

New Europe College *Ștefan Odobleja* Program Yearbook 2015-2016



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New Europe College
Ștefan Odobleja Program
Yearbook 2015-2016

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NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

New Europe College (NEC) is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997–1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 600 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary

dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:

- ***NEC Fellowships (since 1994)***

Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- ***Ștefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)***

The Fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the *Odobleja* Fellowships are integrated.

- ***The Europe next to Europe Fellowship Program (since October 2013)***

This Program, sponsored by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden), invites young researchers from European countries that are not yet members of the European Union, or which have a less consolidated position within it, targeting in particular the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia), Turkey, Cyprus, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

- ***The Pontica Magna Fellowship Program (since October 2015)***

This Fellowship Program, sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung (Germany), invites young researchers, media professionals, writers and artists from the countries around the Black Sea, but also beyond it (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine), for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of this region. This program is therefore strongly linked to the former *Black Sea Link* Fellowships.

- ***The Pontica Magna Returning Fellows Program (since March 2016)***

In the framework of its *Pontica Magna* Program, New Europe College offers alumni of the *Black Sea Link* and *Pontica Magna* Fellowship Programs the opportunity to apply for a research stay of one or two months in Bucharest. The stay should enable successful applicants to refresh their research experience at NEC, to reconnect with former contacts, and to establish new connections with current Fellows. The *Pontica Magna Returning Fellows* Program targets young researchers, media professionals, writers and artists from the countries around the Black Sea: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

- ***The Gerda Henkel Fellowship Program (since March 2017)***

This Fellowship Program, developed with the support of Gerda Henkel Stiftung (Germany), invites young researchers and academics working in the fields of humanities and social sciences (in particular archaeology, art history, historical Islamic studies, history, history of law, history of science, prehistory and early history) from Afghanistan, Belarus, China (only Tibet and Xinjiang Autonomous Regions), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

- ***How to Teach Europe Fellowship Program (since April 2017)***

This Program, sponsored by the Robert Bosch Foundation and a Private Foundation from Germany, introduces a new and innovative Fellowship module at the Centre for Advanced Study (CAS), Sofia, and the New Europe College (NEC), Bucharest. Beyond the promotion of outstanding individual researchers, the Program focuses on the intersection of fundamental research and higher education. The joint initiative seeks to identify and bring together bright and motivated young and established university professors from South-eastern Europe to dedicate themselves for a certain amount of time to research work oriented toward a specific goal: to lend the state-of-the-art theories and methodologies in the humanities and social sciences a pan-European and/or global dimension and to apply these findings in higher education and the transmission of knowledge to wider audiences.

The goal of the proposed program is to use this knowledge to improve the quality of higher education in the humanities and social sciences and to endorse its public relevance. A tangible output will be the conceptualization of a series of new courses or, ultimately and ideally, the development of innovative curricula for the universities of the participating scholars.

Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of New Europe College:

- ***RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)***

The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach activities involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC

published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

- ***The NEC–LINK Program (2003 - 2009)***

Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj–Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

- ***The GE–NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)***

New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10–month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend, and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE–NEC Yearbooks series.

- ***NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)***

In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South–Eastern Europe

(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one-month research trip abroad. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

- ***The Britannia–NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)***

This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

- ***The Petre Țuțea Fellowships (2006 – 2008, 2009 - 2010)***

In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government through its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College's community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Țuțea* Program publications.

- ***Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)***

This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*, Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South–Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

- ***Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)***

This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

- ***The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (2009 - 2013)***

This program, supported by the Getty Foundation, started in 2009. It proposed a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows. As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program also included a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence was meant to ensure a comparative dimension, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

- ***The Black Sea Link Fellowships Program (2010 - 2015)***

This program, sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung, supported young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they had the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomed a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organized within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of the Black Sea region.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

Beside the above-described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

In the past:

- ***The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)***

Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different confessions within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

- ***The Septuagint Translation Project (2002 - 2011)***

This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul*. Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

- ***The Excellency Network Germany – South–Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***

The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South–Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

- ***The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research***

An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources (2006-2008)

The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for Education and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility, connectedness and exploitation of some of the most prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the “Constantin Brăiloiu” Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

- ***Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances.*** This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled ***Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and eastern Europe***, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (December 2009 – November 2012)
- ***The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon*** (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (December 2009 - November 2014)
- ***The EURIAS Fellowship Program***, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-sponsored by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar. (October 2011 – July 2014)

Research programs developed with the financial support of the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, through the Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation – UEFISCDI):

- ***DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (2011)

- **UEFISCCDI–CNCS(PD–Projects):*Federalism or Intergovernmentalism? Normative Perspectives on the Democratic Model of the European Union (Dr. Dan LAZEA); The Political Radicalization of the Kantian Idea of Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense (Dr. Áron TELEGDI-CSETRI)*** (August 2010 – July 2012)
- ***Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (March 2011 – September 2012)
- **TE-Project: *Critical Foundations of Contemporary Cosmopolitanism***, Team leader: Tamara CĂRĂUȘ, Members of the team: Áron Zsolt TELEGDI-CSETRI, Dan Dorin LAZEA, Camil PÂRVU (October 2011 – October 2014)
- **PD-Project: *Mircea Eliade between Indology and History of Religions. From Yoga to Shamanism and Archaic Religiosity (Liviu BORDAȘ)***
Timeframe: May 1, 2013 – October 31, 2015 (2 and ½ years)
- **IDEI-Project: *Models of Producing and Disseminating Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: The Cartesian Framework***
Project Coordinator: Vlad ALEXANDRESCU
(1 Project Coordinator, 2 Researchers, 2 Research Assistants)
Timeframe: January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2016 (5 Years)
- **TE –Project: *Pluralization of the Public Sphere. Art Exhibitions in Romania in the Timeframe 1968-1989***
Project Coordinator: Cristian NAE
(1 Project Coordinator, 1 Researcher, 2 Research Assistants)
Timeframe: October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016 (1 Year)
- **Bilateral Cooperation: *Corruption and Politics in France and Romania (contemporary times)***
Project Coordinator: Silvia MARTON
(1 Project Coordinator, 7 Researchers)
Timeframe: January 1, 2015 – December 31, 2016 (2 Years)

ERC Grants:

- **ERC Starting Grant**

(Grant transferred by the Principal Investigator to the University of Bucharest)

Record-keeping, fiscal reform, and the rise of institutional accountability in late medieval Savoy: a source-oriented approach – Castellany Accounts

Principal Investigator: Ionuț EPURESCU-PASCOVICI

Timeframe at the NEC: May 1, 2015 – March 31, 2017 (1 Year and 10 Months)

Timeframe of the Grant: May 1, 2015 – April 30, 2020 (5 Years)

Ongoing projects:

Research programs developed with the financial support of the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, through the Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation – UEFISCDI):

- **TE –Project: *Turning Global: Socialist Experts during the Cold War (1960s-1980s)***

Project Coordinator: Bogdan IACOB

(1 Project Coordinator, 2 Researchers, 2 Research Assistants)

Timeframe: October 1, 2015 – November 30, 2017 (2 Years and 2 Months)

- **TE–Project: *Museums and Controversial Collections. Politics and Policies of Heritage Making in Post-colonial and Post-socialist Contexts***

Project Coordinator: Damiana OȚOIU

(1 Project Coordinator, 5 Researchers)

Timeframe: October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2017 (2 Years)

ERC Grants:

- **ERC Consolidator Grant**

Luxury, fashion and social status in Early Modern South Eastern Europe

Principal Investigator: Constanța VINTILĂ-GHIȚULESCU

(1 Principal Investigator, 8 Researchers)

Timeframe: July 1, 2015 – June 30, 2020 (5 Years)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

Focus Groups

- *Culture in Murky Times*
- Focus Group on Education and Research
- *New World Disorder*

The Focus Groups are financed by two grants of the *Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation* – UEFISCDI, within the *Prize for Excellence in Research* awarded to Romanian Host Institutions of research projects financed by European Research Council in 2014 – 2016.

Research Groups

- Reflections on the Political History of the 18th and 19th Century in Romania
- The Bible in Linguistic Context: Introduction to the Biblical Hebrew
- The Bible in Linguistic Context: Introduction to the Coptic Language

Present Financial Support

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through the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University
of St. Gallen

The Ministry of National Education – The Executive Agency for Higher
Education and Research Funding, Romania

Landis & Gyr Stiftung, Zug, Switzerland

Private Foundation, Germany

Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Köln, Germany

VolkswagenStiftung, Hanover, Germany

Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and
Social Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden

Gerda Henkel Stiftung, Düsseldorf, Germany

European Research Council (ERC)

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ANDREEA EȘANU

Born in 1980, in Bucharest

Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Bucharest (2010)

Thesis: *The theory of manifolds and the concept of representation in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

Affiliated lecturer at University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy (2014)

Postdoctoral researcher, University of Bucharest (2010-2013)

Conference talks in France, Switzerland, Germany, Bulgaria

Research visit at University of Cambridge, Department of History and Philosophy of Science (2012)

Articles on Ludwig Wittgenstein's early philosophy, history of analytic philosophy and philosophy of science (biology) in peer-reviewed journals and edited volumes published in Romania and abroad

Translation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical correspondence (in collaboration)

AN OVERVIEW OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN'S EARLY PHILOSOPHY: FROM *LETTERS AND NOTEBOOKS* TO THE *TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS* AND A LITTLE BEYOND

"What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile point of view."

(L. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, 18)

Abstract: In his early philosophical work, Ludwig Wittgenstein developed a full range of ideas in metaphysics, philosophy of language and value, but also in the philosophy of logic, mathematics and natural science. The aim of the present paper is to discuss these ideas in relation to Wittgenstein's central metaphysical project, the "picture theory". My first claim is that "picture theory" grounded a semantic research in logic, mathematics and science that was maintained by Wittgenstein until the early 1930s. Secondly, I claim that Wittgenstein's solutions in semantics, especially after 1928, still make a pertinent philosophical project when evaluated from a contemporary perspective.

Keywords: Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, picture theory, philosophy of logic, foundations of mathematics, science, semantics.

Introduction

Throughout his entire life and career in philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein published but a single book. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* appeared, with considerable struggle from the part of its author, at the end of the First World War in 1921. It was initially written in German, but it was translated in English immediately afterwards, in 1922, and was lavishly

prefaced by the English philosopher Bertrand Russell. It is a small book – only fifty five pages long, but remarkably dense and difficult to grasp.

Every year, new readings claim to bring fresh insights into a philosophical work that seems to never age. Many succeed, but the peculiarity of Ludwig Wittgenstein's thought, which often seems to contradicting itself, gives the impression that a complete and satisfying interpretation will never be found. It is Wittgenstein's belief that one needs a special apprehension of what philosophy is in order overcome apparent contradictions and grasp the book, and that such an apprehension cannot be conveyed otherwise than metaphorically: philosophy is like a ladder that one has to climb and eventually drop because it is nonsense. Only someone who is willing to apprehend philosophy in this manner will succeed in giving the *Tractatus* a meaning.

Many early Wittgenstein scholars find themselves puzzled by this predicament. I find myself puzzled quite often. However, Ludwig Wittgenstein's famous claim in the *Tractatus* is just one way to look at his early philosophy. There are more ways. In his early philosophical *corpus* that comprises over ten years of written work starting with 1912, Ludwig Wittgenstein develops quite a range of philosophical ideas in metaphysics, philosophy of language and value, but also in philosophy of logic, foundations of mathematics and philosophy of science. These ideas have a life of their own in notebooks, letters and typed manuscripts remained unpublished – away from the systemic and austere constraints imposed in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* itself. Hence, no matter how important the contention about overcoming philosophical problems was to Wittgenstein in the advent of publishing the book, this is not the only perspective that one can set on Ludwig Wittgenstein's early philosophy.

Setting aside Wittgenstein's own belief, I aim here to explore and develop some of his early views in the philosophy of logic, mathematics and natural science. In the endeavor, I consider not only the oracular maxims found in the *Tractatus* on the topic, but also several unpublished documents from the period: Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical correspondence with Bertrand Russell from before, during and after the First World War; his *Notebooks 1914–1916*, a collection of private notes that document the timely unfolding of his "picture theory" (*Bildtheorie*); and the *Prototractatus*, a provisional version of the published book that existed only in manuscript and became public long after Wittgenstein's death. In order to illustrate how these ideas had a life of their own in Wittgenstein's early philosophy, even years after the ladder metaphor became obsolete,

three post-Tractarian sources are also relevant to consider: Wittgenstein's only published article "Some remarks on logical form" from 1929; the conversations with members of the Vienna Circle from 1929 and 1930 recorded by Friedrich Waissmann; and several philosophy lectures held in Cambridge between 1930 and 1931, recorded by some of Wittgenstein's own students. From 1929 to 1930 is the time when Wittgenstein began to reaffirm big themes of his previous work, while acknowledging that the framework in which the *Tractatus* was set was not necessarily the most fruitful one. In a private note from 1930, Wittgenstein writes: "Aside from the good & genuine, my book the *Tractatus Log.-Phil.* also contains kitsch, that is, passages with which I filled in the gaps and so-to-speak in my own style. How much of the book consists of such passages I don't know & it is difficult to fairly evaluate now."¹

Starting from here, the first point I will make is a hermeneutic one. Ludwig Wittgenstein's goal in the *Tractatus* was to apply modern logic to metaphysics in order to show how human beings make sense of the world. To this end, he sought to figure out semantics – *i.e.* what happens, in principle, when one maintains that a description of the world is either true or false. This is what later became known as his "picture theory" (*Bildtheorie*). It is my claim that Wittgenstein's picture theory grounded a semantic research in logic, mathematics and natural science that was maintained with certain variations until the early 1930s, even though the Tractarian concept of picturing had been strictly abandoned.

The second point I will make is a philosophical one. To create links between logic, mathematics and natural science, in order to develop a knowledge of the world is an open philosophical endeavor still. Classical programs, like Bertrand Russell's semantic structuralism or Rudolf Carnap's syntactic formalism in the philosophy of mathematics and of natural science are in spotlight again and reconsidered. It is my claim that early Wittgenstein's research in semantic representations – developed especially in the late 1920s and early 1930s – should also be on the list. After 1928, Ludwig Wittgenstein began to see semantic meaning as intricately interconnected with calculation, measurement and geometric projection. In this metamorphosis of "picture theory", the idea of true description was slowly enriched with something else – *i.e.* with various human activities of creating descriptions. In Wittgenstein's late 1920s philosophy, an idea was present that went clearly against both Russell and Carnap's programs. According to it, there is no proper semantics of logic, mathematics or science; but logic, mathematics and science provide the semantics (*i.e.*

the projection rules) for our representations in general. In other words, semantics is not “there”, instead it is being made in order to make sense of the world.

1. The Hermeneutic Space

Here, I sketch a hermeneutic space for three important themes that occur in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy: logic, mathematics and natural science. The preferred interval for discussion is 1913 to 1930. It is my assumption that, between 1913 and 1930, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical ideas did propagate a considerable set of infinitesimal echoes and variations, but they remained mostly in the same frame. Once this assumption is made, the selected interval can allegorically perform the function of a Cauchy sequence in mathematical calculus, so that the progression towards some limit is defined by setting up a closed value-space in which the limit itself is contained. It is hard, if not impossible, to pin-point the end of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, but the existence of a closed space beyond which his views start to diverge drastically is somehow a guarantee that the limit exists.

The common element in this space is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “picture theory” (*Bildtheorie*) developed in the *Tractatus*, but quite older than the *Tractatus*, since its first elements already appear in the 1914 manuscript “Notes on Logic”.² Equally remarkable, the “picture theory” does not disappear once the *Tractatus* is finished and published in 1921, but converts into a new semantics of human language in which representation spaces, which are basically mathematical spaces, replace the single Tractarian logical space. This transformation is more than obvious in “Some remarks on logical form” (1929), but it also propagates in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 1930 views of geometry and mechanics.

Therefore, in order to examine the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas on logic, mathematics (including geometry) and science (especially physics) in his early philosophy, it is important to look at how the “picture theory” itself goes through difference stages in this closed interval that seems to contain its very limit.

2. Elements of “Picture Theory” (*Bildtheorie*)


In broad lines, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “picture theory” (*Bildtheorie*) is a speculative theory about how human language works and acquires meaning – it is a philosophical answer to the question of what is going on when a proposition about anything in the world is true. For example, a sentence like “Snow is white” is true because it depicts something real about the world – *i.e.* the fact that snow, as we know it, is white and not black or green. Also, precisely because snow is white and not black or green, the sentence “Snow is green” is false, and also, because snow has the physical properties that it has, it is not only false, but actually meaningless to say that “Snow runs”. The “picture theory” makes intuitive and straightforward complicated abstract concepts like truth, falsehood and meaningfulness of plain human language.

But what happens when we have to deal with logical propositions containing formal signs, such as logical operators ‘ $\neg$ ’, ‘ $\&$ ’, ‘ $\vee$ ’ etc. or the sign for identity ‘ $=$ ’? Or when we have to make sense of mathematical equations? Or of physical laws, which are not simple propositions coding facts, but propositions coding various necessary correlations between facts? It is relevant to mention here that Ludwig Wittgenstein was looking, for instance, for a solution to the meaning of the identity sign ‘ $=$ ’ as early as 1913, but he was not very sure how to approach the issue. In a personal letter to Bertrand Russell, he was writing quite passionately: “Identity is the very Devil and *immensely important*; very much more so than I thought (...) I have all sorts of ideas for a solution of the problem but could not arrive yet at anything definite. However I don’t lose courage and go on.”³

This is actually where the substantial and counter-intuitive input of “picture theory” should enter and make a significant contribution with respect to meaning, truth and falsehood. It should make clear in which sense all those kinds of propositions (logical, mathematical) are meaningful, if at all. It should tell, eventually, something important about human knowledge (*i.e.* about the meaning of general scientific claims, like the principle of induction, which bear no picturing relation with anything in the world). Wittgenstein was aware of these challenges and he did embrace them. The letter from 1913 to Bertrand Russell was no accident in this respect – it showed his determination. Eventually, the Tractarian “picture theory”, finished already by 1918, was a good theory of the specialized languages of logic, mathematics and physics, even though the account was not done in as straightforward fashion as in the

case of factive human language, and not in a bulletproof manner either. We shall see why.

The main claim behind the Tractarian “picture theory” is that all meaningful propositions represent the world directly and all representation is done pictorially. In order to understand the claim, let us look at some simple examples. These are meant to showcase the pictorial nature of the relationship between a rudimentary language and a world made of just a few possible states.



Cases (1) and (2) depict a color world characterized by two possible elementary states: $W_1 = \{\text{magenta}, \text{cyan}\}$, while case (3) depicts a color world characterized by four possible elementary states: $W_2 = \{\text{magenta}_{\text{left}}, \text{cyan}_{\text{left}}, \text{magenta}_{\text{right}}, \text{cyan}_{\text{right}}\}$.⁴

Now, case (1) is trivial because its pictorial truth-condition is evident. But what is the truth-condition for case (2)? The world cannot contain “negative facts”, because that would generate an inflationary metaphysics and Wittgenstein simply rejected inflationary entities. So the solution must be different. What we know is that a negative proposition obtains whenever the affirmative proposition fails to obtain. But, in pictorial terms, what does it mean that the magenta circle fails to obtain? Wittgenstein’s suggestion in his 1914 manuscript “Notes on logic” is almost a photographer’s solution: a magenta image fails to obtain whenever the pixels are *inverted* in the picture. In other words, the negation of a proposition describing an elementary world-state can be expressed as the actual inversion of the elementary world-state. At this point, Wittgenstein called language “bipolar”: each proposition that describes a world-state has both a positive and a negative (inverted, complementary) pole which is its negation ‘ $\neg$ ’.

Case (3) is a composite proposition (a logical conjunction with a negative conjunct), so its pictorial truth-condition is more complex than cases (1) and (2). In Wittgenstein's pictorial terms, the corresponding world-state should be two circles side by side, drawn in complementary colours. Here, conjunction is expressed pictorially as *concatenation*, while negation is expressed as before as inversion. In this ingenious way, Ludwig Wittgenstein explicates logical connectives through pictorial equivalents and so achieves a more substantial pictoriality of human language, that goes beyond intuitive factive accounts like "Snow is white" and dissolves logical operators like classic first-order operators (negation, conjunction etc.) into collages of pictures.⁵

To generalize, Wittgenstein's "picture theory" is built on five central assumptions:⁶

1) *Atomicity*: Individual words mirror (individual) objects. "Magenta" mirrors magenta, and "circle" mirrors circle.

2) *Categoricity* (similarity): Words are similar to objects, *i.e.* they bear the same formal properties and the same formal relations to each other. If magenta and cyan are two inverted colors, then the terms "magenta" and "cyan" are two complementary predicates, and *vice versa*.

3) *Compositionality*: Words form elementary propositions and elementary propositions form composite propositions, by means of logical operations. Case (3) is such a composite proposition.

4) *Pictoriality*: Elementary propositions picture elementary world-states.

5) *Truth-functionality*: Each composite proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (TLP 5).

Therefore, since every meaningful proposition is either elementary or composite and each composite proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions, such that it preserves pictoriality, given that each logical operation is equivalent to a collage of pictures, then all meaningful propositions represent the world *directly* and all linguistic representation is done *pictorially*. The direct character of representation is obtained by simply assuming categoricity or similarity (Assumption 2) while the pictorial character has to be secured through a conservative extension of the elementary picturing relation (Assumption 4).

In order to be able to maintain this version of *Bildtheorie*, Wittgenstein has to show that, indeed, each logical operation is equivalent to a collage of pictures. Otherwise, the extension of pictoriality from the elementary to the composite cases would be non-conservative. On the other hand, if full pictoriality is shown, then the logical vocabulary of first-order logic, *i.e.* '¬',

'&', '∨', '⊃', could be dismissed as superfluous, and logical propositions would be shown to be very different from plain factive language in the sense of lacking descriptive content entirely.

This is where the strange proposition number 6 in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* comes into full play: "The general form of truth-function is $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$. This is the general form of a proposition." (TLP 6). Proposition 6 provides the notational device by means of which the pictoriality proof can be obtained unproblematically. Basically, proposition 6 says the following: given $\bar{p}$, the set of elementary propositions $p, q, r, \dots$ in a language L and $\bar{\xi}$, the set of Sheffer truth-functions on $\bar{p}$ (i.e. negations and conjunctions of negations of $p, q, r, \dots$), then any composite proposition in L can be written as a n -th application of the Sheffer truth-function on $\bar{p}$. In plain words, a composite proposition is a picture if and only if it can be translated as a conjunction (concatenation) of elementary propositions (or pictures) taken in their negated (inverted) form.

The first step towards this result was achieved by the French logician Jean Nicod who, in 1917, proved that all first-order truth-functional language can be translated into Sheffer truth-functions by using a most minimal logical system.⁷ Nicod's system had a single connective, the "Sheffer stroke" or 'I', such that a sentence 'plq' was assigned the meaning "not both p and q", and all connectives in first-order language were translated into Sheffer equivalents, like this:

- i) '¬p' is equivalent to 'plp';
- ii) 'p&q' is equivalent to '(plq)l(plq)';
- iii) 'p∨q' is equivalent to '(plp)l(qlq)' and
- iv) 'p⊃q' is equivalent to 'pl(qlq)'.

What Wittgenstein extracted from Nicod's proof was the certainty that any meaningful proposition, as far as it is either true or false, is equivalent to a Sheffer concatenation of only inverted elementary propositions. Nicod's proof, however, displeased him profoundly, because it was done by means of a procedure that he considered illegitimate. In the Preface of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, in 1919, Wittgenstein wrote emphatically "... in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense."⁸ To prove that his minimal system was complete with respect to the expressiveness of first-order truth-functional language, Nicod had to introduce "from outside" in Wittgenstein's view both an arbitrary

inference rule and an axiom for making derivations and substitutions,⁹ which of course were meaningless. Neither the rule, nor the axiom were saying anything, but still they were held as “true”. To use them in order to show the expressive completeness of Nicod’s system meant for the young Wittgenstein to trespass the limit of meaningfulness itself.

So, in the 1917s, 1918s Wittgenstein was looking for another way to achieve expressive completeness with his *Bildtheorie* – this time “from within” language itself. He did not keep the Sheffer notation as such, but remained faithful to the important insight behind it. The young Wittgenstein was hoping that, by using only pictorial operators – like concatenation (conjunction) and inversion (negation) – he could reach the same result as Nicod did, but without having to work out any axioms and inference rules. He was determined to obtain expressive completeness by means of a generic procedure of constructing all truth-functions of first-order language as a series of sums. This result, however, was formally intractable. In fact, after 1928, he abandoned the idea entirely.

Yet, Wittgenstein had discovered no later than 1916¹⁰ that a constructive limit of any $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$ sequence could be given as a tautology or contradiction of first-order truth-functional logic. Playing with his new T-F notation, he noticed that, after enough many iterations, any meaningful proposition can be made to converge towards a meaningless one. To the young Wittgenstein, this formal aspect of language could not have been a mere accident. On the contrary, to him such results were showing that the limit of sense could be drawn from within language itself – even though in a rather inexact manner.

I will illustrate this insight with a very simple $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$ sequence:

1: $\neg p$

2: $\neg\neg p$

3: $\neg\neg p \ \& \ \neg p$

4: $\neg(\neg\neg p \ \& \ \neg p)$

5: $\neg\neg(\neg\neg p \ \& \ \neg p)$

Iteration 4 here expresses the law of the excluded middle which, in early Wittgenstein’s philosophical idiom, is a meaningless tautology (e.g., “It rains or it doesn’t rain”). It is also nice to observe that iteration 5 is a continuation of the sequence, which remains in the limit, given that a meaningless contradiction is now obtained (e.g., “It is not the case that it rains or it doesn’t rain”). This neat result must have pleased Wittgenstein because it illustrates quite convincingly the mathematical idea of limit, which can be simply characterized like this: let $T=(S, \tau)$ be a discrete

space with a discrete metric τ , called logical space. Let $N = [\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$ be the general term of a truth-functional sequence in first-order language. N converges in T to a limit if and only if: $\exists k \in N$ and $\forall m \in N$, such that $m > k$ and $m\bar{\xi} = k\bar{\xi}$. Simply said, in a discrete space, a sequence N reaches a specific value of S and it just “remains there”. That is the limit.

The fact that such a limit exists shows now beyond doubt, in young Wittgenstein’s view, that logical connectives are indeed empty notational devices, which can be either dismissed or kept only in order to ease more fastidious pictorial representations. In this sense, all meaningful propositions represent the world directly and all linguistic representation is done pictorially, according to the *Tractatus*.

2. Early Views on Identity, Arithmetic and Mechanics

I will now discuss a few interesting consequences of this theoretical set-up for Wittgenstein’s early semantics (before 1928) of identity, arithmetic and mechanics. Even if one accepts the “picture theory” as a proper account of meaningful plain language, certain things may still appear puzzling. For example, what are synthetic identity statements like “Cicero is Tullius” or “Hesperus is Phosphorus” really about – what facts do they picture? What do the apparently synthetic propositions of arithmetic like “ $2 \times 2 = 4$ ” actually mean? What sense do the general laws of nature like Newton’s laws of motion or the principle of least action convey, as long as Newtonian and analytical mechanics are absolutely equivalent as far as their empirical predictions go? In short, what can the “picture theory” tell about real human knowledge, *i.e.* about the *synthetic* propositions of mathematics and natural science?

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s answers to these questions are quite sophisticated and suggest that his “picture theory” can indeed be a workable philosophical tool. I will start with arithmetic.

It is plainly obvious that “ $2 \times 2 = 4$ ” is not a pictorial representation of any fact, so how are we to understand mathematical equalities? Wittgenstein’s solution here is coherent with his previous considerations on linguistic meaning: mathematical equations are akin to tautologies in first-order truth-functional language; as there is a logical method to prove tautologies (TLP 6.1203), there is also a substitutional method¹¹ in arithmetic that allows to prove mathematical equations. Thus, Wittgenstein would say that a mathematical relation like “ $2 \times 2 = 4$ ” holds if and only if

the corresponding equation, which is framed in the language of a general theory of operations, can be proven. Again, he uses a fully constructive approach – which does not assume set theory or any formal theory alike.

His ingenious solution is to define natural numbers as generalized sums based on a abstract notion of operation: $[a, x, O'x]$, where: (i) a is a 0 term, (ii) x is an arbitrary term, (iii) $O'x$ is the form of the term that immediately follows x , obtained by applying operation O to x (TLP 5.2522). Then construction may proceed like this:

(*) $a, O'a, O'O'a, O'O'O'a, O'O'O'O'a, \dots$

which counts successive applications of the abstract operation O :

(**) $(O)^0x, (O)^{0+1}x, (O)^{0+1+1}x, (O)^{0+1+1+1}x, \dots (O)^{\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n}x$

Now, natural numbers are defined as the exponents of the series of sums in (**):

(***) $(O)^0x, (O)^1x, (O)^2x, (O)^3x, \dots (O)^nx$ and so on.

Based on this formalization, a formal proof of “ $2 \times 2 = 4$ ” might be sketched as follows:

$2 \times 2 = 4$ iff: $O^{2 \times 2}x = O^4x$

(1) $(O^v)^\mu x = O^{v \times \mu}x$, Def.

(2) $O^{2 \times 2}x = (O^2)^2x$, from (1) by substitution.

(3) $(O^2)^2x = (O^2)^{0+1+1}x = O^2O^2x$, by (**) and then by (***)

(4) $O^2O^2x = (O'O')'(O'O')'x$ by (*)

(5) $(O'O')'(O'O')'x = (O'O'O'O')'x$, by associativity of addition

(6) $(O'O'O'O')'x = O^{0+1+1+1+1}x = O^4x$ by (**) and then by (***).¹²

This substitutional approach shows how the equality sign can be eliminated from arithmetic just like logical connectives can be eliminated from the truth-functional first-order language, once we proceed from a most general form of operation, to which both numbers and specific arithmetic operations can be reduced. There is no synthetic mathematical knowledge – but only clear-cut formal transformations in the general language of operations. The very idea of “mathematical equality” is only apparent in the substitutional character of mathematical proofs, quite in the same way in which the ideas of “negation” and “logical product” are apparent in the pictorial character of propositional language (as inversion and concatenation of elementary world-states). From this perspective, two important claims in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* receive a clearer

meaning at this point. "Mathematics is a method of logic." (TLP 6.234) and "The logic of the world which the propositions of logic show in tautologies, mathematics shows in equations." (TLP 6.22) The whole world scaffolding in built in the *Tractatus* on a most general notion of operation. $[\bar{p}, \bar{x}, N(\bar{x})]$ is in fact only a case of $[a, x, O'x]$.

Now, even synthetic identity statements like "Cicero is Tullius", which had puzzled young Wittgenstein for years, can be explained. If the equality sign '=' is a notational device in mathematics, what else can the identity sign from "Cicero = Tullius" be in logic? It is not clear yet how the identity sign can be eliminated from logical vocabulary. It is, in fact, the categoricity¹³ of *Bildtheorie* that led Wittgenstein towards finding a solution to the problem he had posed in 1913 as "Identity is the very devil!". In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he had a way out. The proposition "Cicero = Tullius" is simply meant to say that the person called Cicero is the same as the person called Tullius. Now, if the mirroring relation between a name (word) and an object is *categorial* (i.e. it has exactly one form¹⁴ up to isomorphism) then an identity copula '=' is redundant. In our case, the two names "Cicero" and "Tullius" have the same mirroring relation with a unique object of reference. Assuming categoricity, Wittgenstein simply claims that, if distinct names from a common category picked up the same object, then any proposition containing one name could be substituted with a proposition containing the other name without changing its meaning or truth-value.¹⁵ Let's see the following substitutions:

- (1) "Cicero wrote *De Natura Deorum*" is true.
- (2) "Tullius wrote *De natura Deorum*" is also true.
- (3) "Cicero was born in Arpinum" is true.
- (4) "Tullius was born in Arpinum" is also true, and so on.

From them, it is obvious that the proposition "Cicero = Tullius" is simply superfluous or, better said, it indicates a misleading use of the very notion of identity. We could be under the wrong impression that the proposition expresses some kind of metaphysical fact, i.e. an identity of indiscernible objects as Gottfried Leibniz would have called it, but in fact it is not so. There are no metaphysical facts. What we have in "Cicero = Tullius" is just a substitutional equivalence between words. Of course, this equivalence rests on a significant number of conventions regarding, for instance, the manner in which specific names in a given category, like the category of male proper names, are chosen and assigned to objects. The use of conventions is ultimately what makes such an equivalence synthetic. Otherwise, an identity statement does not say anything real

about the world –or not in the sense that Leibniz would have wanted it, anyway. For reasons of notational clarity, Wittgenstein even proposes in *Tractatus* the identity sign ‘=’ be eliminated entirely from first-order language: “Identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by different signs.” (*TLP* 5.53) The entire metaphysics of indiscernible objects is, thus, dismissed in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* by means of a clear and perspicuous logical notation. Wittgenstein was, in fact, really convinced that a logical notation that does proper justice to the pictorial nature of human language can resolve metaphysical problems occurring not only in logic or in mathematics, but even in natural science.

The most general principles of nature (like the principle of causality or the principle of induction) are not, as one might expect, necessary synthetic propositions about the physical world, but only pseudo-propositions¹⁶ (*TLP* 6.3). In classical physics, for example, one can easily replace *salva veritate* one entire physical theory for another: analytical mechanics – developed on the principle of least action,¹⁷ could be applied instead of Newtonian mechanics – developed on the principle of causality,¹⁸ in order to account for the same phenomena of physical motion. Two physical theories can be empirically equivalent, and this indicates the most general principles of nature do not say anything proper about the world. However, it is Wittgenstein’s belief in *Tractatus* that physical laws play a constitutive role in human knowledge: “Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the description of the world. Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it. We then say that whatever kind of picture these make, I can always approximate as closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the surface with a sufficiently fine square mesh, and then saying of every square whether it is black or white. In this way I shall have imposed a unified form on the description of the surface. The form is optional, since I could have achieved the same result by using a net with a triangular or hexagonal mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would have made the description simpler: that is to say, it might be that we could describe the surface more accurately with a coarse triangular mesh than with a fine square mesh (or conversely), so on. The different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world.” (*TLP* 6.341)

Mechanics adopts different systems of description with different “meshes” in order to explain and predict events in the world. This can be illustrated with a very simple pictorial analogy. Consider a rudimentary

world populated by a single mass point r acted upon by a force F . The motion function of r is $\vec{r}(t)$, and the resultant effect of the acting force F will be:

$$(1) \vec{F} = m\vec{a} = m\ddot{\vec{r}}.^{19}$$


This intricate mathematical relation can be represented more intuitively once an abstract surface with a specific “mesh” is specified (the mesh characterizes the touching points between the abstract surface and a physical phenomenon). In our rudimentary world, the mechanical mesh consists of a single point in accelerated displacement (the mass point mirroring the physical body in motion).



In analytical mechanics, however, an entirely different mesh is at work: for each possible path (or displacement $\vec{r}$) of the mass point r , a quantity called *action* is defined such that it expresses a minimal variation in energy between the initial and final times, t_1 and t_2 , of r 's motion:

$$(2) S(\vec{r}) = \int_{t_2}^{t_1} (KE\vec{r} - PE\vec{r}) dt.$$

The corresponding surface looks intuitively like this (with two touching points that mirror the initial and final motion state of the physical system).



Now, from the worlds' point of view, (1) and (2) are equivalent descriptions, even though they picture the physical world differently. This case resembles “Cicero = Tullius”, in the sense that the only significant difference between theories (1) and (2) is ultimately a conventional one: equation (2), which is an integral, corresponds to a coarser mesh applied to the physical world than (1). Equation (1), which is a second-order differential equation, generates a finer-grained mesh because it accounts

for local physical displacement, not just for a global variation in energy. On the other hand, theory (2) is *simpler* than (1) because theory (2) fully ignores instantaneous behavior which can be irrelevant or sheer intractable in case of too many interactions. The most important virtue of theory (2) is, in fact, an epistemic one: it does not say more about reality than the other one does, it only says it more parsimoniously.

But epistemic values, like simplicity or even clarity, are important in science. The young Wittgenstein was strongly influenced in this belief by a treatise in classical mechanics he had studied during his engineer years in Manchester: Heinrich Hertz's *Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form* (1894).²⁰ Hertz had suggested that even a scientific theory is facing some "choices" – because any scientific theory has, embedded deep in its equations, a conceptual form. In our particular case, the form of Newtonian mechanics is deterministic (as it is a theory of forces) while analytical mechanics is actually not (as it relies exclusively on a calculus of variations). In this respect, it makes no sense to believe in a "deterministic" or in a "variational" world. These are just epistemic choices. But then, again, the question resurfaces: how is the progress of science possible? In what sense is scientific knowledge ultimately synthetic?

Inspired by Hertz, Wittgenstein viewed scientific progress as primarily a matter of conceptual transformations, which are transformations in form (quite like religious conversions, Wittgenstein believed: nothing in the world changes; change affects only the subject who experiences the world, the form of the experience, not its content; change is transcendental). The same holds with science as well as with philosophy: wherever conceptual forms are present, also conceptual problems arise, and conceptual transformations are expected. In this respect, it is not that Copernicus, Darwin or Einstein told us something "truer" about the world or that they discovered absolutely new facts when they introduced their theories of planets, life and universe; what made their science better was their ability to master profound conceptual transformations, so that more satisfying accounts of facts were eventually attained. These are, according to Wittgenstein, the sort of conversions that are really necessary for the real advancement of human knowledge – *i.e.* new conceptual forms that trigger better representations of the world. For example, in Newtonian mechanics, a bizarre thing happens when the third law of motion is considered. Let's think for a moment of an object attached to a rod that is rotated such that the object moves on a circular trajectory around some axis. The object is kept on its curved path by the centripetal force that "pulls" the

object towards the rotation axis and, according to Newton's third law, by a second force equal in magnitude and opposed in orientation to the centripetal force, called centrifugal force, which prevents the object from actually "falling" into the axis. This representation is neat and seems to explain satisfactorily the observed phenomenon. However, centrifugal force is a strange notion. It does not do anything in the explanation. What counterbalances centripetal motion in our example is the object's own inertia to remain on a straight path, and not a second force. It is both Hertz's and Wittgenstein's belief that this conceptual difficulty was generated by the form of Newtonian theory, that postulated counteracting forces everywhere in nature. So, if a better explanation of circular motion is desired, then the classical theory of mechanics needs to be brought to a coherent form. This can be achieved, in Wittgenstein's opinion, through a proper "meshing" of theory onto the world, without idle concepts – that is, through an adequate construction of *the general form of mechanical theory*, and not by discovering new facts (e.g. centrifugal behaviors).


3. Later Stages of Picture Theory (1928-1930)

In 1922, Ludwig Wittgenstein decided to retire from professional philosophy.²¹ He was firmly convinced that everything was settled in the *Tractatus*. In 1928, however, after few uncertain years, Wittgenstein met in Vienna Moritz Schlick, who was the leader of a small philosophical group called the Vienna Circle, and under his influence slowly began to reassess claims from his earlier work. He even befriended Schlick in whom he discovered, quite unexpectedly, a close and kindred spirit.

During the years 1928 to 1930, Ludwig Wittgenstein's picture theory (*Bildtheorie*) takes a fast and surprising evolution. Some of the previous core assumptions about representation are dropped without much ado: atomicity, categoricity, even truth-functionality. Slowly, Wittgenstein starts to imagine a different way of making sense of the world, still underlined by a general idea of representation (*Abbildung*), but not in the strict sense of before. His old theory of logic that was scaffolding his very concept of "world" begins to crumble after 1928, giving way to a diversity of systems of representation, intuitive human calculi and applied geometry. The world looks, all of a sudden, a lot more complex, more patchy and under the constraints of actual human abilities to make sense of it. Even the idea of a "true" representation gets replaced with that of a perspicuous

representation, *i.e.* one that possesses the right mathematical multiplicity in particular a system of representation but is not the exact mirror of what it represents. There are “so many logical forms”, Ludwig Wittgenstein writes in his short paper from 1929 entitled “Some remarks on logical form”, and his revisionary work starts to illustrate this idea more and more convincingly.

One can imagine a very simple example, a sentence like: “There were three knocks on the door”. Now, what does it mean for this sentence to be true? Should three knocks exist in the world? Does the sentence really mirror knocks? At this point it becomes obvious to Wittgenstein that it is misleading to refer to knocks on door as existing objects that our words mirror by similarity. Something else is the case here. Knocks on door may be something real, but only in a very particular system of representation – for instance, in a system of sound and time scales. Sound and time scales, on the other hand, are human constructs which involve intricate projective calculi: *i.e.* defining a sound and a time unit, counting such units (by means of, let’s say, the general operation O), composing them into n -dimensional scales by forming Cartesian products thereof. A simple sentence like “There were three knocks” is actually a quite complex representation like this one:



This is just a schematic example of how the assumption of categoricity (according to which words mirror objects by a relation of similarity) simply fails. Along with it, however, other fundamental assumptions of “picture theory” fall as well. A straightforward case is that of truth-functionality, *i.e.* the assumption that each composite sentence is a truth-function of elementary sentences to which the truth-operation N is applied. We want to say, for example, that “It is not the case that there were three knocks”. The latter is a composite sentence obtained by applying sentential negation

to our supposedly elementary sentence: “There were three knocks”. But what state of affairs does the negated sentence depict? As we may assume from the *Tractarian* concept of direct representation, it should depict the inverted or complementary state of three knocks. However, in this case, an infinite number of alternative states is possible: from no knock to several knocks, provided enough time. So there is no inverted world-state for three knocks.

As Jaakko Hintikka pointed out with respect to the development of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s picture theory in the late 1920s: “Complex propositions have to be projected on reality, *i.e.* connected with atomic propositions, in some other way than truth-function theory. And it is clear from what Wittgenstein says that his first candidates for this role are the calculi that operate with numbers”.²² Projective calculi are more effective in making explicit the meaningful connection between human language and reality than the coarser grained logic of tautologies, of the kind “ $p \vee \neg p$ ”. In many representation cases, the excluded middle simply does not hold because, in between the logical extremes, an entire variety of intermediary world-states is possible. Applied mathematics and applied geometry can definitely account for those, a lot more perspicuously than logic does. Wittgenstein’s revised concept of representation (*Abbildung*) from 1929 suggests that calculation and projection are, in fact, deeply embedded in the manner in which human beings make sense of the word – even in most elementary descriptions. This is what *shows* itself in human language and not an immutable logical structure of the world.

Another aspect of representation that now falls short for Wittgenstein is the very idea of atomicity, which he had most probably gotten from Bertrand Russell as early as his first years in Cambridge. Atomicity is, basically, the claim that individual words mirror individual objects: “table” mirrors table, “chair” mirrors chair, “dog” mirrors dog and so on. Let us suppose now that we want to talk about a very simple measurement, like: “This wooden plank is 2 meters long”. What does “2 meters” here mean? What individual objects are thereby mirrored?

It is quite salient that no individual objects called “meters” exist. When one counts “2 meters” it is not as if two individual objects are concatenated one next to the other, as the atomicity assumption requires. If that were to be the case, then the sentence “This wooden plank is 2 meters long” should be written as “This wooden plank is 1 meter long *and* this wooden plank is 1 meter long”. It should be similar to: if “The cat and the dog are sitting on the mat”, then it is the case that “The cat is sitting on the mat” and

“The dog is sitting on the mat”, since cat and dog are individual objects for which independent predication is required. Yet, this predicative approach does not work in the wooden plank case. Here, by contracting redundant conjuncts, we simply obtain the sentence “This wooden plank is 1 meter long” which obviously is not the same as “This wooden plank is 2 meters long”. The example illustrates plainly that, in measurement representations, units are not just concatenated, but they form measurement scales for which a system of representation (e.g. a ruler) and an internal relation (e.g. addition) are stipulated. Someone has to perform such stipulations in order to get a sense of many things: from lengths, colors and sounds that make the universal human phenomenology, to intricate metric determinations of physical space that make the advanced science. This means that not even physical space is an object in itself, as some would still believe in the footsteps of Newtonian metaphysics. Numbers, scales and metrics are deeply entrenched with language, as part of various systems and calculi that serve to represent the world.

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s late “picture theory” (1928-1930) is, in fact, a complex theory worth some particular attention in its own right. This is a point I find very important to underline. However, I will not be able to insist too much on it here. I mention only three salient aspects: late “picture theory” (a) preserves a representation (*Abbildung*) relation between language and world; (2) is characterized by a mathematical scaffolding (instead of a logical one) as calculus and projection are inherent parts of it and (3) is practical rather than transcendental; for instance, there is not an *a priori* notion of physical space that frames human experience, but rather it is human experience that frames a certain notion of physical space.

4. Semantic Research in 1930

In this final part, I shall illustrate the development of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s view of geometry in relation to mechanics, development that was motivated by his partial revision of “picture theory” in the late 1920s. As I was beginning to suggest at the end of the previous section, the revised “picture theory” infuses a new and more nuanced understanding of what scientific knowledge ultimately is. Once one abandons the idea that theories are transcendental, the metaphor of a meshed grid imposed onto the world by a transcendental subject, touching reality only into its distant nodes, is also starting to shimmer. Scientific theories of physical

space are constructive human endeavors; each conceivable spatial mesh is perspicuously sewed onto the world with calculations and geometrical projections that make sense for beings who experience space, in a way or another.

In 1929, in a conversation with Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waissmann in Vienna, Wittgenstein introduced an elaborate concept of geometry as syntax of physical space: "Einstein says that geometry is concerned with possible positions of rigid bodies. If I actually describe the positions of rigid bodies by means of language, then it is only the syntax of this language that can correspond to possible positions."²³ In this view, geometry provides *constitutive rules* for the expression of spatial properties and relations; that is, geometry is understood as a grammar of physical language. Geometry is used to describe physical space, but also to constrain what spatial rapports are possible or impossible between physical objects. In other words, mechanics, for example, is always constrained by the kind of geometry one has – since, depending on the particular geometry, certain trajectories in space are conceivable or not. In this sense, both Wittgenstein and Einstein were quite fond of applied geometry, just like Hertz had been several decades before.²⁴ Geometric conventions make sense only in as much as they are involved with real objects of experience.²⁵

The suggestion, which Wittgenstein did not explicate any further, can be illustrated with a very nice and intuitive example. One can draw the following table:²⁶

Spatial relation	Kind of geometry (in which the spatial relation is expressible)
(1) The pencil is in the box. (box is closed)	Topology
(2) The pencil is in the box. (box is open) Mary is sitting between Jose and Maria.	Affine geometry
(3) The post office is over the hill.	Projective geometry

This tables offers an intuitive glimpse into the geometry (or geometrical “syntax”) that makes the semantics of various spatial prepositions in English. It works with the general simple idea of spatial invariance. Intuitively, in the case of: “The pencil is in the box” and the box is closed, the spatial relation “_in_” is invariant under continuous deformations of the box, so one could say that the use of preposition “_in_” from (1) is underlined by a notion of topological invariance. Now, if the box is open, one can easily imagine deformations of the object – *i.e.* the five-wall container plus the pencil – that do not preserve the “_in_” spatial relation; for instance, one bends the five disconnected walls in opposite directions. However, in the case of: “The pencil is in the box” and the box is open, the “_in_” relation can be preserved once one sees, if the example is simplified to a two-dimensional representation, the pencil line as being in the same plane as the three-line container. An invariance under affine transformations – which preserve co-planarity – is thus obtained. The other example: “Point x is between point y and point z” is meant to suggest that the “_between_and_” preposition is also invariant under affine transformations, since affine geometry preserves also collinearity. The last case is even a simpler one: a figure (*i.e.* a post office) is projected in a different plane while preserving the relative distances between its points. So “_over_” expresses an invariance under translation, which is characteristic of projective geometry.

Carl Hempel later called this kind of view a semantic interpretation of geometry; it was definitely influenced by Albert Einstein’s “Geometrie und Erfahrung” (1921) and it had a lot to do with Wittgenstein’s new notion of representation as a human activity based in human experience. Einstein had explicitly claimed that, in mechanics, by studying the movement of rigid bodies with geometric tools, one can formulate rigorous statements about real bodies’ motion capabilities – because geometry is concerned with real objects of experience and their constrains. For Wittgenstein, things reached a little further, since even the logic of plain spatial language could be shown to be entrenched with rudimentary geometrical representation.

This idea was discussed at length in the Vienna Circle during the 1930s, and it is really remarkable and also a little puzzling that Wittgenstein called geometry “a syntax” of physical space. Both Schlick’s and the Vienna Circle’s view of geometry, including Carnap’s, was actually more formal than Wittgenstein’s. Carnap’s view was, in fact, a properly syntactic one: it was Carnap’s belief that primitive notions of geometry

like “point”, “line”, “plane”, together with the axioms and postulates should be understood independently of any intuitive manipulation of words, shapes and physical objects in bi-dimensional or three-dimensional spaces. In Carnap’s sense, geometric notions have no empirical bearing, *i.e.* they are entirely formal. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, who was pairing with Einstein in this heavy polemic, maintained that geometry should be conceived of as embedded in human experience and, thus, in human language. So, geometry was not purely formal or syntactic. Against Carnap and even Schlick, Wittgenstein took a system of geometry, like Euclidean geometry, to be a system of rules for *applying* specific geometric notions such as “point”, “line” or “plane” in different empirical contexts, including mechanics. From this particular perspective, that Wittgenstein was inclined to endorse towards the beginning of the 1930s, arithmetic and geometry were both formalisms, but not just formalisms. Arithmetic and geometry did not make sense just as such, by stipulation; what gave these systems meaning was their straightforward application from which they could not be separated.

Ludwig Wittgenstein started in Bertrand Russell’s philosophical tradition from Cambridge in the early 1910s. Simplifying, his first philosophy up to the publication of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in 1921 was a mix of both embraces and challenges to Russell’s ideas, some of which were more or less direct. One good example is the atomistic assumption of *Bildtheorie*, which both resembled and differed from Russell’s. But the years starting from 1929 leave the impression of a deeper philosophical awakening for Wittgenstein. Russell’s logical analysis of language is definitely left behind; and the proposal to characterize semantic aspects of human language based on mathematical and geometrical forms of linguistic representation is, indeed, entirely new. It is also productive because the notion of invariance may be just as worth exploring in semantics, as it is in mechanics. Yet, this discussion will have to be postponed for another time.

NOTES

- ¹ L. Wittgenstein, *Public and Private Occasions*, p. 39.
- ² See also M. Potter, *Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic*, p. 224-226.
- ³ L. Wittgenstein, *Cambridge Letters*, p. 42.
- ⁴ For the general case, the number of possible elementary states is 2^n (TLP 4.27, 4.28).
- ⁵ Wittgenstein calls it in the *Tractatus* a "fundamental thought" (*Grundgedanke*): "My fundamental thought is that the logical constants do not represent. That the logic of the facts cannot be represented." (TLP 4.0312)
- ⁶ See J. Hintikka, "An Anatomy of Wittgenstein's Picture Theory", pp. 21-54.
- ⁷ J. G. Nicod, "A Reduction in the Number of Primitive Propositions of Logic", pp. 32-34.
- ⁸ L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, pp. 3-4.
- ⁹ The inference rule is a *modus ponens*: from $A|(B|\Gamma)$ and A, Γ can be inferred. The axiom expresses the condition of *well-formation* for any Sheffer formula:

$$(A|((B|\Gamma)|(\Delta|(\Delta|\Delta))|((E|B)|((A|E)|(\Delta|E)))).$$
- ¹⁰ See M. Potter, "Wittgenstein's Pre-*Tractatus* Manuscripts: A New Appraisal", pp. 13-33.
- ¹¹ "If two expressions are combined by means of the sign of equality, that means that they can be substituted for one another. But it must be manifest in the two expressions themselves whether this is the case or not. When two expressions can be substituted for one another, that characterizes their logical form." (TLP 6.23)
- ¹² For complete proofs, see P. Frasca, "The 'Tractatus' System of Arithmetic", pp. 353-378.
- ¹³ Categoricity is a notion that Ludwig Wittgenstein knew from the foundations of mathematics, where it was applied for the first time by Richard Dedekind to prove that the axioms of arithmetic have exactly one model up to isomorphism, at the end of the 19th century. However, such uses of formal methods in Wittgenstein's early philosophy should not be taken in their strict mathematical sense, but in a rather speculative manner. Brian McGuinness calls them "snippets of method" (*Approaches to Wittgenstein*, p.165) because Wittgenstein never developed them into full formal applications.
- ¹⁴ See J. Hintikka, "An Anatomy of Wittgenstein's Picture Theory", p. 22: "Each name has the same logical form (logical and categorial type) as the object it represents".
- ¹⁵ "Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others" (TLP 2.0121)
- ¹⁶ For a more comprehensive exposition of this idea, see B. McGuinness, *Approaches to Wittgenstein*, pp. 117-118.

- 17 In analytical mechanics, a physical system of n mass points is characterized by a total quantity of motion which is expressed as a global least difference between the potential and kinetic energies of the system.
- 18 In Newtonian mechanics, motion is the response of a mass point to various forces, when considered in relation to other mass points. The action of forces is local and underlined by the idea of causality. Motion is obtained by changing a body's state through interaction with other bodies: through pushing, pulling, dropping etc.
- 19 The motion effect is equal to the acceleration of the mass point along its trajectory of motion. This can be written down as the second derivative of the mass point's displacement through time.
- 20 "The admiration that Wittgenstein conceived for Hertz in his youth was something he never lost. Later in life we find him entering reservations about almost everyone else – even about Frege – but right up to the end of his years he continued to quote Hertz with approval and agreement." (A. Janik and S. Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, p. 275)
- 21 See especially R. Monk, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*.
- 22 J. Hintikka, "Die Wende der Philosophie: Wittgenstein's New Logic of 1928", p. 85.
- 23 L. Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, p. 28.
- 24 The physicist Heinrich Hertz was on the same page when he formulated his "geometry of systems of points": "... all our statements represent possible experiences; they could be confirmed by direct experiments, by measurements made with models. Thus we need not fear the objection that in building up a science dependent on experience, we have gone outside the world of experience." (H. Hertz, *The Principles of mechanics presented in a new form*, p. iii)
- 25 "...it is certain that mathematics generally, and geometry in particular, owes its existence to the need which was felt of learning something about the behavior of real objects. It is clear that the system of concepts of axiomatic geometry alone cannot make any assertions as to the behavior of real objects of this kind, which we will call practically-rigid bodies. To be able to make such assertions, geometry must be stripped of its merely logical-formal character by the coordination of real objects of experience with the empty conceptual schemata of axiomatic geometry. To accomplish this, we need only add the proposition: solid bodies are related, with respect to their possible dispositions, as are bodies in Euclidean geometry of three dimensions. Then the propositions of Euclid contain affirmations as to the behavior of practically-rigid bodies. We will call this completed geometry 'practical geometry'." (A. Einstein, "Geometrie und Erfahrung", the English translation: <http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~ncrato/Math/Einstein.htm>).
- 26 The source of these examples is P. Suppes, *Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures*, p. 106.

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THE MYSTERY OF THE HUMAN BEING IN AUGUSTINE: IN QUEST OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN APOPHATIC ANTHROPOLOGY

Abstract: The purpose of this research is to examine whether and in what sense one could identify an apophatic approach to the human being in Augustine's writings. It also explores the relationship between the negative theology and the negative anthropology in Augustine's thinking. Augustine's conception of human interiority as dwelling place of the divine, his reflections on the deepness of the heart, on illumination, on transfiguration through love or divinisation of the human being, bring to light fundamental traits of a genuine apophatic discourse.

Keywords: Apophatic theology, apophatic anthropology, ineffability, unknowability, interiority, heart, illumination, love, charity, divinisation, image, likeness.

I. Fragile Beauty and Beautiful Difficulty

We are used to tackling Augustine's vision of the human being through certain thematic constellations and pre-established conceptual distinctions. We speak of the human being as a composite of body and soul,¹ or as being caught in the dichotomy flesh-spirit.² We speak of man's inner constitution, of levels of interiority or subjectivity.³ We speak of mind and heart,⁴ bodily senses and spiritual senses,⁵ outer and inner man.⁶ Even when dualist logic is overcome by triadic structures – such as: memory, intelligence, will – we are still in the same effort of classification and systematisation. We may collect and interpret passages on consciousness, self-awareness and self-knowledge. We can see the Augustinian man through the debates on free will and grace,⁷ or we can go through his consideration of desire,⁸ delight,⁹ love and gift.¹⁰ The self of the *cogito*¹¹

and the “I” of prayer,¹² confession¹³ and praise¹⁴ may constitute complex and delicate viewpoints to focus on Augustinian anthropology. They are not mutually exclusive and they can illuminate different facets of the Augustinian self.

All these themes (and many possible others) propose an interesting mapping of Augustine’s complex view on the realities of the human being. And yet, the human being is not fully expressed or described through such thematic investigations. There is always an excess that cannot be exhausted through such an approach to the human being. There is always something deeper in man, transcending man, granting the particularity and unity of the human being, something that goes above and beyond these thematic constellations. We search for the wholeness, coherence and sense of the human being, and yet we are confronted with incomprehensibility, ineffability, unfathomable depth, hiddenness and mystery.

In this paper, I will argue that one has to disclose and assume the incomprehensibility of man in Augustine’s thinking –and that a certain apophatic attitude is not only present, but indeed crucial to Augustine’s anthropology. It is my deepest conviction that anthropological apophaticism might shed a new light on classical thematic approaches and pre-conceived ideas of Augustine’s theory of man, dismantling some of them, reconstructing others on new foundations, but inviting our current understanding to embrace the exercise of wonder before the mystery of man.¹⁵ To approach the fragile beauty of a human being’s mystery is, indeed, a difficult task – but also a fascinating one.

II. Research Questions

Let us unfold the preliminary questions that guide the current investigation and inform our discourse on Augustine’s perspective on the human being. First of all, what is apophatic anthropology? Or rather, what is anthropological apophaticism? How can we define the apophatic approach to man, thinking along with Augustine and trying to read his works as a source of inspiration and reflection on this specific approach? What is the specificity of apophaticism when directed towards the human being, in comparison with the apophaticism defining our attitude towards God?

Secondly, how do we relate apophaticism to key-concepts concerning the level of speech (such as ineffable, inexpressible, indescribable,

unspeakable, unsayable), and respectively the level of knowledge (unknowable, incomprehensible, unfathomable, ungraspable)?

Thirdly, how is the vocabulary expressing negation (e.g., endless, impenetrable) related to the vocabulary expressing mystery (something inexpressible because hidden) and the vocabulary expressing puzzle/enigma/*aporia* (something inexpressible because it contains inner contradictions or is impossible to decipher in itself and from itself)?

In the fourth place, what is the relationship between the vocabulary of negation (non-...) and the vocabulary of eminence (beyond and above...) in Augustine's anthropological thought?

Finally, can we see the apophaticism of the person as intertwined with the apophaticism of relationship? How does the infinite reference to God – including the permanent searching-finding tension, the continuous longing, the endless loving knowledge and knowing love – trigger as necessary an apophatic approach to the relationship man-God?

III. A Glimpse into Unfathomable Humanity

1. *The ineffable receptacle of divine ineffability*

In *Exposition 2 on Psalm 101*, Augustine proposes an exegesis on the name of God revealed to Moses. It is one of his favourite themes, and he often comes back to propose a glimpse into the hidden meaning of the name of God. It is an occasion to contrast divine nature and human nature (in its worldly condition), and to underline the immeasurable and unimaginable greatness of God's "is", in contrast to any human affirmation of "is" in respect to one's own being.

He asked God's name not out of impertinent curiosity, but because he needed to know it for his ministry. *What shall I say to the sons of Israel if they challenge me, Who sent you to us?* Then the Creator named itself to the creature, God to a human being, the immortal to a mortal, the eternal to an ephemeral man: I AM WHO I AM, he said. (...) What a mighty 'is'! What an incomparably great 'is'! What is any human being beside that? A human being 'is' something, but what is he or she, alongside the great 'is'? Who can grasp that being? Who can share in it? Who pant for it, who aspire to it? In its presence, who dare even think he 'is'? But do not despair, frail humanity. I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob (*Ex. 3:13-14*), he says. 'You have heard what I am in myself; listen

now to what I am for your sake.' That eternity has called us, for the word has burst forth from eternity. (*En. Ps.* 101.2.10, WSA III.19, 71).¹⁶

At first glance, the preference for antitheses suggests a very sharp ontological divide between God as Creator, immortal, eternal, and human being as creature, mortal and ephemeral. The rhetorical questions might suggest as an answer: "Nobody". And still there is a second possible answer: "the human being". From all the creatures, only the human being can aspire to know the Creator, to participate in immortality and eternity, to taste, by grace, the divine life. And as we shall see later in our analysis, the language of aspiration (longing)¹⁷ and the language of participation (sharing in)¹⁸ are used by Augustine to express the relationship between man and God. For now, as far as the cited passage is concerned, we can conclude: the unapproachable God, whose IS is incomprehensible by the limited human being,¹⁹ can be approached, because God has approached man. Fragile humanity is thus not to fall in despair, not to feel crushed under the incomprehensible divine IS. For there is a call to eternity, for eternity is the vocation of the human being, for the Word "calls temporal creatures, and makes them eternal" (*En. Ps.* 101.2.10, WSA III.19, 71).

