originel, mais seulement un effet dérivé de la sui-référence⁶².

Par rapport à ces différents traits de la sui-référence, dans la conception d'Oswald Ducrot, une question intéressante surgit, relativement à l'orientation qu'ont prise ses recherches dans ces dernières années. A partir déjà des *Mots du discours* rédigé 1980 en collaboration avec quelques-uns de ses élèves, et puis, de *l'Argumentation dans la langue* écrit avec Jean-Claude Anscombe, Ducrot tente de construire une sémantique argumentative. Ses études sur différents connecteurs, la théorie des topoï, plus récemment la découverte des modificateurs déréalisants sont autant d'outils que Ducrot s'est donnés afin de justifier le choix théorique général selon lequel la phrase comporte des instructions à partir desquelles peut être calculé le sens de l'énoncé.

Aussi Ducrot se propose-t-il d'étudier de quelle façon certains éléments de la langue contraignent l'usage argumentatif des énoncés qui les contiennent. Ces contraintes sont des formes de sui-référence. Elles fournissent un objet d'étude très riche et les schématiser pose nombre de problèmes du plus haut intérêt.

Si l'on suit cependant l'itinéraire que je propose dans cet article, et si l'on accepte qu'il y a une analogie entre les actes illocutoires et l'argumentation, au sens où tant les uns que l'autre sont des phénomènes de sui-référence, il faudrait arriver à dire que les mots argumentatifs ne sont qu'un mirage provenant d'un fonds bien plus profond. Car, de même que les verbes performatifs sont une image projetée dans l'énoncé d'une obligation que l'énonciation même formule, de même les éléments argumentatifs devraient être tenus pour des reflets dans l'énoncé d'une argumentation conçue comme un effet originel de l'énonciation. Sur la trace de ce fonds argumentatif dû à un rapport interne de l'énoncé et de l'énonciation, les mots du discours joueraient le même rôle qu'ont eu les pronoms personnels et les verbes performatifs dans la découverte de la nature énonciative de la subjectivité et de l'illocutoire.

2.3. **Un regard sur l'énonciation** — Alain Berrendonner prend appui dans l'analyse de l'illocutoire par Ducrot, afin de développer une conception propre de la sui-référence. Dans son étude *Quand dire, ce n'est rien faire*⁶³, il prend le contre-pied de la théorie de Austin et fait le choix d'un « crédo représentationaliste », selon la formule de François Récanati⁶⁴, posant, à la suite de Frege et Russell que :

« a) la fonction sémantique primitive d'un énoncé est généralement de représenter (décrire, constater, dénoter...) un "état de choses" référentiel: le langage, comme code de signes, n'est donc qu'un tableau de la réalité;

b) lorsque "dire, c'est faire", la valeur d'acte que reçoit l'énoncé est dérivable de sa signification représentationnelle primitive: il s'agit là d'une valeur pragmatico-rhétorique figurée, et non de l'attestation d'une signification linguistique "propre" »⁶⁵.

La position théorique de Berrendonner est ainsi contraire aux présupposés fondamentaux de Ducrot, qui travaille à montrer que le langage peut être expliqué par une sémantique essentiellement argumentative.

Berrendonner articule une explication générale de l'illocutoire dans lequel il voit une valeur « A-substitutive » de l'énoncé, c'est-à-dire l'accomplissement substitutif dans le discours d'une action que le locuteur n'accomplit pas dans la réalité. Dans le cadre que s'est choisi Berrendonner, la valeur « A-substitutive » s'explique toujours par un rapport interne de l'énonciation à l'énoncé. Cependant, et là il adopte la position de Ducrot quant à l'illocutoire, Berrendonner croit aussi que cette valeur n'est pas une affaire de langue, au sens où « elle n'est pas marquée dans la phrase dont l'énonciation sert de substitut à l'acte⁶⁶ ».

Un énoncé tel que

(16) *Je donne mon livre à Jacques.*

est susceptible tantôt d'une interprétation A-substitutive (et alors l'énonciation de cet énoncé est le don même), tantôt d'une interprétation constative (l'énonciation étant alors la description d'un événement contemporain). On voit là que Berrendonner, en raison de son « crédo représentationaliste », ne suit pas Austin jusqu'à faire de l'assertion un acte illocutoire.

La question se pose de savoir ce qui fait choisir au destinataire la première interprétation au lieu de la seconde. Arrivé à ce point, Berrendonner fait appel à la solution de Ducrot (qui lui même avait extrapolé Benveniste au delà des performatifs explicites), consistant à dire que l'énoncé reçoit une interprétation illocutoire s'il peut apparaître, au cours de son énonciation, comme sui-référentiel, c'est-à-dire comme un commentaire de sa propre énonciation. Ce que Berrendonner reproche à Ducrot, c'est de n'avoir pas donné un critère pour déterminer quand un énoncé est sui-référentiel, c'est-à-dire quand il renvoie à sa propre énonciation. L'objection vient, selon moi, d'une différence quant aux choix théoriques de base, car, pour Ducrot, la sui-référence ne connaît pas

de bornes. Sur ce point, on peut dire que Ducrot suit Austin jusqu'au bout, au sens où il accepte de faire de l'assertion un acte illocutoire. Par conséquent, il ne dira pas qu'il y a des interprétations constatives d'un énoncé, d'où la sui-référence serait absente.

Berrendonner est lui aussi d'avis que l'illocutoire consiste en une interprétation sui-référentielle de l'énoncé. Mais, puisque l'illocutoire ne prend pour lui que des valeurs « A-substitutives », n'embrassant pas la totalité du discours, il lui appartient d'en expliquer l'apparition. Dès lors, il propose de mettre en place des règles inférentielles permettant d'interpréter un énoncé comme ayant une valeur A-substitutive, à chaque fois que l'interlocuteur remarque « une absence de référent capable de valider l'énoncé ». Transposée dans la théorie de l'implicite de H.P. Grice, l'illocutoire deviendrait, il me semble, une implicature déclenchée par le fait de bafouer la maxime de qualité⁶⁷.

Dans cette tentative d'expliquer l'illocutoire à partir d'une conception représentationnelle du langage, l'acte *locutoire* (qui est lui aussi énonciation) est déjà, à l'encontre de Austin, une prise en charge de l'énoncé. Berrendonner ne pose pas un acte illocutoire particulier comme acte « neutre » et toujours « premier », tel que, par exemple, l'acte d'assertion. En fait, la place d'un tel acte est détenue par l'acte locutoire, par lequel le locuteur s'empare d'une proposition (c'est-à-dire d'une structure conceptuelle dénotant un référent, candidate à la vérité ou à la fausseté), l'assume et la soumet à la validation d'autrui⁶⁸. En plaçant l'*assertion* au niveau du locutoire, Berrendonner vise à rendre compte des deux faits suivants :

a) que tout énoncé comprend un acte assertif;

b) que l'assertion a un caractère symptomatique, c'est-à-dire qu'elle n'est pas de l'ordre du dit, mais du *montré*, de l'*exhibé*, sans pour autant inscrire cet acte d'assertion dans le contenu énoncé, c'est-à-dire sans avoir à admettre que le contenu désigne réflexivement sa propre énonciation (position qui sera celle de Ducrot, dans ses recherches sur l'argumentation, à partir de 1980).

Ce *montré*, ou « marge du discours », comme l'appelle Récanati⁶⁹, est, pour Berrendonner, le domaine propre de l'énonciation. L'énonciation est avant tout une action, donc un fait, un élément de réalité. En outre, « elle est un geste, c'est-à-dire qu'elle a le statut sémiotique d'un symptôme: sa valeur signifiée s'exhibe sans se dire⁷⁰ ». Berrendonner n'accepte pas de voir du « montré » dans le contenu des énoncés, ni dans les verbes performatifs, ni dans le contenu des incidentes à signification métadiscursive. Pour lui, ces éléments, comme tout élément interne au contenu propositionnel, dénotent. Seul le comportement locutoire d'énonciation en relève, pour autant qu'il comporte une prise en charge spécifique du contenu exprimé, par exemple la valeur d'assertion. Ainsi, il n'y a rien qui « dit » l'énonciation; elle ne fait que se montrer.

Quels sont alors les rapports de l'énoncé et de l'énonciation? Dans une étude consacrée à l'ironie, publiée dans le même volume⁷¹, Berrendonner expose une

théorie générale de l'énonciation comme symptôme. Le symptôme peut être défini, à la suite de Peirce et Jakobson, comme un cas particulier d'indice, fondé sur une relation de partie à tout. En assignant à l'énonciation le statut d'un symptôme, Berrendonner arrive à rendre compte de plusieurs phénomènes énonciatifs. En effet, le symptôme se distingue par plusieurs traits :

a) le signifiant du symptôme tient lieu du signifié absent (comme dans toutes les formes du signe) ;

b) étant inclus (comme partie dans le tout) dans son signifié, il est l'un des attributs de ce qu'il signifie. « En tant que tel, il ne peut donc représenter sans qualifier quelque propriété attribuable à son signifié, et assure par là, nécessairement, une fonction authentiquement prédicative sur ce dernier⁷² » ;

c) dans certains cas, le signifiant et le signifié d'un symptôme peuvent s'identifier l'un à l'autre. Il s'ensuit que toute énonciation peut être considérée comme symptôme d'elle-même.

Bref, une énonciation est symptôme de l'énoncé tout en le commentant et, en outre, elle est symptôme d'elle-même en se commentant. Le premier niveau apparaît dans le cas des valeurs illocutoires de l'énoncé. Elles sont l'effet d'un commentaire prédicatif de l'énonciation sur le contenu de l'énoncé. Le second niveau devient visible dans toutes les formes de distanciation (ironie, paradoxes). Ainsi la distanciation semble-t-elle être pour Berrendonner une ressource supplémentaire de l'énonciation qui se commente elle-même, avec un effet de surprise quant à l'interprétation.

Quelles sont ainsi les nouvelles formes du dualisme que nous avons surpris chez Benveniste ? Selon Berrendonner, l'énonciation est une actualisation dans le monde des *realia* du contenu de l'énoncé. La sui-référence est double. Il y a premièrement l'effet de l'énonciation sur l'énoncé, en tant que commentaire du dit par le dire, lui assignant les valeurs illocutoires et argumentatives les plus diverses. Il y a ensuite une dépendance de la valeur argumentative de l'énonciation de la nature du contenu énoncé.

Notes

1. Pour une introduction dans l'ensemble de la problématique de l'énonciation, voir les articles récents de Oswald Ducrot dans le *Nouveau dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du langage*, Paris, Seuil, 1995 (sous la direction de O. Ducrot et J.M. Schaeffer).

2. Pour un aperçu de la problématique qu'engendre cette opposition, voir, par exemple, Étienne Gilson, *Linguistique et philosophie. Essai sur les constantes philosophiques du langage*, Paris, Vrin, 1969.

3. O. Ducrot, *Le Dire et le dit*, Paris, Minuit, 1984.

4. La définition du scepticisme par Sextus Empiricus fait valoir l'itinéraire proprement sceptique : « Le scepticisme est une faculté, un pouvoir d'opposer représentations sensibles (φαινομενα) et conceptions intellectuelles (νοουμενα) de toutes les manières possibles, pour

en arriver, étant donné l'égalité propre aux choses sensibles et aux raisons, d'abord à l'équilibre mental qui caractérise la suspension du jugement (εποχη) et ensuite à la quiétude de l'âme (αταραξια). » (*Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes*, I, 8. J'utilise le volume édité et traduit par J.P. Dumont, *Les Sceptiques grecs*, Paris, P.U.F., 3^e éd., 1992.). On ne saurait penser le scepticisme, *stricto sensu*, en dehors des étapes de ce parcours, qui se sont cristallisées dans la tradition des penseurs sceptiques, pour aboutir dans la présentation de Diogène Laërce et dans les traités de Sextus.

5. Vlad Alexandrescu, *Le Paradoxe chez Blaise Pascal*, Berne, Peter Lang, 1996, p. 11–27.

6. *Ibidem*, p. 69–100. J'utiliserai dans ces pages les notions d'énonciation engagée et d'énonciation distancée, que j'appellerai quelquefois *énonciation forte* et *énonciation faible*, selon la typologie à laquelle je viens de renvoyer.

7. *Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes*, I, 192.

8. *Ibidem*, I, 15.

9. A titre d'exemple, ce passage de Sextus : « La formule *pas plus ceci que cela* définit notre état d'âme (παθος) : en vertu de l'égalité des pressions exercées sur nous par des raisons contraires, nous sommes conduits à la quiétude. Par *égalité* nous désignons le sentiment d'une égale probabilité de nos représentations, par *contraires* nous entendons généralement en conflit, par *quiétude* : le refus de donner notre assentiment à telle ou telle raison. », *ibidem*, I, 188.

10. *Seconds Académiques*, I, 12, 45.

11. Cf. ci-dessous, note 15.

12. *Premiers Académiques*, II, IX, 28 in *Les Stoïciens*, trad. par E. Bréhier, revu par V. Goldschmidt, édité sous la direction de P.M. Schuhl, Paris, Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1983.

13. *Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes*, I, VII, 14.

14. Cf. aussi ce qu'en dit Sextus : « Quand le sceptique déclare que *tout est indéterminé*, le verbe *être* désigne l'*être-représenté* ; par le mot *tout*, il faut entendre non pas ce qui existe, mais plus précisément les objets appartenant aux obscures recherches des dogmatiques, qu'il lui a été donné d'examiner, et par le mot *indéterminé*, il faut entendre qu'aucune des représentations contraires, ou en quelque sorte entrant en lutte, ne mérite qu'il y ajoute ou non foi. », *Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes*, I, 198.

15. Dans ma typologie des paradoxes, j'appelle ce cas particulier *aporie du doute*, voir *Le paradoxe chez Blaise Pascal*, p. 234 et 235, et, pour le commentaire, p. 77–79.

16. Sur le rôle de l'intellect agent, consulter Ștefan Vianu, *Intellect humain et science divine chez Aristote*, article en instance de publication.

17. Voir, entre autres, Alan M. Boase, *The Fortunes of Montaigne. A History of the Essays in France, 1580–1669*, London, Methuen & Co., 1935 ; Rosalie L. Colie, *Paradoxia epidemica. The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966 ; Richard H. Popkin, *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979.

18. A l'intérieur de l'immense bibliographie cartésienne à ce sujet, je tiens particulièrement à renvoyer aux deux volumes d'Henri Gouhier, *Essais sur Descartes*, Paris, Vrin, 1937 et *La pensée métaphysique de Descartes*, Paris, Vrin, 1969.

19. Descartes, *Oeuvres et lettres*, textes présentés par André Bridoux, Pléiade, 1952, p. 268.

20. *Le Paradoxe chez Blaise Pascal*, p. 71.

21. Descartes, *op. cit.*, p. 271.


22. *Ibidem*.

23. *Ibidem*.

24. *Ibidem*, p. 272, c'est moi qui souligne.

25. *Ibidem*.
26. *Ibidem*.
27. Francis Jacques, *Dialogiques. Recherches logiques sur le dialogue*, Paris, P.U.F., 1979, p. 121.
28. Jean-Luc Marion, *L'altérité originaire de l'ego*, in *Questions cartésiennes II*, Paris, P.U.F., 1996.
29. Descartes, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
30. *Ibidem*, p. 275, c'est moi qui souligne.
31. *Métaphysique*, livre *Gamma*, 3, 1006 a 13–28.
32. B. Cassin, *La décision du sens*, in Aristote, *La Métaphysique, le livre Gamma*, introduction, texte, traduction et commentaire par Barbara Cassin et Michel Nancy, Paris, Vrin, 1989.
33. O. Ducrot, *Le Dire et le dit*, chap. VIII, *Esquisse pour une théorie polyphonique de l'énonciation*.
34. *Métaphysique*, livre *Gamma*, 1005 b 23–26.
35. J'utilise les articles de E. Benveniste, *Les relations de temps dans le verbe français, La nature des pronoms, De la subjectivité dans le langage, L'appareil formel de l'énonciation, Le langage et l'expérience humaine*, publiés dans les années 1956–1970 dans différentes revues, puis rassemblés dans *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, I et II, Paris, Gallimard, 1966, 1974.
36. O. Ducrot, art. *Énonciation*, dans le *Nouveau Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences su langage*, *ed. cit.*
37. O. Ducrot, *Analyse de textes et linguistique de l'énonciation*, in Ducrot et al., *Les Mots du discours*, Paris, Minuit, 1980, p. 7–56.
38. Rappelons que ce projet épistémologique est au demeurant strictement cartésien. L'explication physique de Descartes était volontairement contingente. Il se proposait de « feindre un nouveau Monde » plutôt que de parler directement du vrai. Entre plusieurs hypothèses, le choix devait porter sur celle qui permettait d'obtenir une explication simple et complète des phénomènes (*Le Monde*, ch. VI, *Discours*, 5^e partie, *Dioptrique*, *Discours premier, L'Homme*). A cet aspect contingent, faisait suite un aspect essentiel, car la science a une certitude « morale » ou « plus que morale » (*Principes*, 4^e partie, art. 205 et 206) que Descartes revendique sur le plan métaphysique. Voir la belle introduction de Pierre Guenancia, dans *Descartes*, Paris, Bordas, 1986.
39. A. Rivarol, *Oeuvres choisies*, tome 1, Paris, Flammarion, 1924, p. 292.
40. De même que Descartes se demande, après la présentation du *cogito*, si le monde extérieur existe et s'il y a d'autres sujets, de même apparaît chez Benveniste la question troublante de savoir pourquoi, dans une conversation, *mon passé* et *mon futur*, par rapport à *mon présent* sont acceptés par mon interlocuteur comme *passé, futur*, etc. Si Descartes résolvait la question en invoquant la véracité divine, Benveniste la tranche en faisant apparaître l'appareil formel de l'énonciation, un inventaire de formes permettant à l'interlocuteur de reconnaître la présence du locuteur à sa parole.
41. Descartes renvoie Elisabeth dans cette même lettre à « la notion de l'union que chacun éprouve toujours en soi-même sans philosopher; à savoir qu'il est une seule personne, qui a ensemble un corps et une pensée, lesquels sont de telle nature que cette pensée peut mouvoir le corps, et sentir les accidents qui lui arrivent ». Les phénoménologies actuelles se proposent d'exploiter cette troisième voie de connaissance, qui serait une manière de vivre pleinement. Voir la grande thèse de Denis Kambouchner, *L'homme des passions*, 2 tomes, Paris, Albin Michel, 1995.
42. O. Ducrot, *Le dire et le dit*.

43. *La philosophie analytique*, Paris, Minuit.
44. Repris dans *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, I, p. 267–276.
45. *La philosophie analytique*, p. 271.
46. *Ibidem*.
47. *Ibidem*, p. 285.
48. *Ibidem*, p. 275.
49. *Problèmes...*, I, p. 270.
50. *Ibidem*, p. 265.
51. *Ibidem*, p. 260.
52. On a du mal à expliquer pourquoi Benveniste refuse d'accorder le statut de performatif à un énoncé prononcé par une personne n'ayant pas l'autorité nécessaire pour le faire de manière heureuse. On sait que pour lui quelqu'un qui crierait sur la place publique: « je décrète la mobilisation générale » faute de l'autorité requise, ne fait entendre qu'un propos se réduisant à « une clameur inane, enfantillage ou démençe » (*Problèmes*, p. 273). Après avoir opté pour une position qui consiste à voir les obligations que l'acte de langage crée au sujet parlant comme découlant de la sui-référence greffée sur la formule performative explicitant l'acte, on peut reprocher comme une inconséquence à Benveniste d'avoir posé aussi des conditions sociales à l'accomplissement de l'acte. A ce propos, voir aussi l'analyse de O. Ducrot, *Illocutoire et performatif*, dans *Dire et ne pas dire*, Paris, Hermann, troisième édition, 1991: « soutenir une telle thèse, c'est pousser jusqu'à l'extravagance l'aspect normatif de la linguistique », p. 285.
53. *Ibidem*, p. 272.
54. *Ibidem*, p. 275.
55. J.L. Austin, *Quand dire, c'est faire*, Paris, Seuil, 1970.
56. Selon la mise au point de P.F. Strawson, *Intention and Convention in Speech-Acts*, *The Philosophical Review*, 1964
57. Dans l'article cité, il remarque: « si quelquefois on se demande, ce qui peut arriver, si un énoncé quelconque de cette forme-ci est performatif ou plutôt constatif, on résoudra la question en se demandant si l'on peut insérer quelque phrase qui équivaille au mot anglais *hereby*, c'est-à-dire "par ces mots-ci" » (p. 273). Bien qu'Austin propose ce test pour distinguer les énoncés performatifs des énoncés constatifs, à la lumière de l'extension des performatifs à l'ensemble de l'illocutoire, il faut comprendre cette sui-référence comme caractérisant l'illocutoire en général.
58. Datant de 1977, mais revu et corrigé pour la troisième édition de *Dire et ne pas dire*, Paris, Hermann, 1991.
59. *Ibidem*, p. 290.
60. *Ibidem*, p. 292.
61. *Ibidem*, p. 291.
62. Elles ont « le même type de réalité qu'un mirage », écrit Ducrot, p. 295.
63. *Éléments de pragmatique linguistique*, Paris, Minuit, 1981, p. 75–137.
64. *La Transparence et l'énonciation*, Paris, Seuil, 1979
65. *Ibidem*, p. 78.
66. *Ibidem*, p. 107.
67. H.P. Grice, *Logic and Conversation*, in P. Cole, J.L. Morgan (éd.), *Syntax and Semantics*, 3, 1975, p. 41–58.
68. Berrendonner, *op. cit.* p. 121.
69. *Ibidem*.
70. *Ibidem*, p. 121.
71. *Ibidem*, p. 173–239.
72. *Ibidem*, p. 218.



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Devastatio Constantinapolitana

Figures de l'altérité et choc des cultures dans l'imaginaire religieux de la Quatrième Croisade

...sachez que nous ne sommes pas venus vous nuire, mais nous sommes venus pour vous protéger et vous défendre si vous faites ce que vous devez ; si vous ne le faites pas, nous vous ferons le pis que nous pourrons.

VILLEHARDOUIN

I. Les faits et les discours

Fait pèlerin inscrit dans la longue durée des attentes eschatologiques, incarnation d'un esprit chevaleresque international, champ militaire où s'affrontent, sans jamais se figer dans une hiérarchie stable, la fascination de l'Orient et la haine de l'Infidèle, carrefour des discours pastoraux et des stratégies commerciales, le phénomène des Croisades demeure, au-delà de ses distorsions et de ses reculades, l'événement fondateur de ces Temps Modernes dont la dynamique saura se dégager progressivement, à travers la scolastique, l'humanisme et la Réforme.

Loin de se réduire à la dérive héroïque des foules se précipitant vers une Jérusalem largement mythisée, loin de s'épuiser dans l'expansion quasiment coloniale censée exprimer la logique globale de cette violence épisodique, les Croisades nous présentent également la dramaturgie d'une quête identitaire et l'occasion d'un brassage culturel dont les conséquences lointaines se retrouvent quelque peu dans l'actuel partage de la Méditerranée entre les deux Europes et le monde islamique. C'est justement cette quête — fondée sur un obscur désir de légitimation — qui pourrait expliquer, autant que faire se peut, le détournement survenu en avril 1204, lorsque les chefs francs de la IV^e Croisade organisèrent le sac de Constantinople, en s'emparant ainsi non seulement d'une ville et de ses richesses universellement enviées, mais aussi d'un symbole autour duquel toute une cosmographie spirituelle du christianisme s'était, jusqu'alors, organisée. Malgré ses apparences accidentelles, cette « gloire honteuse » — immédiatement scellée par des massacres et des profanations dont certains témoignages contemporains nous transmettent la navrante description¹ — avait été longuement préparée par les mésententes théologiques, les conflits d'autorité et les accrochages diplomatiques si abondamment présents dans la chronique des relations entre les Occidentaux et les Byzantins, depuis la période iconoclaste et les controverses pneumatologiques du temps du patriarche Photius, jusqu'aux dérapages inhérents aux deux premières Croisades, en passant par le Grand Schisme de 1054.

L'histoire des tensions mentionnées à l'instant avait subrepticement mis en place une morphologie de l'altérité forgée par des perceptions uniformisées et

des schémas livresques dont nul ne saurait nier la signification anthropologique : il est question d'une *création* lourde de conséquences socioculturelles que l'on devra approfondir un jour (à travers une grille interdisciplinaire) et dont le présent travail ne fait qu'ébaucher les grandes lignes.

Amplement illustrée depuis l'école vénitienne jusqu'aux peintres romantiques français, la prise de Constantinople par les Latins constitue l'exemple idéal du *fait* historique qui *se fait* en tant qu'objet intellectuel béant². L'analyse de cette trauma originaire se heurte d'emblée à une configuration fantasmatique, à des jugements périmés et surtout aux impondérables de la longue durée dont l'amalgame produit un curieux effet d'opacité.

Comment expliquer les écarts significatifs creusés entre cette mythologie (paradisique) de la Croisade et la facticité (destructrice) des agissements ? De quelle façon éclaircir, sans recourir à un facile déterminisme rétroactif, l'écroulement d'un mythe — celui de la *urbs regia* — qui avait pourtant si bien structuré, au fil des siècles, l'imaginaire politique des sociétés chrétiennes ? Quel effet pervers a-t-il pu se mettre en œuvre pour que l'antique *unanimitas imperii* — but supposé de la dynastie théodosienne³ — ainsi que le noble principe du pèlerinage pénitentiel⁴ puissent céder le pas à cette *partitio Romaniae* qui allait douloureusement s'opérer après la chute de la Nouvelle Rome ? Voilà autant de questions restées non pas sans réponse, puisque la bibliographie du sujet ne cesse de s'accroître, mais plutôt en dehors de toute interprétation consensuelle.

On s'accorde sur la « complexité objective » des relations culturelles établies, *pax constantiniana* oblige, entre l'Orient byzantin et l'Occident latin. Si ces relations nous échappent généralement ce n'est pourtant pas en raison de leur ouverture vers plusieurs niveaux de réalité, mais plutôt à cause du fait qu'elles furent modelées sinon déformées par certains stéréotypes que byzantinistes et médiévises se sont chargés de nous léguer sans le moindre souci critique⁵.

Peu nombreux furent, en effet, ceux qui (spécialistes des Croisades ou historiens de l'Église) résistèrent à la tentation de moraliser l'épisode de 1204, en dressant la liste des coupables comme si le Jugement Dernier n'aurait pas suffi pour que ces accusés — Italiens « perfides », Francs « illettrés » ou Byzantins « décadents » — expiassent leurs crimes. On a déploré ainsi une fracture de la chrétienté médiévale qui allait entraîner par la suite celle(s) de l'Europe moderne. On a dénoncé l'instrumentalisation idéologique d'une guerre sainte qui corrompait elle-même la pratique jadis irréprochable, car foncièrement pacifique, des pèlerinages⁶. Et l'on s'aperçoit qu'au-delà des anciennes rivalités confessionnelles, la gestion symbolique du mythe de la Croisade repose encore sur des attitudes passionnelles, voire partisans lesquelles aboutissent à des représentations historiennes par trop souvent réductrices.

Dans la mêlée, la notion même de « Croisade » subit des extrapolations et des raccourcis sémantiques dictés soit par la volonté justificatrice des uns, soit

par l'appétit culpabilisateur des autres. D'aucuns pensent la Croisade comme militarisation du fanatisme : l'idée se retrouve ainsi complètement politisée, et partant sécularisée. Certains estiment qu'il s'agit d'un idéal religieux fatalement déprécié : il n'y aurait jamais eu de Croisade véritable, mais uniquement des projets avortés.

Selon les acteurs eux-mêmes, est Croisade toute « guerre juste » menée sous le signe de la vraie foi, mais qui décide de la justesse des comportements et à qui se fier quant à l'authenticité des croyances ? Et surtout, qui fut, dans ce formidable choc historique, le héros civilisateur de l'Autre ?⁷

Cette ambiance nébuleuse s'explique assez facilement : d'abord, les auteurs des premières chroniques étaient aussi les protagonistes des aventures consignées ; nul parmi ces témoins qui, tels Villehardouin ou Nicéas Choniates, faisaient ou plutôt subissaient l'histoire pour immédiatement la transcrire, n'aurait pu bénéficier du recul exigé par toute critique « impartiale » : ils se retrouvaient tous là, au cœur d'une utopie réalisée semblablement par la bravoure militaire et par les agréments du style. Ensuite, les enjeux (l'unité de l'Église⁸, retrouvée sur fond de francocratie, au détriment de l'Islam) furent trop importants pour qu'une véritable sérénité puisse marquer la postérité immédiate de la Croisade. Enfin, l'Europe moderne supporte toujours, sous une forme certes atténuée, mais néanmoins révélatrice, la tension entre l'Islam, l'orthodoxie et le catholicisme romain dont la récente confrontation, grandeur nature, certifia tragiquement la vitalité d'une concurrence plus que millénaire. Il semble logique, dès lors, que l'« observation participante » recommandée en anthropologie gagne, au cours des enquêtes concernant l'imaginaire de la IV^e Croisade, une allure plus ou moins polémique.

Initiée il y a plus d'un siècle⁹, la controverse scientifique suscitée par cet événement est loin d'être épuisée. Deux théories se disputent notamment la vedette :

1) *La théorie de la préméditation* inspirée par E. Winkelmann¹⁰ et reprise depuis par P. Riant¹¹, J. Tessier¹², L. Bréhier¹³, R. Grousset¹⁴ et Th. Uspensky¹⁵. D'une part, les tenants de cette hypothèse affirment que les instigateurs (et les principaux bénéficiaires) du détournement de la Croisade furent les Vénitiens, la plus lourde responsabilité revenant, en l'occurrence, à Philippe de Souabe.¹⁶ D'autre part, ils semblent exacerber la séparation des deux chrétientés, en supposant que toutes les querelles dogmatiques et les animosités tactiques antérieurement refoulées, ont finalement trouvé une échappatoire dans la politique du fait accompli. Pour ces défenseurs ingénus de l'« Histoire naturelle », le détournement de la Croisade se fit à l'encontre de l'ordre établi, au prix d'une violence monstrueuse car artificielle : c'est la rhétorique de « l'aberration calculée » qui présente le complot des croisés sous les dehors de « l'assassinat politique ». D'ailleurs, telle fut l'interprétation des événements donnée par les Byzantins eux-mêmes qui pensaient que « les plus simples » des Croisés (*tôn*

haploustéron) étaient animés par le désir véritable d'adorer les Lieux Saints, alors que les barons latins ne sont que des hypocrites avides des conquêtes.¹⁷

2) *La théorie des circonstances fortuites (Zuffalstheorie)* qui affirme que la capitale byzantine fut prise à l'improviste, par le simple jeu du hasard et des opportunités imprévisibles.¹⁸ Ceux qui y adhèrent parlent plutôt d'une guerre civile menée dans une aire multiculturelle théoriquement unifiée par l'Évangile, mais pratiquement divisée à cause de la réelle décadence de l'Empire oriental. Du coup, « l'assassinat » se fait « nécropsie », la rhétorique ici engagée étant plutôt celle du « fruit mûr », inévitablement cueilli par les chevaliers occidentaux. Au bout d'une démarche historiographique apparemment explicative et profondément irrationnelle, on nous invite ainsi à choisir entre un projet humain criminel et une fatalité aveugle : sombre alternative.

Quoi qu'il en soit, avril 1204 déclare la pathologie d'un émerveillement collectif ayant comme point de mire un Orient raconté, imaginé, mirobolant et enviable. Cette fascination ne saurait certes manquer dans une histoire de l'ethnologie européenne conçue comme lente découverte, voire invention d'une altérité tour à tour inquiétante et envoûtante¹⁹.

Nous savons aujourd'hui que ladite ethno-mythologie focalisée *in partibus transmarinis* n'est pas strictement liée au phénomène des Croisades et qu'il faut remonter au moins jusqu'à des textes tels que la *Chanson de Roland*, le *Pèlerinage de Charlemagne à Jérusalem*, la *Cosmographie* d'Ethicus sinon la *Peregrinatio Aegeriae*²⁰ pour puiser aux vraies sources d'une exaltation fabulatrice et descriptive dont la motivation inconsciente fut probablement celle de trouver une contrepartie solaire au sombre imaginaire celtique des populations occidentales²¹.

En réalité — et sans surprise, puisqu'il s'agissait encore, du moins en principe, d'un *oekoumène* chrétien²² — les échanges en tout genre furent spontanément souhaités et politiquement régularisés, de façon que le mutisme des sources non-byzantines datant du premier millénaire devrait être imputé à la banalisation des contacts plutôt qu'à leur hypothétique singularité : effet d'une distanciation volontaire ou forcée, dépaysement spirituel qui n'est pas sans rappeler la *xénitéia* des anciens moines gyrovagues, ce fameux « émerveillement » générateur de mythologie orientale n'allait se manifester que sur fond de provincialisme culturel et sous l'autorité d'une monarchie papale qui — *Donatio Constantini* et autres ustensiles à l'appui — savait si bien entériner le prestige englobant de sa « catholicité ». Mais, à la différence de l'exotisme condescendant qu'allait susciter, en pleine Renaissance, la découverte du Nouveau Monde, l'engouement des Latins du XIII^e siècle face aux richesses (réelles ou supposées) de l'Orient byzantin et « sarrasin » fut fait de rage, d'envie et de bovarysme narcissique beaucoup plus que d'admiration désintéressée et de vocation assimilatrice.

Nous disposons d'une bibliographie si considérable à propos du contexte historique, militaire, socioculturel et économique de la IV^e Croisade qu'il serait inutile d'en reconstituer ici le décor événementiel en termes d'histoire quan-

titative : d'aucuns ont expliqué la défaite des Grecs par une furtive corrosion de la base sociale de l'Empire manifestée dès le XI^e siècle²³. D'autres se sont plu à psychanalyser les ressentiments des acteurs²⁴. Pour ce qui nous concerne, nous préférons investiguer ici uniquement les mentalités mises en œuvre dans le « drame historique » de 1204, bien qu'au bout du compte, cette notion s'avère être tout aussi fuyante.

II. Cosmographie politique et messianisme ethnocentrique à Byzance

La mentalité des Byzantins confrontés au phénomène de la Croisade correspondait encore à un « monde enchanté » : univers clos, où géographie et axiologie se superposent et dont la diachronie est mystiquement englobée dans la sphère de l'Histoire sainte. Il semble établi que l'institution de la Croisade contredisait brutalement cet édifice imaginaire. Quant à elle, la IV^e Croisade provoque une faille dramatique dans ce système laborieusement consolidé au cours du premier millénaire chrétien. Dans ces conditions, le discours des élites byzantines contemporaines de la catastrophe (critiques, chroniques, prophéties, lamentations, commentaires, réactions ponctuelles) tente de restaurer l'intégrité d'une vision menacée et se pose comme fidèle transcription d'une cosmographie politique qu'il s'agit de sauvegarder à tout prix. Quelles étaient donc les coordonnées de ladite vision ?


On rencontre d'emblée l'archaïque dualité entre les Grecs et les Barbares. Ce couple antinomique et complémentaire, constitué à l'époque des Guerres Médiques (V^e s. av. J.-Chr.), représente le noyau dur de l'*Ordre établi* à Byzance, car c'est autour de lui que s'organise l'imaginaire anthropologique des élites byzantines. En tout cas, il traduit le rapport hiérarchique entre les forces en présence²⁵.

D'une part, on exalte la bonne grecité du Byzantin, qui détient *naturaliter* non seulement le monopole de la Raison et de la Civilisation, mais aussi le summum des vertus chrétiennes. D'autre part, on déplore — *progymnasmata* à l'appui — les vices innés du Barbare, qui se trouve être cruel (*apénés*), malveillant (*dusménés*), violent (*drimús*), sanguinaire (*haimocharés*), inhumain (*omonoos*) et finalement monstrueux (*drakontodes*)²⁶. Ces traits s'expliquent par le désir d'établir un contraste entre la nature réfléchie et rationnelle du « civilisé » et celle, irrationnelle, du « barbare ». On l'a dit et redit, ce système de l'altérité admet des nuances, dans ce sens que l'on peut tolérer les « bons sauvages » (tels les Arabes, cruels comme des enfants, mais finalement, « bons enfants »), alors que l'on doit réprimer les « mauvais », ordinairement identifiés aux « races sans honneur²⁷ » (les Normands et les Francs)²⁸. Le « Barbare » n'est pas vraiment une


personne déterminée une fois pour toutes: mal nécessaire, il valorise plutôt, par contraste, le bien-fondé du *statu quo*.

Qui plus est, la réalité s'avère être plus flexible que ses modèles culturels, de façon que au-delà des tropismes xénophobes, l'on rencontre, dans la vie quotidienne, des sympathies et un humanisme en herbe variablement marqués par une espèce d'universalisme englobant²⁹.

Il faut prendre en compte, ensuite, la doctrine de *la famille des princes et des peuples*, traduisant, en termes fonctionnels, la conception de l'État comme *patrimonium*³⁰.




Succédant à des théories anciennes reprises à l'époque hellénistique, cette conception — pleinement maturisée au X^e siècle, grâce au traité *De caeremoniis* — faisait de la pyramide du pouvoir terrestre une réplique de l'autocratie ouranienne assumée par le Christ. Le vocabulaire du protocole impérial atteste par ailleurs la « consubstantialité » métaphorique liant la personne du basileus à celle du Seigneur: sa nomination est « opérée par la Trinité » (*problema tēs Triados*), lui-même étant « gouverné par Dieu » (*Theokubérnetos*), dont il incarne la Loi vivante (*nomos empsuchos*).



C'est dans une pareille perspective que nous devrions placer l'équation Ville impériale = Ville du Christ. La Cité idéale, dans laquelle *omniumque nationum gentes conveniunt*³¹, n'est pas simplement « cosmopolite »: elle offre au monde civilisé une synthèse, un point d'appui dans l'au-delà, un avant-goût de l'ère eschatologique. Byzance vivait donc dans un contexte contradictoire: d'une part, le cadre apocalyptique, trop vague; d'autre part, ledit système symbolique de la parenté universelle, trop rigide.

La pyramide politico-religieuse qui organise l'espace intérieur de l'État se reproduit — selon un schéma identique — au niveau diplomatique et missionnaire: l'Empire et l'Orthodoxie constituent des noyaux durs également protégés par le limes et par les dogmes contre l'agression des « ethnies » et des hérésies, ces dernières étant à leur tour distinguées par rapport au néant extra-mundain et l'athéisme qui lui correspond au niveau de la foi.



Cet engrenage n'est pourtant pas aussi rigide que l'on pourrait croire, puisque le cœur de l'Empire chrétien, image du ciel et siège de l'Orthodoxie, est voué à une expansion virtuellement œcuménique: seule Byzance est immuable, car ancrée dans une Constitution parfaite; les « barbares » bougent sans cesse afin de se rapprocher du monde civilisé; subissant l'irrésistible attrait du Centre, ils abandonnent leur nomadisme pour se « fixer » simultanément sur une terre d'élection (celle de l'Empire) et dans une croyance véritable (celle prêchée par l'Église): l'Évangile se fait ainsi « l'instrument de la romanisation politique et de l'hellénisation culturelle³² ».

III. L'imaginaire religieux de la IV^e Croisade

Selon Gilbert Dagron, Constantinople serait « une élaboration, à travers l'histoire romaine, des mythes fondateurs de Byzance »: « Rome est avant tout pour

Byzance une histoire à reconquérir et à s'approprier³³. » Evidemment, le sac de 1204 actualise essentiellement la tension entre l'ancienne Rome — ville apostolique ayant perdu sa légitimité impériale — et Constantinople — ville impériale, mais non-apostolique. L'axe Rome-Constantinople est toutefois entrecoupée par une autre relation axiale, celle entre Athènes (dont Rome avait hérité la culture païenne) et Jérusalem (dont le prestige hiérophanique était revendiqué par la capitale byzantine). De cette façon, la tension identitaire entre l'ancienne Rome et la Nouvelle Rome se résout par la vocation chrétienne de la Ville qui, adoptée et partant protégée par le Christ lui-même³⁴, est vouée à une destinée de Ville Sainte.

Il est notable que cette idéologie de Constantinople comme Nouvelle Jérusalem l'emporte symboliquement sur le motif de la « Nouvelle Rome ». C'est elle qui introduit le providentialisme dans l'action historique, dans la philosophie officielle et l'herméneutique des trois cultures (arabe, grecque, latine) qui s'y rencontrent pour décider de leur suprématie³⁵. C'est parce qu'elle incarne la Nouvelle Jérusalem que la prise de la ville devient irrésistible aux yeux des croisés et le détournement, légitime.³⁶ C'est pour la même raison que les intellectuels byzantins interprètent la chute de la capitale, nouvelle Sodome, en termes de punition divine³⁷. C'est enfin pour des raisons similaires que les musulmans intègrent leurs hésitations politico-militaires dans une théologie de la cité archétypale, qui tombera fatalement entre leurs mains³⁸. Providentialisme, oniromancie, astrologie, mystique des Empires, anachronismes révélateurs, tout se mêle, dans cette « Constantinople imaginaire », où le passé et le futur se valent³⁹ et qui, ne pouvant guerre usurper l'éternité divine, se contentera d'assister à la fin du monde.⁴⁰

IV. La morphologie de l'altérité

Aujourd'hui, on accepte généralement l'idée selon laquelle la perception de l'autre n'est jamais immédiate, irréfléchie et purement « sensorielle » : elle se soumet inconsciemment à un processus d'élaboration intellectuelle, pour déboucher vers une lente *construction* culturelle de l'altérité. Autrement dit, on ne perçoit que ce que l'on veut voir, à partir d'un certain nombre de représentations préexistantes⁴¹. Cette construction de l'altérité suppose, dans notre cas, l'agencement de plusieurs niveaux significatifs, interférents et complémentaires :

A. *L'image générique*, abstraite et englobante : le Franc, le Byzantin⁴², le Musulman. Celle-ci, sommaire et persistante, se fixe plutôt dans une mémoire collective alimentée, en l'occurrence, par une espèce de folklore ethnologique. C'est un fantasme puissant, tyrannique et fascinant, qui réduit l'autre à une

espèce hypostasiée, mais aussi une représentation intemporelle, décalée, inhumaine, car souvent poussée jusqu'aux frontières du tératologique⁴³.

B. *L'image collective*, plurielle, massive, participant à l'histoire du monde comme une force vive, aveugle et théologiquement motivée : les Francs, les Arabes⁴⁴, les Vénitiens⁴⁵, etc. Ici, ignorance, assimilation, contagion collaborent à la naissance de grandes confusions qui, soient-elles volontaires ou accidentelles, n'en sont pas moins parlantes. Ainsi, Choniates — qui utilise généralement des ethnonymes hérodoteiens — confond les Francs avec les Allemands (XVII, 39–43) ; ailleurs, il les nomme Italiens, Flamands, Celtes, Catalans, etc. Cette confusion est non seulement le reflet du modèle cosmologique antérieurement évoqué (modèle biblique réduisant l'altérité à l'abstraction collective des « Nations »⁴⁶ / *ethne*), mais aussi l'effet d'une « éternité » assumée, qui exile les autres dans une sorte de fixité intemporelle et atopique (puisque l'Occident, *Dusis*, désigne, le plus souvent, une géographie immatérielle). Des transferts se produisent, en l'occurrence, dans un total mépris des réalités ethniques ; ainsi, le cliché concernant la « cupidité » des Croisés reprend aisément une perception stéréotypée à propos des brigands égyptiens qui « préfèrent la richesse à la vie même⁴⁷ », alors que la série inconstance-agressivité-lâcheté (également attribuée aux Latins) se rapporte au même portrait-robot⁴⁸.

En tout cas, c'est à ce niveau de représentation que l'altérité se retrouve diabolisée, sous l'influence des élites rigoristes⁴⁹ qui, vers 1215, haïssaient « les Latins » au point de penser que toute personne les ayant touchés est souillée, d'où le besoin d'une compensation lustrale⁵⁰.

Plus subtile dans le mépris qu'elle dégage néanmoins, l'*Alexiade* s'avère être, dans ce sens, incontournable, puisque tous les stéréotypes hostiles à l'encontre des Latins s'y étalent⁵¹.

C. *L'image incarnée d'une essence* : c'est en principe l'image du souverain étranger : khalife, khan, tsar, empereur — qui se bâtit dans une perspective d'exemplarité politique et de légitimité imposante ou négociable.

Cette image déclenche des énergies redoutables (militaires, idéologiques, rhétoriques) et c'est sur elle que l'on règle les contacts immédiats. Ainsi voit-on s'améliorer l'image de l'empereur byzantin dans des sources arabes antérieurement hostiles : le basileus y était désigné comme « le chien (*kalb*) des Rûms⁵² » ; maintenant, il devient, alors que l'heure est à l'entente arabo-byzantine contre le double péril (Occident plus les Turcs), « le roi des Rûms dont le siège est à Constantinople ».

On échange les bons procédés ; selon le géographe Mas'udi, au X^e siècle, Nicéphore I^{er} aurait interdit aux Byzantins de désigner les Arabes du terme de *saracinus* (« les esclaves de Sara »), éponyme péjoratif ; en revanche, un scribe de la chancellerie mamelouk en Egypte donne dans l'adresse baroque, en décrivant le souverain byzantin comme un « roi excellent, important, un lion

courageux, glorieux, défenseur du royaume [...] ami des musulmans, modèle des rois et des sultans » (159). Des fluctuations semblables marquent les représentations occidentales du monarque byzantin⁵³ ou encore celles du sultan arabe, idéalisé sous les traits du légendaire Saladin.⁵⁴ Pareillement, les empereurs byzantins, tels Alexius IV, imitent parfois les mœurs des Latins⁵⁵.

D. *L'image indirecte* — diffuse, elle est obtenue par une description personnelle (exilés, réfugiés, voyageurs, marchands, ambassadeurs, prisonniers, etc.) qui établit indirectement un jugement de valeur sur les habitudes ou encore la valeur des hôtes. Elle peut aussi résulter des descriptions visant la vie des différentes catégories professionnelles; c'est le cas de Benjamin de Tudèle (XII^e s.) qui explique l'antisémitisme des Grecs par le fait que les tanneurs Juifs de Pera, à Constantinople, « déversent dans la rues les eaux sales et nauséabondes provenant du traitement des peaux⁵⁶ ». Les Juifs sont ainsi dénoncés comme source d'impureté.

E. *L'image individuelle* — fruit des rencontres circonstanciées, celle-ci se place au centre d'une anecdote (rencontre réellement consommée et dont la relation semble impérative au narrateur), soit pour des raisons personnelles (mettre en valeur ses qualités), soit pour des raisons morales (souligner la singularité d'un comportement, exprimer la « leçon » d'un geste). Sur ce plan, le cliché trouve une confirmation ponctuelle, dans la « réalité » même des événements relatés⁵⁷.

V. La longue durée comme espace-temps d'une anthropologie religieuse

Envisagée dans la longue durée, la diversion de 1204 trahit les dysfonctionnements structureaux qui font et refont l'architecture politico-théologique des deux christianismes médiévaux; les mises de cette histoire sainte en dérive visent, au-delà du jeu entre les apparences et la vérité, une inlassable querelle de légitimité: le thème du *faux pèlerin*, le thème de la *capitale apostolique et impériale*, le thème, enfin, de l'*entente monothéiste* réalisée entre les *frères ennemis* constituent autant d'enjeux voués à répandre l'idée selon laquelle la *violence religieuse* (*djihad*, Croisade, etc.) serait le prix à payer afin de remettre en place un monde disloqué, malmené, usurpé.

Avril 1204 inaugure, au niveau de l'histoire européenne, l'*ère des nations*⁵⁸, mais aussi celle du *réalisme politique* et des révisions réparatrices. La capitale byzantine entraîna dans sa chute l'ethnocentrisme « culturel » ayant marqué, vers la fin du premier millénaire, les rapports entre le monde chrétien et l'Islam naissant. En tout état de cause, c'est la première fois que l'on voit comment une religiosité

sécularisée, dégradée en idéologie légitimiste et servant d'alibi aux pires atrocités remplace furtivement « l'action de Dieu ». Si avant 1204, l'interprétation *succédait* aux événements pour mieux *confirmer* certains schémas prophétiques, après cette date, on élimine Dieu du champ d'une Histoire modelée désormais par la seule volonté des acteurs humains. Le Dieu de la Tradition se manifestera non seulement à l'aide de ses élus, mais surtout à *travers* des chefs de guerre — représentant des « nations » de plus en plus définies. Véritable révélateur du Grand Schisme, 1204 pousse à l'extrême la séparation des deux chrétiens, tout en imposant une nouvelle cartographie mystique selon laquelle l'Occident se pose en nouvelle Terre d'élection et s'identifie à l'imagerie du Nouveau Testament, alors que l'Empire grec poursuit inéluctablement son déclin⁵⁹.

Ce n'est qu'au XV^e siècle, après la chute définitive de Constantinople, que « les fils d'Abraham », héritiers acharnés de l'idée monothéiste, tâcheront de retrouver une entente méta-religieuse, malheureusement cantonnée, jusqu'à nos jours, au niveau d'un *wishful thinking* sans conséquences. Le héraut de ce projet syncrétiste fut Georges de Trébizonde, grec orthodoxe converti au catholicisme qui, dans son traité *Peri tês aletheias tês Christianôn pisteos*, s'employa à persuader Mehmet II de restaurer l'empire constantinien, sous les auspices d'une turcocratie « évangélisée »⁶⁰. Son plaidoyer nous intéresse ici non seulement parce qu'il propose un premier bilan moral des Croisades, mais surtout parce qu'il relève les ressorts de la haine inter-religieuse avec une étonnante maîtrise des vérités incommodes :

« Tous les autres (*sc.* à part Mehmet II), que l'on nomme sages et lettrés depuis Mahomet jusqu'à nos jours, aussi bien chrétiens que musulmans, tous se sont détournés du droit chemin par suffisance et vanité (*di'alazoneian kai kenodoxian*) et se sont montrés insensés (*emoranthesan*), eux qui se prenaient pour des sages. (...) Les chrétiens ont injurieusement tenu les musulmans pour stupides et illettrés (*hubrizousin hos aphronas kai amatheis*), et les musulmans les chrétiens pour idolâtres et les uns les autres pour impies (*asebeis*). Nous savons que l'injure n'apaise pas mais soulève plutôt les scandales et les inimitiés (*tâ skandala kai tâs echtras*), allume la passion, excite la flamme de la colère, agite une grande haine et divise le plus les hommes. (...) Mais aussi c'est l'ignorance (*hè agnoia*) qui a rendu les divergences plus grandes. Les chrétiens et les musulmans ne peuvent converser ensemble (*sunomilein*) parce que les uns ignorent la langue des autres. Ce qui a augmenté la division et la haine entre nous et vous, c'est surtout que bien de gens, avant d'apprendre avec soin ce que l'autre partie dit, professe et croit, et comment elle le fait, portent leur jugement et font usage de glaive soi-disant pour la cause de la vérité (*hos hupèr tês ale-theias*), ce qui est injuste et ne plaît pas à Dieu »⁶¹.

L'injustice et l'apostasie comme effets d'une fatuité insultante, voilà un diagnostic des plus lucides que personne, avant notre auteur, n'avait eu le courage

de poser et qui nous démontre que l'*homo byzantinus* n'a pas quitté la scène avant de récapituler, dans une prise de conscience finale, les raisons de sa perte. L'ignorance monolocale et monolingue, l'ardeur vexatoire de la division, la versatilité accommodante sur fond d'ethnocentrisme, la cupidité profanatrice ou encore la vocation du rapt ne se sont malheureusement pas limitées aux relations entre le christianisme et l'Islam. Elles furent aussi violemment entretenues par cet inexplicable « élan vers le pire » qui allait défoncer la solidarité entre l'Orient byzantin et l'Occident latin en provoquant la catastrophe du 13 avril 1204.

Il semble inutile de vouloir restaurer, dans notre post-modernité éclatée, une « unité spirituelle » passablement compromise par les avatars d'un malentendu généralisé. De même, il serait vain de nous attarder davantage sur la question de savoir « à qui la faute » de tel ou tel changement brutal de paradigme historique. Les « leçons » de l'Histoire ne se laissent point appréhender dans l'immédiateté du jugement moral et encore moins sous la magie d'un nouveau projet de société; le seul savoir (essentiellement heuristique) auquel nous pouvons aspirer passe plutôt par cette lecture anthropologique de la longue durée capable de cerner les représentations collectives mobilisées chaque fois qu'un Mythe fondateur se meut en Fondation mythique. Dans le cas étudié ci-dessus, personne ne s'étonnera de constater que le poids d'une Jérusalem eschatologique et celui d'une Rome archéologique ont pu conjointement écraser la réalité de cette capitale byzantine asphyxiée par ses victoires excessives, ébahie par ses prestiges intolérables, ruinée par ses richesses démesurées et affaiblie par son pragmatisme baroque. Le 13 avril 1204, Constantinople a payé de sa défaite l'impossibilité d'un Christ romain et la faute de ne pas avoir reçu, *illo tempore*, la visite des Apôtres.

Notes

1. Parmi les sources les plus fréquentées, citons : Nicéas Choniates, *Historia*, publiée par Im. Bekker dans la *Byzantine de Bonn*, 1835 (on trouvera une traduction récente en anglais : *O City of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas Choniates*, translated by Harry J. Magoulias, Detroit, Wayne University Press, 1984, pp. 322–362); *Devastatio Constantinopolitana*, Monumenta Germaniae historica, *Scriptores*, t. XVI, pp. 9–12, républiée par Karl Hopf, *Chroniques gréco-romanes inédites ou peu connues*, Berlin, Librairie de Weidmann, 1873; le point de vue d'un pèlerin russe, Antoine de Novgorod, *Liber qui dicitur Peregrinus, seu descriptio sanctorum locorum caesareae Civitatis*, cf. Riant, *Exuviae*, t. II, pp. 218–230; v. aussi *The Chronicle of Novgorod 1016–1471*, trans. Robert Michell et Nevill Forbes, Cadmen Society, IIIrd Series (XXV), Londres, 1914, pp. 43–48; quant à l'attitude détaillée des Croisés, v. William M. Daly, « Christian Fraternity, the Crusaders and the Security of Constantinople 1097–1204: The Precarious Survival of an Ideal », in *Medieval Studies*, 22 (1960), pp. 78–89.

2. L'iconographie occidentale de cette victoire ambiguë respire elle-même le vide : sur un plateau de faïence conservé au Museo Civico Correr, on peut voir le doge Enrico Dandolo couronner Baudouin de Flandre comme empereur de Byzance : la scène du sacre compte huit personnages seulement et l'on s'aperçoit que les acteurs de ce rituel illicite (car le nouveau patriarche, Tommaso Morosini, n'était pas encore arrivé dans la capitale) se retrouvent quelque peu suspendus au-dessus de la faille historique subitement ouverte sous leurs pieds.

3. En 396, la « philadelphie des empereurs » (censée garantir le *salus Orientis* et la *felicitas Occidentis*) avait été célébrée par une émission monétaire constantinopolitaine.

4. Tel qu'il apparaît dans une lettre du pape Urbain II aux Flamands et aux Bolognais : *Quicumque pro sola devotione, non pro honoris vel pecuniae adoptione, Hierusalem profectus fuerit, iter illud pro omni poenitentia ei reputabitur* (cf. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum...* 20, col. 816 (1775). Un concile de Narbonne (1054) avait déjà établi que toute marche contre des chrétiens équivalait à « verser le sang du Christ » (cf. Mansi, 19, col. 827–832). Nul ne saurait idéaliser pour autant la conduite des Byzantins face aux chrétiens occidentaux : parmi une foule d'exemples, rappelons uniquement ce 12 mars 1172 lorsque Manuel Comnène fit emprisonner, à Constantinople, plus de 10 000 Vénitiens, ou encore 1182, année où l'on a pu voir la tête d'un cardinal attachée à la queue d'un chien rebondissant sur les pavés de la capitale... (cf. Charles Diehl, *Figures byzantines*, I, Paris, 1906, p. 222).

5. Archibald Lewis résume admirablement cette vision des choses avant de prendre ses distances : « It emphasizes that as early as the fourth or fifth century A.D., and certainly by the eighth, the Byzantine world and Western Europe had come to develop different civilizations. Their differences were further intensified as the centuries progressed until, by the time of early Crusades, understanding and collaboration between the two had become impossible. As a result, a fatal chain of events ensued — the tragedy of the Fourth Crusade, an abortive Latin Empire and Latin Patriarchate in Constantinople, and an increase of Italian commercial imperialism in the Byzantine East — all of which helped to make possible the eventual triumph of the Ottoman Turkish Empire. » (cf. « Byzantium as an integral part of European Christendom : political and military factors, 568–1204 A.D. », in *The Sea and Medieval Civilizations*, Londres, Variorum Reprints, 1978, XIV, p. 1).

6. « Les pèlerinages ont joué un rôle important dans la genèse des Croisades. Les relations de pèlerinages, les *Itinera hierosolymitana*, et les récits oraux, assortis souvent de détails légendaires, habituèrent les Occidentaux à considérer la Terre Sainte comme leur patrie lointaine. En vertu des pèlerinages les Lieux Saints n'étaient plus seulement une expression géographique, une suite de noms bibliques, ils devenaient des sites familiers, ils parlaient au cœur et à l'imagination. Or, le vocabulaire de pèlerinage se retrouve dans le vocabulaire de la Croisade; le croisé est un pèlerin, *peregrinus*, la Croisade est le pèlerinage à Jérusalem, *iter hierosolymitanum*, le saint voyage. » (Paul Rousset, *Histoire d'une idéologie. La Croisade*, Lausanne, L'Age d'Homme, 1983, p. 28).

7. On prête d'habitude l'oreille aux chroniqueurs byzantins selon lesquels, nous aurons l'occasion d'y revenir, les Francs appartenaient fatalement à cette « barbarie périphérique » déjà évoquée par les géographes de l'antiquité; (à propos de la « barbarie » des Normands, v. Anne Comnène, *Alexiade* I, éd. Reif, p. 10, 26; 11, 24; 11, 30; Georges Akropolitès, éd. Heis, p. 98, 8 sq. etc.). Tout autre tableau sous la plume d'un Charles Hopf pour qui 1204 marqua le début d'une colonisation salutaire : « ...On parlait à la cour des ducs d'Athènes aussi bien les français qu'à Paris, et le pape Honorius III appelait le Grèce du nom de Nouvelle France. Tout le pays et toute la nation grecque subirent l'influence de la féodalité romane dont les traces ineffaçables se reconnaissent encore aujourd'hui dans les balades populaires des Grecs

modernes et dans l'aspect imposant des châteaux francs de Clarentpa, de Patras, de Lépante, etc. » (*Chroniques...*, Introduction, p. 1).

8. Cf. Villehardouin: la condition des Croisés était « en tout premier lieu, de mettre l'empire de Romanie en l'obédience de Rome, dont il s'est jadis séparé ». (éd. LBL, p. 188).

9. Cf. D.E. Queller, J. Stratton, « A Century of Controversy on the Fourth Crusade » in *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, IV (1969), pp. 235-277.

10. Cf. *Philipp von Schwaben und Otto von Braunschweig*, Leipzig, 1873, p. 525 sq. La thèse de la préméditation est renforcée par des antécédents historiquement notoires: Frédéric Barberousse avait lancé, en 1189, un appel de Croisade contre Constantinople; Henri VI aurait eu des projets similaires peu avant sa mort, en 1197 etc. Mais c'est au pape Urbain II qu'il faudrait peut-être reprocher la déviation de 1204, puisqu'il fut le premier qui assimila les chrétiens d'Orient aux infidèles: « instituit quicumque scilicet ire possent ad Jerusalem aliasque Asiae ecclesias a paganorum potestate eruendas pro Dei amore, omnium remissionem peccatorum sibi adipiscenda unanimes arma gerentes pergerent » (cf. *Historia peregrinorum*, 3, *Hist. occ.*, p. 169 sq.). On notera toutefois que, d'après les Latins, les véritables conspirateurs étaient, bien entendu, les Grecs, traités de *perjuri et mendaces* ou encore de *Christianitas proditores*. Après le siège, Baudouin et Dandolo déplorait, dans une lettre adressée au pape Innocent III, la fourberie des Grecs *quae ipsum Dominum ad nauseam provocabant* (cf. *Reg. Innoc.* 7, 152-201; 8, 133, PL 215, 447, 452 etc.).

11. « Innocent III, Philippe de Souabe et Boniface de Montferrat », in *Revue des Questions Historiques*, XVIII (1875), p. 42.

12. *Quatrième Croisade. La diversion sur Zara et Constantinople*, Paris, E. Leroux, 1884.

13. *Les Croisades*, Paris, 1928, p. 152 sq.

14. *Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jérusalem*, III, Paris, 1936, p. 173 sq.

15. *Istorija Vizantijskoj Imperii*, III, Moscou-Léninegrad, 1948, p. 367 sq. Dans un très beau livre, Paul Lemerle écrit justement pour clore le débat: « On peut discuter le degré de la préméditation, le moment où elle fut acquise, la part de chacun, le rôle des divers facteurs: non la préméditation elle-même » (*Byzance et la Croisade*, Florence, G.C. Sansoni Editore, 1955, p. 612).

16. A la différence d'un L. Streit, défenseur inconditionnel du doge Dandolo (cf. *Venedig und die Wendung des vierten Kreuzzuges gegen Konstantinopel*, Anklam, 1877, pp. 33-34), une majorité de chercheurs ont fait le procès de la mauvaise foi des Vénitiens: L. De Mas Latrie (1861), G. Thomas (1864), K. Hopf (1870), pour des détails, v. H. Gregoire, « The Question of the Diversion or the Fourth Crusade », *Byzantion*, XV, 1940-1941, p. 158 sq. On trouvera un jugement plus récent, mais tout aussi intransigeant chez John Julius Norwich qui pense que le sac fut probablement « the most catastrophic single loss in all history » (*Byzantium*, t. III, « The Decline and Fall », Londres, Viking, 1995, p. 182), alors que Donald E. Queller tente de produire « Some further arguments in defense of the Venitians on the Fourth Crusade », in *Byzantion* (Bruxelles), t. LXII (1992), pp. 433-473. Le pape Innocent III est lui aussi tour à tour mis en cause et loué. Ainsi, pour M.A. Zaborov, il demeure le véritable instigateur de la diversion (« La papauté et la prise de Constantinople par les Croisés », in *Vizantijskij Vremennik*, 5 (1952), pp. 152-177), alors que pour Paul Alphandery et Alphonse Dupront, l'auteur du traité *De contemptu mundi vel de miseria conditionis humanae* « critiquait sincèrement les princes de son temps qui ne se remettent pas au doigt de Dieu, mais plutôt à ses propres forces » (*La chrétienté et l'idée de Croisade*, t. II, Paris, Albin Michel, 1959, p. 41). Paul Lemerle explique ce divorce par le fait que Byzance ne pouvait point assimiler l'idéologie de la Croisade: « A aucun moment, un front commun des Latins et des

Grecs contre les musulmans n'a été, sur le plan religieux, possible » (*Byzance et la Croisade...*, p. 618), ceci n'étant point « inertie morale » et « fatalisme » (selon les mots de V. Laurent, « L'idée de guerre sainte et la tradition byzantine », in *Revue historique du Sud-Est européen*, 23 (1946), p. 90), mais plutôt fidélité au christianisme primitif (un canon de St. Basile privait de communion, pour trois ans, celui qui aurait tué à la guerre un ennemi) et respect des exigences monastiques.

17. D'après l'analyse proposée par la princesse Anne, l'armée croisée comprend: a) les pauvres gens, dont la piété est sincère; b) les Normands, dont le seul dessein vise la ruine de l'Empire grec et c) les alliés des Normands, qui se laissent entraîner par ces derniers. (*Alexaïde*, II, éd. Leib, pp. 209, 212, 220-221). Le thème du « faux pèlerin » occidental passe chez les historiens de la 2^e Croisade (e.g. Kinnamos, II, 12, éd. Bonn, pp. 67-83). On comprend mieux, dès lors, la déclaration de divorce faite par Nicéas: « *to gar tês ekeinon prôs hemàs apachtheias kai tò hyperballon tês ep'ekeinous hemôn dichonoias oudemian hekatérois pareisêge ropên philanthron* » (éd. Bonn, p. 752).

18. Le point sur cette question chez A. Frolow, « La déviation de la 4^e Croisade vers Constantinople », *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, t. CXLV (2), avril-juin 1954, pp. 168-187 et (3), juillet-septembre 1954, pp. 67-89.

19. « L'exotisme, c'est-à-dire le fait de ressentir une curiosité devant des types humains, des usages étrangers à ses habitudes s'est traduit chez les voyageurs de tous les temps par la notation de ces traits qu'ils estimaient de nature à étonner leurs lecteurs. Or ce que les hommes du moyen âge appelaient des « merveilles » est devenu l'objet d'intérêt pour les ethnologues de notre époque » (Jean Richard, *Les récits de voyage et de pèlerinage*, « Typologie des sources du Moyen Age occidental », Turnhout, Brepols, 1981, p. 82).

20. V. D. Jacoby, *Essor et fortune de la chanson de geste dans l'Europe et l'Orient latin*, vol. 2, Modena, 1984, pp. 617-646. Pour le corpus, v. *Itineraria et alia geographica*, Turnhout, 1965, 2 vol., Corpus Christianorum, series latina, n. 175, 176, et M. Michelant, G. Reynaud, *Itinéraires à Jérusalem et descriptions de la Terre Sainte rédigés en français au XI^e, XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, Genève, Société de l'Orient latin, « Série géographique », 3, 1882.

21. Cf. M. J. Horrent, *Le Pèlerinage de Charlemagne. Essai d'explication littéraire*, (« Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de Liège »), Paris, 1961, p. 125 où l'on évoque les merveilles du palais du « Roi des Grecs », ainsi que l'éclairante étude de Jean Richard, « La vogue de l'Orient dans la littérature occidentale du MA », dans *Les relations entre l'Orient et l'Occident au Moyen Age*, Londres, Variorum Reprints (XXI, pp. 557-561), 1977 qui cite les romans antiques décrivant « les aventures du conquérant [Alexandre le Grand] aux limites de la terre habitée » ainsi que les romans [*Huon de Bordeaux*, *Floire de Blancheflor*, etc.] « où l'on voit ordinairement un chevalier cherchant aventure dans un Orient de fantaisie et conquérant le cœur d'une princesse « païenne » au milieu d'épisodes fantastiques et malgré toutes sortes d'enchantements et de prodiges » (*op. cit.*, p. 558, cf. aussi L. Homo, *Alexandre le Grand*, Paris, 1951, pp. 356-371). Notons également des échos littéraires dans l'épopée byzantine du X^e siècle (Basile Digénis Akritès étant le fils d'un émire arabe et d'une princesse grecque) ainsi que chez le troubadour Raimbaut de Vaqueiras (XII, éd. J. Linskill, Paris, 1964, pp. 218-53). Quant à lui, l'Orient musulman fut beaucoup moins curieux de ce qui se passait au-delà du monde islamique: pour le premier millénaire A.D., on connaît seulement trois sources concernant l'histoire de l'Occident (cf. Bernard Lewis, « Mas'udi on the Kings of Franks », in *Studies in Classical and Ottoman Islam (7th-16th Centuries)*, Londres, Variorum Reprints, 1976, (IV, pp. 7-10). Et Robert Irwin de s'étonner: « The lack of interest in and knowledge of Europe, Byzantium, the papacy, and the Holy War is the

more surprising when one considers the many meeting-points between Islam and Christendom and the plethora of potential channels of information » (cf. « The Image of the Byzantine and the Frank in Arab Popular Literature of the Late Middle Ages », in *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204*, éd. Benjamin Arbel etc., Franck Cass, Londres, 1989, p. 226). Néanmoins, des clichés se développent : selon deux traités musulmans sur l'achat des esclaves, contemporains de la IV^e Croisade (*al-Saqat* et un autre, anonyme), l'esclave byzantin a les yeux bleus et il est cultivé, attentif, beau à voir et très intelligent, alors que l'esclave franc est « grand et brave, mais aussi stupide et pas du tout cultivé » ; pour ce qui les concerne, les femmes des Francs sont « grossières, brutales et sans pitié » (cf. H. Muller, *Die Kunst des Slavenkaufs nach arabischen, persischen und turkischen Ratgebern vom 10 bis zum 18 Jahrhundert*, Freiburg, 1980, pp. 104 ; 129–30).

22. De nombreux ecclésiastiques semblent avoir eu, au Moyen Age, la conscience de cette unité transculturelle, vécut ou du moins réalisable dans la personne du Christ. Écoutons à cet égard Pierre le Vénéérable, abbé de Cluny, qui, dans une lettre à Jean de Calcédoine, s'exprimait clairement : « *Quamvis et terrarum remotio et linguarum divisio, nobis invicem et vultus invident et verba subducant, tamen unus Dominus, una fides, unum baptisma, una charitas et divisa conjugere, et affectus unire, et sermones debent aliquando communicare* » (PL 189, 262, cf. aussi Théophylacte d'Ochride, *Allocutio de iis quorum Latini incusantur*, PG 136, 224, où l'on relativise les raisons du schisme).

23. E.g., Speros Vryonis Jr., « Byzantium: The Social Basis of Decline in the Eleventh Century », in *Byzantium. Its internal history and relations with the Muslim world*, Londres, VR, 1971 (II, p. 160, n. 1 : bibliographie de ce point de vue). Dans les années d'après-guerre, on avait même expliqué la chute de la capitale byzantine en avril 1204 par... la lutte interne des classes (cf. E. Frances, « Sur la conquête de Constantinople par les Latins », in *Byzantino-slavica*, 15 (1954), pp. 21–26).

24. Ainsi, le doge Dandolo aurait perdu la vue sur l'ordre d'un basileus, d'où son acharnement anti-byzantin (cf. Gerland, *Vierte Kreuzzug*, p. 507, n. 3, *apud* FROLOW, p. 179, n. 2).

25. Théoriquement, est *barbaros* tout étranger non civilisé, mais... tout le monde est passé par là. Ainsi, les païens considéraient les Juifs et les chrétiens comme étant des « barbares » (*Homiliae clementinae*, I, II, cf. Porphyre, *apud* Eusèbe, *hist. eccl.* 6, 19, 7, PG 20, 565 A) ; ailleurs, les « barbares » sont les païens, en opposition avec les Juifs (cf. Théodoret, *commentarii in Ps.* (82, 1), éd. L.J. Schultze, Halle, I, 1189 C. A Byzance, les païens et les hérétiques détiendront le même rôle : « *Ellenes esesthe kai Oualentinoi kai barbaroi* », Eunome, *apud* Grégoire de Nysse, *Contra Eunomium*, 12, PG 45, 1065 C).

26. Cette ségrégation entre le Grec et le Barbare est entérinée par la législation byzantine (seul l'étranger peut être soumis à la torture et à l'esclavage), renforcée par le canon académique (systématiquement ethnocentrique et débordant de clichés anti-barbares), affirmée par l'iconographie du culte impérial (où, dans les scènes du triomphe du basileus, le Barbare est assimilé au serpent sinon au Démon), célébrée dans les romans d'amour (tels *Hysminé et Hysminias*, *Drosilla et Chariclès*, *Rhodante et Dosiclès*) et exaltée par le discours officiel (cf. Michel Italikos, *Lettres et discours*, éd. P. Gautier, Paris, 1972, texte 44, p. 294, ll. 28–33, où, dans un *Basilikos logos*, on peut lire : « Puisque nous croyons et sommes bien convaincus qu'à travers ta personne, Empereur, Dieu est avec nous, nous pouvons adresser en toute confiance aux Barbares ces mots conformes à la prophétie : Barbares, nations qui voulez la guerre, voici que nous e été donné l'empereur Manuel : connaissez le pouvoir (*gnontes tèn toû onomatos dunamin*), soumettez-vous et fuyez ! » (*apud* Corinne Jouanno, « Les Barbares

dans le roman byzantin du XII^e siècle. Fonction d'un topos », in *Byzantion* (Bruxelles), tome LXII (1992), p. 281). Ce système binaire n'est pas sans faille, car chaque fois que la puissance de l'autre s'impose, politiquement, à Byzance, on invente des catégories intermédiaires : c'est bien le cas de l'idéologie impériale byzantino-bulgare (fondée sur la culture slavo-hellénique) qui fit du tsar Syméon un *hemiargos* (demi-Grec).

27. Constantin Porphyrogenete, *De administrando imperii*, (éd. Moravcsik, Washington, 1967, 13, 106, p. 70).

28. Selon un parfait jeu de miroir, le « bon sauvage » (*xénos*) est le héros capturé par les Barbares, alors que le « mauvais » (*ho barbaros*) est l'antihéros assimilé par les Romains. « Les Francs sont des figures inextricablement confondues dans un archétype hérité des temps carolingiens, confirmé par le comportement des nombreux mercenaires occidentaux employés par l'empereur depuis le XI^e siècle. Les interventions des Normands Guiscard et Bohémond, en 1081–1084, sont venues raviver les aspects les plus odieux de cet archétype » (cf. Alain Ducellier, « La Nouvelle Rome face au monde », in *Constantinople 1054–1261. Tête de la chrétienté, proie des Latins, capitale grecque*, dirigé par A. Ducellier et Michel Balard, Editions Autremont, Paris, 1996, p. 65). Mais, s'ils sont aussi odieux, pourquoi leur accorde-t-on toujours un quelconque espace dans les chroniques ? Selon Ducellier, c'est « seulement pour prouver que ces vices leur viennent de la nature ». D'après Anne Comnène (qui fait à Guiscard un portrait à la fois sombre et caricatural), les latins « s'inscrivent simplement dans cet interminable complot barbare contre la civilisation » (*ibidem*, p. 65).

29. Prenons, au hasard, deux exemples : a) Anne Comnène, *Alexiade*, XV, 7, 9 (éd. Leib), qui nous décrit un orphelinat fondé par son père où toutes les nations se rassemblent sous l'idéal commun de l'hellénisme : « Là on peut voir un Latin qui s'instruit, un Scythe qui apprend le grec, un Romain qui s'exerce sur les textes hellénistiques et le Grec illettré qui se forme à parler sa langue correctement » ; b) Constantin Manasses, *Synopsis chronikè* (éd. Bonn, vv. 2569–2572) : « Comme quoi la noblesse d'âme (*to chrestotropon*) existe aussi chez les Barbares (...) car la nature a semé le bien en tous les hommes (*to gar kalon ek phuseos hapasin enespare*). » Cette xénophilie est confirmée par les emplois patristiques du terme *xénos* : objet de la charité chrétienne (*Constitutiones Apostolorum*, 4, 2, 1), personne religieusement séparée du monde (*Apophthegmata Patrum*, PG 65, 256 C) et, à la limite, le Christ lui-même en tant qu'Étranger absolu (ps.-Epiphane, *hom.* 2, PG 43, 445 C), etc.

30. « En établissant un système de parenté fictive, on imaginait ainsi une famille, symbolique, des princes des différents états. A la tête de cette famille se trouvait l'empereur de Byzance » (cf. Ivan Dujcev, « La crise idéologique de 1203–1204 et ses répercussions sur la civilisation byzantine », in *Christianisme byzantin et archéologie chrétienne*, « Cahiers de Travaux et de Conférences », I, Paris, Maisonneuve, 1976, p. 6 ; v. Aussi F. Dolger, « Die Familie der Könige im Mittelalter », *Historische Jahrbuch*, 60 (1940), pp. 397–420.

31. *Gesta Francorum Hierusalem expugnatium*, in RHC, *Historiens occidentaux*, III, Paris, 1886, p. 494.

32. Gilbert Dagron, « “Ceux d'en face”. Les peuples étrangers dans les traités militaires byzantins », in *Travaux et mémoires*, 10, Paris, De Boccard, 1987, p. 220, qui cite à ce titre La Constitution XVIII des *Taktika* de Léon VI : « Voilà pour les peuples Turcs [= les Hongrois], qui ne diffèrent des Bulgares qu'en ceci que ces derniers ayant embrassé la foi chrétienne, se sont progressivement transformés sous l'influence des mœurs romaines et ont perdu, en même temps que leur incroyance, leur caractère sauvage et nomade » (PG 107, 61, *apud* Dagron, *op. cit.*, p. 219).

33. Cf. « Rome et l'Italie vues de Byzance (IV^e-VII^e siècles) », in *Bisantio, Roma e l'Italia nell'alto medioevo*, t. I, Spoleto, 1988, pp. 58 et 66.

34. Avant de quitter la Ville, Constantin Porphyrogénète priait ainsi: « Seigneur Jésus-Christ, mon Dieu, je confie dans tes mains cette ville qui est à toi. Protège-là de tous les ennemis et adversaires qui surviennent contre elle, de la guerre civile et de l'invasion des étrangers » (cf. *Le livre des cérémonies*, II, p. 151, 15 sq. *apud* Ivan Dujcev, *op. cit.*, p. 11).

35. Mais aussi ce « défaitisme » psychologique en l'absence duquel on ne saurait point expliquer la défaite réelle d'une Ville d'un million d'habitants face à quelques 20 000 assaillants occidentaux.

36. C'est, au fond, le clergé romain qui fit basculer le sort de la Ville, en légitimant le sac par des arguments religieux: « C'est pourquoi nous vous disons, fait le clergé, que la bataille est droite et juste. Et si vous avez droite intention de conquérir la terre et de la mettre en l'obédience de Rome, tous ceux qui y mourront confessés auront le pardon que le pape vous a octroyé. Sachez que cette chose fut un très grand encouragement pour les barons et pour les pèlerins » (cf. Villehardouin, éd. Budé, p. 225). Dans une lettre à Innocent III, Baudouin de Flandre et Dandolo estimaient que la conquête avait été faite *ad subventionem Terrae sanctae*, (...) *ad honorem Dei et sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae* (PL CCXV, 450, 512); le pape lui-même allait accepter, dans un premier temps, cette victoire *ad honorem et profectum apostolicae sedis*, avant de lui attribuer une signification providentielle: « *Manus Domini operetur haec omnia... brachium virtutis ejus revelatum est in nobis.* » (Reg. Innoc., VII, 152, PL CCXV, 447). Mais, dans une autre lettre à Baudouin, le pontife déplorera durement les excès des barons; on trouvera une excellente traduction anglaise de ce document chez Ernle Bradford, *The Great Betrayal. Constantinople 1204*, Londres, Hodder and Stoughton, 1978, p. 184.

37. Il y a consensus, parmi les chroniqueurs byzantins, quant à l'idée selon laquelle toute catastrophe se produit *dià tas hamartias hemôn*. Citons, en l'occurrence, les prévisions d'un Ghenadios Scholarius: « *tò télos eitoun e metabolè toûde toû kosmou, eggus, hos ek tôn pragmaton estin horân. Ei dè kai mè toû sumpantos kosmou, tò goun hméteron génos kai hè patris haute en taîs eschataîs anapnoasîs schedon estin, an mè tò Theîou cheîra hupérscê* » (in *Oeuvres complètes*, t. III, Paris, Maison de la Bonne Presse, 1930, p. 94, ll. 27–30).

38. Mohamed Tahar Mansouri nous offre, sur ce point, des informations révélatrices. Ainsi, la sourate XXX du Coran (*les Rûms*) prévoit la survivance des Byzantins et une hadith attribuée au Prophète affirme que « les Rûms se renouvelleront tous les siècles » (cf. « L'œil du grand rival: la ville vue par les musulmans », in *Constantinople*, Autrement, pp. 154–170). « En effet, l'Islam ne revendique plus maintenant la conquête de Constantinople qui est devenue, pour les musulmans, la « protégée d'Allah », même si cette protection n'est vue par eux que comme un simple ajournement de la chute entre leurs mains: la prise de la ville ne relève plus des œuvres humaines, car elle ne pourra procéder que de la volonté divine et, dans ces conditions, chargée d'un sens apocalyptique, deviendra prémonitoire de la fin des temps » (*op. cit.*, p. 158).

39. La lamentation d'un Nicéas devant la prise de la capitale par les Croisés illustre ce processus grâce auquel, « dans un double mouvement facile à observer, les apocalypses sont devenus un genre constantinopolitain, et les récits des origines de la ville un genre apocalyptique » (G. Dagron, *Constantinople imaginaire. Etudes sur le recueil des « Patria »*, Paris, PUF, 1984, p. 328). Depuis l'*Oracle de Baalbek* (cf. P. Alexandre, *The Oracle of Baalbek, The Tiburtine Sybil in Greek dress*, *Dumbarton Oaks Studies*, 10, Washington, 1967) jusqu'aux *Révélation de Méthode* (cf. A. LOLOS, *Die Apokalypse des Ps.-Methodius*,

Beitrag zur klassischen Philologie, 83, Meisenheim am Glan, 1976), en passant par l'*Apocalypse d'André Salos* (cf. L. Ryden, *The Andreas Salos Apocalypse*, *Greek Text, Translation and Commentary*, DOP, 28, 1974, pp. 197–261) on reprend inlassablement l'idée selon laquelle Constantinople est l'espace de la révélation de Dieu, terminus de l'Histoire et territoire éthique où vont s'affronter les forces chaotiques d'ici-bas. Pour d'autres références concernant l'indéfectibilité symbolique de la Capitale et la grandeur indépassable de l'Empire grec (v. Choricus de Gaza, *Apologia mimorum*, 69, p. 360, l. 4–5, éd. Foerster; Nicéphore le Presbyte, *Vita Andreae Sali*, PG 111, 853 B; Constantin Manasses, *Compendium*, v. 2548 = 110, Bonn etc.). Agostino Pertusi a bien décelé, dans cette mythologie de l'extrême, la présence subreptice mais tenace d'une appréhension collective liée à la future destruction de la Ville par cette *gens blunda* (*xanthà géne, xanthon génos*), désignant les Francs et les Longobards, qui, selon les prophéties populaires, incarne implacablement la volonté pédagogique du Christ: la *Visio Macarii* et la *Visio Anastasiae* (IV^e s.), le *Strategikon* de Maurice (III, 5, éd. Mihaesco, Bucarest, 1970), les témoignages de Léon VI et de Nicéphore Ouranos (au IX^e et au X^e siècles), ainsi que celui de Georges Pachimères (au XIII^e s.) préparent, sur un plan imaginaire, la défaite de 1204 (cf. *Fine di Bisantio e fine del mondo. Significato e ruolo storico delle profezie sulla caduta di Constantinopoli in Oriente e in Occidente*, Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, « Nuovi studi storici », Rome, 1988, 280 p.). On peut leur associer certains textes occidentaux qui alimentent le mythe de Constantinople et reflètent à leur tour ce mythe: ainsi, Fulcher de Chartres (*RHC; Historiens occidentaux*, III, Paris, 1886, p. 331 sq.), l'auteur anonyme de la *Gesta Francorum Hierusalem expugnantium* (*ibidem*, p. 494), Eudes de Deuil, *La Croisade de Louis VII, roi de France* (éd. H. Waquet, Paris, 1949, pp. 44–45) etc. Sur le public « populaire » des textes annonçant cet « eschatological happy-ending », v. I. Sevckenko, « The Decline of Byzantium seen through the Eyes of its Intellectuals », DOP, 15 (1961), p. 171.

40. Nous renvoyons, à cet égard, à la tradition des *laudes Constantinopoleos* (cf. Himerius, *Oratio*, 4; éd. Colonna, p. 170, 42) et au système d'analogies/assimilations/projections et solidarités qui, à travers les *patria Constantinopoles* (fin X^e s.), fait de l'histoire byzantine un échiquier théologal, véritable miroir de la providence. On trouvera une excellente analyse de ces productions chez Paul J. Alexandre, « The Strength of Empire and Capital as seen through Byzantine Eyes », in *Speculum. A Journal of Medieval Studies*, XXXVII, July 1962, n. 3, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 339–357. Cette sacralisation prophétique de l'histoire se manifeste, pour ne prendre qu'un seul exemple, à travers le topos de « la femme impure qui renverse l'autel »: ladite créature qui, selon Dagron, « a pour modèle la Cléopâtre des *Oracles Sibyllins* et peut être assimilée à Véline (La Scylla) ou Eudoxie » est un signe des temps également présent dans la littérature apocalyptique (cf. *Anonymi narratio de aedificatione templi S. Sophiae*, 19, in Theodor Preger, *Scriptores originum constantinopolitanum*, I, pp. 74–108; *Visio Danielis*, éd. Istrin, 138, 141; *L'Apocalypse d'André Salos*, éd. Ryden, 208–209 etc.) et dans les textes historiques (e.g. Nicéas, décrivant l'intronisation profanatrice d'une prostituée sur le trône patriarcal de Constantinople, ou encore André Salos, PG 111, 864 B, qui prévoit que des *orchéseis kai tragodias satanikai* ainsi que des *chleuasmoi kai paignia* seront organisés dans les églises, lors de la fin du monde, coïncidant avec la fin de la Ville).

41. Ce principe se vérifie aisément à travers les chroniques enluminées des Croisades, où l'on voit bien que l'imagerie de l'autre, mentalement reconstruite par les illustrateurs, n'a rien à voir avec la véritable « couleur locale » des événements et des personnes: on sait que les Musulmans portent le turban, cela suffira donc pour les « individualiser »...

42. Cf. Guillaume de Pouille, *La Geste de Robert Guiscard*, éd. Marguerite Mathieu, Palerme, 1961, lib. I, 77–79: « *Graecos nullius roboris esse... non audaces, sed... fugaces.* » V. également H. Hunger, *Graeculus perfidus, Italos itamos*, Unione internazionale degli istituti di archeologia, storia e storia dell'arte in Roma, Rome, 1987 et E. Morini, « Graeci e latini dalle crociate alla francocrazia nelle fonti storiografiche greche » in *Medioevo orientale europeo*, Bologne, Lo Scarabeo, 1990, pp. 203–232. Cet auteur démontre, à partir des textes hagiographiques rédigés en milieu monastique (notamment athonite), que l'anti-latinisme féroce des moines recoupait celui du bas-peuple plus que le concordisme vacillant des élites — mieux informées, mais aussi plus favorables au compromis avec les *latinophones*.

43. L'image des Byzantins et des Francs reçoit des dimensions cocasses dans le cycle épique de 'Umar al-Nu'man (dans les *Mille et une nuits*), malgré le télescopage chronologique (entre le siège arabe de Constantinople, 717, et la 2^e Croisade): le guerrier byzantin Luqa a un visage d'âne, un dos de singe et le regard d'un serpent, alors qu'une jeune femme, nommée Dhat al-Dawahi, est traitée de « sorcière, lesbienne et empoisonneuse ».

44. Pour ce qui concerne la perception musulmane sur le monde chrétien, le mépris de l'autre n'est pas moindre. Dans une perspective inversée, Al-'Umari nous présente les Allemands comme étant les « Mongols » de l'Europe, alors que l'on trouve, chez Ibn al-Wardi, une description péjorative des Galiciens du Nord de l'Espagne, qui portent des vêtements jusqu'à leur usure complète, pratiquent la promiscuité, sont ignorants et stupides (*Kharidat*, Le Caire, 1939, p. 79). V. aussi M. Izzedin, « Quelques voyageurs musulmans à Constantinople au Moyen Age », in *Orient*, 9 (1965), p. 92.

45. Cf. Kinnamos, VI, 10 (Bonn, p. 280): « peuple de proie, immoral, dépourvu du sens de l'honneur. »

46. Chez les Pères Grecs, *tò ethnos* désigne « les autres peuples », en opposition à « notre peuple » (*laos*), v. Origène, *commentarii in Jo.* 28, 19, éd. G. Preuschen, GCS 4 (1903), p. 414 sq. Au pluriel, (lat. *gentiles*) on désigne ainsi soit les païens, pour les distinguer des Juifs (cf. Ignace, *Epistola ad Smyrnaeos*, 1, 2), soit les païens convertis au christianisme (cf. Justin Martyre, *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judeo*, 29, 1, PG 6, 537 A), soit, enfin, les païens, en opposition aux chrétiens (cf. « *tà ethne gàr akouonta ek toù stomatos hemôn tà logia toù Theoû* », *epistula secunda Clementis ad Corinthios*, 13, 3). Retenons également le pluriel *hoi Ethnophrones*, réservé aux hérétiques chrétiens (cf. Jean Damascène, *liber de haeresibus*, 94, PG 94, 757 C) et dont la simple existence nous démontre que la représentation des « Nations », tout comme la sémantique de la « barbarie », n'est jamais associée à une mentalité « essentialiste ».

47. Cf. Héliodore, *Les Ethiopiennes*, I, 32, 4, LBL, 1960 (I-II), 1991 (III).

48. Cf. Achille Tatius, IV, 14, 9: « L'Égyptien, lorsqu'il a peur, est asservi par la lâcheté, et son instinct belliqueux, dans les moments où il reprend confiance s'exacerbe; dans les deux cas il est sans mesure (*katà mètron*): tantôt dans le malheur, il est trop couard, tantôt, dans la victoire, il est trop téméraire » (*apud Jouanno, art. cit.*, p. 268).

49. Par exemple, l'accusation globale d'homosexualité, cf. Jean Kameniates, *Sur la prise de Thessalonique*, PG 109, 628. Jadis, on avait attribué aux Perses la vocation de l'inceste: « ignorant la dignité de la nature, ainsi que des bêtes sans raison, ils couchent avec leurs mères et leurs sœurs » (cf. *Expositio totius mundi et gentium*, 19, éd. Rouge, pp. 152–155).

50. La IV^e Constitution du Concile du Latran (IV, 1215) confirme l'absolue répugnance des Grecs envers les Latins: « Les Grecs se sont mis à abominer tellement les latins (*in tantum Graeci coeperunt abominari Latini*) que entre autres pratiques impies marquant leur mépris à leur égard, s'ils arrivait que des prêtres latins célébrèrent sur leurs autels, ils ne voulaient eux-mêmes offrir le Saint Sacrifice sur ces autels avant de les avoir d'abord lavés, comme

s'ils avaient été souillés par ce seul fait. Et même, dans une audace téméraire (*ausu temerario*), ces mêmes Grecs osaient rebaptiser ceux qui avaient été baptisés par les Latins; est nous avons appris que, encore maintenant, certains ne craignent pas de le faire » (*De superbia Graecorum contra Latinos*, in *Les Conciles Oecuméniques*, II, 1, (« Les Décrets »), Paris, Cerf, 1994, pp. 504–505).

51. Selon le portrait peu flatteur brossé par la princesse Anne, les Latins seraient: grossiers, bavards, (éd. Leib, Paris, LBL, 1937–1945, II, p. 229, III, p. 161 sq.), orgueilleux (II, 213–214), versatiles (*ibid.* p. 206, p. 233: *to phusei palimboulon tôn Latinon*), cupides, braves, mais ignorant la science militaire (III, p. 28) V. sur ce point, Paul Lemerle, *Byzance et la Croisade*, Florence, 1955, p. 597 sq.; Franziska E. Schlosser, « Byzantine studies and the History of the Crusades: the Alexiad of Anna Comnena as source for the Crusades », in *Byzantinische Forschungen* (Amsterdam), 1990, vol. 15, pp. 397–406.

52. Par ailleurs, l'insulte peut changer de camp: dans un texte hagiographique (*Vie de saint Lazare le Galésiot*, AASS nov. III, col. 515), nous lisons: « l'impie ordonna à l'un de ceux qu'on peut appeler ses chiens, et qui dépassait les autres par sa force corporelle et par sa méchanceté, d'aller, malheur sur moi! et d'abattre et jeter à terre la vénérable croix qui dominait la coupole... » (*apud Ducellier, Le Miroir*, p. 221).

53. Par exemple, si, lors de la 1^{ère} Croisade, Albert d'Aix évoque respectueusement « le Seigneur empereur très-chrétien de Constantinople » (*Liber christianae expeditionis*, I, 13 et 15, RHC, *Historiens occidentaux*, IV, pp. 282, 284), Raymond d'Agiles (*Historia francorum qui coeperunt Hierusalem*, I, 1, RHC, III, p. 236) et Guibert de Nogent (*Gesta Dei per Francos*, I, 5, RHC, IV, p. 130 sq.) nous livrent une image du basileus franchement défavorable, alors qu'un Odon de Deuil traite Manuel 1^{er} de *dolosus proditor* et de *Constantinopolitanum idolum* (cf. *De profectioe Ludovici VII in Orientem*, VI, New York, 1948, p. 112).

54. Découvert lors de la 3^e Croisade, Saladin incarne « l'ennemi admirable »: « par sa loyauté, sa bravoure et son esprit chevaleresque, le prince Kurde était apparu aux chevaliers occidentaux comme un adversaire digne de leur estime; les poètes imaginèrent de faire de lui le fils d'une princesse chrétienne transportée en Orient par les pirates et devenue l'épouse d'un roi musulman » (Jean Richard, « La vogue de l'Orient dans la littérature occidentale du MA », in *Mélanges René Crozet*, Poitiers, 1967, p. 558, repris dans *Les relations entre l'Orient et l'Occident au MA*, London, Variorum Reprints, 1971 (XXI). V. aussi, *idem*, « La Chanson de Syracon et la légende de Saladin », in *Journal Asiatique*, CXXXVII, Paris, 1949, pp. 155–157, ainsi que Gaston Paris, « La légende de Saladin », in *Journal des savants* (1893).

55. Villehardouin, I, 194; Robert de Clari, *Conquête*, 54–56, ou encore la lettre de l'empereur Baudouin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 209, etc.

56. Cf. David Jacoby, « Les Juifs: protection, divisions, ségrégation », in *Constantinople*, Paris, Autrement, 1996, p. 180.

57. Par exemple, le cliché concernant « le gigantisme des Barbares » s'active à travers le récit d'un témoin: « Un des Musulmans qui avaient franchi leur retranchement, rapporta qu'il y avait vu un individu, un Franc, d'une taille énorme, qui, monté sur le parapet, repoussait les Musulmans à lui seul; (...) cet homme — disait-il — fut atteint de plus de cinquante coups de flèches et de pierres, mais rien ne le détourna de son travail » (cf. « Anecdotes et beaux traits de la vie du sultan Youssouf (Salâh ed-Dîn) », in RHC, *Historiens occidentaux*, III, p. 231). La « réalité » se superpose ici au portrait standardisé du « Barbare », présent, entre autres, chez Achille Tatius (cf. *Le roman de Leucippé et Clitophon*, III, 9, 2, Paris, LBL, 1991), aux yeux duquel tous les « sauvages » seraient énormes (*mégaloï pantes*), mais aussi chez la princesse Anne,

impressionnée par « la belle stature des hommes du Nord » (I, 10, 4, éd. Leib, I, p. 37 sq.) ou encore chez Nicétas lui-même, qui nous dit que les Grecs voyaient les Latins comme « des anges exterminateurs ou d'invulnérables statues d'airain » (cf. Bonn, pp. 714, 718, 754). Tout ceci rappelle la description des Germains par Tacite (*Germ.* IV, V, VII, XI–XVIII etc.) reprise par Procope (*Bell. goth.*, II, 25) et Agathias (*Hist.* I, 2–4) à propos des Francs : cheveux longs et blonds, *taille gigantesque*, obsession de la liberté, rudesse irréfléchie, courage, mais aussi manque d'endurance, etc. V. également C. Asdracha, « L'image de l'homme occidental à Byzance : le témoignage de Kinnamos et de Choniates », in *Byzantinoslavica*, XLIV (1983).

58. Après cette date charnière, l'universalisme « romain » cède le pas au nationalisme grec : les historiens du XIII^e siècle parlent déjà des « Hellènes », alors qu'auparavant l'expression *imperator Graecorum*, utilisée par Otto le Grand, avait irrité Nicéphore Phokas, en 968.

59. L'une des preuves éclatantes de cette séparation est liée aux *critères du pillage* de la Capitale lors duquel les Latins ont « presque complètement dédaigné les reliques des saints orientaux peu connus en Europe, et même les souvenirs de l'Ancien Testament, si vénérés par les Grecs, et réunis, avec tant de soin, par les empereurs » (Le Comte P. Riant, *Des dépouilles religieuses enlevées à Constantinople au XIII^e siècle par les Latins*, Paris, 1875, p. 29). N'oublions pas que le premier réveil franciscain ainsi que l'esprit naissant du joachimisme sont relativement contemporains de la IV^e Croisade. La quantité énorme des reliques *déplacées* en Occident (cf. l'inventaire publié par Riant, *op. cit.*, pp. 177–211) accompagne l'émergence d'une nouvelle géographie religieuse : au lieu de conquérir une Terre Sainte incertaine et déjà « souillée » par les Infidèles, les Croisés préfèrent tout transporter en Occident afin d'en relancer, au prix d'une formidable *charge symbolique*, la destinée spirituelle assoupie, car injustement éclipsée par la gloire « illégitime » des « schismatiques ».

60. « Ne pense pas, sérénissime sultan, que Constantinople t'a été livrée de la part de Dieu (*di' allen tina aitian...theothen*), car tout est soumis à Sa volonté, pour quelque autre raison qu'à cause de Sa volonté de rassembler tous les hommes en une seule profession de foi (*eis mian pisteos homologian pantas sunagogein*). Et moi je conjecture ici que la ville mère des chrétiens (*tèn metéra tôn christianôn polin*) t'a été livrée par Dieu, à toi et non à un autre, parce que d'abord il t'appelle à réaliser cette divine union (*theian henosis*), Georges de Trébizonde, « De la vérité de la foi des chrétiens », in *Corpus islamo-christianum*, CIS-Altenberge Verlag, 1987, texte grec et traduction fr. par Adel Th. Khoury, pp. 74–75).

61. *Ibidem*, pp. 78–79.

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
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War, Revolution, Carnival: Three Attempts at Integrating Politics and Literature (1880–1970)

I. Introduction

When speaking about literature and politics, the difficulty one encounters from the very beginning is that of defining literature as such. Different cultural epochs cast different lights on what we understand as being *literature*. This has to do neither with a highly specialised philological debate nor with a purely logical description of the concept of literature, but is implied by the very different responsibilities, fantasies, utopias or existential projects bestowed upon the realm of poetic fiction. Apparently, to deal with politics and literature would mean to summarise the whole lot of historical meanings of 'literature' and to compare it with the historical series of the meanings of 'politics'. It is possible, though, to avoid such cybernetic an enterprise. We intend to restrict the sphere of 'literature' to those cases in which it explicitly raises claims to a form of 'power'. The interest lies with those cultural contexts and with those frames of mind that allow literary imagination to take off, to represent itself as a total, mystical, founding and, at the same time, projective discourse.

The origins of this ambition are quite disputable, as origins always are. My suggestion is to consider the war ballads of Bertrand de Born as the first 'mature' poetical expression of pride and vanity. One of the most violent of the troubadours, Viscount de Hautefort, has left his mark on the political life from the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth century. His *Chansons de guerre* (polemic, aggressive political poems formally related to the rhetoric of *fin amors*, but in fact expressive of the sensibilities of the Northern 'wild' gentry, as opposed to the refined Southern one) represent a most authoritative example of how violence and poetry are associated. This *Stimmung* was clearly rooted in the culture of chivalry, in that very unstable balance between intense, mystic love feelings and the psychic drift towards aggression and destruction. Bertrand de Born did not create a school. In a scientific idiom, we could say that his type of aesthetic behaviour failed socialisation. Even in his own time Bertrand was a rather strange figure, an eccentric if not a mere outcast,¹ unfit even in the eyes of his own kind, the grand seniors of France.

However, his poetry expressed the attitudes of a social group that almost defined itself through 'violence' and could, at times, give birth to open conflicts with the political authority of the kings as well as with the spiritual authority of the Church.² Whether the poetry of the troubadours really expressed a kind of ideological code typical of a specific social category or whether it represented the cipher language of the Cathar heresy³ is, of course, another problem. What we still have is this association of poetry and top 'ideological' ambition, of literature and dissent.

Another important moment of poetical emancipation is to be found during the Renaissance, when esoteric traditions of the Antiquity, gnosticism, alchemy, Zoroastrianism, were rediscovered through the Arabs. This has provided some small groups of intellectuals with the feeling that they could dispose of huge energies and powers. From the secret cult of the *fedelli d'amore*, of which Dante himself was a member, to the mannerist theoreticians of art of the sixteenth century, this blend of mystical devotion and magic 'arrogance' could be easily located.⁴ But, apart from the hiding-place where heretic fantasies are nurtured, Renaissance also witnesses an unprecedented growth in the social prestige enjoyed by writers and poets. The public figure of the scholar is centred on creative, fictional abilities. For Jakob Burckhardt, the lack of legitimacy of Italian thirteenth-century princes is at the root of this cult for art and the artists. Unlike other European political leaders, the Italians could not use the support of a stable, traditional, sacred hierarchy. Usually they came to power through *coups d'état* and had to face communities with a rather high degree of political awareness. Surrounding themselves with poets and scholars, Renaissance tyrants were experiencing a new type of legitimacy, conferring, at the same time, a new status to the arts and the letters.⁵

Poets were very much aware of their position and did not hesitate to blackmail their lords and masters, as they also believed in the power of poetry for conferring either immortal glory or eternal oblivion. In fact, Dante's *Divina Commedia* is a huge device of asserting merit and distributing penitence which clearly indicates to what extent the Poet saw himself as having been granted divine attributes.⁶ Another main source of social prestige was the Renaissance invention of literary success. Separated from the traditional link with the Church, the epic or dramatic poetry of the Late Renaissance (from the sixteenth century, or even the beginning of the seventeenth), discovered and learnt to exploit the vulgar mind, the collective fantasies of urban audiences. The very subtle and powerful theory of Mikhail Bakhtin on Rabelais' *Gargantua*, seen as a highly sophisticated though truthful and reliable intellectual reconstruction of common Renaissance culture, awakened the interest for Carnival, perceived as a determining cultural pattern which equally put the culture of the scholarly elite under pressure.⁷ At

the centre of the symbolic constellations of Carnival, Bakhtin discovered a mythical fascination with 'matter', as something rejected by the high spirituality of ecclesiastic authorities but which contained energies and powers beyond imagination. The 'people' represent in fact a fantasy of this primordial substance, of this 'organic' vitality.

There are presumably three origins to the political and spiritual ambitions of literature: a) a privileged access to ancient traditions of the occult, to a Gnosis enabling the initiate to command over vital energies such as the ones contained in the huge body of the 'people'; b) the rhetoric art of creating and maintaining charisma, those subtle devices called 'myth making', which can activate and control collective memory; c) the divine nature of inspiration, an ancient *topos* re-enhanced by the recent studies of Plato.

Another significant structure of meaning is to be found in the seventeenth century. The classicist revolution brought about the strong affirmation of an understanding of literature as **construction**, implying both a specific competence, a Gnosis of the eternal, and the ability of entrusting this values to the world. From Boileau to Pope or the literary court of Czar Peter the Great, the classicists had a major contribution in the edification of a conservative *Weltanschauung*. By adding the ethos of the Stoa (that is to say a dignified impassiveness in front of merciless Fate) to the old cult of chivalry and to the old sense of divine hierarchy typical of the Middle Ages, the classicists created, as a matter of fact, what is generally known today as the *ancien régime*. Classicism was marked both by the allegiance to the values of Greek and Latin tragedy and by a sense of dramatic balance, able to hold together the Christian tradition, the pagan addiction to violence typical of the warriors' culture, and the classical belief in rationality itself.⁸

In the seventeenth century, the representation of power through dramatic means equated the very creation of power. Classicist tragedy dwells not on leaders in the very act of governing, of exercising power, but rather shows political leaders in the process of *creating themselves*. The classic, that is to say conservative, political ethos did not require the monarch to try to harmoniously shape the unpredictable world of social experience, but to embody eternal moral imperatives, to give a perceivable expression to values and ethic commandments that would always count as 'true'. The leader opposes society just as ethic values oppose empirical experience.

Nevertheless, the moral and intellectual ideal of the Classicism, which was profoundly linked to the idea of self-containment and self-limitation, was no fertile milieu for extreme experiences of imagination. If we were to regain the path of literary maximalism, we should perhaps go as far as the end of the eighteenth century. During the decades that preceded the French Revolution,

the concept of *homme de lettres* grew to cover a great variety of meanings. From Buffon's *Histoire naturelle* to Voltaire's *Zadig*, from Montesquieu's *L'Esprit des lois* to the scientific treatises of Laplace, everything was *littérature*, and had to comply with all the requirements of high rhetoric.⁹ 'Philosophy' also acquired quite confusing meanings. Studying the catalogues of the *cabinets de lecture* and of the bookshops of pre-revolutionary France, Roger Chartier reached the bewildering conclusion that, for the reading public, 'philosophy' was not restricted to the works of La Mettrie or D'Holbach, to Rousseau's *Contrat social* or to the Encyclopaedia; philosophy also included well-known pornographic best-sellers such as *Thérèse philosophe* or the works of the Marquis de Sade and Crébillon-fils.¹⁰

The seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries can be considered as a hiatus in the evolution of the 'ego' of literature. This is the type of break that forces any serious observer to ask him- or herself if, under the circumstances, one can talk about evolution or 'history'.¹¹ It is reasonable to assume that, when the literary 'fundamentalism' burst up again, in the Romantic age, it had no real, profound connection to what had happened in the past. It is true that, in its heroic attempt to restore Poetry to its 'aboriginal' dignity, Romanticism used every possible rhetoric and imaginative device, exploring the non-classic epochs in search of new sources of pathos. But this was something as artificial, as unrealistic as the belief of the Middle Ages alchemists that they were continuing the uninterrupted tradition of Chaldean mysteries or the pretence of the classicists that they were part of the same world and shared the same values as the Greek and Latin authors.

Nevertheless, Romanticism turns out to be a corollary of all the attempts made to transform literature into a fiery togetherness of thought and feeling. Romanticism managed to recreate, through a kind of trial-and-error experiment that covers the largest part of the nineteenth century, all the relevant patterns of what I call here 'literary maximalism', and turned them into *La Belle Epoque*, into the historical Avant-Garde, and into the neo-Avant-Garde of the Sixties.

These patterns depend on the representation of the power they are centered on, the right to use actual or symbolic violence in a fairly unrestricted way. The attempt to give meaning to this powerful attraction towards violence creates different species of modernity. But interpreting violence has to do with the way poets understand power. According to this criterion, I think I can distinguish three views of the world, three different 'cultures of violence', three different narratives of Creation, each displaying different forms of dramatics.

The first one sees power as pure energy, separated from the amorphous world of 'matter' but entering it violent and defying. From this point of view, power is absolutely synonymous to violence. It bursts out in the social world or, rather, it

is its very blast that creates the social world. Power is a kind of highly dramatic founding sacrifice, a Big Bang in which the world is conceived. This understanding of power implies a pattern of circularity, of 'eternal return', because the primeval event, the revelation of force, should be continuously repeated in order to sustain reality, to help it survive. Inside this frame of mind, the experience of the power explosion is, in fact, *the* experience, the only acceptable reason for living one's life. We will give this cultural pattern the code name **War**.

The second model of our paradigm is based on the understanding of power as consisting essentially of knowledge. Initiation in this knowledge consists of two different parts: the revelation of the hidden architecture of the Universe and the revelation of the means by which this absolute order can be imposed on the real world. Violence has to do with the infliction of this other order, with the aggression of form over matter. Violence can be equally linked to the spasmodic condition of the neophyte striving for the final reward of Gnosis. The ancient theory of government as the art of creating a beautiful society, a beautiful *polis*, perfectly balanced according to cosmic rhythms and ratios, the Greek understanding of politics as a form of aesthetic commitment¹² revived during the Renaissance,¹³ and which survived in the 'administrative utopias' of the bureaucratic Enlightenment,¹⁴ are closely linked to this second pattern. Basically, this implies another 'species' of time: historical, moving along the line of imposing 'truth' on 'matter', gradually becoming an object of thrill and veneration in itself. We shall name this pattern **Revolution**.

The last model imagines power as existing from the very beginning, as having no outcome and no end, no input and no output. Power permeates everything and fertilises the substance of the world. From this point of view, violence itself is a fertilising act, it engenders life as everything else does in this pantheistic universe. However, violence can not put an end to anarchy, on the contrary, it can only help it proliferate. Power is actually unalienable, power is a substance, a body, no vital energy and no spirit, no *Raja* and no *Logos*. Power is the state of communion, the warmth of human contacts, the exuberance of a pointless solidarity. And this last pattern of our making will bear the name **Carnival**.

The three models suggested above are the result of an attempt to create a bridge between some accepted anthropologic patterns of the human imaginary and several dominant, if not obsessive, themes of modernity. It is not my intention to argue the fact that mythical structures underlie the entire cultural development of humanity and that we should discover remains of ancient fertility or passage rites in every daily gestures. Let us rather begin by modestly considering this scheme the way Ezra Pound thought of the Homeric design of James Joyce's *Ulysses*: as a supporting structure that can be removed, once the edifice supports itself.

II. War Culture

So far, I have tried to make a distinction between 'tradition' and other past-oriented attitudes. The simple act of invoking a vision of the world belonging to the active or passive historical heritage of a given culture does not imply a continuity of mind and thought, or a spiritual community between the living and the dead.

In the case of south-eastern Europe, this becomes obvious when one comes to accounting for local attempts at constructing a conservative ideology based on the Western pattern of 'medieval nostalgia'. How is it possible to preserve a past that did not actually exist? How can one claim the legacy of aristocratic, heroic values in the case of peasant societies that either completely lacked urban political elites for centuries or whose elites differ strikingly from those of the classical Western feudalism? For these cultures, the gap between the existing social reality and the image projected on it is absolutely evident. And this helps us understand the fact that conservative heroic 'operas' were in fact a trading place for certain cultural elements (symbols, customs, folk stories and poetry) that could be considered as 'aboriginal' heritage, and imported medieval fantasies which, in fact, bespoke of the fascination with Western civilisation — one which, paradoxically, meant the fascination for *modernity*.

I shall only give the example of the Romanian national poet Mihai Eminescu (1850–1889). He wrote 'metaphysical ballads' and some 'heroic fantasies' in which he managed to fit national folk tales or historical stereotypes not only into a Schopenhauer frame of mind, but also into the settings and psychological atmosphere of 'Gothic' Romanticism. His fictional characters, poetical settings, and poetical metaphysics are typical of the education Eminescu received in Vienna and Berlin. But his use of very specific Romanian archaisms and regional words, of old linguistic clusters (or of clusters made to *sound* old, in a very Sezessionlike manner), of ethnographic details (fused with 'feudal' Western patterns through subtle, unperceivable licences), turned his poetry into a keystone of Romanian conservative political philosophy and of Romanian national sensibility in general.

This process of invention, apparently so clear when one deals with 'marginal' areas in European culture, is in fact specific to the Romantic revaluation of the Middle Ages in general. It has nothing to do with a process of cultural legacy, with tradition in the usual meaning, but it is rather a case of 'present' influencing and creating the 'past', of the kind mentioned by T.S.Eliot in his famous 1920 essay *Tradition and Personal Talent*. What Romanticism and especially post-Romanticism attempted to recreate was a symbolic way of looking at the world, an initiatic approach to life, an intense feeling of communion, a naive and spontaneous defiance of death, a sense of spiritual sacrifice and personal devotion.

The magnetism of the 'dawns of the European civilisation' was closely linked to the ambiguous attitude of Romanticism toward aristocracy and aristocratic values. On the one hand, Romanticism lived on a revolutionary mythology, and even contributed to develop this mythology. On the other hand, a large part of the Romantic trend resulted from a genuine fascination with the ethos of chivalry. According to V.L.Saulnier, it is not possible to establish the political option of Romanticism: on the eve of the 1830 revolution, almost every possible ideological option acceded to the new language.¹⁵ But after 1848, as the tide of social revolution drew back, Romantic opinion makers seem to have joined the consensus that Thomas Nipperdey calls *the post-revolutionary political culture*.¹⁶ This extended and complicated contract between the aristocratic architecture of power and the liberal social doctrine and ethos was translated into a specific artistic language by the Biedermaier, *le pompierisme bourgeois* or the Victorian (and later, with a label invented by Virginia Woolf, Edwardian) spirit.¹⁷

Actually, it was this very layer of intellectual security, of gracious aesthetics, of refined prosperity and relative moral stability that engendered *La Décadence*. The *fin de siècle* launched in fact the last campaign of medieval revival, the one in which the basic artificiality of this attempt revealed itself most clearly. The pre-Raphaelites set the tone for a style and a sensitivity that were to be continued and refined by Central-European Jugendstil and the Art Nouveau. As a matter of fact, there were two models of the medieval spirit that were more or less consciously competing: the spiritual devotion of the troubadours of the twelfth century and the virile brutality of the *chansons de geste* of the early Middle Ages. The aesthetised suffering of the medieval love songs was continued by the symbolists, following the path opened by the sado-masochistic experiments of Charles Baudelaire. The idea of poetry as inherently connected to moral sufferings, as a form of initiation in the mysteries of alchemy of converting pain into pleasure and vice versa, lies at the core of the *Décadence* of the 1890s, when Joris Karl Huysmans called his fellow naturalists to aesthetic disobedience. In *Là-Bas* (1891) Huysmans' alter ego, the *décadent* Durtal, is writing a novel on the horrifying figure of Gilles de Rais, the French marshal put on trial for Satanism, abduction, and child murder. In this novel, which can be equally interpreted as a long essay, Huysmans meditates on the spiritual mould of a Middle Ages that had the moral force to face the worst of satanic Evil and yet preserved intact its capacity for forgiveness. The other branch of medieval nostalgia, the one descending to the dark layers of mythical imagination, trying to reproduce, so to say, *in vitro* the birth of the mythical Hero, finds itself under the authority of Richard Wagner. This amazing forerunner of J.R.R.Tolkien and of *heroic fantasy* as a literary genre was driven by the ambition to obtain the supreme status for music and poetry by bringing to life the archetypal figure of the warrior-singer. The *Gesamtkunstwerk* is, in fact, a totality of passion and power, a reconstruction of the archaic centered on the very idea of sacred violence.

But the reconstruction of the ethos of aristocracy could not be reduced to diving into a blurred medieval 'past'. For more than two centuries, high culture identified with Greek and Latin studies. As already suggested above, Classicism introduced self-containment, lucidity and scepticism in the cultural definition of itself of French and other European gentry. In fact, High Romanticism tried to preserve this precious legacy. High Romanticism did not dismiss antiquity, but tried to provide a more vivid image, to cast its own hope and despair into the mould of Classicism. These experiments reached a peak in the thinking and poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche. Even though a harsh enemy of Romanticism, Nietzsche gave in fact expression to the Romantic dream of legitimacy. To show that modern passion was rooted in ancient pathos, that *le mal du siècle* was an offspring of the same divine enthusiasm that inspired the Orphic hymns, was more than the Romantic rebellion could dream of. A new image of Antiquity, a new meaning bestowed upon classic culture were, to a certain extent, a kind of therapy for a schizophrenic aristocracy which was torn between a cult of violence, inherited from war-waging ancestors, and a cult of rationality that was the legacy of forerunners who had developed a true addiction to the values of geometric beauty. Nietzsche's *Geburt der Tragödie* puts on the same level the Apollonian and the Dionysian, as the two theatrical masks of the being. More than that: *das Werden des Menschen* makes these masks fatally and ironically alternate. The pride of being aware, the sign of election represented by lucidity (cultural features that had entered the spiritual coat of arms of the aristocracy) no longer contradicted bellicose instincts. The new doctrine also had the merit of relieving aristocratic culture from the complications of Christian moral commands. On the one hand, the Wagnerian emphasis on archaic layers of violence underlying the mystically gracile Romantic visions of the Middle Ages, on the other hand, Nietzsche's archaeology, which brought to light Minoic and Thracian grotesque from under the philologic utopia of Greek Periclean rationalism, contributed to shape a brand new image of 'the elect' and lay the foundations of a new culture of War.

