

New Europe College Regional Program Yearbook 2001-2002



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NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

The *New Europe College (NEC)* is a small independent Romanian “center of excellence” in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, 1990-1991 Romanian Minister of Culture, 1997-1999 Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs). Since its founding, the community of fellows and alumni of the college has enlarged to over 150 members. In 1998, the *New Europe College* was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in higher education and research. In 1999, the Romanian Ministry of Education officially recognized the *New Europe College* as an institutional structure of continuous education in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Aims and Purposes

- to create an institutional framework with strong international links, offering young scholars in the fields of humanities and social sciences from Romania and South-Eastern Europe working conditions similar to those in the West, and providing a stimulating environment for transdisciplinary dialogues and critical debates;
- to promote contacts between Romanian and regional scholars and their peers worldwide
- to cultivate the receptivity of scholars and academics in Romania towards methods and areas of research as yet not firmly established here, while preserving what might still be precious in a type of approach developed, against all odds, in an unpropitious intellectual, cultural and political context before 1989
- to contribute to forming a core of promising young academics, expected to play a significant role in the renewal of Romania’s academic, scholarly and intellectual life.

Fellowship Programs

As an institute for advanced study, NEC is not, strictly speaking, a higher education institution, although it has been consistently contributing to the advancement of higher education in Romania through the impact of its fellowship programs and of the activities it organizes under its aegis.

NEC Fellowships (1994 – to present)

Each year, ten NEC Fellowships for outstanding young Romanian scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by an international Academic Advisory Board, and receive a monthly stipend for the duration of one academic year (October through July). The Fellows gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research projects. In the course of the year, the Fellows are given the opportunity to pursue their research for the duration of one month abroad, at a university or research institution of their choice. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows submit a paper representing the results of their research. These papers are published in the “New Europe College Yearbook”.

NEC Regional Program (2001 – to present)

As of October 2001, the New Europe College has expanded its fellowship programs to include scholars from South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Slovenia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia). This newly added regional dimension to our programs aims at integrating in the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at regional level. With the prospect of the European integration, and in complementing the efforts of the European Union to implement the Stability Pact, the New Europe College invites academics and scholars from the Balkans to cooperate towards overcoming the tensions that have won this region an unfortunate fame over the last decade.

The NEC-LINK Program (2002- to present)

Drawing on the experience of its NEC Fellowships and RELINK Fellowships Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiates in the 2002 a new program, that aims to directly contribute to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian universities. Eight teams consisting of a visiting academic and one from the host university will offer joint courses for the duration of one semester in the fields of the humanities and social science; the NEC-LINK courses need be new ones and meet the distinct needs of the host university. The academics participating in the Program will receive monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their course, as well as funding for inviting guest professors from abroad, and to organize scientific events.

The GE-NEC Program (2000 – to present)

As of the academic year 2000-2001 the *New Europe College* organizes and hosts a program supported by the Getty Grant Program. Its aim is to strengthen research and education in the fields of visual culture by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian MA students, PhD candidates, and young scholars. The program includes two senior and two junior fellowships per year for Romanian scholars, who undergo the same selection procedures as all the other fellows of the NEC administered programs. The GE-NEC Fellows are fully integrated in the life of the College, receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of spending one month abroad for a research trip.

RELINK Fellowships (1996-2002)

The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified, preferably young Romanian scholars returning from studies abroad to work in one of Romania's universities or research institutes. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local research milieu and to improve their

working conditions, a support lasting for three years was offered, consisting of: a monthly stipend, funds in order to acquire scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer.

The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards EU Integration

As of 2001, the *Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft* funds - within the framework of the New Europe Foundation – a newly created institute, that focuses on the extremely sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans (and beyond) from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute intends to foster the dialogue between distinctive religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), as well as between confessions within the same religion, trying to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. To this end, the institute hosts international scholarly events, sustains research projects, brings out publications, and strives to set up a topic relevant library in Romania, intended to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

The *New Europe College* hosts an ongoing series lectures (an average of 30 per academic year) given by prominent Romanian and foreign academics and researchers, that is open to a larger audience of specialists and students in the fields of humanities and social sciences. The College also organizes national and international seminars, workshops, and symposia.

Financial Support

The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

The Swiss Federal Department of Home Affairs

The Federal Ministry for Education and Research – Germany

The Federal Ministry for Education, Science, and Culture – Austria

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Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft – Essen, Germany

Volkswagen-Stiftung – Hanover, Germany

The Open Society Institute (through the Higher Education Support Program)
– Budapest, Hungary

The Getty Grant Program – Los Angeles, U.S.A.

The Ludwig Boltzmann Society, Vienna, Austria

* * *

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NATIONAL IDENTITY: INVENTION OR NECESSITY?

CASE STUDY: REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

1. Introduction

Despite that the founding of the Republic of Moldova* was an event largely overlooked by the rest of the world due to the general changes and much bloodier national problems in the other Eastern European and former Soviet countries, the process of nation building that can be seen in this region poses a challenge to recent theories of nation and nationalism.

The transition of the Republic of Moldova from a totalitarian political system to a tempting, but unknown democracy started with the help of national demands. During the “voluntary fall” of the Soviet Union, the ruling discourse was dominated by national ideas – the Romanian language, the Latin alphabet, tricolor, the reinterpretation of history, the elimination of consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, union with

* The main geographical names of the region studied in this paper are spelt in two ways in the English language: “Moldavia” > “Moldavian”, “Bessarabia” > “Bessarabian”, “Dniestr” > “Transdnestr”, and “Moldova” > “Moldovan”, “Basarabia” > “Basarabian”, “Nistru” > “Transnistria”, respectively. The first variant is based on the Russian translation of the names and became the rule in the English language during the Soviet period. The second variant is based on the Romanian version of the names and entered use following the declaration of independence of the Republic of Moldova. Although both variants are now used, the “Romanian” variant has become the rule; see, for example, the names “Moldova” and “Moldovan” in *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, 2001, *Appendix 2, Geographical names*, p. 1396. For the benefit of coherence of spelling in this paper, all geographical names are spelt as per the “Romanian” variant.

the “mother country”, and so on. To this very day, the events of 1988-1991 are still called the “awakening” of the national consciousness, and the Basarabian intelligentsia, who were influential in the late 1980s, consider this “awakening” to be the main work of their lives. Although in 1989 the Basarabians were “haunted” by the ghost of the Union, the events that followed proved the “materialization” of another state of mind. Transition to democracy replaced the tsarist and Soviet discourse of the Moldovan language and Moldovan nation and citizens identified themselves with this discourse. Researchers and western observers have now begun to wonder why the notion of the Moldovan *ethnos* has outlived its creator, why the concept of the Moldovan nation has taken root, why a national Moldovan consciousness came into being after the fall of the Soviet Empire.¹

Explanations of the worldwide appeal of nationalism are divided into two main categories: the primordialist approach with its variations – the perennialist and the ethno-symbolist perspectives – and the modernist-instrumentalist approach.² Primordialists see nation as natural, part of the human condition, outside time and history.³ For perennialists – Adrian Hastings, John Armstrong, and others – ethnic communities and nations do not constitute a part of the natural order, but they can be found in every continent and every period of history. They are perennial and immemorial, but not primordial and natural.⁴ The ethno-symbolist approach emphasises the cultural antecedents of nation, the significance of cultural nationalism, the forging of a nation out of the memories, myth, symbols and traditions of pre-existing *ethnies*.⁵ An ethno-symbolist like Anthony Smith argues that, even if they are only constructs, national culture and identity remain obstinately “particular, time-bound and expressive”.⁶ National identity is one type of collective identity that, in his opinion, involves a sense of continuity between the experiences of succeeding generations, shared memories of specific events and persons which have been turning points in a collective history, and a sense of common destiny for the part of the collectivity sharing these experiences.⁷

Modernists emphasise the recent character of nations and nationalism. The basic idea behind the modernist approach is that national identity and nationalist ideology are based on mass literacy/education and require a certain type of society characterized by social mobility, relative egalitarianism, anonymity, semantic/communicative rather than physical work, a context-free medium of communication.⁸ In the modernist-instrumentalist approach, nations, as a political principle of government,

were not (God) given, but created and invented by social engineering only in the modern period of Western history. According to Gellner, nationalism is a political principle which transforms the pre-given cultures in nations: "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist – however, it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if ...these are purely negative".⁹

At first sight, it seems that the constructionist perspective – assumed by authors like Ernest Gellner, Elie Kedourie, John Breuilly, Benedict Anderson, Tom Nairn, Eric Hobsbawm, Eugen Weber, Liah Greenfeld and others – explains all confusions concerning Moldova's national problems because the researcher is mainly dealing with Soviet and tsarist inventions. However, it is not long before the researcher encounters the authentic confrontation of theories – part of the population confirming the primordialist or ethno-symbolist theories by their struggle for the Romanian language, as a proof of the true, original, authentic identity. Yet, another part maintains the confidence in what they consider to be Moldovan values. After understanding this situation, the researcher is not able to operate with polarities and seeks a more complex approach.

In my opinion, a general theory of nationalism, that applies to all types of nationalism and tells us non-trivial things, is an impossibility. In practice, few scholars adhere entirely to either the primordialist or the instrumentalist pole – the question being to what extent is such a synthesis empirically helpful. Despite this, the utility of the modernist approach in clarifying nation formation in the case of Moldova should not be ignored. The modernist-instrumentalist perspective offers a very useful conceptual framework within which to raise interesting questions and investigate the case of Moldova case in historically and culturally specific ways.¹⁰

From the modernist-instrumentalist point of view, approaches to national identity that do not concern political modernization misunderstand the basic mechanisms of national identification. What is considered pre-modern national identity is, in fact, an ethnic identity.¹¹ In this paper, the expressions "the ethnic majority from the Republic of Moldova", "Moldova's ethnic majority" will be used to refer analytically to the undifferentiated category which precedes both the Romanian identity discourse and the Moldovan identity discourse, in spite that both discourses use the ethnicity, almost inventing it.

Although in a coherent instrumentalist approach it could be argued that a different *ethnie*¹² has arisen in Moldova's case, the same researcher will encounter the necessity of a theoretical equivalent to the "primal" or "raw" material, which is used both by the Moldovan and the Romanian national discourse. Otherwise, it could be concluded that that ethnicity can not only be manipulated, but also manufactured *ex nihilo*. For the purposes of this paper, it will be maintained that the main difference between ethnic identity and national identity is the non-mobilized political character of ethnic identity.¹³ Ethnic groups are small scale and essentially pre-political, providing the raw material on which nation-builders can draw. Ethnic groups are defined as quasi-kinship groups, regulated by the myth of common descent, a sense of shared history and a distinct culture. Nations are distinguished by a commitment to citizens' rights and the possession of a highly literate culture, a consolidated territory and unified economy.¹⁴

In the case of Moldova, the terms "invention" and "construction" have the strong connotations not only of novelty, but also of intentionality and manipulation because the extreme dimension of Moldova's national predicament is the revival of the tsarist and Soviet myth of the Moldovan nation. However, there are at least three aspects to the question as to whether national identity is invention or necessity. The first of which is theoretical: the confrontation of instrumentalist approaches that consider identity to be something invented in modern times and primordialist approaches which maintain that national identity is a necessity that originates from a unique history and results in a particular destiny. The second aspect concerns the emotive power of national identity: is national identity a vital necessity for the Moldovan people? In Moldova, national identity is regarded as a necessary condition for human survival and there is a lot of "identity talk" – "Moldova has lost its identity", "Moldova is in search of identity", etc. This has led to a proliferation in conflicts and crises of identity. The third aspect, as the first, is theoretical, though it can also be seen as political: is national identity necessary in order that Moldova meet its needs to practice democracy and build civil society?

2. Discourses of national identity in the Republic of Moldova

2.1 Construction of identities

In general, the approaches of identity follow at least two paths:¹⁵ 1) Identity is essential, fundamental, unchanged, like a kernel in a nut – this is the essentialist approach, characteristic of philosophical inquiry which still argues for identity and essence or as essence. 2) Identity is constructed and reconstructed – this is the instrumentalist model, dominant in the contemporary social sciences. When identity became a concept good-for-all in the social sciences, it had already been used with the meaning of construction.¹⁶

There are two aspects of the instrumentalist model, which make it useful and attractive: identity as a function of difference within a system, and identity as discourse and narrative.

“Us”-“them”: Identity as a function of difference is also well known as the “us”-“them” mechanism. Identities are constituted within a system of social relations and require the reciprocal recognition of the other:¹⁷

Identity is not a “thing” but rather a system of social relations and representation. It is a continual process, in re-composition, rather than a given process in which the two constitutive dimensions of self-identification and affirmation of difference are continually linked.¹⁸

It means that the most exact characteristic of an element is that of being what others are not. For example, we identify number 13 as being between 12 and 14. But unlike with numbers, maintaining of a national identity is a continual process of re-compositions. This implies both self-identification and affirmation of difference. A national community uses these patterns to imagine itself as different from others,¹⁹ to imagine a nation among nations.²⁰ Identity is not only constituted in and by its relations with others. To possess an identity, comprehension of what differentiates one from another is necessary. It is not sufficient to send a message of identity in order to have an identity; this message must be accepted by the “significant other”.

Identity as discourse and narrative: The second attractive aspect of the instrumentalist approach is that identity exists and is constituted by narration and discourse. The “us”-“them” mechanism and identity as

narrative are bound. Nationalism and national identity “can be thought of as the specimens of the big families of *we-talks*; that is, of discourses in which identities and counter-identities are conceived and through which they are sustained”.²¹ If it is possible to think of nationalism as a kind of “narcissism of minor differences”, then the logic of manipulating differences implies narrative constructions. National discourse takes neutral differences and essentializes them in a narrative of an “us”-“them” opposition. As Michael Ignatieff argues:

A nationalist takes the neutral facts about people – their language, habitat, culture, tradition and history – and turns these facts into a narrative whose purpose is to illuminate the self-consciousness of a group, to enable them to think of themselves as a nation, with a destiny, a vocation and a claim to self determination. A nationalist, in other words, takes “minor differences” and transforms them into major differences.²²

This process includes a tendency to essentialize national identities, to single out one trait or characteristic in codifying a national or ethnic group.²³ For example, in Moldova, in order to make a distinction between “us” and “them”, the nationalist discourses differentiate between the ethnic majority and the ethnic Russians. Thus, national identity is defined in terms of the opposition “our homeland”, “our language” *versus* Russian colonizing values, or in terms of a different structure of the same experience – colonizer-colonized, immigrants-indigenous, aggressors–victims. This essentialization of traits has become crucial to the way in which identities are represented both in the strategies of the elite and in the minds of the masses.

The nationalist discourses in former Soviet countries reinvent and repackage a supposed pre-Soviet or pre-colonial golden age of the homeland. To say something about a nation, a minimal narrative cannot be avoided – the moment the community came into being and the most important events witnessed.²⁴ The narrative form, with its assumption of a beginning, a middle and an end, is also the single vehicle that gives legitimacy to a national movement, that can organize different events in a story or, in Anderson’s words, write a “biography of a nation”.²⁵ Benedict Anderson’s theory of imagining a collective existence functions implicitly by relying on the theory of narrative and discursive fields. These discursive fields provide individuals with a sense of identity over time.²⁶

2.2 Identity discourses in the Republic of Moldova

The discourses of national identity articulated in Moldova can be classified according to the criteria which result explicitly from the assumption of the construction of identity and the aforementioned mechanisms of identification. The main criteria are the “us”-“them” mechanism and attitudes towards the main aspects of national problem.

1. Attitudes towards (national) community.
2. Attitudes towards language.
3. Uses of history.
4. Attitudes towards state.
5. Integration of minorities.
6. Us-them relations:
 - a) We and Romania;
 - b) We and Russia;
 - c) We and Europe.

For the purposes of explanation, the discourses are classified as two main types: Romanian oriented discourse and Moldovan oriented discourse, respectively. The radicalization of both types of discourse should also be mentioned: Neo-Soviet discourse as radicalization of Moldovan oriented discourse, and European oriented discourse as radicalization of Romanian discourse, respectively. These discourses are not official, nor are they the discourses of political parties or social-cultural movements. Systematized for the purposes of this paper, these are discourses on the basis of the empirical discourses of political leaders, intellectuals, declarations, the mass media, official acts, including all types of written text and so on.²⁷

(i) Romanian discourse:

Attitudes towards (national) community: Romanian nation.

Attitudes towards language: Romanian language.

Uses of history: The main historical event that feeds this discourse is the Union with Romania (1918-1940), which signifies a golden age and a project for the future. Although Basarabia did not witness the events of

the nineteenth century – 1848, 1859, 1877-1879 – that were crucial to the formation of the Romanian nation, there was nonetheless an impact on the national consciousness of certain generations as the result of the cultural politics of Romanian state in the period 1918-1940, as described by Irina Livezeanu:

Cultural politics is the third part of a triptych, preceded by the economic or cultural revolution and bureaucratic-military revolution. Whilst Romania and the other Eastern European states experienced weakened forms of the first two types of revolution, they experienced an all the more vigorous version of cultural revolution.²⁸

Attitudes towards state: Moldova is the second Romanian state or is another Romanian state, and union of the states will come sooner or later.

Integration of minorities: The example of Estonia can be used as a model for this discourse: citizenship should be granted only on ethnic grounds or, in the case of members of ethnic groups, only on proof of knowledge of the official language.

Us - them relations:

- *We and Romania:* This is a case of a permanent inclusion: “We are Romanians”.
- *We and Russia:* “Russians are occupiers”. Russians are identified with Soviets and Communists as the three faces of the same enemy of this Romanian region.
- *We and Europe:* European integration will come, sooner or later, together with Romania.

(ii) Moldovan discourse:

Attitudes towards (national) community: The Moldovan nation is different from the Romanian nation, not from an ethnic point of view, but from a political point of view.

Attitudes towards language: “The national language is the Moldovan language based on the Latin alphabet” (Constitution, Article 13).

Use of history: Ernest Renan, in his well-known conference *What is a Nation* (1882),²⁹ said that forgetting history as well as remembering it is an essential factor in forging a nation. But in Moldova, what is forgotten by one discourse is stressed by another, as happened, for example, in the

22 years of the Union with Romania. Romanian oriented discourse forgets the behavior of the Romanian authorities in the region, whereas the Moldovan discourse stresses it, exaggerating it. Speculation is rife as far the question of the Union is concerned:

To what state would the Basarabian population have chosen to belong if the referendum proposed by Russians had been held? But the referendum was rejected by the “Sfatul Țării”³⁰, which considered that the will of the people had already been expressed by the Greater People’s Assembly.³¹

Moldovan oriented discourse displays hostility towards Romanians and a preference for the historical Moldovans of the period before the formation of the Romanian State in 1859. Moldovan ideologists have published maps of Greater Moldova, reaching from the river Nistru to the Carpathians and containing a portrait of Stephen the Great.

Attitudes towards state & integrating minorities: The Citizenship Law adopted in June 1991³² is considered to be among the most inclusive in Eastern Europe: all persons living in Moldova on the date of the declaration of Sovereignty – 23 June 1990 – were automatically taken to be citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, linguistic abilities or any other criteria. The Constitution promulgated in 1994 contains no mention of ethno-national identities as being defining characteristics of the state and continually uses the phrase “people of the Republic of Moldova” in order to avoid any link between statehood and ethnicity.

We and Romania: This Moldovan discourse accords a special status to relations between Romania and Moldova. “Special relations” is an expression used by Moldovan oriented politicians, even though it was never clear.

We and Europe and We and Russia: pragmatism and conciliation

(iii) Neo-Soviet discourse

This discourse could be named “national communism” because it is a mixture of communist and nationalist ideas. This is also a governmental nationalism. According to J. Breuilly, governmental nationalism can only be considered as a distinct subject when the links to an earlier phase of nationalist opposition are particularly evident or when the government is confronted with a nationalist opposition claiming to speak for another nation.³³

Attitudes towards (national) community: The Moldovan nation exists independently and is entirely different from the Romanian nation.

Attitudes towards language: prohibition by governmental order of the use of the expressions “Romanian language”, “Romanian literature”, “History of Romanians”.

Uses of history: Soviet and communist history. For example, re-publishing of the Soviet period history books in which the term “annexation by Romania” is used to describe the 1918-1940 period.

Integration of minorities: Neo-Soviet discourse claims to be an active defender of minority rights, but, in fact, all minorities are reduced to Russian. The Russian language is the “language of inter-ethnic communication”. However, Neo-Soviet discourse also requires that the Russian language acquire the status of official language. The argument is quite democratic and is characteristic of the contemporary politics of identity: the example is given of democratic states, such as Belgium or Switzerland, but more often that of Finland where the Swedish make up only 2 percent of the population, but the Swedish language is nonetheless an official language.

Attitudes towards state: Moldova as federation (Moldova, Transnistria, Gagauzia); integration by union with Russia and Belarus.

We and Romania: Romania is a foreign state, which intervenes in the internal affairs of the independent and sovereign state of Moldovan.

We and Europe: Europe is ignored. “Europe is foreign and has no basis for understanding us”.

We and Russia: In this discourse, Russification and the proliferation of the Russian language should not be seen as the propaganda of Kremlin, but as a tool of modernization. From their point of view, modernization was not only the fundamental purpose of the Soviet and communist regime, but it was also a real achievement.

(iv). European oriented discourse:

Attitudes towards (national) community: “We are Romanians, beyond any discussion or doubt, but we are Romanians with a Basarabian ingredient with which we bring diversity and richness to the ways of being Romanian”.

Attitudes towards language: “We should stop discussing what is the real nature of our language and start speaking the Romanian language correctly, which is our ‘given’”.

Use of history: There are some aspects of history, which cannot be ignored when defining who we are. Moldova did not experience the events of the nineteenth century, which proved crucial for Romania – the years 1848, 1859, 1877-1879. Furthermore, all aspects of the Union are accepted, such as the fact that the Union was preceded by a secret convention to annex Basarabia signed by Romania and Germany; that Germany accepted annexation of Basarabia on the condition it be allowed to move its army through Basarabia to conquer the Ukraine; and that the formalities of the local declaration of the Union were made for the benefit of credibility and legitimacy among the population.

Attitudes towards state: Moldovan state should be based on a strong civil society.

Integrating minorities: Cultural rights for ethnic groups without ignoring the rights of the national or ethnic majority;

We and Russia: Dialogue with Russia is accepted only to the extent that Russia affirms her European vocation and Western orientation;

Romania and Europe: “We will find Romania again in Europe”; “Here in Chisinau we are accustomed to say that our path to Europe passes through Romania. Although, in saying this, we have always believed that we are testifying to an original form of patriotism, the statement, in fact, hides an inertia and intellectual sufficiency. Because we are not aware that the situation is exactly the opposite: we will find Romania again in Europe if we adopt the values and the strictness of the democratic world”.³⁴

Questions which may arise at this point are numerous: how it is possible within the same community, with the same “objective” data of language, territory, ethnicity and history, that two radically different discourses of identity have emerged – the Romanian identity discourse and Moldovan identity discourse? Why do some people identify themselves as Romanians and others as Moldovans? Why do these people want to live together and others not? Why do they constitute a community and the others not?

3. The identity confusion as inheritance

3.1 Invention of the Moldovan nation

Moldova has never existed as an independent political state within its present borders. From the mid-fourteenth to the fifteenth century, an independent principality of Moldova emerged in the lands between the Carpathian Mountains and the Black Sea. In the fifteenth century, Moldova became a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. In 1812, the Russian Empire annexed the eastern half of Moldova located between the rivers Prut and Nistru, naming it Basarabia. The western half of Moldova was incorporated into the newly created Romania in 1859. By 1918, Basarabia had become a part of Greater Romania, only for it to be annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 and become part of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, formed in that year, together with a small region on the east of the river Nistru called Transnistria.³⁵

Until 1924, Transnistria seems to have been a no-man's-land of Romanian, Ukrainian and Russian villages. In 1923, part of the population of this territory, mainly Bolshevik refugees from Basarabia (at the time was part of "bourgeois and capitalist" Romania), demanded autonomy within the Ukraine. Of a sudden, the Kremlin accepted the demand and the Autonomous Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (AMSSR) was declared official – though not as a part of the Ukraine, but as a part of the Soviet Union. There was an obvious reason to creating this republic: keeping the Romanian government alert and then uniting it with Basarabia.

After the annexation of Basarabia³⁶ in 1812, the tsarist government started to create a Moldovan nation, distinct from the Romanian nation. The Russians and Pan-slavists advanced two hypotheses in order to justify the existence of the Moldovan nation. One tsarist hypothesis claimed that the Moldovans were a Slavic people that had adopted a Roman language in the Middle Ages. A more temperate argument asserted that the Basarabian population had developed as a separate nation in the nineteenth century when they did not share the cultural and historical experiences of the united Romanian nation.³⁷

In 1917, the Bolsheviks addressed their messages to the Basarabian proletariat in terms of the international class struggle. But shortly afterwards, in 1924, by creating the AMSSR, Soviet ideologues revised the historical and ethnic arguments on the existence of Moldovan nation.

When the prospects of re-annexation of Basarabia diminished in the 1930s, Soviet propaganda intensified its focus on the creation of the Moldovan nation. The hypothesis that places the genesis of the Moldovan nation in the convenient darkness of the Middle Ages was easier to maintain and more credible to those who had to adopt it.³⁸

What did the ideologists intend to create – a nation or an *ethnie*? The answer can be ‘both’ or, to be more precise, an ethno-nation,³⁹ as, generally speaking, the Soviet approach to the national problem was that of ethno-nationalism, both on academic⁴⁰ and empirical levels:⁴¹

According to the Soviet nationality theory, each people passed through a number of stages: tribe (*plemea*), nationality (*narodnosti*), bourgeois nation and socialist nation. The Volochi, the ancestors of both Romanians and Moldovans split during either the second or the third stage. The Volochi in the south interacted with the South Slavs and became Romanians. The Volochi in the north interacted with the East Slavs and became Moldovans.⁴²

Some authors argue that the myth of the Moldovan nation was attractive since the name “Moldovan” had actually been used on both sides of the river Prut at one time or another. But, despite the fact that old Romanian chronicles refer to “Moldovans”, it was clearly a reference in a geographic, non-ethnic sense.⁴³

3.2 *Invention of the Moldovan language*

The problem of the Moldovan language was first raised in 1924 in Transnistria (AMSSR) and continued by Soviet linguists.⁴⁴ The founders of Transnistria claimed they needed an instrument with which to communicate with the rural population and to promote Bolshevik values. They tried to impose a language spoken in some villages but encountered the need for a standard language and, inevitably, had to adopt the existent Romanian. The unique difference was the choice of script – though the Latin script was in fact used in 1932-1938. In order to avoid the creation of obstacles to re-annexation, however, the Soviet authorities recommended use of the Latin script and the Romanian language over that of the newly invented Moldovan.

The Soviet period was one of promotion of intense Russification in order to guarantee the stability of western borders. Russification was effected in two ways: the obligation to speak Russian and the adoption of

Russian words in the national language. Nonetheless, despite Russification, the Soviets found it difficult to argue the difference between the two languages. And despite their relative success in imposing the expression "Moldovan language", on August 31 1989, Moldova adopted the Latin alphabet and in 1991 changed the name of the spoken language from "Moldovan" to "Romanian".⁴⁵

But, five years later, the second parliament elected in 1994 by free democratic elections changed the name of the state language back to "Moldovan". This was the beginning of a linguistic battle. International conferences, symposia, and workshops were organized to demonstrate that the language spoken in Moldova was, in fact, Romanian. Again, it had been demonstrated, linguistically speaking, that the Moldovan language did not exist. There was no more discussion and doubt about the nature of the language spoken in Moldova. This scientific proof, however, did not convince everybody that their language was not Moldovan and was not a different language from Romanian. There is no simple choice when it comes to naming a language. Choosing one name over another leads to different behavior: those who believe their language to be Moldovan would read different newspapers, listen to different radio stations and watch different TV stations than those believing their language to be Romanian. Political behavior will, therefore, be different, with, for example, people voting different political parties accordingly.

3.3 Identification through inventions

Of course, it cannot be said at which point the word "Moldovan", in the ethnic and national sense of the word, started to take on meaning, apart from its use by ideologists. It is difficult to say how peasants identified themselves in the nineteenth century, whether they were able to identify themselves in relation to other ethnic groups. Basarabian intellectuals, students and soldiers in Russia, however, confirm the theories of identity, and even confirm Gellner's story of the Ruritaniens of Megalomania.⁴⁶ A powerful mechanism of national identification is exposure to difference or contact with others which shows differences between self and other groups, intensifying ethnic and national feelings, the feeling of belonging to "our group".

In Petrograd in 1917, for example, the Basarabians Ion Inculeț and Panteleimon Erhan founded the *Basarabian Society* (Societatea Basarabească) with the purpose of instructing propagandists in the spread

of Bolshevik ideas in Basarabia. The same year saw the organization in Odessa of the Moldovan Progressist Party.⁴⁷ The fact that these groups were organized in Russia allow us to say that intellectuals, students and soldiers from the Russian Empire discovered their difference and, in order to give a name to it or to differentiate themselves from other contacted ethnic groups, they used the already existing terms “Basarabians” and “Moldovans”. These contacts with tsarist bureaucracies also served as a source of Basarabian nationalism in 1917-1918:

It is this that pushes people into nationalism, into the need for the congruence between their own “culture” (the idiom in which they express themselves and understand others) and that of the interconnected bureaucracies, which constitute their social environment. Non-congruence is not merely an inconvenience or a disadvantage: it means perpetual humiliation.⁴⁸

Perpetual humiliation at the hands of the bureaucracies of the empire explains why, when returning to their country, Basarabians instructed as Bolshevik-propagandists became nationalists, declared autonomy for Basarabia and played a major role in the Unification of Basarabia and Romania.⁴⁹

3.4 Institutionalization of the “mistaken identity”

During the Soviet period, in Moldova there existed deliberate constructions of the nation – the invention of the pseudo-theoretical concept of the “Moldovan people” and “Moldovan nation”. Concomitantly, however, there also existed an institutionalized process of forging a national identity. The resurrection of nationalism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has been explained in terms of the emergence of the ethno-national conflicts “frozen” by communist regimes. Recent interpretation of the Soviet period argues that this is not exactly the case. The Soviet period was characterized by a double strategy or double politics regarding the national problem – the development of nationalities and their simultaneous fusion:

Far from ruthlessly suppressing nationhood, the Soviet regime pervasively institutionalized it. The regime repressed nationalism, of course, but at the same time it went further than any other state before or since in

institutionalizing territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality as fundamental social categories. In doing so, it inadvertently created a political field supremely conducive to nationalism.⁵⁰

The Soviet Union did not suppress nationalism, but re-shaped it. There were two types of republic created – *unional* and *autonomous* – based on local ethnic communities, newly incorporated in the Soviet empire. Ethnicity and nationality of the republics were defined according to Stalin's definition of nation: "a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make up manifested in a community of culture"⁵¹. This is obviously an ethno-nationalist position. Thus, the Soviet Union was the only state in the world where the ethnic principle was used as a basis for its administrative structure.⁵² The Soviet republics were defined as quasi-nation states, complete with their own territories, names, constitutions, legislatures, administrative staff, cultural and scientific institutions, etc. At the time of its dissolution, the Soviet Union included 53 nation-state formations, each one based on self-determination of an ethnic group.

Interpretation of the former Soviet empire distinguishes between the degree of institutionalization of ethnic identities and their psychological depth: "it is important to distinguish between *the degree of institutionalization* of ethnic and national categories and *the psychological depth, substantiality* and *practical potency* of such categorical identities".⁵³ The populations incorporated in the Soviet empire were required to have a national consciousness at local level and express their patriotism at the unional level. At the same time, however, Soviet patriotism was supposed to replace national local identities – patriotism being a moral quality, the patriot being a person who acts voluntarily and rationally in the interest of his country.⁵⁴ This double national strategy has similarities with the agrarian reform of the Bolsheviks: to gain the support of the enormous mass of peasants incorporated in the empire, land was allotted to the peasants for a short period of time, only for it to be were collectivized 10-12 years later – a strategy more successful than the "patriotization" of ethno-nationalism. Although ethno-nationalism was something created, it was nonetheless stronger than Soviet patriotism. This is why Walker Connor considers the case of the Soviet Union to be the most instructive example for the force of ethno-nationalism "wherein a most comprehensive, intensive and multigenerational program to

exorcise nationalism and exalt Soviet patriotism has proven remarkably ineffective".⁵⁵

3.5 "*Mistaken identity*" at work

Beside the institutionalization of the nationalism in the unional republic, some important conditions for the creation of a national identity were fulfilled:

Standard education of the masses: Ernest Gellner argued that the development of national awareness was possible only after the elimination of illiteracy, when a common written standard culture (in the sociological, not the elitist sense of the word) was shared by the masses. According to Gellner, nationalism is

The general impositions of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases the totality, of the population. It means the general diffusion of a school-mediated, academic supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of a reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is establishment of an anonymous impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of the previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves.⁵⁶

During the Soviet period, Moldova's population received a standard education, which was the main condition for a common Moldovan identity. Moreover, there are many accounts which maintain that the illiteracy was eliminated for the first time in the Soviet period.⁵⁷

Industrialisation: Nationalism was explained as the transition from *Agraria* to *Industria* and Soviet efforts were considerable in this respect. Soviet strategy of state building and mobilization "could not be implemented without more effective control of the rural majority of the population and the transfer of resources from the agricultural sector was seen as essential to rapid industrialization".⁵⁸ Although Moldova was and still is an agricultural country, a form of industrialization was nonetheless developed: a food processing industry, textile and wine industries, and even heavy industry for different kinds of agricultural

machines. Today, the workers have returned to their villages, however the shared values of Soviet workers remain strong.

Common action: According to exegetes, the term “industrialization” can be replaced by “modernization”:

If modernity is taken to mean the kind of social arrangements that there were institutionalized after the English industrial and French political revolutions, that is, if the term describes the destruction of localism and creation via unprecedented social mobilization, of broad social areas in the social, political, economic and cultural spheres, then we can argue that the elective affinity that Gellner tries to establish is not between nationalism and industrialization, but between nationalism and modernity.⁵⁹

Industrialization could mean the whole idea of modernization as both suppose literacy, urbanization, the school system, symbols and complex cultural artifacts. Some Soviet regions saw all these elements for the first time during the Soviet period. Revisionist interpretations of totalitarianism regard the Soviet period as one of modernization of most of the regions within the Soviet empire.⁶⁰ This is not an acceptable argument because any account of Soviet phenomena must be located within a global framework, part of global modernization. Nonetheless, even though the revisionist modernization argument does not hold up entirely, the population of Moldova did carry out construction works in the Soviet period, such as roads, factories, schools, institutions and kolkhozes, etc.⁶¹ – all new to the population and signs of a “better life”. It is difficult to call these were good things, but it was, nonetheless, collective action. Identity was also defined as a “dynamic emergent aspect of collective action”⁶² or, more exactly,

as the reflexive capacity for producing consciousness of action (that is the symbolic representation of it) beyond any specific contents. Identity becomes formal reflexivity, pre-symbolic capacity, the recognition of a sense of action within the limits posed at any moment by the environment and the biological structure.⁶³

In Moldova, the identity created as an emergent aspect of common action was, of course, the Moldovan identity. Even if a part of these people understand that these actions and institutions would have been

more feasible in a democratic, non-communist, non-Soviet regime, it would be very painful for them to give up all their beliefs and accept that their lives had been totally wrong.

Imagined community: As Benedict Anderson argued, mass communication plays a fundamental role in the forging of a common identity. One of the first tools in the creating of a nation is the newspaper – it is no accident that they appear at the same time. If the newspaper forms the basis of nation building, then the broadcasting media are the main tool in its consolidation. Radio is employed “to forge a link between the dispersed listeners and the symbolic heartland of national life”. Broadcasting media allows a space of identification based not only on a common history, but also on common daily experience. Mass media is a linking mechanism between the rituals of every day life and the “imagined community” of the nation:

Nations are held together by beliefs, but these beliefs cannot be transmitted except through cultural artifacts which are available to everyone – books, newspapers, electronic media. This is the basis of Benedict Anderson’s claim that nations are not wholly spurious inventions, but imagined communities, because their existence depends on collective acts of imagining which find their expression mainly in the media.⁶⁴

During the Soviet period in Moldova, a strong imagined community was forged by the mass media that had appeared predominantly in the Soviet period; it was a single state mass media system and it forged, for the first time, an imagined community and a common identity.

Creations of institutions and Moldovan culture: Throughout the history of the Soviet Union, a cultural elite would emerge among most ethnic groups as “national” poets, writers, artists, filmmakers, and academics. Also, “the cultural mosaic” would be “thoroughly documented, academically described and staged in the repertoires of numerous national theaters, operas, museums, and folk music and dance groups”.⁶⁵ Moldova, for example, saw the imposition of a kind of “academic-popular” folk music and dance, stylized folk clothes and food – all things that are now taken as ethnically specific to Moldovan culture.⁶⁶

Thus, in the Soviet period in Moldova, a strong system of institutionalized identities was created, with the help of which, the

population represented reality, channeled their political action and organized their social and cultural life.

4. Between “national awakening” and “social engineering”

4.1. “National revival” and “national backlash”

In spite of the institutionalization of a “mistaken” identity, for many western observers, the events of 1988-1991 seemed to serve the purpose of denying the difference between Moldovans and Romanians and describing the idea of the Moldovan language and Moldovan nation as linguistic and ethnic farces, invented in order to justify an annexation of territory. In the summer of 1988, Basarabian intellectuals and a part of the political elite (members of the Communist party) created the unofficial movement *The Democratic Movement for Supporting Perestroika*. Again in 1988, *The Literary and Musical Club “Alexe Mateevici”* was set up to formulate the national and cultural claims of the ethnic majority. In 1989, these two movements merged to become the *Popular Front*. In the period 1988-1991, most of their requirements were realized.

Identity claims satisfied in the period 1988-1991:

- Introduction of the Latin alphabet and declaration of the Moldovan language as state language – August 31, 1989;
- Strengthening of the “Romanian-Moldovan linguistic identity” – September 1, 1989;
- Adoption of Tricolor - 27 April 1990;
- Introduction of “History of Romanians” and “Romanian literature” courses in the curricula – September 1990;
- Adoption of the national anthem: “Deșteaptă-te române” – May 23, 1990;
- Renaming of the country – May 23, 1991;
- Declaration of Sovereignty – June 23, 1991;
- Declaration of Independence – August 27, 1991;
- Declaration of the Romanian language as state language – August 27, 1997;

- Others: de-Russification of geographical names, Romanization of names, changing of street names, etc.

Identity claims satisfied in 1994-1995:

- In 1994, a new democratically elected Parliament changed the “acquisitions” of the national movement:
- Ratification of the fundamental act of Community of Independent States – April 1994;
- Declaration of the Moldovan language as state language – July 27, 1994, Constitution, Article 13, 1;
- Adoption of a new national anthem: “Limba noastră” – 1995;
- Attempt to introduce Moldovan history in the curricula – 1995.

Since 1995, there has been a change from the dominant Romanian oriented discourse to the discourse of neo-Soviet identity, via the phase dominated by the Moldovan discourse. In 2001, the former communist party, without changing its name, won the general elections in a most democratic way by taking 70 percent of the vote.

How can such a radical succession of identity discourses be explained? Why was a strong national movement followed by a backlash and a return to the “mistaken identity”? Normally these questions can be formulated from primordialist and culturalist perspectives of nations and nationalism, which name a particular movement as a “national-awakening”. It might be useful to start the explanation from within instrumentalist theory and then to deal with the unexplainable side of the national movement.

4.2 National revival: cause or consequence of disintegration of empire?

The traditional interpretative approach of post-soviet nationalism maintains that the national revivals in most Soviet republics led to the break up of the Soviet empire. But these two phenomena – the “national revival” and “falling empire” – are, in fact, simultaneous and are even logically opposed. The break up of empire leads to the national movement: “nationalism is a dialectical affair, with movements among Ruritians often resulting from the action of those in the Megalomanian metropolis”.⁶⁷

According to Miroslav Hroch,⁶⁸ the social conditions of national revival pass through three phases. In phase A – cultural, literary, and folkloric – a group of intellectuals share a “new spirituality” emerging from a collective history and destiny. In phase B, a *minorité agassante* finds (or invents) the political implication of these ideas and starts a political campaign for its implementation. In the final phase, phase C, national feelings and the inevitable political demands are shared by the masses.⁶⁹

The initial period, phase A, when activists devote themselves to scholarly inquiry into the linguistic, historical and cultural attributes of their ethnic group, something which is a long way from having political goals, is not easy to establish in Moldova – it may possibly lie in the activity of intellectuals from the Soviet period, the intellectuals opposed to the Russification in the time after 1956, which was witness to a period of post-Stalinization ‘liberalization’. It is an amazing fact that, during the cultural and literary phase, there was no significant difference between the Moldovan and Romanian oriented intellectuals. Both were fighting together against Russification and their differences were negligible. After 1989-1991, when the divergences among intellectuals started to become obvious, tension and reciprocal blame grew rapidly and strengthened.⁷⁰

The role of the *minorité agassante*, which discovered the political implication of cultural and linguistic ideas and started a political campaign for its implementation, was played both by the political elite – members of the Communist party who created the unofficial movement *The Democratic Movement for Supporting Perestroika* – and by intellectuals – those from the *Literary and Musical Club “Alexe Mateevici”*. Political demands emerged in phase C, when the Soviet Empire had collapsed.

The transition to the decisive phase of national agitation occurred almost at the same time as the old regimes and social system were in crisis. As old ties disappeared or weakened, the need for a new group identity brought together, under the auspices of the national movement, people belonging to different classes and groups. Similarly, following the breakdown of the system of planned economy and communist control, old ties disappeared. Under conditions of general uncertainty and a lack of confidence, the national idea assumed an integrating role. These were stressful circumstances and people usually overestimated the protective effects of their national group.⁷¹

There are some elements that allow the national movement of 1988-1991 to be seen as a consequence of the disintegration of the Soviet empire, rather than an awakening of the old force:

a) The movement appeared within the Communist system in order to protect the system and improve it – as already said, it was *The Democratic Movement for Supporting Perestroika*, which appeared first. There is clear similarity with the Basarabian national movement from 1917-1918. Both movements were organized by groups of Basarabians during obvious collapses of empire – the disintegration of the tsarist empire in 1917, following the Bolshevik revolution, and the end of empire in 1989, due to perestroika. These movements were also set up in order to sustain the official system – in 1917, for the promotion of the Bolshevik values, and in 1989, in order to sustain perestroika. In 1917 in Petrograd, the Basarabians founded the *Basarabian Society*, which the Russian provisional government recognized as pro-Bolshevik, but, when they came to Moldova to represent the newly created Soviet power, they actually made union with Romania. Some Moldovan soldiers in the Russian army also started to spread revolutionary propaganda, but this soon turned into a nationalist movement,⁷² confirming Lord Acton's prophecy that "*Exile feeds the nursery of the nationalism*".⁷³ But, the final stages of national movements are quite different. At the beginning of the century the nationalist movement had lead to Union with Romania, whereas, by the end of the century it lead to Independence and the creation of a new state.⁷⁴

b) Another argument for the supposition that national movements are mainly a consequence, rather than a cause of the disintegration of empire, is the fact that national movements were common among the Soviet unional republics and lasted until Independence was gained.

c) Most national movements quickly achieved their principal goal: political independence. Fifteen new nation-states emerged from the former Soviet Union without facing any serious danger from abroad. After achieving their main goals, national movements disappeared in most countries. Thus, the national movement emerged as a result of, and as an answer to the crisis and disintegration of the communist regime and its system of values.

4.3 Elite manipulation

In order to understand a national movement and its consequences, it is very important to analyze the behavior of the elite during the stages of national agitation. The perspective of elite manipulation is regarded with suspicion by some theoreticians, but in the case of Moldova it provides a very powerful explanation.⁷⁵

During the Soviet period, the Moldovan political elite was made up of members of the Communist Party from Transnistria.⁷⁶ Until 1989, no leader from Basarabia held the position of first secretary of the Communist Party as the Kremlin supposed personnel from Transnistria to be more reliable than their counterparts from Basarabia, part of "bourgeois Romania". In this case, it can be said that this is a classic example of "blocked elite".⁷⁷

In 1989, a new local elite that had been educated in the same communist regime emerged as champions of a cultural renaissance. They intended to take the place of the transnistrean elite. For the Moldovan elite, acceptance of a cultural nationalist was permissible for a short period in order that they acquire the vacant places in the state administration. This elite manipulation explains why the Union with Romania did not come about, despite the strong claims of the unionists. As it is known, this perspective was used by Ernest Gellner in order to explain the case of "one nation – two states".

If a nation has 2 states, it follows that their glorious unification will reduce the number of prime-ministers, presidents, directors of academies, managers of football teams, etc., by a factor of n . For every person in such a position, $n-1$ people will lose the position. All these $n-1$ will be the losers in unification, even if, as a whole, the nation makes gains. And, while there is no doubt that it is better to be a big boss than a small boss, the difference between these positions is not as important as that of between being a boss, no matter how big or small, and not being a boss at all.⁷⁸

4.4 Mass support in national revival

Researchers of nationalism and national movements agree that, regardless of the nature of the social group in which so called "national consciousness" may first appear, the masses are the last to be affected by it.⁷⁹ The main interest of the researcher is to analyze the ways in which the political and intellectual elite, the *minorité agassante*, gains mass

support. How can the mass support which Moldova's national "awakeners" claimed to enjoy be explained?

a) Unification of the social, economic, political, and cultural requirements: In Moldova, ethnic sentiments were first used to mobilize divergent groups in a coalition against the Communist regime. However, antipathy between these groups emerged, and, as a result, the movement was seceded. By way of example, in 1989, the main Gagauz organization, *Gagauz Halki*, even became involved with the *Popular Front* in order to support Perestroika and to press for increased cultural provisions for the ethnic Gagauz. Thus, both organizations saw their goals as essentially compatible. However, in 1990, when the *Popular Front* moved in an increasingly Romanian direction, the Gagauz feared it would press for the forced Romanization of the ethnic minorities inside a reconstituted Greater Romania and consequently separated, not only from the *Popular Front*, but also from the Moldovan state.⁸⁰ In June 1989, other local non-formal organizations also joined the *Popular Front*, unifying their cultural, political, economic and social claims, as the *Popular Front* was the only independently recognized organization which had the right to propose candidates for election from the USSR in 1989 and from Moldova in 1990. After the election, the movements separated as their short-term pragmatic interests had been satisfied.

b) Support of different social strata: Max Weber, in his definition of a nation, emphasized the fact that not all social strata enjoy the same degree of solidarity in national movements.⁸¹ In classic national movements, peasants are active according to the amount of land possession. In 1917, the Basarabian peasants were very active. They demanded land, but also political and social rights. In 1988-1989, there was no active participation by the peasants because they had no economic demands. Normally, officials, office workers, civil servants, etc. show reluctance towards national movements out of fear for their positions. The common support of all social strata is a logical condition for a successful national movement: "Self-determination was stronger and more successful in national movements based on a complete social structure from their non-dominant ethnic group and which could utilize some state institutions or traditions from the past".⁸²

c) Religious authority: In Moldova, the religious authorities played an important role in spreading the ideas of the *minorité agassante* among the masses. Under Communism, only a small number of churches were allowed to function, and attendance was strongly discouraged and met

with moral reprimand. For the ethnic majority, cultural nationalism was a religious renaissance – their national meetings had a strong religious flavor and even religious décor. The religious authorities were very active and, to the extent in which they acted to bolster their own influence, they were rationalist and pragmatic, as is characteristic of the political elite.

5. From “primordial remains” to “civic act”.

5.1 Whose emotions? Whose rationality?

As explained by instrumentalist approach, there is no doubt what it was that enabled the invented, or “mistaken” identity to survive: the pragmatic interests of the elite to obtain an independent state. The instrumentalists attribute rationality to the national movement because it concerns autonomy, independence, and secession, which are pragmatic aims in themselves. Thus, a rational explanation for the national movement would be relative economic deprivation, elite ambitions, rational choice theory, and internal colonialism.

On the other hand, it is generally accepted that if nationalism existed only in the third world, it could be explained entirely by the instrumentalist approach.⁸³ Similarly, if the Moldovan discourse had been the only discourse in the Republic of Moldova, it could then have been explained entirely by instrumentalist theories. However, this explanation brings with it the risk that an excessive and even impossible rationality is attributed to the elite and that nationalism is transformed into a rationalistic strategy to be employed by leaders in mobilizing the masses for their own, opportunistic ends.

There was a powerful emotive dimension to the national movement of 1988-1991. The dominant narrative during those years was the narrative of national prison and liberation; the intellectual elites described their actions in the emotional registers of dignity or, to be more precise, of the humiliation to which they were exposed, and that of current dignity. How can this emotional power be explained?

The ethno-symbolist and primordialist approaches consider the emotional power of nationalism to be precisely the most important element that the instrumentalist perspective fails to explain. By way of example, Anthony Smith blames the limitation of the instrumentalist approach for,

firstly, failing to distinguish between genuine constructs and long-term processes and structures in which successive generations have been socialized; secondly, concentrating on the actions of the elite at the expense of popular beliefs and actions; and thirdly, neglecting the powerful affective dimensions of nations and nationalism.⁸⁴

It can be presumed that there is an unexplainable remainder from Moldova's national predicament, which the instrumentalist-modernist approach cannot explain. This can be called "the primordialist remainder" due to its reference to what are considered "primordial" givens, that is, language and special bonds with the "mother-country". In point of fact, the language of primordialism and ethno-nationalism – "Romanian brothers", "mother country Romania", "the mutilated body of the country", etc. – and the images and phrases in which their unconscious convictions are expressed – blood, family, brother, sister, mother, forefathers, ancestors and home – were used by the national awakeners in 1988-89.⁸⁵

As argued in the previous chapter, the nationalist claims of Romanian oriented and Moldovan oriented discourses were not separate during the 1988-1991 agitation. In fact, they were unified in their struggle against Soviet rule and Russification. Both orientations considered their "national awakening" to be a part of the primordial rhythms of a nation and saw it as the passage from ineffable origins to efflorescence, then to decay due to foreign power which is followed by the current glorious rebirth. Both discourses considered their primordial attachments to be overriding and ineffable.⁸⁶

After the discourses separated, it became clear that the primordialist language belonged mainly to the Romanian oriented discourse. So, does this mean that the Moldovan oriented discourse can be explained by the pragmatism of political leaders and that Romanian oriented discourse is responsible for the emotional aspects of nationalism? This is not entirely the case since the Moldovan oriented discourse is not lacking in emotional power.

So, if the "true primordial givens" are the same – language, blood, ancestry, community, customs – how is it that these can engender different attachments or, in any case, different emotions? As Clifford Geertz argues, this ineffability results from the importance which human beings attribute to the cultural givens, rather than from any intrinsic properties of the ties themselves "for virtually every person, in every society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural – some would say spiritual – affinity than from social interaction".⁸⁷

If the primordiality is attached, then the direct implication is that Moldovan oriented discourse also attributes ineffability to some givens. If the same primordial givens generate different primordial attachments, then the primordialist approach fails to distinguish pure constructs – Moldovan identity – from long-term processes – “true” Romanian identity.

Despite the “*blut und boden*”⁸⁸ language, the Moldovan nationalist movement cannot be understood as an atavistic reaction; it is a quintessentially modern sentiment and phenomenon. “Nationalism, as a sentiment, could arise only in modernity” and, as Isaiah Berlin noted, mainly as a “result of humiliation” perceived acutely by “the most conscious members of a society”.⁸⁹

As many authors have underlined,⁹⁰ unlike western political nationalism, based on the civic participation of citizens, nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe is the creation of intellectuals whose social mobility was restricted. For these reasons, Eastern nationalism is considered to be a “cultural nationalism” which appeared as an answer by intellectuals to western modernity. For Charles Taylor, the modernity

can be felt as a threat to a traditional culture. It will remain an external threat to those strongly opposed to change. But there is another reaction among those who want to take on some version of the institutional changes... What they are looking for is a creative adaptation, drawing on the cultural resources of their tradition that would enable them to take on the new practices successfully. In short, they want to do what has already been done in the West. But they see, or sense, that it cannot be done by simply copying the West.⁹¹

Gellner, the author who has most convincingly argued for the link between modernity and nationalism, also denies that his theory is reductive in the sense that it neglects the psychological authenticity and depth of the emotional power of nationalism. In his later works,⁹² Gellner emphasizes that his theory seeks to explain why these emotions exist, why they are invested in nations, why they are felt authentically and powerfully in the hearts of nationals.⁹³ Thus, while feelings of humiliation might be socio-economic or the result of ethnic/linguistic difference, they might also be the result of political arbitrariness. And all these become sources of nationalism only in modernity:

Oppression is not some kind of independent and additional factor: cultural differentiation, inoffensive under the old intimate social order, is automatically experienced as oppression in the age of anonymity, mobility and pervasive bureaucratization with a standardized idiom.⁹⁴

The general conditions of modernization explain the humiliation of the community as a whole in terms of economic deprivation, lack of political participation and restricted social mobility of non-dominant ethnic groups:

members of the intelligentsia that experience restricted social mobility, and who share cultural traits with the proletariat that experiences multiple humiliation in urban environments and discrimination in labor markets, provide the personnel for nationalist movements.⁹⁵

To the extent that intellectuals perceive this humiliation more acutely and act to eliminate it, the ineffable emotive power becomes explainable from the perspective of the ambitions of the elite and rational choice theory.

5.2 The call to difference

Humiliation not only provides the personnel for nationalist movements, it is also an existential challenge for the most conscious members of a society:

The refusal – at among the elite – of incorporation by the metropolitan culture, as a recognition of the need for difference but felt existentially as a challenge, not as a matter of valuable common good to be created, and viscerally as a matter of dignity, in which one's self-worth is engaged. This is what gives nationalism its emotive power. This is what places it so frequently in the register of pride and humiliation.⁹⁶

The “call to difference” felt by “modernizing” elites is a background to nationalism.

The call to difference could be felt by anyone concerned for the well-being of the people involved. But the challenge is experienced by the elite concerned overwhelmingly with a certain register – that of dignity.⁹⁷

What is dignity? In Taylor's opinion, the notion of dignity was developed in modern, equal direct-access societies. Although Kant supposes that dignity is the *appanage* of all rational beings, "philosophically we can attribute this status to all, but politically, the sense of equal dignity is really shared by people who belong to a functioning direct-access society".⁹⁸

Recognition by the metropolitan culture did not count for Moldova's intellectuals. On the contrary, the Soviet Empire was perceived as an impediment that blocked entry to the "civilized world". Perception of the West did not immediately lead to a feeling of superiority and inferiority. The West was perceived through the "mother-country" which the intellectuals had rediscovered. Nonetheless, the need for dignity and "call for difference" soon appeared and followed a strange trajectory. Once the difficulties of communication with the Romanians "from beyond" had been overcome, along with the matters of approaching, which had been forbidden for decades, and knowing each other mutually, there followed "the sharpening of the difference that had not been clearly seen till then, because real contacts had not existed".⁹⁹ In the late 1980s, identification with Romanians "from beyond" was effected by means of borrowed representations acquired illegally, albeit indirectly.¹⁰⁰ The cultural discrepancy, clear and difficult to surpass, then brought on a rudimentary complex among the Basarabian intellectuals. Their works belonged to trends that had disappeared from Romanian culture at the beginning of the twentieth century. The time of a contemporary cultural processes is beginning only now with the works of the new generation. Admission of this discrepancy by the intellectuals educated in the old system seems impossible because it makes them feel psychologically uncomfortable; it gives them a feeling of failure.

The acceptance of cultural discrepancy gave birth to two or even three different attitudes. The first is identical to that of the Ruritanian intellectuals from the imaginary experiment invented by Gellner in *Nation and Nationalism*, who discover that in Ruritania they could have roles which they would not have if they had been citizens of Megalomania, roles that allow the Basarabian intellectuals to compensate for their inferiority: do they not share the same social positions as the intellectuals of the "mother-country"?¹⁰¹ Another attitude attempts to hide the difference in perspective and acceptance of the perspective of the other over their own identity, an acceptance that leads to shame, humility, and self-hate. Michael Ignatieff calls these feelings "the Cain and Abel syndrome"

– “the ironic fact is that intolerance between brothers is often stronger than between strangers”¹⁰² and this paradox is based on a “narcissism of minor differences”, “it is not the common elements humans share with each other that inform their sense of identity, but the marginal ‘minor’ elements separating them”.¹⁰³ The third attitude is that of intellectuals who still maintain their Romanian dignity and claim to authenticity. And this is the most important aspect of the intellectual life of Moldova.

5.3 The need for authenticity in the Romanian oriented discourse

If it is supposed that claims of the Romanian “true” identity discourse still remain unexplainable because its attachment is more primordial than that of the Moldovan discourse, then it would follow that Romanian discourse does not make a rational connection between the culture and the political concept of the nation. This Romanian ideology has the appearance of being made up of descriptive statements, but it also contains some arbitrary assumptions that are immune to refutation – for example, “the need for authenticity”.¹⁰⁴

The concept of authenticity appears in modernity and supposes that differences among human beings have moral signification. This ideal of authenticity is applied both to individuals and to cultures. How can the claim to authenticity of the Romanian discourse be explained? It can accept the “natural” propulsion to state and state power in the case of manipulative pragmatic elite as parallel. Firstly, Romanian intellectuals require recognition of personal authenticity. Normally, their professions imply the use of the standard and literary Romanian language. For personal recognition, they also need recognition in the whole space that uses this language. They need recognition in Romanian culture, recognition by and through Romanian culture, recognition by the institutions of Romanian culture. Here lie the roots of the obsession with integration, which can be seen among Moldovan intellectuals.

The excessive value given to language by the intellectuals has spread to other social strata. Studies of sociolinguistics and applied linguistics, carried out in Moldova by the Romanist departments of some German universities, show that the Romanian language creates a “feeling of glottal inferiority”¹⁰⁵ among Moldova’s population because their spoken language is an archaic language that, simultaneously, is their mother tongue, the only language spoken. Even though they study modern standard and literary

Romanian, on a day-to-day basis, they continue to speak in what is for them a natural way – a rudimentary language.¹⁰⁶

It seems the “glottal inferiority” is produced naturally. Moldovans compare themselves with Romanian speakers from Romania. It seems that speaking a correct native language has in itself some aesthetic value; however, it also has a political value. Speaking the standard literary Romanian brings with it the values of the culture to which the language belongs, values normally explained in a socio-political context. Choosing a language as a value option is not unique. Jews at the beginning of the twentieth century opted for Hebrew, considered a language of culture and civilization, over the proletarian Yiddish; and today Norwegians are faced with the choice of Norwegian *Boksmal*, also a language of culture, over Norwegian *Nynorsk*, the language preferred by Norwegians hostile to European integration – amazingly both of these Norwegian languages are invented.¹⁰⁷

There is no simple choice when naming a language. Choosing one name or another leads to different behavior: those who believe their language to be Moldovan would read different newspapers, listen to different radio stations and watch different TV stations than those believing their language to be Romanian. Political behavior will, therefore, be different, with, for example, people voting for different political parties accordingly.

Thus, an element that had been considered primordial¹⁰⁸ and natural acquires non-natural values, that is, political values that suppose assumption and awareness.

Due to the role of language as an assumed political value, Romanian oriented discourse also becomes a rational discourse. If, for example, unification with Romania was considered as a choice of blood, then intellectuals have now re-thought the idea of unification:

Unification as a political act is not possible today, cannot be conceived today as we have been accustomed to conceive it since 1918. The union cannot be realized only through integration. We cannot “unify” in a simplistic way, we must integrate according to reciprocally accepted political principles and cultural norms. This is the only way to construct something durable.¹⁰⁹

Thus, what was seen as a primordial given has now become a rational political act. The reinterpretation of the idea of unification can be seen as an emancipation of national feeling, as rational and moral thinking.

6. Politics of identity *versus* politics of rights

6.1 *From invention to ethnic neutrality*

Generally, it is not possible to consider the modernizing nationalists as being outside their society, mobilizing it from above. But, this does seem to be the case for Moldova. Here the terms “invention” and “construction” have strong connotations, not only of novelty, but also of intentionality and manipulation, the myth of the Moldovan ethno-nation being a creation of tsarist and Soviet ideologues in an attempt to legitimize the annexation of territory.

The independent Republic of Moldova proves the relative success of the tsarist myth and of Soviet efforts to create a Moldovan nation. Was real independence more necessary than the pseudo-autonomy of Soviet federalism in making this happen? Are national inventions necessary? Are nationalism and national identity vital components of social life and of the Republic of Moldova’s need to practice democracy and build civil society?

The previous chapter contained analysis of the emergence in the region of different discourses of national identity and the most useful approach for that purpose was the modernist-instrumentalist approach. In order to analyze national identity as a political necessity, however, a completion of the modernist-instrumentalist approach is inevitable, even though this completion can be seen as a shift of perspective. Although both Gellner, in *Nations and nationalism*, and Anderson, in *Imagined Communities*, see the connection between nationalism and egalitarianism in modern societies, they do not see the mutually reinforcing relationships between nationalism, egalitarianism, and democratization.¹¹⁰

[Gellner] leaves little for the creative possibilities of political design and architecture. Constitutional and political engineers do not figure in this sociologically reductionist conception of modernity, in which all nationalisms must eventually be cultural nationalisms.¹¹¹

Gellner's theory assumes too readily that the political and cultural nation are one – an example such as Switzerland would be “a real anomaly”.¹¹² However, he did later try to take account of politics.¹¹³

As John Breuilly has argued, in studying national identities, the major focus should be on the relationship between nationalism and political modernization. Liah Greenfeld has also demonstrated that, initially, nationalism developed as democracy: “the location of sovereignty within the people and the recognition of the fundamental equality among its various strata, which constitute the essence of the modern national idea, are at the same time the basic tenets of democracy”.¹¹⁴ As Greenfeld argued, in the sixteenth century England the Latin words *republica* and *patria* were used as equivalents of “nation” and, at the same time, those who committed themselves to the ideal of nation called themselves patriots, not nationalists. Lately, however, nationalism has spread in different conditions, and the idea of the *natio* has moved from the idea of sovereignty to the uniqueness of a people. The original equivalence between nationalism and democratic principles was lost, the process called the *nationalization of patriotism*.¹¹⁵

The discussion of necessity/inutility of national identity for political practice already has an impressive tradition as in the debate between communitarians, who maintain that national identities continue to matter for political purposes, and liberals who argue that, in a neutral liberal state, the political participation of citizens should be based on the respect of fundamental rights.

The communitarian conception is logically bound to the primordialist and ethno-symbolist approach. For Anthony Smith, national identity has a particular power vis-à-vis other forms of identity because

it provides the sole vision and rationality of political solidarity, one command, popular assents and elicitation of popular enthusiasm. All other visions, all other rationales appear vain and shallow by comparison. They offer no sense of election, no unique history, no special destiny.¹¹⁶

Communitarians advocate that politics of civic virtue can only be sustained by a “vision of the common good” that must be rooted in a love of the country, a love of what makes each country unique: its language, ethnic backgrounds, its history.¹¹⁷

Clearly, in the national confusion of Moldova, where uniqueness and special destiny is not given by language, but by the confusion regarding

the language, one command, popular assents and elicitation of popular enthusiasm are impossible. Being aware of this fact, the official framework does not include reference to the ethno-national identity.

In Moldova's fundamental act – the Constitution – national identity was not considered an essential component for the practice of democracy. The only identity required by the formal framework of the Moldovan state is political identity. The political community supposes equal rights for all, regardless of ethnicity. The final expression of this community is common tradition, values, ideas, and feelings that bind the people together in a historical territory. The most well known examples of this form of national identity are the United States of America – although Walker Connor considers this an improper analogy¹¹⁸ – and Switzerland, where national identity was built on constitutional principles, irrespective of ethnic identity.

The political and juridical characteristics of the Moldovan state suppose a pure political identity, with no ethno-cultural ingredients.¹¹⁹ According to the liberal perspective, states should be neutral with respect to the ethno-cultural identities of their citizens and indifferent to the ability of ethno-cultural groups to reproduce over time. The state should guarantee fundamental individual rights irrespective of ethnicity because these rights are universal. Ethnic identity can be expressed only in private life.¹²⁰ The Constitution contains no mention of a ethno-national identity of the state and uses the phrase “the people of the Republic of Moldova” in order to avoid any link between statehood and ethnicity: “the state recognizes that this territory is populated by a single people, the people of the Republic of Moldova” (Constitution, Article 10, 1.2). “The Republic of Moldova is the common and indivisible *patria* of their citizens” (Constitution, Article 10.1).

In the constitutional acts of Moldova, “people” is defined in an intricate manner:

People – as a high form of human community, unconfoundable with other collectivities – is not exclusively an ethnic or biological phenomenon. It is a complex reality and, at the same time, a result of a long historical process, based on a community of ethnic origin, culture, religion, psychic factors, community of life, traditions and ideals, but especially on the common past and the will to be together of those who live on a given territory”.¹²¹

This definition is a mixture of the anthropological, ethno-national, and political perspectives, which is also reminiscent of Stalin's definition of nation.¹²² This conception of the people is also similar to that of the Constitution of 1978, in which it was specified that the Moldovan Unional Republic is "the Republic of the Moldovan people", strongly suggesting that minorities also belong to the Moldovan people, the ethnic connotation being superseded by a territorial connotation, as observed by experts.¹²³ Etymologically, the term "people", as it is used in Moldova, is closer to *narod* than to *demos*. The Soviets employed the term *narod* with a double meaning. The first is an ethno-national meaning, which reflects the development of a community from tribal stage (*plemea*) to the stage of nation. Another use of the word "people" was "proletariat", this meaning being part of the expression "Soviet people", along with the associated patriotic connotations. The concept of "Soviet people" was manipulated by the implicit redefinition of the Moldovan people in territorial terms.

Much discussion concerning the unity of the Moldovan people was provoked by the use of expression the "Gagauz people" in some official laws: "The inclusion in the preamble to the *Law concerning the special juridical status of Gagauz-Yeri* of the notion of the 'Gagauz people' and its subsequent development in article 4... introduces prejudices in the unity of Moldovan state and is non-constitutional"; "The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova recognizes the unity of the people living on this territory and they cannot be divided ; the use of the expression 'Gagauz people', therefore, is already a privilege".¹²⁴

The *Law of Citizenship* adopted in June 1991 also presupposed ethnic neutrality. This Citizenship Law is among the most democratic in Eastern Europe: all persons who were living in Moldova on the date of the declaration of Sovereignty – 23 June 1990 – became citizens irrespective of their ethnicity, linguistic abilities or other criteria.

According to the political and juridical framework made up by the legislation of the Moldovan state and by ratification of international treaties, the Republic of Moldova is a state of law, that is, an instrument that must assure, through a system of rules and fair procedures, accommodation of different private and particular interests without establishing a consensus of a common good. As a complementary aspect of the state of law in the Republic of Moldova, there is also a regulative framework for civil society, which allows citizens to pursue their aims in a manner advantageous to them, whereby the state only intervenes when the procedural rules are not adhered to.

6.2 *Nation-building and/or nation-destroying*

The political framework of Moldovan state does not require a pre-political national identity. However, identity does appear, undermining the neutrality. As with other identities, the invented Moldovan identity intervenes in political practice, but it intervenes in a more decisive way – as a strategy of state building. As with other newly democratizing countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Moldova is following the model of the “nation-building” state in that it is engaged in nation-building and nation consolidation projects by its diffusion of a common societal culture throughout the territory of the state.¹²⁵ The building tools of post-soviet countries are: official language policy, attempts to create a uniform national education system, migration and naturalization policies requiring migrants to adopt a common national identity, the redrawing of administrative districts to spread the concentration of minorities, the centralization of power so that all decisions are made in a context where the dominant groups form a clear majority.¹²⁶ In the Republic of Moldova, these strategies are weaker than in other countries and, as a result, Moldova has often been considered a model for democracy for other post-Soviet states. For example, Moldova did not redraw its administrative districts in order to spread the concentration of its minorities and did not centralize power. On the contrary, the construction of the Moldovan State is in keeping with ethno-cultural justice, as described by Kymlicka,¹²⁷ that is, the accommodation of minority rights as fundamental human rights. For example, the declaration of the official state language took place concomitantly with the declaration of the bilingual language system; the Constitution already contains provisions for the special status of Gagauz-Yeri and for the districts on the left bank of the river Nistru (Transnistria) and also for poly-ethnic rights, such as representational and cultural rights. Gagauz-Yeri was considered a model for minority integration and ethno-cultural justice.¹²⁸ The 1994 Constitution provided special status for the currently unrecognized Gagauz Republic. This was followed by approval from the Moldovan parliament for a more special law concerning the matter of local autonomy for the region. According to this law, “Gagauz Yeri is an autonomous administrative unit (UTA) which, with a special status in the form of self determination for Gagauz, is a part of the Republic of Moldova”.¹²⁹ The unit *Gagauz Yeri* – the Gaguz land – enjoys wide-ranging autonomy. It has its own president, executive committee, locally elected legislative assembly. It also controls its local resources, economy and justice system.

Only foreign policy, the granting of citizenship, currency issues, and national security remain in the hand of central government. Further to this, three languages – Gagauz, the state language and the Russian – enjoy equal status.

In Moldova, one of the most obvious tools of nation building is the official language. The 13th article of the Constitution – “the state language is the Moldovan language based on the Latin alphabet” – is a controversial article, both from a scientific and political point of view, as the article undermines the ethno-cultural neutrality of the state. The existence of a state language is sufficient reason for the claims of the collective rights of minorities: self-determination, poly-ethnic rights, etc.