For reasons of exegetical systematisation, I propose to consider divine apophaticism²⁰ in Augustine's texts from the angle of three modes of discourse: the first, using the language of ineffability or inexpressibility,²¹ the second, using the language of incomprehensibility or unknowability, and the third, centred on expressing the divine eminence.

a. The ineffable divinity

Augustine frequently mentions the ineffability of God's substance, presence, communion within the Trinity, truth, light, greatness or beauty. First, ineffability is attributed to God's being or essence; God is presented as "an inexpressible substance", prior to all spaces and all times (*De Gen. ad litt.* 5.16.34, WSA I.13, 193), but ineffability is also chosen to characterize God's appearance and speaking in the vision of Moses: "So then, in that other way, in the form by which he is God, he speaks in an ineffably more secret and intimate way, in inexpressible words" (*De Gen. ad litt.* 12.27.55, WSA I.13, 496). *Ineffabilis* can be associated with divinity as truth: "the divine and inexpressible truth that is above us" (*De Trinitate* 5.1.2, WSA I.5, 189), and it is also appropriate to suggest an attitude of wonder and speechlessness before the divine light, "that inexpressible light" (*De Trinitate* 15.6.10, WSA I.5, 402).

The language of ineffability also accompanies the Trinitarian teaching of Augustine, both in the treaty *De Trinitate* and in private correspondence. The community granted by the Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian life is ineffable, and ineffable is also the mystery of the Person of the Holy Spirit: "So the Holy Spirit is a kind of inexpressible communion or fellowship of Father and Son" (*De Trinitate* 5.11.12, WSA I.5, 197).²² But the same embracing of the unsayable also applies when trying to point to the inseparability of the three divine Persons in only one divinity, whereas the one God is the "ineffably inseparable Trinity" (*Ep.* 120.3.13).²³ Moreover, each of the Three Persons has an "inexpressible majesty" (*Sermo* 52.17; WSA III.3, 58). The inadequacy of language to approach the Triune God is underlined at the end of *De Trinitate*, as Augustine evaluates his inability to say something worthy (*dignum*) of the "ineffability of that highest Trinity" (*illius summae trinitatis ineffabilitate*). (*De Trinitate* 15.27.50, FC 45, 92).²⁴

Augustine's considerations on the creation as confessing the Creator permanently, silently, within a universal theophany and a cosmic liturgical praising, can also be connected to apophatic theological discourse:

For, quite apart from the voice of the prophets, the very order, changes and movements in the universe, the very beauty of form in all that is visible, proclaim, however silently, both that the world was created and also that its Creator could be none other than God whose greatness and beauty are both ineffable and invisible. (*De ciu. Dei* 11.4, FC 14, 191).

Ineffability is not only the condition of approaching God here and now, within the borders of imperfect humanity, but it will also qualify the vision and the knowledge of God in the restored and perfected humanity, in eternal life: "When, after all, will you say, 'This is what God is'? Not even when you see him, because what you will see is inexpressible." (*Sermo* 53.12, WSA III.3, 72).²⁵

Not only attributes, but also names are powerless to convey the divine nature. Above all name and naming, the one named God is in fact the nameless, even though it can be attributed numberless beautiful, excellent, superlative names:²⁶

whatever we name what cannot be named, whatever we want to name it, it is called God. And when we name it God, what have we named? Are these two syllables all that we are looking toward? Whatever we have been able to name it, then, is inferior. (*Io. Ep. Tr.* 4.6, WSA III.14, 70).

In Augustine's view, even to say that God is ineffable would contradict His ineffability. God is indeed beyond any human attempt to name His ineffability, to propose it as an attribute to the divine nature. Even when asserting the ineffability of God, speech remains ultimately inadequate. Thus, in *De doctrina christiana* I.6.6, Augustine plays on the paradox of naming the inexpressible, on the *aporia* of expressing the inexpressibility, of speaking out the ineffability of God:

Have I said anything, solemnly uttered anything that is worthy of God? On the contrary, all I feel I have done is to wish to say something; but if I have said anything, it is not what I wished to say. How do I know this? I know it because God is inexpressible (*quia Deus ineffabilis est*); and if what has been said by me were inexpressible, it would not have been said. And from this it follows that God is not to be called inexpressible (*ne ineffabilis quidem dicendus est Deus*), because when even this is said about him, something is being expressed. And we are involved in heaven knows what kind of battle of words, since on the one hand what cannot be said is inexpressible, and on the other what can even be called inexpressible is thereby shown to be not inexpressible. This battle of words should be avoided by keeping silent, rather than resolved by the use of speech. (*Teaching Christianity*, WSA I.11, 108).²⁷

b. The unknowable divinity

Another dimension of the apophatic approach to God is centred not on the failure of discourse to express what God is, but on the impossibility of the human capacities to fully comprehend the divine being, or even to think, to understand, to penetrate the divine works, judgements or love. Considerations of the unknowability or incomprehensibility of God can be linked to considerations of the incomprehensibility of the human intellect itself. In a sort of *a fortiori* argument, Augustine asserts that the Creator cannot be grasped if the created intellect, the faculty of human comprehension, is itself beyond grasp: "In any case, what intellectual capacity has a man got to grasp God with, if his own intellect with which he wishes to grasp him still eludes his grasp?" (*De Trinitate* 5.1.2, WSA 1.5, 190).

Augustine argues against any attempts to apply to God Aristotle's categories of accidental predication, for God is beyond the categories which apply to created substances (*De Trinitate* 5.1.2),²⁸ but also against thinking of God in terms of "spiritual conceptions" that might be subject to changeability (*De Trinitate* 8.2.3). In refusing the approach to God by

intellectual categories and concepts, one is at least aware of what one shouldn't think about God: "Whoever thinks of God like that may not yet be able to discover altogether what he is, but is at least piously on his guard against thinking about him anything that he is not." (*De Trinitate* 5.1.2, WSA 1.5, 190). The utility of the *via negativa* recommended here is asserted in terms of knowledge: "before we can know what God is, we are at least able to know what he is not." (*De Trinitate* 8.2.3, WSA 1.5, 243).²⁹

Divinity is fundamentally beyond any human grasp, it cannot be constituted as an object of knowledge: "We are talking about God, so why be surprised if you cannot grasp it? I mean, if you can grasp it, it isn't God." (*Sermo* 117.5, WSA III.4, 211). Any knowledge that pretends to intellectual conceptualization is impossible, for it is impossible to circumscribe the un-circumscribable. Augustine continues: "Certainly it is great bliss to have a little touch or taste of God with the mind; but completely to grasp him, to comprehend him, is altogether impossible." (*Sermo* 117.5, WSA III.4, 211). The relationship between the human mind and God cannot be thought of in the logic of container-contained, but a certain approach and a certain knowledge of God is possible by spiritual experience, which Augustine suggests using terms related to the spiritual senses, mentioning touch, or taste or the mind's eye:

So what mind's eye will be able to grasp God, take all of him in? It is enough to touch his fringes, if the mind's eye is pure. But if it does touch upon him, it does so with a kind of immaterial and spiritual touch, but still does not embrace or comprehend him all; and that too, if the mind is pure. (*Sermo* 117.5, WSA III.4, 212).³⁰

Speaking of the incomprehensible God supposes, for Augustine, not an abstract exercise of denying attributes, concepts, notions, names, a purely discursive game of negations, aimed to end in absolute silence or distance.³¹ The use of negations, as sign of the awareness of God's transcending all intellectual categories, is the preliminary stage to acceding to another kind of approach of the unapproachable, by spiritual experience, through the spiritual senses. Without being an intellectual container that encompasses the essence of God, the human being – the human mind or mind's eye, in the terms of the *Sermo* 117 – can become a receptacle for what God reveals of Himself in human interiority, in privileged moments of great intimacy between man and God.

c. Eminence and surpassing:

Ungraspable in words, incomprehensible for human understanding, invisible, inexplicable, impenetrable,³² God's presence can be suggested using the language of eminence and surpassing, sometimes articulated in paradoxical formulations, which try to transcend the limits of language by pushing language beyond self-contradiction. The human struggle to think and suggest through words God's eminence is a constant of Augustinian thinking from *De doctrina christiana* onwards:

All of them, however, put up a strenuous and zealous fight for God's excelling everything else there is; nor can any be found who suppose that God is something than which anything else is better. And so all agree that God is whatever they put above all other things. (I.7.7, WSA I.11, 109).

The superlative of hiddenness is the mode of manifestation of God, even in his most intense presence: "secretissime et presentissime – deeply hidden yet most intimately present" (*Conf.* 1.4.4, Chadwick 4-5). This extremely hidden and yet all-encompassing, all-penetrating presence is surpassing all interiority and elevation within the human being: "interior intimo meo et superior summo meo – more inward than my most inward part and higher than the highest element within me" (*Conf.* 3.6.11, Chadwick, 43).³³ Eventually, *Deus secretissimus* also surpasses any hiddenness of the inner man: "omni secreto interior – more inward than any secret recess" (*Conf.* 9.1.1, Chadwick, 155).

Eventually, eminence can be paired with unchangeability: "that supremely eminent and unchangeable nature" (*De Trinitate* 15.6.10, WSA I.5, 401). In fact, Augustine often insists on the immutability of God, especially when he discusses the significance of the name of God revealed to Moses in *Exodus*. The unbridgeable difference between the Creator and the created human self does not exclude a strong sense of proximity, of indwelling, of presence. "We observed it as both not being far away from us and yet being above us, not spatially, but in its august and marvellous eminence, and in such a way that it also seemed to be with or in us by the presence of its light." (*De Trinitate* 15.6.10, WSA I.5, 401). The paradox of the divine eminence, which is at the same time a paradox of human receptivity and openness to that divine eminence, is that the "above us" is not incompatible with the "with us" or "in us". Augustine considers that this paradox can be better expressed in terms of a light-presence. In

fact, divine eminence can be depicted in terms relating to light imagery, as “dazzling brilliance” (*De Trinitate* 15.6.10, WSA I.5, 402).

All these passages can be read, of course, as pointing to the mystery of the incomprehensible God, for which both the apophatic and the cataphatic way are inappropriate.³⁴ But most of them also hint, in a second moment, at the wonder of the human being who can be a receptacle for that eminent nature, for that most hidden and most secret presence, for that surpassing light. The mystery of the human being resides in the very fact that it can host, in his innermost realms, this intense presence of the secret God. This presence abides beyond the most profound subjective interiority or hiddenness, and above the most elevated subjective superiority. That descent of the divine hiddenness into human hiddenness, that presence of the divine secret to the human secret, that indwelling of the divine surpassing light in the human person are constitutive, fundamental for the human being. The human is thus disclosed as being essentially receptive and responsive to the divine hiddenness. Moreover, he is renewed, enlarged and deepened, through the work of grace, in his openness to the divine hiddenness. Therefore, an apophatic approach to God invites also, as a necessary counterpart, an apophatic approach to the human person, as the mystery of God imprints its reflection and finds its dwelling place in the mystery of man.³⁵

2. The divine secret of the hidden heart

There is a lot of exegesis around the centrality of the heart in Augustine,³⁶ and a lot of positive affirmations can be gathered in order to characterize the potentialities, dispositions, attitudes, thoughts and works of the heart. Innumerable passages from Augustine’s works can support these affirmations on the understanding, the memory, the sensibility associated with the human heart. I will not propose revisiting them. Instead, I would like to insist on the passages supporting the idea that the human heart is, within the human constitution, the special *locus* inviting an apophatic attitude. Of the three types of discourse that characterised theological apophaticism, the one which can be most appropriately applied to the human being is that centred on unknowability,³⁷ with a special emphasis on deepness and inscrutability.

The unknowability of the human heart can have a double meaning. The first meaning refers to human sinfulness, imperfection and instability in the present world. The depth of the human heart is unknown even to

one's own spirit because one may never know what secret thoughts or impulses lie hidden in the heart, deeper than what can be grasped at the level of introspection and consciousness. The second meaning refers to the human heart as fundamentally unknowable because of reflecting a unique and ineffable relationship to the unknowable God. This unknowability is not confined to the any state of ignorance due to our imperfect, limited, mortal condition. On the contrary, it is preserved and even enhanced as the human being approaches the perfection of his being, being renewed so as to reach the perfection of the image of God. This second unknowability is in fact the original and primordial one as it expresses the true vocation of the human being, according to God's project of humanity. It not only transcends the limits of the fallen predicament, but also the limits of creaturliness, bringing before our feeble intuition the eschatological transfiguration of the created Adam.

Both of these connotations can be attested in Augustine's discourse. For reasons of clarity and conciseness, I will illustrate them in relation to one polyvalent motif of Augustine's thinking: interiority perceived as an *abyss*. For Augustine, the abyss is a metaphor of the unsearchable and impenetrable; more precisely, it illustrates the bottomless and limitless space of the inner man, of the hidden and secret inner life.³⁸

On the one hand, the image of the abyss is evoked to express the darkness of the heart related to evil, corruption and death. For example, it points to the irrational human fall into the seduction of evil: "ecce cor meum, deus, ecce cor meum, quod miseratus es in imo abyssi – Such was my heart, o God, such was my heart. You had pity on it when it was at the bottom of the abyss" (*Conf.* 2. 4. 9, Chadwick, 29). Or it can be associated with the depth of death and of corruption which has engulfed the heart: "et dextera tua respiciens profunditatem mortis meae et a fundo cordis mei exhauriens abyssum corruptionis – Your right hand had regard to the depth of my dead condition, and from the bottom of my heart had drawn out a trough of corruption" (*Conf.* 9.1.1, Chadwick, 155). Furthermore, in Book 13 Augustine operates a transposition of the image of a cosmic deep inside the most intimate self, in order to show the abyss which engulfs the human, when he it is not open to the illuminating and forming activity of the Holy Spirit (*Conf.* 13. 8. 9).

On the other hand, the abyss of the human heart is not always linked to the darkness related to evil, ignorance, sin, absence of grace and remoteness from God. It can express the potentialities of the heart of a preacher of God's word, as well as its fragility, its lack of strength

against temptation. Such is the case in the long exegetical excursus which associates the human heart with an abyss in *Exposition of Psalm 41.13*. Here Augustine comments on the verse: “Deep calls to deep at the sound of your cataracts” (*“Abyssus abyssum inuocat, in uoce cataractarum tuarum”*). Interpreting the significance of the abyss as an unsearchable and incomprehensible deepness, Augustine identifies, through rhetorical questioning, the human heart with the abyss meant in the Psalm:

What then is the deep (*abyssus*) that is calling out there, and what the deep that is invoked? If ‘deep’ signifies profundity, surely the human heart is a deep abyss? Could anything be more profound? Human beings can speak, they can be observed as they use their limbs, and heard in their speech; but can we ever go to the bottom of one person’s thoughts, or see into anyone’s heart? (WSA III.16, 251).

The abyss of the heart expresses allegorically the ungraspable intentions, possibilities, activities, purposes and volitions of the heart (whether negative or positive). And Augustine extrapolates from the deepness of the heart to the profundity of the human being, bringing in another scriptural reference:

The profundity of a human being is surely referred to in a saying we find elsewhere: ‘A mortal will draw near to the heart’s depths, and God will be exalted.’ (Ps. 63:7-8 (64:6)). (*En. Ps.* 41.13, WSA III.16, 251).

Another fundamental point in Augustine supporting the apophatic retreat is the articulation of the created and the Uncreated within the heart visited by the grace. Thus, humanity and divinity can meet each other in the human heart within an ineffable encounter, as in a bridal chamber.³⁹ The paradigm of the union is given by the heart of Christ, named in *En. Ps.* 63.13: “*cor altum, cor secretum, cor abditum* – deep heart, secret heart, hidden heart”. In this *enarratio*, Augustine is interpreting the following verse: “a man will approach, with a deep heart; and God will be exalted.”⁴⁰ The heart can be the hosting place of incomprehensible, hidden divinity in the human being. It can name the depth of divinity within the human being, as in the divine-human person of Christ.

He drew near as a man, but deep was his heart. A secret heart was his, one that presented a human nature to human observers, but kept its godhead

hidden within. It concealed that form of God in which he is equal to the Father, and offered outwardly the form of a servant in which he is less than the Father. (*En. Ps.* 63.13, WSA III.17, 255).

The articulation of concealing and manifestation is characteristic of the union of the two natures in Christ. And this articulation finds its proper place in the heart. Obviously Augustine elevated the *topos* of the deepness and hiddenness of the heart to a new, Christological dimension. But this new signification reverberates back to re-evaluate the relationship between human weakness and divine power in the human heart, as Christ has assumed it to elevate it to a 'divine heart':

A man will approach, with a deep heart, a secret heart, a heart hidden from sight (cor altum, cor secretum, cor abditum), revealing neither what it knew nor what it was. The Jews assumed that what met their eyes was all there was to him, so they killed this man with the deep heart; but in that divine heart (in corde diuino) God is exalted, for Christ was exalted by the power of his own majesty. (En. Ps. 16.13, WSA III.17, 255).

This is an exceptional example of the hiddenness and profundity of the human heart: a heart in which humanity can be contemplated, a heart in which God himself can be seen.⁴¹ We may consider Augustine's commentary as also implying that this deep heart is the ultimate model for the human heart, as Christ is the model for the human being, and the human being is made according to the image of the Son of God.⁴² After all, the mystery of the person of Christ is established as an *exemplum* for the mystery of the human being in general, for the whole of humanity. In this sense, particularizing, the mystery of Christ's heart can be seen as an *exemplum*, as paradigmatic for the mystery of man's heart, called to a mystical (and sacramental) union with the divinity.⁴³

From the model of the heart of Christ, we can speak also of the bridal chamber of the heart, as the privileged space of union between humanity and divinity. This can be constituted as a place of peace and rest. It becomes the place of the mystical union with the Wisdom of God (*sapientia Dei*), understood allegorically under the figure of the bride or sweet spouse indwelling deeply in the inner consciousness (*ad interiora conscientiae tuae*), the inner chamber of the heart (*cubiculum cordis*):

And if you have found there a spouse in whose company there is no bitterness, the very Wisdom of God (See Wis. 8:16), unite yourself with her, be at peace there within your bedroom (*in cubiculo tuo*), and do not allow the fumes of a bad conscience to drive you out. (*En. Ps.* 35.5, WSA III. 16, 76).⁴⁴

In other passages with marital imagery, Christ is depicted as the bridegroom,⁴⁵ whereas the metaphor of the *cubiculum cordis* can be reiterated without necessarily bearing an explicit nuptial meaning, but rather in relation to the inner prayer.⁴⁶ The mystical union of divinity and humanity in man's heart can evolve from nuptial images to sacramental ones, and the secret inner chamber can be conceived instead as a place of cult, as an altar or sanctuary: "The great houses, the mighty tabernacles of God are the hearts of the saints - *Magnas domos, et magna tabernacula Dei, corda sanctorum...*" (*En. Ps.* 44, 23, WSA III. 16, 300).

The idea of mutual indwelling and mutual hiding in the hiddenness of the other, in the relationship established between God and man, while man is on the way to sanctification, occurs when Augustine comments on the verse: *You will hide them in the hidden recess of your face* (*Ps.* 30:21). God's face (*facies*), invisible and ineffable, will become man's proper shelter (*sinus*), abiding in him secretly:

Be a home for him, and he will be a home for you; let him dwell in you, and you will dwell in him. If you have welcomed him with your heart (*corde tuo*) in this age, he will welcome you with his face (*uultu suo*) when this age is past. (*En. Ps.* 30 (4). 8, WSA III. 15, 353).

It seems that the proper place of dwelling (*domus*) for the human is in "the hidden place of your countenance", and that the heart is the place of such hiding, so that those who are servants of Christ, despite being reviled by other people, "can flee to God in their hearts and have some initial hope of his sweetness" (*En. Ps.* 30 (4).8, WSA III.15, 353).

The correspondence that is established between the heart of man and the countenance of God, as places of secret indwelling, sweet sheltering, protective hiding, invites also to a double-faced apophaticism. If the hidden face of God requires an apophatic approach, so does the hidden heart of man. Moreover, the relationship of mutual hiding is also, in itself, transcending the possibilities of conceptual language, even though it

can be described in metaphors which will not exhaust its plenitude and deepness.

Continuing the semantics of bridal celebration and marital harmony, we should also mention the reference, in Book I of the *Confessions*, to Vergil's tragic couple Dido-Aeneas, in contrast to the true uplifting and transfiguring love of God, signified in metaphors of inner nourishment and marital union (*Conf.* 1.13.21).⁴⁷ The human heart, having as model the perfect union of humanity and divinity in the secret heart of Christ, discovering itself as a bridal chamber, through purification and illumination, is immersed in and flooded with divine light, *lumen cordis mei*. Man becomes an ineffable reflection of the ineffable and splendid light of God.

3. The effulgent reflection

For Augustine, the human is radiant with the deepness of the divine life because it shares in the divine life. The language of reflection, linked to the imagery of light and illumination, brings us to a kind of foreshadowing of the effulgent brilliancy of the perfect manhood, which will be in the *eschaton*. The question is whether (and to what extent) the luminosity and radiance of the illumined man offers another thread for apophatic discourse in Augustine's anthropology.

In Augustine's terms, the notion of an enlightened soul brings up, at first glance, a theory of knowledge which aims to explain how the soul achieves a full vision of intelligible forms, ideas or reasons. Illumination can thus be taken in an epistemological sense and express the privilege of contemplating the forms, a privilege characterising the excellency of the rational soul, whereas excellency (as a potentiality, granted by the soul's nature) must be coupled with purity and proximity to God (as attained or actualised during human life):

Now among the things which have been created by God, the rational soul is the most excellent of all, and it is closest to God when it is pure. And in the measure that it has clung to him in love, in that measure, imbued in some way and illuminated by him with light, the soul discerns – not with physical eyes, but with its own highest parts in which lies its excellence, i.e., with its intelligence – those reasons whose vision brings to it full blessedness. These reasons (*rationes*), as we said, may be called ideas, or forms, or species, or reasons; and while it is the privilege of many to

name them what they wish, it is the privilege of very few to see them in their reality. (*De diu. qu.* 46, FC 70, 81).

However, beyond the epistemic sense, there is another, existential meaning of Augustine's notion of illumination. Sometimes, the human being is characterized not in the tension between light and darkness, as two contradictory ontological entities, but in the oscillation between two inner processes: being illumined and being darkened. Augustine seems to assume that the human soul has an inherent light. Therefore, the real question is not linked to the existence of this light, but to considering its diminution or its amplification. The essential criterion is the orientation of the inner view. If contemplation is turned towards the inner light as self-sufficient, the soul experiences a diminishing of the light. But if the vision is turned towards the source of the inner light, towards the transcendent light, the soul experiences an amplification, an overwhelming of the light: "Every soul is Zion, if it focuses its gaze in order to see the light which it is meant to see. If it concentrates on any light of its own it is darkened, but if it concentrates on God's light it is illumined." (*En. Ps.* 98.4, WSA III.18, p. 470).

We can read the second option described in this passage – namely illumination – as an example of the human being *mirroring the blinding and unchangeable light of God*. Consequently, we can ask here if illumination in itself doesn't call for an apophatic attitude before the reflection of the divine light in the human being. If illumination makes the human person bearer of the blinding light, if his innermost self becomes a reflection of the dazzling divine light, then this brilliant reflection itself becomes a blinding light which cannot be either directly contemplated, or completely grasped within inner perception. But how can we read Augustine's language of illumination in terms of a luminous reflection touching the realms of ineffability and incomprehensibility? And how does Augustine characterize the illuminated soul, the illuminated mind, the illuminated heart of man? My further analysis tries to identify in his characterisation elements of an anthropological apophaticism, starting from the ineffability of the effect of illumination in the human inner realm.

In *Io. Ep. Tr.* 1.4, God's light is "characterized" in the language of eminence raising it above all types of created light. This consideration is followed by a reflection on the possible transfiguration of the human being by embodying the likeness to that "much greater (...), much more excellent, much more super-eminant", "so much far beyond all else" light

of God. The human being may become a reflection of the super-eminent and dazzling divine light, it may be like this light, if it is illumined by this light. In order to experience the illumination, the human being should be oriented towards the divine light through knowledge of that light, but also through self-devotion:

And perhaps we shall be like it. If we know what that light is, and if we devote ourselves to it, so that we may be enlightened by it, because by ourselves we are darkness, and if we have been enlightened by it we can be light and not be confounded by it, since we are confounded in ourselves. (*Io. Ep. Tr.* 1.4, WSA III.14, 25).

The “overwhelming light” of the “supreme goodness” cannot be an object of grasping or contemplation for the “human mind with its weak eyesight”, but it can be gazed upon by the mind which has been rendered pure (“most purified”) and restored to its “full vigour” (*De Trinitate* 1.2.4, WSA I.5, 67). The vocabulary of surpassing impregnating the discourse about God meets the language of superlatives and fullness in speaking about the human mind. When reinvigorated, when perfected, the human mind has the capacity to look at the surpassing divine light.⁴⁸ But in the present predicament, there is still a certain inadequacy of the human mind to the fully revealed divine light (as charity), which means that the human mind can begin to discern or to guess the “glimmerings” of the Trinity, but in its weakness has to retreat before any continuous presence and full manifestation of the “inexpressible light” (*De Trinitate* 15.6.10; WSA I.5, 402).

Along with the enlightened soul and the enlightened mind, the heart also appears quite often in Augustine as a *locus* of illumination. And it is from the heart that the illumination radiates and transfigures, restores, brings to perfection the whole human being: “... whereas the true light which illuminates every human person sheds light in the heart, where alone understanding resides.” (*En. Ps.* 93.4, WSA III. 18, 377). The heart is seen not only as a passive bearer of light, as an enlightened space, but also as active bearer of Light, reflecting light back – as a “lamp” shining in the firmament of heaven (*En. Ps.* 93.6).⁴⁹ While the human person is enlightened, the heart undergoes an enlargement (*dilatatio cordis*), as grace (God) is being poured into the human heart (*En. Ps.* 4.2).⁵⁰ A shining heart will therefore not only be an enlarged heart, but also a purified heart. For only a purified heart can see and also behold the light of God, engaged

in an endless seeking⁵¹ both for the ineffable light and for the hidden face of God. (*En. Ps.* 26 (2).15).⁵²

Light, illumination, shining, brightness, invisibility, ineffability and certainty – all come together in Augustinian speech to characterize the relationship established between the human and the divine. Trying to explain how the light of knowledge sheds on the human mind some of its splendor, Augustine considers that the process of human sharing in that light is ineffable and invisible:

...this light, then, in which all the things are distinguished is not, of course, poured out like the brightness of this sun or of any bodily light through stretches of space and in every direction. And it does not illuminate our mind as if by a visible splendor but invisibly and ineffably, and it shines, nonetheless, in an intelligible manner. It is as certain for us as it makes certain for us what we see in accord with it. (*Ep.* 120.2.10, WSA II.2, 135).

Thus, the apophaticism developed from the phenomenon of illumination pertains to the impossibility to completely grasp, in (spiritual) vision, and to completely express, in words, what one might have visually perceived of the illumined core of the human being.

4. *Renewal through love*

I would like to examine now the various modes of Augustine's depicting the transformative power of love poured into human interiority and how these modes can be perceived as various steps in disclosing a deep human incomprehensibility, in relation to the incomprehensibility of the Divine Love.

In *Sermon* 23, the apophatic approach of God as Love is developed within, and departing from, the invitation to the believer to drink life from the fountain of life (*Sermo* 23,12). Afterwards, Augustine develops a pedagogy of discovering love, along with a phenomenology of love as immanent in the human being, along with but ungrasped by the human being:

Notice what you have been drinking, though. You have been drinking love. If you recognize it, God is love (1 Jn 4:8.16). So if you have been drinking love, tell me what place you have drunk it in. If you recognize it, if you have seen it, if you love it, what do you love it with? After all, whatever

you love rightly, you love with love. And how can you love anything with love if you don't love? So if you love it, what do you love it with? It comes to you, and you recognize it, and you see it. And it isn't seen in a place, not looked for with the eyes in your head in order to be loved more intensely. You don't hear it talking to you, and when it has come to you, you didn't perceive it coming in. Have you ever felt the feet of love walking about in your heart? So what is it? Whose is this thing which is already in you, and is not grasped by you? That's how you must learn to love God. (*Sermo* 23, 13, WSA III.2, 62).

In examining the very possibilities of human love, Augustine indicates that the source of love is already in the self, but is transcending the self. God as love is the already present indweller of the human heart, the mysterious guest of human interiority, the silent and invisible presence, inviting to and nourishing constantly a more intense and more vivid love. The inner space of the human being is at the same time attributed with and denied the category of "place". It is a place of drinking love, and it is a place of questioning and searching for the place of drinking love. The image of drinking offers a vivid metaphor for how love is assumed and interiorized in the human being. But it isn't a place of visibility, of seeing somebody entering the boundaries of interiority. Constituted as a space of spiritual perception for the movements of Love, it becomes a propaedeutic space for learning to love the incomprehensible (never grasped) love.

The idea of learning to love what is already in the human as the source of unspeakable, ever more intense love, is linked to the question of the human being engaging on the *via amoris*,⁵³ the only way to approach the unapproachable, to advance towards some experiential knowledge of the unknowable divinity. This *via amoris* engages in the complexities of the apophatic approach of God and the human being at the same time. It reflects the entanglement of the impossibilities to grasp the one who loves, the love by which one loves, the love which is loved, the love which grants the capacity of love within the one who loves, the love which actually loves within the loving one. This multiple-oriented impossibility of grasping is resolved in the possibility of feeling through the spiritual senses, naming the loving openness of transfiguring interiority: as ultimately (sensorially and conceptually) invisible, as "an invisible reality", God could be accessible only to the heart, to the open and active spiritual senses (purified "eye of the heart"), as charity (*Io. Ep. Tr.* 7.10, WSA III.14, 111).

The realm of spiritual perception opens a space of simultaneity and indistinctiveness, allowing for the mutual indwelling and abiding between

the human and the divine: “These aren’t distinct members occupying space, but he who has charity sees everything all at once with his understanding. Dwell there, and you shall be indwelled. Abide there, and you shall be abided in.” (*Io. Ep. Tr. 7.10*, WSA III.14, 111-112). The place of spiritual perceptions (which can bear the *name* of “the heart”) does not revendicate any space, and still this no-space place is the only adequate one for mutual indwelling. On the one hand, the paradigm of spiritual perception makes it possible to link divine charity to the superlative of sweetness, and to present love as to be tasted, embraced, taken, possessed: “Charity is being praised to you. If it is pleasing, have it, possess it. (...) Take it, embrace it: nothing is sweeter than it.” (*Io. Ep. Tr. 7.10*, WSA III.14, 112). On the other hand, the mutual indwelling is not defined through a space of settling, but through a place of movement, of progress. It is a dynamic indwelling of the pilgrim progressing in divine love, and of the divine love progressing in the restless human being: Here, the heart is again named as the place of examination and the agent of response to the degree of human progress in charity.

He tells how each person may examine himself as to how much progress charity has made in him, or rather as to how much he has made progress in charity. That is how charity is said to progress in you – that you progress in it. Ask, then, how much you have progressed in charity, and let your heart respond as to what it is, so that you may know the extent of your progress. (*Io. Ep. Tr. 9. 2*, WSA III.14, 132)

The restless heart has no place of settling until it rests in God. We may speak of a constant progress towards its final, eschatological settling in the divine,⁵⁴ who is Himself above all notions of settling and moving, of progressing or regressing.⁵⁵

Perceiving God as charity opens to a kind of knowledge of God through tasting and taking. Here, taking should not be understood in terms of possession and conquering, but rather in terms of taking in, hosting, abiding. Thus the language of possessing is dissolved in the language of habitation, which has a double orientation, evoking the human as a home for the divine and the divine as a home for the human. Moreover, mutual indwelling is transformed in mutual progress: the incomprehensible love progresses in the self as far as the self progresses in the incomprehensible love. Thus, the self experiences a double opening towards incomprehensibility. Moreover, mutual progress opens to another

paradoxical language game: the human being *rests* in God, and also *moves* perpetually towards God. Thus, the self is seen in a present and prospective resting in its place of *requies*, in God as charity. At the same time, it is seen in a continuous progress in the one love which is above all progress, charity as Divinity.⁵⁶ As a sabbatical horizon, charity is the end of the human pilgrimage, it means finding and settling in the homeland. "What is the end? But my good is to cling to God (Ps. 73:28). You have clung to God, you have come to the end of the way, you shall abide in the homeland." (*Io. Ep. Tr.* 10.5, WSA III.14, 151).

Nonetheless, experiencing Love as an end is experiencing love as completeness. But fullness of charity means being full of God, either on a personal level, or on the level of community (*En. Ps.* 98, 4).⁵⁷ This means that the incomprehensibility of the divine charity is to be reflected in the person or the community of persons (city) full of divine charity. This incomprehensibility is articulated in the human being through the possibility of sonship with the Only-Begotten. Divine *dilectio* as incomprehensible (*incomprehensibilis*) and unchangeable transcends the human being, human creatureliness, human possibility to respond to divine love, being rooted before time and before the foundation of the world (*Io. Eu. Tr.* 110.6).⁵⁸ And this incomprehensible eternal love embraces the human being, and manifests itself, as taste of fullness, within the human being.

Drinking, embracing, tasting, progressing in, and resting in divine love are ways of transfiguration of the human person. This transfiguration is finally a transfiguration in beauty. Indeed, the human being is raised from being "loathsome and ugly" to being beautiful by God, who is "always beautiful, never ugly, never changeable". Thus, loving the supreme everlasting beauty makes the lover beautiful, and his beauty grows as his love grows: "How shall we be beautiful? By loving him who is always beautiful. Beauty grows in you to the extent that love grows, because charity itself is the soul's beauty." (*Io. Ep. Tr.* 9.9, WSA III.14, 141). But splendour and comeliness are granted to the human being only by Christ, who is, in his divinity, above all human concept of beauty.⁵⁹ Christ is the one by whom the human being can be made beautiful, as long as one is entirely turned towards him – in his contemplation, in his movement, in his love – and yearns to be beautiful so as to be loved by Christ:

Look to him by whom you have been made beautiful. May you be beautiful so that he may love you. But focus your attention entirely on him, run to

him, beseech his embraces, fear to part from him, so that there may be in you the chaste fear that abides forever. *Let us love because he loved us first.* (Io. Ep. Tr. 9.9, WSA III.14, 142).

Beauty and search of beauty open the topic of desire, where desire acts as gravitation and enflames as fire. Transfiguration through love presupposes a process of dislocation; the human being is resituated in a *place*, where he becomes both a sanctuary and a burning offering to God. Somehow, the gravitational force of love brings the human to its indefinable place: a place which is, paradoxically, no place, but a process, a tension, a longing – that of being aflame for God’s presence. Augustine puts forward a wide semantics of *ardor-burning-being aflame*, in which the metaphysical language of being, and the application of binary patterns (as subject-object, substance-attributes) have little to no relevance at all. Thus, a very strong negative anthropological approach is inherent in the *topos* of the purifying, consuming, transfiguring fire of the divine love.⁶⁰ The meaning and the plenitude of the human being lies in his “being kindled” by the ever-burning, never quenched fire (*Conf.* 10.29.40).

The deepest self is not the self that I discover (or rather fail to discover) while exploring myself, in introspection, but the self that I receive while “being enflamed by the divine fire”. In introspection, the self is unknowable because it presents itself as a puzzle, a riddle, an enigma, an *aporia* or an unsolved question.⁶¹ In confessing the ardour of love, on the contrary, the self is unknowable because fully immersed in the fire of the divine love. These two levels of unknowability encapsulate each other: the aporetic self hides the mystery of the burning self, but also the incomprehensible kindling in the divine fire deepens the *aporia* of the uncontained self.⁶² In Augustine’s spiritual imagery, the *topos* of the burning self (which I do not understand from my-self) illustrates the transfiguration of the human being into what he loves. Encountering the semantics of gift and donation, the fire enflames and transfigures those who receive it (*Conf.* 13.19.25), being related to a definition of love in terms of weight (*pondus meum, amor meus*), directing every being to its natural place.

My weight is my love. Wherever I am carried, my love is carrying me. By your gift we are set on fire (*accendimur*) and carried upwards: we grow red hot (*inardescimus*) and ascend. We climb ‘the ascents in our heart’ (Ps. 83:6) and sing ‘the song of steps’ (Ps. 119:1). Lit by your fire, your good

fire, we grow red-hot and ascend, as we move upwards 'to the peace of Jerusalem'. (Ps. 121:6), (*Conf.* 13.9.10, Chadwick 278).

The enflaming love of God acts as an "inversed gravitation", supporting man's ascent towards God, and lifting him up to his resting place in the heavenly city.⁶³ Thus, the language of fire becomes utterly illustrative of the transfiguration of the human being, through love, into love, while constantly moving (ascending) to the place of the fullness of love.

5. Divinisation

The language of transfiguration through love raises the theme of divinisation, of "becoming god". In the *Homilies on the First Epistle of John* 2.14, becoming god is related to the theme of the transforming power of love, as one becomes what he loves:

...because a person's love determines the person's quality. Do you love the earth? You will be earth. Do you love God? What shall I say? That you will be god? I don't dare to say this on my own. Let us listen to the scriptures: *I have said that you are gods and sons of the Most High.* (Ps. 82:6), (WSA III.14, 51).

Though rarely indicated in Augustine's writings by the technical term *deificare*, occurring 18 times, the concept of deification is essential for Augustine's theological view. "Deification is Augustine's supreme image of Christian salvation."⁶⁴

Divinisation of the human is possible through the grace of God, not by acquiring the same nature of God or by being begotten from the divine substance.

It is quite obvious that God called human beings 'gods' in the sense that they were deified by his grace, not because they were begotten of his own substance. (...) If we have been made children of God, we have been made into gods; but we are such by the grace of him who adopts us, not because we are of the same nature as the one who begets. (*En. Ps.* 49.2, WSA III.16, 381).

Being made god by grace implies the vocabulary of participation, not that of essence or nature: "He calls them *gods* in virtue of participation, not

nature; they are gods by the grace through which he willed to deify them. How great must our God be, if he makes us gods?" (*En. Ps.* 94.6, WSA III.18, 414). Only God can be alone the source of deification, because he has Godhead of himself and not by participation (*En. Ps.* 49.2).

For Augustine, deification presupposes that human beings are given the "power to become children of God" (*En. Ps.* 49.2; *En. Ps.* 94.6).⁶⁵ In addition, the notion of divinisation is indeed Christo-centric; the sonship by grace is made possible through the Incarnation of the Son of God: "This is what God brings about. He transforms children of men into children of God, because he made the Son of God become the Son of Man." (*En. Ps.* 52.4.6, WSA III.17, 36). Christ participates in the human condition in order to make it possible for the human to participate in the divine life. "The Son of God was made a sharer in our mortal nature so that mortals might become sharers in his godhead." (*En. Ps.* 52, 4, 6, WSA III.17, 36-37).⁶⁶ The opposition is not between *humanitas* and *diuinitas*, but between *mortalitas* and *diuinitas*. Participation in the divinity of the Christ is possible because of his participation in our mortality.⁶⁷

Deification is related to vision, to seeing God (*En. Ps.* 49.2),⁶⁸ but also to illumination, to the experience of the divine light perceived with the spiritual eyes: "He made us into gods because he shed his light upon our inner eyes." (*En. Ps.* 94.6, WSA III.18, 415). Divinisation means achieving likeness to God, and this likeness is realized in the human being by knowing God and by being transformed through this divine knowledge: "It follows that insofar as we know God we are like him, but never like him to the point of equality, since we never know him as much as he himself is." (*De Trinitate* 9.11.16, WSA I. 5, 279).

Ontologically speaking, deification does not erase the difference between Creator and created being, in Augustine's view: "the created being remains a created being, even though deified".⁶⁹ It means human participation not in the divine nature, but in the divine life. Deification consists in acquiring the "divine *modality of being* of persons in communion",⁷⁰ which is centred on infinite and unwavering charity. Becoming more and more similar to God means, eventually, realizing the fulfilment of human nature.⁷¹ The intensification, the perfect realization of likeness to God is linked to progressing into the loving knowledge and knowing love of God:

By the same token when we know God we are indeed made better ourselves than we were before we knew him, especially when we like this knowledge

and appropriately love it and it becomes a word and a kind of likeness to God; yet it remains inferior to God because it is an inferior nature, our consciousness being a creature, but God the creator. (*De Trinitate* 9.11.16, WSA I.5, 280).

The question of deification, as well as the anthropological apophaticism implied by it, are intimately intertwined with the dynamics of man's progress towards the likeness of God and with the achievement of the perfect image of God in man. The apophatic approach to the human being is required by the fact that the human being bears the imprint of his absolute otherness, bears a constant reference to the Incomprehensible, being the unimaginable image of the One who has no image, the "icon of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15).⁷²

The more the human being enhances its likeness to its prototype, the more its incomprehensibility reaches its genuine meaning and deepness. Therefore, Augustine often speaks about the renovation of the human being in order to reach the perfection of the image: the image needs to be formed again and renewed, because it became defaced and tarnished, having lost its righteousness and holiness by sinning (*De Trinitate* 14.16.22).⁷³ Further on, in *De Trinitate* 14.19.25, Augustine considers that man's perfect likeness to the Trinity will be achieved in eternal life, after the resurrection. This eschatological understanding of the likeness corresponds to a state of contemplation of God face to face:

But the image which is being renewed in the spirit of the mind in the recognition of God, not outwardly, but inwardly from day to day, this image will be perfected in the vision that will then be face to face after the judgement, while now it makes progress through a puzzling reflection in a mirror. It is with reference to this perfection that we shall understand the words, *We shall be like him because we shall see him as he is* (1 John 3:2). (*De Trinitate* 14.19.25, WSA I.5, 391).⁷⁴

Since the perfect likeness – and so deification – of the human is eschatologically achieved, after the resurrection, "deification is a concept that cannot be analysed according to its fulfilment".⁷⁵ So it opens the space of silence on what we cannot speak about.

The nearer man gets to his Creator, the more he borrows from His ineffable presence; the more man advances in the knowledge of God, the more he is shaped in the image of the Divine; the more resplendent

becomes the image of the divine in man, the more intimately he participates in the spiritual life that works the renewal and finally the deification of man. Augustine speaks of the accomplishment of the spiritual man, possessing full and unerring power of judgement:

So man 'is renewed in the knowledge of God after the image of Him who created Him' (*renouatus in agnitione Dei secundum imagine eius, qui creauit eum* – Col. 3:10). Being made spiritual, 'he judges all things' (that is, of course, things that need to be judged), 'but he himself is judged by no one.' (I Cor. 2:15), (*Conf.* 13.22.32, Chadwick, 292).

Consequently, as in the anthropological reflection of Gregory of Nyssa (*De hominis opificio*)⁷⁶ and Diadochus of Photike (*One Hundred Gnostic Chapters*),⁷⁷ according to Augustine, the mystery of the human being grows more intense as man progresses in the likeness with his divine Archetype.

IV. Final Remarks and Conclusions

In the light of this analysis, apophaticism for Augustine is not a mere exercise of negating predicates adopted in counterbalance to the cataphatic way of discourse, namely to the mode of affirmative predication of attributes. It represents rather a spiritual attitude, growing within the doxological approach of the divine mystery, which leads implicitly to an intensified awareness of the human mystery. One dimension of apophaticism lies in underlining the ineffability of the mystery, by denying that the language has any possibility to encompass the full and deep reality of the mystery. Even in the use of negation, superlative, paradox, or metaphor, there is a poignant awareness of the inadequacy of language to convey a literally undepictable hiddenness. Another dimension of apophaticism lies in the fundamental unknowability or incomprehensibility of the mystery – through concepts, categories, or images. However, in this framework of radical incomprehensibility is inscribed the possibility of a privileged access – granted in the opening of the spiritual senses, in a loving approach to the Unapproachable.

In consequence, I argue that it is possible to speak of elements or foundations of a negative anthropology in Augustine. It is not a systematic approach, but it infuses and irrigates his whole thought. Without having a definite distinction of *via negativa* and *via eminentiae* when speaking of

the mystery of the human being, Augustine lays the grounds for both of them in theoretical considerations, exegetical reflections and performative speech acts (confession, praise) embedded in his writings.

Human incomprehensibility is rooted *in* and depends *on* divine incomprehensibility in at least three possible ways: by derivation (the problematic of image and likeness),⁷⁸ by participation (divinisation), by transfiguration (in light, through burning, within love).

In comparison to divine apophaticism, the specificity of human apophaticism consists in several layers of unknowability, modelled on man's created being ascending to the Uncreated. The mystery of the human being remains in terms of enigma and *quaestio*. But it also remains in terms of hosting the most secret God, of ineffably bearing the reflection of the ineffable Light, of the overwhelming and unfathomable fullness of love. The unknowable self, as opaqueness to the bordered, impure, ignorant mind, meets the unknowable self, as an enigma impossible to be decrypted or deciphered exclusively within the self, without any reference to the other than the self. Deeper than these two dimensions of unknowability, the mystery of the human being grows in impenetrability because of the increasing resemblance to the incomprehensible God. By its endless dynamic, ineffability and unfathomable deepness, the relationship between man and God invites in itself an apophatic stance. Thus, the apophaticism triggered by this relationship contributes to the incomprehensibility of the human person, whose mystery is fully and most beautifully realized only in (and starting from) this relationship.

The labyrinth of inner obscurity, the gift of human inaccessibility, the unscrutability of human fragility, the ungrasped beauty growing secretly in the endless longing for the divine are various facets of man's hiddenness. The mystery of the human being is called to share in the incomprehensibility of the Selfsame, in *Idipsum*⁷⁹ – the mysterious name of *Deus secretissimus*.

Abbreviations

Conf. – *Confessiones*

De ciu. Dei – *De ciuitate Dei*

De diu. qu. – *De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*

De Gen. ad. litt. – *De Genesi ad litteram*

En. Ps. – *Enarrationes in Psalmos*

Io. Ep. tr. – *In Ioannis Epistolam ad Parthos tractatus*

Io. Eu. tr. – *In Ioannis Euangelium tractatus*

NOTES

- ¹ Charles Couturier, "La structure métaphysique de l'homme d'après saint Augustin", in *Augustinus Magister*, Communications I, Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 1954, pp. 543-550.
- ² Goulven Madec, *Lectures augustiniennes*, Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 2001, in particular: "La chaire chrétienne". Saint Augustin et la corporalité, pp. 258-270.
- ³ Isabelle Koch, "Y a-t-il une intériorité de l'intériorité chez Augustin?", in *Le moi et l'intériorité*, Gwenaëlle Aubry & Frédérique Idelfonse (eds.), Vrin, Paris, 2008.
- ⁴ The hypothesis of a possible synonymous use of the terms *cor* and *mens* is proposed by certain scholars such as: Isabelle Bochet, "Cœur", in *Encyclopédie Saint Augustin. La Méditerranée et l'Europe. IVe – XXIe siècle*, dir. Allan D. Fitzgerald, Marie-Anne Vannier, Cerf, Paris, 2005, pp. 277, 279-280; Goulven Madec, "Cor", in *Augustinus-Lexikon*, Cornelius Mayer (ed.), vol. II, Schwabe, Basel, 1996-2002, col. 2; *Lectures augustiniennes*, Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 2001, p. 136. For the integration of the duality *cor-mens* in the wider semantic sphere of *anima-animus-cor-mens*, see: Edgardo de la Peza, *El significado de "cor" en San Agustín*, Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 1962, p. 72.
- ⁵ Jean-Louis Chrétien, "Des membres du cœur aux organes de l'âme", in *Symbolique du corps. La tradition chrétienne du "Cantique des Cantiques"*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2005, pp. 17-20; Jean Pépin, "Augustin et Origène sur les *sensus interiores*", in *Sensus-Sensatio. VIII Colloquio Internationale, Roma, 6-8 gennaio 1995*, atti cura di M. L. Bianchi, Leo S. Olschki Editore, Firenze, 1996, pp. 11-23; M. -F. Berrouard, *Note complémentaire* 14. "Les sens du coeur", BA 72, pp. 736-738. And recently: Matthew R. Lootens, "Augustine", in *The Spiritual Senses. Perceiving God in Western Christianity*, Paul L. Gavrilyuk, Sarah Coakley (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 56-70. In particular, for sight: Margaret Miles, "Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint Augustine's *De Trinitate* and *Confessions*", in *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 63, nr. 2, 1983, pp. 125-142.
- ⁶ Gareth B. Matthews, "The Inner Man", in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1967, pp. 166-172; Bogdan Tătaru-Cazaban, "Devenirea omului interior", in *Iter Sapientiae. Studii patristice și medievale*, Bogdan et Miruna Tătaru-Cazaban, Galaxia Gutenberg, Târgu Lăpuș, 2003, pp. 61-170; Aimé Solignac, "Homme intérieur. Augustin", in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique. Doctrine et histoire*, Fascicules XLVI-XLVII, Beauchesne, Paris, 1969, col. 655-658.
- ⁷ Paul Agaësse, *L'anthropologie chrétienne selon Saint Augustin. Image, Liberté, Pêché et Grâce*, Médiasèvres, 2004.

- ⁸ Isabelle Bochet, *Saint Augustin et le désir de Dieu*, Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 1982.
- ⁹ Margaret R. Miles, *Desire and Delight. A New Reading of Augustine's Confessions*, Crossroad, New York, 1992. Isabelle Bochet, *Saint Augustin et le désir de Dieu*, pp. 322-334 ("La Délectation").
- ¹⁰ Hannah Arendt, *Le concept d'amour chez Augustin. Essai d'interprétation philosophique*, Payot & Rivages, Paris, 1999; John Burnaby, *Amor Dei. A Study of the Religion of Saint Augustine*, The Canterbury Press, Norwich, 1991; Lee C. Barrett, *Eros and Self-Emptying. The Intersections of Augustine and Kirkegaard*, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan/ Cambridge, UK, 2013. For the theme of the gift of the Holy Spirit, related to the quotations of Rom. 5:5 ("*quia caritas Dei difussa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sactum, qui datur est nobis*"), see: Anne-Marie la Bonnardière, "Le verset paulinien Rom. V, 5 dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin", in *Augustinus Magister. Communications II*, Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 1954, pp. 657-665.
- ¹¹ Gareth B. Matthews, *Thought's Ego in Augustine and Descartes*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London, 1992, pp. 29-38; John M. Rist, *Augustine. Ancient Thought Baptized*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 87-88 (identifies self-knowledge and *cogito*); Brian Stock, *Augustine the Reader. Meditation, Self-knowledge and the Ethics of Interpretation*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England, 1996, pp. 271-272 (treats self-knowledge only in relationship to the mind and roots the whole problematic in the notion of intentionality). For a reevaluation of the Augustinian *cogito*, see Jean-Luc Marion, *Au lieu de soi. L'approche de Saint Augustin*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2008, pp. 89-97.
- ¹² Goulven Madec, *Chez Augustin*, Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 1998, p. 64.
- ¹³ Jean-Louis Chrétien, *Saint Augustin et les actes de parole*, PUF, Paris, 2002 (chapitre XI. "Confesser", pp. 121-135).
- ¹⁴ Jean-Luc Marion, *Au lieu de soi. L'approche de Saint Augustin*, pp. 39-40.
- ¹⁵ Andrew Louth associates "the permanent place of wonder" with the "essentially irreducible character of mystery" (*Discerning the Mystery. An Essay on the Nature of Theology*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 144). He speaks of the "ultimate mystery of God" and of the mystery of the human being as made in the image and likeness of God, and presents the theological character of mystery as something which "challenges us", "questions us", "awakens a sense of wondering awe" (pp. 145-147).
- ¹⁶ I refer to the Latin text for expressing the wondering before the incomprehensible name and overwhelmingly ineffable presence of God: "Magnum ecce Est, magnum Est! Ad hoc homo quid est? Ad illud tam magnum Est, homo quid est, quidquid est? Quis apprehendat illud esse?

- quis eius particeps fiat? quis anhelet? quis aspiret? quis ibi se esse posse praesumat? Noli desperare, humana fragilitas. *Ego sum, inquit: Deus Abraham, et Deus Isaac, et Deus Iacob*. Audisti quid sim apud me, audi et quid sim propter te." (En. Ps. 101.2.10).
- 17 John Burnaby, *Amor Dei*, pp. 96-97.
- 18 Mary Noreen Rita Marrocco, *Participation in the Divine Life in St. Augustine's De Trinitate and Selected Contemporary Homiletic Discourses*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of St. Michael's College, Toronto, 2000.
- 19 Deirdre Carabine proposes an interpretation of the passage in the light of an understanding of God as "fullness of being" and "absolutely transcendent being", from which Augustine would have derived the unknowability of God. His interpretation is situated in the interplay of contradictions imposed by the ontological divide and is integrated in an exegesis of Augustine's negative theology exclusively, with little regard to the implications for Augustine's anthropology (*The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena*, Peeters/Eerdmans, Louvain, 1995, Chapter 9. "Saint Augustine. A Negative Theology?", pp. 266-7). For example: "the eternity and immutability of God cannot be known by a finite and mutable mind." (p. 267.)
- 20 The scholarly reflection on apophatic theology in Augustine has been encouraged by V. Lossky's identification of elements of negative theology in Augustine's writings: "Plus modeste, l'apophasie est cependant assez marquée chez Saint Augustin pour qu'on puisse parler au moins d'éléments de théologie négative dans sa pensée religieuse." (Vladimir Lossky, "Les éléments de théologie négative dans la pensée de saint Augustin", in *Augustinus Magister, Communications I*, Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 1954, p. 576).
- 21 The two terms are defined as synonymous in the very interesting conceptual analysis proposed by Silvia L.Y.N. Jonas in her thesis: *The metaphysics of ineffability*, B.Phil. Thesis in Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, 2010.
- 22 "ineffabilis est quaedam ... communio". For commentary, see Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 25.
- 23 "But now hold with unshakable faith that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are a trinity, and that there is, nonetheless, one God, not that the divinity is common to these as if it were a fourth, but that it is itself the ineffably inseparable Trinity" (WSA II.2, 136).
- 24 D. Carabine, *The Unknown God*, p. 264: "Even at the end of his great theological excursion into the ineffable realms of trinitarian exegesis, Augustine again admits the poverty of his thought and the attempt to express his thought."
- 25 For commentary, see also Lewis Ayres, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

- 26 For the difficulty of naming the nameless, see Jean-Luc Marion, *Au lieu de soi*, p. 389 sqq. ("Addition. *Idipsum* ou le nom de Dieu").
- 27 Book I of *De doctrina christiana* was written around 396, shortly after Augustine had become a bishop (Introduction, WSA I.11, p. 11). Commentary in William Franke (ed.), *On What Cannot be Said. Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Literature and the Arts*, vol. 1, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 2007, p. 153. See also: Deirdre Carabine, "Negative Theology in the Thought of Saint Augustine", *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, tome 59, 1992, p. 9.
- 28 See commentary of D. Carabine, *The Unknown God*, p. 269. In the denial of the applicability of Aristotelian categories, Augustine uses a kind of juxtaposition of negative and positive discourse, a dialectical method of thought which will become characteristic for later writers embracing negative theology, such as Eriugena.
- 29 This can be considered in the light of an aphaeretic approach to God, suggesting that it is better to approach the ineffable and incomprehensible God by knowing "what he is not" (*quid non sit*). Cf. *En. Ps.* 85.12 (*dicere, quid non sit*); *Io.Eu.tr.* 23.9-10 (*scire, quid non sit*). This mode of discourse specific to the negative theology can be named *via remotionis* (D. Carabine, *The Unknown God*, p. 268 ff.)
- 30 For a commentary on these passages of *Sermo* 117, with a personal translation, see Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, Duckworth, London, 1987, pp. 214-215. The passages were interpreted as part of a negative theology in V. Lossky's study: "c'est le terme de l'ignorance apophatique, la lumière de la vraie connaissance atteinte, sans être acquise, dans un contact passager du présent toujours fuyant de la pensée créée avec le Présent éternel de Dieu..." ("Les éléments de théologie négative dans la pensée de saint Augustin", p. 380). Commentaries to be found also in the collection of W. Franke, *On What cannot be said*, p. 152, and in Jean-Luc Marion, *Au lieu du soi*, p. 392.
- 31 The negative theology has to be counterbalanced and continued by a cultic use of discourse, it ends in and opens to praise: "And yet, while nothing really worthy of God can be said about him (*cum de illo nihil digne dici possit*), he has accepted the homage of human voices, and has wished us to rejoice in praising him with our words. That is fact is what is meant by calling Him God. Not, of course, that with the sound made by this one syllable any knowledge of him is achieved; but still, all those who know the English language are moved, when this sound reaches their ears, to reflecting upon some most exalted and immortal nature (*mouet ad cogitandam excellentissimam quamdam immortalemque naturam*)."

- and the end of the *Confessions* (1.1.1; 13.33.48). Cf. Jean-Luc Marion, *Au lieu de soi*, p. 392.
- 32 See the list of terms with negative prefix used by Augustine in relation to God (*incomprehensibilis, inexplicabilis, ineffabilis, impenetrabilis, invisibilis, incomprehensibilis*) in Paul van Geest, *The Incomprehensibility of God: Augustine as a Negative Theologian*, Peeters, Leuven, 2011, p. 8, footnote 19. This series can be compared to the list of similar terms proposed by the Greek tradition of apophatic theology: see Ysabel de Andia, "Négative (Théologie)", in *Dictionnaire critique de théologie*, Jean-Yves Lacoste (dir.), Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1998, pp. 791-795; and the first chapter "A brief Survey of Negative Theology in the Hellenistic and Patristic Periods" of Gregory P. Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God. Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Anthropology*, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2004, pp. 3-26.
- 33 Vladimir Lossky considers that this phrasing "oblige la pensée de rejeter tout ce qu'il n'est pas." ("Les éléments de théologie négative dans la pensée de saint Augustin", p. 578). For a development of Augustine's anthropology starting from this particular phrase see Charles T. Mathewes, "Augustinian Anthropology: *Interior intimo meo*", in *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1999, pp. 195-221.
- 34 Jean-Luc Marion, *Au lieu de soi*, pp. 389-414, especially 395-396; Paul Van Geest, *The Incomprehensibility of God*, p. 83.
- 35 For the negative anthropology being intimately related and founded by negative theology, see Willemien Otten, "In The Shadow Of The Divine: Negative Theology And Negative Anthropology in Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius and Eriugena", *Heythrop Journal*, Vol. 40, Issue 4, 1999, pp. 438-456.
- 36 See, for example, Edgardo de la Peza, *El significado de "cor" en San Agustín*, Études Augustiniennes, Paris, 1962; Anton Maxsein, *Philosophia cordis. Das Wesen der Personalität bei Augustinus*, Otto Müller Verlag, Salzburg, 1966; Eric Dubreucq, *Le cœur et l'écriture chez Saint Augustin. Enquête sur le rapport à soi dans les Confessions*, Septentrion Presses Universitaires, Paris, 2003; Isabelle Bochet, "Cœur", in *Encyclopédie Saint Augustin. La Méditerranée et l'Europe. IVe – XXIe siècle*, dir. Allan D. Fitzgerald, Marie-Anne Vannier, Cerf, Paris, 2005, pp. 279-280; Goulven Madec, "Cor", in *Augustinus-Lexikon*, Cornelius Mayer (ed.), vol. II, Schwabe, Basel, col. 1-6; Daniel Austin Napier, *En Route to the Confessions: the Roots and Development of Augustine's Philosophical Anthropology*, Peeters, Leuven, 2013, pp. 71-114.
- 37 Jean-Luc Marion transforms this unknowability in the *privilege* of the human being: "*Mihi magna quaestio factus sum: The Privilege of Unknowing*", in *The Journal of Religion*, Vol. 85, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-24.