The idea of natural born superiority, of a natural right to dominance is, politically speaking, of aristocratic origin, but the knights who dedicated themselves to this cause, at the end of the nineteenth century, were not necessarily pure breed aristocrats. They could as well come from the ranks of the upper bourgeoisie, they could be the sons of merchants or low-ranking clerks, of the high or petty intellectuality. The origin was no longer relevant. Alain Besançon calls this social structure created by the more or less secret solidarity of youngsters with a sophisticated education who felt excluded and therefore developed an alternative, 'subversive' *Weltanschauung*, **radical intelligentsia**.¹⁸ Besançon discusses the context of nineteenth-century Russia, and relates 'genetically' the birth of the 'intelligentsia' and of 'ideology'. But, in the articulated, abstract and

'modern' disguise we are used to, ideology is not a compulsory element in the definition of *fin de siècle* dissent. *Décadence* is built on a very diffuse nostalgia and on a rather incongruous attempt at restoring the 'savageness' and 'refinement' of the mythical chivalry to their brilliance and freshness. The Romantic naiveté of recreating them through mimetic devices, through imaginary medieval scenery and outfits, was abandoned in favour of a spiritualised, quintessential image of power and violence. In *Bereitschaft zum Gewalt*,¹⁹ Christina von Braun identifies violence as one of the defining trends of the *fin de siècle*. In her opinion, violence has to do with the basic need to prove, to oneself and to the world, that one does really exist. Violence is an attempt at resisting the '*Gefühl der virtuellen Existenz*'²⁰ invading the frame of mind of the aristocratic-like intelligentsia of *La Belle Époque*. Professor von Braun relates this crisis to the advance of modernity, to the rise of new reproductive techniques such as photography and film which, far from improving the social sense of reality, contribute to the further fictionalisation of the environment.

Themes generally considered expressive of the essence of Romanticism, as, for instance, the erotism of death and the *Weltschmerz*, are in fact discovered or granted full strength only in this period. We must accept that it is no longer possible to distinguish between what is Romantic and what is not Romantic, and that post-Romanticism slowly fades into *Décadence*. Intermediary concepts like Julien Benda's *Romantisme de la dureté* or *du dédaigne*, or like Mario Praz's *schwarze Romantik*, can help us understand this inchoate transition.²¹ The differences grow, on the technical side, between Romanticism and *Décadence*, as *der Man ohne Eigenschaften* typical of 1900 tries hard to cover his 'void complex' by refining his senses and by continuously improving his ability to express perceptions. Rimbaud's famous call for 'la dérégulation de tous les sens' or Ezra Pound's no less famous aphorism that 'he who tries to use his mind where he should use his senses, is driving screws with a hammer' speak for this hunger for 'concreteness' which eventually leads to a paradoxical deconstruction of the entire mimetic tradition of arts and literature. However, on the emotional side, the inceptive modernism of the final decades of the nineteenth century seems to continue and to emphasize the High Romantic tradition, against the newly-born Biedermeier, and later against the Naturalist consensus with civil society. This emphasis reaches a degree that leads George Mosse to say that, for the *décadent* spirit, death is 'the last real or 'sensual' experience.'²²

The line of argumentation embedded in the fantasies of the last decades of the nineteenth century follows, more or less, into the footsteps of German Romantic philosophy. The idea of individuality was much closer to Fichte's attempt to found metaphysics as a whole on the *Ich Prinzip*. In a way, *Décadence* followed the same path that brought Fichte from the limits of solipsism to a consensatory view of political hierarchy incorporating the divine principle.²³ The most

explicit resemblance can be found with Maurice Barrès, a key personality for the understanding of the *Décadence*. Barrès became famous through his *Trilogie du Moi* but ended, in the course of his inflamed participation in the Dreyfus scandal, as a promoter of devotional nationalism, as a priest of the cult of heroes and a delirious crusader against the 'Jewish conspiracy'. The case of Gabriele D'Annunzio, a European *arbiter* of the *Décadence* who ended as an enthusiastic supporter of Italian fascism, is not very different. The same can be said of Ezra Pound, one of the major poets of the twentieth century and, in my opinion, a typical representative of the same *Décadence*, in spite of his temporary connections to the *Avant-Garde*. Pound also cautioned the authoritarian regime of Mussolini, considering *Il Duce* as a simultaneous incarnation of ancient Roman imperial glory and of Confucian ethic principles.

The aristocratic individualism, founded on a kind of natural right conferred by one's genius, was, in fact, understood as a plunge into one's self, as an exploration of inner possibilities. From this point of view, it is quite hard to understand why the artistic sensitivity should be 'enchanted with the vision of a multitude of elements subordinated to each other up to the supreme one, who holds the supreme authority', as Julien Benda very clearly and bitterly stated.²⁴ Hierarchy implies a regular, even logical structure and a principle of functioning that seems to require an amount of rationality greater than the one a typical decadent would be willing to accept for no matter what so ever. If we want to understand this frame of mind and the type of political culture it finally tutored, we must be ready to suppress the contradiction between hierarchy and irrationality. The conservative, aristocratic sensibility did not perceive 'structure' the way we do, after almost half a century of intensive structuralism. It *experienced* rather than conceived hierarchic functions. As for classical education, it did not help this semi-aristocracy, this 'noble' artistic intelligentsia, to cast 'hierarchy' under the scan of reason, but to take seriously the Greek etymology of the word: *hieros*, sacred, and *to archein*, to be first, to rule (*apud* Webster's *Encyclopædia*). Hierarchy is taken to have meant, in fact, *living* power, experiencing, so to say, the secret of 'the violent' and the violence of 'the secret'. A trace of this fantasy can be detected in the poetics of what is generally called, after the title of a manifesto published by Jean Moréas in *Le Figaro*, in 1886, Symbolism. The junction between sophisticated sound and rhythm effects and the obligatory obscurity of the psychic background can suggest the same strangeness that associates the geometry of vertical organisation to a brutal blood cult. Hyper-selfconsciousness, the slogan invented by Poe and Baudelaire, did by no means contradict the taste for the esoteric and for experiences that disorganize the psyche, which is so characteristic of decadentism. The famous mixture of violence and voluptuousness is to be found 'in den literarischen Werken des 'soldatischen Mannes' wie in denen der Dekadenz'.²⁵

The imperative of overcoming contradictions, of neutralizing apparently irreducible oppositions, finds its most important artistic expression in the already mentioned ideology of the *Gesamtkunstwerk*. The need for totality is a particular type of urge for knowledge, but, for the frame of mind of the 'neo-aristocrats', discursive knowledge was unacceptable. Initiation, as a cultural model that appears with a constantly growing emphasis at the end of the century, is linked to tradition only by artificial, rhetorical devices. In fact, the nostalgia for initiation rites that would have regained their original force and cruelty (as opposed to the abstract rites of free masonry, for instance, already void of meaning and emotional substance in Tolstoy's *War and Peace*) is expressive of a need for simultaneity quite characteristic of modernity. I guess *fin de siècle* decadents could have sung, together with their descendent Freddy Mercury, the late leader of the legendary rock group *Queen*, 'I want it all and I want it now!'

To enclose in one and the same cultural pattern, artistic performances that go from obsessive, narcissistic aestheticism, to a pagan cult of life and virility and to ostentatious religious conversions seems quite risky an attempt. Trying to express the ambiguous and self-contradictory political reflexes of conservatism, Chantal Millon-Delsol speaks of 'la nébuleuse des fascismes-corporatismes'.²⁶ There really is a nebula of impulses and ideas, which brings together Barrès, Sorel, Maurras, the paternalist and religious authoritarian regimes of Pilsudski, Primo de Rivera, Salazar, Horthy and, last but not least, Italian fascism. Even if it is difficult to think of a really coherent configuration to master this diversity, I shall still try to relate the aristocratic fantasies of *fin de siècle* intelligentsia to a dominant symbolic pattern. And this pattern is, as already suggested in my preliminary argument, War. War seen, of course, as initiation rite and as a spiritual experience.

Anthropologists do not always agree on the place and meaning of violence in the realm of culture. The point of view inherited from the Enlightenment is that war is purely irrational, an expression of the beastly nature of man that reason has to fight uninterruptedly. This is the spirit of the definition of war contained in the famous *Encyclopédie*. But other approaches to the ways violence really functions in the so-called 'primitive' cultures and in the economy of the human psyche favoured the idea of its primeval value. In fact, the status of war as such is disputed: it is either that of 'non-culture' or that of an autonomous structure of meaning, of an organizing cultural pattern. The contemporary 'common sense' of cultural anthropology seems to favour the latter interpretation, but, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the academic establishment was still far from a unified theory of the subject. This is, of course, up to the moment when, in some academic areas, Nietzscheanism became the official policy.

By considering war a dominant *fin de siècle* myth, I do not mean to say that each and every manifestation of the *Décadence* can be integrated in it. Neither do I mean that, throughout their lifetime, *Décadence* writers were representatives of one and the same *Weltanschauung*. A creative personality is looked upon as lively and mobile in two opposite cases: when it is said to move along with an entire system of ideas and with the stream of the 'collective subconscious' and when it is vested with the power to break loose from the inertia of corporate society and to swim against the tide. The *hommes de lettres* of the *Décadence* were too intelligent, too spirited and energetic not to experience both. So that one can discover among them hard-line individualists who have pushed the principle of dissent and rejection up to the point of despising their own kind, or, with a cluster borrowed from the sociological jargon, their own 'group of reference', namely the aristocracy, with its heroic war fantasies.

From this point of view, it would be very interesting to contrast the attitudes of two classics of literary Dandyism: Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Marcel Proust. According to Adorno, Hofmannsthal had to face an Austro-German aristocracy quite different from the nostalgic model of a nobility defined by extreme refinement, subtle manners and an exquisite artistic taste. German speaking aristocracy was rather indifferent to its legitimation by means of arts and the *belles lettres* and was very attached to its patriarchal way of living; for the German aristocrat hunting was the major fulfilment of one's life. So that a would-be aristocrat like Hofmannsthal had to invent a style for this upper class, to embody a spiritual model that had no real life backing; in fact, he had to live within an utopian aristocracy.²⁷

On the other hand, the authorized biographer of French high-life, Marcel Proust, practiced a highly different policy toward his 'reference group'. Even if overcome by nostalgia and expressing an irresistible fascination with the nobility by birth, even if centered on the myth of a blood so pure that it was beginning to rot, Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu* lends itself to being interpreted as a mock epic of French aristocracy. True enough, the irony addresses more the upstart nobility of the *Second Empire*, but this is not as exclusive as to become moralizing and doctrinaire. Proust has the lucidity to measure the gap between the ever-increasing bourgeois passion for everyday comfort and well being and the heroic, glorious self-representations of the aristocrats. The taste for glory and life-size patriotic adventure had been awaked by the Dreyfus affair. The fact that Proust kept a safe, ironic distance from the turmoil that opposed passionate Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards, on the eve of World War One, was considered by Jean-François Revel as a token of independent critical thinking in the old liberal style.²⁸

However, one notices a wide range of attitudes, from the total identification with the aristocratic ideal of power and beauty, to the ironic reluctance and

'demystification' of this ideal (of which not only Proust but also a great figure of the *Wiener Moderne*, Robert Musil, are highly representative). This should warn us against and prevent us from inadequate generalizations. Not all the great writers of the *fin de siècle* shared an irrepressible commitment to the values of a war culture. One can reasonably question whether the representatives of the dissenting current of *Décadence* really had alternative values, without profound connections to this broader pattern of mind and feeling. The point I am trying to make is that neither Proust or Musil, nor any other ironical spokesman of the *Décadence* could be seriously considered as representing a democratic alternative and a reasonable, critical counter-model to the dominant intellectual *Stimmung* of their time. The fact that they did not praise war, that they refrained from melting into the fiery 'paste' of patriotic enthusiasm, still does not mean that they did not share the essential features of the decadent ethos or the aristocratic contempt for democratic procedures and values.

One has to be cautious, since an attempt at including literature under some more general anthropological and political determinations is a very risky enterprise. Modern tradition — it is long since this word cluster ceased to be paradoxical or oximoronic — has placed literary creation under the sign of pure intimacy. The only consistent approach that defied such a view, and that generated a separate, 'scientific' perception of literature, is Marxism. Marxists like Georg Lukacs, or its more sophisticated offsprings, such as, for instance, the genetic structuralist Lucien Goldmann, include literature in a pattern of class conflict. A literary work which is, manifestly or not, hundred percent ideology, is — from the perspective of theories that feed also on psychoanalysis — an expression of a collective thrive for power. So, speaking about *Décadence* as hiding in its essence an aristocratic war-culture, may sound very much like the authoritative view of dialectical and historical materialism.

To compensate for the above invocation of Marxism — a capital offence nowadays in Romania — I can only say that, in my view, this theory has limited valability. Though it may be flexible and comprehensive enough to explain the turn-of-the-century cultural context, to generalize it, to pretend that it can be applied to the interpretation of everything, from ancient Greece to the Renaissance and to James Joyce, is illegitimate and even unsound. The Marxist theory of literature, which is to say, in fact, the theoretical works of Georg Lukacs, is expressive of the essence of the *fin de siècle*. Lukacs himself, in spite of his very Leninist lack of understanding artistic modernity, like many other Marxists with aesthetic interests, is a typical product of *fin de siècle* mentalities. Therefore, the idea of literature springing from the viscera, from the vital greed of a social class, is less of an explanatory theory and more of a project or manifesto. Like many other attempts typical of the epoch we are interested in, the Marxist approach to literature takes its energy from the one and the same *Gesamtkunstwerk* project.

More than that: even if the *liaisons* between Marxism and literature will be dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter, which focuses on the myth of Revolution, let it be said now that, in my view, part of the socialist culture of the *fin de siècle* has affinities with the war-culture and the aristocratic culture. In a very perceptive essay on Rosa Luxemburg, Hannah Arendt considers that the main motivation of her commitment to the cause of the working class was of a pure moral nature, that Rosa Luxemburg had a kind of aristocratic idealism about her. As for the erotic culture which developed inside the revolutionary cultures of the time, Hannah Arendt says (discussing the break between Rosa Luxemburg and her husband, Leo Jogiches) that 'this generation still firmly believed that love would only strike once in a lifetime, and one should not mistake its indifference to marriage licences for some belief in free love.'²⁹ I think that a sensitivity towards unconditioned sacrifice is the real link between social revolutionaries and the decadents, far more than the active and unlimited support granted by European social-democrats to the national hysterics preceding World War One. The same can be said about the anarchist movement: part of it was also influenced by the cult of war and allowed for the development of an aristocratic ethos. True enough, this is a nuance that can be detected more on the fringes of anarchism, in the artistic milieu that had a certain sympathy for the aesthetics of terrorism *per se*, i.e. without any definite political mobile.³⁰

Fin de siècle is the stage of laborious efforts of building a theory of war that could bring together Enlightenment and vitalism. The liberal tradition, generally looked upon as a perpetual challenger of the conservative focus on natural strength, is in fact not quite unrelated to the exultation of national energies. Not only the liberalism of the marginals — i.e. Italians or Eastern Europeans — was structured on a hard-core nationalistic discourse, but also the liberal theoreticians of what was to be called later 'imperialism', spoke the same language of grandeur and blind self-confidence. That is why even in the United States one could hear opinions such as that of Albert Beveridge who speaks of a 'race of conquerors' and of the 'call of the blood'.³¹ In the Old World and in the United Kingdom, the theoretic frenzy was, of course, even greater. War culture was not carried only by 'natural' agents, such as Rudyard Kipling or William Ernest Henley in England, Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras in France, Gabriele D'Annunzio in Italy, by social Darwinians such as Treitschke, or by a follower of Clausewitz, general Golz, but also, as Barbara Tuchman bluntly puts it, by the political implications of Bergson's 'élan vital' or by George Bernard Shaw's 'vital force'.³²

War seemed something noble and dignified, it enclosed a moral code of courage, manliness and boldness. This spirit was so widely spread, that war enthusiasts count among their ranks amazing casualties, like Thomas Mann, for instance. The conflict opposing him and his brother Heinrich is perhaps one of the most

relevant incidents of the time. In 1915, Thomas Mann wrote *Friedrich und die grosse Koalition*, a more than explicit approval of war and a homage paid to the hard-line foreign policy of Wilhelm II. Heinrich Mann, an admirer of Nietzsche in his youth converted to the *Zivilreligion* by the fascinating example of Emile Zola's *engagement*, replied to his brother in an article called *Geist und Tod* (published in *Weissen Blättern*, 1915). In it, Heinrich Mann attacked and exposed the mechanism of the *Décadence*, pleading for 'Frieden', 'Wahrheit', 'Optimismus', 'Demokratie' and of course 'Sozialismus'.

In his turn, Thomas Mann reacted promptly with a highly relevant text, *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, in which he deploys a large range of rhetoric devices, accusing his brother of being incapable to tell 'Zivilisation' from 'Kultur'. Thomas Mann's pamphlet contains, indeed, some of the key concepts of decadent political culture. First of all, it was 'unpolitisch', because politics has to do with the spiteful level of 'Zivilisation'. The fact that literary aristocracy was not interested in politics did not imply, as it is traditionally believed, a lack of interest in power. The literary aristocracy simply believed that the world should not be run by endless discourses of loose rhetoric competence or by pragmatic and 'materialistic' means, but rather by acts of power and authority that could be, at the same time, acts of beauty. War was an essential revelation of the true, noble essence of the human being. This essence is synthetically embodied in the happy few, in *die Geistige*. This message of the *Betrachtungen* is also explicitly revealed in Thomas Mann's famous novel *Der Zauberberg* (1924), in which the character Hans Castorp completes his initiation on the battlefield.³³

The relationships between the decadent heritage and the modern concept of politics become more explicit at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the very aggressive and apparently determined first generation of the Avant-Garde comes to the fore of the literary stage. The first manifesto of Italian Futurism (1909) states: 'We want to sanctify War — the only hygiene of the world — militarism, patriotism, the destructive deed of the anarchists, the beautiful ideas for which one dies, and the despise for womankind'.³⁴

By far the most important alternative cultural manifestation of the period preceding World War I, Italian futurism represented a strange hybrid between the legacy of chivalry — an ostentatious Latin, Classical, legacy which had been argued by Charles Maurass of the previous generation —, and the newly born machinism. The continuity with the decadent forerunners is quite obvious in a lot of details and one could say that, in fact, Futurists were born mannerists, because all they added to the already constituted ethos of the *Décadence* (which, in the Italian culture, played an even more important role than in the other European cultures mentioned so far) was a new rhetoric, a language at the same time more straightforward and more sophisticated.

Futurists did not pretend they were 'unpolitical'. On the contrary, in 1913 they launched *Programma politica futurista*, a document in which nationalism, industrialization and war were the key concepts. The movement, which spread from Italy to Catalonia, America and Russia, had obsessive fantasies about modernity, but to its representatives modernity was no more than a background, a scenery. In all his manifestos and proclamations, F.T. Marinetti — the international leader of the Futurist movement and one of the most influential voices of his generation — invokes modernity, the need for speed and the need for a total change of the poetical imagery, which should include all the items of twentieth-century technology. But nothing else. The moral code, the values that count for the number one of world Futurism are the conservative ones of *fin de siècle*.

The decadent political culture is, I dare say, a mixture of emotion and spirituality. Political system, political discourse, political mechanisms, political rationality: these are notions that a *Geistiger* can understand only as tools sometimes not even worth touching. Of course this kind of sensitivity, this way of thinking could find no better medium than arts and literature. And it is interesting to meditate on the fact that the Nazis did not possess such an articulated ideology as the Bolsheviks. Their 'view of the world' was more adequate for a type of symbolic, intensely emotional language which was highly reminiscent of what has been called here a poetic war-culture.

III. Revolution

It is quite a challenge to make a distinction between the bellicose system of symbols and the powerful stream of revolutionary myths and emotions. Not that these two literary ideologies resemble one another. If we were to think only of the understanding of time, in both perspectives — a point that I tried to make from the very beginning — we could easily observe a major difference. War is the founding manifestation of Power, a revelation that has to be enacted periodically. It has to do with the *ewige Wiederkehr*, with the circular time pattern put by Gilbert Durand under the Tarot symbol of the Coin (the Dinar), whereas Revolution implies the belief in turning points, in irreversible processes, therefore has to do with Judeo-Christian linearity, it is placed under the magic symbol of linear time, the Staff.

However, in actual literary life, there is often no difference of style between the 'aristocrats' and the 'revolutionaries'. The broad and diffuse cultural zone separating (or uniting) these two worldviews could be anarchy. Or, the other way round, we could say that at the core of each of these ideologies there is

an irreducible tinge of anarchism. They both flourish from what Barrès called *le culte du moi*. However strong their devotion towards traditional authority, the Christian moral establishment or a revolutionary party, the moderns always tended to wage their own war. It is also true that the opposite need for higher legitimation, for hierarchy, for the geometry of command and control also holds together 'knights' and 'revolutionaries'. And if I argued that some of the leading figures of the *fin de siècle* workers' movement had an ethos based on honour, pride and audacity typical of the *ancien régime*, the same holds true and is even more appropriate for the *litterati* who embraced the cause of World Revolution.

A warrior culture implies the coexistence of at least two separate orders of reality and consciousness. The *Übermensch* lived in his own world, tortured and suffering until the moment of great exploits would come. And then, he would act in order to re-establish the frame of the world, to give a fundamental example of vital energy. Warriors were the carriers of a model of beauty and incorporated this model of beauty. The poet-warriors, whom positivist scholars, the Romantics and, later on, the Decadents brought back to life from the *Iliad* and the *Eddas*, were *rois fainéants* the most of the time. In fact, in times of peace, of painful bourgeois stability, they had to fight spleen, which is to say their own inner demons. They challenged the obscurity and brutality of the universe by abusing their own mental, spiritual and physical health, by cultivating excess and self-destruction. In a way, the decadent poet offered his/her own body as a theatre for the strife between human will and the forces of decay.³⁵

Revolutionaries take 'the mould' from outside themselves and from outside the world. In their imagination, body as such does not play a very important role. The universe should not be conceived as anthropomorphic. There is some kind of embodiment, but it is that of the Perfect City, and the revolutionary can never be sure whether that perfect model of the world will be the one to gain substance, or the low, corrupted mundanity will be delivered of its gross, Calibanic appearance and will regain the dignity of the spirit. From this point of view, we could explain a whole chain of theories from the 'dehumanization of art' preached by José Ortega y Gasset (who, in spite of this, was closer to the aristocratic ideal), to the Sixties' imperative of rejecting 'humanism' as a bourgeois, repressive construct, led by Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault. But there is always a breeze of pride or vanity that turns *les hommes de lettres* from a complete identification with Revolution and gives them a 'body' of their own.

It is difficult to make aristocratic literary intelligentsia and radical intelligentsia part, because the latter very often tries to join the culture of Revolution, that is to say of total dedication, without giving up its special privileges of tolerated eccentricity, be it intellectual, aesthetic or purely erotic. A most astonishing eclecticism can be traced, for instance, in the case of the representatives

of the so-called Bloomsbury club. It was founded around 1915 by a group of brilliant young representatives of the British post-Victorian elite, led by Lytton Strachey and counting among its members remarkable personalities like E.M. Forster, Virginia Woolf (and her husband, Leonard, the Fabian militant), Keynes and, occasionally, the young T.S.Eliot. With them, the aesthetic ideals of the *fin de siècle* Décadence blended with the moral philosophy of the Cambridge philosopher George Moore, the social theories of left-wing Labourites like Sidney and Beatrice Webb and finally with the most radical Marxism. As Stephen Koch, a historian of the Bloomsbury group, claims, their egalitarianism was pure gibberish. The essayist and biographer Lytton Strachey, the most politically minded of the group, managed to convince everyone else that socialism would not diminish, but strengthen their power as a cultural elite.

More interesting than the political fantasies of this generation are the influences they had on younger intellectuals who were to become vocal in the Thirties. Anthony Blunt, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean and Kim Philby, the media star of this Stalinist espionage network, were, as Stephen Koch puts it, the 'progeny of the original Bloomsbury circle'.³⁶ This famous Cambridge circle of spies was held together by naive beliefs in the rightness of the proletarian cause, as well as by a fraternity based on an acute sense of their intellectual superiority and on the symbolic complexities of a homosexual solidarity. In a word, something very similar to the decadent circles of aristocratic literary intelligentsia.

Even more puzzling within the context of distinguishing between 'war' and 'revolution' as cultural and imaginative patterns is Georges Sorel's theory of 'revolutionary war'. The author of *Réflexions sur la violence* is a perfect example of syncretism: an enthusiastic Marxist in the beginning, Sorel ended as a flamboyant apologist of energetism, nationalism, war, and social mythology. The blend of Marx and Nietzsche represents a distinct tradition which produced some very influential personalities, like Georges Bataille and some of the Surrealists, for instance, and later flourished in the rock culture of the Sixties.³⁷ Georges Sorel also made a clear distinction between revolutionary violence and war. In his critique of the French Revolution, interpreted in the tradition of Tocqueville and Taine, as a continuation of the taste for political geometry of the *Ancien Régime*, Sorel opposes the violence of the *Jacobins* to his own moral understanding of class struggle. About the 'violences prolétariennes', he wrote that 'elles sont purement et simplement des actes de guerre, elles ont la valeur de démonstrations militaires et servent à marquer la séparation des classes. Tout ce qui touche à la guerre se produit sans haine et sans esprit de vengeance; en guerre on ne tue pas les vaincus; on ne fait pas supporter à des êtres inoffensifs les conséquences des déboires que les armées peuvent avoir éprouvées sur le champ de bataille; la force s'étale alors suivant sa nature, sans jamais prétendre rien emprunter aux procédures juridiques que la société engage contre des criminels'.³⁸

The difference between 'war' and 'revolution' is that revolution is what we would call today a 'total war', an attempt so radical at the extermination of every possible enemy that it can no longer make a clear distinction between friends and foes. Commitment to Revolution has no other intellectual, psychological or moral content than 'le culte superstitieux de l'État',³⁹ while commitment to war relies on 'powerful', 'brave', 'dignified', full of 'vitality' **social myths**.

In fact, Sorel opposes utopia to myth; utopia is seen as the pure outcome of a wrecked rationalism rooted in seventeenth-century classicism and in eighteenth-century Enlightenment, while myth is the energetic expression of a moral grandeur rooted in human nature from the beginning of history. As a matter of fact, Sorel's conception of social myths could help define the nature of the entities suggested as essential for the understanding of the links between literature and politics: war, revolution, carnival. According to Sorel, in the social myths 'se retrouvent les tendances les plus fortes d'un peuple, d'un parti ou d'une classe, tendances qui viennent se présenter à l'esprit avec l'insistance d'instincts dans toutes les circonstances de la vie, et qui donnent un aspect de pleine réalité à des espoirs d'action prochaine sur lesquels se fonde la réforme de la volonté.'

Another source of misunderstanding is the fact that the concept of revolution has been used in contexts that render it completely ambiguous. The idea of a 'conservative revolution' that grew in the milieu of the right-wing theorists of the Thirties is symmetrical to the above-mentioned 'revolutionary war'. In Italy, the fascists used revolutionary slogans to a large extent, both before and after coming into power. The 'conservative revolution' meant the restoration of plain moral values, a revival of responsibility, courage, sympathy for your fellow man (in the very restrictive sense of 'fellow countryman'; this did not apply to outsiders, to those who did not share in the 'vivid' traditions of the community). 'Conservative revolution' also meant a new sense for hierarchy, for social discipline and for self-commitment. It was, in fact, an attempt at rebuilding the spirit of the community which, according to a theory accepted by everybody, from the extreme political left to the extreme political right, had completely vanished from the industrial and liberal world. From this point of view, the difference between left and right apparently lies in the fact that the right considered the idea of community to be embodied in the 'people', in nation seen as a whole consisting of thought, feeling and action, while the left, even if bewitched by the same fantasy, considered that the working class represented the epiphany of the unaltered humanity.

Scarce as they may be, these elements can, nevertheless, help us understand the extreme difficulty of separating the 'culture of war' from the 'culture of revolution'. For politologists and historians this may be less of a problem. A rationalization of the conflicting ideologies of our century may still consider them as basically incompatible, in spite of the countless similarities of detail.⁴⁰

For someone concerned with the imaginary, with the artistic trials of giving utopias a perceptual consistency, the border between communism and fascism is, by far, less evident. As a matter of fact, the theme of revolution should be approached from at least three points of view: a) the perspective of high culture, which tries to cope with the idea of social justice, rejecting (repressing) the evidence of its own privilege and imagining a kind of socialization of its ideals; b) the experiments of the radical Avant-Garde for which Revolution is prior to every other cultural or symbolic activity and which tries to internalize dialectics, to dissolve itself in the huge process of becoming of the collective proletarian consciousness; c) the attempts made by the revolutionary ideological establishment to bring literature under control, to provide the correct interpretation for the creative process, to make literature fit into the corpus of revolutionary knowledge.

Subversive aristocrats

Speaking of the participation of French writers and intellectuals in the workers' movement, at the end of the century and in the interwar period, Michel Trebitsch distinguishes two categories of *engagement*: on the one hand, that of the romantic magus, the prophet who brings light to an ignorant but innocent people, breaking (betraying) the principle of the separation 'entre la connaissance abstrait et l'authenticité, entre le conçu et le vécu'; on the other hand, that of the revolutionary intellectual, totally committed to the myth of revolution, and who, in order to accede to 'l'authenticité lukacsienne', has to betray his own kinship and class.⁴¹

Several important distinctions should be made within the first category in which the heirs of the Enlightenment find a suitable place. The rationalist and bourgeois belief in personal autonomy of the hard-core Naturalism, which gathered momentum during the Dreyfus scandal and was embodied by Émile Zola, found a prominent follower in Heinrich Mann. The contribution of the modern Gnostics, of the esoteric circles around Mallarmé, Stefan George or Vyacheslav Ivanov, who believed in a restoration of the hermetic philosophy and in the resurrection of mystical experience shouldn't either be forgotten. These authors also placed themselves above the civilian society, in a transcendent realm from where they could bring a message of redemption to the people. By giving 'un sens plus pur au mot de la tribu' they were undergoing their own *spiritualist* (when not *spiritist*) revolution.

A third and most relevant category of writers that had affinities with the present topic were the heirs of *Décadence*. The blend of courage and sensuality typical of this kind of post-aristocratic literary culture nourished both the

chauvinistic and the proletarian revolutionary approach. In the Thirties, the leading figures of French antifascism — André Gide and André Malraux —, and of the German 'archetypal' revival — Ernst Jünger, Gottfried Benn — were, in my opinion, continuators of the *Décadence*. To them all, politics was a combination of violence and voluptuousness, which provided them with an opportunity to undertake beautiful acts of personal courage.

It is true that between Gide (who belongs, from an aesthetical point of view, to the generation of D'Annunzio and Oscar Wilde) and the younger writers there is an important difference of nuance. The 'neo-decadent' spirit tended to explore the everyday life even in its marginal and miserable aspects. Malraux's novels, featuring the quest for illuminating violence just as much as every poem by Marinetti, take place in a world of common people, full of sufferings, rough, even promiscuous, a world totally unacceptable to the taste of the *fin de siècle*. Even more relevant is the case of Céline, the violent pamphleteer and obstinate monographer of human decay, who owed his fame, in fact, to the sophisticated intelligentsia, thrilled by his hidden aestheticism. Mention should also be made of the alliance between *Décadence* and the spirit of the *Lumpenproletariat*, such as it appears in the writings of Jean Genet. In their essays, Benn and Jünger explicitly condemn the poetry of vague and void preciousness, the useless lasciviousness of their predecessors, yet in their writings they perpetuated the Symbolist and Expressionist taste for the perverse. In Russia, Alexander Block strived to break free from his symbolist past by devoting himself to the Revolution and writing the poem *The Twelve*. Block was contested both by the Futurists and by the Akhmeists who wanted to remove spiritualism from the pre-structured, hyper-aesthetic poetical world of Block's generation and to pour it over a world of open experience, one that would not refrain from being 'common' or 'vulgar'.⁴² In Italy, we face the difference between the overwhelming and flamboyant classicism of D'Annunzio and the ostentatious, almost 'proletarian' lack of style of Giovanni Papini's variant of the *Décadence*. But the stream of naturalism brought by the so-called 'Generation of the Trenches' in the universe of the aristocratic fantasy did not, in fact, change the nature of what we agreed to call 'War culture'. It did not help to invent another aesthetics and did not change the decadent idea of what the 'totality' of the work of art is, namely, an extreme intensity of personal experience melting together the body and the spirit.

There is a certain underground solidarity between the different literary trends which tried to protect the privileges of literature, its right to cross the limits of common sense, morality, decency, logic, and efficiency. The political attitude of these trends is characterized by the fact that they do not accept either privilege (there is a feeling of responsibility towards the masses, the suffering, the poor), or the fact that they might ever abandon the 'nobility' of poetry. The idea of

democracy entertained by these trends is, in fact, the socialization of this freedom of imagination, the socialization of the political, erotic, ethical privileges of literature. From this point of view, it is easy to understand why the Russian Futurism and the French Surrealism became, for a while, enthusiastic 'compagnons de route' of the Communists. Both trends were seeking the political force that could help them expand their message, that could turn their aesthetics into the dominant one. The same motivation can be found on the other side of the political barricade. In Italy, Marinetti fought continuously against the suppression of Futurism and against the influence of the Nazi aesthetic ideology of Alfred Rosenberg.⁴³ Ezra Pound's association with Mussolini had the same aesthetic basis, it was a contract based on aesthetics. In the eyes of the American poet, *Il Duce* represented the only barrier against the grotesque tide of the bourgeois art and literature, against the wreckage of authentic arts and the invasion of the realms of the spirit by the brutish forces of finance and commerce.

Between the Surrealist dreams to erotically revolutionize the proletariat of the world and the conservative fear of barbarism there seems to be a world of difference. Since, throughout the nineteenth century, the chimera of the dangerous classes was closely connected to the political emancipation of the working class, it seems reasonable to think that this phobia still echoed in the ideas that Pound, Eliot, Maurras or Paul Valéry entertained about barbarity. The demophile inclinations of the anarchist Avant-Garde, of Expressionism, Futurism, Surrealism, seem the perfect counterpart for this conservative modernity. Yet the 'conservative' often see capitalism as their direct enemy, whereas the abstract enthusiasm of the left-oriented for the 'people' could be psychoanalysed as an attempt at exorcising a profound fear. The myth of the proletarians as well as the myth of the race could be seen as attempts of 'euphuisation'⁴⁴ of the menacing unknown.

Apart from fear, the new generations of the *Décadence* also have to solve an ethical problem. By the beginning of the century, an articulated and aggressive Marxist discourse succeeded to inoculate a feeling of guilt into part of the intellectual elites. The simple but effective idea of a class representativeness of the products of the mind made writers compete against themselves: how could they escape being determined by their own social origin? How could they pretend art was an expression of spiritual liberty, against its definition as a way of codifying the power structure of society? Between the two world wars, the attacks of the Lukacs school against aestheticism, seen as a major ideological enemy, continuously grew in intensity. The Frankfurt school brought Walter Benjamin's ideas on the deep relationship between *l'art pour l'art* and totalitarianism to paroxysm. The ethical condition of art became more of a problem with the outburst of Fascism in Italy and with the rise to power of Hitler. Thus, by the mid-Thirties, nobody could avoid the obligation of taking a stand, of making statements any longer.

The literary elite had to accept that individualism, sensuality, the cult of divine beauty, of orgiastic knowledge, of gratuitous courage and nobility were profoundly immoral, as long as they were only a kind of leisure for the powerful if not a way of hiding the brutal, 'terrorist' essence of capitalist society. Yet to most of the *Décadence*-inspired writers, the perspective of socializing their own perception of life, of preaching their own gospel of the forbidden pleasures, was irresistible. They were not ready to accept the 'guilt' of their art the way they accepted it for their social class. In their view, guilt had a certain intrinsic value, one that need not necessarily be suppressed. To include vast majorities in their own frame of mind, to impose their view of the world, which, for so long, had been seen as perverse, as the aesthetic norm of society, seemed much more of a revolution to them, than to try to discover the 'appropriate' literary language for the 'progressive' political forces. Their political project was more the unlimited access to eternal voluptuousness and the unlimited participation in the contemplation of eternal beauty — all of which had been the traditional attributes of a closed, self-centered aristocratic culture. Their political project did by no means include the suppression of aestheticism and hedonism, but their exhibition and socialization.

Hard-line revolutionaries

The crisis of the ethical and political status of literature found more than one answer, and the one discussed above is hardly the only representative one. It is not even prevalent. We tried to tell the story of a literature that circled the realm of political revolution, rather than enter it directly. This type of literature preferred to invent a revolution of its own rather than accept the ideological frames of the already existing revolutionary movements. The Stalinist masters of the literary-political game created a special name for this type of writer. They were called 'travel companions'. Marxists placed them the way Dante had placed Greek and Latin poets and philosophers: neither in Paradise or Purgatory, as they were heathen, nor in the Inferno, as they illustrated the glory of the 'progressive' trans-historical team.

However, our interest lies now with the attitude and creative commitment of the writers who really thought of Revolution as teleology and who genuinely believed in the explanatory patterns of History as a whole. A difference can be made between those who considered Revolution as a means of achieving a goal and those who saw Revolution as an end in itself.

Anarchists. They are closely linked to the political idea of 'permanent revolution', the innovation introduced by Leon Trotsky in the classical Leninist theory of proletarian revolution, from his Mexican exile. Yet the Trotskyite milieu

are not the only ones representative of this way of thinking and they can by no means be granted their invention. Trotsky's idea itself could be understood as either the remnant of or a conscious attempt at bestowing new meanings onto a traditional anarchist theme. It is the Heraclitean dimension of Bakunin or Kropotkin that is brought to life again in the desperate attacks of the most famous dissident of the Bolshevik Revolution against Party bureaucracy.

Anarchist imagination took part in the great *fin de siècle* attempt at bringing together the mystical and the scientific sides of modernity. The longing for this synthesis can be felt even in the works of Balzac, and later in those of his hard-to-define follower Leo Tolstoy (who, in *War and Peace* articulates social inquiry and the theology of history); the synthesis gained momentum with the Symbolists (if we take into account the theories of Baudelaire about the solidarity between scientific and poetical means of exploring the world), and became obsessive with the Decadents. In his novel *Là-Bas*, J. K. Huysmans imagines the literature of the future as a convergence between the techniques of hyperrealistic description and mystical inner expansion. The model for this new *Weltanschauung* is to be found in the creation of the German painter Grünewald and, as regards the modern times, in the novels of Dostoevsky.⁴⁵ From this point of view, Anarchism brought an interesting solution. Its view of freedom was based, on the one hand, on the mystical, Romantic exaltation of the individual, of the unalienable sovereignty of the human being, that made every state construction illegitimate. On the other hand, as Emmanuel Mounier noticed, there was very little unconditional exaltation in the actual anarchist theories.⁴⁶ Bakunin and Kropotkin in particular used a rhetoric based on rational arguments that often invoked the prestigious model of positivistic investigation. Kropotkin claimed that society had to be set up on the principles of empirical and experimental research. Scientific approaches are bound to refrain from any manipulation or deformation of facts and to formulate physical laws and principles that are debatable and subjected to continuous revision under the pressure of new evidence. Likewise, society cannot be organized in a stable, hierarchic form, it cannot legitimately employ force and violence — be it physical or spiritual — against individuals, who are the very political equivalents of epistemological 'facts', whose Brownian irregularity is sacred.⁴⁷ Kropotkin's views differ greatly from the Marxist pretensions of building a scientific theory of society. As far as political practice is concerned, the anarchist philosopher argued the emulation of the basis of empirical research. Society should be de-centralized just as scientific research rejects all-embracing, metaphysical explanations of the world. This was an explicit attempt at considering experiment not as an accessory to social change, but as the very essence of modern society.

With the arts, this very tempting analogy between revelation, scientific knowledge and political freedom became widely spread. An explicit relationship with political anarchy could be detected only after World War One. Not that the *fin*

de siècle did not witness a growing sympathy of the artistic milieu for the anarchist underground. But this sympathy was of the type analyzed in the previous chapter, aristocratic curiosity rather than real interest. Things decidedly changed with the advent of the Avant-Garde. As strange as it may seem, the interest in anarchy was generated by Italian Futurists, the uncontested leaders of the 1900 revival of artistic expression. Their profound influence on the alternative milieu of young writers, artists and intellectuals in France, England, Germany, the Austrian monarchy, and Russia brought to life a curious mixture of exaltation and furious rejection of state power. The political imagination of the first generation of Futurists was not as absurd as it may seem. In fact, Marinetti wanted a kind of treaty with top political leaders, which would grant artistic experiment total independence and the artistic caste aristocratic privileges, in exchange for its 'professional' support of totalitarian power. Arts were entitled to conclude a kind of separate social contract, one which would exempt them from ordinary moral and social duties and would integrate their civil disobedience in a broader concept of political and national grandeur. This principle is not inherently different from the attitude of the American 'lost generation', whose representatives, in the words of Irving Howe, made their own 'separate peace' during or after World War One.⁴⁸ They believed in their preferential status *as* artists and writers, in their non-identity with law-abiding ordinary citizens.

This is a vision of artists as an anarchist colony tolerated inside the body of society, a kind of compensatory, reversed image of political order, a living utopia that establishes a minimum of diplomatic contacts with the outside world which enable it to survive. But the conversion of literature to anarchism implies much more than this analogy. It is expressed in the participation of artists to real revolutionary events or projects, it is expressed in the radicalisation of the artistic discourse in the aftermath of both World War One and World War Two. The enthusiasm of the Russian Futurists for the Bolshevik Revolution, of German expressionists or of the Dadaists for the Bavarian Commune of 1919 or the support granted by an important number of avant-garde Hungarian writers and artists to the Soviet Republic of Béla Kun are events that marked a profound change in the evolution of the theme of revolution on literary and artistic ground. The ideological tension between nationalist, conservative, Christian political trends associated with totalitarian movements like Fascism and National-Socialism on the one hand, and the bundle of left-wing doctrines, among which the totalitarian Communist movement gradually took the symbolic lead (following the Russian Revolution) on the other hand, brought the process of radicalization of arts and artists to its extreme.

There is still another difference between writers who assumed anarchism through their aesthetic commitment, by dismantling the oppressive structures of language, and writers who considered that literature could advocate, with more

or less conventional means, the anarchist point of view. The latter are represented by challenging figures, by authors who also became political stars, such as George Orwell and Arthur Koestler, and later by 'political refugees' from the Communist camp, like Manès Sperber or Victor Serge. After World War Two, in the context of the *tiersmondisme* and of an antifascist *engagement* which unfortunately lacked Fascism, the writer's absolute independence, so close to anarchistic positions, was represented by Albert Camus, who systematically turned down every ideological affiliation. During the sixties, when one witnessed a strong movement against the Vietnam war, American imperialism, cultural manipulation, alienation through technology and 'consumerism', the cause of anarchy was embraced by German writers like Heinrich Böll, Günther Grass, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, by Bernard-Henri Lévy and a part of the *Tel Quel* group in France, by the poets of the '63 Generation in Italy. The idea also played a role in the East-European dissident movement, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, with writers close to the Chart '77 group, in Russia, with Brodski and Axionov. As for Romania, one of the most challenging experimentalists who could publish his works in a moment of apparent liberalization, in the late sixties, Dumitru Tsepeneag, openly stated, after his expulsion to France, his affiliation to the anarchist creed. Tsepeneag also belongs to the line of anarchistic affinity, not only to that of anarchistic affiliation. By anarchistic affinity I understand the attempt at making revolution with no other weapon than linguistic hyper-creativity, which could allow for the subversion of the basic institution of language. If one states that language is the primary and basic determination of the human being, that all the structures man is part of, are mere analogies of links and patterns which already exist in language, and that every form of power over man and society is basically exercised through language, then one could conclude that by deconstructing/restructuring language — which is, at the same time, the 'brain' and the concentrated image of the whole system — the very social or political ties are broken and reshaped. It is this type of cabalistic picture of the world that underlies many of the Dada and Surrealist experiments and it is this total belief in the epistemological power (or the power *over* epistemology, over cognitive paradigms) of the language, that motivates the French *Nouveau* and especially *Nouveau Nouveau Roman*.

Marxians. It is, in fact, this last category that best illustrates the description of the *Weltanschauung* of revolutionary literature given in the introductory chapter in which Revolution was linked to the belief in a transcendent model of perfection, to an image of the *Civittà del Sole* or the New Jerusalem, according to which the whole world must be modified. From this point of view Revolution is only a process of revelation, of giving the ideal the flesh and blood of reality. This is no end in itself, it is only subsequent to the purpose, it is motivated by the faulty nature of humans.

However, it would be far too much to claim that every single intellectual and artist who dealt with Revolution as a simple means, as an instrument of achieving a goal, had such utopian and apocalyptic visions. One should distinguish between utopian and dialectical revolutionaries. The first category consists of people who actually imagine the future. They are driven by the future, they try to communicate (and, sometimes, genuinely believe they do communicate) a sense of immediacy, of the presence of the future, which is experienced as a kind of specific power. The most visible embodiment of utopian thinking in the first decades of our century is science fiction, a genre that enjoyed great sympathy in Soviet Russia and, to some extent, in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.⁴⁹ This line of literary production, striving to give substance to the so very abstract and disquieting perspectives of revolution, filled in a blank that existed in both Communist and Nazi ideology: even if prophetic in nature, neither of them ventured to give precise descriptions of the world to come. But, irrespective of the fact that they were writing out of pure enthusiasm, or were responding to a 'social command', SF authors remained marginal, and, at least at the apex of Stalinism, they were even persecuted and censured.⁵⁰ One should also notice that, between the wars, no actual link existed between this 'literature of anticipation' and the experimentalist trends. Such a junction was made only in the late fifties, with the American New Wave dominated by the great novelist Philip K. Dick. Yet this trend developed from the alternative tradition of the counter-utopias of Zamiatin, Orwell or Huxley. The rhetoric of revolutionary science-fiction of the twenties and the thirties is conventional, plain-hearted, omniscient, popular realism.

SF never represented a serious competitor to the title of 'revolutionary literature', even if it constantly remained a medium for the ideological self-assertion of the technical intelligentsia or rather an efficient safety valve for its fantasies of progress, frustrated and repressed by the party elites.⁵¹ The debate around 'revolutionary literature' developed after the October Revolution and, for about a decade, expanded in a really autonomous form, without the vigorous regulatory intervention of party officials. The revolutionaries were different from both decadent and avant-garde writers. The names of Boris Pylniak, Vsevolod Ivanov, Isaak Babel were put forward, especially by the French and German communist *hommes de lettres*, as possible models for what a 'new' literature could or should be. In the thirties, Alexander Blok and Boris Pylniak were the most translated Russian authors and were perceived as legitimate literary spokesmen of the Revolution.⁵²

Blok and Pylniak were not very vocal as literary theoreticians, but someone like Victor Serge, in France, or Ossip Mandelstam, in Russia, tried to construct a new aesthetics based on this 'natural' offspring of the Communist Revolution. What they required was, with the words of Jean-Pierre Morel, 'une modernité entièrement positive, non-contaminée par l'avantgardisme, une modernité qui

sera le produit sans mélange de la révolution sociale et politique. L'inspiration révolutionnaire plus la forme novatrice, l'une et l'autre dépourvues d'ambiguïté, voilà ce qui définirait la vraie 'littérature révolutionnaire'.⁵³ Pylniak and the authors gathered under the name of 'the Serapion Brothers' equated, in fact, Revolution with a style of fresh observation, with a 'brutal' mix of episodes, with a narrative speed permanently threatening to dissolve the narrative itself. Pylniak's novel *The Barren Year* or Vsevolod Ivanov's *Armoured Train 14–69* provoked fiery debates because of their open, multiple-narrative conception. At the beginning, the translation of Pylniak into French provided Victor Serge with the opportunity to assert that the novel without a central character, without intrigue, without a focal point, the 'récit multilinéaire et discontinu', was the very expression of Revolution.⁵⁴

As early as 1922 came the reply of the intellectual moguls of Revolution, through the voice of Leon Trotsky. In an article published in *Pravda*, he made an extended analysis of *The Barren Year*, reaching the conclusion that the strange structure or lack of structure of the novel pointed to the fact that the author could not make heads and tails out of the revolutionary reality, that he lacked ideological guidance and that, in fact, he was no more than a 'fellow companion'. This reaction is expressive of the great differences in understanding Revolution that underlie the apparent homogeneity of the radical intelligentsia. To the Serapion Brothers as well as to independent writers like Mikhail Bulgakov, author of *The White Guard*, Vassilyi Platonov, the creator of *Chevengur*, or to the famous couple of satirical writers Ilf and Petrov, Revolution was an open reality, as unpredictable as life itself. To Trotsky, who also took the matter seriously and amplified his theories in *Literature and Revolution* (New York, 1925), this flexibility was unacceptable and even dangerous, since the only chance to acquire a revolutionary consciousness was to cling to the concept of Revolution. Only the 'dialectical and historical' vision of Marxism-Leninism could shape the huge and centrifugal amount of facts generated by the October Revolution. Jean-Pierre Morel gives a highly perceptive interpretation of Trotsky's reaction. According to him, from the point of view of a founding father of the Soviet system, the Serapion Brothers were excluded from the understanding of revolutionary reality because they borrowed the perspective of the average, unaffiliated, 'traditional' man. These novels could only be blueprints of the confusion created in empirical minds by the turmoil of the Revolution. They were not really 'modern', they were rooted in the past, they were still affected by the Russian inertia. In spite of their good intentions — Trotsky did not declare them enemies; for this to happen, we shall have to wait for the epoch of the grand purges —, they were no more qualified to express Revolution than the 'bourgeois' avant-garde; they were unable to diagnose the causes of the capitalist crisis and condemned to remain, more or less, a marginal symptom of this crisis. In Jean-Paul Morel's

opinion, Trotsky wanted writers to see Revolution from above, from the point of view of the power, to put each and every casualty under the authority of scientific socialism, to think in 'grandes formes'.⁵⁵

A more successful attempt at finally creating the literature that would legitimately speak for the revolution was that of the revolutionary milieu of the anti-fascist German exile. The ideological radicalization of the exiles grew systematically during the Nazis' ascent to power. The brutal installation of the totalitarian system, its discriminatory, oppressive and, finally, extermination policies against Jews, against every other 'inferior race', against sexual minorities, avant-garde artists, political opponents, generated, apart from the ideological frustration, a strong personal frustration as well. Apocalyptic feelings and the conviction that radical means had to be employed against Fascist barbarity — the idea that intellectuals had to wage a total war not only against racist ideologies, but against the flesh-and-blood representatives of these ideas, to raise in arms, to take weapons — made some prominent young German writers approach the Leninist idea of revolution and the Soviet Union as the most determined enemy of the Nazis.

The most interesting such example is that of Bertolt Brecht. Not because his ideological radicalism were superior to that of Walter Benjamin or to the one of the Frankfurt School, which, in the thirties, moved to Paris, before finally settling in New York.⁵⁶ Brecht is the only one who was committed to elaborating a theoretical revolutionary aesthetics, and also to exemplifying it in his own literary creation. Brecht had a major contribution in transporting the abstract principles of dialectics into a functional concept of the literary work.

Brecht's most interesting theoretical construct challenges the Aristotelian idea of the aesthetic experience as *katharsis*. In his *Theorie des epischen Theaters*, Brecht argues the dialectical value of theatrical performance: the playwright should not force the identification of the audience with theatrical archetypes, on the contrary, he should create a critical distance, a space of lucidity, an intellectual tension. A theatrical experience should not 'purge' the consciousness of its frustrations and anxieties, but should make these frustrations and anxieties obvious to the consciousness, should rationalize frustration by making the human subject inquire the actual, social and political causes of his unhappiness. Brecht called this the *V-effekt*.⁵⁷

At the core of his aesthetics lies the idea of truth. In his 1939 essay *Fünf Schwierigkeiten beim Schreiben der Wahrheit*, Brecht explained his idea of truth: 'sie darf nicht etwas Allgemeines, Hohes, Vieldeutiges sein'⁵⁸, but 'etwas Praktisches, Tatsächliches, Unleugbares, das, um was es sich handelte.'⁵⁹ But Truth has to be reached by the use of a suitable method, by the science of grasping the essentials of every phenomena. For this, one needs 'eine Kenntnis der materialistischen Dialektik, der Oekonomie und der Geschichte.'⁶⁰ As a matter of fact, Brecht equates the practised art with the capacity of making truth instru-

mental. The third chapter of his essay bears the title 'Die Kunst, die Wahrheit handhabbar zu machen als eine Waffe'.⁶¹

Brecht's discovery of Marxism was prior to his antifascist commitment and occurred at a time when he was already a mature writer. Marxism did not modify his literary language, only radicalized it. Brecht thinks of the literary work as if it were a precise, rational demonstration which, somehow, enacts the dialectical movement of history. The literary structure is moulded on the pattern of the dialectical triad: thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Brecht builds on classical values: limpidity, coherence, lucidity. But he changed the meaning of these categories by separating them from an ethos of self-containment and loyalty to the Eternal and projecting them against the background of class conflict and social becoming.

Unlike other 'revolutionary writers' of his generation, Brecht did neither claim the self-determination of literature (this would be the case of hard-core Communists like Louis Aragon and Rafael Alberti, who were always granted the privilege of following, in their poetical work, their personal fantasies), nor did he complacently accept the ideological guidance of the Communist party (like Paul Nizan or the Russian promoters of 'socialist realism': Sholohov, Ehrenburg, Alexey Tolstoy). Brecht unified his literary and his intellectual beliefs out of conviction. He carried out a personal project of totality, of completeness which essentially contradicted his enthusiasm for dialectics. The famous statement of Walter Benjamin on Fascist aestheticism in politics which has to be confronted with the increased political awareness of aesthetics might have been inspired by the antifascist work of Bertolt Brecht.⁶² But, at a closer look, are these two processes as different as they first seemed? Is the passion for a structured, complete and dramatic explanation of the world totally unrelated to aestheticism? Was Marxist hermeneutics not an aesthetic experience of the 'totality' in the same way in which the organicist theory of the state was an aesthetic experience for the Fascist-Futurist intellectuals incriminated by Walter Benjamin?

The fact that Brecht's intimacy with Marxism was of a special nature, that he actually found in Communist revolutionary ideology structures that helped him complete his 'neo-classic' experiments, may be proved by the huge literary heritage he left behind. Writers of the so-called Generation of '47 who came to be acknowledged after World War Two, placed themselves under the authority of Brecht. The most important post-war German fiction writers paid him homage. True enough, this reverence belated the moment of interrogation over the Brecht's activity in East Germany as an undecent Stalinist zealot. Brecht's image, in both German states, was emblematic for the 1968 rebels. After his death, he became the 'living evidence' testifying to the possibility of an 'authentic', creative Marxism, unstained by the bureaucratic sclerosis of the Soviets, yet profoundly orthodox. Brecht was impressive in his desperate act of conti-

nuously watering the Marxist wooden language, hoping that one day it will suffer the same miraculous transformation as Tannhäuser's staff.

Ideologists

Up to this point, I discussed only the point of view of those writers who appropriated the theme of Revolution, as if they enjoyed a special kind of legitimacy in dealing with it. But even Bertolt Brecht, who had the closest approach to the criteria of ideological orthodoxy, did not think of himself, during the most important period in his creative activity, as an obedient servant of the Communist Party. In a text written in the '30, Brecht accuses the reluctance of intellectuals as regards the Party, but he agrees that it is a bureaucratic structure lacking creative spirit and generosity, and that, at the outbreak of the revolution, its interests will prove to be different from those of the working class. Brecht was only convinced that, when the time came, the Party would be 'dialectically' overcome by the spontaneous spirit of the popular upsurge.⁶³

The image that poets had about Revolution and their attempt to dominate or integrate themselves in the revolutionary process is only one side of the story. In order to acquire a better understanding of this matter, it is vital to look at the facts from the point of view of those in power, of those who were actually making the Fascist, Nationalist or Communist revolutions. Their attempts at imagining literature and integrating literature in their picture of the world will be the focus of the following inquiry.

We must perhaps differentiate the policy of the Communist or of the Nazi party with regard to writers from the ideological attempt at creating a literary orthodoxy. The political strategies of both totalitarian movements fluctuated with time. The Soviet strategy, which has a much longer history, reached a final state of baroque self-contradiction in this respect. Different power nuclei inside the power structure used writers as their speakers and many political or ideological wars have been waged under literary cover. In the Soviet system, literary criticism used to play a greater role than literature itself. There is a significant difference, from this point of view, between Communist and National-Socialist dictatorships. In Hitler's Germany, writers never had the social status and the symbolic power they enjoyed in Soviet Russia, even at the apex of Stalinism. This is one of the reasons behind the claim which can still be heard, that Communism had a more human face than its right-wing counter-part, because it inspired a great literature and it cherished poetry.

To account for this difference, we have to look into the Russian tradition of the enlightened intelligentsia, one that has generated a specific blend of political and literary culture, a belief in the 'mission' of literature which has been

pathetically advocated by generations of Populists, Socialist Revolutionaries, Anarchists or Panslavists, and ended up in becoming part of the second nature of Russian intellectuals. Russian culture developed the theme of the intellectuals' 'guilt' to an extent that makes comparison with other spiritual areas extremely difficult. Inherited from one generation to another, the theme acquired an intellectual and aesthetic poignancy that entitles it to be considered a *form* rather than a diffuse *substance*. One cannot insist enough on the cultural rather than psychological nature of the theme of 'guilt'. This guilt complex explains both the surrender before the pretence of ideological domination of the Bolsheviks and the tenacity of the intellectuals' resistance to Communist totalitarianism. Writers were traditionally granted the status of intermediaries between the solitary man who represented the peak of the 'power' (the Little Father, be he the Czar or the Secretary General), and the 'people'.⁶⁴ German tradition favoured the image of the Poet who transcends human contradictions. If there is some kind of agency that the poet can exercise, this is more one of a spiritual kind. The poet should intermediate between community and the ethereal spheres — or the dark powers of the abyss, not between the autocrat and the masses. The poet's status was not built on a profound feeling of guilt, but on a very serious belief in the poet's spiritual superiority.⁶⁵

Apart from these 'spiritualist' considerations, other pragmatic reasons may have oriented the literary policies of the two major totalitarian regimes. The fact that electric media were not as highly developed in the USSR, in comparison with Nazi Germany, might have also contributed to the Communist over-evaluation of literature. Yet it is interesting to note that both ideological movements developed their interest in the propagandistic value of literature more in their foreign than in their domestic practice. In the thirties, literature seemed a perfect means of disseminating the myth of internationalism, of Communist revolution, of the USSR as the motherland of world proletariat as well as for the dissemination of the Aryan myth and for the ideology of national socialism. The policies applied on both sides of the ideological barricades are, in many ways, symmetrical. The Komintern worked very hard to promote an organization of 'progressive' writers, moulded on the structure of the Third International. The greatest concentration of symbolic, intellectual power of the epoch was, undoubtedly, Paris, and the Komintern ran an assiduous campaign for bringing the French opinion leaders under its command or, at least, under its control. But the Nazis were by no means less aware of the symbolic overcharge of the *Ville lumière*. After 1933, the year the Nazis came to power, they openly supported right-wing cultural tendencies all over Europe. But Nazi cultural propaganda reached the peak of its efficiency during the occupation of France. In 1940, Otto Abetz, the German Ambassador in Paris, said that there were three forces in France: communism, finance and *La Nouvelle Revue Française*.⁶⁶ In compliance with this remark,

Abetz supervised a policy of tolerance and generous offers of co-operation as concerns French writers and intellectuals. The most efficient instrument of this policy was the German Institute in Paris, led by a sophisticated intellectual, Karl Epting. In the forties and from the Nazi point of view, a cultural intercessor like the sculptor Arno Becker played exactly the same role Ilya Ehrenburg had played during the thirties for Soviet propaganda.⁶⁷

It is not the purpose of my study to elucidate whether the policy of the Popular Front (largely backed by Joseph Stalin) emerged from real fear of the Nazi menace or was, from the very beginning, a cynical technique of manipulating other people's fears. The purpose is to prove that it was a turning point in the social career of literature. The fairly coherent and planned operations of structuring that which Jean-Pierre Morel called 'l'Internationale littéraire' also implied marketing an emphatic social status of literature, great exposure for the literary profession, and a social myth of the writer as a civilizing hero, as eternal campaigner against 'barbarity'. I strongly doubt that the importance of the Komintern conspiracy for the socialization of a triumphal image of literature and the creation of the conviction that literature was, in itself, a form of political power could be easily quantified. The contributions of professional Komintern agents like Ilya Ehrenburg and particularly Willy Müntzenberg and Eugen Fried, alias *le camarade Clément*, are very telling insofar as regards the use of Communist intellectual guerrilla techniques of controlling the media and exercising an aggressive, populist and effective propaganda. Communist agitators of Stalinist make-up provided the literary stars of the moment with several techniques for dealing with mass society. Writers had a tradition of despising mass society; the Communists taught them how to confront and tame the masses.⁶⁸

But, for the history of the relationship between literature and ideology, the theoretical creation of the *socialist realism* represents a moment of much greater importance. The very complicated, if not complex, negotiations and polemics around the clarification of the leading role of the Bolshevik Party in literature belong to a different form of understanding the theme of Revolution. During the NEP period, the Communist Party did not actually adopt a political line on literature. With the tacit approval of Lenin, the People's Commissariat for Enlightenment led by Lunacharsky, almost favored the plurality of literary experiments.⁶⁹ Only the 'counter revolutionary' tendencies were excluded from this treatment. Non-party writers were accepted, encouraged and, by means of personal talent and intellectual creativity, they even dominated the literary life. The Serapion Brothers have already been mentioned; the LEF (the Left Front of the Arts), later to become the *Novyi Lef* (counting among others Kruchonich, Mayakovsky, Ossip Brik), the *Akhmeists* (Gumilev, Akhmatova, Mandelstam), the group *Pereval* (Ivan Katayev, Platonov), and exile writers who manifested a growing sympathy for the liberal spirit of the early twenties and who gathered

around the Berlin publication *Smena Wech* (A. Tolstoy, Bunin)⁷⁰ should also be added. Richard Stites generously speaks about 'Lenin's gigantic laboratory of revolution' in which utopian and experimental literature also had a place, protected from the frowning of hard-line Bolsheviks and from the attacks of the different 'proletarian' fundamentalist associations (which, in a certain sense, were avant-garde and experimental themselves).⁷¹

When Stalin rose to power he put an end to NEP and inaugurated an epoch of 'revolutionary' terror, which radically changed this policy. After fiery debates for the hegemony over the literary life, led mainly by RAPP (the Russian Association of the Proletarian Writers) and the *Litfront*, the Party reached the conclusion that 'fractionism' and 'sectarianism' in the realm of *belles lettres* had to cease, much in the same way in which they had been expelled from the political life. In April 1932, a resolution of the Central Committee made it clear that all writers, party or non-party members, had to unite around the Communist ideology and fully participate, by means of their specific competence, in the construction of socialism. The process thus generated eventually led to an organizational and administrative control over the writers (as, apparently, was the main interest of Stalin) as well as to the imposition of 'socialist realism' over literature. The most interesting aspect of the debates that led to the relative clarification of this blurred concept was the clash between allegedly 'proletarian' writers and critics, who required a highly ideological art, profoundly linked to the understanding of dialectics, and the party officials or the Communist scholars appointed by the Party officials to elaborate the ideological profile of Soviet literature. With his 'robust' optimism, Stalin stated that any author honestly mirroring the socialist reality will be a socialist realist,⁷² and, at the second Plenum of the Organizational Committee of the Writers' Conference, Lunacharsky claimed that a good writer was not necessarily supposed to have experience in matters of ideology.⁷³ From the point of view of a RAPP critic and playwright such as Afinogenov, who had developed a Marxist theory of drama somehow similar to Brecht's ideas, such a position seemed unacceptable.

The most extraordinary thing about 'socialist realism' is that it encouraged a paradoxical estrangement of literature from ideology as such. Socialist realism favored a 'vigorous', traditional view of the writer, it valued the writer from the point of view of his 'mimetic' and 'monumental' technical abilities, stressed on the emotional function of literature (Stalin stated that writers are 'producing' human souls⁷⁴). The writer was no longer a 'fellow traveller', and by no means was he an ideological partner, a *tavarysh*. The *Proletcult* ideology, initiated by Lenin's Bolshevik comrade, the engineer and science-fiction author Bogdanov, began by requesting such a preferential treatment for those who were creating, through their literary works, a purely proletarian literature. These thought of themselves as some kind of proletarian aristocracy and, during the NEP period,

they requested total autonomy of their organization, as long as the Bolshevik Party itself, which contained peasant and intelligentsia elements, was not purely proletarian.⁷⁵ At this level of competence, they felt entitled to participate in the very making of the Communist ideology. As 'initiated' Marxists, characterized by their lucidity, commitment, awareness and class purity, they were ready not only to exercise power in the literary field, but also to influence, in a certain measure, the global perspective of the Soviet view of the world. As embodiment of the Bolshevik apparatus, Joseph Stalin could not tolerate such a pretense. So that, even if he made no consistent suggestion as to how socialist realism should look like, the stand he took contained a powerful ideological input.

As a matter of fact, the doctrine of 'socialist realism' dismissed the hopes held by radical factions of the literary intelligentsia with regard to being treated as a politically and ideologically privileged elite, an elite that could participate in preparing the elements as well as in the very exercise of symbolic power. Such illusions were still nurtured by the Western antifascist literary intelligentsia, and the Popular Front spirit and policy were largely founded on them. But literary Stalinism meant something very different from the Brechtian vanity of submitting only to the pure laws of dialectics. The Stalinist experience brought to the revolutionary culture a masochistic taste for irrational and unconditional submission, an acceptance of the transcendence of the Party and the conviction that the Party could be embodied in a supreme leader. Pathetic rationalism ceased to be the essence of 'revolutionary literature'. It was replaced by a dramatic act of blind faith.⁷⁶

Yet, a difference in the style and treatment of literature in the two totalitarian regimes may have originated in this opposition. Constantly pretending to be the unavoidable, though dialectical, development of the Enlightenment and the rationalist tradition, European Communism favored a type of aesthetic experience that emphasized the values of self-consciousness. Its style, in Germany, France and, to a lesser extent, in Italy, was a pathetic hyper-lucidity. This irrational praise of some forms of rationality and self-awareness was an important link between Marxism and Existentialism, in the fifties, or between Marxism and the 'Neue Neue' *Sachlichkeit* of the German Generation of '47. In the USSR and its later East-European satellites, literature appeared more as an emotional safety valve, as a corrective of the necessary abstraction and scientific quality of the political discourse. This line was followed by the official writers as well as by dissenters. To a certain extent, the East preserved a distinction between rationality and emotion which had been promoted by 'socialist realism'. Literature should be emotion, empathic experience. Disagreements between orthodox followers and dissenters appeared only with regard to whether the territory of this emotional experience should be pre-determined by Communist Knowledge, or should remain unmarked and unlimited.

Nazi ideology differs in that it never drew a firm line between the politic and the poetic. Literature as such could not acquire a great prestige under Nazi rule, because it was already present, in a diffuse state, in the emotional political discourse of Hitler. Alfred Rosenberg, the main theoretician of Nazi literary orthodoxy, could not overcome the performances of his *Führer*. The highbrow *Kulturpessimismus* is obvious in the following rhetoric sample, taken from a speech Hitler delivered before German officers a couple of months before his death: 'Es ist eine andere Weltordnung und ein anderes Weltgesetz nicht denkbar, in einem Universum, in dem die Fixsterne Planeten zwingen, um sie zu kreisen, und Planeten Monde in ihre Bahn zwingen, in dem in gewaltigsten, gigantischen Geschehen Sonnen eines Tages zerstört werden und andere an ihre Stelle treten.'⁷⁷

IV. A culture of the carnival

War and Revolution are two galaxies of symbols that concentrate a great deal of the literary substance of modernity. They are strongly polarized in the consciousness of the thirties: on one side, a culture of war embodied in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, on the other, revolution and its friends and fans attached either to humanism or to Marxism-Leninism, gathered around the USSR. In real artistic practice it is very hard to distinguish between the two. My last attempt will be to shape another cultural pattern (social myth, stream of consciousness) which, though it may often appear in close symbiosis to the other two, does still possess a significant degree of autonomy. One of the most important effects of this complication of the ideological-literary scheme is that, beyond blurring the mechanical opposition between Fascism and Communism, it also forces us to put the opposition between literature and political totalitarianism in a more balanced perspective.

I call this third entity *Carnival*. The suggestion is borrowed from the great Russian literary scholar, Mikhail Bakhtin. Even if the last decades witnessed a constant increase of the interest for this cultural structure/theme, I dare say that theoreticians who worked in this field, like the anthropologist Victor Turner or the promoters of the popular culture studies, did nothing but gloss on Bakhtin's ideas. The Russian scholar made a very personal investigation into Medieval and Renaissance popular imagination, taking as a pretext the work of Rabelais. Combining the method of the German school of philology and of nineteenth-century historians of culture like Burkhardt, with the methods and the concepts of the Russian Formalists, which he appropriated after having thoroughly revised them,⁷⁸ Bakhtin came up with a brand new theory of the popular.

According to his interpretation, carnival is a cultural expression of 'totality'. Speaking in Formalist terms, one could say that the paradigm of the popular culture language is fully actualized in the syntactic aspect of the carnival performance. Carnival reverts the official, 'frozen', authoritarian, hierarchical world of high culture, it spontaneously creates a general equality of status, or rather a general lack of status. By doing this, it channels tensions and frustrations out of society, it creates the premises of a new beginning. Carnival is inherently opposed to linear, conceptual thinking because it 'consists of' a basic distrust of theoretical and ideological constructs. By exulting the intensity of feeling and direct experience, by triumphantly praising the body and the values of corporeality, by harboring a limitless optimism and a 'shameless' joy of living, carnival is, in fact, an alternative to understanding life and society *more geometrico*. Moreover, carnival is subversive. It penetrates the apparently rational order of 'day-light society' and, through mock rituals, turns it into a fluid, nocturnal shape. This cannot be done without the use of violence. Therefore, carnival uses violence. Yet the main argument in favor of the idea that carnival is not a survivor of 'barbarous' epochs, but a complex, even sophisticated, cultural form, is that it is centered on a euphuistic, symbolic, ludicrous violence, one that appears, at the same time as 'void' (devoided of cruelty, not producing real effects) and 'magic' (having as a background fertility rites that have survived Christianization).⁷⁹

As already stated, Bakhtin's theory does not refer exclusively to popular culture, it inquires into the relationship between popular culture and the intellectuals. What did Rabelais do, in fact, when writing the story of Gargantua: did he submit to the charming spirit of liberty, to the spontaneous anarchy of popular culture, or did he try to use the popular element as a vehicle for his own intellectual utopia? Of course, this is a scholastic question of the type Rabelais himself used to mock at. Its merit lies in pointing to the fact that 'carnival'—taken not literally, but in a typological or (anti)metaphysical perspective— is by no means purely 'popular'. Apart from the cultural anthropology of late Medieval and Renaissance urban culture, Bakhtin also examines the emergence of a spirit that I would venture to call 'ludicrous subversion'. Carnival, as Bakhtin understands it, seems to have two different origins: the pagan elements which survive on the fringes of a Christian culture imposed from above and the sophistication or *avant la lettre* 'decadence' of intellectual elites secretly defying ecclesiastical authority.

This culture of carnival borders on both utterly popular forms of playful violence and jocund utopias created by the literary intelligentsia. Though it is possible to associate them in one and the same concept, in my view they remain clearly distinct, they do not really mingle. In fact, the label 'carnival' could be used for every 'wisdom' that denies the capacity of the mind to fully describe

or even approximately perceive objective reality, for every 'wisdom' that relies on strategies of detouring this dangerous illusion and, last but not least, discovers a certain pleasure, a hedonistic ethics, in the ironic dissolution of 'bulky' representations of the truth as well as in the opening toward the unexpectedness of experience. Hedonism is necessary in order to distinguish this tradition from medieval nominalism or from Kant himself. Skepticism — for keeping it distinct from the energism of Romanticism. But skepticism and hedonism are also the prevalent characteristics of the *Décadence* that we considered typical for War culture. There is still another element, essential to the carnivalesque: the assumption that the sense of humor may form the basis of a self-contained philosophy, that comedy is a self-sufficient view of the world.

Even if it has deep connections with the popular and emulates some of its most distinctive features, this type of culture is complicated enough and its chances of becoming genuinely popular are quite scarce. The connection between the two is not only 'natural', expressed by the indefinable quantity of mutual changes, but there are also ethical and ideological perspectives of the matter. Ethical, because it is by ethical decision that the 'carnavalesque' author opens him- or herself towards the undetermined social and cultural diversity of his fellow humans. Ideological, because the experiments of writers in the sphere of the popular could also express a tendency toward 'control' and 'submission' of this form of culture: propaganda could be defined as an attempt at filling a popular 'form' with an ideological 'content' that has nothing to do with the inherent (anti)ideology which Bakhtin ascribed to Carnival.

The *liaisons* between *Décadence* and Carnival are very ambiguous. We ascribed to the spirit of *Décadence* the attempt at re-creating an aristocratic philosophy of life, including the appropriated re-shaping of the liberal and/or positivistic understanding of politics. And yet, some of the traits of *Décadence* culture strongly remind us of what has been described as Carnival. Nietzsche's *Gaya Scienza* seems very close to the outbursts of pure joy and to the unmediated experience of vital energy characteristic of Carnival culture. This is quite paradoxical, since Nietzsche counts as a theoretician of the elite, of the superior race, far removed from the stream of popular culture. However, if we accept that the Nietzsche of the later period is not completely free of links with the early Nietzsche and the seed of his (anti)system can already be found in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, we may discover that the metaphysical category of the Dyonisian, on which the philosopher's basic existential attitude relies, is extracted from ancient Greek popular cults. Nietzsche's theory on the birth of tragedy deduces, in fact, this form of high culture *par excellence*, from the Dyonisian feasts and the Dyonisian mysteries which, from Bakhtin's standpoint, should be placed in the ascendancy of Carnival. Not to mention the famous Nietzschean

theme of the *laughing God*, which could be considered as a highly accurate symbolic expression of the Carnival nebula.⁸⁰

'Holly drunkenness' and the orgiastic understanding of vitality are deeply embedded in Nietzscheanism — the very backbone of what we called *Décadence* and War culture. We can clearly trace these elements from the *Wiener Moderne*,⁸¹ Expressionism, and the interwar *Neue Sachlichkeit*,⁸² to Anglo-American or French admirers of the philosopher (D.H. Lawrence, Ezra Pound, Malraux, Bataille),⁸³ up to literary stars of the fifties and the sixties, like Allen Ginsberg and Norman Mailer.⁸⁴ Does this mean that all these groups and writers are legitimate members of the Carnival 'Phi-Beta-Kappa'?

I would say no. 'Joy' is understood by this stream of ideas as an all-embracing category which reconciles man with his most profound nature, individuals with 'organic' togetherness, high culture (detached contemplation) with politics (the realm of action). But I think a distinction should be made between this 'joy' and the sense of humor and ludicrous freedom. The Decadent pattern contains an essential element which is incompatible with the pattern of Carnival: the *Kulturpessimismus*. The ingenious *Décadence* forced its radical hedonism to meet stoic ethics. The Decadent subject is implied and impassable at the same time. He or she can loathe the energetic consistency of Life with all his/her sensors, while its intellect contemplates, through the veil of Maya, the ataractic purity of vacuum.⁸⁵ His/her joy simultaneously implies an intense feeling of being alive, and of being free from life, from determination, from empirical bonds, it implies being possessed by and possessing the vital energy. Carnival does not include *Weltschmerz* among its premises. The idea of voluptuousness needs not to include sufferance, its literary genre is not 'tragedy being born' but sheer comedy commanding over nuclei of tragedy. Decadent utopia of establishing a fix, inner point of reference and reflection inside the universal fluidity is completely purged out by the spirit of Carnival. The jocular completeness could not tolerate the 'frozen' attitude of tragic contemplation.

With respect to politics, both War and Carnival can be said to practice 'politics of voluptuousness', but this will have very different meanings depending on context. For the *fin de siècle* decadent spirit, the only meaning of exercising power is the pleasure this very exercise can give. Or, with an important nuance, the chance of experiencing power, of *living* it, through the agency of politics. A political hierarchy is, from this point of view, a scale of intensities: the closer to the top one gets, the more thorough the experience of power. From the perspective of Carnival, hierarchy exists only to be mocked at, and the ratio between political status and the intensity of 'political emotion' is reversed: the 'top' is absolutely barren, lacking human consistency, it is barren and hollow, while the 'basis' is the preferred residence of the 'living' power. It is no 'basis' in fact, but a kind of 'depth' you descend into, in order to regain your original

innocence. Carnival deploys a political strategy that should *protect* and *develop* voluptuousness. For the imagination of *Décadence*, with its undeniable touch of masochism, the power structure tends to become a nexus of erotic freedom and delight. For the Carnival imagination, the pleasure resides in by-passing power structures and playing tricks on them. Carnival does not reject or exorcise power in itself, it just sets power 'free' from its narrow, official, administrative, hyper-organized self-consciousness.

In one word, if we look for *fin de siècle* examples of a culture of Carnival, we should not hope to find them in the realm of aristocratic vitalism and aestheticism. It is rather in the spirit of an author like Alfred Jarry that one can identify the Rabelaisian legacy or, partially, in the theatrical works and the pornographic novels of Guillaume Apollinaire. A very interesting example of association between modernity, ludicrousness and a 'popular' audience is the Viennese *Sezession*. Austrian artists managed to create an idiom of the arts with a marked carnival-like appearance. Austrian Art Deco profoundly influenced the bourgeois taste and penetrated the everyday life of the average people, by means of what could be called today industrial design.⁸⁶ But it is difficult to find an exact literary counterpart for this phenomenon. If we agreed that this spirit of Carnival must not be *literally* popular, that it is a honorable intellectual project which can afford to ignore the actual public as much as every other modern project, I would say that perhaps Robert Musil's *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* is a literary example of the carnivalesque.⁸⁷

Avant-Garde brought about an interest in the popular that expressed itself in theoretical terms. The first irruption of this new, unclassifiable attempt at creating a hundred percent novelty, the Futurism, expressed its will to do away with the traditional and somehow patriarchal *fronde artistique* of the nineteenth century. I think this idea is thoroughly expressed in the 1913 *Futurist Manifesto Against Montmartre* signed by A.-F. Mac Delmarle, 'Futurist painter'. In it, the whole spirit of the famous artists' colony is contested in the name of an imperialistic modernity: 'No doubt that your Moulin de la Galette will disappear into a metro station.'⁸⁸ Apparently, Futurism did not contradict the ludicrous aspect and the carnival atmosphere of Montmartre. Its fantasy excesses and its exhibitionism overcame the 'domestic' feasts of the old would-be Avant-Garde, but, at first sight, one would have said that these exaggerations could not really alter the relationship between arts and society. The carnival was, up to 1900, only the epiphenomenon of the artistic underground: a way of life rather than an outspoken political attitude, that could still be associated with the traditional rituals of medieval artistic guilds. Futurism seemed to lend these outskirts of artistry an independent significance. It projected the burlesque life-style of traditionally tolerated but marginal artistic colonies on the public stage, granting it an ostentatious — doctrinaire, if not already ideological-significance.

F.T. Marinetti was the first to state explicitly that the culture of the urban masses — the new 'popular culture' — could be explored in search of new means of expression and techniques. These modern forms of the popular were a reservoir of collective fantasies that could not be ignored by a poet willing to express the Age of the Machine. It is the possibility of associating the schemes and the language of the 'teatro di varietà' with the mechanical production that thrilled Marinetti, in a rather spirited manifesto of 1913.⁸⁹ Russian Futurists developed the same taste for the popular. Among the first consequences of this turn of mind were the theories and the stage practice of Meyerhold, who tried to articulate a new theatrical expression by melting and reshaping elements of pantomime, puppet theater, and vaudeville.

Even when employing popular culture as an instrument, Futurism did not completely engage in a culture of carnival. Marinetti's trend is essentially related to the neo-aristocracy of the *Décadence*. The spirit of the political Futurism is clearly expressive of War culture, as previously pointed out. An entirely carnivalesque Avant-Garde emerged with the outbreak of World War One, when the strange and distorted form of pacifism of the Dada movement came into being.

The Dada style in its entirety hints to the underground tradition explored by Mikhail Bakhtin. Even if it is generally perceived as an anti-bourgeois movement, it is quite hard to deny the numerous links existing between Dada and *urban popular culture*. This notion is close to Bakhtin's *culture of the marketplace*. The Russian scholar links the dialogic structure of the cogito to the cultural entity of the marketplace: economic and symbolic processes of change are integrated in the same mental pattern. The 'marketplace' is a kind of essential image of what has been described by Karl Popper as an 'open society', reminding, to a certain extent, of the anarchist project (a free market is, first of all, free of any transcendent command).⁹⁰ It is possible to associate Dadaism with the traditions of 'marketplace freedom', taking into account its specific way of insertion into social life. The Dada movement, from the very moment of its foundation in Zurich, in 1917, by a group of Swiss and of various other exiles who were fleeing World War One, acted according to a mental representation of the *Gesamtkunstwerk* that had more in common with 'popular' feasts than with the *Décadence* (or, as I shall try to prove hereafter, revolutionary subcultures). From the very beginning — that is to say, from its first manifestations at the famous *Cabaret 'Voltaire'* — Dada did not create art or literary *objects*, but *performances* including poetry, music, fine arts, dance and acting. This cocktail was set under the sign of the 'mother of invention', of a pointless freedom and vitality. It did not try to be 'aristocratic', it did not elude or transcend all possible marks of the vulgar, of the 'popular'. In fact, Dada seemed to deny all difference between high and popular culture, in the name of child-like purity, of creative naiveté, of refreshing absurdity. It was very close to the spirit of Carnival underlying the tra-

ditional, 'patriarchal' market. The marketplace was itself open to performances of all kind, to mimicry, to the burlesque — a paradoxical place of ludicrous 'displacement', of 'farical' fluidity.

Le dérèglement de tous les sens, the intersection of different, incompatible orders of reality and pseudo- or super-reality, the de-structuring of time and space already existed in European literature. But they were connected to gothic or sado-masochistic fantasies, they implied a Romanticist experience of the grotesque and the sublime and were intricately connected to a cathartic pattern of literary experience based on awe, anxiety, or even sheer terror. The high tradition embodied in the different forms of *fin de siècle* Décadence produced rather scary representations of the unknown and irregular. Décadence expresses disorder with mixed feelings of fear and fury, with dread and despair. Sometimes, irregularity is accepted with a kind of perverse sensuality, with a sense of complicity vacillating between disgust and superior irony. The Dada movement completely altered this crypto-classical approach. Dada felt no longer compelled to give incongruity, contradiction, amorphousness a profoundly negative connotation. It did not attack War culture by means of symbolic violence, curses and apocalyptic imagery, the way Expressionism did. It simply tried to invent a world in which sheer fear and terror were no more possible: as long as reality and possibility are joined and equated, as long as the unexpected as such is burnt out by overcharge, there are no more reasons (no more intellectual reasons, at least) for a cosmic feeling of menace and insecurity. Dada tried, in a way, to imitate the great ability to exorcise collective fear by means of tricking Death and cheating Fate, means which were so typical of traditional Carnival.

The evolution of Dada is essential for understanding what brings together and what separates revolutionary culture from what was called here the culture of carnival. It is most instructive to compare the ironic and playful language of the manifestos and proclamations of the Zurich period with the ever gloomier tone of the documents issued during the next phase of the movement, when its international headquarters moved to Berlin. In the beginning, no one within Dada seriously thought of associating the literary *soirées*, exhibitions, and representations with world revolution or with the cause of the world proletariat. Even the most ideologically oriented member of the group, Tzara, seems quite remote from actual political preoccupations. The style of his first Dada manifestos retains, apart from an enormous quantity of bluff, a certain civility, a certain — to use a contemporary American label — human nicety. In his 1917 *Manifeste de M. Antipyrine* (maybe a mock replica of Paul Valéry's *M. Teste*), Tzara addressed 'le gentile bourgeois'. This could be considered an obvious irony, had not the author clearly stated that Dada was neither madness or wisdom, nor *irony*.⁹¹ Even if it is quite certain that Tzara did not really think of the bourgeois as being *stricto sensu* 'nice', the determination is not, in my

opinion, totally void of meaning. According to the general Dada philosophy, it expressed a readiness to absorb, in a quasi-Buddhist way, one's opposite into one's self, to encompass and include contradiction rather than to obsessively isolate and sharpen it, as the revolutionary pattern required. The manifesto ends with Tzara declaring his wish to please his audience and the powerful love for this audience that had overcome him.⁹²

Moving to Germany, where the tense atmosphere that was oozing with violence, social frustration and anxiety, in an intellectual climate dominated by the Bavarian communist-type upsurge and the brief but pathetic episode of the Munich Soviets, Dada underwent a gradual but irreversible change. The beginnings of Dada in Berlin are not as fundamentally different from the previous history of the movement. In the speech Richard Huelsenbeck delivered at the Galerie Neumann (Berlin, Kurfurstendamm), on the 18th of February 1918, he warns the audience: 'Deswegen, wenn Sie mich fragen, was Dada ist, würde ich sagen, es war nichts und wollte nichts.' But, at the same time, Huelsenbeck brings some comfort: 'Bitte bleiben Sie ruhig, man wird Ihnen keine körperliche Schmerzen bereiten. Das einzige, was Ihnen passieren könnte, ist dies: daß Sie Ihr Geld umsonst ausgeben haben.' After such statements, the final formula of the speech, 'Es lebe die dadaistische Revolution', could have but a playful meaning.⁹³

The Dada manifesto that followed also focused on artistic issues, hailing 'bruitistische', 'simultanistische', 'statische Gedicht' and 'neuen Materials in der Malerei'; it gives an explicit though ambiguous evidence of the links between Dada and Carnival, stating that a genuine ('echten') Dadaist is 'halb Pantagruel, halb Franziskus'. From the same text, however, we learn that 'Dadaist sein kann unter Umständen heißen, mehr Kaufmann, mehr Parteimann als Künstler sein/...'.⁹⁴ At this point, the salesman and the partyman are placed, ironically, on the same level. But the political radicalization continues, and, in 1919 the 'dadaistische Zentralrat der Weltrevolution' proclaims, in 1919: 'Dadaisten gegen Weimar'.⁹⁵ One of the most interesting Dada documents, this time issued by 'der dadaistische revolutionäre Zentralrat Gruppe Deutschland' (Hausmann, Huelsenbeck, Golyscheff), shows an incredible contamination of Avant-Garde with Communist motives. The manifesto 'Was ist der Dadaismus und was will er in Deutschland?' opens in a strikingly ideological manner with an appeal to the 'internationale revolutionäre Vereinigung aller schöpferischen und geistigen Menschen der ganzen Welt auf dem Boden des radikalen Kommunismus' and, further on, requires 'die Verpflichtung der Geistlichen und Lehrer auf die dadaistischen Glaubenssätze'.⁹⁶

What happened during the twenties (the Surrealist appraisal casting Dadaism into oblivion, much in the same way Dadaism took over Futurism), is the stabilization of confusion between revolutionary and carnival culture within the

Avant-Garde. The Surrealist commitment to 'the cause of the proletarians' went hand in hand with a radicalization of their theoretical language which, on the one hand, continued to borrow concepts from Marx and, later on, from Lenin (mixing them with Freudian elements), and, on the other hand, grew ever more aggressive. Dada practiced a mock-violence and attacked official ideas, symbols, themes while their more systematic, 'ideological' followers organized public trials of flesh-and-blood representatives of the cultural establishment (beginning with Maurice Barrès) and did not stop before sheer incitations to lynching or to forms of execution that were even more imaginative. Of course, no one could claim that irony or the ludicrous spirit were totally absent from these 'juridical procedures'. It is also true that, in the decisive moment of the 1936–38 trials organized on Stalin's orders by Vyshinski against Zynoviev, Kamenev, Bukharyn and many other Bolshevik old-timers, Surrealists were among the very few who publicly condemned the murderous orgy that was taking place in Moscow.⁹⁷ But adversity to Stalinism did not imply abandoning the intellectual stream of totalitarianism. The excuse that the incredibly authoritarian way in which Breton led the Surrealist International was only a mock-parallel to what happened within the Third International, the orders for which came from Moscow, does not hold. Contemporary critics claim that Breton took genuine pleasure in exercising unlimited power and that the only difference between him and other leaders of fanaticized sections of the European intelligentsia is that, by limiting himself to the domain of *belles lettres* and to the 'revolution on paper', Breton took no actual risks while enjoying the pleasures of political irresponsibility.⁹⁸

Thus, during the rough period of *engagement* preceding and accompanying World War Two, it became increasingly more difficult to make the distinction between Carnival, as a specific cultural and spiritual orientation, and the bulk of the revolutionary trend of the epoch. This brings us to the very problem of affinities and idiosyncrasies shared by these two 'cultures'. In the deep structure, as far as such processes can be formally understood, revolution and carnival are retraceable to the same pattern: both of them imply overcoming social and political *statu quo*, both develop in conditions of crisis. They *are* cultures of the crisis. Revolutionary moments are partially fitted by anthropological descriptions of Carnival such as the one given by Victor Turner,⁹⁹ and carnival partially overlaps with contemporary theoretical models that no longer consider the use of actual violence as a revolutionary *sine qua non*.¹⁰⁰

Yet, the difference is important: Carnival mutations are reversible, while the purpose of any revolutionary movement is to cause irreversible alterations of the social and political form of the world. It is true that revolutionary culture had a lot in common with the spirit of the popular feast. This was almost fatal for a type of literature for which the praise of the 'working class' and 'popular culture' became an ideological keystone. But revolutionary doctrines, of the left

as well as of the right, are quite ambiguous in their praise of 'the people': their belief in painful labor integrating men in the cosmic rhythm (shared by both Fascists and Marxians), is paralleled and surpassed by their mistrust in the capacity of the same laborers to govern themselves. Revolution, as the totalitarian consensus of the '30s seems to prove, was understood as coming from above: it was a form, created in remote laboratories of intense 'scientific' meditation, which had to be projected onto the scattered, miscellaneous reality of social life.

The literary intelligentsia that had been converted to this understanding of revolution was never populist, even if they referred periodically to the need to take a plunge in the ocean of the unsophisticated and the simple-hearted. Their treatment of popular culture is instrumental: they extract elements of symbolic or mythical thinking from their 'organic' environment and fit them into the pattern of dialectics or of 'national rebirth'. This process reached a climax when a whole trend of revolutionary literature went on inventing a socialist 'folklore' and a 'proletarian culture'. It is highly relevant that the creators of these forms were typical representatives of the intelligentsia. We may well believe that the competition between Russian Futurism and the *Proletcult* represented the competition between 'free spirit' and *l'esprit de caserne* but we still have to accept that they were representing the same ambition of the literary segment of the intelligentsia, namely that of controlling the lore of the 'masses'.¹⁰¹ The experiments of Bertolt Brecht are also highly relevant of the way popular discourse was manipulated for propaganda goals. The synthesis between elements of cabaret or street theatre and the Marxian dialectic 'aestheticism' may be remarkable from the craftsman point of view. Yet it should be contrasted to the far more genuine understanding of the popular theatre of Garcia Lorca, who was no less of an experientalist, but who organically rejected ready-made ideological mappings of reality. As a playwright, Lorca is far better acquainted to carnival. His experiments with the vagrant 'popular' theatre 'La Barraca' on the eve of the Spanish Civil War are, in spite of his unconditional support for the left-wing regime, hardly related to the ideology of 'revolution'.

If the differences between a culture of the carnival, as practiced by Dada, and the teleological revolutionaries can be quite numerous and clear-cut, it may be less easy to grasp what elements, if any, separate carnival from the alternative view on revolution, carried by the anarchist movement. The burlesque coherence of carnival, the belief in an order that imperceptibly persists in the midst of continuous change and turmoil, of disparity and turbulence — a subtle order, strangely related to the gross fantasies of the 'material and corporeal' (Bakhtin) — could not be without connection to the anarchist utopia of statelessness and spontaneous organization. There are authors who regard experimental arts as representing merely one of the many trends of twentieth-century anarchy. However, there is a historical litigation between the two, which can be placed under

the authority of Zola's critique and rejection of the ideas expressed by the famous utopian thinker Proudhon in his posthumous *Du principe de l'art et de sa destination sociale*. Zola's review of the book analyzes with sharp irony the vision of an art relegated to public service, free only as long as it expresses positive values and moral consent: 'Je consents a habiter sa cité: je m'y ennuierais sans doute, mais je m'y ennuierais honnêtement et tranquillement, ce qui est une compensation. Ce que je ne saurais supporter, ce qui m'irrite, c'est qu'il force à vivre dans cette cité des hommes qui refuse énergiquement la paix et l'effacement qu'il leur offre.'¹⁰²

What Émile Zola apparently understood in 1865 is a principle James Buchanan has also effectively expressed: from all possible social systems, anarchy is the one which depends most on the general respect for law and order.¹⁰³ Without a full internalization of social principles, of ethical norms (at least those which are regulating public dialogue), it simply cannot work. A world without a definite, autonomous, specialized power structure is a world either of extended civil war or of diffuse but ubiquitous moral *authority*. Without being a representative of the culture of Carnival, the author of *Nana* was nevertheless committed to the idea of unconditional artistic freedom. Carnival itself, rejecting authority, would automatically reject the rationalized variety of anarchy which foretells, in the manner of Fourier and Proudhon, a dictatorship of humanitarian principles.

It is equally difficult to identify the attitude described by Bakhtin as 'carnavalesque', with a form of anarchy similar to Max Stirner's hyper-individualism (for which Surrealists had great consideration). 'Individuality' is a firm and stable concept that could not resist the tide of universal burlesque. Closer to our point might be Bakunin's fascination with the 'spontaneous', 'living' revolution, with 'a popular uprising, elemental, chaotic, and merciless', with 'the rude, untamed force' of the masses.¹⁰⁴ But it is not really *passion* that characterizes Carnival ethos and neither is, in spite of its 'popular' appearance, the *glorification of the people*. Even if it spends huge amounts of energy, carnival is not pathetic, it is totally anti-climactic and it liberates liveliness from the moral and spiritual pressure exercised by conventional representations such as 'passion' and 'people'. In fact, the cultural pattern we have called Carnival is related to the popular mainly through the idea of universal *openness*. It is the mystique of equally approaching the sublime and the trivial as legitimate manifestations of the divine, it is a kind of synthesis between empathy and irony that feature the 'popular' appearance of Carnival. Its place is sometimes quite close to 'ludicrous' forms of worship such as Zen-Buddhism or Hassidism.¹⁰⁵

It is also the 'plain' sense of humor that links Carnival as an 'intellectual' way of life to 'popular' Carnival. As already suggested, humor is seen as the highest expression of human wisdom. It is distinct from high-culture irony or from revolutionary sarcasm, because it includes pleasure and even voluptuous-

ness. Carnival humor is a kind of erotic irony and/or self-irony. The historical Avant-Garde, culminating with the Surrealist practical and theoretical revolutionary 'earnestness', lost just this feature. André Breton inoculated the movement with a taste for 'sublime' and 'heroic' theatrical exposure that grew with Sartre and the Existentialist trend of the next generation. Emmanuel Mounier made a distinction between *la gauche optimiste* and *la gauche qui pleure ou qui ne rit pas tous les jours*. The former believed in the innocence of the human being, which one only had to release from under the crippling edifice of class society in order to allow it to generate beauty and harmony spontaneously, whereas the latter was a sort of Hobbesian left,¹⁰⁶ which doubted the natural inclination of the human being for brotherly love, concentrated on material stability and security as well as on controlling the self-destructive impulses of an unconscious population.¹⁰⁷ Surrealists proved that this notional distinction could be easily neutralized: although they claimed to believe in the innate innocence of all human needs and desires, their style was that of a *gauche qui pleure*. The social *personae* they devised are morose and suggest the classical tenure of great responsibility. As for Existentialists, they match the pattern of *la gauche qui pleure* with such accuracy that, had it not been for Mounier's first publication of the essay in 1938, one could think that he had coined the formula on the very example of the Sartre of the fifties.

These are elements that help us understand the marginalization of the spirit of Carnival within the austere culture of *engagement*. They do not imply, however, that Carnival should automatically be in a better relationship with *la gauche optimiste*. It is interesting that Mounier did not use the formula *la gauche qui rit*. One could come to the conclusion that there was no place for laughter among the representatives of the revolutionary and radical intellectual culture of the late thirties. The sharpening confrontation between Nazi, Communist and Liberal ideologies and, later on, the outbreak of World War Two, which blurred the apparent logic of these confrontations, replacing them with an apocalyptic state of mind, are the objective conditions which have led to the obliteration of Carnival. After the war, the shocking reality of Soviet invasion of Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and the conflicts generated by the last colonial wars, the feelings of anger and guilt of the young generations upon their gradual discovery of the acceptance and even collaboration with Fascist regimes of older intellectuals, on the other hand, favored for the proliferation of War/Revolution spirit and Carnival culture as well as of a possible link between Carnival and the New Left.

Following the important moment of the *destalinization*, and the gradual abandoning of socialist realism, the premises for a new alliance between avant-garde literature and avant-garde politics seemed cast not only for the leftist

milieu of Western Europe and the United States, but also for Marxist revisionists and experimental writers of Eastern Europe. Yet, in spite of the apparent consistency of what is called today the New Left counter-culture, the sixties and the following decades witnessed a growing contradiction between revolutionary and carnival culture. Even when they still voted for the communists, writers completely abandoned the idea of creating a purely Marxist aesthetics. The more subtle theories of neo-Marxist thinkers did not create a new 'revolutionary literature' but only endeavored to put up with the rhythms of experiment. Roger Garaudy's *D'un réalisme sans rivage* (Paris, Plon, 1963), perceived, especially in Eastern Europe, as a manifesto of Communist liberalism, was only an intellectual hocus-pocus aimed at preserving the illusion of a necessary link between Marxism (as the 'progressive' doctrine *par excellence*...) and artistic experiment.

The literature that followed the events of '68 was less and less 'revolutionary' and with the outburst of the Pop movement, writers began to discover that they could do better than claim to create the aesthetic counterpart of Communist Revolution. The Absurd was met with reluctance by a literary establishment centered on revolutionary myths. Beckett and Ionesco were accused of defeatism because of their radical de-ideologization of the world. For a revolutionary-oriented type of culture, satire is meaningful only if directed against a determined, 'historically bankrupt' form of power and authority, not against power and authority as such. The carnival-like sensibility which developed from Beckett onward, turned to the same strategy of complete desacralization of power, of imagining worlds in which power as such could no longer exist because its logical and affective premises were cancelled with mock-up authority. The American post-modern fiction of the sixties, which became increasingly influential in Europe, continued the same trend of thought. Carnival culture is essential to the understanding of many of the literary experiments made in Eastern Europe, after the revisionist illusions of the sixties faded away. Authors like Kundera and Hrabal, Danilo Kis, Peter Eszterhazy, Radu Cosașu are only some of the representatives of a trend which, in my view, is extremely consistent throughout most of the ex-communist countries, in spite of the fact that actual contacts between the really creative writers of those countries were, and still are, scarce.

V. Failures and Conclusions

During my ten months of working on this project, my view of the subject underwent several major changes. In the beginning, I was convinced that the best method for covering the span of time I had chosen (from *La Belle Époque* to *Mai Soixante-Huit*) was a purely historical one. I thought that my survey of

three distinct cultural moments (La Décadence, the Popular Fronts of the thirties, the students' movements in the 1960s) could be rather free of preconceived ideas and descriptive models, that is to say almost hedonistic. I am not sure that this method would not have been a better one because, by taking a different route, I have missed at least the 'historical' target I had set. Whereas the first two moments could be covered in an acceptable manner (I am exaggerating, I know), the information I had for the 1960s was poor and speculation steadily took over analysis.

Nevertheless, I hope readers will agree that this shift, from a diachronical to a synchronical presentation (to use the key words of classical structuralism) of the subject, has brought some advantages as regards cognition and comprehension. But, even if I am profoundly confident in the intelligence of my presumed readers, I shall try to give an articulate expression to the corpus of judgements on literature as a political phenomenon which either pre-existed or emerged and developed as work on the present paper progressed. I feel also compelled to mention several major limitations or faults in my treatment of this subject. Not about all of them, because this might at least double the length of this already oversized material, but about the most important of them.

I shall bravely begin by presenting the weakest points of the present approach:

Failures. Misfits. One of the most complicated matters is the use of the word 'culture'. Studies of comparative political sociology have argued the necessity of the concept of *civic* and *political culture*. The pioneering act of bridging the gap between cultural anthropology and political studies was made by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba.¹⁰⁹ The main aim was to refine the analysis of political processes by enlarging the system of reference. Politics should not be reduced to fully intelligible schemes of interest-group interaction, it should not be completely quantified and rationalized; motivations underlying political fields can be extremely diverse and are not reducible to a single, utilitarian pattern.

In constructing my literary-political typology, I was largely influenced by this attempt of projecting political action against the background of a certain culture, against a symbolic view of the world, comprising types of representing time or death, ways of understanding the relationship between body and the soul. Such an attempt is always risky, because one has to draw on the rather airy means of intuition, more than on sound, quantitative analysis. I am aware that, because of this, my understanding of war, revolution or carnival *culture* is quite fluctuating. It combines an 'internal' perspective on the evolution of literature, which implies 'war', 'revolution' and 'carnival' are treated as specific literary themes, as subcultures within the greater frame of the literary culture of modernity, with an 'external' perspective according to which literary development is subject to the changes which take place outside the confines of literature as such and which leads to the idea that different modern literary approaches

should be integrated into different pre-existing social, political, cultural complexes labelled 'war', 'revolution' or 'carnival'. Sometimes, this fluctuation is generated by the objective discontinuities in the object of my study: literary commitment to Marxism is, in some cases (Brecht), an obvious form of adherence to an ideological *a priori* while the literary, and even philological, anticipation of a neo-heroic political ideology (Nietzsche) is beyond all doubt.¹¹⁰ But there still are a lot of situations in which one cannot make an easy decision as to who is prior to whom and what is prior to what. It is therefore difficult for me to say whether war, revolution or carnival are: 1) personal fantasies of isolated eccentric personalities, 2) attempts of self-representation of the literary/artistic community as a keeper of initiation rites, excepted from common moral and juridical bonds, or 3) collective fantasies with a powerful cultural articulation with which literature modestly tries to cope. As a matter of fact, these three possibilities are not mutually exclusive and in many cases more than one explanation should be considered as valid. This would greatly hinder any attempt at giving a non-ambiguous definition of what is meant here under 'culture'.

The fact that ambiguities with respect to the status of literature are cultivated and manipulated by writers themselves also generated certain difficulties. Oscillation between a literal and a purely symbolic interpretation of their writings could be, more or less, a conscious policy of radical *hommes de lettres*. This can be noticed from the Surrealists' aggressive attitude to Sartre's incitements to murder and violence,¹¹¹ from Brecht's appearance before the Commission for anti-American Activities (where he pleaded that he was writing fiction, not pressing for proletarian world revolution)¹¹² to Heinrich Böll's argumentation that he should not be taken for his characters who might have passed positive judgements on the terrorist activity of the Baader-Meinhof group.¹¹³ Such very interesting 'phenomena' would require a distinct analysis, focusing on the problem of guilt and responsibility in relation to fiction writing.

Another problem is the disparity between the status and history of themes such as 'war' and 'revolution' and the status of 'carnival'. Whereas war and revolution were overt obsessions of the *fin de siècle*, of the militant thirties and of the sixties, 'carnival' is a concept borrowed from an author (Mikhail Bakhtin) who was completely marginal in his lifetime, a concept which only recently (and partially) came to be considered a plausible description for some developments pertaining to cultural modernity and, especially, post-modernity.¹¹⁴ Carnival as such, as a *theme* or obsession, does not exist. Could it have then become an irradiating centre for that kind of symbolic consistency that has been called in these pages a 'culture'? I do not know if I succeeded in persuading anybody that it could have.

The last issue I would like to raise is the would-be pretence of exhaustiveness of the above description. Though I might have had such a false impression in the very beginning, I soon had to admit the fact that the number of 'cultures'

could have been at least double. In my opinion one could always look into the intellectual features of these decades following the line of such central themes as 'tradition', 'Christian community', 'liberalism' or the 'commonwealth'. All of them are partially implied in the three structures imagined above, but at the same time each of them represents something distinct, irreducible. For instance, it is true that 'war', 'revolution', and 'carnival' share a mystic dimension, but this is something else than the attempts at completely re-structuring modernity from a religious point of view. The 'cultures' I just mentioned and the ones discussed in the present paper have all attempted to overcome or at least re-shape individual experience, and to build powerful symbolic representations of the 'wholeness' (even literary liberalism, which projects the individual on a mythical scale). It is my belief that the three symbolical entities discussed here to some length are more explicit in making this urgent need for a total experience perceivable and that they are the best starting point for advancing the hypothesis that 'totalitarianism' was more than a political phenomenon restricted to the USSR and to Nazi Germany.

With this we have reached the realm of the *provisory conclusions* of the present study. The approach to the relationship between literature and politics was based on the classical Freudian description of the subject. According to Freud, writers are individuals characterized by deep frustrations with regard to their social status and erotic performances. Their strategy consists in withdrawing from the real world and conquering personal power in the realm of imagination. In a third phase, somehow reminiscent of Hegelian dialectic, the forces of fantasy manage to take hold of the minds of more and more people and, by this detour, the Poet himself returns to reality and obtains the power and sexual rewards that he was initially denied.¹¹⁵

Like many other theories of the Viennese therapist, this one may not enjoy universal applicability but it can certainly explain some cultural and intellectual turn-of-the-century developments. This attempt at challenging the authority of the 'real world', irrespective of whether this 'reality' was understood on ontological, social or political grounds, is constitutive of literary modernity as such. It is well known that the founding fathers — Baudelaire, Rimbaud, even Mallarmé — could be found on the actual or ideological barricades of revolutions they were not really interested in, simply for the sake of this challenge. Modern literature is deeply concerned with the possibility of projecting a consistent alternative to secular power or religious authority. This may not necessarily call upon the worship of violence but the interest of the present paper was limited to literary trends that do.

However, the perspective of the present study is largely contrasting to the classical psychoanalytical description. There was no intention to limit the complexity of the cultural interaction between literature and politics to the inner

labyrinth of one author or another. At times, the history of this interaction is written by 'lonely riders', but even then the *intellectual*, self-conscious shaping of their idea of power is undeniable. If *fin de siècle* Décadence is the inflation of *aesthetic individualism* (which by no means coincides with the individualism of the liberal political philosophy), Avant-Garde introduced the corporate spirit of the *literary movement*, born of an affinity with revolutionary and totalitarian political movements, obsessive though not always intentional.¹¹⁶ In both cases 'power' is not completely latent, it is not a pure 'fact' of the unconscious. 'Power' also belongs, to a large extent, to the modern writer's sphere of intellectual awareness. 'Power' is a conceptual presence in modern literature, and its aesthetic representation is subsequent to this fact. It is not my intention to deny the interference of the unconscious in the 'praxis' of literature, but I think no reasonable scholar will fail to notice the fact that 'unconscious' is, generally speaking, monitored. It is placed under the supervision of a certain global view of the social function of literature. A radical author might rush against social conventions in a berserk state of mind, but his or her outburst would be integrated in a more complex pattern of behavior and his or her inner motivation might be no stranger to the purely intellectual temptations of utopianism. 'Culture' was here used to express precisely this alternation of conscious and unconscious. I borrowed the point of view that makes 'culture' a mediator between overt, covert and unconscious needs and impulses, a subtle balance between frustration and satisfaction. 'War', 'revolution', and 'carnival' are, in my opinion, such mediators.

The Freudian scheme also includes the output, the feed-back of fiction inserting itself in reality and influencing it. This is what really ends the game, by annihilating the root inferiority complex that opened the creative cycle. Theoretically, I should also address this issue: did the cultures pictured above influence political reality in a way that is worth mentioning? And if so, what would be our chances to account for this influence? I think that to answer these questions one should not embark merely on other studies, but also on another *kind* of studies. To investigate this subject in a speculative and purely theoretical manner would not bring us very far. Sectorial sociological analysis inquiring into the political biography of writers of a certain group or generation,¹¹⁷ into the relations that exist between them, into their impact on media and media policy, investigating the structure and history of the institutions which determine the socialization of literature directly (universities, public education, editing houses, literary press or TV shows, literary prizes, academies, writers' unions, international writers' organisations, censorship etc.),¹¹⁸ or the diffusion and impact of modern literature on different types of audience, could only provide evidence as to the influence or lack of influence of literature over political life. Common sense tells us that we cannot speak of a single type of influence, perhaps not even of a finite number of patterns of influence, but of a large field of possibilities from which casualty and haphazard can never be excluded.

It is not possible to determine once and for all if the radical attitudes of Décadence, Avant-Garde or neo-Avant-Garde really encouraged radical intelligentsia in its terrorist or totalitarian adventures. It is also impossible to determine if the critics of the carnival-like dissidence of Eastern Europe or of carnival-like post-modernism who accuse these trends of having greatly damaged the feeling of public responsibility and the civic commitment that should underlie a sound liberal society, are completely right or completely wrong.¹¹⁹ It is also not possible to know to what extent the literary component of the radical, Maoist, Trotskyist, Guevarrist, and finally Zen-Buddhist ideology of the sixties really contributed to the spreading of a radical, aggressive sensivity, strongly rejected by European critics like Jean-François Revel or Kurt Sontheimer and diagnosed by the American Allan Bloom as the 'closing of the American mind'.¹²⁰ What could really be done, starting from the present study, is to speak about the analogies between literary and political imagination and about the symbolic links that may bring them together.

The end of the nineteenth century witnessed a radicalization of Romantic ambitions. The ideal of the total work of art is what actually brings together 'war', 'revolution' and 'carnival'. The way this wholeness is understood makes them differ, but the essential ambition out of which all these three cultures developed is clearly recognizable. The forcing of limits and the forcing of distinctions and oppositions on which bourgeois culture was built are characteristic of all these 'revivalist' and 'renovative' attempts. Traditional conceptual pairs, like body and soul, intellect and emotion, individual and community, liberty and determination, reality and fantasy, were subjected to the same totalitarian urge for oneness, for non-contradiction. Coming into a world of the printed letter which created a fatal distance between the author and his audience, and dissolved the audience into autonomous nuclei which could not represent a community, an actual social force, the modern writer is equally always at war with his or her own status. This means that he or she tries hard to re-create the mythical link, the fascination and enthusiasm that poets of the traditional societies legitimately enjoyed.

This was not the traditional mystical aspiration toward the *coincidentia oppositorum*. The simple intuition of oneness as possibility or potentiality is not enough: it should be created here and now, it should be brought into actual existence. This tendency includes a large amount of symbolic violence and it is latent violence that creates the same connection between these three cultures as between André Breton's *Vases communicants*. And this commitment to violence, this continuous drift towards radical, ultimate solutions is what links radical literature and political totalitarian movements. The oscillation between a vision of total control and a vision of total freedom is characteristic of both literary and political *totalitarianism*. Starting from this, one might try to enlarge

the meaning of this concept so as to include not only a political project typical of Italian Fascism and German National-Socialism, but also a mood which was characteristic of the greatest part of European and European-like intelligentsia for a period of time whose limits are still to be 'negotiated'.

This brings us to a moral dilemma first expressed, in modern terms, by T.S.Eliot: how can one enjoy a literary piece that includes an ideology or a view of the world which is completely strange to oneself or of which one thinks of in terms of reluctance if not of repugnance?¹²¹ Eliot was thinking of hardcore Protestants reading Dante or of devout Catholics reading Milton. The answer of T.S.Eliot, expressive not only of the views of Anglo-Saxon New Criticism but also of those of Russian and French structuralism, is that the literary work has a reality of its own, which transcends moral convictions and historical metaphysical systems. One can enjoy the inner *imbroglio* of poetry without paying any interest to the ideology of the text. This opinion is opposed to the Marxist view on art as being a privileged carrier of explicit or subliminal ideological messages. The school of literary criticism initiated by Georg Lukacs or the American Marxists have constantly proclaimed this as a basic truth.

I have no intention to show now a third way, to bring an unexpected solution to this question. Authoritative answers, as the ones mentioned above, present perhaps no other major inconvenience than that of being too 'easy' in the sense of coming too quickly (perhaps we should say automatically), to our minds. The point I tried to make in the present study was only that this question is one of those that does not or should not allow for easy answers and this is why it is worth asking the question.

Notes

1. Bertrand de Born was famous for his political versatility. The habit of changing camps and breaking oaths brought him the fair accusation of felony.
2. 'These people, considered as enemies who, from the point of view of the elementary dualism professed by the Christian faith, seemed to embody the armies of Evil, were no others than the knights.' Georges Duby, *Le temps des cathédrales*, Paris, Gallimard, 1981. Romanian translation, 1987, p. 86.
3. For a good account of these theories, see H.I.Marrou, *Les troubadours*, Paris, Seuil, 1971.
4. Julius Evola, *Metafisica del sesso*. Romanian translation, 1994, I, pp. 300–10.
5. Jakob Burckhardt, *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*. Romanian translation, 1969, I, p. 11.
6. It is, of course, relevant that Dante was also one of the main political philosophers of his time, and that, in *De monarchia*, he felt entitled not only to advocate the divine right of the Emperor, but also to support this theory with examples taken almost exclusively from Greek and Latin epic poetry.
7. Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and the Popular Culture in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, Moscow, 1965. Romanian translation, 1974.

8. As a matter of fact, Classicism was both identical with itself, in its attempt to re-establish the ancient propriety of values and of morality, and non-identical, when using classical culture in its refined work of giving sense to a world which had very little to do with the ancient. This double-sidedness suggests a vision of the arts focusing more on the means themselves, rather than on the moral purposes. This is one good reason for accepting Jean Rousset's idea according to which French classicism is more of a species of the baroque. See Jean Rousset, *La littérature de l'âge baroque en France. Circé et le Paon*. Paris, Librairie José Corti, 1954.

9. See Wolf Lepenies, *Die Drei Kulturen. Soziologie zwischen Literatur und Wissenschaft*, Rowohlt Enzyklopädie, 1988, p. III. Professor Lepenies' approach greatly appealed to my theoretical imagination. The basic idea of this study, the trinity of war, revolution and carnival, is somehow reminiscent of 'die drei Kulturen'.

10. Roger Chartier, *Les Origines culturelles de la révolution française*, Paris, Seuil, 1990, pp. 90–97.

11. Things can become very relative if the focus shifts from French to German literature. The fascinating attempt made in J.W. Goethe's *Faust*, with a view to reconciling Enlightenment with the esoteric discourse parallel to it, suddenly placed literature in a strikingly different reference system. Goethe himself did not have an immediate predecessor, he was inventing rather than continuing something.

12. Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 1954. French translation: *La crise de la culture*, Paris, Gallimard, 1972, p. 158.

13. Henry Berger, 'The Renaissance Imagination. Second World and Green World', in *Centennial Review*, IX (1965).

14. Richard Stites, *Revolutionary Dreams. Utopian Visions and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution*, New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 19.

15. V.L. Saulnier, *La littérature française*, Romanian translation 1973, II, p. 163.

16. Th. Nipperdey, 'Der Umbruch zur bürgerlichen Gesellschaft', in K.W. Hempfer, A. Schwan (eds.), *Grundlagen der westlichen politischen Kultur*, Berlin-New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1987, pp. 177–9.

17. See Virgil Nemoianu, *The Taming of Romanticism*, Harvard University Press, 1984. V. Woolf is quoted in Lepenies, p. 176.

18. Alain Besançon, *Les origines intellectuelles du léninisme*, 1977. Romanian translation 1993, pp. 91–2.

19. Christina von Braun, 'Der Hauptmann' Dreyfus — die Brüder Lumière. Körper und simulierte Wirklichkeit' in Julius H. Schoeps, Herman Simon (eds.), *Dreyfus und die Folgen*, Edition Hentrich, 1995, p. 277.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

21. Julien Benda, *La Trahison des clercs*, 1927. Romanian translation 1993, pp. 123–33. Mario Praz, *Liebe, Tod und Teufel. Die schwarze Romantik*, 1988.

22. George Mosse quoted in von Braun, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

23. See Gerhard Göhler, 'Die „Aufhebung“ aufklärerischer Rationalität im Idealismus und Marxismus,' chapter 'Fichte: das übersteigerte Ich,' in K.W. Hempfer, A. Schwan (eds.), *Grundlagen der politischen Kultur des Westens*, Berlin-New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1987, pp. 131–133.