The existence of the state language is almost unavoidable because the analogy between church and ethnicity, proposed by theoreticians, does not work:

As the state should not recognize, endorse or support any particular church, so it should not recognize endorse or support any particular group or identity. But the analogy does not work. It is quite possible for a state not to have an established church. But the state cannot help but give at least partial establishment to a culture when it decides which language is to be used in public schooling, or in the provision of state services. The state can (and should) replace religious oaths in courts with secular oaths, but it cannot replace the use of English in courts with no language.¹³⁰

In Moldova, the official framework tries to compensate for the lack of “linguistic” neutrality by means of “real bilingualism” – “Russian language is used on Moldovan territory as a language of inter-ethnic communication, a fact which assures a real bilingualism, national-Russian and Russian-national”.¹³¹

The solution arrived at thirteen years ago concerning spoken languages was considered correct and democratic.¹³² For all intents and purposes, the Romanian and Russian languages are equal. It is compulsory to publish official documents in both languages, public officers are obliged to speak both languages, whereas choosing a language for communication is at the discretion of citizens. “In relation to the state administration, institutions and organizations of Moldova, the language of communication, be it written or oral, is to be chosen by the citizens. In the areas where the majority is constituted by Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians or other ethnic groups respectively, the native language or another acceptable

language is used" (article 6). However, 30 percent of the population still does not know both Romanian and Russian, so these languages cannot be equal. This asymmetric situation, therefore, is perpetuated and sustained on a legal basis. Of course, Russian-speaking citizens not intending to become officials do not need to learn Romanian, and, for the sake of symmetry, the Romanian-speaking people should be allowed to "forget" the Russian language.¹³³

6.3 "Mistaken identity" versus "true identity"

National identities in Moldova are constantly at war and when one identity discourse becomes dominant, supporters of another discourse will always react painfully. For example, the controversial 13th article of the Constitution – "the state language is the Moldovan language based on the Latin alphabet" – does not satisfy the needs of those who consider themselves Romanian. On the contrary, it insults them.

The present Moldovan government also considers Moldovan citizens who declare themselves Romanian to be members of a national minority in Moldova. According to the *Law of National Minorities*, the only criterion when it comes to belonging to a national minority is individual choice: "affiliation to a national minority is a question of individual choice and no disadvantage should result from this choice".¹³⁴

To consider Romanians from Moldova as a national minority is a paradoxical consequence of applying formal logic to national claims. After the unionist movement of 1988-1991, relations with Romania became entirely vague for the period 1993-1996. Speeches, of an equal unionist and anti-unionist nature, were delivered to great effect. The relationship between the "mother-country" and the Republic of Moldova was made reasonable with the help of the study "The relationship of Romania and the Republic of Moldova", drawn up according to formal logic and international rights.¹³⁵ The study intended to eliminate the "clichés" through which relationship between the two countries had been expressed and to surpass the emotional level of the discourse.¹³⁶ Among other clichés, the study requested that only international rights should guide the relationship between the two states. It also accepted the responsibility of the Romanian State for the Romanians of Moldova, not a fraternal responsibility, but one in accordance with the international rights of minorities.¹³⁷ *"The citizens of Moldova who have declared themselves Romanians are automatically passed over to the regime of internal and*

external protection of minorities".¹³⁸ The logic of the study validates Moldovan nationality alongside Romanian nationality within the same territory or even as part of the same family, so as long as nationality depends on individual declaration. There is no criterion which can validate the choice of the individual except their wish.

The Romanian oriented political parties declared that the study could only be elaborated in the offices of the governing party in Chisinau. At the same time, officials of the Moldovan state discussed the study at their meetings, published it in governmental publications and put it into political practice. There was one particular question, which could not be avoided: why was a neutral point of view, according to international rights, so convenient for a non-neutral nationalism that had particular interests?

Although individuals in Moldova can choose a national identity – and this is another unique feature of Moldova's national predicament – they cannot choose other desirable identities. They make their choices, not from the point of view of nowhere, but from the point of view of having attachments, background, and commitments. In other words, this is not a choice in the wider sense of the word; it is mainly an assumed identity.¹³⁹ The supporters of Romanian oriented discourse assume their identity, maintaining that their choice is correct and authentic. Nationalist intellectuals often make the strong claim that their culture, morality and politics is real, historical, organic, faithful, uncorrupted, pure, authentic and superior to synthetic, unnatural and hybrid Moldovan creations.

Yael Tamir considers that "there is a dangerous dimension to claims about authenticity".¹⁴⁰ "The right to culture is interpreted as the right to preserve the culture in its "authentic" form, but does this represent fairly the interests of all members?"¹⁴¹ If respect for individuals and their autonomy, that is, for their capacity to make their own decisions and determine their lives for themselves, is taken as a prime concern, then promotion of the authenticity of Romanian oriented discourse cannot be considered fairly. Everyone, of whatever nation, culture, or language, is formed to be, whatever they may be, by the internalization of the assumptions and thought-structures of the society in which they are born and brought up.¹⁴² Individuals are not themselves guilty that they were socialized in a particular way. It is not their fault that they were taught that being Moldovan is meaningful. When Romanian oriented discourse attempts to show that Moldovans have a "mistaken identity", they feel their values are devalued, feel lost or even betrayed. Individuals in their

autonomy are free from coercion and from the vision of a common good. However, the same argument is valid of the Romanian claims. Those who considered themselves Romanians are not guilty that they were socialized, in their families or schools, to consider being Romanian meaningful.¹⁴³

6.4 “The need of belonging” and the ideal of “the good citizen”

In Moldova, the gap between the ethno-national identity and political identity is bigger and more difficult to surpass than in other post-soviet countries. On one hand, there are some ethno-national communities with their affective affinity and ties, while, on the other, there is the neutral political framework.

This fact is also confirmed by the plurality of citizenship among part of the Moldovan population. Moldovan citizenship presupposes civic and political participation based on the rationality of the law and human rights alone, regardless of the ethno-cultural origins of the individual. “The citizenship of the Republic of Moldova establishes a permanent juridical and political link which generates reciprocal rights and duties between state and person”, (The Citizenship Law, No. 1024/XVI, 02.06.2000, Article 3.1). In theoretical and normative discussions, this type of citizenship is considered the most democratic and correct. But, at the same time, citizens of Moldova are and can become citizens of Romania, Ukraine, Russia and any other state, which awards citizenship according to ethnic criteria, that is, a citizenship based on affectivity and ethno-cultural identity. The fact that double and even triple citizenship is asserted in affective and emotional ways is usually shown during elections.¹⁴⁴ For Romanian, Russian, and Ukrainian communities, the ethno-cultural identity remains the place of affectivity where a common language, culture and tradition are shared.¹⁴⁵ This “ethnic” citizenship is easier to understand than the abstract and rational citizenship required of them in their own states. The weakness of national identity based on rational political citizenship, as it is present in Moldova, is an aspect of the general difficulty experienced in setting up post-national citizenship, in the sense used by Habermas. For example,¹⁴⁶ Habermas’s constitutional patriotism separates the notion of citizenship from the concept of a people as a pre-political community of language and culture. The case of Moldova allows a question to be posed that is valid for contemporary discussion on citizenship: to what extent can the acceptance of abstract and rational

principles – respect for human rights and state of law – replace the effective political mobilization based on interiorization of political and ethno-cultural tradition?

Empirical behavior of national minorities in Moldova and in general in Central and Eastern Europe also confirms that the need to belong to an ethno-national community is sufficiently strong. In Moldova, as in the whole of post-soviet space, minorities are disloyal in the sense that they were collaborators with the former oppressors and continue to collaborate with current or potential enemies.¹⁴⁷ Ethnic relations are seen as a zero-sum game: anything that benefits the minority is seen as a threat to the majority¹⁴⁸ and the treatment of minorities is above all a question of national security.¹⁴⁹

In Moldova, the need to be included in a community exists alongside the framework of laws and rights. Individuals seek to unify them, look to exercise their rights whilst, at the same time, manifesting the affectivity towards a community of language and culture. Moldova reflects a current and acute political quarrel: does a community of diverse cultures and identities need a unifying idea parallel to the political framework?¹⁵⁰

There is no need to encourage longing for ethno-cultural oneness, particularly in the case of Moldovan ethno-cultural identity, which is an invention. A link between ethno-cultural identity and political identity would be dangerous, a “surplus of affect” being “more libidinal than procedural”.¹⁵¹ Constitutional citizenship in Moldova might flourish separately from ethnic and cultural elements. There can be no political culture that is sustained by motivation for the “common good” and is rooted in national tradition and identity because tradition and identity are weak, false, controversial, conflicting and open to continuous interpretation and politically oriented revision. Moldova, as a democratic state, cannot be made up of ethno-cultural roots, cannot be both *demos* and *ethnos*. If democracy needs the civic virtues of citizens, and even more so that of the political elite,¹⁵² then these civic virtues cannot be based on ethno-national values.

Moldova does not have to pass a theoretical test of nationhood to prove that it possesses some of the national criteria of national unity, be they of ethnicity, language, or culture. The test is concrete, based upon the ability of the Moldovan state to impose order and monopolize violence in an established territory. Citizens “cannot love a state that treats them unjustly”,¹⁵³ but citizens are capable of committing themselves to the idea of liberty and fundamental rights.

NOTES

- 1 "Western observers have now begun to wonder why the notion of a Moldovan *ethnos* seems to have outlived its creator. To a certain extent, asking why Moldovans have not embraced their ostensible Romanian identity is like asking why Macedonians do not think of themselves as Bulgarians. It is true that the language spoken in Bucharest and Chișinău differ only slightly and that in its written form there is virtually nothing to distinguish Romanian from what is once again termed Moldovan. But it is equally true that linguistic and cultural similarities can push nation apart as much as bring them together." Charles King, *Post-Soviet Moldova: A borderland in Transition*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, p. 30.
- 2 John Hutchinson, Anthony Smith, "Introduction", to John Hutchinson, Anthony Smith, (eds.) *Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, 5 volumes, London and New York, Routledge, 2000, vol. I, p. XXVI.
- 3 The "founders" of primordialist approach, Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz, distinguish between primordial and civil ties. For Shils primordial ties have the ineffability attributed to ties of blood. Clifford Geertz describes "primordial bonds" as being attributed by individuals to the religion, blood, race, language. In "The Integrative Revolution: primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states", in John Hutchinson, Anthony Smith, (eds.) *Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, op. cit., pp. 117-161.
- 4 John Hutchinson, Anthony Smith, op. cit., p. xxvii.
- 5 "Ethno-symbolists agree with modernists that nations are recent in their territorial consolidation, their mass literate public culture and their drive for self-determination, but the primary concern of the nation is not with modernity. Central to nations is a concern with identity and history", John Hutchinson, "Nations and Culture" in *Understanding Nationalism*, (eds.) Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson, Polity Press, 2001, p. 76.
- 6 Anthony Smith, "Towards a Global Culture" in Mike Featherstone, (ed.), *Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity: A Theory, Culture and Society Special Issue*, London-Thousand Oaks-New Delhi, SAGE Publications, 1999, pp. 171-193, p. 179.
- 7 Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, London, Penguin, 1991, p. 179.
- 8 Gellner rejected four erroneous theories of nationalism: i. The theory that nation is natural, self evident and self-generating; ii. Kedourie's theory that the contingent consequence of "ideas which did not ever need to be formulated and appeared by regrettable accident"; iii. Marxism's Wrong Address Theory": the liberationist message intended for classes were "by some terrible postal error" delivered instead to nations; iv. "Dark Gods Theory", Brendan O'Leary, "Ernest Gellner's diagnoses of nationalism: a critical overview, or, what is living and what is dead in Ernest Gellner's philosophy of nationalism?", in John Hall, (ed.) *The state of Nation, Ernest*

Gellner and the Theory of nationalism, Cambridge University Press, 199, pp. 40-88, p. 46.

⁹ Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, London, 1965, p. 168.

¹⁰ Gellner's theory was considered an "ideal-type" theory, a conceptual tool for investigating problems and for preparing the ground for the construction of more substantive, more context-sensitive theories, see Nicos Mouzelis, "Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism: some definitional and methodological issues", in John Hall, (ed.) *The State of Nation, Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 163-164.

¹¹ Van der Berghe distinguishes between three types of ethnic markers: 1. Genetically transmitted phenotype: skin pigmentation, hair texture, etc. 2. Man made ethnic uniform – body mutilations, clothing, tattoo, circumcision, etc., 3. Behavioral: speech, manners and, of course, language. Van der Berghe Pierre, *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, Elsevier, New York, Oxford, 1979, p. 29.

¹² Barth stresses that ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves. "Some cultural features are used by the actors as signals and emblems of differences, others are ignored, and in some relationships radical differences are played down and denied" Frederik Barth, "Introduction", in F. Barth (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, 1969; Bergen, Oslo, and London, Univ. Vorlaget G.Allen&Unwin, pp. 9-38, p. 14. Thus, the continuity of the ethnic entities is given by a persistent dichotomization between members and outsiders, which uses cultural traits, whose relevance is contextual. "The cultural features that signal the boundary may change and the cultural characteristics of members may likewise be transformed, indeed, even the organizational form of the group may change – yet the fact of continuing dichotomization between members and outsiders allows us to specify the nature of continuity and investigate the changing cultural form and content" (*ibid*, p. 14). Therefore, an investigation of ethnic phenomena in case of Moldova should focus on the ethnic boundaries that define the groups, boundaries that are socially constructed. Without doubt, this investigation implies many risks.

¹³ Walker Connor blames that theories of nation-building with tending to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or treat it superficial in "Nation building or nation destroying", in *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 29-67.

¹⁴ It seems that for the ethno-symbolist approaches of ethnicity, these two oppositions are not so drastically emphasized, as is, for example, the definition of *ethnie*, given by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith. According to these authors an *ethnie* has six main features: 1. A common proper name with which to identify and "express' the essence of the community. 2. A myth of common ancestry, a myth rather than a fact, a myth that includes the idea of a common origin in time and place and that gives an *ethnie* a sense of fictive

- kinship. 3. Shared historical memories, or better shared memories of a common past, including heroes, events and their commemoration 4. One or more elements of common culture, which need not be specified but normally, include religion, customs, or language 5. A link with a homeland, not necessarily its physical occupation by the *ethnie*, only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, as with Diaspora peoples. 6. A sense of solidarity on the part of at least some sections of the *ethnie*'s population", in John Hutchinson, Anthony Smith, "Introduction", in John Hutchinson, Anthony Smith, (eds.), *Ethnicity, A Reader*, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 7.
- 15 Richard Jenkins, *Social Identity*, London and New York, Routledge, 1996, p. 11.
- 16 It is generally accepted that the concept of identity was made popular by Erik Erikson in his book *Identity, Youth and Crisis*, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1968.
- 17 Ferdinand de Saussure, in *Course of General Linguistic* (1915) established a pattern of conceiving identity through difference, by the definition of sign as a result of differences in a system.
- 18 David Morley&Kevin Robins, *Mass media, Electronic landscape and Identities*, London and New York, Routledge, 1999, p. 46.
- 19 The mechanisms exhaustively explained by Michael Billig, in *Banal Nationalism*, London, Sage, 1995.
- 20 This is the intern/extern dialectic of identity, Richard Jenkins, *op. cit.*, Chapter 4, "Theorizing social identity".
- 21 Zygmund Bauman, "Soil, blood and belonging", in *The Sociological Review*, 1992, p. 678.
- 22 Michael Ignatieff, "Nationalism and Toleration", in *Europe's New Nationalism, State and Minorities in Conflict*, (ed.) Richrad Caplan&John Feffer, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 212-231; p. 215.
- 23 Graham Smith, *The Post-Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition*, Arnold [London, Sidney, Auckland], 1999, pp. 77-85.
- 24 In "Virtues, uniqueness of human life and the concept of a tradition" Alasdair MacIntyre emphasizes the narrative model of identity and tradition, see Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue, A Study in Moral Theory*, Notre Dame University Press, 1985, second edition, Chapter 15.
- 25 Anderson Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London; New York, Verso, 1991, pp. 204-206.
- 26 The identity is itself a consequence of modernity, a point of view exhaustively explained by Charles Taylor in *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000; Anthony Giddens in *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Stanford University Press, 1991; "Lifting identity to the level of awareness, making it into task – an objective of self-reflexive activity, and object of

simultaneous, individual concern and specialized institutional services – is one of the most prominent characteristics of modern times”, Zygmund Bauman, *op. cit.*, p. 680.

27 David Miller, in his book *On Nationality*, Oxford, Caldron Press, 1995, presents five elements of national identity: 1. A community constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, 2. extended in history, 3. active in characters, 4. connected to a particular territory, 5. marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture; pp. 21-25.

28 Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania – Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle 1918-1930*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996, Romanian translation, Humanitas 1998, p. 20.

29 Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?”, in Homi K. Bhabha, (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, Routledge, London and New York, 1990.

30 “Sfatul Țării” was the Basarabian legislative body in 1918, which was made up of representatives of all co-inhabiting nationalities.

31 Hannes Hobbsbauer, *A country forgotten between Europe and Russia*, Wien, 1993, Romanian translation, Bucharest, Editura Tehnică, 1995, p. 81.

32 In 2000, Moldovan Parliament adopted a new Citizenship Law that requires knowledge of the Romanian language.

33 John Breuilly, *Nationalism and State*, Manchester University Press, II edition, 1992, p. 9.

34 Vitalie Ciobanu, *Frica de diferență*, Bucharest, Romanian Cultural Foundation, 1999, p. 206.

35 Main historical data are taken from the Willhem Petrus Meurs, *The Basarabian Question in Soviet Historiography*, East European Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 1994; Romanian translation, *Chestiunea Basarbiei în istoriografia sovietică*, Chișinău, Arc, 1997.

36 The word “Basarabia” has a rather strange history. In the 13th and 14th centuries, there existed the principality of Walachia to the south of Moldova. The prince of Walachia arrived first on the side of Danube which included two important commercial cities for Genova: Moncastro and Licostomo. This territory was named “Basarabia” because the prince’s name was “Basarab”. In 1475, the Turks occupied Basarabia – and those two cities became Turkish *raya*. In 1811-1812, during the Russian-Turkish war, the Russians forced the Turks to negotiate. The Russian commander, Kutuzov, demanded Basarabia from Turks. He used the word “Basarabia” for the entire land between the rivers Nistru and Prut, however the Turks uses of the word referred only to those two cities. In 1812, the treaty was signed and the word “Basarabia” was extended by Russians to mean the entire territory. Ironically, “Basarabia” and “Basarabians” are now used to refer to Romanians and to the land as Romanian land. Ion Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei*, Chișinău Cartea Moldovenească, 1991, p. 25.

37 Meurs, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

- ³⁸ See, for instance, *Kurs Istorii Moldavii*, I, 40-43, Eds. A. Udalkov, L. Cerepin, Chișinău, Scoala Sovietică, 1949, A. Lazarev. *Vosdoedienie moldavskogo naroda v edinoe spovetskoe gosudarstvo*, Chișinău, Cartea Moldovenească, 1965.
- ³⁹ See Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994.
- ⁴⁰ Academic nationalism is a specific Soviet phenomenon. After the formation of the Soviet Union, scholars – linguists, historians, ethnographers and so on – started to “clarify” the ethnic and national problem for ideological reasons. Stalin’s definition of a nation – “a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make up manifested in a community of culture” – is also “academic nationalism” because the definition was used by scholars as a basis in their endeavors, for instance, to create the Moldovan nation and Moldovan language. Later Soviet scholarship added an important element to Stalin’s definition of nation: a feeling of common identity or national self-consciousness, see for instance, the *Soviet Encyclopedia’s* definition of nation: “an historic entity of people with its territory, economic ties, literary language and specific culture and character comprising the whole of a nation’s features”. According to Valery Tishcov, this is obviously an ethno-national meaning of nation; Valery Tishcov “Post-Soviet Nationalism”, in *Europe’s New Nationalism, State and Minorities in Conflict*, (ed.) Richard Caplan&John Feffer, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 23-41; p. 28.
- ⁴¹ According to the Soviet census of 1926, there were approx. 200 different nationalities in the Soviet Union. Scholars labeled all Soviet nations as *narodnosti* (people) and created a hierarchy of ethnic groups, for example Turks and Tatars in Transcaucasia were listed officially as “Azerbaijanis”, Pomors and Cossacks as “Russians”, and so on. Tishcov, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
- ⁴² Meurs, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
- ⁴³ In particular in Miron Costin’s, *De neamul moldovenilor*, a work preferred by the propagandists of the Moldovan nation in the past as well at present.
- ⁴⁴ In 1926, Soviet linguist, M. Serghievski, wrote about the existence of Moldovan language and tried to construct a basis for the Moldovan ethnogenesis. Moldovan ideologists were also influenced by the class character of languages and by the theory of N. Marr, although this author sanctioned the interpretation of the Moldovan language as a non-Romanian amalgamation. Meurs, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
- ⁴⁵ Five days after declaration of Moldovan language as state language (August 27, 1989), “Romanian-Moldovan linguistic identity” was specified in an additional act.
- ⁴⁶ “The Ruritanians were a peasant population speaking a group of related and more or less mutually intelligible dialects and inhabiting a series of discontinuous but not very much separated pockets within the lands of the

Empire of Megalomania. The Ruritanian language, or rather the dialects of which it was considered to be composed, was not really spoken by anyone other than peasants. The aristocracy and officialdom spoke the language of the Megalomanian court, which happened to belong to a language group different from that from the Ruritanian dialects were an offshoot. Most, but not all, Ruritanian peasants belonged to a church whose liturgy was taken from yet another linguistic group.... The petty traders of the small towns serving the Ruritanian countryside were drawn from yet another ethnic group and were of yet another religion, that was vehemently detested by the Ruritanian peasantry" Gellner Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 58.

47 Meurs, *op. cit.* pp. 55-71.

48 Gellner, *Reply to critics*, quoted by John Hall, "Introduction", in *The State of Nation*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

49 Among them were Ion Inculet, Panteleimon Erhan in Petrograd, and Anton Crihan in Odessa, where he organized the *First Congress of Basarabian peasants*, (May, 1917), Meurs, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

50 Rogers Brubaker, "Myth and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism", in Moore, Margaret, (ed.) *National Self-determination and Secession*, Oxford University Press, 1998; p. 233-266, p. 286.

51 Meurs, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

52 Tishcov, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

53 Brubaker, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

54 Maurizio Viroli in *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, Oxford Calderon Press, 1997, maintains that, properly understood, the language of republican patriotism could serve as a powerful antidote to nationalism "to survive and flourish, political liberties needs civic virtue, that is citizens capable of committing themselves to the common good, to stand up for the defense of the common liberty and rights"; p. 10.

55 Connor, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

56 Gellner, *Nation and Nationalism*, p. 57.

57 Owing to the rural nature of the region, illiteracy among the population was the rule at the beginning of the 20th century: 94,2% in 1900. Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania – Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996, Chapter "Basarabia – Nationalism in an Archaic Province", pp. 111-157; Common opinion holds that illiteracy in this region was eliminated only after 1945 by the soviet politics of *likbez*.

58 Graham Smith, *The Post-Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition*, Arnold, [London, Sidney, Auckland], 1999, p. 16.

59 Nicos Muozelis, "Ernest Gellner's Theory of Nationalism: Some Definitions and Methodological Issues", in *The State of Nation*, p. 158 –165, p. 160.

60 Graham Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

- 61 Eugen Weber in his famous *From Peasants to Frenchmen, The Modernization of Rural France*, Chatto & Windus, 1977, part II "Agencies of Changes", proved the importance of common action in constructing "civilized" life in rural regions, for example, "there could be no national unity before there was national circulation" p. 218; "a number of Frenchmen have spoken on roads as having cemented national unity" p. 220.
- 62 Philip Schlesinger, "On National Identity: Some Conceptions and Misconceptions Criticized", in *Nationalism, Critical Concepts in Political Science*, ed. by J. Hutchinson and A. Smith, Routledge, 2000, vol. I, p. 86.
- 63 *Op. cit.*, p. 86.
- 64 David Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
- 65 Valery Tishcov, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
- 66 For example, the folk dance group "Joc", as well as the folk music stylized and transmitted by national radio during the Soviet period, are now considered to be Moldova's authentic ethnic and folk culture.
- 67 John Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
- 68 Miroslav Hroch is a well known theoretician of national movements, particularly since the publishing of *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*, Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- 69 Miroslav Hroch, "National Self-Determination from a Historical Perspective", in *Notions of Nationalism*, ed. by Skumar Periwai, CEU Press, 1995, p. 67.
- 70 For example, the case of Ion Druță, a Moldovan writer who promoted national values during the Soviet period. In particular, he wrote against the Russification of the Romanian language, and later became an ideologist of the "Moldovan nation".
- 71 Miroslav Hroch, "Nationalism and National Movement: Comparing the Past and the Present of Central and Eastern Europe", in *Nationalism, Critical Concepts in Political Science*, vol. II, p. 610.
- 72 In 1917, in the first stage, the Moldovan intellectuals created their own political party – The National Moldovan Party. Their political objectives were the autonomy of Basarabia in Russian Federation, the opening of Moldovan schools, the creation of the Moldovan army. In this context, in 1917-1918, the Romanian language and Latin script was introduced into the academic year in Basarabian schools.
- 73 Quoted by Benedict Anderson in "*Nationalism at a Great Distance: International Capitalism and Ascension of the Identity Politics*" 1992, republished in POLIS, 1994, N2.
- 74 The way in which Moldova became independent seems very similar to that of Ruritania – when the international situation was favorable! As western observers state, "Political figures admit in private discussions that the actual creation of an independent Moldova was more a by-product of the Moscow coup than the culmination of any centuries-long struggle for statehood",

Charles King, *Post Soviet Moldova*, Iasi, Center for Romanian Studies, 1996, p. 13.

75 Charles Taylor considers that "elite manipulation" is a cynical explanation: "the cynical view (exposed, for instance, by Pierre Trudeau in relation to Quebec nationalism) that the whole thing is powered by the ambition of social elites to establish a monopoly of prestigious and remunerative jobs. The refusal of bilingualism is then easily explained: under this regime, members of our gang get 50 percent of the jobs, under unilingualism, we get 100 percent". Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and Modernity", in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, *The Morality of Nationalism*, New York; Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 35.

76 See the chapter *Leftbankers versus Basarabians*, in Meurs, *op. cit.* pp. 131-133.

77 "Blocked elite" is an expression used by John Hutchinson in analyzing the national movements from Ireland, in "Cultural nationalism, elite mobility and nation building: communitarian politics in modern Ireland"; in *Nationalism, Critical Concepts in Political Science*, ed. by J. Hutchinson and A. Smith, Routledge, 2000, p. 587-606.

78 Ernest Gellner, *Nation and Nationalism*, 1983, (re-translation from Romanian), p. 174.

79 Eric Hobsbawm, *Nation and Nationalism since 1790*, Chişinău, ARC, p.14.

80 In 1990, the Gagauzi separated from Moldova, and their separatist republic was rejected by an order from Moscow signed by Mihail Gorbachov.

81 Max Weber, "The Nation", in *Nationalism*, vol. I., *op. cit.*, pp. 5-12.

82 According to Miroslav Hroch, if these two conditions coincide, the call for self-determination and statehood can even be developed and accepted during Phase B, as it was for Poles, Magyars and Norwegians", Miroslav Hroch, "National Self-Determination from a Historical Perspective", in *Notions of Nationalism*, ed., by Skumar Periwal, CEU Press, 1995, p. 79. National movements based upon almost complete social structure – usually members of the ruling classes – as were landlords and nobility in the Polish or Magyar national movements, entrepreneurs and members of the high bureaucracy in the Greek and Norwegian national movements, leaders of local administration and merchants in the Serbian national movement are also more successful. Hroch, *op. cit.* p. 77

83 Some authors observed that African students at the London School of Economics applied the theories of Ernest Gellner, Elie Kedourie and others in construction of new nation-states on returning to their countries, see Sukumar Periwal, *Notions of Nationalism*, Budapest, Central European University Press, 1995.

84 Anthony Smith, *Myth and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford University Press. 1999, p. 9.

- 85 "Full attachment, rather than coming from an authentic prior sense of shared community (whether based on language, history, soil or some other primordium), might actually be produced by various forms of violence instigated, perhaps even required, by the modern nation/state", Arjun Apadurai, "The Grounds of the Nation States: Identity, Violence and Territory", in Kjel Goldman, Ulf Hannerz, Charles Westin, (eds.), *Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post Cold War Era*, London and New York, Routledge 2000, pp. 129-143, p. 132.
- 86 Walker Connor, in *Ethno-nationalism*, found an example of ineffability in Freud's observation that he was "irresistibly" bound to Jews and Jewishness by "many obscure and emotional forces, *which were the more powerful the less they could be expressed in words* as well as by a clear consciousness of inner identity, a deep realization of sharing the same psychic structure", Standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 20, 1925-1926, London 1959, quote by Connor, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
- 87 Clifford Geertz, "Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa", New York, Free Press, 1963, p. 105-157, in John Hutchinson John, Anthony Smith, (eds.) *Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, London and New York, Routledge, 2000, volume I, p. 120.
- 88 Connor, *op. cit.*, p. 204.
- 89 Isaiah Berlin, "Nationalism", in *Adevăratul studiu al omenirii*, Meridiane, 2001, pp. 557-579, "nationalism is firstly a counter-reaction to the attitude of and the result of humiliation of the most conscious member of a society, which produces hunger and self affirmation" (p. 569). Like Gellner and Taylor, Berlin considers the hurt of pride of the spiritual leaders to be a condition for the appearance of nationalism, but not a sufficient condition in itself – there is a need for a new vision of life by which the hurt society or the group, which was excluded from political power, would unify. He gives the example of Slavophile movement in Russia as a reaction to the modernizing effect of the West.
- 90 Distinction inaugurated by Hans Kohn in *The Idea of Nationalism*, New York, Macmillan, Intro, 1946 and retaken by most of authors.
- 91 Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and Modernity", in Robert McKim Robert, Jeff McMahan, *The Morality of Nationalism*, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 44.
- 92 *Encounters with Nationalism*, Oxford, 1994; *Nationalism*, London 1997; "Reply to Critics", in J. A. Hall and I.C. Jarvie, (eds.), *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*, Amsterdam, 1996.
- 93 Brendan O'Leary, "Ernest Gellner's Diagnoses of Nationalism: A Critical Overview, or, What is Living and What is Dead in Ernest Gellner's Philosophy of Nationalism?", in John Hall, (ed.) *The State of Nation, Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 40-88; p. 72.

- 94 As Gellner argued in his replies to critics, the passion of nationalism is very present in his theory: "the passion is not a means to a particular end, it is a reaction to an intolerable situation, to a constant jarring in the activity which is by far the most important thing in life – contact and communication with fellow human beings", Gellner, *Reply to Critics*, quoted in John Hall, (ed.) *op. cit.*, p. 12.
- 95 Brendan O'Leary, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
- 96 Taylor, *Nationalism and Modernity*, p. 45.
- 97 *Op. cit.*, p. 44.
- 98 *Op. cit.*, p. 45.
- 99 Different national identities can become a "tribal stigma". Sorin Antohi describes the devastating consequences of becoming aware of the stigma in Romanian space in the chapter "Cioran and the Romanian Stigma. Identity Mechanism and Radical Definitions of Identity", in *Civitas Imaginalis*, p. 208.
- 100 Communication between Basarabian intellectuals and their Romanian "brothers" was possible in an indirect way: through the libraries and bookshops of Moscow and St. Petersburg.
- 101 Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 92-98.
- 102 Michael Ignatieff, "Nationalism and Toleration", in *Europe's New Nationalism, State and Minorities in Conflict*, (eds.) Richard Caplan&John Feffer, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 212-231, p. 225.
- 103 Ignatieff, *op. cit.*, p. 213.
- 104 Charles Taylor, in *The Ethnics of Authenticity*, Harvard University Press, 1991, analyses the need for authenticity in nationalist struggle, as well as in multicultural movements of the contemporary world.
- 105 Klaus Heitmann, *Limbă și politică în Republica Moldova*, Chișinău, ARC, 1998, p. 141.
- 106 Due to the linguistic inferiority, being Moldovan became a kind of stigma. According to psychological approaches stated by the book of Erving Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, stigma is produced when somebody accepts the perspective of the other over his own identity and this leads to shame, humility, self-hate. Of course, one condition for the appearance of tribal stigma was the meeting of Moldovans with Romanians. Usually, being in Romania, Moldovans try to hide the linguistic difference, particularly the phonetic differences that are considered ridiculous. But now there is stigma even among Moldovans. Moldovans, who speak their native language "correctly", fluently, without stuttering, consider ridiculous those who still speak the archaic dialect.
- 107 For an explanation of the case of Hebrew and Norwegian languages see *Language and Nationalism in Europe*, (ed.) Stephen Barbour & Cathie Carmichael, Oxford University Press, 2000, and Thiesse Anne-Marrie, *Crearea identităților naționale în Europa, secolele XVIII-XX*, traducere A.

- Paul Corescu, C. Capverde, G. Sfichi, Polirom 2000, chapter "Language of the Right, Language of the Left".
- 108 For example, Joshua A. Fishman maintains that community of language is perceived as the main marker of primordial ties, or like "bone of their bone, flesh of their flesh and blood of their blood", Joshua A. Fishman, "Social Theory and Ethnography: Language and Ethnicity in Eastern Europe", in *Nationalism, Critical Concepts in Political Science*, ed. by J. Hutchinson and A. Smith, Routledge, 2000, vol. I., pp. 200-215. p. 208.
- 109 Vitalie Ciobanu, *op. cit.*
- 110 According to Brendan O'Leary, the apolitical character of Gellner's theory can be substantiated in several ways: i. His typology is geared towards explaining the development in the thwarting of nationalist secessionism, but does not provide a politically sensitive account of what may dampen nationalist secessionism. ii. The theory appears to rely on culturally or materially reductionist accounts of political motivation. iii. Gellner neglects the role of power politics in explaining which cultures become nations and the possibility that nation-builders explicitly see the functional relationship between nationalism and modernity which he posits. iv. Although Gellner sees the connections between nationalism and egalitarianism in modern societies, curiously he does not see the mutually reinforcing relationship between nationalism, egalitarianism and democratization; v. he displays contempt for nationalist doctrines; Brendan O'Leary, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
- 111 *Op. cit.*, p. 65.
- 112 *Op. cit.*, p. 65.
- 113 In *Nationalism* (1997), Gellner takes account of politics and makes political prescriptions. Brendan O'Leary considers that Gellner "describes this prescription as banal, perhaps because he may have been conscious of how far they support the conventional wisdom of Euro-liberals", *op. cit.*, p. 75.
- 114 Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, Cambridge. Mass.; Harvard University Press, p. 565.
- 115 Maurizio Viroli, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-161.
- 116 *Op. cit.*, p. 176.
- 117 Communitarians like Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, Alesair MacIntire.
- 118 Walker Connor considers the main result of the improper analogizing from experience of the United States to be the presupposition that the history of acculturation and assimilation within an immigrant society would be suitable for repetition in multinational states, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
- 119 "Many post-war liberals thought that religious tolerance, based on the separation of church and state, provides a model for dealing with ethno-cultural difference as well. In this view, ethnic identity, like religion, is something which people should be free to express in their private lives, and

is not the concern of the state.", Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural citizenship*, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 3.

120 Will Kymlicka, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

121 *The decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of article 1.4 of Law No.344-XII / December 1994, concerning the special juridical status of the Gagauz Yeri*, No. 35 / 21.12.1995.

122 See Stalin's definition of nation, note 39 above.

123 Meurs, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

124 *The decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of article 1.4 of Law No.344-XII / December 1994, concerning the special juridical status of the Gagauz Yeri*, No. 35 / 21.12.1995.

125 The case of the Baltic states shows that construction of nation states is compatible with the practice of democracy. The Baltic political elite constructed and strengthened the nation state, ignoring the need for ethno-cultural justice and they succeeded: "Their nationalist sentiment might be even more intense then elsewhere. But it was also more political in its mode of expression. This political element contained ethnic hostility (for both the majority and minority)... The political elite succeeded in making the term "citizen" the cornerstone of state and nation building. Certain legal norms for the political actions of the Baltic countries, especially independence, can be criticized as being unreasonable and discriminating against Russian minorities. However, compared with the experience of the more southern regions of the post-Soviet world, the Baltic nationalist movements can serve as a model for the use of nationalist sentiment in building reasonably strong and fairly liberal state structures."; "It is no coincidence that the first ethnic massacres in the last years of the Soviet Union happened not in the Baltic countries, where political nationalist movements were strongest, but in regions such as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan that had no traditions of political nationalism to speak of. If it is not channeled through political action, ethnic nationalism is an amorphous destructive force that not only targets 'suspicious' minorities but ultimately undermines the chances of building a viable state in the name of the majority ethnic group.", Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and the Crisis of Liberalism", in *Europe's New Nationalism, State and Minorities in Conflict*, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-119, p. 117.

126 Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, (eds). *Can Liberal Pluralism be exported?*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 53.

127 As Kymlicka argues, there are three stages to the debate on minority rights. In the first stage, the pre-1989 debate, the issue was equivalent to the debate between "liberals" and "communitarians". In its second stage, minority rights were discussed within a liberal framework. In its third stage, minority rights are viewed as a reaction to the nation building where ethno-cultural neutrality is replaced by ethno-cultural justice. Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular*,

- Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 17-39.
- 128 The Gagauz language is akin to Anatolian Turkish. The ethnic origins of this group are very unclear. Some scholars have counted as many as 19 separate theories on Gagauz ethno-origins. In terms of second language ability, the Gagauzi are linguistically the most Russified. The biggest Gagauz community in the world is in Moldova, the number of Gagauzi being very small in southern Ukraine and Romania. For a long time, the Gagauzi were also one of the most disadvantaged ethnic groups in Moldova, with an attendance rate in 1990 at institutes of higher education, for example, of only 1.4 percent of the total number of students. Some western commentators have suggested that the Gagauz Yeri might provide a model for the granting of local autonomy to minority populations in the other parts of Eastern Europe. See Charles King, *Post Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995; King Charles, *Moldovenii, România, Rusia și politica culturală*, Chisinău, ARC, 2002.
- 129 *The Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the special juridical status of Gagauz Yeri*, No. 344-XII / 23. 12. 1994.
- 130 Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, p. 111.
- 131 *The Law regarding the spoken languages in the territory of the Republic of Moldova*, No.3465/XI / 01. 09.1989, Article 3.
- 132 The Republic of Moldova is now preparing to adhere to *European Charter for Regional or Minority Language* (adopted on 5.IX.1992). At this language level, there are two unusual cases. The first paradox is that the bilingual system in Moldova was introduced simultaneously with the state language, which had been neglected during the Soviet period. The second paradox is that Russian, having been the dominant language in the Soviet period, became a "language of interethnic communication". Even officials of European institutions, such as the *European Charter for Regional and Minorities Languages*, have declared this situation to be quite unusual and that the case is unique. In Moldova, the *Charter* first and foremost protects the minority languages of Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian, but not the languages of inter-ethnic communication and the official language.
- 133 An example of "real bilingual harmony" is given by the state company (MOLDTELECOM) employee who offered information to a client in the state language (Romanian) only, despite the fact that the client had made his request entirely in Russian. The client demanded his rights under law. There followed a legal case, after which the employee was dismissed. What shocked public opinion was not the force of the law, but the fact the Russian language citizen insisted on demanding his rights, while completely forgetting the duties.

- 134 *The Law of Republic of Moldova regarding the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and juridical status of their organizations*, No. 382-XV / 19.07.2001, Article 2.
- 135 The study *The Relationship between Romania and the Republic of Moldova*, 22 Plus, January 25, 1995.
- 136 The first “cliché” deconstructed by authors was the manner in which the political leaders conceived the current territorial borders as the negative consequences of the Ribbentropp-Molotov pact. The authors demonstrated that the current frontiers were not consequences of the pact, but of the Peace Treaty (Paris, 1927), which established the territorial reality based on the relation between the conqueror and the defeated. Another cliché rejected in the study was the expression “mother country”, which in the authors’ opinion no longer expressed the historical necessities. The study criticized the leaders of Romania who, from the position of *Mutterland*, protested against the decision of Parliament in Chişinău in April 1994, to adhere to the Community of Independent States and against the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova (29th of July 1994), which declared the Moldovan language the official language of the state. *Op. cit.*
- 137 *Op. cit.*
- 138 *Op. cit.*
- 139 Yael Tamir draws the distinction between choice of identity and assumption of identity, assumption being more moral than simple choice. Assumption is also the only possible “choice” of identity. *Liberal Nationalism*, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 50.
- 140 *Op. cit.*, p. 50.
- 141 *Op. cit.*, p. 48.
- 142 This is reminiscent of Pierre Bourdieu’s term ‘habitus’ conceived as “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being the products of obedience to rules “produced by” the structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g., the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition). Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 72.
- 143 The questions “Who are the Romanians in Moldova?” and “Who are the Moldovans in Moldova?” are still waiting for an explanation, based on empirical data, collected by sociological inquires, interviews in focus group and another empirical studies.
- 144 Those in Moldova who have the right to vote in elections in Romania, Russia, and Ukraineand give vote for the most nationalistic parties.
- 145 Common citizenship provide a political framework for the representatives of all ethnic groups, however, despite their ethnic origins, members of other

groups, for example Ukrainians and Bulgarians, identify themselves as “Russian” or “Rosiiskii”. For them this Russian identity comes first, only after that comes the Moldovan political identity. In this case, “Russian” means “Rosiiskii” (not “Russkii”), a term used in tsarist and Soviet empires by ideologists to emphasize the multiethnic character of Russia. “Rossiiski”, meaning belonging to Russia without being Russian, is a term identical to “Sovietskii” (Soviet).

¹⁴⁶ Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe”, (1992) in *Citizenship. Critical Concepts*, (ed.), Bryan Turner, London, Routledge, 1994, pp. 341-358.

¹⁴⁷ After the annexation of 1812, Russia accorded privilege to this region for some years in order to make it more attractive. The Russians and the Ukrainians established in the region received land and privileges. Out of fear of Turkish repression, the Gagauzi also settled in the region, in south of Basarabia. In half a century, the population tripled. But still, on average, the ratio of different groups is the same today as it was 150 years ago: 65 percent Romanians/Moldovans, 35 percent minorities – Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Turks, Bulgarians, Germans, Gypsies. Traditionally, the majority was predominantly to be found in rural areas, while ethnic groups, particularly Slavs and Jews populated the towns and cities. Industrialization and urbanization during the Soviet period did not close this ethnic gap between town and village because the movement of ethnic Moldovans to the expanding urban centres was, to some extent, offset by the migration of Russian and Ukrainian workers from other parts of Soviet Union to those same centers. During the Soviet period, Transnistria was particularly attractive to ethnic Russians from Siberia because it was already a Slavic region.

¹⁴⁸ Will Kymlicka, *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported*, p. 67. The Advertising Law provides an example of this situation. The Advertising Law and the Law of Language in the territory of the Republic of Moldova requires bilingualism – Romanian and Russian – in all public spheres. The language of advertising had been 90 percent Russian until then. In the first week of August, the Moldovan government proposed the completion to Law of Advertising, requiring that all advertising have its main message in Romanian and, if the producer wished, accompanied by a translated text in another language, requiring additional costs. On August 18, 1999, the Russian newspaper “Komsomolskaia pravda” (with the highest circulation of some post-Soviet countries) printed the article “Moldovan politicians on the tracks of Hitler” which accused the Moldovan government of fascist actions. The article tried to argue the case that the completion of the Advertising Law was akin to the Nazi action which forbade the use of the language of the Slav minority in the German territory. The Moldovan government sued the Russian publication for libel. The different communities of ethnic groups discussed this article at the meeting of the House of Nationalities and addressed their

protest letters to the international committee of Human Rights. The Law remained unchanged.

149 When ethnic Russians came to Moldova, as well as to the other parts of the Soviet Union, they did not think of themselves as immigrants or a minority. They were moving around within a single country – their homeland. “Their migration was legal not only under the laws of the Soviet Union, but also under international law, which affirms the basic human right to move freely throughout one’s own country – it is important to remember, in this respect, that most countries recognized the boundaries of the Soviet Union”, Will Kymlicka, *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?*, p. 77.

150 This predicament seems to be an unsolved puzzle: “The question of why large groups of individuals united by some sort of republican commitment to a modern legal political order should experience a level of attachment to each other and to the state defined territory with which they identify and which permits them to kill and die in its name, is an unsolved puzzle”, Arjun Apadurai, “The Foundations of Nation States: Identity, Violence and Territory”, in Kjell Goldman, Ulf Hannerz, Charles Westin, *Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post Cold War Era*, (eds.,) Routledge 2000, pp. 129-143, p. 131.

151 *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

152 Viroli, *For Love of Country*, p. 174.

153 *Op. cit.*, 184.



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LE MONDE DOMESTIQUE : LES OBJETS ET LA MEMOIRE

La maison, la vie domestique, les savoirs-vivre

Le monde domestique représente l'unité et les relations profondes entre les humains et le milieu matériel qui les entoure immédiatement en créant les conditions d'existence et l'intimité nécessaires pour la vie des individus. Dans son oeuvre *La poétique de l'espace* Gaston Bachelard a mis en évidence les rapports dynamiques entre l'homme et le foyer de naissance, et le rôle important qu'ils jouent dans le processus de construction d'une personnalité. La démarche phénoménologique suivie par l'auteur, démontre que la maison possède le pouvoir d'intégrer les pensées, les souvenirs, les rêves des gens par l'intermédiaire des images qui se croisent dans les champs de la conscience et de l'inconscient ainsi que par la manière réaliste ou artistique de considérer la réalité. Ce point de vue met en relief les motifs psychologiques, les effets de l'imagination, les expériences spirituelles, les contributions personnelles pour créer des modèles d'organisation, d'aménagement et d'esthétisation de l'espace habité. La topoanalyse découvre que ces images et représentations sont en liaison avec la manière dont les gens donnent un sens d'un lieu depuis un certain point de vue. Il s'agit d'interprétations qui sont reliées aux diverses sensations humaines comme celles de sentiments de sécurité et stabilité, de sens de confort, de l'envie des rêves et des secrets. Ces types de sentiments reposent au fond de la fonction d'habiter.

L'habitation du logement ne signifie pas seulement la résidence dans un lieu mais aussi les soucis quotidiens pour les objets qui construisent l'intérieur. Dans cette perspective le ménage domestique est une activité qui est chargée d'un sens plus complexe qu'une simple procédure de mise en ordre des choses.

Les objets ainsi choyés naissent vraiment d'une lumière intime ; ... Ils propagent une nouvelle réalité d'être. Ils prennent non seulement leur place dans un ordre, mais une communion d'ordre. D'un objet à l'autre, dans la chambre, les soins ménagers tissent des liens qui unissent un très ancien passé au jour nouveau (Bachelard, 1958, p. 74).

Les activités ménagères créent des relations profondes entre des hommes et des objets en maintenant une ambiance intime. Et puis, les objets divers aident à entretenir les souvenirs et les sentiments des leurs propriétaires, ils font construire les liens qui relient le passé et le présent.

En s'efforçant d'éclaircir l'essentiel de la notion de la famille, P. Bourdieu a insisté sur la liaison étroite entre la famille et la maison. Plus précisément, il trouve que la définition dominante et légitime de la famille repose sur une constellation de mots maison, maisonnée, qui construit la réalité sociale. Selon cette définition la famille est un ensemble d'individus apparentés qui cohabitent en partageant un même toit. Les gens la considèrent comme un univers social et cette représentation passe par la symbolisation des qualités physiques et matérielles de l'édifice. La maison est envisagée comme un lieu stable et solide, bien fermé et séparé de l'extérieur par la barrière symbolique du seuil qui assure et sauvegarde l'intimité en marquant le domaine privé. La famille s'associe de façon durable à la maison parce qu'elle se transmet indéfiniment d'une génération à l'autre.

D'une telle façon la maison fonctionne comme un des milieux de la reproduction sociale.

Pour comprendre comment la famille, de fiction nominale devient groupe réel dont les membres sont unis par d'intenses liens actifs, il faut prendre en compte tout le travail symbolique et pratique qui tend à transformer l'obligation d'aimer en disposition aimante et à doter chacun des membres de la famille d'un « esprit de famille » générateur de dévouements, de générosités, de solidarités (ce sont aussi les innombrables échanges ordinaires et continus de l'existence quotidienne, échanges de dons, de services, d'aides, de visites, d'attentions, de gentillesse etc.)... (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 140).

Cela veut dire que la maison possède une vocation symbolique à assurer la transmission de sentiments d'appartenance à la famille et du patrimoine entre les générations. Les actions domestiques servent à

intérioriser l'ordre social, les attitudes et le comportement. C'est la condition essentielle qui garantit la vitalité et la continuité de la famille.

Un autre aspect de recherches sociologiques envisage la maison dans le champ de l'ordre sociologique ainsi que la nécessité de la fonctionnalité. C'est Baudrillard qui tente d'expliquer la nature du système des objets. Organiser l'espace, reconstruire l'ambiance en utilisant les couleurs, les matériaux, les formes, construire un intérieur par l'aménagement des objets et des choses : dans l'essence de toutes ces actions résulte la fonctionnalité. Or, pour Baudrillard, la fonctionnalité de l'objet n'est pas l'équivalent d'une utilité primaire mais elle signale l'appartenance à un certain ordre, à un certain système qui lui permet de s'associer dans une intégrité existante. Cela veut dire qu'elle possède un double sens puisque le monde des objets tisse ses propres liens avec la réalité et que, d'autre part, il relie avec des gens quand ils leur permettent de satisfaire leurs besoins. Lorsque les objets surpassent leur fonctionnalité utilitaire, ils trouvent leur place dans le système de fonctionnalité secondaire où ils deviennent « élément de jeux, de combinaison, de calcul dans un système universel de signes » (Baudrillard, 1968, p. 89). Le choix des objets et leurs utilisations marquent le statut social de l'individu, découvrent son mode de pensée ainsi que les outils de reproduction de différences sociales.

D'ailleurs, les enquêtes aident à mettre en relief les idées qui animent les gens quand ils créent leur univers domestique et permettent d'analyser les usages sociaux des phénomènes culturels. Pour cette raison on constate l'augmentation de l'intérêt ethno-anthropologique pour l'espace domestique quotidien avec les descriptions détaillées de décor et l'analyse du rangement dans le but de comprendre l'appropriation et la construction de l'environnement à travers et par des objets (Segalin, Bromberger, 1996, p. 5-16 ; Chevalier, 1996, p. 115-128 ; Filliod, 1996, p. 125-147).

La connaissance de l'objet, les connaissances par l'objet

L'étymologie de mot « objet » insiste sur son opposition à sujet, l'objet, c'est « ce qui est jeté devant », c'est-à-dire quelque chose de solide ayant unité et indépendance et répondant à une certaine destination (Petit Robert, 1987, p. 1292). Les études linguistiques et philosophiques sur le mot latin constatent que les gens ne séparent pas l'objet du social ou de l'humain.

Nous le tenons pour ce qui extériorise tant la personnalité de son détenteur, qui l'a sûrement marqué, que celle de son créateur, qui l'a conçu, voir exécuté (Dagognet, 1993, p. 20).

L'étymologie de terme « objet » en lange bulgare (Dictionnaire étymologique, 1971) découvre ses traits les plus importants : il est matériel, indépendant, existe réellement et durablement et permet d'être abordé par les sens humains. Il possède le caractère dialectique qui exprime la mutualité de deux essences, naturelle et technologique. La signification du mot en deux langues confirme qu'il n'existe pas d'objet sans projet, c'est-à-dire que tout objet

jusqu'au plus modeste, fonctionnel et quotidien, est un objet de culture : produit par une culture qui, dans tous les sens du terme, l'in-forme et que lui-même contribue à constituer. ... Artefact, l'objet le plus banal implique toute une conception de l'homme et du monde (Greff, J.-P., 1996, p. 12).

Les objets représentent le mode par lequel l'homme envisage le monde et ses relations avec lui.

Tous les objets possèdent deux côtés importants : ils trouvent leur origine dans la nature par leur matérialité et, en même temps, ils appartiennent à la culture par leurs usages et leurs fonctions. Les rapports de l'homme à la nature passent par les connaissances de l'environnement, des méthodes et des techniques de son acquisition et de sa transformation. Nous ne pouvons pas penser séparément la nature et la culture parce que les interactions humaines avec l'environnement naturel et physique se définissent par la façon dont les gens traitent les problèmes qu'il soulève et par son incorporation dans le milieu culturel. Les êtres humains peuvent

interroger et modifier ces rapports au monde. L'homme développe une relation de type herméneutique avec son environnement. Il interprète constamment la réalité qui l'entoure pour s'y adapter et pour la transformer (Cerclet, D., 1998, p. 12).

Cette complexité de l'objet et de ces rapports avec des gens lui donnent la capacité de servir d'instrument pour étudier les conceptions de l'homme sur le monde et sur soi-même.

L'approche fonctionnelle représente la première étape pour comprendre le caractère de l'objet. En examinant des problèmes différents dans le

domaine de l'art populaire, y compris de costume traditionnel en Slovaquie, P. Bogatyrev fut l'un des premiers chercheurs qui a montré l'ensemble de fonctions diverses des objets dans le champ socioculturel : utilitaire, esthétique, magique, rituelle, marqueur d'identification statutaire ou d'appartenance locale et nationale, et il a attiré l'attention sur leur caractère dynamique (Bogatyrev, 1971). Il a développé l'idée que toutes les fonctions possibles établissent une structure étroitement unie où émergeaient les deux aspects généraux – pragmatique et communicatif – qui étaient la manifestation de deux essences de l'objet – sa matérialité et son rôle de signe.

Ch. Bromberger a approfondi cette conception en proposant trois voies pour analyser un objet : d'abord, démontrer le réseau de correspondances entre la matière, la forme et les fonctions qui lui sont attribuées culturellement ; en second lieu, mettre en évidence les indications que livre cet objet sur le statut de son détenteur ; enfin, interpréter les significations symboliques dont il est investi (Bromberger, 1979). La liaison stable et flexible entre les idées, les valeurs, les signes et la forme matérielle qui les revêt repose au fond sur le rapport entre l'objet et le social.

Thierry Bonnot propose un point de vue intéressant qui invite à parler de la biographie des choses banales :

... le même objet peut être considéré soit comme un produit industriel, témoignant de la vitalité économique d'un village, soit comme la trace matérielle de l'histoire d'une activité disparue... Au-delà du fait que la position de ces objets dans l'espace social – cour d'usine, vitrine, cave ou grenier – participe à la construction de leur statut et le révèle en modifiant le regard posé sur eux, comment appréhender ce phénomène par lequel ne sera jamais seulement un produit industriel, seulement une poterie de grès, seulement un élément du patrimoine de Pouilloux, ni seulement « la vase de la tante Germaine ? » Car l'objet, lui-même sera un peu tout cela, mais jamais tout en même temps... (Bonnot, 2002, p. 4).

Ce regard permet de voir que la complexité de l'objet qui est le résultat de sa nature hétérogène.

D'ailleurs, il s'agit aussi de rapports de l'homme à l'homme par intermédiaire des objets. La société utilisatrice les charge de significations dans le processus de leur production ainsi que de leur consommation. Ayant en vue les objets d'art on ne pourra pas éliminer leur effet sur les

perceptions esthétiques et sur la valeur qu'ils prennent dans la société. Ils renferment les connaissances et les expériences attachées aux émotions, aux intuitions, aux choses vécues. Voilà pourquoi ils produisent une grande influence psychologique sur les êtres humains. C'est-à-dire les objets sont pénétrés de l'existence humaine par ce qu'ils s'inscrivent au fond d'actes de la pensée et de communication.

Comme nous l'a bien montré Jean Baudrillard dans son livre *Le système des objets*, il existe une grande catégorie d'objets qui se trouvent en dehors du système fonctionnel pour répondre au besoin d'ordre subjectif. Ce sont des objets singuliers, anciens, folkloriques, exotiques, qui possèdent un statut psychologique spécial.

Pourtant il (l'objet) n'est pas afunctionnel ni simplement « décoratif », il a une fonction bien spécifique dans le cadre du système : il signifie le temps (Baudrillard, 1968, p. 104).

C'est la signification du temps passé qui est la plus importante. Ce n'est pas le temps réel mais les indices culturels et les images du temps retrouvé dans l'objet ancien. Il aide aussi à visualiser les liens diachroniques réels ou imaginaires entre générations d'une même famille en jouant le rôle de mythe d'origine. Alors, l'objet renferme le temps et répond à deux nécessités : la nostalgie des origines et le besoin d'authenticité pour valoriser le présent. En étant qu'emblèmes, ils rappellent les souvenirs et nourrissent la mémoire individuelle, familiale et communautaire. De la même manière les objets hérités subissent des nouvelles interprétations, prennent des nouveaux sens et ils deviennent le point d'articulation entre la diachronie et la synchronie. Cela leur permet d'illustrer les conventions sociales et nous aide à comprendre ce qu'est le social et la culture dans leurs rapports au temps et à l'espace.

Construire le monde domestique, se présenter soi-même

Les ouvrages cités ci-dessus mettent en relief le caractère complexe des objets qui font partie de deux registres : le fonctionnel où ils répondent aux nécessités pratiques, et le symbolique où les choses matérielles donnent à voir la réalité socioculturelle. Une question importante est la manière dont ils matérialisent les souvenirs, visualisent l'immatériel et reçoivent les nouvelles significations pour devenir le lieu de mémoire.

Pierre Nora note que la mémoire se nourrit d'affections, de sentiments, de souvenirs et s'enracine dans le concret, dans l'espace, le geste, l'image, l'objet (Nora, 1997, p. 25).

La mémoire est un phénomène qui appartient aux êtres vivants. Elle est construite par rapport à leur propre trajet de vie et dans le croisement entre des événements collectifs et des souvenirs individuels. Dans son œuvre remarquable *La mémoire collective* Morrice Halbwachs a mis en évidence l'importance du cadre social dans le procès de génération des souvenirs individuels (Halbwachs, 1968). La formation d'une personnalité se déploie toujours dans une certaine communauté qui impose une matrice de perception et d'évaluation des événements passés en fonction de l'échelle axiologique construite culturellement. Les images collectives influent sur la transformation des souvenirs privés parce que les gens intègrent des épisodes de la vie commune dans leur mémoire personnelle en croissant le passé vécu avec le passé collectif.

Il ne s'agit pas pour nous de suivre le fil de la liaison étroite entre histoire et mémoire au sens strict, mais plutôt d'étudier les rapports sentimentaux et historiques entre les individus et les objets afin de dévoiler certains fonctionnements sociaux plus généraux relevant du domestique. J'approcherai ici la question de savoir comment les objets servent à porter des souvenirs humains en fonction de stratégie contre l'oubli.

Cette question s'inscrit dans un contexte plus large et concerne le rôle que jouent des objets dans le processus de construction et d'individualisation de milieu domestique. Les conceptions et les images qui guident l'organisation de l'espace et la transmission des modèles d'habiter sont importantes. J'attirerai ici l'attention sur les règles culturelles et les normes sociales qui prédéterminent l'établissement des attitudes collectives dans les manières d'habiter. Ensuite, je chercherai de quelle façon les objets contribuent à personnaliser l'espace privé à travers l'arrangement des objets dans l'espace. Leur importance et valeur pour le propriétaire deviennent visibles quand nous connaissons leurs places (exposés aux lieux visibles ou cachés dans les tiroirs, dans l'armoire etc.), leurs qualités et particularités artistiques, leurs relations avec les autres domaines de l'esprit, par exemple, la religiosité, l'art, l'esthétique.

Etude de cas : le terrain ethnologique de Plovdiv

Plovdiv, deuxième ville de Bulgarie est un exemple de coexistence et de tolérance entre différentes communautés. Les témoignages archéologiques et historiques, les rapports des diplomates et des missionnaires, les multiples narrations de voyageurs décrivent le caractère multiculturel de la ville en présentant un tableau pittoresque de cohabitation de diverses communautés ethniques et religieuses au cours des siècles. Aujourd'hui encore la ville est un territoire de cohabitation entre d'une part, de nombreuses communautés ethniques : Bulgares, Turcs, Tsiganes, Arméniens, Juifs et Grecs ; et, d'autre part, un grand nombre de groupes confessionnels : orthodoxes, catholiques, protestants, évangélistes, musulmans, grégoriens, judaïques, uniates. Les Plovdiviens sont habitués depuis longtemps à cette diversité culturelle qui s'est accompagnée de nombreuses pratiques de co-existence intercommunautaire.

La culture urbaine influe vigoureusement sur le mode d'habiter la maison. En général, la manière dont ils construisent leurs espaces domestiques et créent leurs intérieurs ne les distingue pas fortement les uns des autres. Ce sont notamment les détails qui contribuent à personnaliser leur univers domestique. Les relations continues des hommes et des objets aident à stéréotyper le savoir-vivre comme une pratique culturelle et à garantir l'accumulation de la mémoire autant personnelle que collective et la transmission de valeurs communes entre les générations.

A partir de récits de vie recueillis sur Plovdiv, j'étudierai les modes de transmission par l'intermédiaire de la famille, et plus spécialement le rôle médiateurs des objets domestiques qui entretiennent les manières d'habitation, le prolongement des souvenirs, les sentiments des individus et la manière dont ils établissent des liens entre le passé et le présent. Les exemples sont plus explicites dans le milieu des communautés locales ou en diaspora qui s'efforcent à préserver la particularité de leur culture. Pour cette raison j'ai fait mon terrain ethnologique porte sur les personnes d'origine arménienne et juive ainsi que les gens appartenant à groupe des Bulgares de Thrace Egéenne. J'ai fait plus de 20 enquêtes en suivant les critères sociologiques concernant le choix des gens en utilisant l'observation, l'étude de cas, les interviews.

Les enregistrements des histoires de vie ou autobiographiques prêtent aux choses éprouvées et au registre des souvenirs les sentiments et les

appréciations que les individus ont à l'égard des événements, en insistant sur la manière de s'exprimer et les réflexions sur soi qui sont celles des narrateurs. En même temps, le récit d'un événement se construit dans un certain contexte socioculturel et exprime une individualisation du modèle culturel communautaire. Sur cette base je ne parviendrai pas à la conclusion finale d'ordre général mais j'essayerais plutôt de faire une analyse microsociale pour discuter ensemble de l'idée proposée.

Construire son espace domestique

L'observation du logement donne la possibilité de relever les idées qui dirigent une personne lorsqu'elle crée son univers domestique. Cela permet d'analyser aussi l'état et le changement des normes culturelles et sociales. On fait ainsi émerger les rapports entre la maison en tant qu'édifice et la maison comme foyer. L'observation permet de montrer la création et les métamorphoses de la maison qui dépendent du modèle d'organisation de l'espace et son individualisation par la manière d'organiser le cadre domestique, à former les petits coins personnalisés, à ranger les objets divers – les meubles, les outils etc. Il s'agit d'étudier le mode d'habiter, c'est-à-dire le savoir-vivre à la maison qu'on pourrait qualifier comme une pratique culturelle qui se transmet au sein de la famille.

La société bulgare respecte toujours l'injonction traditionnelle « d'avoir une maison à soi » qui se traduit par l'attitude rependue que l'époux accomplisse sa responsabilité de faire construire la demeure pour sa famille. L'Etat soutient cette pratique et encourage la construction des maisons privées en poussant les banques à prêter à long terme les finances nécessaires. A cause de la situation financière actuellement difficile dans le pays, et en conformité aux règles coutumières, les parents s'engagent à aider leurs enfants à atteindre cet objectif. Ce n'est pas rare qu'en suivant cette prescription, les jeunes couples partagent l'habitation avec les parents du jeune marié (ou de la jeune mariée) jusqu'au moment de l'obtention de leur propre appartement. Cette habitude détermine un mode d'organisation de l'espace domestique où parfois habitent en commun deux ou trois générations. Souvent cette cohabitation conditionne la transmission et les formes d'usage des objets familiaux et influe directement sur la construction et la transformation du décor intérieur.

Les récits de vie reliés aux histoires d'appropriation de la demeure démontrent le processus de transformation de la maison en foyer et l'organisation du milieu domestique. La trajectoire résidentielle est très importante lorsqu'il s'agit de l'organisation même des récits de vie, parce qu'il y a un lien fort entre la création et la transformation du logement, et le changement de l'état de la famille (Löfgren, 1996, p. 145). En général les narrations suggèrent les liens profonds entre la création de la maison et le destin personnel du propriétaire et sa famille. Ici, je ne proposerai que quelques exemples pour illustrer cette affirmation.

i. *« J'ai eu une maison magnifique que mon père a fait construire... c'était une très belle maison à deux étages et un magasin au rez-de-chaussée. Elle a été très bien meublée, avec en goût esthétique. Ma mère avait un goût extraordinaire. La chambre de mes parents était toute blanche. Nous avons un salon très beau. ... Entre-temps sont advenus des événements difficiles et nous avons abandonné l'appartement et nous avons déménagé. Nous avons laissé tout, y compris le piano de ma mère, elle jouait d'une manière excellente. ... Ma famille a supporté les conséquences de la récession mondiale des années 29-30. Mon père était inquiet à propos de situation financière de sa banque et il a provoqué la faillite. Dès ce moment-là nous avons une existence très difficile... »* (Y. A.).

ii. *« Mes parents se sont enfuis trois fois : en 1911, 1913, 1918 et encore une fois en 1944. ... A Xantie où se trouvait ma maison natale, mon grand-père a eu le projet de construire un dépôt, un dépôt de tabac. Là-bas il y avait une auberge dans une grande cour, il y avait aussi un tas de matériaux pour la nouvelle construction. ... Quand nous étions enfants, nous nous y réunissions à midi – des enfants bulgares et grecs, il n'y avait pas de différence entre nous ... Après, pendant la guerre, j'ai fait la connaissance de mon futur mari. Il était le trésorier du VI^{ème} régiment ... Personne ne s'est occupé de nous lorsque nous sommes venus ici. Une famille grecque habitait cette maison mais au début de la guerre elle a émigré en Grèce. Nous avons commencé à payer le loyer à leur avocat ... Après, selon la convention signée entre les deux pays, la Bulgarie a acheté les biens des Grecs, donc ils appartenaient déjà à l'État. Nous continuions à habiter cette maison en payant à service de logement. Plus tard nous l'avons réussi à l'acheter et à la reconstruire. La maison a deux étages et deux entrées autonomes : une pour nous et l'autre pour la famille de notre fils ... »* (R. N.).

iii « *Mes grands-parents sont des migrants de Turquie de 1922 lorsqu'ils se sont réfugiés à cause du génocide sur les Arméniens ... Ma grand-mère m'a raconté que tous les Arméniens vivaient bien là-bas, ils possédaient des fermes, des ateliers d'artisanat, ils travaillaient. A cette époque on a commencé à dire qu'il y aurait un pogrome ... Mon grand-père est parti aux champs, parce qu'il était agriculteur, mais un groupe des Turcs armés y est passé et il a été égorgé. Toute la famille a trouvé une charrette et a pris rapidement la route vers la frontière. Les trains ont été pleins des gens angoissés ... Et alors, toute ma famille est venue à Plovdiv. Mon oncle a trouvé et acheté la maison dans l'ancienne ville. Au-dessous de la maison il y avait une cave où se trouvait un puits. Dans cet endroit il y avait une atmosphère romantique. Moi, je l'aimais bien. Il y avait aussi un couloir frais parce qu'il a été pavé des plaques de pierre ... » (I. S.).*

Ces exemples peuvent être multipliés et chacun parmi eux représente une situation particulière. Le point commun est que les souvenirs racontés nous remmènent vers des événements historiques, politiques et économiques vécus par les gens. Les récits représentent des relations claires entre les histoires autour de la construction ou l'appropriation de la maison et les trajectoires de vie des propriétaires et de leurs parents. Les conversations concernant la maison rappellent des souvenirs qui inscrivent la mémoire personnelle dans le cadre du passé familial. Fréquemment le contenu des entretiens démontre la liaison rattachant l'individu et la famille au groupe social et à l'appartenance communautaire. Le type de maison, son style architectural, la manière dont l'intérieur est aménagé deviennent des indices qui signent le statut social et culturel de la famille et contribuent à l'auto-identification du propriétaire.

Dans les villes bulgares une partie des logements est privée. Dès 1960 on observe de fortes vagues de migrations urbaines suscitées par l'Etat en permettant d'accès à la propriété par petites men-sua-li-tés étalées sur de nombreuses années. A cette époque a commencé la construction des grands immeubles (de type HLM, dits blocs) créés selon le même type de plan d'aménagement. L'espace des appartements dans les grands immeubles est strictement fixé, tandis que dans les maisons il existe plusieurs variantes d'organisation des espaces intérieurs et fréquemment on trouve une petite cour et un jardin à côté d'elles.

Pour illustrer l'appréciation des gens sur d'habitation en comparaison entre l'appartement dans un grand immeuble et dans une maison voici exemple de l'avis de deux jeunes femmes.

i. « Je préfère la maison avec une cour ... Si quelqu'un habite la maison, le rapprochement avec des gens est plus fort, tandis que dans un appartement tu fermes la porte et tu n'as pas des relations avec des autres ...Le côté positif ici c'est le chauffage central et aussi que tout dans l'appartement est assez compact ...» (E. K.).

ii. « La maison a appartenu à mes grands-parents. C'est un bien hérité. J'ai grandi chez mes grands-parents dans cette maison. C'est très différent par rapport à la vie dans un grand immeuble. Dans la cour nous avions des fleurs et des arbres fruitiers, un mûrier. Mon grand-père ramassait des mûres et ma grand-mère préparait de la confiture. Je me souviens de mon grand-père qui allumait le poêle en hiver. Il y avait une ambiance inoubliable ... » (A. I.).

Ces extraits montrent l'opinion fréquemment partagée qui envisage la maison comme un milieu plus humain et plus affectueux. L'idée est répandue que l'espace ouvert devant elle favorise la sociabilité, bien que la cohabitation dans les blocs favorise aussi les liens de voisinage.