- 38 On the abyssal dimensions of the interiority or of the heart see: Carol Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, pp. 173-175; Anton Maxsein, *op. cit.*, "Cor als Organ der menschlichen Verhülltheit und Verborgenheit", p. 152 sqq.
- 39 For the bridal imagery, see also: Isabelle Bochet, *Saint Augustin et le désir de Dieu*, pp. 383-387.
- 40 We may discuss the sense of the preposition preceding the word *cor*, which gives a hint about whose heart the Psalm speaks. "the Vulgate here has: 'to a deep heart'. The Hebrew is corrupt and unintelligible, but it seems likely that the original reference was to the heart of the schemers. However, the Septuagint and Augustine's Latin version had 'and a deep heart', which he interprets as a reference to Christ's hidden divinity." (WSA III.17, p. 255, footnote 19).
- 41 "So he approached, a man indeed, though deep of heart. Contemplate his humanity in that deep heart; and in the same heart also discern, if you can, to the utmost that you can, God himself (*Intuere hominem in corde alto: uide quantum potes, si potes, et Deum in corde alto*). He approached as a man, but he was also God. He was about to suffer because he willed it, and he was to give an example to the weak (*quia exemplum praebiturus infirmis*)." (*En. Ps.* 63.14, WSA III.17, p. 256).
- 42 The human being is considered in earlier works after the image of the Son (393-4), later as the image of the Trinity (426-27). This change is obvious in *De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus* 16, between paragraphs 57-60 and paragraphs 61-62. See Isabelle Bochet, "Le statut de l'image dans la pensée augustinienne", *Archives de philosophie*, tome 72, 2/2009, pp. 259-260 (especially footnote 55, p. 260).
- 43 For the meanings and relationships between *exemplum*, *sacramentum* and *mysterium* in Augustine, see: B. Studer, "'Sacramentum et exemplum' chez Saint Augustine", in *Studia Patristica* 16, 1985, pp. 570-588; C. Coutourier, "'Sacramentum' et 'mysterium' dans l'oeuvre de Saint Augustin", in *Études Augustiniennes*, Aubier, Paris, 1953, pp. 161-332. Cf. also Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity*, p. 168: starting from *De trinitate* 4.3.5, Christ's work is presented as an *exemplum* for the "outer man", and simultaneously as a *sacramentum* for the "inner man".
- 44 Other two associations between *cor* and *cubiculum* occur in the same *En. Ps.* 35.5 (WSA III.16, 74-75).
- 45 *Conf.* 4.12.19; 13.13.14; *Io. Eu. tr.* 8.4; *En. Ps.* 44.25; *Sermo* 184.2.
- 46 See, for example, *En. Ps.* 141.3 or *Io. Eu. Tr.* 10.1.
- 47 "quid enim miserius misero non miserante se ipsum et flente Didonis mortem, quae fiebat amando Aenean, non flente autem mortem suam, quae fiebat non amando te, Deus, lumen cordis mei et panis oris intus animae meae et uirtus maritans mentem meam et sinum cogitationis meae?" – "What is more pitiable than a wretch without pity for himself who weeps over the death of

- Dido dying for love for Aeneas, but not weeping over himself dying for his lack of love for you, my God, light of my heart, bread of the inner mouth of my soul, the power which begets life in my mind and in the innermost recesses of my thinking." (Chadwick, 15-16).
- 48 For alternative translation and commentary see O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind*, p. 212. The vision vocabulary (the eye of the mind) is interwoven with metaphors of nourishment, suggesting the restoration of the full capacity of spiritual perception.
- 49 "When we keep our hearts lifted high, our very hearts are lamps; they shine in heaven and are not quenched by the darkness below them." (*En. Ps.* 93.6, WSA III.18, 379-380) And also: "Let our hearts be in the book, then, for if our hearts are in God's book, they are in the firmament of heaven. If your heart is there, let it shine from there, and then it will not be shaken by iniquities below it." (*En. Ps.* 93.6, WSA III.18, 380).
- 50 "...for this was another way of showing what it means to have our heart enlarged, to have God poured into our hearts already: it means that we can converse inwardly with him. This is quite reasonably understood to refer to a person who believes in Christ and has been enlightened." (*En. Ps.* 4,2, WSA III.15, 86).
- 51 On progressing in the discovery of the incomprehensible, on the endless process of searching-finding God, see Isabelle Bochet, *Saint Augustin et le désir de Dieu*, pp. 171-174.
- 52 "To whom does our heart say, *I have sought your face*? Only to him who offers himself to the eyes of the heart. One kind of light is what the eyes of your flesh seek, the other is sought by the eyes of the heart. But you want to behold the light which is seen by the eyes of the heart, because God is that light itself. God is light, says John, and in him there is no darkness at all (1 Jon 1:5). Do you aspire to see that light? Make your eye clean, so that you can see it, because *blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.* (*Mt 5:8*)" (*En. Ps.* 26 (2).15, WSA III.15, 283-4).
- 53 D. Carabine, *The Unknown God*, pp. 272-276.
- 54 *Conf.* 1.1.1: the motif of the *inquietum cor*. For interpretation, see L. C. Barrett, *Eros and Self-Emptying*, p. 68; Juhn Burnaby, *Amor Dei*, p. 98.
- 55 "For, if *God is charity*, God neither progresses nor regresses." (*Io. Ep. Tr.* 9. 2, WSA III.14, 132).
- 56 See also Jean-Luc Marion, "Resting, moving, loving: The Access to the Self according to Saint Augustine", *The Journal of Religion*, Vol. 91, No. 1, 2011, pp. 32-34.
- 57 "But God himself is this charity, for Scripture says unambiguously, *God is charity* (1 John 4: 8). Any person who is full of charity is therefore full of God, and when many persons are full of charity, they make a city for God." (*En. Ps.* 98.4, WSA III.18, 470).

- 58 “Therefore, the love by which God loves is incomprehensible and
unchangeable. For he did not begin to love us from the time when we were
reconciled to him through the blood of his Son; but before the foundation
of the world he loved us, that we, too, might be his sons together with his
Only-Begotten, before we were anything at all.” (*Io. Eu. Tr.* 110.6; FC 90,
296).
- 59 Augustine quotes, as referring to Christ: *Splendid in form beyond all sons
of men, grace is poured forth on your lips* (Ps 45:2) in *Io. Ep. Tr.* 9.9.
- 60 See *Conf.* 3.4.8, *Conf.* 4.7.12, *Conf.* 4.12.19, *Conf.* 11.29.39, *Conf.* 12.18.27,
Sermo 361.2.
- 61 The self appears as “magna quaestio” (*Conf.* 4.4.9) or as “quaestio” (*Conf.*
10.33.50). Alternatively, see the puzzle of the memory, identified with the
mind and the self (*Conf.* 10.17.26).
- 62 For the *aporia* of the uncontained self, in its first presentation, see: *Conf.*
10.8.15.
- 63 For the ancient sources, but also for the originality of Augustine’s
development on love in terms of weight (*pondus*), see Jean-Luc Marion,
“Resting, moving, loving”, pp. 34-39.
- 64 David Vincent Meconi, *The One Christ: St Augustine’s Theology of
Deification*, Catholic University of America Press, 2013, p. 236.
- 65 “Moreover he who justifies is the same as he who deifies, because by
justifying us he made us sons and daughters of God: he gave them power
to become children of God (John 1:12).” (*En. Ps.* 49.2, WSA III.16, 381).
And: “The true God makes gods of those who believe in Him, for he has
given them power to become children of God.” (*En. Ps.* 94.6, WSA III.18,
415).
- 66 Similar phrasing is found in *En. Ps.* 66, 9: “Fecit eum participem prius
mortalitatem nostrae, ut crederemus nos esse posse participes diuinitatis
eius.” See Isabelle Bochet, *Saint Augustin et le désir de Dieu*, p. 386.
- 67 “Deification is therefore by consequence of humanity being assumed by
God in the Incarnation.” (Gerald Bonner, “Deificare”, in *Augustinus-Lexikon*,
Cornelius Mayer (ed.), Schwabe and Co, Basel, 1996, vol. II, col. 265).
- 68 “The only-begotten Son is like him by being born of him; we become like
him by seeing him.” (*En. Ps.* 49.2, WSA III.16, p. 381)
- 69 Gerald Bonner, *art. cit.*, col. 266.
- 70 Paul McPartlan, “Sainteté” (c. “Déification”), in *Dictionnaire critique de
théologie*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1998, p. 1046.
- 71 *Idem.*
- 72 See Jean-Luc Marion, “Resting, moving, loving”, p. 31: “Man remains
unimaginable, since formed in the image of He who admits none,
incomprehensible because formed in the resemblance of He who admits
no comprehension.”

- 73 "And thus the image begins to be reformed by him who formed it in the first place. It cannot reform itself in the way it was able to deform itself. As he says elsewhere, *Be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and put on the new man who was created according to God in justice and the holiness of truth* (Eph 4:23). 'Created according to God' means the same as 'to the image of God' in another text. But by sinning man lost justice and the holiness of truth, and thus the image became deformed and discoloured; he gets those qualities back again when it is reformed and renovated." (WSA III.5, 388).
- 74 Other passages from *De Trinitate* convey mainly the same idea, mentioning the transformation of the image brought by the vision of God, which makes the human be like God (see *De Trinitate* 15.11.20; 15.11.21).
- 75 Jonathan D. Teubner, "Review: *The One Christ: St Augustine's Theology of Deification*, David Vincent Meconi", in *Reviews in Religion & Theology*, Volume 21, Issue 2, 2014, p. 245.
- 76 *On the Making of Man* 11.3-4, *Patrologia Graeca* 44: 156b, *apud* Jean-Luc Marion, "Resting, moving, loving", p. 31. In Gregory of Nyssa, *Dogmatic treatises, etc.*, trans. William Moore and Henry Austin Wilson (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 5), Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1965, pp. 396-97.
- 77 Diadoque de Photicé, *Cent chapitres gnostiques*, in *Oeuvres spirituelles*, Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes de Édouard des Places, Sources Chrétiennes nr. 5 bis, Cerf, Paris, 1955, ch. 89, pp. 149-150.
- 78 Jean-Luc Marion, "Resting, Moving, loving", p. 31; "The Privilege of Unknowing", p. 17.
- 79 For an interpretation of *Idipsum* as name of the nameless God, in the framework of Augustine's negative theology, see: Jean-Luc Marion, "*Idipsum*: The Name of God according to Augustine", in *Orthodox Readings of Augustine*, ed. by Aristotle Papanikolaou and George E. Demacopoulos, St. Vladimir's Seminar Press, Crestwood, New York, 2008, pp. 167-190. For the question of human sharing in the *Idipsum*, see *En. Ps.* 4.9, where the incorruptible and immortal condition is an expression of the human indwelling or resting in the *Idipsum*, or *En. Ps.* 121.5, where sharing in the *Idipsum* is possible through being rooted in the heavenly Jerusalem. For the association of *Idipsum* with Christ and the mystery of Incarnation, see Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity*, p. 205. For the interpretation of three mystical experiences related to the *Idipsum* and presented in *Conf.* 7.10.16, 9.4.11, 9.10.23-26, see Takeshi Kato, "*Idipsum* in Augustine's *Confessions*", in *Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church*, vol. 2, edited by Pauline Allen, Wendy Mayer and Lawrence Cross, Australian Catholic University, Queensland, 1999, pp. 217-225.

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
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THE WINE-TAX REGULATIONS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE IN WALLACHIA, 1740-1831

Abstract: Focusing on the regulations of the wine-tax, my article engages the role of such documents in the transformation of the state in Wallachia from 1740 to 1831 in a context determined to a large extent by the Ottoman fiscal pressure. By analyzing the form, content, and employment of the regulations, I claim that the princely power expanded its area of routine intervention in society. At the same time the regulations, while sanctioning the extant social hierarchy, subjected it to the “law” and produced the notion of a homogenous state territory, divided in counties. The main argument is that the fiscal regulations accelerated the transition from the judicial principedom, mainly arbitrating disputes among his subjects, to a more interventionist administrative principedom.

Keywords: fiscal regulations, privilege, wine-tax, principedom, state, territorialization, Wallachia, Ottoman Empire, taxation, representation of society, representation of the territory, administration.

My article stems from a concern with the modalities of rule in Wallachia before the Western-style modernization marked by the adoption in 1831 of the Organic Regulation, the first constitution of Wallachia. Among the new modalities of rule which appeared in the 1740s, were the regulations, princely ordinances which regulated various aspects of the subjects' lives from taxes to the purchasing of medicine and ammunition, the closing hours of the taverns and other aspects. Here I will focus only on one fiscal regulation, the regulations of the wine-tax (*ponturile vinăriciului*), to illustrate how they altered the exercise of rule.

This type of administrative-legal document issued by the princely chancellery was a novelty at the time and it escaped the attention of

historians; first of all by the simple fact of addressing the entire population of the country at one time and then by the detailed description of the fiscal process and obligations. My article engages the role of such written regulations in the transformation of the state in Wallachia from 1740 to 1831. By analyzing the form, content, and employment of the regulations, I cast light on how political power was represented in relation to the land over which was exercised and to the inhabitants of that land. In main it argues that fiscal regulations represent new practices of governance that illustrate and in the same time contribute to the emergence of a new form of state in Wallachia in the period under discussion.

My discussion of the new form of state is premised on a double understanding of the state. On the one hand it refers to an organization which interferes in the subjects' lives in order to extract resources and control their actions. In this sense the state occupies a central place and attempts to reach out in the territory it claims to control; in the words of Michael Mann it exerts "infrastructural power".¹ On the other hand I see the state as inhabiting the social and the material world which it rules. In the latter sense, and related to my concerns here, the state is an idea that exists in the social divisions it produces through its policies or in the notion of territory and territorial divisions it creates; the notion of state as an impersonal and objective entity is also produced through the depersonalizing effects of the written norms.²

The perspective I propose here offers a corrective to the Romanian literature on the so-called Phanariot regime (1716-1821). The 18th century was commonly thought of as a debacle in Romanian history; this was mostly due to the Phanariots, the Greek or Hellenized elites from Constantinople to which the Sublime Porte had entrusted the governorship of Wallachia and Moldavia between 1716/1711 and 1821.³ The next decade (1821-1831) was too short to acquire a more positive evaluation, except the fact that 'indigenous princes' that is, recruited from local boyars were reinstated.⁴ This extremely negative image was forged in the 19th century, the period when nationalism was used as political ideology by the Romanian elites. Several features were ascribed to the Phanariot regime: despotism (this being obviously just an extension of the European view of the Ottoman Empire as despotic); rule of foreigners (Greeks); fiscal extortion; administrative corruption; and in the most ideological statements all these led to moral corruption of the Romanian nation, obstructing its modernization.⁵

Already at the end of the 19th century Nicolae Iorga has questioned the identification of the Phanariots with foreigners; he showed that in fact the Phanariot families mixed with the Wallachian (and Moldavian) boyar families blurring the dividing lines between locals and foreigners.⁶ Other objections to the negative image followed suit but were rather unsuccessful in changing the perception of the Phanariot period.⁷ Regardless of the adopted perspective on the Phanariot rule, an aspect of the period which was never reconsidered is the rulership, the way rule was exercised in Wallachia. Especially in the “accusatory” view of the Phanariot regime, the institutions of rule were simply seen as the site of corruption, abuse and excessive fiscal extraction. Alternatively they were regarded as examples of failed reforms inspired by the contemporary enlightened absolutism. Such a judgment precluded the analysis of important transformations in the modalities of power. This study aims at redressing this omission.

The remaining part of this paper is organized in three sections. First I will discuss in brief the relationship between Wallachia and the Ottoman Empire and assess the impact of the latter on the socio-economic transformations in Wallachia; this wider contextualization is premised on the assumption that the transformations taking place in the Ottoman Empire must be taken into consideration in order to better understand the transformations taking place in the principality situated north of the Danube. Next, I will trace the history of the wine-tax regulations from 1740 to 1831, point out their main features and discuss their employment in administration. Throughout the latter part and especially in the concluding section I will reflect upon the impact of these regulations on the exercise of rule and on the redefinition of the relationship between principedom and subjects.

The Ottoman Context

In order to better understand the transformation of the Wallachian state in this period it is important to relate it to the wider Ottoman context of which Wallachia was part as a tributary principality.⁸ Studies from the last two decades emphasize that from the late 16th century to the early 19th century the Ottoman Empire underwent deep socio-economic transformations and not just a decline of the classical institutions. The phenomenon is too complex even to be summarized here. What matters is that the central aspect of these transformations was the growing need

of coin and the consequent fiscal pressure determined by the growing costs of the war.⁹ So, in this period the Ottoman Empire experienced two contradictory trends: one was of increasing levels of taxation; the other was the stagnation or only marginal growth of the incomes entering the treasury coffers. This was due to a large extent to the increasing role of the intermediaries in the fiscal process and the large share they managed to retain from the total gross revenue.¹⁰ Normally, the latter trend only aggravated the former. The fiscal pressure rose especially during periods of war and they triggered fiscal reforms as those from the end of the 17th century, resulting in increased revenues during the first half of the 18th century.¹¹ It is in this context that the local notables acquired more power and were given more responsibilities – even to maintain order and to recruit armed forces.¹²

Besides taxation, one method the central power used to collect more cash from provinces was to pit the groups contending for governorships one against the other and hence to increase the prices of the appointments. Suraiya Faroqhi wrote with regard to the Anatolian provincial governors:

‘these dignitaries, who often paid substantial sums to the central treasury in order to secure appointment, and remained in any given post for only short periods of time, came to compete for taxes on crops which could be harvested only once a year.’¹³

The same mechanism can be identified in the Romanian principalities in the 18th century, although it started earlier.

Wallachia was tied to the Ottoman Empire through social networks stretching south and north of Danube of which the Phanariots were important members; also, the connection was solidified by the economic exchanges, the majority of Wallachian exports being sold in the Ottoman territories.¹⁴ But maybe the most visible sign of integration was the tribute and other payments related to acquiring and keeping the princely governorship. These extra-economic payments started to increase substantially in the 16th century reaching a peak in the last years of those centuries and provoking a massive uprising under the command of Prince Michael the Brave; the uprising determined a sudden drop in the amount of the direct payments toward the Sublime Porte. During the 17th century the tribute increased again at a slower pace; after 1700 the pace accelerated and between 1730 and 1768 the payments reached a new historical maximum and slowly decreased afterwards.¹⁵ All in all,

the payments towards the Ottoman Empire were very high during the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th.

The long term consequence of this Ottoman fiscal pressure was the dissolution of the communal villages that is, communities where land was held in common, in a process that lasted from the 16th to the 19th century.¹⁶ But there was also a short term consequence in the increased fiscal exploitation of the Wallachian tax payers; the situation became acute in times of war when the desertion of the villages made both the seigniorial and the fiscal extraction of the principedom unsustainable. Therefore, if we zoom out the picture, we can notice that neither the fiscal pressure nor the attempts to curb its effects were peculiar to the tributary principalities; far from being just an external intervention, the two phenomena were actually present in the areas under direct Ottoman administration.

The Phanariot princes' "reforms" represented a provincial response to a wider Ottoman phenomenon; they were part of process whereby local and regional leaders accumulated more responsibilities and introduced various measures to prop up the empire but also to increase their power. This reverberation of empire-wide phenomena articulated with the need of the Wallachian landlord class to strengthen its grip on a more and more volatile dependant peasantry fleeing war destructions and fiscal and seigniorial exploitation. Thus, the fiscal regulations which I will be discussing below were part of a comprehensive attempt to overhaul the Wallachian institutions by the prince Constantin Mavrocordat. They were complemented by other measures: agrarian regulations, administrative and judicial reorganization etc. This attempt – called "reforms" in the Romanian historiography – was meant to stabilize the taxable basis of the country, to increase the fiscal output and to make seigniorial exploitation sustainable. However, the most visible effect was to alter the relationship between the principedom and the subjects, as I will show below.

The Regulations of the Wine-tax to 1831

What I call regulations were normative texts, issued by the princely chancellery or treasury, which established the rules for various activities and institutions. Although issued in the name of the prince, as if they were the product of his will, in reality the text of many regulations was actually drafted by members of the princely council (*divan*) and only sanctioned by the prince; the regulations were also issued in the name of the Divan

or the deputy boyars (*caimacamii*) when the Wallachian throne was vacant or, in times of war, in the name of a foreign general commanding the occupation army.

The regulations were preserved in archives (I include here also the manuscript section of the Library of the Romanian Academy), either individually or collated in registers (be they the registers of the princely institutions like the chancellery or the treasury or private registers). In some cases the text of the regulations was preserved only in the form of authorization letters handed to tax-collectors whereby the latter were entitled to carry out their job contained the paragraphs (*ponturi*) of the respective tax. A considerable number of the regulations which I will cite were published in source volumes.

The regulations from the 18th and early 19th century can be classified in several categories. The agrarian regulations concerned the relations between the dependant peasants and landlords (boyars, monasteries, bishoprics, members of the princely families). It was for the first time that the central power intervened in these relations; until then, they were a local and private affair, established by an oral or written agreement. The administrative regulations dealt with the administrative offices either the newly established or old ones which were reformed now and had their responsibilities and jurisdictions more clearly stipulated. Police ordinances usually comprised the rules and procedures regarding the capturing of bandits, their investigations and punishment. The church regulations regarded the recruitment of priests, the keeping of holidays, the situation of other religions, the moving of cemeteries outside towns etc. Public order regulations which regarded an array of activities: the purchase of medicines; the purchase of ammunition; anti-fire measures (each inhabitant to keep a barrel full of water ready for case of fire), the speed of coaches in Bucharest, beggary; the functioning of taverns (closing hours, personnel), construction rules (the distance between houses, interdiction to build in such a way as to obstruct public spaces); quarantine and anti-plague measures; registration of the clients of inns etc.

Finally, there were the fiscal regulations, for the important taxes collected by the Wallachian principedom: poll tax (*bir*), wine-tax (*vinărici*), sheep-tax (*oierit*), pigs and honey tax (*dijmărit*), tobacco tax (*tutunărit*). They were issued in the form of princely ordinances, addressed to all the inhabitants of the country and established the amounts of taxes, the exemption from taxes of some people (partial or complete), the modalities of assessment and collection and other rules to be attended during the fiscal

process (the behavior of the collectors, methods to prevent tax-evasion, punishments and penalties etc.).

These regulations were enacted from 1740 on, the period corresponding to the “reforms” of Constantin Mavrocordat. So, around the middle of the 18th century the Wallachian principedom started to regulate by written ordinances activities and institutions which were hitherto beyond its concerns. This was an attempt to extend the infrastructural reach of the principedom that is, a growth in the capacity to act at a distance. But it was equally an attempt to fashion the society and the territory in order to facilitate their administration.

In spite of their importance for the Romanian administrative and legal history, the regulations did not attract much attention in the Romanian historiography as a topic in itself. They were mainly used as sources for various histories: agrarian, fiscal, economic, urban, administrative, legal (in the sense of judicial organization). The legal historiography in Romania focused on the customary right – which it tried to identify in various practices and institutions – or on well known collections of laws such as: “The Law [Published at] Govora” (*Pravila de la Govora*, 1640, the translation of a Slavic translation of a Byzantin collection of laws, mostly church law, but also secular); “The Amendment of the Law” (*Îndreptarea legii*, 1652, canonic and secular law, mostly criminal but also civil); “The Legal Register” (*Pravilniceasca condică*, 1780, civil law; agrarian regulation); “The Law of Caragea” (*Legiuirea lui Caragea* (1818, civil law); “The Organic Regulation” (*Regulamentul Organic*, 1831, the first constitution). The 17th century collections were never actually used on a regular basis in the administration of justice.¹⁷ “The Legal Register” from 1780 is the first legal case published in Wallachia to be frequently used in administration and justice. But along with it, and this passed unnoticed, the regulations enacted in the last decades of the 18th century came to be regularly invoked in administrative and judicial decision. Hence, their neglect in the Romanian historiography and their importance in the administration of Wallachia constitute the double motivation of my interest in them.

In order to discuss the importance of this new instrument of princely rule I will focus here on one of the fiscal regulations, namely the regulations of the wine-tax (*vinărici*). Historians concentrated mainly on the “hard” part of taxation during the so-called Phanariot period: the amount of taxes, the variations and effects of taxation of the living conditions of the taxpayers.¹⁸ In distinction to them, I will focus on the second part of the

location (regulation); more precisely I will discuss the impact of the fiscal regulations upon the modalities of rule.

To illustrate the transformation in the modalities of rule I will resort to a comparison between the regulations after 1740 and the letters of authorization for the collection of the wine-tax (*vinărici*) around 1700, during the time of Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu (1688-1714). The letters were transcribed in a register kept at the treasury – *Anatefter* – and listed the quantum of the tax, the categories subject to taxation and other details regarding the collection of the tax. Below I present a summary of four such letters:

1698: "Letter [of authorization for the collection] of the wine-tax on the hill of Târgoviște" (*Carte de vinăriciul dealului Tîrgoviștii, Sept<embrie> 1, anul 7207 [1698]*). The tax was to be collected from all those who had vineyards in the respective hill: "boyars, princely servants, merchants, common taxpayers, men of every status". The collectors were entitled to take 1 out of 10 buckets "according to the custom" (but the cash equivalent of the bucket was not specified) and a fixed fee (*poclonul*) paid individually, of 33 *bani*. So, in this region every owner of vineyard paid the same ratio and the same fee.¹⁹

1698: "Letter [of authorization for the collection] of the wine-tax on the hill of Pitești" (*Cartea vinăriciului dealului Piteștilor, Sept<embrie>, 26 zile, anul 7207[1698]*). The common taxpayers (*birnici*) had to pay 40 *bani* per bucket and 30 *bani* fixed fee per capita; the princely servants were also obliged to 40 *bani* per bucket but only 15 *bani* as fixed fee; the priests and the deacons had to pay 22 *bani* per bucket and the fixed fee of 12 *bani*. The letter mentions that "this settlement is also written in the charter that I gave to the inhabitants of the hill of Pitești".²⁰

1700 or 1701 – the letter for the hill of Târgoviște reveals different amounts of tax and different fiscal categories than in 1698. The tax was to be collected from everybody "boyar, princely servant, merchant, captain or common tax-payer" except from "the vineyards of the boyars to whom the princes had donated lands with princely charter". The common taxpayers and the princely servants had to pay 33 *bani* per bucket; the fixed fee consisted of 30 *bani* for the first category and 12 for the second. The priests and deacons were supposed to pay 20 *bani* per bucket and a *poclon* of 12 *bani*.²¹

1709 – the letter for the hill around Bucharest stipulates that the tax was to be collected from everybody, regardless of social status. Everybody had to pay 30 *bani* per bucket; the *poclon* was differentiated: the priests

and the deacons had to pay 12 *bani*, the princely servants 15 and the common taxpayers 30. Besides, everybody had to pay an additional tax (*părpărul*), 12 *bani* per barrel and 6 for a smaller barrel.²²

This is indeed very fragmentary evidence. However, it does indicate a striking feature of the assessment and collection of the wine-tax around 1700 pertaining to the political geography they describe: these letters of authorization are addressed to very small areas of vine cultivation, "the hills", and not to administrative units (counties, districts, or towns). So, they describe a particular or separate relation between the principedom and various spots from the land it ruled, but not a relation to a homogenous territory. This observation is further supported by the fact that technicalities of the wine-tax were different in all these areas: the quantum of taxes, the categories subject to taxation, and the variations in the quantum of the tax according to category. In one case, Pitești, there is a charter given to the tax-payers which stipulated their fiscal obligations.

Anticipating, I have to add that the text of these letters is shorter than in the case of the similar letters issued later in the 18th century because they contained fewer stipulations. Moreover, it is a one paragraph text without any internal division in paragraphs. Understandably, the adjudications of litigations related to the wine-tax were done on the basis of the charters with which each community for individual was endowed and not with a regulation applicable to the entire country. For example, in 1713 the prince ordered the wine-tax collectors to respect the grants he had made to two monasteries from the wine-tax "according to their charters and custom" (*precum le scrie hrisoavele si le iaste obiceaiul*) and not according to some countrywide regulations which did not exist.²³ So, the tax-agents had to attend to these private charters, not to some country wide regulation.

The format of such letters of authorization changed significantly after 1740 because they came to comprise the regulation of the wine-tax issued annually by the princely treasury. The text of one of the first such regulations was reproduced in a letter of authorization given to the wine-tax collectors (*vinăriceri*) by Constantin Mavrocordat on August 29, 1746. The letter (and the regulation) stipulated the method of assessment (one bucket from ten, so 10% of the wine production) and the amounts to be paid: 4 *bani* per "princely bucket"²⁴ and a fix fee (*poclonul*) 1 *ban* per bucket by those that had between 10 and 120 buckets and 1 taller per head by those who have more than 120 buckets. The letter also listed the exempted categories (the great boyars, the boyars with or without office, the great monasteries and their daughter monasteries (*metohuri*),

the boyars' widows, the lesser boyars without office, merchants and the clerks of the divan); the penalties for tax-evasion and for complicity to tax-evasion are specified; the fines for those tax-collectors who would demand sustenance without payment or would exact over the amount that "is specified in this letter of my Princeship" (*din cât scrie într-această carte a domnii mele*).²⁵

This type of document issued by the princely chancellery was a novelty at the time, first of all by the simple fact of addressing the entire population of the country at one time and then by the detailed description of the fiscal process and obligations. Unfortunately no wine-tax regulation was preserved in the following four decades. But, the ones from the last two decades of the 18th century reveal further change in format and content. In 1783 the regulation of the wine-tax administration becomes much more complex and the format of the documents undergoes a sensible change. First of all, the text is entitled "The Regulations of the wine-tax on the year 1783, [showing] the way the wine-tax collectors are to act for the administration of this job" (*Ponturile pentru slujba vinăriciului pe anul acesta let. 1783, în ce chip să urmeze boierii vinăriceri la căutatul acestei slujbe, cum arata*).²⁶

The text was organized in ten numbered paragraphs called *ponturi*. The first lists the categories which are exempt from this tax. The second mentions the deductions of various grants (mile) from the collected money destined to social support institutions. The third and tenth points warn against tax-evasion. The forth and the fifth are the largest paragraphs and tackle the most sensitive issue: the assessment and collection of the tax; the forth exposes a very complicated method of registration in writing and issuing of testimonials to the tax-payer to attest the amount of wine that is subject to taxation and the amount of cash paid; the method is destined to prevent both tax-evasion and fraud by collectors and to facilitate later controls from the center; it is also stipulated that the vessels of wine are to be measured with the princely ell handed to the tax collectors from the treasury; the fifth point deals with the grants of half of *vinărici* to monasteries: it forbids farming out of such grants by the abbots and stipulates the right of man of the monastery to take part in the operations of measurement and taxation; attention is given to forms of written controls in this case too. The sixth point specifies the right of the boyar who farmed the wine-tax to judge small cases, but also the supervision by the *ispavnic* in case of abuses.²⁷ The other points regulate the fees paid by butchers

as part of the wine-tax and the behavior of the agents – ordering them to pay for their food and the fodder for the horses.

What are the differences in comparison with the rules included in the letters of authorization issued around 1700? tome

1. In terms of size, the text is much larger than the small letters of authorization from around 1700 and even from the letter of authorization from 1746. The detail in which the actual operation of measurement and registration of barrels with wine is prescribed is significant – but consonant with other regulations, especially fiscal ones.

2. The text was organized in paragraphs (*ponturi*), each of them tackling a specific problem related to the administration of the wine-tax; that is, from a simple letter of authorization, it became a statute. This aspect was important for it allowed the regulation to be subsequently used like a legal text.

3. Another significant aspect – already encountered in 1746 – is that there is no specification of a certain area where the regulation is valid, obviously because it had country-wide application. Besides it is addressed to all the inhabitants of the country which paid taxes or were tax-exempt (the Roma slaves were not mentioned perhaps because they did not possess juridical person).

Let me elaborate these three changes on the format of the regulations. Such regulations were issued annually and until the end of the period under research here, when the *vinărici* (and other medieval taxes) were abolished as part of a move to simplify taxation.²⁸ In main they remained the same, but in time the details of the fiscal process became more numerous and the amount of the tax tended to increase. Leaving aside the variations in the amount of the tax,²⁹ the procedure of tax-collection and the measures to prevent fraud and abuses are more carefully listed.

It was thought that frauds and abuses could be curtailed by the publicity of the regulations so that both fiscal agents and tax-payers would be well acquainted with their duties and rights. For instance, in 1801 the regulation of the wine-tax – transcribed in the county-register of the Vlașca county – stipulated that the tax-farmer had to read the content of the regulation “also to the those that you hired in the districts of the county for the collection of the tax”.³⁰ The obligation is repeated in the regulation of the wine-tax from July 13, 1803.³¹ A few days later, the regulation of the exceptional wine-tax collected from the “privileged” (*privilegheați*) issued on August 25 1803, and containing 11 paragraphs, required that the text be read “throughout all the hills and all the villages”.³²

Perhaps because of the rampant irregularities in the assessment and collection of the wine-tax, the central authorities try to co-opt the tax-payers themselves in the process: so, on September 21, 1811, it is established that

the farmers of the tax [have] to measure the barrels of wine in the presence of two honest men who will be chosen for that matter in each village and in the presence of the priest ... then, the priest will investigate the receipts issued by the tax-farmer, will compile them in one document and he will also sign.³³

Intense publicity and signatures from the tax-payers were combined in an order from October 29, 1811; the document repeated the obligation of the county superintendents (*ispravnici*) to publicize the ordinances “in the entire county” and “have it read out loud from village to village”; this time though, it also required that the copy of the ordinance read in villages be signed by the priest, the headman and one or two villagers and then submitted to the Divan.³⁴ Obviously this was meant to make sure that all tax payers would know that amount and the technicalities of the taxation process.

By 1822, the regulation of the wine-tax comprised 13 paragraphs because the procedures of assessing and collecting the taxes were laid down in even more detail. If some of the previous stipulations in the previous regulations were dropped, new ones were added. It is noticeable an emphasis on the punitive aspects for non-compliance. The tax-collectors, who ignored all previous exhortations to behave according to the regulations, were threatened with overt and secret investigations in order to uncover their frauds. Moreover, the text lists for the first time the penalties which would incur those who would infringe on the regulations: the payment of the damage (illegally collected sum), the confiscation of the wealth, the annulment of the privileges and of the boyar rank and the public beating followed by the sentence to hard labor in the mine; moreover, for “greater crimes” the offender would be sentenced to death.³⁵ The harshness of the penalties, going to the social degrading of the offending party and hence his treatment on a par with commoners, suggests an incipient, and perhaps rhetorical, equality in front of law; but is also a clear indication of the weak control or infrastructural reach of the central authorities over the fiscal agents’ behavior.

So, the gradual swelling of the wine-tax regulation was due to the addition of more and more details regarding the technicalities of this tax. This indicates the expanding sphere of state intervention, the assumption of more responsibilities and the attempt to control a wider area of the social reality. The attempt is part of what Charles Tilly called "invasions of small-scale social life" by the state.³⁶

How were the wine-tax regulations employed in administration and justice? First of all, their authority was not recognized automatically. For instance, in 1756 Constantin Mavrocordat scolded the wine-tax collectors for asking the monasteries and other exempted categories of subjects to show the charters of exemption:

This thing has astonished us and made us wonder what your justification was. Perhaps you could not understand what is stipulated in the regulation (*ponturile*) enacted by my Princeship which was handed to you, namely nobody is entitled to exemption beyond the stipulations of the old custom of the country.

The reference to custom should not deceive us as the custom establishing precisely who was entitled to tax-exemption was actually a recent regulation. In fact the case is indicative of the transition from an administration based on particularisms to an administration based on general rules. The tax-collectors were expected to carry out their job according to the country-wide regulations, regardless of documents attesting local or private fiscal privileges. It is an attempt to replace the myriad of private privileges and fiscal arrangements with general regulations which comprise the fiscal status of all taxpayers and classifies them in homogenous fiscal categories. The princely letter also reveals a tension between such a trend and the habit of tax-collectors to deal with a variety of fiscal regimes granted by princely charters. The superior authority of the regulation over private charters emerges with even more clarity in a case from 1811: the Divan rules that the slaughter house built on the estate of a litigant is exempted from taxation even in the absence of a charter of privilege "because in the eighth paragraph of the wine-tax regulations ... it is specified that the slaughter houses from the monastic and boyar estates are exempted".³⁷

Although the central authorities (the prince or the Divan) repeatedly endorsed the authority of the regulations, the taxpayers did not feel protected by such written laws. For instance, in 1794 the inhabitants

from the “hill of Pitești, from Muscel county” complained that the wine-tax collectors committed great abuses and exacted two or three times over the legal amount. Hence, they asked a princely charter specifying their just dues, so that they could show it to the tax-collectors. It was exactly the type of document which the people from the hill of Pitești had in 1698, as I showed above; it is remarkable that the geography of this complaint recalled the geography of the wine-tax collection from around 1700. However, since the wine-tax was regulated by documents with countrywide validity, Prince Alexandru Moruzi refused to revert to the habit of bestowing charters and simply sent them “our princely charter comprising exactly the regulation of the wine-tax” (*domnescul nostrum hrisov cu cuprindere întocmai după ponturile vinăriciului*). The princely order also instructed the tax-agents to attend the 7th paragraph (*pont*) which laid down in detail the method of accurate registration of the name of the tax payer, his wine production and the amount he paid.³⁸

Cases similar to that described above reveal both the inertia of the old customs and the resolution of the principedom to fix the fiscal obligations of all Wallachian taxpayers by a written general regulation. Apparently by 1797 many tax-payers, exasperated by the abuses of the wine-tax collectors demanded separate charters to stipulate their fiscal obligations. Nevertheless, such a practice would have defeated the purpose of regulating taxation by countrywide settlements. Alexandru Ipsilanti, the prince who enacted the first legal code to for regular judicial use Wallachia,³⁹ could not consent to the revival of the old legal practice. So, on September 18, 1797, he ordered the superintendents to assure that the wine-tax collectors would not exceed the lawful amount and attend the lawful methods of assessment.⁴⁰ The struggle between general regulation and local privilege continued in the first years of the 19th century, as I showed above, but in itself it testifies to the slow integration of the Wallachian subjects under the effect of a general legal text.

The cases I mentioned above reveal the most evident feature of the wine-tax regulations enacted after 1740: they became the normative ground for adjudicating disputes related to this tax and they were referred to explicitly in the judicial decisions. This is important because previously decisions were based on customs, the princely will or charters of privilege. The judges could either refer to the regulations in general as whole texts or to specific paragraphs which regulated a particular issued of the fiscal process.

The administration of the wine-tax according to a general, country-wide valid regulation is apparent already in 1749. On September 15 prince Grigore Ghica renewed the grant of half of the princely wine-tax and the right to the wine-tithe (*otaștina*) to the monastery Fedelșciorii from an estate. So, the document is a renewal of an ancient privilege that is, a particular tie between principedom and a social actor, “according to the content of the regulation that My Princeship has done, both for the wine-tax and for the wine-tithe” (*dupe cum să coprinde și în testamentul ce am făcut Domniia Mea, atât pentru orânduiala vinăriciului, cât și pentru otaștină*).⁴¹ Similarly, on December 20, 1766, Prince Alexandru Scarlat Ghica dispatched a commissioned official (*om domnesc*) to Muscel county where the local superintendent⁴² did not adhere to “the contents of authorization letter and the paragraphs” (*nu au urmat cărții și ponturilor dupe cum se cuprinde*) regarding the collection of the wine tax from the vineyards where monasteries had half of this tax granted as princely munificence (*milă*): he did not allow the man of the monastery to participate in the assessment and perception of the wine-tax so that the religious establishment could take its share.⁴³ What is remarkable in both these cases is that the renewal or the endorsement of previous privileges was done in the terms of the regulation. The ancient privileges continued to exist but only by being transformed in legal categories and being stipulated in state endorsed legislation.

Subsequent documents show that the judges habitually invoked the relevant written regulations when they adjudicated fiscal litigations. On September 13, 1777, the metropolitan and the great boyars constituted in a judicial court, judged and referred to the prince the case of a wine-tax farmer who got into a conflict with the priests of the princely court because of the rights to gather the mentioned tax from a certain area. The judges corroborated more proofs in order to make a decision: an old charter, a contract of wine-tax farming and a personal testimony from a former tax-farmer and the princely regulation for the concession of the wine-tax. In the end they adjudicated the case in favor of the priests also because the regulations for the farming out of the wine-tax indicated (*dăosebit să vede și ponturile vînării vinăriciului*) that the priests were right.⁴⁴

The resolution of a case could be informed by both custom and regulations, indicating a certain limitation of the latter. On September 13 1781, the divan judged the request of the Argeș monastery to cash the rents of the shops held during the market days on its estate at Ștefănești and incomes of the butcher. The judges’ report recommended the prince

to order the superintendents to investigate the custom on neighboring estates for the rents of the shops and to grant the income from the butcher shop. The recommendation was based on the fact that whereas the latter income was stipulated in the regulations, the former was based on custom. Consequently, the prince, in his resolution, followed the recommendation in the first issue and ordered the superintendents to act according to the wine-tax-regulation in the problem of the butcher shop income.⁴⁵

The references to the wine-tax regulations become more and more frequent after 1800 through expressions such as “according to the content of the wine-tax regulation” or variants thereof⁴⁶; alternatively, certain practices could be described as “infringing the regulation” (*peste ponturi*)⁴⁷ or the local officials exhorted to enforce the collection of the tax “according to the princely [wine-tax] regulation”⁴⁸ or the “content of the regulations of the Divan”.⁴⁹ The recalcitrant tax-payers refuse to pay “according to the regulation” or “do not comply with the regulation in effect”.⁵⁰ An order dispatched on August 20, 1822 to the counties from the northern part of Wallachia (mountain area) instructed the superintendents to assist the fiscal agents with “enforcing the content of the regulation”.⁵¹

Yet, as the regulations started to be formatted as legal texts, in numbered paragraphs, their employment starts to be more sophisticated. Judges do not invoke them as a whole, but they cite or quote the paragraph which is supposed to justify the decision. I already brought such references above. Several other examples will strengthen the point.

Probably warned of some previous irregularities, on September 9 1793 Prince Alexandru Moruzi urged the wine-tax collectors from Romanați county strictly observe the “12th paragraph” (*capul 12*) of “the regulations of my Princeship that were issued at the auction of this tax” (*ponturile domnii mele ce li s-au dat la căutatul slujbii*), which forbade them to collect the wine-tax from the villages that belonged completely to the monasteries.⁵² So, the tax-agents were supposed to act on the basis not of a private charter of the monastery, comprising its privilege – although this might be used to identify the beneficiary of the privilege – but a particular paragraph from the country-wide valid regulation.

A month later, on October 16, 1793, two county-superintendents reported to the prince that the agents collecting the wine-tax in their jurisdiction cashed in fees from the slaughterhouse of Urlați, a market town, and asked for exemption. On October 27 the prince ordered the great chancellor⁵³ of the Lower Country to investigate the case by consulting the content of the regulations for the wine-tax (*văzînd și cuprinderea*

ponturilor vinăriciului). The great chancellor Scarlat Ghica referred back to the prince after consulting the regulations for the wine-tax transcribed in the register of the Divan; the “seventh paragraph” (*pontul al șeptelea*) forbade the wine-tax collectors to collect any fee from the slaughterhouses on boyar and monastic estates, except a small quantity of meat as their food; they could collect such fees from the slaughterhouses without princely charters granting exemptions. On October 28 the prince gave his positive resolution on the anaphora of the *vel logofăt*.⁵⁴

Two decades later a comparable case is documented. On June 26, 1815 a judicial report (*anafora*) of the divan states that “it was investigated in the wine-tax regulation and the 9th paragraph stipulates that the litigations between the vineyards owners are to be adjudicated by the tax-collector”; however, the case judged by the Divan was different in the sense that it referred to an extra tax which was not regulated by the wine-tax regulation. So, although in this case the 9th paragraph did not apply, it is noteworthy that the regulation in effect was consulted in order to formulate a decision. Even more importantly, the employment of the regulations in various administrative and judicial decisions indicates a depersonalization of the political power. Moreover, it also points to transformation in the legal culture in the sense that Wallachian judges (be they the prince of the boyars) gesture towards justifying their decisions in legal terms. Neither the will of the prince, not the old custom of the country seem sufficient as normative grounds.

Finally, the regulations were important in that by nominating social categories and their fiscal status helped produce the social order and the social divisions while at the same time homogenizing these categories. Although they still reflected the hierarchical structure of the pre-modern society, with privileged people who were exempt from taxes and commoner tax-payers who paid all the taxes, the wine-tax regulations – along with other regulations issued in the same period – promoted a sort of equalization within certain categories and subjected all these categories to the same legal text. In front of the country-wide valid regulation the individual privileges ceased to be relevant except as legal stipulations. Similarly, the regulations helped to construct and disseminate a notion of state territory. They were addressed to the entire country or to the 17 counties⁵⁵ which made up the territory under princely hold, and not to hills or other wine-producing areas. In other words they produced a different political geography, according to the central criteria of space division and land management.

Conclusions

So, what do the fiscal regulations tell about the Wallachian state in the 18th century and the first three decades of the 19th century? First of all it was a more intrusive state, a state which dealt with much more details of the fiscal process and tried to control a larger share of the subjects' activities. It was a state which expanded considerably its area of intervention, though this move was not perceived legitimate as showed by resistances, irregularities, and inertias; however, the deficit of implementation should not conceal this change. Secondly, the regulations promoted depersonalization of power. Instead of the princely will or a custom which usually had to be endorsed by witnesses, the judges began to invoke in their decisions a text or a paragraph from a text which transcends the tenure of a prince or of an official; the authority was more and more perceived to be lying in a written text. Thirdly, the regulations also expressed and produced a new political geography. By addressing all the subjects at once (although they were still unequal in front of law as some still retained a privileged status), by delivering the same message, by imposing a certain uniformity in taxation – according to the social categories, these texts represented a homogenous territory as the space of the state; and while it did maintain – actually legalize – social inequalities by allowing the existence of privileged social actors, it subjected the latter to a single, state endorsed rule.

All these features – intrusiveness, territorialisation, and depersonalization – are features of the modern state, of the modern modality of rule. This transformation effected (or made visible) the transition from a judicial princedom, characterized by little interference with the lives of the subjects and confined to arbitrating their disputes, to an administrative princedom, ready to intervene, instruct, and coerce on a larger scale than before. Thus, the wine-tax regulations and their effects can be read in two ways. If we have in mind the 19th century developments we would be led to conclude that the transformations I discussed above were part of the overture of political modernization in Wallachia. If we temporarily leave out the 19th century, or the period after 1831, we can see the transformations I discussed here as the regional response to the deep transformations taking place at the time in the Ottoman Empire which have driven significant transformations in the nature of the Wallachian princedom.

NOTES

- ¹ Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms and Results" in *States, War and Capitalism* (Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 1992), 1-31; the author also refers to the "despotic" power, the capacity of the central elites to adopt various measures without consulting regularly the society, a notion that does not interest me here.
- ² My sources of inspiration were Philip Abrams, "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977)," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 1/1 (March 1988): 58-89 and Pierre Bourdieu, *Sur l'État. Cours au Collège de France (1989-1992)* (Paris, Raisons d'agir/Seuil, 2012), 15 and *passim*.
- ³ The last work on the origin and function of the Phanariots in the Ottoman state, albeit focusing on the career of a 19th century bureaucrat is Christine Philliou, *Biography of an Empire. Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution* (Berkely, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2011).
- ⁴ Technically speaking this is inaccurate since the first "indigenous" prince of Wallachia was Grigore Dimitrie Ghica (1822-1828), member of a family whose ascendancy in the Ottoman power structures in the late 17th century followed a clearly "Phanariot" pattern and which gave several Phanariot princes of Wallachia and Moldavia during the 18th century.
- ⁵ Here are some of the authors adopting this standpoint: Mihail Kogălniceanu, "Histoire de la Valachie, de la Moldavie et des Valaques Transdanubiens" in Mihail Kogălniceanu, *Opere* Tome I, ed. Andrei Oțetea, (Bucharest: Editura Fundațiilor Regale, 1946), 429. Nicolae Bălcescu, *Românii supt Mihai-Voevod Viteazul* [Romanians under the Rule of Mihai-Voevod Viteazul], first published in 1878, ed. Andrei Rusu (Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1973), 15, 18 and Nicolae Bălcescu, "Românii și Fanarioții" [The Romanians and the Phanariots], *Magazin Istoric pentru Dacia*, 1 (1845), 115-121,; A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Traiană* [The History of Romanians from Trajan's Dacia], 3rd edition, (Bucharest: Editura "Cartea Românească," 1930), vol. IX, 5-6, 87; Pompiliu Eliade, *Influența franceză și spiritual public în România* [The French Influence and the Public Mind in Romania], original French edition in 1898, (Bucharest: Institutul Cultural Român, 2006). More recently, Damian Hurezeanu, "Regimul fanariot. O poartă spre modernizarea Țărilor Române?" [The Phanariot Regime. A Gate to the Modernization of the Romanian Principalities?] in *Historia manet. Volum omagial Demény Lajos*, ed. Violeta Barbu, Bucharest (Cluj: Kriterion, 2001), 399-412; the anti-Phanariot stereotypes were uncritically repeated by Bogdan Bucur, *Devălmășia valahă. O istorie anarhică a spațiului românesc* [The Wallachian Melange. An Anarchic History of the Romanian Lands] (Pitești: Paralela 45, 2008). The Communist historiography maintained such evaluations but emphasised more the socio-economic factors instead of the

- moral deficiencies of the elites, *Istoria României* [History of Romania], vol. 3, ed. Andrei Oțetea (Bucharest: Editura R.P.R., 1964). For a review of this strand see Cornelia Papacostea-Danielopolu, "État Actuel Des Recherché Sur L'Époque Phanariote," *RESEE*, XXIV/3 (1986): 227-234
- 6 Nicolae Iorga, "Cultura română sub fanarioți" in *Două conferințe* (Bucharest: Editura Librăriei Socecu & Comp., 1898), 53-108. Recent studies suggest the same, Christine M. Philliou, "The Paradox of Perceptions: Interpreting the Ottoman Past through the National Present," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 5, 2008.
 - 7 Nicolae Iorga, "Le despotisme éclairé dans les pays roumaines au XVIIIe siècle" in *Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences* IX (1939), 101-115; Nicolae Iorga, "Au fost Moldova și Țara Românească provincii supuse fanarioților?" [Were Moldavia and Wallachia Provinces Subject to the Phanariots?], *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*, (1937); Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria Românilor* [History of Romanians], vol. 7, (Bucharest: S.N., 1938), 5-10; the articles published in *Symposium. L'Époque phanariote, 21-25 Octobre 1970. A la mémoire de Cléobule Tsourkas* (Thessaloiniki: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1974). Ștefan Lemny, "La critique du régime Phanariote: clichés mentaux et perspectives historiographiques" in *Culture and Society. Structures, Interferences, Analogies in the Modern Romanian History* Editura Al. Zub, (Iași: Editura Academiei R.S.R., 1985), 17-30.
 - 8 The tributary status meant the obligation of pay tribute and other gifts and to align the foreign policy with that of the Sublime Porte in exchange for the internal autonomy. The legal terms of this arrangement were studied by Mihai Maxim, *Țările Române și Înalta Poartă. Cadrul juridic al relațiilor româno-osmane în Evul Mediu* [The Romanian Principalities and the High Porte. The Juridical Framework of the Romanian-Ottoman Relationships in the Middle Ages] (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1993) passim and Viorel Panaite, *Pace, război și comerț în islam. Țările Române și dreptul otoman al popoarelor (secolele XV-XVIII)* [Peace, War and Trade in Islam. The Romanian Principalities and the Ottoman Law of the Peoples (the Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries)] (Bucharest: Editura All, 1997), 328-433; a different perspective, emphasizing the contingent nature of the tributary status was exposed by Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "What is inside and what is outside? Tributary states in Ottoman politics," in *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth-Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. GáborKármán and LovroKunčević, Leiden - Boston: Brill, 2013.
 - 9 From the already vast literature on this topic see Halil Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700" in Idem, *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), Baki Tezcan, *The second Ottoman Empire : political and social*

transformation in the early modern world, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

- 10 K. Kivanç Karaman and Şevket Pamuk, Ottoman State Finances in European Perspective, 1500-1914, *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. 70, no. 3 (September 2010), 597, 609.
- 11 Ibid. 599-600 and 607.
- 12 Ibid. 602.
- 13 Suraiya Faroqhi, "Seeking Wisdom in China: An Attempt to Make Sense of the Celali Rebellions" in Rudolf Vesely et al. eds. *Zafar Name. Memorial Volume of Felix Tauer* (Praha: Enigma Corporation, 1996), 105-106.
- 14 Bogdan Murgescu, *România şi Europa. Acumularea decalajelor economice (1500-2010)* [Romania and Europe. The Accumulation of Economic Discrepancies (1500-2010)], (Iaşi: Polirom, 2010), 40-48; an illustration of this close economic links was the fact that the peasants from Oltenia (Western Wallachia), during the Austrian rule there, could not procure the cash necessary for paying the taxes due to the interruption of trade with the Ottoman Empire, see Şerban Papacostea, *Oltenia sub stăpânirea austriacă(1718-1739)* [Oltenia under Austrian Rule (1718-1739)] (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1998), 91-93.
- 15 Bogdan Murgescu, *România şi Europa*, 27-56; Mihai Berza, "Haraciul Moldovei şi al Țării Româneşti în sec. XV-XIX" [The Tribute of Moldavia and Wallachia during the 15th-19th Centuries], *S.M.I.M.*, II (1957), 7-45; Mihai Berza, "Variațiile exploatarei Țării Româneşti de către Poarta otomană în secolele XVI-XVIII" [The Variations in the Exploitation of Wallachia by the Ottoman Porte during the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries], *Studii*, 11 (1958), 59-71. Although admitting the role of the Ottoman privileges (*hاتیşerif*) in reducing the obligations towards the Porte, some authors conclude contradictorily that the late 18th century was a period of maximum Ottoman exploitation: Maria-Matilda Alexandrescu Dersca-Bulgaru, "Rolul hاتیşerifurilor de privilegii în limitarea obligațiilor către Poartă" [The Role of the Charters of Privileges in the Limitation of the Obligations towards the Porte], *Studii* 11/6 (1958), 101-121, see p. 115; Alexandru Vianu, "Aplicarea tratatului de la Küciük-Kainargi cu privire la Moldova şi Țara Românească (1775-1783)" [The Application of the Küçük-Kaynarca Treaty with regard to Moldavia and Wallachia], *Studii*, 13/5 (1960): 71-103. I have not discussed here the delivery of staples from Wallachia to Istanbul or to the Ottoman fortresses on the Danube Bogdan Murgescu, "Avatarurile unui concept: monopolul comercial otoman asupra Țărilor Române" [The Avatars of a Concept: The Ottoman Commercial Monopoly over the Romanian Principalities] in *Țările Române*, 151-172 has showed, the Porte's demands have never amounted to an Ottoman economic monopoly, a notion with a long career in the Romanian historiography.

- 16 The process is treated with impressive erudition and theoretical sophistication by Henri H. Stahl in his *Contribuții la studiul satelor devălmașe Românești* [Contributions to the Study of the Communal Romanian Villages], vols. 1-3, (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, [1958-1965] 1998). In a more condensed form and with slight alterations see Stahl-influenced work of Daniel Chirot's contribution which, *Social Change in a Peripheral Society. The Creation of a Balkan Colony* (New York: Academic Press, 1976).
- 17 Cristina Codarcea, *Société et pouvoir en Valachie (1601-1654). Entre la coutume et la loi* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2002), passim and especially the "Conclusion" shows that in the first half of the 17th century the functioning of the political power and was eminently oral. The Wallachian society had no clear definition of the custom or of the law; when the latter is nevertheless mentioned in the contemporary documents it is impossible to understand which law is it.
- 18 Vasile Mihoarea, "Vinăriciul domnesc și vădrăritul," *Studii. Revistă de istorie*, 22 (1969): 1078-184.
- 19 Dinu C. Giurescu, "Anatefterul. Condica de Porunci a Vistieriei lui Constantin Brâncoveanu" [Anatefter. The Register of Ordinances of the Treasury of Constantin Brâncoveanu] *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie*, V (1962)], 38. Also published by Nicolae Iorga in his *Studii și documente*, vol. V, 347
- 20 Ibidem, 40; the document is also published in Iorga, *Studii și documente cu privire la istoria românilor* [Studies and Documents Regarding the History of Romanians], vol. 5 (Bucharest: Stabilimentul Grafic Socec, 1903), 350-51 (hereafter, Iorga, *Studii și documente*, vol. 5). An identical letter was issued in 1704, Giurescu, "Anatefterul," 55.
- 21 Ibidem, 56.
- 22 Ibidem, 58.
- 23 Nicolae Iorga, *Studii și documente*, vol. 14, (Bucharest: Atelierele Grafice Socec et. Comp, 1907), 13.
- 24 The source stipulates the sum of 40 bani pe bucket, but this is obviously a mistake of the editors. All other sources from the same period indicate that the sum to be paid per bucket was 4 *bani* not 40. In this case there might be a mistake of the editor of the document. In 1749, half of the wine-tax donated to monasteries consisted of 2 *bani* per bucket, so the entire tax was 4 *bani*, see Iorga, *Studii și documente*, vol. 5, 494.
- 25 *Documente privind fiscalitatea în Țara Românească (1700-1821)* [Documents Concerning Fiscal Matters in Wallachia (1700-1821)], eds. V. Mihoarea, Ioana Constantinescu, Sergiu Columbeanu, Manuscript deposited in the library of the Institute of History "Nicolae Iorga" from Bucharest, (hereafter, *Documente fiscal*, doc. no.), 153.
- 26 V.A. Urechia, *Istoria Românilor* [The History of Romanians] Tome I, Bucharest: Lito-Tipografia Carol Göbl, 1891, 412-15 (hereafter Urechia, IR, tome).

- 27 The role of the *ispravnic* as supervisor of a correct administration of justice in these cases is another innovation in comparison to the letters of authorization from 1698 which I summed up above.
- 28 *Regulamentele organice ale Valahiei și Moldovei* [The Organic Regulations of Wallachia and Moldavia], eds. Paul Negulescu și George Alexianu, colaborator Aurel Sava (București: Întreprinderile "Eminescu" S.A., 1944), 14.
- 29 See Vasile Mihordea, "Vinăriciul domnesc și vădrăritul," *passim*.
- 30 *Ms. Rom. 645*, Library of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, f. 27 recto; the document bears two dates, August 27 and September 19, 1801, the former is the date of issuing by the princely treasury and the latter the date of registration in the county-register.
- 31 Urechia, IR, XI, 188-189.
- 32 Urechia, IR, XI, 181-184.
- 33 Urechia, IR, XI, 556.
- 34 Urechia, IR, XI, 558-559. The requirement that the copy of the regulation be signed by the headmen and priests is already encountered in the case of the poll-tax (bir) regulation, in 1775, *Documente fiscale*, 198.
- 35 Urechia, IR, XIII, 367-370.
- 36 Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992* (Blackwell: Cambridge MA & Oxford UK, 1992), 25.
- 37 Urechia, IR, IX, 374.
- 38 Urechia, IR, VI, 370-72.
- 39 Alexandru Ipsilanti, during his first Wallachian reign (1774-1782) adopted the "Legal Register" (*Pravilniceasca condică*) in 1780, the first collection of laws to be regularly and explicitly employed in the administration of justice.
- 40 Urechia, IR, VII, 75.
- 41 Iorga, *Studii și documente*, vol. 5, 494.
- 42 The superintendents (*ispravnicî*) were the supervisors of the taxation operations in their county, but in this case it seems that the superintendent was collector of the tax. There are two possible explanations: either in that county the wine-tax was collected by the state apparatus (situation called *în credință*, lit. "on trust") or the *ispravnic* was himself the farmer of that tax in his jurisdiction.
- 43 *Documente fiscale*, 188.
- 44 *Documente fiscale*, 202.
- 45 *Documente fiscale*, 216. Surprisingly, the wine-tax covered items that had nothing to do with the wine, in this case the fees perceived from the butchers.
- 46 Urechia, IR, IX, 377 (in 1811), Urechia, IR, XA, 1039-1040 (in 1814),
- 47 Urechia, IR, XB, 88 (in 1814).
- 48 Urechia, IR, XB, 313.
- 49 Urechia, IR, XI, 543 (in 1807) and 546 (in 1810).

- ⁵⁰ Urechia, IR, XI, 562 (in 1811) and 715-716 (in 1811).
⁵¹ Urechia, IR, XIII, 371.
⁵² *Documente fiscale*, 254. The document is also published in Urechia, IR, VI, pp. 36-37 with the date of September 8 and in Iorga, *St. si doc*, vol. 14: 143-144. Urechia's text has a mistake in the sense that the paragraph in discussion is not the 2nd but the 12th, as it results from other documents of that year – the *capul 12* deals with the grants of wine-tax to monasteries.
⁵³ In the Wallachian terminology this official was called *vel logofăt*.
⁵⁴ All the documents related to this case at Urechia, IR, V, 183-84.
⁵⁵ For example the regulation of wine-tax and honey-and-pigs tax (*dijmărit*) from October 29, 1811 in Urechia, IR, XI, 558.



