

# New Europe College Black Sea Link Program Yearbook 2012-2013



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New Europe College  
Black Sea Link Program  
Yearbook 2012-2013

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# NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

*New Europe College (NEC)* is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997-1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 500 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong

international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

### **Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:**

- ***NEC Fellowships (since 1994)***

Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- ***Ștefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)***

The fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the Odobleja Fellowships are integrated.

- ***The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (since October 2009)***

This program, supported by the Getty Foundation, started in 2009. It proposes a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows.

As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program also includes a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence is meant to ensure a comparative dimension, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

- ***The Black Sea Link (since October 2010)***

This Fellowship Program, sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung, invites young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of the Black Sea region.

### **Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of New Europe College:**

- ***RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)***

The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach activities involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

- ***The NEC–LINK Program (2003 - 2009)***

Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj–Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

- ***The GE–NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)***

New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10–month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend, and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE–NEC Yearbooks series.

- ***NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)***

In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South–Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova,

Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one-month research trip abroad. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

- ***The Britannia-NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)***

This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

- ***The Petre Țuțea Fellowships (2006 - 2008, 2009 - 2010)***

In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government through its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College's community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Țuțea* Program publications.

- ***Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)***

This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*, Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South-Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

- **Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)**

This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

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Beside the above-described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

### **In the past:**

- ***The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)***

Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct

religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different confessions within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

- ***The Septuagint Translation Project (2002 - 2011)***

This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul*. Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

- ***The Excellency Network Germany – South–Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***

The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South–Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

- ***The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research***

*An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources (2006-2008)*

The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for Education

and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility, connectedness and exploitation of some of the most prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the “Constantin Brăiloiu” Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

- ***DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (starting July 2010)
- 
- ***UEFISCCDI–CNCS (PD–Projects): Federalism or Intergovernmentalism? Normative Perspectives on the Democratic Model of the European Union (Dr. Dan LAZEA); The Political Radicalization of the Kantian Idea of Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense (Dr. Áron TELEGDI-CSETRI)***, Timeframe: August 1, 2010 – July 31, 2012 (2 Years)

### **Ongoing projects:**

***The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon*** (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (since December 2009)



***Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances.*** This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled ***Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and eastern Europe***, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (since December 2009)

***Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (starting October 2010)

***The EURIAS Fellowship Programme***, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-sponsored by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar. The College will host the second *EURIAS* Fellow in October 2012.

***UEFISCDI – CNCS (TE – Project): Critical Foundations of Contemporary Cosmopolitanism (Dr. Tamara CĂRĂUȘ),***

Timeframe: October 5, 2011 – October 5, 2014 (3 years)

***UEFISCDI – CNCS (IDEI-Project): Models of Producing and Disseminating Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: The Cartesian Framework (Dr. Vlad ALEXANDRESCU),***

Timeframe: January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2014 (3 years)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

***Present Financial Support***

The State Secretariat for Education and Research of Switzerland (Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University of St. Gallen)

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The Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Culture of Austria

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Landis & Gyr Stiftung, Zug, Switzerland

Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (DaimlerChrysler-Fonds, Marga und Kurt Möllgaard-Stiftung), Essen, Germany

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The Swiss National Science Foundation, Bern, Switzerland

Seventh Framework Programme of the European Communities, ERC Executive Agency

Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, Köln, Germany

Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden

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## **ANNA ABAKUNOVA**

Born in 1982, in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine

Ph.D. Candidate in History, World History Department of Dnipropetrovsk National University  
Dissertation: *The Rescue of Jews during the Holocaust in the Occupied Territories of USSR*

### Fellowships:

“Eshnav” program on Jewish Studies in Jerusalem for Russian-speaking students and young scholars, the Chaise Centre for Jewish Studies in Russian, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2004, 2010)

VWS Fellow in Holocaust and Genocide Studies, the Netherlands Centre of Holocaust and Genocide Studies, the Netherlands Institute of War documentation, Amsterdam (2008)

Isaiah Berlin Fellow at Paideia – the European Institute of Jewish Studies in Stockholm (2011-2012)

She participated in a number of conferences and seminars  
She authored scholarly publications in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, and English



# THE HOLOCAUST AND THE DESTRUCTION OF ROMANI IN THE WORLD WAR II: ORAL HISTORY INTERPRETATIONS ON THE DEPORTATIONS OF ROMANI AND JEWS TO TRANSNISTRIA GOVERNORATE<sup>1</sup>

Transnistria is an artificial region, defined as the area between the rivers of Dniester and the Southern Bug and the Black Sea in the South. It was demarcated during the Second World War in accordance with a German-Romanian treaty signed in 1941. The terms of the treaty granted control of Transnistria to Nazi allied Romania. The region was used by Romanian occupation authorities as a place for concentration and extermination of Jews and Romani from Ukrainian, Moldavian and Romanian territories. During the occupation, thousands of Jews and Romani from Bessarabia and Bukovina were deported to Transnistria.

On June 29, 1941 I. Antonescu signed a decree-law about the establishment of Bessarabia and Bukovina as two separate provinces within Romania [...] August 19 Decree #1 Antonescu created a province of Transnistria and approved the 'Instruction concerning the Governance of Transnistria Province'<sup>2</sup>

Decree of I. Antonescu

about the establishment of the Romanian administration on the temporarily occupied Soviet territory between the Bug and the Dniester rivers

August 19, 1941

We, General Ion Antonescu, the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Army, decree:

Article 1. The territory occupied between the Dniester and the Bug, excluding the Odessa region,<sup>3</sup> bordering the Mogilev-Zhmerynka line [...] becomes a part of Romanian administration<sup>4</sup>

Article 2. We appoint Mr. Professor Gheorghe Alexianu as our representative in Transnistria, with handling all the power<sup>5</sup>

[...]

Article 7. We appoint the residence of authority of Transnistria in Tiraspol city.<sup>6</sup>

Many hundreds of Romani and Jews were found in graves in Transnistria. Nonetheless, particularly on this territory under Romanian control, the most numbers of people could survive. In my article I will appeal to narrations by Jews and Romani, to consider their memory about those tragic events. There are a number of articles, monographs as well as published documents concerning the history of the Holocaust and the annihilation of Jews during the Second World War under Romanian authority. Among the main volumes comprising documents regarding the policy of Romania during wartime and the Romanian treatment of Jews and Romani, namely, extermination in and deportation to Transnistria, one should mention the documents edited by J. Ancel,<sup>7</sup> V. Achim,<sup>8</sup> Y. Arad,<sup>9</sup> etc., and the collection of documents on "Roma in Transnistria (1941-1944)",<sup>10</sup> published in Odessa in 2011. There are also a large number of documents published in the Soviet Republics.<sup>11</sup>

Conducting a fieldwork on this topic is difficult and rare. In spite of wide-ranging projects in oral history developed in the last 20 years, which had as a goal to record personal experiences during the Third Reich period and the Second World War, none of such projects focus on Roma as a separate category of victims. However, some projects conducted about the Jewish memory also dealt with the Roma memory of the war period. One of such projects is the "Surviving in Shoah" (Visual History Foundation). The foundation was created by director S. Spielberg in 1994 to record testimonies of Jewish people who survived the Holocaust and also of other victims of the Nazi regime. Through 1994–1999, 48,361 interviews with Jews and 408 interviews with Roma and Sinti were recorded. 135 of such interviews were recorded on the territory of Ukraine. Out of these interviews, 69 were in Russian language, 42 in Ukrainian, 20 in Romanes, and 4 in other languages. Some of these interviews touched upon concentration camps in Transnistria - Domanovka, the ghetto in Golta, and survivals in Odessa and Vinnytsia regions, in former Transnistria.<sup>12</sup>

Other researchers than those involved in the foregoing project tried to conduct interviews with independent efforts. Among such scholars I can mention the Romanian Petre Matei, the Moldavian Ion Duminica, the Ukrainian Mikhail Tyaglyy. Here I should underline that conducting interviews with survivors is now a very difficult task. Many of war survivors died in the recent years, the rest are disabled or have hard illnesses and therefore, can hardly be sources for information. Still, some who can tell their life stories, were 4-5 years old in 1941, and thus they remember only very limited war experiences.



To work on memory is a complicated endeavor because the memory itself is not perfect. With the years passed, people forget many details, some of the recollections are replaced with more emotional details and frequently what they heard from others seems to them as their own remembrance. According to psychological studies, active memory starts from the age of 7-10, that is to say that the narrative of events until this age is fragmented and inconsistent. When it comes to the age group of 50-80 the challenge with the information is that we cannot notice in the narratives the chronological depth. Also we need to consider the fact that the informant transmits information not only of his/her own memory but of details which he/she heard from his/her parents and grandparents. Therefore, the chronological depth is increased. On the other hand, in such a case we have to deal with collective memory which intersperses with individual memory and sometimes it is difficult to discern between individual and collective memory especially in the case of Roma.

We can define individual memory as personal memory, where personal recollections fit into the frame of the narrator's personality and personal life. Even in recollections which a person shares with others, the narrator takes only the viewpoint where such recollections relate to him/her and define her/his difference from others. On the other hand, the individual memory does not function without such tools as words and ideas borrowed from a person's social surrounding. But this does not change the individual memory, which is anyway based on personal perception of what a person saw or felt in a certain moment of life and personal/individual memory is not mixed with the memory of others.<sup>13</sup>

For this paper I will use my collection of interviews, which were conducted with Jews and Romani who survived in the former Transnistria territories, as well as interviews from a documentary about deportation of Romani to Transnistria. In addition to interviews, as my main sources, I will also use unpublished archival materials, published documents, monographs and articles for argumentation or comparison of historical material with interviewees' narrations of their wartime memories. I will try to show in which way Jews and Romani comprehend the fact of their deportations to Transnistria, how they answer the question why it all happened. And then, I will attempt to interpret their way of thinking. Considering that in 1941, when extermination and deportation started, the most of my respondents were 5, 6, and 7 years old, I will analyze their narratives as a collective memory, rather than an individual or a mixed individual-collective one. Undoubtedly, people can remember

some crucial events for their life experience at that age. However, to give estimations on the social context or comprehend the overall events is impossible at such ages. Along with these interviews, I will use interviews with younger generations (in general, with those who were born during the War, in 1941-43) as examples of collective memory. These will add to interviews conducted with people (considered as representatives of the expression of individual memory) who in 1941 were 7-15 years old.

Certainly, in order to examine the personal judgment on the issue, we need to address two questions: Why some people were deported and why others were not deported?

I have to indicate, firstly, that such way of thinking is characteristic for Romani, rather than for Jews. As a rule of thumb, Romani do not know why they were deported. (I consider it "as a rule of thumb" because I cannot make a decisive argument about all Romani people; my observation is limited to those Romani whom I interviewed about deportations.) The first simple explanation to this would be that they do not have formal education and even if they do have education they do not read about the Second World War, in general, and the deportations to Transnistria, in particular. This is reason why the question "why" appears, in a literal sense, in the narrations of the Romani.

In the Jewish narrations, such question does not come up literally. As a rule of thumb, Jews are well educated, and all of them are knowledgeable on anti-Semitism and the politics of Hitler and Antonescu during the Second World War. This is why Jews have other way of comprehending the events, and therefore, instead of asking the straightforward question "why?" they ask a philosophical question: "how?". More precisely, they ask "How (why) is it possible?", "How could it happen?". At this point, when I remark their philosophical approach to the problem, I think we have to consider some specific aspects. Firstly, the stereotypical perception of Germans. After the examination of the narrations, I can summarize this stereotypical perception as follows: "How such an educated, clever and great nation as the Germans could produce such primitive, savage, and inhuman behavior?" Pre-Second World War individual communications and experiences also caused Jewish disbelief in Nazi-German cruelty. The second aspect of the Jewish reflection on "How is it possible?" has to do with an appeal to God. To put it in other words, Jews tend to reflect through the question: "How could God let such horrible things happen?".

The first aspect, the stereotypes towards Germans, appears in every second narration. For example, Anatolii Shpits, who was born in Odessa

in 1938, remembers from his mother's words that his grandfather's brother said:

I know Germans, they are decent people,.. we don't need to be afraid of them."<sup>14</sup>

Or, Sergei Sushon, who was born also in Odessa in 1928, says:

My grandma was in Germany, in Berlin, before the War and she didn't believe that Germans could do something like this [...] I was an educated kid and I understood that Germany was more progressed, in terms of their development, than the Soviet Union.<sup>15</sup>

Before the Second World War, or, more precisely, during the First World War, the Jewish population in Ukraine, for example, also met Germans. Moreover, many Jews who served in the Tzar's army were captured by Germans. Jews had first hand observation of the German treatment and attitude to them; and on the eve, and even in the beginning of the Second World War, the older generation of Jews told to the young about their earlier experience with Germans. Such experience can be noticed in the interview with Semion Dodik. He was born in 1926, in the village of Kalius, on the Bessarabian border, on the Dniester River (Khmelnitskyi Region). Dodik remembers what his father was telling about Germans:

My father was in German captivity during the First World War. Then, they treated Jews better than the Russians did and we were not afraid of Germans.<sup>16</sup>

The second aspect, the issue of God, could be observed only in the memories of religious Jews. For instance, Moshe Frimer was born to a pious family, in 1929 in the town of Khotyn. His father was religious man, he went to the synagogue, and celebrated all Jewish holidays. Moshe Frimer tells that:

When the War begun, many people started to evacuate. My father was a religious man. He said that we don't have any motive to be afraid of; it is impossible that Germans would kill Jews for no reason.<sup>17</sup>

Moshe then elaborates that his father meant two things by his words. First: we don't have to be afraid because our God will not allow something horrible to happen, and that God's will, in anyway, protects us if something would happen near us. Second: the Germans will not kill Jews without a reason, because they are religious people and Christian religion forbids killing.

Without going into details, I will confine myself mentioning that numerous articles and books were authored on this topic by philosophers, theologians, writers and public activists. Such works provide multifaceted religious explanations and interpretations of what has happened.<sup>18</sup> The reason why I will not examine and discuss such religious explanations and interpretations in this article is because Jewish understanding of the question "why" is not relevant to my approach. That is firstly because the question "why" is connected with the comprehension of Nazi politics in a general sense, rather than the deportation issue as a separate phenomenon. Secondly, the question "why" refers to another level of thinking which touches upon not psychological or everyday life reflections but, as I mentioned earlier, to a philosophical, religious and moral comprehension.

Antonescu spoke, in 8 July 1941, at a cabinet session of the Romanian government, about the forced deportation of Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina:

At the risk of being misunderstood by those who hold traditional views and who possibly are among us, I argue for the forced migration of entire Jewish elements of Bessarabia and Bukovina. They must be thrown out of our country's borders. Also I argue for the forced migration of the Ukrainian elements which are not in this process at the moment.

I do not care whether we are going into history as barbarians. The Roman Empire made a series of barbaric acts against their contemporaries, but still it was the most magnificent political system.

There was no more favorable moment in our history. If necessary, shoot them with machineguns!<sup>19</sup>

However, not all Jews and Romani were deported from Bukovina and Bessarabia to Transnistria. Some Jews were annihilated in the ghettos. Some of them were even killed before the ghettos were established.

The order to exterminate part of the Jews of Bessarabia and Bukovina and deport the rest was given by Ion Antonescu of his own agreement, under no German pressure. For carrying out this task he chose the gendarmerie

and the army, particularly the pretorate, the military body in charge with the temporary administration of a territory. Iosif Iacobici, the chief of the General Staff, ordered the commander of the General Staff's Second Section, Lt. Col. Alexandru Ionescu, to implement a plan "for the removal of the Judaic element from Bessarabian territory (...) by organizing teams to act in advance of the Romanian troops". The implementation began on July 9. [...] The first killings took place at Siret (southern Bukovina), five kilometers from the new border with the Soviets. The Jews of the town were deported on foot to Dornești, twelve kilometers away. Dozens of Jews who were not able to walk – the elderly and some crippled – remained behind with a few women to care them. These Jews were driven to a valley not far from town, where the women were raped by several soldiers of the 7th Division. The elderly were brought to the Division headquarters and accused of "espionage and attacking the Romanian army". That same day, all of them were shot at the bridge over the Prut, in the presence of the inhabitants of Siret, who had been brought to the execution site.<sup>20</sup>

In Moldavia, as well as in Bukovina, Germans and Romanians were exterminating Jewish population together, in the same settlements, before the 31 of August 1941, when the agreement about the establishment of Transnistria and the demarcation of the area of influence was signed in Tighina (Bendery) [...] One of the first mass executions was organized by AK-10a and the Romanian gendarmes in the middle of July 1941 in Bălți (about 450 people were murdered) and in Dubăsari.<sup>21</sup>

Approximately at the same time in Edineț, the mass killing of Jews was conducted by the Romanian troops. 613 people were shot dead. In the same document, written on the 30 of July 1944, one can also find information about the organization of the camp in Edineț, where captive Jews died from starvation every day.<sup>22</sup> Mikhail Roif's (born in 1929 in Edineț) recollections prove the foregoing information:

The war began. A few days later they rounded up about 470 people or so: doctors, teachers, rich Jews. It took a few days to gather them all. They were taken to the Jewish cemetery. There they were forced to dig a pit. If anyone talked to anyone else, they were killed immediately. Then the rest were also shot. It was horrible in Edineț. A Jew had no right to do anything: draw water from the well, or buy a loaf of bread. The humiliation was terrible.<sup>23</sup>

The same information is verified in the words of Tsilia Koifman (née Furman, born in 1928, in Briceni).

In Briceni, the robbery has been started already. People looted empty Jewish houses. The Jews were shot near Edineț.<sup>24</sup>

In another recollection, Moshe Frimer from Khotyn (born in 1929) also tells that the killing of Jews started before the deportations:

In the first days of the occupation, the Germans came in with the Romanians... Germans and Romanians took Jews out of their houses to kill them [...] On the first day, they killed 100-160 people.<sup>25</sup>

In late July and early August,<sup>26</sup> on the heels of the Wehrmacht, German extermination units were advancing rapidly in Ukraine, rounding up and gunning down tens of thousands of Ukrainian Jews. Under these circumstances, lacking coordination with the German army and based only on the talks between Hitler and Antonescu in Munich on June 12, the Romanian army began to deport tens of thousands of Jews who had been arrested in boroughs and on the roads to the other side of the Dniester, in that area that would soon become Transnistria. This action commenced the moment the troops reached the Dniester. Toward the end of July, the Romanian army concentrated about 25,000 Jews near the village of Coslav, on the Dniester. Some had been marched from Northern Bukovina and others were caught in northern Bessarabia, particularly in and around Briceni.<sup>27</sup>

As regards the Romani, as I mentioned earlier, not all Romani were deported. It is noticeable in the interviewees' memories that some Romani stayed during the War in their localities. They noticed the fact that a war has started only when they could not nomadize freely anymore.<sup>28</sup> Concerning the Romani, as Viorel Achim notes, "the most important component of Antonescu's policy was their deportation to Transnistria in the summer and early autumn of 1942. Approximately 25,000 Gypsies were taken to Transnistria, including all nomadic Gypsies and part of the sedentary Gypsies."<sup>29</sup> According to Radu Ioanid, "Gypsy invalids of the First World War were deported".<sup>30</sup> The "legal" basis for the deportations of Romani, as Ioanid emphasizes, "was a May 1942 measure, Order No. 70S/1042 of the President of the Council of Ministers. This was supplemented a few days later by another measure, Order No. 33911, attributed to C.Z. Vasiliu of the Ministry of the Interior and distributed to the police prefectures: the police were to conduct a census of both nomadic and sedentary Gypsies and then deport the former and certain categories pertaining to the latter

group. [...] Questioned after the War, Marshal Ion Antonescu confessed that the original decision to deport the Gypsies had been his ... 'After much investigation we concluded that these were armed Gypsies, many with military weapons, organizing these attacks. All the Gypsies were moved out. Since Mr. Alexianu needed manpower in Transnistria, I said 'Let's move them to Transnistria' ..."<sup>31</sup>

There is a large debate among scholars concerning the Nazi German policies towards Jews, as well as the Nazi German and the Romanian policies during Antonescu's regime towards the Romani.

The major discussion about the Jews includes different approaches on the "final solution of the Jewish question", and the further Nazi policies connected with the "final solution". Scholars are divided into two groups: intentionalists and functionalists. Intentionalists defend that Hitler and the supreme command of Nazi Germany had an intention to exterminate all Jews from the very beginning, and A. Hitler plays the main role in it. Intentionalists try to prove their point by referring to Hitler's decrees and orders which, sent to local administrations, were put into practice by these administrations. On the other hand, functionalists argue that the politics of Nazi Germany was not succeeding and consistent. Many decisions were not made according to a plan, but rather spontaneously. Several practices were contemplated and decided on the spot by local administrations in a fashion to respond to the circumstances in which they found themselves. In this latter case, the role of Hitler was not primary and, therefore, not central to the extermination of Jews.<sup>32</sup>

For the purposes of this article I can elaborate on this discussion in relation to Romanian policies during I. Antonescu's regime in Transnistria concerning the Romani. As it will be shown later in this article, recollections reflect, with regard to Romani, that Romanian local administrations made decisions on the spot. The main debate about the annihilation of Romani developed around a conceptual question: whether the extermination of Romani was implemented on the basis of racial ideology and with a concrete intention and a structured plan, with using all technical and administrative sources for this purpose, or the anti-Romani policies did not have a racial-ideological basis and did not have a structured plan, implying that the purpose was not total annihilation of the Romani.<sup>33</sup> The latter view considers that Romani were persecuted as "a socially dangerous" element.<sup>34</sup> Thus, the Nazi policies concerning the Jews were clear: Jews should have been exterminated in anyway. When it comes to Romani, the case was different and one can observe this in the narrations to follow.

For example, the story of Paraskovia (Ana) Flora, a settled Roma, whose family lived in a village near the border between contemporary Moldova and Ukraine, says:

Nobody deported our gypsies, we were few in numbers and we worked, we didn't live as tramps. Maybe this was the reason.<sup>35</sup>

She further recalls:

When the Germans came, they wanted to take us and my father. But to where they would take us? But our chief [it means more than a *predsedatel*<sup>36</sup>] said: "I will not give you my Gypsies, because they are working, he works, he doesn't loaf about, he works and feeds his own family."<sup>37</sup>

And nobody took them away. In this narration I would like to point out that the *predsedatel* [the head] saved this Romani family from deportation through standing by their side. With this example I could argue that cases of saving Romani from deportation took place on these territories. In addition, I can also conclude, out of this narration, that the Romani understood their place in society and the social values in a larger community where they found themselves in. Therefore, they realized that people should work and people should have a place of permanent residence, etc. By adopting such notions, they could justify their preference to be settled and reject a nomadic style of living. In this way most of the Romani continued to live in Soviet Union until 1956.<sup>38</sup>

Zhuzhuna Duduchava, a younger and educated Roma woman from the Romani branch of Crymy,<sup>39</sup> corroborates in her narration Flora's theory about deportation, *i.e.*, that working Romani were left in the localities:

My grandma told ... Germans lived in our house. Our Gypsies are absolutely different Gypsies and their treatment with us was absolutely different than with other Gypsies. This is an urban group of Gypsies, such Gypsies are [located] only in Odessa and Mykolaiv<sup>40</sup>. During the Soviet times, men got up early in the morning and went to work. Women were housewives in general ... That is why the attitude to them was absolutely different.<sup>41</sup>

Upon my question about the deportation Zakharrii Chebotar said:



Nobody drove us anywhere. Romanians took Gypsies and sent [them] to Bug. [They have taken] not our [Gypsies], but other [Gypsies].<sup>42</sup>

With this narration and interesting fact emerges: that even though he was a nomadic Romani he was not deported.

I nomadized in Bulgaria, Moldova with a [Gypsy] camp. Before the War [the Gypsy camp comprised] 20-40 families (about 100 people or more).<sup>43</sup>

Further, Chebotar narrated that he stayed in Izmail before the War. In Izmail, people from his camp found jobs and in the due course of the War they remained in Izmail.<sup>44</sup>

Why he was not deported? I can only provide two reasons. The first is that he and his family were not deported possibly because during the War they stayed in Izmail and did not nomadize. The second one, more convincing, has to do rather with the fact that many aspects of life depended on local administration, be it German or Romanian. In some cases only local administration decided if these people will continue to live or will be exterminated. And in this latter assumption I agree with Wendy Lower who defended this theory in her book *Nazi-Empire building and the Holocaust in Ukraine*. On the example of German administration, in the Zhytomyr General Commissariat, she shows how the behavior of local administration corresponds to local conditions.<sup>45</sup> In this case, the functionalists' theory seems convincing both in the case of Jews and that of Romani, at least in the territory of Transnistria. In defense of this theory, concerning the deportation of Romani, as well as Jews, in Transnistria, I can adduce proofs from interviews. In interviews with Romani which I collected in Izmail region, people talk about the War time as if it was a period of an absolutely normal life.

The same Chebotar Zakharii, from Izmail, mentioned already, tells:

That Romanians came everything was all right [...] [There happened] nothing to be remembered during the War, everything was as usual, we danced, sang; they [Romanians] only took away horses [...] When everybody was gone and the Soviet Union was coming in, it became worse than during the War, because it was forbidden to nomadize, they forced us to work.<sup>46</sup>

Vladimir Vakulenko was born in Odessa in 1935. In early July of the year 1941, he arrived to a village in Mykolaiv Region.

Romanians arrived when we were in our village in Mykolaiv Region. Everything was as usual, we joked with them, our girls made friends with them. They were Bessarabians in general, that is why everything was all right.<sup>47</sup>

Piotr Damaskin was born in Izmail in 1938. He was in Izmail during the War:

The local Romanians which were here, they were ok, but Romanians from the front, they beat people, [they] tortured [people] for nothing.<sup>48</sup>

In both cases, the interviewees emphasized that the local administration's attitude, in different localities in Transnistria, manifested in diverse ways.

In many cases, the attitude of the Romanians in localities depended on the characters of the individuals. This argument could be noticed in the narrations of Jews. For instance, Zhanna Khvoshchan was born in 1934 in Mykolaiv and survived in the village of Pody (Ochakiv area, Mykolaiv Region). Her narration points to a rather humane treatment from some Romanians, in contrast to the treatment applied by the people from the front.

Everyone had Romanians living in their homes. Two Romanians stayed in our house. They used to sing Romanian songs and play accordion. They were good people, [they were] about 40 years old, and they had children, too. When they got treats from back home, they used to share them with us. We were happy that they turned out to be good people. They fed us occasionally. Sometimes they'd both bring in pots with food, one would give us his bean stew, and they'd eat the other portion together, because they had children our age back home. And when those Romanians left, new ones came to the village, and those were real bandits, [they were] raping and taking everything.<sup>49</sup>

In this article I will not discuss the diverse nature of German and Romanian treatment of Romani and Jews. I have confined myself to give an example which corroborates with the theory about the attitude of local administrations and thereby, I have attempted to find an explanation for

why in one locality Romani were deported and cruelly tortured, and in other localities they could live as usually and continue to work like in peacetime.

Such a treatment from the Romanian administration was not only directed towards Romani, but also to Jews. I will take the well-known ghetto in Zhmerynka as an example. In this ghetto, people survived for three years under the Romanian occupation. Some even deliberately escaped there from Nazis. This was the case with Riva Molochkovetskaia. Her mother, with Riva and her younger sisters, ran to Zhmerynka from the German Nazi occupied Vinnytsia and survived there. In her recollections Riva mentioned that:

There [in Zhmerynka] were also Romanian Jews who escaped from Germans.<sup>50</sup>

Her memories about the local Romanian administration, regarding the possibility of survival, are also confirmed by two other interviews about the Zhmerynka ghetto.<sup>51</sup> Of course, we should not forget that the Zhmerynka case was unique, but anyway this example helps us to understand all the diversities in the relationship between Romani, Jews and the local Romanian or German administration in Transnistria.

Now I am returning to the memories of Chebotar Zakharii from Izmail. Upon my question about the deportation he said:

Nobody drove us anywhere. Romanians took Gypsies and sent [them] to Bug. [They have taken] not our [Gypsies] but other [Gypsies]."

And further he adds with indifference:

But, where is Bug? I don't know.<sup>52</sup>

As an interesting phenomenon the Romani usually talk only referring to the limits of their family or camp. However, they do not even talk about others, *i.e.*, other Romani branches, as if they did not exist. This phenomenon could be explained with the nature of their collective ethnic identity, which is yet formed until today. They are thinking of the social space in a tribal sense because they lived as nomads. This is most likely

why other Romani beyond their space do not appear in their radar when they relate the Second World War memories.

Clues towards another theory about why the Romani were deported is provided by Iona Matrache. She was born in 1936 in Manici village, Nisporeni district. She said:

We were working in the villages where we usually arrived. People worked as blacksmiths, shoemakers, and other jobs that people were skilled at. [...] We were deported because we were rich.<sup>53</sup>

Lina Pleshko from Soroca makes a similar emphasis. She was born in 1942 and, no doubt, she could not relate the deportation out of personal memories. However, her mother and mother-in-law told her about the times of deportation. With that she underlines two aspects of why they were deported:

They gathered rich Gypsies, the Căldărari<sup>54</sup> especially. They were many and Germans started to gather and to punish them.<sup>55</sup>

Thus, if we will look at the research conducted so far regarding the attitude of the Transnistrian administration and particularly about Ion Antonescu's attitude to Jewish and Romani property, we can see that all property was expropriated in favor of the state. Yitzhak Arad paid attention in his research to the question of Jewish property. With regard to Jewish possessions, referring to the Nuremberg Document PS-212, Arad provides a memorandum from the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, entitled "Instructions for Dealing with the Jewish Problem". In this memorandum we notice the Nazi attitude to and demand on the Jewish properties:

It is necessary to seize and confiscate all Jewish possessions, except for what is essential for their existence. As rapidly as possible and to the extent that the economic situation permits, Jews must be dispossessed of their property and belongings by means of orders and additional measures by the senior officials of the Reich Commissariats. This is necessary in order to put an immediate halt to the transfer of property [into the hands of others].<sup>56</sup>

In stenogramma of I. Antonescu's speeches about the government policy in the temporarily occupied Soviet territories (Extract from a

stenogramma of the session of the Council of Ministers of Romania together with Governors of occupied Soviet territories, November 13, 1941) we can notice a similar attitude to the property:

...Transnistria must be managed with its own means, it should be organized in a fashion to exist with its own sources, because in Romanian State do not have necessary reserves to provide [Transnistria] with agricultural, industrial or commercial sources.

Secondly, this district must provide us with foodstuff and satisfy needs of troops which are situated there.

Thirdly, Transnistria must cover our military expenses in the widest sense.<sup>57</sup>

As noticed in the Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, "the deportation of Jews from villages in many regions of Romania is of particular importance, as the isolation of Jews from the rural population always figured high in the anti-Semitic narrative... In addition, the deportation aimed to seize Jewish property".<sup>58</sup>

With reference to archival sources, Viorel Achim describes in his monograph the same situation:

...Gypsies were taken from their homes without being allowed to take with them the personal and household belongings necessary for life in the places to which they were being deported. They did not have sufficient time to liquidate their assets. There were a considerable number of cases in which heads of sections of gendarmes and police took advantage of the opportunity to buy various objects from the Gypsies at derisory prices. The houses and other goods of the evacuated Gypsies were taken over by the National Centre for Romanianisation.<sup>59</sup>

Obviously, Germans or Romanians did not disdain of Jewish and Romani property and we can observe this in the narrations. In principle, the question of property and its analysis demand a separate economic and historical research.

A simplest attempt to comprehend the deportation on just emotional level emerges in the recollection of the nomadic illiterate Roma Zinaida (her Roma name is Kursanka) Prodan. She was born in Dubăsari, in 1935, and deported to Transnistria from Tiraspol region:

He [German] didn't like Jews and Gypsies, simply he didn't like these nations, but for what [reason]? I don't know.<sup>60</sup>

A similar trial to understand the Nazi behavior surfaces in another interview with a semi-nomadic, semi-settled Ukrainian Roma (this is how she called herself). Tamara Tsinia (born in 1930) from Odessa region:

Germans didn't like Gypsies, kept them in the camp. They hated Jews and Gypsies.<sup>61</sup>

Absolutely the same words are repeated by Zakharii Chebotar (born in 1936):

Germans hated Gypsies. Jews and Gypsies.<sup>62</sup>

While telling their stories, Romani always associate and juxtapose themselves with Jews. They underline their common fates. In opposition the Jews who mention Romani in their narrations are very rare. They speak about Romani most often upon a particular question on Romani. Here I can bring forward two reasons as to why Romani and Jewish attitudes in narrations differ: Undoubtedly, Jews know about the deportations of Romani. When they are asked about the deportations of the Romani, they display their knowledge on this issue. But this knowledge is very fragmentary and limited to the information that Romani were also deported and annihilated. Jews really do not have much knowledge of the Romani fate in the War, this is particularly the case if they were not together in the camps or during deportations. But in my view there is another reason for their silence. With their silence on the fate of Romani, Jews underline the distinctive feature of the Holocaust. This has to do with personifying and appropriating individual recollections of their extermination and this topic in general. Romani, on the other hand, understand that different people had different fates and ways of survival during the War. They do not resent a more happy fate in comparison to their own. Moreover, they recognize the Jewish experience vis-à-vis their own.

A Roma from Soroca, Lina Pleshko (born in 1942), understands the reasons of deportation in a different way and she also mentions Jews in her recollection:

The Germans, and more Romanians than Germans, considered that Gypsies and Jews were the most skilful... Germans thought "why should Gypsies and Jews be the cleverest?". And they tortured Jews and they also tortured

Gypsies, not us [meaning Gypsies], but those who were not local ones. They gathered them in villages.<sup>63</sup>

Analyzing this narrative we can see at least four points of interest. Lina was thinking about the characters of Jews and Romani and about their personal features.

It is understandable why Romani are thinking about themselves: they underline that they belong to one people even if they have different branches. Why are they thinking about Jews? From my point of view, there are two reasons. Firstly, Romani lived side-by-side with Jews in many localities (villages and towns) in Ukraine, Moldova and Romania. And Romani observed the behavior of their Jewish fellow townsmen. Secondly, Romani and Jews were stricken by the same curse of deportation and annihilation. Sometimes they lived together in concentration/labor camps.

Telling her own perception of what happened, Lina underlined that Jews and Romani were tortured because of their skills. This boils down to the fact that she is convinced that Germans and Romanians were, sharing Lina's perception of the case, considering themselves as not so clever. This being the case, the motivation of their actions is understandable: if people are better and cleverer it would be better to dispose of such people. This point might be absolutely understandable from a psychological point of view: if person A, who is stronger, sees person B cleverer than himself, because person A has power over person B, then person A will try to avoid person B or to compensate his own lack of abilities, which in turn provokes feelings of envy or fear. In the case of Lina's story this theory is quite possible. As a proof to this, Lina cites an example from her father:

...Romanians came and took immediately my father [to fight] ... My father was very clever. He was not educated, but very clever, very skilful.<sup>64</sup>

She also compares Jews and Romani and put them on an equal footing in spite of the fact that Jews were educated, while the majority of Romani were not. However, she equates the intellectual abilities of Jews with the Romani's sharpness and resourcefulness.

Lina also mentioned that "...they [Germans and Romanians] tortured Jews and they also tortured Gypsies, not us, but those who were not local ones". It means that the attitude to the locals, at least in Soroca, was different. Possibly those who tortured unknown Jews and Romani were afraid of responsibility for their own actions. Because if a person

is unknown to someone, it is much easier to do cruel acts against that person, in comparison to what one could do to a person which he/she personally knows. The same circumstances were very important when local people (Moldavians, Ukrainians, Romanians, Russians, and others) decided to help and to save Romani and especially Jews.<sup>65</sup>

Last important issue, which I will consider in relation to Jewish and Romani understanding of why they were deported, is about the perception of Romanians by the Jews and the Romani. In all recollections which I analyzed above, people at times refer to Romanians, sometimes to Germans, sometimes both to Germans and Romanians. Why do we have such variations in appellations of the “other”? Is it possible that local people do not know really who ruled at that time? Here I would like to propose my theory to the question. The territory, which later was called “Transnistria”, was occupied by the Nazis, and afterwards they handed this territory to the Romanian administration that was ruled by Ion Antonescu. In the narratives we can see different attitudes towards Romanians and Germans. I will provide some examples of Romani narrations about Romanians. In many cases, they consider Romanians and their actions as obedient to Germans. Therefore, sometimes people just say “Germans” and later, from their further narration, one can understand that they really meant both Germans and Romanians or sometimes even only Romanians. Such ambiguity is rather inherent in Romani, while it is very rare with Jews. I will not repeat narrations with such an indefinite meaning of “Romanian”, but I would like to underline that some of the interviewees can explain his/her own perception of Germans and Romanians in the occupied Transnistria territories. In this matter I would like to propose the following excerpts for consideration. For instance, Tamara Tsinia tells how Germans came to her village, Ivanovka, and upon my question “Germans or Romanians?”, she says:

When Germans went, Romanians came. Romanians were under German power.<sup>66</sup>

It means that she understands who is who and even remember the chronology: in the beginning were Germans, and then – Romanians. Then the question arises: why Romani, mostly uneducated, remember very well about who and in which order they arrived? From my point of views it is connected to the actions of Romanians and Germans, with their treatment of Romani and Jews. Lina Pleshko provides data towards the argument:



Germans and Romanians had the same blood. [...] Romanians tormented us. What did Germans do? [They did] the same as the Romanians.<sup>67</sup>

Her words are confirmed by Serafina Preida (born in 1943) from the same town of Soroca:

Romanians were like Germans, they did the same.<sup>68</sup>

The same appraisal is observed in the recollections of some of Jews. For example, Semion Dodik, a Jew who, to survive, escaped from the territory occupied by the Germans to the territories under Romanian control, provided such a view on this issue:

Me and my friend decided to go to the Romanians, we knew they wouldn't kill us [...] The local population was afraid of the Romanians as much as of the Germans, but the Romanians were closer to us.<sup>69</sup>

Romani and Jews knew very well that Romanians established their own regime in this region. We can observe this in Vladimir Vakulenko's the narration. Born in Odessa, in 1935, he speaks about his personal attitude to the Romanians:

Romanians arrived and promised Transnistria, I mean Zadnestrovia, and Odessa became the capital of Transnistria [...] Romanians entered [the city] without any shot. When they arrived, for almost two days Odessa was free [of soldiers]. When the Romanians arrived [there] was silence, [it was] quiet and calm. Arrived, arrived, I said "O, mamalyzhniki [those who eats mămăligă – A.A.] arrived".<sup>70</sup>

While Romani confused, sometimes the Germans with the Romanians, Jews always knew exactly that there were Romanians, but they considered them as one entity with the Germans. Tsilia Koifman (born in 1928) from the town of Briceni tells:

We lived on the central street and all the people came out and said: "Romanians, Romanians!" But my sister said that Romanians are with the Germans.<sup>71</sup>

We can observe the same in the recollections of Moshe Frimer:

"In the first days of occupation, the Germans came in with the Romanians."<sup>72</sup>

I suppose that such a perception of Romanians was also connected with the Soviet propaganda after the War, which used only two terms to define the occupants of the Soviet territories. There were Nazi Germans or German occupants. This definition also extended on other nations who were Hitler's satellites. Thus, in archives we can find reports about atrocities and destruction in occupied territories. Very rarely one can see reports which mention only the Romanian authority. For example, the

Chronological References about the temporary occupation by German-fascist invaders of settlements in Bar district and their liberation by the Red Army:

Reference June 13, 1949 №64

Handed out from Slobodo-Mateikivska council and accounting that the village Slobodo-Mateikivska, in Bar district, was occupied by the German troops, on July 18, 1941, and liberated by the troops of the Red Army on March 23, 1944.

During the occupation, five people were taken by force to Germany, one person was shot dead, two houses destroyed. During the occupation by the Romanian authority, Jewish people were driven out from Bessarabia, and 13 of them were murdered."<sup>73</sup>

In this report we can see that the compilers clearly distinguish between Germans and Romanians. In other reports such distinction is absent. In almost all reports their authors use the term "German-Romanian occupants". As an example I will give two reports from Transnistria territory.

Chronological references about the temporary occupation of settlements in Tulchyn district:

Reference April 13, 1946 №0270

To Tulchyn district executive committee

April 5, 1946, Kalyninska village council of Tulchyn district sending this report, via this paper, about the activities of the German-Romanian occupants, which occupied the village of Kalynino on July 24, 1941, at 4 o'clock in the morning. There started outrages with the civilian population, including 19 men. There were no killings in that part [of the village – A.A.],

there was robbery in 23 farms. 23 heads of horned cattle, 37 pigs, chickens, eggs and much of the house property, which is countless [were stolen].<sup>74</sup>

Chronological references about the temporary occupation by German-fascist invaders of settlements in Sharhorod district and their by the Red Army:

Descriptive reference

Murafa village council, Sharhorod district, Vinnytsia Region: Murafa village, Sharhorod district, was captured by German occupiers at 12 o'clock on July 22, 1941. Murafa village was liberated by units of the Red Army at 5 o'clock on March 19, 1944 [...].

13 persons were deported to the concentration camp. Five persons [out of 13] perished [as a result of] atrocities of the German-Romanian occupants. [As a result of] beating and atrocities two persons died.<sup>75</sup>

So, in my opinion Jews and Romani in most of the cases did not distinguish Germans to Romanians not because they really did not see a difference between them or did not know about the existence of two regimes, but because of the post-war Soviet propaganda. And not only Soviets talked only about Germans as the main evil. People use to apply the same terminology which was applied by the authority and the mass media.

## Conclusions

In this paper I examined the way in which Jews and Romani are thinking about why they were deported. Based on oral history and other historical sources we can see that the interpretation of certain issues is sometimes very different, in spite of similar examples in the memories of Jews and Romani.

After the examination of Romani and Jewish memory about their deportation to Transnistria during I. Antonescu's regime, we can see four major patterns of how Romani and Jews consider their deportation in different ways:

- explanation on the emotional level, which I can characterize with the words: "they didn't like us, they hate us, but we don't know why";

– the conviction that the hate from the German and Romanian sides comes through the extrapolation of good features of character, skills and abilities on oppressed people (in this case Romani and Jews were tortured by Germans and Romanians because they were cleverer and more skilful). But I find this conception only in the interpretation of Romani;

– the explanation on moral and everyday life level, which I can describe with the words of Romani: “we worked, we didn’t live as tramps”. It means that they gained their means of subsistence without help from outside;

– the explanation through economic situation, in the case of deportation of Romani and Jews as a means of confiscation of their property.

I also tried to show, based on examples of memories, that in reality the policy of the Romanian administration was not so definite and depended on local administration and personalities.