Souvent les habitants des grands immeubles mettent de pots de plantes vertes ou fleuries devant leurs portes et dans les escaliers communs afin de créer une ambiance plus humaine et plus proche de celle de la maison. A l'occasion de certaines fêtes ils sont habitués à mettre des petits objets sur les murs en dehors de leur appartement pour montrer qu'ils partagent ces événements ou simplement pour embellir l'emplacement d'habitat. A ce propos il faut mentionner que dans la vie quotidienne l'action du ménage ne s'arrête pas jusqu'à la porte car habituellement les habitants s'occupent à nettoyer aussi la place du palier et les escaliers devant leur entrée.

Mary Douglas a été la première qui a attiré l'attention sur la souillure en s'intéressant aux limites internes ou externes des rapports sociaux. Elle affirmait que la façon de considérer l'opposition saleté/propreté recoupe l'opposition désordre/ordre. Le nettoyage serait une manière de mettre « un nouvel ordre dans les lieux qui nous entourent » (Douglas, 1971, p. 24). En suivant cette perspective anthropologique pour étudier l'espace domestique, Daniel Welzer-Lang et Jean-Paul Filiod traitent le nettoyage comme un rite séculier de purification.

Le but du rite n'est pas de montrer un ordre différent de l'agencement des rapports sociaux à l'œuvre dans l'espace considéré, mais bel et bien de définir et de contrôler sans cesse l'ordre symbolique qu'il met en place (Welzer-Lang D., J. P. Filiod, 1992).

Ainsi, nettoyer l'espace devant l'entrée et y disposer des plantes ou des petits objets indiquent une extension spatiale de l'espace domestique hors les murs de l'appartement. C'est-à-dire que ses limites sont désignées par le ménage et la mise en ordre des objets. Cet endroit peut être considéré comme la figure de lieu intermédiaire entre l'espace public et l'espace privé.

En général, l'espace domestique est considéré en opposition à l'espace public et on dessine une frontière nette entre eux parce que la maison est envisagée comme un lieu fermé, sûr et tranquille. En étudiant les pratiques et rituels du savoir-vivre, Dominique Picard met en relief qu'il existe les mêmes représentations spatiales qui structurent l'espace domestique et l'espace social. La plus importante, c'est la coupure qui sépare les lieux domestiques des lieux publics.

Cependant, que ce soit chez soi ou chez autrui, un logement privé comporte à la fois des lieux sociaux, ouverts à tous les occupants (comme le salon ou la salle à manger) et des lieux intimes (comme les chambres, la cuisine, la cave) dont les légitimes propriétaires se réservent le droit d'ouvrir ou non l'accès. Il y a ainsi une sorte de redoublement de l'opposition privé/public à l'intérieur même de l'appartement ou de la maison (Picard, 1995, p. 56).

Evidemment, habiter la maison cela signifie aussi d'organiser des lieux sociaux et des lieux intimes et de partager cet espace commun.

Chaque famille structure son milieu selon des besoins et des activités humaines de la vie quotidienne en séparant la cuisine, la chambre, le salon, la toilette.

« Nous avons subdivisé tous les coins possibles et au parterre nous avons un coin qui nous permet de distinguer les travaux : les occupations intellectuelles, certains travaux quotidiens – ranger des vêtements et des tissus lavés, les repasser etc. L'organisation des lieux dépend de la surface. Selon notre expérience commune, nous avons constitué une place traditionnelle pour le repas. Notre famille s'y réunit régulièrement. Après chacun de nous regarde la télé, lit le journal, et pour des pareilles activités de ce type nous avons aussi créé les petits coins » (A. T.).

C'est à dire, la fonctionnalité et les besoins de la vie quotidienne ont le rôle prépondérant dans le processus de maîtrise de l'espace domestique. Les lieux structurés se personnalisent par l'intermédiaire des d'activités de chaque membre de la famille ainsi que par des objets appartenant aux individus. Ce sont aussi les facteurs importants qui contribuent à évaluer le degré de l'intimité de chaque lieu qui est la scène des rapports interpersonnels et représentent leurs capacités de reprendre les nouveaux sens et significations.

La façon dont on construit l'espace domestique et arrange l'intérieur correspond aux connaissances et l'apprentissage des pratiques du savoir-vivre, apprentissage qui s'effectue dans le milieu familial et social. Je proposerai deux extraits des entretiens qui représentent deux manières de créer de l'intérieur de manière contradictoire au premier regard.

i. « *Dans la maison de mes parents à Varna où j'ai agrandi, il y avait un confort formidable. Moi, je changeais fréquemment les maisons où l'habitais parce que j'ai vécu avec mes grands-parents à Saint-Pétersbourg. Je me suis rendu compte que ce changement m'a beaucoup influencé. Dans ma vieille maison à Saint-Pétersbourg il y avait une commode fabriquée en bois rouge, de l'acajou, et elle se reflétait dans le miroir en face. Ce grand miroir était le centre de la maison. Maintenant je me rends compte que moi aussi, de la même manière, j'arrange les choses dans ma maison autour d'un centre imaginaire* » (I. Sh.).

ii. « *C'est la maison héritée de mon père... En 1977, après avoir finit mes études je suis revenue à Plovdiv. Mes deux parents étaient décédés. La maison a été arrangée selon leurs besoins mais cela donnait une ambiance angoissante, parce qu'il y avait beaucoup des souvenirs qui pesaient et pour cela nous avons tout vendu de la maison ancienne, absolument tout ... Maintenant nous le regrettons, parce que nous avions des meubles anciens, des garde-robes avec miroirs de cristal, mais à ce moment-là ces meubles n'étaient pas modernes, il me semblait. Aujourd'hui on aime mieux les antiquités. Un jour nous sommes allés dans un magasin et nous avons acheté tout le nécessaire pour notre maison. Autrefois ici il y avait un portail qui séparait l'espace en deux pièces. On a démoli le mur car on préférait un logement plus ample et de telle façon on a créé un salon. Après nous avons trié l'espace de la maison selon la fonction* » (Z. A.).

La maîtrise du territoire domestique s'inscrit dans le processus de transmission de la manière de penser. Elle renvoie à une forme de mémoire domestique, définie par Michel Rautenberg comme

... cet ensemble de symboles, de représentations, de modèles esthétiques, de lieux, de pratiques, de savoir-faire qui se transmettent de génération en génération, évoluant lentement, inspirant des œuvres où l'on habite, tout en procurant le mode d'emploi des manières d'habiter (Rautenberg, 1997, p. 265).

L'organisation de l'intérieur répond aux exigences de la culture. Bien qu'elle dépende de dimensions physiques la distribution de surface suivant les besoins et les envies des habitants, les manières d'arranger et d'habiter le lieu adoptent des modèles et des pratiques qui se sont formés pendant l'enfance. On crée l'intérieur en fonction des préférences plus générales orientées par le style lié de l'époque, le confort ou des formes d'esthétisation du milieu.

Avant d'entrer

Avant d'entrer dans la maison il y a des indications qui informent sur les habitants. D'abord, il s'agit de petite plaque posée sur la porte qui indice le nom de propriétaire ou de tous les membres de la famille. C'est la chose ordinaire dont la première fonction est d'identifier les personnes. Et puis, c'est une chose particulière parce qu'elle représente aussi le goût des propriétaires : il y a des plaques simples, discrètes ou bien ornementées, dorées, toutes neuves ou déjà patinées, celles qui ne mentionnent que le nom et les autres qui marquent la profession, le rang etc. Une enseigne est aussi un petit signe complémentaire sur statut de la famille, qui exprime en même temps la façon dont les propriétaires veulent se présenter au public.

Il existe aussi des manières de signaler l'identité de la famille. Fréquemment sur la porte d'une maison juive on trouve la *mezozza*. C'est un objet en métal de forme rectangulaire ou cylindrique qui contient un extrait du livre sacré des Juifs, la Thora, pour protéger la maison et faire prospérer la famille.

« Tu te trouves au seuil d'une maison juive. Comme dans toutes les maisons juives, j'ai une mezozza. Ma belle-sœur et mon beau-frère m'ont donné cette mezozza quand ils ont quitté leur appartement lorsqu'ils ont émigré en Israël. La mezozza est très modeste, il y en a de plus belles, de plus pompeuses, fabriquées avec de meilleurs alliages, mais les originaux qui étaient dans les maisons de Plovdiv, les maisons juives, étaient

justement en laiton. Habituellement quand on entre ou quand on sort de la maison, on embrasse la mezoza comme porte-bonheur. Auparavant il y avait une mezoza sur chaque porte, en fait, sur chaque porte de chaque pièce. C'est intéressant, la disposition de la mezoza : elle est penchée, ... car si elle prend la position horizontale ou verticale, en ajoutant un complément, elle pourrait se transformer en croix » (Y. A.).

Evidemment c'est un objet symbolique qui traduit l'appartenance ethnique des habitants. Il y a des cas où la *mezoza* n'est posée que sur les portes de l'intérieur des maisons, c'est-à-dire qu'elle est le signe important pour les propriétaires, mais qui reste en connaissances aux membres de la famille et aux invités ou aux visiteurs de la maison. C'est aussi un objet de culte qui assure la continuité de la mémoire religieuse et qui permet aux gens de manifester leur attachement religieux ou plutôt l'affection de suivre la tradition. Après la chute du communisme on aperçut un retour vers le religieux qui se traduit par le désir de participer à des pratiques communes. En même temps, plusieurs des personnes interviewés m'ont expliqué qu'elles ne sont pas croyantes mais elles vont à la synagogue ou respectent les prescriptions religieuses en fonction de la tradition qui les aide à entretenir les relations au sein de la communauté juive. La pratique religieuse est un outil supplémentaire permettant d'affirmer sa différence ethnique et culturelle. Ce fait peut s'interpréter comme une réaction contre les répressions de l'Etat qui se sont succédés avant 1989, mais aussi comme une autre manière d'affirmer son ethnicité.

S'il y a les signes identitaires dans la maison, habituellement ils se disposent à des endroits bien en vue. Par exemple, sur la porte vitrée d'une maison arménienne les propriétaires ont collé un sticker présentant le symbole de H.O.M., l'Association Arménienne de Charité. Les hôtes ont attiré spécialement mon attention sur ce signe et ils m'ont raconté l'histoire de cette organisation, les activités ainsi que leur participation à cette structure. La dame a été une des initiatrices de la re-crédation de l'organisme après 1989, elle est une adhérente active élue au bureau d'administration. En exposant le sticker, la famille déclare partager ces idées caritatives et affirme sa participation à l'une des structures de communauté arménienne.

L'expression de l'attachement affirmé s'approfondit par la commande de fabrication d'une bague qui porte l'emblème de l'Association de charité :

« C'est le symbole de notre organisation. Moi, je me suis adressée aux autres femmes du conseil d'administration et j'ai proposé que nous

commandions pour chacune d'entre nous la bague d'or avec sept petits brillants représentant notre emblème. Il est possible que nous mourions un jour, mais la bague restera pour toujours comme un souvenir. Et toutes nous en avons fait faire » (Z. A.).

Cet exemple démontre une façon dont l'objet se charge des idées, se pénètrent des souvenirs des gens et se transforme en porteur de mémoire. Cette bague a sa propre histoire, mais elle raconte et rappelle une histoire, elle aussi.

Créer un intérieur : poser, disposer, exposer

L'organisation et la modification de l'environnement qui nous entoure est une activité continuelle qui a pour objectif d'adapter l'espace aux besoins humains. Il s'agit de l'organisation spatiale et de la localisation et de l'arrangement des objets. Une analyse des interactions entre les humains et les choses dans les activités ordinaires met en évidence la capacité des objets d'être chargés des expériences et de les sauvegarder, ce qui leur permet de servir de signaux et de soutenir la mémoire (Conein, B., E. Jacopin, 1993, 61).

En étudiant la vie quotidienne, Michel de Certeau a attiré l'attention sur l'espace domestique comme territoire privé qui permet aux gens de « se retirer » et de « rentrer chez soi ». Le propriétaire le construit selon ses besoins et son goût en lui donnant un caractère intime et particulier. En conséquence,

le moindre logement dévoile la personnalité de son occupant. Un lieu habité par la même personne pendant une certaine durée en dessine un portrait ressemblant, à partir des objets (présents ou absents) et des usages qu'ils supposent (Certeau, M.de, L. Giard, P. Mayol, 1994, p. 205-206).

La construction de l'intérieur est un travail sur les détails, une composition d'éléments divers (des matériaux, des formes et des couleurs, de lumière, de mobilier, des objets, des outils etc.) organisés et mis en ordre en suivant des conventions culturelles et des préférences individuelles. L'intérieur propose une autre manière de découvrir le caractère et l'histoire des gens parce qu'il représente une variante visuelle particulière du récit de vie raconté.

La création de l'univers domestique est une affaire du couple qui planifie le rangement de sa maison en fonction de son projet de vie. Beaucoup de personnes interviewés ont signalé que les deux époux discutent sur l'organisation de l'espace, choisissent les meubles et décident ensemble comment les disposer dans l'appartement. On constate une division du travail dans les actions de rangement qui donne la priorité aux hommes de s'occuper des activités plus physiques tandis les femmes s'occupent des détails qui contribuent à l'ambiance personnalisée dans la maison. Je cite les paroles d'une de mes informatrices, parce qu'elles expriment une opinion plus répandue :

« Le rôle de la femme dans la famille c'est toujours le même. Si une femme ne connaît pas bien son travail de maîtresse de la maison, cette famille ne réussira pas. L'homme est le chef, il conduit, et la femme, elle est le pilier qui soutient la famille. Elle manifeste son respect pour le chef de la famille, pourtant la maison sans une femme et l'époux sans argent ne mérite pas d'exister » (D. K.).

La division des engagements correspond aux normes sociales plus générales qui considèrent que l'époux offre la maison et que l'épouse est la gardienne du foyer familial, même si dans les faits l'espace domestique provoque rencontres et négociations entre des conceptions différentes par rapport à l'aménagement du logement commun.

En général, les individus aiment décorer richement leurs intérieurs. Habituellement, sur les murs il y a des tableaux originaux ou les copies, des gobelins, des panneaux, des affiches etc. Le goût pour les œuvres artistiques est forgé dans le milieu familial et leur exposition à l'intérieur de la maison représente une tradition transmise. Fréquemment une partie des tableaux est héritée, elle est toujours présente dans la vie du possesseur et joue un certain rôle dans la formation du goût qui détermine les préférences personnelles. Exposer les tableaux n'est pas simplement une embellie du milieu, c'est plutôt l'expression du partage des valeurs esthétiques avec le groupe familial ou social. Je rappelle les réflexions de Denis Cercllet à propos de l'interaction entre objets esthétiques et mémoire sociale : « ... il faut entendre par ce qui fait mémoire pour une société non pas soumission au passé mais le moyen de conserver le lien entre les membres par la mémorisation d'une culture commune » (Cercllet, 1999, p. 32). La présence des œuvres d'art dans la maison évoque l'image du milieu culturel d'origine du propriétaire et relie d'une façon extraordinaire son existence et l'histoire de sa famille.

Il y a d'autres tableaux ou objets d'art, qui trouvent leur place à l'intérieur parce qu'ils rappellent un certain souvenir personnel.

i. *« Ici j'ai mis de petits tableaux à l'huile présentant les villes où nous avons fait nos études, moi en France et Léon en Allemande. En face tu vois l'affiche d'une rencontre Les Juifs dans la vie de Plovdiv depuis la Libération à nos jours qui a eu lieu il a deux ans. Ici il y a une autre affiche, qui présente le livre sur la cuisine juive que j'ai écrit... »* (Y. A.).

ii. *« C'est une icône que mon mari m'a fait comme cadeau lorsque nous étions ensemble avant le mariage. Cette période n'a pas été assez longue, mais il m'a offert des objets qu'il avait fabriqués tout seul : l'icône de la Sainte Vierge, et sur autre mur j'ai mis le panneau de l'Ancienne ville de Plovdiv... »* (Z. A.).

Les exemples cités montrent que l'une partie des objets sont associés à la formation de l'identité et à son mode d'expression. Les objets d'art sont spécialement exposés pour rappeler moments les plus chéris de la part de personne soit dans le trajet de l'histoire individuelle, soit des événements inscrits dans le cadre des activités collectives. Ils se transforment en signes du passé en reliant le présent avec les choses vécues, les idées et les affections partagées en fonction de leur évaluation ici et maintenant, c'est-à-dire le choix et l'exposition des objets dépendent du système personnel des valeurs.

Les travaux des femmes comme les dentelles, les broderies, les tissus, les couvertures et les nappes tricotées sont préférées dans l'intérieur urbain. Ils sont transmis fréquemment de la mère à la fille et ils donnent à voir les liens entre les générations de la ligne des femmes. Ils reposent sur la transmission des savoirs-faire technologiques car les femmes reproduisent des modèles anciens ou, au minimum, elles savent comment en faire même qu'elles n'en font plus. Autrefois les connaissances et savoirs-faire de la production à la main étaient obligatoires pour montrer d'âge à se marier. Les normes coutumières exigeaient la préparation de la dot qui consistait surtout en ouvrages de dames qui se considéraient comme bien d'héritage. En transmettant des objets on transmet aussi les histoires familiales :

i. *« J'ai une nappe très belle que je garde avec soin et que je n'utilise qu'à l'occasion des grandes fêtes. Elle a été brodée par ma mère à l'époque où elle étudiait au Collège des filles français. Là-bas les filles apprenaient aussi la broderie bulgare. Vous voyez, les motifs sont beaux, il y a six serviettes. J'aime cette nappe »* (Z. A.).

ii. *« J'ai été jeune fille et je regardais ma mère tissant les draps, les fins ouvrages à la main. Nous avons été réfugiés, notre vie n'était pas facile et grâce à ce travail de ma mère nous avons commencé à vivre mieux ... Je peux vous montrer ces objets car je les garde ... » (K. M.).*

iii. *« Chez moi les broderies de filet sont nombreuses. Voilà une draperie que j'ai préparée d'une couverture qui servait à couvrir le piano de ma mère. Elle jouait du piano d'une manière excellente. Moi, je l'ai refaite, j'ai ajouté quelque chose, et voilà » (Y. A.).*

Ces objets contribuent à la formation d'un goût, en même temps ils jouent le rôle de médiateurs entre les générations et les femmes entretiennent des rapports sentimentaux avec eux. Une partie d'entre eux est exposée à l'intérieur et l'autre est bien gardée dans les armoires et utilisée rarement. Ils sont tous valorisés parce qu'ils rappellent les histoires de la vie de famille à leur propriétaire.

D'une même façon, les femmes envisagent aussi les services de table, les verres de cristal ou les services à thé et à café s'ils sont hérités ou offerts à l'occasion des fiançailles ou du mariage. Habituellement ils sont bien chers, beaux et ils se posent derrière des vitrines de l'armoire du salon. Etant très chéris, leur usage n'est pas fréquente et se fait surtout dans les occasions spéciales, pour créer une atmosphère de fête et de plaisir. Ils donnent toujours l'occasion de raconter des épisodes de la vie.

On peut grouper dans la même classe les objets précieux hérités des parents ou des ancêtres qui appartiennent au trésor familial. Je n'énumérerai qu'horloges, vases, services anciens en porcelaine etc., qui constituent des objets de luxe et qui montrent les relations de la famille avec des cultures étrangères. Ils signalent les racines de la famille, son statut social et en même temps ils entretiennent les connaissances sociologiques spontanées attachées aux normes et comportements sociaux.

La capacité des objets à construire une ambiance représentant le milieu culturel et social fait choisir et acheter les choses anciennes.

« Ce poêle que tu as aperçu tout de suite n'est pas en lien avec nos traditions familiales. Nous l'avons acheté d'occasion et ensuite nous avons trouvé d'autres choses anciennes. J'ai compris que les objets anciens, bien qu'ils ne soient pas chargés de souvenirs intimes, portent les souvenirs d'autres gens que nous ne connaissons pas et pour cela ils créent une atmosphère particulière et une énergie spéciale. Après le poêle, sont venus chez nous cette horloge ancienne, par intermédiaire de laquelle

le temps est entré chez nous. Après j'ai acheté une lampe très belle. C'est ce type d'objets, qui sont liés au passé, et que j'aimais beaucoup » (I. Sh.).

Il existe aussi des objets qui provoquent la narration de la vie personnelle et des souvenirs de jeunesse. Ce sont des cadeaux reçus pour fêter l'amitié, des fiançailles, un mariage ou des événements prestigieux de la carrière professionnelle qui maintiennent la mémoire individuelle. Il y a des petits objets décoratifs sur les étagères qui sont achetés pendant les voyages. Fréquemment les gens qui proviennent d'une communauté en diaspora ou d'un groupe local visitent les métropoles et les territoires de leurs ancêtres et y prennent les petites pierres, de la terre ou des petites choses du marché. Ce sont des signes spatio-temporels et servent à construire les liens avec le lieu d'origine et à maintenir la mémoire collective.

Il y a des objets religieux et des objets d'art, des souvenirs mais aussi des objets ordinaires et des livres pénétrés de sens et de sentiments.

« Ici j'ai rangé tous les livres que mon père a aimés et préféré ... Parmi eux j'ai mis le livre contenant les psaumes spirituels, parce qu'il est important pour moi car ma famille d'origine appartenait à la communauté évangéliste, mes ancêtres ont été les donateurs et ils ont fait beaucoup pour le développement de l'église et tous ont été bien respectés des autres ... Voilà le livre Les champs morts de Sibérie que j'achète toujours s'il disparaît de ma bibliothèque, parce que le sujet rappelle l'histoire de mon oncle qui a été déporté à Union Soviétique dans 1947. Le régime communiste l'a envoyé là-bas pour ses idées et il y est mort. Ce livre garde le souvenir de lui » (Z. A.).

C'est clair que des livres sont appréciés non seulement pour leur valeur littéraire mais parce qu'ils évoquent le souvenir des parents et aident à se rallier spirituellement à eux. Cet exemple montre bien la façon dont les objets ordinaires subissent une métamorphose comme signe du passé et lieu de mémoire.

Il faut spécialement noter les coins arrangés qui sont très chargés symboliquement parce qu'ils montrent des passions personnelles. On y voit beaucoup d'objets que le propriétaire veut regarder chaque jour parce qu'il les aime ou parce qu'ils portent un sens important quant à la personnalité. Des choses assez différentes sont exposées et forment un petit ou un plus grand coin d'une chambre.

i. « Voilà mon coin bulgare. Ici j'ai arrangé les récipients traditionnels fabriqués en terre, les petites nappes ornementées de broderie bulgare,

une icône, la petite poudrière de ma jeunesse que j'aime beaucoup, les souvenirs que j'ai apportés de bord de la Mer Egée... » (K. M.).

ii. « *Nous disons que la chambre de notre fils, Anton, est la plus arménienne chez nous, parce que là-bas se trouvent toutes les choses qu'il a apportées de l'Arménie et deux choses que j'y ai prises pour moi ...* » (Z. A.). Dans cette chambre il y a la carte d'Arménie, le plan d'Erevan, la carte postale de Etchmiazin (c'est le centre religieux arménien ou « Le Vatican arménien »), un petit calendrier présentant l'alphabet arménien, un panneau de cuivre fabriqué à la main, les diplômes de l'école etc. Tous ces objets ont été achetés lors des visites à la métropole, des fêtes et événements de communauté arménienne, les prix écoliers.

iii. « *Voilà mon petit coin juif où j'ai rangé la petite navette à l'aide de laquelle ma mère fabriquait les dentelles, une reproduction de Juif errant de Chagall, le menorah que nous a donné l'Ambassade d'Israël en 1967, l'étoile jaune que nous avons été forcés à porter, l'étoile d'or de David que mon fils m'a offert, le moulin à café, le bougeoir qui s'appelle « hannukia », des souvenirs...* » (Y. A.).

On observe que les objets dans ces coins, ont des caractéristiques ambiguës, c'est-à-dire que les objets possèdent certaines fonctions mais ils jouent surtout le rôle de présenter les sentiments et les attachements de leur propriétaire. En ce cas ils se trouvent en dehors du système fonctionnel pour répondre à un désir nostalgique. Ce sont des objets différents, parfois singuliers, anciens, qui relient le présent au passé. En tant qu'emblème d'une appartenance d'un type différent (familiale, culturelle, religieuse, sociale, locale), ils rappellent les souvenirs des gens et alimentent la mémoire individuelle, familiale et communautaire. De la même manière, les objets hérités font l'objet de nouvelles interprétations, prennent de nouveaux sens et deviennent le point d'articulation entre la diachronie et la synchronie.

Chaque objet est présenté par l'histoire de son acquisition ou de son exécution et par sa fonction. En même temps il garde et évoque les souvenirs de l'histoire personnelle et familiale qui est aussi importante. Dans ce coin, il y a toujours des objets de provenance et d'appartenances ethniques, religieuses, locales. Evidemment, ils mettent en évidence les indications que livre chaque objet concret sur le statut de son détenteur et puis ils interprètent les significations symboliques dont ils sont investis. Leur place rappelle les caractéristiques particulières de l'espace muséal qui accumule les temps hétérogènes en les arrangeant dans le but de présenter l'interprétation d'une histoire imaginaire.

Photos et albums

La photographie est souvent réalisée pour garder le souvenir. Le rapport et l'usage des photos dans l'espace domestique suivent l'histoire technique et sociale de la photographie. Les tendances générales de son développement, dès la fin du XIX^{ème} siècle, basées sur le perfectionnement technique correspondant à une commercialisation de la production uniformisée, influencent l'habitude de prendre des photos (Charuty, 1999, p. 58). L'analyse de Clara Gallini, abordant les usages sociaux de la pratique photographique, a montré que

tout en étant reproductibles en série, les images sont, au contraire, pensées et construites comme uniques, ce qui accroît encore leur évidente valeur symbolique (Gallini, 1995, p. 125).

Les images photographiques renferment la capacité de rendre visible le temps passé en donnant une existence matérielle aux choses vécues.

En Bulgarie la culture urbaine a beaucoup influencé la perception et l'utilisation de la photographie qui, a son commencement, avait une forme ritualisée. Au début toutes les activités photographiques se trouvaient aux mains des professionnels qui décoraient leurs ateliers pour proposer aux clients une atmosphère convenable à la création d'images artistiques. Prendre des photos à la fin du XIX^{ème} siècle est encore un produit de luxe : à l'occasion de certaine fête ou pour un jour spécialement choisi, le couple ou toute la famille, habillée pour l'occasion, visitait un atelier et commandait les portraits. La manière de s'habiller, les postures et les gestes de ceux portraitisés présentaient l'étiquette conventionnelle, le comportement et l'attitude culturelle des gens. A cette époque on recherchait dans la photographie de réelles qualités esthétiques et on les exposait dans les salons de réception, encadrées dans les cadres magnifiques ou dans les albums tout aussi beaux. Leur valeur artistique était en rapport avec leur fonction comme signe le prestige et le statut social de la famille.

Le XX^{ème} siècle a marqué par le passage à une production destinée à un public assez large. Les innovations techniques et la fabrication des appareils de photo moins chers ont transformé le contexte en rendant le métier presque ordinaire. Les ateliers des villes ont gardé leur fonction de produire des portraits-cartes, mais aussi les photographies simples des

documents d'identité. En même temps dès les premières décennies du siècle sont apparus les photographes libres qui parcouraient des petites villes et des villages pour prendre des photos des événements ou des réunions des gens. Cela a fait transformer le statut de la photographie qui est entré dans la culture de masse. Malgré ça, elle est considérée toujours comme une manière particulière de fixer et conserver les souvenirs.

Aujourd'hui, nous avons pris l'habitude de l'appareil de photo : c'est le temps des amateurs. On prend des photos partout et pour toute occasion, aussi pour le plaisir de photographier ce qui peut expliquer l'existence d'une grande prolifération des images, des thèmes et des sujets. Il y a une coupure visible entre les qualités technique et esthétique de la production ordinaire et la photographie de qualité. Bien sur existe la photographie d'art, mais elle reste fermée dans un cercle limité de spécialistes. Les gens s'adressent aux professionnels exceptionnellement, à l'occasion des moments importants de la vie d'une personne, comme par exemple la naissance d'un enfant, la fête de majorité, le mariage etc. La photographie ne perd pas sa valeur symbolique et ce fait conduit à l'usage culturel des images photographiques.

Le goût mis dans l'arrangement des photos dans l'espace domestique, la manière de les garder et les présenter indiquent la position sociale des individus. Habituellement, il s'agit des photographies et des portraits des proches qui servent à afficher et à soutenir le sentiment d'intimité. On constate que la culture bourgeoise qui porte l'attention aux détails (Wita, 1988, p. 81-93), influe sur leur traitement et leur place à l'intérieur de la maison. Plus fréquemment les familles d'origine urbaine préfèrent encadrer les photographies en les posant sur les murs du salon, dans les vitrines des bibliothèques ou sur le bureau tandis que pour les nouveaux installés en ville il suffit de mettre simplement la photo derrière de vitrines de buffet. Il n'est pas rare qu'il y ait un petit coin où les photos représentent les deux ou les trois générations et des gens proches de la famille.

« En haut, dans le grenier j'ai meublé un bureau où tous les murs sont pleins des photos. Il y a des images très anciennes. Voilà ici la photo de mon grand-père qui habite maintenant chez nous. Il a 90 ans, mais dans la photo où il nous regarde, c'est un bébé d'un an. Lorsque j'ai posé cette photo j'ai pensé que c'est un exemple qui montre comment les gens changent ... J'aime encadrer des photos. Il y a un magasin anglais qui s'appelle « Past Times », ça se traduit par « les temps passés », et j'y achète toujours quelque chose. Voilà ce cadre de la photo de mes grands-

parents, je l'ai trouvé la-bas, et aussi l'autre cadre ... J'ai idée, bien que je ne l'aie pas tout à fait effectué, de présente nos deux familles, la mienne et celle de mon mari, les gens les plus proches, nos parents, voilà sa sœur et ma sœur. Les images de photos sont très importantes pour nous... » (I. Sh.).

Ces images forment un autel de la mémoire où chaque photo raconte une histoire. Ils font voir les liens familiaux et construisent une vision des relations de parentales. On peut trouver ici une dimension généalogique, qui aide à la quête des origines. Dans cette dimension s'inscrivent aussi les photos des parents ou des époux morts qui participent symboliquement à la vie de leurs successeurs et contribuent à la création de liens stables entre les générations. Il y a des cas de transformation de l'autel de la mémoire qui prend une dimension commémorative rappelant les rites reliés au culte de morts, lorsque devant des portraits on met des fleurs et on établit un petit angle d'hommage. L'image reçoit une nouvelle fonction d'éliminer la rupture entre le temps passé et le présent et de reconstruire la totalité et l'éternité de la famille.

« Ici j'ai fait la composition des photos de tous mes proches – mon époux qui est déjà mort, moi, mes fils et à côté – mon frère cadet. ... En face, c'est la photo de ma noce. Ici on voit l'étoile jaune sur le revers du costume de mon mari. Nous étions obligés de porter l'étoile jaune sur chaque vêtement et pendant chaque sortie. Mon étoile était en peu cachée par des fleurs parce que je n'étais pas fière de la porter. En fait, c'est l'étoile de David... Nous avons fait notre noce en peu plus vite, car mon mari a du partir au camp de travail. Ma mère m'a offert le tissu de soie en pépité et elle m'a cousu un costume. Une autre dame juive a fait mon chapeau, j'ai pris le voile de dot de ma mère. Après, beaucoup de jeunes mariées se sont mariés en portant ce chapeau à voile » (Y. A.).

La photographie joue un rôle important comme témoignage des personnes ou des événements passés, mais il y a aussi l'information complémentaire apportée par les propriétaires. L'objectivation de mémoire dans les photos ne suffit pas et souvent elle exige des repères supplémentaires qui aident à interpréter le passé : il s'agit des rapports entre l'image, l'écrit et l'oral. L'étude de Jean-Pierre Albert prouve que l'écriture, au minimum les indices de date et de lieu, participe au combat contre l'oubli en offrant les cadres thématiques ou chronologiques (Albert, 1993, 71-72). Il est évident que la photographie possède une valeur d'information du fait de sa visibilité, mais il s'agit aussi des moments de la vie que le propriétaire ou les participants à l'événement peuvent

présenter dans un certain contexte. Les récits ou les commentaires oraux accompagnant la présentation de la photo, servent à inscrire les souvenirs dans ce contexte plus large que le moment de la photo même, et à le transmettre à la génération suivante.

L'envie de maîtriser les souvenirs concerne aussi la nécessité personnelle de classer les photos dans un album ou de préparer des albums par sujet qui développent les facettes différentes des trajectoires de vie, comme par exemple la naissance, la noce, les voyages etc.

«Les objets dont nous avons hérités n'étaient pas nombreux. Nous avons des albums. Quand mon grand-père a emménagé chez nous, l'objet le plus important qu'il ait retiré de sa valise et arrangé tout de suite dans sa chambre, c'était un ancien album de photos. C'est l'album le plus ancien dans la famille, les photos de sa famille dès XIX^{ème} siècle. Mon grand-père et l'album, ils vont toujours tous ensemble et il le feuillète chaque jour. De cette façon il trouve sa place dans le temps et il se transporte dans l'espace » (I. Sh.).

La force symbolique aide le propriétaire à s'orienter dans son environnement, pas seulement dans l'espace et le temps, mais aussi dans ses rapports sociaux. L'existence et l'usage d'un album illustre d'une manière très nette sa fonction de présenter l'histoire de la famille et de revêtire les souvenirs d'une enveloppe matérielle pour les transmettre aux héritiers. En même temps ils représentent la lutte entre le souvenir et l'oubli. Marc Augé a proposé l'idée que « se souvenir ou oublier, c'est faire un travail de jardinier, sélectionner, élaguer. Les souvenirs sont comme les plantes : il y en a qu'il faut éliminer très rapidement, pour aider les autres à s'épanouir, à se transformer, à fleurir » (Augé, 2001, p. 24). Donc, la création d'un album est un travail subjectif et toutes les photos n'y trouvent pas sa place. Il est une construction imaginaire née dans le cadre des conventions sociales et du système des valeurs. Elles résultent du fait de recomposer et d'arranger des traces de mémoire en choisissant quoi transmettre, comment montrer et quoi laisser à l'oubli.

Vers une conclusion provisoire

Les entretiens donnent une idée de l'importance des liens imaginaires entre le logement et la famille. Les normes culturelles et les attentes de la société agissent sur le mode d'habiter et d'organiser le lieu domestique. La maison se pense en opposition avec l'espace public comme un

territoire intime, sûr et tranquille, mais l'analyse des manières d'habiter découvre son caractère social. La maîtrise de l'espace domestique dépend des besoins des propriétaires et suit l'apprentissage du savoir-vivre qui s'effectue dans le milieu familial et social. Les activités de ménage, de la vie quotidienne et festive aident à structurer et personnaliser le lieu.

Les objets - modèles et séries - existent parallèlement dans le marché et les préférences des gens sont provoquées non seulement par des nécessités pratiques, économiques ou sociales, mais aussi par la publicité et les tendances de la mode. Leurs qualités artistiques résultent du respect des images et goûts individuels, et de normes que le système idéologique impose dans la société. En effet, la corrélation entre la fabrication d'objets et leur utilisation est déterminée par leurs potentiels d'accumuler et de transmettre l'information sociale. Ils renferment les connaissances et les expériences attachées aux émotions, aux intuitions, aux choses vécues.

La manière concrète d'esthétiser l'intérieur suit des traditions familiales. Le système de valeurs détermine la façon dont les objets sont mis en place. Malgré l'existence d'une standardisation des mobiliers, chaque intérieur porte des traits divers grâce à des détails ou à des objets uniques ou artistiques qui aident à personnaliser le cadre de vie. Une partie des oeuvres et des objets est héritée et exprime les liens généalogiques. Par l'intermédiaire des autres, les individus manifestent leur attachement à certaines idées ou préservent des souvenirs liés aux moments importants de leur vie. Les objets rendent visible le temps passé en matérialisant les choses vécues par l'individu.

Effectivement, nous apercevons les deux formes de l'existence de la mémoire, c'est-à-dire la mémoire visualisée ou exposée et la mémoire transmise par voie écrite ou orale, qui exercent des fonctions complémentaires. Fréquemment les événements individuels s'inscrivent eux aussi dans le cadre de la mémoire héritée appartenant à la famille ou au groupe ethnique ou religieux. Ainsi les objets établissent les liens entre l'individu, sa famille, son groupe d'appartenance et médiatisent leurs relations sociales et culturelles en diachronie. Les objets servent comme lieu de mémoire et la préserve de disparition.

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- Anuchka I. (A. I.) : D'origine arménienne mariée au Bulgare, 29 ans, comptable.
- Antoinetta T. (A. T.) : Bulgare mariée à l'Arménien, 65 ans, architecte.
- Irina Sh. (I. Sh.) : D'origine juive mariée au Bulgare, 42 ans, professeur.
- Zia A. (Z. A.) : D'origine arménienne, 45 ans, pharmacienne (à l'interview participe son mari).
- Danniella K. (D. K.) : D'origine juive, 83 ans, maîtresse.
- Kostadinka M. (K. M.) : D'origine de Bulgare de Thrace Egéenne, 68 ans, infirmière en retraite.



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RIGHT-WING IDEOLOGY AND THE INTELLECTUALS IN ROMANIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The association of Romanian intellectuals with the ideology of the extreme right has been a subject of ongoing debate in historiography. Authors from different academic fields have tried to analyze the reasons for the “strange” engagement of some of the most prominent representatives of the brilliant Romanian “new generation” of the 1930s with the Romanian authentic fascist movement, the Iron Guard. Additional acuteness is brought to the debate by the fact that some of the “Guardist” intellectuals, such as Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran, later received worldwide popularity. But scholarly interest is somehow restricted to the interwar period only and almost no attention is paid to this relationship in the immediate period that followed. In a comparatively recent overview of Romanian historiography on the Second World War, the American historian Kurt Treptow emphasizes that

while some issues such as the Holocaust, the Antonescu regime and the post-1944 communist takeover had become the focal points of increasing interest and debate, others among which internal social, cultural, or economic development have barely been pursued.¹

This article is an attempt to examine the legacy of the interwar pro-German sympathies and extreme right association of Romanian intellectuals in the wartime years when the country was an ally and satellite of Nazi Germany. It will focus on the impact of the ideas behind Hitler’s National Socialism on Romanian society and, in particular, on its intellectuals, with the aim of analyzing the extent of their receptiveness towards and motives for support of the Nazi ideology. Thus, in a way, I will be tracing the development of a process, though, at the same time, it will be in a completely new situation, as the war itself changed the whole perspective. It naturally linked the analysis of the

right-wing ideological orientation of Romanian intellectuals to a more general reflection on the human condition and the state of culture in a time of war. Therefore, the investigation of the issue can only proceed after examining the specific historical context of time and while paying attention to the condition of the intellectual within the constraints imposed by the extreme situation.

In the aftermath of the First World War, Romania joined the “anti-revisionist” camp, and in the interwar period, it strictly followed a policy of preserving the status quo. This meant alliance with the countries supporting it, in particular, France and Britain. Starting with the latter half of the 1930s, Romania increasingly found itself within Germany’s economic and political orbit. Although Romanian politicians at the beginning of the war opted for a policy of neutrality, by the summer of 1940 an alliance with Germany had become inevitable. However, it was the Soviet ultimatum of 26 June 1940, demanding that Romania cede Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, which actually brought Romanian neutrality to an end. In this grave situation, in which Romania could no longer rely on its traditional allies, alliance with Germany seemed the only alternative. The monarch of Romania, King Carol II, made desperate last-ditch efforts to adapt to the situation and win German support. They all proved futile, however, and the Soviet ultimatum marked what was just the beginning of probably the most humiliating period in Romanian history, when, in the course of two months, it surrendered one third of its territory and population without firing a single shot.²

The great territorial losses of the summer of 1940 had a grave impact on Romanian society as a whole and resulted in the widespread feeling of humiliation, despair and desire to take revenge. Return of the lost provinces became Romania’s primary national aim and the main preoccupation of society. Small wonder, that the government decision to join the military campaign against the Soviet Union the following summer received the enthusiastic support of the majority of the population. The signing of the Vienna Diktat had also direct consequences for internal political life. It put an end to King Carol’s rule, who abdicated in favor of his 19-year-old son Michael, and led to the accession of General Antonescu as the only alternative, “the strong man who could save the country”.³

Solidarity with Germany was now considered to be the key in solving the Romanian national question. To this end, the new government formed by Antonescu in September 1940 took immediate steps to drive Romania closer to Germany. In October 1940, the first German troops arrived in

Bucharest In November 1940, Romania signed up to adherence to the Tripartite pact. This was followed one month later by an economic treaty, which geared the Romanian economy to the German war effort. More far-reaching anti-Semitic measures were put into practice, with the amount of anti-Semitic legislation and propaganda increasing steadily in the following years.⁴ On 22 June 1941, just a few hours after Germany had begun its invasion of the Soviet Union, General Antonescu proclaimed that Romania, side by side with Germany, was starting “a holy war” against Bolshevism in order to regain Bessarabia and Bucovina.⁵ Although within a month from the beginning of hostilities, the primary Romanian military objectives in the East – the liberation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina – had been achieved, Romanian troops pressed on, crossing the river Dniester, and soon established a new province (Transnistria) with the city of Odessa as its center. At the same time, General Antonescu (who became “Marshal” from August 1941 onwards) had never given up on the idea of regaining Transylvania and remained convinced that the bigger the Romanian military effort and the closer the cooperation with Germany, the more likely it was that it would indeed be regained. For a long time Romania was considered a close partner of Germany and Antonescu one of the leaders most trusted by Hitler.⁶

By its formal adherence to the Tripartite pact, Romania became a part of Hitler’s grandiose project to build a “new order” in Europe.⁷ I shall try to focus below on how this “new order” was implemented in Romania and to examine Germany’s real “presence” in satellite Romania, in particular with regard to the scope of Nazi propaganda and the influence of the ideology of National Socialism on Romanian society as this will afford us an idea of the wartime ideological climate in Romania.

After the arrival of the first German troops in Romania in October 1940, whose official task was the training of the Romanian army, German military presence grew continuously in the following months. There was also a significant German economic presence, particularly following the signing of the economic treaty of December 1940, which brought hundreds of German “experts” into Romanian businesses. Of special interest for the purpose of this study, however, is Germany’s cultural presence in wartime Romania. One diplomat working at the German Embassy in Bucharest at the beginning of the war mentions in his memoirs that he was impressed by the “mass influx” of German culture in Romania in the period 1939-1940.⁸ This cultural “invasion” was quite normal given that it happened at a time of extensive Romanian appropriation to Germany.

What made it striking, however, was the fact that it was in sharp contrast to the traditionally dominating cultural model in Romania. With the eve of modernity, it was French cultural influence that prevailed in the country. Although this situation started to change in the second half of the 19th century, when Germany gradually began to acquire a high status among the Romanian elite, as a result of the unfortunate experience of the First World War, German influence faded gradually.⁹ In interwar Romania, with exception of the sympathizers and adepts among the people who has been educated in Germany, German cultural influence in the society as a whole was not very significant. In the wake of closer Romanian-German political relations at the beginning of the war, one of the most outspoken German sympathizers and Minister of propaganda at that time, Nichifor Crainic, repeatedly pointed out the "sad reality" that, "due to the policy of previous Romanian governments, Germany was almost totally unknown to the Romanian people", and he insisted that this situation had to be changed as soon as possible.¹⁰

As Romania drew closer and closer to Germany, the propaganda machine made great efforts to make Germany, its history and its culture, better known to the Romanian population at large. Books on German history were translated, numerous articles on German politics, culture and philosophy started to appear in the daily Romanian press, abstracts from the German press were regularly published in the leading Romanian journals and it was mostly German and Italian films and plays that could be seen by the Romanian public.

How did Romanian society react to this change and how successful was the pro-German cultural propaganda spread by the Romanian state? At the beginning of the war it was believed that Romania would manage to stay out of the conflict, or that the Allies would quickly take hold of the situation that prevailed among the population at large. For a long time after the beginning of hostilities, the war seemed to be somehow "far away" to the majority of Romanians. On 2 September 1939, Mihail Sebastian notes in his diary his great astonishment at the unawareness, the calmness with which the Romanian people perceived the war, as if it were something that had nothing to do with them:

Everything is confused, unclear, undecided. But what seems to me most unbelievable is this illuminated Bucharest, lively, full of people, with animated streets, a Bucharest that is very curious about what is going on,

but still not in panic and not conscious of the presence of the tragedy that has just started.¹¹

The American journalist Countess Waldeck was a witness to what happened in Romania in the first two years of the war and made the observation that for the majority of Romanians, the really big change in terms of realizing of the gravity of the situation and Germany's new role in Europe came only after the fall of Paris on 14 July 1940:

With the fall of France, the Germans became the whole show in Romania. Everybody agreed that now in Romania everything relied on Hitler.¹²

The political orientation towards Germany did not lead immediately to widespread pro-German sympathies among the Romanian population. The Romanians maintained a reserved attitude and mixed feelings towards the Germans. There was a combination of different reasons for this. The great territorial losses that Romania had suffered in the summer of 1940 happened not without the consent and the decisive role of Germany. Although blame for the national tragedy was entirely attributed to Carol II, and not to Germany, this fact did not pass unnoticed. At the same time, it was becoming obvious that the only possibility Romania had of regaining what it had lost lay with Germany. Anti-Bolshevism was also a factor that provoked pro-German sympathies. However, the attitude was still quite measured. The Romanians fought "side by side with the Germans" in the war with the Soviet Union, but they did so with great enthusiasm only because they were fighting for their own national ideals, and when the attack continued beyond the river Prut they were no longer so willing to fight.¹³ Despite the official daily propaganda, it was very difficult to convince the population that the interests of Germany coincided fully with those of Romania. The repeated promises of the Romanian leader Marshal Ion Antonescu of the possible return of Transylvania as a reward for the great Romanian military efforts was not enough to bolster the fighting spirit of the Romanians as their military losses increased and, in particular, when set against the perspective of a German defeat.

As for the scope of the German cultural influence in wartime Romania, the fact that up to that time Germany had seemed so "distant" to the Romanians played a role and swift change could not be expected overnight. The already mentioned pragmatic Romanian attitude towards reality was also expressed in a certain way with respect to cultural matters.

In 1943, Nichifor Crainic, at that time a director of Romanian cinematography, pointed out that it was mostly German and Italian films that could be seen in Romania, but that the Romanians clearly preferred the Italian films. His explanation was that the Italian films were simply of better quality and thus better received by the Romanian public.¹⁴

The condition of the intellectuals in wartime Romania was inseparably linked to the political and ideological situation in the country and the possibilities it gave to a free expression of ideas. In this respect, it is interesting to see whether the cultural propaganda spread by the Romanian state was paralleled by a conscious effort by Germany to spread the indoctrinating ideology of National Socialism, and also what constraints the internal political situation in Romania put on the activity of intellectuals.

In the scholarly literature concerning the history of the Second World War, there is general agreement that Hitler did not give much importance to the ideological coherence of the satellite states.¹⁵ He was far more concerned with maintaining military and economic security. The aforementioned memoirs of Countess Waldeck on the situation in wartime Romania support this more general view. Countess Waldeck recalls a meeting she had in 1940 with the plenipotentiary German minister for economic matters in Romania, Hermann Neubacher. The conversation concerned the new economic order being established by Germany across Europe and, at certain moment, Waldeck asked if the Germans intended to make Romania a protectorate or a fascist state in order to implement their economic plans. Neubacher's response was quite unambiguous:

No. We haven't got any political interest in Romania. We have only one aim – to maintain calm in the economic sphere. We don't want to Germanize Romania or to make it fascist. Any strong government, which has the authority to maintain calm in the raw material sphere, will do.¹⁶

From this conversation, it can be concluded that Germany had adopted a quite pragmatic attitude in relation to satellite Romania. As far as Germany was concerned, any strong government that worked would be preferable to a fascist setup that didn't. To this Waldeck adds her own impression that Germans were "resentful towards people who tried to go fascist overnight". Clear evidence that Neubacher really was expressing official German policy is given by the position of Hitler during the acute crisis of January 1941 in relations between Antonescu and the Iron Guard.¹⁷

In terms of the nature of the internal political regime in wartime Romania, there were three distinct regimes in Romania between 1 September 1939 and 23 August 1944: royal dictatorship, National Legionary State, and military dictatorship. The drift towards authoritarianism in Romanian political life was already discernable in the second half of the 1930s. The new constitution of February 1938 marked the beginning of the period of royal dictatorship. It increased Royal prerogatives dramatically and afforded the king a dominant role in politics and government: all political parties were abolished and replaced by a single political organization constituted under the auspices of the king, civil rights and freedoms were limited, anti-Semitic legislation was passed, and censorship of the press was introduced. The period of royal dictatorship lasted until September 1940, when Romania was proclaimed a "National Legionary State" with Antonescu as its indisputable leader (*Conducătorul*). The Iron Guard was recognized as the only legal political organization in the country and became a dominant political force. In power for the first time in their political history, the Legionaries directed their efforts towards building a strong totalitarian state and devoted much energy to the manifestation of legionary spirit.¹⁸ Intolerance, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism developed quickly. Legionary rule soon became synonymous with a reign of terror, anarchy, and fear. The crushing of the legionary rebellion on 27 January 1941 marked the beginning of military dictatorship in Romania, which saw the government made up exclusively of military men. This lasted until the Soviet takeover on 23 August 1944. Although the power had been concentrated in the hands of Marshal Antonescu and a strong personality cult around him had been established, his regime was authoritarian, and not fascist, because, unlike Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, it lacked ideology and was not supported by a mass political party.¹⁹

A general characterization of the wartime internal political regime in Romania is well expressed by the opinion of the Romanian historian Dinu Giurescu in that, apart from the short interlude of the Legionary experiment (September 1940 – January 1941), the regime in Romania was authoritarian, it maintained its traditional features, all, of course, in conditions of war.²⁰ As for the role played by the ideology of National Socialism, given what was said above, it can be concluded that, although propaganda for the Nazi regime existed, there was no determined effort from Germany to implement the ideology of National Socialism in satellite Romania. We must also take into account the fact that, despite the German

military presence, Romania was not occupied; it was, in fact, an ally of the Reich. For Romania, it was the national question and not ideological reasons that determined the alliance with Germany; and Germany's policy towards satellite Romania was dictated by its economic and strategic needs. By the participation of Romanian troops in the war with the USSR, Romania managed to ensure itself a special status in its relations with Germany and enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in its internal affairs during wartime.²¹

As a natural result of the wartime situation and Romania's alliance with Germany, the Romanian press was, as a rule, of pro-German orientation. Coverage of the war, the internal situation in Germany and the ideas of the "new order" Hitler was building across Europe filled the title pages of major Romanian newspapers. Cultural magazines continued to exist, but this was only possible as long as they towed the line of the official cultural propaganda. There was room for publishing on pure literary and cultural matters, but sufficient attention had to be paid to the dominant ideology and the conditions imposed by the war.²²

Although the system was not totalitarian and Germany did not concentrate on instilling its indoctrinating ideology in the society, the ideological climate in Romania in this period had nonetheless changed completely. Though Nazi ideology was not forcefully imposed on Romanian society, the wartime alliance made it unavoidable. War itself imposes a certain totalitarianism of thought. The national interest is brought to the fore as opposed to the selfish private interest of the individual. Everything is politicized, propaganda is of primary importance, censorship is normally introduced, and the free expression of ideas is limited or even non-existent. The activity of the individual takes place within the constraints of the extreme situation. In such circumstances, the position of intellectuals is particularly difficult, as liberty is, by definition, their primary domain.²³

The above-mentioned factors make a judgment on the real ideological convictions of the intellectuals in wartime Romania a difficult proposition. In trying to explain his own position during the Second World War period, the philosopher Constantin Rădulescu-Motru emphasizes the "tight situation" (*situație-limită*) of the period and points to the fact that what was written in this period was often motivated by the context in which it appeared.²⁴ Additional difficulty results from the fact that, in the given situation, Romanian authors were not very prolific, some of them did not write at all. Thus, this investigation must be brought within the limits of

what is discernable. While fully aware of the dangers of not being able to grasp the whole picture, I have decided to focus on several important intellectual figures of the time and, from this basis, tried to arrive at more general conclusions. More precisely, my intention is to draw conclusions on whether extreme pre-war right-wing allegiances and pro-German sympathies among intellectuals developed, given the new circumstances, into support for Hitler's National Socialism.

What was the nature of the ideological development and activity of the much-debated "Guardist" intellectuals of the 1930s in wartime? In fact, for a number of reasons, it turns out to be very difficult to understand the legacy of the interwar extreme right association of Romanian intellectuals in this period. We must keep in mind that, by the time war started, some of them were already dead or imprisoned as a result of the persecutions in the late 1930s. The undisputed mentor of the "new generation", the maestro Nae Ionescu, himself died on 15 March 1940.²⁵ For a short time in 1940, the Iron Guard was legalized and even became a dominant political force in the country, but after the crushing of the January 1941 rebellion, it was again disgraced and disappeared forever from the Romanian political scene.²⁶ It is only in this brief period of Legionary rule in Romania that the activity of the pro-Legionary intellectuals is somewhat more visible. A deep silence covers the lives of those who were still alive after 1941.²⁷ I will briefly try to present what I could discern about the wartime activity and ideological development of three of the most famous "pro-Legionary" Romanian intellectuals – Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran and Constantin Noica.

During wartime, Mircea Eliade was involved in diplomacy and spent almost the whole period of the war outside Romania. Eliade started his diplomatic career in April 1940, when he was sent as a cultural attaché to London. In February 1941, he was assigned the position of cultural secretary at the Romanian Embassy in Lisbon, where he stayed until the end of the war.²⁸ It was as early as the second half of the 1930s that Eliade expressed his pro-Legionary sympathies and the opinion that he was clearly becoming "a man of the right", as Mihail Sebastian characterized him.²⁹ In the period at the beginning of the war in which Eliade was still in Bucharest, Sebastian noted in his diary that, by the time the war had started, Eliade's sympathies to the ideology of the extreme right were stronger than ever, in terms of the war, his attitude was clearly pro-German and most of all anti-Bolshevik.³⁰ Diplomatic appointment came just at the right moment for Eliade and was, in a way,

a consolation for the death of his beloved teacher, Nae Ionescu. Later, Eliade wrote in his memoirs that he had wished to leave Romania for a long time (he wanted to leave for an academic career in the United States) but after the death of Nae Ionescu he also felt he didn't have anything to do in Romania anymore and it was "due to Nae's death" that he was sent to London.³¹

What were the activity and the ideological convictions of Mircea Eliade for the rest of the wartime period after he left Romania? He wrote in his memoirs that, as a diplomat, he was engaged in cultural propaganda, but the war itself changed his proper duties. After Eliade went into diplomacy, he stopped writing for Romanian periodicals and this makes it difficult to learn about his ideological beliefs. In his "Autobiography", Eliade for the first time spoke about the most unclear period of his life (1938-1945), but the fact that it was written long after the events of that period, when Eliade was still trying to break with his past, make his memoirs an unreliable source with regard to his own convictions as we can not fully trust his sincerity.³²

However, judging from what he wrote in this period, it is possible to agree with Laignel-Lavastine that, in the wartime period, Eliade retained his pre-war sympathies for the ideology of the extreme right. His first play, *Ifigenia*, was full of pro-Legionary overtones despite the fact that it was staged at the National Theatre in Bucharest on 12 February 1941, that is, after the Legionaries were no longer in power. In 1942, Eliade published the book *Salazar and the Revolution in Portugal*, in which he spoke with admiration and respect of the Portuguese dictator and the political order he had established. Eliade even met Salazar in person just before his first visit to Romania in July 1942.³³

The beginning of the war reached Cioran in Paris, where he had left for in 1937 with a grant from the French Institute, Bucharest. In the autumn of 1940, Cioran went back to Romania and stayed in Bucharest until February 1941. The reasons for his return to his home country are not quite clear. However, given the timing of the visit, which took place shortly after the Legionaries had come to power, we can assume he had been very much excited to see the accomplishment of his "dreamed of, transfigured Romania".³⁴ During his stay in Bucharest, Cioran passionately expressed his pro-Legionary sympathies. At the end of November, just a few days before the reburial of the legendary Legionary leader Corneliu Codreanu, Cioran gave a lecture on Bucharest radio, in which he spoke in high praise of the "inner profile of the Captain".³⁵

It would have been interesting to know whether Cioran would have decided to remain in Romania had the Legionary experiment proved successful. However, it is clear that after the events of January 1941 he was more than ever eager to leave. On 2 January 1941, Mihail Sebastian took notes in his *Journal* of an accidental meeting with Cioran. Cioran had expressed his happiness at being nominated cultural attaché in France “for the chance it gave him to escape mobilization”. Sebastian defines his behavior as an “astonishing mixture of cynicism and cowardice”.³⁶ In February, Cioran left Romania to settle down indefinitely in France and, with the exception of his short-lived “diplomatic experience” at Vichy, his activity, as well as his ideological inclinations during the rest of the war lie in obscurity.³⁷

While in general both Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran spent the war years outside Romania, each of them returning to his home country only once before leaving indefinitely, the philosopher Constantin Noica remained in Romania for most of the wartime period. Noica’s open support of the Legionary movement came quite late, in 1938, after the death of Codreanu and it was as a sign of protest, although his right-wing orientation had been from as early as 1933-34.³⁸ During Legionary rule in Romania, Noica was one of the most ardent supporters and propagators of Legionary ideology. Even before the Legionaries came to power, Noica had already made clear his pro-Legionary stance. On 8 August 1940, the journal *Ad sum* (*I am present*) appeared as a single publication written and edited entirely by Noica. It included four articles in which he gave clear expression to his pro-Legionary convictions. Noica became the first editor-in-chief of the official newspaper of the Iron Guard *Buna Vestire* when it reappeared on 8 September 1940. In this period he published many “Legionary” articles in which he spoke with great enthusiasm of the mission of the Legionary movement, the establishment of the “new spirituality”, the creation of the “new man”, the essence of the Legionary sacrifice, etc.³⁹ He remained true to his ideological convictions even after the events of January 1941, when the Legionaries were expelled from government and the Legionary movement was banned.⁴⁰

At the beginning of 1941, Noica was appointed referee on questions of philosophy in the Romanian Institute in Berlin. He stayed in Germany until June 1941 and then returned to Bucharest and concentrated mainly on literary and philosophical work.⁴¹ Noica returned to Germany in June 1943, this time to attend a conference in Berlin where he presented the lecture entitled *The Inner Tension of Romanian Culture*, a subject

Sebastian would find quite grotesque at that given time.⁴² If Noica's pro-German sympathies had dated from the period before the war, they were being clearly expressed now. In the period 1942-1944, Noica published a series of articles on German philosophy under the general title "The Political Philosophy of Contemporary Germany" in the Romanian journal *Revista Fundațiilor Regale*. In these articles, he touched upon German history and German contemporary political regime and ideology.⁴³

On the question as to what extent association with the ideology of the Legionary movement turned into support for Nazi ideology, it is my opinion that no such direct "transformation" existed. For Mircea Eliade, although his ideological orientation in this period was clearly right-wing and he expressed pro-German sympathies, there is no evidence regarding his attitude towards the ideology of National Socialism. The same is true of Emil Cioran. Even though Cioran had been expressing his clear sympathies towards the German model and even Hitler himself from as early as the early 1930s, there is no indication that his pro-Legionary sympathies were paralleled by any fascination for the ideology of National Socialism in the wartime years. Apart from the few articles he wrote during his stay in Bucharest, there is no written record of his ideological orientation after he left Romania. In several interviews, mainly during the 1990s, Cioran spoke with regret about his Romanian past, but made virtually no mention of his life during the war. Despite the fact that Noica paid a great deal of attention to Germany and even referred to National Socialism as the "ideology of the future", this did not take the form of propagation of explicit pro-Nazi ideology. The emphasis in his writings of this period was always more on philosophy, than ideology.

Another prominent intellectual figure in Romanian society of that time, who, though not associated with the Iron Guard, was still explicitly orientated towards the extreme right, was Nichifor Crainic.⁴⁴ As early as the 1930s, Crainic became an advocate of a pro-German orientation for Romania and an admirer of the ideology of Hitler's National Socialism. At the beginning of the war, Crainic was one of the most ardent supporters of close political alliance with Germany and, during the war years, worked actively for an even closer relationship with Germany, most particularly in the sphere of cultural relations, remaining one of the most outspoken supporters of German order and ideology. In this period, Crainic was also directly involved in Romanian politics and, due to his political obligations, was, in fact, very active in the area of propaganda.⁴⁵

In 1940, Crainic repeatedly emphasized the need for closer Romanian-German cultural cooperation, something he considered of primary importance to the Romanian national cause. Later, he wrote in his memoirs that he had paid great attention to the “outside propaganda”, aimed at making Romania’s cause known abroad by putting the emphasis on culture. He was convinced it was serving the national cause and considered it particularly important with regard to Transylvania, which, as he noted, “preoccupied his mind day and night”. He also mentions in his memoirs that he made a lot of efforts in this direction and that, in fact, this “outside propaganda” became one of the major areas of his activity while he was a minister of propaganda.⁴⁶

At the same time, equally important for the spreading of Romanian history and culture abroad, most particularly in Germany, Crainic considered making German culture popular to the Romanian public. He emphasized the importance of culture in shaping the national spirit. In a 1943 article, he wrote:

It is my belief that ethnicization in the cultural domain is more important than in the political or economic sphere because the spirit of a nation is modeled by the culture by which it is nurtured.⁴⁷

Crainic highly praised “the German spirit” which he characterized as “the most open and well-disposed in the whole of Europe towards other peoples and races” and was convinced that German influence was of vital importance for the development of Romanian culture, particularly in opposition to the French cultural model. As he pointed out in another article:

As sterile the French influence is, as fertile is the German influence ... French culture enslaves, German culture liberates. French culture annihilates personality; German culture reveals the real deep essence of the individual.⁴⁸

In many of his articles from the wartime years, Crainic repeatedly showed his admiration of the German political order, the National Socialist revolution, the “new spirit”, and Hitler himself.⁴⁹ Crainic’s pro-German sympathies were paralleled by his strong anti-Bolshevism. As a part of the official propaganda, Crainic enthusiastically supported Romania’s “holy” war against the Soviet Union, on which, he believed, depended

not only the destiny of “our brothers” beyond the Dniester, but the destiny of the Romanian national state, the salvation from Bolshevism, as well as the inclusion of Romania in the New Europe – that of the “conqueror of the continent Adolf Hitler”.⁵⁰

As Crainic himself pointed in his memoirs, his pro-German attitude was directly linked to his “outrage” with democracy. On several occasions, he clearly distinguished himself from the democratic regime, which he considered disastrous for Romania. For instance, in an article written exactly after the signing of the Vienna Diktat, Crainic put the whole blame for the “tragedy of Romania” on Romanian democracy, as for him it was a logical consequence of its “unfortunate short-sighted Anglo-Francophile policy”.⁵¹

As an opposite of this “democracy”, Crainic coined a new word – “demophily” (*demofilia*). This concept of “demophily” was developed in detail in a separate article published in January 1941, in which he addressed his students by presenting “demophily” as the essence of the attitude of the new (Christian) nationalism towards the people. Crainic stated:

This new nationalism is not identical with “national pride”, i.e., oriented towards the idealization of the past only, but to love the people as it is in the present with its good and bad sides, or even more – it means “compassion” for the people.

He also emphasized that exactly this Christian specificity – “the love of one’s people with compassion based on the model of Christ” made this nationalism different from all the other European nationalisms.⁵²

An interesting change appeared in this period in Crainic’s famous *gândirist* doctrine. As in the previous period, Orthodoxy continued to lie at its core, but now an attempt was made to somehow “situate” it within the limits of the ideology of National Socialism. This made his doctrine sound quite artificial and confused at some points. For instance, in line with the general preoccupation with race, Crainic spoke of “the boundary of the blood as a law of nature and life, which nobody can destroy in an artificial way”, connecting it with Orthodoxy:

As a Christian people, which has never oppressed another people with tyranny, we see the only possibility for a harmony between the peoples

that states are based on the principle of political and blood boundaries are identical.⁵³

In the new situation of war, Crainic became even more nationalistic than before. He became an advocate of integral nationalism, insisting that "Romanization of the cities was a vital problem for the Romanian people" and that "the ancestral land was an exclusive property of the Romanians".⁵⁴ Crainic's anti-Semitism also increased in the wartime years and he already started to talk about the Jews in racial terms only. In general, during this period, Crainic spoke increasingly of "our race", not of a nation or people.

One of his first actions as a minister of propaganda was to advocate throwing out the Jews from the Romanian press. On 10 July 1940 at a meeting with the editors in chief of the newspapers in the capital, Crainic stated that

Romanian newspapers cannot be conducted by Jews, and in the newspapers conducted by Romanians, Jews cannot collaborate.

His motivation came from the fact that he considered himself a part of a "nationalist" government and pointed out that he had learned from his own experience that

what was written by Jews has never supported of the ideas of Romanianism, but rather an expression of the interests of their own race, which unfortunately are contradictory to that of ours.

He considered the fact that "the whole press was dominated by Jews" as a failure of the previous democratic regime and emphasized the need for a "national press", which should be given the status of "an active collaborator with the regime".⁵⁵

In Crainic's case, right-wing orientation and pro-German sympathies clearly turned into a pro-Nazi support in this period. Which factors contributed to this orientation? To a certain extent, his political engagement implied the expression of such support, as the propaganda of the internal regime was closely intermingled with that of Nazi ideology. Most likely political opportunism also played its part. That Crainic was a political opportunist is evident from the fact that, although he hadn't been a supporter of or even a sympathizer with the Iron Guard

during the 1930s, by the time the Legionaries came to power, he was already one of their most passionate admirers, speaking apologetically about the courage and sacrifice of the Legionaries and praising the young generation to which the nationalist spirit belonged and which was destined to change Romania profoundly.⁵⁶ However, most importantly, Crainic was a convinced admirer of German political model and for him, the support for the ideology of National Socialism came naturally as an evolution of his own ideological development and pro-German sympathies.

Pro-German sympathies and foreign policy orientation were also typical for the philosopher Constantin Rădulescu-Motru. Like Crainic, Motru was also a traditionalist in the sense of the definition of "Romanianism", but unlike Crainic, up to that period, he had never openly expressed ideological support for the extreme right.

In 1941-42, this pro-German orientation, at least at the level of propaganda, turned into support for Nazi ideology, and this is evident from his writings at the time. Some of the articles Motru published in the Romanian daily press (mainly in *Timpu*) contained explicit ideological overtones. Motru was convinced the future lay with German order and that Romania should have sufficient wisdom to realize this. For instance, he repeatedly emphasized the necessity of "the study of the race", to which not enough attention is paid in Romania:

The young Romanian nation which puts so much hope in its future and which has so many intellectual resources, cannot leave its racial origins and its ethnic consciousness neglected.

He gave the examples of Italy and Germany and insisted on the urgent need for the development of ethnical and racial studies, which he considered a criterion for making a distinction between the countries with "real culture" and those without real culture, as, in his view, culture meant the "the ability to foresee".⁵⁷

In another article of around the same time, Motru highly praised the "German idea":

The realization of the German idea has given to the German state a model army, a healthy population in body and soul, a political and moral order that cannot be seen anywhere else. All of these are sufficient prerequisites for its durability.⁵⁸

Throughout the article, he used many quotations from Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and repeatedly expressed his firm belief that the German model was "the future for a new Europe". At a time when great attention was being paid to the education of the youth in the national spirit, Motru stressed the need for an ideal and again showed his own admiration of Hitler's Germany for its ability to make "the best selection of people", which, in his view, was the reason for its success.⁵⁹

In 1942, Radulescu-Motru published the book *Etnicul Românesc. Comunitate de origine, limbă și destin* (*The Romanian Nation: Community of Origin, Language and Destiny*) in which most of the ideas mentioned above are developed in a more systematic way. Motru's pro-Hitler stance had again been clearly demonstrated. For example, he advocated the application of the integral concept of the individual (inseparable body and soul) as in the Italian and German model where "it had formed the basis of state policy" and stressed the importance of knowledge of "the characteristics of the different racial types of which the Romanian nation consists"; and praised highly the German order (especially discipline and selection) and Hitler himself.⁶⁰

In its preface (dated 22 March 1942), Motru stated that the book was addressed first and foremost to the young generation, as

it was called to gather the fruits of victory for when the community of destiny of the Romanian nation was accomplished, or to pay with bitter sacrifice if this were not achieved.⁶¹

Etnicul Românesc was Motru's last extensive work. However, it was written on the request of the Ministry of Propaganda and, for this reason, was full of ideological implications.⁶² He later wrote that when preparing his contribution to the *Anthology of Romanian Philosophers*, he didn't excluded parts of this book from his selection because he considered it as "having the occasional character of a time of war".⁶³

The study of the "ethnic" was not a new topic in the works of Motru. However, on this occasion, he was trying to find an explanation of the term that would serve his contemporary politics. I shall briefly present the major points in the development of his concept in order to illustrate how vague were the premises on which it was based.