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IDÉOLOGIES DE LA LANGUE NATIONALE : UNE COMPARAISON ENTRE LE FRANÇAIS ET LE ROUMAIN

Linguists have not been good about informing the general public about language. (Bauer & Trudgill 1998 : xv)

Résumé : L'étude compare les idéologies autour du français et du roumain, dès lors que ceux-ci deviennent langues nationales et sont investis d'une valeur symbolique. À partir de l'analyse des discours esthétiques, scolaires, législatifs et scientifiques concernant la langue nationale, l'article sépare les contenus des idéologies – essentiellement le purisme prospectif et rétrospectif et le « génie » de la langue – des politiques linguistiques que ces contenus ont pu marquer, et identifie les nombreux points communs entre la situation du français et celle du roumain.

Mots-clé : Idéologie de la langue, standard, français, roumain, purisme, génie.

La langue n'appartient pas aux linguistes, mais à la communauté. Elle fait l'objet de projections imaginaires, d'instrumentalisations, de rêveries ou d'agressions de la part des locuteurs et du pouvoir politique. Au linguiste revient donc périodiquement la mission de détruire bien des mythes. Un premier mythe dit que les langues sont de simples instruments de communication, or, elles sont bien plus que cela. Pour toute communauté, la langue est également investie d'une valeur symbolique, et ce, d'autant plus lorsque cette communauté se crée une variété linguistique supra-ordonnée, que l'on appelle le standard national.

Voici ainsi le second mythe : le standard n'est pas une variété naturelle, mais un artefact historique. Il n'est non plus l'aboutissement nécessaire d'une quelconque évolution en logique progressiste. Tel qu'il a été décrit par Haugen 1966, Le Page et Tabouret-Keller 1985 et Lodge

1997, le processus de formation d'une langue standard se déclenche au sein de sociétés arrivées à un certain degré de « focalisation », c'est-à-dire de conscience culturelle de soi, ayant une organisation complexe autour d'un centre de pouvoir. Le standard répond ainsi à un besoin de communication très étendue dans le temps, l'espace et la société, qui ne se manifeste pas partout. La standardisation implique le choix ou l'invention d'une nouvelle variété linguistique et sa nomination ; ensuite un effort de diffusion, pour faire accepter la forme et le statut du standard par l'ensemble de la communauté. Ces deux démarches purement sociales s'accompagnent de démarches visant à adapter la variété choisie à ses fonctions (exprimer des notions abstraites, des domaines techniques, une sensibilité esthétique, etc.) et à consacrer sa forme dans des dictionnaires et grammaires. Ce que l'on crée ainsi est un standard « fonctionnel », une variété nouvelle qui fonctionne dans une sphère précise d'interactions, notamment la communication publique et écrite.

Mais le standard peut être aussi investi de valeurs symboliques, souvent en rapport avec le contexte historique où a démarré sa formation, ou s'il est associé à une idéologie. C'est ce que j'appellerai un standard « symbolique » ou « supra-standard », renvoyant à l'étymologie du mot, qui évoque la norme, mais aussi l'emblème, l'étendard. Le français est un cas exemplaire de supra-standardisation et d'idéologisation de la langue, mais, étonnamment, le roumain aussi. J'essaierai dans ce qui suit de montrer les points communs entre ces deux idéologies de la langue standard, dans sa symbolique nationale, qu'ils soient dus à l'influence culturelle du français à l'époque de la standardisation du roumain¹, ou bien qu'il s'agisse de développements ultérieurs, comme c'est le cas pendant la période communiste.

1. Survol historique

La standardisation du français commence au Moyen-Âge, par la création d'une *scripta* trans-dialectale, en usage dans la « petite » littérature et la justice locale, mais grignotant progressivement sur les domaines réservés au latin. Au XVI^e siècle, le pouvoir intervient pour en faire la langue de la justice et des sciences. Le corpus est élaboré alors par traductions et emprunts savants, puis par épuration aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles. La codification et, en général, l'usage du standard restent l'apanage d'une minorité savante. Celle-ci l'investit des valeurs intellectuelles qu'elle

apprécie : élégance, rationalité. La Révolution entraîne un changement de perspective sur le standard, qui devrait appartenir à l'ensemble de la nation, alors qu'en réalité la majorité l'ignore (Guillaumou 1989). C'est le moment où le standard fonctionnel devient symbolique et se trouve pris dans l'idéologie de la nation une et démocratique. La valeur symbolique de l'idiome est uniquement affirmée, puisque le gouvernement jacobin n'a pas les moyens d'une politique linguistique à la mesure de cette idéologie. Avec le nationalisme romantique, tout au long du XIX^e siècle, s'établit l'équivalence entre la nation et la communauté linguistique, entre la langue, le peuple et le territoire, et lorsque la France est victime d'une défaite militaire sur son sol, en 1870-1871, la langue est érigée en étendard national par excellence. La diffusion devient question d'État, comme le montrent les lois de l'enseignement de 1880, qui propagent non seulement le matériel, mais aussi tout l'appareil idéologique entourant la langue nationale. Même mouvement à l'extérieur des frontières, lorsque l'usage « universel » du français est limité par les autres nationalismes linguistiques et par l'irruption de l'anglais comme langue diplomatique (1919).

La standardisation du roumain démarre, elle, après la cristallisation d'une conscience linguistique commune et après la création de l'État, en pleine période romantique et nationaliste. Le roumain standard n'eut donc pas le temps d'être fonctionnel avant de devenir symbolique ; il fut pris dès le début dans les différentes idéologies concurrentes qui, au milieu du XIX^e siècle, cherchaient à définir la nation roumaine. La codification et l'élaboration de la fonction se font sous le signe de la latinité, seul point commun des idéologies linguistiques de l'époque : adoption de la graphie latine, emprunts latins et romans, élimination de mots d'origine slave, grecque et turque. Au-delà, la langue est tiraillée jusqu'au milieu du XX^e siècle entre plusieurs projets nationaux et esthétiques, qu'on peut regrouper grossièrement en « traditionalistes » et « modernistes ». Après une brève domination de l'idéologie soviétique et panslaviste, le standard roumain est intégré par le régime de Ceaușescu dans une idéologie nationaliste agressive, sans rapport avec la situation historique du pays et de la langue. En effet, ce n'est plus la variété commune et savante qui est l'enjeu, mais la langue roumaine en tant que symbole de la nation et de son dirigeant. Comme pour la Terreur (et peut-être pour tout régime nationaliste totalitaire), une idée de la nation précède et détermine une idée de la langue, dont on retient uniquement le rôle symbolique. De fonctionnel, le standard devient donc idéologique.

2. Idéologie de la langue standard

L'idéologie de la langue n'est devenue un objet d'étude pour les linguistes que depuis les années 1990. Malgré la jeunesse du domaine, il existe aujourd'hui un tel foisonnement de définitions, de perspectives et même de noms concurrents (Woolard 1992, Wodak 2007) qu'il est nécessaire de délimiter ma propre approche.

Pour le nom, avant tout. Dans le domaine des langues², *idéologie* est parfois concurrent d'*imaginaire linguistique* (Houdebine-Gravaud), ou d'*hégémonie* ou *impérialisme* (dans une approche directement gramscienne, que je ne retiendrai pas). En réalité, les trois termes renvoient à des aspects différents : l'imaginaire implique des croyances et représentations partagées par la communauté, et n'implique pas de rapport avec un pouvoir, deux éléments essentiels de l'*idéologie*. D'autre part, l'*hégémonie* est due à un pouvoir, typiquement l'État, alors que l'idéologie peut être implicite, et partiellement le fait des locuteurs. Ensuite, au niveau de l'association, les noms de *linguistic ideology*, *language ideology*, *ideology of (standard) language* sont concurremment en usage (Woolard 1998, Koerner 2001). Le premier, *idéologie linguistique*, pourrait supposer que l'idéologie affecte la démarche scientifique ; c'est pourquoi *idéologie de la langue* me semble un nom plus approprié. Lippi-Green 2006 emploie *standard language ideology* dans un sens très limité, qui concerne la croyance en une « bonne » langue parlée, abstraite, idéale, stable, qui est imposée par les institutions dominantes. Le concept relèverait donc uniquement des représentations et des pratiques immédiatement influencées par celles-ci, comme la discrimination sociale. Or, le standard n'est pas seulement une variété parmi d'autres. Dans les sociétés européennes, façonnées par le nationalisme romantique, le standard assume souvent d'autres fonctions : emblème ou garant de l'unité de l'État, témoin d'une certaine histoire, etc. Ces aspects dépassent le sens sociolinguistique étroit de Lippi-Green, c'est pourquoi je préfère utiliser *idéologie de la langue*, comprenant par là l'idéologie de la variété standard, nationale et littéraire dans ses différentes valeurs, mais sans inclure d'autres variétés linguistiques (qui peuvent faire l'objet d'idéologies propres, au sein de groupes non institutionnalisés – il suffit de penser au catalan).

La définition de l'idéologie de la langue pose un autre type de problème notamment au niveau de ses manifestations et de la connotation qu'on y attache. Selon Philips 1992, deux grandes perspectives s'affrontent : l'une

voit l'idéologie comme indépendante des comportements linguistiques (Labov, Eagleton, Silverstein), si bien que l'enjeu de toute analyse est d'expliquer les rapports entre les deux. L'autre conçoit l'idéologie comme naturellement présente dans tout comportement linguistique et tout discours métalinguistique (Foucault, Bourdieu). Les deux perspectives s'associent à des connotations différentes : la première implique (sans forcément renvoyer à l'incontournable Marx) une vision négative de l'idéologie en tant que falsification démontable par la confrontation avec la vérité scientifique. La seconde implique une vision neutre de l'idéologie en tant que préliminaire inévitable à la pensée et à l'action de tout sujet parlant. En réalité, les deux perspectives sont valables, mais jouent à des niveaux différents. Il existe certainement des préalables qui déterminent le comportement des locuteurs : choix d'une variété en fonction du contexte et de l'interlocuteur, jugement porté sur l'autre, image que l'on veut donner de soi... tout cela se construit à partir d'un ensemble de valeurs, idées, conceptions sur la langue qui peut être dit idéologique (mais pour lequel je préfère *imaginaire linguistique*). Cet imaginaire peut coexister avec un discours « d'en haut » qui définit, qualifie, valorise la langue au niveau de toute la communauté, mais ne régit pas forcément les échanges individuels, et qui serait l'idéologie dans le sens négatif et restreint. Étant donné l'objet de ma recherche, la comparaison de deux langues standard nationales, je ne peux qu'adopter la définition de l'idéologie dans le sens restreint et négatif.

L'idéologie vise majoritairement quelques aspects de la langue (Woolard et Schieffelin 1994, Woolard 1998, Seargeant 2007) : le contact des langues et le traitement de la variation ; l'historiographie de la linguistique et des discours publics sur la langue ; la métapragmatique et la conception de la langue en usage. L'idéologie de la langue se manifeste dans certaines pratiques sociales plus que dans d'autres, ce que Silverstein 1998 et Kroskrity 2004 appellent les *sites idéologiques* : école, arts, ou encore rituels religieux, civils, etc. Ce sont également ces domaines que j'explore dans mon étude : les discours publics (politiques et scientifiques), l'enseignement, la littérature.

L'idéologie de la langue entretient des rapports variés avec le système linguistique dont elle parle, et qui, en tout état de cause, est rarement son seul objet et objectif. En effet, « ideologies of language are rarely about language alone » (Seargeant 2007 : 349) ; assez souvent elles font partie d'un ensemble plus vaste autour d'autres éléments : nation, ethnie, religion, statut politique, groupe social, économie, etc. Étant au moins

partiellement extralinguistique, l'idéologie peut évidemment se trouver en parfaite contradiction avec le savoir scientifique sur la langue ; elle peut participer du système de la langue (en associant une valeur symbolique à la variation linguistique, par exemple) ; elle peut influencer le système de la langue, lorsque des idées sur la langue se transforment en normes ou règles internes ; elle peut enfin influencer et même se substituer à la description scientifique et « vraie » de la langue. Cela arrive lorsque la démarche scientifique d'explication du système linguistique est conduite, pour des raisons extralinguistiques, à ignorer certains faits et à en exagérer d'autres³ (Seargeant 2007). J'analyse dans cet article plusieurs distorsions idéologiques de ce qui aurait dû être la description scientifique des langues, en essayant de répondre à la question posée par Woolard il y a une vingtaine d'années :

In politicized contests over the 'true' national language, standards etc., which linguistic features are seized on, and through what semiotic processes are they interpreted as representing the collectivity? Is there a hierarchy of linguistic features open to such ideologization? Are all aspects of communicative and linguistic practice equally ripe for distortion, and why or why not? (Woolard 1992 : 243)

Dans tous les cas, on voit que l'idéologie peut influencer le système de la langue (Kroskrity 2004). L'influence de l'idéologie sur le matériel linguistique proprement-dit peut être le fait des locuteurs. C'est ce qu'analyse Bourdieu lorsqu'il évoque la valeur symbolique attachée à telle ou telle variété ou trait linguistique, mais dans ce cas il s'agit d'*imaginaires linguistiques*. L'idéologie dans le sens retenu ici peut affecter la langue par le biais des politiques linguistiques⁴, qui seront analysés plus loin.

Enfin, Woolard et Schieffelin 2004 et Verschueren 2012 signalent le caractère historique de toute idéologie : les idéologies se modifient au fil du temps et se remplacent les unes les autres. À la variation des langues répond ainsi la variation des idéologies. C'est pourquoi il est plus utile pour mon analyse de proposer une liste de caractéristiques – parfois scalaires – de l'idéologie de la langue, plutôt qu'une définition figée :

a) l'idéologie est conceptuelle : elle consiste en idées, croyances, opinions, qui affectent ou non les comportements ;

b) l'idéologie de la langue participe presque toujours d'un imaginaire ou discours qui dépasse la langue ; le plus souvent, elle sert à créer ou à représenter des identités ;

c) l'idéologie de la langue reflète les expériences ou les intérêts d'un certain groupe, mais est présentée comme universellement vraie et allant de soi (ce qui rend sa contestation difficile) ;

d) l'idéologie de la langue est ancrée dans un contexte historique et change avec le temps ;

e) plusieurs idéologies, jouant à différents niveaux, peuvent coexister dans une société ;

f) l'idéologie de la langue a toujours un lien avec les rapports dans la communauté, notamment avec le pouvoir et sa légitimation (cf. Thompson 1990 : 7 « meaning in the service of power ») ;

g) l'idéologie de la langue peut être descriptive, ou prescriptive, ou un mélange de ces deux modalités ;

h) l'idéologie de la langue est plus ou moins éloignée de la connaissance scientifique, et procède souvent par falsification, mystification, effacement ou autres formes de distorsion ;

i) l'idéologie n'a pas besoin d'être cohérente : certaines idéologies représentent des systèmes d'idées plus cohérents que d'autres ;

j) l'idéologie peut être plus ou moins consciente ;

k) l'idéologie peut être plus ou moins explicite⁵ ; en principe, plus une idéologie est acceptée, moins elle est consciente, donc moins elle a besoin d'être explicitée. Inversement, lorsqu'on assiste à une abondance de discours sur des questions linguistiques, il est à présumer que leur contenu idéologique n'a pas l'adhésion de la communauté.

En analyse du discours, on sépare traditionnellement le contenu propositionnel, exprimé comme un ensemble de concepts et relations, et la modalité, qui est l'attitude du locuteur par rapport au contenu, présenté comme réel ou irréel, obligatoire, douteux, possible, etc. Comme j'analyse ici des idéologies à travers leurs manifestations discursives, il semble opportun d'utiliser la même approche. Dans la suite, je séparerai donc le contenu d'idées des idéologies, pour ensuite aborder la modalité, c'est-à-dire la mise en œuvre des idéologies sous forme de politiques linguistiques.

3.1. Contenu : le purisme

Le premier aspect dans lequel on a étudié les idéologies de la langue est, comme je viens de le signaler, le contact linguistique et la variation. Or, quel que soit le type d'idéologie que l'on analyse, le purisme semble

être un élément incontournable. Il vise à préserver la forme linguistique « pure » contre toute « salissure » venant des argots ou jargons, des dialectes ou d'une langue étrangère⁶. Dans cette dernière manifestation, le purisme vise à une sélection artificielle des sources d'enrichissement d'une langue : « Purism is the opening of the native sources and closure of the non-native sources » (Annamalai 1979, apud Jernudd 1989 : 4). Malgré une opinion très répandue, le purisme ne vise pas uniquement à corriger les formes contemporaines et le profil futur d'une langue (ce que j'appellerai purisme prospectif), mais aussi à modifier son héritage historique (purisme rétrospectif).

La France est un cas exemplaire et exceptionnel de purisme prospectif à l'heure actuelle (Ager 1999). En réponse à la « menace » de l'anglais (Weinstein 1989), l'État français a mis en place un dispositif légal et des organismes de défense de la langue. La loi Bas-Lauriol de 1975, devenue loi Toubon en 1994, interdit explicitement l'usage de mots étrangers (lire « anglais ») dans la communication publique :

Dans la désignation, l'offre, la présentation, le mode d'emploi ou d'utilisation, la description de l'étendue et des conditions de garantie d'un bien, d'un produit ou d'un service, ainsi que dans les factures et quittances, l'emploi de la langue française est obligatoire. Les mêmes dispositions s'appliquent à toute publicité écrite, parlée ou audiovisuelle (article 2).

Toute inscription ou annonce apposée ou faite sur la voie publique, dans un lieu ouvert au public ou dans un moyen de transport en commun et destinée à l'information du public doit être formulée en langue française (article 3).

Quels qu'en soient l'objet et les formes, les contrats auxquels une personne morale de droit public ou une personne privée exécutant une mission de service public sont parties sont rédigés en langue française. Ils ne peuvent contenir ni expression ni terme étrangers lorsqu'il existe une expression ou un terme français de même sens approuvés dans les conditions prévues par les dispositions réglementaires relatives à l'enrichissement de la langue française (article 5).

Tout participant à une manifestation, un colloque ou un congrès organisé en France par des personnes physiques ou morales de nationalité française a le droit de s'exprimer en français. Les documents distribués aux participants (...) doivent être rédigés en français (article 6).

L'emploi d'une marque de fabrique, de commerce ou de service constituée d'une expression ou d'un terme étrangers est interdit aux personnes morales de droit public dès lors qu'il existe une expression ou un terme français de même sens approuvés dans les conditions prévues par les dispositions réglementaires relatives à l'enrichissement de la langue française (article 14).

En soutien à ce dispositif législatif, des organismes financés par l'État ont pour objet la protection de la langue française (Adamson 2007). Dans sa dimension nationale, avant tout : en 1966 est créé le Haut comité pour la défense et l'expansion de la langue française, réorganisé en 1989 comme Délégation générale à la langue française (et « aux langues de France » depuis 2001, même si les « langues régionales » enfin découvertes par le législateur ne semblent pas beaucoup préoccuper cet organisme !). La DGLFLF coordonne l'activité d'autres organismes, notamment la Commission générale de terminologie et de néologie et ses dix-huit commissions spécialisées, qui publient plusieurs fois par an des listes d'équivalents français pour les mots techniques d'origine anglaise. En outre, la DGLFLF est responsable des dernières révisions de l'orthographe (décembre 1990). Cet ensemble d'organismes est hautement politisé, à preuve la dépendance directe du Premier ministre et le fait que les recommandations orthographiques et les listes de néologismes sont publiées dans le Journal officiel, dont elles tirent un caractère obligatoire, du moins aux yeux du public (Encrevé 1995, Adamson 2007). Ce dispositif collabore formellement avec l'Académie française ; en réalité, depuis la fin du XIX^e siècle, l'État français limite de plus en plus le rôle de l'Académie dans la question de la langue, la reléguant à une fonction purement décorative (Hautebois 2003).

Dans la dimension internationale, le purisme hérite directement de la conception universaliste de la langue française (Weinstein 1989) et vise au maintien et à l'expansion de l'usage du français dans le monde. De nouveau, par le biais d'organismes totalement ou partiellement soutenus par l'État : Alliance française et Instituts français, différentes agences de la Francophonie. Globalement, le purisme prospectif est la réaction à la perte du statut que le français avait jusqu'au XIX^e siècle, en faveur de l'anglais, perçu comme une menace.

Toute autre est la situation du standard roumain, dont le prestige est uniquement national, et n'a jamais été sérieusement menacé par un autre idiome. On ne peut être que surpris, dans ces conditions, de voir s'y

mettre en place un dispositif légal de protection. La loi de protection de la langue roumaine, proposée en 1993, rejetée, oubliée, enfin promulguée en 2004, prévoit que :

Art. 1. (1) Tout texte d'intérêt public (...) écrit ou prononcé en langue roumaine doit être correct du point de vue de l'adéquation des termes et dans ses aspects grammaticaux, orthographiques et de ponctuation, dans le respect des normes académiques en vigueur.

(2) Tout texte d'intérêt public écrit ou prononcé dans une langue étrangère, quelles que soient ses dimensions, sera accompagné de sa traduction en langue roumaine. (ma trad.)

Cette loi, toujours en vigueur, est justifiée dans le préambule par « la prolifération dans l'espace public, après 1989, des textes (...) en langue étrangère » et par le fait que « la majorité des personnes qui forment la population de notre pays ne connaît pas ces langues étrangères, ce qui suscite un état d'inconfort intellectuel et d'irritation allant jusqu'au sentiment d'aliénation dans son propre pays » (ma trad.). Le repère temporel n'est pas innocent, et montre que cette mesure est un prolongement de l'idéologie nationaliste des années 1971-1989, lorsqu'on voulut isoler la langue roumaine de tout contact, par la censure de la presse étrangère et l'arrêt de la circulation des personnes. La loi voudrait ainsi protéger la population, présumée innocente dans sa pureté linguistique, du déferlement soudain d'idiomes incompréhensibles et de discours fautifs, émanant de locuteurs « incontrôlés ».

Moins restrictive que la loi française dont elle s'inspire peut-être, la loi roumaine désigne elle aussi l'ennemi dans les langues étrangères, sans autre précision ; mais si l'étude des listes France Terme laisse voir que la loi française est concernée par l'afflux de mots anglais, le cas roumain est plus délicat. En l'absence d'organismes et publications similaires venant assurer le respect de la loi linguistique, le seul indice reste le contexte d'invocation de cette loi. Or, dans l'observatoire de la presse, réalisé périodiquement par l'Académie roumaine en vertu de cette loi, l'emploi de mots anglais occupe environ une demi-page sur les 20 du rapport⁷, et aucune plainte au Conseil de l'Audiovisuel (CNA) en vertu de cette loi n'a visé l'emploi des langues étrangères. Toutefois, une proposition d'amendement de 2015, rejetée, visait explicitement la présence de la langue hongroise dans les médias par câble. Pour certains du moins, la

menace ne vient pas de l'anglais universel, mais de la langue du voisin. Par ailleurs, la loi de protection de la langue roumaine est plus large que son correspondant français, car elle vise aussi la pureté grammaticale ; c'est en effet la dimension qui est visée prioritairement par l'observatoire de la presse.

Ainsi, le dispositif législatif français est effectivement la manifestation d'un purisme prospectif dirigé contre un idiome extérieur, perçu comme une menace au corps linguistique national. La loi roumaine, soutenue par un dispositif institutionnel plus réduit, semble moins hostile à l'influence étrangère, et vise plutôt à imposer l'usage du standard dans certains contextes.

Le purisme rétrospectif, par contre, est au cœur de l'idéologie nationaliste de la langue dans les deux cas analysés ici. En premier lieu, parce que la situation historique (malgré le classement différent du français et du roumain cf. Kloss 1967⁸) pose le même problème à l'idéologie de la langue nationale. Objectivement, l'essentiel du matériel linguistique français et roumain est le latin adopté à une date historique par une population non latinophone. Ce phénomène de conversion linguistique (*language shift*) est connu et amplement documenté à toutes les époques, pourtant il représente une pierre d'achoppement pour toute idéologie fondée sur l'ancienneté et la continuité de peuplement d'un territoire (Thiesse 1999). En effet, la conversion implique de reconnaître une infériorité culturelle de l'autochtone par rapport au conquérant venu de l'extérieur⁹. Sans surprise donc, les idéologies nationales s'efforceront à revaloriser l'autochtone.

Le mythe de la langue gauloise commence avec Ramus qui affirme en 1559 que la langue française est « gauloise, nullement latine », voix isolée reprise à la fin du XIX^e siècle (Chiss 2011), dans un contexte qui dépasse la question linguistique. En fait, dès le XVIII^e siècle, Boulainvilliers envisageait l'histoire de la France comme la victoire de la race franque sur la race gauloise, y voyant la justification des privilèges de l'aristocratie d'origine germanique ; ce discours sera amplement repris dans le sens contraire par la Révolution, qui identifie le Gaulois avec le peuple opprimé prenant enfin sa revanche historique. Il sera redécouvert après Sedan et diffusé par l'école, les cérémonies et les arts de la III^e République, qui inventent proprement un « mythe de Vercingétorix », et enfin récupéré après les guerres mondiales dans une dimension territoriale – la France dans les limites de la Gaule – et affective – le Gaulois associé au poilu,

puis au résistant (Amalvi 1984, Weber 1991). Tout cet imaginaire gaulois bute toutefois sur l'argument linguistique, car comment reconnaître que l'ancêtre héroïque, donnant sa vie pour défendre sa terre contre l'envahisseur romain, ait pu abandonner son bien le plus précieux, la langue, et adopter la culture de l'ennemi détesté ? Les manuels républicains présentent alors la nation France comme la symbiose entre l'esprit rural, fruste mais authentique et sincère des Gaulois, et la civilisation romaine (Maingueneau 1979), entre la campagne et la ville, la nature et la culture (Billard et Guibbert 1976) laissant souvent sous-entendre un poids égal des deux héritages¹⁰. Mais la langue continue à faire obstacle.

Commence donc à la Révolution et au XIX^e siècle, avec l'Académie celtique fondée en 1804¹¹, puis avec des chercheurs individuels, une « quête frénétique de la langue gauloise » (Thiesse 1999 : 71), nonobstant la rareté des témoins : il ne reste du gaulois que quelques exotismes transmis au latin, des toponymes peu informatifs sur le profil de la langue, quelques inscriptions en graphie grecque ou latine, trop courtes et répétitives, ou pas encore déchiffrées, et des mots cités par les auteurs latins. L'héritage linguistique est recherché donc indirectement, et hâtivement identifié dans tout phénomène linguistique qui ne semble pas d'origine latine. Ainsi, Monin 1861, pour ne prendre qu'un exemple, propose une origine gauloise pour les voyelles nasales, le /a/ caduc, les consonnes mouillées et les mi-palatales /j/ et /z/ ; il propose en outre une liste assez longue de lexèmes¹² et de suffixes, et environ 80 idiotismes d'origine gauloise. Le dictionnaire étymologique de Gamillscheg en est également influencé lorsqu'il enregistre plus de 180 mots d'origine gauloise, dont la plupart faussement reconstruits.

Ainsi, la première manifestation de « celtomanie » est révolutionnaire, et culmine avec la création de l'Académie celtique, qui combine philologie, archéologie et ethnologie. Dans cette phase, la langue gauloise est cherchée dans le bas-breton, considéré son seul vestige (en réalité une variété brittonique venue sur le continent au V^e siècle)¹³. Un autre courant, plus en vogue après la Vendée, voit dans le celte/gaulois la langue adamique, ou du moins la mère du latin et du grec¹⁴. Enfin, dans la seconde moitié du XIX^e siècle, on préfère voir dans le gaulois un proche parent du latin¹⁵. La langue nationale, identifiée au gaulois, doit être ainsi plus ancienne que toutes les autres, qui en seraient, si possible, les rejetons ; sinon la langue universelle du monde ancien (ce qui justifierait l'universalité moderne du français ?) ; sinon du moins la sœur du latin, lui ressemblant au point que les locuteurs les confondaient.

En outre, l'énumération des lexèmes gaulois (noms d'animaux et plantes, ou les célèbres *bracca* 'braies' du paysan gaulois) laisse voir le caractère rural et « exotique » de cet héritage, ce qui explique la tendance de nombreux ouvrages du XIX^e siècle à proposer des chiffres au lieu des listes de termes, donc une évaluation quantitative et non pas qualitative de l'apport gaulois au français.

On aura remarqué d'autre part que la quête des étymologies gauloises s'inscrit dans le mouvement plus ample de l'ossianisme (Pomian 1997, Thiesse 1999), de la course au plus ancien ancêtre¹⁶ et d'un changement de perspective historique : avant le romantisme, l'histoire commençait par un événement fondateur qui symbolisait l'assimilation vivifiante de l'étranger (colonisation des Gaules par César, puis baptême du germanique Clovis, ou conquête de Trajan, christianisation par Saint André et les différentes *descălecări* à l'origine des États moldave et valaque¹⁷) ; le romantisme le remplace par la vision de la permanence, de la durée, de l'immuabilité de la nation. Avec le problème de la conversion linguistique, que j'évoquais ci-dessus, le contexte culturel romantique et le changement de vision sur les débuts nationaux expliquent ainsi la similitude de la mythologie française et roumaine des origines.

Dans son aspect linguistique, l'idéologie nationale roumaine commence (Muntean 2012) avec le dictionnaire étymologique de B.P. Hasdeu (1887), dont le projet est proposé par le roi Carol I et vise explicitement à préserver le trésor de « la langue ancienne et [de] ses variétés populaires » (Préface, p. iv). Hasdeu procède, comme l'abbé Grégoire en 1793, par questionnaires ethnologico-linguistiques, et fait appel à l'hypothèse du substrat dace à chaque fois que l'étymologie est obscure¹⁸. Toutefois, l'époque n'est pas favorable, car le latin est préféré en tant qu'ancêtre plus prestigieux de la langue culte. Et si un courant ossianiste est sensible en Roumanie au début du XX^e siècle, il touche essentiellement l'imaginaire relatif à la religion et aux traditions des Daces, moins la langue. Inutile de préciser d'ailleurs que les témoins linguistiques daces sont encore plus rares et douteux que les témoins du gaulois. Quelques chercheurs continuent à reconstruire des mots daces dans la ligne de Hasdeu, mais la démarche est surtout l'œuvre d'amateurs, tels l'écrivain Brătescu-Voinești ou le général des armées R. Portocală. Elle recourt aux mêmes hypothèses que la recherche française sur le gaulois pour éviter l'écueil de la conversion linguistique : la langue dace est plus ancienne que le latin, elle est à l'origine de divers idiomes européens, dont le latin¹⁹ ; ou bien le dace est cognate du latin et tellement proche

que les deux idiomes étaient spontanément compréhensibles l'un pour l'autre²⁰, ce qui annule l'hypothèse de l'acculturation.

Dans le contexte du nationalisme des années 1971-1989, la question dace est réactivée. Elle présentait de nombreux avantages pour la mythologie nationale soutenue par Ceaușescu, qui avait besoin d'un ancêtre autochtone, pur, prestigieux, ainsi que pour la politique isolationniste qui voulait rompre avec l'Est (et l'influence soviétique) et partiellement avec l'Ouest, et donc avec la thèse pan-latiniste. Cette fois-ci, l'autorité de l'État vient soutenir ce qui était auparavant des projets individuels d'amateurs. Selon Boia 1997, le la est donné en 1976, dans un article anonyme de la revue *Anale de istorie* (revue de l'Institut d'histoire du Parti Communiste), qui reprend la thèse de la langue dace cognate du latin. La même revue publie en 1979 un article qui affirme la supériorité culturelle des Daces, qui auraient connu l'écriture. Dans la revue *Era socialistă* (organe officiel du Parti pour les sciences humaines) pour la seule année 1978, 9 numéros sur les 12 contiennent des articles sur la contribution (y compris linguistique) des Daces dans la genèse roumaine. Sans surprise, les historiens, linguistes ou amateurs qui défendent la thèse du fonds linguistique autochtone sont proches des structures du pouvoir²¹.

La langue des Daces pénètre dans le manuel scolaire unique après 1978, sous la forme d'une liste de termes sensiblement égale à la liste de mots latins présentée en miroir, et appartenant au même domaine rural-agricole²². Les précédents défenseurs de l'héritage dace, notamment Hasdeu et Densusianu, sont réhabilités, republiés, enseignés en tant que sources scientifiques fiables. Lorsque la Bulgarie organise en 1972 un Congrès international de thracologie, le Parti critique la faible présence roumaine et l'absence de l'argument linguistique²³, ce à quoi on remédiera en organisant un congrès semblable à Bucarest, en 1976, attentivement encadré par le Parti, et un Institut interdisciplinaire de thracologie (en 1979). Selon Boia 1997, on aurait même envisagé la création d'une chaire de langue dace à l'Université de Bucarest. Enfin, la question dace est au cœur des interventions roumaines au XV^e Congrès international des sciences historiques (Bucarest, 1980), selon la ligne indiquée par N. Ceaușescu²⁴. La même année, on célèbre avec faste 2050 ans depuis la fondation du premier État unitaire, sous Burebista, l'occasion de nombreuses publications autour des Daces – et de leur langue.

L'argumentaire relatif au fonds autochtone utilise la même rhétorique que dans le cas français : citation d'autorités antiques évoquant des mots daces, étude de la toponymie, comparaison avec des variétés

censées cognates (l'albanais dans le cas roumain, qui est le descendant de la branche thraco-illyre des langues indo-européennes), évaluations quantitatives jamais complètement exemplifiées (un ouvrage de 1984, *Contribuții la cunoașterea limbii dacilor*, par A. Berinde et S. Lugojan, avance jusqu'à 700 lexèmes daces conservés en roumain). Mais, différence de philosophie oblige, si les ouvrages français du XIX^e siècle évoquaient parfois des aspects grammaticaux du gaulois (comme Monin 1861 ci-dessus), les études roumaines sur le dace ne font appel qu'au lexique, et valorisent son aspect rural, folklorique, populaire, qui correspond à l'image qu'on veut donner de l'ancêtre du peuple.

Ce premier aspect du purisme rétrospectif procède ainsi par « iconisation » (Irvine et Gal 2000) du substrat prélatin. Un second purisme rétrospectif, lui aussi partagé par le français et le roumain, procède par contre par « effacement », celui du superstrat.

L'existence d'une influence linguistique ultérieure au latin en français et en roumain est indubitable, et aisément vérifiable, car dans ce cas les témoins ne manquent pas : témoins synchroniques (puisque les superstrats, germanique et balkanique, ont des descendants contemporains) et diachroniques (leur influence peut être datée et suivie dans les textes du passé). Ce qui semble problématique dans la perspective nationaliste et puriste, c'est le poids du superstrat.

En France, la querelle idéologique qui opposait, depuis Boulaivilliers et Sièyes, les Gaulois aux Francs, a conduit, comme je viens de le montrer, à une réinvention des premiers et, étonnamment, à un grand silence sur les seconds ; révélatrice à ce propos, la grande synthèse de Pomian 1997, malgré son titre « Francs et Gaulois », ne s'occupe que des derniers. Les manuels scolaires de la III^e République n'évoquent aucun héritage germanique ; les diverses histoires de la langue et dictionnaires étymologiques de la même époque reconnaissent une influence lexicale, à l'exception de Fustel de Coulanges, par ailleurs célèbre pour son anti-germanisme, qui nie explicitement en 1875 toute influence culturelle et, partant, linguistique des Germains. La vision populaire semble en outre marquée par l'approche sensualiste du XVIII^e siècle (Rousseau, Rivarol), qui qualifiait l'allemand moderne de « rude, criard, monotone » (Rousseau), « guttural et dur » (Rivarol), par opposition à l'harmonie du français. Cette vision, reprise dans le discours révolutionnaire, dans le contexte de la nécessaire francisation de l'Alsace (Rousseville, *Dissertation sur la francilisation de la ci-devant Alsace*, an II), abandonnée par la suite,

a pu ressurgir après 1870 dans un imaginaire populaire de l'Allemand agressif et brutal.

Les aspects du superstrat germanique qui posent effectivement un problème « idéologique » jusqu'à aujourd'hui sont les conditions socio-culturelles du contact linguistique et la profondeur de celui-ci. L'apport lexical n'est pas contredit, ni falsifié dans son poids ou sa composition, même s'il a touché jusqu'au couches profondes de la langue française (noms de couleur, verbes de sentiment, outils grammaticaux). Par contre, l'influence structurelle germanique montre une faille claire parmi les spécialistes, imputable, à mon avis, à un parti-pris idéologique. Les linguistes allemands et anglophones²⁵ reconnaissent en général comme des germanismes un nombre de traits structurels du français : phénomènes phonétiques (/h/ aspiré, /w/ > /g^w/ > /g/ initial), morphologiques (conservation du système casuel et certaines formes de déclinaison ancien française, formation du pronom *on*, etc.), syntaxiques (interrogation totale avec le verbe en première position, inversion du sujet après adverbe initial de phrase, possibilité d'antéposition de l'adjectif, etc.). Ces phénomènes sont traités généralement par la linguistique française²⁶ comme des évolutions internes, et l'hypothèse germanique n'est pas évoquée. Parfois un discours contradictoire est sensible, qui s'ingénie à démontrer le caractère non germanique de ces phénomènes grammaticaux, tout en évitant d'exposer le point de vue qu'il combat²⁷.

Car reconnaître (la possibilité d') une influence structurelle, c'est reconnaître un contact autrement plus étendu, plus long et plus profond que ne le laisse supposer l'influence lexicale. En effet, toutes les histoires de la France, depuis le XVIII^e siècle, évoquent une petite minorité franque dominante, qui a fini par s'assimiler au bout de quelques siècles, n'apportant dans sa nouvelle patrie linguistique que quelques mots. L'importation de traits grammaticaux, par contre, témoignerait de ce que Sala 2013 : 210 reconnaît être « a situation of active bilingualism (or probably 'bilingualism with diglossia'), in which speakers with very good knowledge of both languages may have been influenced by Frankish morphology, syntax and phonology in their use of Gallo-Romance ». Un tel type de contact linguistique implique une longue durée, l'égalité d'usage des langues, et une base démographique qualitativement et quantitativement plus équilibrée. Ce n'est donc pas la domination d'une aristocratie germanique qui est ici problématique, comme le laissait entendre la théorie de Boulainvilliers, mais la composition ethnique (si l'on conserve l'équivalence romantique ethnique – langue) et le mélange

culturel à tous les niveaux. Les tenants de la thèse du substrat voulaient ainsi éviter la conversion linguistique latine en inventant une situation de mélange gallo-latin, alors que les tenants du non-germanisme adoptent la conversion à bras ouverts pour éviter l'hypothèse du mélange.

Dans le cas du roumain, l'idéologie national-communiste a travaillé elle aussi à l'effacement des superstrats, notamment slave, mais pour des raisons différentes. Après l'idéologie des débuts nationaux, qui voulait chasser le slave, le grec et le turc, lorsque le standard se stabilise suffisamment dans sa forme et dans sa fonction, les superstrats ne posent plus problème. On le constate surtout dans les manuels²⁸ du début du XX^e siècle, qui font une place importante aux nombreuses influences post latines et détaillent l'apport lexical slave, hongrois, grec, turc et néo-latin et, lorsque c'est le cas, la contribution grammaticale de ces langues. L'image de la langue nationale, telle qu'elle se dégage de ces livres de la Roumanie fraîchement unie est celle d'un idiome riche par sa diversité, accueillant et flexible précisément grâce à son profil bariolé. Tout le contraire du purisme !

Mais vint 1947 et l'idéologie soviétique, qui s'imposa du jour au lendemain. Dans sa dimension linguistique et telle qu'elle se manifesta en Roumanie de 1947 à 1960 environ, cette idéologie visait : a) à rapprocher le roumain de la famille slave ; b) à soutenir et encourager le multilinguisme. C'est ainsi que le manuel unique d'histoire de 1947, coordonné par l'idéologue Mihai Roller, affirme que l'influence slave a marqué profondément le roumain et conclut que « la morphologie est majoritairement latine, la syntaxe – latine et slave, et le vocabulaire majoritairement non latin (surtout slave) » (ma trad.)²⁹. Une telle idéologie agressive, venue de l'extérieur, contraire à l'imaginaire roumain sur la langue nationale (créé lors de la standardisation du XIX^e siècle en rupture avec l'héritage slave et grec) ne pouvait être que rejetée, ce qui fut fait dès 1960. C'est par réaction à cette idéologie soviétique que le national-communisme s'ingénia à minimiser le poids slave dans la formation de la langue nationale³⁰. Sans doute, cela participait d'une idéologie plus vaste, qui d'une part faisait des Slaves un facteur de retard dans la modernisation des Roumains (idée datant du XIX^e siècle), et d'autre part correspondait à la politique de distanciation de Ceaușescu par rapport aux Soviétiques.

Par ailleurs, il faut préciser que l'idéologie communiste mélange volontairement apport slave proprement dit (savant ou commun) et influences balkaniques – le nom même est banni et ne figure nulle part, même dans les ouvrages scientifiques. En effet, on savait depuis 1930

que le roumain fait partie d'une aire de convergence linguistique ; la notion est adoptée dans les recherches roumaines et figure même dans un manuel scolaire de 1935 (cf. note 29). Or, l'aire de convergence suppose (Thomason 2001) des contacts fréquents, à tous les niveaux, sur une très longue période, entre des langues ayant un prestige égal, ou plutôt un manque égal de prestige. Dans cette situation particulière et plutôt rare, les langues en présence développent des traits structuraux communs. Or, reconnaître la présence de traits grammaticaux balkaniques en roumain équivaut à reconnaître que la langue nationale n'avait pas plus de prestige que les langues voisines (bulgare, macédonien, albanais, grec). En outre, une théorie historique, qui préoccupait grandement les idéologues national-communistes, évoquait la migration des populations roumaines au Sud du Danube et leur retour tardif sur le territoire moderne de la Roumanie. L'appartenance du roumain à l'aire balkanique pouvait être un argument en faveur de cette théorie, du moins tant qu'on se plaçait dans le paradigme nation – territoire – langue. C'est pourquoi on n'évoque jamais, en matière de superstrat, qu'une influence superficielle, lexicale, et uniquement slave, et les éléments grammaticaux invoqués sont toujours latins.

De même et sans surprise, l'idéologie national-communiste n'évoque nulle part l'influence néolatine, pourtant massive et décisive lors de la formation du standard national au XIX^e siècle. En effet, cela équivaudrait à reconnaître que la langue nationale est un artefact de date historique, et même récente. Comme on le verra ci-dessous, cela contredit tout un imaginaire nationaliste qui mise sur le caractère archaïque et immuable de la langue nationale.

Ainsi, en français comme en roumain, le purisme rétrospectif part d'un élément réel, le fonds latin, y ajoute un substrat exagéré, censé représenter l'ancienneté et l'originalité nationales à l'intérieur de la famille romane, et en efface les superstrats non savants, qui ont le désavantage d'être aussi les langues de nations voisines et de rappeler une période pré-nationale où les populations ont été en conflit, mais aussi en contact très étroit³¹.

Enfin, une dernière dimension du purisme vise à définir et à justifier une bonne forme du standard. Par sa nature même, le standard fonctionnel est une variété écrite, formée par les milieux savants et littéraires pour servir à la communication dans ces contextes précis. Dès que le standard est investi d'une valeur symbolique, sa genèse et sa nature sont déformées.

Certes, la langue française voulue par la Révolution est démocratique et doit appartenir à toute la nation, mais l'image qu'en donne le XIX^e siècle, et surtout l'école de la III^e République est celle d'un français créé par les meilleurs auteurs du passé, éminemment urbain et civilisateur (Maingueneau 1979), en écho à l'effort d'industrialisation et d'urbanisation d'une part, à la colonisation, de l'autre. Au moins, cette image du bon usage français reste proche de la réalité historique du standard. Mais elle est aussi archaïsante, dans ce sens que le canon scolaire est constitué, jusque dans les années 1970, majoritairement d'auteurs du XVII^e et du XVIII^e siècle (Milo 1997), dans un déni de modernisation dont témoignent par ailleurs les refus du public à toucher à l'orthographe du français et à son principe étymologique. La bonne langue française est ainsi dans le passé, l'apanage des grands classiques³².

Dans l'espace roumain, par contre, la définition du bon usage a été le lieu de la plus grande bataille idéologique du XIX^e siècle. Bataille d'autant plus importante qu'elle intervient en parallèle de la standardisation elle-même et peut influencer le matériel linguistique (Muntean 2012). L'École transylvaine, promotrice de l'exclusivisme latin, est rapidement accusée d'élitisme et d'artificialité savante³³ ; les promoteurs de la modernisation par emprunt au français et à l'italien³⁴ sont accusés de falsifier l'esprit national et de déguiser le bon roumain ; enfin, les autochtonistes³⁵ sont accusés de passéisme, d'esprit rural et de primitivisme. Ces trois formes de purisme se manifestent avant et après la création de l'État roumain, lorsque la société découvre le pluralisme politique ; sans surprise, la question linguistique est intégrée donc aux positions politiques³⁶ de chaque acteur. Il est pourtant douteux si ce débat politique a eu un effet réel sur le corpus du standard, qui se forme par le travail des auteurs et traducteurs et la consécration de l'usage. De nombreux mots slaves, grecs et turcs disparaissent effectivement à cette époque, mais parce que les institutions, fonctions ou concepts qu'ils exprimaient disparaissent ; les nouveaux concepts sont empruntés au français, à l'italien, à l'allemand non par programme, mais parce qu'ils sont créés dans ces cultures, auxquelles empruntent toutes les langues européennes au même moment. Peu des néologismes latins ou emprunts français proposés ont remplacé un mot établi dans l'usage, et aucun calque autochtone. Tout au plus les purismes du XIX^e siècle ont-ils décidé de la forme de tel ou tel emprunt³⁷. Quant aux traits structurels empruntés à cette époque, ils sont certainement d'origine française (conjonctions de subordination, infinitif du verbe, etc.) car ils sont adoptés dans la pratique de la traduction, et on traduit essentiellement du

français. L'emprunt grammatical était donc une nécessité, mais ne résultait pas d'une idéologie préalable.

La bataille idéologique autour de la langue se calme après la création de l'État et des institutions (Académie roumaine, université) qui professionnalisent la question linguistique. L'esprit public est à la tempérance et à la synthèse des influences autour d'un caractère national du standard (Maiorescu et son cercle), qui reste pourtant à définir. Cette définition se préoccupe moins des sources de néologie que du profil socio-culturel du standard, et produit une faille, qui culmine pendant l'entre-deux-guerres, entre les positions traditionaliste et moderniste. Elle reflète en réalité la tension entre la ruralité majoritaire et l'effort d'urbanisation/industrialisation par l'État, ainsi que les doutes d'une institution scolaire, déclarée universelle, mais qui s'adresse à des milieux très différents. La bonne langue roumaine est définie donc, selon que l'on se place dans le champ traditionaliste ou moderniste, comme la langue du peuple, expression de son génie authentique, ou au contraire comme la langue des grands écrivains et de l'usage urbain. Dans cette phase, l'idéologie de la bonne langue a donc partie liée avec un certain projet de société.

Dans la mythologie national-communiste, l'idéologie du bon usage est moins liée à un projet de société qu'à un imaginaire social fait de toutes pièces. En effet, l'urbanisation avait suivi son cours, et Ceaușescu l'accélère même dans les années 80, de même que l'enseignement universel. Pourtant, la rhétorique communiste reprend du XIX^e siècle et de l'entre-deux-guerres uniquement le filon autochtoniste rural, qu'elle inclut dans une construction identitaire claire : l'ancêtre dace identifié au paysan roumain, la patrie identifiée au paysage vallonné semé de villages, les arts identifiés au folklore, la langue associée à la mère, à la maison (nécessairement rurale), au chant des bergers. La langue nationale est l'apanage du peuple (on n'évoque plus les grands faiseurs de langue), elle n'est pas une création, mais un attribut de toujours du peuple, et elle est homogène (à la différence du discours de l'entre-deux-guerres, on n'évoque plus les dialectes extérieurs ou intérieurs). L'éducation littéraire est aussi rurale : un survol rapide des manuels de primaire après 1982 montre que les sujets ruraux et folkloriques occupent de la moitié (lectures obligatoires de 2^e) jusqu'aux trois quarts (manuel de 4^e) des lectures, les autres traitant de l'école et de la société contemporaine, dans une perspective qui efface les distinctions socio-culturelles. Il s'agit probablement d'un reflet moins de la société elle-même, que du projet antiélitiste spécifique aux communistes. Ce discours sur la bonne langue

roumaine n'a pas eu, ne pouvait pas avoir de conséquence sur le corps de la langue, ni sur les usages, dominés de toute manière par une langue de bois asociale et aculturelle. On peut pourtant se demander – la question reste ouverte – si le recul actuel du standard dans la sphère publique (Ripeanu 2002) n'est pas dû à cette absence d'éducation à la variation linguistique de l'époque communiste et à cette idéologie d'un « standard populaire et inné ».

3.2. Contenu : les qualités de la langue

Le génie [des langues] est un lieu de pouvoir.
(Meschonnic 2000 : 10)

Une fois investi de valeur symbolique, le standard acquiert des qualités intrinsèques, qui ont une double fonction : justifier son incorporation dans une construction idéologique plus large, et son rôle dominant dans la société, au-delà de sa fonctionnalité. Les qualités d'une langue forment son « génie », un concept qui se cristallise au XVIII^e siècle avec Rivarol, Du Marsais et Voltaire³⁸. À l'époque des Lumières, le génie de la langue sert surtout à « mesurer jusqu'à quel point la place qu'occupait telle ou telle communauté dans l'histoire était celle qui lui revenait » (Crépon 2000 : 10) ; avec le Romantisme, le génie de la langue s'identifie avec la nation ou le peuple d'une part, avec le génie du poète d'autre part. Or, au XVIII^e siècle, le français est la langue de culture de l'Europe ; son génie sera donc obligatoirement savant (l'ordre, la clarté) et universel. Au début du XIX^e siècle, le standard roumain se forme à l'ombre du romantisme ethnociste, dans une culture qui s'efforce de s'individualiser ; son génie sera donc populaire, doux, maternel, affectif. Mais au-delà de ces lieux communs, la langue admet d'autres qualités et représentations.

Canut 2007 dresse une liste des principaux topoi qui sont associés à l'idiome symbolique de la communauté : langue-origine ou adamique, langue-corps, langue pure, langue de la race, langue maternelle, langue identitaire, langue une, langue civilisée. Au gré des contextes historiques, ces « qualités » s'associent en constructions idéologiques.

La réflexion sur le français se cristallise au XVI^e siècle, dans le mouvement d'émancipation par rapport au latin (Swiggers 1987) ; de là vient son premier attribut symbolique, la clarté, qualité intellectuelle qui justifie que le français reprenne le flambeau du latin dans les sciences, le droit et l'enseignement. En effet, le Collège de France, contrepoids à

la latinisante Sorbonne, est fondé en 1530 ; en 1539, l'Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts impose l'usage du français dans la justice ; en 1549, Du Bellay ouvre une longue série d'ouvrages visant à justifier la précellence du français. Mais encore faut-il préciser les lieux de cette clarté. Le XVII^e siècle, siècle des Remarques et des dictionnaires³⁹, la cherche dans le lexique ; le XVIII^e siècle rationaliste et mécaniciste la trouve dans la syntaxe :

Ce qui distingue notre langue des langues anciennes et modernes, c'est l'ordre et la construction de la phrase. Cet ordre doit toujours être direct et nécessairement clair. Le français nomme d'abord le sujet du discours, ensuite le verbe qui est l'action, et enfin l'objet de cette action : voilà la logique naturelle à tous les hommes. (Rivarol, *Discours*)

Dans sa marche claire et méthodique, la pensée se déroule facilement ; c'est ce qui lui donne un caractère de raison, de probité. (abbé Grégoire, *Rapport...*, 1794)

Le français est aussi langue diplomatique et langue des salons ; il a donc nécessairement les qualités associées à ces pratiques : douceur, facilité, agrément (Voltaire). On voit ici se réunir les topoï de la langue pure et de la langue civilisée. La Révolution y ajoute la nécessaire unicité :

On peut uniformer le langage d'une grande nation, de manière que tous les citoyens qui la composent, puissent sans obstacle se communiquer leurs pensées. Cette entreprise, qui ne fut pleinement exécutée chez aucun peuple, est digne du peuple français, qui centralise toutes les branches de l'organisation sociale, et qui doit être jaloux de consacrer au plûtôt, dans une République une et indivisible, l'usage unique et invariable de la langue de la liberté. (abbé Grégoire, *Rapport...*, 1794)

L'unité de la langue nationale reviendra dans les consciences après la guerre de 1870, et présidera aux politiques scolaires de Jules Ferry, à partir de 1880. Dans l'intervalle, le génie de la langue française est associé au génie du peuple (idée qui se trouvait en embryon chez Rivarol), ou bien au génie des auteurs :

Notre harmonie n'est pas un don de la langue ; elle est l'ouvrage du talent. (La Harpe, *Le lycée...*, 1822, p. 87)

Les vrais grammairiens, ce sont les hommes de génie ; ils refont les langues, ils les échauffent à leur foyer et les forgent sur leur enclume. (P. Chasles, Préface à Bescherelle, 1845, *apud* Vanoosthuyse 2009)

L'association avec le génie poétique ajoute au français une autre qualité : l'harmonie, l'euphonie, qui ne survit pas au-delà de cette époque. Ce qui en survit, c'est une « conception littéraire de la langue française » (Eloy 1998), autour d'un corpus d'auteurs canoniques. Vers le milieu du siècle⁴⁰ et surtout après 1870, le génie de la langue rencontre la nation (Meschonnic 2000) dans une construction politique et identitaire qui survit au moins jusqu'à l'étonnant *Génie de la langue française* d'A. Dauzat 1943, qui affirme que la langue est « un des éléments primordiaux de la patrie » (p. 8).

Dans son long parcours historique, le français a ainsi plutôt accumulé que remplacé les épithètes : il est clair et suit la logique naturelle ; il est précis ; il est cultivé ; il est unique pour sa nation, et universel dans le monde. Ces qualités se regroupent dans un ensemble imaginaire assez cohérent : langue intellectuelle, urbaine, dominante, bref masculine. Et si le génie du français a cessé depuis le milieu du siècle de hanter les linguistes et les critiques littéraires, il se maintient toujours dans le discours scolaire (surtout celui dirigé vers l'étranger⁴¹) et dans le discours des hommes politiques⁴².

Le discours sur la langue roumaine est rationaliste à ses débuts (École transylvaine, mouvement redevable aux Lumières), et orienté vers la pratique langagière. Il devient descriptif avec Ion Heliade Rădulescu, auteur de la première grammaire moderne du roumain (1828). Dans l'introduction, appelée *Geniul limbilor în genere și al celei române în parte*, il propose plusieurs qualités de la langue. La première illustre le topos de la langue-corps, dans les expressions « l'enfance des langues », leur « décrépitude », leur « régénération ». S'y ajoute le topos de la nation :

La langue unifiée et cultivée représente la masculinité, la maturité, l'unité et l'indépendance d'une nation. (...) Dès que la nation devient tributaire d'un autre peuple, dès que les Barbares l'envahissent, les sciences et les arts sont oubliés, et la langue perd de sa vigueur (p. 24, ma trad.)

Chez cet auteur, promoteur de la néologie romane, on sent l'influence de la pensée française dans l'emprunt de la notion même de « génie de la langue », aussi bien que dans le choix des épithètes. Mais cet imaginaire

n'allait pas s'imposer. Heliade Rădulescu propose également, dans *Curs de poezie generală* 1870, l'image de la langue maternelle, dans le sens d'héritage transmis par la mère⁴³, mais aussi dans le sens du lien intime entre la langue et l'individu.

Dans ses articles de presse, Heliade Rădulescu évoque un autre génie du roumain, l'euphonie : « Les Roumains peuvent être fiers de la flexibilité et de l'harmonie de leur langue si sonore » (*apud* Zafiu 2007). Si les qualités imaginées dans la *Grammaire* n'ont pas été adoptées, l'euphonie a perduré. En 1850, A. Pumnul pose la sonorité en qualité essentielle de la (future) langue nationale : « Les organes de la parole exigent qu'elle soit facile à prononcer ; l'ouïe demande qu'elle soit douce et mélodieuse » (Zafiu 2007) ; à son tour, Maiorescu évoque explicitement le « génie euphonique » roumain. La sonorité est associée à un caractère national par Negruzzi 1844, qui impute les « sons grossiers et gutturaux » /i/ et /ə/ à l'influence slave. S'y ajoute, après 1959, la dimension populaire (avec Russo⁴⁴ et surtout Hasdeu) qui implique l'ancienneté, attribut nécessaire au jeune État roumain. Cette dimension reste présente dans l'entre-deux-guerres, dans la dispute idéologique et esthétique qui oppose traditionalistes et modernistes, avec la nuance que « populaire » représente plutôt la réaction d'émancipation du modèle français et un caractère « démocratique » de la langue, pas la dimension folklorique imaginée par Russo ou Hasdeu.

Dans l'entre-deux-guerres, comme dans le premier romantisme français, on se préoccupe surtout d'esthétique et de la contribution de la littérature dans la création du standard ; d'ailleurs, c'est de cette époque que semble dater le nom « langue littéraire » pour le standard roumain. Mais le principe directeur reste toujours l'euphonie : Caracostea parle de « voyelles sombres et claires », et affirme que « le moule métaphysique de la langue est rythmique » (ma trad.).

Parmi les épithètes proposées dans le passé, le national-communisme fera une sélection dans le sens de son idéologie antiélitiste et folklorique-sentimentale. Le discours qualificatif de la langue nationale figure en filigrane dans les manuels et les ouvrages d'histoire⁴⁵, mais son lieu de prédilection reste la poésie patriotique – un genre qui se développe au XIX^e siècle et qui explose littéralement aux années 1980 (Both 2001). J'ai pu ainsi décompter plus de cent titres dédiés exclusivement à la langue nationale, et autant de poèmes patriotiques qui évoquent la langue parmi d'autres topoi. Des époques antérieures, on récupère les dimensions musicale⁴⁶, maternelle⁴⁷ et rurale (notamment l'association avec un

paysage prototypique et avec le berger⁴⁸), mais aussi la dimension fragile, de chose à défendre⁴⁹, qui figurait dans la littérature produite à des époques et à des endroits où le roumain était politiquement menacé : en Bessarabie soviétique, en Grèce, en Transylvanie avant l'union de 1918. On voit mal, dans un État national consolidé, le rôle de cet imaginaire de la langue à défendre, si ce n'est que la langue est associée à la défense (militaire) du pays, qui fut une obsession des dernières années de Ceaușescu. Enfin, l'idiome national, devenu ancien, est associé à la longue marche de la nation à travers l'histoire⁵⁰. On retrouve ainsi dans le discours poétique patriotique les topoi de la langue maternelle, de la langue ancienne et de la langue du peuple (Canut 2007), figurant non aux côtés, mais en association avec tous les lieux communs nationalistes identifiés par Thiesse 1999. Enfin, à la différence du génie du français, intellectuel et masculin, le génie du roumain relève de la sphère féminine et rurale (Both 2001).

Toutefois, les mécanismes rhétoriques sont assez semblables dans les deux cultures. La qualité attribuée à la langue reflète la situation de celle-ci aux débuts de la standardisation (effort de rupture avec le latin et dominance européenne pour le français, langue dominée en quête d'une esthétique propre pour le roumain), mais se prolonge bien au-delà du moment initial. Similairement, si le purisme français ou roumain cherche ses arguments dans la couche superficielle du lexique et occulte les aspects structurels, le discours sur le génie de la langue renchérit sur un aspect structurel – la syntaxe dans le cas français, la phonétique dans le cas roumain. Inutile de préciser que ce choix n'est en rien motivé par le système linguistique lui-même, puisque l'ordre rigide sujet-verbe-objet est le plus fréquent dans le monde, et la phonologie du roumain se place dans une banale moyenne pour ce qui est de l'inventaire des sons ou de la flexibilité des combinaisons⁵¹. Concluons sur l'avis sec des linguistes :

Languages cannot possess good or bad qualities : no language system can ever be shown to be clearer or more logical (or more beautiful, or more ugly) than any other language system. (Bauer & Trudgill 1998 : 29)

4. La modalité : politiques linguistiques

Même si tout groupe, de la famille à l'État ou à la société commerciale, peut être dit avoir une politique linguistique (Spolsky 2004), je réserve plus particulièrement cette notion à l'État, qui est obligé d'en avoir une,

même implicite (Mackey 1989, Boyer 2010), et qui a les moyens de créer des dispositifs pour sa mise en œuvre⁵². Selon une distinction proposée par Kloss 1967, les politiques linguistiques visent trois aspects : la planification de statut⁵³, la planification de corpus⁵⁴ et la planification d'acquisition⁵⁵.

