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STILYAN DEYANOV
GERGANA GEORGIEVA

SVETLANA DIMITROVA
MUSTAFA FIŞNE
DIMITAR GRIGOROV
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MIGLENA IVANOVA
ANGEL NIKOLOV
ORLİN SABEV (ORHAN SALİH)
MALAMIR SPASOV
ALEXANDER VEZENKOV

Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

GERGANA GEORGIEVA

Born in 1973, in Shumen, Bulgaria
Ph.D. candidate, Institute of Balkan Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences,
Sofia
Dissertation: *Administrative Structure and Government in Rumelia During
Sultan Mahmud II's Reign, 1808-1839*

Annual Scholarship for High Academic Achievements, Open Society
Foundation, Bulgaria (1995-1996)

Participation to conferences in Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey

Papers and studies published both in Bulgaria and abroad

OTTOMAN MODERNIZATION/ EUROPEANIZATION – A CASE THAT DOES NOT FIT THE DEFINITIONS (STUDY ON OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS)

The Ottoman Empire was a society with an interesting fate. On the edge of both Asia and Europe, it comprised different ethnic groups, religions and cultural traditions. It was Europe's best example of the Other: so close and yet so different. For the Ottoman Empire, Europe was also the Other, the Enemy. But in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Ottoman Empire began searching for way to "meet" Europe and to share its world – not only in terms of architecture and lifestyle, but also in military organization, technology, education and ruling institutions. What was the nature of this process? Was it a modernization, or a simple replica of European models? In this paper I will discuss the concepts used in defining the process of reform in the Ottoman Empire in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and compare them with the institutional reforms that were carried out in the empire.

The main (historiographical or methodological) problem of nineteenth-century Ottoman history is the characterization of the reform period.[1] This definition establishes the framework in which the process is viewed and predetermines where emphasis is placed on certain details of nineteenth-century Ottoman history. Was it a process inspired from abroad (Europe)? Was it imitation of a European model, a copy of European modernization, as some historians have defined it, naming it "Europeanization" or "Westernization"? Or was it modernization with its own specific development and own goals?

There has been much discussion as to the nature of the reform process in the Ottoman Empire, and the debate is still running. Some historians stress the inner character of the movement and define it as (specific) modernization,[2] implying that Ottoman modernization was an internal

process, with its own specific features, brought about through internal development, which overrode the external factors affecting reform. Others stress the external factors and define the process as Europeanization or Westernization,[3] classifying it as a simple imitation of the process of modernization in European countries. They describe the development of the Ottoman Empire as being completely dependent on European tendencies and undermine its inner attributes, which differentiated it from European countries. Opinions as to the predominance of internal/external factors and the definition of the process as an inner process or one of adoption of external ideas are very many and contradictory. A. Miller, for example, believes the Ottoman reforms were not imported, but were a local product;[4] Bernard Lewis stresses the French influence in various areas – in diplomacy and politics, science, technology and education (the usage of French cadres), and ideas (the influence of the French Revolution);[5] Maria Todorova emphasizes that it was a Europeanization process, which should imply an adoption of external models, but at the same time describes the importance of internal factors in the reforms.[6] On the other hand, Strashimir Dimitrov is much more cautious. He speaks much more about the centralization of the empire during Sultan Mahmud II's reign, the use of modern institutions and a modern, trained army and bureaucracy in centralization, while only once mentioning Europeanization, in parenthesis, implying that this generally recognized definition is not completely approved of by him.[7] There is also the view that some non-European countries developed "alternative modernities" which saw them deliberately modernize their societies in order to resist European encroachment.[8]

There is also much debate as to the starting point of Ottoman modernization. Here it is a question of what should be considered modernization and what should be seen as reforms and not directly connected to the modernization of the empire. At issue is how to draw the line between the reforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and how to separate simple reforms from the modernization process. For this reason, historians have established the starting point of Ottoman modernization at various points ranging between the early eighteenth century and the year 1839. Some emphasize the importance of the cultural shift towards Europe,[9] some the military reforms of Sultan Selim III; while others confirm Mahmud's reforms on the basis of the continuity in the reform process. Most, however, accept Gülhane's decree in 1839 as the starting point of Ottoman modernization. D. Rustow and R. Word have

tried to systematize the varying opinions as to the starting point of the Ottoman reforms, but were unable to establish a firm date or period, leading to the appearance of several starting points in different chapters of the survey (varying between the end of the eighteenth century, 1839, and even 1908). [10] Halil Inalcık sees the late eighteenth century as an initial point for the general reforms.[11] Carter Findley establishes a periodization of Ottoman history in which he places the starting point of reform in the late eighteenth century during Sultan Selim III's reign. At the same time, however, he appreciates that this is just a symbolic beginning and that uninterrupted reform starts with Sultan Mahmud II's reforms after 1826.[12] While Stanford Shaw examines Sultan Selim III's reforms, he nonetheless claims it to have been an attempt to return to a traditional state and that there were no real innovations.[13] Bernard Lewis also claims that the new order was established by Sultan Mahmud II and continued by his successors. [14] Strashimir Dimitrov, who also approaches Sultan Mahmud II's reign as a turning point in Ottoman history, states that the reforms began after 1826.[15] Russian historians claim 1839 as a formal starting point of the reform process and include the reforms of 1826-1839 within the *Tanzimat*[16] period.[17] While, though following the earlier reforms (during the early eighteenth century during the reigns of Sultan Selim and Sultan Mahmud), R. Davison believes that the reform period started in 1839.[18]

I do not intend to propose a new definition. I intend merely to raise the question of the confrontation between a case with specific features and concepts developed on the basis of a comparison of definitions of reform and the exact processes of change which took place in the Ottoman Empire. The problem looked at in this paper is that of how broad should the perspective of an individual case be in order to justify it as part of a certain movement. Should certain details be omitted in order to place it in a certain framework and make it comparable with other cases, or should the specifics be stressed and examined as a unique case? Thus I intend to reveal the complicated nature of the Ottoman reforms and to define some of the particular characteristics of the process on the basis of an examination of one element of the reforms – the provincial administration in Rumelia – in order to bring to light some contradictions in already established definitions of the process.