24. Benda, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

25. von Braun, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

26. Chantal Millon-Delsol, *Les idées politiques au XX^e siècle*, Paris, PUF, 1991, p. 113.

27. Theodor W. Adorno, *Prismen*, 1955. French translation: *Prismes*, Paris, Payot, 1986, p. 171.

28. Jean-François Revel, *Sur Proust*, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1987, pp. 101–125.
29. Hannah Arendt, 'Rosa Luxemburg' in *Men in Dark Ages*. French translation: *Vies politiques*, Paris, Gallimard, 1974, p. 56.
30. One of the most shocking example of anarchist supporter is Stéphane Mallarmé. And, even if, from an explicitly political point of view, Paul Valéry was close to the conservative option, his anarchistic reveries are quite well-known today.
31. Quoted in Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Proud Tower*, New York, Macmillan, 1967. Another American theoretician of 'the morality of war' is Captain Mahan, one of the major personalities of late 19th century in the United States. In his books, Captain Mahan convincingly argued the strategic necessity for America to become a maritime power (Romanian translation: *Trufaşa citadelă*, Bucharest, Ed. Politică, 1977, p. 324).
32. Tuchman, *op. cit.*, p. 325.
33. Details of the Mann-Mann polemic are taken from Jost Hermand, 'Das Vorbild Zola. Heinrich Mann und die Dreyfus-Affäre', in Julius H. Schoeps, Herman Simon (eds.), *Dreyfus und die Folgen*, Edition Hentrich, 1995, pp. 243–247.
34. Quoted from Wolfgang Asholt and Walter Fähnders (eds.), *Manifeste und Proklamationen der europäischen Avantgarde (1909–1938)*. Stuttgart-Weimar, J.B. Metzler Verlag, 1995, p. 5.
35. This is meant to be the beginning of an original explanation of the Decadent obsession with the body. Decadent imagination oscillates between Alexandrine hedonism, a refined passion for flesh and pleasure, and obsessions with physical corruption, sickness and rot. Of course that the Decadent trademark was, in the end, the hallucinatory fusion of the two.
36. Stephen Koch, 'Blossomsbury and Espionage', in *Partisan Review* (LXI), no. 1, 1994, p. 23.
37. An account of the ambiguities that made Western Marxist thought and the Nietzschean legacy become part of one another is to be found in Bernard-Henri Lévy, *Les Aventures de la liberté*, Paris, Grasset et Fasquelle, 1991.
38. Georges Sorel, *Réflexions sur la violence*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1990 (reprint), pp. 106–107.
39. Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
40. Even the historians of ideas seem to hesitate in drawing a line between the two mental worlds. I am thinking of Zeev Sternhell's attempt — a successful one, in my opinion — to demonstrate that historical, French-Italian Fascism was nothing else than a branch of revisionist Marxism. Marxism was the starting point of Sorel, as well as of Mosca and Pareto. Sternhell explains these 'proto-Fascist' theories as offsprings of the confusion generated among social thinkers, at the turn of the century, by the fact that Marxist prophecies about the close fall of capitalism were very far from fulfilling themselves (Sternhell, Sznajder, Ashéri, *Naissance de l'idéologie fasciste*, Fayard, 1989).
41. Michel Trebitsch, 'Les intellectuels dans le Maitron', in *Intellectuels engagés d'une guerre à l'autre*, Les Cahiers de l'IHTP, 6 (March, 1994), p. 25.
42. See Nina Berberova, *Alexandre Blok et son temps*, Actes Sud, 1991.
43. See Peter Demetz, *Worte in Freiheit. Der italienische Futurismus und die deutsche Avantgarde (1912–1934)*, München-Zürich: Piper, p. 9.
44. The concept 'euphuisation' is used by Gilbert Durand, in *Les structures anthropologiques de l'imaginaire* (Paris-Bruxelles-Montréal, Bordas, 1969). It expresses one of the main mechanisms of what Durand calls 'nocturnal imagination'. 'Euphuisation' means the kamikaze identification of the spirit with the very forces of decay, death and destruction that actually

- horrify it. By doing so, the consciousness overcomes its own inner tensions and, metaphorically speaking, it manages to master contradiction.
45. J.K. Huysmans, *Là-Bas*. Romanian translation: *Liturghiile negre*, Dacia, 1994, pp. 6–10.
46. Emmanuel Mounier, *Communisme, anarchie, personnalisme*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, p. 96.
47. Mounier, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
48. Irving Howe, *A World More Attractive*, Freeport, New York, Books for Libraries Press, 1970, p. 64.
49. Darko Suvin, *Metamorphoses of Science Fiction*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.
50. Stites, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
51. The idea could be taken even further: the role played by science-fiction in the counter-culture of the eighties, the ideology of the cybernetic society, etc.
52. Jean-Pierre Morel, *Le Roman insupportable. L'Internationale littéraire et la France (1920–1932)*, Paris, Gallimard, 1985, p. 31.
53. Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
54. Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
55. Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 43. It is worth mentioning that, after Trotsky's intervention, Victor Serge completely changed his evaluation of Pylniak, claiming that authors like him try 'à paraître révolutionnaires sans êtres communistes' (Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 44).
56. Albrecht Abetz, *Exil und Engagement. Deutsche Schriftsteller in Frankreich der dreissiger Jahre*, München: Text + Kritik, 1986.
57. From *Verfremdung*, estrangement. See Bertolt Brecht, 'Der Messingkauf. Die Straßenszene', in Henry R. Paucker (ed.), *Neue Sachlichkeit. Literatur im 'Dritten Reich' und im Exil*, Stuttgart, Phillip Reclam, 1974, p. 51.
58. Bertold Brecht, 'Fünf Schwierigkeiten beim Schreiben der Wahrheit', in *Gesammelte Werke*, Band 18, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1967, p. 223.
59. Brecht, *op. cit.*, p. 224.
60. Brecht, *op. cit.*, p. 225.
61. Brecht, *op. cit.*, p. 226.
62. See Walter Benjamin, 'Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit' in *Gesammelte Schriften*, I.2, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978, pp. 467–9.
63. See Bertolt Brecht, 'Studium des Marxismus,' in *Gesammelte Werke*, Band 20, pp. 49–50.
64. From this point of view, one can see Russian terrorism as a form of strange intimacy with the powerful, a kind of highly personalized relationship that expressed, in fact, the paternalistic nature of the bond between political hierarchy and the intelligentsia. Bakunin's letter to Czar Alexander II, which contains his confession and repentance, provides a good body of evidence for such a theory. Let us also remember Alain Besançon's description of the ideal image of itself of the Russian society: a peak and a basis between which only some kind of demi-hero could dare mediate. Besançon's intuition was that this intercessor is, usually, the son of the Czar, the one who, defying his father, attracts and absorbs his fury and, by doing this, exorcises the evil from the body of the whole community (as long as the Czar-Father identifies himself with the community and the land, embodies them). This interpretation is based on the recurrent family dramas of Czars killing their disobedient sons: Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and, later on, Stalin's contempt and hatred for his only male suc-

cessor (see *Le tsarévitch immolé*, 1967). The same pattern can be applied to the relationship between writers and the highly personalized absolute political power.

65. Perhaps the leftist alternative culture of the thirties felt isolated and its representatives forced into exile because this tradition of the 'missionary' poet was no longer familiar to the German audience. The reader refused to identify with political poets because this understanding of poetry was against his/her expectancies, against his/her culture of experiencing poetry.

66. Herbert R. Lottman, *The Left Bank*, 1981. French translation: *La Rive Gauche*, Paris, Seuil, 1981, p. 194.

67. See *Politiques et pratiques culturelles dans la France de Vichy*, Les Cahiers de l'IHTP, no. 8 (June, 1988), and Gérard Loiseaux, *La littérature de la défaite et de la collaboration*, Publication de la Sorbonne, série France XIX^e–XX^e, Paris, Université de Paris I, 1984.

68. An analysis of the Moscow-directed action of manipulating writers/teaching writers the art of manipulating society can be found in Lottman, Morel and Koch. One could stress the tactics of international writers' congresses dominated by the literary intelligentsia, the visits to USSR of the 'progressive' writers, which provided the opportunity for payments of overgenerous author's rights. One should also consider the fact that a highly trustworthy and efficient Stalinist agent like Müntzenberg became a victim of the huge purges of the late thirties, after the policy of the Popular Front failed.

69. See Sheyla Fitzpatrick, *The Commissariat of Enlightenment*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.

70. An account on the literary tendencies of the NEP period in Anthony Kemp-Welch, *Stalin and the Literary Intelligentsia*, London, Macmillan, 1991.

71. Stites, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

72. Kemp-Welch, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

73. Kemp-Welch, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

74. Kemp-Welch, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

75. Kemp-Welch, *op. cit.*, p. 68–113. The main personalities of *Proletkult* were themselves descendants from the intelligentsia. Their proletarian identity was self-asserted.

76. If this analysis is given some credit, it will be difficult to further accept the traditional opposition between 'irrational Fascism' and 'rational Communism'.

77. Quoted in Henri R. Paucker (ed.), *Neue Sachlichkeit. Literatur im 'Dritten Reich' und im Exil*, Stuttgart, Philipp Reclam jun., 1991, p. 25.

78. For instance, the Formalist theory of the dialectical relationship between high culture and the popular, stating that high literature is constantly 'feeding' on the informal, entertainment level of the narrative, that it changes itself by re-structuring and giving new meanings to motives, characters, themes, techniques it borrows from 'trivial fiction'. This thesis was authored by Yuri Tinianov and Boris Tomashevsky.

79. On the symbolic links between violence and fertility, see Bakhtin, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

80. 'Fröhliche Wissenschaft: das bedeutet die Saturnalien eines Geistes, der einem fruchtbaren langen Drucke geduldig widerstanden hat — geduldig, streng, kalt, ohne sich zu unterwerfen aber ohne Hoffnung — und der jetzt mit einem Male von der Hoffnung angefallen wird, von der Hoffnung auf Gesundheit, von der Trunkenheit der Genesung.' Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 'Vorrede zur zweiten Aufgabe', Leipzig, Reclam, 1990, p. 7.

81. Jacques Le Rider, *Modernité viennoise et crises de l'identité*, Paris, PUF, 1990. Romanian translation: *Modernitatea vieneză și crizele identității*, Iași, Editura Universității A.I. Cuza, 1995, p. 42–5.

82. Observations on the German legacy of irrationalism in Thomas Mann, *Deutsche Ansprache. Ein Appell an die Venuft*, 1930.

83. Lévy, *op. cit.*, pp. 193–220.

84. On the origins of the cult of life in the literature of the sixties, see Tony Tanner, *The City of Words*, New York, Harper & Row, 1971, and Manfred Pütz, *The Story of Identity. Fiction of the Sixties*, Munich, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1987.

85. This Hinduist allusion is by no means casual. Historically, Décadence is congeneric to the scholarly interest in Oriental traditions. It somehow sets forth and refines the Schopenhauerian attempt to introduce concepts pertaining to Indian philosophy to the Western cogito. The essence of war culture, as I tried to describe it, can be found in *Bhagavad Gita*. There Krishna reveals to the warrior Arjuna the secret of the Oneness and of the non-existence of human entities. It would be absurd to hesitate before killing somebody in battle or to be afraid of being killed, as far as man is mortal by definition. The point is to understand death, which is in fact the only reasonable chance to transcend illusion and re-unite with the One. Battles should be fought with full chivalrous dedication, but without any touch passion. This 'Aryan' myth helped structure not only decadent but also Nazi imagination, as it can be easily determined from the already mentioned short quotation from Hitler.

86. Le Rider, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

87. Even though published much later, to me this novel is nevertheless a typical expression of the *fin-de-siècle* spirit.

88. A.-F. Mac Delmarle, 'Futuristisches Manifest gegen Montmartre', in Asholt and Fähnders, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

89. F.T. Marinetti, 'Das Variété', in Asholt and Fähnders, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–63.

90. The reality of the medieval market is far from the Rabelaisian slogan 'Do whatever you like'. Market regulations were extremely strict, the control of the guilds on services and labour force sometimes exceeded even those of the Communist rule.

91. 'DADA ist weder Verrücktheit, Weisheit, noch Ironie, sieh mich an, netter Burgeois.' Tristan Tzara, 'Manifest des Herrn Antipyrine', conference held on 14 July 1917 at the first Dada representation at the Waag-Saal in Zurich. Translated in Asholt and Fähnders, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

93. Asholt and Fähnders, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

94. Asholt and Fähnders, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

97. 'Appel aux Hommes. Le Procès de Moscou' in Asholt and Fähnders, *op. cit.*, pp. 419–20.

98. Lévy, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–109.

99. Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process*, New York, Adine Publ. Co., 1969.

100. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, New York, Random House, 1978, and Henri Mendras, *La seconde révolution française 1965–1984*, Paris, Gallimard, 1988.

101. The history of the Proletkult ideas is vividly rendered in Kemp-Welch and Stites.

102. Émile Zola, 'Proudhon et Courbet', first printed in *Le Salut Public*, 26 July 1865, reprinted in *Mes haines*, 1866. Here quoted from *Zola et son temps*, Pierre Cogny (ed.), Paris, Librairie Larousse, 1976, p. 14.

103. James M. Buchanan, *The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan*, Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press, 1975, I, pp. 2–6.

104. Bakunin, *Statism and Anarchy*, Marshall Shatz (trans. and ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 28.

105. We must not forget that the Dada manifestos are full of religious allusions. Let me refer only to the 'halb Pantagrue, halb Franziskus' of the Dada-Berlin, or to the countless references to Buddhism in the manifestos signed by Tristan Tzara.

106. To be exact, Mounier mentions Jeremy Bentham as *the* Liberal.

107. Emmanuel Mounier, *Communisme, anarchie et personnalisme*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, pp. 49–50. I must confess that my résumé is a little bit distorting. As any connoisseur of Mounier's work can easily assume, his genuine treatment of the left, of the 'crying left', in principal, is more sympathetic than my account of it.

108. War-culture partially came to life in the East-European underground of the fifties, which generated a literature of heroic, noble resistance against Bolshevik 'barbarity'. In Romania, evidence of this culture can be found in the poetry written in the prisons of that period, a purely oral form of literary underground, based on a rhetoric of chivalry enriched with Christian elements. This war-culture opposed the official, 'revolutionary' culture, which was being imported from Moscow.

109. Gabriel Almond, Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963.

110. '.../ eine gewisse Philologen-Ideologie, Germanisten-Romantik und Nordglaubigkeit aus akademisch-professoraler Sphäre, die in einem Idiom von mystischen Biedersinn und verstiegener Abgeschmacktheit mit Vokabeln wie rassistisch, völkisch, bündisch, heldisch auf die Deutschen von 1930 einredet und der Bewegung ein Ingrediens von verschwämter Bildungsbarbarei hinzufügt .../' Thomas Mann, 'Deutsche Ansprache. Ein Appell an die Vernunft' in Paucker, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

111. About Sartre's moral support of terrorism at the time of the Algerian war, see Michael Walzer, *The Company of Critics*, 1988, French translation: *La critique sociale au XX^e siècle. Solitude et solidarité*, Paris, Métailié, 1996, pp. 155–159.

112. Bertold Brecht, 'Anrede an den Kongreß für unamerikanische Betätigungen', 1947, in *Gesammelte Werke*, Band 20, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1967, pp. 303–306.

113. 'Kunst ist Anarchie', with Günther Nenning (ORF) on 3.12.1975, in Heinrich Böll, *Interviews I, 1961–1978*, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, p. 442–56.

114. The model of the 'fluctuant stability' imagined by Leonard B. Meyer (*Music, the Arts, and Ideas: Patterns and Predictions in 20th Century Culture*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1967) might be a close approximation of what I meant by 'culture of carnival'.

115. Sigmund Freud, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band X: *Bildende Kunst und Literatur*, Frankfurt am Main, S. Fischer Verlag, 1975.

116. There is a rich literature on the relations between Avant-Garde and Fascism, National Socialism, or Communism. Nevertheless, a synthesis on the mutual exchanges between arts and political thinking within the larger frame of the intellectual stream of totalitarianism is not so easy to find. Some interesting ideas in Matei Călinescu, *Five Faces of Modernity*, Duke University Press, 1987, the chapter on Avant-Garde.

117. For instance, Nicole Racine and Michel Trebitsch (eds.), *Sociabilités intellectuelles. Lieux, milieux, réseaux*, Les Cahiers de L'IHTP, no. 20 (March, 1992).


118. I refer to the types of studies produced by the school of literary sociology of Pierre Bourdieu.

119. A radical critic of East-European dissent is Gáspár Miklós Támás (see 'The Legacy of Dissent: Irony, Ambiguity, Duplicity' in *Uncaptive Minds*, vol. 7, no. 2 [Summer, 1994]).

An analogous critical attitude in the Western world is expressed by Christopher Lasch (*The Culture of Narcissism*, New York, 1979), and Gilles Lipovetsky (*L'ère du vide. Essais sur l'individualisme contemporain*, Paris, 1983).

120. Jean-François Revel, *Ni Marx ni Jésus*, Paris, 1970; Kurt Sontheimer, *Das Elend unserer Intellektuellen. Linke Theorie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Hamburg, 1976; Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad 1965–1990*, Oxford University Press, 1994.

121. The idea appears in T.S. Eliot's essay *Dante* (1929). See T.S. Eliot, *On Poetry and Poets*, London, Faber & Faber Ltd, 1971.



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Modern Architectural Discourse After the Death of Stalin

I. The Corpse

I.1. Modernism, Mimesis, Nostalgia

The only hope for the European painting now is to develop a new realism.

ANTHONY BLUNT, 1937¹

For the first time in many centuries, reality and artistic ideal are no longer contradictory (...) because never before did such an epoch exist, where the very grounds of historic reality are beautiful.

I.V. STALIN

The way official edifices were built between the two World Wars and — as far as Socialist Realism is concerned — after World War Two, cannot be dissociated from the general context of their respective epochs: economic and moral crisis, social restlessness and radicalism, the threat of an emerging war. We discuss about *Zeitgeist*, yet we should not forget the self-commitment of its actors. Gone was the utopianism of the early 1920s, with technology and the myth of progress as universal panacea. Gone was the Russian Constructivist ‘desurbanism’, and the aesthetic-political project of the Avant-Garde to reshape the reality was finally fulfilled; yet not by the Avant-Garde itself, and not in the way it had envisaged the process, but by a new political elite. This elite believed itself to be far more entitled to implement the project than a bunch of radical and untrustworthy artists.

Such a pessimistic (realistic?) abandon of the critical edge of the Avant-Garde in architecture as well as in other arts, explained by Kenneth Frampton in his text on critical regionalism², boosted the ‘conservative’ discourse and its promoters, who had been outcasted for a while by the Avantgardists. Academic and/or ethnocentric, always populist, such discourse produced the official architecture of the totalitarian regimes that governed during the interwar period and, half a century later, Post Modern architecture.

The first five-year plan in the USSR, the economic crisis in the West and in the US replaced gradually the fantasies of their early days with ‘realist’

projects: utopias were replaced by short deadlines within which the existing cities were supposed to be reshaped by implanting monumental edifices and by inflicting the absent 'rational' (i.e. straight) axes upon the 'irrational' (i.e. medieval) textures, while new communities were equally being developed and ample public works — bridges, canals, highways— were being undertaken. What emerged was a new kind of utopianism³: anti-medieval, populist, focused on rewriting the cities, 'heroic' and, like every utopianism, based upon an 'archetypal', primal and 'pure' architecture, that was reached by replacing the War Communism in Russia and its small utopias convincingly described by R. Stites in his excellent book on the 'revolutionary dreams' of that epoch.

Re-designing the existing, corrupt reality, rapid and radical building programs for a society in crisis might constitute the grounds for an apparent paradox. In fact, building was the soundest evidence on how strong and stable a given regime was, since it enacted the myth of the salvation state and its willingness to control the shaking social reality. Weak states, societies in crisis do build massively. Architecture offered the antidote against the mistrust with which subjects regarded a certain regime. Yet this was Architecture with a capital A (i.e. monumental edifices, ample urban schemes aimed at entirely reshaping capital cities), one which privileged stability over the other two attributes in the Vitruvian definition. As for styles, the mixing of various languages from Modernism to Eclecticism⁴ to Art Deco was the envisaged answer to using the best in each of the above-mentioned styles while avoiding the implicit dangers comprised within any of them: the alleged lack of monumental potential⁵ in the case of Modernism, redundancy in that of Eclecticism or any of the national variants of historical styles (vernacular Gothic in *Völkisch*, 'Arian' Doric in *Heimatstil*, Russian Baroque, Neo-Romanian), and an overstated penchant for decor in Art Deco.

The result? An architecture with antique references, centered, symmetrical, frontally experienced, solemn, 'heroic' and ordonated, best suited for an epoch in which control over society, often exercised in a totalitarian manner, was seen as the answer to crisis. The emergence of such a discourse was refreshed by the Modern attribute: fewer or no ornaments at all, structural sincerity, rational expression of the façades and interior spaces, and most important, the free-standing, high-rising building, autonomous to the urban tissue.

Here one must ask two fundamental questions regarding this fusion vocabulary: *a*) How can the same style — 'purged Classicism' or 'conservative Modernism' — bear witness for two apparently self-styled opposed ideologic discourses? and *b*) How can the nationalist rhetorics, centered on the question of identity, be expressed by divergent formulas? The first such formula was to exhibit the very same architecture, as it happened in Paris at the 1937 *Exposition Universelle* with the Soviet, German, Romanian, Italian, British national pavilions;

ions; the second formula was to put forth replicas of certain heritage edifices, pertaining to a given national historical myth or event, to a regional/local idiom expanded to 'national style' ('sentimental regionalism', as Frampton called it), as it had happened in Paris in 1900.⁶

There is an immediate answer to the first question: the idioms of the 1930s emerged from relatively similar conditions, regardless of the ideologies in each of the above-mentioned states. The solutions given to reshaping reality covered evenly the entire range, from left to right. I shall not comment here why Stalinist ideology was inherently 'rightist', and thus 'conservative', or why Roosevelt's New Deal, allegedly democratic and placed at the left of classical liberalism, needed its 'conservative' edifices.

Yet one can propose the following hypothesis: the way those buildings looked was relatively independent of aesthetic criteria. Their expression was the outcome, not the cause. Only a discourse on the formers' origins might illuminate the differences between, say, the 'democratic' and the 'totalitarian' architectures of that epoch. The 'progressive' attitude towards reality condemns it as inescapably corrupt and proposes alternative/utopic communities, combined with a total condemnation of the sinful cities. Only radical and violent changes, achieved by the revolutionary purification of the environment, could change the latter's essence.

What followed? Environmental revolutions: the Volga-Don Canal, Tennessee Valley Authority's terraformations, desurbanists and experimental communities in early Soviet Russia (described by R. Stites), the United States and Italy (comparatively investigated by Diane Ghirardo), or — on a smaller scale — in Germany. According to the other, 'conservative', approach, the city was not to be abolished, but healed by implanting authority, and thereby formal order, within the wounded tissue. This perspective was centered on negotiating with the past and with its formal anamorphosis; one had to create new Jerusalems, ideal cities or city centers which, by empathy, would replace the existing, often medieval structure. This perspective was based on private ownership, traditional values in society and the family. 'Conservatives' treasured the white, European, male culture, founded on issues of identity and authority. In the 1930s such edifices and urban schemes could be found in Washington, D.C., were they followed L'Enfant's rigorous/rational axes of the Enlightenment. Yet the Zeppelinfeld as well as the Stalinist plan for Moscow (1935), Hitler's and Speer's Berlin, as well as the 1935 plan for Bucharest looked precisely the same.

One can thus understand why the architectural processes of the thirties cannot be confined exclusively to one or another of the above-mentioned categories. In fact, the official attitude toward the built environment was rather problem-solving, 'pragmatic', pursuing the adequate answer to a given challenge, beyond

ideologies. The attitude of the authority with regard to transforming the reality was 'leftist', 'progressive', as well as 'rightist', 'conservative', according to the context and the nature of the problem.

One can even forward the hypothesis that there are clear similarities between the projects of the Avant-Garde and the official rhetorics on arts in the 1930s and 1940s; this may well raise the question whether, despite opposite appearances, Avant-Garde and Modernism as a whole did not, perhaps, outlive their time as totalitarian projects; in other words, whether at least parts of the edifices and mass architecture built under totalitarian regimes did not employ concepts envisaged by Modernism. The bottom line lies in the following question: was Modernism a totalitarian project?

There are at least three perspectives on this topic. The first one, and the most radical, advanced by Boris Groys in his book *The Total Art of Stalin* (Princeton, 1992), argues that the aesthetic/political plan of the Avant-Garde to fundamentally reshape the reality was in fact over-fulfilled by the Stalinist regime. Both projects dwell on the fact that society as well as its built environment should be highly controlled. Furthermore, the idea could be extended to post-Stalinist Eastern-Europe, where hard-core Modern concepts such as 'prefabrication', 'standardization' and 'urban control' became deliriously successful from 1954 onward, and in Romania in the 1980s, when one could slide backward to the 'neo-Stalinist' architecture of the so-called 'new civic center' of Bucharest, spiced as it was with a Modernist rhetoric of 'national specificity' and of 'upgrading' the capital city.

If Socialist Realism could change the style of a nearly-erected Constructivist building (Moskva Hotel), the reverse example is equally at hand: Ceicuľin's 'White House' (Russia's House of the Soviets), built as late as 1981, was in fact a Stalinist design stripped off of its ornaments, Palladian statues and the other ingredients that made it desirable before 1953. 'Modern' edifices erected after 1954, such as the Palace Hall and Radio House in Bucharest, are stripped versions of Classicism (or 'conservative' variants of Modernism, for that matter), as well as remakes of pre-war edifices. Even committed Modern architects could dance the Socialist-Realist polka perfectly (Duiliu Marcu, Octav Doicescu in Romania, Rimanoćky in Hungary, as well as the Vesnin brothers in the USSR a decade earlier), only to serenely return to their betrayed 'first love' after 1954.

According to this interpretation, the apparently least Modern of all, that is the Stalinist regime, did in fact the most to reshape the Soviet reality in its entirety, thus implementing the project of the Avant-Garde beyond the original expectations, albeit distorted in its aesthetic appearance and without the original 'travel companions' — the Modern architects — who were left behind by the rapid changes they had first designed.

The second viewpoint is in fact a milder form of the previous one, in saying that the totalitarian regimes reserved the most relevant official edifices for

them-selves. These were to be designed in a rather traditional, classicizing manner (for instance the Führer's Third Reich buildings, the Royal Palace and the Victoria Palace in Bucharest, the Palace of the Soviets in Moscow and so on). Thus they could remain rather detached from the mass production of architecture and second-hand edifices, which could in fact continue to be 'Modern' (i.e. driven by efficiency rather than expression). It was there, at the periphery of official discourses, when it came to industrial architecture, collective dwelling quarters as well as upper class residences, that marginal Modernists could still employ their previously acquired skills.

Finally, there is the healthy Modern tradition, represented by C. Cooke, Khan-Magomedov, Ikkonikov, A. Kopp, which acknowledged the definitive break between Avant-Garde and Modernism on the one hand and totalitarianism on the other hand. Its arguments? Avant-Garde artists were marginalized, Constructivism and other 'degenerated' and 'decadent' styles were ridiculed as 'formalist' (USSR), 'Judaic/masonic' and 'Bolshevik' (Germany, Italy). A huge amount of literature supports this line of reasoning, so I shall only add that the first, two-fold hypothesis — Modernism as a totalitarian project, and its reverse, European totalitarianism as the heir of aesthetic-political plan of the Avant-Garde to redesign the reality — has only recently taken the fast lane, particularly since 1989, and is well-rooted in Eastern European literature on the topic that has been published so far. Scholars in architecture as well as other various artistic and cultural fields often representing the younger generation, are currently investigating the Modern project and its embodiments in Eastern Europe from that perspective, and with solid results. Mention should be made here of Tatiana Pereliaeva from Russia, Mart Kalm from Estonia, the German Boris Groys, the first to submit the concept with excellence, as well as of the Romanians Caius Dobrescu, Marius Marcu-Lăpădat and myself.

Starting from the above-mentioned arguments one can infer that the interest of the Soviet elite lay with controlling the arts by controlling those who produced them rather than with a particular type of aesthetics. The so-called Edifice Committee, the *de facto* jury of the Palace of the Soviets Competition, was a short list of the Politbiuro itself, albeit without Stalin. What the jury expected from this competition was not the emergence of some esoteric new art ideas. The outcome, that is Iofan's design as well as the clues as to what the architectural expression of something called Socialist Realism would have to be, were mere by-products, side effects of the political agenda underlying the competition. This was: *a*) the 'socialism in one country' architectural variant, i.e. no 'gringos' working in the USSR; *b*) the limitation of Avant-Garde influence within the artistic field and its organizations; *c*) a grand replica of the building resulting from the Palais de Nations competition, which was to be — once in Moscow *d*) the largest building in the world.

One knows now that the competition was rather useless, since the difference between Iofan's original tower topped with the statue of an anonymous worker and the winning entry was only a minor one. Both designs reflect the principle of subordinating architecture (the building is seen as a mere pedestal for a gigantic statue); only the worker went out as Lenin made his grand-style appearance. Yet the worker did not disappear for good: he returned in 1937, on top of the Soviet national pavilion (coupled with the Kolkhoz Girl), and once more in 1939, to mimic the Liberty Statue in New York by grabbing a star from the Queens' sky. This was really cynical: the resemblance with the 'Lady with a Torch' was precisely the reason for which Iofan's first entry for the Palace of the Soviets was rejected in the first place!

However, during this competition, much was fulfilled from what the Bolshevik elite had wanted: *a)* foreign architects — most of them committed Modernists — disappeared from the very first stage, with the sole exception of Oscar Hamilton, co-winner, but who was eventually equally eliminated; *b)* apart from the Vesnin brothers, who made it to the final stage of the competition only by disfiguring (i.e. classicizing) their design beyond any Constructivist feature, all the other avantgardists were eliminated, including the proletarian-architects from VOPRA, who were then closest to the party line; *c)* the importance of this competition had already surpassed the one the Palais des Nations competition had had; *d)* the design finally bred was indeed that of the largest and tallest building in the world, a result arrived at by reviewing the design several times, so that it would become taller than any of its contemporary American challengers. Furthermore, the decree of April 23, 1932 (i.e. issued during the competition) had dissolved the existing organizations and forged the controlled Union of Architects and the Academy of Architecture, that is the very institutional grounds for an abrupt change in the way in which Socialist Realist architecture would eventually be designed.

I.2. A Postmodern Critic's Kit to Interpreting Socialist Realism

When discussing Soviet Socialist Realism of, roughly, the period between 1932 and 1954,⁷ and Post-Modernism, which flourished and then faded away in the 1980s, one has to address several points that can shed light on possible aesthetic solutions to tasks which are common, or rather comparable. Here I shall address the adverse reaction to Avant-Garde and Modernism respectively, as a plausible 'primordial cause' for both 'styles', centered on the question of identity. Consequently, and deriving from the anti-Modern matrix, the use of the classicist idiom in architecture, and of realist representation in the fine arts

will be analyzed as the major tools in the resuscitation of a populist adherence to certain value and power systems induced by the two discourses. As there is a large amount of contemporary literature on Post-Modernism, and the primal interest of this paper is Socialist Realism, the 'reading' here given will use the lenses/concepts usually associated with Post-Modernism. Therefore the comparison is rather indirect and perhaps unbalanced. Inevitably and by way of consequence, there will be more room for Socialist Realism than for Post-Modernism.

The issue of identity underlines both Reaganism in the United States, and Thatcherism in the United Kingdom, as a way of reacting against a dissolving, corrosive lack of ideology. By reactivating the ideological rhetoric in the dry veins of the power system, 'conservative revolutions' have awakened the latter's dormant inner strength, reaffirming values associated with tradition, and, implicitly, approaching an aesthetic different from that of the exhausted, redundant Modernism, already drained of its last drop of expressiveness.

Fragmentation — Pastiche — Collage

In looking at the aesthetic discourses of Socialist Realism and (historical) Post-Modernism, one has to note that both were cultures of fragments, collating and pastiche, though for different reasons. Post-Modernism rejected the unified set of values promoted by modernity, in saying that there were many more systems, equally valid, and that aesthetic should include as many as possible, no matter how contradictory or even opposed. It was not recommendable to repress any virtual chance a building might have to please the masses. As a way of enhancing the meaning of a certain edifice, it was desirable to address the diversity of possible options by bringing into the text, and thereby enriching it, multiple references that could allude to the cultural plurality the text stood for. Pastiche was a way of 'quoting' other texts, and therefore a tool in expanding the horizon of meanings, references, sources, and related layers of interpreting a given text.

Socialist Realism used pastiche, collage and fragmentation in the appearance of its architecture as yet another way of re-affirming its identity. What sort of identity, though? One defined by contrast, and by Manichean dichotomies; inclusivist, yes, but only after the target answered positively to the *friend-or-foe* message launched toward the history of art (architecture) by Socialist-Realist censors. History was divided into 'revolutionary', 'progressive' episodes, which fought against 'retrograde', 'conservative' ones. The criterion used in 'dividing' history was the Bolshevik one: according to the Marxist theory,⁸ there were epochs when the most advanced social forces expressed their political agenda through the arts. For Socialist Realism, Greek Classicism was 'progressive' because it belonged to a 'democratic' society. The Italian Renaissance was admitted in the

post-apocalyptic, members-only club of Stalinist culture, because it was responsible for the raising of the bourgeoisie, then an 'advanced' social force. In the fine arts, the *Peredvizhniky* realist movement of nineteenth-century Russia was yet another select guest, for both national and social reasons, whereas in architecture the Russian neoclassicism and baroque were reliable sources for the enrichment of the vocabulary. In playing inside this wide range of discourses, all of them 'politically correct', an artist was not only allowed and entitled to select his own *melange* of historical forms, but was morally (i.e. ideologically) obliged to do so. Could it then be said that, once inside the 'good' half of history, an architect could 'play' at his own will? Not really. There were rules according to which one edifice had to be more severe than the other. Furthermore, local and traditional ornaments were to be included, in compliance with the Stalinist thesis of a compulsory 'socialist content and national form'. A Socialist Realist edifice would therefore account for trans-historical class solidarity, being a living proof that history finally brought justice to the 'good', who now enjoyed the Bolshevik heaven. Since Socialist Realism inherited this treasure of 'purified' discourses, its identity could best be expressed by association with the encompassed moral virtues imbedded in the 'left' half of humankind's history.

Subsequently, all further research of 'new' vocabularies had to stop. Communism was the happy end of history, and Socialist Realism had to be the ultimate style, which recycled, and, in so doing, dramatically improved the meaning of 'the chosen ones'. To search for new forms meant to reject the positive message encompassed by previous discourses, and to refuse the aura of continuity, legitimacy and, consequently, of identity that could be bestowed by using a 'reliable' pool of rhetoric. For an ideology centered on historical Manicheism and social teleology, not to take advantage of such an opportunity of the Constructivist avant-garde served as an example in this respect. A joyous, eclectic play of fragments and pastiches of earlier edifices,⁹ or of earlier vocabularies¹⁰ the unified aesthetic of the Avant-Garde.

Decorum and Classicism

A unique power grid expressed in a plurality of discourses, allowed to play, as in Post-Modernism, either at random, or according to implicit ideologic scenarios, seems to be a contradiction in terms. However, the contradiction is only apparent, since the play remains artificial and extroversive. The edifices are decorated in rich, but nevertheless extroversive skins. The *decorum* that enveloped both Socialist Realist and Post-Modernist edifices was meant to beautify an austere way to express power. It was meant to appropriate popular culture, to make the edifice 'user-friendly' and theatrical, by apparently sharing with the average citizen the 'secrets of the gods' which reside in Form. Consequently,

populism came into picture, and official propaganda advanced either the 'Soviet people's right to columns' (Lunatcharsky), the 'popular capitalism' (Thatcherism), or the 'Versailles for the people' (Boffil) slogans.

In erecting 'palaces for masses', the *piano nobile* moved outside/in front of the building (Arata Isozaki's Tsukuba Civic Center), or in the square (Piazza d'Italia). The Socialist Realist edifices, exhibiting their richness toward the city, had squares for mass gatherings and marches in front of their main elevations (the Palace of the Soviets, Lenin's Mausoleum, all regional party headquarters), which equally incorporated tribunes for leaders/orators. Since the masses could not enter, and were not to have access to the 'Winter Palaces' of Soviet Regime ever again, sharing the meaning of the edifice by organizing gatherings in front of it was a minor concession aimed at maintaining a fascination in the people by suggesting that it was sometimes possible to shortcut the hierarchy, and that the top leaders were somehow accessible, at least visually.¹¹

Conversely, by designing luxurious, rich, and symbolic edifices such as supermarkets and company headquarters, the corporate world intended to suggest that consumerism and businesses were meaningful activities in today's society, and were to be celebrated as such.

In this context, the 'popular palaces' of Socialist Realism and Post-Modernism were a means of rendering accessible and explicit that which allegedly was elitist and encoded: the Modernist aesthetic. They were 'decorated sheds', not 'dead ducks'. They simulated the grass-roots origins of the power systems, that stood for, and were an offspring of the people, and shared with the people the richness of representation, by celebrating common values in an unanimous, allegedly classless society. The best way to assert and celebrate those values was through a classical language. Classicism could decorate the offices of the State Department, at the top of the pyramid, city halls and corporate headquarters, placed somewhere at the interface between 'masses' and power structures, as well as consumerist institutions, placed at the lower end of the social hierarchy. Its language could be both elitist and populist; both utopian, and therefore projective, and 'realist' and retrospective.

Both discourses addressed the question of origins. Whereas Socialist Realism 'inherited', and consequently displayed its stylistic 'ancestors', who were identified according to ideological criteria, Post-Modernism intended to recapture and appropriate tradition, from 'the primitive hut' to the 'golden', Classical Age. Graves' allusions to *megaron*-like structures on top of its proposed Portland building, Rossi's 'types', Leon Krier's and HRH Prince Charles' nostalgic and retrospectivist attempts to recapture past values as if they were forever engraved within Classical forms, all dealt with 'primordial', 'pure' architecture in a way that differed from that of Modernism.

Classicism was not only delightful in both discourses, but was equally more meaningful for the community as compared to Modernism. It inflicted order and hierarchy upon cities, granted edifices an accessible monumentalism, and, unlike Modernism, could act as a 'readable' and, therefore, 'understandable' text.

The contradiction between postmodern irony and the 'seriousness' with which Socialist-Realism made use of Classicism dissolves in the concept of play. Post-modern architects were ironic and sarcastic about the values celebrated in their buildings. Nevertheless, they did not attempt to dissolve them. Unlike Deconstruction, Post-Modernism acknowledged the centered grids of power while attempting to play with its exterior appearance, the interface between power and society, in a sort of semiotic schizophrenia. It made no attempt to uproot or set free the inner contradictions within architecture which were only being camouflaged. Socialist-Realism was also allowed to 'play' with synonymous languages within a unique frame of (ideological) meaning, without questioning it. It was a highly regulated game: the meaning was controlled by the party, as was the amount of toys involved. The artist had only to choose from among the officially approved portfolio the best (combination of) vocabularies in order to embellish and make the meaning more accessible to the masses.

Despite the global visions and degraded utopias of the Stalinist plan for Moscow (1935), and of successive post-war plans to reshape the most important Soviet cities, the implementation of Socialist Realism was only local and piecemeal. Retrograde heavens, those 'Communist Jerusalems' were so highly present in posters, international exhibitions, maps and models set with precious stones, that there was little need to have them actually erected. Holograms and fragments of a larger discourse, the edifices, '*cvartals*' and squares which have actually managed to become 'real' allude to an immanent and imminent vision of total coherence. Socialist Realism and Post-Modernism defined themselves by contrast to Avant-Garde and Modernism, respectively. They were implemented as disjointed, yet ubiquitous epiphanies. It is hard to identify the same comprehensive approach in the case of postmodern urbanists. Rather, one can speak about a local and piecemeal kind of approach, as if by implementing punctual works or ensembles, the corrupted environment were healed by mutual sympathy. It was Christopher Alexander's *Architectural DIY Handbook* for the 'average citizen'.

Both Post-Modernism and Socialist Realism attempted to embellish reality, and to transform the state in a work of art. Yet they remained fragmented, collated, epidermic and superficial. Playing with forms, having no deeper agenda of their own (because, allegedly, no such agenda could exist, or it was not within the reach of the artist/architect, respectively) behind their 'beautiful' façades, neither of these two styles changed the world. By 1953, Socialist Realism was a corpse. An embellished one, yet a corpse nevertheless. But was it really the

'dead style walking'? Perhaps the strongest arguments against an untimely burial of Socialist Realism would be: 1) at least in name, Socialist Realism was the official Soviet style up to the Gorbachev era; 2) immediately after Stalin died, many designs which had been on the waiting list, to be erected stripped off of their theatrical *decorum*, were born anew as Modern edifices. Such was the case with Tchetchulin's 'White House' (the Soviet parliament).

II. The Eulogy

Is Khrushchev's discourse of December 7, 1954 at the 'All-Union Conference of builders, architects and workers in the construction materials industry, in the machine-building industry, in design and research organizations' the lost manifesto of Modern architecture?

II.1. Goals

Before the speech delivered in 1956 at the party congress, widely regarded as marking the actual beginning of the de-stalinization process in the USSR, the discourse Khrushchev gave in December 1954 — albeit a 'gentle manifesto',¹² just like Venturi's was to be twenty-two years later — was, arguably, his first major attack on Stalinism, and an oblique one, too. In it Khrushchev stood up against the previous official perspective on architecture — the Socialist Realist one —, rather than against the ideology that had produced it. However, certain points can definitely be made with regard to the speech itself, from a Modernist / Functionalist perspective on architecture.

a) The speech proclaimed the definitive urge to modernize (i.e. to industrialize) construction techniques, and thus emphasized the standardization of building types, prefabrication and mass-production of structural elements, and eventually — derived from the above — the need to change the way architecture was designed in the USSR.

b) Khrushchev argued against monumentalism (unique monuments and church-like edifices), and favored instead social/common dwelling, which was to be judged on the grounds of the average building costs per square meter, rather than on the number of ornaments adorning their façades.

c) Although the speech did not explicitly bring forth Constructivism as 'good' architectural ideology, it identified the latter as a 'false target', in saying that fighting Constructivism was at that time merely a diversion to camouflage the poor architecture of the Stalinist era.

d) Finally and by way of consequence, by criticising Mordvinov, the Head of the Academy of Architecture, Khrushchev in fact attacked violently the institutional structures Stalinism had left behind.

II.2. Industrialization — Prefabrication — Serial Homes: The Line of Reasoning

Khrushchev's speech was clearly structured as an attack against architecture such as it had been conceived during Stalin's period. First of all, that was neither a conference of the Union of Architects, nor one of the Academy, although both institutions were present (and severely criticized) at the meeting. Rather, it was a meeting of the building industry, of which architects were just a tiny part, and certainly not the most important one, as they had been during the Stalinist era. Let it be remembered that architects were among those most favored by the previous *nomenklatura*: when it came to picturing the highest living standards in the USSR in motion pictures, the interiors featured were those in the homes of architects. The union had its own *dacha* outside Moscow, at Suchanov. The Academy used an old palace all by itself. Even Frank Lloyd Wright, who was on the American team attending the first Congress of the All-Union of Architects in 1937, was surprised and delighted by the luxurious standards architects enjoyed.¹³

The title of the discourse itself made no reference whatsoever to architecture ('On implementing on a large scale the industrial methods, on improving the quality and on reducing the cost of constructions'); the guild itself was mentioned second to that of constructors, in the subtitle. Furthermore, architecture was hardly ever mentioned in the first part of the discourse.

The introduction claimed that heavy industry was the only one that could contribute to the proper development of the USSR. Khrushchev then took the idea one step further, saying that heavy industry meant: *a*) more cement and thus more (reinforced) concrete; *b*) 'the large-scale industrialization of constructions', and thus *c*) prefabricated, *not* monolith concrete,¹⁴ and, in any case, definitely *not* bricks. For Khrushchev, 'more progressive' meant 'industrialized building methods'; thus a whole industry had to be created starting from the concept of progress:

By decree of the CC of CPSU and of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, it is envisaged that in the next three years four hundred and two new factories and two hundred platforms for the production of prefabricated elements and items of reinforced concrete will be built. In these three years, the production of reinforced concrete prefabricated units will increase five-fold; accordingly, the cement production will grow by more than one-hundred-and-fifty percent.

Within the realm of prefabrication, it was hard for the Soviet leader to choose between the existing systems — with prefabricated structure and panels, or just with large panels. Therefore he rather had them compete in the future in a rather 'democratic' fashion: '(...) it seems to me that for the time being one does not have to pass a certain verdict (...) We must offer both systems the chance to develop.' Furthermore, everything that could be prefabricated out of reinforced concrete — not just walls and building elements — had to be done in this way: bridges, pipes, milestones, everything, in order to replace wood, bricks and metal: 'In buildings, everything that can be replaced with concrete or reinforced concrete will be replaced.' There was a shortage of wood in the USSR at that time, allegedly; metal was used inappropriately and 'unjustly'; yet when it came to bricks, Khrushchev's concern clearly regarded the backwardness in building which was associated with their use: why wasting manual labor when there were machines and mechanisms to do that in a more efficient way?

Backwardness is a key word in interpreting this speech, underlined as it is by a 'moral' dichotomy, very similar to that employed by Socialist Realism in the interpretation of history. Bricks and handwork belonged to the past, thereby they were bad. Cement/(reinforced)concrete and industrial building techniques were 'progressive', therefore good. The same logic applied to design activity, the topic of the second chapter in Khrushchev's speech. The design process lagged behind industry, in Khrushchev's opinion: 'sometimes simple buildings are designed over a period of two years or more'. If architects did not realize how slow they were, industry nevertheless urged them to move forward more rapidly. What, then, was 'progressive'? Typified designs — the simpler, the better. Even more: the less types — the better:

Why are thirty-eight typified projects currently used? Is this *rational*? (...) One must choose a limited number of type-designs for dwellings, schools, hospitals, kindergartens, shops, as well as for other buildings and constructions; one must mass-build only according to these designs, for, say, five years. After this period one will discuss, and, if there will be no other better projects, the duration of using them will be extended by another five years. What's bad in this proposal, comrades? (italics are mine, A.I.)

In Khrushchev's dual logic, there was no room for such elaborated (his word is 'exaggerated') finishings and adornments. Architects who design individual buildings suddenly became 'an obstacle against industrializing constructions'; they are the reactionaries who do not like 'building well and fast'. Rather they learned to build monuments (by which the Soviet leader meant 'a building erected according to a personal project'), and probably the education they received in schools had its own guilt. By no means less guilty was the Academy of Architecture, whose president 'has changed after the war. There is no more the same comrade Mordvinov.'

The speech engulfed a definitely more 'social' approach towards the question of architecture than the previous Socialist Realist agenda. The USSR did not need monuments, at least not anymore, but rather 'humble' social housing projects, 'useful' buildings like hospitals, *creches*, schools. Unlike the Stalinist architects, who had lost touch with reality, Khrushchev had empirical, grass-roots arguments from 'out there' to prove his points. Here is one of his examples: in the industrial city of Vatutenki (Moscow region) the kindergarten was oversized (91,9sq.m./child instead of 24sq.m./child, as the norms stated) and 'overloaded with stucco ornaments'; it was a 'palace', claimed ironically the speaker, which costed three times the 'normal' building. 'Yet, the author of the design was rewarded the first prize. For what? For wasting the funds.'

If architects wanted to 'walk along with life', they must have learned to design not only forms, but rather materials, techniques and — even more important — economy as well. One can see here a clear attack against the *beaux-arts* tradition of the Soviet architectural schools. By the same token, he privileged the polytechnical model of teaching architecture, closer perhaps to a Bauhaus curriculum, yet nevertheless strictly controlled by the Bolshevik party. By embellishing their architecture, the *beaux-arts*-ists hanged tasteless and — a Modern argument — useless decorations on their façades. They were difficult to be built, expensive, time and energy consuming. Instead, Khrushchev asserted that the only important criterion was 'the cost of the square meter of building', the effectiveness of their construction.

II.3. 'Ornament is politically incorrect': The Hidden Modern Agenda

'Ornament is crime', Adolf Loos had said long before. Khrushchev would have agreed, adding that it was the fault of an aberrant ('irrational') building program, which had privileged high rising buildings towards which 'we can look, but in which we cannot dwell or work'. The argument against the Stalinist edifices ran eventually as a typically Modern one. Why did Moscow need spires at all, let alone the price, since they looked like churches? 'Do you like churches?', asked rhetorically the Communist leader. It was not just the spires, but the improper expression of the interior function:

One cannot transform a contemporary house, by means of forms, into some kind of church or museum. This does not bring any extra confort to their dweller, but complicates the use of the building and makes its cost more expensive.

But, unlike Loos, Khrushchev was sarcastic in criticising the adornments of high rising buildings in Moscow. 'These are perversions in architecture', and

whoever did not understand it had to be replaced ('He who will not understand must be brought on the right path'), as it happened to comrade Zaharov, who had been previously replaced from leading a design studio. His fault, apart from belonging to the Stalinist nomenklatura? Allegedly, he had designed a tall building with Palladian statues on top of it, yet this was a block of flats with:

a dwelling room with five walls, with a corner window [which] was not comfortable, let alone that the dwellers had to watch all their life the back of the statues. One can understand that it is not very nice to live in such a room.

Yet Zaharov was not alone in this. He could have been inspired by the theories of the necessary monumental approach towards cities' skyline. A.G. Mordvinov himself, the president of the Academy of Architecture, quoted by Khrushchev from *Arkitektura SSSR 1/1945* (*nota bene*: nine years before the speech), as well as professor A.V. Bunin, who had both argued in favor of major, tall urban elements, without an immediate purpose ('porticos, monumental halls, towers'; the city centres, believed Bunin, had to exclude prefabrication, and had to be individually designed, with domes and towers, that is with major vertical silhouettes. No wonder then that the designing architects sacrificed confort and costs, since from the very top came such examples of misunderstanding.

II.4. 'Dead Style Walking': Nikita Khrushchev Promoting Constructivism

But was it really a misunderstanding, or, rather, under the banner of anti-constructivism, Stalinist architects only 'justified their wrong trend'? From this point onward, Khrushchev enters the most surprising and radical part of his discourse. He had to demolish both the Stalinist establishment in architecture, and the atheist ideology promoted in its name. He could deal with the former in a rather easy way, using a 'Trojan horse' named comrade Gradov, who had allegedly tried to criticize Mordvinov (i.e. the establishment itself) by using similar arguments to those used by Khrushchev on December 7, 1954. Yet Mordvinov had tried to prevent him from speaking at the meeting, which proved once again, according to the party leader, 'that in the Academy of architecture there are neither the necessary conditions for a free exchange of opinions regarding the architectural work, nor criticism'. It was not exclusively Mordvinov's fault: worse even, he shared it with the State Committee for Constructions, who was supposed to oversee the work of the academy, to promote the 'standardization activity, urban planning and city building', which they had hardly ever done before 1953.

As for the aesthetics of Socialist Realism, Khrushchev had to be more subtle than just imposing another language by decree; rather, he preferred to build his argument applying the idea that the-enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend kind of approach. Which was the single most hated aesthetics for Socialist Realism? — Constructivism. The Avant-garde elite was gradually replaced even before 1925 by classicists as I. Zholtovsky, A. Schusev¹⁵ and I. Fomin. How then to best subvert the Socialist Realist rhetoric other than by claiming that it was obsessed with fighting Constructivism instead of concentrating on how to properly design the Soviet architecture. 'Of course' one had to find against Constructivism (Khrushchev did not want to go all the way to surprising his audience), but it had to be done only by using 'rational means'. What does this key word in his speech really mean?

If constructivism meant formalism, and if that was bad, then perhaps the Stalinism architects were the real constructivists, since they themselves 'slide towards the aestheticizing passion for a form disconnected from its content'. They were probably blind — one can argue following Khrushchev's arguments — not to see that, well, there were good parts in Constructivism after all. First of all, 'the grey, sad box-style', as the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* called it¹⁶, would have been cheaper than building towers, colonnades. Then the interior distribution of its buildings, the way those could be used were obviously more 'rational', as he liked to point out frequently during the speech, than the useless adornments of the façades. It was a rather negligent attitude towards 'the ardent needs of the people' than was it efficient in fighting Constructivism.

Khrushchev went on eventually only to stupefy even more his audience by proclaiming several aesthetic points dear to any Modernist. a) First of all, a generic one: 'We are not against beauty, but against useless things'. Then, derived from this slogan, it followed that b) façades should be beautiful not because of their decoration, but due to 'skilfull proportions of the whole building, a good proportion of the windows and doors (...), due to a proper use of finishing materials', and, perhaps the clearest paraphrase to the 'form follows function' Modern mantra, c) façades have to be beautiful by 'veridically outlining the wall pieces and elements in the block buildings with large panels'.

II.5. Architecture Bare Naked and the Malignant City: Effects on Architectural Practice

Obviously, this speech was meant to act like a manifesto *against* Socialist Realism as the most representative expression of Stalinism, more than acting as a catalyst *for* a specific alternative aesthetics. The agenda of Modern architecture was used in order to define by contrast what Khrushchev was fighting

against. However, it is obvious that its influence in reshaping the architectural discourse in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries was enormous. After 1954 several Socialist Realist buildings which were under construction in 1953 continued to be erected, yet not without harsh criticism for their costs and decoration. Mordvinov, author of the *Ukraine Hotel* in Moscow (one of the seven Stalinist sky-scrapers), had his share of party criticism right on the spot, during the speech: the square meter was allegedly 17% more expensive here than at the *Moskva Hotel*¹⁷, due largely to the excessive decoration. Many other pavilions at the Agricultural All-Union Exhibition in Moscow (which was extensively described by its chief architect A. Jukov in *Arkitektura SSSR* 7/1954, as well as in *Arhitectura RPR* 9/1954) were completely finished after Stalin died.¹⁸ D.N. Tchetchiulin's *Soviet House of RFSSR* on Krasnopresnenskaia was eventually built¹⁹ very much with the same outline as it had been designed before 1953, yet entirely stripped of its ornaments. Later edifices, such as *Lenin Central Stadium* in Lujniki (1956, A.V. Vlasov, who was in 1954 the chief architect of Moscow, 'a good architect, but who sometimes does not manifest the right perseverance', Khrushchev argued in his speech), recall pre-war edifices such as B. Iofan's *Dinamo Central Stadium*: still classicizing, yet without the emphasis on flamboyant decorations as the post-1948 ones.

In November 1955 the 'useless stylistic elements' were officially and definitely eliminated from the architectural discourse. According to Ockman and Eigen, the first to mention this speech as a possible Modernist text (1993:184), by 1958 almost 70% of the constructive parts in a building were prefabricated, as opposed to 25% in 1950. While in 1948 the Academy of Architecture had to advance prototypes for various building types for five different regions in the country, typification was hardly the result — in Khrushchev's terms later on — since the outcome was: 50 different types of dwelling units and (nota bene) 200 types of public buildings, each with its own set of decorations, 'traditional/local' details. After 1954 this was hardly the case anymore, although it did not mean that the Soviet modernism evolving from Khrushchev's speech was in any way a return to Constructivist experiences. Exhibited at Brussels in the Soviet pavilion, prefabricated architecture tailored according to Khrushchev's speech meant in fact 'a stripped-down façade treatment and fewer compulsory symmetries, but in rigidity of conception it remained very similar to the work carried out under Stalin' (ibidem).

Very much the same thing happened in the satellite countries. In Romania one could observe how the edifices built after 1954 were stripped off of their decorations and entertained the severe classicizing style inspired by *stille littorio* before the war. An eloquent example in Romania was *Romarta Copiilor* Building, opposite to the CCA eclectic edifice. Although in 1954 there was a major competition for designing the square and the surrounding façades, where

the design 18 won the 2nd — highest — prize (arch. Al. Zamfiropol, Al. Hempel and team), and although all the winning entries were clearly indebted to a Socialist Realist aesthetics, the erected building was a symmetrical composition, with stone pilasters, closer to the 1930's architecture in Bucharest than to the Stalinist one. In fact, it was an entirely different design, regardless of the competition.²⁰ Architects like Duiliu Marcu and Tiberiu Ricci could work again after the war and the brief Stalinist intermezzo (Marcu was even the president of the Union of Architects in Romania, which, following the Decree of November 13, 1952 of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party — PMR — was initiated on December 21, 1952, that is: twenty years after the Soviet decree of April 23, 1932 with similar effects in the USSR).

Ricci, the alleged author of some of Marcu's attributed buildings, designed after the war the *Radio House and Concert Hall* in precisely the same manner he used for the pre-war *CAM-Regia Monopolurilor Building* on the Victoria Avenue in Bucharest. Edifices like the *Palace Hall* resemble pre-war classicizing 'palaces' like the one in the Victoria Square, whereas the surrounding blocks recall Bauhaus/CIAM's severe aesthetics. Destalinization made room for flattering national precedents just before opening the door for a flat, industrialized Modernism in the early sixties.

As Grigore Ionescu points out, during the 1955–1960 five-year plan the radical shift from 'design methods based upon an archaic, narrow understanding of the connection between form and content in both architecture and urbanism' happened (Ionescu, 1969: 59) thus taking 'a preparatory step for the ample, high scale work in planning and building which became obvious after 1960' (ibidem). However, it is not until late-1950s, especially after the 1956 revolution and a greater social awareness of the Romanian Communist leadership, that question directly pertaining to architecture and urbanism are abruptly and officially addressed. The Romanian Worker's Party's plenum in November 1958 criticised the late response of the building industry to the economy issue ('let's build cheap housings of good quality'), as well as the backwardness in urban planning, only to have an echo in February 8–10, 1959 when they criticised the 'aesthetic exaggerations' that opposed the 'economic factor' in housing buildings, whereas in terms of urbanism the lack of coherence in decision making regarding the necessity to site large ensembles of dwelling units (too spread out, or too small groups, low density, lack of services). In the same year of 1959 the focus on the so-called 'systematization of the (national) territory' started to become the major event in expanding the Romanian built environment until the mid 1980s, having among the very first projects the enormous trend to systematize the Black Sea coast, which did not become real and complete until the late 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, in order to build such ample new quarters and cities, prefabrication was obviously the key word, following Khrushchev's speech. There was an international exhi-

bition of typified-projects (October 23–November 10, 1957), while competitions were launched to design prefabricated/standard edifices for social programs and even for administrative buildings (from 1955 onward).

Although it is clear that the first trend after the speech was to 'look back' for bridging the gap Socialist Realism inflicted upon the architectural discourses in East-European architecture, the sources of this retrospectivism may vary from one country to another. Romania envisaged a hybrid classicizing Modernism and/or a stripped Classicism (the so-called *Carol II Style* celebrated by its promoters like Petre Antonescu or I.D. Enescu) in its major edifices before the war, indebted to the Italian examples. And for good political reasons: Italy and Romania are both of Latin origins, while the German official architecture was questionable, as anything Nazi at the time.

Estonia had its alternative Modern tradition, while the Soviet Union could not entirely return to the blamed Constructivism whole heartedly, despite Khrushchev's half blessing. However, after 1960, Bauhaus and CIAM urban schemes became the norm in East-European architecture, only to be somehow altered later on, at the top level of the discourse, by a late-Corbusierian aesthetics of rough concrete and spectacular, 'poetic' forms.

Very much the same thing happened in Hungary, where architects like Rimanockzy worked before, during, and after Stalinism, only to use his old tools again after 1956, when the revolution had abruptly switched the clock from Socialist Realism 'back' to plain Modernity. A similar trend can be seen in Estonia, which, largely exposed to pre-war Scandinavian/Aalto Modernism, did precisely the same thing after 1954, that is returned to its modern sources before the war.

II.6. Ideology As/Instead of Aesthetics: Effects On The Critical Discourse

The real issue in interpreting East-European architecture is that it lacked the critical edge, its self reflexiveness. After the suppression of the Avant-garde in the USSR, official discourses stood for/and thus replaced any form of criticism. The leaders would 'draw the official line', while architects would eventually strive to 'implement' it within the discourse, embellishing the respective vague, superficial suggestions with an aesthetic/architectural parlance, attributing a line of reasoning that was allegedly traced from the given speech. After becoming the norm, no one but the party leader himself would dare to criticize the 'official line' in architecture, be it Socialist Realist or its complete reverse after 1954.

One must say that Socialist Realism itself was not the immediate result of certain elaborate aesthetics descending from Stalin, Jdanov or the like, but a by-product of their acts within the realm of architecture, as well as the 'translation'

of their rough discourses on architectural topics. Socialist Realism was the offspring of its many step-parents: the 23 April 1932 decree which had suppressed the organizations within the field, replacing them with a union and an academy; the Palace of the Soviets competition which rejected any straightforward Modern as well as foreign designs, thus suppressing the European Avant-gardists as well as the local ones; and finally, the method of interpreting the history formulated by Lunatcharsky and Gorky, who then concluded that it was not only commandable to use historic precedents in the 'new' Soviet architecture, but, furthermore, compulsory, since Bolshevism was the intended end of the historical 'progress'. After 1934, when V. Vesnin criticised the 'schusism' of Soviet architecture, (i.e. its complete abandon of any aesthetic set of principles in favor of 'anything works', a sort of cowardness promoted, Vesnin believed, by Schusev), and perhaps of some weak criticism at the first congress of the union in 1937, there was no critical agenda attached to the Soviet architecture before Stalin died.

Which brings us to Khrushchev's speech. This was the first top level official discourse in the Communist world which focused upon specific aesthetic issues, drew the respective consequences derived from the theoretical approach and thus inflicted practical tasks upon the Soviet — as well as East-European — architecture. My point is that it was precisely its wholeness that had furthermore suppressed the critical edge of East-European architecture. From now on, one can find exclusively buildings, and very little, if any critical discourse at all. Whereas it is extremely relevant to interpret not only the corpus of Modern edifices in the West, but theoretical discourses: criticism, utopian designs, 'myths' and various *ars poetica*, the researcher has to contend with watching reflections and traces of the official discourses in various how-to texts on architecture, as well as in the built environment.

Perhaps the most illuminating examples in that respect are: a) an article by I. Nikolaev, called 'Questions of economy and aesthetics in Soviet architecture' (*Arhitectura RPR* 7/1955), an architects' digest of Khrushchev's speech, as well as b) the 'table talk' at the Academy of Architecture 'around the question of the nature and specific of architecture' (*Arkitektura SSSR* 6/1955), a mere deciphering of the same discourse, now properly translated into the professional jargon, justified with readings of historical precedents, and with the envisaged consequences for the architectural practice at the end of each talk.

If one looks for eloquent examples of Khrushchev's speech, one has to look very attentively at the architectural media, where the discourse could be swiftly tuned to accord to the official hymns. Watching the 1955 summary of *Arhitectura*, the journal of the Union of Architects and of the (post-Stalinist) State Committee for Architecture and Constructions of the Ministers Council, is reading the abstract of Khrushchev's speech. First of all, industrial building methods took over the content: to theory and history — the last chapter — is devoted

roughly only one seventh of the page numbers during the year. Reading the titles means addressing to anything but building unique edifices; instead, dwelling units, social-cultural buildings, industrial and agricultural buildings are the norm. And — above all — standardization, prefabrication, and typification. *Type*-designs for social-cultural buildings in the countryside (issue 2/55), *type*-designs for public buildings (5/55 — *horribile dictu*, would have said the Stalinist architect before 1953!), *type* designs for schools and kindergardens (10 and 11–12/55) are the key concepts.

Furthermore, the main concern of the IIIrd national conference of the Union of Architects in the People's Republic of Romania (December 10–11, 1954, covered in *Arhitectura* 3/1955, precisely in the aftermath of Khrushchev's speech), had, because of the blurred significance and consequences of the speech, a rather confused and remarkably low-key agenda, while the final conclusions resemble in a striking manner the way Khrushchev's speech (neither he nor it are in any way acknowledged in the text) was structured. But while the latter discussed the industrialization of building activity, followed by the consequences for architecture, the former conclusions addressed the agricultural architecture for the emerging collective farms (*kolkhozes*).

Later on urbanism became again a key issue, as the so called 'systematization of the national territory' began to be looked at as a means to control the landscape/ reality, as an early sketch of the *megastructure* concept that took over the discourse in the 1960s.

II.7. The 'As If' Manifesto of East-European Modernism

Is Khrushchev's discourse really the lost manifesto of Modern architecture? The answer is twofolded. Yes, it was — and no in the same time, depending on where the mirror stands.

Yes, because it engulfed definitely Modern consequences (a definite social agenda for its envisaged architectural program, prefabrication of building, the predominant use of concrete, as well as a remote yet recognizable 'form-follows-function' approach); because it rejected the Socialist Realist aesthetics, used a 'rational' parlance, and because it reversed the anti-Constructivism trend in Soviet architecture.

No, because it was merely a political discourse, not to be critically scrutinized, opposed to, but which was meant to be obediently 'translated' and applied within the practice as such, without further questions. And no, because many of its aesthetic principles are not inherently Modern, but rather the conclusions of Khrushchev's economical obsessions: price-per-square-meter, heavy industry, concrete and the industrialization of building techniques, mirroring a compulsory lack of alternatives to the worldwide trends Socialist Realism wanted to ignore for so long.

Perhaps a better way to characterize the discourse of December 7, 1954, is this: a) the beginning of the de-Stalinization process; b) the speech that *stood for* East-European Modern manifestoes largely by replacing them and suppressing their eventual birth.

III. The Out-Of-Body Experiences: A Reading of Modern Architecture in the Fifties and Sixties

III.1. The Disappearing Body of Modern Architecture?

Architecture in the fifties and sixties increasingly lost its corporeality. It was not just a desfiguring. It was not just an *écorché*, skinless mechanism, displaying (rarely in a glass window) every single organ outside; it emphasised its respective shape (brutalism), flexing rough concrete muscles (Paul Rudolph's Yale Faculty of Architecture, late-Corbusier's La Tourette, Chandigarh and Notre Dame de Haute Ronchamp).

It was much more than all these: architecture after the war revolted against its integrity, completion, definitiveness, permanence, and inside coherence. It stood against internal measure (Michelis, 1982: 200–8) and ended up by being anti-anthropomorphic — at one end the Hi-Tech wizardries, at the other end Kurokawa's 'cyborg architecture'. Architecture as a unique body exploded. Its internal, sustaining structures became interconnected and proliferated, leading to the megastructure concept, while its cells became autonomous, replaceable, moveable, only to evolve eventually towards Reiner Banham's 'bubbles'²¹, to capsules (in Metabolism) and to disposable (Cook called it 'throw-away') architecture later on.

III.1.a. Who Framed the European City? Megastructures and East-European Look-Alikes

Megastructure had a great size; was built of modular units; was capable of great, or even 'unlimited' extension; was a structural network into which smaller structural units (for example rooms, houses, or small buildings, of other sorts) can be built or even 'plugged-in' or 'clipped on' after having been prefabricated elsewhere; a structural framework expected to have a useful life much longer than that of the smaller units which it might support.

REINER BANHAM (1976:2)

The part played by the corporal metaphors in the post-war architecture was not throughout researched. First of all, it may be looked at from the perspective of an analogy between functional and organic: among the ideologies of func-

tionalism identified by Benjamin Handler (1970:5), organicism was by far the most radically encompassing. Sullivan's slogan is thus enhanced, since Handler looks at the perfect identity between form and function (Handler, 1970:9). Form was understood as the outcome, the external expression of an internal process of functioning. According to the theory of systems, form would be 'the functioning of the whole' (*ibidem*).

Obviously, post-war Modernism played with its body (or with what was left after dismembering it) in a rather peculiar way. Architecture as a single, internally and (thus, the Modernists would say) externally coherent body had to disappear. Brutalism was an *corche*: skinless architecture without its protecting envelope to keep together in a unique body the entire building, and to mask its interior from outside looks. The house did not need to be draped by a unique façade anymore. Instead, each part of any given building should be exclamated, displaced from its system/structure and loudly displayed towards the exterior, to be widely visible. For the Smithsons, 'form follows function' became 'every single function should be expressed in a separated exterior shape/volume'. By letting the parts free, Brutalism pointed towards the internal mechanism of the (architectural) body, towards its vital systems sustaining it, which then became essential: circulation/transportation, water pipes and electricity wires in the city, structural elements and correspondents of the above in the building.

There was only one step left to the megastructure concept, which could be looked at as architectural structuralism. The step was made by Archigram and Yona Friedman, by Japanese Metabolists, Urbanisme Spatial in France and by Città Territorio in Italy. The body disappeared, only to be replaced by a twofold alternative: on the one hand the mega/meta organisms that could spread over a whole city and even a (national/world-wide) territory; all it mattered was the 'biological', internal functioning of the whole, how the 'atoms' move and are distributed within it is secondary. While the first Modernists, like Le Corbusier, were fascinated by cars and hangars, architects of the so called 'second Machine Age' (Martin Pawley) looked at space forms and chemical plants instead, 'all canned in exposed lattice frames, NASA style' (Colquhoun, 1986:17), since those provided the kind of 'dismembering' needed to prove their point.

Without bodies to contain them, the internal mechanism could proliferate malignantly, from house to city to the whole environment. All of those were in fact systems of control and manipulation upon the urban structure, that have gradually evolved and took over the architectural discourse, and from which Western environment was saved (except for the interesting Cumbernauld example), since they remained largely as urban utopias rather than realities. In the East 'and in Cuba' (Banham, 1976:10), though, megastructure — as a macro-concept regarding a whole country as *the site* for heroically extending the central control

over it — became increasingly popular since the sixties, only to devour their host — the city — in the late eighties in Romania.

For megastructure was not the 'neutral grid' (Colquhoun, 1986: 121) envisaged by Yona Friedman for the University of Berlin, or by Le Corbusier for his hospital project in Venice — neither in its original understanding, nor in its East-European counterparts. First of all, because the frame was dominant, permanent, fixed and structuring. Secondly because, given the above mentioned inner qualities, it was supposed to be expressed in a monumental way, which eliminates definitively its neutrality. The frame is not the background against which the city projects its functioning, but the functioning mechanism turned the very essence of the city/environment.

In the late 1960s Romania, as well as in the West earlier, the community spirit was replaced by 'civic centres' — monuments dedicated to it, best described, as its West European counterparts, as 'grotesque civic monuments with compulsory piazzas (...) an elephantine tendency' (Curtis, 1982: 349) inspired obviously by 'the last' Le Corbusier²². It is here where the frame/structure exists the internality of the architecture to exhibit its 'heroic' part in sustaining the whole. The grids were metaphors of control displayed on the façades of major administrative buildings built since late 1960's in every county capital city. Although the structural/decorative frames did not become autonomous, as in megastructures, this exhibition of inflated concrete grids is perhaps the most important feature of East European official architecture in the 1960s and 1970s.

In the same 'heroic' style, but closer to a brutalist disembodiment, several major edifices were built in the sixties and early seventies in Romania. The Polytechnic Institute in Bucharest (1962–1972, Octav Doicescu chief-architect; P. Iubu, C. Hacker, S. Lungu, P. Swoboda, I. Podocea architects) was an early example of a monumental, brutalist approach towards a dramatic change in designing edifices after Stalinism. Grids and rough, plugged-in volumes were nevertheless masked with superficial brick finishing, altering their 'sincere expression' praised by Gheorghe Curinschi Vorona (1981: 344). A slightly similar approach was conveyed in designing the Academy 'Ștefan Gheorghiu' (Ștefan Rulea chief-architect): its auditoriums are huge masses detached from the concrete grid of the façade and individually exposed as 'primadonas' of the exterior composition.

Communist Eastern Europe, plagued by prefabrication and social housing after 1954 (i.e. exclusively common dwelling units, with very little ownership allowed since 1970's), was the perfect playground for megastructures — an efficient way to control the environment and its inhabitants. During the sixties, vast areas of environment and historical city centres were destroyed everywhere in Europe in the name of development (Curtis, 1982: 349). Tradition disappeared for Modernism to take over and impose 'a simple and architectonic order on the layout of human society and its equipment' (Banham, 1976: 199).

III.1.b. 'Arise, And Take Up Thy Bed, And Walk': Capsules And the (re)Movable Home

Art.1. The capsule is cyborg architecture. Man, machine and space build a new organic body which transcends confrontation (...). Art. 2. A capsule is a dwelling of Homo movens.

KISHO KUROKAWA (1977: 75–6)

On the other hand, one discusses about the prime unit: a dwelling capsule — detachable, transferable, thus mobile. The body metaphor retreated inside the cell. Yet the cell is secondary, since it depended on the megastructure. Within a 'permanent and dominating frame containing subordinate and transient accommodations'²³, the capsule is just another function of the city 'housed' in 'a large frame'²⁴. While the capsule celebrated by Metabolism had its own roots in the Japanese tradition: *kago*, the individual transportation unit, and the *shoin* pavilions called *jiga* (Charles Jencks in its Foreword to Kurokawa, 1977: 11), in the west it was a clear mark of disembodied architecture.

Yet Kurokawa refined the concept, since the capsule is not exclusively biologic any longer: he talks about 'cyborg architecture' — architectural body with prosthesis. Architects should not look at the body for inspiration, but rather to its technological alter-ego. And, with technology and capsule, 'A Home is not a House' anymore, as claimed by Reiner Banham in 1965. Any of its internal functions could be supplied technologically, and thus their material expression became irrelevant: solid, permanent walls, windows, furniture items with their bourgeois, monumental appearance criticised by Baudrillard (1968).

Despite its compulsory modernism, East European architecture and interior design have never questioned the alleged 'conservative' nature of house furniture, capable of subverting the 'revolutionary' message conveyed by the social common dwelling. More even, furniture in Romania after the war produced retarded yet traditionally 'bourgeois' furniture items, such as the enormously popular glass cases, where the household valuables could be displayed. More even, Modern architecture was transformed and even repressed by vernacular ways of appropriating the internal home space. The 'clean' room for guests took over the living room as a place with the best furniture, the most valuable possessions in the household, where children were not allowed to play. The kitchen, despite its small sizes in Modern apartments, was still the 'fire centre' of the home, and arguably the most important place in any Romanian apartment and so on and so forth.

Yet, as a consequence of their mobility, homes of post-war visionaries lack *oikos*, the site with qualities best described by the concept of *Raum* (Heidegger, 1995: 185). 'Home of the *Homo movens*' (Kurokawa, 1977: 76), the capsule is in fact the most elaborated consequence of previous concepts elaborated by the Constructivist 'desurbanists', who have searched to allegedly give the Soviet

citizen an unlimited freedom to move across the Soviet Union without having to depend on a given, fixed 'dwelling place'. Placeless architecture was the alternative to 'bourgeois' city envisaged by desurbanists, who were repressed since 1930 by Stalin and Jdanov in saying that, since the Bolshevik revolution had won in the cities, it followed that those cities were revolutionary from that point onward. With capsule architecture plugged into megastructures, one deals with a generic human being as opposed to individuals. Man became a social, anonymous being docked in a space without attributes, which he did not own, yet which he had to call home.

The question rises here whether standardisation and prefabrication of home in East-European architecture is the ultimate encapsulation of dwelling, expressed on the façades as well. Architecture in the 1960s emphasised the structural frame, which then celebrated the repetitiveness of its internal units²⁵. The actual limits of any given home (i.e. flat within the block, even individual rooms) were not only left apparent, but they were emphasised towards the exterior. Façades as drapes that could veil and mask such details had already disappeared. One can look at a 'brutalist' attitude: the box frame 'expressed the actual physical limit to each dwelling; each unit reads' (Banham, 1966:91). The poor craftsmanship and mere economy induced this separatedness of each panel, rather than any conceptual attitude.

While in the West the common dwelling was rather the exception, in the East it was the norm: an artificial environment, capable of being manipulated, which could repress self-representations of the individual ego, flattering in exchange the social indistinctiveness. With the skinless, paneled façades, home as a shelter/refuge/hiding space was gone from the post-war Modern architecture.

III.1.c. CorpoReality: Organic vs technological or Architecture as Prothesis

Naturalism does not fit well with modern trends, nor with the structures of today.

E. HEINLE & M. BCHER (1971:284)

By the same token, 'organic' meant something different in the post-war Modernism. While Gaudi's bone columns and visceral Gel chapel still refer to the body metaphor, for Metabolists the organic was just the host for healing technologies. Modern organic architecture looked at how organism worked; at systems, not at their shapes. It was fascinated by velocity, self-sustained processes, internal functioning — metabolism in a word. Bionic architecture itself was not about miming the complete plant or animal body, but rather about why is it working so well. 'Organicism' in the latter discourse was not a celebration of the Body as a whole, but of the way it worked as a *Mechanism* — the ultimate metaphor of Modern architecture.

Banham's environmental bubble as well as Quarnby's 'organic' forms, the fantastic shapes of W.E. Wedin's polyurethane houses have inspired and been inspired by sci-fi/cosmic architecture. An example is Barbarella's Sojo city (imagined by Mario Garbuglia in 1968) and its fur coated space-ship where Jane Fonda purred bare naked — all are somewhat indebted to the organic metaphor, yet expressed in non-organic materials. Although Kurokawa did discuss 'living' concepts, they were scarcely addressing the body alone: movement (Kurokawa, 1977:87), dynamic modulation (ibidem), growth and change (idem: 89–91), or even a possible 'aesthetics of death' (Jencks in idem: 10) referred to mechanism, to cyborgs more than to beings.

III.2. Looking Through: Artificial Environments and The Ultimate Sense

To be able to see through substance became more and more magic as techniques of production were able to give larger and larger uninterrupted forms.

PETER COOK (1970:63)

Combining existing materials, inventing new, artificial building materials and building colours, eroding conventional ways of employing old and new materials in architecture were perhaps the most radical strategy to displace the being from its nest of conventions regarding its urban/public as well as interior/private space after 1950. The most intimate archetypes, such as the trilitic arch-structure, had to be disrupted and dis/re/placed.

Unlike before the war, when architecture, albeit Modern, had still a sense of appropriatedness in dealing with (building) matter, after 1950 one can see architects looking into it to find 'new' ways of twisting, folding, packing, inflating, exposing and even making invisible the very same matter, or its 'cyborg' mutants.

A look into the substance of architecture and how dealing with it changed the very nature of the architectural discourse in Western as well as Eastern Europe might illuminate fractures as well as continuities within this process, and their relevance to our understanding of the architecture of the fifties and sixties.

III.2.a. Erotic vs heroic: Plastic/Soft Architecture

Architecture can be seen more related to the ambiguity of life.

PETER COOK (1970:67)

The most important quality of plastic, apart from its modernity, came from its versatility: by designing plastic furniture, one could invent items with multiple functions and, most important, with non-conventional colours. Even entire cities,

plastic utopias as the Spatial Housing Project (W. Doring), or the suspended Rendo Housing Project (Casoni&Casoni), or the 1966 utopian pneumatic town by Gernot Nalbach. A living capsule made entirely of the same material thus became reality, while inflatable furniture, with its erotic, soft and sometimes transparent shapes, was fashionable in the sixties (and had a comeback in the mid-nineties).

There were clear references to attributes of the body, yet 'embodied' by the most artificial, anti-organic material. Soft architecture is perhaps the best example.²⁶ Bionics and metaphors of life are clearly incorporated in this definitely Modern material, which is more clearly related to the sixties, with its out-of-body experiences — mind expanding, drugs (H.Rucker: *Mind Expander*, 1968) — than with 'classical' anthropomorphism as such. 'Sculptures': all these dialogues, distortions, frustrations have to do with corporeality, witnessing an impossible struggle of Modernity to completely exile its traces within the architectural discourse. Finally, one can argue that the most striking similarity between body and later Modern architecture was their sheer temporality. Architecture was no longer eternal, but replaceable, disposable, and ready to die. Plastic does not die, however.

It has a pre-war history especially in Germany — that wanted to be independent from importing raw materials — and in the UK — with its 1941 Building Plastics Research Corporation in Glasgow. Eventually, it emerged as *the* alternative, up-to-date building material in the early fifties²⁷, due to the dwelling crisis and to plastic's easy prefabrication. The first real structure did not come out until 1955, when, at the Paris Exhibition, Ionel Schein (with R.A. Coulon and Y. Magnart) exhibited a plastic house.

The plastic capsules appeared later on, by the same team: Motel cabin (1956) and exhibition units for a mobile library (1958). Plastic was so popular and hype in the sixties, that it was adopted instantly by the pop culture, thus being present at Disneyland, as a crossed plastic home sitting on a pilaster (1957), shaping 'the ideal home' designed by the Smithsons (1956), and envisaging future habitations (Monsanto House of the Future by Hamilton and Goody).

Plastics then offered unexpected ways to avoid traditional design strategies and conventional forms. There were details: curved window frames, probably alluding to (space)ships, or no window frames at all. Then it corroded the very nature of any architectural structure to day. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Peter Cook thought that a revolution in architecture happened during the fifties and sixties, as new materials and structural techniques allowed architects to blow the trilitic system up. By detaching the structure from the architectural skin after 1945, each component had its own eventual destiny. Without columns and beams, the skin became the structure by itself, due to Otto Frei and Buckminster Fuller: plastic structures²⁸, pneumatics — with their erotic,

'very exciting looking shapes' (Cook, 1970:62) — reinforced cables, as well as geodesic domes.

Finally architecture could become really 'new'. And, more important, Modern architecture found a way to be thrilling without employing strategies of visual heroism. Soft architecture, although inherently big, was regarded as a 'gradual erosion of monumentality' (idem:67). One must remember here that the lack of monumentality was by far the strongest argument to resisting Modernism before the war. It was seen as an unreliable aesthetics, since it was not capable to offer the heroic structures the elites of nation/states needed to convey their messages within city textures.

Modernism thus had to accept pollination with other idioms to accede to more important edifices than extravagant houses in the woods for the rich and the snob intellectual/art elite before the war. Rationalism, Art Deco and Classical features negotiated together to offer a cocktail called either stripped Classicism (as seen at the Paris Exhibition in 1937), or Classical Modernism (of the New York World Fair in 1939)²⁹. This is why Cook's remark is highly important in a discussion on whether Modern architecture was ever able or indeed really willing to produce monumental structures at all.

III.2.b. A Love/Hate Liaison:

Glass and Concrete Playing Sight Against Touch

Glass (...) was, quite clearly, the ideal 'skin' (...) the purpose was to produce maximum invisibility for the wall and maximum visibility for the structural skeleton of the building.

PETER BLAKE (1977:72)

Perhaps the most striking development in Modern architecture after the war is the steady disappearance of the other senses in experiencing the built matter but the visual. In fact, seeing became more and more the only possible way to experience architecture. Yet the more the visual took over, the more substanceless the façades became. Glass was used either as a mirror, or as a transparent 'skin' whose primordial function was not to protect, but to unveil, even expose the structural skeleton.

How did it come to this? First of all, there was the separation between structure and façades, which was a product of the first Modern generation: Gropius' Faguswerk, Le Corbusier's continuous glass windows, and especially Mies van der Rohe's triangular glass Friedrichstrasse tower competition entry displaced the wall from its structural purpose, and the latter was attributed to pillars retreated behind the glass façade. Then, in the fifties and sixties, even the pillar disappeared, as in Fuller's USA Pavilion and his 'roof' for Manhattan, only to make room to a completely glass/transparent façade, regardless how intimate

the interior might have been — a home, as in Philip Johnson's New Canaan residence, or a sky-scraper, as in Lever House of Mies/Johnson.

As the façade was peeled off the structure, the former became just a way of negotiating the dichotomy between interior and exterior, and the latter was increasingly regarded as the essential part of the architectural organism, it was only logical that the former should 'disappear' in order to display/emphasise the latter. While brutalism left the building skinless, arguing that there was no need to camouflage at all the structure — quite the opposite — other idioms found more metaphysical ways to deal with sensual experiences of architecture as a physical body.

In the Western Europe and the US, roughness and opacity (flattering the tactile and being key qualities of an aesthetics based upon concrete) were increasingly and deliberately suppressed from the discourse, by focusing on smoothness and transparency (which in turn emphasised the sight, and were centered around glass and metal). More and more, the choice of materials, surfaces as well as colours in Modern architecture was intended to complement a unique sense, and thus to alienate the being from its built environment.

It was not a straightforward process, nor was it ubiquitously present in all national/regional architectures after the war. One can see it in France, from the late Le Corbusier (with his raw concrete masses which have started a trend in the fifties and sixties in western Europe and the US, only to find it anew in the East in the late sixties and the seventies as 'lyrical functionalism') to Jean Nouvel 'disappearing' glass tower in Defense and the recent Fondation Cartier, where there is no more resistance opposed to visually penetrating the architecture in its entirety.

One can obviously find it in the US, yet in a rather distorted manner, since Rudolph's mid-sixties, à la manière de Le Corbusier, muscle flexing at Yale was rather a reaction *against* the glass curtain of 'Orthodox' (Venturi), corporate Modernism, and where Post-modern opaque consistence brought back matter onto building façades.

However, one cannot find the same process in the East, where Khrushchev's *laudatio* for cement and concrete was absolute. One can make edifices out of concrete: rough, powerful, heavy, thus monumental. Concrete was 'revolutionary', as it was an outcome of the heavy industry, and it was grey, which, as pointed out by Schusev, is worker's colour³⁰.

Glass is cool, both transparent and reflective, fragile and easy, thus 'feminine'. It is present, corporeal as well as absent and virtual. Thus concrete is 'masculine': rough, 'as found' (Glendenning&Muthesius, 1994:92), massive, immobile, the very embodiment of (heavy) industry, progress, and materiality.

There was a discrete yet fundamental change in the nature of finishing. It became a quality of the surface itself, indeed of the structural system, rather than

something applied eventually. Finishing could be a quality, something to enhance the surface's attributes, yet it could also stand for 'accidental marks of shuttering' (ibidem), 'out-of-form'ness (Stillman & Eastwick-Field), in order to obtain a 'directness of expression' (ibidem). Obviously, a 'revolutionary' discourse had to look for certain metaphors and be attentive to the metaphysics of matter.

Thus, following Khrushchev's emphasis on concrete, one can read the glass/concrete marriage as key dichotomy in understanding Communist architecture. Sight was a key sense in experiencing Western architecture. Unlike in the West, due to a ubiquitous presence of concrete, tactile was still present and relevant. Much like plastics, yet more impressive and heroic, concrete could be manipulated and could subvert the trilitic system as well. The so called 'visual concrete' (Heinle&Bcher, 1971) stands not only for the immediate finishing of the structure, but also for expressive, unconventional forms like shell structures with complicated geometry, as well as for a whole range of 'hard landscape[s] in concrete' (ibidem). Up to the 1970's in both West and East, concrete made it to playgrounds, interiors, schools, fountains and urban furniture items.

Hardly can one find towers with glass 'curtain walls' in the east. First of all, because high rising buildings, as major characters of Stalinist architecture from the Palace of the Soviets to the post-war seven towers in Moscow and Warsaw, were among the most important targets of Khrushchev's speech. Secondly, because one cannot imagine unframed glass, i.e. uncontrolled building elements. Thirdly, because architecture (i.e. the structure), although artificial, had to be present, visible, material, whereas glass offered but elusiveness, was slippery and metaphysical, could entail uncontrollable reflections under various light conditions: 'a giant Hall of Mirrors, or Skyline of Mirrors (...) [which] implies, of course, total abdication' (Blake, 1977:73). The concrete structure had to be emphasised, not camouflaged. It was exhibited, not allowed to be unveiled by the glass walls.

Why then reflect the reality, and not be real? The reflected city is not the real city anymore, but an image, an interpretation of it, it's the other city from beyond the mirror. Mies van der Rohe could assert back in 1919 that 'the important thing in a glass tower is *the play of reflections*' (quoted by Blake:ibidem; italics mine, A.I.); and perhaps in the west one needed now more than ever) a second cornea, a screen prothesis to act as protective/interpretative intermediary between reality and being. Perhaps glass could be built in the most ethereal ways, as were the glass skyscrapers in the desert outside Teheran (Iran), where only the chaos was reflected and multiplied, or as is SOM's Bank in Rhyad (Saudi Arabia), with his glass walls (towards the inner, empty, triangular court) looking into themselves.

Yet this was not the case in the East, where glass was heavily guarded and/or framed by opaque panels of concrete, rarely stone, retracted behind heavy *brise-soleils* or colonnades. Enframing the glass panels is the norm in Romanian

architecture during the envisaged period, recalling works like the Ministry of Education in Rio de Janeiro by Le Corbusier and Oscar Niemeyer, or, closer to home, Duiliu Marcu's CAM building on Victoria Avenue in Bucharest.

The outcome were T. Ricci's glass-within-stone/concrete grids Radio House and especially Romanian Television building. The latter's façades are quite relevant in that context, as its boxes resemble TV sets, yet the emphasis is not on the glass screens, but on the green structure which sends the glass towards the depths of the façade surface. Glass flanked in between two opaque panels was also popular in the Classicizing edifices before the war, such as D. Marcu's War School and especially Victoria Palace in Bucharest were sources for post-Stalinist edifices as the Palace Hall in Bucharest, as well as for many city halls and 'unions' culture houses' in the sixties and seventies.

III.3. Original as Originary: Towards The Archaic Modernism?

Andre Lurat invokes the pile dwelling of the late Stone Age in justification of the pilotis so favoured by architects in the thirties to liberate the congested city terrain.

ALAN COLQUHOUN (1986: 16–17)

Originality is return to the origin.

ANTONIO GAUDI

Alan Colquhoun raised the question of whether post-war Modernism recuperates — deliberately or unconsciously — certain archaic structures, patterns and/or archetypes (i.e. 'exemplary models') of architecture. After Collin Rowe, we know that the Modernists were not entirely estranged from composition patterns used by architects beforehand. His comparison of Palladio and Le Corbusier was relevant in that respect. Steiner's Goetheanums, as well as Aalto's sacred spaces could indeed question the entirety of the alleged gap between Modernity and Tradition. Yet an even deeper *raison d'être* of Modern discourse has to be interrogated in connection with its *arche-tecture* (an analogy to Derrida's *arche-writing*). Such ontology might be proudly claimed, accepted as obvious, or rejected. Yet, regardless of the authors' opinion, origins have to be accounted for when one looks into the nature and ingredients of their architecture.

A parallel to the official architecture in the 1930s might be illuminating in that respect. In *Celălalt modernism (The Other Modernism, 1995: 125–37)* I looked into the loudly celebrated, self-styled origins of 'Nazi' and 'Fascist' architectures. At stake there was the question of identity, yet differently tailored, according to the respective regime's ideology. Identity in Nazi and Fascist architectural discourse was defined by nationalism *as* (aesthetic) ideology, whereas in Socialist Realism it was informed by ideology *and* (since the war) nationalism.

Returning to (alleged) origins was then, once again after the French Revolution, the source for restoring the 'revolutionary purity' of architecture. Racial origins would determine the architectural starting point: for Rosenberg, himself an architect who studied at Riga and Moscow, as well as for Speer later on, Dorians (i.e. the Arian ancestors of German people) had their own (Dorian) style. It follows that, when one wants to acknowledge and celebrate one's people origins, one can do it within the built environment by using that particular 'originary' architecture envisaged by ancestors 'as an expression of their racial awareness'.

In *Revolution in der bildenden Kunst*, Rosenberg thus describes how the trilitic structure is genuinely Doric, thus arian, thus 'good', commendable; whereas the arch pertained to Southern, non-arian and (worse!) matriarchal population (Etruscans), was therefore 'feminised', thus 'weak', thus 'bad'³¹. Reversibly, for *stille littorio* (and, remotely, but precisely with similar racial arguments, for the Romanian Carol II style of the 1930s) by immediately or obliquely celebrating the Roman imperial tradition, one could revive and bring forth the values imbedded in the ancient built forms.

At least certain aspects of Modern architecture before and especially after the war could send us to an alternative source. One knows the direct references to Mediterranean vernacular as a privileged source for Cubist architecture: flat roofs/terraces, whiteness, lack of decoration and rectangular shapes. One can also remember the opposition between the circular tent and *tholos* as the built expression of appropriating the space by migrant populations of hunters, as opposed to the Cartesian *megaron*, made out of rectangular bricks of crude or burned argyle, the home of the sedentary agricultural communities. Josef Strzygowski has long ago stated in *Der Norden in der bildenden Kunst Westeuropas* such a Semperian positivist idea that wood was originally the building material of his German/Indo-European ancestors, who were separated by East-Mediterranean and China 'by a belt of brick and of tent builders respectively' (quoted by Rykwelt, 1993:26).

Whereas it seems obvious that the French and Italian Modernism has privileged the latter way of appropriation the built forms, one can elaborate the hypothesis that — predominantly after the war — the architecture of troglodytes was, much like the projective 'cosmic architecture', a (subconscious?) reference for Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian and German architects. After all, Semper believed, archaic forms are not affected by civilisation: 'even today Europe's over-civilised sons, when they wander in the primeval forests of America, built themselves log cabins' (vol.2: 298, note 2). If Le Corbusier's primitive had rationally 'designed the site' (a concept forwarded by Vittorio Gregotti in his 1966 *Il territorio dell'architettura* and celebrated by Kenneth Frampton in Mario Botta's practice) of his walled home, the walking streets at the first floor envisaged by Brutalists (and eventually built at Barbican and in downtown Cincinnati, for

example), the Metabolist pillars, Friedman's megastructure above the existing cities, as well as Archigram's Walking City and the 1960's and 1970's houses on pilotis could be seen as an effort to switch the 'origins' of architecture towards 'troglodytes' (Colquhoun, 1986: 121). The argument might be eventually unfolded as a means of investigating the alternative approaches to built forms/environment: the walled tradition returned in Romanesque, Renaissance to be eventually found in its Modern epiphanies either in the rough concrete architecture of the late Le Corbusier and Paul Rudolph, in the Italian new-Rationalism, in Postmodernism as well as — dematerialised — in the glass/curtain walls of sky-scrapers or in the transparent architectures of Philip Johnson and Jean Nouvel. The 'structural', trilitic tradition of (Northern) Indo-Europeans and 'troglodytes' could be traced in Gothic (both vernacular and sacred), in Constructivist experiments, and in the above mentioned genealogy of megastructures leading towards Hi-Tech. It is an uprooted architecture, without *Raum*, migrant thus placeless and ephemeral.

Perhaps the most important event in Modern discourse after the war was the shift (in the fifties and sixties) from one origin to another. This shift did not happen in East-European architecture.

Coda

The scope of this text is not only to verify whether the East-European architecture after Stalin died, while lacking a definitely critical, self reflective edge, nevertheless echoed and employed major concepts of Western architectural discourse. It is, in fact, a comparative study with rather optimistic conclusions.

While obviously trailing — at least temporally — the Western discourse, it seems quite stunning that Communist architecture, regardless — or, rather, despite — the ideological pressure, the overwhelming state control, the poor craftsmanship as well as the obsessive industrialisation of building techniques, materials and finishing, was in fact able to roughly go along the same trends as its less controlled, more democratic counterpart outside the Iron Curtain.

Which brings us to the question: how really important are ideologies and power manipulations when one observes the aesthetic discourse? Obviously, they were not able to completely turn the clock backward, as Stalinist elite believed, nor were they able to completely control the practice or to stop inner processes emerging within the discourse. For most of the concepts enumerated before, one has merely reflections, distorted copies or look-alikes. It was not, given the absent critical edge, a complete assimilation. Yet, they existed.

There were several directions where East-European architecture leads, with little — if any — equivalent in the West. When Bolshevik ideology met Moder-

nism after Khrushchev's speech, it was love at first sight (or second sight for that matter, after the Avant-garde). Certain aspects of Modernity found in the East their most spectacular fulfilment: mass prefabrication of social housing, which were able to entirely reshape the existing urban structures; inventing new environments, as well as extending the megastructure concept to its malignant variant' — the so-called 'systematisation of the national territory'.

Perhaps the bottom line of this paper would have to be the following phrase: Modernity is a totalitarian concept in the end, and the only place where its basic, most important goal, that of entirely reshaping the reality according to its political/aesthetic plan, was abundantly achieved in the USSR and (some) of its satellite countries between 1954 and 1989.

Notes

1. Quoted in L. Morris and R. Dradford, *History of the International Artists' Association 1933–1953*, p. 15, and in Briony Fer, David Batchelor, Paul Wood, *Realism, Rationalism, Surrealism — Art Between The Wars*. New Haven, Yale UP, 1993.

2. K. Frampton in Hal Foster, 1983, p. 16 sqq.

3. The utopian nature of that epoch was further analyzed by this author in the research journal *Simetria-Caiete de Artă și Critică* of the Institute of Architecture [Bucharest] (Summer 1995) as well as in *The Other Modernism*. Cincinnati, 1995.

4. With a special mark for Soviet architecture, where this word entails several 'Classical' stages: Greek architecture, Renaissance, as well as Russian Baroque and Neo-Classicism.

5. In fact there was probably just the absence of major works. The competition for the Smithsonian Institution, won by Eliel Saarinen, as well as the edifices built by European modernists such as Van der Rohe and Gropius would soon prove otherwise.

6. The Austro-Hungarian pavilion at that exhibition was a replica of the Vajda-Hunyad Castle; that of Belgium was the replica of a famous city-hall, whereas the eclectic one of Russia was somewhat reminiscent of the Vassilii Blajenii Cathedral in Moscow.

7. Although Stalin died in 1953, several projects were not finished until as late as 1956, when the process of 'de-stalinization' actually began.

8. Lunatcharsky delivered several speeches on the appropriate use of historical styles in Socialist Realist arts on many occasions, of which the meetings of the Orgburo of Writers' Union between 1932 and 1934 are only the most important. At the 1934 Writers' Congress, Maxim Gorky delivered the official address, presenting an annotated version of 'good' and 'bad' sides of history. Since Gorky was then celebrated as the father figure of Stalinist literature and a close friend of Stalin, his speech can be looked at as the manifesto of would-be Socialist Realism.

9. Tchentrosoyuz Building, designed by Zholtovsky and erected in Moscow in 1934, copied the Palladian Palazzo del Capitanato in Piazza dei Signori, Vicenza, Italy.

10. Ivan Fomin proposed his 'Red Doric' as the most appropriate style for proletarian architecture.

11. The light put on continuously at the 'Stalin' office in Kremlin was another Agitprop trick: the Father of the nation was ever without sleep, he permanently took care for his people.

12. Khrushchev's discourse opens with a *laudatio*: 'The industrialization of the Soviet country was accomplished thanks to the fact that our party has continuously put into practice the teachings of Lenin and Stalin.'

13. See F.L. Wright: 'Architecture and Life in USSR' in *Architectural Record*/Oct. 1937; trans. Augustin Ioan, *Simetria*, Bucharest (Spring, 1995): 137–44.

14. 'We'll not indicate the names and we'll not accuse those who have directed the builders towards using monolith concrete. I think those comrades have realized themselves they were on the wrong track. Nowadays it is clear to everyone that we should follow *the more progressive way*, (which is) the way of using prefabricated elements and pieces' (italics mine, A.I.).

15. 'One of the fundamental contradictions of Schusev's work was that between his progressive stand — to reject eclecticism and to use the national forms — and the reactionary content of these buildings, often serving the anti-popular czarist church (...) Only after the Great Socialist Revolution in October Schusev could rise up to his own possibilities, his works gaining a proper social and ideological content, thus placing Schusev among the first and most important masters of Soviet architecture'. 'Alexei Victorovici Sciussev — The Great Master of Soviet Architecture' in *Arhitectura* 2/1953. Note the way Stalin's thesis on the dichotomy between form/expression and its content is used in dissociating between Schusev's churches before 1917 and his work after Revolution.

16. Edited in Russian in 1953, vol. 22, pag. 437, quoted in text by Khrushchev himself, only to point to the ideological irrelevance of the way Constructivism was actually defined there.

17. The story, described by Tarkhanov and Kavtaradze, runs that Schusev, who had to redesign the façades of what had initially been meant to be a Constructivist edifice, brought two half-façades united along the symmetry axis instead of two separate variants. As he was not allowed to see Stalin personally to explain the two options, the latter signed across the drawings, which thus became official. No one dared to explain the mistake to Stalin, and the hotel was built with two slightly different half-façades.

18. Tarkhanov and Kavtaradze, in their 1992 *Stalinist Architecture*, wrote about Khrushchev's obsession to compete in making 'his' pavilion the most flamboyant of the agricultural exhibition. While he was the party leader in Ukraine, he ordered that its pavilion should be the most decorated. Becoming eventually the party leader in Moscow, he ordered this next pavilion to be redesigned, to surpass the Ukrainian one.

19. And badly damaged during Eltsin's 1992 attack against the Russian parliament.

20. For details, one can read G. Pătrașcu: 'Notes regarding the competition for the planning of the Square of the Central Army House in Bucharest' in *Arhitectura* 4/1955, pp. 9–22. In fact, nobody won the first prize, which was diluted into smaller prizes. It is perhaps the last wide competition for major edifices of the Stalinist period in Romania.

21. In 'A Home is not a House' 1965, (reprinted in *Design by Choice*, 1981), with drawings by François Dallegret.

22. These buildings are described as 'Rough concrete piers, heavy crates of brise-soleil and rugged overhangs' (Curtis: 1982: 349).

23. Reyner Banham in *Megastructure: Urban Futures of the Recent Past*, quoted by Colquhoun (1986:120).

24. Fumihiko Maki on megastructure (1964), quoted by Colquhoun (ibidem).

25. 'Some architects around 1950 (...) identified endlessness as a particular aesthetic virtue of frame construction' (Banham, 1966:91). Thus the structure was no longer 'neutral'. In fact, as Banham pointed out previously, for most of the works of Modernism, technology has to

be understood 'as symbolic rather than actual technology' (ibidem). Modernist as Heine and Max Bcher could believe though that structure is neutral as long as it is 'sincere' and presents itself 'to be contemplated in its entirety' (1971; 285), without noting that, by saying exactly this, they had in fact recited a stylistic, hard-core Modern slogan. Curt Siegel went even further to say that 'another important characteristic of structural form is its independence of all 'trends' and 'new directions' in architecture' (1961:303).

26. Quarnby gives (1984:63) a throughout classification of spatial enclosures made out of plastic: shell assemblies (pure or frames filled with shells); on site enclosures; folding structures; suspension structures; and pneumatics (with low and high pressure), such as the French Pavilion at Expo 1970, made by Birdair Structures Inc, or the Fuji Pavilion at the same exhibition.

27. Quarnby gives a history of plastics, of which one can note: 1950 — mass scale Teflon; 1952 — MacDonald produces commercial polyformaldehyde; 1953 — Ziegler produced polyethylene; 1954 — Matta produced polypropylene (idem: 15).

28. Cook quotes the 1962 Pascal Hausemann house, the 1964 housing project by W. Dring, and the 1965 W. Chalk, R. Heron and Gaskit homes.

29. For more details one can address my book *The Other Modernism — Utopian Spaces, Decor and Virtual Discourse in the 1930s Architecture*, IAIM, Bucharest, 1995.

30. He used for Lenin's tomb black, red, and grey stone: mourning, communism, and workers.

31. 'The trilitic system, eventually carried by German tribes towards South, did not flourish there with the same strength, because it met the resistance of a non-Arian structure', the arch of a matriarchal society.

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The Gastronomic Discourse

History, Mentalities and Signs

Foreword

Meals and cooking are a constituent of tradition; they characterise a people, a community, a trend of thought. They are intricately connected to the 'image' a community wishes to give of itself, and one of the possible emblems of that community. The mythical, ritual, and symbolical value of cooking and food throughout various periods and areas hardly needs to be argued.

The basic assumption of the present investigation is that gastronomy's 'spectacular' character, its capacity to appeal, simultaneously, to taste, smell, and sight account for it being (perceived as) a phenomenon of mass culture, one which has left an indelible mark on mentalities. Therefore, the investigation focuses less on gastronomy as such (which is a fairly elusive sign), and much more on *the gastronomical discourse*,¹ as rendered manifest in books about 'the art and science of choosing, preparing and eating good food' (A.S. Hornby). The gastronomical discourse is seen as *a semiotic system capable of framing mentalities and ideologies*.

Texts taken into consideration range from travel memoirs and the memoirs of famous cooks, manuscripts of recipes, cookery books and cuisine encyclopaedias, to historical documents such as chronicles, wills, dowry acts, household inventories; menus, bills of fares, catalogues of exhibitions and collections have also been consulted.

The premises of this essay are the following:

Gastronomical discourse has a heterogeneous, encyclopaedic character. It comprises recipes and practical information ('how to buy, store, preserve, cook and serve'), along with data pertaining to political economy, marketing and law, and facts about geography, climate, history. Collateral information (e.g. 'certain shells secrete mother-of-pearl, which is used to make buttons'; 'the potato has been brought from the West Indies' a.s.o. cf. *infra*), fables, anecdotes and myths are equally present. Meant for instruction and amusement, the gastronomical discourse is often a token of its Enunciator's cultural loading, a narcissistic piece (*Exegi monumentum aere perrenius*), an example of 'art for art's sake'. It inscribes

celebration and ceremony; it mirrors a particular manner of experiencing daily events, and is a means of civilising people.

Here are some of the points to be demonstrated:

1) The gastronomical discourse is an *epistemic discourse*, i.e. a means by which the epistemic subject is inscribed *in* (a given) culture and expresses his position *towards* (that) culture. It consists of warnings, pieces of advice, a codified etiquette; cultural symbioses and cultural 'métissage' take place on this ground. A comparison between France, England, and the Romanian cultural space is made on these bases from a philosophical perspective.

2) The gastronomical discourse is a *performative discourse*; it mediates between the 'actual' and the 'possible', between the previous performance of the Enunciator and the probable, future one of the Enunciatee. In 1841, M. Kogălniceanu and C. Negruzzi wrote about 'tested' recipes ('*retete cercate de bucate*'). This particular type of discourse needs (to mimic) the warranty of authenticity. The philosophical problems of 'truth' and 'falsehood' are no less relevant in so far as the gastronomical discourse is concerned.

3) The gastronomical discourse has a *special kind of referent*:

(a) it deals with cooking, viz. with an ephemeral, perishable 'object', intended for consumption, as well as for delight; and

(b) it is a self-referential, autonymic discourse; from this perspective, it has a 'perennial', second-grade referent, namely its own language. Gastronomical discourse is a means of preserving individual as well as collective identity; it is a generator of 'styles' (e.g. styles of language, styles of cooking, table manners, etc.).

4) More often than not, the gastronomical discourse *aims to legitimate its own status* (cf. *infra* Brillat-Savarin's *Physiologie du goût*). Owing to its encyclopaedic nature, to its prescriptive and persuasive goals, gastronomical discourse presents the cuisine — and its 'internal environment' — as a kind of epic: it is interspersed with legends, stories, and personal recollections, often blown into a 'hyperbolic' dimension. This way, the cuisine and its environment become equally *credible* and *fictional*, while the gastronomical discourse is close both to popularised science and to paraliterature. In certain cases the latter category merges into literature,² as, for instance, in the *Grand Dictionnaire de cuisine*³ by Al. Dumas.

5) Although iconography is sometimes as important as the linguistic text in the process of fictionalisation (cf. R. Barthes, *Mythologies*), the gastronomical discourse always *subordinates the iconic sign to the indexical one*, the latter offering more possibilities to kindle imagination.

6) Just like every other type of discourse, the gastronomical one *outlines a specific Enunciator and a specific Enunciatee*. Depending on the individual characteristics of the two, the gastronomical discourse entails a predisposition

for day-dreaming and wishful thinking, if not a feeling of frustration. It induces the awareness of (one's own) limitations; it points out at a possible identification, or at a 'difference'; it deals with identity and alterity, with the constitution of the self and the image of the other(s). A scale of generic and epistemic values can be thus established. Especially in post-modernity, and provided the Enunciatee and the Enunciator belong to different (mental) periods and/or areas, the gastronomical discourse, just like the fictional, is often read for pleasure; one enjoys its stylistic characteristics, its 'exotic' features, its ludical nature ('You whip the ingredients and you enjoy their smell'), the atmosphere it evokes.

7) The gastronomical discourse offers the 'ideal' image of a (dreamt-of) time, space, and social status. It is a means of nostalgically reliving the past ('Those were the days when...'); of appropriating an exotic space; of rejecting another (mental) period and/or area ('In the Middle Ages people used to eat with their fingers'). The attitude towards cooking, as is expressed in the gastronomical discourse, *reflects the evolution of mentalities*. Since the gastronomical discourse is, usually, anchored in a specific culture and primarily addresses people pertaining to that culture, it is devoided of (often strong) *nationalistic* accents ('Plats régionaux de France et d'ailleurs'), especially up to the Second World War.⁴ The analysis of the gastronomical discourse can equally reveal the *frivolity, elitism, conviviality* etc. of one community or another.

8) In most cases, the gastronomical discourse is also a *philosophical meditation*. Brillat-Savarin associates the appetite for fermented drinks with the anxiety towards the future. Epicurism, detachment, asceticism, are but some of the philosophical trends voiced by the gastronomical discourse. The latter also reveals unexpected facets of the relationship between 'science,' tradition, and empiricism.

9) Gastronomical discourse is a *means of inter-cultural and trans-cultural communication*. Therefore, the essay deals with cultural variation and cultural universalia, and with the relationship between culture and mass culture, such as derives from the analysis of this particular type of discourse.

10) The research is based on concepts such as *high-power culture* (characteristic of hierarchical societies), and *low-power culture* (typical of 'egalitarian' communities), borrowed from present-day conversational analysis.⁵ Though the rules of 'what to serve, to whom, and under what circumstances' are less codified nowadays than they used to be, they still involve what contemporary pragmatics calls 'face threatening acts'.⁶ The above mentioned phenomena by the Investigation of the gastronomical discourse may shed new light on these issues while revealing some intricate facets when considered from this perspective.

The basic methods of investigation are borrowed from history and historiography, from contemporary pragmatics and language philosophy. Though a more 'discreet' presence, genre analysis and semiotics won't be neglected.

Research is relevant for the study of daily life, both 'private' and 'collective'.⁷ As is the case with every study of mentalities, its object lies, broadly speaking, mid-way between history and literature. Like all *studies of pragmatics*, it is equally placed between linguistics and philosophy.

The essay aims to open up new perspectives towards history, anthropology, philosophy, sociology, art history, and literary history.

Thus, specialists in the various fields just mentioned might derive some benefit from the present investigation.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A. A Theoretical Approach

French gastronomy, gastronomical writings, and table manners are an essential topic not only because of their doubtless intrinsic value, but also because one cannot tackle *any* European cuisine (as a phenomenon) without referring to the French one. French influence is always there, always relevant, even though it has been exercised in different ways — directly or indirectly, to greater or lesser extent — in different areas. French influence over the European cuisine has also greatly varied with time. *Written testimonies* (in either direct or indirect sources) are fundamental to this effect.

Let it be said from the very beginning that, as a rule, when it comes to tackling French cuisine, we tend to forget a basic fact: French cuisine acquired its status of pre-eminence only in the latter half of the eighteenth century, only during the beginning of the nineteenth century did its reputation become a highly deserved one.

Before the middle of the eighteenth century, it was as 'bad' and indigestible as the Turkish cuisine, for instance.

A chronological approach is unavoidable and will, therefore, be applied in all the three cases taken into consideration here.

At this stage of the investigation, conclusions are more or less implicit and fairly obvious.

References to *food* proper will be avoided as much as possible. As already stated, the study focuses on *texts*. However, every now and then, reference to relevant information about food, table manners, and table settings is unavoidable.

For objective reasons, the survey rarely goes beyond the *titles, names of authors, and years of 'publication'* of the works taken into discussion. Such details have been considered to be significant enough for the study of mentalities in

general, and for that of the cuisine as a cultural-semiotic system able to shed light upon civilisation in particular.

B. Some Remarks about Food in Mediaeval Western Europe

During the Middle Ages, Western cuisine was essentially *international*. The causes of this phenomenon are fairly obvious. Roughly speaking, Western civilisation had a unitary character. It was centred around royal and aristocratic courts. Marriages and wars facilitated frequent contacts among groups of people living comparatively far away from each other. Religious orders were dispersed across the entire Catholic world. Crusades and the troubadours added a final, decisive touch to this cultural 'unification', which reflected upon food and table manners.

The interest of mediaeval cooks lay more with the overall effect of a meal, than in specific dishes. They were equally concerned with 'disguising' the natural qualities and taste of food as much as possible. A dozen highly spiced ingredients were hashed and mixed together in such a way that it could hardly be guessed what one was eating. Moreover, the early recipes which have come down to us are extremely vague as regards measures and weights. This means that, on the one hand, it is next to impossible for a modern cook to reconstruct a mediaeval dish, and, on the other hand, that even in those days a cook could easily spoil a dish in a moment of oblivion. J. L. Flandrin⁸ pointed out another general characteristic of mediaeval cuisine, fairly important for the present discussion. Flandrin notes that the mediaeval belief, according to which people's humours were influenced by what they were given to eat, contributed to a general feeling of tolerance. This apparently minor remark proves that there is a direct relationship between mentalities and the attitude towards food.

Only from the middle of the seventeenth century, that is after the Renaissance — i.e. the second large-scale phenomenon which contributed to the cultural unification of Western Europe — do written records become sufficiently abundant and clear, to enable us to trace (with certain claims to accuracy) the development of 'classical', 'typical' French — or English — cuisine, both for the aristocratic milieu, and even for the peasantry.

Along this line, Froissart (1333–1400) complains of a feast at which a great number of dishes were served, so strange and so disguised that one could hardly guess what one was eating. The practice of mixing all sorts of inharmonious elements in a single dish went on a par with the fashion of piling up various kinds of meats and vegetables on a single platter. This practice was typical of the French aristocracy. As early as 1333, and probably even earlier, the Dauphin

had a dish of twelve chickens, or six cut in half, served on Tuesdays. This custom was particular to all the princes and great lords.⁹

The Northumberland Household Book, an English document dating from the beginning of the sixteenth century, gives a list of the birds which were eaten at that time. Geese, plovers, teals, woodcocks, seagulls, snipes, quails, larks and cormorants were among the most frequently served. Swans, cranes and herons¹⁰ were also eaten on a large scale until the middle of the seventeenth century. Their first mention — as game — in the *Lex Salica* dates back to the eighth century. Fish, lampreys and porpoise were very common, too.

As is well known, for obvious reasons, meat was always highly salted. Ever since the Crusades, spices of all kinds had become extremely popular. Almonds were also used on a large scale in mediaeval cookery. This seems fairly strange, since one can hardly expect almonds to have been cheap. Apparently, prices have not always been a crucial factor in food consumption.

Another characteristic dish served at mediaeval aristocratic tables was the so-called *banqueting stufte*.¹¹ It consisted of a combination of sweets and spices, eaten after dinner, usually even after grace was said. In order to have their *banqueting stufte*, guests moved, as a rule, to a different room, or even to a different — smaller — building, especially designed for this purpose. *Banqueting stufte* were supposed to help digestion; nowadays they are considered the forerunners of chocolate mints.¹²

The first reference — known so far — to *banqueting stufte*, a dish and a custom which had spread throughout Western Europe, is in the *Menagier de Paris*, written in 1392 (cf. *infra*).

The history of the West European gastronomic discourse begins with this book.

CHAPTER TWO

A HISTORICAL SURVEY FROM THE CRUSADES TO WORLD WAR II

A. France

A manuscript called *Traité de cuisine*, written about 1306, and preserved at the Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes, contains the first gastronomic references in France known so far.¹³ The manuscript was edited in 1860. Apparently, the text enjoyed only a moderate reputation.

Historians of civilisation unanimously consider that the foundations of French gastronomy were laid in the latter half of the fourteenth century, as the

gastronomic discourse was first put into text by a collection of recipes called *Le Viandier*, authored by Guillaume Tirel, called Taillevent. Taillevent was born about 1310. It is said that he was 'la première vedette chrétienne de la gastronomie.'¹⁴ He was also known as an alchemist. It seems that, with Taillevent, cuisine begins to be included among the noble arts. Anyway, the fame enjoyed by the *Viandier* is testified to by the fact that its first printed version dates back to as early as 1490, shortly after the invention of the press.

Le Menagier de Paris, dating from 1392, enjoyed equal fame throughout the late Middle Ages. The text quotes a certain Maître Helye, who seems to be the reference of the moment.

Both *Le Viandier* and *Le Menagier* were meant for aristocratic banquets. The first references to table luxury can equally be traced back to these books. In effect, throughout the

Middle Ages, table luxury was to develop gradually into a (minor) art, and to reach its climax, much like every other art, during the reign of François I. During the Renaissance, just as in all other domains, the Italian influence prevailed as regards the cuisine, table manners, and tableware. To mention only the best known examples, Benvenuto Cellini designed and executed ornamental pieces of gold and silver for the table of François I, whose daughter-in-law, Catherine de Médicis, introduced the use of forks.¹⁵ Her suite included several cooks, who introduced Italian recipes to France. The first ice-creams, equally of Italian origin, were served at French aristocratic tables following Catherine's marriage to Henry II. In effect, as far as the assimilation of Italian cuisine in France is concerned, the way had been paved, a couple of years before the arrival of the first Medici queen in France, by the publication of *Le Batiment des recettes, nouvellement traduit de l'italien en langue française*, in Lyon, in 1541.