La planification de statut ne devient souvent explicite qu'après la création de l'État (Wright 2004 : 47), et sa tolérance varie en fonction du poids de la langue dans la construction identitaire. Dans la typologie des rapports langue-nation (Orman 2008), la Roumanie et la France appartiennent au même type de nations, qui comptent une langue majoritaire et des langues minoritaires. Sous l'influence de la conception « une langue-une nation », on s'attend à ce que les langues minoritaires y soient vues comme une menace à l'unité nationale, et la politique de ces États devrait viser à les délégitimer, marginaliser ou éliminer. Une telle politique est énoncée en France sous la Terreur (de Certeau, Julia et Revel 1975), mais n'est effectivement mise en œuvre qu'après 1870, par les lois de l'enseignement de J. Ferry, qui imposent l'usage exclusif du français dans l'enseignement. S'y ajoutent différents interdicts de manifestations publiques et surtout les lois de protection de 1975 et 1994 évoquées ci-dessus. Sous la pression européenne et la perspective « écologique » contemporaine, la politique linguistique française passe à la tolérance, sans plus. Les langues dites « régionales » sont conçues comme des pièces de musée à protéger, et leur protection (on ne parle pas vraiment de revigoration) est laissée souvent à l'initiative privée (Ager 1999).

L'État roumain s'est formé par unifications successives (à la différence de la France, qui grandit à partir d'un centre), dans une région de brassage culturel et linguistique. Lors de sa création, les minorités non roumanophones sont à peine minoritaires, et l'État s'efforce surtout de les faire tenir ensemble. Sa politique linguistique sera donc tolérante, en miroir de l'imaginaire sur la langue nationale vue comme synthèse heureuse de plusieurs influences. L'idéologie soviétique, comme je l'ai signalé, soutient les minorités, notamment hongroise, dans une logique d'affaiblissement interne de la Roumanie. C'est pourquoi la politique nationaliste de Ceaușescu ne put pas être explicitement dirigée contre les langues minoritaires. Mais de nombreuses mesures laissent voir une politique implicite d'élimination : réduction progressive de l'enseignement en langue minoritaire⁵⁶, création de classes mixtes⁵⁷, dispersion des enseignants⁵⁸, et enfin politiques de déplacement ou favorisant l'émigration des personnes (Copilaș 2015). La politique de Ceaușescu

visait donc davantage l'acquisition et l'emploi du standard (Wright 2004), dans le cadre d'une planification identitaire plus vaste (Orman 2008).

La planification de corpus est un aspect de la standardisation ; elle procède par des organismes dédiés, comme les Académies, qui ont pour but de réduire la variation interne et d'élaborer le matériel linguistique pour l'usage dans tous les domaines (Wright 2004). Elle ne se fait pas souvent l'écho d'idéologies émanant d'en haut, car elle doit s'appuyer sur la consécration de l'usage commun. Tout au plus peut-on enregistrer : a) le purisme lorsqu'il arrive à dicter le choix des sources d'enrichissement (le mouvement latinisant qui remplace des mots d'origine slave ou grecque par des mots romans) ; b) le même purisme affectant la forme – symbolique – de l'écrit (choix de la graphie latine en roumain, préférence pour le principe étymologique, savant, de l'orthographe en français). Le discours sur le génie de la langue n'a pas d'incidence sur le corpus, mais uniquement sur l'imaginaire de ce que doit être la « bonne » langue et la « bonne » littérature, en rapport avec un projet politique et social.

Ainsi, le discours sur le standard national s'articule, en France comme en Roumanie, autour de contenus similaires, qui affectent (ou n'affectent pas) de manière semblable les politiques linguistiques. Les différences de contexte historique lors du début de la standardisation se reflètent dans les détails, mais non dans le fond de ces discours : même accent sur le purisme, selon les mêmes méthodes d'iconicisation du substrat et d'effacement des superstrats, enfin, même discours sur le génie de la langue et son rapport avec la littérature nationale. Seul semble différent le rapport de l'idéologie à la politique de la langue : tandis que l'idéologie française débute comme une logomachie à la Révolution et s'achève en politique linguistique sous la III^e République, l'idéologie roumaine se forge dans le sillon d'une politique au jour le jour, au XIX^e siècle, et s'achève en logomachie sous le régime national-communiste.

NOTES

- ¹ Amplement documentée dans Eliade 1898, puis Iordan 1934, Close 1974, Drace-Francis 2006, etc.
- ² Pour un historique de l'idéologie en général, je renvoie au déjà classique T. Eagleton (1991 et 2000).
- ³ Ces deux types de falsification sont identifiés par Irvine et Gal dans le discours sur la langue, et baptisés *erasure* « elimination of details that are inconsistent with a given ideological position », et *iconization* « ideological representation of a given linguistic feature or variety as formally congruent with the group with which it is associated » (2000 : 380).
- ⁴ Pour une discussion terminologique à propos de « politique linguistique », « aménagement linguistique », « planification linguistique », je renvoie à Mackey 1989.
- ⁵ Verschuere 2012 insiste sur le rôle essentiel du discours dans la création et la diffusion des idéologies. Je pense qu'il s'agit d'un biais méthodologique : le seul corpus utilisable pour identifier une idéologie est le discours métapragmatique, mais cela ne signifie pas qu'il n'existe pas d'idéologie sans discours. L'existence d'une idéologie est difficile à documenter de manière indiscutable dans ses manifestations indirectes (attitudes, pratiques...). Le discours n'est donc pas constitutif de l'idéologie, mais il est le seul qui puisse la documenter.
- ⁶ « Language can be thought bad because it is corrupted by sexual references or obscenity, but other criteria are change of any kind and corruption by foreign elements. It is bad enough, some people believe, that languages are changing but even more serious when the source of that change is the intrusion of foreign elements. » (Spolsky 2004 : 23)
- ⁷ Rapport 2016 disponible à http://www.cna.ro/IMG/pdf/Raport_1-31_martie_2016verif.pdf.
- ⁸ Kloss 1967 distingue entre les standards *Abstand* qui se forment sur la conscience de l'altérité génétique par rapport aux voisins (le cas du roumain), et les standards *Ausbau* qui se forment par élaboration intellectuelle sur un dialecte d'un continuum géographique (le cas du français).
- ⁹ cf. « ...Une très grave erreur, que de considérer que la domination, la conquête étrangère peut être acceptée, voir qu'elle est parfois utile », intervention de N. Ceaușescu dans la réunion avec les historiens, avant le XV^e Congrès international d'histoire, Bucarest (Archives nationales, dossier Comité Central du Parti Communiste Roumain, section Propagande – dorénavant CC al PCR Propagandă, 23/1980, f. 46).
- ¹⁰ « Du mélange des vainqueurs et des vaincus se forma la population gallo-romaine, de laquelle nous descendons. » (cours moyen d'histoire de Rogie et Despiques, 1908-1930, p. 14, *apud* Maingueneau 1979).

- ¹¹ L'Académie celtique avait pour but « de faire des recherches sur la langue celtique, de donner des étymologies de toutes les langues qui en dérivent, et spécialement de la langue française » (*apud* Pomian 1997 : 2256).
- ¹² Avec la justification que « la longueur de cette liste n'a nullement pour but de prouver que notre langue est celto-latine. J'ai seulement voulu montrer que tout n'y est point latin. » (Monin, *Monuments des anciens idiomes gaulois*, Paris, Durand, 1861 : 239)
- ¹³ J. Le Brigant, *Éléments de la langue des Celtes Gomériles ou Bretons. Introduction à cette langue et, par elle, à celles de tous les peuples connus*, 1779 ; J. La Vallée, *Voyage en Bretagne*, 1794 ; M. de Kerdaouec, *Histoire de la langue des Gaulois et par suite de celle des Bretons*, 1821 ; Ch. Pinot-Duclos - différents Mémoires publiés en collection posthume, 1821, etc.
- ¹⁴ La Tour d'Auvergne, *Nouvelles recherches sur la langue, l'origine et les antiquités des Bretons, pour servir à l'Histoire de ce peuple*, 1792 et *Origines Gauloises, celles des plus anciens peuples de l'Europe puisées dans leurs vraies sources*, 1796 ; T. Cailleux, *Origine celtique de la civilisation de tous les peuples*, 1878, etc.
- ¹⁵ duc du Roussillon, *Mémoire sur l'origine scytho-cimmérienne de la langue romane*, 1863 ; A. Granier de Cassagnac, *Histoire des origines de la langue française*, 1872 ; H. Boudet, *La vraie langue celtique et le cromleck de Rennes-les-Bains*, 1886, etc. et des échos chez G. Dottin *La langue gauloise : grammaire, textes et glossaire*, 1918.
- ¹⁶ cf. « La France est une patrie ancienne. Vois avec quel orgueil, petit Français, les Allemands se réclament des Anciens Germains, comme ils font sonner les luttes que ceux-ci ont soutenues contre les Romains ! Mais on parlait des Gaulois tes ancêtres bien avant qu'on parlât des Germains. Ils avaient envahi la Grèce, ils avaient pénétré jusqu'au cœur de l'Asie Mineure pour s'y fixer, de longs siècles avant que l'on sût seulement qu'il existait des Germains. Aucun pays du nord, (...) ne remonte dans l'histoire aussi haut que toi. » (Ch. Bigot *Le petit Français*, 1883 : 42-43, *apud* Amalvi 1984 : 285-318).
- ¹⁷ Sans oublier la dimension religieuse de ces événements, que l'on souhaite oublier dans les républiques laïques. L'acculturation latine devient encore plus problématique si on en élimine l'Église, qui y a contribué largement.
- ¹⁸ « *Jelt*, cette appellation du ruisseau spécifique à l'Olténie et unique, qu'on chercherait en vain dans le reste de la Valachie, en Transylvanie ou en Moldavie, est une forme modernisée du mot. Au XVI^e siècle encore, on employait *jilt*, et à cette même époque, la rivière Jiu s'appelait Jil. Ainsi, le vocable dace *sil*, devenu *jil* par une loi de préférence du phonétisme roumain, survit jusqu'à aujourd'hui en Olténie, et uniquement là-bas, dans le diminutif *jilt*, une réduction de *jilut*. » (*Etymologicum...*)
- ¹⁹ T. Antonescu, *Dacia, patria primitivă a popoarelor ariene*, 1894.

- 20 Densusianu, *Dacia preistorică*, 1913 ; R. Portocală, *Din preistoria Daciei și a vechilor civilizațiuni*, 1932 ; M. Bărbulescu-Dacu, *Originea daco-tracă a limbii române*, 1936 ; I. Brătescu-Voinești, *Originea neamului românesc și a limbii noastre*, 1942, qui affirme, p. 39 : « Le latin était la forme littéraire de la langue des Daces. Cette même langue des Daces, arrivée en France, est devenue au début la langue des Gaulois, puis, avec le temps, la langue française » ma trad.
- 21 Ilie Ceaușescu, frère de Nicolae, directeur de l'Institut d'histoire militaire et coordinateur de la seule grande synthèse d'histoire roumaine parue sous le régime ; N. Copoiu, secrétaire de l'Institut d'histoire du Parti, I. C. Drăgan, homme d'affaires proche de Ceaușescu, qui a animé la revue *Noi, tracii* (Nous, les Thraces), Vasile Cărăbiș, professeur d'histoire à l'Université de Craiova et journaliste, Arion Vraciu, professeur à l'Université de Iași, V. Enăchiuc, chercheur soutenu par le directeur de l'Institut susnommé dans sa découverte de l'écriture dace, Dumitru Berciu, historien à l'Institut de Thracologie, ou encore G.D. Iscru, maître-assistant à l'Université de Bucarest, épuré en 1990, qui ne se découvre dacologue qu'après cette date.
- 22 « Mots d'origine dace : Dunărea (Donaris), Mureș (Maris), strună [corde], mînz [poulain], mistreț [sanglier], viezure [blaireau], varză [chou]. Mots d'origine latine : om [homme], frate [frère], soră [sœur], părinte [parent], mare [mer], pămînt [terre], a ara [labourer], a semăna [ensemencer], a cînta [chanter], origine [origine], seară [seigle], cetate [cité] », Manuel d'histoire pour la 4^e, 1978-1993, p. 20, ma trad.
- 23 cf. Archives Nationales, fonds ASSP Istorie, dossier 21/1972.
- 24 Archives Nationales, Fonds CC al PCR Propagandă, dossiers 13, 23 et 25/1980 pour la préparation du congrès.
- 25 Il est significatif à ce propos que la grande histoire des langues romanes de Robert Hall jr 1974 ne peut citer, à propos de l'influence grammaticale franque, que des sources allemandes et américaines, alors que l'aspect lexical est documenté avec des sources françaises.
- 26 Notamment la très consultée *Grammaire méthodique du français* 1992, et même la *Grammaire critique* de M. Wilmet, autrement très... critique quand aux interprétations idéologisantes.
- 27 Dernier en date, l'article de M. Sala dans la grande *Cambridge History of the Romance Languages*, 2013, II.
- 28 G. Tocilescu, *Manual de istoria românilor*, școala secundară, 1900 ; O. Tafrali, *Manual de istoria românilor* clasa a III-a secundar, 1930 ; L. Pamfil Georgian, *Istoria românilor* clasa a IV-a secundar, 1935 (réduit le superstrat slave au lexique et voit les Slaves comme un facteur de retard) ; Rosetti, Crețu, Byck, *Manual de literatură și limbă română*, clasa a VI-a secundar, 1935 ; Rosetti, Crețu, Byck, *Manual de literatură și limbă română*, clasa a VIII-a secundar, 1937 (avec un chapitre de « Grammaire historique de la langue roumaine » qui évoque nommément l'aire balkanique, et distingue

les différentes couches slaves et leur influence) ; C. Loghin, *Limba română*, clasa a VIII-a secundar, 1933.

29 Un peu plus tard, en 1950, à Iași, le professeur Ivănescu, lors d'un procès politique, est accusé de « négliger complètement l'influence considérable de l'élément slave dans la langue roumaine, bien qu'il soit unanimement reconnu que le lexique roumain est à 3/5 d'origine slave » (ma trad., *apud* Momanu 2005 : 196).

30 Le manuel d'histoire de 8^e 1975 reconnaît encore la contribution slave : « Si la langue des Daces n'a laissé que très peu de mots (...), les mots slaves sont beaucoup plus nombreux. » ; le manuel suivant la loi de 1978 (qui instaurait le contrôle total du Parti dans l'enseignement) mentionne uniquement « Les Slaves (...) se sont progressivement fondus dans la masse de la population roumaine. Ils ont laissé quelques mots ».

31 L'idéologie national-communiste réussit même à faire l'impasse sur le latin et assimile directement les langues de superstrat au dace : « Les Allemands comme les Hongrois habitent le territoire jadis habité par les Daces, et ils ont adopté une partie de la culture des Daces. Ils n'ont pas apporté leur culture de l'Asie. Ils ont adopté une nouvelle culture, européenne. (...) On ne peut pas dire que les Hongrois de Roumanie ou de Hongrie qui habitent l'ancien territoire des Daces n'ont pas adopté la culture des Daces. Ils y ont trouvé une culture qu'ils ont adoptée. Ils ont perdu la culture avec laquelle ils étaient venus. » (intervention de N. Ceaușescu dans la réunion de la Commission idéologique, 3 septembre 1976, dossier CC al PCR Propagandă 42/1976 ; ma trad.)

32 Un sondage d'opinion de 1962 révèle ainsi que l'adjectif le plus voté à propos de la langue française est « cultivée » (Michelat et Thomas 1966).

33 Notamment après la parution du dictionnaire de Massimu et Laurian (1871 et 1876), qui proposait des mots inexistantes, créés sur des racines latines, à la place de mots bien établis dans l'usage, qui avaient le malheur d'être ou de paraître d'origine slave, grecque ou turque : *algidu* glosé « rece, inglaciatu », *ambustu* pour « arsu împregiuru, pârlitu », *bellu* défini comme « oppusu la pace, stricare a buneloru relationi d'intră două popore », alors que le slave *război* ne figure pas (Muntean 2012).

34 Ion Heliade Rădulescu, traducteur, journaliste et écrivain, ainsi que le cercle créé autour de sa maison d'édition.

35 M. Kogălniceanu, A. Russo, A. Pumnul, etc.

36 En témoigne une lettre de 1844 de C. Negruzzi : « Lors commencèrent les infinies disputes entre les savants de notre pandémonium littéraire, que nous divisons en trois groupes. Les Libéraux disent qu'il faut chasser tous les vocables slaves et hongrois-turcs-grecs, même si les derniers sont très rares, et seulement employés par les têtes mal faites. Les Modérés disent qu'il faut les anoblir et les roumaniser (...). Enfin viennent les Conservateurs,

- ces vieilles carcasses, qui crient à voix de Stentor qu'on pervertit la langue [avec les emprunts français], criant et pleurant [sa destruction] » (ma trad.)
- 37 On enregistre par exemple au XIX^e s. les formes concurrentes *himie* (du grec), *hemie* (de l'allemand), *șimie* (du français), et *chimie* (du latin) – la forme qui s'imposera est celle latine ; dans le cas de *nație*, *națion*, *națiune* encore, la forme française est abandonnée ; le mot « cellule » entre premièrement sous la forme allemande *țelulă*, mais la forme latine ou française *celulă* la remplace, etc.
- 38 C. Chesneau Du Marsais, *Principes de grammaire*, 1769, repris dans Œuvres, 1797 ; A. de Rivarol, *Discours sur l'Universalité de la langue française*, 1783, publié 1784 ; Voltaire, article « Langue » du *Dictionnaire philosophique*, 1764/1785. Pour un historique critique des qualités du français et de la notion de « génie », voir Fumaroli 1997 ; pour l'influence de Voltaire dans la culture roumaine, voir Mihăilă 1995.
- 39 Dans une logique d'épuration et de précision, tout le contraire de la philosophie englobante qui préside au premier dictionnaire de l'anglais, à la même époque (Swiggers 1987, Estival et Pennycock 2011).
- 40 Ainsi d'E. Renan : « L'esprit de chaque peuple et sa langue sont dans la plus étroite connexité (...) Je persiste donc (...) à envisager le langage comme formé d'un seul coup, et comme sorti instantanément du génie de chaque race. » (*De l'origine du langage*, 1864, *apud* Meschonnic 2000).
- 41 « Apprendre le français, c'est d'abord le plaisir d'apprendre une belle langue, riche et mélodieuse qu'on appelle souvent la langue de l'amour. Le français est aussi une langue analytique qui structure la pensée et développe l'esprit critique, ce qui est très utile dans les discussions ou les négociations. » (site diplomatie.gouv.fr, section Francophonie, consulté avril 2016).
- 42 Un exemple parmi d'autres : « A propos de la langue française, il est difficile d'ajouter, après tant d'autres, des éloges tant de fois répétés sur sa rigueur, sa clarté, son élégance, ses nuances, la richesse de ses temps et de ses modes, la délicatesse de ses sonorités, la logique de son ordonnancement. » (F. Mitterand, discours de 1986, *apud* Lodge 1997).
- 43 « Les femmes (...) nous ont conservé la langue romaine ancienne et pure » (Préface, p. xliii, ma trad.).
- 44 « Les grammaires me paraissent de sèches dissertations de linguistique latine, française, italienne (...) J'analyse la littérature et j'y trouve un mélange indigeste de langues néolatines (...) Où est donc le caractère romain ? Où le chercher, pour me faire une idée du génie romain ? Par hasard, je me promenais un jour à la foire, et (...) j'y vois des gens et des habits que je n'avais jamais vus à la ville ; j'y entends une langue harmonieuse, pittoresque, complètement étrangère au jargon des livres. » (Russo, *Poezia poporală*, 1847, *apud* Muntean 2012)
- 45 cf. Stanomir 2008 : 281 : « Le mot évocateur du spécialiste (...) est suivi par l'incantation poétique. La frontière est abolie entre l'histoire et la poésie. »

- (ma trad.). Ainsi lit-on dans le manuel d'histoire de 4^e, édition revue 1986, p. 19-20 : « La langue roumaine s'est formée en même temps que le peuple roumain (...). Comme elle est riche, harmonieuse et belle, la langue roumaine peut traduire les pensées les plus élevées, les sentiments les plus délicats. Dans ses paroles on entend la rumeur des batailles, le frémissement des forêts, le murmure des ruisseaux, le frisson des champs, le chant de la mère près du berceau. » (ma trad.)
- 46 « Oh, langue roumaine, caresse, doux vocable valaque/ brillant comme le miel au soleil, sous le soleil qui parle. » (Dan David, *Trois hymnes à la langue roumaine*, 1980, ma trad.)
- 47 « Mère langue roumaine,/ Tu nous as continuellement bercés/ Dans ton céleste berceau,/ Dans le bien et dans le mal. » (D. Bălăeț, *Ode à la langue roumaine*, 1982, ma trad.)
- 48 « De la terre a poussé notre langue roumaine,/ Ayant pour bouclier la forêt et la bergerie,/ Elle s'est formée au foyer de nos bons parents,/ Et a grandi avec le conte et la triste doina » (D. Corbea, *Héritage*, 1986, ma trad.)
- 49 « Si je possédais toute la terre, et les airs, et les eaux,/ Et que je ne pouvais pas leur donner les ailes dorées des mots daco-latins,/ Je n'aurais rien... C'est pour cela que si souvent/ Les ennemis ont voulu notre langage/ C'est pour cela qu'il ont voulu nous le ravir... » (I. Dodu Bălan, *Arbres pour l'éternité*, 1982, ma trad.)
- 50 « Ces siècles de peine et de lutte/ N'ont pas coulé en vain:/ Vive est la langue chantée/ Par les ouvriers et les paysans (...) Notre langue, ancienne et douce/ Passe les siècles continuellement. » (C. Theodorescu, *Notre langue*, 1982, ma trad.)
- 51 cf. *World Atlas of Language Structures*, 2005, et en ligne à <http://wals.info/>
- 52 « Le dispositif au niveau étatique peut se limiter à une Académie de la langue et, en guise de dispositions, on peut ne trouver qu'un article dans la Constitution. Mais on peut aussi observer la création d'autres instances de gestion, comme un ministère, un office, une direction, des commissions, des conseils et la prolifération de textes réglementaires : décrets, arrêtés, circulaires et parfois le vote de lois linguistiques. » (Boyer 2010 : 68)
- 53 « *Status planning* refers to the deliberate, authoritative allocation of particular language varieties to certain functional domains at the societal level. Examples of status planning might include the formulation and enactment of legislation which allows or, indeed, demands some form of official or institutional use of a particular named linguistic variety. » (Orman 2008 : 42)
- 54 « *Corpus planning* is concerned with managing or changing the internal properties of language itself (...). Corpus planning activities may include, for example, spelling reform, the development of new lexical items or resistance to the use of foreign loanwords. » (Orman 2008 : 43)

- ⁵⁵ « The third type of language planning – *acquisition planning* – (...) involves activities aimed at facilitating the spread of language varieties throughout particular communities or parts of such communities. Acquisition planning may involve the systematic learning of a foreign or second language or it may involve efforts aimed at the *reacquisition* of a historically associated language. (...) In contrast to acquisition planning, it should be noted that its antithesis, namely *non-acquisition* planning, might also possibly form part of a polity's language policy. In such cases, policy may be designed and implemented with the aim of preventing a particular population group from acquiring or expanding competence in a particular language or languages. » (Orman 2008 : 43)
- ⁵⁶ cf. dossiers 42/1976, 13/1985 CC al PCR Propagandă.
- ⁵⁷ cf. dossiers 28 et 43/1973 CC al PCR Propagandă.
- ⁵⁸ cf. dossier 34/1984 CC al PCR Propagandă.

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ÉCHANGES INTERCULTURELS DANS LES RÉCITS DE VOYAGE DES FRANÇAIS EN ORIENT DE LA DEUXIÈME MOITIÉ DU XVII^E SIÈCLE

Résumé : La présente étude aborde la problématique des échanges interculturels entre Français et Orientaux tels qu'ils sont reflétés par un échantillon représentatif de récits de voyage de la seconde moitié du XVII^e siècle. En retraçant le contexte spécifique de l'ouverture de la France envers l'Orient, où les voyages occupent une place de choix, on en est venu à identifier quelques caractéristiques d'une démarche cohérente des voyageurs. L'exemple de Barthélemy Carré nous a servi d'illustration de certaines tendances communes, telles que le dépassement de préjugés ethnocentriques préexistants allant vers une réhabilitation de certains ethnotypes grâce à des interactions interculturelles prolongées.

Mots-clés : Français, voyage, Orient, XVII^e siècle, échanges interculturels.

Au XVII^e siècle, la France a, plus que jamais, les yeux rivés sur l'Orient. Malgré une efficacité moindre que prévue, les initiatives politiques et économiques de Colbert favorisent la création de compagnies commerciales comme la Compagnie royale des Indes orientales (1664) ou la Compagnie du Levant (1670), devenue la Compagnie de la Méditerranée en 1685. En plus, sa politique culturelle prévoit, entre autres, le financement de diverses entreprises de recherche de manuscrits, antiquités et curiosités à travers le monde, en particulier en Orient, ce qui mobilise les voyageurs de toutes sortes à parcourir cette partie du monde, chargés de diverses missions – diplomatiques, commerciales, scientifiques, culturelles etc. – censées également répandre et accroître le prestige de la France.

Le climat intellectuel est, lui aussi, favorable à cette ouverture vers l'Est, la République des Lettres étant de plus en plus perméable aux diverses influences extérieures. L'érudition des savants en langues orientales découlerait ainsi, dans un premier temps, à en croire Bernard Heyberger,

d'un désir des Européens de connaître leurs propres origines religieuses, dans un climat de compétition confessionnelle. Une culture sur l'Orient se constituait alors, associant la curiosité pour les origines religieuses et culturelles de l'Europe avec la volonté d'affirmer une autorité et une légitimité [...]¹.

Progressivement, nous allons assister à une émancipation de cet intérêt envers les « choses de l'Orient » dont le public devient particulièrement friand, reflété, par exemple, dans la mode des « turqueries » ou dans le développement d'une « curiosité désintéressée pour l'islam² », également nourries par la lecture de relations de voyage.

Mais en quels termes peut-on parler d'Orient au XVII^e siècle ?

1. Orient, orientalisme et voyage au XVII^e siècle

Le terme d'Orient reste encore bien flou à l'âge classique, du moins en ce qui concerne l'espace géographique auquel il pourrait renvoyer. Signifiant « est » d'après son étymologie, il s'appliquait à l'époque aussi bien au Proche et Moyen-Orient, et principalement à l'Empire ottoman, mais pouvait embrasser également d'autres territoires plus éloignés, comme la Perse, l'Inde, la Chine, le Japon. Ce « flou géographique³ » était doublé, comme le remarque aussi Dirk Van Der Cruysse, d'un « flou terminologique⁴ », l'un des termes concurrents étant celui de Levant, issu du français médiéval signifiant toujours « orient », « est ». Désignant traditionnellement tous les territoires méditerranéens à l'est de l'Italie, il en vient à s'appliquer surtout aux régions dépendant de l'Empire ottoman, sans que son emploi soit devenu plus précis pour autant, le terme conservant également une dose d'ambiguïté. Quant à l'Extrême-Orient, vague et immense, aux contours imprécis, c'était soit l'Orient tout court, soit l'Asie, soit les Indes orientales, comprenant principalement l'Asie du Sud et du Sud-Est, chacun des termes témoignant pourtant du même manque de précision.

Voici en quels termes le voyageur Jean Chardin, que les philosophes des Lumières tiendront en très haute estime⁵, entend rendre compte de certaines spécificités rencontrées en cours de route lors de sa traversée de la Georgie :

Les Caravansérails sont de grands bâtiments, faits pour donner le couvert aux Voyageurs. Il faut concevoir que dans l'*Asie*⁶ il ne se voit pas à beaucoup près tant de monde étranger dans les villes et sur les chemins, qu'il se fait en *Europe*. On en peut donner plusieurs raisons. Premièrement, l'*Asie* n'est pas si peuplée, sans comparaison, que l'*Europe* ; j'entends cette partie que les Catholiques-Romains et les Protestants en possèdent, qui est l'endroit le plus peuplé de l'Univers, si ce n'est peut-être la *Chine*. Secondement, les Nations de l'*Orient* habitent un meilleur air que nous⁷.

Remarquons d'abord le chevauchement des termes Orient et Asie, le seul pays bien individualisé étant, en l'occurrence, la Chine. En outre, l'opposition qui s'avère significative à l'époque est moins celle entre Orient et Occident, que celle entre Orient et Europe. Toujours est-il que, malgré le flou terminologique, le fonctionnement en soi d'un principe d'opposition nous renvoie moins à des entités géographiques et culturelles bien définies qu'au rôle qu'aura joué l'Orient, quel qu'il fût, dans la constitution d'une identité européenne. Car « l'Orient est une frontière : une limite visible mais labile, consistante mais poreuse, et une entité éminemment sujette aux fluctuations historiques⁸ ».

Ce qui nous ramène à l'idée force de l'*Orientalisme*⁹ d'Edward Saïd, difficilement contestable malgré les nombreuses polémiques suscitées par l'ouvrage, à savoir que l'Orient est avant tout une production, une construction imaginaire de l'Occident. Ainsi, l'Orient serait une invention de l'Europe, ayant permis à cette dernière de se définir par contraste, l'Orient ainsi que l'Occident étant des concepts historiques, renvoyant moins à une quelconque réalité qu'à une représentation mentale. En lui emboîtant le pas, nombre de spécialistes intéressés par la question de l'Orient sont venus la renforcer, en y apportant nombre d'éclaircissements et de précisions, voire de réfutations, sans pour autant mettre véritablement en doute la validité de son approche constructiviste.

Parmi ceux-ci, on peut évoquer James Clifford et son essai désormais classique, *Sur l'Orientalisme*, à même de mettre en lumière non seulement les inconséquences de l'approche saïdienne, décrites aussi par la suite, mais aussi ses points forts, qui en font à juste titre une référence

incontournable. De ses développements extrêmement nuancés, retenons l'ambivalence dans laquelle opère le concept même d'orientalisme, supposant, aux yeux de Said, tantôt une textualisation d'un Orient authentique, déformé par le discours orientaliste, tantôt une négation pure et simple de l'existence d'un quelconque Orient réel tout court et sa fabrication de toutes pièces. Ce qui, selon Clifford, soulèverait une question théorique essentielle, qui

concerne le statut de *toutes* les formes de pensée et de représentation pour traiter de l'étranger. Peut-on finalement échapper aux procédés de dichotomie, de restructuration et de textualisation quand on se propose d'interpréter les cultures et les traditions étrangères ? Si oui, comment¹⁰ ?

La question est reprise sous d'autres angles par Thierry Hentsch, le titre de l'un de ses ouvrages étant on ne peut plus parlant – *L'Orient imaginaire*. Lui non plus, il n'essaie pas de parler d'un Orient réel, d'un Orient en soi, mais de cerner un concept flou, kaléidoscopique, sans limites précises. L'Orient, de même que cette opposition binaire entre Orient et Occident, dépend ainsi d'« une prise de conscience de l'Occident par lui-même¹¹ », le poids de l'imaginaire et de la mythologie ayant formé et informé les représentations et la construction progressive des concepts historicisables que sont l'Occident et l'Orient. Cette coupure entre ces deux entités serait essentiellement imaginaire et, s'il y a bien une frontière qui les sépare, elle serait avant tout « mythologique » et historiquement constituée, malgré l'illusion essentialiste à laquelle même un Said se laisse prendre.

Tout comme le concept d'Orient, celui d'orientalisme a lui aussi une histoire. Tel que l'entendait Said, l'orientalisme, en tant que discipline autonome, serait ainsi inséparable non seulement d'un regard prédateur occidental, qui se manifestait déjà au XVII^e siècle, mais aussi d'un « usage » violent et brutal de l'Orient, qui ne devient réellement un objet de conquête qu'à l'aube du XIX^e siècle, l'invasion de l'Égypte en 1797 représentant l'un des premiers moments importants. Ce sont donc surtout les évolutions du XVIII^e siècle, qui voit émerger entre autres la « fiction du despotisme asiatique¹² », longuement analysée par Alain Grosrichard, qui vont mener progressivement à la constitution d'un Orient de la modernité auquel les analyses d'Edward Said s'appliquent essentiellement, bien qu'il essaie – et c'est l'un des points les plus contestés – de faire remonter cette façon particulière de se rapporter à l'Orient bien loin dans le temps.

Ces dernières années l'histoire de l'orientalisme a été sujette à toute une série de réévaluations visant à mettre en lumière un autre orientalisme, dénué du poids idéologique que Said lui attribuait. Un ouvrage comme celui de Nicholas Dew se propose de retracer l'histoire de l'émergence de cette discipline dans la France du XVII^e siècle, en insistant sur les caractéristiques d'un « early modern Orientalism ». En voulant refaire une histoire sociale de cet « orientalisme baroque », Nicholas Dew n'a de cesse d'insister sur la spécificité de l'outillage mental et conceptuel des orientalistes de l'époque colbertiste et de l'importance de le saisir et de le situer dans son contexte propre¹³. Parmi ses traits essentiels, retenons le fait qu'il s'agit d'un orientalisme d'avant les Lumières, l'intérêt envers l'Orient relevant à l'époque d'une curiosité érudite plus englobante, ainsi que d'un orientalisme d'avant l'empire, où la dynamique du pouvoir entre l'Europe et les « Pays Orientaux » était complètement différente¹⁴.

Les sources ainsi que les agents de ce savoir éclectique sur un Orient multiforme qui se constitue essentiellement dans la seconde moitié du XVII^e siècle sont eux-mêmes variés. Cela correspond mieux, à notre sens, à une (re)définition plus englobante de l'orientalisme, telle que celle proposée par François Pouillon :

L'orientalisme ne pouvait donc se concevoir que dans une définition large. Il incluait tous ceux qui, au cours des siècles, et quelles que fussent leurs motivations, s'étaient attachés à étudier, décrire, illustrer, faire connaître la mosaïque des formations historiques, des langues et des cultures découvertes, pour les uns, dans le silence des bibliothèques, pour les autres, à l'issue de voyages et d'investigations archéologiques hors de l'espace des civilisations classiques¹⁵.

À une époque de circulation des idées caractérisée par la mobilité, l'orientalisme savant, celui des savoirs spécialisés, est sous-tendu par un « orientalisme de terrain et [de] ses acteurs¹⁶ » dans le cadre duquel les voyageurs auront joué un rôle essentiel. À l'essor de la pratique du voyage correspond d'ailleurs une vogue sans précédent de la relation de voyage, dont le public français devient de plus en plus friand, au point que, comme le souligne Geoffroy Atkinson, « tout le monde lisait des voyages imprimés au XVII^e siècle¹⁷ », surtout à partir des années 1640-1650. Ce n'est donc pas un hasard d'entendre Jean Chapelain affirmer en 1663 que « notre nation a changé de goût pour les lectures, et, au lieu des romans qui sont tombés [...], les voyages sont venus en crédit et tiennent le haut bout dans

la Cour et dans la Ville¹⁸ ». C'est ainsi que savants orientalistes et public lettré puisent des informations ou étanchent leur soif d'« exotisme » par l'intermédiaire des témoignages des voyageurs ayant parcouru les chemins de l'Orient. Nous savons déjà à quel point leur contribution fut importante à l'évolution des idées et à la constitution progressive d'un regard critique dont les penseurs des Lumières se souviendront¹⁹.

Cependant, la complexité de cette expérience viatique des voyageurs classiques reste toujours à mettre en lumière. Car on n'a pas encore véritablement mesuré l'ampleur des échanges interculturels et la portée des relations interpersonnelles tissées au cours de voyages qui, plus d'une fois, se sont transformés en vrais séjours, voire en implantations en terre d'accueil. Notre hypothèse est ainsi que les relations de voyage de l'époque rendent compte d'une ouverture à l'Autre insuffisamment mise en évidence et qui, parfois, dépasse le cadre relativement ethnocentrique que l'on évoque souvent. C'est le cas de l'ouvrage monumental de Sylvie Requemora-Gros selon laquelle

l'étonnement du voyageur français du XVII^e siècle face à l'altérité procède d'une découverte visuelle éminemment subjective mais guidée par toute une série de préjugés ethnocentriques propres à l'esprit classique du « Grand Siècle ». [...] Mais, même si elle est encore très ethnocentrique, il existe bel et bien une tentative d'appréhension ouverte de l'Autre, liée à la vogue croissante des récits de voyage [...]»²⁰.

Malgré l'idée d'une « appréhension ouverte de l'Autre », l'accent est mis en l'occurrence sur des « semblants d'ouverture²¹ », supposant une perspective « encore très ethnocentrique », qu'un Tzvetan Todorov soutient aussi, en voyant dans les auteurs du XVII^e siècle « des ethnocentrismes qui s'ignorent²² ». Bien que cet ethnocentrisme soit indéniable et même, à en croire Thierry Hentsch, nécessaire en tant qu'unique condition de possibilité d'un regard sur l'Autre, ils sont nombreux ces voyageurs qui, en véritables passeurs culturels, ont réussi plus d'une fois à rendre compte, dans leurs témoignages, d'une sensibilité singulière envers l'altérité orientale, qui serait finalement à ranger dans cette tradition orientaliste que James Clifford qualifie de « compatissante et non réductrice²³ ». Mais qui sont ces voyageurs ? Qu'est-ce qui les pousse à prendre le chemin de l'Orient ? Et dans quelle mesure leurs récits sont-ils le reflet d'une expérience authentique de l'altérité orientale ?

2. Rencontrer l'Autre : curiosité, commerce, communication

Il suffit de feuilleter le *Dictionnaire des orientalistes de langue française* déjà évoqué – fruit d'une entreprise menée par une équipe pluridisciplinaire de spécialistes, placée elle-même sous le signe d'une réhabilitation de l'orientalisme érudit –, pour s'apercevoir de la grande diversité des Français ayant séjourné en Orient à l'époque classique. Dès lors, un projet comme le nôtre, loin de pouvoir prétendre à l'exhaustivité, implique une sélection de récits de voyage, qui puisse tout de même constituer un échantillon représentatif aussi bien pour la période concernée que pour la problématique qui nous occupe, à savoir les rapports et échanges avec l'Autre oriental. Qui plus est, à la diversité des « acteurs » français fait pendant une telle « diversité dans l'altérité²⁴ » qu'elle dut sembler déconcertante aux voyageurs exposés à tout instant à subir le « choc de l'altérité », quel que fût l'itinéraire emprunté. Car il en fut qui arpenterent en long et en large l'Empire ottoman, et d'autres qui se lancèrent également à la découverte d'horizons plus lointains encore, comme la Perse safavide, l'Empire moghol ou l'Inde hindoue.

Parmi les figures de marque, qui jouissent de la faveur du public dès leur vivant, nous retenons Jean Thévenot²⁵, que ses contemporains considérèrent comme « le voyageur parfait²⁶ », Jean-Baptiste Tavernier²⁷, le négociant huguenot en pierres précieuses, anobli par Louis XIV, et « peut-être le plus célèbre des voyageurs du XVII^e siècle²⁸ », Jean Chardin²⁹, le jeune continuateur de ce dernier, mais qui saura marier à merveille désir de gain et désir de savoir, Antoine Galland³⁰, orientaliste érudit et premier traducteur européen des *Mille et une nuits*. Et, à côté d'eux, des bourlingueurs moins connus, aussi bien de leur temps que du nôtre, mais tout aussi intrépides, ayant eux aussi bravé les dangers du voyage en Orient, et dont les témoignages ne leur cèdent en rien, comme Laurent d'Arvieux³¹, plus connu comme le chevalier d'Arvieux, l'un des tout premiers Français ayant séjourné dans un camp de Bédouins, Barthélemy Carré, « le courrier du Roi en Orient³² », ou Charles Dellon³³, un aventurier qui se fait passer pour médecin durant son voyage aux Indes orientales, auteur de *l'Inquisition de Goa*.

Au-delà de la diversité des profils de ces voyageurs et de leurs motivations de courir le monde, on pourrait toutefois identifier quelques caractéristiques d'une démarche commune et cohérente. Tout d'abord, du point de vue des types de voyages entrepris³⁴, il y aurait, au sein de notre corpus, deux grandes familles viatiques, à savoir les marchands et

les diplomates³⁵ – le voyage commercial et la mission diplomatique étant cependant plus apparentées que l'on ne pourrait le penser à un premier abord³⁶. Car, si Chardin et surtout Tavernier incarnent à merveille le type du négociant, alors qu'Antoine Galland se rend pour la première fois à Constantinople en tant que secrétaire personnel de l'ambassadeur de France à la Porte, le marquis de Nointel, il y en a d'autres qui sont plutôt des types hybrides. Ainsi du chevalier d'Arvieux, qui débarque à Smyrne pour s'initier auprès de ses cousins aux affaires de commerce, mais qui manifeste très tôt un vif penchant envers les langues orientales et qui finira par être chargé de missions et fonctions diplomatiques, son consulat à Alep entre 1679 et 1686 étant la plus considérable. Ou bien Barthélemy Carré qui, en tant qu'envoyé de Colbert et représentant du Roi, est censé rendre compte à son retour de l'état des affaires et du négoce de la Compagnie des Indes orientales.

En outre, la pulsion initiale qui les aiguillonne tous à se lancer vers l'inconnu, que l'on retrouve peut-être à l'état le plus pur chez Jean Thévenot, assez chanceux d'avoir déjà assez de bien pour s'en donner à cœur joie, c'est la curiosité. Malgré une suspicion qui pèse encore sur elle – héritage de la tradition augustinienne de la *concupiscentia oculorum* –, et bien que le voyage d'agrément ne soit pas encore de saison, la curiosité en tant que premier moteur du voyage devient à l'époque un véritable *topos*. À tel point que rares seront les auteurs qui ne l'invoquent au début du récit de leurs aventures comme l'une des raisons centrales de leur départ, allant souvent de pair avec le désir de s'instruire. Voici, à titre d'exemple, la manière dont Charles Dellon entend commencer sa relation :

La curiosité est une chose naturelle à tous les hommes, mais la jeunesse a plus de penchant à se satisfaire que ceux qui ont passé ces premiers feux : j'eus la passion de voyager dès mon enfance, & après avoir achevé mes études je partis de Paris sans aucun dessein déterminé que celui de quitter la France, et de chercher dans le commerce des Etrangers la connoissance de leurs mœurs. J'arrivay au Port Louïs l'année 1667. & la Compagnie Royale faisant alors un embarquement, j'entrai à son service [...] ³⁷.

Ainsi cette « curiosité boulimique³⁸ », que Dirk Van der Cruysse attribue à Thévenot, pourrait-elle s'appliquer à bien d'autres, l'un des grands curieux étant le chevalier d'Arvieux, comme nous l'avons démontré ailleurs³⁹. Qui plus est, cette véritable « passion de voyager » dont tous se réclament témoigne d'un intérêt et d'une ouverture à l'Autre qui les

poussera – du moins certains d’entre eux – à appréhender parfois l’altérité orientale en « ethnographes curieux avant la lettre⁴⁰ ».

Toujours est-il que cette véritable vertu viatique a souvent partie liée avec le commerce. Comme nous l’avons déjà précisé, pour nombre d’entre eux le négoce est l’une des toutes premières motivations, ouvertement avouée. Il y en a même qui se spécialisent dans le négoce des pierres précieuses, et notamment dans le commerce des diamants, ce qui vaudra à Tavernier de même qu’à Chardin une belle fortune, une belle réputation, mais aussi, comme on pourrait moins s’y attendre, une ouverture à l’Autre qu’on serait tenté de tenir pour incompatible avec le désir de gain. Et pourtant, la volonté d’amasser du bien – nécessairement égocentrique – s’avère, plus d’une fois, allocentrique en tant que projet, car fondé sur la négociation. C’est bien ce que remarquait aussi Dirk Van der Cruysse :

Les marchands, par la nature même de leur négoce, sont forcés à une grande souplesse s’ils veulent réussir. Cette disponibilité d’esprit les amène à s’initier aux modes de vivre et de penser de leurs interlocuteurs commerciaux. Certains se laissent prendre au jeu, apprennent des langues orientales, fréquentent des savants, rédigent des mémoires fouillés sur les pays où ils résident, et y prolongent leur séjour bien au-delà des exigences du commerce qui les y a conduits. C’est parmi les marchands que se rencontrent les voyageurs les plus intéressants⁴¹.

En effet, à la différence du missionnaire qui, en vertu de son appartenance confessionnelle, a comme « mission » de convertir l’Autre au Même, sans trop se soucier de sa spécificité, religieuse ou autre, mais aussi à la différence du diplomate qui, en vertu de son appartenance nationale et politique, a comme « mission » de représenter son pays et de traiter avec l’Autre selon des positions souvent partisans, le marchand, quant à lui, en vertu d’une liberté beaucoup plus grande – surtout s’il s’agit d’une entreprise privée, comme c’est d’habitude le cas, du moins dans les débuts – n’a pas de véritable « mission » à remplir, si ce n’est son propre désir de faire fortune. Cela suppose une disposition à la négociation, au compromis, et, au bout du compte, à l’ouverture.

Car, en effet, étymologiquement, le terme, dérivé du latin *commercium*, renvoie non seulement à l’échange de marchandises, mais aussi, par extension, à un échange interpersonnel, relationnel, voire amical. Ce deuxième sens était, d’ailleurs, courant au XVII^e siècle, où

COMMERCE, se dit aussi de la correspondance, de l'intelligence qui est entre les particuliers, soit pour des affaires, soit pour des études, ou simplement pour entretenir l'amitié. Ces gens ont grand *commerce* de lettres ensemble. ce Sçavant a *commerce* avec tous les habiles gens de l'Europe. ces amis ont un *commerce* d'esprit, d'amitié ensemble⁴².

Il s'ensuit que tout voyageur devient tôt ou tard un « agent de commerce » qui a commerce avec autrui, à l'instar de Charles Dellon qui, bien qu'il ne fût pas négociant, allait rechercher à travers ses voyages aux Indes orientales « le commerce des Etrangers ». De ce point de vue le voyageur marchand l'est doublement, puisqu'il *fait* du commerce de même qu'il a commerce avec les Orientaux. Un syntagme intéressant employé par Furetière est, d'ailleurs, « l'intelligence⁴³ qui est entre les particuliers » traduisant un enjeu supérieur de cette activité d'échange, qui est, dans l'esprit du siècle, la bonne entente, l'accord, la communication.

Cela reviendrait-il à dire que le voyageur marchand serait plus enclin que nul autre à ce type d'échange informel, proche, voire amical et intime « entre particuliers »? Quoi qu'il en soit, ce qui est sûr, c'est que la plupart d'entre eux finissent par prolonger « leur séjour bien au-delà des exigences du commerce qui les y a conduits », tout en prenant bien souvent les couleurs du milieu, à travers une « conversion » à l'Autre. Car cela suppose, en effet, une immersion profonde dans la culture d'accueil, entraînant une altération⁴⁴ identitaire à des degrés divers, effet de l'altérité sur le Moi.

Cette orientalisation plus ou moins partielle se traduit d'abord, au niveau des apparences, par l'adoption des habits de l'Autre, qui conduit à une véritable pratique du déguisement. Si le chevalier d'Arvieux donne le bon exemple, en endossant gracieusement l'habit turc ou arabe selon les circonstances, il n'est pas le seul à le faire. Celui qu'on appelait en Perse *Agha* Chardin s'était si bien fait à l'habit persan, et même au lourd turban qui pouvait peser jusqu'à quinze livres, que même après son retour en Europe et son installation à Londres il aura du mal à s'en défaire. Barthélemy Carré, bien que moins porté sur les vêtements persans, s'habille volontiers à la mode arabe : « je quittai mes habits de Francks pour endosser ceux d'Arabes dont j'avais déjà quelque pratique et habitude⁴⁵ ». Quant à Tavernier, il décrit longuement les préparatifs pour un voyage en Perse dans les termes suivants :

Quand on part de Constantinople, de Smyrne ou d'Alep pour se mettre en caravane, il faut s'ajuster selon la mode des pays où on doit passer, en Turquie à la Turque, en Perse à la Persienne, & qui en useroit autrement passeroit pour ridicule, & quelquefois mesme auroit de la peine à passer en bien des lieux, où la moindre chose donne de l'ombrage aux Gouverneurs qui prennent aisement les étrangers pour des espions. Toutefois ayant par les chemins une veste d'Arabe avec quelque méchante ceinture, bien qu'on eût dessous un habit à la François, on peut sans rien craindre passer par tout. Pour porter le Turban il faut necessairement se faire razer la teste, parce qu'il glisseroit & ne pourroit tenir avec les cheveux⁴⁶.

L'adaptabilité de Tavernier semble sans faille. Cependant, ses dons de caméléon répondent à une visée pragmatique manifeste, celle d'éviter, grâce à l'invisibilité que lui vaut le travestissement, les éventuels ennuis et dangers du voyage. L'habit français gardé par en dessous est, en l'occurrence, hautement symbolique, trahissant ses véritables attachements. Car Tavernier est, de tous nos voyageurs, celui qui se départ le moins de son identité française. Mais, faute d'une véritable conversion à l'autre, son négoce lui réussit à merveille grâce à sa maîtrise des faux-semblants.

Le cas Tavernier est assez particulier, dans la mesure où le succès de son négoce ne semble pas dépendre de ses négociations directes. Il est, en effet, le seul parmi nos voyageurs n'ayant appris, malgré ses six longs voyages en Orient, ni le turc, ni l'arabe, ni le persan, ce qui l'obligeait d'avoir à chaque fois recours à des interprètes lors de ses transactions commerciales. C'est l'une des raisons pour lesquelles d'autres voyageurs – comme Chardin par exemple, qui lui sert même d'interprète à un moment donné – ne manqueront pas de critiquer ses relations qui, à l'en croire, fourmillent d'inexactitudes, relevant, dans une certaine mesure, de son inaptitude à apprendre la langue de l'Autre.

Alors que tous les autres poussent leur orientalisation encore plus loin et, une fois sur place⁴⁷, commencent à apprendre diverses langues orientales. À Ispahan, Barthélemy Carré, qui parlait déjà le portugais – la *lingua franca* des Européens en Asie –, se mettra à l'école d'un père jésuite :

Ce père m'ayant fait connaître que la langue persienne avait cours par toute l'Asie comme le latin en Europe et qu'elle [est] fort facile à apprendre pour ceux qui savaient le latin dont la langue persienne a les mêmes principes, il me fit présent d'une grammaire qu'il avait composée en latin, en français, en portugais et en persan. Ce qui me donna une si grande facilité pour

la langue persienne que je l'appris en peu de temps, et dans un voyage suivant que je fis en Orient cette langue me servit beaucoup dans tous les royaumes d'Asie que je traversai dans la suite [...]»⁴⁸.

Jean Chardin témoigne d'une telle exigence envers lui-même qu'il déclare n'avoir rien écrit sur l'Inde malgré un séjour de cinq ans parce qu'il ne connaissait que « les Langues vulgaires qui sont l'Indien et le Persan, sans avoir rien appris de la Langue des Brachmanes⁴⁹ », le sanskrit, apparemment la seule digne d'être employée à pareille tâche. Pourtant, c'était quelqu'un d'extrêmement doué pour l'étude des langues, qui déclarera avoir « appris du Turc & du Persan plus qu'aucun de ceux qui ont écrit de la Perse⁵⁰ », pour ajouter aussitôt : « je parle aussi aisément le Persan que le François⁵¹ ». Comme le note aussi son biographe Dirk Van der Cruysse : « Dès son arrivée en Perse, Chardin s'était mis à l'étude du farsi, impatient de nouer des contacts personnels sans avoir à passer par les services d'un interprète⁵². »

C'est le même désir de communiquer directement avec les autochtones et de nouer des contacts personnels et souvent amicaux qui poussera le jeune d'Arvieux à apprendre le turc, l'arabe et le persan, en finissant par devenir lui-même l'interprète officiel de langue turque à la cour du Roi Soleil lors de la célèbre ambassade de l'envoyé turc Soliman Aga en 1669. Quant à Jean Thévenot, bien que sa maîtrise des langues orientales n'ait pas toujours été, semble-t-il, à la hauteur de sa « pulsion épistémophilique⁵³ » et « scotophilique⁵⁴ », il finit souvent par arriver à ses fins. Lors de son premier voyage au Levant, alors qu'il était à Constantinople, il tint absolument à assister à l'audience donnée par le Sultan à un ambassadeur du Moghol, et dont l'entrée était en principe interdite aux Francs⁵⁵. Accompagné par un autre gentilhomme français qui, parlant turc, avait entamé les pourparlers avec l'un des gardiens, notre voyageur se joint lui aussi à la négociation en langue turque, même si, comme il le précise, « moy qui à peine à lors en sçavois deux mots⁵⁶ ». L'entretien est plaisant, le jeune français faisant preuve d'habileté et de force de persuasion malgré sa maîtrise très approximative de la langue, qu'il n'hésite toutefois pas d'employer stratégiquement. L'issue en est assez surprenante :

enfin après luy avoir bien rompu la teste de mon Turc à la mode, qui consistoit presque tout en ces mots, allai seuseren, qui veut dire, pour l'amour de Dieu, il envoya un de ses camarades à leur Colonel, qui estoit

sous le porche, pour lui demander permission de nous laisser entrer, ce que le Colonel accorda facilement, de sorte que nous entasmes [au sérail]⁵⁷.

Le « commerce des Etrangers », pour reprendre la formule de Dellon, implique la communication dans la langue de la culture d'accueil, que ce soit par le biais des interprètes, qu'elle soit plus ou moins efficace, ou, dans des situations exceptionnelles, comme celle d'un chevalier d'Arvieux, qu'elle crée aux hôtes, en l'occurrence les Arabes nomades du Mont Carmel, l'illusion d'une ressemblance frôlant l'identité. C'est ce qui fera l'Émir Turabey s'exclamer :

ce n'est pas là un Franc [...] est-il possible, me dit-il, que vous soyez Franc. [...]

Après que j'eus achevé de parler, il me dit qu'il n'y avoit personne qui ne me prît pour un véritable Bédouin. Vous êtes habillé comme eux, et vous parlez notre Langue en perfection ; les Francs ne la parlent pas, ils ont toujours besoin d'un Interprete⁵⁸.

Si l'illusion est parfaite, c'est parce que parler la langue de l'Autre, l'arabe, mène aussi à « la connoissance de leurs mœurs », grâce à laquelle celui que les Bédouins finiront par appeler *Dervich Nasser le Franc* avait su dès le début composer et jouer son personnage. En 1664, au moment de son arrivée au camp de l'Émir Turabey, où il fera un séjour de six mois, Laurent d'Arvieux n'avait plus quitté le Levant depuis une dizaine d'années, ayant subi un processus d'acculturation à même de lui procurer non seulement une connaissance approfondie des coutumes et croyances des « Orientaux », mais aussi une compréhension de l'intérieur de leur culture. L'expérience levantine de ce voyageur marchand est une parfaite illustration de la manière dont « le désir de l'Autre⁵⁹ » pouvait l'emporter, même à l'époque, sur le « désir de gain » au bout d'une longue immersion culturelle au cours de laquelle comprendre s'avérait plus important que prendre. Dans le cas du chevalier d'Arvieux cela est d'autant plus évident que l'état de ses affaires était loin d'être reluisant à son premier retour en France après douze années d'absence.

Par ailleurs, la bigarrure interethnique propre à l'Orient parcouru par nos voyageurs en fait un véritable espace de rencontre, pouvant être défini, dans les termes de Marie Louise Pratt, comme « a contact zone » :

I use this term to refer to social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetric relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths [...]»⁶⁰.

N'oublions toutefois pas qu'à l'époque qui nous occupe, si relations de pouvoir asymétriques il y a, la balance ne penche guère en faveur des Français.

C'est ainsi que certains lieux qui parsèment ces divers Orientes en représentent autant de centres, comme Constantinople, Ispahan etc., chacun pouvant être considéré comme « a locus of early modern interaction⁶¹ », où les échanges complexes entre visités et visiteurs font que « what we are dealing with are not separate and comparable, but connected histories⁶² », faisant signe vers « the dynamic nature of early modern cultural encounter, and the possibility of substantial levels of exchange between diverse cultures⁶³ ». Il n'en est pas moins vrai que nous avons affaire à des degrés divers de connaissance, de dialogue, voire de métissage culturel, la compréhension réciproque dans le cadre d'une relation dialogique et authentique n'étant que l'horizon idéal sur fond duquel ont lieu les échanges réels, empreints, eux, d'impuretés et d'ambivalences.

3. Ambiguïtés des échanges interculturels : l'exemple de Barthélemy Carré⁶⁴

En étudiant le phénomène viatique au XVII^e siècle l'on s'aperçoit que le voyage est à l'époque un parcours semé de pièges de toutes sortes que les protagonistes arrivent peu ou prou à déjouer. Et l'une des épreuves les plus rudes est l'épreuve nommée Autrui. En effet, l'Autre se constitue souvent en une présence opaque, voire menaçante, capable de mettre en échec toutes les stratégies d'approche d'un voyageur plus ou moins expérimenté. Dès lors il n'y a rien de surprenant à ce que l'on voie apparaître au fil du temps des *topoi* mettant en scène l'Autre comme menace, les mers orientales fourmillant de corsaires et de pirates, alors que la voie terrestre est le royaume des Arabes pillards. En ce qui concerne le premier cas de figure, rares sont les voyageurs qui ne rapportent au moins une mauvaise rencontre en mer. Quant aux Arabes coureurs de chemins, ils sont omniprésents dans les récits, ne fût-ce qu'en tant que spectres qui peuplent l'imaginaire des voyageurs, pouvant surgir à tout

moment. Malgré un profil assez stéréotypé, leur présence est pourtant bien réelle. Le récit de voyage de Barthélemy Carré, très peu étudié d'ailleurs, s'avère extrêmement intéressant sous cet aspect. Comme nous allons le voir dans ce qui suit, ses échanges avec les Arabes reflètent la manière dont un ethnotype particulier peut acquérir une épaisseur anthropologique assez singulière pour l'époque.

Barthélemy Carré avait, en effet, subi l'épreuve nommée autrui, s'étant fait dépouiller une première fois lors de son premier voyage, et une seconde fois, à l'aller de son deuxième voyage, lors de la traversée du désert d'Alep à Bagdad en juin 1672, en compagnie d'un guide arabe dont il s'était d'emblée défié. Comme ils approchaient de l'Euphrate qu'ils devaient traverser, ils sont accueillis par un groupe de cavaliers Arabes qui les mènent à la tente du cheikh « qui nous reçut fort civilement⁶⁵ ». Mais, bien qu'il sût « qu'il ne m'arriverais aucun mal ni infortune tant que je serais dans le lieu où ils étaient campés⁶⁶ », l'inquiétude tiraille notre héros, partagé entre la pensée de la trahison de son guide et le pressentiment du danger qu'il courait toujours de se faire détrousser, se retrouvant « au milieu de huit à neuf cents de véritables voleurs et coureurs du désert⁶⁷ ». Et il ne perd rien pour attendre :

Enfin le moment que j'appréhendais tant arriva sur les onze heures de nuit. [...] j'aperçus [...] environ cinquante cavaliers qui marchaient du bel air. [...] j'attendis mes Arabes de *pied ferme*⁶⁸, mon mousqueton en main et mes pistolets à ma ceinture. [...]

Ensuite les autres, s'étant avancés et me voyant en position de les tirer, s'arrêtèrent tous. Entendant que je voulais *parlementer* avec le cheikh ou leur commandant, ils se retirèrent un peu à l'écart à la réserve de quatre qui demeurèrent à huit pas de moi, auxquels *je fis connaître que s'ils ne voulaient point toucher à mes papiers ni à mes lettres je leur donnerais volontiers mes habits et toutes mes hardes*⁶⁹, et qu'à moins de cela *j'étais résolu de mourir* et en tuer cinq ou six des leurs avant qu'ils pussent rien avoir de moi⁷⁰. *Mon guide arabe, que j'avais instruit dès le commencement de mon voyage de mes intentions en cas de pareilles rencontres, leur criait de toutes ses forces de ne point s'avancer et d'entrer plutôt à ce que je souhaitais, à quoi enfin ils s'accordèrent.* [...]

Après m'avoir mis ainsi tout nu, ils me rendirent une chemise et une vieille housse de cheval pour me couvrir. Comme ils faisaient des paquets de toutes mes hardes, ayant trouvé une boîte pleine de drogues médicinales ils me demandèrent ce que c'était. Sur quoi leur ayant dit que c'étaient des choses qui servaient pour donner la santé quand on était malade, ils partagèrent ces drogues entre eux quatre et se mirent à les manger comme

si ç'avaient été les meilleurs mets du monde, et avalaient l'orviétan, la confection d'hyacinthe, les onguents et les pilules d'une manière que, *tout affligé que je fus de mon désastre, je ne pus m'empêcher de rire de la bêtise de ces gens.* [...] [Ils] me laissèrent mon cheval et ne touchèrent point à mon guide, ce qui me fit juger qu'il m'avait trahi et livré à ces Arabes. L'un d'eux qui paraissait *le commandant avant de me quitter m'embrassa et me baisa.* [...] C'est la coutume de ces coureurs du désert, lorsqu'ils détroussent quelque pauvre voyageur ou marchand étranger, de *le traiter avec douceur et courtoisie* (comme me firent ceux-ci) lorsqu'ils trouvent bien de quoi piller⁷¹.