The institutional reforms have been chosen as the main focus of the investigation of early Ottoman reforms because they were also a focal point in the process of transformation of Ottoman society in the period in

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question. It is a proven fact that after his military reforms, which were more or less a continuation of that of his predecessors, Sultan Mahmud II began reorganizing the ruling system in order to strengthen and revitalize it. In fact, the improvement of the administrative system and strengthening of the army helped him to carry out smoothly further action and to obtain control over such areas as finance, religion, and education etc. From a historical point of view, the clarification of institutional organizations helps in the application of power and decision-making in a state. Moreover, it helps in the analysis of the main ideas and tendencies, which drive the policy of a state or ruler.

The focus on the province of Rumelia was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, there is a lack of investigation into administrative structure in this particular province, which is part of and a representative example of the method of governing the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, it needs to be stressed that Rumelia was regarded as a core province of the empire and it was in Rumelia that all major state regulations were implemented. For this reason it can be used to shed light on the main tendencies of Ottoman policy. Furthermore, some comparisons with the military and administrative reforms in the center need to be made due to the clear connection between them and the need for an overview of the process of reorganization in the empire as a whole. It is true that the comparison between center and periphery helps to clarify how the ideas, which appear in the center, were implemented in practice. So far there has been no such comparison between central and peripheral territories for the period in question.

The period 1826-1839 has been chosen for analysis because it can be considered an initial stage of the uninterrupted reforms in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the proclamation of the new order that was to be established, the Gülhane Edict of 1839, was based on Sultan Mahmud II's projects and activities. The initial stage can provide an insight into the reasons for starting this process of reform and the main tendencies established at the beginning of the Ottoman reforms. The period in question witnessed a series of reforms which outlined the main tendencies for later renovations during the whole of the nineteenth century.

There are internal and external factors which gave impetus to the start of the reforms. The mutinies of the Janissaries (1807-1808) caused the death of two other sultans and also threatened the life of Sultan Mahmud II. Decentralization in the provinces turned to disorder and even threatened the sultan's power.[19] Sultan Mahmud II was compelled to

sign an agreement with the local lords, establishing his weakness and dependency on them. On the other hand, the unsuccessful wars with Russia and Austria[20] introduced a notion of decline.[21] The prevalence of European capitalism and the development of science and technology as a consequence of rationalism caused the Ottoman Empire to appear backward in comparison with the European states. The Ottoman sultans tried to revitalize and preserve the empire by generating various projects for the improvement of the ruling system. There was also a preparation phase before starting the reforms. One by one, the sultan suppressed those rivals who had opposed his authority – the local notables, the *ayan*s,[22] who acted in a semi-independent feudal manner; and social groups, which contested his power in the center and acted as an opposition because of their conservatism. He also manipulated public opinion, the religious class, the *ulema*,[23] and the Janissaries[24] (the elite troops of the sultan, who were to mutiny). In 1812 the war with Russia was over. It was followed by the overthrow of the *ayan*s and the restoration of Ottoman administration in the provinces. The sultan's armies defeated some of the local notables, of which some were simply assassinated, while others were persuaded to obey the sultan's authority. Finally, the Janissary corps was abolished in 1826. This episode was called in the official declaration *Vaka-i Hayriye* ("Pleasant event"), though in fact was a massacre of Janissaries using cannons to attack the Janissary barracks. The reforms in the center started in 1826, just after the abolishment of Janissary corps, and the provincial reforms were introduced later.

Provincial administrative reforms

The change in the status of Ottoman provincial governors should be noted as one of the focal reforms in provincial administration. Until this moment, the provincial governors, the *vali*s, had been part of the Ottoman ruling class, which shared two functions – military (as military commanders of local armies) and administrative (as governors of a province). The *Vali*s[25] maintained enormous suites, which varied from between 300 to 1,000 persons,[26] and treated the local troops as their own private armies. Furthermore, they controlled local revenues out of the necessity to cover their own expenses and the expenses of local armies. In fact, until this time, salaries were not known of as a common practice in the Ottoman administrative system. Officials received part of their income from land

ownership and market places, and collected taxes from the local population,[27] and thus had the opportunity to abuse their power over the local population and the income sources of the province. Their access to and actual control of local income without efficient control from the central authority meant they were quite uncontrollable. Formally, the reorganization of the provincial system was done through the implementation of the new military rank marshal (*müşir*) for the *valis* and the fixed salaries which governors received in the second half of the 1830s. This was, in practice, a radical change. The organization became more professional and more structured. The new regulations in the provincial administration turned these aristocrats into state officials with fixed salaries[28] and reduced their financial and military power. As a result of this reform the position of the provincial military-administrative aristocracy was reduced to administration which served the centralized authority.

The military system in the provinces was reorganized gradually. First, the *sipahi* corps, the cavalry, which was considered to be the core of the Ottoman army and one of the oldest traditional institutions in Ottoman society, was abolished. The *sipahis* were granted *timars* – territories from which they had the right to collect certain taxes – as compensation for their military duties. Owing to the direct contact with the local population, they had many opportunities to abuse and expand their power. In 1931 *sipahis* were deprived of their sources of income and they received pensions.[29] Soon after, by 1834, a new provincial military organization, the *redif*, was founded. Maintaining order in the provinces was the main task of the *redif* troops, though they also participated in the military campaigns of the Ottoman army. The soldiers were in normal military service for twelve years with fixed salaries. *Redif* troops became the basis of the new provincial armies[30] which were organized and equipped with modern equipment: regular recruits were introduced, firearms were provided to the soldiers, who were trained according to the latest tactics and strategies, and new barracks were erected in the center of the province.[31] Thus, the close connection and dependency of the local army on the provincial governor was cut, and the provincial military system was modernized on a technological level and more centralized on an organizational level.[32]

In order to prepare the military for reform, the first census in the Ottoman Empire was conducted. The census was delayed for a long time due to the Russo-Turkish war (1828-1830) and completed in 1831. Up until that

point, the size of the local population could be estimated based on tax registers, *mufassal* and *idzhmal defeters*, which contained information on the male inhabitants of every settlement and their property and estates. But even those registers stopped in the seventeenth century due to changes to the fiscal system of the empire. In fact, the first census in the Ottoman Empire covered only the male population of Rumelia and Anadol, since those regions were considered the core of the Ottoman Empire and the main targets of reforms,[33] while inhabitants from other provinces and the female population of the empire as a whole were overlooked. Furthermore, certain problems, including inaccurate data, appeared due to the lack of prepared and specially trained officials carrying out the survey. The main goal of the census was to calculate the number of men capable of military service, as well as to identify taxpaying subjects, who would ensure the funding of the new army by paying the newly established taxes. Thus, the first census in the Ottoman Empire was used not to collect information about the population as a whole, but to serve the state's needs and, for the most part, the military system.[34]