The famous alchemist and stargazer Michel de Nostradamus was also the author of an *Excellent et moult utile opusculum à tous nécessaire, qui desirant avoir connaissance de plusieurs exquisas recettes, divisé en deux parties*, published in Lyon, in 1555. To this very day, it is considered a remarkable treatise. The second part of it, called *Traité de confitures*, contains recipes of fruit preserves known to have been tested, among others, by Louis XIII. Nostradamus' contribution to the art of cooking is considered relevant because he knew how to adjust to the French taste — and to the French fruits — various recipes originating in the Middle East, and brought to Italy by the Arabs from Spain.

In France, the attitude towards food changed with the Renaissance, by which time people began to wonder whether the food they were eating was good for their health. In England (cf. *infra*), similar concerns had been voiced even earlier. One should emphasise, however, the fact that interest in one's health had always been a fairly permanent theme in French gastronomic writings, ever since the sixteenth century; it replaced earlier concerns about the sin of gluttony, or rather rephrased them in a manner more adequate to a post-Renaissance mentality.

It is worth mentioning that, with the help of the Florentine cooks who had followed the two Medici queens, the tradition was established of a *distinct* and *distinguished* French cuisine, all the more so as, in the castles, the standards of living were fairly high, and the premises for refinement had already been created. The development of ‘technology’ — even though, for obvious reasons, still a small-scale phenomenon — was yet another important factor to this effect.¹⁶

During the Renaissance the number of inns in France increased. They have become almost an institution, and, supposedly, mediated ‘*la mise en culture d’une cuisine populaire*.’¹⁷

As regards the mutations in the cuisine, and in the gastronomical discourse, seen as an infallible sign (among many others) of a specific (changing) mentality, Classicism is as important an age as the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. In effect, it is highly time to specify that the development of the cuisine follows — granting very few exceptions — the ‘classical’ periods in the history of civilisation.

The title of the *Almanach parisien en faveur des étrangers: Contenant, par ordre alphabétique, l’indication de tout ce qui est nécessaire à savoir pour un étranger. Ce qui comprend le logement, la nourriture, l’habillement, les voitures* is significant in this respect. Houses, food, clothes, and coaches are considered relevant for the image of the Other; they rank among the emblems of a community; ‘aliens’ willing to be accepted by a community should first appropriate them. The almanac came out in the late sixteenth century. Awareness of the *difference* between the self and the Other, and the inclusion of cooking among the tokens of identification mark the passage between two eras; they occur, for the first time, at the end of the Renaissance and the beginning of the Classical age.

One and a half century later, the image of the Other, as reflected in French cookery books, had become much more specific. The *Apologie des modernes ou réponse du cuisinier français autour des dons de Comus au pâtissier anglais*, published in Paris in 1740, explicitly ‘opposes’ the French and the English, on the one hand, and *cuisine* as a whole, to *pâtisserie* as a part, on the other hand.

In the seventeenth century, the French cooking technique began to be organised by combining work and ingredients *in a modular way*, with a view to providing efficiently executed and infinitely variable meals and dishes. This mental attitude was on a par with various other aspects of seventeenth and eighteenth century thought, which paved the way to the Enlightenment.

During the autocratic reign of Louis XIV, both the cuisine and table manners and table ceremony, as well as other related aspects bear witness to a relevant change of mentalities.

The year 1650 saw the appearance of *Le cuisinier français enseignant la manière de bien appreter et assaisonner toutes sortes de viandes grasses et maigres, légumes, pâtisseries et autres mets, qui se servent tant sur les tables*

des grands que des particuliers, written by Pierre François (dit) de La Varenne. The book was a big success at the time. Its second edition appeared in 1651, i.e. a year afterwards; several other editions came out in the next twenty years. *Le cuisinier français* was the first French cookery book to arise endless disputes, arguments, and quarrels. The book marked a turning point in French cuisine, which was to be quite different afterwards. As regards mentalities, La Varenne’s treatise is important, because it is the first book of this type to place side by side, in its very title, *les grands et les particuliers*, viz. the noblemen and the bourgeois. The rising of Colbert from the status of a petty clerk to the office of Minister of Finance was not such a surprising phenomenon. It was backed by similar events occurring in various other fields. Last but not least, this relevant change in mentalities which made room for the social acceptance of the bourgeoisie was registered on the cover of a cookery book.

Pastry also developed during the reign of Louis XIV. *Le pâtissier français. Où est enseignée la manière de faire toute sorte de pâtisserie, très utile à toute sorte de personnes*, which had a first edition in 1653, and a second one in 1654, is one of the first books in the field.

It is also significant that in 1654 appeared Nicolas de Bonnefons’ *Les délices de la campagne. Suite du jardinier français, où est enseigné à préparer pour l’usage de la vie tout ce qui croit sur la terre, et dans les eaux. Dedié aux dames ménagères*. A second impression came out in 1655; others followed in 1679 and 1682. *Les délices de la campagne* was published more than a century before the works of Voltaire and Rousseau. At least as far as cookery is concerned, there is reason to believe that their influence appeared on a fertile ground. The fact that the book is dedicated to housewives and no longer destined for the almost exclusive use of the *chefs* employed in noble or rich households is equally significant, especially as compared to what happened in England (cf. *infra*), where the middle class was much more present as an explicit reader of cookery books.

A somewhat similar phenomenon is illustrated by Massialot’s *Cuisinier royal et bourgeois*, which came out in Paris in 1691. The book contains simple, gratifying recipes. The royal table and the bourgeois, although dealt with in different sections of the book, are less separated than before, since they were allowed to coexist, beginning with the very title. Moreover, whenever the book refers to bourgeois cuisine, it is explicitly addressed to women. Therefore, the *Cuisinier* reflected some of the changes which took place in society, while also marking the mutation in taste. These developments equally mirror in the six editions the book had within twenty-five years.

Coffee, tea, and chocolate were introduced in France by the middle of the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, the first book of recipes and sundry information dedicated to these ingredients, i.e. Philippe Sylvestre Dufont’s *Traité*s

nouveaux et curieux du café, du thé, et du chocolat, only came out half a century later, viz. in 1685. Strangely enough, gastronomy books do not always keep pace with gastronomical fashions.

In the chapter on gastronomy in *Histoire de la vie privée*, Jean-Louis Flandrin¹⁸ refers to *the progress of individualism* in the seventeenth century, shown in the wide-scale introduction of personal plates, glasses, forks, knives, and spoons. According to him, this phenomenon was generated not only by the concern for cleanliness, but also — and basically — by the fear to get in touch with the other.

Flandrin also points out that even in the seventeenth century, to say nothing of the previous epochs, the handbooks of civility and good manners were full of precepts concerning the dishes and joints of meat which ought to be served to the lord of the house and to his guests of honour, and in what order the other guests should be served. He emphasises that, strangely enough, this hierarchical group structure made room for the admission of lower-class members more easily than the apparently egalitarian group structure which, slowly, replaced it.

Since during the reign of Louis XIV everything connected with the king must be (or at least, seem) aristocratic, table ceremony also interfered with heraldry. The petty noblemen serving at the king's table acquired the right to add certain cuisine utensils to their coats-of-arms. It goes without saying that, no matter how self-important the king's 'officiers de bouche' may have become as a consequence, members of the genuine aristocracy¹⁹ could but look down on their 'colleagues' from the kitchens and the caves. In actual fact, as far as the social status of the 'officiers de bouche' is concerned, they stood in between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie.

However, as far as cookery books are concerned, the bourgeoisie began to be taken into consideration only in 1756, with the publication of Menon's *Cuisinière bourgeoise*. The rising of the bourgeoisie equally signified a comparative emancipation of women (it is the second time that women are explicitly referred to in a cookery-book destined for the bourgeoisie). Strangely enough, at least if the phenomenon is taken into account from an up-to-date perspective, women's emancipation seems to have been helped a great deal by the production of cookery books specially addressed to them. Cooking, considered ever since the end of the nineteenth century as one of the worst servitudes, had been a basic factor of middle-class women's emancipation throughout the eighteenth century in France. The main condition to this effect was that the cuisine should be put into text. In ninety percent of the cases, it was put into text by men.

As will be shown further, a similar phenomenon took place in England, but its roots can be traced much earlier. As a consequence, the examination of English cookery books shows that both the group structure of society, and the 'tableau' of the dominant mentalities were rather different (cf. *infra*).

Anyway, as already indicated in the introduction to this chapter, it was only by the eighteenth century that France began to enjoy the reputation of having

the finest cooks and the best food in Europe. At the turn of the century, French cuisine began to spread all over Europe. The best known example is that of the famous Antonin Careme (d. 1833), who was chief cook to George IV, and then to czar Alexander I.

Nevertheless, this phenomenon had been prepared much earlier. Vincent de La Chapelle's *Le cuisinier moderne qui apprend à donner à manger toutes sortes de repas, en gras et en maigre, d'une manière plus délicate que ce qui a été écrit jusqu'à présent*, published in The Hague in 1735, was immediately translated into English.²⁰ *The Modern Cook* appeared in London in 1735. Seven years later, the book was reprinted in French.

The first dictionary of cuisine came out in Paris in 1767. It was called *Le Dictionnaire portatif de cuisine, d'office et de distillation, contenant la manière de préparer toutes sortes de viandes, de volailles, de gibier, de poisson, de légumes, de fruits, etc.* Apart from the fact it was well received by the society of the time, the publication of the dictionary can be considered an event, because it is a text which demonstrates: (1) that the cuisine has already defined its own referent, and (2) that it aims, even though implicitly, at the status of an autonomous field, of an 'industry', with branches and sub-branches.

Under the circumstances, there is no wonder that Diderot and d'Alembert's *Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts, et des métiers par une société des gens de lettres* (1751–1777) grants cuisine a special chapter. From now on, cuisine's *droit de cité* is unchallenged.

Significantly enough, 1782 saw the appearance of the first *history of private life*, viz. Pierre-Jean-Baptiste Le Grand d'Aussy's *Histoire de la vie privée des français depuis l'origine de la nation jusqu'à nos jours*, in which the development of the cuisine holds pride of place. Revised in 1815, the book stands proof that the evolution of gastronomy and of the gastronomical discourse underwent developments similar to those of any other art or science; after having defined its scope, referent, Enunciator and Enunciatee, it is integrated in its appropriate context, namely the history of private life. The following history of private life came out shortly before the next turn-of-the-century. In 1888 Alfred Franklin's *La vie privée d'autrefois. La cuisine* (reprinted 1980) appeared in Paris, while a third one, the already quoted *Histoire de la vie privée*, edited by Philippe Aries and Georges Duby, has come out this turn-of-the-century (and of the millennium). Now, it is not without relevance that all these three treatises are the work of French authors. The first two focus, almost exclusively, on France. The latter does open perspectives on other West European areas, such as the Italian and the English, and occasionally on the German, the Flemish and the Spanish ones; though more discreet, the French-centred perspective is, nonetheless, still obvious. Once again, the development of the gastronomical discourse proves to be an adequate mirror of mentalities.

Returning once more to eighteenth century France, it is worth mentioning that the institution of the boarding-house (Fr. *les tables d'hôte*) was then 'imported' from England. The first *table d'hôte* was established by Boulanger, in 1765, in Paris.

Restaurants appeared about the same time. The first high-class restaurant was inaugurated by Beauvilliers, in 1782, in Paris. It was called 'La grande taverne de Londres', and it held the highest renown for over twenty years.

The French Revolution was a crucial moment for gastronomy, as for everything else. The aristocratic traditions, banned during the years of Terror, and during the Civil War, are quickly adopted by the nobility of the Empire. At the same time, the bourgeoisie becomes more open-minded and convivial. It seems, actually, that the *nouveaux riches* of the Empire had a contribution to the instauration of the 'service à la russe' (the custom of bringing the dishes to the table one after another, of serving all the guests simultaneously, and of offering the same food to everybody). Since everybody was served same dishes at the same time, the Russian service was more 'democratic'. The introduction of the 'service à la russe' was followed, by way of consequence one might say, by the re-structuring of the menu. From that moment on, the menu consisted of four basic courses, i.e. *hors d'oeuvres*, *entremets*, *rôti* (which was the main dish) and *desserts*. It is also relevant that, after the Revolution, a new term appeared, namely *grand cuisinier*. Its existence and wide-scale use are indicative of a change of social status: from that moment on, cooks were no longer considered servants.

Immediately after the Revolution, the spirit of the Enlightenment permeated all the fields of culture and civilisation, including gastronomy and the gastronomical discourse.

In 1802, Grimod de la Reynière published his *Almanach des gourmands*, which lay the foundations of *gastronomical criticism*. Grimod de la Reynière was the first to give dishes a name. The custom has been preserved to this day. De la Reynière was also the one who, in 1803, established the first *jury des dégustateurs de vins*.²¹

With Grimod de la Reynière's *Almanach* and especially with Brillat-Savarin's *Physiologie du goût* (1824, cf. *infra*), *gastronomical literature* became a genre, and a new *gastronomical ideology* was put forth. Soon enough, this ideology was to become systematic.

Brillat-Savarin's *Physiologie du goût* came out in Paris in 1824. As Dan Grigorescu pointed out, ever since, it has been considered 'a point of reference for an important moment in the history of a century which was to bring about deep changes in people's attitudes towards the existential facts of the individual and of society.'²² The same author rightfully emphasised that the book was 'an eloquent synthesis between the traditions of the literary *salons* and the scientific tendencies which were to lead to the final victory of positivism in 1842.'²³

Brillat-Savarin's text is, among other things, a handbook of perfect hospitality, and a pretext for meditation. Gastronomy is considered an autonomous art, while meals are an occasion for learned yet relaxed conversation among guests. The author speaks about senses in general, and about taste in particular; about appetite; about the properties of foodstuffs in general; about thirst, drinks, and drinking; about the pleasure of dining together; about *gourmands* and *gourmandise*; about the relationship between eating, sleeping, and dreaming; about fasting and exhaustion; about restaurants and restaurant-keepers. The final chapter of this essay dwells a little longer on Brillat-Savarin's 'philosophical' remarks and on their relevance for the relationship between gastronomical discourse and the evolution of mentalities.

Over half of Jean-Paul Aron's *Le mangeur du XIX^e siècle* is dedicated to the evolution of restaurants, and their possible typologies (according to prices, menus, customers, etc.) throughout the nineteenth century. In spite of their earlier establishment, restaurants are, basically, an achievement of the 1800s. Restaurants multiply, diversify, and develop in Paris, especially after the Bourbon Restoration; their menus and service are a token of the dominant mentality of their customers. Aron's book demonstrates this,²⁴ while implying that, as far as mentalities are concerned, in France, restaurants contributed to class segregation; they discharge a function similar to that played by cookery books in England (cf. *infra*). Restaurants are considered a fundamental institution in nineteenth century France; they are subject to improvement and decay, help civilising the lower classes, and indicate the acceptance in, and/or exclusion from, the aristocracy, the upper middle class, the dandies, or the artistic circles. Restaurants are also differentiated according to the kind of weddings celebrated there.²⁵ A close interdependence is thus established between social life, private life, and restaurants; between civilisation and mentalities. Aron's remark is also significant in this respect: 'Remarquez les courbes quasi-symétriques de l'histoire gourmande: l'âge d'or qui culmine entre 1812 et 1825 et lentement se dégrade jusqu'à la grisaille petite-bourgeoise de la monarchie constitutionnelle et l'établissement, en sens inverse, qui s'encanaille, se débride de 1855 aux jouissances de l'Empire déclinant.'²⁶ Anyway, it is by no means irrelevant that restaurants develop and are more and more fashionable as a consequence of the decay of the aristocracy. The chefs of fashionable restaurants are those previously employed by aristocratic courts, a fact which contributes to the restaurants' prestige.²⁷ About the 1850s, dining out began to be increasingly fashionable, a fact which paved the way for Escoffier's reforms (cf. *infra*).

According to J.-P. Aron,²⁸ restaurants can also be classified according to their caves. The rising bourgeoisie, eager to attain higher social status, duly considered the improvement of their cuisine, but neglected wines. This is not only a characteristic of restaurants (most of which were frequented by the lower-middle

improving the menus and inventing new dishes, and particularly in 'tout ce qui est relatif à la table,'³³ viz. silverware, glass, crystal, china, lighting, flowers, tablecloths, and napkins. He was also the first to introduce music in high-class restaurants.

Auguste Escoffier published a lot. Apart from the *Revue de l'art culinaire*, issued in 1878, he wrote *Les fleurs de cire*, first published in Paris in 1885 (a second edition of which was printed in 1910). He is also the author of a *Guide Culinaire*, which came out in 1902; until 1985, the guide was reprinted five times in France by Flammarion. In 1912, he published *Le livre des Menus*, also with Flammarion. Between 1911 and 1914, Escoffier published in London the gastronomic journal *Les carnets d'Epicure*.³⁴ More important still, towards the end of his life, Escoffier published his memoirs, entitled *Souvenirs inédits. 75 ans au service de l'art culinaire*. The book's latest edition appeared in Marseilles, in 1985.

In 1926, Escoffier was awarded the Daneborg Cross by the Danish sovereigns. In 1928, he also became an officer of the *Légion d'honneur*.

All these facts and all these distinctions show that, during the first half of the twentieth century, French cuisine (and French civilisation, of which cuisine is a part) attempted to reach the status of high-power culture; both the French and the representatives of other nations rank it as such.

The final chapter of the present work will give a few more details as regards the interdependence between the gastronomic discourse and a dominant mentality, with special reference to Escoffier's *Souvenirs*.

B. England

The first collection of old English recipes (preserved at the British Museum) dates back to 1381. It was, however, *The Forme of Cury*, a roll of ancient English cookery, compiled about 1390, and considered of obvious French origin, that had the strongest impact on English cuisine during the late Middle Ages. In a study written about a decade ago, C. Anne Wilson³⁵ appropriately remarked that English mediaeval cookery books indicated 'ideal menus', which were put into practice, if at all, only as far as their general characteristics were concerned. Wilson points out that 'the earliest ideal menus which have come to light so far are those appended to two copies of the *Forme of Cury*, made probably in the late 14th century. The group comprises seven separate menus, five for fleshdays and two for fishdays. Three of the fleshdays menus are specified as 'for around Michaelmas', 'at Eastertime', and 'at Pentecost.'³⁶ Each menu is laid out in three courses, which suggests they were intended for important feasts. Everyday meals and even some minor feasts only comprised two courses.

According to present-day knowledge, the first cookery book was printed in England in 1500. It is identified, according to information in its colophon, as '*This is the Book of Cookery*'.

Half a century later, in 1558, the first *translation* of a cookery book came out in England. It is called *The Secrets of the Reverend Master Alexis of Piemont*, and has the long subtitle 'Containing excellent remedies against diverse diseases, wounds and other accidents, with the manner to make distillations, perfumes, confitures etc. A work well approved very profitable and necessary for every man. Translated out of French into English.'

A glimpse at the title reveals several reasons for which it is possible to consider the gastronomic discourse as a partial mirror of mentalities:

(1) translations of cookery books from French into English can be traced back at least to the mid-sixteenth century (actually, to the second half of the fourteenth century, if the manuscript of *The Forme of Cury* is to be taken into account).

(2) Italian influences (Piemont is a duchy in north-western Italy) reached England via France (though, of course, one cannot disregard other possible channels).

(3) Cooking is one of the possible household skills: to make distillations, perfumes, or confitures are equivalent actions; they come second to curing diseases, wounds, and other accidents. Though it varies within certain limits, this third characteristic is constantly present in English cookery books, from the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century.

(4) Women are either excluded from among the explicit recipients of this text or, what is even more plausible, they are included in the generic category of 'man[kind]'.

Certain alterations of this context can be noticed upon examination of a book published fifteen years later, in 1573, namely 'The Treasury of Commodious Conceits, and Hidden Secrets, Commonly Called The Good Housewife's Closet of provision for the health of her husband. Necessary for the profitable use of all estates, gathered on of sundry experiments lately practised by men of great knowledge.' Along with recipes for all kinds of sweets, the book includes recipes to ease digestion, 'to make the face fair and the breath sweet,' 'to make hair as good as gold'. Household medicine, cosmetics, and preserves are the outcome of what was then state-of-the-art chemistry ('experiments practised by men of great knowledge') and range among 'the hidden secrets' to be found in 'a good housewife's closet'. The health of the good housewife's husband could hardly be considered as the main concern of the book. A contemporary reader would be tempted to interpret this specification as more of a trap designed to lure husbands into buying the book. Along the same line, the text is considered as 'necessary for the profitable use of all estates'. The above-mentioned characteristics

seem to indicate the contribution of cookery books (i.e. of books including cooking recipes among their multifarious topics) to the development of a 'democratic' mentality. The presence of the word 'conceit' in the title is equally relevant. *Conceit* (It.: 'conceitto') is a baroque concept which was to make a poetical career during the following century. In England, as much as in France, gastronomy was regarded at the end of the Renaissance, as a discipline between science and art.

A Direction for the health of magistrates and students was published in 1574. It is interesting to note that while mediaeval manuscripts had been intended for the banquets of the nobility, the books previously mentioned were devised 'for the profitable use of all estates' and aimed to contribute 'to the health of every man.' Historical truth is hard to aim at and, even harder to reach; it involves taking into account a large body of sociological data, much of which is either missing, or extremely difficult to get at. Nevertheless, even if, in practice, things might have differed, it is fairly relevant that the Enunciators of those books felt the need to say so.

The above-mentioned book was designed 'for the health of magistrates and students'. This explicit preoccupation with people's health might have been a reaction against the unhealthy — or at least tasteless — meals of the Middle Ages. Awareness as to *sex difference* and *class difference*, as well as the attempt to bridge the gap, ought to be emphasised, too, all the more as they are manifest much earlier than in France. In effect, English cookery books can be considered to have contributed to a great extent to the formation of a middle-class mentality.

As far as sex difference is concerned, the perspective of *The Good Housewife's Jewel*, published 1585, is explicitly reverted. The acknowledged Enunciator is no longer the wife, but *the husband*. The title of the book is *The Good Housewife's Jewel wherein is to be found most excellent and rare devices for conceits in cookery [...]. Also certain points of husbandry, very necessary for all husbandmen to know*. The presence of 'conceits' in the title is not a coincidence either (cf. *supra*).

During the late Renaissance and early Baroque English cookery books concerned themselves not only with (the health of) both sexes and of all estates, but also with (the health of) all ages. In 1586 appeared *The Old Man's Dietary* 'for the preservation of old persons in perfect health and soundness.' The book was 'Englished out of Latin'. Its preoccupation with *mental health* is equally important.

The Householder's Philosophy, published in 1588, is worth mentioning (1) because it was 'first written in Italian by that excellent Orator and Poet Signor Torquato Tasso,' and (2) because the second specification in the subtitle, 'whereunto is annexed a diary book for all good housewives', presents it as one of the first *specialised* cookery books.

Specialised bibliographies³⁷ clearly indicate that, from 1500 onwards, cookery books are extremely frequent among English non-literary publications; the presentation made here is the result of a selection. Two of the books which came out in 1600 have been considered worthiest of mention. The first comprises *Natural and artificial Directions for health, derived from the best philosophers, as well modern, as ancient*. It was written by William Vaughan, 'Master of Arts, Student in the Civil Law.' The philosophical implications of gastronomy, as well as the opposition between the 'natural' and the 'artificial' — presented as an example of *coincidentia oppositorum* in the book — are expressed in the very title. The second publication which deserves special mention is called *Delights for Ladies to adorn their persons, tables, closets and distillations; with beauties, banquets, perfumes, and waters. Read, practice, and censure*. On the one hand, the book continues the line opened by Alexis of Piemont; on the other hand, unlike the previous examples, it is explicitly designed for an aristocratic and intellectual elite. This is only natural, since we are in full swing of the Baroque.

One of the first (English) culinary almanacs was a month-by-month 'dietary', which came out in 1605. It included a long list of the food animals in season. Separate sections were dedicated to quadrupeds, fowls (including a great number of wild birds), and fishes.

The Stuart age is characterised by the publishing of scores of books entitled 'ladies cabinets opened' and 'queen's cabinets opened'. Two examples are enough to illustrate this point, viz. *A Closet for Ladies and Gentlewomen, or the art of preserving, conserving and candying, with the manner how to make diverse kinds of syrups, and all kinds of banqueting stuffs*, printed in 1608, and *The Ladies' Cabinet Opened, wherein is found hidden several experiments in preserving and conserving; Physic and Surgery; Cookery and Housewifery*, of 1639.

Such books are worth taking into consideration for a number of reasons: (1) they explicitly continue a trend inaugurated in the late Middle Ages; (2) paradoxically enough, it is the aristocratic ladies who are supposed to take after the housewives, and not the other way round; and (3) even if these books are *projects*, and not *testimonies* as to what a lady's cabinet *should* contain, since the genre is illustrated by so many titles, it is quite possible that the ladies' cabinets *did* contain such recipes and that ladies did possess such knowledge. Provided this phenomenon were a real one, it would account for the ladies' resisting later on in India, in the Middle East, and elsewhere in the British Empire.³⁸

Along quite a different line, another fact deserves special mention: the 'ordinary' was a kind of public restaurant, where a set meal was served, corresponding to the 'table d'hôte' of the inn.

As already mentioned, La Varenne's *Cuisinier français* was translated in 1653. From this moment on, the French cuisine, can be said to gain ground in England. The various avatars of this phenomenon will be registered in due time.

The penetration of the French influence paved the way for other influences as well. Thus, *The Whole Body of Cookery Dissected, Taught, and Fully Manifested, Methodically, Artificially and according to the Best Tradition of the English, French, Italian, Dutch, etc.*, which came out in 1661, is the first to openly acknowledge sundry European influences. It is interesting to note that the title of the book might be a pastiche of the title of Rembrandt's famous painting *The Anatomy Lesson...*, all the more so as the Dutch sources are explicitly mentioned.

In the latter half of the seventeenth century, Charles II's wife, Queen Catherine of Braganza, introduced the habit of tea drinking in noble English households. Javanese cups without handles were used at the beginning. It is not irrelevant that tea came to England via Portugal, and not directly from Asia. This is only one example showing that the British Empire had next to no influence on English habits.

The year 1664 inaugurates a new era in English gastronomic texts. The first *Cook's Guide* appears then, i.e. the first collection of recipes and practical advice addressed directly to 'professional' cooks, no longer to ladies, gentlewomen, and housewives. This does not mean, however, that the latter category will be neglected from now on. On the contrary: to give just two examples, a book entitled *The Ladies' Delight* was published in 1672, whereas *The Accomplished Lady's Delight* came out in 1675. Stress should be laid, however, on the fact that such books are no longer entitled 'companions' or 'directions' but *delights*. It means that, from now on, it is considered advisable for a lady to *take pleasure* in her household, i.e. the educational dimension is always there, only the persuasive means have changed. The publication of such books equally indicates, although implicitly, a kind of 'labour division', viz. meaner tasks are left in charge of the servants.

As a matter of fact, the year 1677 saw the appearance of *The Complete Servant-Maid, or the Young Maidens' Tutor, Directing them how they may fit and qualify themselves for any of these employments [...]*. A list of employments follows, comprising the waiting-woman, the housekeeper, the chambermaid, the cook-maid, the under-cook maid, the nursery maid, the diary maid, the laundry maid, the housemaid, and the scullery maid, and indicating a fairly specialised 'labour division' even among servants within the same household. The same remark applies to the men servants. In 1692 appeared the *Perfect School of Instructions for the Officers of the Mouth*. Several specifications are necessary concerning this book, which once again actually inaugurates a series. It is important that the French influence takes over in English gastronomy once more. This phenomenon is indicated, first of all, by the presence of the term 'officer of the mouth' which is a naturalisation into English of the French term 'officier de bouche'. A list of the 'officers of the mouth' includes 'The Master

of the Household, A Master Carver, A Master Butler, A Master Confectioner, A Master Cook, [and] A Master Pastryman'. The book is designed therefore to a highly aristocratic household (or rather to a household which aims at being highly aristocratic). To follow the French fashion is compulsory in such a case. Notice also the presence of the term 'master' in the designation of all these employments. Just like the French 'maître', 'master' means both *lord* and *maestro*. As it always happens at the turn of a century, a change of mentality occurs — and can be detected after a close examination of texts connected with gastronomy. In the above-mentioned case, it is fairly important that, a couple of years before the eighteenth century is officially inaugurated, men dominate over women even among servants.

It is by no means a coincidence that this trend is confirmed, for instance, by *The Whole Duty of a Woman, or a guide to the female sex, from the age of 16 to 60*, published, significantly enough, in 1701. The book consists of 'directions how women of all qualities and conditions ought to behave themselves in the various circumstances of this life, for their obtaining not only present, but future happiness.' The boring, didactic style of the book, as well as the clear indication that, once again, men take over women for a fairly long period of time, are only a few obvious indications that the baroque is over, while the eighteenth century has undoubtedly begun.

This brief series of remarks about the reflection of mentalities in turn-of-the-century cookery books cannot be concluded without mentioning *The Family Dictionary or Household Companion*, published in 1695. Among other things, this book is an attempt to inoculate the idea that the *family* is quite essential for the development of society. Half a century later, *The Family Magazine*, published in 1741, was to inaugurate a genre.

Coming back to the French influence on English gastronomy and gastronomic texts, it is fairly significant that a book entitled *The English and French Cook* was published in 1694. It is only now, about two decades after the instauration of the Orange dynasty, that 'the English' and 'the French' can coexist on the cover of the same book (incidentally, a book of cookery).

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, in 1702 an English translation was published of Massailot's *Cuisinier royal et bourgeois*, as well as of *Les Nouvelles Instructions pour les confitures*, by the same author. Eleven years after the books appeared in France, they introduced in England the new style of representing plates on the table-top.

Even if fairly easily accepted in aristocratic milieux, the French influence stimulated concurrence. As Elizabeth Robert Pennell remarked, 'when the French chefs book [i.e.] Massailot's *Cuisinier* was translated into English, [it] threatened to rob the English cook of his glory at home'³⁹. Consequently, English cooks tried to make their recipes entirely different, just 'to win the market.'

Their response was almost immediate. In 1708, Henry Howard published *England's Newest Way in All Sorts of Cookery*, which reached its third edition only two years later. As the title indicates, the book does present England's newest way. It mentions, for instance the recently adopted usage of the *remove*, i.e. of having the dishes succeed each other on the table. Plates were no longer simultaneously present on the table, as it had been the custom till that moment. In effect, this fashion is an equivalent of the *Russian service*, introduced in France — and via France — in the whole Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This apparently insignificant detail tells a lot about the lack of an English cuisine and of English table manners. Whatever their origin, dishes, trends, fashions become important only once they have been sanctioned in France. Otherwise, they are just local customs.

It is time to specify that in England, the restaurant seems to have grown out of the eighteenth century charitable interest in preparing food for invalids; the food was delivered to them at home. Soon enough, the scope of the original plan was widened to include serving *ordinary customers on the spot*. Once again, as shown in the previous chapter, the first restaurant was opened in Paris, by Boulanger.

The examination of cookery books and household treatises which came out in the latter half of the eighteenth century is extremely important, too. A new trend is inaugurated, and a new mentality is reflected, among other things, in the texts about the cuisine. The books published after 1750 include more and more notions of *marketing, management, and domestic economy*. This was only to be expected, since it is in England that the science of economy was founded. Had we not know it already, we could infer it from glancing through the titles of cookery books.

Thus, as early as 1750, the book entitled *The Country Housewife's Family Companion* specified that it gave 'profitable directions for whatever relates to the Management and Good Economy of the Domestic Concerns of a Country Life, according to the present practice of the Country Gentleman's, the Yeoman's, the Farmer's wives in the counties of Hertford, Bucks and other parts of England [as well as] frugal methods for victualising harvest-men'. It is not irrelevant that, from the very start, these notions of management and domestic economy were meant for all ways of life, and for all parts of the country. Cookery and household books in England contributed towards the formation of the middle class (cf. *supra*) and the promotion of a unifying mentality.

The book on *Domestic Management*, published in 1800, is equally relevant to this effect, as it deals with 'the Art of conducting a family; with instructions to servants in general,' and is 'Addressed to Young Housekeepers.' When it came to marketing and management, even servants were supposed to share this knowledge.

Following the same line of thought, it is important that a book called *The British Housewife* appeared in 1770. It is the first time that the qualifier *British* [and not 'English'] is appended to the explicit Enunciatee. The examination of the book demonstrates, however, that the adjective 'British' was only a void sticker, a synonym for *English*. Actually, the Empire is mentioned for the first time on the cover of a text on gastronomy in 1809, when *The Imperial and Royal Cook* came out. This title is an oblique indication that the idea of the Empire has become relevant (or is being promoted as relevant) for a larger category of people.

The year 1810 is significant because of the appearance of two cookery books which indirectly point to a change which has occurred in the collective mentality, namely *The Female Economist*, a title which needs no comment, and *The Housekeeper's Domestic Library*. The later obliquely persuades the housekeepers to borrow books from public libraries, and even to have books of their own.

As far as cookery books printed in England until the beginning of the nineteenth century are concerned, it is equally important that Nicolas Appert's *Art of preserving all kinds of animal and vegetable substances for several years* was translated in 1811, immediately after its publication in France. The year 1811 also marked *The Return to Nature*, with John Frank Newton's book. This is a late echo of the French Encyclopaedists's influence as well as 'a defence of the vegetable regimen; with some account of an experiment made during the last three or four years in the author's family' [author's italics].

The Culinary Chemistry, which came out in 1821, is a scientific treatise aiming to be considered as an object of mass culture. The concept was, certainly, novel at the time, but it is quite important that the book claims to be 'exhibiting the scientific principles of cookery, with concise instructions for preparing good and wholesome Pickles, Vinegar, Conserves, Fruit, Jellies, Marmalades, and various other Alimentary substances employed in Domestic Economy, with observations on the chemical constitution and nutritive qualities of different kinds of food.' As plainly indicated by this extremely long title, the tendency towards 'rational,' 'scientific' eating, typical of Germanic peoples, begins to materialise at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The author, Frederic Accum, was an 'operative chemist, lecturer on practical chemistry to the arts and manufactures; Member of the Royal Irish Academy; fellow of the Linnaen Society; Member of the Royal Academy of Sciences, and of the Royal Society of Arts, Berlin, etc. etc.' From this author's perspective, cookery is definitely a scientific discipline and a 'noble' one, too.

Culinary 'oracles' are also quite frequent during the first half of the nineteenth century. *The Family Oracle of Health; Economy, Medicine, and Good Living*, published in 1824, and *The Housekeeper's Oracle* published five years later, are just two examples.

The most important development in nineteenth century England was the gradual, yet by then irrevocable, influence of French cuisine, its naturalisation and wide-scale acceptance. This process, which had begun with the publication of *The French Cook*, authored by Louis XVI's former chef, continued with the printing, in 1824, of *The Art of French Cookery*, by A. B. Beauvilliers, the well-known Paris restaurateur. As early as 1825, 'an English Physician [Antonin Carême], many years resident on the Continent, published a book of *French Domestic Cookery*, combining Economy with Elegance, and adapted to the Use of Families of Moderate Fortune.' Two of Carême's books were translated into English shortly after his death: *The Royal Parisian Pastry Cook* (1834), and *French Cookery* (1836), 'comprising *L'Art de la cuisine française; Le Pâtissier royal; Le Cuisinier parisien*, by the late M. Carême, some time chef of the kitchen of His Majesty George IV.' Strangely enough, however, Brillat-Savarin's *Physiologie du goût* (1824) was not translated until much later.

As was only to be expected, the almost unreserved adoption of French cuisine — primarily by the upper classes, and in theory, if not necessarily in practice — was followed by a somewhat greater opening towards other peoples' cuisine, the existence of which was at least acknowledged, if not accepted. Another book, also called *French Domestic Cookery*, published in 1846, was 'combining elegance with economy; describing new culinary implements and processes; the management of the table; [...] French, German, Polish, Spanish, and Italian Cookery.' This slight tendency of giving up the deeply-rooted insular mentality is also accounted for by the unprecedented development of tourism among the upper classes and the members of the intelligentsia.

Significantly enough, the same year 1846 saw the appearance of *The Jewish Manual* comprising 'practical information in Jewish and [on] modern cookery, with a collection of valuable recipes & hints relating to the toilette.' Whether the manual was an indirect appeal to tolerance and to the acceptance of the Other, or whether it was an equally indirect acknowledgement of ethnic segregation is difficult to establish.

The Victorian Age was dominated by the unmistakable influence of the French chef Auguste Escoffier (cf. *supra*). As far as the aristocracy were concerned, the return to 'traditional' English cookery was no longer possible, except for breakfast. All the reforms to be introduced from now on until the 1940s regard table manners and dinner habits,⁴⁰ but hardly cooking proper.

Whereas during the eighteenth century and earlier, the principal meals were breakfast, dinner (at midday), and a light supper, from the middle of the nineteenth century social habits require that a large dinner be served in the evening, around 8 o'clock or even later. The 'timetable' and composition of the other meals changed accordingly. Breakfast was served earlier, and luncheon, the newly invented meal, at midday. The habit of people's changing for dinner and men's

'obligation' to wear the newly invented 'dinner jackets,' another Victorian invention, have been preserved at least until the outbreak of World War II. Dinner jackets acquired 'international fame', too. By the beginning of the twentieth century, it became more and more common for English men and women to dine out together, instead of — or in parallel with — entertaining guests at home. Supper after theatrical and operatic performances had become a habit since the final years of Queen Victoria's reign. Restaurants where women of quality could be taken out remained, however, rather exclusive until the end of World War I.

To sum up only some of the inferences which can be made from the considerations briefly made so far, it seems rather strange that the British Empire hardly influenced the English cuisine before the beginning of the nineteenth century (nor will, until after World War II, when, 'exotic' cuisine became international). Stranger still, neither could Scottish, Welsh, or Irish influences be detected. Not even a passing remark about the presence of such texts was ever made in English cookery books.

On the other hand, it has been shown that the Italian influence was fairly obvious during the Renaissance, and that, though not always welcome, French influence on the English cuisine was fairly substantial during various epochs, (irretrievably so from the Victorian age onward). Compared to French cuisine, the English appears to be more 'democratic,' addressing nearly all social categories, contributing to what might be called the emancipation of women, and reflecting a more 'unified' collective mentality. English cookery books contributed to what is usually called 'low-power culture,' typical of constitutional monarchies. The industrial revolution and the founding of political economy are also reflected in various tokens of English gastronomical discourse. So are table manners, rules of politeness, and sex segregation.

C. The Romanian Principalities⁴¹

As far as the cuisine and the gastronomical accounts are concerned, circumstances are slightly different in the Romanian principalities, as compared to the other areas taken into consideration so far. Therefore, the data briefly supplied in this section will also differ, to a certain extent.

Until as late as the 1650s, when the first cookery book is attested, one can hardly speak of gastronomical discourse proper in the Romanian principalities.⁴² What is more, most of the references to food, eating, and table manners are to be found in the accounts of foreign travellers⁴³ in this territory. Even so, fairly relevant inferences can be made as regards the relationship between food and mentalities in the Romanian principalities⁴⁴, as well as concerning the intricate relations between food and table manners, on the one hand, and the development of civilisation⁴⁵, on the other hand.

Ibn Battuta (1304–1377), a Muslim traveller to the south-eastern parts of the area here taken into consideration, speaks of the scarcity of water supplies in Dobruđa and describes the way in which grapes, apples and quinces are stored the year round. *Les anciennes chroniques d'Angleterre* (14th–15th century) mentions the underground granaries, for cereals, oats, and all sorts of grains. In the second half of the sixteenth century, a French traveller, Pierre Lescapier,⁴⁶ refers to the 'grand daily feasts' he attended in Alba-Iulia; at about the same time, the Polish monk Joan Leleszi,⁴⁷ dispatched to visit a Franciscan hermitage in Alba-Iulia, writes of the frustrations of all kinds he had to suffer there: 'Dinner is served without any order or method, the servants, who are all heretics, mock us and threaten us.' That is why he further requires that a good, Catholic cook be sent to his rescue. But that is also why the accuracy of his account can be doubted; it might result from ethnic and religious tensions. All the more so, since during the same period, Stefan Santo, a Hungarian traveller,⁴⁸ has an extremely critical attitude in the very opposite direction. Santo criticises the abundance of food in the Jesuit College in Cluj.⁴⁹ The Italian Antonio Possevino, who travelled to Transylvania during those very years, also notices the inhabitants' intemperance, as well as their afternoon naps, which, in his opinion, predispose to illness. In about 1590, another Italian, Franco Sivoré, states that, while travelling through Wallachia, he noticed 'such an abundance of foodstuffs of all kinds, and everything was so cheap, that a big household could live on very little money.'⁵⁰ He also mentions several kinds of fish, and gives information about hunting. Sivoré equally draws a list of foodstuffs exported to Ancona⁵¹. He considers Wallachian food 'refined and well-cooked,'⁵² although he does not specify what it consisted of. Sivoré's most important remark concerns the fact that 'the ruling Prince used to eat Italian dishes; to this effect, he kept Italian and French servants, who were very skillful.'⁵³

It is fairly relevant that, at that time, Italian influence was fairly strong, too.

In 1582, John Newsberie, an English traveller through southern Bessarabia, remarks the cheapness and abundance of foodstuffs.⁵⁴ It is to Newsberie that we are indebted for one of the earliest recipes recorded in the Romanian principalities; it describes the preparation of sturgeon eggs.⁵⁵

Linguists agree that the Turkish loan words *bacan* (grocer), *cataif* (whipped cream cake), *ciulama* (white sauce stew), *chioftea* (minced-meat ball), *musaca* (eggplant stew), as well as the Greek loan words *conopidă* (cauliflower) and *fistic* (pistachio) made their way into the Romanian vocabulary in the seventeenth century. In their view, in the eighteenth century, such dishes were no longer the exclusive privilege of aristocrats, being equally served to the members of their households.

All sources describing princely feasts in Moldavia and Wallachia throughout the later Middle Ages record the presence of musicians, who used to sing and play Turkish music outside the dining-room, in the inner court of the palace.

A rather hyperbolic feast, offered to the Turkish ambassadors attending the coronation of the Transylvanian Prince, was described by Evlia Celebi (1611–1684?).⁵⁶ Special stress is laid on the forty loaves of white bread, each of them brought to the feast in a cart dragged by two bulls. Each loaf of bread is said to have been 20 yards long, 5 yards wide, and as tall as a man. The special means employed to bake this fairly 'hyperbolic' bread is minutely explained, so that the description of the loaves of bread becomes plausible.

As regards princely — and aristocratic — table manners in the Romanian principalities, one of the first recorded mentions is to be found in *Învățăturile lui Neagoe Basarab către fiul său Teodosie* [The Teachings of Prince Neagoe Basarab to His Son Teodosie (ca.1520)].⁵⁷ The text details 'how the ruling Prince should sit at table', how the boyars and the ambassadors should be placed around the table, and provides several moral precepts (e.g. not to drink too much). Another text following the same line was written much later, in 1726; called *Cartea de învățătură a Prințului Nicolae către fiul său, Prințul Constantin* [The Book of Advice of the Late Prince Nicolae to His Son, Prince Constantin] the book states, among other things, that 'the ruling Prince ought to lead an austere life, and not waste his fortune on sumptuous feasts.'⁵⁸

Remarks on table ceremony and the hierarchy of the boyars waiting at the Prince's table are made in various chronicles. Misail Călugărul [Missaiyl the Monk] annotated the Moldavian Chronicle written by Grigore Ureche (1600–1667), with remarks regarding table ceremony. While describing the table ritual, Missaiyl makes ample reference to the functions discharged by the 'officiers de bouche,' viz. the lords attending the ruling Prince's table.⁵⁹ In his turn Gheorgachi, author of *Condica de ceremonie* [Court Ceremony Chronicle],⁶⁰ describes the feasts offered by the Prince to his boyars, and those offered by the Princess to her ladies. Sometimes, women join their consorts after dinner, the Prince dances with the Princess, and the boyars dance with their ladies. Gheorgachi mentions another interesting detail, namely that the Princess and her ladies used not only to drink wine, but also to make toasts. All chroniclers agree that there were three compulsory banquets offered by the ruling Prince to his boyars, i.e. at Christmas, Epiphany, and Easter.

The Prince's banquets — and mimetically, the aristocratic ones — ended with coffee and fruit preserves. Coffee was prepared in the Turkish manner; sometimes, it was accompanied by a kind of liqueur, 'vutca'.⁶¹ These were served in a separate room. Coffee is mentioned for the first time in the memoirs of Paul of Alep⁶², in the first half of the seventeenth century (during the reign of the Moldavian Prince Vasile Lupu). The first mention of coffee in the Romanian principalities is contemporary to the 'documents' that record the introduction of this beverage in England and France, though it had reached Western Europe through a different channel.

While describing the banquet offered by Vasile Lupu to the Patriarch of Antiochia, Paul of Alep specifies that tables were covered with white tablecloths and napkins, plates were made of silver or gold, and dishes were covered with gold lids, removed when the guests were served. Glasses were made of crystal; the cups were made of China or silver. The bottles of wine and spirits were kept in ice buckets made of wood. Paul of Alep's memoirs are the first document to give such details. The Prince and the Patriarch dined at a separate table, they were served a different wine, and their glasses had a different design from those of the other guests.

Paul of Alep also mentions the existence of countless taverns in Moldavia and Wallachia, which sold wine, spirits, and other beverages in great quantities.⁶³

According to him, during fast days, people used to eat various kinds of beans and green peas, boiled in water, without any oil; they also had sauerkraut and drank apple juice. Oil, olives, pressed caviar, octopus, lemon juice, chick pea, rice, and vermicelli were brought by Greek merchants from European Turkey. These products were meant for the use of the Moldavian aristocracy. Paul of Alep says that they were almost unknown to the peasants, or to the inhabitants of Moldavian boroughs.

The latter must have eaten plenty of game during the second half of the seventeenth century, for the German traveller Conrad Jacob Hiltenbrandt⁶⁴ specifically recounts how full of game, mainly partridge and blackgame, the markets in Iași were.

During the same period, the Scandinavian Clas Brorson Ralamb⁶⁵ gives an accurate description of the table manners of the Wallachian princely court. The description reminds of a late Renaissance tableau:

'The Prince invited me to a banquet. When my coach arrived at the gate of the garden, I was met by five marshals, carrying silver sticks in their hands. The Prince himself met me at the door of his kiosk, where the table was laid. The high-ranking officials, the courtiers, and a few companies of German infantry were outside the kiosk. As soon as I went in, the Prince took me to the table, where we both sat in two high armchairs; the Transylvanian ambassador sat on a bench. On the table, there were only four silver trays, covered by iron lids. After we had talked for a while, dinner was brought in. At that moment, we were joined by the two members of my suite and the Prince's highest officials. The Prince and I ate out of four to six silver trays; all the others ate out of tin trays. The cuisine was good and the food quite well prepared; courses were constantly changing.'

Several testimonies, dating from 1700, about table ceremony at the court of Antioch Cantemir,⁶⁶ contain various details which make it possible to draw a comparison between the Moldavian court and that of Louis XIV, such as described by Saint-Simon and Madame de Sévigné⁶⁷, with respect to table ritual.

The Moldavian Prince is shown to eat by himself, at a small table, placed at a higher level than the long tables occupied by the boyars. During the meal, the prince might have chosen to favour one of his guests or another by sending over a couple of dishes from his own table. At the end of the feast, one of the high officials would rise and drink the Prince's health; he would be followed by all the other guests. Nevertheless, at the end of the feast, Oriental habits took over, as, two by two, all boyars came to kneel on a carpet at the Prince's feet, and drank a last cup of wine in his honour.

All these descriptions are corroborated by Demetrius Cantemir,⁶⁸ well-known scholar and Prince of Moldavia (1710–1711). The similarity of details in three different texts stands proof to their authenticity.⁶⁹ Having been a ruling Prince himself, Cantemir is also the first to provide relevant information about the *everyday* meals of a prince. Usually, they took place in the small dining-room, or in the princess' apartments. At dinner, the prince used to invite a couple of his officials, sometimes several captains in his army or even one or two soldiers who had long served him. Once in a while everybody had their turn. While the prince's dinner was apparently fairly 'democratic', at supper, some sort of a 'camarilla' seems to have been encouraged: only those who took special pains to please the prince were invited. In her turn, the princess may have joined the prince for dinner or, alternatively, she may have ordered to have it in her own apartments, with some of her ladies. Neither in *Descriptio Moldaviae* nor elsewhere is there any mention of an intimate meal taken by the princely couple. According to Cantemir, the guests' plates are changed several times during the meals, probably with every new dish being brought in. The prince's meals (be they official banquets or not) come to an end when the Prince puts his napkin on the table. After grace is said, the Prince, bare-headed, takes leave of his guests. These go home accompanied by the Prince's musicians, who go on playing in the streets. The next day, the boyars thank the Prince for the banquet, and apologise for any inconvenience they may have committed while under the influence of alcohol.

Several sources, both Romanian and foreign, mention the habit of brushing the teeth after meals.

According to present-day knowledge, one of the first gastronomical texts (a cooking-book proper) to have been preserved was published at the beginning of the reign of the Wallachian Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu (1688–1714). It is called *Cookery Book Writing about Fish and Crawfish Dishes, Oysters, Snails, Medicines, Herbs, and other Fastdays and Meatdays Dishes; Each One According to Its Appropriate Place*.⁷⁰ There is no mention of the author. The manuscript is much earlier. According to Marin Cazacu,⁷¹ a later, hand-written copy, dates from 1649. The items mentioned in the title seem to have been eaten on a large scale at that time. A rich variety of fishes are mentioned; oysters are no rarity

at all. Neither are capers or mushrooms. Many of the recipes betray an obvious Italian influence, though the book still mentions Oriental cookery appliances, like *filigean*, *tingire*, *tipsie*, etc. The Italian influence is not surprising; during the same period it was fairly strong in Wallachian architecture, too, and it is basically accounted for by the fact that Wallachia had quite strong trade relationships with several Italian cities during the seventeenth century.

The years 1711 and 1715 saw the beginning of a new historical epoch in Moldavia and Wallachia respectively. The ruling Princes no longer belonged to the local aristocracy; they were appointed by the Turkish Sultan from among rich Greek merchants⁷² living in the Phanar district of Constantinople. As was only to be expected, there was a strong Greek influence in all cultural spheres; cuisine was not exempted from this general trend. Neagu Djuvara⁷³ specifies that, during the eighteenth century, in urban areas, the Turkish-Byzantine cuisine was reigning in every milieu, and was used by all social classes. Specific dishes had been adapted to local traditions and had become 'national dishes'; such was the case with *sarmale*.⁷⁴ But it was also through the Phanariotes that the influence of the French cuisine became fashionable in the aristocratic milieux.⁷⁵

At about the same time Francesco Grisellini,⁷⁶ an Italian traveller through Banat, speaks about the cuisine of the poor people in this part of the Romanian space:

'Their usual dishes are very simple and consist mainly of vegetables; they are spiced with a lot of garlic and onions, but are not so salted. Salads and cakes are cooked with pork fat, and during fastdays, with flax oil. The Romanians breed all sorts of poultry: hens, turkeys, ducks, and geese, but eat them only at very important holidays. Even the poorest people eat a pig at Christmas, and a lamb and pies at Easter.'

It is quite relevant that the number of bakeries throughout Moldavia and Wallachia increases constantly in the eighteenth century; their number doubles within twenty years, their equipment is more and more sophisticated, their products become more and more diversified.⁷⁷ Pastry and confectionery products developed on a wide scale in eighteenth-century Moldavia and Wallachia, just as they did in (Central and) Western Europe.⁷⁸

The abundance of food in aristocratic milieux seems to have reached its climax at the end of the eighteenth century. Ștefan Lemny⁷⁹ specifies that 'a dinner where only three dishes and three glasses of wine were being served was considered to be of very low quality. The richness of meals was meant to convey an image of luxury and well-being of the aristocratic courts,' in spite of any temperance prescriptions.⁸⁰

Viscount of Marcellus,⁸¹ recounts in some detail the fairly 'exotic' simultaneous celebration of four weddings in Bucharest in 1820. One of the brides was the ruling Prince's youngest daughter. By the end of the feast 'at a signal, the two bands joined their efforts, and [...] all the guests drank to the health

of the four newly-wed couples. At that moment, several mercenaries, armed with daggers, destroyed several huge candy cages, placed at the two ends of the hall. Hundreds of canaries and thistle finches suddenly flew out of the cages which had hidden them from view and, followed by the mercenaries, rushed towards the guests, offering them love poems, written in Greek [...] and which were attached to their necks.' This mediaeval and baroque practice had been a custom in West-European countries from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. Its rather late presence in the Romanian principalities is yet another proof that, no matter how big a phase difference, a 'historical' phenomenon has to cover all the required stages before fading away from general practice.

Before moving one step further, a few words are necessary regarding the peasants' food and recipes.⁸² Documents in this respect are even scarcer, at least until the second half of the nineteenth century, when systematic ethnographic investigation began to be carried out. Therefore, when investigating peasant cookery one needs to be even more cautious than when other social categories are brought into discussion.

An issue of the journal *Transilvania*⁸³ shows that, although cereals have always been the basis of peasant food, they have been far from abundant throughout history. Buckwheat and even tree bark have been employed to produce a substitute of flour. The famous *mămăligă* (polenta), various kinds of (corn) flour, cakes and porridge were more frequent than bread. Some travellers consider *mămăligă* tasteless, whereas others⁸⁴ find it delicious. Neagu Djuvara⁸⁵ states that, throughout the later Middle Ages, Romanian peasants used to eat especially *mămăligă* with cheese and/or onions; sometimes they also ate beans with bacon and paprika. At religious and family feasts, they used to have chicken.⁸⁶ According to the same author, peasants considered beef unhealthy, but even the poorest peasants used to sacrifice a pig at Christmas. Well-to-do peasants used to buy fish and salted meat from the nearest boroughs. During the summer, they ate honey and fruits; in many cases, fruits were dried and kept for the winter. Nettle, garden sorrel, and lettuce were eaten mainly in spring. Hardly ever did the peasants go to the tavern during the week. Tavern keepers were also grocers, selling spices to the villagers. Inns were extremely rare in the countryside.

The author of an anonymous volume of travel accounts, printed in Frankfurt in 1793,⁸⁷ says that his hosts in a village on his way to Cluj, offered him honey, eggs, butter, ham, white bread, and old wine in earthenware pots.

In 1993, the Museum of the Romanian Peasant edited a booklet containing 24 *rețete țărănești*.⁸⁸ The recipes had been gathered in the 1970s. However, the well-known patriarchal life-style of Romanian peasants, their famous conservatism, and their reluctance -or extreme caution — to adopt novelties, favour the dating of these recipes back, if not to times immemorial at least a couple of centuries ago. The sample recipes in the book stand proof to the intricacy, imagination, and even refinement of traditional peasant cookery.⁸⁹

Some oblique information about what peasants in the Făgăraş mountains used to eat in the 1950s is to be found in the second volume of Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu's memoirs.⁹⁰ The data supplied by the book provides further proof that life in the countryside has not changed for centuries, and neither did peasant food. Ogoranu's memoirs also give occasion to a few (bitter, but objective) considerations about the close relationship between the Romanians' Christian feelings, and their food.

All excerpts to this effect show that, as far as cooking is concerned, (Romanian) peasants are 'atemporal'. Things have changed quickly in the last decades and peasantry as a class is disappearing; nevertheless, this problem lies beyond the scope of the present paper.

Middle Ages are considered to have come to an end in 1784 in Transylvania,⁹¹ and in 1821 in Moldavia and Wallachia.⁹² Western influence became increasingly stronger during the first half of the nineteenth century; as is well-known, it reached a first climax in 1848. In this respect, a gastronomic 'event' took place in 1841, when the enlightened politicians and writers M. Kogălniceanu and C. Negruzzi published their famous book entitled *200 Rețete cercate de bucate, prăjituri și alte trebi gospodărești* [200 Tested Recipes of Dishes, Cakes, and Other Household Duties]. The specification in the subtitle is fairly relevant: 'Printed at the expense and under the care of a society striving for the progress and excellency of the Romanian nation.' The cookery book is seen by its authors as a factor of progress and civilisation, and the privilege of an élite. In a pertinent article⁹³ published in 1990, Henry Notaker points out that, in spite of Kogălniceanu's 'genuine and serious' interest in cookery, notwithstanding the fact that 'the book was truly innovative and was intended to produce a culinary *revolution*, and that, since it went into three editions, it was successful, [...]. Nevertheless, the cookbook does reveal certain ambiguities in Kogălniceanu's attitude: between national and foreign; bourgeois and popular, modern and traditional.'⁹⁴

The reflection of these 'ambiguities',⁹⁵ rightfully detected by Notaker, is extremely important since the book closely preceded the 1848 revolution, in (the preparation of) which the authors (particularly Kogălniceanu) took an active part. Once again, the gastronomic discourse stands out as the sign of a (prevailing) mentality.

A new epoch begins with 1848, the year which lays the premises for the foundation of modern Romania. The partial unification which took place in 1859,⁹⁶ and especially the accession to power of Carol I in 1866, the Declaration of Independence in 1877, and the proclamation of the kingdom in 1881 were the steps which perfected the process. In this comparatively brief period of time, existing gaps were bridged in nearly all fields of culture and civilisation.⁹⁷ Gastronomic texts do not fail to reflect this process.

A book of recipes translated from the French (the work of a certain Robert, 'an excellent cook from France') came out in Iasi in 1846⁹⁸; it marked the

beginning of a long series of translations of French cookery books, not to be detailed here.

The next publication, entitled *Romanian Cookery*, comprised 'various recipes for dishes and refreshments' and was printed in Bucharest in 1865. The author is not mentioned. The book contains 224 recipes, listed alphabetically; they cover all the branches of cookery. This book shows, among other things, that buffet-type refreshments were being served to the Romanians enjoying high-life. The dishes are miscellaneous, bearing proof to both a Western and a Balkan influence.

One should mention that all of the cookery books printed in the Romanian principalities from the 1850s onwards are preceded by a foreword with a marked didactic, prescriptive, (ludical), and epistemic orientation. Considerations about how to lay the table, in what order to serve the dishes, about the precedence of the guests etc. become as important as remarks about the properties of various kinds of meat and vegetables, about how to store and preserve them; in effect they are as important as the recipes themselves. This is one proof out of many that the gastronomic discourse has quickly acquired 'droit de cité'. Gastronomic texts stand proof that in this field, just like in many others, gaps have been quickly — and adequately — filled in during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Romania's complete integration in Western European civilisation was also achieved by these means.

Another relevant book is called *The Good Housewife*. It was signed by Ecaterina Steriady, the wife of some colonel, and came out in Galați in 1871. The book marks the transition towards 'modern' *haute cuisine*, to be adopted on a wide scale after 1900. It contains scores of recipes for sweet preserves, sherbet, fruit in light syrup, pastry, cakes, and puddings. The place of apparition is quite relevant, too. From now on, cookery books cease to be destined to an élite, and tend to address wider audiences. The fact they were published in various provincial towns such as Galați, Focșani, Bacău, Craiova etc., or Caransebeș, Sibiu, Oradea, and no longer solely in the capital cities of the three provinces bears witness to the same process: de-centralisation had begun.

At the same time a marked attempt of rising the living standard in the country-side is also systematically being made. Housekeeping schools are established nearly everywhere; they are mostly attended either by young girls from the town suburbs and from the countryside, or, even more often, by orphan girls who were taken care of by the Government. It was only natural that housewifery, and primarily cookery, should hold pride of place in such establishments.

In the book describing the *Organisation of practical works in the vocational school of Princess Elena Home*, Bucharest, 1907, Margarita Miller-Verghy dedicates a whole chapter to the dishes and preserves that girls learn to cook in school, as well as to the practical activities involved in maintaining the kitchen,

pantry, etc. in the best order and perfectly clean. She also lays stress on the fact that the girls should be taught to cook unsophisticated dishes, since they ought to be prepared for a simple life, devoid of any kind of luxury. It is worth mentioning that, in spite of the author's acknowledged didactic aims, the 'simple, economical dishes' she suggests indicate that the lower middle-classes (to which the girls belonged) were far from poor, or devoid of imagination. This handbook was by no means unique. It just inaugurated a genre, further illustrated by many other treatises.

The turn of the century was also illustrated by the publication of various cookery books and public lectures addressed to the farmers' wives; their aim was to improve the variety of food and to enhance its quality. Perhaps the most relevant quality of such texts is that they are completely devoid of any tinge of nationalism, rural propaganda, or inferiority complexes. To give just one example of the kind, an undated book, called *The Farmer's Wife's Cookery*, by Maria Dobrescu, includes 23 recipes based on potato, 12 on cabbage, 3 on sauerkraut, along with recipes for 10 bean dishes, green peas dishes, 3 lentil dishes, 4 pumpkin dishes, etc. Traditional dishes for funeral meals, pieces of practical advice concerning poisonous mushrooms a.s.o. coexist with various suggestions for improving several dishes and for modernising them. It is equally worth mentioning that in a much later book, dedicated to *Modern Cookery*, printed by the famous Socec Publishers in the early '20s, Maria Dobrescu appears to hold various international diplomas issued by housekeeping schools in Switzerland and Belgium.

A marked care for people's health is also to be noticed at the turn of the century. *The Queen of the Cuisine, or Universal cookery for healthy and sick people* (Bucharest, 1900), in which the anonymous author compiled more than a hundred recipes for ordinary dishes, sweets, pastry, liquors, etc., seems to have enjoyed the highest reputation in this respect. The book was reprinted six times before World War I.

As already mentioned, the end of the nineteenth century was equally characterised by a wide-scale opening towards West-European cuisine, which came to be adopted not only by the aristocracy (which had favoured it long before), but also by the middle class. Several cookery books (as well as memoirs, letters etc.) stand proof to this effect. One example is an anonymous book called *The Three Main Cuisines, or the Romanian cuisine, the French, and the German*, Bucharest, 1894. A non-dated *Cookery Book* by M. Sevastos, dealing with 'the Romanian cuisine, the French, the Russian, the Greek, the Italian, the Turkish, the Hungarian, the Polish, and the German cuisine,' which appeared in Bucharest at about the same time, is indicative of an obvious tendency towards the acclimation of all cultures, as well as of the lack of any possible complex at the awareness

that Romanian civilisation stands at the crossroads of so many influences, coming from various other cultures.

This opening towards the Other was on a par with similar movements taking part throughout Europe.

In fact, from the last decades of the nineteenth century onwards, and particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, the gastronomic discourse covered a wide range of levels depending on the cultural loading of its Enunciates. It oscillates between 'high culture', addressed to an élite and having a marked philosophical and ludical character, and 'mass culture', which mainly aimed to civilise the lower classes, to enhance the competence of housewives, and to make the lesser bourgeoisie more open-minded. There are cases in which all these tendencies can coexist. The general cultural context (which favoured democracy and pluralism, but equally an avant-garde mentality) makes such a phenomenon quite natural. Therefore the publication of a book dealing with *1001 dishes. Cookery Book for Families and Restaurants, Cuisine de Luxe, and Diet Cuisine* was not shocking at all. The book appeared in Bucharest, at the well-known 'Universul' Publishing House, and was signed by C. Bacalbaşa, a writer and one of the most interesting figures in Romanian gastronomic discourse.

The book bears witness to a variety of mentalities which prevailed among members of the aristocracy and of the upper middle classes in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The survey included in the beginning is worth special mention. The author asked five ladies and five gentlemen to give the recipe of their favourite dish. Their rhetoric varies with their level of education, social status, wealth and knowledge of the world. A close examination of the dishes chosen, of the recipes, and of each author's style allows for a fairly accurate image of a well-defined and rather large section of Romanian society. Self-reference and reference to the Other (one's equal, one's superior, or one's inferior in standing) equally offer rich food for thought. Throughout the following decades the book enjoyed several revised editions.

The first volume of Bacalbaşa's compiled reminiscences called *Bucureştii de altădată (1871–1884) [Old Bucharest (1871–1884)]*, published in Bucharest in 1927, describes exquisite, de luxe restaurants, as well as cheap student pubs with 'menu fixe'; in the case of the latter, table manners, table service, and food quality improved, indeed, in the period under discussion. Mass civilisation was obviously in ascension.

The unprecedented cultural and economic development of Romania in the inter-war period materialised in a few interesting 'details' which occurred in gastronomy, and in the gastronomical discourse.

Mention should be made, first of all, of a *Romanian-American Recipe Book*, compiled by Elisabeta-Lorin, which came out in Bucharest in the early thirties. The professed aim of the book was to familiarise the Romanian public with

the American cuisine (which, at that time, seemed rather exotic). Keeping proportions, the phenomenon reiterated, on a smaller scale, the general trend of exploring 'exotic' spaces, and approaching so far unknown disciplines, which occurred in Romania immediately after World War I.

In 1939, just before World War II broke out, the above-mentioned text had a counter-part in the *Savoury Rumanian Dishes and Choice Wines*, a collection of over 100 Romanian recipes simplified and adapted to the American taste. The book, written in English, was published in Bucharest.

A second characteristic of inter-war Romanian gastronomic discourse was the return into favour of traditional Romanian cuisine. Books like Emil Procopiu's *Recipes of the Ancient Cuisine*, Cîmpulung, 1931, far from indicating a nationalistic tendency, were meant to confer long forgotten dishes a touch of distinction. Turkey with apricots, snail soup, soup of vegetable marrows filled with minced meat, caper sauce, octopus ragout are only a few of the 'picturesque' dishes recommended in the book.

All of the above-mentioned characteristics of inter-war gastronomic discourse in Romania are important enough, and they ought not to be neglected. However, both the period and Romanian gastronomic discourse in general, are best illustrated in the work of Al. O. Teodoreanu,⁹⁹ a humorist, epigramist, newspaperman, and lawyer. He was famous for his weekly gastronomic chronicles, published in various newspapers,¹⁰⁰ and later gathered in several volumes.¹⁰¹ Apart from the often original recipes included, Al. O. Teodoreanu's chronicles are interesting primarily for the ludical-philosophical considerations about the relationships between gastronomy and culture, on the one hand, and gastronomy and mentalities, on the other hand. In 1933 he wrote, for instance, that 'not unlike history, the study of cuisine finds itself between science and art. Its progress can indicate the level of civilisation attained by one people or another, although it does not depend exclusively on this factor. There is no doubt, for example, that the English are an extremely civilised people, although their cuisine is almost inexistent. On the other hand, there is a lot to say about the Russian cuisine. [...]

Civilisation and culture have never attained equal development on all levels.¹⁰² As regards Al. O. Teodoreanu's contribution to the study of mentalities, one should notice that, in the very same year 1933, he remarked: 'Balkan civilisation ends there where, among other things, in restaurants one hears only whispers, as customers are patient and the staff well-bred.' He also noted that 'The manners of the staff in a restaurant can never be more distinguished than those of the customers.'¹⁰³ One could quote such witty remarks almost *ad libitum*.

As regards Al. O. Teodoreanu's improvements on vernacular recipes, it is quite relevant that the various *metissages* he suggested aimed at giving certain traditional Romanian dishes the status of *haute cuisine*. For instance, when giving

the recipe for *sarmale*, he suggests to allow them to simmer in two pints of Cotnari wine,¹⁰⁴ diluted with plenty of Italian tomato sauce. He adds: 'A bottle of white Port could successfully replace the Cotnari, since the latter became so scarce.'¹⁰⁵ As for the appropriate wine to accompany the *sarmale*, Teodoreanu suggested Bourgogne.

One could write an entire essay about Teodoreanu's gastronomical remarks; though one has to refrain from further expanding upon them here, one should mention, however, that according to Teodoreanu's implicit assumption, the status of a certain dish — by extension, of an entire cuisine — depends not so much on the ingredients used or on their quantity, as on the consumer's concern to refine it, and, even more, on people's *attitude* towards that particular cuisine, on the general environment in which they place it.

A provisional, and by necessity, partial conclusion concerning the historical survey of written references to gastronomy in the Romanian space shows that, roughly until 1800, there are scarcely any references whatsoever to peasant food, and especially to recipes of peasant dishes. Strangely enough, it is the knowledge of Romanian peasant mentality, their tendency to live for centuries in closed, unchanged communities, that allows us to infer the kind of food peasants had throughout the Middle Ages, basic recipes, and their main attitude towards food. As a rule, whenever other social classes are concerned, the process takes place the other way round: it is the study of the gastronomical discourse that contributes to outlining group mentalities. As regards the aristocracy, accounts by foreigners who travelled to princely courts in this part of the world before the end of the seventeenth century are contradictory enough. There are cases when the food and the table manners customary in a particular place at a given time are described as 'exquisite' by one foreign visitor, and as quite 'unpalatable' by another. Foreign travellers seem to have been struck either by certain extreme *differences* ('exoticism', 'poverty', 'unparalleled richness') from, or by *similarities* to, their own cultural environment. A permanent interplay between subjectivity and objectivity can easily be noticed.

Historians seem to agree that gastronomy and table manners reached their 'peak' moments (1) in the mid-seventeenth century, during the reigns of Matei Basarab (Wallachia) and Vasile Lupu (Moldavia) when, in spite of a, roughly, one-hundred-year phase difference, (table) civilisation in the two principalities was close to that of Renaissance Western Europe, and (2) at the turn of the eighteenth century, during the reigns of Constantin Brâncoveanu in Wallachia and Demetrius Cantemir in Moldavia, when the influence of Western habits — though largely indirect — was even more poignant.

A fairly interesting cultural *metissage* occurred during the Phanariote epoch, when Greek, Turkish, French, and vernacular influences intermingled. Towards the end of this period, the passage from a south-eastern to a western type of

civilisation made a decisive step. This process was to be continued — at a comparatively slow speed — until the mid-nineteenth century, and continuously accelerated from the beginning of the reign of Carol I until the outbreak of World War II.

Compared to the other two Romanian Principalities, Transylvania seems to offer a more varied and colourful image as regards food and table manners. The cohabitation of various ethnic and religious communities contributed to this effect.

CHAPTER THREE

A FEW EPISTEMIC PROBLEMS

As shown in the present essay, gastronomy is, among other things, what Le Goff calls 'a deformed history of a community.'¹⁰⁶

The implicit — or explicit — postulate of any gastronomical discourse is that gastronomy responds not only to *concrete needs*, but also to *abstract desires* and *theoretical curiosity*. That is why, in most cases, the gastronomical discourse is also a *philosophical meditation*. For instance, in his *Souvenirs culinaires*¹⁰⁷ Escoffier claims that to never lose one's head — even under the most difficult circumstances — is a good cook's first maxim. In his turn, Brillat-Savarin entitles a chapter in one of his books 'An episodic meditation on the end of the world'.¹⁰⁸

Since gastronomy is, to a certain extent, a 'guilty pleasure', it is closely related to *hedonism* and *epicurism*, but also to *detachment*, *asceticism*, and *masochism*. These are as many trends illustrated by the gastronomical discourse.

The philosophical problems of *truth* and *falsehood* are also quite relevant in the case of gastronomical discourse. In his memoirs,¹⁰⁹ Escoffier explains how he once invented a dish called 'The Nymphs', and pretended it was made of chicken; behind this sticker, he dissimulated the frogs, because certain people claimed to hate frogs.

Gastronomical discourse is a ground on which cultural symbioses and cultural metissage take place (see *supra*). Once again Escoffier's views¹¹⁰ are illustrative of such an assumption. He claims that circumstances have pushed him to deeply change the service and to adapt it to the necessities of the extremely speedy life of our times, further expanding on the invention of new methods of dressing and the creation of new material. He concludes that in a time of permanent changes and transformations, it would be absurd to pretend to fix for ever the destiny of an art so intricately related to fashion, and as transient as fashion itself.

Therefore, the gastronomical discourse is also a piece of 'art for art's sake'. The same Escoffier¹¹¹ tells us about '*Un diner tout en rouge*' (A dinner all in red). He explains that a group of young dandies, who had won on red at the roulette, decided to give a dinner in which everything would be red: meat, fruit, ice-cream, sauces, carpets, tapestries etc. That dinner turned into a *show*. Elsewhere he explains, referring to a recipe, that 'the mixture of pineapple and creme Chantilly will give the illusion of a beautiful sunset.'

Besides, the gastronomical discourse also inscribes *celebration* and *ceremony*. Escoffier draws our attention to this fact when he writes that people use to keep the menu of a christening, a marriage feast, or a family celebration, and that such menus should be a reflection of circumstances, a kind of poem reminding of a pleasant time spent together.

More often than not, the gastronomical discourse aims to legitimate its own status. Once more Brillat-Savarin's *Physiologie du goût* is conclusive.

Lyotard¹¹² refers to the necessity of presenting science 'as an epic'. In this way, he adds, both science and the institutions supporting it will become *credible*. For instance, Brillat-Savarin suggests several 'gastronomical tests' in order to see whether a guest is 'initiated'. He ludically speaks of the 'ritual' dimension of gastronomy.

In effect, the gastronomical discourse is the expression of a specific way of experiencing daily events. For instance, in his *Souvenirs culinaires*, Escoffier explains that while serving as an army cook during the Franco-Prussian war, a forthcoming battle or retreat would lead him to improvise not only a new dish, but also a new way of preparing it. In his memoirs, a dish may cause him to remember an event, or the other way round.

The gastronomical discourse allows the reconstruction of the immediate reality, to which it aims to confer a quasi-eternal dimension. In this case, the gastronomical discourse usually focuses on a *specific reality*, one which already enjoys some fame; the Enunciator only increases its fame by giving it a temporal dimension. Thus, the chapter called 'L'épreuve du feu' (The Fire Test) in Escoffier's book refers both to the battle, and to the preparation of a 'roast-beef à la broche'. He also mentions the 'menu suggested and offered by Gambetta to the Prince of Wales (1874),' assuming that it was then that the bases were laid for the Entente Cordiale between France and England, which was to be officially signed only in 1907. The menu is supposed to present the event in a better, nobler light, in their turn, event and participants grant the menu a certain glamour.

The gastronomical discourse is also a prescriptive discourse. This feature includes it in the same category as *medical prescriptions*. In effect, in Romanian and in German, 'medical prescription' and 'cooking recipe' are still designated by the same term, i.e. *rețetă* and, respectively, *Rezept*. This was also the case with Old French, Old Italian, and Old English.

The gastronomical discourse is a didactic discourse as well. Escoffier's 'Preface' to the *Guide for Young Cooks* contains several pieces of advice meant to ensure the success of a recipe, and is equally a meditation on teaching, learning, and improving oneself.

The gastronomical discourse also addresses the issues of 'centre' and 'periphery', 'fragmentary' and 'whole'. Escoffier, in his memoirs, speaks about the *merlan*, long considered a 'rather vulgar fish'. The French chef defends it, explaining that the merlan is not so famous, 'only because its name is not romantic enough. Were it renamed *l'Etoile de Mer*, it would be the king of all fish.' Talking of 'centre' and 'periphery', 'fragmentary' and the 'whole', *polysemy* plays an important part. Escoffier explains that Katinka, a famous ballet-dancer, once told him that she was fond of crawfish, but hated to decorticate it with her own hands. Therefore, the chef invented a dish in which the crawfish was already decorticated; it was 'disguised' in the dressing so far used for fish. He called the dish 'Le reve de Katinka' (Katinka's dream) because (1) Katinka loved crawfish and (2) the crawfish was already decorticated, as Katinka had always wished it to be.

Sometimes, polysemy equally mediates the superposition of the 'gastronomical' and the 'political' meaning. This phenomenon was explained by Escoffier who recollects how he dubbed a pate *la Sainte Alliance*. It consisted of genuine foie gras d'Alsace, and truffes from the Perigord. This he considered to be an *indestructible alliance*; in spite of all the political events that might disturb the atmosphere, this *alliance* was to be always a jewel of the French cuisine.

Menus are often so fanciful as to be anchored into an *imaginary world*, which is made to seem *contingent* and *actual*. This imaginary world becomes *real* and *possible* for a very brief interval (the time of cooking and eating). In this process, the role of discourse is essential, for it proves that the imaginary is possible, and can (seems to) become real.

Sometimes the gastronomical discourse can be read as a possible expression of language philosophy. Brillat-Savarin's 'Preface' to his *Physiologie du goût* includes a metalinguistic discussion concerning the French language. In his turn, Auguste Escoffier claims that, after barely six months of experience, he began to take a deep interest in the composition of menus. He was keen on finding sweet and agreeable consonances for the names of dishes, which were bound to bear an analogy to the dish itself. A well-formed menu had to be evocative... The problem of the adequacy of the metalanguage to the object-language is explicitly phrased.

Since gastronomy *is* an industry, and is supported by industry, the gastronomical discourse makes use of *industrial terms*. An example at hand is 'brigade de cuisine'. It is also significant that authors speak of 'research' in the field of gastronomy, of the 'falsification' of a recipe, and so on.

The attitude towards cuisine, as expressed in the gastronomical discourse, reflects the evolution of mentalities. The present work should be seen as an attempt to prove the existence of this phenomenon throughout the past centuries.

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION

Hardly any recipes have been given in the present paper. The original plan has been changed several times. Many of the problems which the author had originally meant to expand upon, or at least to tackle, have been left aside.

The historical approach was unavoidable since what was aimed was a scientifically-based philosophical conclusion. Reduced to a minimum though it was, the survey amounted to some ninety per cent of the space granted for the present essay. Only a limited number of pages was therefore available for 'philosophical' speculations. Most of them remain implicit.

The author genuinely hopes that the basic issues have been tackled in such a manner as to provide readers with 'food for thought' and encourage them to further explore the intricacy of problems set forth so far, their relevance for various fields of the humanities, and especially their capacity to illustrate a possible comparative history of mentalities.

All this is a reservoir for the future.

Notes

1. In contemporary linguistics, *discourse* means, basically, (a) an intermediary step between the enunciation and the utterance, and (b) a synonym for the text, or for the utterance. (Cf. A.-J. Greimas; J. Courtès, *Semiotique. Dictionnaire raisonne de la theorie du langage*. Paris, Hachette, 1979.)

In the present paper, *discourse* is, more often than not, equivalent to *text*. However, since all kinds of texts have been taken into consideration (cookery books, chronicles, wills, dowry lists, household documents, treatises of cuisine, etc.) (the second meaning is neither neglected, nor does it contradict the former; whenever cuisine and table manners are concerned and put into text, they are underlined by a specific enunciation, framework, capable of outlining a specific *genre*, characterised by its own rules, even if, in practice, it is seldom materialised as such.

2. Literary references to gastronomy lie beyond the scope of the present paper. Ethnological and anthropological references and interpretations have also been left aside.

3. For an analysis of Dumas' *Grand dictionnaire de cuisine*, see M. Net, 'Alexandre Dumas: le pays où il fait mort,' cf. 'Le moi, la cuisine, la creation' (forthcoming).

4. Cf. Jane Grigson, *English Food*. A New Edition of the cooking classic. Revised and Adapted by its Author. London, Ebury Press, 1992, p. X: 'All too often, books on English food [...] end cataclysmically with the outbreak of the Second World War'. In effect, in order to

ensure adequate distance, this study is no exception to this 'rule': none of the texts here taken into consideration were written after 1940.

5. Cf. Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni, *Les interactions verbales*, III. Lyon, PUL, 1993.

6. Cf. Erving Goffman, 'On Face-Work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction,' in *Language, Culture and Society*, Ben G. Blount (editor). Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974, pp. 224–249.

7. Essential contributions in this field have been made by the French *Ecole des Annales* and by the authors of the *Histoire de la vie privée*, Philippe Aries and Georges Duby (coordinators), 6 vols., Paris, Seuil, 1985–1986. For objective reasons, references to the latter, throughout this essay, follow the Romanian translation: *Istoria vieții private* [translators Ion Herdău (I-II), Maria Berza and Micaela Slăvescu (III-IV), Constanța Tănăsescu (V-VI)]. București, Meridiane Publishing House, 1994–1996.

8. Jean-Louis Flandrin, in *Histoire de la vie privée (Istoria vieții private)*, V:3.

9. Cf. William Edward Mead, *The Mediaeval Feast*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931.

10. Joop Witteveen, 'On Swans, Cranes and Herons.' (I-IV). In, *Petits Propos Culinaires*, 24: (1987), 22–31; 25: (1987), 51–57; 26 (1987), 65 — 73; 32: (1989), 23–34.

11. Cf. C. Anne Wilson, 'The Evolution of the Banquet Course; Some Medicinal, Culinary and Social Aspects.' In, C. Anne Wilson (editor), *Banqueting Stuffe. The Face and social background of the Tudor and Stuart banquet*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991, pp. 9–35.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

13. Cf. *inter alii*, Barbara Ketcham Wheaton, *Savouring the Past. The French Kitchen and Table from 1300 to 1789*. London, Chatto & Windus. The Hogarth Press, 1983.

14. Cf. William Edward Mead, *The Mediaeval Feast*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931, p. 50.

15. Forks were introduced exclusively for the dessert and, since they were still a luxury and therefore supplied in small stock, especially ladies used them.

16. One example is provided by the castle of Chenonceaux. Built across the river Cher, a tributary to the Loire, the castle offers ample ground for speculation as concerns a virtual sketch of the relation between science, art, the cuisine, and a certain *Weltanschauung* as the basic constituents of mentality. First of all, as is well known, the three-storey castle is built over the river, linking its two banks like a bridge. The kitchens are in the basement; their windows are placed at water level. A stroll through the long upper floors galleries allows the visitor a complex, simultaneous, partial, and ever changing view of the river, of the Italian gardens in front of the castle (a fashion introduced in France at about the same time), of the woods beyond it, as well as of some details of the outside architectural 'ornaments' (corniches, balconies, etc.). As the visitor strolls along the gallery, the perspective is continuously changing; the castle is built in such a way that one has the impression of manipulating a camera and 'creating' artistic effects. Things change, however, once one reaches the basement. One of the first things to notice is that the castle used to have running water, which was extremely rare at the time even at Italian princely courts, and all the more so in aristocratic French castles. The presence of running water in the grand kitchens of Chenonceaux is, perhaps, accounted for by the castle's relative proximity to Clos-Luce, the manor near Amboise where Leonardo spent the last years of his life. The Palazzo Sforzesco in Milan (where Leonardo lived before moving to the court of François I) did have running water, not only in the kitchens, but also in the bathrooms; one equally knows that Leonardo introduced to France a lot of technical improvements, not necessarily all of his own invention. The relationship between the existence of running water and a flourishing cuisine needs hardly be argued. A second, even more rele-

vant detail, which strikes the visitor of the Chenonceaux kitchens, especially if the tour had begun on the upper floor, is the extremely special view one has when looking through the windows. As already mentioned, they are at the level of the water. More important still, the protruding balconies at ground-floor level function as a kind of eaves; they prevent on lookers from catching the slightest glimpse of the sky above, or of the trees on the banks, otherwise then as a reversed reflection in the water. At twilight, the sun, always invisible from the kitchen windows, can be seen as a reflection in the river, too. The topos of the 'upside-down world' functions as a 'reality' only for the people in the kitchen. The kitchen is a universe apart, governed by its own laws, and enjoying its own compensations. The intricate connection between the cuisine and architecture is fairly obvious, too.

17. Cf. Alfred Gottschalk, *Histoire de l'alimentation et de la gastronomie depuis la Pré-histoire jusqu'à nos jours*. Paris, Hippocrate, 1948, I, p. 341.

18. Jean Louis Flandrin in *Histoire de la vie privée*, Philippe Aries and Georges Duby (coordinators). Romanian translation, *Istoria vieții private*, vol. V, p. 33.

19. These were those entitled 'a monter dans les carrosses du roi', viz. whose nobility dated at least back to 1399.

20. The examination of English cookery books in the next chapter sheds light on new facets of this phenomenon.

21. Jean-Paul Aron, *Le mangeur du XIX^e siècle*. (Paris, Denoel/Gonthier, 1973), mentions malicious comments according to which, owing to this idea, Grimod, as chairman of the juries, had an opportunity to enjoy free meals. Similar malicious remarks claim that the introduction of the 'service à la russe' may be accounted for by the difficulty of assessing how much anyone was eating.

22. Dan Grigorescu, 'Cuvînt înainte,' in Brillat-Savarin *Fiziologia gustului*, București: Meridiane, 1988, p. 17.

23. Dan Grigorescu, *loc. cit.*

24. 'Sur ces mentalités antagonistes la table nous informe. Desormais, il faudra discerner les restaurants qui perpétuent les fastes de l'âge d'or de ceux qui flattent les goûts de la bourgeoisie raisonnable; parmi les tables de luxe, celles qui illustrent la chère et d'autres, les vantards; enfin la table classique et les bistrots ou d'authentiques mangeurs se rassemblent, opérant, jusque dans les bas-fonds, la synthèse de la gourmandise et de la fronde'. J.-P. Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

25. '[Les restaurants] se pretent aux nouveaux usages; dans l'escalier, de plus en plus fréquemment, on y croise des mariages. De la meilleure bourgeoisie, il est vrai: des avoués qui épousent des héritières et qui paient leur charge le jour du contrat. *Le Cadran bleu*, vers 1835, semble un peu en baisse. On s'y marie aussi, mais ce sont les noces du commerce de détail'. J.-P. Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

26. *Op. cit.*, p. 78.

27. Cf. J.-P. Aron, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

28. *Op. cit.*, pp. 120 sq.

29. *Op. cit.*, p. 120

30. *Op. cit.* p. 181.

31. *Op. cit.*, p. 1

32. The fact that Great Britain had been a constitutional monarchy ever since the latter half of the seventeenth century might be considered as one of the principal causes of this phenomenon.

33. Auguste Escoffier, *Souvenirs inédits. 75 ans au service de l'art culinaire*, Marseilles, Jean Laffite, 1985.

33. Auguste Escoffier, *Souvenirs inédits. 75 ans au service de l'art culinaire*, Marseilles, Jean Laffite, 1985.
33. Auguste Escoffier, *Souvenirs inédits. 75 ans au service de l'art culinaire*, Marseilles, Jean Laffite, 1985.
35. C. Anne Wilson, *art. cit.*
36. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
37. Arnold Whitaker Oxford's bibliography of *English Cookery Books (1500–1850)* alone includes more than 300 titles.
38. Alexandru Paleologu indirectly supplies an additional argument in favour of this supposition. In his dialogues with Stelian Tanase (*Sfidarea memoriei*. București, Du Style, 1996), he explains that English governesses used to instruct young Romanian aristocratic girls so as to be able to do without servants, viz. to be capable of doing all the household jobs themselves. The author also refers to Queen Maria of Romania (Queen Victoria's grand-daughter), whose diary bears witness to her having been brought up in the same way.
39. Ever since the end of the sixteenth century, cookery books and gastronomic treatises included folding-plate illustrations showing how a table should be laid.
40. One of the most important reforms was the acceptance of women at table (with the obligation, however, to get up after the meal was over, and retire to the drawing-room, leaving men to discuss over a glass — usually more — of port).
41. The geographical space here taken into consideration is that occupied by the Romanian Kingdom from 1918 (December 1st) to 1940 (June 26). Historically speaking, the Romanian territory consisted of three principalities, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania. Though necessary for the non-Romanian reader, a historical sketch of the main avatars of the three provinces lies beyond the scope of the present paper.
42. Historians agree, however, that less than twenty percent of the chronicles and historical documents in the archives have been deciphered and interpreted so far. Therefore data in this chapter should be taken *cum grano salis*.
43. Cf. *Călători străini prin Țările Române* vol. I–VIII (București; Academiei Publishing House). Cf. also *Călători străini prin Țările Române* vols. IX–X (typescript). I would like to thank Dr. Georgeta Penelea-Filiti, Head of Department, 'Nicolae Iorga' Institute of Historical Sciences, who kindly allowed me to consult the typescripts.
- Cf. also Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria Românilor prin călători*, (Bucharest, Eminescu Publishing House), 1981; Dan Amedeo Lăzărescu, *Imaginea României prin călători*, (Bucharest, Academiei Publishing House), 1985; Sandi Ionescu, *Bibliografia călătorilor străini*; George Potra, *Bucureștii văzuți de călătorii străini (secolele XVI–XIX)*, (Bucharest, Academiei Publishing House), 1992.
44. For obvious reasons, any reference to the ethnological and anthropological impact of food and eating have been left aside. A fairly rich bibliography in this respect is available.
45. The accounts of foreign travellers contain a host of variations and contradictions. Once again, such documents should be considered with caution.
46. Pierre Lescalopier in: *Călători străini...*, vol. II, p. 439.
47. *Călători străini...*, vol. II, p. 463.
48. *Călători străini...*, vol. II, pp. 491–492.
49. There are two dishes of meat, at noon, on meat days, and two dishes of fish on fish days. First they serve pastry, then beef or sheep, followed by chickens cooked with pepper and safran, then purees, and finally fruits and cheese. Chicken is often replaced by geese, while beef and sheep may be replaced by hares or wild game. The greatest luxury characterises their

- food and drinks. [...] Dinner also consists of two meat dishes. [...] The second dish of meat is always hen, or deer, or hare. In the market, a female deer is sold for three chickens.'
50. Sturgeons and carps, cut into quarters, salted and smoked were sent to Constantinople, where they were highly appreciated.
51. Honey, wax, butter, cheese, wheat, barley, cattle, smoked fish, and salt.
52. *Călători străini...*, vol. III, p. 13.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
54. He claims that twenty eggs were sold for a talent, a large hen for two; markets were full of beef, bacon, bread, wine, beer [a kind of beverage made of fermented barley], mied, and especially fresh fish (sturgeon, carp, pike, and mackerel).
55. *Călători străini...*, vol. II, p. 1582.
56. *Călători străini...*, vol. VI, pp. 581–582.
57. *Apud* Dan Simionescu, *Literatura românească de ceremonial*. Bucharest, Fundația Regele Carol I, 1929.
58. *Apud* Dan Simionescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 31–32.
59. Missayil mentions 27 officers. His list opens with the High Chancellor and ends with the Third Cup-bearer. In between range the First Cup-bearer, whose office was to fill the Prince's cup at feasts; the High Stewart, who used to supervise the Prince's table; the Lord Stewart, who had to carve the meat served to the Prince's table; and the High Lord, charged with bringing in the sweets and fruit preserves. There is no room to enter here into all the details of this complicated table ceremony, or into the various offices discharged by the boyars.
60. Gheorghachi, *Condica de ceremonial* (1762).
61. *Apud* Dan Simionescu, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
62. *Călători străini...*, vol. VI, pp. 37–38.
63. He also claims to have seen no drunkard in the streets. On the other hand, all records clearly indicate that the boyars used to drink a lot during the Prince's banquets. At the end of the feasts, some of them were so drunk that they could not walk without the help of the servants.
64. *Călători străini...*, vol. V, pp. 586–587.
65. *Călători străini...*, vol. V, pp. 610–611.
66. The Polish ambassador, Rafael Leszczynski, who condescended to find Antioch Cantemir's court refined enough to suit his taste (*Călători străini...*, vol. VIII, pp. 173–180); secretary De la Croix (*Călători străini...*, vol. VII, pp. 263–268).
67. Cf. Saint-Simon, *Memoires*. Paris, Pleiade, 1972; Madame de Sévigné, *Lettres*. Paris, Pleiade, 1953.
68. D. Cantemir, *Descriptio Moldaviae*. Bucharest, Albatros Publishing House, 1970.
69. Cantemir makes no mention of the boyars' final kneeling; he must have been concerned with conveying a more 'European' image of his country.
70. Dr. Ioana Constantinescu, of the 'Nicolae Iorga' Institute of History, has kindly allowed me to consult the revised edition, *O lume printr-o carte de bucate*, before publication.
71. Marin Cazacu, 'Introducere,' in: *O lume printr-o carte de bucate*. Bucharest, Fundația Culturală Română Publishing House, 1997.
72. The Phanariote epoch lasted until 1821.
73. Neagu Djuvara, *Între Orient și Occident. Țările Române la începutul epocii moderne*. Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1995, pp. 237–238.
74. Minced-meat rolls, wrapped in (sour) cabbage leaves.
75. Various recipes preserved at the State Archives in Bucharest and Iași stand proof to this effect. Dr. Lia Brad-Chisacof, Institute for South-Eastern European Studies, kindly

lent me the transliteration of several of such recipes, which show that French, Greek, and Romanian terms were interchangeably used. This was a period of transition for culture as a whole, not only at the linguistic level.

76. *Apud Ștefan Lemny, Sensibilitate și istorie în secolul XVIII românesc*. Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing House, 1990, p. 50.

77. Neagu Djuvara, *op. cit.*, p. 239, mentions the existence of 19 bakeries in Iasi in 1750, and of 37 in 1770. Newly discovered documents indicate an even higher number.

78. It is equally important that both the quality of flour and the weight of the loaves of bread were stipulated by law. Neagu Djuvara, *op. cit.*, gives the names of two famous confectioners in Iași, *Cristian* (whose name appears in a document from June 9, 1721), and *Ilie*, his son (whose name is mentioned in a document from January 22, 1752). These were just two of the most fashionable confectioners. Archival materials provide us with many other names and places.

79. *Op. cit.*, pp. 64–65.

80. Texts concerned with the relationship between people's health and their food can be found in some of the very first books printed in the Romanian principalities. An interesting, though far from complete, chronological list is given by G. Brătescu, *Grija pentru sănătate. Primele tipărituri de interes medical în limba română*. The list begins with Coresi's *Exempla* (Brașov, 1581), and continues with the popular *Calendar*, quite frequently published in the eighteenth century, which indicate the healthy food prescribed for every month (including recipes, proportions and counter-indications). The encyclopedic nature of such texts lends them a strong didactic character. As it was shown in the previous chapter, such calendars had appeared in England one and a half century before.

81. In George Potra, *Bucureștii văzuți de călători străini (secolele XVI–XIX)*. Bucharest: Academiei Publishing House, 1992, pp. 127–128.

82. Most of the materials in this respect were kindly provided by Dr. Irina Nicolau, of the Museum of the Romanian Peasant in Bucharest.

83. *Transilvania*, 2, 1993.

84. Paul Beke, *apud* Ion Bălan, 'Piinea cea de toate zilele.' In *Transilvania*, 2 (1993), pp. 137–140.

85. *Op. cit.*, pp. 239–240.

86. A few specifications are in order here. Though neither *polenta*, nor *cheese* are typically Romanian dishes, their combination obviously is. The kind of cheese varied with the region. I have been able to count at least forty kinds of cheese. Along the same line, Tudor Pamfile, *Industria casnică la români* [Household Industry with the Romanians], Bucharest, 1910, mentions ten different kinds of sour milk, and explains their different preparation, taste, and qualities. He does the same concerning every dairy product, though he overlooks a fairly large lot of cheeses. Meat and fish are treated in the same way: once again, his list is far from exhaustive. As regards *chicken*, this sticker could generically stand for hen, duck, goose, turkey, guinea hen etc.

87. *Apud. Alimente sfinte și hrana de leac* [Blessed Foodstuffs and Medicine Foods]. Bucharest, Muzeul Țăranului Român, 1992, p. 12.

88. *24 de rețete țărănești*, Georgeta Roșu, Dan Ștefănescu, Ioana Bătrânu, Adrian Hotoiu (eds.), Bucharest: Muzeul Țăranului Român, 1992.

89. By way of example, here are the ingredients for *nettle soup*: a cast-iron kettle full of nettle, 2–3 carrots; 1 parsley root; 1 celery; 2–3 onions; oil; 1 spoonful of flour; tomato sauce; a jug of milk, 1 pot of borsch; parsley leaves; salt.

90. Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu was the leader of an anti-Communist group, which led a guerilla-like war in the Făgăraș mountains between 1948 and 1956. Apart from a very accurate analysis of what Communist terror meant, Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu's book *Brazii se frâng dar nu se îndoiesc niciodată* (Timișoara: Marineasa Publishing House, 1992, 1994) comprises a fairly complete description of peasant life during the process of collectivisation. He describes the way in which the houses were built, what foodstuffs were to be found, and the precise places where they were stored.

91. With the revolt of Horia, Cloșca, and Crișan.

92. The year the revolutionary uprising, led by Tudor Vladimirescu, put an end to the Phanariote regime.

93. Henry Notaker, 'Romania: Cooking, Literature and Politics. A Cookbook from Moldova, 1841,' in *Petits propos culinaires*, 35 (1990), pp. 7–23.

94. For a detailed description of the dishes, and the question marks raised by their selection, see *art. cit.*, pp. 17–19.

95. The printer is Christ. Ionnin.

96. The re-unification of all Romanian territories was completed on December 1st, 1918. It was to last until June 26th, 1940.

97. Henry Notaker, *art. cit.*, p. 15.

98. For an accurate account of this phenomenon on all the levels of social, political and cultural life, see Mircea Eliade, *L'épreuve du labyrinthe*, Paris, Gallimard, 1980.

99. In 1926, almost a decade before Al. O. Teodoreanu, Henriette Krupensky-Sturdza published an *Amusing Cookery-Book Written by a Grandma*. The playful style of the recipes, the remarks about the cheap quality of life before the war, when 'a modest family, living on a clerk's salary, could only seldom afford to eat sturgeon caviar, etc.', the considerations about the quality of the guests, as being determinant for the pleasure given by a meal, her almost philosophical remarks about the interdependence between people's age and the degree of consideration they are shown etc., turn Mrs. Krupensky-Sturdza into a precursor of Al. O. Teodoreanu, although she is almost forgotten nowadays. In fact, Henriette Krupensky-Sturdza constitutes the link between C. Bacalbașa and Al. O. Teodoreanu.

100. Mainly *Adevărul literar și artistic* (1933–1934), *Bilete de papașal* (1928), *Lumea* (1930), *Magazinul* (1933), *Vremea* (1934).

101. The most complete (though not exhaustive) volume is *De re culinaria*, Bucharest, Sport-Turism Publishing House, 1977. Quotations in this chapter are from this volume.

102. Al. O. Teodoreanu, *De re culinaria*, p. 12.

103. *Op. cit.*, pp. 31–32.

104. A variety of Tokay, acclimated to the soil of south-western Moldavia in the fifteenth century.

105. *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

106. Jacques Le Goff, *Imaginaire medieval*. Paris, Gallimard, 1985, p. 8.

107. Auguste Escoffier, *op. cit.*, p. 174. Owing to the unavailability of the English version of the book, all mentions here made refer to the Romanian translation.


108. *Op. cit.*, pp. 150–152.

109. *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

110. *Op. cit.*, pp. 106–107.

111. *Op. cit.* 164.

112. J. F. Lyotard, *La condition post-moderne* [Romanian translation, Bucharest, Univers Publishing House, 1979], 1993, p. 15.



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The Empirical Study of Literature

1. Theoretical and Methodological Aspects

1.1. The 'battle of methods'

The empirical study of literature is a quite recent research field in the humanities. It began to be shaped during the seventies, within the framework of a larger methodological shift which occurred in literary scholarship at that time. The scope, perspectives and the status of this new approach are, nevertheless, still a subject for debate.

What is 'empirical', the labeling mark of the new discipline, supposed to mean? In a narrow sense, it refers to certain investigation procedures such as tests, questionnaires or experiments similar to research instruments commonly used in sociology or psychology. The employment of such instruments represents, to be sure, the 'core' of the discipline and its striking — and embarrassing — novelty. A relative novelty though, at least in the United States, where the investigation of 'literary response' was quite popular even before World War II, mostly in connection with working out teaching and evaluation strategies (KLEMENZ-BELGARDT, 1982). Nevertheless, many scholars in humanities consider this way of dealing with literature altogether inappropriate. The 'empiricist' is perceived as a fanatic of figures and measurements, prone to torture his 'subjects' with EEGs and perspiration tests and lacking the very sense of literary, aesthetic values. An idea which might be exaggerate, but not always out of place.

The disputes caused by various approaches to literature clearly indicate that there is much more at stake than merely methodological options. In scientific research, particularly in the humanities, 'methods' cease to be just convenient means of achieving one's goal. They bring about their own theoretical presuppositions and promote specific research tasks. The already mentioned methodological shift which occurred by the end of the sixties, was triggered by the need to 'rethink literature' as such. The whole range of new or renewed approaches of the time seems thus to reveal a common denominator, 'the movement away

from the formalist and New Critical emphasis on the autonomy of 'the text itself' toward a recognition (or a re-recognition) of the relevance of context, whether the latter be defined in terms of historical, cultural, ideological or psychoanalytical categories' (Susan R. SULEIMAN, in SULEIMAN and Crosman 1980: 5).

Be it a 'change of paradigm' (*Paradigmawechsel*) as Hans Robert Jauss had already argued in 1969 (in ZMEGAC 1972: 274–290), or just one of 'emphasis', the shift in focus from 'text' to 'context' was a turning point in the academic manner of constructing 'literature'. Even French structuralists, perhaps the keen-est supporters of scientific rigor in the humanities during the sixties, eventually adjusted their fundamental theoretical standpoints. The science they had promoted, the 'poetics', which combined the tradition of the rationalist, deductive approach of Aristotle with borrowings from up-to-date linguistics, was meant to specify the *langue* of literature, in relation to which particular texts were perceived as *parole* occurrences. Theorists who had viewed literature as an abstract system and believed in the capacity of poetics to thoroughly investigate the 'possible realities of discourse' beyond and above existing texts (GENETTE 1978: 275), also came to admit, in the following decades, the 'conditional' nature of literature, depending on time and place, on the people involved in it. The central question of the sixties, 'What is literature?' could thus be rephrased, as Nelson Goodman suggested, to become 'When is literature?' (GENETTE 1994: 92).

For most of the people, the meaning of 'literature' evokes the idea of a list of texts, mostly written but occasionally also oral, irrespective of when, how or by whom these texts were brought together. It is some sort of ideal library, the librarian of which remains unknown — or, as Malraux has put it, an 'imaginary museum'. For the formalists and structuralists, 'literature' consists in a set of invariants, such as devices, forms, functions, rules or principles, that allow particular combinations. For the empiricist, it is primarily a matter of human action and interaction. 'Our main theoretical contention is that literature is a form of action with texts', assert Dick H. SCHRAM and Gerard J. STEEN (1992: 239). However categorical this statement may appear, it is nonetheless ambiguous. It may refer, on the one hand, to the actual experience real people have when they are making, reading, working up or mediating various kinds of texts. On the other hand, it may concern inter-subjectively shared beliefs, attitudes, habits or abilities which determine and enable people to act in a specific, 'literary' way under certain circumstances.

The empirical study of literature, in a broader sense, has proved to be able to offer good support for large-scale research programs, which would encompass, correlate and systematize all the relevant aspects of the 'social field of action literature'. The work of Siegfried J. SCHMIDT, *Grundriß der Empirischen Literaturwissenschaft* (I 1980, II 1982) is highly significant from this point of view: it represents, so to say, a theory of the empirical approach, which attempts to

reconsider and reintegrate in a systemic view poetics as well as aesthetics, literary sociology and psychology, theory of communication, documental positivistic research. As for the notion of 'literature' itself, Schmidt endorses a conventionalist perspective. His assumption, which has been widely commented upon, is that literature is characterized by the functioning of two basic conventions, the 'aesthetic' and the 'polyvalence' (I 1980: 92–110). A parallel applied investigation has brought some evidence about the way these two conventions influence the German readers' evaluations of texts as being literary or not (HINZENBERG, SCHMIDT and ZOBEL 1980).

In spite of the bold, promising projects, the empirical study of literature has attained, more often than not, limited results. Obvious priority has been given to the investigation of literary reception or 'response'. There are several reasons for this. First of all, it is much easier to collect data about the reading process than about the creative one. The work of the writer is highly idiosyncratic and could be expected to lead to observations that are very difficult to correlate. The psychology of art or literature, be it speculative or experimental, seems much more suitable for reaching generalizations in this research field. Besides, other activities related to literature (such as the work of the literary critic, the actor, the stage or film director, and so on) have been frequently interpreted, more or less arbitrarily, as forms of 'reading'. The focus on literary response was also stimulated by teaching interests. The 'reign of the reader', which began about the end of the sixties, encouraged by several different approaches (the 'aesthetics of reception' initiated at the University of Constance, Gadamer's hermeneutics, literary pragmatics, semiotics, even structuralism), doubtless influenced the orientation of the empirical studies, too. The foregrounding of the reader role was in its turn caused by various interweaving factors, pertaining both to social history (politics, social and cultural changes) and to the dynamics of the humanities. Reader and reception have been used as a means to overcome the 'crisis' of literary history, to accommodate the theoretical paradigm to a more comprehensive understanding of the way literature comes into being and works upon people, to rehabilitate the popular genres of *Trivialliteratur* or to grant academic 'canon' new legitimacy. Socio-political circumstances also reinforced the orientation toward reader and reception. 'Traditionelle bürgerliche Werthaltungen wie autoritäre Leistungsorientierung, Hochschätzung materieller Belohnungen, Aufstiegs — und Karrierementalität sind im Rückgang; ebenso die Betonung von Ruhe und Ordnung etc. Stattdessen hat sich ein im Lebensstil verwurzeltes Gleichheitsdenken, ein Bedürfnis nach individueller Autonomie, eine Hochschätzung von Sensibilität und Selbsterfahrung ausgebreitet'. The description of the German social environment in the late sixties (REESE 1980: 28) could be obviously applied to larger areas in Western Europe and the United States. The academia itself

was put under severe pressure, such as the 1968 student movements, which most of the later analysts, Walter REESE included (1980: 27), link to 'the rise of the reader' (see also HOLUB 1984: 6–12). The methodological renewal had its own ideological tint, advocating, more or less explicitly, the emancipating function of literature and art. The West-East German polemics on the theory of reception during the seventies is highly illuminating. 'Gerade die Probleme der Rezeption-sästhetik zeigen in aller Evidenz den ideologischen Charakter literaturtheoretischer Debatten' (MANDELKOW 1974: 387). East German theorists oppose the *Wirkungsforschung* to the Western *Rezeptionsästhetik*, while they analogize Marxist economics to literature, considering that the 'production' (i.e. creative writing and its result, literary texts) determines the 'consumption' (i.e. literary reception). The coinage *Rezeptionsvorgabe* is supposed to emphasize this primacy. According to East German polemicists, the Western theory of reception grants the reader unlimited and therefore arbitrary liberty in coping with the text. 'Consumptiveness' and 'manipulation' are key notions underlining the debate (see also HOLUB 1984: 121–133; REESE 1980: 43–53; GRIMM 1975: 42–50).

The 'role of the reader' has also changed in relation to the position which the author, the other main agent of literary communication, has acquired in the literary criticism of the last decades. In this respect, ever since the Russian formalists and the New Critics, the general trend has been to disregard or to minimize the importance of documentation about the author, about his or her biography and personality, about the epoch in which he or she lived and created (the 'original context') or about presumptive authorial intentions. The obliteration of the author, the self-effacement of the individual ego in which literary creations are supposed to originate, is one of the distinctive features of modernism. If we were to believe the confessions of Edgar Allan Pöe in *The Philosophy of Composition*, *The Raven* must have been the result of an entirely rationalistic, carefully calculated design, one which strikingly anticipates contemporary computer procedures. Paul Valery dreamt of a literary history as a history of 'the spirit who produces and consumes literature', so that 'no name of a writer would appear in it' (in MAVRODIN 1982: 62). Mallarmé thought of a *Magnum Opus*, the book of endless possible combinations, and defined the poet as a *grand syntaxier*, while Borges imagined the universe as a timeless labyrinth library in which already written texts fill in just a trifling part in the repertoire of the still-to-be-written ones. Such literary utopias, which recall the medieval metaphor of the 'book of the universe', illustrate a lowering in the very high status the writer had acquired during the first half of the nineteenth century, with Romanticism. The modern writer somehow 'assists' the birth of the text, or is turned into a kind of specialized 'reader' of the latencies of language. Leaving the writer out of consideration or even completely eliminating the authorial *persona* meant a strong bias of literary criticism toward 'modernist' aesthetics on the one hand,

an argument in favor of unrestricted hermeneutics of fiction or poetry on the other. 'Authorial' has often been taken to mean 'authoritative', i. e. prescribing a preferential context and strategy of interpretation.

The banishment of the author has been enacted in order to clear the way for what René Wellek called the intrinsic approach to literature, the *Textimmanenz* of German scholars such as Wolfgang Kayser. 'Within Russian Formalism and the New Criticism, anti-authorialism appeared as a reaction to biographical positivism. In order to establish a coherent field of critical study, it was necessary to extricate the literary object from the mass of biographical and psychological speculation within which it had been submerged in the homespun eclecticism of nineteenth-century criticism' (BURKE 1992: 15). 'The text in itself' is defended against biographism and psychologism by the famous denunciations of the 'intentional fallacy' (1946) and the 'affective fallacy' by WIMSATT and BEARDSLEY (1958), in terms such as 'the question of the author — along with that of the extratextual referent in general (history, society, the world) — was sidelined or bracketed as the preliminary step toward evolving a formal, internal and rhetorical approach to the text. The exclusion of the author functioned quite simply as a methodological gambit within a system which did not pose the questions of the origins and determinants of the text. The *death* or *disappearance* of the author was not at issue but rather the incompatibility of authorial categories with immanent analyses' (BURKE 1992: 16). The much more spectacular 'funerals' initiated by the French structuralists, starting with Roland Barthes' essay *La mort de l'auteur*, first published in 1968 (BARTHES 1977), were meant to wipe off the existence of the phenomenological 'subject', so that the 'death of man' could soon be proclaimed. For the literary critic, this hecatomb would facilitate the liberation of the semiotic fabric of language from any determinants whatsoever. Becoming the 'producer' of the texts read and commented-upon, the critic would paradoxically turn into an epiphany of the dead author, revived from the ashes. Eventually, 'author' and 'reader' have become banners waved by conflicting camps. Robert Crosman, for example, argues against the hermeneutics of E. D. Hirsch, Jr., which focused on the retrieval of the author's intentions, considering reader-oriented criticism the true expression of a 'democratic' standpoint. While meaning results from contextualization, it is only the reader, explains Crosman (in SULEIMAN and CROSMAN 1980: 149–164), who is authorized to provide the appropriate interpretive context.

The empirical study of literary reception may thus be situated within a larger frame of various approaches which emphasize the role of the reader. 'Ce que la science de la littérature aujourd'hui recouvre sous le terme de 'réception' est loin de correspondre à un seul et même fondement épistémologique ou à une

même éthique scientifique. La phénoménologie, l'herméneutique, la sociologie de l'esthétique ou l'étude empirique du lecteur, qui ont toutes contribué au développement de la théorie de la réception dans l'espace germanophone — et qui continuent de le faire —, sont trop incompatibles, sur certains points, pour qu'on puisse les voir réunis en une seule école. Toutefois, s'il n'est pas exclu de découvrir un quelconque élément de convergence qui nous autorise à parler quand même de 'science de la réception' au sujet de toutes ces démarches différentes, je propose d'admettre provisoirement que toutes les démarches qui se réclament de la théorie de la réception ouvrent un champ dont l'objet concerne à la fois les textes (littéraires) et le lecteur des textes' (Elrud IBSCH, in ANGENNOT et al 1989: 249). During the seventies the empirical approach came to define its position, especially in Germany, in contrast with the phenomenological perspective taken up by promoters of the Constance *Rezeptionsästhetik* (Jauss, Iser, Warning, Gumbrecht) and with other related standpoints, advocated by narratologists (Wayne C. Booth, Seymour Chatman), structuralists (Jonathan Culler) or semioticians (Umberto Eco). There appeared to exist two diverging ways of conceiving the reader: one as an 'implied reader', which is a theoretical construct, a 'heuristic fiction' (CORNEA 1988: 66) to be used in text analysis, the other as a 'real reader', the flesh-and-blood person who deals or has dealt with some literary texts. The second type of reader seems much less problematic, even if his or her 'identity card' is far from being strictly accurate. It is very seldom the individual X or Z who stands for the 'real reader', much more often some group whose reading behavior is constructed by working up collected data. Readers differ a lot one from another, depending on educational level, profession, reading experience, personality etc. Even the same text read by the same person at different moments may be strikingly divergent, according to the circumstances in which it occurred. How one selects the target group to play the part of the 'real reader' in an empirical investigation, be it historical or contemporary, based on already existing data or producing them by experimental means, largely depends on the theoretical relevance which is being pursued (CORNEA 1988: 68–72).

Occasional inconsistencies in defining the 'real reader' are not in the least the only weak point of the empirical study of literature. After all, 'real' stands for something that lies beyond the compass of research. It would be utterly naive to hope that any kind of investigation might appropriate reality. The best it can do is to help us understand it. The empirical study is confronted with quite the same epistemological problems as the 'theoretical' one. Being aware of this fact, empiricists have avoided the fallacy of rejecting theory. 'The notion of 'empirical' should neither be taken as a synonym for 'observational', 'sensory' or 'sensory based' nor as a paraphrase for 'non-conceptual' or 'non-theoretical' (as the Logical Empiricists and the proponents of semantic conceptions of theo-

ries suggested). Furthermore, 'empirical' should not be mistaken for a predicate intentionally indicating something like 'brute factuality' or 'objective factuality', 'realness' or 'observer-independence'. It also seems less promising to take 'empirical' for the opposite of 'metaphysical' (as the results of the works of the Wiener Kreis demonstrate). Instead, 'empirical' should be interpreted as 'experiential' in a more complex sense of the word' (Gebhard Rusch in RUSCH 1995: 103). A similar position is advocated by Siegfried J. Schmidt (in RUSCH 1995: 112): 'The touch-stone for empirical knowledge is not ontological objectivity but reproducibility under *ceteris paribus* conditions.' The main advantage of empirical investigation techniques lies in the fact that they are able to provide 'testable knowledge'. This seems to suit better modern epistemological prerequisites, like the ones formulated by Karl Popper for example. From the point of view of the empiricist, 'theoretical' approaches to literature lack the possibility of being 'falsified'. Only empirical evidence may be used to this purpose. This is why empirical research is often directed towards testing current theories in literary scholarship. This is also one of the main reasons why many scholars mistrust or reject such investigations. 'On the one hand, many literary historians and critics formulate their claims in such a way that they can be tested in principle; moreover, literary scholars often argue with such enthusiasm about those claims that the presumption of a principle of testability is vividly dramatized. But on the other hand, when it comes to acknowledging this principle as a guideline for conducting research, then most literary scholars retreat to less well-defined positions' (STEEN 1991: 560). Therefore, if the assumption that testable knowledge is preferable to other kinds of knowledge 'is generally held in all scientific research, it [the assumption] has a funny position in literary studies' (*idem*). The controversy recalls the well-known distinction made by Dilthey between 'explanation' and 'interpretation', between *Naturwissenschaften* on the one hand and *Geisteswissenschaften* on the other.

The objections most frequently raised with regard to the empirical research of literature have been already listed by HINTZENBERG, SCHMIDT and ZOBEL (1981: 3–9). One has reproached empirical research the fact that it only confirms things already known (*Trivialitätsverdacht*) or that it needs too much effort in relation to the results it may reach (*Unangemessenheitsverdacht*). It has been asserted that it encourages the misuse of knowledge about social mechanisms (*Mißbrauchsverdacht*) or that it determines only what the subjects say and not what they may think (*Fallacy-Verdacht*). Last but not least, its projects have been criticized for their lengthiness (*Langwierigkeitsverdacht*). One can hardly deny the relevance of these objections, in spite of the counterclaims the authors I have quoted and others bring forward in defense of empirical research. It is not at all capable of 'spectacular' findings to the same degree as the speculative discourse on literature. It is very often awfully laborious, requiring team work.

It sometimes happens to yield unacceptable interpretations, mostly directed against the 'professional' standards for dealing with literature. It shows, here and there, too much self confidence in emphasizing the 'reliability' of its results and it seems far too optimistic when displaying long-term projects. In my opinion, any attempt to demonstrate the superiority of either empirical or non-empirical study of literature ends in unavoidable misunderstandings. Empirical research will never replace speculative thinking on literary topics, as literature is not only something to be investigated, but also to be 'created'. Literary criticism, history and theory play an important part in this continuous 'creation' of their own research subject. The empirical study is needed especially when hypothetical and actual values fall apart, when people, specialists or not, begin to mistrust not only current theories, but also presuppositions and implications fostered by them. It can be very useful for taking practical decisions in culture or education.

