# New Europe College Yearbook 2000-2001

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Books

Minorities in Romania: Policies and Politics, Limes, Cluj-Napoca, 1999

Facilitating Conflict Transformation: Implementation of the Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Romania, 1993-2001, CORE, Hamburg, 2002

STATE, MINORITY AND IDENTITY ASPECTS RELATED TO ROMANIA'S HUNGARIAN MINORITY

IDENTITY – OUTLINE OF THEORETICAL STANDPOINT

Identity, in what is probably its most frequently used sense, is primarily concerned with the manner in which individuals conceive their particularity and distinctiveness in personal relations. If we consider term in such a narrow sense, we should then distinguish radically between this way of reflecting on identity and uses of the term in describing the basis of collective behavior. Consequently, we must consider the personal, individual identity (conceived as personality, in a psychological sense), and social, collective identity (understood as the basis of an individual's attachment to groups), as two wholly distinct categories and realities.

This dichotomy can be either purely analytical (Jenkins, R. 1996, p. 19), or have a normative basis, based on the modern philosophical representations of the individual (where uniqueness is one of its most important attributes). The *person* of the social sciences is seen as a product of interactions and relations, such that the manner in which he reflects on himself, the categories, which enable him to express his uniqueness or his attachments, are both social. Thus *individuality* is dependent on the social context of reference and can not be considered as an absolute attribute, it is dependent on the circumstance in which individual and collective identity are a matter of perspective of analysis and not two distinct forms by means of which individuals represent themselves as part of their social environment.

Though reflexivity is an essential moment, identity is not solely manipulation of socially produced categories, but is also practice or, more precisely, it is a continuous adjustment of personal experience in line with the socially constructed representations of order (the prerequisite

of any meaningful social action). Therefore identity itself is a continuous process that gives coherence to individual experience, places incident, episode and the routine of particular biographies in the flow of historical time; it is an ongoing endeavor that has as main points of reference the parameters of the discourses that manipulate and integrate the various categories that make sense of social reality.

This approach seemingly contradicts the etymological sense of identity as a certain *sameness* of the individual's basic traits in the context of a changing environment of actions and meanings. We do not understand *sameness* as the preservation of substantial attributes of the individual's personality; rather we interpret it as the socially determined possibility of the individual representing the various roles and situations of his daily routine as being what is considered at a given moment to be the right order of the *way things should be done.* Thus it is not that adaptation affects identity (understood as selfsameness), but the inability of the person to redefine himself as an integrated part of a changing environment.

Therefore the identity process is affected both by the changing environment of social action (because the applicable representations of social order are obscured) and by the various attempts made to reshape the visions of reality (through delineating alternative modes to place ourselves within the flow and web of social relations).

CHALLENGES TO IDENTITY

As asserted above, it is not the social change in itself that is the main process affecting the consistency of the ways in which individuals represent themselves as parts of a larger social environment. Rather it is the possibility of reinterpreting their changed positions and roles within a coherent view of society.

The multiple facets of the social changes of the last ten years experienced by the Romanian population have provided continuous challenges to the ontological security of the individuals: the sense of continuity of their selves with the surrounding social and material environment of their actions was blurred (Giddens, A. 1984, 1991).

It is close to impossible to provide a comprehensive account of the various dimensions that contributed to this process and given this circumstance we presume only to offer some illustrative examples that

highlight the far-reaching impact of these changes in various practices and discourses on the social order with the intention of integrating these changes in a coherent view of the social world.

One of the main aspects of the transition was the passing from a relatively *immobile* society (Roth, A 1999) to a society in which opportunities for both social and territorial mobility had increased significantly (of course, in relative terms only). This involved a change in the definitions of success and failure, wealth and poverty, and also in the circumstances of increased travel opportunities, with the territorial references of identity, the values and meanings attached to home-regions or national homeland, becoming the subject of continuous reevaluation and redefinition. Furthermore, with the process of democratization and the changing of the underlying principles and rules of the relations between state and society, came the redefining of individual relations to authority and discourse on the increased responsibility of the individual with regard to politics.

On their own, these changes affected the manner in which individuals see their place in society; however, the imperfections, hesitations and ambiguities that accompanied these transformations served only to augment the tensions.

As regards the processes of economic and social differentiation, the incongruity between the Weberian capitalist ethos promoted as the ideal type of the new entrepreneur and the accounts of doubtful sources of the wealth of the *nouveau riches* lead to hesitant attitudes towards and vague definitions of the fairness of the overall system, and, in particular, in respect of the moral unfairness of the newly created roles and positions within the new economic system.[1]

In terms of territorial mobility – migration – tensions arose between discourses on the sense of duty towards home society and the promotion of the legitimacy of the individual option to pursue happiness and self-fulfillment in a given form (in the context of increasingly attractive option of moving abroad[2]), leading to problematic relations.

At a political level, the emerging democratic processes offered an increased number political ideologies, various degrees of identifications and forms of political activism, and the new definitions of public and political responsibility lead to the reevaluation of the relations between individual subjects and the polity. However, the sense of responsibility involved in the system of political representation based mainly on the

party system, was contrasted by the perception of the lack of effectiveness of the polity;[3] hence new opportunities for influence are shadowed by a lack of confidence in the actors mediating between society and the system of political institutions, leading eventually to the generalized perception of increased discrepancy between freedom and order.

These circumstances of changing meanings, unpredictable and contradictory processes, emptied categories of belonging; or, to put it briefly: the generalized anomie was the basis on which the universe of meanings offered by ethnicity proved to be one of the pivotal frames of reference when the sense of commonality and solidarity within the society started to be restored (Hobsbawm, E.J. 1992). Furthermore, as in Romania, ideological[4] and structural[5] preconditions facilitated the politically exploitation of the uncertainties of the changing social web by appealing to the *unaltered primordiality* of ethnic principles, and soon after the start of political reform in Romania the nationalist paradigm became the dominant ideology in framing the discourse on identity.

Given these circumstances, we cannot consider nationalism purely as political ideology instrumentalized within the context of political struggle as a convenient pretext for the defense of the vested interests of the old regime (Haddock, B., Caraiani, O., 1999). We must see it as the powerful ideological tool used by politics to forge identities within the context of rapid but hesitant and ambiguous social changes, providing a sense of continuity and facilitating the surpassing of the imminent tendencies to alienate the population from politics and in general from the institutional world (Auer, S. 2000, pp. 221-222) perceived as seriously lacking in public utility.

Thus, in the larger context of searching for coherence in the changing social environment, the appeal to ethnicity becomes an important point of reference for individuals in representing the unity of society and the fundamentals of the link between state and its citizens.[6]

Ethnicity, in Barth's view (1969, 1994), is essentially a concept that brings to mind, not the deep-rooted cultural uniqueness, but a sense of distinctiveness (where boundaries are important and cultural elements not) that is engendered by ongoing social encounters. Consequently, the assertion of particularity inherently supposes the emphasis of difference, the circumstance in which the representation of unity involves the highlighting of deep-rooted dissimilarities. In this general context we

begin to approach the subject of this paper: analysis of the identity of the Hungarians in Romania.

This ethnic group represents one of those historical, cultural and political references in contrast to which *Romanianness* acquired the meaning of the cultural fundament of social and political unity. This lead to a certain ambivalence in the incorporation of Hungarians into Romania, Romania being understood as the larger social and political unit of reference.

In this process, politics – both as the universe of symbolic discourse, and as the main authority in initiating and financing of policy – plays a crucial role; and, when analyzing the situation of this minority in particular, we need to consider it as a game of multiple players. Consequently, in this analysis – along the lines of Brubaker's views on national identity – we need to consider at least three players: the state to which the minority is linked through citizenship, the kin-state, and the political elite of the respective minority (Brubaker, R., 1992, 1996).

In the last decade, Hungary (as kin-state) accorded great importance to the fate of Hungarians living outside its borders. This grew into one of its main foreign policy goals, playing an important role in Hungary's bilateral and international relations. Moreover, Hungary initiated a set of policies intended to encourage Hungarians in Romania to have their particular cultural features represented at an institutional level. All these measures had the aim of forging a more inclusive level of solidarity based on ethnic commonality. These efforts met with the difficulties of integrating the various identity politics and state interests and with the ambiguities engendered in various encounters within Hungarian society in acknowledging the *Hungarianness* of the Hungarians in Romania.

One of the main features of Hungarian-Romanian relations with regard to the Hungarian minority of Romania was, and still is, both the kin-state's and Romania's claim to legitimacy in considering the Hungarian minority as the subject of their respective identity policies. As these two major political entities are competing for control over identity, bilateral relations involve continuous (and recurrently tense) negotiation on the legitimacy, content, form and limits of the respective identity policies and processes that are implicitly or explicitly followed by the states.