Another interesting aspect is the identification of Romanians as Germans in individual and collective memory. Of course, for the historical interpretation, oral history in general, and memory studies in particular, can serve only as additional source, which validate or unvalidate archival data. Nevertheless, memory studies are the main source for understanding the psychological process and the everyday life thinking. By examining individual memory, we can also discover many small details of the historical events and understand the influence of certain factors on people’s life. When we compare individual and collective memory we can further see how personal perception spread on collective consciousness and became its part. Thus, through examples I observed how the identification, on personal level, of Romanians as Germans entered into the mass consciousness of Romani and Jews who survived during the Second World War in Transnistria. At the same time, by working in memory studies I could scrutinize the frame of deportation topic of research and a number of different issues such as: organization and ways of deportation; conditions of life during deportation and suffering, their psychological influence on the recollections and external impact on the survivor’s memory.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Transliteration and spelling of the names in Ukrainian follow the 'National 2010' system; the transliteration and spelling of the names in Russian are done according to the 'Passport (2013), ICAO' system. Romanian names are spelled in the original language.
- <sup>2</sup> "Romy u Transnistrii (1941-1944)". *Arkhivni dokumenty*. Vypusk 1 (Roma in Transnistria, 1941-1944. Archival documents, Issue 1), Odessa: Fenix, 2011.
- <sup>3</sup> At that time the battles were in Odessa.
- <sup>4</sup> "Transnistria" also included the Odessa Region (within the borders of 1941), the Southern part of Vinnytsia Region, and the Western part of Mykolaiv Region. All this territory was divided in 13 large and 65 small districts.
- <sup>5</sup> Gheorghe Alexianu was professor of law and, during the king's dictatorship (1938-1940), a Royal Resident.
- <sup>6</sup> In October 1942, Odessa city became the residence of the civil authority of the governorate "Transnistria": *Odessa v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov. V 3-kh tomakh* (Odessa in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. Collection of Documents and Materials), Vol. I-III, Odessa: Odesskoie oblastnoie izdatelstvo.), 1947-1951. Vol. II, 1949, p. 5.
- <sup>7</sup> Ancel J., *Transnistria, 1941-1942: the Romanian Mass Murder Campaigns*. Vol. I-III, Tel-Aviv: The Goldstein-Goren Diaspora Research Center: Tel-Aviv University, 2003.
- <sup>8</sup> Achim V. *Documente privind deportarea ȋiganilor în Transnistria*, Vol. I-II, Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2004.
- <sup>9</sup> Arad Y. (ed.) *Unichtozhenie evreev SSSR v gody nemetskoï okkupatsii. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Extermination of Jews of the USSR during German Occupation. Documents and Materials), Jerusalem:Yad Vashem, 1992.
- <sup>10</sup> *Romy u Transnistrii (1941-1944). Arkhivni dokumenty. Vypusk 1* (Roma in Transnistria, 1941-1944. Archival documents, Issue 1), Odessa: Fenix, 2011.
- <sup>11</sup> For instance, *Prestupnye tseli, prestupnye sredstva. Dokumenty ob okkupatsionnoi politike natsistskoï Germanii na territorii SSSR. 1941-1944* (Criminal Purposes, Criminal Sources. Documents about Occupational Policy of Nazi Germany in the territory of the USSR, 1941-1944), Moscow: Ekonomika, 1985; *Nurnbergskii protsess, Sbornik materialov. V 8-i tomakh*. (Nuremberg Trials. Materials), Vol. I-VIII, Moscow: Yuridicheckaia literatura, 1987-1999, and other.
- <sup>12</sup> Lenchovska A., Videotestimonies at the USC Shoah Foundation Institute as a source to study and teach the history of the Ukrainian Roma in 1941-44 (in Ukrainian), in: *Holocaust i Suchasnist. Studii v Ukraine i Sviti*, №2 (6), 2009, pp. 114-123.

- 13 Halbwachs M., *La mémoire collective*, Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1967, in: Collection: Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine édition électronique, [http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Halbwachs\\_maurice/memoire\\_collective/memoire\\_collective.pdf](http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Halbwachs_maurice/memoire_collective/memoire_collective.pdf), pp. 25-26; Halbwachs M., *Collective and historical memory*// <http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2005/2/ha2.html>
- 14 Interview with Anatolii Shpits (born in 1938), Chişinău, 18.06.2013 in A.Abakunova archive.
- 15 Interview with Sergei Sushon (born in 1928), Hadera, 07.08.2010) in A.Abakunova archive.
- 16 Interview with Semion Dodik (born in 1926), Tel-Aviv, 08.08.2010 in A.Abakunova archive.
- 17 Interview with Moshe Frimer (born in 1929), Chernivtsi, 23.07.2010 in A.Abakunova archive.
- 18 For instance, see theologists David Weiss Halivni and Peter Ochs; *Breaking the Tablets: Jewish Theology after the Shoah*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007; Eliezer Berkovits, *Faith After the Holocaust*, New York: Ktav, 1973; Ignaz Maybaum, *The Face of God After Auschwitz*, Amsterdam: Polak & Van Gennep, 1965; philosopher and writer Elie Wiesel, *La Nuit*, Paris Les Éditions de Minuit, 1958/2007. Quite a number of such works bring up questions like: “how to live after what happened, after surviving in such inhuman conditions?” or “how is possible to live after Auschwitz?” Owing to a question “How God could let to happen it” philosophers and theologists address the concept of “theodicy”, i.e., justifying God. But this is another huge topic in religion studies.
- 19 Document #5, *Procesul mării trădări raţionale (Stenograma desbaterilor dela tribunalul poporului asupra lui Antonescu)*. Bucharest, 1946 in: *Moldavskaia SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza. Sbornic documentov i materialov. V 2-kh tomakh* (Moldavian SSR in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Collection of Documents), Vol. I–II, Kishinev: Shtiintsa, 1976, p. 35.
- 20 *Final Report / International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania*, Iaşi: Polirom, 2004, p.128-129.
- 21 Altman I., *Zherty nenavisti: Holocaust v SSSR 1941–1945 gg.* (Victims of Hate: the Holocaust in the USSR 1941–1945), Moscow: Collection “Sovershenno secretno”, 2002, p. 299.
- 22 *Moldavskaia SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza. Sbornic documentov i materialov. V 2-kh tomakh* (Moldavian SSR in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Collection of Documents), Vol. I–II, Kishinev: Shtiintsa, 1976, p. 44.
- 23 Interview with Mikhail Roif (born in 1929), Chernivtsi, 22.07.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.

- 24 Interview with Tsilia Koifman (born in 1928), Chernivtsi 21.07.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 25 Interview with Moshe Frimer (born in 1929), Chernivtsi 23.07.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 26 1941. – A.A.
- 27 *Final Report / International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania*, Iași: Polirom, 2004, p.134-135.
- 28 This can be observed in interviews with Romani of Izmail region: Interview with Zakharii Chebotar (born in 1936), Izmail, 04.06.2013, Paraskovia (Ana) Flora (born in 1934), Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi, 06.06.2013, in A. Abakunova archive.
- 29 Achim V., *The Roma in Romanian History*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004, p. 168.
- 30 Ioanid R., *The Holocaust in Romania. The destruction the Jews and Gypsies under Antonescu Regime, 1940-1944*, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000, p. 226.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 226-227.
- 32 See details of both approaches and the discussion in: Friedländer S., *From Anti-Semitism to Extermination: A Historiography Study of Nazi Policies Towards the Jews and an Essay of Interpretation* in [http://www.yadvashem.org/untoldstories/documents/studies/Saul\\_Friedlander.pdf](http://www.yadvashem.org/untoldstories/documents/studies/Saul_Friedlander.pdf); the same article, translated in Russian in: *Yad Vashem Studies*, Vol. 2, ed. by D. Romanovsky, D. Silberklang, Jerusalem: National Memorial of the Catastrophe and Heroism Yad Vashem, 2010, pp.31-76; Dan Michman, *Holocaust Historiography: A Jewish Perspective. Conceptualizations, Terminology, Approaches and Fundamental Issues*, London: Valentine Mitchell, 2003; *The Historiography of the Holocaust*, ed. by Dan Stone, Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- 33 Tyaglyy M., *Mezhdunarodnaia konferentsiia "Tsigane Ukrainy v period Vtoroi mirovoi voiny: sovremennoe sostoianie izuchennosti, prepodavaniia i uvekovecheniia pamiati"* (2 avgusta 2008, Kiev) (International conference "Gypsies of Ukraine during the Second World War: Contemporary State of Research, Teaching and Commemoration", August 2, 2008, Kyiv), in: *Holocaust i Suchasnist. Studii v Ukraine i Sviti*, № 2 (4), 2008, p. 143–148, electronic version: [http://www.holocaust.kiev.ua/news/jurnal\\_nodostup/Tyaglyy\\_Roma\\_.pdf](http://www.holocaust.kiev.ua/news/jurnal_nodostup/Tyaglyy_Roma_.pdf).
- 34 See different points of view in: Hancock I., *The Pariah Syndrome: An account of Gypsy slavery and persecution*, Michigan: Karoma Publishers, Inc., Ann Arbor, 1987; Achim V., *The Roma in Romanian History*, Budapest Central European University Press, 2004; Ioanid R., *The Holocaust in Romania. The destruction the Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime 1940-1944*, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000, Holler M., *Der nationalsozialistische Völkermord an den Roma in der Besetzten Sowjetunion (1941–1944)*, Heidelberg: Dokumentations-und Kulturzentrum Deutscher Sinti und

- Roma, 2009; Solonari V., "Etnicheskaia chistka ili borba s prestupnostiu? Deportaziia rumynskikh tzigan v Transnistriiu v 1942" (Ethnic Cleansing or Crime Prevention? Deportation of Romanian Roma to Transnistria in 1942), in: *Holocaust i Suchasnist. Studii v Ukraine i Sviti*, №1 (3), 2008, pp.65-87, electronic version: [http://www.holocaust.kiev.ua/news/jurnal\\_nodostup/Solonari.pdf](http://www.holocaust.kiev.ua/news/jurnal_nodostup/Solonari.pdf); Altman I, *Zhertvy nenavisti: Holocaust v SSSR 1941–1945* gg. (Victims of Hate: the Holocaust in the USSR 1941–1945), Moscow: Collection "Sovershenno secretno", 2002.
- 35 Interview with Paraskovia (Ana) Flora (born in 1934), Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy, 06.06.2013 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 36 A head of village.
- 37 *Ibid.*
- 38 In 1956, Nikita Khrushchev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the period of 1953-1964, issued the Decree "About the integration for work of the gypsies who were tramps". After the Decree about 90% of Romani in USSR became settled.
- 39 Crymy or Krymy, Kyrymitika Roma, Tatarica Roma, Crimea Tsyhany - ethnic group of Romani nation in Ukraine. Traditionally they dwell in Crimea and in the Southern Oblasts of Ukraine. This group formed in time the Crimean Khanate. Krymy migrated from the Balkans to Crimea and settled among Crimean Tatars. Their language and culture carry strong influence of Crimean Tatars and Russians. In 1944 Crimean Roma, as well as Crimean Tatars were deported to Central Asia. Most of Crymy were registered as Tatars in the Soviet passports. The majority of Crymy Roma are Sunni Muslims. Their traditional occupation is retail trade, musical performances, traditional crafts, blacksmithery, goldsmithery, fortune-telling, and begging.
- 40 She mentioned before that this branch of Romani also lives in the Crimea region.
- 41 Interviews with Zhuzhuna Duduchava (born in 1970), Odessa, 21.06.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 42 Interview with Zakharii Chebotar (born in 1936), Izmail, 04.06.2013 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 43 *Ibid.*
- 44 *Ibid.*
- 45 Lower, W. , *Nazi-Empire building and the Holocaust in Ukraine*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005.
- 46 Interview with Zakharii Chebotar (born in 1936), Izmail, 04.06.2013 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 47 Interview with Vladimir Vakulenko (born in 1935), Izmail, 04.06.2013 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 48 Interview with Piotr Damaskin (born in 1938), Izmail, 04.06.2013 in A. Abakunova archive.



- 49 Interview with Zhanna Khvoshchan (born in 1934), Mykolaiv, 16.06.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 50 Interview with Riva Molochkovetskaia (born in 1928), Vinnytsia, 24.06.2010 and 22.10.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 51 Interview with Milia Balk (born in 1924), Zhmerynka, 02.08.2012; Berta Bondarevskaia (born in 1938), Zhmerinka, from 02.08.2012 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 52 Interview with Zakharii Chebotar (born in 1936), Izmail, 04.06.2013 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 53 Interview with Iona Matrache (born in 1936) in Documentary "The persecution from Bessarabia", director Sergiu Pene, 2011.
- 54 The Căldărari - the Kalderash (also spelled Kalderaš) are a subgroup of the Romani people, from the Roma meta-group. In Ukraine and Russia they call themselves "Kotliary".
- 55 Interview with Lina Pleshko (born in 1942), Soroca, 16.06.2013 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 56 Arad Y., *Plunder of Jewish Property in the Nazi-Occupied Areas of the Soviet Union* in: Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. 29, Jerusalem, 2001, pp. 109-148, Translated from the Hebrew by W. Templer.
- 57 *Moldavskaia SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza. Sbornic documentov i materialov. V 2-kh tomakh* (Moldavian SSR in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. Collection of Documents), Vol. I-II, Kishinev: Shtiintsa, 1976, p. 81.
- 58 *Report / International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania*, Iași: Polirom, 2004, p.111,
- 59 Achim V., *The Roma in Romanian History*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004, p.174.
- 60 Interview with Zinaida (Kursanka) Prodan (born in 1935), village Korsuntsy, Odessa region, 20.06.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 61 Interview with Tamara Tsinia (born in 1930), Odessa, 21.06.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 62 Interview with Zakharii Chebotar (born in 1936), Izmail, 04.06.2013 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 63 Interview with Lina Pleshko (born in 1942), Soroca, 16.06.2012 in A. Abakunova archive.
- 64 *Ibid.*
- 65 Abakunova A., Altman I., *Pravedniki Narodov Mira*, in: *Holocaust na okkupirovannoi territorii SSSR. Entsiklopediia* (The Righteous among the Nations of the World, in: Holocaust on the Occupied Territory of the USSR: Encyclopedia), Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009, pp. 790-793.
- 66 Interview with Tamara Tsinia (born in 1930), Odessa, 21.06.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.

- <sup>67</sup> Interview with Lina Pleshko (born in 1942), Soroca, 16.06.2012 in A. Abakunova archive.
- <sup>68</sup> Interviews with Serafina Preida (born in 1943), Soroca, 16.06.2013 in A. Abakunova archive.
- <sup>69</sup> Interview with Semion Dodik (born in 1926), Tel-Aviv, 08.08.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.
- <sup>70</sup> Interview with Vladimir Vakulenko (born in 1935), Izmail, 04.06.2013 in A. Abakunova archive.
- <sup>71</sup> Interviews with Tsilia Koifman (born in 1928), Chernivtsi, 21.07.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.
- <sup>72</sup> Interview with Moshe Frimer (born in 1929), Chernivti, 23.07.2010 in A. Abakunova archive.
- <sup>73</sup> DAVO (the State Archive of Vinnytsia Region), F. P-4422, Op.,.1, D. 2, L.4 [unpublished document].
- <sup>74</sup> DAVO (the State Archive of Vinnytsia Region), F. P-4422, Op.,.1, D. 37, L.19 [unpublished document].
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# BETWEEN GOD AND CAESAR: THE CLANDESTINE UKRAINIAN GREEK CATHOLIC CLERGY IN THE SOVIET STATE (1946–1989)

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church<sup>1</sup> (hereafter UGCC), a Church of Byzantine tradition with ties to Rome, united almost the entire Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia in the interwar Second Polish Republic.<sup>2</sup> During the Second World War Eastern Galicia underwent a triple (Soviet, German, and again Soviet) occupation and since 1944 it became a part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (hereafter the Ukrainian SSR).

Considered by the Soviet regime as a satellite of Vatican and a spiritual basis of the anti-Soviet nationalist armed resistance, the UGCC was attacked soon after the Soviet reoccupation of Galicia.

In the article “With a cross or with a knife”, which appeared in the newspaper *Free Ukraine* on April 8, 1945, Volodymyr Rosovych (a pseudonym of Lviv Communist writer Iaroslav Halan) associated the UGCC with “treason”, “Fascism”, and “bourgeois nationalism”. After the Metropolitan Iosyf Slipyi, a head of the UGCC since 1944, and Bishops Hryhorii Khomyshyn, Mykolai Charnetskyi, Mykyta Budka, and Ivan Liatyshevskyi were arrested on April 11, 1945, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (hereafter CAROC, Council) in cooperation with the Council for the Affairs of the Religious Cults (hereafter CARC), state security organs, Russian Orthodox Church (hereafter ROC), and the so called Initiative group for reunification of the UGCC with the ROC (hereafter Initiative group)<sup>3</sup> launched the “reunion” campaign. The latter envisaged a series of “soborhyky” (“little councils”) in each district, where, usually in the presence of the state security agent, the members of Initiative group tried to convince other priests to join this group. Before the illegal council of Lviv (March 8–10, 1946),<sup>4</sup> which officially declared the

break of ties with Vatican and “reunion” with the ROC, 997 out of 1,270 Greek Catholic priests present in Galicia at that time formally joined the Initiative group.<sup>5</sup> The “resistant Uniates”,<sup>6</sup> in turn, were often convicted of “anti-Soviet activity” and deported to Gulag.

Between the abolition of the UGCC in 1946 and its legalization in 1989–1990, the majority of the Greek Catholics existed as a “Church within a Church” (a term introduced by Vasyl Markus to describe the self-perception of the “reunited” Greek Catholic community within the body of the ROC<sup>7</sup>), whereas the opponents of “reunion” formed a clandestine UGCC.

This study focuses on the clandestine clergy, both the Greek Catholic clergymen who refused to join the ROC in 1945–1946 and those ordained already after the UGCC’s delegalization. Because of the high level of secrecy in the underground, an exact number of the active clandestine priests is hard to estimate. According to the information provided by the CAROC in January 1948, 75 Greek Catholic priests “stubbornly refused to join” the ROC, from which only 18 conducted religious services.<sup>8</sup> However, this number excludes those priests who were already arrested and deported to Gulag because of their refusal to join the ROC. In 1958, that is after the imprisoned priests were released, the Council reported about the presence in Western Ukraine of 273 “non-reunited” Greek Catholic priests and even a greater number of the monks.<sup>9</sup> It is assumed that a number of the underground priests, both monastic and secular, which was estimated at between 300 and 500 in the 1970s, doubled till the end of the 1980s.<sup>10</sup> However, without the Orthodox priests who joined the UGCC on the wave of the Greek Catholic activism, there were fewer than 500 active clandestine Greek Catholic clergymen in the 1980s.<sup>11</sup>

The abolition of the UGCC in Galicia (1946) drew the incomparably great amount of scholarly attention.<sup>12</sup> The pioneering and the most comprehensive study about the UGCC’s abolition in the context of the Soviet nationality and religious policy was written by Bohdan Bociurkiw, a Canadian political scientist of Ukrainian origin.<sup>13</sup> Most studies on the clandestine UGCC also concentrated on the state repressive policy towards the Greek Catholics,<sup>14</sup> although some researchers analyzed as well the impact of the Soviet regime’s policy on the Greek Catholics’ identity.<sup>15</sup> In particular, a problem of the clandestine clergy’s attitude to the Soviet regime was touched by Ukrainian researcher Natalia Dmytryshyn in her article about resistance and accommodation strategies adopted by different generations of the Greek Catholic clergy.<sup>16</sup>

In fact, such terms as “resistance”, “opposition”, and “accommodation” became widely used by historians to describe the attitude of the underground UGCC to the Soviet regime. Whether any particular action, be it a complaint to the Soviet authorities or an illegal religious service, is an expression of any of the above mentioned concepts depends on the meaning attributed to them. As American political anthropologist James Scott accurately remarked, “It is no simple matter to determine just where compliance ends and resistance begins”.<sup>17</sup> Scott’s concept of everyday (passive) resistance, even though broadly defined, emphasizes the protestor’s intention to resist as crucial to the notion.<sup>18</sup> However, arguing that subordinate groups were deprived of possibility to resist openly, Scott intentionally politicizes their undeclared resistance.<sup>19</sup> According to a social historian Elena Osokina, Russian historians who apply Scott’s concept of resistance to Stalinism tend to interpret disobedience to authorities as resistance to regime.<sup>20</sup> She argues instead that everyday disobedience is not a form of pre-political protest, but a survival strategy, and, therefore, an anthropological rather than political phenomenon.<sup>21</sup> In regard to the Church, Kenneth Westhues, for example, withholds from interpreting a defensive stance on part of the persecuted religious groups as opposition to the established authorities.<sup>22</sup> In his view, the oppositional stance of religious body is defined by its intention to change a wider society, not to secure the autonomy of a group.<sup>23</sup>

The specifics of the Soviet archival data and domination of political history in most studies on the UGCC resulted in overemphasizing the political and national motivation of the clandestine clergy’s opposition to the Soviet state. However, the fact that the Soviet authorities interpreted the clergy’s resistance to “reunion” or their underground religious activities as a threat to regime does not necessarily mean that the clandestine priests considered their actions to be such. Therefore, the present article looks at how the Greek Catholic clergymen themselves defined their attitude to the Soviet State.

Obviously, in comparison with the ROC, which enjoyed the most preferential status among the religious groups in the Soviet Union,<sup>24</sup> the UGCC’ stance towards the Soviet authorities was definitely oppositional. On the one hand, it seems natural that the clandestine Greek Catholics maintained a hostile attitude to the nationally alien and atheistic regime that outlawed their Church and persecuted the “non-reunited” clergy. On the other hand, such stance would be contrary to the position advocated by the Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi, a head of the UGCC in 1901–1944,

whose relations with political authorities were guided by a principle of obedience to civil authorities without compromising Christian identity.<sup>25</sup> In his first pastoral letter after the Soviet occupation of Galicia in 1939, the head of the UGCC wrote:

Our agenda is the following: we will comply with the civil authority; we will obey the laws insofar as they do not contravene the law of God; we will not meddle in political and secular affairs, nor will we cease to work tirelessly for the Christian cause among our people.<sup>26</sup>

In this article, I argue that many clandestine priests shared Sheptytskyi's view on the Church-State relations and prioritized religious identity over national and political matters. This was true both during the "reunion" campaign with the Russian Orthodoxy in 1945–1946 and further existence of the Church in the underground (1946–1989). Therefore, I offer to view the clergy's resistance as an indirect result of the wish to preserve their Church, not the aim by itself. Although the clandestine community was far from being a cohesive group, in their attitude to the Soviet authorities most clergymen distinguished between loyalty to the state on the one hand and the attitude to the Communist and the atheist ideology on the other one. The aim of this article is not to dismiss the national and political motives of the clandestine clergy's opposition to the Soviet regime, but to demonstrate the crucial role of religious motivation in shaping their political attitudes.

This article is mostly based on the unpublished archival material from the collections of the Soviet governmental institutions controlling the religious sphere<sup>27</sup> as well as published reports from the archive of the former KGB [Russian abbreviation for *Committee for State Security*]<sup>28</sup> and the interviews with the clandestine hierarchy, clergy, nuns, and laypeople from the Archive of the Institute of Church History.<sup>29</sup> The research questions are analyzed with the help of the methodology of identity studies, historical anthropology, and sociology of religion.

Geographically, this study focuses on Western Ukraine, namely the territory of Eastern Galicia, which, before the Second World War, belonged to Galician Metropolis of the UGCC. According to the Soviet administrative division it united Lviv, Drohobych (since 1959 – a part of Lviv region), Stanislav (renamed as Ivano-Frankivsk in 1962) and Ternopil regions. The time frame under consideration is the underground period of the UGCC (1946–1989).

The article begins with a theoretical overview of the different modes of behavior adopted by the UGCC and the ROC in relation to the Soviet authorities. Next, it looks at the “reunion” campaign of the UGCC with the ROC as a part of the postwar Sovietization of Western Ukraine, with a special attention to the national and religious motives of the clergy’s resistance to the forced Orthodoxization. Finally, the article focuses on the attitude of the clandestine clergy to the Soviet authorities and Communist ideology.

### **The Church and the Soviet State: The Cases of the ROC and the UGCC**

The theological foundations of Christian attitude to the secular power were formulated by St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans. However, Christian churches interpreted Pauline teaching about divine nature of every authority and necessity of civil obedience in different ways.

A tendency to link opposition to the secular authorities with sectarianism comes from a classical church-sect dichotomy by Ernst Troeltsch, who defined Church as an integral part of the social order and a sect as a religious group in opposition to the state and society.<sup>30</sup> Since Troeltsch’s theory was based on the history of pre-1800 Europe, where Christianity enjoyed religious monopoly and state support,<sup>31</sup> it can be hardly applied to the context of the modern atheistic state. American sociologist Benton Johnson criticized Troeltsch’s typology for containing too many variables and offered instead to define church and sect by a single criterion, namely acceptance/rejection of the social environment.<sup>32</sup> Johnson’s approach blurred the boundaries between church and sect, as he maintained that the Catholic Church in the Communist lands took on some sectarian characteristics.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, sociologist Werner Stark amended Johnson’s church-sect typology by proposing a third type, namely the universal church, to which he counted the Roman Catholicism.<sup>34</sup> According to Stark, the universal church’s principle of the separation of Church and State does not necessarily imply hostility to the secular surrounding, as it is in the case of sectarians.<sup>35</sup> In turn, Kenneth Westhues’s study of conditions that lead to embracing oppositional stance by different religious groups revealed inadequacy of Johnson’s typology by establishing no necessary link between opposition and church-sect typology.<sup>36</sup>

Generally, the Catholic Churches demonstrated a higher level of opposition to socialism than the Orthodox ones, with Hungarian Catholic Church and Georgian Orthodox Church to be the only exceptions.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, whereas the Russian Orthodox Church in the postwar USSR adhered to a principle of the “unconditional political loyalty”,<sup>38</sup> the outlawed UGCC was regarded by the Soviet regime as disloyal.

The differences in the attitude of the official ROC and the clandestine UGCC to the Soviet authorities can be better understood in the light of a conceptual distinction between the state and the universal church. Whereas the ROC was historically affiliated with Russian Tsarism, the UGCC never identified itself with a particular state power. In contrast to the ROC whose spiritual centre was located in Moscow, the UGCC as a part of the universal church was subordinated to the Holy See. Since the Soviet authorities in the postwar time envisaged Vatican as a “defender of fascism” and the UGCC as an “accomplice” to papacy, scholars often consider the abolition of the UGCC to be a part of the Soviet anti-Vatican policy.<sup>39</sup> Thus, Stalin’s wish to use the ROC as alternative “Vatican”<sup>40</sup> to unify the Church life in Eastern-Central Europe resulted in the “reunion” campaigns of the Greek Catholic Churches with the Orthodox ones not only within the Soviet Union, namely in Galicia (1946) and Transcarpathia (1949), but also in Soviet-controlled Romania (1948) and Czechoslovakia (1950).

Another difference between the ROC and the UGCC lies in the national compatibility with the Soviet regime. Although the ROC was severely persecuted by the Bolsheviks after their ascension to power in Russia in 1917, the Second World War brought Church-State rapprochement. Having decided to use the tools of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Tsarism, that is, Russian nationalism, Pan-Slavism, and Orthodoxy, to regain control over the territories in the Western borderland after their temporary occupation by the Nazi Germany, Stalin allowed the elections of the Patriarch in 1943.<sup>41</sup> As Werner Stark remarked, Communist Russia and Orthodox Russia shared the same “ethnocentric and messianic spirit”,<sup>42</sup> therefore, the fact that the Orthodox hierarchy helped the Soviets to abolish the UGCC should not be surprising.

So, differences between the UGCC and the ROC in political philosophy, Church jurisdiction and national character caused both different treatment of these Churches by the Soviet regime and the Churches’ different attitude to the State and its dominant ideology.

## **The UGCC and the Nationalist Resistance in the context of the “Reunion” Campaign of 1945–1946**

Since the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the Greek Catholic clergy played a main role in the Ukrainian “national revival” in Habsburg-ruled Galicia, this Church associated itself with the national cause. During the first half of the XX<sup>th</sup> century, when Eastern Galicia underwent a kaleidoscopic change of state powers,<sup>43</sup> the Church was headed by the Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi, who reinforced the role of the UGCC as a representative of Ukrainian interests. In the words of Volodymyr Tselevych, an interwar Galician politician, UGCC was a “national Church of Galician Ukrainians in the sense that only Ukrainians belong to this Church and that the change of confession amounts to the change of nationality”.<sup>44</sup>

Therefore, the postwar forced merger of the UGCC with the ROC was both designed and perceived as a means of Russification and Sovietization of Western Ukraine. The Soviet authorities regarded the UGCC as “anti-people” in character, since the Church allegedly aimed at “spiritual separation of Ukrainian and Russian peoples”.<sup>45</sup> The members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (hereafter OUN)<sup>46</sup> argued that the abolition of the UGCC would lead to a “forced reunion of Ukrainian people with a Moscow one”.<sup>47</sup> The latter assumption was not groundless, as in 1953 the CAROC plenipotentiary in Drohobych region Shapovalov reported about the successes in the “separation of believers from the Union [*Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church* – K.B.] and their reunion in one family with Russian people”.<sup>48</sup>

The anti-Soviet armed resistance in Western Ukraine constituted one of the major problems in the Soviet Western borderland. Being convinced of a tight link between the UGCC and the nationalist underground, the Soviets expected that the UGCC would be able to persuade the nationalist guerillas to stop the fight.<sup>49</sup> This issue was touched in December 1944, when the Greek Catholic delegation went to Moscow to discuss the possibility of the future existence of the Church under the Soviet rule.<sup>50</sup> However, the leadership of OUN rejected the offer to start negotiations with the Soviets via the Greek Catholic priests.<sup>51</sup>

Despite Metropolitan Sheptytskyi’s confrontation with a radical wing of OUN, Bandera faction,<sup>52</sup> the latter was widely popular among Galician Ukrainians and even young Greek Catholic clergy, a tendency that only strengthened after the Soviet reoccupation of Galicia in 1944.<sup>53</sup> The reports by NKVD [Russian abbreviation for *People’s Commissariat*

of *Internal Affairs*] and the CAROC as well as the oral history sources demonstrate a tight link of many Greek Catholic clergymen to OUN and UPA (hereafter Ukrainian Insurgent Army).<sup>54</sup> A former clandestine believer Maria Nakonechna perceived such connection as natural, arguing that the priests could not be against “our people”.<sup>55</sup> She remembers that in her native village in Lviv region Fr. Danylo Guglevych in his Sunday sermons encouraged believers to provide food, clothes and medical assistance to insurgents who might visit their homes.<sup>56</sup>

Since the clergy’s refusal to join the ROC hindered the Soviet plans of homogenization of the Western borderland of the USSR, the Soviet functionaries persistently linked the clergy’s resistance to “reunion” with the anti-Soviet activities of the nationalist guerillas in Galicia. They blamed, for example, the dwellers of the Greek Catholic monasteries for giving shelter to the members of the nationalist underground, holding religious services on the latter’s tombs, printing and spreading “anti-Soviet literature”, and agitation among the believers not to join the ROC.<sup>57</sup> In the words of one of the regional CAROC plenipotentiaries, Greek Catholic monasteries were “hotbeds of Uniatism”, “seats of papism” and “places, where everything which is hostile not only to the Orthodoxy but also to the Soviet power is concentrated”.<sup>58</sup>

Hence any support of the nationalist guerillas, no matter if it was voluntary or forced,<sup>59</sup> was regarded as “complicity”, many Greek Catholic clergymen including ordained monks from the closed monasteries were arrested according to the article 54 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR adopted in 1927, mostly paragraphs 54-1 “A” (“high treason”), 54-10 (“anti-Soviet propaganda”) and 54-11 (“belonging to the counterrevolutionary formations”).

However, it was rather the clergy’s opposition to “reunion” than a link to Ukrainian national movement that led to persecutions. To illustrate, in the report of NKGB [*People’s Commissariat for State Security*] from April 2, 1945, a future head of the Initiative group Fr. Havryil Kostel’nyk was characterized as “Ukrainian nationalist and the enemy of the Soviet State” maintaining connections with the leadership of OUN and UPA.<sup>60</sup> Besides, most other “reunited” priests as well as the “non-reunited” priests who left priestly activities and found secular employment usually managed to avoid the arrest.<sup>61</sup>

A tight link between religious and national identity characteristic of the UGCC indeed makes it difficult to differentiate between religious/confessional and national/political motives of the clergy’s resistance



to the forced Orthodoxization in the postwar years. In this respect a concept of "identity salience", which presupposes that "self" incorporates different identities organized in the hierarchical order, might be useful.<sup>62</sup> Contemporary identity theorists who redefined George Mead's formula "society shapes self shapes social behavior" as "commitment shapes identity salience shapes role choice behavior" assume that behavioral choices are made in accordance with the most salient identity.<sup>63</sup> For example, if the Christian, precisely Greek Catholic, identity is more salient than a national one, a decision to resist "reunion" would be shaped by the former. On the one hand, this assumption might be problematic for the reasons stated above: one might argue that, first, national component is inherent to the Greek Catholic identity; second, that "reunion" campaign was never planned as a solely Church matter, but aimed at Russification and Sovietization of Western Ukrainians. On the other hand, one should not overstate the role of national factor in the clergy's resistance to "reunion" campaign.

Although the rhetoric of both OUN and the "non-reunited" Greek Catholic clergy against the forced merger of the UGCC with the ROC overlapped in some aspects, their motivation was not identical. Being a radical right movement professing the ideology of integral nationalism, the OUN prioritized the national cause over the principles of Christian ethics.<sup>64</sup> Besides, the OUN's resistance to "reunion" was anti-Soviet and anti-Russian rather than anti-Orthodox in character. To illustrate, in their written appeal to Ukrainian Greek Catholics against the "reunion" (July 1945), the members of OUN wondered "why it should be necessarily "russian" orthodox church, and not, for example, ukrainian orthodox church [*capitalization is absent in the text* – K.B.]?"<sup>65</sup> Similarly, the threatening letters the "reunited" priests received from OUN contained a remark that organization opposed not the Orthodoxy in general, but the Orthodoxy led by NKVD.<sup>66</sup> In the view of Ukrainian nationalists, the "reunited" priests were "betrayers of Ukrainian people and Church" and the "agents of NKVD".<sup>67</sup>

However, in order to save the "local cadres" and prevent the arrival of the Orthodox priests from outside Galicia, at least a part of OUN did not oppose "reunion" and even encouraged the Greek Catholic priests to accept the Orthodoxy.<sup>68</sup> In the view of the CAROC plenipotentiary in Lviv region Anatolii Vyshnevskyi, the "reunited" priests connected with the nationalist underground and playing a "double-dealing role" were even more dangerous than the "non-reunited" ones.<sup>69</sup>

In contrast to the nationalists, the Greek Catholic clergy saw a main hindrance to “reunification” in the differences between the Catholicism and the Orthodoxy. For example, the parish priests who participated in the meetings organized by the Initiative group in 1945 motivated their unwillingness to join the ROC by their loyalty to the Pope, the oath given to a Greek Catholic bishop, the conviction that only within the Catholic Church the salvation is possible, and the perception of “reunion” as a betrayal of the faith.<sup>70</sup>

Consequently, the “resistant” Greek Catholics condemned the head of the Initiative group Fr. Havryil Kostel’nyk and his followers mostly in religious terms, as “betrayers of the faith and people”, “Judas” and “betrayers of the Christ”.<sup>71</sup> Such rhetoric was rooted in the contemporaneous Catholic theological thought, which viewed the Catholic Church as the only Christ’s church.<sup>72</sup> Therefore, according to the head of the UGCC Metropolitan Slipyi, no distinction between renouncing Pope and renouncing Christ could be made.<sup>73</sup> That is why many “resistant” priests and monks as well as Roman Catholic priests informed believers that the clergymen who joined the ROC had lost their “spiritual power”.<sup>74</sup>

In his report to the Soviet state security organs (August 3, 1945), Fr. Havryil Kostel’nyk maintained that, apart from the papacy, the main hindrance to “reunion” was the clergy’s fear of Russification of the Church.<sup>75</sup> However, as follows from the reports of the NKGB representative Ivan Bohdanov, who accompanied Fr. Kostel’nyk at his meetings with the clergy in Lviv region in August 1945, the priests who expressed such doubts nevertheless joined the Initiative group.<sup>76</sup>

Besides, the clergy’s unwillingness to “reunite” can be also explained by the ROC’s discredit through cooperation with the atheistic regime.<sup>77</sup> By defining the Russian Orthodoxy as the “Soviet church” or “state religion like police”,<sup>78</sup> the Greek Catholic clergymen showed their adherence to the universal Church with its principle of division between the Church and the State.

Although both Ukrainian nationalists and a part of the Greek Catholic clergymen opposed “reunion”, their motivation differed on a fundamental level. Whereas the former were driven by the national motives, the latter opposed forced Orthodoxization mainly for religious reasons. Moreover, no direct link between the clergy’s sympathy with OUN and their resistance to “reunion” can be established.

## **The Greek Catholic Clergy and the Soviet State: A Problem of Political Loyalty**

The “reunion” campaign was designed as a test of clergy’s political loyalty, though the Soviets realized that the majority of the clergymen “signed the Orthodoxy” trying to adjust to “current political situation”.<sup>79</sup> As Ivan Bohdanov, a NKVD representative engaged in the “reunion” campaign, observed in 1945, after joining the Initiative group the Greek Catholic priests “remained the same Catholics with the same political views and religious convictions”.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, at the meeting of Western Ukrainian plenipotentiaries of the CAROC ten years later (1955), the Council’s representative from Moscow Spyrydonov once again emphasized that the clergy’s formal break of ties with Vatican and “reunion” with the ROC was a demonstration of their “loyal attitude to the Soviet rule”.<sup>81</sup> As the all-Union plenipotentiary of the CAROC Georgii Karpov blamed Ukrainian republican and regional plenipotentiaries for underestimating the “political relevance of the Union’s abolition”,<sup>82</sup> the leadership of the CAROC in Kyiv also began to interpret the clergy’s refusal to join the ROC in political terms.<sup>83</sup>

Many Greek Catholic clergymen, however, attempted both to maintain a dialogue with the Soviet power and preserve the Greek Catholic identity. For example, at the meeting of the clergy of Stanislav deanery in September 1945, Fr. Mykola Boryslavskyi and Fr. Ivan Ustyianovskiy refused to join the Initiative group, though emphasized their loyalty to the Soviet power.<sup>84</sup> Fr. Ustyianovskiy motivated his choice in a following way:

As a Greek Catholic priest, I am loyal to the Soviet authority. As a Catholic, I will serve and obey the Pope. I know that unless I go over to the Orthodoxy, I will be sent to prison and Siberia.<sup>85</sup>

Fr. Zadvorniak, a priest in Lviv region who escaped both “reunion” and arrest by leaving his priestly activities, actively agitated believers to participate in the elections to the Supreme Soviet, but afterwards, contrary to the expectations of the regional plenipotentiary of the CAROC Anatolii Vyshnevskiy, did not “reunite” with the ROC.<sup>86</sup> Similarly, Fr. Sokol in Drohobych region actively supported all state campaigns including grain procurements, but refused to break his oath and join the ROC.<sup>87</sup> The above mentioned examples, which reveal predominance of religious motivation of the clergy’s resistance to “reunion” over political one, seem

to be mostly consistent with the wartime instructions of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to fulfill the secular orders unless they contradict Christian values.<sup>88</sup> In the eyes of the Soviet authorities, though, the Greek Catholic clergy's statements about their political loyalty to the Soviet State were not valid without "reunion" with the ROC.

The Soviet perception of the "non-reunited" Greek Catholic clergy as "anti-people" and "pro-nationalist" hardly changed after the death of Stalin in 1953. The return of several hundred Greek Catholic priests and about 20,000 convicted nationalists to Western Ukraine after dismantling of Gulag put at risk the successes of Sovietization of the previous decade.<sup>89</sup> The Greek Catholic priests agitated against the "reunited" clergy and spread rumors that the UGCC would be soon restituted.<sup>90</sup> In 1956, the head of the CAROC in the Ukrainian SSR Hryhorii Korchevyi noted that the "Uniate" clergy's activities were aimed against the interests of the Soviet State".<sup>91</sup>

Instead of perceiving the returned clergy as "anti-people element", many Western Ukrainian believers joined the underground Church having a deep respect for the "martyrs for the faith".<sup>92</sup> Moreover, inspired by the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (hereafter CPSU) and upheavals in the neighboring Poland and Hungary in 1956, the Greek Catholics started to send petitions with a request to register their parish as Greek Catholic.<sup>93</sup>

Although the "Uniates" did not belong to religious groups which according to the Instruction of the CARC on the Application of the Law on Cults (1961) were deprived of right to registration because of their alleged "anti-state and monstrous character",<sup>94</sup> none of the petitions sent by the Greek Catholics up to legalization of the Church was answered positively. Since there was no legal explanation of the ban of the UGCC, the plenipotentiaries usually informed petitioners that their Church did not exist after its "reunion" with the ROC in 1946.<sup>95</sup>

On the one hand, the Greek Catholics' letters to power were a legitimate form of protest against the violations of religious freedom. On the other hand, the petitions sent by the members of the "non-existent Church" undermined the official narrative about the "voluntary reunion" and put in question the Soviet vision of the "Uniates" as "enemies of the people" and "counterrevolutionaries". In his complaint to Stalin (1947), Fr. Ivan Hanytskyi assumed that the discriminatory actions against him resulted from his refusal to join the ROC.<sup>96</sup> In October 1956, Fr. Omelian

Shuplat addressed his grievance to the head of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Bulhanin:

We [*“non-reunited” Greek Catholic priests* – K.B.] are still forced to observe that we are called bandits in front of people. We are still regarded not as equal citizens, but as counterrevolutionaries based on the argument that we do not obey to Lviv council, etc.<sup>97</sup>

Fr. Shuplat went even further by rejecting the alleged “anti-Sovietness” of the clandestine priests:

Nobody of us thinks and has a right to oppose the state we live in, nobody can allow himself not to respect the Constitution. The only thing we do not agree with is the atheism, and this does not equal with the hostility to the state.<sup>98</sup>

Considering the declaration’s consistency with a principle of division between Church and State that defined the UGCC’s attitude to the secular authorities before 1946 in general and the wartime instructions of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi in particular, one should not dismiss Fr. Shuplat’s letter as a demonstration of fake political loyalty or another attempt to “speak Bolshevik”.<sup>99</sup> In 1993, that is, after the UGCC’s legalization and collapse of the Soviet Union, another “non-reunited” priest, Fr. Mykola Tsaryk, also stressed that the UGCC never positioned itself against the State, only against atheism, since the Church’s task was to deal with religion, not with politics.<sup>100</sup> Both priests suffered from the local police organs and KGB, but they escaped the postwar deportation to Gulag, therefore, their position might differ from the attitude of the Gulag returnees like Pavlo Vasylyk.

A student of theology arrested in 1947 for his link to UPA, Pavlo Vasylyk was secretly consecrated as a Greek Catholic priest upon his return to Western Ukraine in 1956.<sup>101</sup> Between 1956 and 1959, thousands of believers gathered from all over Galicia in the village of Nadorozhna in Ivano-Frankivsk region to participate in the Liturgies openly celebrated by Fr. Vasylyk.<sup>102</sup> The priest allegedly described the Soviet power as diabolic and stressed the need to destroy it almost in each of his sermons.<sup>103</sup> He was arrested in 1959 and sentenced to five years for “the formentation of interconfessional hostility” and for “possessing an indefinite quantity of anti-Soviet religious literature”.<sup>104</sup> When caught by police in the city of

Ivano-Frankivsk Fr. Vasylyk used the opportunity to tell the passersby about the UGCC and its struggle against “Bolshevik atheism and violence”.<sup>105</sup> As a clandestine bishop (since 1974), he played a leading role in the struggle for legalization of the UGCC during Perestroika.

