New Europe College
Black Sea Link Program
Yearbook 2014-2015

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Editor: Irina Vainovski-Mihai

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NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION
NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

New Europe College (NEC) is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997-1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 500 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong

international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:

- ### *NEC Fellowships (since 1994)*
  Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- ### *Ştefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)*
  The fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the Odobleja Fellowships are integrated.

- ### *The Black Sea Link Fellowships Program (since October 2010)*
  This program, sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung, invites young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and

social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of the Black Sea region.

- ***The Europe next to Europe (EntE) Fellowships Program (starting October 2013)***
  This program, sponsored by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden), invites young researchers from European countries that are not yet members of the European Union, targeting in particular the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia), Turkey, Cyprus, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of New Europe College:

- ***RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)***
  The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one–month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach actives involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

- ***The NEC–LINK Program (2003 - 2009)***
  Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute

more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj–Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

- *The GE–NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)*
  New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10–month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend, and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE–NEC Yearbooks series.

- *NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)*
  In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South–Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one–month research trip abroad. At the end of the

grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

- **The Britannia–NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)**
  This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

- **The Petre Ţuţea Fellowships (2006 – 2008, 2009 - 2010)**
  In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government though its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College's community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Ţuţea* Program publications.

- **Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)**
  This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*, Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South–Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

- **Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)**
  This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

- **The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (2009 - 2013)**
  This program, supported by the Getty Foundation, started in 2009. It proposed a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows. As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program also included a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence was meant to ensure a comparative dimension, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

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Beside the above–described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

In the past:

- ***The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)***

  Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different confessions within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

- ***The Septuagint Translation Project (2002 - 2011)***

  This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul.* Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

- ***The Excellency Network Germany – South–Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***

  The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South–Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

- ***The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research***

  *An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources **(2006-2008)***

  The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for

  Education and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility,

  connectedness and exploitation of some of the most prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the "Constantin Brăiloiu" Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

- ***Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances***. This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled ***Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and eastern Europe***, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (December 2009 – November 2012)

- ***DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (2011)

- ***UEFISCCDI – CNCS (PD – Projects): Federalism or Intergovernmentalism? Normative Perspectives on the Democratic Model of the European Union (Dr. Dan LAZEA); The Political Radicalization of the Kantian Idea of Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense (Dr. Áron TELEGDI-CSETRI),*** Timeframe: August 1, 2010 – July 31, 2012 (2 Years)

- ***Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (Mar. 2011 – Sept. 2012)

- ***The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon*** (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (December 2009 - November 2014)

- ***The EURIAS Fellowship Program***, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-sponsored by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar.

- ***UEFISCCDI – CNCS (TE – Project) Critical Foundations of Contemporary Cosmopolitanism,*** Team leader: Tamara CĂRĂUŞ, Members of the team: Áron Zsolt TELEGDI-CSETRI, Dan Dorin LAZEA, Camil PÂRVU (October 5, 2011 – October 5, 2014)

Ongoing projects

Research programs developed with the financial support of the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, The Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education and Innovation, National Council of Scientific Research (UEFISCDI – CNCS):

- **PD – Project*: Mircea Eliade between Indology and History of Religions.***
  ***From Yoga to Shamanism and Archaic Religiosity* (Liviu BORDAŞ)**
  Timeframe: May 1, 2013 – October 31, 2015 (2 and ½ years)

- **IDEI-Project*: Models of Producing and Disseminating Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: The Cartesian Framework* (Vlad ALEXANDRESCU)**
  Timeframe: January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2015 (4 years)

- **Bilateral Cooperation: *Corruption and Politics in France and Romania (contemporary times)***
  Silvia MARTON – Project Coordinator, Constanta VINTILĂ-GHIŢULESCU, Alexandra IANCU, Frederic MONIER, Olivier DARD, Marion FONTAINE, Benjamin GEROME, Francais BILLOUX
  Timeframe: January 1, 2015 – December 31, 2016 (2 years)

ERC Starting Grant:

- ***Record-keeping, fiscal reform, and the rise of institutional accountability in late medieval Savoy: a source-oriented approach – Castellany Accounts***
  Ionuţ EPURESCU-PASCOVICI
  Timeframe: May 1, 2015 – April 30, 2020 (5 years)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

Present Financial Support

The State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation of Switzerland
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European Research Council (ERC)

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Fellowships and grants:
Universite de Fribourg (Switzerland), Project: "Authority on display: Church Dedicatory Inscriptions and Self-Identity of the Patrons (Greek and Slavic Worlds)", 2014
Academic Research Center in Sofia, Project: "Serbian and Bulgarian Medieval Ktetorship (13th -14th Centuries): Two Ways of Adapting the Byzantine Model", 2013
Center of Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Central European University, Project: Field research "Greek monasteries under Serbian Rule", Greece, 2012
Center of Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Central European University, Project: Field research "Monasteries of Northern Macedonia from king Milutin to emperor Dušan", Macedonia (FYROM), 2012
Curriculum Resource Center, Central European University, Project: Shaping Student course on Medieval Russian Urban Development, Budapest, 2010

Participation in international conferences: Russia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia, Great Britain, Italy, Czech Republic

Articles, researches and translations in the fields of Byzantine and Serbian medieval History and Art

ARCHIVES AND READERS: PRESERVATION AND CIRCULATION OF DOCUMENTS IN BYZANTINE MONASTIC ARCHIVES

Abstract

Present article deals with the problems of Byzantine monastic archives and its readers. Namely, trough regarding methods of keeping, storing techniques, ways of copying and persons responsible for the archives, I find out the possible readers inside of monasteries, and examine their attitude toward the content of the records. While through analyzing the situations when the monastic documents were used outside of the foundations (during tribunals, border-delineations etc.), I discover which laic authorities and individuals had access to records, and what was their ways of reading these texts.

Keywords: Byzantine, archive, monastery, diplomatics, chrysobull, charter, prostagma, cartulary, inventory, typikon, chartophylax, skeuophylax, Athos, Vazelon, Menoikeion.

As any other documents, charters in Byzantium had different stages of existence: they were issued, offered, kept, and exhibited, and, finally, could be destroyed or stored in archives. Some of these stages are well examined, while others still demand a more detailed research. The origins of a charter,[1] its composition, and the instances of approval[2] are sufficiently studied, especially, in the case of imperial charters; however, just a few works focus on Byzantine archives and the documents' circulation.[3] However, the examination of other aspects in a charter's life, such as keeping, copying, and exhibiting, can help one understand Byzantine monks' legal and practical literacy and the role of monasteries in the preservation of records.

Subsequently, the present article will address a series of problems connected with the keeping and archiving of documents, their copying, usage, and those situations when records were exhibited and read. By dealing with these problems, I am going to find out who were people participating in the stages of the charters' material lives, and, consequently, who had access to their content, and was interested in it. The reasons for posing such questions are the following: whereas the ideological content of charters (especially of their *prooimia*)[4] and their use as means of imperial propaganda seems to be self-understood now,[5] the addressees of such texts and their social status are understudied.[6] Moreover, this research can contribute to our understanding of reasons behind numerous donations given to monasteries of. I argue here that well organized archives and monks' care brought to monasteries the fame of good administrators, and guardians of records, which explains in turn why people, wishing to be posthumously remembered, preferred to be commemorated by members of these memory-keeping communities.

Monasteries as Archive-keepers

The problem of Byzantine-archives making was generally addressed on the materials of St. Sophia patriarchal archives;[7] however, the documents belonging to Byzantine monasteries can provide for very detailed accounts on this matter. Monasteries and town metropoleis were perceived as safe places and they had a developed archival system determining private persons to leave there their documents for storage.

The *proedros* Nicephoros Bourtzes passed to the Monastery of Docheiariou only the copies of his documents concerning his property in Rouseou (gift-granting deed of a *kaisar* "and the *chrysobull* accompanied by it"), "because the originals were left for safekeeping in the holy *skeuophylakion* of Hagia Sophia under the receipt of the most blessed Metropolitan of Thessaloniki, *kyr* Theodoulos". He also passed "for greater safety" to Docheiariou the receipt of records left in the metropolis.[8] Similarly, when Michael VII granted an estate to Andronikos Doukas, the original *periorismos* of the possessions was left in the Metropolis of Miletus, while the owner received only the copy.[9]

As these examples show, ecclesiastic institutions had their own archives which could be used by private persons belonging to the jurisdiction of that ecclesiastic institution. Probably, the use of church archives was a

direct consequence of the fact that ecclesiastic authorities held the offices of judges[10] and notaries[11] leaving in the storages of their *metropolia* the copies of deeds they took part in.

In some cases, an ecclesiastic organization could use the archive of another one for storing their records, this guaranteeing a greater safety and the monks' inability to change the content of their founders' constitution or to produce forgeries of imperial acts. Athanasios Philanthropenos, author of St. Mamas Typikon (1158), left "for security" the originals of the main statuary documents (*typikon*, patriarchal *lysis*, and imperial charters) in the *skeuophylakion* of Christ Philanthropos Monastery. The Philanthropos Monastery gave to the monks of St. Mamas the receipt (*semeioma*) confirming the receiving of documents and explaining the ways of keeping, exhibiting and returning them.[12]

Sometimes, documents belonging to a single monastery were divided into groups and kept in different places. In his *Petritzonitissa Typikon* (1083), Gregory Pakourianos ordered that 22 *chrysobulls* concerning family properties in the Eastern provinces were to be kept in Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, while 19 *chrysobulls* concerning monastery's possessions and the founder's personal affairs were kept in the *Petritzonitissa* Monastery. In addition, the *Petritzonitissa* preserved several taxation *pittakia*, copies of cadastres, two *praktika*, and border *periorismoi*.[13]

One can assume that the practice of acts' safe-keeping in external institutions has changed after the 11th-12th century, an indirect evidence of this being the Athonite court act of 1317.[14] The judge (Athonite *protos* Isaak) expresses his deep suspicion toward the provenance of a document, which according to words of the suitors (monks of Xenophon), was kept in the external institution:

> When we wanted to know about the place where it (the act) was hidden for so long… there was great discordance in their words. One told that it was found in the venerable monastery of Thessaloniki, called Basilikon, in the *skeuophylakion*; another one, that it was in the cell of one of its nuns, who was a sister of Pherentinos who, being the *hegoumenos* of the venerable imperial Monastery of Chortiaton, was once a superior of the Monastery of Xenophon and had a good knowledge of its affairs. And that, after his death, he assigned (it) to the one who lived with him (his sister). And now, when she was making arrangements concerning the documents, she found out that it is ours and gave it to us. Another one told also that it was found by someone from Bardarion. And being annoyed by such discordance and impropriety of words, we sent them out…

This passage, if one disregards the hostile tone, represents a quite consistent story about the origin of the act in question. Since Pherentinos was once a *hegoumenos* of Xenophon,[15] he could place some documents in the *skeuophylakion* of Basilikon and appoint his sister to take care of papers after this death, while "someone from Bardarion" could be merely a person who physically brought the records to Xenophon. However, the judge's suspicion and such cases' consequent rarity can explain somehow the rise of forgery production in the 13th-14th centuries.[16] Whereas before monks didn't have permanent access to documents, these being placed in external institutions, in Palaiologan time, when this practice was partially abandoned, the owners of archives could produce forgeries or alter the acts' content.

Some trace of document-keeping in external institutions can be still found in the 14th century on Mount Athos. The Monastery of Kastamonitou kept copies of dispute decisions between the Kutlumus and Docheiariou (1310), Kutlumus and Xenophon (1317), and a dossier of controversy between Neakitou and Zographou (1333-62),[17] while one of the copies of *protos* Daniel's decision concerning the dispute between Kutlumus and Rossikon (1430) was passed for safeguarding to Xeropotamou.[18] Simultaneously, noblemen and even rulers of late-Byzantine epoch deposited their valuable possessions to monasteries,[19] this practice implying that monasteries, especially the Athonite ones, were still considered safe places and could hold some external deposits. So, one can conclude that monasteries, which competed or quarreled with one another, entrusted rarely their documents to external institutions, but simultaneously they were ready to accept documents for safe-keeping from private individuals, whenever these were in relations of patronage with a monastery.

Spaces for Keeping Documents

Byzantine monastic archives were often joined to libraries, as it can observed from practices of Mt. Athos and Patmos,[20] where archives and books were stored together.[21] Such libraries existed usually either on the upper floors of narthexes or in annexes and towers. In St. John Prodromos Monastery in Serres, the library was situated in the two-storey narthex in the western part of the *katholikon*, next to the chapel of St. Nicholas, a fact which is confirmed by a pilgrim description and an inscription written on

the external wall of the church.[22] On the other hand, the founder suggests existence of a special room for archives (*chartophylakion*) and lays the responsibility for archive on the *skeuophyalx*.[23] It is quite possible that both the library and archive were located close to each other in the same upper-floor space.

Proskynetarion of John Komnenos (17th century) offers some relevant information on the Athonite archives: in Vatopedi some books were housed in a special room above the narthex, while others, together with treasures and records, were placed in a *skeuophylakion*.[24] In the Great Lavra, according to G. Millet, the library also was placed on the floor above the narthex.[25]

Sometimes archives and treasuries could be stored together: in his *Typikon*, Neophytos the Recluse mentions "the narthex and its upper storey, [which is] the sacristy",[26] which was meant for storing "holy vessels and books". In the case of Nea Monastery in Thessaloniki, the documents were placed together with the treasuries, since *kaisar* Alexios Angelos, passing his donation act to the monastery (1389), notices that the record will be stored "in the *skeuophylakeion* of the venerable imperial and patriarchal Monastery Nea for security".[27]

Such spaces were usually placed in side-annexes, like in Chora Monastery, where the *skeuophylakion* was situated in the upper storey of the northern annex.[28] They were difficultly-accessible and occupied rooms in the upper parts of buildings, as it was in the Monastery of Theotokos Evergetis, its *Sinaxarion* mentioning the priest, ecclesiarch, and deacon "descending" from the sacristy.[29]

Later, some monasteries acquired special buildings for accommodating their books and acts, as it was the case of Hilandar, where the library (burnt down in 1722) was situated to the east of the *katholikon*, between the tower of St. Sava and belfry.[30] Additionally, some towers (*pyrgoi*) could contain document storages, though this was in great extent a later practice.[31]

One might assume that the most precious documents were separated from the bulk for greater safety. In his account on travelling to Trebizond, Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer described the only preserved *chrysobull* of Alexios III Grand-Komnenos to Sumela Monastery:

> Of many *chrysobulls* belonging to different princes of the Grand Komnenoi Imperial House, which were kept in the archive of the Holy Mount's Monastery 70 years ago, only this one was preserved, as the monks say.

> In order to save it…, it was enclosed in a metallic capsule together with other jewelries, was kept and safeguarded in a chapel inside a grotto, cut out in lime-rock, in a chamber inaccessible to fire.[32]

He also suggests that the monks had document's copy signed by "the four patriarchs of the East", which they used for juridical purposes.

Whether archives were kept together with libraries or in the same place with the treasury, the access to them was extremely limited. Their location was unnoticeable for visitors and restricted for monastic inhabitants. Such rooms could contain only very few persons, which means that the circle of acts' readers was limited to those who had access to such spaces, namely, to several monastic office-holders.

Persons Responsible

On the basis of data provided by *typika*, one can assume that, in Byzantine monasteries, such offices as *oikonomos* (steward) or *skeuophylax* (sacristian) were responsible for archives' supervision and arrangement. Usually, foundation documents do not stress the matter of archive-keeping, but rather the number of books,[33] or the problems of taxes and accounting. Subsequently, one might only guess that archival activities were included in the list of responsibilities of one or another office.

It is worth noticing that a group of three *Typika* (Theotokos Kecharitomene, 1110-16; St. Mamas, 1158; and Heliou Bomon, 1161-2), deriving from a lost *Typikon* of Christ Philanthropos,[34] present some information about the holding of the two offices, *skeuophylax* (sacristian[35] and *chartophylax* (archivist), by the same person. Empress Irene Doukaina Komnene ordered for the Kecharitomene nunnery that *skeuophylakissa* should "guard the sacred vessels and liturgical cloth", "record in detail the expenditures", help the nuns to produce candles, and assist to *ecclessiarchisse*. The same person should hold the position of *chartophylakissa* (archivist), keeping registers and "papers containing the rights of ownership of the convent", guarding and preserving them from moth.[36] In St. Mamas[37] and Heliou Bomon[38] foundations, the sacristian office is combined with the one of the archivist, but in the difference with Kecharitomene, the archivist had a greater importance, since the significant documents were kept in a cabinet "closed and sealed by both the superior and the sacristan", so that one "can't open the records without the other".[39]

In the Monastery of Bebaia Elpis, among the nuns was chosen the *exarchousa* being "already elderly…with respect to her wisdom and character", and experienced "in practical affairs". She was responsible for appointing administrators to the external estates, keeping accounts and records, deposing the revenues, storing precious objects, and reporting to the superior.[40]

The Rule of St. Christodoulos for Patmos monastery suggested that the *hegoumenos* appoints an ecclesiarch, "a man distinguished for his piety", knowledgeable in discipline and order. This one "takes charge of the books and, in particular, the title-deeds of the monastery, and anything else belonging to the church".[41]

In the *Typikon* of Lips Monastery (1294–1301) the archive-keeping was assigned to the *skeuophylakissa*, who was responsible for taking care of "the sacred vessels and liturgical cloths". Among her duties was also to observe that "the paper documents of the convent are securely stored in boxes" being closed and sealed. The access to these documents was thus limited, and if somebody requested them, the *Typikon* establishes the following procedure: "With the permission of the *hegoumene* and in the presence of the preeminent nuns, she should produce the necessary [document], and then ask for it back and, after receiving it in the presence of the same nuns, she should shut it up in a basket and affix a seal".[42]

Another strong proof of archive-keeping as belonging to the duties of *skeuophylax* is the participation of such persons as witnesses in legal transactions, or the combining of the offices of sacristan and notary (*taboullarios*). One of the best examples is Demetrios Diabasemeres[43] who, being a sacristian in the Monastery of Acheiropoietos in Thessaloniki (1328-48) simultaneously composed the acts for Iviron, Xenophon, Vatopedi, Esphigmenou, and Hilandar.

This way, only several monks/nuns holding the offices of *skeuophylax*, *exarch, oikonomos*, or *chartophylax*, had control over archives. They were appointed by the *hegoumenos* from the experienced members of brotherhood and were obliged to report on their activities. In many cases, archiving was one of their numerous administrative duties, which together kept them quite busy, so one might suggest the presence of an assistant or disciple, even though no source directly offers this information. Moreover, even though they were stored and controlled, documents could be requested on certain ground by the brotherhood's members, naturally for a short time and against a receipt.

Storing Techniques

Byzantine charters and *typika* give scattered and incomplete information on documents' physical keeping. However, storing techniques were an essential tool for preservation, and respectively for further use of acts, whether in court or for delimitation procedures. It is possible to reconstruct several methods of storing: boxes, caskets, sacks, piles, and files; the chosen technique depended on the document's importance as well as on the means monasteries had at disposal.[44]

A popular and relatively safe way of keeping was caskets or boxes. According to Anthony Cutler, many middle-Byzantine ivory caskets represented, in fact, a mass product[45] and were often used for keeping money, as in Heliou Bomon[46] and Kecharitomene[47] monasteries. However, the boxes contained also parts of monastic archives, such as *chrysobulls* and *horismoi*; and the way of storing them similarly with money suggests the importance given to such documents.

Boxes were quite a convenient technique for storing, limiting the access to the documents' content. The abbot of St. Mamas monastery passed for safekeeping to the Monastery of Christ Philanthropos "a sealed box containing a *chrysobull* of our God-protected, most-powerful and holy emperor, confirming the independence of the same monastery; a patriarchal *lysis*, pertaining to the independence … a patriarchal memorandum in favor of this independence; the inventory of the monastery and the *typikon* (both in book form), as well as a *semeioma* issued for this *typikon*".[48]

Boxes had also the advantage of being large enough as to contain more than one document. According to a 14th-century marginal note on so-called "Inventory" of Hilandar archive (no. 102), 66 acts of emperors were stored in a metal (tin) or cast caskets, while a simple wooden box contained 13 other documents.[49]

Taking into consideration an average size of Byzantine caskets,[50] either about 11 x 35/40 x 15/20 cm or 15/20 x 30 x 20 cm,[51] and the approximate size of Byzantine legal acts (between 30 and 50 cm),[52] one can assume that acts should have been folded at least twice. Some of the surviving documents indeed show traces of double or triple horizontal folding,[53] but they are not the most common cases.

Many documents were kept in fabric sacks, this being a more simple and cheap way of storing. In the beginning of the 19th century, after his visits to the monasteries of Orthodox East, P. Uspensky noted "scrolls

with … portraits of emperors and empresses, despots and *despoinai* and their children, with their autograph signatures, drawn flowers and seals… are kept in *sakkoulai* or, as we say, in bags".[54] Rolling of acts and their placing in bags was probably the most common technique. In the end of the 12th century, in the Monastery of St. John on Patmos, a register of old documents concerning monastery possessions was compiled (none of them are preserved). It included *chrysobulls*, *praktika*, notes, and orders issued by different lay and church authorities; in the end of the archivist's list consisting of more than 200 items one can find the following words: "And all these were stored in sacks (*sakoullia*) as useless."[55] Similarly, as the note on Hilandar's inventory witnesses, some of the documents still in use were kept "in linen sacks" (*ou plat'nēnē sakouli*).[56]

The simplicity and low price of sacks allowed using of this method even with small financial means. In 1442, Daniel, the *hegoumenos* of small St. Nicholas Monastery in Berat, gave because "of fear of Turks" the property of his monastery to a local ruler (Theodore Mouzaki) and listed these possessions on a manuscript cover. Among several precious liturgical objects and books one can find "*chrysobulls* on the borders of Pentearchontea and of Breasteanis in two sacks".[57]

Arrangement into files helped to find quickly the necessary records concerning the same domain. The inventory of St. John Monastery in Patmos suggests that documents were divided into the property cases and joint into files (*apodesmoi, desmoi*), such as "another file having five papers about Latros, a business note, and a tax note (*lysis*) about the *metochion*…"[58] Some cases were packed into smaller sacks before storing (a small bag having eight parchment pages about Kos and Strobilos),[59] while others were kept as separate pages (*chartia, pittakia*).

Many byzantine acts preserve *verso*-notes referring to the property and privileges in question and the issuing institution.[60] In Slavic monasteries (Hilandar, Panteleimon),[61] these *verso*-notes are made in Slavic or a combination of Greek and Slavic. The notes' content suggests that they were written by archivists in order to arrange and find quickly the required acts.

The sacks or caskets were placed in some furniture items, Michael Attaliates insists in his *Diataxis*: "The title deeds for the immovable property attached to my monastery and poorhouse, as well as the original *chrysobull*, should be deposited in chests placed either in the sacristy of the monastery, or in another safe location. Each chest should have two keys, and my heir should keep one of them, and the steward the other."

However, for preservation purposes "the documents should be unrolled and shaken out three times a year, and then returned again to the same secure place".[62]

This way, the storing techniques, namely, boxes, sacks and folders, had two purposes: to preserve the documents and to arrange them. Moreover, the ways of arrangement showed the hierarchy of records according to their importance (*chrysobulls* were kept more carefully) and marks acts as dedicated to a certain propriety.

Making Copies

One of the most important pre-conditions of preservation, as well as circulation of documents was their replication. Existence of copies increased the chances for acts' surviving. Moreover, the copies could be easily read by non-archivists, since their value was lower than that of the original. This way, they facilitated the circulation of information (texts of acts), but limited the circulation of objects (charters themselves). Copies were classified by Franz Dölger as: made by imperial secretaries, made by the recipients, copies with interpolations, and imitations.[63] I would like to broaden this classification on the basis of the charters preserved in monastic archives, which show different ways of producing copies: multiple originals (issued by the lay or ecclesiastic authorities), copies of documents collected into cartularies, and abbreviated copies of several acts put together in form of *brebia*.

One might encounter the existence of several, absolutely identical copies of the same document, namely multiple originals. The most illustrative example is the so-called Tsar Dušan's General *chrysobull*[64] (1345), a kind of agreement made between the Athonite monasteries and Serbian ruler. The document was addressed to all monasteries of Mt. Athos and stated Dušan's general policy: he confirmed all the possessions and privileges and prohibited to compile cadastres on these territories. In return, the monasteries recognized his authority and agreed to commemorate him. Thus, the charter was an important legal document for every monastery and, possibly, every Athonite monastery received a copy of it. Up to nowadays two copies survived (in Vatopedi and Lavra),[65] and a reference to the existence of such a charter in Iviron can be found in one of Dušan's later charters.[66] Unfortunately, it's impossible to decide

whether these copies were produced for every monastery from a single original (kept in Protaton?),[67] or they were made inside the monasteries.

If two parties were involved into disputes, they received two equivalent copies of juridical decision. In the quarrel between Iviron and Vatopedi over the borders of Semelthos and Radolibos, the patriarchal judge Babylas, the Metropolitan of Ancyra, made the disputants to draw up an agreement act, which was issued in two copies for both parties, and referred in the protocol in plural as "agreement acts" (*ta dialytaia grammata*).[68] In the dispute between Vatopedi and Esphigmenou over *monydrion* Banitza (1316), the act was composed in three copies, two of which survived (one in Vatopedi and one transferred from Esphigmen to Zographou).[69] However, the original of the *protos'* decision was to "be stored in the highest *diakonia* of Holy Mese (Protaton), being above all the assaults".[70] Initially, Byzantine law recognized only the acts' originals, however starting with the 12th-century novella of Alexios Komnenos (1081-18), court could consider as proof two identical copies if the original was lost.[71] In this situation, many monasteries produced themselves copies intended for a better preservation of documents' content. The examination of some monastic charters shows that often such contemporary copies were made in different materials, namely, a parchment act was duplicated into a paper exemplar certified simultaneously or soon after the original. Such practice can be encountered especially in the 14th century.[72] Thanks to the producing a paper copy, Dionysion was able to preserve a solemn and illuminated chrysobull of Alexios III Great Komnenos (1374).[73] Physical evidence suggests that even inventories were produced in original and copy, so the Monastery of Vatopedi possessed one original and three copies of Chalkidiki Praktikon of Constantine Makrenos (1138),[74] one of which was certified. Similarly, in Iviron, the Radolibos Praktikon of John Vatatzes (1341) was kept in original and in certified, contemporary copy.[75]

The number of copied documents increased drastically in the end of the 13th century as consequence of changes in legal procedure, as well of numerous turmoils throughtout that century.[76] For example, the monastery of Xenophon "for many years appeared to be captured by Italian pirates… and suffered the loss of long-ago issued documents about its property",[77] while Pantokrator Monastery witnessed the loss of records in fire (before 1394).[78]

Production of copies was essential for the surviving of documents guaranteeing the monastery's possessions, especially in time of often cataclysms, wars and fires; consequently, copies were made for better

preservation by the almost simultaneously with the originals (i.e. inside the monasteries) and validated as such by local officials (bishops, judges, notaries).

One of the ways of copy-making was the synchronous production of original and duplicate: for example, both, the original and copy, of the charter Panteleimon no. 14 (1366)[79] were made by the same scriber and validated by *protos* Dorotheos. Or in the case of charter given to Docheiariou by Philotheos Kokkinos (1375), where the scriber's note underlined that the copy was left to be signed by the patriarch. [80]

Another function of copy-making was to provide for the circulation of documents. As suggested by B. Caseau, the presence of three copies of Alexios Komnenos (1102) *chrysobull*[81] in Lavra's archive can be explained by the act's content and use: since it confirmed the monastery's right to obtain a ship of 6000 *modioi*, monks were obliged to show this document in different ports, producing thus multiple copies.[82] Moreover, copies could also circulate among persons not belonging to the community: for grounding his own argument, John Rabdokanakes demanded from Lembiotissa Monastery (1236) to show him "either copy or original".[83] Two contemporary copies of *periorismos* made by Nicholas Promountenos for Rossikon (1271?) could be used similarly, one in the monastery and another one on site.[84]

One can notice that the great number of copies produced in Athonite monasteries served two purposes, to increase the chances of the act's surviving, and to facilitate better circulation of its content. The second reason is especially important here, because it shows that the access to documents was not limited to a narrow circle of high monastic offices, but could be given to the parties interested in disputes, officials of different types (*apographeis*, notaries, *praktores*, *strategoi*, and judges), and even to private persons concluding deals of property transfer.

Cataloguing

For reasons of proving the legality of property-transferring, monasteries kept copies of documents concerning earlier ownership over acquired possessions. Such documents were either collected in form of dossiers and piled together with the purchase act (this could be the case of those *apodesmoi* or files described above), or copied in a codex form.

Having received from Xenophon the lands on Lemnos, the Monastery of St. Paul gained together with them a dossier of earlier documents, which confirmed the rights over the properties of the previous owner (Xenophon).[85] After donation of 1400 *modioi* of land near Serres by Theodora Kantakouzene (1338), the Monastery of Vatopedi transferred to its archives a dossier of 110 private purchase deeds confirming the validity of deals made by the patroness.[86] Alexis Amnon giving to Esphigmenou a field in Herissos (1301) also attached a previous deed of sale,[87] while Theodore Tetragonites giving to Iviron the fields near Strumica (1286) added three acts of purchase from the local peasants.[88] Subsequently, the use of such dossiers could be diverse, but their main purpose was to prove the legality of ownership and to show the stages of domain's acquisition.

A good example of such placement is the dossier-cartulary of the Macedonian Eleousa Monastery, which itself was a *metochion* of Ivirion and, therefore, the Athonite foundation kept and copied those acts concerning its dependency. [89] This cartulary is divided into 4 parts: the first consists of 7 imperial charters placed in chronological order, they are followed by the *praktikon* of Michael Tzagritzakes (1152) including the complete text of imperial *chrysobull* of 1152 and the description of lands and peasants, while the other two last parts are the monastery's *typikon* composed by the founder, Bishop of Stroumitza Manuel, and the inventory (*apographe*) of the precious objects belonging to the Eleousa foundation.

One of the purposes of these dossiers was to record the existence of destroyed documents which were known to the compiler. Thus, the author of Eleousa monastery's cartulary make a note instead of placing a proper document entry: "*prostagma* of glorious emperor *kyr* John Mavroioannos was destroyed by the Latins".[90] Such record didn't have legal validity, but it supplied the lack of information caused by a document's destruction. In other words, the dossiers and their copies allowed one to follow the logic of domain clustering and were mainly oriented on readers interested either in the history or legality of property acquisition.

Cartularies

One of the main preservation strategies was the composition of cartularies,[91] codices consisting of the documents' texts. There are several manuscripts of this type originating in the Byzantine monasteries of Nea Moni on Chios (11th-14th centuries),[92] Eleousa near Stroumitza

(12th century),[93] Lembiotissa near Smyrna (13th century),[94] Latros and Xerochoraphion near Millet (10th-13th centuries),[95] Makrynitissa near Volos (13th-14th centuries),[96] John Prodromos near Serres (13th-14th centuries),[97] and Vazelon near Trebizond.[98] Contrarily to what was stated by A.V. Men'shikov,[99] these manuscripts are not organized chronologically, but rather in a mix of territorial and chronological principles allowing the reader to follow the fate of every estate, its construction as entity, and legality in ownership transfer. In a way, these books composed of different dossiers merged into one volume and supplied with general foundation documents, such as *typikon* and imperial *chrysobulls*. Such codices reveal the hierarchy of acts, by placing them in order of importance.

The cartulary of Lembiotissa includes documents "organized in a loose geographical order, based on the monastery's main estates in the region of Smyrna".[100] The cartulary made distinction between imperial *chrysobulls* and the rest of documents; the first part of the manuscript consists of 6 imperial charters placed in chronological order,[101] while the rest is shaped in a combination of territorial, typological, and chronological criteria. The manuscript is generally divided into two big groups of deeds, one concerning the olive estates and another one dedicated to fields;[102] however, within these big entities, one can distinguish certain smaller dossiers, such as the estate "tōn Sphournōn", *metochion* of St. George Exokastriton, *metochion* "tōn Palatinōn", and others.[103]

A similar situation occurred in the case of Vazelon cartulary. In editors' opinion,[104] the imperial *chrysobull* and accompanying properties' list, which nowadays occupy the middle of the codex (ff. 58v -70v), were initially situated in the very beginning. They were followed by *praktika* with *periorismoi*,[105] and only afterwards the scribers copied private deeds.

The structure of the cartulary of Makrinitissa and Nea Petra of 1280s[106] is slightly different, since it included, except for the documents themselves, poetic commentaries, miniatures, golden captions, and the autograph signatures of Patriarch John and Emperor Andronikos II.[107] Except for the monasteries noted in the title, it also concerned the properties of Latomos foundation (Thessaloniki),[108] all being possessions of the Maliasenos family.[109] The sequence of documents is arranged according to the hierarchy of the issuing institutions and the documents' status: it includes 3 *chrysobulls* of Michael VIII Palaiologos, 2 of his *prostagmata* and 3 documents of Epirote *despotes*, 9 patriarchal acts (*ypomnemata*, *sigillia*, the *praxis* of Synod, and a letter of a bishop of Demetriades to the patriarch), letters of *sebastokrator* (later *despotes*) John Palaiologos[110] and

kaisar Alexis Komnenos Strategopoulous,[111] and, finally, a group of private acts "according to the order".[112] The codex is supplied with the author's remarks, which appear in form of two forewords[113] placed in-between the parts showing a conscious planning and arrangement of the manuscript. Thus, the author, being aware of this unusual composition, supplied his text with "a foreword (*protheōria*) concerning why the documents of one monastery are not grouped in one part and of another in another one, but are scattered here and there", which was intended to emphasize the individual structure as a consequence of the patron's special demand. His second introduction, *prooimion*, "says about the goals set by the founders for this book in order to provide benefit and development for the monasteries to improve them" and includes a short praise to the founders".

Before copying the private deeds, the author noticed that there is no need to include in the text all the signatures of the parts and witnesses since they exist on the originals of the acts, while the present copy certified the private deeds as a whole (which can refer to the signatures of the emperor and the patriarch).[114] Similarly, in the collection's very end, he uses the epilogue in order to praise Michael VIII, the founders, and monks working on the foundation's improvement.[115] The dodecasyllabic iambic commentaries situated between the parts of the cartulary served "to establish a connection and to determine a contextual link between individual documentary texts" and, simultaneously, functioned as a mnemonic device for readers.[116] Besides, the appearance of the book was so unusual, that all scholars dealing with the codex noted its luxury character,[117] typical for "highly official copy executed perhaps by the imperial chancery".[118] The last supposition was confirmed also by the poem-authentication[119] composed on behalf of or by the *logothetes ton agelon*[120] and directly stating that it was made "according to the clear order of the three-time ruler Michael named as Angel Palaiologos" by the founder "gathering properly all the *chrysobulls*, *horismoi*, and patriarchal *ypomnemata* in one place". This way, all these specific features suggest that the manuscript was not made for the monasteries' needs, but rather for use by the monasteries' founder Nicholas Joseph Meliasenos.[121] However, because the founder took the monastic vows in his foundation,[122] the codex, probably, was kept in the chief monastery of Makrinitissa.

The cartularies of St John Prodromos Monastery in Serres distinguish as well between private and imperial documents; however, the imperial charters and foundation documents were placed in another codex (so-called cartulary A), slightly different in its content. The two cartularies

of the monastery were made one after another within a short interval, cartulary A being usually dated to 1345-52[123] (though some authors proposed other dates),[124] and cartulary B being composed soon after 1356.[125] These manuscripts have a number of overlapping imperial *chrysobulls*,[126] but the rest of their contents differ. The first collection (A), once called the "Founder's codex",[127] can be understood as a corpus of statutory acts expressing the essence of the monastic institution's governance, administration, and regulations. It includes the founders' *Typikon* (1324), 11 *chrysobulls* (1309-45), two imperial *prostagmata* (1325, 1324), and one patriarchal *sigillion* (1324).[128] Whereas the *typikon* shows in detail the distinctive features in the foundation's life and management (independence from local bishop, patriarchal monastery status, and the superior's self-determined election),[129] the imperial acts are placed here in support to this conception. Thus, the *sigillion* of Patriarch Isaia (1324) enforces the principles of the founder's statute,[130] the *prostagma* of Andronikos II (1325)[131] ratifies the patriarchal document and, finally, the *prostagma* of Andronikos III confirms the freedom of the monks in their choice of *hegoumenos*.[132] Finally, the 11 imperial *chrysobulls* are included as guarantors of state protection over the monastery's properties, privileges, tax-exemptions, and independence.

Codex B, contrarily, deals with matters of economy and landed properties, consisting mainly of private acts, land descriptions, and imperial documents, whose role is to confirm the legality of property's acquisition. The private donation and purchase charters are arranged in several combined principles (territorial units, donors' names, and *metochia*) which, nevertheless, create small groups of dossiers.

This way, such codices played a crucial role in the organization and administration of a monastery, representing a pack of documents proving the legality of its establishment, underling its constitutional principles, demonstrating the legitimate acquisition of its property, and giving a history of its private affiliations. As it seems to me, diplomatic compendia like this can be compared with folders of essential documents of modern companies. Thus, *typika,* the founder's last will, and imperial *chrysobulls* played the role of constitutional charters, namely, of Memorandum and Articles of Association and State Certification and Registration Diplomas; *praktika* and *periorismoi* were a kind of Appraisal Reports and Authorized Capital Records, while private deeds of donation or purchase still exist now under the same terms. However, whenever a company was sued, the trial's records must be included into such package, and so did the Byzantines.

In some situations, these cartularies, being approved either by supreme local or central authorities, could play the role of originals becoming a sufficient proof of legality of ownership. O*rphanotorophos* Sebastos Pelinas,[133] "judge of all Matzuka", in order to solve a dispute between the citizens of the village Hortokopes[134]and Vazelon Monastery over[135] "stripes of land", came on place, inspected the territory, listened the parties, examined "the documents and the codex (cartulary) of the monastery", and assigned the debated lands to Vazelon.

The main purpose of cartularies was to provide a reader with the legal image of an institution, to present its history, properties, patrons and founders, its management tools, and acquired privileges. Undoubtedly, it could have some practical reasons to exist, such as simplification of document-search and archiving strategies, but as genre, such books were aimed on two main audiences, primarily, the monastery's brotherhood and only secondarily court officials. Being physically massive and expensive, they rarely left archive rooms, yet simultaneously, numerous marginal marks and incretions suggest that they were often read and used, so one can assume logically that these readers were the local monks.

Abbreviated Documents

For practical purposes of taxation and arrangement, the abbreviated forms of copies were much better. For everyday use, monasteries had inventories mentioning only the character of possessions (village, field, houses, etc.), their location, and sometimes the names of donors. These inventories were called variously: *brebion* or *brevno* (Slav.) (Hilandar no. 95),[136] *apographe* (Panteleimon no.7, line 4),[137] *katastichon* (Lavra no.146, line 42),[138] and they could include also the lists of valuable monastic goods (icons, books, vessels, etc.).

In their statuary documents, founders often included lists of precious objects and possessions to be stored in the monastery.[139] Later generations of monks continued themselves to compose such registers, as it happens in the Monastery of John Theologos on Patmos in 1200, where quite extensive inventories were compiled; some of them described archival documents (none of them are preserved), while others enumerated books, vessels, icons, textiles, and embroideries.[140]

Praktika, an abbreviated document listing land possessions according to their territorial placement, taxes and exemptions, peasants and their

households, were usually regionally focused and could be accompanied by *periorismoi* (delineation of borders). Their authors and readers were in majority tax-collectors (for example, the 6 *praktika* of Iviron monasteries),[141] therefore it was a genre of specialized, professional texts based on excretions from much more solemn imperial acts and private donations.

The utility of such abbreviated and shortened descriptions can be exemplified by a Slavic inventory of Greek charters found in Hilandar.[142] As the brotherhood consisted mainly of Slavic speakers,[143] the presence of such a register with short information about the acts' content was necessary. Moreover, its marginal note (Hilandar archive no. 102) shows how the inventory was applied, namely, it refers to the placement of documents in containers, a matter which was discussed above.[144] Subsequently, the inventory helped the Slavic speakers to understand the essence of Greek texts, marked the containers holding a document and, finally, listed depository items. On the other hand, one act of a border dispute can shed some light on the way of using *periorismoi* (description of borders), free of rhetorical passages and pious messages. When in 1107, John, *protos* of the Holy Mount, settled the debates between the monasteries of St. Demetrios Kynopodos and Phalakrou, he went on site with the contestants and read the *periorismos* following the described borders in the landscape. As result, only the treatment of the text proposed by the Kynopodoi was logical, since otherwise not only the debated vineyards, "but also the monastery of St. Demetrios would be placed outside of its *periorismos.*"[145] This way, the judges looked indeed only for practical information, since they needed to compare it with physical evidence.

As one can see, the inventories were destined for domestic use and, moreover, their audience was a narrow circle of archivists and property keepers, while the *periorismoi* had the borders' committees as readers (groups of cleric or state officials); however, both of these abbreviated forms were destined for practical purposes and included only necessary information.

Imperial Documents

As one can notice from mentioned above description of Sumela by Jakob Fallmerayer, imperial *chrysobulls* were kept with special care, stored separately and called "divine" (*theios*)[146] and "venerable" (*septos*).

For example, the monks of Hilandar referred this way to the *chrysobull* of Byzantine Emperor Andronikos II,[147] while in 1421 Dionysion was granted "the holy and venerable *chrysobulls* of the blessed and venerable emperor and ruler *kyr* John Palaiologos".[148] Such special treatment of imperial acts was performed not only by monastic communities, but also by officials, like in the case of George Zagarommantes[149], *protovestiarites* and *apographeus* of Patmos, who compiled in 1251 his tax-registers on the basis of "the holy and venerable *chrysobull*, holy and venerable *horismoi*".[150] Especially, the difference in attitude toward imperial and non-imperial documents can be seen from the ways their authors call various types of records in the same texts. An *apographeus* of *thema* Boleron, Edessenos,[151] states that Iviron Monastery holds its properties "on the basis of **holy** and **venerable** *chrysobulls*, **holy venerable** *prostagmata*, registers and different *sigillia* of restitution, and other old documents". The epithets "holy" and "venerable" are applied only to imperial acts.[152] Even the simple-form imperial orders, *prostagmata*,[153] enjoyed a special attitude, being called "holy and venerable" together with *chrysobulls*.[154] As it was noted above, the cartularies' authors made as well selections of imperial acts and placed them in the very beginning of the codices, pointing thus out on the greater importance and unusually high status of such acts.

This attitude toward imperial charters was caused by the importance of their content as well as by their symbolic value. As orders given by sacred, supreme power and touched by the hand of "holy and sacred"[155] authority, these documents were invested with supernatural power. This extraordinary veneration of imperial documents can be exemplified by the ceremony of border delineation between the monasteries of Hilandar and St. Archangels in Serbia (1454), when the two *hegoumenoi* "kissed the *chrysobull*"[156] before starting the actual border-making. Simultaneously, imperial documents were important as objects and were depicted as such in late-Byzantine art. Namely, in the Theotokos Peribleptos Monastery in Constantinople, the Hodegetria Church of Brontocheion Monastery in Mystras, and some Serbian foundations (Studenica, Gračanica, and Žiča monasteries), the texts of royal donation were depicted in form of painted scrolls with seals and signatures, sometimes even put in perspective with folding and touched by shadows.[157] One might assume that, being treated as divine and actual law, these deeds of benevolence had simultaneously legal and spiritual power, and their readers should have been warned and forced to show some respect toward this authority. As result of more

careful treatment, about 40% of the surviving documents in Byzantine monastic archives[158] are imperial or rulers' charters.

Readers

Finally, I would like to examine in more details the problem of the acts' readers. For this purpose, I should also answer the following questions: what were the circumstances when documents were used and read, and how were they read?

The instances when documents were exhibited were quite various, but in the majority of cases, they were demanded to prove the right of a property's ownership. This need was encountered in the following situations: border or property disputes, confirmation of previous possessions by new emperors, and composition of tax and land registers.

First of all, documents were extensively used during land or border arguments, and the procedure of settling disputes and the role of written evidence in such cases can be reconstructed from the preserved court decisions. Usually, the suitor started by addressing a complaint to the emperor or high spiritual authority (for example, the *protos* of the Holy Mount) and waited for receiving the order to debate the case. Afterwards, both sides brought all their files concerning the debated property to the tribunal; these files were read aloud in the presence of judges, representatives of both parties, and, sometimes, witnesses. Judges evaluated the authenticity of documents, questioned the parties and their witnesses, determined the case and issued their own document consisting of a brief description of the case, the court protocol, and final decision.

In 1338, the monks of Hilandar addressed the grand *domestikos* John Kantakouzenos to settle their argument over borders between them and the peasants of the village of Ploumiska. John Kantakouzenos sent Demetrios Diabasemeres, *taboularios* of Thessaloniki, together with notaries Theodore Deblitzenos and Demetrios Pharmakes,[159] to settle the case on place. Having arrived on site, the officials read the description of the possessions[160] before the locals and representatives of Hilandar. On the basis of this description and the newly done measurements, the new border was established.

Similarly, during the argument between Iviron Monastery and the Bishop of Ezoba over the *metochion* of St. Anna, the latter party appeared

in front of the patriarchal tribunal "holding in hands their documents and asking to conduct the befitting investigation".[161]

In the argument between the monasteries of Zographou and Neakitou over the church of Holy Apostles in Mese, the "long ago-appeared documents" were "read aloud" in front of the council of Athonite elders headed by the *protos* Isaak.[162]

In the fight of Zographou and Lavra (1267) over the villages of Hierissos,[163] the monks of Zographou turned to the emperor, who sent an order (*horismos*) to the *kephale* of Thessaloniki, *sebastokrator* Constantine Tornikios, to settle the case; this one forwarded the order to the members of the local administration, *sakelliou* of the metropolis of Thessaloniki, Nicephoros Malleas,[164] and Basil Eparchon.[165] After having investigated the documents they came on site and interrogated the witnesses, "the best citizens of Hierissos", listed by names. Subsequently, documents were read by the emperor, the *sebastokrator*, and provincial notaries.

As these cases reveal, the investigators and, consequently, occasional readers of monastic archives, were those people belonging to ecclesiastical and civil administration (elders, *hegoumenoi*, *kephale*), notaries, and members of provincial nobility (*sebastokrator*). Simultaneously, the text of recited acts could be also partially understood by local citizens, such as in the above case, which mentions "the best citizens of Hierissos".

In those situations when both debating sides had the documents at hand, special officials were sent by the state to examine the papers more carefully. One case study of dispute over the village of St. Nicholas (1327-34),[166] between Esphigmenou Monastery and the inhabitants of Rentina, will help one to understand how the procedure functioned, which documents were examined, and who where the persons involved into their examination and, consequently, the charters' careful reading.

In 1258-9, Esphigmenou got the village of St. Nicholas on the basis of an imperial chrysobull of Michael VIII, and in 1318 and 1321, two *Praktika* written by local *apographeis* described it as belonging to the monastery. However, as result of the civil wars of 1321-8, Esphigmenou abandoned the property, and in 1327-8, the inhabitants of Rentina asked Andronikos III to give them the village as "free" receiving the imperial *horismos* as confirmation. On the basis of this order, *megas papias* Alexios Tzamplakon[167] delineated the new borders and Andronikos III issued the confirmation *chrysobull*. In September 1328, the monks of Esphigmenou turned to the capital requesting the lands as hereditary and got the restitution *prostagma* of Andronikos III. This way, both sides appeared to

have the highest imperial documents confirming their rights and, therefore, in September 1330, Andronikos III confirming ordered to the *kephale* of the West Syrgiannes Palaiologos[168] "to go through (examine) the *chrysobulls* and other documents" of the suitor. In this order, the emperor stated that the monks "showed to my majesty the *chrysobulls* and other documents concerning this land and its borders". Moreover, the investigator was asked to study also the monastic "*periorismos*" (border delineation) and to see whether or not the village was "inscribed into it". However, even after the investigation and the issuing of the new delineation (1333) by *domestikos* of the *themata*, Costantine Makrenos, the villagers continued to use the property, which made the monks to address the general judges in Thessaloniki and to present them with "the documents they have about this land, namely, old *chrysobulls*, a *praktikon* of late Pharisaios making tax registers in this place, and also a holy *prostagma* given by our mighty and holy emperor, and also the renovation report of Makrenos, … *domestikos* of the *themata*". By means of the judges' decision, Esphigmenou finally won the case.

As seen from this example, the main purpose of keeping numerous documents was the possibility to use them in court for defending the rights of ownership. In situations of complex juridical cases, an investigator, usually a high official, undertook the task of comparing the data presented by the acts, which allowed to find whose rights were older and more grounded. For this purposes, the monastic archival technique of dossiers on certain domains were irreplaceable. They could show the logic and succession of a domain's transfer and, in this way, prove the rights of the monastery.

I would also like to turn the attention to the order of documents' examination, namely, to the fact that *chrysobulls* as the strongest proofs of ownership were used in disputes together with border delineations having more concrete and detailed character, the two types of documents being, subsequently, more carefully preserved. Paradoxically, the delineations themselves were grounded not only on written sources, but also on oral testimonies, compared with the written data by the present officials. The institution of witnesses in Byzantine legal practice assumed that making a contract should be testified by 5 to 7 individuals, not involved into the transaction, but understanding its meaning and signing the act.[169]

The *apographeis* Stephanos Doukas Radenos,[170] Constantine Palaiologos Oinaiotes,[171] and John Radenos[172] were ordered to compose a *periorismos* and *praktikon* for the village of Plomiska (1420) belonging to

Lavra. They visited the place together with the bishop of Lite and Rentina and, at the threat of church excommunication, collected the testimonies of locals concerning the borders of the village. Those testimonies, being found non-contradictory to other documents, helped to compose a new *praktikon*.[173]

The witnesses could belong to different social groups and strata. The donation transfer to the Monastery of Lembiotissa (1291) was witnessed by several "local" archonts,[174] while the Plomiska case refers to the village's "inhabitants". The deeds composed in monasteries were always witnessed by the community's members, and their signatures' order showed the hierarchy in honor and importance in the religious foundations.[175]

Old documents played a crucial role in confirming monastic possessions in situations of political changes. Thus, in the *interventia*[176] of Greek or Serbian rulers' charters, one can often encounter the following situation: monks approached a ruler asking him to confirm their possessions on the basis of an old document. In several *chrysobulls* of Stefan Dušan addressed to Athonite monasteries, the same phrase with slight variations appears:[177] "the monks practicing *askesis* from the venerable monastery… placed on the Holy Mount Athos… turned to my Majesty, that this sacred monastery, on the basis of old [chrysobulls] and *prostagmata* and inventory lists and other orders, holds [different] properties and *metochia*".[178] Responding to the pleads, the Serbian ruler of the recently-conquered Greek lands showed his "care" and issued confirmation of properties and rights given by previous authorities, sometimes adding new donations.[179]

Similarly, Michel VIII Palaiologos, after his coming to power in 1359, confirmed all possessions of Athonite Lavra and added the village of Toxompos. He based his decision on "the power of all old documents of the monastery", which allowed to Lavra to acquire "the dominion and right of ownership over all the possessions they received, and to make (them) greater during their holding".[180] However, in the difference with the Serbian ruler, Michael VIII neglected the legal force of the documents issued concerning the same territories by other rulers, if they were unfavorable for the monastery: "if any (possession) from this document… had been taken away by somebody or appeared in the private possession of somebody, through *horismos* or *chrysobull*, or through *praktikon*, duke's decision, juridical document, or gift-giving certificate, it passes now into the possession of the monastery".[181]

The demonstration of relevant documents or their copies was especially important for proving the right of ownership. As the following case

shows, the Byzantine bureaucratic system preferred written documents over oral statements. When after 1371 Emperor John V returned some of the territories previously-occupied by the Serbs, he ordered that "who had possessions and they were taken from this one, let this one having documents govern his possessions". However, if, like in case of Alexios Palaiologos,[182] a person couldn't assure his rights with documents, he lost chances to return the estates.

Finally, old documents were actively read by provincial administration while establishing the borders and amount of taxes. In 1341, *protokynergos* John Vatatzes compiled for Iviron Monastery several *praktika* (for their possessions in Thessaloniki, Serres, and Radolibos) of "the *metochia* and other landed properties on the basis of divine and holy *chrysobulls*, venerated *prostagmata*, notarial certificates and other different, long-ago appeared documents".[183]

Taking into consideration the above-described examples, one can deduce several occasions when previously-issued documents were exhibited and read: trials over lands and borders, confirmation of ownership by a new ruler, proving of ownership, and compiling of cadastres by members of the local administration. In these situations, the following categories of people had access to documents: members of local administration, who examined the records during trials and compiled cadastres; monastery managers (*hegoumenos*, *skeuophylax*, the so-called "elders"); provincial church hierarchs (*hegoumenoi* of other monasteries, bishops), who also participated in trials as parties or judges; provincial noblemen, who consulted the records in case of controversies; and the emperors and their chancellery. Thus, these categories of people were the target-groups of the documents' content, having the required skills to understand and the means to access the records. Simultaneously, the archival system of the monasteries suggested that the carefully-kept documents had as their final purpose the examination and reading by a certain group of people. Those people, even though they had occasional access to the records, were meant to be the documents' main audience, being compelled by circumstances to be attentive readers. Consequently, one can state that this diverse public was actually addressed in those ideology-shaping and propaganda-bearing texts of *prooimia* and forewords. It comprised the highest elite of Byzantine society (emperor, patriarch and synod, grand *domestikos*, sebastokrator), high provincial nobility (*kephale*, *megas papias*, *domestikos* of *thema*),[184] provincial minor officials (*taboullarios*, *apographeus*, notary),[185] members of ecclesiastic courts (high

and low church officials),[186] the administration of Byzantine monasteries (*hegoumenos*, *skeuophylax*, *chartophylax*, *oikonomos*, elders), minor local nobility (local *archontes* and towns' "best citizens") and, finally, by means of reading aloud the texts, these were communicated to the villagers (peasants) and inhabitants of towns, or at least their elders,[187] who assisted border delineations and tribunals.

Conclusion

As this research shows, the ecclesiastic institutions possessed their own archives consisting of documents concerning their properties. These archives could be used by individuals and other monastic institutions as well, for passing their documents for safe-keeping. However, with time passing, this practice became rarer, since the monasteries wanted to protect their independence and often quarreled with each other on matters of property. In these situations, the preservation of notes outside monasteries could be an obstacle in testifying the validity of records in court.

The acts' originals were kept in archives, library-archives, or treasuries, which were situated in hardly-accessible spaces inside the *katholika* or in towers. Their location was unnoticeable for visitors, and restricted even for monastic inhabitants. Among their readers were definitely the *hegoumenoi* and other administrators (*skeuophylax*, *exarch, ecclesiarch, oikonomos*, and *chartophylax*), whose occupation required to use the texts practically (for paying taxes, dealing with management, etc.). However, since these monastic managers were quite busy with other tasks, I suggest that they might have had assistants among the brotherhood.

Some acts, mainly imperial documents, were stored in more safe locations (treasuries, chapels) or even copied in mural-painting, a fact which guaranteed better preservation and underlined their spiritual power, since these acts were issued by God-established rulers. Other documents enjoyed more simple preservation-methods, such as boxes, sacks, piles, and files, being arranged according to the property's domain and issuing authority. Simplifying search and access their verso-side bears notes concerning the location of possessions and institution issuing the charter. For proving the legality of ownership monasteries kept documents concerning earlier owners of donated or purchased lands; these older records were attached to property case-files or copied into cartularies.

Even though the access to documents was greatly restricted inside of monasteries, copies of acts contributed to their circulation among persons involved in the management and taxation of monastic estates. However for taxation and border-making purposes the already-abbreviated documents, such as inventories and *praktika*, were more practical, since they consisted of excerpts concerning the location, size, and tax rate of a certain domain.

For internal use, acts were usually copied into cartularies, organized according to a hierarchical principle; they showed the authorities' approval of the monastery's rules, the process of administrative decision-making over privileges, and the stages of acquiring a certain domain. Being used mainly by the brotherhood and rarely by external officials, these codices responded to the demands of their readers: for an aristocratic founder, they provided miniatures and poetry, while for an ordinary monk or official they preserved the main content of charters. These books rarely left the archives, but were extensively used, judging on their numerous marginalia.

The problem of archiving and accessing the documents lead to a broader topic, that of literacy and documents' audience. Literacy among the Athonite monks was once addressed on the basis of signatures and copyist mistakes;[188] while the question of political literacy among the state officials was posed by Cathrine Holmes,[189] and Judith Waring studied a similar problem using the 12th century monastic inventories.[190] All authors came to conclusions that the provincial aristocracy and monks were sufficiently educated to understand rhetorically-complex writing, but insufficiently to produce them. At the same time, general level of literacy among Byzantine urban population was relatively high.[191]

The present study shows that a relatively wide group of population had skills of pragmatic and legal literacy; moreover, legal literacy not always coincided with writing skills, since the texts of charters were read aloud for the gathered audience. Participation in such processes demanded some basic knowledge of Byzantine law and procedures, which participants of tribunals, even from law social strata (gentries, village elders), must have possessed. The attendees and judges belonging to ecclesiastical and civil administration, notaries and members of provincial nobility, and even village elders, needed to understand the logic of the records, to be able to read them, or at least to listen and comprehend them and to compare the information with physical evidence. This way, the read-aloud acts could be understood even by villagers and town communities' members.

On the other hand, the monastic archive keepers were more concerned about physical state of acts and their arrangement according to practical,

non-rhetorical content (judging on archivists' verso-notes), while the officials or, possibly, historians would be more interested in the authorities and spiritual leaders participating into the establishment and development of a foundation. For these ones, it was precisely the cartularies which provided a hierarchical structure with supremacy of imperial acts.

In complicated tribunal cases, when both debating sides had documents proving their rights, the high-rank officials (*kephale* of the West and *sebastes*) who were sent to examine the records must have possessed great experience and skills in dealing with documentation, a fact attested by their careful reading of acts and attentive comparison of their content.

As it seems, different parts of charters were intended for different audiences: the rhetorically-complex *prooimia* were destined to the next generations of rulers and courtiers, the content (*dispositio*) was aimed on the members of local lay and ecclesiastic administration, while the signatures and dating for monastic archivists.

NOTES

[1]   OIKONOMIDES, N., "Writing Materials, Documents, and Books", in *The Economic History of Byzantium from the 7th through the 15t Century*, ed. A. Laiou et als, Vol. 2., Dumbarton Oaks Research Library, Washington, 2002, 589-592; ŽIVOJINOVIĆ, M. "Monasi Hilandara – Čuvari manastirskih dokumenata", in *Peta kazivanja o Svetoj Gori*, Prosveta, Belgrade, 2007, 141-168.

[2]   For the *formular* of the imperial charters, see DÖLGER F., KARAYANNOPOULOS, J. *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre, Erster Abschnitt: Kaiserurkunden*, C.H.Beck, Munich, 1968, 27-56, 57-67, and OIKONOMIDES, N., "La chancellerie impériale de Byzance du 13e au 15e siècle" , in *Revue des études byzantines* 43, 1985, 167–195. For the Byzantine private acts, see MEDVEDEV, I.P., *Ocherki vizantijskoj diplomatiki*, Nauka, Leningrad, 1988. For Serbian charters, see STANOJEVIĆ, St., "Studije o srpskoj diplomatici," in *Glas Srpske Kraljevske Akademije*, 90, 1912, 68–113 (Invokacija); 92, 1913, 110–209 (Intitulacija); 94, 1914, 192–262 (Arenga. Promulgacija); 96, 1920, 1–74 (Intervencija. Dispozicija); 100, 1922, 1–48 (Sankcija); 106, 1923, 1–96 (Koroboracija); 132, 1928, 29–57 (Pečat. Datiranje); 157, 1933, 155–203.

[3]   OIKONOMIDES, N., "Byzantine Archives of the Palaiologan Period, 1258-1453", in *Pragmatic Literacy, East and West*, ed. R. Britnell, Boydell & Brewer, Woodbridge, 1997, 189-197. MEN'SHIKOV, A.V., "Iz istorii arhivov vizantijskoj cerkvi X-XV vv.", *Otechestvennye arhivy*, 4, 2005, 38-48; MEN'SHIKOV, A.V., *Arhivy Vizantii X-XV vv.*, Dissertacija na soiskanie uchenoj stepeni kandidata istoricheskih nauk, Moscow, 2009.

[4]   For composition of *prooimia* see: HUNGER, H. *Prooimion. Elemente der Byzantinischen Kaiseridee in den Arengen der Unkunden*, Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 1964; BOMPAIRE, J., "À propos des préambules des actes byzantins des xe-xie siècles", in *Prédication et propagande au Moyen Age: Islam, Byzance, Occident. Actes du colloque organisé par l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris,* Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1983, 133-147.

[5]   For the Byzantine charters as propaganda means see: ANGELOV, D., *Imperial Ideology and Political Thought in Byzantium, 1204-1330*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, 30-41, 145-160; KARAYANNOPOULOS, I., E. Hē politikē theōria tōn Byzantinōn, Banias, 1992, esp. pp. 41-60; For using of charters as means of propaganda by Serbian rulers see: MARJANOVIĆ-DUŠANIĆ, S., *Vladarska ideologija Nemanjića. Diplomatička studija*, Srpska književna Zadruga, Begrade, 1996.

[6]   As far as I know, there are just few scattered paragraphs on the level of aristocracy's education, which is proved by the complicated rhetoric of *prooimia* composed by nobility members: WILSON, N. G. *Scholars of*

Byzantium, Johns Hopkins University Press, London-Baltimore, 1983, 3-4; HUNGER, H. "The Classical Tradition in Byzantine Literature: The Importance of Rhetoric", in *Byzantium and the classical tradition: University of Birmingham Thirteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies 1979*, ed. Mullet, M., Centre for Byzantine Studies, Birmingham, 1981, 38.

[7] WEHMEYER, J.M. "The *chartophylax*: archivist and librarian to the patriarch in Constantinople," *Libraries & Culture* 32/1, 1997, 107–112.

[8] OIKONOMIDES, N., *Actes de Docheiariou. Édition diplomatique* (hereafter: *Actes de Docheiariou*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1984, 87, no. 4.

[9] NYSTAZOPOULOU-PELEKIDOU, M., *Byzantina eggrafa tēs monēs Patmou* (hereafter: *Byzantina eggrafa tēs monēs Patmou*), Vol. II, Ethnikon Idryma Ereunon, Athens, 1980, 7-20, no. 29.

[10] ŽIVOJINOVIĆ, M., "Sudstvo u grčkim oblastima Srpskog carstva", in *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog Instituta* (hereafter: *ZRVI*), 10, 1967, 197-249.

[11] MEDVEDEV, I.P. *Pravovaja kultura vizantijskoj imperii*, Aleteija, Saint-Petersburg, 307-392.

[12] *Byzantine Monastic Foundation Documents: A Complete Translation of the Surviving Founders' Typika and Testaments* (hereafter: *BMFD*), ed.J. Thomas, A. C. Hero, Dumbarton Oaks Studies, Washington DC, 2000, 1036.

[13] GAUTIER, P., "Le typikon du sébaste Grégoire Pakourianos", in *Revue des Études Byzantines* (hereafter: *REB*), 42, 1984, 125-131; *BMFD*, 555-557.

[14] OIKONOMIDÈS, N., *Actes de Kastamonitou. Édition diplomatique* (hereafter: *Actes de Kastamonitou*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1978, 38-45, no. 3.

[15] PAPACHRYSSANTHOU, D. *Actes de Xenophon. Édition diplomatique*, P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1986 15-16; *Actes de Kastamonitou*, 38; thought PLP (*Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit, CD-ROM Version* (hereafter: *PLP*), ed. E. Trapp et al., Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 2001, no. 29689) gives only information of his position in Thessaloniki.

[16] About the processes with involvement of forgeries, actual forgeries preserved, legislation concerning forgery-making and the increase of forgeries during the Palaiologan time see: DÖLGER F., "Urkunrien fälscher in Byzanz" in Id., *Byzantinische Diplomatik*, Buch-Kunstverlag Ettal, Ettal, 1956, 384-402; PITSAKES, K., "Egklēma chōris timōria: Ta plasta stē byzantinē istoria", in *Egklēma kai timōria sto Byzantino*, ed. T. Spuros, Idryma Goulandre, Athens, 1997, 337-381. MEDVEDEV, *Pravovaja*, 403-478; OIKONOMIDÈS, N. "Le temps de faux" in *Mount Athos in the 14-16th centuries*, Institute for Byzantine Research, Athens, 1997, 69-74.