The difficulty in reaching agreement lies with the fact that both the Romanian (host-state) and Hungarian (kin-state) discourses are confined to maneuver within the space of confused meanings described by the

categories of citizenship, ethnicity and nation, with the confusion arising from the fact that there is no joint agreement on the political significance of ethnicity. On one hand, in the relations between the Hungarian minority and the Romanian state, the relation between political community and ethnic particularity is not clarified, while, on the other hand, the legitimate forms in which ethnic solidarity should be allowed to exist has not been made clear by Hungary and Romania. It was in these circumstances and given the manner in which Hungarians in Romania have been combining their (ambiguous) political status with their cultural affinities that the concept of dual identity was frequently employed in public, political and even professional[7] discourse. The essence of this concept can be summarized by saying that, as regards formal nationality (citizenship), Hungarians are loyal to the Romanian state; however, in terms of symbolic and cultural commonality, the Hungarian (ethno-cultural) nation is their point of reference.

Such a conceptual endeavor represents more an ambitious political project[8] than provide an accurate description of the blurred relationship between the integrative state structures and the founding ideologies and rhetoric on *Hungarianness.* It is in this circumstance that the role of the political elite of the Hungarian minority is most complex. On one hand, the elite negotiate with the Romanian state the terms of incorporation of the minority within the state, while also pleading for both *undifferentiated* treatment based on the formal link of citizenship and for a *differentiated* incorporation of the Hungarian minority. On the other hand, however, the minority elite maintains relations with the kin-state by assuming an active role in the administration of the resources donated by the kin-state for the support of cultural, educational and social activities, and, in more broader terms, is an active partner in negotiating the effective functioning of the category of nation (as ethno-cultural bound) in political relations; further to this, it also actively participates in the process of institutionalizing and legally defining the content of rights, based on the ethno-cultural bounds, accorded in Hungary to Hungarians living outside its borders.

NATION AND ETHNICITY: THE ROMANIAN EXPERIENCE

Following the downfall of communism and after a very short period of relaxation and the prospect of normalization of Romanian-Hungarian relations, a convenient ideological tool for exercising authority was

acknowledged by the newly emerged dominant political forces in ethno-nationalist discourse. As mentioned above, it would be misleading to view ethnicity as purely a resource that was to be exploited politically and hence to focus on the manipulative misuses of the affective nature of the ethnic bounds.

Ethnicity became one of the points of reference in the overcoming of the rapid changes and the incumbent fragmentation of the social world and, in this circumstance, represented a convenient point of reference for the framing of the ideological foundations of the post-communist political community. As ancestry – the idea of common ancestry, the golden age – played a vital role in offering a sense of pre-contractual primordial solidarity (Smith, A.D. 1996), it was used rhetorically to forge the vision of basic unity of the political community – a unity based on which a new contract between state and society could be negotiated.

Given this circumstance, defense of the unity of the nation in Romania based on ethnicity became the referential value in the overcoming of various divisions within society and the sustaining of the possibility of a new political order. In these conditions, the strength of certain dichotomies, such as communist–democrat or authoritarian–liberal, can weaken, affording possible re-conversion for a plethora of former party activists, legitimizing autocratic political manifestations.

For the Hungarians of Romania, it was highly plausible that the emerging political and social elite would employ ethnicity in redefining their place within the contours of the political and social order. It suffices that we consider the long process of asymmetric incorporation of this ethnic group into the Romanian state, the general state of Romanian political culture – in that it lacked the elements of an integrative civic standpoint in relation to ethnic diversity – and the fact that, during the previous decade, the Hungarian ethnic minority was one of the preferred ideological targets of Ceausescu's nationalistic rhetoric and nationalizing policies.

They appeal to a distinct cultural profile and history and pushed for a differentiated incorporation into the state based on their particular ethnic features. The envisaged political order was one of pluralism on an ethnic basis.

As a result, both the Romanian and the emerging Hungarian elite were making an appeal to ethnicity; however, despite this similarity in the system of codes used to chart political commonality, the respective

roles attributed to ethnicity in the redesigning of relations between society, political community and state were radically different.

The Romanian political elite used ethnicity to represent the primordial unity and cohesion of the political commonality, based on which creation of a new political order could be pursued. The Hungarian elite, however, considered ethnicity as an essential feature of social organization and, when negotiating the redesigning of the political order, stressed the ethnic pluralism of society, claiming political recognition of difference.

In the end, the standpoint that promoted ethnicity as a form of pre-contractual solidarity won endorsement as the basis of the political order. The Constitution, the basic legal act codifying the foundations of political community, defined Romania as a *nation state,* with the insistence that the state be founded based on the *unity* of the Romanian people[9]. Furthermore, to avoid any "misinterpretations", the architects of the fundamental law emphasized the principle that the state is the expression of an historically constituted human community, bound together by common ethnic origin, language, culture and religion (Constantinescu, M et al, 1992, p. 7).

These formulations resulted implicitly in blurred relations between three major categories, namely: citizens, the Romanian people and the ethnic minorities (Capelle-Pogacean, A. 1999). This involved a clear dichotomy between citizenship (understood as membership of the formal political community) and nationality (understood as membership of the nation in the symbolic political community). To a certain extent, these tensions can be considered as *reiterated* given that the divergences between citizenship, nation and ethnicity have historical precedents, reflecting the tensions and unassimilated contradictions of the different ideological sources and traditions in which the idea of the Romanian political community is rooted (Iordachi, C., 2000). However, it is not only history that is the source of the excessive ethnification of nationality, but also the manner in which ethno-nationalism was used to consolidate the authority of the political forces which came to power following the downfall of the Ceausescu regime. The Romanian elite of the time chose to overcome the various existing social divisions[10] by presenting themselves as the guardians of national unity, rather by fostering broad agreement on the fundamentals of democracy, as was considered to be the prerequisite for consolidation of an inclusive democratic regime (Linz, J.J. and Stepan A., 1996, p. 29).

By way of example, prior to November 1991, when the new basic law of Romania was approved by Parliament, the main efforts of the DAHR had been to codification in the new Constitution of guaranties for the collective exercise of minority rights and freedoms[11] and, based on this, the organization of a system of local self-governments, advancing the idea of a minority parliament empowered to coordinate the activities of these self governments.[12] Different formulas for codification of the status of the Hungarian minority in the Constitution were proposed in this period. Of these, that considered most radical (even by the acting general secretary of the DAHR), was the proposal to define the Hungarians in Romania *as co-nation* that, together with the Romanian nation, would constitute the basis of the Romanian political community.[13] Eventually, the resolutions passed by the second congress of the DAHR held in 1991 defined the Hungarian community in Romania as *independent political subject*, equal in rights with the Romanian people.[14] In the Cluj Declaration of October 1992, the political creed which accords the Hungarian minority the status of *separate political subject* (such that integration should be carried out on a collective basis, based principle of the *internal self-determination*) was firmly established in different forms of collective autonomy.[15]

Later, in 1993, when the draft on national minorities was promoted officially by the DAHR,[16] the idea of a separate entity entitled to a differentiated political integration was repeated.

This document states that the national and ethnic minorities in Romania have the right to internal self-determination and that those exercising this right will become an *autonomous community* (Art. 1). National minorities and autonomous communities are to be considered equal political entities and constituent parts of the state, on a par with the Romanian nation (Art. 2 par. 3). Internal self-determination is evident throughout in the exercising of the three forms of autonomy specified by the law: personal, local and regional autonomy (Art.2. par. 5).

Far from codifying a special status for the Hungarian minority, the Constitution that came into force at the end of 1991, served to define Romania, asserted the idea of ethnic unity and the ethnic basis of the political community. Minority rights were referred to in terminology of the *persons belonging to national minorities*, leaving no room doubt that the cultural differentiation in society was not a relevant issue in founding of the basis of political commonality.

Given this, we can define the basic tension resulting from the way in which the Romanian and the Hungarian political elite of Romania defined the role of ethnicity in the complex relations of state-nation-society: the Hungarians emphasized the ethnic pluralism of society, while the Romanians emphasized the fundamental ethnic unity of the political community.

The various political and public debates that took place in Romania, such as on the definition of the content of the minimal public culture achieved by compulsory education, clearly reflect these tensions, particularly with regard to the subjects which can be used to transmit ideologies, thus founding political loyalty and forming a basis for knowledge in respect of nationhood (understood as solidarity with the political community).[17]

Given these circumstances, we can explain why subject of national history was transformed in content from *Romanian History* to *History of Romanians*,[18] and why the dispute over the language in which knowledge relating to national space (Romanian geography)[19] should be imparted (see on this Horváth I. 1998) was so heated. These debates indicate that history, the idea of shared origin and consequently the intrinsic (and exclusive) relation to a given territory, is the founding idea for political commonality, and that politics is strongly committed to the reproduction of this ideology through compulsory education.