However, the behavior of both Fr. Shuplat and Fr. Vasylyk, who used legal and illegal means of protest respectively, was marginal to a dominant guideline of the clandestine hierarchy advocating for the high secrecy in the underground. Since petitions to the Soviet authorities could provoke new repressions, many clergymen in the 1970s considered open struggle for legalization of the UGCC to be betrayal of the Church.<sup>106</sup> In 1987, Bishop Vasylyk was the only clandestine hierarch to sign a letter that declared the UGCC’s coming out from the underground.<sup>107</sup>

So, the labeling of the “non-reunited” clergymen as “counterrevolutionaries” and “enemies of the people” transcended the Stalinist era and continued in the next decades. The clandestine priests, who transgressed the Soviet law on religious cults for the sake of preserving their religious and national identity, in general did not opt for open resistance to the authorities. Moreover, in the contacts with the state officials they often presented themselves as loyal Soviet citizens whose constitutional rights should be respected.

## **The Attitude of the Clandestine Greek Catholic Clergy to the Communist Ideology**

The official position of the UGCC on Communism was formulated in Metropolitan Sheptytskyi’s pastoral letter “Warning against the Danger of Communism” (1936), in which the head of the Church condemned the Communist ideology and declared any cooperation with the Communists to be betrayal of the Church and nation.<sup>108</sup> In 1937, the Communist ideology was condemned by the Pope Pius XI in his encyclical “*Divini Redemptoris*” (“About the Godless Communism”), which was spread in Galicia in 1938.<sup>109</sup>

With the Soviet conquest of Western Ukraine, those Greek Catholic clergymen who once publicly expressed their anti-Communist views could escape arrest only through cooperation with the new power. For example, Fr. Oleksandr Bodrevych-Buts’, an author of several anti-Communist booklets in the interwar time, avoided the arrest after he promised to stop the anti-Communist activities in his letter to the Supreme Soviet in 1940 and joined the ROC in the postwar time.<sup>110</sup> A similar strategy was

used by many other priests, to whom the imprisoned head of the UGCC Metropolitan Iosyph Slipyi appealed in 1957:

Nobody was forced to speak against the Communism as such. And if somebody personally made statements in press with a fuss, he should not later save his skin at the cost of destruction of the Church.<sup>111</sup>

In the postwar time, the anti-Communist stance became one of the core elements of the clandestine Greek Catholics' identity. Since the ROC was closely linked to the Communist regime, many Western Ukrainian laypeople and even some "reunited" priests believed in rumors that the Orthodox hierarchs as well as a part of the "reunited" clergy had membership in the Communist Party.<sup>112</sup> As a "reunited" priest Bohdan Nud remembers, many believers called him "Communist" just because he officially served as an Orthodox priest.<sup>113</sup>

In contrast to the Orthodox theologians who attempted to reconcile Christian and Communist ideologies by developing the concept of "Christian Communism",<sup>114</sup> the Greek Catholic clergymen considered those identities to be mutually exclusive, which can be best exemplified by the clergy's attitude to the membership in the Communist organizations.

The analyzed interviews with the clandestine clergy, monks, nuns, and believers reveal no reference to their membership in the Communist Party. Most clandestine priests, especially from among the Gulag returnees, occupied low-profile positions that did not demand "ideological training." To illustrate, the Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk (born in 1907), who was consecrated as a secret bishop in 1964 and became a head of the clandestine UGCC in 1972, upon his return from the banishment in 1952 and up to his retirement in 1967 worked as a watchman in a park, assistant accountant, hospital attendant and a medical assistant.<sup>115</sup> However, the priests of a younger generation, namely those consecrated after 1946, as well as the candidates to the priesthood, often experienced ideological pressure at their workplaces. During Khrushchev's antireligious campaign (late 1950s–early 1960s), Stepan Stoliarchuk (born in 1930, consecrated as a clandestine priest in 1982) was encouraged to join the CPSU, an offer he persistently declined. As he informed the Party representatives at the plant, he found the Party program acceptable and "humane" and would have gladly joined the CPSU if he had been allowed to attend the church.<sup>116</sup> When asked about his attitude to Marxism-Leninism by his superior at a kinescope factory, Mykhailo Sabryha (born in 1940, ordained in 1974)

answered that as a Christian he did not regard Marxism-Leninism as a teaching and professed “faith of Christ, Catholic Church” instead.<sup>117</sup> Soon afterwards he was attacked by the administration for his alleged belonging to a sect and was forced to quit this job.<sup>118</sup>

In the context of the postwar Galicia, the Communist Party Youth League (hereafter Komsomol, VLKSM [Russian abbreviation for the *All-Union Leninist Young Communist League*]) fulfilled a political rather than a “militant atheistic” function. Considering the scale of the nationalist underground in the 1940s–early 1950s the teachers in Western Ukraine usually forced schoolchildren to join the VLKSM.<sup>119</sup> Thus, the reluctance to join the Komsomol in the postwar time might be interpreted in the terms of broader resistance to the Soviet regime. However, the respondents among the clandestine Greek Catholics usually emphasize that it was the atheistic character of the Komsomol that made their membership in this organization problematic.

There were two main views regarding the participation in the Communist youth organizations within the clandestine Church. The proponents of the nonconformist position considered the membership in the Komsomol incompatible with their religious beliefs and were usually forced to drop their studies or were expelled from the school.<sup>120</sup> The second position can be described as a formal membership in the Communist youth organization without ideological attachment to it. While explaining their choice, the proponents of this position emphasized the formal and forced character of their membership in the VLKSM.<sup>121</sup>

The attitude of the clandestine Greek Catholics to Pioneer organization and the Komsomol was formed by the religious education at home and instructions of the “non-reunited” priests, who usually had a radical anti-Communist stance. Fr. Porfyrrii Chuchman (born in 1906), for example, did not allow the believers to join the Komsomol, considering it to be unacceptable “for Christians, *especially Catholics* [*emphasis mine* – K.B.]”.<sup>122</sup> Fr. Zenovii Kysilevskii (born in 1893), arrested in 1963 for “underground nationalist activities”, was also accused of convincing children during the confessions not to join the Communist youth organizations and giving similar instructions to their parents.<sup>123</sup> Fr. Roman Bakhtalovskyi (born in 1897), an author of a manuscript article “About the Communist Youth League”, where he wrote that the young people in the Soviet Union were afraid to express their views, was arrested in 1968 for the “anti-Soviet activities”.<sup>124</sup> In the 1986, however, the spiritual leaders of Oleh Hovera (born in 1967), who was preparing to become



a clandestine priest, allowed him to join the Komsomol for the sake of receiving a diploma after graduation from a medical school.<sup>125</sup>

In her prominent work on religious activists in the Russian countryside in the 1920s, American historian Glennys Young showed that whereas the Russian Orthodox believers could reconcile their religious identity with the membership in the Communist Party and Komsomol, Orthodox sectarians found it unacceptable.<sup>126</sup> Apart from the church-sect dichotomy, she also explains this phenomenon by a difference between ritual and dogmatic understanding of religion typical for the traditional Orthodox believers and the Orthodox sectarians respectively.<sup>127</sup> It seems that the clandestine Greek Catholics shared the dogmatic understanding of religion, though their attitude to the membership in the Communist organizations was less uncompromising than in the case of some marginal religious subcultures.

The Greek Catholic clergy who rejected "reunion" with the ROC precisely because of the dogmatic differences between the Catholicism and the Orthodoxy preserved the Catholic view on the Communist ideology as irreconcilable with the Christian one. The fact that both clergymen and believers resisted Communist organizations because of their nominally atheistic rather than Soviet character is an additional proof that the clandestine clergy's behavior was motivated primarily by religious considerations.

## Conclusion

After the forced merger of the UGCC with the ROC in Galicia (1946), the Greek Catholic clergymen who opposed "reunion" with the Russian Orthodoxy were persecuted by the Soviet regime for their alleged "anti-Soviet" activities. Considering the generally negative attitude of the Greek Catholic clergymen to the Soviet regime and the Communist ideology before and during the Second World War, most priests were persecuted for their resistance to "reunion" rather than for their actual "anti-Soviet" dealings. The clergy's refusal to join the ROC, though rooted predominantly in the individual perception of the faith and salvation rather than political views, was qualified by the Soviet authorities as a sign of disloyalty to the state.

As Christians, the clandestine Greek Catholic clergymen rejected atheism and Communist worldview. As Ukrainian Greek Catholics, they protested against the ban of the UGCC in the Soviet Union, using both legal

and illegal means. Unlike many other outlawed religious groups in the Soviet Union, the clandestine UGCC did not reject the secular surrounding, but accommodated to it as long as it did not contradict Christian values and Greek Catholic tradition. The clandestine clergy's view on the Christian identity as exclusive and irreconcilable with the Communist one, in fact, did not alter substantially from the position expressed by the Catholic and Greek Catholic hierarchs in the 1930s.

The Christ's instruction to render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar' and unto God the things that are God's was particularly problematic to implement in the Soviet Union. The atheistic nature of the Soviet regime notwithstanding, most clandestine clergymen attempted to apply a principle of division between the Church and the State as well as the Metropolitan Sheptytskyi's instruction to obey the state authorities without compromising Christian identity to the Soviet reality. The case of the underground Greek Catholic clergy in the Soviet Union can serve, therefore, as a good example of the survival of a banned religious tradition in the unfavorable conditions of the Communist rule.

## NOTES

- 1 The UGCC (also known as the Uniate Church) was founded at the Union of Brest in 1596, when a part of the Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Metropolitanate changed jurisdiction from Constantinople Patriarch to the Pope. Having accepted Catholic dogmas, the UGCC retained Byzantine Liturgy, Julian calendar, and married clergy. Since before 1596 the Kyiv Church was not in jurisdiction of Moscow Patriarchate, a term "reunion" is problematic.
- 2 Before 1939, the UGCC had 5 eparchies and 3040 parishes with more than 4, 283 mln believers (LYSENKO, O., "Do pytannia pro stanovyshche tserkvy v Ukraini u period Druhoi svitovoi viiny," v *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, No. 3, 1995, s. 73).
- 3 Founded on May 28, 1945, the Initiative group initially consisted of three Greek Catholic priests – Fr. Mykhail Mel'nyk, Fr. Antonii Pel'vetskyi, and Fr. Havryil Kostel'nyk. The latter priest, who was famous for his anti-Vatican views, became a head of the Initiative group.
- 4 It was not a legitimate council of the UGCC, since no Greek Catholic bishop was present there, and the members of the Initiative group Fr. Antonii Pel'vetskyi and Fr. Mykhail Mel'nyk were consecrated as the Orthodox bishops. For more details on the canonical illegitimacy of the council see: Bociurkiw, B. R., *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939–1950)*, CIUS Press, Edmonton-Toronto, 1996, pp. 181-182.
- 5 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [State Archive of Russian Federation] (hereafter GARF) 6991/1/33/192. The archival sources will be quoted as *fond/opis'/delo/list(y)* (Rus.), *fond/opys/sprava/arkush(i)* (Ukr.), *collection/inventory/file/leaf(leaves)* (Engl.).
- 6 Since a term "Uniate" has a pejorative connotation, in this article it is used exclusively to refer to the quotations from the Soviet sources.
- 7 Markus, V., "Religion and Nationalism in Ukraine", in Ramet, P. (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eastern European politics*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1989, p.153.
- 8 Chumachenko, T., *Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev years*, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 2002, p. 45.
- 9 GARF 6991/1/1585/25.
- 10 Markus, V., *Religion and Nationalism in Ukraine*, p. 155.
- 11 Naumescu, V., *Modes of Religiosity in Eastern Christianity: Religious Processes and Social Change in Ukraine*, Lit Verlag, Berlin, 2008, p. 124.
- 12 See review of historiography on the UGCC's abolition: Myshchak, I., "Likvidatsiia Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy v Ukraini u povoienni roky: istoriohrafiiia", u *Istoriografichni doslidzhennia v Ukraini*, vyp. 17, Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy, Kyiv, 2007, ss. 270-287.

- 13 Bociurkiw, B. R., *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939-1950)*, CIUS Press, Edmonton-Toronto, 1996.
- 14 Pashchenko, V., *Hreko-katolyky v Ukraini (vid 40-kh rokiv XX stolittia do nashykh dniv)*, Poltava, 2002; Stotskyi, Ia. *Ukrainska Hreko-Katolytska Tserkva i relihiine stanovyshche Ternopilshchyny (1946-1989 rr.)*, Pidruchnyky i posibnyky, Ternopil, 2003; Andrukhiv, I., *Relihiine zhyttia na Prykarpatti: 1944-1990 roky. Istoryko-pravovyi analiz*, Ivano-Frankivsk, 2004; Voinalovych, V., *Partiino-derzhavna polityka shchodo relihii ta relihiinykh instytutsii v Ukraini 1940-1960-kh rokiv: politolohichniy dyskurs*, Svitohliad, Kyiv, 2005; Andrukhiv, I., *Polityka radians'koi vlady u sferi relihii ta konfesiine zhyttia na Prykarpatti v 40-kh-80-kh rokakh XX stolittia. Istoryko-pravovyi analiz*, Lileia-NV, Ivano-Frankivsk, 2006.
- 15 Shlikhta, N. "'Greek Catholic'-'Orthodox'-'Soviet': A Symbiosis or a Conflict of Identities?," in *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2004, pp. 261-273; Hurkina, S., Dvi doli: hreko-katolyts'ke dukhovenstvo i radians'ka vlada, u *Skhid/Zakhid. Istoryko-kulturolohichniy zbirnyk*, TOV "NTMT," Kharkiv, Vypusk 11-12, 2008, pp. 265-282; Hurkina, S., "'Obraz syly dukhu:' hreko-katolytske dukhovenstvo Lvivskoi arkhieparchii pislia Druhoi svitovoi viiny i problema personifikatsii relihiinykh perekonan' ta identychnosti", u *Ukraina Moderna*, Kyiv-Lviv, Chastyna 11, 2008, pp. 99-110.
- 16 Dmytryshyn, N., "Mizh oporom i prystosuvanniam: hreko-katolyts'ke pidpillia v systemi radians'koho totalitaryzmu", u *Kovcheh. Naukovyi zbirnyk iz tserkovnoi istorii*, Misioner, L'viv, Chyslo 5, 2007, pp. 256-281.
- 17 Scott, J., *Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985, p. 289.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 290.
- 19 See e.g.: Scott, J., *Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990, pp. 198-199.
- 20 Osokina, E., "O sotsialnom imunitete, ili Kriticheskii vzhliad na kontseptsiiu passivnogo (povsiednevnogo) soprotivlenia", v *Sotsialnaia istoriia: ezhehodnik 2010*, Alteia: SPb, 2011, ss. 284, 295.
- 21 *Ibid.*, ss. 295-296. She offers to substitute a term "passive resistance" with "social immune system" (*Ibid.*, ss. 296-301).
- 22 Westhues, K., "The Church in Opposition", in *Sociological Analysis*, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1976, p. 303.
- 23 *Ibid.*
- 24 Here I allude to Vasyl Markus's categorization of religious groups in the Soviet Ukraine, which is following: 1) preferentially treated religious groups (ROC); 2) relatively restricted religious groups (Reformed Church of Transcarpathia, Evangelical Christians and Baptists); 3) excessively restricted religious groups (Catholics, Jews, Muslims); 4) banned religious groups (the Ukrainian Greek Catholics, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox,

- the Pentecostals, the Adventists, and the Jehovah's Witnesses) (Markus, V., *Religion and Nationalism in Ukraine*, pp. 143-153).
- 25 On the role of Christian social ethics in Metropolitan Sheptytskyi's relations with Austrian, Polish, Soviet and German authorities during 1901–1944 see: Krawchuk, A., *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine: the Legacy of Andrei Sheptytsky*, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, Edmonton, 1997.
- 26 Quoted after: Krawchuk, A., *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, p. 165.
- 27 These include the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (established in 1943), Council for the Affairs of the Religious Cults (established in 1944), and Council for the Religious Affairs (hereafter CRA), which was established in 1965 as a result of merger of the former two institutions. The regional plenipotentiaries of the CAROC, CARC, and CRA sent reports about the religious situation to the Republican plenipotentiary in Kyiv, who, in turn, informed the Council in Moscow. This hierarchical structure worked also in a reverse order, when the instructions from Moscow were sent through Kyiv to regional plenipotentiaries. Since such system usually led to circulation of the same documents at different levels, I worked mostly with the material from the central archives, namely in Kyiv (Central State Archive of the Higher Organs of Power and Administration) and Moscow (State Archive of Russian Federation).
- 28 Likvidatsiia UHKTs (1939–1946). Dokumenty radianskykh orhaniv derzhavnoi bezpeky, PP Serhiichuk M.I., Kyiv, 2006.
- 29 The Archive, which is based at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, contains about 2, 200 interviews conducted during 1990s-2000s with various categories of Greek Catholics (clergy, monkhood, nunnery, laypeople). For this article, the interviews with the clandestine Greek Catholics were selected according to geographic criterion (Eastern Galicia) and thematic relevance.
- 30 Troeltsch, E., *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, Westminster/John Knox Press, Louisville, Kentucky, Vol. 1, 1992, p. 331.
- 31 Johnson, B., "On Church and Sect," in *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1963, p. 540.
- 32 Ibid., p. 542.
- 33 Ibid., p. 543, fn. 15.
- 34 Stark, W., *The Sociology of Religion. A Study of Christendom. Part 1: Established Religion*, Routledge, London-New York, 2000, p. 3.
- 35 Ibid., p.4.
- 36 Westhues, K., "The Church in Opposition," pp. 305, 311.
- 37 Ramet, P., "The Interplay of Religious Policy and Nationalities Policy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe", in Ramet, P. (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and Eastern European politics*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1989, pp. 35-37.
- 38 Shlikhta, N., *Tserkva tykh, khto vyzhyv. Radians'ka Ukraina, seredyna 1940-kh–pochatok 1970-kh rr.*, Akta, Kharkiv, 2011, s.107.

- 39 See e.g.: Chumachenko, T. *Church and State in Soviet Russia*, p. 42.
- 40 Such expression was used by Stalin in September 1943 at the council that signified the ROC's restoration: MINER, S. M., *Stalin's Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2003, p. 189.
- 41 Miner, S. M., *Stalin's Holy War*, p. 96. Steven Miner also maintains that the revival of the ROC was used to express gratitude to the Russian people for their struggle with the Nazis, and, as usually stated in historiography, to mobilize them for the further struggle (*Ibid.*, p. 68).
- 42 Stark, W., *The Sociology of Religion*, p. 214.
- 43 Eastern Galicia was a part of the Habsburg monarchy (till 1918), Russian occupation zone during First World War, Western Ukrainian People's Republic (1918–1919), Second Polish Republic (1919–1939), Soviet (1939–1941), German (1941–1944) and again Soviet occupation zones during the Second World War.
- 44 Volodymyr Tselevych was a secretary-general of the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, the largest Ukrainian party in the interwar Poland. The quoted statement comes from his report to the Soviet state security organs (1940). (*Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptytskyi u dokumentakh radians'kykh orhaniv derzhavnoi bezpeky (1939-1944 rr.)*, Ukrain's'ka Vydavnycha Spilka, Kyiv, 2005, s. 52).
- 45 GARF 6991/1/519/18.
- 46 The OUN emerged in 1929 out of several Ukrainian organizations. In 1940, it split into a more moderate wing headed by Andrii Melnyk and a more radical faction consisting of the younger adherents of OUN headed by Stepan Bandera. The anti-Soviet nationalist underground in the postwar Western Ukraine was led by a Bandera wing of OUN.
- 47 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s. 663.
- 48 GARF 6991/1/1168/19.
- 49 Bociurkiw, B. R., *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State*, p. 84.
- 50 *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.
- 51 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.I, s. 365.
- 52 Though being in favour of Ukrainian national aspirations, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytskyi always condemned the violent methods of Ukrainian nationalists. On the tensions between Metropolitan Sheptytskyi and Bandera movement see: Himka, J.-P. "Christianity and Radical Nationalism: Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and the Bandera Movement", in Wanner, C. (ed.), *State Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine*, Oxford UP, New York, 2012, pp. 93-116.
- 53 *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 104, 110-111.
- 54 See e.g.: Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.I, ss. 313, 332; Interview with Sister Andreia (Anna Shelvika) from 31.03.2001, Lviv. Interviewer: Marko, M. // Arkhiv

- Instituto istorii Tserkvy [Archive of the Institute of Church History] (hereafter AIITs), P-1-1-1126, p. 6.
- 55 Interview with Ms. Maria Nakonechna from 18.12.1992, Lviv. Interviewer: Smoliuk, S. // AIITs, P-1-1-24, p. 2.
- 56 *Ibid.* After the Second World War Fr. Guglevych, who did not join the ROC, was arrested and sent to a forced labour camp in Magadan (*Ibid.*).
- 57 Derzhavnyi arkhiv L'vivs'koi oblasti [State Archive of Lviv region, DALO] 1332/2/15/12-13; Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s. 267.
- 58 GARF 6991/1/519/150.
- 59 Fr. Ivan Dutkevych was sentenced to 10 years for lending money to the nationalist guerrillas, although the latter forced him to do so (Interview with Ms. Anastasia Lahun from 14.05.1994, Ivano-Frankivs'k region, Tys'menytsia district, village Stryhantsi. Interviewer: Pavlykivs'ka, N. // AIITs, P-1-1-389, p. 28).
- 60 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.I, s.454.
- 61 Interview with Fr. Mykola Syvyk from 25.03.1993, 02.04.1993, Lviv region, Zhydachiv. Interviewer: Gudziak, B. // AIITs, P-1-1-335, p. 20.
- 62 Stryker, S., Burke, P. J., "The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory", in *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 4, 2000, p.286.
- 63 *Ibid.*, pp. 285-286.
- 64 Integral nationalism often appeals to traditional religious values, however, as long as they do not contradict nationalist ideology. Its approach to traditional religion is always instrumental (ZAYTSEV, O. "Natsionalizm iak relihii: pryklad Dmytra Dontsova ta OUN (1920-1930-ti roky)," u *Naukovi zapysku Ukrainskoho Katolyts'koho universytetu*, Chyslo 2, seriia "Istoriia," vypusk 1, Lviv, 2010, s.167).
- 65 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s. 63.
- 66 GARF 6991/1/103/59.
- 67 *Ibid.* According to the Soviet reports, about 10 "reunited" priests were killed in Galicia by Ukrainian nationalists during the years of the "reunion" campaign (GARF 6991/1/519/2,158). This list also includes Fr. Kostel'nyk who was murdered in September 1948. Allegedly assassinated by Ukrainian nationalists, he was presented as a "martyr for the reunion" during the Soviet period. According to the memoirs of Fr. Kostel'nyk's family, however, the priest was killed by the Soviet state security agents. (Bociurkiw, B. R., *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State*, pp. 205-206).
- 68 GARF 6991/6/82/27; Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s.25; Bociurkiw, B. R., *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State*, p. 133; Listed as a "reunited" priest against his will, Fr. Roman Lopatynskyi wanted to call back his signature, but was convinced by a member of OUN to keep the parish. Since a priest introduced no Orthodox elements to the Liturgy, delivered patriotic sermons and had connections with nationalist resistance, he was arrested in 1950. (Interview with Ms. Lidiia Zelenchuk-Lopatyns'ka from

- 11.11.1997, Lviv region, Stryi district, Morshyn. Interviewer: Ohorodnyk, T. // AITs, P-1-1-780, pp. 2, 8, 11-12).
- 69 GARF 6991/1/519/149.
- 70 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, ss. 10, 24, 69, 71, 243, 451.
- 71 *Ibid.*, ss. 9, 243; Interview with Fr. Marian Chorneha from 30.03.2002, Lviv region, Zhovkva district, village Krekhiv. Interviewer: Borys, V. // AITs, P-1-1-145, p. 5.
- 72 Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchych orhaniv vlady ta upravlinnia [Central State Archive of the Higher Organs of Power and Administration] (hereafter TsDAVO) 4648/1/165/302.
- 73 TsDAVO 4648/1/165/306.
- 74 GARF 6991/1/1168/21.
- 75 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s.136.
- 76 *Ibid.*, ss. 97-99, 124.
- 77 *Ibid.*, ss. 9, 104, 136-137.
- 78 *Ibid.*, s. 71.
- 79 GARF 6991/1/1271/123.
- 80 Likvidatsiia UHKTs, T.II, s.100.
- 81 GARF 6991/1/ 1271/151.
- 82 GARF 6991/1/103/318.
- 83 GARF 6991/1/216/69.
- 84 GARF 6991/1/33/208, 210.
- 85 GARF 6991/1/33/210.
- 86 GARF 6991/1/216/63.
- 87 GARF 6991/1/216/65.
- 88 However, in December 1940 Metropolitan Sheptytskyi urged the priests from influencing believers before the election: Krawchuk, A., *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine*, p. 166.
- 89 Weiner, A., "The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics", in *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 78, No. 2, 2006, p. 337. Till the end of 1956, 267 out of 344 Greek Catholic priests repressed during 1945–1950 were able to return to the Ukrainian SSR (Serhiichuk, V., *Neskorena tserkva: podvyzhnytstvo hreko-katolykiv Ukrainy v borot'bi za viru i derzhavu*, Dnipro, Kyiv, 2001, pp. 289, 297).
- 90 TsDAVO 4648/1/163/374.
- 91 GARF 6991/1/1378/140.
- 92 TsDAVO 4648/1/148/335.
- 93 TsDAVO 4648/2/216/6-7, 142-150; 4648/2/238/47.
- 94 The list included such groups as, for example, Jehovah's Witnesses, the Pentecostals, and genuine-Orthodox Christians. GARF 6991/2/306/6-7.



- 95 Andrukhiv, I., *Polityka radians'koi vlady u sferi relihii*, p. 273; TsDAVO 4648/2/216/4.
- 96 TsDAVO 4648/2/37/42.
- 97 TsDAVO 4648/2/216/132.
- 98 TsDAVO 4648/1/180/90.
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## FOREIGN ENTREPRENEURS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN SOUTH RUSSIA IN THE LATE 19<sup>th</sup> AND EARLY 20<sup>th</sup> CENTURY

By the mid 1880s, the Russian Empire entered into a period of rapid industrial development. Industrialization led to a series of globally characteristic historical changes, such as mechanized production, urbanization, transformation of the urban landscape, revolution in the field of transport and infrastructure.<sup>1</sup> As an element in this development, a revolution took place also in the field of labor – with the appearance of professional workers – and in that of management. With the appearance of management as a new element in the system of labor relations, the *owner-worker* binary model of labor organization was replaced by the new model of *owner-manager-worker*, which meant the division of the capital and the management.

Foreign entrepreneurs mainly coming from the Western Europe played a prominent part in establishing the conditions of industrialization in Russia. This paper presents an analysis of their role as agents in importing the Western European ways of productive management, innovation, investment of capital, and the “spirit of capitalism”.<sup>2</sup>

The research is focused on the geographical area of South Russia called the Southern Industrial Region which was a crucial territory concerning the transfer of Western European models of industrial management by foreign industrialists. By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century – besides such centers as Moscow and Petersburg – this region became the main area and channel for the transfer and adaptation of Western European models of industrial production.

The activity of foreign entrepreneurs in Russia has repeatedly been addressed by scholarship, and their role has been interpreted from a wide range of perspectives. They were seen as the main driving force of industrialization promoting changes against the “relatively backward

Russians”<sup>3</sup>, and also as those who pushed Russia into a semi-colonial status, entirely dependent on foreign capital.<sup>4</sup>

Despite the constant attention paid to the problem in historiography, there still remained a number of questions that are not fully clarified. Such a debated question is whether foreign investment managed to integrate into the Russian economy. Can we consider foreign entrepreneurs as importers of experience, entrepreneurial spirit, energy and generally as bringing the manufacture culture in Russia up to European standards? What kind of relationships did they establish with the local society and authorities?

An answer will be given to these questions based on the analysis statistical data, memoirs, periodical publications and documents of the enterprises stored in the central archive in Saint-Petersburg and regional archives in Ukraine.

## The Russian industrialization

By the late 1880s, the eve of the industrialization, Russia could be characterized as an economically backward agrarian country with poorly developed industry and transport infrastructure. The only relatively developed sectors were those of food processing and textile industry, and the demand for metal, coal and machinery was covered mainly by import. From the last years of the 1880s however, Russian industry experienced a rapid development. The growth rate in this period exceeded even that of the leading industrial countries (Table 1).

**Table 1. Average annual rates of growth of industrial output (percent)<sup>5</sup>**

<i>Period</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Russia</i>
1870-1884	4,7	2,0	4,2	6,2	
1885-1889	8,8	4,6	5,2	6,6	6,1
1890-1899	5,5	1,8	5,4	9,6	8,0
1907-1913	3,5	2,7	3,9	3,3	6,3
1885-1913	5,3	2,1	4,5	6,2	5,7

The increase in industrial production was particularly impressive in South Russia. The region became the main area of coal-mining and metallurgy in the Russian Empire, by early 20<sup>th</sup> century having outrun

the former metallurgical center, the Ural Region.<sup>6</sup> On the eve of World War I, in 1913, the Russian Empire produced a total of 2.2 billion tons of coal. The share of the Donbass Region within that constituted 70.5%, while the share of the Kingdom of Poland was 22.4%, and that of the Urals only 3.3%.<sup>7</sup>

The amount of pig iron produced in the Russian Empire totaled 55 million poods in 1890. It increased to 176.8 million by 1900. These figures in South Russia counted 13.33 and 91 million poods respectively. In other words, the “imperial five-year plan” for 1895-1900 resulted in a growth of 35 % per year in South Russia. This was an even more rapid development than the one in the period of the Soviet forced industrialization. In 1898, a major journal in trade and industry wrote the following with a display of open admiration towards the development of the southern industry:

No example of such a rapid growth has been known from the entire world history. None of the countries can boast with a similar increase in the production of pig iron achieved within a decade.<sup>8</sup>

### **The role of foreign entrepreneurs in the industrial progress**

Foreign entrepreneurs pursued economic activity in the Russian Empire before the Industrial Revolution as well.<sup>9</sup> From the late 1880s however, we can talk about a movement of entrepreneurs, managers and workers to the Empire as a mass phenomenon. It is not a coincidence that during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century Donbass was called “the tenth Belgian province”. “Foreigners are migrating to Russia with a huge capital! The Belgians are the main masters in South Russia!” – wrote Vladimir Gilyarovsky, journalist and writer, in his essay bearing the title “Iron Fever” in 1899.<sup>10</sup>

The broad participation of foreign entrepreneurs in the industrial development was not a randomly emerging phenomenon, but the result of the conscious policy of the Ministry of Finance. The government realized the necessity of developing a domestic industry, but Russian entrepreneurs did not possess the necessary capital and technologies.<sup>11</sup> The solution was found in the idea of involving foreign capital and foreign entrepreneurs. The main question was how to make them invest in Russia and transfer production there instead of importing the ready products. The solution lied in modifying the tariff policy of the state.<sup>12</sup> The government made a

move from the policy of free trade towards that of protectionism, in which the last step was constituted by the tariff in 1891 elaborated by Dmitry Mendeleev (Table 2).<sup>13</sup>.

**Table 2. Tariffs, 1868 and 1891 (kopeks per pood)<sup>14</sup>**

	<i>1868</i>	<i>1891</i>
Pig iron	5	25-52.5
Iron	20-50	90-150
Rails	20	90
Machinery	30	250
Locomotives and other engines	75	300

Finance minister Sergey Witte, one of the consistent promoters of this policy did realize that the rise of tariffs would load a serious financial burden on the Russian consumers, due to the increasing prices of industrial products. Nevertheless, he believed that on the long run the involvement of foreign capital would lead to the establishment of competitive conditions and eventually to the fall of the prices of finished goods.<sup>15</sup>

In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century almost all the leading industrial countries adopted a protectionist policy: Germany for example in 1879, France in 1892, Italy in 1879 (and more severe tariffs in 1887), and Sweden in 1888. Among the major Western European powers, only Britain adhered to free trade principles.<sup>16</sup> Kevin H. O'Rourke, analyzing the correlation between tariffs and economic growth in ten countries between 1875 and 1914, demonstrated that in these cases tariffs were positively correlated with growth.<sup>17</sup>

Case studies show that tariff policy was not the only means to encourage foreign entrepreneurs to establish production. The policy of the Russian government to attract foreign entrepreneurs can be characterized as "stick and carrot" strategy. The protectionist tariff policy served as the stick, while the carrot was an attractive investment climate. Russian government, through a comprehensive public campaign, tried to convince foreigners that Russia offered a golden opportunity for investment. They published statistics in foreign languages, such as in the "The Russian Journal of Financial statistics". The image they cultivated was that of an unshakable financial stability, which played a crucial importance concerning long-term investment.



Foreign analysts too participated in creating an image of Russia as a “land of opportunities”, a promising arena for their activities and a tempting target for profitable investment. For example, in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century a Belgian professor and business promoter, Marcel Lawik visited Donbass and published a book about it, which became a kind of welcome poster of the region.<sup>18</sup>

As a result of all these efforts, a real “Russian industrial speculative fever” emerged by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Promising market, vast natural resources, low competition level combined with financial stability and political loyalty made investment in Russia a very attractive option. For this reason, foreign businesspersons became interested in combining local resources and markets with their leading banks capital and modern production technologies of the leading western firms.

The legislative regulation of foreign enterprises in the Russian Empire implied an equality of the Russian and the foreigners in terms of their possibilities. Only the law on the estates had a special section entirely devoted to the rights of foreigners in Russia. The civil and judicial codes, the credit statute and the direct taxes statute did not mark foreigners as a specific legal category.<sup>19</sup> The law however, provided a number of exceptions from this general rule. The licensing system impacted the stock companies as well some limitations applied for foreigners pursuing business activity in the frontier territories of the Russian Empire, but the Ukrainian provinces were not included among these specific areas. Thus, the statement made by researcher Tatyana Lazans’ka that “unless foreigners received Russian citizenship they had been discriminated” does not correspond to reality.<sup>20</sup> The Russian economy was liberal and its attitude was friendly towards the participation of foreign enterprises in industrial production in a variety of forms.

The fact that the Russian government guaranteed to purchase the products significantly enhanced the entrepreneurial enthusiasm. Almost each of the largest metallurgical plants, such as the Yuzovskiy iron and steel plant, the Nikolaev shipbuilding, mechanical and metallurgical plant, were eager to receive such assurance.<sup>21</sup>

The participation of the foreign entrepreneurs in the industrial activity could take various forms: portfolio and direct investment through different forms of associate membership and in form of individual entrepreneurship. Portfolio investments meant a passive ownership of the industrial companies’ stock, as opposed to direct investment that implied an active participation in the management of the enterprise.

The companies were registered either abroad or in Russia, depending on where their foundation took place. The “New Russia Company Ltd.” for example, that was the owner of the Yusovskiy iron and steel plant, was founded in 1869 in the United Kingdom, and its board of administration resided in London, with British directors.<sup>22</sup> The plant was managed by executive directors in Russia – John Hughes and John Gooch – but the most important, especially financial matters were settled in England, and the major part of the profit was transferred there, too.<sup>23</sup>

To cite another example, the “Nikopol-Mariupol Mining and Metallurgical Society” was established in Russia, and its board of administration too was Russian. Though the stock-company was founded in Russia, it was initiated by a German citizen, Adolf Rodshtein and an American, Edmund Smith. In 1914 the fixed capital totaled 15.4 million rubles, 4 million from which was possessed by Frenchmen, the share of Belgian measured 3 million, and 3 million was the share of German capital.<sup>24</sup> Thus, the Society was formally Russian, but its foundation was initiated by foreign businessmen, it was based on foreign capital. The entire equipment and engineering came from abroad as well: in 1896 a complete steel plant was transported to Nikopol from the United States, and it was launched under the supervision of American engineers. The neighbor plant “Russian Providence” of The Mariupol mining and smelting company led its engineering based on American productive standards, equipment and technologies as well.<sup>25</sup>

The most common situation was marked by a symbiosis of Russian and foreign capital and the joint participation of Russians and foreigners in the companies’ board of administration. A classic example of such cooperation is the “Russian-Belgian Metallurgical Society” that owned several large metallurgical plants in the Ekaterinoslav Province.<sup>26</sup> The society was founded in 1895 based on the Russian statute. The Russian Andriy Bunge became the chief of the administrative board, and the board members were Russian (F. Enakiev, M. Suschov, B. Yalovetskiy) together with a number of Belgians (O. Bie, E. Despres, A. Nef-Orban).<sup>27</sup> Investments and technologies were provided by the French bank “Société Générale”, the Belgian companies “Société anonyme du Charbonnage d’Angleur” and “Société anonyme Saint-Léonard à Liège”.

Another common way of founding companies in Russia was to establish affiliated enterprises of Western firms. In this case, the parent provided its subsidiaries with a start-up capital, equipment, technologies and managerial know-how. The stock company “Russian Providans” was

typical example for such an arrangement.<sup>28</sup> The society was founded in 1898 by the Belgian “Société Anonyme des laminoirs, forges, fonderies et usines de la Providence” to build steel plants and to carry out other types of business activities.<sup>29</sup> The plant was furnished exclusively with foreign equipment and managed by Belgian managers.

Though by the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century multiunit business enterprises owned by stock-companies started to replace gradually the small traditional enterprise, still the traditional individual (family) entrepreneurship was the dominant form. Most industrial enterprises were concentrated in the hands of the sole owner or co-owners, but the largest companies were owned by stock companies, and the lion’s share of the production and workers was focused there.

Contemporary publication of lists of plants and factories created on the basis of industrial censuses and other sources informs about the proportion and structure of foreign sole proprietorships and their business-interests.<sup>30</sup> By entering the data into a relative database system and analyzing it, the following can be concluded:

Among the enterprises located in the nine Ukrainian provinces<sup>31</sup> (a total of 2,655) at least 123 belonged to foreign citizens (5%). These enterprises produced 12 million of the total 228 million annual output of the sole proprietorships and concentrated 7 thousand of the total of 110 thousand workers. Therefore, the share of production corresponded to their share in the structure of entrepreneurship in Russia.

The absolute majority of enterprises owned by foreign citizens in the Ukrainian provinces belonged to Germans and Austrians – 60 % of the number, 60 % of the output, and 70 % of the workers (see Table 3).

**Table 3. Distribution of sole proprietorships with an owner of foreign nationality concerning the number and proportion of workers employed in the manufacturing and distribution (%).**

Citizenship	<i>Enterprises</i>	<i>Production</i>	<i>Workers</i>
German	38	37	57
Austrian	22	26	13
French	3	5	8
Turkish	3	3	7
Greek	7	3	6

Belgian	13	6	3
Italian	0	1	3
British	11	18	2
Swedish	0	1	2
Swiss	3	2	2

It has been a recurring view in scholarship that business interests of foreign entrepreneurs in Russia focused mainly on “high-tech” industries, such as machinery, metallurgy, chemical industry.

Data in Table 4 data show that the business interest of foreign entrepreneurs was indeed more attracted by metalworking as compared to that of Russian ones. However, they were broadly represented in “traditional” sectors too such as food processing. In general, the structure of the industrial business interest of foreigners repeated the structure of the interest of all the owners.

**Table 4. Structure of industries by types of owners (in %%)**

<i>Group</i>	<i>All single proprietorship</i>	<i>Foreign citizen single proprietorship</i>	<i>Associated owners</i>
Food processing	52	35	54
Processing of mineral substances	12	5	10
Metal processing	10	27	15
Mechanical wood processing	8	6	6
Paper production	6	5	4
Processing of cotton, wool, hemp	4	9	2
Processing of animal products	4	6	4
Chemical production	2	3	4
Processing of different materials	1	5	1

Foreign joint companies appear as being more attracted by the technology industry, which sounds fairly reasonable. Building machine and metallurgy plants require large-scale long-term investment, usually not possessed by a sole entrepreneur. The solution lied in associating capital, technology, and management.

According to the opinion of Rainer Lindner, business activity of foreign entrepreneurs characterized all regions of the Ukrainian provinces, but they were most densely centered in the cities of Southeast Ukraine, while the historical cities, such as Kiev and Zhitomir, remained the preferred locations for business activity of Ukrainian, Russian and Jewish entrepreneurs.<sup>32</sup>

In the following I will briefly review the main components of industrial management from the point of view of participation of foreign entrepreneurs, the “five M’s”: money, machinery, materials, methods, and men.

## Money

According to various estimations concerning different times, foreign capital constituted the 1/3 to the 1/2 part of investment in joint-stock companies operating in Russia.<sup>33</sup>

It is difficult to reconstruct the national structure of investment because of the denationalization process of the capital that took place in this period. Different attempts to calculate it however, show the dominance of Belgian and French capital in South Russia (see Table. 5).

**Table 5. Foreign capital in the Russian industry by region in 1900 (in million francs)<sup>34</sup>**

	<i>France</i>	<i>Belgium</i>	<i>Great Britain</i>	<i>Germany</i>
South	275	550	236	261
Poland	106	32	4	93
Center	72	106	4	24
Russia	692	831	236	261

Foreign capital played the most significant role in mining, machine-building, electrical and chemical industries, that is the high-tech industries that became the basis of the industrialization.<sup>35</sup>

Foreign entrepreneurial investment was involved in the case of each among the 14 major steel producers in South Russia between 1888 and 1900, even if they had Russian statutes and were managed by Russian managers. On the eve of the First World War, the operation of 26 of the 36 Donbass coal mines was based on foreign capital and foreign technology.<sup>36</sup>

Such a significant share of foreign capital has drawn criticism on the financial policy of the government, and gave reason to some of the contemporaries and historians to speak about a “semi-colonial” status of the Russian economy. They accused foreign capital with creating competition for Russian entrepreneurs, they complained for the outflow of the profit claimed that the high proportion of foreign capital enabled foreigners to influence governmental decision making. The latter would have already endangered political sovereignty and national security.

Minister Sergey Witte formulated the essence of such concerns:

There have been lately repeated voices against foreign capital flow. They insist that foreign capital harms the main national interests, that it strives for absorbing the profit from the rising Russian industry, that it leads to selling-out natural resources.<sup>37</sup>

He responded to the criticism as follows:

Foreign capital is five times less than Russian. Nevertheless, it is more noticeable and strikes the eye because it brings both better knowledge and more sophisticated enterprise. But it leaves these cultural forces in Russia, that is why the country should not be dissatisfied.<sup>38</sup>

Evaluations of foreign business as speculative can still be found even in modern historiography. For example, Ukraine scholar Tetyana Lazans'ka says: “the huge profits earned by foreign entrepreneurs were almost completely exported”.<sup>39</sup> Some capital certainly left the country, but dividends received by foreign shareholders, in general, were not taken out, but reinvested into the production.<sup>40</sup> The constant increasing of the production capacity forced the owners to reinvest everything, up to the last penny. By the time the foreign entrepreneurs were ready to reap the fruits of their investments however, the market collapsed because of the 1900-1903 industrial crisis.<sup>41</sup>

The large amount of foreign capital, both in absolute and in relative terms, in itself does not prove the subjection of the economy. Large

businesses, both foreign and Russian ones, tried to lobby for their own interests in the government and to influence the tariff and tax policy<sup>42</sup> and the system of state orders about industrial products. At the same time, the strategic issues of domestic and foreign government policy remained independent from this influence.