[17] *Actes de Kastamonitou*, 33-35, no. 2; 41- 45, no. 3; 49-56, no. 4.

[18] LEMERLE, P., DAGRON, G, ĆIRKOVIĆ S., *Actes de Saint-Pantéléèmôn*, Édition diplomatique (hereafter: *Actes de Saint-Pantéléèmôn*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1982, 131-138, no. 20.

19   Brothers Alexios and John in the mid 14th century used monastery of Vatopedi for storing treasury (MOŠIN, V., "Akti iz svetogorskih arhiva", *Spomenik Srpske Kraljevske Akademije* 91, 1939, 158-163). A provincial noble lady, Theodora in 1322 sold her lands to Hilandar and left a half of payment for safekeeping to be given later to her daughter as dowry (PETIT, L., "Actes de Chilandar, Vol. I: Actes grec," In *Vizantijskij Vremennik*. Prilozhenie 1, vol. 17, 1911, 246-250, no. 118). Brothers Yakoub and Dimitri stored their family treasure in Kastamonitou in 1440 (ZACHARIADOU, E., "Safe and holy mountain: early Ottoman Athos", in *Mount Athos and Byzantine monasticism: Papers from the Twenty-Eighth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Birmingham*, ed. A. Bryer, M. Cunninghem, Variorum, Aldershot, 130-131).

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21   VOLK, O. *Die byzantinischen Klosterbibliotheken von Konstantinopel, Thessalonike und Kleinasien.* Unpublished Dissertation, München, 1954, accessed at https://archive.org/details/DieByzantinischenKlosterbibliotheken VonKonstantinopelThessalonikeUnd; STAIKOS, K., *The History of the Library in Western Civilization*, Vol. III: From Constantine the Great to Cardinal Bessarion, Oakknoll, Newcastle, 2007.

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23   GUILLOU, A., *Les archives de Saint-Jean- Prodrome sur le mont Mènécée* (hereafter: GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*), Presses Universitaires, Paris, 1955, 167 *BMFD*, 1596.

24   KOMENOS, I., *Proskynetarion tou Agiou Orous tou Athonou*, Typographia tou Ag. Georgiou, 1857, 30.

25   MILLET, G., "Recherches au Mont-Athos" in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 29, 1905, 91-92.

26   *BMFD*, 1360.

27   LEMERLE, P., GUILLOU, A., SVORONOS., N., *Actes de Lavra*, Édition diplomatique, *Vol. III: de 1329 à 1500*, (hereafter: *Actes de Lavra, Vol. III*) P. Lethielleux, Paris , 1970, 116-119, no. 150.

28   UNDERWOOD, P. A., Kariye Djami, Vol. I, Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York, 23; BAKIRZTIS, N., "Annexes of Monastic Katholika; The Library as an Annex", in *Annexes and Additions in Early Christian, Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Churches*, ed. Flora Karayanni, AIMOS-Society, Thessaloniki, 2008, 42-51.

29   *The Synaxarion of the Monastery of the Theotokos Evergetis*, Vol. I: September-February, ed. Robert H. Jordan, Belfast Byzantine Enterprises, the Institute of Byzantine Studies, Belfast, 2000, 52 (September 14), MARINIS, V.

Architecture and ritual in the Churches of Constantinople: Ninth to Fifteenth Centuries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, 99.

30 NENADOVIĆ, S., *Hilandar Monastery: an archive of architectural drawings, sketches, and photographs*, Department of Art and Archaeology, Princeton University Princeton, 1987, 8.

31 TRIANTAFYLLOS, S. "Hē bibliothēkē tōn entypōn tēs monēs Megistēs Lauras tou Athō", in *Mnēmōn* 11, 1987, 82-122 (esp. 85-87).

32 ALLMERAYER, J. Ph., "Original-Fragmente, Chroniken, Inschriften und anderes Material zur Geschichte des Kaiserthums Trapezunt", in *Abhandlungen der Historischen Klasse der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 3/2, 1842, 49-50.

33 Such are the cases of *Testamentary Rule* of Neophytos (1214) - *BMFD*, 1365-1366, Testament of Neilos for Prodromos monastery on Mt. Athos (1330-1331) - *BMFD*, 1393-1394; Testament of Neilos Damilas for the Convent of *Pantanassa* on Crete (1400-1417) - *BMFD*, 1478-1479.

34 *BMFD*, 649.

35 About office of sacristian: TALBOT, A.M., "Byzantine monasticism and liturgical Art", in Perception of Byzantium and its Neighbors (843–1261): the Metropolitan Museum of Art Symposia, ed. O. Z. Pevny, New York, 31-35.

36 *BMFD,* 680-681. GAUTIER, P., "Le typikon de la Théotokos Kécharitôménè", in *REB* 43, 1985, 65.

37 *BMFD*, 1002, EUSTRATIADES, S., " Typikon tes mones en Konstantinoupolei tou agiou megalomartyros Mamantos", in *Hellenica* 1, 1928, 256-311, ch. 9.

38 *BMFD*, 1059.DMITRIEVSKY, A. *Opisanie liturgicheskih rykopisei*, vol. 1: Typika, pt. 1., Kiev, 1895, 728.

39 *BMFD*, 1003, 1059.

40 *BMFD*, 1538-1539.

41 MIKLOSICH, F., MÜLLER, F., *Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi sacra et profana* (hereafter: *MM*), Vol. VI, Vienna, 1890, 74, *BMFD*, 589.

42 DELEHAYE, H., *Deux typica byzantins de l'époque des Paléologues*, M.Lamertin, Brussels, 118, *BMFD*, 1272.

43 *PLP*, no. 91785.

44 CUTLER, A., *The Craft of Ivory: Sources, Techniques, and Uses in the Mediterranean World, A.D. 200-1400*, Dumbarton Oaks Studies, Washington D. C., 36-37.

45 CUTLER, A., "On Byzantine Boxes" in *The Journal of the Walters Art Gallery*, 42-43, 1984-1985, 32-47 (esp. 35). The article of A. Cutler mainly deals with the items from middle-Byzantine period being imported after 1204.

46 DMITRIEVSKY, A. *Opisanie*, 729.

47 GAUTIER, P., Théotokos Kécharitôménè, 69.

48 *BMFD*, 1036.

49 SINDIK, D., "Srpska srednjovekovna akta u manastiru Hilandaru", in *Hilandarski Zbornik*, 10, 1998, 63.

[50] Byzantine casket and boxes show great regularity in shape and size, though they were produced in several provincial centers as well as in the capital - *The Carver's Art: Medieval Sculpture in Ivory, Bone, and Horn*, ed. A. Saint Clair, Jane Voorhees Zimmerli Art Museum, New York, 1989, 45.

[51] My observation is based on comparison of several caskets, majority of these objects are dated with 10-12 centuries. Thus, Casket with Warriors and Dancers (20.3 x 28.9 x 19.1 cm), 11th century, Metropolitan Museum of Art (http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/17.190.239), Casket with Warriors and Mythological Figures (11.7 x 43.8 x 18.1 cm), 900-110, Metropolitan Museum of Art (http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/17.190.237); Veroli casket (11.5 x 40.3 x 16 cm), 10th century, Victoria and Albert Museum, (http://collections.vam.ac.uk/item/O70463/veroli-casket-casket-unknown/); Casket with Erotes and Animals, 12th century (12.1 x 39.4 x 19.7cm)/. Metropolitan Museum of Art (http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/the-collection-online/search/464236); casket with warriors and combats (16.5 x 24.9 x 19.5 cm) 11th century, Victoria and Albert Museum (http://collections.vam.ac.uk/item/O84215/casket-unknown/); casket with Adam and Eve (12.5 x 46 19), 11th century, Hessische Landesmuseum in Darmstadt (*The Glory of Byzantium Art and Culture of the Middle Byzantine Era, A.D. 843-1261*, ed. H.C. Evans, Metropolitan Museum, New York, 1997, 234) etc.

[52] The sizes of byzantine acts greatly varies and depend on diplomatic genre, on quality and elaboration of parchment or paper producer, however, its width was rarely less than 30 cm (MOKRETSOVA, I.P. *Materialy i technika vizantijskoj rukopisnoj knigi*, Indrik, Moscow, 2003, 205-207).

[53] For example, *prostagma* of Manuel II Palaeologos (December 1414) from Dionysiou monastery has a pronounced fold in the middle, (OIKONOMIDES, N., *Actes de Dionysiou*, Édition diplomatique (hereafter: *Actes de Dionysiou*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1968, 89-91, no. 13), the *ynomnema* of *protos* John (November 1107) has two horisontal foldings on sides (KRAVARI, V., *Actes du Pantocrator*. Édition diplomatique(hereafter: *Actes du Pantocrator*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1991, p. 69-70, no. 2). Paper letter of *sebastos* John Doukas Balsamon from Docheriou has 6 folds (*Actes de Docheiariou*, 191-193, no. 29). However, the majority of the documents demonstrate only presence of multiple horizontal folding suggesting that they were rolled.

[54] USPENSKY, P. "Ukazatel' aktov, hranyash'ihsja v obiteljah sv. Gory afonskoj", in *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosvesh'enija*, 55/II, 1847, 25.

[55] VRANOUSI, E. L., "Anekdotos katalogos eggrafōn tēs en Patmō monēs (IB' -IG' ai.)", in *Symmeikta* 1, 1966, 138.

[56] SINDIK, D. "Iz hilandarskog arhiva", in *Hilandarski zbornik*, 5, 1983, 69.

[57] ALEXOUDĒS, A., "Dyo sēmeiōmata ek cheirografōn", in *Deltion tēs istorikēs kai ethnologikēs etaireias tēs Ellados*, 4, 1892, 280.

58 VRANOUSI, E. L., "Anekdotos katalogos eggrafōn tēs en Patmō monēs (IB' -IG' ai.)", in *Symmeikta* 1, 1966, 138.

59 *Ibid.*

60 *Byzantina eggrafa tēs monēs Patmou,* Vol. II, 156, no. 64; 164, no. 65; 170, no. 66; 175, no. 67; J. LEFORT, J., KRAVARI, V., GIROS, Ch., SMYRLIS, K., *Actes de Vatopédi, Vol. II: de 1330 à 1376* (hereafter: *Actes de Vatopédi, Vol. II*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 2006, 244, no. 104; 263, no. 109; 272, no. 110; 280, no. 113; LEFORT, J. *Actes d'Esphigmenou. Édition diplomatique* (hereafter: *Actes d'Esphigmenou*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1973, 95, no. 13; 143, no. 22; 177, no. 31; *Actes de Lavra, Vol. III*, 57, no. 136; 88, no. 142;122, no. 152; 131, no. 155; 143, no. 158; LEMERLE, P., *Actes de Kutlumus. Nouvelle édition remaniée et augmentée* (hereafter: *Actes de Kutlumus*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1988, 122, no. 31; 138, no. 37 and many others.

61 Almost all documents in Hilandar have *verso*-marks, just as example see: GIROS, Ch., KRAVARI, V., ŽIVOJINOVIĆ, M. *Actes de Chilandar, Vol. I: des origines à 1319* (hereafter: *Actes de Chilandar*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1998, 139, no. 11, 144, no. 12, 150, no. 14; 158, no. 15; 167, no. 17 etc. *Actes de Saint-Pantéléêmôn,* 87, no. 9; 121, no. 17. In Kutlumus majority of verso-marks are bilingual, Greek and Slavic: *Actes de Kutlumus*, 102, no. 26; 107, no. 28; 110, no. 29; 116, no. 30; 132, no. 35 etc.

62 *BMFD*, 352-353.

63 DÖLGER F., KARAYANNOPOULOS, J. *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre,*, 252-260.

64 SOLOVJEV, A.V. MOŠIN, V.A., *Grčke povelje srpskih vladara* (hereafter: *Grčke povelje srpskih vladara*), Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, Belgrade, 1936, 28-35, no. 5; ŽIVOJINOVIĆ, D. "Regesta grčkih povelja srpskih vlada" (hereafter: ŽIVOJINOVIĆ, D. Regesta), in *Mešovita građa*, 27, 2006, 67.

65 *Actes de Vatopedi, Vol. II* , 195-198, no. 92.

66 *Grčke povelje srpskih vladara*, 38.

67 LASKARIS, M., "Actes serbes de Vatopedi", in *Byzantinoslavica*, 6, 1936, 167.

68 LEFORT, J., OIKONOMIDÈS, N., Actes d'*Iviron*, *Vol. III: de 1204 a 1328* (hereafter: *Actes d'Iviron, Vol. III*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1985, 143-147, no. 69.

69 *Actes d'Esphigmenou*, 83-95, no. 12.

70 *Ibid.*, 93.

71 MEDVEDEV, *Pravovaja*, 298; DÖLGER F., KARAYANNOPOULOS, J. *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre,* p. 130.

72 That is the case with parchment originals and papers copies of king Stefan Dušan's chrysobull on Radolibos (1346) – LEFORT, J., OIKONOMIDÈS, N., PAPACHRYSSANTHOU, D., KRAVARI, V. *Actes d'Iviron, Vol. IV: de 1328 au début du XVIe siècle* (hereafter: *Actes d'Iviron, Vol. IV*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1995, 116-123, no. 90; donation of Demetrios Tzamplakon (1362), vat, II, no. 118, p. 291-295; chrysobull of John V Palaiologos, Ibid., no. 119, 296-298.

73 *Actes de Dionysiou*, 50-61, no. 4.

[74]   *Actes de Vatopedi, Vol. II*, 149-159, no. 81.

[75]   *Actes d'Iviron, Vol. IV*, 79, no. 87.

[76]   ŽIVOJINOVIĆ, M., "Sveta Gora u doba latinskog carstva", in *ZRVI*, 17, 1976, 77-92.

[77]   PAPACHRYSSANTHOU, D. *Actes de Xénophon.* Édition diplomatique (hereafter: *Actes de Xénophon*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1986, 79-83 (cit. 82), no. 3.

[78]   *Actes du Pantocrator*, 124-128, no. 16.

[79]   *Actes de Saint-Pantéléêmôn*, 112-114, no. 12.

[80]   *Actes de Dochiariou*, 240-243 (cit. 243), no. 43.

[81]   LEMERLE, P., GUILLOU, A., SVORONOS., N., PAPACHRYSSANTHOU, D., *Actes de Lavra, Vol. I: des Origines à 1204* (hereafter: *Actes de Lavra, Vol. I*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1970, 282-287, no. 55.

[82]   CASEAU, B., "Un aspect de la diplomatique byzantine: les copies de documents", in *L'autorité de l'écrit au Moyen Âge (Orient-Occident), 39e Congrès de la Société des Historiens Médiévistes de l'Enseignement Supérieur Public*, Éditions de la Sorbonne, Paris 2009, 168-169

[83]   MM, Vol. IV, 193.

[84]   *Actes de Saint-Pantéléêmôn*, 87-92 no. 9.

[85]   KRAVARI, V., "Les biens de Xénophon à Lemnos au 15e siècle," in *REB* 66/1, 2008, 247-252.

[86]   *Actes de Vatopedi, Vol. II*, 90-148, no. 80.

[87]   *Actes d'Esphigmenou*, 76-80, no. 10.

[88]   *Actes d'Iviron, Vol. III*, 118-122, no. 64.

[89]   KAPLAN, M., "Retour sur le dossier du monastère de la Théotokos Éleousa à Stroumitza", in *ZRVI*, 50, 2013, 479-492.

[90]   PETIT, L., "Typikon du monastère de la Kosmosotira près d'Ænos (1152)", in *Izvestija Russkogo arheologicheskogo instituta v Konstantinopole*, 13, 1908, 30.

[91]   MEDVEDEV, I.P., "Cartulaires byzantins et postbyzantins", in *Rivista di studi bizantini e slavi* 3, 1983, 95-109. However some new documents were discovered already after the article was published.

[92]   19 texts survived in poorly edited versions of early 19th century (BOURAS, Ch., *Nea Moni on Chios: History and Architecture*, Commercial Bank of Greece, Athens, 1982, 14-16), which were used for edition of MM, Vol. V, 1-13, 440-452. The rest of 600 acts are only known by names and were destroyed in 1822. The attempts to reconstruct the archive were made by VRANOUSSI, E., "Les archives de Nea Moni de Chio: Essai de reconstruction d'un dossier perdu", in *Byzantinisch-Neugriechische Jahrbücher* 12, 1985, 267-286.

[93]   The copy of complete cartulary was made in 1863 by Emmanuel Miller (National Library of Paris, *Paris. Suppl. Gr. No.* 1222), who found the manuscript in Iviron (*Actes d'Iviron, Vol. III*, 70-82, no. 56), however, the Iviron's original is lost (*Actes d'Iviron, Vol. III*, p 51). On the basis of

old photos and the copy the cartulary was published by PETIT, L., "Le Monastère de Notre-Dame de Pitié en Macédoine," *Izvestiia Russkago Archeologicheskago Instituta v Konstantinople* 6, 1900-1901, 114-125. KAPLAN, M., "Retour sur le dossier du monastère de la Théotokos Éléousa à Stroumitza" *ZRVI* 50/1, 2013, 479-492; *Actes d'Iviron, Vol. III,* 44-46.

94 The codex is preserved in National Library of Austria, *Codex Vindobonensis Historicus graecus* 125, and it comprised of 180 imperial and private documents dated back to 1192-1294 (MM, Vol IV, 1–289).

95 MM, IV, 290-329; WILSON, N., DARROUZÈS, J., "Restes du cartulaire de Hiéra-Xérochoraphion", in *REB* 26, 1968, 5-47.

96 MM, IV, 330-430; PARISINI, J., *Codices manuscripti Bibliothecae Regii Taurinensis Athenaei* (hereafter: PARISINI, J., *Codices*), vol. I, Turin, 1749, 319-362.

97 Two cartularies of St. John Prodromos were taken in 1914 by the Bulgarian Army (DIEHL, Ch., "Destructions commises par les Bulgares lors de l'évacuation de la Macédoine orientale", in *Comptes-rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* 62/6, 1918, 485-486), and so-called codex A later appeared in the University Library in Prague (XXV C 9 (605)), and the codex B in the Dujčev Center in Sofia (Cod. Gr. 80). The first cartulary was published by Andre Guillou (GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*) on the basis of copies, and later, after re-discovery, by Ivan Dujčev (*Cartulary A of the Saint John Prodromos Monastery. Facsimile Edition with an Introduction by Ivan Dujcev*, London: Variorum Reprints 1972). The codex B was published by L. Bénou (BENOU, L., *Le codex B du monastère Saint-Jean- Prodrome (Serrès). Vol. A* (hereafter: *Codex B*), Association Pierre Belon, Paris, 1998) and P. Odorico (ODORICO, P., *Le Codex B du Monastère Saint-Jean-Prodrome (Serrès), Vol. B*, Association Pierre Belon, Paris, 1998). Containing some inaccuracies, the volume A should be supplemented with KRESTEN, O., SCHALLER, M., "Diplomatische, chronologische und textkritische Beobachtungen zu Urkunden des Chartulars B des Ioannes Prodromos-Klosters bei Serrhai," in *Sylloge Diplomatico-Palaeographica* 1, 2010, 179-232.

98 The cartulary is kept in the State Public Library of St. Petersbourg, no. 743 consisting of 190 charters dated back to 1245-1708, USPENSKY, F.I., BENESHEVICH V.N. *Vazelonskie akty: materialy dlja istorii krest'janskogo I monastyrskogo zemlevladenija v Vizantii VIII-XV vekov* (hereafter: *Actes de Vazelon*), Gosudarstvennaja Publichnaja Biblioteka, Leningrad, 1927. The critical remarks and corrections – DÖLGER F., "Zur den Urkunden des Vazelonsklosters bei Trapezunt", in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 29, 1929-1930, 329-344.

99 MEN'SHIKOV, A.V., *Arhivy Vizantii X-XV*, 45.

100 BEIHAMMER, A., "Byzantine Documentary Sources of the Nicean Empire The Cartulary of Lembiotissa: prospects and Possibilities of a New Critical

Edition and Analysis" in *A. G. Leventis Research Projects 2000-2016 Reviews and Contribution* University of Cyprus, Nicosia, 2014, 67.

[101] Re-foundation chrysobull of John Vatatzes (1228), *perioros* made by his order (1235), *chrysobull* of John Vatatzes confirming all the possessions (1235), confirmation *chrysobull* of Michael Palaiologos (1262), confirmation *chrysobull* of Andronikos Palaiologos (1284) - MM, IV, 1-32.

[102] *Ibid.*, 56-106, 141.

[103] *Ibid.*, 32-43; 43-51; 145-150 For the geographical locations, prosopography and dates see: AHRWEILER, H., "L'Histoire et la Géographie de la région de Smyrne entre les deux occupations turques (1081–1317)", in *Travaux et mémoires* 1, 1965, 1-202.

[104] *Actes de Vazelon*, IX-XI, 60-70.

[105] *Actes de Vazelon*, 64-81.

[106] The cartulary was kept in the Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria di Torino (*Codex Taurinensis graecus* 237), in 1904 it was burnt by fire (BARIŠIĆ, F., "Diplomatar tesalijskih manastira Makrinitisa i Nea Petra" (hereafter: BARIŠIĆ, Diplomatar), in *ZRVI*, 16, 1975, 69-70). The composition of the codex can be reconstructed on the basis of two editions made before the fire, namely catalogue description of PARISINI, J., *Codices* and publication with omission in MM, Vol. IV, 330-430.

[107] BARIŠIĆ, Diplomatar, 69-103.

[108] Thus, three foundations which documents included in the cartulary are: Theotokos Makrinitissa on Mount Drongos (KODER, J., HILD, F., *Tabula Imperii Byzantini 1: Hellas und Thessalia* (hereafter: *Hellas und Thessalia*), Denkschriften der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 1976, 210-211), St. John Prodromos of Nea Petra on Mount Dryanoubiana (*Hellas und Thessalia*, 150) and Latomos monastery in Thessaloniki given to the Maliasenoi by Michael VIII (MM, Vol. IV, 336-339; TSIGARIDAS, E., *Latomou Monastery (the Churche of Hosios David)*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1988).The monastery of Makrinitissa was founded before 1215 by Constantine Maliasenos and in 1256 passed under the patronage of his son, Nicholas (Ioashaph) Maliasenos (*PLP*, no. 16523) and his wife Anna (Anthousa) Maliasena Palaiologina (*PLP*, no. 21351), niece of Michael VIII (for the brief history of the monastery see *ypomnema* of patriarch Arsenios in MM, Vol. IV 353-357,). The monastery of St. John Prodromos was made as a nunnery in proximity to the first foundation by Nicholas and Anna in 1271-1272, while Latomou monastery was a much earlier foundation renewed by the family (TSIGARIDAS, E., *Latomou Monastery*, 11-12).

[109] After the death of her husband Anna-Anthousa passed the ktetorial rights to her son John. About the Maliasenoi family see FERJANČIĆ, B., "Porodica Maliasina u Tesaliji", in *Zbornik filozofskog fakulteta. Beogradski Univerzitet* 7/1, 1963, 241-249. Concerning possessions of the foundation – SMYRLIS, K., *La fortune des grands monastères byzantins: fin du Xe-milieu du XIVe siècle*, Centre d'histoire et civilisation de Byzance, Paris, 2006, 65-67.

110 *PLP*, no. 21487.

111 *PLP*, no. 26894.

112 Consequently these groups are: MM, Vol. IV: 330-341, 342-352; 353–383; 384-390; 391-429.

113 PARISINI, J., *Codices*, 320.

114 MM, Vol. IV, 391.

115 PARISINI, J., *Codices*, 322–323.

116 DE GREGORIO, G. "Epigrammi e documenti. Poesia come fonte per la storia di chiese e monasteri bizantini" (hereafter: DE GREGORIO, Epigrammi), in *Sylloge Diplomatico-Palaeographica*, 1, 2010, 58-96 (cit. 79).

117 BARIŠIĆ, Diplomatar, 71, MAGDALINO, P., "Notes on the Last Years of John Palaiologos, Brother of Michael VIII", in *REB*, 34, 1976, 144-145. DE GREGORIO, Epigrammi, 96.

118 MAGDALINO, P., "Notes on the Last Years of John Palaiologos, Brother of Michael VIII", in *REB*, 34, 1976, 145.

119 MM, Vol. IV, 359, 429–430; DE GREGORIO, Epigrammi, 85-96.

120 *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, ed. Kazhdan, A. P., Oxford University Press, Chicago, 1991 (hereafter: *ODB*), 1247.

121 BARIŠIĆ, Diplomatar, 73.

122 The founder is called "the most revered among monks" by Michael Palaiologos in 1274 – MM, Vol. IV, 336-337.

123 DUJCEV, I., "Le cartulaire A du monastère de Saint-Jean-Prodrome sur le mont Ménécée retrouvé", in *REB*, 16, 1958, 172; GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*, 18.

124 1344 by F. Dölger (DÖLGER, F. *Die Urkunden des Johannes-Prodromos-Klosters bei Serrai*, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, München,1935) and with end of the 14th – early 15th by V. Laurent (LAURENT, V. "Remarques sur le cartulaire du couvent de Saint-Jean Prodrome sur le Mont Ménécée", in *REB*, 18, 1960, 295).

125 The date is proposed on the basis of the last donation act survived in the codex Le codex B (GUILLOU, A., "Introduction", in *Codex B*, 2).

126 Chrysobull of Andronikos II (1309): GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*, 146-155 = *Codex B*, 183-184; 2) Chrysobull of Andronikos II (1317): GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*, 156-160 = *Codex B*,184-185; 3) Chrysobull of Andronikos II (1321): GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*, 161-172 = *Codex B*, 181-183; 4) Chrysobull of Andronikos III (1321): GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*, 172-184 = *Codex B*, pp. 185-187; 5) Chrysobull of Andronikos III (1329) GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*, 195-207 = *Codex B*, 187-190; Chrysobull of Andronikos III (1332): GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*, 208-224 = *Codex B*, 190-192.

127 By Christophoros, apud. BMFD, 1580.

128 DUJCEV, I., "Le cartulaire A du monastère de Saint-Jean-Prodrome sur le mont Ménécée retrouvé", in *REB*, 16, 1958, 69-170), GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*, 19-20.

129   In more details on the Typikon, *BMFD*, 1579-1612;GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*, 161-176.

130   GUILLOU, A., *Les archives*, 64-65, no. 14

131   *Ibid.*, 66-67, no. 15.

132   *Ibid.*, 106-108, no. 32.

133   *PLP*, no. 23162.

134   They were a priest Georgios Homochorites (*PLP*, no. 21064), his son-in-law Georgios Tzaruas (*PLP*, no. 27810) and John Koures (*PLP*, no. 13523).

135   *Actes de Vazelon*, 89-90, no. 120.

136   SLAVEVA, L., "Popis na imotite na htetovskiot manastir od 1343", in *Spomenici za srednovekovata i ponovata istorija na Makedonija*, ed. L. Slaveva, V. Mošin, Vol. I, Skoplje, 1980, 283-299.

137   *Actes de Saint-Pantéléèmôn*, 65-76 (esp. 73), no 7.

138   *Actes de Lavra, Vol. III*, 100-104 (esp. 104), no. 146.

139   *BMFD*, 355-363; 552-557, 847-849; 712-717; 1185-1191; 1478-1479; 1668-1675.

140   ASTRUC, Ch., "L'inventaire dressé en septembre 1200 du trésor et de la bibliotheque de Patmos: édition diplomatique", *Travaux et mémoires* 8, 1981, 15-50.

141   DÖIGER, F., "Sechs byzantinische Praktika des 14. Jahrhunderts für das Athoskloster Iberon", in *Abhandlungen der Philosophisch- Historische Klasse der Königlich Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 28, 1949, 8-16.

142   SOLOVJEV, A. V., "Un inventaire de documents byzantins de Chilandar", in *Seminarium Kondakovianum*, 10, 1938, 31-44; Re-dated to 1299-1300 by M. Živojinović (*Actes de Chilandar*, 13-18).

143   ŽIVOJINOVIĆ, M., *Istorija Hilandara: Od osnivanja manastira 1198. do 1335. godine*, Prosveta, Beograd, 1998,

144   SINDIK, D. "Iz hilandarskog arhiva", in *Hilandarski zbornik*, 5, 1983, 69-70

145   *Actes du Pantocrator*, 70, no. 2.

146   For example, in Diataxis of Michael Attaliates (*BMFD*, 345), and in Bebaia Elpis Typikon of Theodora Synadene (*BMFD*, 1557).

147   BOMPAIRE, J., GIROS, Ch., KRAVARI, V., *Actes de Vatopédi, Vol. I: des origines à 1329. Édition diplomatique*, P. Lethielleux, Paris, 2001, 317.

148   *Actes de Dionysiou,* 120.

149   *PLP*, no. 6417.

150   *Byzantina eggrafa tēs monēs Patmou,* Vol. II, 160.

151   *PLP*, no. 91847.

152   *Actes d'Iviron, vol. IV,* 111.

153   About the differences in diplomatic forms of chrysobull and *prostagma* see: DÖLGER F., KARAYANNOPOULOS, J. *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre,,* 25-48, 109-111.

154 For example in Praktikon of Constantine Tzyrapes, LEMERLE, P., GUILLOU, A., SVORONOS., N., *Actes de Lavra, Vol. II: de 1204 à 1328* (hereafter: *Actes de Lavra, Vol. II*), P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1977, 143.

155 About imperial signatures see DÖLGER F., KARAYANNOPOULOS, J. *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre*, 102-105.

156 SOLOVJEV, A.V., *Odabrani spomenci srpskog prava od XII do kraja XV veka*, G. Kon, Belgrade, 1926, 215, no. 129.

157 About such practices of monumentalized depictions of charters see KALOPISSI-VERTI, S., "Church Inscriptions as Documents. Chrysobulls - Ecclesiastical Acts - Inventories - Donations – Wills", in *Deltion tes Hristianikes Arhaiologikes Etaipeias*, 24, 2003, 79-88.

158 MEN'SHIKOV, A.V., "Iz istorii arhivov vizantijskoj cerkvi X-XV vv.", *Otechestvennye arhivy,* 4, 2005, 43.

159 Accordingly *PLP*, nos. 91785; 5170; 29645.

160 As it was suggested by ŽIVOJINOVIĆ, M. ("Jeromonah Mateja i hilandarski metoh u Lušcu", in Hilandarski zbornik, 5, 1983, 63) the document which was read could be the *periorismos* of Lozikon made by Demetrios Aplemene in 1300.

161 *Actes d'Iviron, Vol. II*, 97.

162 *Actes de Kastamonitou*, 49-52, no. 4.

163 PAVLIKIANOV, C., *Bulgarian Documents of the Athonite Monastery of Zographou (980—1600)*, "Kliment Ohridski" University Press, Sofia, 2014, 135-152, no. 7 (the citizens of Hierissos are listed on p. 148).

164 *PLP*, no. 16527.

165 *PLP*, no. 6089.

166 *Actes de Esphigmenou*, 126-134, 137-138.

167 *PLP*, no. 27748.

168 *PLP*, no. 27167.

169 About witness in Byzantium see: MEDVEDEV, *Pravovaja*, 393-403.

170 *PLP*, no. 23999.

171 *PLP*, no. 21028.

172 *PLP*, no. 23991.

173 *Actes de Lavra. Vol. III*, 173-175.

174 MM, Vol. IV, 140.

175 AHRWEILER, H., "L'Histoire et la Géographie de la région de Smyrne entre les deux occupations turques (1081–1317)", in *Travaux et mémoires* 1, 1965, 103; ŽIVOJINOVIĆ, M. "Le monastere de Chilandar et ses metoques dans la region de l'Athos", in *ZRVI*, 26, 1987, 35-67 (40-41).

176 About interventio (petitio) in charters see: STANOJEVIĆ, St., "Studije o srpskoj diplomatici," in *Glas Srpske Kraljevske Akademije* 96, 1920, 1–74; DÖLGER F., KARAYANNOPOULOS, J. *Byzantinische Urkundenlehre*, 48, 238.

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[178] *Grčke povelje srpskih vladara* 96. About dating see ŽIVOJINOVIĆ, D. Regesta, 73-74

[179] KORAĆ, D., "Sveta Gora pod srpskom vlašću (1345–1371)", *ZRVI*, 31, 1992, 15–192.

[180] LEMERLE, P., GUILLOU, A., SVORONOS., N., *Actes de Lavra, Vol. II: de 1204 à 1328*, P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1977, 9.

[181] *Ibid.*, 10.

[182] About history of Alexios Palaiologos see: PAVLIKIANOV, K., *The Medieval Aristocracy on Mount Athos*, I. Dujčev Center, Sofia, 2001,106-108.

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THE RETHINKING OF HUMAN AGENCY AND THE SCIENCE OF LITERATURE: IDEOLOGICAL, SEXUAL AND LITERARY POLITICS IN THE WRITINGS OF RUSSIAN FORMALISTS

This project reassesses the complex relationship between literary criticism and science in the critical practice of Russian Formalists. The monograph that will be the final result of this research will suggest that in the late 1910s and 1920s the Formalists were trying to carve the space for literary studies in a newly formed society by presenting it as one of the scientific disciplines. I am particularly interested in the rethinking of human agency in the writings of Russian Formalists. *Science of the Self: Human Agency and the Legacy of Russian Formalism* is the first sustained study of the ways in which Formalist rethinking of authorship in literature and the arts is the product of the broader project of the creation of the new human in Post-Revolutionary Russia. It will argue that Formalist attempts to institutionalise literary studies go hand in hand with establishing genetics, endocrinology, eugenics, experimental biology and other biomedical disciplines focusing on the human subject as important areas of scientific enquiry in the new Soviet state.

Russian Formalism was a school of literary criticism that emerged in the mid-1910s and peaked by the early 1920s. In recent years there have been attempts to trace the direct genealogical line of descent for literary theory, cultural studies and film studies through the Russia of the 1920s, coming into focus as a site of public debates just before and during the Soviet revolution. As Harvard's professor David Rodowick puts it in his 2014 book *Elegy for Theory*, "it is almost certainly the case that the Russians invented 'theory' in the modern sense for the humanities".[1] Although the tentative "almost" in this sentence reveals the difficult task of reconsidering

Formalism's current status of being an influential, yet methodologically outdated (mainly because of its "scientific" approach), school of criticism, recent work on the movement points to the importance of revisiting this moment of modern cultural history. In a new entry on Russian Formalism in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, commissioned to replace Victor Erlich's article in the three previous editions, Galin Tihanov suggests a new perspective that establishes Formalism's greater importance as an integral part of twentieth-century intellectual history. The Formalist revision of human agency, which moves beyond individuality, facilitated the transition from Romanticist notions of authorship to Post-Structuralist understanding of the author as an element of textual production.[2]

In these studies Russian Formalism is seen as an unlikely Soviet ancestor for Structuralism and Post-Structuralism. Unlike its presumed offspring, however, that boast endless lists of names belonging to major thinkers in practically all fields of the humanities (sociology, history, linguistics, philosophy, psychology, architecture, archeology, anthropology and so on) Russian Formalism revolved around two small groups of young researchers of language and literature, Viktor Shklovsky's Petrograd-based Opoiaz ("Society for the Study of Poetic Language") and Roman Jakobson's Moskovskii lingvisticheskii kruzhok ("Moscow Linguistic Circle"). Moreover, it is often traced to a single article by Viktor Shklovsky, "Art as Device", first published in 1917 and reprinted three times before the end of the 1920s.[3] In this article Shklovsky also explains the concept of defamiliarazation or estrangement, which is now closely associated with his name.

What strikes one as a logical contradiction here is that the name of Viktor Shklovsky, a self-proclaimed "founder of the Russian school of the formal method",[4] stands in for the entire movement, a movement that paradoxically originated the idea that "the author is dead" and has no relevance for the study of literature and other art forms. This is indicative of a split between theoretical underpinnings of Formalist theories and modernist practices of self-fashioning and self-promotion the representatives of this movement very actively engaged in. In their theoretical writings many Formalists adopted Osip Brik's famous anti-authorial stance, according to which literary history is not led or promoted by individual cultural figures, but rather by random variations in the repertoire of devices, motifs, and rules that constitute literary texts.[5] This shift away from Romanticist ideas of individual creativity and authorial will allowed Brik to state that if Pushkin had never existed *Eugene Onegin*

would still have been written. As there are not many good translations of *Eugene Onegin* and the text is not as familiar to Western readers as it is known to Russians who, generation after generation, have to learn large excerpts from it by heart in secondary school. For Western audiences the equivalent would be to say that if Dostoevsky was never born *Crime and Punishment* would still have been written, or that if Tolstoy never wrote a word, *War and Peace* would have written itself.

As Brik sums his seminal article "The So-called 'Formal Method'", published in 1923 in the avant-garde journal *LEF* (*The Left Front of the Arts*), "'Opoyaz' maintains that *there are no poets and writers – there are just poetry and writing*".[6] On the other hand, writings produced by the Russian Formalists show evidence of the primacy of autobiographical genres.

The Formalist rethinking of human agency therefore constitutes a two-sided process, whereby the theoretical move beyond individual agency is counterbalanced by a public stance of self-promotion adopted by major Formalist figures, which established them as both artists and "scientists". Examining the role of the author in debates among the Formalist critics, the project engages with the process by which this re-appropriation of human agency corresponds to the shift from fictional to non-fictional genres. Shklovsky's understanding of a literary work as "pure form" both promotes and is indebted to modernist experiments with genre. As he writes on Rozanov's essays, "Of course, these essays reflect the soul of their author. However, the soul of a literary work is precisely its structure or its form."[7] Shklovsky's re-appropriation of human agency shifts the focus away from the author and towards the form, while simultaneously positioning the autobiographical genre as a medium for the construction of authority. My monograph demonstrates that the literature of the period is shaped by the ways in which Formalism's conflicting models of authorship blur the distinction between theoretical, literary and autobiographical discourses.

Although Russian Formalism was the first school of thought to assert literature as an autonomous object of theoretical analysis, their literary and critical writings often play with a blending of the discourses of literature, autobiography and theory. In my monograph I argue that this self-conscious interdisciplinarity became possible because of their rigorous re-thinking of the roles of literature and literary criticism on the map of cultural production in post-revolutionary Russia. To put it in a nutshell, I am investigating how a group of thinkers in the late 1910s and the 1920s

were trying to carve the space for literary studies in a newly formed society by presenting it as one of the scientific disciplines. I suggest that what sets the Formalists against previous trends in literary studies is their conviction that the new type of literary criticism they were producing was characterized by its scientific character (nauchnost').

The notion of scientific soundness, which Formalists inherited from positivism, as Galin Tihanov has suggested, "became a paramount value, and the formalists proved this by their rigorous concentration on the quantifiable aspects of verse".[8] The avant-garde artists and writers of the time also pointed to the intrinsic interconnectedness between arts, literature and science. Aleksei Kruchionykh, leading Futurist artist and poet, recognized that both contemporary literature and literary studies adopted elements of a scientific discourse evidenced, for example, by the title of his 1922 "treatise" *The Shiftology of Russian Verse.*[9] Scientificity marks not only rigorous attempts of both avant-garde artists and the Formalists to present texts as quantifiable objects of analysis, but also their understanding of authorship as a by-product of literary production. The writing subject for Formalists becomes determined by and constructed in language, yet, simultaneously, the notion of the author comes to play a central role in the formation of both modernism as a movement and Formalism as a "scientific institution" and a school of thought.

Galin Tihanov has recently suggested that Formalism has to be seen as part and parcel of developments on the intellectual stage of the first quarter of the twentieth century. For example, like in psychoanalysis where the subject is governed by hidden forces that only a qualified specialist (a scientist) can hope to uncover, for Russian Formalists the writing subject is also conditioned by forces that are beyond his or her control "most important, the structural characteristics of language".[10] But these forces are, nevertheless, entirely amenable to scientific study and rationalisation. The Formalist idea that literary studies have to be clearly separated from aesthetics, sociology, psychology, and history goes hand in hand with Russian avant-garde's modernist rejection of all the ideas of the past, ill-suited for literature of the new Russia. As the Formalists proclaim, they are not interested in painstakingly trying to find out if Tolstoy was a smoker, but rather in developing, as Brik puts it, "a scientific system instead of a chaotic accumulation of facts and personal opinions".[11] In one of the first studies on Russian Formalism, *Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine*, Victor Erlich argued that such statements were a direct critique

of the "preoccupation with biographical trivia which was so typical of Russian literary history of the first decades of [the twentieth] century".[12]

In his 1926 article "The Theory of the Formal Method", another early attempt to write the history of the movement, Boris Eichenbaum places Formalism among other scientific disciplines, "The relationship between linguistics and the formal method was somewhat analogous to that relation of mutual use and delimitation that exists, for example, between physics and chemistry."[13] In pronouncing the natural sciences as a model for their scholarship, the Formalists thus strove to embody the ideals and values of scientism in a society that had succumbed to the lures of rapid modernisation.

Following the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, Russia's new governing powers began to develop new laws aiming to re-designed all aspect of lives of the citizens of the new Soviet state: from the abolishing of all private property and the redistribution of houses to the rethinking of the dress, physical shape and everyday habits of new Soviet subjects. During the period known as War Communism (from 1918 to 1921) the Bolsheviks began to implement their policies, concentrating on the nationalisation of industry and the control of agriculture.[14] The failure of these policies, that caused famine and led to strikes and peasant revolts, prompted Lenin to order a reversal of policy in 1922, which became known as the New Economic Policy.[15] Although it is often considered to be a more capitalism-oriented economic policy which allowed individuals to own small enterprises, the intellectuals were right to be worried about the new government's intentions with regard to the arts – by the 1923 a new surveillance apparatus had been set in motion as well as the central censorship organ. In other words, as Stuart Finkel has put it, "the avenues for critical public speech had been sharply curtailed".[16]

It is therefore not surprising that Marxist ideologues felt the need to attack some of the more extreme Formalist statements that denied the relevance of social and ideological considerations for the study of art. In his 1923 book *Literature and Revolution* Leon Trotsky severely criticised Shklovsky's 1919 statement, "Art was always free of life. Its flag has never reflected the color of the flag that flies over the city fortress."[17] As I have suggested, by the mid-1920s a number of Formalists had published articles that attempt to rewrite the history of Formalism in order to re-emphasize the relevance of the movement for the Soviet cultural scene. For example, Boris Eichenbaum tried to justify their earlier radical statements, such as the one quoted above, by suggesting that like the Russian Revolution itself

literary theory, too, had to present a radical break away from outdated conventions and theories,

> We knew that […] history demanded of us a really revolutionary attitude – a categorical thesis, merciless irony, and bold rejection of whatever could not be reconciled with our position. We had to oppose the subjective aesthetic principles with an objective consideration of facts.[18]

Like Trotsky, who somewhat unjustly labelled the Formalist approach as "essentially descriptive and semi-statistical",[19] other public opponents of the movement also focused on Formalism's claims to scientificity. Boris Tomashevsky, another advocate of the movement, summarized the main criticism the Formalists were then facing in his article "The Formal Method: In Lieu of an Obituary" also published in 1925. "The other camp accuses us of being scientific", here he proceeds to imitate the voice of the critics in a polemical ventriloquy,

> Poor naïve technical specialists who lost any sense of modernity! How can they understand that the liquidation of all pre-established approaches to literature from sociology and cultural history to bibliography and psychology can only happen in the dying circles of fruitless scholastic sciences.[20]

Both Eichenbaum and Tomashevsky argue that the methods of Formalism were greatly misunderstood. According to them, Formalism does not deny literary criticism's links with other sciences, but is rather interested in a dialogue with them insofar as literature is acknowledged as an independent discipline. The main objection was the tradition within which literature is used to merely draw broader historical or sociological claims or to get closer to the truth about a society at a given time literature supposedly contains and transmits. As Tomashevsky wrote,

> Yes, the Formalists are specialists in a sense that they are dreaming about an independent science of literature, which is interlinked with adjacent fields of knowledge. […] However, to see itself among other sciences literature has to recognise itself as an independent discipline.[21]

The fact that the Formalists were the first to see literary studies as a science with a clearly defined object of analysis (i.e. literary texts) is

of importance for my project. By examining this "scientific" notion of authorship the project casts light on the role of Formalism in the revision of human agency, thus contributing from a specific Russian perspective to a history of ideas in Western literary studies. The resulting monograph will explore the place of human agency in the new model of literature proposed by the Formalists at a historical moment when literary theory is often opposed to science, even when interested in a dialogue with it, as witnessed in the recent relevance of neuroscience and cognitivism in literary studies.[22] In suggesting a new theoretical framework for understanding the notion of literature as an area of scientific study, Formalists engaged with complex questions of literary merit and social value of writing, which emphasise the way in which its institutionalisation in post-revolutionary Russia changed the status of literature as a cultural practice.

In focusing on Viktor Shklovsky, whose work has become increasingly popular outside Russia since the 1960s, this project will not only attract scholars of Russian literature, world modernisms and genre theory but it will also speak to a wider audience of readers who came to know Shklovsky through his autobiographical works such as *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* and *A Sentimental Journey*. Despite such interest to personal experiences of individual Formalists, one of the main objectives of the Formalist movements is that literature is not to be seen as an expression of the author's individuality or a system of hidden messages a critic has to decipher. As Brik puts it in his explanatory article, Formalism "offers a knowledge of the laws of production instead of a mystical penetration into the secrets of creation".[23]

Moreover, in Formalist corpus, the focus shifts away from the critic and his interpretation towards the text itself. For example, Eichenbaum writes,

> We posit specific principles and adhere to them insofar as the material justifies them. If the material demands their refinement or change, we change or refine them. […] There is no ready-made science; science lives not by settling on truth, but by overcoming error.[24]

The inherent flexibility of the Formalist method in this description not only curbs the attacks of its opponents, but also places a text itself and not socio-cultural moment in which it was written as a focal point of literary analysis. The defenders of Formalism are careful to emphasise the relevance of their approach for the Soviet intellectual scene, which

was increasingly dominated by Marxism. Tomashevsky directly responds to a critique that Formalists do "not illuminate literature with ideology" by emphasizing that "Formalism is interested in whatever is present in a literary text, including ideological implications, which are not ignored by any Formalist."[25]

A number of polemics between the Formalists and their Marxist critics resulted in the former's attempts to clearly define what they could contribute to what Brik terms the "proletarian construction of culture".[26] While the Formalists were trying to create a new paradigm for literary studies characterized by its inherent scientificity, they were also forced to turn to their own status within this paradigm by writing themselves into the system of new social relations. The focus on this complex process allows to ask questions considering the changing attitudes about the place of literature and literary criticism within twentieth-century intellectual history.

A drastic rethinking of what makes a new working subject was a crucial element in the Bolshevik rejection of the past. The Formalist critique of the Romanticist understanding of the role of authors and by extension literary critics created a gap which had to be filled with an alternative understanding of subjectivity. By writing human agency in arts and literature into the discourse of science, the Formalists attempted to create the space for all those who performed mental labour in the changing system of social roles. This coincided with the change in their understanding of literary production, with writing now being seen as a profession in service of the new economic system. In the early 1920s a number of articles by major critics explain why Formalism is, in Brik's words, "the best educator for the young proletarian writers".[27] The Formalist agenda for the professionalization of literary activities meant that the author could no longer be seen in terms of the expression of individual creativity and instead acquired a strictly regulated social function.

Eichenbaum's article shows signs of an attempt to find a balance between emphasising a wider importance of the movement and its being an indispensable product of its time, "Actually, the work of the Opoyaz group was genuinely collective."[28] Although Peter Steiner has argued that the only thing that unites individual thinkers within the Formalist movement is their "clear-cut departure from the literary-theoretical tradition in Russia",[29] they repeatedly present themselves as a collective voice of new science of literature, a voice best suited for the uniquely Soviet approach to culture. Boris Tomashevsky's article "The New School of Literary History in Russia", originally presented as a lecture in Leningrad

in 1927 and, one year later, in 1928, in front of the newly formed Prague Linguistic circle, provides an overview of the work done by the Formalist movement. Here Tomashevsky not only presents Formalists as a unified school of "literary history", he also points to the importance of studying literary groups and movements, "The study of diverse groups, of their antagonisms and conflicts, thus became the order of the day. Attention was no longer confined to great writers; it extended to secondary writers, to minor genres, to mass movements."[30] By writing a historical overview of the development of Formalism, Tomashevsky both provides an example of such literary criticism and presents Russian Formalism as an integral part of the new Soviet literary history.

Fredric Jameson suggested that the extensive networking that took place between the Formalist critics and the modernist authors makes Russian Formalism something more than a school of literary criticism. According to Jameson, the Formalists' close affiliation with leading avant-garde artists and cultural figures of the time blurs the boundaries between literary criticism and literature, "an ultimate evaluation of Formalism as a concrete literary phenomenon will bring it much closer to genuinely creative movements such as German Romanticism or Surrealism than to a purely critical doctrine like that of the American New Criticism." [31]

I would like to suggest that the phenomenon Jameson is referring to is closely linked to the Formalist attempt to present literary studies as a field of enquiry indispensible for the cultural environment of the new Soviet State. In an attempt to bring the image of an intellectual worker closer to the emerging template of the ideal Soviet citizen, in their writings the Formalists present themselves as highly adaptable skilled workers in service of a new industry formed under early Soviet policies aiming to improve the efficiency of scientific, technological and cultural production. As Eichenbaum put it, "Science itself is still evolving, and we are evolving with it."[32]

The adaptability of the new Soviet intellectual is a crucial element in the Formalist model of the new cultural industry. According to this model, the new Soviet literature has to be characterized by a complete self-sufficiency which allows it to simultaneously produce theoretical advancements in knowledge and cutting-edge modernist experimentalism. In the writings of major Formalists literary history is often described in terms of random genetic mutations, which is closely linked to idea of social evolution – they bring together the roles of a scientist, writer, critic, journalist and publicist

in an attempt to create an image of a highly efficient multi-tasking Soviet mental laborer.

Arguably Viktor Shklovsky was the first to introduce the themes of social and literary evolutions in his writings. Rad Borislavov offers a discussion of Shklovsky's references to Darwinian trends in literary criticism which had been present in Russian literary debates since the late nineteenth century.[33] According to him, Shklovsky's use of the theme of biological evolution in his discussions of literary history was "[p]artly a rhetorical strategy aimed at defending Formalism against Marxist accusations and partly an attempt at constructing a viable and original literary history".[34] Interestingly, Borislavov argues that Shklovsky's references to genetics and biology in his discussions of literature and literary history were a direct response to Trotsky's critique of what he saw as the Formalist lack of attention to materialist theory of science and the arts, "Trockij compared Šklovskij's attempt to refute materialist interpretations of art to attempts by country priests to disprove Darwinism."[35] According to Borislavov, Shklovsky's engagement with biology and genetics was a rhetorical device, employed to refute the claims that Formalism objects both Darwinism and Marxism.

Rather then seeing Shklovsky's use of evolutionary theories as a rhetorical device, I am exploring the way in which Shklovsky's attempts to present literary studies as a scientific discipline both engage with and are indebted to the institutionalisation of various biomedical disciplines that aimed at "bettering humankind". I would like to demonstrate that Shklovsky's interest in these disciplines manifested in the years directly preceding Trotsky's attack (especially in the texts written during Shklovsky's exile in Berlin that became the focus of Trotsky's attention), which, perhaps, as Borislavov has suggested, provided the initial impetus for Shklovsky's explicit references to genetics on his return to Soviet Russia.

By advocating the drastic revision of ideas of human agency in literature and the arts, Russian Formalists therefore contribute to the wider rethinking of the human subject, the element which, in the years following the Revolution, the Bolsheviks considered an undisputed vehicle of social progress. This new perspective on the Formalist understanding of human agency explains the two-fold nature of my project. On the one hand I am considering how, by presenting an alternative notion of authorship, the Formalists were trying to create the space for literary criticism in the Soviet social and scene by presenting it as a scientific discipline. On the other hand, I am also considering the way in which the writings of Russian

Formalists reveal the changing attitudes to and social positions of newly established sciences in the first quarter of the twentieth century.

In this respect Eichenbaum's phrase, "Science itself is still evolving, and we are evolving with it", highlights the dynamic between cultural activists and their immediate environment. In Eichenbaum's account of "the evolution of the formal method", the urge to break away from practices of literary criticism of the past was supported by the extreme conditions of post-Revolutionary period, which enforced a drastic rethinking of institutional, ideological and material structure of academic life. The role of literary criticism could no longer be to focus on lives and work of individual authors. For Tomashevsky, such focus denies the very possibility of studying literary history because of the clashing categories of influence and "the idea of absolute and hence incomparable individuality of a poet's work".[36]

The Formalists opposed the idea that literary talent is passed directly from one great writer to another, which not only signified, as Tomashevsky suggested, a dead-end of literary theory, but also was incompatible with ideological policies of the new Soviet State. In Formalist practice literary history as a genealogical succession of selected great writers, where "the notion of influence [is] always positive and based solely on the idea of the indefinite perfectibility of the human species," gave way to "a new history rich in wars, or at least in fights and quarrels" against dominant literary forms.[37]

By emphasizing the collective nature of the Formalist movement, Eichenbaum points to their rejection of the understanding of literary history as a succession of individual talents, "from the very beginning we did not see it as the personal affair of this or that individual. This was our chief connection with the times".[38] In an article originally published in 1921, Shklovsky opposed traditional genealogy with a geneticist approach to literary history, "the legacy that is passed on from one literary generation to the next moves not from father to son but from uncle to nephew".[39]

In a 1923 book, published in Berlin, Shklovsky not only continues using kinship terminology to discuss literary history, he proclaims himself as the father of the formula, "According to the law – established for the first time, as far as I know, by me – in the history of art the legacy passes not from father to son, but from uncle to nephew."[40] Such model of literary history defies the understanding of history as a linear progression. As Shklovksy writes, the formula "from uncle to nephew" "is proven by canonization. […] The history of Greek literature, with its successive development

of the epic, lyric, drama, comedy, and novel, is explained not by the creation of one form of art out of another, but by gradual canonization of ever-new types of folklore."[41] Here Shklovsky presented the view on literary evolution which was later adopted and developed by both Iurii Tynianov and Roman Jakobson.[42]

This view of literary history moves away from seeing it as the type of an evolutionary process, where old forms give way to new genres. Rather, according to this model, at any given moment there are "not one, but several lines of literature, among which one dominates".[43]

Literary history is here described as a self-regulating system which, at different points in time, brings out certain styles and genres, which then drift away only to re-emerge at a later point, when social conditions for its dominance become more favorable. In Tomashevsky's later description of the Formalist move away from models of literary history based on the ideas of succession and direct inheritance from one writer to another, literary history is precipitated by the resistance to dominant trends in criticism, literature and the arts. As he writes, "The formula 'the inheritance of the nephew from the uncle' was popular. This implied that the primary driving force in literary evolution was repulsion – that is, the tendency to react against the dominant literary forms of the century."[44]

These considerations to what extent literary works are shaped by their environment, according to the histories of Russian Formalism written in the 1920s, resonate with the evolution of writings by Formalist critics, especially by Shklovsky, which often react to either Marxist critics (for example, in his 1925 book *Theory of Prose* he directly responds to Trotsky's critique) or various policies regulating what sort of literature a Soviet writer can produce. The difficulties Shklovsky faces in trying to find his place in the rapidly changing system of social relations in this period is complicated by the fact that he, threatened with arrest for his earlier political activities, had to escape from Russia in March 1922 and spend over a year living in exile in Berlin.

In what follows I am going to discuss an episode of early-Soviet self-censorship which reveals the difficult dynamics in the literary, scientific and sexual politics of early 1920s Russia. In uncovering this dynamic, I will explore the ways in which Russian Formalist theories of literature and language engage with scientific advances in other disciplines, particularly those in agricultural engineering and biotechnology. The focus is on Viktor Shklovsky's epistolary novel *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love*, in which he attempts to respond to tightening censorship regulations by

linking attempts to control literary production to the changing regulations of sex life and reproduction of new Soviet citizens. In this discussion the theoretical question of evolution of Formalism is juxtaposed with sexual politics in post-revolutionary Russia, which is here interlinked with the science of genetics and animal breeding.

Zoo, or Letters Not about Love provides a compelling case study of the changing regulations of both sex life and reproduction of new Soviet citizens and the production of literature by new Soviet writers. I will suggest that these regulations resulted in increasingly uneasy relationships between individuals, between people and their professional roles, and, importantly, between authors and their texts, which had to be written to fit the ideological agenda, be hidden in desk drawers or undergo extensive editing that produced numerous textual variants. In Shklovsky's lifetime five different versions of *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* were published between 1923 and 1966.

Shklovsky initially wrote and published *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* while living in exile in Berlin in 1923. Another version of the text was published in Leningrad only one year later, in 1924. Although the two editions came out almost back to back, the second version was substantially different from the first one. Both texts are written as a series of letters to Elsa Triolet ("Alya" as the text refers to her), who forbids the author to write about love. In the Berlin edition seven out of the twenty nine letters comprising the book are written by Triolet. Although her name was not on the cover of the book this launched her own literary career. After reading a manuscript of *Zoo* Maxim Gorky, another prominent Russian literary figure then living in Berlin, remarked that the best letters here were not written by Shklovsky.[45] Following his advice Triolet extended a letter, in which she writes about her trip to Tahiti, into a book published in 1925.[46] Curiously, all but one letter attributed to Triolet were cut out of the second "Soviet" edition of Shklovsky's text. What in the first edition is presented as a correspondence between a man and a woman, in the second version becomes a literary device "laid bare," to use Shklovsky's own term: the initial conversation where Alya asks the author not to write about love is now merely summarized in the preface to the book, "This is the plan of the book for you. She forbids him to write about love. He reconciles himself to this and begins to tell her about Russian literature."[47] In Formalist theories exposing techniques used in the writing of the text launches a mechanism of "deautomatizing" the reader's perception of the text, thus producing the effect of estrangement. The aim of this device is

to offer a reader to conceive reality in an unusual way. For example, in Shklovsky's words, estrangement makes a stone "stony".[48]

In *Zoo* the initial exclusion of Shklovsky's correspondent and the addressee of the letters disrupts the communication process, and letter-writing becomes an excuse to write a Formalist analyses of other literary texts.[49] Moreover, by shifting attention away from the female protagonist in the second edition, Shklovsky re-enforces the authority of a far more powerful censor. In the final letter of the novel, which is no longer addressed to Alya, Shklovsky asks the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (ВЦИК) to grant him permission to return to Russia. This unexpected shift from poorly disguised love letters-cum-critical articles to a formal declaration creates a parallel between troubled sexual politics produced in the text and an ideological unease of the exiled author's pleas for return. If in the first edition the final letter announces that Alya never existed and is merely "the realisation of the metaphor" of the author's inability to live outside Russia,[50] in the second edition her letters are excluded from the book altogether.

Although in both editions Alya represents "Pan-European" culture and symbolizes values Shklovsky cannot come to terms with, the first, Berlin, edition attempts to construct a dialogue between the West and post-revolutionary Russia. It opens with Alya's letter to her sister Lilya Brik, who at the time was at the centre of both Formalist and avant-garde literary circles (notoriously she was a lover of both the Formalist Osip Brik and the poet of the Revolution Vladimir Mayakovsky).[51] The descriptive header, in which Shklovsky introduces the letter, sets the tone for this international correspondence, "Written by a woman in Berlin to her sister in Moscow. Her sister is very beautiful, with glistening eyes. The letter is offered as an introduction. Just listen to the calm voice."[52] Since most of Alya's letters are omitted from the edition published in the Soviet Union, here Shklovsky offers a different kind of an introduction.

The first letter to the second edition directly addresses the drastic restructuring of social relations which was instrumental in the revolution's attempt to transform mankind. Moreover, the letter creates an uneasy link between the utopian technological imagery and the depictions of sexual crime. Shklovsky, who fought the First World War as the armoured-car driver and mechanic, argues that it was confiscated cars that allowed the workers to take part in the revolution. As he writes, "You brought the revolution sloshing into the city like foam, O automobiles! The revolution shifted gears and drove off."[53] Here the revolution acquires the properties

of both an automated mechanism and its human driver, which questions the distinction between the organic and the mechanical. Moreover, the revolutionaries themselves acquire prosthetic body parts, as Shklovsky writes, "Subways, cranes and automobiles are the artificial limbs of mankind."[54] Here Shklovsky describes the mechanisation of individuals, something that was often presented as harmful effects of industrialisation on the psychology and physiology of individuals, for example, in Russian science fiction of the time,[55] as a celebrated aspect of the Revolution's fight for the modernisation of society.

In recent years the historians of science have suggested that scientific and political revolutions in Russia go hand in hand and the project of creating the new Soviet citizen is indebted to the legacy of biological engineering, which was institutionalised in the late nineteenth century within the Imperial Academy of Experimental Medicine.[56] Mikhail Bulgakov's fascinating 1925 novel *Heart of a Dog* provides a bitter commentary on the Soviet project of transforming mankind, when a dog named Sharik, who like the inhabitants of H.G. Wells's *The Island of Dr Moreau*, was changed into a human being only to create havoc both for its maker and the Soviet authorities.[57] Not unlike Bulgakov's literary experiments, in Shklovsky's descriptions, if left to its own devices the unbridled speed of modernity with its cybernetic machine-men can also take a dangerous turn.

To support his thesis that, "What changes a man most of all is the machine",[58] Shklovsky provides an account of a gang of Moscow car mechanics who were forcing women into their cars in order to drive them outside the city and rape them. It is not the crime itself, but the criminals' response to the question why they did it that attracts Shklovsky to this episode: they were simply bored. In the letter it is precisely the lack of the sense of purpose that leads to socially and sexually transgressive behaviour.

During the first weeks following the seizure of power the Bolsheviks began to enact new laws and legislations aiming to guard and regulate sexual and family lives of citizens that would help them to create radically new social relations.[59] However, as the questions of sexuality remained a highly disputed topic, questions of sexuality became the subject of an ongoing policy discussion, while continuing to play an important role in debates among leading artists and cultural figures. The debates were divided between the idea that sexuality had to be liberated from outdated moral prejudices and, on the other hand, that it should be completely subordinated to proletariat's class interests. The episode of sexual crime

which Shklovsky recounts in the second edition of *Zoo* reflects the confused perception of the new sexual economics. As Catriona Kelly et al. have put it, the sexual freedom that followed the revolution was merely "the freedom from," not "freedom to", "People sensed that former constrictions had vanished, but they still did not know what to do with that freedom. The result was an incomplete, negative freedom – like the freedom of a thirsty man to wander in the desert."[60]

Although Shklovsky is careful to state that the men were executed, their behaviour is described as a result of their lack of purpose in the newly formed society, "An engine of more than forty horsepower annihilates the old morality. Speed puts distance between a driver and mankind. […] An engine attracts a man to what is accurately called crime."[61] In his analysis of the public coverage of "The Case of Chubarov Alley", which became the code-name for a rape of a student by a group of factory workers in a deserted park in 1926, Eric Naiman explains that although at the time rape was not considered to be a capital offense, and the punishment for gang rapes rarely exceeded five years, in certain cases rape could be reclassified as banditry.[62] In presenting rape as part of a utopian imagery of highly technological modernity, Shklovsky gives up any attempts to describe the behaviour of the factory workers in terms of human motivations. The woman's experience of the crime is reduced to her concern that the rapists would take her fur-coat, to which they respond with a curt phrase, "We're not thieves". Shklovsky comments on the fact that, throughout the episode, the criminals address her as "miss" by confirming that "She was a miss [baryshnia]," i.e., a representative of bourgeois culture. However, they do not put claim on her personal belongings: both in "The Case of Chubarov Alley" and the episode described by Shklovsky only women's bodies become collectivized.