Though it was in matters of education that these tensions came to light, other political endeavors also reflect that the ethnic principle of political commonality, the representations of nation based on ethno-cultural ideology, is highly influential in defining the political agenda. For example, at the beginning of nineteenth century, the idea that in the near future political union with Moldavia was an open possibility was embraced by the majority part of the Romanian political elite (Gallagher, T. 1999, pp. 308-313) and became a subject of passionate debate. Apart from political rhetoric, several concrete policy measures were implemented in this direction, such as educational assistance for students from Moldavia willing to study in Romania, the loose interpretation of naturalization policies for Moldavian citizens applying for Romanian citizenship (Iordachi, C. 2000, p. 53), and the co-opting of Moldavian politicians by the Romanian political elite (Leonida Lari, Mircea Druc, Ilie Ilascu). All these processes were founded on the assumption that, regardless of the politically determined historical evolutions, relations between Romanians will be unproblematic.

Romanianness was represented as dimension of historical authenticity, in opposition to the inauthentic political formulas established in given historical contexts, such as political union considered as a banal accomplishment resulting from the driving force of the common ethnic bounds.

This enthusiasm faded in the circumstances in which in Moldavia found itself – with politicians claiming that political union failed due to gain significant public support while the political forces in favor of maintaining independence gained public support (Socor, V. 1992). These circumstances afforded opportunity for intellectual reflection on the various aspects of the politics based on ethnicity.[20] These debates underlined the idea that the national policies initiated in relation to the Moldavian population represent symbolic messages toward the Hungarian minority as regards their place within the political establishment.

Irrespective of the degree to which the idea of unification of all Romanian inhabited territories was embraced by the population, this moment of political fervor was of some significance: ethnicity became the basis for a political program, with the idea of unification was formulated by appealing to the uncritically assumed *reality* of belonging, loyalty and solidarity, enforcing in society the basic ideological formula of nationalism "that the ethnic boundaries should not cross political ones" (Gellner, E. 1983, p. 1).

In this situation, the Hungarian desire for the ethnic pluralism of society and the key terms in the Hungarian-promoted autonomy project (autonomy, internal self-determination, etc.) constituted the basis of the incriminatory discourses on the Hungarian minority's alleged intention of secession or on Romania's territorial disintegration. These discourses, if considered within the afore-mentioned system of beliefs regarding the unproblematic political unity based on ethnicity, lead us to draw important conclusions about the political order and Hungarian's within this order as viewed by the political elite.

The asserted belonging of the Hungarians of Romania to the Hungarian nation was seen in similar terms as the belonging, loyalty and solidarity which founded the allegedly unproblematic political unity between Romanians living in Romania and Romanians in Moldavia. Thus the claim for differentiated identity politics was seen in terms of political commonality with the Hungarian nation. This, at least at a political level, was the source of seemingly unavoidable tension between the particular

identity of Hungarians and their loyalties in relation to the Romanian state.[21] Their desires to legally codify and institutionalize the cultural reproduction and public expression of their individual traits and for a redefinition of the political system, in which authority in certain field of policy making would be reallocated along ethnic lines (such as, the idea of cultural autonomy), were seen as questioning the bases of political commonality.

However, even had the problem been framed in politically more realistic terms and the idea of Hungarians secession been excluded, another tension would have appeared: that generated by the diffuse relation between the symbolic and the formal, juridical membership of the political community. As ethnic bounds were considered the very basis of political commonality, the formal juridical link between state and individuals, if it were not based primarily on ethnicity, was not considered authentic, engendering a sense of fundamental distrust with regard to Hungarians claims for institutional articulation of their cultural distinctiveness.[22]

In a poll carried out in September 2000, of the Hungarians in Romania asked to assess the effectiveness of the Hungarian party's participation in the government coalition, 39.1% of all respondents saw the DAHR's showing to the Romanian public that they can trust the Hungarians of Romania as positive[23]. The relative statistical weight of this lies with the technicalities of the instrument used; analysis of the data in a more comprehensive manner, allows us to legitimately see that the quest for trust forms a fundamental component of Hungarians' identity in respect of the complicated relation between their identity rooted in a particular ethnic belonging and the universe of meanings in which the Romanian political rhetoric integrates this particularizing feature.

Hence, to a certain extent it can be argued that, though the DAHR, as part of the 1996-2000 Government coalition, did not achieve its most important goals (the establishment of a separate Hungarian language university, for example), it nonetheless succeeded in maintaining the support of its constituency by its rejection of the generalized representations of Hungarians as an unauthentic component of the political system.

PARADOXES OF THE POLITICAL UNITY OF THE HUNGARIANS OF ROMANIA

The political efforts of the DAHR to renegotiate the position of Hungarians within the Romanian state were characterized by a certain duality evident at the level of political strategies and tactics, but also at the level of the implicit ideologies that encompass these undertakings. The duality of strategies also characterized the structure of the political organization, resulting in two markedly differentiated fractions.

The duality of the politics of the Hungarian party is that of the parallel use of the politics, which we will name here affirmative action, and the other branch of politics called the politics of minority nation building.

The politics of affirmative action emphasize the asymmetric relations between Hungarians and the Romanian state, on those facts, policy decisions or the actions of public institutions (the judiciary, the secret services, the army, etc.) which are thought to reduce the chances of Hungarians reproducing institutionally their particular ethno-cultural features, or are considered to amount to discrimination on ethnic grounds. These manifestations fall into the referential category of citizenship - understood as a set of generally applicable and legally guaranteed individual rights, but also as a set of rights for differentiated treatment on a collective basis, namely the right to a differentiated institutional structure that assures the protection and reproduction of the particularizing features of a collectivity.[24] These collective rights are understood as a set of cultural rights that limit the state in promoting educational, cultural or simply identity policies that influence negatively the particular features of a culturally differentiated segment of a population. This line of DAHR political strategy followed the extension and expansion of the status of citizenship, in pursuit of a comprehensive interpretation of citizenship that assures membership of and access to a nation to each individual and where the state imposes no constraints on the special interests of the individual that arise out of socio-cultural differences (Csepeli Gy., Örkény A., 1996, p. 258).

The *nation-building* program (Kántor Z., 2000)[25] of the DAHR pursues a renegotiation of the political status of *Hungariannes* and this orientation is reflected synthetically within the Romanian political community by various political endeavors, such as the autonomy program of the DAHR. The core idea is that redistribution of political authority between state and minority actors (at least in fields related to cultural reproduction)

will lead to a significant decrease in the sense of asymmetric incorporation of Hungarians within the Romanian state.

If the *affirmative action* program pursues objectives such as equal treatment, participation, institutional development, increased influence in political processes following the decrease in influence of ethnicity in the allocation of various resources,   primarily authority; then the *nation building* program[26] pursues the restructuring of the polity and the overall authority of centralized state, following devolution of the central authority along ethnic lines in the fields of cultural, educational and general identity politics, stressing the importance of ethnicity in allocating authority.

Though the political organization of the Hungarians of Romania has been predominantly identified with the nation-building program (indeed this set of ideas formed the core of the organization's rhetoric until 1996), as the DAHR began to engage in various, more integrative political endeavors[27] interest based politics became more dominant, reducing the symbolic weight of both of the systems of principles designed to offer a larger perspective on the integration of cultural differences within the larger political frame. This tension between interests and ideas is another feature of the Hungarian identity in Romania, a tension which can be understood if we follow the dividing lines within this political organization.

However, the maintaining by the Hungarians of Romania of a seemingly unitary façade of political will and action in the institutionalized political process (parliamentary elections, relations with other domestic political actors, etc.) in fact represents a combination of heterogeneous political ideologies and orientations which were kept relatively stable during the last ten years.

The DAHR is a structured as an "umbrella organization", incorporating several political and ideological groupings, some of which (until recently) maintained an autonomous juridical personality (such as The Christian Democratic Party of the Hungarians in Romanian and the Social Democratic Party of the Hungarians in Romanian), including specialized NGO's run by the Hungarians of Romania, and territorial representatives of the Alliance. Al these ideological platforms and interest protection groupings were integrated in 1993[28] by means of a "complicated, multi-layered structure with cross-membership of the different bodies at both central and local levels" (Bíró A., 1996, p. 24).