Sur la scène orientale construite par ce récit haut en couleurs, le protagoniste français fait plutôt piètre figure, livré à la merci de ces Arabes sans scrupules, conçus d'une manière schématique et réductrice par la plupart des voyageurs de l'époque⁷². Et pourtant, le rapport de forces est, du moins au niveau symbolique, moins déséquilibré qu'il n'y paraît. En effet, ce qui, à un premier abord, pourrait être lu dans les termes d'une « mé-rencontre⁷³ » dépourvue de véritables enjeux anthropologiques, s'avère être une expérience interculturelle riche d'enseignements. Premièrement, le voyageur français est moins démuni que la situation désespérée où il se trouve ne le laisse entendre. Car, au-delà d'une stratégie textuelle d'héroïsation du voyageur fréquemment mise en œuvre à travers les relations de l'époque, l'on ne peut douter qu'un homme d'action aussi intrépide que l'était l'abbé Carré ne fût prêt à se défendre vaillamment, lui qui ne reculait même pas devant les lions et autres bêtes féroces peuplant les déserts asiatiques.

L'on s'aperçoit, en outre, que cette « mauvaise rencontre » se déroule sur fond d'un savoir préalable du voyageur, fondé sur son expérience passée, mais aussi sur sa connaissance des mœurs des Arabes, ce qui fait qu'il n'est pas complètement pris au dépourvu. Bien au contraire, les mesures de précaution avaient été prises, comme celle de cacher à la moindre alerte ce qu'il avait de plus précieux, notamment les paquets du Roi et ses papiers, ou d'instruire son guide de la conduite à adopter en pareille circonstance.

Qui plus est, malgré un dénouement prévisible et inéluctable, c'est toujours le Français qui prend les devants, en entamant des négociations dont il fixe des termes bien avantageux pour lui, compte tenu du déséquilibre des forces en présence. Et le lecteur ne saurait s'empêcher de sourire à l'entendre proférer de terribles menaces à l'endroit de ses assaillants, menaces que même son guide traite avec le plus grand

sérieux du monde. D'ailleurs, ce dernier fait figure de bouc émissaire, le protagoniste lui faisant endosser l'entière responsabilité, sans mesurer l'importance de sa médiation, comme si cette mésaventure ne faisait que pleinement confirmer sa méfiance initiale. Le ressentiment du Français dévalisé se traduit de surcroît par le rire devant la « bêtise de ces gens » qui avalent sans discernement les médicaments européens. Ce rire jaune s'apparente ainsi au « rire d'exclusion⁷⁴ » analysé par Frédéric Tinguely qui jaillit en contexte interculturel et qui représente ici une sorte de vengeance imaginaire, une revanche épistémologique censée suggérer la nette supériorité du savoir occidental.

Cependant, ce qui pourrait surprendre, mais n'a pas tellement l'air de surprendre le voyageur, est cette manifestation de « douceur et courtoisie » pour le moins saugrenue dans ce contexte aux yeux d'un Européen. Loin d'être donc dépourvus d'humanité, les Arabes pillards s'avèrent doués d'une humanité autre, que l'abbé Carré leur (re)connaît déjà.

En réalité, ses échanges avec les Arabes sont bien plus riches que cet épisode ne le laisse entendre. D'ailleurs, pendant une bonne partie de sa traversée du désert, il avait eu à ses côtés non seulement ce « mauvais médiateur » qu'il soupçonne d'être de mèche avec ses pairs, mais aussi un autre, qui pourrait incarner la figure du « bon médiateur ». Et, si la rencontre du premier est placée sous le signe de la méfiance, la deuxième – une rencontre de fortune d'un cavalier arabe d'Anah voulant se joindre à eux – est de celles où la même suspicion initiale se dissipera progressivement pour entraîner des changements sur tous les trois axes proposés par Tzvetan Todorov pour penser la relation à l'Autre, à savoir épistémologique, praxéologique et axiologique⁷⁵.

Son inquiétude commence à faiblir lors des bonnes réceptions successives chez des Arabes du désert facilitées par son nouveau compagnon de route, comme celle que leur réserve le cheikh Hussein : « Cette bonne réception et les caresses⁷⁶ que tous les Arabes de ce lieu firent à mon Arabe d'Anah me donnèrent bonne augure et me confirmèrent que je n'avais pas mal rencontré⁷⁷. » Au moment de leur arrivée à Anah, lieu de résidence de celui qui entre temps a déjà reçu un nom – Hassan Faraj – les liens de confiance et affection mutuelle sont déjà tissés entre un Français et un Arabe bien individualisés l'un aux yeux de l'autre :

Mon Arabe Hassan Faraj nous mena descendre à son logis, qui en un instant fut rempli des principaux Arabes du lieu [...] je fus tout surpris de voir entrer un nombre infini de femmes arabes qui vinrent par troupes se

conjoindre avec les femmes et parentes de notre nouveau venu, auquel elles témoignaient leurs joies et satisfactions de son arrivée par des acclamations, des gestes et des battements de mains si plaisants et agréables que jamais je ne me trouvai à telle fête. Sur quoi je faisais de sérieuses réflexions du bonheur de cet Arabe qui en un moment perdait la mémoire de toutes les fatigues de ses voyages par les charmes et la douceur des caresses de ses parentes et amies [...] ⁷⁸.

On voit ici que plus on pénètre dans l'univers intime de l'Autre, « son logis », plus celui-ci nous réserve de surprises, ce qui témoigne de l'inépuisable fraîcheur de l'altérité. Les termes employés décrivent de manière symptomatique le statut ambivalent du voyageur, pris qu'il est dans un mouvement dialectique entre extériorité et intériorité, caractéristique de la posture de l'observateur-participant. La surprise initiale, qui est de taille, en fait un spectateur à la fois abasourdi et enchanté par ce déferlement féminin impromptu. Suit le mouvement d'immersion, d'intégration dans cette singulière communauté et de participation aux réjouissances collectives. Le vocabulaire se fait d'ailleurs très affectif aussi bien dans la description des manifestations festives des femmes arabes que dans leur évaluation, exprimée à travers le jugement axiologique appréciatif « si plaisants et agréables ». Le vécu euphorique du Français est d'ailleurs renforcé par l'unicité de cette expérience interculturelle qui semble le combler : « jamais je ne me trouvai à telle fête ». Mais cette plénitude de la participation n'a qu'un temps ; elle fera place au détachement, à une prise de distance réflexive où il ne s'agit plus d'une vibration à l'unisson, mais d'une contemplation du « bonheur » d'autrui qu'on ne peut qu'envier, car il nous renvoie en miroir un sentiment de non-appartenance. C'est le moment de partir.

Le lendemain, après à peine une nuit de repos, comme notre voyageur se prépare à poursuivre son chemin, son hôte lui propose de l'accompagner, lui ou son fils, jusqu'à Bagdad. Carré aura de quoi se repentir d'avoir décliné cette offre généreuse de celui qui le traite en ami :

Sans doute que, [si] j'eusse cru mon Arabe d'Anah en ce point comme j'avais fait en toutes autres choses, je m'en fusse mieux trouvé que je ne fis. Mon hôte, tout chagrin de me voir partir si précipitamment, fit tous ses efforts pour m'obliger de rester encore quelques jours pour me reposer et refaire des fatigues passées [...] je commençai pour lors à me repentir et à sentir la faute que j'avais faite de refuser le guide que l'on m'avait voulu donner à Anah, dont j'étais assuré et de la fidélité et de l'affection ⁷⁹.

Le ton est toujours empreint d'affectivité, au « chagrin » de la séparation témoigné par son hôte faisant écho le repentir du voyageur trop pressé pour suivre les conseils de son « ange gardien ». En effet, son Arabe d'Anah a tout d'un « bon médiateur », à même d'assurer, non seulement par sa « fidélité » et son « affection », mais aussi par sa connaissance supérieure des siens, l'assistance nécessaire au Français tantôt trop méfiant, tantôt trop confiant, pas toujours capable d'adopter la démarche appropriée aux circonstances. Mais, malgré ses déboires ultérieurs, cette relation interpersonnelle réussie avec Hassan Faraj portera ses fruits. Et, tout comme chez le chevalier d'Arvieux, c'est d'un mouvement allant de individuel, du particulier vers le général, d'une expérience authentique et immédiate de l'altérité, que surgira un portrait élogieux des Arabes des déserts :

Une chose que je trouve admirable parmi ces Arabes qui semblent si éloignés des courtoisies et civilités des autres nations et que l'on croit être du tout ignorants des belles mœurs, est la manière dont ils reçoivent les voyageurs, les civilités et belles règles qu'ils observent charitablement d'une manière incroyable, ce que j'avais déjà expérimenté dans mes premiers voyages avec étonnement et admiration [...]

Voilà les coutumes de ces Arabes qui nous semblent si sauvages et farouches, et qui font honte à la plupart de nos riches chrétiens d'Europe qui le plus souvent refusent un morceau de pain à de pauvres pèlerins ou étrangers qui n'ont pas de quoi se sustenter. Voilà des mœurs et des façons de vivre bien différentes de nos pays où le luxe, la convoitise d'amasser des trésors et le grand faste aveuglent la plupart du monde. Qu'on vienne un peu avec moi dans ces déserts. Je vous ferai voir des nations arabes et barbares qui nous font de belles leçons pour nous ôter de l'esprit les folles et extravagantes ambitions de richesses [...] Venez, dis-je, dans ces pays de nos premiers pères, venez dans l'Arabie. Vous y verrez des nations qui ne savent ce que c'est d'or, d'argent, de vaisselles et meubles précieux, et n'ont pour toute richesse que des troupeaux dont ils retirent tous les émoluments de la vie avec une quiétude d'esprit si grande qu'il semble qu'il n'y ait pas au monde de nation plus heureuse ni plus en repos⁸⁰.

Ces considérations se présentent comme le fruit d'une expérience viatique consolidée, où l'étonnement du premier voyage fait place à une meilleure compréhension, sans que l'admiration initiale en soit affaiblie pour autant. Le texte joue sur l'opposition entre le paraître et l'être, entre le savoir partagé, sommaire et stéréotypé, que les Français ont à l'époque des Arabes nomades, et sa réévaluation fondée sur une

connaissance supérieure, ce qui marque deux positions extrêmes sur l'axe épistémologique. Le fragment ci-dessus opère aussi un véritable renversement axiologique en faveur de ceux que l'on tient d'habitude pour « sauvages », « farouches », en un mot, « barbares », ce qui n'est pas sans évoquer la célèbre réflexion de Montaigne sur la question.

L'excellence des nations arabes s'avère, d'ailleurs, multiple. Sous la plume de Carré, ils font d'abord figure de champions de la politesse interculturelle, leur courtoisie « allocentrique » ne pouvant apparaître qu'« incroyable » aux yeux du public français, comme elle avait dû l'être dans un premier temps pour le voyageur. Leur ouverture aux étrangers est doublée d'une simplicité qui renvoie à un Orient primordial ayant conservé sa pureté. Cette idéalisation, qui sent un peu l'exotisme primitiviste, spécifique à la construction de la figure du bon sauvage, est cependant employée aussi à des fins critiques, tendance qui se développe de plus en plus chez les voyageurs du XVII^e siècle.

Toujours est-il que ce tableau de la félicité collective d'une nation donnée en modèle afin de fustiger les « folles et extravagantes ambitions » de sa propre société est aussi le pendant du bonheur individuel de Hassan Faraj, son Arabe d'Anah, dont la rencontre a permis au voyageur d'évoluer aussi sur l'axe praxéologique dans le sens d'un rapprochement à l'Autre. Et c'est peut-être cette intimité interculturelle qui pousse le narrateur à se constituer en quelque sorte en porte-parole des Arabes du désert et à convier ses lecteurs à se joindre à lui et à voir *par* ses yeux ce que lui, il a vu *de* ses propres yeux. En effet, l'interpellation directe du lecteur-interlocuteur ne fait que renforcer la dimension dialogique du récit, déjà polyphonique par la nature même du genre viatique : « Qu'on vienne un peu avec moi dans ces déserts. Je vous ferai voir [...] Venez, dis-je [...] Vous y verrez. » Le voyageur, observateur et participant, devient aussi médiateur entre le chez-soi et l'Autre, en véritable passeur culturel, à même de garantir, grâce à ses interprétations avisées, une certaine « porosité⁸¹ » de l'altérité.

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C'est sur cette « invitation au voyage » que nous arrivons au terme de notre bref parcours sur les chemins de l'Orient du XVII^e siècle, en compagnie de quelques voyageurs du temps. La grande diversité des profils humains et des itinéraires empruntés par ceux-ci ne pouvait donner lieu

qu'à un traitement sommaire, adapté au cadre imparti à cette étude, de quelques échantillons représentatifs pour une problématique comme la nôtre, celle des échanges interculturels entre Français et « Orientaux ». Ainsi, sur fond d'un climat d'ouverture intellectuelle plus général de la France envers les horizons lointains, la curiosité nous est-elle apparue comme « la chose du monde la mieux partagée », du moins parmi ceux qui, portés vers le « commerce des Etrangers », s'avèrent plus d'une fois capables de dépasser leurs préjugés ethnocentriques. Grâce à une initiation à l'Autre qui prend parfois les traits d'une immersion culturelle profonde, les vrais témoins rendent compte à travers leurs récits d'une expérience complexe de l'altérité, fondée sur une communication plus ou moins biaisée avec une multitude de représentants des divers Orient parcourus. Le cas de Barthélemy Carré pourrait être considéré comme paradigmatique pour la manière dont une série d'interactions interculturelles peut conduire à la constitution d'images concurrentes d'un ethnotype particulier – en l'occurrence la figure de l'Arabe – qui coexistent au sein d'un même récit de voyage. Loin de constituer un paradoxe, cette représentation ambivalente s'explique par les divers contextes pragmatiques de la rencontre, le regard et le vécu du protagoniste étant à chaque fois infléchis selon la nature des échanges. On voit ainsi comment les évolutions sur les axes épistémologique et praxéologique, supposant une connaissance approfondie acquise dans une relation d'intimité intersubjective à l'Autre, peuvent mener à la réhabilitation de toute une catégorie, à travers un véritable renversement axiologique de stéréotypes dépréciatifs préexistants. Cet exemple ouvre la voie vers un prolongement de cette réflexion qui pourrait prendre en compte d'autres figures, comme celles du Persan, de l'Indien ou même du Turc, malgré la connaissance bien plus poussée qu'on a à l'époque de ce dernier. Il s'agirait au bout du compte de retracer les parcours sinueux des voyageurs de l'âge classique à travers cette véritable mosaïque interethnique propre à leurs Orient. Mais tout cela reste encore à faire.

NOTES

- ¹ HEYBERGER, B., « L'Orient et l'Islam dans l'érudition européenne du XVII^e siècle », in *Dix-septième siècle*, No. 268, 2015/3, p. 495-508, p. 496.
- ² *Id.*, p. 508.
- ³ VAN DER CRUYSSSE, D., *Le noble désir de courir le monde. Voyager en Asie au XVII^e siècle*, Fayard, Paris, 2002, p. 48.
- ⁴ *Id.*, p. 46.
- ⁵ Rousseau le comparera à Platon, tandis que Montesquieu s'en inspirera dans ses *Lettres persanes*.
- ⁶ Nous soulignons.
- ⁷ CHARDIN, J., *Voyages du Chevalier Chardin, en Perse, et autres lieux de l'Orient*, éd. par L. Langlès, Paris, 1811, tome I, p. 205.
- ⁸ BARTHÈLEMY, G., « Discours préliminaires » in *Dictionnaire des orientalistes de langue française*. Nouvelle édition revue et augmentée, François Pouillon (éd.), IISMM/Karthala, Paris, 2012, p. XXII.
- ⁹ SAID, E., *L'Orientalisme. L'Orient créé par l'Occident*, Traduit de l'américain par Catherine Malamoud, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1978.
- ¹⁰ CLIFFORD, J., « Sur l'Orientalisme » in *Malaise dans la culture : l'ethnographie, la littérature et l'art au XX^e siècle*, trad. de l'américain par Marie-Anne Sichère, École nationale supérieure des Beaux-Arts, Paris, 1996, [1988], p. 259.
- ¹¹ HENTSCH, T., *L'Orient imaginaire. La vision politique occidentale de l'Est méditerranéen*, Minuit, Paris, 1998, p. 10.
- ¹² GROSIRICHARD, A., *Structure du sérail. La fiction du despotisme asiatique dans l'Occident classique*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1979.
- ¹³ « My use of the term "baroque Orientalism" is not intended as anything other than a reminder that this Orientalism existed, that it was of its time, but that we still have difficulty categorizing it » in DEW, N., *Orientalism in Louis XIV's France*, Oxford University Press, Oxford et New York, 2009, p. 7.
- ¹⁴ « The Europeans were not the dominant powers in this period in those areas. This is not to say that the making of Orientalist knowledge in our period occurred in an absence of power relations, but rather that the power relations in those specific situations need to be studied on their own terms », in DEW, N., *op. cit.*, p. 6-7.
- ¹⁵ POUILLON, F., « Discours préliminaires » in *Dictionnaire des orientalistes de langue française*. Nouvelle édition revue et augmentée, François Pouillon (éd.), IISMM/Karthala, Paris, 2012, p. XXV.
- ¹⁶ BARTHÈLEMY, G., « Discours préliminaires » in *Dictionnaire des orientalistes de langue française*, *op. cit.*, p. XXII.

- 17 ATKINSON, G., *Les Relations de voyage du XVII^e siècle et l'évolution des idées. Contribution à l'étude de la formation de l'esprit du XVIII^e siècle*, Librairie Ancienne Edouard Champion, Paris, 1924, p. 184.
- 18 Cité par ATKINSON, G., *op. cit.*, p. 165.
- 19 Voir les ouvrages pionniers de ATKINSON, G., *Les Nouveaux Horizons de la Renaissance française*, Droz, Paris, 1935 et *Les Relations de voyage du XVII^e siècle et l'évolution des idées. Contribution à l'étude de la formation de l'esprit du XVIII^e siècle*, Librairie Ancienne Edouard Champion, Paris, 1924, ainsi que le livre désormais classique de HAZARD, P., *La Crise de la conscience européenne (1680-1715)*, Fayard, Paris, 1961.
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- 21 *Id.*, p. 612.
- 22 TODOROV, T., *Nous et les autres. La réflexion française sur la diversité humaine*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1989, p. 28.
- 23 CLIFFORD, J., *op. cit.*, p. 259.
- 24 VAN DER CRUYSE, D., *op. cit.*, p. 395.
- 25 Jean Thévenot (1633-1667), neveu de l'orientaliste Melchisédech Thévenot, sa vocation s'avère être le voyage en Orient. En 1664 paraît sa *Relation d'un voyage fait au Levant*, qui rend compte d'un périple à travers l'Empire ottoman (1655-1659), suivie de deux autres, publiées de manière posthume, *Suite du Voyage au Levant* (1674) et *Troisième Partie des Voyages de M. de Thevenot, contenant l'Indostan, des nouveaux Mogols, et des autres Peuples et Pays de l'Inde* (1684). Il trouvera la mort lors de son retour de Perse, pas loin de Tabriz, à la suite d'une blessure accidentelle.
- 26 WOLFZETTEL, F., *Le discours du voyageur. Pour une histoire littéraire du récit de voyage en France, du Moyen Âge au XVIII^e siècle*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1996, p. 202.
- 27 Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1605-1689) entreprend, entre 1630 et 1670, pas moins de six voyages en Orient, en faisant des séjours dans l'Empire ottoman, en Perse et en Inde, ayant l'occasion de faire la connaissance de Thévenot et de Chardin. En 1675 paraît sa *Nouvelle relation de l'intérieur du serral du Grand Seigneur*, et une année après, en 1676, les *Six Voyages de Jean Baptiste Tavernier écuyer, Baron d'Aubonne qu'il a fait en Turquie, en Perse, et aux Indes...* qui jouissent d'un grand succès.
- 28 VALENSI, L., *Dictionnaire des orientalistes de langue française*, *op. cit.*, p. 974.
- 29 Jean Chardin (1643-1712), issu d'une riche famille de joailliers protestants, est surtout connu pour ses voyages en Perse et en Inde qui deviennent de véritables implantations en terre d'accueil. Ses *Voyages*, parus premièrement en 1686, connaîtront plusieurs éditions successives et un grand succès.

- ³⁰ Antoine Galland (1646-1715) est un voyageur et orientaliste français du XVII^e siècle. Il fera plusieurs voyages au Levant, d'abord en tant que bibliothécaire et secrétaire particulier de l'ambassadeur Nointel, ensuite en qualité d'Antiquaire du Roi. Académicien et lecteur au Collège royal vers la fin de sa vie, Galland reste connu surtout en tant que premier traducteur des *Mille et une nuits*.
- ³¹ Laurent d'Arvieux (1635-1702) est l'un des premiers voyageurs français à avoir séjourné dans un camp d'Arabes nomades (1664-1665). Après un premier séjour de douze années dans l'Empire ottoman (1653-1665) où il s'initie aux affaires de commerce, le chevalier d'Arvieux rentrera en France et sera chargé de plusieurs missions diplomatiques. Ses *Mémoires* seront publiés de manière posthume en 1735.
- ³² Qui se désigne lui-même en tant que tel. Voir CARRÉ, B., *Le courrier du roi en Orient : relations de deux voyages en Perse et en Inde, 1668-1674*, transcrits, présentés et annotés par Dirk Van der Cruysse, Fayard, Paris, 2005, p. 18.
- ³³ Charles Dellon (1649-1710) fit des voyages dans les Indes orientales où il eut des démêlés avec l'Inquisition portugaise. Il connut le succès avec sa *Relation de l'Inquisition de Goa*, publiée en 1687, où il raconte l'expérience de son incarcération.
- ³⁴ Pour une typologie des voyages à l'âge classique, voir, entre autres, l'ouvrage de WOLFZETTEL, F., *Le discours du voyageur. Pour une histoire littéraire du récit de voyage en France, du Moyen Âge au XVIII^e siècle*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1996.
- ³⁵ C'est à dessein que, dans le cadre de cette étude, nous avons laissé de côté une catégorie importante de voyageurs, les missionnaires, qui, bien que très représentatifs pour l'époque considérée, entreprennent des déplacements dont les enjeux sont bien différents par rapport aux autres catégories de voyageurs.
- ³⁶ Fait mis également en évidence par Michèle Longino : « The main purpose of the Mediterranean travel for the French was commerce; traders were the principal adventurers sailing across the Mediterranean [...] The profession of diplomacy, initiated by king Francis I in the preceding century, developed in the seventeenth century precisely to serve the needs of the traders; diplomats negotiated on behalf of the merchants for favorable transit, import, and export terms; protection from harm in alien territories; and favorable trade conditions » in LONGINO, M., *French Travel Writing in the Ottoman Empire. Marseille to Constantinople (1650-1700)*, Routledge, New York et Londres, 2015, p. 2.
- ³⁷ DELLON, C., *Nouvelle relation d'un voyage fait aux Indes orientales*, Veuve Bietkins, Paris, 1685, p. 2.
- ³⁸ VAN DER CRUYSSSE, D., *Le noble désir de courir le monde*, op. cit., p. 40.

- 39 Voir PARLEA, V., « *Un Franc parmi les Arabes* ». *Parcours oriental et découverte de l'Autre chez le chevalier d'Arvieux*, ELLUG, Grenoble, 2015, et plus particulièrement le chapitre « Sous le signe de la curiosité » où nous avons dressé également une typologie des formes de la curiosité.
- 40 VAN DER CRUYSE, D., *op. cit.*, p. 33.
- 41 *Id.*, p. 318.
- 42 FURETIÈRE, A., *Dictionnaire universel contenant generalement tous les mots françois tant vieux que modernes, et les Termes de toutes les sciences et des arts...*, Recueilli et compilé par feu messire Antoine Furetiere, 2^e édition revue, corrigée et augmentée par M. Basnage de Bauval, chez Arnoud Reinier Leers, La Haye et Rotterdam, 1702. Voir aussi CAYROU, G., *Dictionnaire du français classique. La langue du XVII^e siècle*, Klincksieck, Paris, 1924, p. 168-169.
- 43 Voir CAYROU, G., *op. cit.*, p. 448-449.
- 44 Dérivé du bas latin *alteritas*, signifiant différence, le terme *altérité* apparaît pour la première fois en français en 1270 avec le sens de changement ou altération. Si, dans les langues latines, le terme *altération* est progressivement devenu péjoratif, renvoyant vers une dégradation, une corruption, voire une perte de l'identité, une aliénation (ce qui pourrait suggérer également l'action corrosive que l'altérité de l'Autre peut avoir sur le Moi), au début il indiquait l'idée de changement, de transformation sur le mode neutre. L'idée de changement induit par le contact avec autrui se retrouve donc au cœur même de la notion d'altérité.
- 45 CARRÉ, B., *Le courrier du roi en Orient : relations de deux voyages en Perse et en Inde, 1668-1674*, transcrits, présentés et annotés par Dirk Van der Cruysse, Fayard, Paris, 2005, p. 437.
- 46 TAVERNIER, J.-B., *Les Six Voyages de Jean-Baptiste Tavernier Ecuyer Baron d'Aubonne qu'il a fait en Turquie, en Perse, et aux Indes...*, Gervais Clouzier, Paris, 1676, I, p. 111-112.
- 47 À part Antoine Galland, qui était déjà un jeune orientaliste en herbe et qui, une fois à Constantinople, ne fera que se perfectionner dans les diverses langues orientales qu'il avait déjà étudiées au Collège de France, comme le turc, l'arabe, le persan, l'hébreu. Son *Journal de Constantinople* foisonne d'ailleurs de réflexions au sujet de divers livres dont il fera l'acquisition au nom de l'ambassadeur de France, comme dans le passage suivant : « Je vis un beau livre Arabe in quarto d'une belle écriture sur du papier de soie réglé d'or avec les interjections et les titres de mesme. [...] Je vis un autre livre Arabe de mesme forme qui n'avoit pas, à la vérité, les mesmes qualités extérieures que le premier mais qui n'estoit pas moins considérable pour ce qu'il contenoit » in GALLAND, A., *Voyage à Constantinople (1672-1673)*, Maisonneuve et Larose, Paris, 2002 (*Journal d'Antoine Galland pendant son séjour à Constantinople*, publié et annoté par Charles Schefer, Ernest Leroux, Paris, 1881), p. 51.

- 48 CARRÉ, B., *op. cit.*, p. 26.
- 49 CHARDIN, J., « Préface » in *Journal du Voyage du chevalier Chardin en*
Perse et aux Indes orientales, par la Mer Noire et par la Colchide. 1^{re} Partie,
qui contient le voyage de Paris à Ispahan, Moses Pitt, Londres, 1686, p. d.
- 50 *Id.*, p. c.
- 51 *Ibid.*
- 52 VAN DER CRUYSE, D., *Chardin le Persan*, Fayard, Paris, 1998, p. 72.
- 53 AFFERGAN, F., *Exotisme et altérité. Essai sur les fondements d'une critique*
de l'anthropologie, P.U.F., Paris, 1987, p. 14.
- 54 *Id.*, p. 23.
- 55 Le terme désigne généralement les chrétiens d'Europe.
- 56 THÉVENOT, J., *Relation d'un Voyage fait au Levant*, Louis Bilaine, Paris,
 1664, p. 161.
- 57 *Ibid.*
- 58 (D') ARVIEUX, L., *Mémoires du chevalier d'Arvieux, envoyé extraordinaire*
du Roi à la Porte, consul d'Alep, d'Alger, de Tripoli et autres Echelles du
Levant, publiés par R. P. Jean-Baptiste Labat de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs,
 Charles Jean-Baptiste Delespine, Paris, 1735, t. III, p. 13-14.
- 59 AFFERGAN, F., *op. cit.*, p. 58.
- 60 PRATT, M. L., « Arts of the Contact Zone » in *Ways of Reading*, 5th edition,
 ed. David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrofsky, New York, Bedford/
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- 61 SUBRAHMANYAM, S., « Connected histories: notes towards a
 reconfiguration of early modern Eurasia », in *Modern Asian Studies*, No.
 31, 1997, p. 735-762, p. 745.
- 62 *Id.*, p. 748.
- 63 HARRIGAN, M., « Seventeenth-century French Travellers and the Encounter
 with Indian Histories », in *French History*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2014, p. 1-22, p.
 3.
- 64 Barthélemy Carré (1636-après 1700), issu d'une famille distinguée de
 Blois, est connu également comme l'abbé Carré, ayant suivi une carrière
 ecclésiastique et ordonné prêtre vers 1661. Ce n'est toutefois pas en qualité
 de missionnaire qu'il va voyager en Orient, mais en tant qu'agent de Colbert
 et porteur des instructions de Louis XIV à la Compagnie des Indes orientales,
 censé également faire un compte rendu de l'évolution du commerce français
 dans la région. Tombé en disgrâce à son retour de 1674, on perd bientôt
 sa trace. Le seul récit de ses deux voyages en Perse et en Inde (1668-1671,
 1672-1674) à paraître de son vivant est une version abrégée de son premier
 voyage, *Voyage des Indes orientales, mêlé de plusieurs histoires curieuses*
 (1699).
- 65 CARRÉ, B., *op. cit.*, p. 455.
- 66 *Ibid.*

- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁸ Nous soulignons.
- ⁶⁹ Au sens de *bagages*.
- ⁷⁰ À l'époque les Arabes nomades ne se servaient pas d'armes à feu.
- ⁷¹ CARRÉ, B., *op. cit.*, p. 456-458.
- ⁷² Une exception de taille est, comme nous l'avons déjà précisé, le chevalier d'Arvieux. Cependant, au début de son premier séjour levantin, il n'avait lui non plus qu'une représentation sommaire des Arabes nomades, qu'il qualifiait de « voleurs habiles », en les assimilant aux Bohémiens. Voir (D') ARVIEUX, L., *op. cit.*, t. I, p. 205.
- ⁷³ Ou « mis-meeting » en original, que Zygmunt Bauman définit comme « des rencontres fortuites sans impact » in BAUMAN, Z., *La vie en miettes. Expérience postmoderne et moralité*, Traduit de l'anglais par Christophe Rosson, Le Rouergue/Chambon, Arles, 2003 [1995], p. 47.
- ⁷⁴ Voir TINGUELY, F., « Rire et relations interculturelles : l'exemple du voyage en Perse à l'Âge classique » in *Le rire des voyageurs (XVI^e-XVII^e siècles)*, D. Bertrand (dir.), Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal, Clermont Ferrand, 2007, p. 75.
- ⁷⁵ Voir TODOROV, T., *La conquête de l'Amérique. La question de l'Autre*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1982.
- ⁷⁶ Amabilités, marques extérieures d'affection.
- ⁷⁷ CARRÉ, B., *op. cit.*, p. 443.
- ⁷⁸ *Id.*, p. 448.
- ⁷⁹ *Id.*, p. 449-450.
- ⁸⁰ *Id.*, p. 443-444.
- ⁸¹ Selon François Hartog, le voyageur est, en effet, le *póros* – signifiant en grec « passage » – capable de rendre l'altérité intelligible aux yeux de son public en tant que « celui qui permet de passer d'une appellation à une autre : il est le *póros* et le garant de ce passage » in HARTOG, F., *Le miroir d'Hérodote. Essai sur la représentation de l'autre*, Gallimard, Paris, 1980, p. 259.

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
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THE FRENCH ORIGINS AND CULTURAL RECEPTION OF THE ROMANIAN TRANSLATION OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU'S *WALDEN*

Abstract: This paper outlines the impressive circulation of Henry David Thoreau's *Walden* (1854) at the beginning of the twentieth century in Europe. In particular, the paper deals with the topic of translation from another translation and analyzes the French, German, Russian, and Bulgarian sources of the Romanian translation of *Walden* in order to offer a better understanding of the circulation of literary texts, of their impact on national literary histories, and of their global influence.

Keywords: American literature, Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*, literature in translation.

Introduction

In this project, I plan to investigate the literary and cultural genealogy of the very first translation from French into Romanian of the nineteenth-century American classic *Walden; or Life in the Woods* by Henry D. Thoreau. In particular, I want to analyze the circumstances in which Panait Mușoiu, a socialist and sometimes anarchist activist, takes time off from fringe politics to translate the work of an author whose objectives, at least in *Walden*, situate himself beyond politics. Eventually, with this study, I intend to lay out the ground for a long term project that includes an annotated edition of *Walden* in Panait Mușoiu's translation as well as a new Romanian translation from its original English.

As a scholar of American studies and as a translator, I envision this project to be translingual, transcultural and interdisciplinary: on the one hand, it will allow me to continue my investigation of Thoreauvian

literature, which I began with my doctoral dissertation dedicated to the analysis of land surveying in Thoreau's work; on the other hand, this study will trace back, if not recover, the influence the American author and *Walden* in particular had on world literature in matters ranging from nature writing and environmental studies to nonfiction writing and civil disobedience politics. My project will analyze the personal and cultural biography of Thoreau and Mușoiu, as well as the cultural exchanges that surrounded the publication and subsequent translation of *Walden* from English to French and then from French to Romanian within the larger context of literary history that spans two continents and almost a century of ideas.

The focus on the circulation and translation of literature as well as on reception theory can provide a fresh perspective for the study of American literature and a new understanding of the global flow of texts, people and ideas in literature in the nineteenth- and the twentieth century. In short then, the purpose of this project is to discern what led Mușoiu to undergo the important task of translating *Walden* into Romanian. In order to answer this question, I first wish to examine the overall critical reception of Thoreau's work and of *Walden* in particular within late nineteenth- early twentieth-century Europe (mainly France, Germany, and Romania); then, I will examine the early French reception of *Walden*, with a particular emphasis on Louis Fabulet's 1922 translation; last, but not least, I will focus on the Romanian translation of the French text that Mușoiu undertook between 1928 and 1934.

Thoreau, Mușoiu and literature in translation

While literary translation affects the reading and writing of any original literary texts, translation from another translation complicates not only the critical reception of the translated work but also the cultural context to which it belongs. By exploring the translation and circulation of an American text in French and Romanian, I would like to highlight how texts originating in different contexts have been locally adapted and adopted as texts of world literature. Thus, the significant flow of translations from one language to another and from one culture to another is intricately linked to the development of the discipline of world literature as well as to the international network of translators, publishers, book sellers and reviewers.

For instance, when I first compared Mușoiu's translation against the French one in the special collections section of the Babes-Bolyai University's Library (in Cluj-Napoca, Romania), I was comparing editions that were donated by two important public intellectuals, the celebrated Romanian comparatist Adrian Marino (1921-2005) and the college professor Henri Jacquier (1900-1980), a French expat teaching literature in Romania. Moreover, Marino's copy of Mușoiu's translation had a newspaper clipping of a note advertising the 1967 Gallimard edition of *Walden* that marked the 150th anniversary of Thoreau's birth, whereas Jacquier's copy was that of the original 1922 French translation. The fact that a Romanian scholar and a French professor, both part of the same literary establishment but coming from different cultures, showed interest in the same American author is an example of the importance that his book once had and why I find it imperative to trace back its Romanian translation. I will do this by both analyzing primary sources and secondary sources that deal with reception theory and translation studies.

In biographical terms, however, Thoreau and Mușoiu could not have been further apart as evidenced by the following short biographical sketches, and yet one's original work and the other's translation brought them together. Next to Ralph Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, Herman Melville, and Nathaniel Hawthorne, Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862) is considered one of the major figures of the American Renaissance, the mid nineteenth-century period associated with the birth of American literature. The author of an impressive journal that he kept for most of his adult life, as well as of two books, many essays and some poetry, Thoreau is mainly remembered thanks to his masterpiece *Walden; or Life in the Woods* (1854) and his essay "Resistance to Civil Government" / "Civil Disobedience" (1849) that later influenced non-violent liberation movements such as Mahatma Gandhi's Indian independence movement in the first half of the twentieth century as well as Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Civil Rights Movement in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s.

Panait Mușoiu (1864-1944) is a Romanian journalist, translator, and editor of popular and philosophical treatises ranging from Plato to John Stuart Mill. Before or during a brief stint as a college student at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (1892-1893), Mușoiu translates for the first time from French to Romanian "The Communist Manifesto" by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, published in Iași. In 1889, Mușoiu founds a libertarian publishing house, "Biblioteca Revista Ideei," where he edits and translates anarchist classics, revolutionary literature, and various

educational pamphlets. At the turn of the century, in 1900, Mușoiu begins publishing "Revista Ideei," the magazine he used as a front for the afore-mentioned publishing house. By and large, throughout his life, he finds himself if not at the center then really close to the Romanian intellectual movements that, starting with the 1880s, adopted Western revolutionary trends such as socialism, workers' and women's movements, and anarchism.

Theoretical framework and research methods

If Mușoiu's translation is an onion, then Thoreau's *Walden* is its core, the *Urtext*, and peeling off the multiple layers is similar to analyzing the primary sources of my project. To do so, I will present the three versions of *Walden*: Thoreau's original from 1854, Louis Fabulet's French translation from 1922, and Mușoiu's Romanian translation published in 1936. Next, I will analyze the three texts about the author and his work that accompany the Romanian translation: Maurice Muret's introduction to a previous incomplete French translation by Winnaretta Singer and published in the short lived magazine "La Renaissance Latine" (1903-4); a critical study of Thoreau's work by Karl Federn (1899) that Mușoiu published in his own magazine "Revista Ideei" (1908); and, Ralph Waldo Emerson's epitaph of Thoreau.

It is worth mentioning here that, even though the manuscript seems to be lost, it appears that Mușoiu may have started translating *Walden* or at least began being interested in it as early as 1904, soon after the Swiss critic Muret prefaced the American socialite Singer's translation published in two consecutive issues of the French *revue* "La Renaissance Latine." Also, similarly important, it is worth pointing out that Federn's text had been translated from German to Romanian by Grigore Goilav following a reprint in the New York based German language magazine *Freiheit*, edited by the German-American politician and journalist Johann (John) Most. Moreover, Stanciu Ștefanof following the Russian and Bulgarian editions of *Walden* translates Emerson's epitaph, which does not accompany the French edition. This, again, is another example of the impressive circulation and impact that Thoreau's work had on world literature at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Within this broader historical context, Mușoiu's interest in Thoreau's work and particularly in *Walden* does not appear to stem from an informed

understanding of Thoreau's radical politics (dealing mostly with resisting a state that supports slavery) but rather from the influence that Thoreau's work had on European intellectuals that Mușoiu wanted to emulate. Another possible explanation of Mușoiu's interest in *Walden* is related to Thoreau's growing fame throughout Europe. For instance, in a review of Fabulet's translation published in 1922, Valéry Larbaud, a French writer, literary critic, and translator, mentions the much earlier German and Dutch translations and ponders as to why the French version took so long into making.¹ Without mentioning the unfinished translation of Winnaretta Singer, dating back to 1903, Larbaud welcomes Fabulet's translation almost like a recovery enterprise and points out that Thoreau's work had been well known in the French literary circles in its original English. Larbaud's review, thus, raises two seemingly disparate points that also inform my own project. On the one hand, a work of literature needs to be able to exist by itself in the world in its original language and those interested in reading it need to be able to read the original; on the other hand, any translation needs to be timely or, at least, be made at the right moment.

With this in mind, my effort here is to consider what it means when a translation is both late and made after another translation; to understand the significance and importance of translations within the culture at large; and, to suggest that translations reflect cultural curiosity and selfless appreciation of great literary works and that second-hand translations are better than no translations at all. In the end, this paper is an investigation of genealogy and cultural influence, a comparativist study of translations and cultural archives that span different geographic areas and historical periods.

Translation Studies, Walter Benjamin and Henry D. Thoreau

The growth of translation studies as an academic discipline is a success story of the last decades of the twentieth century. As various literary critics and theorists argue, the discipline brings together work in a wide variety of fields, including linguistics, literary study, history, anthropology, psychology, international relations, and economics.² In the wake of poststructuralism and postcolonial studies, translation theory gave new insight and new life not only to the almost dying field of comparative

literature but also to the renewed field of world literature. As Susan Bassnett and André Lefevere write:

Translation is ... a rewriting of an original text. All rewritings, whatever their intention, reflect a certain ideology and a poetics and as such manipulate literature to function in a given society in a given way. Rewriting is manipulation, undertaken in the service of power, and in its positive aspect can help in the evolution of a literature and a society. Rewritings can introduce new concepts, new genres, new devices, and the history of translation is the history also of literary innovation, of the shaping power of one culture upon another. But rewriting can also repress innovation, distort and contain, and in an age of ever increasing manipulation of all kinds, the study of the manipulative processes of literature as exemplified by translation can help us toward a greater awareness of the world in which we live.³

As editors of the prestigious series of Translation Studies published by Routledge, Bassnett and Lefevere know that translation is the history of literary innovation. Literature in translation, thus, promotes new concepts, genres, and devices. At the same time, the history of translation overlaps and most of the time replaces history itself in that it appropriates, albeit selectively, the discursive practices (literary, cultural, economic, political, religious, or otherwise) through which we analyze the world in which we live.

In broad terms, then, the whole Western civilization can be reduced to an uninterrupted series of translations and appropriations from the Greeks to the Romans and from the Ancient Greek and Latin to national languages. The fact that we can almost tell the story of Europe through the lenses of a handful of Bible translations, from Hebrew to Greek and then to Latin and to other languages, is a testament to the importance of translation in laying out the ground for national literatures and cultures.⁴ Moreover, a certain type of translation can also manipulate and, when prohibited, insidiously negate the self-determination of *the other*, as Edward Said's concept of *orientalism* seems to suggest. A dominant culture and ideology could completely erase another culture through the means of a foreign colonial language.

Continuing the parallel between translation and history, the history of translation records Walter Benjamin's seminal essay from 1923 "The Task of the Translator" wherein he argues that translation is not only like history but also like literary criticism. In fact, the historicity of this essay

is twofold. On the one hand, Benjamin wrote it as an introduction to his own translation from French into German of “Tableaux parisiens” from Charles Baudelaire’s groundbreaking *Les Fleurs du mal* (1857); on the other, as Paul de Man suggests, “in the profession you are nobody unless you have said something about this text.”⁵ Indeed, famous literary critics and philosophers, such as de Man himself, Jacques Derrida, Maurice Blanchot, Barbara Johnson, to name but a few, have had a lot to say about Benjamin’s essay, so much so that, suffice it to say, for the purposes of this essay, Benjamin’s ideas will help me get closer to both justify the ends of my project and to argue that Thoreau and the German philosopher hold similar views of translation.⁶

As a translator from Greek and Latin, Thoreau himself was sensible to the Transcendentalist theories of translation according to which ancient or primitive languages are the true repositories of human knowledge.⁷ The original is always more important than its translation, and, therefore, any students should try their best to learn Greek and Latin so they can appreciate a work of art and literature in its original language; however, if direct knowledge of an ancient language is not possible, then learning even a few words, like farmers do is preferable; finally, if that is not an option either, then translators should try their best to copy the source as closely and as literally as possible:

The heroic books, even if printed in the character of our mother tongue, will always be in a language dead to degenerate times; and we must laboriously seek the meaning of each word and line, conjecturing a larger sense than common use permits out of what wisdom and valor and generosity we have. The modern cheap and fertile press, with all its translations, has done little to bring us nearer to the heroic writers of antiquity. They seem as solitary, and the letter in which they are printed as rare and curious, as ever. It is worth the expense of youthful days and costly hours, if you learn only some words of an ancient language, which are raised out of the trivialness of the street, to be perpetual suggestions and provocations. It is not in vain that the farmer remembers and repeats the few Latin words which he has heard.⁸

In this respect, Thoreau’s ideas are concordant with Benjamin’s view that the original work of art is almost always more important than its copy, or, its translation, so to speak. However, if we consider a copy and/or a translation as part of the after-life of a work of art, then the work of a translator is worth the while and the translation itself becomes important

once we consider it in-and-of-itself, almost separated and independent from the original. Echoing Thoreau's ideas about the purity of original language which is dead to degenerate times, Benjamin writes that a work of art is translatable insofar as it is close or closer to truth or dogma:

Where a text is identical with truth or dogma, where it is supposed to be "the true language" in all its literalness and without the mediation of meaning, the text is unconditionally translatable. In such case translations are called for because of the plurality of languages. Just as, in the original, language and revelation are one without tension, so the translation must be one with the original in the form of the interlinear version, in which literalness and freedom are united.⁹

With my project then I plan to investigate the extent to which Thoreau's *Walden* is translatable. I also want to find out how close, that is, how true to the original both a translation and a second-hand translation can be. Benjamin's work offers the theoretical framework necessary to analyze this filiation as it originates from Thoreau's work through Fabulet's French translation to Mușoiu's translation. More specifically, if Thoreau's *Walden* is here the "interlinear version," I intend to explore the tension between the French and Romanian versions.

Walden

By the time it was published in 1854, *Walden* had already gone through several revisions and thus Thoreau's experience of living for two years (1845-1847) alone in the woods is no longer considered an experiment about nature but rather seen as meditation and even a pamphlet about the nature of things. During his stay there, Thoreau planted some crops, drafted his first book, *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers*, entertained guests, measured and sounded the pond, spent a night in jail, a experience he would later allude to in his essay "Resistance to Civil Government/Civil Disobedience" and took a trip to Mount Katahdin in Maine. In direct contradiction with his later portrayal by nature lovers and superficial critics as a transcendental hermit, Thoreau was in fact perfecting the craft of an ever-curious scientific writer and social critic. As Laura Walls writes in her book *Seeing New Worlds, Henry David Thoreau and Nineteenth-Century Natural Science*, by the time he had moved to

Walden Pond in 1845, Thoreau was already dissatisfied “with nature as a mere veil, to be pierced en route to a reality beyond.”¹⁰ If the scientific writer was only more recently rediscovered, the social critic appealed to readers from the very beginning, and that is why his message was largely embraced in anarchist, socialist, and workers’ circles such as the ones in Europe at the turn of the twentieth-century which possibly introduced Thoreau to his future Romanian translator.

In “Economy,” for instance, Thoreau sharply criticizes the socio-political system of his time freshly recovered from the so-called Panic of 1837. Moreover, explaining that it is “particularly addressed to poor students,” the author envisions the book as a self-help manual and as an inventory of what it means to be a young individual, freshly out of college trying to make a living in Antebellum America, an experience young Mușoiu must have know too well in a different country on a different continent. Faced himself with the dilemma of choosing between having a profession (teacher, pencil maker, land surveyor, etc.) and tending to his writerly vocation, Thoreau is trying to find answers to some of these questions: Should he live a practical or a principled life? Would being a land surveyor satisfy his love for the outdoors or keep him busy measuring land and thus overlook the beauty of the natural environment? Should he be more than the leader of a huckleberry party, as Emerson dismissively called him in his eulogy? As a surveyor, should he work for the government or challenge its westward expansion by reinscribing the West as the Wild? Based on the practical merits of his surveying and scientific expertise, should he write like a transcendentalist or like a naturalist? These inquiries and his critique of incipient capitalist society together with his experiment of living alone and being self-sustained may have recommended Thoreau to certain libertarian and anarchist circles that adopted him as their hero. Therefore, I believe, that this emphasis on liberation from the constraints of capitalist civilization rather than his writing about nature made Thoreau so appealing to his Romanian translator.

In *A Centennial Check-list of the Editions of Henry David Thoreau's Walden* published in 1954, Walter Harding records about 25 translations of *Walden* out of the 132 editions he inventories. Of all the translations, there is a tie when it comes to the number of the most numerous translated editions in any given language: thus, there are seven translations in German (published in 1897, 1902, 1922, 1945, 1947, 1949, 1950) and seven in Japanese (published in 1922, 1925, 1933, 2x1948, 1950, 1951); three translations are in Czechoslovakian (published in 1924,

1933, 1950) and two are transcribed into Braille (one published in 1932, with no exact year mentioned for the second or perhaps first one); finally, Harding also mentions other seven translations of *Walden* in national languages: in Dutch (published in 1902), in Russian (published in 1910), in French (published in 1922), in Italian (published in 1928), in Swedish (published in 1947) and in Danish and Spanish (both published in 1949).

At a first glance, here are a few interesting notes regarding Harding's list of various editions and translations of *Walden* during its first century of existence. Both the Russian edition and the first two Czechoslovakian editions are accompanied by Emerson's "Thoreau," the famous eulogy which set the tone for how Thoreau's biography was going to be written (the translation of Emerson's text also prefaces the Bulgarian and Romanian editions, and perhaps other editions). The 1950 Czechoslovakian edition was impounded by the Soviets pending ideological investigations. The Spanish edition is published in Argentina while some of the Japanese editions are abridged versions, as is one of the Braille editions. Two of the German editions are published one in Austria and one in Switzerland. Finally, Harding does not mention the Romanian edition, published in 1936, nor does he mention two incomplete Bulgarian translations from 1909 (reprint 1918) and 1925, which I am happy to mention here and add to this provisional list courtesy of Professor Albena Bakratcheva, author of a new complete Bulgarian translation of *Walden* published in 1993.

While dated and most likely already incomplete at the time of its printing, *A Centennial Check-list of the Editions of Henry David Thoreau's Walden* clearly documents the proliferation of translations of *Walden*. The book not only never went out of print in English but also began being translated in various languages, often times with different editions in the same language and regular updates. Thus, according to Harding, the first English edition took eight years to sell, with a second impression coming out immediately after Thoreau's death and the 123 editions of *Walden*, including translations, reflect both the importance of the book being "more frequently reprinted than any other book-length work in American literature written before the Civil War" as well as the widening foreign interest in Thoreau.¹¹

Walden in the world

In 1971, almost two decades after the check-list was published, in the foreword to *Thoreau Abroad, Twelve Bibliographical Essays*, Harding contextualizes Thoreau's literary posterity and world outreach. Noting that "the growth of Henry David Thoreau's reputation in the century since his death is one of the most startling phenomena of American literature," the critic and biographer chronicles the widespread interest in Thoreau's work.¹² Thus, the first wave of international interest in the work of the American writer begins in the 1890s when editions, translations, critical studies and biographies appear both in the US and in England, Ireland, Holland and Germany. While Harding credits this fact on the work of British critic Henry Stephens Salt, who also helped rediscover Herman Melville's novels, he also argues that Thoreau's readership was mainly enjoying his writings about nature. That changed, however, a few decades later, after World War II, together with the expansion of American imperialism, when *Walden*, for instance, became a symbol for both liberty, self-reliance, and independence in the newly liberated countries from fascist and Nazi invasions as well as a symbol for Americans' resistance to their own government's involvement in the wars in Korea and Vietnam.

The first translation of *Walden* into a foreign language appeared in Germany in 1897, following the demand of the public after "nearly a dozen articles of scholarly nature, two of which were of some importance, apparently created sufficient interest" in Thoreau's work.¹³ In Russia, Thoreau had drawn the interest of important writers such as Anton Chekhov and Leo Tolstoy. For instance, as soon as 1887, Chekhov reads an excerpt published in the leading daily newspaper "Novoe Vremya" ("New Times") from an incomplete translation of *Walden*. He is impressed more by the topic than by the style, so he decides to clip off the piece and to mail it to a friend.¹⁴ Tolstoy is won over by Thoreau's lifestyle to such a degree that he commissions an edition to be published by his publishing house Posrednik.¹⁵ In Japan, to assess Thoreau's impact outside Europe as well, *Walden* was first known in English starting with the 1880s when excerpts from the book were collected in Francis H. Underwood's *A Handbook of English Literature*, a manual used at what later would become University of Tokyo. Katsuhiko Takeda writes the anthology contained three passages,

The three selections were "The Bean Field," "Berries," and "The Pond." The first appealed to the Japanese love for agriculture, the second to their

love for solitude, nature, and the fruits thereof, and the third to their deep response to the changing of season in nature. All three passages were evidently chosen for their potential appeal to Japanese readers.¹⁶

Indeed, Thoreau's work might have appealed to the Japanese readers as long as they were able to surpass the language and culture barrier since the first annotated translation of *Walden* was only published in 1911. This is a decade earlier than Harding mentioned in his *Check-list*, and Takeda informs us that it was a great success since it went through three printings in three weeks.¹⁷

***Walden* in France**

Because Mușoiu translated *Walden* from French to Romanian, here's how Thoreau's work had been received in France. For this, I am using an essay titled "Thoreau in France" and published by Micheline Flak and Maurice Gonnaud in the above mentioned collection of essays edited by Eugene F. Timpe in 1971. In their essay, Flak and Gonnaud, mention a first article dedicated to Thoreau's work as early as 1887 ("Le Naturalisme aux Etats-Unis" by Thérèse Bentzon in the "Revue des Deux-Mondes" in September) followed by some translations in 1896 (thus, excerpts from Thoreau's journal, translated by I. Will, appeared in July in "Magazine International" and an abridged version of "Civil Disobedience," translated by A. Phélibé, was published in the "Revue Blanche" in November).

As I mentioned before, although the first excerpts translated to French by Winnaretta Singer from *Walden* were only published beginning with 1903 they were presumably enough for Mușoiu to become interested in Thoreau's work. However, Flak and Gonnaud remind us, not everybody seemed to be happy with that first translation, including Marcel Proust who presumably had planned to translate *Walden* himself together with his friend Antoine Bibesco. That never happened, though, and it takes another decade before Louis Fabulet starts working on his translation of *Walden*, and that very moment is memorable both for the translator and for the history of Thoreauvian translations.

The anecdote, that both André Gide and Fabulet recount separately, although Flak and Gonnaud only mention Gide's version, goes like this: afraid that somebody else would be the first one to translate *Walden*, Fabulet tells Gide in October 1913 that he plans to translate "un livre

extraordinaire" that nobody yet knows... except for Gide who happened to have the book in his pocket that day.¹⁸ In Fabulet's telling, Gide not only had the book in his pocket, but also just started translating it a few days before:

André Gide, avant que j'eusse prononcé nom d'auteur ni titre d'ouvrage, mais sur la nature du bien que je lui disais des deux, sourit, porte la main à sa poche, en tira un livre, qu'il me tendit. C'était *Walden*, et il en avait, me dit-il, entrepris la traduction quelques jours auparavant. Nous nous rencontrâmes à un carrefour. Mon instinct devenait certitude. En l'aimable fraternité que nous lui connaissons, et sachant que je m'étais fait métier de donner à notre pays la version de ce que je sentais lui être profitable, il m'abandonna généreusement le privilège de traduire *Walden*.¹⁹

Going beyond the grandiloquence of this passage, it appears clear that even though they were late to translate *Walden*, compared to other nations, the French did see the task, according to Fabulet, as a privilege. To have Proust and Gide wanting and almost competing to translate your work is sign of great literary achievement.

The other translator Fabulet feared was going to outdo him was Léon Bazalgette, who published his translation of *Leaves of Grass* in 1909 while Fabulet was still working on his version of Whitman's poems. After all, Fabulet had good reason to be cautious since Bazalgette did manage to publish first a volume of translations from Thoreau's essays called "Désobeir" in 1921, whom he considered an extension of *Walden*. A year later, though, in 1922, Fabulet publishes the first complete French translation of *Walden*, an edition that Mușoiu later used as a source for his Romanian translation.

Walden in Romania(n)

Before I delve into presenting Mușoiu's translation, I will provide an overview of the limited reception of Thoreau and of his work in Romania(n). When it comes to poetry, an important but understudied part of Thoreau's work, I could find only three poems translated, as follows: "Smoke" translated by Nicolae Iorga with the title "Fum: Ușor înaripate fum" and published in "Cuget clar" in 1930; another version of the same poem was translated by Petre Solomon with the title "O, fum involt" and

was published in 1979, together with two other poems ("Sic Vita" and "Winter Memories/Amintiri de iarnă") in *Antologia poeziei americane* (*The Anthology of American Poetry*) edited by poet Ion Caraion. The reason why only three of Thoreau's poems were translated into Romanian has to do, perhaps, with the fact that these are among the few poems excerpted into anthologies of American literature to which Romanian translators must have had access. This explains both the importance anthologies and collections played in disseminating canonical texts across ages and cultures and the translators' reliance on the very same canonicity, as exemplified by the translation of the same poem ("Smoke") two times fifty years apart.

If the interest in poetry seems to be almost nonexistent, things are looking slightly better on what we might call the literary studies section. The very first mention of Thoreau and his work in Romania I was able to trace but could not find yet dates from a 1902 piece published in the short-lived magazine "Pagini alese" edited by Al. Gherghel. Written by Paul Reiner, the text is titled "Un Tolstoi American" ("An American Tolstoy"). Both because there is no way of knowing at the moment whether the text was originally written in Romanian or translated into Romanian and because its contents are yet unknown, I cannot comment on its importance and impact it could have had in promoting Thoreau and his work in Romania at the turn of the twentieth-century. Even so, I find it interesting that Thoreau is making his "debut" on the Romanian literary stage under the guise of Tolstoy. A promoter of Thoreau himself, Tolstoy is far wider known both in Romania and in the world at that time and the fact that his name is associated with that of Thoreau in a short piece appearing in a local Romanian paper and probably elsewhere, as well, is relevant to the literary reception of Thoreau's work during the last decades of the nineteenth-century: as his work, particularly *Walden*, began to be rediscovered and translated in various languages, so his prestige started to grow.

Karl Federn's "Thoreau" proves exactly that this is the case. As mentioned before in the brief section dedicated to the reception of Thoreau in Germany, *Walden* was translated into German following the demand of the public who had read critical essays and were eager to read the book itself. In Romania, Federn's essay played that role in that it had a great influence on Mușoiu, who first found out about Thoreau from it, according to his own admission.²⁰ In Romanian, Federn's text, in Grigore Goilav's translation, first appeared in 1908 being published in "Revista

Ideeii," the literary and propaganda magazine Mușoiu edited between 1900 and 1916. Interestingly enough, like other influential essays and studies published in Germany, Federn's text appeared before *Walden* was published, but unlike in Germany, its impact was not big enough to prompt the public's calling for the immediate translation of the book it analyzed. In fact, after it was published in "Revista Ideei," the essay is reprinted twice together with Mușoiu's own translation of *Walden* in 1929 in the literary magazine "Adevărul literar și artistic" ("The Literary and Artistic Truth") and in 1936 in book format.

In Romania, as shown before, the reception of Thoreau starts under the guise of a foreign writer (Tolstoy in Reiner's text) and the interest in *Walden* is prompted by the text of a German literary critic (Federn). Despite being a bit late, the French influence is present, as well, with an unsigned review of Fabulet's translation of *Walden* published in 1922 in the above-mentioned "Adevărul literar și artistic" with the title "Poezia singuratății" ("The Poetry of Loneliness"). It then takes another seven years before the first installments of Mușoiu's Romanian translation of *Walden* begin appearing in the same literary magazine, accompanied by Mușoiu's short introduction, Federn's essay, and another text by Maurice Muret, initially written as a preface to Singer's incomplete French translation of *Walden* in 1903. Moreover, in a note advertising the publication of the book, M. Sevastos, the editor of "Adevărul literar și artistic" compares it to Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* and positions the pond in Canada!

At long last, also in 1929, Thoreau tentatively becomes *American* according to the title of the short introduction written by Nicolae Iorga to "Smoke," the poem he translated into Romanian: "Din Thoreau, poet american" ("From Thoreau, American poet") published in "Cuget clar" ("Clear Thought"). A year later, in 1931, in a short dispatch for the daily "Cuvântul" ("The Word") sent from Paris, France, the celebrated memoirist, novelist, and playwright Mihail Sebastian writes about Thoreau's *Journal* he must have read in English and considers Thoreau a representative for an America that is long gone and argues that, in the wake of industrialization, the Great Depression made the so-called "poetry of nature," as described by Thoreau, almost impossible. This limited reception only goes to show that Thoreau's work is still uncharted in Romania before and even after Mușoiu translates *Walden*. This absence, as it were, reflects almost in real time how great literary works travel in translation. The lack of information, the lack of access and even the confusion coming from mistranslation and misinterpretation are, eventually, compensated by the enthusiasm that

writers, translators, journalists, and editors tap in when it comes to works and authors with whom they resonate.²¹

When it comes to *Walden* itself, there are now three complete translations, including the one by Mușoiu: *Walden sau Vieața-n Pădure*, with a forward by P. Mușoiu and texts by Maurice Muret (translated by P. Mușoiu), Dr. Karl Federn (translated by Grigore Goilav), and Ralph Waldo Emerson (translated by Stanciu Stefanof), București: Biblioteca Revistei Ideei, 1936; unlike Mușoiu's version made following a French translation, the other two are made following the English original, but they leave out the "or Life in the Woods" part of the title: *Walden*, translated by Ștefan Avădanei and Al. Pascu, with a preface by Mihail Grădinaru and a biographical note by Don Eulert, Iași: Junimea, 1973 and *Walden*, translated by Silvia Constantin, București: Aldo Press, 2004.²² In addition, the famous passage about simplicity from the second chapter of *Walden*, "Where I Lived, and What I Lived for," is anonymously translated and published in 1920 in "Pagini libere," a short-lived magazine published by Mușoiu's friend A. Gălățeanu.²³ Last but not least, I should add, as mentioned just before and detailed a little later, that managing editor M. Sevastos of "Adevărul literar și artistic" intended to publish Mușoiu's translation of *Walden* in its entirety in weekly installments starting with January 1929 but the publication stopped in March after only 10 parts.