Dan Healey has suggested that "Early party ideology implied that rape was somehow a 'relic of the past' or a 'depravity' reflecting bourgeois man's proprietorial view on women."[63] In the case of gang rapes, however, it is not individual's materialistic values but the collective aspect of the crimes that not only ensured its countrywide coverage but also changed the legal perception of the gravity of the crime.[64] The language of Shklovsky's description is devoid of any references to sexual desire. In fact, the men are characterized by a remarkable lack of agency, with an automobile engine being responsible for the deed rather than the criminals. In Healey's argument, the elimination of the desiring subject is instrumental to the construction of post-revolutionary sexual discourse,

"Soviet forensic medicine institutionalized the party's technocratic, rationalizing understanding of sexuality, and contributed to the silencing of desire in the Soviet 'sexual revolution.'"[65]

During the years of War Communism rape became a recurrent imagery of the avant-garde's call for the destruction of the past, which was seen as an essential step in the making of the new society. As Naiman puts it,

> rape – in its metaphorical transformation – for the first time became a *positive* symbol: the assault on the earth was essential to the building of an unprecedented, resolutely phallic and iconoclastic proletarian society.[66]

Although in the introductory letter added to the 1924 edition of *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* Shklovsky references back to the urge to wipe out pre-revolutionary ways of thinking, rape enacts the dystopian potential of technology.

Shklovsky's fellow-citizens who, as he states, "were not worse than any others",[67] in this letter are grinded up by the revolutionary machine, which "annihilates the old morality" but fails to produce a new set of values. This equally concerns car mechanics and cultural workers. In the same letter Shklovsky proclaims himself "a man with knowledge of speed and no sense of purpose".[68] This confession creates an uneasy link between Shklovsky's own "crimes" that resulted in his exile (and consequent inability to contribute to building a new society in Soviet Union) and sexual crimes of executed convicts. In Shklovsky's book sexuality is connected not only to crime, but also to the process of writing, which becomes an object of criminal investigation under the eyes of a censor. According to Naiman's argument, crime and illness are as important in utopian narratives as language and history.[69]

In *Zoo* Shklovsky often returns to the historical situation of Russian émigré, arguing that Russian thinkers and writers are out of place in Western capitals. Although in Europe Russian writers could publish their work without a controlling eye of Soviet censors, starting from 1922 Soviet authorities reviewed the books published abroad and most of them were prevented from distribution in Russia.[70] For example, Shklovsky points to the unsustainability of Berlin-based Russian publishers because the books they produce hardly ever reach Russia, "The books come running, one after another; they want to run away to Russia, but they are denied entry."[71] As I have suggested, by adding accounts of sexual crime to the Soviet edition of *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love*, Shklovsky responds to

tightening censorship regulations by linking attempts to control literary production to the changing regulations of sex life, which often entail negative results.

Paradoxically, in Shklovsky's account of his life in exile, away from Soviet regulations of sexual and creative expression, both his professional and sexual lives are put on hold. In response to Alya's letter where she describes her trip on an ocean liner, Shklovsky writes that Russian men, who had lost their ballroom slippers and tuxedos to the revolution, are now losing their women to foreigners, "Foreigners have a mechanical propulsion – the propulsion of an ocean liner, on whose deck it's nice to dance the shimmy. […] The revolution has lost its propulsion."[72] The lost political purpose of those who were involved in the revolution and were later discarded by the new Soviet authorities here is directly juxtaposed with their inability to achieve sexual satisfaction.

In one of the letters added to the second edition, which Shklovsky's introductory note deems so indecent that he is hoping it had not been sent, the unfulfilled sexual urges of former revolutionaries are metaphorically linked to the eroticized imagery of animal breeding:

> When horses are breeding (it's positively indecent, but without it there wouldn't be any horses), the mare often gets nervous; some protective reflex sets in and she refuses to yield. […] A pint-sized stallion is brought it – he may have a really beautiful soul – and led up to the mare. They flirt with each other, but just as soon as they begin to work things out (in a manner of speaking), the poor little stallion is seized by the scruff of his neck and dragged away [to make way for the real inseminator]. The pint-sized stallion is called a 'teaser.'[73]

As the work of Nikolai Kremetsov has demonstrated, in Russia genetics as a discipline came into being only after the revolution of 1917. Within the decade after the revolution, however, "genetics had become a full-fledged discipline with dozens of laboratories, departments and periodicals".[74] The state's investment in plant and animal breeding was one of the main catalysts for this rapid institutional growth.[75] Interestingly, in Shklovsky's account it is not the technical advancements developed by animal breeders, but the feelings of a stallion who is not allowed to contribute his genetic material to the development of Soviet agriculture that is taken into consideration.

Shklovsky first used the imagery of horse breeding in a 1922 letter to Maxim Gorky,

> My love affair with the revolution is deeply unhappy […] We, Socialists Revolutionaries, were 'ploughing' [yarili] Russia for the Bolsheviks. Perhaps, the Bolsheviks are also only "ploughing" [yariat] Russia and it will be the peasant [muzhik] who will use it.[76]

Interestingly, describing his dissatisfaction with his own role in the Revolution, which consisted in preparing Russia for the Bolsheviks, Shklovsky uses an old Slavonic verb "yarit'" (ярить). Being etymologically linked to the name of a pagan Slavic god of vegetation, fertility and spring, Yarilo, the word has both agricultural and sexual connotations – in old Slavonic it refers to engaging in sexual intercourse. In *Letters Not about Love* the protagonist's sexual frustration is inseparable from his cultural and political displacement. By comparing himself to unsuccessful inseminators in horse breeding, Shklovsky also refers to the Formalism's struggle to find its place in a Marxist society. In a 1924 article published on his return to Soviet Union he writes, "Russian intelligentsia played a role of teasers in the history of Russia."[77]

However, I would like to suggest, that in writing *Letters Not about Love* Shklovsky tries to present himself as an exemplarily Soviet citizen who has put in practice revolutionary asceticism not only in his rejection of Western consumerism, but also through sexual abstinence. Although, as I have suggested, after the Revolution sexuality was a highly debated issue, Dan Healey has argued that it was not personal satisfaction but the interests of the new society that was being presented as a priority for Soviet people, "The prevailing view in the party, inherited from Russian radicalism, was that individual fulfilment must wait until the revolution is secured and socialism developed."[78] In *Zoo* Shklovsky presents sexuality as a savage and unruly force – even the technicalities of horse breeding are pronounced indecent rather than being celebrated as an importance step in the betterment of Soviet agriculture. In another letters he gives an account of his encounter with an anthropoid ape confined to a solitary cage in Berlin's Tiergarten, "The ape languishes – it's a male – all day long. At three, he gets to eat. He eats from a plate. Afterward, he sometimes attends to his miserable monkey business. That's offensive and shameful. You tend to think of him as a man, yet he is utterly without shame."[79]

Although the utopian speed of modernity "annihilates the old morality", the ape's putting his sexual needs on display is seen as a transgressive act. After all, even in a futuristic society of Zamyatin's 1921 dystopian novel *We*, where houses are constructed of glass and sex lives of subjects are strictly regulated by authorities, on certain nights, "the blinds [are] modestly lowered".[80] Although in *Zoo* Shklovsky refuses to turn a blind eye to the ape's auto-erotic activities clearly expressing his disapproval, in Andrei Platonov's fascinating 1926 text *The Anti-Sexus* Shklovsky acts as an unexpected proponent of the fictional electromagnetic masturbating device. The text, which remained unpublished during Platonov's lifetime, first appeared in print in 1981 in a special issue of *Russian Literature*.[81] The first English translation came out last year in a New-York-based magazine the *Cabinet*.[82] The text is written as a promotional pamphlet, issued by a fictional production company, and is supposedly merely "translated" by Platonov.

The patented device, which is manufactured in both male and female models that could be adjusted for either personal or collective use, is promising to relieve sexual urges, which prevent people from serving their social and economic functions. The main text of the brochure, which announces the company's extension into the Soviet market after the international success of this "world-wide company", is followed by testimonials by a number of "notable persons", from Henry Ford and Oswald Spengler to Gandhi and Charlie Chaplin. A playful critical preface written by the "translator" condemns the subject matter of the pamphlet as cynical, vulgar and pornographic, adding that the text is translated into Russian because of the style of its writing.

If the main reason for the publication of the text is to reveals the bourgeoisie's moral bankruptcy, it is therefore highly surprising to see the name of Viktor Shklovsky among the reviewers of this collective hi-tech masturbator. Shklovsky first met Platonov shortly before "The Anti-Sexus" was written, when Platonov worked as an agricultural engineer in Voronezh and Shklovsky was writing about flying clubs in Soviet countryside for *Pravda*.[83] Curiously, in the testimonial to The Anti-Sexus, which Platonov attributes to Shklovsky, the exclusion of women is linked to both masturbation and writing, "Women too shall pass, just like the Crusades. Anyone can see this: the point is the form, the style of the automatic age, and absolutely not its essence, which doesn't exist."[84] In Platonov's text the masturbation machine becomes a Formalist literary device, like Shklovsky's *Letters Not about Love*, capable of defamiliarising

preconceived ideas about the relationship between men and women. As Aaron Schuster suggested in an article accompanying the recent English-language publication of "The Anti-Sexus", Platonov produces a subtle joke, where, "literary formalism is ultimately a form of literary masturbation – the pre-eminent enjoyment of the scientific age".[85]

Within this literary dialogue between the two authors, Platonov depicts Shklovsky as being willing to accept masturbation if it is used as part of the Soviet agenda to erase any traces of bourgeois individualism by controlling sexual relations of new Soviet subjects, "Sweet shame made into state practice, though it remains a treat. Now one doesn't have to live so dimly, as if in a condom."[86] Here the technocratic control over subjects' sexualities becomes a means to end Shklovsky's personal and literary erotic turmoil. Curiously in this sentence Platonov quotes Shklovsky's memoir *The Third Factory* also written in 1926, where Shklovksy complains, "I live dimly, as if in a condom."[87] Condom, a potentially harmful object that undermines State control over population while licensing pleasure over duty, in Shklovsky's description becomes an ultimate boundary between the self and the other, completely isolating the subject from the outside world.[88] Moreover, my comparing himself to the content of a used condom, Shklovsky mirrors his use of "teasers" as a metaphor of wasted genetic material. Throughout Shklovsky's texts written in Berlin, his professional belonging to Russian Formalism isolates him from the life in Russian émigré community, as he writes in *Zoo*, "I am bound by my entire way of life, by all my habits, to the Russia of today. I am able to work only for her."[89] Alya, the recipient of Shklovsky's love letters, is written into the discourse of literary theory, "her house is encircled by Opoiaz."[90] In Russian the phrase "opoyasan Opoiazom" is a pun, the adjectival participle "encircled" or "surrounded" and the name of Shklovsky's Leningrad-based research group, Opoiaz ("Society for the Study of Poetic Language"), are practically homophonous.

The troubling political position of the author, which prevents him from taking part in developing the science of literature within the Formalist movement, in *Zoo* is inextricably linked to the image of unrequited love, early Soviet sexologies, genetics and, somewhat disturbingly, the practice of horse breeding. However, unlike "the teaser" whose genealogical line is tragically interrupted, Shklovsky, through Russian Formalism's investment in Darwin's theories, associates literary history with random genetic mutations. In another book written during his miserable but rather fruitful year of exile, Shklovsky returns to the idea that literary genealogy

is not a linear succession from one literary generation to another, but one in which, "the legacy passes not from father to son, but from uncle to nephew".[91] Formalism's interest in genetics points to the fact that even though its "affair" with the Russian Revolution was an unhappy one its legacies became an integral part of twentieth-century intellectual history. As Michael Holquist has aptly observed, the title of another of Shklovsky's 1923 books, which is borrowed from chess, *The Knight's Move*, "is perhaps the best metaphor for the Formalist perception of literary genealogy".[92]

NOTES

[1]   David Norman Rodowick, *Elegy for Theory* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014) 98-99. Similarly, in 2004 Galin Tihanov wrote, "I submit that modern literary theory was born in the decades between the World Wars, in Eastern and Central Europe – in Russia, Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland – due to a set of interesting cultural determinations and institutional factors." Galin Tihanov, "Why Did Modern Literary Theory Originate in Central and Eastern Europe? (And Why Is It Now Dead?)," *Common Knowledge,* 10:1 (2004) 62.

[2]   Galin Tihanov, "Russian Formalism," *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, ed. Alex Preminger and T.V.F. Brogan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) 1239-1242.

[3]   Viktor Shklovskii, "Iskusstvo kak priiom," *Sborniki po teorii poeticheskogo iazyka*, vol. 2 (Petrograd, 1917) 3-14; Shklovskii, *Poetika* (Petrograd: Opoiaz, 1919) 101-114; Shklovskii, *O teorii prozy* (Moscow: Krug, 1925) 7-20; Shklovskii, *O teorii prozy* (Moscow: Federatziia, 1929) 7-23. Translated by Benjamin Sher as "Art as Device," *Theory of Prose* (Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990) 1-14.

[4]   Viktor Shklovsky, *Sentimental'noe puteshestvie* (Moscow; Berlin: Gelikon, 1923) 229; translated by Richard Sheldon as *A Sentimental Journey: Memoirs, 1917-1922* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970) 226.

[5]   Osip Brik, "Tak nazyvaemyi formal'nyi metod," *LEF*, vol. 1 (1923) 213-215; translated by Richard Sheldon as "The So-called Formal Method," *Art in Theory*, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992) 323-324.

[6]   Brik, "The So-called Formal Method," 323.

[7]   Viktor Shklovsky, "Literatura vne siuzheta," *O teorii prozy* (Moscow: Krug, 1925) 162-178; translated by Richard Sheldon as "Literature Without a Plot," *Theory of Prose* (Elmwood Park: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990) 189-206.

[8]   Tihanov, "Russian Formalism," 1240.

[9]   Aleksei Kruchionykh, *Sdvigologiia russkogo stikha* (Moscow: MAF, 1922).

[10] Tihanov, "Russian Formalism," 1240.

[11] Brik, "The So-called Formal Method," 324.

[12] Victor Erlich, *Russian Formalism: History, Doctrine* ('s Gravenhage: Mouton, 1955) 54.

[13] Boris Eichenbaum, "The Theory of the 'Formal Method,'" *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*, translated and with an introduction by Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012) 108.

[14] For a detailed discussion of the landscape of literary criticism during this period see Stefano Garzonio and Maria Zalambani, "Literary Criticism During the Revolution and the Civil War, 1917-1921," *A History of Russian Literary Theory and Criticism: The Soviet Age and Beyond*, edited by Evgeny

Dobrenko and Galin Tihanov (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011) 1-16.

[15] See, for example, Natalia Kornienko, "Literary Criticism and Cultural Policy During the New Economic Policy, 1921-1927*," A History of Russian Literary Theory and Criticism: The Soviet Age and Beyond*, edited by Evgeny Dobrenko and Galin Tihanov (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011) 17-42.

[16] Stuart Finkel, *On the Ideological Front: The Russian Intelligentsia and the Making of the Soviet Public Sphere* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007) 4.

[17] Viktor Shklovsky, "Ob iskusstve i revolutsii," *Iskusstvo kommuny,* 17 (30 March 1919) 2, translated by Richard Sheldon as "Regarding Art and Revolution (Ullya, Ullya, Martians)," *Knight's Move* (Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 2005) 22. Leon Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution*, edited by William Keach; translated by Rose Strunsky (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005) 140.

[18] Eichenbaum, "The Theory of the 'Formal Method,'" 106.

[19] Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution*, 139.

[20] Boris Tomashevskii, "The Formal Method: In Lieu of an Obituary," *Sovremennaia literatura. Sbornik statei* (Leningrad, Mysl', 1925) 144-153.

[21] Tomashevskii, "The Formal Method: In Lieu of an Obituary," 144-153.

[22] See, for example, Mark J. Bruhn and Donald R. Wehrs, eds., *Cognition, Literature, and History* (London: Routledge, 2013); David Williams, *The Trickster Brain: Neuroscience, Evolution, and Narrative* (Lanham: Lexington, 2012); Patricia Waugh, "Thinking in Literature: Modernism and Contemporary Neuroscience," *The Legacies of Modernism: Historicising Postwar and Contemporary Fiction*, ed. David James (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), 75-95.

[23] Brik, "The So-called Formal Method," 324.

[24] Eichenbaum, "The Theory of the 'Formal Method,'" 103.

[25] Tomashevskii, "The Formal Method: In Lieu of an Obituary," 144-153.

[26] Brik, "The So-called Formal Method," 324.

[27] Brik, "The So-called Formal Method," 324.

[28] Eichenbaum, "The Theory of the 'Formal Method,'" 138.

[29] Peter Steiner and Sergej Davydov, "The Biological Metaphor in Russian Formalism: The Concept of Morphology," *SubStance*, vol. 6/7.16, Translation/Transformation (Summer, 1977) 149.

[30] Boris Tomashevsky, Gina Fisch and Oleg Gelikman, "The New School of Literary History in Russia," *PMLA* 119.1 (January 2004) 129.

[31] Fredric Jameson, *The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) 48.

[32] Eichenbaum, "The Theory of the 'Formal Method,'" 138.

[33] Rad Borislavov, "Revolution is Evolution: Evolution as a Trope in Viktor Shklovskii's Literary History," *Russian Literature* 69 (2011) 209-238.

[34] Borislavov, "Revolution is Evolution," 210.

[35] Borislavov, "Revolution is Evolution," 217.

[36] Tomashevsky, "The New School of Literary History in Russia," 129.

[37] Tomashevsky, "The New School of Literary History in Russia," 129.

[38] Eichenbaum, "The Theory of the 'Formal Method,'" 138.

[39] "Literature Without a Plot," *Theory of Prose* (Elmwood Park: Dalkey Archive Press, 1990) 190.

[40] Viktor Shklovsky, *Literature and Cinematography*, translated from the Russian by Irina Masinovsky; introduction by Richard Sheldon (London: Dalkey Archive Press 2008) 33.

[41] Viktor Shklovsky, *Literature and Cinematography*, translated from the Russian by Irina Masinovsky; introduction by Richard Sheldon (London: Dalkey Archive Press 2008) 33.

[42] ee Tynianov's 1924 article "Literary Fact, Iurii Tynianov, "Literaturnyi fakt," Iurii Tynianov, *Arkhaisty i novatory* (Leningrad: Priboi, 1929) 5-29; and Jakobson's 1935 lecture "The Dominant," Roman Jakobson, "The Dominant," Roman Jakobson, *Language in Literature*, edited by Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987) 41-46.

[43] Shklovsky, *Literature and Cinematography*, 33-34.

[44] Tomashevsky, Gina Fisch and Oleg Gelikman, "The New School of Literary History in Russia," 129.

[45] Richard Sheldon, "Introduction," Viktor Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love*, translated and edited by Richard Sheldon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971) xxiii-xxiv. See also B.V. Mikhailovskii, L.I. Ponomarev, and V.R. Shcherbina, eds., *Letopis' zhizni i tvorchestva Maksima Gor'koga*, vol. 3 (Moscow, Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1958-1960) 320-330.

[46] Elsa Triolet, *Na Taiti* (Leningrad: Atenei, 1925).

[47] *Zoo, ili pis'ma ne o liubvi* (Leningrad: Atenei, 1924) 14, translated by Richard Sheldon as *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971) 108.

[48] Shklovsky, "Art as Device," *Theory of Prose* 6.

[49] For the role of letters in modernist textual production see my article on the public correspondence between Shklovsky and Jakobson Asiya Bulatova, "'I'm writing to you in this magazine': The Mechanics of Modernist Dissemination in Shklovsky's Open Letter to Jakobson," *Comparative Critical Studies* 11.2–3 (2014): 185–202.

[50] Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 103.

[51] See, for example, Lilia Brik, *Pristrastnye rasskazy*, ed. by Iakov Groisman and Inna Gens (Nizhnii Novgorod: Dekom, 2011) and Bengt Jangfeldt,

Mayakovsky: A Biography, translated by Harry D. Watson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).

52 Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 11.

53 Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 117.

54 Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 115. Tim Armstrong has argued that in modernist imagery there two ways of incorporating the machine into the human body, "Negative prosthetic" represents the clinical use of technology and "involves the replacing of a bodily part, covering a lack," whereas a "positive prosthetic" "involves a more utopian version of technology, in which human capacities are extrapolated." Tim Armstrong, Modernism, Technology, and the Body: A Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 78.

55 See, Anindita Banerjee, "Creating the Human," *We Modern People: Science Fiction and the Making of Russian Modernity* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2012) 119-155.

56 See, for example, Nikolai Krementsov, "Big Revolution, Little Revolution: Science and Politics in Bolshevik Russia," *Social Research*, 73.4 (Winter 2006) 1173-1204. See also, Nikolai Krementsov and Daniel P. Todes, "Dialectical Materialism and Soviet Science in the 1920s and 1930s," William Leatherbarrow and Derek Oxford, eds., *A History of Russian Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 340-367. In his recent book *Revolutionary Experiments* Krementsov explores how the rapid institutionalization of science in post-revolutionary years became a subject of both public discussions and many literary works of the time. Nikolai Krementsov, *Revolutionary Experiments: The Quest for Immortality in Bolshevik Science and Fiction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

57 Mikhail Bulgakov, *The Heart of a Dog*, translated by Michael Glenny (London: Vintage Classic, 2009).

58 Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 115.

59 See Gregory Carleton, *Sexual Revolution in Bolshevik Russia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005) and Frances Lee Bernstein, *The Dictatorship of Sex: Lifestyle Advice for the Soviet Masses* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007).

60 Mark Banting, Catriona Kelly and James Riordan, "Sexuality," *Russian Cultural Studies: An Introduction*, edited by Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998) 312.

61 Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 116.

62 Eric Naiman, "The Case of Chubarov Alley: Collective Rape and Utopian Desire," *Sex in Public: The Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) 250-288.

63 Dan Healey, *Bolshevik Sexual Forensics: Diagnosing Disorder in the Clinic and Courtroom, 1917-1939* (DeKalb: Illinois University Press, 2009) 83.

64 Frances Bernstein has demonstrated that, in the 1920s, sexual health propaganda focused on presenting the dangers of having sex with multiple partners. Bernstein, *The Dictatorship of Sex.* Similarly, according to Naiman, in media coverage of "The Case of Chubarov Alley" the fact that the convicts contracted gonorrhoea from one another during the collective rape was used as a sign of the degree of their moral corruption. Eric Naiman, "The Case of Chubarov Alley."

65 Dan Healey, *Bolshevik Sexual Forensics* 9.

66 Naiman, *Sex in Public* 284-285.

67 Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 119.

68 Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 119.

69 Naiman, *Sex in Public* 12

70 See Herman Ermolaev, *Censorship in Soviet Literature, 1917-1991* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) and Arlen Viktorovich Blium, "Forbidden Topics: Early Soviet Censorship Directives," translated by Donna M. Farina, *Book History* 1.1 (1998) 268-282.

71 Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 29.

72 Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 63.

73 Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 123.

74 Nikolai Krementsov, "Genetics as an International Science" and "The Road to Moscow," *International Science Between the World Wars: The Case of Genetics* (London: Routledge, 2005) 13-53.

75 In Krementsov's account, the institutionalization of endocrinology is also tied together with animal husbandry. See "Hormons and the Bolsheviks: From Organotherapy to Experimental Endocrinology, 1918-1929," *Isis* 99.3 (2008) 486-518. Frances Bernstein has also discussed the importance of experiments on domesticated animals for the development of Soviet views on gender differences and heterosexuality. Frances L. Bernstein, "'The Dictatorship of Sex': Science, Glands, and the Medical Construction of Gender Difference in Revolutionary Russia," *Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practice,* ed. by David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 200) 138-160.

76 Quoted in Shklovsky, *Gamburgskii schet: stat'i, vospominaniia, esse, 1914-1933* (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1990) 417.

77 Shklovsky, "Probniki," *Gamburgskii schet* 160.

78 Healey, *Bolshevik Sexual Forensics* 5

79 In Sheldon's translation the phrase "monkey business" is translated as "simian needs." Shklovsky, *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love* 26.

80 Yevgeny Zamyatin, *We*, translated and with an introduction by Clarence Brown (New York: Penguin Books, 1993) 13.

81 Andrei Platonov, "Antiseksus," *Russian Literature* 9 (1981) 293.

82 Andrei Platonov, "The Anti-Sexus," *Cabinet* 51 (2014) 48-53.

[83]   A. Iu. Galishkin, "K istorii lichnykh I tvorcheskikh vzaimootnoshenii A.P. Platonova i V.B. Shklovskogo," *Platonov: Vosspominaniia Sovremennikov*, ed. by N.V. Kornienko and E.D. Shubina (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1994) 172-183.

[84]   Platonov, "The Anti-Sexus," *Cabinet* 51 (2014) 53.

[85]   Aaron Schuster, "Sex and Anti-Sex," *Cabinet* 51 (2014) 45.

[86]   Platonov, "The Anti-Sexus," 53.

[87]   Shklovsky, *Trit'ia Fabrika* (Moscow: Krug, 1926) 93.

[88]   Although in Western Europe from the very beginning of the twentieth-century birth control was seen as the triumph of reason over nature made possible by the ability to finally take control over reproductive functions of human beings, Russian society was ambivalent about contraception. See Laura Engelstein, *The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-siecle Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). Naiman provides an example of Rozanov's *Fallen Leaves* (1913-1915) where the heterosexual non-procreative act (i.e. the use of birth control) is labelled as masturbation and "sodomy." Eric Naiman, "The Creation of the Collective Body," *Sex in Public* 27-78.

[89]   *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love 103.*

[90]   *Zoo, or Letters Not about Love 38.*

[91]   Shklovsky, *Literature and Cinematography* 33.

[92]   Michael Holquist and Katerina Clark, "Bakhtin and the Formalists: History as Dialogue." *Russian Formalism: A Retrospective Glance*, edited by Robert Louis Jackson and Stephen Rudy (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1985) 88.

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WHO WRITES THE HISTORY OF THE ROMANS? AGENCY AND CAUSALITY IN NIKEPHOROS GREGORAS' *HISTORIA RHŌMAÏKĒ*

Abstract

The present article inquires into the philosophical conceptions of spontaneity and chance, fate and necessity, free will and divine providence employed by Nikephoros Gregoras (d. *ca.* 1360) in his historiographical project *Historia Rhōmaïkē*. Based on examples from Gregoras' letters, *First Antirrhetics* and his *History*, the author argues that Gregoras drew on Aristotle and Ptolemy for his views on chance and spontaneity, whereas with respect to historical agency and causality, he emphasized the role of the free individual will which he understood as independent from necessity and fate and reconciled with divine foreknowledge.

Keywords: Nikephoros Gregoras, *Historia Rhōmaïkē*, Byzantine historiography, agency, causality, spontaneity, chance, fate, free will, divine providence

In 1981, Roger Scott, following the studies of imitation in Byzantine historiography and literature by Moravcsik[1] and Hunger,[2] problematized himself the classicizing character of Byzantine history writing.[3] Notably, he stated that "there is still an important general question which has not been discussed, and that is whether the Byzantine historians continued the tradition of the classical Greek historians in their approach to their subject and in their methods and concept of history".[4] Further, he argued that "the Byzantine approach to the writing of history after the seventh century was fundamentally different from that of the classical Greek historians"[5] and the main divergence consisted in "the intrusion of the author's person into the subject".[6] Notably, however, Byzantine historians inherited a number of concerns their ancient and late-antique

counterparts were preoccupied with, among them, the engagement with historical causality.[7] Thus, a number of Byzantine historians explored the notions of spontaneity (*to automaton*), chance and fortune (*tychē*), fate (*heimarmenē*), divine providence (*pronoia*), and free will or choice (*proairesis*) as principles of historical causation and, in so doing, imitated, emulated, and, in some cases, innovated a theme prominently featured in 'classical' models such as Thucydides and Polybius.[8] Scott himself pointed out that in Anna Komnene's *Alexiad*, for instance, a number of features distinctive for the classical historians are present, such as "the apparent stress on *tyche*, chance or fate, as an important factor in causation"[9] and that "though it would be going too far to equate the role of Christianity in Anna's work with that of *tyche* in say, Thucydides or Polybius, it is still fair to claim that Anna does not often let Christianity interfere with her interpretation of events, but rather she uses the judgement of God as a way of reinforcing an interpretation which she will have already made in purely human terms".[10] Conversely, despite incorporating a number of classicizing features in his *History*, George Akropolites (1217–1282),[11] for instance, distinguished himself from classicizing authors who emphasize the role of *tychē* in order to explain causes of events. As Macrides pointed out, Akropolites did not attribute special importance neither to *tychē*[12] nor to divine providence, but rather to kinship: "Divine providence does play a role in Akropolites' understanding and interpretation of events but its role is modest except in Palaiologan affairs. It would not be an exaggeration to say that kinship is adduced more readily and more commonly by Akropolites as a cause of events than is God."[13] Nikephoros Gregoras (d. *ca.* 1360) and John Kantakouzenos (*ca.* 1292–1383),[14] on the other hand, approached spontaneity (*to automaton*), chance or fortune (*tychē*), divine providence, human free will, or necessity (*anankē*) as prominent causal principles in the history of humankind. According to Kazhdan, for instance, Kantakouzenos presented *tychē* as instable, inconstant, and incomprehensible and divine providence as rarely revealed to humankind, thus leading to the misconception that spontaneity is in fact the cause of events, since no other could be discerned. In addition, Kazhdan demonstrated an important feature of Kantakouzenos' narrative, namely, his insistence on the role and constraint of necessity which often induced him to act against his own will.[15]

In his interest in spontaneity, chance, divine providence, and human free will as historical principles of causation, Gregoras inscribed himself in the tradition of classicizing historians[16] alongside Pachymeres and

Kantakouzenos. In the following exposition I offer, first, a short biographical account of his life and scholarly activity as well as a short introduction into his *Roman History*. Secondly, I examine his views on spontaneity and chance and inquire after their philosophical foundations. Finally, I relate the theoretical framework, I have thus reconstructed, to discussions of chance, free will, and divine providence featured in the *History*.

The Author

Nikephoros Gregoras (*ca.* summer 1293/June 1294–1358/1361)[17] is well-known to modern scholars as the author of a major work on Byzantine history for the period from 1204 until *ca.* 1359, namely the *Historia Rhōmaïkē*. Recently, however, more attention has been brought to his saints' lives and homiletic works, as Gregoras was also one of the most prominent Palaiologan writers of hagiography. Theologians recognize him as a determined opponent of Palamism, while philosophers emphasize the skeptical tendencies he inherited from his mentor Theodore Metochites. He was also a prolific letter-writer and one of the few scholars in early Palaiologan Byzantium competent in mathematics and astronomy.

Gregoras was born in Hērakleia Pontikē in Asia Minor (today's Karadeniz Ereğli) and, orphaned at an early age, received his initial education by his maternal uncle John, metropolitan of Hērakleia.[18] Around the age of twenty, Gregoras had already moved to Constantinople in order to continue his studies. His teacher of logic and rhetoric was the future patriarch John XIII Glykys (12 May 1315–11 May 1319),[19] while by 1316, his mentor became the *megas logothetēs* Theodore Metochites (1270–1332).[20] Though initially reluctant, Metochites eventually initiated Gregoras in the study of astronomy. During the 1320s, besides tutoring Metochites' children, with the patronage of emperor Andronikos II (r. 1282–1328)[21] and the support of his prime minister Metochites, Gregoras began studying Ptolemy (fl. mid-second century CE) and most probably in 1324, he proposed to Andronikos II a calendar reform related to the calculation of the date of Easter, similar to the one adopted in 1582 by Pope Gregory XIII.[22] In 1326, he participated in an embassy to the court of the Serbian king Stefan Uroš III Dečanski,[23] which seems to be the last time he left the Byzantine capital until the end of his life.[24] During the 1320s, Gregoras started forming a scholarly circle at the monastery of Chora where he taught the disciplines of the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry,

astronomy, and music), as he himself related in his *Letter* 114 addressed to Kaloeidas,[25] while establishing his network and gaining prestige at court. After 1324 and before 1328, he had already composed the first redaction of his treatise on the construction of the astrolabe.[26] Moreover, the *megas logothetēs* Metochites bequeathed his personal library to the Chora monastery and publicly appointed Gregoras as its "defender and protector".[27] In 1328, following the abdication of Andronikos II on May 28, Gregoras shared the downfall of the elderly emperor and his senior minister Metochites. As a supporter of Andronikos II in the civil war of 1321–1328, his possessions were confiscated. He was, nevertheless, allowed to remain in the capital, unlike his mentor Metochites who was exiled to Didymoteichon whence he returned to Constantinople in 1330 and ended his life as the monk Theoleptos at the monastery of Christ Saviour of Chora two years later. It is in the late 1320s and early 1330s that Gregoras started seeking new patrons, such as the *megas domestikos* John Kantakouzenos, the future emperor John VI (r. 1347–1354), to whom he probably dedicated his commentary on Synesios' *On Dreams*.[28] Later in the 1330s, Gregoras succeeded in establishing himself as the leading philosopher and astronomer at the court of Andronikos III (r. 1328–1341),[29] Andronikos II's grandson. At some point between 1332 and 1335 Gregoras published the second redaction of his work on the construction of the astrolabe. Importantly, in the 1330s Gregoras composed and circulated his Platonicizing dialogue *Phlorentios, or, On Wisdom* (*ca.* 1337),[30] this dialogue being, as well as Gregoras' correspondence, the major witness for the debate over astronomical and philosophical issues between the latter and Barlaam the Calabrian. A number of scholars have viewed the dialogue *Phlorentios*, together with the other dialogue authored by Gregoras, namely *Philomathēs, or, On Arrogant People*, as well as the calculations of lunar and solar eclipses, such as the solar eclipse of May 14, 1333,[31] the *Response to Those who Claim that There Is No Humility Among Men*, better-known as *Antilogia*,[32] a number of Gregoras' letters dealing with astronomical matters, and parts of the *History* as evidence for the polemic over astronomy, harmonics, philosophy between Gregoras and Barlaam the Calabrian and have dated the texts correspondingly. The public debate between the two erudites held at the palace of the *megas domestikos* John Kantakouzenos which allegedly took place[33] and was later reported by Gregoras in the *Phlorentios* has been dated to the winter of 1331–1332.[34] Finally, during the 1330s Gregoras notably emended and commented on Ptolemy's *Harmonics*.[35] Subsequently, Gregoras

provided an account of these events in the first part of his *History*, namely Books I–XI, noting in addition the appearance of numerous astronomical phenomena such as comets, solar, and lunar eclipses. Though Gregoras does not give any indication as to the time when he started writing his *History*, van Dieten argued that the text of the first eleven books was already complete by 1344, while their publication probably took place at some point in 1347.[36] In the last two decades of his life, Gregoras entered the so-called 'Hesychast' controversy, a theological, political, and social phenomenon which left its mark on mid- and late fourteenth-century Byzantium and has had subsequent repercussions in the development of Orthodoxy up until today.[37] During the civil war of 1341–1347, Gregoras supported John Kantakouzenos' party and kept a neutral stance as to the theological dispute between Gregory Palamas,[38] on the one hand, and the supporters of Barlaam the Calabrian and Gregory Akindynos on the other. Gregoras openly stated his views against Palamism only after 1346. In 1347, he became the chief of the anti-Palamite party and opposed the newly-crowned emperor John VI Kantakouzenos. It is in 1347 that Gregoras composed his *First Antirrhetics* against Palamas.[39] Despite his opposition to Palamism and to John VI, in 1349, following the death of patriarch Isidore, Gregoras was proposed to ascend the patriarchal throne. Nevertheless, Gregoras refused and was subsequently condemned at the local Constantinopolitan council of 1351, shortly after taking monastic vows. As a result, Gregoras was placed under house arrest at the monastery of Chora until the fall of 1354. Meanwhile, Gregoras continued writing his *History* and one of the last events he described was the death of his opponent Palamas in 1359. Thus, Gregoras' own death has been dated to *ca.* 1359 or 1360. He died in Constantinople and according to the testimony of John Kyparissiotes,[40] after his death, his corpse was mocked and dragged through the streets of Constantinople.[41]

The Text

Historia Rhōmaïkē or *Roman History*[42] was written and circulated in Constantinople in several installments since the 1340s and is preserved today in more than forty manuscripts five of which date to the fourteenth century. Two of them, namely, codd. *Vat. gr.* 164 and 165 are partially copied, annotated, and revised by Gregoras himself.[43] Based on the pinakes and the marginal and chapter titles in both codices, it is clear

that they were designed as an edition of the *Roman History*, Books I–XVII. The title preceding the pinax to *Vat. gr.* 165, written by Gregoras in black ink on the top of f. 1r, for instance, indicates that the volume contains eleven 'discourses' or books of the *History*: † νικηφόρου τοῦ γρηγορᾶ ῥωμαϊκῆς ἱστορίας λόγοι αι΄. Further, the pinax entry on f. 6r, l. 14 points to the beginning of the first 'discourse' (or book) from the second book (or volume) of Gregoras' *History* and further specifies that this would be the beginning of the twelfth 'discourse' (should we consider the work as a whole): † ἀρχὴ τοῦ αου λόγου τῆς β΄ βιβλίου τῆς ῥωμαϊκῆς ἱστορίας τοῦ γρηγορᾶ· ἤτοι τοῦ ιβ΄ λόγου. And indeed, the title of the beginning of Book XII on f. 249r further corroborates the impression of a multi-volume edition the two Vatican codices were conceived as: † τοῦ αὐτοῦ γρηγορᾶ ῥωμαϊκῆς ἱστορίας λόγος α΄ ἤτοι ιβ΄ τοῦ ὅλου ὁμοῦ. Ff. 249r–253r, however, do not contain the entire Book XII; thus, *Vat. gr.* 164 opens with the beginning of Book XII and on f. 10v, l. 20 it picks off from where *Vat. gr.* 165 had left. Finally, the pinax entry at the top of f. 1r in *Vat. gr.* 164 indicating the beginning of Book XII, also introduces the first 'discourse' in the volume as twelfth in the context of the entire work.[44]

Gregoras' *Historia Rhōmaïkē* covers the history of Byzantium from 1204 until the time of his death (*ca.* 1359) and consists of thirty-seven books. The text of the *History* is available in two partial Russian translations, a partial translation into modern Greek, and, importantly, in a full German translation. The two Russian translations, by Shalfeev (1862)[45] and Jashunskiy (2013)[46] both limit themselves to the first eleven books (1204–1341) of the *History*. The same is true for Dimitrios Moschos' translation from 1997.[47] The German translation and commentary were executed for the larger part by Jan Louis van Dieten and were completed after his death by Franz Tinnefeld (1973–2007).[48] Importantly, however, a modern critical edition of the text is still unavailable,[49] thus, one ought to bear in mind that the redaction preserved in the partial autographs *codd. Vat. gr.* 164 and 165 differs from the one rendered by the existing edition from 1829–1855.

While Gregoras historiographical output is well-known to students of Byzantium, his philosophical pursuits are less so. Notably, it is his Platonizing dialogue *Phlorentios*, his *Antilogia*, the *Solutions to Philosophical Questions*, and his *Commentary on Synesios'* On Dreams that have been in the focus of scholarly attention. It has been stated, nevertheless, that "[s]ome of his letters and a few passages of his *Roman History* touch upon philosophical subjects."[50] While in my doctoral

dissertation,[51] I argued that there is much more to be said about the philosophical importance of Gregoras' correspondence, in the present article my goal is to lay down the foundations of a larger examination of the philosophical themes he incorporated in the *History*.

Prolegomena: the *Letters*

Importantly, Gregoras considered human free will to be a fundamental historical principle, as it made possible to discern a moral action from an immoral one and consequently, to assign judgment and responsibility. Gregoras positioned God and God's providence behind the design of the concordant and harmonized universe. Gregoras, however, attributed great importance not only to divine forethought, but also to the regularity of the celestial movements and to the influence heavenly phenomena exerted on terrestrial events. Moreover, according to Gregoras, history interpreted the meaning of celestial phenomena with respect to contemporary events. Notably, Gregoras' *Historia Rhōmaikē* lists and discusses numerous astronomical events, such as solar and lunar eclipses (e.g., *History*, *Book* IV, 8; *Book* IX, 12, 14; *Book* XI, 3), the observation of comets (e.g., *History*, *Book* XI, 5, 7), or the configuration of the stars at a particular moment in time (e.g., *History*, *Book* XI, 11) and despite the technical scientific descriptions characteristic for Gregoras' prose, it interprets the occurrences observed in the sky as either felicitous or infelicitous. At the same time, Gregoras elaborated on the problematics of spontaneity, fortune, and providence in his *History*, *Book* V, 6 (a discussion of divine providence), *Book* VII, 4 (definition of divine forethought), and *Book* XXVIII, 42–68 (discussion of determinism and free will).

Notably, Gregoras discussed the individual free will also in his correspondence where he noted its role with respect to maintaining friendship and attaining knowledge. At least two other factors, however, exerted influence on human cognitive and ethical effort, namely chance or fortune (*tychē*) and divine providence (*pronoia*). A case in point is his *Letter* 134 which was written after a long interruption in the correspondence between Gregoras and Ignatios Glabas, metropolitan of Thessalonike between 1336 and 1341.[52] According to Gregoras, Aristotle was to blame for said silence since the latter postulated equality as a condition for friendship. Importantly, Gregoras argued, should friendship be possible only for those who are equal, achieving it would become impossible due

to the fact that the souls of the friends-correspondents are governed by no other than *fortune* (*tychē*).[53] In the particular case of reestablishing their epistolary friendship after the change in Ignatios' fortune, namely after his ascension to the metropolitan see of Thessaloniki, Gregoras set out to describe how, despite the significant upgrade of Ignatios' situation, the newly appointed metropolitan did not alter either in terms of character, or in terms of his attitude towards Gregoras and, thus, refuted Aristotle and, moreover, demonstrated that *tychē* lacks substance and does not necessarily govern the souls of men.[54] One ought to note that *Letter* 134 relates rather surprisingly Aristotelian theory of friendship with an emphasis on the strong influence *tychē* exerts on human life. Such an understanding of chance, in fact, resembles more the Stoic conception of *tychē*. Within the framework of Stoic universal causal determinism, only an imperfect rational being would perceive *tychē* as a cause, not for other reason, but because due to their imperfect understanding they would not be able to determine the actual cause. Thus, in the Stoic framework, the sage would be invulnerable to *tychē*.[55] In the closing of the letter, Gregoras argued, much along the same lines, that only the weak-minded, those who yield control of their reasoning and open room for ignorance, are prompt to attribute significance to *tychē*, since they renounce the possibility to judge for themselves the changing flow of events.[56]

Another one of Gregoras' letters helps to further interpret the association of Aristotle's philosophy of friendship with the concept of *tychē* as a governing principle, that is, as a principle of causation, and serves, therefore, as a hermeneutical key for understanding Gregoras' treatment of *tychē* as a historical agent in the *History*. *Letter* 42 is a didactic letter in the sense that it renders a solution to a philosophical problem posed to Gregoras by Helene Kantakouzene Palaiologina (1333–1396),[57] namely as to what is the difference between chance and spontaneity. Gregoras derived his answer from the second book of Aristotle's *Physics* in which Aristotle discusses the causes, in particular the causes that lead to change or rest of some sort (*Physics* II 3, 194b16–194b23). Thus, Aristotle famously defined four types of causes, that is, material, formal, efficient, and final. Having analyzed the latter, Aristotle proceeded by stating that chance (*tychē*) and spontaneity (*to automaton*) are also often referred to as causes and, therefore, one ought to inquire how they relate to the four causes he had previously defined and what chance and spontaneity were (*Physics* II 4, 195b31–195b36). He distinguished between them in the following way: "It is clear then that chance is an accidental cause

in the sphere of those actions for the sake of something which involve choice (*proairesis*). Thought, then, and chance are in the same sphere, for choice implies thought (*dianoia*)."[58] Gregoras followed Aristotle in his differentiation between chance and spontaneity based on whether they pertain to rational or irrational beings. Aristotle, however, postulated in addition that spontaneity is the wider notion,[59] a relation which Gregoras subsequently reversed,[60] thus restricting the predication of spontaneity to irrational beings only. Such intellectual maneuver allowed Gregoras to strengthen the correlation between chance and choice and, thus, to increase the responsibility of the rational agent with respect to his or her susceptibility to the influence of *tychē*.[61]

The *History*

Importantly, Gregoras concluded this part of *Letter* 42 with a remark as to the influence of chance and spontaneity over the heavenly bodies: "Democritus is wrong when he claims that 'spontaneously the vortex arouse and a motion which separated the universe in its present order.'[62] For neither chance, nor spontaneity has a place among those that move according to nature and possess unchangeable motion."[63] The reference to the realm of the heavenly phenomena is important in the context of the present inquiry for two reasons. First, as attested by a passage in Gregoras' *First Antirrhetics* which is repeated verbatim in the *Roman History*, Aristotle was not the unique ancient authority Gregoras drew upon when establishing his views on chance and spontaneity. Based on a *TLG* search, which in Gregoras' case renders an incomplete sample, since not all his works are included in the database, Gregoras used the designation for fate or destiny, namely, εἱμαρμένη, ten times (once in the *Roman History*, once in *Letter* 38, two times in his *First Antirrhetics*, and six times in his *Commentary on Synesios'* On Dreams[64]), while he employed the combination of 'chance' and 'spontaneity' (τύχη and τὸ αὐτόματον) eight times (four times in the *Roman History* and four times in *Letter* 42). Of interest here is the beginning of a discourse Gregoras delivered on the request of empress Anna with the intention of refuting the arguments of a certain Latin defender of astrology. This passage invoked the notion of fate and in addition to Gregoras' *First Antirrhetics*, it was employed also in the *History*, Book XIV, 8[65] in a description of the same episode:

And first, Ptolemy, the excellent, said that 'one should not think that all that happens to men is due to some necessity from above and that the events become unchangeable in accordance with certain fate, but that the unchangeable perpetual movement of the heavens is accomplished according to divine creation and order; indeed that the <change> of the earthly phenomena is administered by nature,' as it always has natural alteration and flux, 'it somehow indeed follows also the cause from above accidentally, thus it is not completely understood by the people.' For it would be agreed upon by all who have their share in mind and thought that sun and moon exercise manifold influence through the air upon the earthly phenomena according to certain 'more general principles'. And that the astrological inquiries and all those things by some people which are expressed in maxims concerning the peculiar constitution of each one; that this, then, is a rather exceedingly irreverent annoyance and a toil—the acquired objective <being> ineffectual and incomprehensible—is the opinion not only of Ptolemy, the excellent one, but also of Basil, the great with respect to the divine matters.[66]

Thus, in *Letter* 42 Gregoras stated that the heavenly phenomena which are characterized by their perpetual and unchangeable movement are not subjected to chance and spontaneity. In the *First Antirrhetics* and the *History* Gregoras added that the movements of the heavenly bodies result from the divine design and order, and thus, by extension, they are governed only by divine providence. Second, the sublunary realm of terrestrial phenomena which includes the sphere of human affairs is administered by nature and as, in addition, everything administered by nature is subject to spontaneity, while when it pertains to animate and rational beings, it is also subject to chance. Both claims are inserted in an argument against astrology which relies on two authorities, namely, on Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos* and on Basil of Caesarea's *Sixth Homily of Hexaemeron*.[67]

According to Basil, the determinism implied by astrology could not be reconciled with the Christian doctrine of free will and, moreover, it rendered the concepts of virtue and vice, or in other words, the idea of moral responsibility obsolete.[68] Criticism against the determinism implied by the concept of fate was not reserved for Christians only as it is clear by Plotinus' essay *On Destiny* (*Ennead* III.1) which was read in the Palaiologan period as well, notably by Gregoras' mentor Theodore Metochites who borrowed the Plotinian arguments in constructing his own position on the value of astronomy and its connection with astrology.[69] In his grand astronomical opus *Elements of Astronomy* (*Stoicheiosis* 1:5),[70] in addition

to the Plotinian argumentation, Metochites also referred to Ptolemy, and, in particular, to his *Tetrabiblos*, similarly to Gregoras.[71] Bydén has argued that, in Metochites' time, the *Tetrabiblos* itself was quite difficult to obtain and thus, Metochites himself did not own it; instead, he used a paraphrase of the text, falsely attributed to Proclus and preserved today in *Vat. gr.* 1453.[72]

In the passage from the *First Antirrhetics* and the *Roman History* I discussed above, Gregoras cited *Tetrabiblos* I. 3.[73] He made, however, a number of significant alterations. While following Ptolemy's vocabulary rather closely, especially in the second part of the passage, namely the one discussing the terrestrial phenomena administered by nature, Gregoras altered some key terms in the first part of the quotation, namely the one dealing with the heavenly bodies and their movements. Importantly, Gregoras dissociated the notions of divinity and fate, thus, rendered necessity and fate unsubstantial, that is, they are neither causes nor divine commands. According to Ptolemy,

> we should not believe that separate events attend mankind as the result of the *heavenly cause* (ἀπὸ τῆς ἄνωθεν αἰτίας) as if they had been originally ordained for each person *by some irrevocable divine command* (ἀπό τινος ἀλύτου καὶ θείου προστάγματος νενομοθετημένα) and destined to take place by necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποβησόμενα) without the possibility of any other cause whatever interfering. [italics mine][74]

When Gregoras quoted this passage, however, he substituted "the heavenly cause" and "irrevocable divine command" with "necessity from above" and fate: "One should not think that all that happens to men is due to some *necessity from above* (ὑπό τινος ἄνωθεν ἀνάγκης) and that the events become unchangeable in accordance *with certain fate* (καθ' εἱμαρμένην τινὰ) […]" [italics mine]. Further, in both Ptolemy's and Gregoras' texts the heavenly bodies and their movements are referred to as divinely administered. According to Ptolemy, the heavenly bodies' movement is in accordance with fate: "Rather is it true that the movement of the heavenly bodies, to be sure, is eternally performed *in accordance with divine, unchangeable fate* (καθ' εἱμαρμένην θείαν καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον) […]" [italics mine].[75] In Gregoras' rendering of this passage, however, it is divine creation and order that govern it: "the unchangeable perpetual movement of the heavens is accomplished according *to divine creation and order* (κατὰ γένεσιν θείαν καὶ τάξιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι) […]" [italics mine]. Thus, as

an object of study, the heavenly bodies and their motions have a special status and consequently, the astronomical knowledge caries a particular amount of certainty physics, for instance, does not as it is occupied with the mutable and instable natural world. Certainly, Gregoras added, the celestial bodies influence the terrestrial events, but in this manner, they are only accidentally a cause and, moreover, they do not affect personal choice and action, but larger and more general phenomena, in such way as, for instance, the moon causes the tides, which is an example Gregoras will employ elsewhere.[76]

The second reason for the importance of the reference to the realm of the heavenly phenomena relates Gregoras' views on spontaneity, chance, influence of the divinely administered heavenly movement, and divine providence to his views on history. Importantly, the preface to Book I of the *Roman History* links the celestial bodies and their eternal movements with the value of history:

> For, on the one hand, like silent heralds of the divine magnificence, they (i.e., the heaven and earth, God's first and greatest creations) exist always, as they summon perception only as a witness. History, on the other, a living and a speaking voice and, as it is both really vivid and loud messenger of the same (i.e., the divine magnificence) passes through time, having always shown, like in a picture of the universe, the past events to the generations coming afterwards [...][77]

> And it seems to me that the glory of heaven and earth becomes more glorious through the history and, in a manner of speaking, the splendor <becomes> more splendid by far. For, if there were no history, wherefrom had people known how the sky, since the beginning, as it is always moving according to precisely the same unaltered movement, invariably wheels about <the> sun, moon and all stars towards an orderly and rhythmical variety and equally, describes God's glory, during day and night for eternity.[78]

History told the story not only of people, cities and empires, but also of the heavenly movements and thus, provided knowledge of the past, which in turn, together with the ability to read the celestial signs divine providence furnished, assured that people could make predictions about the future: "But now it <history> makes those who come next prophets [...], since they guess the future events based on the past."[79]

Thus, Gregoras argued against astrology, but, nevertheless, admitted, as, for instance, in his *Letter* 69, that by virtue of their movement the heavenly bodies, chiefly the sun and the moon, can accidentally cause earthly phenomena:

> You did not limit the boundaries of your thinking to the grass, to the flocks of sheep, to the frontiers of the earth, but you went up to the vault of the sky, studying the relation which naturally <unites> the celestial and terrestrial phenomena, the secondary causes of those, and whence the principles of generation descend, <the principles> <that> mystically nurture the terrestrial beings.[80] [...] I shall collect for you from elsewhere the remaining <things> like in a bright *theatron*, so that you know from there how the earthly phenomena are linked to the celestial and <that> the same concordance and arrangement unites them at each end in one and the same thing like in perfection.[81] […] For this I wanted <for you> and to show you how great the causes of the rest of the stars are on earth and how many the effects of their activity, during day and night, in order for you to recognize the greatness of God the creator and how great is the power of science and moreover, so that you would appear to yourself better-pleased with the aim and the desire for science.[82]

The most substantial discussion in Gregoras' œuvre of the relationship between spontaneity, chance, and divine providence, on the one hand, and human free will, on the other is preserved in *Book* XXVIII, 42–68 of the *Roman History*.[83] It consists of a long discussion between Matthew Kantakouzenos (*ca.* 1325–1383),[84] the son of the emperor John VI Kantakouzenos, and Gregoras and in it Matthew is portrayed as someone who attempts to justify his father's political and military conduct through a deterministic theory, thus exculpating the latter.

The conversation is framed as part of Matthew Kantakouzenos' visit of Gregoras' residential quarters in which the latter was confined at the time. Matthew is presented as entreating Gregoras on behalf of his father and mother to return to court, "especially now that it happened that they are completely flooded by many violent waves of events and tossing motion of chance".[85] Matthew proceeded by asking Gregoras to give him an answer as to whether chance and spontaneity prevail over human will:

> But if chance and spontaneity secretly govern our affairs and have an absolute command over our will and we act unwillingly and are subjected by necessity […], then in the future I shall not desire to charge with anything

else, nor to move boundaries subjugated to necessities, but I shall suspect and beware of the inevitability [...][86]

According to Gregoras, Matthew was hoping to be convinced that chance and spontaneity indeed prevailed, the reason being Matthew's willingness to refute all those who blamed his father John for the current misfortunes of the Byzantine state and people.[87] Matthew claimed, moreover, that those people unknowingly annulled the role of divine providence and did not provide for the necessity of chance that ran through the events.[88] For, Matthew argued, since everything is known by God in advance, by necessity it also follows that everything which is foreknown by the divine providence will also be done as it is already known by it.[89] Moreover, he stated, it was possible to hear without hindrance the divine providence being called spontaneity and chance not only by the wiser brethren of the Hellenes, but also by some Christian thinkers. Thus, one ought to approve of the actions of his father who was "led by the divine providence and enslaved by the inescapable necessity".[90]

Gregoras responded by giving an extensive speech whose main points pertaining to the present inquiry I shall summarize in what follows.[91] Importantly, Gregoras stressed that not the foreknowledge was the cause of evil and evil things did not occur because they were previously known by God.[92] In fact, it would be safer to say that something is known by God and in no way foreknown. For God sees our future deeds in the same way as the present ones, as he remains eternally in the state of his own simplicity, even if he stays in the present which never changes. And he does not interfere with change or coerce human will as the latter is free.[93] Therefore, Gregoras concluded, people are responsible for their own affairs and not God, nor his foreknowledge, nor some sort of necessity which absolutely controls the rudder of life, but free will.[94] Correspondingly, it is not divine foreknowledge that forces sinners to sin.[95] Gregoras also made an important point concerning divination, as he related it to the fear of the future. The need for divination followed the anxiety of those who were aware of their mistakes and, thus, were weary of the future. Similarly, he pointed out, if people would not fall to sickness, they would not need doctors and, correspondingly, if they would not sin, divination would have no appeal to them.[96]

Conclusion

The present inquiry pursued two main research directions, namely, first, to examine and reconstruct Gregoras' views on spontaneity and chance, free will and divine providence; and second, to discuss the employment of his philosophical treatment of these concepts for the purposes of explaining historical causality in his *Roman History*. In order to achieve the first goal, I surveyed two of his letters, namely *Letters* 134 and 42. *Letter* 134, on the one hand, argued that chance by no means did govern human souls, except in the case of weak-minded people who do not control their own intellect. *Letter* 42, on the other, defined spontaneity and chance in Aristotelian terms as accidental causes, but at the same time restricted the predication of spontaneity to irrational beings only, thus, leaving only those with a soul and an intellect as possible subjects to *tychē*. Moreover, the discussion in *Letter* 42 related spontaneity and chance to the heavenly bodies and their movements which according to Gregoras were not subjected to spontaneity and chance, nor fate, but to divine creation and order. In addition, Gregoras argued against astrology and divination. However, due to his endorsement of a theory of cosmic sympathy governed by divine design and providence, he allowed for the heavenly phenomena to indicate events in the sublunary realm as divine signs and even to cause accidentally terrestrial phenomena of general character such as the ocean's tides. Importantly, Gregoras related his concept of the value of history to the movements of the heavens. With respect to the historical causation, however, as the example of Book XXVIII of the *Roman History* demonstrates, Gregoras rejected any role of fate or necessity and even of divine providence in coercing human free will and, therefore, in (pre)determining the outcome of one's actions.

NOTES

1   Moravcsik, "Klassizismus in byzantinischen Geschichtsschreibung".
2   Hunger, "On the Imitation (ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ) of Antiquity in Byzantine Literature".
3   Scott, "The Classical Tradition in Byzantine Historiography".
4   *Ibid.*, 62.
5   *Ibid.*
6   *Ibid.*, 63.
7   On George Pachymeres emulating Thucydides in his analysis of historical cause and effect, see Macrides, "The Historian in the History", 210.
8   On Thucydides' employment of the concept of *tychē* as principle of historical uncertainty and of its relation to *gnōmē* and *technē*, see Edmunds, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* and Luginbill, *Thucydides on War and National Character*. On Polybius and his appropriation of the Stoic concept of *tychē*, see Brouwer, "Polybius and Stoic *Tyche*", especially 125: "Thus according to Polybius the task of the historian is to explain the role of *tyche* in relation to human beings in a particular time frame. […] In what I called the epistemological approach, Polybius's *tyche* functions as a last resort: if no explanation of an event can be found, it is admissible to refer to *tyche*. At the same time, in what I coined the physical approach, Polybius uses *tyche* to convey the point that the world is governed by an encompassing force and can hence be explained from the perspective of order […]".
9   Scott, "The Classical Tradition in Byzantine Historiography", 62.
10 *Ibid.*, 63.
11 Erich Trapp et al., *Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit*, no. 518 (hereafter: *PLP*).
12 George Akropolites and Macrides, *George Akropolites: The History*, 54: "For Akropolites *tyche* is not a significant factor in the way events transpire […]"
13 *Ibid.*, 55.
14 *PLP* 10973.
15 Kazhdan, "L'histoire de Cantacuzène en tant qu'œuvre littéraire", 321–323.
16 For a survey of Byzantine authors' treatments of the role of *tychē* as a cause of events, see Medvedev, *Vizantijskij gumanizm*, 128–144.
17 *PLP* 4443. For arguments concerning the dates of Gregoras' life, see Beyer, "Eine Chronologie der Lebensgeschichte des Nikephoros Gregoras". See also Grecu, "Das Geburtsjahr des byzantinischen Geschichtschreibers Nikephoros Gregoras". For a comprehensive, though outdated, account of Gregoras' life, see Guilland, *Essai sur Nicéphore Grégoras*. One of the most useful biographical accounts, however, a catalogue, and a concise description of Gregoras' works are found in Gregoras, *Rhomäische Geschichte*, vol. 1, 1–62. For useful bibliography of primary source literature, see Moschos, *Platōnismos ē christianismos?*. For updated bibliography on

Gregoras, see Dunaev, "Nicephorus Gregoras". Bydén dates Gregoras' birth to *ca.* 1293 or 1294, while Paraskeuopoulou refers to a dating around *ca.* 1295 in one of the most recent publications dealing with Gregoras' hagiographical and homiletic works. See Bydén, "The Criticism of Aristotle in Nikephoros Gregoras' *Florentius*"; Paraskeuopoulou, *To agiologiko kai omilētiko ergo tou Nikephorou Grēgora.*

[18] *PLP* 8609. On John of Hērakleia, see Laurent, "La personalité de Jean d' Héraclée".

[19] *PLP* 4271.

[20] *PLP* 17982.

[21] *PLP* 21436.

[22] Concerning the importance of calculating the date of Easter, see Kuzenkov, "Correction of the Easter Computus. On the dating of Gregoras' proposal for a calendar reform, see Barlaam de Seminara, *Traités sur les éclipses de Soleil de 1333 et 1337*, 151; Theodore Metochites, *Two Poems*, 7. Krumbacher has dated the reform proposal to 1325, while Nikolaides pins it to 1326. See Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur*, 293–4; Nikolaides, *Science and Eastern Orthodoxy*, xvi. More recently Tihon has expressed certain doubts concerning the dating of the treatise. See Tihon, "Barlaam de Seminara. *Traité sur la date de Pâques*", 402.

[23] *PLP* 21181.

[24] On Gregoras' diplomatic mission, see Schreiner, "Die Gesandtschaftsreise des Nikephoros Gregoras nach Serbien (1326/27)"; Id., "Viaggiatori a Bisanzio: il diplomatico, il monaco, il mercante"; Karpozilos, " Ē Makedonia kata tēn epochē tōn Palaiologōn".

[25] Nikephoros Gregoras, *Nicephori Gregorae epistulae*, vol. 2 (hereafter: Gregoras, *Letters*). Gregoras, *Letter* 114, lines 55–63: Ἐφόδια δέ μοι πρὸς τοὖργον αἱ συχναὶ τῶν πολλῶν συνωθήσεις καὶ ἱκεσίαι γεγένηνται τά τε ἄλλα προτείνουσαι δίκαια καὶ ὅτι καθάπαξ πάντας ὁ χρόνος φθάσας παρείλετο καὶ οὐδαμῆ γε οὐδένα τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ἀφῆκεν Ἑλλήνων, ὃς τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς φιλοσοφίας, τὴν τῶν μαθημάτων δηλαδὴ τετρακτύν, ἀκοαῖς ἀνθρώπων παράσχοι καὶ ψυχὰς πεινώσας ἐμπλήσειε, καὶ κίνδυνον ἐντεῦθεν μάλα πρόχειρον εἶναι ζημιοῦσθαι τὸ γένος, χρῆμα πάντων χρημάτων, ὁπόσα γῆ παρέσχεν ἡλίῳ θεᾶσθαι τὸ κάλλιστον. διά τοι τοῦτο καὶ διδασκαλεῖον αὐτὸς ἀνέῳξα καὶ κόποις ἐκδέδωκα ἐμαυτόν […] See also Bydén, *Theodore Metochites' Stoicheiosis astronomike*, 37.

[26] Ševčenko, "Some Autographs of Nicephorus Gregoras"; Barlaam de Seminara, *Traités sur les éclipses de Soleil de 1333 et 1337*, 151.

[27] Metochites, *Two Poems. Poem* 4, lines 1–3: Φίλα Νικηφόρε μοι κεφαλά, τὸν ἔγωγ' εἴραμαι κατ' ἄρ ἐμᾶς σοφίης, ἥτις ποτ' ἂν ἔῃ, λιπέσθαι ἐξ ἄρα διάδοχον […]; cf. *Nicephori Gregorae byzantina historia*, vol. 1, 309, lines 6–11 (hereafter: Gregoras, *History*); Metochites, *Two Poems*, 13.

[28]   For Ševčenko's dating of Gregoras' commentary on Synesios' *On Dreams* to the period between 1330 and 1332, see Ševčenko, "Some Autographs of Nicephorus Gregoras". Importantly, recently Börje Bydén revisited Ševčenko's identification of the original dedicatee of Gregoras' commentary as John Kantakouzenos and, consequently, proposed an earlier date for the composition of the commentary, namely before May 1328. I am grateful to the author for this reference. For Bydén's arguments in favour of an earlier dating, see Bydén, "Nikephoros Gregoras' Commentary on Synesius, *De insomniis*".

[29]   *PLP* 21437.

[30]   Nikephoros Gregoras, *Fiorenzo o intorno alla sapienza* (hereafter: Gregoras, *Phlorentios*); Bydén, "The Criticism of Aristotle in Nikephoros Gregoras' *Florentius*".

[31]   Tihon, "Les sciences exactes à Byzance", 380–434; Barlaam de Seminara, *Traités sur les éclipses de Soleil de 1333 et 1337*, 156; Bydén, "The Criticism of Aristotle in Nikephoros Gregoras' *Florentius*", 111.