Furthermore, the attempt to reform and centralize the tax system in the Ottoman Empire was made in order to cover the increased need for money due to the formation of the new military corps. The tremendous requirement for money in cash for soldiers' salaries was the cause of the state's effort to regain control and centralize provincial revenues, which had been lost as a result of the application of the *iltizam* system. *Iltizam*, the so-called tax-farming system, had spread rapidly through the empire since the early seventeenth century. Farming through *iltizam* meant selling by auction a source of revenue for a specific period of time, usually three years, to a private person, a *mültezim*, who was granted with the right to collect taxes from the population. The *multezims* (agents) were obliged to pay to the state an established sum according to stipulated terms, which was followed later by monthly, quarterly or biannual installments. Thus, as private persons, the *multezims* obtained the right to use state revenues for a period and to control the local population from a financial point of view.[35] New posts in the provinces and their districts appeared as a result of the state's attempt to improve its control over local income and to ensure tax payment. For example, the *sandık emini* was appointed to control tax collection and to prevent abuses. The *defter nazırı* was primarily responsible of maintaining population registers for his area, including not only births and deaths, gender and age, but also the financial status and the property of subjects in the area. He was also

responsible for issuing travel permits, *tezkeres*, which allowed people to travel between provinces and in fact controlled the movement of the population.[36] Hence, the reforms introduced new posts in terms of financial officials in the provincial administration, making it more structured and specialized.

The new territorial division was implemented in 1834 and remained in place until 1839.[37] European observers described this transformation in a number of general accounts of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century,[38] and details are also mentioned in Ottoman documents. There were some changes of local importance, such as the changing of the borders to certain districts and counties – villages and counties were moved from one division to another. A more significant change, however, was the transformation of territorial division based on the diminution of the territories and establishment of new, smaller provinces. This realized the idea of stronger control over the provinces, which was achieved by enlarging the number of provincial officials. Furthermore, the administration clearly became more developed, structured and professional. Until that time, the Balkans had been split into four units: including the Greek territories lost after the Greek uprising of 1821; Bosnia, which included the northwestern part of the Balkans and was reduced in size after the Serbian revolt of 1805; Rumelia, which contained part Greek, Bulgarian, present-day Macedonian, and Albanian lands; and Silistra, in the eastern part of the peninsula. The most important changes in the central Balkan lands were, first of all, the separation of the region of Chirmen around Edirne from the province of Silistra and its establishment as an independent province (*eyalet*),[39] followed by the separation of the region of Thessalonica (encompassing part of Thrace and Albania, Seres, Trikala, Ioannina, and Larissa) from *eyalet* Rumelia.[40] In some areas, the old administrative divisions were radically changed in order to solve particular problems that emerged in the late eighteenth-early nineteenth centuries. For example, the Albanian unrest and the obvious Ottoman failure to control Albanian regions in the eighteenth century caused new divisions in the area.[41] As a result, the Albanian population was divided into various territorial divisions and mixed with Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians. The idea was to avoid constructing a single, separate province with a dense Albanian population that could not be efficiently controlled by the Ottoman authorities.[42] This lead to a break with the traditional territorial division of the Ottoman Empire, which was mainly organized in line with regional specifics and

accepted the existence of various exceptions and small areas with special status. Provinces were normally organized according to their geographical and natural borders. The new administrative divisions, however, were more uniform in terms of their dimensions owing to the principle of standardization applied. Moreover, the centers of various divisions were changed in accordance with the development of certain urban centers, whose importance increased, while others receded.

It is claimed that the new administrative division was directly connected with the new military system in the provinces that was also introduced in the same period. It is indeed possible that the new territorial divisions were suitable to the territorial division of the provincial armies.

A number of urban reforms took place in the provinces, as well as in the capital. Owing to the gradual decay of the Rumelian center, Sofia, as an administrative, military and economic center, and the development of Manastır (Bitola) as alternative center of the province, the process of moving the administrative center took place slowly.[43] Finally, in 1836,[44] Manastır[45] was confirmed as the provincial capital and organized on modern, European principles. Not only were modern urban planning and modern (European) architecture applied, some new institutions connected with modern towns[46] were also introduced, such as fire stations, hospitals, prisons, and barracks. [47]

The administrative reforms in the province of Rumelia did not start immediately after the abolition of the Janissary corps in 1826. The process took some time to develop, firstly in the capital, and than in the provinces. Moreover, some of the reforms were first introduced first in some separate areas and then later applied in other regions. In Rumelia they took place in the first half of the 1830s. One of the major reforms dealt with changing the status of the provincial governors, who were turned from an administrative-military aristocracy with wide prerogatives in the provinces and financial and military power into officials with fixed salaries closely dependent on the sultan. In the provincial military system, the shift was from a traditional cavalry to a modern army with a regular service and fixed salaries. The administrative division was reorganized and turned into a system with more standardized divisions of smaller dimensions, which could be more efficiently controlled by the increased number of bureaucrats. The reforms followed a policy of centralization and strengthening of control over the provincial institutions. This centralization was accomplished by founding modern institutions following European

models: a modern, far more organized and structured army and bureaucracy.

Central administrative reforms

By comparing provincial and central administrative reorganization we see that they follow a common direction. Not only in the sense of centralization, as a main tendency, but also in terms of emphasizing institutional reform. Firstly, a new army was established, followed by a number of measures for bureaucratization of the administrative system.