This integrative formula implied a complicated decision-making system and that its Executive Board enjoy less executive power than

would customary political parties. Instead it was decided that a large decision making body, often labeled the *mini-parliament* of the Hungarians of Romania, be responsible for the main decisions and supervise the restraint decision making body (the Council of the Representatives of the Alliance).

However, its complicated system for accommodating internal interest had, until this point, succeeded in handling the internal tensions and conflicts arising out of the heterogeneity of its organizational and ideological constituency.

In respect of internal conflicts, one important dividing line (often seen as potentially breaking)[29] line within the DAHR deserves mention; namely that between the so-called *moderates* and the *radicals.* The basis of these distinctions is not so much ideological, but simply relates to the rhetoric and tactics of the representatives of the two groupings.

The radicals (labeled voluntarist/populists by annalists)[30] "are in favor of a conflict approach centering on an opposition role and international pressure",[31] of trying to mobilize resources outside the field of institutionalized political negotiations (that is, organize popular assemblies and adopt strong public statements), with the aim of creating favorable conditions for negotiations,[32] or simply of keeping issues related to the Hungarian minority on the agenda of different institutionalized political debates (both domestic and international). Or, in the interpretation of one analyst, the main tactical step revolves around issuing declarations which focus the attention of the international community on the destructive potential of some of the unsolved matters in respect of the relations between the Romanian government and the Hungarian minority, and, based on this, attempting to win the support of the international community in achieving autonomy.[33]

This group had a low profile at first. For a period, it was the politicians gathered around the charismatic personality of the Protestant bishop László TQkés,[34] known for his inflammatory declarations against the ethnic cleansing of the Hungarian minority by the Romanian state,[35] who were considered to be of this orientation. Later, however, those of this orientation became associated with the active and high profile Reformist Platform of the DAHR.

The group of so-called *moderates* tried (by means of alliances and internal pressure) to work the Romanian political system to achieve the objectives of the DAHR. According to the logic of the incrementalist

tactic, they sought to set up a system of political relations and maintain a process of negotiation with Romanian political parties so as to play an active part in defining the frame and maintaining the process of democratization through which the particular interests of DAHR could be promoted (Bárdi, N., 2000).

As the distinct profile of these two orientations was articulated within the DAHR, the moderates had a more or less constant predominance; however, the pressures of the reformist/radical wing became more and more structured. Moreover, it seems that they enjoyed the important support of the leading party of the governing coalition in Hungary.[36] This, in a given sense, represented a new evolution in the relations between the Hungarian state and the Hungarian minority parties abroad, which, until that point, operated on the principle that the Hungarian government does not take up positions as regards the internal affairs of the organizations of its minorities abroad.

Seemingly, the dividing line is purely tactical; the strategic goal – renegotiation with the Romanian state of the status of its Hungarian minority – was shared by both fractions.

This is one possible interpretation and is quite plausible too as the relations between this minority organization and its stable constituency is based on the centrality of ethnicity and on the idea that the particular ethnicity of Hungarians forms a basis for separate a political organization pursuing a differentiated incorporation within the state.

In practice, what we called affirmative action is subordinate to the nation building program; the core element of DAHR ideology is that the minority situation can be resolved only if differentiated incorporation within state is accomplished (Bíró A. Z, 1999).

However, in practical terms, the leading fraction of the DAHR enjoyed its political successes[37] only in terms of what we called affirmative action and only by paying the price of subordinating elements of the nation building program. Nonetheless, despite the notable successes enjoyed in this field, true reorientation of strategy towards affirmative action – the redefinition of the Romanian political community towards a more inclusive citizenship – did not occurred.

Until 1996, no genuine process of political debate on the principles of integration of the Hungarians had taken place. All political debate related to minority issues resulted mainly in reactive attitudes. Problems arose, and the subsequent political projects promoted by DAHR were viewed

only as representing the illegitimate intentions of the Hungarian minority to challenge the underlying ethno-national principle of the Romanian political system. Outcomes of the debates were far from offering a basis for the redefinition of political community or the fundamentals of democracy.

Though major and favorable changes in sectoral legislation (such as language use in public administration, a more permissive law on education, etc.) were promoted during the participation of the DAHR in the governing coalition, no explicit debate took place in terms of general principles and codified agreements on the long term reconfiguration of the political establishment towards more integrative policy with respect to the minorities.[38]

Moreover, Romanian political parties used the ethno-nationalist discourse, both when reflecting on the basis of political commonality, and also when debating issues raised by the DAHR. This was only limited by the desire to obtain a positive assessment by the international community of political relations between the Romanian polity and the DAHR. Thus integrative political solutions in relations with the Hungarians from Romania were not grounded in a new ideology of the political community. Rather the limitation of ethno-nationalistic fervor occurred merely in the context of subordination of minority policies for the achievement of foreign policy goals.

Therefore, the place of Hungarian minority, through its political representative in the political establishment, is likely to be the subject of future debate.

As such, the various political formula designed to integrate the DAHR can be considered as simply the techniques designed to forge larger political consensus and not as the answers to basic questions related to identity, such as whether Hungarians are loyal or disloyal, authentic or inauthentic parts of the political community. Of course, ideas of loyalty and authenticity are normally attributed based on long standing contacts and experiences. However, in matters of social order, these features can be regarded as fundamental dimensions of the political community.

Thus, the longer the moderate fraction of the DAHR finds itself in a paradoxical situation, the more it gives way to a discourse centered on ethnicity and the more it has the chance to influence positively the situation of its constituency. And the more it uses this influence to offer solutions

to precisely defined problems, the more problematic the maintenance of the minority situation of the ethnic group it represents.

HUNGARY: INTEGRATING ETHNICITY AND NATION

The communist regime in Hungary avoided use of nationalist rhetoric, and Ceausescu's communist regime insisted that problem of national minorities was an exclusively domestic issue. Thus, during the communist period, the issue of the Hungarian minority of Romania was almost completely absent from the agenda of bilateral relations in Romania (Barabás B. et alli. 1990) and its presence on public agenda was similarly low.

In the 1980's, a process of political reforms was initiated in Hungary, and, with this, matters such as the situation of the Hungarian minorities abroad, and, in particular, that of Hungarian minority in Romania, became an important subject on the public agenda. Furthermore, the national concern for Hungarians abroad became one of the preferred ways of expressing opposition to communist internationalism and its lack of genuine concern for national values.

One of the most important ways in which the political opposition manifested its solidarity with the Hungarians of Romania was related to the large scale reconstruction of the rural areas initiated by the Ceausescu regime (Turnock, D. 1986, Häkli, J. 1994, Durandin, C. 1995). The project of reconstruction was interpreted as a large scale demolition program that endangered many of the historical artifacts of the Transylvania region where the Hungarian population is largely concentrated. Given Ceausescu's virulent nationalism, with its harsh anti-Hungarian component (Verdery, K. 1991), public opinion in Hungary began to suspect that the large scale reconstruction was nothing other than a plan to destroy the Hungarian cultural and historical assets of the region and resulted in organized mass demonstrations in support of the Hungarians of Romania and in opposition to the systematization project.

Parallel to this and other similar manifestations of solidarity, another important process came to the attention of Hungarian public opinion at the time. Starting in 1986, a large number of migrants and refugees (in particular ethnic Hungarians) began to make their way to Hungary from Romania (Fassman, H., Münz, R., 1995, Sík E. 1990, 1992). This

phenomenon, unusual in itself in peace time, had important implications for Hungarian politics and society.

As far as politics was concerned, apart from the administrative pressures created by a such a large scale movement of population,[39] the fact that the majority of the refugees, when asked, stated the nationalizing policies of the Romanian state as the main reason for their migration (Csepeli Gy., Závecz T. 1991, pp. 91-92), raised the issue of the causes of such large scale movement. As a consequence, the presence of the refuges was used as *evidence* of discrimination based on their ethnic belonging, and the issue of Hungarian minorities abroad became one of the most common subjects in political discourse.

As the problems worsened, the political opposition increasingly chose to exploit the nationalist theme, and eventually even the communists had made the problems of the Hungarian minorities living abroad part of their agenda[40]. Consequently, and with the consent of the actors of the transition period and of the period that followed, the value of nation and the fate of Hungarians living abroad found their way on to the agenda of Hungarian transition (Linz, J.J., Stepan A., 1996). Given these circumstances, at the end of 1989, when Hungary's Constitution was modified to reflecting a sense of solidarity and responsibility for the Hungarians abroad, the following statement was included:

> The Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside its borders and shall promote and foster their relations with Hungary.[41]

This newly strengthened sense of care for Hungarians living abroad became one of the main directions of Hungarian foreign policy and enjoyed the support of all parties on the political stage that formed following 1989. There were three main pillars to this foreign policy: Euro-Atlantic integration, the good-neighbor policy to guarantee regional stability, and an integrative national policy that actively supports ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries.