[32]   P. L. Leone, "Nicephori Gregorae 'Antilogia' et 'Solutiones quaestionum'".

[33]   On whether the debate between Gregoras and Barlaam actually happened, see Gregoras, *Phlorentios*, 32. While Leone considers the *Phlorentios* purely fictional, Medvedev disagrees. Medvedev, *Vizantijskij gumanizm*, 15.

[34]   Bydén, "The Criticism of Aristotle in Nikephoros Gregoras' *Florentius*", 111. Paraskeuopoulou also points to a date of 1331, see Paraskeuopoulou, *To agiologiko kai omilētiko ergo tou Nikephorou Grēgora*, 30.

[35]   For the edition of Ptolemy's *Harmonics*, as well as of Gregoras' additions to it, see Ptolemy, *Die Harmonielehre des Klaudios Ptolemaios*. For an English translation and a commentary, see Ptolemy, *Harmonics*, trans. by Solomon. Compare it with the translation and commentary in Barker, *Greek Musical Writings*, vol. 2, 276–391. For a German translation and commentary, see Düring (ed.), *Ptolemaios und Porphyrios über die Musik*. On the dating of Gregoras' emendations, see Tihon, "Numeracy and Science", 809.

[36]   Nikephoros Gregoras, *Rhomäische Geschichte. Historia Rhomaïke*, trans. J. L. van Dieten, vol. 2, 16.

[37]   On hesychasm and the anti-palamite controversy, see Meyendorff, *Introduction à l'étude de Grégoire Palamas*; Id., *Byzantine Hesychasm: Historical, Theological and Social Problems*; Id., *St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodox Spirituality*; Id., "Is 'Hesychasm' the Right Word?"; Conticello and Contoumas-Conticello, *La théologie byzantine et sa tradition*; Russell, "Palamism and the Circle of Demetrius Cydones"; Rigo (ed.), *Gregorio Palamas e oltre*; Krausmüller, "The Rise of Hesychasm"; Cañellas, *La résistance d'Akindynos à Grégoire Palamas*.

[38]   *PLP* 21456.

[39]   Ierodiakonou, "The Anti-Logical Movement in the Fourteenth Century", 221.

[40]   *PLP* 13900.

[41]   John Kyparissiotes, "Palamiticae transgressiones", in *PG*, vol. 152, 733, 736. See also Russell, "Palamism and the Circle of Demetrius Cydones", 158.

[42]   Gregoras, *History*.

[43]   See, for instance, Bianconi, "La biblioteca di Cora tra Massimo Planude e Niceforo Gregora", 416.

[44]   I am currently preparing for publication the results from my study of *codd. Vat. gr.* 164 and 165 which was sponsored by New Europe College and the Black Sea Link fellowship scheme.

[45]   Nikephoros Gregoras, *Nikifor Grigora. Istoriya* [*Никифор Григора. История*], trans. Shalfeev.

[46]   Nikephoros Gregoras, *Istoriya romeev* [*История Ромеев*], trans. R. Yashunskiy.

[47]   Nikephoros Gregoras, *Rōmaikē istoria: Periodos I: 1204–1341: Kephalaia 1–11*, trans. Moschos.

[48]   Nikephoros Gregoras, *Rhomäische Geschichte = Historia Rhomaïke*, ed. J. L. van Dieten and F. H. Tinnefeld.

[49]   See Foteini Kolovou's project entitled *Nikephoros Gregoras:* Rhomaike Historia. *An edition for the Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae, Series Berolinensis*, currently underway at Leipzig.

[50]   Ierodiakonou and Bydén, "Byzantine Philosophy", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

[51]   Manolova, "Discourses of Science and Philosophy in the Letters of Nikephoros Gregoras".

[52]   *PLP* 4222.

[53]   Gregoras, *Letter* 134, lines 14–26: πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔλεγε καὶ δεῖν μὴ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοῖς φίλοις συνεύχεσθαι· τὴν γὰρ οὖσαν ὑπερβάντας τύχην ἥκιστ' ἔχειν τὴν ὁμοίαν ἔτι δύνασθαι φιλίαν. ποῦ γὰρ ἂν εἴη 'κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων' ἔτι, τῆς τύχης οὐκ οὔσης κοινῆς; ποῦ δὲ 'ψυχὴ μία' καὶ τρόπος εἷς, τυραννουμένων τῶν ψυχῶν ὑπό γε τῆς λειποτακτούσης τύχης κἂν συλλόγοις καὶ καθέδραις τε καὶ στάσεσι πλεῖον ἔχειν τοῦ καθεστῶτος ἀπαιτούσης ἐν πᾶσιν ἀεί; 'ἰσότης' γάρ φησι 'φιλότης'· τοὐναντίον δ' ἀνισότης μήτηρ διαστάσεως. ῥᾷστα γὰρ εἴωθεν αὕτη ἀναμοχλεύειν τὴν γνώμην καὶ καπηλεύειν τὸ ἦθος καὶ ὑποψίας ἀναβακχεύειν, ὁπόσαι καὶ οἶαι μὴ μάλα ἁρμόττουσαι τῇ φιλίᾳ πεφύκασι. ταῦτα λέγων, ἐπήγετο καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα συμμαχοῦντα τῷ δόγματι καὶ 'τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι' φάσκοντα.

[54]   *Ibid.*, lines 40–52: ἐπεὶ δὲ σὺ καλῶς καὶ βεβαίως ἐρριζωμένος καὶ ἡδρασμένος τῷ καλῷ θεμελίῳ τοῦ πνεύματος ἔμεινας ἐπὶ τῶν ὅρων ἐκείνων ἱστάμενος ἀκλινὴς καὶ ὀφρύος καὶ τύφου παντὸς ἐλεύθερον τὸ φρόνημα καθάπαξ τετήρηκας ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ μεγέθει τῆς τύχης, καὶ ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ ἀντίστροφον εἰ ἐξ ὕψους τινὸς ἐς βυθοὺς θαλαττίους αὐτὸς κατηνέχθης, οὕτω τὴν γνώμην διέθηκας, πολλὴν ἐμοὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν κατὰ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐχαρίσω δογμάτων καὶ δριμυτέρους ἤδη κατὰ τῆς ἐκείνου κεφαλῆς τοὺς ἐλέγχους ἐξώπλισας. σημεῖόν γε μὴν ἐποιησάμην τοῦ

τοῖς τῆς φιλίας ἐκείνης ἐμμένειν σε τρόποις καὶ νόμοις, οὐχ ὅπως τὸ ζητεῖν σε γραμμάτων ἡμετέρων νιφάδας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δι' ἔργων πειρᾶσθαι γοητεύειν τὴν ἡμετέραν γνώμην καὶ χεῖρα, πρός γε τὸ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι τῶν ῥαθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ὄκνων οὐδέσιν ἡμᾶς.

55 Brouwer, "Polybius and Stoic *Tyche*", 114.

56 Gregoras, *Letter* 134, lines 52–59: χάριτας οὖν σοι μὴ μόνον τῶν ὅλων ὡμολογησάμην ἕνεκα, ὅτι μὴ μᾶλλον τῆς συμμαχίας τοῦ πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην πολέμου. ἔδειξας γὰρ οὐκ οὐσίαν οὖσαν τὴν τύχην τινά, ἀλλ' ὄνομα μόνον περιϊὸν καὶ πλανώμενον καὶ ταῖς τῶν κουφοτέρων ἀκοαῖς ἐνοχλοῦν· ὧν δὴ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὰς ἡνίας ὁπώσποτε ἐνδιδόντων καὶ κρίσιν ἡγεμονικὴν οὐδαμῇ χαριζομένων τῇ τῶν κινουμένων ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως πραγμάτων ἐπιστασίᾳ, χώραν λαμβάνειν ἐντεῦθεν τὴν ἄγνοιαν καὶ οὑτωσί πως τὸ τῆς τύχης παρεισάγειν ὄνομα, καθάπερ σκότος μεθισταμένου φωτός.

57 *PLP* 21365.

58 Tr. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in Aristotle, *Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1, 27. Aristotle, *Physics* II 5, 197a5–197a7: δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του. διὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διάνοια καὶ τύχη· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις οὐκ ἄνευ διανοίας. Aristotle, *Physica*, ed. W. D. Ross.

59 Aristotle, *Physics* II 6, 197a37–197b1: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, τοῦτο δ' οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης. Aristotle, *Physica*, ed. W. D. Ross.

60 Gregoras, *Letter* 42, lines 52–53: ὡς οὐκ ἐπίσης τύχη καὶ αὐτόματον. τύχη μὲν γὰρ αὐτόματον ἔποιτ' ἄν, τοὐναντίον δ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

61 For a detailed analysis of the argumentation in *Letters* 134 and 42, see my "Epistolography and Philosophy".

62 Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II 4, 196a26–28: ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι τὴν δίνην καὶ τὴν κίνησιν τὴν διακρίνασαν καὶ καταστήσασαν εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν τὸ πᾶν.

63 Gregoras, *Letter* 42, lines 66–70: κακῶς δ' ἔφη Δημόκριτος 'ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου τὴν δίνην καὶ κίνησιν γίνεσθαι, ἣ πρὸς τήνδε τὴν τάξιν διέκρινε τόδε τὸ πᾶν'. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἰοῦσι καὶ ἄτρεπτον κεκτημένοις τὴν κίνησιν οὔτε τύχη οὔτ' αὐτόματον ἐσχήκει χώραν.

64 Nikephoros Gregoras, *Nicephori Gregorae Explicatio in librum Synesii "De insomniis"*.

65 Gregoras, *History*, vol. 2, 723, line 12–724, line 6.

66 Nikephoros Gregoras, *Antirrhetika I*, ed. H.-V. Beyer, Oration 1, section 7, 165, lines 3–16: καὶ πρῶτον, ὃ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ πάνυ φησίν, ὡς ,Οὐχ ἅπαντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὑπό τινος ἄνωθεν ἀνάγκης συμβαίνειν οἴεσθαι χρὴ καὶ ἄτρεπτα γίγνεσθαι καθ' εἱμαρμένην τινὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλ' αὐτὴν μὲν τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων κίνησιν ἐξ αἰῶνος ἄτρεπτον κατὰ γένεσιν θείαν καὶ τάξιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, τήν γε μὴν τῶν ἐπιγείων ὑπὸ φύσεως μὲν διοικεῖσθαι', συμφυὲς τὸ τρεπόμενόν τε καὶ ῥέον ἐχούσης ἀεί, ,ἕπεσθαί γε μὴν ὁπώσποτε καὶ τὴν ἄνωθεν αἰτίαν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐ μὴν ὡς ἐπίπαν ἀνθρώποις καταληπτήν'· πολύχουν μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια κατά τινας λόγους

,καθολικωτέρους᾽, πᾶσιν, οἷς νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως μέτεστι, σύμφωνον ἂν εἴη. Τάς γε μὴν γενεθλιαλογικὰς ἐπισκέψεις καί, ὅσα παρ᾽ ἐνίων γνωμολογεῖται περὶ τῆς ἑκάστων ἰδιοτρόπου συγκράσεως, τοῦτο δ᾽ ὄχλον εἶναι μάλα τοι σφόδρα μάταιον καὶ μόχθον, ἀνήνυτον καὶ ἀκατάληπτον κεκτημένον τὸ πέρας, οὐ Πτολεμαίῳ μόνῳ τῷ πάνυ δοκοῦν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τὰ θεῖα πολλῷ Βασιλείῳ.

[67] For more on Gregoras' views on astrology, see Tihon, "Astrological Promenade in Byzantium in the Early Palaiologan Period".

[68] Basil of Caesarea, *Homélies sur l'Hexaéméron*, ed. Stanislas Giet. Sixth homily, section 7, lines 1–60.

[69] Bydén, *Theodore Metochites'* Stoicheiosis astronomike, 351.

[70] Bydén, *Theodore Metochites'* Stoicheiosis astronomike.

[71] *Ibid.*, 352.

[72] *Ibid.*, 352.

[73] Ptolemy, *Claudii Ptolemaei Opera quae exstant omnia*, ed. W. Hübner, F. Boll, and E. Boer, vol. III, 1, Apotelesmatika, Book I, chapter 3, section 6, line 1–section 7, line 4: ἔπειθ᾽ ὅτι μηδ᾽ οὕτως ἅπαντα χρὴ νομίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ τῆς ἄνωθεν αἰτίας παρακολουθεῖν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀπό τινος ἀλύτου καὶ θείου προστάγματος καθ᾽ ἕνα ἕκαστον νενομοθετημένα καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποβησόμενα, μηδεμιᾶς ἄλλης ἁπλῶς αἰτίας ἀντιπρᾶξαι δυναμένης, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τῆς μὲν τῶν οὐρανίων κινήσεως καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην θείαν καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀποτελουμένης, τῆς δὲ τῶν ἐπιγείων ἀλλοιώσεως καθ᾽ εἱμαρμένην φυσικὴν καὶ μεταπτωτήν, τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας ἄνωθεν λαμβανούσης κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατ᾽ ἐπακολούθησιν, καὶ ὡς τῶν μὲν διὰ καθολικωτέρας περιστάσεις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συμβαινόντων, οὐχὶ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας ἑκάστου φυσικῆς ἐπιτηδειότητος […]

[74] Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, trans. F. E. Robbins, Book I. 3, 23–25.

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] See for instance, Gregoras' *On the Number Seven*. Sbordone, "L' ebdomadario di Niceforo Gregora". Cf. with the *Histories* of Laonikos Chalkokondyles. Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *Laonici Chalcocandylae Historiarum Demonstrationes*, ed. J. Darkó, vol. 1, 88, line 14–90, line 7. See also Akisik, "Self and Other in the Renaissance", 76–77.

[77] Gregoras, *History*, vol. 1, 4, lines 9–14: τὰ μὲν γὰρ καθάπερ σιγῶντες κήρυκες τῆς θείας μεγαλουργίας, τὸν ἅπαντα διαγίγνονται χρόνον, αἴσθησιν προκαλούμενα μάρτυρα μόνην. ἡ δ᾽ ἱστορία, ζῶσά τε καὶ λαλοῦσα φωνὴ διαπερᾷ τὸν αἰῶνα καθάπερ ἐν πίνακι παγκοσμίῳ δεικνύουσα τὰ προγεγονότα τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις ἀεὶ […]

[78] Ibid., line 20–5, line 4: δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τὴν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς δόξαν ἐνδοξοτέραν διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας καθίστασθαι, καί, ἵν᾽ εἴπω, λαμπροτέραν πολλῷ τὴν λαμπρότητα. ποῦ γὰρ ἂν ᾔδεσαν ἄνθρωποι, τῆς ἱστορίας οὐκ οὔσης, ὡς ὁ μὲν οὐρανὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἀρχῆθεν ἀεὶ καὶ ἀκίνητον κινούμενος κίνησιν, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ πάντας ἀστέρας διηνεκῶς ἐξελίττει πρὸς ποικιλίαν ὁμοίως εὔτακτόν τε καὶ εὔρυθμον, καὶ ὁμοίως τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ διηγεῖται δόξαν ἐφ᾽ ἡμέρᾳ τε καὶ νυκτὶ δι᾽ αἰῶνος·

79   Ibid., vol. 1, 5, lines 14–16: ἀλλὰ νῦν γε πρὸς τούτοις καὶ προφήτας […] τοὺς μετιόντας ποιεῖ, ἐκ τῶν φθασάντων στοχαζομένους τὰ μέλλοντα.

80   Gregoras, *Letter* 69, lines 30–35: οὐ γὰρ ἄχρι χλόης καὶ ποιμνίων καὶ ὁπόσα γῆς ὅρια τοὺς ὅρους ὥρισω τῆς σῆς διανοίας, ἀλλ' ἄχρι καὶ οὐρανίων ἁψίδων ἀνῆλθες, τὴν κοινωνίαν εὐφυῶς τῶν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ζητῶν καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτια τουτωνὶ καὶ ὅθεν οἱ τῆς γενέσεως κατιόντες λόγοι βόσκουσι μυστικῶς τὰ ἐπίγεια.

81   *Ibid.*, lines 45–48: ἐγώ σοι λοιπὸν λαμπρὸν ἑτέρωθεν συγκροτήσω τὸ θέατρον, ἵν' ἐντεῦθεν γνοίης ὅπως τοῖς οὐρανίοις συνάπτεται τὰ ἐπίγεια καὶ μία τις ἁρμονία καὶ σύνταξις ἑκατέρωθεν ἐς ἑνός τινος ἔργου συνίσταται τελεσφόρημα.

82   *Ibid.*, lines 108–112: ἐβουλόμην γὰρ ταῦτά τε καὶ ὅσα τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων αἴτια πρὸς γῆν καὶ ὁπόσα ἐφ' ἡμέρᾳ καὶ νυκτὶ τὰ τῆς ἐργασίας αὐτῶν, ἔστιν ἅ σοι δηλοῦν, ὡς ἂν τῆς τε σοφίας τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ τεχνίτου θεοῦ τεκμήραιο καὶ ὅσον τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης κράτος, καὶ ἔτι σὺ σαυτῷ φανείης τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἔρωτος ἡδίων.

83   The only discussion of this passage in the secondary literature, to my knowledge, is offered by Alexander Kazhdan in his "L'histoire de Cantacuzène en tant qu'œuvre littéraire", 320–3.

84   *PLP* 10983.

85   Gregoras, *History*, Book XXVIII, 45, vol. 3, 205, lines 21–22: καὶ μάλιστα νῦν ὅτε συχνοῖς περιαντλεῖσθαι συμβαίνει βιαίοις πραγμάτων κύμασι καὶ σάλῳ τύχης αὐτούς·

86   *Ibid.*, Book XXVIII, 46, vol. 3, 206, lines 7–13: εἰ δὲ τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον ἄγει τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν ἡμῶν ἐξ ἀφανοῦς ἐπιτίθεται τυραννοῦσα θέλησιν, καὶ ἄκοντες δρῶμεν καὶ πάσχομεν ὑπ' ἀνάγκης […], σοὶ μὲν οὐκ ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδ' ὅρους κινεῖν ὑπεζευγμένους ἀνάγκαις βουλήσομαι τοῦ λοιποῦ, ἀλλ' ὑπόψομαι καὶ φυλάξομαι τὴν ἀδράστειαν […]

87   *Ibid.*, Book XXVIII, 46–47, vol. 3, 206, line 15–207, line 23.

88   *Ibid.*, Book XXVIII, 48, vol. 3, 207, line 23–208, line 1.

89   *Ibid.*, 208, lines 2–5.

90   *Ibid.*, Book XXVIII, 50, vol. 3, 209, lines 12–14: δέον οὖν ἐπαινεῖν ὅτι τῇ θείᾳ προνοίᾳ καὶ ὁ ἐμὸς ἀγόμενος πατήρ, καὶ ἀφύκτῳ δουλεύων ἀνάγκῃ […]

91   *Ibid.*, Book XXVIII, 51–65, vol. 3, 210, line 5–220, line 6.

92   *Ibid.*, Book XXVIII, 51, vol. 3, 210, lines 15–17.

93   *Ibid.*, Book XXVIII, 51–52, vol. 3, 210, line 19–211, line 1.

94   *Ibid.*, Book XXVIII, 58, vol. 3, 214, lines 13–18.

95   *Ibid.*, 215, lines 7–8.

96   *Ibid.*, Book XXVIII, 59, vol. 3, 216, lines 3–10.

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EXPLAINING RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT (1991-2013)

Transnistria is Republic of Moldova's breakaway region situated in its eastern part and separated from it by the river Nistru (*Dnestr*). It proclaimed its independence from Moldova in 1990 and after the war of 1992 Transnistria consolidated its *de facto state*.

The biggest problem for any prospect of settlement of the Transnistrian conflict within the framework of a unitary and sovereign Moldovan state is the Russian policy. Russia has played a central role in the emergence, formation and maintenance of the Transnistrian *de facto state*. Its role in the Transnistrian conflict is incontestable and well documented. Yet political science scholarship and expert analyses on this issue provide insufficient accounts about the main factors which influenced Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis the Transnistrian conflict. The academic and policy literature on the Transnistrian conflict is very rich. However it is dominated by theoretically uninformed analyses which focuses on specific aspects of the conflict, and by works which, often implicitly, adopt a particular theoretical perspective without testing it against the evidence.

Among those researches which implicitly or explicitly employ theoretical explanations (International Relations theories) in order to explain Russia's general and particular policy towards Transnistria we can distinguish among three approaches: constructivism, liberal and realist.

Constructivists generally share the assumption that ideational factors such as identity, culture and norms are decisive in shaping state's national interests and its external conduct.[1] Here we may identify between two broad groups of scholars and experts. On the one hand, there is the group who treat ideational factors as deeply rooted features and very difficult to change, and on the other hand, those who regard these ideational factors as only "relatively stable" mental constructs. The former often

refers to Russia's imperial, Soviet or Cold War identities. The latter, known as "social constructivists", analyse Russia's foreign policy through its "collectively held ideas" in some particular period.

Liberal theories on foreign policy highlight the central role of state-society relations for state's foreign policy preferences.[2] They are very close to the constructivist theories and sometimes are indistinguishable. Nevertheless, in liberal approaches the most important factors affecting foreign policies are considered to be the domestic politics and political regimes.

Realist theories, despite their diversity (offensive, defensive, neoclassical, etc.), build their explanations on the basic assumptions that states compete for power and security in an anarchical international system. Realists usually claim that external (geopolitical) context is more important than domestic politics, ideas, identities, etc., States, especially great powers, tend to maximize power and influence and react to any change of the systemic or regional status quo.

This paper aims at advancing the understanding of Russian foreign policy toward the Transnistrian conflict by confronting these approaches against the empirical record since 1991 until 2013. Shedding light on the causes of Russian foreign policy toward the Transnistrian conflict could help us better understand the current regional events and their underlying challenges.

This paper proceeds in two parts, each divided in two sections. The first part focuses on the Boris Yeltsin's period. The first section focuses in detail only on the first year, from August1991 to July 1992. This stage is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, this is perhaps the least studied period of Russian foreign policy. Second, it was during this timeframe that the most interesting events occurred: the fall of the USSR, the birth of the CIS, the war in Transnistria, etc. The second section deals with the Russia's Transnistrian policy evolution in the post-war period until mid-1999. The second part analyzes Russian policy in the Putin-Medvedev era, since late 1999 until 2013.

Russia's Policy toward Transnistria under President Yeltsin (1991-1999)

How do liberalism, constructivism and realism perform in explaining Russian policy toward the Transnistrian conflict during Yeltsin's

presidency? In other words, what were the driving forces behind Russian policy: ideas, domestic politics or power/geopolitical considerations? To answer this question, this section focuses on two phases: since August 1991 until the end of the war in Transnistria (July 1992), and the subsequent period until the arrival of V. Putin as Prime-Minister.

August 1991-July 1992

According to the liberal and constructivist authors, Russian foreign policy in general and in particular regarding Moldova/Transnistrian conflict is an anomaly for the realist theories and could be explained only in terms of ideas or/and the domestic politics.

There is a broad consensus among scholars and policy experts who depict the initial period of the Russian foreign policy as "pro-Western" (Tsygankov, 2010), "liberal internationalist" (Clunan, 2009; D. Lynch, 2000), "Atlanticist" (Litvak, 1996; Jackson, 2003) or "Pro-Western Romanticism" (McFaul, 1999). These labels are often used interchangeably and are based on the assumption that liberal and westernist ideas shared by key Russian policymakers (Yeltsin, Burbulis, Kozyrev, Gaidar, etc.) dominated Russia's initial foreign policy. In concrete terms, this principally meant establishing alliance relationship with the West, renouncement of geopolitical thinking and isolation from the former Soviet republics.[3] From this point of view, A. Tsygankov claims, the CIS was only a "transitional institutional umbrella" and "never meant […] to facilitate cooperation and interdependence in the region".[4] For the Russian policy toward Moldova/ Transnistrian conflict, this entailed support of the "democratic Moldovan government" in its struggle against "pro-communist Dniester Republic".[5] This argument is also shared by analysts less concerned with theoretical appraisal as for example the experts of the International Crisis Group who claim that Moscow took initially an "anti-Transdniestrian" stance and that between August 1991 and the spring of 1992, "it did not interfere with Moldova's ambitions to move towards the West".[6]

This "unchallenged Atlanticist domination in the Russian government",[7] as the argument goes, lasted until the spring of 1992 when nationalistic and conservative forces begun to actively oppose those political circles which shared a "single-minded focus on the West".[8] According to this line of reasoning, if there was some support for Transnistria, it came principally from these nationalistic/conservative forces led by such politicians as the Vice President A. Rutskoi or the Speaker R. Hasbulatov.

Another allegedly important player was the 14th Army in Transnistria which promoted its own policy agenda. By some accounts, the army acted during the entire armed phase of the conflict (March-July 1992) without the consent of Moscow[9] or against its orders.[10] By other accounts, the 14th Army enjoyed some support from the political leadership and the military hierarchy, but this came only after its intervention in the conflict which eventually compelled Moscow to put it under its command in order to avoid further escalation of violence.[11]

The historical evidence, however, refutes this liberal-constructivist argumentation and confirms instead the realist hypothesis. Between the late August 1991 and the spring of 1992, Russian policy was neither "isolationist" regarding the other Soviet republics nor was it "anti-Transnistrian" (and pro-Moldovan). Indeed, until late November 1991, Russian leadership pursued the aim of restoring the broken links within the Soviet Union which at that tame had *de facto* disappeared as many republics declared (or pursued) independence. The approach here was, first, to reach an economic agreement (Treaty on Economic Community of the Sovereign States)[12] and then, conclude a political agreement establishing a new political entity in the form of a confederation under the name of Union of Sovereign States (*Sojuz Suverenyh Gosudarstv*).[13] As many republics were refusing to be dragged into a new political project, and in order to "stimulate" them, president Yeltsin made clear in late October 1991 that Russia's economic relations with those states which promote "artificial isolation from the economic and political community" would be based on world prices (in hard currency).[14]

Russia has also played the territorial card. The best illustration of this is the statement made on 26 August 1991 by Yeltsin's press secretary P. Voshanov two days after Ukraine proclaimed independence. He warned the Soviet republics (except the Baltic States) stating that: "there is the issue of borders which unsettledness is possible and admissible only if enshrined by a relevant treaty establishing unional relationship. In case of their termination, the RSFSR reserves the right to raise the issue of revising the frontiers."[15] And, this was not a new approach. On 22 November 1990, A. Kozyrev himself stressed out during a session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR which ratified the Russo-Ukrainian agreement that the Ukrainian frontiers were recognized only "in the currently existing borders within the USSR" or, in the event of a renewed union, "in the framework of the Union of Sovereign States".[16] Nor was Voshanov expressing exclusively Yeltsin's opinion. For example, V. Lukin[17] reiterated the same

message stating that "when some states would unilaterally violate unional relationship, then it will be necessary to conduct separate conversation about the boundaries".[18] In the same vein, F. Shelov-Kovedeaev[19] pointed to the Ukrainian regions of Sloboda (*Slobodskaja Ukraina*), Novorossija and Crimea highlighting that "if Ukraine will completely break away from Russia then on its vast expanses might appear processes that will threaten its internal integrity".[20] The then mayor of Moscow, G. Popov had even proposed to merge the region of Odessa with Transnistria.[21]

Under these circumstances, there is no surprise that Moscow has not supported the punitive measures of the Moldovan authorities who arrested in late August 1991 the leaders of the Transnistrian and Gagauz breakaway republics for their support of the GKChP.[22] In the end, all they were released by 1 October '91 as a result of the conclusion of two protocols mediated by N. Medvedev.[23] Most importantly, by the terms of this deal, Transnistria gained equal footing in negotiations with Moldovan authorities which had to settle the standoff exclusively by peaceful and non-coercive means.[24]

Moldova, however, pursued complete political independence from the Soviet Union and "increased rapprochement" with Romania.[25] Notwithstanding the signature on 6 November '91 of the economic agreement (initialled on 1 October '91), the then Prime-Minister V. Muravschi reiterated that Moldova was not intending to join any political or military union.[26] Against this backdrop, the dynamic of the conflict has considerably increased. Tiraspol organized on 1 December 1991 presidential elections, won by I. Smirnov, and a referendum on independence. In order to defend Tiraspol authorities from eventual Moldovan powerful measures, on 3 December, the commander of the 14th Guards Army, G. Iakovlev became the chairman of the Transnistrian Republican Department of Defence and Security and remained in office until mid-January 1992.[27]

Certainly, Moscow did not intend to recognize Transnistria. All these measures were principally aiming at bolstering Transnistria's bargaining power and bring Moldovan authorities at the negotiation table with Tiraspol. This policy line was well articulated in a joint declaration on Moldova made by the presidents of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, on 8 December 1991. That statement urged "the parties to sit at the negotiating table for the settlement of the occurred disputes" and expressed the "conviction" that "all the contentious issues in the republic, including the rights of national minorities, should be resolved by peaceful means".[28]

The fact that the situation in Moldova was approached in Minsk alongside such issues as the fate of the USSR and the creation of the CIS proves that the Transnistrian conflict was at the top of Yeltsin's political agenda.

From the economic point of view, Moldova was presenting neither a special interest for Russia nor for an eventual renewed union. Yet, Moldova geographic location represented a key strategic importance for Moscow. To recall that in 1984, the "Stavka" of the High Command of the South-western Direction was established in Chișinău. It suffices a brief looking at the military formations under its command to understand its strategic value: the Kiev and Odessa military districts, the Black Sea Fleet (Sevastopol), the 24th Air Army VGK ON (Vinnitsa), the Southern Group of Forces (Budapest), the 2nd independent Communications Brigade (Chișinău), etc. And with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the strategic role of the south-western group had only increased.[29] The territory of Moldova alone, according to the most conservative estimates, was sutured with enough weaponry for two armies.[30] In this respect, controlling Transnistria was instrumental for exerting the control on Moldova.

Moreover, Transnistria in itself represented an important geopolitical asset as many Russian officials sought it as a bridgehead for Russia's influence in the region. The best illustration of this is a note (unpublished) of E. M. Kozhokin[31] addressed in late 1991 to I. F. Yarov.[32] Kozhokin underscored the role of Transnistria as a "bridgehead for Russian influence in the near Balkan region (*pribalkanskij region*)" and substantiated his argument as follows: "Transnistria would serve as a basis for any kind of activity (from economic to intelligence) of the Russian state in the region which has historically been a zone of our vital interests (southern Ukraine, Bessarabia, Romania and Bulgaria)."[33]

The official dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the CIS on 8 and 21 December 1991 have not changed Russia's geopolitical approach neither towards Transnistria nor regarding its "near abroad". Quite the contrary, the CIS confirmed this approach as it was principally an attempt to accommodate Ukraine. To recall that Kiev was steadfastly severing itself from the union since 24 August 1991 and the referendum on independence of 1 December 1991 in which 90% voted for independence had put an end to all hopes regarding a renewed political union.[34] Signing the agreement on USS without Ukraine would not only mean a stillborn union as its economy represented 25% of the USSR's GDP, but, most importantly, it would have allowed Ukraine to establish effective control over the

colossal armed forces on its territory. This aspect is usually neglected but it should be stressed out in the first place. In 1991, on the Ukrainian territory was deployed the third nuclear arsenal in the world, superior to that of France, UK, and China combined and inferior only to U.S. and Russia.[35] In conventional terms, the armed forces located in Ukraine were even more impressive. It would be sufficient to remark that Ukraine enjoyed "a significant advantage in conventional forces in Europe" as General L. Kuznetsov has worryingly noticed.[36]

The CIS agreement responded precisely to this fundamental military issue as it provided that the Commonwealth members "will preserve and maintain under unified command a common military-strategic space, including unified control over nuclear weapons" (art. 6).[37] For Russia, this meant keeping the army united and subsequently creating a sort of military-political alliance, in some respects similar to NATO.[38] It is worth noting here that Russia imposed its conditional approach on the issue of borders. The article 5 of the Minsk Agreement stated that "territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers" were respected and recognized (only) "within the Commonwealth". One of the authors of the agreement, S. Shakhrai (then State Counsellor on legal policy and Deputy Prime Minister) explained that this article "was referring to Crimea and all other things" in the sense that: "If you want a problem with Crimea, quit the CIS. Or, conversely, integrate the CIS and there will be no border problems."[39]

Not surprisingly then that territorial problems occurred as early as January 1992 since Ukraine struggled to take possession of the armed forces on its soil, including the Black Sea Fleet, agreeing to put only the nuclear weapons under the control of the CIS' unified commandment.[40] For Ukraine, the CIS was merely a form of "civilized divorce" and a first step towards complete independence.[41] In this context, the Russian Supreme Soviet and the MFA commanded the examination of the "Crimean issue" by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (chaired by V. Lukin) which issued on 17 January 1992 the recommendation regarding the cancelation of USSR's decision of 1954 to cede Crimea to Ukraine.[42] It is important to notice that this recommendation was made exactly the day when the first All-Army Officers' Assembly took place in the Kremlin Palace during which the President Yeltsin had emphatically declared that Russia (like Kazakhstan) will "stand to death for unified armed forces".[43]

The desire to keep the former Soviet army united and to form the CIS armed forces was the chief priority of Russia's foreign policy toward its near abroad in the first months of 1992. With much reluctance, Moscow

accepted the idea that a part of the armed forces will enter in the national armies (of Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine, etc.), but it sought to maintain the most important part of them under the CIS high command (Marshal E. Shaposhnikov). So, in early January 1992, the CIS Deputy Commander-in-Chief B. Piankov was charged to conduct negotiations on military issues. On 29 January, the CIS' group of officers led by B. Piankov was included in the State Delegation of the Russian Federation set up by B. Yeltsin in order to prepare the agreements on the "totality of political-military issues" with the former Soviet states.[44] The delegation was headed by S. Shakhrai and comprised different representatives from the executive and legislative power branches, including A. Kozyrev, P. Grachev (then Chairman of the State Committee on Defence), V. Lukin and others.[45]

The negotiations with Moldova have begun in mid-January 1992 and were conducted principally by B. Piankov. From the very beginning, he made clear that the army on the left bank of Nistru (Transnistria) was beyond negotiation and that only the military units on the right bank were susceptible of being left to Moldova, although without specifying how many and what military equipment.[46] After thorny and long negotiations, an agreement on the partition of the army between Moldovan and CIS forces (on temporary basis) was concluded on 20 March between V. Muravschi and Marshal E. Shaposhnikov. Remarkably, throughout this period of "military diplomacy", there was no noteworthy Russian diplomatic initiative for the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. Quite the contrary, Moscow enhanced its support for Tiraspol as the conflict degenerated in early March into armed confrontation between Moldovan police forces and volunteers and Transnistrian Guard backed by the Cossacks.

The conflict escalated exactly at the moment when Moldova was becoming a member of the United Nations. Then, in the night of 1 to 2 March, the police station in Dubăsari was seized by the Transnistrian and Cossack forces and 34 policemen were taken prisoner. After a brief pause (4-8 March), the armed confrontation resumed in Bender/Tighina (9-13 March)[47] and in the area of Dubăsari (14-15 and 17 March).[48] On 17 March, the two sides have agreed to a ceasefire.[49] Local skirmishes have occasionally occurred thereafter, yet the intensity of fighting had considerably decreased.

During this first period of armed confrontation in 1992, Moscow supported Tiraspol principally in the economic and defence fields.

Economically, the Russian Central Bank officially registered the Transnistrian cash settlement centre on 12 March 1992, thus enabling Tiraspol to effectuate international transactions bypassing the National Bank of Moldova.[50] This was a fundamental decision because it gave Transnistria economic independence from Moldova. In the defence field, two aspects should be highlighted. Firstly, Russian authorities encouraged, or at least tacitly accepted, the arrival of the Cossacks in Transnistria. Their arrival in the region from Russia (Don and Kuban) begun by mid-December 1991,[51] but their number had significantly risen with the new round of confrontation. By some accounts, almost 800 Cossacks came in Transnistria in the single day of 5 March.[52] Secondly, Moscow and the CIS military commandment allowed Transnistrian forces to take over weapons from the warehouses of the 14th Army. One relevant example: on 14 March, the guardsmen and Cossacks seized the entire arsenal of the Electronic Warfare Battalion located in Parcani, an event about which Russian authorities were informed in advance but did nothing to curb it.[53]

In the second half of March 1992, two particular events changed the regional geopolitical context. On the one side, Moldova-CIS military agreement of 20 March meant that Moldova acquiesced to the presence of the CIS forces on its soil, mainly in Transnistria although on a temporary basis. On the other side, Ukraine changed its stance on the conflict and, on 17 March, L. Kravchuk issued a decree by which the transition of the Ukrainian territory towards Moldova was halted.[54] In this way, Ukraine turned itself from a gateway to Moldova into a buffer for Russian influence and, at the same time, increased the role of Romania which had no such geographical constraint. A. Kozyrev was particularly anxious about this stating in late March: "we have no border with Moldova; we have a buffer in the form of Ukraine. But Romania has no such buffer…"[55]

These two geopolitical events have lead to a relative shift of Russia's policy expressed in a pro-active diplomacy regarding the conflict resolution, the inclusion of Romania in this process and the prohibition of the arrival of "volunteers" in the conflict zone. The first instance of this shift was the adoption of the CIS declaration of 20 March by which Moldova's territorial integrity was declared the "principal factor of stability in the Commonwealth and in the region" while also emphasising "Moldova's wish to settle the conflict by political means".[56] Regarding the Cossack issue, the declaration stated that the CIS members will neither allow the involvement of foreign citizens in the conflict nor permit the transition of their territories. These terms were reiterated in the Helsinki declaration

of 23 March by the ministers of foreign affairs of Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. In addition, this quadripartite declaration provided for the creation of a "mechanism for political consultations" to resolve the Transnistrian conflict.[57] However, despite the hopes raised by this diplomatic activity, the situation in Transnistria has soon worsened.

Given Tiraspol's refusal of any solution to the conflict that fell short of Moldova's federalization with Transnistria (and Gagauzia) as subject and also, perhaps, overestimating the geopolitical advantages, Moldova passed to powerful measures. On 28 March, President Snegur decreed the state of emergency throughout Moldova and sent an ultimatum urging Tiraspol to surrender arms or otherwise Moldovan forces would "liquidate and disarm" Transnistrian armed formations.[58] Russian reaction came immediately as Moldovan police attempted to establish full control over Bender.[59] On 1 April, B. Yeltsin signed the decree by which the 14th Army, and other military units, formations, institutions, etc., that "have not been included in the armed forces of Moldova", were transferred under Russian jurisdiction.[60] The rationale behind this decision was to defend Transnistria and stop Moldovan advancement. Or how V. Baranets, serving then in the General Staff (CIS), has put: "the presidential decree of April 1 indicated that the Kremlin was trying to cool the aggressive intentions of Chişinău to keep Transnistrians 'in check' by force."[61] Intentionally or not, in the same day was issued A. Kozyrev's interview where he declared that the protections of Russians in Moldova was a priority and that Russia will also use "power methods" (*silovye metody*) if necessary.[62] Not surprisingly the next day, after a long period of silence, the 14th Army Officers' Assembly sent a warning telegram by which it threatened to put the army on full combat alert if Moldovan forces were not stopping fighting.[63]

Simultaneously, the MFA and A. Kozyrev personally increased efforts for turning the course of events from the battlefield to the negotiation table. Relative progress was achieved at the second quadripartite meeting of the foreign ministers held in Chişinău on 6-7 April. Its principal results were an immediate ceasefire, the creation of a mixed commission, in order to observe the ceasefire, and a "goodwill mission" to mediate the dialogue between the sides.[64] At the third quadripartite meeting of 17 April, it was decided to set up a group of military observers (each side with 25 observers).

Further on, however, the negotiations have reached deadlock mainly because of Transnistria's and Russia's insistence to grant a special political status to Transnistria (with the right to self-determination in case of

unification with Romania) and empower the 14th Army with peacekeeping functions. Indeed, A. Kozyrev has raised (unsuccessfully) these issues during both quadripartite meetings of 6 and 17 April.[65] As a consequence of these divergences, the military confrontation resumed with new force from 17 to 21/22 May.

On 17 May, Moldova, using for the first time a limited contingent of military forces with heavy weapons, launched an offensive on the Cocieri-Coșnița direction (Dubăsari) and were close to take the control over the central part of Transnistria and cut it in half.[66] Russian administration foresaw this evolution and sought it as a "direct strategic threat to Russia's interests" as follows from a confidential note of S. Stankevich[67] to B. Yeltsin who served also as Prime Minister (until 15 June '92) and Minister of Defence (until 18 May '92). In that note, Stankevich pointed to the speedy formation of the Moldovan regular army, allegedly trained and equipped with the Romanian support, and warned that the "Transnistrian Guard will not be able to withstand the regular army units."[68] Of course, on 19 May, a contingent of Russian forces consisting of one tank company, three mortar batteries, one anti-tank battery and several other armoured vehicles,[69] which have led in combats additional Transnistrian guards armed by the 14th Army, intervened and stopped Moldova's advance. The newly appointed Defence Minister P. Grachev (18 May) denied any involvement of the Russian forces and insisted that Transnistrians "captured" those arms.[70] In reality, it was a volunteer transfer "carried out on the basis of an agreement between the Russian Ministry of Defence and the TMR."[71] On the involvement of the Russian troops, it seems that they did not have an explicit order to open fire. Nevertheless, the Russian officers were encouraged and even forced to intervene by the retired Col. Gen. A. Makashov who threatened to dismiss and even to imprison some of them in case of no action.[72] The fact that commander I. Netkachev allowed Makashov, a person who had mysteriously escaped prison for his active support of the GKChP, to speak to his subalterns and even threaten them suggests that Makashov enjoyed the support of Moscow from the highest level.

This indirect form of military intervention was conditioned by the geopolitical context. In this period, Russian-Ukrainian relationship has soured to the point that, on 21 May, the Russian Supreme Soviet nullified the Soviet acts of 1954 on Crimea.[73] In this context, Russia could not count on Ukraine in order to assure a supply route for its army in Transnistria. So, an open and direct intervention of Russia in Moldova would have put

an end to diplomatic negotiations which entailed the risk of a large-scale war that Moscow could not afford.

In order to give a new impetus to political negotiations, B. Yeltsin broke the silence on 27 May and promised to withdraw the 14th Army, whilst his ministers A. Kozyrev and P. Grachev conditioned the offer with the final conflict settlement and a special political-juridical status of Transnistria within Moldova.[74] At the same time, P. Grachev warned that in the event of Moldova's military operations in Transnistria he "would find it difficult to restrain the military units subordinated to him".[75] This "stick and carrot" tactical manoeuvring has borne fruit and the two sides engaged in serious negotiations in the first half of June. By mid-June, the sides agreed to a series of measures in order to settle the conflict, the most important of which was perhaps the creation of a "government of national concord" which had to assure proportional national representation in the formation of the governmental institution on all levels.[76] On 18 June, the Moldovan Parliament approved those measures by a special law.[77]

Unfortunately, this peaceful conflict resolution process was brutally halted the next day by an incident (or provocation) at the printing house (near the Moldovan police station) in Bender (Tighina) which has quickly degenerated into intensive fighting. Moldovan Supreme Security Council, the ruling institution during the state of emergency, overreacted and took the decision to launch a massive offensive on Bender in the evening of June 19 involving overall 2500 troops and 56 artillery systems.[78] Bender, including the bridge over Nistru, was relatively rapidly conquered in the night of 19 to 20 June. The Russians and Transnistrians were probably taken by surprise as an eventual attack was expected in Dubăsari were Moldova concentrated up to 3800 troops and 74 pieces of artillery.[79]

From the strategic point of view, Moscow could not allow the fall of Bender under Moldova's rule: if for Chișinău the city was a perfect outpost, for Tiraspol it was a natural buffer. Since the violence has also escalated in South Ossetia (Georgia), on 20 June the Russian government met in urgency and adopted two statements (on Moldova and Georgia)[80] and one resolution (*postanovlenie*) on the use of force.[81] That was a fundamental decision because it empowered the "commanders of formations, units and sub-units of the Armed Forces of Russia in the territory of the former USSR" to take "adequate measures to stop [the] acts of aggression, including firing against the attackers".[82] In the same day started the artillery support of the 14th Army to the Transnistrian counter-offensive in Bender.[83]

By 22 June, due to the Russian military support, Transnistria has retaken a large part of Bender. However, their forces were insufficient to pull Moldovan army and police out of the city, let alone to compel Moldova to make peace on Russian terms. For that, Russia needed the support of Ukraine, and that was eventually obtained during the Dagomys summit (22-23 June) of the presidents, prime ministers and speakers of Russia and Ukraine.[84] Kiev changed its neutral policy on Transnistria and opened its air space for Russian military supplies. Since then, Moscow started preparations for a sort of "peace enforcement" mission and chose Maj. Gen. Alexander Lebed to carry it out.

General Lebed arrived in Tiraspol on 23 June (under the pseudonym "Colonel Gussev") with an airborne battalion of *Spetsnaz*.[85] Even before his official appointment (27 June), he took two fundamental decisions. First, on 24 June he obliged I. Smirnov to sign the decree "On the appointment of the Military Commandant of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic and the city of Tiraspol" in the person of the Colonel M. Bergman.[86] This decree, as M. Bergman puts himself, "subordinated all power structures of the unrecognized republic to the Military Commandant who in turn was subordinated to the commander of the 14th Army".[87] Secondly, he ordered the mobilization of the army and the enrolment of new conscripts from the local population. By the end of June the troops of the 14th Army amounted from overall 10.000 to 17.000.[88] At the same time, he engaged the army in the military confrontations which have resumed in the Dubăsari-Grigoriopol area and, at a low-intensity level, in Bender.

The definitive decision to bring the 14th Army at a new level of engagement was probably taken by B. Yeltsin in June 26, against the backdrop of continuing fighting which was violating the ceasefire agreed the previous day in Istanbul by the presidents of Moldova, Romania, Russia and Ukraine.[89] On 26 June, the General Lebed publicly announced the so-called "armed neutrality" warning that the 14th Army was "strong enough to fight back anyone" and also that it will "interact with the armed formations of Transnistria".[90] The next day, Lebed had been officially appointed as commander of the 14th Army.[91] The same day, the Russian MID expressed a "determined protest over Moldova's continuing military actions" and warned that "the leadership of the Russian Federation cannot stand idly by".[92] Shortly after, President Snegur "noticed the beginning of the economic blockade".[93]

Since Lebed took officially the rule of the 14th Army, the intensity of the war has considerably increased culminating with a massive artillery

attack in the night of 2 to 3 July 1992. During this time, all structures of the Russian MoD were actively involved in boosting the 14th Army's firepower.[94] Dozens of cargo aircrafts were coming in Tiraspol carrying all the 14th Army was in need: different weapons, batteries, laser devices, and even satellite photos of Moldovan positions.[95] Moreover, Col. Gen. Nikolai Dimidjuk, the Commander-in-Chief of the MF & A of the Russian Ground Forces, gave the order to all Russian military districts to not hinder the coming of artillerists in Transnistria.[96] At 3 in the morning of July 3, the 14th Army launched a 45-minutes attack with eight artillery battalions (*divizion*) and six mortar batteries.[97] The exact number of Moldovan causalities remains unknown, but unofficial sources indicate that over 112 Moldavian combatants were killed by that bombardment.[98] After this episode, the continuation of military operation from the Moldovan side became pointless. So, Snegur embarked upon a peaceful course which culminated on 21 July with the signature in Moscow of the "Agreement on the principles for the friendly settlement of the armed conflict in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova" by Yeltsin, Snegur, and also endorsed by Smirnov who put his signature without specifying his title.[99] Besides, the Russian and Moldova presidents issued a *Communiqué*. Two major points should be underscored regarding these agreements. First, by the establishment of a security zone and a trilateral peacekeeping mechanism formed by Russian, Moldovan and Transnistrian military contingents, Russia obtained the legalization of its military presence and also the recognition of Transnistria's right to have its armed forces. Second, Moldova took the engagement to grant Transnistria a political status and only after to proceed with the fate of the 14th Army. This is little noticed but the preamble of the agreement made a reference to the agreement on principles of the conflict resolution reached on 3 July between Yeltsin and Snegur. The most important of them was the granting of a "political status" for Transnistria and, subsequently, the negotiations on withdrawing of the 14th Army.[100] In addition, the *Communiqué* has stipulated Transnistria's "political status" and the "right to self-determination" in the event of "change of the statehood status" of Moldova (i.e. unification with Romania).[101] Here B. Yeltsin had also expressed the hope that Moldova will soon become a full member of the CIS.

August 1992 – November 1999

According to liberal and constructivist scholars the evolution of Russian foreign policy in the '90s was marked by tremendous changes in its domestic politics and identity which accordingly led to a shift away from the initial liberal pro-Westernism/Atlanticism towards a national-pragmatic and even anti-Western stance.[102] For some, the first instance of this shift occurred by late 1992 – when the Prime-Minister Y. Gaidar was replaced with V. Chernomyrdin – and had gradually intensified onwards.[103] For others, liberal ideas ceased to dominate the Russian foreign policy since late 1993.[104] Regardless the disagreement over the timing, liberals and constructivists share a strong vision over Russia's increasing departure from the West in the subsequent years of Yeltsin's presidency. They also underscore the importance of the parliamentary elections of December 1993 (when V. Zhirinovski's LDPR gained almost a quarter of the vote) and those of December 1995 when the Communist Party outranked LDPR as the main opposition party, a fact that compelled B. Yeltsin to replace A. Kozyrev with Y. Primakov at the head of the MFA. In this light, Primakov, who is usually treated in the West as "*homo sovieticus* and Cold War warrior",[105] marked another stage in the growing illiberal trend.

If the liberal and constructivist representations are correct, then one should expect the following Russian foreign policy outcomes regarding the Transnistrian issue. First, we should observe a significant shift from a cooperative towards a more assertive policy occurring in late 1992 or 1993. Second, as most non-realist scholars agree that by late 1993/94 the initial Westernist/Atlanticist period had fade away, we should take notice of a less cooperative Russian policy comparing to the previous period. And third, this assertive trend should have been enhanced after the appointment in 1996 of Y. Primakov at the MFA.

Yet, the historical evidence does not support any of these expectations. First, Russian approach toward the conflict resolution model and the issue of troop withdrawal remained unaltered from 1992 to 1994. To recall that by the terms of the understandings of 21 July 1992 (the peace agreement and the joint declaration of Snegur and Yeltsin), Russia conditioned its withdrawal of armed forces by a final political settlement of the conflict which in turn was conditioned upon the granting of Transnistria a political status within a reunified Moldova which implicitly meant federalization/confederalization of Moldova. President Yeltsin made clear this point on 8 October 1992 when he declared for *Ostankino* TV: "We insist on the fact

that the President of Moldova has to convince the Parliament to provide Transnistria political status[106] which would ensure the implementation in the region of the right to self-determination."[107] Consequently, under these conditions, Russian military and political establishments had no intention to discuss the issue of troop withdrawal. A convincing example in this sense is P. Grachev's telegram to A. Lebed from 16 September '92 in which he stated: "The fate of the 14th Army will be decided after the full resolution by the political means of Transnistria's fate. […] The army will leave only after the consent of the people of Transnistria and Moldova in general."[108]

At the same time, Lebed legalized Transnistrian's possession of all arms and ammunition which had fallen into its hands during the armed conflict by "approving" on 10 September '92 the "Act on seizure of weapons, equipment and ammunition from the units of the 14th Army."[109] It is worth noting that just six days later, President Yeltsin had promoted Lebed into the rank of General-Lieutenant. During the award ceremony which took place on 2 October '92 in Tiraspol, the Russian government has also awarded medals for meritorious service about 200 servicemen.[110]

Second, Russian policy on Transnistria in 1994 contradicts the prediction of a less cooperative foreign policy. In fact, it was exactly this year that marked the first progress regarding the conditions for the conflict resolution and the timeframe for troop withdrawal. In August 1994, after two years of unsuccessful negotiations, Chișinău and Moscow have finally reached a political-military agreement which was signed on 21 October 1994. It stipulated the principle of *synchronization* between the process of troop withdrawal and the political resolution of the Transnistrian conflict with the determination of its special status within Moldova.[111] When compared to Russian previous approach which required first political settlement and only after troop withdrawal, it appears that synchronisation was Russia's tactical concession. Even though, it was a small concession since this principle reflected its basic interest in granting Transnistria a political status. Another major provision was the establishment of a three-year timetable for troop withdrawal counting from the entering into force of the agreement. This provision advantaged the Moldovan side more as it could have been invoked irrespective from the progress in the political conflict resolution.

In geopolitical terms this agreement was risky for Russia. In this case, Moscow's risk-acceptant stance could be explained principally by its desire to take advantage of Moldovan political transformation and induce

it even more into its sphere of influence. At the parliamentary elections of February 1994, the pro-Romanian party FPCD (former Popular Front) lost its influence becoming only the forth political party with 9 seats out of 101. On the other side, the pro-Russian Democratic Agrarian Party became the main political force gaining 56 seats. Against this political background, Moldova was distancing from Bucharest and leaning towards Russia. Regarding Romania, Chișinău organised on 6 March a referendum with respect to the independence of the Republic of Moldova. Although it was called "Sociological survey: advising with people" (*La sfat cu poporul*), and did not directly address the question of unification with Romania, 95.4% voted for the independence of Moldova, thus being indirectly interpreted as rejection of the unification. As regard the Russian vector, the most important decision of the new parliament was the ratification of the CIS Agreement and its statute on 8 and 26 April respectively, although declining its military part. Despite this, integrating the socio-economic institutions was an encouraging signal for Moscow and that explains its eagerness to strengthen relations with Moldova.

Yet, in 1995 Russia has significantly changed its policy embarking upon a more ambitious course. Russian government refused to adopt the October 1994 agreement[112] and by the same torpedoed the process of political resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. It appears that in 1995 the chief priority of Russian in Moldova was the establishment of a military base. Although rumours about the military base intensified since the late 1994, this new Russian policy line was discussed at the highest level in June 1995.[113] What has caused this radical shift? In this period, the Russian political and ideational contexts showed no significant change. The only obvious cause was NATO's announcement of eastern enlargement in late 1994. Against this new geopolitical background, and also taking account of Moldova's constant refusal to join the CIS military alliance, it becomes obvious that Russia would not be able the secure for a long time its influence in Moldova without a long-term (permanent?) military presence.

In respect to the third hypothesis – Russia's more assertive foreign policy under Primakov in 1996/98 – we notice a less assertive approach comparing to 1995. In fact, Moldova's constant refusal to accept Russia's plan for a military base has induced Primakov to search progress in the diplomatic-political field. Thus, the new Russian Foreign Minister struggled to revitalize the political dialog between Chișinău and Tiraspol and bring about a political solution. His efforts, and also those of Ukraine and OSCE, bore fruit when on 8 May 1997 was signed the "Memorandum on the

principles of normalizations of the relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria" between the Moldovan President P. Lucinschi and the Transnistrian leader I. Smirnov. This memorandum introduced the phrase "common state" thus supposing the existence of "two parties" Moldova and Transnistria which has paved the way for a political resolution within a (con)federal framework. In essence, it was nothing new with this document as Moscow pursued this objective since 1992.

Russian Policy Evolution toward the Transnistrian Conflict under V. Putin and D. Medvedev

Due to space limitation and also to the complexity of Russia's Transnistrian policy in the Putin-Medvedev era, this part divides the analysis in two sections. The first scrutinises Russia's policy from 1999 until 2007 and the second from 2007 until 2013.

November 1999-2007

Russian approach on the Transnistrian conflict underwent a significant shift in late 1999 opening thus a cooperative chapter in the conflict resolution process. This phase has lasted until June 2003. Afterwards, Moscow's policy changed once again culminating in 2005-06 with a series of economic sanctions against Moldova.

At the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999, Russia has finally agreed to withdraw its military equipments, arms, ammunition and troops from Transnistria (by the end of 2002). The decision to remove its arms and troops from Moldova (and Georgia) was linked to the adoption of the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE2) which limited the deployment of the troops in Europe on the flanks. Although this process would ultimately be halted in June/July 2003, by that date Moscow withdrew the most important part of its arsenal from the region. The International Crisis Group has concluded that "If the withdrawal had continued at the same pace, most of the ammunition and military equipment would have been evacuated by the end of the year."[114]

Moscow also took an active stance regarding the final settlement of the conflict. For that reason, President Putin made a special visit to Chișinău in June 2000. To note that the resolution process was the most intense in this period, thus giving hopes that a final political settlement would soon be

reached. However, the goal of those negotiations remained constant as in the previous post-Soviet years – federalization. In July 2000, President Putin set up a special state commission for the Transnistrian conflict. The first result of that diplomatic activity was the proposal in July 2002, in common with Ukraine and OSCE, of the "Kiev document" which proposed the federalization of Moldova. Russia exerted substantial pressure on Chișinău and Tiraspol to meet a middle ground for understanding. Although the Moldovan government under the rule of the Communist Party has easily embraced the idea of federalization, Transnistrian leader I. Smirnov lived with the illusion of an independent Transnistria sabotaging the process in various ways. In order to get Tiraspol onboard, Moscow resorted to stick and carrot tactic using commercial pressure and financial rewarding. For example, Moscow halted Transnistrian's exports by refusing to recognize the old Moldovan custom stamps in the possession of Tiraspol which were replaced by Chișinău in 2001.[115] On the other hand, Moscow (Gazprom) promised Tiraspol on 4 March 2003 to cancel the Transnistrian gas debt of 100 million dollars which had an immediate effect.[116] The next day Transnistrian Supreme Soviet adopted a decree asking the government to ensure and facilitate the withdrawal of Russian military equipments and ammunition.[117]

However, since June 2003 the Kremlin pursued a more assertive line vis-à-vis the Transnistrian conflict. Gazprom's promise to write-off Transnistria's gas dept was not kept and, consequently, Tiraspol returned to its familiar practice of obstructing the military withdrawal. This in turn gave an excuse to Moscow to halt the process. At the same time, Moscow set up a parallel, trilateral (with Chișinău and Tiraspol) negotiation mechanism which put the OSCE on the sidelines. Moreover, Putin sidelined the MFA by charging Dmitri Kozak, then first deputy chief of the presidential administration, to negotiate a quick solution to the conflict.

The results of this activity emerged in November with the so-called "Kozak Memorandum" (Memorandum on the Basic Principles for the State Structure of the United State). That document granted Tiraspol a veto power on internal and external policies of the "united state" and, more importantly, assured the presence of Russia's troops in Transnistria until 2020. This document provoked a harsh reaction from the West. U.S. ambassador and Javiel Solana exercised considerable pressure on the then Moldovan President V. Voronin to repeal the agreement. So, in the morning on 25 November 2003, the day when V. Putin ought to come in

Chișinău to sign the agreement, V. Voronin announced that he changed the mind and cancelled the signature of the memorandum.

After this short stage when Russia tried to bring about federal formula by guaranteeing the stay of its troops in Moldova through bilateral negotiations, Russia's favours were switching towards Transnistria. This became evident especially in 2005 and 2006. After the failure of the Kozak Memorandum, Moscow turned its back to V. Voronin making it clear that this is the only solution to the conflict. Smirnov, feeling that his room for manoeuvre increased, resorted to provocative actions. Thus the year of 2004 was an *annus horribilis* in Chișinău-Tiraspol relations when Tiraspol authorities harassed the Moldovan schools in Transnistria.[118]

It followed a difficult period until the end of 2006/early 2007 during which, on the one side, Moscow increased its support for Tiraspol, and on the other, imposed various sanctions against Chișinău. Among sanction on Chișinău we can count: a ban on meat (April 2005), on fruits and vegetables (May 2005), the twice rise of the price for gas (announced in November 2005) and the hardest sanction – the embargo on Moldovan wines and cognacs in March 2006.

In relations with Tiraspol, Moscow substantially augmented the financial support, especially after March 2006 when a new Moldovan custom regime entered into force which obliged the Transnistrian economic agents to register in Chișinău in order to export their goods. Politically, Moscow was not shy to organize various meetings between South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria, which led to the creation of the so-called "CIS-2".[119] During this period, it was not exceptional to hear Russian official defending Transnistria's cause.[120] In September 2005, before the "elections" in Transnistria, the CIS Duma Commission noted that the Electoral Code of Transnistria was consistent with "international standards" and in December 2005, the Kremlin portrayed the "elections" as "respecting international standards".[121] In May 2006 there was even a protocol signed with Tiraspol for bilateral cooperation where Smirnov was named "President of Transnistria".[122] And in September 2006 Tiraspol organized a referendum for the separation of Moldova and the inclusion into Russia, a referendum which was *de facto* recognized by the Russian Duma.

How could liberal, constructivist and realist theories explain Russian foreign policy dynamic? In order to not complicate too much the analysis, I will first consider the weaknesses of the non-realist perspectives

concerning the initial stage (1999-2003), then apply the realist perspective for the subsequent period.

From the liberal point of view, neither the domestic politics in Russia, nor the type of regime could explain why Russia decided in Istanbul to withdraw its troops from Transnistria. In 1999 Russia was neither democratic nor liberal, quite the contrary. Since the arrival of Vladimir Putin to power, Russia followed on the path of "de-democratization" and consolidation of the "power vertical". So, from a domestic political perspective, it is difficult to explain why it was Putin's government that has firstly acquiesced to withdraw its troops from Transnistria in November 1999 and why this trend lasted until June 2003.

If one considers that V. Putin is a product of the KGB, Cold War, or Soviet imperial identity, Russian policy of 1999-2003 is represents an anomaly. This is all the more obvious especially if we consider the enormous humiliation that Russia endured during the Kosovo crisis in 1999.

For constructivists who see the identity as a relational process of the national Self with the significant Other, this seems to be an interesting case. Some are interpreting this shift stating that Russia had an interest to cooperate because at stake was the adapted CFE Treaty and this provided an "equal participation of Russia in the European security system".[123]

This explanation has four shortcomings. First, CFE Treaty does not give Russia a special say in European affairs in order to make it feel included in Europe. After NATO intervention in Serbia, the West should have offered Russia something more than just a regime on conventional forces in order to show "recognition" and "inclusiveness" and make it cooperate over Moldova and Georgia. Second, this treaty did not exclude the enlargement of NATO (or EU), the process considered by social constructivists as the central cause for Russia's fear of being excluded from Europe. What we should notice is the fact that in 2002, seven central and eastern European countries were invited to join NATO during the Prague summit. Third, it compelled Russia to withdraw its troops and ammunition from Moldova and Georgia, thus depriving Moscow of its strongest arguments in those countries. Forth, it is not consistent with the fact that Russia still insisted on the federalization of Moldova. If the adapted CFE Treaty really represented a strong signal that Russia is accepted by the West, then all resolution frameworks should have been acceptable, even the unitary state solution.

When seen through the realist lenses, one could argue that NATO's enlargement did not ceased to be a threat for Russia's influence in Europe.

Yet Russia was powerless to hinder its expansion into the East. Russia was already severely affected by the financial crisis of August 1998. The awareness of this state of impotence also contributed the Russian thundering failure in Kosovo when it was unable to reinforce its troops in Pristina. Moreover, other security challenges occurred in North Caucasus. In August 1999 took place the invasion of Dagestan by the Chechen Wahhabi rebels aiming at the creation of the "United States of Islam" in Caucasus, thus provoking the second Chechen war. Against this security background, NATO expansion was somehow eclipsed.

The only realistic possibility for Russia regarding NATO enlargement was to limit the penetration of NATO in the new and future members of the East by the adoption of a new treaty on conventional forces in Europe which limited the deployment of forces on flanks. Thus, Moscow accepted the link between its military withdrawal from Moldova (and Georgia) with the adoption of the CFE2 Treaty. Given the fact that Russia's military presence in Moldova was also a tool in negotiation process by which Moscow obtained concessions from Chișinău, Russia needed to find a quick political solution to the conflict before the completion of the withdrawal. This explains why the negotiation process had accelerated in this period. Yet Moscow needed a final solution sufficiently to maintain a minimum influence in Moldova and at the same time acceptable to the parties and actors involved.