Motru starts his argument by stating that community consciousness was of primary importance when explaining the term "ethnic" and

continued by tracing three successive stages in its evolution: the consciousness of the community of origin, the consciousness of the community of language and the consciousness of the community of destiny. First came the consciousness of the community of origin. It was based on blood and tradition and referred to the most primitive forms of social organization. In time, this was gradually transformed into the consciousness of community of language because, as he argued, "by means of language the community was able to arrive at consciousness of its cultural unity".⁶⁴

At this point, Motru's argumentation is clear. It is smooth and logical. Suddenly, however, on arrival at the third type of community consciousness, there is an abrupt breakdown in his logic. It is exactly this third type of community consciousness – the consciousness of the community of destiny – that Motru invents in order to be able to build up his new theory of the "ethnic" in the changed situation. The consciousness of the community of destiny appears not as result of social evolution, but as a sudden break up in the course of events. It is presented as a direct product of an extreme situation,

springing from the great historical decisions through which a nation goes in the course of its historical life. Wars, revolutions, wartime alliances, betrayals, that is to say, facts which decide its destiny.⁶⁵

The community of language, argues Motru, was in fact the basis for the idea of national sovereignty of European peoples and, "had it not been for the peril of the war, this stage of community consciousness would probably be dominant in contemporary Europe". "However", and here he reaches the fundamental point of his concept, "the war has brought the need to think about the future, that is, the essential need of a new community consciousness – the consciousness of destiny." "The war", the argument continues, "leads to new relations between nations, new alliances are made between different peoples according to their closeness in destiny".⁶⁶

While the first two types of community consciousness evolved in the history of the society, the consciousness of the community of destiny is directly linked to the future, or, to quote Motru:

Consciousness of the community of origin is the form of the "ethnic" of the villages today; that of language came as a result of the adaptation to the

spiritual needs of the time; the third form is very recent; this is the “national essence” of the future Europe – “the conscious solidarization of the members of a nation in their will to preserve and protect their national unity”.⁶⁷

Motru used his concept to make some explicit ideological references. For instance, Motru states that unlike the first two types of community consciousness, which were a product of human evolution, that of destiny was not essentially based on objective reasons, but depended exclusively on the human will and was most subject to outside influences. He uses this argument to emphasize the decisive importance of a capable leader, gifted with the ability to foresee the future in such a critical time, and this turns into an apology of general Antonescu.⁶⁸ In ascertaining the existence of such communities of destiny in his contemporary world, Motru also points to the examples of “National Socialist Germany, Fascist Italy and the Japanese Empire”, which Romania had to follow because transformation to the “community of destiny” was “the calling of the day” and because the big question facing Romanians at that time was whether they were able to attain this consciousness of destiny, which was “a key to their survival”.⁶⁹

As can be seen, there are many instances of direct propaganda throughout the book, but knowing the motives behind the writing of this book, we cannot use it to judge the real ideological beliefs of the author. When preparing his contribution for the *Anthology of Romanian Philosophers*, Motru did not include elements of *Etnicul Românesc*, as he considered this work as “having the occasional character of a time of war”.⁷⁰

A much more reliable source for Motru’s real ideas and thoughts is the last book he wrote in this period, his *Revisions and Additions*. On 15 February 1943 on his 75th birthday, Motru started writing a diary with the intention of making an account of his life up to that moment and he called it *Revisions and Additions*.⁷¹ This time Motru could allow himself to be more sincere as was not following official orders. This is why I find this book of particular importance for the understanding of his ideological convictions during the war years.

Motru remained strongly pro-German, although by the time he started his diary, Germany was already on the losing side. A convinced anti-Bolshevik, Motru was greatly disillusioned by the prospect of a German defeat and the possible advent of the Soviets. In his view, the bitter

perspective towards the end of the war was that: "if Germany falls, European culture would be replaced by Americanism or Bolshevism".⁷² The fear of what would happen after the war preoccupied his mind, most particularly in 1944, when a German defeat was becoming more and more obvious, however he was convinced that "whatever the fate of Romania would be, it was closely connected to that of Germany".⁷³

Reflecting on the effects such an outcome might have on Romania, Motru could not hide his bewilderment at what he considered a "curious state of the spirit" of the Romanian population at large: living unaware of the course of the war and not realizing the consequences it might have for their own lives. Motru writes:

In the newspapers that write in a bombastic way about the events of the war, the rest of the world leads a life as usual (*ca de obicei*), as if we were not in the most terrible war.

And he adds:

Of course, people speak of the war, but as a "subject" in cafes, not as something tragic.⁷⁴

He was also very much impressed by the fact that the pragmatic attitude of the Romanians remained unaffected by the sweeping course of events "while the people in the upper levels of society speak of the probability of victory for the Allies, those in the lower levels live in apathy", guided by the common wisdom: "What has been, has been. What will be, we are going to see".⁷⁵

In terms of ideological orientation, his diary illustrates that, until the very end of the war, Motru firmly remained "on the German side", however, there is no longer any notion whatsoever of continuing support for Nazi ideology. It is my belief that the support Motru expressed for the ideology of National Socialism during wartime was driven more by pragmatism and opportunism, than by any deep ideological convictions.

Being pro-German did not necessarily imply the embracing, even if only in a superficial way, of the ideology of National Socialism. A typical example of this can be seen in the case of the historian Gheorghe Brătianu who was one of the most manifest sympathizers with Germany in the interwar period. From the second half of the 1930s onwards, Brătianu established himself as one of the most ardent supporters of a pro-German

foreign policy orientation for Romania and he even played an active role in this. In the wartime period, Brătianu remained clearly pro-German but, unlike Motru, he remained unaffected by the influence of the ideology of Hitler's National Socialism and refrained from involving himself with its propaganda.

Instead, Brătianu became one of the most active proponents of the Romanian national cause. In particular, after the "tragic Romanian summer" of 1940, all his academic and public activity was subjected to the ideal of Romanian reintegration. He published numerous articles, both in foreign languages and in daily Romanian press, and gave many public speeches and lectures in which he firmly defended the justness of the Romanian national cause. In this moment of extreme national importance, Brătianu addressed his compatriots in his highly patriotic *Words to the Romanians*, a sequence of ten lectures in which he gave particular emphasis to the idea of Romanian national unity and the need to keep the national spirit alive.⁷⁶ The Romanian national idea and the origins and the formation of Romanian national unity continued to be the main areas of interest in his academic life. However, in this period, as a university professor at the Bucharest University, Brătianu, convinced it was his duty to prepare young Romanians for the great national tasks that lay ahead of them, devoted much of his attention to "academic propaganda".⁷⁷

In all the cases shown above, pro-German attitudes in the wartime period were motivated either by traditional pro-German sympathies (most often as a result of education in Germany) or by an already existent association with the ideology of the extreme right. Strong anti-Bolshevism was also a factor that inspired pro-German feelings and support, but there were also many intellectuals who had never expressed pro-German attitudes at the time the war started, but who suddenly became explicitly pro-German, driven by the comfort of conformism. Mihail Sebastian notes in his *Journal* the deliberate expression of pro-German sympathies among a growing number of his friends and he gives particular mention to the literary critic Camil Petrescu who is described as the typical opportunist. From their viewpoint, in the changed situation after the war started, when German power seemed paramount, becoming pro-German was a way to adapt to the new reality, an attempt at being "objective". Although Sebastian realized conformism was unavoidable in such a situation, he could not accept this "objectivity" which prevented them from reasoning,

from realizing all the consequences of the situation. On 31 Mai 1940, he wrote in his diary:

I could not be objective. The so-called "objectivity" which I observe in many people (Camil as well) seems to me a way of accepting things, of adapting to them. Not only does he not feel frightened by the Germans, but he shows respect, even liking for them.... The world is startled, when it should feel frightened....⁷⁸

The issue of "conformism" brings us into the realm of the more general question regarding the role and responsibility of the intellectuals of the society. This usually leads to passing moral judgment. Inclination to do just this is particularly strong when it comes to the issue that is the subject of this article. It is my opinion that this should be done very carefully and that any such attempt should necessarily start by looking at the choices available by taking into account such questions as: can we accuse someone of not having been sufficiently active and finding the means to adapt? Can we blame those who attempted escape? Of those who were silent, why were they silent? Did this silence mean compliance or agreement, or was it, as a reaction to the lack of choices available, an expression of protest? Finally, is it legitimate to ask this "moral question" in such an extreme situation? As well as the more general question, as to whether the historian has the right to pass moral judgment at all?

This essay was not intended as an assessment of the behavior of the Romanian intellectuals in the wartime years, but only to present their reaction to the paramount ideology of the time. The rest is left for the reader.

NOTES

- ¹ TREPTOW, Kurt, ed., *Romania and World War II*, Centrul de Studii Românești: Fundația Culturală Româna, Iași, 1996, pp. 297-317.
- ² The Soviet ultimatum was followed shortly by the territorial claims from Hungary and Bulgaria. Germany supported the claims of Romania's adversaries. Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were annexed by the Soviet Union; with the Second Vienna Award of 30 August 1940 a huge part of Transylvania was assigned to Hungary and under the Craiova treaty of 7 September 1940 Southern Dobrogea went back to Bulgaria. On Romanian-German relations in 1940 see, HAYNES, Rebecca, *Romanian Policy Towards Germany, 1936-1940*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, pp. 119-166.
- ³ ALEXANDRESCU, Sorin, *Paradoxul Român*, Univers, București, 1998, p. 133.
- ⁴ A detailed account of anti-Semitism in Romania in the WWII years, particularly during the Antonescu regime can be found in the recent book by Radu Ioanid *Evreii sub regimul Antonescu*, Ed. Hasefer, București, 1997.
- ⁵ On 22 June 1941, general Antonescu proclaimed Romania to be starting a "holy war" to regain Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina and put an end to Bolshevism. See, GIURESCU, Dinu, *România în al doilea război mondial (1939 - 1945)*, ALL, București, 1999, p. 94. By the end of the year, the country was fully engaged in the world conflict – on 7 December 1941, Great Britain declared war on Romania; obliged by her commitments to the Tripartite pact five days later (12 December) Romania declared war on the United States.
- ⁶ Strains in relations between the two countries started to appear from the end of 1942 onwards and became most noticeable after the battle of Stalingrad when it became clear that Germany was losing the war. See, HITCHINS, Keith, *Rumania, 1866-1947*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 488-499. In a recent interview, the last king of Romania, Mihai I, also gains the enthusiastic support of the population. In his view, the war became unpopular only shortly before the battle of Stalingrad. See CIOBANU, Mircea, *Mihai I al României*, Humanitas, București, 1997, pp. 146-147.
- ⁷ Mark Mazower speaks of "Hitler's lost opportunity" given the fact that, disappointed by the reality they lived in, many Europeans by the end of the 1930s were ready to leave behind the liberal, democratic order created after the end of WWI for a more authoritarian future. Thus, opinion in Europe at that time was in fact not opposed to the idea of an authoritarian reconstruction of the continent under German leadership. At the beginning, Hitler even raised hopes, but soon disappointment came. Doubts over possible boundary shifts and annexations across Europe also undermined faith in Hitler's New Order. But his major mistake lied in the essential feature of the New Order – it was not European, but German order, and so far as there was a Nazi vision for Europe, it belonged to the sphere of economics not politics – "a regional

- economy with Germany at its heart". MAZOWER, Mark, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, Penguin, London, 1998, ("Hitler's New Order, 1938-1945", pp. 141-184).
- 8 PUSCH, R. and G. STELZER, *Diplomați Germani în București, 1937-1944*, ALL, București, 2001, p. 42.
- 9 See BOIA, Lucian, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, CEU Press, Budapest, 2001, pp. 162-165.
- 10 See, for example "Înfrățirea culturală romano-germana", in: *Universul*, nr. 226, 18 August 1940.
- 11 SEBASTIAN, Mihail, *Jurnal, 1935 – 1944*, Humanitas, București, 1996, p. 227.
- 12 Countess Waldeck arrived in Bucharest on 14 June 1940 and left Romania in January 1941 after the crushing of the legionary rebellion. During her stay in Romania she lived in Hotel Athene and closely followed the course of events. Later she published the book *Athene Palace*, where she described the situation in Romania as seen through her own eyes. See, WALDECK, R.G. *Athene Palace*, Center for Romanian Studies, Iași, Oxford, Portland, 1998, p. 43.
- 13 PROST, Henry, *Destin de la Roumanie (1918-1954)*, Editions Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1954, p. 162.
- 14 „Filmul Românesc”, in *Gândirea*, nr. 5, 1943, p. 274. The article basically dealt with the new tendencies in German historiography in view of the ideas of National Socialism.
- 15 Rab Bennett, for example, in his study of WWII collaborationism makes the observation that in order to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing the indigenous population, the Germans preferred to work with the cooperation of prominent local politicians and administrators, rather than with the “active minority of vociferous but unpopular fascist collaborators who might plunge their country into civil war and chaos”. Ideological identification was less useful to the Nazis’ scheme of economic exploitation than creating a semblance of normality that obscured the extent of their control. See, BENNETT, Rab, *Under the Shadow of the Swastika: The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and Collaboration in Hitler's Europe*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999, p. 43.
- 16 WALDECK, R.G. *Athene Palace*, pp. 55-56, 85.
- 17 In Antonescu's first government there was a “duality of power” between the General and the Iron Guard. For a time, there was a certain degree of consent but signs of disagreement were shortly to appear and they turned into an escalating conflict which reached its peak by January 1941. Supported by Germany, Antonescu took a firm stand against them and, after crushing the so-called Legionary rebellion (21-23 January 1941), became the sole master of Romania. Overlooking the ideological proximity of the Legionaries, Hitler took the side of the General, thus opting for order against chaos and uncertainty. See, GIURESCU, Dinu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, pp. 54-55.

- ¹⁸ In the period 1938-40, the movement was very badly hit due to its conflict with the King who considered it a major adversary to his own power. With their advent to power the Legionaries felt the time for revenge had come and initiated a form of collective psychosis in memory of the Legionary victims of the former regime, which soon turned into "settling private bills" with political adversaries. An excellent and detailed analysis of the history of the Iron Guard can be found in: HEINEN, Armin, *Die Legion "Erzengel Michael" in Rumänien. Soziale Bewegung und Politische Organisation*, Oldenbourg, München, 1986.
- ¹⁹ HITCHINS, K., *Rumania, 1866-1947*, p. 469.
- ²⁰ GIURESCU, D., *România în al doilea război mondial*, p. 79.
- ²¹ GIURESCU, D., *România în al doilea război mondial*, pp. 89-90.
- ²² A good example for this is one of the best cultural magazines in that period, *Revista Fundațiilor Regale*. As in the previous period, after the war years, it continued to publish poetry, novels, articles on history, literature, philosophy, literary criticism, books review and reviews of other magazines. In the new circumstances imposed by the war, several changes became noticeable in the magazine. From 1940, many abstracts from the German press related to Romania were included in the annex and after 1941 "Actualities from the frontline" started to appear as a separate section. Apart from the purely literary and cultural topics, articles were also published with a clear pro-German ideological orientation. See, for instance, the article of D. Gherasim "Spațiul European", where he advocates the "inescapability" of Hitler's "new order" and the proper place Romania deserves within it after its adherence to the Tripartite pact – *Revista Fundațiilor Regale*, nr. 5, 1941, pp. 427-445.
- ²³ On the role and position of the intellectuals in society, see the excellent book of Bernard-Henri Lévy, *Éloge des intellectuels*, Bernard Grasset, Paris, 1987.
- ²⁴ RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Scieri politice*, Nemira, București, 1998, p. 13.
- ²⁵ Nae Ionescu was a professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of Bucharest. He was extremely popular among his students and it is believed that he influenced to a great extent the "Guardist conversion" of some young intellectuals after he became a member of the Legionary movement in 1934. His influence was decisive particularly in the case of Mircea Eliade.
- ²⁶ The events of January 1941 were crucial to the future political destiny of the Legionaries. The Iron Guard was banned, a great number of active Legionaries were arrested, some of them (including Horia Sima) took refuge in Germany, where they lived in concentration camps. At a certain point Sima made an attempt to escape to Italy but was brought back. Although for a time there were rumors that the Legionaries were planing a return to power, they didn't actually have a real opportunity to exert influence on events in Romania and Antonescu kept firm control over the situation. See, BUZATU, Gh., C. CIUCANU, C. SANDACHE, *Radiografia dreptei românești (1927 - 1941)*, Editura FF Press, București, 1996, pp. 319-332.

- 27 It is only in her recent book that Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine sheds more light on the wartime activity of two of the most famous pro-Legionary intellectuals, Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran. See LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, Alexandra, *Cioran, Eliade, Ionesco : L'oubli du fascisme*, PUF, Paris, 2002, pp. 275-382. The book immediately provoked acute debate among the Romanian public. Although some of her statements are too extreme and rely very much on presuppositions, the information she gives, in particular with regard to the wartime activity of Mircea Eliade, is of particular interest as she uses his important Portuguese diary, which was unknown to the public at large as it was only published in Spanish, in 1941.
- 28 Eliade arrived in Lisbon on 10 February 1941, the day of the break-up of the British-Romanian diplomatic relations and was to stay in Portugal until September 1945, when he left for Paris.
- 29 Mihail Sebastian was one of the best Jewish writers in Romania at that time. He was a disciple of Nae Ionescu and many of the representatives of the "young generation" who in the late 1930s became sympathizers or adherents to the Iron Guard. In his diary, Sebastian wrote with sorrow about Mircea Eliade's "Guardist conversion", whom he considered one of his closest friends, and the change in their relationship. See, SEBASTIAN, Mihail, *Jurnal*, p. 41, 45, 85-6, 96, 120, 148, 157.
- 30 See, SEBASTIAN, Mihail, *Jurnal*, pp. 231-32.
- 31 See, ELIADE, Mircea, *Autobiography, vol.II : 1937 – 1960. Exile's Odyssey*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, p. 4.
- 32 The same view is also expressed by Laignel-Lavastine in her recent book (already mentioned) on Cioran, Eliade and Ionesco.
- 33 This was actually Eliade's last visit to his motherland. The reasons for this "coming back" exactly at that time are quite unclear. Eliade mentions in his memoirs that this visit was connected with information he had received from one of his friends in Bucharest that he was listed among the candidates for the chair of Philosophy of Culture, recently created at the University. See, ELIADE, M. *Autobiography, vol.II : 1937 – 1960*, p. 98. It is more believable, however, that it was more in connection with Eliade's recent visit to the Portuguese dictator Salazar and the message he had to deliver to general Antonescu, *ibid.*, pp. 99-100.
- 34 ORNEA, Zigu, *Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească*, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 1996, p. 197.
- 35 The text of this speech was later published in the Transylvanian newspaper, *Glasul strămoșesc* (Sibiu), nr. 10, 25 decembrie 1940. LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, A. *Cioran, Eliade, Ionesco*, p. 132.
- 36 SEBASTIAN, M., *Jurnal*, 286.
- 37 In her last book Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine confirms the disputed fact that for a short time Cioran really occupied the position of cultural advisor at the Romanian Embassy in Vichy. See, LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, A. *Cioran, Eliade, Ionesco*, p. 530.

- 38 Unlike both Eliade and Cioran, Noica did not try to break with his past – he never publicly dissociated himself from his adherence to the Iron Guard and until the end of his life kept silent on this issue.
- 39 See, LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, Alexandra, *Filozofie și naționalism. Paradoxul Noica*, Humanitas, București, 1998, p. 59.
- 40 In his book on Romanian right-wing movements in the 1930s, Zigu Ornea mentions that there were rumors in 1943 that upon learning of Antonescu's decision to release the Guardists from prison and send them to forward positions on the Eastern front, Noica, in an expression of solidarity with his comrades, volunteered to go to the front as well. He was only unable to do so, however, due to prohibition by the medical commission. See, ORNEA, Z. *Anii treizeci*, p. 215, 219.
- 41 Upon his arrival in Bucharest with Constantin Floru and Mircea Vulcanescu, Noica published four university courses of professor Nae Ionescu and the annual *Sources of Philosophy* (1942-43). In 1944, Noica published his book *Pagini despre sufletul românesc*; during this period, he also continued to publish philosophical articles in the major Romanian philosophical and literary journals.
- 42 SEBASTIAN, M. *Jurnal*, p. 516.
- 43 These articles were later published in DIACONU, Marin, ed., *Constantin Noica. Echilibrul spiritual. Studii și eseuri*, Humanitas, București, 1998, pp. 277 – 338.
- 44 Nichifor Crainic (1889-1972) was a very controversial personality – he was a poet, essayist, professor of theology. In the interwar period, Crainic was an editor of the literary magazine "*Gândirea*" and the author of one of the leading traditionalist trends in defining "Romanianism", which regarded Orthodoxy as the core of "Romanian national essence". In the 1930s, Crainic's ideas became increasingly nationalistic, anti-Semitic and exclusivist. Crainic developed his own version of corporatism, the so-called "ethnocracy" and in 1936 he published the program of the "Ethnocratic State" in which he advocated an "organic, spiritual, ethnic community with Orthodoxy playing a leading role". See HITCHINS, Keith, "*Gândirea*: Nationalism in a Spiritual Guise", in: JOWITT, Kenneth, ed., *Social Change in Romania, 1860 - 1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation*, Institute of International Studies, Berkley, 1978, pp. 148-156.
- 45 Crainic was a minister of propaganda in the government of Ion Gigurtu (5 July 1940), and then again in the second cabinet of Ion Antonescu. Meanwhile, he was working in the same domain as a director of the Romanian Radio Broadcasting Station, and later of the Romanian Film Association.
- 46 CRAINIC, Nichifor, *Zile albe, zile negre. Memorii*, *Gândirea*, București, 1991, p. 337, 339.
- 47 "Filmul German", in *Gândirea*, nr. 5, 1943, p. 270.

- 48 See, "Viața spirituală în România de azi", in *Gândirea*, nr. 10, 1940, pp. 633-641. This was originally a lecture Crainic gave on the occasion of becoming doctor honoris causa of the University of Vienna in November 1940. He also repeated it in Breslau and Berlin. In his memoirs Crainic mentions proudly that this speech was very well received and presented extensively in the German press, CRAINIC, N., *Zile albe, zile negre*, p. 308. Similar thoughts were expressed by the writer Liviu Rebreanu in an interview given in the Romanian press on the eve of 1942 after his return from a trip to Italy and Germany. He started with the sad observation that Romanian culture was completely unknown to the public in those two countries, mainly because "for the last 100 years it was turned into a French cultural colony". For this reason he opposed the "unproductive" French influence and advocated Romania's orientation towards the German and Italian cultural models, that "to the contrary, were giving it freedom", see *Vremea*, Crăciun, 1942.
- 49 "Spiritul German contemporan", in *Gândirea*, nr. 2, 1943, pp. 57 – 65.
- 50 "Aliații lui Hitler", in *Gândirea*, nr. 7, 1941, pp. 337-340.
- 51 "Scurtă recăpitolare", in *Gândirea*, nr. 7, 1940, pp. 465-470.
- 52 "Despre demofilie", in *Gândirea*, nr. 1, 1941, pp. 1-10.
- 53 See, "Avram Iancu", in *Gândirea*, nr. 3, 1943, pp. 113 – 120.
- 54 See, *Curentul*, nr. 4717, 2 aprilie 1941.
- 55 *Universul*, nr.187, 10 ianuarie 1940.
- 56 "Viața spirituală în România de azi", p. 635. See also, "Revoluția legionară" – in *Gândirea*, nr. 8, 1940, pp. 521-528. By the beginning of March 1941 Crainic was already praising general Antonescu as "the savior of the country"! – see "Generalul", in *Timpul*, nr. 1370, 12 martie 1941.
- 57 "Rasa Românilor", in *Timpul*, 6 ianuarie 1941.
- 58 "Ideea Germană", in *Timpul*, nr. 1330, 20 ianuarie 1941.
- 59 "De la ideal la conjurație", in *Timpul*, nr. 1371, 13 martie 1941.
- 60 RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Scriseri politice*, pp. 572-73.
- 61 *Ibid.*, p. 571.
- 62 *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- 63 RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Revizuire și adăugiri.1943*, București, 1944, p. 170.
- 64 RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Scriseri politice*, p. 578.
- 65 *Ibid.*, p. 600, 645.
- 66 The concept of "destiny" was already the subject matter of an earlier book the author published in 1940, in which he made the distinction between the chronological time measured by the clock, and the "time that we live" (*timpul trăit*), for which he used the term "destiny". See, RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Timp și destin*, București, 1940.
- 67 RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Scriseri politice*, pp. 643-44.
- 68 *Ibid.*, p. 600, 629, 652.

- ⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 654.
- ⁷⁰ RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Revizuirii și adăugirii*. 1943, p.170.
- ⁷¹ Motru's *Revizuirii și adăugirii* appeared in a total of 6 volumes, covering the period 1943-1948. The first two volumes relating to the period 1943-44 were of particular interest for the purposes of this study.
- ⁷² RĂDULESCU-MOTRU, C., *Revizuirii și adăugirii*, p.151.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.13.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 151.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 254.
- ⁷⁶ See TODERAȘCU, Ion, ed., *G. Brătianu. Cuvinte către români. Zece conferințe și prelegeri*, ed. Univ. "Al.I.Cuza", Iași, 1996. Before being published for the first time in 1942, the lectures were presented to the students at the University of Bucharest, on radio and at the Free University. Brătianu was convinced that what Romanians needed most at that moment was not to loose courage and he consequently put a lot of effort into raising the national spirit. See, for instance, "Destinul în viața poparelor", in *Curentul*, nr. 4718, 8 aprilie 1941.
- ⁷⁷ See, "... Un istoric printre politicieni", in *Dosarele istoriei*, nr.1 (53), 2001, p. 27.
- ⁷⁸ SEBASTIAN, Mihail, *Jurnal*, p. 280.



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ORIENT-EXPRES, OR ABOUT EUROPEAN INFLUENCES ON EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY BALKANS

Some Preliminary Remarks

Orient-Express was not the first agent of Europe in the Balkans.¹ I use it here only as a symbol of European penetration. The destination of this train – famous not only from Agatha Christie’s novel – depends, in fact, on one’s point of view. The train was called *Orient-Express* because its “godfathers” thought of it as a connection to the Orient, to the exotic, picturesque and multinational. From the Balkan point of view, however, it was, in a sense, an ‘Occident-Express’, for its orientation was North-West: the railway station Paris-East was the final point of the two-days trip, while at the same time the express was one of the direct providers of everything European to the Balkans.

If one looks for the very beginning of European influences in the Balkans (or vice versa), one has to go back to the times when people as well as ideas “traveled” on foot. I’m interested mainly in the nineteenth century, however, that is, the time when the newly established Balkan states as well as the lands still under Ottoman rule struggled with modernization. I used “struggled” to emphasize the difficulties all Balkan societies met on their path to modernity in economic, political, and social sphere, for the long absence of own state strengthened the validity of the unwritten laws of patriarchy. Fully aware of the possible contests the term ‘modernization’ could provoke, I use it not as a polite synonym of an undeveloped society but to denote the processes that took place during the transition from traditional to modern industrial society. Furthermore, I quite agree with Andrew Janos that, when addressing the problem of modernization, one has to deal not with a single process, but with both

the rise of a successful material civilization in the Occident and the gradual diffusion of the innovations from the core area to the peripheries and their responses to this ongoing process.² In other words, for non-Western European countries the modernization process meant the dissemination of the Western model. If in the West intellectual responses to the challenges of modernity were to be observed, in the East (and in the Balkans in our particular case) responses to the challenge of westernization have arisen.³ It is in this framework of concepts of modernity and modernization (Westernization, Europeanization) that I would like to present my speculations on the European influences on the everyday life in the nineteenth century Balkans. No doubt, the following text is necessarily selective in the kinds of everyday life it examines.

Europe and the Balkans, or Perception and Self-Perception

Europe has always been considered as a source of modernization. What people think of, however, when referring to "Europe"? History of Europe still concentrates only on the so-called West, while other parts are measured, at best, as something out of or rather beyond Europe.⁴ No doubt, peoples at the periphery were concerned about their place in relation to the core.

Europe along the centuries had several cores. Until modern times it was the East and the South-East in particular (or the Balkans) that provided leadership. Around the year 1000, Byzantium boasted a civilization richer and more refined than Western Europe. In the fifteenth century, this traditional leadership began to be reversed, the principle axis of history shifting towards the West and then to the North-West. During the following centuries, the East was to a considerable degree isolated, even though the West, too, was divided and torn. After the religious wars of the seventeenth century, the rise of science and the Enlightenment brought a new secularism to Europe which made politico-religious structure of the Ottoman Empire seem old-fashioned. In the writings of travelers and philosophers, a new polarization emerges: between civilized West and barbarous East, between freedom-loving Europe and despotic Orient.

In the case of the Balkans, the isolation cannot be attributed exclusively to the Ottoman conquest, even though I cannot agree with the proposal by L. Stavrianos of anti-Westernism of the Balkan Orthodoxy as an explanation.⁵ In fact, it is the term I do not agree on: it is irrelevant to

speak about “anti-Westernism” before the time when Western Europe started considering itself something different and the ‘others’ gradually adopted this notion. Nevertheless, the gap between the one and the other Europe (or one of the other Europes), i.e., the Western and the Balkan Europe, had its roots, indeed,

in the protracted conflict between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, in the barbarities of the Fourth Crusade, and in the merciless stranglehold of the Italian merchants on Byzantium’s economy.⁶

The Balkans occupied an intermediate zone between Europe and Asia – in Europe but not of it, as Mark Mazower has put it.⁷

What did Balkan people perceive as “Europe”? “Our Europe” was for prince Constantin Brâncoveanu, by the end of the seventeenth century, the Christian Europe,⁸ while for the Romanian intellectuals of 1848 it was the Western part of the continent.⁹ The same shift from the East to the West as a reference point was observed in all Balkan lands belonging to the Ottoman Empire. It should be noted that the West appeared to the Balkan peoples as something strange and foreign (they normally talked of “going to Europe”). In the eyes of most Balkan intellectuals, this foreign Europe was advanced, superior, and worthy of emulation, a civilizing force, which was stirring the passive Orient.

The separation from the East disturbed the mental schemes and contributed to the formation of countries’ national consciousness. Contacts with the Westerners and with the West in general (no matter where it happened) woke up the need for identity and helped disentangle Balkan societies from the post-Byzantine universalism (i.e., Orthodoxy and ancient Greek culture as anchors) and to come closer to a new paradigm: Western Europe. The re-orientation to the West had no alternative, for Balkan peoples were looking for their identity in a time when national diversity rather than “transnationalism” of religion mattered.¹⁰ A small literate elite began to elaborate a new language of nations and ethnicities. The Greek historian Paschalis Kitromilides has described their goal as aiming to integrate “the forgotten nations of the European periphery into the common historical destiny of the Continent”.¹¹ Slowly the old assumption that Greek – like Latin in the West – was the route to learning was being challenged as ideas of romantic nationalism (emphasizing the cultural value of peasant languages) spread into the Balkans. In the early nineteenth century, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Romanian intellectuals, often

educated in Greek schools, now began to define themselves in terms of cultural communities for the first time, thus paving the way for modern nationalism and modern nation-states.¹² For all Balkan people there is a general consensus of opinion that it was the epoch of Enlightenment that sowed the seeds of a national revival, thanks also to the subsequent "ground work" done by such "an outstanding peasant as Napoleon Bonaparte", so Francesco Guida.¹³ There exist objections to this thesis but we are still left with the significant irony that an intrinsically cosmopolitan culture like that of the Enlightenment produced the seeds of national renaissance.

Of course, the perception of Europe derived from one people to another and from one person to another but the mid-nineteenth century generation in the Balkans showed incontestable interest in all spheres of life regarding all Western European countries. Once launched on the road of Westernization (Europeanization) the elite in the Danubian Principalities threw itself into the arms of France. At the end of the nineteenth century, Pompiliu Eliade even argued that Romania owed its whole modern civilization to France.¹⁴ Although his opinion provides evidence of contemporary obsession with France, the French myth did play an important modeling role in the case of Romanians. It was only the German model, which managed to occupy a place close to that of the French one. Although the option of minority, it mattered because that was an influential minority – such as leaders of the *Junimea* society like Titu Maiorescu and P. P. Carp.¹⁵

As to the other Balkan countries, while France (and Belgium) represented the best known and most "active" model for them too, other important western European states such as Britain, Germany, Italy, etc., also had a function, or at least, an image to which more attention was paid, for different reasons. Thus, the tendency to restore the broken links between the Balkan people with the European West in order to rediscover themselves and their cultural and national identity was experienced in a differing manner in different societies. Sometimes it was a highly critical one because there existed some uneasiness as to how to root all those imported social phenomena or cultural attitudes into the each national reality. In other words, Western culture had to be used *cum grano salis*, Europe's image must not turn out to be a deceptive dream but blend with Balkan realities.¹⁶

One of the main features of the European penetration in the Balkans as well as in other parts of the globe was its automatic self-perpetuation:

the more West intruded, the more it engendered new conditions and new social groups that demanded still further Westernization (Europeanization).¹⁷ The nineteenth century witnessed the high point of the Europe's impact; this was the time when its dynamism and expansionism was omnipotent and unchallenged. Another feature of the European penetration to the Balkans during the same time was the direct way it came. There was no need of the previously used as channels for communication and interaction regions of Slovenia, Croatia and the Italian-held Greek islands as well as Constantinople and Russia anymore. It were the developments mainly in commerce that created slowly but irreversibly a new Balkan World that was responsive to direct Western European influences. The initiative came already from the rising 'class' of merchants, artisans, etc. in the Ottoman Empire – they needed not only more education but also a new type of education. That is why they bestowed books to their native towns, financed the education of young fellow countrymen in foreign universities and made possible the publication of books and newspapers in their native languages as well as translations of works of western European writers, philosophers, and scientists like Voltaire, Locke, Rousseau, Descartes, Leibnitz, etc.

The inter-penetration of Europe and Asia, West and East – because it's impossible to think about cultural influences as only one-way directed ones – was obvious for people who were visiting the Balkans during the nineteenth century. Travelers comment on signs of 'European' life such as houses with glass windows, cabarets, or hotels with billiard rooms, railways, etc. But under this modernizing façade, there was the same oriental (traditional) substance, deeply embedded into the Balkan societies.

Exactly this two-folded reality – Europeanization (modernization) vs. backwardness – is so interesting to be observed and analyzed. Accommodation of the European influences to the Balkan style of life and Balkan way of thinking is what challenged me to step into the present topic. Europeanization can be represented either as a social process (which can be measured) or as a (self)perception (which has to do with identity constructions and representations). I would like to take the second way, no matter how 'slippery' it may be.

Everyday Life, Rich as It Is, and the Limitation of the Subject

The conception of 'everydayness' was formulated and lived within a discourse on modernity that developed as a commentary on the formation of a modern, capitalist society in Europe in the nineteenth century. A direct and explicit theorization of everyday life came after the Second World War, with Henri Lefebvre's formulation of critique, Michel DeCerteau's reworking of it as a space, and German labor historians (like Alf Luedtke) who represent the effort to dissolve the separation between bourgeois 'everydayness' and the domain of the laborer.¹⁸ During the last decade, however, we've witnessed the renewed interest in the study of the everyday in history and social studies. It performs different functions in different cultural contexts; it can go against the grain of heroic national self-definitions; it can help to recover forgotten histories of modernity (such as histories of women's work, of private life) or contribute to the forgetting of the major catastrophes of the twentieth century (such as the Holocaust – as the *Alltagsgeschichte* of Nazi time have demonstrated).

I am fully aware of the "all-embracity" of the term *everyday life*. It embraces, in fact, almost everything: all what we do from morning until night, from Monday to Sunday (so called "twenty-four seven"), and from the beginning to the end of one's life. It's all about the ordinary and trivial, which is very difficult to map and to frame, whether by art, by theory, or by history.¹⁹ The need to limit the subject imposes immediately. It is not quite easy to decide what to take into account and what to leave out. Nevertheless, there are some limitations that present themselves:

First of them concerns the narrow database as far as the private life is concerned. During the nineteenth century in Western Europe, one could observe imaginary concentric circles, which in reality overlapped, between public space on the one hand, and private, personal, intimate space on the other. The "place of our pleasures and drudgeries, of our conflicts and dreams" – as the authors of *Histoire de la vie privée* call private life – continued to be a rather closed space in the Balkans. This reticence makes it even harder for the historian, since the predominant majority of population (even the urban one) had been illiterate or not sufficiently literate in order to leave some written evidence of their everyday life behind the walls of their homes. We can find data about the changes that have occurred in the private space, too, but our

perception of this part of the everyday life in the Balkans remains very limited. Despite of the variety of the sources: memoirs, diaries, contemporary press, photographs, etc., in most cases they usually give us only small pieces of information and to fit them into the overall picture is not easy.

It becomes considerably easier to “decipher” the everyday life of the people when they enter the public space. The reason is that there are much more data available concerning the changes there because of the emergence (in the nineteenth century) of the newspapers and the daily newspapers in particular in the Balkans. Due to the existence of the press, in addition to the presence of published and unpublished diaries, memoirs, etc. one can read the town and its life as a text and find signs of Modernity. The periodicals were crucial agents in the definition of the cultural, social, and ethical ideas of the time. It is hardly surprising that public life in the South-East European corner was dominated by men. Nevertheless, during the nineteenth century the observer faced a big change: women entered the public arena and became visible. This presents an additional ‘hurdle’: the researcher has to consider everyday life as a gendered one as well.

A further problem ensues from the fact that everyday life can hardly be considered as a unitary thing even if we only think about its urban hypostases. There is a huge difference, for instance, between the life of the working class and the life of the bourgeoisie or intelligentsia, who were thought to be followers of modern (European) trends. The differences – as to social status, ethnicity, age, gender, etc. – are so numerous that one can question whether there is such a thing as everyday life. In my opinion, however, when thinking about all this in the light of the invasion of Modernity one can disregard this plurality of everyday lives. Because the penetration and dissemination of “European” in the Balkans was quite limited during the period under research. As Harry Harootunian states,

In modernity, during the epoch of industrialization and the establishment of mass society, the places of history are the cities, ... and it is in the cities that the everyday writes its own history.²⁰

Indeed, at the beginning the news coming from West affected above all the towns along the Danube and the Baron Hirsch’s railway as well as the capitals of the already present or future Balkan states. Once faced with the Modern in the Balkan capitals and bigger towns, it later penetrated

step by step in the other towns, too, while the countryside remained for a long time impervious to European influences. It is as though the emergence of the idea of modernity in the nineteenth-century Europe, with its sharp sense of time moving ahead fast, encouraged a view of the Balkans as a place where "time has stood still". As we know, Orthodox Christians regarded Catholic Europe's move to the Gregorian calendar at that time as an unacceptable innovation. That is why the Balkans were sleeping in the night of 17/18 December 1899 while the other Europe celebrated the coming of the year 1900, say, at "Maxim" in Paris.

As mentioned above, I would like to think of Europeanisation as a changing (self)perception. However difficult to follow developments from such a point of view, getting a picture (even if only an overall one) is possible. The category of everydayness might serve as a historical optic to widen our understanding of the process of modernity being experienced in the Balkans during the nineteenth century. To make it more bearable, I shall concentrate on the social spaces (or places), which allow closer communication and social interaction, presenting thus opportunities for the people to perform presentations of roles necessary for the functioning of the social system. For after having felt deprived of "being part of Europe" for centuries now, in the nineteenth century, Balkan people wanted not only to know more about Europe as well as feel closer to it but also to show their (mental or actual) belonging to the Western world. In other word, it all concerns the way contemporaries organized their lived experience at a certain historical moment and how they named it. I find it useful to present my discussion in two very much related (and from time to time overlapping) but still separate "files", namely stage and actors.

Stage: New Urban Developments and Appearance of Public Sphere²¹

On 17 July 1856, *Journal de Constantinople* reported about the inauguration of Sultan Abdulmecid Han's new palace at Dolmabahce with a state dinner prepared and served in the French manner.²² The transfer of the royal residence from Topkapi Sarayi across the Bosphorus to the European section of Istanbul and its manner of celebration in particular were symbolic. After the Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty of 1838 and the Tanzimat charter of 1839, which provided the necessary institutions

to foster the Western economic control made possible by the treaty, the European impact on the Ottoman Empire was increasing slowly but irreversibly. Until that point, the Europeanization was confined to the technological, scientific, and educational fields and was almost exclusively oriented toward the improvement of the military forces. Afterwards, the Western intellectual system was imported as well, for farsighted Turks came to realize the necessity for change if their empire was to survive. This resulted in more radical social changes. Foreign observers reported about a perceptive change in the life style of Constantinople, some of them complaining: they found the capital "too europeanized" and, hence, lost some of its exotic charm.²³

The 'Ottoman model'²⁴ and that of Constantinople in particular has dominated the urban life in the Empire for centuries. From the first half of the nineteenth century, however, this model endured some significant developments, for it had to confront another cultural model – the Occidental one. These new developments were not phenomena limited only to the Ottoman Empire; in all Europe, the second half of the nineteenth century was the age of the flourishing capitals. The modernization efforts recast the traditional urban policies based on Islamic law, replaced the urban institutions with new ones adopted (or rather "domesticated") from European precedents, and introduced another set of building types, this time conforming to the requirements of a modern, Westernized lifestyle.

There had previously been some Western signs in the Ottoman everyday life. All Western European diplomats who brought their clothes, hats, and habits to the Orient influenced the circles close to the Porte. For instance, Ubicini reported that in June 1854, after a military ceremony, the 'father' of Tanzimat reforms Abdulmecid (mentioned above) had complimented Madame de Saint-Arnaud and other ladies in French.²⁵ Actually, it was the previous sultan who had already introduced some European habits into his own everyday routine. From 1829 on (the year of the 'fez' reform), Mahmud started wearing shoes and trousers; moreover, in his palace tables and chairs replaced (even though only partially) the divans and the pillows and, in addition, he put his portrait on the wall.²⁶ Some of the Ottoman high officials went further in acceptance of the Occidental model and their 'network' dreamed about Paris and its fashionable life. One can say that in the mid-nineteenth century in Constantinople there already existed social strata ready to adjust itself to Western habits and fashion, if not to Western cultural model yet.

During the nineteenth century, it was not difficult to spot the confrontation of the two models in the Balkan towns. Performances were rather diverse: violent or peaceful, introduced by a law, but all in all they were irresistible like technical progress and commerce were, for they simply embodied the inevitable development and expansion of the European capitalist economy. This confrontation followed different rhythms as well, depending on political climate, geographical position, and historical legacy of each case.

I have already noted that the Western penetration started from some towns along the Danube and railway roads as well as from capital cities. My intention now is to present some examples from Bucharest, Belgrade and Sofia. The development of Bucharest, the capital of Wallachia and later (from 1859 on) of Romania, took different ways due to the unique situation of the two Danubian Principalities within the Ottoman Empire. Belgrade had been for centuries an administrative (and military) centre of the Ottoman Empire and it represents a good example of transformation from a multi-ethnic "Empire" city into a national one in the course of two or three decades. Sofia shows some similarities with Athens: they both were very small places before having been chosen (for different reasons) as capital cities of Bulgaria and Greece.

Among the capital cities of the modern Balkan states, it was Bucharest that made the earliest start to becoming more European. It happened in the first half of the nineteenth century. Already in 1814, the question about gasification of the street lighting was raised; good intentions turned to reality, at least regarding the central part of the city, by 1856. Bucharest was the most important urban center in the South-East of Europe (after Constantinople) from the point of view of demography, too: in 1831, the population of the town was about 60000 people.²⁷ While in 1829 a foreign traveler noted skeptically: "This is by no means an European city.", 30 years later, in 1859 (a few days after the double election of Prince Cuza), a German witness, Heinrich Winterhalder, wrote: "When you see Mogoșoaia street in the area close to the theatre you feel as if you were in one of the famous European capitals."²⁸ Further development of Bucharest was observed during the third quarter of the nineteenth century, after becoming a capital of Romania. It is well known that during the nineteenth century they used to call Bucharest *le petit Paris*. Even a French aristocrat like Count Robert de Bourboulon was pleasantly surprised by Bucharest, which was "nice with its lively streets, almost like those in Paris" and by "its elegant, well dressed and well educated inhabitants who do not show any oriental features".²⁹

Le petit Paris, however, was rather an enigma: everybody knew the expression but nobody said where it had come from, it seemed to be a part of some “imaginative luggage inherited in the family”, according to Ana Maria Zahariade.³⁰ Nevertheless, it seems that the appearance of this saying preceded the developments that could create a substantial base for its support. People who spent more time in Bucharest offered observations that support such an idea: Anna Stanchova Countess de Grenau, the wife of the Bulgarian ambassador in Bucharest, wrote at the beginning of the 1890s about the Modern which had been introduced only to the central streets; a Bulgarian diplomat, Petar Neykov, also pointed out, at the very beginning of the twentieth century, the “screaming luxury” of Calea Victoriei contrasting the misery at the edge of the city.³¹ As one Swedish officer wrote in 1888,

Bucarest est une ville semi-orientale et semi-occidentale, que les Roumains se plaisent à qualifier de « petit Paris ». Pour petit, le mot est vrai, mais pour Paris c'est autre chose ...³²

The same mixture between Oriental and Occidental features, with the former still definitely prevailing, observed travelers who passed Serbia at about 1825-1830. For instance, Otto Dubislav Pirch wrote in 1829, after having visited a house in a town:

In one of the rooms everything was European – mirrors, cabinet, furniture in general... In another room they follow the Turkish customs: no furniture, pillows next to the wall and carpets on the floor.³³

During the second half of the nineteenth century European imprints made some more room for themselves in Serbia, too, but the towns, Belgrade inclusive, still were closer to the Ottoman rather than to the Western model. In 1870, Jan Neruda found in “the rose of the Danube” too many pure oriental particularities.³⁴ The influence of the European model, however, increased irreversibly and – characteristically enough – it was via the Habsburg Empire that it came. In addition, Constantinople itself still played a role of ‘Occidentalizing’ force, at least at the level of the everyday life. For instance, Serbian Prince Miloš wore a European suit only after his visit to the Sultan in the capital of the Ottoman Empire; moreover, it was exactly during the same trip when he discovered champagne unknown until then in Serbia.³⁵

In fact, Belgrade started its transformation from an Ottoman Empire town into a European city in the 1870s, after the Turkish military unit based there left the town in 1867. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the whole city was being redesigned with wide boulevards and large public buildings. Harry De Windt, for example, remarked at the beginning of the twentieth century:

In 1876 dilapidated Turkish fortress frowned down upon a maze of buildings little better than mud huts and unpaved, filthy streets... To-day it seemed like a dream to be whirled away from the railway station in a neat fiacre, along spacious boulevards, with well-dressed crowds and electric cars, to a luxurious hotel.³⁶

The transition from an Oriental to a Western world happened very quickly. But still there was a sort of clash of different cultures to be observed, a semi-Oriental atmosphere in the town.

When one turns one's attention to Sofia at the beginning of its capital being, in the 1880s, it becomes clear that the town was similar to a big village, to quote a young Bulgarian woman coming from Tulcea.³⁷ Konstantin Irecek shared the same observation when he first came to Sofia, in 1879:

... curved street with trees, opened Oriental small shops on both sides, terribly irregular pavement and dreadful mud. Big village.

Only three years later, he noted the great progress of Sofia and the appearance of lots of new buildings.³⁸ By the end of the 1880s, however, Bulgarian capital still is described as nothing else but "a Turkish town, which does not at all resemble a European one". As the future Bulgarian diplomat put it in 1893, his first visit to Sofia made him feel disappointed, moreover, humiliated because "... Sofia was a capital, indeed, but far from being major."³⁹

What made observer wonder was the speed of the changes in course: only in less than two decades the town passed through a real building and enlargement "fever". Wide streets with pavements, beautiful houses, many office buildings, banks, shops, coffeehouses, etc. appeared. Still, electricity, for instance, was introduced only to the central streets and houses of the rich people because of the costs; on the other hand, tramway as well as bicycle as symbols of new way of city transport gradually

became part of the life of the population. All this did not occur without negative reactions and satirical statements. So, for instance, despite the fact that six tramway lines were ready, by the official opening they started using only two of them. The reason: "to give the population and functionaries some time to become used to the new heavy movement".⁴⁰ "Heavy movement" meant, in fact, 15 km/h! Without losing its character as a peasant capital yet, Sofia was certainly moving on its way towards the Modern.

One of the main features of movement to the Modern in the Balkans as well as all over the Europe was the appearance of new modes of sociability that accompanied the rise of the public sphere. Jürgen Habermas defined it, in 1962, as a realm of communication marked by new arenas of debate, more open and accessible forms of urban public space and sociability, and an explosion of print culture in the forms of newspapers, political journalism, novels, and criticism. His public sphere is a historical product of two long-term developments: the rise of modern nation-states and that of capitalism.⁴¹ Given that in the nineteenth century Balkans nation-states were in the process of creating – if only traces of – capitalism, the spectator should not be surprised by performances in that sphere, too.

Change from the old customs to the new Europeanized ones went on with quite fast speed. In spite of the traditional understandings and prejudices, new tastes for change and curiosity developed and new urban points of meeting as societies, bookshops, clubs, etc. were established. One of those new developments was the appearance of special places for walks in the late afternoons or evenings. In Sofia, Belgrade, Plovdiv⁴² as well as in some other Balkan towns there were such walking places called 'alleys' or 'gardens'. People enjoyed going there, moreover, since it belonged to the new *savoir vivre*, to be part of that society and to meet friends or just fellows citizens. An interesting target for walks became the railway station, in towns where there was such one. Citizens used to go there for a walk and to look at trains and locomotives; they considered the railway as a channel for the Western influences. In Bucharest there were several places that people frequented during the early evening and which they called 'promenade'. But the walk along the *șosea* (*Șoseaua Kiseleff*) became part of the chic, or *bon ton*, for the high-life in summer evenings. There was one main difference regarding the Romanian experience: Bucharest high-life used the fiacre. Nonetheless, their main purpose was the same – to have a look at the others and to show

themselves to the others; in fact, this was only possible when the horses ceased galloping at the round point, in order to turn back, otherwise the fiacre moved so fast that there was no opportunity for observations and admiration (or envy), neither for flirting.⁴³

Another new development was the establishment of places where people could spend some time together while drinking something, playing cards, reading newspapers, or simply chatting. Coffeehouses and popular periodicals were two institutions central to the organization of public life in the Balkans, as it was the case in Western Europe, too. They were, however, only men's area, and women were excluded from that public space. The main activities were reading and, more commonly in the Balkans, playing cards. Reading newspapers became part of defining oneself as a person sharing bourgeois cultural standards. It was during the second half of the nineteenth century when literate public grew (though still tiny), with enough education and interest to make reading a part of their daily lives. At the very beginning of the twentieth century, coffeehouses in Bulgaria were all at once places of culture, political clubs, and public reading rooms. And the more newspapers (not only Bulgarian but also some Western European) the coffeehouse offered, the more clients it attracted.⁴⁴ Playing cards as an usual activity was noted by almost all foreign visitors to the Romanian lands: gambling was among the weak points of Wallachian men in particular.⁴⁵

Through the networks of institutions like press and coffeehouse, a new notion of the "public" arose and men conformed to the new codes of conduct. In contrast to other institutions of the new public sphere, the salon was women's way of taking part in the social life and to gradually become visible. Salon was part of the public at the edge of private space and by the end of the nineteenth century, it became very popular, especially with Romanians. Nonetheless, Bulgarian and Serbian "high society" women used to have so called *jours fixes*, too.⁴⁶ No doubt, the salons owed much to the men of letters who frequented them, and the desire to participate in a male-dominated world of letters was probably what led many women to host a salon. But no matter how famous the men in her salon, the hostess was its social center. In other respects, however, the salon embodied essential features of the Enlightenment public sphere: first, its development reflected the growing autonomy from the courtly world even though that had given birth to it; second, the salon, too, enjoyed a close relationship to the print culture; and finally, it provided occasion for individuals from different social and professional

backgrounds to mingle on relatively equal terms.⁴⁷ All these new public places provided the contemporary actors with opportunities to perform many different roles.

Actors: Costumes and Play

Already at the end of the eighteenth century, foreign travelers commented that there were people speaking French and admiring French culture in some Balkan towns and in Romanian lands in particular. Nevertheless, it was the nineteenth century, which was so largely open for all European influences that imposed itself as a 'French' century par excellence.⁴⁸ The phenomenon was similar to that in other Balkan countries. People who were receptive to the new and people who were not able to accept new ideas and customs were likewise two sides of the Balkan attempts toward modernization.

It was the young generation of Romanians at the beginning of the nineteenth century who discovered the French civilization and culture and chose them as a model to follow. Young people wanted to "join" the European world through a mastery of style. One way to achieve it was to emulate the modes, social mores, and cultural ideas already established in that fashionable world. There were many French emigrants who had come to the Danubian Principalities and who gained their life being teachers at boyars' houses. A second channel for European influences – an indirect one – has to be noted, too: Pompiliu Eliade has pointed out the role of Russian officers as foreign agents of modernity.⁴⁹

In Serbia, stimulus for turning to the West in looking for a model came a bit later but it was quite strong, too. Differently, in comparison to Romanian lands, Serbian people followed another Occidental pattern, the one they had seen next to them in the Habsburg Empire. Bulgarians started their "movement" to the West already during the mid-nineteenth century, before throwing off the Ottoman rule. At the beginning, they used Greek culture and schools as well as Russia as a mediator, exactly what had happened in the Romanian case. In this respect, the role of Bucharest and some of the other Romanian towns as an 'Occidentalizing' center for many Bulgarian emigrants during the late 1860s and 1870s should be mentioned, too. At about the same time and especially after the establishment of the Bulgarian national state the eyes of its subjects turned directly to the source of modernization, as it was the case of other

Balkan peoples, and the process of accommodating European values and style of life accelerated very much.

One of the main direct ways for penetrating European influences was, however, the attendance of some of the European universities. Sultana Craia has commented that the first who went from the Danubian Principalities to Europe to study there were the descendants of the boyars' families followed by those of the emerging bourgeoisie and finally some people of modest origin succeeded in joining European culture in this way, mainly using the fellowships provided by state.⁵⁰ However, this is a pattern only for Romania. Other Balkan countries simply lacked social strata that one can think of as an aristocracy. Their "sons" went to study in Europe supported by the new national states; of course, there were exceptions but we really have to reckon with a completely diverse situations while comparing Romania to other states of the region, and particularly in social terms.

As a consequence, almost all people who played an important role in the Romanian political and cultural life during the nineteenth century (the same for the first half of the twentieth century) had got their results from some European university, after having attended courses – usually – in more than one place (and state). The preference had been given to France and no other Balkan country enjoyed such a powerful Francophone elite. On the other hand, as Elena Siupiur has showed, Germany was not neglected. As for the Serbian and Bulgarian intelligentsia, a slight preference for Russian and Central-European universities was taking place.⁵¹

No matter where European culture was coming from and which ways of penetration it was using, it gradually found its place in Balkan lands. Meeting it, indeed, was a challenge for the people who wanted to be modern but did not know how to deal with coming modernity or how to "accommodate" it to the present background. Sometimes irrelevant performances were taking place. So, for instance, in the 1880s, Konstantin Irecek analyzed "the particular childishness" of the Bulgarian society of the time. "Everybody runs and buys European furniture, things unknown until now, ..." ⁵² At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries a lot of indications for the presence of the Western objects in the Balkan societies could be found. Newspapers reported about different news – most of them considered being a luxury. All these things, however, were too expensive at the time, so that only few families

could afford buying them. This, on its turn, is an indicator that new, well-to-do social strata had been appearing.

Furthermore, Irecek noticed that “some politicians think *dass man mit Repräsentation und dinners eine Gesellschaft gründen kann*”.⁵³ In fact, **this** was the problem: people were attracted by the appearance, by the form. The most noticeable changes, which imitated European handwriting, concerned people’s outward appearance. One witnessed invasion of European clothes, which were called differently – and regarding ‘German’ clothes and ‘French’ clothes, the saying *alafranga* in Bulgarian went down well. At the beginning they came from the shops of the big European firms in Vienna and Constantinople, later they already found their direct way from Paris and London. It was much easier to change one’s public behavior, to separate oneself from the community and create a different image than to re-direct the entire society towards the West.

At the beginning, merchants from Orient and Occident swarmed the streets of Bucharest and Jassy, for they found there people interested in what they offered and able to buy it. They brought with them articles of elegance of the two worlds that were melted here in a genuine fashion. In 1819, for instance, William MacMichael visited the court of Bucharest and observed that everything was Eastern in the appearance of the men while in the costume of the women, who were sitting cross-legged on sofas, there was an evident mixture of French and Oriental. Perhaps women were more open to the new influences because there was a stronger control of the suspicious government of Turkey over the men’s dresses: the use of the costume of civilized Europe would be considered as dangerous an innovation, as the adoption of the most enlightened views of modern policy.⁵⁴ In the late 1820s, the times had already changed, although several princes tried in vain to stop the new trends, and all men had to obey, willingly or not, the requirements of a new era and its fashion. By mid-nineteenth century, however, the fashion trends were still shaking between Istanbul and Paris⁵⁵ and only after that, the steady Western direction was pursued.

It was at about the same time when a real change became obvious regarding the clothes of the urban population in other Balkan countries. The first who wore Western type of clothes in the case of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia were the richest merchants; they imported the new fashion dresses for their women and daughters, too, who were open to all the news coming from “Europe”.⁵⁶ The same openness of women for adopting

the new developments was to be observed in Belgrade in the mid-nineteenth century, so the Serbian historian M. Milevi (1870):

What has changed especially fast is the clothing of women – to the point that today it is very difficult to find a lady whose clothes and haircut are other than European ones.⁵⁷

Another social group that “provided” some of The Europe in the Balkans was the intelligentsia who had studied abroad. At some point “French” clothes became a symbol of a higher social status and it took about two or three decades to turn the exception into a rule, which gradually imposed other criteria of social (and intellectual) diversity. Of course, the application and the perception of the news always depends very much on other general conditions, as social and educational background, for instance. For Robert de Bourboulon, French official to the Bulgarian court, officers’ wives in Sofia in the late 1880s, for instance, were dressed quite tastelessly and their haircuts reminded him hardly of Vienna’s fashion; in a letter to his mother he described them all as “provincial teachers”.⁵⁸

Very often, it is difficult to separate the costumes from the play of the ‘actors’. As for instance in Petar Neykov’s statement from 1909 on the high-life of Bucharest:

Elegant society, dressed tastefully according the last Paris fashion. Flatteries of the best French style. Brave flirts, seldom fruitless. Superficial conversations, very often, however, ambiguous and witty. For this enraptured by the Western models milieu the Romanian language was improper, vulgar; they all spoke French and knew it perfectly.⁵⁹

The nineteenth century and especially its second half was not only the time of appearance of a new understanding about the rhythm of the urban life among the population in the Balkan countries. New taste for how one should spend one’s spare time developed, too.

Along the already mentioned evening walks, visits to coffeehouses and attendance of salons, some other new ways of entertainment, also took place. People from both middle and higher social strata discovered how enjoyable one evening with visitors at home could be. It became part of the routine of Bulgarian intelligentsia to gather at one’s house and to discuss a variety of subjects, to sing songs or to dance. These social gatherings went alongside either the professional communities or friends’

circles. As to the high-life in Sofia, they became very quickly aware how important (for their reputation and status) it was to give receptions and to be invited to the “right” receptions of the others, too. Robert de Bourboulon is very useful source regarding this type of information, for he provides his experienced sight on the Bulgarian high society in development. So, he noted that the *société mondaine* and women in particular, instead of enjoying the dancing, tried to show their ignorance and boredom, as if they would have been ashamed of feeling good. At the same time he described the behavior of the men, too, pointing out the jealousy that they did not try to hide!⁶⁰

Bucharest also had its balls as well as many more informal evening receptions. Evidences are so numerous that it is hardly possible to choose just few examples. Everyone, no matter whether Romanian or foreigner, reported about the social life of the high-life of the city. Houses of families Oteteleşanu, Suțu, Veisa, Grădişteanu, etc. were famous with the balls they were organizing. For instance, on 16 February 1862 there was a big ball with masques and costumes, accompanied by a piano playing, at the house of Gregoire de Soutzo, according to the announcement.⁶¹

Assiduous frequentation of dancing parties, balls, etc. was sign of “good manners” which were undoubtedly law-like psychosocial categories. The same concerned the membership with gentlemen’s clubs, committees and societies, and philanthropic organizations, not only for Romanians but for other Balkan peoples, too.

Some more news that came from Europe and gradually penetrated the Balkan societies deserve mentioning in this respect. Summer holidays of the family is another mark of modernity; it had not existed in the pre-industrial times. It is interesting to note that the places people were going to differed according to the social milieu; at least in the case of Plovdiv this is true. In 1900, a newspaper reported that the local *sui generis* aristocracy was going to Markovo, Kuklen was the place for the new bourgeoisie, while artisans and workers simply stayed in town and continued working.⁶² For the high-life of the capital cities, it was Europe itself that was the goal of their journeys. Of course, there were some country’s resorts, too, that were quite preferable places for summer “retirement” as nearby the royal castle of Peleş in Romanian or Chamkoriya (also because there was a summer house of the prince there) in Bulgarian case. The rule was quite common, however, and it dictated necessarily to leave Sofia, Bucharest, or Belgrade in mid-June only to return in September.

All my points and the examples that I have presented concern mainly the presentation of what was going on in the nineteenth century Balkans. Going back to my point about the appearance having dominated the content, I consider this to be one of the main reasons for the amount of information available about the outside features of the people's life than about their private life, not to mention their spiritual one. Alterations in the way of thinking and in the behavior of the population, regardless of whether this concerned men or women, were much more difficult to grasp. In addition, they occurred much slower than all the 'outside', visible changes. The nineteenth century in the Balkans was still patriarchal at heart. But the old forms and modes were on the wane and new things were being born (or rather "adopted"). The tide was turning; the tone of life was about to change. The reason for this delay of the mentality compared to the visible changes, in my view, is the speed of the urbanization processes and impossibility to control them successfully. Changes in the urban life style at large occurred at a rapid rate, which helps to explain the precarious relationship between East and West in the Balkans and the anxiety aroused because of the proximity to their pre-modern past. Which takes me back to the *Orient-Express*. As a contemporary foreign witness noted in the Bulgarian case, the country was advancing "with the speed of this train".⁶³

Conclusion

Nineteenth century was the time of omnipotent penetration of European influences to the Balkans. The new established Balkan states used Western European experience as a model to follow on their way to Modernity, for Europe was in their understanding something superior and, thus, worth to imitate. However fascinated by Europe the people had been, the adaptation of European ways of life to the Balkan constellations turned out to be complicated. The contradiction between the speed of the processes and readiness of the population to "swallow" the new developments resulted in occurrences placed at various points of the spectrum from the ridiculous to the sad, sometimes with touches of absurdness.

I would like to present my opinion regarding the differences as well as similarities as to how the European influences have been accommodating to the everyday life in the Balkans:

Differences concern mainly i) timing and ii) situation at the start. The time when European influences made themselves visible diverges in different Balkan countries. First to begin with the accommodation of "Europe" in its South-East corner were Romanian lands, which started before becoming *de facto* independent from the Ottoman Empire politically in the 1830s. Then, it was Serbia's turn to open its doors to Europe. The influences there met a strong opposition of the predominantly peasant population as well as of the Porte that had continued to exercise control for some more decades after the 1830s (that was the time when Serbia, too, received its *de facto* independency). Future Serbian capital Belgrade in particular took off three decades later. The real latecomer, however, was the Bulgarian state that began its modern national being only in the late 1870s. From the point of view of 'who was where' at the beginning of the nineteenth century: Wallachia and Moldavia had enjoyed a sort of "freedom" though being a part of the Ottoman Empire (even during the Phanariots' rule) while Serbia and Bulgaria experienced much more of the Ottoman administrative power. On the other hand, having been on one hand distant from the Russian Empire, Danubian Principalities had to cope with the constant Russian interventions of a different kind. Weighing up these legacies and bearing in mind that already at the end of the eighteenth century Peter the Great had introduced pieces of Europe in his Empire one could argue that actually the first difference (concerning the time dimension) depends very much on the second one.

I'd like, however, to emphasize some similarities rather than differences: i) European influences reached mainly Balkan urban population; ii) they were not most welcome by a considerable part of society, which brings us to iii) time – but this time from the point of view of how much time it all needed. And now I want to turn our attention back to the view of the Balkans as a place where "time has stood still". Balkan people do not like to be in a hurry, probably because of relativism and disposition to leave things in the hands of destiny. Balkan towns, too, had their own rhythm. No matter how strong they were influenced by the European world, they always remained strongly attached to one of the core readings of the Oriental, the one characterized by a powerful triptych of words: *yarin*, *rahat* and *kayf*.⁶⁴ That is why the penetration of European influences in the Balkans took a very long time and the transition from traditional to modern society has been perpetuating itself (in the case of mentality in particular) since the nineteenth century.

NOTES

- ¹ I use "Balkans" not as a geographical or political denomination but as a useful term for all lands that were part of the Ottoman Empire, no matter exactly how this was arranged juridically. For that reason I include the two Danubian principalities (from 1859 on, Romania) in my research.
- ² JANOS, Andrew, "Modernization and Decay in Historical Perspective: The Case of Romania", in JOWITT, Kenneth, ed. *Social Change in Romania*, 72-116 (74) as well as JANOS, Andrew, *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825-1945*, Princeton 1982, 313.
- ³ RIZESCU, Victor, "Romania as 'Periphery': Social Change and Intellectual Evolution", in MURGESCU, Bogdan, ed. *Romania and Europe: Modernisation as Temptation, Modernisation as Threat*, ALLFA, Edition Körber Stiftung, Bucureşti, 2000, 36.
- ⁴ See, for instance, WEIDENFELD, Werner, ed. *Die Identität Europas*, Bonn 1985, passim; MOMMSEN, Wolfgang, ed. *Der lange Weg nach Europa. Historische Betrachtungen aus gegenwärtiger Sicht*, Berlin 1992, passim.
- ⁵ See STAVRIANOS, L. S., "The Influence of the West on the Balkans", in JELAVICH, Charles and Barbara, eds. *The Balkans in Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century*, Archon Books, Hamden, 1974, 184-226 and 184-187 in particular.
- ⁶ STAVRIANOS, op. cit., 186. I leave Jenö Szűcs' idea about three European regions (SZÜCS, Jenö, *Die drei historischen Regionen Europas*, Frankfurt, 1994, 2. Auflage) aside deliberately, for my purpose is not to discuss how many Europes there are but to try to make sense of the idea about Europe of the Balkan peoples and those of the nineteenth century in particular.
- ⁷ MAZOWER, Mark, *The Balkans*, Poenix Press, London, 2000, 9.
- ⁸ DUȚU, Alexandru, *Ideea de Europa și evoluția conștiinței europene*, ALL Eductional, Bucureşti, 1999, 22.
- ⁹ As Aleco Russo has put it, in some twenty years the eyes and the thoughts of his generation of Moldavians directed not to the East as it was the case of his parents but to the West. – Quoted by both Stela Mărieș and Dumitru Vitcu, see MĂRIEȘ, Stela, "Das westliche Europa aus der Sicht rumänischer Reisender (erste Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts)", in HEPPNER, Harald, ed. *Die Rumänen und Europa vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*, Böhlau Verlag, Wien-Köln-Weimar, 1997, 143-164 (143) and VITCU, Dumitru, „'Europa' aus der Sicht der rumänischen 1848er-Generation", ibidem, 165-184 (169).
- ¹⁰ "Separation from the East" is the way Lucian Boia, whose discussion I am following here, has referred to the process in question. Although his attention is directed to the Romanian case only, the observation on the Romanian responses to the changes is very much relevant to the cases of the other Balkan peoples, too. – See BOIA, Lucian, "Les Roumains et les autres. La quête des modèles dans la société roumaine des XIXème et XXème siècles", in DUȚU, Alexandru et Norbert DODILLE, eds. *L'état des lieux en sciences*

- sociales*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1993, 39-48 (39); IDEM, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, CEU Press, Budapest, 2001, 158-160.
- 11 KITROMILIDES, P., "The Enlightenment East and West: A Comparative Perspective on the Ideological Origins of the Balkan Political Traditions", in his book *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, I: 51-70.
- 12 In the Balkans, far from the nation winning itself an independent state, as romantic nationalists imagined, the leaders of new states had to create the Nation out of a peasant society that was imbued with the world-view of its Ottoman past. "Serbia", noted August Blanqui, "owes to Milos the first routes penetrating its forests, order re-established in its finances, the creation of Serbian nationality." – Quoted by MAZOWER, op. cit., 86. See in this respect also MISHKOVA, Diana, "The Nation as *Zadruga*: Remapping Nation-Building in Nineteenth Century Southeast Europe", in DOGO, Marco and Guido FRANZINETTI, eds. *Disrupting and Reshaping Early Stages of Nation-Building in the Balkans*, Longo editore, Ravenna, 2002, 103-115.
- 13 GUIDA, Francesco, "The Concept of Europe in Romania and Romania's Image in Western Europe", in BIANCHINI, Stefano e Marco DOGO, eds. *The Balkans: National Identities in a Historical Perspective*, Longo Editore, Ravenna, 1998, 75-90 (77).
- 14 See ELIADE, Pompiliu, *Influența franceză asupra spiritului public în România: Originile* (Original edition: ELIADE, Pompiliu, *De l'influence française sur l'esprit public en Roumanie*, Paris, 1898), Humanitas, București, 2000, passim.
- 15 About the importance and the competition between the two models, see BOIA, L., *History and Myth*, 160-165.
- 16 Regarding this point the attitude of the *Junimea* society (Titu Maiorescu) was emblematic: they all felt that Romanian society was giving way to "bottomless forms" and this explains why the influence of important foreign cultures was already seen as a negative influence producing disorder, etc. The debate remained open and others insisted that the "bottom" had to adapt to the "form" (Eugen Lovinescu). Interesting enough, in other Balkan societies there was no real public debate on the way of adopting, or rather accommodating, European models even though there existed single voices insisting on more careful attitude to "reading" Western model(s) and, respectively, while applying them. In other Balkan countries – Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia – , showing the unsuccessful examples in a satirical way prevailed.
- 17 See STAVRIANOS, L., op. cit., 189-190, who shared the view of an English jurist and historian of the 1860s about the spreading of the Western influence "like a contagion".
- 18 LEFEBVRE, Henri, *Critique de la vie quotidienne*, L'Arche, Paris, 1961 (vol. II), 1981 (vol. III); CERTEAU, Michel de, *L'Invention du quotidien*, Gallimard, Paris, 1998 (vol. I), 1999 (vol. II). For German examples, see LUEDTKE, Alf, *The History of Everyday Life*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995,

- esp. pp. 3-40, 116-148, 169-197; also BERLINER GESCHICHTSWERKSTATT, ed., *Alltagskultur, Subjektivitaet und Geschichte*, Verlag Westfallisches Dampfboot, Münster, 1994.
- 19 Stanley Cavell speaks about the “uncanniness of the ordinary” that both resists and invites philosophical discussion. – See CAVELL, Stanley, *In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988.
- 20 HAROOTUNIAN, Harry, *History’s Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, 19.
- 21 It is out of doubt that new urban developments are not only a stage where to look for and to observe the impact of the European influences. They are, in some sense, part of the Europeanization, too. The division of the material aims mostly clearer presentation rather than imposing predestined statements.
- 22 Quoted by ROSENTHAL, Steven, *The Politics of Dependency: Urban Reform in Istanbul*, Greenwood Press, Westport (Conn.)/London, 1908, 3.
- 23 See GEORGEON, Francois, “A la veille de la guerre, des voyageurs”, in YERASIMOS, Stephanos, ed. *Istanbul, 1914-1923 : Capitale d’un monde illusoire ou l’agonie des vieux empires*, Editions Autrement, Paris, 1992, 34. On changes in the capital city of the Ottoman Empire see ROSENTHAL, Steven, op. cit., as well as ÇELİK, Zeynep, *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century*, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 1986.
- 24 While saying ‘Ottoman model’ I think of the concept of ‘Islamic city’. It has passed a lot of avatars by now but usually it is its external aspects mainly that defined it: city which usually grew around important nodal points in the imperial system, expressly concerned with maintaining Ottoman power against the local population and with the protection of trade routes, characterised by its small curved streets, the impasses, the houses with inner yards, etc., where the city life did not happen on the streets but in private. – For further clarifications on this see YERASIMOS, Stephanos, “A propos des reformes urbaines des Tanzimat”, in DUMONT, Paul et Francois GEORGEON, eds. *Villes Ottomanes a la fin de l’Empire*, Editions L’Harmattan, Paris, 1992, 17-32.
- 25 UBICINI, A., *La Turquie actuelle*, Hachette, Paris, 1855, 77-78.
- 26 LEWIS, B., *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, 1961, 102-103.
- 27 For comparison: at about the same time, in 1821, Athens’ population was around 10,000 – and it still was 13 years before its becoming a capital of Greece; in 1846, about 19,000 people were living in Belgrade. – HEPPNER, Harald, ed. *Hauptstädte in Südosteuropa: Geschichte, Funktion, Nationale Symbolkraft*, Böhlau, Wien-Köln-Weimar, 1994, data from different articles.
- 28 HEPPNER, H. ed. *Hauptstädte in Südosteuropa*, 49.

