

New Europe College Regional Program 2003-2004 2004-2005



STILYAN DEYANOV
GERGANA GEORGIEVA

SVETLANA DIMITROVA
MUSTAFA FIŞNE
DIMITAR GRIGOROV
HAJRUDIN HROMADŽIĆ
MIGLENA IVANOVA
ANGEL NIKOLOV
ORLİN SABEV (ORHAN SALİH)
MALAMIR SPASOV
ALEXANDER VEZENKOV

New Europe College
Regional Program
2003-2004
2004-2005

Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

Copyright – New Europe College

ISSN 1584-0298

New Europe College

Str. Plantelor 21

023971 Bucharest

Romania

www.nec.ro; e-mail: nec@nec.ro

tel. (+40-21) 327.00.35; fax (+40-21) 327.07.74

New Europe College
Regional Program
2003-2004
2004-2005

STILYAN DEYANOV
GERGANA GEORGIEVA

SVETLANA DIMITROVA
MUSTAFA FIŞNE
DIMITAR GRIGOROV
HAJRUDIN HROMADŽIĆ
MIGLENA IVANOVA
ANGEL NIKOLOV
ORLİN SABEV (ORHAN SALİH)
MALAMIR SPASOV
ALEXANDER VEZENKOV

CONTENTS

**NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION
NEW EUROPE COLLEGE**

7

STILYAN DEYANOV
CONSTANTIN NOICA ET L'EUROPE

19

GERGANA GEORGIEVA
OTTOMAN MODERNIZATION/EUROPEANIZATION –
A CASE THAT DOES NOT FIT THE DEFINITIONS
(STUDY ON OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS)

45

SVETLANA DIMITROVA
A LA RECHERCHE DE L'INTELLECTUEL APRÈS SA MORT
PRÉCONISÉE. NOTES SUR LES *THINK-TANKS* ET LES PRISES
DE POSITION EN BULGARIE « POST-COMMUNISTE »

73

MUSTAFA FIŞNE
THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY ROMANIA, BULGARIA AND TURKEY
ON THEIR WAY TO EU MEMBERSHIP

105

DIMITAR GRIGOROV
TITO AND CEAUSESCU: FROM IDOLS TO SCAPEGOATS
(AND BACK AGAIN?)

149

HAJRUDIN HROMADŽIĆ
THE HYPERTEXTUAL COAUTHOR IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY: EPISTEMOLOGICAL RETHINKING
OF THE THEORY OF HYPERTEXT

201

MIGLENA IVANOVA

VISIBILITY AND INVISIBILITY: GRAFFITI MURALS AS AN
INDICATOR OF GROWING GLOBAL CULTURAL INFLUENCES
IN POST-SOCIALIST BULGARIA

235

ANGEL NIKOLOV

MEDIAEVAL SLAVONIC ANTI-CATHOLIC TEXTS FROM THE
MANUSCRIPT COLLECTION OF THE ROMANIAN ACADEMY

261

ORLİN SABEV

(ORHAN SALİH)

FORMATION OF OTTOMAN PRINT CULTURE (1726-1746)
SOME GENERAL REMARKS

293

MALAMIR SPASOV

SINGLE WHITE MALE; EDUCATION: UNIVERSITY DEGREE;
MENTALLY HEALTHY; NATIONALITY: EUROPEAN

337

ALEXANDER VEZENKOV

THE SYSTEM OF NOMENKLATURA:
THE CASE OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (1944-1989)

369

NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION

NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

The *New Europe College (NEC)* is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, 1990–1991 Romanian Minister of Culture, 1997–1999 Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs) within the framework of the 1994 established *New Europe Foundation* (a private foundation subject to Romanian law).

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, which was awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and alumni has enlarged to over 450 members. In 1998, the New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in higher education and research. One year later, the Romanian Ministry of Education officially recognized the New Europe College as an institutional structure of continuous education in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Aims and Purposes

- To create an institutional framework with strong international links that offers young scholars and academics in the fields of the humanities and social sciences from Romania and South-Eastern Europe working

- conditions similar to those in the West, and provides a stimulating environment for transdisciplinary dialogues and critical debates;
- To foster, through its programs and activities, the development and reform of the Romanian higher education;
 - To promote contacts between Romanian and regional scholars and their peers worldwide;
 - To cultivate the receptivity of academics and researchers in Romania for fields and methods as yet not firmly established here, while preserving what might still be precious in the particular type of scholarly approach that emerged, against all odds, in the local pre-1989 unpropitious intellectual, cultural, and political context;
 - To contribute to the development of a core of promising young academics and scholars, who are expected to play a significant role in the renewal of the Romanian academe and intellectual life.

As an institute for advanced study, NEC is not, strictly speaking, an institution of higher education, although it has been consistently contributing to the advancement of higher education through the impact of its programs and of the activities organized under its aegis. In order to further enhance its support for the development of higher education in Romania, NEC has initiated as of 2003 the *NEC-LINK Program*, thus establishing its direct presence in the major universities of the country.

PROGRAMS

NEC Fellowships (since 1994): 149 fellowships

Each year, ten NEC Fellowships for outstanding young Romanian scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year (October through July). They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research projects and participate at all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend for the duration of nine months and are also given the opportunity of a one-month research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of the NEC academic year, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, which are published in the series of New Europe College Yearbooks.

RELINK Program (1996–2002): 35 fellowships

The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified, young Romanian scholars returning from studies abroad to work in one of Romania's universities or research institutes. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting for three years was offered, consisting of: funds in order to acquire scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice (in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones), and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Beside their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also involved in organizing outreach activities within their universities (for which they received a monthly stipend). NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group works of the RELINK Fellows.

The GE–NEC Program (since 2000): 29 fellowships

Starting with the 2000–2001 academic year, the New Europe College administers a program that is financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim is to strengthen research and education in the fields of visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian under-graduate and graduate students, as well as young academics and researchers. The program also includes 10-months fellowships for Romanian scholars, who undergo the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows are fully integrated in the life of the College, receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of spending one month abroad for a research trip. At the end of the GE–NEC year, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, that are published in the series of the GE–NEC Yearbooks.

NEC Regional Fellowships (2001–2006): 41 fellowships

As of October 2001, the New Europe College has introduced a regional dimension to its programs (that were hitherto dedicated solely to

Romanian scholars) by offering fellowships for academics and researchers from South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aims at integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region, whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at regional level. With the prospect of the European integration, and in complementing the efforts of the European Union to implement the Stability Pact, the New Europe College invites academics and scholars from the Balkans to cooperate towards overcoming the tensions that have won this region an unfortunate fame over the last decade. The Regional Fellows receive a monthly stipend and are given the opportunity of a one-month research trip abroad. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the series of NEC Regional Program Yearbooks.

The NEC–LINK Program (since 2003): 82 fellowships

Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003 a new program, that aims to directly contribute to the advancement of higher education in four major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca, Iași, and Timișoara). Teams consisting of a visiting academic and one from the host university offer joint courses for the duration of one semester in the fields of the humanities and social sciences. A precondition for these courses is that they be new ones and that they meet the distinct needs of the host university. The grantees participating in the Program receive monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

The Britannia–NEC Fellowship (since 2004): 3 fellowships

This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) has been initiated by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. The fellowship is identical to

a NEC Fellowship in all respects. NEC contributes the one-month research trip abroad, all other costs being covered by the aforementioned donor.

The Excellency Network Germany – South-Eastern Europe Program (since 2005)

The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, is to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South-Eastern Europe in view of developing the regional scholarly milieu mainly in the fields of European integration, transnational governance, and citizenship. To this end the program will be run, in its pilot phase of three years, by the New Europe College. At the present stage, the main activities of the program consist of a) hosting at the New Europe College prominent, as well as young promising scholars coming from Germany in order to give lectures both at the College and at universities throughout Romania, b) the organization of international scientific events with German participation, c) the setting up and development of an increasingly strong network of scholars from Western and Central and South-Eastern Europe. Given the experience gained after the pilot phase, the Hertie Foundation may consider extending the program by also involving other institutes of advanced study from Central and South-Eastern Europe.

The EUROPA Fellowships - Traditions of a New Europe. A Prehistory of the European Integration in South-Eastern Europe (since October 2006): 8 fellowships

This program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung for the duration of three years, takes the now terminated Regional Program to another level. Its aim is to investigate the “pre-history” of the European integration of South-Eastern Europe, and to dwell on its diverse local and regional heritage, thus offering the present Europe some valuable vestiges of its own less known past. Such a description of a Europe in *statu nascendi* may be highly relevant for nowadays consolidated Europe, all the more as this consolidation is, as recent developments have shown, subject to reevaluations, reformulations, and crises.

The project starts off in its first (pilot) year with 8 Romanian and foreign fellows, who will focus their the research on several aspects of everyday life, by studying the history of the costume, of the portrait, or of the “gastronomic memory.”

The Petre Țuțea Fellowships (since October 2006): 5 fellowships

Starting with the 2006-2007 academic year, NEC administers a fellowships program financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania through its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. The fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent, who are living abroad and are working in the domains of the humanities and social sciences, as well as to Romanian researchers, whose projects dwell on the cultural patrimony of the Romanians from abroad. During the academic year the fellows under this program will be actively involved in the scientific life of the College. At the end of the year they are expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, which will be published in the bilingual series of the Petre Țuțea Program Yearbooks.

The New Europe College hosts within the framework of its programs ongoing ***series of lectures*** (an average of 40 per academic year) given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars foremost for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, but also for a wider public. The College also organizes ***international and national events*** (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.). Another important asset of the New Europe College is its ***library***, including among its roughly 25,000 titles outstanding reference works and major works in the humanities and social sciences, as well as several thousand volumes and manuscripts donated to the NEC by private individuals from Romania and abroad. The holdings of the library are opened to readers from the academic and research milieus.

Beside the above-described programs of the College, the New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities during the last years by administering or being involved in the following major projects:

The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)

As of 2001, the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft funded to the end of 2005—within the framework of the New Europe Foundation—an institute that focused on the extremely sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans (and beyond) from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities, the institute fostered the dialogue between distinctive religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), as well as between confessions within the same religion, and aimed at investigating the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. To this end, the institute hosted international scholarly events, sustained research projects, brought out publications, and set up a topic relevant library, intended to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

The Septuagint Translation Project (since 2002)

This project aims at achieving a scientifically solid translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul* and amounts to 120,000 USD. The translation is scheduled to be ended in 2007, four volumes having already been published by the Polirom Publishing House of Iași.

The ethnoArc Project – Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research (since 2006)

An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies—Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources

The goal of the ethnoArc project (that was initially started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for Education and Research of Germany) is to contribute to the preservation, accessibility, connectedness and exploitation of some of the most prestigious ethnomusicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The system will be designed to conduct multi-archive searches and to compare retrieved data. In a two-year effort, ethnoArc will attempt to create an “archetype” of a linked archive that aims to incite modern, comprehensive, and comparative research in ethnomusicology, anthropology, or related disciplines, and to deepen and spread awareness and familiarity with the common European memory and identity.

The project includes an international network of seven partners: four sound archives, two multidisciplinary research institutions, and a technology developer: Constantin Brăiloiu Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest, Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva, Ethnomusicological Department of the Ethnological Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Institute for Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), New Europe College, Bucharest, FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

Present Financial Support

The State Secretariat for Education and Research of Switzerland

The Federal Ministry for Education and Research of Germany

The Federal Ministry for Education, Science, and Culture of Austria

Le Ministère Français des Affaires Etrangères, Ambassade de France en Roumanie

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Department for the Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad), Romania

The Romanian State (indirect financial support through tax exemption for fellowships)

Zuger Kulturstiftung Landis & Gyr, Zug, Switzerland
Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (DaimlerChrysler-Fonds, Marga und Kurt Möllgaard-Stiftung, Sal. Oppenheim-Stiftung, and a member firm), Essen, Germany
Stiftung Mercator GmbH, Essen, Germany
Volkswagen-Stiftung, Hanover, Germany
The Open Society Institute (through the Higher Education Support Program), Budapest, Hungary
The Getty Foundation, Los Angeles, U.S.A.
Britannia-NEC Scholarship Founder, U.K.
The Hertie Foundation, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
The Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation, Munich, Germany
Sixth EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP6)
Fundăția Anonimul, Bucharest, Romania
Forum Auto/Volvo, Bucharest, Romania

* * *

***Founder and President of the New Europe Foundation,
Rector of the New Europe College***

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Andrei PLEȘU

Administrative Board

Ambassador Jean-Claude JOSEPH, Permanent Representative of Switzerland and Chair of the Rapporteur Group for Democratic Stability, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France (*Honorary Member*)
Dr. Cezar BÎRZEA, Director, Institute of Education Sciences, Bucharest; Professor, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania
Heinz HERTACH, Director, Foundation "Scientific and Cultural Center NEC Bukarest-Zug", Switzerland
Dr. Charles KLEIBER, State Secretary, Swiss Federal Department of Home Affairs, State Secretariat for Education and Research, Berne, Switzerland

Dr. Joachim NETTELBECK, Secretary, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, Germany

MinR'in Dr. Erika ROST, Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Bonn, Germany

Dr. Heinz–Rudi SPIEGEL, Program Manager, Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft and German Foundation Center (Deutsches Stiftungszentrum), Essen, Germany

Dr. Cristian POPA, Deputy Governor, National Bank of Romania

Dr. Mihai–Răzvan UNGUREANU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania; Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Iași, Romania

Hanna WIDRIG, Director, Zuger Kulturstiftung Landis & Gyr, Zug, Switzerland

Academic Advisory Board

Dr. Horst BREDEKAMP, Professor of Art History, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany

Dr. Hinnerk BRUHNS, Director of Research, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris; Deputy Director of the Foundation “Maison des Sciences de l’Homme”, Paris, France

Dr. Iso CAMARTIN, President, Suisseculture, Zurich, Switzerland

Dr. Mircea DUMITRU, Professor and Dean, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Romania

Dr. Dieter GRIMM, Rector, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin; Professor of Law, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany

Dr. Vintilă MIHĂILESCU, Professor of Anthropology, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest; Director, Museum of the Romanian Peasant, Bucharest, Romania

Dr. Ioan PÂNZARU, Professor, Department of French Language and Literature; Rector of the University of Bucharest, Romania

Dr. Zoe PETRE, Professor and Chairperson, Department of Ancient History and Archaeology, University of Bucharest; Director of the Institute for Regional Cooperation and Conflict Prevention (INCOR), Bucharest, Romania

Dr. István RÉV, Director of the Open Society Archives, Budapest, Hungary



STILYAN DEYANOV

Né en 1976, à Sofia, Bulgarie

Doctorant à l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris
(en co-tutelle à l'Université de Sofia « St. Clément d'Ohrid »)

Thèse : *L'espace public moderne et la modernité des philosophes
(critique du discours philosophique sur l'Europe)*

Correspondant de la Radio Deutsche Welle, rédaction bulgare
(à Paris et à Bucarest) 2001-2004

Open Society Fellowship for High Academic Performance (1997-2000)

Participation à des colloques en Bulgarie, France, Roumanie

Études de philosophie et d'anthropologie publiées en
Bulgarie, France, Roumanie

CONSTANTIN NOICA ET L'EUROPE

Le présent texte propose une lecture de Noica par le prisme des diverses conceptualisations de l'Europe que le philosophe roumain a faites dans son œuvre. J'essaie de cerner ce thème sans pour autant prétendre accomplir une recherche exhaustive sur le sujet. Ainsi, je fais une analyse textuelle comparée de *Philosophie et nationalisme* et du *Modèle culturel européen* : un des premiers et le dernier texte de Noica qui concerne le thème choisi. J'essaie également de proposer quelques clés pour un futur approfondissement de cette analyse.

*

Cette étude sur Noica fait partie d'une recherche plus vaste que j'ai déjà commencée il y a quelque temps (dans le cadre de mon DEA) et qui est centrée sur la lecture comparée de Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault et Jürgen Habermas. J'ai choisi trois livres : *La condition de l'homme moderne*, *Surveiller et punir* et *L'espace public* qui traitent des sujets presque identiques mais, de points de vue différents. Ainsi, ma démarche méthodologique pourrait être décrite par ce que Husserl appelle « voir des textes l'un par le prisme de l'autre, comme ils ne pourraient pas se voir entre eux ».

Effectivement, les trois textes choisis essaient d'expliquer la modernité européenne (et c'est dans ce sens que je parle d'Europe) en partant de trois points de vue complètement différents : Hannah Arendt part clairement de l'Antiquité classique, Foucault de l'ontologie du moment présent, et Habermas se situe quelque part entre les deux, en arrivant à des conclusions qui sont souvent contradictoires, mais dans lesquelles on peut également trouver un grand nombre de moments communs.

Ainsi, un des buts de ma recherche est de poursuivre ce qu'on peut appeler « l'ambiguïté systématique » des philosophèmes tels que « Modernité », « Europe », « Lumières », « Raison ».

Etant donné que j'ai lu Noica par le biais des conclusions de cette première analyse, et en quelque sorte par le prisme de l'appareil méthodologique élaboré lors de cette lecture, je trouve nécessaire de présenter ses points principaux avant de passer à l'analyse du philosophe roumain.

Dans la *Condition de l'homme moderne* Hannah Arendt prend son modèle de départ dans la *polis* antique. Elle y distingue, d'un côté, l'espace de la liberté, de la *polis* (dans le sens de communauté des citoyens), l'*agora*, où les gens libres discutent afin d'atteindre « le meilleur pour la *polis* » et, de l'autre, l'*oikos* – la sphère où s'accomplit tout ce qui est lié aux nécessités de la vie – manger, s'habiller, se reproduire. C'est précisément ces deux espaces qu'elle appelle « public » et « privé ».

En partant de ce modèle idéal, Hannah Arendt montre comment à l'époque moderne on ne peut plus parler de ces deux espaces. Puisque le privé y est continuellement exposé aux attaques du public qui l'envahi peu à peu et forme ainsi la sphère du social. Face à cette sphère du social, se distingue la sphère de l'intime.

De son côté, Foucault refuse chaque comparaison avec l'Antiquité et cherche à examiner *la modernité par ses propres ressources*. L'auteur préconise « une nouvelle manière de poser la question de la modernité, non plus dans un rapport longitudinal aux Anciens, mais dans ce qu'on pourrait appeler un rapport 'sagittal' à sa propre actualité ».

Il prend son modèle à partir du projet architectural célèbre de Bentham. La prison est structurée en cercle, les cellules sont transparentes et toutes visibles de la tour centrale. De plus, le détenu ne peut jamais savoir s'il y a effectivement un surveillant dans la tour puisque celle-ci a des vitres par lesquelles on ne peut voir que de l'intérieur à l'extérieur. Ainsi, le détenu finit par se contrôler soi-même. C'est l'âme que la pénitence vise et non pas le corps comme sous l'Ancien Régime. Le détenu doit passer plusieurs examens, pas à pas, afin de transgresser les exclusions qu'il subit pour être réintégré dans la société. Et la prison n'est que la métaphore de toute la société moderne qui est gérée par le même principe d'exclusion qu'il faut transgresser. Foucault donne également l'exemple de l'école, de la caserne mais aussi de l'hôpital ou l'hospice.

A la différence de Arendt, Foucault affirme « nous sommes bien moins Grecs que nous le croyons » et il poursuit : « nous ne sommes ni sur les gradins ni sur la scène, mais dans la machine panoptique ». Et même s'il ne l'appelle pas par ce même terme, il nous laisse cependant comprendre

qu'il s'agit d'un retournement de la stratégie : « pour pouvoir comprendre ce que c'est que la raison, il nous faut voir ce qui se passe dans le champ de la déraison ». C'est par les exclus que Foucault commence son analyse par différence de Hannah Arendt qui parle des initialement privés « selon la loi naturelle ». Public/disciplinaire – voilà l'opposition que Foucault laisse entendre. Ou plutôt disciplinaire/public – ce qui illustrerait mieux le retournement mentionné plus haut. Contrairement au schéma de la pensée antique, dans la Modernité, l'espace des exclus tout comme l'espace de la liberté n'existent pas initialement, « par nature ». Et encore si, dans l'Antiquité, on parle d'espaces (dans le sens propre du mot) homogènes (le « public » et le « privé »), le disciplinaire et le public de Foucault ne sont pas deux domaines-oppositions ; ils ne sont pas donnés par nature, ils fusionnent. Ils sont en mouvement perpétuel, sans arrêt. Le disciplinaire pénètre dans le public et devient sa structure interne. Ce n'est que le principe de l'égalité (formelle) dans l'espace public qui cache la structure disciplinaire de ce dernier. Avant tout, on a un mécanisme, une conséquence qui a dépassé et subordonné sa cause et non pas quelque chose de « donné par nature ».

Foucault introduit encore un point, à savoir que le système ainsi décrit est parfait de l'extérieur, tout y est **calculable**. Cependant, l'homme, son créateur, devient quasiment le serviteur de cette perfection. Pour Hannah Arendt la calculabilité est également un élément primordial de la modernité européenne.

Bref, même si Arendt et Foucault partent de points de vue différents dans leurs analyses de la modernité – l'un par l'Antiquité et l'autre par la modernité elle-même, par les exclus – on peut facilement entrevoir plusieurs points communs dans les conclusions : l'envahissement du privé par le public (la naissance du social) et l'imprégnation de toute la société par le disciplinaire sont en fin de compte des processus quasi similaires. Ces conceptions sont à la base de la **critique de la modernité** de Arendt et de Foucault. Les deux présupposent un problème authentique de la modernité que je vais traiter un peu plus loin.

Dans ce sens, du point de vue philosophique, il est peu important que Foucault et Arendt fassent des périodisations différentes de ce qu'ils appellent modernité : Foucault établit son début dans les années suivant la Révolution française et Arendt, en faisant une distinction, dit que « Scientifiquement, l'époque moderne a commencé au XVII^e siècle, et s'est achevée au début du XX^e ; politiquement, le monde moderne dans lequel nous vivons est né avec les premières explosions atomiques »¹.

Cette différenciation du scientifique et du politique est peut-être la conséquence d'une idée que Hannah Arendt extrait de l'exemple de l'Antiquité :

Le conflit entre la *polis* et le philosophe est un thème important pour ma recherche que Arendt introduit dans *La crise de la culture*. Elle l'argumente par la parabole de la caverne de Platon². Rappelons qu'il s'agit du fait que pour ceux qui ont réussi à sortir de la caverne - les philosophes - les Idées contemplées sont perçues comme la mesure de toutes les choses et dans le cadre du système de *La République* comme une Norme du comportement humain, de l'existence humaine. Mais, ce fait-là est en contradiction avec les principes de la *polis*, là où « le meilleur pour la *polis* » doit être atteint par la *praxis* et la *lexis* qui se font dans l'*agora*, donc, dans la sphère publique - qui est réservée aux citoyens libres. Il est intéressant de remarquer pour mon analyse, que Hannah Arendt considère que l'emploi des idées comme mesure rappelle l'emploi du mètre, car le mètre et les idées sont au-delà, ils transcendent les choses. Mais bien que transcendantes, ces idées apparaissent comme une nécessité. Nous sommes en face d'un renversement : la nécessité est loin d'être « exclue », délimitée dans le *oikos*, elle (bien que Divine) est ce qui fonde le fonctionnement politique de la République. Il me paraît que cet étalon économique est aussi présent dans la structure de la société moderne, notamment dans la sphère qui - dans le cadre de la théorie de Arendt - porte le nom de « sociale ». Dans *La condition de l'homme moderne*, nous lisons : « dans le *socium* ce qui est commun aux gens ce n'est que l'intérêt privé ». Autrement dit, ce qui est commun entre les membres d'un État, c'est l'efficacité pure, l'utilité. Ce dernier cas n'est pas tellement surprenant pour un de nos contemporains, mais pour une perspective qui tire son modèle de la *polis/oikos*, donc du public et du privé, il y a une contradiction, *in adjecto*, pareille à celle de l'expression « économie politique ». C'est ainsi que la mort et la vie encadrent et soumettent le politique qui perd son sens de libre de nécessité. Tout au contraire de la *polis* où la vie et la mort restent dans le privé et par conséquent sont non reconnaissables, « mystérieuses », ce n'est pas par hasard qu'on ne partage leur expérience qu'à *Eleusis* (mais personne n'en parle, il n'y pas de langue pour en parler).

Tout en utilisant le modèle idéal de la *polis* antique, Arendt définit ses concepts. Par le terme *vita activa*, Arendt désigne trois activités humaines fondamentales : le travail, l'œuvre et l'action. « Chacune d'elles correspond aux conditions de base dans lesquelles la vie sur terre est

donnée à l'homme » (Arendt 1983 : 41). Le travail correspond à la vie, au processus biologique du corps humain ; l'œuvre – à la non-naturalité de l'existence humaine, à l'appartenance-au-monde ; l'action correspond à la condition humaine de la pluralité (la pluralité en tant que condition de toute vie politique). Le travail assure la survie de l'espèce humaine, l'œuvre confère une durée à la futilité de la vie mortelle, l'action est associée à la fondation et au maintien des organismes politiques, elle crée la condition du souvenir, c'est-à-dire de l'Histoire³. Il est important de souligner que Hannah Arendt n'établit pas un signe d'équation entre la nature humaine et la condition humaine, car, explique-t-elle, même dans l'énumération la plus complète des facultés humaines qui correspondent à la condition humaine, on n'en trouverait pas une sans laquelle l'existence humaine ne serait plus humaine. C'est-à-dire que les hommes ayant quitté la Terre seraient toutefois des hommes et leur nature serait néanmoins conditionnée. En fin de compte la modernité, la science moderne en particulier, tient ses plus grands succès au fait qu'elle prend la décision de juger la nature terrestre à partir d'un point de vue véritablement universel – situé hors de la Terre. Arendt appelle ce lieu « point digne d'Archimède » et lie la naissance de la modernité à la découverte du télescope.

Arendt prête surtout attention au rôle de point de retournement que joue la théorie de Platon de *La République*. « Lorsque disparut la cité antique ... l'expression *vita activa* perdit son sens spécifiquement politique pour désigner toute espèce d'engagement actif dans les affaires de ce monde ». « Désormais on compta l'action, elle aussi, au nombre des nécessités de la vie terrestre » (Arendt 1983 : 49). Le retournement de *La République* consiste dans même le fait que ce livre représente une théorie politique. La racine du mot « théorie » nous dit déjà assez : l'expression « *bios theoretikos* » est traduite en latin par « *vita contemplativa* ». Comme si la théorisation (cherchant la sécurité) de la *polis* éliminait la liberté de délibération et d'action et les transformait en nécessités. *La condition de l'homme moderne* décrit précisément l'histoire de cet avantage que la contemplation, la théorie a pris sur toute action. Et pourtant pour Arendt « l'action est en fait la seule faculté miraculeuse ». « Le miracle qui sauve le monde... Un enfant nous est né »⁴.

Il faut pourtant noter que, lorsqu'elle parle de la *polis* d'avant la théorisation philosophique, quand elle examine la sphère de la liberté et la sphère de la nécessité, Hannah Arendt fait cela en tant que philosophe tentant de contester la contemplation tout en contemplant.

Il semble que le livre *La condition de l'homme moderne* veuille nous dire, quoique qu'il ne l'exprime pas explicitement, que la modernité tente d'éviter d'avouer que l'homme est conditionné par une nécessité. La modernité, par conséquent, ne veut pas construire son propre champ (dans le sens antique du mot) de satisfaction de cette nécessité mais, tout au contraire, elle la « fuit » sans cesse. C'est justement à cause de cela qu'elle ne peut pas avoir un champ libre et véritablement politique dans le sens antique de ces notions. Et toute cette « fuite » du système social moderne contient la nécessité et est imprégnée de cette même nécessité que précisément elle fuit.

Néanmoins, Arendt dit aussi que « la substitution du faire à l'agir... indique bien les problèmes authentiques de l'agir ». Authentiques ? Est-ce que cela veut dire que la *polis* a dû donner naissance aux philosophes, que les philosophes ont été condamnés à apparaître ? Arendt définit également la seule solution possible aux problèmes de l'action : « contre l'irréversibilité – le pardon », « contre l'imprévisibilité – la promesse »⁵. La solution de Foucault est l'effort permanent de critique de la modernité. Cependant, je souligne une fois de plus, dans les deux cas il s'agit d'un problème « authentique » de la modernité.

Noica et l'Europe – quelques considérations méthodologiques

Pour les buts de cette recherche j'ai essayé de restreindre la bibliographie de Noica à quelques ouvrages qui sont liés plus ou moins directement au thème de l'Europe. J'ai laissé donc de côté les livres proprement philosophiques de Noica – ce qu'on peut appeler son ontologie.

Ainsi, le livre qui serait dans le centre de mon étude est *Modelul cultural european* (*Le modèle culturel européen*), un livre dont les différents chapitres ont été publiés en tant qu'articles dans la presse roumaine des années 80 et qui a été imprimé comme tel en 1988, en allemand (sous le titre *De dignitate Europae*), pour ne voir sa traduction roumaine qu'en 1993, trois ans après la chute du régime communiste. Il s'agit du dernier livre écrit par Noica. Je vais centrer la présente analyse précisément sur ce livre.

Les autres textes utilisés ne sont pas centrés directement sur le thème de l'Europe, mais traitent plutôt de l'idée du national et des différents aspects de ce que Noica appelle « roumanité ». Cette dernière est bien

sûr en rapport constant explicite ou implicite, avec l'Europe. Sans que la liste soit exhaustive, il s'agit de : *21 de conferințe radiofonice, 1936-1943* (dont notamment « *Filosofia naționalismului* » – février 1938), publié après 1989, *Pagini despre sufletul românesc* (1944), *Manuscrisele de la Cîmpulung*, publiés également après 1989 et réunissant des cahiers écrits pendant la période d'assignation à domicile au début des années 50, *Sentimentul românesc al ființei* (1978)⁶.

Il faut remarquer que ces livres comprennent une période assez large de temps. Il s'agit donc d'un thème que Noica creuse et poursuit avec persévérance pendant presque toute sa vie intellectuelle. Ainsi, le thème qui m'intéresse se démarque d'autant plus clairement qu'on pourrait poursuivre son évolution dans des contextes différents – dans l'entre-deux-guerres, à l'époque de l'ascension du mouvement légionnaire, dans les années après l'instauration du communisme en Roumanie, à l'époque de Ceausescu.

Avant de commencer l'analyse proprement dite il convient de commenter la présente sélection. A premier abord, une division de l'œuvre de Noica, quelle qu'elle soit, paraît incorrecte. Selon Andrei Pleșu⁷, Noica soutenait l'idée que l'œuvre de tout un chacun doit représenter une suite et dans ce sens il y a une continuité entre tous les livres du philosophe.

En même temps, Noica disait aussi qu'il avait choisi de partir, dans ses analyses philosophiques, de quelque chose qu'il connaissait le mieux au monde, à savoir la langue roumaine. Dans ce sens, on peut entendre cette partie de son œuvre comme la base de sa philosophie et, par conséquent, l'envisager comme une entité en soi.

Le modèle culturel européen

Un excellent jeu de pronoms personnels marque la préface du *Modèle culturel européen* qui s'appelle « Lettre envers un intellectuel de l'Occident ». Vous autres, dit Noica, vous vous demandez si nous pouvions encore être sauvés. « Nous, nous ne vous comprenons pas »⁸... Nous ne comprenons pas vos lamentations. Plus loin, les rôles de « nous » et de « vous » sont encore mieux précisés. Toute « la lettre » est remplie de questions adressées à vous, les occidentaux, les intellectuels de l'Occident et « nous », nous sommes les marginaux⁹, les « frères qui ne sont pas pris en compte »¹⁰.

Pourtant une exception à cette règle imaginaire des pronoms brise la logique de séparation et fait comprendre qu'il existe quelque chose qui est commun à « nous » et à « vous » et qui est « le nôtre ». Noica dit : « vous n'avez pas su mettre en évidence la contrepartie de gloire de **notre** – c'est moi qui souligne, SD – culture »¹¹.

Et il paraît que c'est précisément de cette position de culture commune, que Noica entreprend sa critique envers l'intellectuel de l'Occident. Ce qu'il lui reproche, c'est avant tout le fait de poser la question du salut, qui n'aurait aucune raison sinon sa simple formulation, avec tant d'insistance. Ainsi, la solution que Noica propose est tout aussi simple : « agir, au lieu de déclamer », au lieu de se lamenter. Et il ne tarde pas d'expliquer ce qu'il entend par action. « Einstein, dit-il, a agi... il s'est adressé à un président en lui demandant de défendre le monde du danger atomique »¹². Faut-il entendre qu'agir, c'est en quelque sorte établir le lien entre le monde de la science et celui de la vie réelle dans une concertation avec les responsables du domaine politique ?

Ce début du livre nous fait comprendre également que c'est bien la modernité occidentale qui est en cause, les héritiers des Lumières. « Agissez... ne venez pas effrayer le monde, vous, les illuminés », dit Noica, et continue avec une confiance et un optimisme dignes des Lumières : « Ce que les hommes ont fait, ils peuvent bien le défaire »¹³. Et l'optimisme est d'autant plus remarquable dans le contexte du danger atomique donné en exemple dans le paragraphe précédent.

Cette dernière affirmation paraît exclure toute possibilité d'existence de problème authentique de la modernité. Si tout peut être défait, il ne reste qu'à combattre l'inaction et le fatalisme. Voilà pourquoi, on peut se demander si la deuxième partie de cette préface peut être comprise en tant que critique de la modernité dans le sens de Foucault et Arendt ou bien comme une énumération des problèmes provoqués par l'inaction et par l'hystérie de la crise imaginaire.

Mais avant de voir quels sont ces problèmes il faut préciser que, même si cette lettre n'est pas adressée concrètement à quelqu'un (mais à l'intellectuel de l'Occident en général), la période historique visée est très bien délimitée par Noica. Il parle des deux dernières générations « parmi lesquelles on aurait pu recruter quelques génies mais qui ont été jetés dans les rues et hystérisés »¹⁴, ce qui correspond approximativement à l'après-guerre ouest-européen. C'est précisément là que Noica dit que « vous n'avez pas su mettre en évidence la partie de gloire de notre culture ». Et cette période de dégradation est opposée au siècle des

physiciens qui est unique « non seulement par ses génies parsemés mais aussi par la communauté créée de ces génies qui se parlaient de sommet à sommet » et qui « commence en 1850 par Faraday et se termine après l'école de Copenhague »¹⁵. Par ailleurs, Noica souligne que ce serait de la sorcellerie de croire que la science, « prétendue science faustienne » pourrait être coupable.

A part cela, un autre repaire chronologique nous est donné dans cette lettre qui semble comprimer la plupart des idées du livre. Noica parle de 1500 ans de culture européenne qui « a alimenté, a exploité, il est vrai, mais a aussi éduqué le reste de l'humanité par ses valeurs »¹⁶. Et cette idée de l'exploitation est reprise de plus belle à la fin du même paragraphe : « Nous sommes toujours des pirates, des « conquistadores » et des corsaires, mais là nous sommes des corsaires de l'esprit – et cela change tout »¹⁷. Encore une exception à la règle des pronoms. Nous sommes des « conquistadores » ! Un aveu qui, en effet, pourrait être difficilement fait par un de ses collègues occidentaux et que Noica souligne, et pour ne pas dire approuve, assume pleinement. Je reviendrai sur ce point plus loin dans mon texte.

Pour revenir à la critique que Noica fait, il faut dire que dans le contexte de cette préface on ne saurait pas l'entendre en tant que critique de la modernité ; il s'agit bel et bien d'une critique des intellectuels occidentaux de la deuxième moitié du XX^e siècle, qui, s'écartant de vraies fins de ce qu'on appelle « l'époque des physiciens », n'ont privilégié que le lien extérieur entre les gens et ainsi ont provoqué une société de l'aliénation, où « le sourire fade, la politesse et le gentil bonjour donnent la seule mesure de la société civilisée – la société bye-bye (the Bye-bye society) »¹⁸.

J'ai examiné cette préface en détail parce qu'elle contient en raccourci les idées dont on peut poursuivre le développement dans le livre entier.

Le premier chapitre définit le prisme par lequel la culture européenne va être examinée. En fait, Noica nous propose un schéma par le biais duquel nous pourrions examiner toute culture (et, nous le verrons plus tard, tout être humain). Il part de deux présupposés. Le premier est que toute culture et tout être humain sont soumis à des lois. Le deuxième est que chaque loi admet des exceptions que Noica nomme « exceptions face à la règle ». Il existe, nous dit le philosophe roumain, cinq types d'exceptions face à la règle : celles qui nient la règle, celles qui la confirment, celles qui l'élargissent, celles qui la proclament tout en restant exceptions et enfin celles qui deviennent elles-mêmes règles¹⁹. Par

conséquent, Noica propose de définir les cultures (et les êtres humains) non pas à l'aide des lois qui les dirigent mais en partant du rapport entre ces lois et leurs exceptions. « Si le rapport entre loi et exception est le même, le type d'homme ou de culture est le même »²⁰.

Dans ma tentative de comprendre la position de Noica, je reviendrai à plusieurs reprises sur ce point où Noica établit son point de départ, sa méthodologie et il pose, pour ainsi dire, la base du système dans lequel il va classer les cultures et notamment la culture européenne. Il me paraît essentiel de comprendre les éventuelles conséquences que le point de vue choisi pourrait avoir sur les conclusions. Pour l'instant je pose quelques questions. D'abord, je mets le signe d'interrogation derrière l'affirmation de Noica que toute homme et toute culture sont soumises à des lois. Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire ? Que tout homme ou culture doit obéir aux restrictions qui leur sont imposées : premièrement, par le fait d'être finis, mortels et donc soumis à des nécessités et, deuxièmement, par le fait d'exister dans le cadre d'une société ? Et si c'est ainsi, est-ce qu'on peut toujours distinguer quel est le rapport entre règle et exception qui prédomine ? Ne s'agit-il pas, dans la plupart des cas, d'une coexistence de plusieurs types de rapports entre règle et exception qui pourraient se compléter entre elles et chacune d'entre elles pourrait servir une partie de la satisfaction de la nécessité sans qu'on puisse dire qui prédomine ? Et s'il s'agit de satisfaction de nécessités, de coordination de l'imparfait être ensemble, est-ce qu'il s'agit d'un choix d'un de ses rapports ou bien le type de rapport pourrait être dans certains cas imposé par l'exigence de la nécessité concrète ? Prenons un exemple.

Avec l'examen du premier rapport entre règle et exception, à savoir celui où les exceptions nient ou bien contredisent la règle, on comprend la place de la critique de Noica envers l'intellectuel de l'Occident dans le système de recherche ainsi établi. Ce premier type de rapport est appelé totémique parce que la règle ne tolère aucune dérogation. Le même type de rapport définit tout dogmatisme et également, et c'est là le point de mon intérêt, la civilisation techno-scientifique de nos jours que Noica accuse d'esprit totémique. Et maintenant, dans le contexte de la dernière question du paragraphe précédent : quels sont les fondements d'une critique envers l'intellectuel de l'Occident de vouloir une parfaite exactitude, sans dérogation à la règle (une tolérance zéro) dans le contexte d'une humanité où la bombe atomique est inventée ? A ce point là, la nécessité, le danger que la vie sur Terre soit détruite par une explosion atomique, ne conditionne-t-elle pas le choix impératif du premier rapport

entre règle et exception, à savoir, l'intolérance absolue face à l'exception ? Noica répond tout seul à cette question un peu plus loin dans le texte – en fait, le problème qui se pose, selon lui, ce n'est pas que le domaine technique soit envahi par cette logique (ceci est inévitable et Noica le confirme (p.14)), mais que cette tolérance zéro s'est transférée aussi bien dans tous les autres secteurs de la vie contemporaine, en allant même jusqu'à dominer l'être spirituel (*ființa spirituală*). Et à ce point, on ne saurait ne pas applaudir – ceci est le pathos d'un grand nombre de critiques de la modernité, notamment celles de Arendt ou Foucault. Noica ajoute même des descriptions exquises en soulignant que l'homme occidental contemporain est devenu « le comble du raffinement » et en même temps « le comble du primitivisme ». Ainsi on comprend que le cinquième rapport, faute d'action, pourrait se transformer en premier. Pourtant ce problème n'est pas authentique puisqu'il est le produit du seul manque d'action. Mais si on retourne au modèle méthodologique de Noica, on ne saurait ne pas voir la contradiction : en fait, le problème, la raison de la lamentation des intellectuels de l'Occident est que, dans une société dominée par la technicité, dans une société où la bombe atomique est inventée, le premier rapport, la tolérance zéro, prendrait, d'une manière nécessaire, le dessus et risquerait de devenir prédominant. (C'est cela ce que Arendt appelle « problème authentique de la modernité »). Et Noica avait dit un peu plus haut, rappelons-le, que c'est le rapport entre règle et exception prédominant (et choisi !) qui caractérise une société²¹ ! En fin de compte, la question est si vraiment tout ce qui est fait par l'homme peut être défait, comme affirme Noica. Est-ce que l'irréversible n'existe vraiment pas ?

Et même si l'on n'utilise pas le modèle de Noica qui désigne le type d'époque selon le rapport prédominant entre règle et exception, le problème des critiques de la modernité, tels qu'on l'a vu chez Arendt ou Foucault, ne tient-il pas précisément à la proportion : plus on a des produits de la technicité (qui sont censés nous aider à transgresser plus facilement la nécessité), plus on a besoin de règles, de lois ?

Le pathos contre la stricte régularité et le manque d'exception est poursuivi par Noica dans les autres rapports entre règle et exception. Ainsi, dans le cas où l'exception confirmerait la règle, attribué aux grammairiens, Noica donne un exemple qu'on pourrait envisager en tant que position contre l'image idéale de communication qu'Arendt entrevoit dans la *polis* antique. Ainsi, dans le cas d'une communication avec des extraterrestres, les signaux que les terriens produisent ne devraient-ils

pas être exclusivement réguliers : « ce n'est qu'une irrégularité qui alterne la régularité qui démontrerait, elle à peine, que nous sommes des êtres rationnels » (p. 16).

Tout de même, il faut remarquer que c'est à la régularité qu'on revient, en fin de compte.

Le troisième rapport, quand l'exception élargit la règle, apporte la possibilité d'amélioration des lois et, au sens philosophique, il combat le danger que nos vérités se transforment en inertie²².

Le quatrième rapport, l'exception qui proclame la règle tout en restant exception, est expliqué par le principe des idées de Platon : les choses qui sont belles mais ne sont pas la beauté elle-même, dans leur élan vers l'idée de beauté, la proclament et l'hypostasient²³. En restant près de Platon, Noica affirme que le monde entier est plein de telles exceptions. Ces exceptions pourtant « n'ont pas encore l'autonomie ni la sûreté »²⁴.

Ainsi, on arrive au cinquième rapport où les exceptions deviennent des règles. Un rapport qui, selon le mot de l'auteur, est survenu uniquement dans la culture européenne et que Noica nomme aussi **génialité**. « La génialité serait alors le nom pour toutes les situations dans lesquelles l'exception deviendrait règle »²⁵. De cette manière, on peut parler de génialité de la nature qui a créé l'homme précisément en tant qu'exception qui par la suite est devenue règle. Mais, depuis, tout s'est renversé et désormais on ne peut plus dire que tout a été fait pour l'homme puisque, répète Noica, « maintenant tout peut être fait, défait et refait par l'homme »²⁶. Une idée qui préoccupe ou, plutôt, passionne Noica. J'essayerai de voir tout au long de mon analyse comment Noica est tenté lui-même de faire, défaire et refaire dans son propre oeuvre.

En clarifiant ce cinquième rapport, Noica introduit à plein fouet les définitions qui sont liées à ce qu'il appellera plus loin « culture européenne » ou bien, tout court, « Europe ». L'**histoire**, précisément dans le contexte où tout peut être fait et défait, n'est plus « la pensée divine sur la terre des hommes » mais « la pensée de l'homme sur la Terre du bon Dieu »²⁷. De la sorte, « la génialité de la nature est reprise entièrement sur le registre humain »²⁸. On a l'impression d'entrevoir un transfert qui a la même logique que celui de Foucault. Ce dernier parlait, rappelons-le, de l'homme qui crée le système qui englobe tout, qui est parfait de l'extérieur et qui s'alimente de son propre créateur, l'homme. A ce point, chez Noica, on a l'impression de comprendre aussi ce qui s'est passé un peu avant – la nature a créé l'homme qui devient la règle sur Terre et qui s'alimente de son propre créateur, la nature. De toute façon, il s'agit

toujours de transferts ou bien, dans la langue de Noica, d'exceptions qui deviennent des règles.

Dans cette description du cinquième rapport, Noica introduit également sa définition de la **langue**. La langue, dit-il, est née parce que les gens vivent dans des communautés « et sont forcés » à la créer ! On revoit donc cet élément de nécessité qui paraît être indispensable à la communication. A la différence de la *polis* de Arendt, ici la nécessité est impliquée dans la création de la langue et dans la communication. Chez Arendt, la communication était l'instrument pour obtenir le meilleur pour la *polis* et dans son modèle idéal elle se passait dans l'espace libéré de nécessité de l'*agora*.

Bizarrement à premier abord, plus loin dans son texte, Noica parle d'une conception idéale de la langue. Même si la langue est le produit d'une nécessité, il existe tout de même, selon le philosophe roumain, un **logos unique**. En fait, chaque langue particulière ne représente qu'une exception face à la règle générale du logos unique. Ce qui plus est, Noica invite les linguistes « à trouver des structures identiques, à chercher une grammaire générale et à imaginer pour l'avenir une langue commune » (sic !). Et tout cela en parfaite contradiction avec son idée de l'Etat de 1938 – on y reviendra plus loin.

En fait, dans le schéma des cinq types d'exceptions à la règle, cette conception n'est pas du tout bizarre : la langue y serait une exception qui proclame la règle (le quatrième rapport) et la langue unique de l'avenir serait l'exception qui devient règle. Noica ne répond pas explicitement si cette langue unique va être le logos unique lui-même. La tentation est de penser que la conception de Noica laisse entendre que le logos unique reste inaccessible, comme une idée platonicienne. Dans le cas contraire, le cinquième rapport risquerait de se rendre impossible à exister, une fois le logos unique atteint : on ne saurait plus créer des exceptions qui deviendraient règle.

« ...Chaque langue prétend exprimer quelque chose de plus, « l'excès sur le tout », selon le mot de Valéry. Elles visent toutes de donner la règle pour les mots et le discours, mais elles ne sont que des exceptions à la règle »²⁹.

Il faut souligner tout cela pour comprendre mieux la conception du nationalisme de Noica. Dans une grande partie de ses analyses Noica part exactement de la langue roumaine et il faudrait bien tenir compte de cette définition de la langue qu'il donne ici.

De plus, Noica donne encore une explication dans cette direction. Il dit que c'est par le biais des langues que « se consolident les communautés et se forment les Etats »³⁰. Et « l'Etat est la règle de toute époque plus évoluée, la loi de toute communauté historique »³¹. Donc, ce n'est que les Etats qui ont un être historique. Et tout comme dans le cas de la langue commune, et grâce à sa création, pour Noica il est possible qu'un Etat commun naisse. En revanche, Noica évoque souvent son désir de conservation des Etats et se prononce même contre les éventuels Etats-Unis de l'Europe. Pourquoi ?

Est-ce que cet Etat commun signifierait pour Noica la fin de l'Etat dans le sens évoqué plus haut, la fin des Etats mais aussi, dans ce contexte, la fin de l'histoire ?

On est tenté de dire : la conservation de la langue et des Etats garde l'humanité dans le cadre du quatrième rapport. Parce que les Etats (tout comme les langues qui les rendent possibles) ne font qu'essayer de devenir règle sans pour autant réussir. La conservation des langues et des Etats, dans ce sens, fait impossible l'existence de la culture européenne.

Sinon, ce refus de dépasser l'Etat est-il dicté tout simplement par des raisons de contexte historique et non pas d'idée philosophique ? Et si c'est ainsi, quelles sont les raisons de croire et surtout d'affirmer que le moment de dissolution de l'Etat n'est pas encore venu ?

*

Pour aborder cette problématique d'un autre point de vue, je propose de retourner à un des premiers textes de Noica sur le thème du **nationalisme**. C'est en fait, un texte qu'il a lu à la radio, en février 1938, intitulé *Philosophie du nationalisme*. Même si ce texte a été écrit il y a cinquante ans, il paraît poser des questions similaires. De plus, selon le mot-même de Noica, l'œuvre d'un philosophe ne représente qu'un seul et même livre du début à la fin, comme je l'ai déjà dit.

Pour en faire une synthèse très brève, Noica se demande pourquoi, après tant de guerres, l'Europe continue de creuser le nationalisme et ne construit pas les Etats-Unis de l'Europe. La réponse est que le nationalisme est une solution beaucoup plus profonde qu'une union parce que chaque Etat aurait besoin de se connaître mieux, de découvrir son propre mystère avant de passer à la fraternisation. Noica développe l'idée du mystère perdu à cause du XIX^e siècle qui a voulu tout rationaliser et a oublié qu'il

existait aussi autre chose dans la vie (différemment du *Modèle culturel européen* où même l'irrationnel est inclus dans le domaine de l'esprit). Ainsi, selon Noica, le XIX^e siècle serait une des époques les plus hautaines, il se croirait être le comble de l'histoire, il aurait apporté la technique comme moyen de contrôle du monde et aurait été le seul qui ait écrit son propre histoire³².

Ce texte rappelle par son thème, plus que par ses conclusions, celui du *Modèle culturel européen*. On y retrouve la conversation indirecte avec « l'homme illuminé d'aujourd'hui ». Dans un style ironique, l'homme illuminé est présenté comme quelqu'un qui ne peut saisir le mystère de la vie et qui, dans la personnification de « l'Américain » « trop illuminé » a fini par se suicider à cause du fait qu'il s'ennuyait à répéter chaque jour les mêmes choses : « mettre et enlever ses bottes, sa cravate, sortir se promener, rentrer... »³³. Et Noica termine son texte par un souhait :

« Nous autres, soyons moins « illuminés » et croyons : la vie est aussi autre chose »³⁴.

Ici, à la différence du *Modèle culturel européen*, Noica est quasiment anti-moderne. On voit aussi que c'est bien avant les deux générations d'après la guerre que Noica trouve les raisons de cette critique qui prend les airs d'une critique anti-Lumières. Il ne s'agit pas d'une déviation, d'une simple fatigue et du manque d'action mais d'un problème moderne à long terme. En 1938, Noica est-il vraiment anti-moderne ? Si dans les années 80, l'histoire est conçue comme l'apogée de la civilisation et comme une des caractéristiques principales de la culture européenne, ici on a un XIX^e siècle qui, dans son désir de tout rationaliser, semble perdu *ab initio* dans la technicité. Si ce n'était pas presque anti-moderne, ce texte pourrait nous faire penser à la logique qui découvre un problème authentique de la modernité.

La solution proposée ne semble pas aussi lointaine de celle d'Arendt par exemple : le mystère rappelle la promesse et le pardon qui sont proposés en tant que solutions à l'imprévisibilité et à l'irréversibilité. Dans les deux cas, de telles solutions sont nécessaires devant le même problème : l'impossibilité que la raison explique et englobe tout face à l'imperfection de la raison. « Contre l'irréversibilité – le pardon », « contre l'imprévisibilité – la promesse »³⁵ et l'action (qu'on ne retrouve que dans *Le modèle culturel européen*). (Pourtant, on le verra un peu plus bas, c'est précisément le mystère qui est réfuté dans *Le modèle culturel européen*).

En revanche, même si la logique philosophique est la même, une question se pose (une raison de parler de tendances anti-modernes) : pourquoi chez Noica, l'Etat serait-il précisément l'endroit où on peut trouver ce mystère ? Le pardon et la promesse sont des solutions qui tiennent beaucoup plus de l'individu. Et si on les transférait sur le plan de la société on n'aurait aucune raison de les lier à un Etat concret et non pas à l'Humanité entière. La même chose paraît être valable pour le mystère synonyme de l'imperfection de la raison. Cependant Noica cherche le mystère précisément dans l'Etat. Pourquoi ? Dans le texte de 1938 on ne trouve pas de réponse à cette question. Je vais essayer de revoir ce problème en revenant au *Modèle culturel européen*.

*

La disparition de l'Etat est donc possible (comme on l'a compris dans *Le modèle culturel européen*) mais elle n'est pas envisageable, au moins pas avant que les nations ne prennent conscience de leur propre mystère. Quand est-ce que cela va arriver ? Est-il possible que cela arrive tout simplement ou bien s'agit-il d'un procès sempiternel ?

Cette question peut être reformulée également dans les termes du système du *Modèle culturel européen* :

Les cinq types de rapports entre règle et exception, choisis par Noica, nous laissent entendre qu'en partant du premier et allant vers le cinquième, les cultures emploient de moins en moins de concept-conclusions. Ainsi, le premier entend-il ses lois comme des normes absolues qui ne peuvent pas être changées et ne doivent pas être transgressées. Dans le cas du cinquième rapport l'homme n'obéit à aucune loi, puisqu'il s'est rendu compte que chaque loi est la formulation imparfaite d'une idée. Ainsi, tout un chacun, depuis son point de l'espace et du temps, d'une manière naturelle, voit les idées des choses de sa propre position (exactement comme dans la caverne de Platon) et ainsi essaie d'établir ses propres règles. Il tend à transformer ces règles, d'une manière tout aussi naturelle, en règle pour tout le monde, sans pour autant avoir la garantie d'y jamais réussir. Le cinquième type de rapport représente dans cette logique l'aveu que les idées ne sont pas connaissables d'une manière absolue. Grâce à cela ce rapport regorge le plus d'énergie pour s'élancer vers la compréhension de ces idées.

Un thème qui apparaît à plusieurs reprises est qui pourrait clarifier davantage l'idée de nationalisme de Noica est celui de **l'autonomie**.

Dans le quatrième rapport entre règle et exception, l'autonomie et la sécurité manquent encore et n'apparaissent qu'avec le cinquième. A ce sujet, en parlant toujours du quatrième rapport, Noica donne en exemple la nature qui est aussi peu sûre et instable de sorte que si la température sur la Terre changeait de quelques degrés, tout pourrait changer (p. 22).

Et pourtant, Noica ne cherche pas la sécurité et l'autonomie dans quelque chose de stable et de statique, comme on pourrait s'y attendre si on pensait aux espaces clairement délimités de la *polis* décrits par Hannah Arendt. L'autonomie, trouvée dans le cinquième rapport est en fait le produit d'un perpétuel changement ou, plutôt, elle est la condition pour que ce changement soit toujours possible, puisque c'est à partir d'elle que les individus (autonomes !) ou les sociétés (autonomes !) peuvent tenter d'imposer leurs exceptions en tant que règles pour tout le monde.

Cette thèse de l'autonomie est également différente des espaces de la modernité de Foucault. Chez le dernier on a vu comment non seulement les espaces ne sont pas statiques, mais ils ne peuvent même pas se constituer d'une manière stable parce que le disciplinaire pénètre inexorablement toutes les formes du public et de la vie toute entière en les rendant presque impossibles. Chez Noica, même si on retrouve la même « instabilité » et le même mouvement perpétuel, c'est précisément là-dedans que le dernier retrouve la stabilité. Ainsi, à la différence de Foucault, l'autonomie est-elle tout à fait possible ; les espaces de l'autonomie trouvent leur stabilité dans le perpétuel changement ; on pourrait penser à une « stabilité dans l'instabilité ».

Dès lors, pour comprendre la conception de Noica sur le modèle culturel européen, sur la culture en général, le nationalisme, l'histoire, la modernité, les Lumières... il faut toujours tenir compte de cet espace, produit par l'homme, qui est à la fois autonome et en mouvement permanent ; l'espace que Noica appelle celui de la créativité.

Un dernier détail. Dans cet espace peut se positionner n'importe quel être humain (ou bien société, puisque chez Noica il y a toujours une quasi-équivalence entre individu et société) qui a choisi d'utiliser librement son raisonnement et ne pas vénérer la nature. Donc, l'Europe est accessible à tout un chacun parce qu'elle ne demande pas d'initiation, n'a pas de mystère (à ce point Noica contredit le texte de 1938) et est synonyme d'emploi libre de la raison. Dans ce sens seule la culture européenne est digne du nom de culture, les autres n'étant que des configurations culturelles qui restent en contact avec la nature et la

mortalité. Ainsi pour Noica l'Europe est un modèle éternel – celui de la transgression de la nécessité par l'esprit.

La périphérie et le centre

Le modèle culturel européen nous donne la possibilité d'examiner également le thème du **centre** et de la **périphérie**. Leur signification est tout à fait claire dans le schéma de Noica – le centre étant la règle et la périphérie l'exception (qui pourrait devenir règle). Encore une définition nécessaire à l'analyse de la conception de Noica sur la place de la Roumanie en Europe.

Pour que le cinquième rapport soit réalisé, ne faut-il pas que l'exception qui deviendrait règle soit plus près de l'idée (au sens platonicien) de la chose dont il s'agit ? Dans ce sens, la génialité est-elle une manière d'imposer une exception en tant que règle ? Sinon, quelle est la mesure qui nous fait comprendre que la nouvelle règle est meilleure que la précédente ? Et si pour un individu le choix entre l'ancienne et la nouvelle règle est facile à être effectué, qu'en reste-t-il dans le cas d'une communauté, d'un Etat ou, plus encore, dans le cas où il n'y aurait plus d'Etat ? Est-ce qu'il s'agit de nouvelles approches de l'idée (à l'infini !) ou bien il y a une évolution qui mène à un résultat, à une règle qui est difficile à être changée selon le cinquième rapport ?

Je laisse toutes ces questions ouvertes pour revenir à la comparaison entre le texte de 1938 et *Le modèle culturel européen*. J'ai essayé de montrer comment les thèmes abordés sont similaires, d'y souligner les contradictions majeures. Enfin, il me semble légitime de me demander si *Le modèle culturel européen* peut être conçu comme une évolution, comme une précision, comme une explication du texte *Philosophie et nationalisme* ?

En 1938, le problème de la culture est l'oubli du mystère, le manque d'une zone qui reste inexplicée et inexplicable par l'esprit. Dans les années 80 le fait de ne pas avoir de mystère est proclamé être le mystère de la culture européenne. Cette logique dialectique semble résoudre tous les problèmes authentiques possibles pour la modernité : l'irrationnel est inclus dans le domaine de l'esprit, la sûreté et l'autonomie sont retrouvées dans le mouvement perpétuel. Des conclusions dignes des Lumières. Un Noica qui est plus Lumières que les Lumières. Rien d'un

XIX^e siècle hautain. Au contraire, un siècle des physiciens commençant en 1850 dont l'Occident a oublié les vrais valeurs que Noica rappelle et systématise. Vu que Noica ne fait aucun renvoi à ses conceptions de l'entre-deux-guerres, aucune précision, comment pourrait-on expliquer ce changement radical ?

Par sa logique dialectique *Le Modèle culturel européen* nous laisse entendre une autre lecture de la contradiction. C'est là-dedans qu'on retrouve la règle : le mystère dans le manque de mystère, l'autonomie et la sûreté dans le mouvement, la règle dans la contradiction...

Alors la contradiction entre 1938 et *Le modèle culturel européen* pourrait-elle être expliquée, elle aussi, par ce modèle ? Est-ce que cela est légitime ? Dans quelle mesure ?

Si on choisit une telle lecture de Noica, saurait-on échapper aux deux modèles qui prédominent dans les analyses sur l'œuvre du philosophe roumain : d'un côté Noica l'anti-moderne, le quasi-fasciste et de l'autre, Noica le plus grand philosophe roumain de tous les temps ? Et s'il est clair que la dialectique du *Modèle culturel européen* ne peut pas expliquer les conceptions d'avant-guerre et plus particulièrement celles de *Philosophie et nationalisme*, il me semble pourtant nécessaire d'en tenir compte afin de lire et de mieux comprendre « l'autre Noica ». La recherche d'un point de vue pour une telle lecture était un des buts de la présente analyse.

Certainement, ce point de vue devrait tenir compte, à son tour, des questions que *Le Modèle culturel européen* ne pose pas, des insuffisances du système du « modèle » qui paraît « trop » parfait, plus qu'illuminé, et qui nie la possible existence d'un problème authentique de la modernité : le domaine de l'esprit, dans son mouvement perpétuel, peut inclure et résoudre tous les problèmes jusqu'à l'irrationnel même.

Tout peut être fait, défait et refait par l'homme. Indubitablement, dans le domaine de l'esprit. Et le système du *Modèle culturel européen* part du présupposé que chaque réalité peut être³⁶ incluse dans cette réalité hors-naturelle et spirituelle qui est l'être spirituel. Mais est-ce vraiment ainsi ? N'existe-t-il pas toujours un élément de nécessité, de réalité naturelle qui nous interdit de rester dans un monde dominé par l'être spirituel ? Il me semble que restant dans ce système idéal qui a résolu le problème de la nécessité, Noica fait souvent des transferts illégitimes entre ce monde-ci et les autres qu'on ne saurait décrire sans se référer à l'élément irrationnel de la nécessité, notamment le domaine

politique. Bien sûr, pour la logique du *Modèle culturel européen* il est incorrect de parler de « transferts », parce qu'à ce point Noica exclu l'existence « d'autres mondes », d'autres cultures que le modèle de celle européenne n'engloberait pas.

Toute la conception de Noica en ce qui concerne la culture tâche en fait de mettre de côté (de résoudre radicalement ?) le problème de la nécessité. « Les autres cultures se sont repliées sur elles-mêmes tout en restant sous l'influence de la nature » nous dit Noica dans *Le Modèle culturel européen*. C'est dans ce sens que seule la culture européenne est digne de porter le nom de « culture » les autres n'étant que des « formations culturelles ». L'Europe s'érige dans une sorte de synonyme de « culture ». « Toutes les cultures [les autres] laissent l'irrationnel au-delà, tandis que celle européenne l'emmène et l'ancre ici »³⁷. Cette fois donc, à la différence de Foucault ou Arendt, il n'y a pas de fuite de la nécessité. Aucune idée d'écarter la nécessité – au contraire elle est incluse et ainsi, englobée dans le domaine de sûreté de l'esprit, elle ne risque plus de poser de problème. Ce n'est pas par hasard que Noica commence son livre par l'homme qui serait capable de transgresser sa nature en quittant la Terre pour le cosmos. Bizarrement donc, la nécessité est incluse dans quelque chose qui est parfait de l'extérieur – le modèle de culture en général, valable pour tout le monde, le domaine de l'esprit. Cela veut dire aussi que le cinquième rapport obtient sa « certitude » exactement en encadrant l'irrationnel, le plus incertain, en soi. On a l'impression que l'optimiste Noica voudrait nous dire que la nécessité se perd dans le perpétuel mouvement de l'esprit ; Noica trouve la sûreté dans l'incertain. Pour Noica il est tout à fait possible de faire cela et c'est cet optimisme qui est dans le centre de sa conception de l'Europe³⁸. Noica n'a rien de l'idée d'Arendt d'un manque d'espace public de communication libre qui serait la seule garantie du vrai politique. C'est dans le domaine de l'esprit que « nous sommes désormais conquistadores ».

Ainsi, dans les termes d'Arendt, Noica ne pose non plus le problème du conflit entre la *polis* et le philosophe. Dans le domaine où tout est subordonné à l'être spirituel un tel conflit est impensable. Et pourtant, n'est-ce pas là un problème authentique du système du Modèle culturel européen ?

NOTES

- ¹ ARENDT Hannah, *Condition de l'homme moderne*, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1993, p. 39.
- ² ARENDT Hannah, *La crise de la culture*, Gallimard, Paris, 1995 pp. 144-145.
- ³ ARENDT Hannah, *Condition de l'homme moderne*, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1993, p. 43.
- ⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 314.
- ⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 302.
- ⁶ Il serait intéressant de parcourir brièvement la biographie de Constantin Noica afin de comprendre les possibles influences des époques historiques et des contextes personnels sur les idées du philosophe et notamment sur ses considérations à propos de l'Europe :

Né en 1909 dans le département de Téléorman, en Roumanie, Noica fait son lycée à Bucarest où il obtient son baccalauréat en 1928. Par la suite il suit des études de philosophie et même une année de faculté de mathématiques. Il s'inscrit dans l'intense vie intellectuelle roumaine de l'entre-deux-guerres et fait partie de la génération de Cioran, Ionesco et Eliade. Lycéen encore, il débute, dans la revue « Vlăstarul » en 1927. Il est membre de l'association « Criterion » de 1932 à 1934, obtient une bourse en France pendant l'année scolaire 38-39, soutient sa thèse de doctorat en 1940. Il passe une année en Allemagne de 1940 à 1941. Tout en restant un peu à l'écart de la vie politique, Noica participe tout de même au mouvement légionnaire d'extrême droite ; il est rédacteur en chef de la revue officielle des ainsi appelés « légionnaires » en 1940. A partir de 1934, il refuse d'entrer dans l'enseignement et il gagne sa vie de ses écrits et des leçons privées. Il est référent pour la Roumanie dans le cadre de l'Institut Roumain-Allemand de Berlin (1941 – 1944). Il y rencontre Nicolai Hartmann et Martin Heidegger, il participe à leurs séminaires. Dans l'automne de 1943 on lui refuse la participation au concours pour occuper le poste de maître de conférence à la chaire de Philosophie de la culture et de l'histoire.

Après l'implantation définitive du régime communiste en Roumanie, Noica passe presque dix ans de sa vie assigné à domicile à Cîmpulung (1949-1958). Par la suite il est détenu politique (1958-1964) ; chercheur au Centre de logique de l'Académie Roumaine entre 1965 et 1975 quand il prend sa retraite.

Constantin Noica passe les douze dernières années de sa vie dans les montagnes, au-dessus de la ville de Sibiu, où il crée l'École de Paltinis – une sorte de collège informel –, en fait la maison exiguë où habitait le philosophe et où il recevait ses élèves était un des rares îlots de pensée libre dans la Roumanie totalitaire de Ceausescu des années 1980.

A part ses œuvres de philosophie, Constantin Noica a fait également un grand nombre de traductions philosophiques, notamment celles de Descartes, Kant, Hegel et Platon.

En 1988 il reçoit le prix Herder et en 1990 il est élu membre de l'Académie Roumaine post mortem, confirmation de la reconnaissance de sa place de philosophe roumain du 20^e siècle par excellence.

(Dans cette note j'ai utilisé les données du *Dicționarul scriitorilor români*, M-Q, Ed. Albatros, Mircea Zăciu *et alii* (dir.), București, 2001, pp. 481-487, ainsi que la courte biographie de Noica, présentée dans *Modelul cultural european*, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1993).

7 Citation suivant les notes de mon entretien avec M. Andrei Pleșu (avril 2004).

8 NOICA, Constantin, *Modelul cultural european*, Humanitas, București, 1993, p. 7.

9 *Ibidem*, p. 9.

10 *Ibidem*, p.10.

11 Toutes les citations de Noica sont traduites du roumain par moi-même. Les pages, données entre parenthèses, se réfèrent, faute de traduction française publiée, aux éditions roumaines annotées dans la bibliographie.

12 NOICA, Constantin, *Modelul cultural european*, Humanitas, București, 1993, p. 7.

13 *Ibidem*, p. 8.

14 *Ibidem*, p. 8.

15 *Ibidem*, p. 9.

16 *Ibidem*, p. 9.

17 *Ibidem*, p. 9.

18 *Ibidem*, pp. 9-10.

19 *Ibidem*, p. 11.

20 *Ibidem*, p. 12.

21 « les cultures et les vies se définiront par ce rapport entre règle et exception qu'ils [chaque culture ou chaque individu SD] préfèrent et qu'ils mettent en valeur » (p. 26).

22 NOICA, Constantin, *Modelul cultural european*, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1993, p. 19.

23 *Ibidem*, p. 21.

24 *Ibidem*, p. 22.

25 *Ibidem*, p. 23.

26 *Ibidem*, p. 24.

27 *Ibidem*, p. 24.

28 *Ibidem*, p. 24.

29 *Ibidem*, p. 25.

30 *Ibidem*, p. 25.

31 *Ibidem*, p. 25.

32 NOICA, Constantin, *21 de conferințe radiofonice, 1936-1943*, Humanitas, București, 2000 , pp. 40-41.

33 *Ibidem*, p. 45.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

³⁵ ARENDT Hannah, *Condition de l'homme moderne*, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1993, 302.

³⁶ Doit l'être et l'est ! dans une vraie culture, celle européenne.

³⁷ NOICA, Constantin, *Modelul cultural european*, Humanitas, București, 1993, p. 28.

³⁸ A ce point, j'ai en vue certainement sa conception des années 80, celle du *Modèle culturel européen*.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

- ARENDT, Hannah, *Condition de l'homme moderne*, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1993
- ARENDT, Hannah, *La crise de la culture*, Gallimard, Paris, 1995
- BROWNING, Alison (enquête conduite par...), *L'Europe et les intellectuels*, Gallimard, Paris, 1984
- CIORAN, Emil, *Schimbarea la față a României*, Humanitas, Bucarest, 1998
- CIORAN, Emile, « Sur deux types de société. Lettre à un ami lointain. » dans *Histoire et utopie*, Paris, Gallimard, coll. « Idées », 1960
- FOUCAULT, Michel, *Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison*, Gallimard, Paris, 1975
- FOUCAULT, Michel, « Qu'est-ce que les Lumières? », dans *Dits et écrits*, Vol. IV, Gallimard, Paris, 1983, pp. 562 – 578, 679-688
- HUSSERL, Edmund, *La crise de l'humanité européenne et la philosophie*, Paulet, Paris, 1968 (traduction française Paul Ricoeur)
- IONESCO, Eugène, *Présent passé, passé présent*, Paris, Gallimard, coll. « Idées », 1976, 1968 pour la première édition
- IONESCU, Eugène, Lettre à T. Vianu, voir la lettre du 20 février 1944
- LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, Alexandra, *Filosofie și naționalism (paradoxul Noica)*, Humanitas, Bucarest, 1998
- LIICEANU, Gabriel, *Jurnalul de la Păltiniș*, Cartea românească, Bucarest, 1983 ; Humanitas, Bucarest, 1991
- NOICA, Constantin, *21 de conferințe radiofonice, 1936-1943*, Humanitas, Bucarest, 2000
- NOICA, Constantin, *De dignitate Europae*, Kriterion, Bucarest, 1988
- NOICA, Constantin, « Destin de cultură mică », *Vremea*, nr. 515, 28 nov. 1937
- NOICA, Constantin, « La version moderne de l'un et du multiple », *Revue roumaine de sciences sociales. Philosophie et logique*, nr. 1, 1967
- NOICA, Constantin, *Modelul cultural european*, Humanitas, Bucarest, 1993
- NOICA, Constantin, « Modernizare », *Credința*, nr. 273, 28 oct. 1934
- NOICA, Constantin, « Nu sîntem contemporani », *Buna vestire*, nr. 18, 28 sept. 1940
- NOICA, Constantin, *Pagini despre sufletul românesc*, Humanitas, Bucarest, 1991
- NOICA, Constantin, *Sentimentul românesc al ființei*, Editura Eminescu, Bucarest, 1975
- RESZLER, André, *L'intellectuel contre l'Europe*, Paris, PUF, 1976
- PLESU, Andrei, « Constantin Noica și dialectica limitației », *Dilema*, 17-23 decembrie, 1993
- WISMANN, Heinz, « La situation de l'homme moderne: privilèges, terreur ou administration », dans *Autour de Habermas. La normativité dans les sociétés modernes et l'idée de la justice*, Dom na naukite za tchoveka i obchtestvoto, Sofia, 2000, p. 176-184



GERGANA GEORGIEVA

Born in 1973, in Shumen, Bulgaria

Ph.D. candidate, Institute of Balkan Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences,
Sofia

Dissertation: *Administrative Structure and Government in Rumelia During
Sultan Mahmud II's Reign, 1808-1839*

Annual Scholarship for High Academic Achievements, Open Society
Foundation, Bulgaria (1995-1996)

Participation to conferences in Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey

Papers and studies published both in Bulgaria and abroad

OTTOMAN MODERNIZATION/ EUROPEANIZATION – A CASE THAT DOES NOT FIT THE DEFINITIONS (STUDY ON OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS)

The Ottoman Empire was a society with an interesting fate. On the edge of both Asia and Europe, it comprised different ethnic groups, religions and cultural traditions. It was Europe's best example of the Other: so close and yet so different. For the Ottoman Empire, Europe was also the Other, the Enemy. But in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Ottoman Empire began searching for way to "meet" Europe and to share its world – not only in terms of architecture and lifestyle, but also in military organization, technology, education and ruling institutions. What was the nature of this process? Was it a modernization, or a simple replica of European models? In this paper I will discuss the concepts used in defining the process of reform in the Ottoman Empire in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and compare them with the institutional reforms that were carried out in the empire.

The main (historiographical or methodological) problem of nineteenth-century Ottoman history is the characterization of the reform period.¹ This definition establishes the framework in which the process is viewed and predetermines where emphasis is placed on certain details of nineteenth-century Ottoman history. Was it a process inspired from abroad (Europe)? Was it imitation of a European model, a copy of European modernization, as some historians have defined it, naming it "Europeanization" or "Westernization"? Or was it modernization with its own specific development and own goals?

There has been much discussion as to the nature of the reform process in the Ottoman Empire, and the debate is still running. Some historians stress the inner character of the movement and define it as (specific) modernization,² implying that Ottoman modernization was an internal

process, with its own specific features, brought about through internal development, which overrode the external factors affecting reform. Others stress the external factors and define the process as Europeanization or Westernization,³ classifying it as a simple imitation of the process of modernization in European countries. They describe the development of the Ottoman Empire as being completely dependent on European tendencies and undermine its inner attributes, which differentiated it from European countries. Opinions as to the predominance of internal/external factors and the definition of the process as an inner process or one of adoption of external ideas are very many and contradictory. A. Miller, for example, believes the Ottoman reforms were not imported, but were a local product;⁴ Bernard Lewis stresses the French influence in various areas – in diplomacy and politics, science, technology and education (the usage of French cadres), and ideas (the influence of the French Revolution);⁵ Maria Todorova emphasizes that it was a Europeanization process, which should imply an adoption of external models, but at the same time describes the importance of internal factors in the reforms.⁶ On the other hand, Strashimir Dimitrov is much more cautious. He speaks much more about the centralization of the empire during Sultan Mahmud II's reign, the use of modern institutions and a modern, trained army and bureaucracy in centralization, while only once mentioning Europeanization, in parenthesis, implying that this generally recognized definition is not completely approved of by him.⁷ There is also the view that some non-European countries developed "alternative modernities" which saw them deliberately modernize their societies in order to resist European encroachment.⁸

There is also much debate as to the starting point of Ottoman modernization. Here it is a question of what should be considered modernization and what should be seen as reforms and not directly connected to the modernization of the empire. At issue is how to draw the line between the reforms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and how to separate simple reforms from the modernization process. For this reason, historians have established the starting point of Ottoman modernization at various points ranging between the early eighteenth century and the year 1839. Some emphasize the importance of the cultural shift towards Europe,⁹ some the military reforms of Sultan Selim III; while others confirm Mahmud's reforms on the basis of the continuity in the reform process. Most, however, accept Gülhane's decree in 1839 as the starting point of Ottoman modernization. D. Rustow and R. Word have

tried to systematize the varying opinions as to the starting point of the Ottoman reforms, but were unable to establish a firm date or period, leading to the appearance of several starting points in different chapters of the survey (varying between the end of the eighteenth century, 1839, and even 1908).¹⁰ Halil Inalcık sees the late eighteenth century as an initial point for the general reforms.¹¹ Carter Findley establishes a periodization of Ottoman history in which he places the starting point of reform in the late eighteenth century during Sultan Selim III's reign. At the same time, however, he appreciates that this is just a symbolic beginning and that uninterrupted reform starts with Sultan Mahmud II's reforms after 1826.¹² While Stanford Shaw examines Sultan Selim III's reforms, he nonetheless claims it to have been an attempt to return to a traditional state and that there were no real innovations.¹³ Bernard Lewis also claims that the new order was established by Sultan Mahmud II and continued by his successors.¹⁴ Strashimir Dimitrov, who also approaches Sultan Mahmud II's reign as a turning point in Ottoman history, states that the reforms began after 1826.¹⁵ Russian historians claim 1839 as a formal starting point of the reform process and include the reforms of 1826-1839 within the *Tanzimat*¹⁶ period.¹⁷ While, though following the earlier reforms (during the early eighteenth century during the reigns of Sultan Selim and Sultan Mahmud), R. Davison believes that the reform period started in 1839.¹⁸

I do not intend to propose a new definition. I intend merely to raise the question of the confrontation between a case with specific features and concepts developed on the basis of a comparison of definitions of reform and the exact processes of change which took place in the Ottoman Empire. The problem looked at in this paper is that of how broad should the perspective of an individual case be in order to justify it as part of a certain movement. Should certain details be omitted in order to place it in a certain framework and make it comparable with other cases, or should the specifics be stressed and examined as a unique case? Thus I intend to reveal the complicated nature of the Ottoman reforms and to define some of the particular characteristics of the process on the basis of an examination of one element of the reforms – the provincial administration in Rumelia – in order to bring to light some contradictions in already established definitions of the process.

The institutional reforms have been chosen as the main focus of the investigation of early Ottoman reforms because they were also a focal point in the process of transformation of Ottoman society in the period in

question. It is a proven fact that after his military reforms, which were more or less a continuation of that of his predecessors, Sultan Mahmud II began reorganizing the ruling system in order to strengthen and revitalize it. In fact, the improvement of the administrative system and strengthening of the army helped him to carry out smoothly further action and to obtain control over such areas as finance, religion, and education etc. From a historical point of view, the clarification of institutional organizations helps in the application of power and decision-making in a state. Moreover, it helps in the analysis of the main ideas and tendencies, which drive the policy of a state or ruler.

The focus on the province of Rumelia was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, there is a lack of investigation into administrative structure in this particular province, which is part of and a representative example of the method of governing the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, it needs to be stressed that Rumelia was regarded as a core province of the empire and it was in Rumelia that all major state regulations were implemented. For this reason it can be used to shed light on the main tendencies of Ottoman policy. Furthermore, some comparisons with the military and administrative reforms in the center need to be made due to the clear connection between them and the need for an overview of the process of reorganization in the empire as a whole. It is true that the comparison between center and periphery helps to clarify how the ideas, which appear in the center, were implemented in practice. So far there has been no such comparison between central and peripheral territories for the period in question.

The period 1826-1839 has been chosen for analysis because it can be considered an initial stage of the uninterrupted reforms in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the proclamation of the new order that was to be established, the Gülhane Edict of 1839, was based on Sultan Mahmud II's projects and activities. The initial stage can provide an insight into the reasons for starting this process of reform and the main tendencies established at the beginning of the Ottoman reforms. The period in question witnessed a series of reforms which outlined the main tendencies for later renovations during the whole of the nineteenth century.

There are internal and external factors which gave impetus to the start of the reforms. The mutinies of the Janissaries (1807-1808) caused the death of two other sultans and also threatened the life of Sultan Mahmud II. Decentralization in the provinces turned to disorder and even threatened the sultan's power.¹⁹ Sultan Mahmud II was compelled to

sign an agreement with the local lords, establishing his weakness and dependency on them. On the other hand, the unsuccessful wars with Russia and Austria²⁰ introduced a notion of decline.²¹ The prevalence of European capitalism and the development of science and technology as a consequence of rationalism caused the Ottoman Empire to appear backward in comparison with the European states. The Ottoman sultans tried to revitalize and preserve the empire by generating various projects for the improvement of the ruling system. There was also a preparation phase before starting the reforms. One by one, the sultan suppressed those rivals who had opposed his authority – the local notables, the *ayans*,²² who acted in a semi-independent feudal manner; and social groups, which contested his power in the center and acted as an opposition because of their conservatism. He also manipulated public opinion, the religious class, the *ulema*,²³ and the Janissaries²⁴ (the elite troops of the sultan, who were to mutiny). In 1812 the war with Russia was over. It was followed by the overthrow of the *ayans* and the restoration of Ottoman administration in the provinces. The sultan's armies defeated some of the local notables, of which some were simply assassinated, while others were persuaded to obey the sultan's authority. Finally, the Janissary corps was abolished in 1826. This episode was called in the official declaration *Vaka-i Hayriye* ("Pleasant event"), though in fact was a massacre of Janissaries using cannons to attack the Janissary barracks. The reforms in the center started in 1826, just after the abolishment of Janissary corps, and the provincial reforms were introduced later.

Provincial administrative reforms

The change in the status of Ottoman provincial governors should be noted as one of the focal reforms in provincial administration. Until this moment, the provincial governors, the *valis*, had been part of the Ottoman ruling class, which shared two functions – military (as military commanders of local armies) and administrative (as governors of a province). The *Valis*²⁵ maintained enormous suites, which varied from between 300 to 1,000 persons,²⁶ and treated the local troops as their own private armies. Furthermore, they controlled local revenues out of the necessity to cover their own expenses and the expenses of local armies. In fact, until this time, salaries were not known of as a common practice in the Ottoman administrative system. Officials received part of their income from land

ownership and market places, and collected taxes from the local population,²⁷ and thus had the opportunity to abuse their power over the local population and the income sources of the province. Their access to and actual control of local income without efficient control from the central authority meant they were quite uncontrollable. Formally, the reorganization of the provincial system was done through the implementation of the new military rank marshal (*müşir*) for the *valis* and the fixed salaries which governors received in the second half of the 1830s. This was, in practice, a radical change. The organization became more professional and more structured. The new regulations in the provincial administration turned these aristocrats into state officials with fixed salaries²⁸ and reduced their financial and military power. As a result of this reform the position of the provincial military-administrative aristocracy was reduced to administration which served the centralized authority.

The military system in the provinces was reorganized gradually. First, the *sipahi* corps, the cavalry, which was considered to be the core of the Ottoman army and one of the oldest traditional institutions in Ottoman society, was abolished. The *sipahis* were granted *timars* – territories from which they had the right to collect certain taxes – as compensation for their military duties. Owing to the direct contact with the local population, they had many opportunities to abuse and expand their power. In 1931 *sipahis* were deprived of their sources of income and they received pensions.²⁹ Soon after, by 1834, a new provincial military organization, the *redif*, was founded. Maintaining order in the provinces was the main task of the *redif* troops, though they also participated in the military campaigns of the Ottoman army. The soldiers were in normal military service for twelve years with fixed salaries. *Redif* troops became the basis of the new provincial armies³⁰ which were organized and equipped with modern equipment: regular recruits were introduced, firearms were provided to the soldiers, who were trained according to the latest tactics and strategies, and new barracks were erected in the center of the province.³¹ Thus, the close connection and dependency of the local army on the provincial governor was cut, and the provincial military system was modernized on a technological level and more centralized on an organizational level.³²

In order to prepare the military for reform, the first census in the Ottoman Empire was conducted. The census was delayed for a long time due to the Russo-Turkish war (1828-1830) and completed in 1831. Up until that

point, the size of the local population could be estimated based on tax registers, *mufassal* and *idzhmal defeters*, which contained information on the male inhabitants of every settlement and their property and estates. But even those registers stopped in the seventeenth century due to changes to the fiscal system of the empire. In fact, the first census in the Ottoman Empire covered only the male population of Rumelia and Anadol, since those regions were considered the core of the Ottoman Empire and the main targets of reforms,³³ while inhabitants from other provinces and the female population of the empire as a whole were overlooked. Furthermore, certain problems, including inaccurate data, appeared due to the lack of prepared and specially trained officials carrying out the survey. The main goal of the census was to calculate the number of men capable of military service, as well as to identify taxpaying subjects, who would ensure the funding of the new army by paying the newly established taxes. Thus, the first census in the Ottoman Empire was used not to collect information about the population as a whole, but to serve the state's needs and, for the most part, the military system.³⁴

Furthermore, the attempt to reform and centralize the tax system in the Ottoman Empire was made in order to cover the increased need for money due to the formation of the new military corps. The tremendous requirement for money in cash for soldiers' salaries was the cause of the state's effort to regain control and centralize provincial revenues, which had been lost as a result of the application of the *iltizam* system. *Iltizam*, the so-called tax-farming system, had spread rapidly through the empire since the early seventeenth century. Farming through *iltizam* meant selling by auction a source of revenue for a specific period of time, usually three years, to a private person, a *mültezim*, who was granted with the right to collect taxes from the population. The *multezims* (agents) were obliged to pay to the state an established sum according to stipulated terms, which was followed later by monthly, quarterly or biannual installments. Thus, as private persons, the *multezims* obtained the right to use state revenues for a period and to control the local population from a financial point of view.³⁵ New posts in the provinces and their districts appeared as a result of the state's attempt to improve its control over local income and to ensure tax payment. For example, the *sandık emini* was appointed to control tax collection and to prevent abuses. The *defter nazırı* was primarily responsible of maintaining population registers for his area, including not only births and deaths, gender and age, but also the financial status and the property of subjects in the area. He was also

responsible for issuing travel permits, *tezkeres*, which allowed people to travel between provinces and in fact controlled the movement of the population.³⁶ Hence, the reforms introduced new posts in terms of financial officials in the provincial administration, making it more structured and specialized.

The new territorial division was implemented in 1834 and remained in place until 1839.³⁷ European observers described this transformation in a number of general accounts of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century,³⁸ and details are also mentioned in Ottoman documents. There were some changes of local importance, such as the changing of the borders to certain districts and counties – villages and counties were moved from one division to another. A more significant change, however, was the transformation of territorial division based on the diminution of the territories and establishment of new, smaller provinces. This realized the idea of stronger control over the provinces, which was achieved by enlarging the number of provincial officials. Furthermore, the administration clearly became more developed, structured and professional. Until that time, the Balkans had been split into four units: including the Greek territories lost after the Greek uprising of 1821; Bosnia, which included the northwestern part of the Balkans and was reduced in size after the Serbian revolt of 1805; Rumelia, which contained part Greek, Bulgarian, present-day Macedonian, and Albanian lands; and Silistra, in the eastern part of the peninsula. The most important changes in the central Balkan lands were, first of all, the separation of the region of Chirmen around Edirne from the province of Silistra and its establishment as an independent province (*eyalet*),³⁹ followed by the separation of the region of Thessalonica (encompassing part of Thrace and Albania, Seres, Trikala, Ioannina, and Larissa) from *eyalet* Rumelia.⁴⁰ In some areas, the old administrative divisions were radically changed in order to solve particular problems that emerged in the late eighteenth-early nineteenth centuries. For example, the Albanian unrest and the obvious Ottoman failure to control Albanian regions in the eighteenth century caused new divisions in the area.⁴¹ As a result, the Albanian population was divided into various territorial divisions and mixed with Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians. The idea was to avoid constructing a single, separate province with a dense Albanian population that could not be efficiently controlled by the Ottoman authorities.⁴² This led to a break with the traditional territorial division of the Ottoman Empire, which was mainly organized in line with regional specifics and

accepted the existence of various exceptions and small areas with special status. Provinces were normally organized according to their geographical and natural borders. The new administrative divisions, however, were more uniform in terms of their dimensions owing to the principle of standardization applied. Moreover, the centers of various divisions were changed in accordance with the development of certain urban centers, whose importance increased, while others receded.

It is claimed that the new administrative division was directly connected with the new military system in the provinces that was also introduced in the same period. It is indeed possible that the new territorial divisions were suitable to the territorial division of the provincial armies.

A number of urban reforms took place in the provinces, as well as in the capital. Owing to the gradual decay of the Rumelian center, Sofia, as an administrative, military and economic center, and the development of Manastir (Bitola) as alternative center of the province, the process of moving the administrative center took place slowly.⁴³ Finally, in 1836,⁴⁴ Manastir⁴⁵ was confirmed as the provincial capital and organized on modern, European principles. Not only were modern urban planning and modern (European) architecture applied, some new institutions connected with modern towns⁴⁶ were also introduced, such as fire stations, hospitals, prisons, and barracks.⁴⁷

The administrative reforms in the province of Rumelia did not start immediately after the abolition of the Janissary corps in 1826. The process took some time to develop, firstly in the capital, and then in the provinces. Moreover, some of the reforms were first introduced first in some separate areas and then later applied in other regions. In Rumelia they took place in the first half of the 1830s. One of the major reforms dealt with changing the status of the provincial governors, who were turned from an administrative-military aristocracy with wide prerogatives in the provinces and financial and military power into officials with fixed salaries closely dependent on the sultan. In the provincial military system, the shift was from a traditional cavalry to a modern army with a regular service and fixed salaries. The administrative division was reorganized and turned into a system with more standardized divisions of smaller dimensions, which could be more efficiently controlled by the increased number of bureaucrats. The reforms followed a policy of centralization and strengthening of control over the provincial institutions. This centralization was accomplished by founding modern institutions following European

models: a modern, far more organized and structured army and bureaucracy.

Central administrative reforms

By comparing provincial and central administrative reorganization we see that they follow a common direction. Not only in the sense of centralization, as a main tendency, but also in terms of emphasizing institutional reform. Firstly, a new army was established, followed by a number of measures for bureaucratization of the administrative system.

Immediately after the abolition of the Janissary corps in 1826, a new army was established called the *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye* (the Victorious troops of Mohammed). The two events were announced through a single *ferman* issued on 17 June 1826.⁴⁸ Some of the main features of the new army were the firearms and new European uniforms. Furthermore, a European organization and hierarchy was introduced, possibly following the German model.⁴⁹ A number of instructors, given the task of training the soldiers in new tactics, were also appointed. These were initially selected from among the Egyptian officers of the already modernized army of Muhammad Ali, the semi-independent Egyptian governor, who had carried out reorganization before his sovereign, the Ottoman sultan. In addition, some officers who had been prepared during the interrupted reforms of Sultan Selim III (1789-1808) also found positions in the new army. Later, some French instructors were appointed,⁵⁰ followed by Prussian and English officers in the 1830s. At the same time, many Turkish cadets were sent to European capitals to study the modern military system.⁵¹

There were several important administrative reforms, which took place in the center mainly after 1834. While the traditional system was characterized by having no divisions of function between offices and a lack of coordination between them, the new structure succeeded in clarifying prerogatives, stratifying various levels and increasing the professional skills of the officials. Traditional departments and bureaus were replaced by ministries organized in a European manner.⁵² Even the Grand vizier, the advisor and representative of the sultan, and his *divan* (council) were reorganized. He was renamed *bash vekil* (prime minister) and a Council of Ministers was set up in 1837-1838. In 1837, another principal council was established – the High Council for Judicial

Ordinances – that was responsible for initiating projects and implementing further reforms. In 1838, various committees had been established: for agriculture, trade, industry, and public works.⁵³

International pressure affecting the Ottoman Empire caused it to advance its diplomatic relations with European countries and develop diplomatic departments:⁵⁴ for example, the *tercume odasi*⁵⁵ (translation office), which was formed in 1833. This office, which was attached to the ministry of foreign affairs, became the center for training and education of a new generation of bureaucrats, diplomats and statesmen, who were strongly influenced by Western ideas and went on to occupy important positions and become initiators of further reforms.

Even other innovations, which appeared in the same period, were subjected to institutional (administrative and military) reforms. For example, the establishment of schools for physicians, surgeons, engineers, and even musicians in the 1820s and 1830s⁵⁶ provided cadres for the newly established army.⁵⁷ Some of the reforms were designed to reshape lifestyles and redesign public opinion in Ottoman society. For example, the first formal weekly newspaper in the Ottoman Empire, which was launched in November 1831, served this purpose. It was printed in Turkish, called *Takvim-i vekayi* ("Calendar of Incidents"), and in French, with the name "Le Moniteur Ottoman". Its main aim was to support the sultan's policy in terms of presenting the official political position and promoting the reforms to Ottoman subjects and European powers alike. According to the two-paged brochure issued on 26 October 1831, the newspaper was published as a news source and messenger meant to *educate the people and reveal the acts of government and allow them to be adjusted*. The newspaper had 6 sections: internal affairs, external affairs, military articles, literature, technology and science, and prices and commodities.⁵⁸ New dress codes for state officials were introduced in 1828, imposing the European style, at least for the state administrators (fez, red headdress, stambouline, black coat, and trousers).⁵⁹ It represented an attempt to change the mentality of the Ottomans and to impose, even by force, European standards as psychological preparation for more fundamental change.

The changes were announced through sultanic decrees, in which the reasons for the reforms were explained. These official documents help us to see how the Ottomans viewed and justified the reforms. The proclamation in favor of recovery of the old glory of the empire and the religion of Islam as a basis of the state which should be followed provided

the ideological framework that was to be imposed and which proved the legitimacy of the reforms.

For example, the imperial edict, which announced the abolishment of the old, Janissary army and the formation of the new Victorious Armies of Mohammed in 1826, validates this radical change on the basis of the Janissaries' actions against the Muslim faith and state. It was written that they had used their weapons against the "Muslim state" (Ottoman Empire). Moreover, the Janissaries were blamed for the unsuccessful wars of the empire and the loss of territory.⁶⁰ Notably, the sultan's decision to abolish the rebellious troops was accompanied by a *fetva* – an official statement by the leader of the *ulema* in the empire, providing a strong religious argument in favor of legitimizing the measures taken.⁶¹

The first official reform document, the imperial decree (Gülhane's hatt-i sheriff) promulgated in 1839, combined old rhetoric with new regulations.⁶² The document proclaimed equality before the law and the allowance of life, honor and property for all subjects. These were revolutionary ideas for the Ottoman Empire at the time. The document also stressed the decline of the empire over the previous 150 years due to the disrespect for religious and imperial laws. The new regulations, including that mentioned above for life, honor and property, as well as the abolition of confiscations, an orderly system of fixed taxation, and a regular system of military conscription, were implemented in order *to restore* the empire's prosperity and strength. As a result, official Ottoman documents combine an Islamic background with the idea of establishing of a new order.

In fact, it was a necessity for Sultan Mahmud II to justify his actions on the grounds of religion because it was considered the main foundation of Ottoman authority. Religion is a foundation of Islamic countries in which *sharia* law is taken as the main system. For example, the sultanic regulations (*kanuns*) in the Ottoman Empire appeared only to improve certain elements of the ruling system and dealt mainly with economic and financial problems. Furthermore, when Islam is both religion and the law, society is viewed as a religious community established and ruled by the Prophet Mohammed.⁶³

In fact, Islam was an important aspect of self-identification for the Ottoman Empire. A statement made by an Ottoman official, Sadık Rifat Pasha, from the period proves how strong the impact of Islam was on nineteenth-century Ottoman society. As the official says to Stratford Canning:

In religious matters we need our liberty. Religion is the basis of our laws. It is the principle of our government; His Majesty the Sultan can no more touch it than we can.⁶⁴

The radical change of status of administrative officials was a fundamental transformation that appeared as a result of the administrative reforms. It was crucial because it changed the concept of Ottoman administrative organization, which saw the officials change from being slaves to the sultan into state bureaucrats.

Previously, officials had been organized in a structure, which had remained virtually as the guild organization. They were appointed mainly on the basis of personal contacts and were trained in the offices to which they were appointed initially as novices. There were no special schools for scribes and administrators because extended skills and knowledge, such as languages, were not considered compulsory. Promotion was dependent not on their professional abilities, but on the will of the sultan and their personal connections. Even their lives were reliant on the ruler's will, due to being regarded as slaves of the sultan, and their property was considered to belong to the sultan's treasury after their death. Moreover, administrators were frequently accused of abuse and their property confiscated. As a consequence, an official's family did not have a guaranteed income. In fact, administrators didn't have salaries but received part of their income from various economic sources to which was added a fee for the tasks they fulfilled. As a consequence of this system of financing, bribery was established as a widespread, common practice throughout the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, officials worked the system in order to earn money and increase their income in the face of inflation and a rapidly changing environment; while on the other, people who wanted to find quicker solutions to their problems normally offered an amount of money to officials in every office in order to have their documents processed more quickly in the complicated administrative machine (it was common for several offices to be involved in the process of issuing a document, as with any kind of permission or certificate).

Later on, bribes were prohibited and fixed salaries replaced the various ways of earning money through the administrative machine. There were now clearer regulations, shielding officials and citizens from the pressures of the previous system. Officials' incomes were explicitly guaranteed and the abuse of subjects was limited. Another indication of this major

shift was the abolition of the confiscation of officers' property, making them less dependent on political intrigue at court and subjective judgment. In addition, there appeared a number of ideas designed to improve the skills of the administrators and certain requirements in terms of specialist knowledge were established, turning scribes into professional bureaucrats.⁶⁵

It was not only bureaucrats but also European-minded statesmen that were formed in the course of Sultan Mahmud II's reforms. The sultan attempted to create favorable conditions for further modernization: he ordered the establishment of a new type of education, which was to shape a modern, enlightened elite, open to and enthusiastic about innovation. He needed to establish such a group of reform-minded politicians because of the requirements of those who were to create projects and implement reforms in different areas and on different levels within the state. Modern education became the basis for creating a social group to support consciously and willingly work for further reforms. New schools and *tercume odası* were the places where the ideas of modernity were adopted by the students and young officials through learning European languages, reading European books and meeting foreign diplomats, military officials and scholars.⁶⁶

However, the old elites didn't lose their positions completely within the governmental system. They redesigned themselves, adapted to the new situation, even benefiting from it and remaining powerful. Research reveals how the new military leadership was fully integrated with the older ruling classes. The sons and protégés of the old ruling elite occupied the majority of places in the new military schools, being promoted later in their military careers and monopolizing the top military ranks.⁶⁷ They designed efficient networks, which helped them to support each other and accumulate power. It appears that the local elite, the *ayans*, also managed to survive in the new situation. They infiltrated the new administrative system as representatives of the local population in the newly founded institutions, the *meclises* (councils), which ruled the provinces, regions and counties together with the appointed governors.⁶⁸

Another important step, which is connected to the reform process in general and taken precisely during Sultan Mahmud II's reign, was the break with the established concept of preservation of tradition. In practice, innovation in Islamic societies was and still is avoided due to being considered as *bida*, "forbidden". Consequently, the conservatism of the Ottoman system of government was extremely strong. The ideals of the

old order, from the so-called Golden Age of the empire during the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), who was called *Kanuni*, the Lawgiver, by the Ottomans, were preserved and approved in the rhetoric of official documents, even in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Under Sultan Mahmud II, however, the situation changed and radical measures were introduced to abolish old institutions, such as the Janissary corps and *sipahi* troops.