Russian u-turn in June 2003 could be explained as a balancing act against the intensifying enlargement process of the euro-Atlantic institutions. The concrete episode which triggered this change was the OSCE proposal to change the existing trilateral peacekeeping mechanism (Moscow-Chișinău-Tiraspol). In June 2003, Netherlands Chairmanship sent an informal paper to Russia and other OSCE countries proposing the replacement of the existing mechanism with an EU-led OSCE Consolidation Force. This was "real dynamite" in Moscow, as diplomats are noticing.[124] Facing the perspective of being progressively replaced by the EU and potentially NATO in Moldova, Putin rushed to find an agreement with Moldova which would have prevent such geopolitical evolution. This is the reason behind V. Putin decision to send D. Kozak to negotiate a particular agreement which would have granted Russia a long military presence in the region.

After the failure of Kozak Memorandum Russia has not changed this policy line while Moldova started to lean towards the West. In this context we could notice a strong correlation: the greater the Moldova-Western

rapprochement, the greater Russia's pressures on Chișinău and the greater is its support for Tiraspol.

2007 - 2013

From 2007 until 2013, Russian foreign policy on Moldova evolved through two stages. The first one, since 2007 up to the spring 2011, was marked by a gradual shift of Russian policy in a relatively positive direction. Russia took a more moderate stance towards Moldova and became more open relative to the conflict resolution problem expressing readiness for a status quo change. By the spring of 2011, however, the signs of a policy reversal start to emerge and thereafter the policy trend went down towards a more assertive and conflicting stance.

By 2007, Russia began to leave its embargoes against Moldova. In early summer 2007, Moscow cancelled its embargo on agricultural products and the restrictions on Moldovan alcohol production were removed in the first half of 2008. Even though Moscow continued to help economically Transnistria, this was an important policy shift especially if we recall that the principal causes for these embargoes against Moldova – the new Moldovan custom regime from 2006 and the deployment of the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Moldovan-Ukrainian frontier which forced Transnistrian firms to register in Chișinău – were still in place.

Russia gave a new impetus to the talks on conflict resolution within a trilateral framework Moscow-Chișinău-Tiraspol, bypassing the "5+2" negotiating format (Chișinău, Tiraspol, Russia, Ukraine, OSCE plus EU and U.S. as observers).[125] This new impetus led to the historical meeting between the Moldovan President Voronin and the Transnistrian leader I. Smirnov in April 2008 (the last meeting took place in 2001). Another important trilateral meeting was held in Moscow on 18 March 2009. In the final joint declaration it was agreed to resume the official negotiations in the "5+2" framework in the first half of 2009, and to transform the existing "peacekeeping operation" into a "peace-guaranteeing operation under the auspices of the OSCE". The positive aspect was that Russian drop out its ambition to be the only guarantor for the unified state (as stated in the Kozak Memorandum). The negative aspect was that this transformation would take place "as a result of the Transnistrian settlement".[126]

The Parliamentary elections in Moldova of 2009 and the subsequent change of the Moldovan government ruled by the anti-communist Alliance for European Integration did not enable these initiatives to be brought

to the logical end. Yet the positive momentum in Russian policy on the Transnistrian conflict resolution has not been lost. Quite the contrary, it gained a new impetus in the context of the Merkel – Medvedev "Meseberg process." Its name comes from the Meseberg Memorandum which was signed by A. Merkel and D. Medvedev in June 2010 and intended to pave the way for a deep cooperation between Russia and the EU in the areas of security and foreign policy through the creation of a committee at the level of Foreign Ministers (Ashton-Lavrov). The Transnistrian conflict was mentioned in this document as an example where cooperation could be translated into reality. The Russian Foreign Minister, S. Lavrov even accepted a possible EU involvement in a peacekeeping mission in Transnistria during the talks with the "Weimar Triangle" held on June 23 in Paris.[127] At the same time, Russia has suspended the financial assistance for Tiraspol and intensified its pressure on Smirnov.[128] Moscow's efforts and pressures had eventually led to the acceptance of Smirnov to reactivate the "5+2" negotiation which resumed on 30 November 2011 (too late) in Vilnius, and represented a key factor of Smirnov's failure at the Transnistrian elections of December 2011.

Two particular factors which are consistent with realism stand high in explaining Russian policy in this stage. First, there is Moldova's foreign policy. Since late 2006, Chișinău has begun to lean towards Russia. The Moldovan government became more reticent with regard to reforms demanded by the EU and distanced himself from GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) while searching for the international recognition of the permanent neutrality of Moldova. In 2009-10, despite the fact that the "Alliance for European Integration" comes to power in Moldova, Russia maintains its moderate approach because of the weakness of the government and the impossibility to elect a president.

The second factor was the positive dynamic of Russian-Western relationship. In 2009 the President Obama announced the "reset" of the U.S.'s Russia policy. This opened the route for intensive dialogue with NATO over the possible ways to cooperate in the missile defence sphere (Lisbon 2010 NATO Summit). It also boosted cooperation with the EU and intensive talks on the ways to institutionalize the partnership in the security and foreign policy spheres (inter-ministerial committee) led to the Merkel – Medvedev memorandum in June 2010 (Meseberg process).

The Transnistrian conflict was mentioned as an example where cooperation could be translated into reality. Officially, it was stated in the memorandum that first the new EU-Russia committee would be set up,

and then, with joint efforts, the new committee would be directed to the search how to put an end to the conflict. But unofficially, Russia's European partners (Germany) advanced a precondition: Due to the reluctance of some EU countries to pursue institutionalization in such sensible domains as security and foreign policy, it was necessary for Russia to demonstrate its *bona fides*, thus stimulating positive tendencies on the Transnistria issue.

However, since March 2011, signals were occurring as about a shift in Russian Transnistrian policy. On 10 March 2011, the President of the State Duma, Boris Gryzlov point out that Russia renewed the "humanitarian" (financial) assistance to Transnistria. At the same time, the Russian government decided to elaborate a strategy for the development of Transnistria until 2025. To do this, on March 15, a roundtable was organized in Tiraspol with the participation of two experts from the Centre for Strategic Initiatives close to the Russian government, and led by G. Gref and D. Kozak.

From the summer of the same year, Moscow began to intensify its efforts to push Chișinău to give up the "unitary state" conflict resolution model, and by the autumn it became clear that Moscow had no longer hopes for a quick resolution. If in 2010 the Transnistrian conflict was highlight by Medvedev as "absolutely solvable",[129] then in October 2011 Medvedev said that one of the few frozen conflicts in Europe that can be solved was the Nagorno-Karabakh.[130] In December he even stated that the Nagorno-Karabakh "is the only conflict in the post-Soviet space that can be solved at the present time".[131]

From March 2012 onwards, this negative policy line has only intensified so that the year of 2013 resembles in many respects the 2004 *annus horribilis* in the Chișinău – Tiraspol relations. Russia's new policy line on Transnistria became obvious on 21 March 2012 when the President Medvedev appointed the deputy-Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin - former Permanent Representative of Russia to NATO - as a special representative of the President to Transnistria. On 16-17 April, Rogozin made a visit to Chișinău and Tiraspol during which he promised to contribute to the socio-economic development of Transnistria, announced the strengthening of institutional links between Moscow and Tiraspol, and the establishment of joint committees with the economic ministries of Transnistria. He also promised to open a Russian consulate in Tiraspol. From the second half of 2012, we notice the amplification of this policy.[132] Moscow undertook steps in order to consolidate the military potential of Transnistria and started to repair the military aerodrome in Tiraspol. Perhaps this was the

aim of the secret visit in Transnistria of the Russian Minister of Defence on 12 April 2012. Financial aid for Transnistria has also increased. Moreover, Russian officials multiply messages like "Transnistria has the right to exist". There are also open advocacy of Transnistrian "Eurasian choice". The Russian embargo on Moldovan wines in September 2013 is just another element of this policy. In 2014 this trend has continued as Moldova signed the Association Agreement with EU. Moscow increased its sanctions against Chișinău as for example the embargo on Moldovan agricultural products and the cancellation of the free trade regime with Moldova within the CIS.

Why did the cooperative stage begin to lose momentum in 2011? And why did the negative trend replace it afterwards? Two key systemic factors influenced Russia's reconsideration of its Transnistrian policy. First of all, there was the lack of desire from the EU to deliver on the Meseberg process and Russia's growing frustration throughout 2011. The second key factor was the failure to find a way to cooperate with the U.S./NATO on the missile defence issue. The dialogue on this issue came to a standstill in late spring 2011. Moreover, The U.S. pursued its deployments plans in Europe without taking into account negotiation with Russians. The fact that in October 2011 Romania signed an agreement with the U.S. allowing them to settle in Romania a part of the missile defence shield provoked visible irritation in Moscow. With the failure of these two initiatives was lost a rare window of opportunity to change the geopolitical context and to bring about a solution to the Transnistrian conflict.

Conclusions

This analysis shows that Russian foreign policy evolution toward the Transnistrian conflict is mostly consistent with the realist theory. Since the early post-Soviet period Russia behaved as a power-seeker actor searching to maintain or increase its influence in Moldova. Depending on its power means, Russia was also adapting and reacting to the stimuli and constraints on the local level (Moldova's policies toward Transnistria, Russia and the West), regional (Ukraine and Romanian), and international level (Western/NATO expansion to the east or cooperation with Russia).

The findings of this study have implications for the theoretical/ scholar debates and also for the practitioners of international relations/ foreign policy. The major finding of this paper is that geopolitics play

a central role in Russian policy toward Moldova/Transnistria. This puts under question the dominant opinion on Russia's initial liberal and pro-Western policy of Boris Yeltsin. Researchers should reassess the role of the former Soviet republics in Russia's foreign policy since 1991. Even if Russia has initially pursued good relations with the West, which is understandable if considering the huge internal problems and the need for financial assistance, Russian attitude toward its Near Abroad was far from "isolationism". There is an obvious contradiction between the idea that Russia was seeking a rapid integration into the West and its policy toward Moldova and the CIS in general. How Russian leaders could have expected a rapid integration into the democratic West by applying a realpolitik policy in relation to a former Soviet republic? Was the alleged pro-Western Russian foreign policy a deeply-rooted conviction based on its democratic-liberal ideas or should we rather consider it a tactical move in order attract financial and economic assistance during very difficult times? In other words, was that a real foreign policy or rather discourse?

In practical terms, this analysis suggests that Russian policy toward the Transnistrian conflict will principally depend on the regional and international geopolitical contexts. It suggests that Russia's cooperation or confrontation approach would largely depend on Moldova's European integration progress and on Western (EU and NATO) in the region. The crisis in Ukraine increases Transnistria's geopolitical importance for Russia. It is unlikely that Russia would provoke a war in Moldova as many analysts expect. Moscow has other means to exert influence over Moldova. Yet, should Moldova's integration process in the EU become irreversible, or at the point to retake/regain Transnistria, Moscow could resort to some assertive or even aggressive measures. Reasoning from the realist perspective, there is also the possibility of Russia's power decline as a result of economic, social or political crisis and Moldova's reunification with Transnistria as a consequence. However, serious Russian internal turbulences will most probably have a destabilising effect throughout the entire post-Soviet region, Europe and Asia with unpredictable repercussions.

NOTES

[1]   T. Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory", *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1998, pp. 171-200. R. L. Jepperson, A. Wendt, and P. J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 33-75. A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[2]   Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 4, Autumn 1997.

[3]   For example, constructivists describe Russia's initial westernism as dominated by three features: radical economic reform, rapid membership in the Western international economic and security institutions, and isolationism from the former Soviet states Tsygankov. See A. P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers (2nd edition), 2010, p. 59. Liberal authors claims in the same vein that Russia's initial foreign policy was dominated by "conspicuously pro-Western views, with heavy tilt toward economic determinism, universal democratic values and general neglect of competitive geopolitical and strategic facets of international politics." See K. Litvak, "The Role of Political Competition and Bargaining in Russian Foreign Policy: The Case of Russian Policy Toward Moldova," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 224.

[4]   A. P. Tsygankov, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

[5]   K. Litvak writes that "in accordance with the dominant Atlanticist views, the Russian leadership took the side of the "democratic" Moldovan government in its struggle against the pro-communist Dniester Republic." *op. cit.,* p. 224-25. N. Jackson also claims that "Yeltsin chose to support Moldova's new 'democratic' government and the principle of territorial integrity" because "a liberal westernizing idea: Russia could not maintain preferential ties with Transdniestria (or other regions) if that meant jeopardizing its newly favourable relationship with the West." See *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS. Theories, debates and actions*, Routledge, 2003, p. 94.

[6]   International Crisis Group, "Moldova: Regional Tensions Over Transdniestria", *ICG Europe Report,* no.157, vol. 17, June 2004, p. 3.

[7]   K. Litvak, *op. cit.,* p. 224.

[8]   D. Lynch, *Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan*, RIIA and Macmillan, London and New York, 2000, p. 47, 114.

[9]   This argument is supported also by scholars adopting an eclectic approach. For example Y. Breault, P. Jolicoeur and J. Lévesque, who claim in their

collective work that "the role it [the 14th Army] played in the short civil war cannot be assimilated to Russian foreign policy of that time." See, *La Russie et son ex-empire. Reconfiguration géopolitique de l'ancien espace soviétique*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2003, p. 145. There are also authors who explicitly identify themselves as Realists and adopting this argument about the 14th Army. Allan C. Lynch for example considers that the 14th Army escaped Moscow's control to the point becoming "an effective institutional actor." See, *The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[10] Kate Litvak, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

[11] A. Devyatkov (2010), *op. cit.*, p. 43, 73, 74. N. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 83, 95. I. F. Selivanova, *op. cit.*, p. 57. D. Lynch, *op. cit.* p. 114.

[12] The economic agreement was initialled by all republics except the Baltic states on 1 October 1991; see V. Ardaev and E. Matskevich, "Itogi vstrechi v stolitse Kazakhstana prevzoshli vse ozhidanija," [Results of the meeting in the Kazakh capital have surpassed all expectations], *Izvestia*, no. 235 (23501), 2 October 1991, p. 1, 3. However, when the day of the official conclusion came in October 18th, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, declined to sign.

[13] G. Alimov, "Privykajte k slovam: Sojuz Suverennyh Gossudarstv (SSG)," [Get used to the words: the Union of Sovereign States (USS)], *Izvestia,* no. 272 (23538), 15 November 1991, p. 1. The Baltic States, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine refused to join the political treaty.

[14] "Obrashenie Prezidenta Rossii k narodam Rossii, k Siezdu Narodnyh Deputatov Rossijskoj Federatsii," [Address of the President of Russia to the peoples of Russia, to the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation], *Rossijskaja gazeta*, no. 224 (270), 29 October 1991, p. 1.

[15] "Zajavlenie press-sekretarea prezidenta RSFSR," [Statement by the Press Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation], *Rossijskaja gazeta*, no. 177 (223), 27 August 1991, p. 2.

[16] See the shorthand report of the joint meeting of the second session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR (meeting 42) in the State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond 10026, Inventory 1, Affair 426, p. 27-28.

[17] He served then as the Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

[18] See V. Kuznetsova, "Metamorfozy Yeltsinskoj natsional-politiki," [Metamorphosis of Yeltsin's National Policy], *Nezavisimaja gazeta*, no. 102, 31 August 1991, p. 3.

[19] Then Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Committee on inter-republican relations of the RSFSR's Supreme Soviet and later Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister (October '91-November '92).

[20] See in A. Gagua, "My pereotsenivaem nashih partnerov," [We overestimate our partners], *Nezavisimaja gazeta*, no. 101, 29 August 1991, p. 3.

21   M. Sokolov, "Sudba Sojuza: 'N+0' ili '9-9'?" [Fate of Union: "N + 0" or
      "9-9"?], *Kommersant*, no. 35, 2 September 1991.

22   M. Snegur, *op. cit.*, p. 464-465.

23   Then Chairman of the Committee on National State System and Interethnic
      Relations of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of Russia.

24   E. Kondratov, "V Molodve ponjali: nasilie – besilno," [In Moldova
      understood: violence is powerless], *Izvestia*, no. 235 (23501), 2 October
      1991, p. 1.

25   In late September 1991, Moldovan and Romanian presidents, prime
      ministers and defence ministers met in Huși (Romania) and agreed on the
      "coordinating actions of the two countries after the fall of the USSR" and
      Moldova's "increased rapprochement with Romania, including support
      [from Romania] with weapons and ammunition." See I. Costaş, *Transnistria
      1989-1992. Cronica unui război "nedeclarat"*, RAO, București, 2012, p.
      239-240.

26   A. Sheehy, "Moldavia Joins Economic Union," *RFE/RE Daily Report,* no.
      212, 07 November 1991.

27   I. Dnestrjanskij, "14-ja obshchevoyskovaya rossijskaja armija v
      Pridnestrovskom konflikte" [The 14th Russian Combined Arms Army in the
      Transnistrian conflict], 26 April 2011, available at: www.artofwar.ru.

28   "Zajavlenie 'O sobitjah v Respublike Moldova'," [Declaration 'On the
      events in the Republic of Moldova'], *Rossijskaja gazeta*, no. 270 (316), 10
      December 1991, p. 1.

29   V. N. Baranets, *Genshtab bez tajn* [*General Staff without secrets*], Moscow,
      Politbjuro, 1999. See the Chapter 1, Part 15: "Moldavskoe vino" [Moldovan
      wine], www.militera.lib.ru.

30   *Ibid.*

31   He was serving then as Chairman of the Subcommittee on International
      Affairs of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

32   Then Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

33   E. M. Kozhokin, "Zapiska Zamestitelju Predsedatelja Verhovnogo Soveta
      RSFSR Iarovu I. F." [Note by the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of
      the RSFSR, Iarovu I. F], Fond 10026, Inventory 4, Affair 3336, State Archive
      of the Russian Federation, p. 17.

34   Most surprisingly, 54% of Crimeans and two-thirds of the Soviet military
      personnel in Ukraine supported independence. See Referendum/Presidential
      Election in Ukraine, *CSCE Report*, 1992, p. 1.

35   S. Pifer, "The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and
      Nuclear Weapons," Arms Control Series Paper 6, Foreign Policy at Brookings,
      May 2011, p. 4, 39, www.brookings.edu.

36   Quoted in S. Foye, "Storm Clouds on the Horizon?" *RFE/RL Daily Report*,
      no. 88, 08 May 1992.

[37] The agreement also provided for cooperation in foreign policy, a "unified economic area," a "common European and Eurasian markets," etc. See the Minsk Agreement, in *Rossijskaja gazeta*, no. 270 (316), 10 December 1991, p. 1, 2.

[38] S. Rogov, "SNG nuzhen voennyj alians tipa NATO," [CIS needs a military alliance such as NATO], *Izvestia*, no. 307 (23573), 27 December 1991, p. 2.

[39] P. Aven and A. Koh, *op. cit.,* p. 312.

[40] V. Zenetsov, "Manipulyatsii s armiyey ne privedut k dobru, [Manipulation of the army will not lead to good], *Rossijskaja gazeta*, 10 January 1992, p. 1.

[41] B. Nahaylo, "Ukraine Reaffirms its Independence with Respect to New Commonwealth," *RFE/RL Daily Report,* no. 242, 23 December 1991.

[42] "Prinadlezhnost Kryma Ukraine vnovi pod somneniem" [Crimea's Belonging to Ukraine is again under question], *Nezavissimaja gazeta*, no. 11 (182), 18 January 1992, p. 1.

[43] "Rossija vystupaet za edinye vooruzhennye sily" [Russia calls for united armed forces], *Rossijskaja gazeta*, no. 14 (350), 18 January 1992, p. 1.

[44] "Rasporjazhenie Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 29.01.1992 N 38-rp," [Order of the President of the Russian Federation of 29.01.1992, no. 38-rp], www.kremlin.ru.

[45] The delegation included also D. Volkogonov (Yeltsin's advisor on defence issues), A. Kotenkov (Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defence and Security issues), V. Maschits (Chairman of the State Committee on Economic Cooperation with CIS), A. Oleinikov (First Deputy Minister of Security), etc.

[46] V. Socor, "CIS Deputy Commander in Chișinău," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no. 12, 20 January 1992.

[47] V. Socor, "Left-Bank Russians in Moldova Raiding Right Bank," *RFE/RL Daily Report,* no. 52, 16 March 1992.

[48] V. Socor, "Russian Insurgency in Eastern Moldova Escalates," *RFE/RL Daily Report,* no. 53, 17 March 1992; see also, "Russians Continue Offensive in Eastern Moldova," *RFE/RL Daily Report,* no. 54, 18 March 1992.

[49] V. Socor, "Another Cease-Fire Agreed," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no. 54, 18 March 1992.

[50] I. Stadnik, "Vojna i finansy" [The War and Finances]*, Moskovskie Novosti*, no. 27 (622), 5 July 1992, p. 2.

[51] A. V. Kozlov and V. N. Chernobrivyj, *Nepokorennoe Pridnestrovie: uroki voennogo konflikta* [Unconquered Transnistria: Lessons of the Military Conflict], Moscow, Vesche, 2015, p. 34.

[52] M. Snegur, *op. cit.* p. 496.

[53] A. V. Kozlov and V. N. Chernobrivyj, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

54   V. But, "Kazakov prosjat ne vmeshatsa," [The Cossacks are asked to not interfere], *Izvestia*, no. 68 (23642), 20 March 1992, p. 1.

55   See A. Kozyrev's interview to *Nezavissimaja gazeta,* 1 April 1992, no. 63 (234), p. 1, 3. From the text and the context we may understand that Kozyrev's interview was made in the first days after the Helsinki meeting.

56   "Declarația șefilor de stat ai țărilor member ale CSI cu privire la situația în raioanele de est ale Republicii Moldova," [Declaration by the Heads of State of the CIS on the situation in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova], in A. Țăranu and M. Grecu, *op. cit.*, p. 95-96.

57   See the content of the Helsinki declaration in *Rossijskaja gazeta*, no. 80 (416), 7 April 1992, p. 7.

58   B. Nahaylo, "Moldova Declares State of Emergency and Issues Ultimatum to Rebels. *RFE/RL Daily Report* no. 62, 30 March 1992. See also I. Bistreanu, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

59   R. Solchanyk, "Fighting Continues in 'Dniester Republic'," *RFE/RL Daily Report,* no. 65, 2 April 1992.

60   "Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federatsii 'O perehode pod jurisdiktsiju Rossijskoj Federatsii voinskih chastej Vooruzhenyh Sil byvshego SSSR, nahodjashihsja na territorii Respubliki Moldova'," [Presidential Decree 'On the transfer under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation of the Armed Forces' military units of the former USSR in the territory of the Republic of Moldova"], no. 320, 1 April 1992, in *Rossijskaja gazeta*, no. 77 (413), 3 April 1992, p. 4.

61   V. N. Baranets, *op. cit.,* Chapter 1, Part 15.

62   *Nezavissimaja gazeta,* 1 April 1992, no. 63 (234), p. 1, 3

63   "Postanovlenie ofitserskovo sobranija" [Officers' Assembly Resolution], *Rossijskaja gazeta*, no. 77 (413), 3 April, 1992, p. 1.

64   "Deklaratsija ministrov inostrannyh del Respubliki Moldova, Rossijskoj Federatsii, Rumynii i Ukrainy" [Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Romania and Ukraine], State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond 10026, Inventory 4, Affair 3336, p. 56-60.

65   E. Kondratov, "Ministry chetyreh stran dogovorilis' prekratit' ogon' v Pridnestrovie k 15 chasam 7 aprelja," [The ministers of the four countries agreed to a cease-fire in Transnistria by 15 o'clock on April 7], *Izvestia*, no. 83 (23657), 7 April 1992, p. 1.

66   See the testimony of M. Bălan, commander of one volunteer detachment, and A. Gămurari the commander of police brigade *Fulger* in V. Basiul, "În 1992, la Nistru, am avut un război de partizani," [In 1992, on the Nistru, we had a partisan war], *Adevărul*, 28 February 2011, www.adevarul.md.

67   He was then State Counsellor for Political Affairs.

68   S. Stankevich, "On the situation in Transnistria, strategic threats to Russian interests and possible actions of the Russian structures," 13 May 1992. The

document is available at the State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond 10026, Inventory 4, Affair 3336, p. 39-44.

[69] General Makashov, *Znameni i prisjage ne izmenil!* [I have not Betrayed the Banner and the Oath!], Moscow, Algoritm, 2006, p. 132.

[70] See the interview of P. Grachev to *Izvestia*, no. 127 (23701), 1 June 1992, p. 1, 3.

[71] In a single day of 19 May, the Transnistrian guards were supplied with 63 items of military hardware consisting of 14 BTR-70, 1 BMP-2K, 2 BRDM, 1 PRP-3, 1 122-mm howitzer D-30, 8 85-mm gun D-44, 10 100-mm gun KS-19, 20 cars and 6 fuelling lorries. After the combat, the Russians handed over all other armoured fighting vehicles, including 10 tanks. See A. V. Kozlov and V. N. Chernobrivyj, *op. cit.,* p. 67.

[72] M. Bergman, *op. cit.,* Chapter 5, Part 5 - "Sozdanie armii PMR" [The creation of the army of the TMR]. A. V. Kozlov and V. N. Chernobrivyj, *op. cit.,* p. 61-62.

[73] G. Starovojtova, "Ieshche odna mina pod SNG," [Another mine under the CIS], *Moskovskie Novosti*, no. 22 (617), 31 May 1992, p. 6-7.

[74] See A. Kozyrev's declaration in *Izvestia*, no. 125 (23699), 29 May 1992, p. 1. For the statement of P. Grachev, see V. Socor, "Grachev Qualifies Yeltsin's Remark," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no. 102, 29 May, 1992.

[75] V. Socor, "Grachev Again Warns Moldova," RFE/Rl Daily Report, No. 106, 4 June, 1992.

[76] M. Snegur, *op. cit.,* p. 612-613.

[77] *Ibid.,* p. 614.

[78] The author is not precising whether all those forces were involved from the beginning or joined in the following days. Ion Costaş, *op. cit.,* p. 433.

[79] M. Bergman, *op. cit.*, Chapter 5, Part 3 - "Vzryv 'porohovoj bochki'" [Explosion of the 'powder keg'].

[80] See the declarations in *Rossijskaja gazeta*, no. 141 (477), 22 June 1992, p. 1.

[81] "Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 20 ijunja 1992 g. Nr. 407, 'O merah po presecheniyu dejstvij protiv Vooruzhennyh Sil Rossijskoj Federatsii," [Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 20 June, 1992, No. 407, 'On the measures to curb action against the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation'], Available in *Rossijskaja gazeta*, No. 152 (488), 4 July, 1992, p. 4.

[82] *Ibid.* It is important to note that without the agreement of B. Yeltsin, who was at that time on a trip to North America (U.S. and Canada), the Prime Minister E. Gaidar would have not allowed the adoption of such a crucial decision.

[83] During the day of 20 June, the Russian artillery fired at least 76 rounds on 4 different Moldovan targets in Bender and Varniţa. See A. V. Kozlov and V. N. Chernobrivyj, *op. cit.,* p. 252-253.

84   In Dagomys Russian and Ukraine reached an 18-point agreement. See R. Solchanyk, "Ukraine and Russia Reach Agreement," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no. 118, 24 June 1992.

85   A. V. Kozlov and V. N. Chernobrivyj, *op. cit.,* p. 136.

86   M. Bergman, *op. cit.,* Chapter 7, Part 3 - "Komendant Respubliki," [Republic's Commandant].

87   *Ibid.*

88   M. Bergman, *op. cit.,* chapter 6, Part 9 - "Polkovnik Gussev," [Colonel Gussev]. A. V. Kozlov and V. N. Chernobrivyj, *op. cit.,* p. 142.

89   V. Socor, "Four Presidents Discuss Moldova," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no. 121, 29 June 1992.

90   A. V. Kozlov and V. N. Chernobrivyj, *op. cit.,* p. 157. See also V. Litovkin, "14-ja armija: novyj komandujushij – novaja taktika nejtralitate," [14th Army: a new commander – a new tactic of neutrality]. *Izvestia*, no. 150 (23724), 29 June 1992, p. 2.

91   A. V. Kozlov and V. N. Chernobrivyj, *op. cit.,* p. 158.

92   V. Socor, "Russian Note Increases Pressure on Moldova," *RFE/RL Daily Report,* No. 123, 01 July, 1992.

93   S. Gamova and E. Kondratov, "Mircea Snegur: nachalas ekonomicheskaja blokada Moldovy" [The economic blockade of Moldova has begun], *Izvestia*, no. 150 (23724), 29 June 1992, p. 1, 2.

94   M. Bergman, *op. cit.,* Chapter 6, Part 12 "Komandarm Lebed," [Army Comander Lebed].

95   *Ibid.*

96   *Ibid.*

97   Ten different Moldovan targets were destroyed, including ammunition depots, fuel storages, a command centre and recreation bases of troops and police. See A. V. Kozlov and V. N. Chernobrivyj, *op. cit.,* p. 166.

98   S. Skripnik, quoted in E. Medvedev, *Krovavoe leto v Benderah ... op. cit.*

99   Moldovan authorities and M. Snegur were constantly denying that Smirnov has signed the document in either form, but this claim is highly suspect. Moldovan government had presented to the European Court for Human Rights a copy of the text without Smirnov's signature at the process of Ilie Ilașcu and others, while Russia provided a copy with Simonov's signature. See ECHR, "Case of Ilașcu and Others vs. Moldova and Russia," Application no. 48787/99, Judgment, Strasbourg, 8 July 2004, paragraph 87, p. 21. M. Snegur then declared that he ignored where Smirnov's signature is coming from. However, in his memoirs, Snegur affirms that Smirnov "endorsed" (*vizat*) the document before the official ceremony of the signature of the agreement. M. Snegur, *op. cit.,* p. 655.

100   V. Socor, "Russian-Moldovan Meeting," *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no 126, 06 July 1992. See also, V. Kuznetsova, "Eltsin i Snegur postavili sebja pod ogoni

pridnestrovskogo konflikta, esli ogoni ne prekratitsa segodnja" [Yeltsin and Snegur put themselves under the fire of the Transnistrian conflict if the fire does not stop today], *Nezavissimaja gazeta*, no. 126 (297), 4 July 1992, p. 1.

101 See the "Communiqué regarding the meeting between Moldovan President Mircea Snegur and the President of the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin," in M. Snegur, *op. cit.,* p. 656-57.

102 M. McFaul, "Russia's Many Foreign Policies," *Demokratizatsiya*, vol. 7, no. 3, 1999, p. 402.

103 A. P. Tsygankov, *op. cit.;* A. L. Clunan, *op. cit.;* T. Hopf, Identity, legitimacy, and the use of military force: Russia's Great Power identities and military intervention in Abkhazia, *Review of International Studies,* No. 31, 2005; K. Litvak, *op. cit.;* N. Jackson, *op. cit.*

104 For a liberal view of this see M. McFaul, *op. cit.,* p. 403. For a social-constructivist example, see Ch. Thorun, *op. cit.,* p. 30.

105 See in B. Lo, "Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking," Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 41.

106 In the source the quote reads "political state" (*politicheskuju gosudarstvennost*), however, other sources indicate that it is not "state" but "status," see in M. Snegur, *Op. Cit.*, p. 680.

107 "Helsinki watch – rossijskim vlastjam: Rossija vyshla za ramki dobroj voli" [Helsinki Watch – to Russian authorities: Russia has gone beyond good will], *Nezavissimaja gazeta*, No. 214 (638), 9 November, 1993, p. 5.

108 See in A. Lebed, *Op. Cit.,* p. 458-50.

109 A. V. Kozlov and V. N. Chernobrivyj, *Op. Cit.*, p. 255.

110 *Nezavissimaja gazeta*, No. 214 (638), 9 November, 1993, p. 5.

111 A. Ţăranu and M. Grecu, *op. cit.,*

112 Yeltsin passed the agreement to the Duma for ratification knowing certainly that it would not ratify it. To note here that there was no specific disposition in the agreement regarding the ratification procedure, thus Yeltsin could have approved the agreement by a governmental decision as Moldova deed.

113 See *Kommersant* No. 118 and 119 from 28 and 29 June 1995, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/111934; http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/112039.

114 International Crisis Group, "Moldova: no Quick Fix," *ICG Europe Report*, No. 147, 12 August 2003, p. 11.

115 International Crisis Group, Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria, *ICG Europe Report,* No. 57, 17 June 2004, p. 8.

116 International Crisis Group, 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

117 *Ibid.*

118 G. P. Herd, "Moldova and the Dniester Region: Contested Past, Frozen Present, Speculative Futures?" *Conflict Studies Research Centre, Central and Eastern Europe Series,* February 2005, p. 8-10.

[119] Tracey C. German, "Le conflit en Ossétie-du-Sud: La Géorgie contre la Russie," p. 60. Nicu Popescu, "Outsourcing de facto Statehood: Russia and the Secessionist Entities in Georgia and Moldova," *CEPS Policy Brief*, No. 109, July 2006, p. 5.

[120] For example, in 2005 the then Russian deputy D. Rogozin has warned that Transnistria could turn to be a second Kaliningrad, *Flux*, No. 159 (1479), November 22, 2005.

[121] *Flux*, 172 (1492), December 15, 2005.

[122] A. Devyatkov, "Russia: Relations with Moldova under a Paradigm of Ambiguity", in Marcin Kosienkowski and William Schreiber (eds.), *Moldova: Arena of International Influences*, Lanham, Mayland, Lexington Books, 2012, p.192.

[123] A. Devyatkov, *Politika Rossii v otnoshenii Pridnestrovskoj Moldavskoj Respubliki,* p. 54 and 107-110.

[124] J. Löwenhardt, *Op. Cit.*, p. 107.

[125] This negotiation mechanism was set up in September 2005 in Odessa mostly as an attempt to avoid the entering into force of the new customs regime at the Moldovan – Ukrainian border.

[126] http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/0C29B78403398C46C325757D0056C04E

[127] O. Rusu, "Le 'redémarrage' et la politique russe à l'égard de la Géorgie et de la Moldavie," *Regard sur l'Est,* 17 December, 2010.

[128] Kremlin's pressures upon Igor Smirnov have evolved in the fall of 2011 to lawsuits against members of his family, sharp statements against Smirnov and unprecedented media campaign against him and his clan.

[129] "Transnistrian conflict resolvable – Medvedev," *The Voice of Russia,* 20 October 2010.

[130] http://news.day.az/politics/294668.html

[131] http://www.kremlin.ru/news/14114

[132] D. Minzarari, "Russia is Building Diplomatic and Military Tools to Prevent Western Resistance to its Eurasian Union," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, December 11, 2012.

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ARMENIAN SCRIBE AND PAINTER AVAG TSAGHKOGH (14TH CENTURY)

Abstract

In our paper, we tried to present the life, activity and artistic heritage of one of the individuals of the medieval Armenian art – Avag Tsaghkogh (14th century), whose life was full of wanderings. In future it is quite possible that new books will be found, which will shed a light on the topic and complete our knowledge on the artist.

Keywords: Medieval Armenian Art, Gospel, Bible, painter, scribe, miniature painting, illuminated manuscript, paleography.

List of abbreviations
AODA, HMML – Armenian Orthodox Diocese of Aleppo, Hill Museum and Manuscript Library
BSL – Berlin State Library
BL – British Library
Jerus., Jerusalem – St. James Monastry in Jerusalem
Mat., Matenadaran – Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts in Yerevan
Ven., Venice – Mekhitarists Library in Venice

Miniaturist Avag's artistic heritage summarizes and develops the best achievements of the Cilician and Gladzor miniature painting traditions, and develops them further to a new perfection level. He belongs to the list of talented artists, who has scribed and painted manuscripts.

Since the first half of the 20th century the art of Avag Tsaghkogh raised the interest of many Armenian and foreign researchers.[1] While in the literature predominantly Avag as miniaturist has been discussed (which of course is priority), it is also important to make a reflection on Avag as

scribe, which will give a possibility to get broader picture on this creative individual and his cultural heritage.[2]

The Biography of Avag Tsaghkogh

It is unknown when Avag Tsaghkogh born, but it is known where he was born. In the Bible no 6230 stored in Matenadaran one can read in the colophon left by Avag the following: "I beg you to remember my compatriot Sargis from Moshaghbyur, as well as the parents of our spiritual father and great teacher Yesayi" (fol. 101v).[3] This historical village is mentioned in several sources. For example, this can be found in the record of princess Gontza devoted to construction activities of Jalalyan branch of Orbelian family in St. Karapet Church of Spitakavor Monastery. Gontza purchases Moshaghbyur with treasures from his homeland, with the aim to keep a piece of "homeland" in the monastery. From this fact historian Garegin Hovsepyan implies that Moshaghbyur was located not far from that region.[4] This historical site is located in the territory of nowadays Ararat province of Armenia.[5]

From the above-mentioned colophon it is possible to make implications not only about the place of birth of the miniaturist Avag, but also about the education he obtained: it becomes clear that Avag was the disciple of one of the most fabulous Armenian medieval intellectuals – teacher Yesayi Nchetzi. The talented student praises his spiritual father and teacher also in other manuscripts, calling him "great teacher Yesayi" (Matenadaran no 7650, fol. 349v), "bright teacher, the great Yesayi" (BSL Ms. or oct. no 279, fol. 135v), "under the taught of the great orator Yesayi" (Matenadaran Ms. no 212, fol. 310v).

Art historian Aram Avetisyan considers the gifted and talented painter from Gladzor Toros of Taron also as the teacher of Avag, making a reference to the colophon of manuscript no 6230 stored in Matenadaran.[6] However, reading the colophons of the above-mentioned manuscripts and all other available colophons after Toros of Taron and Avag did not provide any evidence in that regard. Thus, we tend not to agree with the above-mentioned opinion that Toros of Taron was also the teacher of Avag. Perhaps it can be implied that Avag took some painting classes from Toros of Taron, which already by that time had a reputation of well-known and skillful master in Gladzor.

Instead, we learn that Avag was the teacher of certain person named Shnophor, which helped him to create manuscripts. There are two citations in this regards: "Remember our parents and our kind disciple Shnophor deacon, who worked a lot on this" (Matenadaran Ms. no 7650, fol. 354r), "Remember with goodwill our prominent great teacher and spiritual father Grigor priest of Ani and great painter Avag scribe and other beloved brother Shnophor deacon, who helped us in this work" (Jerus. Ms. no 1941, fol. 245v). Shnophor is mentioned as deacon and someone who assisted to the work in another manuscripts also, in line with numerous other names (Matenadaran Ms. no 4429, fol. 149r).

It is interesting that none of the manuscripts of Avag Tsaghkogh, created in Gladzor, has reached to us. The subsequent stage of his life takes us to Sultania (located in the territory of historical Atrpatakan, which is currently the northwestern part of Iran).

At that time Sultania was the capital of the Hulavian Mongolian State, and was one of the rich commercial centers of Asia Major, where numerous cultural directions were cross-cut. It is known that in 1318 this city became the centre of Latin Episcopate of Maragha for a short period. With the collapse of the Hulavian State Sultania lost its importance as capital, and at the end of 14th century and beginning of the 15th century its population was evicted after destruction of the city by the troops of Tamerlane. Thus, a significant part of the Armenian population of Sultania moved to live to Tavriz.[7]

It is unknown when and for what purpose Avag went to Sultania. From the colophons we learn that between 1329 and 1340 the painter lived in that city and significant part of his creative heritage, namely six manuscripts, reached us from there.

It is known that in the first half of the 14th century Dominican and Franciscan monks start implementation of unitive campaign mission in Sultania.[8] These important historical realities immediately find their reflection in the art of Avag Tsaghkogh, who being the confederate and follower of Yesayi Nchetzi, on its turn has struggled against this movement. Such evidence is provided by the most luxurious manuscript of 1337-1340 (Matenadaran Ms. no 212), reached to us – miniature representing the Last Judgment (fol. 79v), where the painter has dared to portray two clargymen in the Hell.

The 1340s are the most unknown periods of the life in the biography of Avag, since the colophons almost do not provide any information about that period. In the Mechitarists Library in Venice a Bible is kept

(Ms. no 935), illuminated by Avag. It is difficult to say when exactly he has illuminated the Bible. Most likely it was until 1341, since in the colophon written after that one can read the following: "Grigor, the wise priest of God, received this in memory of his parents and himself, and for the heritage of his son Eprem Priest in 1341 in Sultania city" and then continues "in the year 1354 of the Savior's birth, Eprem Priest, who is the son of Grigor Priest, with his own will has presented this Bible to Varaga Saint Nshan Church for the good memory of his parents and himself" (fol. 449r). One year after that, in 1355, Monk Movses of Metsopa Monastery writes the Book of Parables in Varaga Saint Nshan Church (fol. 538v).[9]

The next information on biography of Avag is communicated from the colophon of the manuscript no 6230 stored in Matenadaran. In 1350 the king of Cilicia Constandin IV and Mkhitar Catholicos present to Avag a Bible, which he later on, perhaps in 1356-58, illuminates, binders and "brought and presented it to prominent and Christian loving paron Sorghatmish and his believer and hard-working wife Beki Khatun… these people hosted us with pleasure and kindness" (fol. 505v). Garegin Hovsepyan thinks that before going to Cilicia, i.e. before 1350, Avag was in Tpghis (nowadays Tbilisi), where he was informed about the wish of *paron* Sorghatmish to receive a Bible.[10]

One can read in the colophon of the manuscript no 7631 stored in Matenadaran the following: "Unworthy Sargis priest, who worked in very hard times (1352), did it with his own hands by the request of the great orator Avag" (fol. 260v). Perhaps Avag wrote this manuscript in Cilicia between 1350-52. Due to the fact that the parchment was over, Sargis priest completed the work in 1352 (fol. 260v).

Until today the information about the biography of the painter was limited with the fact of presenting Mr. Sorghatmish and his wife a manuscript in 1358. His future fate was remaining unknown.

However, the study of the paleography of manuscripts written by Avag allowed us to assign one more manuscript to Avag Tsaghkogh. This is the Gospel no 6402 of Matenadaran, the paleography of which will be analyzed later on. Now let's present a section from the colophon, which provides biographic information about the painter Avag:

> In 1377 spiritual priest John again repaired and composed it /the Gospel/, since the *varpet* Avag, who started to scribe passed away and could not complete it. Me, Zacharia, unworthy and poor scribe full of numerous

sins, did a lot of work in Aghtamar Island under the sponsorship of Saint Cross and Saint Nshan and under the leadership of *ter* Zacharia (fol. 347v).

Unfortunately, due to scarce information of the colophon we cannot state where did Avag live in his last years and where he passed away. The fact that the manuscript appeared in Aghtamar and Avag did not arrive there to complete, shows that he was in different location. Regarding the date we can only state the assumption of Levon Khachikyan that the colophon of Avag should have been written several years before the 1377.[11]

Thus, the first known to us book of Avag Tsaghkogh dates back to 1329, and his last manuscript was completed by another scribe in 1377. From this we can imply that his creative activities lasted about forty years, and the last book he should have written at the elderly age of over 70 years.

So far this is the information known about the biography of Avag Tsaghkogh.

Study of Paleography

First of all let's mention that in order to recognize and compare the script of Avag two manuscripts are taken as basis, where he signs both as painter and scribe. These are the Gospel of 1337-1340 (Matenadaran Ms. no 212) and a New Testament (BL Ms. no 5304), which does not have a date since its colophon is not maintained. Right from the beginning it should be mentioned that in his manuscripts the text is in two columns, and the cursive is *bolorgir*.

As already mentioned, the first book that reached to us is the Gospel of 1329 (Matenadaran Ms. no 7650). The owner of the manuscript was Aslan, who presented it to St. Sargis Church in Ordubazar, which was in one of the suburbs of Sultania (fol. 353v).[12] The fact that Avag worked in Ordubazar created confusion within some experts, who categorized him as belonging to the Crimea school of painters (this is due to the wrong understanding about the location of the settlement).[13] The scribe of the manuscript is Grigor priest,[14] and Avag was the developer of the Canon Tables, illuminator and binder, about which there are references in different folios (25r, 180v, 349v, 354r).

Without denying the fact, that Grigor priest was the copyist of the manuscript, it should be mentioned that Avag was also partially

participating in that work. Thus, he illuminated not only the Canon Tables, but also wrote the texts within the colons – the Letter of Eusebius to Karpianos (fols. 3v and 4r) and the tables (fols. 5v and 12r, **see table I B 1-4**). In general the script of Avag has certain distinctive features. The Armenian letters *"Մ"-"M"*, *"Ձ"-"Z"*, *"Ս"-"S"*, and *"Ի"-"V"* are distinguished with their style. The writing is harmonious and has a little curvature. Due to thin edge used it is extremely delicate. The scribe preferred using black ink.

In this manuscript Avag has also written the first two folios of each Gospel. In the Gospel of Matthew the writing is of golden color, and in other three Gospels – golden and blue (**see image 1**). Such combination of colors gives a particular charm to the book. A tendency of emphasizing and enriching the writing of the manuscript in such a way is also observed in the manuscripts Matenadaran Ms. no 212 and Matenadaran Ms. no 6402 (**see images 2 and 3**). Also, the initials decorated by the image of bird make the Gospel extremely attractive: red-legged and red-beaked birds are portrayed flying or making complex turns (**see table III A 1-3**). We can also state that the colophon also belongs to the pen of Avag (**see table IV A 1-2**). While referring to the names of the scribe and the receiver he asks the following: "Also considered me, Avag Monk *dpir*, to be worth for composing this holy Gospel" (fol. 354r).

The next manuscript is the Gospel of 1334 written in Sultania (Jerus. Ms. no 1941), the scribe, illuminator and binder of which was one of the famous representatives of the Armenian manuscript art Mkhitar of Ani. In this manuscript Mkhitar of Ani make a reference to Avag as "brave secretary and invaluable painter Avag the *vdt*" (fol. 15r), "multitalented painter Avag the *vdt*" (fol. 156r), and "brave secretary monk Avag *vdt*" (fol. 245v).

The above-mentioned inscriptions "Avag *vdt*" often make the experts to consider him to be so called *vardapet* – an Armenian religious teacher of the highest qualifications. However, both in this and subsequent books (even in the latest manuscript no 6402) next to the name of Avag one can also read the words monk *dpir* or deacon. He could be both monk *dpir* and deacon at the same time, but it is out of logic that he would be *dpir* and *vardapet* at the same time. Thus, we tend to agree with the opinion of Garegin Hovsepyan that the inscription "*vdt*" is used with the meaning of "*vardpet*" or "*varpet*" – which in the medieval armenian art history meant to be both scribe, painter, architect and sculptor.[15]

In this manuscript Avag has illuminated not only images of the Great Feasts, as thought by Norayr Pogharyan and Garegin Hovsepyan,[16] but also the portraits of the four Evangelists. And Mkhitar of Ani is the author of Canon Tables, title pages and marginal ornaments. The latter called himself painter, perhaps meaning decorating ornaments.

The masterpiece of Avagh Tsaghkogh is the Gospel of 1337-1340 (Matenadaran Ms. no 212), which was created in Sultania and Tavriz for *paron* Peshgen, who was the son of Burtel Orbelian prince. In the colophon of the manuscript one can read the following:

> The beginning and completion of this book was in Atrpatakan region, in the king's residence cities of Sultania and Tavriz, under the light of the Holy Mother and under the sponsorship of Saint Sargis, by the insignificant and unworthy scribe and illuminator Avag…. (fols. 310r-v).

According to the colophons the scribe, illuminator and binder of the manuscript was Avag (fols. 152r, 310r, 311r, **see table IV B 1-2**). This small Gospel was intended for personal use, and the author has intensively illuminated it through numerous miniature paintings about the life of Christ. And though he modestly describes himself as senseless, unskillful and immodest scribe and illuminator, in this manuscript he has harmoniously combined the holy text of the Gospel and the image of its interpretation.

However, since our main objective is not studying the painting, let's make a transition into the scribe of Avag Tsaghkogh.

As a matter of fact the Gospel is the first completely handwritten book created by Avag, which reached to us. Like in the Gospel of 1329, in this manuscript we see even better, improved version of his script.

Almost all paragraphs of the Gospel start with decorated initials. Golden-color writing follows the initials until the end of the row, and the next row is written with red ink. He keeps such pattern everywhere. The same principle can be seen also in the Gospel of 1329 (**see table III A 2, B 1**).

The first four folios of the Gospel of Matthew are golden-letter with the illustrations of the Genealogy of Christ (**see image 4**). This principle is also observed in the famous Gladzor Gospel of 1300-1307, which is stored in the library of the University of California, Los Angeles.[17] The first two folios of the following three Gospels are written with cursive *bolorgits*

erkatagir in golden and blue colors (**see image 2**).[18] The paleography of different letters is shown in tables I A 1-4 and III B 1-3.

By the request of the metropolitan Sargis of Syuni in Sultania Avag writes and presents him a Book of Songs (Manrusmunk, BSL Ms. or oct. no 279). In the colophon we can read the following:

> I completed this book of songs in 1337…. during the khanate of Sultan Mahmud and during the realm of the Armenian King Levon IV, also during the patriarchy of Hakob and during the time of the great Armenian and Georgian commander paron Burtel of Sisakan authoritative house, as well as his sons – paron Peshgen and Ivane from the Orbelian's. Thus, great Metropolitan of this province asked to write and compose this book of songs ... and I – the sinful Avag, unworthy and unskillful scribe, wrote and painted this book with my slow hand and strayed mind, and served it to my lord as a present (fols. 135r-v).

This book provides that Avag was a talented artist. As a matter of fact he was not only scribe and painter, but was also gifted with musical skills. The manuscript mainly presents the medieval *khaz-notation*, and only in colophons we recognize his script (**see table IV C 1-2**).

The Bible no 4429 stored in Matenadaran is the second manuscript created in 1338 within the collaboration of Avag Tsaghkogh and Mkhitar of Ani. Mkhitar of Ani is the scribe, and Avag is the painter.[19] The scribe wrote the colophon in the form of a poem, where he asks to remember himself "the unworthy, immodest scribe – miserable Mkhitar" (fol. 148v), and described Avag the following way:

> To the great assistant to this work,
> Brave and knowledgeable secretary,
> Very good illuminator,
> Gifted Avag Deacon,
> Who took a great care of me,
> Like to his own son (fol. 148v).

The next Bible created by Avag Tsaghkogh that reached us is the manuscript created in 1341-1355 and stored in Venice, which we have already talked about. The Bible was written by several scribes,[20] and Avag was the painter of it: "Please remember also the illuminator of this manuscript Avag deacon together with his parents" (fol. 2r).

The illuminations of the manuscript start with Old Testament theme about Adam and Eve (fol. 2v) and with luxurious Incipit page (fol. 3r). In the opposing pages of these two folios Avag wrote the beginning of the text (**see table I C 1-2,4**), which was continued by Karapet Scribe.[21]

The result of the joint work of Sargis priest and Avag Tsaghkogh was the 1352 Gospel (Matenadaran Ms. no 7631). We have already made a brief reference to the manuscript. As scribe and illuminator Avag has left several colophons (fols. 6r, 17r, 260v, 261r, 262v, **see table IV D 1-2**). However, it should be noted that all miniature paintings, including Canon Tables, portraits of four Evangelists, Incipit pages, ornaments and illuminations belong to the paintbrush of Sargis priest.[22] And Avag has calligraphically scribed each letter, in separate cases combining the blue and golden (**see table I D 2-4; image 5**). The same principle was used in the Gospel of 1337-40 (image 7). According to the colophon left by Sargis, the great orator Avag has scribed the book before the Gospel of Luke (fol. 260v).

The Bible scribed by Martiros in 1314 and illuminated by Avag Tsaghkogh in 1356-58 is one of the treasures of Matenadaran (Ms. no 6230). We have already talked about the circumstances of creation and patrons of the manuscript.

The Bible was completely scribed by Martiros (fol. 443v), and Avag has illuminated the New Testament with various marginal images.

The participation of Avag in this manuscript is limited to colophons, where he requests to be remembered as painter (**see table IV E 1-2**), and then at the end summarizes the book with extensive colophon.

Another manuscript – New Testament (BL Ms. no 5304), has reached us from Avag the painter, which is not completely maintained, and unfortunately the main colophon is also lost.[23] Thus we don't know when and where was it created. However, Avag has left two small, but important references: "*I beg to remember Avag painter and scribe*" (fol. 2r) and "*remember to scribe*" (fol. 70r, **see table IV F - 2**).

Being both the scribe and the painter, he had a possibility to illuminate the text with luxurious miniature paintings fully using his talent (as we have already seen, the same principle was applied in the Gospel of 1337-1340).

The paleography is fluent and harmonious, and we see already familiar ornaments (**see table I E 1-4, III C 1-3**).

The last work of Avag Tsaghkogh is the manuscript no 6402 stored in Matenadaran, which is written before 1377 (in the above a section from the colophon is presented).

Experts considered it to be the style of Vaspurakan School.[24] This is perhaps true but only from the perspective of miniature painting, since the scribe of the manuscript, Avag deacon and varpet, was not a representative of Vaspurakan school. The same identity of Avag deacon or varpet and Avag Tsaghkogh is evident, since in this book Avag remained loyal to the style of scribe already familiar to us.

Thus, in each Gospel the first two folios he starts to decorate with blue, golden and red ink (**see images 3, 6**). Then he continues to state the text with already familiar letters and colophons (**see tables I F 1-4, IV G 1-2**).

Unfortunately, due to his death Avag was unable to illuminate and ornament it. The painters Hovhannes and Zacharia of Aghtamar continued this work.

In the literature there are certain inaccuracies regarding the number of manuscripts reached from Avag Tsaghkogh to us, which is worth talking about.

Byzantine art historian Victor Lazarev assigns to Avag a Gospel (Matenadaran no 2653) created in Vardnashen village of Tayotz province (Tayq) in 1341.[25] The first scribe of the manuscript was Stepannos Kanutzi: "I beg for my guilty parent Stepanos to be remembered" (fol. 107r), and the second scribe was Nater:

> Was written by senseless and unworthy scribe, sinful Nater, and remember the Lord through praying hands, and ask for a pardon from the Christ for the Priest Stepanos, who has scribed and illuminated this book as a plea to Jesus… remember Grigor deacon, who is his offspring, and then repaired… and remember his mother, who wanted and helped in this work, and his mother's brother Avag… (fol. 226v).

As we see, Avag who is referred to in the colophon, does not have any role in creation of the manuscript. Maybe the illumination of the book made Lazarev to assign it to Avag. However, our studies showed that Avag Tsaghkogh does not have any relation to this Gospel. The ornaments of the manuscripts consist of portraits of three evangelists - Matthew (fol. 64v), Luke (fol. 108v) and John (fol. 176v), four Incipit pages (fols. 1r, 65r, 109r, 177r), and marginal ornaments and initials illustrated in different pages. Those illuminations do not belong to the paintbrush of Avag.

Presumably Levon Khachikyan assigns to Avag a Homilarium written in 1337 (Matenadaran Ms. no 3787),[26] but we do not know the exist location where it was scribed, though the scribes are known – Grigor priest, Sostenes

and master Avag. In reality, the latter one does not have any relation with Avag we are interested in, since the script is completely different. This thick Homilarium is decorated with illuminations, marginal ornaments, portraits of Saints illustrated in different folios, which unfortunately are fragmented (the outlines of the images are slightly copied in the opposite folios). However, even this vague images show that they belong to the paintbrush of another painter.

According to historian Hmayak Martirosyan, in 1358 Avag Tsaghkogh has also been to Jerusalem, where he reproduced and illuminated a manuscripts by the order of clergymen Grigor and Simeon.[27] This manuscript, which represents Gospel and Lectionary, was being stored in the collection of the Forty Martyrs Cathedral of Aleppo (Ms. no 54).[28] Unfortunately, the church was destroyed in 2015. Now the manuscript collection of the church library is available through the digitized copies of the Hill Museum and Manuscript Library (Collegeville, Minnesota). Let us bring a section from the colophon according to the catalogue of Surmeyan:

> The holy Gospel was copied in the city of Jerusalem, in the glorious temple of Saint Archangels, by unworthy, sinful and unskillful priest Avwag… by the request of clergymen Grigor and Simeon (fol. 443r).

This colophon allowed Hmayak Martirosyan to attribute the manuscript to Avag Tsaghkogh. However, the study of the digitized copy of manuscript[29] proved that it is a work of another artist. First of all we need the careful reading of the colophon: Artavazd Surmeyan read the name of the scribe as ter Awag (տէր Աւագ) instead of Terawag.[30] Even if the scribes names were the same, the paleography of the manuscript proves that the author is not the same. The script of the manuscript differs. Avag's script is characterized by a slight slope, which is not similar with Terawag's script. The linear and colored initials (**see table III.A**), the prefaces of each Gospel are also designed by another way (**see image 8**). The style and the iconography of the miniatures are different from the Avag's artworks. Perhaps the author of the miniatures is the scribe either Terawag or another painter.[31]

Thus, to the extent possible, the above-mentioned detailed study of paleography shows us complete picture of the heritage of manuscripts reached to us from Avag (**see table II**) and helps as to recognize not only Avag the painter, but also Avag the scribe.

Table I

	1 S-Ս	2 V- Ի	3 M-Մ	4 Z- Զ
A Mat. 212				
B Mat. 7650				
C Ven. 935				
D Mat. 7631				
E BL 5304				
F Mat. 6402				

Table II

	Number	Content	Date	Place	Scribe	Painter
1	Mat. 7650	Gospel	1329	Ordubazar	Grigor and Avag dpir	Avag
2	Jerus. 1941	Gospel	1334	Sultania	Mekhitar of Ani	Avag monk and *vardpet*, Mekhitar of Ani
3	BSL or oct. 279	Book of Songs	1337	Sultania	Avag	Avag
4	Mat. 212	Gospel	1337-40	Sultania, Tabris	Avag	Avag
5	Mat. 4429	Bible	1338	Sultania	Mekhitar of Ani	Avag deacon
6	Ven. 935	Bible	about 1341-55	Sultania, Vaspurakan	Karapet, Movses, Sargis, Avag dpir	Avag dpir
7	Mat. 7631	Gospel	about 1350-52	Cilicia	Avag *vardpet*, Sargis priest	Sargis priest
8	Mat. 6230	Bilble	1314, 1356-58	Cilicia, Tpghis	Martiros	Avag *vardpet*
9	BL 5304	Tew Testament	?	?	Avag	Avag
10	Mat. 6402	Gospel	?-1377	? then Vaspurakan	Avag dpir and *vardpet*	John and Zacharia

Table III

	1	2	3
A Mat. 7650			
B Mat. 212			
C BL 5304			

Table III.A

	1	2	2
A MS AODA 54, HMML			

Fragments from the pages 88, 393 and 265. All rights reserved to AODA. Images supplied by HMML.

Table IV

	1	2
A Mat. 7650		
B Mat. 212		
C BSL or oct. 279		
D Mat. 7631		

E Mat. 6230		
F BL 5304		
G Mat. 6402		

Illustration 1. Folio of the Gospel of Evangelist Mark, Ms. no 7650, fol. 122r, Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, Yerevan.

Illustration 2. Folio of the Gospel of Evangelist Mark, Ms. no 212, fol. 99v, Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, Yerevan.

Illustration 3. Folio of the Gospel of Evangelist Matthew, Ms. no 6402, fol. 2r, Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, Yerevan.

Illustration 4. The Genealogy of Christ, Ms. no 212, fol. 17r, Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, Yerevan.

Illustration 5. Folio of the Gospel of Evangelist John, Ms. no 7631, fol. 262v, Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, Yerevan.

Illustration 6. Folio of the Gospel of Evangelist Mark, Ms. no 6402, fol. 100v, Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, Yerevan.

Illustration 7. Folio of the Gospel of Evangelist Matthew, Ms. no 212, fol. 14v, Mesrop Mashtots Institute of Ancient Manuscripts, Yerevan.

Illustration 8. Folio of the Gospel of Evangelist Luke,
AODA Ms. no. 54, fol. 186, HMML. All rights reserved to AODA.
Image supplied by HMML.

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NOTES

1   For the first time R. Drampyan and A. Svirin put the art of Avag Tsaghkogh
    into scientific circulation. See Drampyan R., "Armenian Miniature Painting
    and Literary Art", "Note on the History of Armenian Art", collection of
    articles, Art, Moscow-Leningrad, 1939 (in Russian); Svirin A., *Miniature
    Painting of Ancient Armenia*, Art, Moscow-Leningrad, 1939 (in Russian).
    For more details on the history of studying the art of Avag see Sargsyan L.,
    "The History of Studying the 1329 Gospel of Avag Tsaghkogh", *History
    and Culture Armenological Journal*, volume B, Yerevan State University,
    Yerevan, 2011, pp. 332-337 (in Armenian).

2   There is contradicting information in literature on the manuscripts of Avag
    reached to us. Some assign to Avag manuscripts, which he has not take part
    in creation, and vice versa. Such confusion is due to the fact that there are
    manuscripts, where Avag did not do illumination, but did only reproduction.
    Thus, studying the scribe will help us to differentiate the manuscripts of Avag
    Tsaghkogh of the 14th century from the manuscripts of the authors with the
    same name.

3   For the first time the Russian art historian A. Svirin records that Avag was
    born in Moshaghbyur. See Svirin A., *Miniature Painting of Ancient Armenia*,
    Art, Moscow-Leningrad, 1939, p. 96 (in Russian).

4   Hovsepyan G., *Khaghbekyanqs and Proshians in the History of Armenia*,
   Second Publication, Armenian Patriarchate of Cilicia, Antelias-Lebanon,
    1969, pp. 443-444 (in Armenian).

5   *National Atlas of Armenia*, Editor Babken Harutyunyan, volume B, "Tigran
    the Great", Yerevan, 2008, p. 151 (in Armenian); In the Dictionary of
    locations of settlements of Armenia and neighboring regions Moshaghbyur is
    wrongly identified as Moshahav spring, and located in the Martuni Region of
    nowadays Artzakh (see *Dictionary of locations of settlements of Armenia and
    neighboring regions*, Hakobyan T., Melik-Bakhshyan St., Barseghyan H.,
    Yerevan State University, Yerevan, 1991, volume 3, p. 865) (in Armenian).

6   Avetisyan A., "Miniature Painter Avag (from the History of the Ancient
    Armenian Miniature Painting)", "Etchmiadzin" Journal, Holy See of
    Etchmiadzin, Etchmiadzin, 1961, p. 51 (in Armenian); Same author, *Gladzor
    School of the Armenian Miniature Painting*, Academy of Sciences, Yerevan,
    1971, p. 25; Later on this idea is repeated by Zakarian L., see *Sacred Armenia:
    History and Culture, From the Biblical Armenian till the end of 18th century*,
    exhibition catalog, Editor Claude Mutafian, Paris, 2007, p. 365 (in Armenian).

7   Martirosyan H., *History of Armenian Community in Iran*, Tinkler-97, Yerevan,
    2007, p. 189 (in Armenian).

8   *After Marco Polo. Travel of Western Foreigners into the Three Indian
    Countries*, translation from Latin and Old Italian languages, introduction
    and notes by Sveta. Ya. M., Science, Moscow, 1968, p. 58 (in Russian);

Richard, *La papauté et les missions d'Orient au Moyen Age (XIIIe - XVe siècles)*, École Française de Rome; Palais Farnèse, 1977, p. 180-181.

[9] See the colophons of the manuscripts: F. Sargisean B., "Main Catalog of the Armenian Manuscripts in Venice Mekhtarists Library", volume A, Venice – Saint Lazar, 1914, pp. 93-96 (in Armenian); Khachikyan L., "Colophons of the Armenian Manuscripts of the 14th Century", Academy of Sciences, Yerevan, 1950, pp. 328, 406, 415 (in Armenian); The comparison of the list of Father Barsegh Sargisean shows inconsistency in the number of pages, since we were guided with the current pagination of the manuscript.

[10] Hovsepyan G., "Mkhitar of Ani – Scribe and Painter", "Hask" Armeneological Yearbook, Year A, Armenian Patriarchate of Cilicia, Antelia- Lebanon, 1948, p. 201 (in Armenian).

[11] Khachikyan L., "Colophons of the 14th Century Armenian Manuscripts", Academy of Sciences, Yerevan, 1950, p. 522 (in Armenian).

[12] The identity of these historical persons is described in more detail in the following publication – Zakarian L., Un Artista Anti-Unitore del XIV secolo, Roma-Armenia, a cura di Claude Mutafian, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1999, pp. 176-178.

[13] Svirin A., "Miniature Painting of the Ancient Armenia", Moscow-Leningrad, 1939, p. 97 (in Russian); Lazarev V., "History of Byzantine painting", Art, Moscow, 1986, p. 185 (in Russian).