- ²⁹ BOURBOULON, Robert de, *Bulgarski dnevnitsi (Bulgarian diaries)*, Kolibri, Sofia, 1995, 108.
- ³⁰ I am grateful to her for sharing with me her findings and musings on this topic, which I enjoyed very much. I cannot but agree with her on two reference points she has presented as a possible explanation of persistence of the "enigme": on the one hand, its mythical character and, on the other, its rhetorical importance as a mediator in the communication between the two actors, the Occidental and the Romanian one. – ZAHARIADE, Ana Maria, *L'enigme du « petit Paris »* (unpublished paper), 2002.
- ³¹ STANCHOVA, Anna, *Dvortsovi i diplomatskeski spomeni 1887-1915 (Court and Diplomatic Memoirs, 1887-1915)*, Bulgarski hudozhnik/Universitetsko izdatelstvo, Sofia, 1991, 81; NEYKOV, Petar, *Spomeni*, Izdatelstvo na Otechestveniia Front, Sofia, 1990, 138.
- ³² Quoted by ZAHARIADE, Ana Maria, op. cit., 5. About twenty years earlier Jan Neruda commented in a similar way: "... but 'Paris on Dâmbovița' is an Oriental Paris." – See NERUDA, Jan, *De la Praga la Paris și Ierusalim: Tablouri din străinătate*, Editura Minerva, București, 2000, 251.
- ³³ Quoted by VUCO, Nikola, "L'eupéanisation des villes en Serbie au XIXe siècle", in *Istanbul à la jonction des cultures balkaniques, méditerranéennes, slaves et orientales aux XVIe-XIXe siècles*, UNESCO/AIESSE, Bucarest, 1973, 107-113 (108).
- ³⁴ NERUDA, Jan, op. cit., 265.
- ³⁵ See VUCO, Nikola, op. cit., 108.
- ³⁶ Quoted by NORRIS, David, *In the Wake of the Balkan Myth: Questions of Identity and Modernity*, Macmillan Press, London and St. Martin's Press, New York, 1999, 99.
- ³⁷ PETROVA, Sultana, *Moite spomeni (My memoirs)*, Izdatelstvo na BAN, Sofia, 1991, 158.
- ³⁸ IRECEK, Konstantin, *Balgarski dnevnik (Bulgarian diary)*, Akademichno izdatelstvo Marin Drinov, Sofia, 1996, vol. I, 21; compare to idem, vol. II, 524.
- ³⁹ See respectively STANCHOVA, Anna, *Dvortsovi i diplomatskeski spomeni*, 26; NEYKOV, Petar, *Spomeni*, 70.
- ⁴⁰ KAZASOV, Dimo, *Iskri ot burni godini (Sparks from Adventurous Years)*, Izdatelstvo na Otechestveniia Front, Sofia, 1987, 260.
- ⁴¹ HABERMAS, Jürgen, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zur einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, Darmstadt und Neuwied, 1962, passim. In only a few years this book became one of the most widely discussed works of social and political theory on the West German (and not only) intellectual scene.
- ⁴² Plovdiv was the capital of the autonomous province Eastern Rumelia for seven years between 1878 and 1885, when the province joined to the Kingdom of Bulgaria.

- 43 See GAVRILOVA, Raina, *Koleloto na zhivota: Vsekidneviето na bulgarskiya vuzrozhdenski grad* (*The Wheel of Life: Everyday Life in the Bulgarian Early Modern Town*), Universitetsko izdatelstvo, Sofia, 1999, 48-53; *Plovdivski glas*, 1899, etc. On the 'Corso' of Bucharest see, for instance, LOVERDO, Jean, "Bucarest", in *Le Monde Moderne*, 1897, 1-14 (9); MARSILLAC. Ulysse de, *Bucureştiul în veacului al XIX-lea*, Editura Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1999, 147-158; NEYKOV, Petar, *Spomeni*, 144, where he points out that, at the turn of the nineteenth century, walking was considered a sign of poverty in Bucharest.
- 44 KAZASOV, Dimo, *Iskri of burni godini*, 273.
- 45 See MacMICHAEL, William, *A Journey From Moscow to Constantinople*, London, 1819, reprinted in BANNAN, Alfred and Achilles EDELENYI, eds. *Documentary History of Eastern Europe*, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1970, 121 – for the beginning and, for instance, LOVERDO, Jean, *Bucarest*, 2, for the end of the nineteenth century.
- 46 PETROVA, Sultana, *Moite spomeni*, passim; KUNISCH, Richard, *Bucureşti şi Stambul*, 84-89.
- 47 For more elaborate discussion on the (Enlightenment) salons in Paris, London, Vienna and Berlin, see MELTON, James Van Horn, *The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 2001, 197-225.
- 48 When saying "French" I use the term as a synonym for "European", for it is hardly possible to differentiate where exactly influences came from – only the general direction, that is from the Western (more precisely, North-Western) part of the continent to its South-Eastern corner, is out of doubt.
- 49 ELIADE, Pompiliu, *Influenţa franceză asupra spiritului public în România : Originile*, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2000, 155-160.
- 50 CRAIA, Sultana, *Francofonie şi francofilie la români*, Editura Demiurg, Bucureşti, 1995.
- 51 On issues concerning social and educational background of the political elite in South-East European countries see, for instance: SIUPIUR, Elena, "Les Intellectuels roumains du XIXe siècle et la réorganisation de la classe politique et du système institutionnel", in *Revue roumaine d'histoire*, 1995 (XXXIV), 1-2; IDEM, "Die deutschen Universitäten und die Bildung der Intelligenz in Rumänien und den Ländern Südosteuropas im 19. Jahrhundert", in *New Europe College Yearbook*, 1994-1995; PARUSHEVA, Dobrinka, "L'élite gouvernementale en Bulgarie et en Roumanie a la fin du XIXe et au début du XXe siècle et la France", in *Etudes balkaniques*, 2000, 3-4; IDEM, "Political Elites in the Balkans, 19th and early 20th Century: Routes to Career", in *Etudes balkaniques*, 2001, 4, etc.
- 52 IRECEK, Konstantin, *Bulgarski dnevnik*, vol. II, 374.
- 53 Ibidem; italic in original text.

- ⁵⁴ MacMICHAEL, William, *A Journey From Moscow to Constantinople*, 120-122.
- ⁵⁵ See IONESCU, Adrian-Silvan, *Moda românească 1790-1850: Între Stambul și Paris*, Editura MAIKO, București, 2001. The book is very rich regarding data the author has used.
- ⁵⁶ See the reach discussion of GAVRILOVA, Raina, *Koleloto na zhivota*, 159-166.
- ⁵⁷ Quoted by VUCO, Nikola, op. cit., 108.
- ⁵⁸ BOURBOULON, Robert de, *Bulgarski dnevnitsi*, 59.
- ⁵⁹ NEYKOV, Petar, *Spomeni*, 143.
- ⁶⁰ BOURBOULON, Robert de, *Bulgarski dnevnitsi*, 81, 63
- ⁶¹ HAGI-MOSCO, Emanoil, *București: Amintirile unui oraș*, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 1995, 94. For more details, see IONESCU, Adrian-Silvan, *Balurile din secolului al XIX-lea*, Fundația Culturală D'ale Bucureștilor, București, 1997.
- ⁶² *Plovdivski ek*, 1900
- ⁶³ BOURBOULON, Robert de, *Bulgarski dnevnitsi*, 124-125.
- ⁶⁴ *Yarin* (Turk.) means tomorrow; *rahat* (Arab.) – peace of mind, leisure, vacation, *laissez faire*; *kayf* (Arab.) – mood; it denominates the possibility to enjoy the life as much and as often as possible.



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SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PEASANT COOPERATION IN POST-SOCIALIST ROMANIA

The crucial characteristic of modern societies is the fact that they possess a stronger ability of adaptation than all the other societies (Parsons, 1992: 9). The power, which modern societies are able to express both inside themselves (through control and development of the resources available) and towards their surroundings (i.e., other existing societies), is mainly (but not only) rooted in the extremely high degree of their social integration, based on highly developed division of labor (organic solidarity – Durkheim) and the specific normative system. This integration is achieved by certain institutions and in all three spheres of social activity: economic, political and cultural. In economy, the main integrative mechanism is the market. Actually, the market performs two functions: the first function, and this function is emphasized by economists, is that of the creation of an efficient economic system (which enables modern societies to use and develop their resources and to use them both internally and externally); and the second function, a function emphasized by sociologists, is that of integration of a society; no other economic system has proved to be better in performing these two functions. There cannot be two or more markets in a global society, at least not in a modern society (of course, this does not exclude internal divisions of a single market – commodities, capital, labor force, etc.). Turning to politics, we find that the principle of citizenship that is the most significant institution. A modern society is a society of citizens, that is, of the people who are equal in their rights, one of which being participation in the political constitution of the society they are members of. In the cultural sphere, a very general and stable value consensus is crucial. This means, above all, that there are not many values that almost all members of a society hold to, and that these values are, let us say, wide enough to allow the citizens to move freely inside them. The societies T. Parsons calls “modern” are of western origin, also often called “industrial”, “developed”, etc.

The intention of the Romanian society (which will be dealt with here in **comparative perspective**, together with the neighboring Bulgaria and Serbia) to enlarge its evolutionary capacity through the process of modernization can be considered quite natural. In fact, most societies in Southeastern Europe (the former socialist countries) are facing the task of modernization for the third time in the last two hundred years. They were first confronted with it after liberation from Turkish rule in the nineteenth century. To be more accurate, some of these societies or some parts of their societies (Transylvania, Vojvodina, Slovenia and Croatia) were dominated by a European society that was itself trying to modernize – the Habsburg Empire. However, their modernization went slower than the modernization in other (central) parts of the Empire. By the beginning of the Second World War, at least some aspects of modernization in Romania had been effected, though it could not be said that the transformation was satisfactory – that is, of course, from the point of view of evolutionary capacity.

The second attempt at modernization was made by the new political (communist) elites after the Second World War. To a certain extent, they legitimized their rule by claiming they were going to overcome underdevelopment. Unfortunately, however, the communist elites wanted to conduct “an experiment” and to modernize their countries without establishing modern institutions. In the end, the breakdown of socialist systems did not place the necessity of modernization in the archives of history: on the contrary, the same question, though this time in the guise of “transition”, was raised once again.

The use here of quotation marks with the word “transition” denotes that fact that the outcome of transition is uncertain, despite best wishes and intentions. *Post-socialist transformation* (Stark, 1994: 4) is a better expression. If post-socialist countries are in a process of transition, we have the right to ask: what is on the other side of this transit? Those who say that ex-socialist countries have been moving inevitably towards a market economy and democratic political system are either naïve or ideologists. They are similar to the former communist “theorists” who claimed that “Socialism is a transitional stage on the way to Communism”. The only thing we can be sure about is that profound changes have been taking place in post-socialist countries. What the final result will be, we cannot say. There is no automatism in social life, and that is why tomorrow never comes. The social world is not what it seems to be. Under the visible surface it hides an invisible structure of interests and forces. In

this light, the task of sociology is not to glorify, but to reveal (Berger and Kelner, 1991: 32-33).

Modern society and agriculture

To be a modern society does not only mean that the country in question should accept and introduce the main political and economical institutions of modern societies, such as a multi-party political system, minority rights, the decisive role of the market in the economy, etc. It must also create and possess a *specific social structure* (in its vertical dimension), with the absence of sharp lines between social strata, with vast middle strata and the presence of intense social mobility also being an important feature of modern societies. Thus, the development of the certain traits of the social structure is an integral part of modernization. In agriculture this implies having farmers (as part of the middle strata) instead of peasants and a strong cooperative system instead of disorganized and fragmented peasantry.

The biggest authorities in rural sociology have established the distinction (of an ideal type) between *farmers* and *peasants*. T. Shanin wrote that *peasantry* consists of small agricultural producers, who use small and simple equipment and work of their families to produce means for their own consumption and for fulfilling obligations to those who hold political and economic power. Of this there are four distinctive characteristics: 1) family farm, as the basic unit of social and economic organization; 2) agriculture, as the main source of living; 3) rural way of life and a specific traditional culture of small rural communities; 4) underdog position, i.e., exploitation of peasantry by powerful outsiders (Shanin, 1973: 14-15, 240). On the other hand, *farmers* produce mainly for the market, using modern techniques and technology. They specialize in their production, and their culture does not differ much from the culture of other social groups, making them an integral part of a modern global society. Of course, there are some continuities between peasants and farmers, such as the predominant use of family labor and agriculture as the main source of living, but these do not erase the differences.

Despite the huge migration from rural to urban areas, the overwhelming influence of urban life in villages and the transfer of labor from agriculture to the secondary (industry) and tertiary (services) sectors of the economy, it still cannot be said that there are no rural–urban differences in the

modern societies and that agriculture is no longer important. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU), for instance, has played a crucial role in European integration from its very beginning. The CAP became the blueprint for European integration. At conferences held in 1956 and 1958 the then six Foreign Ministers suggested agriculture receive special treatment, for which they had several reasons: the particular social structure around the family farm, the volatility of production, low elasticity of demand and differences in yields, input prices and revenues between the different regions. Emphasis was put on the importance of the farming population for social stability; the family farm was recognized unanimously as the way to provide this stability. Although the stress in the values usually connected with agriculture started to shift at the beginning of the 1980s towards the importance of agriculture for protection of the environment and preservation of the countryside, the 1988 Euro barometer opinion poll showed that the majority of the population of the European Community was prepared to accept special treatment for agriculture (Moehler, 1996: 1-2).

Agriculture in modern societies allows, apart from satisfying domestic needs, for the export large quantities of food products. This appears to be a powerful lever in world domination. No doubt, one of the institutions that contributed to this situation is the *agricultural co-operative*.

What is a co-operative? Agricultural co-operatives in modern societies

Besides competition, conflict, adaptation, assimilation, etc., cooperation is one of the most important social processes. It can be defined as a mutual effort for achieving common goals. Some theoreticians (for example, Kropotkin) even considered mutual aid and cooperation to be the main principles behind the evolution of living creatures, as opposed to natural selection and adaptation (Darwin).

Forms of cooperation can be classified in various ways. One possible classification is that of non-contractual and contractual forms of cooperation. *Non-contractual* forms of cooperation are those where there is no special contract between the cooperating parties dealing with the nature of the cooperation, its time, etc. This form of cooperation was dominant in pre-modern societies. But, rest assured, it has not completely disappeared from modern societies. It has survived due to the continued

existence of primary social groups in which its roots are to be found: mostly in cooperation between neighbors and relatives. Examples of non-contractual cooperation can be easily be found in peasant societies – it is in fact one of their distinctive traits.

During the first decades of the 19th century, Robert Owen called for *contractual cooperation* as a basis for a new social order, radically different from that of the existing *laissez faire* system. The second half of the same century saw the birth of the first *co-operatives* as a reaction to the conditions created by the industrial revolution. They formed the organizations of modern societies and one forms of contractual cooperation. Being organizations of poor people, their aim was to protect the poor from the rich, to reduce exploitation and to solve both economic and social problems.

In 1844, 28 English craftsmen (most of them weavers) founded the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, Ltd. This is often cited as the first modern co-operative. Owing to dissatisfaction with the retail shopkeepers of their community, they formed a consumer co-operative, selling primarily consumer goods such as food and clothing. Following the example of the Rochdale Society, the co-operative movement spread throughout the world and soon became highly institutionalized. Primary co-operative societies developed mutual co-operation, firstly at a national level, and later internationally. Co-operative alliances of twelve countries (France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Serbia, Denmark, the USA, Australia, India, Argentina and England) gathered in London in 1895 and founded the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA). The number of co-operative federations – members of the ICA – grew steadily ever since, and, in July 1998, ICA members numbered some 236 organizations from 93 countries; these organizations covered 749,100 primary co-operative societies and a total of 724,904,821 members (ICA Statistics – 1998). The ICA also provides definitions, values and co-operative principles. Their definition states that: “a co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically controlled enterprise” (ICA, 1997). Co-operatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, solidarity, honesty, openness, social responsibility and care for others. These values are put into practice through the following co-operative principles: 1) voluntary and open membership; 2) democratic member control; 3) member economic participation; 4) autonomy and

independence; 5) education, training and information; 6) co-operation among co-operatives; 7) concern for community (Ibid). The definition of a co-operative, the co-operative values and the co-operative principles help us to distinguish co-operatives from other organizations, in particular from business corporations.

The Co-operative movement found fertile soil among peasants. As small proprietors, and after the breakdown of the feudal system, peasants had to fight against cruel market rules and capitalist agriculture and industry. A look at today's statistical data on agricultural co-operatives in the fifteen states of the EU shows that European farmers have developed very strong co-operative systems: according to EU sources (COGECA, 2000), in 1999 there were 29,603 agricultural co-operatives in the EU, with 8,891,000 members. The leading countries are Germany (4,221 co-operatives and 2,957,000 members), France (3,750 co-operatives and 1,100,000 members), Spain (5,528 co-operatives and 1,247,000 members) and Italy (6,486 co-operatives and 899,000 members). The data that show the total turnover in 1998 was also impressive: 63 billion Euros in France, 38.28 billion Euros in Germany, and 22.74 billion Euros in the Netherlands. Agricultural co-operatives in the EU (as well as in the USA) deal mainly with *input supply* for farms, the *marketing* of their output, as well with *food processing*.

Agricultural co-operatives in Romania in the light of statistics

As already pointed out, one indicator of modernization in agriculture is surely the degree of transformation of peasants into farmers, including the development of co-operative movements. Farmers and their cooperatives are like "the chicken and the egg": there are no modern co-operatives without farmers, and it is only farmers who are able to form modern ones. Similarly, it is almost impossible to imagine the modernization of agriculture and transformation of large peasantry into farmers without the role of co-operatives. Agricultural co-operatives serve as weapons in the market. The market is a place of power struggles and not merely a mechanism for the "efficient" distribution of goods and services (Mooney, 1995: 155). Farmers and agricultural co-operatives go hand in hand, not one before the other or one after the other.

As the co-operative movement has been highly institutionalized, it seems quite logical to start from the data provided by official statistics of the ICA.

Table 1. – Statistical profile of co-ops in Romania.

SECTOR	Number of primary societies	%	Number of members	%	Number of employees	%
Agriculture	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Handicraft	1,100	32.0	140,000	2.7	84,000	58.1
Banking	1	0.0	4,598	3.2
Consumption	1,577	45.9	3,500,000	68.1	49,000	33.9
Credit	758	22.1	1,500,000	29.2	7,000	1.8
Insurance	1	0.0
Total	3,437	100.0	5,140,000	100.0	1,445,598	100.0

Source: Statistics and Information on European Co-operatives, ICA, Geneva, 1998.

If we relied solely on the table above (and ignored the obvious mistakes and dubious data) and tried to draw some conclusions exclusively on the data contained therein, it could be stated that, for example, there are no agricultural co-operatives in Romania (*Table 1* lists “zero” as the number of agricultural co-operatives). That would mean that the process of modernization of Romanian agriculture has not even started yet and that the backwardness of the Romanian peasantry is among the most extreme in the world. However, we should not forget that the ICA sticks to formal, institutional criteria, which means that it recognizes the existence of co-operatives in cases when: 1) co-operatives have formed a union and 2) that union is a member of the ICA. Thus, if we want to acquire reliable knowledge on the subject, we have to go deeper. Numbers

don't speak for themselves and they are simply not sufficient in themselves, given that sociology is, above all, about understanding social facts and processes.

Historical destiny of Romanian peasantry

"As a nation, the Romanians have suffered more than their normal share of warring and duress," states D. Mitrany (Mitrany, 1968: 3). This is actually true of the peasantry. In their own sad way, Romanian peasants fit perfectly T. Shanin's definition of peasantry as a social class (stratum) in an underdog position. The main trait that differentiates the destiny of Romanian peasantry under Turkish rule from the destiny of its Bulgarian and Serbian counterparts was the survival and existence of "original", "domestic" feudalism. Romania preserved its own aristocracy, its own landlords, owing to vassal status of Wallachia and Moldavia in the Ottoman Empire.

However, this did not help the Romanian peasants all that much. Although this feudalism was of a "domestic" sort, this did not mean that foreign powers did not have any influence on its structure and development. Especially during the Phanariote regime and the period of Organic Statutes, the Ottoman and the Russian Empire exerted their influence in a very significant way. Furthermore, exploitation was not reduced and the amount of money (taxes and bribes) and the quantity of goods taken from the Principalities was no smaller than it would have been in the case of direct Ottoman rule – Wallachia and Moldavia paid a very high social and economic price for their political semi-independence and cultural autonomy (Sugar, 1993: 281-282).

The agrarian reform of 1864 changed the form of this exploitation, but not its essence. Peasants gained the freedom of movement and they no longer had to pay their dues in labor, kind or money. However, most of land remained in the hands of the landlords. The only thing peasantry had, and landlords needed, was labor. The system of agricultural contracts, which became legal in the form a law, created "the new serfdom" (Mitrany, 1968: 66) which prevailed until the First World War.

The peasant uprisings of 1888/1889 in 1907 took the dominant classes and the political elite by surprise and made it clear to some of them that radical land reform was inevitable, but it was only the role of the peasants in the First World War which proved decisive. Even before war had ended,

the political elite “had seen the writing on the wall” and by means of extensive agrarian reform they swept the landlords out power, confining them to history. The average size of a peasant holding was 3.8 hectares, whereby for economic independence at least five hectares were needed. And it was holdings of less than ten hectares that characterized Romanian agriculture (Treptow, 1995: 418). Together with the extending of political rights to the entire (male) population, this provided enormous room for the creation of new political elite based on the peasantry. The National Peasant Party and its leaders played a most important role in Romania between the two World Wars, a time in which peasant estates were becoming smaller and smaller, due to the inheritance system, and when the problem of peasant debt became one of the most difficult national problems.

In these unfavorable circumstances, the co-operative movement among Romanian peasants did not perform badly at all. The co-operative idea (of modern forms of co-operation, not any idea of co-operation) came to Romania with the Saxon colonists in Transylvania. First to appear, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, were popular banks (rural co-operative banks), as a response to the fact peasants were suffering from a lack of capital and were at the mercy of private moneylenders who were “pulling their skin off”. Legal basis for the movement was provided by the Law of 1903, and by forming “the Central Office”, the State made attempted to bring the co-operative movement under its control. A further law, “the Co-operative Code” (1928), served as an additional proof of the State’s intentions.

After the First World War and the agrarian reform, the movement not surprisingly increased. Besides co-operatives in the financial domain, co-operatives of consumption and for joint cultivation of land also grew in number. In 1936 there were 4,084 agricultural credit co-operatives with 799,543 members. The number of agricultural co-operatives of consumption and production was considerably smaller, however, with 509 such cooperatives with 37,793 members in 1937 (Popovici, 1995: 50, 54).

Social differentiation only started in neighboring countries after the departure of the Turks. On Serbian territory during Turkish occupation there had been no difference between being a Serb (an Orthodox Christian) and being a peasant as stratification was based on religious affiliation. After the First Serbian Uprising of 1804, it became clear the land would be transferred into the hands of those who work it, and this indeed took

place soon afterwards. The breakup of the traditional *zadruga* and the influence of the money and credit economy left a lot of peasants with large debts. To prevent the creation of a landless rural proletariat, it was decreed in 1836 that a peasant's house, a certain amount of agricultural land and two oxen and a cow could not be sold or foreclosed for the payment of debts (Tomashevich, 1955: 38-43). The decree was renewed and modified in 1837, 1863 and 1873. Throughout the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, Serbia had remained a country of peasant smallholders, politically free but economically backward and indebted. Modernization was blocked from the inside.

After the First World War, an agrarian reform made and enforced in the new state framework eliminated the feudal estates in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohija and Montenegro, as well as the large landholdings of foreign citizens in Slavonia and Vojvodina. The agrarian structure of the country was desperately fragmented: in 1931, 67.9% of all landholdings were of up to five hectares in size. Peasant debt was a serious headache for all governments who tried, unsuccessfully, to deal with this issue during the 1930s.

Co-operatives spread quickly among the Serbs, first in Vojvodina at the beginning of the 1880s in the form of co-operatives for the joint cultivation of land (which actually consisted of joint leasing and tilling), and then in the Kingdom of Serbia in the mid 1890s as agricultural credit co-operatives, specialized agricultural co-operatives and consumer co-operatives. The establishment of the new state in 1918 brought with it new problems for the co-operative movement, especially in the form of the fragmented structure of various unions and laws that regulated the existence and work of co-operatives. Until the Law on Co-operatives was finally adopted in 1937, there were fourteen different co-operative laws in the country! Political parties and movements tried hard to gain control of the co-operative movement, as to a large extent it would mean control of the peasantry, the largest social stratum. The number of agricultural co-operatives in Serbia in 1940 was 1,894, which included some 15% of the population over 18 years old; 79.51% of these were credit and consumer co-operatives (Vujatovic-Zakic, 2000: 277).

After liberation, in Bulgaria (1878), Turkish holdings were divided among the Bulgarian peasants and the Bulgarian agriculture became "serbianized" (Palairat, 1997: 361). The bulk of these holdings were very small, allowing only primitive tilling for subsistence. As the inheritance system was the same as in Romania and Serbia, the fragmentation of

land continued. In 1926, holdings smaller than five hectares accounted for 57% of all holdings and by 1946 that had increased to 69%. While, several years before the Second World War, an average household had seventeen plots of 0.4 hectares each.

The co-operative movement easily found fertile soil in Bulgaria and co-operatives flourished in the decades preceding and following the First World War. They played an important role in the preservation of bearable economic conditions in villages. However, they also became the target of various political forces, mainly the Agrarians (the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union – BANU) and the Communists. Most co-operatives were credit co-operatives (supported by the state-run Bulgarian Agricultural Bank founded in 1903), but there were also insurance, production and marketing co-operatives. In 1939, there were 3,502 primary co-operative societies with 995,805 members, of which over 90% were peasants (Meurs, Kozhuharova and Stoyanova, 1999: 92-93). The State did not give up control of the movement, and co-operatives were used as agents with which monopolies of many agricultural products were acquired.

Thus, as the Second World War approached, although the starting position had been very different, the situation in the peasantry and co-operative movements in Romania appeared to be converging with that of Bulgaria and Serbia (Yugoslavia) in that there were a lot of small holdings, which were not suitable for serious modernization of production and this, together with the hidden effects of agricultural unemployment, limited peasant activity to that of producing for its own consumption. Moreover, peasant debt represented one of the worst economic and social problems of the time, most peasant co-operatives operated in the financial arena (credit), and political parties and movements, including the state itself, were trying to take control of the co-operative movement in rural areas in order to gain electoral support and economic benefits.

Socialism: collectivization of agriculture

Although the importance of the historical destiny of Romanian peasantry should not be neglected, we can rightfully say that the impact of the changes that had occurred during the socialist period, that is, during the greater part of the second half of the twentieth century, through to the present agrarian social structure, including agricultural co-operatives, have been much stronger and almost decisive.

The communist elites that took power in Southeastern Europe after the Second World War were confronted by very similar problems, particularly in the area of agriculture. Firstly, the situation was crying out for modernization. The backwardness of peasant agriculture was obvious: holdings were too small and fragmented, equipment and technology used for tilling primitive and obsolete, yields were low and production only for the consumption of the households dominated. Secondly, ideological pressure coming from within and abroad, that is, from the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party, was pushing them towards a collectivization of agriculture, as it had been carried out in the Soviet Union from 1929 to 1933. There was an economic rationale to collectivizing agriculture as modernization was primarily envisaged in the development of heavy-industry capacities. The accumulation necessary for this could be squeezed out of agriculture, though this would be extremely difficult to achieve without grouping tens of thousands of small peasant holdings into several hundreds or thousands of large units. "Economies of scale" were also expected to significantly improve agricultural production.

Of the greatest sociological interest was another aim of collectivization. This was legitimized by the ideological story of the "socializing of agriculture". Although most of the service and industrial sectors had been nationalized and all new capacities were built solely by the state, peasant agriculture remained the only sphere of activity not under the direct control of the communist elite. The elite were completely aware of the "unfavorable social structure", which meant the existence of large numbers of peasants who were private proprietors. Being private owners of the means of production, peasants represented a serious threat to the power of the communist elite, since they could manipulate a fundamentally important resource: food. Therefore, the class of peasants had to be eliminated and/or brought under the firm control of the system of economic planning. Any autonomous co-operative movement had to be made state-dependent and be fully controlled. At the same time, through their employment in the developing service and industrial sectors, the peasants would cease to be peasants, becoming industrial workers, clerks, etc. This was the purpose of collectivization. In carrying out this process, the communist elites counted on the not insignificant support they enjoyed in the village.

Nonetheless, at the beginning of their rule, the authority of new communist governments was still fragile, so it was decided to preserve

the political support of the largest stratum in society by drawing up and enforcing a *land reform*. It comes as no surprise that these land reforms further fragmented the landholdings and aggravated existing problems of the time. These land reforms represented a necessary “one step back” before making the desired “two steps forward”, that is, before collectivizing agriculture by transforming it into the *kolkhoz* and *sovhoz* system. Thus, during the early post-war years and at the same time as introducing land reform, the communist elites were simply trying to promote soviet-model agricultural co-operatives without the measures of force and discrimination.

The Romanian post-war government of Petru Groza expropriated all land of over 50 hectares and distributed it among 918,000 peasants, with some of the land becoming state property. In 1948, around five million peasant households cultivated less than 5 hectares, representing 91% of the total number of farms (OECD, 2000: 76). The first wave of soviet-type collectivization started in 1949. Initially, the process was very slow, and by 1956 only about 10% of arable land was part of *kolkhoz*-like co-operatives. These changed their official names several times, but were eventually named CAPs (*Cooperativă agricolă de producție*). In the second half of the 1950s, the second wave began and by 1962, the General Secretary of the Party announced that collectivization had been completed since most agricultural land was in the “socialist” (public) realm. The bulk of the land was in CAPs, though the state farms called IAS (*Întreprindere agricolă de stat*) were also significant. Only about 12% remained in the hands of peasants, mainly in mountainous areas where it was difficult to enforce collectivization (OECD, 2000: 76). However, this was the largest in Eastern Europe after Yugoslavia and Poland. In this process, *chiaburi* (the Romanian equivalent of *kulaks*) were targeted in particular. It is worth mentioning here that a considerable number of Romanian peasantry resisted collectivization, sometimes extremely violently (Roske, 1996/1997; Cioroianu, 2000), though other forms of resistance also existed, ranging from seeking shelter in a house and a village (Hirschhausen, 1997) to the well-known strategy in the whole social economy everywhere in the world of “they can’t pay me as little as I can work”. Throughout the socialist period and as compared with other socialist countries, Romanian agriculture with its CAP and IAS was among the most centralized. Private (peasant) agriculture was systematically penalized and discouraged, while state-controlled agriculture was extensively industrialized. And, although the regime

attempted to reduce the difference between living conditions in villages and that of cities (a constant theme in Romanian history), the gap actually widened.

In Bulgaria, a typical “land to the tiller” law was introduced, which limited privately owned land to 30 hectares in Dobrudja and 20 hectares in other parts of the country. In 1945, a model of new, state-supported production co-operatives – TKZS (*Trudovo Kolektivno Zemedelsko Stopanstvo*) was created. However, during the early post-war years, co-operatives were not required to adhere strictly to the model. By 1948, however, private industry and banking had been nationalized, private trade had been restricted, former political allies of the BANU had been eliminated, and the Party was able to start a collectivization campaign, accompanied by anti-kulak propaganda and measures. Growing hostility of the peasants towards communist rule and a fall in agricultural output forced the government to halt the campaign (Meurs, Kozhuharova and Stoyanova, 1999: 98-99). However the two further waves started in 1950 and 1954, respectively, allowed collectivization to be completed in 1958, leaving 93% of arable land in the hands of the TKZS. This was accomplished mostly by means of intense propaganda and measures of extreme discrimination towards private farmers, whose resistance was not strong enough to halt the process. State farms (*sovhoz*) were also developed in Bulgaria, but only occupied 3.5% of arable land. Throughout the whole socialist period, the state continued with agricultural reforms in order to increase production and strengthen its control of agricultural bodies. The main aim of which was the combing of TKZS to form larger units. This process peaked with the formation of 146 giant APKs (*Agrarno Promislen Komplex* – Agro-Industrial Complex) at the beginning of the 1970s. Problems caused by over-centralization eventually led to some decentralization in the 1980s, on the eve of the breakdown of the socialist system.

The Yugoslav communist government rewarded its peasant soldiers who had enabled the communist elite to win the civil war and who had fought fiercely against the foreign invaders. All arable land of over 45 hectares in hilly and mountainous regions and of over 25 to 35 hectares in the plains was expropriated and redistributed. As in Romania and Bulgaria, the first steps of collectivization came immediately after the war and were carried out cautiously. The Yugoslav version of the *kolkhoz* was the SRZ (*Seljačka radna zadruga*). The changed circumstances in its international relations (the conflict between the Yugoslav and the Soviet

political elite) served only to speed up the collectivization of agriculture. Collectivization was accompanied by higher delivery quotas, and this only served to make the peasant resistance stronger and more violent, particularly in Northern Serbia (Vojvodina). From 1948 to 1951, the number of SRZ rose from 1,318 to 6,797 (Vujatovic-Zakic, 2000: 291). Most of the SRZ were formed in Serbia. This was because the Serbian peasants, who represented the overwhelming majority in the formations of the National Liberation Army during the war, as well as in the units of the Royal Army in the Fatherland (RAF), were considered by communist leaders to be the most dangerous element. What followed made Yugoslavia, together with Poland, an exception in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.

In 1953, the communists realized that the kolkhoz system was not working and that output was falling. Stalin died that same year and the Yugoslav communist elite introduced a “softer” version of the communist ideology and social system called “self-management”. Most Yugoslav kolkhozes were dismantled almost over night. The second agrarian reform came into play: those leaving the SRZ could take with them a maximum of 10 hectares of land (15 in mountainous areas). The rest of land would be given to state farms and remaining co-operatives and this agrarian maximum (10 or 15 hectares, respectively) became a constitutional category. Following these events, over 80% of all arable land was in private ownership.

However, the communists did not give up the so-called “socialization of agriculture”. By using various means and forms of organization, they tried to include peasantry in socialist systems. First, after 1957, they experimented with “general agricultural co-operatives” (OOZ – *Opšta zemljoradnička zadruga*). During the 1960s, however, they changed their minds and introduced “self-management” in the existing co-operatives, transforming them into enterprises in which the peasant members lost all their legal rights to the benefit of the employees (and, of course, management). Finally, in the first half of the 1970s, the remaining co-operatives were merged with large agro-industrial companies as their source of raw materials. At the same time, private (peasant) agriculture, together with peasantry as a social class, were systematically suppressed. The use of non-family labor force was forbidden and peasants could not buy tractors or combine harvesters until 1967. They were also forced, by means of economic monopoly, to sell their output to state-run agro-industrial companies and co-operatives, which were characterized by

low prices, delays in payments, incorrect measuring, etc. The formation of authentic peasant co-operatives was out of the question. Peasants were to benefit from health insurance only as late as 1965, and social insurance in 1979. Pensions for peasants were paid later than others were, and their amount was ridiculously low (this is still the same today).

In all three countries the party-state tried to industrialize agriculture, but results were lower than expected. Nonetheless, great structural changes had taken place. Due to de-agrarization, industrialization, rural-urban migration etc., new interests had been created. New social groups emerged, such as the peasant-workers. The traditional village and peasantry, step by step, ceased to exist.

Post-socialist transformation and agricultural co-operatives

According to David Kideckel (Kideckel, 1993: 65), the Romanian revolution of December 1989 was an urban phenomenon. Demonstrations took place primarily in cities, while rioting in rural areas was only sporadic. The end of the much hated dictatorship in Romania was followed by a euphoria in which everything that was a symbol of the Ceausescu era was destroyed. The CAP, the Romanian version of Soviet kolkhozes, was among the symbols of his time. In some areas of the country furious peasants spontaneously dismantled CAPs, distributing the land among themselves. Sometimes this included the physical liquidation of animal farms and even of buildings. All political forces tried desperately to distance themselves from everything related to the overthrown communist regime, and so they raised their voices against the CAP. Despite the fact that many members of the former nomenclature could be found among the leaders and followers of the National Salvation Front (NSF), the political party also declared itself to be against collectivistic agriculture as its legitimacy was quite questionable before the first democratic elections. In February 1990, a governmental decree stated that all CAP members were to receive a plot of land of maximum 0.5 hectares.

However, after consolidating its power in the spring of 1990, the NSF called for "neutrality" with regard to all forms of property (Kideckel, 1993: 67). It was a typical indication that they were not ready to deal in a radical way with the forms of property established in the socialist period. In other words, that property was the basis of their power as members of

the former nomenclature. They simply did not want to “cut the branch they were sitting on”.¹

Nevertheless, pressure to introduce land reform was too strong both inside and outside the NSF (nor should pressure from abroad be overlooked). This group of neoliberals was mainly made up of those who had been wealthy in terms of land or other forms of property prior to communism and other anti-communists and former political prisoners. At the same time, the post-communists wanted to acquire further political capital by distributing property rights widely with the aim of gaining electoral support, presenting themselves as defenders of the “ordinary people” against the *nouveaux riches* (Verdery, 2001: 379; Swinnen, 1999: 15). This political compromise (which was dominated by the interests of former communists) and the reality that many CAP had already been dissolved, led to land reform in 1991.

Law 18/1991 achieved two things: land was distributed (or, more precisely, started to be distributed) among the owners,² while, at the same time, collective structures were liquidated. According to this law, the owners (or their heirs) had the right to reclaim land of between 0.5 and 10 hectares per person. Maximum land ownership per family was set at 100 hectares. The owners were obliged to work the land or pay a penalty. If, after all claims had been met, there was land left over, it would be given to landless members of dissolved CAPs. A further condition was that for a period of ten years the land could not be sold (OECD, 2000: 79).

As a result, over 3,500 CAPs were dismantled and more than five million people were involved in the process of redistribution, whereby an area of almost ten million hectares was to be distributed (Gavrilescu and Bordanc, 1997: 3). Wherever possible, livestock was returned to former owners, and most of the machines were allotted to successors of the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS).

The process was extremely slow. By 1995, only 44.2% of ownership deeds had been issued, reaching about 76% in 1998. Some factors that contributed to this were of an objective nature: after collectivization was completed, land use obscured previous ownership; boundary stones and markers did not exist anymore; a lot of people who moved to the cities inherited land – often they lived hundreds of kilometers away, and often did not divide the land among themselves, etc. These factors were used by the local elite, who often had been part of the agrarian elite in

the socialist period and who possessed political capital which they could use to acquire land illegally. The deadline for submitting claims, set first at 30 days, then extended to 45 days, was too short for many, however it favored the local elite (educated people, officials, people with connections) who had access to all the necessary instruments. They also used their connections to delay the resolution of some cases in order to benefit from the uncertainty and buy land (unofficially) at low prices. Not surprisingly, exceeding the 90 day deadline for handling cases was not met with penalties, unlike the previously mentioned deadline for reclaiming land! (Verdery, 2001: 384) Clearly, in their selective enforcement of the law, the political elite favored a specific group of people – the local elite.

After a change in government in 1996, some changes concerning the land reforms were made. Law 169/1997 extended the limit of restitution to 50 hectares, while Law 54/1998 increased this 200 hectares. The same law allowed for the free leasing and buying/selling of land. Land ownership by foreigners as non-legal persons was forbidden. The amended Land Lease Law (65/1998) abolished the minimum in the land leasing contract, banned subleasing and leasing to foreigners and introduced the requirement that a lessee-to-be have formal training in agriculture (OECD, 2000: 79).

It is worth noting that not all rural households supported the dissolution of the CAPs (Kideckel, 1993: 68-71; 1993b: 218-222), and this was the main fact that led to formation of new quasi-co-operative associations. Among their supporters were those who had depended on agriculture for a long time and who had accumulated sufficient tools and other resources necessary for private farming. The second largest group consisted of those who were simply fed up with the communist bureaucracy and decided to combine subsistence agriculture with moderate non-agricultural wages. Sociologically, the most interesting group of supporters of private farming were the members of local elites who had few economic skills, but who relied on their political and social capital, or, in other words, relied on transforming their political and social capital into economic capital. On the other hand, many households favored maintaining collective farms. They mainly occupied middle salary positions in CAP production and administration. There were also households who were deeply concerned about the risks and additional labor associated with private farming. Many of them had nothing to do with agriculture, and for them, land could become an unnecessary burden. In the first couple of years after the

Revolution, these divergent interests led to internal conflicts in some villages.

A dual agricultural system emerged out of the land reform (Tesliuc, 1999: 6-7). On one side, we find the small-scale subsistence farm sector, accounting for about 60% of land and livestock. It was totally disconnected from the market: 50% of food consumed by the average Romanian family is produced by the family itself, whilst for farmer-headed households it is 80%. On the other side, there are market-oriented agricultural producers, such as state farms (whose privatization started much later and also happened slowly) and commercial agricultural companies.

Table 2. - Land fragmentation in Romania: 1948 versus 1998.

% of farms	1948	1998
Under 1 hectare	36%	45%
1-2 hectares	27%	24%
Over 2 hectares	37%	31%
Total	100	100

Source: Tesliuc (1999)

The fragmentation of land was even greater than before collectivization started in 1948-49 (*Table 2*). Over four million landowners with average holdings of slightly over 2 hectares divided among several plots took the place of CAPs. The newly-emerged class of small-scale farmers – *peasants* – lacked almost any form of capital – economic, social, cultural or political. They had to cope with four major problems in their economic activity (Tesliuc, 1999: 30-32):

1. Most of the land was restituted to elderly people – peasants who were forced to join CAPs in the period 1949-62 and become their employees. Pensioners' households account for 41% of the rural

population, own 65% of the private land and work 63% of it. Young and middle-aged rural households, who could become the core of the future farmer class, did not acquire enough land.

2. The majority of rural households had no machines, so they had either to use draft animals or to hire machine services from the MTS successors (AGROMESC, whose privatization started in 1997), associations or those rare private farmers who possessed tractors or combine harvesters.
3. Excessive land fragmentation, which raised the cost of working the land.
4. In most rural communities there were no shops/points where farm inputs could be bought, or output collected. Agricultural credit was not available on favorable terms, so peasants relied primarily on informal moneylenders. The land market was absent as well.

We can add here one more important constraint: since most of the new landowners in villages were employees of CAPs for many years, usually caring out specialized work, they did not have the sufficiency of cultural capital that private farming requires. Private farming is a very complex job. It is necessary to be a farm manager, an agricultural worker, a trader and often a mechanic, all at the same time. Furthermore, decades of socialism, in which individual initiatives were suppressed, killed the entrepreneurial spirit of the people who were used only to situations in which somebody else was making decisions. An additional factor was the uncertainty of ownership, since the process of receiving land titles was very slow. And, in many cases, the people got the land in "ideal" plots, which meant they did not really know where their land was.

Added to this, new landowners from cities were incapable of working the land properly. First of all, many of them simply lived too far from their holdings. Usually they did not have any of the resources required for private farming: neither equipment nor machines, no money to invest, no agricultural knowledge. In most cases they simply did not want to engage in agriculture, but neither did they want (nor were they allowed) to sell the land they had, as in the years of economic hardship it would represent an important source of additional income.

It was from these two social groups that the members of new quasi-co-operatives were recruited from. Their common problem could be expressed in a very simple way: "We can't work our land. What are we going to do with it?"

The Law on land reform (18/1991) was accompanied by another law (36/1991) which dealt agricultural associations. The Law allowed landowners to join formal or semi-formal associations. *Societăți agricole* (SA) (Agricultural Societies) are legal entities with a minimum of ten members. The members can contribute land, machinery, equipment and other assets, including money. They are supposed to participate in the distribution of profits. If they contribute labor, they get wages.³ The members remain the owners of the land and they can withdraw their land from the association at the end of an agricultural year. The highest decision-making body is the General Assembly, while the Administration Board and the President manage the association. Some agricultural societies inherited buildings and worn-out machinery from dismantled CAPs. *Asociații familiale* (AF) (Family Associations) are not legal entities, but they have to be registered. They do not have bank accounts, nor do they have to keep books. In most cases they are based solely on verbal agreements and a member can leave at any time. Their internal organization is not formalized.

Law 36/1991 does not speak about “co-operatives” because the word itself had become a symbol of communist oppression.

It is important to notice that both forms of organizations are mainly engaged in production (which is usually not the case in the West) and that they have not built any superstructure, although in Romania in 1999 there were 3,573 agricultural societies (average size of a farm was 399 ha) and 6,264 family associations (average farm size 139 ha), with 16% share of the total of agricultural land (OECD, 2000: 82). SAs exist mainly in the plains since the grain production often requires machines and large land areas if it is to be profitable.

Obviously, AFs are not agricultural co-operatives. Firstly, they are not a modern form of cooperation at all, since they are not based on a written contract, but exclusively on the verbal agreement of the members. Their informal internal structure is the same. Most often they are formed by a group of relatives and/or friends, of whom some possess machines, while others provide land and labor, etc. They do have leaders, but these leaders can claim neither legality nor legitimacy. Disagreements and quarrels are common among their members, and often lead to their dissolution. Here today, gone tomorrow. It would be best to put them among traditional forms of cooperation, together with the other forms of peasant cooperation that have existed for many centuries.

The co-operative character of SAs is disputable. Though one of the co-operative principles requires co-operation among the primary societies, the absence of a superstructure (a union) of SA cannot be accepted as the decisive criterion because it becomes formal if taken separately. Equally, the simple fact that SAs are mainly involved in production and not in input supply, output marketing or processing is not satisfactory. In my opinion, there are more important features of SAs that prevent us from classifying them as agricultural co-operatives.

The rule “one man, one vote” means nothing when such a difference in capital resources (economic, political, social and cultural) exists between the members and the leadership, as in an SA. The same goes for the democratic control of the management by the members of association.

As already pointed out, members of SAs come from two groups of new landowners. The first, the new peasantry, lacks the capital required for private farming. The other, the city landowners, consists mostly of absentees. Members of the management of the former CAP (presidents, vice-presidents, and agronomists), mayors, professionals or other members of local elite, or “the respectable people”, as H. Mendras calls them (Mendras, 1986), usually make up the management. By exploiting the inabilities of the new landowners, they became the leaders of new associations, sometimes starting with the resources of “no one” of a dismantled CAP. The fact that many people got their land only as an “ideal” share of a large plot that once belonged to a CAP helped them a lot, as this practically forced the landowner to join an agricultural society.

Thus, the gap between the management and members is very deep. Control of the management through the General Assembly proves almost impossible. The new peasantry lacks knowledge, information and everything else necessary to exercise control over management, and thus, was easily manipulated by the latter. The absentee landowners cannot either do anything because they are simply not present. Even if they are educated and sometimes influential people, they are powerless at the local level where their cultural and social capital is worthless. We do not want to idealize management–member relations in Western agricultural co-operatives: it would be totally wrong to think there were no differences in capital resources between their management and members. However, the gap is not so big, and Western farmers possess some capital (land, machines, knowledge, etc.) that Romanian peasants do not.

The situation described here, accompanied by the absence of the rule of law, open the way for abuse. Of course, this does not mean that abuse must happen, or that it always will. But when an opportunity exists, it is most likely taken; the internal structure itself allows it. In other words, everything depends on the personality of the manager: if he is not selfish, he can and will do something for his employees, members and the whole village as well; if not, he will only fill his own pockets.

SAs are actually a kind of land leasing. Members put their land into an SA and receive rent in money, in kind or both. As an economic category, rent is a value fixed in advance. However, this rent is not. Members usually do not know how much (and what, money or produce, and what kind of produce) they will receive. Sometimes there are no written contracts. And even if written contracts do exist, they often contain special clauses that allow managers not to fulfill them, or are simply unenforceable. Managers, and nobody else, decide rents, all in an arbitrary way. It means that members sometimes do not receive anything at all except the explanation that “it was a bad year” or “the expenses were too high”. Members do not know how much is harvested or even what crops are grown. They are only interested in getting “enough to make a living”, that is, they use the products they receive to feed themselves and/or their (few) animals (Vintilă, 2000: 6-7).

Another strategy is delay of payments, which has become a “classic case” for socialist and post-socialist societies. If someone is weaker than you, you do not have to pay him. Or, at least, you can postpone payment for as long as it suits you. In delaying payments, managers can manipulate goods and money to their own benefit. Furthermore, some city people simply do not come to collect their rent. Why bother yourself and travel several hundred kilometers for a few sacks of grain? Furthermore, there are those who did not reclaim their land in the first place, or simply do not care too much and make no contract or verbal agreement with the management. During the socialist period, some CAP presidents recorded having smaller areas of land than was actually the case so that they could reduce delivery quotas. These false reports became official, and only the management knew how much land a CAP really had. Once the land reform of 1991 was in place, land claims could not exceed the official land area. Land did not disappear, however – the SA, as the successor of the CAP, is working this land.

Some SAs inherited some (usually obsolete) machinery from the CAPs. They sometimes use them to render services to villagers that are not

members of an SA. Here is one more option for uncontrolled management abuse. Moreover, the selling of produce is also out of all control.

Although it sometimes seems that presidents of SAs behave like the private owners of the association and land they work for, this is not so. Private property means a lot of things, and one of them being responsibility. Property not cared for in a proper manner may be lost. However, this is not the case with SA presidents, who are typical post-socialist managers. They exploit assets that do not belong to them: machines and buildings of an SA, land or member. They pay taxes, though not from their own income, since they are neither controlled from above, as was the case with CAP managers, nor from below, by the members who do not care so much for the economic performance of their SA. They will get their share whatever happens; if there is a bad year or the prices of agricultural products are low, they make the rent smaller or will not give any at all. For this very same reason, they are not interested in making any significant investments, such as buying machines, etc. Their strategy is not long-term. If the performance of the SA becomes unbearably bad, they can simply leave with no serious consequences. Somebody else will take their place and, most likely, continue to behave in the same way they did.

As with all other post-socialist “entrepreneurs”, managers of SAs feel themselves “at home” in the situation of anomy (Durkheim) when “the rule of law” is simply an empty expression, used as a demagogic tool. Instead of the rule of law, “the law of the jungle” prevails, which means that the rights of the weak are not protected. There are no limits to the rule of the stronger and more powerful. The absence of the rule of law appears to be a precondition for a specific post-socialist “first accumulation of capital”.

When the land reform was thought up, the limit to land claims per person (10 hectares) and land possession per family (100 hectares) was introduced because the lawmakers wanted to avoid unequal distribution of land and the exploitation that might follow as a result. As can be seen, exploitation was not avoided. It simply took a different form. It was the creation of a significant number of middle-class farmers in Romanian villages that was prevented. Until 1996 and the change in government, the state (read the political elite then in power) had done nothing to encourage small private farmers. In fact, they were discriminated against (Gavrilesco and Bordanc, 1997: 7; Tesliuc, 1999: 14). Most agricultural subsidies and credits went to inefficient state farms and other state-owned

companies. The exploitation through SAs and the emergence of large commercial farms was not prevented either. Input supply and output marketing was a state-run monopoly.

Was this sort of agricultural policy, sometimes called “the heavy hand of the state”, simply a mistake (Tesliuc, 1999: 16) or a product of class relations in Romania? It is not difficult to imagine the following class arrangement: local elites in the rural areas (“the respectable”) and the political elite, both mainly from the former nomenclature; they make a deal to exploit the peasantry economically and politically. The political elite allows the local elite to do what they do through the SAs and halts (or slows down), not only through the SAs, the formation of a class of middle-size farmers who, together with the Western-type co-operatives they might form, would represent competition to local elites and large private agricultural companies (including land leasing companies) with close links to the political elite. For their part, “the respectable” manipulate the dependent peasantry and provide political support for the government. The political elite get its economic share through the state monopolies in input supply and output marketing, including exports. The peasantry remains the underdog, poor, exploited and manipulated.

With the change in the government of 1996, the emphasis shifted towards state subsidies to private farmers and privatization of state farms, to the successors of MTS and state companies who dealt with agriculture input supply and output marketing. However, this new agricultural policy was hesitant and sometimes inconsistent. (Tesliuc, 1999: 16-18).⁴ Nonetheless, it seems that the latest change in government (2000) also represents a change in agricultural policy. A governmental decree from 2001 states that only farms larger than 110 hectares will be considered as market producers and are to be given subsidies. This means that subsidies will go to SAs and large private commercial landholdings, while most private farmers will not get anything. It is no secret that market-oriented farms can be much smaller than 110 hectares. In many Western countries, for example, they normally are. In 1990 in the UK, where farms are the biggest, the average farm had 109 hectares. France had 43.8 hectares, Germany 29.3, Spain 20.1 and Italy 9.4 hectares (Popovici, 1995: 76). The emergence of a class of middle-size farms will again be prevented, or at least postponed for some time. SAs will continue to operate in the same way they have been doing so far, and formation of Western-type co-operatives will either be unsuccessful or sporadic (Leonte and Alexandri, 2001).

In Bulgaria, a country that fortunately did not need a Romanian-type revolution to start its post-socialist transformation, everything proceeded in the way that was “the same, only a bit different”. The main political struggle concerning issues of land reform and the destiny of the Bulgarian kolkhoz system of TKZS existed between the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), actually the transformed Bulgarian Communist Party, and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) (Creed, 1998: 219). The BSP, whose leaders and officials were members of the former nomenclature, tried to preserve the existing village structures without making any substantial changes, since these structures, especially the TKZS, represented their strongholds in rural areas, providing the necessary political support for the socialists. The UDF favored complete liquidation of collectivistic structures in agriculture, hoping to undermine the influence of the BSP.

The Land Law was adopted in the Bulgarian parliament in March 1991, while the government was in the hands of the BSP. The post-war limitation of the size of private landholdings (20 hectares normally, but 30 in Dobrudja) was not changed and the creation of a land market was for all intents and purposes prevented. Immediately afterwards, the Law on Co-operatives was passed, which allowed old TKZS to re-register under new regulations, respecting voluntary membership and payments of rents and dividends to members.

The problems that occurred during the land restitution process were similar to those in Romania (“return to the future” – Giordano and Kostova, 2000: 11). By the end of 1996, only 58% of the claimed land had been returned. Real land restitution, with borders drawn, reached a level of only 19% of the recognized land by the end of 1997 (Kaneva and Mitzov, 1998: 6). Re-registration of the TKZS went smoothly as planned. Not only were their main traits and power relations maintained, they were also privileged in terms of distribution of resources and keeping the better land and resources. Moreover, during the period of uncertainty between 1989 and the land reform, many managers took advantage of their position and sold desirable TKZS property to their relatives, friends and business partners (Creed, 1998: 223).

The UDF won the elections in October 1991 and one of the first things the new government did was change the Land Law according to its preferences. Land market restrictions were reduced and the rights of landowners extended; limitations on landholdings were lifted. These amendments required the complete liquidation of the TKZS. Co-operative members (or their heirs) were to receive shares of the co-operative’s assets

on the basis of their contributions in land, labor, equipment and money. Special bodies, named Liquidation Committees (LC), were designed to replace the management of quasi-co-operatives. The task of the LC was schizophrenic: they were the managers of the TKZS and their liquidators at the same time (Ibid, 225). Small wonder then, that the scope for abuse was large. Members of LC were accused in many villages of buying the best assets (for instance machines) for themselves (from themselves!) and favoring their friends, relatives and business partners at auctions. Nor were accusations of corruption rare. They were doing exactly the same thing the members of the former nomenclature had done before them. People were different, but the social position they found themselves in was the same.

"The liquidators" were liquidating everything, not only abstract social and legal structures. Animal farms were dissolved, including stockbreeding funds. Apart from the TKZS, state farms, agro firms and scientific institutions were also liquidated. During 1993/1994 about 50% of the biological funds for stockbreeding were destroyed. Between 1991 and 1994, plant cultivation was reduced by 30% (sugar beet by 87%) (Stoyanova, 1999: 117).

In some villages, fierce struggles between the supporters of the UDF (who were members of LC) and the supporters of the BSP broke out. New co-operatives were formed, usually using the assets the former members of TKZS had acquired with their shares. The political conflict was transferred to the co-operative level: "*cherveni*" (red) and "*sini*" (blue) co-operatives appeared. It is worth noting that they were for all intents and purposes illegal, since they had no legal documentation pertaining to landownership.

In the land reform, more than five million hectares were distributed; the average holding in 1996 was 1.47 hectares (Valchev, 1999: 181). Thus, agrarian structures that appeared in Bulgaria after the land reform were very similar to those in Romania. Two social groups of landowners who were not able to work their land properly were evident: the first was that of the new peasants, many of them TKZS pensioners, deprived of all forms of capital – they had no machines, no money to invest, insufficient knowledge, their holdings were small and fragmented and many of them were just too old to be fully engaged in agriculture, so they practiced subsistence agriculture; the second was that of absentee owners who lived in cities, incapable to work the land they received.

As in Romania, working the land was the biggest problem. "Salvation" came in the form of the new quasi-co-operative, the ZPK (*Zemedelska*

proizvodstvena kooperacija – Agricultural Production Co-operative), that was the Bulgarian version of the SA. They were organized by the members of local agricultural elites, usually former presidents of TKZS or professionals who once worked in TKZS (agronomists, vets, etc.). In 1994, former members of liquidated TKZS started to pool their land and shares, bought some TKZS assets (buildings, machines, etc.) and formed a ZPK. Paradoxically, trying to eliminate the source of power of the former nomenclature, the new political elite with its agricultural policy actually created a situation in which the old cadres became irreplaceable. The members of the former nomenclature appeared again as the main actors, like Phoenix.

A ZPK operates like an SA in Romania. Members remain as owners of the land and they receive rent in money and/or kind. The main body of which is the General Assembly, which is supposed to elect and control the management. In 1997 there were 3,229 ZPKs, with an average of 764 hectares each, covering 42% of the total of arable land in Bulgaria (Ganev and Iliev, 1998: 143-145). This makes them more numerous, bigger in size and with a larger share of total arable land than the Romanian SAs. ZPKs (more precisely, around half of them) formed a union, the National Union of Agricultural Co-operatives in Bulgaria (*Natsionalen saiuz na zemedelskite kooperatsii v Bulgaria*). Through the Co-operative Union of Bulgaria it is a member of the ICA, showing that their co-operative character was internationally recognized. However, if we are to take co-operative principles seriously, ZPKs should belong to the same category as SAs. Again, the capital resources gap between management and members is too large. Democratic control is impossible and opportunities for abuse are many. Most ZPK economic performance has been very poor. About 40% of them do well, 20% are in bad economic position, 14% working for the sake of subsistence only, while 10% do not operate at all (Dobрева, 1998: 182). As much as one third of arable land in Bulgaria sits idle every year!

Since the social position of ZPK presidents is almost the same as that of SA presidents, they employ the same strategies as their Romanian counterparts – manipulation of rent, machines and funds. The ability of ZPK presidents to force new landowners to join ZPKs is even higher than in Romania as uncertainty is greater owing to slower process of restitution.

While Romania has AFs, Bulgaria has *sdruzhenii*. These are usually registered under Commercial Law as private enterprises. Although they have leaders, they are actually associations of peasants who work their

land together, often leasing other people's land as well. They seem to be firmer and more durable than the AFs in Romania. It is quite unclear whether they can (or will) be transformed into co-operatives.

The overall situation, as well as class relations and alliances are also similar: the absence of the rule of law that helps the powerful, the pact between local and political elites, the emergence of large private estates and land leasing companies (with holdings of around 500 hectares, covering 37% of total arable land – Mihailov, 2001: 6) with close connections to the political elite, as well as the absence of Western-type agricultural co-operatives. The final outcome is prevention or at least postponement of the emergence of a middle class of farmers.

The biggest difference between the Serbian peasantry and peasantry in other socialist countries of Eastern Europe (except Poland) on the eve of the breakdown of the socialist system was the fact that, from the 1960s onwards, a fairly large group of more than 100,000 peasant families (among them some peasant-worker families) experienced significant transformation (Mrksic, 1987: 154-155). Possessing machines and producing mainly for the market, these families usually had a younger labor force. Actually, it would be difficult to find an important trait that differentiates them from farmers in Western Europe. They acquired a significant amount of economic capital (with the short break, they owned the land, were able to buy machines, accumulate money and build large houses and economic buildings) and cultural capital (they did not stop working the land as peasants, unlike their counterparts in Romania and Bulgaria, so they also preserved their knowledge – acquiring new knowledge as well – and their initiative, having not been spoiled by the kolkhoz system).¹

Although it is true that the communist elite decided to accept nationalist ideology and make it serve its own purposes (i.e., preservation of their power), radical changes were introduced both in the political and economic spheres of activity following 1989. The agrarian maximum was abolished and the land market intensified. This led to sharper differentiation among peasants. In addition, some members of the political and agricultural elite started to buy arable land and had soon acquired very large holdings. The land taken from the peasants who left the SRZs in 1953 was returned to them by the law adopted in 1991. With this law, the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) tried to buy the confidence and the votes of peasants once more: no wonder then that the process itself was terribly slow and followed by many cases of abuse. "Self-management" was finally consigned to history and the co-operative

movement started again. New laws on co-operatives were adopted in the Republic (1989) and the Federal Parliaments (1990 and 1996). Soon, two types of agricultural co-operatives had appeared.

The first is represented by the cooperatives inherited from the socialist system. These cooperatives, which had somehow survived all the hardships they were exposed to during the previous four decades (forced collectivization and its failure, the period of “general cooperatives” and the period of “self management”), took the opportunity that the law provided and detached themselves from the agro-industrial companies they had been merged with. They were engaged in various activities, such as primary production, food processing, production of fodder, input supply and output marketing. A large part of their assets, taken from them by the state after 1953 and transformed into so-called “social property”, has not yet been returned as cooperative property, though the Law (adopted five years ago) states that this should happen. This can only mean that the agro-industrial companies and other “social” enterprises, which hold the bulk of these assets, are simply stronger agents, favored by the state, and that absence of the rule of law has been one of the main traits of the post-socialist transformation. Their economic position is further aggravated by the unfavorable position of agriculture as an economic sector. The internal structure of these co-operatives still retains a lot of the hallmarks of the socialist system. The post-socialist transformation-type managers, who care mostly about their own gains and too much bothered if the enterprise performs unsatisfactorily, and the employees who stick to the motto we mentioned before: “they can’t pay me as little as I can work” play the main roles in these cooperatives. However, it should be noted that employee influence decreased at the beginning of the 1990s, when management extended its authority. The influence of the members is usually very small, if not non-existent.

The new legislation was for the most part in tune with European standards and it enabled the appearance of new, spontaneously formed agricultural cooperatives (engaged mainly – but not only – in input supply and output marketing). These new cooperatives can be classified into two subtypes. The first is that of peasants, for it is peasants who have formed some of them; they have been controlled by (usually well-to-do) peasants (farmers). By organizing a co-operative, they strengthen their position at market, both with input supply and with output marketing. It must be noted that this subtype is not dominant among agricultural co-operatives in Serbia. The second subtype is that in which we put those

agricultural cooperatives that have been established by entrepreneurs who were searching for a way trade in agriculture and the way to avoid, at the same time, the taxes imposed on corporations by the state. They simply find at least ten people (that is the minimum the law requires) who own land and form a co-operative. In these co-operatives, members do not have a say at all, nor do they demand one, since their membership is fairly formal. A co-operative is run like any other private company and there is no doubt that the Serbian peasants see this point when they call these cooperatives “private”. The main problem for the Serbian peasants (at least for the most of them) is not working the land, as in Romania and Bulgaria. Their problem lies in the area of trade and marketing. This situation leaves room for entrepreneurs, who often have cultural capital (education) or social capital (friends, relatives and acquaintances of influential politicians and managers). The money these entrepreneurs create does not always flow down legal channels. If it did, the amounts would be too small for them to be bothering with peasants. Once again, the absence of the rule of law in the process of post-socialist transformation creates the possibilities for exploitation of the weak. Nevertheless, it must be said that the border between the two subtypes mentioned is not always perfectly clear.

Although it has got its superstructure (regional federations of cooperatives, the Cooperative Alliance of Serbia and the Cooperative Alliance of Yugoslavia – the latter being a member of ICA), the cooperative movement in Serbia remains relatively weak, fragile and exposed to the will of much stronger actors on the agricultural scene. Large commercial companies, agro-industrial companies, large landholders – they all see agricultural co-operatives of any sort as potentially dangerous competitors who might organize peasantry and reduce the exploitation, despite the fact that some co-operatives do serve the goal of exploiting of peasantry. The influence of these “big players” in the government and their connections with the political elite was obvious before October 5, 2000. The support of the former regime for peasants’ co-operative movement was support in name only, aimed at collecting as many votes as possible in the countryside. It seems that change of government in October 2000 did bring about the radical turnover in agricultural policy. Like in many other areas, “big players” in agriculture have established links with the new political elite in order to preserve their dominant position.

Between modern and peripheral society

It could be concluded that the situation of agricultural co-operatives as one of the indicators of modernization of agriculture in Romania does not promise much. Western-type agricultural co-operatives hardly exist, quasi-co-operative structures (SAs) are engaged mainly in production, while the capital resources gap between management and members of SAs is too large, preventing democratic control and encouraging abuse. Alternative associations (AFs) have not yet developed a co-operative character. The process of transformation of peasants into farmers reflects the development of co-operative structures: due to specific class alliances, the emergences of a farming middle class has been prevented, or at best postponed.

In Bulgaria the situation is almost the same, while in Serbia it is not much better. Although the Western-type agricultural co-operatives do exist in the latter, they are far from dominant. At the same time, the stratum of farmers that was created during the socialist period has come under growing pressure from much stronger actors.

In short, having no farmers or agricultural co-operatives simply implies that there will be no modernization of agriculture, and, in the end, no modern society. If the countries of Southeastern Europe dealt with are not heading in the direction of modern societies, then where are they heading? The alternative is not very attractive and could be called *peripheral society*. It is likely that this could be the destination of post-socialist transformation processes in Southeastern European countries. Peripheral societies have not been shaped by the image of the *center* (in this case, the center is the modern society of the West), but by its needs. Their social structure is different since it does not include a large middle strata; it is the unstable and potentially very dangerous structure, with a handful of rich on one side, and masses of poor on the other. Power-hungry and corrupt political elites on one side, and a fragmented and mostly impoverished population on the other. These societies are in "permanent transition". In the agricultural sector, this means that a class of landlords will appear in whose hands most agricultural land will be concentrated. In confronting them, masses of almost landless peasantry will emerge, together with a stratum of agricultural workers. Poor, uneducated, easy to manipulate, they will represent a constant threat to the stability of society. This does not completely exclude the existence

of the stratum of farmers; it simply means that its role and position would be marginal.

Are these tendencies visible in Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia? In all three countries, the winners of the post-socialist transformation process in agriculture are the members of the former nomenclature who managed to transform their political and social capital into economic capital. Managers of state farms and agro-industrial companies, presidents of kolkhozes and other members of the socialist agricultural and political elite – once defenders of communism – metamorphosed into the richest agricultural capitalists. Not only did they establish commercial companies for input supply or for trade in agricultural products, they also set up large capitalist farms by buying as much land as possible and by leasing the land from those who were not able to work it. Today, some of them are fabulously rich. Neither private farmers nor co-operative or quasi-co-operative structures represent serious competition to them. Is it necessary to state that their links with political elites are very close to the benefit of both parties? By exerting their influence on agricultural policy, they can have a say in the prices of agricultural products, export conditions and quotas and many other things that make them even richer. They even receive subsidies directly from the state budget, and that money comes from taxes! Are these people our new landlords-to-be? Or, as C. Giordano and D. Kostova put it, “a new class of quasi-latifundist owners” (Giordano and Kostova, 2001: 17)? Similar tendencies can be observed in other former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, such as the Ukraine (Krot, 2001), Poland (Wilkin, 1996) and even East Germany (Dequin and Krause, 1994)!