Characteristics of the Ottoman reforms

The Ottoman reforms at this early stage were a process *initiated from the center* and were even closely connected with and *dependent on the sultan*. In this light, it can be said that a conscious project of reform was launched, *emphasizing institutional reform*, such as the military and the government and the taxation system in the empire. *European models* for the army, bureaucracy, education, and the judicial system, as well as European technology *were used in order to centralize power, strengthen the empire, and protect it from European encroachment*.

The imperative role of the ruler was clear. He first initiated a policy to overthrow the conservative groups, which had opposed the innovations, and later ordered and organized reforms with the help of a small group of supporters. The reforms transformed the major institutions of the empire and were imposed through official edicts. Evidence that the reforms were conceived as rational project is given by the fact that some of the reorganization was implemented only in the most centralized and easily controllable provinces – Rumelia and Anadol – and were possibly looked on as experiments for certain models to be later imposed on all Ottoman lands.

The transformations were designed to solve certain problems that had become obvious to the Ottoman statesmen in the early nineteenth century. In internal affairs, the level of decentralization posed a threat even to sultanic power, compelling the sultan to sign an agreement in 1808 with local notables to recognize their control over the provinces. In terms of the external situation, the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire in comparison with Europe became clear in the early nineteenth century. The comparison was made because the Ottoman Empire was deeply involved in European economic and political affairs and was highly

dependent on the European powers, both economically and politically. The position of the empire and its future were threatened by the European economic and political domination of the region. It inevitably confirmed the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire. This notion led to a constant stream of Ottoman diplomatic missions to the European capitals, and examination of European ruling, law, military and educational systems, and the creation of reform projects.⁶⁹ Consequently, the reorganization of the empire's ruling system and military structure took on increasing importance for the Ottoman Empire. Following European models, which had already been firmly established, examined and proven successful, was considered the correct path of further development.

Self-preservation and existence under the effects of strong European pressure, however, was also a problem the empire still needed to solve. There is some evidence that Sultan Mahmud II's ideas for governmental structures were influenced by the enlightened absolutism in Russia and the Habsburg Empire.⁷⁰ This would mean that the modernization of the governing, taxation and military system was combined with a consolidation of central control. This is why the sultan saw a strictly centralized, almost autocratic ruling system as the best solution for the Empire's problems. It also led to a focusing of the sultans' policy on the reorganization of the military system. In addition, financial reforms were also essential since the state faced the need not only to secure its basic revenues, but also to expand them in order to finance the newly created military institutions through the introduction of new taxes.

Contrary to the opinion that modernization in the Ottoman Empire – as well as in other non-European societies – was a simple process of applying the European model of modernization and imitating European institutions (as reflected by the definitions of the period, such as "Europeanization" and "Westernization"), it can be shown that the Ottoman reforms had their own specific patterns and goals.

Comparison with European modernization

What was the Ottoman reform process? Was it the borrowing of a foreign model after becoming aware of the state's own backwardness? Or was it an internal process of modernization? Is it reasonable to talk about a modernization and Europeanization (Westernization) of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of the characteristics described above?

Firstly, some brief definitions of European modernization will be provided in order to facilitate a later comparison with the specifics of the process in the Ottoman Empire. Certain categorizations by leading scholars can be used as examples of the general trend of understanding and explaining modernization. For example, Larry Wolf explains modernization as *evolution and progress flourishing during the Enlightenment, rationalism and development of sciences, industrialization, and advance in social relations and institutions (bureaucratization)*. Maria Todorova defines the process of “Europeanization” (or “Westernization” or “modernization”) of the Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a *spread of rationalism and secularization, intensification of commercial activities and industrialization, the formation of bourgeoisie and other new social groups in the economic and social sphere, and the triumph of the bureaucratic nation-state*.⁷¹

It is difficult to confirm the existence of a process of **modernization** without the occurrence of some of the main elements in the established pattern. There were no firm social backgrounds as a group, which supported and participated willingly in the implementation of the Ottoman reforms. There had been no secularization of society until that moment – only a few attempts to reduce the role of religion had been introduced by the central authority. There was no development of the sciences or industrialization in the Ottoman Empire of the early nineteenth century. And no bourgeoisie had yet emerged in the empire. Modern institutions were implemented, but were used for the needs of centralization.⁷² The military system was organized according to the European standards and the system of governing became professional and bureaucratized. Innovations in technology, medicine, and education as representations of rationalism and positive knowledge were realized, but they were *borrowed* and used mainly for the needs of the army.

This was not real **Europeanization**, since these were European models applied in the Ottoman Empire, however they managed to retain certain tasks specific to the state, such as the centralization and strengthening of the empire. It should also be mentioned that institutions were implemented in rather formalistic way and some innovations, mainly in technology, were simply *borrowed*. The lack of interest in developing science and technology is also an interesting phenomenon *typical* for the empire. The empire preferred rather to adopt innovations that had already been proved profitable. Furthermore, there was a consciousness resistance

against any European influence and a desire to preserve the inner nature of the empire. The religious background of power and the state as a whole represented the distinctiveness of the Ottoman Empire from an ideological point of view. It was for this reason that the Islamic basis was stressed in the reform documents. The stress on Islam can be understood as a natural reaction against foreign influence. The empire needed to preserve itself and the notion of otherness needed to be stressed in order to maintain a clear separation from Europe. This represented the approval of self-identity in a period in which external influences were very strong.

The backwardness of the empire is clearly proven on comparison with Europe, illustrating the different levels of development. Mainstream opinion as to modernization theories, however, holds that the process of modernization *started in Western Europe and later spread to the countries of Europe, America, Africa, and Asia*. Consequently, it is easy to see how the representation of the rest of the world as inferior arises. Underdeveloped countries should simply follow the path traced by Western Europe. Moreover, the model of Western European modernization is considered the correct one that should be implemented. It was demonstrated above, however, that the process of Ottoman reform was, in fact, not a simple imitation of the European model, since every society has its own needs and own specifics, which dictate its development path. Adopting models from outside is not a simple process of copying, as they need to be adapted to internal needs, such as strengthening power and self-preservation in the Ottoman case.

In terms of the comparison between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, I prefer to see it as an asymmetrical link between two societies at different stages of development.⁷³ Scholars have agreed that a certain stage of development is required in order for modernization to occur. It is clear that the Ottoman Empire was forced to modernize without a real basis on which to do so. Generally, the stage of modernization is said to apply to national (modern) states.⁷⁴ What makes Ottoman modernization different is the fact that a multiethnic empire that had retained feudal features and institutions⁷⁵ endeavored to achieve this stage of development and establish a modern society.

NOTES

- 1 The terms “reform” and “innovation” are used in this paper broadly and do not imply any given concept about the nature of the process.
- 2 Findley, Carter, 1980: 42.
- 3 Inalcık, Halil, 1964: 49; Davison, Roderic, 1963: 5.
- 4 Miller, A., 1947: 77.
- 5 Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 49, 55, 56, 57, 70.
- 6 Todorova, Maria, 1980.
- 7 Dimitrov, Strashimir, 1993: 275.
- 8 See the introduction of: *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. by R. E. Ward, D. A. Rustow, New Jersey, 1964.
- 9 Gerçek, S., *Türk Matbaacılığı* [Turkish Printing], Istanbul, 1928; Adivar, A. *La science chez les turcs ottomans*, Paris, 1939; Berkes, Niyazi, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal, 1964; Uzunçarşılı, İsmail, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlimiye Teşkilâtı* [The Learning Institution in the Ottoman Empire], Ankara, 1965; Becirbegovic, M., “Prosvetni object islamske arhitekture u Bosni i Hercegovine” [The Islamic Educational Architecture in Bosnia and Herzegovina], in *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju*, No. 20-21, 1974, 225-359; Stainova, Mihaila, “Mladata ‘alafranga’ v parvata polovina na XVIII vek v osmanska Turtsia” [The Young ‘Alafranga’ in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century in Ottoman Turkey], in *Studia balcanica*, 15, 1980, 21-40; Stainova, Mihaila, “Tendentsii v kulturnoto i ideinoto razvitie v osmanskoto obshtestvo prez dvadesette godini na XVIII vek (1718 – 1730)” [Tendencies in the Cultural and Ideological Development of the Ottoman Society in the 1820s], in *Studia balcanica*, 13, 1977, 72-95.
- 10 *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, ed. by R. E. Ward, D. A. Rustow, New Jersey, 1964: 8, 435, 452.
- 11 Inalcık, Halil, 1964: 49.
- 12 Findley, Carter, 1980: 42.
- 13 Shaw, Stanford, 1971: 96-97, 405.
- 14 Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 385.
- 15 Dimitrov, Strashimir, 1993: 271.
- 16 This literally means “order”. The word was used to label the reform era in the Ottoman Empire.
- 17 Bodzholian, M., 1984. For a review of Russian studies see also: Avaliani, A. Б., “Ob opite izuchenia reform Tanzimata v Severoiztozhnih vilaietah Turtsii”, in *Kratkie soobshtenia INIA*, 73, 1963.
- 18 Davison, Roderic, 1963: 20-39.
- 19 As a result of the multiple functions given to the local elite by the central authority, such as representing the local population, controlling local revenues, collecting local armies etc., its role in local government increased strongly. In fact, after a period of struggle, a number of powerful local notables, called *ayans*, took over the leadership in Rumelia by eliminating the local

administration and creating a new hierarchy. For more on local *ayans* see Miller, A. F., *Mustafa pacha Bairaktar*, Bucharest, 1975; Inalcık, Halil, 1977: 27-52; Nagata, Yuzo, *Materials on the Bosnian Notables*, Tokyo, 1979; McGowan, Bruce, "The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812" in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, eds. H. Inalcık, D. Quataert, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, 637-758; Nagata, Yuzo, "The Role of the Ayans in the Regional Development during the Pre-Tanzimat Period in Turkey: A Case Study of the Karaosmanoglu Family", in Nagata, Yuzo, *Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire*, Izmir, 1995, 119-133.

²⁰ Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 49.

²¹ A. Miller reveals the interesting tendency whereby the reforms (including the military ones) were developed during peacetime and not wartime. Moreover, wars interrupted the reform process. For example, the peace treaty with Russia in 1792 were the start of Sultan Selim III's reforms; another peace treaty, again with Russia, in 1812, saw the start of action by of Sultan Mahmud II against disorder in the provinces: Miller, A., 1947: 115-118.

²² Initially, they were representatives of the local population to the official authorities. Later, *ayans* increased their power based on the various functions they received, such as tax collection and administering local revenues, as well as collecting troops during the military campaigns. As a result, a number of powerful *ayans* occupied the government in Rumelia and Anadol in the late eighteenth century acting as semi-independent rulers.

²³ The learned in Islamic sciences, in whom was invested the authority to express and apply the commands of *sharia*, the main/religious law of the Ottoman Empire.

²⁴ Elite forces, loyal only to the sultan. Janissaries were recruited from the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire and converted to Islam. Later the Janissary corps grew into one of the strongest institutions of power in the empire, influencing policy and even dethroning some of the sultans. In 1826, Sultan Mahmud II decided to abolish the corps on the grounds of repeated unrest and opposition to the modernization of the army.

²⁵ The term used for provincial governor.

²⁶ Uzunçarşılı, İsmail, 1948: 207.

²⁷ Findley, Carter, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. 7, E. J. Brill, Leiden – NY, 1993, 774; Inalcık, Halil, 1977: 35; Nagata, Yuzo, 1977: 187-188.

²⁸ A document dated May 1838 r. contains the salaries of Rumelian high officials in hierarchical order: *Dokumenti za balgarskata istoria*, 1941: 235, № 430.

²⁹ Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 91.

³⁰ According to M. Ubicini, Bitola became the center of the Balkan army: Ubicini, M. A., 1853: 54.

³¹ Shaw, Stanford, Ezel Kural Shaw, vol. 2, 1977: 43-44.

- ³² In the previous period, the local armies were collected and maintained by the provincial governors. For this reason they were considered and used as private armies. Local finances also came under the control of a governor. For the local army and *vali*'s military functions in the period, see: Georgieva, G. 2003: 57-77.
- ³³ Yalcinkaya, Mehmet, 1995: 356; Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 90.
- ³⁴ For the census, see: Karpat, Kemal, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914. Demographic and Social Characteristics*, Wisconsin, 1985, 109-110; Karal, Enver Ziya, *Osmanlı İmparatorlugunda İlk Nüfus Sayımı, 1831* [The First Census in the Ottoman Empire, 1831], Ankara, 1943, 195-200; Akbal, F., "1831 Tarihinde Osmanlı İmparatorlugunda Taksimât ve Nüfus [The Population and Territorial Division in the Ottoman Empire in 1831]", *Belleten*, No. 15, tome 60, 1951.
- ³⁵ For the *iltizam* system, see: Inalcık, Halil, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire. 1600-1700", in Inalcık, Halil *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History*, 283-337; Nagata, Yuzo, 1977: 169-194; McGowan, Bruce, *Economic Life in the Ottoman Empire. Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Paris, 1981; *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, ed. Halil Inalcık and Donald Quataert, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994: 713.
- ³⁶ For the fiscal reforms see: Ursinus, Michael, 1982; Çadırcı, Musa, "Tanzimat'ın İlânı Sıralarında Türkiye'de Yönetim (1826-1839)", *Belleten*, No. 51, 1987: 1215-1240; Yalcinkaya, Mehmet, 1995: 358-359.
- ³⁷ In fact, in the following period it appears that during the whole of the nineteenth century Ottomans had experimented with administrative division in terms of applying a range of projects for short periods representing various ideas about territorial organization. They tried to find the best solution to replace the traditional system which had been kept for four or five centuries. All transformations in the administrative system can be seen in Mostra's dictionary and Birken's catalogue: Mostras, M., *Dictionnaire géographique de l'Empire Ottoman*, St. Petersburg, 1873; Birken, Andreas, *Die Provinzen des Osmanischen Reiches*, Wiesbaden, 1976.
- ³⁸ Ubicini, M. 1853: 44; Boué, A. *La Turquie...*, Vol. 4. Paris, 1840; Mostras, M. *Dictionnaire*, 1873; E. Dotten quoted on the basis of: Mihov, Nikola, *Naselenieto na Tursia i Balgaria prez XVIII i XIX vek* [The Population of Turkey and Bulgaria in the 18th and 19th Centuries], vol. 3, Sofia, 1929: 152.
- ³⁹ Dokumenti, 1941: 220, N° 407; 225, N° 412; 228, N° 419; 233, N° 427; 237, N° 434; 240, N° 440; 240, N° 441; 241, N° 444; 237, N° 434; 240, N° 441; 247, N° 457.
- ⁴⁰ P. Tivchev, I. Kaludova, "Dokumenti za polozhenieto na naselenieto v evropeiskata chast na Osmanskata impreia, XVI-XIX vek [Documents on the Condition of the Population in the European Part of the Ottoman Empire,

- 16th – 19th Centuries]”, *Godishnik na Soffiskia Universitet, FIF*, No. 65, 1971: 446, № 50; Dokumenti, 1941: 228, № 418; *Britanski dokumenti za istorijata na makedonskiot narod* [British Documents on the History of Macedonian Nation], ed. Hristo Andonov-Poljanski, vol. 1 (1797-1839), Skopje, 1968: 259, № 100; Ubicini, M. A., 1853: 46.
- 41 For the history of Albanian lands in this period, see: Arsh, L., *Albania i Epir v konce XVIII – nachale XIX veka* [Albania and Epirus in the late 18th and Early 19th Centuries], Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk, Moscow, 1963.
- 42 Kanchov, Vasil, “Grad Skopie. Belejki za negovoto nastoiashte i minalo”, *Periodichesko Spisanie*, tome 11, No. 55-56: 41.
- 43 For the gradual process of moving the center of Rumelia from Sofia to Bitola see: Georgieva, Gergana, “Administrative Structure and Government of Rumelia in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: The Functions and Activities of the Rumeli Vali” (forthcoming).
- 44 Ursinus, Michael, 1982: 143.
- 45 From the late eighteenth century until 1836, Rumelia had two centers – Sofia and Manastir – which acted simultaneously as administrative and military centers of the province. In fact, the provincial government was organized in a traditional way, which was quite different from the European (modern) notion of a capital. Local government did not normally have its own specially designed buildings and rented or bought private houses where necessary. It is seems that the core of the government was not firmly connected with a geographical center, but mainly dependent on the local governor (these assumptions/statements are based on Ottoman documents, mainly registers from local courts). For the movement of the center, see: Ursinus, Michael, 1982: 143; Ursinus, Michael, “Manastir”, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition*, vol. 6: 371-372; Ursinus, Michael, “Za razdavaneto na pravosadie ot edno provintsialno upravlenie: rumeliiskiat divan v kraia na XVII – nachaloto na XVIII vek” [About the Administration of Justice from a Provincial Government: the Rumeli Divan in the Late 17th and Early 18th Centuries], in *Sadbata na musulmanskite obshtnosti na Balkanite* [The Fate of the Muslim Communities on the Balkans], vol. 7. [Istoria na musulmanskata kultura po balgarskite zemi [History of the Muslim Culture in Bulgarian Lands], ed. Rossitsa Gradeva, Sofia, 2001, 19.
- 46 For the main characteristic of the modern towns, see: Cowan, A. “Urbanization”, in *Encyclopedia of European Social History*, vol. 2, 2001: 237-249.
- 47 For Manastir’s development, see: Lory, Bernard, “Deux villes aux destins parallèles, croisés, divergents: Sofia et Manastir”, in *Études balkaniques*, No. 3-4, 1999: 114; Cohen, Michael, “Monastir: Oasis of Civilization, 1839-1863”, in *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 24:2, Fall 2000: 3-22; Çadırcı, Musa, “Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentleri’nin Sosyal ve

Ekonomik Yapısı [The Social and Economic Organization of Anatolian Towns in the Period of Tanzimat]”, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1997, 61-63.

This *ferman* is included in Macedonian translation of Ottoman court registers of town of Bitola: *Turski dokumenti*, vol. 4, 1957: 119-122.

Todorova, Maria, 1980: 37.

Todorova, Maria, 1980: 37; Dimitrov, Strashimir, 1993: 245-255.

Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 81-82.

Ministry of War (1826); Ministry of Civil Affairs, later renamed Ministry of the Interior (1835); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1835); Ministry of Finances (1837).

Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 97-99; Todorova, Maria, 1980: 41-43.

The establishment of the translation office is connected not only to the interest of Ottomans for Europe and their interest for European languages; it was also related to political event in the period in question. Because of the Greek revolt in 1821 the former interpreters, who were mainly Greeks, ceased to be reliable and were replaced. This led to a need for knowledge of European languages.

Davison, Roderic, 1963: 28-29; Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 88.

Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 83-86; Todorova, Maria, 1980: 44.

Medical school in 1827; 1831-1834 Imperial Music School (*Muzika-i Humayun Mektebi*) and School of Military Sciences (*Mekteb-i Ulum-i Harbiye*).

Todorova, Maria, 1980: 45; Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 94-95; Information from “Ottoman web site”: <http://www.osmanli700.gen.tr/english/affairs/olayt1.html>

Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 102; Davison, Roderic, 1963: 30.

The *ferman* is recorded in local court record (*kadi sicill*) of Bitola: *Turski dokumenti*, 1957: 119-122.

For the process of decision-making and detailed description of political events in the period, see Dimitrov, Strashimir, 1993: 228-235.

The text of the edict can be seen in *Turski dokumenti*, 1958: 143-147.

See, Inalcik, Halil, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600*, London, 1994.

Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 103.

A comprehensive study of administrative reforms in the center and the emergence of Ottoman bureaucracy was made by Carter Findley in, Findley, Carter, 1980; idem., *Ottoman Civil Officialdom. A Social History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989.

For the first Ottoman reformers see: Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 103-106.

Levy, Avigdor, 1971: 21-39.

There are some notes about this process of adoption (Davison, Roderic, 1963: 46, 48), but further research should be carried out in order to reveal the mechanism and provide examples.

For the diplomatic missions in Europe, see: Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 61-62, 88.

- ⁷⁰ There is a connection between Peter the Great's reorganizations and the beginning of Ottoman reforms. Some European observers have claimed that Sultan Mahmud II was inspired by Peter the Great, others, such as Helmut von Moltke, have directly compared Sultan Mahmud II with the Russian tsar-reformer: Lewis, Bernard, 1968: 82, 103.
- ⁷¹ Todorova, Maria, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, 13.
- ⁷² H. Inalcik considers the introduction of technology, the manner of training and uniforms in the army as modernization/innovation, which challenges the traditional symbols: Inalcik, H. "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey". In "Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey", New Jersey, 1964, p. 49.
- ⁷³ The new theories, such as dependency, the world system and neo-Marxist theories, critically assess the interpretation of modernization and view underdeveloped and developed societies as contemporary but asymmetrically linked to parts of capitalist expansion, rather than interpreting some societies as traditional or archaic. For a review and analysis of various definitions of and approaches to modernization, see: Sterns, P. N. "Modernization". In Encyclopedia of European Social History from 1350 to 2000. Vol. 2. NY, 2001, p. 3-11; J. M. Armer, J. Katsillis, "Modernization Theory". In Encyclopedia of Sociology. Vol. 3. NY, 1992, p. 1299-1304.
- ⁷⁴ As H. Spruyt affirms "a large body of literature, exemplified in the works of E. Gellner, E. Hobsbawm, B. Anderson, and others, argues that modernization is inextricably intertwined with nationalism". Spruyt, H. "Empires and Imperialism". In Encyclopedia of Nationalism. Vol. 1. London, NY: Academic Press, 2001, p. 240.
- ⁷⁵ H. Inalcik claims that at the end of the eighteenth century "the classical regime associated with the Ottoman Empire had completely broken down and the empire had become feudalized". Inalcik, H. "The Ottoman Decline and its Effects upon the *Reaya*". In Inalcik, H. "The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy". London, 1978, p. 352.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

- Dokumenti za balgarskata istoria* [Documents about Bulgarian History], translated by Pancho Dorev, vol. 3, BAN, Sofia, 1941
- Turski dokumenti za makedonskata istorija* [Turkish Documents for Macedonian History], vol. 4 (1818-1827), Skopje, 1957; vol. 5 (1827-1839), Skopje, 1958

SECONDARY LITERATURE

- Berkes, Niyazi, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal, 1964
- Bodzholian, M., *Reformi 20-30h godah XIX veka v Osmanskoi imperii* [Reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s and 1830s, Erevan, 1984
- Davison, Roderic, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963
- Dimitrov, Strashimir, *Sultan Mahmud II I kraiat na enicharite* [Sultan Mahmud II and the End of the Janissaries], Sofia, 1993
- Findley, Carter, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980
- Georgieva, Gergana, "Functions and Prerogatives of the Rumeli Vali in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century", *Etudes balkaniques*, No. 2, 2003, 57-77
- Georgieva, Gergana, "Administrative Structure and Government in Rumelia in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: The Functions and Activities of the Rumeli Vali" (forthcoming)
- Inalcýk, Halil, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey", in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, New Jersey, 1964
- Karal, Enver, *Osmanlı Tarihi* [Ottoman History], vol. 4, Ankara, 1977
- Levy, Avigdor, "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Army, 1826-1839", in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, No. 2, 1971, 21-39
- Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968
- Miller, A., *Mustafa Pasha Bairaktar*, Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, Moscow, 1947
- Nagata, Yuzo, "The Itizam System in Egypt and Turkey", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, No. 14, 1977, 187-188
- Shaw, Stanford, *Between Old and New. The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971
- Shaw, Stanfor, Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2 vols, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976-1977
- Todorova, Maria, *Angliya, Rossiya i Tanzimat* [England, Russia and the Tanzimat], Sofia, 1980. Also in Russian: Todorova, Maria, *Angliya, Rossiya i Tanzimat* [England, Russia and the Tanzimat], Nauka, Glavnoe izdatel'stvo vostochnoi literatury, Moscow, 1983
- Todorova, Maria, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York, 1997

- Ubicini, M. A., *Lettres sur la Turquie ou tableau statistique, religieux, politique, administratif, militaire, commerce, etc.*, Paris, 1853
- Ursinus, Michael, *Regionale Reformen in Osmanischen Reich am Vorabend der Tanzimat. Reformen der rumelischen Provinzialgouverneure im Gerichtssprengel von Monastir (Bitola) zur Zeit der Herrschaft Sultan Mahmuds II (1808-1839)*, Berlin, 1982
- Uzunçarşılı, İsmail, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı* [The Central Administrative and Naval Organization in the Ottoman Empire], Ankara, 1948
- Yalcinkaya, Mehmet, "The Provincial Reforms in the Early *Tanzimat* Period as Implemented in the *Kaza* of Avrethisarý", in *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi*, 6, 1995, 356

ENCYCLOPEDIAS

- Encyclopedia of European Social History*, 6 volumes, Charles Scribner's Sons. An imprint of the Gale Group, New York, 2001
- Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition, 10 volumes E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1986
- Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, 2 volumes, Academic Press, New York, 2001
- Encyclopedia of Sociology*, 4 volumes, Charles Scribner's Sons. An imprint of Simon and Schuster Macmillan, New York, 1992



SVETLANA DIMITROVA

Née en 1972, Sliven, Bulgarie

Doctorante en sociologie, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris

Thèse : Les *intellectuels* dans l'espace public en Bulgarie « postcommuniste »

Membre du Centre d'Etude des Mouvements Sociaux, EHESS, Paris

DEA en sociologie, EHESS, Paris, 2001

Etudiante de l'Ecole Doctorale en Sciences Sociales. Europe Centrale et Orientale, Bucarest, 1999-2000

Bourse du Gouvernement Français, 2003 ; 2004

Bourse de recherche de l'Union Européenne *Marie Curie*, IRESO, CNRS, 2002

Bourse de l'*Agence Universitaire Francophone*, 2001 ; 2000

Participations à des colloques et journées d'étude en France, Tchéquie, Turquie, Bulgarie, Roumanie, Belgique

Articles et communications en sociologie des sociétés « post-communistes »
parus en France et en Bulgarie

A LA RECHERCHE DE L'INTELLECTUEL APRÈS SA MORT PRÉCONISÉE NOTES SUR LES *THINK-TANKS* ET LES PRISES DE POSITION EN BULGARIE « POST-COMMUNISTE »

Serait-il justifié de suivre l'opinion selon laquelle l'intellectuel est mort et que, dans les sociétés « désenchantées » de l'Europe de l'Est des années 90, il n'existe pas non plus ? Ou bien, serait-il plus légitime de renoncer à la recherche de la figure « idéal-typique » du pro-Dreyfusard engagé, en essayant d'élaborer une grille de compréhension de ses nouvelles manifestations ?

Dans cet article, nous nous proposons d'esquisser, tout d'abord, un répertoire des cadres théoriques les plus importants, à travers lesquels les intellectuels de différents contextes ont été étudiés en tant que groupe social, et de présenter, par la suite, un *choix* de concepts et de méthodes qui permettraient une approche adaptée au terrain. Ainsi, nous allons poser quelques questions sur le problème de la « transposabilité » des théories sociologiques dans des contextes « exogènes ».

Le travail commence par une synthèse théorique basée sur nos recherches de terrain sur la diversification du rôle des intellectuels dans la société « post-communiste » en Bulgarie¹ et continue avec une interprétation de la prise de parole dans les médias des représentants des *think-tanks* en tant que nouveaux « professionnels sur le social ». En partant de prémisses théoriques de caractère hétérogène, notre recherche sur cette nouvelle forme de *l'intellectuel* analyse la corrélation entre engagement et espace public en mutation.

Loin de répertorier des assises théoriques afin de proposer une étude exhaustive du « champ » des intellectuels en Bulgarie contemporaine, le texte tente aussi une réflexion pour un bilan des approches possibles des processus spécifiques dans les pays « post-communistes ». Une telle démarche « de sélection » d'outils de paradigmes différents a été adoptée

par János Kornai, Iván Széleányi, George Konrád et David Stark dans leurs recherches sur les transformations économiques ou sur la stratification sociale après le collapsus du communisme. Ce souci épistémologique situe le travail au-delà d'une sociologie de la connaissance dans laquelle sinon il s'inscrit.

Où chercher l'*intellectuel*?

Si nous étudions par exemple la théorie sociologique de Pierre Bourdieu, paradigme dominant dans la sociologie française d'aujourd'hui, nous pourrions retenir des concepts comme le *capital* avec ses différentes formes et l'*habitus* qui se montrent opérationnels dans les analyses de notre objet. Le concept-clé de *champ*, définissant sa méthode d'approche, par contre, s'avère difficilement applicable sur les terrains « post-communistes »². Le *champ* autonome, hiérarchisé et structuré par les tensions internes entre les agents déterminés par leurs dispositions et positions est un modèle structuraliste qui ne « se reproduit » pas dans une société en mutation profonde. Ainsi, par exemple, Széleányi se sert des trois formes du *capital social* pour étudier la stratification sociale « post-communiste » comme « un système historiquement unique de stratification où le capital culturel est dominant »³.

Christophe Charle⁴, en empruntant la méthode bourdieusienne, analyse l'émergence progressive au XIX^e siècle d'une notion englobante comme celle d'*intellectuels* pour désigner des individus consacrés à des activités considérées auparavant comme hétérogènes (enseignants, hommes de lettres etc.). Son étude vise essentiellement quelques grands Etats de l'Europe de l'Ouest. Il considère que le phénomène ne se développe pas sous cette forme en Europe Centrale et Orientale, conception qui, selon nous, ne nie pas l'existence de l'objet, mais confirme, plutôt, l'inapplicabilité du *champ* – cadre dans lequel il pense les intellectuels. Toute sociologie comparée des intellectuels de divers pays européens doit donc être reliée à une morphologie comparée permettant de situer les échantillons analysés, et doit être impérativement prolongée par une analyse des représentations symboliques et politiques qui donnent sens aux spécificités sociales.

Le terme *intellectuel* se prête à une utilisation en tant que concept sociologique désignant une couche sociale avec toutes ses classifications et particularités. Dans ce cas, l'analyse purement sociologique porterait

sur la morphologie de l'intelligentsia du moment étudié, en la positionnant dans l'ensemble de la structure sociale. L'idée assez philosophique de Mannheim⁵, peut nous servir pour amorcer une approche. En se référant à Weber, Mannheim, considère l'intelligentsia comme une couche relativement sans classe, flottant librement. Dans chaque société, existent des groupes sociaux d'élite dont le rôle consiste à « procurer » à cette société des interprétations du monde. Ici se pose un problème : cette couche d'intellectuels peut-elle « transcender » sa position socialement déterminée en créant une connaissance qui aura une validité pour les autres couches aussi ? Et comment arrivent-elle à « promouvoir » cette connaissance comme étant universelle ?

Tout en restant un groupe flottant, politiquement indépendant, elle investit sa position de groupe exprimant des convictions morales toujours marquées par un engagement politique. Selon la conception de l'histoire culturelle française, les intellectuels seront la conscience vive et impartiale. Pascal Ory et Jean-François Sirinelli, partis à la recherche d'une synthèse des définitions, considèrent que « le terme *intellectuel* sous sa forme substantivée peut être situé exactement dans l'espace – la culture française – et dans le temps – l'affaire Dreyfus »⁶. Universitaire, artiste ou de profession libérale, l'intellectuel sera quelqu'un dont le *statut* lui permet et l'oblige à prendre publiquement position par rapport à une idée ; donc, il sera, dans tous les cas, *engagé*. Un tel usage consacré explique-t-il seulement les origines du terme sans permettre une application dans d'autres contextes culturels ? Le regroupement *d'intellectuels*, qui n'est pas un groupe social, contribue et cristallise les idées et, par conséquent, participe aux idéologies. Le concept acquiert par ses origines un sens persistant : l'intellectuel ne se définit pas par son statut, ni par sa fonction, mais par sa participation aux débats⁷. Pourtant la prise de position ne représente pas une « abnégation » d'ordre moral. Comme le souligne Raymond Aron⁸, « toutes les doctrines, tous les partis – traditionalisme, libéralisme, démocratie, nationalisme, fascisme, communisme – ont eu et continuent d'avoir leurs chantes ou leurs penseurs ». Lui-même, en continuant les accusations de son prédécesseur Julien Benda⁹, condamne les intellectuels séduits par le marxisme qui ont ainsi sacrifié leur « statut » de penseurs libres.

L'apparition du terme « intellectuel » sur la scène publique date de l'affaire Dreyfus en 1898. Après le « J'accuse » de Zola, Clemenceau emploie le substantif pour désigner les pétitionnaires favorables à une révision du procès Dreyfus. Ce terme est repris négativement par Maurice

Barrès dans le *Journal*. C'est à cette reprise qui prolonge la polémique en lui donnant une réplique « de pair » dans le sens contraire qu'on attribue le passage de la notion dans l'usage, puisque les incriminés s'emparent du terme et en font leur étendard dreyfusard. La droite nationaliste emploie plus tard ce vocable. Cependant, dans le pays de la naissance du terme-pnénomène, l'expression d'intellectuel de droite connaît un succès faible ; « de gauche » est devenu une composante inhérente de la notion « intellectuel ».

Comment penser le terme dans la société « post-communiste » ? Wolf Lepenies, met l'accent sur la mélancolie et l'utopie comme deux pôles dans lesquels « résident la grandeur et la misère des intellectuels européens ». Seulement les scientifiques arrivent à échapper à cette alternative. « On pourrait presque caractériser la science comme un domaine d'activité intellectuelle située par-delà la mélancolie et en-deça de l'utopie » ¹⁰. Cette utopie nécessaire en quelque sorte de l'être de l'intellectuel ne disparaît pas avec le collapsus du communisme, elle revêt la forme d'un libéralisme utopique de la société civile universelle. C'est justement sur le libéralisme que nous allons revenir plus loin dans notre étude.

La préoccupation des intellectuels revient dans les écrits d'Andrei Pleșu. L'intellectuel est toujours lié à un engagement moral non lucratif ; son travail ne connaît jamais de motivation externe, ni de finalité non palpable¹¹. Cette particularité a fait toujours possible, l'existence de l'intellectuel.

D'après Konrád et Szelényi¹², le terme d'*intelligentsia*, employé au départ en Russie, désignera pendant le communisme un groupe en train de se transformer en classe sociale. L'idéologie de « la société sans classes » distinguait trois couches nettement différenciées : travailleurs, paysans et intelligentsia, définie comme « superstructure » de la société. L'éclatement de cette couche dans la période d'après 1989 va être accompagné d'une émancipation de différentes figures qui se veulent pragmatiques, en conformité avec une société libérale, spécialisées dans des domaines. Plus tard, Szelényi¹³ avance son hypothèse de la perte de l'imagination critique des intellectuels de l'Europe de l'Est : avec les transformations, l'intelligentsia humaniste serait cooptée avec succès et la culture du discours critique serait sacrifiée en échange du pouvoir. Cette considération très intéressante qui vise la participation des

intellectuels dans les fondations saurait-elle résumer les intellectuels de la période des années 90 ?

S'agit-il d'une « cooptation » et d'« une perte de l'imagination critique » ? Ne projette-t-on avec une telle considération une figure d'intellectuel toujours engagé à gauche ? D'autant plus que, comme Christophe Charle l'observe, une caractéristique des intellectuels sera la délimitation d'une partie¹⁴. Ainsi, par exemple, une opinion interne, partagée par les acteurs appartenant d'une manière ou d'une autre à cette catégorie d'« intellectuels », serait la tendance du refus le plus souvent d'être assimilés à un groupe social. Ils se pensent par différence avec les autres élites, allant parfois jusqu'à prétendre être la seule véritable élite ou, plus souvent encore, pratiquant des distinctions internes : vrais « intellectuels » contre faux « intellectuels », demi-intellectuels contre grands intellectuels, écrivains contre universitaires, vieux contre jeunes, avant-gardistes contre académiques, journalistes contre poètes, gauche contre droite, etc.... Nous allons revenir sur l'opinion des intellectuels qui se veulent critiques envers les « intellectuels libéraux » en Bulgarie.

A cette étape de notre analyse, sans prétendre élaborer une formule optimale, nous allons isoler quelques traits afin de disposer d'une définition de travail. Même si l'idée de *l'intellectuel engagé* est considérée située exactement dans l'espace - la culture française - et dans le temps - l'affaire Dreyfus », nous ne lui refusons pas une application dans d'autres contextes culturels. *L'intellectuel* sera donc défini par sa *participation*, son *intervention sur le terrain du politique*, compris au sens de *débat sur la « cité »*.

Notre objectif ici sera d'analyser cette curieuse manifestation d'intervention dans l'espace public d'un intellectuel libéral, en comparaison avec un intellectuel « à la française ». Dans le contexte « post-communiste », l'évaluation selon une appartenance à un « esprit critique de gauche » se montre difficile. Si curieux que cela puisse paraître, nous allons observer des traits dans les argumentations des opinions exprimées qui apparentent ces intellectuels sinon libéraux avec un engagement « à gauche ». Et les critiques à l'égard des « clercs néolibéraux médiatisés » de se dévoiler comme une stratégie de différenciation, une consécration de la part des « vrais » non médiatisés. Souvent ces intervenants actifs sont représentants des ainsi nommés « think-tanks »

Nous allons nous intéresser, par conséquent, à ce que ce terme et ce type d'organisation signifie. Plutôt que de contester leur droit à l'appellation *d'intellectuels*, nous allons analyser leurs prises de parole dans les médias aux moments de quelques crises sociales et politiques.

Comment un expert, lié à une vision politique, sociale et économique libérale par son appartenance institutionnelle et, dépourvu donc de toute possibilité d'être interprété comme *intellectuel* « idéal-typique » de gauche, dans le contexte spécifique « post-communiste », pourrait se présenter en tant qu'*intellectuel engagé* ? Comment cette « contradiction » est-elle possible ? Cette manifestation inédite ne s'explique-t-elle pas par la relation permanente tendue entre l'intellectuel et le politique, par cette opposition dialectique, développée par Weber, entre *l'éthique de responsabilité* et *l'éthique de conviction* ? L'intellectuel qui se trouve confronté à deux logiques d'une manière permanente, dans des moments de crise, se verra-t-il consacré à la recherche d'efficacité ?

La prise de parole de l'intellectuel « libéral »

Comme Jezy Szacki l'a bien analysé dans son livre *Liberalism after communism*¹⁵ la signification et la fonction du libéralisme, comme celle d'une toute autre idée, change considérablement avec sa transposition dans un autre environnement social. Ce sera une banalité pour l'historien des idées ou le sociologue de la connaissance de souligner que l'idée *per se* s'avère toujours transformée afin de donner des réponses, mais à d'autres questions que celles qu'originellement elle était censée résoudre ou remédier. Ainsi, le libéralisme dans le contexte « post-communiste » va être vécue comme un contre-poids démocratique du communisme totalitaire.

Dès lors, penser la prise de position de gauche, critique vis-à-vis du néolibéralisme, a peu de chances de trouver refuge dans la région au début des années 90. Le libéralisme se montre une simple option de transformation après le collapsus de la dictature communiste.

Dans cette optique, « intellectuel libéral » ne paraît pas un oxymore. Et ses manifestations ne nous forcent pas à renoncer au concept. Dépasser le barrage épistémologique que l'opposition conceptuelle entre *intellectuel* et *engagé à droite* crée, signifie ouvrir des perspectives plus déconstructivistes pour aborder les formes inédites.

Peu après 1990, on observe en Bulgarie un désenchantement de la société des principes libéraux et, par conséquent, des changements démocratiques. L'appauvrissement brutal, la « transition »¹⁶ qui risque de continuer à l'infini, pendant que les groupements de l'économie grise redistribuent les bien étatiques, suscite une vision négative envers toute organisation libérale, donc, démocratique. Le parti communiste, rebaptisé socialiste gagne les deuxième élections libres avec majorité absolue¹⁷; les analystes préviennent que les nostalgies dangereuses se profilent de plus en plus fortement, que les mouvements populistes risquent de se faire influents (les analogies avec les moments similaires en Hongrie, 1994, et en Pologne, 1993, s'imposent). D'autre part, les instances politiques et économiques internationales apparaissent, déjà, comme des acteurs réels dans la vie politique et économique du pays. Communiquer avec le *Fond Monétaire International* et la *Banque Mondiale* à un niveau institutionnel, signifiait également l'expliquer aux citoyens. Au début de 1997, la Bulgarie vit un moment de crise économique et d'inflation sans précédent. Dans cette période, les arguments de la démocratie et de la société de marché perdent leur dernière chance de paraître coïncidant avec les justifications de l'enthousiasme anticomuniste. Seulement des argumentations rationnelles et explicites concernant la démocratie, la société civile, l'économie de marché peuvent convaincre. Le paradigme discursif semble changer : l'introduction d'un discours d'expert dans l'espace public devient visible parce que nécessaire. Des articles d'experts dans les domaines des sciences sociales (sociologues, politologues, économistes) se sont taillés une place importante sur les pages des journaux. Qui sont ces experts qui se montrent très soucieux d'un travail d'explication et de présentations sous forme simple dans les médias de leurs recherches ? Si on répertorie les auteurs des articles dans les rubriques d'analyses et d'opinion, on constate la présence récurrente d'analystes appartenant à des centres de recherche d'un nouveau type. Certains les considèrent *think-tanks*. Nous allons consacrer quelques pages d'analyse sur ces structures plus loin. Prenons, maintenant, les interventions en question dans la presse.

Ivan Karaïte considère que « Les think-tanks ont été des agents majeurs dans la révolution rhétorique qui a eu lieu en Europe de l'Est. », que les *think-tanks* ont trouvé le bon argument pour convaincre le public sur la chute inévitable de l'ancien régime et sur la réforme incontournable¹⁸. Nous allons partager cette opinion au sujet du changement radical discursif dans le pays autour de 1997¹⁹ ; par contre, en ce qui concerne les

think-tanks, nous allons souligner que seulement certains représentants et certaines organisations de ce type misent essentiellement sur ce procédé d'intervention médiatique les apparentant à la figure de l'intellectuel engagé.

Nous avons analysé deux moments de crise : les mois entre janvier et avril 1997 et le débat autour de Kosovo en mars 1999.

Dans une parenthèse, nous allons juste justifier notre choix de périodiques. Les quotidiens *Troud* et *24 heures* bénéficient des plus grands tirages. D'après les données du bureau d'études *Alfa Research* qui concernent l'année en question, ils sont lus par 47,8 % des lecteurs de quotidiens. L'hebdomadaire *Coultoura* s'inscrit dans l'espace des médias en tant que tribune des intellectuels. *Capital*, hebdomadaire essentiellement économique, consacre de nombreuses pages à des commentaires. La prise en considération de ces deux hebdomadaires dans notre étude est justifiée non par leur tirage, mais par leurs places de forums devant les intellectuels et les experts.

Les pages des quotidiens *Troud* et *24 heures*, des hebdomadaires *Capital* et *Coultoura* entre janvier et avril 1997 nous donnent une bonne base d'analyse. Les publications d'Ivan Krastev, directeur du *Centre de Stratégies Libérales*, d'Evguénii Daynov, directeur du *Centre de Pratiques Sociales*, de Krassen Stantchev, directeur de l'*Institut d'Economie de Marché*, d'Ognian Mintchev, directeur de l'*Institut de Recherches Régionales et Internationales* sont récurrentes²⁰.

Le contestataire typique, écrivain ou artiste, invité préféré des émissions de télévision, interviewé et commentateur privilégié dans la presse cède la place à un expert sur le social (politologue ou sociologue) qui *argumente* sa position. Dans ce sens, ils ne jouent pas le rôle de *médiateurs*, d'exégètes des idées et des politiques globales du *Fond Monétaire International* (FMI), de la *Banque Mondiale* (BM). Le nouveau de ce discours d'expert médiatisé se distingue par quelques caractéristiques dont l'importance est renforcée par les exigences du contexte : introduction d'un argument rationnel, structuration et hiérarchisation des sous-arguments, critique politique et économique (qui met en relation tous les acteurs et forces : institution politique d'Etat, instances internationales, citoyens), analyse qui manie les outils scientifiques, mais présentée sous forme langagière simple, de vulgarisation. Voici quelques exemples :

Donc, le succès du board présuppose un gouvernement de réforme et « sans cœur », une opposition loyale vis-à-vis du board et des réformes, des syndicats se posant des limites et une mobilisation sociale extrême. La

vraie question – comment mobiliser un soutien actif des citoyens pour les réformes ?

(Ivan Krastev, *En attendant le board, Troud*, 3 janvier 1997)

Nous pouvons observer que le *rationnel* scientifique revêt l'aspect du *bon sens*.

Dans le monde, il n'y pas d'institutions si irrationnelles de donner à un tel gouvernement un « currency board » ou bien un emprunt de stabilisation ou bien de croire, même pour une seconde, qu'un tel gouvernement peut avoir ce soutien de masse nécessaire pour des réformes économiques. L'étatisme et BSP doté de pouvoir ne peuvent pas exister ensemble dans un endroit.

(Evguénii Daynov, *Etatisme et mentalité communiste sont incompatibles, Troud*, 13 janvier)

Ce mandat politique va être réduit à une nomination technique du parlement d'un gouvernement d'experts.

(Ognian Mintchev, *L'opposition est dans sa période la plus responsable de son développement, Troud*, 17 janvier)

Ou bien encore, la présence quotidienne des articles des experts de l'*Institut d'Economie de Marché* Krassen Stantchev, Martin Dimitrov, Géorgui Anguélov et Dimitar Tchobanov sur l'introduction du directoire financier (currency board) en 1997, la réforme du système des impôts, les investissements, la réforme économique se montre explicative. Le langage vise à rendre explicite des questions absconses des politiques économiques.

Prenons l'exemple des interventions médiatiques autour de la guerre de Kosovo de mars-avril 1999.

Le débat *La guerre, l'OTAN, la Bulgarie, la Serbie et les Balkans* entre Andrei Raïtchev et Ivan Krastev devient très représentatif du débat sur le Kosovo. Il expose en synthèse les deux tendances majeures. Le débat a eu lieu le 19 mai 1999 à l'Université de Plovdiv et a été publié, plus tard, le 4 juin dans *Coultoura*²¹. Les deux protagonistes font partie des figures d'intellectuels experts engagés et médiatisés. Ivan Krastev est politologue, directeur du *Centre de Stratégies Libérales*, Andrei

Raytchev – sociologue, directeur de *Gallup*, Sofia. Une analyse détaillée du discours démontre une rhétorique d'arguments rationnels mobilisée autour des « droits de l'homme », « droit international », « intérêt », « individu », « personne juridique ». Les stratégies de l'énonciateur-expert reposent sur la clarté et la simplicité extrême du vocabulaire et de la syntaxe.

Ivan Krastev introduit une distinction entre *intérêt* et *valeur*, entre *Etat* et *individu*, pour légitimer les trois questions qu'il pose : le problème de la capacité à sacrifier (pourquoi l'OTAN n'est pas prête à donner des victimes), le problème du nouvel ordre européen fondé sur les droits de l'individu, posés en priorité par rapport à la souveraineté du pays, le problème de la nécessité d'être impliqué dans une réflexion sur le futur des Balkans :

Et si, en Bulgarie, un débat est nécessaire, il doit être centré sur les questions suivantes : que voulons-nous que les Balkans représentent les cinq ou six prochaines années, où sommes-nous, dans quel type de système de valeurs existons-nous, en quel sens existe l'intérêt national bulgare, qui est différent de la propagande primitive antiserbe et du manque de position pacifiste, complètement passive. Dire que la guerre est quelque chose de mauvais ne signifie rien ; il faut répondre à la question de savoir comment il est possible, ayant en vue que cette mauvaise guerre existe, que la population subsiste économiquement durant les cinq ou dix ans à venir.

Le *Centre de Stratégies Libérales* dans une série de publications met l'accent sur le débat nécessaire au sujet des conséquences économiques de la guerre de Kosovo (par exemple : Guéorgui Ganév *Après la guerre, Démocratzia*, le 4 mai 1999) ; ou bien, inscrit la crise dans le cadre plus large des tendances politiques en Europe ; analyse les différents scénarios possibles leurs conséquences, l'intégration réelle de la région (*Scénarios pour le futur de l'Europe de Sud-Est, Démocratzia*, 13 mai 1999 ; parue aussi sous titre *Le futur des Balkans - l'an 2010, Démocratitchski pregled*, n°39/40, printemps-été 99, t.1, pp. 475-487). Perspectives qui ont donné une autre dimension du débat qui risquait sinon de sombrer dans les simples accusations vis-à-vis la décision du gouvernement donner un couloir aérien à l'OTAN.

Comme le souligne Ivan Krastev, les *thinks-tanks* n'ont pas préparé les événements de 1989. Leur objectif, à la différence de leurs homologues

étasuniens ou britanniques des années 30 et, après des années 60, n'est pas de faire des changements révolutionnaires keynésiens ou anti-keynésiens, mais de « préserver le paradigme » qui a commencé à être établi autour de 1990²².

Pour reconnaître la valeur de ce travail de changement discursif, il convient de rappeler le caractère des écrits des intellectuels au début des années 90. Dans tous les médias imprimés, la tentation postmoderne basée sur le jeu, la provocation, le non-engagement, le relativisme, la pluralité qui rime parfaitement avec la recherche d'un « comment se débarrasser du marxisme »²³ domine. La maligne symétrie entre le symbolisme postmoderne et les penchants culturels du post-totalitarisme génère un *effet pervers* : un décalage entre la base économique et le niveau politique, culturel et médiatique, inhérent au postmodernisme même. Sur cette thèse repose la conception de *Medii i prehod* (*Médias et transition*)²⁴ qui présente l'une des plus amples études sur les médias de la période inaugurée en 1989. Les deux faces du modèle du capitalisme – une logique culturelle et un capitalisme économique, censées être inséparables, se disloquent en Bulgarie. La transition vers une démocratie s'est avérée symbolique « textuelle », supplantant la réelle transformation.

Pour revenir au « renversement » discursif autour du 1997. La stratégie de « court terme », par les publications de journal, l'interview de radio ou de télévision, est propre en quelque sorte à tous les *think-tanks* dans le monde, sauf qu'entre 1994 et 2000, au moment de crises, elle est exclusivement privilégiée par les centres bulgares. Les *think-tanks* post-communistes se prêtent à une interprétation en tant que forme qui rend possible l'existence des intellectuels dans la société désenchantée de l'idéologie totalisante.

Qu'est-ce qu'un *think-tank*?

Après 1990, dans tous les pays de l'Europe de l'Est²⁵, sont apparues bon nombre d'instituts, centres de recherches, fondations – structures, qu'on considère des *think-tanks*. Pour ne mentionner que quelques-uns²⁶ : Centre albanais de recherche économique (*Albanian Center for Economic Research*) (Tirana), Institut d'économie de marché (*Institut for Market Economics*), Centre de stratégies libérales (*Center for Liberal Strategies*) et Centre de pratiques sociales (*Center for Social Practices*) (Sofia), Centre

d'études libérales (*Center for Liberal Studies and Liberal Institut*) (Prague), Société roumaine académique (*Romanian Academic Society*) (Bucarest), Institut lituanien d'économie libre (*Lithunian Free Market Institut*), Centre de recherche sociale et économique (*Center for Social and Economic Research-CASE*) (Varsovie), Gdansk institut d'économie de marché (*Gdansk Institute for Market Economics*) (Gdansk). Plus de 200 sont créées entre 1990 et 1997²⁷. La liste de *Freedom House* du 1999, référence de base considérée représentative, inclut 101 *think-tanks*.

Le terme qui signifie « réservoir d'idées » est très flou et désigne des organisations dont les activités les classent comme des sociétés savantes, groupes d'influence ou instituts indépendants de recherche en politique publique (« new policy research institutes »). Ces organisations, qui apparaissent à fur et à mesure que le tiers secteur s'organise en tant que tel, dans la plupart financées par des instances étrangères, s'inscrivent dans des projets internationaux au niveau global, et se montrent désireux de participer au débat social et politique au niveau local. Définis par eux-mêmes surtout comme *indépendants*, ces centres sont de plus en plus intégrés aux réseaux néolibéraux internationaux²⁸. La vie de leurs recherches politiquement orientées ne se limite pas aux dossiers des rapports de projet, mais souvent prend forme d'article-prise de position dans les médias. Autrement dit, ces centres se sont taillés une place dans l'espace public. Ils sont visibles et en même temps sont ignorés. Leur importance est sujette à des considérations extrêmes – ils sont ou bien surestimés ou bien sous-estimés.

La liste de *Freedom House*²⁹ inclue 16 organisations de Bulgarie. D'ailleurs, des 16 pays présentés dans ce recueil, la Bulgarie est en tête avec le nombre de *think-tanks* ; d'après plusieurs chercheurs, parmi lesquels Alina Mungiu Pippidi, les *think-tanks* bulgares sont considérés particulièrement actifs par rapport à leurs homologues des autres pays de l'Europe de l'Est ; les structures pareilles d'ex-Yougoslavie sont très peu présentes... Afin d'établir une liste sur laquelle vont se baser nos observations, nous avons procédé à une lecture croisée des différentes bases de données des réseaux internationales (dans certains cas, il s'agit de consulter des listes, dans d'autres - de repérer des partenaires), aussi bien que les programmes des centres en question (leurs auto-identifications), leurs pratiques et leur visibilité en Bulgarie, des études qui portent sur la question en Europe de l'Est, en cherchant les interférences. Les bases de données utilisées sont celles de *Freedom House*, *Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE)*, *National Institute*

for Research Advancement (NIRA), Japon, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute; the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), The Global Development Network, Global Think Net, The International Think Tank Forum, The Trans European Policy Studies Association, Transition Policy Network.

Si nous allons restreindre la liste des think-tanks bulgares les plus visibles, nous obtiendrons :

- *Centre de Stratégies Libérales* (1994) <http://www.cls-sofia.org/>
- *Centre de Pratiques Sociales* (1994) <http://www.csp-sofia.org>
- *Centre d'Etude de la Démocratie* (1989) <http://www.csd.bg>
- *Access fondation* (1992) <http://www.access-sofia.org/>
- *Institut d'Economie de Marché* (1993) <http://www.ime-bg.org/>
- *Agence d'Analyses Sociales* (1994) <http://www.asa-bg.netfirms.com/>
- *Club Ekonomika 2000* (1997) <http://www.club2000.org/>
- *Institut de Recherches Régionales et internationales* (1997) <http://www.iris-bg.org/>

Une approche par le prisme de la démocratie situe ces organisations en tant qu'acteurs politiques de première importance dans toute société démocratique. Ces *instituts de recherches indépendantes* « informent le débat » sur les politiques publiques pour les politiciens, le public et les médias. Ainsi, ils seront une infrastructure « allégée » de la communauté politique, « basée sur l'intelligence et le savoir », qui assure une analyse, une recherche et une prise de décisions pluralistes, ouvertes et fondées.

D'habitude décrits en tant qu'invention du XX^e siècle, les *think-tanks* se propagent dans tous les pays du monde après l'époque de la guerre froide. Ainsi, aux Etats Unis, les instituts *Brookings* (1916) et *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (1914) sont parmi les plus connus et les plus anciens. *Russell Sage Foundation* (EUA), créée en 1907 et *Hambourg Institut for Economic Research* (Allemagne), fondé en 1908 sont considérés comme les premiers *think-tanks*. Le *Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies* (Grande Bretagne), fondé par le Duke de Wellington en 1831 sera le prédécesseur³⁰. En Asie, dans leur ensemble, les *think-tanks* se sont établis après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale ; au Japon, par contre, nombre d'organisations datent des années 20 ou avant. Mais, c'est au cours des années 70 que le grand boom fait proliférer ces

structures ; les années 80, elles cherchent une extension en dehors de leur pays de naissance.

Le fait que le nom *think-tank* ne soit pas traduit et personne des chercheurs n'essaie pas de le traduire, signifie en quelque sorte que le terme reste avec son fonctionnement anglo-saxon de départ, avec toutes les connotations socioculturelles que cela implique. Donc, le « passage obligé » de chaque analyse s'avère une comparaison avec les *think-tanks* « idéal-typiques » américains et britanniques.

Freedom House dans la dernière édition *Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe : A Comprehensive Directory* définit les think-tanks comme :

« une source alternative d'information, de recherche et d'opinion d'expert, les instituts indépendants de recherche en politique publique ou bien think-tanks, procurent un équilibre critique d'autorité gouvernementale (...), ils agissent en tant que forme indépendante de débat et source d'idées innovatrices et de recommandations³¹. Certains des 30 critères de sélection qui ont opéré sont : des activités centrées sur la recherche, plaidoyer (advocacy), conférences, séminaires ; principaux intérêts de recherche (démocratisation, développement économique, économie de marché, réforme judiciaire, société civile, sécurité) ; statut juridique – indépendants de toute institution, y compris des académies de sciences, NGO (quelques sociétés privées qui développent des recherches importantes orientées vers les politiques publiques sont incluses à titre d'exceptions).

Les études qui se situent dans cette perspective sont basées essentiellement sur les agendas des centres. Raymond J. Struyk³² résume ses recherches sur les *think-tanks* dans les démocraties du bloc post-soviétique : « ils ont fait un travail de qualité impressionnante et ont été très efficaces dans l'arène politique ».

D'après une autre étude qui se situe dans le même paradigme, celle de McGann et Weaver *Think tank and civil societies: catalysts for ideas and action*³³, les *think-tanks* seraient :

- des universités sans « étudiants », qui développent des recherches à orientation politique, c'est-à-dire, adressées à la communauté politique) ;
- des organisations de recherche à contrat (qui aux USA fonctionnent comme des unités du gouvernement) ;
- le produit de leur recherche se présente sous forme des rapports, mais souvent transformés en articles ;

- se caractérisent par leurs activités de plaidoyer (advocacy).

Cette approche *démocratique* qui prédomine porte les traits d'une prise de partie. D'ailleurs, la plupart des études sur les *think-tanks* sont initiées et réalisées par des représentants de ces organisations... Comme le souligne Diane Stone³⁴, un vrai apport dans le domaine sera la recherche qui arriverait à outrepasser les études qui sont dominées par les organisations les plus populaires et par le terrain privilégié des Etats-Unis ; et qui sera réalisée par un chercheur qui ne fait pas partie du réseau.

Tout en étant sans conteste très fondée, l'approche *démocratique* a le défaut de se montrer trop constatative, fonctionnaliste et efficace devant des donateurs... Diane Stone et Ivan Krastev ont réalisé des études très analytiques³⁵, à des approches non fonctionnalistes, mais ces auteurs ont le désavantage de participer aux réseaux des *think-tanks*.

Une approche critique d'orientation néo-marxiste interprète les think-tanks en tant qu'organisations qui participent à la construction d'un consensus pour la maintenance d'une hégémonie de contrôle des intérêts dominants dans une situation de mondialisation. Elle pose la question si la profusion exprime le caractère démocratique de la démocratie ou bien elle indique une insuffisance progressive de l'Etat démocratique ? Cette tendance puise son orientation de l'espace de l'Europe de l'Ouest, particulièrement de la France, où les structures de l'Etat sont très fortes et des petits instituts indépendants de recherche sont plus rares qu'aux USA.

Bien entendu, on découvre cette approche chez les sociologues de la tradition « française ».

Pierre Bourdieu, dans *Contre-feux I et II*³⁶ et inter-texte dans beaucoup de ses articles et ouvrages, traite la question de l'engagement du scientifique et contre le « mythe de la mondialisation ». Le néolibéralisme dans la pensée de Bourdieu sera « la forme suprême de la sociodicée conservatrice qui s'annonçait, depuis 30 ans, sous le nom de « fin des idéologies ou, plus précisément, de « fin de l'histoire »³⁷ qui participe à la destruction des acquisitions sociales, de l'Etat etc. Les *think-tanks* représentent un discours puissant, une « idée force », une idée qui n'a pas de force sociale, mais qui obtient la croyance.

Les chercheurs, ensemble avec les syndicats et un mouvement social doivent s'opposer à tout ce « discours fort » que le néolibéralisme

représente. La vision néolibérale arrive à se présenter comme évidente et sans alternative grâce aussi à des intellectuels et des chercheurs qui travaillent comme « les chantres » de cette idéologie ; entre autres, son arrivée est préparée depuis longtemps par des groupes d'intellectuels qui avaient pour la plupart des tribunes dans les grands journaux. En se référant à Max Weber d'après lequel les dominants ont toujours besoin d'une « théodicée de leurs privilèges » ou, mieux, d'une sociodicée, c'est-à-dire d'une justification théorique du fait qu'ils sont privilégiés. La compétence aujourd'hui est au cœur de cette sociodicée. D'un intellectuel engagé on passe à un « dégagé », en partie parce que les intellectuels sont détenteurs de capital culturel et que, même s'ils sont dominés parmi les dominants, ils font partie des dominants³⁸. Ce « dégagement » se traduit en *compétence*, seule forme de s'inscrire dans la formule néolibérale. Cette compétence opère dans les instituts de recherche qui influencent les politiques.

Keith Dixon³⁹, en suivant la même perspective (qui elle-même relève d'une critique sociale engagé de gauche), développe son hypothèse que « La grande majorité des think-tanks joue aujourd'hui le rôle de voitures-balais de l'idéologie néolibérale, qui ne connaît pas de frontières ». Les évangélistes du marché se multiplient dans le monde anglo-saxon au sens large, où les plus anciens des think-tanks britanniques et américains ont essaimé ; ils étendent leur activité vers le monde en développement, ciblant les pays de l'Est où certaines expériences gouvernementales sont directement inspirées par les économistes de Chicago.

Loïc Wacquant, dans son livre *Les prisons de la misère*⁴⁰, qui sinon est consacré aux prisons, parle de la « tolérance zéro » au USA. D'après lui, « depuis les années 80, les *think-tanks* néoconservateurs (comme *Manhatan Enterprise*, « centre névralgique de la guerre intellectuelle à l'Etat social », *l'American Enterprise Institute*, *Heritage Foundation* etc) mènent une offensive concertée visant à saper la légitimité de l'Etat-providence et à lui substituer, dans les régions inférieures de l'espace sociale, un Etat-pénitence (...) ». En soulignant le décalage entre la « tolérance zéro » « telle qu'elle est pratiquée au quotidien – plutôt que théorisée par les « penseurs » des *think-tanks* et par leurs épigones dans les champs universitaire et politique », il catégorise ces organisations en tant qu'acteur important « négatif » dans l'accroissement de la répression et de la ségrégation sans retours dans la société américaine.

D'ailleurs, cette orientation de la critique sociale admet difficilement le terme *organisation à but non-lucratif* (« non-profit ») et retient plutôt le terme *économie solidaire* ; L'analyse sera donc toujours jalonnée par des concepts comme *intérêts*, *stratégies*, *capital* (culturel, social, économique).

Quelle version pour les *think-tanks* en Bulgarie ? Transformation involutive

Les *think-tanks* en Bulgarie se montrent extrêmement divers. Certains, comme le *Centre de Stratégies Libérales*, le *Centre de Pratiques Sociales*, *Access fondation*, non seulement sont enregistrés en tant qu'organisations non-gouvernementales, mais aussi fonctionnent en tant que centres à but non-lucratif (sponsorisés par des sources étrangères, américaines dans la plupart des cas). D'autres, comme *L'Institut d'économie de marché* ou *l'Agence d'Analyses Sociales* proposent leurs expertises à des clients. Voilà pourquoi la liste de *Freedom house*, comme le souligne Alina Mungiu Pippidi, échoue dans son intention de dresser un répertoire exhaustif, en réunissant ainsi des organisations aux objectifs et principes managériaux très différents.

Pourra-t-on réunir toutes ces organisations dans une seule et même rubrique, si on essaie de les interpréter en termes *d'involution* ?

Beaucoup d'analyses (les deux paradigmes « démocratique » et critique) des organisations *think-tanks* accentuent leur caractère transnational dans le sens qu'ils « transportent » non seulement des politiques, mais aussi des pratiques d'un contexte à un autre. Cette approche ne renseigne pas suffisamment. En revanche, si nous réfléchissons en termes *d'involution* (tenir compte des *traits involutifs* du terrain), nous allons expliquer mieux ces organisations en contexte « post-communiste ».

Pour comprendre les développements en Europe de l'Est, Ivan Szelényi⁴¹ introduit le terme *d'involution* par opposition à la rupture révolutionnaire et à l'évolution. Le changement, même fondamental, n'est pas un passage d'un ordre à l'autre, mais des réarrangements dans les façons dont des ordres existants ou nouveaux sont intriqués.

Comme nous l'avons mentionné, Szelényi, en étudiant les stratifications sociales pendant la « transition », se sert des trois formes du *capital social* (termes de la sociologie de Bourdieu) pour étudier la société « post-communiste » comme « un système historiquement unique de stratification où le capital culturel est dominant »⁴². Comment peut-on conceptualiser ce passage d'un système « à double stratification » (dual-stratification) à un système social de classe ? Cette transformation capitaliste sans classe bourgeoise est possible en raison de la « bourgeoisie culturelle » – une fraction de l'intelligentsia et de l'ex-communiste élite technocratique. « (...) this two fractions of the intelligentsia have assumed the historic task of a bourgeoisie : civilizing their societies and creating market institutions »⁴³.

Dans ce sens, nous nous permettons d'avancer une hypothèse que les *think-tanks* dans la société post-communiste sont des organisations *hybrides* non seulement par rapport à leur « modèle » idéal-typique américain, mais par la force de leur position « à la croisée » entre deux logiques sociétales – communiste et libérale (dans sa variante post-communiste). Plutôt que de « transposer » des modèles synchroniques, ils « transporteront » des traits diachroniques (du passé). Ainsi, aux moments de crise, les interventions des spécialistes des *think-tanks* dans l'espace public pourraient être lues comme des manifestations de l'intellectuel-expert engagé.

Comme l'observe Liliana Deyanova dans ses analyses portant sur la publicité critique et le langage sociologique dans les médias⁴⁴, si on compare l'intellectuel médiatisé en France (dont l'archétype serait BHL, Bernard-Henri Lévy) qui développe une sorte d'« espéranto intellectuel » et son homologue bulgare, ce dernier se montre engagé. Elle propose une comparaison intéressante : l'intellectuel bulgare médiatique et médiatisé serait plus proche du groupe *Raison d'agir* et de Bourdieu que de la figure de BHL.

Les *think-tanks* en Bulgarie transfigurent une possibilité de faire des sciences sociales d'orientation appliquée après le collapsus des institutions de l'Etat post-communiste. La recherche qui n'est plus le monopole de l'Etat laisse une place aux « indépendants ». Le désengagement de l'Etat s'est poursuivi partout dans le monde au cours de cette décennie 1990-2000.

Il convient de mettre en relation l'émergence de *think-tanks* avec, d'un côté, la crise du monde académique (manque de ressources et par

conséquent de prestige)⁴⁵ et, d'un autre, avec la structure des organisations de recherche pendant la période communiste. Avant 1989, les instituts de recherche en sciences sociales dépendaient de l'Académie des sciences et des Universités contrôlées par l'Appareil de l'Etat-Parti. Ils étaient censés légitimer la politique et non pas contribuer au débat pour une élaboration des politiques publiques. Le politologue Ivan Krastev⁴⁶ considère que les *think-tanks* en Europe de l'Est naissent entre les intellectuels libéraux et les « technopôles » (économistes impliqués dans la politique). La fin des idéologies saura-t-elle déplacer l'« emploi » de l'intellectuel engagé vers une professionnalisation ?

Une brève parenthèse sur l'*intellectuel* et l'*intelligentsia* dans le contexte bulgare contribue au questionnement en termes d'*involution* et de *capital social* (ou *path-dependency*)⁴⁷.

Si on adopte une approche historique, l'*intelligentsia* apparaît en Europe de l'Est la deuxième moitié du XIX^e siècle. Vu le contexte historique, la naissance, ou l'invention des nations, dans la région faisant partie soit de l'Empire ottomane soit de l'Empire des Habsbourg, l'*intelligentsia* est vue comme « promoteur de la conscience nationale ». Le sentiment d'appartenance nationale est le trait fondamental qui la caractérise ; acteur important dans la modernisation, son objectif consiste à « transmettre » ce sentiment aux « larges couches de la société ». Cette mission de « transformation de la nation » et de la modernisation tardive du pays explique le fait qu'elle soit ressortissante essentiellement des domaines des sciences humaines, et pas des professions « libres ». L'idée du rôle d'éveil de l'*intelligentsia* a succès même plus tard, déjà dans le Nouvel Etat, après 1878. En outre, le rôle civilisateur des intellectuels dans le processus de modernisation en Europe de Sud est souligné par beaucoup d'analystes⁴⁸.

Sans conteste, aujourd'hui ce n'est plus la posture détachée, critique ou de gauche qui le caractérise, c'est une intervention en expert. Mais comme le synthétise François Dosse⁴⁹ la nouvelle tâche des intellectuels aujourd'hui consiste à renforcer les médiations afin de susciter des débats, ce qui présuppose de prendre ses distances avec sa position classique hypercritique pour lui substituer une posture plus constructive⁵⁰. Cette perspective présuppose néanmoins un renoncement : celui d'une position de surplomb.

Les *think-tanks*, au moment de leur apparition, peuvent être interprétés comme des intermédiaires entre les observateurs et les conseillers étrangers et les terrains locaux⁵¹. De quels acteurs s'agit-il alors ?

Si on synthétise, les *think-tanks* au cours de la période initiale de leur existence (entre 1994-2000) se caractérisent par :

- indépendance partielle (indépendants par rapport aux interventions directes des/dans les partis politiques, mais dépendants quand même par rapport à une vision libérale) ;

- influence, mais non pas directe, à travers leurs participations au débat politique (intervention médiatique, travail pour une compréhension qui va maintenir le soutien pour la réforme démocratique etc.) ;

- caractère d'intermédiaires dans les deux sens (entre la politique et la vision au niveau global et au niveau local).

Ce qui les situe plutôt comme des acteurs-médiateurs qui ont des traits communs avec l'intellectuel engagé.

Etant en quelque sorte médiateurs dans les deux sens, les *think-tanks* sont des médiateurs d'information vers les réseaux internationaux qui, de leur part, représentent des « banques de données » pour les institutions de gouvernance internationale. L'initiative de *Freedom House* de regrouper les instituts indépendants en politiques publiques dans le blocs ex-soviétiques est lancée en 1997 à Budapest (*Freedom House's Regional Think Tank Initiative* (RTTI)). En 1999, est créé *The Global Development Network* (GDN), une association d'instituts de recherche et *think-tanks*, une initiative lancée par la BM, en coopération avec les NU. L'objectif consiste à créer un réseau entre les instituts dans le monde et à développer une recherche pluridisciplinaire (politique, économique, sociologique, anthropologique), pour informer la politique à un niveau national et global.

Rôles et contextes

Qu'est-ce que c'est qu'un centre de recherche, désigné *think-tanks*, en Bulgarie ?

Dans l'expérience des autres pays, le terme, au départ, dans les années 60, désigne les organisations de recherche à contrats, mais le sens plus large d'instituts de recherche en politique publique est adopté après 1970. Le type de rôles que ces structures se proposent est assez différent. Ces différences sont liées souvent aux caractéristiques des systèmes politiques dans les contextes. D'après NIRA⁵² un rangement par type des *think-tanks*

rend compte des variétés régionales du monde, et peut nous renseigner des différences sociétales. Ainsi, *indépendant*, *ONG*, *affilié à une université*, *semi-gouvernemental*, *gouvernemental* sont des types organisationnels qu'on retrouve en proportions variables dans les régions. Si aux Etats Unis (58%) et en Europe de l'Ouest (70 %) les *think-tanks indépendants* sont en plus grand nombre, en Europe de l'Est ce type est de 18%. Par contre, le statut d'*ONG* et *non-lucrative* est le plus fréquent en Europe de l'Est – 55%.

La dénomination est-elle alors exogène ? Les organisations des *think-tanks* seront-elles toujours des *hybrides* par rapport aux *modèles* ? Les *think-tanks* américains et britanniques étant en quelque sorte idéal-typiques pour les formations « tardives » de l'Europe de l'Est, tout comme les identifications aux théories (libérales, conservatrices etc....) pour leurs homologues.

Les *think-tanks* sont analysés comme une force dirigeante pendant le thatcherisme en Grande Bretagne par Richard Cockett⁵³. « La renaissance économique néolibérale du thatchérisme a été portée par une « contre-révolution intellectuelle » d'« environ cinquante personnes »⁵⁴. Les *think-tanks* de ce moment ont joué le rôle de laboratoires vite constitués et sachant saisir le moment. La conception d'institutionnalisation de la « contre-révolution intellectuelle » reste marquée par le commencement du *Mont Pèlerin Society* à la fin des années 40⁵⁵ et pendant les décennies suivantes a été manifestée par quelques *think-tanks* : *The Institute of Economic Affairs*, *The Center for Policy Studies*, *Adam Smith Institute*. Ces institutions ont pu devenir des supports des idées néolibérales.

Des événements similaires sont observables aux USA. La compréhension de l'ère néolibérale de Reagan n'est pas possible sans la reconnaissance du rôle des *think-tanks* ; ils existent dès le début des années 20, mais le remarquable essor de ces organisations de recherche en politiques publiques coïncide avec la « contre-révolution néolibérale ». Richard Cockett va jusqu'à la conclusion que le savoir-faire politique a été déplacé par les Conservateurs de la Maison Blanche aux *think-tanks* mêmes ; le *lieder* de cette communauté para-politique a joué la *foundation Heritage*.

Chercher une analogie dans les processus en Bulgarie s'avérera une tentative désespérée. Même une distinction libéral/conservateur n'est pas performante en Bulgarie... Nous pouvons définir les *think-tanks* en

Europe de l'Est comme des 'hybrides', formations qui réunissent des traits de plusieurs types d'organisations – instituts de recherche et d'élaboration de politiques, d'expertises, d'analyses. Dans la plupart des cas, ils définissant leurs objectifs comme (néo)libéraux. Pourtant leurs recherches ne peuvent pas être classées sous ce label ou au moins, ici, ce dernier n'a pas tout à fait la même signification. *L'Agence d'Analyses Sociales* a réalisé des analyses sur la pauvreté, la stratification sociale en post-communisme ; Le *Centre de Stratégies Libérales*, après 1999, a orienté ses analyses vers les stratégies de démocratisation durable dans les Balkans, l'agenda de la société civile en Europe de Sud-Est, la criminalité organisée, le *Centre d'Etudes de la Démocratie*, en partenariat avec d'autres ONG, a initié la *Coalition 2000* sur et contre la corruption, etc....

Le mode de financement est un autre point de divergence entre les *think-tanks* en Amérique du Nord et en Europe de l'Est. Ces derniers, comme toutes les ONG, sont créés grâce aux fonds venant de l'extérieur du pays⁵⁶. Leurs sources de revenus les plus récurrentes proviennent des fondations qui fonctionnent par des contrats de recherche : *Open Society Fund* (le plus grand sponsor pour le tiers secteur en Bulgarie), *Freedom House*, *German Marshal Fund of the United States*, *VolkswagenStiftung*, Allemagne ; et par des grands *think-tanks* comme *International Republican Institute of the US*, *Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies* ; la deuxième source de financement sont les Institutions européennes et internationales par l'intermédiaire de la Délégation de la Commission européenne en Bulgarie, le Programme PHARE de la Commission européenne, le Ministère des affaires étrangères de la Hollande, le Programme de Développement des Nations Unies (UNDP) ; les sources en provenance des sociétés économiques restent peu et aléatoires. Par contre, les *think-tanks* états-unis sont subventionnés par les structures de l'Etat (Gouvernement, Congrès etc.) et le secteur privé.

L'influence des *think-tanks* est-elle si grande ? Analysons le « pool » organisé en 2002 par le *Centre de Stratégies Libérales*, l'agence de sondages d'opinion publique *Alpha research*, BTV (la Chaîne télévisée la plus regardée), *L'opinion publique et la délinquance* qui représente une *mise en abyme* (si nous pouvons nous permettre d'emprunter ce terme littéraire) de l'influence que les *think-tank* voudraient exercer. Un sondage d'opinion sur la délinquance est suivi d'une réunion de 3 jours entre experts, hommes politiques et citoyens. Les citoyens interviewés reçoivent

des matériaux d'information, participent à des discussions entre eux, à des sessions plénières où ils posent leurs questions aux experts. A la fin de la troisième journée, le même sondage est répété. Le bilan enregistre une différence considérable entre le premier et le deuxième sondage ; et démontre quelle aurait été l'opinion publique si tous les individus avaient eu la possibilité de recevoir plus d'information et la motivation de chercher à devenir des « citoyens bien informés ».

Autrement dit, c'est l'objectif même des *think-tanks*. Mais cette conclusion, tirée d'une expérimentation, ne pose-t-elle pas la question du chemin entre le travail, les objectifs des *think-tanks* et leurs destinataires réels ?

Ivan Krastev⁵⁷ avance l'hypothèse que les *think-tanks* en Europe sont devenus des acteurs influents non pas grâce à eux-mêmes, mais en raison d'autres acteurs et de facteurs extérieurs à eux-mêmes comme le manque de confiance entre les gouvernements de réforme et l'administration, l'insuffisance politique des partis politiques, l'incapacité des structures académiques et universitaires de l'Etat de se réorienter vers des recherches appliquées.

En même temps, les *think-tanks* ne veulent pas se positionner en tant que laboratoires de recherche rattachés à des partis politiques. Si on les compare, encore un fois, dans le contexte européen, avec les fondations politiques allemandes, on verra que ces dernières sont leurs plus grands rivaux en ce qui concerne la capture de l'imagination politique. Mais les fondations allemandes agissent en tant qu'unités de recherche rattachées aux partis⁵⁸.

Cette étude a ses limites. Elle ne se propose pas d'étudier ces centres en tant qu'entité managériale et se situer dans une sociologie des organisations ; ni de se focaliser sur les acteurs (itinéraires etc.). Une analyse sur les participations des représentants en tant que conseillers auprès des institutions du secteur public serait très intéressante, mais cette direction n'est pas notre but non plus. En se servant d'éléments hétéroclites – de la sociologie de la connaissance et des intellectuels, des études recombinautes de Szelényi, d'analyse du discours, elle se concentre surtout sur les interventions dans l'espace public, sur le discours

et les arguments mobilisés. Dans ce sens, ces observations ont été faites à partir, tout d'abord de sites des *think-tanks* bulgares aussi bien que des réseaux internationaux (qui sont très développés et représentent des véritables bases de données électroniques), des projets et des recherches réalisées par des centres, des publications dans la presse des experts des *think-tanks* entre 1994 et 2000, en accentuant les moments de crise.

Cette recherche essaie de proposer une approche « compréhensive » des *think-tanks*, facilement ignorés si on n'accepte pas le terme ou bien critiquable si on les réduit à de simples laboratoires d'élaboration de politiques néolibérales de domination. Dans un pays en « transition », le rôle de ces centres, instituts ou fondations, relativise la perspective. Définis par le même label, loin dans les ramifications des réseaux transnationaux, situés dans une région sans pertinence structurelle dans le contexte globalisé, ces structures néanmoins sont un acteur important dans la restructuration de la recherche en sciences sociales et de l'espace public des médias.

La discussion sur les différentes fonctions de l'intellectuel aujourd'hui est-elle à jamais discréditée?

Il vaudrait mieux rappeler, au risque de répéter des choses « dites et écrites », qu'aujourd'hui, l'intellectuel ne se fait pas l'interprète de la parole divine, mais de l'opinion publique, d'une efficacité plus immédiate ; il n'est plus conseiller du prince. Le projet de la reprise du même rôle romantique du poète par un nouvel acteur restera voué par lui-même à l'échec. Aujourd'hui, après le « désenchantement du monde », l'intellectuel ne peut plus être pensé à travers le prisme de ses fonctions. Si son rôle de guide, de prophète consacré ou bien de critique toujours rejetant l'ordre existant ne sont plus possibles, ils restent tout de même des phénomènes actuels qui nous provoquent à le reconsidérer.

NOTES

- 1 Dans le cadre de notre thèse en cours de préparation à l'EHESS, Paris.
- 2 I. Znepolski, dans son livre *Weber i Bourdieu – podhodi kam inteligentziata*, Dom na naukite za tchoveka i obchestvoto, Sofia, 2003, en comparant les outils que les deux sociologues peuvent nous proposer pour aborder les phénomènes dans les pays « en transition », mentionne la difficulté d'envisager les intellectuels en Bulgarie dans le cadre du « champ » bourdieusien.
- 3 G. Eyal, I. Szélenyi, E. Townsley, *Making capitalism without capitalists* (Class formation and elite struggles in post-communist Central Europe), Verso, London & New York, 1998, p.7.
- 4 C. Charle, *Les intellectuels en Europe au XIX^e siècle*, Seuil, 2001 (première édition 1996).
- 5 K. Mannheim, *Ideology and utopia*, A Harvest/HBJ Book Publishers, San Diego New Yourk London, 1985.
- 6 P. Ory & J. F. Sirinelli, *Les intellectuels en France de l'affaire Dreyfus à nos jours*, P., Armand Colin, 1992, p. 5.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 9.
- 8 R. Aron, *L'Opium des intellectuels*, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1955, p. 219.
- 9 J. Benda, *La trahison des clercs*, Grasset, Paris, 1975 (première édition 1927).
- 10 W. Lepenies, *La fin de l'utopie et le retour de la mélancolie. Regards sur les intellectuels d'un vieux continent*, Collège de France, 1992, p. 20.
- 11 A. Pleșu, « Intellectual life under dictatorship », in *Repretations* 49, 1995, pp. 61-71.
- 12 G. Konrád & I. Szélenyi, *La marche au pouvoir des intellectuels. Le cas des pays de l'Est*, P., Seul, 1979 (1978).
- 13 I. Szélenyi, *The rise of managerialism: the "new class" after the fall of communism*, paper, Collegium Budapest, Budapest, 1995, pp. 6-7.
- 14 C. Charle, *Naissance des « intellectuels » 1880-1900*, Minuit, Paris, 1990, p.10.
- 15 J. Szacki,, *Liberalism after communism*, Central European University press, Budapest, 1995.
- 16 Révisé à plusieurs reprise par des sociologues et des historiens, le concept « transition » est employé dans notre texte entre guillemets. Nous partageons le scepticisme des critiques de la notion trop finaliste qui prévoit une fin des changements et une « entrée triomphale » dans les normes des Démocraties.
- 17 La chronologie des gouvernements après les premières élections libres en 1991 se présente de la manière suivante :
 - XI 1991-XII 1992 – gouvernement « ultra-libéral » de Filip Dimitrov (UFD, pas de majorité absolue) ;
 - XII 1992-VI 1993 – gouvernement « centre gauche » de Luben Bérov (soutenu par le groupe socialiste de l'opposition parlementaire) ;
 - Gouvernement intérimaire de Rénéta Indjova (indépendante) ;

- XII 1994-I 1997 – gouvernement socialiste de Jean Vidénov (PS, majorité absolue) ;
- Gouvernement intérimaire de Stéfan Sofianski (UFD) ;
- V 1997-VI 2001 – gouvernement d'Ivan Kostov (UFD, majorité absolue)
- VI 2001-VI 2005 – gouvernement Siméon Saxe-Cobourg- Gotha (NDSII).
- 18 I. Krastev "Post-communist think-tanks, Making and faking influence", in D. Stone et A. Denham (ed.), *Think tank traditions. Policy research and politics of ideas*, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 2004, p. 140-161, p. 152.
- 19 A ce renversement discursif se sont intéressé plusieurs analystes parmi
- 20 lesquels Orlin Spasov, Liliana Déyanova, Ivaylo Znepolski, Stefan Popov.
- Notre étude se limite à la presse. Sans doute, elle aurait plus de sources
- convaincantes si elle prenait en considération la télévision ; cependant, le
- volume d'un travail empirique pareil dépasserait le cadre de ce projet.
- 21 *Coultoura*, n°22, 4 juin 1999.
- 22 I. Krastev (2004), op.cit.
- 23 D'après la formule de Foucault, « Comment se débarrasser du marxisme », in *Dits et Ecrits II*, t. I, Paris, Gallimard, 1994.
- 24 G. Lozanov, O. Spasov, L. Déyanova, *Medii i prehod (Media et transition)*, Tzentar za razvitie na mediite, Sofia, 2000. Voir en particulier le texte d'O. Spasov du même titre.
- 25 Nous allons utiliser cette désignation avec toutes les réserves. Elle va nous permettre de parler de tous les pays qui ont connu l'expérience du communisme, sans s'attarder sur les disputes concernant les manières de découper l'Europe et les arguments géopolitiques, idéologiques ou autres.
- 26 Cités par Ivan Krastev, *The Liberal Estate: Reflexions on the Politics of think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe*, in, « Think Tanks and Civil Society. Catalysts for Ideas and action », New Brunswick : Transaction Publisher, 2000.
- 27 Source - les papiers du *Centre de stratégies libérales*, Sofia et *Freedom House*.
- 28 Les bases internationales de données des *think-tanks* sur lesquelles sont basées nos observations sont : Freedom House, *Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe: A Comprehensive Directory*, 1999 (première édition 1997) ; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), Japon, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).
- 29 *Op. cit.*, pages sur la Bulgarie : pp.33-64.
- 30 Cette insistance d'identifier des structures antérieures similaires rappelle peut-être la recherche des ancêtres...
- 31 *Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe: A Comprehensive Directory*, Freedom House, 1999, p.1.
- 32 R. Struyk, *Reconstructive critics: think tanks in post-soviet bloc democracies*, Urban Institute Press, Washington, 1999.

- 33 J. G McGann & R. K. Weaver (eds), *Think tank and civil societies: catalysts for ideas and action*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N J, 2000.
- 34 D. Stone, A. Denham, M. Garnett, *Think tanks across nations. Comparative approach*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1998.
- 35 Voir la bibliographie à la fin de notre texte.
- 36 P. Bourdieu, *Contre-feux I*, Liber-Raisons d'Agir, Paris, 1998 ; P. Bourdieu, *Contre-feux II*, Liber-Raisons d'Agir, Paris, 1998.
- 37 P. Bourdieu, *Contre-feux I*, Liber-Raisons d'Agir, Paris, 1998.
- 38 *Ibid.*
- 39 K. Dixon, *Les évangélistes du marché. Les Intellectuels britanniques et le néo-libéralisme*, Raisons d'agir, Paris, 1998, p. 10.
- 40 L. Wacquant, *Les prisons de la misère*, Liber-Raisons d'Agir, Paris, 1998.
- 41 G. Eyal, I. Szelenyi, E. Townsley, op. cit. ; I. Szelenyi, *Circulation or reproduction of elites during Post Communist transformation in Eastern Europe*, conference, Social Science Research Council, sept. 1994.
- 42 G. Eyal, I. Szelenyi, E. Townsley, op. cit., p.7.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- 44 L. Déyanova, « Nevazmojnata kriticheska poublichnost » (L'impossible publicité critique), in Lozanov, G., Deyanova, L., Spasov, O. (ed), *Medii i prehod*, Tzentar za razvitie na mediite, Sofia, 2000, p. 254.
- 45 I. Krastev (2000), op.cit.
- 46 *Ibid.*
- 47 Le terme *path-dependency* de David Stark utilisé pour analyser les changements dans les pays post-communistes est très proche du concept bourdieusien de *capital social*.
- 48 Voir sur ce sujet l'étude de Roumen Daskalov « Transformatzii na balgarskata inteligentzia » (Transformation de l'intelligentsia bulgare), in R. Daskalov, *Mejdu Iztoka i Zapada. Balgarski kulturni dilemi (Entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Dilemmes culturels bulgares)*, LIK, Sofia, 1998, p. 226.
- 49 F. Dosse, *La marche des idées. Histoire des intellectuels, histoire intellectuelle*, La Découverte, Paris, 2003.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 316.
- 51 D. Stone, *Capturing the political imagination: think tanks and the policy process*, OR. : Frank Cass, London; Portland, 1996.
- 52 National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), Japon.
- 53 R. Cockett, *Thinking the unthinkable: think tanks and the economic counter-revolution 1931-1983*, London, Harper Collins, London , 1995.
- 54 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 55 *Ibid.*, pp. 100-121.
- 56 Par exemple, en 1995, les dons des USA seulement pour des organisations humanitaires s'élèvent à 144 milliards de dollars ou bien 2% du PNB, tandis qu'en Bulgarie la grande partie des petits entrepreneurs sont aux prises avec

le contexte chaotique pour survivre. Source : Access fondation, *Le troisième secteur : conclusions de la chronique du développement* (1990-2002), 2002, Sofia.

⁵⁷ I. Krastev (2004), *op. cit.* A part les travaux d'Ivan Krastev et de Liliana Deyanova sur les think-tanks en Bulgarie et dans la région, il faudrait mentionner la thèse en préparation de Dostena Angélova-Lavergne, LAIOS, EHESS.

⁵⁸ Sur la question du rôle des fondations politiques allemandes en tant qu'acteurs dans la politique étrangère, voir les publications de Dorota Dakowska.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

- BENDA, J., *La trahison des clercs*, Grasset, Paris, 1975 (première édition 1927)
- BOGGS, C., *The End of politics. Corporate power and the decline of the public sphere*, The Guilford press, New York London, 2000
- BOURDIEU, P., *Contre-feux I et II*, Liber-Raisons d'Agir, Paris, 1998
- BOURDIEU, P., *Homo academicus*, Minuit, Paris, 1984
- BOURDIEU, P., *Les Règles de l'art*, Seuil, Paris, 1992
- BOZOKI, A. (ed.), *Intellectuals and politics in Central Europe*, Central European University press, Budapest, 1999
- BROADY, D., SAINT MARTIN, M. de, CHMATKO, N. (eds), *Formation des élites et culture transnationale*, CSEC, EHESS, Paris & SEC, ILU, Uppsala, 1997
- CHARLE, C., *Les intellectuels en Europe au XIXe siècle*, Seuil, Paris, 2001 (première édition 1996)
- CHARLE, C., *Naissance des « intellectuels » 1880-1900*, Minuit, Paris, 1990
- COCKETT, R., *Thinking the unthinkable: think tanks and the economic counter-revolution 1931-1983*, London, Harper Collins, 1995
- DAYNOV, E., *Politicheskiat debat i prehodat v Balgaria*, Balgarska nauka I kultura, Sofia, 2000
- DEYANOVA, L., « Les combats pour la sociologie », in *Transitions*, ULB, Bruxelles, vol. XLII, n° 1 2001
- DEYANOVA, L., « Nevazmojnata kriticheska poublichnost » (L'impossible publicité critique), in Lozanov, G., Deyanova, L., Spasov, O. (ed), *Medii i prehod*, Tzentar za razvitie na mediite, Sofia, 2000
- DIXON, K., *Les évangélistes du marché. Les Intellectuels britanniques et le néo-libéralisme*, Raisons d'agir, Paris, 1998
- DURANDIN, C. (ed.), *L'Engagement des intellectuels à l'Est : mémoires et analyses de Roumanie et de Hongrie*, Harmattan, Paris, 1994
- EYAL, G., SZELÉNYI, I., TOWNSLEY, E., *Making capitalism without capitalists (Class formation and elite struggles in post-communist Central Europe)*, Verso, London & New York, 1998
- HIRSCHMAN, A., *Deux siècles de rhétorique réactionnaire*, Fayard, Paris, 1991
- HOLMES, S., *Cultural Legacies or State collapse? (Probing the Postcommunist Dilemma)*, Paper, Collegium Budapest, 1995
- KONRAD, G. & SZELÉNYI, I., *La marche au pouvoir des intellectuels. Le cas des pays de l'Est*, Seuil, Paris, 1979
- KRASTEV, I., « Post-communist think-tanks, Making and faking influence », in D. Stone et A. Denham (ed.), *Think tank traditions. Policy research and politics of ideas*, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 2004, p. 140-161
- KRASTEV, I., « The Liberal Estate: Reflexions on the Politics of Think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe », in *Think Tanks and Civil Society. Catalysts for Ideas and action*, Transaction Publisher, New Brunswick, 2000
- LEBARON, F., *Le savant, le politique et la mondialisation*, Ed. du Croquant, Savoir/agir, Paris, 2003

- LEPENIES, W., *La fin de l'utopie et le retour de la mélancolie. Regards sur les intellectuels d'un vieux continent*, Collège de France, Paris, 1992
- LOZANOV, G., SPASOV, O., DÉYANOVA, L., *Medii i prehod (Media et transition)*, Sofia, Tzentar za razvitie na mediite, Sofia, 2000
- MANNHEIM, K., *Ideology and utopia. An introduction to the sociology of knowledge*, A Harvest/HBJ Book Publishers, San Diego New York London, 1985 /première édition/ 1929
- MEGANN, J. G & WEAVER, R. K. (eds), *Think tank and civil societies : catalysts for ideas and action*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N J, 2000
- ORY, P. & SIRINELLI, J. F., *Les intellectuels en France de l'affaire Dreyfus à nos jours*, Armand Colin, Paris, 1992
- PLEȘU, A., « Intellectual life under dictatorship », in *Representations* 49, 1995, pp. 61-71
- STARK, D., BRUSZT, L., *Postsocialist Pathways, Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 1998
- STEFANCIC, J. & DELGADO, R., *No mercy. How Conservative think tanks and foundations changed America's social agenda*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1996
- STONE, D., « Acting Locally, Regionally and Globally: Think Tanks and Transnational Policy Debate », in *Think Tanks as Civil Society Catalysts in the MENA Region : Fulfilling Their Potential*, CIPE, 1999
- STONE, D., *Capturing the political imagination: think tanks and the policy process*, London ; Portland, OR. : Frank Cass, 1996.
- STONE, D., DENHAM, A., GARNETT, M., *Think tanks across nations. Comparative approach*, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 1998
- STRUYK, R., *Reconstructive critics: think tanks in post-soviet bloc democracies*, Urban Institute Press, Washington, 1999
- SZACKI, J., *Liberalism after communism*, Budapest, Central European University press, Budapest, 1995
- SZELÉNYI, I., « The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Autocritical Reflection on The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power », in *Politics and Society* Vol.15 N.2 1986/87 pp. 103-144
- SZELÉNYI, I., *The rise of managerialism: the "new class" after the fall of communism*, paper, Collegium Budapest, Budapest, 1995
- Think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe : a comprehensive directory*, Freedom house, Washington, DC, 1997
- TODOROV, T., « Les taons et les modernes » in Borie, J., Todorov, T., Crouzet, M., *La mort de l'intellectuel*, Mesure, Paris, n 2, 1989, pp. 21-29
- WACQUANT, L., *Les prisons de la misère*, Liber-Raisons d'Agir, Paris, 1998
- WEBER, M., *Le savant et le politique*, Paris, Plon, 1971
- WESSELY, A. (ed.), *Intellectuals and the politics of the humanities*, Collegium Budapest, Budapest, 2002
- ZNEPOLSKI, I., *Weber I Bourdieu – podhodi kam inteligentziata*, Dom na naukite za tchoveka i obchtestvoto, Sofia, 2003



MUSTAFA FIŞNE

Born in 1970, in Sivas, Turkey

Ph.D, European Community Institute, Marmara University, Istanbul (2002)

Dissertation: An Analysis of the Copenhagen Political Criteria from the Perspective of 'Being a European State'

Lecturer, Afyon Kocatepe University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences

Jean Monnet Scholarship, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK, 2003-2004

Participation in international conferences

Several articles in European Studies

Book:

Political Conditions for 'Being a European State' – The Copenhagen Political Criteria and Turkey, Afyon Kocatepe University Publication, Afyon, 2003

THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY ROMANIA, BULGARIA AND TURKEY ON THEIR WAY TO EU MEMBERSHIP

Introduction

Attracted mainly by the prosperity, security, and stability produced within the borders of the European Union (EU – previously known as the European Community), many neighboring countries have applied for membership of this supranational organization throughout its history. There have been five rounds of enlargement so far, the most recent of which being the largest in terms of scope and diversity,¹ involving thirteen countries (plus Croatia which was added later), ten of which joined the EU as new member states in May 2004.

The fifth round of enlargement began at the end of the Cold War, when a number of countries from Central and Eastern Europe, including Romania and Bulgaria, asked for membership of the EU. This resulted in the conclusion of Association Agreements with those countries. Like the Association Agreements concluded previously with Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus, these agreements also recognized the parties' intentions to join the EU.² The Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 not only confirmed the eligibility of these countries for membership, it also formulated the criteria – often referred to as 'the Copenhagen criteria' – that these countries would need to meet before joining the EU.³

Following their formal accession applications, the presentation of the Commission's opinion⁴ in 1997 on the appropriateness of awarding candidate status to each country in question marked another important stage in the enlargement process. Based on this assessment, the Luxembourg European Council decided to launch a general enlargement process the same year. Turkey was implicitly excluded from this process until the corrective decision of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, which stated that, "Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States."⁵

Accession negotiations were formally opened with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus in March 1998,⁶ and the same was done with the six other candidate countries of Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and the Slovak Republic, close to two years later, in February 2000.⁷ In April 2003, ten of these countries, with the exceptions of Bulgaria and Romania, signed Accession Treaties with the EU, providing them with full membership status from May 2004 onwards. After repeated reassurances at many European Council meetings⁸ as to their joining the EU in 2007, both Romania and Bulgaria signed Accession Treaties with the EU in April 2005, slating them in for EU membership in 2007,⁹ with an option for a one-year delay to their membership if they do not complete the necessary reform measures and meet their commitments to the EU during this time.

Turkey remained the only applicant country for which there was no fixed date for accession negotiations to begin. However, it was ultimately decided by the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 that Turkey's candidature would be reviewed at the end of 2004 and that this country would be able to start accession negotiations with the EU without delay, providing it fully complied with the Copenhagen political criteria.¹⁰ Acting according to this commitment, in December 2004, the Brussels European Council set the date for opening accession negotiations with Turkey as 3 October 2005, with the condition that Turkey meet some extra requirements by that time. It also established 17 March 2005 as the date for opening accession negotiations with Croatia, which had been included in the fifth round of enlargement by the previous European Council.¹¹ This date was subsequently put back by the European Council due to the failure of Croatia to meet the pre-condition of full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in respect of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

The dates for the basic steps taken by each country in the fifth round of EU enlargement are given below, in Table 1, and can be used to compare the progress of the different countries on their journey to EU membership. It shows that, by comparison with the other applicant countries, the accession processes for Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey have taken longer than for other countries.