[14] In the widely written colophon at the end of the Gospel we can read the following: "*Please remember myself – unworthy and unskillful scribe Grigor priest, and my parents*", fol. 353r.

[15] Hovsepyan G., "Mkhitar of Ani – Scribe and Painter", "Hask" Armenological Yearbook, Armenian Patriarchate of Cilicia, Antelia- Lebanon, 1948, p. 203 (in Armenian); see also Barkhudaryan S., "Armenian Medieval Architects and Stone Masters", Academy of Sciences, Yerevan, 1963, pp. 16-18 (in Armenian).

[16] Hovsepyan G., "Mkhitar of Ani – Scribe and Painter", "Hask" Armenological Yearbook, Armenian Patriarchate of Cilicia, Antelia- Lebanon, 1948, p. 203 (in Armenian); Pogharyan N., "Main Catalog of Manuscripts at Saint James", volume 6, Armenian Patriarchate of St. James, Jerusalem, 1972, p. 21 (in Armenian).

[17] Mathews Th. and Taylor A., The Armenian Gospels of Gladzor: The life of Christ Illuminated, Los Angeles, California, Getty Publications, 2001, plates 9-10.

[18] We see such principle of calligraphy also in the Cilician manuscripts, for example in the Gospel scribed and illuminated by the famous Cilician artist of the 14th century Sargis Pitsak, which after being brought to Romania in 1664 was completed by Avetik deacon (State Archive of Cluj-Napoca, no. 11, fol. 120r). Also the same refers to another manuscript stored in the same collection (no 15), which was written in Cilicia and then in Cyprus

– Famagusta. The manuscript was ordered in 1310-12 by the aunt Alits of the Cilician kings, and scribed by famous artist Stepannos Guynereritzantz and illuminated by Sargis Pitsak (fol. 285r).

[19] The miniature paintings of the Bible are incomplete, which is evidenced by the red ink and drawings painted by feather.

[20] F. Sargisian B., "Main Catalog of the Armenian Manuscripts in Venice Mekhtarists Library", volume A, Venice – Saint Lazar, 1914, pp. 87-88 (in Armenian).

[21] The exact continuity of the original is checked.

[22] In the two ornamental borders of the Gospel John the Baptist and God's Mother are portrayed (fol. 23r, 110r), in the back of which one could notice the traces of drawings with red ink. It is not excluded that Avag did the drawings to paint them after completion of the scribe, but Sargis Pitsak continued it.

[23] For the first time the manuscript was assigned to Avag by great scholar, Byzantine art historian, Sirarpi Der Nersessian, see the digital archive of Der Nersessian S., folder 5, document 5304, stored in Matenadaran.

[24] Matevosyan K., Tumanyan L., Asryan A., "Historical-Cultural Heritage of Aghtamar", Holy See of Etchmiadzin, Etchmiadzin, 2013, p. 124 (in Armenian).

[25] Lazarev V., "History of the Byzantine Painting", Art, Moscow, 1986, p. 185 (in Russian).

[26] Khachikyan L., "Colophons of the 14th Century Armenian Manuscripts", Academy of Sciences, Yerevan, 1950, p. 293 (in Armenian).

[27] Martirosyan H., "History of the Armenian Community of Iran", Tinkler-97, Yerevan, 2007, p. 193 (in Armenian).

[28] Archbishop Surmeyan A., "Catalog of the Armenian Manuscripts at Aleppo Cathedral of Forty Martyrs", Armenian Patriarchate of St. James, Jerusalem, 1935, p. 111-119.

[29] The current location of manuscript is unknown.

[30] For more details about the name Teravag (*Տէրավագ*) see Acharian Hr., *Dictionary of Armenian names*, Yerevan, 1942, p. 144.

[31] The study of the illumination of manuscript and the identification of the artist of manuscript will be discussed by me on another occasion.

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THE UKRAINIAN FAR RIGHT AND THE UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION

Abstract

The article discusses two far right movements that took part in the Ukrainian revolution in 2014. The author argues that, although the fact of the involvement of the far right in the revolution cannot be denied, the Russian media deliberately exaggerated this involvement to discredit the opposition to former President Viktor Yanukovych. Thus, the articles provides a more nuanced picture of the Ukrainian far right before, during and immediately after the revolution. This research draws on the interviews conducted by the author, video and photographic evidence, online and offline publications, results of public opinion polls, and secondary literature on the Ukrainian far right.

Keywords: far right, Ukraine, Euromaidan, Ukrainian revolution, Svoboda, Right Sector

Introduction: The Ukrainian Far Right through the Distorted Lens of the Information War

Both during and after the 2014 Ukrainian revolution,[1] the issue of the Ukrainian far right became a hot topic of debates on the international level. What was once only the subject of a limited number of academic studies suddenly became a key point of the information war unleashed by the Kremlin and Russia's state-controlled media first against the pro-European protesters and the party-political opposition to former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and, later, against the new Ukrainian authorities established after contemporary President Viktor Yanukovych's flight to Russia.[2]

The exaggerated focus on the far right element in the protests, known collectively as Euromaidan, and the consequent revolution

aimed at advancing three major interconnected and mutually sustaining propagandistic narratives.

First, it intended to present the opposition to Yanukovych as a neo-fascist movement that could be supported neither by Russian citizens, nor by Ukraine's highly generalised ethnic Russian/Russian-speaking community, nor by the European Union (EU).

Second, constant references to the "neo-fascist" or "ultranationalist nature" of the Ukrainian revolution served as an evidence of an anti-Russian and hence, xenophobic conspiracy led by the USA and NATO against Russia and the "Russian World". This was also part of a larger, conspiracy-theorist narrative that insisted that the anti-government protests in Ukraine had been inspired by the West in general and the USA in particular to further Western expansionism and the enlargement of NATO, as well as undercutting the Russian sphere of influence.

The combination of the first and second narratives also formed a mythical idea of the anti-Russian NATO using Ukrainian fascists to destroy ethnic Russians in Ukraine and undermine Russia's legitimate interests in its natural sphere of influence. This idea was used as one of the arguments to justify the occupation and consequent annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in March 2014.

Third, the promotion of an idea of a "fascist junta in Kyiv" aimed to revitalise the heroic Soviet imagery and the rhetoric of the "Great Patriotic War" to mobilise the population in Eastern and Southern Ukraine (dubbed by the Kremlin as "Novorossiya") to start an alleged anti-fascist struggle against the newly established Ukrainian authorities. After the EU and USA adopted sanctions against particular Russian individuals, businesses and industries, the same narrative was used to portray Russia as a victim of the Western aggression, replete with references to the USSR similarly being "a victim" of the Third Reich. This propagandistic narrative has found particularly fertile ground in Germany with its *Kollektivschuld* (collective guilt) that overwhelmingly "singles out as the object of German guilt only Russia but not Ukraine as the legitimate heir to the Soviet Union".[3]

The Kremlin's narratives about Ukraine became relatively successful in particular circles in the West. These – predominantly far right and (far) left – were ready to adopt the line on the "fascist junta in Kyiv" and condemn the Ukrainian revolution as a NATO/CIA/US/EU-inspired coup.

An intrinsic characteristic of almost all the Western critical reports and analyses focusing on – and inevitably exaggerating – the role of the Ukrainian far right in the revolution was that they did not discuss

Ukraine as a country willing to become a full member of the liberal democratic community. Ukraine as such was absent from those debates, yet those commentators would be discussing topics such as "Western expansionism", "US involvement", "enlargement of NATO", "EU-Russia relations", "Russian sphere of influence", "Russian legitimate interests". In this context, the Ukrainians were deprived of agency; they were objectified into non-subjectivity, into a mob allegedly manipulated by the West against Russia.

However, those publicists and journalists still needed to focus on the far right to secure a rhetorical retreat in case someone would indeed be willing to discuss the Ukrainians' agency. The line of argumentation was as patronising as it was revealing intellectual laziness: it was the West that was trying to divorce Ukraine from Russia, but even if it were the Ukrainians themselves, then they were all fascists anyway and could not be supported. For the far left, those two arguments blended together: the West conspires against Russia and deliberately supports the Ukrainian far right because the West itself is a nondemocratic imperialistic monster.

For fairness' sake, not everybody coming from the left adopted that patronising tone, and the writings of Timothy Snyder,[4] Slavoj Zizek[5] and some other leading left-leaning intellectuals were indicative of a different perspective on the Ukrainian revolution.

Not that the Ukrainian far right element was absent from the revolution or further political process. On the contrary, it was very visible and apparent. However, not only were ultranationalist elements far from dominant, but the circumstances of their presence were much more complex than those presented either by the Kremlin, Russian state-controlled media, or Moscow's sympathisers in the West. Furthermore, while attacking the Ukrainian far right involvement and even associating the revolution and the post-revolutionary authorities with Ukrainian ultra-nationalism, Moscow preferred to deliberately ignore the far right element amongst pro-Russian separatists and Russian volunteers in the war in Eastern Ukraine, as well as the growing cooperation between the Kremlin and the far right in particular EU member states.

This article aims at providing a more nuanced – although still sketchy, due to limited length – picture of the Ukrainian far right before, during and immediately after the revolution. One inevitable major limitation of this article is that it focuses only on the more significant far right actors that have been involved in the recent developments in Ukraine.

Methodologically, this article draws on the interviews conducted by the author with the representatives of Ukrainian far right organisations, video and photographic evidence collected since the beginning of the Euromaidan in November 2013, far right online and offline publications, results of public opinion polls, as well as secondary literature focusing on the Ukrainian far right.

The Case of Svoboda

Two major far right movements took part in the pro-European protests and the consequent revolution: the political party All-Ukrainian Union "Freedom" (Svoboda)[6] and a coalition of minor far right groups and organisations that became collectively known as "Right Sector".[7]

Svoboda was founded in 1991 in Lviv as the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU), under the leadership of Yaroslav Andrushkiv. The SNPU was officially registered as a political party in 1995 and, thereafter, took part in several parliamentary elections to no avail. The SNPU's only relevant political success was the election of one of its leaders, Oleh Tyahnybok, to the Ukranian parliament or Verkhovna Rada (literally, "supreme council") in 1998 and 2002, representing single-member districts in the Lviv oblast. However, it was Viktor Yushchenko's national democratic electoral bloc "Our Ukraine" and not the SNPU that nominated Tyahnybok in 2002, a sign that the organisational decline of the SNPU had started to set in. Tyahnybok made an attempt to revive the party: following the SNPU congress in 2004, it changed its current name (All-Ukrainian Union "Freedom"), replaced Andrushkiv with Tyahnybok as the head of the party and made several other changes intended to reinvigorate the organisation and make it more respectable in the eyes of voters. Despite these changes, Svoboda's results in the 2006 and early 2007 parliamentary elections, 0.36% and 0.76% respectively, provided no evidence of growing popularity.[8]

Following its relative success in the regional elections in 2009 and 2010, Svoboda made headlines in 2012 when it obtained 10.4% of the proportional vote and won in 12 single-member districts in the 2012 parliamentary elections, and subsequently formed the first ever far right faction in the Ukrainian parliament.

That was indeed a breakthrough for Ukrainian ultranationalists: for more than twenty years of Ukraine's independence, no Ukrainian far right

party had ever succeeded in having members elected to the Ukrainian parliament through the party-list system, although a few ultranationalists from various far right parties had been elected in single-member constituencies. Their numbers, however, had never been sufficient to form their own parliamentary faction, and they had allied themselves with other, mostly national-democratic, factions.

Moreover, rather than being genuine subjects of the political process, the Ukrainian far right were largely fake actors in Ukrainian political life, at least on the national level. Various far right forces were often pulled out of the political fringes by more powerful political actors to be exploited in different political games.[9] As political parties, the Ukrainian far right organisations can provide three major types of services for manipulation purposes. First, they can be employed by more powerful (and usually incumbent) political subjects, to pose as "scarecrow" or "bigger evil" actors to mobilise popular support for the incumbents presented as "lesser evil". Second, during elections of any level, far right parties, which have very limited chances of success, yet are entitled to have representatives in electoral commissions, may financially gain by either exchanging their own representatives for those who represent other parties or participating in electoral fraud themselves to the benefit of more popular candidates. Third, more powerful political actors may promote far right parties, for example by covertly investing in their campaigns, in order to weaken or undermine major competing players, in particular of the mainstream right.

Being a stark opponent of President Yanukovych and his Party of Regions, Svoboda, however, was successful in 2012 exactly because it was manipulated and nurtured by Yanukovych as a "scarecrow" party. When, in 2010, Yanukovych was elected President of Ukraine and Mykola Azarov of the Party of Regions was appointed Prime Minister, the media visibility of Svoboda dramatically increased, especially on TV-channels either directly or indirectly controlled by the Presidential Administration and the new government.[10] Even though it was not represented, at that time, in the Ukrainian parliament, Svoboda's top officials enjoyed a media spotlight which other extra-parliamentary parties only dreamed of. Yanukovych and his associates wanted to damage the mainstream opposition by elevating the significance of Svoboda.

However, Yanukovych's regime – by manipulating and instrumentalising Svoboda – did not only aim at damaging the opposition, but also at securing the re-election of Yanukovych in the 2015 presidential election. Since 2010, it was increasingly clear that Yanukovych and his associates were

trying to promote Svoboda's leader Oleh Tyahnybok in order to have him as Yanukovych's contender in the second round of the presidential election. Until the Euromaidan protests, of all the more or less popular opponents of Yanukovych's regime, Tyahnybok was the only one who, according to the public opinion polls, would have been crushed by Yanukovych in the second round.[11] Two top members of the Party of Regions virtually confirmed the existence of the "Tyahnybok-in-the-second-round" scenario. At the end of 2010, when asked if he preferred Tyahnybok to Yuliya Tymoshenko as an opposition force, then first deputy chairman of the Party of Regions Volodymyr Rybak replied that Tyahnybok was "a model nationalist who worried about Ukraine" thus indirectly giving preference to Tyahnybok.[12] More explicitly, in February 2013, then first deputy head of the Party of Regions' parliamentary faction Mykhaylo Chechetov declared that Yanukovych would win the 2015 presidential election and that "Tyahnybok would be his contender. We know about this".[13]

Thus, at the 2012 parliamentary elections, Svoboda benefited both from its inflated image of the most radical opposition to Yanukovych's regime and from the fact that the regime itself promoted this image through the controlled mass media.

Once in parliament, Svoboda allied itself with the two other opposition parties: Arseniy Yatsenyuk's Fatherland and Vitaliy Klitschko's UDAR. However, Svoboda failed to live up – in the parliament and elsewhere – to the image of the most radical opposition to Yanukovych and started losing popular support already in 2013.

Svoboda's active participation in the pro-European, pro-democratic protests that unfolded in late November 2013 as a response to Yanukovych's U-turn on the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, may seem a paradox: Svoboda used to criticise the EU and reject Ukraine's European integration. As Svoboda MP Andriy Illenko argued in 2010, Ukraine's rapprochement with the EU implied "acceptance of a cosmopolitan ideology, dissolution of the modern liberal empire, and submission to the [...] gradual loss of national identity".[14]

Why, then, did Svoboda support the pro-democratic and pro-European revolution? What compelled Svoboda's leadership to support those Ukrainians who aspired to "dissolve" Ukraine in "the ocean of transnational capital and migration flows"?[15] The following three explanations seem most viable: (1) Svoboda viewed Ukraine's European integration as a definitive turn away from all Russia-led Eurasian integration projects; (2) the party recognised the pro-European attitudes of its voters; and (3)

Svoboda viewed Euromaidan, which quickly evolved into a revolution, as a platform for self-promotion and propaganda. Let us consider these explanations in more detail.

The prospect of signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU was widely seen, not only by Svoboda's leadership, as an almost irrevocable withdrawal from the Russian sphere of influence as represented by the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, as well as the Eurasian Economic Union that was launched in 2015. From the very beginning, Ukraine's choice between the EU and Customs Union was presented as a "zero-sum game". In February 2013, contemporary European Commission President José Manuel Barroso said that "one country [could not] at the same time be a member of a customs union and be in a free trade area with the European Union".[16] In October that year, then Austrian ambassador to Ukraine Wolf Dietrich Heim also said that Ukraine could not "work simultaneously in two areas: as part of the agreement on the creation of a free trade area and as part of the Customs Union".[17] The same argument was acknowledged by Russian President Vladimir Putin.[18]

As the perceived Russian threat to Ukraine had always been the most powerful mobilising element in Svoboda's ideology, the party had no other choice than actively support the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU. Thus, as the "zero-sum game" unfolded, the "modern liberal empire" was seen as a lesser evil than the Customs Union, "a soap bubble for the revival of the Russian Empire in the new old Soviet Union".[19]

It was, therefore, hardly surprising that Svoboda enjoyed the support of the most pro-European electorate among any Ukrainian party elected into the Verkhovna Rada in 2012. According to the opinion poll conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation,[20] 71.4% of Svoboda's voters were in favour of Ukraine's integration with Europe. At the same time, the numbers for the electorates of UDAR and Fatherland were 69.5% and 63.8% correspondingly. When asked whether they considered themselves Europeans, 51.2% of Svoboda's voters gave a positive reply; the numbers for the electorates of UDAR and the Fatherland were 44.5% and 40.6%.

Moreover, when asked to choose three out of eight options in a reply to the question "What is needed for you to feel a European", 46.2% of Svoboda's voters chose "To respect democratic values and human rights", while 31.7% chose "To have fair democratic elections". The numbers for the electorates of the Fatherland and UDAR were 39.5% and 38.4%

for the former option, and 21.9% and 19.2% for the latter. It might seem surprising or even confusing that supporters of the far right party at the 2012 parliamentary elections turned out be more pro-European and pro-democratic than voters for the two democratic parties. However, that problem appeared confusing only at first sight: for many Ukrainian voters, the rejection of Russia-led integration projects was underpinned by the rejection of authoritarianism and the collapse of the rule of law usually associated with the contemporary Kremlin's policies. Thus, Svoboda's radically negative attitudes towards Putin's Russia were re-interpreted by many Ukrainian pro-democratic voters as radical opposition to authoritarianism and backwardness. Svoboda's leadership could not ignore the distinctly pro-EU stances of the majority of its voters, and abandoned the anti-EU rhetoric that might have alienated most of its electorate.

To Svoboda, the Euromaidan protests seemed to be a good opportunity to reclaim the popular support that they had lost within a year of the party's electoral success in 2012. Svoboda obtained 10.44% of the vote in October 2012, but only 5.1% of the voters would have cast a ballot for this party in November 2013.[21] Even more dramatically, Tyahnybok's presidential rating fell from 10.4% in March[22] to 5.8% in May[23] and to 3.6% in November 2013.[24]

At first, Svoboda resolutely plunged into the revolution. The courage and valour that their members (but not only they) showed during the defence of Independence Square (Maidan) – the heart of the revolution – against the riot police on 9 December 2013 contributed to the morale of the protesters. However, Svoboda's fighting units were reluctant to take part in the most significant clashes with the police forces between 19 and 22 January and 18 and 19 February 2014, although individual members of the party participated, while some of them died in the infamous Maidan shootings.

For the most part, Svoboda made a negative impact on the revolution. The party, and especially its paramilitary wing called C14 under the leadership of the notorious neo-Nazi Yevhen Karas, became involved in a number of divisive activities. Displaying racist banners in the occupied Kyiv City State Administration, attacking journalists, volunteer medical workers and other Euromaidan activists, demolishing the Lenin monument, staging a torch-lit march commemorating controversial Ukrainian ultranationalist Stepan Bandera – all these activities damaged the unity, as well as the image, of Euromaidan and the revolution.[25] Furthermore, according to documents revealed by Hennadiy Moskal,[26] the contemporary Fatherland

MP and former deputy chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the security services then controlled by Yanukovych's regime actively recruited agents and informants among many parties and movements, and from Svoboda in particular. Out of 19 agents and informants presumably recruited by the SBU, nine were members of Svoboda.

Moreover, the Euromaidan protests presented Svoboda with an unexpected problem: from the very beginning, the protests were a grassroots initiative. The majority of the protesters were very suspicious of the involvement of the three major opposition parties (Fatherland, UDAR and Svoboda) in Euromaidan. Little more than 5% of participants in Euromaidan in Kyiv were mobilised by the calls of the opposition leaders in December 2013; and by January 2014, the figure had decreased to less than 2%. Furthermore, only 3.9% of the Kyiv protesters in December 2013 and 7.7% in January 2014 were members of any political party.[27] The protesters' concerns that the leaders of the opposition parties might betray the protests and simply use Euromaidan to secure their own bargaining power applied to all opposition parties, but Svoboda was particularly affected. Even in Lviv, Svoboda's long-time electoral bulwark, the MP Yuriy Mykhal'chyshyn was booed by the students who organised a local Euromaidan rally at the end of November 2013.[28]

Tyahnybok's party, which coordinated most of its activities with the other two opposition parties represented in the parliament, yet at the same time clashed with various elements of the civic movement, was increasingly seen as a noisy nuisance, whose radical rhetoric did not match its actions.[29] As Ostap Drozdov put it in his article on Svoboda's "parasitic role" in the revolution, "within just a few weeks, the country has witnessed a real fiasco for the party that blatantly promised to lead the revolution, but, instead, not only became its obstacle, but also its most flawed element".[30] Two months after the start of Euromaidan, less than 3% of Ukrainians thought that Tyahnybok ought to become a leader of the protests[31] – a figure that suggested Svoboda had effectively failed at Euromaidan. Even if it was not a complete fiasco, Svoboda seemed to have failed to make amends as regards its dwindling popular support: at the end of January and beginning of February 2014, only 3.8% of voters were prepared to cast their ballot for Tyahnybok at the presidential elections, and 5.6% for Svoboda – at the parliamentary elections.[32]

Thus, when Svoboda's members were given four ministerial posts in acting Prime Minister Yatsenyuk's interim government formed after the flight of Yanukovych to Russia in February 2014, this was clearly

inconsistent with the then level of support for the party. However, half of the interim cabinet had to be formed by the three former opposition parties, and Klitschko's UDAR refused to take part in the interim government because it was going to enact unpopular measures and UDAR was afraid of losing popular support. Had Svoboda been not given ministerial posts, then it would have been a one-party, i.e. Fatherland-controlled, government – an obvious political disaster.

The involvement of Svoboda in the interim government eventually became yet another blow to the party's popularity (for example, Svoboda's Minister of Defence Ihor Tenyukh was dismissed within a month of his appointment) that further contributed to the demise of the party on the national level, especially after the early presidential and parliamentary elections in May and October 2014 respectively (see below).

Furthermore, there was no evidence that Svoboda exerted any "far right influence" on the workings of the interim government. Not that Svoboda was in the minority and because of this was unable to exert such an influence. Rather, the interim government was essentially dealing with problems – economic crisis and Russian invasion – the gravity of which eclipsed potential ideological demands of Svoboda. Beyond that, those potential ideological demands belonged to the parliamentary, and not governmental, sphere. In parliament, Svoboda still had a group of 36 MPs, but that was a result of the 2012 parliamentary elections, rather than the revolution.

The Case of Right Sector

Partly because of the unwillingness of Svoboda to match its radical rhetoric with radical action during the revolution, some of the protesters' sympathies shifted to Right Sector.

During the revolution, Right Sector was a broad coalition of far right organisations and groups that came together at the end of November 2013, a few days after the start of the pro-European protests. Then, Right Sector comprised of "Tryzub" (Trident), the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian Self-Defence (UNA-UNSO), "Patriot of Ukraine" (PU), "White Hammer" (WH), as well as smaller groupuscules and individual activists. At the end of January 2014, when the author interviewed activists from Right Sector, they said that their movement had around 300 members.

Their numbers apparently grew to 500 in the course of the more violent part of the revolution, i.e. in late January – February 2014.

Ideologically, these organisations ranged from radical national-conservatism of "Tryzub" to the right-wing extremism of the UNA-UNSO to the neo-Nazism of the PU and WH.[33] However, none of these ideological strands was a unifying force for Right Sector activists, while the neo-Nazis – due to the lower position of the PU and WH in the hierarchy of Right Sector – constituted a fringe element in the movement. What united these sometimes conflicting groups at the grassroots level was a combination of vehement opposition to Yanukovych's regime, which was widely considered as anti-Ukrainian and pro-Kremlin, the desire for "national liberation" and romantic militarism. This consensus was reinforced by the leadership of Dmytro Yarosh, the head of "Tryzub" and Right Sector as a whole: contrary to the demonisation of Yarosh in the (pro-)Russian media, it was he who, at the time of the revolution, tried to moderate the movement by publicly denouncing racism and anti-Semitism.[34]

For the outside world, Right Sector had two different faces. First, for the (pro-)Russian and pro-Yanukovych media, Right Sector was a neo-Nazi movement, and it was indeed easy to spot neo-Nazi imagery employed by the activists of Right Sector who belonged to the PU and WH, and then make a time-honoured generalisation. Second, the minimum consensus structure made Right Sector an increasingly inclusive movement, and activists of various ethnic backgrounds joined the movement in the second half of the Euromaidan protests. Around 40% of the movement was comprised of ethnic Russians/Russian-speakers.[35] Right Sector seemed to be a disciplined and efficient fighting unit, and while there were several fighting units during the revolution, some activists preferred to join Right Sector in January-February 2014 exactly because of its efficiency and militaristic image that attracted many a young protester.

Yet Right Sector had a third face that was concealed from outside observers, the face that revealed particular elements of political manipulation. To comprehend these elements, we need to look closely at the histories of some of the groups and individuals involved in Right Sector. However, before turning to these histories, it is important to discuss particular general trends in the extra-political and non-ideological activities of far right social movements in Ukraine.

As was argued earlier, Ukrainian far right political parties are often manipulated and instrumentalised by more powerful political forces.

Yet the spectrum of the services that the far right can offer as social organisations or groupuscules is even wider than those of the far right parties, although the level of reward is lower than in the second case. Most of the services provided by the far right can be grouped into often overlapping four major categories concisely named "illegal economic developments", "protection and security", "fake protests" and "violence".

First, far right activists are sometimes hired as strong-arm men to provide support during illegal takeovers. In Ukraine, redistribution of assets, property, businesses and wealth sometimes take place outside the legal space, and the rule of law is replaced by the rule of force. Far right activists who often practice martial arts and/or bodybuilding are, thus, useful in these situations, especially when an interested party needs to physically break through and occupy particular enterprises and/or offices. While activities such as these are predominantly non-ideological, ideology may play a mobilising role when a far right group is hired to drive out a business run by people of non-Slavic origin from a market. To mobilise their rank-and-file for such an operation, "pragmatists" leading a far right group may interpret it as a part of the "racial holy war", while in reality the original "need" to force out a business from a market has nothing to do with ethnicity.

Second, some far right groups can be characterised as criminal gangs running protection and/or extortion rackets. In the case of the protection racket, far right activists would offer to protect a business against a real threat, for example an illegal takeover or aggressive competitors. In the case of the extortion racket, the far right would threaten to attack a business if it refused protection.

Third, and this point is similar to the extortion racket, far right activists sometimes organise or threaten to organise protests against particular political, social or cultural developments or events in order to extort a reward for stopping them.

Fourth, far right activists can be hired by an interested party to perform acts of violence against its political opponents without giving away the connection between the "customer" and the "contractors". More often than not, "customers" are incumbents who would be interested in disrupting opposition protests or demonstrations that can potentially pose a serious challenge to the incumbents. The violence may be either direct, i.e. physical attacks, or mediated. In the latter case, far right activists would infiltrate the opposition protests without disclosing either their political affiliation or their "customers" and radicalise them to the degree where

a police action against the entire protest would be legitimate. In most cases, far right activists would attack the police to provoke them into using violence against the genuine protesters.

As many other Ukrainian far right activists, certain members and even leaders of Right Sector during the Euromaidan and revolution had been involved in some of the above-described activities.

The main point of reference is the year of 2004 which is commonly associated with the presidential election and the "Orange revolution" – a two-month stand-off between pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych and pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko that resulted in the victory of the latter in the re-run of the presidential election on 26 December.

Electoral fraud was one of the factors which set off the "Orange revolution", but then President Leonid Kuchma's regime employed other methods of political technology in an attempt to damage Yushchenko and hand over the reins of power to Yanukovych. Kuchma's Presidential Administration, then headed by Viktor Medvedchuk, as well as Yanukovych's advisers carried out several acts of political technology that involved the Ukrainian far right. On the basis of their immediate aims, these acts can be divided into two sets: the first set was aimed at inventing or using "scarecrow" individual and parties to discredit Yushchenko in the eyes of the Ukrainian pro-democratic voters and Western observers; the second was aimed at depriving Yushchenko of nationalist votes through the employment of "technical" presidential candidates.

The most infamous act was the "fascist march in support of Yushchenko". It was staged by Kuchma's Presidential Administration and involved an invented "scarecrow" extreme right party Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) led by Eduard Kovalenko. In the beginning of summer 2004, Kovalenko declared that his party would hold a march in central Kyiv in support of Yushchenko as a presidential candidate. Yushchenko's office immediately replied that they never needed that support and did their best to distance from Kovalenko's scandalous initiative. Yet Yushchenko's office could not hamper that march and, on 26 June 2004, the march, which was supersaturated with Nazi imagery and Nazi salutes, proceeded. This was the first time the authorities granted permission to hold a mass extreme right march in central Kyiv.

Kovalenko's UNA was then closely associated with the UNA-UNSO which, in the beginning of the 2000s, split into several factions following the crackdown on the organisation during the anti-government "Ukraine without Kuchma!" campaign in 2001. In 2004, Kovalenko still cooperated

with some of the members of the original UNA-UNSO, and Andriy Shkil, the leader of one of the factions, expelled several members, including Ihor Mazur and Andriy Bondarenko, for collaboration with Kovalenko whose "fascist march" was unanimously seen as an act of political technology against Yushchenko.[36]

Kovalenko's UNA was not the only splinter group from the original UNA-UNSO that was offered collaboration with pro-Yanukovych's spin-doctors. As one of the members of the UNA-UNSO faction led by Yuriy Tyma recalls, when Kovalenko's "masters" decided to intensify the defamation attack on Yushchenko, they turned to them: "These people offered financial support in exchange for our support for Yushchenko... Moreover, we would have to radicalise our slogans and actions".[37] Thus, the pro-Yanukovych political technologists needed to produce a media picture of the "most extreme neo-Nazis" supporting – but, eventually, damaging mainstream support for – Yushchenko. Tyma's faction of the UNA-UNSO presumably refused to collaborate, but they were involved in a different scheme against Yushchenko.

With the backing from the authorities, several "technical" nationalist candidates were registered for the elections.[38] Among them were: Bohdan Boyko, leader of the invented People's Movement of Ukraine for Unity (one of several parties that used the word "movement" (Rukh) to confuse the voters and steal votes from the original People's Movement of Ukraine); Yuriy Zbitnyev, leader of the virtual far right "New Force" party; Roman Kozak, leader of the fringe far right Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine; and Dmytro Korchyns'ky, former leader of the original UNA-UNSO and then leader of the invented far right "Brotherhood" party. These candidates' aim was to steal votes for Yushchenko from the right segment of the political spectrum and provide the electoral fraud machine with loyal representatives controlled by the regime. In the context of this article, it is important to note, in particular, Boyko and his political initiative to form a coalition named "The Movement of Ukrainian Patriots" that was joined, in July 2004, by his own party, as well as Tyma's UNA-UNSO, "Tryzub" under the leadership of Yevhen Fil, and a few smaller groups.

The leadership of Right Sector during the revolution included many of the former and actual UNA-UNSO members who were directly and/ or indirectly involved in the above-mentioned pro-Yanukovych and pro-government political technology projects. Among them were Andriy Bondarenko, Ihor Mazur and Mykola Karpyuk who, after the failure of the

"Ukraine without Kuchma!" campaign in 2001, turned the UNA-UNSO – together with Kovalenko and Tyma – into an organisation loyal to Kuchma.

The dubious past was also present in the PU that was part of Right Sector during the revolution. The PU was formed in Kharkiv in 2005-2009 and led by Andriy Bilets'ky and Oleh Odnorozhenko. In Kharkiv, the PU cooperated with the authorities who used neo-Nazi activists for their own business purposes.[39] In return, the PU was allowed to stage torch-lit marches and intimidate Asian and African students – because of their loyalty to the authorities, they were rarely confronted by the police. The activities of the Kyiv-based branch of the PU, known as the Social-National Assembly (SNA) and led by Ihor Mosiychuk, Volodymyr Shpara and Serhiy Bevz, were similar. They collaborated with the pro-Yanukovych authorities to perform a wide range of activities: blocking observation of local elections, scheming with lease of land, disrupting social and anti-government protests, etc. PU/SNA activists were also involved in attacks on Kharkiv and Kyiv region markets where a lot of Vietnamese people sold their goods, but while these attacks might have been presented to rank and file as a struggle against "illegal migrants", in reality they were simply violent attempts at regulating business interests to the benefit of "patrons" of the PU/SNA.

One of the neo-Nazis who closely cooperated with the PU/SNA was Oleksandr Vakhniy. A leading figure of the neo-Nazi skinhead movement in Kyiv in the late 1990s and a convicted criminal, Vakhniy also cooperated with Korchyns'ky's virtual "Brotherhood", Kovalenko's UNA, as well as being a member of SPAS – an invented pan-Slavic and anti-Crimean Tatar far right party formed by Kovalenko after the UNA. During the revolution, Vakhniy was also a leading member of the WH that was part of Right Sector. Before Euromaidan, the WH was known for attacking and destroying casinos which are illegal in Ukraine. Ideologically, the destruction of casinos might have been driven by social conservatism and arbitrarily interpreted sense of law and order, but the activities of Vakhniy and the WH had also mundane implications, as they stole large amounts of money from the casinos they attacked. After the revolution, two members of the WH were allegedly involved in murdering three road policemen. In March 2014, following the statement issued by the General Prosecutor Office that the murders of the road policemen might have been carried out by Euromaidan activists, the Right Sector leadership expelled the WH from the organisation.

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It would be, however, an exaggeration to say that the entire Right Sector was a fake movement or part of "political technology" in the service of Yanukovych's regime or various business projects. However, in the course of the protests and the revolution, there were several episodes when Right Sector's activists, most likely, deliberately attacked the police to provoke a violent response upon other protesters.

In March, the party-political wing of the UNA-UNSO, namely the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA), was renamed into Right Sector with Dmytro Yarosh as its leader, but later Right Sector – already a political party – parted ways with many members of the UNSO.

Svoboda and Right Sector at the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections

The early presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine that took place in May and October 2014 respectively proved to be disastrous for Svoboda's Oleh Tyahnybok and Right Sector's Dmytro Yarosh.

Tyahnybok obtained 1.2% and Yarosh 0.7% in the presidential election. One irony of their performance, especially against the background of the Kremlin's continuous disinformation campaign, was that Vadym Rabinovych, president of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress, obtained 2.3% of the votes – more than Tyahnybok and Yarosh together.

In the parliamentary elections, Svoboda secured only 4.71% of the vote and, therefore, failed to pass the 5% electoral threshold and re-enter the parliament, although six members of Svoboda were elected in single-member districts. Right Sector fared even worse: it obtained 1.80% of the votes, but Yarosh was elected in a single-member district.

The popular vote in the presidential election was in large part tactical. Every poll since March 2014 put Petro Poroshenko ahead. In April 2014, the idea of electing a new president already in the first round of the election became increasingly pervasive, especially against the background of the separatist activities in Eastern Ukraine and Russia's ongoing invasion. Many Ukrainians felt that "doing away" with the presidential election as soon as possible in order to focus on the anti-terrorist and anti-separatist activities in eastern Ukraine would be good for the country, so they voted for Poroshenko as the most popular candidate. These included adherents of the far right. For example, in Kyiv, where the presidential election took place simultaneously with the election to the Kyiv Council, some adherents

of Svoboda preferred to support Poroshenko for president, yet they still supported Svoboda for the Kyiv Council. In general, far right leaders, as representatives of populist, anti-establishment forces, often benefit from their opposition to existing elites. Ukraine in May 2014, however, still lacked a full-fledged political establishment to oppose. The times were more suited to the demagogic populist, Oleh Lyashko, who railed against unseen enemies on behalf of unseen oligarchic sponsors, and won 8.3%. The same populist narratives allowed Lyashko's Radical Party to attract 7.4% of the votes in the 2014 parliamentary elections.

The unsuccessful performance of Svoboda and the Right Sector in the parliamentary elections requires a more elaborate explanation. Naturally, an element of tactical voting was present during the parliamentary election too. According to public opinion polls conducted before the election, Svoboda was on the verge of passing the electoral threshold and many voters decided not to risk supporting this party. At the same time, the popularity of Right Sector was very low, to the extent that some sociological companies often did not mention it. However, the tactical voting cannot fully explain the far right's failure.

Why did the far right, in particular Svoboda, fail in the parliamentary election? First, as was mentioned earlier, Svoboda's popularity started to decrease already in 2013, as their former supporters became disappointed with its work in the parliament. Second, Svoboda and Right Sector split the nationalist vote; Svoboda was affected the most, as some of its former supporters presumably swung to the Right Sector. Third, Svoboda's success in 2012 was a success of a political force that was considered the most radical in its opposition to contemporary President Yanukovych. Svoboda was largely an "anti-Yanukovych party", but with Yanukovych gone, Svoboda lost the major source of negative mobilisation. Fourth, in 2012, Svoboda was also considered almost the only patriotic party, but since the Russian invasion forced all the democratic Ukrainian parties to turn to patriotic rhetoric, Svoboda lost its "monopoly" on patriotism. Last, but not the least, the questionable conduct and dubious activities of Svoboda's top members (including those who were ministers in the provisional cabinet of Yatsenyuk) in spring-summer 2014 drove off many of their former supporters.

The electoral failure of Svoboda and Right Sector did not mark "the end of history" of the Ukrainian far right. In addition to several members of Svoboda and Right Sector, the PU's leader Andriy Bilets'ky was elected to the parliament in a single-member district in Kyiv.

After the PU distanced from Right Sector in spring 2014, it briefly cooperated with Lyashko's Radical Party. Furthermore, in May, the PU formed the core of the Azov battalion, a volunteer detachment governed by the Ministry of Interior headed by Arsen Avakov. A member of Yatsenyuk's People's Front party, minister Avakov promoted the Azov battalion and granted the rank of police Lieutenant Colonel to its commander Bilets'ky in August. The People's Front also brought Bilets'ky into the military council of the party and apparently planned to officially support his candidacy in the parliamentary election, but, due to the opposition to such a move from the Ukrainian expert community and representatives of national minorities, it was forced to re-think its decision. However, the People's Front, in particular Avakov and his advisor Anton Gerashchenko, still supported Bilets'ky unofficially and contributed to his election to the parliament.

The support for the PU as the core of the Azov battalion, which was transformed into a regiment in late autumn 2014, coming from Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs was a worrying development. However, if had nothing to do with the ideology of the PU. Rather, this was a legacy of nepotism: minister Avakov knew, and cooperated with, the leaders of the PU since 2009-2010 when he was still the head of the Kharkiv regional administration. The cooperation between Ministry of Internal Affairs and the PU seemed to be driven by Avakov's trust in the organisation that he worked with in the past.

Conclusion

The Kremlin's focus on the Ukrainian far right and its allegedly dominant role in the 2014 revolution and the post-revolutionary developments was a part of Moscow's information war that attempted to delegitimise the national-democratic opposition to Yanukovych's regime and, later, the newly established Ukrainian authorities. This information war had three audiences. First, it was aimed at Russian society, including the opposition to Putin's regime, to level down its potential support for protests and upheavals. Second, it appealed to the generalised Russian ethnic/Russian-speaking community in Ukraine to either undermine its trust towards, or reinforce their scepticism of, the pro-European, pro-democratic political forces in the country. Third, it sought to undermine the Ukrainian revolution and post-revolutionary developments

internationally to neutralise Western criticism of Russia's interference in and invasion of Ukraine, as well as the annexation of Crimea.

The success of the Kremlin's disinformation campaign varied in different societies, but it was not particularly successful overall. Moscow's arguments were undermined not only by the low electoral results of the Ukrainian far right, but also by Russia's use of ultranationalists in its invasion of Ukraine, as well as Moscow's flirtations with the European far right that require a separate discussion and were not addressed here.

While the far right is present in Ukraine and, in the case of Svoboda, was even briefly relatively successful on the national level in 2012, it is important to stress the element of political manipulation in its rise. Far right parties and organisations were often exploited in different political games, either as "scarecrow" parties, or fake opposition, or as private "security firms" employed by various, more powerful political actors. Hence, for all the bluster around them, it is possible to predict that Ukrainian ultra-nationalism will most likely remain an extra-parliamentary force – as it was in the 1990s – until the day comes when it is involved in one or another "political technology" project.

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SOME ICONOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE LATE MEDIEVAL ARMENIAN ART ON THE EXAMPLES OF THE ALTAR CURTAINS FROM THE MUSEUM OF THE ARMENIAN CHURCH IN BUCHAREST

Abstract

In the 17-18th centuries radical changes occurred in different fields of art connected with new cultural preferences and tastes of the time, new understandings and the growing influence of the European culture, especially of the printed book and its dissemination. European printed books decorated with etchings, engravings and woodcuts were to have an important impact on Armenian art providing inspiration for the masters in different fields of art. In this paper the main iconographic features as well as the iconographic transformations and innovations typical for the time are presented on the examples of the collection of altar curtains kept in the Armenian museum in Bucharest.

Keywords: Armenian cultural heritage in Romania, Armenian Church, Armenian museum in Bucharest, the art of the Armenian printed book, Altar curtain, wood-block printing art, Tokat (Evdokia).

Introduction: The Armenian Art Exhibition in 1930 and the Establishment of the Museum by the Armenian Church in Bucharest

One of the most important events, marking the centuries-old Armenian cultural heritage in Romania, was surely the Armenian Art exhibition in Bucharest in 1930, which became a great event and a true revelation of the artistic and cultural diversity of the Armenian Art in Bucharest.[1]

The exhibition, which benefited from a lot of attention and appreciation in the Armenian and Romanian leading newspapers and magazines, was initiated by a group of Armenian devotees and first of all the prominent orientalist and specialist in Armenian studies, Hakob Siruni. But it could not have been accomplished and become a great success if it did not enjoy the patronage and support of the Romanian renowned scholar, historian Professor Nicolae Iorga, a great friend of the Armenian people and an admirer of their culture.[2]

Three large exhibition halls showcased oil paintings and icons, illuminated manuscripts and old printed books, national costumes and liturgical vestments, carpets woven in Romania and in various Armenian centers, liturgical textiles and altar curtains etc. There were 15 sections containing 643 samples of art selected out of more than a thousand specimens brought from Suceava, Botoșani, Iași, Roman, Focșani, Bacău, Targu Ocna, Constanța, Brăila, Tulcea, Galați, Gerla and other Armenian churches of Romania.[3]

The exhibition was the first ever successful attempt to introduce people to the Armenian art treasures, and as a unique symbol of revival, it became the ideological basis for the great purpose of establishing an Armenian museum in Bucharest, the idea of which had already originated in the preparation stage of the exhibition.

The brightest page in the history of the museum was written in 1942, when, with the donation of the Armenian benefactors Hovsep and Victoria Dudians, the doors of the house of the Armenian culture[4] for the first time solemnly opened in the courtyard of St. Archangels Armenian church, where the museum was to function alongside the library, being the final destination for numerous samples of art collected during fifteen years due to joint efforts and donations of Hakob Siruni, Armenian prominent families and art dealers.

Because of the complex political situation during the 1940's the library and the museum were shut down and hundreds of books and samples of art were in danger of plunder, destruction and loss. A part of the collection was sheltered in the upper chamber of the church and in the cellars of the museum, some were given to the Armenian families for protection, and a large part, by decision of the church, was moved to the Alex and Marie Manoogian Treasury Museum at the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin in Armenia. The museum was reborn and reopened only in the 1987.[5]

The Armenian museum in Bucharest is the symbol of the Armenian centuries-old presence and cultural heritage in Romania up to this day,

the preservation and study of which is a very important and vital issue. Realizing this problem, the Head of Armenian Church in Romania Bishop Datev Hakobian, in cooperation with the Head of UNESCO Chair of Armenian Art History and Theory of Yerevan State University Dr. Prof. Levon Chookaszian, started to organize and implement the study and preservation of the art collections kept in the museum, and in other churches of Romania.

The cooperation began in the autumn of 2012 when a group of researchers from the UNESCO Chair of Armenian Art History and Theory left for Bucharest to work in the Armenian museum for the first time. Being involved in this working group, I had the chance to get acquainted with the textile collection of the Museum and started to explore it. The study continues until now, identifying and raising many important issues relating to Armenian art in Romania.

In the framework of this study my current research is devoted to the collection of altar curtains kept in the museum of the Armenian Church in Bucharest, which is the most important and remarkable part of the collection of liturgical textiles and represent one of the interesting and unique pages of late Medieval Armenian Christian art.

Although the preserved samples of altar curtains are mostly dated in 17-18th centuries, the tradition of using them in the Armenian Church is almost as ancient as the church itself.[6] It is an individual and exceptional element of the Armenian Ecclesiastical Rite, the current usage of which doesn't have its equivalent in churches of either Latin or Byzantine ritual.

The tradition of decorating the altar curtains with embroidered or wood-block printed and painted pictures also has a long history throughout the centuries.[7]

The samples of the collection are subjected to academic research for the first time. After a careful examination and analysis of individual samples I will try to introduce the main iconographic features of the given samples, as well as the iconographic transformations and innovations typical for the 17-18th centuries.

These valuable objects, definitely produced to glorify God, not only functioned as expressions of the donor's piety and demonstrations of their wealth and power, but were also manifestations of the cultural atmosphere and main artistic tendencies of the time.

The Influence of the European Iconography on the Late Medieval Armenian Art

The 17th century was a crucial period for Armenian art and history, and that was mostly connected both with a more favorable political situation in Armenia, and with an unprecedented prosperity and empowerment of Armenian communities existing in different countries of the world, as a result of a large-scale displacement and migration of Armenians.

In the late middle Ages radical changes occurred in different fields of art connected with new cultural preferences and tastes of the time, new understandings, and with the growing influence of the European culture, especially of the printed book and its dissemination.

In the 16-18th centuries the art of Armenian printed book, started in Venice, was spread to Rome, Amsterdam, Vienna and other European centers, reaching its highest development also in the East: Constantinople, Iran and India.

In the Armenian environment the spread of the European printed books and engraved images reached its peak with the establishment of the Armenian Mechitarists Catholic Congregations in Venice and Vienna, which became a strong basis for the development of the Armenian printed book.

It is necessary to conceptualize a number of transformations which were typical for this time: the geographical location, no longer in Armenia but in diaspora, essentially European; the environment of production, no longer the religious confines of the rural monastery with clergymen as scribes, but an urban one, often with laymen as craftsmen. In this sense, Armenian printing art played a crucial role, moving from the rural, isolated monastic settings to the printing shop, a secular establishment, almost always in an urban environment.[8]

The predominant source for the printed texts was earlier Armenian manuscripts. It is a surprise though that this was not the case for their illustrations. There was apparently no mobility of monastic illustrations to the print trade and no recycling by the master artists of illustrated manuscripts.[9]

The European printed books decorated with etchings, engravings and woodcuts were the main sources for images used in the religious books produced by Armenian artists in different parts of the world.

One book that was of great interest and importance to Armenians all over the world and especially in the Near East was the first printed Bible in the Armenian language, published by Bishop Oskan Erevantsi in 1666 in

Amsterdam and financed by Armenian merchants. The publication of this book was the culmination of a long-time dream of Armenians to print the complete Bible in their own language. It had remained a dream for decades because of technical and political problems, the high cost necessitating financial backing, and complications brought about by Roman Catholic censors. This Armenian Bible was profusely decorated with woodcuts illustrating scenes from both Old and New Testaments. Although the text was printed in Armenian language, Armenian artists did not design or produce the woodblocks from which the illustrations were printed. The woodcuts were the work of a Dutch artist, Christoffel van Sichem, and were mostly signed with his monogram CvS.[10] Some of the woodcuts by van Sichem were simplified versions of prints copied from the works of other well-known artists, such as Albrecht Dürer, Jacob Matham and Hendrick Goltzius. These woodcuts had already appeared in many Dutch books printed from the early 1600s to at least 1657. Oskan Erevantsi apparently bought the woodblocks from either the van Sichem family, or more likely from the Dutch publisher Pieter Jakopsz Paets, who presumably no longer needed them, having already repeatedly used them for decades.[11]

These woodcut illustrations were to have an important impact on Armenian art of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, providing inspiration for the Armenian masters in different fields of art. These illustrations were seen as new interpretations of Christian themes by the masters in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Even though the images came from books printed decades earlier in Europe, they appeared in an unusual, fresh and probably rather exotic interpretations while keeping their Christian context. This was an abiding proof of the Armenians' fascination with the European styles and their openness in adopting and adapting them. In this way, new Christian iconography and decorative motifs were disseminated in various media throughout the region.[12]

The spread of printing art among the Armenians has been defined as a by-product of Armenian merchants, who played a significant role in nearly all early centers of Armenian publication.[13] They had created a unique network among Armenians living and composing throughout the world. Due to the Armenian commercial agents, dealing with a large-scale trade, the Armenian art goes beyond national borders and gets a new chance to be revived. The role of Armenian merchants is invaluable in bringing the World art to the Armenians and at the same time in preserving the Armenian art and culture. Being aware of the development of the world art tendencies and innovations made in different areas, they begin to dictate

tastes by purchasing, ordering and donating samples of art presenting their preferences.

The Collection of the Altar Curtains in the Armenian Museum in Bucharest

Hakob Siruni speaks with great admiration and enthusiasm about the altar curtains that have been decorating the Armenian churches in different cities of Romania for decades, referring to the exhibition held in Bucharest in 1930. He notes that three of them, presented in the exhibition, were brought from Focșani, three other samples were from Botoșani and single curtains were brought from Suceava, Iași and Galați.[14] Hakob Siruni's reference to the Armenian curtains contains important information of great help in clarifying the time and place of their creation. He notes that if the altar curtains kept in the museums at the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin are mainly from far India,[15] the great majority of samples kept in the Armenian museum in Bucharest have been created by Armenian Masters of Tokat (Evdokia) for the Armenian churches in Romania.[16]

Tokat had been a great cultural center for centuries, famous for its numerous crafts and arts; it was the most prominent and important center of wood-block printing art in the Ottoman Empire.[17] The famous Turkish traveler of the 17th century Evliya Chelebi speaks with admiration about the exquisite and precious fabrics created in Tokat.[18]

Being on the important East-West trade route and connecting Constantinople[19] with the East, it had been an important commercial center since the 16th century, where all the vital routes of Asia Minor intersected. It was an important transit center for caravans coming from Persia and India, which being separated here, continued their way to Constantinople and Izmir (Smyrna).[20]

The wood-block prints, silk and cotton fabrics and carpets created in Tokat were of wide renown not only within the Ottoman Empire,[21] but were also transported in large amounts abroad. According to a number of historical records, Armenian merchants of Tokat have been in close relations with Romanian commercial cities and particularly Armenian populated centers for centuries, where many locally produced products were exported. Especially prominent are the altar curtains, commissioned by private individuals and made by Armenian masters in the 17-18th centuries, which were donated to different Armenian churches around the world.[22]

The altar curtains kept in the Armenian museum in Bucharest are unique examples of this cultural center. It should be noted that a few of them were moved to the Alex and Marie Manoogian treasury museum at the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin in the second half of the last century, where they are kept until today.

Nowadays there are six altar curtains in the Armenian Museum in Bucharest. In the context of the issue discussed in this paper the most noteworthy one is the altar curtain from the Holy Cross Armenian church in Suceava (Picture 1). According to the dedication, it was created in 1787, most probably in Tokat, and was made by wax-resist dyeing technique (batik) using the combination of only two colors: blue and white. The melted wax was applied on cloth in a form of images before being dipped in the blue dye.

The iconography and composition of the images decorating the altar curtain having an influence of European art are inspired by the woodcuts from the first Bible in the Armenian language, as well as from European books travelling eastwards.

The twelve scenes on this curtain represent the main events of the Way of the Cross making up the series of Passions of Christ. Breaking the traditional sequence of the image series and putting certain scenes in the central parts of the composition, the master tried to highlight the main scenes of Christ's sufferings and death.

In the center part of the curtain is the depiction of the Throne of Christ for the second coming, which is surrounded by the following episodes: above is the Crucifixion, on the left side is the Descent from the cross (a Pietà at the foot of the cross), on the right side is the Lamentation and the Entombment of Christ, bellow is Christ in prison a palm branch in his hand as the symbol of his triumph over sin and death. The composition is framed by the other scenes presenting the last events of Christ's earthly life: Flagellation: Christ at the Column and Christ crowned with thorns (the left-hand upper corner), Christ carrying the cross and the Erection of the cross (the right-hand upper corner), Christ praying in the garden Gethsemane and the Betrayal and the Arrest of Christ (the left-hand lower corner), Christ before Pilate and the Mocking of the Christ (the right-hand lower corner). Each picture is framed by arches resting on decorated columns, and at the meeting of the arches are placed angels with open wings.

It is important to note that in the Eastern iconographic tradition was an emphasis on the positive aspects of Christ's sacrificial death and it was consistent with Early Christian attitudes towards the Passions. The early

church generally viewed Christ in death as triumphant savior rather than suffering victim. In the Western iconography the full-scale transformation of traditional Passion narratives took place. This transformation is not entirely surprising, in that it parallels the similar shift from the Christus Thriumphans to the Christus Patiens. In the early decades of the thirteenth century the traditional Christus Triumphans, a Christ who transcends suffering and is victorious over death, gazing out with head held erect, was gradually displaced by a new type, the suffering Christ or Christus Patiens. But the image of the crucified Christ is not the only indication of the radical revision in the understanding and depiction of Passion; rather it is merely one symptom of an extraordinary transformation. Another symptom is the changing narrative program: detailed presentation and heightened emphasize on the passion cycle. Relying heavily upon Byzantine images, western masters formulated these shifting interpretations, presenting the variety of scenes and compositions.[23]

Western iconographic motifs and particularly scenes representing passions of Christ started to appear in the Armenian miniature paintings since 13th century, very often as marginal illuminations.[24] In the late middle Ages there was a new great wave of the influence of European iconography related to the wide dissemination of the printed books.

Presenting the same idea and iconographical image fifteen scenes decorating the altar curtain from the Holy Virgin Armenian Church in Focsani[25] (Picture 2) reveal a balance between the events of the Passion and events preceded and followed it, such as the Annunciation, the Baptism, the Washing of the feet, the Transfiguration, the Resurrection, the Ascension, Christ appearing to Mary Magdalene, the Pentecost, and the Assumption of the Holy Virgin.

According to the dedication this altar curtain was made in 1757 also in Tokat and was made also by the wax-resist dyeing technique (batik) being afterwards also painted and colored.

The altar curtain from the Holy Virgin Armenian Church in Botoșani (Picture 3) represents a unique group of curtains from the same cultural center. Images are wood-block printed on unpainted fabric using subtle combinations and color transitions of light and dark tones of red and brown.

The whole surface of the altar curtain is decorated with four large and a number of smaller sacred scenes under the arches. In the center of the composition, are the Crucifixion, the Assumption of the Virgin Mary, Virgin Mary with the Child as a queen of Heaven and St. Gregory the Illuminator.

The images of the Holy Virgin Mary are of special interest. It seems that the compositions are continuing each other: after being spiritually and bodily carried to heaven and crowned by Christ, God the Father and Holy Spirit, the Holy Virgin is presented as a queen of heaven standing on the moon and a dragon under her feet as a sign of the victory over the death.

In these depictions there is an echo of two basic dogmas of the Roman Catholic Mariology. The Catholic doctrine of the Assumption of Mary states that Mary was transported to Heaven with her body and soul united.[26] The religious concept of Immaculate Conception is connected with the divine intervention of Holy Virgin Mary, which holds that Mary was herself free from original sin and, therefore, worthy to be the mother of the Savior.[27]

According to Eastern Orthodox Church Tradition, Mary died like all humanity. She died as all people die, not "voluntarily" as her Son, but by the necessity of her mortal human nature which is indivisibly bound up with the corruption of this world. Her soul was received by Christ upon death and her body was resurrected on the third day after her repose, at which time she was taken up, bodily only, into heaven.[28]

Another interesting point is the depiction of the portrait of the Holy Virgin over her grave, which is being taken to the heaven by angels. According to the tradition the Apostle Bartholomew came to Armenia, bringing a portrait of the Virgin Mary, which was given to him by the Apostle John, because he could not see the Holy Virgin before she was "falling asleep". In the Armenian iconographic tradition the attribute of the Apostle Bartholomew, alongside a large knife, is the image of the Holy Virgin.[29]

The top of the altar curtain is framed with the main scenes from the traditional Feast series depicting Christ's earthly and salvific life, which are present according to the medieval iconographic canon: the Annunciation, the Nativity and Adoration of the Magi, the Presentation at the Temple, the Baptism, the Transfiguration, the Triumphal entry into Jerusalem, the Washing of the Feet, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection, the Ascension, Traditio Legis (The Transmission of the Law (?)). In the marginal parts are images of 4 Evangelists, St. Soldiers, St. Archangels Michael and Gabriel in the medallions.

Altar curtains from the Holy Cross Armenian church in Suceava (1758) and the Holy Virgin Armenian Church in Focșani (1781) (Picture 4) were also created by master Agop in Tokat. Now they are in the Alex and Marie Manoogian Treasury Museum.

Although the Armenian Historian A. Alboyajyan notes in his work dedicated to the history of Tokat that no altar curtain could have its second example, since after finishing the work masters destroyed the templates,[30] these samples suggest the opposite. With slight difference in details above mentioned altar curtains repeat the same artistic design.

A particularly interesting and somewhat unusual trait of many of the objects under discussion here is the addition of an extensive inscription in classical Armenian, which contains some information about the master, about the place and time of the creation of the samples, the names of donator and his family as well as the monasteries and churches they have been donated to. It was traditional for wealthy Armenians to commission sacred objects. Typically, this work was done as a pious gift to a church to ensure salvation for the donor and his family. Besides their important historical meaning and significance, these inscriptions also have a high artistic value.

The inscription of the altar curtain from the Armenian Church of the Holy Virgin in Botosani: "This curtain is to the memory of Todor son of Oqsent and Georg son of Khachik and Esayi son of Astvatsatur in the city Botosani at the door of the church of Holy Virgin in the year of Armenians 1212 (+551=1763 A.D.) printed in Tokat by the hands of master Agop and his son Avetis".

The inscription of the altar curtain from the Armenian Church of the Holy Virgin in Focsani runs as follows: "This curtain is to the memory of Mahtesi[31] Vardan and Mahtesi Avetis sons of Alexander from Focsani at the door of the church of Holy Virgin in the year of Armenians 1230 (+551=1781 A.D.) printed in Tokat by the hands of master Agop".

In the second part of the inscription the master Agop speaks with great sorrow about the sickness and death of his only son Avetis, who was 26 years old and died of plague.

Speaking about the main artistic tendencies dominant in the late medieval Armenian art, it is necessary to underscore the appearance, diversification and progressive increase in numbers of themes indicating the awakening of national identity, typical for that era. Alongside Christian scenes Armenian masters have since early Christian times and during the whole Middle Ages highlighted and often referred to the Armenian national history, but it was during 17-18th centuries that they became key themes of Armenian Art. Highly widespread are becoming the images marking the most important episode of the Armenian history: the adoption of Christianity in Armenia, the establishment of the Armenian Church, life

scenes of the first Armenian Patriarch Gregory the Illuminator, as well as scenes of the Baptism of Armenian royal family.[32]

On the contextual basis of these stories, told by the 5th century Historian Agatangeghos in his History of Armenia,[33] the Armenian masters developed a very specific style of compositions inspired by both the iconography and manner of early European engravers. An iconographic program was formulated and being accepted by the Armenian Church, it entered the Armenian iconographic canon and was widely used in various fields of art. The illustrations, decorating books printed in Europe, had a great impact in formation of iconography and composition.

The wide dissemination of these scenes had its plausible ideological explanation: they were to highlight the Armenian national identity and unite people around the national church, emphasizing the importance of having a unified center for every Armenian living in a foreign land.

The depictions of various portrayals of St. Gregory the Illuminator circulating in books or as separate prints and engravings led to the emergence of identical or highly similar images in different fields of art and in different places otherwise far from one another in geographical terms. In this context there were two main iconographic types. The first, simpler category represents the baptism of the royal family, while in the second category are images where the scene of baptism is surrounded by a narrative frame summarizing the tortures of St. Gregory the Illuminator. The spreading of the iconography of St. Gregory the Illuminator, as well as its prototypes and parallels reflect the Armenian network of connections.[34]

The altar curtain from the Armenian Holy Virgin Church in Galati represents the story of the conversion of Armenia to Christianity. This altar curtain was made most probably in the second half of the 18th-first half of 19th century in Constantinople. The images and scenes decorating it are wood-block printed on the round fabrics, which were afterwards applied on the main surface of the textile.

This altar curtain stands out thanks to its artistic composition and refined mastery, and is distinguished by a strong influence of European art and iconography, manifested primarily in the construction of the composition, the color solutions, the use of perspective, and the careful presentation of the environment.[35] The images are designed with an exceptional delicacy, with sharply defined details, an emphasized individuality and remarkable facial expressions.

The central theme of the curtain is the baptism of the Armenian Royal family. King Trdat and his relatives are shown kneeling in a procession to

be baptized by St. Gregory the Illuminator who is wearing rich episcopal vestments.

Dominating the top middle section is the depiction of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove whose rays of light descend towards Saint Gregory the Illuminator and Royal family. The fourteen medallions around the borders of the curtain represent the major events from the life of St. Gregory. Twelve of these scenes represent the incredible series of tortures to which Gregory was subjected, but which failed to break his spirit.

The number of tortures was a source of interpretations for the medieval Armenian historians, who gave a special meaning to each of them. One of these interpretations is based on the medieval lore, and it claims that twelve senses and body parts of a person were damaged after Adam ate the fruit from the tree of the knowledge. Thus, Gregory the Illuminator purified the senses and body parts cleansing them from the sin through his twelve tortures. According to the second explanation, the tortures of Gregory the Illuminator are related to the martyrdoms of twelve apostles.[36]

One of the medallions represents the scene when St. Gregory cures the king Trdat, who had become a wild boar by a divine punishment for putting to death the nuns Hripsime and Gayane and their thirty-seven companions who had fled to Armenia from Rome during the persecutions of Emperor Diocletian. The King's sister, Khosrovadukht is then told in a vision that only Gregory can cure the King. Gregory is brought out of the dungeon to revive the King. Gregory the Illuminator proceeds to baptize the whole Armenian nation and convert Armenia to Christianity.

On the right side is shown the Baptism of the Armenian nation by St. Gregory the Illuminator. Above on a disc is depicted the column of fire and on top of it a cross of light. According to the tradition, in his old age St. Gregory retired to the Monastery of St. Hakob on the Mount Sepuh and submitted himself to fasts and vigils. Noah's Ark is shown on the Mount Ararat. Each of the images has a caption.

According to the legend Saint Gregory the Illuminator had a vision of Christ descending from heaven and striking the earth with a golden hammer to show where the first Armenian Cathedral should be build. The patriarch gave the church the name Etchmiadzin, which may be translated as the place where the Only-Begotten Son of God descended. Next to Etchmiadzin to the south and north he built the churches for the nuns Gayane and Hripsime whose martyrdom is also depicted with soldiers with swords beheading the kneeling nuns.

Conclusion

After tumultuous decades in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries new opportunities are being created for the development of international trade, in which the Ottoman Empire was actively involved. Being on the important East-West trade route and connecting Constantinople with the East, Tokat had been an important commercial and cultural center since the 16th century.

In the 17-18th centuries radical changes occurred in different fields of art connected with new cultural preferences and tastes of the time, new understandings and the growing influence of the European culture, especially of the printed book and its dissemination. European printed books decorated with etchings, engravings and woodcuts were to have an important impact on Armenian art providing inspiration for the masters in different fields of art. The fact that the European books were available to the Armenian masters in Tokat indicates about economic and cultural recovery in this important trade center.