Immediately after the abolition of the Janissary corps in 1826, a new army was established called the *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye* (the Victorious troops of Mohammed). The two events were announced through a single *ferman* issued on 17 June 1826.[48] Some of the main features of the new army were the firearms and new European uniforms. Furthermore, a European organization and hierarchy was introduced, possibly following the German model.[49] A number of instructors, given the task of training the soldiers in new tactics, were also appointed. These were initially selected from among the Egyptian officers of the already modernized army of Muhammad Ali, the semi-independent Egyptian governor, who had carried out reorganization before his sovereign, the Ottoman sultan. In addition, some officers who had been prepared during the interrupted reforms of Sultan Selim III (1789-1808) also found positions in the new army. Later, some French instructors were appointed,[50] followed by Prussian and English officers in the 1830s. At the same time, many Turkish cadets were sent to European capitals to study the modern military system.[51]

There were several important administrative reforms, which took place in the center mainly after 1834. While the traditional system was characterized by having no divisions of function between offices and a lack of coordination between them, the new structure succeeded in clarifying prerogatives, stratifying various levels and increasing the professional skills of the officials. Traditional departments and bureaus were replaced by ministries organized in a European manner.[52] Even the Grand vizier, the advisor and representative of the sultan, and his *divan* (council) were reorganized. He was renamed *bash vekil* (prime minister) and a Council of Ministers was set up in 1837-1838. In 1837, another principal council was established – the High Council for Judicial

Ordinances – that was responsible for initiating projects and implementing further reforms. In 1838, various committees had been established: for agriculture, trade, industry, and public works.[53]

International pressure affecting the Ottoman Empire caused it to advance its diplomatic relations with European countries and develop diplomatic departments:[54] for example, the *tercume odasi*[55] (translation office), which was formed in 1833. This office, which was attached to the ministry of foreign affairs, became the center for training and education of a new generation of bureaucrats, diplomats and statesmen, who were strongly influenced by Western ideas and went on to occupy important positions and become initiators of further reforms.

Even other innovations, which appeared in the same period, were subjected to institutional (administrative and military) reforms. For example, the establishment of schools for physicians, surgeons, engineers, and even musicians in the 1820s and 1830s[56] provided cadres for the newly established army.[57] Some of the reforms were designed to reshape lifestyles and redesign public opinion in Ottoman society. For example, the first formal weekly newspaper in the Ottoman Empire, which was launched in November 1831, served this purpose. It was printed in Turkish, called *Takvim-i vekayi* ("Calendar of Incidents"), and in French, with the name "Le Moniteur Ottoman". Its main aim was to support the sultan's policy in terms of presenting the official political position and promoting the reforms to Ottoman subjects and European powers alike. According to the two-paged brochure issued on 26 October 1831, the newspaper was published as a news source and messenger meant to *educate the people and reveal the acts of government and allow them to be adjusted*. The newspaper had 6 sections: internal affairs, external affairs, military articles, literature, technology and science, and prices and commodities.[58] New dress codes for state officials were introduced in 1828, imposing the European style, at least for the state administrators (fez, red headdress, stambouline, black coat, and trousers).[59] It represented an attempt to change the mentality of the Ottomans and to impose, even by force, European standards as psychological preparation for more fundamental change.

The changes were announced through sultanic decrees, in which the reasons for the reforms were explained. These official documents help us to see how the Ottomans viewed and justified the reforms. The proclamation in favor of recovery of the old glory of the empire and the religion of Islam as a basis of the state which should be followed provided

the ideological framework that was to be imposed and which proved the legitimacy of the reforms.

For example, the imperial edict, which announced the abolishment of the old, Janissary army and the formation of the new Victorious Armies of Mohammed in 1826, validates this radical change on the basis of the Janissaries' actions against the Muslim faith and state. It was written that they had used their weapons against the "Muslim state" (Ottoman Empire). Moreover, the Janissaries were blamed for the unsuccessful wars of the empire and the loss of territory.[60] Notably, the sultan's decision to abolish the rebellious troops was accompanied by a *fetva* – an official statement by the leader of the *ulema* in the empire, providing a strong religious argument in favor of legitimizing the measures taken.[61]

The first official reform document, the imperial decree (Gülhane's hatt-i sheriff) promulgated in 1839, combined old rhetoric with new regulations.[62] The document proclaimed equality before the law and the allowance of life, honor and property for all subjects. These were revolutionary ideas for the Ottoman Empire at the time. The document also stressed the decline of the empire over the previous 150 years due to the disrespect for religious and imperial laws. The new regulations, including that mentioned above for life, honor and property, as well as the abolition of confiscations, an orderly system of fixed taxation, and a regular system of military conscription, were implemented in order *to restore* the empire's prosperity and strength. As a result, official Ottoman documents combine an Islamic background with the idea of establishing of a new order.

In fact, it was a necessity for Sultan Mahmud II to justify his actions on the grounds of religion because it was considered the main foundation of Ottoman authority. Religion is a foundation of Islamic countries in which *sharia* law is taken as the main system. For example, the sultanic regulations (*kanuns*) in the Ottoman Empire appeared only to improve certain elements of the ruling system and dealt mainly with economic and financial problems. Furthermore, when Islam is both religion and the law, society is viewed as a religious community established and ruled by the Prophet Mohammed.[63]

In fact, Islam was an important aspect of self-identification for the Ottoman Empire. A statement made by an Ottoman official, Sadýk Rifat Pasha, from the period proves how strong the impact of Islam was on nineteenth-century Ottoman society. As the official says to Stratford Canning:

In religious matters we need our liberty. Religion is the basis of our laws. It is the principle of our government; His Majesty the Sultan can no more touch it than we can.[64]

The radical change of status of administrative officials was a fundamental transformation that appeared as a result of the administrative reforms. It was crucial because it changed the concept of Ottoman administrative organization, which saw the officials change from being slaves to the sultan into state bureaucrats.

Previously, officials had been organized in a structure, which had remained virtually as the guild organization. They were appointed mainly on the basis of personal contacts and were trained in the offices to which they were appointed initially as novices. There were no special schools for scribes and administrators because extended skills and knowledge, such as languages, were not considered compulsory. Promotion was dependent not on their professional abilities, but on the will of the sultan and their personal connections. Even their lives were reliant on the ruler's will, due to being regarded as slaves of the sultan, and their property was considered to belong to the sultan's treasury after their death. Moreover, administrators were frequently accused of abuse and their property confiscated. As a consequence, an official's family did not have a guaranteed income. In fact, administrators didn't have salaries but received part of their income from various economic sources to which was added a fee for the tasks they fulfilled. As a consequence of this system of financing, bribery was established as a widespread, common practice throughout the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, officials worked the system in order to earn money and increase their income in the face of inflation and a rapidly changing environment; while on the other, people who wanted to find quicker solutions to their problems normally offered an amount of money to officials in every office in order to have their documents processed more quickly in the complicated administrative machine (it was common for several offices to be involved in the process of issuing a document, as with any kind of permission or certificate).