## **Machines and materials**

Foreign businessman believed that their advanced manufacturing technologies and managerial know-how were their main asset, the key to producing large profit in Russia. The question is whether the technology of the enterprises belonging to foreign entrepreneurs corresponded to the European standards. Analysis of case studies and memoirs of engineers let us give an affirmative answer. The largest metallurgical and machine-building plants were often constructed with an equipment entirely brought from Western Europe. For example, in the summer of 1870 John Hughes transported equipment and tools to the Donbass on eight ships, accompanied by a hundred South-Welsh specialists.<sup>43</sup>

In late 1880s a Warsaw factory was dismantled by Belgian steel industry workers and sent to the village Kamenskoe located near Ekaterinoslav province. Due to the mastery of the Polish managers combined with the know-how of the Belgian engineers, one of the largest metallurgical complexes in the world was founded here.<sup>44</sup>

In 1896 a whole steel and tube plant was transported from the USA to Nikopol' (near the Azov Sea). The American engineers came to Russia together with the equipment to conduct the start-up of the plant.<sup>45</sup>

According to the results of the industrial census in 1900, the cost of the equipment used in the Russian factories and produced in Russia totaled 27.2 million roubles, while the cost of the equipment produced abroad counted 37.7 million roubles, or 58 %.<sup>46</sup> The proportion of foreign equipment was even higher in high-tech enterprises. For example, both of the locomotive plants located in the Ukrainian cities, in Kharkov and Lugansk, were installed based on foreign equipment and managed by foreign engineers.<sup>47</sup> In the Kharkiv Locomotive Plant they applied machine tools mostly made by German and American factories, with the exception of some that were produced by the Kramatorsky Steel Plant and some of their own products.<sup>48</sup> All these mean that Russian industry was developed mainly based on the foreign equipment.

Production figures too indicate the high level of technology implemented at metallurgical plants in South Russia. Table 6 shows that the average output of a blast furnace in South Russia was even more than that in the Western-European countries. The explanation lies in the high quality of Krivoy Rog iron ore combined with its processing with advanced metal working technology.<sup>49</sup>

**Table 6. Average yearly output per blast furnace in selected areas (in tons)<sup>50</sup>**

	1880	1890	1900	1910	1913
All Russia	2	4	10	20	28
South Russia	7	16	47	59	63
Great Britain			23	30	
Germany			31	49	
France			21	35	
Belgium			27	46	
United States			56	100	

The level of technology in the coal mining industry was worse. Mining engineer E. Kolodub employed in the Grushevskij mine for many years wrote: “Attempts to use machinery produced no success”.<sup>51</sup> Another mining engineer, assistant manager at “Pastuhovskaya” mining (township Sulin) O. Terpigorev evaluated the situation in similar terms:

The foreign owners of the coal mines certainly wanted to squeeze everything they could out of their mines. That is why they introduced machinery there, for example, mechanical tramming in the John Huger’s mines, and coal hammers in the Enakiev’s mines. All these tools were of course produced abroad. But such mechanization was absolutely not typical for Donbass. Most of the mines that I have seen were equipped with the most primitive tools. In fact, the only “mechanism” there was the miner’s muscle strength. The coal was produced by using only tubber or pickaxe.<sup>52</sup>

Consequently, the level of technology of coal mining in Donbass was lower than in the Western European countries. Still, this represented a progress as compared to the previous times, when the mine was only a number of few meter deep holes (“peasant hole”).<sup>53</sup>



As John McKay rightly pointed out, foreigners were not necessarily the first to apply certain processes or innovations standing on the technological frontier of their particular industry – certain domestic Russian firms were also on that frontier – but foreigners as a group applied the advanced technique in general. As a result of this consistent approach, what had previously been isolated or exceptional was very rapidly diffused and became received and usual. Similarly, by 1914 technical differences between entirely foreign and Russian firms became increasingly blurred and in some cases ceased to exist.<sup>54</sup>

## **Methods**

Foreign entrepreneurs copied the structure and principles of management of the Western-European companies. Most of the largest metallurgical and machine building plants, especially in the 1890s, employed many foreigners. The share of foreigners among all employees in South Russia, however, was not that significant.

According to the approximate data collected by the Department of Trade and Manufactures of the Ministry of Finance, in the climax of the Russian industrialization the proportion of foreign top-managers in South Russia did not exceed 10 % (see table 5). Although in high-tech production, such as iron-making and machinery building, it increased up to 28 %, most of the managers were Russian even there.

**Table 7. The ratio of Russian and foreign productive top-managers in 1890<sup>55</sup>**

Provinces	Russians managers		Foreign managers		% of foreigners
	With technical education	Without technical education	With technical education	Without technical education	
<b>Ekaterinoslavskaya</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>324</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>8,2</b>
Including iron-making and machinery building plants	13	34	8	8	25,4
<b>Don Host Oblast</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>1229</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0,5</b>
Including iron-making and machinery building plants	11	2	1	-	7,1
<b>Tavricheskaya</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>7,6</b>
Including iron-making and machinery building plants	2	37	1	8	18,8
<b>Kharkovskaya</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6,0</b>
Including iron-making and machinery building plants	4	4	5	1	42,9
<b>Khesonskaya</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>341</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>23,7</b>
Including iron-making and machinery building plants	7	10	10	5	46,9
<b>Totally: South of Russia</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>2457</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>7,2</b>
Including iron-making and machinery building plants	37	87	25	22	27,5
<b>European Russia</b>	<b>957</b>	<b>16717</b>	<b>417</b>	<b>903</b>	<b>6,9</b>
<b>Russian Empire</b>	<b>1199</b>	<b>20843</b>	<b>525</b>	<b>1199</b>	<b>7,3</b>

Foreign specialists had mainly prosaic reasons to come to Russian provincial cities, characterized by “boredom, monotony, exceptionally dull life”:<sup>56</sup> the promise of a fast career and high salary, much more they could have received than in Western Europe.

Companies spent much for administrative and engineering services. The main advantage of employing a foreign manager over a Russian one apparently lied not only in the higher professional level of the former, but in his superiority in the field of ethics. The general perception of the level of Russian dishonesty, however, appears to be an overestimation. Foreign managers were often described as persons for whom the administration of a public corporation was a profession, not a “fief to be plundered”.<sup>57</sup>

Both Russian and foreign industrial companies had to face the problem of internal and external corruption at all levels, but its level can be estimated rather differently on the basis of various sources.

For example, the miners’ folklore presents an illegal financial relationship between the miners and the mine foreman as follows:<sup>58</sup>

You have received a pay  
Do not forget about foreman miners  
One rouble after every hundred, two – on vodka  
Three and a half – on tips.

However, as the mining engineer Alexander Fenin wrote:

... among South Russian engineers, professional ethics required irreversible loyalty to the owner. Throughout my long career, when I was in touch with hundreds of mining engineers whom I observed under everyday conditions, I never came across dishonest people, with only one or two exceptions. Such people immediately became social outcasts.<sup>59</sup>

Similar illustrations can be found in many other memoirs too, like in that of Eduard Kriger-Voinovsky, the Minister of Railways of Russia: “cases of dishonesty among the management and employees of the railway were rare”.<sup>60</sup>

On the other hand, incompetent people occurred among foreign engineers as well. The factory inspector A. Klepikov wrote about one of these managers:

This was a foreigner, a Frenchman, a complete ignoramus in his profession. The owners paid him a lot. He did not have any knowledge, either in chemistry or in coloristic and used recipes from foreign recipes. Of course, he was doing his business very badly. He was a typical representative of the type of alien-cheaters you could previously often meet in Russian factories. He was made many penalties and fired before his contract expired.<sup>61</sup>

There was one more field where Russian managers could perform better – that of the relations with the state and the society. One of the highest compliments that could be paid to a foreign manager was that he knew “how to treat officials correctly”. Such cases were, however, rare exceptions, so the best solution was to employ local managers, which generally meant entering into a cooperation with Russians, who were more efficient in solving external questions such as negotiating with the government for contracts, obtaining official permissions, and dealing with locals.

For example, in the “New Russia Company Ltd.” a honorable figure was assigned as a head responsible for the negotiations with the government: Prince Sergey Kochubei. His rights and responsibilities were settled in the statute of the company. He was an honorary director, but only “with the right of presence and advisory opinion”. He did not have any fixed obligations, nor any responsibilities.<sup>62</sup>

Foreign managers lived separately from the workers and there existed also a language barrier between them and the locals.<sup>63</sup> This barrier was not just a problem in the communication between the managers and the workers, but between the foreign and local managers as well. For example, the representative of the British company “Vickers” cooperating with the shipyard “Naval” in Nikolayev wrote in his letter addressed to the director of the company and the owner of the shipyard that “because of the difficulties with the language sometimes one could really be annoyed ...”.<sup>64</sup>

The language barrier was a common problem. Most of foreign top-managers of large enterprises could not speak Russian and communicated with the local workers through special representatives.<sup>65</sup> In other cases, it was the “body language” that helped to solve the problem through the method of learning by doing. For example, in the Nikopol iron plant, according to the memories of a worker, the communication between the foreign managers and the Russian workers took place as follows:

Kennedy [an American engineer] was a great specialist <...> he did not speak Russian, still, we learned a lot from him. When he was frowning, it meant that something was wrong. He took a wrench, unfastened the screws, checked if they were all right and tightened them again. When one could understand, based on this pantomime, what he was looking for, one went to him and said "I see, Mister!". He gave the wrench back, and he checked if everything was done the proper way. He himself knew how to use a hammer, a scrap, how to change a truss, how to handle the plumbing. He never lost his temper. When he became angry, his face turned red, but you could never hear him raising his voice. Even if his clothes became dirty, it did not take more than an hour and he returned wearing clean ones.<sup>66</sup>

After 1900, sources suggest a massive trend of replacing foreign managers with Russians.<sup>67</sup> It can be explained by a number of reasons.

In 1900–1903, due to the crisis, profits decreased, and owners attempted to cut the high expenses of the management and administration. Employing a Russian manager costed less, so it appeared as a possibility to economize on administrative expenses. Another objective factor resulted from the increasing qualification and number of Russian engineers.<sup>68</sup> As Aleksandr Fenin wrote,

About 60 percent of the coal and 90 percent of the cast iron was produced in plants owned by foreign companies, but by the very beginning of the twentieth century, the overwhelming majority of the managers in the Donbass were Russian engineers. One had to admit that the Russian technical intelligentsia rose brilliantly to this difficult challenge.<sup>69</sup>

After 1904 one more reason emerged to minimize the presence of foreign managers. The development of the revolutionary movement was accompanied by the spread of xenophobia and anti-capitalism, bursting into direct aggression and even attack against foreign managers and engineers in a number of cases.

There was one more alternative of the choice between a more qualified but expensive foreign manager and a Russian one, that is to find an "intermediate" solution by employing Polish engineers and managers. As an example, in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century all engineers at the "Providans" steel plant were Polish.<sup>70</sup>

## Men

A researcher studying the economic history of South Russia unavoidably has to encounter an interesting “paradox”. The second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the early 20<sup>th</sup> century was characterized by a rapid growth of the population and contemporaries were speaking about agrarian overpopulation and the “extra” manpower.<sup>71</sup> Still, entrepreneurs complained about a lack of workers.<sup>72</sup> The problem was recognized by Russian publicists and scientists too. The “Complete geographical description of our fatherland” (1910) says:

... the Donetsk coal industry almost always experiences, but especially in the summer, a lack of workers. The government even offered to provide coal-industrialists with up to 10 thousand prisoners, but this proposal was rejected by the owners of the mines.<sup>73</sup>

This contradiction can be explained by the specific character of the labor market in the region. The southern labor force can be described with an unskilled and migrating character as compared to that in Moscow or Saint-Petersburg. Gustav Hartmann, the founder of the locomotive plant in Lugansk complained that

since all Russian iron plants were fully loaded with work at this time, we managed to employ only few well-skilled workers for the rolling mill.<sup>74</sup>

Many large enterprises in South Russia were founded literally in the steppes, thus, they were not able to find enough workers among the locals and had to employ migrating labor force.<sup>75</sup> The majority of the workers were peasants and tried to stay in touch with the countryside even when being employed in industrial enterprises. Most factories ceased to operate during the intensive farming season prior to the industrialization. Even in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, many among the small factories worked seasonally. According to a special poll created through factory inspection in 1909, middle-size and large factories operated about 266 days per year.<sup>76</sup>

Seasonal work contradicted to the financial interests of the entrepreneurs after the beginning of the development of heavy industry. Moreover, ceasing the operation of the equipment in certain types of production, such as that of a blast furnace, entailed serious technical and financial consequences. Companies resorted to different methods of

keeping workers from seasonal migration: increasing their salary during the summer months (up to 1.5 times more<sup>77</sup>), constructing houses for the workers, creating other means of social infrastructure such as churches, hospitals, schools, baths, etc. There were even more radical attempts too, for example, workers of Yusovsky iron plant were not allowed to plant even a vegetable garden.<sup>78</sup>

Another important task to achieve was developing a new work ethic among the industrial workers still characterized by a traditional one. This traditional type of labor ethic meant working until the satisfaction of the basic needs, without seeking to accumulate money and goods.<sup>79</sup>

The miners' song describes this way of life:<sup>80</sup>

I received a pay  
Exactly twenty-two rubles,  
Two rubles gave at home,  
Well, twenty – for drinking  
Being jolly, soul and body  
All the pay have flown away.

The mine foreman E. Kolodub wrote:

Sober locals use to earn well and live in their buildings properly. Among the local drunkards one can find many professionals. From the other side they are bad workers. They are ready to work only when compelled by hunger and cold and when they do not anything left <...> We had several periods of increasing and decreasing the wages. It was sometimes increased to three times more than the normal earnings. But one could observe neither the welfare nor the increase of civic consciousness among them even in these periods. Then the more they earn, than less days they were working.<sup>81</sup>

Complaints about drunkenness as a terrible vice in the everyday life of the workers occur in all the memoirs written by engineers, mine workers, and factory inspectors. Drunkenness led to more and more frequent absence from work, and if it became a mass phenomenon, it could obstruct the operation of the entire plant or factory. Entrepreneurs were fighting against this by closing wine shops and even by breaking the law, as they did not hand their wages to the workers in each month, but only twice a year. As another solution, the money was directly sent to the workers' families.<sup>82</sup>

As it appears, despite some progress in the field of labor ethics, the industrialization in general was combined with a catastrophic backwardness in the conditions of labor, life and culture of the Russian workers.

## **Conclusion**

To sum up, the analysis of the sources confirm that foreign entrepreneurs imported capital, innovation, advanced technology, management models to Russia, and established business relationships with Western-European banks and industrial groups.

From the late 1880s the movement of foreign entrepreneurs, managers and workers to the Russian Empire became a mass phenomenon, determined by the protectionist tariff policy and the attractive investment climate meaning vast natural resources and a promising domestic market.

The structure of the industrial business interests of the foreigners repeated the structure of the interests of all the owners, but the foreign joint companies were especially attracted by “high-tech” industries, such as machinery, metallurgy, chemical industry.

All during the pre-Soviet period of industrialization, the development of the Russian industry was mainly based on the imported equipment. The foreign entrepreneurs copied the structure and management principles of the Western-European companies, and the largest companies also employed foreign engineers, managers and workers. The encounter of the foreign ideals concerning labor ethic with the Russian reality was, however, not without problem. The clash of the strategies and expectations of the foreign owners and managers with the traditional values of workers recruited from among the local agrarian population directs the attention towards the social context of the economic changes.

Still, foreign entrepreneurs were able to transfer a “spirit of capitalism” into South Russia. They gave an extra impulse to the development of industrial capitalism and played an important and generally positive role in the relatively successful Russian industrialization.



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# TRANS-CULTURAL TRADE IN THE BLACK SEA REGION, 1250-1700: INTEGRATION OF THE ARMENIAN TRADING DIASPORA IN THE MOLDAVIAN PRINCIPALITY<sup>1</sup>

When dealing with the multiethnic merchants of pre-modern Moldavia, modern Romanian scholarship has largely confined itself to Greeks. But Greeks were by no means the only “foreign” traders to engage in commercial and financial transactions. This article looks at Armenians along with the other merchant groups active in Moldavia’s foreign trade from three different angles. Part one, an overview of the types of activities Armenians were involved in, finds that, while Armenians who settled in Moldavia acted as members of the larger Armenian merchant network facilitating the long-distance oriental trade, they also were active in the export of Moldavian commodities. Part two discusses a topic that has received a great deal of attention in Jewish studies, but that remains neglected in the Moldavian-Armenian context: the position of merchants in the host society, in particular their relationship with the holders of power. Were merchants an integral part of the state, or did they operate as an autonomous class whose interests differed from those of the political elite? Part three probes this issue further by examining how the ruling elite perceived Armenian merchants and why affiliation with Armenian Church was so important, not only for making the group consciousness of merchants themselves, but also for the effectiveness of the trans-border merchant network, in general. The Moldavian elite were deeply involved in the export of domestic agriculture, which also had a political dimension, turning the principality into the apple of strife between neighbor powers – the Ottomans, Habsburgs, and Poland. Thus, there was a fundamental convergence of interests between politics and trade. Armenian merchants, who, in turn, achieved high levels of wealth, fulfilled diplomatic functions

and reached beyond it, and by doing this were involved in political intrigues with the holders of power. Though vulnerable to oppression by state officials, they often offered passive resistance, which mostly took the form of migration to more politically stable and/or economically attractive regions such as Poland, Transylvania and Ottoman domains.

Many specialized studies are devoted to Armenian trading diasporas in Poland, Ukraine, and Transylvania. Some research has been done on trade along the main routes, as, for instance, between the Ottoman domains and the Polish kingdom. However, less attention had been given to the logistics of Armenian caravans on the routs between Lemberg/Kamianiec and Constantinople/Adrianople. Until now, there has been no special study investigating the issue of the persecution of Armenians in the 1550s-1570s. Most authors writing on pre-modern Armenian diaspora excluded the involvement of Armenian merchants into the Moldavian politics from their research agenda, repeating instead stories about the alleged Armenian background of some Moldavian rulers.<sup>2</sup>

This paper will explore the following questions: How did the Armenian diaspora interact with its host society? How did diasporic experience contribute to the processes of political mediation and to the economic exchange between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish kingdom? How did Armenian merchant communities negotiate legal regimes and extra-territorial rights in various political and cultural contexts – that is, in the Moldavian Principality and the Ottoman domains? How did different local concepts of identity and belonging inform the trans-regional diasporic experience of Armenian communities in Moldavia and Poland?

Based on these questions, I have outlined four research areas:

1. Armenian migration to Moldavia and the establishment of a merchant network as a part of long-distance oriental trade in the late Middle Ages.
2. Caravan trade between Lemberg and Constantinople: routs, logistics, conditions.
3. Persecutions of Armenians in Moldavia in the 1550s-1570s: religious, economic, or political?
4. Integration of Armenians into the Moldavian politics and society in the late 16<sup>th</sup> – 17<sup>th</sup> centuries.

## **Black Sea trade in the Late Middle Ages: the emergence of Armenian merchant network**

In the second half of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, when the decline of the Crusaders' states in Levant became evident, Genoese and Venetian

merchants gradually shifted their attention to the northern shore of the Black Sea. There, they established their trade colonies in Caffa, Soldaia, Cembalo, Vosporo, Kilia, Moncastro, and Tana<sup>3</sup> to trade with the Golden Horde and even to travel as far as Karakorum and Khanbalik-Beijing.<sup>4</sup> This route through the Black Sea to Soldaia in the Crimea and then, by land, through the Golden Horde was used by Franciscan William of Rubruck and the Polo brothers as early as the 1250s.<sup>5</sup> The security provided by the Mongol control over the whole Inner Asia, combined with the remarkable *yam* system – post communication network<sup>6</sup> – meant that the trade routes from China to Europe were safer than they had ever been before. The sack in 1268 and 1291 of Antioch and Acre in the mainland led to the growing importance of Cilician Armenia and Cyprus in the oriental trade, in which Armenian merchants were also involved. The main trade routes from the Ilkhans' capital Tabriz to the ports of Trebizond and Laiazzo/Layas/Ayas lay through Armenia. In 1288, the Armenian king of Cilicia Levon II granted Genoese merchants the privilege to establish their *fondacco*<sup>7</sup> in Mamistria.<sup>8</sup> These were the main preconditions for the Armenian-Italian economic cooperation in the region. The establishment by the Genoese and Venetians of the trade ports network in the Black Sea stimulated the influx of Armenian merchants and artisans into this region.

I have highlighted three stages of the Armenian migration in the northern part of the Black Sea region. First, through Trebizond and Tiflis to the Crimea (Caffa, Soldaia, and Solchat/Surchat) in 1250s-1290s. Second, to the ports in the estuary of the main rivers, that is, the Danube, the Dniester and the Don (Kilia and Licostomo, Moncastro-Akkerman, and Azak-Tana respectively) in the first half of 14<sup>th</sup> century. Third, to the inland trade centres situated deeper (Lemberg, Lutsk, Kamianiets-Podilski, Suceava, and Iași) in the 1360s-1390s.

The migrations of the 1360s-1390s from Crimea were provoked mostly by the continuous period of political rivalry and internal wars in the Golden Horde,<sup>9</sup> as well as by the destructions caused by Tamerlane in 1395-1396 and the expansion of the Great Duke of Lithuania Vitovt (Witold) in 1397-1398. In the 1360s-1370s, the steppeland of the northern part of the Black Sea region – modern day Southern Ukraine – witnessed numerous clashes between Mamay – a powerful emir of the western part of the Golden Horde – and his rivals from the eastern part of the Horde. And the Crimean peninsula being the most profitable because of international trade and well-fortified with the sea and mountains was at the epicenter of the rivalry between the Tatar khans until the mid-fifteenth century. In

1395-1396, Tamerlane destroyed such centers of trade in the Golden Horde as Yeni Saray on the Volga and Solchat in Crimea. As a result, in the second half of 14<sup>th</sup> century, the centralized power of the Khans has declined and travel in the steppeland became unsafe. Since the road of caravanserais established there before mid-fourteenth century – so-called *via Tartarica*<sup>10</sup> – came into decline, the trade routes shifted from the steppeland to the lands between the Carpathians and the Dniester River, that is, to the emerging Moldavian Principality.

Colophons of Armenian manuscripts written in the 1360s in Crimea reflect this situation of instability and chaos, and, in the mind of local Armenians, a strong intent to migrate.<sup>11</sup>

In this time there was much confusion and agitation at the hands of temporal conquerors, because there was neither leader nor king who could restore the peace, for, as the Lord said, “a divided kingdom cannot stand” [Luke 11:17; Mark 3:24]. Because of this, the governor of this city is digging trenches; he is digging a pit around this city, and he is destroying numerous houses from their foundations. And there is much destruction, and everyone is stricken with fear (Surchat, 1363).<sup>12</sup>

There are also some pieces of evidence that in the 1360s there were migrations of Armenians from the Black Sea region, namely from Caffa,<sup>13</sup> to the Venetian Crete<sup>14</sup> and to the Hospitallers’ islands of Lesbos<sup>15</sup> and Kos<sup>16</sup> in the Archipelago. But the main migration flow was in the north-west direction.

The Armenian merchants themselves preferred to settle in more stable states, such as the Polish Kingdom and the Moldavian Principality. Armenian merchants knew these lands thanks to their previous commercial trips, because trade routes lead through the main cities of the region to Western Europe and to the Baltic Sea. At the early stage, Armenian merchants were granted the protection charter (*salvum conductum*) by the local rulers for the safe and secure entrance and trade in their dominions. A charter issued by Daniel, the Ruthenian prince of Galicia/Halychyna (1238-1264), mentioned in 1578, could serve as a good example in this regard.<sup>17</sup> Then Armenians established their settlements in accordance with the permission of the rulers. There were Armenian colonies in some cities – at least in Lviv/Lemberg and Lutsk – long before the mid-fourteenth century.<sup>18</sup> Armenian merchants could use good relations with the rulers and local authorities they established during their previous trips. Now

Armenian merchants preferred to reside in Lemberg, Kamianiec or Suceava and from there to travel to the Black Sea ports in case of peaceful circumstances.

According to the charter issued by Armenian catholicos/patriarch Mesrop I in 1364 to Grigoris, the Armenian bishop of Lemberg, his diocese consisted of parishes in the cities of Lemberg, Volodymyr, and Lutsk.<sup>19</sup> Later, this situation changed dramatically. According to the charter issued by the Armenian catholicos/patriarch Theodoros II on August 13, 1388 to Johannes, the Armenian bishop of Lemberg, his diocese included parishes in the cities of Lemberg, Siret, Suceava, Kamianiec, Lutsk, Volodymyr, Kiev, Moldavia, Botin (Hotin or Botoșăni),<sup>20</sup> and Yeni Saray.<sup>21</sup> There is an evident growth in the number of Armenian parishes in Galicia, Podolia, Volhynia, and Moldavia, and a decline in the Volga region, since the Armenian community in the Golden Horde capital Yeni Saray<sup>22</sup> was also included in the diocese of Lemberg. On 30 July 1401, the Moldavian prince Alexandru cel Bun (1400-1432) subordinated Armenian churches in the Principality to Ohannes, the Armenian bishop of Lemberg.<sup>23</sup>

The migration of Armenians caused an active building of new churches in the cities of the Moldavian Principality, in the south-east of the Polish Kingdom (former Galician Principality), and in Podolia Principality in the south-west of Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the second half of 14<sup>th</sup> century. On August 30, 1363, two Armenians – Jacob, son of Szakinsach, inhabitant of Caffa, and Panos/Panas, son of Abraham, inhabitant of Nahel/Gagel<sup>24</sup> – gave the church they built in Lemberg to the local Armenian community.<sup>25</sup> Sons of Panos – Asslan and Abraham – are mentioned in the Lemberg city records many times during the period of 1382-1389.<sup>26</sup> I suggest that Panos built an Armenian church in Lemberg, because he intended to settle in the city and his sons Asslan and Abraham also lived in Lemberg. The Armenian liturgical book *Chashots* was copied by the Armenian priest Stephan in the Crimean city of Solchat in 1349. The Armenian Sinan, son of Chutlubei, bought this book and donated it on August 14, 1394 to the Armenian church of St. Nicholas he started to build in Kamianiec-Podilski. The church was completed in 1398 and given by Sinan to the local Armenian community.<sup>27</sup> The financial capacity to build a church made of stone by one or two individuals points to the fact that the founders were rich Armenian merchants doing their business between the Black Sea ports and inland cities, where they built new churches.

Polish, Lithuanian, and Moldavian rulers were interested to invite Armenian merchants into their domains in order to increase their profits

from the commerce fees paid by merchants, to develop cities in the borderland with steppeland, and to use these merchants as middlemen to export agricultural produce – crops, wax, skins, and furs – from nobility's estates to the Black Sea ports. It is possible that Armenian merchants who settled in Kamianiec were granted with the special charter by the Lithuanian princes Koriatovich – rulers of Podolia – between 1374 and 1394.<sup>28</sup>

Along with the convenient transactions and credits, there were the following major forms of cooperation between Armenian, Italian and Greek merchants in the late medieval Black Sea trade:

- There were mixed partnerships of two to ten Armenian and Greek merchants who rented Genoese ships to transport crops, salt, and other merchandise from Caffa to Trebizond.<sup>29</sup>

- Armenian skimmers of Caffa took credits from the Italian merchants with the obligation to supply the processed bull skins a year later.<sup>30</sup> This one year term may probably be explained by the fact that Italians needed one year for their trip to Italy and back.

- Armenian merchants from the northern shore ports of the Black Sea traveled deeper into the remote parts of modern Ukraine, Russia, Romania, and Moldavia. There, they sold oriental goods to the local merchants and bought crops, wax and furs. They used the rivers Dniester, Danube, and Don/Tanais for their trips. There were Armenian communities in the respective river ports of Moncastro-Akkerman,<sup>31</sup> Kilia,<sup>32</sup> and Licostomo,<sup>33</sup> and Azak-Tana,<sup>34</sup> mentioned in sources dated from the 1340s-1360s. There, Armenians sold these goods to Italian and Greek merchants, who transported them as far as Constantinople-Pera,<sup>35</sup> Cyprus,<sup>36</sup> Syria,<sup>37</sup> Egypt, and Italy. Thus, Armenian merchants took an active part in the process of shaping trade and commerce in the Great Circle around the northern shore of the Black Sea, the Archipelago, the southern shore of Asia Minor, and the land route through Laiazzo, Erzinjan, Erzerum, and Trebizond.

After the Ottoman sack of Constantinople in 1453, of Caffa and Soldaia in 1475, and of Kilia and Moncastro in 1484, many local merchants, including some Armenians among them, were resettled in Constantinople, because the Sultan Mehmed II Fatih intended to transform his new capital into the main centre of the oriental trade.<sup>38</sup> According to the earliest surviving *defter* survey, dated 1477, there were 372 Armenian households in Constantinople and the Frankish trading town of Galata.<sup>39</sup>

Thus, in the late 15<sup>th</sup> century, the land route through the lands of the Moldavian Principality to Adrianople and Constantinople became

the main road for the Armenian merchants of Poland. Charters issued by the princes Alexandru cel Bun in 1408 and Ștefan cel Mare in 1460 to regulate collection of tolls and dues, taken from merchants traveling through Moldavia, indicate "Armenian cart" as a stable unit of taxation.<sup>40</sup>

The discovery of the sea route to India in 1498-1499 also led to the change of merchandise exported by the Armenian merchants from the Ottoman Empire and Persia. Now, instead of silk and spices, Armenian merchants from Lemberg and Kamianiec mostly traded with exported westwards carpets, horses, jewelry and textiles, produced in Asia Minor and Persia.<sup>41</sup> Raw silk and cotton were exported by Armenian merchants residing in the cities of Armenia and, after 1605, mostly in New Julfa, near Persia's capital Ispahan, to the Aleppo and Smyrna and then, via the Mediterranean Sea, to Livorno and Venice.<sup>42</sup>

According to F. Mauro, merchant communities and nations retained their own culture, and strong ties of solidarity existed within each nation. Powerful internal solidarity was most conspicuous among large ethnic formations of eastern origin. The Armenian merchant network's redeployment on a vast scale occurred between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century, and corresponded to a combination of new political and economic circumstances.<sup>43</sup>

## **Logistics of the caravan trade**

Merchants and their property were protected by treaties between the Ottoman sultans and the Polish kings. These treaties also emphasized a particular role and significance of Armenian merchants in the trade between the two states. The capitulations, sent in 1577 by sultan Murad III to the Polish king Stefan Bathory, read:

...when Armenians and other infidel merchants living under the royal hand [*i.e.*, the subjects of Polish king] want to come to Moldavia and my other well-protected dominions and practice trade, they should not travel through deserted and wild areas or use hidden roads, but they should come by the direct public road which has been customarily traveled by merchants.<sup>44</sup>

The Ottoman authorities openly required that the merchants use the public roads. Such restrictions ensured that the merchants would not

evade the payment of custom duties. Secondly, public roads were safer from robbers as they were frequently traveled and patrolled.<sup>45</sup>

The Sultans also granted Armenian merchant privileges for free/safe passage (*salvum conductum*). These charters were then kept in the Armenian courts in Kamianiec and Lemberg. Before the caravan trip to the Ottoman Empire, a senior of the caravan – *caravanbashi* (Turkish – *karban başı*, *kervan başı*, Latin – *caravanae ductor*) – elected by the merchants, went to the Armenian city hall –  *ratusz* – and asked for these charters to conduct a safe travel. Then *wojt* – the mayor of the autonomous Armenian community in Kamianiec – gave him the so-called “Turkish privileges” on the eight sheets in one carrying case. *Caravanbashi* was obligated to use these privileges to defend his companions during the travel and to return them when this trip is has ended.<sup>46</sup> According to Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, the role of *karban başı* is first mentioned officially in the Ottoman *‘ahdname* of 1598.<sup>47</sup> He also stated that in 1607, the Porte officially authorized *karban başı* to solve criminal and civil cases among the Polish subjects participating in their caravans.<sup>48</sup> Quite possibly, it was only a reconfirmation of privileges, granted earlier. A story retold by the young Flemish humanist Georg van der Does, who traveled from Lemberg to Constantinople with Armenian merchants in 1597, reveals that Armenian *caravanbashi* disposed the sultan’s charters, describing his judicial competence, long before 1607 and even before 1598.<sup>49</sup> *Caravanbashi* – had in his competence cases concerned with trade, inheritance of dead merchants’ property, and some criminal issues. Polish and German merchants, who joined the caravan, as well as other travellers, were also under the jurisdiction of *caravanbashi*.<sup>50</sup>

Every caravan consisted of several dozens of merchants and servicemen in their disposition. Every merchant had his merchandise loaded on several carts. As a rule, merchants recruited coachers (*aurigae*) – mostly Poles, residents of suburbs in Lemberg and Kamianiec. All of the caravan members were armed with guns and sabers. In order to protect themselves from robbers’ attacks and fiscal abuses of custom office holders, the caravans also joined Polish embassies going to Constantinople and back. An ordinary embassy consisted of several dozens or even hundreds of people, up to 1,200 in the case of prince Zbarazski’s embassy in 1622. An embassy was always accompanied by an Ottoman official – *cavuş*. The Polish nobleman Erasm Otwinowski recorded an unofficial detailed diary of the embassy led by Andrzej Bzicki in 1557. There is a conventional belief in historiography of pre-modern trade that the merchants traveled



under the protection of an embassy. However, Otwinowski's vivid narrative gives a quite different picture, which enables us to establish that it was rather the Polish embassy traveling under the protection of Armenian caravan and not the other way around. According to Otwinowski, in the Ottoman domains, Polish nobles have provoked a conflict with a Turkish shepherd, which turned into a big fight. The shepherd was killed and then several Poles were arrested by the Ottoman judge – *kadi*. When crossing a river in the Balkans, the Poles were not careful enough and certain precious property of the ambassador was stolen by two Turkish villains. In both cases, Otwinowski describes active armful deeds of brave Armenian merchants,<sup>51</sup> who were accustomed to such conflicts during their regular shuttle between Lemberg and Constantinople. Moreover, the Armenian merchants were bearers of indispensable practical experience in how to deal with the Ottoman authorities and Muslim population, how to arrange travel in different segments of the route, how to travel in mountains, where to find pasture for horses, and many other issues. Polish ambassadors lacked this knowledge, because for them it was their first and last mission to the sultan's capital.

As a rule, ordinary travel by inland route took about 20 days from Lemberg to Danube and next 20 days from Danube to Constantinople. The Polish embassy of Andrzej Bzicki traveled with Armenian caravan to Constantinople in 1557. They made their trip on the route from Kamianiec to the lower Danube (the town of "Oblinczyce") in 14 days, then through the Balkan Mountains in 26 days.<sup>52</sup> Young German Martin Gruneweg, being on the service of the Armenian merchant Aswadur, in 1582, traveled with his master from Lemberg to Constantinople. This caravan spent 17 days for the trip from Lemberg to Obluczice (on the Danube), and then 18 days to Constantinople.<sup>53</sup> The Armenian traveler Simeon Lekhatsi of Zamość traveled to Constantinople in 1608 with the Armenian merchants from Lemberg and Iași. Lekhatsi's caravan made its trip on the route from the lower Danube (Galați) through the Balkan Mountains to Constantinople in 19 days, with the total of 47 days.<sup>54</sup>

There was also a combined inland-maritime route. Flemish humanist Georg van der Does traveled with Armenian merchants in 1597. This caravan spent 20 days for the trip from Lemberg to Izmail (on Danube) and 5 days for trip by sea to Constantinople.<sup>55</sup> The combined route was with 10 days shorter than the inland one. The preference for the land route can probably be explained by the fact that it was seen as more cheap – in a ship merchants should pay for themselves and for their cargo – and

more comfortable due to well-established *caravanserais* in the Ottoman domains. In the caravanserais, established in the Balkan provinces, travelers could find not only a well-protected place where to spend a night, but also food and water.<sup>56</sup> This could also explain why Armenian colonies to the south of Danube were not so numerous as in Moldavia. If the navigation from the Danube estuary by the Black Sea normally began in early May,<sup>57</sup> the inland route was used by merchants during most of the year, except in March.

In Adrianople and Constantinople, Armenian merchants bought silk textiles, jewelry, Persian carpets and Turkish horses.

Armenian craftsmen in Suceava and Botoșani mostly specialized on the leather goods – saddlers and horse harness, and shoes made of *morocco* (the French *maroquin* or German *Saffian*) – goat hide dyed in red, green and yellow.<sup>58</sup>

Armenian townspeople, as well as Saxon and Hungarian ones, were granted by Moldavian princes the right to establish autonomous communities in Moldavian cities with their own law and court consisting of 6 to 12 judges – *pârgari* (from German “Burger”), chaired by *șoltuz* (from German “Schultze”) or *voit* (from German “Vogt”).<sup>59</sup> In the 15<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> centuries Armenian *șoltuzes* are mentioned in Siret, Suceava, and Roman.<sup>60</sup>

The growth of Armenian population in the region in the 15<sup>th</sup> century was so evident that in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century the Moldavian diocese was separated from Lemberg’s diocese of the Armenian Church.<sup>61</sup> The scale of construction done by Armenians in Suceava in the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century reflects their demographic growth and economic prosperity in this city, as well as in Moldavia, in general. In accordance with the existing tradition, not only founders, but also renovators and other donors installed memorial plaques into walls of churches, chapels, and bell-towers as a sign of their piety. Thus, the Armenian Church of the Holy Cross founded in 1428 by Edilbei, son of Soghomon, was rebuilt in stone in 1521 by Khacik Hancoian, and deacon Asvatur, son of Gailtsa. The Hagigadar Monastery – Dormition of the Holy Mother of God – was built in 1512, and the church of St. Simeon was built in 1513.<sup>62</sup> By the mid-sixteenth century, Armenian churches could also be found in Hotin, Siret, Botoșani, Iași, Vaslui, and Roman, that is, along the trade route from the Black Sea ports and the Lower Danube to the border with the Polish Kingdom, in the direction to Lemberg and Kamianiec.

## Persecutions of Armenians in Moldavia in 1550s-1570s

The first large-scale persecution of Armenians in Moldavia took place in 1551, during the rule of 19-year old prince Ștefan Rareș (1551-1552) and the regency of his mother – Elena (Ekaterina Brancovič). The main source on the persecution is *The Lamentation* of the Armenian clergyman Minas Tokatetsi (of Tokat – city in Asia Minor), who was an eyewitness of these tragic events.<sup>63</sup> The persecution started on 16 August 1551 at Suceava and continued on 19 August. It eventually spread to other six Moldavian cities with Armenian communities – Botoșani, Siret, Hotin, Iași, Roman, Vaslui. The persecution was lead by the prince in cooperation with the Orthodox high clergy and carried out by agents of the state. Their main aim was forced conversion of the Armenians to Orthodoxy (“Greek faith”). Initially the prince promised benefits for those Armenians who would accept re-baptism, whereas later, the Armenians were threatened with death if they persisted in their beliefs. Ștefan Rareș himself rode his horse to the Armenian church in Suceava, entered it and, standing on the altar, instigated people to violence. The liturgical objects were taken away from the churches, while religious books were burned. Armenian churches were desecrated, locked, and then demolished (probably, only the wooden ones). Armenian priests and monks were imprisoned and tortured.<sup>64</sup>

The large scale persecution is also confirmed by contemporary non-Armenian sources. Macarie, the Orthodox bishop of Roman, who is seen by scholars as the main instigator of the persecution, wrote in his chronicle (around 1551) on the forceful re-baptism of Armenians as of triumph of Orthodoxy.<sup>65</sup> An Italian, Antonio Pandolfi, in his letter to Piero Machiavelli of 4 February 1564 mentioned the persecution of Armenians – forced re-baptism and destruction of the churches – by prince Ștefan Rareș among other turmoil events, which took place in Moldavia between 1547 and 1563.<sup>66</sup> Many Armenians leaved Moldavia for Poland and the Ottoman domains; others were baptized in accordance with the Orthodox ritual.<sup>67</sup> Later, according to a letter of 11 April 1552, sent by Giovanni Battista Castaldo to Ferdinand I Habsburg, Catholics and Protestants – mostly Hungarians and Saxons – living in the Principality, as well as the caravan of Ottoman merchants, were also persecuted by the prince and forcefully re-baptized into the Orthodox faith (*in Valachiam fidem baptisari vellet*).<sup>68</sup>

Ștefan Rareș was assassinated by his boyars on 1 September 1552.<sup>69</sup> His mother Elena was killed in 1553 by the order of new prince – Alexandru Lăpușneanu (1552-1561, 1564-1568) – who married her daughter Ruxandra. Alexandru Lăpușneanu was enthroned through direct Polish military intervention and with support of boyars being in exile in Poland.<sup>70</sup> On 22 June 1553 Alexandru Lăpușneanu, giving his oath of vassalage to Sigismund II August, the king of Poland, promised that he would allow all the Saxon (Protestant) and Armenian churches destroyed by his predecessor to be rebuilt.<sup>71</sup> Armenians living in Moldavia returned to their faith and began renovation of their churches.<sup>72</sup> Nevertheless, in a few time the Prince began the anti-heretical campaign which affected both Armenians<sup>73</sup> and Protestants. According to the report of the Habsburg agent, John Belsius, to the Emperor Ferdinand I, written in April 13, 1562, “Alexandru Moldoveanu (Lăpușneanu) forced all the nations, with no exceptions, to be baptized again and to follow the religion of the Moldavians, taking them away from their own religion”.<sup>74</sup> Probably Alexandru Lăpușneanu intended to get support of the influential Orthodox clergy. The persecution of Armenians took place between 1554 and 1558, while that of Protestants started in 1558.<sup>75</sup> Protestants also were seen as supporters of the boyar conspiracy lead by Moțoc vornicul and Ioan Iacob Heraclid who was a Protestant. In both cases, sources mention the forced conversion, destruction and pillage of churches.

A new wave of persecutions occurred as result of a boyar conspiracy and then a large-scale rebellion led by hetman Ștefan Tomșa against the Prince Ioan Iacob Heraclid Despot (1561-1563) (Despot Vodă or Iakobos Basilikos, who was a Protestant). The Prince retreated to the fortress in Suceava and withstood a three-month siege. At the end of it, Despot was captured and was struck to death with a mace by Tomșa himself. Then, many Protestants, Catholics, and Armenians were killed and their property pillaged.<sup>76</sup> The Armenian chronicle of Kamianiec recounts that in 1563, after the fall of Despot, the Orthodox population of Suceava hung an Armenian monk called Zur Cadag, Hacıus, the *voit* of the Armenians and several innocent people.<sup>77</sup> During the reign of Ștefan Tomșa (August 1563 – March 1564) Armenians along with the Saxons/Protestants were accused of having supported the deposed prince Despot. Persecutions stopped after Stephen’s execution in Lemberg in 1564. Alexandru Lăpușneanu repeated his promise to rebuild the non-Orthodox churches in his oath in 1563.<sup>78</sup>

The persecutions of Armenians, although of a lesser scale, took place in 1570 and 1573, during the rule of Bogdan Lăpușneanu (1568-1572)

and Ion cel Cumplit (1572-1574), respectively.<sup>79</sup> The persecutions of the non-Orthodox “nations” in Moldavia stopped only under the rule of Petru Șchiopul (Peter the Lame) (1574-1577, 1578-1579, 1583-1591).