The wood-block prints, silk and cotton fabrics and carpets created in Tokat were of wide renown not only within the Ottoman Empire, but were also transported in large amounts abroad. According to a number of historical records, Armenian merchants of Tokat have been in close relations with Romanian commercial cities and particularly Armenian populated centers for centuries, where many locally produced products were exported. Especially prominent are the altar curtains, commissioned by private individuals and made by Armenian masters in the 17-18th centuries, which were donated to different Armenian churches around the world.

These valuable objects, definitely produced to glorify God, not only functioned as expressions of the donor's piety and demonstrations of their wealth and power, but were also manifestations of the cultural atmosphere and main artistic tendencies of the time.

Continuing research on these objects will hopefully lead to discover of more points of European influence on the Armenian art. Although the samples of the collection of the altar curtain kept in the Museum of the Armenian Church in Bucharest bear the influence of the Western iconography they nevertheless preserve the main artistic features of the Armenian Church ritual, illustrating the individual and exceptional image of the Armenian Rite.

Picture 1. Altar curtain from the Holy Cross Armenian Church in
Suceava, 1787, Tokat (Evdokia), Armenian Museum in Bucharest,
Romania

Picture 2. Altar curtain from the Holy Virgin Armenian Church in Focsani, 1757, Tokat (Evdokia), The National Gallery of Armenia

Picture 3. Altar curtain from the Holy Virgin Armenian Church in Botosani, 1763, Tokat (Evdokia), Armenian Museum in Bucharest, Romania

Picture 4., Altar curtain from the Holy Virgin Armenian Church in Focsani, 1781, Tokat (Evdokia), Alex and Marie Manoogian Treasury Museum, Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, Armenia

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Picture 5. Altar curtain from the Holy Virgin Armenian Church in Galati, second half of the 18th century-first half of the 19th century, Constantinople, Armenian Museum in Bucharest, Romania

NOTES

1.   In 1906 on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the reign of King Carol
     I of Romania, a great exhibition was organized in Bucharest in which the
     Armenian community also took part with an official invitation presenting
     various samples of the Armenian Art. See Galfagian H., *Ruminahay gałuťĕ*
     [Armenian Community in Romania], Jerusalem, 1979, pp. 173-175.

2.   Siruni H., "Pukreši hay arvesti cucahandesě" [The Armenian Art Exhibition
     in Bucharest] in *Anahit*, №3, Paris, 1930, pp. 107-111.

3.   *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107:

4.   Galfagian H., pp. 163-165:

5.   Bedros V., *Armenian Artistic Heritage in Romania: Between Exilic Nostalgia
     and Cultural Integration*, Bucharest, 2011, p. 129.

6.   In A.D. 335, Macarius, the Bishop of Jerusalem, penned a letter to Catholicos
     Vertanes, the elder son and second successor to St. Gregory the Illuminator,
     in which the bishop addressed a series of questions regarding baptism and
     the Eucharist. In that 4th century document, Macarius directed Armenian
     clergy to make use of curtains to separate the altar from the chancel, and
     the chancel from the nave.

     In the early history of the church, the altar curtain was a common
     ecclesiastical feature. In later centuries, some churches, including the
     Greek Orthodox Church, replaced the veil with iconostases, but this
     tradition was not widely adopted by the Armenian Church. Today, most
     Armenian churches make use of a single curtain to partition the altar from
     the congregation at various points in the Divine Liturgy.

     According to Abraham Terian's seminal translation of the letter, Macarius
     writes: "The table of expiation is behind the veil, where the Holy Spirit
     descends; and the font is next to it in the same compartment, and out of
     honor set up on the right hand. And the clergy in their several ranks shall
     worship (there), and the congregation outside the veil, and the catechumens
     at the door, listening. Lest these partitions be effaced by encroachments, let
     each remain in his own station irreproachable."

     The first mention of the veil of the Tabernacle's separating the Holy
     place from the Holy of Holies and screening the Ark and the seat of God
     indicates that it was a kind of image "the skilled work", woven from blue,
     purple, crimson and linen and embroidered with cherubim. The colors
     woven together had symbolic meaning: the scarlet (crimson) signified fire,
     the linen, earth, the blue, air and the purple, sea. The veil thus represented
     the matter, the substance, of the visible creation and the universe, the image
     of the sacred time simultaneously representing the past, the present and
     the future. The veil was the boundary between the visible and the invisible
     creation. The world beyond the veil was unchanging and without temporal
     sequence of events, but the visible world outside the veil was a place of

change. The holiest realm, placed beyond the veil and existing outside time and matter, creates the eternal pattern for the changing sacred environment in front of the veil. See Lidov A., "The Temple Veil as a Spatial Icon Revealing an Image-Paradigm of Medieval Iconography and Hierotopy". *ICON*, 2014, 7, p. 97-108.

7   Hakobian A., "Haykakan ekełecakan varaguyrneri masin" [About the Armenian altar curtains] in *Ejmiacin*, November, Etchmiadzin, 2007, pp. 96-102.

8   Kouymjian D., "Between Amsterdam and Constandinople: The Impact of Printing on Armenian Culture", *Die Kunst der Armenier im östlichen Europa*, eds. Marina Dmitrieva and Balint Kovacs, Köln-Weimar-Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2014, pp. 21-22.

9   *Ibid.*, p. 24.

10   There were four generations of artists with the same name who used the same CvS monogram. It is thought that Christoffel van Sichem II probably produced most of the woodcuts used in the Armenian Bible. Christoffel van Sichem (II Younger, 1581 Basel-1658 Amsterdam) was a Dutch Golden Age engraver, etcher and woodcutter. See Lehmann-Haupt H., Christoffel van Sichem: "A family of Dutch 17th century woodcut artists", *Gutenberg Jahrbuch*, 1975, pp. 274-306. Ibid., *An introduction to the woodcut of the 17th century*, New York, Abaris Books, 1977, pp. 39-72.

11   Merian S. L., "The Armenian Silversmiths of Kesaria/Kayseri in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", *Armenian Kesaria/Kayseri and Cappadocia*, edited by Richard G. Hovannisian, Mazda Publishers, Costa Mesa, California, 2013, pp. 132-133.

12   *Ibid.*, p. 141.

13   Kouymjian D., pp. 25-26.

14   Siruni H., "Expoziția de artă armeană din 1930" in *Ani, Revista de cultură armeană*, anul 1, vol. 4, Bucharest, 1936, pp. 32-34.

15   The Armenians have settled in India in early Middle Ages. The local Armenian community has developed especially in the late Middle Ages when, as a result of violence and persecution by Shah Abbas, large groups of Armenian merchants and craftsmen from Persia, especially from New Julfa moved to India. One of the most prominent Armenian cultural centers was Madras where alongside with different crafts, the embroidery art had highly developed. See Tarayan Z., *Naboĭka v Armenii* [The wood-block printing in Armenia], Yerevan, 1967, pp. 97-98:

16   Siruni H., "Pukreši hay arvesti cucahandesě" [The Armenian Art Exhibition in Bucharest], p. 112.

17   The wood-block printing art has been known in Armenia since ancient times having its notable development in the late Middle Ages and its most prominent centers become Constantinople, Tokat (Evdokia), Caesarea (Kayseri), Karin (Erzurum), Erzinca, Urfa (Edessa), Van, Kars etc. The

unprecedented prosperity of wood-block printing art was mainly due to great developing and spreading Armenian printing art. See Davtian S., *Drvagner haykakan miǰnadaryan kirarakan arvesti patmuťyan* [Studies on the history of the medieval Armenian applied art], Yerevan, 1981., pp. 39-57.

[18]   *Otar ałbyurnere Hayastani ev hayeri masin*, [Foreign sources on Armenia and Armenians], IV volume, Turkish sources on Armenia, III book, Evliya Celebi, by A. Kh. Safrastyan, Yerevan, 1967, p. 276.

[19]   In late Middle Ages Constantinople was one of the great centers of Armenian national, religious, educational and cultural life, the importance of which was greatly conditioned by high authority of Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople (1461) to which from the 17th century was subordinated also Armenian Churches in Moldavian Principality. A number of samples of liturgical vestments, altar and chalice covers and altar curtains, kept in the Armenian Museum in Bucharest have been created by the Armenian masters of Constantinople. See Kharatyan A., *Kontandnupolsi hay gałťoǰaxe (XV-XVII darer)* [Armenian Community in Constantinople (XV-XVII centuries)], Yerevan State University, Yerevan, 2007, pp. 49-88.

[20]   *Alboyajian A., Patmuťyun Evdŏkio Hayoc* [The History of the Armenian Evdokia (Tokat)], Cairo, 1952, pp. 1259, 1261, 1265-1266.

[21]   *Ibid.*, pp. 1266, 1291.

[22]   *Ibid.*, pp. 1266, 1399-1341.

[23]   Derbes A., "Picturing the Passion in late medieval Italy". *Narrative Painting, Franciscan ideologies and the Levant*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 1-11.

[24]   Evans H., "Cilician Manuscript Illumination: The Twelfth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries", in *Treasures in Heaven: Armenian Illuminated Manuscripts*, ed. T. F. Mathews and R. S. Wieck, New York, 1994, pp. 66-83.

[25]   This altar curtain was among them which were moved to the Alex and Marie Manoogian Treasury museum at the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin in the second half of the last century. Afterwards it was donated to the National Gallery of Armenia, were it is kept today.

[26]   *Lexikon der Chrstlichen Ikonographie*, Zweiter Band, herausgegeben von Engelbert Kirchbaum SJ in Zusammenarbeit mit Günter Bandmann, Wolfgang Braunfels, Johannes Kollwitz, Wilhelm Mrazek, Alfred A. Schmid, Hugo Schnell, Herder, Rom, Freiburg, Basel, Wien, 1994, S. 276-284.

[27]   *Ibid.*, pp. 338-334.

[28]   *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1991, pp. 651-653.

[29]   *Kristonya Hayastan Hanagitaran* [Christian Armenia Encyclopedia], Yerevan, 2002, p. 169.

[30]   Alboyajian A., pp., 1340.

[31]   The word "Mahtesi" (pilgrim) used with the names in the inscriptions is an honorific term to signify a person who has made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

32 The western chamber of the church of Gregory the Illuminator (Tigran Honents, 13th c.) in Ani contains 16 scenes from the life of Saint Gregory the Illuminator - including his trial before king Trdat, the various tortures inflicted upon him (including his imprisonment in a pit), the martyrdom of St. Hripsime, the baptism of King Trdat and the kings of Georgia, Abkhazia, and Caucasian Albania etc.

The processional banner (gonfalon) of Saint Gregory the Illuminator (1448) is the only dated ancient embroidery that has been preserved. The front of the banner has the embroidered full-face frontal figures of the Saint Gregory the Illuminator between king Trdat and St. Hripsime, with their names inscribed above their heads. St. Gregory is wearing a mitre and has a Byzantine short white chasuble adorned with crosses in black a pallium woven with silver threads. On his right hangs an epigonation, symbol of the authority of the catholicos. All the figures have round haloes woven out of gold tread. St. Gregory is blessing with his right and holding a book in his left hand. The king, his hands raised, is dressed in a red tunic with gold belt and embroideries, while the identical tunic of St. Hripsime is green. She is wearing a red cope with matching-color shoes. The fine embroidery has a painterly quality. See Nersessian V., *Treasures from the Ark, 1700 Years of Armenian Christian Art*, The J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles, 2001, p. 129.

Since the 9th century the images of Gregory the Illumination became very common also for the Byzantine and later on since 12th century for Russian art. Ter Nersessian S., *Etudes Byzantines and Armeniennes, Byzantine and Armenian studies*, Tome 1, Imprimerie Orientaliste, Louvain, 1973, pp. 55-60. Айвазян К., История отношений русской и армянской церквей в средние века, Ереван, 1989, с. 66:

33 Agathangelos, *History of the Armenians*, translations and commentaries by Robert W. Thomson, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1974.

Agathangelos, pseudonym for the author of the standart Armenian account of the life of St. Gregory the Illuminator and of the conversion of King Trdat at the beginning of the 4th c. Although Agathangelos claims to have been an eyewitness, the work cannot have been composed before the 5th c. The extant Armenian text is not the original. From an early, now lost, text Agathangelos was translated into Greek, Syriac, and Arabic. From a "received" version – further Greek and Arabic translations were made. No other Armenian text ever circulated so widely outside Armenia. The extant text covers the period from 224 to the death of St. Gregory after 325. It describes the early careers of Gregory and Trdat, the tortures and imprisonment of Gregory by the yet unconverted king, the martyrdom at Vagharshapat of nuns who had fled from Diocletian, the release of Gregory and ensuing conversion of Trdat and the court, and the destruction of pagan

temples. See *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1991, p. 35.

34   *Far Away from Mount Ararat: Armenian Culture in the Carpathian Basin*, Balint Kovacs, Emese Pal, Joint Exhibition of the Budapest History Museum and the National Széchényi Library, Leipziger Universität-Verlag, Leipzig, 2013, p. 78-79.

35   Zambaccian K. H., "Vechi Draperii de altar în bisericile armenești din Moldova" in *Ani, Revista de cultur*ă a*rmean*ă, anul 1, vol. 4, Bucharest, 1936, p. 31.

36   Tatevatsi G., *Giŕk Kaŕōzuťyan* (Ĵmeŕan hator) [Book of Preaching (winter volume)], Jerusalem, 1998, p. 435.

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UNSECULARIZING THE WORLD: MOLDOVAN BAPTISTS AND GLOBALIZATION OF RELIGION

Globalization and Religion

a) The Globalization Debate

A citizen of Saudi Arabia fights in the mountains of Afghanistan, far away from his country, for the cause of Islam. A group of Moldovan Baptist missionaries preach the Gospel in the predominantly Muslim Turkey, Tajikistan and the pagan Russian Far East. Meanwhile dozens of American Mormons and local followers of the Brazilian preacher Edir Macedo's Universal Church of the Kingdom of God are trying to gain converts in the mostly Eastern-Orthodox villages of Moldova. A Ghanaian Methodist is attempting to re-Christianize the secularized England while an Ivorian Coast Roman Catholic is aiming to do the same in the strongly laicized France. A Nigerian, Sunday Adelaja, acts as senior pastor of the largest church in Ukraine, "The Embassy of the Blessed Kingdom of God for All Nations, Kiev". An Argentinean Jesuit becomes Pope of the Catholic Church and Bishop of Rome. An American Muslim is listening in his/her basement in Dearborn, Michigan to sermons of Saudi Arabia clerics delivered via interned. Many Muslim citizens protest simultaneously in London, Beirut, Damascus, Teheran, Nairobi and Jakarta against the publication of 12 cartoons that depicted the Islamic prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper.

None of these vignettes surprises us especially or sounds too exotic to be true. They all are too familiar and even the average citizen of places as distant from each other as Moldova and Ghana, the US and Ivory Coast would encounter such situations in his/her daily life once in a while. After all, if your laptop contains pieces assembled in China, made from metals coming from Guinea Bissau, Congo and Colombia, why to wonder that

religious missionaries from Africa, America or America would knock at your door trying to make you believe that salvation is just around the corner?

But what story do these vignettes tell? Could it be a story of return of religion in public life? Could it be a story of religious groups taking advantage of the advancements in technology and communications in order to spread their message? Could it be a story of religions abandoning their local contexts and going global? Could it be a story of the loss of confidence in the power of science and/or political ideologies and the returning to old spiritual recipes?

It is probably all of them and many other entangled stories. I will attempt to integrate all these stories within the framework of "globalization and religion".

This attempt is by no means the only way to make sense of these stories. We can think of (and there are!) a lot of other ways to describe and analyze the entanglement between religion, communication and globalization. Some authors have argued that these stories show that modernity was wrong, that the word of God has defeated all pessimistic predicaments and has resisted the combined assault of secularism, science and ideology. Other authors, from other camps, have argued that what all these stories show is in fact the resurgence of religion, the explosion of hatred and the advent of the new era of religious intolerance.

Compared to this, the "globalization and religion" approach offers not only a neutral, as objective as possible, theoretically driven and empirically grounded perspective, but also a self-reflexive, self-critical viewpoint.

For, both fields of study – religion and globalization – are not merely objects of study but important constellations of practices and meanings from which people borrow guidance for actions and within which people try to make sense of their lives. The study of "religion and globalization" should take into account not only explicit claims and lines of argumentation, but also what Foucault has aptly called, their *unthought*.

There have been several attempts to philosophically capture this novel type of social reality characterized by increasing interconnectivity. Globalization, cosmopolitanism, world-systems theory, globalism, industrial society, atomic age, global village, post-modernism - are some of them.

All these theories, of course, are not merely descriptions of social processes but contain important normative assumptions. Thus they are

highly contentious, argue between themselves and are embedded in social, philosophical, cultural and political contexts.

Globalization appears to be, by far, the most controversial term although it is among the youngest ones (in contrast, cosmopolitanism has been around for at least two thousand years).

Various sources put the origins of the word "globalization" somewhere in the end of the 50s but the concept was in the air much earlier. Some scholars even claim that the globalization idea was expressed for the first time by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in their *Communist Manifesto* published in 1848 although in different terms (Veseth, 2010). Globalization was included in the 1961 edition of Webster's Dictionary.

The concept remained marginal up until around 1980 and then became immensely popular. A comprehensive survey of the electronic database Factiva operated by a journalist found only two entries of the word "globalization" in 1981, a number that grew spectacularly to over 57 000 in 2001 and remained well over 40 000 after that (Chanda 2007:246).

A preliminary distinction made by many scholars is that between the two basic aspects of the concept: globalization as a description of processes occurring in the social world and globalization as an ideological agenda driven by certain powerful actors (Dicken, 2011; Evans, 2008; Scholte, 2005).

Marko Ampuja summarizes it well: "Globalization is a multi-accentual sign, which represents not only intellectual endeavors but also the nightmares and aspirations of subordinated social groups as well as the powerful interests of privileged minorities." (2012:20).

Let's start with the theory of globalization.

Most of the contemporary scholarship on globalization understands the process as referring to a complex and contradictory series of political, economic, social and cultural changes caused by advances in technology and communications.

The most frequently invoked such changes are: time-space compression, the weakening of the nation-state, the emergence of a global civil society, the global spread of capitalism etc.

But the magnitude, the newness, the direction, the dynamics, the meaning, the driving forces and the outcome of these changes constitute a subject of debates and controversy.

Over the time, three groups of opinions on globalization have crystallized.

One group, called the hyper-globalizers or globalists, argues that changes brought by globalization (understood mostly as the spread of capitalism on a global scale) are unprecedented, inevitable and unstoppable. Although different factions in the group disagree on the question on the ethical evaluations of globalization processes (David Harvey (2005) considers it to be bad, while the likes of Thomas Friedman (2000) see it as a necessarily good project), there is a large consensus in this group that the impact of globalization is real and tangible. Globalization is thought to bring a radical change in the configuration of time and space (Robertson, 1992; Harvey, 2005, Giddens, 1990). Further it is argued that globalization brings into existence a borderless world where the physical borders of the nation state do not count and the nation-states themselves are in danger to be made irrelevant by the global capital (Ohmae 1995). In the sphere of culture globalization is supposed to bring a homogenization of the world where cultures become more and more similar (Tomlinson, 2009, Ritzer, 2011). In the technological realm, the advent of bitsphere (the hyperextended habitat) where individuals are connected with each other through technologies that are able to circulate across state, political or spatial borders is considered to be responsible for the arrival of an international online community that will make state-nations irrelevant (Mitchell, 1996).

A second-group, called the skeptics, has taken a different point of view. For them, the globalized world is more a promise that has yet to be realized or a utopian project rather than a concrete reality. When empirically scrutinizing the claims made by the hyper-globalizers, skeptics have arrived at the conclusion that most of these are not supported by evidence. Against the argument that globalization represents an entirely new phenomenon in the world economy, Hirst and Thompson have argued that 'the present highly internationalized economy is not unprecedented' (2009:3). They also showed that in terms of mobility of people and capital, the contemporary world is less globalized than the world of 1914. Further, the skeptics have challenged the globalist assumption about the death of the nation-state. They have found that states still have a tremendous amount of power especially in the areas of regulation. Transnational corporations, the main rivals and substitutes are still deeply embedded in the structures of the nation-state (Hirst and Thompson, 2009; Mann, 1997). As for culture, skeptics contended, the claim that globalization is bringing homogenization was unsustainable. On the contrary, globalization caused the revival of local identities and

the emergence of conflicts along civilizational/religious/cultural lines (Huntington 1996) or even more fundamentalism and nationalism.

A third group, the transformationalists, has emerged in between these two. This group rejects most of the pathos of both hyper-globalizers and skeptics and attempts to evaluate the magnitude of changes (if any) brought by globalization. In contrast to the globalist claim that globalization is inevitable and unstoppable, transformationalists have argued that globalization represents a rather larger trend that comprises multiple processes including cross-border connections and interdependence (Hay and Marsh 2000). In the political realm, transformationalists see not the death of the nation-state, but rather its reconfiguration (Sassen 2001) along a variety of geographical scales, some of them old (the national and the international) and some of them new (the subnational and the global city). Along the same lines, Slaughter (2004) discusses the transformation of the state into a fragmented arena penetrated by governmental and nongovernmental transnational networks but also by domestic forces. On the international political scene some scholars have described the emergence of new actors that are able to play multiple games on multiple stages: multinational corporations, transnational advocacy networks and even international mafia and terrorist organizations (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Beck, 2005). In the area of culture, transformationalists argue, globalization does not just bring the homogenization of cultures around the world nor does it only create local rejections of global culture and revival of ethnic and tribal values. Instead, it facilitates the creation of "mixes, mélanges hybrids, cut'n'mix, transgression and subversion between local and global forms" (Nederveen Pieterse, 2009).

To these contentions, another one could be added: the question of the driving force of globalization. This question is indeed very important. Existing theories can be roughly arranged along two lines of divide: *culture vs economics.* One of the schools holds that globalization is being mostly driven by economic and technological advances (see Wallerstein 2004, although he never uses globalization and prefers instead the concept of "world-system") . The other school argues that culture and communication technologies are the main driving forces behind globalization (Giddens 1990; Robertson 1992).

From this short overview it should be clear that there is no unitary approach or unified theory of globalization and that many aspects of globalization are still being contested and questioned.

However, as pointed above, globalization represents as much a social theory debate as an economic policy debate, a political, religious and cultural agenda. Academic discourses on globalization are not the only ones in town. There are others too.

One such public talk about globalization is the optimist discourse performed by the likes of Thomas Friedman (2005) who argue that not only globalization is somehow inherently good but it is also necessarily the only way for the poor nations to get rid of poverty.

This discourse was embraced by many powerful international organizations (the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization) and transformed into a universal recipe that was imposed to other countries in the guise of the structural adjustments programs (SAPs) and austerity policies (McMichael, 2000). To further complicate the picture, in some cases, powerful interests have described the advance of globalization as inevitable and thus, in a sense, natural. This had, in the words of Manfred Steger, some important consequences: "it neutralized the challenges of alterglobalist opponents by depoliticizing the public discourse about globalization: neoliberal policies are above politics because they simply carry out what is ordained by nature" (2009:70-71).

b) Religion

Many authors have indicated that the term religion has explicit Western, Judeo-Christian origins (Dubuisson 1998; Harrison 1990; Pye 1994; Fitzgerald 2003; Asad 1993; Masuzawa 2005; Pui-Ian 2011). Most of these scholars that come from fields as diverse as comparative religion or post-colonial studies have claimed that religion - as a term, as a category to classify certain human practices, as a discourse and as a field of scientific inquiry - was born in the Western world.

The concept of religion has clearly originated in the West and other cultures lacked it before the encounter with the West. The word itself comes from the Latin word *religio* but had no established precise meaning: various authors have used it for various purposes and often the same author will use the term to designate different things.

Surprisingly enough, Medieval Christian theology demonstrated little interest and eagerness to work on the term *religio*. Although all the early Fathers have used the term, with the exception of Saint Augustine, no one took the effort to refine the concept or to give it an official interpretation.

In his *De Vera Religione* St. Augustine conceives of religion as being the intimately personal encounter with the divinity. Further, according to St. Augustine Christian religion ensures the best conditions for such an encounter and the role Church is to make the encounter possible (Smith 1962).

This meaning was more or less carried through the Renaissance and the Reform: thinkers and theologians such as Marsilio Ficino, Huldrych Zwingli, Jean Calvin have used it to denote the liaison between human beings and God. For obvious reasons, Zwingli and Calvin dismissed the idea of a body (the Church) to be able to mediate in any way this connection.

Only in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries, religio acquired its modern significance: "a distinctive space of human practice and belief" (Asad 1993:27). The Enlightenment instilled three distinct dynamics into the term. First, there was an *externalization and universalization*. Religion ceased to signify the individual piety and came to mean any system of specific human practices and beliefs. Second, there was an *autonomization* of the term: by opposing religious power to political power, by constructing antagonisms between religion and reason/science, scholars were also defining the boundaries of religion establishing rules according to which various phenomena of human experience/practice would count as "religion". Third, there was an *intellectualization of religion* thereby reason asserted the right to be the only possible and legitimate way to understand and control the surrounding environment, humans, nature and society. Religion was left to deal with the domain of the supernatural but it had to take into account science.

In this way, as Masuzawa (2005) has shown, the discipline study of religion has always had in mind European religions, and mainly Christianity, as the model of the universal religion against which all other religions were compared.

These developments were not, of course, merely intellectual speculations and conceptual developments. Indeed, a logic of power was ingrained in them from the beginning.

Richard King has presented compelling evidence of the process through which Europeans have attempted to make sense of the diversity of faiths in the East. Since the local context provided a wide variety of religious practices loosely united by the worship of the same gods/temples, European scholar invented a series of new categories in order to classify and understand these practices: Buddhism and Confucianism.

This process was accomplished by applying to religious practices in Asia the framework of religion created in the Western world. Among the central features of this model were: the literary bias (a conception, born in Europe after the Reform, according to which texts are considered to be the locus of religion), the rise of scientific rationalism, the emergence of theology as a separate discipline and eurocentrism (1999:43). The same goes, as Talal Asad shows, for the Muslim world. In their attempt to study Muslim beliefs, traditions and practices, sociologists and anthropologists have heavily relied on the concept of religion as it was understood in the West (1993:1).

Furthermore, if the case of the invention of Eastern religions is somehow benevolent and even anecdotal, in other contexts, the embeddedness of religion in western imperial apparatuses of knowledge and power was far more tragic. Such is, for example, the interplay between religion and power in Africa. David Chidester (1998), has presented a vivid story of the ways in which European colonial powers (France, Britain, Portugal, Belgium) have used selectively and abusively the term religion as a classificatory scheme in order to justify their domination over Africa and in order to subjugate and exploit the indigenous African peoples. In the beginning, European travelers, missionaries and civil servants described African tribes as lacking religion. Moreover they "coupled the lack of religion with the absence of other defining human features, such as the institution of marriage, a system of law, or any formal political organization. In many cases, the diagnosis of an alien society without religion was delivered bluntly in the assertion that such people were brutes or beasts" (p.14). In this narrative lack of religion becomes lack of civility and culture and thus it provided Europeans with the necessary excuses to plunder the whole Africa. If religion (in the Western understanding) is universal and inherently human, lack of religion (in the Western understanding) means lack of humanity! This not very sophisticated reason, claims Chidester, allowed European colonial empires to see Africa as pretty much an empty space to be conquered and civilized.

Of course, the intertwining between the concept of religion and the intellectual history of the West, its intimate connection with the colonial exercise of power are not the only criticisms that the concept has to endure.

A highly influential school that started with William Cantwell Smith (1962) has asked the question as to whether the concept of religion does actually describe what it pretends to describe.

Smith has expressed doubts about the accuracy of the concept. He argued that it appears to be inadequate in two ways: first, it doesn't capture neither the personal aspect of belief nor its collective, communal side. Second, it conceives of religion as static, fixed and established. In order to eliminate these difficulties Smith recommends that the term religion should be dropped altogether and should be replaced with *faith* for the personal dimension and *cumulative tradition* for the collective aspect of religion. In the same way, Ninian Smart (1987) argues that "worldview analysis" is a good replacement for religious studies.

c) Religion and Globalization

Some scholars have argued that religion is the original globalizer, i.e the social system that first acted to interconnect communities and cultures across geographical and cultural borders (Lehmann 2002). This view seems to me to be somewhat exaggerated, mostly because it does not take into account the role of other systems (such as the state) and it also suggests for religion a universal agency of its own. Arguments that assign religion a force on its own or a primacy in the processes of globalization should be checked against the concrete historical context.

It is more correct to say that religion acts as one of the original globalizers along others (Meuleman 2002). And this is especially true with the advent of monotheistic religions that contain a very strong kernel of universalistic claims such as the claim to hold a timeless truth that need to be spread as much as possible and the claim that the acceptance of this truth can help believers overcome whatever ethnic, linguistic and other differences they might have).

How religion behaves in the global context?

Peter Beyer (1994:86) states that in the global condition, religions and faith have but two mutually exclusive choices: *the liberal option* and *the conservative option*. The liberal option means for a church/religion/ to accept (even if selectively) certain aspects of globalization, to accept pluralism, tolerance and to adopt an ecumenical attitude towards other religions.

The conservative option, on the other hand, means that pluralism will be rejected and religions will try to impose their views over the views of other religions.

While partially true, this account gives, in my opinion, a too simplistic picture of the existing variety of reactions of religions and religious groups

to the various processes caused by or associated with globalization. Besides, it is not necessarily that one religious group will use only a single type of reaction: the Moldovan Orthodox church, for example, employs a dual discourse, one aimed to the internal audience and another one for the Moldovan Diaspora abroad (Italy, Spain, France). The discursive strategy for the domestic audience is more in line with the conservative option – the Church aggressively defends its claims to be the most respected church on Moldovan territory and promotes the idea of Orthodoxy as being the national religion of Moldovans. On the other hand, since many Moldovans have immigrated to Western Europe because of the economic crisis in the country, the church has to fulfill their spiritual needs too. But it cannot hold and defend the same claims in Italy or Portugal, for example, where Catholicism is the dominant religious group and thus the church tends to be more ecumenical, more cooperative with the Catholicism but also with other churches and religious groups. The contradiction between these two discourses became clear in January last year, when a Moldovan Orthodox priest serving a community in the Padova region, Italy, participated in a collective prayer for the unity of all Christians with representatives of other religious groups. The gesture was heavily criticized in Moldova as some people viewed it as a betrayal to orthodoxy.

Conservative religions do not reject globalization. They rather engage it.

I deliberately chose the notion "engagement" because it seems to best fit the need for a neutral and encompassing term. It has several layers of meaning.

The first layer is the self-reflexivity of religion. As Beckford puts it: "Religions are not simply the effects of external forces; they are also agents, observers and critics of their own development. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that religious organizations can be sensitive and pro-active agencies for processing information about the changing circumstances in which they operate" (2003:105). This means that religions are constantly aware of the external world in which they activate and structure their behavior according to this information.

A second layer of engagement refers to the fact that most religious groups deal, in a way or another, with modernity's legacy, sometimes appropriating it (as is the case with liberation theology), sometimes trying to reform it, sometimes trying to replace it with a project on their own. To be sure, many authors have pointed out that even the supposedly most anti-modernist religious movement are in fact very modern both in terms of message and practice. Olivier Roy (2004) has shown how the new

concept of *ulamah* - envisaged through individualization, deculturation and deterritorialization – and promoted by Muslim Neofundamentalists is not only very modern, but also goes hand in hand with globalization. The same has been said about Jewish Orthodox groups such as Habad (Friedman 1994).

Deterritorialization of religious systems it's probably one of the major consequences of globalization. So far, argues Casanova "cultural systems throughout history have been territorially embedded" (2001:428). This embeddedness is of course of a different type than the territorial embeddedness of the nation-states: unlike states religions were not organized along strict, clear borders. It is true that most religions do have some privileged spaces or sites that they consider highly significant (i.e. sacred): Christians with Nazareth and Rome, Muslims with Mecca, Judaism with Jerusalem, Buddhism with Bodh Gaya. But these spaces are not territories. Furthermore, the constant movement of groups of people – immigration – has operated differently for states and religions: it consolidated the first, but expanded the latter.

Short History of the Baptist Communities in the Russian Empire, USSR and Republic of Moldova

When writing the history of Baptism and Baptist communities[1] in Eastern Europe generally and in Republic of Moldova specifically, choosing the starting point represents a particularly difficult endeavor. We should avoid the usual story that describes a complex historical process that first begun with the Protestant Reformation in Europe the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries and later spread to other parts of the world, including Eastern Europe. The main problem with this approach is not its historical accuracy but its socio-historical validity: its portrayal of Reformation gradually growing and spreading to new territories risks to present an altered picture whereby something (the Reformation) that has originated in one place is progressively being diffused in other places. In this narrative, the Reformation is being constructed as a powerful external "agent" that reshapes other religious contexts.[2]

Such arguments are, of course, wrong on many levels, but for the purposes of this paper I will focus only on one point that seems to me to be extremely relevant, namely the fact that within this framework the local

religious, cultural and political context is being constructed as passive, static and weak.

The short historical account I will present draws a different picture, one in which the local matters almost as much as external. For analytical purposes, I divide the factors that have contributed to the establishment and flourishing of Baptism in Moldova into two groups: indigenous developments and religious diffusion.[3]

a) Indigenous Religious Developments, Political Context and Religious Dissent

News about the Reformation quickly found their way to the principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania.[4] Crucial to the success of the Reformation in Transylvania are the efforts of Johannes Honterus, a Saxon theologian very active in the city of Kronstadt (now Brașov, Romania). In September 1542 the Reformation was introduced in Kronstadt. It appears that authorities in Transylvania have even tried to convert the local, eastern-Orthodox Romanian population to the new faith. One indicator of such efforts is the translation into vernacular Romanian of a book, the *Catechism of Sibiu,* by Philippus Pictor. It was published in 1544 in Hermannstadt. Later, in 1550, the successor of Honterus, Valentin Wagner, wrote another *Katichisis* in Greek supposedly also intended for the Orthodox clergy of region but also probably for the Orthodox clergy in Wallachia and Moldavia (Keul 2009:66-82).

Books and printing, so crucial to the success of the Reformation in Western Europe, were not the only way to spread Reformation in the three principalities. Attempts were made to impose it from above. In the second half of the XVth century, a Reformed Greek soldier, Jacob Heraclides (1561-1563) became ruler of the Principality of Moldavia. Jacob (in Romanian he is known as Despot Vodă) tried to convert the country from Orthodoxy to Lutheranism. Additionally he inaugurated the Latin School in Cotnari taking inspiration from the German universities. The school represents arguably the first university in this space and was active up until 1588, almost two decades after the death of its founder (Hancock-Stefan1997:82; Iorga 1908:168).

The local religious context in the three principalities (and in the region as whole) was far more diverse than many historians would admit and far more filled with tensions and conflicts.[5] Moldavia, especially, was at the border (and a site of contention) of two Eastern Orthodox jurisdictions:

the Constantinople and the Moscow Patriarchate. Internal developments in both jurisdictions but also the conflicts and the competition between them have greatly influenced religious life in Moldavia.

A first major split in the Russian Orthodox world, with consequences for the whole region, is the Schism of 1688 in the Russian Orthodox Church: a group called the Old Believers separated itself from the official church in order to protest against the church reforms implemented by Patriarch Nikon between 1652 and 1666. Although the Old Believers constitute the best known instance of religious dissent in Russia, they were neither the first nor the last dissent group (called in the official historiography of the Russian church "heresies"). They were preceded by the *strigolniki* (an orthodox urban movement in the XIVth century directed against the traditional clergy; they denounced the practice of selling ecclesiastical offices)[6] and *the thought of Skhariya the Jew* (rus. *Жидовствующие*) - a religious group which relied heavily on the Old Testament, denied the sacred nature of Christ, and performed some Judaic religious rituals. Later, another group of dissenters known as Spiritual Christianity broke with the church and started to develop its own theology and religious practices (Berdyaev 1916). The doctrines of Spiritual Christianity resembled, in many ways, doctrines and religious beliefs issued from the Reformation – emphasis on individual belief rather than ecclesiastic authority most importantly - although the contact between the two groups was minimal. Two groups that developed out of this movement are of big importance for this study: the Molokans and the Doukhobors.

The first Molokan community was established in Chisinau already in 1806 (United Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists 1989:319).

Large groups of dissenters have migrated to the Southern frontier of the Russian Empire, in the area known generally as Bessarabia and entered in contact with local populations.

But Bessarabia had its own religious tensions and conflicts too. In the early 1890s-1900s a Moldovan monk, Inochentie (Ioan) Levizor founded in Balta (now Ukraine) a millenialist Charismatic Christian movement that split from the Orthodox Church. A larger than life character, Inochentie preached the imminent arrival of Christ and claimed to have been visited by the Holy Spirit. He gained popularity by delivering his sermons in Romanian[7] to masses, using a simple and accessible language. Later Inochentie began the construction of the New Jerusalem in Balta and started to perform miracles. His monastery became an important (and embarrassing for authorities) centre of pilgrimage – only in 1910 it attracted

more than 80 000 pilgrims (Clay 1998:251). Some researchers have called the New Jerusalem in Balta "a Moldavian Lourdes" (Clark 1927). Imperial authorities tolerated Inochentie for a while but later, at the insistence of the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church, he was deported to the Solovetsky monastery located on a remote island in the White Sea. Only after the February Revolution of 1917 was Inochentie allowed to return to Balta but he died shortly after his arrival. Innochentism survived the death of its leader and later was persecuted by successive political regimes. There are small islands of Innochentism surviving until today.

Another interesting religious movement emerged from the Jewish community. A Jewish lawyer from Chisinau, Joseph Rabinowitz, put the foundation of "Israelites of the New Covenant", a syncretic Hebrew Christian mission and congregation. The movement included a mix of Christian and Jewish elements. The Jewish community in Chisinau was reluctant to convert to the new faith. Isolated from both the Jewish and Orthodox communities, Rabinowitz later converted to Protestantism (Kjaer-Hansen 1994).

b) Contact with Colonists

The Russian Empire gained control of the territory around the Black Sea known today as Bessarabia and Novorossia after the Russian-Turkish wars of 1768-74 and 1787-92. The area was scarcely populated and the Russian government even tried to recruit Old Believers and religious dissidents from other provinces of Russia in order to populate it (Zhuk 2004:36). After the wars, Russian governors offered incentives to foreigners to settle in the area and thousands of French, Swedes, Jews, and Germans have come. Among these incentives were land; monetary advances for agricultural development; freedom from all taxation, duty and billeting; self-government; religious freedom; and exemption from military service (Schmidt 2011:43). Many of these foreigners represented various strands of Protestantism. The German settlers, for example, brought with them Stundism, which itself issued from Pietism.[8]

Imperial authorities praised German colonists for their work ethics, creativity and rationality and opposed them to the supposedly apathetic, passive and unindustrious Russian peasants (Zhuk 2004). Further, German colonists were perceived as important agents of modernization of the South.

Local populations entered in contact with the settlers and with their ways of life. More importantly, German colonists were open about their religion and invited usually their servants and helpers to family worship. There were many other factors that made Stundism and other "German" faiths like Mennonites attractive to the local population: the high prestige and wealth of German colonists, often attributed to their faith; the huge shock that came after the abolition of serfdom in 1866.

The high level of alienation and conflicts with the Orthodox clergy also drove peasants into "sects": the abuses of priests, their "sinful" life, their inability to explain religious matters and their ignorance in general are often quoted as motives for leaving Orthodoxy and going to one of the many sects that flourished in the region.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century the Orthodox Church became increasingly worried about the inroads made by Protestant groups in what it perceived to be its canonical territory. The Church pressed and obtained the introduction of a provision in the Penal Code from 1845 (revised in 1869) that prohibited proselytism and religious conversions. Individuals found guilty of these crimes were exiled to Siberia and other parts of the Empire. They suffered imprisonment, banishment to Siberia, exile abroad, confiscation of property, state seizure of children from Evangelical families, and state and Orthodox harassment of "sectarians" and "sectarian" worship Elliot (2003: 6).

Russian Protestants did not secure a clear legal existence in the Russian Empire until the 1905 Edict of Toleration.

The first Baptist community was established in Chisinau in 1908 by A.F. Ivanov and A.A.Lebedenko. The community gathered on Meșianskaia, 20 street (Michiurin in the Soviet era, now Sfatul Tarii) in the house of Joseph Rabinowitz. In 1912, T.P. Hiznyakov inaugurates the choir of the Baptist community (initially 16 singers). Until 1918, Baptist communities existed only in Chisinau and Tiraspol, later they appeared also in other cities: Balti, Glodeni, Vulcanesti, Floresti, Briceni, Anenii Noi, Hincesti, Ciadir Lunga, Cantemir.

In 1918 a large part of Bessarabia joined Romania and remained part of the Romanian state until June 1940, and again for a short interval (1941-1944) during the WWII.

In 1921, B.P. Busilo becomes presbyter of the Chisinau community. In 1922 the first Baptist prayer house was built in Chisinau, on the Vokzalinaya street (currently Ciuflea). In 1924 a primary school (4 classes) was opened by the church. Two years later the community started to

build an asylum for the Baptist elderly and single believers. In 1926 the community opens its second prayer house, "Bethel", whose constituency was mostly Jews that converted to Christianity. "Bethel" maintained also a tailor workshop for girls and women from poor families. In 1927, the Congress of Representatives of Churches from Bessarabia proclaims the unification of Evangelical and Baptist churches. In the 30s, the community also collects around 514 lei for the missionary activity of Olivier Oyerinde in Nigeria (United Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists 1989).

During the Second World War the community had to endure several blows: its presbyter, Busilo, was arrested by Soviet authorities and was later executed. Also, part of the Baptist community converted to Pentecostalism.

In 1944 Bessarabia becomes part of the Soviet Union under the name of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (created formally in 1940).

During the war Soviet authorities softened their attitude towards religion and started to find a way of accommodating the state and religious communities (with the exception of Jehovah Witnesses that continued to be persecuted because of their refusal to enroll in the army).

The attitude of the Soviet state towards religion in general and Baptists-Evangelicals in particular would change again many times. In 1948 the presbyter Rudenko was arrested on charges of "anti-Soviet declarations" and deported to Arkhangelsk for 7 years.

Subsequently, the Communist Party decided to use the same technique that it employed in relationship to the Orthodox Church: trying to co-opt it. In 1960, the All-Union Council of Evangelical-Baptist Christians surrendered to the pressures of the state and adopted two administrative documents that introduced changes in the way the community was organized. One of them was secret and was called *Letter with instructions for the superior presbyters* (rus. Инструктивное письмо старшим пресвитерам). The secret letter contained, among other things, provisions on limiting proselytism and forcing an opening of the community to the secular culture (Mitrokhin 1997:414). A large part of the community (the so-called Initiative Group, rus. Инициативники) refused to submit to these requirements and decided to quit the All-Union Council of Evangelical-Baptist Christians. The traces and division lines created by this split are visible even today in the community.

The Baptist community in Chisinau numbered, during the 70s, more that 600 members. In the beginning of the 80s, it comprised already more than 1000 members. They represented all nationalities living on the territory of then Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova. An internal survey of

Chisinau's Baptist community shows the following ethnic distribution (as for January1, 1984): Ukrainians – 490, Moldovans – 302, Russians – 142, Bulgarians – 45, Gagauz – 15, Germans – 6, Poles – 6, Belorussians – 3, Jews – 2 (bethel.md).

In 1988 the Communist Party of Soviet Union allowed Christian organizations to celebrate the 1000-th anniversary of the Christianization of Russia. Moldovan Baptists used the moment to "tell to as many people as possible about Jesus Christ" (bethel.md). This is also the moment when local Baptist communities are being visited and helped by foreign missionaries (4 Finnish pastors). During the next year, 1989, the Bible is translated for the first time in Moldovan (Romanian with Cyrillic characters). Also in 1989, Gideons International, an evangelical Christian organization dedicated to distributing copies of the Bible opens an office in Chisinau, the first in USSR.

In the new independent Moldovan state, Baptists were able to practice, more or less freely their beliefs.[9]

According to the Baptist World Alliance, as of December 31 2009, UCEBCM comprised 470 churches and a rough estimate of 20 400 regular believers. These numbers do not include sympathizers or non-decided Baptists (bwanet.org). The most recent general Population Census (2004) conducted by Moldovan authorities indicates a different number: 33 000 Baptists organized in 270 churches. These differences can be attributed partly to the fluid character of religiosity in the region, with large strata of population migrating from one Protestant denomination to another.

Moldovan Baptists and Globalization: A Case Study

I will investigate here several significant issues.

First, there is the issue of religion and globalization/globalizing processes. It revolves around the question: in which ways is religion being transformed (if at all) as a consequence of the various processes of globalization at work – spread of capitalism, diffusion of internet and communication technologies, global outreach of media etc?

Second, There is the question of how different understanding of religion (in this case, Baptism) confront/collude/interact in settings such as Moldova where the local version of Baptism has entered into contact with American versions? I will try to show on how these encounters are not always harmonious. On the contrary, sometimes the sides enters

unequal relationships whereby American culture wars are being imported to Moldova or the theology of Moldovan Baptist imports American topics into local political debates (such as the discussion about evolutionism and creationism).

Third, what is the relationship between religion and politics? On the one hand, before Moldova gained independence in 1991 Baptists avoided any participation in the political and cultural life of the country. On the other hand, the new generation of Moldovan Baptists is actively participating in the political life of Moldova, are forging various alliances with political and religious groups, speak loudly on public issues and have their representatives in the Parliament.

a) Some Preliminary Considerations about the Moldova Context

The discussion about religion and religiosity[10] in the territories of the former Soviet Union is somewhat strange. On the one hand, we would expect that after more than 50 years of anti-religious propaganda religious feelings must be if not eradicated then at least attenuated. On the other hand, the cultural and political isolation of USSR have kept Soviet society from religious and social transformations that have emerged in the West during the second half of the twentieth century.

Not only religion did not disappear in the former Soviet Union, but it came out to be one of the dominant forces in the region. According to Ramet (1998:310) three factors can possibly explain this incredible revival of religion, and the huge amount of religion demand that accompanies it.

First, we can see growing but unsatisfied demand for nontraditional religion. Neo-Protestant cults such as Baptism are, so to speak, in trend with the individualization forces at work in different parts of the world. The most important feature of this individualization is an operation through which individual belief instead of social conformism becomes the basis of religious behavior (Roy 2004, Van der Veer 2001: 10). Individualization goes trans-nationally and trans-culturally: currents and cults of 'born-again' Muslims (movements such as Tablighi Jama'at) have been registered both in Europe and the Muslim world (Van der Veer 2001: 10).

A second factor is the abrupt lifting of controls in the religious sphere. This relaxation of religious legislation opened huge possibilities for missionary work and created favorable conditions for evangelization efforts by foreign and local missionaries.

Finally, the psychological, social, political and economic uncertainties of the post-Soviet scene are profound. Harsh economic conditions, political instabilities, the erosion of communist social institutions – collective property, welfare state – all have contributed to create a general feeling of uncertainty and insecurity. The transition to the market economy is neither easy, nor unproblematic: the welfare state has been dismantled; factories and collective agricultural farms (kolkhozes) were closed and the unemployed rose dramatically. At the individual level a demand for solutions unusual for the setting emerge – Chinese acupuncture, Tibetan herbalism, witchcraft and healing sessions (Ramet 1998:320). Not surprisingly, in these circumstances, the most popular TV show on the Soviet television, watched by millions and millions of Soviet citizens, was a program of collective hypnosis led by two faith healers: Allan Chumak and Anatoly Kashpirovsky that pretended to perform sessions of mass healing through mass hypnosis (Ramet 1998: 321). Situations like these almost always serve religion's interests.

To these can be added also: the *legitimacy vacuum*, existing and maintained *contacts between religious communities* in the West and those from the Soviet Union. The later have existed despite the strong control of the Soviet religious life by the Party and the state.

The Christian missionaries have also benefited from a transitory fascination with everything connected with the United States, as well as from the openness to novelty, brought by the sudden disappearance of the communist old order (Ramet 1998: 265).

Regimes of visibility

This paper will investigate transnational ties among three main actors: Moldovan Baptist communities in the USA, Baptist organizations in the USA and Baptists in Moldova. The aim is both ambitious and difficult. Troubles come mainly from the fact that most of the transnational links between these communities are invisible, hidden from the public view.

The regime of visibility changes according to needs, local contexts and general strategies. In the democratic system of America, for example, Baptists and Baptist organizations are highly visible, trying to push federal and state authorities to promote specific policies. A famous example is the intervention of the former American president Jimmy Carter on the behalf of an imprisoned Baptist pastor, Zaur Balaev, in Azerbaijan. Carter wrote to the country's president Ilham Alyev to freed Mr. Balaev, after a

huge press campaign of both the Baptist World Alliance and the European Baptist Federation (The Baptist Times, 2008).

Reversely, in order to face authoritarian regimes and/or the monopoly of the Orthodox Church in Moldova, local Baptist communities are at times trying to become invisible and non-intrusive.

For these reasons, quantitative data about the extent of Baptists in Moldova, the penetration of the country, the rate of churches per region, the amount of material support Moldovan Baptists receive from abroad is almost impossible to obtain. Thus, I will rely on two types of sources: publicly available journal articles, newspapers, declarations and interviews.

Also Baptist websites and discussion groups (both local and foreign, mostly US based) were used to gather information about other key aspects: transnational collaboration, joint campaigns and missionary news.

The final picture is far from being exhaustive but nevertheless it represents one of the first attempts to map these communities and their interdependencies.

Moldovan Baptists in USA

Moldovan Baptists began to arrive in the US right after the country proclaimed its independence in 1991. It is known that large Baptist Moldovan communities have settled in Sacramento (California) – a rough estimate of 1000 people, Portland and Boise (Oregon), Springfield, Westfield and Agawam (Massachusetts) – another 1000 people, Seattle (Washington state), Hickory (North Carolina), Ashville (South Carolina). Also, small Moldovan Baptist communities have been attested in Georgia, Burlington (Vermont) and Minneapolis-Saint Paul (Minnesota).

The spatial distribution of Moldovan religious communities on American soil was influenced and finally shaped by:

First, there is the influence of the existing patterns of mobility of Moldovan religious immigrants. The first Moldovan Protestants came to United States as refugees seeking political asylum (see Simkin 2012 for a detailed history of religious immigration to the US). Being persecuted for their religious beliefs and practices (by the Soviet State and the new independent republics) they were offered asylum and consequently settled in different geographical areas of the US. The choice of specific places to settle was partly a random process, where individuals were trying to find

good opportunities for life, partly an informally regulated process with various American Baptist communities playing a significant role. The North American Mission Board (NAMB), a branch of Southern Baptists Convention that operates domestically, in USA and Canada, played an instrumental role in the process of assisting immigrants from Moldova and helped settle the religious refugees in various locations.

Political refugee statuses were accorded on an individual basis and later refugees began to bring their closest relatives under the clause of family reunification. Thus, these first established Moldovan Baptist settlements in USA were de facto extended families. Later, this pattern was preserved and perpetuated. New immigrants and/or refugees go to settle in these places where Moldovans were already established.

Another principle of organization of the Protestant migration was linked to the territory of origins. It consists into the fact that people from the same religious community preferred to settle in the same place. According to one of my informants, in Minnesota, for example, there is a Moldovan Baptist Church that serves a community of more that 150 people. The community is composed mainly from immigrants originating from the district of Sângerei. And most of them are relatives (cousins, uncles, aunts, husbands or spouses of cousins and so on).

Second, we should take into account the existing patterns of mobility of ethnico-religious communities that are close to the Moldovan Baptists: Romanian/Russian speaking Baptist groups. Because of their affinities (ethnic origins, shared language) Moldovan Baptists tended to settle in place where significant Romanian/Russian Baptist presence was already established (Oregon, Georgia, Florida, California, South Carolina).

Third, the activity of charismatic leaders and organizers.

American Baptist Organizations and their Connection to Moldova. Transnational Institutions

Christianity itself carries a seed of universality. In its ideal representation, the Christendom acts both as a spiritual community and a political project of constructing a global community of Christians regardless of culture, ethnicity and language.

What is new in the process of re-spiritualization of the world is the incredible amount of instruments and possibilities – means of communication, resources, transport – that economic globalization opens

for social movements committed to the spreading of the Gospel around the world.

A picture of a paradoxical and sometimes even contradictory dynamics of a double movement of people, resources and money emerges when one takes into account all forces involved in these processes of religious globalization and creation of transnational Christian communities.

On the one hand, significant flows of Moldovan Baptist have chosen to emigrate in the United States searching for better living and career opportunities. Most of them have left behind careers, broken lives and despair and arrive in the New World with hopes to succeed.

On the other hand, Christian organizations in America (the Southern Baptists for example) are spending large amounts of money and resources in order to train foreign ministries and missionaries (Americans but also people of other nationalities) to do fieldwork and "church planting" in Moldova. This training usually includes mastering of Russian or Romanian, basic cultural and communication skills.

These two parallel flows of people represent, in a sense, the two sides of the same coin: globalization. For ones it brings poverty at home and thus it becomes necessary to emigrate. For others, this is a wonderful opportunity to conquer new spiritual spaces.

Let's follow some of these connections.

The Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), the largest protestant body in the United States, with over 16 million members "who worship in more than 42,000 churches in the United States" (SBC.net) sponsors more than 5,000 foreign missionaries in 153 nations of the world. It is a remarkable and complex organization that has many subsidiaries doing specific jobs and implementing specific policies. It is also the main hub of distribution of Baptism in Moldova.

One of the branches of SBC, the International Mission Board, represents the body entitled to "evangelize the lost, disciple believers, develop churches and minister to people in need across the globe. This is accomplished by mobilizing prayer support, appointing missionaries, enlisting volunteers, channeling financial support and communicating how God is working overseas"(SBC.net).

The Georgia Baptist Convention (GBC), an autonomous organization connected with the SBC, is another donor and partner to Baptist communities in Moldova. It contributes mainly to organize evangelistic festival and summer camps: during 2006 the festival 'Jesus Christ – the Living Water" was organized on GBC's money.

Another link for the Moldovan Baptists is the European Baptist Federation (EBF). It comprises more than 800 000 European Baptists from Portugal to Russia (ebf.org). EBF operates a major educational hub for training future pastors and evangelical propagandists, the International Baptist Theological Seminary (IBTS) in Prague, Czech Republic. From 2002 to 2004, Valeriu Ghiletchi, the head of Moldovan Baptist Church (currently a deputy in the Parliament of Moldova from the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova), has acted as the organization's president, a fact that emphasizes the importance of the former soviet republics as new territories for evangelization. EBF has developed a different approach from SBC: instead of training foreign evangelists and church planters in USA and sending them in targeted countries, EBF relies on indigenous missionaries. The Indigenous Missionary Project (IMP) provides funding for suitably gifted people to work as evangelists and church planters in their own countries. (EBF.org). By April 2010, EBF managed 6 IMPs in Moldova, more that any European country!

The local Baptist organization is the Union of Christian Evangelical Baptist Churches of Moldova (UCEBCM), a member of both the European Baptist Federation and the Baptist World Alliance.

A somewhat different transnational practice between Baptist communities in the US and Moldova is represented by the deployment of high-profile American activists and pastors in order to help local Baptists win or resist various theological or political struggles. Especially illustrative is the contention over homosexuality. The current Moldovan government wants to join EU and one of the conditions is to provide rights to sexual minorities. Moldovan Christians of all denominations refuse the 'legalization' (as they put it) of homosexuality.

Paul Cameron, a well-know anti-gay activist, a sex researcher who argues that homosexuality is associated with child sex abuse and other social evils and whose work has been repudiated by major professional associations in the United States has visited Moldova three times, in October 2008, in May 2009 and again in October 2011.[11] In January 2011 another controversial anti-gay activist - the pastor and lawyer Scott Lively partially responsible for the harsh anti-homosexual laws in Uganda - visited Moldova and warned, on that occasion, Moldovans about the dangers of homosexuality. Both Lively and Cameron were invited to Moldova by two conservative Baptist groups -- Pro Familia and Moldova Crestina.[12]

This brief survey of American and European Baptist organizations that maintain contact and support Baptist groups in Moldova shows clearly that

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in just twenty years there have been established the seeds of a transnational religious community.

Baptists in Moldova

UCEBCM operates the Institute for Inductive Bible Study in Chisinau in collaboration with Moldova Precept Ministries Association. The institute represents an educational body that organizes Bible study groups, which are "the basis for planting a church in the future" (Precept.md). Another branch of UCEBCM administers the language school "English for a new life". It provides opportunities for learning the Gospel and the English simultaneously (http://efnl.org/rom/). In addition, UCEBCM has a school of technology – "Script Techno" which instructs missionaries and future pastors to use internet technologies (blogs, websites, and forums) to spread the Gospel.

Whilst these educational organizations are domestically oriented, UCEBCM runs an educational facility oriented toward missionary missions abroad: the College of Theology and Education (CTE) in Chisinau. The college received its official government registration in 1995 (Turlac, 2004). It was founded by disciples of the Emmanuel Bible Institute (EBI) in Oradea, Romania – one of the first Baptist schools in the region that began to operate in October 1990 with 60 students from Romania and 12 from Moldova. (Johnson 1996). CTE was intended to train students for missions in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Initially it hosted students from the Caucasus and Siberian and Far East Russian regions including Yakutia (Sakha) and Chukotka (Turlac, 2004). Later, it trained Gagauz students from the autonomous Moldovan Gagauz region to serve as missionaries to fellow Turks in several Central Asian republics and in Turkey also. The graduating class of 2003, for example consisted of students that have come to study at CTE from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan (Turlac, 2004).

Apart from these, UCEBCM manages some nursing facilities for elderly, an Association of Christian Businessmen in Moldova, the Tae-kwon-do Federation of Moldova which started as a sport club but when director Ion Cheptene became a Christian through a Bible study, his club became a Christian mission. The federation now has 60 Christian karate clubs and has seen more than 60 people accept Christ (Merchant, 1999).

Transnational Practices

The main operational channels of Baptist religious organizations are:

- The production and distribution of Bibles and other Christian literature;
- Crusades and Evangelical Festivals;
- Church-sisters;
- Missionaries
- Relief and Charity

The official history of importing Bibles in territories of the former Soviet Union begins in the days USSR still existed. It would be fair to suppose that "Bible smuggling" as a practice has never disappeared, but officially it started in the late 1980s. Just between 1985 and 1989 some 2 million copies of the Bible or the New Testament had been imported into the USSR (Ramet 1998: 235). United Bible Societies, a transnational organization that began in 1946 and currently includes offices in 120 countries is the main institutional umbrella for practices of distributing Bibles globally. Bibles are printed in local languages and support is raised through local congregations" (Wuthnow and Offut, 2008: 223).

In 2006, for example, "approximately 24 million Bibles were distributed worldwide by United Bible Societies. For Moldova, data is available for just one year, 1992, when United Bible Societies have distributed more than 100 000 Bibles" (East and West, 1993:4).

Crusades and Evangelical Festivals are regular events organized usually during the summer. They are managed and implemented by joint teams that comprise international (American, British or European missionaries) and local pastors. They could be: summer camps, concerts, trips. Sometimes prominent Baptists from other parts of the world participate as honorary guests. For example, between July 8 and July 10, Franklin Graham, an American Christian evangelist and missionary has organized a series of "Festivals of Christianity" in nine different regions of the country. For three days Franklin Graham presented the Gospel to over 100,000 people from all parts of Moldova. More than 700 evangelical churches have joined the effort in organizing this project, representing Evangelical Christian Baptist Union, Pentecostal Union, Bible Church, Evangelical Christians, and other denominations. (MoldovaforChrist.org) "In three evenings more than 13,000 people trusted Jesus!" Later that year, Graham visited Ukraine, where a crowd of more that 120 000 assembled at the Olympic Stadium to celebrate him.

Another event with joint participation occurred in 2006, the festival "Jesus Christ – the Life Water", organized by UCEBCM and sponsored by Georgia Baptist Convention.

Moldovan Baptist communities in the US have developed a special sister church program, sometimes formal (at the community level), sometimes informal (at the individual level) to help Baptist churches in Moldova, either in their place of origins, either in other part of Moldova. A Moldovan Baptist from the Minneapolis-Saint Paul community helps the Baptist community from his village in Moldova, as one of my informants told me. He sends regularly money that is used to buy different supplies for the local Baptist Church or is used for relief work. Holidays are another occasion to help the community in Moldova: a special program of child-to-child-letters was developed. Children from Baptist communities in USA write letters to Baptist children in Moldova and send them packages with candy, school supplies and toys. At the community level, the Minneapolis-Saint Paul Moldovan Baptist community supports as a sister-church the Baptist church from Carpineni, Hancesti (Moldova).

The use of missionaries is another important strategy of the church. Under the leadership of SBC, American Baptist churches sponsor evangelization trips abroad. For example, the Bethany Baptist Church, McDonough, Georgia has sent, since 1987, nearly 80 members of its congregation to serve as missionaries throughout Moldova, Ukraine and Russia. Other major fund provider for these trips is the First Baptist Church Marshallville (Georgia). It supports training of pastors in Moldova, as well as medical clinics and Vacation Bible Schools there. The most amazing fact about Marshallville is the fact that 78 percent of the city's population is African-American. It is interesting to see how Baptist Christianity operates as a way to transcend differences of race: black Baptists in America helping their Christian white brothers in a poor country in Europe.

In addition to direct evangelical propaganda, Baptist churches implement programs for relief and charity, non-intrusive actions and procedures that are intended to expose people to baptism in a non-direct way. For example, another of my informants told me, Baptists would request the permission from the administration of the Rusca Prison and would organize a dinner for the female inmates there. Or, another case, they would help a person in need - especially elderly people – repairing the walls, digging the garden, chopping wood. After all the work is done, Baptist would perform a ritual pray and would thank God for help. In most

of the case, this impressive display of community support and compassion would lead to the conversion of the target.

From Moldova to the World

A completely different set of transnational practices is the work of Moldovan Baptists as missionaries and church planters in Russia or other parts of the world. The extent and the scale of such missions will remain unknown since Baptist Churches are reluctant to make it publicly available. In what follows, I will present some parts of that picture.

On January 12, 2004, Serghei Basarab, a pastor in Isfara, Hujand in northern Tajikistan was shot by a Muslim as he knelt in his home for morning prayers. He was shot 13 times with a Kalashnikov automatic rifle. Basarab was pastor of one of six churches that make up the Baptist Union of Tajikistan, a member of the European Baptist Federation (Associated Baptist Press). Also, he was the 10th Baptist to be murdered in that country over a 10-year period[13] (by 2004). Serghei was a Moldovan citizen and student at "Precept Ministries" (a Christian evangelical organization based in Chattanooga Tennessee that hosts Training Workshops, Bible studies, trains individuals to conduct Bible studies). Basarab was also one of the most prominent Moldovan Baptists.

The other story comes from Turkey, where on August 17, 1999 a massive earthquake shook the region of Izmit. Three American Christians and a Moldovan Baptist, Vladimir Rictor, a teacher at Moldova College of Theology and Education, who had been on a ministry trip in Turkey, organized by International Interns, gathered outside with Ozpolat, a Turkish Muslim (International Mission Board, 9/2/1999). The day following the earthquake, they handed out packets of food, supplies and offered New Testaments to those who wanted them. The joint trip of the Moldovan Baptist and the Californians was coordinated by Southern Baptists and funded by International Interns (IMB, 9/2/1999).

These case are, by no means, isolated incidents and/or accidental trips of Moldovan Baptists to other countries. On the contrary, it is a part of a massive set of processes of targeted movements of people and resources that characterize the actual development and diffusion of Baptist Christianity.

In both cases Moldovan Baptists acted as agents of a transnational community of faith. In both cases, their specific skills and knowledge were used in order to help it to attain its goals. Vladimir Rictor, himself

a Gagauz – an ethnic group in Moldova speaking an old form of Turk and the only Turkic people group not predominantly Muslim – was part of a greater plan of Baptists organizations to reach Turkey. Moldovan missionaries with a Gagauz background and knowledge of Turkish would be very useful for that purpose, as they have been instrumental for Russia, due to their excellent command of Russian. In the words of Walt Shearer, president of International Interns, "Moldova is a very strategic country." (IMB, 9/2/1999).