Table 1. Dates for the Basic Steps in the Fifth Enlargement Round of the EU

Country	Ass. Agr.	Acc. App.	Acc. Neg.	Acc. Tre.	Dur. (Years)
Cyprus	1972	1990	1998	2004	32 / 14
Malta	1970	1990	2000	2004	34 / 14
Slovenia	1996	1996	1998	2004	8 / 8
Czech R.	1993	1996	1998	2004	11 / 8
Estonia	1995	1995	1998	2004	9 / 9
Hungary	1991	1994	1998	2004	13 / 10
Poland	1991	1994	1998	2004	13 / 10
Latvia	1995	1995	2000	2004	9 / 9
Lithuania	1995	1995	2000	2004	9 / 9
Slovakia	1993	1995	2000	2004	11 / 9
Romania	1993	1995	2000	2007*	14 / 12*
Bulgaria	1993	1995	2000	2007*	14 / 12*
Turkey	1963	1987	2005*	????*	42+ / 18+*
Croatia	2001	2003	2005*	2009*	8 / 6*

* Planned

From left to right, the columns show the dates for the Association Agreement, Accession Application, Accession Negotiation, Accession Treaty, and the total duration of the membership process for each country. It is best to compare the duration of Turkey's membership process with those of Cyprus and Malta, since these three countries have the oldest Association Agreements and Accession Applications. The lengths of the membership processes for Romania and Bulgaria should be compared with those of the other countries that have similar dates for the same two steps. Compared in this way, Turkey is seen to have the longest membership process (if at all its membership is planned, which is not certain). Turkey has 42+ years, starting from the date of its Association Agreement (1963),

or 18+ years, starting from the date of its Accession Application (1987). The duration for Cyprus is 32/14 (Association Agreement/Accession Application) and 34/14 for Malta. Similarly, Romania and Bulgaria will have the longest durations for the membership process among the other countries in their comparison group at 14 or 12 years for both countries, depending whether the start date is taken as 1993 or 1995.

The research question of this study arises from this fact, and is formulated as follows: "Why did Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey lag behind the other applicant countries in the fifth enlargement round of the EU? (Or were Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey left behind by the EU? If so, why?)"

It is logically clear that the aim of this study is "to find a satisfactory explanation to the given questions by examining the basic factors behind the delayed membership of the three countries to the EU." In other words, this study will seek to arrive at a consistent and satisfactory interpretation of the differences seen in the above table for Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, when compared with the other applicant countries involved in the fifth round of enlargement of the EU.

In terms of method, this study will rely on an extensive review of the relevant literature, as well as a number of interviews and discussions with experts in the field¹² in order to gather additional information as to the resultant difficulties and gain more insight into the matter.

I. Factors in the Delayed EU Membership of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey

The explanation arrived at in this study as to the reasons for the delayed EU membership of the countries in question depends on two basic types of factors: external (exogenous) factors and internal (indigenous) factors. The first group of factors relates to the difficulties faced by these countries in attracting the EU to the idea of their becoming members; the second group relates to the difficulties faced by the three countries in complying with the EU membership criteria. This study first presents a brief discussion of the external factors, and then moves on to an in-depth examination of the internal factors.

1. Difficulties Faced by Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in Attracting the EU

In terms of external factors affecting Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, it can be argued that European mental barriers vis-à-vis these countries have caused varying levels of difficulty in attracting the EU to the idea of their membership. These mental obstacles (or prejudices) have two causes: namely, cultural and religious differences, and the negative image in Europe created both during Communism and immediately after its collapse. Mental barriers based on cultural and religious differences have had a particularly negative impact for Turkey's membership of the EU, while those arising from the negative image in Europe during and after Communism have affected negatively the membership processes for Romania and Bulgaria, most particularly that of Romania.

It is an undeniable fact that many people in Europe today still have a mental map of Europe that was drawn on cultural and religious grounds, notably that of the historically-rooted Christianity vs. Islam dichotomy. As Wallace has put it, in this view "Europe" is synonymous with Christianity and can be defined distinctly in these terms. The borders of "Europe" are drawn where the footprints of Christianity fade out and give way to other religions.¹³

Such a definition of Europe inevitably creates strong mental barriers among some Europeans to Turkish EU membership based on that country's perceived differences in terms of history, culture, and religion. These barriers can be found both among ordinary people and certain academic and political elites who define Europe as such in repeated political statements and academic studies. To supporters of this view, Turkey is mostly an Asiatic country, located on the periphery of "Europe", and with many major differences.¹⁴ It thus has no place in "the European civilizational project."¹⁵

It is thus clear how these mental barriers, based on cultural and religious differences, have had a negative impact on Turkey's membership of the EU. Indeed, Huntington underlines this as the sole factor behind the delay to Turkey's membership.¹⁶

Similarly, there is also some scope to discuss the impact of the same mental barriers in the case of Romania's and Bulgaria's membership if the above-mentioned argument as to the definition of Europe is taken further to differentiate between Western Christianity and Eastern Christianity. By assuming it is the former that is the faith of Europe rather

than the latter, as Khleif said in citing Bernard-Henri Levy, "Europe feels that its border implicitly stops somewhere around the limits of Catholic Europe – certainly before the complexities of the Balkans."¹⁷ The present map of the EU, with its new border between Hungary and Romania, appears to back up this claim. In fact, of the countries involved in the EU's fifth enlargement process (listed in Table 1 above), it is Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey which are predominantly eastern Orthodox and Muslim. This is likely to be a reflection of existing mental barriers, rather than mere coincidence.

There are, however, other, more obvious, grounds for the existence of mental barriers in terms of Romania's and Bulgaria's EU membership. These arise from the negative images these countries have in Europe that were created both during Communism and in its immediate aftermath. The negative images created during the Communist era derive from the fact that there was no strong resistance against the regime in either country. This argument is perhaps best formulated by Kundera, who claimed the existence of a clear difference between the Central European countries (Poland, Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia) and those of Southern Europe (Romania and Bulgaria) in terms of their European identity. He bases this argument on the lack of strong opposition movements against the Communist regimes in the Southern European countries as compared to the Central European countries.¹⁸ Reflecting this view, Petrescu underlines that having been seen to be 'rebellious' during Communism determined the European institutions to choose a more rapid adoption process for Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia than it did for Romania and Bulgaria (both seen as 'non-rebellious' in the past).¹⁹ In other words, it is possible to talk about the existence of a more sympathetic attitude in the EU in assessing the membership requests of Central European countries than for Eastern European countries, based on past attitudes towards Communism.

For Romania, this negative image was strengthened further in the first years of the post-1989 era due to the policies and events in the country at the time. Media coverage of the December 1989 Revolution unintentionally created an image of Romania among the European public as a country of violence and poverty.²⁰ More importantly, Romania was still seen by many international observers as a 'neo-Communist' state, re-modeled on the ideas Gorbachev devised to reform the former Soviet Union.²¹ This assessment was made based on a number of aspects of Romania's post-1989 existence. First, the party that gained and held power

until 1996 was made up of second-ranking members of the former Communist Party. Second, of all other former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, Romania was the only country to sign a treaty of friendship with the former Soviet Union (April 1991).²² Last, though perhaps not the least, there was the use of violent means to suppress demonstrations, as in the case of *mineriade* in 1990-1991 and the reaction to inter-ethnic violence in Targu Mures, which cost five lives and left hundreds injured.²³ Combined with the poor progress in terms of reform during these years, these developments served to strengthen the negative image of Romania in Europe and thus provided grounds for the creation of mental barriers in terms of EU membership. It was only during the second half of the 1990s that this negative perception began to change, slowly, into a more positive view, in parallel with a change in Romanian politics and the newly emerged strategic and geopolitical plans of the EU for the region.

The threat of instability in the region, as reflected by the dramatic events in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, encouraged the EU to turn against any such negative images of Romania and Bulgaria and include them in the fifth round of enlargement as candidate countries in 1997. However, soon after their inclusion, it was internal factors that were to determine the fate of these countries' membership of the EU. These factors will be examined below in detail, including those for Turkey.

2. Difficulties Faced by Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in Complying with the EU Membership Criteria

The most obvious internal (or indigenous) factors behind the delayed membership of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey to the EU can be seen in terms of the difficulties they face in complying with the necessary criteria. Formulated by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, these membership criteria – commonly known as the Copenhagen criteria – consist of the conditions in three fields: political, economic, and legal and administrative.

In the political field, applicant countries must achieve the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”²⁴ Compliance with these criteria is the most urgent for applicant countries since it is a pre-condition for the opening of the accession negotiations.

In the economic field, the criteria include “the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union.”²⁵ Put more simply, applicant countries must have functioning market economies and ensure the competitiveness of their economies before joining the EU. Compliance with the economic criteria is necessary before membership.

Finally, in the legal and administrative field, the membership criterion requires the “ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.”²⁶ In fact, this criterion has two aspects for applicant countries: the first is adoption of all EU legislation expressed in the treaties, secondary legislation, and the policies of the Union; the second is development of the judicial and administrative capacity necessary to implement and enforce them. The importance of the second aspect for a harmonious integration with the EU was first stressed by the Madrid European Council in December 1995 and repeated frequently at subsequent European Councils.²⁷ Like the economic criteria, the legal and administrative criteria must also be met before membership starts.

In addition to these “classic” membership criteria, both the Cologne European Council and the Helsinki European Council (June and December 1999, respectively) emphasized the importance of the meeting of nuclear safety standards by the candidate countries. This concerns Bulgaria in this study.²⁸

As a whole, these criteria constitute the basis on which each candidate country will be judged by the EU in deciding on their readiness for membership. However, it should be underlined that the date for membership can only be determined by the EU, in accordance with also its own capacity to absorb new members.²⁹

Having looked at the membership criteria, it becomes clear that achieving membership by meeting the criteria is no easy task and represents a tough challenge for the applicant countries. This is perhaps particularly so for Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, all of which have faced a number of common as well as country-specific difficulties. These difficulties are examined in the following pages.

A) Difficulties Common to Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey

Broad examination of the regular reports by the European Commission since 1998 on the progress of the each country towards accession EU³⁰ reveals the main common difficulties shared by the three countries in

respect of the political, economic, and legal and administrative criteria as well as the tasks to be achieved by these countries. They include reform of the judiciary; reform of the public administration; the fight against corruption; full and effective implementation of the reform measures and the *acquis*; prevention of police misconduct; and, finally, improvement of the situation in prisons. A recent statement by Romania's European integration ministry also underlines the presence of a compliance backlog in these areas. The statement says that there is still work to be done in the areas of transparency among magistrates, simplification of judiciary procedures, the fight against corruption, and protection of the Roma community (another difficulty faced by both Romania and Bulgaria that will be examined later on). As regards the full and effective implementation of the *acquis*, 85 commitments undertaken in the accession negotiations remained unfulfilled by Romania as of the end of May 2005.³¹

1. Reform of the Judiciary

The ultimate goal for the reform of the judiciary can be expressed as the creation of an independent, effective, efficient, and professional judicial system in the countries in question. The existence of such a judicial system is seen as a prerequisite, not only for guaranteeing the rule of law in these countries, but also for their effective participation in the internal market after membership. Requiring the transformation of the whole system inherited from the Communist regime, this has been one of the most difficult tasks for Romania and Bulgaria during the membership process. Indeed, both in terms of number and content, the following list of tasks to be achieved by the three countries to achieve reform of the judiciary during the membership process reflects the level of difficulty.

Common tasks to be achieved by the three countries include:

- Improving the operation (efficiency) of the judicial system
- Reinforcing the independence of the judiciary
- Combating corruption within the judiciary
- Improving court administration (decreasing workload of judges, solving the problem of understaffing, reducing the duration of proceedings and pre-trial detention time)
- Providing adequate training for the members of the judiciary.

There is also a list of tasks to be achieved by Romania and Bulgaria:

- Enforcing judicial decisions more effectively (solving the problem of non-execution)
- Developing transparency in case handling
- Improving the status and remuneration of the members of the judiciary
- Developing a human resources policy (establishing objective criteria for recruitment and career development for members of the judiciary)
- Ensuring access to legal aid
- Providing modern equipment and better working conditions in the courts
- Providing adequate financial resources for the judiciary and better budgetary procedures.

In addition to these common tasks, there are also many specific tasks for each country (Turkey has the longest list).

The specific tasks for Romania include:

- Developing a comprehensive strategy and action plan for the reform of the judiciary
- Ensuring equitable or consistent application of the law (this problem derives mainly from lack of access to case studies and court decisions)
- Increasing the quality of judgments
- Establishing legal certainty (this problem derives from extraordinary appeals by the General Prosecutor)
- Attracting and retaining more qualified staff.

The specific tasks for Bulgaria include:

- Changing the unusual structure of the investigation service³²
- Restoring public confidence in the judiciary
- Limiting the immunity of the judges.

The specific tasks for Turkey include:

- Addressing the question of the State Security Courts,³³

- Stopping the trial of civilians by the military courts in certain cases³⁴
- Complying with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments
- Making reparations for the consequences of convictions contrary to the ECtHR
- Addressing the question of Juvenile Courts³⁵
- Overcoming the problem of inconsistency in cases concerning freedom of expression
- Ensuring closer control by prosecutors in the investigation of cases.

Steps to address these challenges were not a priority in Romania for a long time, as reflected by the absence of a comprehensive reform strategy and action plan. Initial steps in this direction came with the amendments to the Civil Procedural Code in 1998 and the Law on the Organization of the Judiciary in 1999, the acceleration of cases, reinforcing of administrative capacity and independence of judicial system, and improvement to the status of judicial staff.³⁶ New revisions to the Civil Procedural Code in 2001 sped up the operation of the courts and improved the enforcement of judicial decisions.³⁷ Further significant steps in the reform of the judiciary were taken in 2003. The new Code of Criminal Procedure strengthened a number of fundamental freedoms and liberties in the trial process. In addition, amendments to the Constitution brought with them important reforms which declared the judiciary a separate and equal state power, effecting institutional changes and reinforcing the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time frame. Finally, the Judicial System Reform Strategy was adopted with the objective of ensuring legal certainty and conformity with the ECtHR, improving the quality of judgments, and enhancing the independence of the judiciary.³⁸ Progress in the reform of the judiciary continued during the following year through a three-law reform package that significantly improved the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary. All these steps have provided the basis for a more independent and efficient judicial system in Romania, provided there is effective implementation. However, there is need for further improvements in the management of court cases and the quality of judgments, as well as the independence of the judiciary on the ground.³⁹

The reform process in Bulgaria began in 1998, but lacked an overall strategy until 2001 when the Strategy for Reform of the Judicial System was adopted with the objectives of improving the judiciary in terms of

administration, management, human resources, and physical infrastructure.⁴⁰ The next step came in 2002 with the Action Plan for the implementation of the strategy and major amendments to the Law on the Judicial System, increasing the accountability and transparency of the judiciary through various anti-corruption measures and the introduction of objective criteria for recruitment and the promotion and training of magistrates.⁴¹ Further steps in the reform of the judiciary in Bulgaria were taken in 2003. While the amendments to the Civil Procedure Code concerned the mechanisms for enforcing judgments and reducing the duration of procedures, the amendments to the Law on the Judicial System made the judiciary more powerful vis-à-vis the executive. In addition, important amendments to the constitution were adopted, restricting the absolute immunity of magistrates to that of functional immunity and introducing permanent status for magistrates on the basis of certain criteria.⁴² Progress in this field continued into 2004 with further amendments to the Law on the Judicial System in line with the given constitutional changes. They also established clearer rules for the appointment and promotion of magistrates. However, the need remained for further a strengthening of the judiciary against political interference, improvement to working conditions for its members, the effective enforcement of judgments, a more efficient functioning of the judicial system with a faster pre-trial phase, and a strong campaign against corruption within the judiciary.⁴³

The first important step in the reform process in Turkey in this field came in 1999 with the Constitutional amendments that removed the military judge in the SSCs, abolished their competences for offences relating to organized crime and fraud in the banking sector, and provided detainees with access to a lawyer after 48 hours.⁴⁴ The next steps came in 2002 with the adoption of the third reform package which allowed for the retrial of convictions that are contrary to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).⁴⁵ Similarly, the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure were amended in 2003 in line with these provisions. In addition, while the amendments to the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedures for Military Courts ended military jurisdiction over civilians, the amendments to the Law on Juvenile Courts raised the upper age limit from 15 to 18 for young people tried in these courts. Finally, a law on the establishment of family courts was adopted to increase the efficiency of the court system.⁴⁶ Real breakthrough in the reform of the judiciary in Turkey, however, came in 2004. Through

amendments to the Constitution the SSCs were replaced by Regional Serious Felony Courts which had nearly the same procedures with the exception of the right of detainees to consult a lawyer immediately after being taken into custody. These also paved the way for the Turkish courts to apply the supremacy of international treaties ratified by the country over domestic legislation. Besides a new Penal Code in line with the modern European standards, which came into effect in 2005, the Law on Establishing the Intermediate Courts of Appeal was adopted to reduce the case load of the Court of Cassation. Moreover, amendments to the laws governing various special courts were also adopted to increase efficiency. However, there remained a need to reduce the duration of cases, ensure judicial supervision at the investigation stage, and strengthen the independence of the judiciary.⁴⁷

2. Reform of Public Administration

Administrative reform is also a comprehensive issue and has various aspects. Its overall goal for countries that are part of the EU membership process can be said to be to create an efficient, professional, independent, transparent, and accountable civil service; to build an adequate administrative capacity, both for the implementation of the *acquis* and the proper management of the EU assistance funds; to ensure the adaptation of the administration to the requirements of the market economy; and to achieve de-centralization and public participation.

Unlike in the field of judiciary reform, the number of common tasks for the three countries in the area of public administration reform is low. While, in a sense, public administration reform for Romania and Bulgaria means a re-establishing of the administrative system, for Turkey it implies a transformation of the system from one of a centralized, hierarchical, and secretive nature to a decentralized, participatory, transparent, responsive, and accountable model. Despite the differences, however, the following tasks need to be achieved by all the three countries:

- Improving the management and organizational structure of the public administration
- Ensuring the efficiency of public administration (e.g. decreasing red tape)
- Strengthening the fight against corruption, taking strong anti-corruption measures
- Ensuring the openness and transparency of public administration

- Achieving de-centralization
- Promoting a new administrative culture based on modern standards and practices.

There is also a list of tasks to be achieved by both Romania and Bulgaria during the membership process:

- Developing a comprehensive legislative framework for the reform of public administration
- Building an adequate administrative capacity with improved planning, policy-making, and evaluation, as well as developing inter-agency coordination and cooperation, and increasing public participation
- Separating the political and administrative functions of the executive,
- Creating a modern civil service (e.g. independent, efficient, professional, transparent, and accountable)
- Developing a career development policy for all public officials on the basis of objective criteria
- Establishing structures for the proper management of EU assistance funds
- Building better infrastructure and modern equipment.

In addition to these common tasks with Bulgaria, Romania also has a number of other specific tasks:

- Reinforcing the administrative bodies responsible for the reform of the administration
- Improving the budgeting process and expenditure management
- Ensuring and monitoring the implementation of policy decisions,
- Drawing up laws to protect citizens and control executive.

In Romania, though identified as a priority, progress in the reform of public administration was slow and narrow in scope. Lacking a general strategy until 2004, steps taken in this field mainly concentrated on decentralization and design of various institutional arrangements for the reform of public administration. A General Strategy Regarding the Acceleration of Public Administration Reform was adopted in 2001, implementation of which was to be monitored by an inter-ministerial

council headed by the Prime Minister. In addition, a new Law on Local Public Administration was adopted, extending and clarifying the decentralization process and providing local authorities with the necessary financial means.⁴⁸ And it was only in 2004 that the Public Administration Reform Strategy was adopted, which covers the areas of civil service reform, de-centralization and de-concentration, and policy coordination. The previously established Central Unit for Public Administration Reform became a General Directorate with increased operational capacity. However, there remains the need to implement planned measures, increase the training of civil servants, improve the financial authority and administrative capacity of local government, and for a strong campaign against corruption.⁴⁹

Contrary to the situation in Romania, the first step in this field for Bulgaria came in 1998 with the adoption of the Strategy to Establish a Modern Administrative System in the Republic of Bulgaria.⁵⁰ In line with this strategy, the Law on Public Administration and the Law on Civil Service were adopted to form the key legal framework for the reform of the administration over the subsequent years.⁵¹ A new Strategy for Modernization of the Public Administration was adopted in 2002, covering the period 2002-2005, and further revisions to the legislative framework were made to ensure progress in this field, involving establishing legality, loyalty, responsibility, stability, political neutrality, and hierarchical subordination as the general values of public administration.⁵² The Strategy was updated in 2003 to include the Program and Action Plan for its implementation. Furthermore, a Council for the Modernization of the State Administration was established and specific legislation was adopted in line with the updated strategy for the same year.⁵³ Tangible progress was made in public administration reform in 2004 through the amendments to the Civil Service Law, which provided a more precise definition of the civil service, mandatory competitive selection and the principle of merit for new civil servants, and performance appraisals. They also introduced a new classification system for positions at all levels in the administration. Despite this progress, however, there remains a need for a legislative framework for local administration, significant improvements in the management and organizational set up, a strengthening of administrative capacity, better infrastructure and equipment, and strong anti-corruption measures.⁵⁴

In Turkey, after a number of failed attempts, the first important steps in the reform of public administration came in 2002 with measures to

increase the efficiency and the transparent management of human resources in public service. In addition, the Action Plan on Enhancing Transparency and Good Governance in the Public Sector was adopted with proposals for restructuring the relationships between the central and the local administrations. Following further steps to increase transparency and efficiency in 2003, tangible progress was made in the reform of public administration in 2004. This involved the adoption of a four-law reform package to upgrade and transform the public administration in line with modern principles in this field, including de-centralization, participation, transparency, responsiveness, and accountability. Though initially vetoed by the President on the grounds that it violated the unitary character of public administration, the reform package partly came into force in July 2005 with nearly one year's delay.⁵⁵

3. The Fight against Corruption

The widespread problem of corruption in the three countries in question essentially derives from economic, legal, institutional, political, and financial factors. These include the involvement of the State in economic activities; the lack of a sound legal framework or global strategy for anti-corruption measures; the unclear division of tasks between responsible bodies and weak coordination and cooperation between these bodies; the lack of implementation and enforcement; the lack of appropriate sanctions; the widespread acceptance of corrupt practices; inadequate financial resources; low salaries; and cumbersome bureaucracy.

The common tasks to be carried out in this field by all three countries as part of the membership process are as follows:

- Developing a comprehensive approach to combating corruption
- Providing a sound legal basis for the fight against corruption, with a clear definition of corruption
- Creating an independent institutional body against corruption with clear responsibilities, competencies, and functions
- Ensuring coordination between agencies and initiatives in the fight against corruption
- Developing effective financial control and audit systems
- Establishing appropriate internal control mechanisms and efficient investigation procedures within public agencies

- Focusing on prevention measures (e.g. increasing transparency and accountability standards and public awareness, training public officials, developing a code of ethics etc.).

There is also a list of tasks to be achieved commonly by Romania and Bulgaria:

- Tackling corruption at both high and local levels
- Developing clear regulations for financing political parties
- Ensuring transparency and judicial control over public procurements and privatization
- Establishing criminal responsibility for legal entities involved in corruption
- Ensuring clarity of regulations in the business sector,
- Actively pursuing the fight against corruption in the customs administration,
- Implementing effectively the adopted legislation and measures and developing the necessary administrative capacity to do so.

Besides these common tasks with Bulgaria, Romania needed to complete another specific task together with Turkey:

- Ratifying related international conventions.

In Romania, the first steps in fighting corruption mostly involved the creation of various bodies to tackle the problem. The Law on the Prevention and Punishment of Acts of Corruption reorganized these bodies and introduced charges for acts of corruption by high-level persons.⁵⁶ A further step was taken in 2001 with the adoption of a National Plan and a National Program for the Prevention of Corruption which envisaged the ratification of related international Conventions, the completion of the legal framework, the development of sectoral strategies, and the active participation of Romania in international anti-corruption programs. In addition, the National Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (NAPO) was established to investigate major corruption cases. Besides certain measures to increase transparency, most of the related Conventions were ratified in 2002.⁵⁷ A package of anti-corruption legislation was also adopted with measures to increase transparency in politics and business. Despite all these institutional and legislative developments over the years, corruption

has remained serious and widespread in Romania due mainly to the ineffective implementation of the existing law, in particular with regard to high-level corruption.⁵⁸

In Bulgaria, anti-corruption measures began to be taken earlier than in Romania, including the ratification of major conventions and adoption of laws with provisions to prevent corruption. A National Strategy for Combating Corruption was adopted in 2001, which aimed to create an appropriate institutional and legal environment opposed to corruption, promote anti-corruption reform in the judiciary, curb corruption in the economy, and ensure cooperation between related bodies in fighting corruption. In addition, a number of new measures were taken by means of many new or revised laws designed to increase transparency, simplify the licensing regimes, and introducing more precise provisions on corruption including punishment. Furthermore, the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategy was adopted in 2002 and later extended to cover the period 2003-2005. This focused on prevention activities and development of control systems, as well as including strategies against corruption in the health and education sectors.⁵⁹ Later, the institutional framework against corruption was also consolidated. However, the need remained for effective implementation and new measures to tackle high-level corruption.⁶⁰

In Turkey, the fight against corruption started with some parliamentary and judicial investigations based on special anti-corruption provisions in certain laws. The Action Plan for Enhancing Transparency and Good Governance in the Public Sector, mentioned above under the public administration reform, also included a number of prevention measures, such as a code of ethical conduct for civil servants and public administrators, strengthening the inspection and audit system, and establishing specialized courts for corruption cases. Some new elements were then added by the Emergency Action Plan adopted in 2003 in terms of the ratification of related conventions, increased transparency in financing political parties, and enhanced social dialogue. Under this plan, Turkey soon ratified the related conventions and revised several laws to introduce a better legal basis.⁶¹ The parliamentary investigations resulted in permission being granted for the trial of a former prime minister and a number of ministers before the High Tribunal in 2004, which is still underway. Despite these positive steps, the need remains for a more efficient and effective legal and institutional anti-corruption framework

and to ensure consistency, co-operation, and co-ordination in the fight against corruption.⁶²

4. Prevention of Police Misconduct

This task seems more difficult for Turkey, where misconduct by the police could, until recent years, take extreme forms, such as torture, disappearances and extra-judicial executions, particularly for persons suspected of terrorist acts or separatism. The situation in the southeast of the country, where the authorities are involved in fighting separatist militants, should be seen as the main factor in this – though, of course, this does not excuse it. For Romania and Bulgaria, the problem includes police violence, police brutality, ill-treatment, brutal treatment, inhumane and degrading treatment, and abuses of power by the police. The common factors in such misconduct are a lack of appropriate punishment; the long duration of pre-trial detention; inadequate registration; lack of medical examinations; lack of access to lawyers; lack of prompt notification of family members; and the lack of effective investigations into allegations of misconduct. Accordingly, the common tasks that all three countries need to perform during the membership process are as follows:

- Ensuring effective control and supervision of police activities
- Performing effective investigations into cases of ill-treatment by the police
- Ensuring appropriate judicial and disciplinary punishment for officials involved in misconduct
- Implementing legislation governing the operation of the police
- Providing adequate training of the police in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms
- Taking measures to prevent the use of force during interrogations
- Limiting the use of firearms and prohibiting their misuse.

There is also a list of tasks to be completed both by Romania and Bulgaria, including those related to the general reform of the police:

- Increasing the transparency and accountability of law enforcement bodies
- Aligning police practice with international standards

- Ensuring better minority representation within the police and improved relations with minority groups
- De-militarizing the police,
- Re-organizing the police (removing overcomplicated organizational structures and overlapping responsibilities)
- Ensuring better co-ordination and interaction between different low-level enforcement bodies and the judiciary,
- Introducing a modern human resources policy (clearly defining the status and role of the police force)
- Combating corruption within the police.

In addition to these common tasks with Bulgaria, Romania also has many of its own specific tasks:

- Taking away responsibility from the military courts in cases of police misconduct at detention locations,
- Specifying the obligations of the police in terms of respecting the fundamental rights of citizens.

Like Romania, Turkey has also had many specific tasks to perform in the area of preventing police misconduct, including:

- Ensuring systematic judicial prosecution of police officers for misconduct
- Establishing a judicial review of persons in detention and the legality of their detention
- Ensuring regular medical examinations of detainees
- Decreasing the duration of detention in police custody
- Providing legal advice to all detainees starting at the beginning of the detention period
- Establishing a system for the independent monitoring of detention facilities.

In Romania, the first significant progress in this field came in 2002 with the new Law on the Status of Policemen and the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Police. This legislation started a process of de-militarization of the police force, describing policemen as civilian public servants, bringing them under the jurisdiction of civilian courts, and obliging them to respect human rights and fundamental

freedoms.⁶³ The framework these laws provided was strengthened by the adoption of the related European human rights conventions and protocols in 2004. Despite these positive legislative steps, ill-treatment and the excessive use of violence in police stations and custody has continued, in particular against individuals from minority groups, such as the Roma.⁶⁴

Bulgaria took the first steps to prevent ill-treatment by the police earlier than Romania, starting in 1997. The adoption of a new Law on the Ministry of the Interior constituted an effective legal instrument against abuses of power by the police and security services. Despite this legal operational basis, ongoing de-militarization process, and training activities on human rights, ill-treatment and the use of force by the police during arrests or questioning have continued to be reported, particularly against members of the Roma community. Similarly, progress has been slow in the general reform of the police.⁶⁵

In Turkey, where the problem is most severe, there has been tangible progress since 2001 in terms of major amendments to the Constitution (in 2001 and 2004) and several subsequent reform packages. Reflecting the new zero-tolerance approach, the necessary legislative and administrative framework has been created to combat torture and ill-treatment. Pre-trial detention durations and procedures were aligned with European standards, investigation procedures concerning public officials were simplified, sentences for acts of torture or ill-treatment were substantially increased, court cases for such acts were accelerated, the rights of detainees to have access to a lawyer and medical examinations were strengthened, and widespread training programs on human rights were performed for law enforcement officials. Despite the substantial decline in the number of instances of torture owing to these measures, there still remains the need to continue these efforts to ensure the full implementation of these measures to prevent entirely any such acts, including ill-treatment.⁶⁶

5. Improvements to the Conditions in Prisons

Again, there is a difference in content in this area for Romania and Bulgaria as compared with Turkey. For Romania and Bulgaria, the changes required are only technical in nature and involve an improvement to the living conditions in prisons; for Turkey, however, the changes needed are of a political nature, as emerged from the question of F-type prisons and subsequent hunger strikes and death fasts by several prisoners. Nevertheless, some tasks during the membership process were common to the three countries:

- Preventing ill-treatment and excessive disciplinary measures by prison staff
- Improving living conditions in prisons and detention centers with respect to the problems of overcrowding, poor nutritional and sanitary conditions, inadequate medical care, and the lack of educational and cultural facilities.

The problems of overcrowding and inadequate medical care are common to all three countries, though they are particularly severe in Turkey. The main reasons for the poor living conditions are inadequate financial resources, mismanagement and organization, and understaffing.

Besides these common tasks, there are also some specific tasks for each country. For Romania the list includes:

- Developing alternative forms of punishment
- Decreasing the legal period of detention
- Ensuring the separation of pre-trial detainees from convicted criminals.

Bulgaria has only one specific task:

- Changing the practice of placing juveniles in correctional (educational) schools.

Turkey's specific tasks, highly political in nature, include:

- Addressing the questions of the special type of prison, the F-Type prison, and the subsequent problems of hunger strikes and death fasts engaged in by prisoners.

In Romania, the first steps in the improvement of conditions in the prisons were taken in 2000 with the reforms to the penal system. A probation system was introduced, provisions for conditional release from prison were improved, and the right to appeal against disciplinary measures was granted to prisoners.⁶⁷ Over the course of time, the rate of prison overcrowding (above normal capacity) of 40% was reduced to 20-25% by building new cells, pardoning certain penalties, introducing open and semi-open imprisonment for less serious offences, and applying alternatives to imprisonment for minor offences. In addition, the duration of pre-trial detention was legally reduced to 180 days. However, the

need remains for further reductions in overcrowding, substantial improvements in living conditions, and better guarantees for legal aid.⁶⁸

In Bulgaria, the first important steps for the improvement of conditions in prisons were taken in 2002 with the amendments to the Law on Execution of Penalties and the Penal Code. These amendments increased the opportunities for certain types of inmates to be held in open or semi-open prison, regulated the conditions for the use of physical force, and introduced the probation system as an alternative punishment.⁶⁹ Despite these developments, the need remained for improvements to the largely inadequate living conditions in certain prisons and to prevent ill-treatment during custody.⁷⁰

In Turkey, major reform to the prisons system took place in 2000, with two main directions: modernization of the infrastructure and the establishment of a new administrative system. In terms of modernization, the old prisons with large wards were replaced by newly built prisons with separate rooms shared by up to three inmates (so-called F-Type prisons) charged or convicted under the anti-terrorist law. This step faced strong resistance from inmates and resulted in hunger strikes and death fasts, which were a serious political problem in Turkey for a long time. In terms of establishing a new administrative system, several far-reaching legislative measures were adopted. These included establishing Enforcement Judges, responsible for taking decisions that affect inmates as well as handling their complaints, and Monitoring Boards, responsible for inspecting living and health conditions, transfers, and disciplinary measures in penal institutions.⁷¹ In addition, the training of prison staff, access to telephones, and the right to open visits in F-type prisons have improved considerably. However, the need remains to address the isolation problem in F-type prisons and to provide appropriate medical treatment.⁷²

6. Full and Effective Implementation of the Reforms

It can be argued that this task, which can be described in brief as 'the implementation deficit',⁷³ is the most difficult among the common tasks faced by Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey as part of their respective EU membership processes. It constitutes a major obstacle for these countries, and one they must overcome in order to complete the other given tasks – both those they must achieve in common with each other and those that are country-specific – in order to meet the membership criteria.

This challenge of full and effective implementation and enforcement of the reform measures combined with the adopted *acquis* derives directly from the common shortcomings of the given countries in this process. They include the lack of a comprehensive and coherent approach to reform; weak administrative capacity; limited human and financial resources; resistance to reform from groups seeking to protect their own interests; and political and ideological restraints.

A close look at the list of difficulties faced in terms of the membership criteria shows that most are of an interconnected and interdependent nature. This means that a comprehensive and coherent reform approach is needed to overcome them. However, instead of developing a global strategy of this kind, the governments of the three countries in question have tended to implement separate and partial reform measures. This policy has weakened the chances of effective implementation of the measures due to the lack of supporting steps taken in the relevant areas.

Another major shortcoming that is a cause of the implementation deficit in these countries is the weakness of their administrative capacity. This is particularly the case in Romania and Bulgaria, where weak administrative capacity mostly derives from a combination of the following factors: lack of appropriate institutions; unclear division of responsibilities or overlapping competencies between existing institutions; weak inter-agency co-ordination and co-operation; and poor physical infrastructure and equipment.

Closely connected to the problem of weak administrative capacity are the limited human and financial resources that make a major contribution to the implementation deficit in these countries. Indeed, overcoming the majority of these difficulties requires both a large number of civil servants or public officials, with suitable qualifications and training, and a huge amount of funding.

As regards resistance from groups seeking to protect their own interests, given the widespread nature of corruption and the low level of transparency and accountability in these countries, it comes as no surprise to find groups of people from political, bureaucratic, and economic circles with a strong tendency to seek personal gain from state resources or to maintain their privileged positions. Individuals of this nature have developed various tactics of resistance against the implementation of reform measures with the potential to transform the political and social status quo.⁷⁴

Political restraints to the full and effective implementation of the reforms include inadequate political will and reluctance or indecisiveness on the part of the governments.⁷⁵ This is valid mostly for the ruling coalitions with critical parliamentary support or a weak consensus building capability. In addition to these general political constraints, which also emerged frequently in Turkish politics until the present one-party government came to power in 2002, Turkey also has another important political constraint: the battle against separatist militants in the southeast of the country. In particular, this has affected reform measures in the field of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and cultural rights. Starting in 1984, this separatist insurgency has cost more than 30,000 lives and a significant share of the public budget was spent on military operations. Under such circumstances, it has not been easy for Turkish governments to implement serious measures in the area of fundamental freedoms, human rights, and cultural rights, or to ensure their full and effective implementation by the relevant law enforcement bodies.⁷⁶ Finally, there is one other peculiar restraint on Turkey's full and effective implementation of the reform measures. More ideological in nature, this particular restraint for Turkey takes the form of two powerful political sentiments for the Turkish state: the preservation of the secular nature of the state and the protection of the integrity of the country. Their impact on Turkish politics will be discussed later under the section dealing with the difficulties specific to Turkey in its compliance with the EU membership criteria.

B) Difficulties Common to Romania and Bulgaria

Besides the difficulties common to the three countries in their compliance with the EU's membership criteria, there are also some difficulties faced only by Romania and Bulgaria. These include the integration of the Roma community; the protection of children in institutions; the prevention of human trafficking; and ensuring the competitiveness of the economy. These common difficulties for Romania and Bulgaria (with the exception of ensuring the competitiveness of the economy, which will be dealt with in a separate study) are briefly examined in the following pages.

1. Integration of the Roma Community

According to the 2002 census, Romania has a Roma population of 535,000 – although unofficial estimates put the figure at three or four times this size based on the fact that many Roma people are reluctant to identify themselves as Roma.⁷⁷ This may also be true for the size of the Roma population in Bulgaria – 4.6% of the total population, according to the 2001 census. Both countries have faced difficulties in improving the rather poor living conditions of their Roma communities and integrating the Roma into society as equal citizens. This has been due in both cases to inadequate financial resources and staffing; a lack of concrete action and implementation; weak institutional and administrative capacities with ineffective coordination; and internal divisions among the Roma community.

The list of tasks to be performed commonly by Romania and Bulgaria during the membership process in terms of the protection and integration of the Roma community includes the following:

- Fighting discrimination and racism against Roma people
- Tackling the severe and long-rooted problems of poor living and housing conditions; economic hardship and poverty; chronic and high levels of unemployment; inadequate health care and social support; the lack of effective access to education; and high rates of involvement in criminal activities
- Establishing the necessary institutions to deal with this issue
- Preventing ill-treatment by the police and providing sufficient police protection
- Ensuring access to public services and administration
- Improving Roma representation in political life
- Providing cultural protection and access to the media.

In Romania, where the legislative and institutional set-up has reached a satisfactory level (though with problems continuing to exist on the ground), the most important steps were taken in 2001 with the adoption of a National Strategy for Improving the Condition of the Roma. Covering a 10-year period and with a de-centralized nature, the Strategy aims to change negative public perceptions, improve living conditions for the Roma, and encourage their participation in all aspects of civil society.⁷⁸ The structures for the implementation of this strategy were established in

subsequent years and progress was made in terms of its implementation in many sectors, including education, employment, health, and relations with the police. Despite such positive developments, there have been no major improvements on the ground as regards the problems of social discrimination, ill-treatment by the police, poor living conditions, and the inadequate access to social services.⁷⁹

In Bulgaria, the most important steps in this field were taken in 1999 with the adoption of a Framework Program for the Full Integration of Roma into Bulgarian Society and the establishment of relevant bodies at central and regional level. This program laid down the principles and general measures for fighting discrimination: increasing access to education and health care; improving living conditions; and ensuring cultural protection for the Roma community.⁸⁰ The implementation of this comprehensive program, however, was limited and slow. This led to the adoption of an Action Plan in 2003, which included more specific activities and a timetable. However, due to inadequate legislative reforms in the related key areas of education, health care, and housing, as well as insufficient financial support, most of the above tasks are yet to be adequately fulfilled.⁸¹

2. Protection of Children in Institutions

The roots of this problem go back to the era of Communism, during which the government pursued a policy of population growth and created institutions for the care of the large numbers of children abandoned by their parents. During the EU membership process, the need emerged to improve the poor living conditions in these institutions in accordance with human rights. This task proved difficult for both countries due to weak administrative capacities with ineffective co-ordination, co-operation, control and supervision; limited financial resources and budgetary problems in transferring the necessary funds; mismanagement; and poorly trained staff with low salaries. The problem in Romania was so severe in 1999 that one of the European Commission's regular reports went as far as to threaten the then Romanian government. The report said: "The Commission considers that at the moment Romania still fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, although this position will need to be re-examined if the authorities do not continue to give priority to dealing with the crisis in their childcare institutions."⁸²

The list of tasks to be achieved commonly by Romania and Bulgaria during the membership process in terms of the protection of children in institutions includes:

- Ensuring the full implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
- Reducing the number of children in institutions through de-institutionalization
- Improving living conditions in childcare institutions in terms of basic infrastructure, nutrition, medical care, hygiene, clothing, heating, and general assistance
- Providing adequate human and financial resources
- Improving the coordination and implementation of policies at national and local levels
- Establishing adequate national control and supervisory mechanisms and standards
- Restricting international adoption.

In addition to these common tasks, each country was also given some specific tasks. For Romania, these included:

- Giving priority to child protection
- Integrating childcare policies and social welfare systems to prevent abandonment
- Developing an inclusive educational policy for disabled children.

Similarly, Bulgaria was given the following specific tasks:

- Adopting the implementation regulations of the Child Protection Act
- Improving community care services.

In Romania, the first steps were taken in 2000 with the establishment of a National Agency for the Protection of Child Rights as the main institution responsible for elaboration, co-ordination, and monitoring of reform policies in this field. In addition, a National Strategy on the Reform of the Childcare System was adopted, which aimed to decrease the number of institutionalized children and combat the causes of child abandonment by their families.⁸³ In line with this strategy, which was later revised, the necessary administrative and legislative measures were

taken, large old-style institutions were closed, alternative childcare services increased, and international adoptions suspended. The new legislation on Child Rights and Adoption adopted in 2004 limited international adoptions to extreme cases. This means that the given tasks have been carried out successfully for the time being.⁸⁴

In Bulgaria, the first step came with the adoption of the Child Protection Act, which created a State Agency for Child Protection and aimed to reduce the number of children in institutions through the use of alternative services. Major amendments were made to this law in 2003, consolidating the legal framework and reinforcing the measures for child protection. In addition, the amendment to the Law on the Family changed the rules for international adoptions, making it subject to stricter conditions.⁸⁵ Another important step came in 2004 with the adoption of various strategies, action plans, and the implementation of legislation, including the National Strategy and Program for Child Protection 2004-2006. Despite the establishment of this legislative framework and reduction in the number of children placed in institutions, the need remains for further improvement to the living conditions in these institutions, the development of alternative care services, and a simplifying of the complex institutional set-up for child protection.⁸⁶

C) Country-specific Difficulties for Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey

The list of common difficulties faced in complying with the EU membership criteria is also seen in the country-specific difficulties of each of the three countries. For Romania these include improving legislation and accelerating the process of property restitution; and for Bulgaria these include improving the situation of mentally disabled people and closing nuclear plants. For its part, Turkey faces the specific tasks of strengthening civilian control over the military; ensuring that fundamental freedoms can be exercised (in particular, the right to life, freedom of the press, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, and freedom of religion); and protecting cultural rights.

Clearly the difficulties specific to Turkey are of a highly political nature, compared with those for Romania and Bulgaria (mostly of a technical nature). At first glance, it may seem strange that a country such as Turkey – a member of the democratic Western bloc for a period nearly as long as the history of the EU itself – is facing such difficulties in meeting the membership criteria for this organization in areas directly

related to the essence of the democracy. If this had been the case for Romania and Bulgaria, it would have been understandable, given that both countries were ruled by an oppressive Communist regime during the entire Cold War era.

The explanation to this strange situation lies in the particular nature of Turkey's political system, for which the most appropriate label seems to be the term "controlled democracy".⁸⁷ The two key political motives behind the 'controlled' nature of the Turkish system are the "preservation of the secular nature of the state" and the "protection of the integrity of the country." These two major political sentiments have shaped the legal, political, and institutional framework of the country since its foundation as a republic in 1923, which envisaged the restriction of the religion to the private sphere and the burying of ethnic and local identities under "an overarching national identity".⁸⁸ Turkey's specific difficulties are thus more understandable in this context. They relate directly to the need to strike a balance between the powerful sentiments of the state and the requirements of democracy and human rights in the post-Cold War era, particularly with respect to the process of becoming an EU member.

Conclusions

The first conclusion of this study is that any explanation of the reasons behind the delayed membership of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey of the EU, as compared with the other countries in the fifth round of enlargement, should take into account both internal and external factors. In other words, a combination of both internal and external factors has led to a delay for these countries in attaining their ultimate goal of EU membership. As mental barriers in some European circles, external factors have made it difficult for these countries to attract the EU to the idea of their becoming members, combined with the economic and political considerations related to the cost of their membership. Similarly, as difficulties encountered in respect of complying with the various membership criteria, internal factors have negatively affected the speed of the membership process. Beyond the main strategic, economic, and political motives of the EU, these external factors played a role in the decisions and initial steps of the accession process, including the signing of association agreements and granting of candidate status. Internal factors, on the other

hand, have been of significance during the opening and concluding stages of the accession negotiations.

The second conclusion is that a clear membership prospect can be a real catalyst in the transformation of applicant countries. Despite the difficulties faced by the three countries, they have all made tangible progress in transforming their political, economic, legal, and administrative structures in line with the membership criteria since being granted candidate status. All three countries have already addressed the most challenging tasks they were faced with. Without any clear membership prospects, achieving this kind of transformation would seem impossible. The role of membership prospects in this success is not only restricted to providing technical and financial assistance. More importantly, it also provides political motivation, as well as follow-up work and supervision. Thus the necessary role of internal conditions in a successful reform process should be underlined. This also requires a willingness on the part of the major political, economic, social and bureaucratic actors to support the political decisions of the government.

The final conclusion relates to the difficulties faced by Turkey on its journey towards becoming an EU member. Given the strength of the mental barriers in many European circles towards Turkey's membership of the EU, and the mostly political nature of its difficulties in complying with the Copenhagen criteria, it seems that the future of the country's membership will depend on the solution of two dilemmas: one by the EU, the other by Turkey itself. The dilemma to be solved by the EU is that for some existing EU members, Turkey is too different and too big to be let in, while for others, it is too important to be left outside. The dilemma to be solved by Turkey is to find a balance between its political sentiments, as regards the necessity of preserving both the country's secular nature and its integrity, and the requirements of democracy and human rights as formulated by the membership criteria. The future of Turkey's membership of the EU will mostly depend on the nature of the solutions to these dilemmas.

NOTES

- ¹ Matthew Keyes, "The Enlargement Negotiations", *Proceedings of Enlargement and Civil Society Conference*, The European Commission and Caritas, Brussels, October 1999, p.28
- ² Marc Maresceau, "Pre-accession" in Marise Cremona (ed.), *The Enlargement of the European Union*, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.15. For example, Article 28 of the Association Agreement between Turkey and the EEC (the so-called Ankara Agreement) states that "as soon as the operation of the Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community", see, Dominik Lasok, "The Ankara Agreement: Principles and Interpretation", *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, Vol.:1, No:1/2, 1991, pp.27-33 and 36.
- ³ The official document containing this significant decision is available at the following Internet address:
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf (7 July 2005).
- ⁴ Links to the opinions on each applicant country are available at the following Internet address:
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/ag2000_opinions.htm#Opinions (7 July 2005).
- ⁵ The conclusions of these two historical European Councils can be found at the following Internet addresses: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (7 July 2005).
- ⁶ On 30 March 1998 at a meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the fifteen EU Member States, the ten Central and East European applicant states and Cyprus. In advance of this meeting, country-specific Accession Partnerships were adopted to support the applicant countries in their preparations for membership. These documents set out the priorities for further work and the supporting financial assistance available from the EU. See, Marc Maresceau, "The EU Pre-Accession Strategies – A Political and Legal Analysis" in Muzafer Dartan and Cigdem Nas (Eds.), *The European Union Enlargement Process and Turkey*, Marmara University European Community Institute, Istanbul, 2002, p.138.
- ⁷ Julie Smith, "Enlarging Europe", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.: 38, Annual Review, September 2000, pp.122-123.
- ⁸ The conclusions of the Thessaloniki and Brussels European Councils (June 2003 and June 2004 respectively) can be found at the following Internet addresses: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/76279.pdf and http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/81035.pdf (7 July 2005).

- 9 The European Parliament gave the green light for entry of both countries to the EU on 13 April 2005. On the question of accession by Romania, MEPs voted 497 in favour and 93 against, with 71 abstentions. For Bulgaria there were 522 votes in favour, 70 against, and 69 abstentions. The Accession Treaty of Bulgaria and Romania, together with all its annexes, can be found at the following Internet address: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/treaty_of_accession_2005/index.htm (7 July 2005).
- 10 The conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council (December 2002) are available at the following Internet addresses: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf (7 July 2005).
- 11 For these extra conditions and details of the decision on both countries, see the conclusions of the Brussels European Council (December 2004) available on the following Internet address: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf (7 July 2005).
- 12 These mostly come from the three countries, but I also had the opportunity to contact a number of Europeans thanks to highly integrated nature of the NEC in European networks and its well-organised academic activities.
- 13 William Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, 1990, pp.17-19.
- 14 Barry Buzan *et al.*, *The European Security Order Recast*, Pinter, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, London, 1990, p.47; Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union – An Introduction to European Integration*, Macmillan, 1999, p.195.
- 15 This view was first declared this openly at the summit of Christian Democrat leaders of Europe held on 4 March 1997 and then repeated on other occasions by the new political leaders, the most popular of whom is perhaps Angela Merkel in Germany. For the declaration see, *The Financial Times*, 5 March 1997.
- 16 He asks a similar question to that of this study, concerning the reasons for the delayed membership of Turkey to the EU, in his speech at a conference in Istanbul on 24 May 2005. He answers the question by focusing solely on the existence of cultural and religious differences between the parties. For the full text of the speech, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Culture, Power, and War: What Roles for Turkey in the New Global Politics", *Zaman*, Turkish Daily Newspaper, 26.05.2005. This is also available in English at the following Internet address: <http://www.zaman.com/?bl=commentary&alt=&trh=20050526&hn=20005> (5 July 2005)
- 17 Bud B. Khleif, "The Idea of Europe and Its 'Others'" in Ursula E. Beitter (ed.), *The New Europe at the Crossroads*, Peter Lang, New York and Washington, 1999, p.127.
- 18 Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe" in Gale Stokes (ed.), *From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pp.217-223.

- 19 Dragos Petrescu, "'Rebellious' vs. 'Non-Rebellious' Nations British Perceptions of Romania Anti-Communist Dissidence in the 1980s", *British Romanian Symposium, Romania and Britain: Relations and Perspectives from 1930 to the Present*, New Europe College, Bucharest, 4-5 April 2005, p.163.
- 20 See, Peter Siani-Davies, "Tabloid Tales: The British Press and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989", *British Romanian Symposium, Romania and Britain: Relations and Perspectives from 1930 to the Present*, New Europe College, Bucharest, 4-5 April 2005, pp.166-175.
- 21 Larry L. Watts, "Romania and NATO: The National-Regional Security Nexus" in Charles Krupnick (ed.), *Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and East European Security*, Bowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham Ma. and Oxford, 2003, p.161.
- 22 See, Tom Gallagher, "The Thirty Years of EU Enlargement with Romania: The Survival of Old Instincts and Assumptions", *British Romanian Symposium, Romania and Britain: Relations and Perspectives from 1930 to the Present*, New Europe College, Bucharest, 4-5 April 2005, pp.67-68.
- 23 David Phinnemore, "Enlargement to the East: Romania", *EU Expansion to the East – Prospect and Problems*, in Hilary Ingham and Mike Ingham (eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton, 2002, pp.223-224.
- 24 Later, after the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force in May 1999, these political criteria became an essential constitutional principle of the EU. Article 6(1) of this Treaty reads: "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law." Accordingly, Article 49 of the same Treaty stipulates that, "Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union." They were also emphasized in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was proclaimed at the Nice European Council in December 2000. For further analysis of these criteria, see Mustafa Fisne, *Political Conditions for 'Being a European State' - the Copenhagen Political Criteria and Turkey*, Afyon Kocatepe University Publication, Afyon, 2003, pp.63-95 and 112-114.
- 25 The existence of a functioning market economy basically requires liberalized prices and trade and enforceable property rights. While the presence of a well-developed financial sector and the absence of any significant barriers to market entry and exit improve the efficiency of this economic model, macroeconomic stability and consensus about economic policy enhances its performance and thus strengthens its competitive capacity, constituting the second membership criterion in this field. This second condition also requires a sufficient amount of human and physical capital as well as infrastructure in the country combined with modernizing investments, successful restructuring and innovation, and easy access to outside financing for businesses.

- 26 The obligations of membership include the entire legal and institutional framework developed by the EU throughout its history to implement its objectives. More precisely, they include the contents, principles and objectives of the EU treaties; the legislation adopted in applying the treaties and the case law of the European Court of Justice; the declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; measures relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy; internal agreements concluded by the EU and among the member states themselves in the field of the Union's activities. Known as the *acquis communautaire*, or the *acquis* for short, they are thought to have reached over one hundred thousand pages to date! For a discussion on the difficulties encountered in respect of its definition and content, see Hagen Lichtenberg, "An Analysis of the Enlargement Process", in Muzaffer Dartan and Cigdem Nas (Eds.), *The European Union Enlargement Process and Turkey*, Marmara University European Community Institute, Istanbul, 2002, p.73.
- 27 These include the Seville, Copenhagen, and Brussels European Councils (June 2002, December 2002, and June 2004, respectively). The full texts of their conclusions can be found at the following Internet addresses (in order starting with the Madrid European Council): http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0001.htm, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72638.pdf, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf (08 July 2005).
- 28 Their conclusions are available at the following Internet addresses: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm and http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (09 July 2005)
- 29 See again the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council (June 1993) at the Internet address given in endnote 3.
- 30 Unless stated otherwise, the assessment here of the difficulties faced by the three countries in complying with the membership criteria depends on my own examination of the regular reports prepared by the European Commission since 1998 on the progress of each country towards accession to the EU. Links to these reports on Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey are available at the following Internet addresses: <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/romania/index.htm>, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/bulgaria/index.htm>, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/docs.htm#regular_reports (8 July 2005)
- 31 See, *The Enlargement Newsletter*, July 11, 2005, available at the following Internet address: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/latest_weekly.htm#brief (11 July 2005)

- 32 This is a part of the judiciary instead of the executive, as is normally the case
in European states
- 33 Known as DGMs in Turkey, these courts were established in 1982 and
started operating in 1984 to try the organized crimes or crimes against the
security of the state listed by the anti-terrorist law as “all sort of actions to be
attempted by a person...for the purpose of changing the attribute of the
Republic...destroying the indivisible integrity of the state, its territory and
nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic,
undermining or destroying or seizing the authority of the State...”. The major
problems with these courts were fear of an unfair trial due to their nature;
over-reliance on obtaining confessions rather than on traditional investigative
methods; the relatively powerful status of the prosecutor compared to the
defence lawyer; the slowness of trials; doubts about the impartiality of the
judges due to there being a military judge among them, which was unusual
in Europe.
- 34 Mostly for acts of fraud to avoid military service or obstructing, intimidating
and insulting soldiers on duty.
- 35 There was a problem with their efficiency and competence. Since they were
too limited in number, there was a backlog and the duration of court cases
was high, leading to the trial of juveniles by ordinary courts. In addition,
their competence was limited to juveniles between 11 and 14 years, so
juveniles between 15 and 18 were tried by ordinary courts.
- 36 European Commission, *1999 Regular Report from the Commission on
Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, 13.10.1999, p.12 and 64. [http://
www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/pdf/en/
romania_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/pdf/en/romania_en.pdf) (11 July 2005).
- 37 European Commission, *2001 Regular Report from the Commission on
Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 13.11.2001, p.20. [http://
www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/ro_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/ro_en.pdf) (11 July
2005).
- 38 European Commission, *2003 Regular Report from the Commission on
Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, pp.19-20. [http://www.europa.
eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_ro_final.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_ro_final.pdf) (11 July 2005).
- 39 European Commission, *2004 Regular Report from the Commission on
Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 06.11.2004, pp.19-21
and 31. [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/
rr_ro_2004_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_ro_2004_en.pdf) (11 July 2005).
- 40 European Commission, *2001 Regular Report from the Commission on
Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 13.11.2001, p.17. [http://
www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/bu_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/bu_en.pdf) (11 July
2005).
- 41 European Commission, *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on
Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 09.10.2002, p.25.

- http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/bu_en.pdf (13 July 2005).
- 42 European Commission, *2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, pp.18-19. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_bg_final.pdf (13 July 2005).
- 43 European Commission, *2004 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 06.10.2004, pp.17-19. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_bg_2004_en.pdf (13 July 2005). See also, Center for the Study of Democracy, *Judicial Anti-Corruption Program*, Sofia, 2003, pp.5-94.
- 44 European Commission, *1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 13.10.1999, p.9. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf (13 July 2005).
- 45 European Commission, *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 09.10.2002, p.22. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/tu_en.pdf (13 July 2005).
- 46 European Commission, *2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, p.20. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_tk_final.pdf (13 July 2005)
- 47 European Commission, *2004 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 06.10.2004., pp.23-27. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf (13 July 2005).
- 48 European Commission, *2001 Regular... Romania's...*op.cit., p.19.
- 49 European Commission, *2004 Regular... Romania's...*op.cit., pp.17-18.
- 50 European Commission, *1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, p.41. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_98/pdf/en/bulgaria_en.pdf (13 July 2005)
- 51 European Commission, *1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels 13.10.1999, p.57. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/pdf/en/bulgaria_en.pdf (13 July 2005)
- 52 European Commission, *2002 Regular... Bulgaria's...*op.cit., p.21.
- 53 European Commission, *2003 Regular... Bulgaria's...*op.cit., pp.14-15.
- 54 European Commission, *2004 Regular ... Bulgaria's...*op.cit., pp15 and 27.
- 55 European Commission, *2004 Regular ... Turkey's...*, op.cit., p.15.
- 56 European Commission, *2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, p.18. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/en/ro_en.pdf (15 July 2005)
- 57 European Commission, *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 09.10.2002, p.27. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/ro_en.pdf (15 July 2005)

- 2005) and Southeast European Legal Development Initiative, *Anti-Corruption in Southeast Europe: First Steps and Policies*, SELDI, Sofia, 2002, pp.28 and 30.
- 58 European Commission, *2004 Regular... Romania's...* op.cit., p.22.
- 59 European Commission, *2002 Regular... Bulgaria's...* op.cit., pp.26-27.
- 60 European Commission, *2004 Regular... Bulgaria's...* op.cit., pp.19-20. See also, Coalition 2000, *Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria*, Coalition 2000, Sofia, 2005, pp.5-13.
- 61 European Commission, *2003 Regular... Turkey's...* op.cit., p.23.
- 62 European Commission, *2004 Regular ... Turkey's...* op.cit., pp.28-29.
- 63 European Commission, *2002 Regular ... Romania'...* op.cit., p.24.
- 64 European Commission, *2004 Regular... Romania's...* op.cit., p.24. See also, European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), *State of Impunity –Human Rights Abuse of Roma in Romania*, pp.53-67. <http://www.errc.org/db/00/1E/m0000001E.rtf> (14 July 2005); and European Roma Rights Center, *Roma Rights*, Quarterly Journal of ERRC, No:1-2, 2003, pp.119-122.
- 65 European Commission, *2004 Regular... Bulgaria's...* op.cit., p.21.
- 66 European Commission, *2004 Regular ... Turkey's...* op.cit., pp.33-35.
- 67 European Commission, *2001 Regular... Romania's...* op.cit., p.25.
- 68 European Commission, *2004 Regular... Romania's...* op.cit., p.25.
- 69 European Commission, *2002 Regular... Bulgaria's...* op.cit., p.29.
- 70 European Commission, *2004 Regular... Bulgaria's...* op.cit., p.22.
- 71 European Commission, *2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, Brussels, 13.11.2001, pp.23-24, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/tu_en.pdf (14 July 2005).
- 72 European Commission, *2004 Regular ... Turkey's...* op.cit., p.36.
- 73 Lichtenberg, op.cit., p.75. I would like to use an anecdote from Romania to illustrate the issues of implementation and enforcement. As a part of its tenth anniversary activities, the NEC invited its foreign guests to visit Mogosoaia Palace, which is situated close to Bucharest in a splendid park on the shores of Lake Mogosoaia. On the other side of the lake, many buildings could be seen that seemed to have been erected illegally. Somebody in the group asked the lady responsible for the administration of the palace if she knew when the houses would be demolished. The lady thought for a moment, and then replied, "After integration with the EU, I hope!" This nice anecdote was a learning experience for me, showing both the level of expectations among Romanians of EU membership and that of the state of law enforcement and implementation at present.
- 74 According to Gallagher, the presence of these people is a reality of post-Communist Romanian politics. I believe this is also a reality of Bulgarian and Turkish politics as well. See, Gallagher, op.cit., pp. 75 and 77.
- 75 Phinnemore, op.cit., pp.236 and 240.

- 76 Known as PKK in Turkey, this terrorist organisation largely withdrew from the region into northern Iraq, halted its attacks, and changed its name to Kongra-Gel (KGK) after the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999. Following a period of relative quite, it announced an end to its ceasefire and restarted its attacks in 2004. It was during this period that the Turkish governments were able to adopt very significant constitutional changes in terms of cultural rights and fundamental freedoms. For some brief information on these issues, see CIA, *The World Factbook*, 2005, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tu.html> (09 July 2005).
- 77 European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), *State of Impunity...*, op.cit., p.1.
- 78 European Commission, *2001 Regular... Romania's...*op.cit., p.29.
- 79 European Commission, *2004 Regular... Romania's...*op.cit., p.30.
- 80 European Commission, *1999 Regular... Bulgaria's...*op.cit., pp.15-16.
- 81 European Commission, *2004 Regular... Bulgaria's...*op.cit., pp.25-26.
- 82 European Commission, *1999 Regular...Romania's...*op.cit., p.19.
- 83 European Commission, *2000 Regular... Romania's...*op.cit., pp.19-20.
- 84 European Commission, *2004 Regular... Romania's...*op.cit., pp.28-29.
- 85 European Commission, *2003 Regular... Bulgaria's...*op.cit., pp.23-24.
- 86 European Commission, *2004 Regular... Bulgaria's...*op.cit., p.24.
- 87 The fact that there have been three open military coups (1960, 1971, and 1980) and one hidden military coup (the so-called post-modern military coup in 1997) in Turkey provide some extreme indicators of this controlled form of democracy. For a wide selection of analysis on the nature of Turkish democracy, see *The Journal of New Turkey Special Issue on Turkish Democracy*, Year: 3, No: 17, September-October 1997, (in Turkish only).
- 88 Cigdem Nas, "Turkey-EU Relations and the Question of Identity" in Muzaffer Dartan and Cigdem Nas (eds.), *The European Union Enlargement Process and Turkey*, Marmara University European Community Institute, Istanbul, 2002, p.225.

REFERENCES

- Buzan, B; Kelstrop, M; Lemaitre, P; Tromer, Elzbieta; and Waever, O, *The European Security Order Recast*, Pinter, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, London, 1990
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *The World Factbook*, 2005
- Center for the Study of Democracy, *Judicial Anti-Corruption Program*, Sofia, 2003
- Cigdem Nas, "Turkey-EU Relations and the Question of Identity" in Muzaffer Dartan and Cigdem Nas (eds.), *The European Union Enlargement Process and Turkey*, Marmara University European Community Institute, Istanbul, 2002
- Coalition 2000, *Anti-Corruption Reforms in Bulgaria*, Coalition 2000, Sofia, 2005
- Council of European Union, *Presidency Conclusions*, Brussels, 10679//04, 2004
- Council of European Union, *Presidency Conclusions*, Brussels, 16238/1/04, 2005
- Council of European Union, *Presidency Conclusions*, Copenhagen, 15917/02, 2003
- Council of European Union, *Presidency Conclusions*, Seville, 13463/02, 2002
- Council of European Union, *Presidency Conclusions*, Tessaaloniki, 11638/03, 2003
- Dinan, D, *Ever Closer Union – An Introduction to European Integration*, Macmillan, 1999
- European Commission, *1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, 1998
- European Commission, *1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, 1998
- European Commission, *1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, 1999
- European Commission, *1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, 1999
- European Commission, *1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, 1999
- European Commission, *2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, 2000
- European Commission, *2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, 2000
- European Commission, *2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, 2001
- European Commission, *2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, 2001
- European Commission, *2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, 2001
- European Commission, *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, SEC (2002) 1400, Brussels, 2002

- European Commission, *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, SEC (2002) 1409, Brussels, 2002
- European Commission, *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, SEC (2002) 1412, Brussels, 2002
- European Commission, *2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, 2003
- European Commission, *2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, 2003
- European Commission, *2003 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, 2003
- European Commission, *2004 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, SEC (2004) 1199, Brussels, 2004
- European Commission, *2004 Regular Report from the Commission on Bulgaria's Progress Towards Accession*, SEC (2004) 1201, Brussels, 2004
- European Commission, *2004 Regular Report from the Commission on Romania's Progress Towards Accession*, SEC (2004) 1200, Brussels, 2004
- European Commission, *Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Romania's Application for the Membership of the European Union*, DOC/97/18, 1997
- European Commission, *Commission Opinion on Bulgaria's Application for the Membership of the European Union*, DOC/97/11, 1997
- European Council, *Conclusions of the Presidency*, Copenhagen, 1993
- European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Cologne, 1999
- European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Helsinki, 1999
- European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Luxembourg, 1997
- European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), *State of Impunity – Human Rights Abuse of Roma in Romania*
- European Roma Rights Center (ERRC), *Roma Rights*, Quarterly Journal of ERRC, No:1-2, 2003
- Financial Times*, 5 March 1997
- Fişne, M, *Political Conditions for 'Being a European State' - the Copenhagen Political Criteria and Turkey*, Afyon Kocatepe University Publication, Afyon, 2003
- Gallagher, T, "The Thirty Years of EU Enlargement with Romania: The Survival of Old Instincts and Assumptions", *British Romanian Symposium, Romania and Britain: Relations and Perspectives from 1930 to the Present*, New Europe College, Bucharest, 2005
- Huntington, P. S, "Culture, Power, and War: What Roles for Turkey in the New Global Politics", *Zaman*, Turkish Daily Newspaper, 26.05.2005
- Keyes, M, "The Enlargement Negotiations", *Proceedings of Enlargement and Civil Society Conference*, The European Commission and Caritas, Brussels, 1999
- Khleif, B. B, "The Idea of Europe and Its 'Others'" in Ursula E. Beitter (ed.), *The New Europe at the Crossroads*, Peter Lang, New York and Washington, 1999

- Kundera, M, "The Tragedy of Central Europe" in Gale Stokes (ed.), *From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pp.217-223
- Lasok, D, "The Ankara Agreement: Principles and Interpretation", *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, Vol.:1, No:1/2, 1991
- Lichtenberg, H, "An Analysis of the Enlargement Process", in Muzaffer Dartan and Cigdem Nas (eds.), *The European Union Enlargement Process and Turkey*, Marmara University European Community Institute, Istanbul, 2002
- Maresceau, M, "Pre-accession" in Marise Cremona (ed.), *The Enlargement of the European Union*, Oxford University Press, 2003
- Maresceau, M, "The EU Pre-Accession Strategies – A Political and Legal Analysis" in Muzaffer Dartan and Cigdem Nas (eds.), *The European Union Enlargement Process and Turkey*, Marmara University European Community Institute, Istanbul, 2002
- Petrescu, D, "'Rebellious' vs. 'Non-Rebellious' Nations British Perceptions of Romania Anti-Communist Dissidence in the 1980s", *British Romanian Symposium, Romania and Britain: Relations and Perspectives from 1930 to the Present*, New Europe College, Bucharest, 2005
- Phinnemore, D, "Enlargement to the East: Romania", *EU Expansion to the East – Prospect and Problems*, in Hilary Ingham and Mike Ingham (eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton, 2002
- Siani-Davies, P, "Tabloid Tales: The British Press and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989", *British Romanian Symposium, Romania and Britain: Relations and Perspectives from 1930 to the Present*, New Europe College, Bucharest, 2005
- Smith, J, "Enlarging Europe", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.: 38, Annual Review, 2000
- Southeast European Legal Development Initiative, *Anti-Corruption in Southeast Europe: First Steps and Policies*, SELDI, Sofia, 2002
- The Enlargement Newsletter*, 11 July 2005.
- The Journal of New Turkey Special Issue on Turkish Democracy* (in Turkish), Year: 3, No: 17, September-October 1997
- Wallace, W, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, 1990
- Watts, L. L, "Romania and NATO: The National-Regional Security Nexus" in Charles Krupnick (ed.), *Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and East European Security*, Bowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham Ma. and Oxford, 2003



DIMITAR GRIGOROV

Born in 1976, in Sofia, Bulgaria

Ph.D. Candidate, Department of History, "St Kliment Ohridski" University, Sofia

Dissertation: *The Cult of Personality on the Balkans after the
Second World War: Tito and Ceausescu*

Assistant Professor, Department of Balkan History, "St Kliment Ohridski"
University, Sofia

Editor of the historical e-journal *Anamnesis* (www.anamnesis.info)

Articles on the cult of personality in the Balkan socialist states after the Second
World War

TITO AND CEAUSESCU: FROM IDOLS TO SCAPEGOATS (AND BACK AGAIN?)

Why Tito and Ceausescu? To many people this comparison would sound meaningless. Tito seems to have been much more the success story of Eastern European socialism. "His" Yugoslavia was a socialist country in which rock and heavy metal records, jeans and "Western" fashion could be found; "American" movies were shown, and the people were allowed to travel and work abroad (from the mid-1960s onwards).¹

What about Ceausescu? Is he a success story? Or is he more an actor in a B-movie horror story, as not a few would say? "His" Romania of the 1980s provided an example to the people of other socialist countries that showed that their life was actually not all that bad ("Well, we have some problems, but look what's happening there!") Unbelievable stories were heard of children at stations asking for chewing gum and cigarettes, though regrettably these sad tales were often covered by jokes about Romania which substituted the older "Albanian theme", and most anecdotes were quite inane – "Do you know in what country the fastest animal lives?" "In Romania, of course. Otherwise it would have been eaten immediately!"²

But the task of my research is not to evaluate or compare the Yugoslav and Romanian systems, or to emphasize the personal qualities of the otherwise somewhat unorthodox Yugoslav communist leader and those of the "bad guy" Ceausescu (though, of course, these should be taken into account). Instead, I intend to consider them as symbols, because, as symbols, they not only represented the types of socialism found in their respective countries, but also represented socialism in the Balkans as a whole. As a symbol of the past in Romania, Ceausescu is used to repudiate or justify socialism, for the purposes of legitimating or defaming within political or intellectual power games, to mention just a few of his contemporary functions.³ In the case of the former Yugoslavia, it is worth citing the Yugoslav sociologist Todor Kuljic, who, not without a trace of

irony, wrote: "Tell me what you think about Tito and I'll tell you who are you."⁴ By embodying socialism in the Balkans, Tito and Ceausescu attracted a great deal of attention in Western Europe and the USA throughout their lifetimes. Both continue to play a role in general perceptions of the region in the West: in terms of the quantity of western publications dedicated to Balkan communist leaders, Tito and Ceausescu come out on top, followed at some distance by the two other prominent contemporary symbols of this peninsula's socialist past, Enver Hoxha and Todor Zhivkov. Last but not necessarily least, it is interesting to note that Microsoft Office's spelling and grammar tool recognizes the names of Tito and Ceausescu, together with Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Mao, but rejects Dej, Zhivkov and Hoxha.⁵

The symbolic meaning of the party and state leaders in question here is related to two seemingly contradictory but in reality rather similar processes, which were and continue to be important to the public perceptions of both leaders: the processes of *idolizing* and *scapegoating*. I will concentrate on these two important phenomena.

It may appear a little strange that both the comparatively liberal (albeit undemocratic) socialist system in Yugoslavia and the condemned regime in Romania were in fact home to the strongest of personality cults and phenomena of idolization. Perhaps the main reason this occurred was the relatively independent foreign policy adopted by Tito after his split with Stalin in 1948 and that of Ceausescu, in particular after 1968, when he stood up against the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. Viewed from a wider Balkan perspective, it is possible to conclude that higher levels of idolization existed in countries which acted more independently of the Soviet Union (compared with countries that remained loyal followers of Moscow). Alongside Yugoslavia and Romania we can also add Albania, which cut its ties with the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1960s and left the Warsaw Treaty in 1968, enabling the Albanian strongman Hoxha to present himself as the unique owner and interpreter of communist principles and the true successor to Marx, Lenin and Stalin. The group of states that remained loyal to the Soviet Union in fact only included the potentially notorious example of Bulgaria. One of the many moves in this direction saw the preservation of the cult surrounding the Soviet Union and that surrounding George Dimitrov, Bulgaria's first communist leader, who died in 1949 and was not viewed as being responsible for the Stalinist terror of the early 1950s. The blame for this was attributed to his heir, Valko Chervenkov, thus creating an attitude

towards the country's leaders which had similarities with that in the USSR: Dimitrov enjoyed a postmortem cult, as with Lenin; Chervenkov was condemned as a Stalinist; and Zhivkov's image varied depending on the changing Soviet context (his was represented variously as a mixture of a Bulgarian Khrushchev, Bulgarian Brezhnev and, in the end, in front of audiences at least, he acted as a Bulgarian Gorbachov).⁶

Otherwise, however, despite relatively independent foreign policies, the Tito and Ceausescu cults followed closely the events unfolding in the USSR. After Khrushchev's speech in 1956, all promotion of the Tito personality was held back, a process which continued into the 1960s, a decade characterized by relaxation and moderate reforms in all the countries of Eastern Europe, with the exception of Albania. Tito was against the intervention in Czechoslovakia, but after 1968 the process of his idolization increased and in the 1970s reached its climax. This was also the case with the USSR and the Brezhnev cult. In the end, the Tito cult disappeared along with the collapse of the socialist system in Europe.

Likewise, the personality cult in Romania gained strength in the 1970s, going on to reach its climax in the 1980s at a time when the Soviet Union was experimenting with *perestroika*. However, the idolizing of the leader in Romania came to an abrupt end with the collapse of the Soviet-dominated socialist system in Eastern Europe.

In Yugoslavia and, especially, in Romania, images of the leaders' wives were important elements in the personality cult. Tito's wife, Jovanka Budisavlevic, a Serbian peasant-woman from the district of Lika in southeastern Croatia, always wore a wide smile, even at funerals⁷ and added more glamour⁸ to the stylization of the leader, albeit with a certain amount of kitsch to boot. Jovanka Broz had never held high-level party or state positions and her image lacked independence and was subordinated to that of Tito. Most likely, the marriage of a Croat to a woman from the Serbian minority (which had been treated severely by Ante Pavelic's Croatian Ustasa regime) contained a significant message as part of the ideology of Yugoslavism that played such an important role in Tito's Yugoslavia. In terms of class ideology, the matrimonial union of a man who represented the working classes with a peasant-woman could probably, with a certain stretch of the imagination, also be viewed as a symbolic act.⁹

In Romania, the leader's wife, Elena Ceausescu, enjoyed a far more independent position; indeed, from the end of the 1970s up until the very end of the regime, she was the most influential person in the country

after her husband. In contrast to Jovanka Broz, Elena Ceausescu wasn't just the first lady; she also held leading positions in the party and state apparatus.¹⁰ Romanian socialist propaganda created her powerful cult – emphasizing her abilities as a stateswoman, researcher and scientific organizer¹¹ – though she still remained an omnipresent element in the idolizing of the leader designed to strengthen his position.¹² On the whole, the result was unfavorable; however, it is possible that there existed the hidden intention of promoting Elena Ceausescu in order to transfer negative perceptions from the leader to his wife. Though it is rather hard to prove, this function of her cult was and still is successful, and her image remains darker than that of Ceausescu, with some (or most) of his policy blunders being explained in terms of her “poisonous” influence.

After 1989, “the year of miracles”, the inevitable process of scapegoating began. Both the Yugoslav and the Romanian leader were part of this phenomenon, of which there was a long-standing tradition in Eastern Europe and, of course, the Balkans, as part of this region. When studying the history of Eastern Europe in the 20th century, we frequently come across a basic stereotype: among liberals and conservatives, communists and fascists, nationalists and cosmopolitans, when trying to explain the defeats, losses, failures, sufferings of their respective nations over the course of centuries, there is a tendency to blame influential personalities, smaller or larger social groups, or even non-personal factors (such as ideologies and traditions). The result is nearly always the same: a scapegoat.

Scapegoating also forms part of the legitimization pattern in the region, where the present is always searching for justification in the past.¹³ Scapegoating also contains a message which is easy to receive and understand by popular audiences, since in most cases it is impossible to find a single explanation. The scapegoat is a way out of the dilemma and is a process that is strongly connected with the sense of guilt possessed by the new or slightly new political establishment as well as by society as a whole.¹⁴

In this way, in the former Yugoslavia Tito became a symbol of anti-liberalism, anti-nationalism, bolshevism, autocracy, totalitarianism,¹⁵ excessive luxury and an immoral lifestyle.¹⁶ He was accused of being a Comintern spy;¹⁷ Serbians named him an evil Croat, Croats a servant of Great-Serbian chauvinism. His lifestyle was condemned, books about his women were published, and there were discussions as to how many animals he had killed. And, not least, it was said of him: “Well, you

know his father was... a Jew..." "No, his father wasn't a Jew, but he was a Jew because actually this wasn't Tito, who was a Croat but had died... it's not important when... so the Russians found his counterpart, who was a Jew," "Yes, he was, but instead of the Russians it was the Austrians..." and so forth.¹⁸ For the most part, however, Tito was cast in the light of the break-up of Yugoslavia. He was blamed for the collapse of Yugoslavia, or was used as a weapon when accusing the new political elite over the disintegration, or accused of other political abuses.

In Romania, on the other hand, the scapegoating of Ceausescu took on a more extreme form than in the former Yugoslav federation and the avalanche of negativism was comparable to the level of extreme praise expressed during his lifetime.¹⁹ As in Yugoslavia, the previous extraordinary level of glorification in Romania also became one of the reasons for the later vehement condemnation. The main reason, however, was poor economic performance due to party and state policies, which, having been the leader, was seen as Ceausescu's responsibility. Thus "the Genius of the Carpathians"²⁰ became "the awful dictator"²¹ or "Caligula", and while Romania during Ceausescu's rule had been depicted as a kind of *Ceausescu land*, her identity had been restored upon being freed from the tyrant.

Idolization

The idolization process of both leaders has two major ingredients: communist ideology and traditional political culture. Without underestimating the former, the later ingredient seems to me to be more important or at least more interesting.

A few words concerning the image of the supposedly ideal ruler in the Balkans are nonetheless necessary. In the Yugoslav case, the traditional context is important in understanding the nature of the Tito personality cult, since after 1945 there had been a fast stream of peasant revolutionary elements entering state power who proved incapable of freeing themselves from their old mentality for quite some time. According to certain statistics, in the decades following World War Two, some 7 million peasants moved to the cities, a considerable number of which found employment in the army, security services, police, and in various positions in the party and state apparatus.²² This meant that any successful personality cult of the leader would only be possible by taking in account the virtues that the

verbal and written tradition of a given region bestows upon an imaginary ideal ruler. In this respect Tito's personality cult adopted one exceptionally important element, inherited from the Balkan liberation tradition: the pre-existing cult of heroes.²³ Tito often referred to the 16th-century Croatian peasant leader Matia Gubec²⁴ as well as to Lenin. The mixed Broz cult did not forget the traditional values and mentality based on the ideal qualities of mythical heroes and rulers that still existed in the people's consciousness. The image of the ideal Balkan ruler includes the concept of the liberator, the soldier and the honest common man of the people. If the ruler is brave and righteous it is only natural that he be all powerful as well.²⁵ From a psychological point of view, the Tito cult provided the peasantry with a substitute for God, King and Father.²⁶ Owing to this traditional culture, during the first years in the development of the personality cult Tito became the godfather to thousands of children in Yugoslavia (to every 10th and later of every 7th child in the family).

To link the Yugoslavian case with that of Romania, it is worth mentioning here that Nicolae Ceausescu also received invitations to take part in *botez*²⁷ as a guest or godfather, as well as other kinds of traditional family celebrations.²⁸ As in the case of Tito, the Ceausescu cult was influenced to an even higher degree by the tradition of glorifying heroes of the past. Most of these were of royal origin, and in this respect some representations of the Romanian leader differ from those of his Yugoslav counterpart, who had been pressed to act as a multinational leader and was much more limited in terms of exploiting the past which was already divided between the various Yugoslav "nations and nationalities". As the communist leader of a national state, Ceausescu seized the opportunity to associate himself with the Romanian pantheon which had been created by nationalists in the nineteenth century and which, almost without exception, contained princely figures. The predominant criteria that the ideal prince should meet involved a Romanian national sense, European values, and the effective exercising of authority.²⁹ Trajan was the most important symbolic figure, followed by the "double image" of Stephen the Great and Michael the Brave, the tragic end to whose life placed him among the ranks of Romanian martyrs. These were followed by Mircea the Old, Vlad Tsepes and Ioan Voda the Terrible.³⁰ From modern times the principle names were those of Tudor Vladimirescu and Alexander Ioan Cuza.³¹ The privileged position of warrior heroes, martyrs, founders, liberators and freedom fighters is undisputable.³² Consequently, and without underestimating the differences and details in both cases, the

popular image of the ideal ruler in both countries clearly had a lot of common.

To a certain extent, these stereotypes had already begun to feature among the propaganda images of Yugoslav and Romanian rulers during the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. The influence of Yugoslavia and Greater Romania as monarchies can not be ignored, if only because a considerable part of the populations of socialist Yugoslavia and Romania, both party officials and ordinary people, spent their childhood during these times.

To illustrate the Yugoslav case, we will now look at Nicola Petrovic-Njegos, the Montenegrin Prince and King after 1910. Though he wasn't in fact a Yugoslav monarch, he held aspirations to become a Serbian king with the intention of uniting the Yugoslav people, as expressed by a complaisant poet in 1910:

On your head leader of the courageous knights
Like the sun the crown of king is bright,
The dawn of fraternity will light
The Union of Yugoslavs,
Brave King of Serbs show pride,
Serbians salute his might.³³

Combined with the king's future ambitions, this quotation shows two very important images of the ideal Balkan ruler: that of the brave soldier and the unifier. Traditional Montenegrin society saw him as an omnipresent and almighty master. He could achieve what the administration was not able to. "Stay close to me and the troubles will pass you by" the omnipotent "Master" would recommend.³⁴ The people asked their ruler for almost everything. Some begged for a "little grain for we shall perish from hunger", others sought orders and medals or land, while one, a mountaineer, asked the king to buy him oxen. All this reinforced the idea that the "Master" was above all the laws and institutions.³⁵ Above him there stood only God. Or maybe not even God was above him, for a certain tribal captain, confident in the Master's exclusive abilities, reported in Cetinje³⁶ that thanks to God and the King the long awaited rain had fallen at last.³⁷ Of course a man who could produce rain would have a knowledge of music, as in the fitting example where the "Master" tells Bishop Mitrofan that the church choir isn't singing well: the bishop is in no doubt as to Nicola's hearing and warns the choir tutor not to let such a thing happen again.³⁸

So it looks like Nicola's position as undisputed leader, his way of governing and behavior, and the mentality of the majority of his subjects coexisted peacefully.³⁹ Indeed, it is true that socialist Yugoslavia wasn't Montenegro. However, I consider the people's attitudes and perceptions of Nicola I as a useful example for the origins of the Tito cult, not least because after the Second World War thousands of mountaineers moved from *Crna Gora* to the Yugoslav capital and a good many of them took up positions within the state and party apparatus.⁴⁰

The Serbian and first Yugoslav king, Peter I Karageorgevic, was in a much weaker position than his Montenegrin father-in-law, due to the influence of the military, which brought him to power, and his advance age. Still, his image contained many of the features of the supposed ideal ruler. He was perceived as the nation's father. Ordinary people called him *Cika Pera* (Uncle Pete) and as such he was perceived by the people as a good man. Peter was also supposed to have had a rebellious character because of the unclear nature of his participation in the Bosnian uprising. This rebellious experience was widely exploited. The monarch also respected historical tradition and attempted to associate himself with Serbia's medieval rulers. Like the old Serbian kings, Peter Karageorgevic was anointed and crowned at a solemn ceremony on 26 September 1903 in Zica.⁴¹ To foreign audiences, however, Peter played the role of the democrat and republican. This double language was in fact not only targeted at foreign audiences. Representations of the King abroad, interviews, and newspapers articles about him, together with positive authoritative opinions, were popularized widely in Serbia (this technique is later to be practiced by Tito as well). For example, in a conversation with the American journalist Marshal, Peter I announced that he was "a president with a crown" and "the only king in Europe elected by the people",⁴² and afterwards this statement was also communicated to the Serbian audience. Although there are reasons to doubt Peter's rather impulsive elder son, Prince George, who in 1909 was forced to abdicate his rights to the throne after a bet involving the death of his servant, Stephan Kovacevic, I nonetheless consider what he wrote about his father worthy of quotation; he said: "He is a democrat, as Pasic is Gladstone."⁴³

The real personality cult was created around his heir, Alexander Karageorgevic. Alexander was the first Balkan monarch to establish a dictatorship that stimulated the propagation of his image. During his rule emphasis was placed on three basic elements of the mythological idea

of the monarch: as supreme leader and statesman, as a soldier and military commander, and as a man of the people.⁴⁴ In the words of a contemporary,

King Alexander was the paragon of a soldier with his looks and his soul. He always wore a military uniform, not those brilliant military parade ones which are the typical attire of monarchs, but rather an old worn out uniform which he regularly dispatched to be cleaned and mended.⁴⁵

The king had strong charisma, gained from his participation during the Balkan Wars and First World War, and was thus compared to legendary Kosovo heroes and represented as a defender and savior. The martyr ingredient came soon with the king's violent death in 1934. For example, the vast majority of the content announcing Alexander's tragic end was published in the Yugoslav press through an extra edition of the *Narodna Otbrana* (National Defense) journal during the days of mourning after Tito's death. As a martyr, Alexander's postmortem cult aimed to strengthen the position of the dynasty and his young heir, king Peter II. The latter also was the subject of particular worship on the eve of the Second World War, and just before the onset of the war in Yugoslavia a form of Tito's famous baton rally was held in honor of the king.

Idolizing kings also had its commercial side. There was much selling of posters, calendars and postcards of the rulers showing their various propaganda faces, for the most part in tune with the heroic tradition. In 1934, for example, *Narodna Otbrana* featured a poster that was for sale at an affordable price depicting Peter II as a leader from the Yugoslavian liberation tradition, the background of which contains an image of the tomb-chapel of the legendary Montenegrin prince, warrior and poet Peter II Njegos.

It was not only VIPs with royal blood that became the subject of praise. At the end of 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, Nicola Pasic, the famous Serbian politician and leader of the Radical Party, was also glorified. He became a true symbol, an incarnation of this Serbian, later Yugoslavian, political organization. The myth displayed him as man of the people, naming him *Baja*.⁴⁶ As a prominent radical, he had gone into exile after the so-called Timok uprising of 1883, which afforded him a certain amount of charisma, an important issue for a Balkan rebel leader. Some of the slogans paying tribute to the *eternal Baja* were almost identical to those used later by the Communists – for example, "Pasic belongs to us, we belong to Pasic" and "We are Tito's, Tito is

ours". The conclusion of one of Pasic's opponents that "the Radical Party is Pasic and Pasic is the Radical Party" can be linked to the "Tito-Partija" axiom. Gradually, Pasic's image transformed into myth thus creating an irrational attitude of the population towards him. He appeared as a kind of amulet, without whose presence nothing could be accomplished.⁴⁷

Similarly strong patterns of glorification of the monarchs and certain distinguished political leaders also developed in Romania. The real personality of Carol – a true sovereign and arbiter in political struggles for around half a century – favored the emergence of a myth, which happened during his lifetime.⁴⁸ The decisive position of the monarch is evident in Dimitrie Sturdza's letter to the king of 20 September/1 October 1893 in which this prominent politician "dared" to propose a name that would be suitable for the eagerly awaited child of Ferdinand and Marie. Let me cite the instructive finale to this document:

Thus, I dare to express the desire that the new children of the Romanian dynasty should carry the names Carol or Elisabeth – it is simple and without other connotations and I am sure that this would be well received by the whole country.

I submit this suggestions with most profound respect to Your Majesty and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince, You, who have the first and last say in the matters which concern the position and future of the country.

I am

With most profound respect

Your Majesty's

Most obedient, most devoted

Servant,

Dimitrie Sturdza⁴⁹

As in Yugoslavia, in Romania posters played a part in promoting the ruler. An educational poster from around 1900 presented "the four pillars of the Romanian people" along with other heroes of Wallachian History: Trajan, Decebal, Cuza and Carol I.

The apogee of praise for Carol during his lifetime came in 1906 on the occasion of celebrations of 40 years since his accession to the throne. Two figures stood out clearly from among the other Romanian heroes: Emperor Trajan and Carol I himself.⁵⁰ In his work *From the History of Romania*, published in 1908, the prominent historian Dimitrie Onciul organized the past in terms of rulers, from Trajan to Cuza and Carol I.⁵¹ According to the author, Carol's reign marked the beginning of "a new

era in the development of the Romanian State". D. Onciul attributed to the king the role of initiator in all the great developments of modern Romania. The great naturalist Grigore Antipa depicted Carol as "careful and unparalleled in thrift," good, fair, mild, understanding, an educator for the people, wise worthy, a subtle diplomat, a brave soldier, a skillful strategist, "a man of vast culture and great consideration", "one of the wisest and most listened-to sovereigns of the day", a "giant", by whose "powerful personality" the scholar feels completely "dominated".⁵² Carol I also enjoyed a kind of postmortem cult. In 1933, *Poșta Română* issued a postage stamp commemorating his mythologized landing in Severin on 8 May 1866. The Monarch was depicted greeting a mixed crowd that saluted him. The centenary of his birth in 1939 was made into a national event, marked with festivals, conferences, volumes of evocation or documentation, philatelic issues, and, not least, the erection of a majestic monument, the work of Ivan Mestrovic, in front of the Royal Palace.⁵³ The purpose of this "life after death" edition of the late king was in fact to strengthen and enforce the development of Carol II's personality cult in much the same manner as the postmortem glorification of Alexander was exploited in Yugoslavia.

Carol's successor, Ferdinand, was the victorious king in the battle to make the Romanian people whole, the king who gave land to the peasants and introduced universal suffrage. The pictures of the reception of the King in Bucharest on 1 December 1918, the day of Unification with Transylvania, present the ruler as a symbol of victory, as war leader and unifier.⁵⁴ Part of the celebrations took part in front of the Michael the Brave statue, highlighting the connection between that "Great Unifier" and the new one.⁵⁵ Just as with Carol I, Ferdinand was also a *founder*. The coronation of 1922 was symbolic of a new foundation, but also of the explicit integration of Ferdinand into the long line of makers of Romanian history. Even the choice of location for the ceremony, Alba Iulia, again directly recalled the great deed of Michael the Brave. Meanwhile Bucharest was the scene of a historical procession of enormous proportions featuring Trajan and Decebal, Dragos Voda and Radu Negru, Mircea the Old and Alexander the Good, Stephen the Great and Vlad Tsepes, Michael the Brave, Matei Besarab and Vasile Lupu, Cantemir and Brancoveanu, Horea, Closca and Crisan, Tudor Vladimirescu, Avram Iancu, Cuza and, of course, Carol I. The event expressed the full identification of the dynasty with the destiny of the Romanian nation.⁵⁶

Carol II was also the subject of a cult. The king himself wanted to create a *new Romania*. He was the king of youth and the peasants, and the king of culture. In this case, regardless of how much of this plan was actually achieved, we find a coordinated propaganda effort, as illustrated by the poetry exalting his virtues and his mission. On the 8th anniversary of his accession to the throne, one dutiful newspaper announced that “the miracle has happened”, “after eight years, a new country”, in which the new country was described as “the work of regeneration” by the king and the multitude of “royal foundations” that were on the road to transforming Romanian society. The image of Carol II was that of the modern king, always in the midst of the people, with a personal combination of majesty and populist familiarity.⁵⁷ These popular representations can be compared to some of those concerning Alexander and especially to those of the Bulgarian king Boris III, who established dictatorship in 1934.⁵⁸

Cezar Petrescu’s book *The Three Kings* (1934), though clearly written for educational purposes and aimed at villagers, synthesized the triple royal myth in its highest and purest form.⁵⁹ The Romanian triad of Carol I, Ferdinand I and Carol II, was clearly very similar to the aforementioned Yugoslav triad of Peter I, Alexander I and Peter II. (For the sake of comparison, this wasn’t the case in Bulgaria, where Boris couldn’t use the first Bulgarian Prince, Alexander Battenberg, who came from another dynasty, and his reliance on his father, Ferdinand, who was scapegoated after the First World War, did not prove to be a wise decision.)

Petrescu placed the coming of Carol I under the sign of cosmic miracle. The landing of Carol II, on his return by air from exile in France, was expressed in metaphor as a “descent from the heavens”. Carol I was “the maker of the Kingdom”; Ferdinand “the maker of Greater Romania”; and Carol II “the maker of Eternal Romania” (besides being “the father of the villages and the workers of the land” and “the king of culture”).⁶⁰ Of course, the idea of his being “the king of culture” was quite important and explains why it was printed in 1936⁶¹ and why, four years later, in the year of his demonization, Carol had his speeches published.⁶²

There was another myth of liberal origin that described the attempt to create a cult surrounding the prominent party leaders of the Bratianu family. These idealized representations are comparable to those of Pasic in Serbia and the King’s Yugoslavia. As with the kings, symbolic connotations are highlighted strongly. Ion C. Bratianu was born in 1821, the year of Vladimirescu’s revolution, which marked him out historically

for the mission of completing the process of change which had then begun. Nor was Ionel Bratianu born in an ordinary year; he was born in the key year of 1864, when great reforms were afoot, and on the very day that the rural law was promulgated.⁶³ The Bratianu family was also perceived as the incarnation of the Liberal Party, just as the Serbian Radical Party had been equated with Pasic. Nevertheless, we can underline an important difference here: in Romania the party was equated with the family tradition, while in Yugoslavia it was symbolized by a single, all-powerful leader.

Interwar Romania also saw the idealization of Queen Mary, the only woman in Romania to have been elevated to the status of myth. It was the First World War that led to this phenomenon. The Queen was presented as a savior, a "mother of the wounded", "the living consciousness of Romanian Unity, the symbol of confidence in final victory". It was in this way that, during the aforementioned 1 December 1918 celebrations, she rode alongside her husband, while dressed in military uniform, to the prolonged applause of the people.⁶⁴ Her death in 1938 provoked displays of sincere grief and gratitude, going far beyond the official ceremonial framework. To mark the occasion, Aron Cotrus wrote the poem "Lady Marie" in which the Queen appears as a providential figure coming from far-off shores to infuse the Romanian nation with a new force. Nevertheless, according to L. Boia, Romania still "lacks a great feminine myth."⁶⁵ I dare to think that Elena Ceausescu filled the gap. Myths could also be negative, but, when considering the interwar period in isolation, I believe Queen Mary was the most promoted feminine image in the Balkans. Yugoslavia could not boast of such an example, and this could possibly help explain the weaker propaganda surrounding Jovanka Broz, when compared with the "academic engineer".

A unique example of personality cult building and hero idolization is given by the Iron Guard in Romania. It is hard to find any such phenomenon in Yugoslavia or anywhere else in Southeastern Europe, with only Dimitrije Ljotic's *Zbor* movement having anything in common with its ideology,⁶⁶ though it did not enjoy the Legion's mass support and Ljotic did not share Corneliu Zelea Codreanu's charisma. It is interesting that the Legionary Movement often preferred those who had suffered defeats to those whose martyrdom had helped perpetuate a great idea.⁶⁷ It is for this reason that the defeated Decebal – seen by the Legionaries as victorious in perpetuating the Dacian spirit – is preferred to Trajan. The essence of national history and Romanian spirituality was expressed either through

the triad involving Horea, Eminescu and the Captain, or through the succession from Zamolxis, Stephen the Great and Eminescu through to the Captain. Small wonder, then, that Codreanu enjoyed a glorious "Life after Death". In 1939, Aron Cotrus, who had praised Queen Marie, compared the dead leader to a prophet:

Through the flood that overflows and shatters,
Like a horn sound though the air
Over and over the vast
O, Captain, your holly prophet's voice.⁶⁸

At times even the old national heroes seemed insignificant in comparison with the holy *Capitanul*. Above him in both Romanian and world history came only Christ:

The Captain took on bodily form in order to change man himself, to spiritualize him, to liberate him as far as is possible from the chains of matter. From Jesus Christ to the Captain, no other such transformation had been attempted. The Captain was the direct continuation of the crucified of Golgotha.⁶⁹

In 1940, Emil Cioran equated him with the Divine: "The Captain was a Master installed in the Absolute [...] [He] Went beyond the Romanian limits."⁷⁰ Mass meetings also praised the martyr. In 1940, after the establishment of the Legionary State, the stylized image of *Capitanul* Corneliu Codreanu began to accompany all Iron Guard manifestations. This was yet another expression of the short-lived postmortem cult of the deceased founder of the organization. The slogan used to show the eternity of the leader was that of a military style roll call: "Corneliu Zelea Codreanu: present!"⁷¹ As a product of modern European developments, as a leader of the third mass radical National-Socialist movement in Europe, Codreanu showed that the best way to win support was through adaptation to tradition, whether religious or national.