Since this time, three coalitions have governed in Hungary and all have taken on the objective of supporting Hungarian minorities abroad, developing and maintaining a certain amount of continuity in the institutions meant to strengthen this policy objective. These Institutions were designed to support, not only the cultural activities of Hungarians

in Romania, but also their political endeavors in negotiating the position of the minority in respect of the Romanian state.

This led to the resuscitation of the World Union of Hungarians (Magyarok Világszövetsége), an NGO structure that had existed under communism, which now acted as an important pressure group in matters of policy related to Hungarian minorities living abroad (Capelle-Pogaceanu, A. 1996, p.11).

In September 1989, special structures of Hungarian Cabinet were established to deal with the problems of the minorities living abroad before the eventual founding in 1992 of the **Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad** (Határon Túli Magyarok Hivatala).[42] Its main remit included: co-ordination of governmental activities related to Hungarian minorities living abroad, maintaining "Hungarian-Hungarian ties", maintaining bilateral relations with the governmental bodies responsible for minority affairs in the affected countries, and drawing the attention of international organizations to the problems of Hungarians living abroad.[43]

As a result of the activity of this specialized agency, complex and institutionalized forms of contact and consultation between the Hungarian Government and the political and cultural elite of the Hungarian minority in Romania were established.

In 1996, what had been occasional contact between the political parties of Hungary, various institutions of the central administration and the representative political force of the Hungarians in Romania (DAHR[44]), led firstly to a high level multilateral meeting, the "Hungary and Hungarians abroad" Conference (July 1996), then, in 1999, to the establishment of institutionalized consultation, in the Hungarian Standing Conference (Magyar Állandó Értekezlet).[45]

Apart from these strategies of institutional incorporation of the political elite, another set of policies was initiated to increase the impact of identity politics by supporting the cultural and educational activities of the Hungarians from Romania.

Later, a network of public foundations was established designed to distribute financial support from the Hungarian Government to the Hungarian minorities living abroad: the Illyés Public Foundation (established 1990) offered financing for cultural projects, while the New Shake Hand Public Foundation (Új Kézfogás Alapítvány) supported the entrepreneurial activities of Hungarians abroad.

It is rather difficult to calculate exactly the total amount of funding that went to Hungarians abroad, for, separate to these sources, other public and private foundations receive subsidies from central or local budgets which help to support Hungarians abroad. In 1995, the level of this assistance was estimated to be at more than 1.3 billion HUF, approximately 6,500,000 USD at the time (Bíró A.M. 1996). In fact, the amount of money increased over time, as reflected in a report by the Illyés Public Foundation,[46] the major financial source (Table 1):

Table 1 The evolution of the yearly budget of the Illyés Foundation (mil HUF)[47]

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
15	15	270,3	300	615	312	450	453.3	506	817.9	801.1

Due to their size (being the largest Hungarian community outside Hungary)[48], the Hungarians of Romania received the largest share of this support.

For example, as mentioned in a report of the New Shake Hand Foundation (Új Kézfogás Alapítvány) which offers supports the entrepreneurial activities of the Hungarian minorities living abroad, between 1992 and 1999, some 54.38% of the total amount of 1148.5 million HUF[49] was directed to Romania.

Another important institution of cultural integration for Hungarians living abroad is DUNA TV, a publicly funded satellite television channel, set up at the end of 1992 and which addresses these peoples specifically.

All this support was not only cultural, but political too; a succession of Hungarian governments served to promote the various claims made by Hungarian politicians from Romania in interstate relations with Romania. Hungary also fully assumed its role of kin-state and advocated the case of Hungarians abroad within various international institutions.

The nature of political support since 1989 shows some elements of discontinuity, evidenced by the differing emphasis and strategies of the three successive governments as regards Hungarian minorities abroad.

The Hungarian Prime Minister of the first democratically elected government   which came to power in 1990[50] was quoted frequently on his declaration that he considers himself the Prime Minister in "spirit" of 15 million Hungarians[51] (the population of Hungary being roughly 10

million). Aside from the rhetorical weight of this declaration, it was clear that this government was determined to change radically the political orientation of the communist regime and to promote a more proactive policy regarding Hungarian minorities (Schöpflin, G. 1998, p. 123). The *Antall doctrine*[52] redefined the status of the Hungarian minorities abroad by making the positions of the political representatives of those Hungarians living abroad imperative to Hungary's foreign policy decisions (Bárdi, N., 1999, p. 43). This government also initiated a process of institutionalization of the relations between the minority organizations of the Hungarians abroad and the government of the kin-state and set up a system for institutional support of Hungarians abroad. Furthermore, Hungary actively advocated the cause of the Hungarian minorities in the arena of international organizations, declaring strong political support for the promotion of the collective rights and autonomous structures of the Hungarian minorities abroad (Zellner, W., Dunay P., 1998, pp. 213 – 214).

All of these aspects served to strengthen the suspicion of Romanian political forces and made it yet easier for Romanian nationalists to label Hungary as an irredentist state and the Hungarians from Romania as a secessionist minority.

Seen in this light, the Hungarian government subordinated the objectives of Western integration and the good neighbor policy to the support of the Hungarian minorities abroad, and the situation of the Hungarian minority from Romania was considered the corner stone of bilateral relations with the *host* state (Zellener, W., Dunay P., 1998).

The Romanian government followed the example inherited from the communist period that the situation of its ethnic Hungarians is not a subject to be debated with the Hungarian partner.

In 1995 the situation changed somewhat in terms of incentives for both the Romanian and Hungarian states. On one the hand,

> following a visit to Washington in September 1995, and due to the coming Brussels NATO foreign minister's summit of December 1996, president Iliescu was confident of Romania's chances of being accepted into NATO, and as such was more open to compromise(Bíró G., 1999 p. 368).

The MSZP and SZDSZ[53] coalition in Hungary (1994 – 1998) also promised a shift in policy in favor of the Hungarian minorities abroad by improving their situation through the normalization of the bilateral relation

with the *host* countries (Reisch, A, 1994), explicitly subordinating the minority policy to the objective of Western integration. And it was in these circumstances that the Horn[54] cabinet was open to negotiate with the Romanian Government the terms of a bilateral agreement; this involved a redefinition of policy towards the Hungarian minorities abroad, limitation of its support of their cultural organizations and scrupulously avoidance of the inciting and destabilizing political activity of its co-ethnics (Brubaker. R., 1998, p. 282), changing of the proactive and militant policy of the Antall government to that of a participatory observant role (Bárdi, N. 1999, p. 43), and consideration of the Hungarian political parties from abroad as belonging primarily to the political community of the states to which they belong as citizens, thus subordinating ethnicity to the interest of nation (understood as the community of citizens).

This shift is observable in the Recommendation 1201,[55] one of the main documents included as the legal basis of the agreement. This legal act had particular resonance for Romania during negotiations for accession to the Council of Europe in 1993. During this process Romania was instructed to adopt legislation according to the standards of the Recommendation 1201.[56] Although different public authorities and parliamentary forces committed themselves to embrace this legal act as the basis of its minority policy, in time they became reluctant to keep to this commitment and even contested the validity of this legal act, given that some of its provisions affect the stability of the state.[57] The opposition of the Romanian political elite centered on article 11 of the Recommendation 1201, which states that:

> In the regions where they are in the majority, persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to appropriate local or autonomous authorities or will be accorded a special status …[58]

The Romanians interpreted this provision as being a legal basis for the internal self-determination of the Hungarians in Romania, legitimizing the autonomist movement of this minority.

In the end, Hungarian diplomacy made a concession, and agreed to a footnote which states that:

> The Contracting Parties agree that Recommendation 1201 does not refer to collective rights, nor does it impose upon them the obligation to grant to

the concerned persons any right to a special status of territorial autonomy based on ethnic criteria.[59]

The compromises made by both sides were heavily criticized. The Romanian nationalist forces blamed Iliescu for including in the treaty the issue of the Hungarian minority, while the Parliamentary opposition in Hungary[60] accused the governing coalition that, by signing a treaty lacking strong provisions for the minority issues, they had subordinated the question of the minorities abroad to the process of integration (Bárdi N., 2000, p. 43). Furthermore, DAHR deputies boycotted the meeting of the Romanian Parliament which ratified the treaty.[61] The Hungarian political elite in Romania was dissatisfied firstly because the restrictive notes included in the treaty limited the promotion of one of the forms of autonomy (regional government with special status) included in the draft on national minorities (Bíró A.,1996, p. 26), but also because the bilateral treaty was adopted in the interests of, but without the participation of the DAHR (Gál, K., 1999, p. 5); this being a clear example of the limits of the use of the kin-state as a political resource in negotiations with the *host* state. This development in relations between the DAHR and the Hungarian Government underlines problematic nature of maintaining the common interests between the Hungarian state and minority organizations abroad (Schöpflin, G., 1998, pp. 123–124).