Later on, bribes were prohibited and fixed salaries replaced the various ways of earning money through the administrative machine. There were now clearer regulations, shielding officials and citizens from the pressures of the previous system. Officials' incomes were explicitly guaranteed and the abuse of subjects was limited. Another indication of this major

shift was the abolition of the confiscation of officers' property, making them less dependent on political intrigue at court and subjective judgment. In addition, there appeared a number of ideas designed to improve the skills of the administrators and certain requirements in terms of specialist knowledge were established, turning scribes into professional bureaucrats.[65]

It was not only bureaucrats but also European-minded statesmen that were formed in the course of Sultan Mahmud II's reforms. The sultan attempted to create favorable conditions for further modernization: he ordered the establishment of a new type of education, which was to shape a modern, enlightened elite, open to and enthusiastic about innovation. He needed to establish such a group of reform-minded politicians because of the requirements of those who were to create projects and implement reforms in different areas and on different levels within the state. Modern education became the basis for creating a social group to support consciously and willingly work for further reforms. New schools and *tercume odası* were the places where the ideas of modernity were adopted by the students and young officials through learning European languages, reading European books and meeting foreign diplomats, military officials and scholars.[66]

However, the old elites didn't lose their positions completely within the governmental system. They redesigned themselves, adapted to the new situation, even benefiting from it and remaining powerful. Research reveals how the new military leadership was fully integrated with the older ruling classes. The sons and protégés of the old ruling elite occupied the majority of places in the new military schools, being promoted later in their military careers and monopolizing the top military ranks.[67] They designed efficient networks, which helped them to support each other and accumulate power. It is appears that the local elite, the *ayans*, also managed to survive in the new situation. They infiltrated the new administrative system as representatives of the local population in the newly founded institutions, the *meclises* (councils), which ruled the provinces, regions and counties together with the appointed governors.[68]

Another important step, which is connected to the reform process in general and taken precisely during Sultan Mahmud II's reign, was the break with the established concept of preservation of tradition. In practice, innovation in Islamic societies was and still is avoided due to being considered as *bida,* "forbidden". Consequently, the conservatism of the Ottoman system of government was extremely strong. The ideals of the

old order, from the so-called Golden Age of the empire during the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), who was called *Kanuni*, the Lawgiver, by the Ottomans, were preserved and approved in the rhetoric of official documents, even in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Under Sultan Mahmud II, however, the situation changed and radical measures were introduced to abolish old institutions, such as the Janissary corps and *sipahi* troops.

Characteristics of the Ottoman reforms

The Ottoman reforms at this early stage were a process *initiated from the center* and were even closely connected with and *dependent on the sultan.* In this light, it can be said that a conscious project of reform was launched, *emphasizing institutional reform*, such as the military and the government and the taxation system in the empire. *European models* for the army, bureaucracy, education, and the judicial system, as well as European technology *were used* in order to *centralize power, strengthen the empire,* and *protect* it from European encroachment.

The imperative role of the ruler was clear. He first initiated a policy to overthrow the conservative groups, which had opposed the innovations, and later ordered and organized reforms with the help of a small group of supporters. The reforms transformed the major institutions of the empire and were imposed through official edicts. Evidence that the reforms were conceived as rational project is given by the fact that some of the reorganization was implemented only in the most centralized and easily controllable provinces – Rumelia and Anadol – and were possibly looked on as experiments for certain models to be later imposed on all Ottoman lands.

The transformations were designed to solve certain problems that had become obvious to the Ottoman statesmen in the early nineteenth century. In internal affairs, the level of decentralization posed a threat even to sultanic power, compelling the sultan to sign an agreement in 1808 with local notables to recognize their control over the provinces. In terms of the external situation, the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire in comparison with Europe became clear in the early nineteenth century. The comparison was made because the Ottoman Empire was deeply involved in European economic and political affairs and was highly

dependent on the European powers, both economically and politically. The position of the empire and its future were threatened by the European economic and political domination of the region. It inevitably confirmed the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire. This notion lead to a constant stream of Ottoman diplomatic missions to the European capitals, and examination of European ruling, law, military and educational systems, and the creation of reform projects.[69] Consequently, the reorganization of the empire's ruling system and military structure took on increasing importance for the Ottoman Empire. Following European models, which had already been firmly established, examined and proven successful, was considered the correct path of further development.

Self-preservation and existence under the effects of strong European pressure, however, was also a problem the empire still needed to solve. There is some evidence that Sultan Mahmud II's ideas for governmental structures were influenced by the enlightened absolutism in Russia and the Habsburg Empire.[70] This would mean that the modernization of the governing, taxation and military system was combined with a consolidation of central control. This is why the sultan saw a strictly centralized, almost autocratic ruling system as the best solution for the Empire's problems. It also led to a focusing of the sultans' policy on the reorganization of the military system. In addition, financial reforms were also essential since the state faced the need not only to secure its basic revenues, but also to expand them in order to finance the newly created military institutions through the introduction of new taxes.

Contrary to the opinion that modernization in the Ottoman Empire – as well as in other non-European societies – was a simple process of applying the European model of modernization and imitating European institutions (as reflected by the definitions of the period, such as "Europeanization" and "Westernization"), it can be shown that the Ottoman reforms had their own specific patterns and goals.

Comparison with European modernization

What was the Ottoman reform process? Was it the borrowing of a foreign model after becoming aware of the state's own backwardness? Or was it an internal process of modernization? Is it reasonable to talk about a modernization and Europeanization (Westernization) of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of the characteristics described above?