These examples of adaptations to the real conditions in one form or another, whether consciously or unconsciously, were also used in the representations of the future Yugoslav and Romanian communist leaders. Seen in this light, neither of the two countries' experience was unique within the framework of socialism. Nevertheless, I consider it necessary at this point to clarify more precisely that this political order was not a

literary continuation of the traditions of “Eastern despots” and that the Southeastern European socialist countries were not mere copies of the Balkan authoritarian tradition. Socialism was a different system, with its own way of functioning, decision making, and ideology. The socialist state was much more powerful and omnipresent than its predecessors. Indeed, if we look at the painting by B. Kustodiev entitled *Bolshevik*, we see the new man, giant in his proportions, carrying the red flag, stamping on the old world, devastating traditional symbols. In reality, of course, most Bolsheviks were rather ordinary in size. However, given the conditions in those countries where it took root, socialism was to be constructed not using Marxist theory – obscure in the eyes of the common man – but through acts of will and power,⁷² and, as a consequence, the cult of the great history makers was adapted to fit the bill. In a first phase, princes were replaced by the great rebel leaders and revolutionaries like Spartacus and Robespierre. After the dictatorship of the proletariat came the dictatorship of the leader, the providential figure found central place in the communist system. And since every leader needs precursors to announce and legitimize himself through, the communist pantheon was enriched with figures that had little in common with Marxism.⁷³ Thus it came as no surprise when the Russian philosopher Nicolay Berdyaev concluded that Lenin combined the features of the revolutionaries Chernishevski,⁷⁴ Nechaev,⁷⁵ Tkachov,⁷⁶ and Zhelyabov⁷⁷ with those of the great Moscow princes of Peter the Great and the despotic statesmen. In 1918, through tyrannical means, Lenin was able to stop the chaotic disintegration of Russia. This led Berdyaev to compare him to Peter I.⁷⁸ Following this pattern, Isaac Deutcher observes that the Stalin cult was a mixture of the revolutionary and the traditional. Depending on the changing political situation, Stalin could resemble “the iron tsar” Nikolai I, Peter the Great (as with Lenin), Alexander I, and Ivan the Terrible.⁷⁹

This means nothing is unique in the cases we are considering. But if the pattern is universal, the variety and intensity of its action depend on historical context,⁸⁰ as we will now see when we look at the way this model operated on Yugoslavian soil.

Tito's idolization developed in three main stages: 1) the cult of military leader and statesman, backed by the charisma of Stalin in the period 1941-1949; 2) his own charisma and cult as a party and state leader in the period 1949-1980; 3) an ideological and state cult following his death in the period 1980-1990.⁸¹

During the first stage Tito obtained the important character of the courageous military hero due to the bloody events in Yugoslavia under the German, Italian, Bulgarian and Hungarian occupation and the intense ethnic and civil war. In the traditional framework, like that of the legendary Kosovo martyrs of King Peter and Alexander Karageorgevic, Tito remained to fight with his people, in striking and – of course, due to the partisan propaganda – exaggerated contrast to King Peter II, who had fled to London. The result was that in 1945 a lot of ordinary people, with no notion of scientific Marxism-Leninism, shouted the slogan, “We don’t want the King, we want Tito”,⁸² some even saying they were in favor of “Tito and God.” Thus, the cult of the communist leader had somehow been constructed against the King and the royal idea, though the engineers of his personality cult still exploited the traditional monarchical feelings of the population. These strong traditional feelings were evident even among those defined as atheist partisans, the following verse being a good example:

On our caps there is a star
And versus God we fight
But not against the Christ
For communist he was.⁸³

Tito’s military charisma was supported by the famous marshal title he had received earlier in 1943. Later, in the 1940s, owing to disputes over the so-called Trieste question, his military image was strengthened and it became normal for Broz to display his marshal uniforms in front of audiences. The Army became a supporter of Tito and of Yugoslavia, a promoter of the personality cult, and a producer of the future material for “Yugonostalgia”.

Using his undisputed popularity as a hero, liberator, and savior, party propaganda, already in this initial period, was able to create what was to become Eastern Europe’s strongest popularity cult, overshadowed only by that of Stalin. There were towns in every Yugoslav republic bearing the leader’s name: the Montenegrin capital Podgorica became Titograd, Uzice in Serbia was renamed Titovo Uzice, the Macedonian town of Veles added the same adjective –Titov – to its name, and Croatia was home to Titova Korenica.

The Soviet example here is clear. However, another instrument of mass mobilization that I mentioned earlier with pre-war origins was

unique: that of Tito's Baton, which first took place in 1945. It is a little-known fact that over the period of its existence more than 20,000 batons bearing birthday wishes to Tito were "carried". There were two kinds of batons: local and primary. The latter involved the six batons of the republics as well around a dozen others whose bearers varied and were chosen depending on the political climate of the time. Until 1965, Tito would receive these batons personally from their final bearers, while local batons were presented to the representatives of the authorities at their destinations and were then forwarded to the depot in Belgrade. The purpose of communication by means of a baton was to create a direct, almost physical connection between the citizens of the various regions of Yugoslavia and, in the same way, for them to establish a connection with Comrade Tito. Unlike a scepter borne by a king or a religious leader, untouchable by all others, the baton drew its symbolic political value precisely from the touch of as many hands as possible. Every third Yugoslav citizen took part in carrying the baton. This event, according to the official propaganda, represented the brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav "nations and nationalities" and was "a wonderful example of the people's love and devotion, as well as the character and life-work" of Tito.⁸⁴

As early as the period of 1941-1948, the population began sending various gifts as an expression of their love and respect for the leader. This phenomenon was partly organized by the system, but was also the result of initiatives representing true popular admiration. The Museum of Yugoslav History contains many such gifts received by Tito that are rooted in the traditional culture of the village. They include handkerchiefs, tablecloths, pillows, pillowcases, socks, slippers, shoes, hats and other similar handicrafts. These gifts came from village women and carpenters, and other "ordinary folk", including those to whose children Tito was godfather. Gifts of this kind had a political value because of their modesty and simplicity, which gave the impression of really being "from the heart". One of the earliest gifts from the people was a bottle containing a small, probably gesso bust of Marshal Tito.⁸⁵ Just as alcohol can hold together different people around the table, so Tito's image held together the different "nations and nationalities".

Thus the initial stage in Tito's idolization succeeded in constructing most of the basic elements that go into a leader's personality cult. The conflict with Stalin in 1948, marking the second and longest stage of idolizing, and the increase in external danger, only helped to accelerate the process of glorification. Josip Broz had freed himself from the shadow

of his ex-patron, Stalin. This did not happen immediately, however. In 1948 and well into 1949, Yugoslav communists continued to worship “the father of the people”, but after the condemnation of the Second Cominform Resolution of 1949 more space became available for Tito’s own cult. His heroic image was strengthened and the historical “No” provided the material for new praise. This was presented as the continuation of Tito’s deeds as guardian of Yugoslav independence, since in 1941 he said “No” to the Germans and in 1948 he said “No” again to Soviet *bureaucratic imperialism*. Broz also was presented as a true follower of Lenin and opposed to Moscow’s revisionism. After the introduction of the so-called self-management system, Broz became the real inventor and defender of the true rights of the working classes, which were obviously not being respected in the USSR.

The “historic” 20th Congress of the CPSU increased Tito’s prestige; however, Yugoslav communists were careful enough to follow the events in the socialist “camp” and as a consequence the CC’s Propaganda Commission issued instructions to reduce the number of Tito portraits and images in public places, most of all in bars, which in reality placed restrictions on the expressions of popular adoration towards Broz. In 1957, Tito’s Baton became the Youth Baton and Tito’s birthday, May 25, was celebrated as Youth Day. In fact, the Youth Day rallies were even more pompous and sparkling than their predecessors, which can be seen in recordings of the Youth Day celebrations in 1962 and 1968. Quite remarkable in this respect was the 1968 “We Are All Tito’s Signature” composition made in the JNA stadium by participants in the rally. Not without irony, the Slovenian, Rasko Mocnik, said:

“Josip Broz’s art was TITO. The logo of logos, graffiti inscribed in the sides of the mountains and carried in the hearts of the people, the sonorous incarnation of a mass psychology, an assault on the heavens (‘Tito-party’), symphonic snobbery [...], top of the pops (‘Having Tito as our Marshal’), and, ultimately the forerunner of a neo-folk song (‘There goes Tito, through Romania’). [It is] a name that would fit as well to a folk song (‘Comrade Tito Our Blue Violet’) as to top-level world politics (‘Tito-Nasser-Nehru’),⁸⁶ and so on”.

Indeed the previously illegal name of Tito, like those of Lenin and Stalin, became the most legitimate of signs and was appropriate for all kinds of propaganda messages.

By the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s Tito was no longer a plebeian, partisan leader and an anti-Stalin rebel; he had become an experienced statesman, traveling the world with large delegations. This element was strengthened by the myth of the inventor and leader of the Non-Alignment movement, particularly after the proclaimed first Non-Aligned conference in Belgrade was incorporated into the process of idolizing the leader. Marshal uniforms were balanced by stylish official suits. This may also have been the time when Tito enjoyed mass support, which was lasting and heart-felt. The everyday attitude of the majority of people was a mixture of curiosity, half-cordiality, admiration and surprise towards the image of brilliant elegance of their leader, who, at the same time, was one of the people. Pictures showing the dictator together with world famous writers, philosophers and actors – for example, the 1964 image of Tito together with Kirk Douglas stuck onto a stuffed brown teddy bear – were exploited by Yugoslav propaganda in order to increase the leader's popularity, while television spread this image to the urban population. Such glittery representations lived together peacefully with ideology and traditional perceptions. For example, a letter to Tito from a Yugoslav village in 1963 starts with an excellent example of the cohabitation of Marxism-Leninism and monarchism, using as it does the following opening address: "Dear Lord Comrade Tito". Such letters were full of spelling mistakes and therefore hardly likely to be the product of officials. Similarly, in one expression of adoration and devotion, a lady from Croatia declares her profound sympathy for the leader and an amateur poem, dedicated to Tito, is inserted at the end of the text. Though the content may suggest that some of the senders were mentally unstable, it must also be remembered that Tito received around 4,000 letters each day from Yugoslavs alone.

It was, however, during the 1970s that the Tito cult was to reach its peak. His many faces were armed and thrown in together into a highly consistent propaganda campaign, including the extraordinary boy who had a difficult childhood, the brave young man and his adventures as a Russian prisoner of war, the ardent communist activist in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the courageous organizer, the leader of the Communist Party who fought against Hitler and Stalin, the promoter of self-management, the leader of the Non-Aligned movement, and so on. Ideology was again mixed with glossy images of world VIPs, including Hollywood stars, as in the photograph of Jovanka and Josip Broz with Elisabeth Taylor and Richard Burton taken in Brioni in 1973. Burton himself played Tito in the film *The*

Battle of Sutjeska. Even John Lennon wrote a letter and sent a gift of some seeds to be planted in the Yugoslav leader's garden in Brioni. In reality, however, some of the Tito propaganda representations were slightly out of date, as in the warrior hero representation and that of his possessing eternal youth despite his age.

The year of 1977 marked the climax in Tito's idolization: the 85th anniversary of Tito's birthday and 40th anniversary of his leadership of the Communist Party. This year might well be called Titoviada, and indeed most of the other national and local holidays were celebrated as part of the great Tito anniversaries. On 25 May, the newspapers simultaneously issued almost identical articles and pictures representing the leader's historical meaning, and entire editions were dedicated to him. But the things were not as schizophrenic as some would suggest. The Tito cult was a kind of superstructure in a society that had the opportunity of showing other much longer-lasting but still highly esteemed faces. The Croatian newspaper *Nedelna Dalmacija* (Sunday Dalmatia), for example, though it might be obliged to dedicate its title page to the leader, could show a naked girl described as Swedish on its back page.

The 1977 Youth Rally was also one of the most glorious shows ever and the model of the baton in that year was much more expensive than the first wooden one. Speaking with the distance of time, the Croatian film director Igor Markovic has said:

Many totally distorted things were usual and normal. For instance, the notorious manifestation of communist infatuation, the custom of carrying the baton for the Birthday of the Greatest Son of our Nations and Nationalities.

... during the television broadcast of this event, my whole family would gather in front of the television and, without being forced to do so by either the communist party or the secret police, we would watch the choreography from beginning to end as well as the satisfied Comrade Tito watching it all... and I should point out that I grew up in a decidedly non-political family...⁸⁷

The first part of the above quotation represents today's resignation towards the overly excessive idolization of the past, while the second part offers a view from the time when the Youth Rally was also a show and not just an example of an event that promoted the personality cult.

Obviously, the final stage of Tito's idolization was the postmortem cult that went on for almost ten years and was reminiscent of the Lenin postmortem cult. Some party groups began to use this stage of the cult by pretending they were the true Tito followers, and a certain part of the population viewed Josip Broz as a guardian of Yugoslavian unity.⁸⁸ The party and the state formulated an official evaluation in a statement on the occasion of the leader's death:

For almost a century Tito was a fighter for the interests and historical goals of the working class and all those who toiled for the noblest ideals of our nations and nationalities. Tito is our dearest friend. For seven decades he was a burning force in the workers' movement. For seven decades he strengthened the ranks of Yugoslav communists. For more than four decades he was exercising in most honorable way the most responsible functions of the part. He was a heroic leader of the National Liberation Struggle and Socialist Revolution. For more than four centuries he was at the head of our socialist state and raised our country and our struggle for new human society to the heights of world history, acting and winning the recognition as our greatest historical figure.⁸⁹

When the announcement of his death was made, everything stopped, even football games. Images from the game between *Hajduk* (Split) and *Crvena Zvezda* are now legendary – players from both teams lay on the ground crying. The images had another symbolic meaning as well: *Zvezda* was from Serbia and *Hajduc* from Croatia. Once again, all the newspapers were dedicated to Josip Broz. Thousands gathered for Tito's last reception in *Brotherhood and Unity Square*⁹⁰ in front of Belgrade's main railway station. During days of deep mourning, Tito's pictures were everywhere, even to be seen between the goods people in other socialist countries dreamed of in the window displays of Belgrade's shops. Tito's funeral was attended by some of the most prominent world leaders, a recognition that also became part of the cult.

The following years saw annual commemorations of Tito's death and Youth Day rallies of giant proportions, including Tito's representation in polystyrene form in the JNA stadium in May 1983 and the massive print production dedicated to the leader – all of which showed that the Tito cult continued to be all-embracing and supported the notion that, owing to the system of the Collective Presidency in Yugoslavia, Tito was still President and in charge. But there were also some signs suggesting future changes, as evident in the following quotation:

Someone made an interesting remark about Slobodan Milosevic being the first to realize that Josip Broz was really dead and gone to his grave and begin to act accordingly: first in the inter-party power struggle, and after Gazimestan [...] Milosevic was the first politician in realpolitik terms who realized that Tito would not return from the grave and punish his disobedient successors, while on the broader social scene, it was *Laibach* that was first to grasp that Tito was dead and that everyone was behaving as if no one else knew it.

This quotation shows that there were two powers in post-Tito Yugoslavian society that could act as eventual destroyers of the Josip Broz cult: nationalism and youth. To nationalists the Tito cult was an obstacle to obtaining and holding onto power in the different republics, while for the westernized urban rock and roll youth Tito's cult was something meaningless. A contemporary wrote in an article called *Young and Eternal* (*Vreme*, 4 March 2004): "And it should be clear to us when the comrades replaced the editor of the *Polet* student magazine because he gave equal coverage to the deaths of Lennon⁹¹ and Tito." The Poster Scandal of 1987 was a reaction of the Youth protest. It was an expression of the dark sense of humor of the Slovenian art group, IRWIN, which used a Richard Klein Nazi poster for the last Youth Day in 1987. The leadership of Slovenia's Youth approved the poster and the generals liked it in particular, but the trick was discovered by some Belgrade's journalists.⁹² In fact, Tito's Baton or the Youth Baton, was run for the last time in the same year, 1987. It was to be changed by the relics of saints and poets. Among these were the relics of Prince Lazar, which left Ravanica in June 1989 to arrive in Gracanica on June 28 of the same year, the six hundredth anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Field.⁹³ It is interesting, if not surprising, that the same team engaged in the 1985 and 1986 rallies was to organize the show on Gazimestan.⁹⁴ Milosevic himself was to become object of a kind of personality cult and new poems were composed in the style of those dedicated to the late Broz.⁹⁵

The last pictures of Broz in the non-party editions commemorating the great events in May – his death and his birthday (the succession of events was also significant with commemoration of Tito preceding celebration of his birthday) – were published in 1989. For instance the image of Tito on the title page of *Student* magazine in 1989 is still positive, but the picture with the red heart leaves something of a sad impression. A few months later, all official idolization of the leader was ruined by the collapse of the Soviet "camp". Thus the "non-aligned" Yugoslavia and one of her

main features – the cult of Josip Broz – proved to be “aligned” to the events concerning the Eastern European socialist system. Still, the rejection of Tito was not as extreme as that of his Romanian counterpart at the end of the same year.

The evolution of Ceausescu’s idolization, in my view, went through three main stages: 1) the strengthening of his position as leader of the party and the state, as part of the so-called collective leadership during the period 1965-1967; 2) the creation of his own charisma as a defender and savior of Romanian independence against the “Russian” threat, founder of the new humane socialism and prominent Marxist-Leninist thinker, veteran of the Romanian communist movement and continuator of the Romanian historical tradition, and man of the people in the period 1968-1977; 3) the acceleration of the omnipresent personality cult that included the personality cult surrounding his wife, with stress on his family, especially his son Nicu, in order to achieve patriamonalization of the party and state leadership, in the period 1978-1989.⁹⁶

Ceausescu was not the leader of a successful revolution, as had been Tito, and as such lacked the essential hero charisma.⁹⁷ In the first stage, Ceausescu played the role of first among equals. The picture depicting the leadership that appeared in *Scînteia* on the occasion of the Ninth Congress showed in the centre an old party member surrounded by Ceausescu and Ion Gheorghe Maurer,⁹⁸ thereby emphasizing the collective spirit of the Party.⁹⁹ In 1967, however, Ceausescu became President of the State Council and references to him became more and more frequent. In December, Maurer stressed Ceausescu’s “personal role” in every reform and change.¹⁰⁰ The message was cached and in the autumn of 1967 a first quotation from a speech by the Party leader – that delivered to the party conference (6-8 December 1967) – appeared in *Magazin Istoric*, which had been established at the beginning of the same year.¹⁰¹

In the spirit of this initial period, Ceausescu permitted relative freedom to artists. The leader used a new strategy to gain popularity and legitimacy: meetings with the so-called strategic groups, including artists, scientists, military people, and representatives of the church.¹⁰² In 1966, in the publication on the Romanian plastic artists, *Arta*, only one quotation from the leader was featured. In following years, the Secretary-General was represented by a single picture only, in a group representation of the leader together with the leadership of an exhibition dedicated to 1877.

In my view, the year of 1968 was crucial to Ceausescu's popularity and the growth of his personality cult. In April he eliminated the ex-Minister of Internal Affairs, Alexander Draghici, and soon after denounced Dej and rehabilitated Stefan Foris and Lucretiu Patrascanu, and in doing so he acquired the charisma of the just leader that undoes the wrongs of the past. A far more important event took place in August, when he became a national hero guarding the country's sacred independence against the Soviets: by resisting the Warsaw Treaty intervention in Czechoslovakia Ceausescu became the authentic national leader.¹⁰³ Just as the conflict with Stalin in 1948 enforced Tito's position and his personality, so in Romania the real or imagined "Russian threat" created the opportunity for future idolization of the leader – and neither in the high-level party gatherings, nor even in the rallies held around the country to raise national spirit and promote the new hero, could the origins of the future praise be traced; rather, they were to be found in letters expressing clear popular support.¹⁰⁴ The 10th Congress only served to legitimize this reality and cause the final demise of collective leadership. Every speaker felt obliged to begin and end his speech with remarks that praised the leader. The past was scarcely mentioned.¹⁰⁵

Going with the wind, in September 1968 and using bold print, *Magazin Istoric* published a quotation from Nicolae Ceausescu dedicated to 1848. The quotation was separated from the main text¹⁰⁶ – Ceausescu's thoughts were also soon to appear on the cover, as well as on back cover in the November issue of the historical review. The quotation was dedicated to the unification of Transylvania with the *Regat*.¹⁰⁷ In the following year, 1969, the popular edition allocated some space to an article by Ilie Ceausescu.¹⁰⁸

Nonetheless, Ceausescu's image was not omnipresent. In 1971, *Arta* magazine only published a picture of the dictator being greeted by the party conference.¹⁰⁹ In fact, up until 1973, Ceausescu showed an impressive level of realism towards the artistic circles.¹¹⁰ During that year, he kindly instructed the plastic artists to concentrate their skills on the main events to come in the following year: the 30th anniversary of 23 August 1944, and the conference in Helsinki.¹¹¹

On the whole, however, 1973, which included the celebration of the leader's 55th anniversary, was the highest point in the development of the Ceausescu cult up to that time. *Magazin Istoric* duly dedicated ten pages to the event and the February issue began with an article entitled "Nicolae Ceausescu: His 55th Anniversary and Four Decades of

Revolutionary Activity". The content was divided into three parts: "The Times of a Country and its People," "Man and Epoch" and "Thoughts on Socialist Romania and Her Leader." The content was enriched by illustrations. Ceausescu's picture covered a whole page in the form of a portrait. This single large image was then covered by various smaller pictures representing Ceausescu's different faces, including that of *Conducatorul* with cap meeting workers (this picture was combined with another image of Ceausescu's performance at a rally). The pictures were explained with a single caption: "Permanent dialog, direct communication from heart to heart unites *Conducatorul* with party, people and country".

Another set of photos was accompanied by the following words:

25 January 1973, the Square of the Republic and the sound of *horă*,¹¹² comrade Nicolae Ceausescu and comrade Elena Ceausescu seen among workers from the capital; Flowers and warm greetings are offered by the workers [to the leaders]; August 23, University Hall, Bucharest: honorary doctorate is conferred on Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu.¹¹³

The last part of the tribute came from various people concerning the historical role of the leader in the form of the thoughts of different representatives from within the historical hierarchy. The quotations were also chosen to represent as many of the faces pertaining to Ceausescu's general image as possible. The academic Petre Constantinescu-Iasi's small contribution is entitled "Four decades in the communist movement", while to a 4th-year student Ceausescu is "forever young"; an interwar veteran historian and one-time prisoner under the communists pays his homage under the title "To the Great Patriot" and a university professor from the Hungarian minority considered Ceausescu a "Prominent Creator of Marxism-Leninism"; yet another heavy-weight historian and academic stresses the providential birth of the jubilee hero with the words "Born in the historical year of 1918", while the Director of the Institute for Historical and Social Sciences to the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party clearly chose a slogan through which to express his feelings, with "Ceausescu: heroism, Romania: communism", and a much younger, 2nd-year student in politically correct terms expresses his "Gratitude for the care of his parents."¹¹⁴

The first issue of *Omagiu* also appeared in 1973 and was dedicated to his trips around the country, highlighting his stamina, courage and generosity. His image also had a puritanical aspect in that he defended

party ethics while also revealing those who violated it. As part of his puritan side, *Omagiu* promoted the harmony of his family life.¹¹⁵

Consequently, the outlines of what is called Ceausesism, which appeared in the period 1968-1973, is a strain of national communism best defined as political, economic and cultural Stalinism combined with interwar right-wing nationalistic rhetoric.¹¹⁶ It is sometimes wrongly related to Titoism as another variation of national communism. While it is true that in terms of the personality cult there were many common features, the Yugoslav system was in fact anti-nationalistic and suppressed all "chauvinisms", be they of a "Greater Serbian", "Greater Croatian" or "Macedonian" ("Greater Bulgarian") nature. And if Titoism's main source of legitimacy was resistance, then for Ceausescu it was the Romanian historical state tradition.

New heights in the idolization process were reached in March 1974, when Ceausescu became president. *Scînteia* described the event as follows:

March 28, 1974, will remain engraved in the history of the homeland, in the consciousness of our people. On this memorable day, fulfilling the will of the entire nation, the Grand National Assembly... proclaimed Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu President... This most brilliant son of the Romanian nation, the leader who crowns a succession of great statesman of our lineage, is the first President...¹¹⁷

The ceremony was relayed by the Romanian radio and television services. In November 1974, at the eleventh party congress, it was proposed that he become President for life (as with Tito in SFRY), but the leader himself refused the honor. In *Scînteia* (29 November 1974) he was compared to "Julius Caesar, Alexander of Macedonia, Pericles, Cromwell, Napoleon, Peter the Great, and Lincoln."¹¹⁸

Not surprisingly, in 1974 Ceausescu appeared for the first time on the cover of *Arta* magazine. He was soon followed by his wife in a carving by the sculptor Oscar Han.¹¹⁹ The magazine then began running large features on the leader using a standard set of images. According to Adrian Cioroianu, from 1974 onwards Ceausescu representations in propaganda as the visual expression of his personality cult can be termed videology – that is, ideology that is eager to express itself in a single portrait.¹²⁰ However, here I propose that the term is more suited to the 1980s, when real Ceausescu videology was transmitted on Romanian television.

A new stage in Ceausescu's idolization took shape in 1978. One of the reasons for this was the need to strengthen his personal position, which had been shaken by the disastrous earthquake in 1977 and the effects of the gradually deteriorating economic conditions. A 60th birthday and 45 years of "uninterrupted revolutionary activity" were fully exploited to this end.¹²¹ The formula was almost identical to that employed at Tito's anniversaries the previous year; however, instead of an 85th birthday, Ceausescu was only celebrating his 60th and, what's more, 45 years of brave deeds were more than 40 years at the head of the party, as in Tito's case. Ceausescu's biography was seen as a distilled version of 20th-century Romanian development and life, as a repetition in miniature of the recent changes in the country: "Ceausescu was born a PEASANT... He became a WORKER... He learned, learned tirelessly, he is an INTELLECTUAL... The triple nature: peasant, worker, intellectual; this is what seems to us to be the 'key' that 'deciphers' Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's great personality."¹²²

In the same year Ceausescu again employed the useful Soviet threat and in November he left the Warsaw Treaty meetings, having earlier publicly voiced his criticism of the USSR. On his return he took steps to create an image out of the crisis situation: a meeting of the PEC, meetings with workers, peasants, and intellectuals. A special CC plenum was also held, followed by a joint meeting of the CC, National Council of the Socialist Unity Front, and the MAN. *Scînteia* printed dozens of letters expressing popular support for Ceausescu and his decisions.¹²³ Clearly Moscow was always near to hand when the Romanian dictator needed to boost his popularity.

The following years were marked by a process of steadily growing idolization. Ceausescu became a "new Balcescu." He gave back to Romania her "usurped history" – a cliché already found in many popular letters of support from 1968; his date of birth fell between the October 1917 Revolution and the December 1918 events in Romania,¹²⁴ combining Lenin with the national symbol of Unification, which, when taken to the extreme, has an anti-Russian meaning. The contemporary and notorious Corneliu Vadim Tudor published a poem entitled "Nicolae Ceausescu" which proved to be an example of flattery mixed with anti-Soviet messages.¹²⁵ In addition to all the praise, sixteen volumes of Ceausescu's speeches were published in Romania, thereby raising the leader to the heights of the classics of Marxism-Leninism.¹²⁶

At the end of the 1970s, a new and important element was added to the Ceausescu cult by artists in the country: the image of the *ctitor*. This religious term with archaic overtones has associations with the boyars and medieval princes. Promoting this image became part of the zeal for restriction in Romania during the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, in 1979, the increasingly conformist magazine *Arta* depicted the first couple, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu, in a triptych at a ceremony to lay the foundations at a building site.¹²⁷

The level of idolization became unbearable in the 1980s. Ceausescu's 62nd birthday was celebrated with a degree of pomp previously only accorded to celebrations held every five years, which considerably enhanced the personality cult.¹²⁸ The feasts began on 6 January 1980, when party propagandists exploited the occasion of Elena Ceausescu's birthday to praise the leader through a parallel personality cult for his wife. The leader's wife was described as "a daughter among the most important daughters of this people, a symbolic image of the citizen-woman, the patriot-woman, the scientist-woman, the mother-woman..."¹²⁹ In 1980, on the eve of his birthday, Ceausescu was proclaimed by *Săptămîna* (issue 477, 25 January 1980) as "our lay god, the heart of the party and the nation."¹³⁰

However, the most remarkable phenomenon in 1980 was the massive orientation towards antiquity, involving an appeal to the Dacian kings. The celebration of 2,050 years since the establishment of the Romanian state served to highlight a striking similarity between Ceausescu and Burebista. As Lucian Boia puts it, "We may note the successive avatars of the 'simplified' pantheon of the Romanians: Trajan and Carol I around 1900, Balcescu and Gheorgiu-Dej in the 1950s, and Burebista and Ceausescu in 1980."¹³¹

During the anniversary of the 1965 PCP Congress in 1982, the Ceausescu cult reached new heights. The year was full of celebrations. The feasts started with Elena Ceausescu's birthday, then Nicolae's birthday, followed by the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Youth League. This was followed by the 8th anniversary of Ceausescu's election as President of Romania.¹³² The propaganda did not miss the opportunity to announce the declaration of Ceausescu as "1981's man of the year" by an Indian organization.¹³³ The intensity of the festive calendar led Lunacharskiy to the conclusion that "every true people's democracy seeks the people's feast... In order to sense themselves the masses should manifest themselves externally and this is only possible when, as

Robespierre says, they on their own have become a show for themselves.”¹³⁴ Had Romanians really become participants in their own show, or were they acting in someone else’s?

The last years of Ceausescu’s rule saw the continuous growth of the cult amid worsening economic conditions and deteriorating living standards. Despite the harsh conditions, new materials were constantly issued in honor of the dictator, including five records by *Electrerecord Music* entitled *The Party, Ceausescu, and the Future*, comprising 48 pieces of music and poetry dedicated to Ceausescu; and movies were produced in praise of the leader, such as the 1983 “documentary” feature film *Omagiu*, which was shown on television, and the “poetic documentary” *The Homeland’s Hero of Heroes*.¹³⁵ *Viata Militara* called Ceausescu a demigod and *Romania Literara* attributed “god’s heart to him”.¹³⁶ Corneliu Vadim Tudor wrote that the Ceausescu “tribune... from summer balcony of August proclaimed our eternal independence [...] would forever remain in the Romanian national Pantheon.”¹³⁷ He also called Ceausescu a “peace hero... at the vanguard of the world pacifist movement.”¹³⁸, “the living legend”,¹³⁹ a “Titan among Titans”, and an “unsurpassed strategist among strategists”,¹⁴⁰ the “most Romanian of men”.¹⁴¹

Two years before the collapse of the socialist system in Europe and of Ceausescu himself, two ideological officials with history qualifications, Mircea Musat and Ion Patroiu, produced a list of the great ages of Romania’s national history, each named after a dominant personality: Burebista, Decebal, Mircea the Old, Stephen the Great, Michael the Brave, Constantin Brancoveanu and Cuza, with a final emphasis placed on Ceausescu’s era “of dignity and fulfillment of the great national ideals.”¹⁴²

During this “era” in Romania – as in Yugoslavia but with more absurd dimensions – it was the intellectuals who were some of the most important promoters of the cult. Some in particular made interesting contributions to the theory of flattery. The dictator enjoyed receiving birthday gifts containing wishes such as “Long live *Stăpîne*”,¹⁴³ “Many happy returns, O symphony of mountain pines”, “Many happy returns to our Lord”, “Many happy returns, Husband and Father”, “Many happy returns, Son of the Nation”, “Many happy returns, Sun of Peace”, “Many happy returns, Prometheus”, and even “To Sir Ceausescu, the Eminescu of Politics.”¹⁴⁴ Some addresses were reminiscent of those found among the ordinary people’s letters, but the former were more pompous and probably hypocritical.

The President and his wife received gifts and expressions of homage and gratitude from all professional groups: medics, geographers, scientists etc.¹⁴⁵ The wishes accompanying such gifts expressed the nature of the respective professions of the senders, but usually the flattery of poets and writers came out on top: "In paying tribute to a woman, to Romanian woman, and more than ever and especially to you, dear comrade, Elena Ceausescu, I dedicate the *Dochia* poetic series, where I have tried to link the legends surrounding the courageous daughter of Decebal with the custom of *mărtișor*, a custom that among the nations in the world only we possess."¹⁴⁶ Another poetic wish read: "To Nicolae Ceausescu, a poet of discrete sensibility and mild intimate elegance, and above all profound comprehension for Romanian spirituality which has created this autochthonous state. A supreme homage to the Great Patriot who is akin to the *Voevods*."¹⁴⁷ Writers bowed their heads before "the bravest man in the world" in front of "the immortal oak".¹⁴⁸ In 1978, Mircea Tomuș spoke of "the great man", "the actual symbol of Romania" who makes enormous efforts for "the glittering of Romanian literature".¹⁴⁹

The church also contributed. In 1971, the Archbishop of Ardeal, Nicolae Mladin, together with his gift forwarded a worshipful dedication to the "most loved nation's son", the "skillful *Conducator*", who "dedicated entirely his energies to the advancement of the Socialist Fatherland, to the struggle for peace", "a statesman of high international authority" and so on. In 1979 another man of God, Valeriu Anania, was keen to stress the exceptional nature of the state and party leader: "To his Excellency Nicolae Ceausescu, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania and brave defender of the roots from which we rise and flourish into our identities as people protecting us from the drama of the characters in this book."¹⁵⁰

However, in 1989, Ceausescu suddenly became a scapegoat, and the following question, asked 15 years later, is well suited to the situation. "Can we imagine Ceausescu's frustration when he stood in front of the firing squad: could he understand a nation which had worshiped him for 25 years but in the end came to shoot him?"¹⁵¹

Scapegoating

The year 1990 in Yugoslavia was characterized by a process of visible reassessment of Tito's personality. The new rulers started to destroy Tito's

positive image in an indirect, rather than direct way. The political cult surrounding Tito disappeared along with the invalidation of the legislation which called for the obligatory paying of homage to his personality.¹⁵² As a result, intellectuals and youth in the country became much more open. The writer's edition *Knjizevne novine* introduced the first caricatures depicting the late dictator as an evil uncle, frightening children in their sleep. The student's magazine gradually changed its colors. Students called for the abolition of the law protecting the works and character of Josip Broz. Soon, however, new leaders, like Sesel and Karadzic, were to appear on the covers of the magazine. Sesel smoked cigars like Tito and Tito became an anti-Milosevic symbol, and the Serbian opposition issued a poster mocking Milosevic as Tito's successor: on the poster Tito votes "For Sloba", as is written on the wall behind Josip Broz.

In Croatia, slogans at Tudjman rallies, such as "Franjo, with you our future is secured", were reminiscent of the former Tito slogans – "Comrade Tito, we swear we shall not deviate from your path" – however, the latter were gradually being removed from public places in Croatia.

During the Yugoslav conflict, Tito images fared badly and photos from Sarajevo in the period 1992-1995 depicted the symbolic destruction of his portraits and books, implying that the changed perceptions of Tito were actually part of much more important and tragic changes taking place in an environment where Jovan and Ivan were at each other's throats, George beat Jafer with the latter spiting on the former, the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets swore at each other like taxi drivers after a car crash, and centuries old religious temples were blown up together with the remnants of the gesso Tito heads. Some Yugoslavs were so disgusted by this abrupt change that in the nationality column of the population census they wrote "Mercedes", "Toshiba" and "Indian".¹⁵³

Here I will only briefly illustrate the influence of the Tito cult on the formation of the images for the Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, the politicians whose participation in the break-up of Tito's Yugoslavia was the strongest. Comparisons with Josip Broz became one of the favorite weapons wielded by *yugonostalgics* to mock the new rulers.

No one would be surprised by the fact that the first job of the new national Croatian and Serbian rulers was to move to the old state buildings and surround themselves by the same old cronies – "communists turned democrats, democrats turned nationalists, nationalists turned liberals,

liberals turned conservatives..."¹⁵⁴ In Croatia, a large photo monograph of the new father of the nation, Franjo Tudjman, had been published. Beneath the pictures there were some short explanatory notes, such as "The President shaves... Good morning Mr. President! The President plays tennis. Play a backhand Mr. President!"¹⁵⁵ The Croatian leader began to dress in white jackets as did Tito; and he gave children apricots from his garden, precisely as Broz used to send children baskets with tangerines from his gardens in Brioni. At state shows the former JNA general was even more active than the man from Kumrovec. Dubravka Ugresic commented that while Tito used to sit calmly when his people demonstrated their talents, the Croatian president was participating actively in the production: "Surrounded by young girls in Croatian folk attire on the open stage on the occasion of his inauguration, the Croatian president performed a pathetic pantomime, placing in a solemn manner a gold coin into a symbolic cradle of the new born Croatia, as is the custom of good luck for babies."¹⁵⁶ Newspaper articles devoted to Tudjman revived "the almost forgotten genre of socialist iconography". In new primary school textbooks Tito had been replaced by "the daddy", the nickname of Franjo Tudjman.¹⁵⁷

Slobodan Milosevic also adopted some of the propaganda clichés of the Tito cult. As already mentioned, new songs were devoted to the Serbian president that resembled the songs about Tito. If Tito was presented as the savior of Yugoslavia in 1989-1990, Sloba was praised as the man who resurrected Serbia. The latter was depicted in the central pane of a triptych flanked by the legendary heroes Prince Lazar and Milos Obrenovic. In Milosevic, the Serbian people saw the new Tito. In keeping with folk tradition, the people sang: "From the grave rose Tito and turned into Milosevic Sloba." But when the Serbian President turned from hero to scapegoat, the people began singing a different song: "Tito, come out of the grave and take Sloba with you." It would not be unexpected, however, if one day this new Balkan Leoncio¹⁵⁸ were to appear in some of the episodes of the Balkan soap opera as the good guy. And why not, given that some Serbian politicians already have nicknames like the Paw, the Undertaker, and the Window-Doll, the Peasant, the Dung, the Fur Coat and the Owl?¹⁵⁹

Today Tito's image is still controversial, but in the main it seems that perceptions of the late dictator are steadily improving. Possibly most controversial is Tito's image in Serbia, where the Youth Day rallies were transformed into a transferal of the holy remains, with photos from 2000

showing the newly-elected Serbian president, Vojislav Kostunica, together with the current prime minister, kissing the coffin during the transfer of the holy remains. In 2003, in the center of Belgrade and in front of the Media Center building, it was possible to sign a petition to relocate the remains of Josip Broz. The controversial position of Josip Broz in the memory of the Serbs can be seen on the main Belgrade street that used to be known as *Marshal Tito*. Its new name is that of *Serbian Rulers*, but on one building's entrance the old name is still preserved.

Recent opinion polls have shown public attitudes toward the late leader to be quite positive. Two years ago, Tito was chosen Croat of the century, ahead of Nicola Tesla. He was chosen to be the most influential Slovenian and one of the most important Serbian personalities – though, ironically, this time behind Nicola Tesla.

As part of *Yugonostalgia*, Tito became a part of popular culture and business. Bars would use Tito symbols. Tito symbols could be seen as modern graffiti and anti-war symbols on the remaining walls of a house destroyed during the war in the Bosnian town of Mostar¹⁶⁰ as well as in tattoo form on a young lady's chest on the cover of Slovenia's *Mladost* (Youth) magazine.

This may give an indication as to the secret of the success of the Broz image. He actually looks quite modern. His glittering appearance can fit any context. He could be a millionaire in Texas or California, or an ex-communist turned banker from the primitive accumulation of the 1990s. Tito also appears as a sympathetic old tourist in party mood. And it is for this reason that Josip Broz could be placed in a collage as a kind of businessman or at least a well-to-do German pensioner taking a picture of the sexy Slovenian "superstar" Natalija Verboten,¹⁶¹ and an Internet site tells us that, according to astrological data, the Marshal and the pop star are a perfect match.¹⁶²

Tito's native village of Kumrovec in Croatia is a tourist destination. For the local inhabitants Tito is a legend and also a successful business story. Last year the village was visited by more than 30,000 tourists. However, at the end of the same year the monument to Tito was mysteriously blown up. The right-wing Croatian Government condemned this violent act as a "barbarity". The reaction would have been quite different at the beginning of the 1990s.

In many ways, the Romanian case was different from that of Yugoslavia. There has been no gradual reassessment of the dictator's

record. If in Yugoslavia the political elite had not clearly expressed its attitude towards Tito clearly, in Romania the execution of the ruling couple sent more than a clear message: *Conducatorul* became *Impușcatul* (the shot one).¹⁶³

After 1989 Ceausescu was compared with Nero, Ivan the Terrible, Stalin, and Hitler. The dead idol was described as the “Dracula of the Carpathians” and a “Romanian Idi-Amin”.¹⁶⁴ In fact, over “The Impaler” Romanians preferred Caligula.¹⁶⁵ This sounded attractive to a number of foreign experts as well,¹⁶⁶ but on the whole “Westerners” became more addicted to representations of the late Dictator as Dracula’s heir.¹⁶⁷ Thus it is possible that the most brilliant research into the Dracula myth also grasps the popular notion. While mentioning that the Romanian “official Communist party historians” portrayed Vlad Tsepes as a national hero, rationalizing his supposed cruelties, the authors of *In Search of Dracula* tell their readers that:

None exhibited that hero-worshipping attitude more than the late dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, who, according to some authorities, shared many character traits with Dracula. Revolutionaries often caricatured him as a vampire with fangs.¹⁶⁸

The final line above indicates Romanian participation in the promotion of the Dracula-Ceausescu relationship.

The death of the Ceausescus was attributed to Dracula’s mysterious influence, which rumor claims guided the fugitives to Dracula’s capital, Tirgoviste, where they were “evidently seeking solace and support”.¹⁶⁹ And did the desperate dictator then mutter Eminescu’s famous line: “Where are you Lord Tsepes, now that we need you?”¹⁷⁰

Any comparison with Prince Vlad or Count Dracula is obviously a negative representation. But like the alleged vampire Ceausescu is on the road to becoming a trademark. In 1992 Michael Jackson stayed in the former dictator’s summer palace in Snagov.¹⁷¹ In the spirit of “transition”, the late Communist leader was privatized and, as such, from worshiped national hero he became a private hero. The new era gave one more face to his omnipresent image. Ceausescu is a character in vampire fiction and thus provides tired writers with new plots. The anthology *The Ultimate Dracula* appeared in 1992 and the tale “All Dracula’s Children” for the first time combined a Romanian background with the horrors of death and Ceausescu.¹⁷² In the same year another

anthology was released with a quite ordinary title *Dracula: Prince of Darkness*. The Romanian setting is mixed with the old Dracula's theme and that of Ceausescu as a new "special guest." The curious reader discovers "that the vampire Dracula actually inhabited Ceausescu's body since 1944. Suddenly the vampire rises from its coffin to attack Payne [the main character, a "Western" screenwriter], who flees. But Dracula-Ceausescu pursues Payne and tears out his throat. The police are baffled by the murder and cannot figure out the mysterious note left by Payne, with an actual quotation from Ceausescu "A man like me comes along only every five hundred years!"¹⁷³

In 1999 the vampire business inspired Tomas M. Sipos to write *Vampire Nation*. On the cover the Order of Lenin is depicted, one of the highest Soviet distinctions. Blood runs from the golden Lenin's mouth. This bloody image does not suggest the actual setting, but reviews show that this book is a "horror satire about communist vampires in Ceausescu's Romania". The plot was "inspired by Sipos's visits to relatives in Cold War Transylvania."¹⁷⁴

In the same year Mr. Sipos wrote his book the Romanian *National Institute for the Study of Opinion and Marketing* released the results of a poll in which 1,200 individuals from all over the country were asked to choose "the most important historical personalities to have influenced the destiny of Romania for the better". This resulted in the following "top ten" list, in order of descending popularity: Alexandru Ioan Cuza (24.6%), Michael the Brave (17.7%), Stephen the Great (13.4%), Nicolae Ceausescu (10.3%); Michael I (5.2%), Vlad Tsepes (4.1%), Nicolae Iorga (3.1%), Carol I (3.1%), Nicolae Titulescu (2.3%), and Ion Antonescu (2.2%).¹⁷⁵

November 1999 saw the announcement of the results of a survey according to which 22% of Romanians declared Ceausescu to have been the best Romanian leader of the 20th century. He was followed by Ion Iliescu with 9%, King Michael with 4%, and the then president, Emil Constantinescu, with 3%. The worst Romanian leader was again judged to be Ceausescu, again with 22%, with Constantinescu coming in second place, followed by Ion Iliescu in third.¹⁷⁶

These results show that despite all the hardships of the 1980s, Romania is also part of Eastern Europe's communist nostalgia. "Nothing personal just business" could be heard from characters in American movies. As in Yugoslavia, a composite of nostalgia and business was to appear. Dinel

Staicu, the sponsor of the *Universitatea Craiova* football team, built the so-called *Hotel Restaurant RSP*, and of course the late dictator is an important feature of this semi-hotel, semi-museum. In the open air, Ceausescu's bust forms part of a row of works beginning with Amza Pellea,¹⁷⁷ followed by Vlad Tsepes showing his just sable, Michael the Brave, who has prepared his *bozdugan* for the enemy, Brancoveanu, Iorga, and Marshal Antonescu ordering a crossing over the river Prut. There is also a church on whose walls we see the images Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu as martyrs beneath a depiction of the Last Supper and with the inscription: "Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu in front of those who killed them: a place for prayer and eternal gratitude for those who come to pay tribute to the memory of the heroes of the Romanian nation of whom we beg forgiveness for their shameful and unjust sentence."¹⁷⁸ In this way, the traditional and historical faces of Ceausescu have remained. He is no longer an interpreter of Marxism-Leninism or the party leader; he is now perceived as an important symbol of the past, part of the historical chain of national heroes, a man of the people (Amza Pellea also deserves his place as an actor of the people), martyr. In some respects he is also part of an eclectic ideology that combines *Ceausism* with admiration for "peasant roots, nationalism, and Christian fundamentalism", as Iaromira Popovici has put it.¹⁷⁹ To this I would add only the anti-Russian sentiments.

In the hotel-museum/museum-hotel Ceausescu's "multilateral" image is presented on Bucharest's artistic stage at *Teatrul mic* as the main character in the play *A day in the life of Nicolae Ceausescu*.¹⁸⁰

The increased interest shown for the executed leader is possibly a marker of relief. When commenting at the presentation of Mihaela Ceausescu's book about her famous uncle, Ion Cristoiu suggested that 10-15 years ago such a mass-attendance event would not have been possible, or at least would have been met by shouts from the audience of "Down with Ceausescu!" ("Maybe now they will shout 'Up with Ceausescu!'" someone joked at the time). But, in Cristoiu's opinion, most of those who attended the presentation were not *Ceausescunostalgics*; rather they came because were interested in a political personality who was a part of history. Cristoiu proposes that this interest in Ceausescu's personality is a sign of normalization.¹⁸¹

Nevertheless, due to the mistaken and outdated state and party policy of the 1980s, Ceausescu's image has remained much more negative than that of Tito in the former Yugoslavia. Could this still change?

Lucian Boia gave a perfect example of the possibility for historical gymnastics with “Ioan Voda, who represents one of the most striking cases of ideological transfiguration. His position in the Moldavian chronicles was that of the “bad governor par excellence”. However, during the mid 1860s he was proclaimed to be a “a great administrator, a great politician, a great general” and a personality that had seen the need to reform society against the dominant class taking into account the interest of the majority.¹⁸² Is it then possible that, after some centuries go by, a similar interpretation of Ceausescu could appear, produced by a speculative reader of the past?

As you may well know, one of the most distinguished saviors of the world, “Bond, James Bond”, only lives twice. I will bring this paper to a close with a question. How many lives do Tito and Ceausescu have?¹⁸³

NOTES

- ¹ In a biography dedicated to one of the greatest Bulgarian illusionists, Astor, one paragraph, which depicts his experience in Belgrade in the mid 1960s, is called "Luxury. Beauties. Abroad. All this only in Belgrade." The illusionist was impressed by the western cars, neon lights and that nearly everywhere there were portraits of Josip Broz. But it was the Yugoslav capital's nightlife, the pretty girls, and not the cult of the leader, that were best remembered by the Bulgarian artist. GOZES, I., *Astor. Gospodaryat na magiyata*, Magicheska kashta Astor, Sofia [n.y], p. 54-61.
- ² Because of this, Romania, and especially her leader, offered a quite convenient image for neighboring socialist leaders. The gap between foreign and internal policy could be useful – "Look at him, he is playing with the Americans, but his people are starving. Is this what you want?" Speaking of Bulgaria, as far as I can remember, it was not a problem to tell tales about Ceausescu. I also don't think it was very dangerous to make fun of Zhivkov, though this occurred far less.
- ³ During the last presidential campaign in Romania, the current president, Mr. Traian Basescu, used a poster depicting his rival candidate, the former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, and the then president Ion Iliescu as the useless helmsmen of the sinking PSD-PUR (the coalition dominated by the Romanian Social Democrat Party) ship. In the background could be seen a rather ghostly looking Nicolae Ceausescu, though in fact it is Mr. Basescu's nickname, "The Captain", due to his naval career. A petty observer might point out that Ceausescu was praised in nautical terms as *carmaciul* (the helmsman).
- ⁴ KULJIĆ, T., "Tito u novom srpskom poredkom sećanja", in *Sociologija*, No. 2, 2003, p. 66.
- ⁵ The program proposes to replace Dej by Den, Dee, Dew, Jed or Deem; Zhivkov could be corrected by Zhukov and it would be acceptable to insert instead of Hohxa Hoax, Hoaxer, Hoaxed, Hoxie and Hoo-ha.
- ⁶ Zhivkov offered a rather different interpretation. For details see his memoirs ZHIVKOV, T., *Memoari*, SIV-Abagar, Sofia, V, Tarnovo, 1997.
- ⁷ Her "yugosmile" can be seen on a picture of the funeral of the Yugoslav President of the Federal Executive Council Djemal Bijedic in 1977. See *Iljistrovana Politika*, No. 11, 1977.
- ⁸ Especially in the 1950s when she was very attractive. Looking at the pictures from the visit of the Greek royal couple in September 1955 to Belgrade one is fascinated by Jovanka's splendid image. See *VLASTITO iskustvo, past-present*, ed. Radonja Leposavic. Samizdat, Beograd, 2004, pp. 184, 186, 187, 194.
- ⁹ For a less symbolic and more reasonable explanation see DJILAS, M., *Obshtuvane s Tito*, Hristo Botev, Sofia, 1991, pp.118-128.

- 10 Member of the Political Executive Committee of CC (1974-1989); member of the Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee (1977-1989) and First Deputy Prime minister (1980-1989). *Membrii C.C. al P.C.R. 1945-1989*. Dicționar, Editură Enciclopedică, București, 2004, p. 138.
- 11 GABANYI, A. U., *The Ceaușescu Cult: Propaganda and Power Policy in Communist Romania*, The Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 109.
- 12 OLTEANU, C. L., E.Gheoana, V.Gheoana, *Femeile în România comunistă. Studii de istorie socială*, Politeia, SNSPA, 2003, pp. 31-62.
- 13 See BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001 (First edition in Romanian *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, HUMANITAS, București, 1997); also MISHKOVA, D., *Prisposobyavane na svobodata: Modernost i legitimnost v Serbia i Romania prez XIX vek*, Paradigma, Sofia, 1999.
- 14 The process of scapegoating was conducted not in the New Testament meaning as the gospel of John describes Jesus as the Lamb of God (Agnus Dei) on whom guilt and repentance were consciously transferred and the burden of the guilt is willingly accepted, but in the Old Testament sense as it had been shown in the Book of Leviathans when describing the Day of Atonement: the Lord tells Moses to make Aaron “come into the holy place: with a young bull for a sin offering and a ram for a burnt offering... Aaron shall present the bull as a sin offering for himself and for his house... And when he has made an act of atoning, for the holy place and the tent of meeting and the altar, he shall present the live goat and Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat and confess over him all the iniquities of Israel, and send him away into the wilderness... The goat shall bear all their iniquities upon him to a solitary land...”
- 15 KULJIĆ, T., “Tito u novom srpskom poredkom sećanja”, in *Sociologija*, No. 2, 2003, p. 72.
- 16 VLAHOVIĆ, D., S. Kačarević., *Blago i rasko ? Josipa i Jovanke*, Beograd, 1990. *Rasipni ? tvo i zloupotrebe Josipa i Jovanke: Nepoznato o Brozovim*, Beograd.
- 17 See for example SIMIĆ, P., *Tito agent Kominterne*, Beograd, 1990.
- 18 Accusations and theories of that kind could be seen as a synthesized mode in the work of the lawyer TODOROVIĆ, M. *Hoh?tapler*, Narodna knjiga -Alfa, 2003.
- 19 MICU, C., “Între Țepeș și Caligula: Fiul lui Dracula”, in *Jurnalul Național/ Ediție de colecție*, 24.01.2005, p. 20.
- 20 Just a note: Gheorghe Hagi in his turn was proclaimed as “the Genius of the Carpathians”.
- 21 MICU, C., “Între Țepeș și Caligula: Fiul lui Dracula”, in *Jurnalul Național/ Ediție de colecție*, 24.01.2005, p. 20.

- 22 KULJIĆ, T., "Tito-nacrt sociološkoistorijskog istraivanja", in *Srpska Politička Misao*, No. 1, 1995, p. 53.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 53.
- 24 A popular hero who had led a revolt of Croatian peasants in 1573. One of the first Croatian films directed by Aca Binicki is called *Matija Gubec* (1917). The 32nd Yugoslav partisan division was called *Matija Gubec*. In 1971-1973 the sculptor Antun Augustinčić (1900-1979) made the Monument of the Peasant Rebellion and Matija Gubec. The same sculptor was also responsible for most famous Tito monument in Kumrovec in 1948 and again the monument of the Marshal in Velenje, Slovenia in 1977 (on the occasion of Tito's 85th birthday). It is not unusual that the same artist in 1935 erected the Monument to King Alexander in Varazdin (demolished in 1945), the Monument to King Peter and King Alexander (1937), Skopje, Macedonia (demolished in the course of World War II) and another monument to King Alexander (1940), Sombor (demolished and re-melted in the course of Second World War). See <http://www.mdc.hr/augustincic/eng/augustincic/spomenici.html>
- 25 KULJIĆ, T., "Tito-nacrt sociološkoistorijskog istraivanja", in *Srpska Politička Misao*, No. 1, 1995, p. 54.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 55.
- 27 Christenings, baptisms.
- 28 *Scrisori, invitații la oficierea acordării numelui noilor născuți și căsătoriilor adresate de cetățeni conducerii partidului și personal lui Nicolae Ceaușescu-secretar general al P. C. R.*, Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (ANIC), fond C. C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar nr. 183/1966, f.103; *Scrisori, invitații referate, certificate de naștere adresate lui Nicolae Ceaușescu-secretar general al P.C.R.. privind acordarea numelor noilor născuți și oficierea căsătoriilor și mulțumiri adresate de către cetățeni din țară*, ANIC, fond C. C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar nr. 188/1966; *Scrisorii- invitații la oficierea acordării numelui noilor născuți, căsătoriilor și mulțumiri adresate de cetățeni lui Nicolae Ceaușescu.. 1 ianuarie-31 decembrie 1967*, ANIC, fond C. C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar No. 199/ 1967, f. 324; *Scrisorii- invitații la oficierea acordării numelui noilor născuți, căsătoriilor și mulțumiri adresate de cetățeni lui Nicolae Ceaușescu.. 1 ianuarie-31 decembrie 1967*, ANIC, fond C. C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar No. 200/ 1967, f.271; *Scrisori, invitații adresate tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu, privind acordarea numelor noilor născuți, și oficierea căsătoriilor. 1 ianuarie-31 decembrie 1968*, ANIC, fond C. C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, dosar No. 240/ 1968, f.316
- 29 BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, pp.190-1.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p.198.
- 31 *Ibid.*, pp. 193-94.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p.192.

- 33 PAVICEVIĆ, M., "Himna Kralja Nikoli I", 1910, quoted in ANDRIJAŠEVIĆ, Ž. M., "Istorijske paralele: Kralj Nikola. Jedan za sve", in *Monitor*, 27.12.2002-3.01.2003, p. 18. For more details on Nicola's cult see ANDRIJAŠEVIĆ, Ž. M., "Politička osnova vladarskog kulta knjaza Nikole krajem 19. i početkom 20. vijeka", in *Istorijski zapisi*, No. 1-2, 2002, pp.91-112.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- 36 The old Montenegrin capital.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 17.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 18. In fact, Nicola experienced some trouble after giving Montenegro a constitution in 1905. The problems were mainly with the educated in Belgrade Montenegrin Youth, which wasn't a typical representative of the Montenegrin society at the beginning of the 20th century.
- 40 DEDIJER, V., *Veliki buntovnik Milovan Đilas-prolozi za biografiju*, Kultura, Beograd, 1991, p. 235. Because of this phenomenon there existed the expression in Ex-Yugoslavia "From Cetinje to Dedinje" (Cetinje was the old Montenegrin capital and Dedinje was the Belgrade residential area where Tito lived).
- 41 SUBOTIĆ, D., "Kralj Petar I Karađorđević i institucija ustavne (parlamentarne) monarhije u Srbije (1904-1914)", *Srpska politička misao*, 1/1995, p. 16.
- 42 PETRANOVIĆ, D., *Kralj Petar Karađorđević i Regent Aleksandar. Događaji iz prošlosti i sadašnjosti*, Beograd, 1921, p. 60.
- 43 BANAC, L., *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins History, Politics*, Ithaca & London, 1984, p. 143.
- 44 LALKOV, M., "Tsar Boris III, kral Aleksandar Karadjordjevic-dve realnosti, dva mita", in *Predci i predtechi. Mitove i utopii na Balkanite*, Blagoevgrad, 1997, p. 313.
- 45 LALKOV, M., "Tsar Boris III, kral Aleksandar Karadjordjevic-dve realnosti, dva mita", in *Predci i predtechi. Mitove i utopii na Balkanite*, Blagoevgrad, 1997, p. 313.
- 46 Elder brother, uncle, good man.
- 47 SHEMYAKIN, A. L., "Nikola Pashich", in *Vaprosiij istorii*, No., 2, 2002, p. 80.
- 48 BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 189.
- 49 VERZEA, M., "Numele lui Carol al II-lea inspirat de Dimitrie Sturdza", in *Historia*, No., 38, februarie 2005, p. 53.
- 50 BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 201.
- 51 *Ibid.*, 189.
- 52 *Ibid.*, p. 202.

- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 204.
- ⁵⁴ See *1 Decembrie 1918 în imagini. Alba Iulia. București*, Editura Fundației PRO, s.a, s.l.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-71.
- ⁵⁶ BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 203.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 204.
- ⁵⁸ Boris III was glorified as “the first citizen”, “supreme leader and creator of new Bulgaria”, “the most powerful engine in the rise of our fatherland”, “the dearest leader of the people”, “great personality”, “wise state leader”, etc. POPPETROV, N., “Obrazat na tsar Boris III v dnevniya red na balgarskoto obshtestvo-1918-1943”, in *Istoricheski pregled*, No. 1-2, 2002, pp. 64-65.
- ⁵⁹ BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 205.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 205.
- ⁶¹ See *Discursuri culturale ale M.S. Regelui Carol II, 1930-1936, 1936*.
- ⁶² See *Cuvântările regelui Carol II. 1930-1940, 1936*.
- ⁶³ BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 206.
- ⁶⁴ See *1 Decembrie 1918 în imagini. Alba Iulia. București*, Editura Fundației PRO, s.a, s.l.
- ⁶⁵ BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 208-210.
- ⁶⁶ For details regarding “Zbor” see KULJIĆ, T., “Srpski fa?izam i sociologija”, in *Sociologija*, No. 2, 1972.
- ⁶⁷ BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 213
- ⁶⁸ COTRUȘ, A., “Corabia verde” [The Green Ship], quoted in *Corneliu Zelea Codreanu și Epoca sa*, Crestomație de Gabriel Stănescu, Criterion Publishing, s.l., 2001, pp. 53-54.
- ⁶⁹ “Noul Întrupat”, *Buna Vestire*, 8.11.1940. Cited after BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 213.
- ⁷⁰ Quoted in *Corneliu Zelea Codreanu și Epoca sa*, Crestomație de Gabriel Stănescu, Criterion Publishing, s.l., 2001.
- ⁷¹ CIOROIANU, A., “Art, Propagande et Politique: Le cas de Nicolae Ceausescu”, in *New Europe College Yearbook 2000-2001*, p. 149.
- ⁷² Possibly the best work on the relations of communism with the tradition is BERDYAEV, N., *Izvori i smisal na ruskiya comunizam*, Hristo Botev, Sofia, 1994.
- ⁷³ BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 190.

- 74 Nikolai Chernishevski (1828-1889) Russian revolutionary, literary critic,
utopian philosopher.
- 75 Sergey Nachaev (1847-1882) Russian revolutionary terrorist.
- 76 Peter Tkachov (1844-1886) Russian revolutionary terrorist.
- 77 Andrei Zhelyabov (1851-1881) was one of the leaders of the revolutionary
organization "Narodna volya". He organized the attempt on Tsar Alexander's
life and was executed.
- 78 BERDYEV, N., *Izvori i smisal na ruskiya comunizam*, Hristo Botev, Sofia,
1994, pp. 126-127.
- 79 KULJIĆ, T., "Tito - nacrt sociolo?koistorijskog istraivanja", in *Srpska Politička
Misao*, No. 1, 1995, pp. 55-56.
- 80 BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European
University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 191.
- 81 KULJIĆ, T., "Tito-nacrt sociolo?koistorijskog istraivanja", in *Srpska Politička
Misao*, No. 1, 1995, p. 63.
- 82 For the instructive photo see [de.geocities.com/opimznanarod/slike/fotografije/
004.jpg](http://de.geocities.com/opimznanarod/slike/fotografije/004.jpg).
- 83 KULJIĆ, Todor, *Tito: Sociolo?koistorijska studija*, Institut ya Poltička studie,
Beograd, 1998, p. 47.
- 84 *Titova ?tafeta mladosti*, Beograd 1985.
- 85 I was kindly allowed to take a picture of this gift by the staff of the Museum of
Yugoslav History.
- 86 MOCNIK R., "Tito: Pop-Romantic Mastery", in *VLASTITO iskustvo, past-present*,
ed. Radonja Leposavic, Samizdat, Beograd, 2004, p. 207.
- 87 MARKOVIĆ, I., *Sretno dijete*, Zagreb, 2004, quoted after *VLASTITO iskustvo, past-present*,
ed. Radonja Leposavic, Samizdat, Beograd, 2004, p. 35.
- 88 KULJIĆ, T., "Tito-nacrt sociolo?koistorijskog istraivanja", in *Srpska Politička
Misao*, No. 1, 1995, s. 67. For the same conclusion about Lenin's "life after
death" see BURNS, J. M., *Leadership*, Harper & Row, New York, 1978, p.
248.
- 89 "Quotation from the official statement of the Presidency of the CC of LYC
and the Presidency of SFRY on the occasion of Josip Broz Tito's death", in
Titova ?tafeta mladosti, Beograd, 1985.
- 90 Now the name of the square is St. Sava.
- 91 Lennon was shot on December 8, 1980.
- 92 IRWIN, Ljubljana, "Poster Scandal", in *VLASTITO iskustvo, past-present*,
Ed. Radonja Leposavic. Samizdat, Beograd, 2004, p. 174.
- 93 ČOLOVIĆ, I., "On Models and Batons", in *VLASTITO iskustvo, past-present*,
ed. Radonja Leposavic. Samizdat, Beograd, 2004, p. 155.
- 94 "I'm not afraid of the generals, I find colonels more frightening, interview
with Zarko Cigoja conducted in the Museum of Yugoslav History", Belgrade,
April 2002, in: *VLASTITO iskustvo, past-present*, ed. Radonja Leposavic,
Samizdat, Beograd, 2004, p. 178.

- ⁹⁵ IVKOV, M. A., *Antologija srpske udvoričke poezije (Od Dostēja do naših dana)*, Panpublik, Beograd, 1988, p. 83.
- ⁹⁶ For different periodizations see FISCHER, M. E., "Idol or Leader? The origins and future of the Ceausescu Cult" in *Romania in the 1980s*, ed. by Daniel N. Nelson, Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado, p.120; FISCHER, M. E., "Idol or Leader? The origins and future of the Ceausescu Cult" in *Romania in the 1980s*, ed. by Daniel N. Nelson, Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado; CIOROIANU, A., *Ce Ceausescu qui hante les Roumains: Le mithe, les representations et le culte du Dirigeant dans la Roumanie communiste*, Curtea Veche Publishing, București, 2004.
- ⁹⁷ FISCHER, M. E., "Idol or Leader? The origins and future of the Ceausescu Cult" in *Romania in the 1980s*, ed. by Daniel N. Nelson, Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado, p. 120.
- ⁹⁸ The Prime Minister of the State (1961-1973) and a prominent almost mythical Romanian communist.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.122.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.123.
- ¹⁰¹ "Cu tovarășii Ion Niculi și Gheoghe Stere despre Primul Prezidiu al Republicii", in *Magazin Istoric*, anul I, Nr. 9, dec. 1967, 35.
- ¹⁰² CIOROIANU, A., "Art, Propagande et Politique: Le cas de Nicolae Ceausescu", in *New Europe College Yearbook 2000-2001*, p. 151.
- ¹⁰³ FISCHER, M. E., "Idol or Leader? The origins and future of the Ceausescu Cult" in *Romania in the 1980s*, ed. by Daniel N. Nelson, Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado, p.124.
- ¹⁰⁴ Here I attach two of the most striking examples. The grammar is that of the senders.
- Letter from "poet necolificot Mihoil Godru" to Nicolae Ceausescu August 23 1968:
(Diclorație)
- Domnule Nicoloe Ceușescu, Știu co sînteți îngrijorot pentru foitul co
ormotele celor cinci țori socialiste cori ou ocupote pe republico Sociolisto
Cehoslovacă prin surprindere,
n -om respectot legea pocii
și nici frica
semnelor Dumnezeeshi.
dor Stefan Cel More o reușit cu credințo
sfînto-la toote rozboole și dvs.
Veți reuși doco veți oveo credințo.
Il-om credințo toto
Pe -om un ochi scos din ormoto
Dor în caz co e razboi,
Vod cu unul co cu doi
Și mo duc pe front lo lupto
Cu credinto meo ceo sfînto

So-mi scot țoro din nevoi,

Pe la porei, și de a boi.

Referindu-mo lo situoțieo din Republico Socialisto Cehoslovoco, propun so întoriți, granițele în Jurul Romaniei, și so concentroți so instruți, indeferent fete, femei foro copii, cât și oameni, s-om boeți de lo 18 ani, so romîne numoi ce nu poate curoți cortofi co cozormo.

trebie sa fim goto

pentru opororea patriei,

și m-oi mult nimic.

Domnule Nicolae Ceaușescu,

Doco nu oveți ormoment,

s-au populația suficiento, cereți ojutor de lo țorile copitoliste numoi so nu pierdem Tora. Lo închiere vo doresc încorojore, și încorojore so – mi trimiteți:

Poet necolificot

Domnului Nicolae Ceausescu

Mihoil Codru.

Prim secretar al PCR

Com. Gromiști

1968, 23 August

Jud. Suciova

ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R, Cancelarie, dosar nr. 231/1968, f. 14

Excelenței-Sale

Domnului Nicolae Ceaușescu

Președinte al Consiliului de Stat al Romîniei

[...]

În concluzie forma și condițiile vieții contemporane impune ca toți cetățenii țării să-și exprima liber părerile politice, despre realism si nerealism în toate domeniile de creație artistică inclusiv publicistica; o politică de democrație reală, autentică cu toate libertile ce decura din această democrație ar aduce după sine o mai mare încredere în regimul comunist de la putere din partea unei majorități a națiunii romane, care astăzi privește sceptică la toate promisiunile sterile ale excelenței sale domnului Ceausescu, dar speră odată îndeptati din partid Bodnaras, Chivu Stica și Gh. Apostol, excelențe-sa domnul Nicolae Ceaușescu va putea traduce în viața națiunii ceea are în gând, suflet și inima: o Dacie Felix, o Romînie Mare și moderna cu prestigiu și demnitate, suveran și independentă, bastion al pacii și progresului în acest continent european, care a jucat dar care urmează să joace un rol preponderent în viitor mult mai mare ca întrecut în această parte a lumii contemporane.

[...]

Excelenta [used 16 times in the letter]

Natiunea romînă urează excelenței-voastre sănătate deplină și succes în înfăptuirea unei politici creatoare, care să facă posibilă afirmarea energiilor romînești spre binele patriei și al întregii națiuni, pînă atunci poporul este disciplinat și cu o maturitate politica bine conturată așteaptă.

[...]

Excelentă,

În lumina celor expuse mai sus desi aceste teze sunt cunoscute de idelogii, coducatorii politici ai Romîniei de azi și mai presus de toți excelenta-voastră domnule Ceaușescu, sper că Excelenta-voastra veți adepta o politica realistă pe plan intern și extern în interesele națiunii Romîne și nu al partidului din care face-ți parte, abilitatea excelente-voastre va face ca interesele partidului să corespundă total cu interesele națiunii romîne, acest act istoric vă va reyerua locul de cinste printre eroi neamului: Decebal, Ștefan cel Mare, Mihai Viteazu, Horia, Closca, Crisan, Avram Iancu, Tudor Vladimirescu, Brătienii, Maniu, Antonescu, Pătrășcanu, Ceaușescu.

Ioan I. Stanciu, Oradea, str. Delavrancea 31, Județul Bihor.

ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R., dosar nr., 231/ 1968, f. 85, 88, 89-90

105 FISCHER, M. E., "Idol or Leader? The origins and future of the Ceausescu Cult" in *Romania in the 1980s*, ed. by Daniel N. Nelson, Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado, pp. 125-126.

106 NEAGOE, S., "13 Septembrie în dealul spirii", in *Magazin Istoric*, anul II, nr. 9, sept. 1968, p. 13.

107 *Magazin Istoric*, anul II, nr. 9, noembrie 1968.

108 See *Magazin Istoric*, anul III, nr. 5 (26), mai 1969, pp. 37-43.

109 CIOROIANU, A., "Art, Propagande et Politique: Le cas de Nicolae Ceausescu", in *New Europe College Yearbook 2000-2001*, p. 158.

110 *Ibid.*, p. 152.

111 *Ibid.*, p. 153.

112 Traditional dance.

113 "Nicolae Ceaușescu: 55 ani de viață și patru decenii de activitateta Revoluționară", in *Magazin Istoric*, anul VII, nr. 2 (71), febr. 1973, pp. 3-15.

114 *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

115 FISCHER, M. E., "Idol or Leader? The origins and future of the Ceausescu Cult" in *Romania in the 1980s*, ed. by Daniel N. Nelson, Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado, p. 129.

116 PETRESCU, D., The Collapse of Communism in Hungary and Romania: A Comparative Analysis, in *Studia Politica*, Vol. III, No. 1, 2003, p. 166.

117 FISCHER, M. E., "Idol or Leader? The origins and future of the Ceausescu Cult" in *Romania in the 1980s*, ed. by Daniel N. Nelson, Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado, p. 131.

118 GABANYI, A. U., *The Ceaușescu Cult: Propaganda and Power Policy in Communist Romania*, The Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 17-18.


119 CIOROIANU, A., "Art, Propagande et Politique: Le cas de Nicolae Ceausescu", in *New Europe College Yearbook 2000-2001*, p. 159.

120 *Ibid.*, p. 153.

- 121 GABANYI, A. U., *The Ceaușescu Cult: Propaganda and Power Policy in Communist Romania*, The Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, pp. 32.
- 122 *Ibid.*, p. 30-31.
- 123 FISCHER, M. E., "Idol or Leader? The origins and future of the Ceausescu Cult" in *Romania in the 1980s*, ed. by Daniel N. Nelson, Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado, p. 134.
- 124 GABANYI, A. U., *The Ceaușescu Cult: Propaganda and Power Policy in Communist Romania*, The Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 30.
- 125 *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- 126 FISCHER, M. E., "Idol or Leader? The origins and future of the Ceausescu Cult" in *Romania in the 1980s*, ed. by Daniel N. Nelson, Westview Press / Boulder, Colorado, p. 118.
- 127 CIOROIANU, A., "Art, Propagande et Politique: Le cas de Nicolae Ceausescu", in *New Europe College Yearbook 2000 – 2001*, p. 168.
- 128 GABANYI, A. U., *The Ceaușescu Cult: Propaganda and Power Policy in Communist Romania*, The Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 38.
- 129 *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- 130 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- 131 BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 221.
- 132 GABANYI, A. U., *The Ceaușescu Cult: Propaganda and Power Policy in Communist Romania*, The Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 44-45.
- 133 *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- 134 *Sovetskoye dekorativnoye iskusstvo. Materialiy i Dokumentiy 1917-1932. Agitacionno-massovoe iskusstvo, Oformleniye prazdnenstv. Tabliciy, Isskustvo*, Moskva, 1984, p. 6.
- 135 GABANYI, A. U., *The Ceaușescu Cult: Propaganda and Power Policy in Communist Romania*, The Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 58.
- 136 *Ibid.*, p. 71.
- 137 *Ibid.*, p. 73.
- 138 *Ibid.*, p. 74.
- 139 *Ibid.*, p. 76.
- 140 *Ibid.*, p. 77.
- 141 *Ibid.*, p. 78.
- 142 BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 222.
- 143 Here the word means master, householder, like the Russian *Hazyain*, as Stalin was called by his called by his associates. Above I mention that Tito was also called in this way.

- 144 PLEȘU, A., *Obscenitatea publică*, Humanitas, București, 2004, p. 76.
145 *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.
146 *Ibid.*, p. 78.
147 *Ibid.*, p. 79.
148 *Ibid.*, p. 83.
149 *Ibid.*, 2004, p. 84.
150 *Ibid.*, p. 89.
151 *Ibid.*, p. 90.
152 KULJIĆ, T., "Tito-nacrt sociološkoistorijskog istraivanja", in *Srpska Politička*
153 *Misao*, No. 1, 1995, p. 74.
154 UGRESIC, D., *Kultura na lazhata. Apoliticheski eseta*, Stigmati, Sofia, 1999,
155 p. 54.
156 *Ibid.*, p. 53.
157 *Ibid.*, p. 56.
158 *Ibid.*, p. 66.
159 *Ibid.*, p. 67. One of Tito's nicknames was *The Old man*.
160 Leoncio is the antagonist from the famous Brazilian soap opera *Izaura the*
161 *Slave girl*.
162 *Kurir*, No. 306, 1, 2-3 maj 2004, br. 306, god. II.
163 *Balkanite+*, No. 24, Feb. 2004, p. 2.
164 www.camila.org/theglory/2004/08/natalija_verbot.html
165 www.geocities.com/s000ngs/verboten_fun.htm. The stars show that Broz is
166 "impatient, sentimental, an idealistic explorer of far-off ideas and schemes,
167 however very resolute, determined, and forceful, with an unstoppable ability
168 to turn his dream into reality."
169 *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 292 Issue 1, Jul/Aug2003, p. 13.
170 KUNZE, T., *Nicolae Ceaușescu: O biografie*, Editura Vremea, București, 2002,
171 p. 7.
172 "Ceaușescu și Caligula", in *Journalul Național/ Ediție de colecție*, p. 20.
173 See BROWN, J. F., "Preface" in GABANYI, A. U., *The Ceaușescu Cult:*
174 *Propaganda and Power Policy in Communist Romania*, The Romanian
175 Cultural Foundation Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 13.
176 MICU, C., "Între Țepeș și Caligula: Fiul lui Dracula", in *Jurnalul Național/*
177 *Ediție de colecție*, 24.01.2005, p. 20.
178 McNELLY, Raymond T., Radu Florescu, *In Search of Dracula: The History of*
179 *Dracula and Vampires Completely Revised*, Houghton Mifflin Company,
180 Boston, New York, pp. 4-5.
181 *Ibid.*, pp. 6.
182 *Ibid.*, p. 74.
183 *Ibid.*, p. 103.
184 *Ibid.*, p. 168.
185 *Ibid.*, p. 168.
186 www.comunistvampires.com

- ¹⁷⁵ BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p. 17.
- ¹⁷⁶ KUNZE, T., *Nicolae Ceaușescu: O biografie*, Editura Vremea, București, 2002, p. 8.
- ¹⁷⁷ Amza Pellea (1931-1983) a popular Romanian actor.
- ¹⁷⁸ POPOVICI, I., "Fantoma la televizor", in *Dilema Veche*, No. 53, 21-27.01.2005, p. 22.
- ¹⁷⁹ POPOVICI, I., "Fantoma la televizor", in *Dilema Veche*, No. 53, 21-27.01.2005, p. 22.
- ¹⁸⁰ Learn more from www.teatrulmic.ro/spectacole/o_zi_din_viata.htm
- ¹⁸¹ CRISTOIU, I., "Semnul normalității", in *Monitorul de Vrancea*, luni, 6 dec. 2004, Internet Edition, www.monitorulvn.ro/index.php?&omega=articol&id=7269
- ¹⁸² BOIA, L., *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, p.197
- ¹⁸³ KRSIC, D., "Work in Progress", in *VLASTITO iskustvo, past-present*, ed. Radonja Leposavic. Samizdat, Beograd, 2004, p. 29.



HAJRUDIN HROMADŽIĆ

Born in 1971, in Bihać, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ph.D., Institutum Studiorum Humanitatis (ISH), Ljubljana,
Graduate School of the Humanities (2004)

*Dissertation: The Example of Hypertext: Discourse Characteristics of the
Digital-Electronic Text and the User's Identity Paradigms in the
Interactions' Imaginary Context*

Assistant Professor, Institutum Studiorum Humanitatis (ISH), Ljubljana

Participation in international conferences, seminars, and symposia in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Norway

Articles in anthropology of new medias, and sociology of culture
Primary fields of interests: media anthropology, and anthropology of
consumerism

THE HYPERTEXTUAL COAUTHOR IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SUBJECT/OBJECT DICHOTOMY: EPISTEMOLOGICAL RETHINKING OF THE THEORY OF HYPERTEXT

Introduction

The phenomenon of hypertext (and theoreticians familiar with the theory of hypertext agree on this point) is of significance not only to the future of the book (text), but also to the understanding of the wider social and cultural phenomenon of “information excess” in the “the late age of print”.¹ This phenomenon gives rise to some central questions: Does hypertext merely represent a step forward in the development of western technocracy, or does it offer concrete possibilities in terms of the pluralism of the text? Does hypertext represent a truly symbolic opportunity for the “democratization” of the cultural and social context?

I will approach these questions in a broad manner by focusing on a range of different academic fields, from theory of textuality, media-communication, and literary history, to philosophy and sociology. At first sight, this way of conducting a research might appear to lead either to eclecticism or epistemological heterogeneity. However, I will argue that these potential accusations are misleading based on the constitutional characteristics of the hypertext, which is a heterogeneous structure in itself (it contains large variation of links, nodes, paths, and anchors on the one hand, and text, video, graphics, and audio elements on the other).

At the same time, the hypertext is a large social and cultural phenomenon that extends beyond the boundaries of text, textuality, and digital media systems. Looking at our everyday practices, it becomes obvious that we are already symbolically located in the world of the hypertext. For example, our everyday routines are often hypertextual, bringing us “salvation” from the heterogeneous and chaotic “hyper

information age". In addition, the associative principles of the human mind, which form some of the basic assumptions of rational, intellectual, and cognitive activities, are also hypertextual. The symbolism of the hypertext is visible in the context of human communication, because when we engage in dialog, we tend not to interpret the real meaning as it was constructed in the mind of the person uttering the statement, rather we create new meanings based on our own associations, "verbal footnotes", or the parallel discourses available to us. In short, hypertext and hypertextuality are manifestations of "postmodernism" and as such are being included in classical theories about text, textuality, and the new media. Thus, interdisciplinary methodologies are the most appropriate epistemic tools for this kind of scholarly research.

In the following I intend to research the concept of the "coauthor" or "writereader" (or "wreader", as George P. Landow puts it) in hypertext. This concept exists in the theory of hypertext as a construct derived from the synthesis of two parts: the author (creator of text) on the one hand, and the reader (the consumer of text), on the other. One of the most important questions in the theory of hypertext is the position of the author in the space of the traditional book (author, subject - reader, object); another is that of the location of *the writereader*, or coauthor, as an active component of hypertext. The concept of the "hypertextual writereader" is an example of the creation of virtual identities in new media systems. Virtual identities are created through the dynamic interaction between users and contemporary digital media technology. In this approach, the user of the hypertext is able to establish direct contact with the electronic text in a nonlinear manner; he/she can choose between different links, anchors, nodes or paths, as well as possibilities to cut or add parts of the text; he/she shares feelings of a unique narrative structure which are the result of the user's method. According to this thesis, hypertextual links, nodes and paths connect the reader with other texts, graphics, audio and video materials. They construct decentralized schematic structures and make possible the transfer of a part of the author's functions to the reader. For that reason, the reader of hypertext is an active user: he enjoys an interactive relationship with the hypertext and becomes a hypertextual coauthor or *writereader*.

In this paper I will make a critical examination of the questions that show that the old dichotomy between the writer/author and the reader does not dissolve in the space of hypertextuality or with the introduction of the idea of the hypertextual writereader. My approach to the problem

of the coauthor in the hypertext is much broader than the question of the “destiny” and future of the contemporary reader in his or her contact with electronic text. Namely, I argue that the construct of the hypertextual writereader is one of numerous epistemic efforts typical of the last century that focuses on the question of how to resolve the elementary epistemic dichotomy: the relationship between subject and object.

The problem of the epistemological antagonism between subject and object is very old. Its history can be traced back to ancient philosophy (ancient physis/thesis dichotomy – i.e. the negative dialectics by Heraclitus) and was later developed in the contemporary science topics of the seventeenth century (the so-called Cartesian turn and Descartes thought), followed by Hegel’s dialectic, the linguistic structural dichotomy introduced by Saussure, and the classical nature-culture opposition by Levi-Strauss. We can also add psychoanalytic theory to this path of research, as well as Lacan’s concept of the big Other. At the same time, multiple efforts have been made to find the solution to this scientific problem, such as that in the theory of deconstruction by Derrida. Derrida criticizes the dialectic model itself, pointing to its logocentralistic simplification of thinking, so characteristic of “western thought.” Some other criticisms of the antagonistic dualism that focus on social context appear in the theories of Heidegger, Adorno and Horkheimer. Also of interest here are works by semiotic theoreticians, such as “late” Barthes (*Le Plaisir du texte*, and *Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes*). In his works, Barthes rejects the differentiation between denotation and connotation, which had been very typical of his early texts (*Mythologies*, 1957). Also, Judith Butler, under the strong influence of Foucault and Lacan, defines identity as a social and ideological construct, and not as a biologically determined category. Her analysis has as its final aim the deconstruction of the dichotomy of the sexes.

There are similar developments in the domain of the “exact” sciences, such as in physics. Classical physics (Newton), in the context of the objective experience of the world in three-dimensional space (i.e., *Quattrocento*), runs parallel to the narration of the classical linear text in the novel at the end of 19th century realism. On the other side, there is contemporary physics, and the new understanding of space and time initiated by Einstein’s theory of relativity and, in particular, quantum theory (the role of the observer in observing processes on the micro-atomic level, called as the “Uncertainty Principle” by Werner Heisenberg). This theory is of interest to us because here we recognize elements of the

symbolic relation between the role of reader in the hypertext system (coauthor) and the aforementioned characteristics in the theory of Heisenberg. However, Heisenberg's observer is positioned on the micro-atomic level, while the hypertextual reader is located inside the virtual configuration of computers.

Taking the classical scholar's approach, the epistemological problem of the relationship between subject and object relates to a Cartesian and Enlightenment heritage. In other words, it reflects a need to establish a distance in relation to which a liberal, humanistic subject belonging to the age of philosophical rationalism and the Enlightenment constructs its own identity. At the same time, this turn is a symbolic example of the "break" with the pre-modern and pre-technological traditions – a moment of breakdown with a human organism's origin, his/her natural environment. This form of subject-object dichotomy developed in a linear fashion (reaching its zenith in the scientific positivism of the nineteenth century) until the beginning of the 20th century. The period after that was (through the science, art, and the wider social and cultural context) one of developing critical thinking, indicating that such a simple, black-and-white matrix was not acceptable in a time characterized by strong individual modalities, tiny differences which appear "somewhere between" these two extreme poles.² According to contemporary philosophical thinking, these two sides are in a process of continuing intertexture and dialog which produces a mixing of the identity differences. It reflects the need for a new kind of holistic approach.

In this text I am interested in anthropological, communicational, and philosophical dimensions of the aforementioned epistemological problem as well as users-identity models constructed through contact with computer screens during the Internet "surfing process". The metaphorical question related to this could be: what lies behind the "simple" user's clicking of the computer mouse?

The most common term used to explain this kind of process is that of "interaction". The process of interaction between the computer, its screen, and the consumer should be seen complexly – i.e. also through the "back side" model of the interaction process – as the concept of so-called interpassivity. The other parallel topics developed in this text relate to the characteristics of the computer screen in relation to that of the television; the application of the concept in psychoanalysis (that of Lacan) of the gaze in the context of this problem; and the definition of the contemporary virtual subject.

Interactivity/interpassivity

It is useful to rethink a character in the interaction process from within the context of the contact between the viewer/subject and the perceptive/object, as well as to explore the phenomenon of interlacing, which takes places between these two sides, using the approach based on the concept of interaction. Namely, the “classic” interpretation of the subject-object distinction insists on the difference between the subject being represented as an active, dynamic pole and the object, opposite to the subject, being passive and fixed in one position.

It is possible to observe a kind of scientific conceptual change during the twentieth century. What is the most characteristic about this is the tendency it showed of replacing the strictly epistemic canons of scientific positivism, which was so typical of the nineteenth century, with other knowledge models from the beginning of the twentieth century (e.g., quantum physics).

A rethinking of the interactivity/interpassivity concept thus appears to be one of the key points in a better understanding of the epistemic problem of the subject-object dichotomy. At the same time, this places emphasis on the concept of the hypertextual coauthor. Looking from the perspective of the wider etymological framework, the term “interactivity” defines reciprocal activity between different elements inside a given environment. In this text I am interested in so-called Human Computer Interaction (HCI) or the Human Interface which defines the interaction between human and computer and is probably most present in the example of the World Wide Web as its basic user paradigm. More concretely, I am looking to identify the electronic computer interaction dimensions that lie behind the navigational clicking of the computer mouse.

One of the basic ideas related to the concept of computer media interaction is the thesis of the partial transmitting of technological creation potentials from the programmer to the computer user – i.e., its consumer. Here, the computer user is presented with many different programming possibilities and choices and his/her user paradigm is thus interactive – i.e., he/she is given the opportunity to choose between links and programs, he/she chooses content, combines windows etc. In the near future, software designers will take a back seat in terms of computer user practices, and the user will determine future consumer occurrences. The “price” of this “freedom” is that of acceptance of consumer responsibility on the part of the user him/herself.

It is clear that this kind of “glorification” of interaction potentials is only representative of the perspective of new technology media, and this is highly typical of the postmodern times. What is entirely missing in this form of theoretical approach is an appropriate epistemic input, or scholarly research input, which can critically and properly indicate all of the complicities of the interaction process. The term interaction is rightly place in inverted commas in Žižek’s interpretation of this phenomenon:

...The term ‘interactivity’ is currently used in two senses: (1) *interacting with* the medium – that is, not being just a passive consumer; (2) *acting through* another agent, so that my job is done, while I sit back and remain passive, just observing the game.³

The use of inverted commas in this citation is clearly understandable in light of the correlation of the second meaning of the concept of “interactivity” with the term “interpassivity”, which defines the subject that is “incessantly – frenetically even – active, while displacing on to another the fundamental passivity of his or her being”.⁴ That “another” could be present as an object that we consume also means the computer through the other side of the interaction process – the interpassivity.

Does not interpassivity represent the other side of interactivity? Is it not necessarily the opposite side of my active contact with the object instead of the passive attendance of the performance, the position where the object deprives me – steals from me – my one passive reaction to the pleasure (or sorrow, or laughing)? Instead of me, the object becomes that which ‘enjoys the performance’ and, in doing so, liberates me from the superego’s task of enjoying...⁵

The Austrian media theoretician Robert Pfaller is the main theoretical creator of the concept of interpassivity, especially in terms of the media meaning of the term. In his most prominent work, *Die Illusionen der Anderen. Über das Lustprinzip in der Kultur*, Pfaller illustrates with examples of television shows, such as so-called sitcom comedies, a highly interesting and useful model of the concept of interpassivity that is equivalent to the concept of interactivity.⁶ The model of sitcom comedies, which use the mechanism of so-called “canned laughter”, gives us a very usual motive for analyses on the topic of interpassivity. It provides us with radical examples of how to transmit some of the most typical human, organic feelings like laughter to the “other”, to the machine, an

artificial mechanism which is able to laugh instead of us. In psychoanalysis discourse this represents the transference of enjoyment to the big Other.

Mladen Dolar is the author of the text "Interpassivity". At the beginning of this work, Dolar clarifies the common understanding of the interactivity-interpassivity dichotomy. This kind of common sense, according to Dolar, is represented by some of the following typical attitudes:

What qualified a man to the dignity of the subject (a 'modern' subject, 'western' subject) is at least an opposite of passivity.⁷

It is not hard to represent him/herself like a hero of interactivity, as a somebody who controls things, creates them with his/her own creativity, adds new ideas to those that already exist, who does not allow of control above him/herself, but, on the contrary, strikes back – in a word, like somebody who is a subject (although in a double sense of the peasant in a global village). And, what about interpassivity? This pose could hardly be one of 'fashion'. It is obvious that there is something shameful and humiliating in interpassivity.⁸

In opposition to this, Dolar rethinks the interactivity-interpassivity dichotomy from the context of psychoanalysis in terms of the relation between the structure of the wish (inherent interactivity) and the structure of the instinct (interpassivity) – or, in his words, "the key to interactivity is the wish, and the key to interpassivity is the instinct."⁹ More precisely, the principle of interpassivity is just the flipside of interactivity, like aforementioned example in which the instinct is the opposite of the wish. Dolar concludes that "both activity and passivity belong to the sphere of the wish and its 'destinies', while passivity is the limiting example of activity."¹⁰ This provides us with the following dilemma: "Is there any human activity which could not be placed under the rubric of interpassivity?"¹¹

Interpassivity thus appears to be a phenomenon that is permanently connected with the process of interactivity and often forgotten in rethinking of media computer interaction. Or, to use the terminology of psychoanalysis, interpassivity represents the flipside option of interactivity, and its symbolic example is the spiral, so-called Möbius track: the spiral track as a feature of the number eight where subject and object are placed on the two sides of the same matrix. They move constantly, and change their positions: in one moment the subject takes the place of the

object, and, on the opposite side, the object takes the place of the subject, and this repeats over and over again. This means that subject and object are located in the same place – the track – but can never meet. The Moebius track example is the most representative model used in psychoanalysis theory in rethinking the subject-object dichotomy. It testifies to a meeting and the impossibility of a meeting between subject and object at the same time. The subject “falls” into the object, “becoming” the object, while, conversely, the object “becomes” the subject. A distance is canceled. Through Žižek’s reinterpretation of Hegel’s famous thesis, “the spirit is a bone”:

...The paradox of the subject is the fact that it exists only through its radical non-possibility, through ‘the bone in the throat’, which always prevents it (the subject) from reaching its complete ontological identity. In this way we deal with the structure of the Moebius track: the subject is correlative to the object, but in a negative way – the subject and the object can never meet, being in the same place but on different sides of the Moebius track. That is to say, in philosophical terms, the subject and object are identical...¹²

Interactivity and interpassivity form a phenomenon that is closely connected to the same matrix of appearance. For this reason, any future research into interactivity must include the dimension of interpassivity – and not their simple opposition (the black and white binary perspective) – and do so in the context of the heterogeneous differences of the numerous particular modalities – multitudes that arise in the space between these two sides.

The concept of the gaze, the relationship between the television and the computer screen, and the so-called virtual subject

The phenomenon of the gaze is a paradigmatic philosophical topic *par excellence* (Cartesian metaphor: “seeing like knowing”). Of the many different philosophical approaches to the topic of the gaze,¹³ the most appropriate in the context of this text is that developed by Lacan in the ninth chapter, “What is a picture”, of his 12th Seminar: *The Four Elementary Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. Lacan offers schematic structure of the gaze:

 THE GAZE----->THE IMAGE, THE SCREEN<-----THE SUBJECT OF PERFORMANCE

From the perspective of this schema, most evident is the fact that we are dealing with the concept of the two crossing gazes. In the first case we have the subject of performance on our own position, on the position of the gaze. In the second we testify about a turn: the gaze itself takes on the function of the subject, and it changes me, who I am – the subject who is watching – to the picture, or to the object of performance on the screen. My gaze, the gaze of the subject watching, meets, or better said, crosses with the gaze from the other side of the screen. I am watching, and I am under watch at the same time. Our gazes meet at the image/screen, which is the crossing point. Lacan named this the “scopic field” that signifies the place where “the gaze is outside, I am under watch meaning I am a picture”.¹⁴ The gaze is an instrument that photographs me. According to this interpretation, the screen watches me, its content comes out on the screen cover, and meets there with my gaze. I do not have a way to reach out to the content “from the other side of the screen”, because its content is already directed toward me with the support of the screen – the gaze. It makes me a target of the gaze. It changes me from *the subject who is watching to the object that is being viewed*. I remain on the cover of the screen, there is no “deeper inclusion”. I am “watching” and I am under watch. Thus Lacan’s scheme clearly points out the meaning of Saussure’s concept of the reciprocal relationships between the signifier and signified as one of the basic concepts by Saussure that he applies in his thesis.

An example of television or television screens as a place of intervention in “an inducement” is given in Lacan’s *Television*.¹⁵ In the introduction to this work, Jacques-Alain Miller notes Lacan’s role by himself in this performance:

However, that is the show, the show by the one man (one-man show). The audience could not suppose, not for the moment, that it is allowed to share an intimacy with somebody who leaves himself in total... speaker does not forget, not for the moment, that he is in front of the camera... All that together looks like theatrical tirade... It looks like the narrator is speaking from a distant planet, but periodically he is inside of you.¹⁶

However, there is a chance in a play. The subject, who deals with the schematic structure described above, adds his/her understanding of it. Otherwise, he/she deconstructs the contents from the screen.

Only the subject – the human subject, which is the human essence – is not, contrary to an animal, totally trapped in that imaginary trap. He orients himself in it. How? He, himself, isolates the function of the screen, and starts to play with it. Really, man knows how to play with a mask, the object of the gaze from behind. In this case, the screen is the place of mediation.¹⁷

Lacan's concept is important in this context because it can be applied to the example of television media and the screen. Put simply, the communicational schema of television and its screen is linear, one-dimensional. It designates a form of information flow from the exclusive and strictly controlled television media center to a television viewer, a media consumer. Information, acquired through this kind of media-communication and information transmission, reduces (but does not disable) the potentials and possibilities for a wider qualitative valorization of the media content. In short, *it* ("television inducement") prefers the *it has to be known* type of discourse. Through this kind of approach we are informed at only a superficial level about the event, and we are also deprived of the concrete tools needed for media-communicational deconstruction. This reflects the question: how can we break through the picture of television constructed media and mediate contents?

It appears with the example of television to be possible to theorize about a kind of *interpelation* (in the basic, Althusserian meaning of the word) of the TV spectator (through his/her direct or indirect addressing by the side of the TV subject), and not about the immediate contact of interaction. Interaction, as we saw in the previous chapter, includes the whole palette of different potentials for direct feedback reactions to the offered contents, with the possibilities of qualitative and quantitative changes, as well as the addition of new contents. At the same time, the moments of identification, closeness or distance to the TV program – in a word, the feelings of "warmth" or "familiarization" with the television contents – are the result of the TV *interpelation*, something especially emphasized in television programs such as soap operas, TV novels, sitcoms, or reality shows.¹⁸

If we apply some of the basic concepts of psychoanalysis and its terminology to the epistemic field of understanding of screen functions, it is then possible to say simply, on a primal level, that the subject, places in a three-dimensional real environment and establishes a relationship: from the outside to the screen. On the second level, the content, which “meets” with the subject on the screen, transforms him/her into a “birthmark” implying *emptiness*. According to psychoanalysis’s theory of “emptiness”, like an elementary precondition for the constitution of the subject (and this is indeed what is missing from the subject who is too much “anchored” to “the real reality”), it seems that the screen can symbolize the place of transition: *from the subject who has potential for knowledge toward the subject who knows*. The gaze, and the content mediated through the screen-picture, only offers a “superficial” identification for the subject through the gaze of the Other. The theoretical question that arises here is the following: can we speak, given this example of this kind of communicational relationship – the content (the gaze) – the screen – the subject (or, a potentials’ subject) – about a real, affirmative process of the conceptualization of the subject, about the process of his/her own constitution?

The explicit coordinates of the theoretical problem explained previously are:

- (1) The narrow approach: the space of the computer screen, as a “natural” place of the hypertext, the space of its surrounding, and its concrete realization;
- (2) The wider approach: the computer screen as a place of the transition, the communication channel which mediates the program contents, as well as the position of the body, the physical place of the subject in relation to the screen, its closeness/distance to the screen, and the limitations of the interventional (interpretational) potentials in this kind of consumer contact.

The technological advances in computer screens is one of the most crucial and most important points in the development of the theory of media interactivity. The famous statement by Theodor H. Nelson, the author of the term hypertext (1963) and the *Xanadu* project, points in this same direction:

That the future of humanity is at the interactive computer screen, that the new writing and movies will be interactive and interlinked. It will be united by bridges of transclusion and we need a world-wide network to deliver it with royalty.¹⁹

The computer screen as a “window” to the computer’s virtual reality, which it possesses behind it, is the basic hypothesis in our rethinking of the computer screen in this text. Defenders of the theory of computer interaction principles often emphasize the advantages of computer interaction models which are presenting according to these approaches through the line of the selection potentials. This one of the essential characteristics of the computer screen and the software’s interactive potential: screen active icons, links, nodes, and anchors all create in collaboration user activity between consumer and his/her object of interest. According to this, if we take the simple model of comparison of the computer and the TV screen, which reflects a kind of “aggression” manifesting in the preference for the one-dimensional picture, the computer screen shows a tendency toward the simultaneous coexistence of different screen windows.