The coalition formed in 1998 by the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party[62] and the Smallholders Party provided the cabinet led by Prime Minister Orbán Viktor. His rhetoric on the relations with Hungarians abroad promised changes from the line adopted by the socialist liberal coalition, and indeed his line was close to Antall József's views.[63] Several of his foreign policy initiatives and statements confirmed this. For example, the position of the senior government coalition party FIDESZ that the Hungarian inhabited Yugoslav province of Vojvodina[64] should recover its autonomy within the framework of the political settlement of the Kosovo crisis,[65] was enforced by the declaration of the Foreign Ministry that the Government would support at international level the concept of autonomy for the Hungarians from Vojvodina (Riba I. 1999). These declarations generated the suspicions of the Romanian political elite, already anxious that a Kosovo like scenario might also occur in Transylvania,[66] and, in spite of the repeated declarations by Orbán's cabinet on Romania's admission to the Euro-Atlantic structures,

even Romanian government officials were voicing concern about the reawakening of Hungarian irredentism in the region.[67]

The Orbán cabinet[68] continued with efforts connected with the political reintegration of Hungarians abroad by trying to codify in Hungary the status of Hungarians abroad. This was done in the context of Hungary's integration process into the EU, involving Hungary's joining of the Schengen agreement. Given that some of the countries on Hungary's borders where Hungarians minorities live would then have no visa exemption for travel to Hungary, this might lead to a certain amount of isolation between Hungary and its co-ethnics. Thus, this process became one of Hungarian government's major goals after 1998, as mentioned in the governmental program:

> …the bonds between ethnic Hungarian minorities and Hungary must be settled within a framework of legislation and government, so as to preserve the organic ties of Hungarian communities to Hungary, even after its accession to the European Union.[69]

This was formalized in the so-called status law, a law that is a form of legalization of the Hungarian ethnicity of those Hungarians living in states neighboring Hungary. In practice, this extends the bound of ethnicity from the emotional, based on a shared sense of culture, to a legal relationship between citizens of other states that declare themselves ethnic Hungarians (and are acknowledged as such) and the Hungarian state. This increase in and formalization of the allocative valences[70] of Hungarian ethnicity is seen by its promoters as a way to stop the assimilation of Hungarians in minority situations.

Again, in 2000 with the coming to power of a new coalition in Romania[71], as with the Orbán government in 1991, voting on the law on the status of Hungarians living abroad caused relations between Hungary and Romania to become blurred and hesitant.

The last decade of political experience for Hungary with regard to Hungarian co-ethnics living abroad, and in particular those in Romania, can be assessed in various dimensions. The process of integrating and legalizing ethnicity has proved to be an element of continuity. Through various institutions the political elite was brought closer to the Hungarian polity; also the system of financing the Hungarian elite in Romania attracted noticeable financial and institutional support. And the status law, and particularly those paragraphs that regulate access to the

Hungarian labor market by ethnic Hungarians, has offered extended support for large numbers of the Hungarians from Romania.

However, as this support was dependent on various political circumstances, relations between the Hungarian state and the DAHR came under stress in several cases. Furthermore, the support of the status law for Hungarians willing to work abroad met with the not unproblematic circumstances in which the ethnicity of Hungarians from Romania was not necessarily recognized within Hungarian society.

HUNGARIANS FROM ROMANIA AND THE HUNGARIAN SOCIETY

Migration of Hungarians from Romania to Hungary significantly increased in 1988-1989, between which time and 1992 some 66,423 migrants (Tóth P. P., 1995, p. 79), and 52,423 refugees (mostly Hungarians) from Romania were registered (Nagy B. 1995, pp. 42-43). Data for the number of migrants since that period are differ variously; however, despite this lack of exact data, it can still be observed that migration to Hungary, though reduced in numbers, has still continued.

Table 2. The number Romanian citizens migrating from Romania to Hungary as recorded in different statistical sources.

	ORFK[72]	KSH[73]	CNS[74]
1994	4619	5483	1779
1995	3126	5685	2509
1996	3271	4888	1485
1997	3224	3285	1244

The number of these migrants becoming legal residents in Hungary has continuously increased.

Table 3 The development of the number of Romanian citizens gaining legal status in Hungary (1994-2000)[75]

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Long term residents	3,528	6,586	4,366	5,760	6,216	8,449	10,626
Short term residents	20313	9688	5890	6428	7428	10125	13071

In 2000 the number of residents in Hungary with Romanian citizenship was almost 50,000 (37,750 migrants and 9,765 long term residents)[76]. While those living and working unofficially (estimated in 1991 at 60,000 (Tóth, J. 1991 p.111)), have been tolerated to an extent by the Hungarian ministry of internal affairs (Fahidi, 2000). Thus there is a considerable presence of Hungarians from Romania in Hungary. In the last decade, a large number of migrants and refugees were naturalized; however, at any given moment, there are more than 100,000 Hungarians from Romania in Hungary, a large proportion of which is involved in labor activities.

This continuous movement can be seen in the differences between the Romanians and Hungarians from Romania in terms of the flow and direction of temporary territorial mobility. One in three Hungarians from Romania (as compared to one in ten Romanians) declared travel abroad in the previous year, mainly to Hungary.

Table 4 "Where did you travel to in the last 12 months?"[77]

	Romanians %	Hungarians from Romania %
.. a different locality within your county	82.76	83.40
… a different county within the province [78]	67.23	65.70
… a different province within Romania	47.02	20.91
.. another country.	10.9	36.6

And as research data from 1997 shows, with 21.2% of Hungarians from Romania claiming to have one family member working in Hungary (Sorbán, A. 1999), the primary reason for this relatively extended process of movement toward Hungary is economic.

Given this large scale continuous movement between two societies, it can no longer be adequate to see migration as a single and unidirectional movement in space, which comes to an end when a process of integration and upward mobility begins. Rather it is a long term process involving negotiations of identity and opportunity (Benmayor, R. and Skotnes A., 1994, p. 8).

Thus the encounters within Hungarian society of the *indigenous* peoples and Hungarians from abroad were identifiable in that that Hungarians from Romania were categorized as refugees, migrants and guest workers. Public opinion in Hungary towards these categories could generally be termed as reluctant and this applied even to ethnic Hungarians who spoke

the same language. On evaluation of this migration phenomenon, the sense of ethnic solidarity decreased; public opinion in Hungary strayed from the ethnicity connection, using cross categories such as *Romanian* **migrants** to describe migrants of Hungarian origin, emphasizing citizenship and not ethnicity (Csepeli Gy., Örkény A., 1996).

In 1985 a relatively large proportion (40%) of Hungarians from Hungary considered migration of the Hungarians from abroad into Hungary as an acceptable solution in preserving their threatened national identity; however, by 1993, following the wave (mostly from Romania) of migrants and refugees, only 13% accepted this solution for the problems of Hungarian minorities living abroad (Lázár G. 1996, p. 63).

These data clearly indicate the tensions between the discourses of the Hungarian political elite and the realities of social encounter. Ethnic culture, understood as a sense of commonality based on the community of language and a certain shared sense of the history, was valued in the political discourse. However, at the level of Hungarian society, these common features were not allowed to break down the inferior, guest-worker/immigrant status. In other words, the Hungarians from Romania considered *Hungarianness* as a quality entitling them to equal treatment within Hungarian society and enabling them to overcome problems of legal status – however, this claim to identity was not acknowledged fully and without problems in encounters within the Hungarian labor market. A good indicator of the confusions related to the question as to *what are* Hungarians from Romania can be found in the results of a survey carried out among high school students in Hungary. When asked to give the nationality of Tõkés László (considered one of the illustrative figures of Hungarian minority nationalism in Romania), 32% though him Hungarian, 28% Romanian, and 17% Transylvanian[79] (Szabó I., Örkény A., 1996). According to the authors of the survey, these assessments reflect both the lack of a clearly defined set of categories, based on which the complex relations between ethnicity-citizenship-nation can be represented, and confusion and tension between the meanings associated with different categories (Szabó I., Örkény A., 1996, pp. 214-215).