Although the people’s freedom of action is limited, it does exist, at least in some form. This is why the responsibility of the most powerful people and social groups is the largest. The political elites must face reality: they have to make a decision, have to take both the blame and the merit. The impulse to modernize has to come from inside. It is possible to influence and change the social structure. It is not that long ago, that it was done by the communist elites. Despite the fact that this part of the world has been witness to a quite unfortunate tradition of attempts to bring the co-operative movement under government control, the state must act in the way the government of the USA did in the early twentieth century when it began promoting and fostering agricultural co-operatives among American farmers. Without help, the peasants will not be able to do it themselves.

NOTES

- ¹ The same “neutrality” towards all forms of property was declared in Serbia by the SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia) in 1989 for the very same reason. As in Romania, “neutrality” really meant that the state (“social” in Serbia) property would stay privileged.
- ² Both in Romania and Bulgaria, the land included in quasi-co-operatives was been nationalized; nominally the owners had not changed.
- ³ Normally, an SA has only a few employees, the number increasing during seasons of intensive agricultural work. Many of them lack agricultural specialists and professionals.
- ⁴ It should also be said that the new ruling coalition was not immune to links with the agricultural elite (Wiener, 2001: 3).
- ⁵ Nonetheless, there were about 50,000 poor peasant families.

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PECULIARITIES OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN POST-COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: THE CASES OF MACEDONIA, SERBIA, MONTENEGRO, AND BULGARIA

Does Zero-Sum Social Reasoning Affect Political Culture in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Bulgaria? ²

One of the most widespread definitions of political culture describes it as “a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideas, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country and the role of the self in that system” (L. Diamond, 1994: 7). The concept is usually used as an explanatory variable in politics. However, I believe that “political culture” is not an explanatory concept by itself but a construct that needs to be explained.

Cultural explanations have recently been used to elucidate the relative failures of building democracy in Russia and some other post-communist countries. Indeed, why were some post-communist countries more successful in their transformation than others when the starting point for all was seemingly equal – the demolition of the institutions of the communist party-state? So, why did the point of arrival of the post-communist systemic change turn out to be different for various countries? And is it accidental that there are regional divisions in the success of post-communist transformation, the Central European countries being more successful than the Southeast European states or some of the former Soviet republics? Can it be explained in terms of the “wrong” democratic institution building in the unsuccessful countries, or are there other factors responsible for their relative failure to democratize? Can the concept of culture be satisfactory enough to explain the differences, and how can we verify a cultural explanation? And how could we explain the very cultural differences and similarities of regions and countries?

I argue that the cultural explanation of political change should be reinforced by a historical explanation – otherwise the specifics in regional and national political cultures would be viewed as unexplainable substances, as inextricable and unchangeable characteristics of the people inhabiting these regions and countries.

So, political culture will be defined in this study as an historically shaped popular perception of politics, a set of political loyalties, beliefs, values, and expectations (modes of social reasoning) that are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups. The political culture of Southeast Europe will be viewed as a subject that cannot be described in a straightforward manner but only in a step-by-step manner, thus revealing different levels and elements. Therefore, rather than using cultural explanation, I will employ a historical explanation in order to elucidate the peculiarities in the political cultures of the four Southeast European countries being in question.

The purpose of the project is twofold:

1. To provide a *picture of public attitudes and mental modes of reasoning* of the population in the four post-communist Balkan countries in relation to democracy and inter-ethnic understanding;
2. To try to *explain* the historical and cultural *roots* of these modes of social reasoning.

The *main goal of the analysis* is to find out whether there is a trace of some specific historical legacies of the region, reflected in the way of social reasoning of the population, and whether these legacies of social reasoning affect the level of democratic support and inter-ethnic tolerance in the countries under examination. Thus, the *main object* that will be studied is the impact of a prevailing cultural norm in the region which determines perception of social relations as a zero-sum game. The tradition of a zero-sum perception of social and economic relations has perpetuated the belief that ‘your acquisition of goods, rights, etc. is equivalent to my (potential) loss of these goods and rights’ (see Shopflin, 2000; Offe, 1997). The idea that both parties could gain is considered naïve and impossible. Actually, zero-sum social reasoning has its sources in pre-modern societies where it appears to be the main principle of resource distribution. It is, also, a characteristic of social reasoning in economically backward societies with long-existing patriarchal social structures.

I am going to examine to what extent and in what way this particular cultural norm influences inter-ethnic perception in the region and support

for the market economy and democracy. Also, I will try to verify whether the 'zero-sum game' perception of politics and inter-ethnic relations is accompanied and strengthened by the same pattern of zero-sum economic reasoning.

Between-country difference will not be presupposed on the theoretical level of the study. Thus, keeping in mind the differences between Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro I will not account for them at the level of hypotheses. Therefore, the between-country differences will be expected as a probable result of the analysis of empirical findings.

In order to understand the peculiarity of Southeast European political culture we have to define the main differences between the Western and the Southeast European models of historical development.⁴ The West European case will be used as a frame of reference through which the processes in Southeast European countries will be analyzed and which determines the way in which the comparison is made. The contrast with some Western historical peculiarities will highlight the differences that are considered significant for the purpose of the study, revealing the formation of the structural features that are decisive for the characteristics of political culture in the region. No axiological superiority or inferiority will be presumed during the analysis of the historical features of the two regions.

Peculiarities of Southeast European Cultural History

I will first try to clarify some of the most salient features of Southeast Europe's cultural history which are significantly different from those of Western Europe. The two regions have had different types of Christian tradition since the medieval period: the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox forms of Christianity. They have molded two cultural models, which have had important impact on the value systems of the populations under their influence. These two different civilizational orbits have created distinct popular understandings of the meaning of life and death, the role of action and its purpose in people's lives, the degree of solidarity between people, the way of life and the peculiarities of moral norms.

The distinct religious models have had significant consequences for the very mode of the relationship between the Church and the state, which was constitutive for the medieval society. Balkan religious culture was developed under the direct influence of Byzantine Orthodox culture

that relied on the Caesar-Pope principle organizationally connecting the Church with the secular political authorities. Hence, the Byzantine cultural model powerfully influenced the formation of Southeast European statehood. Not only Orthodox Christianity, but also the socio-political structure of the Byzantine Empire was taken as a chief model in the foundation of the medieval states in the region. These religion-based cultural features formed the consequent socio-structural and political peculiarities key to understanding attitudes towards political authorities, which have been reproduced and transmitted for centuries.

There were some peculiarities of the socio-political system of the Byzantine Empire which were different from West European models. The main aspects of the Western political tradition lay in the separation of religious and secular legitimization. The competition between the ruler and the Church made it possible for third parties to emerge with their own sources of power. Thus, autonomy and the separation of spheres and division of power remained a crucial feature of West European political patterns and became the foundation for the extension of liberties (see Schopflin, 1990). The Eastern cultural and political archetype was much more hierarchical than that of the West. One of its peculiarities was that religion and its institution, the Church, were subordinate to the state. The state itself was highly centralized. There were no landowners independent of the central authorities, and possession of land was arranged through a system of emperor's gifts. These were awarded to aristocrats who behaved in accordance with the emperor's will, and thus reinforced their obedience to him. This socio-political system of strong centralized state power with permanent mobility of the social strata was 'borrowed' by the newly formed Balkan states after the mid 9th century AD.

Thus, the state was the leading factor within the whole system of political, social and cultural relations. This feature defined property relations as well as the relation to property of the highest social stratum – the aristocracy. The aristocracy did not rely on private property, but on state distribution and redistribution. This maintained the position of state bureaucrats who depended entirely on the central power in the hands of the emperor. If an aristocrat at some time was a landowner, it was because he was in power at that moment – but he was not in power because he was a landowner, as in the case of classic feudalism typical of Western Europe. There was no feudal property with guaranteed immunity and, consequently, there was no feudal hierarchy, but state or political

hierarchy. The Balkan aristocracy of the medieval period was a political rather than economic category.

Like the aristocracy, culture and, in particular, religion, with its chief institution, the Church, were also subordinate to political power. Every change the political power relations influenced the Church and the clergy. What was true about the land gifts to aristocracy applied equally to the Orthodox clergy. Therefore, the model of Church power in the region during medieval times was also borrowed from Byzantium. Following the spirit of the Byzantine political conception, the authority of the Church was similarly subordinate to the Tsar, who appointed not only the high priests but also the very head of the Orthodox Church. Those who dominated politics also dominated culture. The state was that institution which determined the strength and the fate of culture (see N. Genchev, 1988). These peculiarities of the Byzantine socio-political model drove historians to speak about two different types of feudalism – the economic feudalism of Western Europe, and the political feudalism of the East European cultural model, which had its roots in the Byzantine cultural and political model.

The East European cultural model influenced to a significant degree the model of social and political relations in Southeast Europe. Contrary to the widespread argument about the interruption of the political history of the region due to the Ottoman invasion, recent studies underline the continuity between the Byzantine and the Ottoman Empire in respect to exercise of power and the centralized role of the state (see M. Mazower, 2000).

The institutionalized Balkan culture of the Middle Ages was destroyed as the only institutions of Orthodox culture, the churches, were ruined. The specific Caesar-Pope principle of close connection between the church and the state authorities meant that the destruction of state power by the Ottoman Turks was, at the same time, a cultural incident that destroyed the official cultural system and altered culture in its every-day forms, restricting elitist cultural creativity to a minimum. The religious centers, the churches, were destroyed during the beginning of the Ottoman conquest, and this caused deep changes in popular cultural life. Thus, for centuries, Balkan cultures lacked a stable cultural and ideological center (see N. Genchev, 1988). The dominant role of the Orthodox religion on the level of official structures was thus substituted by popular and every-day level Balkan culture. That culture of the low social strata perpetuated for centuries a strange mixture of the Balkans-Turkish mentality where

the cultural sphere coincided with every-day practice. As a result, the family appeared to be the main transmitter and protector of Balkan culture in its forms of native language and the Christian religious tradition. The latter was maintained only on the level of every-day morality. Thus, family structures carried out the functions of the whole cultural system, but on the level of archaic patriarchal every-day relations. The connection between individual and society was performed through low-level patriarchal institutions – peasant community and family, rather than through the high-level clerical cultural institutions as was the case in Western and Central Europe. For centuries, Balkan populations lived without national states and national churches. This has produced some important features in the meaning system and the social behavior of the Balkan people which can still be seen today. For all these reasons, both structural and cultural, after the Ottoman conquest, Balkan populations were formed and existed for five centuries as exclusively peasant in nature, with prominent egalitarian cultural characteristics which were enforced by the lack of hierarchical social stratification.

The exercise of power in the Ottoman Empire can be described using Weber's patrimonial type of rule. The distinctive characteristic of patrimonialism is highly personalized exercising of power, the absence of clear distinction between the state and the ruler's household, and of official from private affairs, the unmediated exercise of power, the personal obedience of officials to the ruler, the tendency to regard the state as a source of provisions for the ruler, and the use of tradition as a main principle of legitimization (see P. N. Diamandouros and F. S. Larrabee, 2000: 29-30). Therefore, in contrast to Western Europe, the legacies of Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire in respect to political power and state, on one hand, and civil society creation, on the other, were much more unfavorable.

Inter-ethnic Relations

The peaceful inter-ethnic relations enjoyed during Ottoman rule were due to the *millet* system – administrative structures containing subjects of the same religion and thus separating one religious group from another. The main pillar of identity was, therefore, religion. This peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence came to an end with the rise of the nationalist movements, which eroded the primacy of religious identity. Thus, in

contrast to the image of the 'ancient hatreds' often ascribed to the region, the inter-ethnic problems of Southeast Europe appear to be rooted in the relatively recent development of the region – that of the beginning of 20th century.

Zero-sum Social Reasoning and its Sources in the Southeast European History

As mentioned above, zero-sum social reasoning has its source in pre-modern societies where the zero-sum game appears to be the main principle of resource distribution. It is also a characteristic of social reasoning in economically backward societies with long-existing patriarchal social structures and a predominant peasant population. Peasantry is a permanent and overwhelming social category in the history of Southeast European societies. The most striking feature of Balkan peasantry was lack of the experience of serfdom during Ottoman rule (see P. Sugar, 1977). The system of serfdom was unknown here, in contrast to the Western, Central European, and Russian regions. The Ottoman political system was sustained by political and military power, but not through economic mechanisms, as it was in the Western Europe. However, the complicated system of ownership and the numerous taxes and restrictions on possession of land by peasants, along with some features of the peasant inheritance law, made impossible the maintenance of larger land holdings. This fact perpetuated the predominance of peasant petty landholders almost until the communist takeover. As a result of distinct property and power relations, the social structure of the region was quite different from that of Western Europe. It included a large peasantry and no indigenous aristocracy, features which fostered strong egalitarian attitudes among the populace.

The Ottoman conquest interrupted the elitist cultural line for a long time in Bulgarian, Macedonian and Serbian history. The old aristocracy was eliminated and, with it, the mechanism of transmission of the old cultural experience was abolished and the continuity of cultural production disrupted. The disappearance of the elitist line in Southeast European culture for several centuries caused irreducible consequences for its culture and popular social reasoning. It created a totally new condition in which these societies entered the modern period during the late 18th and 19th century (see N. Genchev, 1988). The lack of the intermediate body of

aristocracy and the lack of a religious-ideological center independent from the Ottoman state deprived Southeast European peasantry for centuries of an institution which could unite people and create the idea of a common virtue and a common good. Thus, it was very difficult for a peasant to go beyond his individual (close community defined) interests and to find the connection between the private and the public, or to be more precise, to see the link between the habitual perception of what is good for the community and the self, on the one hand, and the state, on the other hand.

High levels of distrust and vague idea of public good and public virtues facilitate zero-sum reasoning. It is reinforced by negative (Shopflin) or leveling (Diamandouros) egalitarianism that tends to cause the downfall of all that is different. The leveling character of the region's egalitarianism and the personified exercising of power within the Ottoman Empire contributed to the creation of a profoundly vague and suspicious perception of political power and of its most powerful institution – the state. Due to the highly personal and unmediated exercising of power, these societies were characterized by a weak capacity of formal structures (institutions) to protect subjects from the arbitrary exercising of power.

One additional feature of these societies is their strong antipathy towards political divisions (Diamandoulos and Larrabee, 2000: 35). Fear of political divisions is actually a pre-modern phenomenon and is usually a characteristic of societies with large peasant populations. For centuries, local peasant communities (whatever their criteria for distinction – religious or ethnic) existed in opposition to the Ottoman state and state-dependent institutions. The result was perpetuation of the conditions hindering the emergence of pluralist societies and the preservation of the zero-sum perception of power relations, limiting the acceptance of interests, compromise and positive-sum logics as constitutive attitudes required by modern politics (see Diamandoulos and Larrabee, 2000).

Thus, the overwhelmingly peasant character of Southeast European societies furthered the emergence of powerful collectivist attitudes and practices including the distrust of political division. Due to the belated and weak modernization of the region, which started at the end of 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, Balkan populations remained predominantly rural until the communist takeover. The economic backwardness of the region did not allow for the emergence of dense and numerous working class populations or a strong bourgeoisie. The social status of hired labor in agriculture and industry during the capitalist period

was also somewhat peculiar. A 'pure type' of people totally deprived of property, of the means of production, including land, existed in very limited numbers during the whole pre-war period. For a century, Balkan workers maintained the mixed consciousness of workers and petty owners. This peculiarity even survived communist modernization during which "the worker will continue to feed and revive the petty owner rather than the opposite" (N. Genchev, 1986: 153). Thus, weak class identification has remained a typical feature of the region because of the predominantly peasant nature of local societies until the communist takeover and even after it.

The bourgeoisie in the region also differs significantly from the classical Western capitalists in its genesis, scope of activity, and mentality. During the period of Ottoman rule, the egalitarian social structure was retained due to a lack of conditions necessary for the appearance of wealthy upper classes and economically independent social groups. Therefore, the bourgeoisie of the region was born from the peasantry and petty craftsmen through a difficult process and had no connection to the old aristocracy. It began its social life from a very low economic and cultural level (with the exception of Romania and to some extent of Greece). This meant that all characteristics of the peasants' social reasoning were applicable for the new Southeast European bourgeoisie as well.

The two principles of political legitimization in pre-modern society – imperial and religious – were quite weak in the region (see Diamandourous and Larrabee, 2000). From country to country, there are differences and peculiarities, which, however, do not change the main picture of pre-modern political legitimization. So, the tradition of weak political loyalties is deeply rooted in social consciousness within the region. The most widespread type of political allegiance is that of client-patron networks (originating from the political structure of Byzantium and then reinforced during Ottoman rule). This kind of allegiance is primarily based on informal and even family relations and is reward oriented. It is determined by zero-sum reasoning and additionally supports it.

The strong ethnic bases of state and nation-building processes as compared to civic processes in Western Europe presuppose a dominance of ethnicity-based national identities over political or class-based identities. This fact predetermined the leading role of culture (mainly folk culture) and language for nation and state-building as compared to the strong role of institutions in West European societies. Thus, national homogenization during the nation-formation period was primarily based on vernacular

ethnicity and not on the concept of citizenship, as was the case in Western Europe. Therefore, the very genesis of nation and state-building in the region presupposes the leading role of ethnicity for national and state cohesion. As a result, ethnicity, rather than formal institutions became the main component of national identities in the region. The ethnic foundation of the Balkan states is reinforced by language as the main indicator of ethnic belonging and thus the ethnic nature of the nation-state. Due to the lack of institution-based identity it is difficult to develop a civic dimension of nationhood. As Schopflin rightly points out, in the region civic virtue is collapsed into cultural virtue and is identified with mono-lingualism (Schopflin, 2000: 125). Language-oriented national identity is strengthened by the absence of developed high culture (replaced by traditional folk culture) which could serve as a useful ground for national identification.

Therefore, zero-sum game social reasoning supported by political loyalty organized around informal client-patron relationships, as well as a zero-sum understanding and exercising of political power in the period between the two world wars resulted in a very weak civic dimension of Southeast European societies. State-society relations in the region were characterized by the weak organizational ability of the social actors and a low level of interest articulation. The lack of historically produced intermediate bodies in the exercising of power undermined the ability of civil society to define itself actively in relation to the state and to develop and articulate a sense of collective civic identity. These peculiarities made difficult the appearance of a set of shared public values which form the basis of citizenship. It is almost impossible to construct citizenship on the basis of ethnic mobilization. Identification of the state with patron-client relationships reinforced suspicious attitudes towards the state and made problematic the development of a civil society in which the relationships between the public and private sphere are clearly regulated and transparent. Rather, an understanding of the public sphere as a privatized sphere has remained predominant in the region and has reinforced the patrimonial line in its development up to the present day. The communist regimes after the Second World War built upon the aversion of the Balkan population towards politics, and post-communist political practices in the region have tended to revive old "patron-client" relationships.

Communist Experience

The communist experience reinforced zero-sum social reasoning through the shortage economic system based on soft budget constraints and limited resources, material and symbolic goods (see Janos Kornai, 1985). That system bolstered the common understanding that resources and goods are given in unchanged quantities, so that one person's gain is another person's loss. It encouraged once again patron-client networks based on the illegal exchange of goods and statuses.

The communist state was successful in the creation of a rationalized etatic identity strongly dependent on the communist party-state as a substitute for civic identity. The modernizing attempts of the communist regime established a direct linkage of each person as an individual to the state, allowing collectivities to exist primarily at the level of socialist enterprises. Thus, the communist system did create a specific socialist identity with its own career patterns and public achievements. Within this type of socialist-etatic identity, each individual and community directly depended on the state for the redistribution of both material and symbolic goods.

Therefore, despite the forced modernization of the region during the communist period, there were two factors which reinforced zero-sum social reasoning. One is the shortage economic system, a limited goods system that turned family and friendship circles and even the communities of ethnic minorities into channels for the distribution of scarce material and symbolic goods. The other factor determining the strength of zero-sum thinking under communism is the forced atomization of society and the opaqueness of the public sphere over which the individual had no control. Thus, the public sphere itself exercised power over the individual. The fear and distrust created by the overwhelming 'public' sphere represented by the party-state was damaging to the emergence of a civic identity, a characteristic of developed democracies. Etatic identity was accompanied by the total lack of civil society. Additionally, the forced migration to the cities of large numbers of peasants, rather than dilute their way of life and social reasoning, turned cities into semi-urbanized areas (see Schopflin, 2000).

The unending zero-sum social reasoning typical of the region reinforced in turn the existing weak civic identity and was supported by common public distrust. Political distrust broke down only within close communities like the family and friendship circles. Thus, the communist system, which

aimed to exclude society from political power, in fact fostered its far-reaching de-politicization. It also strengthened the old Southeast European belief that nothing could be achieved through political action. This understanding is reinforced by the habitual belief born within the patrimonial state that those in power are substantially and principally uncontrollable, that they run society for their own private interests and that they are *a priori* amoral. Thus, the state and exercising of power by political authorities are evaluated by the moral criteria of good and evil. These tendencies of social reasoning concerning politics were intensified during the post-communist period. All communist deficiencies turned out to be counter-productive in the development of a stable democracy and civil society.

Post-Communism

The strength and the political role of ethnic identity depends on the strength of the state and civil society – *the weaker the state and civic identity, the stronger the ethnic identity* (see Schopflin, 2000). Post-communism in its early stage could be defined as a society where a weak state meets a weak civil society. Some authors even argue that the states disappeared along with the collapse of the communist states in 1989-1990. Thus, post-communism is characterized by the simultaneous construction of a new state, together with a new civil society. The degree of success differs from country to country, but it is least successful in the South East European post-communist countries, partly due to the long-term historic heritage of the region described above. Therefore, ethnic identity remained the only identity that could create a feeling of stability. The weakness of the state and of civil society leaves room for a strong ethnic identity after communism, not only in Southeastern Europe but also in the whole post-communist world.

Of central importance in this context are the conditions for the reproduction of zero-sum social reasoning. Two factors have strengthened it: first, the way in which political power is exercised, and second, the changed economic logic behind the redistribution of material and symbolic resources. These factors are strongly interrelated. From the perspective of political power, the client-patron relation in state governance has increased the level of popular distrust. There have been numerous attempts to build new party structures on the basis of client-patron networks, efforts

which follow pre-communist political traditions. Due to inexperience with civil society and democratic principles,

the existing rules tend to be weakly regarded and seen as facades for the pursuit of private interests. In effect, there is a very marginal sense of the public sphere and the public good. They do exist but they are destroyed by distrust, disbelief, and the conviction that the exercise of power is taking place 'elsewhere' beyond the cognition and control of the individual. (G. Schopflin, 2000: 179).

In the economic sphere, the low level of law enforcement and the undefined rules of the economic and political game have created conditions for frightening 'mafia'-type interests. Z. Bauman uses Turner's notion of *liminality* to express exactly that kind of absence of clear-cut rules (Z. Bauman, 1994). The prolongation of the *liminality* period, especially in Southeastern Europe, has made possible the political representation of 'mafia'-type interests through different political lobbies represented at governmental level. These lobbies have been able to control to their benefit, not only economic but even political processes in different countries. These post-communist economic and political developments have increased popular distrust of the post-communist economy and politics and reinforced once again the conspiracy way of thinking that looks for simple explanations in moral terms of good and evil.

Thus, political zero-sum reasoning, characterized by a low level of trust and suspicion that the country is run on behalf of a small number of people at the top of the political and economic pyramid (reasoning in terms of moral criteria of good and evil), is accompanied by zero-sum reasoning in terms of interests – my gain is your loss and vice versa. These trends reinforce the lack of co-operation in the economic sphere.

Basic Questions

The main question addressed by this study is whether the pre-modern cultural norm of zero-sum game reasoning that was enforced during the communist period still *dominates mass understandings* of politics, inter-ethnic relations, and economy in the region.

1) I Will examine to what extent and in which way that particular cultural norm influences the tolerance to ethnic minorities in the region, and support for the principles of a democratic regime.

2) I will also try to verify whether this cultural norm of 'zero-sum' perception of politics and inter-ethnic relations is accompanied and strengthened by zero-sum economic reasoning. In this context, I will also verify whether there *is an interrelation* between zero-sum economic reasoning and the same type of perception of politics and inter-ethnic relations.

3) The effect of zero-sum thinking on support for market principles will also be studied. I am interested to discover whether a rise in support for a democratic regime and market principles is accompanied by a corresponding decrease of zero-sum game reasoning.

4) Additionally, I want to verify whether the type of political representation of ethnic groups (corporative vs. civic) in the examined countries is based mainly on inter-ethnic social distances or if there are other factors that account for the choice of a preferred model of ethnic political representation over another.

I consider the corporate or power-sharing solution of ethnic political representation as a manifestation of zero-sum reasoning. This view is based on strong local arguments concerning the nature of inter-ethnic relations in the four countries where surveys were conducted. These relations have been formed by centuries-long peaceful multi-ethnic coexistence in the region, which came to an end with the start of modernization processes in the region in the late 19th and early 20th century. Thus, I do not aim to reject the conciliatory power of the corporate approach to ethnic cleavages. What I argue is, instead, that this approach to ethnic political representation does not offer a proper solution to inter-ethnic cleavages in Southeast Europe and could cause more harm than good.

The power-sharing solution to ethnic cleavages is based on the assumption that ethnic conflicts are created by contact between groups holding irreconcilable culturally rooted values, so what is needed is a separation of ethnic groups from one another through disconnected networks of social and political organizations. Thus, inter-group contacts are restricted to elites, and the leaders of each group exercise decision-making on issues of common interest (see S.L. Burg and P.S. Shoup, 1999: 6). The civic approach to ethnic political representation, which I

consider as most appropriate for the four examined countries calls for the avoidance of the definition of the state or state institutions in ethnic terms and the resolution of interethnic cleavages on the basis of civic solidarity and citizens' integration – irrespective of ethnic group belonging – into the common whole of a democratic and tolerant national community (see O. Minchev, 2000). I argue, therefore, that the more developed the civic identity in the four countries examined, the less profound the inter-ethnic cleavages – a correlation which I will try to test with the data collected.

I would like to note that the hypotheses I propose will not be focused on between-country differences. These differences (if any) would be a result of the data analysis.

Hypotheses:

1) Our first hypothesis is that there is an *interrelation* of 'zero-sum game' perceptions of the economy, politics, and inter-ethnic relations (Hypothesis 1).

2) Support for democratic regime principles is accompanied by non-zero-sum game reasoning about the economy, politics, and inter-ethnic relations. So, non-zero-sum reasoning will be one of the main determinants of support for a democratic regime (Hypothesis 2). I expect the same to be valid for the support for market principles – the stronger the market-oriented thinking, the stronger will be the non-zero-sum perceptions of the economy, politics, and ethnic cleavages (Hypothesis 3).

3) Zero-sum game perceptions are one of the main determinants of ethnic intolerance – the higher the ethnic social distances, the stronger the zero-sum political and economic reasoning (Hypothesis 4).

Empirical Findings

My first hypothesis states that there is an interrelation between zero-sum perceptions of the economy (both as general principles at the foundation of economic relations, and as a real result of the construction of the social matters in the country), politics and the model of representation of the interests of different ethnic groups in society. I have used factor analysis in order to check posited interrelationships (see Table

5-1). As a result of the factor analyses carried out for each country, I can conclude that there is a clear connection between zero-sum perceptions of politics and zero-sum perceptions of economic reality in Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro.

It is important to note that there are interesting differences between the Macedonian case and all the others. There is a clear connection between the non-corporate or civic vision of ethnic political representation and zero-sum perceptions of the real economic relationships where the two examined variables (48.1 and 48.5) compose one factor. In all other countries except Macedonia, zero-sum perceptions of ethnic political representation form one factor in combination with inter-ethnic social distances and are thus unconnected to other forms of zero-sum thinking.³

Therefore, we can conclude that in Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro there is a close connection between zero-sum perceptions of politics and zero-sum perceptions of economic relations as a current socio-economic reality. No connection between them and zero-sum perceptions of ethnic political representation is observed in these countries. On the other hand, in Macedonia, zero-sum perceptions of existing economic relations are accompanied by non-zero-sum perceptions of ethnic political representation.

Thus, we can accept Hypothesis 1 with the qualification that there are between-countries differences. In any case, we can conclude that probably in times of deep inter-ethnic cleavages what is reinforced is not so much the connection between politics and inter-ethnic relations, but that between perceptions of economic matters in the country and the concepts of ethnic political representation.

Determinants of Support for Democratic Regime Principles

With the exception of Bulgaria, the data (Table 1-1->1-4) corroborate Hypothesis 2 on the effect of non-zero-sum thinking upon support for a democratic regime. The more the respondents believe that the enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of its citizens, the more supportive of a democratic regime they are. This connection is observed in the case of both Macedonia (0.145) and Serbia (0.08), but in Macedonia, it is the strongest of all. There is no effect of non-zero-sum thinking upon support for a democratic regime in Montenegro.

While there tends to be strong non-zero-sum reasoning about politics among supporters of a democratic regime in Bulgaria, support for democracy is accompanied by zero-sum reasoning about the current rules of the economy and its principles as developed in the country in the years of post-communist transformation. This needs additional clarification. A discrepancy between political and economic post-communist reforms is the main aspect of Bulgaria's systemic transformation that should be taken into account when analyzing that period. Political reforms there started before economic reforms. Due to the lack of economic reforms, old socialist-type egalitarian and collectivist interests were kept alive during the whole period of post-communist transformation. The illegal and even criminal redistribution of national wealth has additionally strengthened zero-sum perceptions of post-communist economic rules among the Bulgarian population and weakened support for democracy itself, being as it the lowest among the countries examined. This can be observed when comparing the means of the indexes of support for a democratic regime in the examined countries (Bulgaria 6.43; Montenegro 7.75; Serbia 7.50; Macedonia 6.85).

In all the countries examined (with the exception of Montenegro), there is an effect of non-zero-sum political thinking upon support for a democratic regime which is more powerful than the effect of non-zero-sum economic thinking. We can make the general conclusion that, with the exception of Montenegro and to some extent Bulgaria, non-zero-sum thinking about politics and economy increases support for a democratic regime.

Inter-ethnic acceptance and lower social distances among different ethnic groups is another powerful determinant of support for democracy, though Bulgaria is again exception. The higher the acceptance of minority ethnic groups, the higher the support for democratic regime principles in Serbia (0.115), Montenegro (0.17) and Macedonia (0.08). There is no such connection in the case of Bulgaria. As far as there are no predominant inter-ethnic cleavages in Bulgaria and inter-ethnic tolerance is a natural and self-evident state of social relations, there is no causal relationship between support for a democratic regime and inter-ethnic social distances.

Thus, in all other cases, there is a direct connection between acceptance of minority ethnic groups and support for democracy – the higher the social distances between different ethnic groups, the lower the support for a democratic regime. Differences in the strength of this

correlation are due to the experience of ethnic conflict of the respondents in different countries.

Determinants of Social Distances between Ethnic Groups

The data (Table 2-1 -> 2-4) show rather interesting results, which may provoke some thought on the causes of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. They indicate that the most powerful determinant of minority group acceptance in Bulgaria and Macedonia is the belonging of the respondents to the minority groups themselves – it is the representatives of minority groups who are most tolerant to such groups (Bulgaria +0.30; Macedonia +0.25). This result indicates that there are serious inter-ethnic social distances among the ethnic majority and the minority ethnic groups in these two countries. However, in the Bulgarian index of inter-ethnic social distances this effect results from the very low acceptance of the Roma minority. Studies on the recent development of inter-ethnic tolerance show that in recent years there has been growth in anti-Roma prejudice, while negative attitudes towards Turks and Bulgarian Muslims have decreased (see A. Zhelyazkova, 2001b). The same effect of minority group belonging upon inter-ethnic social distances can be observed in Montenegro but is not so strong (0.15). There is no such connection in Serbian.

Support for democratic regime and market principles are the other powerful determinants of the acceptance of ethnic minorities (regression coefficients of support for democratic regime index: Serbia (0.11); Montenegro (0.12); Macedonia (0.10); regression coefficients of market thinking index: Serbia and Bulgaria (0.08); Montenegro (0.09); Macedonia (0.10). The support for the democracy index does not appear to affect social distances among ethnic groups in Bulgaria, however, for the reasons explained above.

There is an effect of non-zero-sum economic thinking upon inter-ethnic acceptance in the case of Serbia only. Therefore, we can accept Hypothesis 2 in this case. In Bulgaria, the zero-sum perception of the existing economic rules in the country (0.09) increases the acceptance of minority ethnic groups. This is due to the peculiarity of Bulgaria's post-communist transformation mentioned above. The rules of the economic game are perceived to be so corrupt and unfair that the very perception of the economic rules as corrupt fosters inter-ethnic tolerance. Zero-sum

economic thinking is accompanied by zero-sum political reasoning. Thus, low trust in politicians increases inter-ethnic tolerance (0.08) rather than decreasing it. This effect of zero-sum perceptions of economic and political practices upon higher inter-ethnic acceptance proves the existence of a deeply rooted culture of ethnic toleration 'from below', independent of the often contradictory interests of political elites and the poor economic results of their policies. On the other hand, suspicions of the fairness of economic and political practices in Bulgaria strengthens inter-ethnic acceptance. These results confirm Zhelyazkova's arguments that the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups in Bulgaria is rooted in the traditions of communal life and thus, is communal level determined. For these multi-ethnic communities

cooperative effort to resolve local problems is often a strategy for neutralizing policies initiated at the highest national level and thus diffusing their potentially explosive and destructive impact (Zhelyazkova, 2001b).

We observe very interesting results in relation to non-zero-sum perceptions of political representation of different ethnic groups as an independent variable. ("The leaders of our country should serve the interests of all the people in the country regardless of ethnic origin or religion" vs. "the leaders of our country should mostly serve the interests of their own ethnic community".) This variable is considered as an indicator of the respondents' non-acceptance of the corporate principle in inter-ethnic relationships. The strongest effect of non-zero-sum perception of the political representation of ethnic groups upon inter-ethnic social distances is observed in Bulgaria (0.14, Table 2-1). It also exists in Serbia (0.10), but there is no such connection to be found in the results for Macedonia and Montenegro. If we consider inter-ethnic social distances as deeply rooted and historically formed attitudes towards 'the others' which cannot be easily changed, we can say that the civic model of ethnic political representation is naturally connected to low interethnic social distances – traditional for Bulgaria and in Serbia, a result of the traumatic experience of war (see Zhelyazkova, 2001a).

Determinants of Market Oriented Thinking (Table 3-1 -> 3-4)

Of our dependent variables – the support for democratic regime, inter-ethnic social distances, and market-oriented thinking indexes – it is upon the latter that non-zero-sum reasoning has the strongest effect. In all the cases examined, non-zero-sum economic and political thinking appears to be a characteristic of the very market reasoning of respondents. Bulgaria is not an exception in this respect, although the effect of the variables of non-zero-sum reasoning is weakest in comparison to the other three cases (see Table 3-1).

There is an interesting relationship between the degree of development of the market thinking of respondents and zero-sum reasoning about ethnic political representation. This effect is observed only in the case of Macedonia – the more accepting of market principles the respondents, the more of a zero-sum oriented vision of ethnic political representation they have. Thus, they prefer the power-sharing solution to inter-ethnic cleavages, that is, they are in favor of ethnically-based political representation instead of civic-based (see Table 3-4). This finding provokes serious thought on the resolution of the inter-ethnic conflict in Macedonia. The civility of the economic reasoning of respondents there, which includes market-oriented thinking, does not suppose a choice of the civic model of ethnic political representation. This empirical result might be affected by the higher level of market-oriented thinking among the minority ethnic groups in Macedonia (Roma and Albanians) in comparison with the Macedonian majority. This disparity can be observed by comparing means of market thinking indexes within each ethnic group – in the Albanian community, the mean is 12.74, while in the Macedonian community, it is 10.73. However, even if this is the main source of that empirical result, it can only prove that ethnic minorities in Macedonia prefer the corporate representation of ethnic groups. There is no connection between the zero-sum vision of ethnic political representation and market thinking in all the other cases examined.

Another interesting result is the effect of inter-ethnic social distances upon market thinking – the more tolerant to ethnic minorities the respondents in Serbia (0.085), Macedonia (0.07) and Montenegro (0.13), the more developed market reasoning they have. Again, the only exception is Bulgaria, where there is no such connection. This again proves that ethnic peace in the country is deeply rooted and relatively independent from recent developments in social thinking.

Additionally, we should note the impact of socio-structural variables upon market thinking – the type of ownership of the enterprises in which the respondents and their families are employed and their occupational status are powerful determinants of market thinking in Bulgaria and Macedonia where economic reforms started earlier than in Serbia and Montenegro. In Serbia, socio-structural determinants on market reasoning are not connected to the type of ownership (private vs. state ownership) but to family incomes and the amounts of savings – the higher the income and the savings of the respondents, the more developed their market thinking. This is due to the lack of economic reforms during Slobodan Milosevic's rule.

Determinants of Ethnic Political Representation as a Zero-Sum Game (Tables 4-1 -> 4-4)

Hypotheses: I hypothesize that the main determinants of zero-sum ethnic political representation will be the low support for a democratic regime (H1a) and low inter-ethnic tolerance (H1b). Additionally, I propose that zero-sum reasoning about politics (H1c) and the economy (H1d) will foster a zero-sum vision of ethnic political representation.

This hypothesis (H1a) is proved correct for all cases examined. The same is true of H1b with the exception of the case of Macedonia. Inter-ethnic social distances have no impact upon the choice of ethnic political representation (civic vs. corporative) in Macedonia, that is, the acceptance/non-acceptance of ethnic minorities does not have a direct impact upon the choice of ethnic political representation. What matters in Macedonian is the perception of the economic game in the country as a zero-sum game. Thus, economic factors are more tightly connected with the choice of an ethnic political representation model than inter-ethnic social distances are. This finding means that the vision of ethnic political interest representation depends on other factors, independent from the deeply rooted and historically molded patterns of the perception of ethnic minorities and their acceptance/non-acceptance.

There is another interesting connection to be found in the case of Macedonia – that of civic self-identity and rejection of ethnic political representation as based on corporate ethnic political rights. The more respondents in Macedonia define themselves in terms of profession, the more supportive they are to civic rather than ethnically-based political

representation (-0.11). Here I find empirical support for my general theoretical conception of the way inter-ethnic cleavages can be overcome and controlled. I have stated that the more developed civic identity is in a country, the less profound inter-ethnic cleavages will be. The connection between civic self-identity and a non-corporative vision of political representation of ethnic groups is confirmed in the case of Macedonia.

Hypothesis (H1d) is partially proved by the cases of Bulgaria and Serbia – zero-sum thinking about ethnic political representation depends on zero-sum reasoning about economic principles. However, there is no connection between zero-sum ethnic political representation and perception of politics in terms of zero-sum game in all cases examined. So we can reject the hypothesis (H1c). Thus, the choice of ethnic political representation – corporate vs. civic – does not depend on the degree of political trust in the four countries examined.

Conclusion

On the basis of these results, we can infer that there is indeed a connection between, on the one hand, the cultural norm of zero-sum thinking about politics and economy, and on the other hand, the level of support for a democratic regime, inter-ethnic tolerance and the market economy. Generally, the non-zero-sum reasoning of respondents increases support for a democratic regime and a market economy in the countries examined and decreases inter-ethnic social distances.

This study thus proves that the political culture of a country or a region can indeed be better understood by looking at the historically formed construction of the modes of social reasoning in that country. It discovered that there is a connection between zero-sum social thinking and the degree of support for democratic regime principles, the market economy, and inter-ethnic tolerance. As a whole, the less profound the zero-sum reasoning of the respondents in the countries under consideration, the more supportive of democracy and the market and more tolerant to ethnic minority groups they are. Of course, there are deviations from this general tendency due to the deviations in the very social reality caused by the way post-communist transformation is implemented, Bulgarian being a case in point.⁸

We can infer that, in general, the development of non-zero-sum reasoning and of civic and individualized consciousness among Balkan

populations could foster democratic tendencies in the countries examined and could decrease inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts. The data analysis proves that the roots of ethnic conflict in the region could only be removed through the development and encouragement of modernization processes in the region. The findings also provide an argument against the corporate approach to the resolution of ethnic conflicts in the four countries examined and for the prevention of inter-ethnic conflicts on the basis of citizenship.

Appendix 1 - Data and methodology

The data-source of the analysis is an empirical survey based on a representative cluster sample of the whole population in Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia of over 18 years of age conducted between February and May 2001. For Bulgaria, it included 1200 respondents, for Serbia – 1000, Montenegro – 500, and Macedonia – 820.

I created additive scales, used as indexes, for some of those dependent variables in order to include a larger number of items as indicators for the mentioned synthetic dependent variables. These additive scales were made on the basis of the Cronbach's alpha coefficients (reliability item analysis). The received alpha coefficients are as follows:

	Serbia; Montenegro; Macedonia; Bulgaria			
Support for democracy index ->	0.60	0.59	0.63	0.63
Specific support index->	0.79	0.77	0.86	0.84
Market thinking index ->	0.85	0.73	0.70	0.86
European Union integration index ->	0.80	0.74	0.81	0.88
Inter-ethnic social distances->	0.96	0.96	0.92	0.93

The support for democracy index includes variables that measure some basic democratic principles, such as freedom of speech and freedom of association, multiparty system, need for free elections and parliament. The specific support index includes variables measuring support for the ruling government and for the main political figures ruling the country. The market thinking index consists of variables measuring acceptance of the withdrawal of the state from the economy. The European Union index represents the popular acceptance of the EU and support for membership in that organization. The index of inter-ethnic social distances consists of E. S. Bogardus scale.

I use factor and regression analyses in order to identify those variables which have the greatest effect on the dependent variables – support for the principles of democracy, inter-ethnic social distances, market oriented thinking and the vision of ethnic political representation.

8) Operationalization of the hypotheses

Zero-sum perceptions of politics:

Q20 – the country is governed in the interest of a small number of people, who pursue their own interests, or for the common good of all people;

Q38.5 – better not to trust politicians;

Q 38.7 – ordinary people are always excluded from power;

Q 38.8 – nowadays only people who want to get rich go into politics.

These variables could also be used as a measurement of the degree of political trust. I use it from a slightly different point of view – zero-sum perceptions of politics. It is well known that this type of reasoning is initially low-trust oriented and suspicious to all forms of political activity.

Zero-sum perceptions of economy:

There is one major distinction that should be made – I distinguish between zero-sum perceptions of the actual state of the relationships and transactions in the economy of the society the respondents live in, and zero-sum perceptions of the general principles underlying economic transactions.

Thus, zero-sum perceptions of the actual state of economy are measured by:

Q 47.5 – in our country when some people get rich, others necessarily get poor;

Q 48.1 – in our country a person can achieve a good life by involvement in illegal affairs and theft.

Perceptions of the very principles of the economy as a zero-sum game are measured by the following variables:

Q 47.6 – the enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of all citizens;

Q 47.4 – economic conflicts can be resolved in such a way that all parties concerned are winners;

Q 47.3 – in the economy some people's gain is a gain for the entire economy;

Q 47.2 – in business affairs there are not necessarily losers in all cases.

Zero-sum perceptions of interethnic relations

Interethnic social distances could not be used as a measurement of zero-sum perceptions of interethnic relations but rather as a consequence of that type of thinking. So, I use one variable to measure that kind of perception.

Q 48.5 – the leaders of our country should mostly serve the interests of their own ethnic and religious community vs. the leaders of our country should serve the interests of all people in the country, regardless of ethnic origin or religion.

As stated above, there are two ways of viewing the resolution of inter-ethnic cleavages – the corporate approach which emphasizes collectively defined rights (collective rights for minorities), and the pluralist or citizenship-defined approach which stresses civic solidarity and the citizens' integration irrespective of ethnic group belonging. The variable is designed to measure that type of vision of a preferred model of ethnic political representation.

Table 1-1: Linear regression results, dependent variable support for democratic regime index, Bulgaria

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	2.939		1.327
1.European Union integration index	0.114	0.16	4.581
2.Market thinking index	5.476	0.15	4.493
3. Satisfaction with the communist regime	-7.401	-0.135	-3.944
4. Parties serve leaders' interests	-0.238	-0.12	-3.593
5. Compare with economic situation of previous government	6.439	-0.10	2.938
6. Zero-sum economic principles	-0.146	-0.10	-2.699
7. Trust politicians	-0.142	-0.09	-2.446
8. Zero-sum actual economic situation – in our country some people get rich, others necessarily get poor	0.153	0.08	2.263
Observations: 1072	Adjusted R2: 0.42		

Table 1-2: Linear regression results, dependent variable support for democratic regime index, Serbia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	1.225		1.872
1. Comparison with previous government	5.067	0.16	4.728
2. Sociotropic economic attitudes – future 10 years	0.316	0.14	2.440
3. Parties serve leaders' interests	-0.122	-0.14	-3.881
4. Place of residence	6.296	0.125	3.365
5. Inter-ethnic social distances index	8.598	0.115	3.525
6. Market thinking index	1.755	0.09	2.595
7. Relative deprivation – compared with parents	7.958	0.09	3.012
8. Enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens	7.482	0.08	2.658
9. Trust politicians	-7.487	-0.07	-2.185
10. Ordinary people excluded from power	6.801	0.07	2.011
Observations: 1000	Adjusted R2: 0.30		

Table 1-3: Linear regression results, dependent variable support for democratic regime index, Montenegro

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	2.697		3.467
1. Inter-ethnic social distances index	9.721	0.17	3.004
2. Religiosity	-0.101	-0.15	-3.179
3. Choose own country	9.980	0.14	2.713
4. Trust politicians	8.574	0.10	2.039
Observations: 500	Adjusted R2: 0.23		

Table 1-4: Linear regression results, dependent variable support for democratic regime index, Macedonia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	6.199		4.718
1. Support for NATO membership	-0.590	-0.24	-6.621
2. European Union membership index	0.145	0.175	4.941
3. Place of residence	0.182	0.17	4.580
4. Enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens	0.234	0.145	4.424
5. Specific support	-0.225	-0.11	-2.557
6. In economy some people's gain is a gain for entire society	0.172	0.10	3.125
7. Education	0.170	0.09	2.611
8. Inter-ethnic social distances index	2.399	-0.09	-2.536
9. Go into politics to get rich	0.178	0.08	2.113
10. Monthly income	-0.120	-0.08	-2.057
11. Private entrepreneur in family	-0.291	-0.07	-2.192
12. Market thinking index	3.641	0.07	2.027
Observations: 820	Adjusted R2: 0.37		

Table 2-1: Linear regression results, dependent variable inter-ethnic social distances index, Bulgaria

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	4.891		0.602
1. Ethnic group belonging	3.634	0.30	7.780
2. Political representation of ethnic groups	0.570	0.14	4.268
3. Proud to be Bulgarian citizen	-1.054	-0.12	-3.595
4. Proud to be Bulgarian	3.039	0.12	2.896
5. Family income now compared with two years ago	-1.273	-0.11	-2.649
6. Place of residence	-0.609	-0.105	-2.676
7. Prosperity in Bulgaria through illegal affairs or honesty	0.292	0.09	2.461
8. Education	0.803	0.09	2.408
9. Market thinking index	0.165	0.08	2.207
10. Trust politicians	-0.855	-0.08	-2.414
11. In economy some people's gain is a gain for the entire society	0.818	0.08	2.471
Observations: 1072	Adjusted R2: 0.28		

Table 2-2: Linear regression results, dependent variable inter-ethnic social distances index, Serbia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	-6.176		-0.709
1. Security – only through good relations of different ethnic groups	0.555	0.12	3.413
2. Place of residence	0.800	0.12	3.212
3. Support for democratic regime principles index	1.521	0.11	3.525
4. Choose own country	1.178	0.11	3.175
5. Self-identification	-2.207	-0.11	-3.569
6. Satisfaction with the rule of Slobodan Milosevic	-0.455	-0.11	-3.169
7. Political representation of ethnic groups	0.466	0.10	2.936
8. Specific support index	1.439	0.09	2.260
9. Parties serve interests of their leaders	-1.029	-0.09	-2.453
10. Market thinking index	0.212	0.08	2.359
11. Enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens	0.903	0.075	2.410
12. Proud to be Serb	0.580	0.065	2.001
Observations: 1000	Adjusted R2: 0.29		

Table 2-3: Linear regression results, dependent variable inter-ethnic social distances index, Montenegro

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	-2.207		-0.189
1. Proud to be Yugoslavian citizen	1.892	0.18	3.811
2. Cooperative thinking	0.624	0.17	4.000
3. Ethnic group belonging	1.264	0.15	3.200
4. Support for democratic regime principles index	2.127	0.12	3.044
5. Market thinking index	0.564	0.09	2.307
Observations: 500	Adjusted R2: .35		

Table 2-4: Linear regression results, dependent variable inter-ethnic social distances index, Macedonia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	7.408		1.457
1. Ethnic group belonging	1.875	0.25	6.298
2. Trust Church	-0.767	-0.14	-3.592
3. Support for democratic regime principles index	0.350	0.10	2.536
4. Choose own country	0.577	0.09	2.567
5. Religion	0.677	0.08	2.177
6. European Union integration index	0.237	0.08	2.096
7. No differences between political parties	0.257	0.07	2.143
Observations: 820	Adjusted R2: 0.25		

Table 3-1: Linear regression results, dependent variable market thinking index, Bulgaria

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	12.671		3.698
1. Support for NATO membership	-0.970	-0.15	-5.140
2. Support for democratic regime principles index	0.368	0.13	4.493
3. Private entrepreneur in family	-1.694	-0.12	-4.325
4. Employment status	-0.308	-0.10	-2.848
5. In our country when some people get rich other get necessarily poor	-0.593	-0.09	-3.390
6. Satisfaction with the communist regime	-0.152	-0.09	-3.109
7. In economic affairs, one person's gain is always another's loss	-0.501	-0.09	-3.346
8. Trust politicians	-0.445	-0.085	-2.963
9. Age	-1.825	-0.07	-2.331
Observations: 1072	Adjusted R2: .037		

Table 3-2: Linear regression results, dependent variable market thinking index, Serbia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	20,080		6.509
1. In our country when some people get rich other get necessarily poor	-0.819	-0.145	-4.726
2. Not proud of being Yugoslavian citizen	0.551	0.13	3.731
3. Choose own country	-0.512	-0.12	-3.825
4. Family income compared with the average for the country	0.794	0.12	3.773
5. Support for NATO membership	-0.661	0.11	-3.490
6. Saving abilities of the family	-0.909	-0.10	-3.092
7. Support for democratic regime principles index	0.406	0.08	2.595
8. Ordinary people excluded from power	-0.399	-0.08	-2.457
9. Inter-ethnic social distances index	0.2778	0.07	2.359
10. In economy some people's gain is a gain for entire society	0.263	0.06	2.058
Observations: 1000	Adjusted R2: 0.36		

Table 3-3: Linear regression results, dependent variable market thinking index, Montenegro

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	16.461		7.752
1. Country run by few interests	-0.702	-0.16	-2.710
2. In our country when some people get rich others necessarily get poor	-0.345	-0.14	-2.579
3. Inter-ethnic social distances index	2.124	0.13	2.307
4. Trust politicians	-0.259	-0.11	-2.144
5. Non-cooperative thinking	-6.153	-0.10	-2.006
6. Place of residence	-0.199	-0.10	-2.084
Observations: 500	Adjusted R2: 0.22		

Table 3-4: Linear regression results, dependent variable market thinking index, Macedonia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	13.221		5.002
1. In economic affairs, one person's gain is always another's loss	-0.595	-0.17	-5.049
2. Specific support index	0.531	0.13	3.003
3. Vision of political representation of ethnic groups	-3.386	-0.12	-2.101
4. The enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens	-0.453	-0.11	-3.242
5. Ordinary people excluded from power	-0.401	-0.10	-2.790
6. Choose own country or not	-0.331	-0.09	-2.788
7. Type of property of the working place	0.284	0.09	2.018
8. Inter-ethnic social distances index	4.854	0.085	2.545
9. Support for democratic regime principles index	0.148	0.07	2.027
10. Have a private entrepreneur in family	-0.538	-0.07	-2.010
Observations: 820	Adjusted R2: 0.36		

Table 4-1: Linear regression results, dependent variable vision of political representation of ethnic groups – Bulgaria

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	6.262		3.267
1. Sociotropic comparison 10 years ago	-0.702	0.18	-5.555
2. Inter-ethnic social distances index	3.578	0.15	4.499
3. Conflict between people speaking different languages	0.394	0.14	4.581
4. Religion	0.373	0.14	3.424
5. The enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens	0.320	0.14	4.528
6. Ordinary people excluded from power	0.322	0.11	3.067
7. Saving abilities of the family	0.904	0.09	3.016
8. Self-esteem of social class	-0.379	-0.09	-2.335
9. Ethnic group belonging	-0.241	0.09	-2.001
10. Support for democratic regime principles index	9.754	0.08	2.008
Observations: 1072	Adjusted R2: 0.215		F-statistic: 5,113

Table 4-2: Linear regression results, dependent variable vision of political representation of ethnic groups – Serbia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	6.242		3.256
1. Dissatisfaction with regime of Slobodan Milosevic	0.166	0.18	5.141
2. Inter-ethnic social distances index	3.625	0.17	4.943
3. Support for democratic regime principles index	0.194	0.14	3.551
4. Choose own country or not	0.201	0.09	2.362
5. The enrichment of the state implies enrichment of citizens	0.176	0.07	2.119
Observations: 1000	Adjusted R2: 0.18		F-statistic: 3,897

Table 4-3: Linear regression results, dependent variable vision of political representation of ethnic groups – Montenegro

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	8.418		3.221
1. Inter-ethnic social distances index	3.210	0.16	2.819
2. Support for democratic regime principles index	0.215	0.14	2.467
3. Choose own country or not	0.263	0.11	2.019
4. Place of residence	-0.258	-0.105	-2.178
Observations: 500	Adjusted R2: 0.185		F-statistic: 1,916

Table 4-4: Linear regression results, dependent variable vision of political representation of ethnic groups – Macedonia

Independent variable	Coefficient estimate	Standardized coefficient Beta	t-statistic
Constant	-1,802		-0.164
1. No differences between political parties	1.452	0.20	5.608
2. Conflict between people speaking different languages	-1.296	-0.11	2.550
3. Self-identification	-2.373	-0.11	-2.986
4. Support for democratic regime principles index	0.675	0.09	2.227
5. Conflict between nationalists and those who are not nationalists	1.297	0.09	2.232
Observations: 820	Adjusted R2: 0.135		F-statistic: 2,252

Table 5-1: Factor analyses results
Bulgaria

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
*Trust politicians *Ordinary people excluded from power *Only people who mean to get rich go into politics *In our country when some get rich others necessarily get poor	*In business there are not necessarily losers in all cases *In economy some people's gain is a gain for the entire society *It is possible for an economic conflict to be resolved so that all are winners. *The enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of all citizens	*Inter-ethnic social distances index *Political representation of ethnic groups	*In our country one can achieve good life through illegal affairs or hard work (-) *Relative deprivation (comparison with parents when being the same age)

Serbia

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
*Trust politicians *Ordinary people excluded from power *Only people who mean to get rich go into politics *In our country when some get rich others necessarily get poor	*In economy some people's gain is a gain for the entire society *It is possible economic conflict to be resolved so that all are winners. *The enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of all citizens	*Inter-ethnic social distances index *Political representation of ethnic groups	*In business there are not necessarily losers in all cases	*In economy one person's gain is always another's loss *Relative deprivation (comparison with parents when being the same age)

Montenegro

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
*Trust politicians *Ordinary people excluded from power *Only people who mean to get rich go into politics *In our country when some get rich others necessarily get poor *In our country one can achieve good life through illegal affairs or hard work (-)	*In economy some people's gain is a gain for the entire society *It is possible for an economic conflict to be resolved so that all are winners. *The enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of all citizens	*Interethnic social distances index *Political representation of ethnic groups	*In business there are not necessarily losers in all cases *In economy one person's gain is always another's loss	*Relative deprivation (comparison with parents when being the same age)

Macedonia

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
*Trust politicians *Ordinary people excluded from power *Only people who mean to get rich go into politics	*In economy some people's gain is a gain for the entire society *It is possible economic conflict to be resolved so that all are winners. *The enrichment of the state implies the enrichment of all citizens	*Relative deprivation (comparison with parents when being the same age) (-) * In economy some people's gain is always another's loss *In our country when some get rich others necessarily get poor	*In our country one can achieve good life through illegal affairs or hard work *Political representation of ethnic groups	*Inter-ethnic social distances index *In business there are not necessarily losers in all cases

NOTES

- ¹ This study is based on a cross-national representative comparative survey, which I designed and commissioned in four Balkan post-communist countries – Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro.
- ² When referring to South East Europe or the Balkans I will mean the four countries being examined, with the exception of Romania which has some distinct historical peculiarities.
- ³ I assumed that relative deprivation would be closely tied with the index of inter-ethnic social distances. However, there is no such trend for all countries examined. Only in Macedonia and Bulgaria is relative deprivation is connected with zero-sum perceptions of economic realities.
- ⁴ The only peculiar case is that of Bulgaria, where zero-sum perceptions of economic reality and economic principles increase support for democracy. This peculiarity was explained in the study by the difficulties of the post-communist transformation in the country, the impact of ‘mafia’ type lobbies upon the slow economic reforms, and the persistence of ill-defined rules of the economic game for a long time during the transformation period. Thus, support for the democratic regime in Bulgaria is increased not only by zero-sum perceptions of the rules of the current economic reality, but also by the very zero-sum perception of the economic principles as such. Hence, the understanding of the general economic laws as a zero-sum game is influenced by the economic practices in the country during the 12 years of post-communist transformation. Here we cannot explain the zero-sum economic attitudes among Bulgarians by their ‘stupidity’ or ‘underdevelopment’ because there is nothing in the heads of the individuals that does not reflect the social reality they inhabit. The increased perception of economic rules in the country as a zero-sum game raises support for a democratic regime and inter-ethnic tolerance. This means that the low support for democratic regime principles and low inter-ethnic acceptance are defined by non-zero-sum economic thinking. Thus, the evaluation of economic reality as fair presupposes an anti-democratic vision of the socio-political system in Bulgaria and low tolerance to ethnic minorities.

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DEATH AND VITALITY IN MONUMENTAL ART IN EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

*La mort – une récomposition du passé qui
donne le sens du présent.*

M. Augé

A well-known and frequently quoted example reminds us of how the principles of the mnemonic technique were discovered in antiquity. In Book II of Cicero's *De Oratore*, Antonius discusses with his friends the value of memory training and recounts how one day Simonides had just stepped out of a banquet hall when the roof collapsed, killing all who had remained inside. Simonides was able to reconstruct the guest list by recalling the location of each person's seat at the table. By placing images in their spatial backgrounds in his memory, he managed to provide an account of the order, and to revive the identity of those who lay dead under the fallen roof (cf. Carruthers 1990:22, 147; Carruthers 1998:27-28, 197; Marin 1992:197-209).

There is a certain retrospective and retroactive potential in this mnemonic technique, which, though frequently referred to by scholars of memory, has never ceased to evoke amazement with the lucidity of its anecdotal wisdom. It is this potential and a line of figurative comparison, which draws my attention to this episode in the history of mnemonics at the beginning of this paper. Monuments of the socialist past – the primary object of my concern and research – have been important guests at a table, which has collapsed with the fall of socialism as state ideology in Eastern Europe. Whether completely destroyed, mutilated, or shaped anew, inscribed with new meanings, forgotten or merely neglected in the new contexts following the changes, the monuments of the period all share the same fate of remaining under a fallen roof. Any approach to

them is, therefore, an approach conscious of a crucial distance, seen through eyes which have stepped across the threshold of the destroyed house and have looked back to remember (mostly with the purpose of localizing in a proper way) the remnants of the presences that remain under ruinous cover.

Apart from the metaphorical potential of this image, there are two presuppositions I would like to emphasize before approaching closely the relationship between death and vitality in the socialist monuments of Eastern Europe. Looking back at the monuments of the socialist past is, as in the Simonides example, a step in the recreation through memory of things which were not imagined as possibly “dead” before the falling of the roof; that is, there is a certain shift in the relationship between life and death in these loci, and a different treatment and attitude towards them when looking back across the threshold. Death, as encoded and perceived in these loci, possessed meanings and sense quite different from that attributed to it after the regime of permanence in the socialist system of representation had been discarded. It is this core meaning of death, in particular, enclosed within temporal limits that this paper aims to trace while keeping at bay the husks of inscriptions and new meanings that inevitably appear in a post-mortem stage. A second presupposition that needs to be pointed out is that approaching the monuments of the socialist past in Eastern Europe represents in itself a mapping of monumental sites and forms which have visually stuck in our memory and which, to anybody witness to this epoch, can easily be recognized as being *present* there, not completely effaced by the passage of time. However – and this must be emphasized – “recreation” through memory does not have as its aim the reconstitution or re-legitimization of socialist monuments as important elements of the system of representation, nor the taking of sides in the agora of ideas sustaining or disclaiming the existence of socialist monuments. Rather, it is a look back to a time before the representative power of the monuments had come to an end, a time in which the presences of the monuments, having already lost some of their vitality, started for the most part to become realities of memory.

Fields, Limits, Contours

How can we talk of socialist monuments in Eastern Europe, when the face of socialism in the different countries throughout the region was so varied that their discursive practices frequently provide grounds for contrast? How can we refer to post Second World War monuments in Eastern Europe as representing history when up until 1945 national and regional histories had followed streams which did not at all appear to be flowing into the same sea? The various referential frameworks of these countries as regards what and how to commemorate up until the Second World War, their swerving paths of inclusion, participation, fighting, and resistance during the war, their fates and roles in collaborating with or opposing fascism, as victorious or defeated states at the end of the war, as having regional and local partisan groups or being solely dependent for their 1944-1945 "liberation" on the successes of the Red Army, and last, but not least, the various levels of their expressions of faithfulness and affiliation to the Soviet type of socialism after 1945, etc. – all these factors, as well as undercurrents, lead to the suggestion that monumental representation cannot be encompassed within a common realm.

Approached from the perspective of background knowledge and the undercurrent motives which are expected to help mold history into palpable representations, the map of Eastern Europe's monument history seems to be traversed by lines of distinctions and particularities. Among such distinctions and particularities, the following examples could be cited: the inexistence of monuments to the Soviet army and Soviet soldiers in post-Second World War Yugoslavia as compared to the common presence of such monuments in the other countries of Eastern Europe; the plethora of monuments dedicated to resistance fighters and partisan communists in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as compared to the rare presence of such monuments in Romania, Hungary, and East Germany; the different historical events and narratives used as legitimization in the monumental traditions in those countries after 1945; the ways in which these traditions were realized in national histories during antifascist and socialist movements, such as independence struggles, popular uprisings and revolutions, the First World War, etc. However, it must not be forgotten that, throughout the period of socialism, monuments in Eastern Europe were developing and attitudes towards them underwent important changes in different countries. While shaped generally as a representative form of visual discourse in the 1940s and 1950s, and legitimized by Lenin's plan

for monumental propaganda,¹ monuments took on varying functions and public meanings over time. Attitudes to monuments related to liberation from fascism by the Soviet army, for example, underwent a polar change after the 1956 Hungarian, and 1968 Czechoslovakian uprisings, as well as in the period following the rise of Solidarnost in Poland (cf. Béke 1992; Kubik 1994). Interest in raising “purely” ideological monuments in Ceausescu’s Romania appears to have been very low,² especially when compared to the persistence of such interest in neighboring Bulgaria, for example.

All these lines of general distinctions and peculiarities confirm that, with respect to monuments (as well as to many other spheres of life under socialism), no socialist country could be considered “typical” – each had its specificities, and each shared certain characteristics with some countries of the bloc, while differing from others (cf. Verdery 1996:11-12). While fully aware of the existing differences in monumental traditions in Eastern Europe during socialism, I have chosen in this paper to probe the possibilities and limits of a single analytical model. As K. Verdery points out, for analytical purposes, the family resemblances among socialist countries may appear more important than their variety (Verdery 1996:20), and their treatment “under one umbrella” may appear more productive in the attempts to reveal the generic underlying mechanisms of the cultural practices developed under socialism. The approach undertaken is, no doubt, preconditioned by the scope of preliminary research and by the nature of questions raised in the course thereof. Apart from the huge amount of data needed to be processed (most of it scattered among distant sites or in archives and collections that require direct access) and the various blank spaces that result from the attempt to map the problem in spatial and geographic terms, perhaps the greatest challenge to the historian of post Second World War monuments is the extreme variety of examples he/she is faced with. This variety is expressed in many ways, most importantly in referential terms: monuments to the Second World War, or monuments built simply in the period after it; monuments to the Soviet army in the region, or busts and statues built at former battlefields, concentration camps, and sites of destruction; monuments commemorating the war dead, or those raised in honor of the founding figures of socialist ideology, such as of Marx, Engels, Lenin, etc. Variety could be identified in the different functions of monuments – overtly commemorative monuments; explicitly celebratory monuments, attesting to victories in the war and the struggle for socialism; allegoric

monuments, as embodiments of everlasting ideas; decorative and artistic monuments, intended to fulfill a more utilitarian function, etc. Even a close observation of monuments of a predominantly commemorative nature reveals an array of types and realizations – societies in Eastern Europe created various forms of monumental expression: stone plaques, war memorials, brotherly mounds, collective or individual monuments, mausoleums, house-monuments, hut-monuments, museum-monuments, park-monuments, fountain-monuments, etc.

It is clear that, given such a wide range of aspects of the problem, any research on post Second World War monuments in Eastern Europe has either to be limited in scope, or sheltered within a framework large enough to encompass the numerous forking paths traversing it. In this paper, I have tended towards the second option, and, by means of discursive analysis, intend to investigate the implicit meanings of the relationship between death and vitality in post Second World War socialist monuments. This text aims to pursue the shaping of the socialist discourse of representation within the death and vitality idiom, within a framework of ideas that refer directly to death and overcoming. To this end, I have dedicated special attention to the particular ways in which death was encoded by means of metaphors of life and regeneration; to the representations of the body in statues and monumental ensembles – as dying but victorious, killed but surviving; to the special status of heroes represented in monuments – as split between life and death and sacrificing themselves in the hope of defeating the latter; and, last, but not least, to mausoleums of socialist leaders – as representing the power of ideas through the simulated and miraculous incorruptibility of their bodies. For all intents and purposes, this approach represents an attempt to look at socialist monuments not from the perspective of the overtly political aspects which monuments had and expressed, but from the view of those undercurrent motives and mechanisms for producing meaning in what was among the most representative of traditions in the socialist period. For, despite the varying faces of socialism in Eastern Europe and the different histories of attitudes to monuments and their referential potential, every country in Eastern Europe witnessed a wave of monumentalization and commemorations which, though subject to a cycle of different peaks and troughs over the years, nonetheless remained characteristic for the whole of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the search for a common key to understanding and explaining the ideological suppositions behind this wave is not only justified, it is also of utmost necessity.

Death and Sources of Life

As has been pointed out by most anthropologists and historians of death,³ the desire for immortality and attempts to transgress the finality of death can be considered universal (Heathcote 1999:6; Morin 1970:129). Death causes “disintegrating impulses” and “threatens the cohesion and solidarity of the group” (Gittings 1984:159), and most mortuary practices are aimed at fighting its destructive impact upon communities. The rotting of the body, especially that of kings or other special dead, is disturbing and often associated with a decomposition of social fabric. Anthropological investigations into practices related to death have often stressed that a corpse is feared because, until its reconstruction in the beyond is complete, part of the spiritual essence remains behind (Metcalf and Huntington 1991:81). To overcome this fear, present in all civilizations (Ragon 1981:5), mortuary practices include separation, transition and incorporation,⁴ and are aimed at establishing and reestablishing a proper relationship between the worlds of ancestors and the living. Of crucial importance for the life of every community is that its dead, or most significantly, its special dead, are manipulated in such a way so as to reduce possible hostility on their behalf and to make them serve broad societal functions. In such manipulations, in the rituals of treating the dead, and in the various expectations associated with them, the society of the dead is shown to be structuring the society of the living (Metcalf and Huntington 1991:83).

One of the most characteristic features of this particular relationship with the dead is the ‘alchemy’, identified by Bloch and Parry, by which mortuary ritual transforms death into fertility and life.⁵ Much of funeral behavior is an attempt to redress the imbalance caused by death by means of a symbolic increase of vitality. Initially expressed through mourning, extreme grief is often replicated and compensated for by great celebration, which finds expression in various festive, food-eating, wine-drinking, animal fighting and sexual themes. At the root of all of these lies the idea that “it is not enough merely to bury someone, or to dispose of a body: the survivors must bring a renewed conception and rebirth of their deceased kin to the world of ancestors” (Metcalf and Huntington 1991:129). In many religions the process of entering the world of the dead is interpreted as the inverse of the process of entering the world of the living, expressed in the belief of the resurrection of the dead, which can also be “understood as a resurrection of hope in survivors about

continuity in life.”⁶ As R. Hertz observes, the notion of death is closely connected to that of rebirth and resurrection, and the exclusion of the dead from the community (always followed, however, by new integration), has at its roots the impulse of resurrecting and symbolically reinstalling the dead among the living (cf. Hertz 1960:79, Seale 1998:67; Mathieu 1986).⁷ Resurrective practices restore a sense of basic security fractured by death (Seale 1998:4), and by stretching over this rupture it fights death, symbolically overcomes it, providing “proof” of continuities which death has tried to destroy.