The classic example of this model is the simple surfing process on the Internet. Hypothetically speaking, I can enter one or more terms into some Internet search engines and will probably get a hundreds or thousands of results from a database that are directly or indirectly connected to the information I am searching for. This means, I am given the contents but have to make a choice between the given links and sources of information. I move across the computer screen with the support of the computer’s mouse; through the “clicking process”, I intervene in the contents. The so-called *point-and-click interactivity* produces the automatic transition, dislocation, or transfer of my gaze; it realizes my personal moving path through the cosmos of the database and creates unique narration structure. I make a selection, I ask about the offered content, and give priority to some links instead of others. In the words of Stuart Moulthrop, “The reader’s path from one lexia² to another is determined partly by active engagement: the reader selects a word in the present lexia, chooses an option from a menu, issues a command...”²⁰

Interaction feelings are more present, more real in a case like this. This often creates a vision of moving *behind the computer screen*, through the *virtual space*. Illusions of this kind are especially present in the

examples of the conceptualization of *the computer's virtual worlds*, and user identity constructions are produced through them.²¹

If we turn back for a moment to Lacan's schema, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter (the crossing between the gaze and the subject of performance on the image/screen), and apply it now to computer screens and not TV screens, it is then possible to actualize the screen, not like a place of crossing, but like a place of *the extension gaze* of the subject of performance, where the (computer) screen is just a place of mediation. The subject positioned in front of the computer screen is "invited" for user intervention (already mentioned in the "click on mouse" process) into the contents behind the screen, through *the extension gaze* from the outside to the screen. It directly changes the character of the media's gaze. In the case of the computer screen, getting to the gaze means, I know ("what I am looking for on the Net"), or I wish ("to learn, to check, to inform myself... about this and that"). In other words, it is impossible to be only a passive user of the computer, staring into the screen. Direct user intervention, through the "click on process" of the computer screen, and supported by the computer mouse, is the first and basic precondition for the practical realization of the computer's media system. Without of the user's active collaboration with the computer, it is impossible to realize its media potential.

By contrast with the case of the TV screen, where the extension of the media signal is "longer" or, better said, more directly relates from the screen toward the TV consumer, the contents of the computer's media system-Internet somehow pulls itself deeper – from the cover of the screen to "behind" itself, toward the so-called virtual space of the computer. Consequently, the consumer's gaze follows the way of the computer contents, and "penetrates" behind the computer screen to the space of "virtual reality". This kind of communication schema favors the creation of immediate closeness and unites consumer feelings in a touch with the computer: that is, *the consumer's immersion* in the media. In this case we can testify about the meeting point between the subject/consumer, on the one hand, and the contents of the background of the computer screen, on the other, which constructs an illusion of the intrusion into "the virtual fourth dimension", as well as feelings of possibility of creating subjectivity in cyberspace. It creates feelings of unlimited possibilities and potential for the creation of subjectivity in cyberspace, for the expansion of the self through interactive contact with the computer screen

– that is, the subject as a virtual *creation*. The theoretical approach that deals with this kind of cyberspace phenomenon is also called *telepresence*.

As an introduction to this way of thinking, we can take •i•ek's question: "How is it possible that we can non-consider reality and drown our selves in the virtual space of the phantasms' screen"?²² In other words, how have the feelings of the loss of reality become so strong (with an important precondition: it is a kind of reality as a specific and clearly definite social construct excepted by the most of the people through their everyday life practices and rituals), while the virtual picture-simulacrum is intertwined with the concrete reality on the level of their non-differentiation? That is the space of the computer screen as the matrix screen through which the cinematic presentation removes "the real reality", the reality of factual presence. The following quotation from Žižek offers a theoretical theory for this and a similar rethinking:

When a user, who is playing with a lot of channels inside the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) says, 'What if real life (RL) is just the one more IRC channel?' In other words, he/she asks, according to the array of windows found in hypertext, 'What if RL is just one more window', his/her illusion, the illusion he/she comes under, is in detail similar to the opposite illusion, to our common sense belief in the complete reality in the virtual universe. More precisely, we have to avoid both traps, the simple direct reference to the outside reality outside of cyberspace, and also to the opposite attitude according to which 'there is no outside reality, RL is just one more window.'²³

This brings us to the conscious/question as to who follows a man during the last few centuries. The problem is that a man constitutively does not know who he/she is, and what he/she is, but he/she asks him/herself intensively about this, and this is the most important point to emphasize. The phantasm of the computer's virtual world, and virtual subject in cyberspace, symbolized through the symbolic of computer screen, needs to be looking through a kind of continuity: as a stage in technological development within which the subject's self-questioning – questioning his/her ontological identity – has a "real-virtual" (Lacan's understanding), conscious/unconscious, practical form of the expression.

Hypertextual coauthor – “writereader”

The theory of the hypertextual coauthor, as an important theoretical concept within the theory of hypertext, has become the hypertextual model of the previously mentioned new media Internet identity. It represents the hypertextual type of the computer's virtual identity, constructed through a dynamic, interaction relationship between two poles: the author/writer of hypertext, on the one hand, and its reader/consumer on the other, all of which with the support of contemporary, digital media computer technology.

It is necessary to put historical and critical stress on this kind of phenomenon. Media theory teaches us, from a historical point of view, that the invention of any kind of new media in history was always followed by strong utopias with non-critical expectations of the high new media user-identity liberations allegedly offered by the new media systems. In this way, the discovery of radio was probably more of a stimulus for utopian dreams about creation of new media user identities than was the Internet today.

To summarize, the concept of the hypertextual coauthor is the following: a user of hypertext has possibilities for close and intensive contact with the electronic text in a so-called non-linear way; he/she has opportunities to choose between the different electronic links, anchors, nodes, and paths... According to this, he/she shares feelings of the unique narrational structure, which is the result of his/her own user strategy. He/she has possibilities to move or add different parts of the text... A reader of hypertext is its active user, he/she has interactive relationships with it... Put briefly, he/she becomes a hypertextual coauthor or *writereader*. Following the numerous examples from the theory of the hypertext, hypertextual links connect a reader with a lot of other texts, graphs, audio and visual materials; it decentralizes schematic structure, and makes possible the transition of a part of the authorship and author functions from author to reader.

Opposed to the hypertext, which represents, according to the previously explained theory, an example of the textual democratization *par excellence*, we have “traditional” print text, which is centralized, linear, and establishes and promotes a hierarchy of knowledge with the “omniscient” author as the central and advance figure. It becomes obvious that these hypertext theories belong to a long continuity of rethinking on the role and importance of the contemporary author and the “destiny” of

authorship, meaning the theoretical tradition which began at the end of the 1960s, in particular some of the works by Roland Barthes and Michele Foucault.²⁴

For many theoreticians in field of hypertext, hypertextual writing represents a kind of collaborative project, a process of limitless spreading of the text in which all participants in this process become potential hypertextual coauthors.

From this point of view, it is easier to understand many of the hypertext theoreticians who argue that the reader of hypertext takes on some of the authorial responsibility which traditionally (and still do) belong to the Author. In a hypertextual environment the author is deprived of some of his/her traditional means and one can no longer grant the author much intentional authority. Thus, traditional book writing stresses hierarchy, the Author, the linearity of the text and the book publishing industry; against this, the computer hypertext can liberate by destroying the single author, by empowering the reader to reorganize the text, by allowing for collaboration...

Discussion of what an author is and what he/she should be become intriguing to the hypertext theory. Hypertext writing, for many hypertext theorists, is a joint venture in which the text expands infinitely and everybody, through this process of expansion, becomes a co-writer such that we can no longer speak of a master-author. At this point it is necessary to present some of the most knowledgeable authorities in these matters. The theory of hypertext offers many examples of these kinds of theories, in the works of some of the most prominent theoreticians in the field.

One such author is George P. Landow, who characterizes the hypertext reader as a "reader-author" or Landow's "wreader": "Hypertext... creates an active, even intrusive reader",²⁵ or an active and interactive reader.²⁶ He speaks about blurring the distinction between author and reader, which happens at several levels. At a basic level, the reader chooses which links to pursue. A reader navigates his/her own way through the text, and he/she reconfigures the document. When the reader links to other documents, he/she has created a new document.

This construction of an evanescent entity or wholeness always occurs in reading, but in reading hypertext it takes the additional form of constructing, however provisionally, one's own text out of fragments, out of separate lexias."²⁷

Landow concludes:

The virtual presence of other texts and other authors contributes importantly to the radical re-conception of authorship, authorial property, and collaboration associated with hypertext. Within a hypertext environment all writing becomes collaborative writing, doubly so.²⁸

Jay David Bolter, also one of the most famous hypertextual theoreticians, shares a similar view. He says, "In the electronic writing space... The reader performs the text."²⁹ Bolter claims that the electronic text permits the reader to share in the dynamic process of writing and that "the text is realized by the reader in the act of reading."³⁰ He also asserts that electronic technology is "changing the relationship of both the author to the text and that of text to the reader."³¹ Ted Nelson sees his model of the new writing system (*Xanadu*) as a tendency to decentralize authority and empower individuals. It is not so hard to recognize what Nelson had in his mind when he used these terms: the term authority likes "the institution of an Author", and individuals like creative readers or users of the hypertext.³² Jakob Nielsen, in his comments on the electronic text, which he believes should be based on interaction, hypertext linking, navigation, search, etc., wrote: "nobody has time to read long reports any more: information must be dynamic and under the direct control of the reader, not the author."³³ More cautiously, Jane Yellowlees Douglas writes about interactive construction, which does not efface or impair the position of the author, but rather transforms it. Authors of interactive pieces in any genre, says Douglas, come to be what playwrights have always been: creators of initial conditions for later performances.³⁴ This short review of the ideas held on the so-called coauthor or *writereader* by some of the most knowledgeable hypertextual theoreticians will be conclude with the theory of Richard Lanham. Lanham believes that the reader of hypertext is always at least the coauthor of the text, and, more radically, sometimes the reader of hypertext can be the primary author. He emphasizes that electronic readers are interactive readers who can do all the things that are claimed for them, or choose not to do them. In this way, reflects Lanham, "the boundary between creator and critic simply vanishes."³⁵

To summarize the theories of the authors mentioned (and many others): it is impossible to be a passive reader of hypertext; electronic writing emphasizes the impermanence and changeability of the text and tends

to reduce the distance between author and reader by potentially turning the reader into an author. Hypertext lacks the author who selects, arranges and edits the text to build a structure of interrelated ideas or concepts. That is the special characteristic of hypertext, its possibility for recombination, which can describe its interaction style. The reader of the hypertext picks and chooses his/her own way from node to node, from link to link; he/she adds new text to the network... allowing more independence in reader response, allowing the reader to start at any given point in the hypertext, and giving him/her a sense of power. The reader becomes a potential author. All these characteristics, following these theories, enable his/her transition from a passive, "traditional" reader to an active, hypertextual *writereader*, coauthor.

The important doubt here, however, is in the question: does the process of interactivity really eliminate the distance between the observer and the observed, between author and the user of the hypertext? Is this true? At this point, it seems important to mention some of Michele H. Jackson's ideas. He says the link, like a basic tool for the hypertextual interaction does not represent the essence of hypertext – it is merely a mechanism to implement hypertext.³⁶

It is a fact that in hypertext the user is able to interact *physically* with the text. He/she navigates through the links in a clicking-key process, and interactive characteristics of hypertext offer him/her an opportunity to participate actively. This enhanced interaction between the reader/user of the hypertext and the hypertext itself is one of the most significant characteristics of hypertext reading and writing. From this point of view, it seems that the active readership of hypertext predominates over the more passive readership of print. These facts give the statement that hypertext offers its reader much more authority than in printed texts. This allows the reader to become a co-writer or co-author him/herself, thereby through his interaction effacing any authoritative distinction between the original author and him/herself.

In fact, the act of reading could be much more present in hypertext than in traditional print works. For example, can the reader of hypertext participate in the link creation process? Rosenberg suggests that the reader might become a programmer if offered full programmability within the hypertext interface. In this case, might the reader also become a designer of hypertext?³⁷ Contrary to this, a link is limited by the author or designer of the Web page. That means, every link is planned and specifically created by the web designer. The use of the link enables the designer to

control all of the potential ways a user can move through information, and, it should be emphasized, the links between documents may not generate new or unexpected structures. The process of selection of some words or sentences as potential links, their “canonization” – their transformation into hypertext anchors, and their arrangement on fixed locations in the hypertext – all these facts together are the key factor in the process of hypertext design. They are not only some neutral media points in the hypertext system. The real questions are: Why is the one link offered exactly at that position in hypertext? Which sites does it connect to? What are the results of those connections? Hypertextual links are the product of designers, the authors of Web sites, and they create them strictly in accordance with their own interests. The user or the reader of the hypertext has limited choices in terms of links, nodes, or anchors. His/her feeling of unlimited possibilities in terms of hypertextual connections is just an illusion. These kinds of possibilities are always limited by an author’s selection.

The problem of the concept of the so-called coauthor in hypertext might be recognized, as I have already mentioned at the beginning of this text, as the one particular examples of a wider, and probably more important epistemic problem of the twentieth century: the dichotomy between a subject, on the one hand, and an object, on the other. Scientific efforts to resolve or exceed this split represent one of the most important struggles of our time. Deconstruction of the hypertextual concept of the coauthor, its “demystification”, is an effort in support of this.

Slavoj Žižek describes “the cyberspace hypertext” as a new media system, where the new “life experience”, meaning the experience of life which breaks off with a linear form and offers an alternative of “multiform flow” of the complex contingencies and considers its own “natural, appropriate objects’ correlation.”³⁸ That kind of the cyberspace narrative, says Žižek, is experienced as a “postmodern”, hypertextual, and indefinite form of the rhizome function, which does not prefer any precise and exactly definite order of reading or interpretation.³⁹ In this context, through an effort to place the interpretation of the cyberspace as a symbolic dimension of Lacan’s Imaginary-Symbolic-Real schema, Žižek also rethinks the theoretical problem of the hypertextual coauthor. He understands it through the terminological construction of “the procedural authorship”, as defined by Janet H. Murray.⁴⁰

...The author (let's say in the interactive environment of the ruin, where we actively collaborate through the playing of roles) does not write detailed literature stories anymore, but just offers the basic rules (the coordinates of the fictional universe where we run down, restricted lines of the acts, possible to be carry out inside of such a definite virtual space, etc.), who could be serve as a base for an active include of the inter-actor (the intervention, the improvisation). That term 'procedural authorship' reflects a need of some kind of Lacan's 'big Other': if the inter-actor wants to be include in cyberspace, he/she must works inside of the minimum of the accepted symbolic rules/coordinates, who are *ordering from the outside*.⁴¹

This citation very clearly points out interesting details about the rethinking of the theory of the hypertextual coauthor. First, there is the marked syntagm – symbolic coordinates *ordering from the outside* – who are set up more or less by the redefined institution of an author inside the digital, cyberspace text. This brings us to the second interesting point of this quotation – the inter-actor. The term "inter-actor" remarks the same as the theory of hypertext defines with the concept of hypertextual coauthor, or *writereader* ("wreader" according to Landow). "As 'inter-actors', we are placed in the position of the 'little god', and have at our disposal the limited power of intervention in a subject's life story..."⁴² (Žižek understands it according to the story by Janet Murray). In this case, it seems important to emphasize the syntagm – the limited power of intervention – which is, the same as in the case mentioned previously of the symbolic coordinates *ordering from the outside*, ordered and limited according to a choice and textual strategy by the new type of "secret" hypertextual coauthor.

Through these examples, I am trying to sketch a wider framework of the theoretical questions surrounding the concept of the hypertextual coauthor and offer possible critical approaches toward it, as well as to show that a "new kind" of Cartesian dualism is still alive today, regardless of the different postmodern efforts to cross on the subject/object dichotomy. The idea of hypertextual co-authority is one more example of the postmodern utopian myth, which has been born and defined through the critic of the binary model (so characteristic for the time of "Modernism"). At the same time, it is a result of the non-critical understanding of convergence between the new informational, and communicational technology, on the one hand, and consumer practices of their use, on the other. The concept of the hypertextual coauthor appears inside the dynamic dialog between an author and the reader/consumer.

It is a kind of synthesis that results from their interaction exchanges. But, although they belong to the same matrix (the process of contact with the text, its interpretation, or consumption), even though they communicate, and “compressively” relate one to another, an author/writer and a reader/consumer could hardly, even in the example of hypertext, become one. They could never meet, or be regarded as identical. The border between author and reader in hypertext is flexible, dynamic, and mobile, sometimes even insignificant, but never reaches a level that could endanger the existence of their particular identities. In this case, a theory about partial change of pro-traditional canons in understanding an author and a reader could be much more appropriate, as opposed to the theory of their particular death and disappearance. These two poles are split, if not with a typical, external dividing line, then with the one symbolic border line inherently internal to their relationship. That kind of dividing line is a precondition for their particular existences at the same time. The distance between these two poles remains, even in the cases of their partial interaction change of positions (as in the case of hypertext), which represents the other side of the same coin of the same concept. The classical author-reader dichotomy also exists in the case of the hypertext, albeit as a partly changing concept.

The theory of the coauthor-*writereader*, as a symbolic synthesis between two opposite poles, becomes meaningful only through the perspective in which an author and a reader are two sides of the same matrix. These two sides are in a reciprocal relationship, though this does not mean that they are identical at the same time. The concept of the hypertextual coauthor-*writereader* is one example of the theory of the hypertext and represents wider theoretical and epistemological efforts: which models can define an identity of the “new kind” that is the postmodern subject in a holistic perspective of its differences, which are absorbed and united inside him/herself. This means that the example of hypertextual coauthor represents an effort of the symbolic split from the Cartesian heritage and the epistemic subject-object dichotomy established upon it. This is the one of scientific efforts of “the postmodern era”, which emphasizes the priorities of the individualized interaction relationships, like prerequisites for the constitution of contemporary subjectivity. Instead of defining precisely with a clear line the distinction between subject and object, postmodern approaches offer an active relationship between the subject-subject (that is, an author-interactive reader in hypertext). The result of such a relationship is a contemporary identity – “nomadic subject”

– that is fragmental and de-territorialized, and the hypertextual coauthor-*writereader* represents one of these. In that way, the postmodern subject has been replaced in a new version of “the pre-Cartesian universalism”. The virtual omnipresence of cyberspace – the digital space of the new informational-communicational media technologies – is one of the most current examples of “the new universalism”, and the hypertextual subject is just an illusion of the fullness of self accomplished created through the contact with other similar individuals “behind computer screens”.

In lieu of a conclusion

If we contextualize the coauthor in hypertext in the field of new media, art, and society today, then we can theorize about the contemporary author’s intellectual rights and copyright. The idea of the end (death) of the genius artist, of the individual who is endowed with God’s initiation and who chooses to give humanity an artifact of invaluable value, took came to the forefront during the period of “postmodernity”. This postmodern concept offers a new kind of artistic identity: an artist who is aware of the collage and dispersion of contemporary society, a society that is divided into numerous particles. The concept of the nineteenth century’s remarkable artifact, which has a holy essence and aureole, has thus been replaced with the idea that any object can potentially become an artifact if placed in a certain context (*La rone de bicyclette* by Marcel Duchamp from 1913, being this transitional moment). In agreement with this, the Author with a capital “A” loses his/her sacred meaning and becomes one among a multitude of equals.

The development of digital media technologies, and well-organized information foundations, as well as the building of computer archives in the last fifteen or twenty years, makes different new creative new possible. This period is signified by the “user paradigm”. This is the epoch of citations, recycled references, copies that become originals for new copies (the old thesis by Walter Benjamin). In this sense, the postmodern author/artist is not somebody who waits for the moment of great inspiration, but somebody who uses materials, which already exist and recombines them into new forms. Thus, the artist/author and the receptor/consumer of the artifact move closer to one another, they cross old divides and mutually transform each other’s identities. Consequently, with the idea of the

hypertextual coauthor or *writereader*, the theory of hypertext joins current postmodern thoughts. Namely, hypertextual theory, like any other postmodern theoretical model, respects the continuity of the postmodern story-tale based on the aforementioned disappearance of great authorities. Hypertextual theory contributes to the glorification of the user (reader) praxis and his/her interactive relationship with the text. In the meantime, this postmodern idea has been disputed with the argument that the author's authority suggests its potential existence and the author is far from dead. Because of this, the theory of hypertext offers a new myth, that of the *writereader*, which is the synthesis of the collaboration of coauthors, a kind of collage made of cooperative individuals of equal levels engaged in the creative process of togetherness.

Additionally, the concept of the hypertextual coauthor is a product of wider social tendencies characteristic of the new type of contemporary individual. It is an example of the postmodern concept of non-normative identity, which is pluralistic, fluid, and changeable. Non-normative identity is the idea of the self-confident, inter-active subject who obediently believes in his/her potentials and possibility to create his/her own identity. Through this concept, personal identity becomes a feature of our self-creation. The maxim of this ideology is the phrase: "take your destiny into your own hands".

Let us then take another approach which offers a better way to analyze the hypertextual coauthor. Is not the survival of the basic, historically determined dialectic and its antagonistic reality a sign of the potential of opposites and, through that, of the potential for the creation of qualitative pluralism? It is not the understanding of the negative dialectic (which is constant in the history of western civilization) signified by the binary model, but the dialectical principle of a dynamic relationship between the multitude of particularities and differences that offer potentials for the flexibility of the whole social structure. This last point relates to the parallel, "back side" option, offered in the framework of the neo-liberal matrix, and its aspiration to the totality of the One — the global economic market under the rules of the Capital "monster".

The ambition of this neo-liberal doctrine, of its postindustrial and multinational capitalism, is to overcome oppositional struggles and powers, and in such a way also to improve the capacity of this system to adjust and absorb any attempts at change of the dominant neo-liberal model. This means the destruction of the potentials for the qualitative change within the political, economic, and social structure of neo-liberalism.

Marx coined the term for this kind of tendency in capitalism as “formal sub-sumption”. By this term he points to the capability of the capitalist system to include in its production work practices which do not directly rise from its domain. Here we witness the institutionalization of oppositional margins and the positions of resistance and change, as well as the endangering of the dialectical mind or “the critical consciousness... which breaks open a closed universe of discourse...”⁴³ Also, Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony brilliantly capture this tendency of the hegemonic order to absorb counter-hegemony in its very structure (i.e. there is no hegemony without counter-hegemony).

Commercialization brings the homogenization and flattering of differences and assimilation of the heterogeneous multitudes into a uniform model. With the incorporation of any changing potential in the total Reality of the One and the one-dimensional society or its contemporary version of Empire, the subversive power, which could protect contradiction, disappears. Methodology for the realization of that model is wide and obvious: acceleration of the rhythm of creation, production, and new consumer fashions, marketing mechanisms that differentiate consumer types, recognition and definition of their specificities and characteristics, development of the strategy for the market sale, etc. All this becomes possible with the growth of living standards among the population of the “First World”, with the development of the consumer culture, or massive pop-consumerism.

If the typical model of the factory and industrial production has been Fordism and its *assembly line*, then the main symbol of the actual postindustrial or post-Fordian production is *the net*, with its principle of circular production, which is oriented toward the production of informational, linguistic, and communicational – that is, non-material – services. That kind of “netlike” decentralized and de-territorialized production matrix of postmodern capitalism has its own symbolic equivalent in the structural, organizational, and functional type of the worlds’ global media — the Internet, or the hypertext.⁴⁴

What place does “our” hypertextual coauthor-*writereader* occupy in this contemporary, global meta-structure, as briefly described above? Is it in the model of the universal One, of the one who is “hidden behind the screen” and who, through an “innocent” click of the mouse, emphasizes the myth of great technological interaction? Is it an ideal consumer who loses any critical distance and perception of his/her own user praxis in the confusing virtual space of highly-developed computer

technology? The idea about the totality of the One is a classical example of totalitarian ideology. It is a monistic ideology, contrary to the dichotomy, its oppositional potentials, and the possibilities born in the domain of pluralism.

With awareness of the possibilities and potential for liberation from the totalitarian ideological matrix – the matrix that hides the absolutism of one hyper-monad behind the scenes of endless choices – the author and the reader are allowed to develop a productive dialog through the active exchange between them. At this point, the concept of the hypertextual coauthor will move to the place where it belongs: to the archives of postmodern mythology and postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism.

NOTES

- ¹ J. D. Bolter, *Writing Space: Computers, Hypertext, and the History of Writing*, Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1991, p. 3.
- ² A good example of the artistic questioning of the subject/object dichotomy is found in the work of the famous Russian painter Kazimir Malevic. Malevic, who worked at the time often seen as the zenith of modernism (the first and second decades of the twentieth century), is a kind of a forerunner of the post-modernistic picture artifacts. His paintings are the best examples of the early Russian avant-garde, as well as the works which achieve a kind of the wholeness only through the certain theoretical reflection at the same time. Probably the most significant of his works in this context is the picture "Black Square" (1913). In his book *Nonobjective World*, Malevic wrote: "Any artistic work – any painting – has to be introspective like the resolving result of the conflict between the subject and the object." K. Malevic, *Nonobjective World* (translation in Croatian, *Nepredmetni svijet*), Centar za kulturnu djelatnost Galerija Nova, Zagreb, 1981, p. 34.
The previous sentences may show us Malevic's efforts at rethinking the models of how to go beyond elementary modernistic dichotomies. Is not his thesis a classic example of the post-modern tendency to leave behind the split between the subject and the object? I develop this thesis further in the text "Od Malevicevega kvadrata do racunalniskega zaslona" ("From the Malevic's Square to the Computers' Screen"), *Apokalipsa* 63/64/65, 2003, p. 215-228.
- ³ S. Žižek, "Is it Possible to Traverse the Fantasy in Cyberspace?", S. Žižek, E. Wright, E. Wright (eds.), *The Žižek reader*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK, 1999, pgs. 105–106.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 106.
- ⁵ S. Žižek, *Kuga fantazem (The Plague of Fantasy)*, Analecta, Ljubljana, 1997, p. 130.
- ⁶ R. Pfaller, *Die Illusionen der Anderen. Über das Lustprinzip in der Kultur*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 2002.
- ⁷ M. Dolar, "Interpasivnost" ("Interpassivity"), *Filozofski vestnik*, vol. XVIII, no. 3, 1997, p. 11.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, pgs. 21-22.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.
- ¹² S. Žižek, *Krhki Absolut, enajst tez o krscanstvu in marksizmu danes (The Fragile Absolute, Eleven Thesis about Christianity and Marxism today)*, Analecta, Ljubljana, 2000, p. 22.
- ¹³ A historical summary of the concept of the gaze from the philosophical point of view is given by the book *Downcast Eyes* by Martin Jay (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1994).

- 14 J. Lacan, *Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse* (*The Four Elementary Concepts of Psychoanalysis*), Seuil, Paris, 1973, p. 98.
- 15 J. Lacan, *Televizija* (*Television*), Problemi-Eseji, Ljubljana, 3/1993. *Television* is a textual version of the TV show on the French national TV from the January 1974 on which Lacan was a guest.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 17 J. Lacan, *Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*, p. 99.
- 18 The book by Tony Wilson, *Watching Television; Hermeneutics, Reception, and Popular Culture* (Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1993), offers a detailed and precise analysis of the interpellation of TV spectators through the example of the TV programs mentioned.
- 19 T. H. Nelson, "The Story so Far", *The Ted Nelson News Letter*, Number 3, October 1994. The Ted Nelson News letter: *Interesting Times*, www.sesensemedia.net/993.
Lexia is the concept introduced by Roland Barthes, and defined in his book *S/Z*, where he analyzes Balzac's novel *Sarrasine*. According to Barthes, lexia represents a line of short, fragment units of reading, which constitute a pluralistic text (he defined 561 lexias, which are separate in five lexical code groups). George P. Landow, one of the most prominent theoreticians in the theory of hypertext, applies Barthe's concept to his definition of the hypertextual structure (G. P. Landow, *Hypertext: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory & Technology*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1992).
- 20 S. Moulthrop, "Getting Over the Edge", <http://raven.ubalt.edu/staff/moulthrop/essays/edge.html>.
- 21 Classic examples of this kind of creation of virtual computer worlds are given by MUDs (Multi User Domain, Multi User Dungeon, or Multi User Dimension). MUDs are virtual textual worlds constructed with many levels where users/players have the possibility to perform different kinds of "research" inside these created worlds. The historical background of MUDs is seen in computer games like *TrekMUSA*, *LambdaMOO*, and *Dungeons and Dragons*, which were popularized (commercialized) in the 1970s and 1980s (before that time they were accessible only within closed US Army-scientific circles). For more references on this topic, see Sherry Turkle, *Life on the screen, Identity in the Age of the Internet*, Simon & Shuster, New York, 1995.
- 22 S. Žižek, "Kiberprostor ali neznosna zaprtost bivanja" ("Cyberspace, or unbearable closeness of the residence"), *Problemi* 7-8/1996, p. 105.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 110.
- 24 In the first place this relates to the works *Authors and Writers*, *Death of the Author*, and *S/Z* by Roland Barthes, as well as to the attempts by Michael Foucault, especially in his text *What is an Author*, to revise some of the more recent conceptions of authorship and reconsider the role of the author as it relates to textual production.

In his texts, Barthes stresses the interaction between author and society, and tries to demonstrate that an author is a subject who is socially and historically constituted. Barthes suggests, at the time almost radical access, it is necessary to transform the interest of literary critics from the Author toward a reader. A famous maxim encapsulating this idea is his well-known thesis: "Born of a reader need to be pay with death of an Author". He differentiates between "intransitive" and "transitive" writing. By the former he understands the situation in which the author is the only master of the language, or text. With the latter there is "transitive" writing where "language supports a praxis", and "writers are not part of the literary institution per se". These ideas from *Authors and Writers* are almost complementary to Barthes' theory on differences between *readerly* (*lisible*) and *writerly* (*scriptible*) text in his work *S/Z*. Barthes outlines two types of readers, a readerly consumer of text and a writerly producer of text. In its interesting dichotomy, Barthes favors the process of writerly because, "the aim of the literary work is to create a reader who is a producer of the text, not consumer anymore". Similar to Barthes, Michael Foucault understands an Author as a function, or more precisely "an author is nothing else than author function" in terms of how texts are distributed and received in a social environment. The author function, according to Foucault, is located in the gap between the real writer and fictitious speaker, and its basic characteristic is pluralism of ego. He focuses on analyzing the relationship that exists between the name of the author and the text it is connected to.

- 25 G. P. Landow, and P. Delany (eds.), *The Digital World: Text-Based Computing in the Humanities*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 90.
- 26 G. P. Landow, *Hypertext 2.0: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1997, p. 120.
- 27 *Ibid.*, p. 195.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 104.
- 29 J. D. Bolter, *Writing Space: Computers, Hypertext, and the History of Writing*, p. 158.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 32 T. H. Nelson, *Computer Lib/Dream Machines*, WA: Tempus Books, Redmond, 1987.
- 33 J. Nielsen, "Electronic Books-A Bad Idea", *Alterbox*, 1998.
<http://www.useit.com/alertbox/980726.html>.
- 34 J. Y. Douglas, "Where the Senses Become a Stage and Reading is Direction: Performing the Texts of Virtual Reality and Interactive Fiction", *The Drama Review* 37(4), 1993, pgs. 18-35.
- 35 R. Lanham, *The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993.

- ³⁶ M. H. Jackson, "Assessing the Structure of Communication on the World Wide Web", *JCMC* 3 (1), June 1997.
- ³⁷ J. Rosenberg, "Locus Looks at the Turing Play: Hypertextuality vs. Full Programmability", *Hypertext 98: The Proceedings of the Ninth ACM Conference on Hypertext and Hypermedia*, ACM, New York, 1998, pgs. 152-160.
- ³⁸ S. Žižek, "Realno kiberprostora" ("The Real of Cyberspace"), *Problemi* 3-4/1999, pgs. 9-10.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- ⁴⁰ J. H. Murray, *Hamlet on the Holodeck*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997.
- ⁴¹ S. Žižek, "Realno kiberprostora" ("The Real of Cyberspace"), p. 5 (my italic).
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- ⁴³ H. Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, ABACUS, Sphere Books, London, 1972, p. 89.
- ⁴⁴ See also A. Negri, M. Hardt, *Empire*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000.

REFERENCES

- BOLTER, J. D., *Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing*, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, Hillsdale, 1991
- DOLAR, M., "Interpasivnost", *Filozofski vestnik*, vol. XVIII, no. 3, 1997, (9–30)
- DOUGLAS, J. Y., "Where the Senses Become a Stage and Reading is Direction: Performing the Texts of Virtual Reality and Interactive Fiction", *The Drama Review* 37(4), 1993, (18-35)
- HROMADŽIĆ, H., "Subjekt, multiplativnost njegova karaktera i virtualno u odrazu Foucaultove teorije diskursa", *Filozofska istrazivanja* 85–86, 2002, (357–372)
- HROMADŽIĆ, H., "Od Malevicevega kvadrata do racunalniskega zaslona", *Apokalipsa* 63/64/65, 2003, (215–228)
- HROMADŽIĆ, H., "Hypertext, Myth of Coauthor, and the Process of Interactivity", Edition of International Conference: "Libraries in the Digital Age"; *WWW and Information Retrieval & WWW and Libraries*, Faculty of Education, University J. J. Strossmayer in Osijek, Croatia and Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA, Inter-University Center, Dubrovnik and Hotel Odisej, Mljet, Croatia, May 25 – 30, 2003
- HROMADŽIĆ, H., "Hypertextual Coauthor in the Age of Neo-Liberal Consumerism", *ART-e-FACT, Strategies of Resistance, TECHNOMYTHOLOGIES*, issue no. 3, 2004, http://artefact.mi2.hr/_a03/lang_en/theory_hromadzic_en.htm
- JACKSON, M. H., "Assessing the Structure of Communication on the World Wide Web"; *JCMC* 3 (1), June 1997, <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol3/issue1/jackson.html>
- JAY, M., *Downcast Eyes*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1994
- LACAN, J., *Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse*, Seuil, Paris, 1973
- LACAN, J., *Televizija, Problemi–Eseji*, Ljubljana, 3/1993
- LANDOW, G. P., *Hypertext: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1992
- LANDOW, P., *Hypertext 2.0: The Convergence of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1997
- LANDOW, G. P., and DELANY, P. (eds.), *The Digital World: Text-Based Computing in the Humanities*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993
- LANHAM, R., *The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993
- MALEVIČ, K., *Nepredmetni svijet*, Centar za kulturnu djelatnost Galerija Nova, Zagreb, 1981
- MARCUSE, H., *One Dimensional Man*, ABACUS, Sphere Books, London, 1972
- MOULTHROP, S., "Getting Over the Edge", <http://raven.ubalt.edu/staff/moulthrop/essays/edge.html>

- MURRAY, J. H., *Hamlet on the Holodeck*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997
- NEGRI, A., HARDT, M., *Empire*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000
- NELSON, T. H., *Computer Lib/Dream Machines*; WA: Tempus Books, Redmond, 1987
- NELSON, T. H., "The Story so Far", *The Ted Nelson News Letter*, Number 3, October 1994, www.sesensemedia.net/993
- NIELSEN, J., "Electronic Books-A Bad Idea", *Alterbox*, 1998, <http://www.useit.com/alertbox/980726.html>
- PFALLER, R., *Die Illusionen der Anderen. Über das Lustprinzip in der Kultur*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 2002
- ROSENBERG, J., "Locus Looks at the Turing Play: Hypertextuality vs. Full Programmability", *Hypertext 98: The Proceedings of the Ninth ACM Conference on Hypertext and Hypermedia*, ACM, New York, 1998, (152-160)
- TURKLE, S., *Life on the screen, Identity in the Age of the Internet*, Simon & Shuster, New York, 1995
- WILSON, T., *Watching Television; Hermeneutics, Reception, and Popular Culture*, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 1993
- ŽIŽEK, S., "Kiberprostor ali neznosna zaprtost bivanja", *Problemi* 7–8/1996, (101–132)
- ŽIŽEK, S., *Kuga fantazem*, Analecta, Ljubljana, 1997
- ŽIŽEK, S., "Is it Possible to Traverse the Fantasy in Cyberspace?" Žižek, S., Wright, E., Wright, E. (eds.), *The Žižek reader*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK, 1999, (102–124)
- ŽIŽEK, S., "Realno kiberprostora", *Problemi* 3–4/1999, (5–16)
- ŽIŽEK, S., *Krhki Absolut, enajst tez o krscanstvu in marksizmu danes*, Analecta, Ljubljana, 2000



MIGLENA IVANOVA

Born in 1964, in Varna, Bulgaria

Ph.D. Institute of Folklore, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (1999)

Dissertation: *Visual and Anthropological Characteristics of Contemporary Bulgarian Graffiti*

Associate Researcher, Institute of Folklore, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

Participation in international conferences in Germany, the Netherlands,
Moldova

Articles on immaterial cultural heritage, oral history, material and visual culture,
anthropology of gifts

Participation in scientific projects in anthropology

VISIBILITY AND INVISIBILITY: GRAFFITI MURALS AS AN INDICATOR OF GROWING GLOBAL CULTURAL INFLUENCES IN POST-SOCIALIST BULGARIA

Murals were both late and recentcomers to the Bulgarian graffiti scene. They began to appear in the USA in the second half of the 1960s, going through strong stylistic development in New York in the 1970s before spreading to Western Europe in the 1980s. Graffiti in Bulgaria, however, only started to increase in the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, and the type of graffiti that emerged was quite different from the prevailing styles in the USA and Western Europe.

Though the official identities of the authors of these works remained hidden, the Bulgarian style of graffiti conveyed a wide range of meanings, at times even intimate ones, in which attitudes, feelings, and cravings were shared with a wide public. Consisting of simple and well known abbreviations, these graffiti nevertheless varied in terms of their thematic scope: popular wisdom or humor, including anti-socialist or other political statements; support for a particular football team or band; and signs of belonging to non-formal youth groups, such as hippy, heavy metal, punk, skater and skinhead groups. After existing almost undisturbed for more than a decade on school desks, in public lavatories and, increasingly, on the exterior surfaces of larger towns, graffiti became an important element of Bulgarian cityscape and the city imaginary. Some played an important role in the political and social transformation of the country, both during the final years of socialism and the first years of post-socialism. To a large extent, this all became possible because they were able to be quickly and directly understood in broad social circles.¹

In contrast with the Bulgarian graffiti of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as many of the earlier forms of graffiti, murals are more difficult to read and understand. This new type of graffiti – though unknown on the Bulgarian scene until the late 1990s, it recently became the predominant form throughout the country – is now also found in big cities all over the

world. It is called variously tagging, murals, American graffiti, New York style, subway graffiti or hip-hop graffiti, and contains within it a name, written in embellished letters, that is often distorted to the point of illegibility. This form of graffiti is suited to secret communication while using public space as its medium, and it developed gradually out of more legible forms of graffiti, such as the early graffiti writers in Philadelphia, New York and some other American towns, who wrote their names in simple, well formed Latin letters. Unlike gang graffiti, which involved a pseudonym followed by the gang name, graffiti loners would only draw or inscribe their aliases. This form of graffiti soon began to grow in number and size, including application by spraying involving increasingly sophisticated calligraphy to mark them out from the rest. The image component of the writing began to grow in importance, and by the 1970s graffiti names had already become relatively intricate murals. Different individual and local styles began to appear gradually, though in most cases they were recognizable only from within writers' circles. Thus, though practiced in public spaces, this type of graffiti facilitated a means of communication between writers, while generally excluding outsiders. Murals went on to enjoy international popularity, and by 2000 they had become a global phenomenon.²

When the first writing experiments in graffiti labels and logos began to appear in the second half of the 1990s, the lettering used was more or less legible. The first visible change,³ however, came in the mid 1990s with the calligraphic experiments that took their inspiration from advertising and involved naming favorite football clubs, bands, or youth groups, such as those of the hippies, punk or metal fans. These were written almost exclusively in the Latin and not Cyrillic script, and often featured outlined contours or were ornamented with arrows, arrowheads and other elements, and made a substantial contribution to the development of a taste for the embellished Latin letter. More importantly, they provided ample opportunity to future mural authors to hone their writing skills. Indeed, the older and more respected Bulgarian graffiti masters claim to have started their careers in precisely this way, and it was only in their late teens, and in some cases even in their early twenties, that they invented graffiti names and began writing tag signatures.⁴ Soon after, their production underwent important changes due to the direct influence of the global graffiti model. After initially imitating foreign examples seen on television, in American films such as "Wild-style", or specialist West European graffiti magazines, they gradually appropriated the various forms

and elements of mural imagery between 1998 and 2005. The result – in similar vein to foreign examples of graffiti murals – was alien to passers-by, but legible and highly appreciated in writers' circles. Just like the foreign examples, the Bulgarian murals were able to hide not only the official identity of the writer but also the majority of the meanings they conveyed – i.e. though existing directly in the public realm, they in fact served to facilitate communication between writers, while hampering communication with the others at the same time.⁵ Moreover, by developing an apprenticeship system and the skill of mural evaluation, the young men involved formed a circle of practitioners and connoisseurs with specialist knowledge that was more or less inaccessible to outsiders. They also attempted to construct the history of the Bulgarian graffiti mural movement as a new and still developing branch of global graffiti muralism that had nothing to do with earlier Bulgarian graffiti. Thus the graffiti scene conceptualized itself as an individual self-sufficient entity that was highly dependant on the international scene and for the most part independent of wider Bulgarian society.

Remaining true to the basic principles and practices of graffiti mural writing was considered a sign of authenticity. Still, given the nature of the tradition and the way it was acquired in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian scene has many individual traits. The graffiti murals in Bulgaria not only sought to hide their meanings, and even their content, despite being in the public domain; they were also increasingly executed in the style of the global graffiti tradition as a sign of respect and belonging.

The authors of Bulgarian murals are mainly young men aged between 12 and 28. They all made conscious decisions to do graffiti, in contrast to some of their peers. This is usually explained by the high level of pleasure associated with making murals, regardless of the ever-present moral, physical and legal hazards.⁶ Inter-writer collaboration exists to a great extent for practical reasons of reducing the risks associated with their hobby, especially among those who run the risk of public condemnation or criminal prosecution. At the same time, and precisely because of the high risks, the willingness to get involved in mural writing is fueled by a need to prove themselves in difficult conditions combined with a strong sense of belonging to a secret masculine entity. The act of mural writing is highly praised and respected, mostly because it opens the door of the writer to a close circle of graffiti writers that belong to an international tradition, within which the writer proves his bravery, reliability, devotion, and creative potential, and which offers the writer the opportunity to win

respect and fame among respected peers. All these possibilities are available to he who dares chose and follow a hidden career and identity within mural writers' circles.

In a recent study of New York murals and their authors from the 1970s, Ivor Miller pointed out the importance of the choice of graffiti name for the creolized identities of the majority of the writers. Self-chosen to be suitable for writing and, more importantly, to win respect and dignity, all Bulgarian graffiti names are based on English language models and wordplays. Since many writers were of Caribbean or African origin, their name choices correlated quite closely with the wishes of their respective immigrant groups or countries of origin. The choosing of a name represents the symbolic act of acquiring the identity aspired to.⁷ At the same time, the mural writers were able to linger between an English based graffiti tradition and their native one, thus enabling them to find the most appropriate graffiti name to suit their identity aspirations. The tradition of choosing a graffiti name is suited to different cultural contexts and it therefore comes as no surprise that it reappears when transferred to Europe, thereby further strengthening and developing the graffiti tradition of name choice. When the first taggers and crews in Bulgaria began to use graffiti names, the results were a strange combination of orthodox names in the Cyrillic script and graffiti names borrowed from the global tradition. Later they began to signify naming practices so removed from the mainstream trend that many would not imagine that the strange Latin letters on the streets of Sofia were anything other graffiti aliases. This peculiarity strongly differentiated these writers from the rest of the society and allowed them to form a specific group of their own.

By contrast with previous forms of graffiti, instead of inscribing the names of their preferred groups, bands and teams, these writers began using their own graffiti names or those of their respective graffiti crews. All these names demonstrate a close phonetic and visual resemblance to the pseudonyms used in global graffiti traditions. Following a well established pattern, they sound American, make wide use of word play and are written in Latin script, marking a radical difference from traditional Bulgarian names (based on Orthodox models and written in Cyrillic script). Also, the names the Bulgarian crews chose for themselves were quite similar to mottos or graffiti promotions – e.g. Crazy Bombing Crew or Flash the Dark Crew. Other writers are expected to know only their abbreviations, CBC or FDC. Nevertheless every new crew is more or less expected to choose a name, basing itself on a similar principle.⁸ Thus

the choice of the name already implies in itself an aspiration of belonging to the international graffiti tradition.

These preferences are clearly in keeping with name choices in the global tradition, but they also accord with certain tendencies in wider Bulgarian society. Evgeniya Krăsteva-Blagoeva points out that, in the last three decades of the twentieth century, there was an increasing trend among parents of choosing West European and American names for their children. She also notes that many Bulgarians with traditional given names also have unofficial aliases based on the same foreign pattern and sounding similar to their given names. This author advocates that these choices are not only anticipations of future successful contact with the West, but that they are also expressions of a wish for a western quality of life.⁹ The adoption of graffiti names runs along similar lines, while also signifying an appreciation and belonging to the global graffiti tradition. One example is the Bulgarian writer, Blade, who took the name of a famous American writer. Another, SirGo, is the name of a Bulgarian king but also closely resembles the trend among some early American graffiti writers of placing the prefix “sir” or “lady” before their names in order to sound ‘cool’. Other examples include Naste (which sounds phonetically similar to the English “nasty”) and Argot, chosen due to the writers’ regular use of words with negative connotations to signify high quality. As a rule, individual graffiti names sound phonetically similar to the name of the writer – e.g., SirGo and Blayz, which start with the same letter as the given names of the writers.¹⁰

Despite their similarities with child naming and alias preferences in Bulgarian society as a whole, special graffiti names clearly signify a belonging to a separate group with distinct and secret preferences and tastes. Still, the fact that writers coexist with a cohort of peers to whom the basics of these principles are clear – in so far as their own names or aliases are also based on similar, albeit non coinciding models – already facilitates the existence of links of mutual understanding and even connoisseurship in youth circles. At the same time, the more recent practices of naming reflect aspirations to belong to the global graffiti culture in general and as such also a common philosophy of estrangement from traditional Bulgarian male naming patterns.

Processes of differentiation from mainstream culture are also directly observable in the specific language used by the writers. In naming their works, as well as a hierarchy of mastership among the writers, they adopt and use specific terms, all of which are based on the English language

and used as such, even in Bulgarian, albeit in many cases adapted slightly to the native tongue. Writers who do not speak English nonetheless know the meaning of terms like *writer* (an author of graffiti murals), *crew* (a collective of writers), as well as the terms used to name the different variants of mural images, and the terms *toy* (a beginner), *king* (a respected master) and *shit* (a good mural). These terms were incorporated into the language of the first Bulgarian writers through self-study using graffiti films and graffiti magazines, as well as the Internet, all of which were an important source of information.¹¹ The terms were learnt diligently and put into practice and no attempt was made to change their meaning; they were understood to be part of the tradition, and as such were to be readily adopted rather than used provisionally, as was the case in the USA in the early stages of the mural tradition.¹² In this respect, the Bulgarian scene bears a close resemblance with other countries – e.g., in Germany, France and the Croatia, where muralism was appropriated as an already well developed tradition.¹³ Of course, it should be mentioned here that these terms in use in Bulgaria and all over the world are used exclusively in writers' circles. As such, unified terminology enhances direct and indirect contact with writers from other countries and strengthens the sense of belonging to a global subculture. On the other hand, regular use of special terminology, based on a foreign language and restricted to a limited group of "specialists", differentiates the writers from other Bulgarians, making them feel special, while novices must make special efforts to learn the terminology – a tribute every beginner is expected to pay early on in his career.¹⁴

The existence and use of graffiti terminology in writers' circles is clearly congruent with the widespread use of English vocabulary among Bulgarian teenagers. Though graffiti terminology is used most proficiently by writers themselves, many young people are also familiar with a handful of basic graffiti terms¹⁵ – e.g., both use figures instead of words when writing. Still, Internet forums and the regular insertion of comments in English within the murals themselves clearly demonstrate that graffiti writers have developed special skills in terms of producing and reading iconotexts ("an image which depends for its interpretation on the texts incorporated within it"¹⁶). Consequently, names, written using lettering that is hard to read, are usually reinforced by a more readable signature. Many murals also combine iconic texts with human figures or faces, which further helps to imbue the name with emotion.¹⁷ Alternatively, the letters of the names are sometimes distorted, tilted or interwoven

with one another to convey elements of the author's self-representation as well as concrete moods and attitudes – e.g., in a crack in the middle of a letter, upper and lower sides are joined at an angle that repeats rhythmically within the letters of the name, but differently for other names. Murals can thus convey different dynamics and illusions of motion,¹⁸ while lines, colors, faces and human figures also contribute to the expression of perceptions, attitudes and feelings. Mural writing might look like an illegible mass to an outsider, even to young people; writers, however, are able to differentiate the myriad details, individual or crew peculiarities, or occasional inventions, and then to borrow certain features from each other.¹⁹ Since each piece is considered an individual act of genuine self-expression, novelty and originality is highly praised,²⁰ and close "readings" of the work of others and a day-to-day following of the local graffiti scene is taken for granted.²¹ The act of detailed and specialized reading is thus proof of belonging to the writers' circles and as such serves as a specific, insider mode of communication which remains virtually inaccessible to outsiders.²² This is then usually reinforced by personal contacts and discussions of sketches and works, further enhancing the growing knowledge of individual graffiti writers and crews and their own specific ways of writing, not to mention awareness of current trends in the development of the graffiti murals in general.²³ Mainly thanks to the advent of the Internet in recent years, global and local levels of indirect contact are becoming increasingly interwoven. Early American inventiveness, as well as recent German and, more generally, West European precision, are highly praised and even considered examples that are difficult, if not possible, to match on Bulgarian soil.²⁴ Praising foreign murals above their own is a clear sign that Bulgarian writers consider their national tradition a "toy" one. In interviews I conducted, many writers made explicit statements on these matters.²⁵ Nonetheless, an ability to read murals and attempts to follow recent trends already show a sense of belonging to a common whole and provide a source of courage and willingness to advance and develop.

The use of lines, as well as various forms of underscoring, ornamenting and fading colors are all powerful means of self-expression. In the early stages of the murals scene in the New York subways, writers were also expected to express their individuality and distinctiveness by inventing new styles of writing. From the 1980s onwards, however, and especially on the European scene, innovations were only considered appropriate if they did not exceed the limits of the established graffiti tradition.²⁶ As a

result, later developments were marked not only by a mandatory process of acquisition, but also by a stage of perfecting older styles or gaining insights from previous achievements in the tradition.²⁷ Since Bulgarian writers were quite late in joining their foreign colleagues, they were forced to learn the basic styles of graffiti writing not only on individual basis, but also to establish the beginnings of a national tradition as well. It can be safely said that this is still a wholly unfinished matter, though it is also true that the basic “styles” of writing on walls were acquired between 1998 and 2000. Even toys are today expected to differentiate between tags (calligraphic signatures, based on the graffiti name),²⁸ throw ups (where a name or its abbreviation is quickly sketched in letter outlines and often filled in with a different color),²⁹ pieces (short for masterpieces and a highly embellished and multicolored writing of names),³⁰ wild-style (in Bulgaria typically a flat style of writing which can only be read only with difficulty due to the prevalence of arrows, arrowheads and other ornaments),³¹ 3D (conveying the illusion of three dimensions, often abstract or constructivist in nature), and characters (human faces and figures of the writers themselves or others who they encounter in their everyday lives).³² The partial appropriation of the peculiarities is due to the fragmented adoption of a tradition already at a certain stage in its development. There are, for example, no subway train graffiti in Bulgaria and even freight train writing only gained momentum after 2002 – although writers know its “styles” and history, they rarely practice this form of graffiti. Still, some of the peculiarities of mural writing, developed in the subways of New York and Europe, already existed in Bulgaria on the walls of traffic tunnels and other walls. It therefore comes as no surprise that certain themes from the history of the murals are known on a simplistic level – e.g., even Bulgarian writers who regularly practice the 3D style tend to believe that it was invented in Germany, while in fact it was invented on the old New York subway scene.³³ And last, but not least, some elements, such as the characters, have been honed to near perfection by Bulgarian writers, while letter styles tend to be monotonous. The Bulgarian tradition is thus already well established within the global tradition and features signs of its development, as well as signs of its further fragmentation. At the same time, even where fragmented, the global graffiti tradition as it exists in Bulgaria is practiced such that it is more easily understandable to foreign writers than to ordinary Bulgarians with no experience of mural reading. The best proof of this is the gradually developed insider system of evaluating mural quality.

Declarative graffiti are best known for being placed at important topoi and also for the creative insights of their content, which rely on signs or linguistic expressions. Similarly, many authors consider some murals on prestigious and well guarded buildings in the central city space as original, in so far as their creation involves bravery and inventiveness,³⁴ such as the graffiti that appeared in 2004 on the newly painted wall of the headquarters of Post Bank in central Sofia.³⁵ At graffiti forums, writers themselves speak about tags made on the desk of a military recruiting office and on the walls of the National Assembly.³⁶ In parallel with the increasing sophistication of Bulgarian murals over the course of time, other criteria – e.g., originality, technical accuracy and specific creativity within the already existing graffiti styles – have gained ground, especially among respected mural masters. For example, the direct borrowing of the image of a flame from a foreign graffiti magazine has been strongly criticized as plagiarism, and technological mastery of the spray blast is a mandatory skill to be achieved long before a piece can be seen by thousands of people. As a result, young writers are already expected to have developed their styles, conceptually and technically, through hard work on paper and hidden walls before doing graffiti in well seen locations.³⁷ The criteria mentioned above seem to be the most important and to have been commonly accepted, while others – such as the general esthetic impression the mural creates – are observed by some writers (mainly those specially trained in art) and omitted by others.³⁸ In so far as some of these qualities are widely considered important, respected graffiti kings have, as a rule, chosen to master piece production rather than rely for their fame on abundant tag or throw-up production. Bulgarian graffiti kings enjoy an authority that could be shared with their foreign counterparts. For example, evaluation of Bulgarian graffiti contests by foreign writers has been readily accepted and praised.³⁹ Although these attitudes were partially connected with the dissatisfaction over the inclusion of artists, sponsors and organizers in the graffiti juries, as well the rivalries between crews and groups of crews in Bulgaria, foreign kings are in fact welcomed as jury members in contests precisely because they are considered the most competent. As a result, the criteria and abilities used in judging graffiti production were not only developed gradually in Bulgaria, but these criteria and evaluation were believed to be identical with those found in the international graffiti tradition.

Today, though already in their late twenties, some of the early Bulgarian writers are still practicing their art. They gained their knowledge and

skills on their own, learning from foreign models in a process of indirect communication. A lot of young writers seek their help, especially at the start of their graffiti careers. The graffiti shops belonging to two of the most respected kings in Sofia, for example, have become places beginners go to not only to but spray paint, but also to seek technical advice, approval, inspiration and moral support.⁴⁰ It is very important to be able to meet a person whom you respect and admire for having turned his hobby into a way of earning a living.⁴¹ The authority of the kings also places them in a mentoring position, enabling them to demand a certain level of devotion to graffiti writing as well as allowing them, at least partially, to exercise control over the graffiti production and quality. Respect for those who have “paid their tribute” is common to different national traditions and also present on the global level. It is also not uncommon for Bulgarian writers to show respect for certain foreign kings. Although they usually measure their own successes and failures in comparison with other Bulgarian writers and collaborate with them in order to minimize risk and fear, even the youngest Bulgarian writers still think of themselves as a part of the global graffiti tradition. By belonging to the wider scene, and believing in its self-sufficiency, it is easier to ignore some of the uncomfortably different values and priorities of others, even if they are directly present in the immediate urban reality. All this helps in achieving the inner freedom needed to practice mural painting on urban exteriors, including in central topoi.

At present, large and medium-sized Bulgarian towns are being increasingly saturated with images conveying limited information to outsiders, while at the same time offering a means of intense indirect communication for insiders. These murals, with their own history of proliferation, are nevertheless a form of cultural production, and one which is performed directly in a certain space and shared with others – though a new phenomenon, they have already found a social niche, and by doing so graffiti circles have profited greatly from previous visual regimes in the urban space within the country.

The spread of graffiti murals in Bulgaria happened after a mass outburst of declarative public graffiti in the 1980s and early 1990s that were often considered genuine signs of protest and expressions of grassroots’ indignation, and as such helped promote favorable attitudes towards murals.⁴² These positive perceptions were to a large extent transferred directly to the murals. The murals themselves also benefited from a certain amount of artistic and intellectual appreciation, which was heavily based

on foreign examples and initially appeared long before the appearance of the Bulgarian murals themselves.⁴³ All this created ample conditions for the rapid growth of the murals, while also affecting their nature and helping them become a relatively widespread hobby.

Media comments about graffiti murals are even more abundant than representations of other, earlier forms of graffiti writing. While the appearance of some of the declarative graffiti – most of all the political graffiti – constituted news in its own right and was reflected in the media, journalists now use reports on graffiti contests and events as an opportunity to inform the public about the peculiarities of this type of graffiti and its respected writers.⁴⁴ This is also accompanied by reports of occasional arrests of writers and measures taken against mural writing in foreign countries.⁴⁵ As a rule, journalists tend to sympathize with the authors and show an interest in their hobby, only occasionally doubting their creativity and artistic merit. Yet, despite the fact that murals form an unquestionable part of the graffiti found in the streets of Bulgaria's large towns, media reports and Internet sites alike have also continued to provide information on other, declarative types of graffiti. Thus, though very rare today, general articles written on graffiti tend to pay more attention to the previous forms of political, sexual and live graffiti than they do to murals, while literature and the Internet are full of information on student, soldier, political, activist and other forms of declarative graffiti. Most of these tend to appreciate the older type of graffiti and are silent when it comes to murals – alternatively, some openly declare that they do not understand them.⁴⁶ It also worthy of note here that one particular teenage forum, during the short time it was engaged in discussing graffiti production, contained an abundance of different attitudes towards graffiti murals – from the strongly positive to the strongly negative. This shows that only a small number of young people have a reasonable understanding of murals – normally teenagers who have developed a certain fascination for murals. The attitudes found in the forum, though very limited in number, are not misleading and are confirmed by a partial answer-sheet investigation performed in an MA thesis writing project that shows that pupils and students aged between 12 and 18 have widely varying attitudes to murals. Moreover, only a small minority these knew any writers personally or have tried writing any from of graffiti themselves.

At the same time, a number of Internet sites representing mural production have gradually appeared. They belong both to writers and connoisseurs and contain information about the history of the murals,

contests and mural production in different towns by different crews and individual writers. Writers typically advertise their production or small graffiti writing businesses here, but these sites also offer possibilities for further contact and sometimes provide advice to younger writers. Regularly updated photographs of murals serve to demonstrate artistic qualities as well as to attract potential customers and admirers. Sites and forums organized by outsiders are predominantly aimed at expressing positive attitudes towards graffiti art in general, but are often criticized by the writers themselves for lacking a critical eye in the evaluation of graffiti products and are accused of not understanding what real graffiti is. In addition, an internet forum moderated by a group of NGO activists for the Foundation for Youth Culture, often challenges writers, forcing them to show a high level of disrespect for outsiders entering the graffiti scene with the intention of organizing and managing its needs. While clearly using the site to search for information about graffiti competitions, workshops and other similar initiatives, and then using the forum as an additional space for hidden insider communication by writing iconic texts, the writers also use it actively to criticize interference in the self-organization and self-evaluation practiced within writers' circles. At the same time, they regularly refuse to engage in debates and discussions on the nature of their art, thus demonstrating that it is neither important nor even acceptable to them that outsiders understand their motivation or inspiration for writing as well as their attitudes towards graffiti as both art and crime. Consequently, it can be said that writers' circles often turn their backs on public discussion and instead engage in closed discussions on the quality of various aerosol paints and images, self-affirmation, mock rivalries and toy educational efforts. An almost complete neglect of the obvious public hunger for information about the content and motivation of the murals is also seen in the advertisements for chemical cleaning products designed to remove graffiti as well as the information provided by voluntary NGO initiatives for graffiti cleaning. We can therefore conclude that, on the one hand, public discourse on graffiti tends to show a wider willingness to understand graffiti murals; while, on the other hand, the discourses of writers and cleaners tend not only to exist separately and to ignore each another but also serve to neglect and discourage discussion in wider circles. The overall discourse thus shows signs of increasing fragmentation, to which writers are themselves actively contributing, even though, at the same time, they try their best to profit from positive attitudes and the general interest in graffiti. This is best

seen in that they actively look for outsider postings of information on legal graffiti events and also make use of any direct or indirect opportunities for contract work.

Initially, all graffiti was illegal in Bulgaria. Later on, however, with the active collaboration of people who do not practice graffiti, numerous possibilities appeared for the creation of legal murals. Writers were then able to work freely without fear of being accused of committing a crime and were provided with the necessary space and sometimes even spray cans. Graffiti contests are the oldest and the most popular form of legalizing graffiti as modern youth art. They have become popular among writers and wider youth circles and are often organized as events. The first such contest was held in Tărgovishte in 2000. The initiators of the contest were graffiti writers themselves and disciples of the art department at the University of Veliko Tărnovo. Right from the start they received permission and understanding from the municipality of the town, and it is no surprise that the North-East Battles, which were also occasionally held in other parts of east Bulgaria, already have a long history. In 2002, in a modern art gallery, the experienced graffiti photographer Evgeni Inanov exhibited a series of photographs of murals in Sofia entitled *Street Voices*. In parallel, and together with a group of young intellectuals, he also staged an exhibition of graffiti murals on canvas. This same group, which formed an NGO called the Foundation for Youth Art, has since 2003 been at the heart of the organization of the annual summer graffiti event called *Aerogressia*, which is staged in front of Sofialand, as well as the Sprite graffiti festival sponsored by *Coca-Cola Bulgaria* held in front of the National Palace of Culture. Evgeni Ivanov and other members of the foundation also recently worked on the *Radar* project, which included a series of practical and theoretical graffiti workshops. In 2005, the traditional Sprite graffiti festival was held together with the regional Write-for-Gold competition in which eight crews from Bulgaria and Romania went head to head to fight for a place in the annual finals in Germany. Local enthusiasts also organized a big graffiti festival on the waterfront in the town of Varna in 2004. All this would have been impossible without the active initiative of the youth NGO activists, with the occasional support from modern artists, art historians and curators. Similar efforts also made possible an exhibition of graffiti at the largest and most prestigious art gallery in Bulgaria, the Union of Bulgarian artists, popularly known under the name of its location on 6 Šipka Street in Sofia. The exhibition included graffiti on canvasses created by the best

Bulgarian writers, which were exhibited together with modern photographs. Local municipalities, for whom the existence of graffiti in urban exterior spaces is a serious problem, were not initially very keen to help with graffiti contests and events. In the summer of 2003, however, initiated by the FM+ radio station and with the permission and support of the Municipality of Sofia, a series of legal graffiti works were performed in the underground passageway of the National Palace of Culture in Sofia and the mayor of Sofia officially opened the *Graffiti* tram and trolley bus stop. Reports of this initiative appeared in the electronic and print media, setting a further important example that was then followed by many high school administrations and other institutions that offered writers the possibility to write freely on their outer walls that were already covered with tags.⁴⁷ Corporate organizations and local administrations were also quick to declare the traditional child drawing competitions as graffiti contests, thus allowing occasional graffiti lettering to be included in the images.

While organizing legal writing opportunities, some of the initiators also co-opted respected Bulgarian writers. That said, almost all of the aforementioned initiatives would have been impossible without the participation of the writers. Many reacted positively to these initiatives based on their belief that legal contests and events could contribute to the development of graffiti mural art in Bulgaria. For example, the members of the young CBC crew believe it is extremely important to use the opportunity the contests provide to produce sophisticated murals, in so far as there is an abundance of time and spray. Some of the writers even managed to save some of the aerosol paint and use it elsewhere.⁴⁸ SirGo, a well known writer from Sofia, also confesses that contests sponsor bombing in various ways, but also sees the substantial opportunities they can offer. Although he dislikes being assigned the wall in a contest, rather than being able to choose it himself, he maintains that the best examples of graffiti in Bulgaria are the legal ones, because contests offer opportunities for self-expression and demonstrations of spray mastery.⁴⁹ Another respected writer, Naste, a writer who is personally involved in organizing different graffiti contests and battles, also believes that only the legal opportunities can support the development of graffiti mural art in Bulgaria.⁵⁰ A counterargument to this point of view is that some writers are not happy being evaluated by non-writers. Additionally, there is dislike for some of the organizational matters, allowing writers' official identities to be exposed on public. At the first Sprite graffiti festival in 2003, for

example, the crews were asked to climb on to the specially built stage in order to be presented. This resulted in confusion as the writers did not want this exposure and the organizers were forced to compromise by providing the crews with their paint in a quiet fashion off stage. Although very happy when their work is highlighted by newspapers reporters and TV cameras, most writers go to considerable lengths to cover their faces when being filmed – many are responsible for a substantial amount of illegal mural production and fear condemnation and punishment, sometimes to the extent that they refuse to accept prizes. Thus collaboration between writers and insiders, though crucially important at contests and big events, is far from unproblematic. While it demonstrates that certain intellectual circles are co-operating actively with writers in order to produce graffiti events, writers nonetheless see them as organizers, not connoisseurs, despite their declaring a deep interest in graffiti as an art.

Some examples of collaboration between graffiti and business are also worthy of mention. For example, the advertising campaigns for *Absolut* vodka shown abroad made use of graffiti murals long before their arrival in Bulgaria. It therefore comes as no surprise that in the mid 1990s, when calligraphic experiments in graffiti writing had just started to appear, *Absolut* was among the first to stage a commercial graffiti event on the walls of the Art Gallery of Sofia. Discotheques and night clubs – e.g. the *Graffiti* discotheque in Blagoevgrad and the *Lancelot* music club in Rouse – were still hiring graffiti writers to decorate their walls in the late 1990s and, in the case of the Karamel discotheque in Sofia, at the beginning of the new millennium. A number of other commercial areas, such as youth tourist agencies and Internet clubs, are also continually being covered with murals and as such easily turn their respective products into cultural goods. The most common of these today are kiosks. Eventually, kiosk owners started to prefer to have their walls covered with graffiti rather than pay for continual re-painting, after discovering that graffiti murals improve their sales of simple sandwiches, coffee, soft drinks and cheap alcoholic drinks. Some writers report regularly accepting such jobs. The cost to the owner is very low or non-existent, and at the same time the kiosk offers the writer a legal way to practice murals. Some writers have also been involved in creating murals from which images are then used in advertising campaigns for paints, beverages, clothes, hip-hop concerts and other goods aimed at the youth market. Incorporating graffiti murals into these market strategies is not exceptional, but advertising agencies usually tend to work with a handful of respected authors. Last, but not

least, a limited number of authors, already at the end of their graffiti careers, have aimed to make their hobby not only a way of life but also a way of earning a living. The history of graffiti writing abroad is full of cases of resistance to writer commercialization. The respected Bulgarian writers, on the other hand, who have chosen to open graffiti shops selling paint and graffiti designs, are seen examples that other writers aspire to follow.⁵¹ Thus, successful collaboration between business and graffiti can be seen to lead to the extensive use of graffiti murals – both as photographs and directly produced on the spot as their images are commonly considered attractive to certain groups of young customers.

Both insiders' and outsiders' appreciation of graffiti murals in Bulgaria has been strongly affected by understandings and tastes that came from far away from the country. At the same time, all knowledge about murals has been essentially fragmented. In addition, local discourses on murals have further contributed to the marginalization of the society, based neither on ethnic, religious nor economic grounds, but on the basis of a choice of identity by the mural writer and its appreciation in the wider society.

Compared with the American and West European examples, Bulgarian murals still don't possess straightforward and easily distinguishable national peculiarities and have not produced any remarkable achievements. Despite this, having studied the Bulgarian graffiti scene for the last 10 years – both in terms of careful documentation of graffiti images and in terms of conducting interviews with some of the writers – I advocate that these murals have already developed a specific nature of their own and are thus remarkable not only because of the sheer number and the fast growth of their images in the urban space. I also advocate that they have appeared and have developed as a phenomenon not only parallel to other processes of globalization in Bulgarian society, but have also occupied a position in a wider social niche which would have been impossible without earlier global influences, not to mention the more recent processes of globalization. Both analyses of the mural production as a self-sufficient entity and as a phenomenon nested in wider social discourses and acts offer an opportunity to explain and clarify the mechanisms laying behind this rather complicated cultural practice based on an intimate internalization of the global model and its "creolization" on Bulgarian terms. Consequently, the study of graffiti murals and their social pigeonholing provides an example of a phenomenon indicative of the increasing appropriation of fragmented traditions which appeared

and first developed at a considerable distance. They are also remarkable because of further contributing to both the fragmentation of society and the appreciation of marginal cultural production within the wider social milieu. I would also like to pay special attention to the ways in which graffiti writers invest considerable effort in their estrangement from others, as well as their alternative co-opting of dialog and negotiation over a space in which to practice their hobby in the public realm. Consequently, newly acquired Bulgarian mural writing can be viewed as a phenomenon not only signaling continuing globalization because of the nature of its images, but also because of the social relations involved in the production and appreciation of murals as well as the identities and sophisticated modes of inter- and intra-group communication focused in their images.




Illustration 1: Tags "Sited" on a Sofa Advertisement Image (Detail).
Photo Miglena Ivanova, 2005.



Illustration 2: RIPERIC. Throw-Up. Photo Miglena Ivanova, 2005.



Illustration 3: Nd2Nd. Legal Piece on the Facade of a Public Building.
Photo Miglena Ivanova, 2004.



Illustration 4: CBC. Graffiti – Wild-Style Winner on the Second Sprite
Graffiti Fest in 2004. Photo Miglena Ivanova.



Illustration 5: SirGO. Graffito - 3D Winner on the First Sprite Graffiti Fest in 2003. Photo Miglena Ivanova.



Illustration 6: Aerogresia. Graffito Written during Varna Street Graffiti Fest in 2004. Photo Miglena Ivanova.

NOTES

- 1 Cf. Kraev, G., "Gradăt? ... na velikolepnata sedmorka" – In : Izkustvo, 1988, No. 9, 11 –14; Kraev, G., "Naivăt". – In: Izkustvo, 1989, No. 5, 42-45; Mihaylova, K., "Fotorazkaz za novoto lice na mavzoleya". – In: Bylgarski folklor, 1991, No. 4, 104 –109; Rangočev, K. and O. Tunčeva, "Grafiti - opit za analiz". – In : "Bălgarski folklor", no. 4, 1994, 44 - 48; Varzonovcev, D. *Fenomenologija na grada*, Universitetsko izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia, 1992, 78-81; Ivanova, R. *Sbogom, dinozavri, dobre došli, krokodili : Etnologija na promjanata*, Akademichno izdatelstvo Prof. Marin Drinov, Sofia, 1997, 96-105; Šopov, R. and S. Vălkova, "Graffiti War". – In: Problemi na bălgarskata sociolingvistika, V. 5, 1997, 89-93; Yarulina-Todorova, T. "O neoficial'noj pis'mennoj kul'ture sovremennogo polisa". – In: Problemi na bălgarskata sociolingvistika", V. 5, 1997, 102-105; Ivanova, M. *Vizualno-antropologični harakteristiki na săvremennine bălgarski grafiti*. Ph. D. Thesis, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 1998.
- 2 Austin, J. *Taking the Train: How Graffiti Art Became and Urban Crisis in New York City*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001; Bushnell, J., *Moscow Graffiti. Language and Subculture*, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1990; Castleman, C., *Getting up: Subway graffiti in New York*, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass, 1982; Cooper, M. and H. Chalfant, *Subway Art*, Schwartzkopf and Schwartzkopf, Berlin, 2002 [1984]; Felonneau, M.-L. *Tags et grafs: les jeunes à la conquête de la ville*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2001; Ferrell, J., *Crimes of style. Urban Graffiti and the Politics of Criminality*, Garland, New York and London, 1993; Ganz, N. *Graffiti World. Street Art from Five Continents*, Thames and Hudson, London, 2004; *Graffiti Art*, Schwartzkopf and Schwartzkopf, Berlin, 2001; Henkel, O., T. Dennant and R. Westhoff. *Spray City. Graffiti in Berlin*, Akademie der Kunst und Scwarzkopf, Berlin, 1994; Keim, S. *Surf the City. Graffiti in Subways in Germany and Europe*, Aschaffensburg, 2000; Kokoreff, M., *Le lisse et l'incisif. Les tags dans le metro*, IRIS, Paris, 1990 ; Kreuzer, P., *Das Graffiti-Lexikon. Wand-Kunst von A bis Z*, Heyne, München, 1986; Lalić, D., A. Leburčić, and N. Bulat *Grafiti i subkultura*, Alinea, Zagreb, 1991; Macdonald, N., *The Graffiti Subculture: Youth, Masculinity and Identity in London and New York*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002; Meyer, B. *Graffiti - eine Kunstform Jugendlicher?: eine empirische Studie über die Akzeptanz von Graffiti bei Schülern unterschiedlicher Schulformen und Jahrgangsstufen*, Tenea, Berlin, 2002 ; Miller, I., *Aerosol Kingdom : Subway Painters of New York City*, University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, Miss., 2002; Morley, S., *Writing on the Wall: Word and Image in Modern Art*, Thames and Hudson, London, 2003; *On the wheels of steel...end2ends*, Aschaffensburg; Publikat-Verl., 2002; Peteet, J., "The Writing on the Walls: Graffiti of the Intifada". - In: *Cultural Anthropology*, 1996, 139-159; Phillips, S. *Wallbanging'. Graffiti and Gangs in L.A.*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1999; *Power of Style: Berlin Stylewriting*, Publikat-Verl.,

- Aschaffenburg, 2003. Rahn, J. *Painting Without Permission. Hip-Hop Graffiti Subculture*, Bergin and Garvey, Westpoint, 2002; Schiemann, H. and P. Watzl *Munich Graffiti:100 Pieces*. Dagmar-Verlag-und-Film-GmbH, München, 1986; Schmitt, A., Irion, M. *Graffiti – Problem oder Kultur*, Beust, München, 2001; Stahl, J. *Graffiti : zwischen Alltag und Ästhetik*, Scaneg, München, 1990.; Stein, M. "The Politics of Humor: The Berlin Wall in Jokes and Graffiti". - In: *Western Folklore*, 1989, No. 2, 100 –107; Stewart, S. *Crimes of Writing. Problems in the Containment of Representation*, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1994.
- Van Elteren, M. "Conceptualizing the Impact of US Popular Culture Globally", in *Journal of Popular Culture*, no. 1, 1996; Van Treek, B. and M. Todt. *Hall of Fame*, Aragon, Moers 1995; Van Treek, B. and M. Wiese, *Wholecars: Graffiti auf Zügen*, Aragon, Moers, 1996; Van Treek, B., *Das grosse Graffiti-Lexikon*, Lexicon-Imprint-Verl., Berlin, 2001.
- 3 Ivanova, M., "Grafite – izobraženija, s koito se sblăskvame v zabărzanija si delnik. – *Vox Literarum*, 2004, No. 2, 54.
- 4 Interviews conducted by the author with Naste in November 2004 and SirGo in December 2004.
- 5 Interview conducted by the author with CBC crew in August 2004.
- 6 Interview with SirGo; Interview by the author with an anonymous graffiti crew in July 2004.
- 7 Miller, I., *Aerosol Kingdom*, 53-69.
- 8 Interviews conducted by the author with the FDK crew in July 2004 and with CBC in August 2004; interview with Naste.
- 9 Krăsteva-Blagoeva, E. *Ličnoto ime v bălgarskata tradicija*, Akademichno izdatelstvo Marin Drinov, Sofia, 1999, 148.
- 10 Interview with CBC; interview with SirGo.
- 11 Interviews with Naste, SirGo, and CBC.
- 12 Miller, I., *Aerosol Kingdom*, 53-69.
- 13 Felonneau, M.-L. *Tags et grafs: les jeunes à la conquête de la ville*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2001 ; Ferrell, J., *Crimes of style. Urban Graffiti and the Politics of Criminality*, Garland, New York and London, 1993; Ganz, N. *Graffiti World. Street Art from Five Continents*, Thames and Hudson, London, 2004; Kreuzer, P., *Das Graffiti-Lexikon. Wand-Kunst von A bis Z*, Heyne, München, 1986; Lalić, D., A. Leburic, and N. Bulat *Grafiti i subkultura*, Alinea, Zagreb, 1991; Macdonald, N., *The Graffiti Subculture: Youth, Masculinity and Identity in London and New York*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002; Meyer, B. *Graffiti - eine Kunstform Jugendlicher? : eine empirische Studie über die Akzeptanz von Graffiti bei Schülern unterschiedlicher Schulformen und Jahrgangsstufen*, Tenea, Berlin, 2002 ; Schiemann, H. and P. Watzl *Munich Graffiti:100 Pieces*. Dagmar-Verlag-und-Film-GmbH, München, 1986; Schmitt, A., Irion, M. *Graffiti – Problem oder Kultur*, Beust, München, 2001; Stahl, J. *Graffiti : zwischen Alltag und Ästhetik*, Scaneg, München, 1990.;

1996; Van Treek, B., *Das grosse Graffiti-Lexikon*, Lexicon-Imprint-Verl., Berlin, 2001.

14 For example when SirGo, while addressing younger writers, offers explanations of those terms on his Internet page – cf. <http://graffiti-mania.hit.bg>, 24 June, 2005.

15 Cf. Dimiev, B. *Graffiti kato fenomen na masovata kultura*. Didakticheska preценка. MA Thesis. University of Sofia, 2003, 38-47.

16 Briggs and Burke Briggs, A. and P. Burke, *A Social History of the Media. From Gutenberg to the Internet*, 44.

17 Cf. Illustration No. 5.

18 Cf. Illustration No. 4.

19 Interviews with anonymous crew, FBC, CBC, Naste and SirGo.

20 Interviews with CBC, Naste and SirGo.

21 Interview with CBC.

22 *Ibid.*

23 Interviews with Naste and SirGo.

24 Interview with SirGo.

25 Interviews with anonymous crew, CBC, Naste and SirGo

26 Meyer, B. *Graffiti - eine Kunstform Jugendlicher? : eine empirische Studie über die Akzeptanz von Graffiti bei Schülern unterschiedlicher Schulformen und Jahrgangsstufen*, Tenea, Berlin, 2002.

27 *Ibid.*

28 Cf. Illustration No. 2.

29 Cf. Illustration No. 3.

30 Cf. Illustration No. 5.

31 Cf. Illustration No. 6.

32 Interview with CBC; interviews with Naste and SirGo.

33 Cf. Miller, I., *Aerosol Kingdom*.

34 Interviews with CBC and SirGo.

35 Documentation by the author of graffiti murals in Sofia in 2004 – Electronic Archive of the Institute of Folklore at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, signatures MI – graffiti 26/VI/26 and MI – graffiti 26/VI/27.

36 *Graffiti – glasove on ulicata* forum – www.dir.bg, accessed on 30 June 2005.

37 Interviews with Naste and SirGo.

38 Interview with Naste.

39 Cf. comments on the foreign writers' jury on Write-for-Gold regional competition - *Graffiti – glasove on ulicata* forum – www.dir.bg, 30 June 2005.

40 Interviews with CBC and Naste.

41 Interview with CBC.

42 Cf. Ivanova, R. *Sbogom, dinozavri, dobre dosli, krokodili*, 96-105.

43 Cf. R. Ivanova's comments on graffiti on the Berlin Wall - Ivanova, R. *Sbogom, dinozavri, dobre dosli, krokodili*, 96-105.

- ⁴⁴ E.g. "Grafiti fest s bra hiljadi kraj NDK" - *Dnevnik on-line*, 14.07.2005; the Internet, [http:// www. Dnevnik.bg](http://www.Dnevnik.bg) ; "Pobeditelite v Sprite Graffiti Battle bjaha izbrani po vreme na nacionalen Sprite grafiti Fest" – *Slovesa*, 14.07. 2005; the Internet, [http:// www. slovesa.bg](http://www.slovesa.bg); "Grafiti v njakolko stila prevzeha oficialnite prostranstva okolo NDK". - The Internet - <http://www.stroitelstvo.bg>, 23 June 2003; The Internet -, [http://www. razkazzivkartinki.com/novinite.html](http://www.razkazzivkartinki.com/novinite.html) – 10 May 2005.
- ⁴⁵ E.g. "Nemskata policija vklju i i helicopter v borbata sre tu grafitite". - *Dnevnik*, 24.04.2005. the Internet, <http://www.dnevnik.bg>
- ⁴⁶ E. g. Stoyanova, S., " ivotat e kratak, grafitite ve ni - *Standart*, 5 May 2005.
- ⁴⁷ Interview with Naste.
- ⁴⁸ Interview with CBC.
- ⁴⁹ Interview with SirGo.
- ⁵⁰ Interview with Naste.
- ⁵¹ Interview with CBC.



ANGEL NIKOLOV

Born in 1971, in Sofia, Bulgaria

Ph.D., “St Kliment Ohridski” University, Sofia (2002)

Dissertation: *The Bulgarian Political Ideas, 864 – 971 A. D.*

Lecturer in Mediaeval History of Bulgaria, Department of History, “St Kliment Ohridski” University, Sofia (2002)

British Academy Visiting Fellow (2004)

Primary field of interests: mediaeval political theory, East-West religious polemics

MEDIAEVAL SLAVONIC ANTI-CATHOLIC TEXTS FROM THE MANUSCRIPT COLLECTION OF THE ROMANIAN ACADEMY

On 25 May 1670, Petar Bogdan (1601-1674) arrived in Bucharest “by the grace of God and the will of the Holy Apostolic See Archbishop of Serdica, named of Sofia, Administrator of Thrace and Coastal Dacia, of Transalpine Wallachia, apostolic vicar.”¹ This is apparently the last visit of the superannuated Catholic prelate to the capital of the Wallachian principality and his experiences, related several months later (10 November 1670) in a detailed report² to the *Congregation for the Propagation of Faith* in Rome, narrate more than the bare facts: through subtlety of detail they reveal a historical and cultural situation, rich in contradictory tendencies, an intricate web of religious, political and personal motives which govern the thoughts and behavior of the ruler, the barons, the metropolitan, and the common people.

Welcomed to the palace with becoming courtesy by the Wallachian prince Antonie Vodă of Popești (1669-1672), Petar Bogdan becomes aware of the presence in this same room of the Orthodox metropolitan of Ungro-Wallachia, Teodosie (1668-1672; 1679-1708). Then,

turning towards the metropolitan, the archbishop addressed him politely and congratulated him on his promotion, for he had been elevated only a few months before, and the other one stood as a madman, neither did he utter a word, nor made a gesture of urbanity. In a short while the archbishop bid the prince farewell. The cubicularius went out as well and when the other barons gathered round, they excused the metropolitan, saying: “Your Excellence, be not amazed at our metropolitan. He is a man uneducated, brought up since his youth in the mountains among the monks, and little does he care to know about what is becoming, so let him be excused.”³

If we distance ourselves from the particular circumstances in which the ‘meeting’ between the two clerics described above took place (and to this we shall return later), it is worth noticing the commitment, explicitly

stressed in the above quoted text, of Metropolitan Teodosie to the traditions and outlook of Orthodox monasticism. One look at the surviving monasteries in what are today Romania and Moldova is sufficient to convince us that it was precisely there that the traditions of the Byzantine Orthodoxy, which spread in Romanian lands, were preserved in their purest form. Its influence increased from the 14th century onward, through the continual communication with the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate, Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia, and a number of monastic communities in the Balkans, among which Mount Athos should be given precedence.

To begin I propose we assume that the outright disrespect and lack of courtesy on the part of Metropolitan Teodosie towards the Pope's vicar for Bulgaria and Wallachia can at least partially be explained in terms of the deep-rooted hostility towards Catholicism which the Byzantine Church had cultivated for centuries and bequeathed to the peoples that professed the Eastern Orthodox faith during the Middle Ages – Bulgarians, Russians, Serbs and Romanians.

As a result of the combination of historical circumstances, up until the end of the 17th century and early 18th century, the liturgy in the Romanian Orthodox churches in Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania was conducted predominantly in the Slavonic language, while the *scriptoria* and libraries of the Romanian monasteries mostly copied and housed Slavonic books.⁴ With a view to this fact, the present paper aims to raise a number of difficult questions (though it will not provide definitive answers): Copies of which Byzantine anti-Catholic texts (in their mediaeval Slavonic translations) and original Slavonic works with a similar motivation were subject to dissemination in the Romanian principalities from the 15th until the 17th century? What was the significance of these copies with regard to the textual analyses of the respective works? How, during the second half of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century, were the mediaeval Slavonic polemical texts gradually superseded by their Romanian translations, or by direct translations from Greek into Romanian, which were disseminated as manuscripts or printed books.

This study is of a preliminary nature only, since it is based on direct observations of manuscript materials from the collection of the Romanian Academy. About one third of the Slavonic manuscripts in this collection, however, have no printed description, and for this reason I am unable to claim absolute thoroughness. Despite this, the 600 Slavonic manuscripts⁵ which have already been annotated, as well as a small number of

Romanian manuscripts from the collection of the Romanian Academy, provide a valuable source and create an opportunity not only for empirical observations but also for certain generalizations. My research trip to Belgrade also proved highly profitable, for there I was able to examine *de visu* a number of manuscripts from the collection of the Archive of the Serbian Academy, as well as to familiarize myself, with the help of the exceptionally rich microfilm collection of the Archaeographical Department of the National Library of Serbia, with a number of Serbian and Old-Bulgarian manuscripts from the virtually inaccessible collections of the Serbian Orthodox Church Museum and the monasteries in Peć, Savina, Nikoljac, Pljevalja, etc.⁶

First let us address the question of the character of the Byzantine anti-Catholic (or 'anti-Western') polemic. Undoubtedly, this changes considerably between the time of its origin under Patriarch Photius (858-867; 877-886) in the 6th decade of the 9th century and the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453, as a result of the changing political, cultural, and ethnic landscape in South-East Europe and the Middle East. As T. Kolbaba's recent observations have demonstrated, this polemical tradition can not and should not be regarded as a frozen set of "immutable" accusations and refutations concerning the dogmatic innovations and corrupt practices of the Western Christians. As the apt summary of the American author reads,

An issue becomes one of the crucial issues in the Greek theological literature only when it becomes a matter for debate within the Orthodox world... Debates about Latin practices and beliefs grew fierce and polarized less because of the intrinsic importance of the issue being debated than because of fundamental doubts about what it meant to be an orthodox, imperial Christian – what it meant to be, as they would have put it, a pious Roman.⁷

This serves to remind us that within the framework of the mediaeval *Pax Orthodoxa* (or in the language of D. Obolensky, *Byzantine commonwealth*⁸), polemical literature has as its purpose to shape, strengthen or reformulate a particular identity⁹ which has not only a religious but also a political and even an ethnic aspect. It is relevant here to quote from I. Dujčev, who remarks that,

Byzantium gave the Christian religion to mediaeval Russia but at the same time provided it with the spiritual weapons to fight all forms of heterodoxy

and heresy... In supplying the Russians with all these polemical works Byzantium certainly contributed considerably to the strengthening of their orthodoxy, which was growing as a factor in Russian history, to the point of becoming identified with the notion of nationality.¹⁰

Written on the occasion of the appearance of the London reprint (1972) of A. Popov's book on "the Old-Russian polemical works against the Latins" (1875), the above conclusions reached by I. Dujëev are largely valid for Bulgaria and Serbia, where almost all mediaeval Slavonic translations of Byzantine anti-Catholic works analyzed by A. Popov originated and were copied and disseminated for centuries. They are no less relevant when it comes to the Romanian principalities, where these same texts, spread initially in Bulgarian and Serbian copies and often copied subsequently by local scribes, played an important role in shaping a specific ethnic consciousness. It should not be forgotten that, until the 18th century, what lay at the heart of the Romanian sense of unity was not so much the doctrinal system of Orthodoxy, but "an amalgam of faith and religious practices intertwined with ancient folk customs and beliefs that had been passed down from generation to generation."¹¹

As early as 1910, A. Jacimirskij, the most eminent foreign expert on the Slavonic manuscripts held in Romanian monasteries and libraries, noted the need for a systematic study of the mediaeval South-Slavic copies of the polemical anti-Catholic texts.¹² This, however, is yet to be done. Contemporary scholars are usually content to cite the two seminal works on this subject: A. Popov's book¹³ and A. Pavlov's review.¹⁴ Unfortunately, these authors almost exclusively analyze Russian manuscripts and are not well acquainted with the south-Slavic tradition of these texts, which left its imprint and developed on Romanian soil between the 15th and 17th centuries. It is reasonable to say that, since the end of the 19th century, the question of the mediaeval "Slavonic reception" of the Byzantine religious polemic against the Catholic West has only been posed in passing or on the basis of limited and relatively late manuscript material. A happy exception is a number of valuable works contributed recently by Y. Kakridis which provide us with an opportunity to appreciate with greater clarity and confidence the significance of a number of Slavonic translations of Byzantine polemical treatises made during the 14th century for the study of the original Greek texts, some of which are completely unknown at present.¹⁵

I would like to note that the study of the texts we are concerned with is to some extent complicated by one peculiar circumstance: it was only very rarely that mediaeval scribes would copy separate polemical texts; more frequently entire collections of such works were copied. Hence, the observations on each particular text should necessarily be augmented by an analysis of the accompanying works of identical character. The contents of these collections often varies considerably because few of the copyists refrained from altering the sequence of the texts, omitting some and replacing them with others borrowed from various manuscripts. Nevertheless, some of the earliest miscellanies of anti-Catholic texts, which subsequently influenced the tradition, can be identified and at least partially reconstructed.

With these general considerations in mind, we can proceed to an analysis of one of the earliest miscellanies of the kind we are dealing with: manuscript BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, a compilation written using the Serbian spelling in the last decade of the 15th century.¹⁶ It consists of three clearly defined sections. The first comprises texts discussing monastic life and discipline, Orthodox dogmatic and canon law.¹⁷ Here, incidentally, we find a short exposition “about the Frankish faith”, which describes and anathematizes the two main deviations of the Western Christians – Holy Communion with unleavened bread and the addition of the *Filioque* clause to the Creed.¹⁸ The second section of the miscellany includes mostly polemic texts that target Catholicism.¹⁹ The third section contains the second Slavonic translation of the Chronicle of George the Monk, made in the 14th century, the ending of which is missing.²⁰ The existing part recounts the events from the Creation of the world until the death of the Byzantine emperor Alexander (912-913).²¹

The *Tale, briefly told, about how and what for the Latins split and were excluded from their primacy and from the commemorative books in which the orthodox patriarchs are listed*, to be found in the second section, introduces the reader to the issue of the historical roots of the rift between Constantinople and Rome.²² The anonymous Byzantine author stresses that all Roman popes up to the pontificate of Stephan VI (885-891)

were orthodox, professing the Creed..., as it was bequeathed by the Holy First Ecumenical council and was then confirmed and announced also by the six ecumenical councils, [to wit] that only from the Father does the Holy Spirit proceed – as Orthodox churches hold even to this day.

After the imperial coronation of Charles the Great (768-814), performed in 800 AD by Pope Leo III (795-826), certain Frankish heretics arrived in Rome and began to preach that the Holy Spirit proceeded not only from the Father but from the Son as well and that Holy Communion should be taken with unleavened bread. Wishing to prevent the spread of this heresy, Pope Benedict III (855-858) sent a letter to the four eastern patriarchs in which he asked them not to recognize any of the popes to succeed him after his death before they had received written testimony confirming his adherence to the orthodox faith. The implication of this text is absolutely clear: by breaking away from heresy-befallen Rome, eastern churches would be complying with the will of the former pope and become champions of true orthodoxy.

The first pope to adopt secretly the heretic additional *Filioque* was Formosus (891-896), and a century later the Constantinople patriarch Sergius (1001-1019) and the rest of the eastern patriarchs were forced to cast out of their diptychs the then pope,²³ who openly declared his approval for this heretic doctrine. After pronouncing an anathema on all those who failed to observe the prescriptions of the seven ecumenical synods, the anonymous writer concludes his story by announcing that after the aforementioned Sergius “it was Cerularius who was Patriarch of Constantinople and he too cursed the Latins, who openly became heretics.”

The Greek original of the story was obviously written after the so-called “Great Schism” of 1054, most probably as early as the second half of the 11th century;²⁴ it was published following 6 different copies from between the 13th and the 15th century.²⁵ We also have a fairly certain *terminus ante quem* for the appearance of the Slavonic translation – a copy of it was included in a Russian miscellany from 1261.²⁶ Since the manuscript tradition of the translation of this interesting work has never been subject to a special analysis, I will briefly present here the conclusions based on my study of the copies of the text to which I currently have access.

It appears the translation was completed shortly after the emergence of the original Greek text. The manuscript tradition of the Slavonic text has two main branches – a Bulgarian and a Serbian one, whose oldest extant copies date back to the same period (the second half of the 14th century). The Bulgarian branch, which extended through Serbia and Russia, is closer to the archetypal text of the translation.²⁷ The history of the Serbian branch is more complicated. The earliest copies in which it can be traced in fact reflect a revision of the text, which is notable for the fact that the title of the work mentions as its author, Michael Synkellus

(+ 846).²⁸ This redaction was prepared on the basis of an earlier version (which came into existence no later than the middle of the 14th century), at the core of which was a text belonging (or at least very closely related) to the Bulgarian branch of the manuscript tradition. This early revision of the work appears to have originated in Serbia and it can hardly be coincidence that today it is only known in three Serbian copies, the earliest of which being the one from Bucharest.²⁹

The *Tale* is followed by a peculiar historical “dossier”³⁰ consisting of letters and other documents, copies of which can also be found in manuscript BAR Ms. Slav. No 155, a miscellany dating from the third quarter of the 15th century, a Serbian copy of an older Bulgarian manuscript, which belonged initially to the Mount Athos monastery of Xenophon and was later (probably in 1779) brought to the Moldavian monastery of Neamț by Paisij Veličkovskij (1722-1794).³¹

Folios 133v – 135 of BAR Ms. Slav. No 330 feature the well-known letter of Michael Cerularius, Patriarch of Constantinople (1043-1058) addressed to the Patriarch of Antioch Peter III (1052-1056).³² In this epistle, written in June/July 1054, literally days before the “Great Schism” became a fact on the 18 July of the same year, the head of the Byzantine church vented his anger and indignation at the behavior of the emissaries of Pope Leo IX (1049-1054) led by cardinal Humbert and staying in Constantinople at that time. The Slavonic translation of the epistle is a considerably shortened version of the Greek text, which nevertheless preserves some of the most caustic passages:

What should I say or how should I tell of their pride and brazenness: how they entered into my presence without uttering a word to me or at least slightly lowering their heads and did not want to give me the usual greeting from their bishop; neither did they want, when we had gathered together at the council to sit further back, away from the metropolitans, as required by the custom handed down to us, considering it an insult to themselves. What should I say about the even greater madness of theirs, that they did not humble themselves even before the imperial power and grandeur as they aspired too high and thought they stood higher than the rest, [and] entered the palace with crosses and scepters and none of these things did they perform properly.

Further, the patriarch includes a long list of the transgressions of the Latins, which is to become a true model and source of ‘inspiration’ for many orthodox polemicists during the centuries to follow.³³ This text is

an expression of radical intolerance not only towards the religious doctrine and liturgical practices of the Western Christians, but also towards a number of elements of their culture and traditions, which bear no relation to their "Orthodoxy". Even Byzantine readers must have found it strange that the patriarch pointed out as heretical deviations, along with the addition of the *Filioque* clause to the Creed, the use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist, the differences in observing fasts, and such 'problems' as the habit of Western monks of eating lard instead of butter, the custom among bishops of wearing a ring, and that among clerics of shaving etc. Despite the warning of the Bulgarian archbishop Theophylact of Ochrid (1088/1089 – after 1126) that the authors of such random and ever longer enumerations of the "Latin errors" only "mutilate the body of Christ on account of their own self-love",³⁴ these lists became extremely popular in Byzantium and the rest of the Orthodox world.

As confirmation we can cite the fact that in BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, Cerularius's list, overlong in itself, features in a perceptibly expanded and revised version. So far it has not been established whether a Slavic writer prepared this version of the text or whether it was translated directly from the Greek. Whatever the case, my observations on several unpublished Bulgarian and Serbian copies show that what A. Popov calls "the second redaction" of the Slavonic translation of the epistle,³⁵ containing only the list of "Latin errors", is in fact a shorter version of the text included in BAR Ms. Slav. No 330 and existing in a number of other copies. Closest to the Romanian copy examined here appear to be the copies from Ms. Nikoljac 49, f. 231 – 235 and Ms. Hilandar 189, f. 150 – 154v (the ending is missing).³⁶ In their turn, the text found in BAR Ms. Slav. No 330 and the manuscripts from its group sprang from the version closer to the archetypal translation, known from copies in the manuscripts Dečani 75, f. 300v – 302; Dečani 102, f. 256v – 259v and BAR Ms. Slav. No 155, f. 598 – 602.

The folios, which follow in BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, feature two letters exchanged in 1053-1054 between Dominic, Archbishop of Venice and Peter III, the Patriarch of Antioch.³⁷

At the beginning of his excessively polite letter, the Archbishop of Venice justifies, by putting forward a number of historical arguments, his right to carry the dignity of "patriarch" and proceeds to complain about the, in his opinion, unfounded attacks of the Constantinopolitan clergy³⁸ against the Eucharist with unleavened bread practiced by the Western church, requesting the Antiochian patriarch's opinion on this issue. In his

written response, Patriarch Peter stresses that no bishop or archbishop, apart from those of Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, has the right to use the title of "patriarch". Further, the Antiochian pontiff expresses his support for Constantinople's position and firmly denounces the use of unleavened bread as a practice alien to the ecclesiastical tradition.

The two letters were translated into the Slavonic language at the same time using a Greek text which at certain points deviates from the one published more than a century ago in J.-P. Migne's *Patrologia graeca*. In turn, the copies of the Slavonic translation sometimes differ from each other and some of the oldest extant copies contain secondary or erroneous readings, while some of the later ones preserve the initial correct variant.