1.2. Why here? Why now?

In Romania, the empirical study of literature is almost unknown, although related attempts have not been missing completely since the late seventies. For example, a group of specialists from the Institute of Psychological and Pedagogic Research (GÎRBOVEANU et al 1980) has published a stimulating study about creativity in school, based on several tests and experiments. The authors have succeeded in proving that creativity falls down quite sharply following the beginning of each of the elementary school stages, i. e. during the 1st and the 6th form respectively (*idem*: 55–68). They have tried to develop and test various creativity training methods in order to counterbalance the presumable influence of other general teaching demands (among others: working with metaphors, with similes or with fictional narratives). As far as I know, very little has been done for the integration of such experimental devices in standard teaching methodologies. In 1980 I had the opportunity to attend a training lesson with pupils in the 2nd form and I was very surprised by the inventiveness of the 7–8 years-old children in 'playing with metaphors'.

At that time, during my studies at the Faculty of Letters in Bucharest, I was part of a research team working on experimental poetics. The team elaborated several tests and questionnaires, both in written and oral form, to be applied mainly on pupils aged 11–15, in order to investigate several general, specific (related to age and educational levels), and individual parameters of literary response. The end of the studies interrupted the processing of the data obtained, the greatest part of the research archives having got lost. I have resumed this type of research in 1990, this time from a teaching perspective, within the same faculty. I still feel attracted toward the empirical study of literature, for several

circumstantial reasons. This paper advocates the necessity for intensifying, correlating and judging more comprehensively investigations of this type, which are rather scarce, occasional and go almost unnoticed in Romania for the time being.

To support my claim I would like to dwell on two main aspects. First, experimental research can draw attention on the 'role of the reader', a topic common to several different approaches. Second, investigations could provide rich and relevant information for hot present-day discussions (e. g. the status of literature in Romanian contemporary society) and reforming the teaching system.

The 'change of paradigm' detected and anticipated by Jauss at the end of the sixties was felt very little in Romania. Researches on literary reception, be it historical or contemporary, had little echo in our country. The 'intrinsic' approach prevailed until late in the eighties with only few exceptions. Silvian IOSIFESCU (1973; 1981) and Ion VLAD (1972; 1977) discussed the act of reading and its importance for the knowledge of literature in an essayistic manner. Carmen VLAD (1982) analyzed the critical reading from a semiotic point of view. Nicolae CONSTANTINESCU (1985) investigated particular aspects of the reception of folk literature. Pavel CÂMPEANU published sociological researches on radio, TV and theater audiences (1972; 1973). Amza SĂCEANU investigated the theater audience in Bucharest (1977; 1979). A treatise on literary sociology was published by Traian HERSENI (1973). Constantin CRIȘAN (1977; 1978; 1989) and Ion Vasile ȘERBAN (1983; 1985) contributed several studies in the same research field. However, most studies in literary sociology showed no particular interest in reception, used but poor information (Lukacs, Escarpit, and Goldman were often the only reference sources), were almost exclusively theoretical, commenting upon data usually collected in France. The main concern of Romanian scholars seemed to be 'sociological criticism', a speculative form of critical discourse. One cannot avoid the impression of amateurishness and 'political correctness' when reading many of these studies, which failed to gain the deserved reputation for literary sociology in our country. Writings by L. GOLDMAN (1972) and Robert ESCARPIT (et al 1974; 1980) were translated into Romanian. Other 'classics' such as Fügen, Schücking, Lowenthal or Leenhardt have not been translated. On the whole, literary sociology was unfortunately mistaken for a reminder of the former 'sociologism' that had impoverished and distorted a great deal literary criticism during the fifties and the sixties or for a discipline that could not avoid Marxist influences. Unlike their East-German colleagues, intellectuals in Romania soon lost their confidence in Marxist philosophy — if they ever had had any. Quotations from Marx, Engels or Lenin were used more and more sparingly, in a 'ritualistic' fashion. Apparently, political authorities willingly tolerated this detachment from the ideological forefathers of communism, which could be used to the profit of a personal dictatorship.

Romanian academics and critics took but poor notice of the German *Rezeptionsästhetik*. Only the writings of Jauss appealed to a larger audience. His *Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literaturwissenschaft* first appeared in Romanian as a series of fragments in the students' review *Alma mater* (Iași, 1975) eight years after its original publication, to be afterwards fully translated for the supplement *Caiete critice* of the review *Viața românească* (1980). Jauss's comprehensive volume *Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik* was translated by Andrei Corbea (1983).

The *Literaturpsychologie* of Norbert GROEBEN, first published in 1972, also reached the Romanian public in the translation of Gabriel Liiceanu and Suzana Mihalescu (1978). Groeben's book could have stimulated experimental researches of literary response, had it not been too 'technical' and too concerned with 'scientific objectivity' for the taste of the Romanian scholars in the humanities of the time.

Historical studies on literary reception occasionally appeared in academic reviews (see CORNEA 1980: 58, 276). Specialists mainly focused on the analysis of critical reception. The traditional so-called 'criticism of criticism' accompanied academic editions of Romanian outstanding writers and very numerous studies in literary history. Approaches of this type were, more often than not, either documental or heuristic, the latter used mainly in order to highlight the 'novelty' of the perspective taken by the commentator. They usually proved no theoretical or methodological concerns. There were even fewer exceptions, even though noteworthy ones. Ecaterina MIHĂILĂ published a monograph on the reception of poetry (1980). *Regula jocului* by Paul CORNEA (1980) gathered several very well-informed, illuminating studies in the sociology of reading and other fields of literary reception (theory of success, theory of literary influence, theater audience etc.), regarding nineteenth century Romanian literature. Florin MANOLESCU (1983) analyzed with remarkable insight the communication strategies in the work of I. L. Caragiale, a well-known Romanian playwright and prose writer of the late nineteenth century. One issue of the review *Cahiers roumains d'études littéraires* (3/1986) dealt exclusively with literary reception. A highly perceptive systematic treatise on the theory of reading, written by Paul CORNEA (1988), marked an important starting point in Romanian literary studies of this kind.

It seems that reception studies did not fit very well into the Romanian social and cultural circumstances of the last decades. The ideological 'thaw', introduced in the late fifties, put an end to the 'proletcult' period in which literature had been almost completely subordinated to political commitments. Writers began to enjoy a relative freedom — excepting, of course, 'taboo' topics, such as attacks on the existing social and political order. The dogmatic appraisal of the Romanian literature from before communist dictatorship gradually lost

ground. Critics and writers began to emphasize the aesthetic value of literature, opposing it, most often tacitly, to its ideological manipulation. The 'aesthetic autonomy' of art and literature meant not only a rehabilitation of the 'true nature' of aesthetic experience, but also a defensive weapon against official pressures and threats. It appeared to be an effective means to safeguard free creation and interpretation. The 'intrinsic' approaches suited much better the specialists' and artists' hopes and wishes with regard to a restoration of the dignity of literature. Neither communist cultural supervisors nor intellectuals striving for an independent status were really interested in the reading audience, either past or present. Endeavors to recover the 'literary heritage', severely censored and misjudged during the fifties, had very little to do with the reconstruction of the 'original context'. With the exception of a few scholars, usually high-school teachers of literary history, most of the exegetes looked for the 'perennial' value and significance of earlier texts or, even more often, for their contemporary relevance. A collection of monographs, typical for this tendency, appeared during the seventies, reinterpreting classics of Romanian literature as 'our contemporaries'.

The cultural dirigisme that continued throughout the communist period allowed only little room for the consideration of the real wishes and expectations of the present-day reading public. The political regime that built up huge and carefully supervised propaganda networks came to pay little heed to the effectiveness of the messages it broadcasted. Propaganda agents eventually gave up their attempts at convincing their audience, being increasingly more sensitive to what their superiors would think of their work. *Mutatis mutandis*, this holds true also for writers and critics. The controlled publishing market made an accurate feed-back from the reading public quite impossible. Literary discourse aimed upwards. The response of the informal intellectual leaders weighed a great deal more than the one of the readers that the books and large circulation reviews seemed to address. The elitist pattern, which represented, in spite of its shortcomings, a sound position as far as 'cultural survival' was concerned, also encouraged a contemptuous view of popular writing. No wonder that after the fall of communism many writers and critics were puzzled by the fact that, with the unrestricted freedom of speech came the loss of much of the esteem in which writings of aesthetic value had been held, and many readers turned away from literature for a while. Some intellectuals blamed the outpouring of trivial and trashy publications on the book free market, showing now and then bits of nostalgia for a 'cultural' censorship. Voices have been heard that deplored the 'betrayal of the reading public'. It is hard to believe that the readership completely changed in the course of a few weeks or months. It would be fairer to admit that the image writers and critics had of it was a rather deceptive one. It is my conviction that no serious discussion of the role and status of literature in present-day Romania could be carried on without an equally serious analysis of the reading public.

Paying attention to readers and reception would certainly refresh the academic manner of dealing with literature. The adoption of the contextualist view, mentioned in the beginning of this essay, is not just a matter of keeping up with the general trend, even if the advantages of speaking the same language with theorists and critics abroad are not to be underestimated. The contextualist view is required by internal factors that resemble more or less the initial circumstances of its coming to the fore elsewhere. Whether we like it or not, the democratization of reading already works upon cultural and educational institutions: publishing houses, bookshops, reviews, magazines, newspapers, schools and universities. The literary canon has become more uncertain and less compelling than ever. A central problem is the revision of the hierarchies established during the last five decades. Some critics hold this revision for an urgent task, others firmly deny its usefulness. The necessity of reevaluating Romanian literature goes back beyond the communist period. There is much more at stake than simply rehabilitating censored genres — e.g. religious literature —, authors, or writings banished because of political convictions and statements. The critical interrogation of the canon implies rethinking some basic questions: how should we regard literature *per se*? How should we deal with the history of Romanian literature? The understanding and the appraisal of the works of the past cannot be isolated from the present-day turmoil in studies of Romanian socio-political and cultural history. It is probably true that general history has been manipulated by the ideological dogmas of nationalist communism to a much higher degree than the literary one. The preference for text-immanent approaches must have played its part in keeping earlier literature safe from ideological distortions as much as possible. An activist position, such as many literary critics and historians require nowadays, especially in the United States, used to be equated with an opportunistic, collaborationist stance. Romanian specialists in literature did not ignore the crisis of literary history largely discussed in Western countries during the sixties. They took notice of René Wellek's famous aporia that epitomized the dilemmas of the discipline: 'Most of the great histories of literature are either histories of civilization, or collections of critical essays. The former are not histories of art; the latter are not histories of art' (WELLEK and WARREN 1967: 334). But the only way out of the aporia acknowledged in the Romanian humanities seemed to be a historical standpoint akin to the theory of the relatively autonomous cultural series elaborated by the Russian formalists. It is high time that literature recovered its place within history. Besides 'creation', literature has been always 'communication', too, participating in a larger confrontation of values.

Empirical investigations into literary response may have particular relevance for teaching activities. They may provide useful guidelines for the reform of the teaching system in progress in Romania. Curricula and school books for Romanian language and literature have been extensively discussed during the

past few years. Debates have been stirred by the pressing necessity of waving propaganda texts and discredited authors from former school books and curricula. Further reflections on this very delicate subject of school canonization did not go far beyond the first impulse. Controversies focused almost exclusively on priorities regarding writers and texts: what or whom should be included or omitted from curricula and school books. The criteria to be used for making such choices remained unclear up to the present, except for the frequently mentioned 'aesthetic value'.

The authors of one of the most difficult new school books of Romanian language and literature, that for the 12th form which comprises the period after World War II, explicitly refer to the attempt of building a 'school canon' (GRIGOR et al 1993: 3) and to the unavoidable relativity of their enterprise, one which overlaps the natural lack of critical consensus. It is obvious that the authors have tried to conceive a history of Romanian literature as balanced as possible in its selections and commentaries. But a school book is not the same with a literary history. Should a school book mainly enable pupils to follow and to understand the evolution of Romanian literature, or should it rather mainly stimulate literary taste and specific reading abilities, using Romanian (possibly also foreign) works as a means to this end? What is the main objective: to provide pupils with the instruments that will enable them to enjoy and read various kinds of literary works in an appropriate manner, irrespective of their origin, during their study years as well as later on, or teach them how to judge and appreciate the values of Romanian literature? Certainly, the two aspects do not exclude one another. They are not contradictory. A clear idea about the priorities to be followed would be, in my opinion, nevertheless, a very helpful guideline for the teaching reform. I also consider too strong an emphasis on 'national values' to be counter-productive, deviating from more important educational purposes. It strikes me, for example, that even new curricula for elementary school justify their project mainly in terms of national values, although they do not follow the principle of historical presentation, include additional foreign texts, pay more attention to adequacy criteria with respect to age and educational level and are more strictly oriented toward formative goals. 'Romanian language and literature, a major component of pre-university teaching, shapes the personality of the pupils by offering them a cultural model: that of Romanian spirituality', and other similar remarks, equally vague and emphatic, can be read in the preface to the curriculum for the elementary school (from the 5th to the 8th form), entitled 'Romanian language — a fundamental mode of expression of the national culture' (GOT et al 1994: 4).

In my view, the educational canon for literature cannot be restricted to the corpus of authors and works to be taught in school. Besides the corpus, it includes three other important components: the reading abilities, the critical abilities and

the aesthetic, literary and educational presuppositions preponderantly selected, induced, or recommended when teaching Romanian language and literature.

It is not my intention to discuss at length the 'canonical problem'. To mention that such a discussion never took place in Romania until a few years ago will do for the purpose. There are but few intellectuals in Romania nowadays to doubt the legitimacy of a 'sound' canon that would corroborate the examinations of the most authorized critics, even if an agreement among experts looks highly improbable. In teaching, the canonical question has different implications. The main problem is to evaluate the effectiveness of canonical choices with respect to intended purposes. In other words: how can we optimize pupils' reading behavior? It is highly significant, in my opinion, that the ongoing reform of the teaching system has, so far, ignored almost completely those towards whom it is directed: the pupils themselves. We may cherish our thoughts about the ideal graduate, but how much do we know about the real students? An informed empirical study of present canonical teaching strategies and their influence on pupils' reading behavior would be highly rewarding. Another very useful research would investigate the relations between school readings and private readings. Do they overlap or do they split? What would pupils like to read during the classes? How could we help them make the right choices? A lot of questions mark out a very large research field.

The present paper focuses on an experiment of a narrower scope. I hope that some of my readers will find it stimulating. One of the main problems of any research is that it needs a scientific community of specialists who share similar study interests, speak a common language, and are able to link the new information to that already existing and thus evaluate the relevance of the results. Such a community of scholars practicing empirical approaches is by no means influential in Romania. It is one of the reasons which prompted me to make the presentation of the experiment less technical and to add here and there explanatory excursuses.

2. 'Literariness' Criteria Experiment

Most people seem to believe they have a clear-cut notion of 'literature' in the modern sense of the word, namely as an aesthetic form of linguistic communication. However, such conviction is, more or less, the product of a permanent contextual orientation by means of school books, genre specifications on the cover or the first page of books, oral or written reading recommendations, magazine headings, prior knowledge about an author, about a book collection or even a publishing house, and so on. The situation in which people begin to read some text in order to guess what kind of text they are reading is highly

improbable in everyday life. In practice, discriminating between the literary and the non-literary is much like finding one's way when driving on the highway: the most important thing is to follow the traffic signs. When confronted with unfamiliar types of texts, accompanied by no signals whatsoever with regard to their destination, most people probably begin to hesitate. In spite of the signalization system, there has never been total agreement on what is literary and what is not.

Moreover, 'literariness' seems to be rather a scalar notion: texts are judged as being 'more' or 'less' or 'not at all' literary. Theorists have repeatedly tried to identify the salient features of texts — be these features aesthetic, linguistic, pragmatic etc. — which would enable us to define literature. Are these intentional definitions clear enough to stand the test of the extension consensus? Do people adhere, even if intuitively, to similar definitions?

Such questions may look tedious. To speak about 'definition', 'intention', or 'extension' with regard to literature seems to partake of an obsolete essentialist way of thinking. How we define literature might be irrelevant, indeed. What matters is how we understand it and, above all, how we experience it. This is exactly the point. My assumption is that people do have an intuitive notion of what literature should be like, and that this notion is closely related to their reading expectations, options, strategies and estimations.

2.1. Design of the experiment

The experiment was devised during the first term of the 1990–1991 academic year in a seminar about reception theories for the third study year at the Faculty of Letters in Bucharest. It was intended as a means of investigation as well as a teaching instrument. The students grew familiar with basic problems of empirical research, learned how to handle them, became aware of the profits and shortcomings of this type of study. The experiment was carried on, from the very beginning up to the end, as a team work with the seminar group of students and my colleague, Rodica Zafiu, from the Department of Romanian Language. It aimed at revealing: a) what kind of texts first-grade students of the Faculty of Letters judge as literary or non-literary, and b) on what grounds. The experiment was performed in spring 1991. The results were published in 'Analele Universității București' (CONSTANTINESCU et al 1991: 57–68).

In the spring of 1996, I repeated the experiment, with minor modifications, on a similar group of subjects, trying to find out whether any significant differences had appeared in the meantime. Five years is undoubtedly too short a time for basic changes to occur in what people believe literature should be like. Still, since Romania has underwent deep changes in political and social life

during these past few years, it was to be expected that aesthetic behavior and literary reading in particular have also been modified.

I am most grateful to some of my former students, Romanița Constantinescu, Andreea Deciu, and Mihai Giurgea, who collaborated in the first phase of the experiment, and to Andreea Ciotec and Bogdan Ciubuc, who helped me a lot in carrying out the second phase.

2.2. The experiment

Subjects were given a small collection of short texts of various types and were asked to decide whether they held each text to be literary or non-literary and to briefly justify their options.

2.2.1. Stimuli

Stimulus texts were chosen quite freely. It was decided to present subjects with a wide variety of texts rather than with samples selected according to a strict schema of contrasting features (e.g. fictional vs. non-fictional, figurative vs. non-figurative and so on). We agreed not to start from a preconceived set of criteria to be tested, in order to allow the experiment a higher degree of complexity. The final selection, which was used for the experiment, comprised 10 short texts or text fragments, some of them with strongly marked features (e.g. T1: metaphors, condensation; T6: syntactic deviance, semantic opacity; T9: pseudo-language; T4: scientific discourse; T3: advertising), others representing typological overlaps, peripheral or equivocal kinds of discourse (e.g. T5: light verse about gastronomy; T10: apparently an encoded telegram) in order to stimulate confrontation or refinement of criteria. A literal translation and a brief description of each text is given in Appendix 1. The relevance of the experiment may be best judged in relation to the stimulus texts.

To ensure that the entire collection of texts could be read within a brief time, only short and very short texts have been selected. With the exception of T2 1991, especially written by one of the students, all other texts have been chosen from different sources. To us, the use of ready-made texts rather than the creation of new ones was no clue whatsoever as regards their 'literariness'. The radical displacement and modification of the text samples (elimination of the title; fragmentary excerpts; disappearance of the original context; re-contextualization alongside with the other texts) and the reading situation created by the experiment allowed the interpretation of responses independently of the stimuli sources. We also tried to select texts which (or the sources of which) could not be easily

recognized. Several texts in the collection were obviously fragmentary. Subjects were thus invited to ground their options concerning 'literariness' in the attempt of figuring out what kind of larger texts these fragments could be a part of. To a certain extent, *every* text sample may be considered fragmentary, even if it lacks only the title or a genuine communication context. We found no alternative for avoiding this dilemma, caused by the 'artificial' character of the experiment itself. In the second phase, I tried to enlarge the tasks, in order to attenuate this shortcoming (see below, 2.2.3.).

In 1996 T2 was replaced with a very short narrative by Dino Buzzati, which I found to be quite challenging.

2.2.2. Subjects

We tested first-year students of the Faculty of Letters in Bucharest, during their second term, in spring 1991 (37 students), and 1996 respectively (46 students).

This target group was chosen for several reasons. First of all, we found it worth knowing what kind of expectations students had about literature at the beginning of their philological studies. This could also be relevant for the prevailing mental constructs with respect to literature which they had acquired during and owing to their high-school education or by means of their preparation for the admission examination (universities in Romania have *numerus clausus* and candidates to matriculation must stand a sometimes very demanding competitive examination). Such data seemed to be very useful for the orientation of the teaching. Besides, it was a promising prospect to find out whether young people who had decided to become 'specialists' in literature shared some up-to-date beliefs with contemporary writers and critics or whether they tended to prefer older aesthetic standpoints. This seemed all the more interesting as a wide confrontation of aesthetic options started in Romania during the 80s, in which 'modernist' older generations were challenged by the 'post-modernist' younger ones. We also expected the experiment to indicate the extent to which young specialists, just joining the field, were contemporary to this evolution.

It would nevertheless be arbitrary, in my opinion, to hold the investigated students as representative for some other, larger groups of population. The experiment can only provide some clues in this respect, to be tested by future research.

2.2.3. Tasks

Subjects were asked to read carefully each text in the collection they were presented, to indicate if they considered the text to be literary or not, and to briefly justify each answer. A multiple choice form with four answers, **YES, PROBABLY**

YES, PROBABLY NOT, NO was provided for the first task (which I shall further on call LITERARINESS OPTIONS) for each text. The JUSTIFICATIONS were freely phrased by the subjects.

In addition to this, subjects in 1996 had to specify in the case of each text sample whether they considered it to be a text or a text fragment (TEXTUALITY OPTIONS). The same multiple choice form as for the LITERARINESS OPTIONS was used. Finally, they were asked on what terms a text or a text fragment can be considered, in their opinion, literary (EXPLANATIONS).

In both phases of the experiment subjects were invited to use pseudonyms. They were given one hour and a half to finish their tasks.

Excursus

One can distinguish in the empirical research of literary reception two main types of experiments. On the one hand, there are the text-oriented experiments, based on the assumption that the texts one has to deal with represent the main stimulus that determines the response. On the other hand, there are also situation-oriented investigations, that attempt to prove that the texts play but a secondary role, if any. Crucial to the behavior of the subjects is the situational context which is built in the experiment. Both types of research must, of course, take into account the existence of additional individual variables, that one would try to neutralize when interested in results of sociological kind (group characteristics) or to isolate and to highlight when interested in data of psychological nature such as reader typology or aspects of the reading process. Researches in the second category became much more popular after the famous experiment of Stanley Fish, who presented his students with a list of names of literary and religious scholars pretending it were a poem they had to interpret and comment upon, which the students did with considerable success. This led FISH (1980 : 326) to the conclusion that 'It is not that the presence of poetic qualities compels a certain kind of attention but that the paying of a certain kind of attention results in the emergence of poetic qualities.' The advocates of this standpoint, called by some theorists 'radical conventionalism', would claim that 'there is nothing in the textual surface structure to constrain interpretation' (ZWAAN 1993 : 9), an assumption with plenty of theoretical as well as practical drawbacks that 'moderate conventionalists' such as Siegfried T. Schmidt or Jonathan Culler tried to avoid by accepting 'that the application of reading conventions can be triggered by linguistic signals' (ZWAAN 1993 : 11). The most elaborate study I know that attempts to bridge the gap between the two types of empirical research, the role of both textual and contextual variables, is that of Petra HOFFSTAEDTER (1986; very good summary in HOFFSTAEDTER 1987).

My study belongs to the first category. Still, the JUSTIFICATIONS and especially the EXPLANATIONS provide relevant data about the way subjects activate current conventions concerning 'literariness'. As for the last task, I was very much interested in the students' awareness as to the conventional character of the criteria they were asked to specify.

2.3. Experiment interpretation

The interpretation of the experiment consists in: 1) analysis and comparative rating of the LITERARINESS OPTIONS; 2) analysis and rating of the criteria used for JUSTIFICATIONS; 3) analysis and rating of the criteria used for EXPLANATIONS; 4) final remarks. Extensive quantitative information is provided in Appendices 2–4.

2.3.1. Analysis of the OPTIONS

The main quantitative information is shown in the following tables:

TABLE 1. Comparative rating of positive (Yes + Probably yes) LITERARINESS OPTIONS 1991–1996 (%):

TEXT		1	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
		+!		+!!	-!	+!!	-!	+!!	-!!!	
1991	Y+Py	88.2	00.0	17.6	47.2	84.8	31.4	73.5	35.1	56.3
1996	Y+Py	91.1	15.2	10.9	72.7	73.8	52.2	62.2	60.0	23.9

Y = Yes; Py = Probably yes

! = +/- 10...19 %; !! = +/- 20...29 %; !!! = +/- >29%

Average: 1991: 48.2 %; 1996: 51.2 %

TABLE 2. Comparative rating of negative (No + Probably Not) LITERARINESS OPTIONS 1991–1996 (%):

TEXT		1	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1991	N+Pn	11.8	100.	82.4	52.8	15.2	68.6	26.5	64.9	43.7
1996	N+Pn	08.9	84.8	89.1	27.3	26.2	47.8	37.8	40.0	76.1

N = No; Pn = Probably not

TABLE 3. 'Indecision' (Probably yes + Probably not) comparative rating of LITERARINESS OPTIONS 1991–1996 (%):

TEXT		1	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1991	PyPn	32.3	17.6	26.5	61.1	24.2	45.7	52.9	51.3	46.9
1996	PyPn	24.4	23.9	17.4	47.7	47.7	50.0	62.2	65.7	34.8

Average: 1991: 39.8 %; 1996: 41.5 %

TABLE 4. Comparative ranking of LITERARINESS OPTIONS 1991–1996

	Y	Y	N	N	Y+Py	Y+Py	Py+Pn	Py+Pn
	1991	1996	1991	1996	1991	1996	1991	1996
1	T1	T1	T3	T4	T1	T1	T5	T9
2	T6	T6	T4	T3	T6	T6	T8	T8
3	T8	T5	T9	T10	T8	T5	T9	T7
4	T10	T8	T7	T7	T10	T8	T10	T6/T5
5	T7	T7	T10	T9	T5	T9	T7	T6/T5
6	T5	T9	T5	T5	T9	T7	T1	T10
7	T9	T10T3	T8	T8	T7	T10	T4	T1
8	T4	T10T3	T6	T6	T4	T3	T6	T3
9	T3	T4	T1	T1	T3	T4	T3	T4

The overall quantitative variation of LITERARINESS OPTIONS is almost insignificant. A very slight increase of the '(probably) literary' estimations (2.1 %) and of the 'indecision' rate (1.7 %) can be noticed.

Significant variations appear, nevertheless, in estimations of individual texts.

Strange enough, out of the two 'norm texts' which should have elicited, in accordance to our expectations, the most obvious LITERARINESS OPTIONS within the group of subjects, T3 and T4 (the advertising text and the scientific statement), T4 was taken to a larger extent for '(probably) literary' in 1991 (+ 17.6 %, out of which 14.7 % **Probably yes** OPTIONS), while none of the subjects took T3 for '(probably) literary'. It seems that the highly abstract meaning of T4 and its neologistic language were perceived as marks of a certain intellectual

'elevation', which could be occasionally associated with 'literature'. In 1996, T4 reached the first place for 'non-literary' and the lowest indecision rate (17.4 %). T3 obtained, in spite of its obvious utilitarian destination, its trivial message and its everyday language, 6.5 % **Yes** and 8.7 % **Probably yes** OPTIONS for 'literary' and an indecision rate of 23.9 %, which is just as much as T1, the text which ranked first, in 1996 as well as in 1991, in the top of both absolute and overall positive LITERARINESS OPTIONS. Other statistical data indicate that thematic and stylistic 'elevation' has lost ground in the second phase of the experiment. T5 registers in 1996 25.5 % more overall positive OPTIONS and the hesitations are 13.4 % lower than in 1991. The agglomeration of exact measurements in the description of Böll's character, in T7, appeared less embarrassing to subjects in 1996 than it did in 1991. T7 got + 24.9 % '(probably) literary'. Nevertheless, doubting estimations of T7 were slightly more numerous (+ 4.3 %) in 1996, going up from the 5th to the 3rd place.

The LITERARINESS OPTIONS formulated in connection with T2 in 1991 seem to contradict the explanations I have suggested. The 'ordinary' subject matter of the short narrative did not prevent many students from choosing '(probably) literary' (75.5 %, 3rd or 4th place, same ranking as T8; 32.2 % absolute positive OPTIONS, 44.1 % indecision, a middle value). It was due to the elaborate aspect of the text, ironically leading towards the final wit, with an emphatic use of bathos, that T2 received so generous estimations. T2 1996, the effect of which was not in the least as transparent as that of the previous T2, scored only 26.6 % absolute and 66.6 % overall positive OPTIONS and a higher indecision rate (60.0 %). It is worth noting that T2 1996 was considered by 66.6 % of the subjects '(probably) a text fragment'. The JUSTIFICATIONS point out that the students were very little aware of the possible symbolic connotations of the 'closed' story. They rather looked for signs of literariness in the very manner of narrating or in presumptive contextualizations.

On the whole, it may be concluded that the variations analyzed indicate a more flexible approach to the hierarchical structure of literature. The current opposition between 'high' and 'low' forms of literature seems weaker in 1996 than in 1991. Stylistic characteristics such as the ones of T1 (see Appendix 1; also semantic vagueness, existential significance emotionally colored by an acknowledged lyrical mood) continue to reign supreme. Still, the acceptance of literary values beyond 'elevation' and 'esoteric' (depth and richness of meaning) has certainly increased. Even rudimentary criteria such as prosody gained weight in 1996 (T3, T5).

Excursus

Some further research contrasting different levels of literature could bring more relevant evidence in this respect. The internal hierarchy of the literary field in modern times has been a very controversial problem also from a theoretical point of view over the last decades. A clear discrimination and

description of the levels of literature — as clear as, for example, the ancient theory of the three styles — can hardly be attained. The partial overlap of literature's vertical structuring with the genre system is also confusing. The terminology, especially for designating the 'inferior' literary forms, lacks precision and agreement: 'low', 'popular', 'trivial', 'light' literature, 'Unterhaltungsliteratur', 'Trivialliteratur', 'Konsumliteratur', 'Konformliteratur', 'Kolportageliteratur' (LINK 1976: 64). There is no consensus even about the number of levels to be taken into consideration, not to mention the identity and the denomination of these. A very influential dictionary of literature by Gero von Wilpert defined *Unterhaltungsliteratur* (5th edition, 1969) as '...die Zwischenstufe zwischen hoher Dichtung oder Kunstlit., die allein an künstlerischen Ansprüchen zu messen ist und Trivialliteratur als e. lit. wertlosen, nur soziologisch interessanten Phänomen...' (apud BORGMEIER 1977: 19; for a three-level description see also LINK 1976: 64–80). Other theorists and critics chose to differentiate only two levels, the one of 'canonical' literature, the other comprising works which are accepted as 'literature' in a broad sense but remain outside the canon. 'So bezeichnet etwa der Terminus Trivialliteratur Werke, die im weiteren Sinne 'literarisch' sind, aber nicht zum Kanon gezählt werden, wie zum Beispiel Kriminal- und Liebesromane oder Gedichte, die in sehr auflagestarken Zeitschriften erscheinen' (HAWTHORN 1994: 157). The critical tradition used to ignore these lower levels of literature, if not to warn the readers against them by epithets such as 'trashy' (Schundliteratur) or 'kitsch'. It has remained a commonplace that various vertical divisions are primarily based on evaluative, not on descriptive criteria. "Trivialliteratur" bezeichnet keine strukturell abgrenzbare eigene 'Literatur', sondern bedeutet eine vor allem an literarischer Funktion und Wirkung orientierte Wertung von Literatur" (WALDMANN 1973: 7). The hierarchical structuring of literature takes various forms, according to some specific oppositions: written / spoken, sacred / profane, educated / uneducated, poetic / non-poetic, superior / inferior from a social point of view (MARINO 1987: 351–363). The rehabilitation of previously despised or even incriminated forms of literature during the last decades, alongside with the 'canonical battle', reinforced, among others, the awareness that the ups and downs of the inner hierarchy are tightly connected with historical widenings and narrowings of the notion of literature itself. 'Solche neuen Ausdrücke [wie Trivialliteratur] kamen auf, da der Begriff 'Literatur' im Laufe der Zeit eine Veränderung durchmachte; aus einer sehr allgemeinen Bezeichnung wurde ein sehr viel engerer und — etwa von Kritikern wie F.R. Leavis — nur sehr selektiv verwendeter Begriff. In jüngster Zeit kann man allerdings auch die entgegengesetzte Tendenz beobachten, weg von einer elitären Begriffsverengung hin zu einem viel weiteren Begriff' (HAWTHORN 1994: 157).

The tendency toward a more permissive notion of literature was confirmed by our experiment. Even though this was a highly probable development, it was not in the least self-evident. Nowadays many writers are still confused in Romania because of the changes in the reading public which have occurred during the past few years (decades?), and would hardly accept them as a matter of fact. Beside, the teaching of literature, both at school level and, to a lesser extent, at academic level, hardly takes notice of this reality.

It is very difficult to decide when this widening of the notion of literature began — and the lack of empirical evidence is, after all, a factor. In my opinion, one can trace it back as far as the end of the seventies. Some reference points mark out this process: the gradual growth of interest and delight in the playfulness of literature and the weakening of central criteria of literariness, 'fiction' and 'diction' according to GENETTE (1994); an increasing success of non-fictional, 'border' genres such as diaries, memoirs, letters, biographies, stories which resemble a lot reports from everyday life on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the employment of prosaic, non-metaphoric modes of expression in poetry. These characteristics led several critics to compare the literary tendencies of the eighties with the avant-garde movements between the two World Wars. The revival of the avant-garde was certainly not what was happening, yet, in the eighties, younger generations of writers waged a similar attack on the established image and notion of literature. The concern for 'post-modernism' and for the change of paradigm this term was supposed to epitomize also awoke during the 80s in Romania. The 'transcendental' view of literature and the doctrine of aesthetic autonomy which had dominated the sixties and the seventies, casting a bridge toward the 'Great Tradition' of the Romanian literature from before World War II, began to lose ground.

It is not my intention to judge, one way or another, the changes in literary conceptions and taste which I have briefly commented upon here. My only claim is that one should no longer act as if they did not exist, especially in those fields where 'strategic' decisions are to be taken. Should one stress the importance of the Great Tradition, of 'canonical' aesthetics, in order to counterbalance the gradual dissipation of literature and the increasing indistinctiveness of the aesthetic response literature is meant to elicit, or should one endeavor to bridge the gap between what and how people are told to read as literature and what and how they tend to read on their own? No empirical research in itself could provide an answer to these questions. Unsystematic information, gathered from teaching experience, should rather suggest a troublesome amount of hypocrisy in literary responses of students during school or high-school education.

The more permissive notion of literature does not necessarily imply the acquisition of a sensibly higher rate of positive OPTIONS in the second phase of the experiment. The greatest variation is, on the contrary, a negative one (T10), while the average rate of the estimations of literariness remains almost the same. The variations regarding T10, T6 and T9 may be accounted for in terms of willingness for interpretation. Density, obscurity and ambiguity of meaning, up to a certain limit, are often associated with 'literature'. The problem is, in how far are literary works accepted to force the limits of comprehensibility? What is the borderline between 'literature' and 'nonsense'? There is no simple answer to such questions. The degree of tolerance depends on several factors, such as text type (genre, in a broad sense: surrealist poetry, *nouveau roman* and so on), general and specific aesthetic norms, individual or group reading styles and preferences, previous literary experience etc. In particular, such factors may influence the readers' choice, when alternative interpretive strategies are available, for the simpler or for the more complex ones.

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It has been noticed often enough that literary works, especially modern ones, take advantage of a more general habit in human communication, namely the receiver's inclination to try by all means to make sense out of a message, however obscure, intricate, unusual or surprising this may be. First of all, people engaged in communication usually share the presupposition that, if somebody has formulated and delivered a message, it must have been intended to mean something. In order that communication work properly, the receiver should try to interpret the message as correctly as possible, even when this proves to be a strenuous job. The receiver may also choose to step out of the game without infringing upon the bona fide condition of communication partnership. He or she may reject the message altogether, considering that it is not worth taking pains to find out what it means. We usually avoid to declare some message nonsensical, unless we imply either some accident in its production or transmission, or some communication deficiency in the sender.

Literature has acquired a different status in this respect. Literature grants the reader wider interpretive freedom and stimulates him or her to take full advantage of this liberty. Literary hermeneutics are both 'looser' and 'tenser'. The problematic nature of literary communication led many theorists to the conclusion that literature can be defined as a special sort of language. Many attempts have been made to explain literariness by finding out salient features, be they structural or functional, to be contrasted with other types of discourse. In the last decades it has been claimed, for example, that literature systematically infringes upon the Cooperative Principle and the conversation

maxims that are, according to the philosopher H. P. GRICE (1975), basic rules of 'ordinary' communication, which is tantamount to saying that literature brings about some sort of 'negative discourse', an idea which tempted several speech act philosophers. Other analysts consider Grice's maxims to be rather irrelevant for literature, which follows its own principles (SCHMIDT 1980: 152–159). There are also linguists who think that literary communication functions according to rules that neither contradict nor replace the ones of ordinary communication. From the point of view of Mary Louise Pratt, the characteristics of literature could be accounted for by 'adjusting' the maxims of Grice (PRATT 1977: 147).

Anyway, when reading literary texts the original intention does no longer represent a strong requirement of communication. Modern authors have often declared that they themselves did not know what they meant in their writings, or else they provided interpretations which seemed less satisfactory than those provided by their readers. Modern works in particular present themselves as 'interpretive offers'. The reader is, in most cases, aware of this 'convention' and chooses to act accordingly. He or she may occasionally find a text 'too sophisticated' for his or her taste and give up trying to interpret it or even to read it further. The individual response is backed up by personal judgment. But the reader may also cease trying to grasp the meaning of a text considered 'sheer nonsense'. This judgment is supposed to have inter-subjective relevance. The willingness to collaborate is determined both by subjective factors (one's likes and dislikes, skills and incapacities) and by beliefs and expectations about the 'rules of the game'.

T10 contains contradicting signals that point towards different interpretive keys (see Appendix 1): it looks like a telegram, but a very unusual one. Most of the subjects in 1996 (76.1 %) decided to take T10 for '(probably) non-literary', with a fairly low indecision rate (34.8 %, 6th place). The overall positive OPTIONS diminished by 32.4 %, the hesitations by 11.1 % compared to 1991. The possible cultural, symbolic connotations were almost completely ignored in 1996. Very few students tried to imagine metaphorical scenarios which might have rendered the text meaningful.

The interpretation I suggest may seem far-fetched, were it not supported by the JUSTIFICATIONS on the one hand, by other variations of OPTIONS on the other. Very frequently, the subjects reconciled the conflicting interpretive signals by declaring the text an 'encoded telegram'. This was an easy way to escape hermeneutic dilemmas, crediting the final information in T10.

The variations of the OPTIONS for T6 and T9 provide some additional clues. Both texts are samples of experimental poetry. Only one student, in 1996, detected the palindrome structure of T6. It was hard to expect that many subjects would

notice this unusual formal pattern: who starts to read a text backwards without being invited to do so? Still, T6 received in 1991 a very high positive evaluation (2nd place after T1, 84.8 % in all) and a very low rate of indecision (24.2 %, 8th place, less than T1). 63.6 % of the subjects chose **Yes**, quite as many as the ones who thought T1 was surely literary. Only 40.9 % selected **Yes** in 1996, the overall positive OPTIONS were 11 % lower than in 1991. Surprisingly, overall positive evaluations of T9 went up (+ 24.9 % compared to 1991). A correction must be made here. Not only an increase of 14.4 % doubt ran parallel to the one of positive choices, but also a considerable amount of invalid OPTIONS (i. e. more or less than a single selection: 11 out of 46, which means 23.9 %). It is sure that T9 caused the highest confusion in the whole experiment. The 51.4 % 'vote' for **Probably yes** was 'negative', yielding to literature a graphemic structure that seemed to find its place nowhere else. Very many subjects justified their option emphasizing formal aspects of T9. Some of them mentioned 'hermetic', 'dadaist' or 'avant-garde' poetry. Interestingly, the latter two appeared also in the JUSTIFICATIONS of relative (2) or absolute (2) negative OPTIONS. Most of the subjects complained of the incomprehensibility of T9. Seven subjects thought of the possibility that T9 had been written in some unknown 'foreign language'. All of them found the text 'probably literary'. Other 6 subjects spoke of a 'code' or 'cypher' in relation to negative OPTIONS or to no option at all. Only one selected **Probably yes**, asking rhetorically: 'What is literature after all if not a code?!?'

In brief, willingness for interpretive endeavors has diminished. Tolerance for textual eccentricities originates very often in naive motivations.

Significant variations may be noticed also in the estimations of T7, T5 and T8. In order to be able to explain these changes more precisely, let us have a look at the JUSTIFICATIONS the experiment required. But first, some additional remarks on this point.

Not only the variations, but also the constancy of OPTIONS may be relevant for the scope and the kind of changes the experiment aimed to detect. Variations were lowest in the case of T1 and T4, both of which are texts that rank as extremes (T4 the last but one in 1991, the last in 1996). This shows that one should be careful not to overestimate the extent of the changes the experiment points out. More evident differences appear in relation to texts which, in 1991, reached middle positions and a relatively high rate of indecision (T10, T5, T9, T7). The clearest marks of literariness and non-literariness remained the same.

Valuable additional information may also be obtained by analyzing TEXTUALITY OPTIONS. Some of these help us understand better the prototypical readings of certain texts. A fairly large number of subjects (35.5 %) thought T7 to be a complete text, 13.3 % being even sure of that, in spite of the conspicuous reference to a larger context ('co-text' might say some linguists, in

order to distinguish it from 'situational context', i.e. circumstances of communication) from the very beginning. The fact that T7 is a character presentation abounding in very precise details made some subjects perceive it as a self-sufficient discourse. This 'informational saturation' seems to have blocked out further insights into the point of view or mode of presentation. T7 received in 1991 a low percentage of positive evaluations of LITERARINESS, only 17.1 % **Yes** and 14.3 % **Probably yes**. Very few students grasped the ironic combination of stylistic variants, the Victorian-like novelistic writing on the one hand, the routine schematism of personal records on the other. T7 was the most relevant test of the low receptivity subjects had for 'post-modernist' fiction. Some of them were so confused, that they believed T7 to be part of a book review or commentary, although it remained hard to guess where the critic or the reviewer could have picked up the information from, if not out of the book itself. Students in 1996 were statistically keener to judge the unfamiliar fictional mode of T7, but things did not radically change. Only a slight majority, 52.2 %, agreed that T7 was or could be literary.

75.5 % of the subjects considered T1 '(probably) a text fragment', more than a half thought it was a text fragment for certain. Only one subject identified a one-verse poem, a poetic pattern that is quite uncommon, yet several respondents made sensitive remarks to justify their OPTIONS for '(probably) an autonomous text': completeness, independence and condensation of meaning, complete structure (beginning, middle and end), complete image, aspect of adage or aphorism, elliptical, concentrated expression. On the whole, the very high rate of positive LITERARINESS OPTIONS was based very little on the consideration that T1 looked like a shorter poem, much more on the identification of certain characteristics proper to the poetic style.

2.3.2. Analysis of the JUSTIFICATIONS

The way subjects justified their choices is one of the most interesting aspects of the experiment. Unfortunately, it was very difficult to systemize and to work out the results in order to obtain clear, relevant quantitative information.

Two types of major difficulties appeared in the data processing as early as the first phase of the experiment already, the ones in the transformation of the syntactic, propositional form used for formulating the JUSTIFICATIONS into a paradigmatic set of items, the others in grouping the resulting items in a classificatory system. A mixed procedure, both deductive and inductive, was used to elaborate the taxonomic pattern. Theoretical suggestions were taken from PLETT (1983), MARKIEWICZ (1988), CORNEA (1988), and JAKOBSON (1964). We were aware of the fact that 'the eclecticism of the resulting system reflects the diversity and the lack of homogeneity of the criteria in use' (CONSTANTINESCU et al 1991 : 59). The theoretical frame was adjusted after some informal

examination of the JUSTIFICATIONS. As for the syntactic problems, the most embarrassing ones were raised by the use of the same criteria in different relations to the stimulus texts. 'Figurative language', for example, was used to motivate not only the literary character of a certain text, but also the absence of figures of speech was mentioned to demonstrate the non-literary character of some other text (EX CONTRARIO reasoning). Some criteria also appeared in concessive phrasings, that would have justified rather the opposite of the OPTION made by the respondent: 'This cooking recipe, although shallow and funny, has literary qualities' (T5). These OPPOSITIONS in reasoning, expressed in a lot of syntactic forms ('in spite of', 'but', 'yet', 'still', 'although', 'nevertheless' etc.) were registered apart. In the tables in Appendix 4 they were added to the criteria used affirmatively, not to overload the information.

The tables in Appendix 4 show the occurrences of the main types of criteria in relation to OPTIONS and to the stimulus texts. They illustrate only the first level of the classifier system, that permits a large survey of the quantitative variations. The very general information, compacted in only five columns, needs further specification.

The complete classificatory system had three levels. Here is a brief description of it.

A.: 'empirical' criteria, based on analogy, resemblance or recognition of:

1. text (T1: 'It reminds me of Arghezi's *Inscriptii* <Inscriptions>')
2. author (T8: 'The author tries to catch up with Caragiale')
3. acknowledged literary text types (border genres included: 'poem', 'haiku', 'novel', 'epigram', 'fable', 'parody' 'S.F. work' etc.)
4. acknowledged non-literary text types ('advertising text', 'telegram', 'newspaper article', 'book review', 'cooking book' etc.)
5. discourse types (such as narrative, descriptive, argumentative)
6. literary or aesthetic orientations ('avant-garde', 'dadaism', 'modernism', 'hermetic poetry' etc.)
7. aesthetic categories ('humorous', 'funny', 'ironic', 'satiric' etc.)

B.: value estimations such as

1. valuable or not ('has aesthetic value', 'worthless', 'trifling' etc.)
2. interesting or not ('tedious', 'boring' etc.)

C.: 'pragmatic' criteria, pertaining to a functionalist view of literature:

1. reference-oriented criteria (following the suggestions of CORNEA 1988: 25–31); sub-classes:
 - a. referential (about something that is considered to exist; factual communication; T4: '...transmits an exact information')

- b. pseudo-referential (about something imagined; fictional communication; T1: 'The reflexivity of the language is higher than its transitivity')
- c. self-referential (about nothing outside the message itself; T6: '...communicates nothing about reality')
2. reader-oriented criteria, mainly emotional response (T1: 'It awakes a certain feeling')
3. author-oriented criteria, expressiveness (T1: 'The desert' and 'the dust' are transpositions on the level of reality of the inner void caused by 'the departure'), intentionality (T1: 'Words are not chosen at random')
4. purposelessness, playfulness (T6: '...merely playing with words')

D.: structural criteria such as

1. formal features; sub-classes:

- a. figures of speech (T8: 'in this text we come across some figures of speech specific to literature: metaphors, epithets')
- b. grammaticality (T1: 'The absence of the verbs is also part of the literary style; T2: '...the free mode of expression in relation to grammatical norms')
- c. prosody (T9: 'It looks like verse', '...stanza structure'), sound effects (T1: '...special musicality')
- d. occurrence (T2: 'The idea is communicated in an unusual form'; T7: '...some surprising associations')
- e. recurrence (T2: 'It looks like any ordinary sentences'; T7: 'A prosaic, realist description, much concerned with details. It could have been done by anyone')

2. style (T5: 'The form in which ideas are presented, the way they are expressed are literary'; T4: 'scientific style', 'scientific language'; T7: 'everyday language', 'a simple account, with no aesthetic claims')
3. text organization (composition, coherence and cohesion, symmetry, narrative structure; T1: '...parallelism: 'extinguished fire', 'packed up tent'; T2: '...first person narrative, combination of direct and indirect speech')

4. meaning; sub-classes:

- a. comprehensible / incomprehensible (T6: 'I do not understand at all the message, the meaning of the text', 'The message cannot be grasped if we do not know the other part of the text')
- b. univocal or denotative / plurivocal or connotative (T4: 'The vocabulary is very precise'; T5: 'It is quite ambiguous')

c. significant / insignificant (T2: 'That answer 'good evening' is not accidental, it must have meant something'; T5: 'It seems to have no deep significance')

5. imagery (T1: '...creates a visual image'; T8: '...the descriptive side, the created images')

E.: tautological JUSTIFICATIONS (T2: 'I am ready to say *yes*, I don't really know why'; T10: 'It looks like a literary text')

The classification has plenty of weak points, some of them perhaps unavoidable when dealing with such an intricate subject, others detected after the first phase of the experiment but left unchanged, except for some minor terminological alterations and peripheral readjustments, in order to get comparable results. **A.** contains criteria based on different kinds of reasoning: recognition, analogy or similitude (**A.1.**, **A.2.**), categorization (**A.3.**, **A.4.**, **A.5.**, **A.6.**), and description or effect (**A.7.**). **C.1.** is far too abstract to fit the motivations formulated by the subjects. It is sometimes difficult to decide between **C.2.** and **C.3.**, as it is unclear whether the comments upon certain emotional or cognitive aspects are reader-oriented or author-oriented. It seems almost impossible to find the right place for **C.4.** It is an inconsistent class, that collects both derivatives from the 'art for art's sake' doctrine and some depreciatory judgments. **D.** can be hardly considered a purely structural class, has loopholes, fuzzy or eclectic sub-classes. **D.1.**, for example, overlooks other literary devices apart from figures of speech. Prosody (**D.1.c.**) is to be understood in a broad sense, including the graphic arrangement of the text. **D.1.d.** and **D.1.e.**, following the terminology of PLETT (1983: 143–146), reduce wider aesthetic criteria such as 'novelty', 'originality' to the level of verbal expression. It is worth mentioning that only the EXPLANATIONS listed 'originality' in its broader sense among criteria for literariness. JUSTIFICATIONS in **D.2.** come close to **A.4.**, **D.1.d.**, **D.1.e.** and to **E.**. **D.3.** is a very amalgamated class, suitable especially to those JUSTIFICATIONS which consist in text analyses or paraphrases, with very poor argumentative force. **D.5.** comes close to the pragmatic class, insofar as 'imagery' is, to a certain extent, a matter of literary effect (imaginative function). **E.** occasionally causes some trouble in drawing the line between null information and very general, vague information.

On the whole, the criteria most frequently mentioned were the ones from class **D.** and class **A.**, based on structural characteristics and on text type recognition. **A.4.** got a very high score for T4 (especially 'scientific text') and for T3 (especially 'advertising'). T7 was also attributed to several non-literary text types (10): 'newspaper article', 'journalistic text', 'police file', 'police report', 'medical report', 'literary criticism', 'summary', 'fragment of a diary'.

One subject thought it could be 'stage directions'. Many items (11) concerning T7 were also listed under **A.5.** (especially 'description'; one respondent referred to 'pseudo-description') and under **A.3.** (various literary text types, especially 'portrait' and 'play' but also 'novel', 'detective novel'). The attempt to identify the text type or the discourse type (**A.3.**, **A.4.**, **A.5.**) to which T7 could belong was very frequent (30 items on the whole, quite different ones). This seems to have been one of the main problems with the fragment from Heinrich Böll's novel. A lot of suppositions were made about the text type of T5, too. Most of the mentioned text types are either border genres, or so outmoded that they belong to the historical realm of 'literature': 'epigram', 'fable', 'satire', 'lampoon', 'proverb', 'folk verse'. They were, nevertheless, meant to motivate mainly positive LITERARINESS OPTIONS. **A.6.** class received a high score for T6 (11) and T9 (8): 'modernist poetry', 'something modern', 'avant-garde', 'avant-garde literary experiment', 'dadaist manner', 'dadaist exercise' were criteria common to both texts. Even extremely vague criteria such as 'it belongs to a literary trend' (T6) were recorded.

Value criteria were used more frequently in connection with T3 (12), T2 (7), T5 (4) and T7 (4), especially in EX CONTRARIO reasoning or in OPPOSITIONS. It is significant, I think, that only one subject used a **B.** criterion, EX CONTRARIO, in connection with T4, the other 'norm text' besides T3 (v. supra, 2.3.1., p.).

C. criteria appeared quite seldom: **C.1.c.** more for T4 (5) to explain negative OPTIONS, which was something hardly unexpected. **C.2.** and **C.3.** criteria were associated with T6 (emotional response and expressiveness, 6 and 8) and with T3 (5 items in **C.2.**, all of them motivating negative OPTIONS by the absence of emotional appeal: 'The relation between author and reader (listener) is no longer emotional, but commercial' etc.).

Structural criteria, the most numerous ones on the whole, filled in especially the classes **D.1.a.**, **D.1.c.**, **D.4.b.**, **D.4.c.** and **D.2.a.**. The presence or absence of figures of speech was mentioned very often in the JUSTIFICATIONS. 17 items were recorded for T1. Figurative speech was one of the criteria most frequently used EX CONTRARIO (e.g. 5 times for T4, but only once for T3, in inverse proportion to **B.** criteria). Prosody was important for motivating the OPTIONS for T9 (14 items, out of which 11 for positive OPTIONS), T3 (10 items, 3 for definite **Yes** and 7 for definite **No**, out of which 5 were OPPOSITIONS), T6 (9 items, 4 for positive and 5 for negative OPTIONS, 4 OPPOSITIONS in the last category) and T5 (8 items, 4 for positive and 4 for negative OPTIONS, 3 OPPOSITIONS in the last category). The idea that verse writing might be enough to indicate the literariness of a text or that it might be at least a strong argument for it was shared and rejected by subjects in a fairly balanced proportion. A clearly predictable incomprehensibility was mentioned with respect to T9 (15) and T6

(13), only once in connection with T10, which confirms my hypothesis about choosing the 'easy reading'. Univocal, denotative language was noticed in T4 (11) and in T7 (10) — once more, a proof that but few subjects grasped the ironical mode of the fragment. Besides, there are reasons to believe that the subjects were not prone to associating irony either with figurative language (for which metaphor is deemed the most representative) or with ambiguity (irony would rather be equivocal, *zweideutig*, than plurivocal, *mehrdeutig*). JUSTIFICATIONS based on distinctions between stylistic varieties were more numerous for T8 (14), T1 (12), T2 (10) and T2 (10). They were very often difficult to distinguish from A.3., A.4. or even A.5. criteria, while the presence or the absence of certain stylistic markers was deemed to support the identification of the text or discourse types: 'The way in which subordinate clauses are introduced makes one think of a literary text about a social event rather than of a scientific text with a historical content' (T8). Four respondents found T8 definitely 'not literary' because of its 'wooden language' — an expression designating the style of the official communist discourse. The 'journalistic style' prompted a **Probably not** OPTION. Three other respondents made the same choice commenting upon the stylistic contrast within the text. **Probably yes** OPTIONS were motivated by 'elevated expression', 'text strewn with neologisms', 'speech imitation', or simply by 'the existence of some stylistic marks'. 'The language is not an usual one' — noticed one respondent who held T8 for 'literary', which may be also considered a **D.1.d.** ('occurrence') criterion. In such cases the whole context of the JUSTIFICATION usually made it possible to decide whether 'novelty' or 'stylistic discrimination' was meant. Two other students were not impeded by the 'colloquial style' of T8 to consider it 'literary'. Regarding T10, subjects referred to 'slang', 'administrative style', 'concise style and formulas characteristic of a telegram' in order to motivate negative OPTIONS. 'It has nothing in common with the artistic style' — reasoned one student. Another one meant, on the contrary, that 'the mere deviation from the usual manner of communicating may be deemed literary'. Several quasi-tautological JUSTIFICATIONS were listed in connection with T2: 'artistic style', 'it is written in a literary style', 'the wording seems to be literary', or even, as sole argument for a positive choice, 'the language'. 'Concise style' or 'concise expression' appeared, this time in favor of literariness, also in connection with T1, alongside with the 'writing manner of a 'man of letters'' or 'differing from the scientific language'. **D.2.** clearly pointed out the inconsistency of using 'style types' as a means of delimiting 'literature'.

In all, the analysis of the criteria shows quite a competent reception of the stimulus texts, even when these perplexed the respondents. There were almost no blatant misreadings — on the average, of course, not in individual cases — the only notable exception remaining T7. T10 called for, as I have pointed

out, a 'comfortable reading', which is also legitimate. T2 disappointed many students because of its apparent banality, which was not a very subtle response indeed, but it was not an aberrant one either. T8 prompted several subjects to think of silly journalism or of the official 'wooden language' of the communist period. Both observations were correct, except for the fact that the respondents overlooked the inconspicuous parodic signals of the text. As for the rest, T9 was seen as an eccentricity hard to explain, which is, in a way, just what it is; T6 was deemed a poetic puzzle, which was not completely beside the point, even if the formal constraints passed unnoticed. T3 and T4 made respondents judiciously concentrate on the 'advertising' and 'scientific' structural and functional features of the texts and prompted them to advance value arguments.

I would like to add one final methodological remark to this part of the experiment interpretation. The fact that the open-question method was chosen for collecting data about the criteria used for evaluating the literary or non-literary character of the stimulus texts opened the possibility to investigate a large field of hardly predictable information. This method also has the disadvantage of securing minimal control over the collected data (STEEN 1991: 567, 569–571). The 'translation' procedure of content analysis and classification might have induced some considerable amount of simplification or even distortion of information. One of the things that almost unavoidably gets lost in this data processing is the inner logic of the propositional answers. Why should respondents have emphasized, for example, value criteria for T3 and not for T4? Possibly because they thought that T3, because of its verse pattern, *could be taken* for literary, were it not for its aesthetic worthlessness. The OPPOSITION reasoning is sometimes explicit; more often than not it is only implied. Theoretical considerations help us understand another very complicated aspect of the problem: pondering on the 'literariness' of different texts may activate different notions of literature (see ESCARPIT et al 1974: 259–275; CORNEA 1988: 46–47; MARINO 1987: 450–466) — in our case, the structural or the functional one for T4 and the qualitative one for T3, according to which a bad novel is, under extreme circumstances, 'no literature'.

The comparative analysis of the JUSTIFICATIONS in 1991 and 1996 showed that the set of criteria and their correlation to texts and OPTIONS remained quite stable. I shall briefly comment upon some significant changes:

– For **Yes** OPTIONS: Respondents paid more attention to structural criteria (**D**) with respect to T3 and to the text type (**A**) that could be attributed to T5. Both texts received higher positive estimations of literariness in 1996.

– For **Probably yes** OPTIONS: T7 received more numerous items both in class **A** and in class **D** to motivate the increasing estimations for 'probably literary'. A more careful structural examination was recorded for T6.

– For **Probably not** OPTIONS: A considerable decrease of both text type and structural criteria was registered for T5, mainly because of the very few estimations of it as ‘probably non-literary’ in 1996.

– For the **No** OPTIONS: The quantitative growth of valoric JUSTIFICATIONS (B) for T3 was surprising, most of them claiming, in 1996, the ‘worthlessness’ of the text. A shift from structural to text type criteria could be noticed in connection with T7. The rate of absolutely negative OPTIONS diminished very little. The conviction that T10 is non-literary, one which went up by 23.3 %, was motivated especially by structural criteria.

2.3.3. Analysis of the EXPLANATIONS

For the analysis of the EXPLANATIONS I have used an inductive method, grouping the items mainly after certain catchwords that were selected in the examination of the answers. The resulting classification roughly coincides with that of the JUSTIFICATIONS, yet it is more flexible and allows more irregularities. Some changes are caused by the different tasks the subjects had to perform. For example the criteria of the **A** class, based on recognition, similarity or analogy had little chances to be reiterated as *general* conditions for literariness and vice versa: there are a few general criteria that would hardly apply to *particular* texts without further elaboration (e.g. ‘In order that the text be literary, it should be based on a convention between the author and the reader so that the text might correctly cover the distance between the sender and the receiver’ — catchword ‘convention’).

Only 2 items about the appertenance to some literary genres and 3 items about ‘following norms or conventions proper to literature’ correspond to class **A**.

There are much more items that come closer to **B**: aesthetic / artistic value (9) or purpose (6), the beautiful (2), even moral value or purpose (4). ‘Aesthetic accomplishment’ (2) points out the qualitative notion of ‘literature’: ‘Not all the attempts are literary’, ‘Literary is not every text that was intended to be so’.

Criteria reminding of class **C** are:

– emotional response (8, out of which one item is ‘catharsis’ and one ‘aesthetic emotion’)

– expressiveness (7 – catchword ‘subjectivity’ – including ‘subjective transfiguration of reality’ [2] and ‘artistic vision’ [1])

Some other criteria (4) have formed the loose class of ‘aesthetic autonomy’, roughly corresponding to **C.2.c.**: a literary text should be ‘an autonomous universe, that exists according to its own inner law’ or cause an ‘impersonal elevation’, a ‘distancing from the real world and integration in the described world’, an ‘elevation in the realm of aesthetic delight’.

Seven items emphasized the importance of ‘originality’, of which there is no exact equivalent among JUSTIFICATIONS: ‘new’, ‘un-repeatable’, ‘qualitative novelty’, ‘individuality’, ‘originality’.

The criteria corresponding to class **D** are the most numerous:

– specific language characteristics (12). The list is rich, yet there are obviously some recurrent items: ‘neat and expressive language’, ‘elevated language, strewed with figures of speech and neologisms’, ‘syntactic blendings of great elegance and stylistic accuracy’, ‘neat and correct language’, ‘grammatically correct’. An unexpected confusion was revealed by the EXPLANATIONS, namely the one between ‘literary’ meaning ‘which belongs to / is characteristic of literature as one of the arts’ and what is called in Romanian linguistics *limbă literară* (‘literary language’), recommended for all sorts of ‘educated’ or ‘formal’ communication: science, teaching, journalism, law, politics etc. Seven respondents, influenced by the lectures on Romanian linguistics they had recently attended, clearly thought of the second meaning of ‘literary’ as they considered ‘correctness’ a criterion of prime importance. Four subjects have explicitly distinguished between the two meanings of the term.

– figures of speech (8)

– musicality of words (1)

– unparaphrasable expression (1): ‘impossible to be rendered in different words’

– a special kind of language (12 – catchword: ‘artistic style’): ‘observing certain style conditions’, ‘distinctive expression, differing from the common, current language’)

– meaning:

– literary texts should have meaning (4)

– ideas (6): ‘clarity’, ‘complexity’ of ideas, ‘the power of thought’, ‘a more or less implicit idea’, ‘stirring a doubt in my soul or my mind’

– comprehensibility (2): ‘one should finally be able to reach the essence of the text’, ‘it should be written in an accessible language’

– coherence (3): literary texts ‘must be coherent (although very many are not)’

It is possible that many EXPLANATIONS in the last four groups were influenced by the previous stimulus texts. The other criteria recommended, on the contrary, difficult meaning:

– plurisemantism (4): ‘additional meaning’, ‘several interpretations’

– non-informative meaning (3): literary texts ‘should not convey information’, or they should render ‘information of a different kind than the purely cognitive one’

- opacity (1): a literary text ‘should not reveal its aim from the very beginning’
- intransitivity (2, following the terminology of Tudor VIANU [1941]): literary texts ‘should be reflexive’, ‘should be neither very reflexive, nor very transitive’
- indirect expression of meaning (1)
- imagery (5): ‘images’, ‘ideas in material form’, ‘information just as an occasion for sensations’

Some EXPLANATIONS, no more than 10 %, could hardly be analyzed because of their exceedingly digressive, confuse wording. Some of them were metaphorical or sentimental, not always lacking in insight. Beside enthusiastic allegations such as ‘art is sublime, art is sacred’, allusions to ‘the magic wand, the angel finger-nail of the artist’ that ‘makes a hidden string vibrate’ one could read that a literary text ‘should know when to ‘speak’ and when to ‘keep silent’, in a language that only an inner ear may have the ‘chance’ to hear’. I also came across criteria that would better fit special ‘poetics’, sometimes very peculiar ones, recommending ‘balance’, ‘universal themes’, ‘narrative roundness’ or ‘lack of authorial ‘selfishness’’. More sophisticated EXPLANATIONS suggested cumulative or alternative conditions of literariness. Quite often (15 items) respondents reasoned by exclusion or by contrast. Literary texts *should not* ‘transmit information’, ‘be immoral’ like dadaists and surrealists, pursue ‘commercial aims’, ‘be univocal’, be ‘insipid, dry, objective’ etc. They *are different* from scientific or historical writings, newspaper articles, advertising texts, telegrams, everyday communication etc.

The degree of ‘relativism’ was lower than I had expected. One can find only very poor traces of the ‘conventionalist’ view, that has become so popular nowadays, in the EXPLANATIONS of the students. One subject, whom I already quoted, speaks of the literary text as ‘being based on a convention between the author and the reader’. Another respondent, who basically reasoned that literary are texts lying outside ‘usual’ communication, ended up in saying, almost contradicting, that ‘even texts that do not follow compulsory grammatical rules in normal communication (see T6) may be regarded, in certain contexts (accepting certain conventions) as literary’. ‘There are *norms* (more or less highlighted, more or less easy [*sic*] to the common sense) according to which texts are grouped into literary/non-literary’ — was asserted in another EXPLANATION. Five respondents thought that the notion of literature is subjective, that it ‘has a different meaning for each person’, ‘exists only in relation to the reader’, ‘depends on the aesthetic sense of each of us’, ‘is a matter of intuition’, ‘impossible to decide’, or is barely ‘what I like’. One subject implied that ‘literariness’ is a quality that might appear in all sort of texts, insofar as they ‘testify to the refinement of some thinking or the intensity of some feeling’. Another respondent noticed that

general criteria are often contradicted by reputedly literary texts. Consequently, ‘there are no definite criteria to establish a literary text’. After naming Titu Maiorescu (Romanian literary critic, teacher, and politician of the second half of the 19th century, well known for his attempts to establish criteria of aesthetic judgment) and mentioning ‘many others’, ‘the ones we are learning about in the lectures of literary theory’, another student concluded: ‘Come back and ask me three years from now.’ A last example of confoundedness: ‘I am afraid I don’t really know what it means for a text to be literary (perhaps that is what the test aims to demonstrate)’. That was not at all the point of the test, although the students who helped me with data processing were often prone to interpreting it as a means of showing the ‘ignorance’ of the respondents. On the contrary, I was interested to find out to what extent respondents were aware that they were dealing with a very relative matter, that had no ‘correct answer’ whatsoever. The most striking aspect in the analysis of the collected data is that the subjects were pretty sure of the amalgamated set of features they *had learnt* to be characteristic for literature. One may think they were influenced by the academic environment in which the experiment took place. I did my best to explain to them that it was no academic task, that it was by no means aimed to ‘examine’ them and that they were asked to formulate their own opinion.

2.4. Final remarks

In 1991 the literariness criteria experiment led to the conclusion that ‘the prevailing reception pattern, of which subjects may or may not be aware, seems to combine a type of traditional (romanticist?) poetics, based on expressiveness and emotional involvement, with a modernist one, in which plurisemantism, suggestiveness and discontinuity are fundamental. For both kinds the prototype is (lyrical) poetry, as one can easily notice. A natural consequence of this orientation is the rejection of the borderline or ‘minor’ literature.’ (CONSTANTINESCU et al 1991: 66–67).

The ‘new’ reception pattern has retained similar fundamental traits. ‘Poetry’ continues to be the main reference point, with regard to formal, semantic and thematic aspects as well. Characteristics such as ‘playfulness’, ‘humor’, or ‘irony’ continue to play just a minor role in assessing ‘literariness’. They either pass unnoticed quite often, or receive a negative evaluation, being associated with a lack of aesthetic value. The poetics of vagueness, suggestion and interpretive openness make the exact, minute presentation alien to literary quality.

Nevertheless, some tentative changes may be noticed, even though they seem to be contradictory. One can ascertain a significant widening and loosening of

the notion of 'literature' on the one hand, regarding both the relationship between 'high' and 'low', and 'central' and 'peripheral', together with a tendency toward 'easy reading'. On the other hand, 'the authority of cultural models which match quite a rigid system of aesthetic norms' (CONSTANTINESCU et al 1991: 67) seems to gain weight. The additional task of the EXPLANATIONS has shed more light into the investigation of the attempt to reconcile individual desires and expectations of literary reading and educational recommendations. The vertical analysis of *all* the OPTIONS, JUSTIFICATIONS and EXPLANATIONS delivered by every *single* subject would help a lot in highlighting the coexistence of different, even diverging reading patterns and the attempts to make them fit together, but this is certainly too meticulous a job for this paper. Besides, I think that supplementary information would be needed in order to obtain fully reliable results. For me the relationship between 'private reading' and 'school reading' seems to be a very promising topic for further research.

Are the changes I have presented to be explained as a result of a poorer literary education among students in their first academic year at the Faculty of Letters? I deem this hypothesis highly plausible, but the experiment itself is unable to clear the causes of the phenomena it is meant to detect. The more permissive notion of literature is certainly influenced by the weakening of the 'canonical' authority. Whether this emancipatory trend is based on aesthetic options fully conversant with the matter or merely on increasing ignorance is a recurrent question in debates pro and against 'post-modernism'. Even the naive reliance on a 'rigid system of aesthetic norms' could be interpreted in terms of a more superficial, rather mechanical, uncritical commitment to some rudimentary canonical prescriptions received by students during their school education or while preparing for the matriculation exam.

Appendix 1

1. Stimuli texts

T1: Foc stins, cort strîns, pustiul și pulberea plecării.

T2 1991: Joi dimineața s-au strîns cu toții în jurul lui. L-au îngrijit cum au putut, au încălzit apa, au chemat și doctorul, că îl iubeau și era singura lor nădejde. Tot degeaba. Pînă seara, porcul murise.

T2 1996: Era spre sfîrșitul după-amiezii dar soarele încă mai strălucea pe cer. Pe stradă mă întîlnesc cu cineva. 'Bună ziua' îi spun. El mă privește și-mi răspunde: 'Bună seara'.

T3: Of, iar plouă!

Ei, și ce ne pasă nouă?

Vine ploaia și e rece
Dar prin hainele noastre nu trece
Pentru că le-am apretat,
Pentru că le-am impregnat
Cu produsul garantat
IM-PREG-NOL.

T4: Energia nu poate fi creată din nimic și nici nu poate să dispară în cursul proceselor și se transformă numai dintr-o formă în alta, conservîndu-se cantitativ.

T5: De-i place porcul, orice amator
Îi poate coace pulpa la cuptor.
Dar dacă-i suferind, nu e o culpă
Să fiarbă la foc molcom acea pulpă
Și de-o va fierbe, cum spusei, cu artă,
Va prețui de-a pururi pulpa fiartă.

T6: Dus aici bețiv opal
Lapovițe bici asud
Dur, o vietate (cal)
La cetate — ivor ud.

T7: Eroina acțiunii din prima parte este o femeie de patruzeci și opt de ani, nemțoaică; are înălțimea de 1,71 m și greutatea de 68,8 kg (în haine de casă), așadar cu 300–400 grame mai puțin decît greutatea ideală. Culoarea ochilor ei se află între albastru închis și negru, părul blond și foarte des îi e încăruntit pe alocuri și-atîrnă lejer și neted, înconjurîndu-i capul ca o cască.

T8: Acest individ, dușman feroce al noii orînduiri, prin diferite mașinațiuni a reușit să inducă poporul local în cea mai neagră noapte a decăderii, zicîndu-le că e bine, cum că trebuie toți să creadă că dracul există.

T9: Ooo toe aferoov vehon
Pindi sabroe barchizani
Barcarehol ii abriod coom
Ooof findi.

T10: Către P
Contractează imediat aer. Anunță dacă ai reușit. Unanimitate pentru pasărea Phoenix.
Dacă sînt alte propuneri, telegrafiați cifrat. N.

2. Sources, literal translation and description of stimuli texts

T1: Ion Pillat, 'Poeme într-un vers' (One-Verse Poems)

'Extinguished fire, packed up tent, the desert [the solitude] and the dust of departure.'

No predication, past participles; marked sound patterning, regular rhythm, euphony; metaphorical suggestiveness, ambiguity and lyrical undertones of some lexical items.

T2 1991: unpublished text by Mihai Giurgea, student in the 3rd academic year at the Bucharest Faculty of Letters and member of the research team at the time of the first phase of the experiment

'Wednesday morning they all gathered around him [it]. They looked after him [it] as well as they could, warmed up water, called for the doctor, too, 'cause they loved him [it] and he [it] was their only hope. But in vain. Until the evening, the pig had already died.'

Reference and topic indistinctiveness, caused mainly by the equivocal use of the 3rd person predication (in Romanian the personal pronoun in the 3rd person lacks the distinction 'human'/'non-human' and the subject may be deleted in the surface structure); final clue and wit, pointing out some specific background of life style and mentality.

T2 1996: Dino Buzzati, 'Povestiri de seară' (Evening Short Stories)

'It was toward the end of the afternoon, but the sun was still shining. I met someone in the street. 'Good afternoon', I say to him. He looks at me and answers: 'Good evening.'

Obvious commonplace turned into something uncanny by means of textual isolation (and change of the verb tense), which invites the reader to look for a hidden point; there is a contrast between topic triviality and potential connotations (time and being).

T3: Radio advertising in verse

'Oh, it rains again!
But what do we care?
The rain comes and it's cold
But it won't penetrate our clothes
Because we have starched them,
Because we have impregnated them,
With the warranted product
IM-PREG-NOL.'

Transparent, naive, colloquial; clumsy versification; obvious utility function; definite text closing.

T4: 'Fizica' (Physics), textbook for the 9th form

'Energy can neither be created out of nothing, nor can it disappear in the course of certain processes; it only transforms itself from one form into another, remaining quantitatively constant.'

Obvious sample from a scientific topic (the conservation of energy law) and style.

T5: Al. O. Teodoreanu, 'Gastronomie' (Gastronomics)

'If he likes pork, any amateur
May bake the gammon in the oven
But if he's suffering, it is no guilt
To boil that gammon on a gentle fire
And if he boils it, as I've said, with art
For ever will he relish the boiled gammon.'

Sample of 'light verse'; dealing with gastronomical advice, the short poem nevertheless exhibits a gratuitous playfulness and skillful handling of the verse; a touch of irony may also be perceived.

T6: Nichita Stănescu, unpublished text

'Gone here drunkard opal
Sleets whip I sweat
Tough, a creature (horse)
At the fortress — wet ivory.'

Experimental verse, palindrome (the two couplets, verses 1–2 and 3–4 respectively, read identically both forwards and backwards); highly ungrammatical at a syntactic level, in spite of the quite elaborate punctuation in verses 3–4; difficult meaning construction, on the verge of incomprehensiveness.

T7: Heinrich Böll, 'Fotografie de grup cu doamnă' ('Gruppenbild mit Dame')

'The protagonist in the first part of the plot is a forty-eight years old German woman; she is 5 ft. and 7 in. tall and weighs 151 lb. and 14 oz. (in home dress), which means about 10–15 oz. less than the ideal weight. The color of her eyes is between dark blue and black, her blond, very thick hair is grizzled here and there and hangs loose and smooth, surrounding her head like a helmet.'

Contradictory text signals: clear reference to narrative fiction frame and general traits of character description (portrait) on the one hand, exact quantitative details which don't fit the usual manner of introducing and depicting literary characters on the other; mixing up style variants (fictional and official) and narrative perspectives correlated to them in a 'postmodern' fashion.

T8: Ion Anghel Mănăstire, 'Noaptea nu se împuşcă' (One Doesn't Shoot at Night)

'This fellow, a ferocious enemy of the new social order, has managed, by means of various machinations, to delude the local folk into the darkest night of decay, telling them that it is good so, that they all believe that the devil exists.'

Sample of emphatic ideological (possibly journalistic) discourse; the mixture of authorized clichés and ungrammatical formulations may also indicate an attempt to imitate official phrasing (e.g. in a political denunciation); parodic effects.

T9: Virgil Teodorescu, 'Poem în leopardă' (Poem in Leopard Language)

Untranslatable 'Jabberwalky'-like piece of poetry; no hints at a potential syntactic structure.

T10: Nichita Stănescu, 'Respirări' (Breaths)

'To P
Contract air immediately. Announce whether you have succeeded. Unanimity for the Phoenix bird. If there are other proposals, telegraph encoded. N.'

Conflicting text signals: frame structure of a telegram, lacking essential information (addressee); obscure meaning, semantic isotopies, cultural connotations; the overt reference to an 'encoded telegram' may either determine the reader to give up searching for meaning, or make him suspect the frame structure for a fake and try to look beyond it.

2.1. Complete texts (without title): T1, T2 1991 (?), T2 1996, T3, T5 (?), T6, T10 (?)

2.2. Fragments: T4, T7, T8, T9 (?)

Appendix 2

1. Comparative rating of LITERARINESS OPTIONS (valid answers):

TEXT		1	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1991	Y	22	0	1	4	21	6	10	2	6
1991	Py	8	0	5	13	7	5	15	11	12
1991	Pn	3	6	4	9	1	11	3	8	3
1991	N	1	28	24	10	4	13	6	16	11
1996	Y	33	3	2	13	19	8	10	3	3
1996	Py	9	4	2	19	16	15	18	19	8
1996	Pn	2	7	5	2	6	8	10	4	8
1996	N	2	32	37	10	5	15	7	11	26

Y = Yes; Py = Probably yes; Pn = Probably not; N = No

2. Comparative rating of LITERARINESS OPTIONS (%):

TEXT		1	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1991	Y	64.7	00.0	02.9	11.1	63.6	17.1	29.4	05.4	18.7
1991	Py	23.5	00.0	14.7	36.1	21.2	14.3	44.1	29.7	37.5
1991	Pn	08.8	17.6	11.8	25.0	03.0	31.4	08.8	21.6	09.4
1991	N	02.9	82.4	70.6	27.8	12.1	37.1	17.6	43.2	34.4
1996	Y	71.7	06.5	04.3	29.5	41.3	17.4	22.2	08.1	06.7
1996	Py	19.5	08.7	04.3	43.2	34.8	32.6	40.0	51.3	17.8
1996	Pn	04.4	15.2	10.9	04.5	13.0	17.4	22.2	10.8	17.8
1996	N	04.4	69.6	80.4	22.7	10.9	32.6	15.6	29.7	57.7

Appendix 3

Rating of LITERARINESS and TEXTUALITY OPTIONS 1996 (valid answers for both tasks)

LY = literary Yes; LPy = literary Probably yes; LPn = literary Probably not; LN = literary No; TY = text Yes; TPy = text Probably yes; TfY = text fragment Yes; TfPy = text fragment Probably yes

T1:

L/NI T/Tf	LY	LPy	LPn	LN	TOTAL
TY	7	1	0	0	8
TPy	2	1	0	0	3
TfY	18	4	0	1	23
TfPy	5	3	2	1	11
TOTAL	32	9	2	2	45

T2:

L/NI T/Tf	LY	LPy	LPn	LN	TOTAL
TY	2	1	0	5	8
TPy	0	3	3	1	7
TfY	8	9	3	0	20
TfPy	2	5	3	0	10
TOTAL	12	18	9	6	45

T3:

L/NI T/Tf	LY	LPy	LPn	LN	TOTAL
TY	2	2	6	28	38
TPy	1	2	1	4	8
TfY	0	0	0	0	0
TfPy	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	3	4	7	32	46

T4:

L/NI T/Tf	LY	LPy	LPn	LN	TOTAL
TY	1	0	0	10	11
TPy	0	0	1	7	8
TfY	1	1	1	12	15
TfPy	0	1	3	8	12
TOTAL	2	2	5	37	46

T5:

L/NI T/Tf	LY	LPy	LPn	LN	TOTAL
TY	10	7	1	6	24
TPy	0	6	1	3	10
TfY	2	2	0	1	5
TfPy	1	4	0	0	5
TOTAL	13	19	2	10	44

T6:

L/NI T/Tf	LY	LPy	LPn	LN	TOTAL
TY	2	1	0	1	4
TPy	4	7	3	3	17
TfY	5	1	0	1	7
TfPy	7	6	3	0	16
TOTAL	18	15	6	5	44

T7:

L/NI T/Tf	LY	LPy	LPn	LN	TOTAL
TY	1	1	2	2	6
TPy	1	5	1	3	10
TfY	5	5	3	9	22
TfPy	1	3	2	1	7
TOTAL	8	14	8	15	45

T8:

L/NI T/Tf	LY	LPy	LPn	LN	TOTAL
TY	2	0	1	1	4
TPy	0	2	2	1	5
TfY	7	13	3	3	26
TfPy	1	3	4	2	10
TOTAL	10	18	10	7	45

T9:

L/NI T/Tf	LY	LPy	LPn	LN	TOTAL
TY	1	0	1	2	4
TPy	2	11	3	5	21
TfY	0	0	0	0	0
TfPy	0	8	0	2	10
TOTAL	3	19	4	9	35

T10:

L/NI T/If	LY	LPy	LPn	LN	TOTAL
TY	3	6	4	19	32
TPy	0	0	3	4	7
TFY	0	0	1	0	1
TfPy	0	2	0	2	4
TOTAL	3	8	8	25	44

Appendix 4

JUSTIFICATIONS 1996

For the Yes OPTIONS:

TEXT	A	B	C	D	E
T1	6	1	13	33	5
T2	8	0	0	14	0
T3	1	0	0	8	0
T4	0	0	0	3	0
T5	9	1	0	5	0
T6	12	1	2	14	0
T7	6	0	0	5	0
T8	9	0	1	8	0
T9	1	0	1	3	0
T10	2	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	54	3	17	93	5

For the **Probably yes** OPTIONS:

TEXT	A	B	C	D	E
T1	2	0	1	13	1
T2	9	4	0	18	4
T3	2	0	1	0	0
T4	0	0	0	3	0
T5	13	2	1	10	0
T6	5	0	2	14	1
T7	14	1	0	11	2
T8	10	1	0	6	2
T9	11	0	0	15	1
T10	8	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	74	9	6	91	12

For the **Probably not** OPTIONS:

TEXT	A	B	C	D	E
T1	1	0	1	0	0
T2	3	3	4	4	0
T3	8	0	2	3	0
T4	6	0	1	1	0
T5	1	0	3	1	1
T6	1	0	1	9	0
T7	4	1	2	6	0
T8	7	1	0	4	1
T9	4	0	0	6	0
T10	2	1	0	2	0
TOTAL	37	6	14	36	2

For the No OPTIONS:

TEXT	A	B	C	D	E
T1	0	0	1	2	0
T2	1	0	0	4	0
T3	21	12	10	14	0
T4	31	1	7	21	1
T5	3	1	3	13	2
T6	1	0	1	7	1
T7	12	2	4	9	0
T8	1	0	0	5	0
T9	4	2	0	8	2
T10	14	1	3	13	0
TOTAL	88	19	29	96	6

For all OPTIONS:

TEXT	A	B	C	D	E
T1	9	1	15	48	6
T2	21	7	5	40	4
T3	32	12	13	25	0
T4	37	1	8	28	1
T5	26	4	7	29	3
T6	19	1	6	44	2
T7	36	4	6	31	2
T8	27	2	1	23	3
T9	20	2	1	32	3
T10	26	3	4	16	1
TOTAL	253	37	66	298	25

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Biological Roots of Human Vocal Communication

The Speech: Human's Exclusive Gift

Motto:

'If we were to find a pygmy chimpanzee that imitated all human cognitive and linguistic abilities, we should probably ask ourselves what sort of genetic disorder led him to be so short and hairy.'

SNOWDON, 1990

The title of this paper may seem both old-fashioned and too daring. To walk down such a 'beaten track' which bears the imprint of famous philosophers and scientists may be regarded at first sight as something of little relevance. Library shelves are full of books which witness the human interest in, and knowledge about, our most precious gift: speech. To a novice this in itself should be an inhibiting signal; however a basis for challenging established views does also exist.

'...the general scenario of the bipedal posture, freeing up the hands and leading to tool use, gesture, and on to language is still popular' (5), although:

— Cross-cultural studies show that even sophisticated modern languages are a poor medium of instruction as regards tool manufacture or use (5, 21, 86), visual observation and imitation being far more effective. 'Gesture may be superior to speech in showing how to do things and there may be syntactic commonalities between gesture and language, with gesture closely following speech patterns.' (5)

— Hunting has also been suggested as an explanation for the development of language (a necessity in forming hunting teams), but many other social animals hunt in teams, without being excessively vocal. Except for the planning stage, hunting is an activity in which silence (i.e. not alerting the prey) is of value.

— Language as an integral component of the social life of humans is another explanation which cannot be supported if at the same time we consider it as an uniquely human trait, because 'some might argue that our societies are not intrinsically so very much more complex than those of other primates.' (5)

In Wind's multifactorial feedback model, notable factors include 'hand and arm use, changes in posture and anatomy of the vocal tract (partly driven by

changes in posture and flexion of the basicranium), pre and postnatal development, a switch from an arboreal to a terrestrial life, increases in brain size, social relationship, tool use, number of descendants, neoteny and changes in facial structure, including nose and jaw reduction. While the ultimate origin of human language must remain speculative, hints to possible origins may be derived from studies of its ontogenetic development in the child, from its break-down in the aphasia's, and from its appearance *ab initio* in, for example, sign language for the deaf, pidgin and Creoles' (cf.5, p. 318).

Our 'unique patterns of behavior' are known to have precursors among higher non-human primates: 'cooperative hunting, food sharing, nest construction, territoriality, bipedal locomotion, tool construction and use' (35). On a more cognitive level, we can add the capacity for general learning, the ability to recognize oneself in mirrors, symbolic play, some interest in 'painting', insightful problem solving and learning, counting (at least up to five), the ability to categorize, differentiate and generalize, and the cross-modal transfer... 'Nevertheless, language was not just *discovered*, like writing. The latter has to be learned, with effort, whereas a major genetic component ensures the relative effortless acquisition of the former, even though learning is also involved. We can in fact process visual representations even faster than the spoken word; it would be interesting to speculate on our alternative evolutionary and technological history had our ancestors evolved a visual rather than auditory channel of communication.' (5)

Few things are more diverse in human social life than languages. An extreme example is Papua New Guinea, an island of about 900,000 square km in land area (much of which is inhabited), where around 1,000 different languages are spoken. What could be the reasons for such a 'Babel'?

Often, despite the fact we talk about the same topic and use the same language, we refer to very different things. At other times, without knowing one single word of our interlocutor's language we still can understand at least 'what it is about'.

Apparently all spoken messages include a set of features as body and facial gestures, inflections, tonality and melody of language, which add information to words and make possible cross-cultural, sometimes even cross-specific understanding. These contrasting aspects lead (at least the biologists' minds) to certain parallels with what is known and largely accepted as a major concept of biological evolution: '*common features reflect (most of the time) common origin.*' Vocal communication in particular includes a number of aspects which indicate that we can rely neither on mere coincidences or analogies nor on the 'de novo' emergence of structures and functions. As some authors observe 'it is most unlikely that human communicatory behavior arose in our hominid ancestors by one-shot genetic salt, and that apes, so close to us genetically, would show no trace of it. Any differences are likely to be quantitative rather than qualitative' (Dingwall, 1988; Raijmakers, 1990, cited by 5). Pinker and Bloom (76) note that

'evolution often makes innate and automatic those functions which hitherto have had to be performed by general learning and processing mechanisms at a deliberate, conscious, effortful level, thereby freeing up the organism to undertake another simultaneous task.'

A common definition of communication, given by T. Sebeok in his book 'The Play of Musement' (89) involves the 'movement of information in time from one place to another. From this point of view, it is of little consequence whether the trafficked ware consists of random noise, to 10/10 bits of information inherent in a strand of DNA programmed, to rebuild itself, or some configuration of signs, like a sonata by Mozart, charged with high aesthetic value. If information is available, it can be communicated.'

In a narrower sense, by human communication we usually mean speech and even more, languages with all their richness and symbols. The capacity of '*Homo loquens*' to use the language 'has always been the first candidate in the search for a feature characterizing the distinguishing feature of man' (102). At the beginning of the twentieth century the 'Linguistic Society of Paris' established a rule barring from its sessions all lectures which dealt with the origin of speech. Sapir (83) considered language to be '*a purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions and desires by means of a system of voluntarily produced symbols.*' Times have changed since then, but there is still disagreement over whether there is a continuum of vocal and/or gestures and facial forms of communication ranging from non-human primates to humans. In recent studies on human-animal relationships (33, 95, 96) done on children and adolescents, the most frequent answers to the question concerning the human/animal differences were: 'speech' and 'thinking or intelligence'.

It is not surprising that humans of different cultures, ages, or levels of instruction try to delimitate our species from the rest of the animal kingdom, invoking and even exaggerating these 'human gifts'.

Any attempt to investigate in a comparative manner the human and animal communication systems is blocked not only by beliefs, but also by a tremendous amount of information coming from very diverse fields of science (primatology, animal and human ethology, anthropology, linguistics, semiotics, prosody, phonology, computer technology, etc), each one having distinct theories, terminologies and methods. Not to mention the different schools existing in each of these fields, often more severe in criticizing one another than other related sciences. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that scientists still debate, for instance, the definition of semiotics, which ranges from 'activity', 'movement', and 'project' to 'field', 'approach', 'method', 'discipline', 'doctrine', 'metadiscipline', 'theory' and 'science' (104). Despite this debate, we still need to find a category, a definition, an explanation, for semiotics as well as for any other thing existing or imagined.

The crossroad of biology and semiotics was first analysed in the work of the German biologist Jakob von Uexkull early this century (99). Born in 1963 as one of the subdivisions of semiotics, **zoo-semiotics** is defined as 'that segment of the field which focuses on messages given off and received by animals, including important components of human nonverbal communication, *but excluding man's language, and his secondary, language-derived semiotic systems such as sign language or Morse code*' (89). This exclusion, sustained mainly by linguists and anthropologists, is contested by some primatologists and ethologists. As Robbin Burling (1993) points out, there are different perspectives in looking at the origin and evolution of language, 'forward from the anatomy and behavior of our earliest hominid ancestors — the most plausible model for non-human primate anatomy and behavior — or back from language itself. It is natural for primatologists and linguists to start from opposite directions — primatologists looking forward, linguists looking backward but between the starting point and the ending point lies a great gulf of unknown' (8).

One major problem is that of defining what we mean by *language*. If we refer to it as being 'a *system of communication*, then obviously many species have languages. If, on the other hand, language is defined as a *system of arbitrary vocal symbols* then not only very highly developed animal codes, but also human sign languages must fail to qualify as language' (102, p. 150). The anthropocentric way of comparing animal/human 'languages' seems to be, in my opinion, unsuccessful from the starting point. Certainly we cannot find equivalents as long as we do not take into account the differences between the biology and the culture of the two 'subjects'. Such comparison is similar to that between infant speech and that of a specialist in computers or medicine.

Language is a 'system of arbitrary vocal symbols', as Trager defined it (102), but **is it entirely arbitrary? Are all the words so much different from one language to another unrelated one to justify assuming their random construction? And if not, what could be the common factors facilitating the use of similar to identical sounds in denominating the same reality?**

One of the most recent scientific debates on theories and hypotheses was provoked by a series of lectures delivered by Robert Burling at the University of Michigan in 1991, and published in 1993 under the provocative title 'Primate Calls, Human Language, and Nonverbal Communication', together with a number of comments by well-known scholars active in this area of science (8). As it contains many contradictory arguments regarding the origin and development of language, I will try to construct my own discourse based on this rich material.

The author synthetically formulates four basic 'propositions':

'1. Human beings have at least two fundamentally different forms of communication. One includes language along with some other closely related signals.

The other (which I will refer to as our 'gesture-call' system) includes most of our nonverbal communication. Human language is almost as different from human nonverbal communication as it is from primate communication.

2. Both the messages communicated by human gesture-call system and the means by which they are communicated are very much like the gesture-call system of other primate species. Our system deserves to be recognized as constituting the primate communication of our own particular species.

3. That human language emerged as an elaboration or evolutionary outgrowth of our gesture-call system seems implausible. If it did not emerge from our own gesture-call systems its emergence from some other gesture-call systems is no more plausible.

4. If language did not emerge from a gesture-call system we must ask what other starting point it might have had. Since language is inseparably bound up with human cognition, the obvious place to look for hints about possible antecedents of language is in the cognitive abilities of primates. I will conclude by suggesting that we are likely to learn more about language origins by studying how primates use their minds than by studying how they communicate' (8. p. 25–26).

The alternative I would like to suggest to the above-mentioned statements is based on the reconsideration of already existing data and focuses on the similarities and universalities manifested in the communication systems of non-human and human primates rather than on differences (on which too many of the studies and theories are centered). I would also like to re-open the debate on the order in which certain language and paralinguistic characteristics emerged during the evolution from non-humans to *Homo sapiens*. I will also refer to some personal findings concerning primate communication.

1. There are no strong reasons to consider speech and the gesture-call systems as being 'fundamentally different'. Animal vocal emissions are perceived and described by us as songs, screams, shouts, yells, grunts, growls, yaps, and so on.

2. The human nonverbal communication system is largely inherited, most of its repertoire being universal. We admit that monkeys share with us a range of facial expressions such as frowns, pouts, threat grimaces, smiles, eyebrow flashes, as well as expressions of disgust, fear, mirth, surprise, all of them immediately and mutually intelligible. The nonverbal communication system also contains some culturally established components which vary from one group to another.

3. In oral speech, verbal and nonverbal behavior are simultaneously expressed, nonverbal gestures and expressions contributing to the normal perception and understanding of verbal information's content. Without the nonverbal or paralinguistic component, speech is perceived as 'neutral', artificial, or mechanical.

4. There are reasons to consider the possibility that human vocal communication originated in both vocals and gestures of primate behavior.

5. The dichotomy between an ape's mind and communication systems seems simplistic. To admit that an ape's mind is performant but then claim apes do not use it in one of the most important aspects of their life as social beings is not logic. Why then should the mind of apes have such potential?

As a major example of non-equivalence of primate calls and human words or sentences, Burling refers to the observations made by Cheney and Seyfarth on the vervet monkeys' vocal repertoire (11). Noting that their book is 'representative of the best modern work on primate communication', Burling says: '...I doubt that I am the only linguist to feel in the course of reading their book, that *they struggle almost obsessively to ferret out language-like aspects of primate calls... I am struck by their painstaking attention to vocal communication at the expense of other forms of communications... I am surprised by the willingness of so many primatologists to deal with vocal communication as if it constituted an autonomous system while failing to give the same serious treatment to gestural communication*' (8, p. 26–27).

It should be observed that the results of Cheney and Seyfarth (11) are based upon a body of data, starting with the studies of Strusaker (94), who reported in 1967 that vervet monkeys emit different calls at the sight of different predators. Later studies were done on various primate species 'vocalization, as well as on listeners' behavioral reactions to different types of calls. Playing-back recordings of these calls, Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler (90) reported that they evoke different avoidance behavior patterns, even in the absence of any predator. The same authors (10, 90) mentioned at least six acoustically different alarm calls used by the vervets for predators such as leopards, small cats, martial eagles, pythons and baboons. Each of these vocal signs releases a different and appropriate escape response: running up in the trees at the hearing of loud leopard-like alarm calls, or looking up in the air in the case of more grunt eagle-like alarm calls. Vervet monkeys are also able to recognize the specific meaning of the alarm calls of other species, reacting for instance in a very appropriate way to the distinct calls emitted by the common superb starling *Spreo superbus* announcing the presence of aerial or terrestrial predators. When these calls are played, the vervets respond by looking up or down.

The vervet monkey is not the only primate whose vocal repertoire is known to be adapted to situational factors. Studies in the wild of chimpanzees, gorillas, bonobos and on many other species of monkeys (35, 38, 44, 47–52, 63, 65, 67, 68, 70, 71) brought to light new information about the variety and the functionality of vocal communication in infra-human primates. Marler and Tenaza (66) reported that the repertoires of the gorilla and the chimpanzee show close correspondence, despite their ecological differences, testifying in their opinion to the role of phylogenetic in primate vocal communication.

'The chimpanzees may call to mark territorial boundaries, to signal alarm on the appearance of a predator, to summon help from an ally or to locate lost individuals. Some calls can occur in monosyllabic isolation or may be combined multi-syllabically with changes in inflection, consisting in hoots, screams, pants and whispers of varying intensity' (5).

Goodall (35) claims 34 discrete calls but it is unclear if they are expressions of the emotional state or are carrying also information upon the social and/or physical environment, or if they signal even deliberate intentions. 'So far they seem to vary in pitch, tenseness, phrasing, duration, volume, format frequencies, vowel quality, intonation patterns and number of repetitions. They may possibly convey information on age, sex, identity, emotional state, size and makeup of a party, the nature and intention of agonistic situations, interest in being sociable, feeding conditions and intentions to hunt, patrol, or nest, the presence of neighbors, and the location distance, and the direction of travel. However, as yet this is still hypothetical (3), there is no evidence that chimpanzees' communications (natural or acquired) depend in any way on the common sense, tacit knowledge or shared assumptions between listener and speaker, which are so much a feature of our discourse, and which are such a problem for machine translation or even speech decoding' (5).

As an argument that the vervet calls are far from being 'words', Burling shows that a certain call of the repertoire 'cannot be extended to a context in which it would mean *'Have you seen any leopard?'* or *'Don't worry the leopard has gone'* (8, p. 27). These quotations reflect that even today it is still difficult to find a 'common language' for scientists dealing with a common or tangential area of research. It seems unproductive to refer to subtle and complex samples of speech, if we really are trying to find some connections between primate or other animal calls and human language. The difficulty of putting things together arises mainly from the fact that often we do not take into account that:

— as *cultural animals*', we are also biological beings;

— our environment changed dramatically, especially as a consequence of our own human activity, constraining us to adapt by all means, inclusive a more and more complex language. For the other primates, the direction of the natural (physical and social) environmental pressure was much more stable over thousands and thousands of years. In this context, what we should compare is primate vocal and paravocal communication with some kind of *'proto-language'*. There is no real trace of such an incipient form of language, but we still can imagine what could be biologically important to be transmitted as information for early hominids. If we want to compare vocal signals in human and non-human primates we should not oppose animal 'screams' to Shakespeare's meditations but only naturally equivalent situations. What humans do when warning somebody about an imminent danger is not so different from what vervets do: We simply scream: 'shark', or 'leopard',

or 'earthquake', or 'simply danger', because the most important thing for the survival of our congeners is to react promptly and adequately to the environmental situation. All other comments such as those cited by Burling are after-facts. I do not know precisely how vervet monkeys react when the danger is gone, but I suppose that, like other primate species including humans, they do possess behavioral ways of diminishing the stress: some specific sounds, social grooming or other forms of body contacts.

In Burling's view, sustained and contested with equal passion, differences between the human language and the gesture-call systems reside in the following:

— language is seen as a *digital* form of communication characterized by linguistic contrast, while gesture-calls vary in form and meaning along a continuous scale, constituting an *analogical form*;

— language, as well as other types of communication included in the same term *have to be learned*, and for that reason they are *different from one community to another*;

— there is no evidence of volitional control of vocalization in infra-human primates.

The first assumption can be considered partly true. If we compare, for instance, one of the words on the first page of *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English* such as 'abandon' with a word on one of the last pages of the same dictionary, say 'youth', it is quite clear that there is no continuity. But if we analyze words such as 'sea' and 'see' then we have to accept that there is some continuity, at least in the way they sound. In comparison with this example, the vervet calls are in full contrast to one another despite the fact that they might fail 'to be language on other counts such as necessary association with certain stimuli', as David Armstrong noted (2).

From the point of view of biological survival the information needed to distinguish between these should be more valuable than to understand the meaning of a sentence such as 'I see the sea'. On the other hand, if we are able to understand the meaning of such a sentence, then why not admit that non-contrasting sequences also found in primate calls are significant in communicating information?

Burling's second assumption is, in my opinion, also partly true. *Learning* plays a decisive role in speaking a certain language. From this point of view, many of the primates calls seem to be very uniform, but, even if the animal's repertoire of calls is basically a 'congenital endowment' — experiments of Winter (103) have shown for instance that, infant monkeys, even deprived of social contacts, possess essentially a full complement of species-specific calls — how can be an alarm call for warning 'leopard!' genetically based in the absence of the leopard notion? How could monkey infants in their natural habi-

tat know without being exposed, and learn that a leopard is a leopard and not a snake, or at least that their relatives behave in a certain way in response to a certain call? The call-systems of the primates, as well as of other animal species, though fairly fixed and unchangeable, can code a wide range of data and transmit them to con-specifics in an informational useful manner. The uniformity of the call-repertoire might reflect limits in emitting sounds and also a certain uniformity of the environmental events which must be communicated by vocalization. As long as these types of calls are not broadcasted at random, but are strictly connected to specific targets, releasing specific behavioral complex reactions, it seems more plausible that vocal ability and the innate program is coupled with learning.

Several studies demonstrate the existence of troop dialects in macaques and other primates (36, 64, 82) and the necessity of acoustic exposure to con-specifics for a completely normal development of calls (72), suggesting some vocal plasticity as well as the existence of a 'proto-culture' (social learning and transmission from one generation to another). The results of Masataka and Fujita (69) on the ability of monkey infants of one species, fostered by adults of another macaque species, to learn and reproduce calls specific to the foster parents is considered by Burling (8, p. 34) as 'an unusual finding'. He supports his affirmation with one of the conclusions of Snowdon (92) namely that 'there is not conclusive evidence for vocal learning in monkeys'.

Speaking about innate and learned behavior in the vocal communication of monkeys and apes, we need to make a digression and present some of the most important results obtained in laboratory studies. In contrast with field studies, where usually spontaneous vocalization is recorded and interpreted in connection with the subjects general behavior, the experimental investigations have dealt mainly with the ability of infra-human primates to emit sounds, even words, or to manipulate other symbols equivalent to human words. 'Ape-language began with what seemed to be a very simple and intriguing question: can apes learn to talk?... The behavior of these animals seemed so intelligent that many scientists were repeatedly puzzled as to why they could not learn to speak' (84).

The famous projects of Kellog and Kellog (57, 58) and of Hayes (41, 42) on trying to teach English to infant chimpanzees resulted in failure because, after several years of training, the subjects were not able to pronounce more than four words despite the fact that they attained a passive vocabulary of around 100 words.

In 1969, Gardner and Gardner (31) trained the chimpanzee Washoe to use the 'American Sign Language' (ASL). In three years he acquired an active ASL vocabulary of 132 words. This successful result stimulated research on other primates and a later study on gorillas, done by Patterson (74), proved their ability to learn, in about four years, some 220 ASL words. As Nöth pointed out in 1990,

'the most significant results of these projects are the discoveries concerning the degree to which apes are able to generalize and abstract in the use of signs. The gestures used by Washoe were not only context-dependent indices of imitative icons (for which apes are proverbially famous), but true symbols, arbitrary signs used in the absence of the referential object, occasionally even in creative generalizations and sometimes for no other purpose than naming the object' (102). The most important criticism brought to these projects is that apes trained by humans could detect some nonverbal cues from their trainer, the so-called 'Clever Hans phenomenon' (88).

Premak (78, 79, 80) used, with the chimpanzee Sarah, a specially created artificial language in which plastic tokens of various shapes and colors were used as the equivalents of words. The research focused on the ability for syntax and logic. Acquiring some 130 symbols, Sarah was able to use and understand quantifiers to describe colors and shapes, 'to construct sentences and questions in correct word order' (102).

Rumbaugh and Savage-Rumbaugh (81, 84, 85) used another artificial symbolic language in which the symbols consisted of geometrical configurations embossed on the keys of a computer keyboard with 124 keys, each of them being equivalent to a human word. The subject, again a chimpanzee, had to manipulate the keys in a correct syntactical order. To avoid any influence from the non-verbal behavior of the trainer, no direct contact with the subject was possible, the 'conversation' being screened and the experimenter offering the rewards from a distance. 'Apes can learn words spontaneously and efficiently, and they can use them referentially for things not present; they can coordinate their joint activities to tell another thing otherwise not known; they can learn rules for ordering their words; they do make comments; they can come to announce their intended actions; and they are spontaneous and not necessarily subject to imitation in their signs' (85). Despite all these results, objections were raised about the fixed place of the keys on the keyboard which could facilitate simple positional learning.

In other recent studies done on bonobos (*Pan paniscus*), Savage-Rumbaugh et al (1990, 1994) mentioned that the two young individuals studied showed much evidence of *naturalistic* (as opposed to trained) acquisition of spoken English, comprehending many quite complex statements the first time, without the need for gestures. Early exposure to naturalistic spoken English seems to be the critical factor, just as with human children who, in some respects, scored lower until the age of 3–4 years. 'On the other hand, there seems to be no evidence as yet that the trained apes spontaneously teach each other their new-found skills. Moreover, the chimpanzees can learn to sign, to draw and to communicate via gesture in the laboratory but cannot *create* or *maintain* these behaviors *naturally*, out of laboratory. These considerations lead some critics to say that, finally, rather

than tapping the language *per se*, the studies address capacities for categorization, association, problem solving, and communication' (8).

Here we are confronted with two different aspects of language: **speaking and understanding**. Apes cannot produce vocal sounds such as *i*, *a*, *u*, or the phonemes *g* or *k* due perhaps to limitations in their vocal tract anatomy, their central nervous system or volition. As a species they prefer visual signaling via facial expression, gestures, and postures to acoustic signaling. But some humans, due to their vocal or brain limitations also cannot perform sounds specific to the human language. What should be the phylum for integrating them? Humans, because they lack tails and body-hair, or non-humans because they lack speech?

Non-human primate research proves that there is a great difference between what apes and monkeys can perform vocally and what they can understand trans-specifically. 'Our closest animal cousins, the common chimpanzee and the bonobo (pygmy chimpanzee), can achieve surprising levels of language comprehension when motivated by skilled teachers. Kanzy, the most accomplished bonobo, can interpret sentences he has never heard before, such as 'Go to the office and bring the red ball', about as well as a 2.5 years old child. Neither Kanzi nor the child constructs such sentences independently, but they can demonstrate by their actions that they understand them' (9).

Studies on non-human primates intellectual abilities use performance as a reference point but it is very important to keep in mind the fact that the ape subjects task in any one of these studies was a very artificial one. Compared to that, the task of a native English speaker to learn Chinese is simple. Despite criticism of these results, it is difficult to ignore that by different techniques and with different subject species, the conclusions are pointing in the same direction, proving that the brains of monkeys and apes are capable of so much more than their vocal tract.

Back to Burling's paper, we may reconsider his sharp distinction between the **'two fundamentally different forms of communication'**, based on some features (contrast versus continuity, auditory-vocal channel versus other channels of the propagation of information, etc.), taken into account by linguists and anthropologists. Reactions to this assertion are extremely diverse, starting with B. G. Blount (8, p. 39) for whom the two forms of human communication **'are more likely of being complementary systems, one embedded in the other'**, and ending with that of W. C. Stokoe (8, p. 43) for whom **'the difference is not between language and non-verbal communication but between language and the communication of creatures without language.'**

The debate is also continuing as to which of the two systems is older. For Mary le Cron Foster (8, p. 39), 'vocal language is an older system than gesture

signaling. Our perception of the operation of iconicity in it fades as the function of analogy became classificational rather than sensory-perceptive'...? In C. A. Callaghan's opinion (8, p. 39), 'it is quite probable that gesture-language evolved before spoken-language.'

Burling suggests parallels which he finds 'more promising... between primate calls and human nonverbal communication.' Commenting upon the distinctive grunts that vervets exchange with one another (these include one kind of grunt that a vervet monkey makes when approaching a superior and another used when approaching an inferior) which are described by Cheney and Seyfarth in their book (11), the author considers that these grunts' presumably, help to smooth the relations among the animals, offering reassurance about each animal's knowledge of its place in the hierarchy. Should they however be compared to language? I suggest that when humans use signals that are most similar to these vervet grunts we do not count them as part of language... Until these (two types of communication) are recognized as distinct, comparisons with animal communication will always be difficult' (8, p. 28). He also notes that 'our own language is vocal. Vocal communication is so crucial to us that we may exaggerate its role among animals. We too easily forget to acknowledge that sound is only one part of their multi-channeled communication system' (8, p. 27).

I should say first that, if some barrier blocks our judgement on such an important topic, rational efforts should be made in order to get over it. Verbal communication in humans, just like oro-facial (vocal and mimic) communication in other primates and non-primates, seems to be adapted for two different purposes:

— **long distance interactions** or conditions in which direct interaction is screened (in the darkness, in thick vegetation, etc.). In such circumstances the call-system, i.e. the vocal-auditory channel is dominant. Human warning calls as well as those used for locating other members of the group are short. Perhaps most important features of such calls are the intensity of the sounds, the intonation and the structure of the words — long vowels alternating with strong consonants, which provide sound reverberance. Asking for help or warning of a danger is entirely possible and effective using screams consisting of such a combination of sounds instead of clear words. The signals eliciting alert responses should consist of these long phonemes. It would be useful to analyze the accented phonemes in the alarm calls of humans in different languages.

In humans but also in non-human primates, as well as in many other animal species vocalization has advantages and disadvantages. By vocalization they can communicate and locate their mates or infants or congeners, but at the same time, they can be easily located by predators or enemies.

— **close interaction**, where visual cues are more accessible. In this situation somebody can gain much more information by combining speech with body

and facial gestures and postures. Apparently the dominant channel switches to the visual one — and this should be more a kind of comparison and integration of acoustic and visual information. Loud calls, just like loud human speech, has an aggressive meaning if it continues to be performed in the proximity of congeners. From this point of view, it is not surprising that the vocal repertoire of vervet monkeys turns from calls to grunts, while they are in close contact, because different types of information about the self and the environment must be offered. I do not think the differences between this kind of vocalization and our whispers are so dramatic even if the word should be the same, as at warning 'leopard'.

By way of contrast to the parallel between primate calls and human non-verbal behavior, I suggest one between primate vocal-facial gestures and human speech. To support it, I would first bring into discussion the age of the two systems. Almost all the authors dealing with primate and human communication recognize the striking resemblance between non-human and human primates' facial expressions. Many human-ethological studies also demonstrate that, despite the great diversity of human cultures, very many facial gestures are universally present, and have the same meaning (23–26, 36, 45, 53). As early as 1872, Charles Darwin (18) pointed out a number of cross-cultural similarities in human expressive movements, which in his view originated in a common phylogenetic root. Despite being repeatedly challenged, 'in a number of cases comparison with other primates revealed some behavioral patterns, very probably phylogenetically old, as is the case with expressions of smiling and laughing, for which homologues are found in the *horizontal bared-teeth face* and *relaxed open-mouth face* respectively of the chimpanzees and some monkeys' (46). A review of chimpanzees' facial expression, reflecting/signaling specific emotions/psychic states is to be found in the studies of A. Jolly (53), and of Chevalier-Skolnikoff (12). Results of child development studies equally point out that 'by the time children utter their first words, they already have a well-developed gesture-call system' (8, p. 49). In his very detailed study on the gestural behavior of the deaf-and-blind-born children, I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (20) discusses basic similarities between the expressive behavioral patterns of his subjects and the expressions of non-deprived children. These facts cannot be explained entirely by learning acquisition because of the severe channel impairments. The author also notes differences in the expressive behavior: the deaf-and-blind-born often lack minute gradations; the superposition of various expressions occur, but are less refined than the composite expressions of normal children, fact which seems to be the result of adjusting behavior by imitation and learning.

Combining these data together with many other results, we may recognize that the nonverbal expressive behavior was the first step in close communication in primates.

The ability of 'the smartest ape' to articulate a richer repertoire of sounds did neither cancel nor replace the nonverbal expressive behavior, but built up on it. In other words, as long as emitting sounds and combining them into 'proto-words' requires not only brain and vocal cords, but also mouth movements, it would be very uneconomical and unwise to 'invent' them at random. These arbitrary signs will change facial expressions, making other congeners doubt the truth of intentions and emotions of the emitting individual. It would be much easier and more efficient to produce those sounds which best fit an appropriate oro-facial expression. To support my hypothesis, in addition to results on primate behavior discussed above, I will now turn to data provided by studies on comparative anatomy and physiology. The amount of information is enormous and I only want to mention those results which attest, in non-human primates, the existence of macro- and micro-level equivalencies of human brain speech areas and of related structures involved in the production and reception of vocal-acoustical-visual information:

— **Lateral asymmetry** of functions depends on a complex of genetic, structural and functional factors and is also influenced by hormonal and maturation elements. The most important and intriguing level where lateralization is expressed is that of the brain hemispheres. This asymmetry is considered to be the anatomical support of the highest human brain activities such as tool use, language and intellect (37). But lateral asymmetry is far from being uniquely human, occurring frequently as a characteristic of many animal species. There is good evidence for homologous lateralization, at least in the processing of non-human primate vocalization (62). Heffner and Heffner (43) showed that lesions of the left temporal lobe of Japanese and Rhesus macaques induced loss of ability to discriminate species-specific calls. Some behavioral studies also show that there exists a right ear preference for inter-individual vocal communication i.e. left hemisphere (39, 75). Morphological asymmetries in the temporal areas corresponding to those in humans were also found in chimpanzees' brain (105).

— **Specific speech areas** i.e. Broca, Wernicke, are known to exist in the human cortex. As Wilkins and Wakefield (101, p. 163) underline, 'the claim is not that language relies exclusively on these areas but rather the more modest one: that these areas are necessarily, but not exclusively, involved in language.' The existence of these cortical areas is, among others, one of the basic material arguments of Chomsky's nativist theory of language (14). 'According to Chomsky, our language ability, as he sees as both species- and task-specific, derives from an innate language-specific neural mechanism or mechanisms. He sees the latter as discreet modules for such separate components as syntax, the lexicon, and so on, with no prior evolutionary history, no prior preadapting counterparts in earlier species suddenly appeared, full blown as Athena from the head of Zeus' (5, p320). In other words, 'language acquisition is guided by a language instinct — crudely, a genetic determined region in the brain' (40).

There are several reports concerning the presence in the brain of non-human primates of regions cytoarchitecturally homologous to our Broca and Wernicke speech areas. Galaburda and Pandya (30) as well as Deacon (19) claim to have found such homologues in the Rhesus monkey, together with the arcuate fasciculus which links the two major areas. 'Phonation and vocalization in monkeys is at least partly under the control of limbic centers, such as the anterior cingulate, as indeed may also be true for humans. Thus, emotional signals like crying and laughing seem to employ similar subcortical circuitry to those mediating animal calls with lateral evolution of the cortical system' (5). Doreen Kimura (60) has found that aphasic patients whose aphasia resulted from damage to left lateral brain areas also have difficulties in executing novel sequences of hand and arm movements (apraxia). 'By electrically stimulating the brains of patients being operated on for epilepsy, George A. Ojemann of the University of Washington has also shown that at the center of the left lateral areas specialized for language lies a region involved in listening to sound sequences. **This perisylvian region seems equally involved in producing oral-facial movement sequences—even non-language ones. These discoveries reveal that parts of the 'language cortex', as people sometimes think of it, serve a far more generalized function than had been suspected. It is concerned with novel sequences of various kinds: both sensations and movements, for both the hands and the mouth'** (cf. 9).

'The response of vervet monkeys to an alarm call, though different for each type, is invariant and, presumably, limbically controlled. Words by contrast, are typically produced without limbic involvement (as far as is known), are uttered in a dispassionate fashion, are not stimulus bound, and do not evoke a stereotypical behavioral response in the hearer' (cf. 100, p. 134–135). But as Deacon notes, 'our own older limbic vocalization circuits are still important in initial speech activation, in prosodic and emotional expression. Indeed they activate our few remaining species-specific calls; for example laughter, crying, shrieks, sighs, groaning and sobbing. Generally cortico-cortical connections in the monkey's perisylvian regions predict the spatial pattern of functionally connected areas in human temporal, parietal and frontal lobes. This suggests that language functions, during evolution, have recruited cortical circuits that were already present, perhaps for different purposes, in our primate ancestors. Quantitative changes in particular populations of neurons may be more common than novel rerouting of neural connections or the 'de novo' creation of new brain structures in vertebrate brain evolution. Deacon again emphasizes that there is no evidence for a *de novo* appearance of speech areas in the brain of early hominids; any differences between us and our ancestors are likely to be quantitative rather than qualitative' (cf. 100, p. 328).

As can be seen, material proofs of at least 'primordial structures existing in non-human primates brain are not missing as well as some references about

the common neural pathways controlling speech and non-language oro-facial movements.'

— **The auditory boundaries** of infants and adults of non-human primates coincide with the phonetic boundaries present in humans. Based on this overlap, Kuhl (61) argues that 'there may be no special speech-specific mechanisms, and that speech production evolved to match the properties of the ear.' According to Kuhl, the auditory system may have played a key role in shaping the acoustics of language and the mechanisms that produce it. Thus even if early hominids could not produce a full range of 'our' kind of speech sounds, and this is itself a disputed proposition, they may still have been able to perceive and discriminate a full range. If Kuhl is proven right, we may have to conclude that the uniqueness of human speech lies not at the phonetic level, but rather at the levels of syntax and semantics' (cf.5, p. 331).