In fact, these blurred perceptions are also shared by the Hungarians from Romania. This was demonstrated in a survey in 1999. When asked to whether they agree with the statement *The majority of the Hungarians from Hungary dislike the Hungarians from Romania*, 58.5% agreed fully or partially, with only 24% disagreeing[80] – a perception, which, when

seen in the context of the aforementioned tendencies in Hungarian society, shows clearly the difficulties encountered by the matter of ethnicity in relation to the kin–society.

In the process of negotiating the appropriate categories which form the foundations of the social relations within Hungarian society, doubts were raised not only in connection with the idea that ethnicity is a basic category and point of reference for social order, but also in respect of the idea that ethnicity and culture are congruent and to an extent, synonymous terms – this latter point arising from encounters of Hungarians from Romania in which they experienced a certain degree of difference between the *ethnic culture* (as defined above) and the *culture of daily routine* (the particular knowledge and norms based on which the everyday social relations and institutions function) which differentiates Hungarian society from their home societies.

Experience of these differences involved a process of redefining the particularities of the *Hungarianness* from Romania as compared to that of Hungary.

Table 5. "Do you agree with the following statements?"[81]

		Agree %	Don't know %	Disagree %
1.	The Hungarians from Hungary are not upholding their authentic traditions.	19.5	29.1	49.5
2.	Among Hungarians from Hungary there are many assimilated people who are not of Hungarian origin.	47.4	36.6	13.4
3.	You have more chances to be successful based on your knowledge and abilities in Hungary than in Romania.	82.6	11.3	4.4
4.	Hungarians from Hungary only speak Hungarian, but they don't have a real idea about what it means to be Hungarian.	43.5	23.3	41.2
5.	Even if a Hungarian from Transylvania moves to Hungary and lives there for a long time, he will not become a true Hungarian from Hungary.	71.1	11.1	17.1
6.	The majority of the Hungarians from Hungary dislike the Hungarians from Romania.	58.5	15.7	24
7.	In many situations Hungarians from Hungary are generous with the Hungarians from Romania.	79.5	15.7	2.8

As can be seen in Table 5, there is a perceived sense of tension between the sense of national solidarity with the members of Hungarian society (see statement 7) and sympathy in every day life encounters (see sentence 6). A large proportion (43.5%) of Hungarians from Romania perceives the minority situation as a means to claim a higher level of

authenticity of ethnicity, over and above the simple use of the Hungarian language (see statement 4). This perception is contrasted by the refusal of the majority to see in Hungary a modernized society which has lost its connection to its *authentic* traditions (see statement 1), though the Hungarians from Romania still overwhelmingly consider the Hungarian society a modern society when compared with that of Romania (see statement 3). While acknowledging these differences, there is large support by the Hungarian population of Romania for use of the Hungarian from Transylvania category (see statement 5), not only as a regional identity, but also as a particular form of *Hungarianness* – a particularizing dimension where references to purity in ethnic and racial terms are merely supported rather than rejected (see statement 2).

Analysis of the increased mobility of Hungarians from Romanian traveling from Romania to Hungary shows that this has not resulted in an increased sense of solidarity and commonality at a popular level. Rather it has created tensions between ethnicity and citizenship, enforcing the idea of a differentiated Hungarian identity for Hungarians from Romania, acknowledged both in terms of quasi-ethnic differences (at least in terms of ethnic purity) and the historical particularities resulting from experience of the minority situation.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS: FIXED REFERENCES AND INBETWENNESS

The more politics becomes one the main forms of expression of a modern society, the more important politics as an institution becomes in organizing society and as a point of reference for identity. When imagining the relationship between state and society, the link between ethnicity and sovereignty becomes an important ideology of reference, involving a high degree of politization and ethnification of nationality (Bowler, S. 1999). In these circumstances ethnicity, beside its main role as the major form of social organization of the cultural differences (Barth, F. 1996), becomes one of the fundamental references when imagining the political order, when forging links between state and society. In this circumstance, nationality, understood as politicized ethnicity, becomes a point of reference in the representation of the coherency and the continuity between the individual and the increasingly complex institutional world.

The political management of ethnic and cultural differences can be carried out at various levels, and the experiences can be positive. Political

relations with the state and with minorities can be worked on within the framework of various institutionalized models of negotiating and renegotiating authority.

With so many tensions revealed, we have seemingly reached a tragic situation for a minority: its present political elite are integrated within the political structure, but the population is alienated from the *host* state, or at least from the principles underpinning the relations between state and the society. The kin-state is willing to integrate them, not only symbolically but also by attempting to increase the value of being Hungarian within the Hungarian society, but the differences existing between the two societies at the level of culture of social routine involve a sense of relativity of the common ethnic culture.

All these tensions can be looked upon in less drastic terms if we consider them as embedded in certain trends of political organization of a political community, assuming congruence between a particular identity within a fixed territoriality. If we really on a different view of territoriality, the 'identity problems' described above can be interpreted as a manifestation of crisis in the political thinking based on fixed and clearly delimited territoriality. An alternative that allows for a rethinking of the problem is *neo-medieval territoriality*, a new form of relation between state, territory and population within which the hegemonic authority and uncontested legitimacy of the central state in forging loyalties is supposed to split under pressure from above and below (transnational identities, European identity, regional identities, transnational political movements, etc),[82] a split that will not result in a definite reallocation of sovereignty between various entities, but diffusion of identity policies and of the authorities promoting them (see Bull, H., 1977 cited in Anderson, J., Goodman, J., 1999, p. 25).

In the logic of defining the political relevance of ethnicity it is natural for Romania-Hungarian interstate relations to become increasingly strained as the status law promoted by the Hungarian Government is essentially an attempt to reallocate sovereignty, the legitimate right to influence the loyalties of subjects, and this, in terms of the modern conception of relations between a state and its subjects, is an inconceivable endeavor. However, in the context of the process of globalization, it can be seen rather as the legalization of a certain state of facts, than as an ambitious identity project, as identities (those that underpin large scale solidarities) are not objects connected in the natural world, rather "they" are symbolic processes that emerge and dissolve in particular contexts of action (Handler, R., 1994, p 30).

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NOTES

[1]   In 1998 only 16% of Romanians declared they earned enough money from their regular jobs to satisfy they basic needs, the average among Central and Eastern European populations was 44% (Rose, R., Haerpfer, C. 1998, p. 55). In 1998, 66% of the Romanian population saw the privatization process as mostly dishonest (CURS, 1998, p. 49) and only 7% considered hard work and personal ability as the source of new possessions, with more than half of the population (54%) considering the source of new fortunes to be illegal (CURS, 1998, p. 51).

[2]   In 2000, more than a quarter of the Romanian population (25.5%) declared they would not exclude moving to Western Europe in the future; 2.6% declared they were actively looking for opportunities to leave (Culic, I., Horváth I; Lazăr, M. 2000).

[3]   In 1998 only 10% of the whole population claimed to trust political parties, while 19% claimed to trust Parliament (CURS, 1998, p. 220).

[4]   See the national-communism promoted by Ceausescu (Veredery, K., 1991).

[5]   The members of marginalized party apparatus (Deletant, D., 1991, p. 29.), generally persons with positions in the old regime but having "few rhetorical alternatives but the time-honored «defense of the nation»" (Verdery, K. 1993, p. 188) were used on a large scale by the dominant political force that controlled the transition process.

[6]   See Verdery's definition of 'nation' and 'nationalism' (1993, 1996); see the identity function of nationalism (Auer, S. 2000).

[7]   See Culic, I., 1999

[8]   Actually its origin are related to a such a political project. It was formulated after 1968, after the communist states considered that itself the proclamation of the communist internationalism is not a sufficient solution to the existing problems related to national minorities and designated to them a role of linkage, cultural bridge between the communist states (Bárdi N. 2000).

[9]   See art. 1 (1) and art. 4 (1) of the. *Constitution of Romania 1991* Monitorul Oficial [Official gazette of Romania] Part I No 233 Novermebr 21, 1991.

[10]   We refer not only to those related to ethnic differences, but also to more general aspects of the renegotiation of the underlying principles of the political system.

[11]   RMDSZ (1990) par. 7.

[12]   Idem, par. 13 and 14.

[13]   'Szöcs Géza fõtitkári jelentõje- RMDSZ második Kongresszusa' [The Report of the general secretary Szõcs Géza, - the second congress of DAHR] In *Romániai Magyar Szó 29 May 199.*

[14]   „önálló politikai szubjektumnak […] a román nép egyenjogú társának" In 'Az RMDSZ II. Kongresszusának a határozatai' In *Romániai Magyar Szó* 27 May 1991.

15 'Az RMDSZ nyilatkozata a nemzetiségi kérdésrõl' In RMDSZ 2000, pp. 125 – 126.