The bones of the dead, as Hertz persuasively demonstrates, can become protective relics, representing benevolent ancestral spirits, and can serve as a main source in defining and sustaining the idea of the sacred, as well as of the belief that relics ensure the material bridge between life and death. Most clearly expressed in Christian tradition, though well-known to other religions and cultures, the belief that a “holy” body refers to a body which has overcome the corruptibility of the flesh, and that, by the relics it has left and the martyr’s or heroic narratives it has given rise to, it “stretches” towards resurrection, “strives” to take hold of time, overcomes time’s passing dominion. By their ability to fight the corruption of matter, dead bodies can turn into *vis vegetans*, *vestigium vitae*, and can serve as sources of life, as tools for transforming the pure negativity of death, as means of achieving fertility and hope. According to Hertz, the presence of the dead, duly honored, guarantees the prosperity of the living, and thus, by establishing a society of the dead the society of the living “regularly recreates itself”.

As validity of the symbolic mechanisms underlying religion, traditional culture, and folklore, these features of the holy dead have not lost their special importance for the modern methods of ordering and perceiving the world. It is particularly interesting to see how this functioned in the general discourse of life and death in socialist Eastern Europe, where the bodies of communist heroes, as represented by socialist monuments – dying but uncorrupted, victims but heroic in overcoming defeat, killed but victorious – are turned into images personifying death and the regeneration of life. Monuments built after 1945 in Eastern Europe provide numerous examples of a particular interpretation of death through the notion of vitality. The enormity of death in the War was replicated, not so much in images of mourning, but in abundant expressions of victory and celebratory spirit. Moving representations of “overcoming” death and surviving the finality of life, images of fighters going beyond the

limits of bearable suffering and trials of death, motifs of success and victory – all these flooded monumental space, affording monument stylistics a particular regenerative and optimistic character, stronger than the memory-ridden and painful. The death and vitality symbolism was often inherent in the very act of building a monument as it often coincided temporally with the reconstruction of towns which had been destroyed during the war or with the creation of the so-called model socialist cities in the 1950s and 1960s (cf. Aman 1992:147-164). It found expression in numerous architectural elements emphasizing the boundary between life and death, in details such as brass or stone wreaths, urns covered with stone flowers, and in eternal flames “frozen” into marble and concrete. All these, as characteristic elements of funerary art in general, were complemented by the explicitly celebratory mood of socialist symbolism – five-pointed stars, the hammer and sickle, pierced fascist casks, broken chains, unfolded banners, etc. The rhetoric of life as stretching beyond death is especially vivid in the inscriptions on monuments. The variety of phrases used were based on one basic formula – “you died so that we will live happily, and thus you will live forever”. The characteristic First World War monument formula “Rest in Peace” does not appear on the monuments of the Second World War, in which death is of more watchful and restless nature – as if only its standing to alert and incomplete separation from life could guarantee the peace achieved.

In all representations of life and death in socialist monuments a merging of the commemorative overtones with the language of the undefeatable can be witnessed; of the spirit of loss and bereavement with the pathos evoked by the victory of all progressive forces of the world against fascism. All monuments to the Second World War, including those at concentration camps and sites of destruction, overtly expressed the notion of victory – sometimes even displacing the representation of death. Inherently present in monuments to the Soviet army, or in those dedicated to victory in battle by communist groups, this notion appeared and often predominated in monuments to events which were not victories. Monuments in Pīrchupis (Latvia), Hatyīn (Belorussia),⁸ Lidice (Czechoslovakia), monuments to those who died in battle, the numerous brotherly mounds of soldiers who died at war, and even monuments at the sites of the fascist concentration camps – Salaspils (Lithuania, 1967), Treblinka (Poland, 1964), Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald (GDR),⁹ all these stood not merely as signs for the thousands and millions of tortured and dead, but also as a backdrop to optimistic and reviving spirit (cf. Kosellek 1997:148; Frank

1970:11 sq) which marked the period. In Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald, for example, statues depicted defiant male prisoners with raised fists and their staunch Soviet "liberators". As J. Young points out, they were not so much intended to mark loss of life but rather to illustrate the glory of resistance and to celebrate the socialist victory over fascism (Young 1993:74). In this way, Cl. Koonz observes, they taught the lesson

that fascism and monopoly capitalism bore the responsibility for the war crimes; that the German working class, led by the Communist party, and aided by Soviet troops, had bravely resisted Nazi rule; and that this heroic heritage set the stage for the GDR's unflagging battle against international capitalism in the future (Koonz 1994:265-266).

Similarly, the red stars on the memorial plaques at Auschwitz were not merely there competing with the yellow stars that symbolized the Jewish catastrophe, but were also rewriting memory through the narrative of heroic resistance which foreshadows victory. Or, to take another example, in the Warsaw uprising memorial, where the iconographic position is that of heroism rather than suffering" (Heathcote 1999:70), Jewish rebels are depicted sharing in much of the pattern of representation of communist fighters and heroes.¹⁰

Resistance in the East was symbolized primarily by the Communist party and by the martyrdom of its leaders (Young 1993:73), the same way as victory was appropriated only as a result of the exploits of the Soviet army and of the communist party members in the countries of Eastern Europe. This found expression in the numerous monuments to the Soviet army, the majority of which was created immediately after the war, before any other permanent symbols of power of the new political order existed (Aman 1992:35). As Aman has pointed out, there were already about 200 such monuments in East Germany by the 1950s, and in Poland there were more than 300 (Aman 1992:37). One of the most representative examples of this is the Soviet victory monument in Berlin-Treptow (1951), which can be regarded as a victory monument in the land of the defeated/ "liberated" (Aman 1992:23). It honored the fallen, but only those who fell on the winning side (*ibid.*), and celebrated the Red Army as a symbol of freedom and liberation. Occupying a huge amount of space, with brass flags, marble tombs, and mass graves, the Berlin-Treptow memorial has as its central the figure that of the liberator – a Soviet soldier with a child in his hands.¹¹ Monuments to the Soviet soldier were sometimes

erected on a hill above a town, so as to give it the symbolic function of a guardian protector outlined in the cityscape (for example, the monuments to the Soviet army in Plovdiv, Bulgaria [fig. 1]), at the very center of a city, or at one of its main entrances (for example, the monument to Bulgarian-Soviet friendship on the northeast side of Varna, Bulgaria [fig. 2]). In numerous cases, the figures of the Soviet “liberators” were



FIG. 1 – MONUMENT OF THE SOVIET ARMY IN PLOVDIV, 1956.
PHOTO: D. PARUSHEVA, 2002.



FIG. 2 – MONUMENT OF THE BULGARIAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP IN VARNA, BULGARIA.
PHOTO: N. VUKOV, 2002.

accompanied by representatives of national communist traditions. The monuments of the Soviet army in Sofia, Bulgaria (1954, [fig. 3]), for example, and Arad, Romania, (1959) – both very similar in composition and visual language – represented unity in the struggle and again employed the idiom of “liberation from fascism”¹² as a launching pad from where to emphasize the idea of post-war revival under the protection of the Soviet army.

Monuments did more than simply “commemorate” historic events – death had to be celebrated as overcome and defeated, with military parades, manifestations and festive celebrations taking the place of the cemetery pilgrimages that were the typical memorial-day activities of the First World War (Gillis 1994:13). Every year, monuments provided the venue for celebrating, with full military honors, the anniversaries of the “liberation from fascism”, of the Great October Socialist Revolution, of the dates when the Red Army victoriously entered the countries of Eastern Europe, etc. As they held special importance throughout the period of socialism, anniversaries regularly witnessed a wave of new monument



FIG. 3 – MONUMENT OF THE SOVIET ARMY IN SOFIA, 1954.

PHOTO: N. VUKOV, 2002.

erection – most of the monuments dedicated to Stalin in Eastern Europe, for example, were built either to celebrate his anniversary, or to celebrate the anniversary of victory in the Second World War. Monuments, as one historian of Bulgarian monumental art observed, were “connected with the necessity to create a celebratory mood and to decorate and aesthetically shape the town or the village” (Trufeshev 1978). This spirit of celebration and festivity suffused the whole context in which monuments of the period functioned. The laying of wreaths, holding of memorial celebrations, fireworks, oath giving rituals, etc. – these were all elements of a discourse, in which the enormity of death was encountered and surpassed by the vitality of the post-war period, by the notion of revival and rebirth following the war. Even special days dedicated to dead heroes and tragic events were “indirectly connected with the happiness of the overcome grievous occasion and the coming of a happy future” (Trufeshev 1978). All this not only made life and death exchange their meanings, but also helped reverse meanings, as if, in the dialectics

of the ideological context, life were dependent on death, and were centered permanently on its remembering and re-articulation, while death were infused with regenerative vitality, with faith in the control gained over the future.

It is important to point out that this particular form of interdependence between life and death was among the most important features of socialist art in general. While its emphasis varied among topics and motifs, it enjoyed a long-term presence in the art of the whole period. Vitalistic overtones were clearly expressed in the many pictures depicting construction plants and factories, of peasant labor, of harvesting and plowing, and in pictures of the everyday life. Images of cornfields as signs of fertility; of happy children and cheerful pioneers; of bread and wheat, which were present in almost every picture of socialist rural life; the visual framework of continuity and succession (such as that of the father with his son as a pioneer); images of miners and construction workers set against the background of new plants and factories – all these introduced emphatically the spirit of revival and regeneration which socialist ideology aimed to embody. These expressions of vitality were shown as parallel to the other major theme – that of death as remembrance those who had died for this earthly happiness. This topic was developed strongly in the visual representations of fights and armed battles of the Second World War, in the iconographic representations of dead heroes and of scenes related to their death in fight or torture; in the retrospective reading of national and regional revolutionary traditions; in the recurrent presence of the revolutionary and anti-militarist topics, etc. Death informed art, but at the same time, art was informed by the richness of ideologically shaped vitalistic imagery. Death and life not only permeated art through different branches of topics, motifs and images, but also reflected each other, not as separated, but as closely brought together components of a powerful *seme* of trials and salvation.

The general context of expressions of vitality in the art of the period is of particular importance for the understanding of how the death and vitality idiom functions in socialist monumental art. The compositions of many monuments included scenes representing the happy life established after the Second World War. Scenes of technological and scientific progress, of agricultural abundance and grandiose constructions were regular *topoi* of the various genres and functions of monuments. They were frequent elements of the friezes on Stalin's monuments in Eastern Europe (cf. Béke 1992; Aman 1992:181-210);¹³ were present on a regular basis in

monuments to the Soviet army in the region and in allegoric representations of victory (for example, the victory monument in Constanța, Romania, [fig. 2]); were inseparable elements even with brotherly mounds and war memorials (for example, the brotherly mound in Sofia, [fig. 3]). To give just one example – the image of the child in the soldier's hands (introduced by E. Vuchetich's monument to the Soviet soldier in Berlin-Treptow), found expression in numerous monuments of the period. Children were depicted as the first to meet the liberators and as happily rejoicing at the overcoming of the trials of war and the victory of socialism. Being in the hands of the saviors was meant to be the most secure position possible; offering a child to be hugged and caressed by the victors was considered a sign of utmost respect for their humane mission; having a child represented as rejoicing in the monumental composition was the most powerful way to introduce the idea of the happy future, which was believed to have been established with the coming of socialism. What is important to emphasize is that this atmosphere of the festive spirit was depicted as possible due to the sacrifice and dedication in battle, with continual representation in parallel pictures. The greater the happiness and rejoicing, the higher the cost paid for it. Images of war, soldiers on the attack and dying comrades, were inseparable elements of the scenes of victory – remembering death, though regarding it as historically determined and necessary starting point for the life to come. The carnage of war, the representation of which was primarily justified by its nature as a source of life and regeneration.

It should not be forgotten, however, that the relationship between death and vitality owes much of its specificity to the general system of representation during the socialist period and to the rules and visions regarding the function of art, which, though they seem distant and hostile to opinion today, not that long ago were believed to be innovative and effective. The transparency of meanings, the extreme "actuality" of art in the period, related to its high propaganda function. The concept of art as a weapon, fighting for particular goals,¹⁴ the context in which the language of art loses its variety and freedom and turns into a figure reflecting ideological postulates – all bear witness to a special mode of representation, which monuments of the socialist period used to demonstrate. In such a way, the real, though having been strongly proclaimed to be the ultimate and only goal of representation in art, fell away, leaving room for ideological assumptions and postulates to take advantage. But the problem is not only about the nature of truth and

about the validity of the real in socialist art – questions broad enough to be discussed here – it is, rather, about a symbolic technique, which preconditioned this particular relationship between life and death, and which, in constituting the very entity of images and meanings in monuments, was then itself constituted by them in a sort of reflexive dialectics. This happened because, “behind and between” the ideological suppositions and their monumental realizations, between the realm of instigating ideas and material bearers of representation, there were other forces that “ordered” and conveyed meaning to the world. Who would be considered as special dead and receive monumental representation; who would be regarded as a hero whose exemplary life people could follow; whose body would be accepted as sufficiently valid to cross the border between destruction and new life; who can retroactively be considered as being worthy of sacrifice – these are all issues, to which the answers formed not only a backdrop, but also the real means through which representation in monuments of the socialist past was made possible.

Bodies, Heroes, Sacrifices

The dynamics of the relationship between life and death cannot be traced without analyzing the idea of the human body represented in the monuments of the socialist period. On the one hand, it is a body, that is missing and which the representation aims to make up for, to recreate through visual means. On the other hand, we have the body’s exclusive presence in monumental art – a presence, which unites the missing body of the dead with the represented bodies of those who fought and who survived. Numerous monuments of the period include these two realms of bodily presence in representations of various sides and parts of monuments, in the inclusion of scenes of dying and victory, in the literal presence of the dying comrade in the hands of the surviving victors, etc. An important characteristic of these representations of death is that the figure of Pieta, so present in the visual art commemorating victims of the First World War, is distinctively absent from post-Second World War monumental art in Eastern Europe. Of the numerous examples of Bulgarian and Romanian monuments, which I have studied in some detail, there was only one monument, in Bulgaria, in which a true representation of a mother mourning above the body of her dead son can be found; while in the several others, in which a remote association to this theme is evident,

the mother is seen instead as carrying on the struggle or appealing for battle. The man-woman couple, representing death, bereavement, and pain for the irrecoverable loss, was notably replaced in socialist monumental art by a comrade-comrade couple, in which emphasis was given to overcoming death through war, and to the firmness and courage required to face war [cf. fig. 4].



FIG. 4 – MONUMENT-PANTHEON OF THE FALLEN IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST FASCISM AND CAPITALISM, VARNA. PHOTO: N. VUKOV, 2002.

An important aspect of the specific representation of the body in socialist monumental art is that it is a body shown as being in a state of torture – tense and mobilized in its stature of protest, wounded and mutilated, but nonetheless victorious. It is a body in a restless state; its handsomeness and dignity lies precisely in its fearless opposition to death, its ability to transcend death and its transfiguration by death. The wounded and dying body was turned into a position of central significance in this ideological and representative discourse. However, it was not a *transi* body – a representation of the corpse in the process of decay as in the typical representations of the effigy in the fifteenth century¹⁵ – rather it was a body mobilized and tense so as to provide firm grounds for the metaphor of death overcome. Even when represented as ugly, crude, and subject to fragmentation, the body of the dead was aestheticized within the sphere of the metaphor and within the ideological coverage it aimed to sustain. The totality and enormity of death and pain was mirrored by the totality of the indestructible and incorruptible bodies in fight, by the corporeal wholeness they managed to preserve in trials and in death. This is why, the body of the victor in monuments of the socialist period who literally survived death so often cannot be distinguished from the body that died but scored victory over death through the legitimacy of the ideas. They might stand together, line in line, forming one community of intransient nature, or they might merge their statuses within figures, in which commemorative and celebratory elements are closely intertwined.

The indestructible status of the dead bodies was perhaps the strongest vehicle with which incorruptibility was delivered to the socialist idea and the universalist dimension it claimed to possess in the post-war period. At its core, this reflected on a well-outlined feature of the discourse of the period – that of the utter unity of ideological and social systems “modeled around bodily organization” (Hillman and Mazzio 1997:xiii). As Mary Douglas points out, “the human body is always treated as an image of society and ... there can be no natural way of considering the body that does not involve at the same time a social dimension” (cf. Douglas 1982:70; Laqueur 1987:4). Socialist monumental art testifies to a new discourse of the body that dominated the period, which, to use Gallagher and Laqueur’s description of the nineteenth-century discourse, “not only attributed a new set of social, political, and cultural meanings to bodies but also placed them at the very center of social, political, and cultural signification” (Gallagher and Laqueur 1987:vii). The body as represented in monuments was one of the chief loci, where ideas about

destruction, corruption, and, notably, about the possibility of overcoming death and generating belief in the building of a new life in the post-war period were most richly expressed. The miraculously surviving body surpassing corporeal finitude, the mobilized body – perfect in its pre-mortem dedication to the idea – became an important tool for establishing the hope of a perfect society and the ideas of order and harmony claimed to have been established with the end of the Second World War.

The female body also played a very specific role in this dialectics of life and death. Up to the 1940s, the representation of women in public monuments was predominantly that of allegorical embodiments of ideas, such as, independence, freedom, victory, etc.¹⁶ – all essentially different from the realm of images and meanings attributed to men in their monumental representation, mainly that of fighters and the fallen in battle, as the objects of mostly metonymical, rather than allegorical, representative techniques. The new ideological and imagerial discourse preserved some of the basic elements of this fundamental division between the sexes as belonging to separate realms of representation, but it did make some steps towards bridging this difference, to including it in one homogeneous realm of images and meanings. Although the allegorical representations of women continued to abound in the post-Second World War period, they were complemented by the proliferation of monumental images of women as being equal to men in life and death, as sharing one similar and often identical fate in the carnage of war and rebellion. The introduction of the woman-hero, of the female partisan in the heroic pantheon [cf. fig. 5] had lasting significance for social, political, and ideological dispositions, and for the general system of representation in the period. The female body was not only that of mother bereaved by the loss of her sons (as so often had been her basic function in the monuments of the First World War), not only the maiden, whose image could take on important humanistic ideals, rather, for the most part, it had already become the figure of the rebellious woman, who had fought shoulder to shoulder with men in the struggle and has taken a share in the heroic life and death of men. The corporeal concreteness of women's bodies in monuments of the socialist period also took on an enormous new weight of cultural meaning. The reproductive potential of women's bodies was complemented and expanded into another version of reproductivity – that of dying in armed struggle and resurrection by the validity and incorruptibility of ideas. In this new vision of women's symbolic potential, the female and male variants of sacrifice and reproductive suffering for



FIG. 5 – BROTHERLY MOUND TO THE FALLEN IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST FASCISM AND CAPITALISM, SOFIA. PHOTO: N. VUKOV, 2002.

the community tended to merge, becoming one dominant discourse of reproducing the future through fight, of recreating the socialist idea through the trials of death.

All this helps outline important characteristics of the notion of the hero as envisioned by socialist ideology and represented in monuments. Heroes are split between life and death – they have either died for the realization of ideas or, having faced death in the struggle, survived victoriously.¹⁷ The ancient division between heroes and martyrs, between heroes and victims, has been notably reshaped in the socialist pantheon in favor of the heroic status. No one could remain merely a victim of the fight; nobody could stay immobilized or untouched by the polar disposition of struggle. The choice in interpreting the dead was of an exclusively polar nature – one was either a fighter or the enemy: “he who is not with us, is against us” – as the famous slogan said. Yet, every hero was himself or herself a martyr to the socialist idea – undergoing unbearable treatment and suffering, but remaining firm in his/her beliefs. A major characteristic

of the martyred flesh, as C. W. Bynum points out, is its being “capable of impassability and transfiguration; suffering and rot could not be the final answer. If flesh could put on, even in this life, a foretaste of incorruption, martyrdom might be bearable” (Cf. Bynum 1995:45). The power of belief in the communist idea helped to endure the pain and kept their heroes’ gaze permanently fixed on the future.¹⁸

A key to this firm and unflinching acceptance of pain can be found in the very nature of sacrifice as “magical, systematic and universal exploitation of the fecund force of death” (E. Morin). Narratives about communist heroes and the inscriptions on monuments relating to them, seldom failed to mention the act of “sacrifice”, made voluntarily by the heroes in their dedication to a social or humanist ideal. While to make a sacrifice is to exploit to the extreme the fecundity of death, to offer oneself as a voluntary sacrifice is a powerful votive, striving to transform one’s own death into life well before the act of death has taken place. No self-sacrifice is involuntary, and the stronger the will to offer one’s life for the success of ideas, the firmer the belief that ideas would gain realization. Providing a differentiating line between heroes and victims, the voluntary deaths of those who sacrificed themselves for “us” brings with it obligations for the living and assures that fecundity and rejoicing inevitably follow as a consequence of the self-sacrifice.

A closer look at the abundant narratives belonging to this heroic tradition, which developed after the Second World War, reveals a reification of old mythological motifs and heroic narrative schemes. Earlier rituals and myths of death and rebirth were actualized in a tradition shaped and fashioned by the heroic mode.¹⁹ Communists’ experience as fighters and rebels was clearly interpreted as a legendary descent to hell, as a repetition of the life and standing of Prometheus, as an image of the Phoenix rising from the ashes alive. When they die, the heroes sing, when they survive, they sing for the victory of the ideas they fought for. Though always victorious in the end, the fight is emphasized as uneven – it creates a notion of unfair conflict and an image of the enemy, who is threatening life in the community. Every sacrifice, as V. Turner points out, requires “not only a victim, [...] but also a sacrificer” (Turner 1974:69). The firm standing of the heroes on the side of “right” also helped create an array of images of evil, a realm of infernality, which, though once defeated by the victory of socialism, further demanded watchfulness and alertness.²⁰ As special representatives of the community, heroes served to validate that it consisted of fighters and was pure from contamination.

To have a local hero in a town or village was sufficient precondition for raising their status. Not only were towns and villages renamed after special figures of the antifascist and communist movement, but the practice of upgrading villages to towns or regional centers because an important hero or influential antifascist was born there was not an infrequent event. Ironically, it seems, the magical power of relics and of sacred biographies does not seem to have changed much throughout history.

Equally reminiscent of older epochs, heroes in the post-Second World War pantheon served as exemplars²¹ – death and exploits needed to be repeated. The presence of exploits had to permeate everyday life and bodies had to live an intensified life, in a position of permanent attentiveness. The steps and the deeds of the heroes had to be followed so that their will of a “bright future” would come true. The acts of Heroes of denying death (by its fearless acceptance) had to be reenacted by observation and attentiveness so that their acts would live for “us”. Only by being with the heroes, and thus being a hero himself/herself, could the enormity of death be faced and surpassed. Only a hero could actually transform death into life, the morbid into regenerative status. Socialist heroes were not simply mediators between those radically opposed worlds, but figures, which covered and encompassed this polarity within them. However, it is possible to suggest that the fact they were such powerful symbols is mainly due to their split and double nature, that is, as V. Turner would say – “precisely because like all dominant or focal symbols, they represented a coincidence of opposites, a semantic structure in tension between opposite poles of meaning” (Turner 1974:89). They were at once victims and victors, dying and living, then and now.

Monuments served as embodiments of these exemplary narratives and life-providing narratives of communist sacrifices. They had to cover the wide span of meanings inscribed in the ideological dialectics of death and life, and to give it vivid expression. An important element of this regime of life and death symbolism was the notion of the sacred, which permeated the space of socialist monuments and constituted the nature of the ritual acts performed around them. It could be traced in the images of sacred life and death, as represented in the monumental compositions; in the waves of pilgrimage and ritual meetings on special occasions around monuments; in individuals’ ritualized behavior around monumental sites; in the establishment of cult and even “totemic” figures of reference, narratives, and interpretative frameworks, etc. The monumental embodiments of socialist heroes were loci where the “divine” power of

ideology could be encountered and received, and where following in the footsteps of the heroes could once again be reenacted and confirmed. Much like the requirement at the end of the ninth century that all churches should contain the relics of saints, so it was with the socialist practice of establishing a monument and the cult of the hero in almost every town or village. Although attempting to express the sacred in an ideological and counter-religious mode, although shedding new light on the relationship between life and death, socialist ideological discourse was nonetheless a reworking of older notions of sacred bodies and sacred spaces and was symbolically legitimized by the “holy” bodies visualized and revered in the monuments of the period.

Continuities, Discontinuities and Displacements

Having already shed some light on similarities with mortuary practices of earlier epochs and various cultural contexts, the impression of the representation of death in socialist monuments as not being historically specific may be difficult to avoid. How are we to consider the appearance and evolution of this particular relationship between death and vitality in the socialist period – is it a result of a split from previously existing systems of representation – comparable in its spirit of invention only with the social order claimed to have been established? Or is it a continuation and the “logical result” of a continuous trend of utilizing and interpreting death, meaning that its contours can be considered to have been prepared and predicted by preceding periods and systems of representation? Or, as seems plausible, is it in fact a reworking, in a particular way, of notions and ideas whose importance for sustaining symbolic power, legitimacy and persuasion have so often appeared to be crucial throughout history? In order to approach these questions, it is necessary to look at the post-Second World War’s direct chronological predecessor in coping with a powerful presence of death – the First World War – and to attempt to explain the typology of the relationship between these two realms of “managing and representing the enormity of death”. In spite of the numerous parallels, distinctions and interpretations that have been made, certain aspects of the relationship between the utilizations of death in post-First and post-Second World War experience have still not been investigated, most notably in the case of monuments built to the east of

the Iron Curtain. I will try to sketch some of the most important features of this diachronic relationship of continuity and distinction.

The economy of utilization of death after the Second World War in Eastern, as well as in Western Europe, differed significantly from that which was visible in the monumental art following the First World War experience. In contrast to the post-1918 period, the rupture of language and imagery which followed the Second World War was profound and enduring (Winter 1995:8).²² The difference was first of a referential nature, in so far as the experiences of the particular states in the world were varied radically, and in so far as the welcoming body of the pantheon of the WWI dead was that of the national state. It was an all-inclusive pantheon – no one's memory was disclaimed, no dead were disallowed the right of being a hero. Thus, while in the monuments of the First World War we can trace a certain unity of representation, any unity of representation of the community of the sacred dead in the Second World War was ruptured by ideological and group belonging, by distinctions and clearly cut lines of classification. The logic of interpreting and commemorating death in the post-Second World War period was carved out from within by the divisions between those who had died properly enough to be commemorated, those who had fought on the "right" side, and those whose death did not confer the right to commemoration. However, it was not only the enormity of death which made it impossible to encompass all the dead in commemoration, but also the internal necessity of the commemorative thought to classify and group, to provide a narrative of inclusion and exclusion for the dead.

Unlike after the end of the First World War, when art and representation were flooded with images of death, bereavement, and unbearable pain, the world after the Second World War seemed, paradoxically, much different. Death and pain were coupled with motifs of fighting and overcoming, and the figures of loss were inseparable from those of victory and vitality. These vital metaphors, themselves rooted in ideological notions and paradigms, were a kind of an antidote to the horrors of war and a useful tool for the newly established ideological order to gain power and control in its role as savior. The establishment in power of communist regimes in Eastern Europe after the Second World War introduced a certain new order to utilizing the dead – an interpretative framework, in which what had been lost, was gained in the progress towards a better life; those who died, died for "us" to live. The persuasive potential of this dialectics in the sphere of meaning helped polish over

the ruptures of exclusion within the post-Second World War pantheon, and facilitated the openness of the ideological paradigm to temporal planes where this dialectics was seen as erupting and prefiguring the victory of socialism. Certain historical figures and events dating back to the ancient and medieval times – rebellions against established order,²³ etc. – were allowed to be drawn within the referential system of this paradigm. This openness, in particular after the 1960s, not only permitted the spirit of monumentalization to flourish in figures and events belonging to national regional histories, but also marked the highly inclusive nature of the Second World War towards heroes of former époques.

Although examples of such utilizations can also be seen in post-Second World War monuments in Western Europe, it remained largely a characteristic of monumental art in Eastern Europe. The tradition of listing the names of the dead from the 1939-1945 period to the monuments which already existed is referred to by R. Kosellek as a practice, which took place mainly in France (Kosellek 1997:157). Although little research has been carried out into this phenomenon East of the Iron Curtain, my observations on post-Second World War monuments in Eastern Europe show that, apart from the Soviet Union where the First World War was denounced as a product of czarist policy and its dead were not commemorated publicly, all the countries of Eastern Europe had monuments whose referential framework included First and Second World War experience together. In Romania, for example, where the First World War held a special place in the national historical paradigm and was represented in more than a half of all existing monuments, the raising of monuments to both the First World War and the antifascist struggle²⁴ was to a large extent the result of a technique to increase the symbolic capital of the latter. Though not uncommon in earlier phases of monumental traditions,²⁵ this phenomenon often represents an example of the rooting of socialist monumental traditions in the traditions of high legitimacy in the national historical paradigms of the countries of Eastern Europe (for example, wars of independence, the Balkan wars, the First World War, etc). This rooting was, in fact, an act of displacement, an example of commemorative coexistence, adding new meanings to the initial event that had served as host.²⁶ Apart from being an attempt to stress and gain further legitimization from a historical event with high symbolic meaning, it was also a way to strengthen the notions of victory and rebirth that, in Romania in particular, were strongly associated with World War One.



FIG. 6 – VICTORY MONUMENT IN CONSTANȚA (1968), PHOTO: N. VUKOV, 2002.

Another characteristic of this relationship between the First and the Second World War utilizations of death can be pointed out. It is actually a consequence of those characteristics already mentioned. In an insightful analysis of the ways in which monuments to the dead shape the identity of the living (Kosellek 1997), R. Kosellek dedicates special attention to the occurrence of the process of democratization of death which can be traced in the history of public monuments and reaches a peak in the monuments to the dead in the First World War.

The equality in death is replaced by equality, which guarantees national homogeneity: the homogeneity of the living and the survivors. Monuments are erected by political entities, which mutually demarcate each other. That is why the function of the monuments to the dead tends to a *religion civile*, in the sense meant by Rousseau, and contributes to the foundation of democratic legitimacy (Kosellek 1997: 151).

As R. Kosellek describes it, this is equality between those who fell for the fatherland, an equality internalized within the national framework. Although traces of continuity can still be found, the monuments to the dead built after the Second World War seemed to step aside from the process of democratization written about by R. Kosellek. For Eastern Europe (though not only), the framework within which the dead could gain equality was no longer national. In a period when validity was reserved for ideas of an international nature, the war dead (and most notably the “heroes of war”) were no longer of “internal” use only, but also were known and commemorated across boundaries. Together with facilitating the “export” of special dead to brotherly countries,²⁷ this period was witness to the formation of a pantheon with predominantly ideological contours. Within this pantheon, international socialist heroes would often outnumber national heroes, thus according them more regional, if not completely marginal, importance.²⁸

Even on a regional level, however, death was far from being considered as democratically represented. Apart from the politics of exclusion of those unworthy of commemoration, and apart from the special selectivity of those who were considered true embodiments of the ideas propagated in the post-Second World War discourse in Eastern Europe, it is important to point out that hierarchies within the post-Second World War pantheon were clearly expressed and frequently reiterated. The special status of local heroes was rarely strong enough to compete with the high status of communists whose exemplary life and death gained nationwide and international (within Eastern Europe) importance. The latter, for their part, received power and coherence from the founders of socialist ideology and the most special communist leaders to whose words and exemplary behavior their images were constantly referred. The hierarchy among bodies was directly reflected by the placing of monuments dedicated to them in the geography of communist sacred places. If, in the representation of heroes in public monuments, the dead body, though resurrective in its heroic vitality, was nonetheless absent from vision and its corporeal features described in stone or marble monumentalizations, then in other monuments – those of the specially designed tombs to communist leaders – the dead body had a strong presence. Once again – this time in material terms – death was shown as having been defeated by life. Through a simulacrum of corporeal remains preserved as incorruptible, the mausoleums of dead leaders utilized to the very limit the sacred powers of dead bodies and, as ultimate expressions of a “magic” transformation

of death into life, occupied the very heart of communist monumental discourse: located at the center of capitals, raised above the flesh-consuming earth, closer to heaven.

Between Heaven and Earth: Mausoleums

Though far from being characteristic of all the countries of Eastern Europe²⁹ and no doubt lacking a widespread appearance, the mausoleum can be regarded as a type of monument that played a key role in the socialist system of representation – a monument in which the interpretation of death as vitality was revealed in a new, yet more profound and expressive way. In spite of the rhetoric of persuasion about the established control of communist regimes over the mortality of heroes, signs of the perilous affliction of death could not completely be avoided in the long run. Though locked, once and for all, behind the slamming doors of the 1945 victory, death nevertheless managed to sneak up and surprise its victims from among the ever-watchful guard of the party leaders. The deaths of Stalin, G. Dimitrov, Cl. Gottwald, G. Georghiu-Dej, as well as of many other prominent figures in the communist parties of Eastern Europe, of resistance fighters and revolutionaries who had survived the war, all posed a challenge to the ideology, which overtly rejected the power of death over ideas. The exploration of ideas of immortality, as Heathcote emphasizes, proved to be a fundamental cornerstone of Revolutionary art: the Revolution and its leaders had to be seen as immortal (Heathcote 1999:50) and cults, rooted in the idea of god-building,³⁰ were to be built around them. By constructing specially designed tombs for its leaders, the communist regimes of Eastern Europe attempted to utilize to the extreme the possibility of transforming death into metaphors of vitality and immortality, and thus, exercising strong pressure at the limits of representation, to make the specific interpretation of death not merely a simulacrum of the real, but “reality” itself, proven by the miracle of the exhibited as incorruptible body matter.

Mausoleums and various forms of mausoleum existed (and in certain periods proliferated) well before the second half of the twentieth century,³¹ but it was the period of socialism in Eastern Europe which developed functions and meanings for the mausoleum that were hardly known until then. The abundance of mausoleums created in Eastern Europe to commemorate the heroes of national revivals and those who fell in the

First World War³² was marked by explicit impulses to create national pantheons and democratize the death of those who had fallen fighting for national independence and national unification. Being richly represented in various traditions of funerary architecture, the mausoleum was too powerful a form to be underestimated by the post-World War II communist regimes in their attempts to demonstrate their control over death. However, it was not a premeditated attempt to utilize the product of elaborate architectural traditions developed throughout the ages; rather, it was an invention of tradition, a modeling of the visual expression relating to particular notions of death, memory and representation which the newly established social order had come to require.

Although elements of the mausoleum can be identified in the numerous memorials and brotherly mounds which were raised to commemorate the dead of the Second World War, the ultimate realizations of the idea of the mausoleum were those several examples of funerary architecture which served to preserve inside and to exhibit to visitors the dead bodies of communist leaders. Far from being limited to the countries of Eastern Europe only,³³ and far from being deprived of local, regional and historical specificities, mausoleums to the communist leaders represented a case in which death and vitality intersected and exchanged meanings intensely. The bodies to be commemorated in them were those of the most special dead, of the founders and leading followers of the communist idea. Their lives and deeds were believed to be expressions of complete dedication to the idea – they not only presented it, but embodied it without leaving any remainder. The idea was fused into their bodily concreteness, “sanctifying” any sign of their bodily presence. This unity of representation stabilized the function of the idea, delegating the proof of its validity to the body of the leaders, who, while still alive, had every deed, movement, thought and gesture guided by it. The representation with no remainder, itself a special form of conversion of the real, could not to take place in *everybody*, though *all* bodies had to strive to achieve such a high (though never ultimate, in so far as only the founders or leaders had the right to and power of this absolute) representation of the idea throughout their lives. The main point where this juncture of representation faced overt threat was where the body encountered its material finality – death.³⁴ This was a point of real concern – does the idea die when its absolute embodiment is no longer alive? Does it have to change, mutate, transform, while adapting to another body in which it would achieve a new absolute representation? Or is it beyond bodies, and does its everlasting or temporal



FIG. 7 – THE MAUSOLEUM OF G. DIMITROV IN SOFIA. POSTCARD, 1949.

nature not depend on one particular body only? How can the materially and tangibly the concreteness of an idea be proved when the life-source of the material bearer had become a victim of decomposition?

The spirit of disorder and the production of such alarming questions are not new in themselves and, as anthropologists have often pointed out, considerable alarm within communities is expected to appear especially when the matter is about the deaths of leaders (cf. Hertz 1960; Bloch and Parry 1982). The alarm is related mainly to the split which the death of leaders has brought to the ultimate unity of representation and is actually about the continuity of power, which, surpassing the body natural of the king and his successor, has to unite them in a timeless institution, a divine center of order, a perpetual source of life. The necessity to minimize the crisis and cause it to happen as if outside time was expressed in the magic-like appearance of mausoleums in several cases of death of a communist leader – huge and elaborate buildings, erected within days of a leader's death. The immediate and sudden blow of death was replicated by immediate assurances of the everlasting nature of the ideas,

which, though painfully harmed by the loss of a leader, the party and the people claimed to be fighting for with renewed strength. The death of the leader itself presented an opportunity to turn mourning into victory, martyrdom into triumph (Ioan 1996: 77), and, in the short period in which such merging took place, death's miraculous metamorphosis into vitality can again be identified.

However, it was the materiality of the bodies preserved in these specially designed tombs, which had the most important say in this miraculous transformation. The bodies of the leaders had to be presented as intact as possible, successful in their fight over decay. Their often visibly incorruptible remains were reminiscent of saints and to their miraculous abilities to overcome decay and putrefaction. Whether embalmed inside the tomb or not, the body of the leader was an object of adulation and pilgrimage, while the permanence of the bodily standing in the mausoleum accorded a non-passing status to the represented ideas. The bodies were exhibited as sleeping, rather than dead, as watching "us" rather than being watched. As ultimate points in elaborate systems of stairs, levels and mazes in the mausoleums, they were to be approached and wondered at – dead ends, where the make-belief of socialist ideology found firm launching ground for legitimization.

In this attempt to interpret death through an incorruptible metaphor, it is again, as in the general tendency to raise monuments for the purposes of propaganda in Eastern Europe after the Second World War, that the example of Lenin proved convenient. Created shortly after Lenin's death and reconstructed several times until it reached its permanent red-granite form,³⁵ the Lenin mausoleum served as a pattern for the immortalization of those great figures, whose bodies the party would not surrender unto death, and chose to turn into objects of esteem and veneration. The Lenin mausoleum served as an archetype for other mausoleums built in Eastern Europe, and it was this cornerstone of the communist monumental tradition in which the two basic features (the importance of the body's public visibility and the demonstrated appearance of incorruption)³⁶ found their inspiring pattern. Though never able to surpass in extent and intensity the worship of Lenin, the rhetoric of extreme adulation addressed to dead leaders throughout the years has been shaped by the all-encompassing and persistent Lenin cult and shared much of its forms and expression.

Underpinned by old mythological motifs,³⁷ and surrounded by a festive, rather than mournful spirit, mausoleums functioned as holy centers for the socialist ideologies of Eastern Europe – sites around which important

trends of the ideological discourse started and developed. Mausoleums served as local shrines for the veneration of the memory of leaders and were loci where the “truths” of the vivifying power of ideas was revealed. They helped to organize the system of representation in a way that showed death not only controlled and overcome, but also institutionalized as an object of adulation and a source of life and inspiration. As B. Zbarsky, the head of the team authorized to embalm Lenin’s body, has pointed out, “the opportunity to see the favorite leader, though immobile, would partly calm the pain of the loss and would inspire further struggle and fight” (cf. Zbarsky 1946:22). The exhibition of leaders’ bodies served to make mausoleums pivotal places, “anchoring the space of the living to a particular location and sacralizing it in the world” (Heathcote 1999:6). It was by means of this ultimate concentration upon the body of the leader – dead but vital in its uncorrupted materiality – that the gift of fertility, simulated and promised as a reward of proper celebration, could be monopolized (cf. Bloch and Parry 1982; Seale 1998:68) by the ideology in power and used in its exercise of social control.

Conclusion

It can be claimed, and quite justifiably so, that the relationship between life and death lies in the very nature of a “monument”, not only of socialist monuments. As K. Verdery puts it, “tearing down and erecting statues goes on all over the world, in times past as well as present, [and] there is nothing post-socialist about it” (Verdery 1999:6). One aspect most overtly expressed in commemorative monuments, though shared by all other types of monuments, is that monuments are generally built as expressions of the victory of life over death, as objects indicating the defeat over time. Having its roots in ancient practices of ancestor worship,³⁸ raising a monument to the dead suggests their being “not completely dead, not utterly gone, finished, complete” (cf. Greenblatt 2001:17); yet, it is an act to be perceived much more as an active investment in a community’s present and future,³⁹ rather than merely being a resurrective approach to the past. Notably, while all this can be identified in any particular example of monuments, a much stronger example of this would be the weight of symbolic investment and expectations expressed emphatically in a whole outburst of monumental expression over several decades in a large part of Europe.

The visual expression of life and death has been one of the most characteristic features of monumental art in Eastern Europe after the Second World War and has contributed enormously to the specificity of the East European monumental tradition after 1945, to its distinctive difference from monumental forms in other countries and previous historical periods. The ideological context that engendered and surrounded the particular forms of monumental art in Eastern Europe played a decisive role in this regional and historical specificity, though it would have not possessed the expressive power it had, had the interpretation of death, finality and mourning have not been so closely intertwined with overtones of vitality, regeneration and celebration. Nor would understanding of the general ideological context, of the power of representation and the representation of power, have been complete without the problem of death and vitality and have been put to interpretative use in the analysis of the cultural and social processes in Eastern Europe after 1945.

As clearly demonstrated by the monuments of the socialist past, the Second World War marked the beginning of a new epistemics in Eastern Europe, that of a special relationship between death and vitality. It was determined by the enormity of death and destruction in the war, by the necessity of their overcoming in the post-war years, and by the clearly shaped dividing lines between fascist and anti-fascist affiliation, between fighting on the "right" and fighting on the "wrong" side. Heroic tradition and the supreme worlds of life experience dedicated to the communist idea functioned as an antidote to despair, as a tool for overcoming the trials of war and destruction and as legitimization of the special regime of power in the period. In its monumental representations, the economy of life and death under socialism can be seen as affording death a passing status, shaping it as a transitory phenomenon which was stepped over by the permanent nature of incorrupt ideas, an instance to be remembered mostly because of its function in enabling the gap between the past and present to be bridged. Death and the special bodies of communist heroes were seen as producing knowledge, as being the true symbols of the discourse of "make-belief" under socialism. In its particular methods of "preserving the bodies" – by visual means, by authentication through names, narratives, biographies, etc. – monumental art under socialism played an important role in sustaining knowledge and structuring postwar community identities. It appears not only as a visual representation of the special dead of various communities, but also as a kind of "prolongation" of the identity of the dead themselves, a means not only

of displaying but also, in a way, “displacing” the dead bodies they initially came to represent through images of victory and rebirth.

The relation to monuments is a relation to time. However, in the socialist period it was shaped in a particular way that faced the open futurity of the ideological narrative and conceived the past as a revelation of the truth to come. This way of relating to the continuous and encompassing nature of time attributed the meaning to death that it was a point to be surpassed, a limit to go beyond. Thus, in socialism, death was expressed and represented, though it was rarely interpreted in autonomous terms. It was “naturally” placed under another symbol – not allowed to be “consumed” as existential or neutral from the point of view of ideological implications, and was always coupled with images of the overcoming and optimistic spirit. In fact, this was a matter of a very powerful undertaking which socialist ideology insisted it was able to carry out – the ability to control, express and represent death, to cope with it despite its “vivid” presence.

Behind this imposing visibility of control, however, other, invisible, slips and displacements took place. The notion of the “death worth dying” with all its metamorphoses throughout the ages – from the idea of the sacrifice of Christ in the Christian religion to the sacrifice of the soldier for the country, as so persuasively demonstrated by Kantorowicz, was important during socialism in the modeling of the socialist party as a “corpus mysticum” (Cf. Kantorowicz 1997), something previously represented by the state. By sticking closely to the enormity of death and providing tools for, narratives and exemplars of its fighting and overcoming, the communist representative discourse appropriated the role of “magically” transforming death into life, of being the only one able to link such unbridgeable realms. It was exactly this role which the monuments of the period, as particles in a general discourse of transforming death into life, clearly demonstrated.

Was it not difficult to imagine that a “demystification” of this power relation would some day be possible; that, as in the case of Simonides, the roof over the table where monuments and heroes had been such precious guests, would someday, inevitably, collapse?

NOTES

¹ Lenin's plan for visual and, in particular, monumental propaganda was announced by a Decree of the Council of commissars of the republic, dated 12.04.1918. For a detailed analysis of the realization of this plan in the first years of the Russian revolution and for its subsequent effects on socialist art in the countries of Eastern Europe after World War II, v. Bowlt 1980; Golomstock 1980; Blomqvist 1987, Aman 1992, etc.

² The memory of the generally unfriendly policy of Ceausescu's regime towards monuments to the Soviet army and to symbols recalling the Soviet post-World War II domination in the region after 1945 evolved to the widely accepted belief that "socialist monuments almost did not exist in Romania throughout socialism". In order to counter this belief unsupported by actual data, I provide here a more extensive list of socialist and antifascist monuments in Romania, fully aware that persuasion cannot be achieved by means of a list only.

Monuments to the antifascist war and to communist resistance were built in almost all larger towns and villages in Romania: Alexeni (memorial plaque dedicated to the heroes of the antifascist war, 1964), Arad (monumental bust to the communist Ilie Pintile; monuments to the heroes in the antifascist war; memorial plaque dedicated to the patriots in the insurrection of August 1944), Bacău (monument to the heroes in the antifascist war, 1959), Baia Mare (monument to the heroes in the antifascist war), Băile Felix, Balta Doamnei, Beiuș, Bod, Bozeni, Brașov, Bucu, (1954), Câmpia Turzii, Carei, Căscioarele, Cehu Silvaniei (1959), Chișineu-Criș (1946), Cincu, Cluj-Napoca (a monument and several memorial plaques to anti-fascist heroes; a memorial plaque dedicated to the revolution of social and national liberation), Constanța (monumental bust to the communist Filimon Sîrbu, 1976; monument to the heroes in the armed struggle; monument to victory, 1968), Covasna (1973), Dăișoara (1981), Deleni (1957), Dobolii de Jos, Doftana, Epureni (1965), Galați (monument in honour of the hero of the working class, 1956), Gerăusa, Giurgiu, Ghenci, Gugești, Fetești, Flămânzi (1964), Herepeia (1958), Jimbolia (1979), Jucul de Jos (1960), Lăpușel (1975), Luduș (1960), Mădăraș (1958), Mirăslău, Miercurea-Ciuc (1974), Moldova Veche, Moreni (1958), Oarba de Mureș, Odăile (near Otopeni), Pașcani, Păuliș, Piatra Neamț (1954), Pianu de Jos (1980), Ploiești, Rucăr (1957), Scărișoara, Sanica de Sus, Sebiș (1959), Sofronea, Șomcuta Mare, Stănișești (1948), Suceava, Tășnăd, Tăuții, Tăuții Măgherăuș, Teliu, Țirgu Lăpuș, Țirgu Jiu, Timișoara (monument to the fighters for communism), Tunari, Turda, Turnu Măgurele, Urziceni, Valea Plopilor, Văleni-Stînișoara (1964), Zimnicea (1974).

Only in Bucharest could at least two memorial plaques dedicated to the Congress of the Romanian Communist Party be found; monumental bust to

the communist Ilie Pintilie; monument to the Soviet soldiers (1946), memorial plaque dedicated to the fighting communist Olga Bancic (1912-1944); memorial plaques dedicated to communists Bela Brainer, Nicolae Mohănescu, Pompiliu Ștefan, Filimon Știrbu; memorial plaques dedicated to *luptele insurreționale* [insurrection fights] (1944) at the Square of Independence, at the Military Academy (Monumentul Eroilor Patriei, 1958, inscription: "Monumentul eroilor luptei pentru libertatea poporului și a patriei, pentru socialism"), on the București-Constanța and București-Ploiești highways, at Băneasa airport, etc.

For a thorough description of these monuments and visual material about them v. Tucă & Cociu 1983, as well as references to some of these monuments in: Grozdea 1974; Grozdea 1987, etc. In this list I did not include monuments of the so-called "mixed" type, i.e., those dedicated, for example, both to the First World War and to the antifascist war in so far as I mention them later in this paper. Other exclusions include general monuments such as those dedicated to the Romanian soldier, although by their visual framework and contexts of celebration throughout the period of socialism most of them had meanings which bring them close to monuments of the antifascist type (i.e., such monuments as in Arad, Baia Mare, Carei [1965], Oradea [1958, inscription: "Glory to the Romanian soldiers, who fought with heroism against fascism for the liberation of the country, for the freedom and independence of the Romanian people!"]; Bucharest [1946], with the Soviet coat of arms and the scenes of meeting the Soviet soldiers in Romania], etc.). Even from such a brief and far from complete list of socialist monuments built in Romania after 1944, it can be concluded that, though not on a par with such monuments in other socialist countries, Romania can hardly be seen as exceptional as regards the wave of socialist monuments which flooded Eastern Europe after World War II.

- 3 From the abundance of anthropological literature on death and mortuary practices v. in particular Frazer, J. 1934; Hertz 1960 (1907); Tenenti 1952; Lévi-Strauss 1955; Bloch 1971; Morin 1970; Ariés 1975; Ariés 1977; Vovelle 1974; Vernant and Gnoli 1982; Vovelle 1983; Vovelle and Bertrand 1983; Bloch and Parry 1982; Thomas 1980; Thomas 1985; Geary 1986; Geary 1994; Geary 1995; Paxton 1990; Metcalf and Huntington 1991; Bynum 1992; Bynum 1995; Schmidt 1994; Ratzinger 1994; Bendann 1996; Prigent 1996; Tréffort 1996; Verdery 1999; Schmitt 2001, etc.
- 4 Van Gennep analyses of funerals as involving rites of transition, whereby mourners travel a path parallel to the journey of the soul (Van Gennep 1960). An analysis of the stages of this transition cf. Hertz 1960, Metcalf and Huntington 1991.
- 5 Cf. Bloch and Parry 1982, Seale 1998:110. Following M. Eliade's analysis of the numerous zones of interference between fecundity cults and funerary

cults, E. Morin also defines fecundity as solicited by death, and death as “universal source of fertility” (Morin 1970: 129).

⁶ Seale 1998:194. For a thorough analysis of the evolvement of this doctrine in Western Christianity v. Bynum 1995.

⁷ In archaic thought, for which the elementary experiences of the world are those of metamorphoses, disappearances, reappearances and transmutations, as E. Morin observes, “all death is informed by rebirth, every birth is preceded by death, every change is analogous to death-and-regeneration – and the cycle of human life is inscribed in the natural cycles of death and rebirth” (Morin 1970:123).

⁸ Cf. *Nabat Pamyati – Sovetskie memorial’nye ansambli, posviashtenye zhertvam fashizma*. “Iskusstvo”, Leningradskoe otdelenie.

⁹ About the post-World War II monuments in GDR, v. Frank 1970.

¹⁰ For a detailed analysis of this monument v. Young 1989; Young 1993.

¹¹ Cf. *Pamyatnik voynam sovetsoj armii pavshim v boiah fashizmom, Berlin, Treptow-Park*, Moskva, 1961.

¹² The establishment of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe was facilitated to a large extent by the moral, administrative, and economic vacuum left by the Nazis and their allies after the Second World War (A. Aman), and by the symbolic capital communist parties gained as taking the posture of “liberators from fascism”. For the history of antifascist movements before and after the World War II, and the specificity of communist antifascism, v. esp. Groppo 2000.

¹³ The evolving scenes of Stalin monuments in Budapest depicted the history of the Soviet soldier until the liberation of the Hungarian people, while the other part represented “life renewing in its wake – the sharing out of the land to the peasants, the reconstruction, pioneers, soldiers, sportsmen, etc.”. Cf. Béke 1992:278.

¹⁴ Cf., for example, the widely popularized in the socialist aesthetics phrase of V. Mayakovski about slogans and art in general as “artillery, beating at the rear rows of the enemy”.

¹⁵ The characteristic representation of the dead in the 15th century was a two-tiered tomb, whose upper part represents the body in glorious clothes and armor, while the lower part is a representation of the corpse in the process of decay. Cf. Cohen 1973; Panofsky 1964; Tristram 1976:15.

¹⁶ Cf. Warner 1985; about the rare presence of female figures in the First World War monuments, v. Agulhon 2001:37.

¹⁷ For some basic aspects of the constitution of heroes in culture and history, v. Campbell 1972 (1949); Raglan 1979 (1936); Fabre 1999; Centivres et al. 1999.

¹⁸ Compare with Tertulian’s note about Christian martyrdom – “the leg feels no pain in its tendons when the soul is in heaven” (quoted in Bynum 1995:45). The promise of rising again, C. W. Bynum emphasizes, “makes it possible

- for heroes and ordinary Christians to face [...] the humiliation of death and the horror of putrefaction" (Cf. Bynum 1995:45-46).
- 19 About the special role that the figures of heroes played in socialist culture, v. Clark 1981; Morris 1993; Unfried 1999.
- 20 Cf. C. Lefort's analysis of "the representation of the People-as-one", as built on a denial that society consists of divisions. As a consequence of such policies, he claims, "In the so-called socialist world, there can be no other division than that between the people and enemies" (Lefort 1986). More about the construction of communist parties' identities by defining and sustaining a wide array of images of enemies, cf. in K. Verdery's interpretation of Lefort's thesis, in Verdery 1996:93.
- 21 V. in this respect P. Brown's classic text about saints as exemplars in Late Antiquity (Brown 1983). Cf. also K. Verdery's analysis of the importance of "exemplary biographies" of "remarkable men" in shaping Romanian national sentiment – just as medieval Christians absorbed the exemplary lives of saints, she points out, so 20-century Romanians learned to identify with exemplary national heroes. Cf. Verdery 1999:77. The conscious appropriation by communists of the technique of exemplars found in ancient and medieval religious traditions should not be overestimated, though clear questions of this technique in the communist persuasion after World War II in Eastern Europe may often amaze the researcher.
- 22 About monuments to the First World War, v. esp. Fussell 1975; Descamps 1978; Mosse 1990; Prost 1997; Winter 1995; Kosellek 1997; Heathcote 1999: 42-47; Winter 1999; Agulhon 2001:35-46, etc.
- 23 Cf. for example, the pervading wave of monuments in all Eastern European countries dedicated to rebellions and uprisings which communist ideology considered as preceding and foreshadowing its own victory.
- 24 Cf., for example, such monuments as those in Băleni-Sîrbi, Bujoreni, Fîntînele (1976), Focșani, Lăpușel, Olteni, Sălcina de Sus (1946), Scărișoara (1980), and Valea Doftanei. An interesting example is a monument in Pătîrlagele. Built in 1928, it was initially a monument to the heroes of the First World War, but, to the inscription "Celor ce s-au jertfit pentru patrie", another obviously later inscription was added – "Heroes from Pătîrlagele, who fought against German fascism, 1944-1945."
- 25 In Romania, for example, monuments of this "mixed" type were widely spread in the interwar period, bringing together the wars for independence and the First World War. Cf. such monuments as those in Corod (near Galați), Români (near Neamț), Ruginești (near Vrancea), Tîrgoviște, Devesel, Vlădeni (Dîmbovița), Ghigoești, Glodeni (1938), Ianca, Vaslui (1934), Liteni (1923), Zimnicea (1930). Attention should also be drawn to cases of really wide continuity, such as the monument in Hălmașiu, which represents a memorial ensemble dedicated to martyrs of the rebellion of 1784, to the heroes of the revolution of 1848-1849 and to the First World War.

- 26 Here I refer basically to the working definition which St. Greenblatt gives of “displacement” – as a “process whereby a prior symbolic structure is compelled to coexist with other centers of attention that do not necessarily conflict with the original structure, but are not swept up in its gravitational pull” (cf. Greenblatt, 1980:230).
- 27 This aspect of post-World War II commemorations deserves a thorough analysis. Communist internationalism found various expressions, but among the most persistent throughout the years was the practice of dedicating special days to heroes and important dead of other socialist countries, those of the Soviet Union being the most numerous, though far from all the cases.
- 28 To a great extent this appears to have been quite different in Ceausescu’s Romania, where national heroes were strongly exalted, at the expense of heroes and special figures of international origin (cf. Verdery 1991; Verdery 1996:42).
- 29 In Eastern Europe mausoleums particularly dedicated to prominent communist leaders were built for Lenin, Dimitrov, and Gottwald. The Dimitrov mausoleum in Sofia was built in 1949 and remained preserved until the changes of 1989, when after long and vigorous debates Dimitrov’s body was taken out of the mausoleum in 1990 and the tomb itself destroyed in 1999 (on Dimitrov’s mausoleum v. Gradev 1992; Vukov 2002). The miraculous appearance of a mausoleum marked the news about Gottwald’s death in 1953, however the Czech communist leader was less lucky as regards staying “untroubled” for long, in so far as, in the 1960s, after a series of demonstrations, his body was expelled from the tomb (Crampton 1997:320). Expulsion was the fate of Stalin’s body, too. Having been exhibited in the Lenin’s mausoleum together with the body of Lenin, Stalin’s remains were swiftly removed from Lenin’s tomb and buried within the Kremlin’s walls. A collective mausoleum to the heroes of 1948 revolution and communist heroes in Romania was built in Parcul Carol (former Parcul Libertății) in Bucharest after the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, in 1965. The Romanian communist mausoleum, still preserved, though closed to visitors, was dedicated to “fighters for the liberation of the people and the fighters for socialism” – Ș. Gheorghiu (1879-1919), I. C. Frimu (1871-1919), Dr. Petru Groza (1884-1858), Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1901-1965) (cf. Gheorghescu et al. 1966).
- 30 On the god-building idea in Marxist, socialist and revolutionary thinking v. Tumarkin 1983.
- 31 On mausoleums and funerary architecture, v. Panofski 1964; Cohen 1973; Krautheimer 1975; Ragon 1981; Vovelle 1983; Curl 1980; Ragon 1981:37-49; Curl 2000; Ozouf 1997; Colvin 1991; Davies 2000, etc.
- 32 In Bulgaria, for example, the period from last quarter of the 19th century until the 1940s witnessed a proliferation in Church-monuments and mausoleum-monuments — temple-monument Alexander Nevski, temple-monument

Shipka, mausoleum-monument to Al. Batenberg, mausoleum to T. Kableshev and N. Popstoyanov in Koprivshtitsa, mausoleum to Bacho Kiro and Pop Hariton in the Dryanovo monastery, etc. (cf. Trufeshev 1981). The situation in Romania was – immense mausoleums to the fallen in the First World War were built in Braşov, Buzău, Măraşti (1928), Soveja (1929), Tîrgu Ocna (1925-1928), Topliţa (1925), Tulcea, and Valea Mare-Pravăţ. Cf. Tucă & Cociu 1983.

33 Examples of communist leaders embalmed and/or exhibited in mausoleums were widespread throughout the communist world, ranging from China and Vietnam to Angola. Cf. Zbarsky and Hutchinson 1999.

34 The body, as Jankelevitch points out, is “not only means for the individual for expression and communication, it is also ... the place of the principle of finality and the use of time” (cf. Jankelevitch 1966:407).

35 The symbolism of the color of the Lenin mausoleum (as well as of the other mausoleums built for socialist leaders) had special importance. As the symbol of the revolution, the red was the color considered to symbolize struggle for revolution and to inspire feelings of pride in the victory achieved by the people under Lenin’s leadership. Black, as the color of mourning, “expressed convincingly the infinite sorrow with the loss of the favorite leader” (cf. Stoyanov 1950:65). For more about the Lenin mausoleum and the evolving Lenin cult v. Zbarsky 1946; Stoyanov 1950; Tumarkin 1983; Heathcote 1999:50-52; Zbarsky and S. Hutchinson 1999; Dickernan 2001.

36 Cf. Dickerman 2001:79.

37 Cf., for example, the mythological image of tombs and caves as places of regeneration and mystical rebirths of exemplary heroes (cf. Dragan & Ioan 1996:28).

38 Ancestors, as K. Verdery reminds us, were buried in the soil around the dwelling; their presence consecrated that soil, and continuous rituals connecting them with their heirs created a single community consisting of the dead, their heirs, and the soil they shared... The dead were thought to live underground and to require frequent nourishment with food and prayers; in return, they offered their descendants protection (Verdery 1999:104).

39 As A. Boime puts it, monuments reconfigure the memory of the past in order to structure the present (Boime 1998:11) and expectations of the future; they create a link with the past, which, in its turn, facilitates a passage into another state and another time (Heathcote 1999:207).

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IMPACTS OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS ON INDUSTRIAL UPGRADING AT THE FIRM LEVEL: EVIDENCE FROM THE ROMANIAN FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY

1. Introduction

Over the last decade transition in the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) has altered the industrial structure of traditional industries, not only due to the system change from centrally planned economy to free market economy but also due to the strong globalization effects. Although transition is a gradual process, the aspiration of accession to the EU has provided an impetus to rapidly harmonize with the global economic system in these countries. Therefore, they have actively engaged in international business and their firms are compelled to position themselves quickly in the new markets. As is well known, in the last two decades, economic globalization has influenced the growth of multinational enterprises and the CEECs have competed for as large a piece as possible of this cake. Within the region, we observe differences among the countries due to different reasons, which are out of the scope of this paper.

The corresponding institutional changes are not automatic and take more time than predicted, and their delay produces co-ordination failures. The Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) have been affected by this immature structure of institutions. For instance, they faced a lack of information on business partners as well as on how to conduct business in CEECs. Most of the foreign investment has stayed away from the Eastern European countries (EECs) until clear regulatory frameworks and a secure business environment were provided (which did not happen until the mid-1990s in most of those countries). Data on FDI inflows to the CEECs presented in the 1999 EBRD report demonstrate how Poland, Romania and the Czech

Republic began to attract FDI after 1995-6, whereas Hungary had reached to its maximum after 1995 as a result of its clearly leading position with respect to FDI inflows immediately after transition in 1989 (see also Meyer, 2001).

Foreign firms are often seen as ideal sources for the investments required for industrial restructuring and enterprise transformation, as it is common sense that the expertise at the firm level resides in foreign firms (Casson, 1994). FDI brings a package of finance, marketing and technology to the enterprises, thus it has to be encouraged. As will be discussed below, FDI has penetrated the CEECs in the food processing industry primarily with the market-driven motive, and market-driven FDI has a significant share in the total FDI in these countries. There are two issues here. The first is how to direct these capabilities of FDI to the benefit of the domestic firms (e.g., via complementarities and forward and backward linkages) instead of competition with them, which leads to negative spillovers. The second is how to create a suitable and attractive environment for FDI, since the business environment in CEECs is often substantially different from that in developed market economies. Casson (1994) argues that the change from centrally-planned to market economy needs to begin with a top-down approach, to be complemented by a bottom-up approach needed to resolve the problems at the enterprise level. On the other hand, the foreign firms that have entered to the market first have obtained some first-mover advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) in influencing the business environment at least at local level.

This paper will discuss the level of industrial upgrading in the Romanian food processing industry and the role of inter-organizational networks in achieving this upgrading by means of empirical investigations of MNE subsidiaries and domestic firms. It links networks as a growth strategy in transition economies (see Peng and Heath, 1996) to industrial upgrading at the firm level by answering the research questions: what is the level of industrial upgrading of food companies in Romania, and to what extent do networks play a role in this level of industrial upgrading? The findings demonstrate that MNE subsidiaries in the Romanian food processing industry achieves to a high level of industrial upgrading via strong links with parent firms in knowledge acquisition, but that its network development strategy is limited to production networks where the direction of knowledge flow is from the subsidiary to farmers. The most striking finding concerns the Romanian food firms, for which knowledge network development is a must for high-level industrial upgrading. If they fail to

engage in this, they are locked into low-level industrial upgrading trajectories.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the conceptual framework will be elucidated in separate sections where industrial upgrading is defined and articulated in terms of sources, both internal and external. In the third section, the food processing industry is examined in terms of the communist legacy, FDI, its significance in the Romanian manufacturing industry and its special characteristics. In the fourth section, the research methodology, followed in this paper, is described. The fifth section provides the brief case studies and empirical analysis of the industrial upgrading-networks relationship in the Romanian food processing industry. Finally, the sixth section concludes.

2. Conceptual Framework: Sources of Industrial Upgrading at the Firm Level with Special Emphasis on External Sources

After the transition, both government policies and academic studies have focused on the shift from centrally planned economy to market-based economy and ownership and corporate governance issues related to privatization. However, in reality, growth processes involve a much richer and more complex array of elements. The multi-dimensional processes include systems, networks and, if possible, their alignment.

2.1 What is Industrial Upgrading at the Firm Level?

Industrial upgrading is a newly evolving concept in the literature, hence it is necessary to clarify a few points regarding this concept. First, it cannot simply be equated to productivity or performance of the firm. The latter can be measures for upgrading but do not exhaust the concept of upgrading. Second, the word ‘industrial’ might give the impression of ‘upgrading at the industry level’. However, the term broadly covers the upgrading process at several levels. In the literature, it has been mostly examined at the country and industry levels, instead of at the firm level. In this context, Ernst (1998) has defined industrial upgrading as substantial changes in a country’s *specialisation* and *knowledge base* that increase its capacity for value generation. According to him, “industrial upgrading

needs to *complement* the current emphasis on financial and corporate restructuring”¹ (Ernst, 2001:1). He states that “industrial upgrading attempts to model the link between innovation, specialisation and Hirschman-type linkages (‘industrial deepening’), and possible consequences for economic growth through induced improvements in productivity” (Ernst, 2001:4; Hirschman, 1958). Moreover, the sources of innovation and growth have to be considered in a broader frame of reference that “includes the firm itself, its relationship with other organisations, and also government policy”.

Ernst (1998, 2001) puts forward four features of industrial upgrading:

- It implies a broader definition of innovation which covers not only R&D and patenting but also engineering, technology purchases, expenditures on licensing and consultancy, and technology search, as well as the accumulation of tacit knowledge required to absorb imported technology;
- It is a context-specific concept whose characteristics differ across industrial sectors and countries;
- It involves the possibility of a vicious circle of truncated industrial upgrading;
- It focuses on co-evolution of industry structure and firm behaviour as a result of the consensus that industry structure is insufficient to explain the dynamics of innovation and that firm behaviour (including organisation and strategy) has an important bearing on the strength as well as the kinds of innovation activity.

In pursuit of operationalisation of the concept, Ernst has proposed to a taxonomy which distinguishes five forms (below) alongside criticizing the studies that focus on only the first two forms of industrial upgrading and therefore fail to produce convincing results.

- *Inter-industry* upgrading within a hierarchy of industries that proceeds from low value-added industries (e.g., light industries) to higher value-added industries (heavy and higher-tech industries);
- *Inter-factorial* upgrading within hierarchy of factors of production that proceeds from “endowed assets” or “natural capital” (natural resources and unskilled labour) to “created assets”, i.e., “physical capital”, “human capital” (specialised skills), and “social capital” (a region’s support services);
- Upgrading of *demand* within a hierarchy of consumption, that proceeds from “necessities” to “conveniences”, to “luxury goods”;

- Upgrading along *functional* activities within a hierarchy of value chain stages. That proceeds from sales and distribution to final assembly and testing, to component manufacturing, engineering, product development, and system integration; and
- *Industrial deepening* within a hierarchy of Hirschman-type forward and backward linkages, that proceed from tangible, commodity-type production inputs to intangibles, i.e., a variety of knowledge-intensive support services (Ernst, 2001: 4).

He also gives emphasis on the last two forms where the fourth form is *firm level* upgrading and the fifth is, in his words, the lifeblood for the individual upgrading firm (Ernst, 2001: 5).

Gereffi (1999) has made a significant contribution to the upgrading debate by examining the Asian and Mexican apparel value chains. He defines industrial upgrading as

a process of improving the ability of a firm or an economy to move to more profitable and/or technologically sophisticated capital and skill-intensive economic niches.

In this definition, industrial upgrading becomes a process of gradual shift from lower to higher value added activities within the value chain.² He proposes to examine industrial upgrading at different levels, mainly taking the apparel industry as the basis for his analysis: *within factories* – upgrading involves moving from cheap to expensive items, from simple to complex products, from small to large orders; *within inter-firm enterprise networks* – upgrading involves moving from mass production of standardised products to flexible production of differentiated products; *within local or national economies* – upgrading involves moving from simple assembly of imported inputs to more integrated forms of production (such as OEM and OBM), involving greater use of forward and backward linkages at the local or national level; *within regions* – upgrading involves shifting from bilateral, asymmetrical, inter-regional trade flows to a more fully developed intra-regional division of labour incorporating all phases of the commodity chain from raw material supply, through production, distribution and consumption. His analysis is strongly constrained by the evolution of apparel industry.

Gereffi emphasizes the necessity of ‘learning’ by the firm throughout the upgrading process. Taking the necessity of learning for granted, Ernst

uses innovation as one of the features of industrial upgrading, whereas Kaplinsky and Readman (2001) try to distinguish industrial upgrading from innovation. According to them, innovation is the development of new products/processes or improvement of existing products by the firms compared to their previous position, whereas upgrading is how fast the firm reacts to its changing environment in comparison to its rivals. This definition brings in *dynamics* analysis to the industrial upgrading concept, which I try to grasp through dynamic capabilities (internal to the firm) and networks (external to the firm).

Kaplinsky and Readman (2001) have worked on industrial upgrading at the firm level (at small and medium-sized enterprise [SME] level) and associated it with the value chain concept.³ They distinguish four types of upgrading:

- Process upgrading: *increasing the efficiency of internal processes* such that these are significantly better than those of the rivals, both within individual links in the chain (for example, increased inventory turns, lower scrap), and between the links in the chain (for example, more frequent, smaller and on-time deliveries from suppliers).
- Product upgrading: *introducing new products or improving old products faster than rivals to reap a market advantage*. This involves changing new product development processes both within individual links in the value chain and in the relationship between different chain links.
- Functional upgrading: *increasing value added by changing the mix of activities* conducted within the firm (for example, taking responsibility for, or outsourcing accounting, logistics and quality functions) or moving the locus of activities to different links in the value chain (for example, from manufacturing to design).
- Chain upgrading: *moving to a new value chain* (for example, Taiwanese firms moved from the manufacture of transistor radios to calculators, to TVs, to computer monitors, to laptops and now to WAP phones).