— Most of the **oro-facial muscles** implied in speech are equally involved in nonverbal facial gestures, and have homologues in the anthropoid apes (23, 45, 53). As noted by Savage-Rumbaugh and Mc Donald (1988), 'the chimpanzees facial anatomy is very similar to our own except for a large protruding jaw and brow ridges; the nerves and muscles moving the various facial structures are practically the same as ours and, when accustomed to the chimpanzees slightly different facial architecture, we soon learn to read its expression accurately, particularly in the case of the pygmy chimpanzees (bonobo). This subspecies has a much smaller brow and jaw and may in fact be more closely related to us.' (cf 9).

Another set of important information comes from studies on infant and children's general and vocal behavior. An early phylogenetic origin of language in mother-infant contexts has been suggested by several authors (32, 73). Children are born with a capacity for learning the language to which they are exposed in the first years of life, without predisposition for a certain language. In order to understand how the speech-learning process functions, we have to take into account not only the acoustic input, but the entire context in which the 'maternal language' is taught and perceived. It is quite clear that no infant is able to learn a language from an audio-tape, even if it implies a very sophisticated method of teaching. Usually it is the mother's 'job' to talk with the infant. This kind of communication ('baby talk' or 'motherese speech') is very special and efficient; Eibl Eibesfeldt in his 'Human Ethology' explained some of the characteristics:

1. Raising tone frequency relative to normal speech by one octave.

2. Exaggeration of intonation structure, whereby the melodic form conveys specific information (D. N. Stern et al 1982). Mothers use rising melodies when they elicit their child's visual contact. Yes/no questions have similar frequency

curve. Why-questions and demands utilize falling melodies. Sinusoidal and Bell curves are used when mothers wish to maintain the infant's interest.

3. Emphasis of important elements.

4. Clear, simple speech.

5. Grammatical simplification.

...Facial expressions are also modified specifically for children. Mothers exaggerate expressions and change them slowly' (21, p. 207–209).

To these characteristics I would add:

— repetition of the word until imitation occurs in the child;

— affective reciprocal rewarding;

— close body and visual contact while 'teaching' the infant.

The 'motherese speech' seems to be universally present in humans, suggesting that it has some important functions in facilitating language acquisition by infants as well as in bonding the dyad.

As Ann Cutler remarks (16, 17), 'Human speech and perception is truly remarkable in his robustness and flexibility. What is equally remarkable is how IN-flexible human speech perception is with respect to the needs of a polyglot environment. Adult language users find learning new languages extremely hard; increased exposure to foreign languages does not alter this situation at all.'

Could this lack of flexibility in adult language learning be the result of a very different approach (grammar based rather than visual and acoustic input), compared to that of infants?

Analyzing the role of each of the 'motherese language' characteristics, we may propose that:

— The raising of the tonal frequency can be considered an almost reflex reaction when:

a) we are in contact with beings or things that elicit our kindness and delicacy: small children but also small animals, beautiful little things such as flowers, etc.

b) we want to communicate our real or pretended fragility and need for protection (children talking to adults, women to men, subordinate to leaders, etc.).

It is probably a way of gaining confidence by making 'a slam voice', more similar to the natural tonality of children's voice (59). The raising of tonal frequency alone is not efficient in establishing friendly contacts, as long as screams (angry speech) also imply a raise in tonal frequency.

— Exaggeration of intonation structure, with an accent on the melody of speech, is one of the most interesting characteristics of the 'motherese speech'. The fact that this 'melody' is accentuated, even exaggerated might reflect a special, innate mechanism of perceiving it in infants. Such a behavior would not be maintained, were it not efficient in facilitating communication. Adult speech melody is also extremely important in the emotional decodification of

messages. This melody may be the key element in understanding ‘What it is about’ in an unknown language because, despite the great variability of identical words, when we have to communicate information in different languages, the melody seems to be very much the same. Perhaps some common features can be found in the melodic shape of vocal emission in deaf and/or dumb children and adults who try to express feelings.

Turning from language-melody to music, I would like to emphasize that ‘music is more immediately effective than is visual art. It is directed toward our emotions, with primary leitmotifs presented as releasers in more or less veiled form’ (21, p. 691). By primary leitmotifs one understands the fact that ‘people can accurately categorize heroic, hunting, war, mourning, lullaby, and love songs with a high degree of certainty (R. Eggebrecht 1983; M. Schröder 1978)’ (cf. 21, p. 690). Eibl Eibesfeldt also mentions the findings of Sedlacek and Sychra (1963) ‘who showed that non-Czech speaking persons correctly interpreted the mood in which a Czech sentence was spoken’ (21, p. 690).

‘The sense for musical harmony is based upon the biologically determined ability to extract a single tone from a chord’ (91). ‘This perceptual ability is based on a constant calculation of harmonic intervals between the individual partial tones and thus requires a special abstraction ability, since the actual tone frequency does not have to be physically present in the chord itself. Parallels to analogous central information processing strategies in recognition and estimation of human verbal sounds suggest phylogenetically acquired learning programs’ (97, cf. 21, p. 694).

These findings can also support other hypothesis: if speech melodies (and also music, vocal or instrumental) have several universal traits then it should be possible that in the genesis of vocal/verbal communication the melody came the first, perhaps as grunts, calls, etc. Such a hypothesis would explain its universality despite the languages ‘explosion’.

The rhythm of sound emissions can express the emotional state of the animal (chimpanzees vocalizations in agonist interactions, distress calls of infants, etc.).

Also tonality and the harmonic intervals could be important information carriers.

Going one step further, one may find some parallels with the vocal melody of non-human primate calls. Major versus minor tonalities (intervals) known as one of the landmarks used to decipher the ‘primary leitmotifs’ could perhaps be found in non-human vocalizations as well. It would be important to establish whether they have the same emotional meaning as in the case of humans, but such investigation requires very sophisticated sound and video-analyzing systems.

This argument does not depend on the other three characteristics of ‘motherese speech’ enumerated by Eibl Eibesfeldt, namely emphasis of the important

elements, clarity and simplicity of speech, and grammatical simplification nor on my remark on the repetition of the word in order to elicit vocal imitation, because they follow a more general learning scheme.

Facial exaggeration of expressions, their long-lasting display, the close body and visual mother-infant contact and affectionate reward for spontaneous or volitional vocalization/verbalization, are aspects usually included in the ‘non-verbal’ communication category. I already discussed the hypothesis of the close connection between oro-facial gesture and words, with the possible origin of speech from paralinguistic behavior. The spontaneous, perhaps innate need of adults to accentuate facial expression and to present it in a very explicit way to the infant could sustain such a hypothesis. ‘Kuhl (1988) notes that the infants are born with certain predispositions; they prefer looking at faces than at equally complex visual stimuli (Fantz and Fagan, 1975), they prefer viewing faces judged attractive by adults, indicating that facial attractiveness is innately assessed (Langlois et al. 1991), they imitate (within 72 hours of birth) facial expressions or actions presented to them (Meltzoff and Moore, 1983), and they prefer to listen *motherese speech* to *adult speech*’ (cf. 5, p. 330). With adults too the acquisition of a new language is more efficient if the exposure involves not only acoustic but also visual contacts.

Some of the experiments on infant speech perception used measures such as time of non-sucking or fixation time of visual-acoustic stimulus in familiar and non-familiar ambiance — ‘habituation paradigm’ (22, cf. 17).

‘Research with these methods shows that infants can discriminate speech sound contrasts both from their own and from other languages. Thus, they can discriminate contrasts which they have never heard; and they can discriminate contrasts which adults fail to discriminate because mature language users identify speech sounds only in terms of the categories of their native language’ (17). Recent studies point out that vowel perception and discrimination between the native and non-native vowels develop earlier (around the age of 4 to 6 months), while consonant perception and discrimination occurs around the age of 10 months (77). The authors give an acoustical explanation, saying that vowels have longer duration than consonants and have more marked periodic structure, which corresponds to the infants preference for ‘periodicity bias’ (16).

A complementary explanation for the earlier perception of vowels comes from the fact that *their duration is longer than that of the consonants* giving more time to the infant ‘to analyze’ them not only acoustically, but also visually. The duration of exposure to the vocally emitted sound (vowel in this case) is longer and the time for the infant to hear and to observe the facial expression (mouth shape) in pronouncing it is also longer. Before performing real words, very small infants move their mouth spontaneously, or trying to imitate the movements observed. When an infant is seen performing such movements, the

adults most frequent reaction is to 'respond' by imitation, adding the corresponding sound.

Another question is the following: is the *motherese speech* 'deformed' and exaggerated, or is it more probable that adult speech evolves by reducing some of the emotional informational cues or by replacing them with a richer vocabulary? The use of *motherese speech* is sometimes criticized, the 'positive emotional function of this means of expression' (Mannelore Grimm, 1983 cf. 21) being neglected. 'If it is reduced to a purely academic consideration, based theoretically on the linguistics of speech, this argument is untenable. Unless one would wish for speech development without considering the affectivity of words' (21, p. 207).

As regards the acoustic perception and discrimination of vowels and consonants, it might be interesting to analyze the most basic linguistic repertoire of infants in their first year of life which contains a lot of repetitive syllables as: baba, caca, dada, gaga, lala, mama, nana, papa, tata, etc. Many of them, before being real words, are simple spontaneous vocal exercise results. This may be the reason why they became important words denominating close relatives, physiological or psychological needs in almost every language. Some of these words often change the last vowel into an 'i' or transform a non-accentuated into an accentuated vowel, forming in some cases the diminutive of the initial word. One should also note the words repetition as a means to express the plural as in Pidgin languages, Indonesian, Papuan and perhaps in languages in many other parts of the world. This aspect might also explain why, in various situations when a message has to be underlined, this is done by repetition of syllables or words (yes, yes; sure, sure; etc.) or by repetitive gestures such as shaking the head or the arm.

Taking into account all these, one way to understand how speech might have originated implies several combined studies to answer the following questions:

1. Which are the non-human primates' oro-facial distinct expressions most frequently used in close interactions with congeners?
2. What are the clearest meanings of these expressions, considering the context and the consequences of their being shown?
3. What are the specific (or equivalent) muscles involved in these mouth movements?
4. What are the human mouth movements (and specific/equivalent muscles) involved in pronouncing sounds and groups of sounds?
5. What are the most striking equivalences of mouth movements in humans/non-human primates while gestural/vocal communicating?
6. Is there any correspondence between these motor equivalences and the phonetic structure of specific words across languages?

For the first four questions, as mentioned before, a great number of studies already exist. For the last two, there are no comparative interspecific data, but only some human trans-cultural linguistic studies focussing mainly on related languages. I have only one reference, concerning the biophysiological origin of the word 'mama', which does not involve interspecific, but only transcultural comparison.

Starting from the etymology of the word 'mama/mamma'

Greek: *mámma* = mother, mother-breast

Latin: *mamma* = female breast, mother

middle-high German = *mamme*, *memme* = mother breast, mother, woman

Wulf Schiefenhövel (personal communication), points out that 'one theory suggests that the 'm' phonem is equivalent to sucking in / directed inwards, involving the lips and the other parts of the mouth of the milk suckling baby'. Indeed, if we check the way infants name their mothers, in many languages of the world, we can observe that their mouth is moving in a very similar fashion to the movement they are performing while in suckling or asking for breast feeding:

ma – (Prakit, Hindi and many other modern vernaculars, also *amma*, *ama*)

mi, *me* – Talaing

ma – Palaung, En, Yin, Kla Muk, Malay

mi, *ma*, *mia* – SE Papuan

mo – Pak, Sasar, Teqel

mama – Savo

moa – Wa

mwe – Son

ma-e – Dana

mai – War

may – Kurdu

u-ma – Mundari

a-ma – Malay, Fasu, Kewa, Beami

me – Tai

mei – Li, Laqua

mama – 'nursing mother' Samoa

ama – 'female guardian, female authority' Tagalog

It is interesting also that in many languages the words for face, mouth include the same phoneme (the same mouth movement)

mukha – face, mouth Sanskrit, Philippines, Indonesian, Malay

muham – mouth, Prakit

mukh – face Bengali

muh – mouth, common in modern vernaculars

muka – face, Malagasy

maka – face, Polynesia
mata – face, N. Guinea
meka – tongue Amboyna
mocha – mouth, Kherwari, Santali
mua – mouth, Katorr
main – mouth, Son
mu-lut – mouth, Malay, Indonesian
murū – mouth, Central Papuan
mangai – mouth, Maori
mana – mouth Vaturana, Florida
muu – mouth, Manggarai
mut, mit – mouth, Formosa
mingir – mouth, Awyi
magota – mouth, Kiwai
mongot – mouth, Kati
manga – mouth, Kapau

(The list of words is selected from Internet based information).

While in some instances the correspondence may be coincidental, it is obvious that, as a whole, such a high rate of coincidences between various language groups is very unlikely. When we add the known European equivalences it becomes evident that some of the words are not created at random.

Very similar movements of the mouth are performed when pronouncing 'papa' which in some languages is denominating the father (bapak, Indonesian), in others food. In Romanian, where 'papa' means food, the word is used only for speaking with infants and very young children, or in 'motherese speech' but not in adult speaking.

It is not my intention to argue that all words are conceived in this way, and I would like to stress that I am interested only in those words or vocal expressions which are of great biological significance, analyzed from 'proto-language' perspective.

In recent years, in studies concerning decoding the multimodal verbal and nonverbal systems of human communication using speech, facial expression, and body gestures in relation with artificial intelligence, human-computer conversation, very sophisticated programs are developed for searching human-computer interaction and dialogue, natural language processing collaboration theory and technology, speech act theory, knowledge-based simulation applications to mobile computing and information management (15). It is possible to make accurate and complex measurements using computer technology (4, 6, 7, 27, 28, 29, 54, 55, 56) such as the one used by J. Schubert (87) for analyzing verbal, vocal and visual aspects of political speech. (Some samples of

Romanian and English spontaneous speech in situations considered to be biologically meaningful have already been analyzed with such modern equipment. In the near future a twinning project will probably help us conduct more detailed study using the existing audio-video recordings.

To summarize briefly, the main aspects of this paper include the following:

— Despite strong opposition, there is a host of data coming from diverse fields of science, suggesting that human language did not appear *de novo*, but has, in addition to cultural roots, important biological ones.

— In order to investigate the precursors of human vocal communication in infra-human primates' systems of communication, it is essential to choose carefully those samples which are equivalent in humans and non-humans, e.g. information with biological meaning.

— Starting from the observation concerning the universality of most of the primates' gestural behavior, it should be possible to design a hypothetical 'proto-language' including assumptions as which words correspond to specific facial expressions.

— Supplementary arguments can be traced in infant incipient speech, as well as in cross-cultural linguistic studies on 'motherese speech' and children's vocalizations.

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The Biography of an Illustrious Stranger: Samoil Botezatu

Apparently Samoil Botezatu did not receive too much attention from historians. Nobody ever acknowledged him as a major cultural personality, as a deserving officer or as an influential politician. Nevertheless, he is one of the most prominent individuals of the nineteenth-century Moldavian cultural milieu, and his literary, teaching, and theatrical activities gained him a well-deserved reputation in Iași during the 1830s and the 1840s. For this reason he is included in literary dictionaries which, in rather brief entries, mention a few details concerning his cultural activities; however, the information provided is utterly insufficient. In my opinion, Samoil Botezatu represents a typical case of cultural integration in the society of modern Moldavia. His name alludes to a religious conversion;¹ his entire biography — both his personal life and his cultural activity — is therefore all the more worth being analyzed. The following study represents but a mere biographical research on a personality who has apparently embodied the symbolic image of social and professional achievement in a culturally fluid environment. The reader may also be prompted to consider it as the story of someone's successful social integration, by means of cultural affinities and affiliations. Botezatu was an emancipated 'marginal' — to use Robert E. Park's sociological icon —,² who gave Moldavian intellectuals a relevant example of 'oriented' cosmopolitanism. The present study will also tackle this aspect. No matter how barren this research may appear to the exigent reader, one should take into account the clear-cut limits of the project, the article's scope and purpose. The author's meager powers should, therefore, be forgiven.

Information concerning Botezatu's life is extremely scarce. No thorough research has yet been made and there are not enough elements to draw a satisfactory biography. Dictionary entries usually begin by mentioning an issue of the magazine *Albina românească* (no. 68, 17 September 1830) in which Samoil Botezatu introduced himself as being a teacher of German at the '*Gimnazia Vasiliană*' in Iași. The note states clearly that Botezatu was of Romanian origin and that he had just arrived from Bucovina, as well as the fact that, prior to his arrival in Moldavia, he taught German at the Pedagogic School in Cernăuți. Disparate data is to be found in Vasile A. Urechia's *Istoria școalelor naționale de la 1800–1864* (tomes I, II, IV), published in Bucharest in 1892. In *Istoria*

teatrului din Moldova, Teodor T. Burada, a contemporary of Samoil Botezatu, supplies the following details concerning this subject: ‘*Samoil Botezatu was born in Transylvania by the year 1790 and lived in Iași for a long time. He has also been secretary of the Health Board in Iași. He died in the capital of Moldavia around 1856. Because of the excellent manner in which he performed his duties, the government awarded him the rank of serdar.*’³ Unfortunately, almost all information in Burada’s book is false! Sheer misunderstandings also abound in an article by N. Iorga, who considered Samoil Botezatu to be of Jewish descent.⁴ Lucian Predescu, the very famous author of the *Enciclopedia ‘Cugetarea’*, perpetuated Burada’s historical mistakes,⁵ even though by the time he wrote his major work he had access to articles written by either Dumitru Furtună (published in 1938 in a regional magazine),⁶ or by Mihai Costăchescu.⁷ The latter took for granted and used information gathered by Gheorghe Ghibănescu in an attempt to write the history of the Pedagogic Institute for Schoolmistresses of Iași.⁸ In my view, these lacunae are due to the lack of archival research (with a notable exception: Urechia’s efforts to uncover the real dimensions of Moldavian modern cultural life were extensively based on archival sources). *Dictionarul literaturii române de la origini până la 1900* [The Dictionary of Romanian literature from its early beginnings to 1900] brings new data into discussion. The author of the entry, Florin Faifer, considered all available sources related to Samoil Botezatu’s life and cultural activity before sketching a biographical outline.⁹ Faifer also quotes a Transylvanian encyclopaedia according to which Botezatu was of Transylvanian origin, even though the note in *Albina românească* refers to a different place of birth.¹⁰ In recent years, Professor Horst Fassel, from the University of Iași, has written about Botezatu,¹¹ including the latter’s work in a comprehensive book on the history of the teaching of German in Iași.¹²

I succeeded in re-tracing Botezatu’s paternal genealogy to Bucovina, and finally found confirmation of the information published in Gheorghe Asachi’s magazine. The name *Botezatu* is not uncommon in northern Moldavia — a region where various ethno-cultural groups mingled with the Romanian majority for the past three centuries. In Suceava, the census of the fur merchants and skimmers made on 31 January 1673 mentions a certain Vasilie Botezatu who lived on the Main Street. Dumitrașco and Toader, sons of one *Botedzat*, lived on the Fruntea Street.¹³ Over a century later, on January 25/February 4, 1792, several inhabitants of the city of Suceava asked the Orthodox Administrative Council of Bucovina to intervene with the authorities — represented by the Imperial Regional Commissariat — to stop the demolition of the Sf. Gheorghe (the ancient Metropolitan Church) and the Adormirea Fecioarei churches. The document mentions two individuals bearing the name *Botezatu*, namely Toader Botezat and Gavrilă Botezatul, as residents in Suceava.¹⁴ An agreement concluded

on 10 August 1795 between residents on the domain of the monastery of Zamca and Nicolae Capri, the administrator (*vechil*) of the Armenian community bears, among others, the signature of one Gabriel Botezat. The act refers to all duties incumbent upon the townsfolk during the toiling of the soil they had taken on lease.¹⁵

More important still than any of the above-mentioned persons is Ioniță (Iuoniță) Botezat of Suceava. He was a teacher and transcribed documents and, for a while, a clerk with the District Court of Law. He endorsed a series of writings and records employed in judging several civil causes, such as the lease-deed of July 7, 1789,¹⁶ the commercial contract of April 16/27, 1798,¹⁷ a contract interesting the baron Neculai Andrieș von Capri, of September 6/17, 1798,¹⁸ a lease-deed of November 19, 1800,¹⁹ a marriage contract of January 30, 1802.²⁰ He called himself a *pisar*, using the Slavonic term for transcribers hired by the State Chancellery. Apparently those who knew Ioniță Botezatu considered him to be a person of some distinction. He was versed in legal matters and in the proper use of German, the official language of the province at the time, as well as in that of Romanian. Undoubtedly, he enjoyed high reputation and respect throughout his life. It is for this reason that I have identified him with the person who, on September 26, 1830, wrote a letter to the bishop of Bucovina, complaining about the persecutions suffered by his son, Samoil. The text of the letter is the following:

‘Holy Father Bishop,

I, the undersigned, grieving sorely in my heart, dare reveal the following, and in so doing act as a private person, not in the line of duty — just a spiritual son disclosing all his sorrows.

Firstly,

*I, the undersigned, am now in the thirty-ninth year of employment as a trifialnic teacher [dascăl trifialnic] with the Trifialnic School [Școala Trifialnică — ‘trifialnic,’ from Latin *trivium*; school offering courses in Grammar, Dialectics, and Rhetoric; my note] in Suceava, and have been married twice; I have come to spend all my fortune and the dowries on the studies of a son of mine, Samoil, who has completed eight years at the Latin School in Cernăuți, and two more of Philosophy, and another three years at the High School in Cernăuți; and as a student he has learned well. Whereupon sensing the pressure put on [those of] the Greek Orthodox faith and understanding from various people that unless he becomes a Catholic he stands no chance to obtain a teaching position, one which he dreamed of ever since he was a child, he went to the master Aufseher Mr. Panchevici and told him:*

— Sir, pray advise me, for I have now spent so many years here, in Cernăuți, learning: Should I entertain any hopes to be appointed teacher — yes or no?

And [he] was given the following answer:

— *Should you become a Catholic, you will soon be appointed!*

Yet he, unwilling to give up his faith, was forced to leave his native country and had to seek his fortune elsewhere. Therefore he asked the honorable government for a passport and left for Moldavia.

Secondly,

For this I have spent my fortune to the last penny, for I have hoped that, when sick or old, shall I live long enough, my son will be here to support me. Still, I am not envious of others, such as Ioan Livițchi from Văscăuți, Săvinescu, Pavlovici, and Ranca from Călinești, who have received the Catholic faith and thereby secured [what they have achieved].

And now Moldavians, having understood that there is no justice and that they shall not be granted positions meant exclusively for the Galicians, have sent their sons across to Moldavia, for fear of conversion, for which reason the number of pupils has also dropped sharply.

And the complaint I dare bring before You, Holy Father, for You are the Head of our Church and our spiritual shepherd, has been prompted by my sorrow and the weakness of my old age.

Suceava, the 26th of September 1830.

Your Holiness' spiritual son and humble servant,

*Ioniță Botezat, teacher.*²¹

Presumably Ioniță Botezat lived long after his son emigrated to Moldavia. As elected representative of the town of Suceava, on 19 July 1841, he signed the bill of donation the Moldavian Prince, Mihai Sturdza, had issued on behalf of the town, granting its inhabitants full rights to use the territories of Tătărași and Areni.²² The mayor, Michael Winiarski, and Ariton von Pruncul also signed the act. His presence among the notabilities, nobles and wealthy merchants, suggests the symbolic rank and the influence he had, at a time when his son was already living in Moldavia.

The letter offers clues for a more complete biography of Samoil Botezatu. One can easily sum up the duration of his studies: eight years of Latin, two years of Philosophy, and three years of High School, *i.e.* all in all, thirteen years of study. Assuming that Samoil had left Suceava around 1830 — the year his father wrote to the bishop in Cernăuți —, he must have started to go to school in 1817, when he was 8 to 10 years old. This was the average age for the first contact with school and learning. Consequently, with a two-year approximation, we can infer the date of his birth to be around 1807–1809.

Though I have tried to find proper confirmation of Botezatu's birth date, I have been unable to track down any marriage record or death certificate. One can only presume that he was married and had children. While Director of the School for Girls in Iași, Botezatu occupied some rooms in the building, which housed both the classrooms and the dormitories of the school. Lack of comfort

prompted him to address the Board for Public Education on March 11, 1848, asking to be granted living quarters more adequate with his social position; '*I am a Principal and I also have a family,*'²³ he wrote. I have tried to find a record of Botezatu's death, to check the date mentioned by D. Furtună in his brief article. Furtună considers Botezatu's burial place was in Iași, in the cemetery of the St. Pantelimon Church.²⁴ Unfortunately, all the records kept by the priests there have been destroyed, and so was the graveyard. The date mentioned by T.T. Burada (1856) has no solid proof; besides, Burada gives a different birth date (1790) from the one inferred above. The many differences between Botezatu's real biography and that supplied by Burada make the latter rather unreliable.

However, investigations have revealed the existence of a death certificate, noted in a civil register, and dated August 26, 1867. The document mentions a certain S. Botezu, aged 60, a clerk of Orthodox religion, married to Rarița Botezu, aged 56. Both lived in Iași, in the 4th *arrondissement*, very close to the church of St. Panteleimon. S. Botezu died on August 24, 1867, at 3 o'clock in the morning. It is very possible that S. Botezu was an acronym Samoil Botezatu had used in his later years. Several occurrences allow us to infer the assumption is correct: the initial letter of the first name, the approximate birth date (S. Botezu was born around 1807), the position he held and his religion, the confirmation of an existing marriage, the confirmation of his death and the place where he was buried. The alteration of the name (from Botezatu to Botezu) is no exception. Botezatu's contemporaries used to change their names to lend them an 'updated' ring, *i.e.* more *bourgeois*. For instance, the above-mentioned death certificate is signed by S. and Rarița's son, Nicolae, aged 27, with a French sounding version of the name: *Bottez*!²⁵ Moreover, Moldavians were all aware of the obvious significance of the original name; almost all the Botezatus were suspected of being of Jewish origin, or of concealing an early conversion to Orthodox Christianity.

There are enough reasons to consider the year 1830 as the one in which Samoil Botezatu finally settled in Iași. The note published in *Albina românească* recommended him as a new-comer, eager to find an appropriate employment in education. Soon after he began to earn his life decently, he moved to a house right in the middle of the city, in the 1st *arrondissement*. He rented it from a wealthy Jew, Mincu Marcovici. Mincu Marcovici was, beyond all doubts, one of Botezatu's acquaintances, perhaps even a friend: along with Constantin Carp, Nicolae Canta, Enache Cogălniceanu, Andronache Donici, Alexandru Beldiman, he attended courses at the Prince's Academy in Iași, during the years Botezatu taught there. They visited the same intellectual circles and had some famous Greek scholars for teachers, such as E. Vulgaris, or Dimitrios Gobelias, whose fame and influence with the Court gave them the status of permanent residents in the Moldavian capital.²⁶ Documents indicate that Botezatu paid rent for these quarters until 1835, the year of his designation as Principal at the School for Girls.²⁷

Replacing Botezatu's extended biography with a *cursus honorum* provides the same results for the interpretation of his social integration in the Moldavian society. *Condica rangurilor boierești...* [The Register of Moldavian Noblemen, 1835] mentions him as **medelnicer**.²⁸ Botezatu was ennobled by Prince Mihai Sturdza himself, on 11 November 1835, the Prince's Orthodox saint patron day.²⁹ As director of the School for Girls in Iași, he became **serdar** (1839).³⁰ In consideration of the diligence with which he carried out his duties, Botezatu was awarded the rank of **paharnic** in 1843.³¹ In 1844, he was made **căminar**.³² A later register of noble ranks lists him as **ban** (1851). Eventually he became **aga**, a title he held until his death.³³ This social and hierarchical evolution proves the swift and thorough integration of the Bucovinan newcomer in the Moldavian society. It also demonstrates the success of his personal strategy of integration was based mainly on the strength of his professional qualification, proven in favorable cultural circumstances. The pace of his social ascension shows Samoil Botezatu was an intelligent, competent, well-educated individual, endowed with a strong belief in the spiritual power of Orthodoxy and who was resolved to make his own way up by using all the moral means he could draw on. Apparently he maintained close ties with all those who showed him friendship and helped him whenever necessary, or who relied on him. As a result he turned these personal assets into valuable means of socialization. He succeeded in reflecting a good image of himself onto his peers, through an appropriate public and moral behavior, due largely to his German education and spirit.

Samoil Botezatu was one of the first Romanians to teach German in a Moldavian public school, during the first half of the nineteenth century. The teaching of German was known to be mostly a private educational activity, and it usually involved native German speakers. However, among the important Moldavian intellectuals of the early nineteenth century there were many scholars who had been brought up in the German language or who had been educated in German-speaking intellectual milieus, had a good command of the language and were interested in all aspects performing to German modern culture. For example, Gheorghe Asachi — to whom Botezatu owes his teaching career in Iași — had lived in Vienna for five years (1822–1827) as a diplomatic agent for Ioniță Sandu Sturdza, Prince of Moldavia between 1822 and 1828. Asachi had previously studied in Vienna and Rome, and had no difficulty in growing familiar with the spirit of central European culture.³⁴ His wife, Elena Tauber, was the daughter of the *Hofmeister der königliche Kapelle* in Vienna; she taught German to the two sons of Mihai Sturdza while the future Prince of Moldavia lived in the Austrian capital.³⁵ It is not surprising that Mihai Sturdza, one of the most educated contemporary Moldavian boyars and a sincere admirer of the Prussian political establishment, considered German language and German education to be appropriate for his sons. Sturdza himself was a polyglot and proudly boasted

his wide classical knowledge. So were both his wives, and he wished his offsprings to be raised in the same way. The German spirit seemed to act pervasively throughout the entire Moldavian society. Apparently Asachi named one of his daughters, Hermiona (b. 1823), after the main character in *Hermione, die Braut der Unterwelt*, a drama written by the Viennese Fr. Wilhelm Ziegler and successfully played for almost twenty years in Austrian theaters.³⁶ Hermiona Asachi herself translated dramatic plays from German into Romanian, and taught her mother tongue in private. Another prominent cultural figure, the poet Alecu Donici, learned German, Russian, and French by the time he was living in St. Petersburg, in his early years (before 1825).³⁷ Because of their small number, German-speaking intellectuals more or less knew each other and found ways to keep in touch constantly, thus helping themselves to find reasons for communicating and lobbying. They definitely shared a certain sense of intellectual community and were perfectly aware of all the advantages incumbent to their outstanding social position.

German was largely considered to be the most suitable language for public order and social discipline.³⁸ For almost half a century French had been regarded as the language of social communication and gentlemanly conduct. To speak French, to read French books suggested an European attitude toward culture, closely related to the status French culture enjoyed at the end of the eighteenth century and during the Napoleonic era. However, French was also the language of a terrible revolution, of social unrest and unleashed violence. After 1815 and following the growing influence of German Romanticism in Europe, the speaking of German and a German-like behavior became the epitomes of those personal qualities any 'civilized' European who would respect and have consideration for the importance of legal matters, should always prove. Moreover, Germans seemed to be endowed with a specific sense of respect toward all kind of hierarchies pending to the establishment, thus enabling them to pass for examples of what a modern human society should look like in the first half of the nineteenth century. To the question why should German spirit become an educative example to a country ravaged by a series of successive and ruthless wars, and whose political foundations had been thoroughly shaken up, Mihail Kogălniceanu found an answer while in Berlin, in 1835: '*En Allemagne on est plus tranquille, l'instruction est plus profonde, les mœurs sont plus innocentes et les coutumes plus patriarcales.*'³⁹

All significant mutations in the socio-political climate which had occurred at the beginning of the century, the long series of wars between the Ottoman and the Russian Empires, the sudden replacement of elected or nominated Princes, the ceaseless political instability affecting Moldavia and its inhabitants, made Moldavian intellectuals yearn for a firm government and a befitting leadership. German language impregnated the Romanian cultural milieu with the idea of

social harmony, which would have been put to work through the joint efforts of all classes and social categories. German language and the principle of social order — as Costache Conachi, a famous, rich nobleman and poet, put it — ‘*are destined to regulate public life*’.⁴⁰ By the beginning of the nineteenth century the orientation toward a moral reform of the public spirit slowly made its way; the emphasis it laid on a proper employment of the German social and civic model became obvious in the 1830s. The adoption of an increasingly open mind towards German culture — in a broad sense — also engendered the bridging of the cultural gap between local culture and what was deemed to be the West (Germany and France), political motivations resulted from the revolutionary course steered by France.⁴¹ Transformations inspired by the new constitutional body of laws (**Regulamentul Organic**, 1832) required a new type of citizen, one always ready to do what the Moldavian society would ask of its members. Botezatu belonged to such a category: he was devoted to hierarchies, showed no interest in political dissent, was respectful of the ruling classes and aristocratic system. Neither him, nor his protector, Gheorghe Asachi, had been affected by the 1848 revolution in Moldavia; they refused to take part or pay any attention to it.

His political passivity is due to a bitter experience. In November 1835, he meddled in politics, and signed (or copied) the *Adresse des grands Boyards de la Moldavie a sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies*, a protest addressed to Czar Nicolas I, the official Protector of the Romanian Principalities, against Prince Mihai Sturdza and his government, the actual target of the *adresse*. The document — drafted by a handful of boyars concerned with the strong-hand regime that had been institutionalized in 1834 —, in spite of its diplomatic and tactful phrasing, suggested a radical change in the nature of the home and foreign policies inaugurated by Sturdza's regime. Botezatu's participation had been undoubtedly prompted by the relationships he had developed with aristocrats during the very first years of his Moldavian sojourn. However, politics could endanger the status of a newcomer and bring his professional career to a halt. He, therefore, might have been advised against any participation in actions planned by the political opposition parties, for the sake of his life and career. The indefinite and discouraging result of the document and the lack of political abilities put an abrupt end to Botezatu's political pursuits.⁴²

The nature of the links between Samoil Botezatu and Gheorghe Asachi deserves special attention. The latter realized that Botezatu's intellectual biography and educational background befitted his own projects very well. The note Botezatu published in *Albina românească* does not represent only a personal advertisement, it is also a sign that he had already been accepted as teacher and acknowledged as such by the intellectual community of Iași. The step Botezatu had made put him into direct and close contact with his Moldavian intellectual

peers, who were, more or less, politically active. *L'accesso nella famiglia dell'intellettualità* opened doors for him that were generally closed to new-comers, and eventually led him to fame and public *reconnaissance*. Asachi gathered around him intellectuals who were eager to be granted a specific social and symbolic status in contemporary Moldavian society. Therefore, due to the personal strategy on which Asachi always drew in cases of cultural and social integration, he managed to offer Botezatu private jobs, such as that of teaching German to members of local aristocratic families.

German natives were quite well known for their being employed by wealthy families who wanted their children to be taught in German. They also proved themselves able to organize the teaching of German in private boarding schools: in 1831 a certain Hönig taught in a French-ruled private school in Miroslava, on the outskirts of Iași (the Lincourt-Chefneux private boarding school).⁴³ E. Tollhausen, who came from Frankfurt am Main, happened to be chosen by the local authorities in 1834 to teach German at the *Gimnazia Vasiliană*, in Iași.⁴⁴ Ch. Flechtenmacher, a well-known Moldavian lawyer of Transylvanian German origin (he came from Brașov [Kronstadt]), taught German literature at the *Academia Mihăileană* in 1836.⁴⁵ Less than twenty years after the introduction of the **Regulamentul organic** (1832), the intensive teaching of German was a common feature with almost every private school in Moldavia; admission examinations in German were also customary;⁴⁶ for instance, this was the case at the ‘Concolî’ private school, in 1833.⁴⁷ In April 1837, a report drawn by the Department of Internal Affairs for the Board for Public Education mentioned six private schools, with a registration quota of 116 pupils (four schools for boys and a private school — *Cuénim* — in Iași only), which included German in their curriculum as a compulsory course.⁴⁸ A similar report, dated September 1839, mentions eight Moldavian schools (and 99 pupils), which were resolved to employ teachers of German.⁴⁹ Friedrich von Kühntal, who was teaching German in 1838 at the *Academia Mihăileană*, also held classes in various private schools until the 1860s.⁵⁰ Various foreign residents in Moldavia were likely to register their children with schools providing compulsory German classes. In March 1840, the Armenian community of Iași embarked upon drafting the statutes of an Armenian school, where pupils would have been given the opportunity to learn Armenian, Romanian, French, and German.⁵¹

Wallachians shared the same concern for the cultural importance of German teaching. The reasons were unchanged: a clear and unbiased reaction to the socially pervasive French ‘materialism’, as Ioan Maiorescu — a Transylvanian teacher who had settled in Wallachia and the father of the famous Romanian literary critic Titu Maiorescu — put it, in 1837.⁵² A reputed nineteenth-century autobiographer, Colonel Grigorie Lăcusteanu, began to learn German during his stay in Sibiu (Hermannstadt, Transylvania), where his family had fled the

1821 Greek revolutionaries who had invaded the country. He later resumed his study in Bucharest, attending the lectures given by a teacher who taught both German and Greek.⁵³ In 1833–1834, German was taught in only one private school in Bucharest, by a certain Anton Stamatopol; 19 children attended courses in Greek, French, and German.⁵⁴ The chair of German language at the St. Sava College in Bucharest came into being somewhat later (August 1845). This was headed by K. Schweder, a native German who, prior to that date, had also taught it in some private schools in Bucharest. The director of the Department for Schools, P. Poenaru, explained the social necessity of teaching German in relevant words: *'There is a public wish to establish a connection between these courses and to their similes [...], not only because this language is one of the most cultivated languages today, but mostly because of the relationships which have been established between this Principality and Germany, in the realm of commerce.'*⁵⁵

In Moldavia, apart from their private character, these 'supplementary courses' were organized by the Board of the Gimnazia Vasiliană. Whoever intended to study German at the Gimnazia without being one of the registered students, could do it in private with the help of a teacher who was on the payroll of the Gimnazia Vasiliană, namely Samoil Botezatu (in May 1830).⁵⁶ Eventually, Botezatu began to be noticed by influential people, whose children he successfully taught. His powerful friends and supporters as well as his teaching abilities prompted the authorities to include the teaching of German among the supplementary courses held at the Academia Mihăileană, along with Roman law taught by Ch. Flechtenmacher, Greek — taught by Grigorie Therapianos, French (Ét. Monton), Russian (V. Peltechi), and music (Prof. Paulicec).⁵⁷ However, in the course of 1831, Botezatu resumed his private activities and taught German to wealthy people of different ages and social positions. That year, *Albina românească* published the following note: [Samoil Botezatu] *'teacher of German, Latin, and Moldavian [...] would like to announce that he is ready to teach these languages to noble houses.'*⁵⁸ Needless to say that, apart from his private activity, he never abandoned the prospect he had been offered thanks to Asachi's influence, namely the opportunity to work in the only University in Moldavia. Samoil Botezatu taught at the Academia Mihăileană until 1847.

Because of its position in the curriculum as supplementary course,⁵⁹ German could be taught exclusively in the afternoon, from 4 to 6 p. m.; this was the timetable during the summer semester of the 1831–1832 academic year.⁶⁰ Examination subjects included basic grammar, theory and exercises.⁶¹ The number of pupils attending courses in foreign languages increased steadily and at a fast pace. A report by Gh. Asachi addressed to the Board for Public Education, dated September 29, 1832, ended with a request made to the government to restrict public access and to unconditionally limit admission quotas for foreign language courses. The report stated: *'only students from the Academy and pupils*

*from the High School are welcomed to learn one of the modern languages (or even two by turns), provided they prove remarkable talent and skills in this respect.'*⁶² During the following school year, Botezatu taught from 11 to 12 a.m. every working day of the week. The schedule credited German classes with six hours per week, the same amount of time as Russian, and half the time allotted for the learning of French and classic Greek.⁶³ Botezatu employed the same methods as his colleague who taught Russian, V. Peltechi.⁶⁴ In his introductory classes he taught reading and writing, and continued with German grammar and the conjugations of verbs.⁶⁵

In the meantime, Botezatu's social position apparently grew ever more secure. He was earning a good salary (2400 lei/ year) in 1833.⁶⁶ His academic position was assimilated — according to the rank system established by the **Regulamentul Organic** — with that of director of a civil ministry department.⁶⁷ Due to the good recommendations he had, Botezatu was given a second assignment; the position thus obtained being directly related to his classes and his work. On January 15, 1832, following Gh. Asachi's proposal, the Board for Public Education (consisting of Prince Mihail Sturdza, Veniamin Costache — Metropolitan of the Moldavian Orthodox Church —, and C. Mavrocordat), pledged its plan to set up a three-month course *'to prepare candidates for teaching positions in departmental primary schools in Moldavia.'*⁶⁸ Botezatu was immediately credited with lectures in Pedagogy, mainly because of the way in which *'he had carried out similar obligations while in Bucovina'*. Asachi urged the appropriate public authorities to increase the latter's income, too. As of February 15, 1832, Botezatu took over his auxiliary duties. Many of those who passed the final examinations in Pedagogy (July 16, 1832) later joined Botezatu's classes of German at Academia Mihăileană: Theodor Stamate (then part-time teacher in Iași), C. Zefirescu (teacher in Huși), V. Pavlovici — Paulini (teacher in Focșani).⁶⁹

The year 1832 happened to be a good one for Botezatu. He won public recognition for his linguistic skills, as well as for his pedagogic accomplishments and for the steadfast determination with which he completed tasks pending to his various jobs. Asachi noticed his pedagogic training and suggested he should write a book on didactic methodologies. As a result, *Despre metod* [On Method] was published September 1832, under the names of both Asachi and Botezatu.⁷⁰

When the Academia Mihăileană opened its doors in the early autumn of 1834, Samoil Botezatu began teaching German to undergraduates. Meanwhile he had to take up responsibilities as director of the School for Girls. Soon after that, the *Reglementul școlilor publice din Principatul Moldovei* [Regulations for Public Schools in the Principality of Moldavia, June 1835], the country's first modern educational constitution, drawn by Gh. Asachi, became effective.⁷¹ Consequently, the teaching of German finally acquired a distinct status among

the other subjects usually taught in Moldavian schools. This is why the general educational syllabus for the Academia Mihăileană as well as for all public schools in Moldavia (*Tabloul gheeneralnic a materiilor de învățătură care să paradosesc în Academia Mihăileană și shoalile publice din Moldova*), printed in Iași in 1835, mentions the teaching of German among the 'general courses in Philology'. It was aimed that the course would address two different groups of students; students in one group were supposed to study to become teachers of German literature.⁷² Samoil Botezatu was in charge of the German grammar courses (for undergraduates), and E. Tollhausen — a native German speaker — taught German literature.⁷³ Botezatu's colleagues were largely foreigners or Romanians from other provinces who had settled in Moldavia when they were young: Ch. Flechtenmacher taught German and Latin,⁷⁴ N. Draghinici taught Latin, V. Paulini, T. Verescu, and V. Peltechi taught Russian, Ch. Tissot and A. Malgouverné taught French, L. Répey taught French literature, N. Porphirogenitos taught classic Greek, and N. Cuculli taught Latin.⁷⁵ Botezatu's income was about 2400 lei per year.⁷⁶

The invitation to the grand opening of the Academia Mihăileană, dated June 16, 1835, which had been sent to all employees the day before the ceremony, was signed, among others, by Botezatu.⁷⁷ The syllabus named three week days during which German was taught as supplementary course, during the morning and in the early afternoon.⁷⁸ Since the number of students attending the supplementary courses became disproportionately high compared to the facilities provided by the building, the Academic Board (comprising Gh. Săulescu, V. Fabian, Major Singurov, and Gh. Asachi) ordered the academic staff to continue teaching during the holidays.⁷⁹ The excellent pedagogic achievements of the first semester of study prompted the Board for Public Education to address Prince Sturdza an official request to endorse the awarding of noble titles to the most distinguished scholars of the Academy (October 29, 1835). The document was annexed to a report concerning the general condition of schools during the 1835–1836 academic year.⁸⁰ As a result, on November 8, 1835 (Prince Mihai Sturdza's saint patron day) Samoil Botezatu was granted the title of **medelnicer**, a recognition of his meritorious pedagogic activity during the three years he had been in Moldavia.⁸¹

Teachers of modern European languages seemed to be in fashion. They parroted notoriety with foreign lecturers. On July 1, 1836, the Board for Public Education decided to offer accommodation to two pedagogues, one French and one German, at the 'Institute for Noblemen in the vicinity of the Academy'. Both of them assumed to do their best in 'training the students in Rethorics and good manners.'⁸² The newly elected Academic Board (Gh. Asachi, Gh. Săulescu, Damaschin Bojincă, Ch. Flechtenmacher, Major Singurov) took the problem into consideration, and sent a report to the Academy (November 29, 1836).⁸³

Eventually, in March 1837, the Board for Public Education (Metropolitan Veniamin Costache, Ioan Canta, Ioan Ghica, Gh. Asachi) notified Prince Mihai Sturdza of the decisions the Academic Board had taken. Their report (no. 67 of March 18, 1837), included recommendations aimed at improving the syllabus. The text pointed out the role 'modern and classic languages' were supposed to play in the proper education of younger generations. Modern languages were thought to be 'models as well as life suggestions'. The document further stated that 'bringing up pupils and students [...] requires an extremely careful supervision', one that only foreign pedagogues would be able to perform. These newcomers were to be from France and Germany, and were supposed to have 'an acknowledged proper behavior and the appropriate qualities for such a service'. The document was enacted by Prince Sturdza on March 20, 1837.⁸⁴

A modest income, compared to his family's needs, prompted Botezatu to accept other public employments, such as translating German documents into Romanian (1836), which constrained him to neglect the regular courses at the Academy. The Academic Board promptly reacted by reporting the case to the Prince (report no. 157 of July 3, 1836), and asking him to release Botezatu of 'the German-Romanian translation tasks, because his numerous employments are detrimental to teaching activities.'⁸⁵ This reaction was perfectly motivated: the number of students attending Botezatu's classes had grown during the previous academic year. Most students preferred German to Russian and even to French. All in all, 20 students out of 397 had chosen German instead of other languages — thus outnumbering by far those who had opted for Russian as a foreign language.⁸⁶ This development eventually drove Professor V. Peltechi, in charge of the Russian classes, to extremity. Peltechi tried hard to change the timetable and thereby increase the attendance figure for his classes. Unfortunately his efforts were in vain; he finally gave up Russian classes in favor of French and German courses. As of November 7, 1839, he began teaching Romanian and Latin.⁸⁷

At the beginning of the 1837–1838 academic year, Botezatu had the opportunity to thank Gh. Asachi for what the latter had done for him. Botezatu was one of the signatories of the message whereby the academic staff at the Academia Mihăileană — 'corposul profesoral' — expressed their gratitude toward Gheorghe Asachi as the latter gave up his position as director with the Board for Public Education. Others such as **căminar** Flechtenmacher, **paharnic** Gh. Săulescu, **medelnicer** Vasile Peltechi, **medelnicer** Teodor Verescu also signed the message.⁸⁸

Botezatu taught German reading, writing, and translation in the first form, grammar (up to verbs), dictations, translations, dialogues, and Gothic hand-writing in the 2nd form, syntax (up to the use of adverbs), translations from famous moralist authors, dictations, and writing in the 3rd form.⁸⁹ The syllabus for German courses

remained almost unchanged during the following years, until the closure of the Academy. The number of attendants did not vary too much either; students of German always outnumbered those of Russian.⁹⁰ For a while, Botezatu's income remained unchanged: 2400 lei per year, with installments paid at irregular intervals, until April 1843.⁹¹ However, Botezatu apparently did not mind, and carefully observed the syllabus and the school's regulations. This attitude with regard to the financial hardships of the Academia Mihăileană brought him even more disciples.⁹² A reputedly reliable person, Botezatu was always nominated in the examination boards for regional schools. For instance, on 15 July 1839 he took part in a public examination in Botoșani aimed at evaluating the activities and the results of teachers. He came to be known to everybody as '*the professor from the Academia Mihăileană*'.⁹³

The textbooks Botezatu used were from Austria. It can be inferred that he had become accustomed to work with them while studying German in Cernăuți, in Austrian Bucovina. In the meantime, he also wrote his own textbooks. On November 5, 1838, the Central Administration ordered the Academic Board to have all the professors at the Academia Mihăileană fill in a questionnaire, concerning the textbooks they would recommend their students to read and study. Botezatu mentioned a German primer, printed in Austria and translated by him into Romanian, and a manuscripted Romanian-German grammar. The latter was never printed.⁹⁴

After 1840, the transformations undergone by the educational system and the subsequent financial cuts prompted the Academic Board to turn once again to the status of supplementary courses and analyze it. In its report to the Board for Public Education (no. 38 of 2 September 1840), the Academic Board asked for a limitation in the number of supplementary courses. The Board turned to the example of a teacher of French, St. André, who had not managed to gather the minimum number of course attendants (twelve) set up by the Board along with other compulsory legal provisions regulating the organization of educational activities. Apart from this, supplementary courses were apparently filling the entire learning time of the students.⁹⁵

But the most significant change of attitude as regards the role of modern foreign languages in Moldavian schools is related to an extremely delicate matter, which eventually led to fierce disputes over the fate of Moldavia's culture and over future developments in its educational system, namely what was to be the main teaching language at the Academia Mihăileană? On 23 October 1843, the Academic Board (I. Ghica, Th. Stamati, P. Câmpeanu, Gh. Săulescu) decided that one out of the two most important European languages (French and German) should be compulsory for all the students who were registered with the Academy. As long as the teaching of German was concerned, this could have resulted into the transition from a somewhat uncertain and less important

position in the syllabus to a first-rank position, similar to that of Romanian, the national language, for instance. It was I. Ghica — at that time Principal Inspector for Schools — who took the initiative and brought the questionable educative role of the Russian language into discussion, into a more or less subtle attempt to eliminate Russian from the syllabus. His skepticism was shared by almost every other member of the Board. There were no voices against silencing any initiatives trying to restore the status Russian language had during the Russian military occupation of the country (1828–1834). Eventually, the Board set an inconvenient time of the day during which Russian could be taught as supplementary course: in the afternoon, from 4 p. m. onwards. Almost surprisingly, if one considers the political meaning of such a settlement, the Central Administration (Alecă Balș, N. Suțu) approved the proposal (30 October 1843).⁹⁶ However, soon afterwards I. Ghica left his office (perhaps because of diplomatic pressures), and a second project aiming to reform the educational system (the so-called 'German project', authored by Neugebauer) granted the teaching of German a 'supplementary course status', thereby pushing it back among the peripheral disciplines in the structure of the curriculum, and disregarding a notable detail: upon a request the Board had made sometime ago,⁹⁷ Academia Mihăileană had accepted to appoint the two foreign pedagogues (one German and one French). This was a sign, which proved that German had lost 'the battle of languages' to French. In fact this change actually followed a much more complicated process of cultural re-orientation, one which became obvious by the middle of the century: the growing interest for French culture finally diverted public attention from German and made the latter resist only in German-speaking intellectual milieus.⁹⁸

It will be very relevant to briefly consider Botezatu's most favorite students. This would give the reader a hint as to the pedagogical and scientific abilities of the teacher himself characterized by Asachi in 1843 as '*one of the most outstanding Moldavian professors, a former teacher of German and the director at the School for Girls in Iași*'.⁹⁹ Sending students abroad to take advantage of scholar — and fellowships was not uncommon in a society whose wealthy members praised and highly regarded Western educational methods, be they German or French. Encouraging, sending and supporting young people to travel and study in prestigious foreign universities has a history of its own, one at least as old as the history of the modern educational system in Moldavia.¹⁰⁰ In August 1833, Gh. Asachi addressed the Central Administration the first suitable proposals. One month later, in September 1833, the selected students (T. Stamate, Anton Velini, C. Zefirescu, A. Costinescu — all undergraduates) asked the Administration to facilitate their registration with the University of Vienna.¹⁰¹ Eventually, the Central Administration accepted their request provided they fulfilled one particular condition: '*Because a decent knowledge of German is*

indispensable in order to attend courses in the Austrian provinces, the supplicants will take it upon themselves to learn the language before the beginning of spring.¹⁰² The candidates therefore attended the German classes held by Botezatu. The official announcement issued by the Central Administration on 10 May 1834 stated that all applicants for scholarships have been allowed to continue their studies in Vienna, by means of state-granted fellowships. The nominees — all of noble origin — were also supposed to meet part of their regular accommodation costs. Anastasie Fătu, a famous naturalist and physician, was given the right to work in Vienna as well. A wealthy Romanian merchant, Hagi Constantin Popp — ‘a wise man and a friend of our nation’ — was in charge of students staying in Vienna. Later on, his brother, Dr. A.C. de Popp, took over the responsibility.¹⁰³ At the last moment, Anton Velini was replaced by Alexandru Corlățeanu, a teacher from Huși. The latter was determined to earn a specialization in German, the language parents in Huși wanted their children to be taught in.¹⁰⁴

How far did Botezatu’s students get after they graduated is important for our research, too. Theodor Stamati graduated Philosophy and Arts at the University of Vienna (10 May 1837). Alexandru Costinescu, the father of the future minister for Public Finances Emil Costinescu, knew German, French, Italian, and Greek. He studied Mathematics, Physics, Applied Geometry, Mechanics, Engineering, Architecture, Astronomy, Geodesy at the Viennese Polytechnic Institute. C. Zefirescu knew German, French, and Greek, and was registered with the same institute. He attended courses in Technical and Specific Chemistry, Commerce, and Mining Engineering. He also worked for some time in several Bohemian factories and at the Institute for Mines in Schemnitz, Hungary. All six of them earned excellent references¹⁰⁵ and upon their return were immediately offered full-time academic positions with the Academia Mihăileană, as of the beginning of September 1838.¹⁰⁶ Stamati took the Chair of Philosophy, and started to teach Elementary Mathematics (first form), and Theoretical and Experimental Physics (second form). Costinescu taught Engineering and Basic Mechanics (fourth form), and Zefirescu began teaching Technical and Specific Chemistry (to postgraduates), and Commerce (fourth form).

As usual, there were students who bitterly disappointed their teachers. Leon Filipescu, for instance, was sent to an institute in Hohenheim, Stuttgart. He did not succeed to take any of the examinations, but instead managed to stir the local policemen against him. As a result, the Central Administration asked the Prince (report no. 94 of 12 June 1839) to bring him back home, and replace him with C. Zefirescu. The latter was supposed to register with the Institute of Agronomy in Altenberg, Hungary, and to work at Archduke Charles’ experimental farm. By sending Zefirescu there, the Central Administration hoped that, as a postgraduate, he would be able to take a chair at the new Institute for Agro-

nomy in Iași, although this institution was just a part of an ambitious and generous project.¹⁰⁷ Zefirescu left Moldavia for a second time and went to Weissenburg, near Troppau, in Moravia. Soon afterwards, he applied for the Austrian citizenship, and never returned to Iași. As late as 1845, the Central Administration was still trying to recover one hundred gold florins from him, to cover expenses made by the State for his education, to which extent it was sending him countless letters of request. The negative answers — brought back by Dr. Czihak, the Principal of the St. Spiridon Hospital in Iași — left the office no chance to recuperate the financial loss.¹⁰⁸

Much to his former professors’ surprise, Leon Filipescu managed to stir the enthusiasm of an academic audience only a few days after his return to Iași. Though his previous disrespectful behavior had brought shame onto Moldavian academic representation abroad, Filipescu soon worked his way up and, in 1841, became Associate Professor with the Academia Mihăileană.¹⁰⁹ He later took the Chair of Rural Economy at the Seminary in Iași. On 10 January 1843 he asked the Central Administration to support one of his bold scientific projects: the publishing of a German book he had translated while in Germany (Dr. Schlipers’ *Manualul popular de economie rurală*). The Academic Board and the Director of the Agronomic School — Mihalic de Hodocin — reviewed the book and its translation, commending its scientific and didactic qualities, and eventually approved its publication.¹¹⁰ In 1845, Leon Filipescu temporarily took the place of his former teacher, Samoil Botezatu, and taught German at the Academia Mihăileană.¹¹¹ In 1838, the Academic Board asked the Central Administration to send Filipescu once more abroad in Germany, together with Gh. Asachi’s son, Dimitrie — himself an engineer and an architect —, and Gh. Lemeni, who was born in Bucovina and was a native speaker of German. Gh. Panaiteanu-Bardasare, who graduated the high school in 1840, joined the latter at the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich, where he continued to study Painting and History of Art with Professor Schwankenthaler.¹¹²

Botezatu earned his reputation not only as a teacher of German, but also as Director of the School for Girls in Iași. The institution was established in compliance with **Regulamentul Organic** (Chapter Two, Article 422).¹¹³ It began to function on 8 November 1834¹¹⁴ in a building which belonged to the Monastery of Bărboi in Iași. In 1836, the school moved to another building close to the Church of Sf. Ilie.¹¹⁵ The general syllabus first comprised three years of study, and later four, due to the growing number of attendants. The staff was rather limited: Botezatu was Director and ‘*Professor-in-Charge Head of Staff*’, Ioan Mielu, the priest, was father confessor and ‘*the teacher of Religion*’, Elisabeta Alexandrescu taught household skills; they were joined by a superintendent, sister Susana, and a manager, Iordache Gheorghiu.¹¹⁶ The staff changed several times over a fifteen-year period: the school hired an engineer, Gustav Hof-

mann, to give an introductory course in Technics,¹¹⁷ and a teacher of Drawing, Stavsky — ‘a distinguished painter, who has married and settled in Iași’.¹¹⁸ Elisabeta Alexandrescu, the teacher of household skills, died in 1838¹¹⁹ and her position was filled by another well-educated and skilled lady. Botezatu, who deftly run the school, remained Director until 1849.¹²⁰

The syllabus was oriented mainly toward the teaching of household skills¹²¹ but there was also room for Romanian literature and grammar, geography, and calligraphy — subjects taught by Samoil Botezatu in 1840–1841.¹²² In 1843, he taught Arithmetics and Geography.¹²³ However, the money he earned was never enough to support his family, even though he was once again teaching German in private and continued to give courses at the Academia Mihăileană, maintaining his position there.¹²⁴ Botezatu had to confront a huge set of administrative problems, and to keep a watchful eye on everything that happened in the school. The managerial archive confirms his tireless efforts.¹²⁵ He scrupulously recorded all the difficulties he had to face and the decisions he took, from measures aimed at bringing down the AWLs and the refurbishment of the school’s furniture¹²⁶, to the expelling of pupils, proper educational management of the increasing number of students, to fund-raising for scholarships and relations in the staff. Botezatu’s diligence, tenacity and finesse earned him the rank of *căminar* — following a favorable report made by the Board for Public Education on 3 March 1842.¹²⁷ For years and years, *la mémoire collective* of former pupils and teachers at the School for Girls evoked Botezatu’s figure and good-hearted behavior. Half a century later, Theodor Codrescu¹²⁸ and C. Gane¹²⁹ still remembered the official opening of the school and the awarding ceremony held in the summer of 1835. Botezatu’s contemporaries were moved by the interest all the girls apparently had for increasing their knowledge as well as by the pedagogical skills and the distinguished intellectual quality of the staff: ‘A l’école des jeunes filles on enseigne dans 4 années les mêmes objets et encore toutes sortes d’ouvrages de mains et le dessin.’¹³⁰ Ceremonies were always carefully prepared: all classrooms were decorated with bunches of flowers, and objects made by the pupils were on display. The day of the summer examinations, the young girls, aged 8 to 15, were assembled in the school’s courtyard. Dressed in white, with a girdle in the colors of the national flag, they readily answered the questions, phrased by a special commission, that were asked to them in public. The audience consisted of representatives of central and local authorities, councilors of the Central Administration, priests, clerks, nobles, ‘and an impressive number of elegant ladies’. The Board for Public Education delegate opened the ceremony with a speech in which he thanked the Prince and His government, and the outstanding Head of Staff at the School. As the school was under the patronage of Her Highness the Princess, the prince’s family usually took part in the ceremony, or at least had the girls, accompanied

by Professor Samoil Botezatu, invited to the palace. On this occasion, teachers and students received important prizes. In June 1839, after the Director of the School for Girls presented the official report to the Prince, Botezatu was granted the rank of *serdar*.¹³¹

Samoil Botezatu’s relationship with Gheorghe Asachi developed into a long-lasting friendship between men of letters. Whenever Asachi went through a difficult moment in his life — regardless whether the authorities or his other friends were responsible for it, Botezatu did not stand apart, but encouraged and supported his benefactor.

One of the most significant examples of this long-lasting relationship concerns Botezatu’s affiliation with a group, which had planned to produce the first Romanian-German conversation dictionary. The event also sheds light on the intellectual quality of Asachi’s friends. Similar projects had been undertaken earlier in Wallachia (Ioan Heliade-Rădulescu in 1831, for instance). A widespread interest in publishing dictionaries paralleled the classical tendency of interpreting contemporary cultural needs as subjects of literary research, in terms of establishing grammatical categories, of ‘academizing’ words and language altogether.¹³² The Moldavian project, which envisaged the creation of a functional linguistic instrument capable of defining and purifying the lexical contents of the Romanian language, dates from 1839. Ten years later, an editorial in the magazine ‘*Albina românească*’ dealt exclusively with outlining the ambitious cultural project. Apart from technical details associated to its content and scope, Asachi also wrote: ‘A philosopher once said:’ *the lexicon of one’s language is the capital book of that nation.*’ *The Academy [Academia Mihăileană] in Iași has been striving for a long time now to gather Romanian words, so that, by putting them together with those gathered by Romanian scholars from Bucharest and from Transylvania, a lexicon would become available which, in the long run, will give Romanians everywhere a language sharing common features.* According to Asachi, all Romanian words, including those which are ‘less familiar, belong to idiomatic speech, are mentioned in early documents, or even are concocted by the authors themselves’ would have to be listed in a special appendix. Asachi invited Romanians everywhere to take part in the editing, and to send proposals for words to be included in the dictionary, ‘together with their meaning, and with a note specifying the place or the source of the word, or the particular purpose for which the word had been conceived.’¹³³ What Asachi had in mind at that time were the German initiatives and researches in the comparative study of languages, dating from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹³⁴ Botezatu was precisely the right person for making such remote examples and precedents clear through translation and proper interpretation.

The scope of this cultural project was immense. Asachi frequently referred to the existence of a group within the Academia Mihăileană which was in charge

of all the work. In the first half of the nineteenth century, when ‘*differences between men of letters were not so clear*’,¹³⁵ such a body of intellectuals would have contributed to the creation of a specific cultural identity, and by means of common interests, aims, and public behavior, would have developed a socio-cultural feed-back. The group was also said to promote the project, laying stress on its nation-wide importance and cultural role. However, regardless how attractive the academic plan was, one pre-requisite had to be fulfilled before actual work could begin. I hereby refer to a *Maecena*, whose existence would have been instrumental in covering the costs implied by such an enterprise. Private support for cultural initiatives in societies which lack an autonomous cultural network (system) should seek to actively encourage creation in those fields of research which the State cannot afford to support financially. The Moldavian society of the nineteenth century was deprived of an active, institutionalized cultural network, able to sustain itself through a direct business-like relation between the authors (the offer) and their public (the cultural demand).¹³⁶ Moldavian culture also lacked an established and acknowledged cultural identity, in which a sponsor would have liked to invest, in order to catalyze and animate further creation. There was no sense of what culture may induce to the self-definition of Moldavians as part of the Romanian nation; culture seemed to have no specific and immediate social or political utility. The only financial solution for elaborating and editing a dictionary was a substantial sponsorship, to which nobles and bourgeois alike could contribute. Unfortunately, it could have been easier to raise funds in Wallachia, where people acted more associatively, than in Moldavia.¹³⁷

Asachi was the first who signed the subscription list compiled for the publishing of the dictionary and entitled: ‘*Prospectus for the publishing of a Conversation Lexicon by subscription — translated from German into Romanian by a Moldo-Romanian society of men-of-letters, under the direction of aga Gheorghie Asachi*’ (10 March 1839). All the members of this ‘society’ knew German, and were educated in German schools: **paharnic** Gh. Săulescu, Dr. P. Câmpeanu, Dr. Th. Stamati, Alex. Costinescu, **medelnicer** Samoil Botezatu, I. Albineț.¹³⁸ The list was discreetly sent throughout the Romanian provinces, according to an advertising plan that had been sketched beforehand.¹³⁹ Meanwhile, a certain Dr. Risel finished drawing another Romanian-German dictionary. In March 1839, the Central Administration sent it directly to the Academic Board, to have it analyzed and its importance assessed. The Board rejected the manuscript and turned down an invitation to edit it, invoking the author’s poor knowledge of Romanian grammar and lexis (letter no. 13 of 20 March 1839). The document also mentions that ‘*the Board itself has been engaged for a long time in planning a recollection of all sources necessary to a Romanian dictionary, which will be presented to the Central Administration*’. This letter was

signed not only by Gh. Asachi, but also by P. Câmpeanu, Th. Stamati, and Gh. Săulescu; hence it may also be interpreted as an attempt at defending the monopoly Asachi’s group had over national cultural initiatives.¹⁴⁰

In July 1839, the Central Administration ordered in advance more than a hundred copies of the forthcoming dictionary, offering in exchange an important amount of money: 2,000 lei.¹⁴¹ In 1842, *Albina românească* released new information concerning the project: authors were to sign their contributions with numbers (consequently Asachi signed with a ‘1’, Botezatu with a ‘4’, Albineț with a ‘5’ etc.), printing had already begun, and the first galleys, out of twenty, were almost ready.¹⁴² After a couple of weeks, the magazine announced the first fascicle was on sale; the first volume of the dictionary was planned to be comprised of four such fascicles.¹⁴³ The Transylvanian magazine *Foaia pentru minte, inimă și literatură* immediately disseminated the news throughout the province.¹⁴⁴ However, despite advertisements and scientific and cultural interest, the linguistic enterprise died shortly after the first fascicle was delivered. By that time, Asachi had lost his influence with the Prince, and the funds the Central Administration had allotted for the entire project were cut off.

Samoil Botezatu wrote a lot;¹⁴⁵ to him, writing was another means of strengthening his intellectual status, besides giving lectures and teaching courses at the Academia Mihăileană and at the School for Girls.¹⁴⁶ Asachi apparently encouraged his literary activity as he supported any of Botezatu’s cultural intentions.¹⁴⁷ In 1835, he copied and deciphered D. Cantemir’s *Hronicul romano-moldo-vlahilor*, working together with **paharnic** C. Săulescu, who compared the original and the translated versions.¹⁴⁸ He was attracted to Voltaire’s dramas, such as *La Henriade*, and, in 1839, started to write poetry.¹⁴⁹ When Asachi set up a new weekly entertainment magazine, *Icoana lumei. Foaie pentru îndeletnicirea moldo-românilor*, he thought of Botezatu to take on the editorial responsibilities.¹⁵⁰ During the first year of its existence, Botezatu signed thirty-eight articles on various subjects: biographies (Copernicus, Galilei, H. Cortez, W. Penn), zoology, history (*The Ancient Amerindians and Their Buildings, Israel’s Exodus from Egypt*), geography. The greatest part of his writings concern travel memoirs and descriptions based on German subjects.¹⁵¹ Their number and the absence of any further reference to Botezatu dating from 1849 onwards, prompt us to believe he had left Moldavia for a while, to visit Germany or/and Austria. Upon reading his articles, one comes across words that did not exist in Romanian, and were borrowed from German. Botezatu re-composed them using phonetic transcription, and tried to acclimatize unusual neologisms, following Asachi’s recommendation to enrich the national language with as many neologisms as necessary. Thus, ‘Wilhelm’ became ‘Vilhelm’, ‘Hawai’ became ‘Havai’, ‘Cortez’ became ‘Cortet’.¹⁵² After *Icoana lumei* went bankrupt, Botezatu began to publish translations in various other popular almanacs. *Calendarul pentru poporul ro-*

mănesc pe anul 1845 (IV) for example, published a fragmentary translation of Wilhelm de Kotzebue's *A Trip Through Moldavia's Carpathians* (pp. 153–175).¹⁵³

An encyclopedic nature, Botezatu could not avoid the contact with drama-turgy. Apart from its cultural significance, the theater provided an opportunity to socialize in a milieu in which public contacts and recognition opened doors otherwise closed to foreigners or new-comers. Theater could also imply an author's leaning toward Western cultural influences. Besides, Asachi equally mastered drama and theatrical performances, and his contributions in this field were remarkable. The Music and Drama Conservatory was set up on 15 November 1836 as a result of Asachi's cultural projects. The Board of the Conservatory was comprised of Gh. Asachi, **vornic** Stefan Catargiu, and **spătar** Vasile Alecsandri; Samoil Botezatu was the secretary.¹⁵⁴ Botezatu never limited himself to administrative duties and became an enthusiastic actor. On 23 February 1837 he played Boureau in August von Kotzebue's minor vaudeville *Die schlaue Witwe oder die Temperament*. The play had been translated by Asachi, who had also translated Kotzebue's drama *La Pérouse*, equally played during the very same days. Botezatu was accompanied on stage by Gh. Căliman (who was finally awarded a pocket watch for his role by **postelnic** Gh. Pruncu), I. Albinet, Dimitrie Gusti, I. Dimitriu, Alex. Asachi. Most of them taught at the Academia Mihăileană. This proves that drama playing was mainly a small-group intellectual entertainment, involving high-class scholars related to Asachi, and an aristocratic public. Actors, who were people of poor condition, were never considered to be worthy enough to give a performance in front of a cultivated audience. However, '[...] *the first theatrical performance in our country's national language*' was successful; only three days later, Asachi decided to repeat the show.¹⁵⁵

Social interest in the theater in general was not purposeless. In early nineteenth-century European societies major cultural enterprises such as Asachi's have always been linked to a process of renewal (*le renouvellement*) with regard to morals.¹⁵⁶ What Asachi wrote on the occasion of the official opening of the Conservatory tallied perfectly with the common opinion on the role the principle of social order should assume in a modern society, based on strict social discriminations: '*This institution can influence in a positive way the discovery of musical talents and the development of a national theater, which is a genuine school of public conduct, or morals, and a source of innocent pleasures.*'¹⁵⁷ '*Every social class, every category of people,*' wrote a Bucharest magazine in 1835, '*hurry to the theater, as if it were a school of morals, of wisdom and good manners, wherein, enjoying oneself, everyone can acquire those virtues which are most useful to social life.*'¹⁵⁸ Theater, drama, as a literary genre, could influence the progress of society, could determine its movement toward order and social peace, by peacefully 'revolutionizing' its moral structures.¹⁵⁹ Theatrical performances promoted a new type of moral rhetorics, which followed

the urgent political and social issues of the day, and focused on the image of the flawless individual, at peace with the establishment and aware of his civic importance.¹⁶⁰ Culturally borrowed rules of social conduct could be exemplified by theatrical performances, as well as through literature and literary interpretations of contemporary realities.¹⁶¹ The idea of using theater as a mean of social and moral propaganda was deeply rooted into the consciousness of the public itself, since most of those who could afford to go to the theater were military men or state officials. The public, therefore, proved sensitive to the social message and significance of plays, to general symbolic suggestions, no matter to what degree they were cultivated. Recalling the performances of the National Theater in Bucharest during the 1840s, the French diplomat Felix Colson wrote: '*Il n'est fréquenté que par les uniformes et les plumets, dilettants galonnés, qui ne causent pas moins bien musique qu'art militaire.*'¹⁶² They listened to what they understood to be '*the voice of national regeneration*', as the contemporary poet Vasile Alecsandri put it. The Prince himself took advantage of the political outcomes of the moral stance and summoned Asachi to write as many plays as possible '*to the moral benefit of the entire nation*'. Since German was the language of social order, and German literature and philosophy could teach the feeling of respect common people should pay to social hierarchies and rulers, since theater too would show the results of the application, the teaching of German was, therefore, closely related — in Asachi's projects — to the social role of the theater, as well as to that of the schools.

Prompted by Asachi, Botezatu began to pay attention to literary dramas. In 1838 he copied the vaudeville *Pansionul de fete în vreme de război* by A. D'Emmery and E. Cormon, translated and revised by C. Negruzzi,¹⁶³ and, in 1840, Voltaire's *Alsire*.¹⁶⁴ Botezatu's collaboration with Negruzzi is not incidental: Negruzzi used to amend — both grammatically and stylistically — any text presented to him by amateur or professional writers.¹⁶⁵ Asachi's historical drama *Petru Rareș* was duplicated by Botezatu in 1837, and collated by the author. The play was read and approved by the Board (Camille de Barozzi, the principal press censor, was a member of it).¹⁶⁶ *Petru Rareș*, in a version multiplied by Botezatu, was played successfully by Conservatory students on 8 April 1837.¹⁶⁷

Samoil Botezatu's preferred German author was, by far, August von Kotzebue. His propensity toward this minor German novelist is probably due to Gh. Asachi's literary preferences. Von Kotzebue's writings exalted the strict Prussian moral rules of conduct, the total and unconditional subordination to every state initiative, the acceptance of modern state authoritarianism. This alludes implicitly to the adjournment of any critical attitude. It is also relevant that August von Kotzebue, who invoked the necessity of preserving public order, ended up murdered by a German revolutionary student in 1819 because he opposed social unrest and the rallies against the government stirred up by Romantic revolutionaries. To Moldavian intellectuals, Kotzebue's death resembled a mar-

tyrdom on behalf of the modern establishment **Regulamentele Organice** and their continental similes had built in the decades following the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. Moreover, von Kotzebue's writings originated in the German cultural space, deemed to represent the epitome of European culture and civilization, the spiritual expression of social order.¹⁶⁸ Botezatu was the first Romanian intellectual to translate some of von Kotzebue's plays.¹⁶⁹ In 1835, he put into Romanian *Die Uniform des Feldmarschalls Wellington*.¹⁷⁰ Apparently, the translation met with Asachi's unconditional approval.¹⁷¹

That very same year, Botezatu's translation was published together with J.F. Junger's comedy *Amestecătoriul în toate*; both plays were bound together in a single volume, printed at Asachi's publishing house, 'Albina'. The book was eulogically reviewed in 'Albina românească'¹⁷² and ran almost immediately out of print.¹⁷³ One can easily recognize Botezatu's translation because of the terms he used — most of them archaisms and literally adapted neologisms.¹⁷⁴ In 1840, the theater column in *Albina românească* included another play by Kotzebue translated by Samoil Botezatu (*Nenorocita pătire a Boureanului, e.g.*).¹⁷⁵ The latter, together with *Amestecătoriul în toate* and *Înșelătorul înșelat*, were performed until 1848, by which time their fame had faded away.¹⁷⁶

The end of Botezatu's theatrical activity corresponds to the beginning of his career as a writer; he wrote articles until his death. Later on, after his luck and celebrity withered, he quietly retired at a mansion nearby Iași which he had purchased from a nobleman (**postelnic** Iordachi Tătaru), in 1842.¹⁷⁷ Samoil Botezatu's death marked also the end of a generation of newcomers who dedicated their lives to utopian social ideals. The teaching of the German language was merely a pretext, ingeniously instrumented by the Prince and his paramount political associates, Asachi *y compris*, to promote the structural changes the regime undertook in 1834. In nineteenth-century Moldavia, people like Botezatu were engaged in achieving bits and pieces of a remarkable project related to a German version of social modernization. No matter the model was not French or Russian — its outcomes would have been entirely Romanian. Therefore, a detail like the following should not surprise us: in the 1890s, more than two thirds of the Romanian M.P.s knew German very well.

Notes

1. On the significance of Botezatu's family name, see my 'Câteva aspecte ale regimului asimilării confesionale în Moldova. Genealogii de 'botezați', in *Arhiva Genealogică*, I (VI), (1994), 1–2, p. 232.

2. R.E. Park, 'Human Migration and the Marginal Man,' in *The American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII, 6 (1928), pp. 881–893.

3. *Apud* T.T. Burada, *Istoria teatrului din Moldova*, Chișinău, 1991, p. 124, n. 1.

4. N. Iorga, 'Istoria evreilor în țările noastre,' in *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*, 1st series, XXXVI (1913), p. 201, n. 2.
5. Lucian Predescu, *Enciclopedia Română*, Bucharest, 1940, p. 120.
6. D. Furtună, 'Căminarul Samoil Botezatu,' in *Cuget clar. Noul 'Sămănător'*, III, 23 (15 December 1938), pp. 355–357.
7. M. Costachescu, 'Samoil Botezatu,' in *Anuarul centenarului Școlii Normale de Învățătoare 'M. Sturdza'*, Iași (1935), pp. 17–28.
8. Gh. Ghibănescu, *Școala Normală de Învățătoare 'M. Sturdza'*, Iași (1935), p. 123 sqq.
9. Fl. Faifer, 'Samoil Botezat' in *Dicționarul literaturii române de la origini până la 1900*, Bucharest, 1979, p. 121.
10. C. Diaconovici, *Enciclopedia română*, I, Sibiu, 1898, p. 548.
11. Horst Fassel, 'Samoil Botezatu, einer der ersten Deutschlehrer in der Moldau,' in *Volk und Kultur*, 27 (1975), 12, pp. 44–45.
12. Horst Fassel, *Deutschunterricht in Jassy (1830–1992). Wissenschaftler und Lehrer als Vermittler im West-Ost-Dialog*, Tübingen, 1993, p. 16 sqq.
13. Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului, *Suceava. Documente privitoare la istoria orașului, 1388–1918*, I, Bucharest, 1989, doc. 199, p. 337.
14. *Ibidem*, doc. 321, p. 514.
15. *Ibidem*, doc. 330, p. 530.
16. *Ibidem*, doc. 318, p. 510.
17. *Ibidem*, doc. 334, p. 542.
18. *Ibidem*, doc. 336, p. 544.
19. *Ibidem*, doc. 342, p. 552.
20. *Ibidem*, doc. 348, p. 559.
21. The Romanian original is far more relevant:

'Înalt Presfintite Stăpâne,

Din gios iscălitul cu mare jale a inimii sale descoperă în următoare pricină, însă privat, nu din slujbă, ca un fiu dohovnicesc arătându-și toate ale sale dureri.

1- tîi. Fiindcă iscălitul al 39-le an slujește la Școala Trifialnică a Sucevei ca dascăl tr(i)ff(i)alnic [since 1791–1792 — my note] și avînd doao însurăciuni, toată agonisată avere, cât și zestrile, le-au cheltuit cu un copil al său, anume Samoil, fînându-l la Cernaui la Școala lătinească 8 ani, până au isprăvit, și 2 școli a filosofiei și 3 ani au fost la Școala di Căpitenie în Cernaui; ca pripărant cu bune sporuri s-au arătat. Iar vîzînd el atîta gonire asupra legii grecești și înțelegînd di unii și alții aceasta cum că care nu s-a face catolic nu să pute așeza în slujba dăscălească, la care el din copilărie s-au tras, au mers la domnul aufseher Panchevici și i-au zis:

— Domnule, mă rog să mă sfatuiești, ca eu iată acum am petrecut atîția ani aice la Cernaui cu școlile, am vro nedejde de așezare ca dascăl sau ba?

Au luat acest răspuns:

— De vei lua lege catolicească, apoi degrabă vei fi așezat.

Și el, nevoind a-și lăsa lege, au trebuit sa-și(i) lasă patria și să margă în altă țară a-și căuta hrana sa. Și luîndu-și pas de la cinstit(a) gubernii, s-au dus în Moldova.

2-le. Eu pentru aceasta am jertfit toată avere me de am rămas ca un calic, socotind că la slăbăciune me sau la bătrînețali meli, di vor fi lungi, voi avè o sprijineală di fiul meu. Și totuș(i) nu bănuiesc vîzînd pi alții care au primit lege catolicească, precum Ioan Livițchi di la Văscău(i), Săvinescul, Pavlovici și Ranca di la Calinești, ci au dobîndit cu aceea.

Și acum moldovenii văzând că ei n-au dreptate a încăpe la slujbă, ce numai ga-
lițienii, cei mai mulți au trecut pe fiii lor în Moldova, tot di frica **uniației** (în sensul
de 'convertire' — n.n.), de cari pricina și numărul școlerilor foarte s-au scăzut.

La care jeluire, Preosfințiilor Voastre, ca unui cap legii noastre și păstori sufle-
tesc, durere și slăbăciune a bătrânețelor mă sălescu.

Suceava, la 26 septembrie 1830.

Al Preosfințiilor Voastre fiu dohovniceșc și plecată slugă,

Ioniță Botezat, profesor [m.p.]' (*Ibidem*, doc. 383, pp. 636–637).

22. *Ibidem*, doc. 390, pp. 649–656.
23. Arhivele Naționale — Iași [further referred to as National Archives, Iași], Școala
normală 'M. Sturdza' collection, 3/1846–1850, ff. 23 v. — 24; V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, II,
p. 171.
24. D. Furtună, *op. cit.*, p. 356.
25. National Archives, Iași, Stare civilă Iași. Morți collection, 881/1867, no. 475.
26. C.I. Andreescu, 'Istoricul Liceului Național din Iași (1835–1935)', in *De la Academia
Mihăileană la Liceul Național — 100 de ani, 1835–1935*, Iași, 1935, p. 18.
27. In *Vidomostiia cuprinzând casele boierești, lăcuitoriești, bisericiești și dughenile află-
toare în orașul Iași*, 9 October 1835; National Archives, Iași, Ministerul de Interne collec-
tion, tr. 696, op. 772, dos. 1084, f. 133 v.
28. National Archives, Iași, Manuscrise collection, 1639, f. 14.
29. National Archives, Iași, Secretariatul de Stat collection, 345/1835–1855, f. 207; the
decree bears the number 250 of November 8, 1835.
30. *Ibidem*, *loc. cit.*; decree no. 849/09.07.1839.
31. *Ibidem*, *loc. cit.*; decree no. 1728/25.04.1843.
32. *Ibidem*, *loc. cit.*; decree no. 1974/12.05.1844.
33. National Archives, Iași, Secretariatul de Stat collection, 1742/1851–1856, f. 480;
decree no. 181/24.04.1852. See also *Carte de rangurile boierilor din Principatul Moldovei
hărăzite de Pre Înțeleptul și Pre Luminatul domn Grigorie A. Ghica voievod, domn Țării
Moldovei, orânduită sub direcția secretarului de stat, cavaler Alexandru Sturdza, 1851* (Library
of the Romanian Academy, Manuscrise collection, 5374).
34. Gheorghe Asachi (1788–1869) attempted to modernize the Moldavian educational sys-
tem and contributed at the foundation of new schools and academic institutions modeled after
Central-European institutions (a Polytechnical Institute in 1818, *Gimnazia Vasiliană* in 1828,
the School for Girls in 1834, Moldavian rural schools, *Academia Mihăileană*, with its two chairs,
Philosophy and Law, in 1835). The latter was the first university in the Romanian Principalities.
Asachi also established the first Moldavian modern magazine, *Albina românească*, in 1829,
and contributed to the first theatrical performance in the Romanian language (1816).
35. E. Lovinescu, *Gheorghe Asachi. Viața și opera*, Bucharest, 1927, pp. 37–39.
36. G. Bogdan-Duică, 'Traducătorii români ai lui August de Kotzebue (1830–1850),'
in *Omăgiu lui Titu Maiorescu*, Bucharest, 1900, pp. 191–192, n. 1, 4.
37. V. A. Urechia, *Istoria școlilor de la 1800–1864*, II, Bucharest, 1892, p. 268.
38. A French traveler, Saint-Marc Girardin (*Souvenirs de voyages et d'études*, Paris, 1852),
wrote about the languages spoken in Iași. According to him, German, French, Turkish, and
Russian were the most important languages the boyars employed in the first half of the nine-
teenth century; *apud* Simona Vârzaru (ed.), *Prin Țările Române. Călători străini din secolul
XIX*, Bucharest, 1984, p. 61.
39. Mihail Kogălniceanu, *Scrieri*, Bucharest, 1913, p. 141.

40. See 'Scrisoarea lui Conachi către mitropolitul Veniamin despre învățăturile din
Moldova,' in Costache Conachi, *Poesii, alcătuiți și tălmăciri*, N. Vogoride-Konaki (ed.), Iași,
1888, p. 336. Conachi himself was educated in Vienna, at the turn of the 18th century (see
Dalila Lucia Aramă, 'Un moldovean student la Viena în anul 1800: Costache Conachi,' in
Almanahul Parohiei Ortodoxe Române din Viena, XIX [1980], pp. 280–283). Veniamin Cos-
tache, the metropolitan of Moldavia, shared Conachi's opinions about the social adequacy
of German. 'German is one of the most useful languages on Earth,' he wrote on the 15th of
August, 1827 (Th. Codrescu, *Uricariul...*, VII, Iași, 1886, pp. 93–95). After 1821 Veniamin
Costache sent Gheorghe Săulescu — subsequently teacher of German at the Academia Mihăi-
leană in Iași — to Vienna, to study modern European languages, German philology, and philo-
sophy. In 1833, Săulescu published one of the first Romanian grammars, using German methods
and sources (C. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 26).

41. A typology of feedbacks to foreign cultural models in P. Cornea, 'Pașoptismul și
cultura germană, partea I, II,' in *Revista de istorie și teorie literară*, XXXII, 3 (July–September,
1983), pp. 64–65 sqq., and 4 (October–December, 1984), pp. 56–61, respectively.

42. The address dates from 9/21 November, 1835; see Th. Codrescu, *op. cit.*, VIII, Iași,
1886, pp. 120–159. See also D. Ciurea, *Moldova în vremea lui Mihai Sturdza*, Bucharest,
1947, p. 65.

43. *Albina românească*, 36 (September 24, 1831).

44. *Idem*, 98 (November 18, 1834).

45. V. A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, I, p. 322.

46. The social status and significance of German are in some respects similar to the status
enjoyed by the French language, which, to Moldavians, was the language of courtesy and social
relations (see *infra*). For the status of French in Moldavian private schools, see N. Cartoian,
'Pensioanele franceze din Moldova în prima jumătate a veacului XIX,' in *Omăgiu lui Ramiro
Ortiz*, Bucharest, 1929, pp. 67–75.

47. C. I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

48. V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, pp. 375–376.

49. *Ibidem*, pp. 121–124, 199.

50. H. Fassel, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

51. *Ibidem*, II, p. 201.

52. See P. Cornea, *Originile romantismului românesc*, Bucharest, 1972, pp. 682–684.

53. Sanda Vârjoghe (ed.), *Amintirile colonelului Lăcusteanu*, Galați, 1991, p. 16.

54. V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, I, p. 240.

55. 'Există astăzi o obștească dorință pentru adăugarea acestei învățături [...], nu numai
pentru că această limbă este una din cele mai cultivate din ziua de astăzi, dar mai ales pentru
contactul în care se află acest prințipat cu Germania în privința comerțului' (*Ibidem*, II, pp.
293–294).

56. *Albina românească*, 33 (May 4, 1830) (supplement); V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, I, p. 147.
Private classes have always represented a good opportunity to become known and to develop
good relationships with the local aristocracy. By the mid-1830s, Th. Codrescu, author of the
Uricariul... collection of documents, was recommended by a nobleman (Dimitrie Scarlat
Miclescu) to teach French and Romanian grammar to the offsprings of some wealthy people.
At that time, Codrescu was employed by the Academia Mihăileană, as teacher of French.
He later admitted that that particular recommendation had secured his admission 'in the
aristocratic world,' one by which he 'grew strong'. His brother, Mihalachi, gained a similar
recommendation from Prince N. Vogoride during the latter's trip to Constantinople, in August
1844. See Th. Codrescu, *op. cit.*, VII, p. 204.

57. D. Pompeiu, *Monografia Liceului Național din Iași*, Iași, 1907, pp. 10–15. Paulicec's appointment is listed under no. 1374 in I. Lupu, N. Camariano, Ov. Papadima, *Bibliografia analitică a periodicelor românești*, I, 1790–1850, 2nd part, Bucharest, 1966, p. 675; V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
58. No. 13774 in I. Lupu *et al.*, *Bibliografia...*, p. 677.
59. See the 'Statute of Moldavian Schools' presented to the Russian General P.A. Kisseleff before the end of March 1832, in D. Pompeiu, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–15.
60. *Albina românească*, 34 (May 1st, 1832). Frenchman Ch. Tissot was teaching both German and French.
61. *Idem*, 54 (July 13, 1832), and 57 (July 22, 1832).
62. 'Numai alieții din institut și școlarii din gimnaziu au voie să învețe pe rând una din limbile moderne, sau și două, dacă au talant și începuturi întru aceasta'; V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
63. See *Tableau des leçons au Gymnase de Jassy pour le cours d'hiver l'an 1832*. The daily program of the pupils was particularly severe: they were supposed to wake up at 5–5.30 a.m., pray between 5.30 and 6, prepare their lessons between 6 and 7.30, have breakfast from 7.30 to 8, have classes between 8 and 11, have a break or supplementary courses from 11 to 12, then lunch and an afternoon nap between 12 and 2 p. m. Classes started again at two in the afternoon and lasted until 6 p. m., followed by a break between 6 and 7, and again by study between 7 and 9. Supper was served at 9 p. m., and the last prayer was said at 10 (National Archives, Iași, Secretariatul de Stat collection, 117/1832–1834, f. 43).
64. See the records of the semestrial examination held on April 26, 1833 in C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–51.
65. Cf. A.D. Xenopol, 'Memoriu asupra învățământului în Moldova' in A.D. Xenopol, C. Erbiceanu, *Serbarea școlară de la Iași*, Iași, 1885, p. 135; V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, I, p. 244.
66. Cf. 'Foaia cheltuielilor de peste an ce au a se face pentru ținerea șoarelor publice în Moldova,' in Th. Codrescu, *op. cit.*, XVI, Iași, 1891, p. 393.
67. Academic positions were assimilated with those of directors of ministry departments, whereas school teachers were assimilated to section principals in ministries; see V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
68. *Albina românească*, 6 (January 21, 1832).
69. V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, pp. 200–201.
70. H. Fassel, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
71. For an interpretation of it see G. Bădărău, 'Organizarea și conținutul învățământului public din Moldova între anii 1832 și 1848 (I),' in *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie 'A.D. Xenopol' din Iași*, XVII (1980), p. 354.
72. Cf. M. Bordeianu, 'Date noi privitoare la istoria învățământului românesc,' in *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie 'A.D. Xenopol' din Iași*, XIV (1977), p. 330; see also C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–63.
73. M. Bordeianu, *op. cit.*, p. 331; see also V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, pp. 296–297.
74. Flechtenmacher strove hard to stress the role of Poetics, giving examples from German classics. His income was about 6,000 lei/year. See C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 70, 237.
75. See G. Bădărău, *Academia Mihăileană (1835–1838). Menirea patriotică a unei instituții de învățământ*, Iași, 1987, pp. 94, 180; N.A. Bogdan, *Orașul Iași*, 2nd ed., Iași, 1913–1915, p. 258 sqq.
76. C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
77. *Ibidem*, p. 64; V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

78. C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
79. *Ibidem*, pp. 68–69.
80. V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, p. 292; G. Bădărău, 'Organizarea și conținutul învățământului public... (II),' in *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie 'A.D. Xenopol' din Iași*, XVIII, 1981, p. 221.
81. T. Verescu, V. Peltechi, and Emanoil Mavrodin, Secretary of the Board for Public Education, were awarded the same rank; *Buletinul Oficial*, III, 89 (November 10, 1835), p. 572.
82. *Idem*, IV, 54 (July 9, 1836), p. 396.
83. C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
84. *Ibidem*, pp. 85–86; V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, pp. 362–364.
85. C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
86. *Ibidem*, p. 75.
87. *Ibidem*, pp. 94, 241 (n. 500).
88. Th. Codrescu, *op. cit.*, IX, Iași, 1887, pp. 29–30.
89. V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, II, p. 48; C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 88; *Buletinul Oficial*, V, 76 (September 26, 1837), pp. 293–295.
90. Twenty-four students were enlisted during the 1839 summer semester (D. Pompeiu, *op. cit.*, pp. 43–44), twenty during the 1840 summer semester (C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 96), twenty-five during the 1842 winter semester (*ibidem*, p. 101; see also V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, II, p. 202), twenty during the 1843 summer semester (C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 104), twenty-five during the 1845 winter semester (*ibidem*, p. 107), seventeen during the 1845–1846 academic year (*ibidem*, p. 109).
91. *Ibidem*, pp. 92, 101. He complained about these unexpected financial delays and, together with several of his colleagues (I. Albiș, I. Ionescu, D. Gusti, T. Codrescu, G. Schiavoni), signed a formal request addressed to the Prince asking for an increase in their financial rewards (V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, II, p. 225).
92. See Alex. Lapedatu, 'Cronica lucrărilor pregătitoare pentru întâia reformă școlară în Moldova, 1844–1845,' in *Un mănunchiu de cercetări istorice*, Bucharest, 1915, pp. 82–83, appendix 2.
93. No. 13430 in I. Lupu, N. Camariano, Ov. Papadima, *Bibliografia...*, p. 660.
94. Th. Codrescu, *op. cit.*, IX, Iași, 1887, p. 86; V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 54–56.
95. V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, pp. 160–161.
96. *Ibidem*, pp. 240, 264; C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
97. V. A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, pp. 249–256.
98. We employed the term 'battle' to match Vasile Alecsandri's description of this process: 'French-educated and German-educated people formed two rival parties, each of them trying hard to catch up with the development of society and to promote the ideas [i.e. political and social principles] of the countries where they had been raised' (in *Opere*, IV, Bucharest, 1974, p. 341).
99. V. A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, p. 320.
100. See D.C. Amzăr, 'Studentii români în străinătate. Date și interpretări statistice' in *Cercetări literare*, IV, 1940, pp. 215–248. Amzăr gives a comprehensive list of all the students who came from Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia and registered with the University of Berlin, beginning with 1821; some are very well-known names: Mihail Kogălniceanu, Dimitrie and Grigorie Sturdza — Mihai Sturdza's sons — Emanoil and Grigorie Costache — the Metropolitan's nephews — Petre and Mihail Cazimir, Ioan Palade, Nicolae Aslan, Nicolae Burghelea etc. See also V. Grozav, 'Știri noi privitoare la bursierii români în străinătate (1820–1877),' in *Revista Arhivelor*, tome XXXII, 1, XLVII (1970), pp. 111–112.
101. C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–53, 55.

102. V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 245–247.
103. *Ibidem*, pp. 267–268. See also N. Iorga, *Studii și documente*, VI, Bucharest, 1903, pp. 111–112 (the Moldavian students addressed a letter of gratitude to C. Popp for his exquisite behavior and help; they also asked for an increase in their scholarships).
104. C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
105. N. Iorga, *op. cit.*, p. 112 (a copy of a decree issued by the Imperial Commission for Studies 'an die Niederösterreichische Regierung' on 18 October 1834, confirming that 'die aus der Moldau gebürtigen sechs Jünglinge, welche sich hier den Studien zu widmen wünschen, als ausserordentliche Schüler zugelassen [...] erteilt werde'). Their assiduity to learning is endorsed by Hagı C. Popp who, in a letter to the Metropolitan, wrote the following: 'The students' behavior and application to learning was worth the funds the State has raised on their behalf; so was their selection, too' (*ibidem, loc.cit.*).
106. V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 52–53.
107. *Ibidem*, p. 115.
108. C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, p. 111; V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 163, 304.
109. *Ibidem*, p. 271.
110. Dr. Schlipper was director of the Agronomic Institute in Hohenheim; see Al. Andronic, Gh. Ungureanu, 'Învățământul agricol în Moldova în prima jumătate a secolului XIX,' in *Studii și cercetări științifice, Iași*, Istorie, IX, 1958, 1–2, p. 115; V. Apostolescu, 'Din trecutul instituțional agricol: Comisia de agronomie și economie rurală din Moldova,' in *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie 'A.D. Xenopol'*, Iași, XXIII, 1986, 1, p. 274.
111. A.D. Xenopol, C. Erbiceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 231.
112. C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–112; V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 130, 162–163, 206. For a comprehensive bibliography and their biographies, see Ion I. Solcanu, 'Gheorghe Asachi, fondatorul învățământului plastic din Moldova' in *Gh. Asachi. Studii*, Bucharest, 1992, pp. 84–92. For Fătu's and Velini's biographies, see V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 377–378. For other biographies of Romanian students at German universities, see Elena Siupiur, 'Intellektuelle aus Rumänien und den Südosteuropäischen Ländern an deutschen Universitäten im 19. Jahrhundert (II. Teil),' in *Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Européennes*, tome XXXIII, (1995), 3–4, pp. 251–265. (Gregorie and Emanuel von Kostaki attended courses of Law in Lemberg and Heidelberg, in 1837; Lascăr Rosetti studied Law in Heidelberg, too (p. 260). Pavel Câmpăneanu attended Philosophy in 1851. Dimitrie Alexandru Sturdza, son of Prince Mihail Sturdza, attended Law courses in Göttingen, Berlin, München, and Bonn, in 1851. See Siupiur, *idem*, p. 261.)
113. Cf. *Analele parlamentare ale României*, I, 1856, 11, Bucharest, pp. 220–222; C.I. Andreescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–36.
114. *Albina românească*, 88 (14–26 October 1834); *Buletinul Oficial*, II, 25 (30 September 1834), pp. 426–428. See also G. Bădărău, *op. cit.*, pp. 214–215.
115. N.A. Bogdan, *op. cit.*, p. 259. Private schools meant for the general education of girls were somewhat of a routine in Iași; one of them was mentioned in 1811, even though there were only nine girls who attended it (see T.G. Bulat, 'Un pension de domnișoare la Iași în 1811,' in *Cercetări istorice*, XIII–XIV, (1940), pp. 414–423.
116. Cf. M. Bordeianu, *op. cit.*, p. 330 (see *Tabloul ghegeneralnic...*).
117. Hofmann left the school because of a quarrel with Samoil Botezatu; see V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 380–381.
118. *Albina românească*, 10 (2 February 1839).
119. *Idem*, 28 (10 April 1838).

120. The National Archives in Iași preserve the certificates Botezatu had offered to members of the academic staff; see, for example, National Archives, Iași, Documente collection, 549/61.
121. See, for example, 'Programa examenului public urmat în Iași în 20 mai 1836 la Institutul pentru învățătura fetilor,' in The Archives of the 'Mihai Eminescu' Central University Library, Documente collection, 58; V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, pp. 332–333.
122. V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
123. *Ibidem*, p. 260.
124. Up to 1845 Botezatu used to receive a monthly salary of 3,000 lei; cf. 'Budgetul Casei Școalelor pe anul școlastic începător de la 1 octombrie 1844 până la 1 octombrie 1845,' in Th. Codrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 101. Information concerning his monthly income in The Archives of the 'M. Eminescu' Central University Library, Manuscrise collection, 1/1745–1863, ff. 163, 164, 168, 182, 182 v. In 1847, his salary was raised to 5,000 lei, cf. 'Tablou a școalelor publice în Moldova,' in A.D. Xenopol, C. Erbiceanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 234–235.
125. National Archives, Iași, Școala normală 'M. Sturdza' collection, 1/1834–1839; 2/1840–1851; 3/1846–1850.
126. In relation to the general status of Moldavian schools, shortages, and payment problems, see National Archives, Iași, Secretariatul de Stat collection, 184 (238)/1832–1858.
127. National Archives, Iași, Secretariatul de Stat collection, 648 (I)/1839–1849, f. 227.
128. See Codrescu's exhortation at the unveiling of Asachi's statue in Iași, on 14 October 1890, in *Uricariul...*, XVI, Iași, 1891, p. 429. See also Th. Codrescu, 'Amintiri despre Gheorghe Asachi,' in *Arhiva*, II (1890), 5, p. 341. An outstanding note in Rudolf Suțu, *Iașii de odinioară*, I, Iași, 1923, pp. 118–119.
129. C. Gane, *Trecute vieți de doamne și domnițe*, II, Chișinău, 1991, p. 430; *idem*, *Acum o sută de ani. Cronica lunară a anului 1834*, Bucharest, 1935, pp. 104–105.
130. Cf. 'Notices sur l'état de l'instruction publique en Moldavie, 1841,' in A.D. Xenopol, C. Erbiceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 225.
131. V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 292–293; II, pp. 120–121, 178.
132. Cf. M. Zăciu, 'La critique roumaine et la relation littérature-société,' in *Cahiers roumains d'études littéraires* (1973), 1, p. 5: 'Le souci de poétique perçant sous la philosophie des Lumières commence par se confondre avec le besoin de fixer certains catégories grammaticales et prosodiques tendant à saisir la réalité de la terminologie et du 'langage' de l'oeuvre'. Records of similar initiatives date from 1834 (Simeon Marcovici) and 1840 (Iordache Goleșcu). See also D. Popovici, 'Primele manifestări de teorie literară în cultura română,' in *Cercetări de literatură română*, Sibiu, 1944, pp. 167–193; G. Ivașcu, 'Introducere,' in *Din istoria teoriei și a criticii literare românești, 1812–1866*, Bucharest, 1968, pp. 5–72.
133. 'Un filosof zice: "...lexiconul limbei este întâia carte a unei nații'. Academia de Iași se îndeletnicește de mult cu adunarea de cuvinte ca, cu împreună lucrarea învățătorilor români, atât din București, cât și din Transilvania, să poată înființa lexiconul, ce cu vreme va putea statornici între români haractirul limbei.', etc. *Ibidem*, II, p. 138.
134. See Franz Grisellini's case in E. Coseriu, *Limba română în fața Occidentului*, Cluj, 1994, pp. 72–86.
135. L. Volovici, *Apariția scriitorului în cultura românească*, Iași, 1976, p. 109.
136. See P. Cornea, *Originile romantismului românesc*, Bucharest, 1972, pp. 256–257.
137. *Idem*, 'Cultura și literatura română în perioada pașoptistă,' in *Istoria literaturii române*, II, Bucharest, 1968, p. 249.
138. 'Prospect pentru tipărirea prin subscriere a Lexiconului de conversație, adus pe române de pe limba germană de o societate de literați moldo-români, sub direcția d. aga Gheorghie

Asachi,' in *Creșterea colecțiilor Academiei Române*, 1911, octombrie-decembrie, Bucharest, 1911, p. 289.

139. See *Albina românească*, 10 (1839), *Curierul românesc*, 10 (1839), *Gazeta de Transilvania*, 2 (1839); no. 29 in I. Lupu, N. Camariano, Ov. Papadima, *Bibliografia...*, 1st part, Bucharest, 1966, p. 5.

140. V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

141. *Albina românească*, 57 (20 July 1839).

142. *Albina românească*, 13 (1842), no. 35 in I. Lupu, N. Camariano, Ov. Papadima, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

143. *Albina românească*, 15 (1842), no. 36 in *ibidem*, *loc.cit.*

144. *Foaia pentru minte, inimă și literatură*, 6 (1843), no. 37 in *ibidem*, *loc.cit.* The fascicle was presented at the Academia Mihăileană Jubilee exhibition, cf. A.D. Xenopol, C. Erbiceanu, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

145. Lists of titles in Horst Fassel, *Traian Bratu și germanistica ieșeană*, Iași, 1981, and in *idem*, *Deutschunterricht in Jassy...*, pp. 110–111. Most of his articles are listed in I. Lupu, N. Camariano, Ov. Papadima, *op. cit.*, 1st part, 1790–1850, *passim*.

146. See Dim. Păcurariu, 'Clasicism și tendințe clasice în literatura română. Traducerile și semnificația lor (1750–1830),' in *Revista de istorie și teorie literară*, XXVII, 3 (1978), pp. 355–367.

147. Asachi was supportive of all his literary companions, who were not necessarily prepared to write literature. See the sociological analysis of nineteenth-century intellectual conversion to literature in Elena Siupiur, 'L'écrivain roumain au XIX^e siècle. Typologie sociale et intellectuelle,' in *Cahiers roumains d'études littéraires* (1980), 2, pp. 35–54.

148. Library of the Romanian Academy, *Manuscrite* collection, 113. The notes referring to the transcriber are at f. 341. See also I. Bianu, *Catalogul manuscriselor românești. BAR, 1–300*, I, Bucharest, 1907, p. 259; G. Ștrempel, *Catalogul manuscriselor românești. BAR 1–1600*, Bucharest, 1978, p. 38.

149. In *Foaia pentru minte, inimă și literatură*, 25 (1839); Th. Codrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

150. First bibliographical mention in N. Hodoș, Al. Sadi-Ionescu, *Publicațiunile periodice românești*, I, 1820–1906, Bucharest, 1913, pp. 322–323. A brief survey of its history in I. Hangiu, *Dicționar al presei literare românești (1790–1982)*, Bucharest, 1987, p. 169. In 1846, Botezatu hired Zaharia Columb, who was born in the region of Banat, to write articles for this magazine. The latter was the author of the first German textbook in Romanian (1855), and was reputed as one of the finest teachers of German throughout the country. For a while, Columb directed the famous *Liceul Național* in Iași (1868–1874, 1876–1878); see Horst Fassel, 'Relații literare româno-germane. Zaharia Columb,' in *Anuar de lingvistică și istorie literară*, 28, 1981–1982, pp. 105–107; *idem*, 'Zaharia Columb, der Verfasser des ersten Deutschlehrbuchs in der Moldau,' in *Deutschunterricht in Jassy...*, pp. 57–63.

151. Fl. Faifer, *op. cit.*, p. 121, dismissed them as 'literary vague narrations'.

152. On early nineteenth-century neologisms in Romanian literary texts, see Alex. Niculescu, 'Le Roumain littéraire entre l'Orient et l'Occident,' in *Cahiers roumains d'études littéraires* (1975), 2, pp. 4–19 (a list of sources included); Klaus Bochmann, 'Der Wortschatz der rumänischen Aufklärung im Europäischen Kontext,' in *Cahiers roumains d'études littéraires* (1979), 2, pp. 19–29.

153. See G. Răduică, N. Răduică, *Calendare și almanahuri românești, 1731–1918*, Bucharest, 1981, p. 439. Various editions of the almanac *Calendarul pentru poporul românesc* include many other translations by Samoil Botezatu: 1853 (vol. XII) — *Luptele*

furnicilor, pp. 94–98 (see *ibidem*, p. 444); 1858 (vol. XVII) — *Biserica numită 'La ceasul cu apă' <Sevilla>*, pp. 38–44; *Bărbatul și femeia*, pp. 60–61; *Rugăciunea de noapte*, pp. 67–80 (see *ibidem*, p. 448), (vol. XVIII) — *Cine este cu Dumnezeu, cu acela este și Dumnezeu*, pp. 29–55; *Un mântuitor rar*, pp. 58–65; *Amazoanele din Siam*, pp. 70–72 (see *ibidem*, *loc.cit.*). However, the huge number of French translations (385) outnumbers by far the number of German translations (83) made between 1780 and 1860. See P. Cornea, *Pașoptismul...* (I), p. 64.

154. This was based on the similar society that existed in Wallachia; see V.A. Urechia, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 398–399; N.A. Bogdan, *op. cit.*, p. 314. For the history of the National Theater in Iași, see T.T. Burada, *Cercetări asupra Conservatorului filarmonico-dramatic din Iași*, Iași, 1888, pp. 5–7; I. Masoff, *Teatrul românesc. Privire istorică*, I, Bucharest, 1961, p. 223; M. Cozmei, 'Gh. Asachi, animator al mișcării artistice din Iași în prima jumătate a secolului XIX,' in *Gh. Asachi. Studii*, Bucharest, 1992, p. 101.

155. T.T. Burada, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–11.

156. I share D. Păcurariu's opinion as stated in his *Romantismul românesc*, Bucharest, 1969, and in *Studii literare*, II (Ioana M. Petrescu ed.), Cluj, 1974. The following example restores the image of what Henry H.H. Remak called 'a political and practical, i.e. pragmatic, Romanticism' ('West European Romanticism. Definition and Scope,' in N.P. Stallknecht, H. Frenz (eds.), *Comparative Literature. Method and Perspective*, London — New York, 1973, p. 290). It definitely applies to early nineteenth-century Romanian Romanticism, whose specificity still needs to be defined.

157. *Albina românească*, 13 (14 February 1837): 'Acest așezământ poate înrăuri într-un chip foarte favoritor asupra dezvelirii talentelor muzicale și în formarea unui teatru național, ce este adevărata școală a moralului și izvorul plăcerilor nevinovate.'

158. 'Toate clasele societății, toate treptele alerg la teatru ca la o școală de morală, de învățură și de bunăcuviință, unde fiecare parte poate desfășurându-se să dobândească virtuțile cele mai de trebuință la viața socială.' In *Gazeta Teatrului Național*, 2 (1 December 1835), apud G. Ivașcu, *Din istoria teoriei și a criticii literare românești, 1812–1866*, Bucharest, 1967, p. 201.

159. Cf. Pompiliu Eliade, *Influența franceză asupra spiritului public în România*, Al. Duțu and A. Creția (eds.), Bucharest, 1982, p. 284. The idea of the social and political role all literary genres played in the formation of an adequate 'national' identity proved pervasive and long-lasting. For Alecu Russo, literature was the very expression of the national existence (in *Scrieri*, Bucharest, 1954, p. 44). For the role moral propaganda assumed during the nineteenth century, see M. Zăciu, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–7.

160. Cf. Al. Duțu, *Eseu în istoria modelelor umane*, Bucharest, 1972.

161. We owe the extensive application of this fruitful interpretation of the nature of social communication through literary means to Al. Duțu. He referred to the English case in 'English Literature of the Enlightenment in South-East Europe,' in *Actes du Premier Congrès International des Etudes Balcaniques et Sud-Est Européennes*, VII, Sofia, 1971, pp. 307–310; 'Civilitate engleză și moralism sud-est european,' în *Cartile de înțelepciune în cultura română*, Bucharest, 1972, pp. 156–162; 'Gentlemanliness and Patriotism — Two Forms of Enlightened Moralism,' in *Cahiers roumains d'études littéraires* (1976), 1, pp. 4–11.

162. F. Colson, *De l'état présent et de l'avenir des Principautés Roumaines*, Paris, 1839, pp. 177–178.

163. At that time, Botezatu was Director of the School for Girls. Negruzzi corrected the manuscript ('a îndreptat smintelile'); Library of the Romanian Academy, *Manuscrite*

collection, 1022. See also *Cuget clar. Noul 'Sămănător'*, III, 18 (11 November 1938), p. 288; I. Bianu, G. Nicolaiaș, *op. cit.*, III, Craiova, 1931, p. 272; G. Ștrempel, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

164. T.T. Burada, *Istoria teatrului în Moldova*, Chișinău, 1991, p. 124, n. 1.

165. This was the case of **comis Dim. Balica**, who, in January 1843, sent Negruzzi a historical drama translated from Greek; see Al. Lapedatu, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–124.

166. Library of the Romanian Academy, Manuscrise collection, 3577, 3578; G. Ștrempel, *op. cit.*, III, Bucharest, 1987, p. 179.

167. *Albina românească*, 29 (11 April 1837).

168. For the role of August and Wilhelm von Kotzebue in Romanian culture, see N. Iorga, 'Wilhelm de Kotzebue și momentul de prefacere modernă a societății moldovenești,' in *Revista istorică*, XIX (1933), pp. 115–117, or the volume edited in Bucharest, in 1934; C. Turcu, 'Un călător german acum un veac prin județul Neamț: W. von Kotzebue,' in *Anuarul Liceului de băieți 'P. Rareș'*, Piatra Neamț, 1942.

169. G. Bogdan-Duică, 'Traducătorii români ai lui August de Kotzebue (1830–1850),' in *Omagiu lui Titu Maiorescu*, Bucharest, 1900, p. 193. Botezatu's example is not singular; in Wallachia, I. Văcărescu and I. Voinescu II showed interest in von Kotzebue's writings, as well (see *ibidem*, pp. 181–191, 195 sqq.).

170. Kotzebue's plays and novels came into fashion during the 1830s. In Hungary, his entire body of works was published in 20 volumes (1836); a second edition came out in 1839 (*ibidem*, p. 194). Thirteen of Kotzebue's plays had been translated until 1848, in comparison to 14 by Moliere. The public response they enjoyed was comparable (P. Cornea, *op. cit.*, p. 66).

171. *Ibidem*, p. 199.

172. No. 478 in I. Lupu, N. Camariano, Ov. Papadima, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

173. D. Furtună, *op. cit.*, pp. 356–357.

174. *Idem*, 'Încă o traducere a lui Samoil Botezatu' in *Cuget clar. Noul 'Sămănător'*, III (1939), 28 (19.01.1939), pp. 435–437.

175. *Albina românească* 11 (22.02.1840); no. 19512 in I. Lupu, N. Camariano, Ov. Papadima, *op. cit.*, 3rd part, p. 969.

176. N.A. Bogdan *op. cit.*, p. 286; see no. 19617 in I. Lupu, N. Camariano, Ov. Papadima, *op. cit.*, p. 974.

177. In Cozmoaia Valley, close to Cetățuia Monastery; cf. D. Furtună, *Căminarul Samoil Botezatu*, p. 356.



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Textes de frontière, contextes de transition

Avant-propos

Les buts de cette étude concernent à la fois les fonctions et les formes des écrits contemporains de type *témoignage*, *autobiographie* et *journal intime*. Malgré son caractère vague et négatif, le concept de « littérature de frontière » a été retenu pour désigner ces textes, vu que les autres concepts souvent utilisés dans le domaine (littérature subjective, personnelle ou autobiographique, littérature de mémoires ou de confession) présentaient, en outre, le désavantage d'être restrictifs. D'ailleurs, la question des concepts et des définitions est secondaire pour notre recherche, car on ne se propose pas comme priorité théorique la mise en cause de la « frontière ». Autrement dit, on admet l'existence empirique d'un espace intermédiaire entre la littérature, l'historiographie, l'essai critique et le journalisme et on essaye de surprendre sa configuration actuelle.

L'accent sur les textes *contemporains* n'implique pas un découpage monographique de l'actualité. On prend comme repère fondamental leurs *motivations* (qui comportent, d'habitude, la référence au contexte post-communiste) et on les interroge par rapport avec les modèles génériques, les structures narratives et les cadres de la réception. Les modèles descriptifs des sous-genres de frontière sont envisagés plutôt comme point de départ pour l'examen des notions plus complexes (notamment celle de « pacte autobiographique ») qui circonscrivent le discours de ces motivations. Les analyses du deuxième chapitre portent sur le thème de la mémoire, en tant que leitmotiv métatextuel qui organise ce discours. En guise de conclusion, le dernier chapitre rappelle quelques aspects de la réception critique renvoyant au problème plus général du canon littéraire.

La sélection des textes commentés obéit au critère des « écarts » perceptibles au niveau des rapports entre *motivation* assumée, *convention du genre* et *structure narrative* : ces écarts permettent de situer et d'interpréter la spécificité des textes. Un témoignage de prison adressé à un narrataire, un journal intime qui désobéit au calendrier, un journal de bord rédigé de mémoire, une autobiographie où l'auteur entreprend la lecture de ses propres écrits, etc. représentent de pareils écarts, des « solutions » aux tâches que chaque texte s'engage de résoudre. Le

choix du « triangle » générique témoignages-autobiographies-journaux intimes dévoile mieux la signification de ces rapports sur le fond d'une triple problématique de la mémoire : référentielle, existentielle et « instrumentale ».

Un dernier mot sur la méthode de lecture employée dans la présente étude. Elle s'efforce de respecter l'hétérogénéité des fonctions et des formes, en assumant un certain éclectisme. Dans ce champ encore peu étudié, une analyse purement historique serait, dans le meilleur cas, un fragment d'histoire politique déguisée et, dans le pire, un abrégé idéologique des discours du moment. De l'autre côté, une analyse purement formelle choisirait ses « types représentatifs » parmi des textes canoniques, ignorant les possibles innovations contemporaines. Sans prétendre avoir trouvé une troisième voie, on a essayé d'identifier les points où les éléments réflexifs et formels du texte s'articulent de manière saisissante.

Récit, mémoire, identité

Le champ de la littérature de frontière regroupe aujourd'hui en Roumanie des écrits très différents en ce qui concerne le genre, le contenu, la chronologie ou la manière de publication. Ces écrits n'ont peut-être en commun que le fait de se légitimer (ou d'être légitimés) par des formules comme « vérité historique », « restitution du passé », impératif de la « mémoire » etc. Quoique sincères, ces formules omettent de dire que le passé s'écrit à partir du présent, et que ce présent ne signifie pas seulement les lacunes à combler de l'historiographie ou de l'histoire littéraire.