In Tajikistan, Moldovan Baptists served not only as pastors but also as the main providers of highly-trained missionaries and religious functionaries. Moldovan Baptists helped to launch the first Bible School there, with 29 students, and acted as the governing body of the school. Teachers and pastors were also recruited from former students of the College of Theology and Education of the Moldovan Baptist Union. At the same time, Moldovan Baptists provided the backbone of the process of "church planting" in Tajikistan.

Oleg Turlac, dean of theology at the College of Theology and Education, Kishinev, Moldova, and a doctor of ministry candidate at Beeson Divinity School, Samford University, Birmingham, Alabama lists, not without a big deal of joy, the reach of Moldovan Baptists and their significant role in the process of spreading Baptism in the world:

Vyacheslav Grini, Peter Litnevsky, and Vladimir Gladkevich, graduates of CTE, serve in Chukotka near the Bering Strait in Siberia. Yuri Vylkov serves as a missionary in Bulgaria. In the Yakutia region of Russia, Lyubomir Tataev, a 1998 graduate of CTE, and Alexander Kravchenko, a 1997 graduate, have joined together in ministry. Viktor Koval serves as a missionary in Yoshkar-Ola, while Mikhail and Inna Biryuk serve in Chita in the Russian Far East. Evgeny Shablenko, Alexei Botnari, Pavel Belev, and Sergey Kul'kov serve in different regions of Russia, while Mikhail Arabadji ministers in Turkey and Nikolai Khripko ministers in the Odessa region of Ukraine. Vyacheslav Verbitsky and Emil Agaev founded a Bible school in Shymkent (Chimkent in Russian), Kazakhstan. The Bible school in Shymkent became the first satellite school of CTE. Igor Kohaniuk, a graduate of CTE's Bachelor of Divinity program, started a Bible school in Tajikistan in 2003. In the fall of 2003 CTE's professor Serghei Namesnic traveled to Tajikistan to teach homiletics to 34 students at the Bible school in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. (Turlac, 2004)

Inequalities and Contradictions in the Baptist Religious Globalization

Do transnational religious movements reproduce structural inequalities between the West (conceived broadly as richer and more powerful) and the East? Or "the love for the Gospel" could attenuate these differences and solve inherent conflicts and disputes that may arise?

The answer is very complex and is complicated by the shortage of available information. Conflicts within and between Protestant Churches rarely get outside the boundaries of the community - to the general public - and usually are solved within it.

The few available testimonies can only suggest the existence of such conflicts and inequalities. One of them is that of Danut Manastireanu, a lecturer in theology at Emmanuel Bible College, Oradea, Romania. It was published in the *East-West Church Ministry Report*, back in 1998. Manastireanu's account summarizes some key aspects of the complicate relationship between Protestant centers in the US and local realities in Romania. They are:

First, an almost exclusive theological dependence upon the West, especially the United States. According to Manastireanu "it is absolutely vital for us to learn from those who are ahead of us theologically. We are confronted, however, with a sort of theological aggressiveness, even with a form of theological "imperialism," which can have very serious negative consequences for the future relevance of Evangelical theology in a cultural environment totally different from the American Evangelical context." (Manastireanu, 1998).

Second, import of Western theological disputes in cultural and intellectual contexts where these debates are irrelevant or without roots. Manastireanu provides two examples of such "theological imports': the so-called "Lordship salvation" dispute and the dispute on inerrancy. This, argues Manastireanu, "may satisfy and reassure some donors, but it will surely not help Evangelicals in Romania very much in the long run" (1998).

A side-effect of importing Western disputes is the 'import of the US culture wars'. The expression was used by Warren Throckmorton, an associate professor of psychology at Grove City College, a Christian college in Pennsylvania who closely follows the visits of American preachers to Eastern Europe.[14] Julie Dorf, a senior adviser with the Council for Global Equality, a U.S.-based NGO that works to oppose human rights abuses directed at individuals because of their sexual orientation or gender

identity. She criticizes Lively and Cameron's visits to Moldova by arguing that they bring to Moldova messages that have been rejected in the US. There is a risk, contends Dorf, that American anti-gay crusaders will abuse both the vulnerability and the ignorance of Moldovans in order to promote their agendas.[15]

Third, Christian vocations and salaries. Neo Protestant sects share a dualistic approach to life, with a strong emphasis on the full-time Christian ministry as the highest possible calling. This leads to the fact that many talented young people leave their promising careers in the secular life (politics, business, art) in order to become pastors and evangelists. They are well paid according to Romanian standards, but their salaries come from donations originating mainly in the US. "What will happen with the national workers when the Western support ceases? ... It's a true manifestation of «free market» capitalism." (Manastireanu, 1998)

Fourth, cultural alienatedness of Protestant cults from the local cultural religious and spiritual culture. Most of the Protestant worship, music, theology and liturgy are import products with no effort to accommodate them to the local cultural context.

Politics and Religion

Moldovan Baptists are active participants in the public sphere. They engage in discussions about abortion, granting rights to sexual minorities, the introduction of creationism in the educational curriculum. They express their opinions on the internet (where they maintain a quite impressive presence), on social networkings sites, in the blogosphere, on dedicated channels on Youtube etc. They have even managed to get two of their most prominent members – Valeriu Ghilețchi and Veaceslav Ioniță elected in the parliament. The somewhat stereotypical figure of the contemporary urban Moldovan Baptist will be: culturally and theologically aware,[16] technically savvy and politically active.

The situation has not been always this way. On the contrary, Protestant communities in general Baptist in particular, have tried, due to the specific context of their existence (a relatively small community living at the margins of an immense Orthodox world), to avoid as much as possible the contact with the state as the latter changed its mind so many times in history and has persecuted the community in so many various ways.

After the 1905 Edict of Toleration, Baptists in Chisinau obtained finally legal recognition. But after Bessarabia joined Romania in 1918

their fate changed dramatically. Although the Romanian Constitution of 1866 guaranteed formally the freedom of conscience (art. 21), in practice authorities used various ways to limit the activity of Baptist congregations – arrests, persecutions, closure of houses of prayer, sophisticated procedures needed to obtain legal recognition etc (Popovici 1980). The situation worsened in the 30s, with various right-wing governments coming to power in Bucharest. In December 1938 all Baptist churches in Romania were closed.

When Bessarabia was again incorporated in the Soviet Union in 1944, the attitude of the Soviet State towards religious groups was already somewhat benevolent (with the exception of the Jehovah Witnesses), but the situation changed after the death of Stalin and installment of the new general secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev. But this time the state did not proceed to kill or deport religious dissenters. Instead, it launched a massive propaganda campaign that aimed to ridicule religious belief as being archaic, obsolete and obscurantist (Froese 2008).

In this situation, the Baptist community developed a strategy of maintaining at a lowest possible level contact with the state. The state was to be avoided and its coercive secularism rejected (Mitrokhin 1997; Nikolskaya 2009; Simkin 2012). That pushed the community to live at the margins: to avoid any political career and to not take any participation in the political system of the country (membership in the Party or in the organizations for the youth), to develop a "system" of informal homeschooling in order to counteract the official education and its political-atheist content, to avoid as possible the contact with the official Soviet culture (many of my respondents said that for a very long time their families did not own phones, TV or radio sets, did not go to the local cinema), to take jobs that did not involve participation in the Party life or Party membership (low level jobs in collective farms, factories, plumbers etc).

In the beginning of the 1990s, when the Soviet State collapsed and the newly independent former Soviet countries from Eastern Europe started to build new political systems that were, at least in theory, democratic, the community found itself at a crossroad. On the one hand, if there was any lesson to be drawn from the entire history of the community, that lesson was that the state could change its mind any time. This implied a continuation of the old strategy of living on the fringes.

On the other hand, the newly created political infrastructure (democratic in its pretentions!) provided Baptists (but also other non-Orthodox religious

groups) with the opportunity not only to participate in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the state, but also to have a say in the process of building a new society.

Much of the community chose the second path. There are two major explanations for this choice.

- The huge prestige, influence and material support that came (and continues to come) from Evangelical groups in the United States. Foreign missionaries appeared at the end of the 90s and by now they are familiar figures of the religious landscape in Moldova. They brought with them not only Bibles and money but more importantly, ways of organizing, practices of participation and attitudes toward the political system.[17]

- Change in religious demographics. Another major shift in the community that happened in the 1990s is the huge influx of new converts that very quickly surpasses the number of traditional believers. These new converts (some of them coming from Orthodoxy, others are former atheists that discover the new faith) do not share the institutional, cultural and political history of the traditional believers. For them being apolitical in a democratic system does not make sense.

These transformations did not happen without leaving traces. Many believers from the older generations have expressed, in interviews, a certain feeling of alienation from the new Baptists. One of them said: "Everything we believed: discretion in prayer, avoiding politics and the state, avoiding contacts with secular culture, beware of the dangers of technology – now is turned upside down. These new Baptists pray on television, participate in elections and use computers and internet."

Time however, is on the side of new Baptists. The new social reality – that of globalization – is on their side too. As shown above, they are active just on all fronts.

They participate in local politics, but also, occasionally, in international politics. Recently, the Council of Europe has adopted a new resolution calling for more acceptance of religious pluralism. The resolution was proposed by Valeriu Ghiletchi, a Moldovan politician and former president of the European Baptist Federation.

They initiate, wage and participate in culture wars. In January 2013 they asked the Ministry of Education to make amendments in the curriculum and to add creationism as a valid "scientific theory that should be taught along evolutionism."[18] The ministry denied the request but it was supported by the Orthodox Church. In 2012, when the Moldovan Parliament decided to adopt the Law on Equality of Chances (also known

as the Anti-Discrimination Law), Moldovan Baptists were protesting loudly. Moreover, on the "abortion" and "anti-gay" fronts, they receive support from influent conservative groups from the US – several prominent conservative figures such as Paul Cameron and Scott Lively came to Chisinau in order to help the community fight the evil of homosexuality. These preachers also met with the Metropolitan of Moldova in order to elaborate platforms for future collaboration.

Conclusions

Theories of cosmopolitanism and globalization have often neglected religious movements and their transnational connections/actions. Deemed as being parochial and condemning the believer to absolutism and a lack of tolerance (Van der Veer 2002: 104), religion was neglected in the large cosmopolitan pictures of our times.

The picture of religious globalization is nether static, nor fixed. Instead, religious globalization is, in the words of Valentine Moghadam, a "movement of movements". Paraphrasing her description of Islamic social movements, we can say that the main goal of religious globalization is the establishment or reinforcement of different religious laws and norms (Christian, Islamic) as the solution to economic, political, and cultural crises. (Moghadam 2009:50)

Without any doubt, religions are transnational and they do have a project of globalization on their own. This is valid for both the new forms of religion (neo-Protestant cults) as well as for the traditional religions: Islam, Eastern Orthodoxy and Hinduism.

The Orthodox Church, for example, is also a transnational religion. Its administration and structure was established by seven Ecumenical Councils, the last of which was held in the eighth century, i.e. long before national states and territories were constituted. Secular and religious borders sometimes coincide (e.g., Bulgaria, Greece, Romania), sometimes strongly diverge (Russian Orthodox Church with a strong presence in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine) (Matsuzato 2009: 240).

Religion or faith, like capital, is in a sense rootless: it flows freely across borders, states and spaces. It could serve, along with the ideology of the free market and individualism as a fully developed project of globalization.

But religion is also embedded in existing social and economic relations – sometimes it even replicates them.

There are streams of money and resources with concrete address and locations, origins and destination. These material phenomena can be linked to circles of ideas and ideologies that have also concrete origins.

The actual religious revival could be treated as another form of cultural expansion of the West, since western countries, USA in the first place, are the main exporters of religion on a global scale. Will the religious globalization stop in the very unlikely situation that USA runs out of money?

Existing relationships and inequalities suggest that in the absence of western money local protestant communities will face harsh times. Which, in neither case, does not mean that we doubt their adhesion to the faith.

In this sense, Moldovan Baptists are global citizens, both shaping and being shaped by globalization processes.

NOTES

[1]   Baptists are members of one of the many religious groups that grew out of the Protestant Reformation. The official history of Baptism begins in 1609 when John Smyth, an Anglican priest that broke with the Church of England and subsequently migrated to Holland, baptized himself and others thus initiating the first Baptist congregation (for a comprehensive guide to Baptists and their history see Brackney 2009)

[2]   This leads further to the argument (with many political consequences) that if such is the case, then Protestantism must be a foreign religion, a religious phenomenon that is not characteristic to "our" place and was brought/imposed/imported here.

[3]   These factors are not to be thought in a functionalist way as causes that add up mechanically in order to create a new social reality. Rather, I speak of them as contact points between complicated social processes that are simultaneously cultural, religious, political, ideological etc.

[4]   The first mention of Martin Luther occur in a letter from 9 March 1524 from Lajos II, King of Hungary, to the Hermannstadt (now Sibiu, Romania) town council (Keul 2009:47).

[5]   For a history of confessional diversity in the principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania see Istvan Keul, *Early modern religious communities in East-Central Europe ethnic diversity, denominational plurality, and corporative politics in the principality of Transylvania, 1526-1691.*

[6]   A bibliography of heresies in the Russian Church is beyond the scope of this work, however there are several excellent works on the subject. See Никольский, Н. М. История русской церкви (The History of the Russian Church), 1931; Клибанов А.И. (ed) Русское православие: вехи истории (1989);

[7]   At that time religious services in the Russian Empire, Bessarabia included, were conducted only in Russian.

[8]   The name Stundists comes from the fact that the members of the community gathered in their houses in order to discuss and read the Bible during the special hours (germ. *Stunde*) after the church service.

[9]   Reports such as International Religious Freedom Report elaborated by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor of the US State Department talk about formal and informal restrictions that Baptists but also other religious groups encounter in Moldova.

[10]   Religion and religiosity are considered to be different concepts that explain different social realities. I embrace Olivier Roy's taxonomy: *religiosity* (self-formulation and self-expression of a personal faith) and *religion* (a coherent corpus of beliefs and dogmas collectively managed by a body of legitimate

holders of knowledge). See Roy, Olivier. 2004. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. Columbia University Press, pp. 5-6

11   http://wthrockmorton.com/2011/03/14/scott-lively-goes-nuclear-in-moldova/
12   http://www.rferl.org/content/gay_rights_take_center_stage_in_moldova/2337579.html
13   http://www.abpnews.com/content/view/2537/117/
14   http://www.rferl.org/content/gay_rights_take_center_stage_in_moldova/2337579.html
15   *Ibidem.*
16   One of the many articles on moldovacrestina.md, a website maintained by Pastor Vasile Filat with the goal of providing guidance to Baptists in a variety of areas (personal life, popular culture, religion, politics) engages critically the curriculum for…Romanian literature. Some believers have had issues with the excessive use of curse words and dirty language by some contemporary writers (see http://moldovacrestina.md/Raspunsuri-din-Biblie/mama-nu-permite-copilului-sa-faca-temele.html).
17   Casanova (1994) describes the process through which evangelicals in the US have evolved from total isolation from the cultural/political life of the country in the 1920s, after the Scopes trial, to full engagement and active participation in politics in the 1980s. American missionaries that came to Moldova were part of this new generation of active evangelicals.
18   Scrisoarea bisericii "Buna Vestire" adresată Ministrului Educației cu privire la modificările în manualele școlare privind teoria evoluționistă http://moldovacrestina.md/social/scrisoare-mininster-educatie-modificari-manuale-evolutie/

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Forty Turkish menkabes, Tarpan, Simferopol, 2015

IDENTITY, MEMORY, PLACE, NARRATIVE: THE CASE OF CRIMEAN TATARS

Abstract

Crimean Tatar ethnical identity was investigated in the context of their attachment to different places such as Crimea, Turkey, and Romania. Mythologization of these places was detected. The fact of losing and restoring their ethnic identity throughout time, which depends on political and historical circumstances, was surveyed. The study of identity of Crimean Tatars helped to understand the characteristics of their folklore in emigration. The religious character of Crimean Tatar folklore in Romania was discovered. Double ethnic identities in the Crimean Tatar case were found. The concept of *the others* in the construction of ethnic identity was analyzed using the Romanian folklore material.

Keywords: ethnic/national identity, Crimean Tatars, homeland, legends, we-the others dichotomy

Introduction

This research is a part of the ongoing anthropological investigation of Crimean Tatar folk legends which has been carried out by the author during the past ten years (2004-present). A folk legend is an oral folk narrative about real events, these events are very important for people, and they are mythologized, by this way an element of the miracle appears in legends. A legend has to be connected with real historical events, historical people or geographical places. Therefore legends are good material for studying of cultural identities.

During the author's M.A. and Ph.D. researches, the whole published Crimean legends were investigated. The previous post-doctoral research covers Crimean Tatar folklore in Turkey. The present post-doctoral project

is about Crimean Tatar legends in Romania. The state of the research in the field should be explained.

As far as the Crimean and Turkish material has been studied, it is urgent to carry on the same research in Romania. Today, approximately 250,000 Crimean Tatars live in Crimea, it is 12% of Crimean population,[1] and about 200,000 Crimean Tatars remain in Central Asia, mainly in Uzbekistan. In Romania in the Dobrogea region, there are more than 20,000 Crimean Tatars.[2] It is realistic to say that there are approximately 5 million Crimean Tatars-origin people who are living in Turkey.[3] The research is combining Crimean, Turkish and Romanian folklore material, leaving Crimean Tatar folklore tradition in Central Asia for future research. The paper is based on analyzes of mostly published text which were found in Crimea, Turkey and Romania libraries. The concept of "homeland" (namely Crimea) is very strong among the Crimean Tatars.[4] In the present research, more proofs of the fact are found in Crimean Tatar legends where the value of love for Crimea is the most important and constant.

The aim of the previous post-doctoral research was to find legend material in Turkey. Only some Crimean Tatar legends were found. However the texts are republished legends before the Second World War. Other genres of Crimean Tatar folklore are presented in variety in Turkey. It is important to analyze why Crimean Tatar legends were not preserved in Turkey.

There are many characteristics which define a national/ethnic/cultural identity, such as language, education, literature, mass media et cetera. Folklore of a certain group is among them and it is among important criteria. In the article, the emphasis is, put on Crimean Tatars' legendary due to the fact that legend generally has connection with particular geographical places. This introduces new interrelation of collective memory, ethnic identity and place.

It is important to explain why the Crimean Tatar case is chosen. Crimean Tatars passed through many waves of emigration and one deportation. Being moved to different places, Crimean Tatars have new and old homelands at the same time. A host country all the time tries to change an identity of ethnic minorities. The main aim of the article is to check is this happening in Crimean Tatar's case? The novelty of the present research is the fact that ethnic identities of Crimean Tatars have been never studied in a comparison of Crimea, Turkey, Romanian material spatially using their folklore as material.

In order to understand the issue properly, the first part of the paper gives a brief historical background of Crimean Tatars. The second part is about Crimean Tatar national/ethnic identity. At the end of the article, the analysis of Crimean Tatar folklore narratives is made. The results of the research are given in the article's conclusion.

A brief History of the Crimean Tatars

The Crimean Tatars (*Qırımtatar*) are one of Turkic ethnic groups which came into Crimea in the beginning of the thirteenth century. The Crimean Tatars are Hanafi-Sunni Muslims. Linguistically and ethnically Crimean Tatars are Turks. There are three sub-ethnic groups among Crimean Tatars – *Noğais*, who lived in the northern Crimean plains, *Tats*, who lived in the southern mountains and *Yalıboyus,* who lived in the coast of the peninsula. These ethnic groups succeeded in establishing their independent state (the Crimean Khanate) in 1441. Ottoman Empire invaded Crimea and the annexed cities in South coast in 1475. The Crimean Khanate came under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, the Tats and the Yalıboyus, who were living in the southern coast, were mixed with Turkish people. Their culture was transformed under Turkish influence and now it is very close to Turkish culture.

The Crimean Tatar Khanate existed more than three hundred years (1440-1783) until Tsarina Catherine the Great made Crimea part of the Russian Empire. "The Crimean Tatars were transformed into a politically passive community of peasants and began to abandon their ancestral lands in an extraordinary series of migrations to the lands of their traditional suzerain/allies and coreligionists, the Ottoman Turks."[5] There is an opinion that the emigration of Crimean Tatars had forced character.[6]

The reasons for the migrations were both cultural and economic. First of all, cultural-religious differences between the Orthodox Russians and the Muslim Tatars. Crimean Tatars were afraid they would not be able to live their life as Muslims. There was fear of forced Christianizaton.[7] The second reason was economical, namely losing their lands and increasing land taxes. In addition, there were rumors about Turkey who was giving free good lands for emigrants. It was allegedly written in some letters sent from Turkey to Tatars by their families who emigrated earlier.

This verse was recorded among emigrants to Turkey:

"*Mezarımız ğavur toprağında kalmasın,*
Kızlarımız dinsizge bike bolmasın,
Ullarımız ğavurğa asker bolmasın"

Which means: our graves should not be left in unfaithful lands; our daughters should not marry godless men, our sons should not be in an unfaithful army.[8]

The first emigration started after ending the Russo-Turkish War of 1787–1792 and the signing of the Treaty of Jassy between Russian and Ottoman Empires in 1792, which confirmed Russia's dominance in the Black sea region. Approximately 60,000 Crimean Tatars immigrated to Turkey that time.[9]

During the Russo-Turkish War (1806–1812) the Russian Empire was afraid of some sabotage because the Tatars were always loyal to the Ottomans. Tatars were moved from the coast to the North of Crimea and there were even plans to move them to Siberia.[10] These rumors also caused big waves of immigrations. As a result of them only 1/3 of the population of Crimean Tatar stayed in Crimea.[11]

The next wave began directly after the Crimean War in 1856-1861 this time 180,000 Crimean Tatars moved to Anatolia,[12] 30,000-40,000 of the number to Dobrogea which was a part of the Ottoman Empire at that time.[13] The emigration was quite tragic and went through the hard circumstances, thus many Tatars died of diseases and drowned in the Black Sea. The second post-Crimean War migrations happened in 1874 and 1891-1902, and were caused by "rumors concerning the pending Tsarist repression of Islam and the Muslim way of life."[14] By the time of World War I Tatars in Crimea numbered 25% of the Crimean population when Russians were 50% and the other ethnic groups were 25%.[15]

Repressions and Migrations of the First Years of Soviet Union

After the Great October Socialist Revolution, Crimean Tatars got a chance to create their own independent state. Unfortunately, it had a short life **(1917-1918)**. In spite of this in the first years of the Soviet regime, the Crimean Tatars had preferential treatment. The **1920s** were the Golden age for all Soviet nations due to the so-called politics of *korenizatiia* when many state institutions work on the development of the ethnic languages, non-religious national traditions, history, and folklore. Thus, the Soviet Union policy aimed to develop and revived the culture of Crimean Tatar.

In 1921, the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was found. It could not be the republic of Crimean Tatars, because Crimean Tatars became a minority in the peninsula, but they certainly were a privileged native nationality. For example, the Crimean Tatar language (in addition to Russian) became the national language of Crimea.

Nevertheless, it did not last long:

> By 1927, the Soviet regime had, however, finally established a firm central authority throughout the USSR and new Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, saw the burgeoning national identities in the Union's various ethno-administrative territories as a centrifugal threat to his long-term objective of creating a unified Soviet *Rodina* (in Russian, Motherland) in which the various nationalities were to undergo *sliianie* (literally, "merging" but, in fact, Russification).[16]

The 1930s in Soviet Union history are known as the Great Purges or Stalin's repression. At this time, national newspapers, magazines, literature, folklore were forbidden, shut up and destroyed. Stalin made an effort to create so-called *Homo-Sovieticus*, but in these years the Crimean Tatars "developed greater emotional attachment to their Crimea Vatan/ASSR than the larger Soviet Rodina." "This tendency was exacerbated in the Crimea (and elsewhere) by Stalin's ill treatment of national groups during the 1930s. The Soviet Center had killed or deported as many as 40,000 of the Crimean Tatars' newly formed intellectual and political."[17]

Before the Russian annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars were 80% of the total Crimean population. During different migration periods and repressions, approximately 1.8 million Crimean Tatars moved to the Ottoman Empire what reduced per cent of Crimean Tatars by 21% before their deportation.[18]

After World War II the politic of the Communist party was aimed at the destruction of the Crimean Tatar nation and Slavization of Crimea. The slogan "Crimea without Crimean Tatars" appeared. The Crimean Tatars had been accused of treason and cooperation with the Nazi army, and then in 1944 the whole Crimean Tatar population was deported from the Crimea to Siberia and Central Asia, mostly to Uzbekistan. Many did not survive and died on their way to the place of their exile, where many more died of various diseases: 110,000 out of a total of 238,500.[19] Moreover the immigrants received a cool welcome from their host soviet republics. To create a strong Soviet identity the state needed to find *the Others.*

For the rest of Soviet time Crimean Tatars were labeled as "enemies of soviet nation." This was the reason why Crimean Tatars lived all the time together and never mixed with other Turk ethnic groups such as Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens et cetera.

Stalin tried to erase more than five hundred years of Tatars presence in the Crimean peninsula. Russian and Ukrainian colonists were sent to live in Crimea. Crimean Tatar material culture was mostly destroyed, many mosques, graves, turbehs were ruined. The whole Crimean Tatars toponyms were replaced with Russian names. Crimean Tatar Literature was forbidden. Crimean Tatar history and folklore was re-written, in the new version, Tatars were shown as robbers and occupants of Crimea. By this way many examples of folklore were lost. This is why it is so important to study Turkish and Romanian material.

The repressions went on until Khrushchev's times when totalitarian regime was reduced. In 1954, Crimea was connected to Ukraine. In 1957, many ethnic groups who had been deported in Stalin's time were found not guilty and got opportunity to come back home, every ethnic group but Crimean Tatars. In 1967, Crimean Tatars were found not guilty but did not get permission to come back to Crimea. This was a time when the Crimean Tatar National Movement started. In 1968, the department of Crimean Tatar literature and language was open at the Tashkent Pedagogical Institute.[20] This was reason for publishing books of Crimean Tatar folklore in the exile in native language. Mostly fairy tales were published.[21]

When Gorbachev came to power and politics of *Glasnost* started, Crimean Tatars rehabilitation and homecoming became possible. National morale of Crimean Tatars by this time was extremely high. They got as a charismatic leader, Mustafa Dzhemilev. They organized various demonstrations, wrote open letters, and did everything to come back to Crimea. Thus, in 1987 in the Red Square, there was demonstration with slogans "Motherland or death".[22]

Crimean Tatars were approximately fifty years in their exile until "the Supreme Soviet's decision of 1989 regarding the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars to their homeland caused a large-scale return migration of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea".[23] These migrations continued until 1991, and by this time about 120,000 Tatars were living in their homeland when about the total population of Crimean Tatars in Central Asia was 500,000.[24]

In 1991, Crimea became an independent Republic which was subordinated to Ukraine. Crimean Tatars established their own executive-representative semi-official body, namely Mejilis with Mustafa Dzhemilev

as its leader. Crimean Tatars national flag, hymn, and other national symbols of 1917 were renovated. This provides the ability to restore the Crimean Tatar language, to found new religious organizations, to open school, to start publish national newspapers and broadcast TV programs. However, relationships between Tatars and other ethnic groups in Crimea have been very tense since Tatars' returning home.

Ukraine has never been an empire. The state was tolerant to national and ethnic identity of Crimean Tatars. Crimea had been part of Ukraine until 2014 when Crimea again became a part of Russia. The only Crimean Tatar TV channel "ATR" was forced to shut down after failing to register under Russian law in 1 April 2015.

Turkey as a Host Country

The Tatars "felt obligated to immigrate to the Ottoman Empire as *muhajirs* (those who migrate to Islamic lands from the lands of unbelievers to preserve their religious beliefs)."[25] The reasons why the Ottoman Empire was chosen for the migration are the following. First of all, both the Crimean Tatars and the Ottomans were Sunni Muslims. Besides the Crimean Tatar Khanate and the Ottoman Empire historically had close connections, especially after the 1700s when the Tatar state directly came under the control of the Ottomans.

Crimean Tatars settled the cities around the whole Ottoman Empire such as Edirne, Tekirdağ, Bursa, Eskişehir, Ankara, Istanbul, Konya, Balıkesir, Çorum, Kütahya, Adana. At first Crimean Tatars got a cold welcome from locals because they had to share their lands with new comers. However, common traditions and similar languages helped in closer relationship.[26]

The important event in the history of the Ottoman Empire, which influenced Crimean Tatars, was establishing the Turkish Republic in 1923. The first president and founder of the Republic, Kemal Atatürk, realizing the multi-ethnic character of the Ottoman Empire, had to "unite the Turkish nation on its territory that was far from homogenous."[27] "The government policy throughout the life of the Republic has aimed at the homogenization of the population of Turkey based on Turkish culture and linguistic coordinates. The main tools in this process were education and the press."[28] The whole ethnic groups in Turkey were under influence of all-inclusive Turkish identity.

It is possible to say that Crimean Tatars experienced certain pressure from the Turkish state. Crimean Tatar organizations were forbidden, the state warned to use the name "*Turk*" and not "*Tatar*," by this way the term "*Crimean Turk*" came to existence. Thus, Crimean Tatars have been Turkified and retain only a passive identification with their former homeland.[29] Even the Young Turks, who were the most politically active Crimean Tatar intellectual group, accepted Pan-Turkic ethnicity.[30]

The changed of politics started after the collapse of the Soviet Union when other Turk ethnic groups such as Uzbeks, Tatars, Kazaks attracted attention. The 1990s Turkey has changed its position on the ethnic issue and then Crimean Tatar organizations began to prosper. This was a time for revoking of Crimean Tatar identity. However, urbanization and intermarriages have been challenges for reducing ethnic identity.[31] Thus, according to Hakan Kırımlı, Crimean Tatars in Turkey were partially assimilated and became hybrid, ethnically and culturally.

However, in spite of the tragic circumstances of the migrations of Crimean Tatars to Turkey and politics of Turkification in the period of formation of Turkish Republic, they "managed to preserve some of their culture (songs, literature, newspapers) but largely assimilated with the surrounding Turkish population over the next two generations."[32] Whereas, Crimean Tatars in Romania have been surrounded by Christians have been not assimilated and have kept their identity on a religious rather than a national basis.[33]

Romania as a Host Country

The earliest Tatar existence in Dobrogea was recorded in the thirteenth century.[34] It is interesting, that at the same time Crimean Tatars were enemies for their Romanian neighbors which had been living under the fear of their raids for a long period of time.[35] From the fifteenth century Dobrogea had been the part of the Ottoman Empire. In Dobrogea, two ethnic groups (Tatars and Turks) have lived together since. Both groups blended with each other. Thus, the term "*Turko-Tatar*" is usually used to describe the community.[36]

However, constant wars between the Ottoman and the Russian Empires in the end of the eighteenth century were largely fought in Dobrogea. By the way in the beginning of the nineteenth century Dobrogea became depopulated. The Ottoman government needed to find potential

immigrants to settle in Dobrogea. Tax-free lands, religious and cultural rights were advertised in European newspapers by the Ottoman Empire.[37] As long as the Russian Empire encouraged Crimean Tatars emigration,[38] the Ottoman Empire assisted with their resettlement.

The most active emigration started after the Crimean War (1853-1856). Crimean Tatars settled mostly in the provinces of Constanta and Tulcea, but also outside Dobrogea: in the towns Braila, Cluj, Craiova, Drobeta-Turnu Severin, Iasi, Orsova, Slatina, Timisoara.[39] The emigration stopped in 1878 when Dobrogea became a part of Romania according to the Berlin treaty.[40] Thenadays, Turks, Tatars and Bulgarians were the majority in Dobrogea.[41]

The Romanian state offered equal rights to all citizens[42] by this way the Crimean Tatars cultural identity was preserved. Tatars in Dobrogea were mostly from intellectuals. The important role in preserving of their cultural identity played Tatar Mass Media, namely *Emel*[43] magazine (1930-1941). On the magazine's pages, there were publications about Crimean Tatar literature, history and what is more important for the present research Crimean Tatar folklore. The World War II ended the work, and the magazine has continued its life in Turkey from 1960 till now.

Dobrogea several times changed hands between Romania and Bulgaria in the beginning of the twentieth century. The factor forced many Tatars to emigrate to Turkey, as part of *hijra* (migration from unfaithful lands to a Muslim country).[44] Moreover, the Romanian state made an attempt to settle Romanian population in Dobrogea. By the 1930 there were 22,000 Tatars in Dobrogea and by the end of the World War II both Turks and Tatars formed 28,000.

In 1947 the People's Republic of Romania was declared. The Communist regime stopped emigration of Crimean Tatars to Turkey because unfriendly relations between two states. In the 1950s Romanizing of Tatars and Turks started, but was quite mild in comparison to the Soviet Union. For example, publications in the Crimean Tatar language were not forbidden. National education was available too, but only in primary school. Before the Communism the education of Crimean Tatars was in Turkish, after books in Kazan-Tatar were imported from the Soviet Union.[45] In spite of isolation from Turkey, Turk-language education survived.[46] During the Soviet period of history in Romania, there were ant-religious propaganda and some restrictions on Islam, but religion was not totally forbidden.[47] However the Communist regime led to homogenization process and assimilation of the Crimean Tatar population.[48]

Crimean Tatar National/Ethnic Identity

Crimean Tatar national/ethnic identity has been studied by many scholars. These are separate investigations of identity of different groups of Crimea Tatars those who migrate to Turkey and Romania and those who was deported to Central Asia. However, there is no research which combines three groups together (two voluntary and one forced migration). The comparison could give interesting material for further researches. Initial trial is going to be done in the present article, using the previous works on national/ethnic identities of Crimean Tatars.

It is important to define some notions which are important for the study. Defining **national identity**, it is possible to say that it is a sense of belonging to one's state/nation. The identity is based on common symbols, language, history, territory, culture, and so on.

It is necessary to distinguish the concepts of national and ethnic identities. National identity is a broader concept. **An ethnic group** is a community which shares common values, ancestry, religion, language, rituals, characteristics which are different from other ethnic groups. It is possible to say that the feeling of differences from the others is the most important characteristic for both national and ethnic identities. In the case when an ethnic group is living in a state which official religion is different from its own, *religious identity* could be distinguished.

Dr. Ismail Aydıngün and Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün introduced the notion of *cultural identity*. They suggested that the cultural identity has hybrid character. The researchers analyze how different cultures and state politics shaping ethnic and cultural identities. They proofed that it is easier to analyze the Crimean Tatar case from this perspective.[49] Dr. Ismail Aydıngün and Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün criticized the fact that national and cultural identities are used as synonymous. A cultural change, for example, disappearance of certain traditions or language loss, does not necessarily mean loss of ethnic or national identity, because self-consciousness of a group may continue to exist.[50] Ethnic boundaries are more important than cultural content.[51] Thus, the total loss of culture may still preserve its ethnic and national consciousness. In the case, a group may reconstruct itself symbolically and generally its leaders and intellectuals become leaders of such cultural revival projects.

In the case of Crimean Tatars, a notion of *diaspore* must be defined as well. It is a migrant community which settled outside their natal

territories, but maintains strong collective identities and sometimes feeling of connection with the ex-homeland.

Symbolic ethnicity has connection with the previous notion. It is H. Gans's term, he explained it: "Members of a group may have nostalgic feelings towards their culture and homeland, or they may be proud of their traditions and love them, without necessarily living them in their daily lives. This is a 'state of mind', one that is defined as 'symbolic ethnicity'."[52]

In the case of Crimean Tatars we have an interesting phenomenon. Crimean Tatars during the three-century existence of the Crimean Khanate, firstly as an independent state, then as a subordinate state to the Ottoman Empire, did not form the national identity; most probably due to the fact that the eighteenth century was not the time for national identities. Crimean Tatars at that time had just strong connection to their land and religion.

After the Crimean Tatar state was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1783, Crimean Tatars started to feel strong a national identity which also included a sense of belonging to the Islamic world. Thus, in case of Crimean Tatars two types of identification could be marked out: macro and micro identifications (connection with Islam and Crimea), because "a community can have a strong national identity without being a politically recognized nation and without possessing a state, as in the case of the Crimean Tatar."[53]

The emigrations of Crimean Tatar to Turkey and Romania led to a crisis of identity among the Tatars who stayed in Crimea. After less than one hundred years of Russian rule and "the Crimean Tatars were a culturally, economically and politically impoverished people with almost no sense of political identity."[54] Alan Fisher noted that "only a sense of traditional religious identity remains intact".[55] The same effect happened among Romanian Tatars after connection of Dobruja to the Orthodox Romania.[56] It is possible to conclude that religious identity is the most constant by the reason of its meta-character.

However, after the 1870s, young Crimean Tatar elite who was studying abroad, and was influenced by nationalism and socialism, which were so popular that time, organized Crimean Tatar National movement which was headed by Ismail Gaspıralı. Edited by him newspaper "*Tercüman*" ("Translator") became the cultural source for the whole Turkish speaking audience. These new movements helped in the redefining of Crimean Tatars identity.[57] When in 1917 the Crimean independent state had declared, the most important national symbols were created (flag, anthem, oath, martyrs).[58]

The deportation of Crimean Tatars had an aim to erase their national identity. "The Kremlin had erased this nation of 'traitors' from the USSR's ethnic map and it became apparent that the unique Crimean Tatar ethnic identity had been slated for total eradication. Scattered across thousands of miles throughout six Soviet republics with no institutions to maintain their national identity (the Crimean Tatars had no newspapers in their language, no schooling in Tatar etc.)."[59] It seemed there was no way to restore the identity of the nation.

The important role in the revival of Crimean Tatars' national identity was played by Mustafa Dzhemilev, who had a Mandela-like status among Crimean Tatars in Central Asia, and they gave him the honorary title *Kırımoğlu* ("son of Crimea") for his sacrifices made in the name of his people. He spent fifteen years in prisons and labor camps, making personal sacrifices to bring Crimean Tatars to their ancestral land.

One more factor which helped to save ethnic identity of Crimean Tatars was the fact living of Crimean Tatars as a closed community which strongly differentiated itself from the other ethnic groups in Central Asia. Crimean Tatars always felt guest in Central Asia.[60] Mixed marriages were forbidden even with Turk ethnic groups such as Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tajiks.

Different situation was for the Crimean Tatars who immigrated to the Ottoman Empire. Mixed marriages were a problem at first, but after all they were accepted, by this way assimilation and losing of their ethnic/national identity began. The loss could also be explained by their strong Islamic identification.[61] It is possible to say that now Crimean Tatars in Turkey have a Turkish national identity and Crimean Tatar ethnic identity.

The most interesting case of Crimean Tatar identity is in Romania. Romanian Tatars changed "the focus of their identity from the traditional religious community approach to the ethnic community approach, the latter marked by a sense of national identity and strong attachment to their motherland Crimea."[62] At the same time they have a Romanian national identity. For example, the Romanian government generally privilege Tatars over Turks because Tatars look at themselves primarily as Romanian citizens, and only secondary as Crimean Tatars. Turks, on the other hand, identify themselves more with Turkey than with Romania.

Multiple identities are the mixture of two or more different identities, for example Turkish-Tatar identity in Romania. The Soviet Union aimed to merge the whole nations into one soviet nation, and soviet identity had actually become meta-identity for every ethnic group who was living in the Soviet Union. Crimean Tatars managed to preserve their ethnic identity

under broader soviet identity. **Subordinate identity** is national and ethnic identities together. The good example is Turkey, which has many *millets* (ethnic groups) under one Turkish nation.

It is possible to say that identity of Crimean Tatars in Romania is the most complicated and composed of many elements. There are many reasons of the plurality. First of all, the Tatars who immigrated to Romania in the end of the nineteenth century were afraid of their identity because of mythologization and demonologization Tatars in Middle Ages. It was safer to belong to general Muslim or Turkish identity. Choosing the Turkish identity had also material reasons. Turkey supported Crimean Tatars in Romania economically, assisted with national education and cultural development.[63] The Turkification was easy due to the original orientation towards Turkey: common religion, shared customs, belonging to the same Turk culture. Mixed marriages between Turks and Tatars were not forbidden and of course children from such couples also choose a Turkish-Tatar identity.

Nadir Devlet wrote that the tendency is common for all Tatars, to pick a mega identity in a place of micro identity.[64] The term *Crimean Tatar* got an official status in the first years of the Soviet Union.[65] In their deportation Crimean Tatars lost the word *Crimean* in their name.[66] Generally the most sensitive for the specification "Crimean" are only Tatars from Crimea, not Kazan Tatars or Siberia Tatars. However, in Romania, the Tatars have less expressed ethnic identity, using mostly Turkish language, prefer to call themselves as "Dobrogea Tatars" or "Romanian Turks."[67] In Turkey Crimean Tatar are generally called Crimean Turks (*Kırım Türkleri*) and their language is called Crimean Turkish (*Kırım Türkçesi*) because everyone in Turkey who was living in Anatolia was called Turk.[68]

In this case, religion is also very important factor of the duality. Crimean Tatars are related to so-called **faith-based** collective identities. Islamic religion in Romania had been under formal protection Şeyhülislam (based in Turkey) until the foundation of the Turkish republic when the whole religious institutions were closed down. In spite of this, Tatar organizations continued to have religious character and their religious identity was stronger than their ethnic identity in inter-war Dobrogea.[69]

Fifty years of communism regime in Romania worsened the situation with Crimean Tatar ethnic identity, because Tatars were afraid of associating with the 'forbidden Crimea' and repression of the NKVD.[70] There were certain difficulties for religious identity, but not like in the USSR where religion was forbidden. Romanian Tatars kept their religious identity. It should be noted that there was no such a problem in Turkey.

The opportunity to rediscover their ethnic identity was given for the Crimean Tatars in the Post-communist period. In early 1990s Tatars and Turks split by political reasons. The conflict was sparked by the discussion about the assignment of the next Mufti. The separation led to return to their own Crimean Tatar identity and revision of ethnic values in spite of the dominance in Turkish orientation.[71] The twenty-first century is characterized by urbanization and strong secularization which are challenges for religious and ethnic identities.

As a result of this loss/preservation of national identities, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the whole Crimean Tatars from Central Asia, Turkey and Romania had the opportunity to come back to Crimea, but only the Crimean Tatars from Central Asia came back. The reason why the other Tatars did not come back could be explained by many factors such as absence of the real Crimean Tatar state, Russian subordination, losing connections to the historical roots, differences in languages, culture and economical situations. What was different for Crimean Tatars who were living in Central Asia? They were always ready to come back to Crimea. There were some sad examples such as couples did not marry, waiting for their wedding in Crimea.[72] It could be explained by some practical reasons. In this case the theory of forced and voluntary migrations could be used. In spite of the pressure of the Russian Empire, the Tatars who emigrated to Turkey and Romania, did this voluntarily it was their decision. In the case of the deportation, violence was involved. Deportation was proposed as collective punishment which bound Crimean Tatars.

Greta Lynn Uehling in her book *Beyond Memory,* analyzing the reasons of Crimean Tatars' return, suggested that the trauma of the events helps in the integration of the nation. They were mobilized by sharing their collective memory from the tragic experience and building solidarity. One more proof of the theory is the H. Kırımlı's statement about Crimean Tatars who emigrate to Turkey the twentieth century were emigrants, whereas after twentieth century were émigrés, exactly the latter inspired national thoughts among other Tatars.[73]

It should be mentioned that oral narratives about the tragic events could be a subject for separate investigation of the relationship between collective memory and certain places. The first attempt was made by G. Uehling who used multigenerational interviews to analyze feelings and memories of Crimean Tatars in relation with political, social, and geographical space.

Folklore as Material for the Analysis of Construction of Ethnic/National Identities

This paper refers to J. Assmann and Y. Lotman's definitions of cultural memory. According to J. Assmann, cultural memory is a continuous process, in which every culture shape and stabilizes its identity via reconstruction of its own past. On the other hand, Y. Lotman, described it through the definition of culture: culture is cultural memory, a supraindividual mechanism of maintaining and transmitting texts and creating new ones. Combining these two definitions, a new one was suggested in the present article: cultural memory is a myth-making process of a certain nation for the construction of its identity. The analysis of Crimean Tatars legends can give current data about the ways of construction of their national identity.

Construction of an ethnic identity is closely associated with emotions. Therefore, the conceptual and the categorical apparatus of a national identity includes notions "*national pride*" and "*nostalgia.*" These concepts appeared in interaction with another ethnic group in crucial moments of their lives. These could be wars, foundations of new countries, migrations, deportations etc. These events stimulated creation of new mythological texts. Extremely productive is studying narratives from different nations which live in one cultural space.

There are following genres in Crimean Tatar folklore: epic poem (*destan*), fairy tale, legend, anecdote, folk song, humorous rhyme (*çın and mani*), proverb and saying. It is interesting that Crimean Tatar folklore does not have folk tales.

Epic poems in Crimean Tatar culture could be prose or poetic narratives about heroic or romantic events in the remote past. The most popular epic narratives are *Qoplandı Batır, Edige, Çorabatır, Köroğlu.* Heroes of the poems generally are shared by the whole Turkic ethnic groups; this is why they are not suitable material for the present research. Fairy tales of any nations have no connection to any historical events, and they could not be used for the analysis of cultural memory and ethnic identity.

Legends, on the other hand, are oral folk narratives about real historical events, historical people or geographical places, which are very important for the society in which they are told. This leads to mythologization of the events and people. Thus, a miracle and a value are important elements of legends. It has to be mentioned that the more significant is the value in a legend, the more incredible is the corresponding miracle. This statement was used as a method for analysis in our previous articles and in two

books. It will be used in the present article as well. To sum up, legends, as short narratives about the resent past, could be good material for studying collective memory and identity among prose narratives in the Crimean Tatar folklore.

Small forms of folklore, such as humorous rhyme, proverb and saying, do not have a plot and cannot be used for the analysis. Crimean Tatars anecdotes have common Turkic hero Nasreddin Hodja and do not have stories about resent past. It should be noted that some part of folk songs are about historical events or love for homeland, but the fact that they are in verse make them less flexible and changeable to compare with legends. Thereby, the focus of the present research is Crimean Tatars legends.

Tatar Folklore in Crimea: Short Characteristic

Crimean folklore is poorly researched and remained unknown both to Ukrainian and foreign specialists. Crimean Tatar folklore was collected in the period between the end of the nineteenth and the middle of the twentieth century's mostly by unprofessional collectors such as V.H. Kondaraki, N.A. Marx, S.S. Krım, A.K. Konchevskiy, and M.G. Kustova. A few collections of folklore were published, but their scientific level does not meet current anthropological criteria due to the obvious editing of the texts by their collectors and rough handling of references. There were some scientific expeditions organized by the museum of the Bakhchisaray Palace (1925) and Vorontsov Palace in Alupka (1935) in the beginning of the twentieth century in Crimea. Unfortunately, the Stalin's repression of ethnic minorities started shortly after the expeditions, this fact blocked the publication of its materials. The folklore of the post-deportation period in Crimea was considerably edited, national and ethnical features such as national heroes, folk rites and customs were erased, Crimean Tatars were described as enemies in their own folklore. After deportation and returning home, Crimean Tatar cultural traditions were mostly lost. Thus, organized by the Crimean Art Museum and the Research Centre of the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University field work on Crimean Tatar culture did not detect any pattern of folk narratives among Crimean Tatars in Crimea in 2007-2008 years. Crimean Tatars started to forget their folklore and it became harder and harder to collect it.[74]

To sum up, Crimean Tatars had rich folklore and culture, but it was mainly lost due to migrations and deportation. This is why it was necessary

to check the Turkish and Romanian material for traces of Crimean Tatar folklore. The first waves of immigrations (1792-1902) of Tatars from Crimea to Turkey and Romania are the most important for the present research, because they cover the end of the eighteenth and the whole nineteenth century. The migrations were voluntary in contrast with forced deportation in 1944. This makes Turkey and Romania perfect field for examination of examples of Crimean Tatar folklore. Turkey and Romania are good places for collecting Crimean Tatar legends also due to less oppression from the states like it was in Soviet Russia. The Crimean Tatar folklore in Turkey and Romania is going to be analyzed in the context of losing or preserving of national/ethnic identity. The folklore in the exile period was not studied properly. Hopefully this will be the subject for the future research.

Crimean Tatar Folklore in Turkey

Is it possible to create new folklore in emigration? Or the most important is to save at least what was created before? Folklore generally is about something that is important for people. Nostalgia, homesickness and sadness of impossibility to come back are the adequate subjects of emigrant folklore.

As it could be seen from the history of Crimean Tatar, there were two critical challenges for Crimean Tatars national/ethnic identity: the annexation of Crimea by Russian Empire (1783) and the deportation of Crimean Tatars (1944). Some part of Crimean Tatar migrated to the Ottoman Empire (Turkey and Dobrogea) and the anther was forced to move to Central Asia. Both groups of Crimean Tatars lost their homeland. The collections of Crimean Tatar folklore in Crimea were made mostly between these two crucial events. Thus, the motif of losing and missing the homeland, namely Crimea, is constant in many folk narratives that was created in Crimea and then was kept in emigration period.

It should be mentioned that there have not been any field work on Crimean Tatar folklore in Turkey. One attempt was made by Zühal Yüksel, but her aim was to record samples of the Crimean Tatar dialect. She did her research in one district in Turkey, in Polatlı.[75]

Thus, there is no collection of Crimean Tatar folklore that was published in Turkey. However, there are three Crimean Tatars legends which are still circulating among Crimean Tatars such as "Arzı Kız," "Altın Beşık," "Ayuv dağ." Besides their symbolic meaning and description of Crimea

as the most beautiful place in the world, there is a practical reason for the popularity. These are the only legends that were published in Crimea, both in Russian and Crimean Tatar languages.

In the Crimean legend "Arzı kız," the beautiful girl Arzı was kidnapped from her village Mishor shortly before her wedding. She was sold to the harem of a Turkish Sultan. In spite of her rich life in Istanbul, homesickness made her deeply unhappy. Even giving birth to a boy did not make the situation better. She took her son and threw herself from a tower to the Black Sea. The inhabitants of her village started to notice that the girl with her child went out of the sea and spent some time near her favorite fountain every year. Thus, Arzı chose her homeland over her life and the life of her child.

In the contexts, another Crimean Tatar legend "Aziz" should be mentioned. It was published in revolutionary time in Crimea in one of scientific journals. This was the reason why it did not become popular, but time of collection, 1918, reflects Crimean Tatars' public mood at that time. According to the legend, a centenarian made a hajj. He was asked to stay in Mecca, to live in the holy place and to serve Allah, but he remembered his homeland, garden and nut wood and decided come back. On his way home, the man was killed by Arabs, but before he died, he asked God to be buried in Crimea and he heard a voice promising him that. When the Arab cut his head, the old man took it under his arm and walked from Mecca to the Crimea. People from his village noticed a grave near his nut wood and saw a green light there, and they understood that this was the grave of *Aziz* ("saint"). Strong love for native land, the desire of living in Crimea (even though it was not possible), and mythological thinking constituted an unbelievable miracle – the dead man came back to Crimea. In both legends, mythological thinking tries to highlight the value of love for Crimea by using fantastic miracle "dead person returns to home" as a vehicle.

The legend about Auv-Dağ has different way to express love for Crimea. It has poetical and romantic descriptions of Crimean nature trying to say that the Crimea is the most beautiful place in the world. When residents of the Crimea read these lines far from their home, they could have a deep feeling of nostalgia. C. Lévi-Strauss mentioned a similar example of the Aranda myth-telling process. Aranda tribes narrated legends about the place where their ancestor was born with tears and deep feeling of love for the places.[76]

The legend about Auv-Dağ runs as follows, in old times when people of Crimea became very sinful, God sent to Crimea one giant bear to

destroy the villages of those sinners. The bear destroyed everything on his way until he reached the beautiful Partenit valley. He stopped to admire the scenery: "beautiful hills, magnificent gardens, fragrance of flowers, succulent grass, and heavy bunch of grapes, - our lovely Partenit valley." The bear looked at incomparable beauty and riches of the valley and he realized that there had not been more beautiful valley in Crimea and the whole world. He could not ruin the valley and stopped. God turned him into a big mountain as punishment for his disobedience. Now beautiful *Auv-Dağ* ("the Bear Mountain") is a place of health resort for children. In the descriptions of beauty of Crimea, the example of the concept of "nostalgia" could be seen.

The legend about Altın Beşik was also important for Crimean Tatar in the period of their deportation, and it will be analyzed in the context below. Before passing to the next subject it should be mentioned, that Turkey was also mythologized by those Tatars who were living in Crimea before their migrations. For example, names which were used to define Turkey: *Ak toprak, hak toprak* (White land, Land of Truth)[77] or the following metaphor: if Crimea is Tatars' Motherland, Turkey is their Fatherland.[78]

One more example of the mythologization of Turkey is the cycle of legends about Alim. The image of Alim in Crimean Tatar folklore could be compared with British Robin Hood. The Crimean Tatar Robin Hood was a robber who took money from the rich and gave them to the poor. The Russian police was looking for Alim but could not catch him for a long time until one day when they managed to do this. In many versions, Alim was sent to Siberia, but in some variants, he was able to run on his way to the exile and went to Turkey where he became a religious person (*dervish*).[79] The symbolic meaning of the legend is obvious. Turkey always had been "Promised Land" for Crimean Tatars, and most probably the question "*What if we immigrated to Turkey and did not stay in Crimea*" was asked by Crimean Tatars who experienced hardships in Russian Crimea.

Crimean Tatar Folklore in the Deportation

At time of their Deportation, Crimean Tatars were in danger of losing of their national identity, but they were raised on the idea of Crimea as their sacred homeland. It is a good example of the importance of space and place in creating of national identity. Robert Kaiser defined the concept of motherland as "a powerful geographic mediator in sociopolitical behavior"

and suggested that "the idea of homeland was the dominant stimulus in Crimean Tatar communal activity during the exile period."[80]

Many scholars wrote about the strong connection of Tatars to their homeland – Crimea. Brian Glyn William wrote that they have "sense of almost mystic attachment to the nation and homeland". He believes that the concept of homeland (Crimean Tatar *vatan*) was born in the beginning of XX century. For emigrants Crimea became a symbol of a sacred abode.[81]

New generations of Crimean Tatars who was born in Central Asia had never saw Crimea, but they had collective memory about Crimea, the mental image of their homeland: "The stories of this homeland were passed on from one generation to another and Crimean Tatar children who grew up in Central Asia never having seen the Crimea, often had very detailed mental maps of their homeland." Some researchers use poeticization to describe love and connection for Crimea among Tatars, for example, claiming that the first word of Crimean Tatars children was not "mother," but "Crimea."[82]

It is important to point this happened only for Tatars in deportation. Crimean Tatar from Romania and Turkey realized their roots in Crimea. Crimea was always their ancestral land where the graves of the forefathers were left. However, they accept Romania and Turkey as their present homeland. Whereas, Crimean Tatars, who were deported to Central Asia, did not accept "new homeland." The sense of territorial belonging to Crimea had been developed during many years by the aged or intellectuals.[83] The very important role of folklore should not be forgotten. Crimean Tatar art, literature and folklore cultivate the strong connection with native land. The situation leads to mythologization of Crimea.

For example, in literature, the Crimean Tatar poet Cengiz Dagci wrote poems "The Man Who Lost His Land" (*Yurdunu Kaybeden Adam*) or "That Land Was Ours" (*O Topraklar Bizimdi*). Names of journals in Central Asia were "Return" (*Avdet*) and "Homeland" (*Vatan*).

In deportation, the myth of indigenous people was born. There have been a series of discussions about the hybridity of Crimean Tatar origin. The author of the theory is Valeriy Vozgrin who tried to prove that Crimean Tatars are descendants of the Golden Horde, which mixed with the previously-settled in Crimea Italians and Greeks, and later with Anatolian Turks who were coming to Crimea during the Middle Age.[84] This theory was called "myth of indigenous people." It was constructed during a really difficult period time for Crimean Tatars. Valeriy Vozgrin's book was written shortly before Crimean Tatar's homecoming.[85] The desire

of Crimean Tatars to prove that they are Crimean indigenous people and not an ethnic minority leads to political determination of Crimean Tatars which has a strong national identity.[86]

The most striking illustration of the myth is the legend about Golden Cradle which became a national legend of Crimean Tatars. The legend was first published in Crimea in 1936 and it was not re-published in the deportation, but it was not forgotten by the people. According to the legend, there were two enemy clans in Crimea, one was native, and another was foreign. When the locals begun to lose the war, their leader made a decision to save his people in the following way: he climbed up to an inaccessible mountain, hid a cradle (the sacred object of the clan) in a cave, and charmed it by invoking the spirits of this cave. The war officially was lost, but the fact that the cradle has been still in the cave in one of the Crimean Mountains guarantees that the native clan will continue to live safely in Crimea.

There is an opinion that Crimean Tatars came back from their deportation because they remembered about their cradle hidden in a Crimean Mountain. The symbol of the Golden cradle has the strongest meaning in Crimean Tatar culture. The famous Crimean Tatar artist Ismet Valialuev made a picture "Altın Beşık" (The Golden Cradle) in which the symbolic meaning of the legend could be seen. The legend is used as a proof of belonging of Crimean Tatars to Crimea.

Crimean Tatar Folklore in Romania

As it was said above, Crimean Tatars have double Turk-Tatar ethnic identity, and this influenced their folklore. This material attracted attention both Romanian[87] and Turkish researchers.[88] Therefore, there are many collections of Turk-Tatars folklore. These are collection of Turkish-Tatar fairy tales, proverbs and sayings, epic poems.[89] There is no collection of legends, but the texts of legends and their analysis are included in the book and series of article about Turkish-Tatars legends in Romania.

First of all, it should be mentioned that Romanian folklore itself is very reach and voluminous. Concerning Crimean Tatar legends, it is possible to divide the two groups of narratives: Romanian legends about Turks and Tatars as *the Others*, and Turk-Tatar own legends.

For detection of legends about Turks and Tatars in Romanian folklore the two-volume typology of Romanian legends was used. The author of the

magnificent work, Tony Brill, separated about forty legends about Tatars[90] and about forty legends about Turks.[91] These legends deserve separate research, but short characteristics of the group should be mentioned. First of all, the legends about Turks and Tatars are separated, but it is possible to see their resemblance. Both Turks and Tatar are described as extremely cruel and savage people. Characteristics of notion about Tatars and Turks are following. They are equated with the mythological creature Căpcăun. Căpcăun is an evil creature in Romanian folklore. The word "Căpcăun" could be translated from Romanian as "*dog-head*." Thus, in Romanian folklore, căpcăuns have dog heads with one/four eyes, or eyes in the nape. They are black, small, but have big hands. They could eat each other, but prefer eat Christians.[92] Crimean Tatars in Romanian folklore are shown as Căpcăun and various stories are used to underline their evil character: torturing of Romanians, killing of small children and old men, raping of women.[93]

Tatars and Turks are both ethnically and religiously different from Romanians. Moreover, the relationship between Turks and Romanians had not been friendly for a long time. These explain the existence of the horrible stories and demonologized of the ethnical and religious others. However, in spite of the demonologization, there are legends about the possibility of peaceful interreligious relationships between Romanians and Turks. Similar research about interethnic and interreligious relationships was done in Turkey and it showed the same results. "The value of the holy is universal to all religions, there are no distinctions between national communities and religions: both Christian and Muslims worship to saint people and their graves, religious building of different nationalities."[94] For example, in Romanian material, both Christians and Muslims go to graves of the Muslim saint Sarı Saltuk to make wishes and pray.[95]

In opposition to Turkey, in Romania, the Tatar legends which were originally born in Crimea did not survive. This could be explained by strong attachment of the Tatars to Romania which became their first homeland. The fact that Tatars have been living in Romania from the thirteenth century is important factor as well. Romanian Tatars created their own folklore which had connections to Romanian history and landscape.

In the part of the article about Crimean Tatar identity in Romania, its religious character was detected. Tatar and Turkish legends in Romania is one more proof of the fact. Only religious legends were found. The texts are shared both by Turks and Tatars. These legends are about saints and their tombs. They spread mostly in Dobrogea and the most popular

legends belong to the city Babadag. These legends could be related to specific genre *menkabe*. *Menkabes* refer to a folk story about the life of a saint and his miracles which he performs during his life and miracles that happened after his death. In previous research, the detailed analysis of miracles of Turkish saints was made and the research could be used for comparison with Romanian material.

There are many different saints and their sacred places in Dobrogea but the legends about Sarı Saltuk are among the most spread and well-known in the whole Turk world. It is possible to say that its main value is dissemination of Islam. The legend includes a feeling of national pride. Memory about ancestors is the most widespread form of cultural memory. The feeling of national pride exists in legends about revering ancestors, heroes, and saints. J. Assmann wrote that saint's monuments and graves unite people; because of this, some cities were founded on the graves of heroes or saints, like it happened to the city of Babadag according to some legends. This material is extensive and requires separate research.

The book *Fata din Mishor, Legendele Crimeei* has to be mentioned. The book was published in 1942 by Arvatu Ioan Georgescu. The collector itself was in Crimea during the Second World War what left a scent on characteristics of the texts. A. Georgescu collected legends from published sources in Crimea and then translated them into Romanian. The collection includes both Crimean Tatar legends and legends of the Christian population of Crimea. It is obvious that the book is edited according political circumstances of those days, and deserves a separate research.

Conclusion

Crimean Tatars had been living as a nation until the end of the eighteen century. The annexation of Crimea to Russian Empire was crucial for the national identity of the Crimean Tatar population which was basically divided into ethnic groups, such as the diaspore in Turkey, the diaspore in Romania, and a specific case, the Crimean Tatar ethnic group who was forced to move to Central Asia and then came back to Crimea after fifty years of their exile. Crimean Tatars who migrated to Turkey and Romania lost their national identity, but managed to keep ethnic one (sometimes losing and finding it again depends on political and historical circumstances). The Crimean Tatars who came back from Central Asia to Crimea were able to save their national identity in spite of, or may be

due to, constant threat to their both national and ethnic identity during tsarist and then Soviet regime.

All three groups of Tatars passed through various types of assimilations: Russification, Sovietization, Romanization, Ottomanization. However, it should be noticed that the most flexible political regime for Tatars was in Romania. As a result, rich folklore materials were found during the present research.

The Crimean Tatar ethnic identity stayed the same, but the cultural identity became hybrid. Interaction with other ethnic groups led to the hybridity in Crimean Tatar culture. What mechanisms were involved to preserve cultural identity? There are factors, which helped in saving of Crimean Tatar identity: a charismatic leader, national intelligentsia, common goals, the tragedy experienced together, and the idea of the homeland, Crimea.

Identity is usually constructed in contrast with *the others*. In case of Crimea, ethnic and religious *Others* were Russians in Russian Empire, Romanians in Romania. The question is, were there the other for Tatars in the Ottoman Empire? Ethnically close and religiously the same, Tatars were assimilated easily in Turkey. This was more challenging for identity than the Soviet repressions. This is why there were no legends detected among Turkish material.

Concerning the subject of *the Others*, the new theme for future research was found. The interaction of the Crimean Tatars with other ethnic groups: in Crimea before and after deportation, in Romania, in Central Asia. Legend material is perfect for the research, when it is possible to find legends about one event or one person in different ethnic groups which live together. Profound material was found in Romania. It is planned to do the investigation of Romanian legends from this point of view in future.

The study of identity of Crimean Tatars helped to understand the characteristics of their folklore in emigration. Losing national and ethnic identity in Turkey, Crimean Tatars could not create new folk narratives. However, some texts were saved and it is not surprising that the dominant motif of the texts is love for Crimea and nostalgia for losing of a homeland.

In the Romanian case, the national identity of Crimean Tatars changed to religious one which has a general character and has nothing to do with the sense of a place, but has the sense of belonging to the Islamic world. This is why Crimean Tatar folklore in Romania has expressive religious character. Romania is a Christian state, which in spite of some attempts to assimilate Tatars has been given the rights for national minorities.

However, there has been essential percentage of Turkish population in Romania. Crimean Tatars and Turks have been living together for a long time and they are mixed by some points. This is why it is difficult to understand what the origin (Turkish or Tatars) has the legends about saints in Dobrogea.

Crimean Tatars in Central Asia were oppressed by the government, but still managed to publish some folklore material. The investigation of folklore in Turkey and Romania showed how important to do the similar research in Central Asia because the materials definitely deserve attention of scholars.

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