Firstly, some brief definitions of European modernization will be provided in order to facilitate a later comparison with the specifics of the process in the Ottoman Empire. Certain categorizations by leading scholars can be used as examples of the general trend of understanding and explaining modernization. For example, Larry Wolf explains modernization as *evolution and progress flourishing during the Enlightenment, rationalism and development of sciences, industrialization, and advance in social relations and institutions (bureaucratization).* Maria Todorova defines the process of "Europeanization" (or "Westernization" or "modernization") of the Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a *spread of rationalism and secularization, intensification of commercial activities and industrialization, the formation of bourgeoisie and other new social groups in the economic and social sphere, and the triumph of the bureaucratic nation-state.*[71]

It is difficult to confirm the existence of a process of **modernization** without the occurrence of some of the main elements in the established pattern. There were no firm social backgrounds as a group, which supported and participated willingly in the implementation of the Ottoman reforms. There had been no secularization of society until that moment – only a few attempts to reduce the role of religion had been introduced by the central authority. There was no development of the sciences or industrialization in the Ottoman Empire of the early nineteenth century. And no bourgeoisie had yet emerged in the empire. Modern institutions were implemented, but were used for the needs of centralization.[72] The military system was organized according to the European standards and the system of governing became professional and bureaucratized. Innovations in technology, medicine, and education as representations of rationalism and positive knowledge were realized, but they were *borrowed* and used mainly for the needs of the army.

This was not real **Europeanization**, since these were European models applied in the Ottoman Empire, however they managed to retain certain tasks specific to the state, such as the centralization and strengthening of the empire. It should also be mentioned that institutions were implemented in rather formalistic way and some innovations, mainly in technology, were simply *borrowed*. The lack of interest in developing science and technology is also an interesting phenomenon *typical* for the empire. The empire preferred rather to adopt innovations that had already been proved profitable. Furthermore, there was a consciousness resistance

against any European influence and a desire to preserve the inner nature of the empire. The religious background of power and the state as a whole represented the distinctiveness of the Ottoman Empire from an ideological point of view. It was for this reason that the Islamic basis was stressed in the reform documents. The stress on Islam can be understood as a natural reaction against foreign influence. The empire needed to preserve itself and the notion of otherness needed to be stressed in order to maintain a clear separation from Europe. This represented the approval of self-identity in a period in which external influences were very strong.

The backwardness of the empire is clearly proven on comparison with Europe, illustrating the different levels of development. Mainstream opinion as to modernization theories, however, holds that the process of modernization *started in Western Europe and later spread to the countries of Europe, America, Africa, and Asia.* Consequently, it is easy to see how the representation of the rest of the world as inferior arises. Underdeveloped countries should simply follow the path traced by Western Europe. Moreover, the model of Western European modernization is considered the correct one that should be implemented. It was demonstrated above, however, that the process of Ottoman reform was, in fact, not a simple imitation of the European model, since every society has its own needs and own specifics, which dictate its development path. Adopting models from outside is not a simple process of copying, as they need to be adapted to internal needs, such as strengthening power and self-preservation in the Ottoman case.

In terms of the comparison between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, I prefer to see it as an asymmetrical link between two societies at different stages of development.[73] Scholars have agreed that a certain stage of development is required in order for modernization to occur. It is clear that the Ottoman Empire was forced to modernize without a real basis on which to do so. Generally, the stage of modernization is said to apply to national (modern) states.[74] What makes Ottoman modernization different is the fact that a multiethnic empire that had retained feudal features and institutions[75] endeavored to achieve this stage of development and establish a modern society.

NOTES

[1]   The terms "reform" and "innovation" are used in this paper broadly and do not imply any given concept about the nature of the process.

[2]   Findley, Carter, 1980: 42.

[3]   Inalcık, Halil, 1964: 49; Davison, Roderic, 1963: 5.

[4]   Miller, A., 1947: 77.

[5]   Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 49, 55, 56, 57, 70.

[6]   Todorova, Maria, 1980.

[7]   Dimitrov, Strashimir, 1993: 275.

[8]   See the introduction of: *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey,* ed. by R. E. Ward, D. A. Rustow, New Jersey, 1964.

[9]   Gerçek, S., *Türk Matbaacılıgı* [Turkish Printing], Istanbul, 1928; Adivar, A. *La science chez les turcs ottomans,* Paris, 1939; Berkes, Niyazi, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey,* Montreal, 1964; Uzunçarşılı, Ismail, *Osmanlı Devletinin Ilmiye Teşkilâtı* [The Learning Institution in the Ottoman Empire], Ankara, 1965; Becirbegovic, M., "Prosvetni object islamske arhitekture u Bosni i Herzegovine" [The Islamic Educational Architecture in Bosnia and Herzegovina], in *Prilozi za orientalnu filologiu*, No. 20-21,1974, 225-359; Stainova, Mihaila, "Mladata 'alafranga' v parvata polovina na XVIII vek v osmanska Turtsia" [The Young 'Alafranga' in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century in Ottoman Turkey], in *Studia balcanica*, 15, 1980, 21-40; Stainova, Mihaila, "Tendentsii v kulturnoto i ideinoto razvitie v osmanskoto obshtestvo prez dvadesette godini na XVIII vek (1718 – 1730)" [Tendencies in the Cultural and Ideological Development of the Ottoman Society in the 1820s], in *Studia balcanica,* 13, 1977, 72-95.

[10]   *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey,* ed. by R. E. Ward, D. A. Rustow, New Jersey, 1964: 8, 435, 452.

[11]   Inalcık, Halil, 1964: 49.

[12]   Findley, Carter, 1980: 42.

[13]   Shaw, Stanford, 1971: 96-97, 405.

[14]   Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 385.

[15]   Dimitrov, Strashimir, 1993: 271.

[16]   This literally means "order". The word was used to label the reform era in the Ottoman Empire.

[17]   Bodzholian, M., 1984. For a review of Russian studies see also: Avaliani, A. Б., "Ob opite izuchenia reform Tanzimata v Severoiztoshnih vilaietah Turtsii", in Kratkie soobshtenia ИНА, 73, 1963.

[18]   Davison, Roderic, 1963: 20-39.

[19]   As a result of the multiple functions given to the local elite by the central authority, such as representing the local population, controlling local revenues, collecting local armies etc., its role in local government increased strongly. In fact, after a period of struggle, a number of powerful local notables, called *ayans*, took over the leadership in Rumelia by eliminating the local

administration and creating a new hierarchy. For more on local *ayan*s see Miller, A. F., *Mustafa pacha Bairaktar,* Bucharest, 1975; Inalcık, Halil, 1977: 27-52; Nagata, Yuzo, *Materials on the Bosnian Notables*, Tokyo, 1979; McGowan, Bruce, "The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812" in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914,* eds. H. Inalcık, D. Quataert, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, 637-758; Nagata, Yuzo, "The Role of the *Ayan*s in the Regional Development during the Pre-Tanzimat Period in Turkey: A Case Study of the Karaosmanoglu Family", in Nagata, Yuzo, *Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire,* Izmir, 1995, 119-133.