They have suggested that 'standards'⁴ have become crucial parameters determining the upgrading of process or product or both, due to their role as qualifying requirements for participation in global product markets and value chains. For this reason, upgrading follows a logical path, starting with process upgrading to decrease costs and improve quality. On this

upgrading trajectory, process upgrading is followed by product upgrading, then functional upgrading and finally with chain upgrading (Readman, 2002) that resembles to upgrading path in the Asian electronics or clothing firms. Process upgrading is particularly critical at the early phase of the upgrading trajectory since it paves the way for production network development via production sharing or a division of labor in the production cycle (for example, firms making complementary products or components for each other).

The context of Eastern Europe calls for addition of a prior category of upgrading to the four categories of industrial upgrading put forward by Kaplinsky and Readman (2001). I call it *managerial upgrading* and define it as improving the efficiency and effectiveness of production and non-production activities by acquiring new forms of organizational and managerial methods, such as training, teamwork, involvement of workers, application of ISO certificate and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) – in the food industry –, use of consultancy, etc. It constitutes the re-organization of the managerial activities so as to increase the efficiency in the firm, and development of the base for knowledge acquisition, accumulation, and integration through giving emphasis to means of internal and external learning. This must precede the other upgrading types in the context of CEE firms, in order for them to follow the trajectory suggested by Kaplinsky and Readman.

Therefore, *industrial upgrading* is part of a process of gradually acquiring, or enhancing the deficient intangible assets of the enterprises, that enable the enterprises to shift from lower to higher value added products and activities. Due to the specificities of the Central and Eastern Europe, enterprise transformation (ET) has become one of the major issues after privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) by either foreign or domestic investors. This is the process whereby the firm changes its shape, initially inherited from the communist era, via managerial and organizational changes and capability development. Doczy and Meyer (2000) define ET as

the process of changing an organization previously adjusted to perform according to the performance criteria and rules of the game of the real existing socialism to perform competitively according to the performance criteria and rules of the game of a market economy.

This definition underlines the necessity of managerial upgrading as the prerequisite for the continuation of the upgrading trajectory laid out by Kaplinsky and Readman. Consequently, managerial upgrading has its roots within ET but is not as broad as ET.

In addition to the universally applicable examples of functional upgrading given by Kaplinsky and Readman, two forms of functional upgrading that this research applies for the specific situation of the food industry value chain are the extension of the firm's activities to include systematic nation-wide distribution and consultancy to farmers.


In a 1991 paper, Ozawa discusses how the changes in both the domestic market conditions (i.e., demand side) and in the manufacturing sectors (i.e., supply side) lead to a *new dynamo of industrial upgrading* in Japan.⁵ The above studies have put more emphasis on the supply side of the industrial upgrading, as the present study does. Yet the demand side deserves to be mentioned briefly, since Romania's low GDP per capita, coupled with increasing poverty and a growing informal economy, lead to imbalances in the demand and supply conditions in the food industry. The market conditions are mostly determined and controlled by the foreign investors rather than the demand, needs and preferences of Romanian consumers. The penetration of Western FDI after transition, alongside trade liberalisation, has introduced new and expensive products into the Romanian market. However, the capacity of Romanians, trapped by low real wages with decreasing purchasing power to respond to these products is limited. The local producers have evaluated the demands of Romanian consumers better than the foreign producers. Because they are not faced with consumers demanding luxury or innovative products but with the needs/aspirations of Romanian consumers to acquire diversified products at affordable prices – products which are not new on a global scale but are new for the Romanian market. Thus, the production of new products (mainly via the imitation of the new products introduced by foreign food companies into the Romanian market) with affordable prices has become one of the driving forces for the Romanian producers competing against foreign producers in Romania. These changes are gradually pushing domestic producers "to improve and move into newer and more advanced segments of the food industry over time, often upgrading competitive advantage in the process" (see Porter, 1990: 89) once they gain the necessary organisational capabilities.

As discussed in the above-mentioned literature, on the supply side, the installation of the latest possible machinery and equipment and the

acquisition and maintenance of up-to-date technology (which depends, of course, on the available capital) has helped the increase in productivity in the Romanian firms. Moreover, organisational improvements are complemented by managerial upgrading (i.e., change from rigid top-down to collaborative mentality), bringing about openness to complementing market relationships (i.e., buyer-supplier relations) with non-market relationships (i.e., networks).

The conceptual framework for this research, emerging from the discussion summarised above, is shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: *Conceptual framework: Two-legged feeding mechanism of industrial upgrading*



2.2 Explaining Industrial Upgrading at the Firm Level by Resources and Capabilities within the Firm: Internal Dynamics

To understand “industrial upgrading at the firm level”, I will make use of the approaches on the growth of the firm (Penrose, 1995; Chandler, 1996). These approaches stress the resources, capabilities, and motivations within the firm, which prepare the backdrop for understanding industrial upgrading at the firm level (Kaplinsky and Readman, 2001). Resources transform inputs into outputs in terms of quality as well as quantity,⁶ whereas capabilities appear as each firm’s idiosyncratic ability to utilize these resources (Yoruk and von Tunzelmann, 2002). The theory of the

growth of the firm is essential in understanding not only allocation of resources and development of capabilities within the firm but also the modes of growth of the firm. I refer to the former as the internal dynamics of the firm. The latter comprises internal/generic expansion, mergers and acquisitions, and networks (Peng and Heath, 1996), as will be discussed in the case studies below.

Differing capabilities reflect the heterogeneity of firms in terms of their efficiencies when they are working with roughly similar resources. In the literature, different types of firm capabilities are examined in order not only to ascertain why firms differ but also to explain how these differences matter. These capabilities are complements rather than substitutes and they help in understanding the internal dynamics of the firm as a “processor of knowledge” (Fransman, 1994).

The key issues for this research are the underlying reasons behind the heterogeneity of firms and how changes in capabilities over time influence firm growth through external dynamics. As Kay (2000) summarizes Penrose’s argument (1959, 1995),

[T]he firm is a collection of resources, and its expansion is dictated by the interplay between internal resources and external opportunities. The emphasis is on the role played by productive resources, especially *management*.

The direction and extent of expansion is limited by the nature and availability of internal human (managerial) resources. Penrose points out that firms typically find it cheaper and less risky to concentrate on their existing products, *ceteris paribus*, but may expand into new areas in pursuit of growth (Kay, 2000: 82-84) (This will be demonstrated by two Romanian firm case studies below). She emphasizes that such choices are influenced not only by external opportunities but also by the nature of the internal resources available to pursue these expansion opportunities. In particular, human resources are firm specific and their effective combination with other resources (inside or outside the firm) is what makes for the firm’s competitiveness. So, it is up to the firm to develop and manage the resources and the core competences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) to create internal knowledge that paves the way for internal growth. Chandler (1996) also stresses *the capabilities of managerial hierarchies*. While acknowledging the crucial importance of the functional and strategic capabilities of the firm to compete for market share and profits,

he argues that it is the internal dynamic provided by the organizational capabilities of the firm that allows it to continue its growth.

Besides managerial capabilities, firms also develop other sets of capabilities that are highly important in firm growth. The concept of technological capabilities has been developed by Bell and Pavitt (1993) by making a useful distinction between production capacity and technological capabilities, where the former

incorporates the resources used to produce industrial goods at given levels of efficiency and given input combinations: equipment (capital-embodied technology), labor skills (operating and managerial know-how and experience), product and input specifications, and the organizational methods and systems used,

and the latter

consists of the resources needed to generate and manage technical change, including skills, knowledge and experience, and institutional structure and linkages.

Ernst et al. (1998) have identified six categories of technological capabilities in the context of traditional industries in developing countries: strategic marketing, production, investment, linkage, minor and major change capabilities. Investment capabilities refer to the knowledge and skills needed for the expansion and/or modernization of the existing production facilities or the identification, preparation, design, setting up and commissioning of a new investment. This capability is extremely important in the CEE firms for a fresh start with higher productivity levels and lower production costs. Production capabilities, as distinct from production capacity above, relates to the knowledge and skills within the firm applied to both process and product technologies and industrial engineering such as repair and maintenance as well as monitoring and controlling of the functions during production. Besides ensuring smooth functioning of the technologies in use, production capability refers to utilization of the in-house abilities for the absorption of the new technologies bought or imitated from other firms (Lall, 1992; Ernst et al., 1998). For Ernst et al. (1998), minor change capabilities include the firm's abilities to improve and adapt continuously its products and processes, whereas major product change capabilities are those needed for creating

new technology, i.e., major changes in the design and core features of products and production processes (pp.18-20, 22).

CEE firms have special needs with respect to complementary capabilities related to finance, marketing, quality, and organization as opposed to technological capabilities. Radošević (1996) argues that these enterprises have relatively well developed production capabilities, yet lack system integration at the product level and network building at the enterprise level. Nevertheless, re-configuration of capabilities within firms is taking place, irrespective of their lack of strategic awareness in some areas. The main interest of this paper is to find out what are the networking impacts on this capability development en route to upgrading.

In line with the 'dynamic' definition of upgrading above, this paper also refers to 'dynamic capabilities' (Teece et. al., 1997), a concept which is defined as the ability to achieve new forms of competitive advantage, elucidating the change in capabilities over time, often characterized as unique and idiosyncratic processes that emerge from path-dependent histories of individual firms. The authors describe what they want to emphasize with the use of these terms as follows:

The term "dynamic" refers to the capacity to renew competences so as to achieve congruence with changing environment; certain innovative responses are required when time-to-market is critical, the rate of technological change is rapid, and the nature of future competition and markets (is) difficult to determine. The term "capabilities" emphasizes the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting, integrating, and re-configuring to match the requirements of a changing environment. (Teece et al., 2000:4)

In light of the above definition, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) elaborate the definition of dynamic capabilities as "the organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve *new resource configurations* as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve and die" (p. 1107). They articulate the definition by a list of exemplary types of dynamic capabilities based on extensive empirical research and management applicability: strategic decision making (concerning the strategic moves of the firm); (internal) knowledge creation routines; alliances and acquisition routines for gaining new resources or altering their resource base from external sources; and exit routines in the case of a market change.

A significant element in sustaining dynamic capabilities in the firm consists in ‘gatekeepers’ – individuals that maintain active communication with scientists in other firms, government laboratories, and universities. Communication of this type, which represents the bulk of relationships of Romanian food firms with the universities, generally takes place on an informal basis. The gatekeeper is usually the production or technical manager, who is a graduate of a particular university and maintains his or her relationship with staff of that university with regard to consultancy, new knowledge acquisition, product development, and the like. However, neither this kind of network development through gatekeepers nor the presence of gatekeepers themselves in most of the Romanian firms is a strategic decision.

According to the dynamic capabilities discourse, the main point is not the capabilities themselves but the use of these dynamic capabilities for new resource configurations by managers. Therefore, to gain competitive advantage, dynamic capabilities are necessary but not sufficient conditions; resource re-configurations, as combinations of tightly woven, synergistic activities, are also needed (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).

Linkage capabilities are of special interest to this research. Lall (1992) defined linkage capabilities as the skills needed to transmit information, skills, and technology to, and receive them from, component or raw material suppliers, subcontractors, consultants, service firms, and technology institutions. Ernst et al. have divided the mutual transmission of the knowledge mentioned by Lall into three levels, namely within a firm, from one enterprise to another, and between the firm and the domestic science and technology infrastructure. This research adopts a combination of the two definitions but will not restrict itself to domestic science and technology institutions. The international dimension of the relationships is significant in understanding the global impacts of the networks.

There are two crucial points here. The first is that resources and capabilities might provide the potential of *having* knowledge but they are not justified as long as this potential is *used* (Ritter and Gemuenden, 2002) in pursuit of better performance. The second is that in addition to technological and dynamic capabilities, to which most attention is devoted in the literature, complementary and linkage capabilities that are directly linked to managerial capabilities are also highly significant in shaping the growth strategies of firms in the CEEC context.

Drawing upon this background of what I call the internal dynamics of the firm and following the Penrosian approach, I argue that networks constitute a key external element/tool in such learning and knowledge transfer processes. It thus becomes necessary to understand the firm in both its internal and external relations. However, it is not easy to separate networking from the issues of modes of governance, which have been employed in the generation of resources and products, and had impacts on the development of capabilities within the firm. Governance can be defined very broadly as 'organizing collective action' (Prakash & Hart, 2000). Conventionally, modes of governance are divided into markets, hierarchies (both corporate and political), and networks. The process of transition in the CEE countries is most simply regarded as a shift from political hierarchies to markets as the predominant governance mode. However, my concern in this research is more with the networks, without ignoring the corporate hierarchies. The former are seen as critical to the interlinking of resource accumulation and production activities. The latter is a dominant feature of the multinational enterprises (MNEs) studied in this research to form a basis for comparison with Romanian firms.

Hence, industrial upgrading at the firm level appears to be a function of technological, complementary, dynamic and linkage capabilities as well as absorptive capacity. The latter is defined by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) as a function of the prior level of related knowledge and background history. This refers to the acquisition and/or assimilation of information by an organization as well as the organization's ability to exploit it. Absorptive capacity does not simply depend on the organization's direct interface with the external environment, but on the transfers of knowledge across and within sub-units. Thus, the need to access the external environment for external knowledge acquisition and/or transfer requires linkage capabilities within the firm.

Therefore, this paper argues that the internal dynamics are important but not sufficient for the growth of the firm and thus industrial upgrading within the firm. The capabilities that constitute internal firm dynamics create an important backdrop for understanding the evolution of industrial upgrading at the firm level "(t)hrough the recombination of knowledge, ... partly by the generative logic of their capabilities but also by the opportunities and influences of the external environment" (Kogut and Zander, 1996: 503). Firm dynamics benefit from external elements like networks with other organisations in order to bring the external knowledge into the firm.

2.3 Explaining Industrial Upgrading at the Firm Level by Strategic Networks: External Dynamics

The growth of the firm in transition economies has been divided into three categories by Peng and Heath (1996): first, generic expansion, as discussed by the resource-based view (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Chandler, 1996) and followed by the capabilities literature; second, mergers and acquisitions (minor or major) where the firms create bigger oligopolistic units by merging or subsidiaries or affiliates (i.e., holding-type structures) by acquiring shares in an existing firm; and third, networks which are treated as either the intermediate form between market and hierarchy in transaction cost economics (Contractor and Lorange, 1988) or a new phenomenon in their own right (Chesnais, 1996). Recently internal growth generated by the capabilities discussed above has become a *sine qua non* for firms to operate on the frontier of the market, if not of the technology, in the CEECs. Generally, in the last two decades there is a global tendency for the reinforcement of enterprise growth strategy to be strongly predominated by networks; in the most developed countries, moreover these networks are increasingly characterized by non-market activities. Also, in the 1990s, to some extent, the MNEs have transformed/decentralized their internal structures, becoming networked firms (Buckley and Casson, 1998). Yet, as will be shown, the MNEs in the CEECs – particularly in the food processing industry – hardly provide evidence of this transformation into ‘networked MNE’ structures.

In the 1980s, scholars have been interested in the simple buyer-supplier relationships that inspired the huge business networks literature, which in particular focuses on the co-operative marketing activities of firms, and the mechanisms by which they stimulate the development of further networking activity (e.g., in the areas of production specialisation, knowledge and technology transfer, etc.). In the 1990s, the profile of the networks has been altered in response to the demands of the developing knowledge-based economy, as firms have begun to search for new external knowledge through differing means than they have employed inside the firm. As mentioned above, the purpose of various types of networks is to enhance and facilitate the ability/potential to extract knowledge from these relationships and then absorb/integrate it into the pool of knowledge within the firm. The crucial role of knowledge integration (as well as acquisition and accumulation) has been emphasized in the knowledge management literature.

There are no clear-cut types and definitions of 'networks' in the literature. As early as 1983, Haegg and Johanson edited a book called *Firms in Networks*, in which they introduced the concept of networks as a mode of organization, that is neither a company nor an "intermediate form"; this concept was to serve as a tool for understanding the relationships in the industrial market in order to understand the industrial development. Though they restricted their description of the scope of networks to buyer-seller relationships, they pointed out the importance of long-term and stable relationships between buyers and sellers for the exchange of information and also noted the differences between domestic (more extensive, more intimate and informal contacts) and international relationships.

In his book on strategic networks, Jarillo (1993) starts by making a broad definition: "...a set of companies that work together towards a common goal" and ends up with the definition of "an arrangement by which companies set up a web of close relationships that form a veritable *system* geared to providing product of services in a coordinated way." Gulati et al. (2000) very broadly defines strategic networks as a "...firm's set of relationships, both vertical⁷ and horizontal,⁸ with other organizations – be they suppliers, customers, competitors, or other entities – including relationships across industries and countries". There are many approaches to networks from different disciplinary backgrounds that define various types and dimensions of networks that *overlap* to a great extent in the real world, such as *business networks*, *industrial or production networks*, *innovation networks*, *knowledge networks*, and so on.

In this paper, networks are defined as inter-organizational relationships without (as much as possible) hierarchical control, i.e., formed by large firms to develop non-market flows, which are often aimed at changing quality rather than quantity. I differentiate here between two types of relationships: equity (where the partners are linked by ownership – shareholding, i.e., pecuniary relationships) and non-equity (i.e., not based on ownership) relationships. This research does not totally exclude equity relationships but includes third party relationships such as joint venture and acquisitions (resulting from growth strategies as discussed above). The non-equity type of relationships includes subcontracting, alliances with suppliers and customers, licensing, research consortia, strategic alliance, cooperation with potential competitors; the first two are vertical relationships and the rest are horizontal.

Vertical relations in a network help develop exchange/transfer of knowledge from one stage of production to the next stage in the value chain (from upstream to downstream); here firms play complementary roles – one can think of it as a division of labor. Horizontal relationships, on the other hand, facilitate the improvement of products, processes, etc. through dissemination of knowledge among companies, with more or less similar capabilities. By its nature, the firm always seeks to create diversity by combining bits of information on the cutting edge and benefiting from coping with the ‘unknown’. But tacit knowledge is not costless and not easily transferable, and its dissemination necessitates interaction as it is embodied in human, in firm, and so on.

There is also another dimension of the networks, which is the spatial/regional dimension: local, national, international (or global) networks. This dimension is analyzed in the literature mostly from the international networks viewpoint via the operations of the subsidiaries of the multinational corporations in the host countries, i.e., East European countries. The multi-level structure of governance has also yielded these three regional levels of networks. Subsidiaries of multinational corporations are often recognized as important for the development of international business. They represent one of the hierarchical governance structures. By interacting with their own networks at the international level, they shape the networks in the host country. What impact the subsidiary’s competence has on the development of the foreign corporation or on the development of the host country’s industry climate and vice versa is not deeply analyzed.

MNE growth is not analyzed in categories substantially different from those used in the general discussion of the growth of the firm. Yet, it has been generally explained through Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI) advantages by Dunning (1994), where it is examined alongside the internationalization process. In terms of the OLI framework, FDI is undertaken if these three advantages are met simultaneously. As Narula and Dunning (2000) discusses in the context of developing countries, there are opportunity costs on which MNEs and the CEECs base their relative bargaining power in developing international business. FDI flows to transition economies are based on the demand for the firm-specific assets of foreign firms in transition countries (Meyer, 1997). In his OLI framework, Dunning refers to these firm-specific assets that MNEs possess as ownership advantages. On the other hand, the host countries possess the location advantages, including policies and incentive systems, natural

assets, created assets, and agglomeration economies (Meyer, 1997), that lead to four distinct type of FDI: resources-based, cost-reducing, R&D-driven, and domestic-market-driven (Radosevic, 1997).

Although the Dunning model is static (that is, it does not cover the impact of changing environment due to liberalization of markets, privatization, and so on), it does provide insights into what FDI might bring to the transition economies in the sense of improving the existing situation at the firm level. Recently there have been studies that investigate the co-ordination of knowledge transfer (backward or forward) between the MNE and its subsidiaries (Cohendet et al., 1999; Gammelgaard, 2002). In the Romanian food industry we observe mostly the internal flow of resources – namely, product, capital, knowledge and technology – within the MNE network from the parent to subsidiary. Thus, the subsidiary or the affiliate becomes a ‘resource user’; that is, there is low outflow from the subsidiaries to the rest of the MNE network but high inflow of resources from the rest of the MNE to the subsidiaries (Randoy and Li, 1998).⁹ A reversal of this situation, making the subsidiary a ‘resource networker’, necessitates improvement of its own, independent capabilities. Failures to achieve this constitute one of the most frequently criticized points regarding the operations of MNEs in developing countries (see Ariffin and Bell, 1999).¹⁰

Not only firms are active agents in knowledge production and distribution. Local institutions also contribute to the process of socialization of information and knowledge. This has led to a discussion of local level networks. For this reason, at this stage, this research does not exclude other organizations from the analysis.

The recent literature has mainly concentrated on understanding the formation of networks, seeking to explain its determinants as well as the motives of the firms for engaging in such activity. This is an area where there is very limited research on Eastern Europe. The aim of my research is to identify patterns of the knowledge transfer among firms and other local, national, or international organizations through networks and the impacts of the networks on the firm itself. So, assuming that knowledge is created within and/or acquired from the networks, this research attempts to find out how these networks affect the indigenous firms in Romania by trying to answer the questions to what extent the indigenous firms are involved in networks, to what extent they are capable of acquiring and absorbing the knowledge from the network they are involved in, and what are the consequences of knowledge acquisition and absorption in

integrating into further networks after achieving some level of industrial upgrading.

3. The Food-Processing Industry

3.1 General Assessment of the Food-Processing Industry in the Communist Period with Special Reference to the Romanian Food Processing Industry

As we have analyzed elsewhere (Yoruk and von Tunzelmann, 2002), food processing in Romania before the transition was shaped by the dominance of political hierarchies. Due to supply and self-sufficiency policies, priority and subsidies were given to *production of basic consumer products*, but not to a level of processing that would differentiate products in the market, to packaging for marketing purposes, to distribution (run by the state), and to quality (kept at an inferior level). The industry was sacrificed in favor of the expansion of other industries, such as heavy industry and extractive industries. Therefore, when the system collapsed, the food-processing industry was underdeveloped, with an enormous need for investments to update the obsolete machinery and equipment as well as to catch up with European standards. Under these circumstances, a severe crisis after the transition was inevitable. For this reason, Hanzl (2000) calls the period between 1989-1993 a ‘transformational recession’, which was coined by Kornai (1995), in the context of food industry. The liberalization of markets and trade, coupled with the change in the political system, has encouraged the imports of high quality food products as well as FDI from the West. Subsidies from the government have come to a halt. The strong and airtight ‘state-run network’ between the large collective and state farms (*kolhoz* and *sovhoz*) and large combined food processing factories (*combinats*)¹¹ has disappeared. We see this as a context characterized by widespread ‘network failure’.

This network failure is due to the socialist period’s top-down science and technology policies in which the monopolization of co-ordination mechanisms by hierarchical relationships precluded horizontal co-ordination (Pavitt, 1997). After the transition, with the evolution of the enterprises through restructuring, privatization, and corporate governance, a bottom-up system has started to emerge. The existing national innovation system, which was predominantly state-dominated, has shown signs of

conversion into a market-oriented one. However, there appears to be a danger of switching from one network failure (state domination) to another: domination by foreign firms. Both the old and new networks show disconnectedness within the system. In the upstream segments of the food industry (i.e., agriculture), the state ceased to be a system integrator with the fall of the communist system. The problems of agriculture have become more severe, and old vertical relationships were all destroyed (OECD, 1998; OECD, 2000).

The food-processing industry is strongly linked to agriculture, which functions as its main raw material supplier. There were significant differences between the structure of the food chain in the capitalist system and that in the communist system. In the West, farmers were typically small producers in competitive conditions, while processors were large producers in oligopolistic or even monopolistic market conditions. Therefore, the retailers, who were generally also small units operating under competitive conditions, were driven by the processors. The recent tendency is towards the dominance of large firms with a fringe of smaller ones, but driven by oligopolistic retailers, like Carrefour, Metro, Tesco, etc., who control not only the food manufacturers but also the agricultural growers. This is strongly related to the high saturation and fierce competition in the downstream of the food industry in the West and reflects the shift from being supplier-dominated to being demand-driven (cf. Gereffi, 1999, buyer-driven value chain literature).

In very general terms, in the communist era, the collectivization of agriculture was not only an obstacle to competition but also determined the organization of the food industry. Instead of agriculture being dependent upon the processing firms, the processing factories were dependent upon the agricultural collective farms; thus, in contrast to the West, the upstream was favored in lieu of manufacturing. The retailing part of the industry was oligopolistically or monopolistically state-run and driven by the state processors (OECD, 2000). A stagnating and supply-driven industry was left to be revitalized primarily by the inflow of foreign technology following transition (von Tunzelmann & Charpiot-Michaud, 2000), at least in the mid-term.

3.2 Foreign Direct Investment and Its Expected Impacts

After transition, the targets and associated strategies of domestic firms have been shifting, into line with western values and perceptions, and these shifts have of course radically altered business practices. The food processing industry has experienced restructuring through privatization of the former state-owned enterprises and entry of MNEs to the region, although this has occurred relatively late in Romania compared to other CEECs. This restructuring is strongly influenced by the pace of changes, though slow, in the agricultural system, and the rebuilding of networks with the drive coming from the food processing companies, instead of the state.

Especially at the beginning of the transition, the food-processing industry was performing badly in almost all CEECs. Yet, it has attracted significant amounts of FDI (Duponcel, 1998), which was focusing on market-seeking strategies in the internationalization policies of MNEs. The latter have mainly been attracted by domestic market share rather than export opportunities. This has helped to decrease competition in Western Europe by allowing for production and export within the CEEC region, if appropriate. However, investors have preferred factories with more advanced technology, a quasi-monopolistic position, relatively good organizational features, and favorable location (Hanzl, 2000). It is also argued that FDI has positive effects on the restructuring of the domestic enterprises and the reorganization of the structure of the industry in the transition economies, through stimulating the competitive environment and bringing new technology and new managerial know-how. The domestic companies are compelled to adopt cost-saving and quality-improving production processes as well as to learn and apply marketing and advertising. This has paved the way for increasing efforts by domestic companies to catch-up with the European standards of food quality and safety all along the food chain and to obtain ISO certificates, not only to retain their market shares against the foreign competitors but also to be able to penetrate to foreign markets, particularly in Western Europe. Attracting FDI is also related to government policies. For instance, the stock of FDI in the Czech Republic, where priority was given to privatization to domestic owners via voucher scheme in lieu of attracting FDI, was less than half that of Romania at the end of 1996 (Duponcel, 1998).

Foreign investors are selective concerning which sub-sectors to enter (OECD, 1998). In Romania, we see foreign investment mainly in edible-oil, confectionery, sugar, beer, and tobacco, but not much in primary-processing sub-sectors like dairy, bakery, and meat. They have chosen the industries that are profitable, are state monopolies, or have easily obtainable market share, and in which brand ownership is decisive. At least at the beginning of the transition, they stayed away from the sub-sectors where the exportation to the CMEA was high since these sub-sectors experienced overcapacity problems.

A phenomenon worthy of special attention is the expansion of (already penetrated) foreign investors' operations by the continuous acquisition of new firms. This does not leave any room for newcomers and makes it difficult for the Romanian firms to compete in the market. Finally, Duponcel (1998) argues that the industries where less cooperation with the agricultural suppliers is required are also preferred by foreign investors in the food-processing industry. But four years later, our data provide evidence to counter this claim.

3.3 Significance of the Food Processing Industry in the Romanian Manufacturing Sector

Although the significance of the food processing industry varies from country to country within Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Duponcel, 1998), in general terms, it is a central part of manufacturing, both in terms of production and employment (Hanzl, 2000). In 1989, the food processing industry played a major role in almost all the CEECs, while in 1999 only Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria¹² have remained specialized in this industry. In Romania, after 1990 almost one fifth of the manufacturing industry has been composed of food and beverage industry (Table 1). However, after 1993 it has shown negative growth in contrast to other CEECs, which can be explained by supply and demand side effects, i.e., the stagnation in agricultural production due to late privatization or restitution on the supply side, and restricted access to the foreign markets due to quality factors and the low purchasing power of the Romanian consumer in the domestic market on the demand side. Romania has become a net importer in agro-food sector while it was a net agro-food exporter under the communist regime (OECD, 2000).

Table 1. Structure of industrial production in selected significant sectors in Romania (percentage)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Manufacturing total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Food and beverage	16.8	17.7	18.0	22.9	20.0	20.2	20.9	20.4	23.1	18.7	20.3
Textiles*	14.3	13.6	10.7	10.2	8.5	9.1	8.7	7.9	8.9	9.4	8.4
Metallurgy	9.9	11.5	13.0	10.4	11.9	12.9	12.7	14.7	12.3	12.1	14.4
Crude oil processing	8.0	7.8	8.2	10.2	9.7	9.6	7.8	10.5	8.0	10.6	12.7
Chemistry and synthetic and manmade fibres	8.5	9.3	10.8	8.7	9.4	10.8	9.5	9.1	7.4	7.8	8.8

* Textiles include 'textiles and textile products', 'textile, fur and leather wearing apparel', and 'leather goods and footwear'.

Source: own calculations from the data of INSSE, Annual Yearbook, 2001

Table 2 shows the growth in the share of food and beverage industry employees in total manufacturing employment, and Table 3 shows the growth of investments and intangible fixed assets in the Romanian food and beverage industry. Discernibly, in these terms, the share of the food industry in total manufacturing has shown acceleration after the transformational recession period.

Table 2. Average number of employees in Romanian food and beverage industry

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Manufacturing total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Food and beverage	7.5	8.0	8.6	9.8	10.1	10.5	10.2	10.5	11.2	11.3	10.8

Source: INSSE, Annual Yearbook, 2001

Table 3. Indices of investments and tangible fixed assets in Romanian food and beverage industry 1990=100

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Investments	105.3	147	159.9	138.6	327.7	352.6	252.8	290.3	219.2	219.2
Tangible fixed assets	104.7	109.9	117.6	125.9	156	161.9	163.7	237.5	249.4	326.9

Source: INSSE, Annual Yearbook, 2001

3.4 Special Characteristics of the Food Processing Industry

The food processing industry contains a diverse and very heterogeneous collection of sub-industries, some approaching perfect competition, others decidedly imperfect (cf. Sutton, 1991). Moreover, it is often overlooked as a major segment of manufacturing in the West, where studies have

recently tended to focus on the 'high-tech' industries. It is regarded a traditional, backward-looking and low technology industry. However, the industry has not only played a major role in the early stages of industrialization in a number of advanced countries, like the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland, but has proved to be an evolving industry with increasingly capital-intensive technology (particularly in the West, though to a lesser extent in Eastern Europe) and provides impetus for growth (von Tunzelmann & Charpiot-Michaud, 2000).

It is true that food-processing firms do not carry out much of their innovation 'in-house', which eliminates them from the R&D intensive industry categories (as, for instance, in the OECD classification). Innovations have predominantly been process innovations and thus mainly come from suppliers of machinery and equipment. This has pushed the industry into the "supplier-dominated industry" category of the much-used Pavitt taxonomy (Pavitt, 1984). The process innovations in the mechanical engineering industry have not always targeted the food-processing industry, but machinery producers for the food-processing industry have benefited from the advances in machinery that are destined for different users. Moreover, the food industry is a beneficiary of scientific advances in mathematics, chemistry, physics, computer science, and biotechnology. For instance, the modification of milk to produce healthier butter is a matter of choice among various available techniques, including the physical, the chemical, the biotechnological, or the agricultural techniques (changing the feed of the cows). These techniques are integrated into the processing techniques in the food industry, in cooking, pasteurization (UHT milk), in freezing, in production integration and in packaging. Process innovation is at the middle of the shift from supply-driven to demand-driven (the latter including changes due to the shifts in socio-economic patterns such as the increase in the number of working women, etc.).

The product innovations, on the other hand, can be divided into two categories: new products and new ingredients. New products include more exotic foods such as ready made dishes; more prepared foods such as sauces, microwave foods; more casual foods such as snacks; healthier foods such as low calorie, low fat foods. Examples of new ingredients include the substitution of natural for artificial ingredients (replacement of E-number additives with more nature-identical flavorings) and the replacement of 'bad' ingredients (protein alternatives to fats, alternatives to sugar). There are also demand changes that affect product innovations,

like rising incomes, homogenization of tastes (demand for ethnic foods); rising employment of married women (ready-made meals); increased pressure and stress in life (snacking); global competition among producers for market share restructured tastes in the world (Coca Cola, McDonald's, etc.). For example in packaging, the new processes are designed to meet consumer demands for (i) ease of use (e.g., ring-pull cans and tear-strip openings), (ii) new eating habits (as for ready meals), (iii) food safety (e.g., avoiding the 'migration' of packaging into the product), (iv) environmental friendliness (e.g., avoiding non-biodegradable and wasteful packaging). In these respects, the process changes have aligned with product innovations as responses to shifting consumer demands (for details see Christensen et al., 1996).

The permeation of food-processing technology by industries such as biotechnology, pharmaceuticals (e.g., to develop special vitamins that are not destroyed at high temperatures), advanced materials (whose use in the packaging industry has generated product innovations, especially in the cases of frozen food and ready-made products) and other high-tech industries has been a recent phenomenon that mitigates the backwardness of the food-processing industry in terms of research and development. This has introduced and strengthened the need for collaboration with other firms and industries, encouraging horizontal spillovers of technological know-how.

4. Research Methodology

The conceptual framework of this research is tested through empirical work with data collected from four multinational and four Romanian large food enterprises as well as one special case (a small Romanian university spin-off firm). In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the industrial upgrading (at the firm level) and networks relationship, this research was conducted at the firm level instead of the industry level, but it will place firms in the context of the mezzo environment of the 'industry' or 'sub-sector' that surrounds them, not least because this is a key determinant of their strategy (cf. Porter, 1990). Because the food processing industry is a very competitive industry, I have coded the company names.

I will make use of what the historian Eric Hobsbawm calls "grass root history", i.e., gathering information not only from information codified in

the history but also from personal memory and experience. For this reason, face-to-face interviewing is the main technique used to shed light to the research question this paper examines.¹³ Information used to select the companies has been collected on the basis of a two-page questionnaire sent to the firms. Using the results of this questionnaire, firms were selected for case studies on the basis of their networking activity. The sample was chosen in such a way as to include both firms with or without networks. Information for empirical testing of the framework was collected through interviews, site observation, company annual reports, and secondary sources such as business magazines, journals, newspapers, and the Internet. The interviews were conducted with people at top and intermediate managerial levels (see Table A.1) in both question-answer and discussion form. When necessary, native interpreters have been used.

In the next section, I present this empirical analysis, focusing on the interface of the network development strategies of the firms and their level of upgrading. In line with the framework of this research, the interview questions have sought first to ascertain the existing resources and capabilities as well as capability development with the firms interviewed. Then the spatial dimension of network development of the firms is analyzed, i.e., networks at local, national, and global level as well as with the EU, as a supranational organization. Finally, the upgrading is analyzed in terms of the four categories discussed above, namely managerial, process, product and functional upgrading.

5. Empirical Findings in the Industrial Upgrading – Networks Relation in Romanian Food-Processing Industry

In this section, I begin with brief presentations of nine companies (Table A.1 in Appendices). Then the analysis follows in the light of the model. The role of network development strategy (Table A.2) in the industrial upgrading of foreign and Romanian food companies (Table A.3) is discussed taking into account the resources and capabilities (Table A.4) within the firms.

5.1 Concise Company Presentations:

Foreign Firms

FOR1 can be seen as an example of upgrading without networking, and is, additionally, a good example of the expected positive effects of FDI (see discussion above on FDI) on the host. The company has undertaken enormous investment in production facilities, modernizing and introducing state-of-the-art technology. These changes have covered new product launch in the domestic market, for which know-how has been brought by the parent company. Profound change has taken place in the managerial activities, in organization, and especially in the distribution system as FOR1 produces a consumer product (beer). Training for the Romanian managers and engineers has become priority, yet the top management is still composed of foreign managers who have worked in the other companies of the Group in other countries. The company seems to cooperate with the subsidiaries of the other MNEs in Romania in its market-based relationships. It is not involved in the global networks of the mother company whatsoever, yet its needs are determined and met via co-ordination of the mother company with other companies within the Group. Synergies within the Group seem to be under control of the mother company, with a highly hierarchical structure.

FOR2 produces an intermediate good (malt) for breweries and bakeries, which requires secure raw material procurement. The firm has penetrated CEECs using differing modes of entry, taking the situation of the production facility as its choice criterion. The two Romanian factories in which production is carried out are technologically obsolete. For this reason, two factories have been rented for five years instead of bought, and FOR2 plans to make a greenfield investment after the rental period ends. This makes a difference for its approach to process upgrading. The priority of the company during this rental period is to establish its supplier base through strong, long-lasting, and trust-based relationships with farmers and secure its raw material stock. The general manager was working in the home country before being promoted to Romania, and the Romanian agronomist has been sent to the home country for training. The know-how and the agricultural techniques are guided by the parent company, which specializes in agricultural procurement, and by the French consultants it appoints for its subsidiaries. The firm uses experimental fields where it gathers the Romanian farmers to demonstrate good and bad practice as well as new agricultural techniques and their outcomes.

The most striking feature of this company is the effort of the general manager to develop systematic and efficient interaction among actors within the sector, and to coordinate them in hastening urgently needed agricultural reforms by getting the support of the ministries. The synergies between the Romanian and other CEECs subsidiaries are coordinated and well managed by the parent company. These companies are integrated into the global network of the mother company, especially in the outsourced R&D facilities.

FOR3 produces sugar for industrial and consumer consumption. In 2001, they started to produce branded sugar, which is an innovation in the Romanian market. The firm has modernized in the infrastructure of the factories and introduced its own know-how (five-step technology) with the existing machinery and equipment. The Romanian subsidiary is unique among the CEE subsidiaries in that the raw material is supplied through world markets. This is due to the deterioration in sugar beet production in Romania since transition (OECD, 2000). However, a project is underway to develop a local supply chain and work with contracted farmers under their supervision. Apart from these plans for the near future and market-based transactions, the firm has no particular relationships with other organizations. Its main customers are other foreign firms in the Romanian food industry, like Coca-Cola, Kraft Jacobs, etc. On one occasion, a Romanian research institute was contacted to solve a machinery problem. The main links are developed with, and under the control of, the mother company. There are no obvious synergies between the CEE subsidiaries, possibly because of the raw material importation in Romania. It is aware of the importance of ISO certification and aims at getting it soon.

FOR4 produces processed cheese (cream cheese) with the raw material (milk) supplied by Romanian farmers. This forces the firm to cope with some of the predicaments of agriculture in Romania. In order to ensure the hygienic condition of the milk, they have made some investments in the collection points as well as in training of the farmers as to how and when to milk and bring the milk to the collection points. It made a further acquisition with the aims of securing the raw material and specializing the factory in *cașcaval* (Romanian cheddar). Again, the relationships are mostly restricted to its mother company and to other foreign firms in Romania with whom the mother company works. There are some market-based relationships with big Romanian firms. ISO certification is a policy of the mother company as well, and the Romanian

subsidiary, and expects to get it soon. The first acquisition was a state dairy factory, which has been rebuilt in accordance with the new production process and technology brought by the mother company (this was second-hand but relatively new technology). The Romanian technical and quality control employees have been trained in the home country. Since FOR4 started operations in 1998, they have launched many new varieties of processed cheese and *cașcaval* on the Romanian market. The general manager, who is Romanian, aims at getting funding from the EU through the SAPARD program for the restructuring of agriculture in the region.

Romanian Firms

ROM1, in the milling and bakery industry, is a success story in itself. It was privatized through a management-employee buyout (MEBO). Although the management has not changed since the privatization, ROM1 has undergone significant organizational change with the establishment of new departments (in which CEE firms are generally deficient), from 1993 to 1996. These included marketing and sales, distribution, economic analysis, and strategy departments. The finance department has also been re-organized. Exceptionally, in 1993, ROM1 has set up an in-house R&D unit and got patents for its inventions in four products. This unit has paved the way to development of strong relationships with Romanian universities as well as European research institutes (like the Dutch ATO) and to getting involved in EU-financed programs and obtaining funding from the Romanian government for these involvements. It is a vertically integrated firm. Since privatization, ROM1 has extended its activities to bread improvers, frozen pastry products and catering facilities, but it is not engaged in upgrading raw material procurement with a view to obtaining higher quality raw materials. It has solved this problem by developing a correction technique in its processing technology, developed by its R&D unit. Lately it has established a joint venture with a Danish company and has acquired 41% of a Bucharest bakery company. It obtained ISO certification in 2000, and aims at exporting to West European markets as well as establishing networks with West European firms. It cooperates with local Chamber of Commerce in training and marketing, and with the University of Galati in R&D activities. It also works with Romanian and foreign training and consultancy agencies.

ROM2, a dairy company, is highly reserved in its contacts with other organizations and has almost no explicit links with any organization apart from buying and selling activities. A team of five people in the management makes decisions on product and process development. ROM2 does not hold any patents but is the exclusive producer of two products whose processing is very specialized. It exports overseas through an intermediary trade company in Bucharest, just as in communist times. No managerial changes have been made since privatization. A hierarchical structure is combined with the sceptical attitude of the firm's management towards any kind of collaboration with other organizations, owing to distrust of its foreign and domestic competitors. New investments have been made in order to expand the business to new production areas within the dairy industry (e.g., ice cream). The only inflow of knowledge is from universities; though not through collaboration, but rather through the enrolment of its managers in masters and PhD programs at the universities. Through these links, one of the production managers has been working on HACCP. ROM2 is a vertically integrated firm, having its own farms for milk supply and its own distribution system for the entire county.

ROM3 is a very good example of mismanagement, though the firm has a good historical record, with potential to upgrade. It was a successful company, which was conducting product development under the development plans of the ministry, functioning in a broad range of sectors within the food industry. During the privatization process, the government sold its shares to one of the company's local competitors, which brought an end to the successful improvements. The decline of ROM3 helped the competitor company that acquired it to replace its market share. Until that time, ROM3 had been producing 12% of the confectionery in Romania. The engineers of the company, who are still with the company, successfully introduced expanded cereal for the first time to the Romanian market and developed a new product in 1997 in interaction with a customer. Yet the investments to modernize the technology of the company have been very restricted, undertaken just before transition and in 1996. Now they are cautious as to whether an investment in technology will be rewarding. Therefore, in attempts to stabilize the position of the company in the regional market, the first aim is to diversify their products with the existing process technology. During those years, ROM3's international cooperation has been limited to exporting attempts and technology acquisition. Before the onset of mismanagement, the

local Chamber of Commerce helped ROM3 in making contact with a foreign vitamin producer firm operating in Romania, to realize its new product development plan: cereals with vitamins (which was new to the Romanian market at that time). Today, its main collaboration is with the local university, with whose co-operation it is gradually introducing HACCP and becoming a partner in PHARE projects as a processing company. The technical director, who is a part time lecturer at that university, would like to get funding through SAPARD in the future.

ROM4 is an edible oil producer, which underwent a turnaround in the vision of management of the company after the privatization in 1998. The focal point of the firm's strategy is the sales organization as well as expansion (horizontal diversification). For this reason, the marketing manager has recently been transferred from FOR3. ROM4 has recently acquired an edible oil factory in the north west of Romania, and a rice and sugar packing plant in Bucharest. The main shareholder of the company is a Romanian construction company. Just before privatization, modernization in the process technology had been undertaken to some extent. The managerial change and ongoing organizational restructuring have taken place after the privatization. Due to the entry of MNEs into the edible oil market, ROM4 has lost its market share and stepped back to fourth place among its competitors. New acquisitions have targeted capturing more market share. There is no serious network development strategy except market exchanges, generally with Romanian firms. ROM4 works with agencies for market research and recruitment purposes. Distribution has been outsourced to a Belgian-Romanian company since the privatization, so the focus is on manufacturing and marketing, but there is no product differentiation at the moment. The plans for the future do not involve networking.

Romanian Firm - Special Case

ROMX, a small business, is a university spin-off founded by Romanian and German university professors, a Romanian medical doctor, and an agronomy engineer. The mastermind is a Romanian professor teaching and researching in the biochemistry department, who has her own patent for a bread additive from Romanian Patent Institute (OSIM). The other products of ROMX are all registered by OSIM. All the technological capabilities are embedded in two employees, who are a doctoral student (specialist on plants and seeds) of the above-mentioned professor and a

chemist (responsible for technology creation) – and the founder professors. The products are based on plant extracts, since the objective is avoiding use of chemical additives by using the bioactive components of plants and keeping their natural molecular environment as natural additives for food, animal feed and cosmetics. For monitoring of product quality, ROMX works with German labs, due to mistrust of Romanian labs. For testing of its cosmetics products, it cooperates with the hospital of the Medical University in its region for four-year testing periods before launching the products. ROMX monitors the suppliers of seeds and plants. The Institute of Horticulture cultivates the flowers. The Forestry Department at the University collects some special seeds from the forest. Farms, which are state owned, are under the monitoring of the doctoral student, who intends to extend this co-operation to private farms. ROMX participates in projects as a processing unit through its founder, who works as the scientific consultant of the company. She has made applications for EU and World Bank projects with several international partners from universities and research institutes as well as foreign and domestic companies in Romania.

5.2 Results

The sample of enterprises displays interesting features in terms of our model. First, there is a clear pattern whereby the Romanian firms that choose networks as part of their growth strategies gain in terms of industrial upgrading. This pattern is less clear for the foreign firms (see Table 4 and Figure 2). The unidirectional knowledge flow from mother to subsidiary within the foreign firm does bring industrial upgrading regardless of additional network activity (note the accumulation of the foreign subsidiaries in the right hand corner of Figure 2). However, it is not easy to conclude that upgrading comes only with the internal growth of the foreign firms backed by their parents. In some sectors, there are externalities that the firm cannot control, compelling it to establish network relationships so as to secure its raw material. The latter is the guarantee of its long-term presence in the country. For this reason, a shift from the short-term measures taken by successive Romanian governments to date to a program of hastened agricultural reforms aimed at long-term solutions to the deficiencies in Romanian agriculture would attract knowledge-seeking FDI. In our sample, there are subsidiaries such as FOR2 that

have shown significant network developments that have helped to upgrade both the firm and its partners within the chain (Table A.3).

Table 4. Overall assessment of the relationship between network development strategy and industrial upgrading in MNE subsidiaries in Romania and the Romanian firms.

	MNC subsidiaries				Romanian big firms				University spin-off
	FOR1	FOR2	FOR3	FOR4	ROM1	ROM2	ROM3	ROM4	ROMX
network development strategy	closed	half open	closed	half open	open	(implicitly) open	half open (open to possibilities)	closed	open
level of industrial upgrading	high	high	medium	medium	high	high	low	low	high

Source: Interviews conducted by the author.

Second, the Romanian firms have a tendency to develop knowledge networks with the universities, to which they have easy access, whereas the foreign firms focus on the raw material procurement and thus establish production networks with the upstream agriculture thereby helping in the upgrading of agricultural production. On the one hand, the low quality of domestic agricultural produce, together with declining quality of agricultural technology with the fragmentation of the farms and inadequacy of technical support from agricultural extension services after the fall of the communist regime, have become a focal point of attention for foreign entrants, once they move beyond importing some or all of the materials (e.g., FOR3 in Table A.3). There are problems in securing hygiene of the milk collected in the dairy industry due to the lack of milking machines and fully equipped collection points, which are awaiting foreign investments. In effect the foreign investors have been sucked into trying to revive the upstream end of the industry, by having to teach the farmers how to obtain the quantity and quality of output which they need for downstream processing (Yoruk and von Tunzelmann, 2002). On the other hand, the foreign firms do not want to diffuse their know-how to domestic organizations through co-operation whatsoever if they are not convinced that they will get something in return by way of reciprocity. Figure 2 clearly reveals this unidirectional knowledge flow within the MNE itself.

The biggest shortcoming is the weakness of the national and local networks in the form of cooperation among firms and between firms and the industrial research institutes, which existed under the communist regime and have made very few adjustments since the transition. This is partly the result of weak governments, which are faced with large co-ordination problems when pursuing a variety of conflicting objectives (Radosevic, 2002).

Knowing all the drawbacks in Romanian agriculture, Romanian firms have concentrated their limited financial and other resources on efforts to upgrade their complementary capabilities. They are faced with a dilemma posed by fierce competition from foreign firms: to die or to survive. Only the development of capabilities opens the windows of opportunities for integrating into international production and knowledge networks. Thus, the Romanian firms that have developed organizational capabilities (Table A.4) search for opportunities to approach foreign organizations for knowledge transfer. To date, the only example of success in this venture is ROM1, with its integration into production networks through a joint venture with the Danish firm Palsgaard and into knowledge networks through involvement in EU-financed projects with foreign research institutes like the Dutch ATO (Table A.2).

The firms that are laggards in terms of developing networks and achieving industrial upgrading, like ROM3 and ROM4, provide good examples for the initial preferences of the Romanian firms. These preferences are product differentiation and marketing to gain market share. This is followed by technology acquisition abroad. Only after obtaining complementary and technological capabilities to some extent do they begin to concentrate on overcoming technological dependence by accessing knowledge through various links and by getting training from different organizations, i.e., developing linkage capabilities. We should also note that firms under the former regime were excessively vertically integrated. Thus, the vertical integration of ROM1 and ROM2 does not represent a post-transition choice but rather a legacy from the former regime. Being vertically integrated, they do not need to be involved in and play a role in shaping production networks in Romania.

From the FDI point of view, there are some other conclusions. First, we observe that the foreign firms have benefited from first mover advantages in their respective sectors. FOR4 is the only foreign processed cheese producer, FOR2 is the only foreign malt producer, FOR3 is the first to launch branded sugar in paper packs in Romania, and FOR1 is

one of the first international breweries that have penetrated Romanian market. FOR3 and FOR4 have advantageous positions in brand recognition, whilst FOR2 has obtained the chance to influence the local environment in its own favor.


Second, the structure and strategy of mother companies are strongly shaping the depth and the extent of industrial networks that the subsidiaries establish in the host country as well as the type of upgrading. Industrial networks are most often vertical and dyadic, i.e., involving parent company and local subsidiary (Radosevic, 2002). Otherwise, as discussed above, they are shaped according to the needs and priorities of the subsidiary. This is strongly related to the kind of sector the subsidiary is operating in. The FDI that targets the final consumer (i.e., that produces final products) and FDI that targets industrial consumer (i.e., that produces intermediate good) exhibit differences in terms of developing production networks and (functional) upgrading. The former has given importance to development of its competitiveness countrywide in distribution, leading to a change in the functions of the firm (FOR1), whereas the latter has given priority to the quality and quantity of the raw material, leading to establishment of trust relationships with farmers based on consultancy (FOR2, and to some extent FOR4). As mentioned before, the need to function as consultants to the farmers appears as a direct result of the insufficient and ongoing restructuring in agriculture.

Third, as discussed in the FDI literature, the foreign firms interviewed have to some extent been the vehicle selected for replenishing and augmenting much-needed capital for the restructuring and modernization of the Romanian food processing industry (see Table A.3), while also bringing in managerial and technological skills (Yoruk and von Tunzelmann, 2002). However, they have maintained market-seeking motivations in their penetration of the Romanian market and have not shown any signs of a move towards efficiency or knowledge seeking. Hence, the strategies pursued by foreign firms have remained limited to production networks with farmers. Their growth strategies also rely on horizontal expansion through acquisitions and greenfield investments that bring about consolidation and thus reinforce the oligopolistic market structure in the industry (see Table A.1).

Moreover, foreign firms show less variation in their level of upgrading, since this heavily depends on the investments in improving the technology of the acquired firms as well as the sector in which they are operating (as discussed above). Figure 2 displays the distribution of the firms according

to their level of upgrading in relation to their network development in a two-dimensional scale as opposed to the one-dimensional ranking of Table 4. Thus, Figure 2 helps us better visualize the variation between foreign and Romanian firms.

Figure 2. The Distribution of the Firms on the Network Development Strategy (NDS) – level of industrial upgrading (LIU) graph



A seemingly strict evaluation of the level of upgrading (i.e., high-medium-low) has been used. This evaluation puts Romanian firms into extreme camps: either at the managerial upgrading stage (ROM3, ROM4), or active shake up (ROM1, ROM2, ROMX). The linkage capabilities – in other words, the ability to grow based on networking (notably with universities and foreign partners) – seem to be important for the upgrading of Romanian firms (e.g., ROM1). There is room for upgrading without networking with foreign partners (e.g., ROM2), however for full upgrading to be achieved, firms have to escape from sticking to the managerial habits of the centrally planned system (Table A.3). As suggested in the framework, the Romanian firms are most likely to gain the greatest benefits if they follow the upgrading trajectory (discussed above).

The special case of ROMX contributes to the analysis as a small business that has overcome difficulties through being a research-based company. Although as far as the founders are aware, ROMX is the only university spin-off company in the country, it is a good example that of how SMEs have served as the motor of industrial development in the transition, and it therefore indicates a need for further research on role of SMEs in the food processing industry.

6. Conclusion

This research examined the level of industrial upgrading in the Romanian food processing industry and the role of inter-organizational networks in achieving this upgrading by means of empirical investigations of MNE subsidiaries and domestic firms. Strikingly, the results have shown that Romanian firms are very much open to knowledge networks, especially with Romanian and (if possible) foreign universities as external sources of knowledge, and that such networks can help these firms achieve high levels of industrial upgrading. MNE subsidiaries, on the other hand, are more inclined to maintain their internal flow of knowledge within the Group and have no tendency to establish knowledge networks with Romanian organizations. Since they are strongly market-driven, they give the main emphasis to revival of agriculture in their own segment of production; therefore, they are engaged in production networks with Romanian farmers.

In general, the food processing industry is a sector with low/medium opportunity but with medium appropriability and cumulativeness¹⁴ (see Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995). It is also an industry that is moving from low to medium technology. This makes it a potentially promising sector in many respects even in the CEECs, provided that national networks develop that would generate a diversified knowledge base and restructure upstream agriculture, and that the EU food market fully open up to CEE firms (Radosevic, 2002, Yoruk and Von Tunzelmann, 2002).

There seem to be two choices for the domestic producers, either to stay in the 'low-tech niches' of the industry, or to try to imitate the 'up-market shift' of the West. The former option seems to be a dead end. Moreover, there is little alternative to the latter. For this reason, although I am talking about industrial upgrading and not innovation, for this upgrading to be achieved, there is considerable need for the highly skilled

human capital specialized in the scientific advances (such as mathematics, physics, biotechnology) that work for the food industry. This seems to be the only way for transition countries like Romania to achieve comparative advantage, at least in some sectors. Yet, in order to achieve this, the wake of basic deficiencies of the top-down research systems of the Eastern countries have to be abolished in favor of bottom-up, market driven research and development. This basic deficiency – the disconnected research and development units and production – represents a situation which is precisely the opposite of what Romania needs today – namely, to build necessary institutions and to reorganize the networks in order to interconnect them. Furthermore, in order to move forward, Romanian firms already possess the necessary dynamics, but need some direction and support from well thought-out, consistent, and stable industrial policies.

APPENDICES

Table A.1. Basic information about the firms studied in this research

	MNE subsidiaries				Romanian big firms				University spin-off
Code of the firm	FOR1	FOR2	FOR3	FOR4	ROM1	ROM2	ROM3	ROM4	ROMX
Sub-sector within food industry	beer	malt	sugar	malted cheese	milling and bakery	dairy	confectionery	edible oil	human food and animal feed additives
Firm structure	processing and distribution	processing	processing	processing and distribution	vertically integrated	vertically integrated	processing and distribution	processing and distribution	processing and distribution
Finance and Ownership	96% foreign owned	wholly owned subsidiary	80-86% for owned. The rest SOF and individuals.	wholly owned subsidiary	98% MEBO, 2% individuals	39% MEBO, 61% individuals	51% individual, 20% employees, 29% individuals	91.2% Romanian construction firm	physical persons / shareowned
Nationality	South Africa	France	Austria	Germany	Romanian	Romanian	Romanian	Romanian	Romanian
Year of privatisation/ entry to the CEECs	1996	1998	1998	1998	1995	Became an SA in 1990	started in 1995	1998	N.A.
Type of investment/ privatisation	brownfield / acquisition	brownfield / rent	brownfield / acquisition	brownfield / acquisition	MEBO	Mass Privatisation Program	Mass Privatisation Program	sales of large blocks of shares	de novo
Total number of employees in Romania	less than 1500	80	more than 1200	N.K.	1900	1450	635 in 1996, 1000 in 1998, 100 in 2000	375	3 in production, 3-4 in distribution
Total number of factories in Romania	4	2	3	2	21	5	2	3	1
Market share	10%	market leader	32-35%	70-82%	26% Rom retail mkt, 18% ind cons, 78-80% local mkt	market leader in its county	Until 1998, 12%	11-13%	N.K.
Growth policy*	acquisitions	greenfield investments	acquisitions	acquisitions	generic, acquisitions and networks	generic	generic	acquisitions	generic and networks
Strategies pursued**	market-seeking	market-seeking	market-seeking	market-seeking	market- and knowledge-seeking	market-seeking	market-seeking	market-seeking	market-seeking
Person(s) interviewed	Financial manager	GM, agronomist and PM in both factories	FM in Buch.GM and PM in one of the factories.	General Manager	Vice-President, Mrktng M, Prod chef in Constanta factory	Production Manager of one of the factories	Technical Manager	General Manager and Marketing Manager	Scientific Consultant

N.A. not applicable

N.K. not known

*According to the categories of Peng and Heath (1996) in transition economies: generic (internal), mergers and acquisitions and networks.

** According to the categories of Dunning (1994) with regard to the strategies of MNEs in the host countries: market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and knowledge-seeking.

Source: Interviews conducted by the author.

Table A.2. Type of networks the Romanian food companies are involved in

	MNE subsidiaries				Romanian big firms				University spin-off
	FOR1	FOR2	FOR3	FOR4	ROM1	ROM2	ROM3	ROM4	ROMX
CEE LOCAL NETWORKS	Not present.	Strong upstream.	Planned upstream.	Developing upstream.	Chamber of Commerce. Local university.	University - PhD programmes only.	Local university. Chamber of Commerce.	Not present.	Local university
CEE NATIONAL NETWORKS	Other foreign firms in Romania. University of Galati.	Other foreign firms in Romania. Efforts of GM.	Other foreign firms in Rom. Rom research institutes.	Other foreign firms in Romania.	Rom and for training and consultancy agencies. Minor acquisition of a Rom bakery.	University of Galati.	Not present.	Rom agencies in distribution, mkt research, recruitment	Not present.
GLOBAL NETWORKS	Parent-subs synergy	Integration into the Group networks.	Only with the parent. No synergies with the other subs.	Integration into the Group networks.	JV. Foreign research institutes. EU-financed projects.	Apart from technology acquisition, no links.	Not present.	Machinery and equipment acquisition.	Foreign Universities
EU	No role.	EBRD - finance links	No role.	Intention to get funding through SAPPARD	EU financed projects	No role.	No role.	No role.	EU financed projects for CEE researchers
Motivation for network development	Not present.	Secure quality raw material. Establish strong presence in CEE.	Secure raw material	Secure quality raw material. Establish strong presence in CEE.	Technology and knowledge acquisition to develop process and new products.	Knowledge acquisition to develop process and new products	To develop stability and prospect for the firm.	Not present.	To develop process technologies and new products.
Assessment of network development	Restricted to Group network.	Upstream and Group network	Group and planned upstream network	Upstream and Group network	Networks as source of knowledge.	Informal personal (implicit) networks.	Potential and willingness to develop networks	No awareness of networks.	Strong university link. Research-based firm.
Network development strategy	closed	half open	closed	half open	open	implicitly open	open to possibilities	closed	open

Source: Interviews conducted by the author.

Table A.3. Level of Industrial Upgrading in Food Companies in Romania

	MNE subsidiaries				Romanian big firms				University spin-off
	FOR1	FOR2	FOR3	FOR4	ROM1	ROM2	ROM3	ROM4	ROMX
managerial upgrading	highly satisfactory	highly satisfactory	highly satisfactory	highly satisfactory	highly satisfactory (in Western terms)	satisfactory (still preserves elements from former regime; e.g. hierarchy and scepticism)	not present (recently starting)	a weak presence	satisfactory
process upgrading	highly satisfactory (within the firm)	highly satisfactory (within the value chain)	satisfactory (within the firm)	satisfactory (within the firm)	satisfactory (within the firm)	satisfactory (within the firm)	a weak presence	a weak presence	highly satisfactory (within the firm)
product upgrading	satisfactory	satisfactory	satisfactory	highly satisfactory	highly satisfactory	highly satisfactory	a weak presence	not present	highly satisfactory
functional upgrading	satisfactory (distribution)	satisfactory (consultancy to farmers)	not present	a weak presence (consultancy to farmers)	satisfactory (distribution)	a weak presence (distribution)	not present	a weak presence (distribution)	not present
level of industrial upgrading	high	high	medium	medium	high	high	low	low	high

Source: Interviews conducted by the author.

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Table A.4. Internal Dynamics: Resources and Capabilities within the firm

Table A.4.1. Technological Capabilities

		MNE subsidiaries				Romanian big firms				University spin-off
		FOR1	FOR2	FOR3	FOR4	ROM1	ROM2	ROM3	ROM4	ROMX
Technological capabilities	investment capabilities	New acquisition and subsequent investments	Greenfield investment is under progress	Local supply chain management project	Acquisitions to improve supply base	JV with foreign partner. Acquisition of a bakery firm. Establishment of strategy unit. New product development projects.	New product development projects. Investments in increasing production capacity of a particular product.	No capital available.	Acquisition of an edible oil factory. Acquisition in line with extension of the production areas.	New product development projects are under progress.
	production capabilities	State-of-the-art technology. Training to engineers.	Use of old technology. Own know-how.	Use of old machinery. Application of own technology.	Second-hand machinery. Relatively new technology.	Gradual modernisation of all production technology through foreign cooperation.	Based on existing technology.	Based on the existing old technology.	Based on the existing old technology. Several machinery acquisitions after 1995.	Research-intensive laboratorial production
	minor and major change capabilities	Strong in both.	Successful in minor change capabilities.	Successful in minor change capabilities.	Active in minor change capabilities.	Strong in both.	Strong in both.	Efforts in improving minor change capabilities.	Depends on the machinery and technology used.	Strong in major change capabilities.

Source: Interviews conducted by the author.

Table A.4.2. Complementary Capabilities

		MNE subsidiaries				Romanian big firms				University spin-off
		FOR1	FOR2	FOR3	FOR4	ROM1	ROM2	ROM3	ROM4	ROMX
Complementary capabilities	Finance	Strong position.	Strong position.	Backed by the mother.	Strong position.	100% Romanian capital. Strong position.	100% Romanian capital. Strong position.	100% Romanian capital. Awaiting improvements via new management strategy.	100% Romanian capital. Improvements after privatisation.	100% Romanian capital. Small budget. Gradual development.
	Marketing and distribution	Strong mktng policy. Countrywide distribution.	No mktng. Distr from the factory to industrial customers.	New brand launch. Distr from the factory to industrial customers.	Mktng office in Buch. Distr outsourced to a Romanian firm.	Mktng unit since 1993. Countrywide distr. Strong in the county.	Mktng unit since 1997. Own distr in the county and outsourced for the country.	Prior strategy focus on mktng. Weak distr.	New orientation on marketing. Outsourcing distr since 1997.	Distribution by individuals on comission basis.
	Quality	In-house quality control laboratory.	In-house quality control laboratory.	In-house quality control laboratory. Getting ISO soon.	In-house quality control laboratory. Getting ready for ISO.	ISO (2000)	In-house quality control laboratory. Working on HACCP.	Collaboration with the University Cluj to implement HACCP.	In-house quality control laboratory. Intention to get ISO.	HACCP

Source: Interviews conducted by the author.

Table A.4.3. Dynamic Capabilities

		MNE subsidiaries				Romanian big firms				University spin-off
		FOR1	FOR2	FOR3	FOR4	ROM1	ROM2	ROM3	ROM4	ROMX
		Strongly relevant.	Strongly relevant.	Relevant.	Strongly relevant.	Relevant.	Moderately relevant.	Not relevant.	Weakly relevant.	Strongly relevant.
Dynamic capabilities	reconfiguration of resources	Strongly relevant.	Strongly relevant.	Relevant.	Strongly relevant.	Relevant.	Moderately relevant.	Not relevant.	Weakly relevant.	Strongly relevant.
	availability of (informal) gatekeepers	German connoisseur and technical director	General manager and agronomists	Not present.	Not present.	in-house R&D unit (since 1993)	GM and technical director.	Not present.	Not present.	Phd Student and professors.

Source: Interviews conducted by the author.

Table A.4.4. Linkage Capabilities

		MNE subsidiaries				Romanian big firms				University spin-off
		FOR1	FOR2	FOR3	FOR4	ROM1	ROM2	ROM3	ROM4	ROMX
		unidirectional (from mother to subsidiaries)	unidirectional (from mother to subsidiary)	unidirectional (from mother to subsidiaries)	unidirectional (from mother to subsidiary)	Teamwork between departments	A team of 5 people from the administration	Attempts to develop a sustainable strategy.	At administration level.	Appropriated by the owners and employees within the firm
Linkage capabilities	within firm	unidirectional (from mother to subsidiaries)	unidirectional (from mother to subsidiary)	unidirectional (from mother to subsidiaries)	unidirectional (from mother to subsidiary)	Teamwork between departments	A team of 5 people from the administration	Attempts to develop a sustainable strategy.	At administration level.	Appropriated by the owners and employees within the firm
	between firms	Restricted to foreign firms in Romania.	Strong links with Romanian farmers.	Planned upstream links.	More links with German firms then with Romanian firms.	Successful orientation towards West Europe.	Market exchanges with Romanian firms.	Market exchanges with Romanian firms.	Market exchanges with Romanian firms.	Not present.
	with other organisations	Traditional link with University of Galati.	Efforts of GM to develop systematic and efficient interaction among actors in the sector.	Through links of parent company. Problem-solving purposes.	Not present.	Romanian Universities. Foreign research institutes. EU - financed projects. Chamber of Commerce. Training and consultancy agencies.	University - master and PhD programmes only.	University. Chamber of Commerce.	Market research, recruitment, financial agencies.	Regional University. Foreign Universities.

Source: Interviews conducted by the author.

NOTES

- ¹ Unless otherwise mentioned, italics are my emphasis in quotations.
- ² Gereffi (1999) first works on 'global commodity chain' concept, on which he has recently agreed naming it as 'value chain' as other scholars working on the subject matter.
- ³ The value chain is the full range of activities, which are required to bring a product or service from conception, through the different phases of production (involving a combination of physical transformation and the input of various producer services), delivery to final consumers and final disposal after use (Kaplinsky and Readman, 2001).
- ⁴ These are standards that are imposed by importing countries in lieu of dismantled trade barriers, by global producers on the production organisation and by MNEs to ensure compatibility between processes and procedures throughout their global chains, and that are process-packages like ISO certification and industry-specific standards like HACCP in the food industry (Kaplinsky and Readman, 2001).
- ⁵ His focus is more on the overseas Japanese investment as a vital catalyst of industrial upgrading in Japan in the late 1980s.
- ⁶ The mainstream economics deal only with the quantity side of the matter, taking the quality side granted.
- ⁷ Vertical relationships are composed of backward and forward relationships within an industry. These relationships occur as a result of the preference of the firms to cooperate with the supplier or customer firms in its production chain. For instance in food industry, a cooperation between agricultural raw material supplier and the food processing company, or a cooperation between the food processing company and the spice supplier.
- ⁸ Horizontal relationships are composed of cooperation of the companies in the same, similar or complementary industries. For instance in food industry, a cooperation between a food processing company and biotechnology company.
- ⁹ The study of Randoy and Li (1998) examines the alternative roles of MNE subsidiaries in accordance with the resource flows from the MNE network to subsidiaries (outflow) and vice versa (inflow). They determine four cases: Resource independent (low inflow, low outflow), resource provider (low inflow, high outflow), resource user (high inflow, low outflow) and resource networker (high inflow, high outflow).
- ¹⁰ The other criticism is that these subsidiaries do not generate technological externalities of 'spillovers' to local firms (see Ariffin and Bell, 1999 for further references).
- ¹¹ The structure of these *combinats* differed from country to country. For instance in Poland, there were large enterprises that owned smaller production units in their vicinity, whereas in Romania the enterprises were structured as country-wide horizontal integration of one large enterprise in

an industry controlling the factories functioning in that industry. Therefore the privatisation methods have shown differences after the transition. In Poland, each enterprise has been privatised with its small production units, yet in Romania, factories under the large enterprise have been privatised as separate entities.

¹² Hanzl (2000) mentions the 'reagrarization' in Romania and Bulgaria has been taken place in recent years due to an employment crisis in industrial production and limited absorption capacity in services. However, she also mentions that a large agricultural sector does not necessarily mean that there is a large and successful food industry.

¹³ As another method, sending postal questionnaires could be applied, however it requires total reliance on the firms' own assessments. Also, questionnaires provide much more limited information. Face-to-face interviews give opportunity to the interviewer to compare the firms visited and to assess them objectively, being an observant at least for a short time period.

¹⁴ By which we mean "*Opportunity*, the possibilities open for benefiting from emerging (technological) conditions; *Appropriability*, the extent to which they can capture such benefits; *Cumulativeness*, their track record of development in the field (as in the Penrosian approach); and the *Knowledge base*, as the underlying ability to comprehend and foresee advances." (Yoruk and Von Tunzelmann, 2002).

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