On the surface, there is an evident reason for the religious persecution of Armenians in Moldavia. Since the schism at the Ecumenical Council in 451, provoked by the Christological controversies about the doctrine of two natures of Christ, relations between the Chalcedonic/Orthodox and Monophysite (Armenian, Abyssinian, Jacobit, mostly in Syria, and Coptic, in Egypt) Churches were characterized by a constant tension.<sup>80</sup> In the late Byzantine Empire “Armenian heresy” was condemned among the most dangerous heresies. This highly inimical attitude towards Armenians and Monophysites, in general, had spread in the countries of post-Byzantine circle – in Russia, Moldavia, and Wallachia.<sup>81</sup> There is a 16<sup>th</sup>-century Greek manuscript in the Library of the Romanian Academy. The manuscript contains, along with the Orthodox credo and some patristic works, a treatise directed against “Armenian heresy”, as well as another treatise criticizing errors of Armenians, Latins, and Jacobites.<sup>82</sup>

During his rule, the Moldavian Prince Petru Rareș (1527-1538, 1541-1546) founded several new monasteries and churches, assuming the role of protector of Orthodoxy after the fall of Byzantium. They are famous for their outer wall paintings.<sup>83</sup> Among other major themes of outer painting, “The Last Judgment” had for its contemporaries not only eschatological meaning, but also a political one. One can see the crowds of chosen righteous people on the right and “the damned nations” on the left. “The damned nations” procession led by Moses includes Jews, Turks, Tatars, Latins, Armenians, and Ethiopians.<sup>84</sup> The Armenian chronicle written in Kamianiec recorded that on 3 January 1534, prince Petru Rareș had forced the Armenian priests to eat meat during Christmas Fast, because of the difference between calendars used by Armenian and Orthodox Churches: “The Moldavian Prince Rareș forced the Armenian priests to eat meat in the Christmas Fast with beatings”.<sup>85</sup> There is an evidence that during the second reign of Petru Rareș, in 1541-1546, Jews were persecuted in his domains.<sup>86</sup> Nevertheless, my point is that this religious persecution of Armenians, as well as other non-Orthodox groups in 16<sup>th</sup> century Moldavia, was politically motivated.

Romanian art historian Sorin Ulea interpreted the whole external painting program as expressing the idea of the Holy War against the Ottomans.<sup>87</sup> My point is that the enmity with Poland was not less important for Petru Rareș’ visual propaganda, than the Turkish threat, for two reasons

– Borderland territory of *Pokutie* was an apple of strife between Poland and Moldavia in the 1530s, and because the Polish model of the “Republic of nobles” was seen by Moldavian boyars as an alternative to the “tyranny” of their own rulers. Many boyars found their asylum in Poland, intriguing on behalf of new pretenders for the Moldavian throne.<sup>88</sup>

As further history of Moldavia demonstrates, the majority of the princes obtained power with the evident assistance of powerful Polish aristocrats and wealthy merchants – Greeks, Jews, and Armenians.

Every new prince had to visit a sultan in Istanbul in order to get confirmation from him, which was actually bought with huge sums of money.<sup>89</sup> The princes needed loans and became more and more dependent from wealthy merchants – Greeks,<sup>90</sup> Jews,<sup>91</sup> and Armenians – residents of Constantinople and Lemberg. Thus, Armenians living in Moldavia and maintaining constant economic, religious and matrimonial relations with Armenians in Polish kingdom, were seen by the rulers of Moldavia as agents of Poland and as potential supporters of a new pretender for the throne. The political crisis of 1546-1563<sup>92</sup> replaced the autocratic model of state introduced by Petru Rareș and his predecessors with a new one, when almost every new prince was *de facto* appointed in Lemberg and then confirmed in Istanbul. Istanbul and Lemberg became the main scenes of Moldavian politics where the princes were made, and where many of them were executed.

That is why state-sponsored religious persecution was in particular aggressive in 1551-1563. Every new prince at the initial stage of his short rule made deliberate efforts to diminish the influence of too influential merchant networks in his principality, which, in the case of non-Orthodox diasporas – Armenian, Saxon/Lutheran, Hungarian/Catholic, and Jewish – took the form of forced baptism into “Wallachian faith” or expulsion. The main purpose of these persecutions was to break religious ties between the Prince’s non-Orthodox subjects and their co-believers abroad (in Poland, Transylvania, the Habsburg and Ottoman domains), which would inevitably lead to breaking other ties (matrimonial, business, etc.).

## **The Price revolution and Armenian export from Moldavia westwards**

Nevertheless, Armenians were never expelled from the principality, the majority of them did not migrate from Moldavia, and the persecutions ended in the late 16<sup>th</sup> century.

My explanation of this phenomenon is based on the global and regional trends in economics during the researched period. There was an evident growth of prices in the 16<sup>th</sup> century Europe known as the "Price revolution": at the end of the century, prices were three to four times higher than at the beginning of the century. In the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, silver mines were opened up in the New World, in the lands of north Mexico (1546-1562), and in Peru, the astonishing rich lodes of the mountain at Potosi were "discovered" in 1543.<sup>93</sup> The import of American silver to Europe reached its apex in the 1590s and it caused the evident growth of prices along with the decline of intrinsic value of currency. During the period of 1555-1575, the increase in prices constituted 265 percent, and in the 1590s – 627 percent.<sup>94</sup> The rise in prices was not uniform across the different regions of Europe. The prices of the same commodities in the countries of Eastern Europe were relatively lower. The consequent growing demand for foodstuffs could only be satisfied through imports, and Eastern Europe became a major supplier. Polish grain, Moldavian and Hungarian cattle found a ready, and highly profitable market.<sup>95</sup>

Large cargoes of wheat and rye were exported from Eastern Europe through the Baltic seaports, mostly through Polish Danzig/Gdansk, during the course of the 16<sup>th</sup> century and shipped to the Low Countries, to Portugal, and Spain.<sup>96</sup> Cattle-farming was more developed in the eastern parts of the Polish Kingdom – in Podolia and Ukraine, as well as in the Moldavian Principality, as corn was more difficult to transport from there to Baltic seaports. At the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Polish kingdom exported about 60,000 oxen a year, mostly to the German principalities, Italy, and Bohemia. Most of these cattle were breed and bought in Moldavia.<sup>97</sup>

Armenian merchants bought cattle in fairs specialized in trade with Moldavian cattle – namely in Shypintsi, Botoșani, Hotin, and Chernivtsi – in the Polish-Moldavian borderland. For instance, only in the Chernivtsi fair, in the 1590s, the turnout was around 30,000 oxen.<sup>98</sup> The average number of cattle in one party shipped from Moldavia to Western Europe by wealthy Armenian merchants was anywhere from 500 to 700 oxen,

and sometimes exceeded 1,000 oxen.<sup>99</sup> The main business partners of Armenian merchants in Moldavia were great boyars, high officials and princes themselves (for instance, Petru Cazacul,<sup>100</sup> Aaron Tiranul,<sup>101</sup> and the Movilă family).

Armenian merchants traded in fish from the Lower Danube to Lemberg and Kamianiec. The earliest example known from the Lemberg city records is a large scale commerce of Kokcza (Kokscha), Armenian merchant from Suceava, who in the winter of 1472 imported to Lemberg 21 cartloads of sturgeon – property of Moldavian prince (Ștefan cel Mare). In Lemberg, local merchants – mostly Armenians – bought sturgeon from Kokcza in big lots, paying either in cash or in credit, with the average price of 45 Hungarian florins per cartload.<sup>102</sup> Next year, we see Kokcza again in Lemberg's market as a trade agent of the Moldavian prince. This time, Kokcza sold sturgeon for 40 to 46 Hungarian florins per cartload to seven local Armenian merchants.<sup>103</sup> Armenian merchants from Botoșani actively exported fish from Moldavia. Milko Jakubowicz, an Armenian from Lemberg, in 1574 purchased fish sold by Armenians from Botoșani.<sup>104</sup> Iwaszko Lukaszowicz, an Armenian from Kamianiec, in 1623 bought 3 *kufa* (Germ. *Kufe* – big barrel) of fish from Mikolaj Nigoli, an Armenian from Botoșani.<sup>105</sup> Iwan Teodorowicz, an Armenian from Botoșani, sold fish in the trade fairs in Lemberg and Sniatyn in 1633.<sup>106</sup> The Armenian merchant Iwaszkowicz from Lemberg purchased 200 “stones” of fish – around 2,600 kg – from Dragan, an Armenian from Botoșani in 1646.<sup>107</sup>

The constant growth of prices in western markets made the Armenian merchant network indispensable for the Moldavian ruling elite to export their agricultural produce westwards.

### **Polish military interventions, Movilă family, and economic expansion of Armenian merchants on Moldavian market**

The Ottoman Empire, long accustomed to putting a high price on silver, inevitably lost a great deal of ground with the changes in the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century provoked by the rising deliveries of silver from the New World. In less than a century (1530-1614), the Ottoman currency – *asper* – lost 56% of its intrinsic value.<sup>108</sup> The devaluation of money led to the rise of prices on food and, thereby, to the progressive fall in the standards of living. In 1568, sultan Selim II (1566-1574) prohibited Moldavia and Wallachia from selling their principal products – mainly



comestibles, such as grain, livestock, butter, and wine – to any country other than Turkey.<sup>109</sup> The intention was to reserve the rich agricultural output of the nearby vassal states for Istanbul, which had grown into a metropolis of several hundred thousand people.

The effectiveness of the measure was undermined by the covert resistance of the Romanian principalities. Actually, sultan Selim II recognized, when giving the order to Prince Bogdan Lăpușneanu (1568-1572) in 1568, that the prince's father Alexandru Lăpușneanu ignored the same restrictions imposed by the previous sultan. The Polish diplomat Andrzej Taranowski wrote in his letter on 14 May 1595 that the new sultan Mehmed III (1595-1603), after entering Istanbul, ordered to cut off noses and ears of hostages – sons of princes of Moldavia and Wallachia. This atrocity was motivated by the fact that the rulers of these principalities came out of Ottoman suzerainty, and exported foodstuff to Poland in great quantities, what, in turn, provoked a great dearth in Istanbul.<sup>110</sup>

The conflict between the interests of the Ottomans, Poland, and the Habsburg Empire with regard to Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania sometimes went so far as to lead to armed intervention. On 27 August of 1595, the crown army of Poland led by the chancellor and hetman Jan Zamoyski entered Moldavia. Zamoyski was known as protector of Armenians. When in 1585 he founded in his domains the new city of Zamość, he invited Armenians from different countries to settle there along with the Catholics, Orthodox Ruthenians, and Sephardic Jews. On September 4, 1595, Zamoyski installed his protégé Ieremia Movilă (Jeremy Mohyla) as Prince of Moldavia and Polish vassal.<sup>111</sup>

For the last time an Armenian priest was portrayed among “the damned nations” on “The Last Judgment” frescos of Sucevița monastery built in 1595, that is, in the very beginning of Movilă's rule. It is worth to note that only a priest was portrayed there with no Armenian laymen. Armenians never appeared again in the Last Judgment scenes in Moldavian churches built after 1595, as well as in book miniatures illustrated after this date.<sup>112</sup>

There is an evidence that at the beginning of his rule (in 1597), Movilă made restitution of property for one of the richest Armenian merchants – Bogdan Danovakovich, whose father Dragan Danovak fled from Moldavia to Poland in the time of the persecutions, in 1563.<sup>113</sup> After the death of Prince Ieremia Movilă in 1606, Moldavia fell in political turbulence once again. Some members of Movilă's family fled to Lemberg, where they rented apartments in the house of Bogdan Danovakovich.<sup>114</sup> This case

could be seen as a good example, which can explain why the cooperation with Armenian merchants was so important for Moldavian rulers, not only in trade. Other Lemberg Armenian, Almas Jurkowicz, spent four years and 10,000 *zlotys* to pave the way for Gavril Movilă (1618-1620) to the Wallachian throne.<sup>115</sup>

Movilă's family ruled in Moldavia from 1595 to 1634 (in Wallachia, in 1600-1602 and 1618-1620). Ieremia Movilă's daughters were married with the most powerful Polish aristocrats – Stanisław Potocki, Stefan Potocki, Samuel Korecki and Michał Wiśniowiecki. Several times these Polish aristocrats made military interventions into Moldavia to support Movilă family: Jan Zamoyski, in 1595 and 1600; Stefan Potocki, in 1611 and 1612; Michał Wiśniowiecki and Samuel Korecki, in 1615; Stanisław Żółkiewski and Samuel Korecki, in 1620.

In 1615, Samuel Korecki was defeated by the Ottomans and imprisoned in the Yedikule castle in Istanbul. In 1617, he escaped from the castle thanks to the joint efforts of the French ambassador, an Orthodox priest, and Armenian merchants. In 1620, Korecki again took part in the Polish invasion into Moldavia. He was captured again after the defeat in the battle of Țețora, in 1620, imprisoned in the Yedikule castle, and finally executed in 1622.

During that era, many Armenian merchants – Polish subjects – were envoys on the service of European rulers. Among the most famous examples was "Petrus Armenus Gregorovicz", an Armenian merchant from Lemberg, who, in 1597-1612, was an official envoy of the Emperor Rudolf II Habsburg to Wallachian princes Mihai Viteazul and Radu Șerban, and to the Prince of Moldavia Constantin Movilă.<sup>116</sup> Sefer Muratowicz, an Armenian merchant from Warsaw, was a secret envoy of the Polish king Sigismund III to the Persian Shah Abbas, in 1601-1602.<sup>117</sup>

Different attitudes toward Armenian merchants could be illustrated with two examples from the time of Prince Alexandru Lăpușneanu and of Movilă dynasty. In 1557, Armenian merchants from Lemberg and Kamianiec traveled with Polish embassy to Constantinople. They have done it many times before in order to avoid taxation of their merchandise in custom houses thanks to the embassy's diplomatic immunity.<sup>118</sup> On their return from Constantinople, the embassy and caravan crossed the border of Moldavia on the Danube, where merchants did not pay any tolls or dues. When the embassy reached the town of Lăpușna, in Moldavia, on 4 October, the head of the custom service – the great *vameș* – who was the brother of the Prince – demanded tolls from Armenian merchants.

The ambassador Andrzej Bzicki sent his deputy Stanisław Żółkiewski, an interpreter (*tlómacz*) Mikołaj, and an Ottoman envoy (*cauş, czausz*) to Prince Alexandru Lăpuşneanu, in order to clarify the issue with the dues. After waiting four days, on 8 October, the ambassador made the decision to continue his travel with having no response from the Prince. Armenian merchants followed him with their merchandise. Then, the head of the custom service, with forty horsemen, pursued them and stopped the embassy.<sup>119</sup> He arrested some Armenian merchants on the accusation of avoiding the dues. Other Armenian merchants gave him 400 tallers in order to free their companions. On 10 October, the embassy and caravan resumed their travel. When they crossed the Polish-Moldavian border and arrived to Kamianiec, on 14 October, they met their envoys with the response from the Prince, which stated that Armenian merchants should not pay any tolls.<sup>120</sup> According to the letter of Antonio Pandolfi (1564), Prince Alexandru Lăpuşneanu made deliberate efforts to establish his personal control over the trade in Moldavia. He prohibited commerce in the Principality for many merchants, thus destroying their businesses, and in ten years he earned 2 million ducats on trade.<sup>121</sup> This mercantile politics of Alexandru Lăpuşneanu could also explain the persecution of the “infidel” merchants during his rule as well as incidents, such as the one mentioned above, which happened with foreign merchants, including even those traveling under protection of an embassy.

Around 1607, Armenian merchant Stecko Lewonowicz (Steocko Leouovowicz ormenio) from Lemberg appealed to the princely court of Constantine Movilă voivod. Stecko stated that noblemen brothers Dumitru (Dumitraşcu) and Vasilie stole his fabric. The merchant estimated his losses at 700 tallers. Since Dumitru and Vasilie fled from Moldavia, their brother Lucoc was imprisoned. Then Lucoc’s sister Nastasia bailed him out of prison. She borrowed money – 670 tallers – from the family relatives – princes Nastasia Cărmăneasă and her son, boyar *ceaşnic* Dumitru Buguş. On 18 January 1608, Stecko made an official statement in the court that he received 670 tallers – actually only 500 – from Nastasia Cărmăneasă and her son Dumitru Buguş and will not file a lawsuit against Dumitru and Vasilie.<sup>122</sup>

Thus, in the first case, because of the ambiguous situation of whether the cargo in question should be considered a merchandise or property of an embassy, the high official used his authority to force merchants to give him a bribe. In the second case, a statement of a single complainant was

enough for a prince to imprison a relative of the suspects – the noblemen – and thereby to compensate the merchant's losses.

As in many pre-modern countries, townspeople in Moldova could own only lands situated near a given town, that is under the jurisdiction of a magistrate. This area was called *hotar*. The townspeople could not buy manors since their owners – the noblemen – fulfilled services – mostly military – from which townspeople were freed. The fewer manors were in noblemen's disposal, the fewer services were fulfilled by the nobility before the ruler. That is why Armenians, as well as other townspeople, owned only hay meadows, gardens, ponds, and vegetable gardens in a *hotar* area around a city. Armenian townspeople could buy vineyards situated around the city of Cotnar (Germ.: Guttmar), mostly inhabited by the Catholic burghers of German and Magyar origins. There was no Armenian community in Cotnar, but sources available to us show that many Armenians from Suceava, Siret, and Roman were owners of vineyards in Cotnar in the 1570s-1640s.<sup>123</sup> The size of these vineyards was between 2 and 6 *fălci*,<sup>124</sup> that is, between 3 and 9 hectares.

There was one exception to this rule. Probably, Armenians could buy lands being property of the Orthodox Church. At least, in 1570 an Armenian became owner of some parts of the village Lipești. Marco, an Armenian of Lipești, bought from Soabur, son of Gadulbei, an Armenian of Suceava, 2.5 *fălci* of vineyard in Cotnar for 400 golden, and sold it to Mitropolit Teofan for two parts of Lipești village and 50 golden.<sup>125</sup> I have found a case of the same nature in Wallachia. Matei Basarab, Prince of Wallachia (1633-1654), on 20 December 1649, granted to Golgota monastery the land property (*ocina*) in Cârlița village which he bought from the Armenian Sefer.<sup>126</sup>

The growth of economic and political influence of Armenian merchants is reflected in the growth of their building activity in Moldavia in the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. This growth is particularly evident in comparison with the total stagnation in the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century – after the persecutions of 1551. The numbers are based on the calculation of churches, chapels, and bell-towers, their rebuilding and renovation, reflected by the plaques with inscription installed into the wall. There are at least 6 memorial plaques installed by clergymen and laic renovators and donors into the wall of Armenian churches, chapels and bell-towers in Suceava between 1609 and 1631.<sup>127</sup>

## **Demographic situation of Armenian diaspora in the 17<sup>th</sup> century Moldavia**

The Armenian diaspora in Moldavia recovered economically, religiously and demographically by the late 1580s. The Jesuit Missionary Johannes Kunig in his report to the General of Jesuits, Claudio Aquaviva, written in Roman on 30 September 1588, when describing religious diversity in Moldavia, put Armenians on the second place after Orthodox Romanians, but before the Catholics: "In this province of Moldavia people have different rites and religions. In the first place are the Rumanians, who have lot of churches and monasteries, patriarchs, metropolitans and bishops and priests. Armenians are the next, who have different churches from that of the Rumanian ones. In third place are the Hungarians and Saxons coming from Transylvania. There are also gypsies".<sup>128</sup> My point is that Armenians could not outnumber Roman Catholics in the principality. When putting Armenians on the second place after the dominant Orthodox population, Kunig wanted to emphasize a better position of Armenian community in the principality – well-established church hierarchy, regularity of church services and so on, in comparison with the declining Catholic community, which he situated further – just before the gypsies.

The exact number of Armenians living in Moldavian Principality could not be calculated even for the 17<sup>th</sup> century, because there are no sources with statistic data, such as tax censuses, where Armenians are mentioned. Normally, Catholic missionaries sent to Moldavia paid major attention in their reports to the Catholic communities there. In many instances, they also mentioned Armenian parishes in the Moldavian cities and towns, but not in a systematic way. The most comprehensive list of Armenian communities in Moldavia was composed in 1669 by Louis-Maria Pidou – Teatin missionary to Armenians of Lemberg. Pidou never visited Moldavia. It is likely that he collected his data from Armenian-Catholic missionary Iohannes Keiremowicz sent there, or from Moldavian Armenians visiting Lemberg for the commerce. Pidou mentioned Armenian parish churches in Suceava (3), Iași (2), Siret, Botoșani, Hotin (Hocim), Roman (Urman), Vaslui and Galați.<sup>129</sup> Marco Bandini in his report (1646-1648) also mentioned Armenian church in Bârlad.<sup>130</sup> Other missionaries sometimes gave a very rough estimates of Armenians living in a given city or town. My point is that the missionaries never counted Armenians by head, but instead calculated their numbers in the following way: they equated every

stone-wall church to 100 households (families) and every wooden church to 20 households.

The largest Armenian community existed in Suceava, Moldavian capital until 1564 and residence of Armenian bishop in the principality. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century there were 3 Armenian churches and 2 monasteries there. Minorite Observant monk Bartolomeo Basetti in his report (April 12, 1643) gave such figures for the population of Suceava: "Catholic houses are 12, [with] 50 souls, 26 [of them practicing]. Schismatics [Orthodox Moldavians] have 700 houses, which count over 3,000 souls and they have 16 churches. The Armenians have five churches, one for the bishop – because the Armenians have their own bishop in the town".<sup>131</sup> This data corresponds with the early account of Armenian traveler Simeon Lekhatsi from Polish city Zamość, who spent three months and two weeks in Suceava in 1608. He stated that, "There are 300 or 400 Armenian houses in the city. There are three stone-walled churches and two wonderful and superb monasteries outside the city – one near the city, and another one two miles away from the city".<sup>132</sup> Thus, the approximate number of Armenians living in Suceava in the 1600s-1660s could be estimated at around 1,500 to 2,000. For Iași (Iash-bazar) community, Lekhatsi offers the following description: "There are 200 houses of Armenians – newcomers and locals. There is a wonderful stone-walled church, wise priests and magnificent rich men".<sup>133</sup> Being Armenian clergyman (*dpir*), Lekhatsi deliberately omitted the existence of Armenian-Catholic church in Iași.

Marco Bandini, Archbishop of Marciapolis and Catholic missionary to Moldavia in 1646-1648, described population of Vaslui (Vaslo): "Vaslui had over 300 Hungarian Catholic houses, a church, a priest and a school. The church is in ruins now, 4 houses are here with 16 Catholic souls, Rumanians have 300 houses and the Armenians have 100 houses".<sup>134</sup> A different figure for Vaslui was given by Simeon Lekhatsi in 1608: "There is a wooden church, a priest and twenty Armenian families".<sup>135</sup> The difference could be explained by the suggestion that between 1608 and 1648, the wooden church in Vaslui was replaced with a stone-walled one, which reflects an increase in prosperity and population growth of Armenian community. Nevertheless, both figures – 20 and 100 houses – are rough approximations. Pavel of Haleb, who was in Vaslui on 22 January 1653, mentioned Armenian church in his itinerary: "In this town is a number of churches, besides the one we have mentioned; and there are Armenians, who have a church of their own".<sup>136</sup> This Armenian church was probably stone-walled and thus worthy of his attention.

Even in the case when missionaries visited the same place with the interval of only a year or two, there is an evident difference in the number of “souls” or parishioners, since different missionaries equated the same number of households to the different number of “souls”. For instance, Petru Bogdan (Petro Deodato) Baksic, Apostolic vicar of Sofia, in his description of Roman (1641) noted: “Armenians have 80 houses with 450 souls. They have a walled church and a priest from their nation, Armenian”.<sup>137</sup> According to B.Basetti (1643) in Roman: “Armenian houses are 80. 360 souls, with a church”.<sup>138</sup> The only exception could be Armenian-Catholic community in Iași since it was united with the Roman Church, and, probably, the exact number of its parishioners was presented in the report of Bartolomeo Basetti (1643): “There is an Armenian church [in Iași] too, the priest is under the auspice of the Roman Church. The Catholic Armenians’ houses are 60, the souls are 222”.<sup>139</sup>

Antonio Pignatelli, papal nuncio in Poland (1660-1668), in his report to the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide on November 23, 1662 gave the following numbers: 3,000 Armenians in Poland with 15 churches and all of them are united with the Roman Church, and 7,000 Armenians in Moldavia with 10 churches.<sup>140</sup> My own calculations, based on missionaries’ reports for Moldavia, analyzed above, and much more correct figures of real estate taxation censuses for Poland, analyzed above, bring quite different results – about 3,000-4,000 Armenians in Moldavia and about 6,000-7,000 Armenians in Poland. My calculations for Poland correspond to the note made by Francesco Martelli, papal nuncio in Poland (1675-1681), in his report of 3 August 1678. Martelli indicates that because of the Polish-Turkish war (1672-1676) – which affected regions of Podolia and Rus’/Ruthenia, where the majority of Polish Armenians lived before the war – their number declined tenfold, to 600 souls.<sup>141</sup>

Thus, my point is that the approximate number of Armenians living in Moldavia in the 1640s-1660s could not exceed 3,000-4,000.

Though majority of Armenians living in Moldavian Principality were faithful to Armenian Apostolic Church, there were also Armenian-Catholics united with the Roman Church. The Jesuit missionary Giulio Mancinelli in his report written between 1583 and 1588 mentioned his visit to Armenian-Catholic church in Iași. According to Mancinelli, these Armenian-Catholics parishioners were numerous and prosperous. He was amazed by this fact also because he found the Roman Catholic community in the Romanian principalities in a total decline after persecutions of the 1550s-1570s. On the contrary, Armenian-Catholics of Iași maintained

relations with the Apostolic see in Rome: “Iași, with Armenians, many and rich, who are living in that town, and they are Catholics. That almost every Catholic Christian, who were numerous some years ago, in the two principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, they all turned into Orthodox, because of not having a Catholic priest; a Roman Catholic church was found abused by Lutheran priests, who were coming often to that place to hold their masses for the craftsmen, who are mostly German, Hungarian or Lutheran. He went to the Armenians’ church, keeping their counsel there, and they told him that the church is at his disposal and they are, too. They showed him affection, due to the talks of an Armenian, who came from Rome and talked to them about the Pope’s love for that nation and about the good reputation of the Jesuit Society”.<sup>142</sup>

When in 1630 Nikol Torosowicz – bishop of the Armenian Church in the Polish Kingdom (1627-1681) – declared his unification with the Roman Church, he was supported by the Jesuits and by the Catholic hierarchy in Lemberg as well as in Rome, but rejected by the overwhelming majority of Armenians living in the kingdom. This confrontation provoked numerous conflicts and lawsuits, the appeals and complaints to the king and to the hierarchs of the Roman and Armenian Churches.<sup>143</sup> In 1654, a temporary compromise was found, and in the 1660s efforts were made to establish Armenian-Catholic bishopric in Moldavia as part of Armenian-Catholic archbishopric of Lemberg. Iohannes (Ohanes) Kieremowicz was appointed as bishop-suffrage and sent to Moldavia (Bogdania). His mission was not successful. In his letter sent to the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide on 3 October 1662, Kieremowicz described his conditions there as miserable, having no money to buy winter clothes and asking for financial support.<sup>144</sup> Antonio Pignatelli, papal nuncio in Poland (1660-1668), in his report on 23 November 1662, noted that among ten Armenian churches in Moldavia only one is Armenian-Catholic.<sup>145</sup>

## **Migration to Transylvania and some later developments**

There were several revolts against the hard fiscal policies of the Prince Gheorghe Duca (1665-1666, 1668-1672, 1678-1683). The prince accused Armenians of being supporters of the conspiracy and mutiny led by the boyar Mihalcea Hâncu and Durac against him in October 1671. In 1672<sup>146</sup>, many Armenians, mostly from Suceava and Siret, led by their bishop, Minas Zilihtar (Ziliftar-oghlu) Tokathetsi, migrated to Transylvania.



Initially, their stay there was to be temporary, and after Duca's final fall in 1683, many Armenians returned to Moldavia. Moldavian princes Ștefan Petriceicu (August 1672 – November 1673, December 1673 – February 1674, December 1683 – March 1684) and Antonie Ruset (1675-1678) made efforts to return Armenians, understanding their importance for the economy of the Principality. Ștefan Petriceicu granted to Armenian bishopric in Suceava three families of *scutelnici*<sup>147</sup> (19 January 1673).<sup>148</sup> Antonie Ruset (21 April 1677) granted Armenian bishop of Suceava and monastery there 5 families of *scutelnici*, that is five Armenian families were exempted from state taxation. In his charter, the Prince noted that he granted this privilege to Armenians in order to stimulate them to invite there more Armenians from Ottoman domains and Poland.<sup>149</sup> Nevertheless, many Armenians settled in Transylvania permanently. There, Prince Mihaly Apafi (1661-1690) allowed Armenians to settle in Bistrita, Gheorgheni, Miercurea-Ciuc, Petelea, Sumuleu, Alba-Iulia. A charter issued by Apafi in 1680 gave Armenians autonomy, the right to exercise freely their trade and crafts and to elect their own judges. In 1699 Transylvania became part of the Habsburg Empire. In 1700, the Transylvanian Armenians were awarded by the Austrian emperor Leopold (in exchange of 25,000 florins) the right to build their own town on the Somes River. The town was known as Armenopolis/Armenierstadt or Gherla/Szamosujvar since for a long time the town's population was mostly Armenian. The other main Armenian center in Transylvania was Elisabethopolis (Erzsebetvaros, Ebesfalva, Ibasfalau, Dumbraveni).<sup>150</sup> After Bishop Minas's death in 1686, the efforts were made by the Congregation for the Propagation of Faith (Rome) and Vardan Hunanean (1644-1715), Armenian-Catholic archbishop of Lemberg, to bring about the Armenians' church union and organize the Armenian-Catholic Church in Transylvania. This task was fulfilled by Oxendio Virziresco (1654-1715), a Catholic Armenian missionary born in Moldavia and educated at the Armenian College in Lemberg and the Urbanian College in Rome.<sup>151</sup>

Armenian migration from Moldavia in 1672 was not a massive and single-stage exodus.<sup>152</sup> It was rather a gradual outflow of Armenians from declining cities of Moldavia to more stable and prosperous Transylvania. One also has to take into consideration the mass escape of other ethno-religious groups of Moldavia's population to Carpathian forest areas caused by constant Tatar incursions. Catholic missionaries who visited Moldavia in the 1680s-1690s pointed out that they could not count Catholics living in the Principality since the majority of its population found

their permanent asylum in the woods.<sup>153</sup> Nevertheless, only Armenians migrated from Moldavia forever, founding new colonies in Transylvania. Being merchants involved into the long-distance trade, these Armenians were more dependent from trade route changes, as well as from market conjuncture. Being merchants, they visited Transylvania and established their businesses there long before the migration of the late 17<sup>th</sup> century.

The main reasons for Armenian migration from Moldavia in the 1670s-1680s could be formulated as the following:

Because of the decline of the inland routes of the oriental trade in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, Armenian merchant network in Moldavia lost its transit function;

The growing competition of Greek merchants, many of whom managed to integrate themselves into Moldavian ruling elite<sup>154</sup> through financial and matrimonial strategies;<sup>155</sup>

Polish-Ottoman wars in 1672-1684 in the northern Moldavia led to economic and demographic decline of the Principality;

Ottoman occupation of Kamianiec-Podilski and of Jazlowiec in 1672-1699 caused migration of the majority of local Armenians southwards to Filippopolis/Plovdiv and westwards, where they dispersed in many towns of modern day Western Ukraine. Some Armenians returned to Kamianiec in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century, but the city as well as Armenian community could not restore its leading role in the oriental trade. Naturally, Ottoman occupation also affected Armenian communities in Moldavia, which constituted part of Armenian merchant network involved in the oriental trade;

Political decline of Poland, which gradually lost interest in Moldavian affairs in the 18<sup>th</sup> century;

The general decline of urban economics in Moldavia by the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

In the late 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, one could also witness establishment of new Armenian colonies in Polish kingdom along the northern border of Moldavian Principality – in Kutý, Stanisław, Tysmenytsia, Horodenka, Lysiec and Mogyliv-Podilskyi. These new communities were founded thanks to the privileges from the Polish aristocrats – mostly of the powerful Potocki family – owners of these towns. Armenians living in these towns were merchants and artisans, mostly specializing in export of Moldavian cattle and horses westwards, and leather tanning, respectively. One could hypothesize that many of these new settlers were newcomers from the old Armenian colonies, situated in the northern part of Moldavia. Many

of them later migrated to Bucovina when it became Province of Habsburg Empire in 1775 and in the following decades turned themselves into prosperous landowners.<sup>156</sup> The new Armenian settlements were also founded in the south – in the Lower Danube region. Armenian churches were built in Focșani (St. George, in 1715, and Virgin Mary, in 1780), Brăila (Nativity of the Lord, in 1837), Constanța (Virgin Mary, in 1840), Galați (Virgin Mary, in 1858). This construction activity reflected growth of Armenian population in the region caused mostly by the opportunity to take part in prosperous trade in agricultural produce exported from Moldavia and Wallachia by Danube to the Black Sea and then to Western Europe.

## Conclusion

Armenian communities in Moldavia emerged in the 1360s-1380s as a result of the shift of trade routes in the oriental trade. They fulfilled transitive functions for more prosperous communities of Lemberg, Kamianiec, Caffa and Constantinople for more than three centuries. In Moldavian Principality, Armenian communities founded their own churches and established their autonomous courts in accordance with the princely privileges. Nevertheless, because of religious differences, the Armenians could not be integrated into Moldavian society as deeply as the Orthodox Greek, Aromanian and Arnaut merchants did.

Since Moldavian Principality was dependent from neighbour powers (Ottomans, Habsburgs, and Poland), Armenian merchants were deeply involved in the politics of the principality. Well-established merchant network could be also used for political purposes. Some richest Armenian merchants established close personal ties with the rulers. The fulfillment of the functions of a creditor, political promoter, mediator, or secret envoy by a merchant could provide him with certain privileges and promote his business, but this close connection with the powerful policy-makers also could lead to many troubles and even to the persecution of the whole community.

Periods of cooperation between merchant network and ruling elite in economics and politics alternated with periods of oppression and persecution. Having well-established business ties with Polish aristocracy, Armenian as well as Jewish merchants exported Moldavian cattle through Polish kingdom westwards. That is why Armenians were seen as agents

of Polish influence in Moldavia in particular in periods of political crisis in the principality. Political dependence of Moldavia from Poland in the late sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries – ruling of Movilă dynasty and Vasile Lupu – was the era when economic prosperity of Armenian diaspora reached its peak in the Principality. Periods when Poland's efforts to establish its influence in Moldavia met with resistance of the princes like Petru Rareș, Ștefan Rareș or Alexandru Lăpușneanu – in the 1530s-1570s – or even led to military conflicts between Poland and the Ottomans – as in 1672-1676 and in 1683-1699 – were also troubling times for the Armenian diaspora in the principality, leading to its persecution or forced migration. On the other hand, Greek merchants – subjects of a sultan or of Venice – mostly limited their trade with Poland to the import of vine, because of the lack of influential Greek diaspora in the kingdom. Greek merchants dominated southern direction of Moldavian export to Constantinople. Greeks were much more influential at the sultan's court, and in the late 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries many representatives of these Greek elites became rulers of Moldavia – so-called Phanariotes.<sup>157</sup>

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> I would like to express my gratitude to Constantin Ardeleanu and Alexandru Tofan who turned my attention to many important Romanian works and translated some of them.
- <sup>2</sup> Ureche Grigorie și Simion Dascălul. *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei până la Aron Vodă (1359-1595)*, ediție comentată de Constantin C. Giurescu. Craiova: Editura Scrisul Romanesc S.A., 2001. p.151; Grigore Ureche, *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei* (ediția a II-a îngrijită de P.P. Panaitescu). București, 1958, p. 195, 206; Căuș, Bogdan. *Figuri de armeni din România. Dicționar*, ediția a II-a, București, 1998, p.311; Ciobanu, Tiberiu. *Ioan Nicoară Potcoavă, domn al Moldovei (1537-1558)* [[http://www.istoria.md/articol/574/Ioan\\_Nicoar%C4%83\\_Potcoav%C4%83,\\_domn\\_al\\_Moldovei](http://www.istoria.md/articol/574/Ioan_Nicoar%C4%83_Potcoav%C4%83,_domn_al_Moldovei)]; Dan Dimitrie. *Armenii ortodocși din Bucovina*. București: Zamca, 2010, p.38; Iorga, Nicolae. "Byzance après Byzance", *Considérations générales pour le Congrès d'Etudes Byzantines de Sofia*. Bucarest: [L' Institut d' Études Byzantines], 1934. p.140; Iorga, Nicolae. "Armenii și românii: o paralelă istorică", extras din *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secției Istorice*, seria II, tom XXXV, 1913-1914. București, 1913, p.27; Siruni, H. Dj. "Legenda Serpegăi", *Arhiva Națională din Iași*, II, vol. III. Iași, 1936, p.81-82; Schmidt, Wilhelm. *Suczawa's Historische Denkwürdigkeiten Von Der Ersten Historischen Kenntnis, Bis Zur Verbindung Der Bukowina Mit Oesterreich: Ein Stück Städtechronik Und Moldauischer Geschichte*. Czernowitz: druck von R. Eckhardt, 1876. s.139.
- <sup>3</sup> Michel Balard, *La mer Noire et la Romanie génoise, XIIIe – XVe siècles*. London: Variorum reprints, 1989; Michel Balard, "Gênes et la mer Noire (XIIIe-XVe siècles)", *Revue Historique* 270 (1983): 31-54; L. Petech, "Les marchands italiens dans l'empire mongol", *Journal Asiatique* 250, no. 4 (1962): 549-574.
- <sup>4</sup> For a detailed analysis of the trade routes see: Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony: the World System A.D. 1250-1350*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- <sup>5</sup> Thomas T. Allsen, "The Cultural Worlds of Marco Polo", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 31, no. 3 (2001): 375-83; Anna-Dorothee von den Brincken, *Fines Terrae. Die Enden der Erde und der vierte Kontinent auf mittelalterlichen Weltkarten*. Hannover, 1992; Christopher H. Dawson, *The Mongol Mission. Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, reprinted 1980. New York, 1955; Peter Jackson, *The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410*. Harlow, 2005; John Larner. *Marco Polo and the Discovery of the World*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999; Igor de Rachewiltz, "Priester John and Europe's Discovery of East Asia", *East Asian History* 11 (1996): 59-74; Jean Richard, *Croisés, missionnaires et voyageurs: Les*

- perspectives orientales du monde latin medieval*. London: Variorum Reprints, 1983; Denis Sinor, "The Mongols in the West", *Journal of Asian History* 33, no. 1 (1999): 1-44.
- <sup>6</sup> "The Yam system was designed to facilitate the travels of envoys going to and from the Mongol courts; it was used for the transportation of the goods; it ensured the speedy transmission of royal orders from one part of the empire to another; and it provided the framework whereby the Mongols could receive intelligence as quickly as possible. By abuse it was also used by merchants and by traveling Mongol notables who had with them a sufficient following to enable them to enforce the compliance of the Yam officials." David Morgan, *The Mongols*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, p. 90-91.
- <sup>7</sup> For more details on *fondacco* or *funduq* see: Olivia Remie Constable, *Housing the Strange in the Mediterranean World. Lodging, Trade, and Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- <sup>8</sup> V. Langlois, *Mémoire sur les relations de la République de Gênes avec le royaume Chrétien de la Petite-Arménie pendant les XIII et XIV siècles*. Paris, 1860, p.298-300; *Actes passés en 1271, 1274 et 1279 a l'Aias (Petite Arménie) et à Beyrouth par-devant des notaries génois*, par le Ch. Cornelio Desimoni. Gênes, 1881.
- <sup>9</sup> On the relations between Italian overseas colonies and the Golden Horde see: Nicola Di Cosmo, "Mongols and Merchants on the Black Sea Frontier (13<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> c.): Convergences and Conflicts", in *Turco-Mongol Nomads and Sedentary Societies*, eds. Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran. Leiden: Brill, 2005, p.391-424; Nicola Di Cosmo, "Venice, Genoa, the Golden Horde, and the Limits of European Expansion in Asia", in *Il Codice Cumanico e il Suo Mondo*, eds. Peter Schreiner and Felicitas Schmieder. Roma: Storia e Letteratura, 2005, p.279-296; Enrico Basso, *Il 'Bellum de Sorcati' ad i trattati del 1380-1387 tra Genova e l'Orda d'Oro*. Genova, 1991, p.14-15.
- <sup>10</sup> This route was mentioned in correspondence between the Senate of Venice and Venetian authorities in Tana in March 14, 1344. *Régestes des délibérations du sénat de Venise concernant la Roumanie*, par F. Thiriet. Paris, La Haye: Mouton, 1958, t.1: 1329-1399, p.54. On the Dulcert *portulan* of 1339 Lemberg is depicted as significant point in oriental trade between Flanders and the Black Sea. Balard, "Gênes et la mer Noire", p.52-53. The rout from Lemberg (city of Leo – Leopolis) to Tana mentioned in November 3, 1343 in the treatise between Venice officials and two citizens (*providi viri*) of Venice, travelling to the domains of the Golden Horde Khan Zanibech: "... per viam de lo Leo usque Tanam, ...". *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum sive acta et diplomatares venetas graecas atque levantis illustrantia*, a. 1300-1350. Venetiis, 1880, p.266-267. The inscription on the Catalan Atlas of 1375 reads "To the city of Leon (*ciutat de Leo*) arrive various merchants

from Levant who continue later across the German Sea to Flanders" [<http://www.henry-davis.com/MAPS/LMwebpages/235B.html>]

- 11 A.K. Sanjian, *Colophons of Armenian Manuscripts, 1301-1480*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969, p.90-98.
- 12 Ibid, p.93.
- 13 There was mentioned Armenian Vanes of Caffa (*Vanes de Cafā Armenus*) – representative of Armenians from Mitilena. Anthony T. Lutrell, "The Hospitallers' interventions in Cilician Armenia: 1291-1375", in *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia*, ed. by T.S.R.Boase. New York: St.Martin's Press, 1978, p.118-144, here 131f.
- 14 *Régestes des délibérations du sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie*, par F. Thiriet (Paris, La Haye: Mouton, 1958), t.1 (1329-1399), p.105-107.
- 15 Lutrell, *The Hospitallers' interventions*, p.131f.
- 16 *Fratr Raymundus Berengarii* of Rhodes wrote to the Armenians residing on Mitilena (*Armenis omnibus et singulis residentibus in insula Metellini*) about his treatises with their representative Vanes of Caffa (*Discretus et sapiens vir Vanes de Cafā Armenus*) (8 February 1366). Malta, cod. 319, f. 270v. I am indebted to Professor Anthony T. Lutrell for bringing this item to my attention.
- 17 Quoted in: Myron Kapral, *Natsionalni hromady Lvova XVI-XVIII st.: Sotsialno-pravovi vzayemyny* [The national communities of the city of Lviv in 16<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup> centuries: Social and juridical relations], Lviv: Piramida, 2003, p.368-369.
- 18 Polish king Kazimierz/Casimir III by his decree of 1356 confirmed to Armenian community in Lemberg its right for self-government. *Pryvilei mista Lvova XIV-XVIII st.* [Royal Charters Granted to the City of Lviv in 14<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup> Centuries], ed. Myron Kapral (Lviv: Piramida, 1998), p.27-28.
- 19 Dashkevych, Yaroslav, "Davniy Lviv u vormenskykh ta vormeno-kypchatskykh dzherelakh" [The Old Lviv in Armenian and Armeno-Kipchak Sources], in *Ukraina v mynulomu*. Vol.1. Kiev-Lviv, 1992, p.9.
- 20 Some scholars also identified Botin with Vidin in Bulgaria. Năsturel, Petre Ș. "L'attitude du Patriarcat oecuménique envers les Arméniens des pays Roumains (fin XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle – début XV<sup>e</sup> siècle)," *L'Arménie et Byzance. Histoire et culture*. Paris, 1996, p.147.
- 21 Dashkevych, Yaroslav, *Davniy Lviv* , p. 10.
- 22 Armenian bishops in Caffa, Solchat and Saray (*episcopus Armenorum in imperio Tartarorum lusbecki*) were mentioned in sources in 1320s. Jean Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient au Moyen Âge (XIII<sup>e</sup>-XV<sup>e</sup> siècles)*. Rome, 1998, p. 92, 159-160.
- 23 *Documenta Romaniae Historica* (București: Editura Academiei R S România, 1975), t.1, p. 21. Panaitecu P.P. "Hrisovul lui Alexandru cel Bun pentru episcopia armeană din Suceava (30 iulie 1401)", *Revista Istorică Română* vol.4, fasc.1-4 (1934): 44-56.