[20] Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 49.

[21] A. Miller reveals the interesting tendency whereby the reforms (including the military ones) were developed during peacetime and not wartime. Moreover, wars interrupted the reform process. For example, the peace treaty with Russia in 1792 were the start of Sultan Selim III's reforms; another peace treaty, again with Russia, in 1812, saw the start of action by of Sultan Mahmud II against disorder in the provinces: Miller, A., 1947: 115-118.

[22] Initially, they were representatives of the local population to the official authorities. Later, *ayan*s increased their power based on the various functions they received, such as tax collection and administering local revenues, as well as collecting troops during the military campaigns. As a result, a number of powerful *ayan*s occupied the government in Rumelia and Anadol in the late eighteenth century acting as semi-independent rulers.

[23] The learned in Islamic sciences, in whom was invested the authority to express and apply the commands of *sharia*, the main/religious law of the Ottoman Empire.

[24] Elite forces, loyal only to the sultan. Janissaries were recruited from the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire and converted to Islam. Later the Janissary corps grew into one of the strongest institutions of power in the empire, influencing policy and even dethroning some of the sultans. In 1826, Sultan Mahmud II decided to abolish the corps on the grounds of repeated unrest and opposition to the modernization of the army.

[25] The term used for provincial governor.

[26] Uzunçarşılı, Ismail, 1948: 207.

[27] Findley, Carter, *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* vol. 7, E. J. Brill, Leiden – NY, 1993, 774; Inalcık, Halil, 1977: 35; Nagata, Yuzo, 1977: 187-188.

[28] A document dated May 1838 г. contains the salaries of Rumelian high officials in hierarchical order: Dokumenti za balgarskata istoria, 1941: 235, № 430.

[29] Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 91.

[30] According to M. Ubicini, Bitola became the center of the Balkan army: Ubicini, M. A., 1853: 54.

[31] Shaw, Stanford, Ezel Kural Shaw, vol. 2, 1977: 43-44.

[32] In the previous period, the local armies were collected and maintained by the provincial governors. For this reason they were considered and used as private armies. Local finances also came under the control of a governor. For the local army and *vali*'s military functions in the period, see: Georgieva, G. 2003: 57-77.

[33] Yalcınkaya, Mehmet, 1995: 356; Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 90.

[34] For the census, see: Karpat, Kemal, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914. Demographic and Social Characteristics*, Wisconsin, 1985, 109-110; Karal, Enver Ziya, *Osmanlı Imparatorlugunda Ilk Nüfus Sayımı, 1831* [The First Census in the Ottoman Empire, 1831], Ankara, 1943, 195-200; Akbal, F., "1831 Tarihinde Osmanlı Imparatorlugunda Taksimat ve Nüfus [The Population and Territorial Division in the Ottoman Empire in 1831", *Belleten*, No. 15, tome 60, 1951.

[35] For the *iltizam* system, see: Inalcık, Halil, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire. 1600-1700", in Inalcık, Halil *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History*, 283-337; Nagata, Yuzo, 1977: 169-194; McGowan, Bruce, *Economic Life in the Ottoman Empire. Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Paris, 1981; *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914,* ed. Halil Inalcık and Donald Quataert, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994: 713.

[36] For the fiscal reforms see: Ursinus, Michael, 1982; Çadırcı, Musa, "*Tanzimat*'ın Ilânı Sıralarında Türkiye'de Yönetim (1826-1839)", *Belleten*, No. 51, 1987: 1215-1240; Yalcınkaya, Mehmet, 1995: 358-359.

[37] In fact, in the following period it appears that during the whole of the nineteenth century Ottomans had experimented with administrative division in terms of applying a range of projects for short periods representing various ideas about territorial organization. They tried to find the best solution to replace the traditional system which had been kept for four or five centuries. All transformations in the administrative system can be seen in Mostra's dictionary and Birken's catalogue: Mostras, M., *Dictionnaire geographique de l'Empire Ottoman*, St. Petersburg, 1873; Birken, Andreas, *Die Provinzen des Osmanischen Reiches*, Wiesbaden, 1976.

[38] Ubicini, M. 1853: 44; Boué, A. *La Turquie…*, Vol. 4. Paris, 1840; Mostras, M. *Dictionnaire,* 1873; E. Dotten quoted on the basis of: Mihov, Nikola, *Naselenieto na Tursia i Balgaria prez XVIII i XIX vek* [The Population of Turkey and Bulgaria in the 18th and 19th Centuries], vol. 3, Sofia, 1929: 152.

[39] Dokumenti, 1941: 220, № 407; 225, № 412; 228, № 419; 233, № 427; 237, № 434; 240, № 440; 240, № 441; 241, № 444; 237, № 434; 240, № 441; 247, № 457.

[40] P. Tivchev, I. Kaludova, "Dokumenti za polozhenieto na naselenieto v evropeiskata chast na Osmanskata impreia, XVI-XIX vek [Documents on the Condition of the Population in the European Part of the Ottoman Empire,

16th – 19th Centuries]", *Godishnik na Soffiskia Universitet, FIF*, No. 65, 1971: 446, № 50; Dokumenti, 1941: 228, № 418; *Britanski dokumenti za istorijata na makedonskiot narod* [British Documents on the History of Macedonian Nation], ed. Hristo Andonov-Poljanski, vol. 1 (1797-1839), Skopje, 1968: 259, № 100; Ubicini, M. A., 1853: 46.

41   For the history of Albanian lands in this period, see: Arsh, L., *Albania i Epir v konce XVIII – nachale XIX veka* [Albania and Epirus in the late 18th and Early 19th Centuries], Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk, Moscow, 1963.

42   Kanchov, Vasil, "Grad Skopie. Belejki za negovoto nastoiashte i minalo", *Periodichesko Spisanie*, tome 11, No. 55-56: 41.

43   For the gradual process of moving the center of Rumelia from Sofia to Bitola see: Georgieva, Gergana, "Administrative Structure and Government of Rumelia in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: The Functions and Activities of the Rumeli Vali" (forthcoming).