D'ailleurs, la position de ces écrits par rapport avec les trois circuits littéraires majeurs (officiel, d'avant-garde et trivial) n'est plus la même qu'en 1990, au moment post-révolutionnaire de leur résurrection. Au début, c'était l'urgence enthousiaste, l'accent exclusif sur la fonction documentaire du témoignage, le stéréotype du passé qu'on ne doit pas oublier. Lecture juste, sans doute, mais à un niveau de généralité où les différences entre les « témoignages » ne comptaient plus. Le scepticisme allait succéder de façon nécessaire à cette inflation de mémoires et du mot-devise « mémoire ». On signalait les aspects de « mode » associés à toute diffusion généralisée. Et, en effet, la plupart des écrits de frontière d'aujourd'hui sont plus proches du journalisme et de l'industrie éditoriale que du document ou de la fiction littéraire.

Le texte de frontière répond surtout aux exigences du moment; ce faisant il porte aussi l'empreinte d'une durée culturelle plus longue: la mémoire individuelle ne saurait s'exprimer sans une mémoire des genres littéraires et des lieux rhétoriques afférents. La lecture référentielle qui se sert à présent du mot *mémoire* comme synonyme des « faits » implique le paradoxe d'un anachronisme. L'individualisme et le sécularisme moderne sont les arguments majeurs des historiens

contemporains qui insistent beaucoup plus sur la genèse récente de ces sous-genres que sur leur filiation qui remonte à l'antiquité. Jusqu'au XVIII^e siècle, paraît-il, la fonction des *mémoires* reflétait plutôt le sens du mot « mémoire » : document, rapport, bilan de ce qu'il faut rappeler. Après Rousseau, cette fonction mnémotechnique sera obscurcie par un mythe de *la mémoire* comme subjectivité, individualité ineffable, réflexion autobiographique, etc. De 1850 à nos jours, les sous-genres de frontière se sont peu à peu éloignés du domaine historique et politique *stricto sensu* à la faveur d'un parallélisme avec la série littéraire. Cette évolution comporte aussi, à l'âge du modernisme consacré, le partage entre la zone canonique et la zone de consommation. Les textes contemporains ne sauraient donc être réduits à un statut purement documentaire, même s'ils s'arrogent une pareille fonction. L'accent « historique » s'inscrit dans une sémantique historique de la mémoire qui implique la coexistence de multiples couches; dans le cas contraire, on devrait présumer une véritable « révolution » (régression) temporelle, un retour à l'identique. En effet, il n'y a pas de témoignage à présent qui ne s'interroge sur sa validité à partir d'une problématique de l'*authenticité*.

Autobiographie ou journal intime? Le seuil du récit. La critique roumaine se sert parfois du concept global de « mémoires » (« memorialistică ») pour désigner l'ensemble de la littérature de frontière. L'image d'un champ homogène de la mémoire est pourtant illusoire, car chaque sous-genre puise dans une mémoire différente. Les « témoignages » exigent une capacité de mémorisation des « faits » supposée exacte, référentielle. Les mémoires dites plus « subjectives » et les autobiographies (une époque, une vie) mettent en scène une mémoire-rétrospective totalisante, qui souvent n'est crédible qu'en défiant l'exactitude. Le journal semble n'avoir besoin que d'une mémoire du jour; son caractère prospectif est plus manifeste que la rétrospective: le diariste se compose une sorte d'archive personnelle.

Si on remplace « mémoire » par *rétrospective*, ces différences s'organisent dans un tableau général, assez cohérent, des sous-genres, dont le repère pourrait être la définition de l'*autobiographie* formulée par Philippe Lejeune: « Récit rétrospectif en prose qu'une personne réelle fait de sa propre existence, lorsqu'elle met l'accent sur sa vie individuelle, en particulier sur l'histoire de sa personnalité¹. » Ce qu'on appelle *mémoires* est aussi un récit rétrospectif, mais ayant comme sujet propre des circonstances sociales ou historiques extérieures. De façon évidente, la différence remonte aux motivations (« apologie » de ses propres actions ou « témoignage » public); la distinction, bien relative², dépend des données culturelles plus complexes. Au contraire, la différence *autobiographie-journal intime* est d'ordre formel: le manque de rétrospective du journal signifie aussi l'absence du récit (au sens général du terme). Mais, sans récit, pas de « sujet » propre — sauf dans le cas d'un *journal de bord* qui raconte une expérience

déterminée. Quant au *journal intime*, le « sujet » (métaphorique) c'est le diariste même, son rapport avec le temps : « Je m'impose d'écrire n'importe quoi, mais régulièrement, chaque jour » (Gide). La différence mémoires-autobiographie se retrouve dans le champ du journal par cette distinction entre les expériences que l'on peut raconter et l'espace intime d'un « soi-même » sans détermination préalable.

La poésie a insisté sur l'opposition autobiographie-journal intime au point d'en fabriquer un dualisme rigide projet-spontanéité, ordre- désordre. « C'est la distance entre le temps du récit et le temps de l'événement qui permet à l'écrivain de créer après coup une unité à son aventure : l'au jour le jour ne peut pas avoir de structure », écrit Béatrice Didier³. Les marques d'une mise en forme, si évidentes dans l'autobiographie classique (périodisations, raccourcis, commentaires, etc.), trahissent l'introduction après coup d'un mécanisme causal dans la suite des événements. Ce « besoin d'ordre » imposé au vécu, à la pure contingence, signifie aussi la certitude d'une identité conservée en dépit des accidents, contradictions, démentis ; bref, cette forme close, figée, semble typique pour « le rationalisme de la tradition occidentale⁴ ». Ce que l'auteur propose n'est pas une « biographie » mais une « idéographie » : une lecture-modèle de sa vie, du point de vue d'un présent qui n'appartient plus au récit⁵.

Les poètes du journal intime choisissent presque toujours les mémoires ou l'autobiographie classiques pour renforcer cette opposition. Ils semblent ignorer l'évolution contemporaine (celle de l'autobiographie en particulier), qui renverse souvent les indices du rationalisme tutélaire. Un tel choix dissimule un parti-pris esthétique qui rappelle l'opposition, en vogue dans les années 20–30, entre le roman traditionnel et le roman moderne. Leurs descriptions ne parlent qu'en passant des possibles traits communs : la date ou le présent grammatical dans l'autobiographie, les raccourcis et les commentaires après coup dans le journal etc. En effet, la trame du récit autobiographique n'obéit jamais entièrement aux « intentions rationnelles » de l'auteur (exposées d'habitude dans les préfaces) ; elle trahit du même coup la pression des motivations « irrationnelles », comme la réminiscence, l'obsession, le pari avec le temps, etc.⁶ La rétrospective n'est pas de façon nécessaire l'expression de la certitude du sujet ; la connaissance autobiographique s'articule souvent comme une interprétation aux contours hypothétiques.

En France, le journal intime doit beaucoup de son prestige critique à Maurice Blanchot : l'écriture au jour le jour et « l'obéissance au calendrier » feraient de ce genre le complément du « récit »⁷. Jean Rousset a repris cette analyse en ajoutant à la régularité journalière le caractère d'autodestination. Une prémisse cachée de son étude affirme la présence du mystérieux engagement temporel du diariste sur les contenus du journal : on peut faire abstraction des contenus pour mieux dégager « les permanences du genre »⁸. La règle fondamentale de

l'écriture au jour le jour décide de la « forme ouverte », fragmentée, inachevée, que le diariste ne saurait maîtriser en auteur. Rousset souligne que cette « durée indéterminée » oppose le journal intime au journal de bord, dont la forme est analogue au récit⁹. Mais cette règle fondamentale se manifeste surtout par des infractions et des lacunes entre les dates, qui appellent la réflexion et le commentaire de la culpabilité : « ...on répugne à l'obligation quotidienne, on y revient toujours ; une fois l'habitude prise [...] l'abandon s'accompagne de remords, d'où ces nœuds de réflexion autour des ruptures¹⁰ ». Le thème de l'indétermination essentielle régit aussi la fameuse *Délibération* de Barthes, où le diariste est hanté par des dilemmes typiques : laisser subsister les lacunes ou bien les combler ? tenir son journal à l'état brut ou bien le « travailler à mort » pour aboutir à l'œuvre ?¹¹

Séduit par Amiel, Rousset transforme le journal intime en utopie d'un pari absolu avec le temps. Il semble oublier que celui-ci ne représente souvent pour le diariste qu'un exercice préliminaire en vue des mémoires ou des œuvres de fiction. En plus, il semble négliger les fonctions les plus visibles de la *date*, élément commun du journal intime et du journal de bord. Celle-ci est plus qu'un indice de régularité journalière ; elle s'accorde avec une certaine récurrence des contenus-thèmes, à même de restituer au diariste une figure intelligible de son devenir. Il est vrai que, le plus souvent, le futur de la relecture n'apporte que la preuve de notre discontinuité, de notre inconsistance. Mais cela n'empêche que l'attente du diariste soit, tout comme celle de l'autobiographe, rationnelle : forger un diagramme de son évolution, tenter de saisir le « sens » ou le « destin », etc.

Les mémoires, les autobiographies et les journaux intimes sont des textes référentiels : en principe, ils devraient avoir une destination également réelle et déterminée. Ceci n'est pas le cas, parce que la référentialité doit beaucoup de ses effets à la forme du récit. Les témoignages intéressent surtout par leur « pacte référentiel » (Lejeune), qui inclut, à part l'information historique, des garanties d'authenticité, le nom de l'auteur comme repère d'un savoir culturel, l'exposé des motivations, etc. Dans le cas des autobiographies, à cette fonction historique explicite s'ajoute l'intérêt pour le témoignage privé, la conscience que le récit d'une vie reflète aussi notre vie. Cette zone privée est elle-même historique, mais à un niveau différent : celui des codes culturels et des « modèles d'identification » (Jauss) qui renvoient à une dialectique de l'individuel et de l'universel. Les formes que revêt celle-ci vont de l'ancien concept de l'exemplarité jusqu'aux avatars actuels de l'individualisme moderne. Le « pacte autobiographique », fondé sur le nom de l'auteur, englobe le « pacte référentiel » (l'exactitude y étant remplacée par la fidélité d'ensemble). C'est un aspect de ce que Philippe Lejeune appelle le « contrat de lecture » : « Le genre autobiographique est un genre contractuel : il n'est pas un rapport entre texte et réalité mais à la fois un mode de lecture et un type d'écriture¹². »

En ce qui concerne les contenus, l'autobiographie et le journal intime sont également autobiographiques. Pourtant, si « auto » implique « rétro », la structure fragmentaire du deuxième et sa « rétrospective de faible portée » (Rousset) correspondent plutôt à ce que la critique appelle parfois une « ego-graphie ». Le caractère intime du journal s'exprime par une « destination close » ou « auto-destination » qui, selon Rousset, représente un cas-limite de l'institution littéraire. Les cas fréquents de publication voulue dès la vie de l'auteur ne changent rien par rapport avec la « clause du secret » des premiers journaux : il s'agit toujours d'une « réception indéterminée¹³ ». L'usage du terme « contrat » devient paradoxal chez Rousset : il désigne un engagement que les rédacteurs « souscrivent avec eux-mêmes » et une lecture par « effraction » faite par des lecteurs avec lesquels « nul contrat n'a été passé¹⁴ ».

Identité ou spécularité? Les enjeux politiques de la mémoire. A ce point, l'opposition récit-écriture journalière met en cause les éventuelles fonctions du texte et, du même coup, les représentations de l'identité individuelle. La destination close se reflète dans le caractère problématique du journal, qui semble incapable d'objectiver ses motivations par un rapport social avec autrui. Rousset énumère quelques motivations des journaux célèbres (« se connaître », « se relire », « exercice de style » etc.) pour conclure qu'elles demeurent incertaines dans la mesure où elles ne regardent que la personne de l'auteur. Elles restent à l'intérieur du procès spéculaire d'un soliloque infini, de même que l'identité du diariste, vouée au narcissisme et à la fragmentation névrotique : « Le rédacteur [...] ne peut que s'inventer au fur et à mesure ; condamné à la quête, il en vient à se surprendre, au double sens de capture et de surprise¹⁵. » Le vrai protagoniste du jeu, paraît-il, est le journal et non pas le diariste : il « parle de lui-même, se regarde et se questionne, se constitue souvent en journal du journal¹⁶ ». C'est-à-dire que les éventuelles fonctions ne sont que « des rôles que le journal, comme s'il était un personnage multiple, vient jouer auprès de l'intimiste¹⁷ ». Mais cette subversion de l'identité n'est elle pas, pour une part, la conséquence de la décision critique de mettre entre parenthèses les « contenus » ?

Le « pacte autobiographique » de Philippe Lejeune propose, au contraire, une identité « pleine » : « l'affirmation dans le texte de l'identité entre auteur, narrateur et personnage¹⁸ ». Ce concept ambitionne de donner une formule rigoureuse à ce que l'on connaissait depuis longtemps sous le nom d'authenticité¹⁹. Car pour Lejeune l'affirmation de l'identité renvoie à une identité réelle, « des individus ». Si le nom propre peut désigner la personne de celui qui parle aussi bien que le pronom « je » (il y a des autobiographies écrites à la deuxième ou à la troisième personne), c'est que ce nom « inscrit sur la couverture du livre » représente à la fois « le sujet profond de l'autobiographie ». Il est et la « convention sociale » qui engage « la responsabilité de la personne réelle envers

le texte » et le symbole d'identité qui « résume l'existence de l'auteur »²⁰. Pour conclure : l'identité n'est affirmée que dans la mesure où elle est fondée dans le nom.

Contresigné par le lecteur, le pacte autobiographique devient un « contrat de lecture » que l'historien littéraire pourra reconstituer s'il tient compte de tous les éléments du « système de lecture de l'époque ». La prémisse de Lejeune est que le lecteur comprend toujours de manière correcte ce que lui propose l'autobiographe à la différence d'un biographe ou d'un auteur de roman autobiographique. Dans la biographie, l'identité est le résultat d'une ressemblance au modèle ; dans le roman elle n'est pas une « question de droit » mais un projet profond qui, pour se retrouver, doit s'égarer d'abord dans l'espace d'une non-identité imaginaire. Mais le « lecteur » de Lejeune reste lui-même indéterminé (on doute qu'il ne soit un alter-ego du théoricien). Par-dessus, on s'aperçoit du fait que Lejeune doit revenir sur le partage entre autobiographie et fiction dès qu'il l'établit, pour ne pas enlever toute authenticité à la littérature. Il parle d'un « espace autobiographique » plus large, mais cette solution ne résout pas le problème : si l'autobiographie est l'affirmation la plus directe de l'identité, elle occupera de façon nécessaire le centre de cet espace, usurpant la place canonique de la fiction.

La question qui subsiste alors est : pourquoi le nom n'aurait-il pas les mêmes fonctions dans le cas de l'œuvre littéraire ? Ce qui doit faire défaut est sa capacité de « résumer l'existence » (car la « convention sociale » est la même ; la littérature, elle aussi, a son « droit »). En effet, c'est le point le plus obscur de toute la démonstration : en posant le nom comme « événement fondateur du sujet », Lejeune cite les concepts lacaniens de « stade du miroir » et de « nom-du-père ». Dans la psychanalyse lacanienne, le nom a un rôle très important dans la formation du « je » qui correspond au « symbolique ». Pourtant, Lacan n'affirme pas que ce nom-signifiant est identique au nom inscrit sur la couverture d'un livre (signifié d'un savoir culturel). En tant que psychanalyste, il ne saurait confondre, comme Lejeune, le domaine du « droit » avec celui de l'ontologie...

Une identité fondée dans le nom n'est pas « historique » au sens de la réception de Jauss (que Lejeune invoque) ; bien au contraire, on peut dire qu'elle précède l'histoire. Si l'affirmation du pacte est toujours vraie, elle pourra s'énoncer aujourd'hui comme du temps où Rousseau écrivait : « Voici le seul portrait d'homme peint exactement d'après nature et dans toute sa vérité, qui existe et qui probablement existera à jamais²¹. » En effet, Lejeune cite ce passage célèbre des *Confessions* comme exemple ; il admet son actualité même s'il en accuse le caractère excessif. Ce faisant, il devrait assumer aussi les présupposés d'une poétique de « l'expression » qui met en scène le « livre » comme image fidèle de l'auteur (« ...je viendrai, ce livre à la main, me présenter devant le souverain juge [...] : voilà ce que j'ai fait, ce que j'ai pensé, ce que je fus. [...]

j'ai dévoilé mon intérieur tel que tu l'as vu toi-même...²² ». Toute théorie de l'identité « contractuelle » à la manière de Lejeune a, de la sorte, un accent rousseauiste qui n'échappera pas aux philosophies contemporaines du texte et de son sujet hétérologique, disséminé.

Partir d'une question de sous-genres pour arriver aux dilemmes de l'identité peut paraître surprenant, voire excessif. Mais ce parcours n'a rien d'inouï, car le problème des écrits de frontière est celui de l'auteur qui, en garantissant l'authenticité de ce qu'il raconte, assume forcément une certaine autorité en dehors des circuits institutionnels (scientifiques ou littéraires). Et ce problème ne tardera pas à se poser de façon politique. Afin de rendre plus clairs les enjeux philosophiques actuels de l'autobiographie, nous allons examiner deux critiques de la théorie de Lejeune qui ont quelques points communs, malgré leur appartenance à des poétiques très différentes : elles portent non seulement sur Lejeune ou sur le genre autobiographique mais sur tout discours autoréflexif du sujet ; elles s'énoncent dans des livres d'apparence autobiographique, comme pour écarter cette apparence même.

Le Roland Barthes de Roland Barthes (1975 : même année que celle de l'étude de Lejeune) affirme : « Ce livre n'est pas un livre de "confessions"... » La confession serait incompatible avec un « savoir contemporain [...] qui peut se résumer ainsi : ce que j'écris de moi-même n'est jamais *le dernier mot* : plus je suis „sincère“, plus je suis interprétable, sous l'œil d'autres instances que [...] *l'authenticité*. Ces instances sont l'Histoire, l'Idéologie, l'Inconscient²³. » Contre l'autorité individuelle, Barthes invoque une autorité (actualité) épistémologique d'allure, on dirait, foucauldienne. Mais « l'œil » omniscient était aussi — coïncidence ou paraphrase ? — un leitmotiv de Rousseau, qui l'invoquait pour garantir la « vérité » de sa confession !

Il s'agirait donc de deux « épistèmes » en conflit et non d'une actualité immanente. Quand Barthes refuse la convention de l'autobiographie intellectuelle il rejette du même coup la présomption d'un « je » identique à soi-même, de l'auto-biographique en tant que médiation : « Je n'avais d'autre solution que de me réécrire, [...] d'ajouter aux livres, aux thèmes, aux souvenirs, aux textes, une autre énonciation, sans que je sache jamais si c'est de mon présent ou de mon passé que je parle²⁴. » En tant que signifiante ou présent pur, l'écriture rend impossible la dissociation typique des autobiographies (passé du personnage-présent du narrateur). Pourtant, — chose étrange — l'expression rousseauiste aboutissait aussi à une fusion du présent et du passé, ressuscitant l'objet à partir de la sensation présente : « En me livrant à la fois au souvenir de l'impression reçue et au sentiment du présent, je peindrai doublement l'état de mon âme, savoir au moment où l'événement m'est arrivé et au moment où je l'ai décrit²⁵. » On dirait que le « souvenir » de Rousseau et « l'écriture » barthesienne ont le même effet. Dans ce cas, l'anti-rousseauisme de Barthes,

visible comme intertexte, est paradoxal : « Je ne cherche pas à mettre mon expression présente au service de ma vérité antérieure [...]. Je ne dis pas : „Je vais me décrire“, mais : „J'écris un texte et je l'appelle *R.B.*“. [...] Le fait (biographique, textuel) s'abolit dans le signifiant, parce qu'il *coïncide* immédiatement avec lui : en *m'écrivant* [...] je suis l'histoire qui m'arrive²⁶. » Ces lignes correspondent à ce que Rousseau avait toujours déclaré : vérité de l'expression, coïncidence du livre avec le fait biographique, continuité du présent et du passé. Par-dessus, choisir son nom propre comme titre (« *R.B.* ») pourrait suggérer (au lecteur de Lejeune) non l'autonomie du texte mais la forme radicale, tautologique, d'un pacte autobiographique.

Dans ses *Mémoires pour Paul de Man*, Derrida cite les thèses de son ami De Man sur l'autobiographie, notamment l'essai « *Autobiography as Defacement* » (inclus dans *The Rhetoric of Romanticism*). Ces citations gagnent une signification spéciale dans un « livre sur l'autobiographie » qui contient un « fragment d'autobiographie » et dont le titre « pourrait donner à entendre [...] la multiplicité ou la dissociation des mémoires²⁷ ». La critique demannienne des concepts de Lejeune porte sur trois aspects : le statut de genre de l'autobiographie, le présupposé d'une « totalisation » de la vie faite de mémoire et l'engagement authentique de l'auteur. Le statut de genre s'opposerait à une distinction autobiographie — fiction qui est et qui doit rester « indécidable ». A l'ambition canonisante de Lejeune, De Man oppose un concept d'autobiographie comme « figure de lecture » qui apparaît dans tous les textes ou une « structure spéculaire » est « intériorisée »²⁸.

Sans reprendre dans tous les détails cette théorie alternative ou les concepts de la déconstruction demannienne, nous dirons seulement que la spécularité s'oppose ici à l'identité et qu'elle trouve son pendant dans une « structure rhétorique » du texte en général, ayant pour conséquence le fait que ce texte se déconstruit lui-même. L'autobiographie est, pour De Man, une « allégorie » de la lecture qui révèle le contraire du principe de conformité du « livre » de Rousseau : « L'intérêt de l'autobiographie [...] n'est pas de révéler une connaissance de soi digne de foi — elle ne le fait pas — mais de démontrer de manière saisissante l'impossibilité de la clôture et de la totalisation (c'est-à-dire l'impossibilité d'accéder à l'être) de tous les systèmes textuels constitués par des substitutions tropologiques²⁹. » Elle est l'image d'une mémoire qui n'a aucune « capacité de faire ressusciter une situation ou un sentiment qui a réellement existé », simple « acte constitutif de l'esprit » dans lequel « le passé intervient seulement en tant qu'élément pur formel »³⁰. Bref, il s'agit d'une mémoire projective, qui met en scène le passé pour combler son manque constitutif et qui s'étale au niveau d'une « topologie de la mémoire ».

De façon évidente, cette interprétation s'oppose non seulement à Lejeune mais aux motivations de la plupart des autobiographies. De Man nous persuade

que ces motivations sont des symptômes ou des suppléments de la structure rhétorique-négative, des performatifs ou des « promesses » qui ignorent leur propre impossibilité. Le pacte autobiographique de Lejeune serait une pareille promesse para-logique: « Les auteurs d'autobiographies aussi bien que ceux qui écrivent sur les autobiographies sont obsédés par la nécessité de passer de la connaissance à la résolution et à l'action, de l'autorité spéculaire à l'autorité politique et légale³¹. » Pourtant, dans un autre essai sur le *Contrat social*, De Man montre que ce modèle rhétorique (de la promesse) est « un fait de langage » sur lequel l'auteur n'a aucun contrôle: « ...le langage lui-même, dans la mesure où il est nécessairement trompeur, [...] communique aussi nécessairement la promesse de sa propre vérité³² »; par-dessus, cette fatalité du langage engendre en tant que cause profonde la dynamique de l'histoire! Dans ce cas, il semble que la critique de l'autobiographie perd tout poids concret; c'est une critique des textes, du langage et de l'histoire en général. Si le langage produit des affirmations trompeuses, il peut produire aussi des « identités contractuelles » vraies et fausses à la fois. Derrida souscrit à l'idée de cette « structure performative du texte en général comme promesse » et s'insurge contre « l'excès essentiel » ou la « perversion irrémédiable » inscrites dans « l'acte de promesse »³³. En guise de contribution personnelle à la critique de l'autobiographie, il ajoute à cette conception antipragmatique du performatif une variation sur le thème ancien de l'écriture et du logocentrisme³⁴. Les mémoires seraient l'exemple typique d'écrits qui ignorent leur statut d'écriture, c'est-à-dire « le lien irréductible entre la pensée comme mémoire et la dimension technique de la mémorisation, de l'art d'écrire, [...] bref de toute cette extériorité dite, depuis Platon, hypomnésique³⁵ ». La référence implicite à Rousseau peut se lire dans la distinction entre « le souvenir comme intériorisation » et « la mémoire pensante » associée à l'écriture: « l'inscription de la mémoire est un effacement du souvenir intériorisant³⁶ ». Cette paraphrase du *Phèdre* platonicien est, bien entendu, dirigée contre la mémoire psychique ou intérieure; elle affirme la valeur de l'écriture comme mémoire artificielle, qui trouve un nouvel essor dans les techniques actuelles d'archivage³⁷. Le concept de « différance » se retrouve lui-aussi comme hypothèse d'une mémoire « sans passé », qui « inscrit la différence dans la présence même du présent³⁸ ». Le thème demannien de l'autobiographie est, pour Derrida, (encore) une occasion de déconstruire l'identité et l'être-présence.

Ces critiques du « pacte autobiographique » semblent ignorer dans leur radicalisme le fait que la plupart des autobiographies contemporaines (« anti-mémoires », « journaux en miettes » etc.) sont écrites à partir d'une impossibilité de l'identité, de la mémoire ou de l'être. Elles ignorent justement l'éventuelle autonomie du texte par rapport avec ses prémisses conceptuelles, en critiquant un modèle canonique abstrait, sans spécificité. A l'affirmation de l'identité

« dans le texte » de Lejeune, Barthes oppose le texte comme auto-représentation (« en m'écrivant... je suis l'histoire qui m'arrive »); De Man et Derrida déconstruisent et l'identité et le texte en tant que promesses fondées sur leur propre impossibilité. A travers trois poétiques — de l'expression, de l'écriture et de la différence — le thème de l'identité renvoie au dualisme platonicien mémoire intérieure-écriture hypomnésique³⁹. Ce dualisme n'est pas sans rapport avec l'opposition autobiographie-journal intime qui a représenté le point de départ de notre discussion.

La mémoire: du thème aux textes

La plupart des écrits de frontière contemporains contiennent un discours sur la mémoire qui est aussi une interrogation sur la possibilité du texte. D'une part, la réflexion métatextuelle est un caractère propre de ces écrits qui doivent exposer leur motivation. Une étude exhaustive devrait tenir compte de toutes les instances du métatexte, groupées d'après leur position par rapport avec le texte (un chapitre pourrait être dédié à l'analyse des préfaces, par exemple). D'autre part, le fait que le thème de la mémoire revêt un caractère métatextuel nous oblige de revenir sur ce que nous avons dit au début du premier chapitre: il ne s'agit pas seulement d'un mot-devise, emprunté à l'idéologie du moment, mais d'une notion qui change de signification dans son contexte, d'un complément de la motivation assumée par l'auteur.

Dans la majorité des cas, cette problématique de la mémoire fait ressortir le conflit, typique pour ces écrits, entre la mémoire comme intériorité ou subjectivité et l'écriture comme support mnémotechnique. C'est bien le conflit repéré par De Man et Derrida, mais, contre toute présomption « logocentriste », on doit ajouter que les écrits contemporains ne cherchent pas à le dissimuler. *Ce métatexte de la mémoire* ne fournit pas une clef de lecture infaillible: il peut s'accorder plus ou moins avec les structures narratives du texte. L'important c'est qu'il ne désigne pas une référentialité transparente ou une « totalisation » autobiographique de principe. Dès lors, on pourrait toujours suspecter une promesse-de-mémoire ou une affirmation-de-l'affirmation, mais on ne peut plus inférer que ces performatifs s'ignorent comme performatifs. En renversant la logique du présent pur et des structures rhétoriques « fatales », il serait tout à fait légitime de se demander si ce qui oblige à la promesse n'est pas quelque chose de l'ordre du passé. Ou bien si la « fatalité » de la promesse que De Man et Derrida accusent n'est pas elle-même un autre nom pour l'histoire.

Le thème de la mémoire se retrouve dans les témoignages, dans les autobiographies et dans les journaux intimes, malgré le fait que ces sous-genres distinguent, comme nous l'avons montré auparavant, plusieurs types fonctionnels

de mémoire (rémémoration référentielle, rétrospective de la vie, mémoire-archivé personnelle constituée pour le futur). Le commentaire métatextuel n'ignore pas ces différences, mais, tout en les posant, il devient le lieu où elles s'articulent : il montre ainsi qu'il n'y a pas de référentialité sans dimension autobiographique, que, pour s'assumer comme histoire individuelle, l'autobiographie doit assumer des « faits » et que l'écriture journalistique est inconcevable sans contenus et sans raccourci biographique. Les analyses du présent chapitre réinscrivent comme horizon herméneutique un niveau d'unité profonde, trans-générique, que la description formelle ne pouvait situer que comme utopie.

La prison: témoignage ou récit? A la motivation « témoignage » devraient correspondre, en principe, des récits strictement chronologiques d'une expérience déterminée. Cependant, aucun des grands sous-genres de frontière n'obéit à ce modèle; la littérature des prisons, par exemple, regroupe des écrits de type hybride: des « chroniques⁴⁰ », des monographies, des essais à prétexte biographique (comme l'étrange conte voltairien de Noica, *Priez pour le frère Alexandre*), des romans non-fictionnels ou des faux journaux de bord. Cette variété de formes indique une thématique encore trop nouvelle, qui est en quête de ses structures narratives non par souci littéraire mais justement à cause de son statut référentiel. Le métatexte de la mémoire s'insère au moment où l'auteur admet qu'il lui serait impossible de rapporter seulement « les faits » à cause même de (la structure complexe de) ces faits.

Dans *Gherla*, par exemple, Paul Goma insère une longue digression qui commence par cette question surprenante: « Mais quelle vérité? Qui pourrait certifier que ce qu'un ancien prisonnier raconte correspond exactement à la réalité? » (p. 18)⁴¹. Il ne s'agit pas de la « subjectivité normale », souligne l'auteur, (car plusieurs témoins d'un événement pourront mettre d'accord leurs « versions »), mais du fait que « si l'événement a été violent, [...] forcément ma mémoire l'a retenu avec violence, c'est-à-dire déformé, ou même dénaturé » (p. 18). L'ancien prisonnier n'est jamais un « simple témoin » mais « le héros » (la victime) des événements: dans ce cas, est-ce qu'on peut lui faire confiance en tant que narrateur? La « violence » est une allusion transparente aux terribles coups que Goma reçut le lendemain de sa libération de *Gherla* — épisode autour duquel tourne tout le récit de son livre-témoignage. La démonstration qui met en cause la « vérité » d'un tel témoignage semble donc démolir le texte-même. Comme pour aggraver le dilemme, Goma rappelle aussi la possibilité des « troubles de mémoire » qui engendrent des écarts de langage: même si la première impression a pu être vraie, elle sera « altérée par omission ou par addition » au cours des récits-variantes que l'ex-prisonnier fait successivement de son calvaire (p. 19).

Pourtant, juste quelques pages avant, les anciens prisonniers étaient appelés à écrire et à envoyer leurs écrits « là où ils pourront être publiés » (p. 17). Au

sujet des quelques écrits similaires publiés (en 1978), Goma avait déclaré: « Ce sont simplement des témoignages et leur seul but est de porter témoignage. Qu'importent leur acharnement — d'ailleurs tout à fait légitime — et leurs défauts de langage? Ce sont des documents qu'on n'a pas le droit d'ignorer » (p. 14). Ces deux théories opposées ne sauraient s'accorder que si l'enjeu de l'argumentation n'est pas « l'exactitude » du témoignage mais son authenticité: dans ce cas, la démonstration citée ci-dessus est une *reductio ad absurdum* prônant la nécessité de tels écrits et, à la fois, une poétique de *Gherla*. Elle comporte en même temps une distinction entre la remémoration exacte et le souvenir sensible qui peut nuire à celle-ci.

En effet, le narrateur de *Gherla* semble incapable de maintenir les faits sous contrôle: il s'égaré tout le temps dans un monologue désordonné, dont la violence du ton correspond à la violence que le personnage Goma a subi. Notons le fait que les fractures de la diégèse sont doublées par des apostrophes d'un lecteur-allocuteur, comme s'il s'agissait d'un récit oral: « Mais [...] permettez-moi une autre parenthèse... » (p. 26), « Mais, avant, il faut retourner à... » (p. 27), « Mais, revenons aux coups que j'ai reçus... » (p. 42) etc. Par endroits, il semble que ce narrateur joue un peu la comédie: « Je crois que j'avais commencé une autre parenthèse... » (p. 77), « Tu as raison, rappelle-moi où nous en étions... » (p. 95). Le procédé ironique est dévoilé quand Goma-narrateur feint de s'empresser à la rencontre du tortionnaire de Goma-personnage: « Mais, pas une parenthèse de plus, revenons dans la cour où Somlea nous attend avec impatience... » (p. 162). De même, dans ce procès dialogique, l'allocuteur, indiqué au début seulement par un « tu » virtuel, dévoile son identité de narrataire par déterminations successives: il s'agit d'une femme (« Non, madame... »), qui se montre un peu sceptique (« Tu ne peux pas croire, tu ne peux pas accepter... »), parce qu'elle se trouve, en tant qu'occidentale, sous l'influence des discours « gauchistes » de l'époque, et a du mal à accepter les révélations du goulag. Ce narrataire ne « répond » jamais, mais ses questions ou objections hypothétiques relancent le témoignage, dans l'ordre apparemment arbitraire du monologue. La mise en scène d'un tel « dialogue » est une stratégie fréquente dans les textes de Goma: dans la courte préface des *Couleurs de l'arc-en-ciel* (77), le narrateur, placé devant un miroir, répète les questions des autres (occidentaux) sur son identité et sur la « couleur politique » du mouvement pour les droits de l'homme de 1977. La digression sur la vérité des témoignages de *Gherla* est l'une des longues « parenthèses » ouvertes pour persuader un pareil allocuteur « étranger ». Le procédé du narrataire confère au discours une apparence d'authenticité, mais, du même coup, il inscrit le témoignage dans l'ordre fictionnel d'un roman autobiographique.

La démonstration finit d'ailleurs en renversant ses prémisses: Goma expose sa « méthode » contre les effets de la violence sur la mémoire-langage. La thérapie

qu'il recommande semble déduite du principe éthique, souvent affirmé, du courage comme unique attitude capable de briser le cercle funeste de la peur et de l'agressivité. Seule « l'observation ou l'intention d'observer » peut réduire « l'intensité de l'événement » : « ... si tu reçois des coups et que tu t'efforces d'observer pendant ce temps ce qu'ils disent, ce qu'ils font, [...] ce que tu ressens et ce que tu penses toi-même [...], la douleur va diminuer au moins d'un quart » (p. 19). Comme méthode de remémoration anticipée, cette attention aux détails dirigée contre la surprise de l'instant de violence est aussi un aperçu du témoignage-écrit, une sorte d'écriture dans la mémoire qui réduit l'écart du souvenir douloureux. L'équivalence mémoire-écriture est plus manifeste dans *Les couleurs...*, où Goma menace ses enquêteurs de « se souvenir d'eux », afin de les « mettre dans un livre » plus tard.

Dans une « Note de l'auteur » placée à la fin du premier volume de *Notre prison quotidienne*, Ion Ioanid expose la motivation de son livre : « ...j'ai commencé à noter mes souvenirs [...] espérant que ce que ma mémoire a pu enregistrer [...] sera un jour, à côté des nombreuses autres preuves qui devront être rassemblées, un témoignage utile pour la reconstitution intégrale de la vérité sur la vie des prisonniers politiques... » L'auteur n'aspire pas au rôle d'historien ; il sait que son livre n'est qu'un témoignage, mais, en même temps, il espère que la destination de ce témoignage sera une future synthèse historiographique. Cette destination différente exige une autre poétique, par rapport avec laquelle la « méthode » de Goma ne saurait être suffisante. Dans cette « Note », Ioanid se préoccupe du problème de la « subjectivité », qu'il résout par le choix d'une convention : il admet la « subjectivité inévitable » de ses jugements (parfois « durs et sévères ») mais il décide de n'en garder que ce qui était en accord avec l'opinion de la majorité des prisonniers.

La performance de « reconstitution » du livre de Ioanid est en effet extraordinaire ; tous les compte-rendus critiques ont insisté sur ce point. Elle est d'autant plus remarquable que l'auteur ne se contente pas de raconter ce qu'il a vécu lui-même pendant les 12 années au cours desquels il a changé plusieurs fois de cellule et de prison, mais il essaye d'utiliser tout ce qu'il a pu apprendre des autres prisonniers sur l'ensemble du goulag roumain de l'époque. En fouillant sa mémoire prodigieuse, Ioanid a dû prendre des précautions d'historien, car les « informations » qu'il pouvait recueillir étaient incertaines : messages incomplets, chiffrés, variantes contradictoires, rumeurs etc. Quand l'information lui semble improbable, il l'offre sous réserve méthodologique, « dans l'espoir que les souvenirs des autres prisonniers pourraient combler les lacunes » (I, p. 148). Dans le même but d'exactitude, il transcrit en annexe à la fin du dernier volume des lettres d'autres prisonniers, accompagnées par des fiches biographiques. Ce n'est pas par hasard que *Notre prison quotidienne* insiste sur le thème central de tous les témoignages de prison : celui de la communication

à travers les murs (alphabets chiffrés, stratégies d'écoute, langages des gestes, techniques d'écrire sur n'importe quoi, de dissimuler et de transmettre des messages).

Du point de vue du récit, l'insistance de Ioanid sur les faits, sur les moindres détails, menace souvent la cohérence du texte. Elle implique des descriptions et des digressions typiques pour la littérature des prisons (l'espace clos d'une prison ne devient intelligible que grâce à une « encyclopédie » de codes et de connaissances spécifiques), mais qui chez lui s'accompagnent de terminologies techniques, de chiffres et de dessins hyper-référentiels. Les nombreuses parenthèses du narrateur montrent que l'auteur est conscient des risques qu'il prend : « Je me rends compte qu'une description si détaillée d'une occupation banale risque d'ennuyer le lecteur. Je la garde, quand-même, afin que le lecteur puisse se faire une idée sur l'importance que les moindres détails avaient acquis dans notre vie » (III, p. 214). Ces « explications » très fréquentes suggèrent que Ioanid essaye de maintenir un équilibre difficile entre l'intérêt d'un historien et la patience du lecteur moyen. L'auteur n'ignore pas les exigences de l'intrigue et du vraisemblable esthétique, mais les transgresse toujours, préoccupé surtout par la vérité historique. La priorité du lecteur réel devient évidente lorsqu'il emploie son livre comme une bouteille à la mer, pour signaler aux témoins du passé dont il a perdu la trace sa présence et son dessein documentaire.

L'exigence de reconstitution totale s'oppose même à l'ordre chronologique du récit : bien qu'il n'ait pas la moindre intention littéraire, Ioanid doit recourir à des manœuvres narratives compliquées pour maintenir l'unité du sujet. Il doit déplacer, par exemple, des épisodes qui n'avaient pas de sens au moment où ils étaient arrivés, ou, au contraire, il se voit obligé de revenir sur plusieurs épisodes du passé avant de relater un événement présent, pour mettre en évidence son importance. D'ailleurs, Ioanid avoue quelque part que son projet initial n'a pas été d'écrire un livre-récit mais de composer « une liste » de tous les prisonniers qu'il a rencontré. Cet aveu très important montre que la mémoire de l'auteur n'est pas chronologique mais plutôt « horizontale » ou associative. Quand cette mémoire extraordinaire fait défaut, à cause de la multitude des faits à rapporter, le narrateur trouve une solution de continuité qui représente un compromis entre le principe linéaire du récit et le principe de la liste : « Je vais relater cette étape en présentant d'abord un tableau nominal des prisonniers dont je me souviens, par ordre alphabétique [...] je vais raconter les faits ou les épisodes que chaque nom me rappelle. [...] Les autres événements plus importants seront relatés plus tard et en plus de détails [...]. Ainsi, la liste pourra servir au lecteur pour identifier les personnages, chaque fois qu'il sera nécessaire » (III, p. 259).

D'une certaine manière, ce choix en dit plus sur le phénomène des prisons politiques que la plus exacte reconstitution. Chaque nom évoque un détail, un

épisode qui est le noyau d'un portrait: c'est comme la lecture des épitaphes dans un cimetière! La « solution » narrative nous rappelle qu'en effet l'expérience de la prison est impossible à « raconter »: observer le principe chronologique, ce serait trahir la multitude des histoires parallèles des prisonniers, la simultanéité des existences séparées par des murs. La prison est ce qui brise l'histoire individuelle et collective au sens littéral, de diégèse fragmentée qui échappe à la trame narrative.

Si l'on compare *L'Evasion impossible* de Lena Constante au livre de Ioanid on a l'impression d'un contraste net. La mémoire de Ioanid faisait parfois défaut à cause des matériaux épiques trop riches; chez Constante, c'est le manque de matériaux qui fait obstacle, le « vide » diégétique qui se transforme en vide de mémoire: « ...il me serait impossible de raconter jour après jour cet intervalle » (p. 40), « ... sept cents jours, interminables parce que si vides » (p. 201). Le raccourci autobiographique de la préface renforce ce paradoxe. Dans son livre antérieur, *L'Evasion silencieuse*, Constante avoue qu'elle a été à même de raconter avec maints détails le long « silence » d'une première période de plusieurs années passées à Miercurea Ciuc en régime d'isolement total (les autorités communistes craignant que les prisonniers du « lot Pătrășcanu » ne communiquent entre eux). Malgré cette situation-limite, « tout s'était imprimé profondément dans ma mémoire » (p. 40). *L'Evasion impossible*, récit d'une deuxième période « banale », vécue en compagnie d'autres femmes dans la même prison, s'avère être, au contraire, « un livre gris » et non pas « noir », plus difficile à écrire à cause des souvenirs plus faibles. Constante déclare s'être décidé de l'écrire aux instances de ses amis, pensant au devoir envers ses camarades de prison et à « la mémoire de l'histoire ». Son témoignage est plus vague en tant que récit, car beaucoup de « détails » se sont « effacés de sa mémoire », mais, on dirait, il est plus authentique tel quel, juste à cause de ces lacunes: « ...je n'ai employé aucun artifice pour remplacer ce que j'avais oublié ».

Mais, chose assez étrange, malgré ces avertissements négatifs, le livre ne diffère pas beaucoup quant à l'épaisseur épique des autres livres sur les prisons. On retrouve les détails typiques sur le programme des prisonnières, sur l'alimentation, sur les gardiens, sur les stratégies de communication et sur les techniques pour faire passer le temps (Lena Constante est fière de son rôle public de conteuse de romans et de films pour les délices de ses camarades). On retrouve aussi les portraits et les biographies de ces camarades, assez subtils du point de vue psychologique, et l'analyse saisissante des rapports et des hiérarchies spécifiques pour un univers féminin. Lena Constante n'oublie jamais de nous renseigner sur l'origine sociale et l'éducation des prisonnières et, bien qu'elle se défende contre l'éventuelle accusation de « snobisme », ses jugements sont ceux d'une femme de sa génération et de son milieu social: assez tranchants en ce qui concerne l'altérité. Fait d'autant plus bizarre qu'elle rappelle souvent

au lecteur sa profession d'ethnologue et sa compétence en matière de codes comportementaux des femmes paysannes. Cette compétence est réelle; elle est déchiffrable dans la description des gestes et des activités quotidiennes de ces femmes, tissée d'allusions fines à un symbolisme féminin.

Dans ces conditions, le thème des troubles de mémoire, réitéré dans le texte comme un leitmotiv, semble plutôt ambigu: « J'essaie en vain de presser l'éponge de ma mémoire... » (p. 102). Cet « oubli » correspond en quelque sorte au regret qu'au milieu des femmes « l'évasion » dans soi-même soit devenue « impossible ». Les nombreuses digressions du livre représentent non seulement des explications, comme chez Ioanid, mais aussi des excuses pour le fait qu'une prison politique de femmes n'offre rien d'intéressant à raconter: « Je sais que ce que je raconte ici, ce sont des faits mineurs, sans éclat, presque dépourvus de signification. Mais ainsi se tramait la vie de ces femmes... » (p. 79); « Ce chapitre est aussi puéril et insignifiant que les autres. Mais dans notre cellule, comme dans toute la prison, il n'y avait pas des hommes politiques, des combattants pour un idéal, des anciens dignitaires. [...] Nous n'étions qu'un troupeau de femmes choisies au hasard, enfermées au hasard... » (p. 81). Dès que Lena Constante parle des « femmes » au pluriel, il ne s'agit pas seulement d'un certain groupe marginal, condamné sans raison politique (pour omission de dénonciation des pères, maris, fils) mais d'un problème d'identité culturelle négative. « Insignifiant », « fade », « puéril », « menu » sont les équivalences du « vide » mnésique d'une prison « de femmes » qu'il convenait mieux de désigner comme *prison féminine*: « Que peuvent-elles faire pour échapper à l'ennui des heures vides? Rien — car elles n'ont même pas du fil et de l'aiguille pour réparer leurs vêtements... » (p. 31); « Pour mieux suggérer l'atmosphère qui régnait dans notre cellule je devrais répéter toujours les mêmes mots. Ennui. Inactivité. Faim. Perplexité. Nostalgie. Somnolence mentale et physique » (p. 69). Lena Constante a oublié la plupart de ses camarades de prison, car « c'étaient des êtres modestes, fades, timides, incapables d'un geste ou d'un mot pour se faire remarquer » (p. 79). Ou bien, quand elle arrive à se rappeler « les visages et les noms » de ces femmes, elle « ne se retrouve pas elle-même », comme s'il s'agissait là d'une incompatibilité (p. 174). Au-delà de l'atmosphère « grise » d'une prison de femmes, ce commentaire qui se souvient tout ce que Lena Constante croit avoir oublié porte les indices d'une identité féminine refoulée. Pourtant, malgré ces indices d'ambivalence, ou juste à cause d'eux, *L'Evasion impossible* représente un excellent livre-document à la fois sur les prisons et sur une certaine condition a-politique des femmes.

Par rapport avec ce paradoxe du récit de prison que nous avons tenté de mettre en évidence, la formule singulière du *Journal du bonheur* de N. Steinhartd représente en soi la meilleure conclusion. Ce chef-d'œuvre du genre (et peut-être de toute la littérature de frontière contemporaine) est un journal écrit de mémoire:

« L'usage du crayon et du papier étant défendu en prison, il serait malhonnête de prétendre que ce journal a été tenu au jour le jour; il est rédigé *après coup*, à partir de souvenirs frais et vivants, [...] dans l'ordre de succession des images, des souvenirs et des pensées... » (« Notice introductive »). Les fragments portent des dates disparates qui composent une chronologie éclatée; leur principe de succession est difficile à dégager: il n'est ni biographique ni thématique. Steinhardt passe de la remémoration à l'exégèse morale et religieuse en gardant le même ton direct, exubérant, de dialogue intérieur: son livre est à la fois un témoignage sur les prisons et une apologie du christianisme. Le corrélatif de la reconstitution intégrale assumée par Ioanid est une « anatomie » de la prison dont la meilleure définition serait la confession, au sens augustinien du terme. Steinhardt répète que les jours passés dans la cellule 34 de Jilava, où il a reçu le baptême, ont été les plus « heureux » de sa vie; cet événement partage sa vie entre un « avant » et un « après » sans reste. Mais le « bonheur » mystique n'apporte pas l'éloignement du monde. Dans un prologue intitulé « Les trois solutions — un testament politique », l'auteur insiste sur le fait que les solutions pour échapper à « l'univers carcéral » et à la fois à « tout produit du totalitarisme [...] ont un caractère pratique et sont accessibles à tout le monde ». Comme partout dans le texte, la morale « du courage, de la dignité, de l'honneur et de l'héroïsme » s'énonce dans la perspective de la liberté humaine: « Souvenez-vous: Soljénitsine, Zinoviev, Churchill–Boukovski: La mort acceptée, anticipée, assumée; l'indolence et l'impertinence; le courage vaillant et la gaieté folle. *Vous êtes libres de choisir*. [...] » Le fait que, dans son propre cas, la révélation a eu lieu en prison, un certain jour, est irréductible à une causalité quelconque. C'est le mystère du présent (ou de « l'instant » kierkegaardien) qui disloque le sens du temps: « ...le véritable chrétien ne vit ni dans le passé ni dans le futur: il vit seulement dans le présent... » (p. 138). Le lecteur pourra témoigner du fait que ce présent domine les fragments du *Journal du bonheur*: la rétrospective cède la place à une polyphonie dialogique des temps et des modes de l'écriture.

L'autobiographie et les apories de la mémoire. Les autobiographies font figure d'exception parmi les écrits contemporains de frontière. Cette situation, due à des raisons politiques évidentes pour les dernières décennies, a aussi des causes culturelles complexes (l'une d'elles est la circulation limitée d'un concept d'origine anglo-saxonne dans une culture orientée vers les modèles français; les *Mémoires* de Mircea Eliade, par exemple, sont une autobiographie, malgré leur titre)⁴². Les quelques textes de type autobiographique publiés après 1990 sont, du point de vue historique, des autobiographies intellectuelles, mais dont la détermination « intellectuelle » semble s'opposer à l'idée d'autobiographie. D'une part, la référence au passé communiste appelle la qualité de témoignage

plutôt que celle de confession: la fonction historique sert de corollaire (et parfois d'alibi) à l'expression individuelle. La fréquence du concept de *génération* (qu'on retrouve aussi dans beaucoup de journaux intimes), par exemple, est le reflet du modèle historique dominant dans le discours critique du moment. D'autre part, le terme « essai », inscrit quelques fois en sous-titre (chez V. Nemoianu, H.R. Patapievi), avertit que le récit autobiographique sera indirect, inséré par fragments, dans un ordre thématique. Pour conclure, l'autobiographie intellectuelle contemporaine abandonne à la fois la présomption individualiste des modèles historiques et la présomption didactique des ouvrages qui mettent l'accent sur la genèse des idées ou des œuvres, à la faveur d'une herméneutique historique-existentielle.

Le fait que l'une des autobiographies les plus typiques que l'on puisse trouver soit écrite par un professeur de littérature comparée qui vit depuis plus de vingt ans aux États-Unis, pays où l'autobiographie est une catégorie centrale des études critiques, ne saurait être accidentel. L'intertexte culturel du livre de Virgil Nemoianu, *L'Archipel intérieur*, a comme noyau autobiographique le thème de l'exil. Dans le premier chapitre (qui est une préface incorporée), l'auteur souligne que sa vie « mérite d'être racontée » premièrement en tant qu'« expérience historique » complexe: la « coexistence contradictoire de plusieurs couches historiques » lui semble un aspect commun de sa vie et de l'histoire roumaine. Le récit autobiographique sera, donc, guidé par « le thème des ironies dialectiques qui agissent entre l'ethnique et le culturel », ou, tout simplement, « entre les origines et l'existence ». Il s'arrête, d'ailleurs, au moment où Nemoianu s'est installé aux États-Unis, frontière biographique commentée dans un « Epilogue provisoire ».

Malgré cette unité thématique, le livre n'est pas écrit d'un seul coup: ses chapitres, obéissant au schéma classique des « âges », sont des « essais » rédigés à des dates différentes. Le discours proprement autobiographique de *L'Archipel*...représente, à notre avis, le niveau le plus stéréotypé: l'autoportrait est figé, objectif, sans autonomie; la temporalité, à l'exception des années de l'enfance, passées dans un Banat natal prodigieux, n'a aucun mystère: « une période [...] finit avec mon entrée hésitante dans l'univers des réalités », la « période » suivante s'étend « jusqu'au moment où j'ai pu me considérer un vrai adulte » (p. 301), etc. Les meilleurs pages sont celles d'évocation historique: portraits de famille, récits de voyage, anecdotes qui révèlent les mœurs des mondes différents, le portrait moral de la première génération éduquée pendant le communisme, etc. On dirait que pour cet auteur inné de mémoires l'autobiographie est plutôt une obsession et une nostalgie. En parlant de ses écrits théoriques, Nemoianu insiste sur leur ancrage biographique, multipliant les analogies qui renvoient aux souvenirs éloignés. Le choix de ses thèmes majeurs serait l'expression d'un besoin de « récupérer mes sentiments d'adolescent,

de me légitimer et de défendre mon être et mon style de vie » au sein de « l'univers post-industriel et post-moderne américain ». En cela, son modèle est l'œuvre de Mircea Eliade, « une immense tentative d'auto-explication et d'auto-justification » (p. 288).

L'influence d'Eliade est avouée aussi par la fréquence du concept d'un « monde organique », en faveur duquel Nemoianu s'engage de manière polémique : « nombre d'auteurs contemporains veulent nous persuader que ce qu'on appelle une culture organique ne serait qu'une forme d'idéalisme, une ruse de notre mémoire, une vue esthétique, réactionnaire de notre esprit. Moi je peux témoigner que de pareilles sociétés existent, car j'ai vécu moi-même pendant mon enfance au sein d'une société organique intacte » (pp. 256–257). Au niveau de l'existence individuelle, l'organique se retrouve comme mémoire profonde, couche de souvenirs où puise l'être : « Plus j'étais petit, plus j'avais des souvenirs ; au moins c'est ce qu'il me semble, car la plupart de ces souvenirs éloignés doivent être faux, [...] des choses entendues que je prenais pour aussi vraies que l'expérience directe... » (p. 63). Cette mémoire con-substantielle rappelle le paradigme rousseauiste de l'individu ineffable. Le village des premières vacances (Borloveni) compte pour Nemoianu comme un « réservoir d'images » à la fois virtuel et très puissant, car « tous mes paysages ultérieurs, naturels ou culturels, en portent l'empreinte » (p. 255). Ainsi, défendre et légitimer son être signifie défendre des origines qui sont réelles en tant qu'imaginaire. L'auteur conçoit son évolution comme « un affranchissement progressif de toute contrainte historique » (p. 328), en commençant par les contraintes de la société organique-traditionnelle, mais à la fois comme une rémanence du passé dans le présent, grâce à laquelle cet affranchissement n'a pas été une rupture. Il compare souvent « son âme » à une « maison victorienne » qui, au-delà des apparences prosaïques de loisir bourgeois, garde de nombreux endroits mystérieux. Ainsi, les accents « typiques » de cette autobiographie post-goethéenne indiquent le souci de concilier un concept de personnalité harmonieuse, organique, avec les théories contemporaines de la différence. L'autobiographie est employée par Nemoianu pour légitimer un modèle libéral d'identité contre les thèses radicales des études culturelles américaines et, à la fois, contre l'ethnocentrisme de certains compatriotes d'outre-mer.

Une exception remarquable à la prédominance des autobiographies sous caution intellectuelle est *La garde des dragons* de Ion Negoïtescu. Malheureusement, la mort de l'auteur a interrompu le récit après les deux premiers chapitres, au moment où l'adolescent découvre l'art moderne. Ce qui reste pourrait être appelé un autoportrait du critique en jeune homme. C'est toujours un livre d'exil, mais dont le caractère s'exprime par l'intensité de la confession, au-delà d'une thématique afférente. Negoïtescu confiait à un ami : « Dans l'autobiographie je dirai tout sur moi, même les choses les plus déplaisantes. Ce livre apportera

quelque chose d'absolument nouveau dans notre littérature » (préface critique de Ion Vartic). Une lecture superficielle pourrait gloser ces affirmations en rapport avec les nombreuses scènes d'érotisme homosexuel du livre, comme goût de la provocation exhibitionniste associé au désir d'épater un public supposé réticent. Mais la nouveauté de cette autobiographie ne se réduit pas à ce genre de provocation.

Negoïtescu construit son récit du point de vue du personnage qui arrive, pas à pas, à la conscience de sa différence : cette perspective du vécu domine la convention auctorielle de l'omniscience. L'aspect est très important parce que « dire tout sur soi-même » ne signifie plus rompre le silence sur des choses que l'on pouvait avouer depuis longtemps : l'aveu, l'écriture et l'identité individuelle coïncident. De nombreux passages suggèrent l'évolution du héros de l'ignorance innocente à l'angoisse d'une singularité totale, irréductible et, finalement, à l'expression autobiographique. Negoïtescu se souvient qu'ayant reçu comme devoir scolaire un essai sur le dernier livre lu, lorsqu'il était adolescent, il a avoué spontanément « sa particularité sexuelle ». Il ne se rappelle pas ce qu'il avait écrit dans cet essai, mais seulement le fait qu'il avait reçu un dix du professeur, qui cependant s'était gardé d'y ajouter le moindre commentaire. Il ne comprendra que plus tard le sens de ce silence : le professeur, qui était lui-même homosexuel, avait voulu le protéger. « L'oubli » coïncide ainsi avec le « silence » culturel qui entoure le « sujet », représentant un obstacle à la fois extérieur et intérieur. En tombant sur un article de journal, le personnage aura un premier aperçu de sa méconnaissance : « ...j'ai trouvé là bas le terme „homosexuel“ et j'ai pu comprendre ainsi que le penchant vers ceux du même sexe a un nom générique appartenant à la réalité commune et qu'il ne représente pas une singularité cosmique » (p. 138). Les plus belles pages du livre sont celles où, explorant ses souvenirs d'enfance (vrais et faux à la fois, comme chez Nemoianu) à la recherche des signes obscurs de sa prédestination, le narrateur arrive à transposer ce sentiment de singularité cosmique dans l'écriture. Le récit de ces souvenirs garde, comme l'image du jardin de la maison natale, « quelque chose de tropical : abondance, liberté, obscurité » (p. 36). C'est un trajet d'anamnèse qui renverse le parcours épique et confère aux épisodes ressuscités une qualité poétique et musicale assez rare dans une autobiographie.

En commentant ses échecs littéraires de l'adolescence, Negoïtescu avance comme hypothèse le fait que « mon imagination était à ce point subjuguée par mes fantasmes qu'il n'y restait de place pour rien d'autre ». De façon curieuse, il ajoute que cet obstacle imaginaire frappait surtout les tentatives de récit : « Je crois que cela explique aussi le fait que je n'ai jamais pu achever quelque chose dans le genre épique, en dépit de mes efforts. Et ce n'est qu'aujourd'hui, quand je suis vieux et que je revis ma vie, que ma plume fugueuse peut glisser sur les pages blanches en prenant l'avance sur mes pensées... » (p. 112). En effet,

La garde des dragons est la plus « épique » des autobiographies contemporaines : les commentaires et les digressions se fondent dans le rythme fulgurant des images d'un conte féerique et cruel. Le passage que nous venons de citer implique un rapport profond d'équivalence entre récit et identité. C'est à ce niveau qu'on trouve la véritable nouveauté du livre ou, encore, l'extraordinaire revanche de Negoïtescu sur la tradition littéraire locale.

L'autobiographie contemporaine compte aussi, malgré sa rareté, un « best-seller » : l'« essai sur la formation » de Horia Roman Patapievici, *Vol à la portée de la flèche*, livre comparable à ce que dans les années 80 fut *Le journal de Păltiniș* de Gabriel Liiceanu. On pourrait parler même d'une influence directe, lisible surtout dans la préface (« De quoi s'agit-il ? »). Le raccourci autobiographique qui raconte la genèse du texte met en scène à la fois l'authenticité de certains événements singuliers et l'exemplarité d'un manifeste de « génération » : « ...une réponse, un fragment d'un dialogue passionné et amoureux [...]; un livre typique pour l'atmosphère dans laquelle une part de ma génération a vécu et a fait son apprentissage intellectuel »⁴³. En bref, le projet répond au « défi » d'un ami, mais ce défi est lui-même la suite des dialogues (« séminaires ») sur des « thèmes » philosophiques que le groupe de Patapievici organisait à l'époque. Ce groupe ou cette « génération » aurait fait le choix du socratisme et de l'intransigeance éthique, aboutissant à « une extraordinaire liberté intérieure » contre « la terrible contrainte sociale » et « la surveillance policière » du régime.

Au-delà de cette « représentation » un peu ostentatoire, le texte est remarquable par sa capacité de personnaliser le discours intellectuel, par son pathos affirmatif qui propose une nouvelle formule d'authenticité. Il est composé de fragments numérotés dont le principe de contrepoint est la relecture des écrits anciens — « cahiers », « essais », « journaux », etc. (la « bibliographie » de ces écrits est donnée à la fin, en guise de document). Ce scénario d'auto-commentaire permet à l'auteur d'insérer des digressions philosophiques et de surprendre son évolution intellectuelle, ce qui déclenche l'anamnèse autobiographique par association d'idées. De nombreuses adresses dialogiques (au lecteur ou à l'ami qui a lancé le défi) composent une sorte de ponctuation dramatique d'un parcours existentiel qui commence avec une adolescence éprise d'érudition, du genre Eliade, et finit, vers trente ans, par l'aveu d'une crise spirituelle.

Le récit autobiographique suit le schéma discontinu des expériences fondamentales qui ont déterminé des conversions spirituelles : épisode traumatisant du service militaire, rencontres d'amis, illuminations survenues à partir d'un paysage ou d'un geste anodin, etc. Une première crise éclate au moment où, après avoir pris la décision de se consacrer aux livres, le personnage s'aperçoit qu'il « n'a plus de biographie », qu'il « ne sait plus vivre ». Le remède trouvé est le journal intime : il recommence plusieurs fois cette expérience, changeant chaque fois de motivation (le « ressentiment », le besoin de « mémoire »,

« l'urgence de ce qu'on doit devenir », « la pression de l'aveu »). L'exercice diaristique prend fin à la veille du présent essai, lorsque le rédacteur comprend « le principe de succession de ses âges ». C'est une sorte de rite de transition dont les étapes remplacent et suggèrent en même temps le parcours biographique.

Sur un autre plan, le thème de l'authenticité existentielle appelle de longs commentaires sur la mémoire. Ce discours ne remplit pas une fonction purement théorique : il accompagne une « intrigue » profonde dont les repères sont l'enfance et la mort du père. Dans une première étape, la distinction entre une « mémoire-conscience » et les « simples souvenirs, ... images disparates » de l'enfance a une allure rationnelle, qui correspond à la volonté d'un « destin » intellectuel. La perspective, anti-rousseauiste, accorde la préséance à la mémoire-récit des « signes qui font la réalité » (pp. 47–48). Cette priorité est paradoxale, car les quelques souvenirs de l'enfance sont assez faibles : le vague « sentiment d'une liberté joyeuse et sans rivages », qui semble obéir plutôt au « désir » (p. 32). Peu à peu, Patapievici change de théorie : la mémoire-conscience s'avère décevante ; elle ne couvre qu'un intervalle de temps très court, elle ne donne que l'image de ce que l'on a voulu devenir. L'argumentation reprend par endroits les apories augustiniennes de la mémoire humaine comparée à l'omniscience divine. Quelques troubles de mémoire d'apparence insignifiante (le motif d'une ancienne « passion pour l'Inde », une déclinaison latine) préparent le passage à l'équivalence mémoire-identité : « Se souvenir signifie se réapproprier le corps qu'on avait perdu. Comment expliquer les vides de mémoire, cet enfer de l'identité qui semble s'effondrer ? » (p. 180) Patapievici distingue les objets de l'oubli, considérés comme des « faits secondaires », du problème ontologique qu'ils révèlent. Ses gloses sont redevables aux concepts d'Eliade et non à ceux de Freud (pour lequel ce qu'on oublie n'est jamais insignifiant).

Malgré cette distinction rassurante, il est de plus en plus hanté par l'oubli de l'enfance, par ce que pourrait s'y cacher derrière, et il envisage deux possibilités de retrouver cette mémoire enfouie : soit la découverte accidentelle de quelques objets ou « vestiges » de cette époque, soit un changement intérieur de l'ordre du « destin » qui « pourrait forcer la résurrection du passé » (p. 47). En effet, ces deux possibilités deviendront indissociables, lors de la découverte de quelques livres qui l'avaient fasciné pendant son enfance. Cet événement se consumera comme un seul coup de dés, un seul signe du destin ayant l'intensité d'une « révélation ». Sans ces « objets qui ont survécu au déluge temporel, le passé serait entièrement inventé », dit-il (p. 47). Mais avec ces objets, le passé ne devient pas plus réel, car ce ne sont que « des signes vers le passé » : ce qu'ils signifient, c'est l'impossibilité du « retour » et même la fascination des « origines » comme « récapitulation de ma mort » (p. 48). La découverte ne fait qu'augmenter la nostalgie, en rendant l'absence irrémédiable et l'anamnèse illusoire.

Le motif des livres retrouvés par hasard représente une allégorie spéculaire de l'autobiographie qui s'écrit à l'aide d'anciens textes. Car ces livres n'ont plus de « sens »; leur « rencontre » est le symbole de la perte du sens. La seule chose que Patapievici parvient à se rappeler est un épisode qu'il savait depuis longtemps, mais qui apparaît dans une lumière nouvelle, fulgurante: quand l'adolescent a fait le choix d'un destin intellectuel, il a marqué « la première césure fondamentale de sa vie » en brûlant tout ce qu'il avait écrit jusque là. Il saisit maintenant l'envers de cette « décision de brûler complètement une archive — témoignage unique d'un passé que la mémoire est incapable de ressusciter »: « Je sais à présent que la raison pour laquelle j'ai oublié mon enfance est à la fois la raison pour laquelle j'ai brûlé tous mes écrits [...]; je sais maintenant, après 30 ans, que mon âge futur retrouvera l'enfance ou ne sera pas » (pp. 185–186). Mais que veut dire « retrouver l'enfance », puisque le retour, comme il l'avait affirmé, est impossible? « L'archive brûlée » est une métaphore que Freud employait pour surprendre le fonctionnement de l'obscur pulsion de mort⁴⁴. Le nouveau pari de l'âge futur rétablit-il vraiment, comme le pense Patapievici, une continuité de l'être ou bien est-il une autre « césure »?

Les passages dédiés à la mort du père semblent confirmer cette dernière hypothèse; ils sont introduits par des négations tranchantes, qui brûlent en quelque sorte toute la théorie précédente de la mémoire-identité: « ... je ne me souviens jamais de la moindre chose. Tout ce que je feins de me rappeler ici est inventé » (p. 179). Le rejet du souvenir est l'expression culminante du désespoir: « Oh, mais je veux qu'il vive et non que je puisse me souvenir de lui » (p. 234); « Nos souvenirs dansent sur la chair décomposée d'un cadavre. [...] Il n'y a pas de monument du passé qu'on puisse restaurer par notre chair. Tout se joue dans une fraction de seconde, dans la lumière qui brille maintenant » (p. 310). Cependant, vers la fin du livre, Patapievici exaltera de nouveau le souvenir comme l'aurait fait l'autobiographe le plus typique: « il y a quelque chose dans le souvenir qui est irréductible au fait vécu » (p. 311); « le charme appartient à ce passé irrémédiable... » (p. 313). De telles « contradictions » théoriques correspondent aux tonalités ou perspectives différentes de l'autobiographie.

Patapievici anticipait peut-être cette inconséquence nécessaire, lorsqu'il formulait sa poétique de l'authenticité ou du premier jet: « je n'ai jamais été capable de „ré-écrire“ mieux une „version“ antérieure. [...] La vérité est dans le vécu, [...] dans le *nunc stans* » (p. 198). La vérité devrait être dans le vécu, car c'est toujours lui qui l'avoue, l'écriture ne fait que frôler le vécu; elle ne conserve que « l'intelligence » ou « le sens »: « Que j'ai vraiment été comme je me peins ici, la chose est sûre. Mais je n'ai réussi à exprimer que le sens: le corps de ma vie est absent » (p. 121). Le *corps* est un mot-clef que l'auteur associe toujours aux idées, à la culture ou, comme nous l'avons remarqué, au

souvenir. Mais le corps, s'il est *corps propre*, n'est pas une métaphore. Chez Patapievici, le réseau métaphorique souvenir-corps-écriture-mort se referme sur lui-même, dans sa cohérence paradoxale.

Le journal intime et son double. La plupart des journaux intimes rédigés au cours des années 70–80 et publiés à présent s'éloignent du modèle poétique examiné dans le premier chapitre. Ce modèle avait été employé aussi par la critique littéraire roumaine, en réponse à la pratique littéraire des écrivains de Tîrgoviște, qui, à leur tour, avaient renoué avec les théories des écrivains de l'entre-deux-guerres. Mais les journaux destinés « au tiroir » se souciaient peu des modèles poétiques; c'étaient plutôt des journaux de bord d'un quotidien politique obsédant. La conscience d'une évolution de mal en pire, le sentiment de l'absurde généralisé, l'attente diffuse d'un changement quelconque expliquent le ton sec de transcription, de chronique, qui reproduit souvent les lieux communs d'un savoir populaire subversif⁴⁵.

Le clivage entre les exigences de l'actualité politique et ceux de la tradition littéraire, que nous avons mis en évidence en parlant du moment post-communiste, a été anticipé par le journal. Symbole (ou échappatoire) d'une dernière marge de liberté, le journal non-destiné à la publication retrouvait sa fonction élémentaire d'aide-mémoire. La clause du secret n'était pas celle de l'individualisme romantique mais le signe renversé d'une interdiction: chaque diariste connaissait des *histoires* de journaux confisqués, utilisés comme corps du délit dans les procès politiques des années 50–60. Cette fonction politique évidente ne renvoie pas à un répertoire thématique figé; elle admet des degrés différents de référentialité et des interférences littéraires multiples.

Un cas-limite d'adhérence à l'événement est le « journal » que le narrateur des *Couleurs de l'arc-en-ciel* met en scène comme première écriture chiffrée, nécessaire à la mémorisation d'un récit-témoignage ultérieur. Cette fonction d'aide-mémoire est figurée dans le texte par la perte accidentelle de quelques pages: « Dommage, car je suis incapable de reconstituer de mémoire cette période très importante » (p. 50). Une définition non-littéraire minimale fait allusion à l'univers des prisons politiques, où le « papier écrit » représentait la valeur suprême: « Le journal est du papier écrit; il enregistre „la réalité telle quelle“, ce qui peut t'envoyer d'un coup en prison » (p. 36). Mais un pareil journal, dont Goma cite des fragments elliptiques en tant que *documents*, demeure un cas idéal, même si son modèle est réel: il ne saurait être publié tel quel, sans élaboration ou sans insertion dans un récit.

Son complément pourrait être le journal d'un homme dont la biographie a été aussi marquée par la violence politique et qui, cependant, est le contraire d'une chronique. Le *Journal d'un diariste sans journal* (« d'un journaliste », en roumain) de I.D. Sârbu est une collection de « gloses » divisée en trois « hivers »

(de 1983 à 1986), qui répond à une situation politique globale, et non pas à l'événement ponctuel. Sa motivation est simplement celle de faire oublier le passé biographique: « La vérité est que je possède une très bonne mémoire et que je ne sais plus comment y échapper; [...] je ne peux survivre que dans la mesure ou je parviens à oublier ma biographie » (p. 136); « Ma liberté n'est que l'absence de la peur, le pouvoir de l'ignorer et de l'oublier. Mais [...] la peur revient dans mes rêves; je revis toujours les moments où ils ont enlevé ma ceinture et m'ont obligé à mettre les lunettes noires » (p. 113). La forme d'un carnet d'idées répond à cette fonction de thérapie, sans effacer pourtant les traces du passé. Car Sârbu ne choisit pas des thèmes de réflexion originaux; au contraire, il énumère tous les lieux communs politiques du quotidien: le système communiste comme monde à l'envers, les mécanismes du pouvoir et de la lâcheté, les reflets d'une mentalité opportuniste dans le langage, l'ambivalence de l'humour subversif, etc. Ce sont le plus souvent les « mots » de quelques amis (« mon bon ami Claude », « ma muse clandestine, Olimpia », etc.) rapportés à la suite des conversations banales. Sârbu se déclare lui-même un « type de parleur, de conteur » pour lequel l'écriture n'est qu'un sacrifice et une « auto-mutilation »: « Je fais souvent le rêve d'une salle remplie d'amis auxquels, sans texte préparé à l'avance et sans scrupule littéraire, je puisse confier tout ce que je porte dans mon âme... » (pp. 155–156). La raison d'être de ces cahiers-substituts est « que la vérité simple qui m'empoisonne et me tue [...] ne peut s'exprimer que sous des formes multiples, à travers d'innombrables tentatives » (p. 152). En effet, en lisant le journal on se rend compte que, sous l'apparence de « gloses », l'auteur recherche les métaphores capables de surprendre les traits communs d'une condition individuelle et d'une situation collective.

Un autre complément possible du « journal » imaginé par Goma serait *Le journal d'un témoin: Bucarest, le 13–15 Juin 1990* de Liviu Ioan Stoiciu. Ce texte figure de manière saisissante le paradoxe d'une tentative d'enregistrer sur le vif l'événement actuel-historique. Le journal de bord du témoin ne peut s'articuler sans le support d'un journal du journal qui refait la distance par rapport aux visions immédiates — et donc irréelles — de la rue. Enregistré tel quel, l'événement a l'apparence d'un spectacle absurde, dans la ligne du Waterloo de Stendhal. Stoiciu contemple étourdi des élèves d'allure innocente qui font les guérilleros, vidant les réservoirs des autos et déchirant leurs chemises pour fabriquer des cocktails Molotov. Il entend des répliques du genre « Sois pas bête, viens. Tu jettes une bouteille et, si tu crèves, ce sera ma faute à moi, quoi... » (p. 109). Il s'efforce de compléter un puzzle impossible en combinant de tels instantanés avec les informations fournies par la télé et la presse. Se rendant compte du faux de ces « informations », il s'empresse de nouveau vers les rues. Ces ruptures diégétiques sont marquées dans le texte par des adresses au lecteur réel (le journal a été publié d'abord en feuilleton dans la revue

Contrapunct), qui ressemblent aux adresses rhétoriques de *Gherla*. Stoiciu guide son lecteur à travers un labyrinthe de circonstances où il se retrouve lui-même en tant que personnage réel, journaliste qui écrit des articles protestataires, qui transcrit les « déclarations » d'autres témoins etc. Collage ahurissant de textes, le *Journal d'un témoin* montre qu'à l'événement ne correspond pas une poétique réaliste de reportage, mais, au contraire, une « éthique de l'aveu complet »: « Je vous donne ma parole que je vais raconter seulement ce que j'ai vu, entendu, senti, jugé à ces moments même » (p. 116); « aux écarts intérieurs de notre sensibilité correspondent des écarts de langage, [...] des dialogues intérieurs du rédacteur... » (pp. 106, 121). La preuve suprême d'authenticité est le fait que la syntaxe de ce journal ressemble à la syntaxe des poèmes de Stoiciu: les violences de Juin 1990 n'arrivent-elles pas au poète lui-même?

Le prototype contemporain du journal-chronique est, sans doute, le *Journal* de Mircea Zăciu, véritable histoire-alternative de la vie littéraire pendant le communisme. La fonction des préfaces des deux premiers volumes semble être celle d'expliquer le paradoxe d'un journal qui, par son sujet, devrait être une monographie monumentale ou, du moins, une « comédie humaine » du monde des écrivains. Et, en effet, il semble que cette tâche d'explication n'est pas facile: une certaine tension, que la dichotomie subjectivité-objectivité ne peut pas résoudre, persiste entre le sujet et la forme. La formule critique adoptée par Zăciu est celle d'un document subjectif comme expérience et objectif par son appartenance à une époque. Une subjectivité typique, représentative, de « témoignage d'époque », échappe à la présomption d'autorité d'une théorie de l'objectivité historiographique.

La préface du premier volume avertit sur « les lacunes » chronologiques du journal (« ...l'euphorie ou le désespoir ont pu en être la cause; d'autres fois seulement l'ennui ») et sur « la pauvreté des détails intimes » qui correspond au choix — « normal » pour un homme de lettres dont l'existence a une dimension publique — de « noter en chroniqueur l'espace réel... » de la vie littéraire. L'auteur est assez évasif sur ce point qui mériterait plus de réflexion: pourquoi quelqu'un, même s'il s'identifie au monde des écrivains (« notre petite société »), déciderait-il de s'en occuper en exclusivité dans son journal? Un des épigraphes, tiré de Mircea Eliade, suggère une autre face de cette identification, une sorte de passion dépersonnalisante: « En réalité, je n'avais pas vécu; les autres avaient vécu à ma place. » Au delà des mobiles personnels, on présume qu'un pareil intérêt ne saurait se manifester que pour ce qu'on appelle une *histoire*, au sens référentiel et épique à la fois. Pourtant, en expliquant le choix du journal, Zăciu rejette juste l'idée d'histoire: « Ce que j'ai écrit n'est pas l'histoire d'une époque [...] mais une expérience immédiate et, par conséquent, subjective... »

Il semble que cette distinction est à la fois une restriction épistémologique et une garantie d'authenticité. D'une part, l'auteur affirme qu'il ne s'arroge pas

la position d'un moraliste: même s'il lui est arrivé de juger les autres, il a été le premier à se juger comme « incapable d'échapper à sa condition », « vivant comme la plupart de nous entre l'accès de révolte et la rechute lâche ». Mais cette même condition moyenne, associée à la notion d'une écriture immédiate, fonctionne comme une clause d'authenticité: « Je n'ai rien changé de ce que j'avais noté sur le vif; je me suis gardé surtout de juger le passé d'après les critères du présent ». Dans ce cas, on dirait que « l'expérience immédiate » ne signifie pas l'absence de tout projet mais un projet négatif. En relisant les pages du premier volume, par exemple, Zăciu remarque leur « monotonie » et déclare l'avoir gardé en tant qu'aspect typique de la vie dans les sociétés totalitaires ». De même, il n'a rien ajouté à certains passages auto-censurés par prudence et donc obscurs: leur « caractère ambigu et trouble » suggère la tension des moments de la rédaction. La figure constante de l'argumentation est la métamorphose de l'intention en expression, du *projet* associé à la vie littéraire en *produit* de l'époque. Remarquons que le principe éthique de non-intervention dans l'écriture du passé a aussi un aspect esthétique, qui renvoie à une poétique réaliste du document.

Le texte du *Journal* nous révèle cependant non pas une expérience immédiate mais une attente d'historien dont l'indice le plus clair est l'attention au journal intime comme document. Pendant une séance des écrivains, Zăciu s'aperçoit que quelques-uns de ses collègues écrivent dans des carnets dissimulés sur les genoux. Il présume qu'il s'agit de journaux et s'écrit: « Et cela est bien! Même si ces journaux ne survivront pas en totalité, quelques uns seront sauvés et, un jour, il y aura un témoignage direct sur notre époque. Ainsi l'oubli n'emportera pas tout... » (2, p. 183). La dernière phrase est une réminiscence de Miron Costin (célèbre chroniqueur du XVII^e siècle), qui déplorait la tâche difficile d'écrire l'histoire pendant les époques agitées... De même, à la suite d'un dialogue avec quelqu'un qui, en esthète, abhorre les journaux, l'auteur s'interroge: « Dans ce cas, le document... quand sera-t-il écrit et par qui? Voire le document individuel, psychologique, qui reflète le point de vue d'une génération, d'un moment, d'une époque? » (2, p. 229). C'est, évidemment, ce que Zăciu lui-même se propose de faire: écrire ce qui un jour pourrait être un document. C'est à la fois ce qu'il salue dans les journaux d'autres écrivains (Galaction, Rebreanu) qui — allusion polémique aux opinions d'autres critiques — « n'ont pas employé leurs journaux pour méditer aux œuvres, pour philosopher... » (2, p. 243). La poétique du témoignage invoque aussi des idées de Gide, Green, Eliade et Sartre. Du dernier, Zăciu traduit un long passage qui exprimerait son point de vue: « J'écris n'importe quoi dans mon journal, sachant que ce qui compte surtout est la valeur historique de mon témoignage. C'est un témoignage médiocre et simplement pour ça il a une valeur générale » (2, p. 189). Ces phrases résument l'argumentation des préfaces. Faudrait-il dire

encore que le *Journal*, loin de contenir « n'importe quoi » ou d'être « médiocre », est remarquable et comme document et comme prose? Dès lors, on peut se demander à quoi bon cette insistance sur des principes « réalistes » restrictifs, comme cette équivalence sartiennne entre médiocrité et valeur historique. Peut-on s'assurer de cette manière que sa propre subjectivité est typique, donc représentative pour « l'histoire »? Ou bien ce n'est là qu'un alibi pour l'étrange « passion » refoulée d'un poète épique, à l'âge de la crise des « grands récits »?

Journal intime (mais sans intimisme), journal du journal, anti-journal seraient quelques hypothèses de départ pour caractériser les livres récents de Liviu Ciocârlie: *Le Paradis dérisoire* et *La vie entre parenthèses* (PD et VP à partir d'ici). En tout cas, nous sommes aux antipodes du projet de Zăciu; chez Ciocârlie, la « poétique » du journal n'est que l'apparence d'une délibération qui relance le texte tout en posant sa propre négativité ou impossibilité. Phrase-leitmotiv: « Pour avoir un sens, le journal devrait être à la fois son propre contraire » (PD, p. 74). Mais qu'est-ce, en effet, « le contraire » d'un journal?

Ce pourrait être un journal sans date. Si « la raison d'être » du journal est « mnémotechnique » ou « documentaire », comme l'affirme Ciocârlie, la désobéissance au calendrier en serait la négation: « je ne note pas pour la mémoire, ni pour la mienne ni pour celle d'autrui. [...] C'est la cause des nombreuses lacunes de mon journal » (VP, p. 188). Et pourtant il n'y a pas de journal sans lacunes — Zăciu, qui note tous les deux ou trois jours en inscrivant soigneusement la date, l'avoue aussi. Pour aboutir au contraire du journal, la désobéissance devrait être totale, systématique, ce qui est difficile à imaginer.

Après sept pages, le narrateur du *Paradis...* se décide de préciser « quand même que nous sommes en 1988. Octobre bleu. A neuf heures et demi on attend le docteur... » (p. 8). Il descend donc la date dans le texte, ce qui la rend un peu dérisoire; parfois il n'indique que les jours de la semaine ou les repères temporels du discours (« hier », « aujourd'hui », etc.). Cette alternance est arbitraire par rapport avec un journal mnémotechnique mais motivée en tant que fiction. L'ordre chronologique est maintenu; en échange, tout semble permis quant aux durées (une journée, un mois et une année peuvent occuper le même espace). De même, l'aveu des lacunes doit être accepté sous réserve, comme l'indique ce petit clin d'œil: « Je n'ai rien écrit ces derniers deux jours et peut-être qu'on ne l'aurait jamais su si je ne l'avais pas avoué » (VP, p. 51). D'ailleurs, si l'acte d'écrire est représenté, tout effet de réel peut figurer une lacune, voire, par exemple, cette scène typique des hivers communistes: « J'écris ces lignes et je m'accroupis sous les couvertures » (PD, p. 22). C'est ainsi que la spécularité du monologue peut rendre douteuse la vérité métatextuelle des affirmations les plus directes, comme celles qui portent sur la date: « Je n'ai pas noté dans mon journal chaque jour. Je n'ai jamais éprouvé le besoin d'un aide-mémoire. Je ne me suis pas même soucié de mettre la date » (VP, p. 149).

Le contraire du journal pourrait être aussi le journal réécrit: « Si on veut transformer son journal en littérature, il faut le „travailler à mort“, comme disait Barthes » (PD, p. 144). Le texte de Ciocârlie semble parfois « travaillé à mort »: est-ce un indice que l'auteur suit la piste de Barthes? Il envisage quelque part, pour y renoncer ensuite très vite, l'idée d'un « triple journal, où le second serait le commentaire ironique du premier et le troisième abolirait les deux premiers » (VP, p. 147). Cependant, le procédé des « parenthèses » ajoutées aux pages anciennes est fréquent: « Ensuite, un fragment où je disais que je ne sais pas qu'est-ce que je dois écrire... » (VP, p. 50); « Je venais de taper à la machine l'enfance, j'étais arrivé au carosse [...] et soudain, me rappelant comment je menais des chevaux imaginaires, j'ai commencé à rire... » (VP, p. 47). Ce ne sont pas là, évidemment, des effets de relecture spontanée; le diariste devient le personnage d'une sorte de roman du journal.

Est-ce alors de la littérature? Quand il semble se prononcer en théoricien littéraire, Ciocârlie n'accorde pas au journal la moindre chance artistique: ce n'est qu'un « journalisme *sui-generis* »; il ne contient « que des nouvelles » ou de « l'éphémère » qui, en s'accumulant, finissent par donner « la nausée » (PD, p. 232); il ne puise pas dans « l'imaginaire » mais dans le « voyeurisme » (PD, p. 74); il n'est pas « métaphorique » (VP, p. 255), etc. Malgré ces avertissements, si le journal reste à l'état brut, non travaillé, il sera abandonné dans un tiroir et retrouvé un jour, par hasard, par quelqu'un. Mais, dans l'hypothèse contraire, « le temps aura un corps, il sera sa propre transcendance » (VP, p. 216). Il arrive à Ciocârlie lui-même de tomber sur « des cahiers de toutes les périodes », en fouillant dans une armoire. La carrière de diariste qu'il s'attribue est l'équivalent d'une autobiographie en raccourci: « A l'école élémentaire, j'étais gai et insouciant, amateur de clichés et analphabète. Au lycée vinrent les grands mots, le pathos, et point de talent. Pendant les études, j'étais insipide et précieux. Plus tard, tout ça s'est combiné de diverses manières à chaque époque » (VP, p. 323).

Ce « plus tard » renvoie aussi aux textes que nous lisons. *Le Paradis...* porte en sous-titre la mention « journal sur l'indifférence »; un livre précédent s'intitulait *Fragments sur le vide*. Plus concrète que le vide, l'indifférence signifie un état régressif de non-différenciation fertile (la nuit des romantiques, l'eau bachelardienne, la mère retrouvée en sont quelques équivalences indiquées par le critique). Le mobile du journal serait « le manque d'intimité » comme symptomatologie d'un « Artaud format petit-bourgeois »: « manque d'énergie, faiblesse physique, réticence, apathie... » VP, p. 96). Ce serait à la fois, comme l'avoue Ciocârlie, le péché d'inauthenticité d'un « mobile littéraire »: le journal « a été toujours de la littérature, la seule forme de littérature dont je me sens capable » (VP, p. 203); « le journal comme substitut de littérature est un hybride » (VP, p. 150). Il ne s'agit plus, dans ces contextes, d'un refus de la date, mais d'une

inadhérence élémentaire à la chronologie. L'absence de la date implique de manière directe l'effondrement de l'identité, la surprise et la coïncidence spéculaire, énoncées comme chez Rousset: « Celui qui tient un journal sait à l'avance ce qu'il va écrire. Moi je ne peux rien prévoir, je me surprends [...]. Je suis un premier lecteur qui coïncide avec l'auteur » (VP, p. 157).

La « surprise » est l'effet le plus fréquent dans la mise en scène de l'acte d'écriture que Ciocârlie s'amuse à représenter. Elle est le contraire du devoir quotidien, de la fidélité aveugle au journal: « Je cherche un cahier neuf pour mon essai et je tombe sur mon journal. Je constate qu'il m'intéresse et je le reprends » (VP, p. 323); « j'ai eu soudain envie de reprendre le journal mais, le temps de le retrouver, l'envie s'est envolée » (VP, p. 42). Ces hésitations sont suffisantes comme matériaux pour une sorte de récit minimal, à la Beckett: « ... encore quatre lignes jusqu'en bas, quatre heures moins une minute, pause ici, quelques idées rejetées, deux lignes et demi; deux; encore un effort, longue pause ici, j'ai dit presque tout, quatre heures et deux minutes, voilà, j'arrive à la dernière ligne... » (VP, p. 54). L'envers de la date est l'acte pur d'écriture, dans son immanence vide. Les textes de Ciocârlie altèrent de pareils fragments au présent avec des récits autobiographiques éclatés; ce qui ne se retrouve jamais c'est le compte-rendu du jour, le journal tel quel. Mais l'effet de surprise peut aussi être réel. Pendant quelques mois après décembre 89, ce diariste typique, « incapable de vivre sa vie comme histoire » a vécu « en dehors de soi-même ». En retournant au journal, il s'est surpris écrire des pages de « chronique politique » ou incapable d'écrire à cause du « contraste entre l'apathie de mes phrases et la tension dans laquelle on vit » (PD, p. 89). Il s'est dit alors, de nouveau, que le journal « devrait être à la fois son contraire » pour avoir un sens ou seulement pour pouvoir continuer. Et peut-être Ciocârlie n'est-il pas si loin d'une pareille synthèse, qui reste pour l'instant sans concept.

Conclusions (Réception critique et canon littéraire)

De nombreux processus institutionnels reflètent la tendance actuelle de canonisation des écrits de frontière: les journaux publient des fragments en feuilleton, les maisons d'édition font la chasse au manuscrit et fondent des nouvelles collections, on publie des anthologies didactiques, on ajoute un nouveau chapitre aux manuels de littérature, etc. La réception critique — des comptes-rendus aux thèses de doctorat — se trouve le plus souvent en retard sur ce rythme débordant, mais elle contribue néanmoins, au niveau des idées ou à celui des présupposés, aux déplacements du canon. Une étude systématique des textes

supposés « contractuels » devrait accorder la priorité aux multiples aspects de la réception. Située dans la proximité du phénomène, notre étude ne peut pas ambitionner un tel but ; on se contentera d'esquisser en guise de conclusion quelques idées générales, en nous gardant des prévisions.

Le contexte post-communiste de la réception engendre parfois l'illusion d'un « silence » total avant 89. Censure il y a eu, sans doute, mais son mécanisme n'a pas fonctionné de façon constante et sans brèche : les fluctuations correspondent en général aux étapes connues de la politique culturelle du régime. Quelques livres ont pu être publiés même au cours des années 80, dans un climat de restauration staliniste : les journaux de Radu Petrescu, M.R. Paraschivescu, Ion Caraion, la correspondance Ion Negoïtescu — Radu Stanca, le *Journal de Păltiniș*, les écrits de quelques critiques littéraires à la recherche d'un langage moins conventionnel — pages de mémoires, journaux de voyage, autobiographies déguisées — ont eu un succès public remarquable. A présent, on juge parfois ces livres comme des compromis avec les stratégies du régime : celui-ci aurait encouragé, dans une première étape, une liberté d'expression limitée, pour l'étouffer ensuite, agacé par un jeu qui s'autorisait trop de licence. De telles interprétations, qui portent l'empreinte d'un après-coup idéologique, mériteraient d'être nuancées par des analyses plus rigoureuses.

D'autre part, on affirme souvent que la vague de mémoires représente une sorte de revanche nécessaire sur la littérature de fiction, dont la domination culturelle pendant le communisme aurait usurpé les fonctions de l'histoire. Cette thèse n'est pas fautive, en principe, mais en exagérant l'effet de discontinuité du régime passé, elle réduit une causalité complexe à un déterminisme idéologique. Des écrivains de 1848 à ceux de l'entre-deux-guerres, tous les moments d'épanouissement de la littérature de frontière roumaine font la preuve d'un synchronisme remarquable avec les évolutions littéraires occidentales, et cela même quand les textes avouent des complexes d'inactualité typiques pour une « petite » culture. Ce synchronisme implique aussi de multiples rapports avec la série littéraire et un rôle essentiel des grands écrivains dans la canonisation des sous-genres de frontière.

La période contemporaine ne saurait marquer une discontinuité absolue. Si on prend comme point de départ le modèle historique accrédité — celui des générations — les tendances générales semblent interférer avec les fonctions traditionnelles de ces sous-genres. La nouveauté littéraire a été conquise toujours soit par un pacte historique-référentiel soit par un pacte d'authenticité : lyrisme retrouvé dans les années 60, retour à la prose au cours des années 80, post-modernisme polémique de la dernière génération. Pourtant, une seule connexion est claire : le roman « de la décennie obsédante » (qui tentait une critique partielle du système en situant l'intrigue dans les années 50) a profité de l'absence

des mémoires, tout comme il a profité des tabous de l'historiographie, pour lancer des thèses le plus souvent ambivalentes.

Le fait que la censure affectait surtout le récit explique aussi pourquoi pendant cette période seulement le journal intime a pu avoir une certaine carrière littéraire et théorique. Évidemment, cette explication négative coïncide avec l'intérêt esthétique pour une écriture plus moderne que celle des mémoires, « modernité » consacrée auparavant par les poétiques des années 30 (Mircea Eliade, Eugen Ionescu, Anton Holban, Mihail Sebastian, etc.)⁴⁶. La structure fragmentaire, ambiguë, polymorphe du journal intime le rend plus perméable aux expériences stylistiques mais aussi plus commode du point de vue de l'idéologie officielle. Des années 50, quand les écrivains de Tîrgoviște commençaient leur activité littéraire, il ne nous reste presque aucun journal proprement dit. Le journal de Radu Petrescu, remarquable sous tant d'aspects, l'est aussi par l'absence totale des références sociales et historiques. Cela ne veut pas dire que les expériences de l'École de Tîrgoviște représentent un chapitre isolé dans l'histoire littéraire : la pratique ludique-mimétique du journal, qui allait s'étendre bien au-delà du groupe, a engendré une nouvelle conscience sociale et un nouveau projet d'authenticité qui n'étaient pas sans rapport avec la subversion explicite des journaux destinés au tirage. Sur ce point, la Génération 80 ne fait que renouer avec la poétique des précurseurs. Les manifestes littéraires et les essais théoriques recueillis dans une anthologie récente⁴⁷, invoquent souvent le modèle stylistique du journal contre le modernisme « langagier » de la Génération 60, dans la ligne d'une authenticité conçue comme synthèse thématique du « quotidien » et de « l'autobiographique »⁴⁸.

L'intérêt de la critique pour la littérature de frontière est double, esthétique et historique, le rapport entre ces perspectives étant, du reste, assez vague. La critique universitaire compte quelques monographies rédigées sous l'influence d'une étude classique de Tudor Vianu. Parmi celles-ci, le livre de Silviu Iosifescu⁴⁹ a le mérite d'avoir relancé le concept dans les années 70, en regroupant la « littérature des confessions », celle des « voyage » et la « science-fiction ». A part cette initiative, il est décevant du point de vue théorique, même pour son époque. Un regard comparatif sur les immenses bibliographies des États-Unis ou de France en dit long, toutes proportions gardées, sur le stade débutant de ce domaine de la recherche en Roumanie.

L'histoire littéraire a amorcé un « complexe » du journal intime dès les années 40, quand G.Călinescu constatait « l'absence » de cette espèce dans notre tradition. Le critique ne s'inquiétait pas beaucoup pour cela car, avec une sorte de parti-pris universalisant, il jugeait le journal comme une collection de « faits extérieurs, insignifiants » et même comme « une bêtise⁵⁰ ». La chose étonnante est qu'on peut détecter des traces de ce parti-pris chez des critiques contemporains qui ont une idée différente sur les fonctions et sur la position canonique

du journal. Ils sont prêts à reconnaître sa valeur, mais uniquement à condition qu'il obéisse à une norme intellectuelle ou artistique, en devenant l'image d'une pensée ou d'une œuvre.

Eugen Simion, par exemple, propose une typologie d'apparence assez souple : le journal comme « roman indirect » (au sens d'Eliade), comme « aide-mémoire » et comme « fiction de la non-fiction ». Mais le matériel littéraire fourni par l'histoire qui devrait correspondre à ces catégories est assez pauvre. La littérature roumaine « n'a pas donné jusqu'à présent un grand journal de type Gide », affirme Simion ; et il explique cette carence de façon circulaire, par « l'absence d'une tradition locale⁵¹ ». Les deux symptômes majeurs de cette absence seraient le manque de la « dimension intime », du à une « censure morale puissante » (mais la censure ne pourrait-elle pas avoir aussi l'effet contraire, générant un culte de l'intimisme ?) et, d'autre part, le manque de la « réflexion sur l'œuvre » dans les journaux des écrivains (Rebreanu et Camil Petrescu), dû à la contrainte du social. Cette dernière exigence du critique (contre laquelle s'insurgeait Zăciu) dissimule un certain présupposé biographiste. Comme l'a montré Genette, la plupart des journaux d'écrivains ne peuvent être que décevants à cet égard, parce qu'ils sont des « compléments » de l'œuvre : le diariste, assez discret et elliptique, ne dit que le genre de choses qui peut « faire un effet sur soi » ; il parle donc surtout de ses échecs⁵².

La typologie de Mihai Zamfir semble plus proche du champ du journal comme genre : elle oppose « le journal de l'existence » au « journal de la crise ». Certains auteurs tiennent un journal seulement pendant les périodes de crise ou de tournant de leurs vies ; d'autres, au contraire, s'identifient avec l'écriture au jour le jour au point de « construire leur existence d'après le modèle du journal⁵³ ». Cette deuxième catégorie est illustrée par le journal d'Amiel (qui représentait un prototype aussi pour Rousset). Une ample enquête diachronique révèle que la plupart des journaux roumains sont des journaux de crise, à trois exceptions seulement — une pour chaque moment majeur d'affirmation — : Titu Maiorescu, Mircea Eliade et Radu Petrescu. On pourrait objecter qu'à part la fidélité au journal, ces trois cas n'ont rien de commun entre eux ou avec l'exemple d'Amiel. Qu'est-ce qui explique alors leur triomphe sur une « tradition locale » qui, tout comme chez Simion, agit en « censure » redoutable ? La réponse du critique invoque « une compréhension de plus en plus profonde de la culture⁵⁴ » (critère qui exclut encore une fois les journaux de Rebreanu et de Camil Petrescu). L'influence de Călinescu se devine à ce point sans peine : seulement la culture permet au journal l'accès à un « niveau méta-individuel » où la vie devient « un reflet de l'ordre universel »⁵⁵. En effet, le « journal de l'existence » envisagé par Zamfir représente une combinaison inouïe entre les dimensions du journal intime amiélien et les motivations d'un journal de bord intellectuel. C'est un journal intime sans intimisme (et sans névrose amiélienne),

auquel on assigne une fonction culturelle plus noble. Sous cet aspect, la conception de Zamfir s'accorde avec les motivations exposées dans la préface du *Journal de Păltiniș*, à la même époque : le « modèle païdéique » proposé par Liiceanu est, par rapport avec tout ce qu'implique un journal, une sorte de caution transcendente ou allégorique, un plan d'exemplarité méta-individuelle où les personnages ne comptent que comme des « agents accidentels »⁵⁶.

L'actualité du journal comme thème critique est certifiée en 1986 par la parution d'un numéro thématique des « Cahiers de critique littéraire », intitulé « Le journal intime comme littérature »⁵⁷. Intitulé ambigu qui, sous l'apparence d'une restriction au domaine, fait allusion à d'autres éventuelles fonctions du journal. Le sommaire systématique et la liste des collaborateurs (critiques, écrivains, fragments de Blanchot, Rousset, Genette en traduction) indiquent le souci de synchronisme et de dialogue européen. L'intérêt de ce numéro, qui mériterait une analyse plus développée, réside premièrement dans les réponses de type « littérature » ou « document » à la question implicite du journal comme genre ambigu, protéique. Car, de façon évidente, ces réponses ont une double détermination — théorique et politique.

Un sondage rapide révélerait que « littérature » signifie dans ce contexte des choses très différentes : personnage (E. Simion), procédé susceptible de transposition romanesque (Monica Spiridon), source d'authenticité pour le discours critique (I.B. Lefter), etc. De l'autre côté, « document » a aussi plusieurs significations : information historique, témoignage, mentalité (S. Cioculescu, Ov.S. Crohmălniceanu), refuge individuel ou subversion pendant les « époques de terreur » (E. Simion, Norman Manea), etc. Les lectures du deuxième type n'ont en commun que le fait de s'opposer aux lectures « esthétiques », rappelant « ce que les journaux contiennent en effet » (Ov.S. Crohmălniceanu). Mais, les descriptions critiques des contenus se ressemblent à s'y méprendre ; il s'ensuit que la distinction littérature-document est sans différence. Et c'est justement par ce dualisme épistémologique que le numéro des *Cahiers* représente un précieux document de la réception : il montre qu'en 1986, entre fiction et document il n'y a aucune solution de continuité.

Ce partage net se retrouve après 1989, cette fois-ci articulé comme priorité « réaliste » du document, de l'histoire, et, quant aux genres, des témoignages et des mémoires. La réception critique ne dépasse que rarement le niveau du compte-rendu apologetique ou polémique : on interroge la personnalité de l'auteur, les « faits » qu'il évoque, son idéologie, parfois son style etc. La grille de lecture est le plus souvent la vieille dichotomie subjectivité-objectivité ; l'effort de synthèse ne dépasse pas le niveau des « portraits » psychologiques et des analogies furtives.

Cependant, on arrive parfois à poser des problèmes fascinants, comme celui — inconcevable avant 89 — des rapports entre témoignage historique et historio-

graphie. Cette question, proposée d'abord par les auteurs de mémoires, devrait conduire à un débat plus complexe, avec double ouverture vers la philosophie du texte et vers celle de l'histoire. Mais les rares articles qui s'engagent sur ce terrain semblent s'organiser autour des vieux présupposés positivistes d'une historiographie exacte, objective, scientifique, par rapport à laquelle le témoignage individuel serait ou bien une source d'information ou bien une déformation. Dans un numéro de la revue *Dilema* qui porte le titre « Mémoire et mémoires », deux articles expriment ces points de vue opposés. L'historien Z. Ornea affirme que les mémoires (ceux qu'il appelle « historiographiques » en les distinguant des « mémoires des écrivains ») peuvent servir comme sources à l'historien contemporain qui tente d'élucider « les dossiers historiques les plus chargés ». Il garde cet « espoir » en dépit du fait que la plupart des éditions parues sont jugées inutilisables comme « instruments scientifiques⁵⁸ ». A l'optimisme de Ornea, le critique Dan C. Mihăilescu répond par un désespoir orwellien : il regarde la vague des témoignages contemporains comme un substitut des « documents exacts » et il n'hésite pas de comparer la « passion actuelle pour le passé » avec les mobiles troubles des romans « obsédantistes ». L'image qu'offrent ces témoignages serait celle d'une « histoire défigurée ; une aporie, un labyrinthe de type Luna Park ».

Malgré cet intérêt prédominant pour l'histoire, la seule monographie sur la littérature de frontière publiée après 89 est dédiée toujours au journal intime. Pour Mircea Mihăieș (qui esquissait le projet d'une « poétique inductive » du journal dès 1986, dans le numéro cité des « Cahiers de critique littéraire »), celui-ci représente « l'espèce fondamentale de l'autobiographique », la matrice des autres types de journal⁵⁹. Son essai sur « le journal intime et le suicide » est une tentative courageuse de concilier la poétique avec la critique des profondeurs. Il contient deux analyses des journaux de Sylvia Plath et de Drieu la Rochelle qui témoignent d'un certain penchant existentialiste et psychanalytique. Cependant, si on lit la préface on a la vive impression d'un malentendu : « On s'était habitué à juger la valeur d'un auteur selon la profondeur esthétique de ses expériences métaphysiques. Mais aujourd'hui on doit tenir compte de la description exacte des lieux, d'événements et de personnages (réels) [...] ; l'art d'écrire a été remplacé par l'art de la remémoration. Les vedettes du moment sont des auteurs comme Ioan Ioanid, Lena Constante et I.D. Suci (sic!)...⁶⁰ ». Selon cette rhétorique dé-canonisante, la littérature du « document » ou du « réel » imposerait par une mort de la fiction, qui expie ainsi des vieux péchés esthético-métaphysiques. Si cette leçon du présent est effective, pourquoi s'occuper de Sylvia Plath et de Drieu la Rochelle à la place de Ioanid et de Lena Constante ? L'appel à la littérature des prisons serait-il la meilleure manière de préfacier une problématique du journal et du suicide ?

Le procès de canonisation que nous avons mis en évidence n'est pas univoque : à présent, de nombreuses voix s'élèvent pour « défendre » l'art et même « la culture » contre une soit-disant concurrence injuste des textes de frontière. Le fait de publier des mémoires ou des journaux est jugé parfois indigne d'un écrivain et opportuniste, véritable « trahison du métier ». Ces métaphores agonaux admettent de manière implicite ce que les discours respectifs refuseront en principe : l'évidence que « la frontière » n'est pas immuable. Notre étude a tenté de dégager des rapports moins tranchants, sans adhérer en cela à une perspective dé-canonisante. Des livres comme ceux de Steinhardt, Negoïțescu, Goma, Ciocârlie, Patapievici, Stoiciu, etc. dessinent un espace de liminarité qui fournit des alternatives à la fois éthiques et esthétiques, idéologiques et littéraires. Leur message est contraire à tout retranchement de type « réaliste » ou « esthétique », à toute logique du genre « ou... ou ».

Notes

1. Philippe Lejeune, *Le pacte autobiographique*, Seuil, col. « Poétique », 1975, p. 14
2. Georges May, *L'Autobiographie*, P.U.F., 1979, deuxième partie, « L'Autobiographie et les genres avoisinants », p. 46
3. Béatrice Didier, *Le journal intime*, P.U.F., 1976, p. 160.
4. Georges May, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–58.
5. Radu Toma, *Epistemă, ideologie, roman — secolul al XVIII-lea francez (Episteme, idéologie, roman — le XVIII-e siècle français)*, Bucarest, « Univers », 1982, pp. 101–104.
6. Georges May, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
7. Maurice Blanchot, *Le livre à venir*, Gallimard, col. « Idées », 1971.
8. Jean Rousset, *Le lecteur intime : de Balzac au journal*, José Corti, 1986, p. 15.
9. *ibid.*, pp. 158–159.
10. *ibid.*, pp. 160–162.
11. Roland Barthes, « La Délibération », dans *Tel Quel*, no. 82, 1979.
12. Philippe Lejeune, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–45. La théorie de Lejeune reprend la conception de Georges Gusdorf sur l'autobiographie, qui déplaçait la question des « faits » sur « un plan de signification anthropologique », plaidant pour une critique qui « au lieu de vérifier la connexion matérielle du récit ou de mettre en lumière sa valeur artistique tentera de dégager la signification intime et personnelle [...] comme symbole d'une conscience en quête de sa propre vérité » (Georges Gusdorf, *Conditions et limites de l'autobiographie*, apud. May, *op. cit.*, p. 90).
13. Jean Rousset offre une typologie des « degrés de destination » du journal intime (« autodestination », « autodestination externe » etc.) en précisant les rapports avec les modalités de publication (*op. cit.*, pp. 143–148).
14. *ibid.*, pp. 15, 152.
15. *ibid.*, p. 157.
16. *ibid.*, p. 155.
17. *ibid.*, p. 172.
18. Philippe Lejeune, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

19. Pour les sens historiques du concept d'authenticité, voir Adrian Marino, *Dictionar de idei literare (Dictionnaire des idées littéraires)*, vol. I, « Eminescu », 1973, pp. 160–176.
20. Philippe Lejeune, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 33.
21. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Les Confessions*, dans *Œuvres complètes*, vol. I, Pléiade, 1959, I, 3.
22. *ibid.*, I, 5.
23. Roland Barthes, *Roland Barthes*, Seuil, col. « Écrivains de toujours », 1975, p. 124.
24. *ibid.*, p. 145.
25. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *op. cit.*, p. 1154. Pour les paradoxes de la poétique de l'expression chez Rousseau, voir aussi Jean Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau — la transparence et l'obstacle*, Plon, 1957.
26. Roland Barthes, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–61.
27. Jacques Derrida, *Mémoires pour Paul de Man*, Galilée, col. « La philosophie en effet », 1988, p. 9.
28. *ibid.*, p. 45.
29. *ibid.*, p. 49.
30. *ibid.*, p. 72. Le fragment est de *Blindness and Insight*.
31. *ibid.*, p. 46.
32. *ibid.*, pp. 99–100.
33. *ibid.*, p. 103.
34. Voir *De la grammatologie*, Editions de Minuit, 1967, chap. « Le dehors et le dedans », où la tradition du « logocentrisme » est illustrée par Platon, Rousseau (les écrits théoriques sur la prononciation) et Saussure.
35. Jacques Derrida, *Mémoires pour Paul de Man*, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
36. *ibid.*, p. 72.
37. *idem*. Le thème de « l'archive », préfiguré dans un essai sur Freud de 1967 (« Freud et la scène de l'écriture », dans *L'Écriture et la différence*, Seuil), se retrouve dans un livre récent, *Mal d'archive*, Galilée, col. « Incises », 1995.
38. *Mémoires...*, *op. cit.*, p. 108. Voir *La différence*, dans *Théorie d'ensemble*, Seuil, 1969.
39. On se rappelle la réponse que le roi Thamouos donnait, dans le *Phèdre*, au dieu Theuth qui vantait les mérites de l'écriture (« ...mémoire aussi bien qu'instruction ont trouvé leur remède! »): « Ce n'est donc pas pour la mémoire, c'est pour la remémoration que tu as trouvé un remède. Quant à l'instruction, ce n'est que la semblance que tu procures à tes élèves, et non point la réalité ». Car, pour Socrate, l'écriture n'est que le simulacre du discours légitime qui « s'écrit dans l'âme de l'homme » (Platon, *Phèdre*, dans *Œuvres complètes*, tome IV, troisième partie, 274 b-d, 276 b, texte établi et traduit par Léon Robin, Société d'Édition « Les belles lettres », 1933, pp. 88, 90). Cependant, Socrate trouvait une excuse à l'écriture en tant que divertissement moins grossier que les divertissements habituels. Dans ce contexte, il esquisse le portrait de quelqu'un qui pourrait être Platon, mais qui est un aperçu du mémorialiste moderne: « ... mais quand il lui arrive d'écrire, c'est un trésor de remémorations qu'ainsi il se constitue, et à lui-même en cas qu'il arrive à l'oublieuse vieillesse, et à quiconque suit la même piste » (276 b, *op. cit.*, p. 91). Rousseau déplore souvent son « défaut de mémoire », mais ce qu'il entend par là n'est pas, évidemment, le souvenir, l'unité de la mémoire et du sentiment, mais l'équivalent de la « remémoration » platonicienne. Les troubles occasionnels de mémoire n'affectent pas l'ensemble du portrait, qui reste « vrai »: « Je n'ai rien tu de mauvais, rien ajouté de bon, et s'il m'est arrivé d'employer quelque ornement indifférent,

ce n'a jamais été que pour remplir un vide occasionné par mon défaut de mémoire. J'ai pu supposer vrai ce que je savais avoir pu l'être, jamais ce que je savais être faux » (*Les Confessions*, *op. cit.*, I, 5–6). Au contraire, le souvenir peut totaliser l'existence en faisant revivre le passé à partir de la sensation présente: comme l'a montré Starobinski, les lacunes, les déformations, les fantasmes acquièrent la même valeur de document que les détails les plus exacts (*op. cit.*). H.R. Jauss a insisté, dans une étude sur l'histoire de l'autobiographie, sur le fait que « l'unité de la mémoire et du sentiment comme nouvelle instance de la vérité » chez Rousseau comporte un renversement complet des attributs négatifs que Saint Augustin assignait à la mémoire humaine et une « usurpation » des attributs divins (voir « Schiță pentru o teorie și o istorie a experienței estetice » [« Esquisse d'une théorie et d'une histoire de l'expérience esthétique »], dans H.R. Jauss, *Experiență estetică și hermeneutică literară [Expérience esthétique et hermeneutique littéraire]*, trad. en roumain par Andrei Corbea, Bucarest, « Univers », 1983, 8c, pp. 234–248). Le « Livre VI » des *Confessions*, qui décrit les diverses méthodes employées par le jeune Rousseau pour corriger son peu d'aptitude pour l'étude, représente une variation sur le motif du *Phèdre*. Le héros s'efforce « d'apprendre par cœur » des passages des livres ou des mots latins pour... « me donner par force de la mémoire »; « forcer ma mémoire à prendre de la capacité », etc. C'est, évidemment, une plaidoirie indirecte, ironique, pour la mémoire-intériorité. On pourrait rappeler aussi, comme dénégation de cette théorie, le fameux épisode des lettres volées du douzième livre. Pour commencer le travail, ses « Mémoires », Rousseau transcrit « des lettres dans un recueil qui put guider ma mémoire dans l'ordre des faits et des temps ». Une « lacune de près de six mois » dans cette suite qui couvre dix ans — la perte ou le vol de quelques lettres — lui cause beaucoup d'ennui. N'est-ce pas là un aveu du caractère indirect, secondaire du souvenir par rapport avec la remémoration hypomnésique dont Derrida fait l'éloge? Mais, avant Derrida, c'est Bachelard — poéticien des « images » et des « rêveries » — qui s'est insurgé contre « le mythe d'une mémoire universelle » de type rousseauiste ou bergsonian. La mémoire n'est qu'une « faculté tardive », liée à la raison, à l'existence sociale et aux techniques: elle implique toujours une intention présente, une schématisation langagière et intellectuelle, des « cadres » plutôt qu'une substance. Car... « un souvenir non-daté n'est pas un véritable souvenir, [...] il reste une rêverie mêlée d'illusions » (Gaston Bachelard, *Dialectique de la durée*, P.U.F., 1950, pp. 45–50).

40. Georges May propose de réunir sous cette étiquette tous les écrits — les anciens genres historiques aussi bien que ceux appartenant au journalisme moderne — rédigés « sous la forme des mémoires dont l'auteur est à peu près totalement absent » (*op. cit.*, p. 50).

41. Pour simplifier les notes, les citations des textes commentés dans ce chapitre seront marquées entre parenthèses. Le nombre de la page renvoie aux éditions indiquées dans la bibliographie. La traduction des fragments nous appartient.

42. Le concept d'*autobiographie*, très fréquent dans la critique anglo-américaine, est plutôt rare dans les études roumaines, où l'espèce est confondue avec les mémoires. Dans son *Dictionnaire...*, Adrian Marino ne lui accorde que deux pages, à la fin de l'article sur la biographie. Il garde comme définition valable l'acception romantique du terme, « la forme suprême du procès biographique... dans laquelle la création et la biographie coïncident » (*op. cit.*, pp. 280–282). L'Histoire du concept est examinée par Georges May, qui montre aussi que, du point de vue générique, l'autobiographie se détache au fur et à mesure des mémoires, en dérivant ses structures propres de la biographie et du roman (*op. cit.*, voir la deuxième partie, « L'autobiographie et les genres avoisinants »).

43. Le thème du « dialogue » se retrouve dans beaucoup de préfaces des textes contemporains. *Souvenirs en dialogue* de Matei Călinescu et Ion Vianu est, de plus, un livre rédigé de manière dialogique: « *Souvenirs...* est un livre de mémoires entretissées, dont le projet fut esquissé le printemps de 1991, dans la correspondance de Matei Călinescu avec Ion Vianu. Le premier a suggéré au second ce projet de mémoires; Vianu l'a jugé bon et s'est offert d'écrire lui-même le premier chapitre... » (Matei Călinescu, Ion Vianu, *Souvenirs en dialogue*, « Eminescu », 1995, « Notice introductive »).

44. Derrida lui consacre d'amples commentaires dans *Mal d'archive* (*op. cit.*, voir la note 37).

45. Dans le journal de Florența Albu on trouve ces lignes sur la fonction du journal, écrites après la lecture d'un numéro des « Cahiers de critique littéraire » dédié au journal (voir le dernier chapitre de notre étude): « Chaque époque cherche une motivation au journal, plus ou moins „intime“ ... Je crois qu'à présent seulement le journal qu'on garde dans un tiroir, le *journal subversif*, peut exprimer un point de vue critique, l'envers du discours officiel, le retranchement de l'individu dans la solitude, là où il trouve encore le courage misérable de hurler sa révolte, d'être soi-même » (p. 370).

46. Dans ses *Mémoires*, Eliade évoque les projets de sa jeunesse: des livres « appartenant à la fois au carnet d'idées, au journal intime, à la monographie érudite, à la correspondance et à la réflexion philosophique » (Mircea Eliade, *Memorii*, vol. I–II, « Humanitas », 1991, vol. I, p. 177). Un projet analogue est mentionné par Virgil Nemoianu comme typique pour les années '70: « un micro-essai situé à la frontière de la littérature et du théorique, ... avec des personnages *ad-hoc*, plutôt des „clefs musicales“, ... et des chapitres thématiques » (pp. 359–360).

47. *Competiția continuă — Generația 80 în texte teoretice; o antologie de Gh. Crăciun*, « Vlasie », 1994; voir les textes signés par I. Buduca, Al. Mușina, M. Cărtărescu, I. B. Letfer, Simona Popescu, Gh. Crăciun.