Moreover, I recently found that Don Eulert is the person behind the 1973 translation of *Walden*. In fact, the book has a foreword written by Mihail Grădinaru and a biographical sketch of Thoreau by Don Eulert. Although I need more information, I know Eulert had been a Fulbright fellow in Romania during the early 1970s and either brought along a copy of *Walden* or introduced the book and its author to Romanian students. He nonetheless recommended its translation. Here's what Cornelia Hâncu wrote when Eulert received the Odyssey Lifetime Achievement Award from the San Diego Psychological Association in 2014:

I believe that "Don's Odyssey" should include his unique experience in Romania, his love of villages and peasants, the folk art, the shepherds' rituals. His presence there at that particular time was extremely important for the students. The historical context was that of an awakening all over the world... Spring of Prague, the cultural revolution, the Vietnam war, The "All we need is Love" revolution. An international unrest was bubbling everywhere. Music, Dance, Poetry, Literature, Art in general was reflecting the change to come. That time in fact seeds were planted which made

possible for Communism to collapse. And he was one of many many gardeners of that time.²⁴

If Thoreau had been arguably rediscovered during the Civil Rights movement of the 50s and 60s in the US, where his ideas had been planted a century before, it would be interesting to see how his ideas had been seeded in Romania at the height of the Cold War. This would be yet another example of how the focus on the circulation of texts and, especially, of literature in translation as well as on reception theory does provide a fresh perspective for the study of world literature and a new understanding of the global flow of texts, people and ideas.

Mușoiu's *Walden*

At long last, here is the culmination of my project: the presentation of *Walden sau Vieața-n Pădure*, Mușoiu's translation of Thoreau's book. I cannot address the complete translation published in 1936 without mentioning how the Romanian translator found out about Thoreau's book. According to his own admission, Panait Mușoiu got a taste for Thoreau's work via an incomplete French translation of *Walden* by Winnaretta Singer, which was published in two consecutive numbers of the short lived magazine "La Renaissance Latine" (1903-4). Doing research for this project in the manuscript collection of the National Library of Romania in Bucharest I was fortunate to find a folder with Mușoiu's transcription by hand of the first installment and the loose pages of the second printed installment. The first installment (30 pages long in Mușoiu's handwriting on undated railway telegram sheets) also contains a text by Maurice Muret, which Mușoiu translated and later published in the incomplete magazine version from 1929 and in the 1936 complete book edition of *Walden*.

Unfortunately, my efforts to date the paper on which Mușoiu copied Muret's preface and Singer's translation or to find a railroad or paper historian who could help me do so have been unsuccessful so far. Establishing a reliable timeframe when Mușoiu first read and transcribed passages from *Walden* is crucial to my project in that it would allow me to show exactly the moment of the so-called first contact. Equally difficult is dating the first time Mușoiu heard or read about Thoreau. Even though, according to his own words, I now know that he first found out about the American writer from Karl Federn's essay, I could not tell the exact date

when Mușoiu read Federn's text; yet, I can draw a window of time, from 1899, when the essay was published in German, to 1908 when Grigore Goilav translated the text and Mușoiu published it in the magazine he edited "Revista Ideei."

At the moment there is no way of knowing when Mușoiu first read Singer's translation and Federn's essay, nor there is information about the order in which he read them. Even though the same can be said about the first time Mușoiu read Louis Fabulet's 1922 French translation of *Walden*, one thing is certain: he started working on the translation in 1928. While further research is needed in order to find documents that would help me give a better timeframe, there is plenty of information regarding the publication record of the first Romanian translation of *Walden*. Thus, the first selections in Panait Mușoiu's translation appeared in the literary supplement of the daily "Adevărul" ("The Truth") in 1929. The ad advertising the publication reads as follows: "Starting with this issue / "Adevărul literar" (The Literary Truth) presents / Life in the Woods / a novel by Henry David Thoreau / Wonderful scenes of authentic life spent / by an American intellectual in the middle of nature."

As already mentioned, in a longer promotional text published on January 22nd, 1929, the editor of "Adevărul," M. Sevastos, compares Thoreau's *Walden* to Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe. For his love of nature, Sevastos also compares Thoreau to the Greek god Pan and writes that Walden Pond is in Canada. More importantly, Sevastos informs the readers that "Life in the Woods" will be published, chapter by chapter, in "Adevărul literar." Unfortunately, that's not going to happen because the publication stops only after ten installments (the first two of which being dedicated to texts about the book and the author by Mușoiu, Maurice Muret, and Karl Federn). My provisional guess, for now, regarding the interruption of *Walden*'s publication is that the translator couldn't keep pace with the demands of weekly installments.

In fact, according to information provided in the printed version of *Walden* (1936), Mușoiu began the translation in October 1928, a date which is concordant with the installment publication schedule presented in "Adevărul" starting with January 1929. However, it took Mușoiu another two years to finish the translation in 1931 and two more years to revise it (1932-1934). He then sent the manuscript to the printing press in August 1935 and the first copies of the book were finally published in March 1936.

The table of contents of *Walden sau Vieța-n Pădure* in Panait Mușoiu's translation is an interesting document in that it both presents the book

and the effort it took to be published. The actual chapters of *Walden* are prefaced by Mușoiu's presentation of the book, followed by translations of three texts about the book and the author by Maurice Muret, Karl Federn, and Ralph Waldo Emerson. The second half of the page functions as an acknowledgment section, wherein Mușoiu details the timeframe of the translation, together with the names of his family, friends, and benefactors who housed him throughout the years.

In his preface, Mușoiu names Thoreau one of his favorite writers next to Nikolay Chernyshevsky (1828-1889), the Russian socialist critic and revolutionary embraced by, among others, American anarchist Emma Goldman, who also tried her best to recover Thoreau as an anarchist and supposedly established Thoreau's legacy within anarchist and libertarian circles. Incidentally, Chernyshevsky and Thoreau share the same birthday (July 12th) and Mușoiu made a name for himself by translating (from French, again) into Romanian and publishing the Russian writer's well-known novel *What Is to Be Done?* (1863, the Russian first print and 1896 and 1909 for the Romanian editions). Mușoiu then recounts how he first got acquainted to Thoreau's work. In order, he mentions Federn's essay, Singer's translation, and, finally, Fabulet's complete translation. He even favors Singer's version over Fabulet's and writes that before acquiring the latter's translation he tried his hand translating Singer's rendition. As of yet, I am not able to say what happened to that translation, nor when or if it was published. Similarly, as mentioned before, I cannot provide a clear timeframe regarding Mușoiu's interactions and contacts with those texts. Furthermore, he also boasts that he was able to verify Fabulet's translation against an English original and event to have expanded the notes the French edition copied following an edition of *Walden* edited by Francis H. Allen. However, that does not seem to be the case.

Maurice Muret's piece, probably translated by Mușoiu himself, is the introduction to a previous incomplete French translation by Winnaretta Singer, which was published in the short lived magazine "La Renaissance Latine" (1903-4). The text welcomes Singer's translation and compare's Thoreau's reception in England, where his work is discussed ("elles est discutée" in French or "ie discutată" in Romanian) and in Germany, where the work is commented upon ("elle est commentée" in French or "ie comentată" in Romanian). Muret then presents a short biography of Thoreau and, out of the 11 volumes (sic) of Thoreau's complete works, praises *Walden* as the most accomplished ("le plus achevé" in French and "cea mai desăvîrșită" in Romanian).

Karl Federn's "Henry David Thoreau" (reprinted here after it appeared in Mușoiu's own magazine "Revista Ideei" in 1908) was originally published in a literary criticism volume *Essays zur amerikanischen Litteratur* in 1899. It had been translated from German to Romanian by Grigore Goilav following a reprint in the New York based German language magazine "Freiheit," edited by the German-American politician and journalist Johann (John) Most. By far the longest piece of the three, Federn's essay gives a good overview of both Thoreau's life and work, including *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers*, Thoreau's first published book he drafted while living at Walden Pond.

Ralph Waldo Emerson's eulogy of Thoreau, which does not appear in the French edition, is translated by Stanciu Ștefanof following the Bulgarian translation of *Walden*, which in turn follows the Russian translation. In the words of Emerson, his friend and mentor, Thoreau was a "searching judge of men" and "attorney of the indigenous plants" who "lived for the day." Emerson's eulogistic recollection of his friend informs to a large extent all subsequent references to Thoreau's life and work. As a judge of men and a political activist, Thoreau is remembered as an awkward personage who spent a night in jail for refusing to pay the poll tax and who became a staunch abolitionist while risking his life to transport fugitive slaves to Canada. His public protest, in essays such as "Civil Disobedience" and lectures such as "Slavery in Massachusetts," against the Mexican War, against slavery, and against the Indian Removal contributed as well to his image of a radical writer. In fact, Thoreau's radical image is best expressed in his support for John Brown, the infamous homegrown terrorist and/or martyr who brought violence and murder to the abolitionist movement. As an attorney of plants, however, Thoreau is remembered as the aloof pseudo-scientist who traveled the woods and observed and absorbed nature in all its manifestations because, as both a naturalist and a natural historian, he showed interest in much larger issues than the current political events of the day.

This is just a glimpse into the impressive European circulation of *Walden* at the beginning of the twentieth century. Analyzing the French, and, it seems, German, Russian, and Bulgarian origins of the Romanian translation offers a better understanding of the circulation of literary texts, of their impact on national literary histories, and of their global trace.

Conclusion

In my paper I researched and analyzed sources dealing with Thoreau's and *Walden's* reception in France and Romania. For instance, while in France major writers such as Marcel Proust, André Gide, and Romain Rolland had all been interested in Thoreau's work, in Romania the American author had only sparked the interest of minor socialist intellectuals such as Mușoiu. My analysis gave insight both into the Romanian intellectual life in the first half of the twentieth century and into the reception of world literature in translation. When it comes to world literature studies, I agree with the comparativist David Damrosch, who argues in his book *How to Read World Literature* (2008) that literary value can also be created away from the point of origin. I am also following closely Emily Apter's ideas espoused in *Against World Literature, On the Politics of Untranslatability* (2013), wherein the critic argues for a plurality of "world literatures" oriented around geopolitics, radical activism, and resistance. In this respect, as I tried to show in my project by analyzing Mușoiu's translation of Fabulet's translation of *Walden*, here it is a clear example of how world literature gains through translation. Ultimately, then, the examination of this process both traces back the meaning of texts to their original moment and offers critical insight into the act of interpretation itself by focusing on the production, translation, and circulation of literary works in a world driven by economic, political, and cultural capital.

Last but not least, world literature also gains new meanings after the recent digital turn in the humanities. While almost instant digital translation produces a disruptive shift in the understanding of the world literature canon, such as a revaluation of what constitutes translation and what constitutes literary text, it also brings us closer to analyzing a digital archive of world literature that can be accessed from everywhere in the world. Thus, beyond the close reading approach to literature, to hermeneutics and, eventually, to translation, the digital turn allows us to take a more distant and more inclusive look at world literature. As Franco Moretti is advocating, distant reading and data visualizations help us make better sense of the whole archive of world literature and not only of the canonical works. To complement my project, in the future I plan to accompany my traditional text-based research with digital tools in order to analyze the impact of the translation, publication, and reception of *Walden* throughout Europe in general, and in France and Romania,

in particular. For instance, in the Romanian edition, the text of *Walden* (in Mușoiu's translation from a French translation) is prefaced by the translations of two auxiliary texts: one written in German (by Karl Federn and translated into Romanian by Grigore Goilav) and the other written in English (by Ralph Waldo Emerson and translated into Romania by Stanciu Stefanof from a Russian and Bulgarian edition). This fact only shows why data mining through the European publication record of *Walden* could give us a better understanding of the circulation of literary texts, of their impact on national literary histories, and of their global trace. I also intend to use data visualization software to showcase the differences between the French and the Romanian translations against the original.

NOTES

- ¹ See Valéry Larbaud's review of L. Fabulet's translation in "La Revue de France," pp. 658-662.
- ² For the historical *quarrel* between German- and French-style translation during the European Romanticism, see Antoine Berman's seminal work *L'Épreuve de l'étranger. Culture et traduction dans l'Allemagne romantique* (1984); for the application of Berman's theories to a Anglo-American genealogy of translation, see Lawrence Venuti's treatise *The Translator's Invisibility, A History of Translation* (1995); last but not least, for the reassessment of the field from a more political perspective in the twenty-first century, see Emily Apter's book *The Translation Zone, A New Comparative Literature* (2006).
- ³ Susan Bassnett and André Lefevere, "General Editors' Preface" in Lawrence Venuti's *The Translator's Invisibility, A History of Translation*, p. vii.
- ⁴ Consider, for instance, how Martin Luther's translation of the *Bible* (which in turn led to Tyndale's translation of the *Great Bible* and to the *King James Bible* in England) is on an equal foothold with the Arabic translations and preservations of Ancient Greek philosophy and science that survived the European Dark Ages.
- ⁵ Paul de Man, *The Resistance to Theory*, p. 73.
- ⁶ In the alphabetical order of the authors, here are the (significant!) titles of these essays: Maurice Blanchot, "Translating," Paul de Man, "Conclusions: Walter Benjamin's 'The Task of the Translator,'" Jacques Derrida, "Des Tours de Babel," Carol Jacobs, "The Monstrosity of Translation" and Barbara Johnson, "The Task of the Translator."
- ⁷ For a list of Thoreau's translations, see *The Writings of Henry David Thoreau. Translations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- ⁸ Henry D. Thoreau, *The Writings of Henry David Thoreau. Walden*, p. 100.
- ⁹ Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 82.
- ¹⁰ Laura Dassow Walls, *Seeing New Worlds, Henry David Thoreau and Nineteenth-Century Natural Science*, p. 108.
- ¹¹ Walter Harding, *A Centennial Check-list of the Editions of Henry David Thoreau's Walden*, pg. vii-viii.
- ¹² Walter Harding, "Foreword" in *Thoreau Abroad, Twelve Bibliographical Essays*, p. 3.
- ¹³ Eugene F. Timpe, "Thoreau's Critical Reception in Germany," *idem*, p. 76.
- ¹⁴ Jerzy R. Krzyzanowski, "Thoreau in Russia," *idem*, p. 133.
- ¹⁵ Nikita Pokrovsky, "Thoreau in the Global Community" in "The Concord Saunterer, Special Walden Sesquicentennial Issue: Walden the Place and Walden the Book," p. 53.
- ¹⁶ Katsuhiko Takeda, "Thoreau in Japan" in *Thoreau Abroad, Twelve Bibliographical Essays*, p. 169.

- ¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 172.
- ¹⁸ Micheline Flak and Maurice Gonnaud, "Thoreau in France," *idem*, p. 39.
- ¹⁹ Fabulet, "La Revue de Paris," p. 48.
- ²⁰ P. Mușoiu, "Prezentare" in *Walden sau Vieața-n Pădure*, p. 3.
- ²¹ It should be mentioned here that there are also some critical essays dedicated to Thoreau's work, but until the present moment they do not seem to have gotten any traction. For instance, in 1974 Nicolae Balotă publishes a short piece dedicated to *Walden* in the leading literary magazine "România literară." Published a year after the first Romanian translation of the book from English, the article does not make any reference to it, which makes me suspect Balotă became familiar with Thoreau via a French translation. The piece was reprinted in the essay volume *Universul prozei* two years later. The year 2001 chronicles the publication both of a chapter and of a whole book dedicated to Thoreau. The chapter, by Codrin Liviu Cuțitaru, appeared in *Transcendentalism și ascendențialism. Proiect de fenomenologie culturală a romantismului American*, originally the author's doctoral dissertation. The book, by Marius Jucan, is titled *Singuratea Salvată, O încercare asupra operei lui Henry David Thoreau din perspectiva modernității americane*, and, so far, is the only book-length study dedicated to the work of the American writer.
- ²² Act & Politon Publishing House in Bucharest recently republished the 1973 edition of *Walden* but without Grădinaru's preface and Eulert's biographical sketch.
- ²³ Interestingly enough, A. Gălățeanu is not only drawn to Thoreau, anarchism, and simple living but he is also Mușoiu's biographer having published, together with N. Gogoneață, a bio-bibliographical brochure in 1970 called *Evocări, Panait Mușoiu*.
- ²⁴ Iuliu Rațiu. 2016. Thoreau in Translation. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://thoreauintranslation.tumblr.com/post/138920095494/walden-1973-and-the-seeds-of-change>. [Accessed 14 July 2016]. [original link no longer available]

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VIRGIL MADGEARU AT THE CROSSROADS OF AN ANTICAPITALISTIC TRINITY: GERMAN HISTORICISM, POPULISM AND MARXISM

Abstract: The aim of the present paper is a critical evaluation of Virgil Madgearu's economic ideas from the perspective of classical liberalism. As the paper emphasizes, in the light of the classical liberal tradition, Madgearu's ideas appear as having an obvious anticapitalistic blend, although without embracing the socialist perspective. Madgearu advocates a *middle of the road policy* or *government intervention* in the market economy, in the middle of an age with splendid scientific contributions in favor of the free market.

Keywords: capitalism, classical liberalism, Virgil Madgearu, interventionism, peasantism, Marxism

1. Introduction

Virgil Madgearu (1887-1940) is through the lens of his biographers, one of the leading Romanian economists of the interwar period.¹ The purpose of the present research is to critically expose the formation and implication of his economic thought.² By critical we understand less a perfectly equal representation of all lines of contemporary thought and more an assessment of his ideas from the perspective of classical economic science, as formulated by the British³ and French classical liberals. The motivation of choosing the classical liberal framework is based on empirical evidence⁴ which proves its too easy, uncritical disavowal by Romanian authors. In a word, along with the economic writers, historians too *decided* the non-debatable character of the oddness of liberalism, as reflected in 18th and 19th century England and France, through the pen

of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jean Baptiste Say, Frederic Bastiat and many others. Madgearu's own words confirm the above statement, as he is certain that „social experience has proved the fallacy of absolute economic liberty's principle” (1915a, p. 13), or „old liberalism died” (1922, p. 112). To what extent are these solid theoretical convictions or just historical overviews, the present paper should also clarify.

Although not coming from a peasants' family, Madgearu was the main supporter and ideologue of the Peasants' doctrine.⁵ From a political perspective, the ideology of peasantism had as purpose the creation of a rural democracy. It considered *peasants* as an important class, especially in Romania. From an economic point of view *peasantism* meant government intervention in the peasant-landowner relation, in the form of *price controls* (fixing the rents that the peasant had to pay to the landowner), expropriation⁶ of landowners ('big' ones) in favor of peasants. As a matter of fact, 19th century Romania was dominated by the 'rural problem' (*chestiunea agrară* or *chestiunea țărănească*) as permanent conflict between peasant and landowner reflected in a bad economic state of the Romanian peasant. As Eidelberg argues, the 1907 revolt "ranks as one of the most important peasants revolt in East European history" (1974, p. 2). From a philosophical and cultural point of view, the 'rural problem' draws its origins in an „anticapitalistic mentality” (Ornea, 1971, p. 131-132) while the repeated land reforms (1864, 1921, 1945, 1991) enforced by the governments which succeeded to power only replaced winners (landowners) with losers (peasants) and vice versa. State intervention was the common feature of this *pathology* of reform,⁷ which in almost a century (around 1930) showed its real dramatic implications:

Food was representing the most important article in the family's budget: in households under 3 hectares it represented 6/7 of total spending; in those of 10 hectares, 2/3. It remained almost nothing to 'misspend' on clothes and other luxury objects...Variety was lacking...corn was the main food... corn was consumed especially as polenta (*mămăligă*)...The poor health status of the rural population was becoming a chronic phenomenon, due to the inadequate nutrition, poor living conditions and lack of knowledge of elementary hygiene norms...The characteristic disease of poverty, pellagra had a serious incidence, being after tuberculosis and cancer, the main cause of death. (Hitchins, 2013, pp. 380-381)

Adding to this situation the catastrophic effects of the two World Wars and Romania's engagement in both of them, one could hardly find a better *soil* than Romania for revolutionary socialist ideas. The socialist plague took its share, and for more than fifty years (1945 - 1989), the red curtain with its soviet-style socialism isolated Romania from the capitalist international economies. In a way it could be argued – although it remains a debatable issue – that the popular economic ideas before 1945 (state planning in agriculture, industry and money, minimum wage laws, legal monopolies) were the preparation for socialism. To be sure, socialism as an economic system cannot be judged independent of its previous popular ideas. Speculating even more, 1945 could be avoided if among elites a *sound* liberal-based doctrine would have survived.

Although true classical liberal ideas never had the chance of a real competition in Romania, as compared to fascist-style policies ('neoliberal' in Marxist terms) before 1945 and after 1990, paradoxically many people today display a certain suspicion and fear⁸ whenever one broadcasts ideas such as capitalism, private property, profit, competition etc. This resembles to a certain extent the 'straw man fallacy', an error of argumentation when one criticizes an argument which was never advanced by the opponent. 'Straw man fallacy' results in confusions of capitalism with state capitalism/crony capitalism, free trade with zero-sum game, competition with extinction, foreign capital with imperialist exploitation etc. Whatever definition of capitalism and private property circulated in the modern, post 1848 Romania it was certainly not the classical liberal one:

The program of liberalism...if condensed into a single word would have to read: private property of the means of production. (Mises, 1985, p. 19)

As an extension, the pretense of classical liberalism is that society (in particular economic society) is governed by natural laws such as private property, division of labor, competition, prices and so on. Moreover, these laws are responsible for the peaceful cooperation between people and the future preservation of society. If positive law (state law) is the reflection of natural law, cooperation works smoothly with the state as a protector of private property rights. Whenever positive law contradicts natural law, social cooperation is in danger, since the state assumes a significantly broader role than it naturally has. If Madgearu was using this meaning of liberalism or other, we shall also see in the next pages.

2. German Historicism: A Decisive Step for Madgearu's Skepticism Towards Economic Theory

It is commonly accepted⁹ that Virgil Madgearu's ideas were the product of three main schools of thought: the German historical school (in particular the second generation of historicists), the populist school ('poporanism', with origins in Russian *narodnicism*), and the Marxist school. There is no doubt here. What should be doubtful from a theoretical perspective is the nexus of ideas which have put in motion all of the three perspectives and Madgearu's quite small susceptibility towards it.

The influence of the German historical school upon Virgil Madgearu obviously starts with his doctoral research in Leipzig, under the coordination of Karl Bücher (1847 - 1930). However it should be noted that Bücher, was part of the second generation of German historicism (Gustav von Schmoller being the most popular voice of it), about which it is generally held that it deviated the line of the first generation, through a *metamorphosis* of the "authority of tradition and wisdom of ages gone by" into regarding "capitalism and free trade – both domestic and international as the foremost evil, and joined hands with the "radical" or "leftist" foes of the market economy, aggressive nationalism on the one hand and revolutionary socialism on the other" (Mises, 2007, p. 198). The 19th century is the age of the great transformations produced by the capital accumulation which made possible the Industrial Revolution. Nevertheless it is also the age of its bad reputation to the contribution of which Marxism played the key role.

The pretense of extracting economic laws from historical experience (which is more than the plain study of economic history) evolved during the second half of the 19th century into one of the most interesting epistemological debates (*Metodenstreit*) between German historicist school and Austrian economics school. The debate still has echoes today, among the epistemologists. At stake within the *Metodenstreit* was if social sciences, in particular *economic science* can derive general, universal laws to explain human action. Austrians took the affirmative position while the historicists the negative one. (Raico, 2012, pp. 4-5)

The main point of Schmoller's concept of historic relativity and the emphasis on development, was to show that there are no stable economic laws like natural laws in physics. (Kozłowski et al., 1997, p. 80)

...the phenomena of economic life, like those of nature, are ordered strictly in accordance with definite laws. (Menger, 2007)

The problem is a crucial one. The implication of a relativized concept of theory would bring economic science into a position of an empirical science, which can produce laws only to the extent they confront experience. But without a general economic theory, the evaluation of pure economic historical facts would be impossible. Economic history has presuppositions while their understanding must be made in the light of an economic theory.

Every historical report, no matter whether its theme is the conditions and events of a remote past or those of yesterday, is inevitably based on a definite kind of economic theory (Mises, 2007, p. 208).

Time passed by and the *Metodenstreit* literally fell into oblivion, under the more powerful positivist school. Madgearu presents the debate on few pages in his political economy course. It dedicated no separate work to this debate¹⁰, although the Austrian side offers valuable insights which are crucial for public policy. One of these is that if economic laws have the epistemological status of universal laws, government intervention through positive law is free to act only as a recognition and preservation of these laws.

Historicism, as discussed, is the pretense of extracting from historical experience *a posteriori* laws. 'Learning from experience' tells the slogan. The historicist method is dividing the applicability of economic law according to different historical periods. Each period has its own economic laws. That Madgearu was believing in this idea is a fact.

The scientifically treatment of an economic issue is based on status quo's research, of its transformations and evolution trend, so that after these findings can reveal the economic policy criteria. In considering the craftsmen's issue, we will try to apply the method of Leipzig' economist Karl Bücher (1911a, p. 3).

Or, when emphasizing that *pure theory* is only a tool in the hands of *historical theory*:

Historical theory has two means: pure theory which determines what is fundamental, important and historical reality which proves in fact the existence of various phenomena. Pure theory and historical theory are integrated, on a reciprocal basis, the first delivering through its categories the ability to study the latter, while the latter facilitates discovering new categories (1936, p. 78).

However, there is a subtle circularity here. If history itself is a producer of pure theoretical categories, how is the scientist able to detect and understand them, since understanding is based *already* on an existent body of pure theory? Or, to put it another way, to historically establish the categorical character of 'new categories' one must already have used a *categorical criteria*, which must be a-historical, otherwise the argument is circular. Madgearu only seems not to be on an *extreme historicist* position, since it leaves space for *pure theory*, but this, as should be seen remains *just* a theory.

The theories on the economic evolution advanced by Western economists – whatever their value – cannot be applied to Eastern and Southern European countries (1936, p. 79).

As a matter of fact, none of these theories pretends universal validity (1936, p. 80).

Realist economic science studies people as they are in reality, motivated by all kinds of reasons, and belonging to a certain people, state or epoch (1936, p. 80).

For Madgearu, historicism was the first, perfect ally (consciously or not) for advancing a pseudo economic science of the *peasantry*. Historically, it was the perfect moment. The Romanian peasantry, this beaten-by-fate 'class', enduring a 'neoserfdom' relation with the landowners and victim of so many failed rural reforms, was becoming more and more important from a political point of view. And an *economic theory* of the peasantry would have been virtually impossible if Madgearu would have clung of odd, universal theories such as classical "invisible hand" of Adam Smith, or "the less seen consequences of an economic policy" of Frédéric Bastiat. Thus he proceed to find sources that could legitimize, from a scientific (historicist) point of view, a differentiation between the *rural*, *agrarian*

economy and the *capitalist economy*. Russian populist (poporanist) authors are quoted, such as Nicolai-On, who argues that capitalism needs markets and these markets (in Russia's peasant economy) are absent, therefore capitalism is impossible.

The fundamental argument of these theories is the following: to develop capitalism requires the existence of an external market; colonies being under the rule of Western European countries there can be no important markets for the capitalist products, and as a result capitalist production is impossible (1940, p. 9).

He calls them 'scientific' – although he considers them "not universal" (1940, p. 11) – but they're just describing *the institutional* factors which impede the development of capitalism in these states. This is true as much as it is true that free trade is impossible because of the protectionist tariffs.

Madgearu brings a counter-argument to this one, quoting Lenin who understood that "capitalism creates its own markets" (1940, p. 14), and those markets would be composed, as Madgearu describes, of the means of production transferred from the hands of small entrepreneurs to the ones of new capitalists, and of the means of existence – *nota bene* – of those "expropriated", which in capitalism becomes a "commodity". Lenin thus – *horribile dictum* – puts an end to this "odd" *narodnicist* ideas that capitalism can't develop in the eastern, rural countries. True, it can develop, but the problem is how to stop it. Having reviewed the *narodnicist*, Marxist and Bolshevik thesis Madgearu ends with:

The research of economic evolution in Eastern Europe countries...if it doesn't neglect the impossibility of capitalist economy, it reveals certain features and limitations (1940, p. 14).

That poporanist erred in their theories, Madgearu is certain. Why did they err is more interesting, and reveals once again his historicist blend when stating that the "poporanists wrote in 19th century Russia, a period of semi-feudal agricultural relations" and they "lived the extortion of the peasantry caused by the extinction of home industry" (1940, p. 11). Thus it emphasizes less a *theoretical* shortcoming in poporanists' thought and more the simple fact of living and writing in a certain century.

3. The 'Economics' of Populism (Poporanism): A Romantic Anticapitalistic Episode

According to Madgearu, as a *philoagrarianist*, agriculture cannot follow the same capitalist route as industry. He argued that agriculture was governed by *different* laws which could make the small agricultural household economically independent of the extended division of labor phenomenon, specific to the urban development. However, it can hardly be found in his work what should be the most important economic argument in favor of such an independency. Independency would certainly not mean avoiding the capitalist production, but just creating a *balance* between the capitalist economy and the rural economy. This middle of the road policy has its origins in the doctrine of poporanism, of which the Peasant Party is a "spiritual descendant...and which was to some extent derived from the Russian *narodniki* of the latter years of the nineteenth century" (Roberts, 1969, p. 142). Peasantism is basically the most pragmatic form of populism, with the agrarian state or the doctrine of an agrarian Romania at its core.

The most original contribution...was probably the systematically elaboration of the doctrine of an agrarian Romania, as a third world between the individualist capitalism of the West and the socialist collectivism of the East (Hitchins, 2013, p. 359).

The below account of the populist economic thought reflects the essence. Considering Romania an agricultural country with a high percentage from its population made of peasants, a proper form of production would be small and autarchic rather than profit-based rural households.

In agriculture the circulation of capital has a certain timing due to the fact that nature determines the length of the production process...While the economic advantages are definitely in favor of small household; small household does not run after the rent, neither after the capital's interest, so thus it produces cheaper; small household disposes of the more intensive working power of the man who works for himself; this is what makes that every parcel of land is used according to its nature (Ornea, 1972, p. 220).

Assuming different *laws* for the development of agriculture, Madgearu went further to a more practical level, proposing a system of economic

organization that would fit Romania's agricultural situation, and promote the need for rural economic independency. It is the popular system of economic cooperation¹¹, which consisted of a nexus of grouped units of agricultural production and consumption coordinated by a National Government Office, which received funding from Rural State Banks,¹² created for this specific purpose. But would such a system be an assurance for the cooperation's independence in front of potential intrusions of the local, national state? Wouldn't the benefits of protection against foreign capitalism be offset by the fact of being an appendix of the State? The whole system appears more like a clear intention of protectionism, with the government on top of it working as a *national bureau* for protecting the agricultural producers of the foreign capitalist 'invasion'. In particular, protecting small producers.

The main arguments advanced by Stere (afterwards by Madgearu) to prove the impossibility of industrial development in Romania (the lack of foreign markets, the narrowness of the internal market) are to be found easily at all antiindustrialist and anticapitalist thinkers who were on the romantic positions of the small producer (Ornea, 1972, p. 214).

The economic system which lays behind populism and therefore peasantry – as would be further discussed in the next chapters of the paper – is nothing else than *interventionism*, which is a mixture of state planning with free market (capitalism). Thus, Gheorghe Zane, a popular populist - so to speak - writes that "Peasantry is a new social movement with the aim of creating a new type of state", that "improving the peasants' state of affairs is impossible within the capitalist state" or "between capitalism and communism we take the third exit" (apud Scurtu, 1994, pp. 242-243). Madgearu, in an effort of making explicit in what respects the *cooperation* idea differs the socialist idea:

We must reject those theories, either of pure liberals, or socialist theoreticians, according to which there would be an identity between cooperation and socialism... There is no such identity, for the cooperation is a proper combination of the individual and social idea as concerns labor. While socialism is based on revolutionizing this situation, by the transformation of individual property into collective property and socialization of the means of production (apud Scurtu, 1994, pp. 245-246).

There is of course a great deal of injustice to consider cooperation the same thing as socialism. But if cooperation is based neither exclusively on free market ideas, it means its organization borrows both from socialism and free market. For this reason it was baptized as *interventionism* or *middle of the road* policy. A detailed and powerful critique of interventionism – in the middle of his ‘success’, 1920s – was delivered by the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises, who in 1929 writes *Kritik des Interventionismus: Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsideologie der Gegenwart* (Critique of interventionism: inquiries into present day economic policy and ideology). The main argument of Mises is that intervention in the economy, namely in the production relations, price system, wages etc., distorts the efficient allocation of resources, because it puts them on a different allocational track than would have otherwise been chosen by the owners. Thus instead of increasing – as it wishes – it is decreasing general welfare, while also posing an important incentive problem, since it determines owners to rely more on public interventions (based on political decisions) than on consumer satisfaction. Madgearu does not make any reference to Mises’ arguments. His main argument in favor of interventionism is historical and less theoretical. He states that, present economic conditions (1910s) are such that

Nobody – among people of name – question anymore the State’s right to regulate the conflicts between capital and labor. All our political parties admit State interventionism under the conceptual doctrine of *social policy* (1915a, p. 26).

Although it is true that the 1910s and the 1920s were the years of the rising ideologies of nationalism and interventionism, a look into the history of 19th century economic thought could hardly be read as a completely unity of thought as concerns the matter of state intervention. Leaving aside the Austrian school of economics, Germany was before the second generation of historicists (*kathedersozialismus*) a good soil for the scientific treatment of state intervention into the market through the works of Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1783 - 1850), Herman Heinrich Gossen (1810 - 1858), Friedrich von Hermann (1795 - 1868), Eugen Richter (1838 - 1906). United States too, where economic science rose through the voices of John Bates Clark (1847 - 1938), Frank William Taussig (1859 - 1940), Frank Fetter (1863 - 1949), Herbert Davenport (1861 - 1931), Allyn Young (1876 - 1929), E.R.A. Seligman (1861 - 1939). All these authors are

definitely good reasons to believe that, the matter of state intervention is anything but a case closed issue in economics.

State intervention, according to Madgearu, is also an alternative to the “reign of absolute economic liberalism” (1915a, p. 36), it has the power to restore workers’ dignity fighting against “extremely low and inadequate wages” (1915a, p. 39), to “encourage industry” (1913, p. 140), to “impose minimum wage laws” (1913, pp. 141-142), to conduct public enterprises “applying methods similar to private enterprises” (1925, p. 5), to “capitalize wealth for the general interest” (1925, pp. 40-41). The layman, unspecialized reader of the present paper could justly ask what would be *wrong* with all these so called powers of the State. In a nutshell, it could be argued that economic science is simply being ignored by claiming the superiority of *historical context* or of the *political reality*. Thus, science become only a historical option, not a matter of theoretical and practical constraints about what is possible and less possible within the economic realm.

This is the irrefutable conclusion of economics. He who undertakes to recommend a third social order of regulated private property must flatly deny the possibility of scientific knowledge in the field of economics (Mises, 2011, p. 18).

In a similar tone as Mises, Zigu Ornea observes the ignorant spirit of these romantic, anticapitalistic ideas towards the teachings of social sciences.

All this wishful thinking on the best and proper way of development in Romania, sincere hopes in this regard were based on arguments that, in fact, dissolve the evolution of social sciences (of sociology and political economy) in the 19th century, ignoring through naive Kantian rationalist motivations or narodnicist theses, the complexity of social reality, the real specificities, the determinations of social evolution (Ornea, 1972, p. 214).

4. Marxist Language and the ‘Exploitation’ Power of Capital

Was Virgil Madgearu a Marxist? For one reason or another Romanian historiography doesn’t focus on this particular problem. Foreign historians neither present him as a Marxist thinker. For instance, Henry L. Roberts

remembers *en passant* that Madgearu “on several occasions he quoted with approval Guizot’s remark, ‘The class struggle is not a hypothesis, not a theory, but purely and simply a reality’” (1969, p. 150). Indeed, in one of the most important pieces on *peasantism* of Madgearu (*The Peasantist Doctrine*, 1923) he is employing terms like “class conflict” or “bourgeoisie”, being nowhere on doubt with respect to their theoretical, scientifically meaning. “Class struggle had changed during history”, “Peasants do have a role in class struggle”, “(...) political leadership was left to the rising bourgeoisie”, “commercial bourgeoisie”, “bourgeoisie liberalism”, the historical sequence of ‘commercial capitalism, industrial capitalism and financial capitalism’ as being “a normal scheme of the bourgeoisie evolution” (1936) are few examples. Madgearu is certainly not against Marx’s theory of class struggle. He uncritically admits the existence of classes (bourgeoisie, workers, peasants), building on it a *schismatic* science of the agrarian economy or a pseudo-science of agricultural production.

The Romanian economist was convinced that such an analysis would not only determine a new course in the theory of peasant economy, but would create a ‘special scientific system of national-economy with the purpose of studying a non-wage national economy’ (Murgescu, 1987, p. 253).

Moreover, he pays lip service to Marx, arguing that nowhere it follows from Marx’s theory that class struggle should be understood as bloody revolutions or social unrest: “Nothing could be further from the truth”, he states. Letting himself completely absorbed by the Marxist language, he even pronounce the negative role of the same *bourgeoisie* for this misleading and unfortunate understanding of the class struggle. In an exegesis attempt of Marx, Madgearu points that “class struggle can run in the press, in the parliament, through strikes, lock-outs or boycotts, as it can run in the street, as rebellions, civil wars or social revolutions”. His attempt to save Marx, by introducing an alternative key of understanding class struggle, is in fact his own view of class struggle, the *Madgearian* understanding of Marx’s class struggle. A democratic political regime, would guarantee in Madgearu’s view that class struggle will be present only as a non-conflictual, but still ‘natural’ phenomenon. On the aggressive nature of the Marx’s inherent conflict between classes, the libertarian economist and philosopher, Murray Rothbard states that:

As Diocletian once declared the legitimate right to kill Christians when they are seen, so Marx envisioned such a world: “Indeed, in a speech in London in 1856, Marx was to give graphic and loving expression to this goal of his ‘praxis’. He mentioned that in Germany in the Middle Ages there existed a secret tribunal called the *Vehmgericht*. He then explained: ‘If a red cross was seen marked on a house, people knew that its owner was doomed by the *Vehm*. All the houses of Europe are now marked with the mysterious red cross. History is the judge – its executioner the proletariat’” (2006, p. 363).

However, Madgearu is also critical to Marx but only to the extent that Marx did not believe in the political and social power of the peasants, as an important class. In other words (our reading), Marx wasn’t sufficiently a Marxist – so to speak – since he attached only to the *proletarians* an important social role, leaving peasants aside the political action. Otherwise there is no critique of Marx’s economic and anticapitalistic views. On the contrary, Madgearu, again in an uncritically fashion assumes the existence of capital vs. labor conflict and the need of State action “to regulate it” (1915a, p. 26), adding an unfortunate understanding of the firm when explaining that

Protecting the wage has a three dimension purpose: a. to guarantee the worker’s wage, who loans the employer, for it receives the wage only after a certain time spent in working (1915a, p. 24).

Or, when evaluating the poor situation of the workers in the newly small house industries system, lacking any economic explanation,¹³ but still no less emotional:

One can imagine what is to be expected from a generation of people whose life is stuck in the sameness of 11-12 hours of sweatshop labor per day, one or two hours of lunch and eight hours of sleep! This would mean a dumbing down, which would result in a barbarian state of things (1915a).

Or, adopting the labor theory of value when explaining the evolution of capitalism:

The result of this evolutionist process is, on one hand, the existence of capitalists’ class, which accumulates wealth by the surplus value of labor (1923, p. 94).

An important problem could be highlighted here. In the above statement there is an implicitly (never explained) preference for operating with the socialist view on capital, the *exploitationist* view. Apart from the fact that there are other alternative explanations of the phenomenon of capital¹⁴, it should be noted that the socialist view based on the labor theory of value has an unavoidable and fatal shortcoming: it cannot explain price formation. The main problems of considering labor as the only source of economic value, can be structured as follows:

(1) if one finds a diamond, this would not have any market value (...) (2) it erroneously considers that the worker should receive *now* the value that his product will have *in the future* and (3) the theory cannot explain why two given goods produced with the same quantity of labor have different values if the labor was bid at different moments. (E.g. wine sold earlier vs. later) (Pătruți, 2016, pp. 91-92).

In his *Doctrine of the Peasants*, Madgearu also criticizes Karl Kautsky, "the Pope of Marxism", for arguing that capitalism can turn peasant exploitation into its own appendix, with an accent on *the domination power* of capitalism. At a first glance, one could read in Madgearu a purely free market, non-dialectical thinker:

It is at least an exaggeration to speak of the fatal subordination of peasantry to the industrial agricultural capitalism and of the danger of peasant exploitations becoming appendixes of capitalism (1923, p. 99).

In any case, capitalism is not harmful for peasants because of some *intrinsic* virtues of it, that understood properly, could place the peasant on his most productive level in the production process. Capitalism is not harmful because peasants have the *cooperation* option (exit?), "cooperation which facilitates the peasant to get rid of the capitalist domination" (1923, p. 99), which as discussed, means hands on the state to pump public resources into the specific cooperation units.

Military analogies with regard to capitalism are neither excluded, such as "invading foreign capitalism", "the leaning towards the rule over the State", railroads "ruled" by the commercial and financial capitalism, the banking trusts which "rule the whole economic life", the "fight to conquer the markets", trusts and cartels which "destroy" competing industries and "rules" them in a monopoly-fashion. (1936, p. 145) However, it

is important to notice that Madgearu explains all these manifestations as being outcomes of an *economic imperialism*. In short, *economic imperialism* is defined as capitalist interests which tend to control the State through the mean of *financial capital*. The logic here is so close to the liberal point of view:

It is certain that protectionism by favoring the creation of cartels, forced export of goods – dumping – capital exports through industries establishment abroad and exaggerating the drive towards economic autarchy as a supreme guarantee in case of war, gives an impetus for an aggressive economic policy and as a result to an aggressive foreign policy which ends in wars of expansion. Protectionism, the struggle for markets, colonialism, the drive towards economic autarchy, the capital export or the formation of global empires are manifestations of the economic imperialism (1936, p. 146).

The consequences of *economic imperialism*, as Madgearu sees this phenomenon, are excellently described. Not the same thing can be said about its causes, which Madgearu doesn't articulate very clearly. He is sure on the involvement of the State in this imperialism, but this is only because capitalists "command these imperialistic purposes", while the State only "follows their interests" (1936, p. 147). For instance, commenting on the historical evolution of economic imperialism, Madgearu describes it as "the political force of the State consciously put to attend economic expansion" (1936, p. 149). It is a crucial question to decide whether Madgearu thought that *economic imperialism* is connected or not with government interferences in the market. Could the economic imperialism be the outcome of a *distortion of the natural laws that govern* economic activity? In simpler words, a firm which is protected by government tariffs, becomes a monopoly and eliminates its competitors, impose higher prices to local consumers, negotiates privileges with foreign governments in the foreign markets, up to involving in financing of wars is the result of its own nature or of the significantly use of political means (tariffs) to acquire wealth? The lack of a systematically, theoretically treatment of capitalism and capital, and being less precautionous with the use of Marxist judgements, entitles us to argue that Madgearu is not far away from operating with an unsound understanding of the nature of a firm, incidentally or not, so close to how Marxism understands it.¹⁵

The liberal understanding of the “class struggle”

There are many conceivable classes in our human society. The class of shoe makers, the class of drinkers, the class of shepherds, examples can go on. A class is a group of individuals which have something in common. There is an infinitely number of classes. But they are not in any measure in conflict, but they live peacefully and cooperate within the society. Still, there is no case in which a *conflict between classes* can evolve? Yes there is.

Yes, there are such times, but only when some classes are privileged by state coercion, while other classes are restricted or burdened by state coercion. Ludwig von Mises perceptively used the term ‘caste’ to identify groups of either privileged or burdened by the state, as distinguished from ‘classes’, which are simply groups of people on the free market in no sense in inherent conflict (Rothbard, 2006, p. 380).

Here is how a conflict can start between two imaginable classes:

Suppose, for example, the state decrees a large subsidy for all people over 6 feet tall, or a special heavy tax on all those under 5 feet 5 inches. If special privileges were heaped on people named Smith, then this would be a privileged class at the expense of everyone else, and there would be an economic incentive to try to join the ‘ruling class’, people named Smith, as quickly as possible (Rothbard, 2006, p. 381).

Therefore, there is no conceivable conflict or “struggle” among various social classes other than that entailed by using political power to curtail the free exercise of other people’s private property rights.

5. The Economics of an ‘Eclectic’ Economist

Madgearu is considered an “eclectic economist” (Malinschi, 1975, p. 36). *Eclecticism* means adopting different theoretical frameworks with the aim of explaining economic and social reality. From a logical perspective, this is a sensitive method or paradigm, if each one of the frameworks holds opposite views. As mentioned, the case of Virgil Madgearu is a combination of three major intellectual influences: historicism, populism and Marxism. The common point of these schools is the more or less

anticapitalistic view, which would imply that Virgil Madgearu is also an *anticapitalist* economist. Few selected passages from his work will prove the falsity of this statement, but no less Madgearu's obvious theoretical ambiguity.

Capitalism, Socialism and Interventionism

The *agrarianist* blend of Madgearu's economic thinking made him pay less importance to the nature and role of economic systems. Agriculture shouldn't 'subscribe' to the same economic laws that produced the welfare of Western capitalist countries, partly because Romania did not have a real *bourgeoisie class*, and partly because agriculture has a *science* of itself which can supposedly prove the superiority of small autarchic rural households (*cooperation*) to the capitalist production. Capitalism is preferred only to the extent it can offer – through urban industries – a market for agricultural goods. Two conditions should be met for capitalism to develop: first is "private property rights and economic liberty", and second, "economic life enters the stage of production" (1936, p. 120).

A capitalist society is based on economic enterprises. The satisfaction of needs depends exclusively on the existence of economic enterprises.

Only then could we speak of a capitalist economic order, if by the elimination of economic enterprises we get the image of a total societal collapse due to the impossibility of satisfying human needs (1936, p. 121).

However why would anyone imagine the elimination of economic enterprises? Would this be the consequence of an economic crises? Then the causes of it should be studied. Finding the causes and preventing future crises by adopting sound economic policies would give the necessary strength to the capitalist economy. The accent is thus on *crises* not on *economic enterprises*. Would this be a *natural* phenomenon, people preferring autarchy to exchange? Then the transition is painless since people have substituted a less satisfactory state of affairs (capitalism) with a more rewarding one (autarchy). But the premise of this transition is the voluntary, non-coerced action. Would this be a pure imagination exercise? Fair enough, but the real, positive question still remains: is there a natural trend to more developed forms of society, voluntarily adopted by the people? If it is, arguing that people's preferences for capitalism could lead to an inherent collapsing society is in no way different than arguing the collapse of an autarchic society because of labor shortages or natural

hazards. Adding insult to injury, the exercise is perfectly suitable for the socialist/communist utopia. An elimination of the socialist fabrics, of the socialist economic centralized plans would mean a societal collapse developing in shortages, wasted capital goods and the impossibility of satisfying human needs. Today these are facts. Therefore, why would capitalism be more 'collapsing' than socialism? A theory of these systems is required. Contrary to the spirit of some its biographers, there is no original theoretical contribution of Madgearu to neither of the main three economic systems: capitalism, socialism and interventionism. Although probably the most popular word of his works after *peasants* would be capitalism, it is difficult to find a coherent, systematic line of thought to explain one of these economic systems. There are of course his lectures at the Academy of Higher Commercial Studies which took the form of economic manuals, but the obvious purpose of them is more a pedagogical one.

The more obvious consequences of Madgearu's theoretical convictions could be seen in the rest of his writings where all the references to capitalism, socialism or interventionism are more or less *contaminated* by personal or borrowed, supposedly objective historical judgments. But, this is not a surprise since it was already stated his historicist legacy. The greatest part of Madgearu's *research* carrier is dedicated more to a sociological (German methods) perspective of the economic reality and less to the study of economic laws, or economic science.¹⁶ His work at the Academy for Science and Social Reform (later the Romanian Social Institute) proves this fact. Thus, by Madgearu the *researcher* we understand his studies (materialized in various papers and books) on present social problems of the Romanian state, using the historical methodology in which economic theory has no special place.

The following is an instance of a fuzzy understanding of capitalism by a bizarre association between mercantilism and capitalism.

In general, mercantilism seems to be a partnership of the State with the capitalist interests. The State is considered as being composed exclusively of capitalists and entrepreneurs and the entire economic policy is directed by the impulses of capitalists' interests" (1936, p. 172).

First, Madgearu rightly argues that mercantilism is an institutional product of State interests and capitalist interests, which would perfectly fit the description of a *fascism avant la lettre*. Then, the bizarrely sets in, when mercantilism should be read as State interests serving the capitalist

interests. (1936, p. 129) Why not vice versa? And when capitalist interests are served by the State, the specific name given to this (a Marxist copyright) is *monopoly capitalism*. What about a possible *monopoly mercantilism*? Or, as the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises would propose, a name given to the system of government intervention in the economy: *monopoly interventionism* or *monopoly statism*. (1998, pp. 680-681) To what extent are State interests serving capitalist interests more than capitalists' interests serving State interests? And how would a possible exit from such an undesirable situation look? The presupposition is in favor of an institutional revival but more in the direction of regulating markets, and less to testing institutional/government compatibility with natural institutions (private property, division of labor, prices, competition etc.). The *social policy* idea, embraced by Madgearu as a new, fresh way of conducting the economic affairs, fully supports the thesis that *interventionism* into the market system was a strong conviction for the professor. Below, a proof of a 'technocratic', supposedly non-ideological air:

Nobody – among people of name – question anymore the State right to regulate the conflict between capital and labor. All our political parties admit State interventionism under the conceptual doctrine of *social policy* (1915a, p. 26).

The private economy along with the *science of businesses* will be historically acknowledged and will function as a support for *public intervention* of the State. In a sentence, this is the great task of social economy, to know the particular features of private businesses with the aim of regulating them. (1915b, p. 36-37) But government intervention in the economy is necessary to be under the democratic rule, it should be a 'guided' economy but not authoritarian, like in the cases of fascist Italy or national-socialistic Germany which substituted the 'liberal' economy. (1936b) Madgearu thus believed in an overall liberal economy, guided by the state everywhere markets fail to achieve their outcomes and in despite of "so many failures of public intervention" (1936b).

Socialism, by which today economists understand "public property on the means of production", Madgearu understood it much in the same manner as interventionism. Arguing that it's childish to judge socialism only through the Russian experiment, he defended various quasi-socialist (social democracy?) regimes based on "unionism" and the "elimination of profit as a main motivational factor". As examples he offers Arsenal

industry from Austria and France's substitution of profit-based principle to labor-based principle. While it would probably be far-fetched to consider Madgearu in favor of socialism it's nevertheless in the spirit of truth to argue that 1) 'liberal' economy – Madgearu's perspective – is a semantic trick, since liberalism is used only as a leg for interventionism ('dirijism'); 2) Madgearu had no suspicion of the implication and further consequences of an interventionist regime, naively thinking that a constitutional democracy can temper the unavoidable distortions in the system of prices and production.

Last but not least, while admitting the benefits of capitalism in offering higher standards of living for the workers (1940, p. 6) Madgearu is against the Romanian liberal fascist-style polices, which captured the industries and slowed economic growth.

...wasn't right when I said from the beginning that you don't provide incentives for a mixed regime but you organize the assignment of State assets to the private capital, and specifically organized in your national trust? (1925, p. 64)

However, *social policy* or *social economy* is not fundamentally different than the bulk of liberal policies of the interwar period¹⁷. With few different accents put on the import of foreign capital and international trade issues, where liberals proved to be very protectionist in comparison with Madgearu and the peasantist doctrine, the two paradigms are pretty much the same, or at least they share the same unshakeable conviction: State intervention is necessary irrespective of how natural institutions set the stage.

Fiscal policy

Operating with the idea of redistributive justice, Madgearu considers that for the war's material and human casualties, there is a responsibility of even those who rightfully became rich, through economic means.

Even the most honest capital accumulation – which is private savings – holds a responsibility, since while a great number of people were losing their lives on the battlefield, their homes, others enjoyed the quietness of their lives and saved money (1921).

He was against fiscal evasion, in the name of a *fiscal justice* – which is backgrounded in a more general idea of *social justice* – and proposed through legislation an intensification of State control and raising penalties for non-compliance. He did not believe in a so called excessive fiscal regime that would define Romania, and suggested comparisons with other countries. However, capital accumulation and purchasing power is different from country to country, thus being of little importance such comparisons. Ion N. Stan resumes in few propositions Madgearu's fiscal intentions:

For the implementation of his reform Madgearu adopted the following financial methods: 1. the cut of certain taxes which founded it too burdensome, according to the ability-to-pay principle; 2. augmenting the fiscal base by introducing new taxable objects; 3. Corection and systematize of certain taxes; 4. improving the tehnique of disposition, levy and tracking of the taxes, in order to ensure a general and equal imposition; 5. Combating fiscal evasion and frauds; 6. Renewal and improvement of the administrative apparatus of the State (1945, p. 13).

In short, his reform meant a reduction of many taxes and impôts on agricultural goods, buildings, labor income, automobiles, which aim at favoring small craftsmen (the small bourgeoisie), but still promoted an “reserved attitude towards enterprises and capitalist creations” (1945, p. 13). This was due probably to the fact that Madgearu “was convinced that because of plutocratic interests, fiscal quotas applicable to the big economic actors were too small, and those applicable to the small ones were too burdensome” (1945, p. 14).

International trade and foreign capital

Madgearu advances a striking idea on mercantilism, that it didn't mean a confusion of wealth with money. (1936, p. 127) However, how else could be explained the preference of the absolutist monarchs for the affluence of money, in gold and silver coins at that time?

Free trade in international trade, one of the principles of the liberal doctrine (in the French and British sense of the word), is overall preferred to mercantilism. This stems out clearly from Madgearu's writings and speeches. Free trade renders better outcomes than mercantilism which “had questionable effects”, created monopolies with a “harmful impact” on the economy (1936, pp. 172-173). However, as regards modern

mercantilism, or protectionism, Madgearu remains on the same eclectic positions. While protectionism - especially industrial protectionism – can lead to “chronic hunger” (1936, p. 179), there can be instances in which “imports can gain more feathers”, can become a “wild” import with results in the “congestion of the local stores with goods” (1936, p. 12). Jean Baptiste Say’s law of markets doesn’t seem to be a reliable judgment for Madgearu as he believes in this increased-imports scarecrow. For Madgearu, although there are “natural brakes” for increasing imports (e.g. currency depreciation), these can still go beyond a ‘reasonable’ limit.

Although in general in favor of a free international exchange regime, Madgearu wasn’t applying the same principle at home, where protectionist laws, such as the minimum wage law should ‘protect workers’ or laws regarding prices of industrial goods in the energy sector, where “it is unconceivable an absence of a price policy” (1925, p. 65).

On the problem of foreign capital imports, Madgearu was in favor of such imports. He recognized the lack of capital accumulation in Romania and urged to open the frontiers for foreign capital. “Putting barriers to foreign capital imports, in all cases and where there is no superior State interest, is a mistake” (1925, pp. 38-39). He was referring to the liberal protectionist attitude towards foreign capital. In the view of the liberal party leaders, foreign capital, once imported, it could offer political opportunities for foreign governments, which in times of crises or war is to be avoided (2013, p. 404). With all these risks, foreign capital could be the only option for a state in which “the normal source of capital creation, the economies of the productive class transformed into industrial investments, was completely absent” (1925, p. 40).

State (bureaucratic) management vs. Private (profit) management

Although Madgearu recognized the importance of capital and capitalism, when it comes to State assets his ideas follow the same interventionist route. He seems to argue in favor of a State which has no economic calculation or incentives problems:

...instead of giving State wealth for exploitation to favored individuals based on political considerations, one should give State wealth to be exploited according to the general interest and for the satisfaction and sanctification of the right that labor has on the wealth of the country (1925, p. 41).

And the solution envisioned for avoiding capitalist *exploitationist* schemes include the mixt cooperative regime, which according to Madgearu is “moral and social useful” because “it encourages organized labor in cooperatives, and, instead of giving public wealth to favored individuals, it would be exploited with Romanian labor organized in cooperatives which will accompany the State, counties and communes” (1925, pp. 57-58).

Madgearu is against the monopoly prices of some monopolist public enterprises but does not propose the eradication of the cause, a possible abolition of public monopolies. Instead, he is in favor of regulating their prices (1925, p. 66). Moreover, we discover that state monopolies can be more efficient if they are taken out of the bureaucratic system, which “impedes any rational organization, any accountability and calculation” (1925, p. 69). However, to take it out does not mean to privatize, but only to put it under that part of the State which has the managerial function. According to him, there is a so called managerial function of the State, which should not be confused with the authority function:

It is the crises of modern State. Modern State has not come to distinguish between its two functions: authoritative function and management function (1925, p. 3).

We also discover in Madgearu’s ideas that public enterprises can be conducted under the same methods as private enterprises. “...to apply to households and public enterprises a method of organization and management similar to that of modern private enterprises” is a task of the State, since “even Alexander Millerand, the president of the French Republic, speaking about these organizations said: ‘I do not admit a State managed by other laws and rules than those of an well managed industrial enterprise’” (1925, p. 5).

As regards the boards of privatized companies, Madgearu knows that more State delegated members in the board’s enterprises would have potential harmful effects, as in the case of State enterprises. Nevertheless, he considers that this issue “is not the most important” (1925, p. 51).

6. Conclusion

The present research was intended to be a travel into the history of ideas. Its leitmotif was that Virgil Madgearu – and probably other important figures of the Romania's interwar period – need a new, fresh and subjective approach towards his/their ideas. The methodology used was in the tradition of classical liberalism, British and French schools, of 18th and 19th century. It is therefore a critical overview of Madgearu's economic ideas from the perspective of a lost tradition, but nevertheless still producing echoes today. An example would be the recent planetary event of Great Britain's referendum which decided in favor of leaving the European Union, which determined a commentator to say that "Great Britain is going back to the illusions of 19th century", a suggestion to the liberalism of 19th century. Other example is the Marxist semantic trick called 'neoliberalism' which tends to be an outrageous attempt to undermine and damage the meaning of true liberalism. Properly understood in technical economic terms, neoliberalism is nothing more and nothing less than government intervention in the market economy. The bulk of synonyms include: fascism, crony capitalism, social market economy, state capitalism, 'guided' economy and others. A correct and historically fair approach to it would be *neointerventionism*. At any rate, there is thus a legitimate research task to search for the position of true liberal ideas in the Romanian space.

As the paper first emphasized, Madgearu's eclecticism in theory – no less in practice – is the result of three main influences: German historicism, Russian narodnicism (poporanism) and Marxism. It was called *anticapitalistic* trinity because there are no doubts about its obvious skeptical positions towards the capitalist society. This eclecticism served well the political purpose: pleading in favor of the peasants' class and for a rural, agrarianist state with small household production protected of the capitalist exploitation. But it nevertheless requires at least an explanation for its adoption, which Madgearu did not offer, probably also due to his early death in 1940 (age 53). And this would be the second major contribution of the paper, to stress on the problematic character of Madgearu's theoretical eclecticism which went perfectly together with interventionism in the market economy.

Questions regarding the philosophical, sociological or cultural feasibility of such a *peasant's* society were outside of the paper's purpose which was to expose as much as possible only Madgearu's ideas as

an economist. There are of course other interesting adjacent areas that remained unexplored, and could take the form of future research concerning Virgil Madgearu. Of these we could mention a category of purely economic issues such as the clarification of two cloudy ideas, the relation of Madgearu with socialism and fascism, his ideas and public policies during the Great Depression, his monetary thought, his thoughts on the economy of war; and another category of purely biographical or historical issues, with Virgil Madgearu through the lens of his contemporaries, the conflict with the Iron Guard, his supposed relation with the Fabian Society of London, the trustiness of post-1945 biographies of Madgearu. All these can definitely constitute important steps for shedding light upon the life and personality of Virgil Madgearu.