Further, in BAR Ms. Slav. No 330 a series of texts can be found which deal with the negotiations carried out in 1233-1234 on the formation of a union between the churches of Rome and Constantinople, conducted under the auspices of the Nicene emperor John III Dukas Vatatses (1222-1254).³⁹ The ecclesiastical council summoned for this purpose by the Constantinopolitan patriarch (in exile), Germanos II (1222-1240), had its meetings first in Niceaea (in Bythinia) between the 15 and 28 February 1234 and subsequently continued its work in Nymphaeum (in Lydia) between 27 March and 8 May 1234. The titles of these three texts are written in red ink: *Exhortation of Patriarch Germanos to the Cruel Latins; Confession of the Roman Pope, brought by his emissaries, called fremenurii* [i.e. Minorites or Franciscans], *to the Holiest Patriarch of Constantinople, kyr' Germanos; Reply of the Holiest Ecumenical Patriarch kyr' Germanos and of his Holy Synod to the fremenurii sent by the Pope and the Latins who accompany them.*⁴⁰

The three texts are closely interrelated but the logical sequence in which they should be studied is different from that in the manuscript. Firstly, the *Confession*, which the emissaries of Pope Gregory IX (1227-1241) read at the council's meeting on 29 April 1234, offers the reader a clear-cut idea about the position of the Papacy on the question of the origin of the Holy Spirit.⁴¹ The Slavonic translation, provided with a rather wordy title, renders only the first few lines of this long document, ending with the words: "And he who does not profess that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son is on the road to perdition." This is followed by the signatures of the three papal emissaries: "Ougo of the Order of the Dominican brothers-preachers"⁴² (in a number of copies, the name Ougo becomes the Slavonic interjection "oubo");⁴³ "Amonie of the Order of

the brothers" (the word 'Minorites' was omitted, which disrupts the meaning); and "fremenur, who is of the same order" (in the earliest copies of the translation the correct "Radulfo, who am of the same order" is to be found).

The *Reply* discusses and refutes the dogmatic views expressed in the *Exposition*. The short polemical fragment at the beginning is supplemented by a compendium of extracts from works by eminent church fathers, which should endorse the position of the Nicene theologians. The *Exhortation*, on the other hand, presents the heated discussion between Patriarch Germanos and the Pope's emissary Hugo, who contested Byzantium's arguments against *Filioque* and tried to defend Rome's position availing of some books in the Greek language, forged in the spirit of "heresy".

Further, BAR Ms. Slav. No 330 features a short text entitled *Of Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople. To the Romans, about the Holy Spirit and the unleavened bread offered by them*, which again returns the reader to the question of the historical roots of the rift between Rome and Constantinople and denounces communion with unleavened bread.⁴⁴ Although the title mentions the name of the renowned Patriarch Photius, this is actually a work compiled by an anonymous Byzantine author in the second half of the 11th century / beginning of the 12th century. The Bucharest copy is almost identical to that published by A. Popov.⁴⁵

The collection of anti-Catholic works in our miscellany concludes with two pieces of writing of a purely theological nature: the treatise by the Presbyter of the Studion monastery, Nicetas Stethatos (11th century), *Epistle to the Romans*⁴⁶ (devoted to the unleavened bread, Saturday fast and priests' marriages) and *From the Oration to Adrianopolites, against the Latins concerning the unleavened bread* by John, Patriarch of Antioch.⁴⁷ It is also worth mentioning, however, the treatise by Nicetas the Philosopher Paphlagon (c. 885-950), discussing the fact that the Last Supper of Christ and his disciples took place a day before the Jewish Passover.⁴⁸ Although it does not contain a single direct accusation aimed at Western Christians, this work has been described by A. Pavlov as "one of the earliest, if not the earliest, attempt at a literary dispute with the Latins on the issue of the unleavened bread."⁴⁹

The observations on BAR Ms. Slav. No 330 show that this miscellany, intended to be read by monks, included the Slavonic mediaeval translations of some of the most significant and authoritative Byzantine

anti-Catholic texts. Moreover, the compiler of the manuscript did not perform the selection of these texts: he simply borrowed this collection of texts from an earlier manuscript. My research so far proves that a series of anti-Catholic works, virtually identical in its contents, was included in a Serbian miscellany from the monastery of Nikoljac (near Bijelo polje, Montenegro), copied in 1556.⁵⁰ A fair degree of similarity is also displayed in a manuscript dating from 1400/1410, in the collection of the monastery of Pljevlja⁵¹, as well as a manuscript from the Archive of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, copied in 1734.⁵²

The next manuscript from the collection of the Romanian Academy we shall examine in some detail is BAR Ms. Slav. No 685 – *Nomocanon* (a miscellany of ecclesiastical rules), copied in 1512 at the Monastery of Neamț by Hierodeacon Nicodem by order of the Moldovian ruler Bogdan (1505-1517) for the benefit of the Monastery of Bisericani in Northern Moldavia.⁵³ Appended to the part of the miscellany dealing with legal matters is a series of anti-Catholic texts, which gained considerable popularity in the Moldavian lands during the 15th and 16th centuries.

The collection opens with a *Useful Tale about the Latins, [of] when they split from the Greeks and from the Holy God's church and how they found the heresy to serve with unleavened bread and abuse the Holy Spirit* – a detailed historical account of the split between Rome and the Eastern churches. The beginning of this text is very similar to the already discussed *Tale, briefly told...* Next comes a list of the Latin transgressions, followed by a rather confused tale in terms of chronology of how the Byzantine emperors succeeded in converting the Bulgarians, Russians, and Hungarians, all traditionally hostile towards the empire. But the onset of invasions of various barbarian peoples from the east, north and south weakened the empire and allowed the Latins to attract the Hungarians to their faith. The tale ends with the conclusion that the Latins, having seen the wars of the pagans against the Greeks, "became worse enemies of the Christian faith and God's Church, and thus established over the earth their foul faith and their evil heresies." The Slavonic text represents a translation of a now lost Greek original prepared in the Bulgarian lands under Byzantine rule no later than the very beginning of the 12th century.⁵⁴

On the following folios⁵⁵ we find a number of texts against the Catholic custom of fasting on Saturday, and priests' celibacy, shaving, and wearing of long hair and rings. Without acknowledging his source, the compiler of the miscellany borrows articles from Nicetas Stethatos' polemical treatise *To the Latins, about the unleavened bread*, whose translation

enjoyed considerable popularity in all Slavic countries after the 13th century owing to its inclusion in the so-called *Kormčaja kniga*, compiled in 1219 by the first Serbian archbishop, Sava (1219-1235).⁵⁶

According to A. Jacimirskij,⁵⁷ the author of the only description of the manuscript published so far, f. 244-248 feature the polemical work *About the Franks and the other Latins* – a Slavonic translation of one of the relatively early Byzantine lists of the Catholic errors, which during the Middle Ages was, for no particular reason, attributed to Patriarch Photius.⁵⁸ It should be noted, however, that the copyist of BAR Ms. Slav. No 685 was working with a corrupt manuscript from which not only the folios with the second part of the treatise, *About the Franks and the other Latins*, but also the beginning of the following text, *About the unleavened service and about the Latins and their service*, was missing. The scribe must have been completely unaware of the missing folio and did not indicate by a dividing mark or a title the point of contact between the two texts.

Further, the miscellany also contains a fragment of *Tacticon* by Nikon of the Black Mountain,⁵⁹ compiled in Antioch around the end of the 11th century and full of attacks against the Catholics,⁶⁰ and a *Short account of Christ's suppers* by Patriarch Nicephorus Kallistos Xanthopoulos (ca. 1256-1335),⁶¹ which are followed by two rather curious anti-Catholic texts, thematically interrelated and imbued with a spirit of extreme intolerance.

The first of these is entitled *Oration on the fallacy of the Germans, how Peter the Mutterer taught [them] a heresy*⁶² and is in essence a short apocryphal story about the imaginary founder of the "Latin heresy", who used to wear silk clothes, a hat with horns and gloves, trimmed his beard and ordered everybody to trim their groin, eat various unclean and foul things, ordered priests to take seven wives and concubines, musicians to play in the temples, etc. The anonymous writer concludes his account with the words: "Let it be known that it is in Peter the Mutterer that the Latins believe and not in Saint Peter. And if somebody professes the Latin faith, be they cursed so that the Christians are not tempted by the perverse⁶³ Latin faith."⁶⁴

The second text is a *Story about the Latins*,⁶⁵ compiled by the hegumenos of the Monastery of Pečora, St. Theodosius (+ 03.05.1074) and addressed to the grand duke of Kiev, Izjaslav Jaroslavič (1054-1078).⁶⁶ The expanded and interpolated redaction of the text, to be found in BAR Ms. Slav. No 685,⁶⁷ begins with the authors confession that he was brought

up by a “father and Christian mother” to live according to the honest and Orthodox law,

and not to follow the dim and abominable Latin faith, nor to go with them, nor to observe their customs, nor to take communion their way and not to listen to any of their preaching; and to guard against all their ways: neither to give my daughters to them in marriage, nor to become related by marriage to their sons, nor to arrange marriages between my sons and their daughters; in no deed to get close to them: neither to swear brotherhood, nor to be best man, nor to bow to him, nor to kiss him; and from the same vessel neither to eat, nor to drink with them... Because they do not believe right, nor do they live clean.⁶⁸

There then follows a short account of the founding of Constantinople, the decline of old Rome and the election of Peter the Mutterer, “one of the Vandals, of Latin stock”, as pope.⁶⁹ The description of the imaginary founder of Catholicism and of his “teachings” coincides almost literally with that in *Oration about the Fallacy of the Germans*... Next comes a random list of 34 errors of the Latins, among which unleavened bread and *Filioque* come as low as numbers ten and eleven, followed by further accusations, such as that Catholics eat out of the same vessel together with dogs and cats; drink their own urine and wash their eyes with it; eat wild horses, tortoises, donkeys, dead animals, bears, beaver tails, and tallow; their priests do not marry but live with their female slaves; their bishops have concubines and go to war; their women, when they give birth, wash in the same vessels from which they later eat and drink, and so on.⁷⁰

It is obvious that we are dealing here with a text whose author makes unashamed use of invention and vilifications in order to create in the mind of the orthodox reader a completely negative and repulsive image of the Western Christians. Taking into account the peculiarities of the Byzantine anti-Catholic polemic, this approach is hardly surprising. The anonymous Slavic scholar who edited the *Oration about the Latins* by Theodosius of Peëora skillfully “embellishes” the vitriolic text of the Kievan hegumenos with many new and “valuable” details, turning it into a favorite reading matter for the orthodox clergy and monks.

It is interesting to note that the cycle of anti-Catholic works included in BAR Ms. Slav. No 685 enjoyed considerable popularity in the Moldavian lands. The earliest copy of this cycle can be found in a miscellany copied

in the second quarter of the 15th century by the well-known scribe from the monastery of Neamț, Gavril Uric.⁷¹ In 1557 hierodeacon Ilarion copied the texts that concern us from BAR Ms. Slav. No 685 or from its antigraph into his bulky miscellany, compiled by order of Gregory, the metropolitan of Suceava, and donated to the Neamț monastery.⁷² The same texts were included in the famous *Kievan Miscellany*, written in c. 1554-1561 in Baia (near the Neamț Monastery) and the monastery of Bistrița (Northern Moldavia),⁷³ as well as in Ms. Hilandar 481 – a miscellany from the middle of the 16th century brought in 1590 to Mount Athos by Athanasius, the hegumenos of the Bistrița Monastery.⁷⁴

All these Slavonic miscellanies employ Old-Bulgarian orthography, which is hardly a coincidence. Undoubtedly, they originate from a collection of texts compiled in Bulgaria during the last quarter of the 13th century and including a series of polemical (predominantly anti-Catholic), historical, hagiographical and dogmatic texts.⁷⁵ The compilation of this miscellany was most probably prompted by the vehement opposition of the Bulgarian ruling circles against the union formed in Lyons in 1274 between the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus (1259-1282) and the Roman Church. An active role was played in these events by the emperor's niece and Bulgarian tsaritsa, Maria Palaeologena, who tried to organize joint resistance against the union of the patriarchs of Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria.⁷⁶

Eventually, Michael VIII's attempt to impose his church union by force on Byzantine society failed and he earned the reputation of being one of the most impious rulers of the "New Rome". For example, for centuries in Mount Athos there circulated legendary tales in Greek and Slavonic about the violence and atrocities committed by the emperor's Western mercenaries against the disobedient Athonite monastic brotherhoods.⁷⁷ These texts were read and copied in the Romanian lands, evidence of which still exists in a number of (though rather late) manuscripts from the collection of the Romanian Academy.

Thus, in 1777, somewhere in the vicinity of the Hermitage of Deleni (also known as Lacuri monastery, 3 km northwest of Hîrlău), the monk Jeronimus copied a *Story about the monastery of Xeropotamou, which is situated in the holy Mount Athos and what was done there by the Latin-thinkers*.⁷⁸ Another late manuscript, donated by Father Mitrophan in 1818 to the monastery ('skit') of Poiana Mărului (in the mountains above Buzău), includes *Epistle confessional, sent by all inhabitants of Mount Athos to emperor Michael Palaeologus...*,⁷⁹ in which the Lyons

union is described as “destruction for the entire body of the Church”,⁸⁰ and *Story about our venerable fathers in the holy Mount Athos killed by the Latin-thinking emperor Michael and by those who are with him, Latins and Latin-thinkers*.⁸¹

The most interesting invective directed at Michael VIII's religious policy, however, appeared even before the emperor's death and was soon translated into the Slavonic language.⁸² This is the *Dialogue of Panagiotes with an Azymite* – a work belonging to Byzantine “low” literature, which presents an imaginary public dispute, held in the presence of Michael VIII and a number of distinguished Byzantines, between the champion of Orthodoxy Constantine (referred to as *Panagiotes* or *Philosopher*) and one of the Pope's representatives, referred to as Azymite. Unfortunately, the Greek text has never been a subject of special study,⁸³ which makes it difficult to answer the question about the correlations among the three versions of the Slavonic translation identified by A. Popov.⁸⁴

The manuscript BAR Ms. Slav. No 649, written in the 16th century and donated in 1869 to the Bulgarian book club in Tulcea by Mančo Džudžov, contains a copy of the second redaction of the translation, which, however, is characterized by a number of individual peculiarities.⁸⁵

I will not dwell on the first part of the dispute, in which Panagiotes “amazes” his opponent with his “deep” knowledge of the secrets of life and the structure of the world. Having established his intellectual superiority, the champion of Orthodoxy launches an attack on the 72 heresies of the Catholics. It is here that the tendency towards “trivialization” and denigration of the religious dispute, towards the actual substitution of existing differences between orthodox Christians and Catholics by outright lies and fabrications, so characteristic of the Byzantine polemical literature, reaches one of its peaks. This is illustrated in the following straightforward example. Panagiotes asks Azymite why the Pope shaves. Azymite explains that during the night an angel visited the Pope and ordered him to cut his beard. What follows is Panagiotes' vehement refutation: “This is not true, now you have lied! Listen, Azymite, let me tell you the truth... The Pope wanted a certain woman. So he sent the woman [a letter] to come and lie with him. Then the woman sent him [a letter] saying: ‘If you want me to come and lie with you, shave off your beard.’ And the Pope cut his beard and sent [a letter] to the woman. The woman said, ‘Because you cut your beard and shamed your honor for the sake of my female sex... I don't want to come to you!’” It further

relates how the Pope convened an ecclesiastical council and announced that an angel sent by God had told him that he and his bishops should cut their beards to become worthy of an angelic order. "This is what you have been doing ever since," this absurd tale is concluded by Panagiotes, "and a woman shamed you and you shaved your beards for the sake of the female sex."⁸⁶

The lively interest towards this pure propaganda in Bulgaria and Serbia at the end of the 13th and 14th centuries seems to be completely unrelated to the classic religious dispute. On the other hand, however, if we bear in mind the fact that the Lyons union confronted the orthodox Christians with the necessity of stating firmly their attitude towards the papal primacy, the appearance of such a "compromising sexual revelation", targeted at the Roman pontiff, lends itself to a logical explanation.

Inspired by Panagiotes' denunciatory story, an anonymous South-Slavic man of letters (a Serb or Bulgarian) created a separate work entitled *A story about how Rome fell from the orthodox faith*. The text, as it is known to date, comes from three copies from the 16th and 17th centuries, housed in the Library of the Romanian Academy,⁸⁷ the Church Historical Archive and Museum in Sofia,⁸⁸ and the Archive of the Serbian Academy of Sciences.⁸⁹ It is yet to be studied or published. I will present here only the opening section of the work, which is contained in the only surviving folio of the Bucharest copy.

The *Story* begins with an introduction consisting of brief questions and answers, which prove that this oration was written at the Seventh Ecumenical council, after Rome had been turned away from the Orthodox faith by Peter the Mutterer and Paul Ermon made pope by Basil the Great. These two mysterious *personae* were obviously "borrowed" from the second redaction of the *Dialogue of Panagiotes with an Azymite*, where it says: "Peter the Mutterer and Paul of Samosata. They brought about this heresy and to you they transferred their foul-smelling heresy – heretics, cursed by the holy fathers at the Seventh council; and you have clung to this heresy ever since."⁹⁰ The mention of Paul of Samosata clarifies the logic of the exposition – this patriarch of Antioch was removed and excommunicated by a local council on charges of heresy and suspicions of sexual dissipation.⁹¹

Further in the *Story* there follows a rather unusual paraphrasing of the tale about the lewd pope, familiar from the *Dialogue of Panagiotes with an Azymite*. Pope Ermon

sent a letter to the maiden's house, which read as follows, "The Pope bows to you. Come to the apostolic throne to have dinner with the Pope." And the maiden was God-wise, filled with the Holy Spirit. When the letter arrived, she threw it into the fire; and the second, and the third, and the fourth, and the fifth, and the sixth. The seventh one was angry. The seventh letter said, "Maiden, you can not escape from the Pope's hands." The maiden... sent a letter to the Pope; she wrote, "Holy Pope, send me your golden hair, and your beard and moustaches, if you want to make love to me. For I am of better stock, of Israel's blood." The maiden wrote the letter so that the Pope would leave her alone. Said the maiden that if the Pope shaved his beard and his moustaches for the sake of a woman, the earth would sink, the heavens would come apart, that is why the Pope would not do it.

The Pope, however, fulfilled the maiden's wish, "The maiden saw the Pope's golden beard and moustaches and cried bitterly, cut her golden hair, and hit her head into the stones." Firmly resolved to expose the Pope, she composes a letter, which is read aloud all around Rome: "Let it be known to you, rulers and Roman lords, this is how Rome fell. The Pope shaved off his beard and his moustaches for the sake of a woman's eyes." The Pope is on the verge of suicide but then Peter the Mutterer comes to him, consoles him and writes his first false heretical book in which it says, "Let it be known to the East, and the West, and the South, and the North! Know, brothers, that this night Archangel Michael came and brought this letter from heaven, and told us to follow Saint Peter the Apostle's rule – every one must shave their beard and moustache..."⁹²

In a remarkable manner the author of the *Story* reworks his literary original, introducing a number of additional colorful details and heightens the dramatic quality of the situations described. Particularly important and practically without precedent in that age is the fact that he employs stylistic devices and lexis characteristic of the oral folk tradition. Undoubtedly, in future this newly discovered work will attract scholarly attention and will be studied in detail.

The *Dialogue of Panagiotes with an Azymite* did not escape the notice of the Muscovite defenders of Orthodoxy in the 17th century either. Here it was published for the first time in 1644 in the so-called *Kirillova kniga* ('St Cyril's book').⁹³ However, this printed edition contains a number of – sometimes rather brutal – alterations of the text, as we already know it. For example, in a curious manner, the Russian editor transforms the woman's refusal to meet the Pope "because you cut your beard and shamed yourself, disgraced your rank and ruined your honor for the sake

of *my woman's beard below the navel*.”⁹⁴ Even more interesting is the following long addition: overcome by grief and despair, the Pope taught some pigeons to perch on his shoulders and feed on seeds placed in his ears. He appeared with these pigeons on his shoulders before the council of the Western bishops and announced that God had sent his angel to him as a pigeon with a message and told him that he and his [spiritual] children should from then on shave their beards.⁹⁵

It should be stressed here that *Kirillova kniga* abounds in such grotesque passages. The compilers and the publishers of this huge volume were ordered by the Russian tsar Mikhail Feodorovič (1613-1645) to gather as many as possible of the most biting polemical texts against Judaism, Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism in existence around the first half of the 17th century.⁹⁶ The appearance of this Slavic Panoply was an expression of the increased power and confidence of the Muscovite state, while the unrestrained and aggressive tone of a number of the texts included in it provoked the angry reaction of the few Europeans who managed to acquaint themselves with its contents.⁹⁷ The book, however, enjoyed enormous popularity in Russia – 1032 out of a total of 1163 copies published were sold within the first three months of its appearance.⁹⁸ Odd printed and manuscript copies of the book crossed the borders of the country and contributed to the consolidation of the orthodox resistance against the onslaught of Catholicism and the various Protestant teachings.⁹⁹

During the second half of the 17th century, *Kirillova kniga* gained popularity in Wallachia as well. Evidence for this is given by two manuscripts from the collection of Romanian manuscripts in the Library of the Romanian Academy: BAR Ms. Rom. No 1570 (written in 1667)¹⁰⁰ and BAR Ms. Rom. No 1917 (from the end of the 17th century).¹⁰¹ These are bilingual manuscripts which include texts from *Kirillova kniga*, accompanied by a parallel Romanian translation. The two manuscripts are incomplete and neither of them has the title page of the book, and it is for this reason that a number of contemporary scholars have regarded them as Romanian translations of certain Slavonic handwritten miscellanies. The comparison between the two manuscripts shows that each of them contains a section of one **full Romanian translation of *Kirillova kniga***. When, where and by whom the translation was made is impossible to determine for the time being.¹⁰² Such an undertaking, however, could hardly have been the product of a personal initiative or whim – obviously this is a translation done at the behest of the high

ecclesiastical circles in Wallachia around the middle or second half of the 17th century.

Let us now return again to Archbishop Peter Bogdan's experiences in Bucharest in 1670. In his report to the *Congregation for the Propagation of Faith* he remarks sadly on the public reaction to the collapse of the hastily and incompetently reconstructed Catholic temple in the capital of Wallachia. Shortly before that the newly ordained Patriarch of Jerusalem Dositheus (1669-1707) spent a few months in Bucharest, seizing every opportunity to heap insults on the Roman Church, and at the festive service on Good Thursday excommunicated the First Throne because it fell into heresy.

And because the aforesaid church of the Catholics had collapsed... almost all schismatics say: "The church of the papists collapsed because our patriarch had excommunicated it." This rumor spread throughout the whole area, so that everybody who came to Bucharest, a monk or a layman, Wallachian or Greek, nobleman or ordinary person, the whole schismatic people, they all throng as if to see a miracle and grow stronger in their schism. Infinite is the number of fools!¹⁰³

So, during his last visit to Bucharest Peter Bogdan witnessed the beginning of new processes in the spiritual life of Wallachian society. Patriarch Dositheus, who wished to eliminate the Catholic influence in the Holy Lands,¹⁰⁴ would during the years to follow turn Wallachia and Moldova into strongholds in his struggle against Catholicism and Protestantism. During the rule of the enlightened prince Constantin Brăncoveanu (1688-1714), Greek academic education and publishing in the Greek language became a new dominant in the cultural life of the Wallachian principality. The militant anti-Catholicism fostered by Dositheus was welcomed here in the last decade of the 17th century, when Catholic Austria laid hands on Transylvania and its orthodox clergy experienced a deep internal spilt, culminating in 1697-1698 in the union with Rome proclaimed by the Alba Iulia Councils.¹⁰⁵

It can be claimed that the appearance in the manuscript tradition of Romanian translations of various polemical texts during the second half of the 17th century, as well as the publication in Wallachia and Moldova at that time of a number of polemical works in Greek and Romanian thanks to the efforts of Patriarch Dositheus, determined the gradual decline of interest in the classic Slavonic anti-Catholic works discussed in the

present paper. This problem should be examined further in the context of the general tendency in the Wallachian lands, which became apparent at the end of the 17th and early 18th centuries, towards a gradual marginalization and ousting of the Slavonic language from church life.¹⁰⁶ Along with this, well-focused and detailed research should be conducted to determine whether and to what extent the numerous Slavonic translations of Greek and Romanian printed books of a polemical nature, disseminated in manuscript form across Russia and Serbia during the 18th century, contributed to overcoming some of the mediaeval anachronisms in the thinking of the Slavonic orthodox polemicists from the Enlightenment.¹⁰⁷

NOTES

- ¹ *Dokumenti za katoličeskata propaganda v Bălgarija prez XVII vek*, Universitetsko izdatelstvo "Sv. Kliment Ohridski", Sofia, 1993, p. 294.
- ² *Dokumenti za katoličeskata propaganda...*, 292-321.
- ³ *Dokumenti za katoličeskata propaganda...*, p. 300.
- ⁴ PANAITESCU, P. *Începuturile și biruința scrisului în limba română*, Editura Academiei R.P.R., București, 1965, 13-28; ZACH, K. *Orthodoxe Kirche und rumänisches Volks-bewußtsein im 15. bis 18. Jahrhundert*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1977, 30-31; CALINESCU, G. *History of Romanian Literature*, Nagard Publishers, Milan, 1989, p. 17; TEOTEOI, T., V. VĂȚĂȘIANU, "Cultura in secolele XIV-XVI", in *Istoria Românilor*, Vol. IV, Editura Enciclopedica, București, 2001, 654-661. As regards the numerous confusions and speculations on the issue of the Slavic elements in the Romanian language and culture, I would like to cite the opinion of an otherwise respected Romanian scholar: "The Slavonic stock strikes one immediately by its mumbling, somber sounds, often of a grotesque sadness, by the thick dye which usually leads to 'native' speech. Either because it comes from a people with smoldering feelings, self-contained, slow-thinking and overburdened by all the obscurities of migration, or because the natives borrowed words denoting a new state of things, the vocabulary of Slavonic origin expresses the loss of human dignity, inequality, the harsh relations of dependence, humility, necessity. Unwanted masters came, outraging souls and awakening misanthropy." (CALINESCU, G. *History...*, p. 18). On the essentially negative image in Romanian historiography of the Barbarians – "migrants", flooding into the Romanian lands during the Middle Ages and successfully assimilated by the "indigenous" population, see NICULESCU, G.-A. "Nationalism and the Representation of Society in Romanian Archaeology", in *Nation and National Ideology: Past, Present and Prospects. Proceedings of the International Symposium held at the New Europe College, Bucharest, April 6-7, 2001*, New Europe College, Bucharest, 2002, 209-234. Cf. also BOIA, L. *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2001, 14-15.
- ⁵ PANAITESCU, P. *Manuscrisele slave din Biblioteca Academiei R.P.R.*, Vol. I, Editura Academiei R.P.R., București, 1959; PANAITESCU, P. *Catalogul manuscriselor slavo-române și slave din Biblioteca Academiei Române*. Vol. II. Ediție îngrijită de D.-L. Aramă și revizuită de G. Mihăilă cu o prefață de G. Ștrempel, Editura Academiei Române București, 2003.
- ⁶ I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Predrag Matejic, who was kind enough to send me copies of a number of Hilandar manuscripts from the Microform Collection of the Hilandar Research Library at the Ohio State University, Columbus, OH. I am also extremely indebted to Dr Jonathan Shepard, thanks to whose assistance I had the opportunity as a British

- Academy Visiting Fellow to gather valuable material at the Bodleian library in Oxford.
- 7 KOLBABA, T. "Byzantine Perceptions of Latin Religious 'Errors': Themes and Changes from 850 to 1350", in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, ed. by A. Laiou and R. Mottahedeh, Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Washington, D.C., 2001, 118-119.
- 8 OBOLENSKY, D. *The Byzantine commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500-1453*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1971.
- 9 Cf. CAMERON, A. "Disputations, polemical literature and the formation of opinion in the early Byzantine period", in REININK, G. J., H.L.J. VANSTIPHOUT (eds.), *Dispute Poems and Dialogues in the Ancient Medieval Near East*, Uitgeverij Peeters, Leuven, 1991, 91-108 (repr. in: CAMERON, A. *Changing Cultures in Early Byzantium*, Variorum, Aldershot, 1996, II).
- 10 DUJŽEV, I. "Introduction", in POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor drevne-russkich polemičeskch sočinenij protiv latinjan (XI-XV v.)*. With an introduction by Ivan Dujčev, Variorum Reprints, London, 1972, p. 4.
- 11 HITCHINS, K. "The idea of Nation among the Romanians in Transylvania, 1700-1849", in *Nation and National Ideology: Past, Present and Prospects. Proceedings of the International Symposium held at the New Europe College, Bucharest, April 6-7, 2001*, New Europe College, Bucharest, 2002, 83-84.
- 12 JACIMIRSKIJ, A. "K istorii apokrifov i legend v južno-slavjanskoj pis'mennosti", in *Izvestija Otdelenija Russkogo Jazyka i Slovesnosti*, XV, 1910, p. 56.
- 13 POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor drevne-russkich polemičeskch sočinenij protiv latinjan (XI-XV v.)*, Moscow, 1875.
- 14 PAVLOV, A. "Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor drevne-russkich polemičeskch sočinenij protiv latinjan. Sočinenie A. Popova. Moskva, 1875", in *Otčet o devjattjadcatom prisuždenii nagrad grafa Uvarova*, Saint-Petersburg, 1878, 187-396.
- 15 KAKRIDIS, I. *Codex 88 des Klosters Dečani und seine griechischen Vorlagen. Ein Kapitel der serbisch-byzantinischen Literaturbeziehungen im 14. Jahrhundert*, Verlag Otto Sagner, München, 1988; KAKRIDIS, Y. "Vizantijska, antička i sholastička tradicija u srpskoslovenskim prevodima dela Grigorija Palame i Varlaama Kalabrijskog", in *Srpska književnost u kontekstu evropske književnosti* [= Naučni sastanak slavista u Vukove dane, 30/2], Međunarodni slavistički centar, Belgrade, 2002, 25-31; KAKRIDIS, Y. "Barlaam von Kalabrien, Gegen der Lateiner. Edition der serbisch-kirchenslavischen Übersetzung nach der Handschrift, Dečani 88", in *Hilandarski zbornik*, 11, 2004, 181-226.
- 16 VASILJEV, LJ., GROZDANOVIĆ, M., JOVANOVIĆ, B. "Novo datiranje srpskih rukopisa u Biblioteci Rumunske akademije nauka", in *Arheografski prilozi*, 2, 1980, p. 59 (No 75); PANAITESCU, P. *Manuscrisele...*, 99-103; MILTENOVA, A. *Erotapokriseis. Săcheneriyata ot kratki văprosi i otgovori v starobălgarskata literatura*, Izdatelstvo "Damyan Yakov", Sofia, 2004, p. 111.

- 17 BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, f. 1 – 116.
- 18 BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, f. 65v – 66.
- 19 Here I would not dwell on the anti-Jewish work, included in the miscellany on f. 116 v – 131, which has recently been discussed on the basis of other copies in PERESWETOFF-MORATH, A. “‘And Was Jerusalem Builded Here?’... On the Textual History of the Slavonic Jerusalem Disputation”, in *Scando-Slavica*, 47, 2001, 19-38; PROHOROV, G. (ed.) *Enciklopedija ruskogo igumena XIV – XV vv. Sbornik prepodobnogo Kirilla Belozerskogo. Rossijskaja Nacional’naja Biblioteka, Kirillo-Belozerskoe sobranie, No XII*, Izdatel’stvo Olega Abyško, Saint-Petersburg, 2003, 129-139, 320-335.
- 20 BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, f. 116 v - 178 v.
- 21 In fact, after f. 281v, where we find described certain events from the rule of Basil I (867-886), there are missing folios, and f. 282 was misplaced there / it relates the events surrounding the Byzantine campaign against Bulgaria in 917; the order of the following folios is also confused.
- 22 BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, f. 132v -133v.
- 23 According to the anonymous writer, the name of this pope was Christophorus, which casts doubts on the authenticity of this section of the story. It appears that here we stumble upon a late and confused echo of the events accompanying the dismissal of the anti-pope Christophorus (903-904) and the appointment of Pope Sergius III (904-911).
- 24 HERGENRÖTHER, I. *Photius, Patriarch von Konstantinopel. Sein Leben, seine Schriften und das griechische Schisma*, III, Regensburg, 1869, 843-848.
- 25 HERGENROETHER, I. *Monumenta graeca ad Photium ejusque historiam pertinentia*, Ratisbonae, 1869, 154-163.
- 26 OBOLENSKIJ, M. “Letopisec Perejaslavlja Suzdal’skago”, in *Vremennik Imperatorskago Obščestva Istorii i Drevnostej Rossijskikh*, IX, 1851, p. LXXI.
- 27 Ms. Pljevalja 12, Bulgarian, ca. 1360/1370 (NIKOLOV, A. “‘A Useful Tale about the Latins’: An Old Bulgarian Translation of a Lost Byzantine Anti-Latin Text of the End of 11th – Early 12th Century”, in *Scripta & e-Scripta*, 1, 2003, 104; STANKOVIĆ, R. *Rukopisne knjige manastira Svete Trojice kod Pljevalja. Vodeni znaci i datiranje [= Narodna biblioteka Srbije. Opis južnoslovenskih ćirilskih rukopisa, T. VII]*, Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Belgrade 2003, p. 7); National library of Serbia, Rs 11, Serbian, end of 14th century. (ŠTAVLIJANIN-ĐORĐEVIĆ, L., M. GROZDANOVIĆ-PAJIĆ, A. CERNIĆ, *Opis ćiliskih rukopisa Narodne biblioteke Srbije, Knj. 1*, Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Belgrade, 1986, 20-23); Russian State Library – Moscow, Kirillo-Belozerskoe sobranie, No XII, Russian, end of 14th/early 15th century. (PROKHOROV, G. (ed.) *Enciklopedija...*, 155-157) ; Russian State Library – Moscow, Egorov (F. 98), No 158, Russian, 15th century. See also the Russian 15th century copy, edited in: Pamjatniki starinnoj russkoj literatury, izdavaemye graфом G. Kuševym-Bezborodko, Vyp. IV, Saint-Petersburg, 1862, 218-219.

- 28 Ms. Dečani 75, Serbian, ca. 1360-1370 (LAZIĆ, M. "Isihazam resavskih rukopisa", in *Arheografski prilozi*, 8, 1986, 96-97; GROZDANOVIĆ-PAJIĆ, M., R. STANKOVIĆ, *Rukopisne knjige manastira Visoki Dečani. Knjiga 2. Vodeni znaci i datiranje* [= Narodna biblioteka Srbije. Opis južnoslovenskih ćirilskih rukopisa, T. IV], Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Belgrade 1995, p. 28); Ms. Dečani 102, Serbian, ca. 1415/1425. (LAZIĆ, M. *Isihazam srpske knjige*, "Prosveta", Niš, 1999, 226-228; GROZDANOVIĆ-PAJIĆ, M., R. STANKOVIĆ, *Rukopisne knjige...*, p. 37); State Historical Museum – Moscow, Sinodal'noe sobranie, No 374, Serbian, early 15th century. (POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor...*, 136-145); Ms. Nikoljac 52, Serbian, ca. 1485/1495 (MILTENOVA, A. "Apokrifni proizvedeniya v manastirskite sbornici (postanovka na vāprosa)", in *Kirilo-Methodievski studii*, 3, 1986, 265-270; STANKOVIĆ, R. "Datiranje i vodeni znaci rukopisnih knjiga manastira Nikoljca", in *Arheografski prilozi*, 16, 1994, 182-183; MILTENOVA, A. *Erotopokriseis...*, p. 282).
- 29 The rest of them are: Archive of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), Ms. 51, Serbian, 15th-16th century. (STOJANOVIĆ, LJ. *Katalog rukopisa i starih štampanih knjiga. Zbirka Srpske Kraljevske akademije*, Belgrade, 1901, 186-187); Ms. Hilandar 301 (*Nomocanon* from 1620).
- 30 BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, f. 133v – 144.
- 31 JACIMIRSKIJ, A. *Slavjanskija i russkija rukopisi rumynskikh bibliotek* [= *Sbornik Otdelenija Russkago Jazyka i Slovesnosti Imperatorskoj Akademii Nauk*, T. LXXIX], Saint-Petersburg, 1905, 763-767; PANAITESCU, P. *Manuscritele...*, 219-225; VASILJEV, LJ., GROZDANOVIĆ, M., JOVANOVIĆ, B. "Novo datiranje...", p. 50.
- 32 Cf. BAR Ms. Slav. No 155, f. 598 – 602. Greek text with parallel Latin translation: MIGNE, J.-P. (ed.), *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca*, T. CXX, Parisiis, 1880, coll. 781-794 ("Michaelis sanctissimi archiepiscopi Constantinopolis novae Romae, et oecumenici patriarchae, Cerularii, ad Petrum sanctissimum patriarcham Theopolis magnae Antiochiae"). See also: GRUMEL, V. *Les registres des actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople, Vol. I. Les actes des patriarches, Fasc. 3 1043 à 1206, Socii Assumptionistae Chalcedonenses*, Paris, 1947, 5-7 (No 866).
- 33 KOLBABA, T. *The Byzantine Lists: errors of the Latins*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 2000.
- 34 Here I cite the tract *Concerning Those Who Accuse the Latins* after: KOLBABA, T. *The Byzantine Lists...*, p. 92.
- 35 POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor...*, 50-56; PAVLOV, A. "Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor...", 227-229.
- 36 Two later versions were produced on the basis of copies of the text, similar to these three: the first, which appeared no later than the mid-15th century, is known from Ms. JAZU III a 47, f. 545v-547 (MOŠIN, V., *Ćirilski rukopisi Jugoslavenske akademije. I Dil. Opis rukopisa*, Jugoslavenska akademija

- znatnosti i umjetnosti, Zagreb, 1955, 61-67; HRISTOVA, B. *Opis na r kopisite na Vladislav Gramatik*, Izdatelstvo "PIK", Veliko T rnovo, 1996, 25-48) and Ms. Hilandar 469, f. 276-279v, and the second - Ms. Hilandar 301, f. 120v-123 and Ms. SANU 51, f. 22-24v.
- 37 BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, f. 135r-v, 135v - 140v. Cf. BAR Ms. Slav. No 155, f. 588-598. Greek text with parallel Latin translation: MIGNE, J.-P. (ed.), *Patrologiae cursus completes. Series Graeca*, T. CXX, Parisiis, 1880, coll. 756-781 ("Venerando coangelico domino et spirituali nostro fratri, sanctissimo archiepiscopo Gradensi seu Aquileiae, Petrus misericordia Dei patriarcha Theopolis magnae Antiochiae").
- 38 In the Slavonic translation the Greek word "κλήρος" – 'clerus', 'clergy' – is rendered as "сѣборъ" – 'council'.
- 39 On the Greek original of this 'dossier' see : LAURENT, V. *Les registes des actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople, Vol. I. Les actes des patriarches, Fasc. 4 1208   1303*, Institut fran aise d tudes byzantines, Paris, 1971, p. 82.
- 40 BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, f.140v – 144. Cf. BAR Ms. Slav. No 155, f. 602 – 604v.
- 41 Editions of the text: GOLUBOVICH, H. "Disputatio Latinorum et Graecorum, seu Relatio Apocrisiarorum Gregorii IX de gestis Nicaeae in Bithynia et Nymphaeae in Lydia 1234", in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XII, 1919, 455-458 (Latin text); WADDINGUS, L. *Annales Minorum, seu trium ordinum a S. Francisco institutorum*, T. II (1221-1237), Quaracchi, 1931, 374-381 (Greek and Latin texts).
- 42 Cf. identical reading in Ms. De ani 75 и Ms. De ani 102.
- 43 Cf. Ms. Pljevlja 12.
- 44 BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, f. 144-145.
- 45 POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literurnyj obzor...*, 40-43. The two significant additions to the published text in the Bucharest copy are identical to those in a late Russian copy: BY KOV, A. *Opisanie cerkovno-slavjanskikh i russkikh rukopisnykh sbornikov Imperatorskoj Publi noy biblioteki*, T. I, Sankt-Peterburg, 1882, p. 262.
- 46 The Greek text has been published in: DEMETRACOPULUS, A. *Bibliotheca ecclesiastica, continens graecorum theologorum opera ex codicibus manuscriptis Mosquensibus*, T. I, Leipzig, 1866, 18-36.
- 47 This seems to be a reference to the Antiochian patriarch John IV (V) Oxeites (1089-1100).
- 48 BAR Ms. Slav. No 330, f. 154-158.
- 49 PAVLOV, A. "Istoriko-literurnyj obzor..." p. 223.
- 50 Ms. Nikoljac 49, f. 226-264v (STANKOVI , R. "Datiranje...", 179-181).
- 51 Ms. Pljevlja 41, f. 237-321v (STANKOVI , R. *Rukopisne knjige...*, p. 15).
- 52 Ms. SANU 135, f. 425-477v (STOJANOVI , LJ. *Katalog rukopisa...*, 102-114).

- 53 In fact, BAR Ms. Slav. No 685 is a photocopy of the original manuscript, which at the end of the 19th century became part of A. Jacimirskij's personal collection. This collection was subsequently transferred to the Library of Saint-Petersburg Academy of Sciences (signature 13.3.23). Manuscript description: JACIMIRSKIJ, A. *Iz slavjanskih rukopisej. Teksty i zametki*, Moscow, 1898, p. 2, 85-92.
- 54 NIKOLOV, A. "'A Useful Tale'...", 99-119.
- 55 BAR Ms. Slav. No 685, f. 235 – 244.
- 56 POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor...*, 125-133; TROICKI, S. "Kako treba izdati Svetosavsku Krmčiju (Nomokanon sa tumačenjima)", in *Spomenik Srpske akademije nauka, CII, Odeljenje društvenih nauka, Nova serija 4, 1952*, 87-88.
- 57 JACIMIRSKIJ, A. *Iz slavjanskih rukopisej...*, p. 89.
- 58 HERGENROETHER, I. *Monumenta...*, 62-71 (Greek text and Latin translation); POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor...*, 58-69 (edition of the mediaeval Slavonic translation from the Serbian *Kormčaja* with parallel Greek text); KOLBABA, T. *The Byzantine Lists...*, p. 178.
- 59 BAR Ms. Slav. No 685, f. 249-252.
- 60 LEVY-RUBIN, M. "'The errors of the Franks" by Nikon of the Black Mountain: between religious and ethno-cultural conflict", in *Byzantion*, LXXI, 2001, 422-437.
- 61 BAR Ms. Slav. No 685, f. 252.
- 62 BAR Ms. Slav. No 685, f. 253-255v. Edited by POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor...*, 22-23. See also the discussion in PAVLOV, A. "Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor...", 205-212.
- 63 The word 'perverse' ("развращенно") is missing from the copies published by A. Popov.
- 64 BAR Ms. Slav. No 685, f. 255v.
- 65 Beginning on BAR Ms. Slav. No 685, f. 255v.
- 66 POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor...*, 69-81.
- 67 The copy from Ms. Slav. No 685 is practically identical to Gavril Uric's mid-15th century copy (see below) edited by A. Jacimirskij. Hereafter I refer to this edition (JACIMIRSKIJ, A. *Iz slavjanskih rukopisej...*, 23-27).
- 68 JACIMIRSKIJ, A. *Iz slavjanskih rukopisej...*, p. 23.
- 69 JACIMIRSKIJ, A. *Iz slavjanskih rukopisej...*, 23-24.
- 70 JACIMIRSKIJ, A. *Iz slavjanskih rukopisej...*, 24-25.
- 71 JACIMIRSKIJ, A. *Iz slavjanskih rukopisej...*, p. 2, 28-30; JACIMIRSKIJ, A. *Grigorij Camblak. Očerk ego žizni, administrativnoj i knižnoj dejatel'nosti*, Saint-Petersburg, 1904, 376-377. More generally about the literary activity of Gavril Uric see MIHAILA, G. "Rukopisi Gavriila Urika Njameckogo i ikh literaturnoe značenje", in *Tárnovska knižovna škola*, 2, 1980, 81-88; PASKAL', A. "Itogi i zadači izučenija rukopisej Gavriila Urika kak rannikh istočnikov po istorii slavjano-moldavskoj knižnosti XV veka", in *Issledovanija po*

- istočnikovedeniju istorii SSSR dooktjabr'skogo perioda*, Institut istorii SSSR, Moscow, 1989, 4-32; PASKAL', A. "Novye dannye o knižnoj dejatel'nosti Gavriila Urika Njameckogo, in *Tărnovska knižovna škola*, 5, 1994, 409-413.
- 72 BOGDAN, I. *Cronice inedite atingătoare de istoria românilor*, București, 1895, 81-90; JACIMIRSKIJ, A. *Iz slavjanskih rukopisej...*, 2-3
- 73 BOGDAN, I. *Vechile cronice moldovenesci pana la Urechia. Texte slave cu studiu, traduceri si note*, Bucuresti, 1891, 3-11; TYUTYUNDŽIEV, I. *Bălgarskata anonimna hronika ot XV v.*, "Elpis", Veliko Tărnovo, 1992, 34-39. The manuscript is currently housed at the Central Research Library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, indexed as Poč./Ber. 47 116.
- 74 MATEJIC, P., H. THOMAS, *Catalog. Manuscripts on Microform of the Hilandar Research Library (The Ohio State University)*, Vol. I, Resource Center for Medieval Slavic Studies, the Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1992, p. 569.
- 75 The two earliest copies of this miscellany still in existence – one, Bulgarian, from 1360/1370 (Ms. Pljevlja 12) and one, Serbian, from the last quarter of the 14th century (National library of Serbia, Rs 11) – are a somewhat distorted reflection of its contents. It seems that the miscellany opened with an *Introduction*, the so-called *Tale about the restoration of the Bulgarian Patriarchate in 1235*; followed by *Useful Tale about the Latins, To the Latins, about the unleavened bread* by Nicetas Stethatos, the aforementioned fragment from *Tacticon* by Nikon of the Black Mountain, *About Christ's Suppers* by Nicephoros Calist, *Oration on the fallacy of the Germans, how Peter the Mutterer taught [them] a heresy, To the Latins about the unleavened bread, About the Franks and the other Latins, Brief story about the Latin heresies, Confession of the Roman pope...*, Patriarch Germanos's *Reply, Devotional and kind exhortation to the cruel Latins* by Patriarch Germanos, *Confession about the Holy and Life-giving Trinity, Brief exposition on faith* by Anasthasius of Antioch and Cyril of Alexandria, *Tale, briefly told, about how and why the Latins split...*, *Exposition on faith in brief* by Maxim Confessor, *Short Vita of Constantine-Cyril the Philosopher (Dormition of Cyril)*.
- 76 NIKOLOV, A. "'A Useful Tale' ...", 107-108.
- 77 ŽIVOJNOVIĆ, M. "Sveta gora i Lionska unija", in *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog insituta*, XVIII, 1978, 141-154; BOŽILOV, I. "'Măcenie na zografskite monasi". Legendi i fakti", in *Svetogorska obitel Zograf*, T. II, Universitetsko izdatelstvo "Sv. Kliment Ohridski", Sofia, 1996, 175-188.
- 78 BAR Ms. Slav. No 575, f. 127-132 (PANAITESCU, P. *Catalogul...*, p. 431). According to A. Turilov, this is a Bulgarian text written in the first half of the 14th century, which is known today solely from East-Slavonic copies (such as the Bucharest one). These copies share a common archetype, brought into the Suprasl monastery (near Bialystok, Poland) in 1546 (TURILOV, A. "Maloizvestnyj istočnik po istorii idei "Tret'ego Rima" u juznykh slavjan

(Povest' o Ksiropotamskom monastyre)", in *Rimsko-Konstantinopol'skoe nasledie na Rusi: ideja vlasti i političeskaja praktika*, Moscow, Rossijskaja akademija nauk, Institut rossijskoj istorii, 1995, 137-139). It seems to me that the question about the origin of this *Story* will not be fully resolved before the as yet unpublished Greek texts dealing with Xeropotamou's fate have been studied in detail. (BINON, S. *Les origines légendaires et l'histoire de Xéropotamou et de Saint-Paul de l'Athos. Étude diplomatique et critique. Publiée par les soins de F. Halkin*, Bureaux du Muséon, Louvain, 1942, 110-113). I am obliged to A. Turilov for the additional information offered in a personal letter to me from 5 April 2005. The observation contained in it that this text does not vary significantly in the available copies and differences are largely due to orthographic variations and occasional omissions is generally confirmed by the comparison between the Bucharest copy and the only printed edition of the work (VIŠENSKIJ, I. *Sočinenija. Podgotovka teksta, stat'ja i komentarii I. Eremina*, Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, Moscow-Leningrad, 1955, 332-335).

- ⁷⁹ BAR Ms. Slav. No 383, f. 290-300 (PANAITESCU, P. *Catalogul...*, p. 182). The same text features in a miscellany from A. Jacimirskij's collection, which was written in the second half of the 18th century by Paisij Veličkovskij (SREZNEVSKIJ, V., F. POKROVSKIJ, *Opisanie rukopisnogo otdelenija Biblioteki Imperatorskoj Akademii nauk, T. I/2*, Petrograd, 1915, 131-132).
- ⁸⁰ BAR Ms. Slav. No 383, f. 297.
- ⁸¹ BAR Ms. Slav. No 383, f. 300v-303. This is basically a literal translation of the Greek text published in LAMPROS, S. "Ta Patria tou Agiou oros", in *Neos Ellēnomnēmōn*, 9, 1912, 157-161.
- ⁸² SPERANSKIJ, M. "K istorii "Prenija panagiota s azimitom", in *Vizantijskij vremennik*, II, 1895, 526-527.
- ⁸³ KOLBABA, T. *The Byzantine Lists...*, 179, 182-183. To the literature cited there one should also add KRASNOSEL'CEV, N. "Prenie Panagiota s azimitom" po novym grečeskim spiskam", in *Letopis' Istoriko-filologičeskogo Obščestva pri Imperatorskom Novorossijskom universitete, Vizantijskoe otdelenie*, III (VI), 1896, 295-328.
- ⁸⁴ POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor...*, 238-286.
- ⁸⁵ BAR Ms. Slav. No 649, f. 3v-18. Description of the manuscript: *Srednebolgarskij perevod Khroniki Konstantina Manassii v slavjanskikh literaturakh*, Izdatel'stvo Bolgarskoj akademii nauk, Sofia, 1988, 90-94. Cf. MILTENOVA, A. *Erotapokriseis...*, 196-197, 207.
- ⁸⁶ BAR Ms. Slav. No 649, f. 11-11v. Cf. POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literaturnyj obzor...*, 273-274. The Greek copies published so far, as well as the first redaction of the Slavonic translation, do not include this motif.
- ⁸⁷ BAR Ms. Slav. No 421, f. 142v-143v. The manuscript is *convolute*, and the folios that concern us date back to the third quarter of the 16th century (VASILJEV, LJ., GROZDANOVIĆ, M., JOVANOVIĆ, B. "Novo datiranje...",

- 59-60). Description: PANAITESCU, P. *Catalogul...*, 237-242 (The Story was not identified due to its condition and was described as "Legenda apocrifă Despre despărțirea bisericii catolice de biserica prevoslavnică").
- 88 CIAM Ms. No 1161, 62-69v, 16th century. About the manuscript: KOŽUHAROV, S. "Neizvesten prepis na Solunskata legenda", in *Bălgarski ezik*, 16, 1966, 491-495; MILTENOVA, A. *Erotapokriseis...*, 297-298.
- 89 SANU Ms. N^o 147, f. 26-31v, 17th-18th century. (STOJANOVIĆ, LJ. *Katalog...*, p. 191).
- 90 BAR Ms. Slav. No 649, f. 12v. Cf. POPOV, A. *Istoriko-literurnyj obzor...*, p. 275.
- 91 Euseb. Caes. Hist., Lib. VII, XXX. 13-14 (Eusebius of Caesarea, *The Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. II [= *The Loeb Classical Library*, No 265], Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000, p. 220, 222)
- 92 CIAM Ms. No 1161, f. 62v-64v (I take into account, however, some other better readings of the other two copies).
- 93 ZERNOVA, A. *Knigi kirillovskoj pečati, izdannye v Moskve v XVI-XVII vekah. Svodnyj catalog*. Gosudarstvennaja Ordena Lenina biblioteka SSSR imeni V. I. Lenina, Moscow, 1958, p. 59, No 169; NIESS, H. Kirche in Rußland zwischen Tradition und Glaube? Eine Untersuchung der Kirillova kniga und der Kniga o vere aus der 1. Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1977; KAGAN, M. "Kirillova kniga", in *Slovar' knižnikov i knižnosti Drevnej Rusi*, 3/2, Izdatel'stvo "Dmitrij Bulanin", Saint-Petersburg, 1993, 163-166; OPARINA, T. "Prosvetitel' Litovskij – neizvestnyj pamjatnik ideologičeskoj bor'by XVII v.", in *Literatura i klassovaja bor'ba epohi pozdnego feodalizma v Rossii. Otvetstvennyj redactor E. Romodanovskaja*, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka" – Sibirskoe otdelenie, Novosibirsk, 1987, 43-57; OPARINA, T. "Prosvetitel' Litovskij", in *Slovar' knižnikov i knižnosti Drevnej Rusi*, 3/3, Izdatel'stvo "Dmitrij Bulanin", Saint-Petersburg, 1998, 275-277.
- 94 BAR Ms. Rom. No 1570, f. 27.
- 95 BAR Ms. Rom. No 1570, f. 27-27v.
- 96 NIESS, H. Kirche in Rußland..., 12-17.
- 97 NIESS, H. Kirche in Rußland..., 11-12.
- 98 NIESS, H. Kirche in Rußland..., p. 11.
- 99 KACZIBA, Á. *Budimpeštinski rukopis Hristofora Račanina (Sadržaj, paleografski opis i pravopis)*, Institut za slavistiku Univerziteta "Jožef Atila", Szeged, 1999, 25-33.
- 100 ŠTREMPEL, G. *Catalogul...*, I, p. 372.
- 101 ŠTREMPEL, G. *Catalogul...*, II, p. 102; BARBU, V. *Miniatura brâncovenescă. Manuscrise illustrate și ornamentate*, Editura Merediane, București, 2000, 73-75.
- 102 Judging by some notes on the manuscripts, BAR Ms. Rom. No 1570 was housed at the bishopric of Buzău, and BAR Ms. Rom. No 1917 - at the bishopric of Râmnic (at least since 1791).

- ¹⁰³ *Dokumenti za katoliëeskata propaganda...*, 301-302 (Latin text), 331 (Bulgarian translation).
- ¹⁰⁴ FONKIČ, B. "Ierusalimskij patriarh Dosifej i ego rukopisi v Moskve", in *Vizantijskij vremennik*, XXIX, 1969, 275-299 ; PANČENKO, K. "Osmanskaja imperija i sud'by pravoslaviya na Arabskom Vostoke (XVI – načalo XIX veka)", in *Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies*, II, 1999, no. 5, 89-92 (<http://www2.let.uu.nl/Solis/anpt/ejos/EJOS-II.5.html>).
- ¹⁰⁵ RUFFINI, M. *Biblioteca stolnicului Constantin Cantacuzino. Traducere din limba italiană de D. Panaitescu și T. Pârvulescu. Prefață de V. Cîndea*, "Minerva", București, 1973, 142-146, 154-155; PIPPIDI, A. "Pouvoir et culture en Valachie sous Constantin Brancovan", in *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, XXVI, 1984, 285-294 ; MIRON, G.-M., "...poruncește, scoale-te, propoveduește..." *Biserica Greco-Catolică din Transilvania. Cler și enoriași (1697-1782)*, Pressa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, 2004, p. 35, 37-44.
- ¹⁰⁶ PANAITESCU, P. *Începuturile...*, 220-226; ZACH, K. *Orthodoxe Kirche...*, 184-187.
- ¹⁰⁷ SREČKOVIĆ, P. *Nekoliko srpskih spomenika [= Spomenik Srpske Kraljevske Akademije XVI]*, Belgrade, 1892, p. 24 ; KOSTIĆ, M., "Akatolička književnost u Srba krajem XVIII v.", in *Glasnik Srpske Pravoslavne Patrijaršije*, II, 1921, 312-313 ; TURDEANU, É. "Le livre grec en Russie: l'apport des presses de Moldavie et Valachie (1682-1725)", in *Revue des Études slaves*, XXVI, 1950, 69-87; RYKOV, JU. "Rukopisi, popolnivišie v 1987 g. ranee postupivšie sobranija", in *Zapiski Otdela rukopisej*, 51, 2000, 96-97.



ORLIN SABEV (Orhan Salih)

Born in 1970, in Shumen, Bulgaria

Ph.D., Institute for Balkan Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia (2000)

Dissertation: *Ottoman Educational Institutions in Bulgarian Lands 15th-18th
Centuries*

Research Fellow, Institute for Balkan Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences,
Sofia

Andrew Mellon Foundation Fellowship, American Research Institute in Turkey
(2002)

Fellowship at the Skilliter Centre for Ottoman Studies, Newnham College,
University of Cambridge, UK (2001)

Research Support Scheme, Higher Education Support Program of the Open
Society Institute, Budapest and New York (1996-1998)

Member of the Executive Committee of the International Association for
Ottoman Social and Economic History (IAOSEH) – since 2001

Member of the Research Board of Advisors of the American Biographical
Institute (North Carolina, USA) – since 2004

Academic prize: “Marin Drinov” Prize (2002), awarded by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences for young research fellows

Participation in congresses, conferences, and workshops (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Turkey, USA)

Books:

Osmanski uchilishta v balgarskite zemi XV-XVIII vek [Ottoman Schools in Bulgarian Lands 15th-18th Centuries], Ljubomadie-Chronia, Sofia, 2001
Parvoto osmansko pateshestvie v sveta na pechatnata kniga (1726-1746). Nov pogled [First Otoman Trip in the World of Printed Books (1726-1746). A Reassessment], Avangard Prima, Sofia, 2004

FORMATION OF OTTOMAN PRINT CULTURE (1726-1746)

Some General Remarks

The grand vizierate of Damad İbrahim Pasha (1718-1730) was a remarkable period for the Ottoman Empire: the so-called Tulip Age (*Lale Devri*). The tulip left its imprint on the time because this flower became enormously popular among the Ottoman elite. A lot of tulip gardens were cultivated in different places of Istanbul and their fragrance replaced the smell of gunpowder that prevailed during the preceding wars. Besides, during those years there was a place in the then Ottoman capital where one's nose could for the first time sense another kind of smell: the heavy smell of oil-based ink used in the first Ottoman Turkish printing press. In fact, the Ottomans experienced this smell in earlier times because Jewish, Armenian and Greek-Orthodox printing houses had been established during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it was during the Tulip Age that printing technology with movable type was introduced to the Ottomans themselves.

The adoption of this technology was closely connected with the socio-cultural developments that took place during the Tulip Age, and this is why contextualization of the first Ottoman printing press within the framework of these developments is unavoidable. The major trend that started during the Tulip Age was the so-called Westernization of the Ottoman Empire, which to a large extent was the result of the first long-term Ottoman embassy in France. The almost year-long embassy, which took place in 1720-1721, gave birth among the Ottoman elite to a remarkable interest in western culture, luxurious lifestyles, and architectural styles such as rococo and baroque, and led to findings in the field of geography, astronomy, biology, and medicine.¹ The western influence, however, did not replace traditional Ottoman culture immediately and completely but was adapted, rather than merely adopted,² thus creating, in Fatma Müge Göçek's words, a "cultural dichotomy"³ or, as Rifaat Ali Abou-el-Haj put it, a "cultural symbiosis."⁴

In this cultural atmosphere, which was much more open to its western counterpart than in previous times, the Ottoman elite, or at least a part of it that was inclined to make use of selected western achievements, supported the establishment of a typography to print books for the Turkish-speaking Muslim reading public.

Though they did not initiate it, the Ottoman authorities supported this printing enterprise, which was a completely private and personal undertaking. It was İbrahim Müteferrika, who, with the moral and financial support of Said Efendi, one of the officials to join the embassy in France, established the first Ottoman printing press. If we had been eighteenth-century citizens of Istanbul we would have experienced its heavy smell of ink somewhere near the grand mosque of Sultan Selim I (*Selimiye*), and, even more so, near the humble mosque (*mescid*) of *Mismari Şüca*, situated to the northwest of *Selimiye*. It was this *mescid*, which still exists today, which was at the heart of the neighborhood (*mahalle*), and where the house of İbrahim Müteferrika himself is situated. Presumably the printing presses were installed in the same house. In fact, the precise location of Müteferrika's lodgings and printing house on the eighteenth-century map of Istanbul was only possible due to his probate inventory, which I came across in 2002 in the Archive of the Istanbul Mufti. Although İbrahim Müteferrika was an Ottoman statesman and diplomat, the inventory, dated 20 Rebiü'l-evvel 1160/1 April 1747, presents him merely as a printer (*bāsmacı merhūm İbrāhīm Efendi*).⁵ It was his pioneering printing activity that made him famous, not only within the Ottoman borders or the world of Islam, but also in western Europe. The West's keen interest in this person was mainly due to his non-Ottoman and non-Muslim origins.

Emergence of the first Ottoman printer

For the time being we have at our disposal a few narrative sources that provide some details of the pre-Ottoman phase in İbrahim Müteferrika's life. All, however, date from the period after his conversion to Islam. The most comprehensive, though possibly not the most faithful of these narratives is one of the letters from the Catholic Hungarian nobleman Cezarnak (César) de Saussure, who, as a companion of Ferenc Rákóczi during his exile in the Ottoman Empire (1717-1735), met the printer in 1732. According to this letter, İbrahim Müteferrika was an

18-20-year-old Hungarian, who studied to become a Calvinist minister, but in 1692 or 1693, during the revolt of Tököly Imre against the Austrian occupation of Transylvania since 1680, had the bad luck to be enslaved by the Turks (who supported Transylvanian independence). Then, according to Czezarnak de Saussure, because of the cruelty of his Ottoman master he chose to convert to Islam, taking the name İbrahim.⁶

However, according to a later narrative (1738) provided by the French Charles Peyssonnel, who was assigned to the Grand Vizier Damad İbrahim Pasha as a military observer during the Austro-Ottoman war of 1736-1739, İbrahim Müteferrika was formerly a Protestant who denied the Holy Trinity.⁷ Thus Peyssonnel claims that İbrahim Müteferrika was an anti-Trinitarian or a Unitarian before he became an Ottoman subject and Muslim.

In fact, in 1710 İbrahim Müteferrika himself wrote a treatise in Ottoman Turkish. It had no title, but researchers usually call it the *Treatise on Islam* (*Risāle-i İslāmiye*). In it he relates that he was born in Kolozsvár (Cluj), Transylvania.⁸ It is this treatise from which Niyazi Berkes concludes that İbrahim Müteferrika was not a Calvinist but a Unitarian. Unitarianism was a very popular denomination in Transylvania, in particular among the Hungarian burghers in Kolozsvár.⁹ According to Berkes, although the treatise condemns the Catholic Church and claims that it will be defeated by Islam, it seems it had been written to suggest a direct link between İbrahim's previous Unitarianism and his conversion to Islam.¹⁰ In the treatise İbrahim writes of how he had secretly studied anti-Trinitarian texts and as a result attained an insight into Muhammad's prophecy.¹¹

On the basis of this treatise Niyazi Berkes concludes that Czezarnak de Saussure's account of İbrahim Müteferrika's enslavement and consequent conversion to Islam is not faithful. According to Niyazi Berkes, it is more probable that İbrahim Müteferrika fled from Habsburg rule in Transylvania and joined Tököly Imre as a liaison officer with the Ottomans.

Unfortunately, there is no contemporary evidence of the pre-Ottoman phase in İbrahim Müteferrika's life. His original name is unknown, although Niyazi Berkes suggests that it was probably Abraham.¹²

According to Czezarnak de Saussure's account, after his conversion, İbrahim acquired literacy in the Turkish language and in Muslim culture. His probate inventory provides some idea of his intellectual profile since it includes details of his personal collection of books. This information is

divided into two lists: the first listing books in the Arabic script, the second those in the Latin script (*Kütüb-i Lâtîn*). Prior to his death he possessed around a hundred books in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. Of these worth noting are titles of popular works in history, geography, astronomy, as well as treatises dealing with political ethics and social order. As for the Latin books (36 titles in total), most were related to geography (mainly atlases).¹³ In fact, this collection of literature reflects Müteferrika's interests, not only as a reader, but also as an Ottoman diplomatic negotiator, publisher, and author.

In 1716 he was elevated to the position of permanent *müteferrika*, after which he was nicknamed Müteferrika. *Müteferrika* was the name of a corps at the Ottoman court whose members were especially attached to the person of the sultan and were used in various important public or political missions. In 1716 İbrahim served as an Ottoman commissioner with the Hungarians who had assembled in Belgrade to promote their struggle for independence, which had the support of the Ottomans. In 1720 he was appointed liaison officer to Prince Ferenc Rákóczi, whose revolt against the Habsburgs in 1703-1711 proved unsuccessful and who had come to Turkey in 1717 from France to continue his struggle against Austria. In 1737 İbrahim was dispatched to the Palatinus of Kiev to perform negotiations over the treaty between the Ottomans and the Poles; he was one of the promoters of a Turkish-French alliance against Austria and Russia during the years 1737-1739; in 1738 he conducted negotiations on behalf of the Ottoman government and the anti-Austrian Hungarians for the surrender of the fortress of Orsova to the Ottoman forces. Together with the Comte de Bonneval, who had converted and took the name Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha, he also played an active role in promoting Turkish-Swedish cooperation against Russia. Besides diplomatic missions İbrahim was also charged with a number of bureaucratic responsibilities: during the period 1738-1743 he was assigned scribe at the Ottoman artillery (*top arabacı*), in 1744-1745 he became scribe at the sultan's council (*divân-i hümayûn*), and his last service seems to be the direction of what was presumably the first Ottoman paper mill at Yalova, near Istanbul, in the years 1744-1747.¹⁴ İbrahim passed away at the end of January 1747.¹⁵

İbrahim Müteferrika became famous, however, due to his undertaking to establish an Ottoman Turkish printing press. His first attempts at printing were with maps, and he held a particular interest in maps due to his diplomatic career.¹⁶ He printed maps of the Sea of Marmara (1719),¹⁷

the Black Sea (1724-25), Persia (1142/1729-30), and Egypt.¹⁸ İbrahim was very confident in his printing enterprise, although it is unclear whether he was proficient in printing technology. He most likely became acquainted with the art of printing while still studying in Kolozsvár, where the famous Transylvanian printer Nicholas (Miklós) Kis (1650-1702) had revived in 1689 the Calvinist printing house after his return from Amsterdam.¹⁹ İbrahim Müteferrika was an “educated border crosser,”²⁰ and, as Stefan Reichmuth states, not a typical renegade who changed his faith and citizenship for prosaic reasons such as career and wealth.²¹ But it seems that in the case of İbrahim Müteferrika, conversion was not associated with a total replacement of a previous identity with a new one. Although Müteferrika claims in his treatise on Islam that he became a convinced Muslim even before his flight to the Ottoman domains, he apparently never forgot his Unitarianism – that is, his more or less non-Muslim cultural background. In a letter dated 1737, De Laria, an interpreter at the French Embassy in Istanbul, provides some noteworthy detail about İbrahim Müteferrika’s habits. According to De Laria, although İbrahim converted to Islam, he was not a strict observant and conversations with him were made funnier through wine. Based on these accounts, regardless of whether or not they are faithful, we might assume that İbrahim was, in fact, a good example of a cultural dichotomy or symbiosis. In other words, he never stopped being a Christian, and never became a real Muslim. That is, he could never delete his background, in which he was more or less familiar with print culture, and never became a “traditional” Muslim who was satisfied with manuscripts. This was probably why İbrahim Müteferrika, who according to Sinan Kunalp was one of the “extraordinary persons” (*personnages hors du commun*) who emerged in Ottoman history from time to time,²² was quite venturesome in establishing the first Ottoman Turkish printing press.

Deux ex machina

Meanwhile, the Ottoman authorities had already been convinced of the permissibility of such an innovation. The Grand Vizier Damad İbrahim Pasha, Mehmed, known as Yirmisekiz Chelebi, who headed the embassy in France in 1720-1721, his son Said Efendi, and the Grand Mufti Yenışehirli Abdullah Efendi all encouraged and supported İbrahim with the official opening of the press in 1727.

The official opening, however, appears to have been beset by obstacles set by the alleged opponents of printing, such as scribes, manuscript copyists and religious men. In order to convince the authorities of the benefit of his undertaking, in 1726 İbrahim wrote a treatise entitled *The Utility of Printing* (*Er-Risāletü'l-müsemma bi-Vesīletü't-Tıbbā'a*). In it İbrahim pleads the case of his printing enterprise by exposing its eventual benefits to the Muslims and the future of the Ottoman state.²³

Besides this treatise, İbrahim also submitted to the Grand Vizier an application for an official permit to run his printing house.²⁴ In the application, probably also dating from 1726, he makes it clear that he intends to print dictionaries as well as books on astronomy, medicine, arithmetic, geometry, and geography. He writes that he has been attempting to print for eight years, while enjoying the support of the Istanbul-based Jewish printer and punch-cutter Jona and the facilities of his printing house. İbrahim adds that for two years he has enjoyed the financial support of Said Efendi and now is applying not only for an official permit, but also for financial aid to be granted by the state. Along with the application Müteferrika presents a few sample pages from the Arabic-Turkish dictionary of Vankulu, which was printed by him, and asks for a permit to print 500 copies.²⁵

The Grand Vizier approved the application,²⁶ and the Grand Mufti then issued an official religious opinion (*fetvā*), permitting printing as a useful way of multiplying written materials.²⁷ Finally, the sultan Ahmed III (1703-1730) signed a special decree (*fermān*), dated Evasit-i Zilkade 1139/the beginning of July 1727, which gave İbrahim and Said Efendi an official permit to run the printing house. (In fact, Said Efendi effectively withdrew in the early 1730s leaving Müteferrika to run the enterprise alone). Four former high-level religious officials were appointed as proofreaders.²⁸

Given these administrative procedures, we might conclude that the official chronology of the opening of the first Ottoman Turkish printing house was not the real chronology of its beginning. In other words, the first Ottoman Turkish printing press received an official permit *post factum*.²⁹ The authorities, however, reached a compromise solution whereby the printing house was only allowed to print books on secular matters, while the crowded army of manuscript copyists was left undisturbed to copy manuscripts predominantly on religious matters. Thus İbrahim Müteferrika received the necessary state support by means of *deux ex machina*, so to speak, as in an old-Greek drama.

Success or failure?

The first Ottoman Turkish printing enterprise would be meaningless if it could not prove successful in terms of commercial results and socio-cultural adoption. However, it is important to define clearly in what sense we understand the term “commercial success”. In principle, it implies not only good sales figures, but also a good turnover on the investments made. If we are speaking about success in a broader sense, we need to consider the printing press as a cultural product to be adopted or rejected by society. Since it is difficult to assess to what extent the net proceeds of the sale covered the investment made by Müteferrika in his printing enterprise, for the time being it seems more reasonable to look at the sales figures, which reflect the printing process as a mutual process, in which both the printer/seller and the reading public/customers are involved. Until very recently the sales figures were unknown, and only the newly found probate inventory of İbrahim Müteferrika provided the number and prices of the unsold copies of the books printed by him.³⁰ Since the initial print number of thirteen out of his sixteen editions is known, an interpretation of the figures of unsold copies, and their juxtaposition with the total number of initial prints made, allows us to gauge the degree of success or failure of Müteferrika’s printing project.

The first work, *Tercümetü’s-Sihâh-i Cevheri*, the celebrated Arabic-Turkish dictionary of Vankulu in two volumes, was printed by Müteferrika in 1729 in 500 copies, of which only one appears in the probate inventory. Thus, in effect the whole edition had been sold, and it clearly was Müteferrika’s bestseller.

He printed the second book, *Tuhfetü’l-kibâr fî Esfâri’l-Bihâr* (*Select Gift in Voyages*), by Katib Çelebi (1729), in 1,000 copies, and the third book, *Târîh-i Seyyâh der Beyân-i Zuhûr-i Ağvâniyân ve Sebeb-i İndihâm-i Binâ-i Devlet-i Şâhân-i Safeviyân* (*Traveler’s Accounts About Afghans’ Appearance and the Reasons for the Decline of the State of the Safavi Shahs*), by Juda Tedeusz Krusiński (1729), in 1,200 copies.

The next three books, *Târîhü’l-Hindî’l-Garbî el-Müsemmâ bi-Hadîs-i Nev* (*History of West Indies Called the New World*), *Târîh-i Tîmûr-i Gürkân* (*History of Tamerlan*), by Nazmizade Efendi, and *Târîhü’l-Misri’l-Cedîd; Târîhü’l-Misri’l-Kadîm* (*History of New Egypt; History of Ancient Egypt*), by Süheyli Efendi, appeared in 1730 in 500-copy editions.

The latter five titles are mentioned in the probate inventory together, probably because of their similar size in quarto. There were 1,114 unsold

copies of these five books. Thus, less than one third of the estimated initial print run of all five books – that is, 3,700 copies – remained unsold, and their commercial success was relatively good.

Of the seventh publication, *Gülşen-i Hulefâ* (*Rosary of Caliphs*), by Nazmizade Efendi (1730), which was also printed in 500 copies, 235 copies remained unsold upon Müteferrika's death.

The next Müteferrika edition, *Grammaire turque ou Méthode courte & facile pour apprendre la langue turque* (*Turkish Grammar or A Concise and Easy Method of Learning the Turkish Language*), by Holderman (1730), was printed in 1,000 copies, and the number of the unsold copies, appearing in the probate inventory, is 84. Thus, this book of Turkish grammar, which was designed to serve mainly as a textbook for students of French, followed the Dictionary of Vankulu in Müteferrika's bestsellers list.

Müteferrika's own treatise, *Usûlü'l-Hikem fî Nizâmi'l-Ümem* (*Reasonable Principles in Public Order*), was the ninth edition of his printing press (1732), with the tenth, *Füyûzât-ı Mıknâsiyye* (*Features of Magnets*), a work on the magnetic features of the earth, compiled and translated by Müteferrika himself (1732). The total print volume of each was 500 copies. The probate inventory lists the latter two books along with the fifteenth edition of *Ahvâl-i Gazavât der Diyâr-i Bosna* (*The State of Religious Wars in the Province of Bosnia*), by Ömer Bosnavi (1741). A possible reason for such a grouping is the similar size of these editions, which were in quarto but smaller than the aforementioned group of five earlier editions. According to the probate inventory, 240 copies of these three books remained unsold. The total print volume of the third book is unknown, but on the assumption that it was also published in 500 copies, we might conclude that of 1,500 copies some 1,260 copies would have been sold, which would have been quite an impressive commercial success.

The next edition, *Kitâb-ı Cihânnümâ* (*The Book Mirror of World*), by Katib Çelebi (1732), was also printed in 500 copies, and Müteferrika's probate inventory lists 249 unsold copies. That is, only half the edition was sold by early 1747.

Takvîmü't-Tevârîh (*Calendar of Histories*), by Katib Çelebi (1733), the thirteenth book to be printed at the first Ottoman printing press, was put out in an edition of 500 copies, albeit 226 remained unsold, as the probate inventory reveals.

The next edition, *Târîh* (*History*), by Na'ima in two volumes, appeared in 1734 in 500 copies. The probate inventory lists a total of 112 unsold

and unbound copies. Thus almost four-fifths of that voluminous book had been sold.

The size of the total print volume of Müteferrika's fourteenth edition, *Tārīh* (History), by Raşid Efendi, printed in three volumes (1741), as well as its appendix (*zeyl*), *Tārīh* (History), by Çelebizade Efendi (1741), is unknown. The latter, having been appended to Raşid Efendi's *Tārīh*, does not appear as part of the probate inventory. The probate inventory indicates 306 (in the document itself the figure is incorrectly given as 311) unbound copies. On the assumption that the two titles were in 500-copy editions, it can be concluded that approximately one third had been sold.

The last, and sixteenth, edition of the first Ottoman printing house was, as the first, also a dictionary. The two volumes of the Persian-Turkish dictionary *Lisānū'l-'Acem* or *Ferheng-i Şu'ūrī* (1742) are the first of Müteferrika's printed books to be listed in his probate inventory. This is probably because the number of unsold copies exceeded the other editions. There were 409 unbound copies in total, and these remained in Müteferrika's inheritance. On the assumption that the total print run for the dictionary was 500 copies, it be estimated that only one fifth had been sold by the beginning of 1747.

As Müteferrika's probate inventory shows, the books he printed sold slowly and with some difficulty. *Omne principium difficile!* Logically, the unsold copies of the earlier editions are less in number than later ones, since they had been in the book market for a longer period of time. Also, at the time of the inventory, there seem to have been a number of books which were yet to be, or were in the process of being prepared for sale, such as in the case of *Kitāb-ı Cihānnümā*, *Tārīh*, by Na'ima, *Tārīh*, by Raşid Efendi, and *Ferheng-i Şu'ūrī*. Most of these copies were unbound (*cildsiz*), unpolished (*mühresiz*), and with no margins around the pages (*cedvālsiz*). The unsold copies of *Gülşen-i Hulefā*, *Tuhfetü'l-kibār*, *Tārīh-i Seyyāh*, *Tārīhü'l-Hindî'l-Garbî*, *Tārīh-i Tīmūr-i Gürkân*, *Tārīhü'l-Mısri'l-Cedīd*; *Tārīhü'l-Mısri'l-Kadīm* and *Takvīmü't-Tevārīh* were sewn (*dikilmiş*), cut (*kesilmiş*), and partly bound. Those books with a low number of unsold copies, such as *Grammaire turque*, *Usūlü'l-Hikem fī Nizāmi'l-Ümem*, *Füyûzât-ı Mýknâtýsiyye*, and *Ahvâl-i Gazavât der Diyâr-i Bosna*, were completely bound (*tamām mücelled*). It seems there was some connection between the demand for some books, and the success of their sale, on the one hand, and the state of their readiness for sale, on the other.

By comparing the number of unsold copies with the volume of the initial print run for each of the Müteferrika editions, the degree of popularity each title enjoyed can be estimated. Among Müteferrika's bestsellers were the Arabic-Turkish dictionary of Vankulu and *Grammaire turque*, followed by titles such as *Usûlü'l-Hikem fî Nizâmi'l-Ümem*, *Füyûzât-ı Mıknâtsıyye*, and *Ahvâl-i Gazavât der Diyâr-i Bosna*, as well as *Târîh* of Na'ima. There are five other titles on history and geography, such as *Tuhfetü'l-kibâr*, *Târîh-i Seyyâh*, *Târîhü'l-Hindi'l-Garbî*, *Târîh-i Tîmûr-i Gürkân*, *Târîhü'l-Mısri'l-Cedîd*, and *Târîhü'l-Mısri'l-Kadîm*, which also seem to have sold well, but since they are inventoried in one group it is difficult to distinguish between them.

Books such as *Gülşen-i Hulefâ*, *Takvîmü't-Tevârîh* and *Kitâb-ı Cihânnümâ* seem to have enjoyed moderate commercial success. And only *Târîh*, by Raşid Efendi, and *Ferheng-i Şu'ûrî*, which had been in the market for a good six years before the death of İbrahim Müteferrika, sold less than 50 percent of their number.

Having examined the number of unsold copies, and the degree of popularity of individual titles, let us now turn to total figures in order to get an overall picture of Müteferrika press results. Estimates vary as to the total number of the books Müteferrika printed, including: 12,000,³¹ 12,500,³² 12,700,³³ and 13,200 copies.³⁴ However, these figures may be overestimations. In my opinion, the safest way to reach a more accurate estimate is to turn to the *Târîh* of Na'ima, which gives the total initial print of twelve Müteferrika press editions (*Grammaire turque* is missing). The figure for these twelve editions can be calculated at 7,200.³⁵ We know from the author of *Grammaire turque* (Holderman) that the total print figure for his grammar book was 1,000 copies.³⁶ Thus, the cumulative figure of initial prints whose number of copies is known (as opposed to estimated) is 8,200. As for the books whose initial print numbers are not known, as I suggested earlier an informed and conservative figure is 500 copies for each of the last three editions. If we add the estimated figure of 1,500 to the figure calculated for those books whose initial print numbers are known, the total number of copies of all the printed books would be 9,700. However, if we take a less conservative estimate of 1,000, instead of 500, for those editions whose initial print numbers is unknown, then the total print run of all Müteferrika's printed books comes to 11,200 copies. While a definitive answer is impossible, we can settle on an average between the conservative figure of 9,700 and the liberal figure of 11,200 and suggest that the total number of printed copies was in the

range of 10,000 to 11,000 copies. If we juxtapose this figure against the number of unsold copies left by Müteferrika upon his death (2,981 unsold copies), as mentioned in the probate inventory, we can infer that 69.3 percent of his editions were sold. These figures clearly show that İbrahim Müteferrika's printing enterprise was far from the fiasco presented by previous studies.

However, these figures need to be qualified and placed in a different context before we make a final judgment. First, not all of the printed books that circulated in the market were actually sold. Some of Müteferrika's copies were presented as gifts by the printer himself or by the Ottoman court to different royal libraries in European countries, such as Austria (1730),³⁷ Russia (1731),³⁸ Sweden (1735),³⁹ and France (1741-42).⁴⁰ However, the number of gifts can not have been so high as to force us to make adjustments to the sales figures already suggested.

It is not sufficient, however, to dwell only on how many copies Müteferrika appears to have sold during his lifetime. We also need to try to find a reasonable explanation and assessment for the sale figures that appear from the exploration of his probate inventory. Since the latter states the estimated prices of the Müteferrika editions after his death, another important issue relates to the observations made by previous scholars, and by Müteferrika's contemporary, De Saussure, about the book prices of the first Ottoman printing press. In any market, and in the book market in particular, price is an important issue with great implications for the success or failure of any commercial enterprise. Indeed, Osman Ersoy demonstrates that the first printed books were far more expensive than manuscripts and were unaffordable, even for most high level Ottoman functionaries.⁴¹ This confirms De Saussure's remark that Müteferrika was unable to sell books due to the exorbitant prices, which prompted the first Ottoman printer to reduce initial prices, sometimes even by half, as Holderman (1730),⁴² Müteferrika himself (1146/1733-34),⁴³ and Edvard Carleson (1735)⁴⁴ pointed out. The discounting of prices on Müteferrika's printed books is also confirmed by the probate inventories of the time.⁴⁵ It is worth noting that the prices of some Müteferrika editions, such as the Dictionary by Vankulu and *Tārīh* by Raşid Efendi, were halved before increasing again in the late 1740s. The discounted prices were probably a commercial policy implemented by Müteferrika in order to improve sales of his books, before later reverting to their initial prices. The relatively high prices of Müteferrika's printed books must have affected sales negatively.

But, besides sales quantities, we need to address another issue in our evaluation of the success of the printing press: the quantity of printed books relative to the market of the reading public. Osman Ersoy believes that İbrahim Müteferrika would not have been very hopeful of any commercial success because the total print volume for his editions was so insignificant – it was not even “a handful of sand thrown to the sea” or “a teaspoon of water given to a sick man dying of thirst.”⁴⁶ To deal with this issue we need to consult the appropriate source documents and apply a reasonable methodology. To date, Turkish researchers of Ottoman printing history have been unreasonably critical. They point out that the total volume of printing of the first Ottoman printed books were much lower than those in Western Europe during the first half of the eighteenth century. Such a synchronic comparison, so to speak, is not very reliable because we are confronted with two identical processes but at different stages of development. We should not forget that Muterferrika’s efforts represented *the very first* introduction of the printing press in Ottoman society, whereas, in other parts of Europe in the same period, the formation process of print culture was already centuries old. In my opinion, a correct and precise comparison would be between the initial stages of European and Ottoman printing, in the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively. This would represent a diachronic comparison between two processes, which developed in different ages and contexts, but which were, in fact, sufficiently similar to warrant comparison. In applying this methodology, we could reach a more objective assessment of the real achievements and importance of the beginnings of Ottoman printing.

In this respect, by comparing average print numbers for Müteferrika’s editions with average total print figures for European incunabula, we see that they are in fact identical. Early printing houses in Europe printed books in runs of 150-1,500 copies, and a considerable number of presses failed after printing only one or two books.⁴⁷ It is therefore not only unfair, but also incorrect to claim that Müteferrika’s total print volumes were insufficient. After all, the total print run of a given book should be relative to the number of potential buyers and readers.

By exploring those probate inventories that include the titles of books we can gain some notion of the Ottoman Muslim reading public in terms of potential reader numbers and the demand for certain books. This approach, however, can also be problematic, for the following reasons. First, the documentary basis for this type of study is selective due to Islamic inheritance laws, which meant that registers did not include the

inventories of deceased persons who left behind minor children, whose eventual heirs applied to the judge to settle disputes over how to share the inheritance, and who left no heirs and whose property had been the subject of seizure by the state treasury (*beytūlmāl*). Second, the inventories only reflect the situation at the time of death, so it is difficult to speculate whether the deceased had previously held more books than was left at the time of his or her death. The book owner might have sold or given a part of his or her books to another person or donated them to a pious foundation (*waqf*). Or the deceased, though there are no books mentioned in his or her probate inventory, might well have been a book owner while alive. Third, the number of book owners found in probate inventories does not account for the number of actual readers, since many potential readers may not themselves have owned books – for example, the students of the Muslim theological schools (*medrese*) who usually made use of the facilities of the public *waqf* libraries. Fourth, only a part of these registers is now preserved in the archives and available for research. Nonetheless, the number of registers available is quite considerable and would need to be explored by one person over the course of a normal lifetime.⁴⁸

Given the peculiarities of this documentary basis, the best researchers can do is to limit the scope of their study in terms of chronology, territory, and studied items, on the one hand, and to gain a reasonable notion about their subject, on the other. With this in mind, I tried to look for book owners in probate inventories from the time of the first Ottoman printing press, limiting my search to citizens of Istanbul who enjoyed *askeri* status (the ruling class who were exempted from taxes) and who left more than three manuscripts or printed books among their possessions when they died. This approach enabled me to reveal the segment of the Ottoman Muslim reading public that was likely to have been the first to see and, eventually, to buy Mütferrika editions, for the following reasons: first, they were living in the same place where the press had been established; second, as *askeri* they were able to afford such relatively expensive books; and third, possessing more than three books, they were probably more interested in books than those with only one, two or three books mentioned in their probate inventories. In the *Askeriye* collection of the Mufti Archives of Istanbul, I was able to track down some 335 deceased with more than three books registered during the period 1137-38/1724-26 – 1160-61/1747-48 – that is, from the time Ottoman Turkish printing first began to the period in which its first stage came to an end.

Of course, this figure does not refer to the real number of persons, who had *askeri* status and who were book owners. Yet another caveat regarding this sample is that the book market was not limited to Istanbul; however, with it being the imperial capital, we would still expect it to have the largest concentration of reading public. That said, the figure of 335 book owners with more than three books found in Istanbul probate inventories implies that, as a whole, both in absolute and relative terms, the Ottoman reading public seems to have been quite limited. De Saussure said that “the literate Turks are not so many in numbers; they are not fond of reading and they do not enjoy reading.”⁴⁹ Holderman made the same observation in 1730.⁵⁰ Even the total print volume for poetry collections, a favorite of the urbane Ottomans, and the textbooks printed in the 1840s and 1850s by the order of Istanbul booksellers (*sahhāf*), was usually only 1,200 copies.⁵¹ It was very rare that total print runs of an edition would reach 2,000 copies.⁵² In this respect, the allegation that Müteferrika’s output was “a handful of sand thrown to the sea” seems incorrect. Given the limited nature of the Istanbul reading market in the eighteenth century, and the relatively low level of demand for books even in the middle of the nineteenth century, Müteferrika’s output was in no way insignificant – in fact, if anything, it was slightly overambitious in view of the potential of the Ottoman book market.

Special attention should be paid to the social and professional profile of the persons who bought Müteferrika’s printed books. A cursory glance at the same Istanbul probate inventories provide us with some insight into this issue, although I came across Müteferrika prints only in sixteen probate inventories. We see that the first printed Ottoman books appear in probate inventories soon after their printing, and clearly their higher initial price did not present a significant problem to all the potential buyers. The same is true also for the probate inventories held in the provinces.⁵³ It is remarkable that those who possessed these printed and expensive books were usually among Ottoman military and were bureaucratic as well as religious functionaries. The latter is significant, since it had been alleged that the religious functionaries were the traditional opponents of the printing press.

It is important, as a next step, to contextualize Müteferrika’s print production in terms of the contemporary reading public’s taste and preferences. The majority of the Istanbul book owners studied, which includes five booksellers, possessed predominantly religious literature, mainly in written Arabic, as well as samples of Oriental poetry in written

Persian, Arabic and Turkish. Of the religious books, the most popular were normally the Qur'an, a small collection of some of the most popular Qur'anic chapters (*sura*) entitled *En'ām-i Şerīf* after the *sura En'ām* (*The Camel*), the religious poem *Muhammediye*, written by Yazıcıoğlu Mehmed in 1444 which describes the life of the prophet Muhammad, as well as *Vasiyetnâme* of Mehmed Birgivi (sixteenth century), which presents a summary of the main dogmas of Islam and the religious practice it requires. The latter two writings were from Ottoman Turkish authors, and their popularity was largely due to the easily understandable vernacular language they used. As for books on history and geography, the most popular were again those related to religion, such as the *History* of al-Tabari, which relates the life of Muhammad and the emergence and development of Muslim statehood,⁵⁴ and travelogues written by pilgrims to Mecca.⁵⁵ Old Persian epics such as *Şāhnāme* and *Hamzanāme* also featured among the favorite books. In fact, dictionaries were very seldom listed in these inventories, even in those of the five booksellers I came across while exploring the archives. And the reading public itself comprised mainly religious men and students undergoing theological education, administrative and military officials, and sometimes traders and craftsmen, with men prevailing over women to a considerably degree.

Given this reading public and its taste, İbrahim Müteferrika clearly filled a niche by printing the first dictionaries, while Vankulu's Arabic-Turkish redaction of *Sihāh* unsurprisingly became a bestseller. But in his editing policy Müteferrika was much more inclined to print historical and geographical books: nine of the sixteen editions are related to history, a further two combine historical and geographical accounts (*Tuhfet* and *History of West Indies*), while the most eminent output of his printing house was Katib Çelebi's geographical work, *Mirror of World*. Müteferrika, however, printed texts that did not follow the traditional religious or epical trend of historical and geographical writing, but which addressed topics that related to the concerns of his contemporaries. By printing Ottoman maritime history or the political history of Persia, the Caliphate, and the Ottoman Empire in more recent times, as well as geographical books that significantly broadened the horizons of the Ottoman elite, Müteferrika was attempting not to be moralizing, in a religious sense, or entertaining, but, rather, to be useful to those involved in the government and didactic insofar as historical developments are full of lessons. Indeed, as William Watson said, İbrahim's printing philosophy seems to have been completely utilitarian.⁵⁶

On the other hand, it is noteworthy how, except for one edition (*Calendar of Histories*, written in Persian), all the books printed by Müteferrika were written in Ottoman Turkish and were thus far more intelligible by their potential readers. These books could be read not only by Muslims but also by Turkish-speaking non-Muslims. This meant that the printer had in effect expanded the boundaries of the traditional Ottoman Muslim reading public. Moreover, he challenged the traditional Muslim concept of knowledge and learning, which placed emphasis on religious matters based on the belief that the earthly life was only a preparatory stage of the eternal post-mortal being. Accordingly, those branches of learning which provided secular and utilitarian knowledge were considered far more insignificant than religious learning and education.⁵⁷

So, to repeat, was the first Ottoman printing press a success or failure? İbrahim Müteferrika's probate inventory leaves no impression that he failed in his undertaking, though the unsold copies of books printed by him constitute a large part of his assets: this is probably a normal situation for a tradesman and an enterprising person like him. By the end of his life İbrahim Müteferrika had succeeded in selling around 70 percent of the books he had printed: this was quite a satisfactory result for his enterprise. At any rate, his fate seems to have been luckier than that of Johann Gutenberg, who lost his printing house after falling into debt with his sponsor Johann Fust. As Sigfrid Steinberg remarked, most early European printers seem to have been better printers than businessmen. They did not enjoy significant commercial successes because they were unaware of the main problem in printing: printing requires significant investments to be made in advance, and the turnover is slow.⁵⁸ In fact, De Saussure appears to have been aware of this problem when he expressed his concerns that the Müteferrika enterprise would cease with the printer's death due to the impatience and lack of enthusiasm of "the Turks" for delayed, long-term returns.⁵⁹

Print culture versus script culture: the long wait

Sigfrid Steinberg's remark in fact gives rise to the following question: if we accept that the first Ottoman Turkish printing enterprise was a success, rather than a commercial fiasco, why then did it cease immediately after Müteferrika's death, only being revived sporadically

for one edition in the mid-1750s, before returning to operate in 1784 in a more stable way? Are previous studies incorrect in claiming that the first Ottoman Turkish printing press was a failure rather than a success? The hitherto negative assessments of Müteferrika's printing enterprise were possibly due to the view that the printing innovation was a sweeping revolution that took place in a short period of time. It was Elizabeth Eisenstein, the prominent researcher in the field of book history, who put forth the idea that the printing press was an "agent of change" that resulted in a "communications revolution" and due to which the traditional script culture was replaced by the new print culture.⁶⁰ In another of her studies, published twice under different titles, she explains how her particular notion of "revolution" is inspired by Raymond Williams's oxymoronic expression "long revolution"⁶¹ in a sense that it is not about fast change as a result of a single act, but about a continuous but irreversible process, whose effects become visible in the course of its development.⁶² Not everyone, however, shares Eisenstein's "revolution" theory. Robert A. Houston, for example, agrees with Eisenstein that printing undoubtedly changed the way of thinking and played an indirect role in economic, social and political development in early modern Europe (1500-1800), but he qualifies Eisenstein's thesis by stating that the printing press's "impact was neither immediate, nor direct, nor certain." The changes, he continues, were slow and contingent, depending on various social, economic and political contexts, and printing "was arguably not fully developed until the eighteenth century."⁶³ Jacques le Goff also stresses how, upon its introduction in Europe, the printing press only met the needs of the literate elite, and it was not until the Counter-Reformation that this technology was used to educate the public.⁶⁴ And Brian Richardson concludes: "The transition from manuscript to printed book was in some respects, then, a process of evolution."⁶⁵ Indeed, the latest scholarship in book history is attempting to reevaluate Eisenstein's theory in radical⁶⁶ or moderate ways,⁶⁷ criticizing her non-contextualized approach, in which the advent of printing with movable type in itself created a print culture, and insisting that when studied within a given socio-cultural context it can be seen that manuscript copying and printing coexisted or were competing technologies until well into the eighteenth century.

In terms of printing in the world of Islam, most scholars are inclined to think that the same "print revolution" should have happened,⁶⁸ although there are exceptions in which the printing press gave rise to a cultural

“evolution” in the Ottoman Empire or, in broader terms, in the world of Islam.⁶⁹ So, was Mütferrika’s printing enterprise an “agent of change” in the world of Islam? Previous scholarship has tended to answer this question in the negative, since he did not sell the entire number of copies he printed, and since his enterprise was suspended after his death. But, in my opinion, İbrahim Mütferrika was indeed an “agent of change”, though not an “agent of *immediate* change”.

The transition from scribal to print culture was a slow, gradual and arduous process. In Brian Richardson’s words, old habits die hard.⁷⁰ But at what stage in the development of printing can we claim that a certain print culture has already formed? We need a definition of print culture in order to fix the time of its real domination over scribal culture. The traditional so-called “print-culture scholarship” is satisfied with pointing out that as soon printing technology with movable type was introduced the spread of printed books caused profound transformations in all social spheres. But is a printing press itself all that is required to speak about print culture? A significant sign of a developed and dominating print culture is probably the existence of a social conviction of the necessity of printed “agents” of knowledge and information. The establishment of a printing house, then, is certainly a starting point in the formation of print culture. And, within different social contexts the latter could overcome the strong traditional scribal culture in the shorter or longer term.

A good illustration of this is given by the case of Greek-Orthodox printing, which started in the sixteenth century thanks to a number of printing houses beyond the borders of the Ottoman Empire, and one founded by the patriarch himself (Kyrillos Lukaris) and the priest Nikodimos Metaksas in Istanbul in 1627, which nonetheless stopped functioning at the beginning of 1628. However, until well into the nineteenth century, Greek monasteries, schools and other cultural institutions continued copying theological books by hand since the locals considered the books, printed in Western Europe, to be corrupted with Catholic interpretations.⁷¹ At the turn of the nineteenth century, Greek intellectuals held controversial attitudes towards printing. In 1783, D. Katardzis (d. 1807) called on Greek calligraphers to “resurrect” and plead for the active use of manuscripts using the example of the Ottomans, who at the time had no printing house, while others, like Y. Misiadakas (d. c. 1800) and A. Korais (d. 1833), insisted on printed books.⁷² So, given these conflicting opinions, can we claim that Greek print culture proved

itself towards the beginning of the nineteenth century? It seems a lot of patience is required when considering a positive answer. In other words, the formation of print culture must be considered a long-term process, which would take less or much more time in different socio-cultural contexts.

As for the transition from scribal to print culture within the Turkish-Muslim segment of Ottoman society, its long print revolution – or evolution – was preceded by a *long delay* or *wait*. Printing in Western Europe began in the mid-fifteenth century. Non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, such as Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Orthodox Slavs, Arabic-speaking and Turkic-speaking Christians, established their own printing presses to print predominantly religious texts during the late fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and early eighteenth centuries, but the first Ottoman-Muslim printing enterprise was launched only in the third decade of the eighteenth century.

How can we explain such a delay? Let us first turn to their contemporaries' accounts. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century western travelers believed that the Ottoman reluctance to adopt the printing technology was due to the strong manuscript tradition and the resistance of the Ottoman copyists and calligraphers.

Ogier Ghiselin Busbecq (1522-1592), the Austrian envoy to the Ottoman Empire, wrote in his account of his second stay in Istanbul during the period 1555-1562 that the Turks adopted from Europe neither the printing press nor the clock towers because of their firm conviction that the former would be considered offensive to the holy texts, while the latter would harm the service of the *müezzins* in charge of calling the faithful to religious service by crying from the minaret.⁷³ Clearly it was unusual for any Muslim to see the Qur'an in printed form, although some western Qur'anic prints already existed in the sixteenth century, simply because the Qur'an was considered the ultimate divine revelation as fixed in manuscript form. Neither its sacred text nor its sacred form could be changed. For Muslims the Qur'an is eternal, and every word between its two covers is literally divine.⁷⁴ As Thomas Francis Carter said, it was clearly the conservative attitude that fed the Muslim bias against printing: since the Qur'an was written in manuscript form, it should be always reproduced by hand.⁷⁵

This explanation might sound sensible. But what then of the late nineteenth-century findings in the Fayyum oasis in Egypt of fragments of block printed texts in Arabic, dating mostly from the late-thirteenth

century, the earliest of which dating to the tenth century and the rule of the Muslim dynasty Fatimi (909–1171)? Moreover, among these block prints there is also a printed example, containing Qur’anic verses.⁷⁶ Ibn al-Abar (1199–1260), on the other hand, recounts how, during the reign of the Muslim ruler of Andalusia (Muslim Spain), Abd ar-Rahman an-Nasir (912–961) official administrative documentation in printed form was sent to the provincial governors.⁷⁷ These findings imply that block printing was known and used to a certain extent in the Arabic Muslim states in Egypt and Andalusia from the tenth to thirteenth centuries, but did not develop later, probably due to a lack of efficiency.