48. L'article le plus saisissant sur l'authenticité est « Dialogul în proza scurtă III » (« Le dialogue dans le récit court III ») de Mircea Nedelciu. L'auteur s'interroge sur les conséquences du procédé postmoderniste de « l'apparition de l'auteur (avec son nom propre) dans un texte littéraire »; cette problématique implique quelques coïncidences remarquables avec les théories de Lejeune (*ibid.*, pp. 286–291).

49. Silvan Iosifescu, *Literatura de frontieră (La littérature de frontière)*, deuxième édition, éditions « Enciclopedică », 1971.

50. George Călinescu, *Cronicile optimistului (Les chroniques d'un optimiste)*, E.P.L., 1964. Călinescu allait modérer ses jugements, sans en changer l'essence: « Extraire de soi-même l'homme universel ne veut pas dire égoïsme; [...] égoïste est celui qui parle de soi-même en mettant l'accent sur ce qui est accidentel dans l'existence » (*op. cit.*, pp. 69, 76).

51. Eugen Simion, *Sfidarea retoricii (Le défi à la rhétorique)*, « Cartea Românească », 1985, chap. « Jurnalul lui Rebreanu » (« Le journal de Rebreanu »), p. 276.

52. Gérard Genette, *Seuils*, seuil, col. « Poétique », 1987, pp. 355–363.

53. Mihai Zamfir, *Cealaltă față a prozei (La face cachée de la prose)*, « Eminescu », 1988, chap. « Jurnal de criză și jurnal de existență » (« Le journal de la crise et le journal de l'existence »), pp. 104–139, p. 105–106.

54. *ibid.*, p. 108.

55. *ibid.*, p. 109.

56. « ...moi-même et les autres personnages [...] ne sommes que les agents accidentels d'une situation *exemplaire* [...] même la personne de Noica devient accidentelle, et tout ce qu'on pourra trouver comme épisode, anecdote, nom, — bref « indiscretion » — peut être

excusé au niveau de « l'universel concret », c'est-à-dire du fait que l'esprit ne peut agir que s'il se donne un corps » (Gabriel Liiceanu, *Jurnalul de la Păltiniș*, édition revue, « Humanitas », 1991, pp. 19–20). Aujourd'hui, quand on connaît la suite « épistolaire » de ce livre, on pourrait se demander combien de ses « personnages » ont consenti à ce type de lecture...

57. « Caiete critice », no. 3–4, 1986.

58. *Dilema*, no. 126, Juin 1995. Zigu Ornea, « Memorialistica istoriografică » (« Les mémoires historiographiques »), p. 10; Dan C. Mihăilescu, « Refugii, rătăcirii, capcane. Memoria ca impas » (« Réfuges, érrances, pièges. La mémoire comme impasse »), p. 6.

59. Mircea Mihăieș, *Cărțile crude — jurnalul intim și sinuciderea (Les livres cru(els) — le journal intime et le suicide)*, Timișoara, « Amarcord », 1995, p. 193.

60. *ibidem.*, pp. 7–8.

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
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Des échos roumains dans la presse française l'illustration, 1843–1944

I. Introduction

1. *Préliminaires historiographiques*
2. *Prétextes pour une méthodologie*

1. L'histoire des relations franco-roumaines est un sujet qui a fait couler beaucoup d'encre. Il serait inutile de retracer maintenant l'historiographie complète de ce problème par rapport à notre démarche effective. C'est pour cela que nous allons nous limiter à quelques données que nous considérons comme significatives dans l'économie de notre essai.

L'histoire de ces relations comporte plusieurs chapitres dont nous rappelons ceux qui concernent l'éducation des jeunes Roumains à Paris au XIX^e siècle, la pénétration de la culture française dans l'espace roumain (et, implicitement, la formation d'une certaine image de la France dans la conscience des autochtones), mais aussi les stéréotypes utilisés par les voyageurs et les diplomates de l'Hexagone de passage à travers les Principautés, les publications qui ont soutenu la cause roumaine et ont contribué à la formation d'une opinion sur la Moldavie et la Valachie (à l'égard notamment des événements du milieu du siècle dernier), les relations politiques et diplomatiques des deux pays, etc. Il faut remarquer que tous ces thèmes ont fait l'objet d'études extrêmement sérieuses centrées surtout sur la fin du XVIII^e siècle et la première moitié du siècle suivant. Mais les obsessions de l'historiographie roumaine, plus ou moins récente, ont subordonné cette thématique soit à une référence égocentrique, nationale, soit à un déterminisme socialisant¹.

En ce qui nous concerne, nous voulons initier une étude d'imagologie plus vaste qui prenne comme point de départ la presse française. Nous essayons de nous montrer à la hauteur des démarches antérieures qui jouissent d'un prestige incontestable: V. V. Haneş (*Formarea opiniei franceze asupra României în secolul al XIX-lea*, 2 vol, Craiova-Bucureşti, 1929), V. Mihordea (*Les Principautés Roumaines dans la presse française au XVII^e siècle, 1680–1699. Extraits de « La Gazette », Paris, 1932*) ou N. Isar (*Publiciştii francezi şi cauza română*,

1834–1859, București, 1991; *Istoria modernă a Românilor. Imaginea societății românești în Franța, 1778–1848*, București, 1992).

A cette occasion, nous allons présenter seulement une partie de notre travail de recherche, mené à la Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine (fond périodiques; cote P.I.III. 13714), mais aussi à la bibliothèque parisienne S-te Geneviève (fond microfilms; cote Mm 132). Cette partie a comme sujet la manière dans laquelle certains aspects de la société roumaine se reflètent dans les pages de la revue *L'Illustration* tout au long de sa parution (1843–1944).

2. La nouveauté de notre essai vient du fait que les historiens roumains ne font que très rarement référence dans leurs ouvrages à la revue *L'Illustration*. On peut rappeler cependant l'article de V. Buduru², paru dans *Magazin Istoric*, concernant l'*Album moldo-valaque* (1848) d'Adolphe Billecoq³, album auquel font aussi allusion G. Oprescu, V.V. Haneș et N. Isar⁴. On trouve aussi de courtes notes sur la revue parisienne dans les commentaires ou les éditions des œuvres de Vasile Alecsandri (à propos de la variante française de sa prose *Balta Albă / Le Lac Blanc*, publiée en 1854)⁵.

Notre démarche tire également sa nouveauté du changement de regard sur les Principautés Roumaines (la Roumanie) dans la presse française. A savoir que c'est la source, ayant une continuité de plus de cent ans, qui édifie elle-même le sujet. Le découpage contextuel (la révolution de 1848 ou l'union de 1859), la personnalité de tel journaliste ou de tel diplomate français qui écrit à un moment donné sur les Roumains, ne sont plus des critères valables pour constituer l'objet de la recherche, comme ils l'étaient pour V.V. Haneș, O. Boitoș, L. Maior, V. Lungu, R. Pantazi, M. Bucur, N. Isar etc. Nous éliminons ainsi toute prémisse de falsification du sujet de la part de l'auteur, laissant la source française se dérouler et se dévoiler d'elle-même. Dans la longue durée nous allons essayer de trouver les moments d'expression les plus intenses et, bien sûr, ceux du plus grand intérêt pour celui qui regarde. Dans un livre publié en 1979, Al. Dușu⁶ souligne le fait que ces moments remémorent les stéréotypes à date historique, en les revigorant ou en les annulant, en fonction du contact affectif entre deux cultures ou d'une certaine préférence/option de celui qui regarde. La même idée est soutenue par K. Heitmann lorsqu'il analyse les causes de la formation des images des Roumains dans l'espace linguistique allemand⁷. Donc, pour qu'une image puisse se manifester telle quelle, elle doit remplir plusieurs conditions de composition. Selon l'opinion de L. Trénard, il y en aurait trois, c'est-à-dire, que l'objet en soi soit bien reflété dans un miroir, qu'il soit inscrit dans la longue durée, et, finalement, que l'image soit composée d'une série de reflets de ce type provenant de milieux différents: sociaux, politiques, d'instruction, etc.⁸ Dans son essai publié en Roumanie en 1981, dans la revue *Synthesis*, D.H. Pageaux s'arrête sur deux conditions seulement: sources et

interprétations différentes; longue durée⁹. Dans le même contexte, le professeur de littérature comparée de la Sorbonne proposait quatre types de fonctionnement des images (se référant surtout aux images littéraires, mais leur degré de généralité permet l'extension de la zone imagologique). Ces types sont conditionnés par la position hiérarchique ou de qualité que la culture d'origine (celle qui regarde) confère à la culture étrangère (l'altérité, la culture regardée). Ainsi, entre la culture étrangère et la culture d'origine s'établit un des quatre rapports suivants: (1) de supériorité, (2) d'infériorité négative, (3) d'égalité positive, et (4) visant l'emprunt culturel¹⁰. Notre démarche retrouvera un de ces quatre rapports, sauf que, dans notre cas, on ne peut pas parler, pour le moment, d'une image, mais simplement d'une touche (vu que la source discutée ne remplit que le critère de la durée) de ce que sera plus tard une image au sens plein du mot. Elle devrait inclure les diverses représentations dans la presse, mais aussi les impressions mises en circulation par les relations de voyage ou par les volumes à part.

Pour conclure, il faut dire que notre essai est le fruit d'un travail qui n'a rien de spectaculaire, qui veut seulement se constituer en index des thèmes roumains qui ont présenté un certain intérêt pour la presse illustrée française de 1843 jusqu'en 1944.

Puisque nous avons touché le problème du transfert de l'image d'une certaine culture dans l'autre, on ne peut pas ne pas se demander combien de Français se sont fait, dans une période de temps établie, une certaine opinion sur les Principautés Roumaines (sur la Roumanie). La réponse à cette question pourrait offrir le deuxième critère dont on aurait besoin pour parler effectivement d'une image. Mais il est difficile de différencier les lecteurs de la revue car il y va de leur fidélité envers une certaine rubrique. Or, si le texte n'apparaît pas dans cette rubrique, il est fort possible qu'il passe inaperçu par les lecteurs. La seule opération que nous pourrions faire pour rester dans les propos théoriques énoncés ci-dessus serait d'associer à notre étude une autre concernant les connaissances sur tel ou tel sujet que les lecteurs d'une revue auraient acquises à l'école. Dans ce cas on ne peut pas opérer une différenciation des lecteurs, des récepteurs, on peut seulement offrir une alternative des informations qu'ils acquerraient par la presse. Cependant, les brèves notations à propos du tirage, du public ou du prix de la revue ne nous semblent pas tout à fait superflues. Elles nous donnent une idée sur le référentiel numérique qui peut nous indiquer l'audience possible d'un sujet quelconque. Il est de même avec l'intérêt pour les options politiques de la revue qui nous fournissent un certain nombre d'indices sur ses lecteurs. Et last, but not least, toutes ces informations parlent de l'importance de *L'Illustration* dans l'ensemble de la presse française.

II. Le Destin d'une revue; L'Illustration, 1843–1944

1. *Journalistes, options politiques, thématique générale*
2. *Public, prix, diffusion*

1. *L'Illustration* parut à Paris le 4 mars 1843. Ayant aussi un modèle britannique¹¹, les quatre fondateurs du journal (A. Joanne, E. Charton, J. B. A. Paulin, J. J. Dubochet)¹² proposaient aux lecteurs un mariage relativement insolite à cette époque-là entre le texte écrit et l'image (gravure sur bois) qui l'aurait rendu encore plus expressif. L'idée était explicitement formulée dès le premier numéro — voir l'article programme « Notre but » — et soutenue par des arguments favorables pour chaque domaine qui allait être présenté dans les pages de la revue (événements politiques, mœurs du monde entier, biographies, théâtre, arts, vie quotidienne, mode, etc.¹³).

Cette conception du journalisme n'ignorait pas les techniques classiques d'information, tels la lecture de la presse étrangère, les correspondances des envoyés spéciaux, les collaborations des lecteurs et le recours aux agences de presse. Mais les difficultés de la correspondance ne pouvaient être compensées que partiellement par l'image. On sait que l'intervalle entre l'événement et sa présentation dans le journal était très long; une lettre d'Alger à Paris mettait, vers 1840, à peu près une semaine, tandis que les nouvelles de Tahiti n'arrivaient pas avant quatre mois.¹⁴

Le premier rédacteur en chef (et aussi gérant) du journal fut Jean Baptiste Alexandre Paulin (1843–59), un journaliste connu, qui venait du cercle libéral-républicain du *National*. L'appartenance de Paulin à la famille politique libérale allait imprimer au journal une orientation d'opposition à tous les régimes politiques successifs de cette période-là, sauf quelques exceptions pendant l'année 1848¹⁵. Cette orientation aurait valu à Paulin une série d'avertissements de la part de la police et même de l'empereur Napoléon III.

Les événements de première page jusqu'à la fin des années soixante du siècle dernier ont été: *la colonisation de l'Algérie* (les années quarante), *la guerre de Crimée* (1853–56) — qui dévoilait un fort sentiment russophile, *l'unification de l'Italie* (1856–59), etc. A tout cela s'ajoutaient les présentations pittoresques des régions lointaines ou inconnues jusqu'à ce moment-là. La rubrique hebdomadaire de politique externe, *Histoire de la semaine*, éveillait aussi un fort intérêt.

Après la mort de Paulin, son fils, Victor, prend la direction du journal pour une courte période (1859–60).

A partir de 1860, *L'Illustration* entre dans la deuxième phase de son existence¹⁶, qui voit se succéder à sa direction Auguste Marc (1860–86)¹⁷ et Lucien Marc (1886–1903)¹⁸. Les difficultés financières ainsi que les chicanes de la censure impériale héritées de Paulin ont entravé le redressement initié par le nouveau rédacteur en chef. Il y avait aussi la concurrence acerbe du journal *Le Monde Illustré*, un journal soutenu par le Ministère de l'Intérieur, étant catalogué parmi les journaux non-politiques, ce que l'on ne pouvait pas dire à propos de *L'Illustration*. Après 14 ans environ de monopole de l'information politique illustrée (1843–57), information absente des pages du *Magasin Pittoresque*, un concurrent appuyé par le pouvoir ébranlait cette suprématie.

Auguste Marc allait voir les effets de son effort de redressement du journal tard, vers 1880. Finalement, il n'a pas renoncé à l'article politique. La ligne générale était marquée par le patriotisme républicain, mais aussi par l'antiparlementarisme et l'antisocialisme (surtout après 1895–1900, lorsqu'il attaquait Jean Jaurès, « le Saint Jean Bouche d'Or du socialisme¹⁹ »). Un dossier important de la revue a été fourni — d'une manière très prévisible — par l'affaire Dreyfus. Les événements politiques extérieurs ont gardé une place significative dans l'économie du journal qui publiait de longs articles sur *la guerre d'Europe orientale* (1877–78), sur *l'amitié franco-russe* (prémisse d'un puissant sentiment russophile²⁰), sur *les Expositions universelles parisiennes* (1867, 1878, 1889, 1900), etc. On pouvait aussi remarquer l'anglophobie, devenue traditionnelle dans *L'Illustration*, ainsi que l'attitude prudente envers le pangermanisme.

Pendant « la dynastie » Marc, de nombreuses nouveautés techniques de l'époque ont été adaptées au profil de la revue, telles le procédé de l'héliogravure (1869), les photographies, les premières planches en couleurs (1884) ou les premières couvertures en couleurs (1887), etc.

Au XX^e siècle, on trouve « à la une » de *L'Illustration* des informations sur *les deux guerres mondiales*, sur *la guerre civile de l'Espagne*, et sur *les Expositions universelles* de 1929 (Barcelone), 1935 (Bruxelles), 1937 (Paris), 1939 (San Francisco et New York). D'une importance centrale dans l'économie de la revue ont été aussi, dans les années trente et quarante, les rubriques permanentes de politique étrangère et de guerre: *Politique et diplomatie* et *Les événements et les hommes*. A noter aussi les numéros spéciaux (et les « hors-série ») qui avaient comme sujets *les familles royales européennes* ou certains Etats du monde.

Entre 1904–44, le journal a été dirigé par René Baschet²¹. Cette période fut la meilleure du point de vue financier (surtout entre 1929–32), mais, en même temps, elle annonça son déclin et sa disparition. La revue a été accusée d'avoir collaboré avec les nazis et d'avoir reçu des autorités allemandes 20 millions de francs. En 1945, une nouvelle revue, *France Illustration*, suivit, mais elle

ne résista pas à la nouvelle concurrence. Ce n'est qu'en 1954 qu'elle fut réhabilitée par décret présidentiel.²²

2. Essayons de voir de qui était formé le public de cette revue. Pour trouver une réponse, il faut souligner premièrement que *L'Illustration* a toujours été une revue assez chère : 75 centimes (en 1843), 1–2 francs vers 1900. Jusqu'en 1944 son prix a augmenté jusqu'à 5–10 francs. En 1912 la revue coûtait plus qu'un kilo de pain (30 centimes), de lait (40 centimes) ou de pommes de terre (1,17 francs) et moins qu'un kilo de beurre (4 francs)²³. À côté d'un prix assez élevé, *L'Illustration* avait aussi un format qui ne lui permettait pas d'être vendue par les vendeurs ambulants comme la presse populaire. On la trouvait seulement dans les kiosques et les librairies. Mais, ce sont ces caractéristiques qui lui conféraient, en partie, le statut qu'elle avait acquis vers la fin de son existence :

« un des journaux typiques de la vieille bourgeoisie française, une revue réputée pour sa modération, sa pondération, son patriotisme²⁴ ».

Deuxièmement, on note que l'orientation politique de la revue a pu influencer et créer également un public spécifique. Presque toujours en opposition modérée par rapport au pouvoir, *L'Illustration* s'est manifestée clairement contre tous les extrêmes, et surtout contre l'extrême gauche. Les dernières années d'existence, la rédaction a été attirée par la droite politique, option qui lui a valu de graves accusations après la deuxième guerre mondiale²⁵.

Mais comment se présentait le public de cette revue du point de vue numérique ? Dans *L'Histoire générale de la presse française*, mais aussi dans la monographie de J.N. Marchandiau, une série de documents nous renseignent sur le tirage et le nombre des lecteurs de la revue (abonnés ou lecteurs occasionnels). Le tirage a augmenté de 13 400 exemplaires en 1843²⁶ à 52 000 en 1900, pour dépasser les 100 000 exemplaires en 1908, et atteindre le maximum en 1940 (220 000)²⁷. En 1938, on estimait le nombre de lecteurs à environ un million, dont 13% à Paris, 69% en province et 18% à l'étranger²⁸. Quant à la diffusion à l'étranger, une statistique de mai 1931 montre que sur une moyenne de 206.855 exemplaires diffusés en une semaine, 149.469 restaient en France et les autres partaient pour 148 pays étrangers dont la Belgique (10 306), l'Algérie (4 172), la Suisse (3 995), les États Unis d'Amérique (2 996), les Pays Bas (2 225), l'Italie (2.118), la Roumanie (2 024), l'Espagne (1 971), la Pologne (1 788) etc.²⁹ Malgré ce grand nombre de lecteurs, le bilan financier était rarement positif : 1848–1849, 1872, 1887–1889, 1903–1909, 1911–1913, 1919, 1929, 1935, c'est-à-dire un total de 42 ans sur 102 années d'existence³⁰. Les dernières années favorables du point de vue financier ont coïncidé à une large diffusion internationale de la revue. Comme nous avons dit ci-dessus, *L'Illustration* était lue de l'Alaska jusqu'au Cap de Bonne Espérance :

« dans les palais somptueux, dans les petits cafés de province, dans les rédactions des journaux, dans les salons des dentistes, chez la demoiselle roumaine comme il faut qui a étudié le français, dans "le home" confortable du "bon vivant" auquel le journal rappelle quelques inoubliables voyages à Paris, dans toutes les institutions qui se respectent³¹. »

Après 1932, la revue a subi de grandes pertes financières, de sorte que le déficit atteignit environ 20 541 819 francs pendant les années de la seconde guerre mondiale³².

III. Les Principautés Roumaines/La Roumanie dans les pages de la revue *L'Illustration*

1. Articles spéciaux

2. Articles de contexte, informations ponctuelles

3. Faits divers, variétés

4. Exemples

– *Album Moldo-Valaque*, 1848 ;

– *Le Lac Blanc*, 1854 ;

– *Gravures/Photographies/Biographies* ;

– *La Famille royale* ;

– *La Roumanie pendant les guerres (1853–56 ; 1877–78 ; 1912–13 ; 1914–18 ; 1939–44)* ;

– *La Roumanie et les Expositions Universelles de Paris (1889, 1900, 1937)* ;

– *L'Exposition nationale de Bucarest, 1906* ;

– *La Grande Roumanie, 1929* ;

– *La Roumanie de l'entre deux guerres* ;

– *La Roumanie Nouvelle, 1939*.

1. Les informations sur les Principautés Roumaines apparurent assez tôt dans la publication parisienne ; la première nouvelle date de 27 avril 1844, elle portait le titre *La chambre Valaque* et était complétée d'une gravure représentant l'Assemblée réglementaire de la Valachie. Ce court article était inclus dans la rubrique permanente de politique générale *Histoire de la Semaine*³³.

Jusqu'en 1848 on ne trouve plus d'autre article sur les Principautés. À partir d'août 1848, la revue commençait à publier une série dont le titre était *Album Moldo-Valaque* (six articles entre 5 août et 30 septembre). L'*Album* a paru aussi « hors-série » au mois de décembre de la même année³⁴. Il faut souligner que la presse française ou francophone était, dans les années 30–50 du XIX^e siècle, très réceptive aux problèmes roumains. Des articles importants paraissaient

souvent dans le *Journal des Débats*, *Le National*, *L'Annuaire Lessur*, *La Revue Britannique*, *Le Temps*, *L'Europe Littéraire*, *Le Constitutionnel*, *La Revue du Nord*, *Le Courier de Londres*, *Le Portofolio*, *Le Siècle*, *La Réforme*, *Mercure de Souabe*, *La Patrie*, *L'Esprit public*, *La Gazette de Cologne*, *Revue Indépendante*, *Revue des Deux Mondes*³⁵. Une bonne partie de ces articles étaient commandés et même écrits par les Roumains qui avaient de nombreux contacts avec les milieux intellectuels et politiques français³⁶.

En 1854, *L'Illustration* publiait dans quatre numéros successifs (28 juillet-19 août) la prose de Basile Alecsandri — *Le Lac Blanc*. Après cette date sont à signaler les articles de Charles Doussault³⁷ sur la société et les mœurs moldo-valaques (1853, 1854, 1856), le texte et la gravure de la couverture représentant le nouveau prince de la Roumanie en 1866 (2 juin), ou les informations sur l'expulsion des juifs en 1879 (30 août), sur la construction du pont d'Anghel Saligny à Cernavoda (11 mai 1895), sur l'Exposition roumaine de 1906 (29 septembre et 6 octobre), etc.

A l'occasion de l'anniversaire de 10 ans de la proclamation de la grande Roumanie, *L'Illustration* publiait un album où signaient la reine Elisabeta de Grèce, la princesse Ileana, la princesse Bibesco, Elena Văcărescu, l'ambassadeur français en Roumanie pendant la première guerre mondiale, St. Aulaire, ainsi que des politiques comme G.G. Mironesco et Sever Bocu, les historiens Nicolae Iorga et Henri Focillon, le politologue Guglielmo Ferrero et les journalistes d'Arnaville et Robert de Beauplan³⁸.

En 1939 la Roumanie (de Carol II) était de nouveau au premier plan, la revue lui dédiant un dossier très important occupant le numéro presque dans son entier et le supplément (du 26 août 1939) appelé *La Roumanie Nouvelle*. A la signature de Robert de Beauplan se joignaient celles des journalistes Pierre Ichac et Charles Oulmont, de l'économiste Mititiță Constantinescu, du professeur Scarlat Lambrino, du directeur général au Ministère du Travail de Roumanie, Stavri C. Cunescu, et de l'agronome Ion Scutaru³⁹.

La présence des signataires roumains, ainsi que la coïncidence presque parfaite entre l'idéologie officielle du pays et le texte des articles nous déterminent à envisager l'hypothèse de la propagande de l'équipe gouvernementale de Bucarest dans les pages de la revue française. Il faut remarquer pourtant que, dans la période 1938–39, l'intérêt pour la Roumanie était aussi justifié par l'orientation de droite de la revue de cette époque-là et par les profondes mutations politiques du centre et du sud de l'Europe. A ce sujet, il faut rappeler la série documentaire réalisée par *L'Illustration: A travers l'Europe troublée* (janvier — février 1938) qui présentait la situation politique de l'Allemagne, de la Tchécoslovaquie, de la Pologne, de la Hongrie, de la Roumanie, de la Bulgarie, de la Yougoslavie et de la Grèce⁴⁰.

2. Il y a eu pas mal d'informations de contexte qui ont porté la Roumanie dans les pages de *L'Illustration*. Pour donner un exemple nous avons choisi deux grands dossiers de la revue dans lesquels la Roumanie a sa place bien précisée. En premier lieu, il s'agit de l'image de notre pays dans le contexte des guerres européennes ou mondiales et des leurs conséquences politiques : la guerre de Crimée (1853–56), la guerre russo-turque (1877–78), les guerres balkaniques (1912–13), les deux guerres mondiales (1914–18 et 1939–44). Deuxièmement, nous intéressent les Expositions Universelles de Paris et surtout l'importance que la rédaction de la revue a donné à la Roumanie à ces occasions-là (les Expositions Universelles de 1889, 1900, 1937).

3. La revue soumettait aussi à l'attention de son public des faits divers dont le protagoniste ou la scène était la Roumanie. On peut faire un classement de ces articles ; premièrement, ce sont les faits divers typiques, sans spécifique national ou provincial ; par exemple, le 13 mars 1915, l'expérience tragique d'un inventeur de Bucarest victime de sa propre invention (un dispositif pour couper les fils de fer qui marquaient sur le front les différentes zones militaires) ; ou l'histoire des petits ours orphelins de Farcău-Brateș (10 août 1935). Il y a ensuite les visites des membres de la famille royale roumaine dans les pays d'Europe occidentale. De tels sujets étaient inclus dans la rubrique *Variétés, Fêtes et Cérémonies*, où on trouvait aussi des photo-reportages du Bucarest mondain (la présence des futurs souverains européens aux courses hippiques organisées en Roumanie — 29 novembre 1913 ; ou les rencontres d'aviation franco-roumaines — 15 novembre 1913). Enfin, *L'Illustration* présentait aussi des manifestations ayant déjà un air provincial à cause d'une rhétorique anachronique, spécifique au *nationalisme* ou à l'*européanisme* roumain. Un exemple est la narration de Camille d'Alb, *Scènes de Roumanie* (10 août 1861), qui remettait en valeur une tradition romaine retrouvée dans la vie quotidienne des paysans roumains. Il s'agissait de la coutume rituelle de battre les chiens, coutume instituée dans l'Empire après une attaque nocturne des Gaulois qui auraient trompé la vigilance des quatrupèdes, Rome étant sauvée seulement par le criaillement aigu des oies du Capitole⁴¹. On peut rappeler aussi la fête de la fraternité latine organisée à Braila (2 août 1913), ainsi que l'excursus dans l'histoire des Roumains à l'occasion de la découverte de l'étendard de Ștefan cel Mare au Monastère Zografu par un groupe de militaires français (18 juillet 1917).

Une partie des faits divers évoqués ci-dessus devient illustrative dans l'économie de notre texte pour certains aspects caractérisant une possible image de la Roumanie en France : la mythologie de l'origine latine, le stéréotype du défenseur de la civilisation européenne ou le degré d'intégration dans l'Europe mondaine.

4. Avant de commencer la série des exemples, nous voulons donner quelques détails quantitatifs concernant notre étude.

Nous avons pris en considération 115 articles (titres) dont 20 publiés jusqu'en 1900, 36 entre 1900 et 1929, et les 59 autres entre 1930 et 1944. Sur ces 115 articles, trois ont été publiés en séries de respectivement trois, quatre et six numéros consécutifs. Nous n'avons pas pris en compte les informations sur la Roumanie du temps des conflits européens.

Le plus grand photo-reportage (*La Roumanie Nouvelle*) a été publié en 1939. Il comprend 39 titres sur 31 pages, ce qui représente pratiquement toute la revue, à laquelle s'ajoute son supplément. Il faut souligner que, entre 1938–39, la Roumanie, à côté de l'Espagne, de l'Allemagne, de l'Autriche, de la Tchécoslovaquie et de la Pologne, a été au premier plan dans les pages de *L'Illustration*. L'intérêt se portait surtout sur les événements politiques qui se succédaient à Bucarest. Il y aurait deux explications à cet intérêt : d'abord, le journaliste désirait légitimement fournir les nouvelles les plus récentes d'un scénario qui semblait à l'époque capable de changer l'équilibre des forces politiques européennes, la Roumanie s'intégrant évidemment dans un tel scénario. Deuxièmement, l'activité de propagande absolument remarquable menée par le régime institué à Bucarest en février 1938 devait y jouer un rôle important.

Mais il ne faut pas s'imaginer que la revue a consacré des numéros entiers seulement à la Roumanie ; entre les deux guerres mondiales, on y trouve d'autres photo-reportages. Un exemple serait celui au sujet de la famille royale anglaise au moment de l'abdication d'Edouard VIII et de l'avènement de Georges VI (les numéros du 19 et 26 décembre 1936).

Il y a eu aussi deux albums sur les Principautés Roumaines / la Roumanie, publiés par l'imprimerie de la Société *L'Illustration* en 1848 et 1929, mais ceux-ci non plus n'ont pas été uniques dans leur genre.

L'Album Moldo-Valaque

Le texte de l'*Album Moldo-Valaque* a été écrit par Adolphe Billecocq en 1847, et les 46 gravures jointes portaient la signature des peintres Michel Bouquet⁴² et Charles Doussault. Le premier avait déjà publié en 1843, chez les Editions Goupil & Vibert, une collection de gravures intitulée *Vues et costumes pittoresques de la Valachie*, qui étaient le fruit de son séjour dans les Principautés pendant l'année 1840. Charles Doussault avait passé un certain temps en Moldavie et Valachie entre 1843–44, ayant, au départ, la tâche de représenter dans une série d'aquarelles les moments les plus importants de la visite du prince Albert de Prusse dans ce coin du monde (1843). Finalement, il est resté dans les Principautés jusqu'en 1844. Entre 1853–56, il a signé dans *L'Illustration* une série de quatre articles accompagnés d'une partie des dessins faits pendant son voyage. Adolphe Billecocq a essayé de faire publier son album dès février

1848. La preuve en est une lettre de 25 février que le diplomate avait envoyée à Crémieux — ministre, à l'époque, dans le gouvernement provisoire — lui demandant son concours pour réaliser ce projet. Mais sa démarche n'a mené à aucun résultat. En mai 1848, Billecocq a pris contact avec Jules Janin de *Journal des Débats*, mais toujours sans aucun effet⁴³. Ce n'est qu'en août-septembre que l'*Album Moldo-Valaque* allait paraître sous la forme de six articles dans la revue *L'Illustration* (5.08; 19.08; 26.08; 2.09; 16.09; 30.09). La même revue sortait aussi, en décembre 1848, un numéro spécial, « hors-série », de l'album.

Le texte de l'ancien diplomate était évidemment anti-russe (une option qui, à cette époque-là, se manifestait aussi dans d'autres journaux français)⁴⁴. Il paraît, d'ailleurs, que cela lui ait valu en 1846 son rappel des Principautés. Appartenant aux milieux politiques hostiles à Guizot, et bien sûr à la Russie, Adolphe Billecocq était persuadé que les Principautés allaient finir par être annexées par leur voisin de l'Est (« Le Nouveau Goliath »), — le cas de la Pologne⁴⁵ lui semblait, dans ce contexte, très significatif. Selon lui, les Principautés étaient la clé de l'équilibre européen, et c'était pour cela que l'Occident entier aurait dû réfléchir sérieusement au faux protectorat que la Russie avait assumé. Il y avait aussi l'argument du maintien de l'intégrité de l'Empire turc, l'annexion possible des Principautés étant en fait le signe de sa dégradation accélérée.

Dès le préambule, l'auteur soulignait combien l'image des Principautés était confuse pour la France de la première moitié du XIX^e siècle. Les ouvrages didactiques fournissaient aux futurs citoyens français des informations erronées et lacunaires sur les presque neuf millions de moldo-valaques qui vivaient en Europe⁴⁶.

« Monsieur le ministre de l'instruction publique met entre les mains de la jeunesse des collèges un ouvrage auquel maint homme d'Etat, ministre, ou membre de la représentation nationale a souvent demandé les seules notions ethnographiques qu'il possède; nous voulons parler de l'*Atlas* de Lasage, lequel enseigne dans des cartes enluminées avec des frais immenses, que des provinces, grandes à elle deux comme le tiers de la France et plus riches encore... eh bien, c'est ce croyable? L'*Atlas* de Lesage enseigne... depuis plus de trente années à la France entière, que de l'année 1806, l'époque des plus grands succès militaires de l'Empire, la Valachie et la Moldavie ont été conquises par l'empereur Alexandre et incorporées à l'empire de Russie!⁴⁷ »

L'Album visait donc à suppléer l'absence évidente d'informations concernant les Principautés. (Nous rappelons toutefois que les renseignements absents des manuels étaient bien présents, dans les années 30–50, dans la presse française.)

Adolphe Billecocq a essayé, par la suite, de saisir quelques traits caractéristiques des habitants de ce coin d'Europe. C'est sur trois aspects que l'ancien diplomate s'est penché : la tradition légendaire des Valaques et des Moldaves

qui renvoyait souvent au mythe des origines latines, la tradition orthodoxe de la spiritualité et le mélange culturel entre l'Orient et l'Occident, entre la barbarie et la civilisation.

L'auteur a noté que l'image de l'empereur Trajan était partout présente. Il a fait aussi des références à la légende de Dochia, sans nommer pourtant l'initiateur de cette tradition légendaire (Gheorghe Asachi). Pour soutenir ses affirmations, Adolphe Billecocq citait Hippolyte Desprez qui avait publié au premier janvier 1848, dans la *Revue des Deux Mondes*, un article très riche en informations sur les Principautés Roumaines :

« Les légendes n'y manquent pas (...) elles sont en général patriotiques ou religieuses, et dans les deux cas, il est rare qu'elles ne mêlent pas les temps modernes avec les temps anciens, les héros du moyen âge avec les héros romains. Il est surtout un personnage particulièrement cher à l'imagination du paysan roumain et qui lui apparaît toujours entouré de gloire et de puissance, c'est le vainqueur du roi Décébal, c'est Trajan lui-même ! Ils ne retrouvent pas seulement sa trace glorieuse dans les ruines des monuments élevés par lui sur le territoire national, ils croient reconnaître aussi sa présence dans les grandes manifestations de la nature. La voie lactée, par exemple, c'est le chemin de Trajan ; l'orage, c'est Trajan qui gronde ou qui menace ; enfin tout ce qui porte l'empreinte de la force et de la grandeur, c'est l'œuvre de Trajan, dont l'ombre paternelle n'a pas cessé de veiller sur les destinées de la Roumanie⁴⁸. »

Après Trajan et Dochia, Adolphe Billecocq a évoqué aussi d'autres personnages légendaires tels Panagia, nom emprunté à la Vierge et donné au plus haut pic des Carpathes de la Moldavie⁴⁹, ou Bucegi, qui aurait été le nom d'un lieutenant (et gendre en même temps) de Genghis-khan⁵⁰. Mais les plus belles pages sont celles sur la ville de Târgoviște :

« De même qu'après quarante jours d'un déluge universel l'arche de Noé, par le fait de l'écoulement des eaux, finit par s'arrêter en Arménie au sommet des monts Ararat, de même au premier jour marqué pour le reflux de ces flottes de race humaine qu'un invisible pouvoir avait poussé vers les régions de l'Occident, la ville de Targowist, longtemps la capitale de la Moldo-Valachie, et aujourd'hui en ruines, devint le point où s'arrêtèrent en état de société politique constituée les Romains descendants des légions de Trajan, Daces de Décébal, Huns d'Attila, Sarmates et Goths venus du Nord, Barbares de toutes formes, de toutes migrations et enfin Mongols de Gengis-Han, formant là, comme au sein de l'arche présumée, un échantillon curieux de chacune des races survivant au tourbillonnement de l'espèce humaine pendant les huit derniers siècles.

Targowist resta longtemps, comme capitale, la résidence des princes roumains ; l'un d'eux, féroce comme Néron, voluptueux comme Sardanapal, voulut prouver un jour dans un festin sa double descendance asiatique et roumaine ; il ordonna qu'on mît le feu aux quatre coins du palais ou il fêtait, dans une orgie somptueuse, de nombreux convives, et s'y fait réduire en cendres avec eux⁵¹. »

Il nous est assez difficile d'établir maintenant l'identité de ce personnage « féroce comme Néron et voluptueux comme Sardanapal » (il s'agissait probablement de Vlad l'Empaleur) ; ce qui semble intéressant du point de vue de notre essai est le fait que Billecocq reconstituait l'histoire roumaine évoquant une double ascendance, asiatique et européenne. De plus, il essayait de comprendre la mentalité des Valaques et des Moldaves en partant des leurs caractéristiques ethniques auxquelles avaient contribué tant de peuples⁵².

En définitive, les précisions sur l'origine et la succession des sociétés politiques post-diluviennes expliquaient — selon lui — du point de vue psychologique et historique, la situation réelle du milieu du XIX^e siècle, quand les Principautés étaient un mélange évident de mœurs orientaux et de formalismes occidentaux. Mais, malgré cette ambiguïté, l'héritage latin restait, sans aucun doute, reconnaissable, comme on l'a vu, dans les légendes, mais aussi dans les occupations traditionnelles des paysans ou dans les monuments dressés jadis par les colonisateurs romains⁵³.

La deuxième caractéristique culturelle qu'Adolphe Billecocq mettait en discussion était la tradition orthodoxe. Il a passé en revue les monastères de Neamț, Agapia, Bistrița, Căldărușani, Pasărea, Dintr-un lemn, Polovragi, Țigănești, Cozia, Horez, Tismana et l'église Sf. Gheorghe de Bucarest. L'auteur remarquait ensuite que les propriétés foncières de ces monastères représentaient la cinquième partie du territoire roumain. En outre, leur valeur matérielle était doublée d'une valeur symbolique ; les « couvents » moldo-valaques étaient pour Billecocq des lieux de méditation, mais également des forteresses pour des soldats. Il introduisait ainsi le thème de l'orthodoxie croisée. Mais même si les combats et la qualité de soldat dominaient dans cet espace-là, la méditation et la subtilité de l'interprétation atteignaient des profondeurs insoupçonnées. Billecocq faisait, d'ailleurs, l'éloge des gens au service de l'Eglise, ce qui ne sera plus le cas en 1856, lorsque Doussault parlera justement du niveau d'instruction extrêmement bas de ces gens⁵⁴.

Pour convaincre ses lecteurs, l'ancien consul raconta ce qui s'était passé pendant l'un de ses voyages. De retour de Constantinople, il a vu dans une église valaque le motif ornemental de l'œuf d'autruche qui décorait fréquemment les mosquées turques. Billecocq s'en est montré très étonné mais un prêtre lui a dévoilé le mystère :

« Ne trouvez pas mauvais, monsieur, que j'ose ici vous faire observer, à mon tour, que l'œuf d'autruche est un symbole qui convient tout aussi bien à la parure intérieure des églises chrétiennes qu'à celle des temples mahométans. L'autruche, en effet, ne féconde ses œufs que par la tendresse et par la sollicitude de ses regards ; sa présence, dans la maison de Dieu, enseigne donc à féconder aussi la grâce divine par un doux recueillement et par une pieuse attention aux cérémonies des saints sacrifices⁵⁵. »

L'œuf d'autruche était un élément décoratif du mobilier des églises orthodoxes des XVI^e–XVII^e siècles; il pendait devant l'autel de sorte que tout le monde le voie. Dans un article récemment paru⁵⁶, V. Căndea discutait la signification de ce motif dans la tradition de l'Église orientale. Ayant comme point de départ un texte du XIV^e siècle de l'écrivain arabe Yuhanna Ibn Abi Zakarya, inspiré du *Physiologue*, le professeur Căndea constatait que l'œuf d'autruche était le symbole de l'appel incessant à la vigilance et à l'attention nécessaires sur le chemin de l'accomplissement spirituel. A l'instar de l'autruche qui ne quitte pas des yeux ses œufs, en les gardant sans cesse, les croyants ne doivent pas s'éloigner de la prière. Celle-ci donc doit être pour l'homme ce qui était le regard de l'autruche pour ses œufs.

En faisant la description de Hanul lui Manuc, Adolphe Billecocq avait l'impression de retrouver Constantinople au milieu de Bucarest⁵⁷, bien que celle-ci ait aussi l'air d'une ville occidentale, Madrid⁵⁸. (Cette ville aussi se remarquait par le mélange culturel hispano-mauresque, elle avait donc une importante composante orientale.) Obsédé par l'image de la Russie envahissante, Adolphe Billecocq trouvait des explications de conjoncture pour la fuite de protectorat dans les bras de la Turquie européanisée⁵⁹.

Après Adolphe Billecocq, d'autres observateurs ont souligné le caractère composite de la société moldo-valaque. Sont éloquentes à cet égard les articles de Charles Doussault des années 1853–56. Voici la description du grand boyard Georges Philipesco :

« Le grand Bano Georges Philipesco reste le type élégant du passé de son pays; en voyant ce beau vieillard si grand seigneur dans ses somptueux habits, qui pourrait deviner que ce boyard vêtu à l'orientale parle le français le plus pur, et qu'il est le père ou l'oncle des charmantes jeunes femmes toutes françaises qui l'entourent dans son salon, si courtoisement ouvert aux étrangers?⁶⁰ »

Doussault a essayé aussi de saisir l'air de bazar et le mélange ethnique qui caractérisaient les Principautés⁶¹. Il y avait des Juifs, des Grecs, des Turcs, des Albanais, des Bulgares, des Serbes et les Gitans les plus nombreux de toute l'Europe (selon Vaillant)⁶², chacun avec leurs marchandises et leur empreinte ethnique.

Le Lac Blanc

Dans quatre numéros consécutifs (29 juillet – 19 août 1854), la revue *L'Illustration* publiait sous le titre *Correspondance d'Orient* la version française de la nouvelle de Basile Alecsandri, *Balta Albă*. Celle-ci avait le sous-titre, significatif d'ailleurs, *La Découverte de la Valachie par un touriste parisien*. Alecsandri

l'a écrit en 1847, lors d'une cure dans la « station » respective et l'a publiée pour la première fois à Iași, en 1848, dans le *Calendrier pour les Roumains* de Gheorghe Asachi (pp. 39–58). L'idée centrale de cette narration était justement l'image que les Occidentaux s'étaient forgée des Principautés: des régions sauvages, inconnues, qui devaient absolument être explorées.

Un tel explorateur s'avère être le personnage de Alecsandri, qui a découvert dans son voyage que si la Valachie n'est pas un pays exotique, alors sûrement il est un pays des contrastes :

« Que vous dirais-je encore ? C'était un tableau inimaginable; une mosaïque de tous les contrastes, un musée de tous les costumes: habits européens, anters et Kalpaks byzantins, guenilles tziganes; robes de chambre juives en lustrine noire, vêtements pittoresques valaques, foustanelles albanaises, etc. etc., le tout blanchissant, scintillant, et se mouvant dans la lumière du soleil⁶³. »

L'auteur a fait quelques modifications dans la version française par rapport à la roumaine. D'abord, dans les pages du journal français, chaque fragment a reçu un sous-titre: *Voyage à travers les steppes*, *Contrastes*, *Vive la France*, *Le petit oiseau* et *Paris dans les steppes*. Le jeune voyageur français est choqué quand il tombe à Balta Albă sur un magasin de modes parisiennes et un salon de coiffure⁶⁴. En même temps, il ne prend plus le repas selon la mode turque, mais selon celle roumaine et anglaise⁶⁵, etc.

Les modifications de la version française sont dues, pensons-nous, au fait que le texte s'adressait à un autre public. C'était en quelque sorte aussi une invitation aux Principautés pour les amateurs d'aventures au *happy ending*. La stupeur (évidemment ironique) du voyageur parisien à la fin du troisième épisode du récit reprend les idées reçues qu'ont les Français sur la Roumanie :

« Un magasin de soieries et de dentelles au milieu des steppes! un cabinet de lecture français sur les bords d'un lac perdu à sept cents lieues de la France! un salon de coiffure chez un peuple que j'avais soupçonné se livrer au plaisir du scalp!⁶⁶ »

Gravures/Photographies/Biographies

Nous voulons dans ce chapitre dresser la liste des personnalités politiques et militaires roumaines que nous avons retrouvées parmi les portraits parus dans la revue *L'Illustration*. Nous ne rappellerons pas ici la famille royale de Roumanie qui en a détenu clairement la suprématie. D'ailleurs, la couverture du numéro du 2 juin 1866 a été dédiée au prince Carol de Hohenzollern, première fois qu'un événement des Principautés a éveillé à un tel degré l'intérêt des lecteurs.

Jusqu'en 1866, *L'Illustration* a reproduit les gravures de Michel Bouquet et de Charles Doussault qui présentaient Grégoire Ghica, prince de la Moldavie (1849–53), Alexandre Ghica, prince de la Valachie (1834–42), Neophite, métropolitain de la Valachie en 1848, la princesse Marie Bibesco et le grand boyard Georges Philipesco. La figure d'Alexandre Ioan Cuza (1859–66) est devenue aussi connue au public français par l'intermédiaire des lithographies de Carol Popp de Szatmary et de Theodor Aman (30 juillet 1864). Au cours de l'année 1877, la revue publiait les biographies et les portraits du colonel Slăniceanu, le chef de l'État-major de l'armée roumaine à cette époque-là et de l'homme politique C. G. Costa-Foru qui mourut à 55 ans à Bucarest; en 1889, lors de l'Exposition Universelle de Paris apparaissait le portrait de l'un des plus enthousiastes adeptes de l'idée, Alexandre Ciurcu.

Après 1900, les photos des hommes politiques et des militaires de carrière roumains apparaissent de plus en plus souvent. Parmi ces photos, celles du Commissaire général de l'Exposition de 1906, C. Istrati, du Premier ministre Titu Maiorescu à la Conférence de Bucarest de 1913, accompagné des représentants de la Grèce (E. Venizelos), de la Bulgarie (Toncev), et de la Yougoslavie (Pacici). On rencontre aussi les photos des généraux Iliescu, Istrati, Averescu, pendant la première guerre mondiale, ainsi que celles du Premier ministre de 1922, Ionel Brătianu, des hommes politiques Iuliu Maniu, Sever Bocu, Constantin Sărățeanu, et du Patriarche Miron Cristea (1929). D'un intérêt spécial jouissaient à cette époque-là les biographies de Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Octavian Goga et Elena Lupescu. Le numéro de 25 août 1939 présentait presque toute l'équipe des collaborateurs de Carol II durant la dictature royale: le Premier Ministre Armand Călinescu; le Sous-secrétaire d'Etat de la Propagande, Eugen Titeanu; le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Grigore Gafencu; l'Ambassadeur de la Roumanie à Paris, Gheorghe Tătărescu; le Gouverneur de la Banque Nationale et le Ministre des Finances, Mititză Constantinescu; le Ministre du Travail, Mihai Ralea; le Directeur général du Ministère du Travail, Stavri Cunescu; le Ministre de l'Agriculture, D. Cornățeanu; le Ministre de l'Economie Nationale, Ion E. Bujoiu; le Ministre des Communications et des Travaux Publics, Mihail Ghelmegeanu; le Maire Général de Bucarest, le général Dombrovski, mais aussi leur opposant infatigable, Iuliu Maniu. Après cette date, ce sont le général Antonescu et Horia Sima qui viennent au premier plan.

La Famille royale

A l'Exposition Universelle de Paris de 1867, à côté du tableau qui reproduisait la fresque des fondateurs du monastère de Curtea de Argeș, il y avait le portrait du nouveau souverain de la Roumanie, Carol de Hohenzollern. La proximité

des images de deux fondateurs (Neagoe Basarab, le protecteur de l'orthodoxie et Carol I, le fondateur de la dynastie de Roumanie) légitimait en quelque sorte la continuation d'une tradition dynastique autochtone⁶⁷. La Constitution de 1866 s'exprimait d'ailleurs sans équivoque, en établissant le principe héréditaire dans le choix du prince et l'obligation d'élever les descendants princiers dans la religion de l'Eglise orientale (art. 82). On retrouve la même formule dans la Constitution de 1923 (art.77).

Les principes constitutionnels s'accompagnaient d'une fine propagande, de sorte que l'identification de l'Etat avec la dynastie produit l'image extrêmement éloquentes d'une *Roumanie des rois*⁶⁸. Nous trouvons l'expression la plus vive de cette image dans le règne de Carol II. Sa position politique, la propagande interne et surtout externe, son mécénat culturel, ont éveillé un grand intérêt à travers l'Europe. Tandis que son prédécesseur, Carol I, a toujours balancé entre l'honneur personnel et le devoir envers la patrie⁶⁹, et que son père, Ferdinand a été le champion de l'unification roumaine⁷⁰, Carol II a incarné le roi omnipotent, l'initiateur de *la révolution royale, le souverain des jeunes et des paysans*⁷¹. Ce portrait idéal, copié, dans ses grands lignes, d'après *L'Illustration* correspondait à l'image globale créée par la propagande de la *Nouvelle Roumanie*.

Les membres de la famille royale se sont trouvés souvent dans les pages de la revue parisienne. Nous avons ainsi compté neuf couvertures dédiées à ceux-ci lors de différentes occasions entre 1866–1931⁷²; il s'agissait soit de cérémonies privées, mondaines (tel le mariage de la princesse Ileana avec Anton de Habsburg dans le numéro du 1^{er} août 1931), soit d'événements d'importance publique (comme le couronnement et le sacre des souverains de la Roumanie, Ferdinand et Maria; le numéro du 28 octobre 1922). Qu'il s'agisse d'événement mondain ou politique, la *Roumanie des rois* était intégrée dans *l'Europe des rois* ou, mieux, dans la famille européenne des têtes couronnées. Voici qui se trouvait à côté de Ferdinand et Maria dans la loge officielle d'Alba Iulia au moment du couronnement de 1922: les reines de la Yougoslavie et de la Grèce, le duc de Gênes, le duc de York, le deuxième fils du roi d'Angleterre, cousin de la reine Marie; Alphonse de Bourbon et l'infante Béatrice de l'Espagne, sœur de la reine Marie; le prince Paul de Serbie, etc.⁷³

La Roumanie des guerres

Adolphe Billecocq remarquait dans son album la vocation de croisé du peuple roumain, l'épée et la croix étant emblématiques pour son mode de vie durant le Moyen Age⁷⁴. Cette idée revenait aussi dans un article publié dans *L'Illustration* en 1917 lorsque les soldats français découvraient dans le monastère Zografu l'étendard d'Etienne le Grand:

« On conservait dans ce petit poste avancé et secret des défenses ennemies une relique historique singulièrement chère au cœur d'une nation amie (...). Une inscription en langue slavone l'aureole de cette ardente supplication : "O, toi, accablé de tourments et chargé de victoires, Grand Georges qui viens promptement au secours des malheureux ! ô, toi qui es la joie de ton humble serviteur Jean Etienne, voévode par la grâce de Dieu, Prince de la terre de Moldavie ! Garde-le de toute atteinte en ce siècle et dans les siècles à venir, et daigne exaucer la prière de ceux qui t'implorent, afin qu'ils proclament ta gloire dans les siècles des siècles. Amen" (...)

Fidèle à la tâche que lui avait laissée Mircea le Grand, protecteur de la Serbie menacée, et Vlad, le vainqueur de Mahomet II, il lutta pendant un demi-siècle contre l'invasion turque avec une vaillance et un acharnement prodigieux. (...)

Dès cette époque ce prince valeureux assure à son pays un prestige moral qui lui vaut le respect universel. Les souverains lointains recherchent son amitié : Uzun, le shah des Perses, lui offre son alliance ; Venise lui envoie un ambassadeur, et le Pape, qui voit en lui le champion de la Chrétienté contre le peril musulman, s'efforce de grouper autour de ce vaillant défenseur de la civilisation d'Occident tous ceux qui ont le devoir de barrer la route des infidèles. La fourberie de Mathias, roi de Hongrie, ne permettra pas à Etienne le Grand de recueillir le prix de ses exploits, et ce n'est que plus tard, en 1599, que Michel le Brave, prince de Valachie, parviendra à réunir sous le même sceptre la Valachie, la Moldavie et la Transylvanie, rassemblant ainsi les trois terres roumaines qui formaient l'ancienne Dacie.

Ce sont tous ces glorieux souvenirs qui revivront lorsque, dans le grand amphithéâtre de la Sorbonne, M. Alexandre Lahovary, au nom de la Roumanie, recevra l'étendard d'Etienne le Grand qui par les soins du général Sarail, va solennellement faire retour à sa patrie⁷⁵. »

Ces traditions des croisés légitimaient une histoire ininterrompue et, sans doute, une certaine image du soldat roumain. Son profil, défini dans les guerres modernes, était celui d'un homme sobre, vigoureux, intelligent, respectueux et jovial⁷⁶, à la différence des soldats slaves (bulgares surtout), considérés comme très brutaux et très cruels⁷⁷. *L'Illustration* n'oubliait pas non plus les officiers qui parlaient presque tous le français⁷⁸. L'éloge du soldat roumain se transformait souvent en un éloge de l'armée et du souverain du pays. A chaque fois, on n'oubliait pas de présenter le potentiel militaire (le plus impressionnant des Balkans⁷⁹) et la position stratégique de la Roumanie dans les conflits soit orientaux (la guerre de Crimée⁸⁰, celle de 1877–78 ou les guerres balkaniques⁸¹), soit européens (les deux guerres mondiales⁸²). Ces deux éléments (le potentiel militaire et la position stratégique) ont fait de la Roumanie un vrai arbitre dans le cadre des conflits des Balkans⁸³ (voir surtout les articles sur la paix de Bucarest de 1913, et moins ceux qui parlent de l'intervention de 1877–78, quand, à l'approche de la signature des traités de paix de San Stefano et de Berlin, *L'Illustration* oubliait le rôle attribué à l'armée roumaine lors des lourdes défaites subies par l'armée tsariste).

La Roumanie aux Expositions universelles de Paris

Les Expositions universelles ont constitué l'un des plus importants dossiers de la revue. Comme nous l'avons dit au début de notre étude, *L'Illustration* a manifesté un grand intérêt tant pour les Expositions parisiennes que pour celles organisées dans d'autres parties du monde. En ce qui concerne la Roumanie, sa présence a été signalée seulement aux Expositions de 1889, 1900, 1937.

En 1889, *L'Illustration* insistait sur le caractère pittoresque de l'exposition roumaine. La plupart des visiteurs avaient l'impression de se trouver dans la cour ou sur la terrasse d'une auberge. Autour d'eux fourmillaient de belles femmes, habillées en costumes traditionnels, qui leur servaient des plats délicieux et de vins de Drăgășani ou de Cotnari. Le menu comprenait, bien sûr, les « sarmale » (boulettes de viande hachée, enveloppées dans des feuilles de choux), les « frigărui » (brochettes) ou les « mititei » (hachis de viande en forme de petit rouleau, rôtis sur le gril). Cette ambiance a fait venir dans le pavillon roumain toute la société élégante de Paris :

« tous les artistes et les hommes de lettres, ainsi que les étrangers de distinction ont tenu à le visiter et nous pouvons citer parmi les personnes les plus marquantes, le prince et la princesse de Galles, le roi de Grèce, le roi Dinah-Salifou, la reine Isabelle d'Espagne, etc.⁸⁴ »

Le texte était complété par quelques illustrations des pavillons roumains, deux « lautari » (violoneux) et deux femmes habillées en costumes traditionnels. Il y avait aussi « ploștile » (les gourdes) qui, pour les français, étaient des « bidons en bois peint pour les excursions ». Comme l'article rendait à la fin un hommage à l'un des organisateurs de l'exposition roumaine (Alexandru Ciurcu), son portrait ne pouvait évidemment pas manquer.

Onze années plus tard, la photographie du pavillon de la Roumanie situé Rue des Nations paraissait dans *L'Illustration*, accompagnée d'une description hâtive :

« M. Formigé s'est inspiré des églises roumaines du seizième et du dix-septième siècles. Il a emprunté son porche et son hall central à l'église d'Horezu ; ses fenêtres à la basilique de Stavropoléos ; des colonnes, l'arc du grand tympan de la façade, des clochetons à la cathédrale d'Argesh ; une corniche et une frise à l'église des trois Hyérarques de Jassy. Tous ces détails se sont assemblés sans effort, mais de cet assemblage est résulté un édifice hybride, ni civil, ni religieux : mettons que ce soit une église byzantine tronquée et désaffectée⁸⁵. »

On ne trouve plus dans cet article la saveur des présentations gastronomiques ou l'hospitalité de l'auberge roumaine de 1889. L'auteur s'est contenté d'observer qu'il est dans un espace de civilisation byzantine, passant rapidement à côté des autres objets exposés pour arriver au pavillon suivant : celui des Bulgares.

« Nos alliés chez nous »⁸⁶, c'était le titre de la présentation que *L'Illustration* faisait au pavillon de la Roumanie dans son supplément du 29 mai 1937 dédié à l'Exposition universelle. Les quatre photographies accompagnant le texte synthétisaient la présence roumaine sur les bords de la Seine : le château Peleş, le symbole de la dynastie ; l'intérieur de l'église Văcărești, l'expression orthodoxe de la tradition culturelle roumaine ; la petite église en bois de la Transylvanie de Nord, le monde patriarcal du village et le Jardin Cișmigiu, l'histoire de Bucarest, *la capitale sans faubourgs*.

Après avoir décrit le pavillon de Duiliu Marco et le restaurant d'Octav Doicesco, l'auteur de l'article invitait ses lecteurs à un voyage imaginaire à travers les villages de la Roumanie, où le souvenir des armées de Décébal ou des légions de Trajan était encore vif. Étaient glissées aussi des allusions à l'extraordinaire effort économique fait par la Roumanie dans les dernières années du règne de Carol II. En fait, la propagande officielle avait été très efficace, car elle se retrouve point par point dans la manière dans laquelle la revue parisienne a perçu le pavillon roumain de 1937, pour ne plus parler de l'article exhaustif du 26 août 1939 (*La Roumanie Nouvelle*). Du caractère représentatif d'une maison paysanne enveloppée dans une ambiance d'auberge en 1889, en passant par l'anachronisme glacé, byzantin de 1900, l'image de la Roumanie avait donc évolué vers celle de la *renaissance nationale*. Il semble que l'étiquette de pays oriental, habituelle pour l'espace roumain en 1867, ait complètement disparu (la Bulgarie était arrivé en 1937 « au seuil de l'Orient⁸⁷ ») ; mais les obsessions latines, byzantines et patriarcales dont les élites politiques et intellectuelles avaient toujours revêtu leurs origines demeuraient toujours présentes⁸⁸.

L'Exposition Nationale de Bucarest

A l'Exposition de Bucarest de 1906, organisée à l'occasion du quarantième anniversaire de l'avènement de Carol I, deux pays étrangers étaient invités : la France et l'Autriche-Hongrie. Cet événement a été commenté dans deux photo-reportages publiés dans *L'Illustration* le 29 septembre et le 6 octobre. Le texte faisait une description des pavillons spécialement construits à cette occasion, essayant de mettre en évidence quelques caractéristiques locales, mais aussi les souvenirs les plus vifs d'un règne si long.

« En arrière du palais (le palais des Beaux-Arts — *n.n.*), à sa gauche, à sa droite, dispersés autour du lac avec art, s'éparpillent des pavillons de style roumain ou oriental : la Koula, ancienne maison boyarde, mi-ferme, mi-forteresse ; la reproduction de la vieille tour de Tepes-voda, qui sert de château d'eau ; les pavillons des Roumains de Transylvanie et de Bukovine, des cabanes et maisonnettes de paysans, tout

un petit village où circulent, pour ajouter à la couleur locale, des tziganes avec leurs ours savants.

Enfin, on devait réserver ici une place au grand souvenir historique de Plevna. On la lui a donnée ; *la Chapelle de Grivitza* d'une part, et un plan-relief, minutieusement établi, de la place et des environs, d'autre part, rappellent l'époque des luttes héroïques où la Roumanie conquiert son indépendance⁸⁹. »

La Grande Roumanie

Dans la matinée du 16 mars 1929, le bourgeois parisien du Quartier Latin regardait d'un air étonné le dessin de Georges Scott qui représentait un enterrement en Roumanie. La légende de cette image lui confirmait le pittoresque de la cérémonie, pittoresque qui était en train de disparition dans l'Europe uniformisée de ces années-là :

« Le pittoresque disparaît peu à peu de l'Europe de plus en plus uniformisée. La Turquie de Moustapha Kemal n'a presque plus rien d'oriental, ni d'étrange, et c'est plutôt dans les provinces séparées au cours du dix-neuvième siècle de l'Empire ottoman et devenues des nations⁹⁰. »

Même le grand-père de notre bourgeois avait, peut-être, une idée de la ressemblance entre la civilisation traditionnelle roumaine et celle turque depuis la lecture d'un article de 1877 sur les cimetières moldo-valaques où apparaissait l'affirmation suivante :

« Le cimetière valaque, ainsi que le cimetière turc, auquel il ressemble d'aspect, n'a rien de lugubre⁹¹. »

Au 25 mai 1929, *L'Illustration* marquait par un texte assez étendu le dixième anniversaire de la Grande Roumanie. Sur la couverture — la famille royale saluant le défilé des troupes. A cette cérémonie étaient présents le petit prince Mihai avec son cousin, le prince Alexandre de Yougoslavie, la reine Maria, la princesse mère Elena et l'ex-reine Elisabeta de Grèce. Le photo-reportage montrait aussi le prince Nicolae et les deux chefs du parti de gouvernement de cette époque-là (PNT), Iuliu Maniu et Ion Mihalache. L'auteur du texte, Robert de Beauplan, passait en revue le passé et le présent du pays. On retrouve les lignes habituelles consacrés au combat des princes roumains contre le Croissant, à la nouvelle image de la Roumanie que la dynastie avait imposée dans l'Europe, à l'harmonie civique et aux nouvelles structures politiques du pays. Ne manquent pas, bien sûr, les appréciations solennelles au sujet de la traditionnelle amitié franco-roumaine, l'un des leitmotives des articles de Robert de Beauplan.

« Un Roumain me disait: “Nous allons sans cesse en France: quel dommage, pourtant, que Bucarest soit plus loin de Paris que Paris de Bucarest!” Tout ce qui pourra contribuer à raccourcir cette distance doit être encouragé. C’est le vœu qu’ont certainement formulé tous les Français — pas assez nombreux, malheureusement — qui ont eu le plaisir d’assister aux belles fêtes de l’Union roumaine⁹². »

Le désir de Robert de Beauplan allait se matérialiser dans les mois suivants; *L’Illustration* sortait un album spécial intitulé « La Grande Roumanie » qui fut remis, d’une manière très cérémonieuse, à Paris, à Sever Bocu (à cette époque-là, ministre du Banat) par René Baschet, en présence du ministre plénipotentiaire roumain, le prince Cantacuzène⁹³.

Le 28 septembre paraissait aussi un article de G.G.Mironesco, ministre roumain des affaires étrangères, spécialement écrit pour l’album. Mironescu vantait la lutte des Roumains qui auraient empêché par leur héroïsme l’invasion des musulmans dans l’Europe occidentale. Les Roumains étaient donc les sauveurs de la civilisation occidentale, non seulement d’après G.G.Mironesco, mais aussi selon les historiens français réputés Lavis et Rambaud qui étaient cités dans le texte du ministre roumain :

« On a dit, avec raison, que si la civilisation occidentale échappa à la mort ou au moins à l’éclipse dont la menaçait le Croissant, elle en fut redevable... notamment aux Roumains. (Histoire générale de Lavis et Rambaud)⁹⁴ »

Même si la paix européenne offrait à la nation roumaine les conditions du développement, pourtant son rôle de sentinelle n’était pas révolu. La Russie soviétique menaçait de devenir à tout moment dangereuse, car l’intégration des soviets dans l’ordre international ne semblait pas possible :

« Mais un bouleversement profond s’est produit, il y a dix ans, au delà de la frontière orientale, dans un pays immense, et l’on ne saurait encore prévoir ce qu’il va en sortir.

Y verra-t-on l’éclosion d’une organisation sociale nouvelle susceptible de s’harmoniser avec la civilisation européenne ou doit-on craindre pour celle-ci une formidable tentative d’anéantissement ?

Angoissant problème pour la Roumanie et pour tout le monde civilisé.

La sentinelle roumaine doit toujours veiller⁹⁵. »

A cette position géo-stratégique privilégiée correspondait au plan culturel l’image d’une synthèse entre la civilisation orientale et la civilisation européenne. Cette idée revenait dans les pages de la revue dès les premiers articles dédiés aux Principautés Roumaines, et elle était reprise encore une fois sous la plume énergique d’Henri Focillon. L’illustre historien de l’art publiait dans *L’Illustration* (n. 4517 du 28 septembre 1929) un ample article sur l’art roumain ancien :

« Dans son art convergent plusieurs courants de civilisation, la force propre à l’Occident à travers des apports vénitiens, dalmates, saxons de Transylvanie, polonais,

et le charme de l’Orient, coloré par l’influence serbe et l’influence arménienne, et d’abord la leçon et le prestige de Byzance, enrichis plus tard de notes persanes et de notes turques. Mais si, pendant des siècles, c’est surtout vers la Méditerranée orientale, la Grèce byzantine et l’Asie que semble se tourner cette culture riche et touffue (tout en maintenant jusqu’au seuil de la Renaissance des formes très anciennes de l’art chrétien de nos pays), l’époque moderne a vu la Roumanie se tourner vers l’Occident de l’Europe et vers la France⁹⁶. »

Henri Focillon n’était pas à sa première collaboration sur ce sujet avec *L’Illustration*; il avait fait auparavant la présentation générale d’une exposition d’art roumain qui a été ouverte au Jeu de Paume en 1925⁹⁷. Il avait aussi écrit dans le catalogue de l’exposition imprimé à cette occasion, insistant sur l’idée de continuité artistique.

Tandis que l’art roumain ancien, un art des monastères, clairement imprégné de l’autorité princière, se caractérisait par l’ordre, l’art du XIX^e siècle était, avant tout, l’expression du lyrisme et de l’émotion. Tandis que les artisans médiévaux connaissaient très vaguement l’Occident, les artistes roumains des XIX^e et XX^e siècles étaient de vrais Occidentaux du sud-est de l’Europe, qui, il n’est pas moins vrai, se sentaient les continuateurs des peintres de Voroneț ou de Sucevița⁹⁸. Dans ces conditions, le caractère composite de l’art roumain évoqué par Henri Focillon ne faisait plus référence à la frontière entre l’Occident et l’Orient, mais à celle entre la tradition et la modernité.

Nous pouvons donc conclure que l’image de la Roumanie des années trente (et surtout de 1929) qui ressort des pages de la revue parisienne est composée surtout de quelques caractéristiques prédominantes : l’air solennel de l’harmonie sociale, le dévouement populaire à la dynastie et au pays, la vocation de défenseur de la civilisation chrétienne européenne assumée au long de l’histoire, ainsi que sa culture de frontière.

La Roumanie d’entre les deux guerres mondiales

Pendant cette période, la Roumanie a été le pays de deux mythes dynastiques : Ferdinand et Marie. Lors de la disparition du roi Ferdinand, *L’Illustration* lui dédiait une évocation émouvante signée par la princesse Bibescu. La figure du roi apparaît comme celle d’un solitaire, une victime du peuple qu’il avait conduit vers l’unité :

« Maintenant le sort en était jeté. Il fallait que le destin s’accomplît avec la plus grande violence et que l’unité du peuple roumain se fit par les mains de sa victime (...) Quand il descendit l’escalier du Parlement, de sa démarche mal assurée, les yeux rouges, le poing crispé sur la garde de son épée, il était roi, et il savait qu’il allait faire la guerre à l’Allemagne⁹⁹. »

La mort avait mis fin à sa condition de monarque :

« Demain, il va cesser d'être seul, cesser d'être roi...¹⁰⁰ »

A sa mort en 1938 la reine Marie est évoquée en termes identiques. Le style était plus naturel, mais il n'y avait pas de phrase qui ne souligne l'empreinte de la reine sur le destin politique de la Roumanie entre les deux guerres. A l'exception, peut-être, de l'image d'une petite fée blonde descendue des contes d'Andersen, qui rappelait l'enfance heureuse de la reine passée à Eastwell¹⁰¹.

La Roumanie de cette époque-là pouvait être aussi bien l'expression d'un contraste: *Ancienne et nouvelle Roumanie* était la légende des deux photographies reproduites dans le numéro du 4 avril 1931 et représentant deux femmes habillées, l'une avec un costume traditionnel, l'autre avec un costume à la mode¹⁰². *La Roumanie nouvelle* est une idée qui circulait de plus en plus fréquemment dans les années 1938–39; elle sera d'ailleurs le sujet d'un chapitre séparé.

L'un des épisodes les plus médiatisés de la Roumanie d'entre les deux guerres mondiales semble avoir été l'ascension politique de la Garde de Fer. Après les présentations des assassinats de I.G.Duca¹⁰³ et d'Armand Călinescu¹⁰⁴, *L'Illustration* a commencé à s'intéresser davantage à l'évolution de ce mouvement.

Si, en 1938, Georges Oudard notait les inconséquences du discours de Corneliu Zelea Codreanu¹⁰⁵, deux ans plus tard René Martel adoptait un point de vue tout à fait différent (l'explication se trouve dans le nouveau contexte politique instauré après la défaite et l'occupation de la France par l'Allemagne). En premier lieu, la Garde de Fer semblait être absoute, aux yeux du journaliste français, des assassinats politiques commis au fil des années, la plupart étant justifiés par les provocations du gouvernement. C'est avec sympathie que l'auteur a approché le passé et le présent de la Garde de Fer, sa carrière électorale et la participation symbolique de quelques gardistes à la guerre civile d'Espagne. Malgré les vicissitudes et les adversités de toute sorte, la Garde a réussi — écrivait-il — à prendre dans ses mains la direction de la Roumanie. Il ne restait plus à ce mouvement que de prouver la volonté politique de régénérer et de sauver le pays¹⁰⁶.

En 1941, René Martel revenait dans un article encore plus développé sur l'idéologie de la Garde de Fer. Il évoquait cette fois-ci la clarté dont avait fait preuve Corneliu Zelea Codreanu en caractérisant en 1919 le national-socialisme chrétien :

« Il ne suffit pas, écrivait-il alors, de vaincre le communisme. Nous devons lutter pour les droits des travailleurs. Ils ont droit au pain et à l'honneur. Nous devons lutter contre les partis avides de pouvoir et appeler à la vie des organisations nationales des travailleurs pour que l'ouvrier obtienne ses droits dans le cadre de l'Etat et non contre lui.

Nous ne pouvons admettre qu'à l'abri de mots d'ordre nationaux une classe sociale d'opresseurs et d'exploiteurs juggle la classe ouvrière, la dépouille en lui parlant sans relâche d'un parti qu'elle n'aime pas, d'un Dieu auquel elle ne croit pas, d'une Eglise qu'elle ne fréquente jamais¹⁰⁷. »

Le même Codreanu reprochait à la démocratie bourgeoise six défauts essentiels: la destruction de l'unité naturelle du peuple qui était divisé en fonction d'options politiques; l'acceptation des droits civiques pour les juifs; la succession des partis au gouvernement qui rendait impossible tout effort ou tout projet à long terme; dans une démocratie l'homme politique ne pouvait être qu'un pantin au gré du parti, incapable d'accomplir ses tâches envers le peuple; la démocratie était incapable d'instaurer et de maintenir l'autorité; et, finalement, la démocratie était incapable de se passer de la haute finance. René Martel justifiait l'antisémitisme de Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, en citant abondamment des arguments du « Capitaine ». Après cela suivaient tous les lieux communs de la doctrine légionnaire: la ruine de la société roumaine, la nécessité de la purification spirituelle, un nouvel idéal moral :

« La foi en Dieu et dans l'Eglise orthodoxe; l'amour entre les hommes et les classes, par opposition à la haine prêchée par Marx¹⁰⁸ »,

un autochtonisme qui se faisait remarquer dans toutes les activités pratiques, et qui voulait exclure toute influence juive. Les nouveaux modèles politiques étaient l'Italie de Mussolini, l'Allemagne de Hitler, le Portugal de Salazar. Ces conceptions définissaient — selon René Martel — l'idéologie de la renaissance roumaine. Au bout de tant d'années de confusion et de désordre, on apercevait enfin une voie. Le miracle de l'avoir trouvée s'était manifesté grâce à la volonté et à la jeunesse de la Garde de Fer.

Les trois aspects examinés ci-dessus ne sont pas les seuls à déterminer l'image de la Roumanie d'entre les deux guerres mondiales dans la revue *L'Illustration*. Cette image a été et sera complétée dans les autres chapitres de notre essai.

La Roumanie Nouvelle

Les années 1938 et 1939 de l'histoire de la Roumanie ont été les mieux représentés dans *L'Illustration*. En 1938, onze articles sur les changements politiques engagés par Carol II ont publiés. Il faut dire que l'idée d'une nouvelle Roumanie avait commencé à être développée dans les pages de la revue dès 1929, dans un article sur l'élection de Constantin Sărățeanu en tant que régent de la Roumanie¹⁰⁹. La reprise de cette idée, à toutes autres dimensions, s'est faite dans la série de mars-avril 1938 intitulé « La naissance d'une dictature royale »¹¹⁰. Les articles portaient la signature d'une vieille connaissance, Robert

de Beauplan, envoyé spécial à Bucarest. Elles faisaient partie d'un ensemble de reportages initiés par *L'Illustration* dans les pays de l'Europe où la vague des changements politiques pouvait influencer l'équilibre précaire du continent; voir à ce sujet les enquêtes italiennes de Robert Chenevier (15 janvier–12 février), celles réalisées en Tchécoslovaquie (22 janvier–19 février) et en Allemagne (26 février) par Ludovic Naudeau ou celles faites en Pologne par Robert de Beauplan (1–8 janvier).

Le texte de Robert de Beauplan sur la Roumanie présentait la situation politique après la promulgation de la Constitution du 20 février 1938. Il faisait allusion au plébiscite du 24 février et à l'opposition envers le régime personnel instauré à ce moment-là (la figure de Iuliu Maniu, l'ancien défenseur de Carol au début de son règne, apparaissait dans ce contexte)¹¹¹.

L'auteur considérait que les problèmes majeurs de la Roumanie étaient la Garde de Fer et l'orientation possible du gouvernement vers l'Axe. Après un court historique de la présence des juifs dans l'espace roumain, le journaliste français essayait de mettre de l'ordre parmi les chiffres contradictoires des statistiques de cette époque-là concernant la population juive (il y avait des variations entre 250 000 et 3 000 000)¹¹².

Le reportage finissait avec quelques considérations sur la traditionnelle amitié franco-roumaine. De Beauplan soulignait la francophilie de toutes les couches de la société roumaine, mais en même temps remarquait que le prestige de la France avait perdu, les derniers temps, de son éclat. Les causes résidaient dans la déception que la France avait causée à la Roumanie par sa politique extérieure aux moments clés de la dernière décennie (l'indifférence du gouvernement de Paris envers la rupture du traité de Locarno par l'Allemagne en 1936; l'inactivité du gouvernement français au moment de l'application des sanctions économiques imposées à l'Italie par la Société des Nations à cause de l'invasion en Ethiopie; l'option pour une alliance avec la Russie soviétique ainsi que l'installation au pouvoir du Front Populaire soutenu par les communistes). Sur le fond de cette déception apparaît donc un partenaire prometteur qui aurait remplacé la France, il s'agissait de l'Allemagne.

La précarité des moyens matériels de la propagande française, leur inefficacité ont mené à la diminution de l'influence française en Roumanie. De Beauplan estimait que la plupart des Roumains qui, en 1938, aimaient toujours la France étaient ceux qui avaient passé la quarantaine, une autre génération donc; d'ailleurs, le nombre de ceux qui étudiaient en France avait baissé de 1 000/1 200 au début du siècle à environ 300 en 1938. La jeunesse roumaine semblait donc gagnée, selon le journaliste, par ceux qui exaltaient son goût pour l'action et pour la parade¹¹³.

La crainte que la Roumanie ne sorte de la sphère d'influence de la France s'est manifestée assez souvent dans les articles publiés dans *L'Illustration* en

1938–39. Cela explique, peut-être, l'intérêt accru de la publication pour les événements de Bucarest. Par exemple, à l'installation du gouvernement Goga, *L'Illustration* se dépêchait d'enregistrer les personnalités politiques roumaines francophiles du nouveau gouvernement, en reproduisant largement toutes les déclarations des officiels roumains selon lesquelles l'Etat roumain promettait de ne pas modifier la ligne politique extérieure¹¹⁴. En même temps, la revue enregistrait la visite de Carol II à Londres, l'accord roumain-allemand, et, à la suite des préoccupations plus anciennes, remarquait l'évolution politique de la Garde de Fer et de Corneliu Zelea Codreanu.

En 1939, Pierre Ichac publiait un long reportage sur les bouleversements politiques survenus dans certains pays européens. *A travers l'Europe troublée* tentait d'expliquer les drames de l'Europe en passant par Prague, Berlin, Budapest pour arriver aux Balkans (Bucarest, Belgrade, Sofia, Athènes). Tandis que la Tchécoslovaquie et la Yougoslavie étaient dans le feu des agitations, que la Hongrie et l'Allemagne manifestaient vigoureusement leurs intentions guerrières et révisionnistes, que la Bulgarie tendait à devenir un facteur d'équilibre dans les Balkans, la Roumanie, pour Pierre Ichac, était un pays à la dérive, qui avait du mal à rompre avec une certaine tradition politique, mais qui jouait beaucoup avec l'idée du rapprochement avec l'Allemagne. La marque orientale du monde roumain, cette familiarité avec les ambiguïtés et les tergiversations donnaient l'impression d'une claire indécision politique. Les mots qui caractérisaient l'accord roumain-allemand remettaient en discussion, après pas mal du temps, les traits orientaux des Roumains :

« Mais ici nous sommes en Orient, et le texte de l'accord est si vague qu'il paraît devoir contenir exactement ce que l'adresse de l'un ou de l'autre signataire voudra y mettre. C'est ce caractère indécis qui semble le rendre rassurant, et en même temps dangereux¹¹⁵. »

Sur la page de garde du numéro du 17 juin 1939 était reproduite la photographie de la séance d'ouverture du nouveau Parlement roumain. Dans le même numéro, Robert de Beauplan insérait un photo-reportage intitulé « La renaissance d'une nation ». C'était en fait le préambule d'un numéro spécial et du supplément de 16 août (« La Roumanie Nouvelle »). Le texte, les photographies, ainsi que l'arrangement en soi étaient conçus comme une propagande évidente en faveur de Carol II. Une impression de louanges exagérées se dégageait de chaque article; les incertitudes de Pierre Ichac exprimées quelques mois avant avaient disparu sans laisser de trace sous la plume des apologistes carlistes.

Au début du reportage, la rédaction de la revue avait mis en page quelques images qui synthétisaient le texte : une carte de la Roumanie encadrée par ses richesses traditionnelles (le blé et le pétrole) et, plus bas, au centre, l'Arc de Triomphe qui dominait l'avenue Kisselef, symbole du parcours glorieux des ancêtres, mais aussi de la nouvelle vocation du futur.

« La Grande Roumanie, la Roumanie nouvelle... Deux expressions et deux étapes.

La Grande Roumanie est née au lendemain de la guerre mondiale quand l'héroïque petite nation qui avait combattu avec les Alliés contre les Empires centraux reçut la juste récompense de ses sacrifices et de ses souffrances par la récupération de ses frontières historique. Le nom du roi Ferdinand I^{er} reste indissolublement attaché à cette triomphale réunion, sous un même sceptre et dans une même unité nationale, de toutes les provinces roumaines (...)

La Roumanie nouvelle n'a que dix-huit mois d'existence. C'est la Roumanie du roi Carol II.

De 1918 à 1938 vingt années se sont écoulées, traversées de vicissitudes diverses (...)

C'est alors que le roi Carol II, au mois de février 1938, accomplit sa *révolution*. Le mot n'est pas trop fort. Les révolutions n'ont pas obligatoirement leur origine dans une effervescence populaire et il en est de constructives.

L'initiative de Carol II a détruit ce qui était un ferment permanent de désordre et d'anarchie et elle a reconstruit. Elle a édifié un régime fondé sur une autorité ferme et sage à la fois, sur l'union de tous les citoyens au service d'une cause unique : celle de la nation, incarnée par la dynastie (...)

Cette Roumanie nouvelle, c'est à la mieux faire connaître que les pages suivantes sont consacrées. Au sommet, un homme : le roi, qui détient la souveraineté des pouvoirs. Autour de lui, une équipe de collaborateurs qu'il a choisis comme les mieux aptes à réaliser ses desseins. Une constitution réformée qui n'a aboli aucune des libertés essentielles, mais qui fait prévaloir en toutes choses l'intérêt du pays. Une solide armature de l'Etat, constituée par une organisation politique unique. Une représentation parlementaire qui est la plus exacte des représentations nationales puisqu'elle n'est plus celle de l'arbitraire ou du hasard, mais des catégories professionnelles. Voilà le cadre à l'intérieur duquel la nation roumaine régénérée éduque sa jeunesse (...), prépare son avenir dans le travail et la foi.

La Roumanie de Carol II est un exemple qui mérite d'être médité!¹¹⁶ »

La citation est, nous pensons, significative ; sous la devise *travail et foi*, une nation parachevait la révolution initiée par son roi, une *révolution royale* qui mettait de l'ordre dans le chaos¹¹⁷. Le concept classique de la révolution suggérait le retour au contrat initial lorsque le roi prenait directement le contact avec ses sujets, en devenant ainsi *le roi des paysans et des jeunes*. L'idée de la *révolution royale* n'était pas une invention des journalistes de *L'Illustration*, elle était empruntée « mot pour mot » à la propagande de Carol II pour laquelle l'axe central était l'identification de la Roumanie avec son roi (la même impression laissait, comme nous l'avons déjà dit, le pavillon de la Roumanie à l'Exposition universelle de Paris de 1937¹¹⁸). A l'intérieur d'une telle construction idéologique, les vieilles obsessions culturelles et originaires perdaient de leur importance, de sorte que la latinité, la vie patriarcale du paysan roumain, la tradition orthodoxe devenaient des légitimités secondaires. Si dans l'*Album Moldo-Valaque* de 1848 ces obsessions représentaient des légitimités rétrospectives pour

la reconnaissance européenne des Principautés, *la Roumanie nouvelle* de l'an de grâce 1939 les intégrait dans un projet intérieur et ne laissait s'entrevoir que l'idée de leur existence parmi les autres. Et cela parce que cette fois-ci le fond de la légitimité avait les traits d'un symbole mouvementé, en train de s'édifier.

Mais il y avait d'autres observateurs de la société roumaine qui ne partageaient pas l'opinion de ceux qui écrivaient pour *L'Illustration*. Un exemple, Alphonse Dupront, directeur de l'Institut Français des Hautes Etudes de Bucarest, de 1932 à 1941, dont l'avis était tout différent. En 1938 il publiait un article dans *L'Europe Nouvelle* avec un titre incitateur : « Où va la Roumanie ? »¹¹⁹ Les perspectives ne semblaient pas très encourageantes. Si les inquiétudes de Dupront coïncidaient à ce moment-là avec celles des rédacteurs de *L'Illustration*, après l'instauration de la dictature royale leurs jugements sont devenus totalement divergents. Là où Robert de Beauplan voyait le retour à l'ordre et au travail, Alphonse Dupront remarquait la déroute et le désordre¹²⁰. C'était le même régime, mais vu par deux personnes différentes, ayant chacune son propre point de vue.

Alphonse Dupront a vécu à Bucarest la rébellion légionnaire. Il n'y a rencontré que de faux prophètes et une nouvelle servitude devant la violence, c'est-à-dire rien de ce que disait René Martel sur la reconstruction et la renaissance nationale promises par les légionnaires. L'image de la synagogue détruite de la rue Atena et du petit homme sale qui gardait son entrée est restée très significative :

« Symbole douloureux, ridicule à force d'être petit, de la malveillance des faux prophètes (...). Tout le secret de cette humanité chancelante est de trouver plus faible que soi, de s'enivrer dans la puissance, facile. Ou difficile, comme une discipline de vie, et un vertige au bout, à l'allemande¹²¹. »

Une telle société qui réinventait la violence et la dictature en les appelant ordre, ne pouvait être ni normale, ni correcte, ni logique. Alphonse Dupront était resté fidèle à la *Grande Roumanie* qu'il avait connu de près, avant qu'elle devienne la *Nouvelle Roumanie*.

IV. En guise de conclusion

Le 22 mars 1913, *L'Illustration* offrait à ses lecteurs une correspondance de guerre des Balkans. Le journaliste Réginald Kann essayait de mettre de l'ordre dans la complication des arguments et contre-arguments qu'un différend territorial entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie avait fait apparaître. Certainement, les détails n'intéressent pas directement notre thème, ce qui n'est pas le cas avec les appréciations du correspondant de *L'Illustration* qui nous sont très utiles :

« Il suffit de quelques jours de résidence dans une capitale balkanique pour se familiariser avec le jargon politique habituellement employé dans la discussion des questions d'Orient. Lorsqu'un pays désire opérer une annexion territoriale par voie diplomatique, sa procédure se fonde invariablement sur quatre arguments suivants : droit historique, considérations ethniques ou de nationalité, conditions économiques, nécessités stratégiques ; dans le différend actuel la discussion n'est pas sortie du cadre accoutumé.

Le demandeur commence toujours par faire valoir ses droits historiques : c'est l'argument le plus commode. En effet, suivant l'époque à laquelle on se place, chaque peuple peut revendiquer non seulement telle ou telle région, mais encore la Péninsule entière, ou peut s'en faut. Les Serbes de Douchan, les Bulgares du tsar Siméon ont possédé tout le pays s'étendant de la mer Egée à l'Adriatique, les Roumains se réclament de l'empereur Trajan, les Grecs de Justinien ou d'Alexandre le Grand. Les Albanais vont plus loin ; ne descendent-ils pas des Pélages, les premiers occupants ; pour eux, il ne s'agit plus de droits historiques, mais de droits... préhistoriques. Malheureusement, la conquête ottomane en courbant toutes les têtes sous le joug commun, est venue niveler ces prétentions. D'ailleurs, on a tellement usé et abusé des droits historiques que l'effet s'en est émoussé (...)

Il n'est guère plus facile de d'apprécier l'argument des nationalités, car, dans les Balkans, on change son origine à peu de frais. C'est une simple question de désinence des noms propres. La termination *of* est bulgare, *vitch* serbe, *esco* roumaine, *idis* hellénique. Combien de personnes ont mutilé une syllabe pour échapper à l'oppression d'un gouvernement de propagande ! Combien de *Popof* sont devenus *Popesco* ou *Popovitch*, ou inversement¹²². »

Réginald Kann a synthétisé avec ironie l'identité des populations balkaniques. Leur obsession historiciste, fortement cultivée par la propagande, a déterminé les Occidentaux à considérer ce monde comme très limité et prévisible.

L'Illustration a mis souvent en circulation les stéréotypes de cette propagande. Dans la plupart des articles sur la Roumanie ou les Roumains, nous avons invariablement trouvé des remarques sur l'héritage latin, la tradition byzantine (orthodoxe), le contraste entre les cultures ou l'orientalisme des mœurs, ainsi que sur la lutte continue pour défendre la civilisation occidentale, ou sur le sentiment aigu de la frontière que les descendants de Trajan ont éprouvé depuis toujours, etc.

Qui étaient ces descendants de Trajan ? *L'Illustration* a principalement insisté sur deux catégories sociales : les soldats et/ou les paysans. Les premiers, selon une vraie manie rétrospective, ne pouvaient être que vaillants, vigoureux, intelligents, beaucoup plus subtils et plus raffinés que leurs homologues slaves. Invariablement, comme leurs ancêtres illustres (le panthéon national sélectionné par la revue était essentiellement héroïque : Décébal, Trajan, Rodolphe Le Noir, Mircea l'Ancien, Vlad l'Empaleur, Etienne Le Grand, Michel Le Brave, etc.). La majorité des soldats étaient des paysans. Comme les paysans représentaient

70–80% de la population de la Roumanie, la conséquence en est que presque tous les roumains étaient pareils.

Aux qualités belliqueuses s'ajoutaient les pacifiques. En 1889, les 32 250 297 visiteurs de l'Exposition universelle de Paris¹²³, ou les 22 359 abonnés de la revue *L'Illustration* ainsi que les 8 450 lecteurs occasionnels ont pu se familiariser avec la beauté proverbiale des femmes roumaines (Billecocq soutenait que les femmes de Moldavie étaient proches du type de beauté polonaise, par la délicatesse de leur visage et leurs manières élégantes, tandis que les femmes de Valachie avaient quelque chose d'oriental à cause de leur charme langoureux et du sentiment d'abandon total qu'elles inspiraient) ou avec l'ambiance d'une auberge roumaine où on pouvait manger et boire à son gré en écoutant la musique des violoneux tziganes.

Il semblait aussi que les Roumains connaissaient assez bien le français et étaient au courant des événements culturels de l'Hexagone, ce qui flattait une revue parisienne attentive à ce type de manifestations.

Francophones ou pas, les Roumains respectaient scrupuleusement la tradition orthodoxe, même s'ils ne pénétraient pas son sens profond et mystérieux. Leur dévouement pour le cérémonial extérieur de l'Eglise était connu dès les articles de Billecocq ou Doussault écrits au milieu du XIX^e siècle. Un exemple plus proche de nos jours en serait la cérémonie publique de la bénédiction des eaux à l'occasion de l'Épiphanie (no 4586, 24 Janvier 1931), à laquelle prenaient part le Roi et le Patriarche du pays. L'un d'eux jetait dans la rivière de Dâmbovița une croix que plusieurs nageurs cherchaient ; celui qui réussissait à la trouver était célébré comme un héros. Il devait ensuite porter la croix de foyer en foyer et chaque croyant embrassait l'objet précieux.

Charles Doussault a été un observateur extrêmement critique à l'égard des Roumains. Dans un article de 1854, il remarquait les anomalies de la société politique de Valachie, d'ailleurs la seule composante occidentalisée ; comme en Russie, les boyards d'origine se confondaient avec ceux dont la noblesse consistait en leur fonction, les juges pouvaient devenir à tout moment des officiers, et la limite réelle entre les petits et les grands boyards était insignifiante, très controversée et arbitrairement établie. Sauf que les uns habitaient dans les faubourgs et les autres sur « podoumogochoae ». Ne parlons pas de la misère et de la pauvreté des couches inférieures, de leurs mœurs orientales ou de leur respect excessif envers l'autorité (de n'importe quelle nature), ressemblant au plus honteux servilisme.

Au XX^e siècle, les contrastes entre le vieux et le neuf commençaient à marquer une société dynamique ; les anomalies socio-politiques du type observé par Doussault allaient disparaître complètement.

Pendant le règne de Carol II, la propagande officielle a proposé l'image d'une Roumanie profondément intégrée dans le monde contemporain. Les procédés

rétrospectifs n'étaient pas totalement abandonnés, mais, cette fois, ils étaient subordonnés aux éloges rendus au profil d'un personnage qui, rituellement, devenait le dépositaire de toute une histoire: *le paysan roumain*. Cette conception n'était pas nouvelle, elle avait été véhiculée aussi au XIX^e siècle, lorsque l'accent était mis sur sa dimension rétrospective. Mais à l'époque de Carol II, quand l'enjeu était la contemporanéité et que la confrontation entre l'Orient et l'Occident avait cédé la place à l'opposition ancien/nouveau, ce personnage était devenu l'expression de la vitalité d'une nation en pleine renaissance. Une nation qui ne se proposait pas de vivre de sa gloire passée, mais de construire l'avenir:

« Force et beauté! (...) La force d'un pays sur lequel veille son roi: un roi jeune et, comme son peuple, ardent au travail; le roi animateur dont se retrouvent l'influence et l'autorité dans tous les domaines, mais qui, noblement, sentant qu'il a le devoir de créer l'avenir, s'est comme réservé l'éducation nationale. Compréhension rapide, volonté, courage des responsabilités, beauté de l'acte net: il ne risque pas sa signature, mais on est toujours sûr de la trouver là où il faut qu'elle soit. Ce roi moderne, dévoué à sa tâche est au courant de tout ce qui peut améliorer le bien-être de son peuple¹²⁴. »

Jeunesse et modernité étaient considérées comme les qualités essentielles de Carol II. Mais même s'il avait initié une *révolution royale*, il appartenait à une vieille et respectable dynastie parfaitement intégrée dans l'Europe. *Souverain des jeunes et des paysans*, Carol II avait une autorité qui s'inscrivait dans une légitimité de la construction identitaire d'un type nouveau, sans que cette légitimité soit complètement séparée de celle rétrospective reconnue pendant le règne de son père, par exemple. Notre affirmation est appuyée par les plus importants photo-reportages sur la Roumanie publiés dans *L'Illustration* après 1918, c'est-à-dire ceux qui ont eu comme sujet l'avènement/le couronnement de Ferdinand et de Marie à Alba-Iulia, ainsi que ceux qui ont marqué l'anniversaire de dix ans depuis l'édification de la *Grande Roumanie*. Entre *La Grande Roumanie* (1929) et *La Roumanie Nouvelle* (1939) est survenu le changement concernant tant la propagande que la réception de l'image proposée par celle-ci.

Notes

1. Voir Georges Bengesco, *Bibliographie franco-roumaine*, Paris, 1907 (II^e édition); Al. et G. Rally, *Bibliographie franco-roumaine*, 2 tomes, Paris, 1930; les sept volumes de la *Bibliografia istorică a României* (19^e siècle; 1944–1989).

2. Valeriu Buduru, « Septembrie-decembrie 1848: un eveniment publicistic și artistic european. Album românesc în cea mai răspândită revistă pariziană », in *Magazin Istoric*, XII, no 6 (135), iunie 1978, pp. 5–9.

3. Adolphe Billecocq — diplomate français; il a rempli des missions diplomatiques en Suède et dans l'Empire Ottoman; consul général de la France à Bucarest, (1839–1846). Il a publié

en 1847 *La Principauté de Valachie sous le Hospodar Bibesco*, Bruxelles (II^e édition, 1848) et *Le nostri prigionieri! ou le Journal de Billecocq, diplomate français*, (2 tomes) 1849–1850.

4. G. Opreșcu, *Țările Române văzute de artiști francezi (sec. XVIII–XIX)*, București, Cultura Națională, 1926, pp. 22–35; V.V. Haneș, *Formarea opiniei franceze asupra României în secolul al XIX-lea*, vol. II, Craiova-București, 1929, p. 165; Nicolae Isar, *Istoria modernă a Românilor. Imaginea societății românești în Franța, 1774–1848*, București, 1992, p. 101; *Idem*, *Publiciști francezi și cauza română, 1834–1859*, București, Ed. Academiei, 1991, p. 18.

5. Voir, par exemple, G. C. Nicolescu, *Viața lui Vasile Alecsandri*, București, E.P.L., 1965, p. 275; V. Alecsandri, *Opere*, vol. IV, București, Minerva, 1974, p. 343.

6. Alexandru Dușu, *Modele, imagini, priveshti. Incursiuni în cultura europeană modernă*, Cluj, Dacia, 1979, pp. 69–96.

7. Klaus Heitman, *Imaginea românilor în spațiul lingvistic german 1775–1918*, traduction de Dumitru Hîncu, București, Ed. Univers, 1995, pp. 43–62.

8. Cf. Louis Trénard, « Les représentations collectives des peuples », in *Bulletin de la Section d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, Paris, 1962, IV, pp. 9–23 (p. 15).

9. Daniel Henri Pageaux, « Une perspective d'étude en littérature comparée: l'imagerie culturelle », in *Synthesis*, VIII, 1981, pp. 169–185 (pp. 179–181).

10. *Ibidem*, pp. 182–183.

11. Il s'agit de *Illustrated London News*, hebdomadaire fondé en 1842 par Herbert Ingram.

12. Adolphe Laurent Joanne (1823–81), homme de lettres français, avocat à Paris; à partir de 1840 il a publié les *Itinéraires* qui l'ont rendu très connu à l'époque; il a continué la série d'*Itinéraires* avec celle des *Géographies départementales*.

Edouard Thomas Charton (1807–90), homme politique et journaliste français; avocat, secrétaire général dans le ministère Carnot (1848); député et membre du Conseil d'Etat (1849); après le coup d'Etat de Louis Bonaparte, il s'est retiré de la vie politique jusqu'en 1871 quand il devient député de Yonne, puis sénateur; il a fondé *Le Magasin Pittoresque* en 1833, directeur des journaux *Bibliothèque des Merveilles* et *Le Tour du Monde*, et collaborateur de la *Revue Encyclopédique*, *Le Temps*, *Le Monde* etc.

Jean Baptiste Alexandre Paulin (1793–1859), avocat; il a fondé avec Thiers, Miguet et Carrel; *Le National*.

J.J. Dubochet, journaliste français proche des milieux politiques fréquentés par Paulin.

13. « Notre but », in *L'Illustration*, An I, no 1, 4 mars 1843, p. 1.

14. Jean Noël Marchandiau, *L'Illustration, 1843–1944. Vie et mort d'un journal*, Toulouse, Bibliothèque Historique Privat, 1987, p. 53.

15. *Ibidem*, p. 76.

16. *Ibidem*, pp. 103–152.

17. Auguste Marc (1819–86), peintre et publiciste français; il a peint, en général, des portraits et des scènes historiques (par exemple, la composition *La France* qui se trouve à l'Hôtel de Ville de Metz).

18. Lucien Marc (1846–1903), bachelier du lycée Bonaparte; il a fréquenté la Faculté de droit de Paris; journaliste à la *Liberté* et, à partir de 1866, à *L'Illustration*.

19. *Apud* Jean Noël Marchandiau, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

20. *Ibidem*, p. 297.

21. René Baschet (1860–1949), éditeur; président du syndicat de la presse parisienne; élu en 1935 à l'Académie des Beaux-Arts.

22. Pour des détails supplémentaires sur l'histoire de la revue *L'Illustration*, voir *Histoire générale de la presse française*, sous la direction de Claude Bellanger, Jacques Godechot,

Pierre Guiral et Fernand Tarrou, Paris, P.U.F., 1969 (t.II, 1815-1871; t.III, 1871-1940); E. Baschet, *L'Illustration, 1843-1944. Histoire d'un siècle*, Paris, Hachette, 1986 (16 tomes); Jean Noël Marchandiau, *op. cit.*

23. Jean Noël Marchandiau, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
 24. *Ibidem*, p. 293.
 25. *Ibidem*, p. 298.
 26. *Ibidem*, p. 325.
 27. *Ibidem*. En 1846, la revue avait 17 000 abonnés, pour arriver, en 1931, à 171 800, étant ensuite en baisse (en 1943, 53.500).
 28. *Ibidem*, p. 298
 29. *Ibidem*, p. 329
 30. *Ibidem*, p. 311
 31. *Ibidem*.
 32. *Ibidem*, p. 307
 33. *L'Illustration*, no 61, 27 avril 1844, pp. 129-130.
 34. Voir G. Oprescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34 et Valeriu Buduru, *art. cit.*
 35. V.V.Haneş, *op. cit.*, 2 tomes, pp. 87-106 (tome I); pp. 125-148 (tome II).
 36. *Ibidem*, pp. 87-106; voir aussi Ion Ghica, *Opere* (tome V), Bucureşti, Minerva, 1988, pp. 71-72 (lettre à D. Brătianu, le 24 juin 1840), ou pp. 102-103 (lettre à Ioan Câmpineanu, le 1 juin 1839); Dan Berindei, « Tineri români la Paris înainte de 1848 », in *România şi Europa*, Bucureşti, Museion, 1991 (pp. 70-78), p. 73.
 37. Charles Doussault né à Fougères (Ille et Vilaine). Ses professeurs ont été Achille et Eugène Deveria, peintres très connus à l'époque. Il a débuté en 1834, au Salon de Paris où il a exposé jusqu'en 1870. Il a été un collaborateur constant de la revue *L'Illustration*.
 38. *L'Illustration*, 87^e année, no 4517, 28 septembre 1929, p. 317.
 39. « La Roumanie Nouvelle », in *Idem*, 97^e année, no 5034, 26 août 1939, pp. 577-584 + supplément.
 40. Pierre Ichac, « A travers l'Europe troublée », in *Idem*, 97^e année, no 5015-5019, 16 avril-13 mai 1939.
 41. Camille d'Alb, « Scènes de la Roumanie », in *Idem*, no 963, 10 août 1861, pp. 91-92.
 42. Michel Bouquet (1807-1888), né à Lorient, en Bretagne, il a fait des études avec Gudin, un disciple de David. Il a débuté au Salon de Paris en 1835. Après 1855, il s'est dédié exclusivement à la peinture sur porcelaine.
 43. *Apud* G. Oprescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.
 44. Voir V.V.Haneş, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-106 (t.I)
 45. « Album Moldo-Valaque », in *L'Illustration*, no 284, 5 août 1848, pp. 344-345.
 46. *Ibidem*, p. 344. Nous croyons que le chiffre avancé par Billecocq était exagéré, si nous tenons compte du fait que, en 1857, la population de la Valachie était seulement de 2 330 760 habitants (*apud* Ioan C. Filitti, « Populaţia Munteniei la 1857 », extrait des *Analele economice şi statistice*, sept.-dec. 1931, Bucureşti, Socec & Co. S.A., 1932, p. 40).
 47. *Ibidem*, p. 345.
 48. *Idem*, no 286, 19 août 1848, p. 378.
 49. *Ibidem*.
 50. *Idem*, no 284, 5 août 1848, p. 346.
 51. *Idem*, no 287, 26 août 1848, p. 391.
 52. *Idem*, no 290, 16 septembre 1848, p. 42.
 53. *Idem*, no 284, 5 août 1848, pp. 345-346.

54. *Idem*, no 286, 19 août 1848, p. 378; voir C. Doussault, « La Valachie », in *Idem*, no 563, 10 décembre 1853, p. 381: « Le bas clergé valaque est comme le clergé russe, grossier et ignorant. Il vit dans les cabarets côte à côte avec l'homme du peuple et le paysan, sans pouvoir s'élever au-dessus de lui. C'est à cet état d'ignorance et de vulgarité qu'il doit le peu d'empire qu'il exerce sur le peuple qu'il est appelé à moraliser. C'est à ces prêtres si peu lettrés que l'instruction de l'enfance est confiée. »

55. « Album Moldo-Valaque », no 286, 19 août 1848, p. 378.

56. Virgil Căndeia, « Les œufs d'autruche et la vigilance », in *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, t. XXI, nos 3-4, 1993, pp. 301-303.

57. *Idem*, no 287, 26 août 1848, p. 393

58. *Ibidem*, p. 391.

59. *Ibidem*, p. 393: « Mais, aujourd'hui que le Turc s'est fait Européen, aujourd'hui que le titre de sultan ne signifie pas seulement, en langue turque, / le calife/, mais veut dire aussi, dans l'idiome des Occidentaux, / le plus juste et le plus honnête des Rois !/, tout bon patriote moldo-valaque place son salut dans le lien vassalique qui l'unit à lui ! Le principe de la suzeraineté ottomane sera au jour du danger le phare véritablement protecteur ! »

60. C. Doussault, *art. cit.*, p. 381.

61. *Ibidem*; voir C. Doussault, « Les rangs et les titres de la Valachie », no 592, 1 juillet 1854, pp. 7-10.

62. J. A. Vaillant, « Origine. Etat actuel. Aptitudes et croyances des Iases ou Romes dits Bohémiens », in *Idem*, nos 590 (17 juin 1854, pp. 389-391); 593 (8 juillet 1854, p. 23); 596 (29 juillet 1854, p. 71); 601 (2 septembre 1854, p. 131); 605 (30 septembre 1854, pp. 230-232). En ce qui concerne le nombre des gitans dans les Principautés Roumaines, ainsi que leur répartition en Europe, voir l'article de 29 juillet 1854 :

Turcia	200 000
Transilvania, Bucovina, Banat	140 000
Moldova	137 000
Valahia	123 000
Rusia, Crimeea, Basarabia	90 000
Spania	60 000
Polonia, Galiţia, Lituania	30 000
Italia, Grecia şi Insulele	20 000
Suedia, Norvegia	20 000
Anglia, Scoţia	11 000
Serbia, Muntenegru	10 000
Danemarca, Olanda	6 000
Germania	6 000

63. Basile Alexandri, « Le Lac Blanc », in *Idem*, no 598, 12 août 1854, p. 99.

64. *Ibidem*.

65. *Idem*, no 599, 19 août 1854, p. 119.

66. *Idem*, no 598, 12 août 1854, p. 99.

67. Voir notre article, « România la Expoziţia universală de la Paris din 1867. Imaginea identităţii naţionale — Propagandă şi receptare », in *Buletinul Institutului de Studii Sud-Est Europene*, II/1994, pp. 21-29.

68. Formule empruntée au livre de Andrei Pippidi, *România regilor*, Bucureşti, Litera, 1994.

69. « Les funéraires du roi Carol I^{er} de Roumanie à Bucarest », in *L'Illustration*, 72^e année, no 3740, 7 novembre 1914.

70. La Princesse Bibesco, « Une victime royale. Ferdinand de Roumanie », in *Idem*, 85^e année, no 4404, 30 juillet 1927, p. 101.

71. « La Roumanie Nouvelle », p. 577, *Idem*; Charles Oulmont, « Carol II — Roi des paysans et roi de la jeunesse », in *Idem*, pp. 578–580.

72. Le prince Carol de Hohenzollern — 24^e année, no 1214, 2 juin 1866; le prince Carol de Roumanie (d'après une photographie de Lejeune — 35^e année, no 1738, 28 avril 1877; le roi de la Roumanie, Ferdinand et Marie et leur fils, le prince Nicolae (d'après une photographie de A. Dancovici) — 74^e année, no 3835, 2 septembre 1916; la reine Marie et le prince Nicolae en visite dans les plus pauvres villages de Roumanie (d'après une photographie de Jean Ursescu, correspondant de *L'Illustration*) — 77^e année, no 3966, 8 mars 1919; le couronnement du roi Ferdinand et de la reine Marie à Alba Iulia en 1922 (photographie de A. Frankl) — 80^e année, no 4156, 28 octobre 1922; couronnement du roi Mihai en 20 juillet 1927 au Parlement de la Roumanie (photographie de I. Berman) — 85^e année, no 4404, 30 juillet 1927; la dixième anniversaire de la Grande Roumanie (photographie *Wide World*) — 87^e année, no 4499, 25 mai 1929; Carol II aviateur — 88^e année, no 4554, 14 juin 1930; la princesse Ileana de Roumanie et son mari, Anton de Habsburg, à Sinaia et les parents de l'archiduc (Blanche de Castille et Leopold Salvator), ainsi que deux de ses frères, François Joseph et Renier Charles (photographie: *Universul*) — 89^e année, no 4613, 1^{er} août 1931.

73. « Le couronnement des souverains de la Grande Roumanie », in *Idem*, 80^e année, no 4156, 28 octobre 1922, p. 110.

74. « Album Moldo-Valaque », in *Idem*, no 286, 19 août 1848, p. 378: « Retraite pour le religieux, forteresse pour le soldat, un monastère, dans la Moldo-Valachie, domine toujours, au sein des Carpathes, des passés inexpugnables. »

75. « L'étendard d'Étienne le Grand », in *Idem*, 75^e année, no 3882, 28 juillet 1917, p. 89.

76. *Idem*, 35^e année, no 1788, 2 juin 1877, p. 350; *Idem*, 35^e année, no 1790, 16 juin 1877, p. 380; *Idem*, 74^e année, no 3835, 2 septembre 1916 (Alain de Penennrun, « L'armée roumaine »), p. 216. Les Roumains étaient caractérisés comme les « Prussiens des Balkans »: « Le fond de l'élément militaire, l'homme, le soldat roumain est excellent: Moldaves et Valaques rudement formés à la vie agricole, accoutumés aux rigueurs des plateaux danubiens et de la montagne de Transylvanie, soumis à un climat qui passe aux extrêmes du froid et du chaud, sont d'une endurance surprenante à la marche aux intempéries. Alliant les ancestrales vertus des légionnaires romains, dont ils descendent, aux qualités viriles des balkaniques qui les environnent, ces robustes Latins ont jadis, devant Plevna, donné la pleine mesure de leur valeur et de leur courage (...) Frais lancé dans la lutte, sans peine il triomphera du Hongrois affaibli et de l'Austro-Allemand épuisé. »

77. Alain de Penennrun, « Aux armées roumaines, en territoire bulgare », in *Idem*, 71^e année, no 3678, 23 août, 1913, p. 150.

78. *Idem*, 35^e année, no 1788, 2 juin 1877, p. 350.

79. Voir, par exemple, la série d'articles sur les armées de Sud-Est de l'Europe de 1940; Georges Oudard, « L'armée roumaine » in *Idem*, 98^e année, no 5075, 8 juin 1940, pp. 199–203: « Dans l'état actuel des choses, l'armée roumaine paraît de taille à arrêter une attaque hongroise ou bulgare et même les deux ensemble » (p. 203).

80. C. Doussault, « Les déceptions de la Russie », in *Idem*, no 600, 26 août 1854, pp. 131–134.

81. Voir la série d'articles des années 1877 et 1913.

82. Voir la série d'articles des années 1916–1919 et 1940.

83. A.C., « L'Intervention roumaine et la paix de Bucarest », in *Idem*, 71^e année, no 3676, 9 août 1913, pp. 109–111.

84. « La Roumanie à l'Exposition », in *Idem*, 47^e année, no 2427, 31 août 1889, p. 180.

85. « Les Pavillons de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie », in *Idem*, 58^e année, no 2988, 2 juin 1900, p. 346.

86. « Nos alliés chez nous. La Roumanie », in *Idem*, 95^e année, no 4917, 29 mai 1937, supplément (LXX).

87. « Au seuil de l'Orient... sur les bords de la Seine! La Bulgarie », in *Idem*, 95^e année, no 4917, 29 mai 1937, supplément (LXXV).

88. Voir notre article « Arhitectură efemeră și imaginea identității. O istorie a pavilioanelor României la Expozițiile universale pariziene », in *Buletinul Institutului de Studii Sud-Est Europene*, III/1995, pp. 61–86.

89. « L'Exposition nationale de Bucarest », in *Idem*, 64^e année, no 3318, 29 septembre 1906, p. 199.

90. *Idem*, 87^e année, no 4489, 16 mars 1929, p. 269.

91. « Les cimetières moldo-valaques », in *Idem*, 35^e année, no 1809, 27 octobre 1877. Sur la couverture de ce numéro, il y a un dessin de Charles Doussault qui représente les cérémonies de la Toussaint dans un cimetière roumain.

92. Robert de Beauplan, « La dixième anniversaire de l'Union roumaine », in *Idem*, 87^e année, no 4499, 25 mai 1929, p. 640.

93. « L'album roumain de *L'Illustration* », in *Idem*, 87^e année, no 4520, 19 octobre 1929, p. 431.

94. G.G. Mironesco, « La sentinelle roumaine », in *Idem*, 87^e année, no 4520, 28 septembre 1929, p. 431.

95. *Ibidem*.

96. Henri Focillon, « L'ancien art roumain », in *Idem*, 87^e année, no 4517, 28 septembre 1929, p. 317.

97. Henri Focillon, « L'Exposition d'art roumain », in *Idem*, 83^e année, no 4296, 4 juillet 1925, p. 16.

98. Exposition de l'art roumain ancien et moderne. Catalogue des œuvres exposées au musée du Jeu de Paume à Paris du 25 mai au 1^{er} août 1925, Paris, Imprimerie Georges Petit, 1925: Henri Focillon, « L'art et l'histoire en Roumanie », pp. 18–29, (p. 27 et 29).

99. La Princesse Bibesco, *art.cit.*, p. 101.

100. *Ibidem*, p. 102.

101. « Marie de Roumanie », in *Idem*, 96^e année, no 4978, 30 juillet 1938, p. 446.

102. *Idem*, 89^e année, no 4596, 4 avril, 1931, p. 418.

103. « Les événements de Roumanie », in *Idem*, 92^e année, no 4741, 31 janvier 1934, p. 62.

104. « La sanglante tragédie de Bucarest », in *Idem*, 97^e année, no 5040, 7 octobre 1939, pp. 130–135.

105. Georges Oudard, « Un entretien avec Corneliu Codreanu, chef de la Garde de Fer », in *Idem*, 96^e année, 10 décembre 1938, p. 495: « Il se promena quelques instants de long en large sans arrêter de tourner les épaules, de faire des gestes bizarres, de se contorsionner de mille manières. Enfin il retomba sur son siège et se remit à parler d'une voix rauque, désagréable, avec peine et effort. Il semblait tirer les mots un à un du fond de sa gorge, s'interrompant presque à chaque phrase pour chercher un terme que je lui soufflais tout bas. Il secouait alors la tête en signe d'acquiescement et, le doigt tournant en l'air, poursuivait son discours. Son élocution était pénible, sa pensée souvent obscure. Que cet individu illuminé pût présentement diriger lui-même un parti et rêver de mener un Etat dépassait l'entendement d'un homme normal.

De toute évidence, il y avait derrière cet exalté des gens habiles qui le maniaient, abusant de sa puérole vanité. »

106. René Martel, « La Garde de Fer en Roumanie », in *Idem*, 98^e année, no 5094, 26 octobre 1940, pp. 185–187.

107. *Idem*, « L'Idéologie de la Garde de Fer en Roumanie », in *Idem*, 99^e année, no 5109, 8 février, p. 145.

108. *Ibidem*, p. 146.

109. « La Roumanie Nouvelle. L'élection du nouveau régent », in *Idem*, 87^e année, no 4520, 19 octobre 1929, p. 431.

110. Robert de Beauplan, « La naissance d'une dictature royale », in *Idem*, no 4960 (26 mars 1938, pp. 335–337); no 4951 (2 avril 1938, pp. 357–359); no 4962 (9 avril 1838, p. 383).

111. *Ibidem*, p. 337.

112. *Ibidem*, pp. 357–359 (dans une interview publiée dans le *Daily Herald* le 10 janvier 1938, le roi avait déclaré 250 000 juifs, tandis que le premier ministre, O. Goga, avançait un chiffre de 500 000). Voir aussi *Handbook of Central and East Europe 1932–33* (Zurich, 1932, p. 550) où on trouve le chiffre de 1 100 000 juifs (*apud.* le compte rendu de Andrei Pippidi au livre de Georges Castellan, *Histoire des Balkans — XIV^e–XX^e siècles*, Paris, Fayard, 1991, in *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, t. XXXI, no 3–4, 1993, p. 444).

113. *Ibidem*.

114. « Le nouveau gouvernement roumain », in *Idem*, 96^e année, no 4949, 8 janvier 1938, p. 33.

115. Pierre Ichac, « La Roumanie au carrefour de deux routes », in *Idem*, 97^e année, no 5018, 6 mai 1939, pp. 15–16.

116. « La Roumanie Nouvelle », p. 577.

117. Robert de Beauplan, « Un pays de renaissance nationale et de révolution royale », in *Ibidem*, pp. 581–582.

118. Voir notre article, « Arhitectură efemeră... », pp. 71–72.

119. Pierre Noël, « Où va la Roumanie? », in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, no 1041, 22 janvier 1938, pp. 77–80 (selon André Godin, Pierre Noël serait le pseudonyme d'Alphonse Dupront)

120. Alphonse Dupront, « Années roumaines, 1932–1941 », in *Cahiers Alphonse Dupront*, no 3, 1994, p. 13.

121. *Idem*, « Journées révolutionnaires (22 janvier 1941) », in *Idem*, pp. 21–22. (Nous remercions M. le professeur Alexandru Duțu pour les informations et la bibliographie sur Alphonse Dupront.)

122. Réginald Kann, « Silistre et le différend bulgare-roumain », in *L'Illustration*, 71^e année, no 3656, 22 mars 1913, pp. 247–248.

123. Anne Rasmussen, Brigitte Schroeder Gudehus, *Les fastes du progrès. Le guide des Expositions universelles*, Paris, Flammarion, 1992, p. 112.

124. « Nos alliés chez nous; La Roumanie », in *idem*, *loc. cit.*