16 RMDSZ törvénytervezet a nemzeti kisebbségekrõl és autonóm közösségekrõl In: *RMDSZ Közlöny* [RMDSZ Bulletin] 7-8, 1998, pp. 4-11. For the English version see http://www.hhrf.org/rmdsz/index.htm.

17 We are referring particularly to history and geography.

18 For the functions of history education see Horváth I., Lazăr, M. 1999.

19 During the various processes of negotiating and renegotiating the law on education one of the most heated issues was the language of education for History of Romanians and Romanian Geography. The (ethnic) Romanian parliamentarians insisted that even the minorities, who otherwise use their mother tongue unrestrictedly in education, should be taught these subjects in Romanian only.

20 See a part of the debate related to this subject in Andreescu, G. ed. (1996).

21 See Turda, M. (2000), or in a historical perspective see Iordachi, C. (2000).

22 See the debates from 1998 on a separate Hungarian Language University (Andreescu, G. 1999)

23 CCRIT 2000. The research data were not made public. The information referred to can be found in manuscript form in the CCRIT documentation center.

24 The illustrative political document that reflects this political orientation is the Memorandum issued by the DAHR in 1993 concerning Romania's admission to the Council of Europe; see 'A Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség Memoranduma România felvételételéröl az Európa Tanácsba' In RMDSZ (2000) p. 150.

25 The author uses the term nationalizing minority.

26 This political orientation of the DAHR was synthetically categorized as a *minority nation-building strategy* (Kántor Z., 2000).

27 Participating as full members in the governmental coalition between 1996-2000. Since 2000 offering parliamentary support for the governing political party.

28 Based on the statute of DAHR approved at the third congress; see *RMDSZ Közlöny* [RMDSZ Buletin] 1993/1 pp. 1-5.

29 Bárdi, N. (2000).

30 Capelle Pogaceanu, A (1996) p. 31.

31 Interview with the former advisor to the DAHR. 13. September 1999.

32 Capelle Pogaceanu, A. (1996), Bárdi, N. (2000).

33 Bíró B. 'Együttmûködés vagy konfrontáció' [Co-operation or confrontation] *Magyar Hírlap 23 June 2000.*

34 In December 1989, the repercussions of his defiance of the communist regime, involving mass support and sympathy, gave birth to the events which lead to the Romanian anti-communist revolution.

35 RFE/RL NEWSLINE 1995-10-27 *Tokes accuses Romanian Government of ethnic cleansing.*

36 The FIDESZ – Hungarian Civic Party Tibori Szabó Z: Távolodik az egyenlõ közelség In *Népszabadaság* 20 June 2000.

37 Inclusion in the governmental coalition in power between 1996-2000, parliamentary co-operation with the governing party starting in 2001.

38 Kántor Z., Bárdi N. (2000), p. 179.

39 Between 1988-1999, 52.423 mostly ethnic Hungarian refugees arrived in Hungary (Tóth, P. P. 1995 p. 79), also in the same period 43.884 Hungarians migrated from Romania mostly to Hungary (CNS,1993, p. 143).

40 See the outline of the program for national politics published in February 1988 (Szokai I., Tabajdi, Cs. 1988, reproduced in Bárdi N. and Éger Gy. eds., 2000, pp. 647-659), or the first step to institutionalize the new political orientation, the creation of the National and Ethnic College and Secretariate Győri Szabó R., 1997).

41 Article 6 paragraph 3 of the Constitution of Hungary. In *Magyar Közlöny* [Hungary's Official Gazette] 1989. October 23, No. 74.

42 Actually a continuation of the afore mentioned National and Ethnic College and Secretariate.

43 See mission statement of this office at http://www.htmh.hu

44 Uniunea Democratică a Maghiarilor din România – see also the Hungarian acronym RMDSZ (Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség) or in English DAHR (Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians in Romania).

45 Par. 11 of the: A magyar – magyar csúcs közös nyilatkozata [*The common declaration of the Hungaria –Hungarian high level meeting]* In *Szabadság*, 1996, July, 6.

46 The data comes from an official report published on Hungarians from Romania by the Office for the Hungarians Abroad of the Hungarian Government. On: http://www.htmh.hu/rep-frame.htm.

47 http://www.hhrf.org/ika/evesbeszamolok/99evibesz_elemei/sheet003.htm.

48 Distribution of Hungarians in countries neighboring Hungary is: Romania 1.62 million, Slovakia 563,000, Vojvodina (Yugoslavia) 240,000, Ukraine 156,000, Croatia: 22,000 and Slovenia 10,000-12,000 persons.

49 n.a. (1994) 'Kisebbségi magyar gazdaságpolitika: Új Kézfogás Közalapítvány'.

50 The conservative political basis of this government was formed from the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the Smallholders Party (FKgP) and Christian Democrat Popular Party (KDNP).

51 There are 5 million living outside Hungary. 1.7 million in Romania.

52 Antal József was the prime minister of this government.

53 MSZP – Magyar Szocialista Párt [Hungarian Socialist Party], SZDSZ – Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége [Alliance of Free Democrats].

54 Horn Gyula, the leader of MSZP, prime minister between 1994-1998.

55 *Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European convention on Human Rights.*

56   OPINION No. 176 (1993) on the application by Romania for membership of the Council of Europe. Text adopted by the Assembly on 28 September 1993.

57   For a brief description of the juridical status see Weber, R. (1998); for the debates related to the Recommendation 1201, see Andreescu, G. (1995).

58   *Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European convention on Human Rights.*

59   'Annexe: List of documents referred to in Article 15, paragraph (1) b of the Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborhood between the Republic of Hungary and Romania; Official Translation by the International Law Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary.

60   RFE/RL 13 September 1996: *Hungarian opposition criticizes thePremier's statement on the treaty with Romania* and RFE/RL 4 September 1994: *Hungary's opposition attacks draft basic treaty with Romania.*

61   RFE/RL 04 October 1994 *Romanian Parliament ratifies treaties with Budapest.*

62   FIDESZ – Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége – Magyar Polgári Párt – Federation of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Party.

63   Orbán Viktor declared at his first press conference after wining the elections that "the borders of the Hungarian nation does not coincide with Hungary's borders", RFE/RL 21 October 1998 *Hungary: New Government Feels responsible For Minorities Abroad.* See also Haraszti M. (1998).

64   At the beginning of 1991 there were 345,400 ethnic Hungarians in Serbia, mostly in the Province of Vojvodina, where they represented approximatively 17% of the population.

65   'Lányi szerint a Vajdaság önálló állam is lehetne' [According to Lányi, Vojvodina might even become an independent state] In *Népszabadság* 11 May 1999.

66   Former President Ion Iliescu's assessment was that "regardless of assurances received by Romania, the escalation of revisionist designs questioning existing borders in East Central Europe cannot but result in apprehensions among Romanians that they might become victims of similar designs". The full statement is in RFE/RL Newsline, 10 April 1999; see also the analysis of Gallagher, T (2000).

67   In 1999 a high-ranking general at the Romanian Army headquarters declared that Hungary was again finding the courage to claim Transylvania . Quoted in Tibori Sz. Z.: 'Román katonapolitikus az "erdély veszélyrõl"' In *Népszabadság* 10 November 1999.

68   Orbán Viktor was the head of the cabinet formed in 1998.

69   *Government programme for a civic Hungary on the eve of a new millenium* see http://www.htmh.hu/govpr-frame.htm.

70   The law offers certain rights, for example grants working permits for those who are the subject of status law.

[71]   Our analysis stops in 2000.
[72]   Homepage of the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs *A benyújtott bevándorlási kérelmek számának alakulása (1994 – 2000. évben)* http://www.b-m.hu/
[73]   KSH (1998).
[74]   CNS (1999).
[75]   Homepage of the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs : *Huzamos tartózkodási engedély kérelmek számának alakulása (year 1994-2000.).* See http://www.b-m.hu/
[76]   Homepage of the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs : *A bevándorlási engedéllyel Magyarországon élõ külföldiek száma (2000. 12. 3)*, illetve *A huzamosan tartózkodási engedéllyel rendelkezõk száma Magyarországon (2000. 12. 3)* see http://www.b-m.hu/
[77]   See in Culic, I., Horváth I; Lazăr, M. (2000)
[78]   Though is not an accustomed administrative category, in the every day popular reflection peoples make differences within the three major historical provinces of Romania: Transylvania, Moldavia and Valachia.
[79]   22% don't know.
[80]   CCRIT (2000).
[81]   CCRIT (2000).
[82]   See on this idea more in Anderson, J., Goodman, J. (1999).

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