- 24 The original charter was written in Armenian and in 1641 translated into Latin. That is why there are different readings and interpretations of the city's name which could be read as Nahel or Gagel. The city could be identified with the Gabal/Jebel in Syria – in thirteenth-fourteenth century important sea port with Genoese emporia. Fourteen Merchants from Jebel are mentioned in Caffa city records in 1381. A. L. Ponomarev, "Naselenie i territoria Kaffy po dannym massarii – bukhgalterskoi knigi kaznacheistva za 1381-1382 gody", [Population and Territory of Caffa According to the Data from the Massaria – an Account Book of Treasury, 1381-1382] *Prichernomorie v srednie veka* 4 (2000), p. 359.
- 25 Latin translation was published in: Sdislaus Obertyński, "Die Florentiner Union der Polnischer Armenier und ihr Bischoffskatalog", *Orientalia Christiana* 36, no.1 (1934): p.41-42.
- 26 "Asslany Armeni filio Panosso" and "Abraham Panossowicz". *Pomniki dziejowe Lwowa z archiwum miasta* [The Records on the History of Lemberg from the City Archive], ed. by Aleksander Czołowski. Lwów, 1892, t.1: 1382-1389, p.1, 8, 16, 17, 47, 64, 108.
- 27 Aleksander Przezdziecki, *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina. Obrazy miejsc i czasów* [Podolia, Volynia, Ukraine. The Images of Places and Times]. Wilno, 1841, t.1, p.144-145.
- 28 This earlier privilege without exact date was mentioned in charter issued in August 13, 1443 by Jan of Czyżów, the Polish governor of Podolia. Przezdziecki, *Podole*, t.1, p.147-148.
- 29 Balard, *Gênes*, t.1, p.68, 109, 233-234. G.I. Brătianu, *Actes des notaires génois de Péra et de Caffa de la fin du treizième siècle (1281-1290)*. Bucarest, 1927: p.173-174, 228.
- 30 Ibid., p.160, 301, 309, 337.
- 31 There is an inscription on *khachkar* – stone-cross memorial – in the Armenian church in Akkerman dated 1351. Khristofor Kuchuk-loannesov, *Starinnye armianskie nadpisi i starinnye rukopisi v predelakh Yugo-Zapadnoi Rusi i v Krymu* [The Ancient Armenian Inscriptions and Manuscripts in the South-Western Rus' and in the Crimea], *Drevnosti vostochnye. Trudy Vostochnoi Komissii Imperatorskogo Moskovskogo Arkheologicheskogo obshchestva* [Oriental Antiquities. The Transactions of the Oriental Commission of Imperial Moscow Archaeological Society]. Moscow, 1903, t.2, no.3, p. 66.
- 32 Armenian Grigo, son of Arabec, burgher of Kilia (*Grigo Erminius, quondam Arabec, habitator et burgensis Chili*), was mentioned in records 14 September 1360. Michel Balard, *Gênes et l'Outre-Mer*, t.2: *Actes de Kilia du notaire Antonio di Ponzo. 1360*. Paris, La Haye, 1980, p.107-108. *Sarchis Erminio de Caffa, filio Constantini* (30 October 1360). In this transaction among witnesses was also mentioned *Sabadim Erminio, habitatore Chili*. Balard, *Gênes*, t.2, p.193, 194. Sarchis of Caffa was again mentioned as witness in



- Kilia records 25 August and 14 September 1360. Balard, *Gênes*, t.2, p.58, 111.
- 33 The Armenians from Caffa are mentioned in Licostomo records 13 September 1373 (*Machitar maiorem esse annis XVII, cum consilio Abram Erminii de Caffa et Georgii Erminii de Caffa*). Balbi, Raiteri, *Notai genovesi*, p.197.
- 34 The Armenian church of St. Gregory Illuminator in Tana was mentioned in 1339 and 1341. *Pamyatnye zapisi armianskikh rukopisei XIV v.* [Colophons of the 14<sup>th</sup> Century Armenian Manuscripts], ed. by Levon S. Khachikian. Yerevan, 1950, p.329-330. Among 443 free figurants of transactions written in Tana records in 1359-1360 there were 7 Armenians. Sergei P. Karpov, "Tana – Une grand zone réceptrice de l'émigration au Moyen Âge", *Migrations et diasporas méditerranéennes: Xe – XVIe siècles: actes du colloque de Conques, octobre 1999*, réunis par Michel Balard et Alain Ducellier (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002), p.77-89, here p.79.
- 35 Balard, *Gênes*, t.2, p.107-108, 193-194.
- 36 Ibid., p.128-129, 135-136.
- 37 Armenian Kilakos (Kirakos ?) of Kazaret (*Chilacos erminio de Cazarese*) 18 July 1289 credited Italian Raphael Ebriac with 2,000 aspros. The latter is obliged to return credit in 15 days when his vessel arrived from Arsuf in Syria (*in Siria loco ubi dicitur Sur*). Balard, *Gênes*, t.1, p.120. Armenian Christophano, inhabitant of Caffa (*Christofano erminius, habitator de Caffa, sive de Sorchati de Laizo*), 24 June 1290 credited John of Syria (*Johannes Sorianus*) with 1,800 aspros. The latter is obliged to return credit in 1.5 year. Balard, *Gênes*, t.1, p.220.
- 38 Lowry, H. "From Lesser Wars to the Mightiest War': The Ottoman Conquest and Transformation of the Early Byzantine Urban Centres in the 15<sup>th</sup> Century", in *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society*, ed. by Bryer Anthony and Heath Lowry. Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 1986, p.325.
- 39 Bryer, Anthony. "The Roman Orthodox World (1393-1492)", in *The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire c. 500-1492*, ed. Jonathan Shepard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. p.871.
- 40 Slavonic originals published in: *Ukrainski hramoty XV st.* [Ukrainian Charters of 15<sup>th</sup> Century], ed., V.M. Rusanivskiy. Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1965. p.69-72, 110-113. See also: Panaitescu P. P. "La route commerciale de Pologne à la Mer Noire au Moyen Age", *Revista Istorică Română* 3 (1933): 172-193.
- 41 Aghassian, Michel, and Keram Kevonian. "The Armenian Merchant Network: Overall Autonomy and Local Integration," *Merchants, Companies and Trade. Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era*, ed. Chaudhury, Sushil and Morineau, Michel. Cambridge, 1999. p.74-94; Matwijowski, Krystyn. "Jews and Armenians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *The Jews in Old Poland 1000-1795*, ed. Antony

- Polonsky, Jakub Basista and Andrzej Link-Lenczowski. London: Tauris, 1993. p.63-72; Nadel-Golobic, Eleonora. "Armenians and Jews in Medieval Lvov: The Role in Oriental Trade, 1400-1600," *Cahires du Monde russe et soviétique* 20 (1979): 345-388; *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982; Zakrzewska-Dubasowa M. *Ormianie Zamojscy i ich rola w wymianie handlowej i kulturalnej między Polską a Wschodem*. Lublin, 1965.
- 42 For more details on this trade see: Sebouh David Aslanian, "From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: Circulation and the Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa, Isfahan, 1605-1747" (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, *The Shah's silk for Europe's silver: The Eurasian Trade of the Julfa Armenians in Safavid Iran and India (1530-1750)* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999); Herzig, Edmund. "The Rise of the Julfa Merchants in the Late Sixteenth Century," in C. Melville (ed.). *Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an Islamic Society* (1996), p.305-322; Herzig, E. "Venice and the Julfa Armenian Merchants", in *Gli Armeni e Venezia. Dagli Sceriman a Mechitar: il momento culminante di una consuetudine millenaria*, ed. by B. L. Zekiyan and A. Ferrari. Venezia, 2004, p. 141-164; Matthee Rudi. *The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran. Silk for Silver, 1600-1730*. Cambridge University Press, 1999; Matthee Rudi. "Merchants in Safavid Iran: Participants and Perceptions", *Journal of Early Modern History* 4. no.3 (2000): 233-268; *Armenians in Asian Trade in the Early Modern Era*, ed. by Sushil Chaudhury, Gegham Gewonean. Paris: Fondation Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2007.
- 43 Mauro, Frédéric. "Merchant Communities, 1350-1750", *The Rise of Merchant Empires. Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750*, ed. James Tracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. p.266, 270.
- 44 Kołodziejczyk, Dariusz. *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> Century): An Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and Other Documents*. Leiden: Brill, 2000. p.278.
- 45 Kołodziejczyk, Dariusz. "Polish-Ottoman Trade Routes in the Times of Martin Gruneweg", in Almut Bues (ed.). *Martin Gruneweg (1562 – after 1615). A European Way of Life*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009, p.168.
- 46 These privileges were mentioned in the records of Armenian court in Kamianec at least twice – eight charters in 1604, twelve charters in 1615, and five more charters issued to cross the border on the Dnister River. Central Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kiev, fond 39, holding 1, file 20, fol.50; file 26, fol.40. Published in: Garkavets O.M. *Virmeno-qypchatski pukopysy v Ukraini, Virmenii, Rosii. Katalog* [Armenian-Qipchaq Manuscripts in Ukraine, Armenia, Russia. The Catalogue]. Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1993.

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- 48 Ibid. p.186, 336, 343.
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- 121 "Et mercantilmente quante incette erano da farsi nel suo paese, le faceva fare per suo conto proprio proibendo alli altri Mercanti, talché al suo tempo si sono rovinati quanti Mercanti usavano negoziare in suo Paese, e così signoreggiando vicino al X<sup>mo</sup> anno si crede, che avessi congregato meglio, che dua milioni d'oro compreso le gioie che ne aveva assai". Masi G. *La lettera*. P.382. See also: Pippidi, Andrei. *Les Roumains vus de Pologne*. P.118.
- 122 *Documente privitoare la istoria oraşului Iaşi*, vol.1, editate de I. Caproşu şi Petronel Zahariuc. Iaşi, 1999, p.111, 114-5.
- 123 *Surete şi Izvoade (Documente slavo-române)*. Publ. de G.Ghibanescu. Iaşi, 1908. Vol.5. P.226; *Suceava. File de istorie. Documente privitoare la istoria oraşului (1388-1918)*. Publ. Vasile Gh. Miron, Mihai-Ştefan Ceauşu, Ioan Caproşu, Gavriil Irimescu. Vol.1. Bucureşti, 1989. P.185-186, 208-210; *Documenta Romaniae Historica. Seria B. Ţara Românească*. Publ. Violeta Barbu, Constantin Bălan, Florina Manuela Constantin. Bucureşti: Editura Academiei Române, 2006. Vol.27. P.266, 340-341.
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- 128 *Moldvai Csango-Magyar Okmanytar* [Hungarian Csango Documents from Moldavia], vol.1 (1467-1706), ed. Benda Kalman. Budapest: Magyarságkutató Intézet, 1989. p.87-88.
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- 136 *Travels of Macarios, Patriarch of Antioch*. Part I: *Anatolia, Romelia, and Moldavia*, ed. F.C. Belfour. London, 1829. p.47.
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- 141 APF SOCG. Vol.471, fol.314.
- 142 "Vita de padre Giulio Mancinelli", in *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor* / culese de Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki. București, 1897. Vol.9. p.116.

- 143 For more details, see: Petrowicz, Gregorio. *L'unione degli Armeni di Polonia con la Santa Sede (1626-1686)*. Roma: Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1950.
- 144 APF SOCG. Vol.225: Armeni di Polonia Valachia. fol.72-72v.
- 145 APF SOCG. Vol.225: Armeni di Polonia Valachia. fol.74.
- 146 Other historians named either 1669 or 1668 as the year when some Armenians and their bishop fled to Transylvania.
- 147 *Scutelnic* (also *scutnic*, from Romanian verb *scuti*, "to exempt", "to absolve"; plural: *scitelnici*, *scutnici*) were peasant servants in Wallachia and Moldavia who were exempt from state taxes. They were charged with various duties and were attached to *boiers* and to monasteries.
- 148 *Suceava. File de istorie. Documente privitoare la istoria oraşului (1388-1918)*, ed. Vasile Gh. Miron, Mihai-Ştefan Ceaşu, Ioan Caprosu, Gavriil Irimescu. Vol.1. Bucureşti, 1989. p.321-323.
- 149 *Documente Bucovinene*. Publ. de T. Balan. Cernaui, 1938. Vol.4. P.236-237.
- 150 For history of Armenian Diaspora in Transylvania, see: Pál, Judit. *Armenians in Transylvania. Their Contribution to the Urbanization and the Economic Development of the Province*. Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Cultural Institute, Center for Transylvanian Studies, 2005. 174p.; Pal, Judith. "Armenian image – Armenian identity – Assimilation of the Transylvanian Armenians in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries", *Integrating Minorities: Traditional Communities and Modernization*, ed. by Agnieszka Barszczewska. Cluj-Napoca: Kriterion, 2011. p.13-32; Kovács, Bálint. "Über Rom nach Siebenbürgen. Der armenische Missionar Minas Barun und die Siebenbürger armenische Kirche in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 18. Jahrhunderts", *Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde* 29. Jahrgang, Heft 1 (2006) S.44-50; Kovács, Bálint. "Armjanské biblioteki i armjanskaja literatura v Transilvanii" [Armenian Libraries and Armenian Literature in Transylvania], in: *Iz istorii armjano-ukrainskich, vengerskich i moldavskich otnošenij. Sbornik statej i materialov*, ed. Karen Chačatryan and Ovanes Aleksanjan. Erevan, 2012. p.131-137; Öze, Sándor, Kovács, Bálint (eds.). *Örmény diaszpóra a Kárpát-medencében*. Piliscsba, 2006, 2008; Rita Bernád, Bálint Kovács. *The Armenian Catholic Collective Archive in Armenopolis. Repertory*. Budapest-Gyulafehérvár-Leipzig, 2011. 320 p.; Armenuhi Drost-Abgarjan, Bálint Kovács, Tibor Martf. *Catalogue of the Armenian Library in Elisabethopolis*. Leipzig - Eger, 2011. 456 p.; Gazdovits Miklós. *Az erdélyi örmények története* [History of Armenians in Transylvania]. Kolozsvár: Kriterion, 2006.
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Vardapet Minas Tokhatetsi, Bishop of the Armenians in Transylvania, Make a Confession of Faith in the Roman Catholic Church in 1686?" *Haigazian Armenological Review* 31 (2011): 427-442; Nagy, Kornel. "Archbishop Vardan Hunanean's Two Unpublished Letters of 1687 to the Holy See on the Armenians in Transylvania", *Haigazian Armenological Review* 32 (2012): 309-320.

- 152 Conventional model of Armenian migration to Transylvania caused by religious persecutions was elaborated by Christophor Lucacs, Armenian Catholic priest in Armenopolis/Gherla: Lucacsi, Christophorum. *Historia Armenorum Transilvaniae a primordis gentis usque nostrum*. Viennae, 1859. p.16, 66. This model was criticized in: Chelcu, Marius. "Cause ale părăsirii Moldovei de către armeni la sfârșitul secolului XVII", *Istorie și societate în spațial est-carpatic (secolele XIII-XX)*. *Omagiu profesorului Alexandru Zub*, ed. Dumitru Ivănescu, Marius Chelcu. Iași: Junimea, 2005. P.73-81.
- 153 From the letter of Franciscan monastic missionary Francisco Antonio Renzi from Stipide to the Propaganda Fide, written in Lemberg on October 23, 1692: "I went to Baia. The town is completely abandoned, and the churches, both Catholic and schismatic are burned down (...) In Suceava, the Tatars had burned the churches and all the Catholics from Baia and Suceava fled into the mountains, to live in Câmpulung". Archivio storico Congregazione per l'evangelizzazione dei popoli ("De Propaganda Fide"). Scritture riferite nei Congressi (SC). Fondo Moldavia, vol. 2, fol.345-346. Published in: *Moldvai Csango-Magyar Okmánytar.* vol.2. p.716-718. See also report of the Apostolic vicar from Moldavia, Vito Piluzzi da Vignanello, Archbishop of Marcianopolis, to the Propaganda Fide, written in Bacău on July 10, 1682. Archivio storico Congregazione per l'evangelizzazione dei popoli ("De Propaganda Fide"). Scritture riferite nei Congressi (SC). Fondo Moldavia, vol. 2, fol.116-119. Published in: Bianu I. "Vito Pilutio. Documente inedite din arhivulu Propagandei", *Columna lui Traian*, s.n., IV, 1883, p.260-263.
- 154 "Marc' Antonio Borisi, the great dragoman of the Venetian ambassador in Constantinople, credited Gaspare Graziani with the amount 5,500 thalers in 1619, when the sultan Osman II appointed Graziani prince of Moldavia. This sum was repaid in part to the merchant Pellegrino Testa, the creditor's son-in-law. Bernardo Borisi, Marc'Antonio's brother was appointed to the high office of grand hetman by Gaspare Graziani, who had debts to both the Borisi brothers". Luca Cristian. "Venetian Merchants in the Lower Danube Area and their Role in the Development of the International Trade Exchanges in the Seventeenth Century", *The Czech Historical Review/Český časopis historický*, 109/2 (2011), p.305.
- 155 "The mainly Greek Venetian merchants, citizens or subjects of the Serenissima, through a keen spirit of enterprise and the clever management of the privileged relations with the local political-administrative authorities, were able to consolidate their social status and to acquire the financial

- resources necessary for buying administrative offices". Luca C. Op.cit. p.311. "The most prominent Greek merchants in Istanbul became *capigi-agas* or entrusted at the Porte with the matters of the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia." (For *kapi kethüdasi* or *kapi kâhyasi*, stewards of the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, representing the interests of their masters at the imperial divan)". Eldem, Edhem. "Istanbul: from imperial to peripheralized capital," *The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul*, Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. P.159. See also: Falangas, Andronikos, "Post-Byzantine Greek Merchants of the Fifteenth–Seventeenth Centuries", *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 33, no.1–2 (2007), p.8-10; Ștefănescu Melchisedek (Episcopul Dunării de Jos). *Chronica Romanului și a Episcopiei de Roman*. Partea 1. București, 1864. p.33.
- 156 Osipian A. "Orenda virmenamy zemel'nykh volodin' na Bukovyni u 1775-1850 rokakh" [The Armenian Leasing of the Land Possessions in Bukovina, 1775-1850], *Pytannia istorii Ukrainy* [Issues of the History of Ukraine] 4 (2000): 256-261.
- 157 Phanariotes were members of those prominent Greek (including Hellenized Vlach and Albanian) families residing in Phanar, the chief Greek quarter of Constantinople, where the Ecumenical Patriarchate is situated. Phanariotes emerged as a class of moneyed Greek merchants (they commonly claimed noble Byzantine descent) in the latter half of the 16th century and went on to exercise great influence in the administration in the Ottoman Empire's Balkan domains in the 18th century. They tended to build their houses in the Phanar quarter in order to be close to the court of the Patriarch, who under the Ottoman millet system was recognized as both the spiritual and secular head (*millet-bashi*) of all the Orthodox subjects (the Rum Millet, or the "Roman nation") of the Empire, often acting as archontes of the Ecumenical See; thus they came to dominate the administration of the Patriarchate frequently intervening in the selection of hierarchs, including the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. Many members of the Phanariot families (which had acquired great wealth and influence during the 17th century) occupied high posts of secretaries and interpreters to Ottoman officials and officers Many had entered the ranks of Wallachian and Moldavian boyar nobility by marriage.



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# HISTORY, LAND AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY: CRIMEAN COSSACK AND CRIMEAN TATAR CONTESTATION ON PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL SPACE

This article is dedicated to the study of the Crimean Cossacks' impact on the way interethnic relations unfold in the Crimean Peninsula. Therefore, the study aims to discover if Cossacks' presence in the Peninsula has led to any conflictive consequences in the physical and social space. Moreover, the aim of the study is to examine if the Cossacks' presence in the Peninsula has impacted the way interethnic relations unfold and if this led to conflictive consequences in the social and physical space. In the study of the Cossack impact on the interethnic life, this work tests how such causes relate to the perception of the past, the land and the formation of collective memory and identity.

Cossacks in Ukraine re-emerged in the late Soviet era. Most of such Cossacks formed organizations and legally registered after the declaration of Ukraine's independence. Such revivalist movements usually tend to combine what is left in individual memories and their knowledge from written sources to formulate their collective memory and identity. They revive and reconstruct traditions and practice rituals in physical and social space. Such revivals and reconstructions often delineate ethnic lines and define communal interests.

Considering the historical image of Cossacks as warriors, who were attached to their kin, land and religion we might hypothesize that the Crimean Cossacks reconstructed their historical memory and identity with reflection to the main characteristics of the Cossack "forefathers". If this would be the case, we may expect that the collective memory and identity formulations of Crimean Cossacks would cause conflicts as Crimean Tatars are historical arch enemy to the Cossacks, and that Crimean

Tatars are of another religion, i.e., Muslim. The complication here is with the Crimean Cossacks' attachment to the land. The Crimean Peninsula is not a motherland for Cossacks. Therefore, Cossack legitimization of their current presence on the land and their claims on the space could either be found in mythologies or in the subversion of the case by references to the other past events in order to illegitimise the Crimean Tatar claims on the territory or refute the Crimean Tatar perception of the land as their motherland.

With such aspects hypothesized, this research is oriented to look at the impact of the perception of the past to build identities in the present, the attachment and legitimization of the land for the Crimean Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars, and the role of religion in the making of ethnic borders.

There are several arguments towards the validity of such an investigation agenda: the return of Crimean Tatars to the Peninsula and the subsequent complications have drawn scholarly attention, particularly in Ukrainian and, to a less extent, in Anglophone researches. However, in most cases, the research carried out so far on the complications created by the return of Crimean Tatars and on their relations to other ethnic groups in the Peninsula tend to take the Russian ethnos of the Peninsula as a homogeneous group. Most of such researches argue that the "homogenous" group, the Russians, was and is opposed and threatened by the return and claims of the Crimean Tatars. Taking the ethnic Russians of the Peninsula, in the analysis of interethnic relations, as a homogenous group is erroneous because it disregards and oversimplifies the diversity of interests and values among them. Nonetheless, such a view is also an overgeneralization of the case for the sake of avoiding intellectual complexities, a phenomenon largely caused by the priorities and values of compromised scholarship. This study, instead, in an attempt to avoid oversimplification and overgeneralization of the issues pertaining to the ethnic Crimean Russians, focuses on one particular group which is largely assumed as an organized part of Russian people in the Peninsula: Cossacks. By focusing on Cossacks as a subject of study, this article attempts to provide refined findings and results in understanding the interethnic conditions and conflicts in the peninsula.

Another aspect towards the validity of the research agenda offered here is the limited number of scholarly studies on Cossacks in Ukraine. Yet, the study of modern Cossacks in Ukraine in Anglophone and in Ukrainian scholarship is still a major gap. As much as I am concerned with the scholarship produced, major scholarly works have not been

conducted to understand and explain the modern Cossack phenomenon. My dissertation, which focused on the making of modern Cossacks collective identity and the revival of Cossackdom in Ukraine, stands as one of the few research so far conducted in the Anglophone scholarship. However, my dissertation did not contain the study of Cossackdom in the southern regions Ukraine. Therefore, this study stands as an expansion to the research which I have so far conducted. In this sense, the study of Crimean Cossacks in relation to Crimean Tatars from the perspective of construction of identities is a scholarly attempt in understanding the balances in the peninsula from a very fresh perspective.

One of the methods, to accomplish the tests proposed here and to accomplish the research agenda, is to conduct interviews with Crimean Cossacks. Such interviews would likely provide insights into the reconstruction of the past for the purposes and the needs of the present, the discursive methods of legitimizing the presence in the peninsula and legitimization of the ownership of the land, and the role of religion in drawing ethno-cultural borders and, furthermore, the role of religion in aggravating interethnic conflicts. Another method used in this research is reviewing the online material on the Crimean Cossacks. The review of such sources would likely provide more information towards how values, interests, and identities are constructed. The results of reviews of Cossacks' organizational (where available) and third party web sites, journals and online newspapers will also be used as complimentary sources. Finally, this research also refers to secondary sources.

With such research method employed, the structure of the paper will first include the history of Cossacks and Crimean Tatars from a perspective where the past is taken as a variable in the way identities are formulated in the present. Secondly, the analysis of data will be offered. Thirdly, the comparison of the interview data to the data acquired from journals, newspapers and Cossack websites will be provided. This section will be followed by the interpretation of the data and the discussion of the findings.

### **History as a Source of Identification and Conflict: Tatars as the Invasive, Alien "Other"**

The historical events are largely invoked by ethnic communities to built identities through which they claim interests on land and draw ethnic lines in the social space. In our case, the history of Cossacks Tatar-Ottoman

interaction provides rich sources for identity building in the present time. Therefore, I will briefly touch upon certain aspects in the past, when the identities of the two are co-constructed by the interaction.

The nature of interaction between Cossacks and Tatars were largely identified as of conflictive nature, while present collective memories often tend to exclude the common cultural assets of both sides and periods characterized by friendly and cooperative relations. However, as narratives of past conflicts prove more lucrative for communities in the present, for identity building most emphasis is placed on how “the Tatar other” was uncivilized, invasive, destructive and uncooperative. The way the collective memory and, therefore, the collective identity are constructed on references to the past conflicts has largely to do with the competition for political power in the present. Therefore, the past exists in the present while being conditioned by the perceptions of the present. In this section, I will provide an insight towards the perception of the Tatar through a historical perspective, which tends to shape images of the Crimean Tatar in the Ukrainian social space.

The Crimean Tatar is often taken as an alien who came from the steppe to raid Ukraine, the invasive “other”. However, considering the major place reserved for the Cossacks in the historical perception of the Ukrainian past, one cannot make sense of the Cossacks’ emergence without the impact and existence of the Tatars. The Cossacks emerged, in the south of the Dnieper River, possibly due to unfavorable conditions caused by continuous Tatar raids and the abusive Polish feudal system. According to this reading of the past, Tatar raids costed lives and created material losses, which most likely provided an impetus for an armed defensive reaction on the part of local Slavic population. Simultaneously, in addition to the Tatar impact, the Polish feudal system was creating uneasy masses, which were taking refuge in the southeastern edge of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and along the lower Dnieper River bordering the Tatar realm. People of varied origins, including Turkic people from the steppe, gradually formed the distinctive group of people which later came to be known as the Cossacks of Zaporozhzhia. Therefore, all in all, it is necessary to consider the Tatars as a variable which caused the emergence of Cossacks as a distinctive community.

Even though there is a basis for discussion of the Cossacks’ emergence with reference to the Tatars, the mainstream theory on the emergence of Cossacks constructs the Tatar as the “alien other”. The mainstream theory in contemporary Ukraine is the one which is build on the concept

of “greater frontier”. As defined by the mainstream theorists, the “great frontier” is dividing the world of the “primitive” nomads from the world of the “civilized Christian”,<sup>1</sup> sedentary Europe. The foundations of the theory argued that the frontier was depopulated because of the Tatar invasion of the 13<sup>th</sup> century. This depopulated area, therefore, appeared to be advantageous for the runaway Slavic serfs. The region had rare steppe hideouts beyond the rapids of the lower Dnieper River and these steppe hideouts allowed the Slavic serfs to develop a distinctive way of life based on pursuits of warriors.<sup>2</sup>

The mainstream “civilizational” theory has a challenger. According to the counter-theory, the Tatars were not aliens to the region and the Cossacks emerged in the same social environment defined by the steppe culture. This theory challenges, in its fundamental point, the argument that there was a civilizational confrontation conditioned by the open steppe. Defenders of the theory maintained that the steppe was not a frontier, but a part of the Turkic world:

The borderline of the steppe zone, on which Cossacks formed, was not in between the “east and west”, but organic part of the east where Turkic people, for ages, lived and had their states, such as the Pecheneg Khanate, the Cumania, the Golden Horde, the Crimean Khanate, the Nogai Horde, and the Budzhak Horde.<sup>3</sup>

Therefore, the Cossacks emerged on the social environment of mixed Slavic and Turkic linguistic, traditional and religious traits.

While the mainstream theory is providing the basis for the argument that Tatars were the invasive “others”, the earliest documented references to Cossacks were made in 1492. The first record accounts an attack on a Crimean boat, by people from Kyiv and Cherkasy.<sup>4</sup> The Tatar Khan Mengli Giray later wrote a letter to the Lithuanian Grand Duke Alexander and complained about the attack. The Duke, in his response letter, assured that they will investigate about the “Cossacks” who have potentially carried out the attack.<sup>5</sup> In a later account, the Khan identified the aggressors as Cossacks, when the Ochakiv fortress, then an Ottoman fortress, was destroyed in 1493.<sup>6</sup>

Tatars continued to play a role in the events unfold for the Cossacks in the following centuries. In the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century, the Zaporozhian Cossacks have also taken an oath of loyalty to the Russian Tsar in 1654 and remained as a separate polity after the uprising and the formation of

the Hetmanate. Zaporozhians enjoyed Russian support in times of need and, starting from 1668, the Zaporozhians became more dependent on the tsars and preferred to remain loyal to the Russian Tsar, whom they assumed as the overlord.

Zaporozhians' attitude towards the Tsar changed in the late 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. The underlying reason for the Zaporozhian's attitude was the news about the Tsar's plans to destroy Tatars once and for all. The destruction of the Tatars meant the annihilation of the Zaporozhian's *raison d'être*. The existence of Tatars was justifying the Zaporozhians' existence as a military structure set to function against Tatar raids.

The Zaporozhians, realizing the Tsar's future aims, decided to shift sides and allied with Ivan Mazepa when he turned against the Tsar. However, like Mazepa, they had to pay dearly for their decision. After the Battle of Poltava, the Zaporozhian headquarters (Sich) was destroyed and they had to take refuge in Crimea. The Zaporozhians, on the condition that they will serve for the Russian Army and subject to the orders of the Russian governor of Kyiv, were allowed to return to Zaporozhia. However, the Zaporozhian autonomy was largely breached. This paved the way for their destruction towards the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

During the reign of Catherine II, Russia was gaining the upper hand against the Ottomans and the Tatars. However, the Zaporozhian autonomy remained a question for the Russian Empire. After the Battle of Poltava, the Zaporozhians escaped to the Crimean Khanate, where they established Oleshkivs'ka Sich (1711-1734). Their return in 1734 to establish the New Sich (1734-1775) assured the Russian domination on the Zaporozhians, since the latter recognized the Russian ruler (Empress Anna Ivanovna) as their overlord. In return to their submission, the Zaporozhians regained the traditional Cossack rights and the autonomous control over their territories, which technically remained beyond Russia's control.

The Zaporozhian submission to the Empress re-confirmed the former's function as gathering point for the Russian armies at times of war and served as a defense line against the Ottoman and the Tatar incursions. Nevertheless, as soon as the Crimean Khanate was neutralized and the Ottoman influence was pushed back in the Balkans, the Zaporozhian Sich lost its *raison d'être* for the rulers of the Russian Empire. Thus, after the successful completion of the war against the Ottomans, the Russian army was given orders to destroy the last of the Zaporozhian Siches (the New Sich), in 1775. With the destruction, the Zaporozhian Cossacks lost their territory and liberties.

Some of the Zaporozhians were enlisted and some others joined the Russian army as carabineers, while some others decided to take refuge in the Ottoman territories..<sup>7</sup> The post-1775 flight of the Zaporozhian Cossacks could challenge the Russian interests because the Zaporozhians, joining the Ottoman war efforts, could threaten the Russian frontier. With the aim to stop the Cossack flight, Grigorii Potemkin, the governor-general of the New Russia and Azov Gubernias (regions)<sup>8</sup> decided to reinstate the Zaporozhians as a military force.<sup>9</sup> With the reestablishment of the Cossack armies, Russians would protect newly gained territories, and prepare themselves for a future war with the Ottomans.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, the Russian rulers declared, in 1783, that they will form a volunteer army to attract Zaporozhian Cossacks to serve in the Russian army.<sup>11</sup> The new Cossack formation, then known as the Loyal Cossack Host, was declared in 1787, ahead of the Ottoman-Russian war of 1787-1791. To attract recruits and achieve better control of the new Host, former Cossack officers Zahar Chepiha and Sydir Bilyi were assigned as the Cossack commanders. A year later, when the Host gained better organizational scheme and prospects, the army was renamed as the Black Sea Cossack Host (1788). To draw more Cossacks to the Host, the Russian administration expanded the Cossacks privileges such as tax waivers, service under former Cossack officers, corrections in social status and payments.

The Host took part in a number of significant battles and played a critical role in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1787-1792. While some of the Black Sea Cossacks were settled in Kuban and renamed as Kuban Cossacks in 1864, some others remained in the territories which were once owned by the Ottomans and Tatars.

The section displayed that the major readings of the Ukrainian history scholarship takes the Crimean Tatars as aliens from the Asian steppe. The perception of the Tatars as the destructive element which had to be fought away remained as a major task for the Cossacks. However, as also shown here, through selected periods of history, the Zaporozhian Cossack and the Crimean Tatar identities were co-constructed by the interaction of the two. Therefore, the existence of the two, to a large extent, depended on the existence of the "other".

## **Since the 1980s to Present: The Fate of the Crimean Tatars and the Cossack Revival**

In 1774, with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between the Ottoman and Russian Empires, Crimea was declared an independent entity. This marked the 299 years of Ottoman control over the Crimean Khanate. With the Treaty, the Khanate became open to Russian influence. Starting from 1783, the Khanate was incorporated by the Russians and the Russian colonization of Crimea begun. Since then, the Crimean Tatar and Ottoman territories in the north of the Black Sea were gradually transformed into a Russian imperial realm.

The Crimean Tatar fate has significantly changed during the Second World War. On the pretext of being collaborators of the Nazis, Crimean Tatars were deported *en masse* to various locations in Central Asia. It is largely argued that half of the deported Tatars lost their lives either on the way or in the following year. The Crimean Tatars who survived the deportation were banned to return to the Peninsula. Only in 1967, after daring Crimean Tatar demands, they were pardoned. However, this did not allow Tatars to return to their homeland. It was only after Crimean Tatar protests in the Red Square in 1987 that a Soviet commission examined the demands and agreed that after decades of demographic transformation, particularly due to Russian ethnic settlements on Crimean Tatar properties, there is no place for Tatars to return. However, the Supreme Soviet decided to allow Crimean Tatars to return to the Peninsula in July 1989. With this decision, Crimean Tatars started to return to the Peninsula. In 1991, they convened the Kurultai (first one in December 1917) and adopted the national flag, which carried the Giray Dynasty symbol. The Kurultai also adopted a national hymn. The Kurultai stood against the pro-Russian forces in the Peninsula, which demanded Crimea's return to Russia on the alleged reason that the fate of the Peninsula cannot be decided without the involvement of the native Crimean Tatars (not of those who came after the deportation). In the meantime, the Crimean Constitution of May 5, 1992 declared Crimea a sovereign state. The Verhovna Rada of Ukraine cancelled the declaration of independence and both sides agreed on the autonomous status of Ukraine. However, all such events, led Kurultai to form the representative body named Mejlis, and the Mejlis declared the right of self determination (1993).

While Crimean Tatars were challenged by lack of homes, land and basic services, the pro-Russian and separatist sentiments were running high



in the Peninsula. The peak was reached in 1994, when the newly created office of the president of Crimea was accessed by the first and only Crimean president Yuriy Meshkov (elected in 1994). Meshkov's measures to annex to Russia led the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to abolish the constitution of 1992 and the seat of the president (March 1995).

The return of the Cossacks to the Ukrainian realm followed a different path. As mentioned earlier, some Cossacks served in the Russian army and later settled in different locations in the Empire. Some, however, remained on the territory of contemporary Ukraine. While some of these Cossacks lived with certain Cossack privileges, some others were enserfed and lost their Cossack status. The fate of those remaining Cossacks was challenged further by the time the Empire started to fall apart. Cossacks both served in the Red and White armies and later were suppressed by the Soviet regime. Under the Soviets, Cossack privileges and identity could not be claimed.

In the Ukraine of the 1980s, the long suppressed nationalist circles started openly to criticize the Soviet system. They recalled the "great freedom-loving" Cossack forefathers to claim separate Ukrainian nationhood and moved the Cossacks to the center of ethnic identification for a future independent Ukraine.

In this period, the nostalgia attached to Cossacks became a tool to rediscover and reclaim the Cossack space. For example, a group of students in Donetsk aimed to create a Cossack consciousness through historical-ethnographical expeditions (in June 1987) to the territory of the former "Samars'ka Palanka", an administrative unit of the Zaporozhian Sich (of the *New Sich*, 1734-1775), in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Further signs of politicization of the Cossack movement surfaced in 1989, when the Donetsk Cossack formation fostered close relations with "Rukh", the Ukrainian nationalist movement. The members of the early Cossack formation were mostly "Rukh" activists and the two formations collaborated at all levels.<sup>12</sup> In return, the elements of "Rukh" also took part, as members, in the development of the Cossack organizations.

After the Ukrainian independence, Cossacks unified (October 14, 1991). The "Ukrainian Cossacks" (Ukrains'ke Kozatsvo, UK) was formed as the umbrella organization for all Cossack groups. This formation had a symbolic importance in the sense that it restored the post of Hetman for the first time since 1918. The Rada also restored the mythologized "father" (*bat'ko*) status, once attached to the Zaporozhian Cossack leaders, of the Hetman's post as it could manage to bring all Cossacks under the rule of Chornovil. Another symbolic significance was that the Cossacks used this

opportunity to revive their traditions, as they called the meeting of the Rada and used Cossack voting procedures, reinstated the Cossack officer class, and other Cossack military ranks. Again, to revive the old Cossack traditions, Patriarch Mstyslav (1898-1993) of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church consecrated the UK Cossacks and the Hetman.

The early members of the Cossack organizations, which later were unified under the UK, were largely Ukrainian nationalists. However, as much as the Cossack movement gained visibility and certain leverage in state bodies, and followed a political agenda it gained wider attention from people who had initially had no interest in the ideas which the founders of the movement fostered. In this process, the non-nationalist Cossack formations gained visibility among the Cossack ranks. Therefore, the UK became a platform for the clash of interests between the non-nationalist, rather pro-Russian Cossacks, and the nationalist and traditionalist Cossacks. As much as the core nationalist and liberal held on to the control of the UK divisions appeared inescapable.

The anti-nationalist wing began to form and eventually solidified under the "Union of Ukraine's Cossacks: Zaporozhian Army", which was then a branch of the UK. This group demanded from the UK core to recognize the Moscow Patriarch as the patron of Cossacks, respect the Russian language as the state language, and finally, collaborate and unify with the Russian Cossacks. It comes as no surprise that the nationalist UK core rejected these demands, and the Zaporozhians decided to quit the UK. They formed a new Cossack formation called the "Cossack Army of the Lower Dnipro" (KVZN).<sup>13</sup> The new formation gathered its first Great Rada on Khortytsia Island (September 17, 1994). As a display of their Cossack identity and political preference, the clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate and the members of Russian Cossacks from Moscow, Urals, Kuban and Don participated in the Rada. In recognition of the identity formulation of his Cossack organization, the leader of the movement argued that their decision to walk away was an act against the UK's anti-church, anti-Orthodox policies of the "nationalist" administration of the UK.<sup>14</sup>

## **The Crimean Cossacks**

In Crimea, in a similar fashion to what was going on in the mainland Ukraine, Cossack organizations were established. The development of such organizations, as in the rest of Ukraine, started from the late 1980s.

Gradually, few early formations transformed into matured organizations. Following the polarization of the pro-Ukrainian and anti-nationalist factions in the mainland, the Crimean Cossackdom, with a large impact of Russian ethnic population, remained on the pro-Russian faction. The Ukrainian nationalist Cossack faction considered the Crimean Cossacks as servants of Russian interests and separatists who were interested to integrate Crimea to the Russian Federation.

At present time, the number of Cossack formations in Crimea is quoted as around forty. A number of all-Ukrainian Cossack organizations also has branches in the Peninsula, however, with rather minimal representation. The number of Cossacks in Crimea, according to the members of such organizations, are tens of thousands. Some of such organizations functioning in Crimea are: The Crimean and Southern Garrison of Zaporozhian Army, the Union of Cossacks (Feodosia region), the Taurida Cossacks, the Crimean Palanka of Zaporozhian Cossacks, the Cossack Squadron "Sable", the Sevastopol Cossack Community "Patriots of Sevastopol", the Crimean Republic Union "Great Brotherhood of Cossack Army", and the Sevastopol Cossack Union "Rus". The Crimean Cossack Union and the Union of Crimean Cossacks are two major platforms where Crimean Cossack plan towards organized activities.

### **Data: Interview with the Ataman of the Sevastopol Cossack Union "Rus"<sup>15</sup>**

The Sevastopol Cossack Union "Rus" is a Cossack organization which is based in Sevastopol. However, the organization is active in all the Crimean regions. Starting with 2010, the organization became a member of the "Council of Crimean Atamans" and the "Coordination Council for Sevastopol Blagochinije".<sup>16</sup> With such memberships in umbrella organizations and active participation in community life, the "Rus" remains one of the active Cossack groups in Crimea.