As to printing with movable type, which was invented in Europe in the mid-fifteenth century, the first sixteenth-century examples of Arabic texts printed in Europe proved the imperfectness of the technology, rather than its utility, in terms of the many orthographical and grammatical errors in the western printed versions of the Qur’an and Avicenna’s *Canon of Medicine*.⁷⁸ The imperfectness of these examples was due to the lack of capable punch-cutters of Arabic characters as well as proficient proofreaders.⁷⁹ It appears that the poor quality of the layout of these editions was responsible for lower number of sales than expected. In his preface to Herbelot de Mollenville’s *Oriental Library*, which was printed in France in 1697, Antoine Galland, who was in Istanbul in 1672-73,⁸⁰ relates how Rome-based Medici Press’s late sixteenth-century editions of Arabic texts of Avicenna (medicine), Euclid (geometry) and al-Idrisi (geography) were printed with the intention of achieving full sales in the Middle East, but did not prove a commercial success because Muslims preferred manuscripts to printed books, despite the higher price.⁸¹ Indeed, according to an eighteenth-century inventory of prints by the Medici Press, which are stored in wardrobes in the Palazzo Vecchio in Rome, 810 copies of the Avicenna, 1,967 of the Euclid, and 1,129 of the Idrisi still remained unsold.⁸²

Any duplication of the Qur’an in particular was expected to be faithful to the adopted norm in terms of contents and orthography, not only because it was considered divine revelation, but also because, since the dawn of Islam, the Holy Book has been recommended for reading and learning off by heart by every Muslim, both men and women.⁸³ This shows that the copying of the Qur’an was of vital importance for its spreading among the whole Muslim community. By contrast, in Christendom the Church was opposed on principle to direct and unlimited widespread access to the Bible by the common people, the message of the Scriptures being

disseminated to them only through the learned ecclesiastical hierarchy. This is why the Church was highly concerned about the spread of vernacular Bibles, even before the invention of print in Europe, not to speak of the printed versions of the Bible, whose text was corrupted due to some disadvantages of the printing technology itself.⁸⁴ In this respect, duplication of the Qur'an required strict faithfulness to the norm, since it would be read and learned not only by educated Muslim religious functionaries, but also by the public. Moreover, according to the traditional Islamic concept, the education of children should start with the reading and learning of the Qur'an off by heart.⁸⁵ Accordingly, the main issue was the correctness of the text itself, and the mode of duplication was required to implement this irrevocable condition. Essentially, since the mid-fifteenth century, manuscript copying and printing with movable type had been competing modes of duplication, with the latter improving only over the course of time.

Other seventeenth-century Western travelers tended to be more subjective, claiming that the resistance of the copyists and calligraphers and the obstacles set by religious men and the authorities were the main reason for the delay of Ottoman printing. In his book on the Ottoman Empire, which was published in 1668, Paul Ricaut claims that printing was prohibited because it would aid learning and thus become a threat to the tyrannical Ottoman rule, as well as depriving numerous scribes from a means of living.⁸⁶ In his book on Turkish literature, printed in 1688, G. Donado claims that the Ottoman sultans banned printing in order to maintain the source of living for the manuscript copyists, and that the Turks considered printing to be a Christian invention and printed books heretic, albeit this negative attitude was never explicitly admitted.⁸⁷ On the other hand, Count de Marsigli, who spent eleven months in Istanbul in 1679-1680, visiting the Ottoman capital again in 1692, relates in a book on the military state of the empire, printed in 1732, that the Turks did not use printing because of a prohibition, but because of the concern for the livelihood of the numerous copyists and calligraphers.⁸⁸

However, no documentary evidence has come to light so far to confirm the allegations that the Ottomans were negatively inclined toward printing. Some higher Muslim religious officials possessed copies of the western editions of Arabic texts. Zeynulabidin son of Halil, kadi of Galata, for example, possessed a Medici Press copy of Avicenna's *Canon of Medicine* (1593), as a note in the margin (dated 1049/1639-40) on the title page reveals.⁸⁹ Two other identical notes in the margin on the same page

reveal that a certain El-hac Mehmed al-Garbi (a nickname implying a western origin) bought the copy in 1107/1695-96 from the inheritance of the late El-Hac Mahmud, who was mufti of Trabzon.⁹⁰

Two prominent seventeenth-century Ottoman writers, İbrahim Peçevi (1574-before 1649) and Katib Çelebi (1609-1657), deal in brief with the printing technology. In his *History* the former relates the advent and development of European printing, emphasizing that printing of one thousand copies of a book was easier than copying a single manuscript.⁹¹ In his famous *Mirror of World* the latter mentions how the Chinese had been acquainted with the art of printing since ancient times.⁹² But, as Orhan Koloğlu points out, Katib Çelebi did not recommend the art to the Ottomans themselves.⁹³ İbrahim Peçevi, for his part, also remained silent.

The lack of any such recommendations leaves the impression that the Ottomans did not feel the need for printing. As Rifaat Ali Abou-el-Haj and Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu have pointed out, the Ottoman elite was in a permanent contact with Europe and no “iron curtain” existed to prevent the adoption of new ideas and cultural patterns from their European counterparts; adoption was made only when really needed.⁹⁴

According to certain late eighteenth-century western authors of histories or memories of the Ottoman state, such as Abbot Mignon (1773),⁹⁵ Elias Abesci (1784),⁹⁶ and François de Tott (1786),⁹⁷ the guild of copyists and calligraphers and the theologians were responsible for the cessation of Ottoman printing after Müteferrika’s death. Others, however, hold a different view. Giambatista Toderini, for example, who spent four and a half years in Istanbul during the period 1781-86 and wrote three volumes on Turkish literature and writing culture, denies that it was the opposition of the copyists that brought the first Ottoman printing enterprise to an end, and points out that it would not have been able to threaten their livelihood because it did not print religious books. According to Toderini, the only reason was the death of İbrahim Müteferrika himself.⁹⁸ As a contemporary of Toderini, Mouradgea D’Ohsson gives the same view in his *Tableau général de l’Empire Ottoman*:⁹⁹ the vitality of the first Ottoman printing press depended entirely on the efforts and activity of its founder. As Toderini stated metaphorically, Müteferrika was the “soul” of the press.¹⁰⁰ Or, in Gibb and Bowen’s ingenious simile, the first Ottoman printing house was in a sense a “one-man show”.¹⁰¹

Another late eighteenth-century western traveler, Carsten Niebuhr, claims, however, that neither the theologians, nor the copyists and scribes hindered the use of printing technology in the Arabic countries, as believed

in Europe. He believes İbrahim Müteferrika's printing house was closed down because manuscripts were still surpassing in their elegance the texts printed with Arabic letters.¹⁰² Indeed, even towards the close of the nineteenth century, as Lucie Garnett explains, the Turks preferred elegant manuscripts to printed books, and the copying of manuscripts was still practiced.¹⁰³ Niebuhr's contemporary, François de Tott, also relates how Müteferrika's press could not achieve perfection in "liaisons", it was despised, and Ybrahim closed the printing shop ("la Typographie ne pouvait atteindre à la perfection des liaisons; on la méprisa, İbrahim ferma boutique").¹⁰⁴ Under "liaisons" François de Tott must have meant the liaisons between the Arabic type, which had always been problematic in printing with movable type. Ubucini also draws attention to the same problem, particularly in terms of competition with the calligraphically executed manuscripts.¹⁰⁵

Indeed, although Müteferrika succeeded in printing books with type face that was much more legible and pleasing than the previous western editions of texts in Arabic, the liaisons between the types in the books he printed are not always perfect and sometimes the linking is visually missing, possibly due to the uncontrollable movement of type during printing (see Figure 1). This is far more pronounced in later editions, where the type seem to be already spoiled. The problem is that printing with Arabic letters creates great difficulties, not found in printing the Latin, Greek, Armenian, Hebrew, and Cyrillic alphabets, or even Chinese hieroglyphs. In fact, in evaluating Müteferrika's enterprise, previous scholarship has paid less attention to this aspect of printing.¹⁰⁶ Arabic, and its Persian and Ottoman Turkish versions respectively, are cursive scripts – that is, most letters are linked to the preceding and following ones. As a result they have four different forms: one main and three other forms, depending on the position in the word. Thus, printing in Arabic is much more difficult and, in a sense, less practical: first, because it requires far more forms than the other scripts; and second, because these forms need to link perfectly.¹⁰⁷ This means the typesetting process takes far longer, and the result is not always satisfactory, leaving little room for claims that printing is a better way of duplicating texts than copying by hand. Calligraphy is a supreme Islamic art¹⁰⁸ that makes success for printing technology a hard task. When lithography was invented in the late eighteenth century, and later introduced to the world of Islam, it proved far more satisfying to the Muslim reading public on esthetic grounds.¹⁰⁹

It appears, therefore, that technological difficulties made the world of Islam reluctant about any immediate or final adoption of printing technology with movable type, and it was only personal effort, as in the case of Müteferrika, and not clear socio-cultural demand, that called Muslim printing into being. It is probable that printing with movable type was the first European invention to be adopted by the Ottomans solely due to the personal aspirations of Müteferrika. In fact, unlike many other innovations of European origin – for example, cannons and firearms – the Ottomans apparently had no need or wish to adopt the printing press. However, once introduced, it did not fail to draw attention and left behind its traces in Ottoman cultural history.

İbrahim Müteferrika's printing enterprise was only possible because he was, as seems likely, well skilled in the art of European print culture and sufficiently motivated to undertake a similar venture in an Ottoman milieu, where calligraphy was adored and printing considered unsuited to the specifics of the Arabic alphabet. In fact, the Ottomans relied upon such agents of change, which came from beyond their borders, until well into the nineteenth century: for example, Topçu Urban, who made cannons for the Ottomans during the reign of Sultan Mehmed II (1451–1481); İbrahim Müteferrika, who introduced printing technology; Clod de Bonneval, who converted and took the name of Ahmed Pasha and went on to train the Ottoman artilleryists; all were educated border crossers who became "agents of change" in a state that was inward-looking except for its conquest aspirations. And it was during the Tulip Age (1718-1730) that for the first time long-term Ottoman embassies were sent to France and Persia, although permanent Ottoman embassies were established only in 1793.¹¹⁰ From that time on, the Ottoman state gradually became more outward-looking, more interested in developments outside its borders, and its own representatives were charged to observe these developments and operate as "agents of change", enabling the adoption or adaptation of some of them in the Ottoman milieu. And it was not only diplomats, but also Ottoman students who were sent to Europe to acquire Western knowledge and apply it on their return in the homeland.¹¹¹

Probably that is why the Ottomans waited too long for their Godot. As Samuel Beckett's famous play "Waiting for Godot" implies, chance is an underlying factor of human existence and, as a direct result of this, time is meaningless.¹¹² In this sense it was a matter of chance that İbrahim Müteferrika, who, to repeat Sinan Kunalp's words, as one of the "extraordinary persons" who emerge in Ottoman history from time to

time, appeared during the first half of the eighteenth century (a period in Ottoman history when such “eccentric” enterprises such as a printing press seem to have been quite welcome) and took the first steps in the formation of Ottoman print culture.

These first steps, however, were uncertain and hesitant as far as the reading public was concerned. As in late fifteenth-century European practice,¹¹³ during the second half of the eighteenth century some of the first Ottoman printed books were also copied by hand,¹¹⁴ and missing pages from printed copies were recovered from their hand-written copies.¹¹⁵

In fact, the very act of copying a printed text by hand implies the need of duplication, and once introduced printing technology offered an alternative that was not disregarded, even though Ottoman printing ceased after Müteferrika’s death at the beginning of 1747 and revived only for the second edition of the Vankulu dictionary in 1755-1756. For example, in his *Mecmua*, a treatise presented to the Sultan Abdulhamid I (1774-1789), a member of the Ottoman bureaucracy, Penah Süleyman Efendi, called for printing to be revived for administrative and educational purposes. However, it was not suggested that the printing house print religious texts, such as the Qur’an and the Hadiths.¹¹⁶ Ottoman printing was finally revived in 1784, at the initiative of the sultan himself.

In his printing enterprise, İbrahim Müteferrika introduced some *ad hoc* layout changes, while paying tribute to the strong scribal culture. Early European printers, for example, strove to print books with a layout as similar to the manuscripts as possible. Müteferrika was no exception. Nonetheless, the first eight books he printed had no decoration (*unvan* or *serlevha*) on the introducing page, a page normally decorated in manuscripts.¹¹⁷ But as soon as a book printed by Muteferika had been bought it was illuminated by hand, as a number of preserved copies clearly show (see Figure 2).¹¹⁸ During these times, the book, whether in manuscript or printed form, was considered an organic combination of a text and a physical form – that is, the codex, which constituted the “body” or the “home” of the writing itself. Apart from the binding, the text on each page was framed by margins, and the introducing page was illuminated by ornamentation resembling the gates of monumental public buildings from the world of Islam (see Figure 3).¹¹⁹ These ornamentations suggested that the reader, when entering a given book, was entering a building. Müteferrika apparently noticed that his customers tended to have their printed copies illuminated, and as of the ninth edition

(*Usūlū'l-Hikem fī Nizāmi'l-Ümem*, 1732) he began printing ornamentation on the introducing page (see Figure 4).¹²⁰ However, customers would have the ornamentation segments colored by hand, as we see in some of the preserved copies.¹²¹ Another change – this time in a break with manuscript tradition – can be seen in the last three Muteferika editions in the inclusion of a quasi-title page. It was a quasi-title page, because its layout resembled a title page, but there was no title printed on it. Instead, it featured the honorable titles (*elkāb*) of the sultan, the Grand Vizier and the Grand Mufti of the time, as well as the place and year of printing (see Figure 5).


In fact, even later Ottoman printed books remained more or less faithful to the traditional manuscript layout, and it is for this reason that Meral Alpay considers all Ottoman books printed in Arabic script incunabular.¹²²

So, at what time can we speak of a developed Ottoman print culture? Jale Baysal suggests that an important step was taken in 1803, when for the first time a religious book, Birgivi's *Vasiyetnâme*, was printed in Istanbul and the reading public could read this popular text in printed form.¹²³ Finally, she also claims that during the period 1869-1875, when the first Ottoman Turkish novels and plays were being written and printed, printing answered adequately to the expectations and tastes of the Muslim reading public, by then being "already accepted by the society".¹²⁴ Moreover, during the same period, another major step taken in Ottoman printing proved irreversible: the printing of the Qur'an itself. It was first printed lithographically in 1871, and then with movable type in 1874.¹²⁵ It was apparently only in the 1870s that the Muslim part of Ottoman society was prepared to see its holy text in printed form, having waited a long time to be persuaded of the advantages of printing technology. An insight into the motives behind the decision to print the Qur'an is given in *History*, written by the prominent nineteenth-century Ottoman intellectual Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (1822-1895). In a historical discourse he points out that İbrahim Müteferrika and Said Efendi had obtained a permit to print books (excepting religious texts). He believes the printing of religious texts was considered a threat to their sacredness, as also believed by the aforementioned Busbecq in the sixteenth century, though this time because of the pressure applied to the sheets themselves. However, he adds, the bookbinders bind the Qur'an exactly in the same way, by pressing the codex, and place an ornamental stamp on the cover by striking the seal. And if that was not considered blasphemy (since the sacredness of the text remained well preserved), then it was decided that

printing of religious books was similarly not blasphemy. Thus the printing of religious texts began – first of all with the treatises for students of Muslim theology and jurisprudence.¹²⁶ It seems that during the 1870s Ottoman print culture was sufficiently developed and the Muslim reading public accepted the first Ottoman printed versions of the Qur'an as better than earlier West-European Qur'anic prints. At the very least, the 1878 probate inventory of a certain Hadice, the daughter of Hacı Ömer Ağa, from Salonica, which included two printed Qur'ans,¹²⁷ suggests that printing was no longer considered *advocatis diaboli* – as was still the case in 1844, for example, when Charles White noted that Istanbul booksellers believed manuscript copyists deserved to enter paradise while the printing press was made of the poisonous plant *zakkum*.¹²⁸

However, there was another striking sign that showed that the 1870s were indeed a turning point in the development of Ottoman print culture. Intellectuals like Münif Pasha (1830-1910) and Celal Nuri were concerned that printing with movable type did not quite meet the specificities of the Arabic script.¹²⁹ But this did not mean that the Ottomans should desist from using movable type. In 1879, therefore, the Council of Public Education (*Meclis-i Maarif-i Umumiye*) appointed a special committee to revise the Arabic script by making it incursive in order to facilitate the printing process. However, the committee proved unsuccessful.¹³⁰ Later, in 1914, the so-called "Enver Pasha orthography" (*Enver Pâşâ imlâsı*) divided the Arabic characters and some print testing was performed.¹³¹ Finally, however, the introduction in 1928 of Turkish version of the Latin script solved all these problems.¹³²

In conclusion, by the 1870s the Ottomans appear to have been already quite accustomed to having their books printed, and clearly intended to solve the dilemma of the cursive Arabic script (generally in use from the seventh century onwards) and printing with movable type (which only began in the 1720s) in favor of the latter. Was this not a revolutionary intention, the result of an evolution of mind that lasted overall for a century and a half?



1. *Usūlū'l-Hikem fī Nizāmi'l-Ümem* (1732).
Courtesy of the National Library, Sofia.



2. *Tercümetü's-Sihāh-i Cevheri* (1729).
Courtesy of the National Library, Sofia.



3. *Takvīmü kvīmū't-Tevārīh* (1733); *Süleymaniye Mosque*, Istanbul (16th century). Courtesy of the National Library, Sofia.

Photo by Julian Dinkov.



4. *Usūl'ī-Hikem fī Nizāmi'l-Ümem* (1732).
 Courtesy of the National Library, Sofia.

5. *Tārīh-i Rāşid Efendi* (1741).

Courtesy of the National Library, Sofia.

NOTES

- ¹ For the Tulip Age, see for example: HEINZ, Wilhelm, "Die kultur der Tulpenzeit des Osmanischen Reiches", in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 61, 1967, 62–116; EVIN, Ahmet Ö., "The Tulip Age and the Definitions of 'Westernization'," in *Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071-1920), Papers Presented to the First International Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey (Ankara: Hacettepe University, July 11-13, 1977)*, Meteksan, Ankara, 1980, 131-145; GÖÇEK, Fatma Müge, *East Encounters West: France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century*, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford, 1987, 72-81; ZILFI, Madeline C., "Women and Society in the Tulip Era, 1718-1730", in *Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History* (ed. A. el-A. Sonbol), Syracuse University Press, 1996, 290–303.
- ² See PEKER, Ali Uzay, "Western Influences on the Ottoman Empire and Occidentalism in the Architecture of Istanbul", in *Eighteenth-Century Life*, 26/3, 2002, 139-163.
- ³ GÖÇEK, Fatma Müge, *East Encounters West*, 81.
- ⁴ ABOU-EL-HAJ, Rifaat Ali, *Formation of the Modern State. The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1991, 67.
- ⁵ İstanbul Müftülüğü Şeriye Sicilleri (further on İMŞS): Kismet-i Askeriye Mahkemesi, Defter 98, fol. 39a – 40b.
- ⁶ THÁLY, Coloman de (ed.), *Lettres de Turquie (1730–1739) et Notices (1740) de César de Saussure*, Budapest, 1909, 93–94.
- ⁷ DUVERDIER, G  rald, "Savary de Br  ves et Ibrahim M  teferrika: deux dromans culturels    l'origine de l'imprimerie turque", in *Bulletin du Bibliophile*, 3, 1987, 322–359.
- ⁸ NECAT  O  LU, Halil, *Matbaacı İbr  h  m-i M  teferrika ve Ris  le-i İsl  miye*, Ankara, 1982, 6.
- ⁹ K  PECZI, B  la (ed.), *History of Transylvania*, Akad  miai Kiad  , Budapest, 1989, 290.
- ¹⁰ BERKES, Niyazi, "  lk T  rk Matbaası Kurucusunun Din   ve Fikr   Kimli  i", in *Belleten*, XXVI/104, 1962, 715-737; BERKES, Niyazi, "İbrahim M  teferrika", in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, vol. III (ed. B. Lewis, V. L. M  nage, C. Pellat, J. Schacht), E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1971, 996–998.
- ¹¹ NECAT  O  LU, Halil, *Matbaacı İbr  h  m-i M  teferrika ve Ris  le-i İsl  miye*, 13-14, 57-58.
- ¹² BERKES, Niyazi, "104 Sayılı Belleten'de   ıkan '  lk T  rk Matbaası Kurucusunun Din   ve Fikr   Kimli  i' Adlı Yazı İ  in Bir Not", in *Belleten*, XXVIII/109, 1964, 183.
- ¹³ İMŞS: Kismet-i Askeriye Mahkemesi, Defter 98, fol. 39a-40a.
- ¹⁴ Details of the biography of İbrahim M  teferrika are provided in: HALASI-KUN, Tubor, "İbrahim M  teferrika", in *İsl  m Ansiklopedisi*, vol. V-2, MEB, İstanbul,

- 1950, 896-900; BERKES, Niyazi, "İbrahim Müteferrika"; AFYONCU, Erhan, "İbrâhim Müteferrika", in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 21, TDV, İstanbul, 2000, 324-327; AFYONCU, Erhan, "İlk Türk Matbaasının Kurucusu Hakkında Yeni Bilgiler", in *Belleten*, LXV/243, 2001, 607-622.
- 15 There are some controversial views, according to which Müteferrika died in 1745, 1746 or 1747. See the latest articles on this issue: BEYDİLLİ, Kemal, "Müteferrika ve Osmanlı Matbaası. 18. Yüzyılda İstanbul'da Kitabiyat", in *Toplumsal Tarih*, 128, 2004, 44-52; AFYONCU, Erhan, "İbrahim Müteferrika'nın Yeni Yayınlanan Terekesi ve Ölüm Tarihi Üzerine", in *Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 15, 2004, 349-362.
- 16 DUVERDIER, G rald, "Savary de Br ves et İbrahim M teferrika".
- 17 SUNGU İhsan, "İlk T rk Matbaasına Dair Yeni Vesikalar", in *Hayat*, III/73, 1928, 10; GER EK, Selim N zhet, *T rk Matbaacılıđı, I. M teferrika Matbaası*, M V, İstanbul, 1939, 34-35; ERSOY, Osman, *T rkiye'ye Matbaanın Giri i ve İlk Basılan Eserler*, A.  . Dil ve Tarih-Cođrafya Fak ltesi, Ankara, 1959, 31, 37.
- 18 GER EK, Selim N zhet, *T rk Matbaacılıđı*, 35-38; ERSOY, Osman, *T rkiye'ye Matbaanın Giri i*, 37; EHRENSV RD, Ulla, ABRAHAMOWITZ, Zygmunt, "Two Maps Printed by İbrahim M teferrika in 1724/25 and 1729/30", in *Svenska Forskningsinstitutet i Istanbul Meddelanden*, 15, 1990, 46-66.
- 19 HAIMAN, G., *Nicholas Kis: A Hungarian Punch-cutter and Printer 1650-1702*, Akad miai Kiad , Budapest, 1983.
- 20 FAROQHI, Suraiya, *Subjects of the Sultan, Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire*, I. B. Tauris, London-New York, 2000, 92-94.
- 21 REICHMUTH, Stefan, "Islamic Reformist Discourse in the Tulip Period (1718-30): İbrahim M teferrika and His Arguments for Printing", in *International Congress on Learning and Education in the Ottoman World, Istanbul, 12-15 April 1999* (ed. A.  aksu), IRCICA, İstanbul, 2001, 153.
- 22 KUNERALP, Sinan, "Les d buts de l'imprimerie   Istanbul au XVIII  si cle", in *Turquie: Livres d'hier, livres d'aujourd'hui* (ed. P. Dumont), Centre de recherche sur la Civilisation ottomane et le domaine turc contemporain Universit  des Sciences Humaines -  ditions ISIS, Strasbourg-Istanbul, 1992, 3.
- 23 The text is presented in transcribed form in: KUT, Turgut, T RE, Fatma (ed.), *Yazmadan Basmaya: M teferrika, M hendishane,  sk dar*, Yapı ve Kredi Bankası, İstanbul, 1996, 34; Translation in English is provided in: ATIYEH, George N. (ed.), *The Book in the Islamic World: The Written Word and Communication in the Middle East*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1995, 286-292. For the French translation see: OMONT, H., "Documents sur l'imprimerie   Constantinople au XVIII  si cle", in *Revue des Biblioth ques*, V, 1895, 193-200.
- 24 SUNGU, İhsan, "İlk T rk Matbaasına Dair Yeni Vesikalar", 11-13.

- ²⁵ See: ERTUĞ, Hasan R., *Basın ve Yayın Hareketleri Tarihi*, Yenilik Basımevi, İstanbul, 1970, 96-101.
- ²⁶ SUNGU, İhsan, "İlk Türk Matbaasına Dair Yeni Vesikalar", 11; GERÇEK, Selim Nüzhet, *Türk Matbaacılığı*, 52-57. The text is presented in transcribed form in: REFİK, Ahmed, *Hicrî Onikinci Asır'da İstanbul Hayatı (1100-1200) [Onikinci Asr-ı Hicrî'de İstanbul Hayatı (1689-1785)]*, Enderun Kitapevi, İstanbul, 1988, 91-94.
- ²⁷ The text is presented in transcribed form in: ŞEN, Adil, *İbrahim Müteferrika ve Usûlü'l-Hikem fî Nizâmî'l-Ümem*, TDV, Ankara, 1995, 56. Comments on the text are available in: NUHOĞLU, Hidayet Y., "Müteferrika Matbaasının Kurulması İçin Verilen Fetvâ Üzerine", in *Basım ve Yayıncılığımızın 250. Yılı Bilimsel Toplantısı*, 10-11 Aralık 1979, Ankara, *Bildiriler*, Türk Kütüphaneciler Derneği, Ankara, 1980, 119-126.
- ²⁸ *Tercümetü's-Sihâh-i Cevheri [Lugat-i Vânkülü]*, Kostantiniye, 1141/1729, [4]; The text is presented in transcribed form in: REFİK, Ahmed, *Hicrî Onikinci Asır'da İstanbul Hayatı*, 89-91; ŞEN, Adil, *İbrahim Müteferrika ve Usûlü'l-Hikem fî Nizâmî'l-Ümem*, 57-59. Translation in English is provided in: ATIYEH, George N. (ed.), *The Book in the Islamic World*, 284-285. French translation is provided in: OMONT, H., "Documents sur l'imprimerie à Constantinople au XVIII^e siècle", 190-192.
- ²⁹ KABACALI, Alpay, *Türk Kitap Tarihi, I. Başlangıçtan Tanzimat'a Kadar*, Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1989, 40; TONTA, Yaşar A., "Ahmet Rasim'in İbrahim-i Müteferrika ve Matbaacılık Üzerine Yazdıklarının İncelenmesi", in *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 3/1, 1985, 163.
- ³⁰ İMŞŞ: Kismet-i Askeriye Mahkemesi, Defter 98, fol. 40a.
- ³¹ HOPP, L., "İbrahim Müteferrika (1674/75?-1746): Fondateur de l'imprimerie turque", in *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, XXIX/1, 1975, 108.
- ³² HAMMER, Joseph von, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. VII, Pest, 1831, 585; ERSOY, Osman, "İlk Türk Basımevi'nde Basılan Kitapların Fiyatları", in *Basım ve Yayıncılığımızın 250. Yılı Bilimsel Toplantısı*, 10-11 Aralık 1979, Ankara, *Bildiriler*, Türk Kütüphaneciler Derneği, Ankara, 1980, 57; BABINGER, Franz, "18. Yüzyılda İstanbul'da Kitabiyat" (trans., ed. N. Kuran-Burçoğlu), in *Müteferrika ve Osmanlı Matbaası*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, 31.
- ³³ ERGÜRBÜZ, Şefik, *Matbaacılık Tarihi*, Işıl Kitabevi, İzmit, 1947, 46; ERTUĞ, Hasan R., *Basın ve Yayın Hareketleri Tarihi*, 116.
- ³⁴ WATSON, William J., "İbrâhîm Müteferrika and Turkish Incunabula", in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 88, 1968, 436.
- ³⁵ *El-Cildü's-sâni min Tārîh-i Na'imâ*, Kostantiniye, 1147/1734, [741]. In fact, the source mentions 8200 copies. This calculation, however, takes into consideration the total print of each of the volumes of the Arabic-Turkish dictionary of Vankulu and *Tārîh* of Na'ima, both in two volumes. Thus, so if

- we calculate the figure of initial printed titles as opposed to printed volumes, the real total number of the printed copies of the editions decreases to 7200.
- 36 OMONT, H. "Nouveaux documents sur l'imprimerie à Constantinople au XVIII^e siècle", in *Revue des Bibliothèques*, XXXIII, 1926, 6-7.
- 37 HAMMER, Joseph von, *Gesichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, vol. VII, 413; UZUNÇARŞILI, İsmail Hakkı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. IV, part II, TTK, Ankara, 1988, 516.
- 38 MEYER, M. S., *Osmanskaya imperiya v XVIII veke*, Nauka, Moskva, 1991, 184.
- 39 CARLESON, Edvard, *İbrahim Müteferrika Basımevi ve Bastığı İlk Eserler/İbrahim Müteferrika's Printing House and Its First Printed Books* (ed. M. Akbulut), Türk Kütüphaneciler Derneği, Ankara, 1979, 8.
- 40 TIMUR, Taner, "Matbaa, Aydınlanma ve Diplomasi: Said Mehmed Efendi", in *Toplumsal Tarih*, 128, 2004, 59.
- 41 ERSOY, Osman, "İlk Türk Basımevi'nde Basılan Kitapların Fiyatları".
- 42 See OMONT, H. "Nouveaux documents sur l'imprimerie à Constantinople au XVIII^e siècle", 9-10.
- 43 See MÜTEFERRIKA, İbrahim, "Osmanlı Matbaasının Kuruluşu ve Başlangıcı" (trans., ed. N. Kuran-Burçoğlu, M. Kiel), in *Müteferrika ve Osmanlı Matbaası*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, 72-74.
- 44 See CARLESON, Edvard, *İbrahim Müteferrika Basımevi ve Bastığı İlk Eserler*, 9-12.
- 45 Details are provided in: SABEV, Orlin, *Parvoto osmansko pateshestvie v sveta na pechatnata kniga (1726-1746). Nov pogled [First Ottoman Trip in the World of Printed Books (1726-1746). A Reassessment]*, Avangard Prima, Sofia, 2004, 251-255.
- 46 ERSOY, Osman, "İlk Türk Basımevi'nde Basılan Kitapların Fiyatları", 76.
- 47 See FEBVRE, Lucien, MARTIN, Henri-Jean, *L'apparation du livre*, A. Michel, Paris, 1958, 307-312; RICHARDSON, Brian, *Printing, Writers and Readers in Renaissance Italy*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 25-26.
- 48 The Kısmet-i Askeriye Mahkemesi Collection, for example, includes 2144 registers of the period 1000/1591-92 – 1342/1924. See AKG-ND-Z, Ahmet (ed.), *Şer'îye Sicilleri: Mahiyeti, Toplu Kataloğu ve Seçme Hükümler*, Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, İstanbul, 1988, 100-116.
- 49 THALY, Coloman de (ed.), *Lettres de Turquie*, 95.
- 50 OMONT, H. "Nouveaux documents sur l'imprimerie à Constantinople", 6.
- 51 See KARAKIŞLA, Yavuz Selim, "Osmanlı Kitap Tarihinde Bir Katkı: Osmanlı Devlet Arşivi'nde Bulunan, Kitap ile İlgili Bazı Belgeler (1844–1854)", in *Müteferrika*, 14, 1998, 41-59.
- 52 STRAUSS, Johann, "Les livres et l'imprimerie à İstanbul (1800–1908)", in *Turquie. Livres d'hier, livres d'aujourd'hui* (ed. P. Dumont), Centre de recherche sur la Civilisation ottomane et le domaine turc contemporain Université des Sciences Humaines – Éditions ISIS, Strasbourg-Istanbul, 1992,

- 5; STRAUSS, Johann, "İstanbul'da Kitap Yayıncılığı ve Basımcıları", in *Müteferrika*, 1, 1993, 5.
- 53 More details are provided in: SABEV, Orlin, *Parvoto osmansko pateshestvie v sveta na pechatnata kniga*, 255-260.
- 54 See *The History of al-Tabari: Biographies of the Prophet's Companions and Their Successors* (trans. E. Landau-Tasseron), The State University of New York Press, New York, 1998.
- 55 See COŞKUN, Menderes, "Osmanlı Hac Seyahatnamelerinde Hac Yolculuğu", in *Osmanlı* (ed. G. Eren), Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, 1999, vol. 4, 506-511; COŞKUN, Menderes, "The Most Literary Ottoman Pilgrimage Narrative: Nabi's Tuh-fetü'l-Haremeyn", in *Turcica*, 32, 2000, 363-388.
- 56 WATSON, William J., "İbrāhīm Müteferrika and Turkish Incunabula", 436.
- 57 See UNAN, Fahri, "Taşköprülüzâde'nin Kaleminden XVI. Yüzyılın "İlim" ve "Âlim" Anlayışı", in *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, XVII, 1997, 149-264; UNAN, Fahri, "Osmanlı Medrese Ulemâsı: İlim Anlayışı ve İmâ Verim", in *Türkler* (ed. H. C. Güzel, K. Çiçek, S. Koca), Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, 2002, vol. 11, 436-445.
- 58 STEINBERG, Sigfrid H., *Five Hundred Years of Printing*, Penguin Press, 1977, 130.
- 59 THÁLY, Coloman de (ed.), *Lettres de Turquie*, 95.
- 60 EISENSTEIN, Elizabeth L., *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change. Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-Modern Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 1979, 44.
- 61 WILLIAMS, Raymond, *The Long Revolution*, Hogarth, London, 1992.
- 62 EISENSTEIN, Elizabeth, "The Fifteenth Century Book Revolution, Some Causes and Consequences of the Advent of Printing in Western Europe", in *Le Livre dans les sociétés pré-industrielles*, Athens, 1982, 57-76; EISENSTEIN, Elizabeth, "From Scriptoria to Printing Shops: Evolution and Revolution in the Early Printing Book Trade", in *Books and Society in History, Papers of the Association of College and Research Libraries Rare Books and Manuscripts Preconference, 24-28 June, 1980, Boston, Massachusetts* (ed. K. E. Carpenter), Bowker, New York-London, 1983, 29-42; See also EISENSTEIN, Elizabeth, *The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- 63 HOUSTON, Robert A., *Literacy in Early Modern Europe. Culture and Education 1500-1800*, Longman, London-New York, 1988, 160-163.
- 64 GOFF, Jacques le, *Les intellectuels au Moyen Âge*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1985, 187.
- 65 RICHARDSON, Brian, *Printing, Writers and Readers in Renaissance Italy*, 9.
- 66 RAVEN, Diederick, "Elizabeth Eisenstein and the Impact of Printing", in *European Review of History – Revue européenne d'Histoire*, 6/2, 1999, 223-234.

- 67 JOHNS, Adrian, *The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago–London, 1998; HUDSON, Nicholas, “Challenging Eisenstein: Recent Studies in Print Culture”, in *Eighteenth-Century Life*, 26/2, 2002, 83-95; BRIGGS, Assa, BURKE, Peter, *A Social History of the Media: From Gutenberg to the Internet*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003, 15-73.
- 68 See HAGEBUTT-BENZ, Eva, GLASS, Dagmar, ROPER, Geoffrey (ed.), *Sprachen des Nahen Ostens und die Druckrevolution: eine interkulturelle Begegnung/Middle Eastern Languages and the Print Revolution: a Cross-cultural Encounter. A Catalogue and Companion to the Exhibition*, Johann Gutenberg Museum, Mainz, 2002.
- 69 See DEMEERSEMAN, André, “Un mémoire célèbre qui préfigure l’évolution moderne en Islam”, in *Institut des belles lettres arabes (IBLA)*, XVIII, 1955, 5-32; GDOURA, Wahid, *Le début de l’imprimerie arabe à Istanbul et en Syrie. Évolution de l’environnement culturel (1706-1787)*, Institut Supérieur de Documentation, Tunis, 1985.
- 70 RICHARDSON, Brian, *Printing, Writers and Readers in Renaissance Italy*, 77.
- 71 ΣΚΛΑΒΕΝΙΤΗΣ, Τ. Ε., “Η δυσπιστία στο έντυπο βιβλίο και η παράλληλη χρήση του χειρογράφου”, in *Le Livre dans les sociétés pré-industrielles*, Athens, 1982, 283–293. I am grateful to Svetlana Doncheva (Institute of Balkan Studies, Sofia) for the translation from Greek.
- 72 ΚΟΥΜΑΡΙ’ΑΝΟΥ, Ά., “Στάσεις και συμπεριφορές απέναντι στο ελληνικό έντυπο στον φθίνοντα ΙΗ’ και στον αρχόμενο ΙΘ’ αιώνα”, in *Le Livre dans les sociétés pré-industrielles*, Athens, 1982, 257–269. I am grateful to Svetlana Doncheva (Institute of Balkan Studies, Sofia) for the translation from the Greek.
- 73 See GDOURA, Wahid, *Le début de l’imprimerie arabe à Istanbul et en Syrie*, 103.
- 74 PEDERSEN, Johannes, *The Arabic Book*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1984, 12.
- 75 CARTER, Thomas F., *The Invention of Printing in China and Its Spread Westward*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1931, 112.
- 76 See OMAN, G., “Matba’a, 1. In the Arab World, A. Xylography”, in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition*, vol. VI (ed. C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat), E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1991, 795; BULLIET, Robert W., “Medieval Arabic Tarsh: a Forgotten Chapter in the History of Printing”, in *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 107/3, 1987, 427-438.
- 77 KALDY-NAGY, Gyula, “Beginnings of the Arabic-Letter Printing in the Muslim World”, in *The Muslim East, Studies in Honour of Julius Germann, Loránd Eötvös* (ed. Gy. Kaldy-Nagy), Loránd Eötvös University, Budapest, 1974, 201; BULLIET, Robert W., “Medieval Arabic Tarsh: a Forgotten Chapter in the History of Printing”.

- 78 See MAHDI, Muhsin, "From the Manuscript Age to the Age of Printed Books",
in *The Book in the Islamic World: The Written Word and Communication in
the Middle East* (ed. George N. Atiyeh), State University of New York Press,
Albany, 1995, 1-15.
- 79 GDOURA, Wahid, *Le début de l'imprimerie arabe à Istanbul et en Syrie*, 35.
- 80 See GALLAND, Antoine, *Istanbul'a Ait Günlük Hâtıralar (1672-1673)* (ed. C.
Schefer, trans. N. S. Örik), TTK, Ankara, 1949.
- 81 Quoted after: GERÇEK, Selim Nüzhet, *Türk Matbaacılığı*, 18-19; KABACALI,
Alpay, *Türk Kitap Tarihi*, 13.
- 82 See LUNDE, Paul, "Arabic and the Art of Printing", in *Saudi Aramco World*,
32/2, 1981 ([http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/198102/arabic.and.
the.art.of.printing-a.special.sec-tion.htm](http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/198102/arabic.and.the.art.of.printing-a.special.section.htm)).
- 83 TIBAWI, A. L., *Islamic Education. Its Tradition and Modernization into the
Arab National Systems*, Luzac, London, 1972, 24.
- 84 See RAVEN, Diederick, "Elizabeth Eisenstein and the Impact of Printing".
- 85 TIBAWI, A. L., *Islamic Education*, 26; İZGİ, Cevat, *Osmanlı Medreselerinde
İlim*, İz, İstanbul, 1997, vol. 1, 61-108; ÖZYILMAZ, Ömer, *Manzume-i Tertib-i
Ulûm, Tertibu'l-Ulûm, Kaside Fi'l-Kütüb-i'l Meşhure Fi'l Ulûm, Kevakib-i Seb'a
ve Erzurumlu İbrahim Hakkı'nın Tertib-i Ulûm isimli Eserine Göre*, XVII. ve
XVIII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı Medreselerinin Eğitim Programları, T.C. Kültür
Bakanlığı, Ankara, 2002.
- 86 RICAUT, Paul, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, London, 1668, 32.
- 87 BABINGER, Franz, "18. Yüzyılda İstanbul'da Kitabiyat", 9 (footnote 12).
- 88 MARSIGLI, Signore conte di, *Stato militare dell'Impero Ottomanno
incremento e decremento del medesimo/L'Etat militaire de l'Empire ottoman,
ses progrès et sa décadence*, Haga-Amsterdam, 1732, 40.
- 89 National Library (Sofia), Oriental Department, O II 160, *Kitābü'l-Kānūn
fī't-tıbb li-Abu 'Alī eş Şeyh er-Reis İbn-i Sīnā*, Romae: Tipographia Medicea,
XCIII [1593], [1]; See KENDEROVA, Stoyanka, IVANOVA, Zorka (ed.), *From
the Collections of Ottoman Libraries in Bulgaria during the 18th-19th
Centuries*, National Library, Sofia, 99, 95.
- 90 National Library (Sofia), Oriental Department, O II 160, p. [1].
- 91 PEÇEVİ, İbrahim Efendi, *Peçevi Tarihi*, vol. I (ed. B. S. Baykal), Kültür Bakanlığı,
Ankara, 1981, 82-83.
- 92 GÖKYAY, Orhan Şaik, *Katip Çelebi'den Seçmeler*, MEB, İstanbul, 1968,
124.
- 93 KOLOĞLU, Orhan, *Basımevi ve Basının Gecikme Sebepleri ve Sonuçları*,
İstanbul Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, İstanbul, 1987, 30.
- 94 ABOU-EL-HAJ, Rifaat Ali, *Formation of the Modern State*, 68; İHSANOĞLU,
Ekmeleddin, "Ottoman Science in the Classical Period and Early Contacts
with European Science and Technology", in *Transfer of Modern Science &
Technology to the Muslim World, Proceedings of the International
Symposium on "Modern Sciences and the Muslim World" Science and
Technology Transfer from the West to the Muslim World from the*

- Renaissance to the Beginning of the XIXth Century (Istanbul 2–4 September 1987)* (ed. E. İhsanoğlu), IRCICA, İstanbul, 1992, 25, 29; İHSANOĞLU, Ekmeleddin, “Some Critical Notes on the Introduction of Modern Sciences to the Ottoman State and the Relation between Science and Religion up to the End of the Nineteenth Century”, in *Comité international d’Études pré-ottomanes et ottomans VIth Symposium, Cambridge, 1st-4th July 1984, Proceedings* (ed. J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont, E. van Donzel), Institut Français d’études anatoliennes; Éditions Divit, İstanbul–Paris–Leiden, 1987, 251.
- 95 ZAIMOVA, Raia, *Patyat kam “drugata” Evropa. Iz frensko-osmanskite kulturni obshtuvania, XVI–XVIII vek*, Kralitsa Mab, Sofia, 2004, 216.
- 96 ABESCI, Elias, *État actuel de l’Empire ottoman* (trans. M. Fontanelle), vol. I, Paris, 1792, 151-152.
- 97 [TOTT, Baron de], *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur les Turcs et les Tartares, Nouvelle éditions revue, corrigée & augmentée*, part 1, Maestricht, 1786, 117-118.
- 98 TODERINI, M. L’abbe, *De la Littérature des Turcs*, Paris, 1789, vol. III, 212-219.
- 99 D’OHSSON, Ignace Mouradgea, *Tableau général de l’Empire Othoman*, vol. I, Paris, 1787, 301.
- 100 TODERINI, M. L’abbe, *De la Littérature des Turcs*, vol. III, 19.
- 101 GIBB, Hamilton A. R., BOWEN, Harold, *Islamic Society and the West*, vol. I (*Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*), part II, Oxford University Press, 1962, 153.
- 102 NIEBUHR, Carsten, *Beschreibung von Arabien*, Kopenhagen, 1772, 215-216. Quoted after KOLOĞLU, Orhan, *Basımevi ve Basının Gecikme Sebepleri ve Sonuçları*, 42.
- 103 ERDEM, Yahya, “Sahhaflar ve Seyyahlar: Osmanlı’da Kitapçılık”, in *Osmanlı* (ed. G. Eren), Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, 1999, vol. 11, 728.
- 104 [TOTT, Baron de], *Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur les Turcs et les Tartares*, 118.
- 105 UBICINI, M. A., *Lettres sur la Turquie ou tableau statistique, religieux, politique, administratif, militaire, commercial, etc. de l’Empire ottoman, depuis le Khatti-Cherif de Gulhanè (1839). Première partie. Les Ottomans*, Librairie militaire de J. Dumaine, Paris, 1853, 245.
- 106 [ERZİ, A.], “Basım”, in *Türk (İnönü) Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 5, fas. 37-38, 1951, 334, 336; MADEN, Sait, “Başlangıcından Bugüne Türk Grafik Sanatı. Müteferrika Dönemi”, in *Çevre. Mimarlık ve Görsel Sanatlar Dergisi*, 2, 1979, 83-87; 3, 1979, 87-90; 4, 1979, 89-90; KOLOĞLU, Orhan, *Basımevi ve Basının Gecikme Sebepleri ve Sonuçları*, 41-44; KABACALI, Alpay, *Türk Kitap Tarihi*, 112-113; TOPDEMİR, Hüseyin Gazi, *İbrahim Müteferrika ve Türk Matbaacılığı*, T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı, Ankara, 2002, 30-32.
- 107 ABIFARES, Huda S., *Arabic Typography: A Comprehensive Sourcebook*, Saqi Books, London, 2001, 94-95; CHAPPELL, Warren, *A Short History of the Printed Word*, André Deutsch Ltd, London, 1972, 38.

- 108 See DERMAN, Uğur, ÇETİN, N., *The Art of Calligraphy in the Islamic Heritage* (ed. E. İhsanoğlu), IRCICA, İstanbul, 1998.
- 109 ROBINSON, Francis, "Technology and Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print", *Modern Asian Studies*, 27/1, 1993, 229-251.
- 110 See KURAN, Ercüment, *Avrupa'da Osmanlı İkâmet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Elçilerin Siyâsî Faâliyetleri (1793-1821)*, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara, 1988.
- 111 İHSANOĞLU, Ekmeleddin, "Osmanlı Eğitim ve Bilim Müesseseleri", in *Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi* (ed. E. İhsanoğlu), IRCICA, İstanbul, 1998, vol. II, 295-297.
- 112 See the comments on the Web site: <http://www.freeessays.cc/db/philo-sophy/index.shtml>.
- 113 EISENSTEIN, Elizabeth L., *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change*, 51.
- 114 BABINGER, Franz, *Die Geschichtschreiber der osmanen und ihre Werke*, Otto Harrassowitz, Leipzig, 1927, 277; SELEN, Hamit S., "Cihannümâ", in *Kâtip Çelebi Hayatı ve Eserleri Hakkında İncelemeler*, TTK, Ankara, 1991, 122.
- 115 WATSON, William J., "İbrâhîm Müteferrika and Turkish Incunabula", 440; IRCICA Library – İstanbul, 955.03/KR.T.
- 116 TELCİ, Cahit, "Bir Osmanlı Aydını XVIII. Devlet Düzeni Hakkındaki Görüşleri: Penah Süleyman Efendi", in *Osmanlı* (ed. G. Eren), Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, 1999, vol. 7, 178-188.
- 117 See DERMAN, Çiçek, "Osmanlılarda Tezhip Sanatı", in *Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyeti Tarihi* (ed. E. İhsanoğlu), IRCICA, İstanbul, 1998, vol. II, 487-491; DERMAN, Çiçek, "Osmanlı Asırlarında Üslûp ve Sanatkânyla Tezhip Sanatı", in *Osmanlı* (ed. G. Eren), Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, 1999, vol. 11, 108-119.
- 118 National Library (Sofia), Oriental Department, O II 175; IRCICA Library – İstanbul, 962/SÜ.T; 359./009561/KA.
- 119 See HILL, Derek, GRABAR, Oleg, *Islamic Architecture and Its Decoration A. D. 800-1500*, Faber and Faber, London, 1967, 83; ÜNAL, Rahmi Hüseyin, *Osmanlı Öncesi Anadolu-Türk Mimarisinde Taçkapılar*, Ticaret Matbaası, İzmir, 1982; ÇAKMAK, Şakir, *Erken Dönem Osmanlı Mimarisinde Taçkapılar (1300-1500)*, Ankara, 2001.
- 120 For comment on the layout changes in the Ottoman printed books, see İHSANOĞLU, Ekmeleddin, AYNUR, Hatice, "Yazmadan Basmaya Geçiş: Osmanlı Basma Kitap Geleneğinin Doğuşu (1729-1848)", in *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, XXII, 2003, 219-255.
- 121 National Library (Sofia), Oriental Department, O II 159; O II 150a; O II 17; IRCICA Library – İstanbul, 491./5539435/FA.
- 122 ALPAY, Meral, "Türkçe Basma Kitapların Beşik (Incunabel) Devri", in *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Sanat Tarihi Yıllığı*, V, 1972-1973, 587-599.
- 123 BAYSAL, Jale, *Müteferrika'dan Birinci Meşrutiyete Kadar Osmanlı Türklerinin Bastıkları Kitaplar*, Edebiyat Fakültesi, İstanbul, 1968, 63.

- ¹²⁴ BAYSAL, Jale, *Müteferrika'dan Birinci Meşrutiyete*, 71-74.
- ¹²⁵ See KESKİOĞLU, Osman, "Türkiye'de Matbaa Te'sisi ve Mushaf Basımı", in *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, XV, 1967, 121-139; GÜNDÜZ, Mahmud, "Matbaanın Tarihçesi ve İlk Kur'anı Kerim Basmaları", in *Vakıflar Dergisi*, XII, 1978, 335-350; KURAN-BURCUOĞLU, Nedret, "Matbaacı Osman Bey: Saray'dan İlk Defa Kur'an-ı Kerim Basma İznini Alan Osmanlı Hattatı", in *Türklük Bilgisi Araştırmaları/Journal of Turkish Studies*, 26/II, 2002, 97-112.
- ¹²⁶ *Tārīh-i Cevdet*, vol. 1, Matba'a-i 'Osmāniyye, Der sa'ādet, 1309/1891, 76.
- ¹²⁷ ANASTASSIADOU, Meropi, "Livres et "bibliothèques" dans les inventaires après décès de Salonique au XIX^e siècle", in *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, 87-88, 1999, 120.
- ¹²⁸ ERDEM, Yahya, "Sahhaflar ve Seyyahlar: Osmanlı'da Kitapçılık", 725.
- ¹²⁹ TOPDEMİR, Hüseyin Gazi, *İbrahim Müteferrika ve Türk Matbaacılığı*, 30-32.
- ¹³⁰ İSKİT, Server, *Türkiye'de Neşriyat Hareketleri Tarihine Bir Bakış*, MfV, İstanbul, 1939, 90.
- ¹³¹ [ERZİ, A.], "Basım", 336; İSKİT, Server, *Türkiye'de Neşriyat Hareketleri*, 145-146.
- ¹³² [ERZİ, A.], "Basım", 336.



MALAMIR SPASOV

Born in 1977, in Dobrich, Bulgaria

Ph.D. Candidate, Institute of Balkan Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

Dissertation: The Romanian Psychological Novel of 1930s in the
Context of the Modern European Literary Trends

Contributed with articles in comparative literature and cultural history

Participated in several conferences in literary and social studies

SINGLE WHITE MALE; EDUCATION: UNIVERSITY DEGREE; MENTALLY HEALTHY; NATIONALITY: EUROPEAN

"Words, words, words..."

Hamlet, William Shakespeare

Prologue

A title such as this could sound similar to an advertisement in the personal column of a local newspaper. On the other hand, expressed in one short sentence, it could also describe what I see when I look in the mirror – or at least what I would like to see. Looking into the mirror in itself is not sufficient for me to know who I am, however, if this at all is my goal. Just as it isn't necessary to know who am I – at any cost – in order to face the mirror, it is at least necessary to want to find out about this issue. But not everyone needs such knowledge: for some it may be something like the bait to the fish, for others it is the air they breathe. I believe that we – you and I – belong to the latter set. Or at least I would like to...

I will use as background in this article a number of Southeastern European psychological novels from the period between the World Wars – three Romanian, one Bulgarian and one Serbian. Based on these, we will discuss the narrator/protagonist and some ideas surrounding his personality. We are going to talk about...

The relationship between our common concepts of self-revelation and works of art, between the very processes of self-defying and that of creating, has an intimate nature. It is a love relationship. I imagine that there hardly exists another cognitive form that is more proficient in revealing what man has inside him than fiction (with the possible exception of anatomy, of course). And the psychological novel, made of mental archeology, is his favorite obsession.

Proust says the novel is a mirror held up to life. Let us then take up a position behind the mirror and try to see through it; let us see through the text, through the flesh of fiction and face the narrator/protagonist of the Southeastern European psychological novel between the World Wars. Let us strip down the personality of he who narrated the interwar psychological novel at the moment when this form of fiction produced its best works. Let us make it more clear what that personality combined, what the problems and complexes of the narrator/protagonist in the Southeastern European psychological novel between the World Wars were and to what extent they corresponded to their time and place – because all these problems, manifested or hidden therein, were also our problems. And some still are. Every time we raise our line of sight, we can see them, hanging above us, fastened with only a single strand of ancient horsehair...

From a close distance this personality does not seem so fictional. We would meet mostly a young man, a European – where European means an inhabitant of that resurrected and worse than ever Babylon of the Old continent following the First World War; he is as a rule an intellectual, together with his self-awareness of the fact in the company of his quests, breakaways and returns, he is all the time tossing himself into the whole crowd of existential questions. When we meet someone, in our world, the first issue to arise is normally the social aspect of his identity. What later on tries to sneak up on us, sometimes in the form of obsession, is the appearance of the psychological, the personal identity of the narrator/protagonist, in which his human problems are indexed. These mark every step he has taken on the road to self-defying and self-improving in an all too familiar way that has a sobering influence on us. If we move our attention over and across borders to the national aspect of identity, we can then outline an early sense of an intellectual European community that is representative of the interwar period. This sense is traceable from the Southeastern European to the global in a time of historic cataclysms.

We would not try to exhaust this topic. Thus we could only exhaust our patience...

We begin with the words of others, the result of long and weary searching, in order, along the way, to find our own words, which could lead us to something original, beyond the mirror.

Man is a historical animal, said Terry Eagleton. Man could not be himself without belonging to both the universal and the individual at one and the same time, without belonging to the self-identity of the human

spirit, without belonging to his species, his essence that makes him what he is, without being a part of the history of mankind. Here is ours...

Babyloniad

Europe between the World Wars – a few decades like a leap into the nothingness. After the First World War, the Old Continent resembled a crowd disheveled by visions of horror, disgust, melancholy and the quests of a super-active consciousness. The times had become fierce. It seemed as if mankind had departed, its face washed away in a stunning vortex of all names of madness. War strengthened the trust in violence as a relatively fast means of achieving aims, or at least what were considered to be aims. The crisis of democracy had already infected the wounds of war. A new disease pulsed within the social changes, in the disappointment, the newborn faith in domination, which produced social transpositions, brought large human masses under unified leadership and tore many away from their original environment. Expatriations, internal resettlements – migrations became a way of life again. A new disease pulsed into a gradual distortion of world economics, in internal discords, in the newly created multi-national states such as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. An old damnation corroded the sick boundaries of young nations: the strengthened sense of nationality with its inherent primitive emotions and demagogues. In interwar Europe nightmares substituted conscious dreaming. Typhus, cholera, mass graves... The anemic Old World entered the vestibule of a wicked illness. Wild abundance of reparations and debts impeded its economic growth. The children of the new world order – the young democracies – reeled upon their low political literacy. Social transpositions increased the burden of the miserable working class. Europe emaciated due to political egoism, national rivalry and malnutrition. It lost its world leader position. Post-war stabilization appeared to be a feigned upsurge. The 1929 world economic crisis also served to overwhelm the Old World. This was followed by national catastrophes, economic downfalls, inflation, reparation debts, poverty, unemployment, political falseness, social chaos, steep social division... With the impatience of a child eager to go out in the yard to play, the people of Europe set about developing their arms industries. In the scorched garden of the Old Continent ancient games with new bombastic names began to be played all too often: military coup, military dictatorship, coup d'état,

personal regime, royal dictatorship, president dictatorship, one-party authoritarian state... One might say nothing but concepts as hard to pronounce as to endure. Interwar Europe saw more than twenty dictatorships and fostered fascism and National Socialism...

...And a generation of authors, although some assumed them and at times they even assumed themselves, were rather demolishers. A generation, which called itself "*lost*". Lost after the Belle Epoque in the unusual silence of the ideological vacuum, the social disorder and the hollow guiltiness of Cain... A somber adventure of that generation was the First World War. The sobering effect of the disgusting spectacle and its subsequences aroused a personality crisis, a kind of roaming through the blurred reality where consciousness no more managed to be adequate to itself, was disabled from finding an identical image. An enlarged consciousness, which as though it sometimes went and faced the mirror, was as indifferent as if merely left aside and the wide open coffin of a dead child...

In the interwar period – vertiginous due to the rate of all these things happening – a certain vast process that pervaded mainly the sphere of the spirit as early as the end of 19th century, known as *modernism*, raged unrestrained. The notion of *modernism* is quite a general and abstract term denoting a movement conditioned by history, in principle inevitable, with original causes in the socio-political climate of its ideological and philosophical concepts, the common European and world literary context and increasing exchange of cultural values and ideas of art; a movement, stimulated by crisis that transformed the world in revolutionary way, producing events of global significance. *Modernism* stirred the realistic surface of art. The reasons for this could be not only sociologically global, but also purely esthetic. At any rate, disturbing energies always came from the recesses. However, seen from another viewpoint – that of the historical time – it could seem like a boundless impulse towards *transcending* a certain context. Besides, its striking presence is not in any way a proof – neither of the inescapability and indispensability of modernistic art, nor of the idea that this is the true art of the *modern times*... But for sure, *modernism* is a notion one could speak a lot about without saying anything at all.

Interwar modernism appeared to be the artistic destiny of a whole generation of authors, forced by historical conditions to discover its own path and its own image, wandering the unavoidable adventures of quests, experiments, and failures, until making its choice of self-definition in

terms of esthetics, ethics and philosophy; until finding its ideological vaulted arch, which is at once unattainable and found in its entirety.

Reaction against tradition was one of the most essential ideological components of any of the modernistic trends. The esthetics of modernism, to a great extent, was constructed on the basis of negation – as an antithesis to the preceding cultural model in its cultural-historical and esthetical aspect, a negation that applied to its face the mask of surprise. This negation was rooted in the necessity of driving the spiritual life of society to excess in that very historical moment. While vigorously opposed to the traditional values and models of art, modernism surprised while experimenting with the communicative and significative nature of the expression of art. Modern art was an art of the innovative, it was experimental, formally sophisticated and indistinct, and comprised creative and non-creative elements; its social content was non-conformist... This modernistic gesture was not evolutionary but revolutionary, and always placed modernism into a sort of a romantic situation.

It is a fact that there exists neither indefeasible tradition, nor hermetic culture. A couple of factors – the national-specific, which is tradition, and that which is acquired from outside, the inevitable impression by the vigorous trends of world-wide importance – coexist and interact with each other during every moment of the cultural development. This introduces a specific character to the models of both: modernistic art, on the one hand, and every national traditional culture, on the other.

It is as if the earth began to rotate faster after the First World War and as if life found itself shorter of breath, more determined to get somewhere...

The nature novel – under the classification of the literary genders and genres – is the latest (though not necessarily the slightest) phenomenon which theorists still find hard to frame in a crystal-clear definition. Its development is usually considered to be dependent on the recognition of fiction as an empirical and skeptical means of cognition, of investigating the familiar environment. This made the novel more contingent on realism than other known genres. Notions formulated as to its range would not remain for long on their pedestals since this range became wider with each new novel. Its fiction juggled various registers, structures, and typologies, all the time discovering new levels of presence, traveling, free of all restrictions, from history and documentary prose to the heights of literary formalism and beyond. Its fiction had access to the magic coherence of all the domains of human knowledge and loved to surprise

with the unsuspected directions it often took. In a fascinating way, the novel was able to give the imaginary formal limits of authenticity, for the entire relative fortuity of its form, no matter how uneven, perceived reality as an object. *Visible unrealities were always that which art wanted.* In this sense, realism is also a product of imagination. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the novel – in close connection with realism – established itself as a mimetic genre, and the methodology used to study it worked exclusively with its mimetic characteristics: poetics peered at the object of imitation, thereby taking us to the realistic novel of the 19th century. The beginning of the 20th century saw a gradual altering of concepts, together with a poetics that was already focusing on the very means of fictionalizing, which take us to the modernist novel. It did not hide the fact that it was an outcome of a realized and determined action of human consciousness, which in essence represented a material verbal construction that often carried things too far – for example, to a state where rhetorical and linguistic features gain the upper hand over all other features in the construction of a work.

As an *institution* of modern society, said Malcolm Bradbury, the novel is especially manageable to the chances of life and the prevailing structures of perception. With the naked eye, one could see the domination of realism throughout 19th century, followed by the naturalism, some forms of the modernist novel, the antinovel and so forth... The novel clearly went through definite phases in its development, which make a chronological approach a suitable method with which to study it; nevertheless, a satisfactory definition of the novel is still missing. But perhaps this very fact defines the novel sufficiently well... As with *modernism*, there is only relative agreement about what is *not* a novel.

Whatever the content of this questionable definition might be, in terms of its diachronic nature, it did not correspond to the Southeastern European manifestations of the novel and, in particular, that of Romanian, Bulgarian and Serbian interwar fiction, which was an original *rara avis* under the common European classification of literary genders and genres. Or perhaps they were *avis incognita* on the European market, and maybe they still are... In 19th-century fiction in England, France, Russia and, gradually, in the other developed European countries, the novel established itself to such a degree as to become a synonym for the century itself. Belinsky emphasized that there are ideas of time as well as forms of time, thereby hinting at the novel, which had begun to be perceived as the genre most suited to the new times. But while the novelistic form crowned the fiction

of the then developed European countries, throughout the peculiar Southeastern European time zone, also called the Balkans, the novel was in the form of a literary embryo and the prose of these nations was associated with little more than the so-called pre-novelistic forms such as the cyclic-combined narratives. At the gates of the Orient, the development of almost all genres came late. This oddity of new Southeastern European literature was born of the unusual revival of the countries in this region, and its novel was a product of the Renaissance. Out of the special historical conditions prevalent in this region began a compulsive, accelerated development of national cultures that had been revived in the 19th century. The inconsequent, incomplete outliving of the stages in literature – representative of the Western European countries – and the eccentric coexistence of diverse styles in the works of one and the same author became a regularity. The Southeastern European Renaissance appeared to be deprived of a self-dependant stage throughout the course of the accelerated development when renaissance processes, perforce, were performed in an impure way and at times diverged into anecdotic eclecticism.

The peculiarities of the Southeastern European novel did not only come from the quickened pace of breath in Balkan literature. A national tradition of the genre was missing entirely from the Balkans, where the medieval novel had not existed. In one sense, entire episodes of national history of the Balkan peoples were also missing. At this point, another gap opened wide: the great forms of fiction had critical history as a background, but here, in the Balkans, there was no original concept of history, no philosophy of history. And, while at the organic development of the novel short fictional forms – memoirs, short stories, novellas, feuilleton, etc. – in a sense marked the decline of the realist and romantic novel, in the late and accelerated development of Southeastern European literature the same genre forms preceded and, to an extent, filled the role of the novel. As such, the unavoidably eclectic approach of literature in the Balkans was only a matter of course, as if these short forms appeared more suitable and more appropriate forms with which to react to the fast-developing plethora of new moments. The greatest achievements of Southeastern European literature during their revival and the close post-revival period remained in the field of short prose forms (in the other area of large fictional works they were for a time in many ways imitative).

What is tempting about the novel is its incompleteness, the openness of its genre; and here I perceive a sort of *mirror-ness* relationship between

the way we apprehend the novel and the way we think about the Other, since what makes the Other difficult to gain access to is the fact that he or she is first of all never completed, never entirely determined by the context, but always somewhat “open” and “drifting”.

The prose of Southeastern European writers after the First World War appears to have been tempted by the novelistic form. A true outburst of the genre of the novel followed – in the Bulgarian literary context it lasted less than three decades, but produced more than 400 novels... Looked at from a bird's eye view, interwar fiction by Balkan writers appeared to be dominated by a realistic method of representation – the imaginary path of development of Balkan writers towards a new realism.

In search of... the psychological novel

The novel is built around the human being. Every novel tells the story (or history) of one or more human beings. Put briefly, the psychological novel is a first-person narrative of a self who, in one way or another, is in search of himself or his Self. Alexander Woolcott said: “Reading Proust is like bathing in someone else's dirty water.” In fact, the psychological novel is first of all a label. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, it presents “a work of fiction, in which the thoughts, feelings and motivations of the characters are of equal or greater interest than is the external action of the narrative.” The reason that external events form part of the psychological novel to the extent that they do relates to the emotional reactions and internal states of the characters, which in their turn are prompted by external events –sometimes the size of a pea.

This is a cause and effect relationship, a vicious circle in which the particular, personal perspective of the psychological novel focuses exclusively on a person's inner life, a vision always intermediated by a confessed point of view. In Pompiliu Constantinescu's opinion, for example, in *Ioana* by Anton Holban, external action is missing entirely. Consequently, the plot of the psychological novel is subordinate to and dependent upon the probing manner of delineating the character. The chronological order of representing events is thus replaced by the events' habit of occurrence in the character's mind, by thoughts, associations, memories, fantasies, reverie, contemplation, dreams, analysis, obsessions...

This entire interiority did not appear of course as *deus ex machina* out of nowhere. It has its history and its causes. Shakespeare's Hamlet is probably the prime example, at least in terms of drama, of this stress on the internal life of characters seen in a large number of works of art. Psychological approaches and psychological moments in general can, of course, even be found among the earliest novels in England, France and Spain, but the psychological novel itself was only to reach its full potential during the 20th century, predominantly in the interwar years. This development suspiciously coincided with progress in the field of psychology and Freud's discoveries, though without necessarily being a result of it, nor an accidental fact. This reminds me of a skeptical remark about psychoanalysis which said that theory itself appeared to be the disease, even though it was itself trying to heal. Perhaps we are dealing with a similar case in the psychological novel? The psychological novel could itself be the very path it is trying to walk...

The reason for these essential processes, as is true for others also, could be a part of the global subjectivist turning of modern culture towards the individual, towards and sinking into the self; a new form of interiority in which we start to think of ourselves as creatures in possession of inner depths. The first versions of this concept rendered by Jean-Jacques Rousseau are theistic, or at least pantheistic. Novelty could be detected through the analogy of the previous moral concepts in which complete existence was possible only if one is in touch with some moral source such as God or the idea of good, for example. In times of modernity, the source is moved deep within our selves. This circumstance is a part of the global subjectivist change in modern culture, that new form of interiority in which we start to think about ourselves as creatures with inner depths. Psychological complexity and the subconscious incentives belonging to it are undeniable in the painful introspections of Fedor Dostoyevsky and Lev Tolstoy; in techniques such the recording of detailed descriptions of the effects external events exert upon an individual consciousness in the works of Henry James and Thomas Mann; in the suggestive cobweb of recollections of Marcel Proust; in the overwhelming and devastating stream of consciousness of James Joyce and William Faulkner; in the shady womanly flow of experience of Virginia Woolf; in the hybrid world of Franz Kafka in which reality hangs upon the skeleton of the subjective logic of dreams... These are actually some of the adepts of the psychological novel and they all have their individual approaches, reached

individually by every one of them, under the sign of a comprehensive individualization of human consciousness.

Characteristic features of modernity such as the “instrumental mind” or individualism and psychological analysis were often explained as a secondary product of social transformation, as just an occasional and attendant result of industrialization, higher mobility and urbanization. This could be read in every history book. But there must be important casual connections here: what made us *chose* exactly this way?

With the arrival of the 20th century, the novel began to change its character. For there to be sufficient transformations of content, alterations of form were needed. The old certainty that experience could be appropriate as represented by the language and structures of the conventional novel became more and more questionable. Writers began to examine the ways in which reality eluded the grasp of literature just as mankind began to gain new freedom by breaking off *the old moral horizons*. In their experiments and attempts to capture the complex and fragmentary essence of experience, some of these authors were *stretching the limits* of the conventional novel to such an extent that it became increasingly remote from the expectations – sometimes also the comprehension, interest and needs – of the average reader. I perceive this – let’s call it *mirror-ness* – here between the cited literary process and the real human situation. After the First World War, the European intellectual was intentionally *stretching his/her own limits* with varying success... These modernist experiments sometimes produced works of art of great interest, which also tended to widen the gap between the popular and the “literary” novel, between the convention and high culture, just like the state of affairs among people.

The “epiphanic”, as Charles Taylor called it, the creation of high culture on the one hand and the low and common, but undoubtedly indispensable reality, on the other, could never be harmonized perfectly. In fact, a lot of modernist writers felt the widening gap between the language and what it pointed out. This made of the people of modernity, and those who followed, creatures doomed to dwell upon more than one level and encouraged them to turn toward the inside. Those seated on more than one chair at once would inevitably fall to the floor, and probably this is the way it should be. This movement towards psychological analysis in art is traceable exclusively in the novel.

It was as though – though this was not everything – man gradually turned, put in a figurative way, from searching for himself in God to

searching for God in himself. We have real indications that the Southeastern European intellectual began to believe that the way to achieve this goal really went through man himself by diving into the human being, *stretching our own limits* and piercing our own selves completely, intentionally and conscious of the risk... Or, if you would prefer, breaking through and beyond the mirror...

The writers whose fiction we are trying to focus on are popular in a different manner and are known personalities, such as Camil Petrescu, Anton Holban and Mircea Eliade. Although diverse, one from another – whether in terms of individualities or in terms of being peculiar as writers, in their path of life or in their creative approaches and research, or even simply chronologically – there are few things which can equal them. They were all Romanian prose writers, connected in one way or another to the interwar period of the 20th century. They were also more or less connected to that phenomenon, the so-called psychological novel. Moreover, they were all connected to another phenomenon: the similar tendencies of the novel in the light (and shadow) of its Southeastern European context. This already leads us towards a comparison when observing this complex identity, for the novel in its Southeastern European manifestations showed a proximity in terms of the problems of the intellectual, for example, and not only that...

Words are ill mannered: they never listen, just as old teachers never learn; they have an awful habit of interference, between those who speak them and the things we speak about, thereby increasing a basic distance. As a result, we forget we are speaking about human beings, made of flesh and blood, who, for sure, just like us, once felt naked, dumb and frightened...

Heart of Darkness

Many others have taken this road – from Joseph Conrad to Francis Ford Copola, from Heart of Darkness to Apocalypse: Now, and beyond... But we are still there where we started. Are we still there?

As a graduate of the department of literature and philosophy in the University of Bucharest, a teacher in Timișora, an influential journalist, critic and polemicist, a director of the Bucharest Theater and a member

of the Romanian Academy, Camil Petrescu (1894-1957) is well-known, not least as a prose-writer, dramatist and drama critic. His importance comes from his interwar novels, *The Last Night of Love, the First Night of War* ("Ultima Noapte De Dragoste, Întâia Noapte de Razboi") (1930) and *Procrustean Bed* ("Patul Lui Procust") (1933). His third major narrative, *A Man Amongst Men* ("Un Om Dintre Oameni") (1958), is much more subsequent, much more different and never completed... Being an orphan, he had had a hard existence, learning assiduously and working to support himself. In 1916 he was drafted into the armed forces and sent to the battlefields of the by then raging First World War where he was wounded and taken prisoner by the Austro-Hungarians. He was released in 1918, but it would seem the war had been implanted into his being and would never leave. In a sense, every one of these writers – in a similar way to all the intellectuals belonging to the interwar generation and the people who had endured the war – was a veteran of sorts in so far as the war and jaws of history had left them crushed and with divided mind, with eyes and corpse bitten, and with a disabled heart and consciousness turned upside down, naked and horrified. It could be no other way. I think that even characters like Mateiu Caragialle's *kings of night* from *Craii de Curtea Veche* were somehow veterans in their own way, even if they wasted themselves away earlier in that the war had withered away their creator too. Later, that war environment and the breath of massacre would be built-in to *The Last Night of Love, the First Night of War* – a work of fiction that probed the consciousness of the interwar generation, torn away from the bygone days, a generation without a plan, and without wanting to have one. With subtlety and accuracy, parallels were drawn between individual, social and national psychology, on the one hand, and between the personal, internal suffering, searching, experiments and breakdowns, and the cruel exterior experience of war, on the other. Petrescu's strength presumably lies in his ability to describe the psychological dimensions of an inner impact at a moment when, as Charles Taylor calls them, *old moral horizons* were buried six feet under and the *instrumental mind* was overcoming the increasingly urbanized social structures; at a moment when human being probably began to be aware of the loss of faith, freedom and sense, sinking into the mirror... Certainly there were merits of form as well as content: namely, clean factual style and innovative techniques – a new form vis-à-vis a new content. Camil Petrescu has been often reproached for burdening the text with over-theorizing in places full of philosophical moments. Here I see the

intellectual and the creator himself – the narrator/protagonist facing the mirror of narrative, perched on the edge between two nights, between love and death, trying to keep his balance, just like Holban's Sandu reeling upon an old rail somewhere on the edge of Cavarna Port – one of his favorite games... The narrator/protagonist in *The Last Night of Love, the First Night of War* is Ștefan Gheorghidiu – a young European, or at least a Southeastern European. His mental health is increasingly called into question after every gaze into the mirror of narrative, with the approach of introspection; he is lost amidst the *desolation* of war, he himself becoming a *desolate tract*. He has a university degree in philosophy; he is also manifestly a Romanian writer, part of the capital's literary milieu, and he is married – a marriage that is questionable enough to cause me to hesitate to use the word.

According to critics, Camil Petrescu represents something of a theorist of the new epic style in Romanian interwar prose writing. Despite recurrent personal differences, he was close to Eugen Lovinescu's (1881-1943) modern, urban and Western-oriented intellectual circle, in which one would often happen upon the name and figure of one of Lovinescu's nephews: Anton Holban (1902-1937). As French language professor in Galați and in Bucharest and an assistant to the most outstanding Romanian literary magazines of the day – *Sburătorul*, *Viața literară*, *Rampa*, *Vremea*, *Azi*, *Critica*, *Critica actualității*, *România literară* etc. – his life ended rather hastily and unexpectedly after complications during surgery. He read French at the University of Bucharest and subsequently spent some time at the Sorbonne in Paris working on a Ph.D thesis on Barbey d'Aurville which he never finished... *Death That Proves Nothing* ("O Moarte Care Nu Dovedește Nimic") (1931) and *Ioana* (1934) are the novels that his name has mostly been connected with and which earned him the award of the Society of Romanian Writers in 1934. The artistic approaches of Holban and Petrescu have been compared from the point of view of sincerity, authenticity and the refusal of refined and sophisticated writing. Like Petrescu, Holban was absorbed by interpreting the works of Marcel Proust. In fact his contribution to Romanian interpretations of this adept of the psychological novel probably counts among the most important. Of both Romanian writers – Petrescu and Holban – it could equally be said that they were exclusively novelists, (auto)analysts, theorists and practitioners of first-person narration. But let the author him-self pique our curiosity and stir our imagination: "*Death That Proves Nothing* is a dynamic novel, *Ioana* is a static one. That is the

first difference between them. (...) Why should the first person be more unvaried than the third person? (...) As for me, it was sufficient to have the opportunity to examine myself, since I am the one bound to live with me all the time, until the comedy of my life is not completely brought to the end. *Besides I had also the chance to know myself better that way.* As for Sandu, I could make him as sophisticated as I wanted to. Inside him I could let coexist even the most contradictory characteristics. Since transparency plays a major role, he can afford himself every kind of confession. Still, some things are untenable, but that doesn't matter. Everything in his soul is set off by accidental intrigue. Anyway, one shouldn't believe that the author and Sandu are perfect fits..." In fact, I don't think there can be a fit at all, even with his self, even compared with the day before. The narrator/protagonist in *Ioana* is Sandu. He is young and also a European, or at least Southeastern European – "at the end of the world", on the very edge of both *deserts* – that of the desolated Caverna Port and the "wilderness" of the sea, on the one hand, and the *desert* that is Sandu, as we might call it, on the other. His mental health is such as the mental health of any human being on the verge of committing suicide could be – that is to say, doubtful. Stingily, he preserves and cultivates this state of his, not wanting to share it, even with Ioana, who to an extent resembles an incarnation of his soul in a world he doesn't belong to despite being in touch with it. Sandu is extremely refined and clearly has a university degree; he is clearly a Romanian writer who is part of the capital's literary milieu. As to the marriage, this is an issue of an exceedingly obscure nature, a fact that automatically strips it of value. One could only say their souls had been lovers. At any rate, Sandu's prototype (the writer himself) had already been married for some two years to Ioana's prototype (Maria Dumitrescu).

Another graduate of the department of literature and philosophy of the University of Bucharest was Mircea Eliade (1907-1986). Excepting the fact that he graduated in philosophy, there exists a mountain of other facts testifying to his personality: he performed research in India, studying Sanskrit, the Tibetan monasteries and the practices of Hinduism; initially, after returning from India, he became an assistant-professor in the department of literature and philosophy at the University of Bucharest, where he himself had studied; after this he became a cultural attaché in London (1940), a cultural counselor in Lisbon (1941-1944), and a lecturer in the history of religion in Paris (1946-1948); he was invited to be a visiting professor at the University of Chicago in 1956-1957 and

subsequently held a chair and was a coordinator at the department of history of religion (renamed the Mircea Eliade department in 1985); he was a member and later a president of the American Society for the Study of Religion and also a member of the Belgian Royal Academy and Dr. honoris causa in many universities; and, finally, he was enormously prolific in literary, scientific, publicist and editorial activities, the 1930s being a particularly fruitful time for his fiction writing. Overall, his personality has provided a significant amount of material to his biographers – seemingly he is better known as a researcher of Yoga, occult practices, comparative religion studies, and other fields, than as a novelist and prose writer, even though it is precisely there – in his novels – that I think he contrived to express himself as completely as was possible. As a young man, Eliade was divided between the mysticism of the East and the modernity of the West, something which probably magnetized him more than the Romanian perspective. *Maitreyi* (1933) is considered to be his finest piece of literary work, which, put criminally briefly, represents the striking of balance in a love affair tempted by psychoanalysis. This novel is preceded by only one completed work of fiction, *Isabel and the Devil's Waters* (*Isabel Și Apele Diavolului*) (1930), an overt and purposeful analysis of the youth's sexuality. In *Maitreyi* – a novel considered rather Anglo-Saxon and openly based upon his diaries – Eliade openly aims to see the Anglo-Saxon and then the Asian in the mirror, to find someone else within himself. Spiritualism, which is as old as myth, hunts this fusion with a feverish eroticism, which is as glamorous as could be in the consciousness of a twenty-six-year-old European, or at least what is often "the only white man" in the surroundings – an engineer with a university degree from somewhere in Europe, the narrator/protagonist in *Maitreyi* whose name was *Alan*. The more his story progresses, the more he is transformed from an engineer devoted to construction works into a young man of words with definite literary and philosophical inclinations and a talent to suffer; the deeper he falls into newfound inner vibrations, the more he becomes an owner of a reeling mentality and health, devoted to self deconstruction. He finds himself in the *wilderness* of an unknown country, the single holder of an unknown that is turning into a *desert* of consciousness. In addition, he is the complete, young bachelor.

If I were to mention here a couple of other narrators/protagonists they would seem completely suitable to the sort of stereotype I am outlining – Miloš Crnjanski's Petar Raic from *Diary of Charnoevic* (1921) and Juan or Ivan Bistrov from Boris Shivachev's *The Inventor* (1931) – and one would

initially notice how similar these characters are, and it would be not until later that the differences start to show. But if I were to mention Proust's Marcel, Joyce's Leopold Bloom, or even Stephen Dedalus, I do not think it would turn out in exactly the same way. First thing, then, comes the distinction...

Boris Shivachev (1902-1932) was a Bulgarian. He was a writer who remained in the shadows. He died at a very early age and *The Inventor* is the only book he published. On top of this, the book was banned immediately after publication, leaving it almost entirely unknown until near the end of the century. And yet this is probably the novel most approximate to the idea of the psychological novel in the Bulgarian literary reality of the period. Georgi Raichev, for example, was Bulgaria's most famous psychological writer, though he never wrote a novel. The somewhat outshined narrator/protagonist in *The Inventor*, Juan, has similar features to both Alan and Sandu, or to Ștefan... The Argentinean environment made of him a noticeable European, or at least a Southeastern European, that was thrown away in Latin America. He might not be "the only white man", but at the end of his story he was simply the only man in the wastelands of Patagonia. An adolescent with a degree in engineering, dosed in vanities and self-pity, passion and suffering, breakdowns and more breakdowns, he was torn between his ebullient sexuality and indications of homosexuality, which was treated as a disease and prohibited as a crime at the time. The way Shivachev dealt with this issue reminds me of Panait Istrati's "Chira Chiralina". Again, Juan walked the path from construction to deconstructing himself and from drawing up plans to keep on taking down notes of a quest for something unnamed. All this transformed him into creature that was similar to a madman. Alienation from civilization went in parallel with alienation from the outer world, a departing journey into one's self, where the remoteness of horizon began to resemble an identity... He was single, lonely and a virgin. Into the *wilderness* of Patagonia Juan – himself a *desert* – vanished without leaving a trace, except that poor notebook that was turned into the source for a novel, or at least that is what the author claimed. It would seem he broke through the mirror...

Miloš Crnjanski (1892-1977) is a Serb from the Vojvodina Province and his *Diary of Charnoevich* is perhaps one of the most prominent achievements in psychological prose in South Slavic literature. He was considered the creator of one of the manifestoes of Serbian postwar modernism and was a leading poet of the expressionist wing of Serbian

modernism. The poetic escape from reality, launched by Crnjanski, outlined the contours of reality itself. *Reality was self-accomplished through escaping itself...* In its appearance this novel is like pale-existentialistic pastel nuance upon warm aquarelles and a piece of extreme lyrical devotion of a poet and a broken man. Sad evidence of the incurable breakdown of an artist and the fatal deepening of his personality trauma is the other Crnjanski: submissive publicists and a man from the diplomatic service after the end of 1920s, a conformist or just a very tired man. Like all until now, the narrator/protagonist here also represented *otherness*. His name was Petar Raic. He was a veteran from the First World War and his journey of alienation from the outer world was almost complete at the time of his returning home. He was simply a dead man. Only the artist living within his personality was closing its eyes more slowly. But through the blurred and purposely unfocused sight we can recognize the silhouette of an at least outwardly young European, an ex-sculptor... In fact "ex" is all there is left of him except for the transparent suffering whole he had turned into. Somewhere, so far and away, where dreams play childish games, perched upon the horizon, and where past and future seem to be one and the same thing... somewhere there he had a sense of community, youth, a university degree, wife, mental health – he was an artist and he had a life. But that was so long ago... Nothing of these had any value any more: even his wife – his closest Other – was already living across the street, which was actually much more. Now the only thing he was left with was a diary and a *desolate tract* – an inner and outer *desert* – to describe before the final smile of the void.

The writers, whose fiction we are trying to focus upon here, are well-known personalities such as Camil Petrescu, Anton Holban and Mircea Eliade. They have been gone a long time. We only have their words left. And what we used to forget all the time – we who dwell upon these words of theirs – is that they were also human beings of flesh and blood who – just like us – have felt naked, dumb and frightened...

The novel is built around the human being. Every novel is the story (or the history) of one or more human beings. The Psychological novel, put briefly, is a first-person narrative of one's own self, which, in one way or another, is searching for itself or for its Self. The narrator/protagonist in these stories is constant prey for Simplegades, constantly between Scylla and Charybdis, persistently in the maelstrom formed *intentionally* by continuously complicating interpersonal relationships, persistently inlaid

somewhere in the strata of all kinds of problems and dilemmas that one can find on the modern market of the soul. The narrator/protagonist in these stories is frequently also the generator and accelerator of the same troubles, where, after a time, the reader can find his own fossils. This might be his way of eluding the more severe questions that life, the world and the universe place before his eyes or even load upon his shoulders. Could we claim it is not a routine even for us today? In these stories, the narrator/protagonist appears to be desperately trying to find his identity, while stubbornly escaping it. He reaches for his self-definition while turning away from it and taking a step into the abyss he appears to be. But is it indeed true that sinking with a one-way ticket into one's self means escapism, evading the problem, getting round and endless delay, common surviving and vegetating...? For sure, this could be true; however I do not think this is the case here, with these stories, protagonists and authors. I do think that they all represent some kind of *otherness* – a feeling I get from the suggestive whisper, drifting from their part – that is a sort of knowledge they more or less possess...

Stories, they say, are few, and mankind has been repeating and will repeat them over and over again until the end of time. The first story is about a fortified and besieged city, whose defense is doomed to failure. This is a story about every Troy, or perhaps it is about the subject – fortified and besieging him or herself. The second story is about every search filled with impediments, about every Jason in his search for the Golden Fleece, and maybe this is the story about the search for the Other and his acknowledgement, or about the subject – searching for and simultaneously searched by him or herself. The third story is about every long return, or every Odyssey on his way back to Ithaca. This could be the story of the subject looking for his or her way back home and being that home at the same time...

The first story, they say, is about the city – fortified and besieged, about the subject – fortified and besieging him or herself. I imagine them all as a prepared city – a consciousness, fortified, more or less, against everyone else, where sometimes even its own soul can not break in; a consciousness drawn into a certain personal space, a *desert*, or *heart of darkness*, where it could achieve the dreamt of self-revelation and self-definition. And I imagine that *same* consciousness also besieging itself in order to break through *itself*, aiming to pierce and transcend itself towards a greater sense. Initially one needed to outline, define and express his identity as limpidly as possible and then one might transcend

it. Somehow they needed their identity in order not to need it anymore... *The desert was the way*. Into the wilderness – sooner or later every one of them found himself roaming the wilderness and the wilderness itself roamed through every one of them. And all of them brought with them something to be sacrificed and a diary to kill with. After all, the narrator/protagonist's besetting sin in these psychological novels was the diary he left behind. None of these novels concealed the fact it was an artifact, and all of them were in fact more or less based on personal notes. One could even sense the books' cool striving to articulate themselves. Each resembled a system of mirrors, a narcissistic ensemble, which all the time was rearranged and adjusted in the search of certain old or proper new angles. Perhaps then it was not by accident that one of the chapters in *The Last Night of Love, the First Night of War* was called *Between a Couple of Mirrors*, or that initially *Death That Proves Nothing* was called *Parallel Mirrors*. Of course, Petrescu and Holban were both admirers of Proust anyway. Through the use of the first-person the narrator/protagonist devoted himself to a painful process of zooming in his lens upon his mirror image like someone who has faced the mirror, undisturbed and on his own. Even when staring into someone else's eyes, into the eyes of the Other, he was actually seeking his own reflection. Even when he scrutinized Ella, or Ioana, or Maitreyi, he was seeking an image, a notion, a conception or solution of his own. And in this we are the voyeurs, enticed into his boudoir. As for his diary, perhaps it was his only crime... All these were more or less diaries of an intellectual from that time and location. Ștefan Gheorghidiu, Sandu and Alan, as well as Juan and Petar Raic could all be classified as Southeastern European intellectuals. What does this mean? After all, only a real intellectual could summarize while speaking aloud the entirety of human philosophical science while together with a naked young woman in bed, as did Ștefan Gheorghidiu...

Socio-derivative identity by its nature is dependant on society, said Charles Taylor. *Social acknowledgement is built into the socio-derivative aspect of identity by force of the fact it is based upon social categories, which everyone takes on trust*. On getting inside these very narratives it is mostly the social aspect of the narrator/protagonist's identity that we meet. Indeed, this is the way we are used to acting in real-life situations where social status comes first. It is not until then that we start to discover other strata and dimensions of the other in an on-going communication.

They were all men, young men with higher education and also men of words – intellectuals placed in non-intellectual situations, whether

voluntarily or not, where they forced themselves to photosynthesize their limpid self-conscious intellectuality. The intellectual was seemingly a comparatively new appearance of an old romantic position, which had its presence in each epoch. They were neither rich nor poor, but were living a *modest life*, which was mainly a personal choice. They all had certain social positions and social concepts, were always critical or at least skeptical towards politics, but at the same time always distant and intermediated by the personal and intimate modes of their points of view. One could say they were building around themselves walls of private manias in order not to mix with all those sophisticated and needless worldly matters. Even when drafted into the very core of world events, even being Ștefan Gheorghidiu on the front line, mingled with and killing others to survive, even then he perceived in all this a *desert* of his own, something more – a wished-for one... Being among people was always felt to pollute and infect self-perception. They all needed the *desert* in order to outline themselves. Call it desolation of the battlefields somewhere in the surroundings of Sibiu, if you wish, or that of the inhumanly deserted Caverna Port, the dusk jungles of India or the similar unsure moisture in the wastelands of Patagonia, or possibly home itself, which on returning there one day he found had been transformed by a certain broken mood of autumn merely into an open and waiting grave. *If the circumstances did not take them there – into this desert of theirs – they would invent it by themselves anyway.* Even before their desert that was to come, in society and among people they alienated themselves by all means available, fortifying themselves with books and music, or prolific and elaborated complexes or obsessions. Ștefan and Sandu had their Bucharest, the old, glittering and fashionable Bucharest of the good times; Alan: his Calcutta with the cozy house of the engineer and all those lodgings; Juan: a Buenos Aires of his own, especially by night; and Petar Raic: his unnamed native town, the town of his mother. And gradually no one was left – in that wilderness – except the narrator/protagonist and the Other, his partner, oddly made to resemble an identity by the remoteness. Before withdrawing, they all carefully estranged themselves from this background. They desperately needed another empty canvas, a certain personal space, which became tangible, which, by delineating their difference from the others, delineating the unique and genuine issues within them, would enable them to reach out for some self-definition. They reached out for self-revelation through *authenticity*. In order to reveal and comprehend themselves, they had to define, delineate themselves,

to articulate and interpret these issues, in the form, for instance, of a diary, or – why not? – a novel.

Comprehension of the self is an interpretation, said Paul Ricoeur. *In its turn amongst other signs and symbols interpretation finds in the narrative a privileged mediator*. And thus the story of one's life could grow to be a fictional history, or even at times a historic fiction.

The concept of modernity that each one of us has his or her own way of being human requires from each of us that we find out what it really means to be ourselves. And people discover what they should be on turning it into a way of life, expressing through words and action the original issue in their selves. Thus the modern idea of the individual is somewhat expressionistic because of the conception of achieving revelation through expression. Here one can perceive the connection between self-revelation and fiction. In times of modernity, fiction became a paradigm of self-definition. The creator somehow turned into the paradigmatic case of human existence, in so far as he accomplished original self-definition. That intellectual was the narrator/protagonist in the Southeastern European psychological novel, a phenomenon that probably crowned the general subjectivist change to modernity in literature. The path to his self-revelation went through the creation, through the making of something original and innovative; or through murdering something, which could be perceived as a creation... Self-revelation requires creation. Creation is interpretation. Interpretation is comprehension of the self. The mission that fell on delicate shoulders of art, literature, and the psychological novel in particular, with its fragile protagonist, was neither simple nor painless, especially in the years after the First World War. The narrator/protagonist in all of these novels naturally turned towards the inside, towards experience and subjectivity. But such an act would not simply signify a turning towards oneself, which then follows to be articulated and thus revealed, provided revelation really is achievable, through expression and stopping at that point – dipped in and stuck into a subject; a turning towards the inside could take us further, beyond the self, towards structures outside of the self... Thus, in order to find his way through the mirror, the narrator/protagonist needed to identify himself, to define his identity. His modern identity represented his authenticity or the modern ideal of authenticity. To be himself, to be true to himself, would then mean being true to his originality, to his own genuineness, which only he could express and reveal. By expressing that issue he at the same time defined and defied himself. Thus he realized

an opportunity which was only his own. This was the basis on which the modern ideal of authenticity unfolded and on which people set themselves the aims of self-expression and self-realization, to which is usually connected the ideal concerned.

Breaking off the old habits, discrediting the previous "moral horizons" led us to gain the new freedom. They call this change "disenchantment" of the world. People got rid of the magic together with the passion. They raised the lath of pleasure too high. They focused upon their individual existence at the price of the breadth of their horizons, the reduction of dimensions, the loss of their aims. If once people used to say they had "horizons", now they say they have "a point of view". The new ideal is for them to be true to themselves, that is to say, genuineness and authenticity. Authenticity began to be comprehended in similar way to beauty – as authenticity for authenticity's sake. This brings authenticity and art closer. Authenticity would be convulsive or it wouldn't be at all, one might say, using the words of Breton. If comprehension of the self is an interpretation then interpretation leads us towards comprehension of the self. But is it true that comprehension of the self, self-revelation and self-definition is the real aim? The Golden Core, the Philosophical Stone, Shangri-La, Avalon, the Island of the Blessed, the Holy Grail, the Parrot with the Color of an Orange, the Blue Flower, the Aim of the Aims... In fact, the real aim could be the very searching and the process of interpretation itself. It might be that the questions are more important than the answers and, after that, the aim-like-horizon, the always-receding-aim would be the real aim...

When he strived to comprehend what it means to define himself, to specify what it was that constituted his genuineness, he saw immediately that he must take as a basis the sense all that is significant. To define himself meant discovering his characteristic from others. And he could only determine his identity against the background of the things that were significant. Authenticity was not incompatible with requirements that came from outside the self; in fact, it premised them. But he needed to be left to go alone into the *desert* to face them.

Some issues that were transcendent to the self were needed and they always have been. I believe the narrators/protagonists of our interwar psychological novel somehow unconsciously realized this, albeit not clearly. Consciously, subconsciously or unconsciously – this has always been the aim of the aims, and the way towards such an aim passes through

our selves, through the mirror, amidst a wilderness of our own. We need first to find ourselves in order to step over.

The Golden Fleece

Stories, they say, are few, and mankind has been repeating and will repeat them over and over again until the end of time... *The second story* is about every search filled with impediments, about every Jason in his search for the Golden Fleece, and maybe this is the story about the search for the Other and his acknowledgement, or about the subject – searching for and simultaneously searched by him or herself.

Love is a basic problem in literature as literature is a frequent topic in the conversations of those in love. Love and death went together in modern culture as did Laurel and Hardy. Love and death are *identical* notions in so far as within their essence they deny the individual existence, in so far as they *transcend* the limits of the particular individual. Death is what ruins the discontinued human being. It is a *stepping over the limits* which that human being identifies with himself. Love is a *psychological* search. Unfolding itself, love ruins the structure of the enclosed being, what each one represents out of it. It is disturbing because it breaks the self-possession of the individual; it breaks the possessing of this existing and fixed individuality within each one. Love is communication, which, in its essence, represents a searching for a possible continuity for the discontinued human being. It is a *stepping over the limits* of the individual, a *transcending* of the individual existence.

One might meet that pink-and-black unity at every step while walking the path of the art of modernity. However I perceive a touch of difference here: *love and death, and their unity, were the basic obsession of the Southeastern European psychological novel*. Petrescu's title *The Last Night of Love, the First Night of War* is emblematic. Who could say war didn't mean death? In fact, I believe war is an attribute of death and not quite the contrary.

A common feature of human life, said Charles Taylor, *is its fundamentally dialogic character. People become complete representatives of human kind, capable of comprehending themselves, hence of defying their identity, through acquiring the treasure of human languages of expression, including those of art, gesture and love. But people acquire them through exchange with the others. No one, on his*

own, could achieve the languages needed for his or her self-determination. Namely, the connection between expression and the finding of the self, creation and self-revealing, transformed the intellectual, the creator, the narrator/protagonist, into the paradigmatic case of complete human existence in so far as he accomplished original self-definition, no matter how tragic and contradictory he was, and even because of that. People are expected to develop their own opinions, conceptions, and positions to a considerable extent by self-dependent reflection. But how could anyone manage to resolve significant issues, such as all the questions surrounding identity, without having the means to do so? This issue is resolved in dialog with the others – partly open, partly interior. The narrator/protagonist needed a certain personal space – a *desert* of his own to define and defy himself, to realize and accomplish himself, but he also desperately needed the Other for the same purpose and more. The so-called *desert*, which became touchable, meant *the way* to do that. And I think he knew that the *Other* meant *the means* to do that – the acknowledgement and the language to express, and, of course, the very impulse towards transcending. The development of the modern ideal of inwardly conceived identity gave a new significance to the acknowledgement on the part of the other. His own identity depended on his dialogical relationships with the Other. Each of the aspects of his identity – personal, social or national identity – was dependent on the closest others, or the others in his social milieu, or those from a larger region, but always others. In those moments, when the other is confused and not completely connected with his or her context, we are able to penetrate as deep as we ever could, into him or her, because this self-incomprehensibility is also valid for our own selves. One comprehends the other when one realizes that what bothers one about the other, the other's enigmatic nature, is also one's own problem. If the other still remains puzzling, the very cause of this must lie in the other's own self-incomprehensibility. What makes the other difficult to access is the fact that he or she is first of all never completed, never entirely determined from the context but always somewhat "open" and "drifting". The dimension of the universal appears when that what is lacking – both from him and that of the other – are put together. *What one and the unattainable other share is the vacant denotative in the place of X, which eludes both of them*, said Terry Eagleton. We are all discontinued human beings and all we can share is to take a peep into the gap between us... The universal is that break through or crack in one's identity which opens from the

inside towards the other and prevents one from completely defining him or herself with any sort of a context. But this is our way of belonging to the context, and not to miss it. *Tempestuous disruption that comes after connecting the universal with a particular content is what we know as a human subject. Human existing is moving into the conjuncture of what is particular and what is universal, that of the body and the symbolic environment. And this is not a place where one could feel like home.*

Raising the problem of identity is symptomatic. For sure, in pre-modern times people also had identities and these identities were also dependant on the acknowledgement of others, but clearly that issue was not so problematic as in the period we are talking about. The ideal of authenticity forms both the social and the intimate aspect of identity. In the social aspect, people maintain a permanent policy of equal acknowledgement. However, the inwardly conceived identity does not have that a priori acknowledgement. On an intimate level they are able to conceive how much an original identity needs the acknowledgement, given or refused, of others – the closest others – and to what extent it is vulnerable by its absence. In the culture of authenticity, private relationships are considered as key-positions of self-revelation and self-approval. Love relations are important, and not only because of the general focus of modern culture on the satisfaction of common needs; they are also decisive because they are a kind of test of the inwardly conceived identity.