NOTES

- ¹ See Ion N. Stan, *Virgil Madgearu în finanțele publice românești*, Remus Cioflenc, Bucharest, 1945, where Madgearu is described as “one of the strongest, dynamic and original figure of all economists that Romania had” (Introduction); Ion Gh. Roșca & Ovidiu Nicolescu, *Mari personalități ale ASE. Virgil Madgearu*, Ed. ASE, Bucharest, 2011, note that “without any doubt, of the pantheon of great romanian economists... Virgil Madgearu cannot miss” (p. 7); “an coryphaeus of Romanian economic thinking” (p. 129) is the noble title attributed to Madgearu, by Maria Nicolai & Edit Lukacs, contributors of the same publication.
- ² The author would like to address his gratitude to Jörg Guido Hülsmann, professor of economics at *Universite d’Angers*, for his kindness in offering precious advice in the elaboration of the present paper.
- ³ Although, because of the labor theory of value, British economic writers have done much harm to economic science. Because of this unfortunate fact, Paul Douglas places Adam Smith as a “precursor of Marx”, since Marx borrowed from the British classical economists the labor theory of value, adding it the ‘surplus’ theory. (via Rothbard (2006, p. xii)).
- ⁴ Romanian economic historiography is not so generous here. However, for an in-depth analysis of the liberal/free trade vs. statist/protectionism debate in 19th century Romania, see Eugen Demetrescu, *Influența Școalei Economice Liberale în România în Veacul al XIX-lea*, Editura Domino, Bucharest, 2005. Demetrescu explains how “the idea of free trade acquires a meaning before the independence, after this moment being replaced with the protectionist idea” (p. 91); In a recent work, Topan (2016) argues that “One of the things which can probably be safely – and sadly, in our opinion – said about the history of modern Romania is that it knew neither a coherent and consistent body of classical liberal ideas nor a genuinely classical liberal political and economic program.”; Also, Smirna & Topan (2015) conclude that „The rule in the Romanian economic literature from 19th and 20th century is to judge the matter (of foreign capital) based on mercantilist and protectionist ideas.”
- ⁵ As a matter of fact, the *social base* of the Peasants Party – as the promoter of peasantist ideology – was not based exclusively of peasantry members. “The social structure of the Party was extremely heterogeneous, a significant place being composed of small and medium bourgeoisie” (Scurtu, 1994, p. 69)
- ⁶ The first land reform of the National Peasants Party continues the expropriation policy of former liberal governments.
- ⁷ An interesting similar phenomenon is observed by Professor Costea Munteanu evaluating the number of post-communist governmental reforms. Professor Munteanu baptized it as *pathological gradualism*. (1995)

- ⁸ To say the least. According to a study, 55% of the Romanians think that “the communist idea is a good one but badly applied” (2012, p. 9).
- ⁹ See Isărescu, Mugur (coord.) et al., *Viața și opera lui Virgil Madgearu*, Restitutio, Banca Națională a României aprilie 2012; Malinschi, Vasile, *Profesorul Virgil Madgearu (1887-1940)*, Editura Academiei, Bucharest, 1975.
- ¹⁰ We speculate, perhaps seeing that others before him already classified it as a “history of wasted energies which could have been put to better use” (Schumpeter, 2006, p. 782).
- ¹¹ Two laws were enacted for this purpose: the law for the organization of cooperation (March 28, 1929) and the law for the organization of rural mortgages and agricultural credit (July 29, 1929).
- ¹² State funding was not an option to private funding. Romania interwar period was lacking the necessary capital for such projects (Roberts, 1969, p. 159).
- ¹³ On the problem of capital accumulation in Romania, as the cause for workers’ poor situation see Hitchins (2013) and Roberts (1969).
- ¹⁴ Other capital theories: productivity theories (J.B.Say, W.G.F. Rocher, J.M. Lauderdale, T. Malthus, K. Wicksell, F. Hayek), independent-use theories (H.G. Hermann, K. Knies, C. Menger), abstinence theories (N. Senior, F. Bastiat), work-compensation theories (J. Mill, J.R. McCulloch). For a detailed exposition of these theories see Eugen von Böhm Bawerk, *The Positive Theory of Capital*, New York: G. E. Stechert & Co, 1930 and a recent Romanian contribution, Alexandru Pătruți, *Teoria Structurii de Producție*, Editura Universității Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Iași, 2016.
- ¹⁵ “According to the Marxian doctrines of imperialism, there prevails within an unhampered market society a tendency toward the establishment of monopolies. Monopoly, according to these doctrines, is an evil originating from the operation of the forces working in an unhampered capitalism. It is, in the eyes of the reformers, the worst of all drawbacks of the laissez-faire system; its existence is the best justification of interventionism; it must be the foremost aim of government interference with business to fight it. One of the most serious consequences of monopoly is that it begets imperialism and war.” (Ludwig von Mises, *The Omnipotent Government. The Rise of the Total State and Total War*, Yale University Press, 1944, p. 70). The same Mises delivers a trenchant semantical solution to this problem: “They are not products of capitalism, but precisely of the endeavors to counteract the forces determining the height of the market prices. It is a distortion of fact to speak of monopoly capitalism. It would be more appropriate to speak of monopoly interventionism or of monopoly statism” (Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action. A Treatise on Economics*, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998, p. 677).
- ¹⁶ Whoever wishes to understand the phenomenon of capitalism in Romania, or in the eastern part of Europe, could be at pains reading Romanian sociology

or economics. Socio-economic evolution is described with Marxist theories, as Virgil Madgearu confirms it:

In Romania a common practice is to apply Western theories with regard to capitalist evolution on the European eastern and south-eastern, without any qualification. Some of our sociologists do this relying only on Sombart's theory of western capitalism's evolution, and others endorse the Marxist evolutionist theory. (1936, p. 119)

Had been any other alternative theories in the epoch, we assume that, Madgearu should have known of their existence.

- ¹⁷ Keith Hitchins offers a delightful synthesis of how liberal governments understood 'liberalism'. It was interventionism, and no trace of liberalism: "They had an authoritarian approach in economy. Without hesitation they organized cartels, imposed tariffs, granted subsidies and other financial favors to achieve their main purposes – industrialization and the creation of a modern infrastructure based on Western models. Such policies were benefits for the financial and industrial oligarchy, but costs for other groups and classes" (2013, p. 427).

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MAKING (NEW) SENSE OF MARSYAS IN LATE ANTIQUITY: A FORAY INTO JOHN MALALAS' CHRONICLE AND ITS LITERARY HORIZON

Abstract: This paper aims to outline a preliminary study of the founding figures and narratives of the *aulos* in Late Antiquity, addressing their structure, popularity / reception, and discursive uses against the changing socio-cultural and ideological background of their production. After following the dominant synthetic Athenian narrative in the culture of Imperial and Late Antique *paideia*, I focus on John Malalas' radically revised account of Marsyas' invention of the *aulos* and death, arguing for its origins in the rationalizing and euhemeristic Greco-Roman mythography. A wider analysis of the musical references in Malalas' book IV brings to light an underlying, coherent succession of musical *protoi heuretai* rooted in the tradition of Classical and Hellenistic musical historiography.

Keywords: Ancient Greek music, Greek literature, Marsyas, *aulos*, historiography, mythography, heurematography, chronography, John Malalas, Agathias of Myrina, late Antiquity

"After Gideon, Tholas led Israel. During the time of Tholas, Marsyas, the philosopher, lived in the land of Phrygia. He invented through (his knowledge of) music pipes made out of reeds ..."

With these words, John Malalas' 6th century AD world chronicle (*Chronographia*) introduces two figures belonging to the distinct worlds of Jewish biblical historiography and Greco-Roman mythography: the vetero-testamentary judge Tola and the ill-fated (satyr) musician Marsyas.¹ While the former receives as little attention as possible, merely serving as a chronological reference point, Marsyas' story represents one of the last developed accounts in a literary tradition built around the founding

figures of the *aulos*, and spanning almost one millennium of Greco-Roman culture. At the end of a career oscillating between *hybris*, satyric grotesque, vanity or sheer stupidity, on one hand, and the position of a proper first inventor (*prōtos heuretēs*) and teacher (*didaskalos*) placed at the very dawn of Greek musical tradition, Marsyas enters Byzantine literature as a solitary philosopher and musician devoid of any satyric features or divine competitors whatsoever. What does this singular account tell us about the shorter and long-term dynamics and discursive uses of a narrative repertoire which had yet to become what the modern European tradition called *mythology*? How does it engage or bridge the pagan / Christian hiatus which underlies the syncretic efforts of late antique chroniclers, including Malalas? Does it bear any relation whatsoever to the contemporary musical practices of the 5th and 6th centuries AD – and if so, in what ways?

The present paper, developed from a classical scholar's perspective (rather than a byzantinologist's), can only attempt to provide a few preliminary answers and directions for future research at this point. At the very least, it responds to a serious lacuna in the current bibliography on the founding figures and narratives of the *aulos*: when not looking for sweeping generalizations rooted in formalist and/or structuralist readings, recent studies have privileged by and large late Archaic/Classical and early Imperial material and contexts, while the development of the same cultural lineage in Late Antiquity remains largely unexplored.² Something all the more problematic, if one takes into account the fact that a significant part of our extant, fully preserved textual sources does in fact stem from the late antique production of rhetorical *exempla* and mythographic *compendia*. Thus, covering some of these under-researched links within the Greek tradition on Marsyas becomes an imperative for any wider socio-cultural history of the *aulos* in the Greco-Roman world.

1. Dominant narratives on the invention of the *aulos* and discursive uses in imperial and late antique Greek literature

Following these introductory remarks, let us start with a brief overview of the main issues regarding the Greek literary tradition on Marsyas, focusing on the organization of mythographic knowledge and the development of narrative prose forms comparable to Malalas' account in the Imperial period and Late Antiquity.

The earliest extant references to a founding figure of *auletikē* date back to the turn of the 5th century BC, of which Pindar's twelfth Pythian *epinikion*, composed to celebrate the Delphic victory of the *aulos*-player Midas of Akragas (490 BC), remains the only fully preserved poetic articulation of the theme prior to the Hellenistic period.³ Although clearly different in pragmatic scope and actual musical references, they all link the establishment or transmission of *auletikē* to the goddess Athena. Marsyas is first attested in the extant historical record around 460 BC, in a now lost painting decorating the *Leschē* of the Cnidians in Delphi, which represented Odysseus' voyage to the Underworld (*Nekyia*); the satyr was depicted teaching his disciple, Olympos, to play the pipes, within a complex setting of transgressive figures which also included Thamyras, Orpheus, Acteon and Pelias.⁴ Such company suggests that Marsyas' own hubristic competition with Apollo was, at this point, already a part of the satyr's narrative baggage. The same seems to be true about Marsyas' strong ties to Phrygia and, more precisely, with the topography of the Phrygian town of Kelainai (refounded in the 3rd century BC as Apameia).⁵ By the third quarter of the 5th century BC, Marsyas seems to have been integrated in a markedly Athenian narrative which fused the satyr's musical competition against Apollo and the preexisting association of the *aulos* with the goddess Athena.⁶ Thus, Athena would have invented, and then abandoned or passed on the instrument to Marsyas, after seeing the facial distortion caused by the playing of the *aulos* - a narratological device which also provided the story with a new ideological spin, not only directed against the general notion of *hybris*, but arguably questioning the art of *auletikē* itself.⁷ Recent literature has looked for the implications of this narrative in the political conflicts between Athens and Thebes, in the volatile social environment within Athens, and more precisely in the projection of these tensions on the Athenian performance culture, as documented by the late 5th and early 4th c. BC debates around the so-called New Music.⁸ For the matter at hand, following the intricacies of such social readings is less important than understanding the dominant position held by this *synthetic Athenian narrative*, as I would propose to call it from this point onwards, in the extant literary corpus.

Any attempt to follow the tradition of this narrative has to address an overarching problem: the surviving textual sources on Marsyas which can be securely dated to the 5th and 4th c. BC are either fragmentary, or amount to little more than short, conjectural references.⁹ In fact, no extensive account of Marsyas' auletic misfortunes prior to Diodorus' *Historical*

Library (1st c. BC) survives, and even that one is a highly original version which has more to do with a particular euhemerist trend in Hellenistic mythography, as we shall see later on, than with a direct Classical lineage.¹⁰ One will have to refer to the less ambitious mythographic compilations of the Roman period, such as Hyginus' *Fabulae* or Ps.-Apollodorus' *Library* for linear, albeit sketchy synopses starting with Athena's invention of the instrument and ending with Marsyas' death (and metamorphosis).¹¹ These later texts are indeed compatible with the Classical corpus to the extent where one feels secure to posit the existence of a Classical tradition informing, more or less directly, the synthetic narratives of the Roman period – although this should not authorize, *vice versa*, any implicit projection of later features on the lacunar aspects of the earlier Classical material. Looking from a reception point of view, what one misses is, in fact, a traceable, authoritative reference which could underlie the enduring popularity of this synthetic narrative in the Greek literary tradition, despite the obvious changes in social contexts and performance culture. For instance, Melanippides' *Marsyas* may have held an important role in the genesis of the Athenian synthetic narrative, but its later echo is nearly impossible to trace outside Athenaeus' quotation which ensured its fragmentary survival. The repeated references to Marsyas and Olympos in the platonic corpus and Aristotle's appeal to the rejection of the *aulos* by Athena in the *Politics* would certainly qualify for authoritative sources in the canonic *paideia* of the Imperial period, but that doesn't make up for a major *narrative* antecedent.¹² To be sure, this is not *Quellenforschung* for its own sake: the lack of a familiar authority seems in fact to be echoed in Malalas' chronicle and another contemporary text to be discussed at the end of this section. In this respect, the Greek corpus stands in significant contrast to the less complex Latin tradition on Marsyas, where Ovid and Hyginus are clearly situated at the origin of a lineage of mythographic summaries and commentaries which include the *Narrationes fabularum Ovidianarum* attributed to Lactantius Placidus, Fulgentius' *Mythologiae* and the much later *fabularia* of the first two Vatican Mythographers.¹³

Going back to the Imperial and late antique Greek textual corpus, one can pinpoint the major tradition of extant prose summaries on the founding narratives of the *aulos* at the crossroads of two seemingly separate genres: mythographic *compendia* and rhetorical *exempla*. The most often-cited example of the former group is Ps.-Apollodorus' text, reproduced below for all practical purposes:

Ἀπέκτεινε δὲ Ἀπόλλων καὶ τὸν Ὀλύμπου παῖδα Μαρσύαν. οὗτος γὰρ εὐρὼν αὐλοὺς, οὗς ἔρριπεν Ἀθηνᾶ διὰ τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῆς ποιεῖν ἄμορφον, ἦλθεν εἰς ἔριν περὶ μουσικῆς Ἀπόλλωνι. συνθεμένων δὲ αὐτῶν ἵνα ὁ νικήσας ὁ βούλεται διαθῇ τὸν ἡττημένον, τῆς κρίσεως γινομένης τὴν κιθάραν στρέψας ἠγωνίζετο ὁ Ἀπόλλων, καὶ ταῦτ' ποιεῖν ἐκέλευσε τὸν Μαρσύαν· τοῦ δὲ ἀδυνατοῦντος εὐρεθεὶς κρείσσων ὁ Ἀπόλλων, κρεμάσας τὸν Μαρσύαν ἐκ τινος ὑπερτενοῦς πίτυος, ἐκτεμών τὸ δέρμα οὕτως διέφθειρεν.

Apollo also killed Marsyas, the son of Olympus; for Marsyas had discovered the pipes that Athena had thrown away because it disfigured her face, and he challenged Apollo to a musical contest. They agreed that the victor should do what he wished with the loser, and when the test was under way, Apollo played his kithara upside down and told Marsyas to do the same; and when he was unable to, Apollo was recognized as the victor, and killed Marsyas by suspending him from a lofty pine tree and flaying him.¹⁴

It is worth noting, as far as the organization of mythographic information is concerned, that Ps.-Apollodorus' narrative is framed in a double catalogic structure: a list of mythical figures killed by Apollo and Artemis (1.4.1-5), itself subsumed to the larger genealogical design of the work. In contrast, no obvious classificatory principle can be identified in the cluster of summaries (including a Marsyas narrative) preserved at the end of Palaephatus' *Peri apistōn* (*On Incredible Tales*), but certainly belonging to a different mythographic tradition.¹⁵

In the age of the second sophistic, Marsyas seems to have also become part of a repertoire of rhetorical *topoi* used and abused, it would seem, at the expense of Attic conciseness. For instance, the 2nd century AD rhetorician Antiochos was reputed to have criticized his rival Alexander Peloplaton for building his discourses around "Ionias, Lydias, Marsyai, nonsense".¹⁶ Interestingly enough, this anecdote is mirrored in the rhetorical handbook transmitted under the name of Aelius Aristides by a commentary on Xenophon's brief reference to Marsyas, served as an illustration of the ancient style (ἀρχαῖος τρόπος) and interspersed with counter-examples of rhetorical excess.¹⁷ A short version of the synthetic narrative is included as a model of narration (*diēgēma*) in Libanius' *Progymnasmata*, a collection of exercises meant to provide aspiring orators with basic compositional and argumentative skills, making extensive use of mythological references.¹⁸ Such rhetorical *savoir faire* wasn't ignored in Christian territory, as illustrated by an oration of Gregory of Nazianzus, which resorts to the *topos* of Athena's facial deformation in order to ironize

the pagan emperor Julian the Apostate.¹⁹ More significantly, as we are getting closer to John Malalas' time, it would seem that such classical references were becoming less intelligible for 6th century Christian readers, leading to the compilation of a mythological commentary on some of Gregory's orations, attributed in the subsequent manuscript tradition to Nonnos of Panopolis. Not surprisingly, the commentary on Gregory's auletic reference takes the form of a standard mythographic summary in the vein of Ps.-Apollodorus:

<δεκάτη ἐστὶν ἱστορία κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν καὶ τοὺς αὐλοὺς. ἔστι δε αὕτη> Ἀθηνᾶ ποτε τοὺς αὐλοὺς λαβοῦσα καὶ αὐλοῦσα παρῆλθε ποταμόν. θεασαμένη δὲ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τὴν ἑαυτῆς σκιὰν πεφουσημέναν ἔχουσιν τὰς γνάθους, καὶ ἀπρεποὺς ἐκ τοῦτου φαινομένης αὐτῆς, ἔρριψε τοὺς αὐλοὺς ὡς ἀμορφίας αἰτίους. ἐν γὰρ τῷ αὐλεῖν τὸ πνεῦμα ἐξογκοῖ τὰς γνάθους, καὶ ἀμόρφους ποιεῖ τοὺς αὐλοῦντας. τούτους τοὺς ῥιφθέντας αὐλοὺς λέγεται Μαρσύας εὐρηκέναι καὶ ἐρίσαι τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι, καὶ ἡττηθῆναι καὶ ἐκδαρῆναι παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν, ἐξ οὗ Μαρσύας ὁ ποταμὸς λέγεται.

*Tenth is the story about Athena and the pipes. It is this. Athena once took up the pipes and passed by a river as she played. But when she saw her reflection with distended cheeks in the water, an unseemly sight to her, she threw the pipes away for causing ugliness. For in playing the pipes the breath distends the cheeks and disfigures the ones who play the pipes. Marsyas is said to have found the abandoned pipes and to have competed with Apollo, and to have lost and been flayed by the river, which was then called the Marsyas.*²⁰

Such examples illustrate well enough, I think, the convergence of rhetorical *paradeigmata*, mythographic summaries and commentaries within the written culture of Late Antiquity, to the point where they become practically indistinguishable in their textual form and pragmatics, as long as they envisaged the fast accumulation of an operational and canonized *paideia*.

The last stop in this textual itinerary doesn't qualify for a comprehensive attestation of the synthetic narrative on the invention of the *aulos*, as it only deals with Marsyas' competition with Apollo and its violent outcome, but its discursive context (a contemporary historical account), the altered details in the mythical narrative and the extensive accompanying reflection provide an extremely relevant analogy to both Malalas' Marsyas and the rhetorical *paradeigmata* discussed above. The following passage comes

from a section of Agathias' *Histories* dealing with the siege of Phasis (555-556) during the so-called Lazic War, fought against Sassanid Persia. The reference to Marsyas is prompted by the flaying of the Persian general Nachoraban on the orders of king Chosroes, as an exemplary punishment for having retreated and abandoned Phasis in the hands of the Roman army:

τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ Μαρσύᾳ θρυλούμενα τῷ Φρυγί, ὡς ἔρις αὐτῷ πρὸς Ἀπόλλωνα ξυνέστη ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐλῶν καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἐπιστήμης ὅτι τε ἡσσήθη ἀνὰ κράτος ὁ Μαρσύας, καὶ μάλα δικαίως, ἅτε δῆθεν, εἰ μὴ λίαν εὐηθες εἰπεῖν, οἰκείῳ θεῷ ἀνταυλίσας, καὶ ὡς τήνδε ἀνέπλησε τὴν τιμωρίαν τῆς προπετείας ὑπὸ τοῦ νενικηκότος, ἀποδαρὲν αὐτῷ ἅπαν τὸ δέρμα καὶ ἐπὶ δένδρῳ ἡωρημένον· ταῦτα δὴ οὖν ἅπαντα ποιητῶν ἂν εἴη τερατεία καὶ μῦθοι καὶ παίγνια, οὔτε τῶν ἀληθῶν οὔτε τῶν εἰκότων ἐστοχασμένα, εἴ γε αὐλητὴν φασὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω γεγενῆσθαι καὶ ἀμυλλόμενον ἐπὶ τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ ἐς τοσοῦτο μετὰ τὴν νίκην χαλεπήναντα, ὡς ἀνοσίαν οὕτω καὶ μανιώδη ποινὴν ἐπαγαγεῖν τῷ ἡττημένῳ. πῶς δὲ ἂν καὶ ἤρεσκεν αὐτὸν ἐκ τοῦ μετεώρου φαινόμενον τῆς ἀπανθρωπίας τὸ κατηγόρημα; [5] ταῦτα γὰρ οἱ τε πρότερον ποιηταὶ ᾄδουσι καὶ οἱ νέοι παραλαβόντες συνᾄδουσιν. ὦν δὴ καὶ Νόννος, ὁ ἐκ τῆς Πανὸς τῆς Αἰγυπτίας γεγεννημένος, ἐν τινι τῶν οἰκείων ποιημάτων, ἅπερ αὐτῷ Διονυσιακὰ ἐπωνόμασται, οὐκ οἶδα ἐφ' ὅτῳ ὀλίγα ἅττα τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος περὶ ἀφηγησάμενος (οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῶν προηγουμένων ἐπὶ ἐπιμέμνηται) εἶτα ἐπάγει·

Ἐξότε Μαρσύαο θεμιάχον αὐλὸν ἐλέγξας

Δέρμα παρηώρησε φυτῷ κολποῦμενον αὔραις.

[6] ὡς μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἐκείνου τὸ μίasma τοῦτο οὕτω τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ γένει διέγνωστο, σαφεῖ τὰ τεκμήρια καὶ ἀποχρῶντα παρὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς ἀναθεωρεῖν καὶ τεκμαίρεσθαι τὰ παλαιάτα πεφυκόσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιητικῇ θεολογίᾳ παρακρουομένοις.

There is a well-known story about Marsyas the Phrygian according to which there was a pipe-playing competition between him and Apollo, in which Marsyas was roundly beaten and rightly so, since he had the temerity (if it does not seem too absurd to put it that way) to play the flute against his own particular god. Whereupon his victorious opponent is supposed to have punished him for his rashness by flaying him and hanging his skin on a tree. The whole tale is, of course, a wildly improbable fabrication of the poets, a mere flight of fancy without a shred of truth or likelihood about it, involving as it does the far-fetched assertion that Apollo became an aulos-player, took part in a musical contest and became so violently enraged after his victory that he inflicted such an altogether wicked and insane punishment on his unsuccessful competitor. And is it really conceivable that he could have been ready to have the indictment of his cruelty displayed in mid air? [5] At all events this theme, which is handled by the poets

of old, has been taken over and exploited also by modern poets, one of whom Nonnus of Panopolis in Egypt, after having made some mention of Apollo (I cannot say in what precise connection because I do not recall the preceding verses) in a poem of his called the *Dionysiaca*, goes on to say [Nonn. *Dion.* 1.42-43]:

“Ever since he humbled Marsyas’ god-defiant pipe,
and hung his skin on a tree to belly in the breeze.

[6] *That this abomination was at the time still unknown to man should be sufficiently obvious to anyone who is capable of viewing the distant past with the right degree of critical detachment and who does not allow himself to be misled by the tales the poets tell about gods.*²¹

Agathias’ account of the flaying of Marsyas fits the traditional elements known from Classical and Hellenistic sources, with one striking difference. The competition has lost its strings vs. *aulos* profile, on which so much ink has been spilt in the last 150 years of scholarship, and Apollo becomes himself a divine *aulos*-player, thus establishing a far stronger connection than whatever implicit affinity one might have looked for in the traditional Athena-Marsyas aetiological transaction: Apollo is nothing less than Marsyas’ private god (οἰκεῖος θεός).²² Ironically, Agathias himself dismisses the prospect of the divine *aulos*-player as far-fetched, suggesting that the origin of this unique development must lie elsewhere. Or does it? His handling of poetic references is obscure at best: the poets of the old (largely meaning, at that point, pre-Nonnian poetry) are conveniently left unnamed, while the *Dionysiaka* quotation from memory doesn’t have anything to do with an *aulos*-playing Apollo.²³ One should not forget that Agathias has been recently shown to be a versatile literate who might well provide a perceptive reader with a multilayered, intertextual experience, to the point of altering historical facts for a mythological *clin d’œil*.²⁴

The corollary of this logical reconfiguration of the entire narrative has much to do with the ambivalent attitude of Agathias’ literary persona towards poetic discourse, Greco-Roman heritage and the (musical) past. On one hand, the rant against the marvelous fabrications of the poets could have been perceived just as legitimate by a non-Christian audience brought up with Plato’s *Republic*, as it would have stroke a familiar chord for a Christian reader – the difference being that a Christian wouldn’t have any obvious reasons to care about Apollo coming off just as irrational and cruel as a Persian king. In fact, some of the more sophisticated extant (pre- or non-Christian) texts on Marsyas do attempt to address or compensate in some way for the incongruity between Apollonian piety

and the satyr's gruesome punishment. In Diodorus' version, Apollo flays Marsyas in a momentary fit of bitterness, only to repent soon afterwards, destroying the new kitharodic *harmonia* that he had just invented for the contest and then dedicating both his kithara and Marsyas' *auloi* in a sacred cave of Dionysos.²⁵ Lucian's decidedly less pious humor makes Hera appreciate that if the verdict of the Muses hadn't been corrupted from the very beginning, Marsyas would have been the one flaying Apollo.²⁶ As for Agathias, the concluding remarks of the passage preserve its ambivalence – or perhaps cultural dissonance: it remains unclear whether this ποιητική θεολογία is to be dismissed as misleading because it soils Apollo's stature and a less violent past, or because it invented Apollo and Marsyas in the first place.²⁷ However, the appeal to the distant past (τὰ παλαιάτατα) seems to imply that there are at least some kernels of truth to recover from such poetic fictions – and this leaves us on the threshold of Malalas' chronographic project.

2. Marsyas without competitors: Reinventing the *aulos* for the Christian reader

Up to this point, I have attempted to outline a coherent, if selective overview of the dynamics and uses of the dominant synthetic narrative on the invention of the *aulos* within the world of Greek paideia, and Agathias' finely staged, ambivalent reflections on the poetic fabrication of Marsyas' competition with Apollo provided this itinerary with a fitting coda. In doing so, I left aside intentionally more than a handful of sources and traditions which, either due to their regional references, technical / antiquarian character or fragmentary state have to be regarded as minor in relation to the "mythographic boulevard" we have just crossed. That doesn't mean at all that such sources, taken individually or grouped, are less relevant to an exhaustive study of the founding figures of the *aulos*; on the contrary, niche euhemerist mythography, such as Diodorus' source on Marsyas, regional monographs and catalogues of *heuremata* represent some of the most dynamic and expressive witnesses of the full, polyphonic semantics of an aetiological repertoire such as the one built around the *auletikē technē*. Moreover, some of these minor lineages may end up redefining the dominant tradition in times of profound cultural change – and this might have happened with the entrance of Marsyas in Christian chronography.

This is the full passage on Marsyas in John Malalas' chronicle mentioned in the opening of this paper:

Μετὰ δὲ Γεδεὼν ἡγεῖτο τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ Θῶλας. ἐν δὲ τοῖς καιροῖς τοῦ Θῶλα ἦν ἐν τῷ Φρυγίᾳ χώρα Μαρσύας ὁ φιλόσοφος, ὅστις ἐφεῦρε διὰ μουσικῆς αὐλοὺς ἀπὸ καλάμων. καὶ ἀπενοεῖτο ἀποθεῶν ἑαυτὸν καὶ λέγων, “εὗρον τροφὴν ἀνθρώποις διὰ τοῦ μέλους τῶν μουσικῶν καλάμων”. ὥκει δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς Μαρσύας εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους ἀγροὺς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον· ὅστις Μαρσύας θεοχολωτηθεὶς ἐξέστη τοῦ ἰδίου νοός, καὶ παραφρονήσας ἔρριπεν ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ ἀπόλετο· ὄντινα ποταμὸν οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας Μαρσύαν καλοῦσιν ἕως τῆς νῦν. περὶ οὗ ἱστοροῦσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ὅτι πρὸς ἔριν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἦλθε· τοῦτο λέγουσι, φησὶν, ὅτι οὗτος βλασφημήσας ἐξέστη τοῦ ἰδίου νοός καὶ ἐφονεύθη, καθὰ καὶ ὁ σοφώτατος Νίνος συνεγράψατο. καὶ ὁ σοφώτατος δὲ Λουκιανὸς ἐμνημόνευσε τῆς ἱστορίας ταύτης, ὅστις εἶπεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ Καλχίδος εἶναι.

After Gideon, Tholas led Israel. During the time of Tholas, Marsyas, the philosopher, lived in the land of Phrygia. He invented through (his knowledge of) music pipes made out of reeds and then he went out of his mind, proclaiming himself divine and saying “I have found nourishment for men through the melody of musical reeds”. Marsyas lived on his own estates for the whole of his life. He incurred divine anger and went out of his mind and while he was distraught, hurled himself into a river and perished. Men of that country call this river Marsyas to the present day. The poets say of him that he had a quarrel with Apollo. They mean, according to the story, that he blasphemed and went out of his mind and was killed, as the most learned Ninos has written. The most learned Lucian, who said that Marsyas came from Kalchis, has also recorded this story.²⁸

Marsyas' textual encounter with a vetero-testamentary judge is not the only surprise provided by Malalas' account. In fact, the entire narrative has undergone a radical reconfiguration which evacuated Athena, Apollo, and Marsyas' own identity as a satyr from the story; the musical competition and punishment are reduced to little more than a psychological anecdote ending in suicide, with the eponymous Phrygian river coming to be known as Marsyas precisely because of this suicide and not as the result of a metamorphosis. On the surface, this handling of the narrative recalls the explanatory strategies employed by Classical and Hellenistic rationalizing mythographies, such as Palaephatus' *Peri apistōn*, so as to reduce incredible myths to their natural explanations.²⁹ Here, however, both *hybris* and divine anger remain active elements of the plot, one becoming more interiorized, the other one more abstract – needless to

say, both are thus rendered compatible with Christian thought. From this point of view, Malalas' narrative can be viewed as one of the available responses to Agathias' cultural dissonance explored earlier: one can save morals and the mythical past by purging the pantheon.

It is time to take a closer look at the central content of the narrative, Marsyas' identity and invention. Without Athena or other minor predecessor (such as his obscure father, Hyagnis) left around, Marsyas becomes the indisputable *prōtos heuretēs* of the aulos.³⁰ This, in itself, is far from being a unique situation in our surviving record: from earlier classical texts to Hellenistic and Imperial antiquarian sources, a variety of musical inventions have been ascribed to Marsyas, including the aulos *per se*.³¹ What we miss for the most of them is the *emplotment*, the narrative assumptions and articulation which make it possible for Marsyas, rather than Athena or other divine figure, to step up in the position of the first inventor. In fact, the only other fully preserved account which allows us to better understand these narrative and heurematographic mechanics is the story of Rhea-Cybele included in Diodorus' *Historical Library*, book III – in fact, a digression of uncertain Hellenistic origin in the middle of a larger quotation taken from the *Libyka* of Dionysios Scytobrachion, a better documented euhemerist romance datable to the 3rd c. BC.³² While a detailed analysis of this extremely rich narrative will have to wait for a future publication, it must be said that there, as in Malalas, Athena disappears and Marsyas loses his satyr attributes, becoming the wise and chaste friend of Cybele. If Marsyas' invention appears isolated in Malalas, the Hellenistic account situates it in a more complex musical genealogy underlain by a certain notion of progress, as Cybele is first credited with the invention of the syrinx; Marsyas is then led to imitate the notes of the syrinx and to adapt its entire scale on a new instrument, the *aulos*.³³ The text does not do away with Marsyas' antagonist, as Malalas' chronicle, but rather humanizes him, true to its euhemerist outlook, transforming Apollo into a successful and innovative citharode in his own rights.

One additional contact point: both narratives tend to show a peculiar intellectualist inclination towards musical invention, emphasizing Marsyas' wisdom in a manner which strongly contrasts with his dismissing characterization in other types of rhetoric or poetic discourses. Diodorus' text returns several times to Marsyas' *sōphrosynē* and, when the competition starts unfolding against his fortune thanks to Apollo's trick of joining vocal singing to the sound of the kithara, Marsyas actually makes an appeal to the higher intellectual aim of the competition: it was

all about *examining* (ἐξετάζεσθαι) the tuning and the melodic features of the two instruments, not winning with the help of two arts against one. Malalas' boastful Marsyas doesn't use the vocabulary of a *harmonikos*, but he is nonetheless described as a philosopher.³⁴ Moreover, if the rather contrived syntax of the sentence ἐφεῦρε διὰ μουσικῆς αὐλοὺς ἀπὸ καλᾶμων is understood correctly, Malalas' text too emphasizes Marsyas' musical knowledge which led to the actual invention of the instrument.³⁵ Admittedly, these similarities do not show any obvious connection of Malalas' account with the euhemerist version in Diodorus, but they draw, at the very least, the outlines of a revisionist, innovative mythography which makes use of similar strategies in order to circumnavigate the narrative commonplaces of Greco-Roman *paideia*.

Behind the surface of Malalas' narrative reconstruction and musical content, one may still identify discrete echoes of the epichoric aspects of Marsyas known from previous sources. First, the text only mentions the river and not the city of Kelainai / Apameia Kibotos, but the peculiar detail about Marsyas living his entire life on his own estates (εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους ἀγροὺς) like a late antique aristocratic landowner sounds very much like a 'rationalization' of the satyr's status of local hero and strong ties to the Apameian landscape.³⁶ Secondly, Marsyas' death in the waters of the eponymous river has several parallels outside the standard mythographic accounts.³⁷ The Vatican Paradoxographer maintains that one could sometimes hear sounds of auloi and kithara near the river, because Marsyas the aulos-player drowned in it (ἀποπνιγέντος ἐν αὐτῷ Μαρσίου τοῦ αὐλητοῦ).³⁸ The Pseudo-Plutarchian *De fluviis* mentions the itinerary of Marsyas' skin, carried away at one point by the wind, then by the waters of the river, eventually leading to the foundation of a city called Norikos at the place where it was recovered by a fisherman.³⁹ Last but not least, Maximus of Tyre relates that the Phrygians of Kelainai sacrifice to the Maeander and the Marsyas by throwing thigh-bones into the common source of the two rivers and whispering the name of the recipient; when the two rivers finally separate their courses, the offerings to each river will miraculously follow the adequate stream respectively.⁴⁰ Of course, there is no easy way to make sense of this wild web of aetiologies, substitutions and *mirabilia*, but at least they allow us to presume that Malalas' suicide of Marsyas is not just the logical result of Apollo's expurgation from the narrative, but very probably shows some knowledge of earlier mythographic traditions with an interest in Phrygian topography.

The previous points provide us with valuable insights, when confronted with Malalas' patterns of reference to other authors and the construction of authority within our Marsyas passage. As it has been shown before, Malalas' chronicle includes an unusually large number of such references, many of them probably acquired from his primary sources (some of which are left unmentioned), some of them erroneous, not attested elsewhere (almost one third of his references) or downright spurious.⁴¹ In our passage, Malalas supports his reconstruction of the narrative on the authority of Ninos, to which Lucian is added as a secondary reference, although it is not clear whether we are supposed to understand that he, too, rationalized Marsyas' narrative. The traditional version of Apollo's competition, as in Agathias' account, is wrapped up with "the poets" without any further details. And here comes the problem: this "most learned Ninos" is not attested outside Malalas' text, if what we are looking for is a historian or mythographer; Jeffreys observes optimistically that "the reported comment would appear appropriate to a Christian allegorist", but his name obviously recalls the mythical husband of Semiramis and founder of Niniveh in Greco-Roman historiography, turned into the protagonist of a successful Greek novel in the first c. AD.⁴² Replacing one far-fetched speculation with another one is no great gain, but I wonder whether Malalas' Ninos might not hide a misunderstood reference to the novel or some other text derived from it. In the end, it wouldn't be surprising if a "local" figure like Ninos were especially popular in Antiochene literate circles.⁴³ The second reference is not less problematic, because no mention of Kalchis in relation to Marsyas is to be found in the surviving corpus of Lucian's works, although Marsyas does indeed appear in four different texts of his.⁴⁴ It would seem then that Malalas (or his source) has either mixed up the information in Lucian, or is trying to use his reader's hazy memory of Lucian to further his own revised version of the Marsyas narrative. Still, if Kalchis is to be emended to Chalkis, as Jeffreys proposes, we have to add a second entry to the list of Syrian connections in the passage.⁴⁵ In the end, this may just be the primary pragmatic function of these citations, be they misunderstood or invented: to anchor Malalas' revised history of Marsyas in a more familiar Antiochene field of references.

At this point, all these seem then to leave us with a narrative which makes use of the "toolbox" provided by the older tradition of rationalizing mythography and shares some similarities with a Hellenistic euhemerist experiment on the Marsyas narrative, while reconfiguring it for the ideological needs of a Christian audience. Purging Greco-Roman gods,

playing with topographical references and ambiguous citations seem to make for a constituent part of this process, as much as one is able to discern intention from accident in Malalas' writing. Among the many questions raised by this account, one seems particularly adequate at this point: why even bother to save a still hubristic Marsyas and his distant musical past for a Christian chronicle, if Apollo is expendable?

3. Provisional epilogue: Musical past(s) for a Christian chronicle

From the very beginning, Malalas' narrative is set apart from the entire corpus of narratives on the *aulos* discussed beforehand by the synchronization of biblical historiography with the Greco-Roman mythographic tradition represented by Marsyas. At the beginning of the 6th century AD, this feature could have hardly qualified for a novelty in itself: Christian writers had been experimenting with the notion of unifying their Jewish biblical outlook with the Greco-Roman chronological conventions into a coherent worldview ever since Julius Africanus' *Chronographiai* (early 3rd century), which in turn informed Eusebius' influential two-part chronicle.⁴⁶ Malalas' work, unlike his Christian predecessors, does not attempt to lock events on a rigorous annalistic timeline, relying instead on laxer synchronisms with biblical figures and events, interspersed at intervals with absolute dates counted "from Adam".⁴⁷ In the case of the passage under scrutiny here, the biblical reference is Tholas or Tola, the son of Puah, one of the vetero-testamentary judges who are recorded to have ruled over the Israelite tribes before the establishment of the first Kingdom of Israel – in fact, the most obscure among the twelve mentioned in the Book of the Judges.⁴⁸ As it is, this correspondence doesn't tell us much, but a preliminary look at the chronological structures underlying Malalas' book IV places Marsyas not only in a much more complex mythographic context but also, more interestingly, within a rudimentary series of *protoi heuretai*. Since this is not the place for a full analysis of these structures, I have isolated for now the following synchronisms which include musical figures:

- (1) thirteen judges who succeeded Joshua and Phinees | Prometheus (inventor of writing), **Epimetheus (inventor of music)**, Atlas (inventor of astronomy), Argos (inventor of the arts in the regions of the West) [Malal. 4.3 Thurn].

(2) Barach and Deborah | the (Delphic?) Sibyl, the Athenian kings Kekrops & Kranaos | **Sappho, the first female musician** (πρώτη μουσική) / **the first of the Muses** (πρώτη Μουσῶν)? [Malal. 4.5-6 Thurn]

(3) Gideon | **Orpheus of Thrace, Odryssian lyre-player** (λυρικός), the most learned and famous **poet** (ὁ σοφώτατος καὶ περιβόητος ποιητής) [Malal. 4.7 Thurn]

(4) Tola | Herakles and the Argonauts | **Marsyas, inventor of the auloi** [Malal. 4.7-8 Thurn]

When detached from its confused context, this series of musical inventions would appear to follow a largely coherent pattern based on instruments and genres, which could find its (admittedly more complex) counterparts in the late Classical and Hellenistic musical historiography: music > lyric poetry (and implicitly its associated string instrument) > aulos and auletikē.⁴⁹ But what should we do with Sappho, who would seem in any classical scholar's eye totally out of place in this succession of early, archetypal musicians? On one hand, Sappho's anachronistic interference must have something to do with Malalas' mishandling of two different chronologies used in the process of compilation. Given the general chronological inaccuracy of the work for earlier periods, this is a hardly adventurous proposition; in fact, at least one instance of blatant anachronism (Democritus and Hippocrates as contemporaries of Pelops) might well show the interaction of the same two sources in book IV.⁵⁰ But, chronographic accuracy left aside, this doesn't really tell us if Sappho had a place in this underlying succession of musicians, addressed only in its internal coherence and closed worldview. There are at least two points which may suggest that Sappho is in the right place, after all: first, no canonic Archaic poet / musician among those normally cited in chronographic tables appears in book IV; Homer, for instance, appears only in book V, in the generations between king Solomon and Hezekiah. Secondly, her entry in the list not as a lyric poet, but as the first female musician (πρώτη μουσική) or, according to an alternative scribal tradition, as the first of the Muses (πρώτη Μουσῶν) does not actually alter the logic of the succession on the whole, providing it instead with a paired counterpoint: Epimetheus was the first (male) musician, Sappho the first (female) musician, just as Orpheus and Marsyas respond each other as lyre and *aulos* players.

If my preliminary reading of these references is indeed correct, not only are we able to provide Malalas' revised narrative on Marsyas with a few musical analogies, but we gain a larger, internally coherent, and decidedly surprising perspective on the Greco-Roman musical past, as it would have been revisited and conceptualized at the end of Antiquity – that is, at a time when the institutional structures of the Greco-Roman musical tradition had already disappeared, and its actual performing practices were undergoing changes at the same time irreversible and, in many cases, invisible for the modern researcher.⁵¹

NOTES

- ¹ Mal. *Chron.* 4.7 Thurn; for the English translation, see §2.
- ² Formalist, structuralist analyses and other related approaches to the founding figures of the *aulos* include: I. Weiler, *Der Agon im Mythos*, Springer, Berlin / Heidelberg, 1974, 37-59; J.-P. Vernant, *La mort dans les yeux. Figures de l'Autre en Grèce ancienne*, Hachette, Paris, 1985, 55-63; B. Leclercq-Neveu, "Marsyas, le martyr de l'*aulos*", in *Mètis* 5, 1989, 251-268; J. Svenbro, "'Ton luth, à quoi bon? La lyre et la pierre tombale dans la pensée grecque'", in *Mètis* 7, 1992, 135-160; M.R. Maniates, "Marsyas Agonistes", in *Current Musicology* 69, 2000, 118-162; Ph. Monbrun, "Le notion de retournement et l'agôn musical entre Apollon et Marsyas chez le ps.-Apollodore: interprétation d'un mythe", in *Kernos* 18, 2005, 269-289. See also note 8 for the Classical Athenian context.
- ³ Pind. *Pyth.* 12; Epicharm. *Mousai*, fr. 92 Kassel-Austin = Athen. 4.184f + *Schol. Pind. Pyth.* 2.127 + Ael. Arist. *Or.* 37.22; Corinna, PMG 668 = Plut. *De mus.* 14.1136b (if one accepts Corinna's traditional dating). For Pindar's Pythian XII, see notably J. Strauss Clay, "Pindar's Twelfth Pythian: Reed and Bronze", in *American Journal of Philology* 113.4, 1992, 519-525; C. Segal, "The Gorgon and the nightingale: the voice of female lament and Pindar's twelfth Pythian Ode", in L.C. Dunn & N.A. Jones (eds), *Embodied Voices. Representing Female Vocality in Western Culture*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge / New York, 1994, 17-34; G.F. Held, "Weaving and Triumphal Shouting in Pindar, Pythian 12.6-12", in *Classical Quarterly* 48.2, 1998, 380-388; Z. Papadopoulou & V. Pirenne-Delforge, "Inventer et réinventer l'*aulos*: autour de la XIIe Pythique de Pindare", in P. Brulé & C. Vendries (eds), *Chanter les dieux. Musique et religion dans l'Antiquité grecque et romaine. Actes du colloque des 16, 17 et 18 décembre 1999 (Rennes et Lorient)*, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2001, 37-58.
- ⁴ The Leschē of the Cnidians is described by Paus. 10.25-31, with the Marsyas-Olympus section mentioned at 10.30.9. For several tentative reconstructions of the Nekyia, see L. Faedo, "Breve racconto di una caccia infruttuosa: Polignoto a Delfi", in *Ricerche di storia dell'arte* 30, 1986, 5-15 and M. Stansbury-O'Donnell, "Polygnotos' Nekyia: A Reconstruction and Analysis", in *American Journal of Archaeology* 94.2, 1990, 213-235. For political readings of the entire visual program, see R.B. Kebric, *The paintings in the Cnidian Lesche at Delphi and their historical context*, Brill, Leiden, 1983 and D. Castriota, *Myth, ethos and actuality: official art in fifth-century B.C. Athens*, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison WI, 1992, 89-127.
- ⁵ The association of Marsyas with Kelainai in the Classical period is documented by Hdt. VII, 26; Xen. *An.* I, 2, 7-9; Eur., TrGF 1085 Kannicht = Strab. XIII.1.70. Later references: Tit. Liv. *A.u.c.* 38.13.5-7; Strab. 12.8.15 and 13.1.70; Plin. *NH* 5.106 and 113, 16.239-240; Stat. *Theb.* 4.185-6;

- Mart. 10.62; Aelian. *Hist. Var.* 13.21; Paradox. Vat. 20; Ps.-Plut. *De fluv.* 10.1-3 (including Alex. Polyhist. FGrHist 273 F 76); Paus. 10.30.6-9; Philostr. *Imag.* 1.20 (Σάτυροι); Arist. Quint. 2.18; Ps.-Plut. *Prov. Alex.* 2; Claudian. 20.255-69. For secondary bibliography, see also note 37.
- ⁶ The earliest evidence for this synthetic Athenian narrative is provided by Myron's Athena and Marsyas statuery group, dated around 450 BC, described by Paus. 1.24.1 and Plin., NH 34.57 and documented by several Roman replicas and compositional parallels in Attic 5th century vase painting. See notably K. Junker, "Die Athena-Marsyas-Gruppe des Myron", in *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts* 117, 2002, 127-184 and H. Bumke, *Statuarische Gruppen in der frühen griechischen Kunst*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2004, 145-154.
- ⁷ Fifth and fourth century BC sources for the synthetic narrative: Melanippides, *Marsyas*, PMG 758 and Telestes, *Argo*, PMG 805, both quoted by Athen. 14.616e-617a; Fr. trag. ades. TrGF 381 Snell-Kannicht = Plut. *De cohib. ira* 6, 456b-c (tentatively ascribed to Iophon's *Aulodoi* by R. Krumeich, N. Pechstein & B. Seidensticker, *Das Griechische Satyrspiel*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1999, 549-551); Arist. *Pol.* 8.5.15-16, 1339b-1340a.
- ⁸ A concise bibliography on Marsyas, New Music, and the Athenian socio-political context of the late 5th century includes H. Froning, *Dithyrambos und Vasenmalerei in Athens*, Konrad Triltsch Verlag, Würzburg, 1971, 29-44; P. Wilson, "The aulos in Athens", in *Performance culture and Athenian democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 60-62; Junker, "Die Athena-Marsyas-Gruppe des Myron", esp. 148-153; P. Wilson, "Athenian Strings", in P. Murray & P. Wilson (eds), *Music and the Muses. The Culture of the 'Mousike' in the Classical Athenian City*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, 274-277; A. Heinemann, "Performance and the Drinking Vessel: Looking for an Imagery of Dithyramb in the time of the 'New Music'", in P. Wilson & B. Kowalzig, *Dithyramb in Context*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, 282-309, esp. 294-298, with further references.
- ⁹ See above, note 7.
- ¹⁰ Diod. Sic. 3.58.1-59.6; for this passage, see below, §2.
- ¹¹ Greek mythographic summaries: Ps.-Apoll. *Bibl.* 1.4.2; Lib. *Progymn.* 20; (Ps.-)Palaeph. *Incr.* 47, discussed below, to which add the mosaic of quotations in Plut. *De cohib. ira* 6, 456b-c (including Simias, fr. 3 Powell) and Schol. in Plat. *Symp.* 215b. The synthetic narrative is equally implied in Nonn. *Dion.* 10.230-234. Latin versions of the synthetic narrative: Ov. *Fasti* 6.693-710, *Met.* 6.382-400, cf. *Ars am.* 3.503-506; Hyg. *Fab.* 165; Fulg. *Myth.* 3.9; Myth. Vat. I, 2.23 Kulcsár and Myth. Vat. II, 2.138-9 Kulcsár.
- ¹² Plat. *Symp.* 215a-216e, *Resp.* 3.399e, *Euthyd.* 285c, *Leg.* 3.677d, *Min.* 318b; Arist. *Pol.* 8.5.15-16, 1339b-1340a. For a possible intertextual play on the

- passage from Aristotle's Politics in Athenaeus, see P. LeVen, "New Music and Its Myths: Athenaeus' Reading of the Aulos Revolution (Deipnosophistae 14.616e-617f)", in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 130, 2010, 35-47. Cf. Xenophon's reference to Marsyas in the *Anabasis* used for didactic purposes in 2nd or 3rd century AD rhetoric schools: see below, note 17.
- 13 See note 11.
- 14 Ps.-Apollod. *Bibl.* 1.24, in the edition of P. Dräger (ed.), *Apollodor. Bibliothek: Götter- und Heldensagen*, Artemis & Winkler Verlag, Düsseldorf, 2005, 18-20; English translation adapted after R. Hard (transl.), *Apollodorus: The Library of Greek Mythology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, 32.
- 15 On the structure of this surviving epitome, see the comments of J. Stern, *Palaephatus: On Unbelievable Tales*, Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, Wauconda IL, 1996, 5 and 22-24.
- 16 Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 2.574: Ἰωνίαι Λυδίαι Μαρσύαι μωρίαί, δότε προβλήματα.
- 17 Ps.-Ael. Arist. 2.127-130, quoting Xen. *An.* 1.2.8. The same passage is used as an example of *paradiegesis*, without any close commentary, by Rufus, *Ars rhet.* 23.
- 18 Lib. *Progygn.* 20. On the specifics of *progymnasmata*, see for instance the introduction of C.A. Gibson, *Libanius's Progymnasmata: Model Exercises in Greek Prose Composition and Rhetoric*, Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta, 2008, xx-xv with further reference.
- 19 Greg. Naz. *Or.* 5, in its turn most likely inspired Plutarch's own reference to this episode in relation to the facial deformations caused by anger: Plut. *De cohib. irae* 6, 456b-c.
- 20 Ps.-Nonn. *Narrat. ad Greg. Invect.* 5.10, in the edition of J. Nimmo Smith, S. Brock & B. Coulie (eds), *Pseudo-Nonniani in IV orationes Gregorii Nazianzeni commentarii*, Brepols, Turnhout, 1992, 186. English translation adapted after J. Nimmo Smith, *A Christian's Guide to Greek Culture: The Pseudo-Nonnus Commentaries on Sermons 4, 5, 39 and 43 by Gregory of Nazianzus*, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 2001, 76-77.
- 21 Agath. *Hist.* 4.23.4-6, in the edition of R. Keydell (ed.), *Agathiae Myrinaei Historiarum libri V*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1967, 152. English translation adapted after J.D. Frendo, *Agathias: The Histories*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin / New York, 1975, 125-126.
- 22 A series of late 5th century BC Attic painted vases do represent Marsyas playing the lyre or kithara (see references at note 8), but an aulos-playing Apollo confronting Marsyas seems to be a *hapax*. The closest one gets to this notion is Corinna, PMG 668 = Plut. *De mus.* 14.1136b, stating that Athena taught Apollo to play the *aulos*.
- 23 On "modernist" late antique poetry and its use in schools, see G. Agosti, "Greek Poetry", in S.F. Johnson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Late*

- Antiquity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York, 2012, 361-404, esp. 373-376 with further references.
- 24 On this point, see A. Kaldellis, "Things Are Not What They Are: Agathias 'Mythistoricus' and the Last Laugh of Classical Culture", in *Classical Quarterly* 53.1, 2003, 295-300; A. Alexakis, "Two Verses of Ovid Liberally Translated by Agathias of Myrina (Metamorphoses 8.877-878 and *Historiae* 2.3.7)", in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 101.2, 2008, 609-616.
- 25 Diod. Sic. 3.59.5.
- 26 Luc. *Dial. Deor.* 18(16).2.
- 27 On the relation between poetry and historiography in Agathias, see A. Kaldellis, "Agathias on History and Poetry", in *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 38, 1997, 295-305, who goes one step further in remarking that "Whereas a Christian apologist would reject Apollo on the basis of the story, Agathias rejects the story for the sake of Apollo" (300, n. 16).
- 28 Mal. *Chron.* 4.7, in the edition of J. Thurn, *Ioannis Malalae Chronographia*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin / New York, 2000, 54; English translation adapted from E. Jeffreys, M. Jeffreys & R. Scott et al., *The Chronicle of John Malalas: A Translation*, Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, Melbourne, 1986, 37.
- 29 See an overview of these strategies in Stern, *Palaephatus: On Unbelievable Tales*, 18-24 with further references.
- 30 On Hyagnis, see Aristox. fr. III 3 70 Kaiser, 78 Wehrli = Athen. XIV, 624b; *Marmor Parium*, FGrHist 239, §10; Dioscorides, *Anth. Gr.* 9.340; Alex. Polyhist. FGrHist 273 F 77; Kallistratos, FGrHist 433 F 3; Apul. *Flor.* 3.5; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1.76.5 ("Agnis the Phrygian"); Nonn. *Dion.* 10.233 and 41.374.
- 31 Metrod. *Troika*, fr. 1 Fowler = FGrHist 43 F 1 (syrinx and aulos); Plat. *Symp.* 215c (θεῖα αὐλήματα); Plat. *Leg.* 677d (τὰ περὶ μουσικὴν), Plat. *Min.* 318b (ἐν τοῖς αὐλητικοῖς νόμοις νομοθέτης), Sim. Rhod. fr. 3 Powell (phorbeia?), Euph. fr. 182 van Groningen = 69 Cusset (syrinx kērodetos), Poseid. FGrHist 87 T16 (aulos), Diod. Sic. 3.58.3 (aulos), Alex. Polyhist. 273 F77 (aulos), Plin. *NH* 7.204 (*tibiae geminae* and the Phrygian modes), Paus. 10.30.9 (the nome of the Mother of Gods), Plut. *De mus.* 14.1135f (aulos), Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1.74.6 and 76.6 (aulos, the Phrygian, Mixophrygian and Mixolydian modes), Hagiopolites fr. 2.1-3 di Giglio (aulos).
- 32 Diod. Sic. III.58.1-59.6, in the larger passage ascribed to Dion. Scytobrachion, III.49-74. On the euhemerist mythography of the latter, see J.S. Rusten, *Dionysius Scytobrachion*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1982; S.A. Stephens, *Seeing Double: Intercultural Poetics in Ptolemaic Alexandria*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2003, 39-43; M. Winiarczyk, *The Sacred History of Euhemerus of Messene*, De Gruyter, Berlin / Boston, 2013, 125-128.

- 33 Diod. Sic. III.58.3: τὸ μιμήσασθαι τοὺς φθόγγους τῆς πολυκαλάμου σύρριγγος καὶ μετενεγκεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐλοὺς τὴν ὅλην ἁρμονίαν.
- 34 Other mythical figures are also qualified as philosophers by Malalas: Aphrodite and Adonis (1.9), Tiresias (2.14) and Chiron (5.5).
- 35 Jeffreys et al., *The Chronicle of John Malalas*, 37 translates it as “he invented reed flutes for music”, but such a turn is not warranted by the construction διὰ μουσικῆς, which suggests agency, rather than finality; on the other hand, the semantic spectrum of the term μουσική, unlike its modern counterpart, gravitates around the performer’s craft or (technical) knowledge, rather than the aural product *per se*. It would seem preferable then to understand Malalas’ words as pointing out the resource of Marsyas’ invention, his musical competence. A similar line of thought is followed by J. Thurn & M. Meier, *Johannes Malalas: Weltchronik*, Anton Hiersemann, Stuttgart, 2009, 98 in their German translation of the passage: “welcher mittels seiner Musikkennntnisse die Rohrflöte erfand”.
- 36 On Marsyas’ poorly documented local Apameian aspect, see note 5 and Leclercq-Neveu, “Marsyas, le martyre de l’aulos”, 266-267; P. Chuvin, *Mythologie et géographie dionysiaques. Recherches sur l’œuvre de Nonnos de Panopolis*. Adosa, Clermont-Ferrand, 1991, 116-120; N. Zwingmann, “Erinnerungslandschaften und Identitäten in einer Kulturellen Kontaktzone: Mythen und Denkmäler in Kelainai-Apameia Kibotos”, in L. Sumerer, A.I. Ivanchik & A. von Kienlin (eds.), *Kelainai - Apameia Kibotos: Développement urbain dans le contexte anatolien. Actes du colloque international Munich, 2-4 avril 2009*, Ausonius éditions, Bordeaux, 2011, 96-98.
- 37 I leave aside Suid. s. v. Μαρσύας, M 230, which is dependent on Malalas’ text.
- 38 Paradox. Vat. 20.
- 39 Ps.-Plut. *De fluv.* 10.2 (= Euem. Cnid. FHG IV 408, if this is not a fictitious source), with the comments of Ch. Delattre, *Pseudo-Plutarque: Nommer le monde. Origine des noms de fleuves, de montagnes et de ce qui s’y trouve*, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, Villeneuve-d’Ascq, 2011, 130-135 ad. loc. and 54-68 on fiction, aetiology and the specificities of this strange text.
- 40 Max. Tyr. *Diss.* 2.8. For the hydrography of the Kelainian area in ancient sources, see L. Sementchenko, “Sources of Maeander and Marsyas in classical texts”, in Sumerer, Ivanchik & Kienlin (eds.), *Kelainai - Apameia Kibotos*, 63-70, and 68-69 on the passage discussed here.
- 41 The primary study on the topic remains E. Jeffreys, “Malalas’ sources”, in E. Jeffreys, B. Croke & Roger Scott (eds.), *Studies in John Malalas*, Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, Sydney, 1990, 167-216. W. Treadgold, “The Byzantine World Histories of John Malalas and Eusthatius of Epiphania”, in *The International History Review* 29.4, 2007, 709-745, esp. 722-5 uses these erratic reference patterns, among other features of the text, to build

- his radical case on Malalas as a mere fraud who paraphrased the chronicle of Eusthatius of Epiphania.
- 42 Thus J. Thurn & M. Meier, *Johannes Malalas: Weltchronik*, Anton Hiersemann, Stuttgart, 2009, 99 ("möglicherweise eine Verwechslung"), cf. Jeffreys, "Malalas' sources", 187-188. For the Greek tradition on Ninos and the surviving fragments of the novel, see S.A. Stephens & J.J. Winkler, *Ancient Greek Novels. The Fragments*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1995, 23-71.
- 43 In fact, one of the two extant mosaics depicting Ninos comes from Antiochia: D. Levi, *Antioch Mosaic Pavements*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1947, vol. 1, 117-119; LIMC s.v. Ninos 1 = Semiramis 2.
- 44 Luc. *D. Deor.* 18/16, *Podagr.* 314-315, *Ind.* 5.13, *Harm.* 1.32.
- 45 Jeffreys, "Malalas' sources", 186.
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- 49 On this topic, see first A. Barker, *Ancient Greek Writers on their Musical Past. Studies in Greek Musical Historiography*, Fabrizio Serra, Pisa / Roma, 2014.
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