The Ataman of the "Rus" Cossacks, Borys Viacheslav Bebnev, who has been in Crimea since the age of 12 and calls himself a thoroughbred Crimean, defines the basic aim of Cossack life in the modern times as the Cossacks' will to learn the traditions of the forefathers.

We learn our traditions, what was important for the lives of our forefathers, how our forefathers lived, we recall, we ask our fathers and grandfathers

how they lived, and continue to transmit this to our children and grandchildren. In this fashion [children and grandchildren] can live exactly how their ancestors and forefathers lived.

Therefore, the revival of the traditions and the claim to the heritage of the “forefathers” proves to be one of the priorities for Cossack groups.<sup>17</sup>

According to Bebnev, many in the Peninsula are interested in Cossacks and their activities. For him, this interest has to do with the “roots” of the people:

Cossacks are interesting for people. And this is about roots. Where are they coming from? Many of them do not know about their forefathers. Their Cossack genes call them; genetic code is freedom, that is freedom. For Cossacks [freedom] is the most important thing, and the Orthodoxy.

Therefore, while arguing that many people are not aware of their Cossack origins, Bebnev claims that the Cossack functions in the society are guided by the Cossack freedom and religious belief.

When it comes to the land and interethnic relations, Bebnev argues that “the Cossack relates to all others with tolerance. [Tolerance] to all religions and confessions. There is no extremism [among Cossacks]”. He underlines that “ [they] are not dealing with land occupation like the Mejlis.” With regard to the Crimean Tatars, he talks about extremism: “With extremist Muslim organizations we do not need to deal. The state apparatus has to deal with them on legal grounds... They want caliphate, they want to impose their belief, traditions and religion on all others... This should not happen. Christians, Orthodox and Jews should live their lives and nobody should stay higher on others... there is no other way. This is the democratic principle which corresponds to a world without war and violence”. On the question if the Cossacks are involved in conflicts with the Crimean Tatars, Bebnev argues that:

No, there are no conflicts. It does not make sense. Because if a conflict takes place between Cossacks and Tatars, this is interethnic enmity. But this should not happen. However, in the everyday life something can happen. If it will be on an interethnic level, this will mean war. We want to live, we want to raise children, and they also want to raise children. For that, the Mejlis should not exist. There should not be parallel rule... they create their own government, which is ready to take on anytime ruling powers... If law enforcement agencies deal with this all, it will be fine in Crimea.

However, these agencies are afraid to handle the situation. The situation will explode if we touch Tatars. All has to be equal. Tatars should not occupy lands, they should acquire the land as other Crimean people. But they occupy lands. Then there will be peace... we need to see who is more tolerant and more civilized. If the Mejlis is not a civilized organization, they are not even registered as an organization. We are registered as an organization through the Ministry of Justice, with documents. The Mejlis does not have such documents. The Mejlis seems as if does not exist, but it is everywhere. However, the situation being this, that they [the Mejlis] yelps that they are the owners [of the land]. If we are to measure swords with them, then this means that we should be uncivilized. If they are uncivilized, then why do we need to measure swords with them?

Bebnev further elaborates on the Cossackdom in relation to states, borders and land:

The Cossacks are brothers. Cossacks have such a tradition of brotherhood. The Cossacks are divided by borders. We can talk about Cossacks of Belarus, Cossacks of Russia and Cossacks of Ukraine. However, there are no Ukrainian Cossacks, no Russian Cossacks but Cossacks... Cossacks are brothers. There is such a tradition of brotherhood. The Cossacks are divided by borders. There are no Ukrainian Cossacks, no Russian Cossacks, there are only Cossacks and Cossackdom. There are Cossacks who live in Ukraine and Russia... This is a nationality... We do not relate to governments. We just live our Cossack life. We do not run after rebuilding Cossack lands in Don or Kuban. We just live within the borders of the country... We cannot call this land as Cossack land, because Tatars say that this is a Tatar land... If there is a document for the land, this is my land. If there is no document, this means you occupied that land and this land is not yours.

### ***The Web Data***

The official website of the Sevastopol Cossack Union “Rus” also provides insights into definitions of the Cossack self, the Cossack functions, the land, and the “other”.<sup>18</sup> In terms of the definition of the Cossack self, the website underlines that:

The Cossacks are a people with its own culture, history and memory. The glorious past of Cossacks, deeds and ancestors’ covenants give us the right to proudly say: “Thank you, Lord, that we are Cossacks.” In general, Cossacks have always been beyond the personal [interests]. The

Cossacks have always served their native land: Holy Russia, its people and their government. Cossacks: We are the descendants and the heirs of the pioneers, who had created Russia.

In terms of defining the grounds for the Cossack functions in the society, the website makes an emphasis on the service to the Russian state. However, as much as the service is directed towards the Russian state and its people, it is described within the religious framework:

Cossacks see their main mission in the service of the people of Russia and for the sake of their welfare, and not for their own gain and glory. The service is framed in the words of church fathers such as that of the Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladozhskogo Ionna (Snychev): "Fatherland is a sacred notion because it is given to every people by the Lord God." The gift of God should be kept as an apple of the eye. To protect the strong Fatherland... is the sacred duty of every Orthodox citizen. Take a look at the history of your homeland: everywhere we see signs of military prowess and civil courage left by our ancestors from generation to generation, mightily building the Russian state.

Again by reference to another Church father, the Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow, the website defines the Cossack values in action: "Love your enemies, crush the enemies of the Fatherland, and abhor the enemies of God." The website article further elaborates that the church looks on

patriotism as a religious duty, as a spiritual virtue for a pious Christian... until the return of joy to the motherland, the peaceful existence, and the return of the lost sovereign power - we [Cossacks] have no right to be called the heirs of the great Russian victories... Without the past there is no future for the people. Healthy historical memory is the key to the viability of the nation and the strength of the Russian State. Forgetting the feats of ancestors is a grave sin ... Looking at the history of the Russian state, we see that for centuries the Cossacks were the defenders of orthodoxy and Mother Russia. And in our shameful time, our Russian people dies morally and physically in front of our eyes. The turn has come to the modern generations to defend the Fatherland and the Russian nation. We do not need to look hard for what methods to be performed to undertake the sacred duty of a Christian: a patriot should protect the homeland. More than 300 years Russian Cossacks undertook such tasks. We just need to revive all the traditions and customs of the Russian Cossacks.

External web sources provide deeper perception of the self, the land, and the “other” according to the Cossacks of the Sevastopol Cossack Union “Rus”. The first excerpt is from the day when “Rus” Cossacks were accepted to the “Council of Crimean Atamans”.<sup>19</sup>

Today, we [the Sevastopol Cossack Union “Rus”] were accepted to the Council of Crimean Atamans. This is a significant event for the Sevastopol Cossacks Union “Rus”. As you have seen, the police tried to stop our event [to celebrate the occasion]. However, the Cossacks did not allow the Police to do so. I would also like to note that for us there is no separation among Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. For us, there is only a single state. In the near future, we will continue our patriotic and educational work.

While the Cossacks’ leader declares that they perceive Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus as one and united country, he also supports this ideal through his personal involvement in politics. Ataman Bebnev was actively involved in the all-Ukrainian political party “Russkiy Blok” (RB), which was known by its pan-slavist political discourse.<sup>20</sup> Bebnev’s political involvement with the RB could be examined in several perspectives and with numerous examples. However, I will refer to one occasion when Bebnev was indicted for a violation of a criminal code and the RB members involved in the case. In April 2009, Bebnev, who served as a deputy of the RB in Inkerman local administration, was indicted by the Sevastopol’s prosecutor for unauthorized occupation of a land. According to the police report, Bebnev illegally occupied a land (of 0,23 hectares) and started a construction on the land. When the police arrived at the sight, upon a complaint placed by a local, they were subjected to the verbal abuse of Bebnev. The district court placed Bebnev under 15 days of detention. While Bebnev was under arrest, the activists of the RB started a picket and demanded Bebnev’s release.<sup>21</sup>

Bebnev also took part in pro-Russian activities such as that of the “defense of the Grafskaya Pristan’”, a historical quay which was named after a commander of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia (1786-1790). The events broke out when the Ukrainian government decided to install a memorial plaque on Grafskaya Pristan’, a memorial representing the Russian glory, to mark the 90<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of the Ukrainian Navy (July 5, 2008). Bebnev was one of those who remained at the Pristan to not to allow such a plaque to be installed and to impede the Ukrainian flag to be raised on the Pristan. Eventually, the defenders did not allow the

plaque to be installed. With this, Bebnev gained the name of defender of the Grafskaya Pristan and for his action he was granted an order.<sup>22</sup> During the 5<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the “defense”, Bebnev was invited to address the crowd gathered on the quay. Then he said “If such an attempt would take place for a second time, we will react in a similar fashion.”<sup>23</sup>

Bebnev’s involvement in social life could also be observed on other occasions. For example, in February 28, 2013, Cossacks of “Rus” took part in a protest named “Crimea in Exchange for Gas”. The event was organized in front of the Administrative Court of Appeal by a separatist NGO active in Crimea (“Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia”). According to news agencies, the protesters carried posters of the first and only Crimean president Yuri Meshkov and banners reading “No to the Annexation of Crimea [annexation by Ukraine]”, “We do not like Ukraine”, “Do you want Gas? Return Crimea to Russia”. The members of “Rus” also supported ideas which defended the illegality of Ukraine’s control over Crimea and the illegality of the abolition of the Crimean constitution of 1992.<sup>24</sup> In a similar fashion, Cossacks of the “Rus” took part in the events of the “Constitutional Day of the Crimean Republic”, which were carried, in Simferapol, under the slogan of “Grant Federalization”. Participants to the event carried flags of the Russian Federation and the Russian Empire. The Cossacks of the “Rus”, besides a Russian flag, carried posters reading “Sevastopol is a Russian Shrine; the loss of it is a national disgrace”.<sup>25</sup> In addition to the pro-Russian activities of the “Rus”, the external web sources show monarchist tendencies of the Cossack organization. The “Rus” Cossacks have taken part in placement of a plaque dedicated to Nicholas II of Russia.<sup>26</sup>

### **Interview with the Ataman of the Belhorod Cossack Society of Sviator - Crimean Palanka of the Zaporozhian Army of the Lower Dnipro<sup>27</sup>**

Viktor Sidenko is the Ataman of the Belohorskoï Cossack Society of “Sviyator” – Crimean Palanka of the Zaporozhian Army. The Crimean Palanka is a sub-branch of the “Cossack Army of the Lower Dnipro” (KVZN), which was mentioned above.

The Crimean Palanka appears as one of the most active and effective Cossack organizations. The leader of the Palanka, Sergey Yurchenko, also acts as the Head of the Coordination Council of the Crimean Atamans since



the very beginning of the Council.<sup>28</sup> Yurchenko is as well a Bakhchisarai deputy of the city council for the political party "Russkoye Yedinstvo"<sup>29</sup> and one of his Cossacks with whom I conducted an interview, Viktor Sidenko, is an Ataman of one of the local branches of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Sidenko introduces himself as a former Communist and a Soviet military officer, historian, economist, warrior and lawyer:

I am Ukrainian by nationality, I am a Ukrainian Cossack of Zaporozhian ancestry... Cossacks have no borders. We are Cossack brothers, Cossacks from America, from Poland, and Africa are all Cossack brothers. For us there are no borders. How Orthodox believers have no borders, we are likewise... Cossacks, in their time, united all Russia and Ukraine 500-600 years ago... These were all Cossack lands. This is a people that has no national identity. In our blood there are Turkish, Tatar, Kalmyk blood... Why not love others such as Tatars, or others while these nations relate to my people?... I am Ukrainian, but I consider myself Russian. I speak only in Russian and I see dreams in Russian language. I am ethnically Ukrainian, Zaporozhian Cossack... We are free people. People of Honor and Orthodoxy... For me it does not matter if it's cold or hot, if we are all Russians and we are Slavs, Russians. Western Ukrainians were under Poles and Austrians for more than 300 years... They are not Slavs... I do not consider that there is a Ukrainian state. Simply, it was created for formality. They are clowns functioning as presidents...

Sidenko seems to have a rather warm approach to the "other", as he recognizes that Cossacks carry heritage from different ethnic groups. But his anti-Jewish discourse provide clues to his perception of the "others" as oriented rather towards ethnic and religious hatred:

Men have to be warriors, that is a must... Nothing has changed in the world. Because the war goes on until the present time, not with swords, however... Zionists, this people, I call them the garbage of the world, the planet lives through all horrible things coming from this people [Jews]. Our civilization passed through Rothschild and other thrashers and stinkers, They want to create their order in the world, they created the European Union, made people gay, at present time there is this gay movement, lesbians, freedom and liberty, without religion, without God... all are sinners ...

Sidenko's worldview tends to see others from the duality of good and evil and in this competition of the good and evil he defines his Cossack identity:

In my opinion, they worship the devil. The Israelites, they are Satanists, they call it their God, however, among others, our God is Jesus Christ ..., all the messiahs, the saints - they teach the good. On the other hand, the case is different with the Jews. They want the devil [diablo] to be the winner through their personality [manifest through the individual self]. Nothing good will come from the devil. There is a war between the good and the evil and I am the warrior of the good. I protest against the evil of the world. I understand very well that this mission occurred with me. I am ready to give my life for my own people, and for all the people who live here and understand correctly that we fulfill God's cycle – to give birth to children, continue life, and give further life as nature..., but we cannot live like this, this can only happen in heaven. But on earth, if you want to live in good [wellbeing], somebody wants to take this away. [If somebody wants to take something from you] for such a purpose the Cossacks exist. Cossacks understand that they are warriors of the good... If somebody sees Jews steal something, there should be a law to shoot them for this.

While Sidenko's remarks about Jews were so sharp, his discourse about the Crimean Tatars justified the deportation of the Crimean Tatars. He recognizes that the land is not a historical Cossack land, but also denies Crimean Tatar claim to be indigenous people of the Peninsula and interestingly defines the Peninsula as being historically Turkish:

Crimea was not a Cossack land. Many groups of people lived here... The Turks were the owners of this land... And Turks had to hand Crimea to the Russians... In the period before the war, the Tatars were not deported, but resettled and in this way they saved Tatar [lives]. Because they could be slaughtered by Germans. They returned [to the Peninsula] and revive their society. [Thanks to] money from Great Britain and Saudi Arabia, they have the possibility to develop. With this [aid], the Tatar separatism grows. And, of course, we are against this. However, there is no difference between Tatars, Russians, Cossacks and we can live together. If you are sold for dollars and if you start hisbi [Hizb-ut-Tahrir?] wahhabism here, events against the peace do happen. In this case, I am sorry, f... you, you will not be able to do this. They are saying "this is our [Tatar] Crimea". How is this your Crimea? What is your juridical status? Crimea was Turkish and with all the peoples who lived here, not only Tatars, it was transferred to Russia. Russia accepted all the peoples, including Tatars, equally... And Tatars tell that they are indigenous people, [and that they] want to live here, and [tell that] "you [Russians] go to your Russia". Who are you? You are the same people as me, and the Greek, and the others. You are not different than the others. Only Turks can claim something, because Crimea was

Turkish. And you are no one... Turks were the landlords, you were no one. We are not separatist, we observe the situation and consider... We want to live in peace... we are peaceful people. If you are not peaceful, the war comes to you...

### ***The Web Data***

As mentioned earlier, Belohorskoi Cossack Society of "Sviyator" functions as a sub-branch of the Crimean Palanka of the Zaporozhian Army. The latter is a regional organization for the "Cossack Army of the Lower Dnipro" (KVZN), led by the Union of Ukrainian Cossacks "The Zaporozhian Army". Therefore, both Yurchenko and Sidenko are local leaders of Alexander Panchenko. As indicated earlier, Panchenko puts his Cossack identity in contrast to the Ukrainian nationalist wing of Cossacks. He attracted retired Soviet military personnel to the ranks of his organization. He also received support from oligarchs. With such a background, the nationalist wing of the Ukrainian Cossacks tagged him as "pro-Russian" and "pro-imperial chauvinist".

Ataman Panchenko is politically involved. He worked for Leonid Kuchma's presidential bid in 1999. However, he was imprisoned for corruption charges related to the election campaign money. He served three years and a half in jail. After Panchenko's release from jail, efforts were paid to expand the area of organizational influence on Poltava, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and most particularly on Crimean *palanky*. With this enlargement, the KVZN transformed itself into the "Union of Ukrainian Cossacks" (UUK).<sup>30</sup> Panchenko became the Hetman of the UUK and continued its political agenda as he supported Kuchma's party *Za ledynu Ukrainu* in the 2002 elections. As soon as Kuchma fell from grace, he started to support Viktor Yanukovych in the 2004 presidential elections. After the Orange Revolution, fearing political persecution, he escaped to Russia, to Cossacks. During the presidential elections of 2010, being a good ally of the Party of Regions, Panchenko gave full support to the Yanukovych's campaign. The collaboration was marked with an agreement signed before the elections which assured the KVZN Yanukovych's full support in case he was elected.

Looking at the political background and the anti-nationalist discourse of the organization and its leader, we can assume that the Cossacks of this organization were rather friendly to Russia and unfriendly to the rising influence of the Crimean Tatars. In this framework, when web sources

are reviewed, certain patterns emerge about the Crimean operations and discourse of this group of Cossacks.

First of all, the definition of the Cossack self overlaps with other examples examined in this article. Sergey Yurchenko, as the primary figure of the Zaporozhian Cossacks of the Crimean Peninsula, argues that the major tasks of the Cossacks is the protection of the Orthodox shrines, the protection of the social order and the state borders, and the military-patriotic upbringing of the youth. In a larger sense of identity, Yurchenko defends that “people of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are temporarily separated by borders” and that emphasizes that he and his Cossacks remember those who spent efforts to unify these people.<sup>31</sup>

Yurchenko's and his Cossacks' relations with the Crimean Tatars show signs of conflict. For example, in 2011, in Feodosia, the Cossacks wanted to erect a cross. Upon Tatar reaction, the cross was removed. However, the Cossacks tried to restore the cross. During the attempts to restore the cross, the Cossacks and the security forces clashed. Yurchenko appears to be part of the events that took place and supported the erection of a cross at the cost of the Tatars' disturbance.<sup>32</sup> It appears that Yurchenko was unhappy with the security forces' intervention, which left some Cossacks injured. However, according to web sources, Yurchenko was pleased with the security forces' sharp intervention on Ukrainian nationalists, who wanted to conduct protest on the anniversary of the Second World War.<sup>33</sup> On another occasion, the Cossacks of the Union led by Yurchenko blocked roads in order to impede the Ukrainian nationalist political leader Oleh Tiahnybok to take part in a TV discussion.<sup>34</sup>

### **Interview the Ataman of Taurida Squadron of the Terek Cossack Army<sup>35</sup> and the Founder of the Cossack Squadron “Sobol”<sup>36</sup>**

Vadym Ilovchenko claims Ukrainian origins; however, he has no Cossack origins. He argues that he came across Cossacks in his daily life, in their Cossack uniforms, and has grown interest in Cossacks. He decided to create his own organization in 2004 and named it Sobol (Sable). The organization has drawn two hundred members in its initial period.

Ilovchenko narrates with excitement how initial reactions of the members were as they started to say “With two hundred Cossacks we go through all Crimea. We can do this and we can do that... and people started to ask [Sobol Cossacks] for help ...” However, Ilovchenko's

narration points to a rather immediate marginalization of the group, its reflection to the interethnic relations, and the way the organization has developed:

We started to have conflicts with the Tatars, and we were saying we are such Cossacks. Then we were becoming more of a hooligan band rather than a Cossack society. Problems with the police and the public prosecutor's office emerged because of the conflicts which started off with Tatars. And with the development of a conflictive situation and the police and the procurator growing an interest on us, all who worked for money started to track us. After this [developments] most [Cossack members] have left.

As it was the case with the other Cossack groups, Ilovchenko refers to the religion in defining his perception of the Cossack identity:

Cossacks are Christian warriors. I am Christian and all Cossacks should be Christians as well. Without Christianity, one cannot be Cossack... A Cossack is the protector of the Orthodox belief, primary among others he is defender of his own land. This is about feelings of fairness to self and others... To each person who comes to me [with an interest to become Cossack] I tell him that Cossackdom is not a hobby club [but a society of values]... and every Sunday we started to go to Church with Cossacks.

In Ilovchenko's narrations, his perception of the land and of the "other" occupies a major place. The following is rather illustrative of the way how he perceives the "other":

I tell to my Cossacks that it is necessary to fight if there is a need, if there is an aggressor, if there is a possibility of harm to you, and your children, and your land. Only then it is necessary to fight. When a politician yells that "there, the Tatars are killing us, Cossacks let's go to help [those being attacked]", stop friends! I treat Tatars with indifference. I have many friends and acquaintance among Tatars with which I meet in various conditions for varied reasons... When there is some problem, if there are serious people on the other side, we discuss and the conflict resolves by itself.

However, while Ilovchenko argues that he has no predisposition against the Crimean Tatars, he is rather conservative with regard to the land. "Tavrida [Taurida]. Why not Crimea? Because Crimea is a Tatar word. We do not like to call [the land] with Tatar words." While he later

emphasizes that: "Tatars, they are my fellow countryman. They do not represent my ethnic nation. I do not have anything against them. They have their culture, and we have ours."

At some point in his Cossack career, Ilovcheko decides to take a different turn and creates a new Cossack organization: the Terek Cossacks were particularly known for their participation to Peter I's conquest of Dagestan as the Terek Cossack host was located near the Terek River:

When we came together as the gang, I call it gang in a figurative way, the group, the society; yes, Sobol, Sobol was a bandit [organization], our bandit precedent has passed. Now there is a society based in Sevastopol... They have taken this name Sobol... Now we are named Terek Cossacks. Why Tereks? When we got together, we had a well respected person, Terek, Vitaly Petrovich [Khramov]<sup>37</sup>... go to Tereks and talk to them. And I said "let's go Vitaly Petrovich", and we went... We discussed that calling ourselves the Terek Army would not be so bad. [Vitaly Petrovich] to prove his roots he has no documents, but he says that he has Cossack blood.

Going back to the discussion of the land and identity, Ilovchenko argued that he is Ukrainian, however, this was an identity rather politically imposed on him. He considers that Russians and Ukrainians are one people and regards the Cossacks as a national group.

### ***The Web Data***

According the data collected through online sources, the "bandit past" of Ilovchenko is quite complicated and includes illegal acts. Understanding Ilovchenko's Cossack functions, his definitions of Cossackdom, land, religion, and relations with Tatars, one needs to work not only with interviews but also online data. To start with, I will suffice to note that Vitaly Khramov, who inspired Ilovchenko's constructed Terek Cossack identity and Vadym Ilovchenko were, and still are, brother-in-arms from the very beginning of the brigand period.

According to accounts based on online data, Khramov has long been involved, since 1998, in raiding and occupying enterprises, including state-held ones. Khramov owned a Joint Stock company called "Aspect" (est. 1994). According to the Crimean Prosecutor, this company was engaged in hostile takeovers through illegal methods.<sup>38</sup> For example, in 2004, the sanatorium Gornoe Solntse, in the Crimean city of Alupka,

was seized by armed men. They were identified as the Cossacks of the Sobol, reported to be based in the service yard of the Simferopol Central Bus Station.<sup>39</sup> From 2004 to 2006, seven court cases were started in relation to the activities of the Aspect and in a similar fashion the Aspect and the Sobol acquired ownership of the territory near the Simferopol Central Bus Station. The gas station in the area was apparently catching the attention of the group. To fast forward events in relation to the gas station, Ilovchenko was sentenced to five years of probation. The reason for the sentence was his violation of the criminal code through abuse of power, while Ilovchenko and his man obstructed the work of the gas station and caused more than 6.2 million dollars of loss. The court cases which started in 2005 have been closely followed by the Cossacks of the Sobol, who often protested in front of the courthouse.<sup>40</sup>

In 2007, the leaders of the Sobol have grown an interest in politics and decided to join the ranks of the political movement "Ruskoe Yedinstvo". "Observing the political attempts of the group, Mikhail Baharev, then the deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea, urged the political community against the move of the Sobol leaders when he confirmed illegal acts of the Sobol and Khramov."<sup>41</sup>

It appears that Ilovchenko's conditional sentence for five years convinced him to give up his Ataman post at the Sobol Cossack Society, already notoriously accused of criminal acts, and to create Terek Cossacks.<sup>42</sup> While creating the new organization, Ilovchenko left the leadership position of the Sobol to Khramov (Khramov carries the title of Elder). However, his close connection with the Khramov continued as the two appeared together in public events, protests and conflicts. Though, in September 2011, Khramov, who holds Russian citizenship, was expelled from Ukraine and banned to return for five years. The reason was related to the decision of the Court of Simferopol, which found Khramov guilty of inciting ethnic and religious hatred.<sup>43</sup> Khramov's actions were committed against Crimean Tatars, Muslims, and Ukrainians.

Even though he was expelled, Khramov continued to return to Crimea on various occasions and continued his sharp discourse against Crimean Tatars. For example, in April 2013, he wanted to place a billboard message to congratulate Crimean Tatars for their survival in the Second World War. The billboard message he wanted to place, "Congratulations Pechenegs of Taurida for the day of the fifth miraculous rescue", was rejected by billboard companies after they consulted with prosecutors with regard to the message's offensive nature. Defending his billboard message, he said

that "Tatars should be grateful to the Stalinist regime for their relocation from Crimea to Central Asia because this saved them from the vengeance of the soldiers whose families have suffered at the hands of collaborators during the occupation of the Peninsula."<sup>44</sup> In another case, Khramov argued that Crimean Tatars cannot qualify as the native people of Crimea for the fact that Tatars cannot get Europeans, cannot claim the rights of archaic ethnic groups and because of their forefathers' "slave trade, widespread looting, mass killings..., illegal trade in unsuitable places, and *shawarma*, and *chebureks* made from dead cats".<sup>45</sup> Khramov argues that on the foregoing basis, Tatars cannot be recognized as indigenous people.

## Conclusions

The interview with the Ataman of the Sevastopol Cossack Union "Rus" reveal that the Cossacks of the "Rus" are constructing their present identities with a reference to the traditions of their forefathers. This reference points to the forefathers' imagined freedom-loving character and their dedication to the Orthodox belief.

In terms of interethnic relations and with regard to the question if the Cossacks play a role in this, the interview data show that the Cossacks are an active part of interethnic life in the Peninsula. Bebnév underlines that they are tolerant to the other religions. However, he adds that they are uneasy about the newly emerging religious Tatar groups. As to the right of the Tatar "other" to get organized to defend the communal interest, Bebnév is critical of the Mejlis while it calls it illegitimate and possibly of an uncivilized character. He argues that it should not exist. When it comes to the ownership of land, Bebnév argues that the land is owned by the one who has documents for it. Therefore, Tatars who return from exile are seen as occupants and they cannot claim indigenous rights. No doubt, Bebnév avoids touching the issue of how Tatars were deported and how their properties were appropriated. Instead, Bebnév argues that the Cossacks are a nation and their living space is cut through state borders.

On the other hand, the official web site, discussing the identity and functions of Cossacks argues that the Cossacks have always served their native land: Russia. The service to Russia is reasoned with religious context, in which pious Cossacks are argued to be serving their native lands. However, the discourse of the online text is rather aggressive, as it teaches to crush the enemies of the Fatherland and to abhor the enemies of God.



In practice, the activities of the “Rus” Cossacks shed light to how such teachings are practiced. The first excerpt displays that for Bebnev there is no separation between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, and that there is a single state. Therefore, looking at the ideas expressed on the official website, I can argue that for the “Rus” Cossacks, Crimea is Russia and thus, the Fatherland. With this logic, the enemies of the Fatherland and the enemies of God should be those who would not accept Russia as their Fatherland and those who would not accept the Orthodox God.

Bebnev’s cooperation with a pan-Slavic party and a separatist movement shows that actually Bebnev and his Cossacks are taking on the task of the forefathers: that is, to defend the Fatherland and the religion. The task taken prepares the grounds for conflictive relations between the Cossacks and Tatars, since the attitude does not allow Crimean Tatars to claim the land as their Fatherland. It is rather ironic that while Bebnev proposed Tatars to get legal documents to revindicate the land, which is unlikely in a place where most Tatars live in poor conditions with low income, he was taken to court for illicitly occupying land.

Sidenko, like Bebnev, argues that all Cossacks are brothers and, in a similar fashion, he puts emphasis on the idea that Cossacks have no borders. Like Bebnev, he argues that Cossacks are free people and Orthodox. He defines himself as Ukrainian of Zaporozhian ancestry, with no attachment to the Ukrainian government, as he sees the Ukrainian government as a formality. On the other hand, he stresses on the Russian language and makes no differentiation between being Slav and being Russian. Therefore, for him, the two concepts overlap.

He tends to recognize the mixed ethnic background of the Cossacks and, therefore, argues that he would love Tatars and others who have contributed to the Cossack ethnicity. However, on the other hand, he has a clear hatred towards Jews. This compromises his claim that he has warm feelings to Tatars and others. In the meantime of narrating his intolerance to Jews, he goes into the definition of his Cossack self in reference to religion. By referring to his belief, he builds up his argument towards the idea that he is a warrior of the good, fighting evil and, moreover, Cossacks are ready to take on the fight. What is striking here is his sharp remarks about destroying the evil. He incites that Jews be killed on the spot, shot without any judicial process. Looking at these remarks we can conclude that such an identity definition allows and fosters hatred towards others on the basis of religious difference.

In this sense, the identity formulation can anytime construct the Tatar "other" as a representative of the evil. Such an attitude to Crimean Tatars emerges in the interview when the discussion comes to Crimean Tatar claims on the land. Sidenko, while recognizing that the land is not Cossack, argues that it was not Tatar either. Instead, he maintains that the land historically belonged to Turks (Ottomans) and only they could claim the land. He obviously is disturbed by the growing Crimean Tatar influence organized around religious groups funded by other countries. At this point, his wording gets as sharp as his discourse on Jews.

The data from the web show that the Crimean Zaporozhian Cossacks are part of a larger Zaporozhian Cossack movement, which is notorious among Cossacks by its pro-Russian, pro-Orthodox (leaning towards the Moscow patriarchate), and anti-Ukrainian nationalist. The data also show that the group runs for political interests and the leader has a criminal past. The leader of the Crimean organization has a leading role among all Cossacks of Crimea and takes active part in support of ethnic Russian organizations and the Orthodox Church. A major example of Yurchenko's role in the Feodosia events shows that Cossacks do not hesitate to incite ethnic and religious conflict in the Peninsula.

The interview with Vadym Ilovchenko produced a rather different line of Cossack identity. He had no notion of Cossackdom until the age of 35. According to the interview data, at one point in his life, Ilovchenko decides to become a Cossack and gathers people around him. Ilovchenko defines their motivations and activities as of being brigands. The interview data also suggest that he and his Cossacks immediately involved in conflicts with Tatars.

In terms of how he constructed his Cossack identity, Ilovchenko refers to religion and argues that without Christianity one cannot become Cossack. With the religious perspective, the Cossack is also a defender of his land. In this sense, he argues that in case of need it is necessary to fight. However, he also stresses on peaceful resolution of the conflicts with Tatars. Ilovchenko is against imposed Ukrainian identity and considers that Russians and Ukrainians are one people and Cossacks are a nation.

As it is the case with other interviewees, he denies the connection of the Crimean Tatars to the Peninsula by calling the Peninsula "Taurida", instead of "Crimea", a Tatar word.

The data on the web turn out completely other sources for his Cossack identity. According to the data, verified through multiple online sources, Ilovchenko and his brother-in-arms Khrarov are notorious with their

illicit activities, particularly in forced occupations of land and enterprises. Therefore, Ilovchenko, sentenced for land occupation, and Khramov, sentenced for inciting ethnic hatred, are Cossacks who are interested to increase personal wealth through methods of organized crime.

The leaders of these Cossacks participate to almost all the events and activities which mark the Russian and Soviet victories in and around the Peninsula and their discourse is offensive against Crimean Tatars. With such activities and their open public statements, these Cossacks place emphasis on the fact that they own the land and deny the Crimean Tatars claim to be recognized as indigenous people.

In an overall look at the data, we may conclude that the Cossacks have a significant impact on the way interethnic relations between Russians and Crimean Tatars unfold. The data show that Cossacks are active both in the physical realm through defending the Churches and religious spaces and marking the space with Christian crosses. They are also active in the social space through events such as festivals, commemorations and youth camps. With such activities in the physical and social realm, the Cossacks define and redefine their interests, construct their values and negotiate their political priorities. Such priorities, as the present research shows, are often in conflict with the interests, values and political priorities of the Crimean Tatars. As the data provided here have pointed out, the identity definitions of the Cossacks provide the grounds for conflict. The contemporary Cossack identity is built around the historical image of the Cossack forefathers, which is often promoted around the idealistic perception of freedom, service to the Fatherland and service to the Church. The data show that the Cossacks of Crimea, as sampled in this article, define the land as the Russian land and with that it should be protected as a Fatherland. This notion leaves no grounds for Crimean Tatar definition of the land as a Fatherland. The fact that Crimean Tatars were perceived as the alien from the steppe, occupying, stealing and raping, has a coupling impact with the Crimean Tatar land occupations which occurred in the post-1990s.

The religious difference is also a matter of how identities and interests are defined. As Cossacks built their identities around the service to the Church, servants of God, therefore servants of the good versus the evil, Cossacks are marking the space as an Orthodox space. The very conservative nature of the Cossacks also leaves not much ground for the Crimean Tatar religious belief. The recent upsurge of religious sects among Crimean Tatars shows signs of marginalization which might have

been motivated by the Cossacks' protective and conservative attitude to the religion and the land. Recently growing Crimean Tatar religious sects, mostly of Arabic line, threatens the Cossacks and challenges the Cossack primacy in the physical and social space. If the nature of events unfold in this direction a larger scale ethnic and religious conflict in the Peninsula is unavoidable.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi. *A History of Ukraine*. Archon Books, 1970, p. 151.
- <sup>2</sup> Dmytro Doroshenko. *A Survey of Ukrainian History*. Trident Press Limited, Winnipeg, 1975, p. 131.
- <sup>3</sup> Iakovenko, 2005, p.182.
- <sup>4</sup> Quoted from Litovska Metrika in, B. V. Cherkas. "Ukrainian Cossacks in late 15<sup>th</sup> and early 16<sup>th</sup> centuries". In Samolii *et al.* *History of Ukrainian Cossacks: Essays in Two Volumes*, Kyiv-Mohyla Academia Publishing House, Kyiv, 2006, p. 57.
- <sup>5</sup> Hrushevs'kyi. Vol 7, p. 61.
- <sup>6</sup> Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi. *A History of Ukraine*. Archon Books, 1970, p. 154. See also, O. B. Holovko. "Problema Doslidzhennia istorichnykh poperednykh ukrains'koho kozatstva" (The Research Problem of the Historical Predecessors of Ukrainian Cossacks).
- <sup>7</sup> Hrushevsky, p. 456.
- <sup>8</sup> New Russia gubernia (Novorosiis'ka gubernia) was an administrative structure formed to rule regions to the north of the Crimean Khanate. It was first formed in 1764 to include parts of Zaporozhian territories. As Russian Empire expanded southward, the gubernia covered former Zaporozhian, Tatar, and Ottoman territories to the north of the Black Sea.
- <sup>9</sup> Hrushevsky, p. 457.
- <sup>10</sup> Volodymyr Mil'chev. *Zaporozhtsi na Viis'komu Kordoni Avstriis'koï imperii\ 1785-1790 rr.* (Zaporozhians on the Military Border of Austrian Empire, 1785-1790). Tandem-U Publishers, Zaporozhzhia, 2007, p. 27. Other author favoring the argument is Roman Shyian. *Kozatstvo Pivdennoi Ukraïny v Ostannii Chverti XVIII st.* Tandem Publishers, Zaporozhzhia, 1998, p. 4.
- <sup>11</sup> Roman Syhian. "Chornomors'ke Kozats'ke Viis'ko". In O.A. Bachyns'ka *et al.* *Kozatstvo na Pivdni Ukraïny. Kinets XVIII-XIX st.* Odesa, 2000, p. 94.
- <sup>12</sup> Vadym Zadunais'kyi, "Ukrains'ke kozatske vidrodzhennia ta Narodnyi Rukh Ukraïny: kinets 80-kh – pochatok 90-kh rr." *Skhid* 6:97 (2009).  
[http://www.experts.in.ua/baza/analitic/index.php?ELEMENT\\_ID=44626](http://www.experts.in.ua/baza/analitic/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=44626)
- <sup>13</sup> Kozats'ke viis'ko zaporoz'ke nyzove (KVZN).
- <sup>14</sup> <http://kvzn.zp.ua/?go=katalog&catid=129&podcatid=674>
- <sup>15</sup> Borys Bebnév. Personal interview. June 11, 2013. File access number A0070101, Oylupinar archive.
- <sup>16</sup> Sevastopol Blagochyniye is an ecclesiastical district of Simferopol and Crimean Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The Coordination Council was established in December 26, 20120 at the Saint Vladimir's Cathedral near Khersonnes. The Council aims at regulating cooperation between the Church and the Cossack organizations. At present time seven Crimean Cossack organizations take part in this Council. See <http://yug-front.info/main/3645-new-3645.html>

- 17 See, Oylupinar's dissertation.  
18 <http://sevastopolkazaki.ru>  
19 <http://yug-front.info/main/757-new-757.html>  
20 Starting from February 2013, the leadership of the Russkiy Blok decided to  
liquidate the party. [http://911sevastopol.org/articles/Sevastopolskij\\_ataman\\_  
postroit\\_sebe\\_torgovyj\\_centra\\_Kosareva/  
21 <http://www.leus.sebastopol.ua/1016/>  
22 The order was established by the Russian Community of Sevastopol. \[http://  
www.nr2.ru/221559.html/print/  
23 <http://sevastopol.su/news.php?id=50282>  
24 <http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1630789.html>  
25 \\[http://www.liveinternet.ru/showjournal.php?journalid=3809708&tag  
id=204415\\]\\(http://www.liveinternet.ru/showjournal.php?journalid=3809708&tagid=204415\\)  
26 <http://www.sotnia.ru/forum/viewtopic.php?f=9&t=15315>  
<http://iks2010.org/?p=11771>  
27 Viktor Sidenko. Personal interview. June 13, 2013. File access number  
A0060000, Oylupinar archive.  
28 The Coordination Council was established in May 2005, in Bakhchisarai.  
Ataman Yurchenko was elected the Ataman of the Council.  
29 A political movement which defends the rights of the Russian population  
in Crimea. It was registered as a political party in September 2010. In  
October 2010 elections, the party achieved the 3 percent barrier and gained  
three chairs in the Crimean parliament. The party gained most votes in  
Bakhchisarai and therefore, the mayor's seat.  
30 Soiuz kozakiv Ukraïny. The UKK was not registered formally. Therefore,  
this organization uses KVZN for formal purposes while using the UKK for  
public access.  
31 <http://odnarodyna.com.ua/node/11718>  
32 <http://www.edrus.org/content/view/23267/53/>  
33 \\[http://anvictory.org/blog/2011/07/04/izbienie-kazakov-v-krymu-o-krestax-  
i-krasnyx-tryapkax/  
34 <http://russ-edin.org/component/k2/item/43-russkie-kryma-ob-edinilis>  
35 Tavrisheskoy sotni Terskogo voyskogo kazachego obchestva.  
36 Vadym Ilovchenko. Personal interview. June 8, 2013. File access number  
A0040000, Oylupinar archive.  
37 The current leader of Sobol. He is usually titled as the Elder of the Sobol.  
38 Sergey Mal'nev, "Professiya - reyder", \\\*Krymskaya Pravda\\\*.  
\\\[http://kp-old.crimea.com/news\\\\\_details.php?news\\\\\_type\\\\\_id=3&news\\\\\_  
id=1867\\\]\\\(http://kp-old.crimea.com/news\\\_details.php?news\\\_type\\\_id=3&news\\\_id=1867\\\)  
See also, <http://1k.com.ua/187/details/5/5>, \\\[http://maidanua.org/static/  
krymmai/1302691084.html\\\]\\\(http://maidanua.org/static/krymmai/1302691084.html\\\)\\]\\(http://anvictory.org/blog/2011/07/04/izbienie-kazakov-v-krymu-o-krestax-i-krasnyx-tryapkax/\\)\]\(http://www.nr2.ru/221559.html/print/\)](http://911sevastopol.org/articles/Sevastopolskij_ataman_postroit_sebe_torgovyj_centra_Kosareva/)

- <sup>39</sup> The author of this article conducted his interview with V. Ilovchenko at the location indicated in the reports.
- <sup>40</sup> <http://novoross.info/4255-sud-prigovoril-atamana-ilovchenko-k-5-godam-lisheniya-svobody-uslovno.html>
- <sup>41</sup> <http://yug-front.info/main/498-new-498.html>
- <sup>42</sup> The web sources refer him as Ataman of the Sobol Cossacks until 2011.
- <sup>43</sup> [http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian\\_news/11951-ataman-vitalij-xramov-vinovnyj-v-razzhigani-mezhnacionalnoj-i-mezhreligioznoj-vrazhdy-vydvoren-s-territorii-ukrainy.html](http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/11951-ataman-vitalij-xramov-vinovnyj-v-razzhigani-mezhnacionalnoj-i-mezhreligioznoj-vrazhdy-vydvoren-s-territorii-ukrainy.html)
- <sup>44</sup> <http://www.nr2.ru/crimea/432756.html>
- <sup>45</sup> <http://novoross.info/kazaki/9320-vitaliy-hramov-tatary-kryma-ne-mogut-stat-korennym-narodom-potomu-chto-ih-predki-zanimalis-netipichnymi-sposobami-hozyaystvovaniya.html>

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# NEW DIMENSIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ENERGY SECURITY AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

## Introduction

Energy security has emerged as one of the cornerstones of the EU's foreign and security policy in recent years, due to highly growing dependence on imports of oil and gas, the major part of which comes from Russia. Concerns over security of energy supply caused by unprecedented dependence on external imports and exacerbated by uncertainty over the reliability of energy supplies have propelled the EU institutions and member states to put a pronounced emphasis on the diversification of energy supplies. Namely, the Russian-Ukrainian gas crises (2006, 2009) made clear that enhanced energy security can be achieved only by intensive diversification of energy supplies and transit routes with a full account of neighbouring regions providing access to alternative energy.

In this context the South Caucasus region, which is *a key area for achieving the EU's goal of energy diversification*, has gained substantial importance, quickly becoming a priority in the energy security plans of the EU. Although this interest is not new and the EU's policy drivers in the region have always been dictated by its heavy dependence on hydrocarbons the EU has recently speeded up various activities aimed at strengthening its influence and establishing foundations for the southern diversification of energy supplies in wake of overdependence on Russian supplies. Nonetheless the EU's growing engagement in the Caucasus-Caspian region, attainment of Union's goals in the region may be hampered by several economic, (geo)political, commercial factors that prevail in the region, coupled with tensions that obstruct the EU attempts to establish a coherent and common external energy policy among the EU member states.