In the wilderness – sooner or later every one of them found himself roaming there and the wilderness itself roamed through every one of them. And sooner or later they found themselves in the maelstrom, squeezed in-between Scylla and Charybdis. In one sense or another, this worsening vortex of interpersonal relationships was a complete invention of theirs. Ștefan and Sandu created their mysterious and somehow immaterial third angle in their love triangles by themselves and almost out of thin air. Alan confidently took actions to loose Maitreyi, keeping his decisions always on the opposite strand. The more his disgust for the inventor grew, the more Juan strived to get closer to that mythologized evil creature and his wife, who, on the top of this, was the untouchable beloved. Petar Raic precisely engraved an autumn of his own in his entire inner space, turning himself skillfully into an *authumn-holic*, intentionally wiping out the woman he loved and devoting himself to an apathy he grew and painted with care. Since the great mental suffering was comprehended as the obvious and probably the only passageway to the inner depths the narrator/protagonist made violent efforts to obtain more

and more pain. There was plenty of worldwide suffering in the years between the World Wars, however, but of a totally different nature. He needed a pain of his own. He found or invented – or both – the proper way, created the suitable circumstances, chose the required medium and drove deep into the mirror at the right moment, when the last break had come. Inside his mind he made not castles in the air but real flaws and then he used all the optics of his imagination to turn them into gaps to explore. But there was one more thing: he had to delude himself and the others about the purpose of his intentions because living in our world with a transcendent statute would be self-annihilating. In other people's eyes he was a self-tortured, introverted creature, whose exaggerated sensibility has condemned to a futile pining. So he fortified himself within and set off on a quest while simultaneously besieging himself and being the quest's goal himself, though not quite.

The narrator/protagonist in these stories was clear about the values' currency of the day. Most likely he knew that the most valuable thing he had – the opportunity to realize, to accomplish himself – was extremely dependent on the Other. And in the end he always realized the negative side of his relationships with his most valuable Other. The Other, was the first to give acknowledgement to his personal, inwardly conceived identity. Then, in the middle of that self-invented *desert* of his own, at ease and methodically he sacrificed his *love* for the Other, whom he had brought there himself. *He was self-accomplished through escaping himself.* The narrator/protagonist prepared everything about this breakdown by himself. Then he used the pieces of that collapse to create a horrifying tension, to stretch his own limits. And he missed a lot of opportunities to quit while all this – to which he was devoted – in people's eyes looked like escapism. In fact, I believe it was a reach out for universal issues beyond his depths. Because nothing could resemble the *universal* more than that which is purely *essential*, simply taken alone without external relations. The *universal* is not just the opposite of the *individual*, just as the narrator/protagonist is not simply the opposite of the common human being, but its own paradigm. In the very *essence* of a thing, in its particular core and taste, we can find that which *transcends* its ordinary characteristics. *Individuality* is the mediator of the *universal*, while the peculiar characteristics are absolutely accidental. Art reproduces individual things in the form of their universal essences and thus makes them unique. During this process art turns them from accidental into indispensable, from dependable into free. The esthetic artifact is one of the great

resolutions modernity gave to one of its toughest problems: that irritating relationship between what is individual and what is universal. Thus questions concerning esthetics appear frequently as society is less capable to spare time for art. Conscious of this or not, this knowledge sprang from the narrator/protagonist in the Southeastern European psychological novel between the World Wars like a suggestive otherness.

What is peculiar about the creating symbols being is that it is in its nature to transcend itself, said Terry Eagleton. It is in human nature to create excesses. It would be unnatural for human beings not to exceed themselves. Human nature is naturally unnatural, going beyond the measure simply by virtue of what it represents. That is the way we are constructed and aspirations excel our needs. A certain potential of affluence is built into us and then every real situation owns a certain hidden, unrealized potential.

If we want to understand modern art, we must distinguish these two kinds of subjectivities. The first is that distorted by the *instrumental mind* and the ideologies of the *egocentric manifestation* stuck into the blind alley of one self's inner shallows. The other is the subjectivity that aims not at the self but at something beyond the self, something beyond the mirror... Some of the greatest writers of the 20th century are subjectivist writers in this second sense – Rilke, Elliot, Pound, Joyce, Mann etc., all of whom explore some kind of order beyond the self. I believe the case of the so-called psychological novel from Southeastern European and its representatives is similar. I believe also that authors like Camil Petrescu, Anton Holban, Mircea Eliade, Boris Shivachev, and Miloš Crnjanski, whether they gave us masterpieces or not, explored some structures outside the self and gave us indications of this.

Odyssey

Proust says the novel is a mirror held up to life. The virtue of the work is in the quality of the mirror, not of the life it reflects. What if the mirror is a novel held up to your eyes? There is recognition that life, as we live it, is not particularly linear, and that a really accurate mirror held up to it would portray this deflection of line. Life itself is more of a spiral than a straight line. In a perfect spiral you would end up back where you began, meaning nowhere; but in a real-life spiral you get closer, if not to the goal, than at least to some result, entropy, age and death... *Sometimes*

the long way round is the shortest way home, said Joyce – a nice, strange device for the banner of twentieth-century literature. Why a spiral and not a progression? Because the narrator/protagonist is exactly there where he was, but only worse. Stories, they say, are few and mankind has been repeating and will repeat them over and over again till the end of time. *The third story* is about every long return, or about every Odyssey on his way back to Ithaca. This could be the story about the subject looking for his or her way back home and being that home at the same time.

Epilogue

Stories are few they say and there is one more: *the last one*. This is a story about the sacrifice of a god, about the death of Egyptian Osiris, about the mutilation and murder of the Phrygian Attis, about the underworld trip of Sumerian Ishtar, about the tearing of the Thracian Dionis, about Baal, about Odin, sacrificed in the name of Odin, about Jesus, crucified on the cross of the Romans... This could be a story about stretching and stepping over the limits of the individual, about transcending the discontinued being, about transcending self-consciousness by sinking deeper into it, about the self beyond the self, although we are all naked, dumb and horrified; a story about the sacrifice upon the secret altar of the universal or just about an author, who wanted to kill something within himself and therefore created. This must be the story of the one and only human being existing in the world. Whoever or whatever you ask as to who that human being really is, to whomever or whatever you appeal, everything always whispers: *you*.

The end

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ADORNO, T.W., "Aesthetics Theory", Agata-A, Sofia, 2002
- POLLINAIRE, G., "Literary Criticism", Lik, Sofia, 1998
- BATAILLE, G., "The Eroticism", AE, Sofia, 1998
- BORGES, J.L., "Selected Works", Lik, Sofia, 1998
- CHILDS, P., "Modernism", Routledge, London – New York, 2000
- CRNJANSKI, M., "Migrations. Diary of Charnoevich", DI "Narodna Kultura", Sofia, 1981
- CROHMĂLMICEANU, O. S., "Cinci Prozatori în Cinci Feluri de Lectură", Cartea Românească, Bucharest, 1984
- "Detraditionalization: Critical Reflections on Authority and Identity"/Edited by Paul Heelas, Scott Lash and Paul Morris, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1999
- "Dicționar de Literatură Română. Scriitori, Reviste, Curente", Univers, Bucharest, 1979
- EAGLETON, T., "Literary Theory: An Introduction", Blackwell Publishing, MA – Oxford, Malden, 1996
- EAGLETON, T., "The Idea of Culture", Blackwell Publishing, MA – Oxford, Malden, 2000
- ELIADE, M., "Maitreyi", Gramar, Bucharest, 2002.
- "Encyclopedia of World Literature in the 20th Century", Frederik Ungar Publishing Co., New York, 1982
- FOWLER, R., "Dictionary of the Current Literary Terms", Sofia, 1993
- GIDDENS, A., "Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age", Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1991
- HOLBAN, A., "O Moarte Care Nu Dovedește Nimic. Ioana", Editura de Vest, Timisoara, 1993
- IGOV, S., "History of the Bulgarian Literature", Sofia, 2002
- "Leksikon Pisaca Jugoslavije", Matica Srpska, Belgrade, 1972
- MANOLESCU, N., "Arca lui Noe: Eseu Despre Romanul Românesc", Gramar, Bucharest, 2004
- "Modernity and Identity"/Edited by Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman, Blackwell, Oxford, U.K.; Cambridge, U.S.A., 1992
- MUȘAT, C.M., "The Romanian Novel", Literary and Art Magazine, 1(5) – 1997
- PETRESCU, C., "*Ultima Noapte De Dragoste, Întâia Noapte de Razboi*", Gramar, Bucharest, 2002
- RICCER, P., "Myself As Someone Else", "EA" AD – Pleven, 2004
- SARTRE, J.P., "Literary Criticism (Situations, I)", Sofia, 1996
- SEIMOUR-SMITH, M., "Guide to the Modern World Literature", The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1985
- SHIVACHEV, B., "The Inventor", Hemus, Sofia, 1992
- TAYLOR, C., "Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition", Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994

TAYLOR, C., "Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity", Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000

TAYLOR, C., "The Ethics of Authenticity", Harvard University Press, London, England, 1999

The New Encyclopaedia Britannica In 32 Volumes, Chicago; Auckland; London [...], Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1994

"Theory of the Novel: A Historical Approach"/Edited by Michael McKeon, Baltimore & London, The John Hopkins University Press, 2000



ALEXANDER VEZENKOV

Born in 1971, in Sofia, Bulgaria

PhD in History, University of Sofia (2001)

Dissertation: *Urbanization Process and Demographic Changes in Bulgaria (1944-1989)*

Fellowship of the Center of Advanced Study, Sofia, *Roles, Identities and Hybrids* Project (2003-2004)

Fellowship of the Center of Advanced Study, Sofia and Collegium Budapest, *We, the People* Project (2005)

Participation in international conferences in Bucharest, Budapest, Istanbul

Articles on 19-20 cc. urban history, institutional history of the communist regimes, language policy

THE SYSTEM OF *NOMENKLATURA*: THE CASE OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (1944-1989)

The term *nomenklatura* is widely and somewhat imprecisely used to designate the elite that existed during the communist period. It has clearly negative connotations and is the preferred term among critics of this elite, although it was in fact borrowed from the political language used by the Communist Party itself. Used as a synonym for expressions such as “the new class” or “the red bourgeoisie”, for most people the word *nomenklatura* implies an unjustly privileged elite.

The fact that a privileged elite existed is beyond question, but the popular view of the *nomenklatura* as *elite* is in need of revision. First of all, this use of *nomenklatura* is not based on the actual meaning of the term. The word ‘nomenclature’ literally means a list of names. It is used in different domains –, e.g. in science (list of terms used in a particular scientific discipline or field) and economics (the list of the products of an enterprise). In the administrative world, it usually refers to a totality of positions whose holders are appointed, controlled, transferred or dismissed by a specific body.

The *nomenklatura* is not simply a list of privileged people, but a *control mechanism* invented by the Communist Party leaders. Cadres of the *nomenklatura* are always cadres of a certain body, and thus the denomination implies not only high rank but also subordination to an even higher leading body. It is neither by omission nor by mistake that the members of the two highest bodies of the Communist Party leadership – the Politburo and the Secretariat – are not listed among *nomenklatura* cadres. In addition, instead of being a more or less homogeneous group, the *nomenklatura* is organized in a strict hierarchy: leading party bodies at different levels had their own lists, and *nomenklatura* cadres of the Politburo were hardly comparable to those of a local committee.

Dissidents (M. Djilas)¹ and emigrants (M. Voslensky)² helped popularize this topic but also misled the general public into perceiving

the *nomenklatura* as a group and privileged elite. They used the Marxist theory that the state is an instrument of exploitation in the hands of the ruling class and turned it against “actually existing socialism”, pointing the finger at the “new class” or “*nomenklatura*.” At the time, this interpretation was of enormous political importance because it demonstrated that some of the main claims of the communist regimes were groundless – those countries were *not* ruled by the working class and socialist society was *not* egalitarian. However, this theory is of very limited use if we want to understand the way communist countries were governed. That the elite enjoyed better living standards than the rest of the people is not a unique characteristic of communist regimes. If there is something characteristic here, it is that these higher living standards were usually the result of having a higher level in the party or state hierarchy.

Still, the main purpose of the *nomenklatura* system for the party leadership was to achieve effective control of the country and the party as a whole. Numerous reliable sources testify that this was the initial goal of Stalin and his collaborators when they designed the *nomenklatura* system. Seen from this perspective, the privileges enjoyed by *nomenklatura* cadres appear to be a problem of secondary importance. This paper aims to present the *nomenklatura* or more precisely the *nomenklatura of cadres* as one of the key mechanisms of the political system of communist regimes: the control of the Communist Party leadership of all important appointments, promotions and dismissals.

Publications. There already exists a large range of studies dealing with the *nomenklatura* system. While dissidents and emigrants have criticized the privileged in “actually existing socialism”, western scientists, with their focus on the Soviet Union³ and other East European countries,⁴ have begun to examine the *nomenklatura* as a political mechanism of rationalization and systematization of party control of state and society. A number of publications also deal with China, where the topic continues to arouse interest.⁵ Secrecy is the main reason for the gaps in these studies and this shortage was gradually if incompletely repaired since the opening of the former communist parties’ archives after 1989. Studies already based on archival evidence were published on *nomenklatura* in the GDR,⁶ Poland,⁷ Czechoslovakia,⁸ Hungary,⁹ Romania,¹⁰ and the USSR,¹¹ many of which included publications of the original lists. This project is an attempt to go further in that direction by looking at an unstudied case. At the same time, many publications focus

on the social composition of the nomenklatura, regarding it as an elite and dealing mostly with the *conversion of the elites* in former communist countries after 1989.¹²

Archives and sources. The present article examines the nomenklatura system in Bulgaria based on archival material from the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (until December 1948 officially known as the *Bulgarian Worker's Party /Communists/*). For comparative purposes, nomenklatura lists as well as other relevant documents from the archives of the central committees of the ruling parties in Romania, Hungary and the former GDR were used.

First of all, the study relies on *lists of nomenklatura cadres* for the party bodies that have the right to manage cadres (nearly all the lists concerning the nomenklatura of the Central Committee (CC) and many other lists for the lower levels were consulted). For CC nomenklatura these are lists described as nomenklatura managed by the sector (later department) Cadres of the CC from June 1945,¹³ January 1947,¹⁴ 1948,¹⁵ the instructions for compiling the nomenklatura of October and November 1949¹⁶, and a list from 1950.¹⁷ In the following years there are several lists from 1951, detailing nomenklatura cadres managed by specific departments,¹⁸ and a very short list of cadres managed by the Department for Work among Women from June 1954.¹⁹

Common lists of the CC nomenklatura cadres began to reappear and were reviewed regularly starting in the mid 1950s (an unapproved list from April 1955²⁰ with a corrected and approved version in June of the same year,²¹ an unapproved project from June 1957²² approved with amendments in March 1958,²³ and various lists from June 1961,²⁴ January 1967,²⁵ February 1970,²⁶ December 1974,²⁷ July 1978²⁸ and May 1980²⁹ with amendments from October 1987.³⁰ Meanwhile, various decisions and changes were made –, i.e. changing the level of control over certain positions, the addition of newly created positions to the lists, decisions for determining the list of nomenklatura positions managed by certain newly created departments. In most cases, the changes were not reflected until the lists were updated as a whole. Similar lists exist for the nomenklatura of the local committees. During early years they were compiled in parallel with those for the CC and were standardized. Later, however, they were prepared at a local level in keeping with the indications, and under the control, of the apparatus of higher bodies. These lists are obviously the most impressive single documents. Beside these, this study also uses the instructions for cadre selection, the

organization of apparatus work, the compilation and storage of the cadre files, reports on cadre policy (usually suggesting improvements), etc.

In order to examine how the rules were applied into practice, a large number of decisions on appointments and dismissals were also consulted. These include decisions taken by the leading party bodies and other institutions which serve only to repeat a previous decision by a party body. In some cases the documents explicitly quote the decision of the party body, others only mention the decision on the back of the document, while sometimes there is no reference at all and the preceding party decision can only be found in the party archives. Another possible source is that of the *nomenklatura cadres' files*, but these have only been partially accessible and as such not very useful when examined one by one. These include formal documents, such as a short autobiography, information about the person in question describing the positions that he/she had held and the decisions taken in respect of those appointments, and other personal records, which, however, were not updated on a regular basis.³¹

Beside archival material, two main types of sources were also taken into consideration. The first of these is given by the memoirs written by leading members of the regime, which contain reliable information about appointments and dismissals and describe the body that made the decisions concerning those appointments and dismissals and the circumstances in which those decisions were taken. Only a few attempt to record the information concerning cadre policy in a systematic way.³² The second is that of official publications on "party building" from the communist period – although the *nomenklatura* was a classified topic,³³ these publications contain a number of insightful remarks, some of which are surprisingly sincere.

I. The *nomenklatura* pyramid

The *nomenklatura* system was adopted in the first years after the Communist Party takeover of September 1944 and underwent substantial changes during the first decade of its existence. From the late 1950s onwards, it took on a more stable form, which it maintained until the end of the communist regime.

First of all, we will present the *nomenklatura* system as it was during this approximately thirty-year period. This approach allows the system to be viewed in its most coherent form which is both easier to understand

and to describe. Only after this will we return to look at the process of its adoption, with all its turns and contradictions, and the important changes that took place. This will allow us to perceive the different points of conflict, which were settled in later years and became more difficult to understand. Before doing this, however, given that the nomenklatura system was organized according to the hierarchy of the leading bodies of the Communist Party, we will first present the basic features of its structure.

The highest permanent decision making body of the Communist Party was the *Politburo*, albeit in theory it was subordinated to the *Central Committee* (CC), which was in turn accountable to the party *Congress*. Although the most important decisions were submitted for approval to the CC, they had previously been adopted by the Politburo. In order to make the decision-making bodies function more effectively, an apparatus of permanent staff was assembled at the CC, a small number of whom were also members of the CC itself. The apparatus was divided into *departments* (*otdeli*), which were usually subdivided into *sectors*. The names and structure of the departments often changed but always covered the functioning of the party itself, the state apparatus (with its military, security, administrative, diplomatic, economic, social and cultural structures), ideology and propaganda, and all mass organizations. Irrespective of transformations and restructuring, it was always clear which part of the party apparatus was responsible for a given field, and no one of them remained without control. This apparatus was led and coordinated by the *secretaries* of the CC, who formed the *Secretariat* of the CC. Each of these was responsible for one or more of these departments or specific fields. Many scholars insist that, due to their control of the apparatus, the secretaries of the CC had more power over everyday affairs than the members of the Politburo (with the exception of those that were members of both bodies), including the selection of leading cadres. At a later stage this study will try to clarify the role of these two types of structures – collective leading bodies and party apparatus – in the appointment of leading cadres.

At lower levels, the network of party committees reflected the administrative division and was restructured after every administrative reform. Similar to the CC, local committees had a large collective leading body (county/district/city committee plenum) which only rarely held sessions. Each such committee had its own *bureau*, the most influential members of which being the secretaries of the respective local committee. One of these was the *first secretary* (initially the other secretaries were

known as the second secretary and, if available, third secretary, though later only the field for which the secretary was responsible was mentioned). Unlike in the CC, however, there was no separate bureau and secretariat – the secretaries being the most important members of the bureau and their authority went unquestioned. Attached to each of these committees was a party apparatus, which was similar to that at a central level though far simpler: the lower the level of the committee, the smaller and simpler the apparatus.

At the lowest level, Communist Party members were included in *primary party organizations* (PPO). The unusual feature of the PPOs was that they were not only formed on a territorial basis, as with party organizations in multiparty systems, but also in all institutions and enterprises. In fact, members of the local PPOs were mostly retired people, while the vast majority of Communist Party members were organized into PPOs at their place of work. In the big institutions and enterprises, where the number of party members was larger, bigger units were created, such as *plant* or *institutional* party committees (*zavodski* and *uchrejdenski partiini komiteti*). They, like the big PPO, also had a secretary and a bureau, but no apparatus. In institutions where centralized power was strictly preserved, party organizations were transformed into political departments (*politotdeli*) within the institutional framework.

The party committees of the territorial units had a higher rank than the corresponding state structures: the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee were ranked above the Council of Ministers and the State Council, the county/*okrąg* party committees above the executive committees of the county/*okrąg* people's council, and so on. At the same time, primary party organizations (PPO) and their derivatives, the *institutional* and *plant* party committees, were not superior to the administrative leaderships of the corresponding structures. Of course, these administrative leaderships were not short of party control. They were subordinated to party committees of the territorial hierarchy (*obshtina*, *city*, *okrąg* party committees) or the state institutions of higher rank (ministries, state committees, etc.). In turn, both ministries and local committees were subordinated, directly or through one more intermediary, to the central party leadership.

Nomenklatura cadres in the CC of the BCP. At a central level, the leading positions in the nomenklatura were defined as "nomenklatura cadres accountable to the CC of the BCP." (*Nomenklaturni kadri na otchet v TzK na BCP*). Initially, decisions were made by the party leadership

without any clear regulation. Later, however, the nomenklatura cadres in the CC of the BCP were subdivided into two, and finally three levels of decision making and control: 1) by the Politburo, 2) by the Secretariat, and 3) by the departments of the CC in the BCP.

Politburo. In the formal scheme of the nomenklatura lists, the cadres managed by the Politburo sit at the top of the pyramid. Appointments and dismissals from all the key positions in the country depended on this collective body. Its nomenklatura list is subdivided into three groups of positions: those in the party, those in the state institutions, and those in the mass organizations.³⁴

The first group includes the most important officials of the party. Within the apparatus of the CC, this meant only the heads of the departments and the few others who shared this rank. One Politburo appointed the secretaries of the county/*okräg* party committees (including not only the first secretaries but also the other secretaries), including the secretaries of the Sofia City Committee and, since 1975, the first secretaries of the two next largest cities of Plovdiv and Varna. This included also the editors in chief of the official party newspaper *Rabotnichesko delo* and its journal *Novo vreme*, the directors of the Institute of History of the BCP and of the Institute of Modern Social Theories, the chief director of the Publishing House of the BCP, and the rector of the Academy for Social Sciences and Social Management (known by its abbreviation AONSU). It should be emphasized here that even if the secretaries of the CC were of lower rank than the Politburo members, they were *not* listed among its nomenklatura cadres.

The second part of the Politburo list contains the most important state positions. It is here that we can see how the Party ruled the state by controlling the appointments to the highest state positions. The nomenklatura cadres of the Politburo were all members of the Presidium of the National Assembly (which became the State Council in 1971): the chairman, vice-chairmen, secretary and ordinary members; the members of the Council of Ministers (its president,³⁵ deputy prime-ministers and ministers) and the deputy ministers; the chairman and the vice-chairmen of the National Assembly; and the president and the vice-presidents of the Supreme Court and the chief prosecutor. The top army officials in the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff, as well as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and State Security, were appointed only after approval by the Politburo. The same was true for all ambassadors and plenipotentiary ministers. The Politburo appointed the presidents of other important

institutions at a central level, such as the National Bank or the Academy of Sciences. From the local administration level, the chairmen of the executive committees of the county/*okrăg* people's councils (as well as the people's council of the city of Sofia) were on the list.

In the third group of Politburo nomenklatura – that of mass organizations – included the chairman and the secretaries of the Central Council of the Bulgarian Professional Syndicates, the secretaries of the CC of the Dimitrov's Communist Youth Union, the chairman, the vice-chairmen and the secretaries of the Fatherland Front, as well as the chairmen of the other most important mass organizations, such as the Bulgarian Union for Physical Culture and Sport, the Union of the Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship Societies, the Central Committee of the Fighters against Fascism and Capitalism, the Committee of Bulgarian Women, etc. The Politburo approved the presidents of the various unions of artists (the so-called "creative unions").

The most important nominations, mainly concerning high state offices (Council of Ministers, State Council, etc.), were submitted for further approval to the CC Plenum.³⁶ These were purely matters of formality, taking no account of the discussions or in some cases even the objections of the candidates that had been "proposed" by the leadership, and were adopted unanimously, in some cases even without formal voting. Contrary to other communist parties (e.g. in the GDR after 1951, Czechoslovakia after 1952, Hungary after 1957, the Romanian list of 1968), the nomenklatura list of the CC of the BCP does not specify the positions to be "elected" by a CC Plenum (as with the members of the Politburo, Secretariat) or by the Party congress (as with the members of the CC).

The Secretariat. A characteristic feature of the nomenklatura managed by the Secretariat of the CC is its inclusion of positions ranked immediately below those listed for the Politburo. The number of positions managed by the Secretariat was much larger in number, but of less importance at the same time. This list included either the deputies and the immediate subordinates of the nomenklatura cadres in the Politburo or the heads of less important institutions. Among the party cadres, it included the deputies of the heads of the departments of the CC and the heads of sectors, etc., the members of the bureau of the *okrăg* party committees, the members of the editorial boards of the aforementioned *Rabotnichesko delo* and *Novo vreme*, and the heads of less important party institutions, such as the director of the National Museum "Gheorghe Dimitrov".

A similar situation is found for the state offices. The nomenklatura cadres in the Secretariat were the chief secretaries of the ministries (with the exception of those with the rank of deputy minister, who were nomenklatura in the Politburo). Other positions were listed according to ministries and institutions, with the number being very different. More clearly than with the Politburo list, here we can see how control mostly resides with certain key ministries such that the number is largest for the Ministry of National Defense, followed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Secretariat lists include the rectors of the universities and the directors of most of the national cultural institutions as well as the editors-in-chief for many central newspapers (e.g. *Otechestven front*, *Stārshel*) and journals. In terms of the mass organizations, we once again find the inclusion of various positions one step down in the hierarchy from the heads of the mass organizations, which were listed in the Politburo nomenklatura, as well as the presidents of some other slightly less important organizations such as the Bulgarian Olympic Committee, the Slavic Committee, etc.

With the exception of the heads of departments, the Secretariat appointed the whole political apparatus of the CC including political workers, the so-called instructors, as well as the whole staff of the Central Party Archive, the Institute of History of the BCP, and the National Museum "Gheorgi Dimitrov". The Secretariat exercised control over party education: it confirmed admissions as well as the appointment of those who had studied at top party educational institutions such as The High Party School and later the Academy for Social Sciences and Social Management.

It should be underlined at this stage that, contrary to the popular interpretation which sees the *whole* elite as being the nomenklatura, the members of the two highest party bodies – the Politburo and the Secretariat – of the CC of the BCP *were not* mentioned among the nomenklatura lists.³⁷ They were not in the nomenklatura; rather they were *above* the nomenklatura. At the same time, the members of these two bodies were able to control by accumulation the leading positions in the state institutions and mass organizations, which featured in the nomenklatura list of the party leadership. Obviously, the priority was given to their position in the party hierarchy.

The CC departments. At the third level there are the nomenklatura cadres of the CC departments. This is still only a "registered and controlled nomenklatura" ("*otchetno-kontrolna nomenklatura na TzK na BKP*") in

opposition to the “basic” (*osnovna*) nomenklatura of the Politburo and the Secretariat. The basic nomenklatura consists of positions to which appointments are made directly after a decision by the respective body. The denomination “registered and controlled nomenklatura” means that the listed positions were in the *basic* nomenklatura of lower party bodies or directly dependent on the administrative leadership of a certain state institution or mass organization. The body in whose basic nomenklatura the position existed took the decisions but had to “coordinate” this with the department in whose registered nomenklatura the position featured as well as with the secretary responsible for that department.³⁸ The approval was usually easy to get with the CC apparatus intervening only in cases of alleged wrongdoing where the case was referred to the Secretariat for a final decision.³⁹ This second type of nomenklatura is indicative of the overlap of control that existed in cadre appointments and the power sharing between party bodies at different levels. It is also symptomatic of the process of further transferring power from “elected” bodies to the party apparatus.

Nomenklatura positions are listed on a department by department basis, each being subdivided according to the institutions to which the positions in question belonged – for example, within the party these could be the heads of the respective departments in the *okrąg* committees, or, within the state apparatus, the leading officials from the ministries and key officials in the respective field at *okrąg* level who were in the *okrąg* committee nomenklatura.

Nomenklatura in the local committees of the BCP. At local level, the hierarchy of the party committees reflected the logic of the administrative division. The nomenklatura list of the local committees was initially compiled by the CC apparatus, in parallel with that from the central level, and was consequently standardized. This was the county/*oblast*, later the *okrąg*, committee nomenklatura and below it came the district/*okoliya* committees of the BCP. City and *rayon* committees were put on one and the same level as the *okoliya* committees. There were several versions of lists compiled from 1945 until 1950.⁴⁰ The cadre lists of the *okrąg* and *okoliya* committees were specified for a longer period through a circular of the CC of 13 January 1950.⁴¹ In January 1958, the Politburo, while drawing up the new CC nomenklatura, decided that the *okrąg*, *okoliya*, city and *city rayon* committees should in future determine their own nomenklaturas.⁴² Later, every revision of the CC list was to be followed by the same process for the local committees. Still, where

conflict arose with other institutions the Secretariat of the CC would intervene with instructions determining the extent of the *okrąg* committee nomenklatura.⁴³ After 1958, the nomenklatura of the local committees was split into two levels: 1) the level of its bureau, i.å. there was no separate secretariat in this case, and 2) the level of the departments, which were much fewer in number than in the CC.

At the second level of committees managing nomenklatura cadres were the *okrąg* committees. The scheme of the CC committees appears in a simplified form. The bureau controlled all the important local officials sharing power with the CC apparatus for the most important ones. It also controlled the leaderships of the party committees at lower levels.⁴⁴

For almost 15 years (until 1959) *okoliya* committees were the third and the lowest level of party committee to manage nomenklatura, city and *rayon* committees being of the same rank. They controlled the lowest level of nomenklatura cadres, which beside its own apparatus included key functionaries at *okoliya* level, the secretaries of primary party organizations, village mayors, heads of militia office stations, and leaders of local mass organizations and syndicates.⁴⁵ After 1959, however, only the city committees remained functioning as a third level.

Two very different structures were referred to as *obshtina* party committees at different time. Before 1959, when *obshtina* corresponded with a medium sized village, there were only PPOs. During the period 1959-1979, *obshtina* committees already existed and were coordinating several PPOs in rural areas and the agrarian cooperatives (TKZS) of the respective *obshtina*. They had a list of the positions they were monitoring, but did not compile cadre files. Consequently, during this period, all important appointments in rural areas were controlled directly by the *okrąg* committees.

After 1979 and the second administrative reform that merged the previously rural communes to form larger units, a new type of *obshtina* emerged. Where the center was a city, the existing city committees were transformed into *obshtina* city committees and included the rural surroundings at the same time. In the capital city, as well as some other major cities, subdivisions continued to exist – *rayon* committees of the BCP. Following the model of the *okrąg* committee, the *obshtina* committee controlled the most important positions in the respective administrative unit, sharing control over nominations with the higher committee and its apparatus and for certain key positions, even with the CC apparatus. The

nature and length of the nomenklatura lists differed substantially depending on the importance of the center –, i.e. either an *okrąg* center, a former *okoliya* center or a bigger village assigned as an *obshtina* center, even if they were at the same level in the hierarchy. For example, in the smaller *obshtina* committee nomenklatura there were no cadres from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the judicial system since they were not centers of the so-called *rayon* stations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, court and prosecution that were usually located in the former *okoliya* centers. Shorter still were the lists of cadres in enterprises, social and cultural institutions.⁴⁶

Overall, despite several administrative reforms, and with some exceptions and deviations, as with most other nomenklatura systems there was a three level hierarchy: 1) the CC at the top, 2) county (*oblast/okrąg*) committees 3) district/*okoliya* = city committees, later *obshtina* committees. In this respect, the hierarchy of the nomenklatura simply reflected the organization of a modern centralized administration.

Nomenklatura in the PPOs. The nomenklatura of the PPO, plant and institutional committees appeared in the 1960s – this was not mentioned in the 1961 lists, but according to the lists of 1967 they were already in existence in some cases and had to be compiled where they did not exist. Given the fact that PPO, plant and institutional committees were positioned lower than the administrative leadership of the respective institution, and given how deep into the hierarchy the influence of the higher committees' nomenklatura reached, we can easily imagine how little remained for the *PPO* nomenklatura. They controlled certain positions for non-paid activists in the syndicates, in the Communist Youth and in some professional organizations where available. Their opinion on cadre policy had to be taken into account, without being mandatory for the administrative leadership. As known from other communist countries, primary party organizations had mostly consultative functions.⁴⁷ Even if the existence of party organizations at work places was one of the main features of the totalitarian model, their role in leading cadre selection was only at the lowest level. On the other hand, primary party organizations were not independent organizations – their bureau and secretary were controlled by the higher party committees. Therefore, in as far as they played any role in the selection of leading cadres, they also functioned as a parallel mechanism for transmission of cadre policy decisions from the higher party committee that controlled them. In practice, managing cadres was reserved for party committees of higher

rank. Those that had a bureau but were not big enough to have their own apparatus had only a list of nomenklatura cadres without keeping any cadres files. For instance, in 1967 under the *okrąg* level, only the city committees and the *rayon* committees in Sofia kept cadre files, while all others (city committees without bureaus, *obshtina*, *rayon* committees in provincial cities, *plant* committees, big PPOs) had only lists.⁴⁸

II. Establishing and reforming the system

The Soviet model. Organizing cadre policy according to a nomenklatura is a practical and useful solution for controlling appointments to key positions. Like the leaders in all Soviet satellites, the Bulgarian leaders did not need to invent such a system themselves; together with the Stalinist political model as a whole it was imposed from Moscow. Many of the Party leaders had the opportunity to learn about this system from the inside during their stays in the USSR. Gheorghi Dimitrov, the first leader of the regime, dealt with cadre issues during his time as secretary general of the Comintern (1935-1943).⁴⁹ As “president of the CC” and later secretary general he was directly involved in cadre issues. Another member of the Politburo, Gheorghi Damyanov, was well acquainted with the nomenklatura system. In the Comintern apparatus he first served as deputy head (1937-1938) and later as head of its Cadres Department (1938-1943). Immediately after his arrival in Bulgaria on 22 September 1944 he took on the leadership of the Military Department of the CC and began to apply his experience in conducting purges among officers, selecting the so-called deputy-commanders (*pomoshtnik-komandiri*) and training new military cadres that were faithful to the Communist Party.⁵⁰ Gheorghi Tchankov, a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CC, who was responsible for “organizational work” and cadres policy until 1949, on two occasions stayed for almost a year in the USSR during the first half of the 1930s.⁵¹ As CC Secretary in December 1944, he had already received from Dimitrov “some materials on organizational issues of the VCP/b/” and short instructions on how to perform the selection of leaders and in particular the secretaries of the local party committees, the drawing up of cadres files, etc.⁵² In June 1945 Dimitrov called him to Moscow for almost a month to study “the Soviet experience” in party work.⁵³

These biographical details may explain why the nomenklatura system was adopted in Bulgaria earlier than in other East European communist regimes. In most other cases the first lists dated to 1949 (GDR, Poland⁵⁴) and 1950 (Hungary⁵⁵, Romania,⁵⁶). Some of these clearly represent the first attempts to work according to a nomenklatura system. For example, in the case of the GDR it was only at the end of 1948 that the leaders of the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED) were advised from Moscow "to organize the cadres according to a nomenklatura"⁵⁷ and in March 1949 that the first very short list was approved.⁵⁸ Everything started much earlier in Bulgaria.

First steps. Almost immediately after the communist takeover, the Communist Party leadership started to make decisions on cadre appointments and dismissals in place of the competent state institutions. Party structures led both purges of existing personnel and the filling of state apparatus vacancies with faithful cadres. During the first months this practice was still being performed in an unsystematic way and relatively few documents have been preserved in the archives. In many cases the coordination was done verbally, without consulting all of the Politburo or Secretariat members.⁵⁹

The channeling of the process of cadre selection was achieved with the creation of a new specialized structure within the party apparatus at every party committee. The process started with the decisions of the Politburo of 17 and 20 October 1944 to create a Cadres Sector within the framework of the Organizational Department of the CC.⁶⁰ Despite this, the Cadres Sector in the CC only started to function in February 1945.⁶¹ In the committees at lower levels, similar cadre sectors within the framework of the organizational departments were created or at least an assistant responsible for cadres (*pomoshtnik po kadrite*) was appointed. These started to function with delays in the *oblast*, and even more so in the *okoliya* committees.

At the same time, the drawing up of the nomenklatura lists was being envisaged. On 20 October 1944, the Politburo decided that "the range of high administrative and public positions for which the candidates should be approved by the Politburo is to be specified."⁶² This list was not compiled immediately: the first *lists of cadres* (not called nomenklatura and not formally approved) discovered so far date to June 1945. From late 1945 and early 1946 onwards, the processing of cadre nominations became more standardized and consisted of a request from the head of the institution where the appointment was to be made, verifications of

the person proposed by the Cadres Sector and a final decision of the Secretariat or the Politburo.⁶³

A major reorganization followed the October 1946 elections, as well as the formation of a government more openly dominated by the Communist Party, and the number of cadre nominations among the decisions of the Politburo and the Secretariat increased significantly. According to a decision of November 1946, the Cadres Sector of the Organizational Department of the CC became an independent department⁶⁴ just as it was in the CC in Moscow. In turn, this department was subdivided into sectors that dealt with cadres in different spheres: the party; economy; army, militia and justice (a separate sector for the army cadres was formed later); science and culture; diplomatic and consular; and syndicate cadres. There was also a separate sector where the personal files were kept. At the beginning of January 1947, the Politburo formally approved the nomenklaturas of the CC and the local committees for the first time.

As in other East European communist parties, a new wave of adopting the Soviet practice took place in late 1949 when a delegation was sent to Moscow and Minsk to study the functioning of the party apparatus. The report presented was used as a basis for the reorganization of the nomenklatura system.⁶⁵ If in other cases the result of this was the compilation of the first nomenklatura lists (especially in Romania⁶⁶), in Bulgaria it led to the rationalization of the existing lists.⁶⁷

Dissolution of the Cadres Department. The nomenklatura system underwent reorganization in December 1950, when the Cadres Department was closed and a cadres sector created in its place at every specialized department.⁶⁸ The new regulation followed the model established in the USSR in July 1948.⁶⁹ Cadres departments were also closed in certain other communist parties – e.g., in Romania (in February 1950),⁷⁰ Czechoslovakia (in October 1951)⁷¹ and Hungary (March-August 1952).⁷²

In fact, the change was not as radical as it might seem at first glance. The processing of personal proposals was simply channeled in a different way: the proposals were already being examined by the cadres sector of the specialized department instead of the specialized sector of the cadres department. Even the existing nomenklatura lists elaborated earlier during the same year remained valid. As before, the initiative belonged to the head of the institution or the unit to which the person in question was to

be appointed, and the final decision was taken by the Politburo or the Secretariat. It should be added that the existence of a centralized Cadres Sector/Department did not lead to an over-concentration of power. At the level of the CC, neither those working there nor the heads of the department (Ivan Maslarov, Gotcho Grozev, Dimo Dichev, Dimităr Dimov), nor even the CC secretary responsible for the cadres policy (Tchankov), enjoyed faster-progressing or better careers than their colleagues at the same level in other spheres of the party apparatus. On the contrary, most of them failed.

At the same time, the communist parties which preserved their Cadres Departments in end used a very similar system of cadre selection and decision-making. In the CC of the SED, a separate department for “Cadres Issues” (*Kaderfragen*) was maintained, but this dealt with party education and had mostly coordinating functions in respect of cadre policy, while cadre selection itself fell to the specialized departments. A cadre department was reestablished in the CC of the Romanians Workers Party in 1955. It was responsible for verifying the political past of the cadres that had already been proposed for nomination and also had some coordinating functions.⁷³ The Polish case was similar to this.⁷⁴ The Department “Cadres Policy” (*Kadrova Politika*) that existed in the CC of BCP during the years 1984-1989 dealt with education and by no means with nomenklatura cadres as a whole.

The Politburo-Secretariat division. The first list included all nomenklatura cadres of the CC without specifying which body should take the decision. At the same time, more attention was paid to the question of which department or sector should process the nomination before submitting it for approval. In 1948 a decision was taken only the most important cases to be discussed by the Politburo and the rest to be submitted to the *Orgburo*.⁷⁵ This contradicted Soviet practice in which the Orgburo did not deal with cadre appointments, and a year later the communist leadership in Sofia adopted the standard solution that less important cadre decisions should be submitted to the Secretariat.⁷⁶ Generally speaking, proposals were sent to the Secretariat, where the decisions were made with only the most important nominations being transmitted to the Politburo for confirmation.

It was only in the CC nomenklatura of 1955 that the decision-making spheres of these two bodies were clearly separated. The initial confusion and the consequent clarification could be explained through the changing role of the secretary general in the work of the Secretariat. Initially, he

directly participated and chaired its sessions. All nominations of cadres were submitted to the Secretariat where the secretary general predetermined the most important cadre decisions before their submission to the Politburo. They were simply accompanied with a note "to be submitted to the Politburo for approval". The change took place when the party leader Vălko Tchervenkov ceased to participate regularly in the work of the Secretariat, in the period 1952-1953, and especially after he stepped down from the position of secretary general, in January 1954. According to a decision of October 1953, any matters of principle in the future should not be decided by the Secretariat.⁷⁷ The same practice was introduced for cadre decisions, the most important of which were already being submitted directly to the Politburo. An almost identical separate Politburo list was drawn up in the CC of the Romanian Workers Party in April 1954,⁷⁸ when Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej temporarily passed the position of first secretary to Gheorghe Apostol. By way of contrast, a clear distinction had already been introduced in the first lists of 1949 in the GDR, where the co-presidents of the SED, Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl, were not members of the Secretariat.

The introduction of controlled and registered nomenklatura 1955-1957. Following the practice of the CPSU,⁷⁹ a system of control and registration first appeared in the project for nomenklatura cadres at the CC of April 1955. It was initially rejected by the Politburo but then adopted with the project for the next CC nomenklatura of June 1957 and definitively approved in March 1958. This was in part a way of searching for reserve cadres, i.e. potential heirs for the current holders of the posts in the basic nomenklatura of the respective committee, but mostly a way of controlling the cadre policy of lower party bodies, state institutions and mass organizations. Registered and controlled nomenklatura was a compromise between two contradictory aims – that of reducing the length of the nomenklatura lists and that of keeping control over the cadre policy of the lower party bodies and state institutions.

The lists from other communist parties show which other solutions were possible. In the first instance, several communist parties also created *the nomenklatura of a secretary of the CC* below the nomenklatura of the Secretariat (Czechoslovakia 1954-1957 and 1969-1988,⁸⁰ Romania after 1966,⁸¹ Hungary 1963-1985,⁸² Poland⁸³). In some cases, there was also the *nomenklatura of the heads of departments* of the CC (Poland, Hungary). The Bulgarian leaders, just like their GDR counterparts, remained faithful to the principle of "collective decisions." A specific body existed in the

SED Cadres Commission (*Ėaderkommission*) that appointed the ordinary political collaborators of the CC apparatus. Given the relatively larger apparatus of the CC in the SED, its Secretariat appointed a 5-member commission in order to reduce part of its own workload.

Later modifications. As in all other cases, the nomenklatura system in Bulgaria began to take on a stable shape after the mid 1950s.⁸⁴ Later modifications of the nomenklatura lists mostly dealt with routine matters connected with economic and administrative reforms and changed nothing essential in the system. There was a considerable increase in the number of positions in the economic field controlled by the Politburo. Since the rankings in the lists were also an indicator of the importance attributed to the institution, the changing importance of an institution would give rise to a corresponding change in the nomenklatura ranking of its head. For example, in 1976, following the strengthening of nationalism in the official ideology, the director of the National Historical Museum was transferred from the registered and controlled nomenklatura of the Art and Culture Department to the CC Secretariat.⁸⁵ A change in the 1960s was the creation of nomenklatura at lower levels, i.e. at the level of plant and institutional party committees, large PPOs, etc. Despite the compilation of nomenklatura lists, the initial role of the PPOs was mainly reduced to “controlling from below” the execution of the decisions of the higher bodies and did not change significantly. At the same time, the system was flexible enough to permit changes in cadre policy. As we can see from the example of other communist regimes, depending on the style preferred by the leader this either implied conservation (as in the USSR under Brezhnev and in the GDR under Honecker) or a faster rotation of cadres (as in the USSR under Khrushchev and in Romania under Ceaușescu).

III. Analyzing the lists

“How many nomenklatura cadres existed?” This question inevitably appears in every study on the nomenklatura, most of which prefer to show the number of privileged to be as large as possible. The question itself is rather misleading, especially if we think of the nomenklatura as a control mechanism. As we have seen, nomenklatura cadres formed a strict hierarchy, but even at one and the same level there were important differences in matters of decision-making power. For example,

nomenklatura cadres in the Politburo were at the same time the ministers of Internal Affairs and National Defense, marginalized party veterans presiding over mass organizations, as well as the losers of inner party power struggles that were sent to be ambassadors to Third World countries.

The numerical dimension of the nomenklatura was still very important, but in a different way – it had to be a manageable number. The nomenklatura was supposed to deal with the important positions, and power relations at the lowest levels are not taken into account. As a result, the total number of positions in the nomenklatura lists is much lower than the number of members of the Communist Party. Its power was not in compiling long nomenklatura lists, but in selecting key positions.

Cadres on CC lists usually number several thousand. At the highest level, in the Politburo, there were a few hundred and this was mainly due to the inclusion of the secretaries of County Committees of the BCP, ambassadors, members of the government and, in particular, the deputy ministers. The increase in the number of positions in these categories led to an increase in Politburo nomenklatura numbers, even if the controlled level remained unchanged. In the Bulgarian case, for example, the number of positions managed by the Politburo was larger than in most other communist parties. The Secretariat controlled many more positions due to the specificity of the decision-making process there – decisions were usually presented by one of the secretaries responsible for the respective sphere and then only formally approved by the Secretariat as collective body. Larger still was the number of “registered and controlled nomenklatura of the CC departments” – more than half of the entire lists but distributed between departments (with great differences between them). Within departments the work was further distributed among sectors and individual instructors.

The number of CC nomenklatura dealing with cadres abroad was proportionally very large – more than one third of the whole list. In the early 1970s and 1980s this numbered around 2000 permanent positions, including not only diplomatic and commercial representatives but also lecturers in the Bulgarian language and culture and even some students abroad.⁸⁶ This large number was the result of a technical issue whereby being abroad meant they could not be included in any other party nomenklatura except the CC list. The inclusion of such low ranking positions in the CC nomenklatura shows there were no key cadres

controlled only by the leadership of the state institutions – they were also on party account.

Reducing the nomenklatura. Popular perception sees over-concentration as a typical trait of the Stalinist period, followed by relative decentralization in the following years. It is true that in 1947-1948 the Cadres Department of the CC dealt with improper activities and intervened in appointments and purges reaching far beyond the CC nomenklatura, even in selecting and purging students.⁸⁷ In the first years we find decisions of the Politburo for the hiring of typists or workers in the CC cantina.⁸⁸ However, the reduction of the number of nomenklatura positions on the list started very early, and the first decision for this purpose dates from May 1948.⁸⁹ The following year, after studying the practice in the USSR, a project in October and a decision in November 1949 effectively reduced their number.⁹⁰ Obviously, the shortening of nomenklatura lists was not a liberal innovation, but an inherent aspiration of the system in its 'Stalinist' version. The process continued in the mid-1950s: according to the 1955 nomenklatura, the Politburo appointed not only the heads of departments in the CC, but also the deputy heads and the heads of sectors; not only the secretaries of the *okrąg* committees, but also the members of their bureaus, etc. These positions were transferred to lower bodies from 1957 onwards.

Later there was also a constant preoccupation with reducing the length of nomenklatura lists and transferring as many positions as reasonable to lower bodies. The reports accompanying the proposals for modifications of the nomenklatura lists usually mention to what extent this task had been achieved.⁹¹ Higher bodies needed to control a limited number of key functionaries who in turn were responsible for cadre selection at lower levels. Reducing the length of nomenklatura lists did away with the formal and meaningless countersigning of decisions made at a much lower level.⁹² The intention was to allow the party leadership to concentrate on the most important cadre decisions. The shortening of the nomenklatura lists therefore had nothing to do with decreasing of party control.⁹³ Leaving aside the reduction in the nomenklatura of the CC of the Czechoslovak Communist Party during the Prague Spring⁹⁴ as well as the extremely short CC list of the Hungarian Workers Party of 1988,⁹⁵ there is no correlation between liberalization and shorter nomenklatura lists.

Nomenklatura: leading cadres or cadres of the Communist Party? Initially, cadres were regarded as the most reliable and experienced

members of the Communist Party. They represented the human resources of the party, and each "comrade" was to be appointed to the job "he was most suited to".⁹⁶ "Correct distribution of the cadres, correct distribution of our forces"⁹⁷ was one of the slogans of the time. The decisions on cadre policy of the first CC Plenum after the communist takeover reflected the same sentiment.⁹⁸ During the first the years, only the party members were considered to be nomenklatura cadres of the party committees – indeed the instructions up until the mid-1950s meant that the party nomenklatura could deal only with communists, and some lists even omitted leading positions if they were occupied at that moment by non-communists.⁹⁹

Initially, the subordination of the party cadres in state institutions or mass organizations to party decisions was the result of the principle of party discipline. Every communist in a state or any other office, independent of his or her rank, was obliged to fulfill the assignments and the orders of the party. The basis of the nomenklatura system was the centralism in the Communist Party and the unconditional subordination of its members to party decisions. To occupy a position was seen and in many cases effectively resulted from a party assignment. Having started by controlling communists in key positions, the nomenklatura system ended by controlling all persons in key positions. In most communist parties this assimilation of non-party members into the party nomenklatura took place in the mid-1950s. After practically all the leading positions had been attributed to communists, they finished by applying the rule for all leading cadres. Non-communists were included in the party nomenklatura, because positions, not persons, were considered first.

List of positions or list of cadres. The usual title of the nomenklatura lists "nomenklatura of the cadres" can be misleading: with very few exceptions these lists include positions, not persons. As a consequence one person could occupy two or three nomenklatura positions, be in the nomenklatura of two different bodies at the same time, or be appointed to a position in the nomenklatura of the party body of which he or she was a member. Even the "lists of reserve cadres", were compiled according to the nomenklatura hierarchy. Instead of representing a pool of cadres, as some scholars are tempted to describe them, they list potential heirs (usually one or two) to specific places, almost always from among the current deputies or close collaborators.¹⁰⁰ Only certain privileges were attributed to party veterans on a case-by-case basis.

Leading cadres of important cadres. In the nomenklatura certain positions were listed whose holders could hardly be considered leading (*răkovodni*) cadres, but which were still considered important. For example, the correspondents of the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency and of the Committee for Television and Radio abroad which was accountable to the Secretariat. Lecturers of the Bulgarian language and culture abroad and even students in certain disciplines abroad (International Relations, International Economic Relations) were included in the registered nomenklatura of the CC. The latter were considered as future cadres for key positions, most probably also abroad. A similar case was that of those teaching in universities. The attribution of the title of professor was coordinated with the Science and Education Department of the CC of the BCP, of the associated professors with the *okrăg* committees or the Sofia city committee, for doctoral students, researchers, assistant professors and lecturers with the party committees of the high schools or scientific institutes.¹⁰¹

Members of non-permanent working bodies. Not all leading bodies were permanently working and the larger ones would hold only a limited number of sessions per year. This was the case for the party (the CC and the local committees of the BCP), the state institutions (the National Assembly and the people's councils), and the mass organizations, which, theoretically at least, were led by large collective bodies. Initially, all the members of these bodies were included among other leading cadres in the lists: members and candidates of the CC as well as members of the National Assembly were in the CC nomenklatura.¹⁰²

From the mid-1950s onwards, nomenklatura lists included only cadres in permanent positions. But even if the members of the non-permanently working bodies were no longer included in the lists, their election continued to be systematically controlled by the respective party leadership. Selecting the members of the CC did not present a problem to the party leadership: they were elected *en bloc* by the party congress according to a list "proposed" by the Politburo. Between congresses, members were dismissed and new ones elected by the CC plenum following a proposal of the Politburo. The candidates for the National Assembly were also approved – by the Politburo for those "from the center", and by *okrăg* committees for the rest.¹⁰³ The same non-codified control was exercised over honorific positions and titles, such as the members (regular and correspondent members) of the Academy of Science. Their election needed the approval of the party leadership – initially of the

Politburo,¹⁰⁴ later the Secretariat of CC of the BCP.¹⁰⁵ The proposal was sent by the president of the Bulgarian Academy of Science (a nomenklatura cadre of the Politburo himself) to the CC department that monitored the Academy and, through the secretary responsible for ideology, was submitted to the Politburo/Secretariat. During the early years, the party apparatus introduced certain corrections; later on, however, this procedure seems to have taken place before submitting the formal proposal. Only after this pre-selection and approval did the “election” take place for the new members of the Academy, with one candidate per place. The manipulated elections in the political arena corresponded with the manipulated “competitions” in universities and academia.

Members of these bodies usually also had a permanent position in the nomenklatura. They were treated according to their permanent posts and independently of their membership of any prestigious non-permanent bodies. For example, the evaluation of CC members had to be performed by the CC apparatus and the Secretariat only for those working at central level, while for those at provincial level this was done by the bureaus of the respective *okrąg* committee.¹⁰⁶

“Party” and “State” Nomenklatura. Some studies insist on the existence of a “state nomenklatura” along side the “party nomenklatura”. In the USSR, state institutions had their own nomenklaturas which were coordinated with the CC apparatus.¹⁰⁷ In the GDR, beside that of the CC, there was a nomenklatura of the Council of Ministers, with a separate nomenklatura of the National Defense Council added for the army, the police and the secret services, below which there were nomenklaturas for specific ministries and central institutions.¹⁰⁸

As in the USSR, in Bulgaria there were instructions to create these institutional nomenklaturas from the late 1947, as well as cadre departments in the ministries and institutions.¹⁰⁹ Unfortunately, access to the state archives from the communist period in Bulgaria is still more restricted than to the archive of the former Communist Party, and to date the documents of the state institutions regarding cadres is still not accessible for research. On the other hand, studies on the GDR case show that this information might not change substantially the picture of party control. The fact that a leading body had a “nomenklatura” must not be perceived as something exceptional. It is only natural that every leader or leading body knows to which positions it was able to appoint and dismiss office holders. If this phenomenon is of special interest for the communist system, it is because here control over *all* leading positions

was concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party. All of the most important positions in the country were in the end controlled by *one* nomenklatura: the nomenklatura of the Communist Party leadership. The perception of the “state nomenklatura” as independent or opposed to the party nomenklatura is wrong – every nomenklatura was under the ultimate control of the party structures.

Leading positions not included in the nomenklatura lists. It was stated at the beginning of this study that the nomenklatura of the CC of the Communist Party included *all* the leading positions. At least at first glance there are two exceptions: 1) the leadership of the allied party – the Agrarian union (known through the abbreviation BZNS),¹¹⁰ and 2) the religious hierarchs.¹¹¹ In practice, without featuring in the lists, these were subjected to a very similar form of party control. First, they could be appointed to different positions in state institutions and mass organizations, included in the nomenklatura lists, only after approval of a party body, which was identical to other cases; second, at least in some cases, their election within the hierarchy of their own institution took place after a formal decision of a party body.

Appointments of representatives of the Agrarian Union to positions in the state administration and the mass organizations were approved by the party leadership, as in all other cases according to their nomenklatura rank, after a proposal of the Agrarian Union. It seems the hierarchy of the Union itself enjoyed significant influence over the selection of the appointed persons.¹¹² This “autonomy” was counterbalanced by only giving the “agrarians” positions without any real power. They did not qualify for positions as military officers or in the Ministry of Interior. In State Security they served as agents, collaborators and informers, but never as regular officers. There were several “agrarian” ministers, but all the deputy ministers responsible for cadres were communists. At the same time, the Communist Party leadership kept an eye on key appointments within the Agrarian union. In October 1974, the Politburo approved the decision that Petăr Tanchev should replace the by then very old and sick Gheorgi Traykov, not only as first vice chairman of the State Council (which was a normal nomenklatura procedure) but also as secretary of the BZNS.¹¹³

The same was true for the Orthodox Church. Both patriarchs, Kiril and Maxim, were appointed among the vice-presidents of the National Peace Preserving Committee – positions included in the ‘registered and controlled nomenklatura’ of the CC. Some bishops were members of the *okrăg*

leaderships of this committee as well as of other mass organizations in their respective eparchy centers. The Vatican strictly forbade its own clergy to get involved in similar activities.¹¹⁴ Moreover, the party leadership made the most important “cadres decisions” concerning the Church. For example, the demission of Exarch Stephan (September 1948) was “accepted” by the Politburo before the formal act of the Council of Ministers, as legally required.¹¹⁵ This case is very insightful: even if the government was completely dominated by the communists and more than the half of the Politburo members were at the same time members of the Council of Ministers, the general rule that the most important decisions should be made in the Politburo was respected. In March 1971, the Politburo formally approved a decision to support the Bishop of Lovech Maxim as candidate for patriarch and he was consequently elected.¹¹⁶

The Moslem clergy was even more affected by interventions. A decision by the CC Secretariat of June 1988 envisaged “the strengthening from a cadres point of view (*da se ukrepi kadrovo*) of the office of the chief *mufti* in Sofia,” “to replace the unfitting *muftis*” specifying that “the replacement of the imams staff (*na imamskía sáštav*) ... should take place gradually.”¹¹⁷ The phraseology used itself implies that the clergy was seen in terms of cadres.

Nomenklatura and privileges. In parallel with the lists of the cadre nomenklatura, within the CC apparatus a whole range of lists of positions, whose holders were entitled to specific privileges, were drawn up and approved, in some cases by the Politburo but usually by the Secretariat. These lists contained the names of those who had access to the Government Polyclinic¹¹⁸ and, later, to the Hospital for Governmental Officials.¹¹⁹ They also detailed “the leading posts and individuals served with personal office cars”,¹²⁰ “the cadres served by the VIP-services” and “to whom the Ministry of International Affairs issues diplomatic passports”,¹²¹ “the persons who posses the right to acquire housing with a surface area greater than 120 m²”,¹²² and the positions included in the government telephone exchange “*Petoláčhka*”,¹²³ etc. For the organization of public manifestations and the way they should be reported in the media the party apparatus drew up and regularly updated an “Order of Seniority” listing all the important political posts, starting with the secretary general of the CC of the BCP.¹²⁴ In all these lists, the leaders of the Agrarian Union, as well as spiritual leaders, were included on a regular basis. According to the documents quoted above, the secretary of the BZNS was put on the same footing as the members of Politburo. The patriarch

and the bishops of the Orthodox Church, as well as the chief *mufti*, were served by the VIP-services, but in terms of personal office cars, where privileges were attributed less generously, the patriarch was treated like the ministers – i.å. he was ranked below the Politburo members, but was provided with a better car than the chief *mufti*.

All these lists describe positions in party, state or mass organization hierarchies. Without explicitly referring to the lists of nomenklatura cadres, they indirectly reflect their hierarchy. Most are even not called nomenklatura, with the exception of the “nomenklatura of positions allowed to subscribe for the classified news bulletins of the Bulgaria Telegraph Agency”,¹²⁵ “the nomenklatura of leading cadres entitled to use hotel “Rila” in Sofia”,¹²⁶ “the nomenklatura of the cadres, who should study in the Academy for Social Sciences and Social Management”,¹²⁷ “the nomenklatura for decorating with the jubilee medal ‘1300 Years Bulgaria’”¹²⁸ and certain others. These lists allow us to see the problem of the *privileges* of the nomenklatura cadres as secondary – in almost all cases, access to special hospitals, better stocked shops, personal cars, bigger houses, diplomatic passports and more information resulting from the position occupied, even where it was no longer occupied due to retirement, transfer to another position, etc.

IV. The decision making process

Decisions of collective bodies? Compared with constitutions, legislation and party statutes, nomenklatura lists bring us much closer to the real power relations existing in the communist regimes. Still, we need to take one step further and try to examine how the system functioned in practice. In theory, with very few exceptions, decisions had to be made by collective bodies, and the question arises as to who made them and how they were made. First, in most important cases, the leader of the collective body made the decisions personally. The decisive role of the first secretary/secretary general in the Politburo is well known. At lower levels, cadre decisions were formally taken by the bureau, but in cases of failure in cadre policy, mostly (and in some cases only) the first secretary was held responsible.¹²⁹ Of course, first secretaries of local committees had to take into account the indications coming from above, just as the party leader had to consider pressures from the Kremlin.

Second, an important role was played by the secretary responsible for the respective field. In some cases only his signature was needed but this category remained limited compared with other parties.¹³⁰ He was responsible for checking the proposals before submitting them to the Secretariat or the Politburo. In this way, secretaries played a decisive role in cadre policy in the fields they were responsible for, even in cases where the decisions were made by the Politburo. For that very reason, in other communist parties those appointed by the secretary responsible for the respective field were included as a third level in the CC nomenklatura.

An important role was played by the head of the institution or unit where the appointment was to be made. Once in such a position, he or she was responsible for the cadre policy in the respective institutions and in most cases his or her proposal was not a mere formality. Ministers and heads of state institutions had an important word to say in cadre policy in their field.¹³¹ Still, their personal influence depended very much on their status within the party: for example, the minister members of the Agrarian Union had to follow the cadre selection of the party. A person leaving a key position was asked to make one or more suggestions for an eventual heir, and he or she usually suggested the appointment of some of the current deputies. Every leading cadre was supposed to “raise” potential heirs.

Coordination between leading party bodies and heads of the controlled institutions was crucial. Nomenklatura lists were secret, but party leadership made them well known to cadre workers. For instance brochures containing the CC nomenklatura were addressed not only to the staff of the CC apparatus that processed the decisions but also to those who had to submit them for approval –, i.e. ministers and heads of central institutions, their deputies responsible for cadres, party and state leadership at *okrąg* level.¹³² During the decade of 1948-1957, special cadre departments existed in the ministries, in other central institutions and in the “people’s councils”. They were headed by communists and were in contact with the Cadres Department of the CC.¹³³ Later, in every ministry there was one deputy minister responsible for cadres who was in charge of coordinating all appointments part of the CC nomenklatura with the respective party body.¹³⁴ Only in the first years do we find proposals that were rejected. In the following decades, the issue was previously discussed and only after agreement was reached was a formal proposal submitted, which explains why they were always “accepted.”

The role of the departments. As already mentioned, through their “controlled and registered nomenklatura,” the departments monitored the cadre policy of the lower bodies and, in cases of disagreement or failure, would refer the matter to the Secretariat (in fact, the secretary responsible for the field). Obviously departments were not collective bodies and decisions were made by their respective leaderships – the head, probably in some cases the deputy responsible for the specific field. It is symptomatic in this respect that in the nomenklatura of the SED until 1953 the category corresponding to the later *Kontrolnomenklatur* were described as nominations “to be approved by the head of the department of the CC.”¹³⁵

Still, the most important part of the cadre work of the departments is that they processed all proposals submitted to the Secretariat and the Politburo (in practice the most important ones were excluded). All lists up until 1955, as well as some notes to the 1955 CC nomenklatura, show how it was specified which department would process each position in the Politburo and the Secretariat list.¹³⁶ Later decisions on the department’s nomenklatura also list which positions of the Politburo and the Secretariat nomenklatura were monitored by the respective department.¹³⁷ In some cases the department had to coordinate the proposal with another department, and supplementary notes to the CC nomenklaturas specify these cases. The department had to take position on the proposal, before submitting it for a final decision.¹³⁸ This division of work was very important, and in the case of the SED in the GDR, the lists were organized first by departments, and only after that, as subdivisions, by level of approval, the Politburo, the Secretariat, the Cadres Commission, and the controlled nomenklatura. In a separate column it was specified whether the nomination in question had to be coordinated with another department or in some cases with a local party committee.

Interventions from above. In extraordinary circumstances higher party bodies would decide on appointments or dismissals beyond their nomenklatura. For example, the Politburo ordered the dismissal of cadres of much lower nomenklatura level in cases of alleged wrongdoing.¹³⁹ This was considered a normal practice when serious problems needed to be solved.¹⁴⁰ Such decisions also took place in exceptional cases not envisaged in the lists: for example, in March 1978 the Politburo nominally approved the “candidates for spacemen”.¹⁴¹ On a case-by-case basis, higher ranked party officials would intervene individually. For instance the party leader T. Jivkov was consulted on important appointments to

the Secretariat nomenklatura, even if he did not normally participate in its work. This happened regularly with appointments to the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs,¹⁴² but also in other cases.¹⁴³ Party veterans, intellectuals or artists often directly addressed the party leader or other members of the top party leadership in cases concerning relatively minor positions.

Influence from below. In many cases appointments were made by the authorized party body *pro forma*, while simply confirming a decision arranged by their subordinates and the apparatus. For instance, the selection of reserve cadres was made by the party apparatus without the participation of the body in whose nomenklatura the respective positions were included. The Secretariat approved the reserve cadres for first secretaries of the *okrąg* committees and the presidents of the *okrąg* peoples' councils that were all in the nomenklatura of the Politburo. The Secretary of CC responsible for the party apparatus and the head of the Organizational Department, and the current first secretaries of the *okrąg* committees took part in drawing up the list.¹⁴⁴ In the Czechoslovak Communist Party some lists of local committees contain positions that the respective committee submits for approval to higher party bodies.¹⁴⁵

In some cases, party bodies had to consider any possible opposition. This was sometimes the case with elections in academia or in so-called creative unions and also in PPOs where the people knew each other and were eager to discuss and even oppose candidatures. In such cases, most often during the first years after 1944, as well as during the *Perestroika* period, party organs considered several possible candidates. For example, in early March 1989, the Politburo approved between 2 and 4 (usually 3) candidates as presidents of the so-called "creative unions": those of the filmmakers, journalists, actors, writers, translators and painters.¹⁴⁶

It would be misleading to see the communist system as perfectly centralized, where the center controlled everything. Obviously there were contradictions and the question that arises is that of how were they channeled. It seems that bargaining took place not within the collective body, but between two or three persons in key positions: the first secretary of the respective committee, the secretary responsible for the field, the head of the institution where the appointments was made, in many cases the deputy head responsible for cadres.

Criteria and sources of information. The criteria used in cadre selection were never clearly specified and the so-called "model instructions" contain

mostly empty phrases like: "in the selection, promotion and distribution of the leading cadres to take always into account the interests of the people."¹⁴⁷ Obviously there were large opportunities for subjective choice. Professional qualification, social background and political liability were evaluated subjectively by the selecting body or, more precisely, by the key figures dominating this body. Selection from above generated clientelism and paternalism. Corruption should also be considered.¹⁴⁸

Sources of information are stated explicitly only in the earlier documents, in the text of the proposal or in margin notes. Besides the candidate's CV (autobiography) and the evaluations from the party and/or syndicate leadership of the place where he or she had previously worked, any information about the candidate was collected by important and reliable party members as well as the State Security.¹⁴⁹ The cadre workers had to know and follow personally those cadres already selected under their supervision.

Verification by the secret services was important before appointing the person in question for the first time to a *nomenklatura* position at the "entrance" of the system.¹⁵⁰ But they had only to collect and deliver information, not to make the decision. In parallel, party activists would perform a separate inquiry. The party leadership was determined to reduce by as much as possible the influence of the State Security in the decision-making process itself. For this reason they were not allowed to recruit *nomenklatura* cadres as collaborators. Even if a number of the positions in all the institutions, especially those abroad, were reserved for cadres or collaborators with the State Security, these were not head positions of those respective institutions.¹⁵¹

Education of the nomenklatura cadres. Education is a central issue for every modern administration and the communist leaders paid special attention to this. This was closely related to the perception that cadres were "built up", "raised" and even "forged". Education of cadres had two dimensions: regular studies and party schools. In principle, and especially in the later decades, "party education" was not considered a substitute for "civil education," but as a necessary complement. In this respect, the restrictions on admissions to universities for political reasons (until the early 1960s and in individual cases even later) and the quotas for admissions to universities for children of participants in the communist movement before 1944 (up to 1987 inclusively) were not only "discrimination" and "privileges" but also a measure taken to create educated cadres loyal to the regime. Courses in party education were set

up for cadres at a specific level, in many cases for potential heirs. The regulations concerning the selection of students for the party schools and courses explicitly referred to the cadres nomenklatura.¹⁵²

The composition of the nomenklatura. Not only the selection of individuals, but also the composition of cadres occupying nomenklatura positions as a whole was a matter of constant concern for the party leadership and apparatus. This was regularly monitored according to a number of criteria and detailed statistical data were collected from 1945 onwards. What is revealing is not so much the data collected (this was very much an exercise in “how to lie with statistics”), but the very perception of the nomenklatura cadres as human material, as a resource that could be managed. The often quoted saying by Stalin that the “cadres decide everything” does not mean that the cadres would make the final decisions. On the contrary, this is symptomatic of the fact that the party leadership regarded even the leading cadres as human material to be used to achieve the party’s goals. Leading cadres were, or at least were supposed to be subjected, to centralized planning.

The ambition was to have a “balanced” and “representative” leadership according to a number of criteria – age, sex, education, social background, nationality and party affiliation. The party leadership’s instructions constantly called for increasing the proportion of women, young people and industrial workers in leading positions – the older male administrators would get there anyway. Non-party members, members of the BZNS, also had to be present in the leading bodies, if not in key positions. Minorities also had their quotas, even during the 1970s and the 1980s, when minority issues gradually became a taboo. Even after the forced renaming of the Turks with Bulgarian names (December 1984-February 1985) the apparatus continued to count separately “the people with restored names” (*s vǎzstanoveni imena*).¹⁵³ The striving for “representativeness” was clearer in the selection of the members of non-permanent bodies like the CC and the National Assembly, where manual workers, party veterans and young women sat alongside the party functionaries. Still, the same tendency was visible in appointing the members of the permanently working bodies – for instance, in the composition of the secretaries of the local committees of the BCP.

Almost all publications insist that once included in the nomenklatura, a cadre would have a high chance of remaining there irrespective of any bad performances or failures. There is a large amount of anecdotal evidence available to sustain this statement. During reorganizations, even when

they aimed to reduce the bureaucratic apparatus, it was always insisted that “no one would remain without work, not even with a lower wage”, regardless of what position they were transferred to.¹⁵⁴ This is usually considered a handicap that caused inertia and sclerosis in communist societies. Still, as a power mechanism, the nomenklatura system was very flexible, allowing for the removal of undesired people from key positions and depriving them completely of power but without expelling them from the elite.

* * *

The system of nomenklatura shows how, contrary to many other clichés, “the leading role of the party” in communist countries was not an empty phrase. Appointments to and dismissals from all leading positions in the state, as well as the so-called mass organizations, were under the ultimate control of the ruling party. It demonstrates how, in the framework of the party itself, the leadership closely controlled the lower levels. Through the right to appoint and dismiss leading cadres, control over the whole of society was concentrated in the hands of those who were leading the Communist Party.

The system of nomenklatura also reveals the importance of the party apparatus in ruling the state and society. In this way it helps us understand the distribution of power at the very top of the party hierarchy. Behind the formally empowered collective bodies we can see the decisive role of those who were “assigned” to lead and control the party apparatus – the first secretary/secretary general, the secretaries of the CC, and below them the heads of the departments responsible for the respective fields.

The nomenklatura system clearly shows what things are important in order to understand the communist regimes – the party and its apparatus. It is misleading to center studies on state institutions, even if when talking about the State Security. Any analysis of the system should start from the decision-making and control center, i.e. the party leadership.

NOTES

- ¹ DJILAS, M. *The New Class. An Analysis of the Communist System*. Praeger, New York, 1957, 37-69.
- ² VOSLENSKY, M. *Nomenklatura, die herrschende Klasse der Sowjetunion*. Fritz Molden, Muchen, 1980.
- ³ LEWYTZY, B. "Die Nomenklatur – Ein wichtiges Instrument sowjetischer Kaderpolitik." In: *Osteuropa*, 1961, 6, 408-412; HARASYMIW, B. "Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System." In: *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, II, 1969, 4, 493-512; HARASYMIW, B. *Political and technical qualifications in the selection, appointment and training of Soviet decision-makers*. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1970. HARASYMIW, B. "Die sowjetische Nomenklatur" In: *Osteuropa*, 1977, 7, 583-598 and 8, 665-681; RIGBY, T.H. "Staffing USSR Incorporated: The Origins of the Nomenklatura System." In: *Soviet Studies*, 1988, 4, 523-537.
- ⁴ GLAESSNER, G.-J. *Herrschaft durch Kader. Leitung der Gesellschaft und Kaderpolitik in der DDR am Beispiel des Staatsapparates*. Opladen, 1977; LOWIT, T. "Le parti polymorphe en Europe de l'Est." In: *Revue française de science politique*, 1979, 4-5, 812-846; LOWIT, T. "Y a-t-il des Etats en Europe de l'Est?" In: *Revue française de sociologie*, 1979, 2, 431-466.
- ⁵ BURNS, J.P. *The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System*. New York/London: M.E.Sharpe, 1989; BURNS, J.P. "Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura." In: *The China Quarterly*, 138, 1994, pp. 458-491; HEILMANN, S., KIRCHBERGER, S. "The Chinese Nomenklatura in Transition." In: *China Analysis*, No. 1, June 2000.
- ⁶ Among many the most detailed are several publications by Mathias Wagner and especially his book: WAGNER, M. *Ab Morgen bist du Direktor: das System der Nomenklaturkader in der DDR*. Ost, Berlin, 1998; AMOS, Í. *Politik und Organisation der SED-Zentrale 1949-1963. Struktur und Arbeitsweise von Politbüro, Sekretariat, Zentralkomitee und ZK-Apparat*. LIT Verlag, Münster, 2003, pp. 95-108, 585-600.
- ⁷ EHRLICH, S. "Nomenklatura — przykład Polski (Próba analizy normatywno-porównawczej)." In: *Państwo i Prawo*, 1991, 12, 25-40; PACZKOWSKI, A. "System nomenklatury kadr w Polsce (1950-1970)." Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 2000; DUDEK, A. "Mechanizmy rekrutacji elity oraz kadr PZPR." Online: <http://www.omp.org.pl/dudek2.htm>.
- ⁸ KAPLAN, K. *Kádrowa nomenklatura KSČ, 1948-1956: Sborník dokumentů*. Praha: ÚSD, 1992; HRADECKÁ, V., KOUDELKA, F. *Kádrowa politika a nomenklatura KSČ, 1969-1974*. ÚSD, Praha, 1998.
- ⁹ VARGA, G., SZAKADÁT, I. "Íme a nómenklatúrák! Az MDP és az MSZP hatásköri listái." In: *Társadalmi Szemle*, 1992, 3, 73-95; SZAKADÁT, I. "Káderfo(r)gó. A hatásköri listák elemzése." In: *Társadalmi Szemle*, 1992, 8-9, 97-120.

- 10 IONESCU-GURĂ, N. "Reorganizarea P.M.R.-ului după P.C. (b.) al URSS și crearea nomenclaturii al P.M.R. în Republica Populară Română (1949-1954)." In: *Totalitarism și rezistență, teroare și represiune în România comunistă*. CNSAS, București, 2001, 216-250.
- 11 KORJIHINA, T., FIGATNER, Y., "Sovetskaya nomenklatura: Stanovlenie, mehanizm'y deystviya." In: *Vopros'y istorii*, 1993, 17, p. 25-38; VOSELENSKY, M., *Das Geheime wird offenbar. Moskauer Archive erzählen, 1917-1991*. Langen Müller, München, 1995, 135-173; LEWIN, M. "Nomenklatura – arcanum imperii." In: *Svobodnaya m'ysl*, 1997, 4, 75-80. VELIKIY, A. "Partiynaya nomenklatura v kommunisticheskoi Belarusi: 1917-1991 gg. Sozdanie. Razvitie. Krah." In: *Contemporary Issues*, 1999. Online: <http://newsletter.iatp.by/ctr8-9.htm>; and some others.
- 12 MINK, G., SZUREK, J.-C. *La Grande Conversion*. Le Seuil, Paris, 1999.
- 13 Central State Archive (CSA), 1-b/12/53, f. 2-3. The list is prepared by the Cadres Sector of the Organizational Department of the CC.
- 14 CSA, 1-b/6/172, f. 13-16: Protocol B 4 of the Politburo / 4 January 1947.
- 15 CSA, 1-b/23/78, f. 2-17. Draft without exact date.
- 16 CSA, 1-b/8/595, f. 20: Protocol 388a of the Secretariat / 25 October 1949;
- 17 CSA, 1-b/23/458, f. 1-7.
- 18 The two last pages (of 6) of the list with the nomenklatura cadres of the Administrative Department, beginning of 1951. Includes 582 positions: CSA, 1-b/24/11, f. 1-2.; *List of the nomenklatura cadres controlled by the Sector "Ministry of National Defense,"* 16 May 1951, including 219 positions: CSA, 1-b/24/26, f. 1-4; Agricultural department from December: CSA, 1-b/6/1504, f. 4-5: Decision 315 of the Politburo / 26 December 1951.
- 19 CSA, 1-b/6/2214, f. 11, 102: Protocol 232 of the Politburo / 17 June 1954.
- 20 CSA, 1-b/6/2514, f. 4: Protocol 93 of the Politburo / 7 April 1955.
- 21 CSA, 1-b/6/2574, f. 1-21: Decision 153 of the Politburo / 7 June 1955.
- 22 CSA, 1-b/6/3305, f. 47-55: Decision 178 of the Politburo / 27 June 1957.
- 23 The list from 20 March 1958 was not found in CSA, but the next CC nomenklatura refer to it.
- 24 CSA, 1-b/6/4474, f. 1-23; Decision 125 of the Politburo / 1 June 1961.
- 25 CSA, 1-b/6/6526, f. 4, 183-204; Protocol 28 of the Politburo / 17 January 1967; brochure of 8 February 1967 (f. 205).
- 26 CSA, 1-b/35/1212, f. 3, 59-86: Decision 107 of the Politburo / 17 February 1970; brochure of 28 February 1970 (f. 87).
- 27 CSA, 1-b/35/5098, f. 3, 63-68: Protocol 573 of the Politburo / 10 December 1974; brochure of 3 March 1975 (f. 63).
- 28 CSA, 1-b/66/1323, f. 3, 56-64: Protocol 280 of the Politburo / 11 July 1978; brochure (f. 65).
- 29 CSA, 1-b/66/2376, f. 1, 2-49: Decision 256 of the Politburo / 30 May 1980; brochure of May 1980 (f. 85).
- 30 CSA, 1-b/68/3266, f. 1-2; Decision 734 of the Politburo / 19 October 1987.

- 31 CSA, 1-b/38/148, f. 1-8: report of the Organizational Department, 1966.
- 32 E.g.: IAHIEL, N., *Tedor Jivkov i lichnata vlast*. M-8-M, Sofia, 1997, p. 397-398; SOLAKOV, A., *Predsedateliat na KDS razkazva ... Spomeni*. Teksimreklama, Sofia, 1993, p. 87-88, 90.
- 33 In 1932 this topic became classified in the USSR: KORJIHINA, T., FIGATNER, Y., "Sovetskaya nomenklatura...", p. 31; In Bulgaria nomenklatura lists were explicitly listed among "the state secrets": CSA, 1-b/70/678-1984, f. 162a: Decision 293 of the Secretariat / 31 March 1984.
- 34 This subdivision remained unchanged from 1961 onwards. In the 1955 nomenklatura, the second and the third section were in reverse order, while in the 1957 version there was no subdivision.
- 35 The president of the Council of Ministers started to be listed separately in the list only in the 1970s – after the first secretary of the CC definitely ceased to accumulate the position of prime minister as well.
- 36 It was only during the so-called Stalinist period that a larger number of cadre decisions, including less important ones, were confirmed by the CC plenum: TZVETANSKI, S. *Organizacionno razvitie na BCP, 1944-1986*. Institut po Istorija na BCP, Sofia, 1988, 108.
- 37 In the nomenklatura lists of the communist parties of the GDR after 1951, Czechoslovakia after 1952 and Hungary after 1957 the members of Politburo and the Secretariat were defined as cadres elected by and in some cases even as nomenklatura cadres of the CC. In Bulgaria there is no such perfidious formula. To the contrary, the first lists (up to 1950, valid until 1955) list the members of the Central Committee among the nomenklatura cadres followed by the Cadres Department of CC. The same in the first CC nomenklatura in Hungary: Magyar Országos Levéltár (MOL) M-KS 276. f. 90/142 ö.e., f. 274, 289 (in the drafts) and f. 320 (in the final version).
- 38 CSA, 1-b/6/4474, f. 10; Decision 125 of the Politburo/1 June 1961.
- 39 CSA, f. 1-b, op. 36, a.e. 4725, f. 208-209: Protocol 724 of the Secretariat / 29 July 1975.
- 40 Following the above quoted CC nomenklatura lists of June 1945, January 1947 and 1950. Slightly different versions: CSA, 1-b/23/458, f. 1-6; CSA 1-b/23/483, f. 1-2.
- 41 CSA, 1-b/6/3508, f. 96: Protocol 23 of the Politburo/9 January 1958.
- 42 Ibid., f. 4-5.
- 43 CSA, 1-b/36/270, f. 10: from Protocol 513 of the Secretariat/7 October 1968.
- 44 State Archive (SA)-Sliven, 1-b/8/25, f. 1-7: Nomenklatura of the Sliven *okrąg* committee, brochure of 1970; SA-Sliven, f. 1-b/8/26, f. 1-11: the same of 1981.
- 45 CSA, 1-b/12/22, f. 6: instruction of the Cadres Sector of 1945.
- 46 SA-Sliven, 1-b/8/25, f. 46-58: Nomenklatura of the Nova Zagora *obshtina* committee. Ibid., f. 164-161: Nomenklatura of the Sliven *obshtina* committee, august 1986. Ibid., f. 185-187: Nomenklatura of the Tvärditza *obshtina* committee.

- 47 HARASYMIW, B., "Die sowjetische Nomenklatur...", 1977, 589; LOWIT, T., "Y a-t-il des Etats...", 1979, 454; SZAKADÁT, I. "Káderfo(r)gő...", 1992, 99; HRADECKÁ, V., KOUDELKA, F., *Kádrowa politika...*, 1998, 98.
- 48 CSA, 1-b/6/6526, f. 205: Protocol 28 of the Politburo / 17 January 1967.
- 49 DIMITROV, G. *Dnevnik. 9 mart 1933 – 6 fevruari 1949*. Universitetsko izdatelstvo, Sofia, 1997, pp. 225, 235.
- 50 CSA, 1-b/22/2, f. 1-4: report of the Head of the Military Department Damyanov of late 1944.
- 51 TCHANKOV, G. *Ravnosmetkata*. Hristo Botev, Sofia, 2000, pp. 16-25, 613-615.
- 52 CSA, 1-b/12/10, f. 1-2: letter of Dimitrov to Tchankov / 1 December 1944.
- 53 TCHANKOV, G. *Ravnosmetkata...*, 2000, 248.
- 54 GARLICKI, A., *Z tajnych archiwów*. BGW, Warszawa, 1993, p. 108-114; DUDEK, A. *Mechanizmy...*, p. 4.
- 55 VARGA, G., SZAKADÁT, I. "Íme a nómenklatúrák....", 1992, 77; Projects existed already in 1949: MOL M-KS 276. f. 90/59 ö.e.
- 56 Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (ANIC), fond C.C. al P.C.R. – Cancelarie, dosar 36/1950, f. 4. Proces verbal Biroului Organizatoric / 8 mai 1950; IONESCU-GURĂ, N. "Reorganizarea P.M.R.-ului...", 2001, 228-233.
- 57 AMOS, H. *Politik und Organisation...*, 2003, 87.
- 58 Stiftung Archiv Der Parteien Und Massenorganisationen Der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch) DY / 30 / J IV 2/3/9, f. 2-4: Protokoll des Sitzung des Kleinen Sekretariats / 1 March 1949.
- 59 CSA, 146-b/5/476, f. 5-6; CSA, 1-b/7/804, f. 1-2: letters of the regent Todor Pavlov.
- 60 Protocol 11 of the Politburo / 17 October 1944 and Protocol 12 [of the Politburo] / 20 October 1944, quoted according to: CSA, 146-b/5/191, f. 1, 3.
- 61 CSA, 1-b/12/182, f. 5: report of the head of the Cadres Sector of 1945.
- 62 Protocol 12 [of the Politburo], of 20 October 1944. Quoted in: CSA, 146-b/5/191, f. 6.
- 63 E.g.: CSA, 1-b/8/35, f. 1-2; CSA, 1-b/8/71, f. 1, etc.
- 64 CSA, 1-b/6/142, f. 1 sqq: Decision 57 of the Politburo / 16 November 1946.
- 65 CSA, 1-b/23/271, f. 1-7: "Note regarding the work with the cadres of V.C.P./b/" by N. Stefanov of 1949.
- 66 ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R. – Cancelarie, dosar 66/1949, f. 3. Protocol 17 Biroului Politic / 18 iulie 1949; IONESCU-GURĂ, N. "Reorganizarea P.M.R.-ului...", 2001, 217-218.
- 67 Also in the GDR: SAPMO-BArch DY / 30 / J IV 2/3/81, f.7; Protokoll der Sitzung des Sekretariats / 30 January 1950.
- 68 CSA, 1-b/6/1172: Decision 455 of the Politburo / 18 December 1950.
- 69 CSA, 1-b/23/271, f. 1-2.
- 70 ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R. – Cancelarie, dosar 117/1950, f. 30. Still, a separate Sector for Verifying the Cadres was preserved.

- 71 KAPLAN, K. *Kádrosa nomenklatura...*, 1992, 70-71.
- 72 MOL M-KS 276. f. 53/95 ö.e., f. 20-21: Protocol of the Politburo / 20 March 1952.
- 73 ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R. – Cancelarie, dosar 14 / 1955, f. 3, 7. Protocol 8 Secretariatului / 7 februarie 1955.
- 74 LOWIT, T., “Y a-t-il des Etats..., 1979, 453.
- 75 Among the preserved documents of the Orgburo (CSA, 1-b/9/1 to 71) there are almost no cadres decisions. However, there are some proposals addressing the Orgburo following which decisions were made by the Secretariat or the Politburo.
Temporarily in Hungary the Orgburo (Szervező Bizottság) was the third level of decision making after the Politburo and the Secretariat (in 1950 and 1951 lists): VARGA, G., SZAKADÁT, I., “Íme a nómenklatúrák!..., 1992, 3, 75; the same in Romania according to the 1950 nomenklatura: ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R. – Cancelarie, dosar 36/1950, f. 4, 57.
- 76 CSA, 1-b/8/595, f. 20: Protocol 388a of the Secretariat / 25 October 1949.
- 77 CSA, 1-b/6/1916, f. 4: Protocol 185 of the Politburo / 17 October 1953.
- 78 ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R. – Cancelarie, dosar 40/1954, f. 6.
- 79 In USSR it existed since 1951: HARASYMIW, B. “*Nomenklatura...*”, 1969, 496.
- 80 HRADECKÁ, V., KOUDELKA, F., *Kádrosa politika...*, 1998, 93.
- 81 ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R. – Cancelarie, dosar 14/1966, f. 2, 51; *Ibid.*, dosar 259/1968.
- 82 VARGA, G., SZAKADÁT, I. “Íme a nómenklatúrák!..., 1992, 3, 86-88 and MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/291 ö.e.: the list of February 1963; *Ibid.*, 5/424 ö.e.: the list of May 1967; *Ibid.*, 5/444 ö.e.: the list of January 1968; *Ibid.*, 5/556 ö.e.: the list of June 1971. After 1975 transformed into nomenklatura of a secretary of the CC *and* the head or the respective department of the CC: MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/676 ö.e.: the list of November 1975; *Ibid.*, 5/729 ö.e.: the list of October 1977; *Ibid.*, 5/826 ö.e.: the list of Mai 1981; *Ibid.*, 5/896 ö.e.: the list of November 1983.
- 83 LOWIT, T. “Y a-t-il des Etats ..., 1979, 450 sqq (the list of Okotber 1972).
- 84 The same, not only in other East-European communist regimes, but also in China: BURNS, J.P. *The Chinese...*, 1989, p. xvi.
- 85 CSA, 1-b/66/151, f. 1: Decision 151 of the Politburo / 6 May 1976.
- 86 CSA, 1-b/67/1446, f. 5: note to Decision 697 of the Politburo / 19 October 1982.
- 87 CSA, 1-b/6/493, f. 8-9: report of the Cadres Department to Protocol 104 of the Politburo / 20 May 1948.
- 88 E.g.: CSA, 1-b/6/175, f. 1: Protocol 7 of the Politburo / 9 January 1947.
- 89 CSA, 1-b/6/493, f. 2: Protocol 104 of the Politburo / 20 May 1948.
- 90 Respectively: CSA, 1-b/8/595, f. 9-10: Protocol 388^a of the Secretariat / 25 October 1949 and CSA, 1-b/6/679, f. 55: Protocol 106 of the Politburo / 3

- November 1949; *Statii po izuchavaneto, podbora, razpredelenieto i vāzpitanieto na kadrite*. SGK na BCP, Sofia, 1949, 11-12.
- 91 CSA, 1-b/6/6526, f. 214; CSA, 1-b/35/5098, f. 3, 65.
- 92 MOL, M-KS 288. f. 5/676 ö.e., f. 98: Protocol of the Politburo / 4 November 1975.
- 93 Also because it was only down to the party leadership to shorten or to enlarge the nomenklatura lists: HARASYMIW, B. *“Nomenklatura: ..., 1969, 512.*
- 94 HRADECKÁ, V., KOUDELKA, F., *Kādrova politika...*, 1998, pp. 10, 88 sqq.
- 95 VARGA, G., SZAKADÁT, I., *“Īme a nōmenklatūrāk!...*, 1992, 3, 91-93.
- 96 CSA, 1-b/12/6, f. 1.
- 97 CSA, 1-b/12/52, f. 2.
- 98 The VIII plenum, 27 February – 1 March 1945, quoted after: CSA, 146-6/5/21, f. 44.
- 99 For example the nomenklatura controlled by the Administrative department (1951) omitted the Minister of Justice, a position occupied by a member of the Agrarian Union: CSA, 1-b/24/11, f. 1.
- 100 CSA, 1-b/36/1331, f. 1-61: Decision 128 of the Secretariat / 5 March 1971; The same according to Romanian sources: ANIC, fond C.C. al P.C.R. – Căncelarie, dosar 125/1955, f. 17.
- 101 CSA, 1-b/36/2767, f. 1 sqq: Decision 283 of the Secretariat / 21 March 1973.
- 102 In communist parties where members of non-permanent bodies continued to be listed in the nomenklatura lists, as for instance in the GDR and Czechoslovakia this was still within general lists.
- 103 E.g. CSA, 1-b/67/173, f. 8-40.
- 104 E.g. CSA, 1-b/6/1253, f. 2-3; CSA, 1-b/6/3508, f. 8.
- 105 E.g. CSA, 1-b/36/3232, f. 1-2; CSA, 1-b/69/3669, f. 1.
- 106 CSA, 1-b/36/4725, f. 5: Protocol 724 of the Secretariat / 29 July 1975.
- 107 KORJIHINA, T., FIGATNER, Y., *“Sovetskaya nomenklatura...*, 1993, 27.
- 108 WAGNER, M. *Ab Morgen...*, 1998, pp. 74 sqq, 211-223, 236-238.
- 109 CSA, f. 1-b, op. 23, a.e. 16, f. 2: instruction of the Cadres Department of 1947.
- 110 The same in Poland and Czechoslovakia: HRADECKÁ, V., KOUDELKA, F., *Kādrova politika...*, 1998, 134-135; In the GDR they were included in the lists from the 1950s, dropped starting from 1960 and once again included from the June 1977 CC list onwards. WAGNER, M. *Ab Morgen...*, 1998, 84.
- 111 The same in GDR, CSSR, Poland, USSR, Hungary, Romania.
- 112 CSA, 1-b/5/495, f. 95-96: CC plenum / 14-15 March 1962; also CSA, 1-b/6/3508, f. 18, 26.
- 113 CSA, 1-b/35/5025, f. 1: Protocol 500 of the Politburo / 29 October 1974.
- 114 CSA, 1-b/71/305-88, f. 83-84: note to Protocol 305 of the Secretariat / 22 June 1988.

- 115 CSA, 1-b/6/539, f. 1: Decision 152 of the Politburo / 10 September 1948.
 116 CSA, 1-b/35/2040, f. 1: Decision 145 of the Politburo / 8 March 1971.
 117 CSA, 1-b/71/305-88, f. 55-56: Protocol 305 of the Secretariat / 22 June 1988.
 118 CSA, 1-b/6/1295, f. 1-4: Decision 102 of the Politburo / 20 April 1950.
 119 CSA, 1-b/36/24, 95, 140 and many other complementing decisions of the Secretariat.
 120 CSA, 1-b/68/3555, f. 4 sqq: Decision 202 of the Politburo/ 27 December 1988.
 121 CSA, 1-b/71/220-87, f. 19-30: Protocol 220 of the Secretariat / 11 March 1987. Two separate lists.
 122 CSA, 136/84/193, f. 2-4: Decision 480 of the Council of Ministers / 6 August 1973.
 123 CSA, 1-b/71/90-87, f. 27-39: Protocol 90 of the Secretariat / 28 January 1987. Two separate lists.
 124 Ibid., f. 3-14; The same in GDR: WAGNER, M. *Ab Morgen....*, 1998, 73.
 125 CSA, 1-b/71/330-88, f. 1-5: Order 330 of the Secretariat / 5 July 1988. There are three separate lists for the different bulletins; for the main list there are three levels of confidentiality.
 126 CSA, 1-b/71/285-88, f. 1: Order 285 of the Secretariat / 7 June 1988.
 127 CSA, 1-b/36/916, f. 14-22: Protocol 300 of the Secretariat / 21 April 1970.
 128 CSA, 1-b/67/530, f. 13-15: Decision 530 of the Politburo / 9 November 1981.
 129 CSA, 1-b/66/68, f. 2-4 and 6-9: Protocol 68 of the Politburo / 20 February 1976; CSA, 1-b/66/745, f. 33-36: Protocol 223 of the Politburo / 23 May 1977.
 130 The technical collaborators with the CC that were appointed by the decision of one single secretary. The 1957 CC nomenklatura includes a few more posts whose holders had to be appointed by only one secretary: CSA, 1-b/6/3305, f. 55.
 131 SOLAKOV, A., *Predsdateliat...*, 1993, p. 90.
 132 CSA, 1-b/66/1323, f. 54-56: amendment to Protocol 280 of the Politburo / 11 July 1978; In the GDR, only the respective part of the nomenklatura was made known to the subordinated bodies: WAGNER, M. *Ab Morgen....*, 1998, 76.
 133 In Mai 1957 most were dismantled: CSA, 1-b/6/3249, f. 1-3: Protocol 126 of the Politburo / 9 May 1957; The same happened in Czechoslovakia in 1958: HRADECKÁ, V., KOUDELKA, F., *Kádřova politika...*, 1998, 10.
 134 CSA, 1-b/66/1323, f. 57-61: Note to Protocol 280 Politburo / 11 July 1978.
 135 WAGNER, M. *Ab Morgen....*, 1998, 43-44.
 136 CSA, 1-b/67/2514, f. 35: information to the Decision 93 of the Politburo / 7 April 1955.

- 137 CSA, 1-b/36/2867, f. 6, 29-30: Protocol 469 of the Secretariat / 26 April
1973: approves the nomenklatura of cadres who will be overseen by the
Department "Cadres, Party Organizations and Official trips abroad."
- 138 CSA, 1-b/5/157, f. 18: Minutes from the meeting of the party leadership with
the CC apparatus in November 1954.
- 139 E.g.CSA, 1-b/68/1546, f. 1-2: Decision 290 of the Politburo / 14 March
1986.
- 140 *Statii po izuchavaneto...*, 1949, 11-12.
- 141 CSA, 1-b/66/1166: Decision 123 of the Politburo / 11 March 1978.
- 142 CSA, 1-b/71/448-1988: Decision of the Secretariat 448 / 12 December 1988.
- 143 E.g. the election of the new rector of the University of Sofia in 1979: CSA,
1-b/69/905-79.
- 144 CSA, 1-b/36/1331, f. 1 sqq: Decision 128 of the Secretariat / 5 March 1971.
- 145 HRADECKÁ, V., KOUDELKA, F., *Kádřova politika...*, 1998, řđ. 190-193,
219-221.
- 146 CSA, 1-b/68/3610 to 3616 and 3618: Decisions 45 to 51 and 53 of the
Politburo / March 1989.
- 147 CSA, 1-b/36/4725, f. 197-210. Protocol 724 of the Secretariat / 29 July
1975.
- 148 LEWIN, M. Nomenklatura..., 1997, 77-78.
- 149 CSA, 1-b/23/398, f. 4: report of the Cadres Department of 1949.
- 150 WAGNER, M., *Ab Morgen...*, 1998, 109.
- 151 There is evidence from the GDR that the Stasi supported candidates for
certain positions: VOLLHALS, C., "Nomenklatur und Kaderpolitik.
Staatssicherheit und die Sicherung der DDR-Justiz." In: *Deutschland Archiv*,
1998, 2, pp. 230, 234-235.
- 152 CSA, 1-b/36/1231, f. 1: Decision 888 of the Secretariat / 1 December 1970.
- 153 In reports concerning the composition of the *okrăg/oblast* secretaries: CSA,
1-b/68/801-86, f. 61; CSA, 1-b/68/3180, f. 10.
- 154 E.g.: CSA, 1-b/66/1480a, f. 50-51; CSA, 1-b/70/339-1984, f. 99.