44   Ursinus, Michael, 1982: 143.

45   From the late eighteenth century until 1836, Rumelia had two centers – Sofia and Manastır – which acted simultaneously as administrative and military centers of the province. In fact, the provincial government was organized in a traditional way, which was quite different from the European (modern) notion of a capital. Local government did not normally have its own specially designed buildings and rented or bought private houses where necessary. It is seems that the core of the government was not firmly connected with a geographical center, but mainly dependent on the local governor (these assumptions/statements are based on Ottoman documents, mainly registers from local courts). For the movement of the center, see: Ursinus, Michael, 1982: 143; Ursinus, Michael, "Manastır", in *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition*, vol. 6: 371-372; Ursinus, Michael, "Za razdavaneto na pravosadie ot edno provintsialno upravlenie: rumeliiskiat divan v kraia na XVII – nachaloto na XVIII vek" [About the Administration of Justice from a Provincial Government: the Rumeli Divan in the Late 17th and Early 18th Centuries], in *Sadbata na musulmanskite obshtnosti na Balkanite* [The Fate of the Muslim Communities on the Balkans], vol. 7. [Istoria na musulmanskata kultura po balgarskite zemi [History of the Muslim Culture in Bulgarian Lands], ed. Rossitsa Gradeva, Sofia, 2001, 19.

46   For the main characteristic of the modern towns, see: Cowan, A. "Urbanization", in *Encyclopedia of European Social History*, vol. 2, 2001: 237-249.

47   For Manastır's development, see: Lory, Bernard, "Deux villes aux destius parallèles, croisés, divergents: Sofia et Manastır", in *Études balkaniques*, No. 3-4, 1999: 114; Cohen, Michael, "Monastır: Oasis of Civilization, 1839-1863", in *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 24:2, Fall 2000: 3-22; Çadırcı, Musa, "*Tanzimat* Döneminde Anadolu Kentleri'nin Sosyal ve

Ekonomik Yapısı [The Social and Economic Organization of Anatolian Towns in the Period of Tanzimat]", Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1997, 61-63.

[48] This *ferman* is included in Macedonian translation of Ottoman court registers of town of Bitola: Turski dokumenti, vol. 4, 1957: 119-122.

[49] Todorova, Maria, 1980: 37.

[50] Todorova, Maria, 1980: 37; Dimitrov, Strashimir, 1993: 245-255.

[51] Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 81-82.

[52] Ministry of War (1826); Ministry of Civil Affairs, later renamed Ministry of the Interior (1835); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1835); Ministry of Finances (1837).

[53] Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 97-99; Todorova, Maria, 1980: 41-43.

[54] The establishment of the translation office is connected not only to the interest of Ottomans for Europe and their interest for European languages; it was also related to political event in the period in question. Because of the Greek revolt in 1821 the former interpreters, who were mainly Greeks, ceased to be reliable and were replaced. This led to a need for knowledge of European languages.

[55] Davison, Roderic, 1963: 28-29; Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 88.

[56] Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 83-86; Todorova, Maria, 1980: 44.

[57] Medical school in 1827; 1831-1834 Imperial Music School (*Muzika-i Humayun Mektebi*) and School of Military Sciences (*Mekteb-i Ulum-i Harbiye*).

[58] Todorova, Maria, 1980: 45; Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 94-95; Information from "Ottoman web site": http://www.osmanli700.gen.tr/english/affairs/olayt1.html

[59] Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 102; Davison, Roderic, 1963: 30.

[60] The *ferman* is recorded in local court record (*kadi sicill*) of Bitola: *Turski dokumenti,* 1957: 119-122.

[61] For the process of decision-making and detailed description of political events in the period, see Dimitrov, Strashimir, 1993: 228-235.

[62] The text of the edict can be seen in *Turski dokumenti,* 1958: 143-147.

[63] See, Inalcık, Halil, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600*, London, 1994.

[64] Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 103.

[65] A comprehensive study of administrative reforms in the center and the emergence of Ottoman bureaucracy was made by Carter Findley in, Findley, Carter, 1980; idem., *Ottoman Civil Officialdom. A Social History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989.

[66] For the first Ottoman reformers see: Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 103-106.

[67] Levy, Avigdor, 1971: 21-39.

[68] There are some notes about this process of adoption (Davison, Roderic, 1963: 46, 48), but further research should be carried out in order to reveal the mechanism and provide examples.

[69] For the diplomatic missions in Europe, see: Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 61-62, 88.

70   There is a connection between Peter the Great's reorganizations and the beginning of Ottoman reforms. Some European observers have claimed that Sultan Mahmud II was inspired by Peter the Great, others, such as Helmut for Moltke, have directly compared Sultan Mahmud II with the Russian tsar-reformer: Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 82, 103.

71   Todorova, Maria, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, 13.

72   H. Inalcık considers the introduction of technology, the manner of training and uniforms in the army as modernization/innovation, which challenges the traditional symbols: Inalcık, H. "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey". In "Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey", New Jersey, 1964, p. 49.

73   The new theories, such as dependency, the world system and neo-Marxist theories, critically asses the interpretation of modernization and view underdeveloped and developed societies as contemporary but asymmetrically linked to parts of capitalist expansion, rather than interpreting some societies as traditional or archaic. For a review and analysis of various definitions of and approaches to modernization, see: Sterns, P. N. "Modernization". In Encyclopedia of European Social History from 1350 to 2000. Vol. 2. NY, 2001, p. 3-11; J. M. Armer, J. Katsillis, "Modernization Theory". In Encyclopedia of Sociology. Vol. 3. NY, 1992, p. 1299-1304.

74   As H. Spruyt affirms "a large body of literature, exemplified in the works of E. Gellner, E. Hobsbawm, B. Anderson, and others, argues that modernization is inextricably intertwined with nationalism". Spruyt, H. "Empires and Imperialism". In Encyclopedia of Nationalism. Vol. 1. London, NY: Academic Press, 2001, p. 240.

75   H. Inalcık claims that at the end of the eighteenth century "the classical regime associated with the Ottoman Empire had completely broken down and the empire had become feudalized". Inalcık, H. "The Ottoman Decline and its Effects upon the *Reaya*". In Inalcık, H. "The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy". London, 1978, p. 352.

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