The present paper investigates the efforts of the EU to create an institutionalised external energy policy vis-à-vis the South Caucasus. It elucidates the drivers and evaluates the effectiveness of the EU's external energy strategy towards the South Caucasus, highlighting the obstacles that may hamper the EU's external energy agenda in the region.

After the EU's 2004 enlargement, the advance of external governance in energy policy increased the degree of institutionalisation between the EU and the region. The EU set ambitious goals in its initiatives (European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Baku Initiative, Eastern Partnership (EaP), Black Sea Synergy (BSS), aiming to create a "ring of energy cooperation" based on the effective application of the EU's internal rules and the principle of liberal interdependence. Needless to say that the investigation of the relationship between the principles of external governance and priorities of the diversification of energy supplies is of crucial relevance.

Special attention has been devoted to the investigation of the EU's policy coherence and consistency: the coherence between national and the EU policies and the extent to which energy policy is consistent with broader foreign policy objectives within the given geographical framework.

## **Theoretical framework**

Some energy policy experts have utilised dichotomous metaphors – such as 'Markets and Institutions' versus "Regions and Empires" – to examine the EU's external energy policy<sup>1</sup>. These metaphors can be located within broader international relations theories (Neo)realism, (Neo)liberalism) to elucidate the main theoretical reflections on the EU's external energy policy.

Traditionally, global energy governance has been an enterprise blind of values and dominated by crude realpolitik concerns hence, much of the literature on the politics of international energy adopts implicitly a realist and geopolitical theoretical approach,.

From the realist perspective geopolitics has become pivotal in the absence of any agreement on the basic 'governance structure' of international energy, meaning that "the conflict-laden history of international oil in the 20<sup>th</sup> century is bound to continue well into the 21<sup>st</sup> century".<sup>2</sup>

The realist approach considers the physical security as the central element of energy security, suggesting that external policy goals can be

best attained through bilateral deals among energy producers, transit and consumer countries versus international (regional) energy regimes. This line of thinking assumes that coercive diplomacy and projection of hard (military) power are crucial to securing energy supplies considering prevention, deterrence, containment and crisis management as the main objectives of external energy policy.

Yet the EU's global identity as a soft and normative power is in sharp contrast to these dominating principles of realist approach.

Largely rejecting the geopolitical interpretations of the energy policy European commitments, formal documents and rhetoric contained much that approximated closely to the liberal approach of energy policy putting the main focus on well-functioning markets, and market-based solutions to energy-related issues based on international coordination, international good governance standards and multilateral cooperation. Integral to this approach is the "spillover" of the EU internal market rules into the neighborhood aiming at creating a common regulatory framework between the EU and neighbours, which is the recipe for more stable and transparent exporter–importer relations.

Yet, when it comes to the South Caucasus, the market mechanisms and the EU's modes of governance seem to be dominated by the imperatives of pipeline politics coupled with intense geopolitical struggle **over** control of transit routes. Some authors have employed the terms "battle of domination"<sup>3</sup>, "New Great Game" to describe the new energy geopolitics in the region. Namely, the concept of a "New Great Game" has been used as a shorthand for the competition for influence, power, hegemony and profits, often referring to the oil and gas industries and reserves in Central Asia and the Caucasus.<sup>4</sup>

The question to be addressed is whether the EU can move beyond the traditional geopolitics of the region and become an important external player relying on its "soft power" and market mechanisms.

Indeed, many doubt that the integrative EU market approach towards energy security in the area is an appropriate strategy given geopolitical competition. In particular, it is generally argued that any engagement in the Caucasus-Caspian region requires the EU to adhere to a realistic posture and in practice it is impossible to be post-modern in the region. As long as the U.S., China, and Russia act this way, so must the EU.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the EU's quest for diversification does not proscribe all claims to its being soft and normative power.<sup>6</sup> However a closer look at the developments

in the region offers a more nuanced perspective of the capacity of the EU to achieve its energy goals in the area.

### **The EU's energy security: Growing concerns and emerging priorities**

During the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, energy security has emerged as a key issue on the European policy agenda, increasingly perceived by both national governments and European Union institutions as an area of priority concern due to the depletion of intra-EU resources and growing dependence on energy imports. The EU's import dependency reached almost 54% in 2006 and keeps growing. If nothing changes, by 2030 more than 70% of the EU oil and gas will have to be imported.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, the depletion of oil and gas reserves in the EU member states or quasi-members such as Norway is shifting the distribution of available energy sources further away from Europe. Specifically, the key source of oil is the Middle East and OPEC countries but the largest single oil supplier to the EU is Russia, which is also the largest supplier of natural gas to the EU.

**Table 1.** *Energy dependency rate, EU-27, 2000-2010 (% of net imports in gross inland consumption and bunkers, based on tonnes of oil equivalent).png<sup>8</sup>*

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>All products</b>	47.8	48.6	48.8	50.2	51.6	53.9	55.2	54.5	56.3	55.2	54.1
<b>Solid fuels</b>	30.5	33.7	33.1	34.9	38.1	39.3	41.0	41.3	44.7	41.1	39.4
<b>Crude oil</b>	75.6	77.7	76.4	78.7	80.9	82.4	84.0	83.5	85.0	84.2	85.2
<b>Natural gas</b>	48.9	47.2	51.1	52.4	54.0	57.7	60.8	60.3	62.3	64.3	62.4

As the European Council noted:

the EU is faced with the ongoing difficult situation on the oil and gas markets, the increasing import dependency and limited diversification



achieved so far, high and volatile energy prices, growing global energy demand, security risks affecting producing and transit countries as well as transport routes, .... the limited coordination between energy players while large investments are required in energy infrastructure.<sup>9</sup>

Paradoxically, even though the whole integration process of Europe started with cooperation in the field on energy, with the 1952 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the European energy policy ultimately proved to be an unsuccessful example of integration. As the assemblage of member states and institutions evolved to become the EU, energy policies and industries tended to divergent national models. The EU and the Commission lack formal authority and legitimacy over energy security issues. As a result, the EU consists of 27 member states with independent interests and varying agendas in energy matters since common energy policy and “single voice” in external energy relations are currently unattainable. Some authors argue that European energy policy originated in the need to respond more capably and efficiently to international energy supply crises.<sup>10</sup>

The issues of energy security gained steady relevance in the Post-Cold War period due to the growing dependence on external energy supplies. Three green papers on energy were launched by the European Commission that partially referred to a need for a common energy policy highlighting main aspects of the issue: the diversification of energy supplies, competitiveness, sustainability, establishment of integrated internal market. The European Commission’s 2000 Green paper – “Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply” – became one of the most significant of this series, placing a pronounced emphasis on the security and diversification of energy supplies: “Security of supply does not seek to maximise energy self-sufficiency or to minimise dependence, but aims to reduce the risks linked to such dependence. Among the objectives to be pursued are those balancing between and diversifying the various sources of supply (by product and by geographical region)”.<sup>11</sup>

However, until the mid 2000s, the EU was strongly relying on market mechanisms, believing that “well-functioning world markets are the guarantees for secure and affordable energy supplies” and putting energy security issues apart from common foreign and security policy priorities. Meanwhile, the exponential growth of energy demand in the emerging

economies of China and India, coupled with quintuple rise of oil prices since 2002/3, made clear the incrementing politicization of energy-related issues and the fact that emerging challenges cannot be handled by the markets alone.

In this regard the Russian -Ukrainian gas conflict of 2006 served as an unpleasant reminder to member states that they had theretofore largely ignored supply security at their own peril. This “wake-up call”<sup>12</sup> in 2006 revealed that the EU needs to make energy a central component of all external relations, and pursue new measures to ensure energy security, which go far beyond pure market mechanisms and the principles of liberal interdependence.

Clearly, the crisis propelled the European Commission to reassess energy security on the EU’s foreign and security policy agenda. Namely, at the end of 2006, Commission president José Manuel Barroso declared that energy had been until recently a forgotten subject in the European agenda stressing up the importance of adequate and pan-european response to Europe’s rapidly changing energy landscape.<sup>13</sup> In his turn the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy J. Solana warned that

The days of easy energy are over. Global demand is rising rapidly while supply is maturing. .. We will increasingly be competing with others for energy. Overall world energy consumption is set to increase by well over 50 percent over the next 25 years...<sup>14</sup>

In March 2006, the European Commission published the Green Paper, A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, which identified the main objectives of energy policy to be pursued at the EU level: competitiveness and integrated internal market; diversification of energy supplies; sustainability, innovation and technology; solidarity and integrated approach to the management of energy crises; Common EU external energy policy through the development of new partnerships with other main producer and consumer states.<sup>15</sup>

In the follow-up documents the Commission identified the following risks which derive from:

- Increasing dependence on supplies from unstable regions and suppliers.
- Some major producers using energy as a political lever.

- The effects on the EU internal market of external actors not playing by the same market rules.<sup>16</sup>

In short, as a response to growing demand and uncertainty over energy relations three main principles were put forward as the building blocks of the EU's energy security, which are security of supply, competitiveness and diversification of energy supplies, sustainability.

Certainly, the new priorities of energy security marked a major shift in the external dimension of the EU's energy policy. It should be noted that the EU's Member States have often regarded energy policy as a domestic, not European issue. In wake of 2006 crisis several statements and documents suggested that energy must become a central part of all external EU relations and that it is vital for the EU to develop an external energy policy that is coherent, strategic (widely recognizing the geopolitical dimensions of energy security issues) and consistent with the EU's broader foreign policy objectives, such as conflict resolution and human rights promotion.<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, External-relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner suggested to put all the external and internal policy instruments of the EU at the service of its energy security, revealing that the aim to bolster the foreign-policy dimensions of energy policy was the key driving force behind the European Neighborhood Policy. At the first high-level European Neighbourhood Policy conference held on 3 September 2007, Ferrero-Waldner listed energy as a top priority putting forward the idea of a new "neighbourhood energy agreement".<sup>18</sup>

Among other suggestions related EU's external energy policy priorities, the European Commission and Council emphasized the vital importance of Caspian basin resources and the need to intensify the EU's relations with Caspian and the Black Sea regions, with the view of further diversification of energy supplies and transit routes: "There are a number of new gas projects ...If completed, they could create new energy corridors and new import capacity amounting to a significant share of the EU's current gas consumption".<sup>19</sup>

The statements were followed by EC's proactive efforts in establishing foundations for a shift in the southern dimension of the EU's external energy policy dramatically intensifying efforts in southern diversification of energy supplies and routes. Namely, in November 2010 the Commission published its energy strategy towards 2020 (accompanied by a €200 billion plan laying out the EU's infrastructure priorities for the next decade), which put a pronounced emphasis on the diversification both in terms of new

sources, as well as routes of gas imports.<sup>20</sup> In this respect, the projects of the Southern Gas Corridor are of crucial relevance since they fit well with the priorities of diversification policy.

Hence, a range of energy initiatives, directed at the facilitation of the accords on southern diversification, was gradually established. Namely, in September 2011 the EU Foreign Affairs Council authorised the EC to facilitate a bilateral agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for the construction of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline (TCP), which was followed by the signature (January 2011) of Joint Declaration on the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. According to the deal, Azerbaijan will deliver 10 bcm of gas per year to the EU markets, thus giving a new lease of life to the projects of the Southern Gas Corridor.

Apparently the quest for energy diversification was the key driver force behind the EU's growing involvement in the South Caucasus region.

## **The quest for energy diversification and the South Caucasus**

The slowly but clearly growing understanding of the strategic importance of the South Caucasus in the EU became a major political factor for regional development. In addition to some high level statements from EU officials, various EU policy documents on energy state that Caspian oil and gas will be important for the EU's security of energy supply "by increasing the geographical diversification of the EU's external energy supplies<sup>21</sup>." It follows that diversification of energy supplies and transit routes assume increased attention to the South Caucasus constituting a vital land bridge between Asia and Europe and physically linking the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia with the Black Sea and Western Europe. The geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus region is also based on the presence of valuable energy resources, especially in Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and the Central Asian states.

**Table 2:** *Caspian and Central Asian proved oil reserves (2011)*<sup>22</sup>

<b>Country</b>	<b>Global ranking</b>	<b>Barrels</b>
Kazakhstan	11	30,000,000,000
Azerbaijan	19	7,000,000,000
Turkmenistan	44	600,000,000
Uzbekistan	47	594,000,000

**Table 3:** *Caspian and Central Asian proved gas reserves (2011)*<sup>23</sup>

Country	Global ranking	Cubic meters
Turkmenistan	6	7,504,000,000,000
Kazakhstan	14	2,407,000,000,000
Uzbekistan	19	1,841,000,000,000
Azerbaijan	27	849,500,000,000

In itself the Caucasian share of global oil and gas reserves is not considerable. However, in view of the growing dependence on Russian resources and the uncertainty over reliable energy partnership, the transportation of Caspian and Central Asian energy supplies to the EU via the South Caucasus has gained vital importance.

## EU's take on the South Caucasus

Although, the EU's main interest in the region has always been dictated by its heavy dependence on hydrocarbons, its approaches (perception) to the region have undergone drastic changes since the disintegration of Soviet Union which can be reduced to the following:

- *“European Caucasus approach”*, emphasizing the European nature of the region, which provides a fertile ground for the rapprochement with the EU. The EU's official documents and statements have on numerous occasions emphasized the need to develop a regional policy for the South Caucasus, where the practice of “sharing values would be central”.<sup>24</sup>
- *“Post-soviet Caucasus approach”* underlining the turbulence and uncertainty the region has gone through since the breakup of USSR, and offering economic, technical assistance in order to make the processes of transition relatively smooth and swift. Estimates suggest that the EU was the major donor in the region allocating over a billion euro to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia from 1991 to 2000.<sup>25</sup>
- *“Trans-Caucasus approach”* considering the region a “zone of Russia's traditional influence” and thus recognizing the “Russia-first” approach.
- *“Middle Eastern” and “Balkan Caucasus approach”*, focusing on the major sources of instability in the region and calling for the EU's

active engagement in its securitisation. In this regard the European security strategy (ESS) referred to the importance of the control and management of security threats to the European continent, including unresolved regional conflicts, and terrorism stating that “Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies...all pose problems for Europe’.<sup>26</sup>

- “*Third World Caucasus approach*” regarding the region as a challenge for the EU due to a number of socio-economic complex problems, and ill-functioning political systems. In this vein ESS underlines: “We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be neighbouring region”.<sup>27</sup>
- “*Caspian Caucasus approach*” , focusing on the geographic importance of the region as a hub between Asia and Europe, transit corridor to the Caspian energy resources expected to meet the EU’s growing demand of energy supplies.

To put it more precise, from the EU’s perspective the region can be perceived as a “neighbor”, a “conflict zone” and a “transit corridor”.<sup>28</sup> Thus, South Caucasus is widely viewed as a region which offers both *opportunities* by providing access to alternative energy resources and creates challenges due to unresolved conflicts and internal sources of instability. Clearly, the region’s functional importance as a “transit corridor” played the key role in identifying the EU’s interests in the South Caucasus making the region more present in the EU’s political thinking. Unsurprisingly, in the first document reflecting the EU’s strategy towards South Caucasus issued in 1995, the EU underlined its interests in the region finding its presence important “in order to promote its interests in energy sector”.<sup>29</sup>

## **EU governance of external energy policy in the South Caucasus region: Main interests and initiatives**

The Caspian alternative to increasing dependence on Russia was apparently acknowledged by the EU through the realization of the INOGATE (launched in 1995) project aiming to promote regional integration of the European pipeline systems, to support investments in the energy sector and to facilitate the transport of oil and gas towards the European markets by addressing existing gaps in the energy infrastructure and creating new means of transportation.<sup>30</sup>

Unsurprisingly, discussions of east-west transport corridors out of the Caspian region have tended to speak of either a new “Silk Road” or a new “Great Game”<sup>\*</sup> referring to Western growing involvement in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. However until the mid-1990s the EU was reluctant to become involved in a “Great Game” for several reasons. One reason was the exaggerated perception of a “Great Game” and the overloading of the South Caucasus region and its conflicts with geopolitical significance. This had a deterrent effect on the EU, which was unwilling to get involved in a geopolitical power struggle, perceiving the South Caucasus as a part of the Russian “Near Abroad”. Another reason for the EU’s relative lack of interest particularly in the energy sector was the considerable divisions between the different actors and institutions at the EU level.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, there was no consensus on the external policy toward the South Caucasus due to the anxiety that direct competition with Russia in this region would have a negative impact on EU–Russian energy relations.

Clearly, for the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU activities were predominantly concentrated on technical and humanitarian assistance and development in the South Caucasus region due to its perception as a region of little importance both from political and economic point of view.

However, in the mid-2000s, the situation began to change as a result of the rise in European gas demand and the increasing imports from Russia to meet it. Clearly, energy security issues became instrumental in enhancing awareness of the region’s strategic importance. An important shift can already be traced in the official discourse reflecting the EU’s new take on the region, previously perceived as a “Russian space” and now turning into an “area of overlapping concern”.<sup>33</sup>

**Table 4:** *South Caucasus: From challenges to opportunities*

<b>The main discourse of the 1990s</b>	<b>The main discourse since the mid-2000s</b>
Transcaucasus, "Third world" Caucasus, Post-Soviet Caucasus,	South Caucasus, European Caucasus Neighbor,
Russia's "Near Abroad", "space of Russia's influence", where "a greater involvement of the European Union is bound to rebalance the traditional relations of spheres of influence in the region". "no men's land", "terra incognita"	Area of overlapping concern Remarkable region due to its functional role as a transit corridor
Complex region, challenge for the EU (region containing a number of potential trouble spots, and also abutting on politically unstable areas)	A remarkable and complex region that has enormous economic promise (challenge lying in its complexity and the opportunity stemming from its energy promise)
Economic, technical, humanitarian assistance	Political partnership, association, integration

The shift in region's perception as a transit corridor and area of vital interests reflected the EU new member states' push for the Southern Caucasus to be included in the European Neighbourhood Policy, with a primary focus on energy. The EU set itself ambitious goals in the ENP, aiming to create a "ring of energy cooperation" based on the ecentrality of the EU's internal energy market and the transfer of its own rules in the neighborhood.

These policy efforts towards the South Caucasus enhanced in wake of Russian-Ukrainian disputes over gas (2006 and 2009), which were decisive in the EU's search for alternative suppliers. In this context, the South Caucasus gained substantial importance for the Union due to Azerbaijan's reserves and the whole region's role as a transit area for the transportation of Caspian energy resources to Europe. Namely, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy B.F. Waldner stated that the policy (European Neighbourhood Policy) takes



full account of the vital role that the EU's neighbours play in the EU's energy security either as supplier or transit countries... "The Commission is now looking to strengthening this policy. There will be a clearer focus on energy issues, both at a bilateral and regional level. ...We are committed to bringing Azerbaijan energy resources, in particular natural gas to the EU market, through the Nabucco pipeline and the Turkey- Greece – Italy gas interconnector.<sup>34</sup>

Under the new approach the neighboring region (South Caucasus) has an important role to play in the step-by-step creation of a pan-European energy community. Of particular importance for the EU's approach to the region is the Baku Initiative<sup>35</sup> (launched in November 2004) which is exclusively energy-focused. This multilateral mechanism covers the Caspian Sea region, the Black Sea region, and the neighboring countries. This initiative builds upon a timetable for the convergence of energy markets, enhanced energy security through supply diversification, a sustainable energy policy, and investment issues. In 2006, at the Energy Ministerial Conference held in Astana, the Baku Initiative was made more concrete through the development of a road map putting a special emphasis on the creation of integrated regional energy markets and their gradual integration with the EU internal energy market. The priority areas for action are defined as promoting the development of the energy sector based on the principles of security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability and the establishment of a stable, sustainable energy policy framework in all beneficiary countries.<sup>36</sup> Some authors argue that even though the Baku Initiative will not produce significant results in terms of the pattern of energy production and trade between the EU countries and their Caspian partners, it holds the potential to facilitate the energy relationship between the EU and Caspian energy producers thus establishing foundations for market-based dialogue expected to boost new supplies from the Caspian basin to Europe<sup>37</sup>. The recipe is simple; the promotion of European investment in Caspian Sea/Central Asian States in return for their cooperation in supplying energy to the EU.<sup>38</sup>

Declaring that the internal market has been the key to the EU's strength in world affairs, the EU top officials suggested that external energy policy goals can be best attained through market mechanisms and accompanying institutional structures: "Energy security can be achieved by the EU extending its internal energy market to include its neighbours within a common regulatory area with shared trade, transit and environmental rules'... We need to convince non-EU consumer countries that world

energy markets can work for them".<sup>39</sup> This is the idea behind the EU's initiatives (ECT, Baku Initiative, ENP) based on the principles of liberal interdependence, and market-based solutions to energy-related problems.

However, despite the EU's reliance on soft power and adherence to liberal principles, several factors, among which China's growing interest in Caspian energy resources and Russia's negative approach to the ratification of Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) drove the need to reinforce the bilateral partnership with energy producers and the geopolitical dimension of external energy policy. Namely, bilateral energy-partnership agreements signed with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 2006 manifested that a more political approach and presence was required as the importance of gas increased relative to oil –the former being linked to long-term contracts over fixed pipeline routes, very different to the dynamics of oil supplies to international markets.<sup>40</sup>

Certainly, the question of the compatibility between bilateral partnership and multilateral cooperation remained open to doubt. In this regard, Black Sea Synergy initiative (launched in 2007) came as a special platform aimed at complementing the bilateral partnership with regional multilateral cooperation, emphasizing the need for an enhanced policy in the Wider Black Sea region with a special focus on energy. Namely, the Commission's communication underlining the purpose and strategies of the new initiative mentioned the "trans-Caspian trans-Black Sea energy corridor" for gas exports from Central Asia to the EU as an important component of the EU's energy security strategy.<sup>41</sup>

However, the BSS gives no further detail as to how this objective will be achieved, nor how the Black Sea Synergy will create a deeper connection among the other initiatives that it claims to be coordinating (Baku Initiative).

Obviously, the EU's 2007 enlargement marked a major shift in its foreign and security policy towards the South Caucasus dictated both by the imperatives of geographical proximity and the need for southern diversification of energy supplies. The perception of "Caspian Caucasus" as part of Wider Black Sea region became dominant and the significant potential for energy supply diversification helped to reassess the region's prominence. It should be noted that to certain extent Black Sea Synergy is rather the manifestation of the EU's new member-states' push for a deeper engagement in the region than a result of consistent and clear-cut Caucasian policy at the Union level. Namely, the top officials of Central and Eastern EU countries have on numerous occasions called for

a more strategic vision of the region based on its functional role in the southern diversification of energy supplies and transit routes.<sup>42</sup> It came as no surprise, that Southern gas corridor was promoted during Czech EU presidency, pursuing southern diversification of supplies. However, despite the EU's reliance on the Southern Corridor, and high hopes for the southern diversification August 2008 Russian-Georgian war cast doubts on the reliability of the "Caucasian corridor" showing how delicate the energy security in the region is, as both the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Supsa pipelines running across Georgia's territory had been shut down due to the conflict. The crisis prompted the EU into action in the words of J. Solana serving as a "wake-up call": After the EU's rapid response to the August crisis and our strong engagement on the ground in Georgia, there should be no doubt about the importance we attach to the South Caucasus region. The proposal for an "Eastern Partnership" is further evidence of this.<sup>43</sup>

Obviously, the Eastern Partnership (launched in 2008) represents an important step towards a change in the EU's relations particularly with South Caucasus countries, contributing to the substantial upgrading of the level of political engagement, including enhanced energy security arrangements. In terms of energy security the EaP proposes to:

- Establish mutual energy support and security mechanisms, including early warning systems and joint security actions;
- Accelerate the harmonisation of partners' energy policies and legislation with the EU practice;
- Create a mutually beneficial interconnected and diversified energy market between the EU and partners;
- Diversify supply and transit routes, in part through the EaP contributing towards the ongoing strengthening of the Baku Process as a genuine energy partnership, and including through the development of the Southern corridor the Transcaspien.<sup>44</sup>

Moreover, the Southern Corridor summit, which took place the next day after Eastern Partnership summit (May 8, 2009) came to prove the importance that is placed on the initiative in terms of energy security. "Our strategic priority in the EU is to enhance energy security in particular by diversifying the EU's energy sources and energy routes... The Eastern Partnership is indeed historic."<sup>45</sup> It was no surprise that Russia's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov expressed concerns about Eastern Partnership, often perceived as an EU attempt to expand its "sphere of influence" in

the quest for hydrocarbons.<sup>46</sup> In view of the EU's growing efforts in the realization of the Southern Gas Corridor projects and Russia's counter-efforts in keeping control over the energy supplies and transit routes in the Caspian region, the geopolitical struggle and "race for diversification" seem to be inevitable.

Although the history of Southern Gas Corridor dates back to the 1990s, when the European Commission identified South Caucasus and Central Asia as the main targets for the diversification of its energy supplies and transit routes, it acquired a greater degree of emphasis with regard to the construction of the original backbones of the corridor Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines which are the most vivid manifestation of the growing connections between the South Caucasus region and Europe, though fraught with geopolitical significance.<sup>47</sup> Largely a US initiative, the BTC pipeline became an important element in expanding oil production in the Caspian basin, significantly altering the system of energy supplies transportation in the region. Even though the BTC only transports around 1 per cent of total global oil supplies, and is probably one of the most controversial and politicized energy pipeline of modern times from the EU's perspective it established foundations for direct access to Caspian energy resources. Namely BTE, the twin gas pipeline of the BTC became a foundation for Nabucco, largely considered as the flagship of the Southern Gas Corridor.

Nabucco was a considerably more ambitious project than its competitors (TAP, ITGI), expected to transport much larger volumes of gas to Europe. As a matter of fact Nabucco was endorsed as a priority project by the European Commission. Although the EU's European Investment Bank (EIB) involvement in the project and contribution (in the amount of €200 million), to the feasibility studies of the pipeline generated high hopes regarding the successful realization of the project and its subsequent positive outcomes for the EU's energy security, over time it became clear that the European Commission has evidently downplayed a number of geographical, commercial and political obstacles that have been hampering the realization of Nabucco. The weakness of the original Nabucco proposal could never be overcome: there was no source for the natural gas that the pipeline was supposed to carry. Despite intensified negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, 10bcm of gas per year agreed with Azerbaijan could hardly meet the EC's expectations pertained to Nabucco. Hence, the European Commission came up with the idea that since the construction of large pipelines is not currently attainable,

the realization of small projects providing access to Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz II gas field may establish foundations for more ambitious projects.

Furthermore, in May 2012, the European Commission stated that it does not consider Nabucco to be the priority option in importing Caspian gas to Europe and supports all pipelines that are being developed for this purpose equally and is neutral in the choice of the pipeline.<sup>48</sup>

In this vein, new package of agreements signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan on October 26, 2011, establishing rules for the transit, volumes and prices of gas, triggered new developments and established foundations for the start of the southern gas corridor projects. Under the new agreement, Turkey is to transit 10 bcm/year of gas from Azerbaijan to the borders with Greece and Bulgaria through the recently agreed Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which would then send gas to Europe via Nabucco West, Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) or South East Europe Pipeline (SEEP).

Underlining TANAP's importance, the EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger stated that: "Europe is now a step closer to its aim to get gas directly from Azerbaijan and the other countries in the Caspian region".<sup>49</sup>

Apparently, discussions over the Southern Gas Corridor became decisive in stepping up the EU's engagement in the region and after 2006 and 2009 gas crises the EU's regional policy has been particularly formed out of Union's desire to diversify its energy sources and transit routes. However, many uncertainties remain with respect to achieving this aim and in particular two interrelated questions emerge. The first question relates to the EU as an international actor in external energy policy, that is, to the existence of a coherent policy at the EU level. The second question relates more particularly to the consistent with the EU's broader foreign policy objectives (democracy and good governance promotion etc.) energy policy, the ability of the EU to succeed in diversifying its energy supply, yet not drifting away from its Common foreign and security policy principles.

## **The issue of coherent energy policy**

It is widely recognized that the ability of the EU to promote its norms successfully depends on the level of coherence between the EU policy and that of the member states. The issue of coherent external energy policy gained increased relevance after Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes. Namely, Green Paper and follow-up documents asserted that:

The energy challenges facing Europe need a coherent external policy to enable Europe to play a more effective international role in tackling common problems with energy partners worldwide. A coherent external policy is essential to deliver sustainable, competitive and secure energy.<sup>50</sup>

Moreover, B. F. Valdner and other top officials argued that energy is a perfect example of common sense driving integration and

it is illusory to think that Member States can deal with today's energy challenges on their own... common voice - is absolutely essential if the EU is to rise to the challenges of oil and gas geopolitics.<sup>51</sup>

The European Commission suggests that coherent energy policy would cover several key goals and instruments, such as coherent policy on securing and diversifying energy supplies, energy partnerships with energy producers and transit countries, developing a pan-European Energy Community, responding more effectively to external challenges, integrating energy into Common foreign and security policy etc.<sup>52</sup> However, despite the release of many directives, statements, reviews and action plans, certain challenges continue to hinder a common European Energy Policy and energy security remains mainly a national issue, as member states- extremely heterogeneous in terms of resources, energy mix, level of demand, and structure of supply, are wary to yield sovereignty in this strategic policy area.

Differences in energy security risks between the member states were reaffirmed by the EU member states' approaches to the projects of the Southern Gas Corridor. While "old" member states have been diversifying away from the Persian Gulf for years in favor of Russia, post-communist countries such as Poland and the Baltic states, seek to reduce overdependence on Russia and consider the rising assertiveness of Russia in the international arena as a considerable threat.<sup>53</sup> As Pierre Noël put it: "

When it comes to gas, the Iron Curtain still seems to cut Europe in two – in the Western EU, the markets are large but diversified, in the East the markets are smaller but much more dependent on Russia.<sup>54</sup>

For instance, countries that have developed a widely diversified import strategy, like Italy, Spain and France, have different perceptions, needs and interests from the EU's eastern members, such as Slovakia or Hungary,

which depend almost entirely on Russian supplies. Germany's high-profile relations with Russia on energy has been an exemplar of energy policy bilateralism in Europe, but others, such as France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Bulgaria, have also fallen into the temptation to pursue their own separate agreements with Gazprom.<sup>55</sup>

Unsurprisingly, under such circumstances, the EU27 member states, often with vastly divergent energy profiles and policy preferences, have tended to rely on bilateral energy partnerships making clear energy governance takes place in a field of tension between governance based on market and institutions on the one hand, and state-centered, power-based geopolitics on the other.<sup>56</sup> Although the EU was actively involved in addressing energy security challenges, in its working paper the European Commission admitted, "the scale of the gas supply disruptions required an adequate response at the EU level, however, a clear strategy as well as concrete instruments were lacking".<sup>57</sup>

Thus, it is rather complicated to find common ground among all 27 member countries. Obviously state-centred approach, lack of agreement and coordination reduces the EU's role in international energy relations limiting the EU's foreign policy options, and thus damaging the EU's overall energy security.

Needless to say that more often than not, the EU and its Member States do not form a coherent whole with respect to their energy and other initiatives and actions vis-à-vis Caucasus-Caspian region, meanwhile pursuing individual barter deals makes the instruments of the EU's external governance inapplicable.

### **The issue of consistent energy policy towards the South Caucasus: Energy and broader foreign policy objectives**

It is widely recognized that a prominent feature of the EU's self-definition is the affirmation of its internal adherence to and external promotion of particular (liberal) norms and values.

Apparently, energy represents a more serious and genuine test of the EU's capacity and commitment as a "normative power". The difficulty for the European Union is essentially how to preserve its political and economic status in a changing energy world with the bargaining power shifting to energy producers and exporters. Largely rejecting the geopolitical approaches to the energy policy the EU top officials declared

that energy policy must be compatible with its broader foreign policy objectives, based on the commitment to the promotion of economic liberalization, democracy and good governance in energy producer states. Hence “external governance” – is the overarching EU approach to energy relations with the region and “the EU will not pursue energy interests in isolation from its Common foreign and security policy principles... relying on its soft power and believing that good governance and human rights contribute to Europe’s energy security”.<sup>58</sup>

In this regard, the EU set itself ambitious goals in its initiatives (ENP, BI, BSS, EaP) aiming to create a “ring of energy cooperation” based on the promotion of the EU’s own rules in the neighborhood. Clearly, enhancing energy security and deeper cooperation with neighbours in the sector is a challenge for the EU’s external governance. In the case of the South Caucasus, the situation is aggravated by intense geopolitical competition in the region. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the EU’s ability of standing up for its interests and staying true to its values is being tested in the South Caucasus region, where the EU has positioned itself as a special actor, the interests of which are not confined to energy:

Whereas the significance of the region for the positive involvement of the EU is not only linked to its geographical position as a transit area for energy supplies from Central Asia to Europe but is also based on the mutual interest, shared by all concerned, in the development of the region with a view to enhancing democracy, prosperity and the rule of law and thus creating a viable framework for regional and inter-regional development and cooperation in the South Caucasus area.<sup>59</sup>

Moreover, the EU differentiated itself from other actors, which can be seen in the following statement:

Highlights... the growing interest of other economic powers, such as Russia, the United States and China, in this area; considers it of the utmost importance, therefore, that cooperation with the South Caucasus be given the highest priority, not least in matters relating to energ.<sup>60</sup>

In this regard, the case of Azerbaijan, which is the key energy producer in the region, represents a serious test of the EU’s ability to provide balance between bilateral energy partnership and multilateral external governance, “reconcile energy with democracy”.



When Azerbaijan was included in the ENP, Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner declared that this offer reflected the country's "geo-strategic location and energy resources". For this reason, it was included in the ENP.<sup>61</sup> The EU commenced initiatives to deepen energy cooperation with Azerbaijan in recognition of the latter's importance as a transit route into the EU and Baku's influence in Caspian region. European officials insisted that energy interests warranted a priority focus on governance reforms. Namely, out of the 30 million euro Commission aid commitment for 2004–6, 17 million were allocated for "institutional, legal and administrative reform".<sup>62</sup> The Commission aid programme, concluded under the Neighbourhood strategy, listed democratic and energy reforms as two priority areas of support. With regard to the bilateral energy agreement (Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership between the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Field of Energy) with Azerbaijan the president of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso declared:

This is not just about energy ... Our relations are also about pursuing shared European values of democracy, good governance, fundamental freedoms and the protection of human rights. We will continue to work with Azerbaijan in all of these political and economic areas.<sup>63</sup>

However, despite this liberal rhetoric over time it became clear that when it comes to the diversification of energy supplies, The EU's "soft power" has little to do: democracy and energy go in opposite directions and energy policy is not consistent with the EU's broader foreign policy objectives. This argument can be amplified by ENP progress reports reflecting the growing gaps between bilateral energy partnership and democracy promotion in the EU's neighborhood.<sup>64</sup>

In view of underlying tension between the geopolitical realities of the region and the EU's modes of governance some officials suggest that the tougher international energy panorama requires the EU to drop the pretence that energy policies are to be based on liberal interdependence.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, some authors argue that the EU has failed to "reconcile energy and democracy", as any engagement in the Caspian region requires the EU to adhere to a realistic posture. Hence, it is impossible to be post-modern in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. As long as the U.S., China, and Russia act this way, so must the EU.<sup>66</sup> While these "normal" actors are pragmatic and materialist in their aims and policy orientations, the "normative" EU cannot pursue only normative goals setting aside its

energy interests. Thus, the EU's quest to ensure the reliable supply of energy resources does not proscribe all claims to its being a normative power and it makes the EU appear more normal than some have presented.<sup>67</sup>

As J. Solana declared:

We may have to deal increasingly with governments whose interests are different from our own and who do not necessarily share our values... Our energy needs may well limit our ability to push wider foreign policy objectives, not least in the area of conflict resolution, human rights and good governance... The scramble for territory of the past maybe replaced by a scramble for energy. We have to take our energy from where we find it.<sup>68</sup>

Within the corpus of literature on the EU relations with states that are oil and gas producers, for example in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, there are many references to goals of democratization and human rights but little on how the EU will provide balance between energy and other policies (particularly democracy and good governance promotion) towards energy producers countries since the quest for diversification exacerbated by harsh geopolitical struggle seems to be incompatible with external governance and democracy promotion. The case of Azerbaijan, suffering from unsatisfactory fulfillment of democratic reforms is illustrative: a situation which no degree of economic carrots is likely to change. Unsurprisingly Azerbaijan's progress under the ENP is slow. The Commission's review in March 2008, as well as subsequent reports admitted that in Azerbaijan no progress had been made on democracy and human rights; corruption had worsened; the "non-oil sector" had shrunk; and inflation had risen.<sup>69</sup> Some authors argue that the EU is broken-winged in influencing Azerbaijan to move on the democracy and human rights reform front since energy revenues and Europe's thirst for oil and gas make the leverage non-existent. Although the EU has the possibility to apply negative conditionality through suspending funding, it is unlikely to impress Azerbaijan. ENP budget support to Azerbaijan that amounts to approximately 15 million euro a year is no incentive in view of the rising state budget; this amount of aid is equivalent to the revenues of about one afternoon of pumping oil through the BTC oil pipeline.<sup>70</sup> Moreover, the EU is lacking the carrot of membership of the European Union, meanwhile there is no precedent of promoting EU rules (the *acquis communautaire*) as a template for development and modernisation without a formal membership perspective on the table.

Apparently, Azerbaijan's unique position in the EU's energy initiatives has vastly increased the negotiating leverage of the state vis-à-vis the EU, reducing the inherent asymmetry of a strictly bilateral setting of negotiations and making clear that Baku is not devoid of options and the EU is in no position to put conditions on energy-or other relationships. The recent (12.09.2011) "unprecedented commitment" of the European Commission to elevate the status of diplomatic engagement with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to a bilateral Treaty – committing all parties to the construction of a Trans-Caspian pipeline system, and the Joint Declaration on the Southern Gas Corridor (13.01.2011) –embolden the political elite of Azerbaijan even more for two reasons:

- First, because they increase the centrality of Azerbaijan for the European natural gas market, a fuel that is vitally important for EU's energy security .
- Second, the realization of all projects of the Southern Gas Corridor depends on smooth cooperation with Azerbaijan, which has allowed the latter to pursue horizontal and symmetric partnership with the EU due to its "geostrategic importance". Obviously the EU's inability to provide balance between energy interests and its "transformative capacity" puts serious constraints on its broader foreign policy objectives. Moreover, some authors argue that driven by the desire of diversification the EU favours stability and economic-and energy-interests over reform, to the detriment of Europe's "soft" or "normative" power and "the strong state first" approach to the South Caucasus region has taken over policy circles in Brussels.<sup>71</sup> Thus, "normative" goals and the scenarios leading to change (reform) are currently dominated by the interest in alternative energy resources and diversified transport routes.

**Table 5:** *The EU's energy policy: Rhetoric and State-of-the-art*

<b><i>Rhetoric</i></b>	<b><i>State-of-the-art</i></b>
Coherent, common external energy policy	Lack of coherence, bilateral deals
Energy policy, which is consistent with broader foreign policy objectives	Growing gap between energy and other policies, "normative" goals dominated by security interests
Market-based solutions to energy-related issues	Structural weakness of market mechanisms

Although theoretically a successful EU's regional policy should not be confined to energy embracing a broader approach, but also dealing with the parallel promotion of its interests in the governance and security sectors, in practice the quest for energy currently limits the EU's ability to push wider foreign policy objectives, widening gap between energy and other policies of the EU in the South Caucasus region.

## Conclusion

The growing dependence on external energy imports coupled with uncertainty over the reliability of energy supplies has significantly bolstered the foreign-policy dimensions of the EU's energy security. The quest for diversification of energy supplies and transit routes has become instrumental in stepping up the EU's engagement in the South Caucasus region especially since the 2006 and 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes. Starting from these key assumptions this analysis highlights the following points:

- Although the European Commission started to formulate external energy policy for the EU in its 2000 Green Paper, it was not until the aftermath of the 2006 row over gas prices between Russia and Ukraine that energy security became a priority issue on the European foreign and security policy agenda. The 2006 energy cut-off served as “wake-up call” making clear that the EU needs to make energy a central component of all external relations, and pursue diversification of energy supplies and transit routes. The follow-up EU energy policy documents put a pronounced emphasis on the southern dimension of the EU's energy policy asserting that Caspian oil and gas will be important for the EU's security of energy supply by increasing the geographical diversification of external energy supplies. This marked a shift in the importance the EU attaches to the South Caucasus region due to its functional role as a transit corridor to Caspian energy resources .
- Although the Caspian alternative to increasing dependence on Russia was apparently acknowledged by the EU through the realization of the INOGATE programme, for the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union EU activities were predominantly concentrated on technical and humanitarian assistance and development with a relative lack of interest in the energy sector. Due to region's perception as a part of Russia's “near abroad” and a space of Russia's influence, the EU was avoiding direct geopolitical

competition with Russia. The policy efforts towards the South Caucasus enhanced in wake of Russian-Ukrainian disputes over gas (2006 and 2009), which were instrumental in the EU's search for alternative suppliers. A range of initiatives and the pipeline projects of the Southern Gas Corridor came to redefine the EU's actorness in the region with a special emphasis on the energy sector.

- The main rationale of the EU's initiatives was to promote the development of the energy sector based on the principles of security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability leading to the establishment of a common regulatory area. Namely, it was suggested that energy security can be best achieved by the EU extending its own energy market to include its neighbours within a common regulatory area with shared trade, transit and environmental rules'. Integral to this approach is the conviction that institutionalized energy policy based on the principles of multilateral cooperation transparent and stable regional energy market is key to achieving the EU's goal of diversification.

However, despite the EU's reliance on its "soft power" and adherence to the principle of liberal interdependence over time it became clear that market-based liberal initiatives do not have much room to grow, coming to prove the structural weakness of market mechanisms and the underlying tensions between the priorities of diversification (pipeline policies) and the governance modes of the EU.

In general, three main factors hampering the EU's external energy agenda in the region may be identified: lack of coherence in external energy policy; geopolitical realities of the region characterized by the domination of power politics; irrelevance of the EU's conditionality due to lack of membership perspective. Such a situation has driven the need to reinforce bilateral energy partnership marking a shift in the geopolitical dimension of the EU's external energy policy towards the region. Namely, a number of bilateral energy agreements have started to pick up speed since 2006. Needless to say that the incoherent and inconsistent external energy policy widens gap between multilateral governance and bilateral energy partnership, thus limiting the EU's ability to push broader foreign policy objectives in the region.

However, the Southern Gas Corridor and the processes of different degrees of energy integration are not yet finished. Therefore, further research could provide a more nuanced perspective of the setbacks and accomplishments of the EU's external energy strategy towards the South Caucasus region.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

BI - Baku Initiative  
BSS - Black Sea Synergy  
BTC - Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  
BTE - Baku-Tbilisi-Erzrum  
EaP - Eastern Partnership  
EURATOM - European Atomic Energy Community  
EC - European Comission  
ECT - European Charter Treaty  
EIB - European Investment Bank  
ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy  
ESS - European Security Strategy  
ECSC - European Coal and Steel Community  
EU - European Union  
IEA - International Energy Agency  
INOGATE - Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe  
ITGI - Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy Pipeline  
SEEP - South East Europe Pipeline  
SGC - Southern Gas Corridor  
TANAP - Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline  
TAP - Trans Adriatic Pipeline  
TCP - Trans-Caspian pipeline

## NOTES

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