

# New Europe College *Black Sea Link* Program Yearbook 2013-2014



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*Black Sea Link* Program  
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# CONTENTS

**NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION  
NEW EUROPE COLLEGE**

7

**DAVID (DATA) CHIGHOLASHVILI**  
IMAGINING PUBLIC [SPACE]: SOCIALLY ENGAGED INTERVENTIONS  
AND TRANSFORMATION IN BUCHAREST

19

**LILIANA COROBCA**  
CENSORSHIP INSTITUTIONS IN THE COUNTRIES  
OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC

45

**ELNUR ISMAYILOV**  
CLASH OF RUSSIAN-AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS  
IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

71

**ALEXANDRU LESANU**  
HOLOCAUST IN A TRANSNISTRIAN TOWN:  
DEATH AND SURVIVAL IN RYBNITSA (1941-1944)

115

**SERGIU MUSTEAȚĂ**  
WE AND OUR NEIGHBOURS:  
WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT EACH OTHER. HISTORY TEACHING AND  
TEXTBOOKS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND ROMANIA

137

**ELENA PAVLEEVA**  
“NATIONNESS” IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE:  
APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF THE PHENOMENON

193

**SERGEY RUMYANTSEV**

POST-SOVIET DIASPORA-BUILDING PROCESSES AND THE  
TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF THE POLITICS OF MEMORY

227

**NIKO TATULASHVILI**

EUROPEAN WORKERS' FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE  
IN THE EUROPEAN COURTS

261



# NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

*New Europe College (NEC)* is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997-1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 500 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong

international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

### **Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:**

- ***NEC Fellowships (since 1994)***

Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- ***Ștefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)***

The fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the Odobleja Fellowships are integrated.

- ***The Black Sea Link Fellowships Program (since October 2010)***

This program, sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung, invites young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and

social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of the Black Sea region.

- ***The Europe next to Europe (EntE) Fellowships Program (starting October 2013)***

This program, sponsored by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Sweden), invites young researchers from European countries that are not yet members of the European Union, targeting in particular the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia), Turkey, Cyprus, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice.

### **Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of New Europe College:**

- ***RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)***

The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach activities involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

- ***The NEC–LINK Program (2003 - 2009)***

Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute

more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj–Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

- ***The GE–NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)***

New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10–month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend, and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE–NEC Yearbooks series.

- ***NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)***

In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South–Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one–month research trip abroad. At the end of the

grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

- ***The Britannia–NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)***

This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

- ***The Petre Țuțea Fellowships (2006 – 2008, 2009 - 2010)***

In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government through its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College's community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Țuțea* Program publications.

- ***Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)***

This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*, Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South–Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

- ***Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)***

This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

- ***The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (2009 - 2013)***

This program, supported by the Getty Foundation, started in 2009. It proposed a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows. As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program also included a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence was meant to ensure a comparative dimension, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

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Beside the above-described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

### **In the past:**

- ***The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)***

Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different confessions within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

- ***The Septuagint Translation Project (2002 - 2011)***

This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul*. Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

- ***The Excellency Network Germany – South–Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***

The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South–Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

- ***The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research***

*An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources (2006-2008)*

The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for

Education and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility,

connectedness and exploitation of some of the most prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the “Constantin Brăiloiu” Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

- ***Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances.***

This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled ***Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and eastern Europe***, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (December 2009 – November 2012)

- ***DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (2011)



- ***UEFISCCDI – CNCS (PD – Projects): Federalism or Intergovernmentalism? Normative Perspectives on the Democratic Model of the European Union (Dr. Dan LAZEA); The Political Radicalization of the Kantian Idea of Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense (Dr. Áron TELEGDI-CSETRI)***, Timeframe: August 1, 2010 – July 31, 2012 (2 Years)
- ***Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (Mar. 2011 – Sept. 2012)
- ***The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon*** (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (December 2009 - November 2014)
- ***The EURIAS Fellowship Program***, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-sponsored by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar.
- ***UEFISCCDI – CNCS (TE – Project) Critical Foundations of Contemporary Cosmopolitanism***, Team leader: Tamara CĂRĂUȘ, Members of the team: Áron Zsolt TELEGDI-CSETRI, Dan Dorin LAZEA, Camil PÂRVU (October 5, 2011 – October 5, 2014)

## Ongoing projects

Research programs developed with the financial support of the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, The Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education and Innovation, National Council of Scientific Research (UEFISCDI – CNCS):

- **PD – Project: *Mircea Eliade between Indology and History of Religions.***

***From Yoga to Shamanism and Archaic Religiosity* (Liviu BORDAȘ)**

Timeframe: May 1, 2013 – October 31, 2015 (2 and ½ years)

- **IDEI-Project: *Models of Producing and Disseminating Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: The Cartesian Framework* (Vlad ALEXANDRESCU)**

Timeframe: January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2015 (4 years)

- **Bilateral Cooperation: *Corruption and Politics in France and Romania (contemporary times)***

**Silvia MARTON – Project Coordinator, Constanta VINTILĂ-GHIȚULESCU, Alexandra IANCU, Frederic MONIER, Olivier DARD, Marion FONTAINE, Benjamin GEROME, Francais BILLOUX**

Timeframe: January 1, 2015 – December 31, 2016 (2 years)

## ERC Starting Grant:

- ***Record-keeping, fiscal reform, and the rise of institutional accountability in late medieval Savoy: a source-oriented approach – Castellany Accounts***

**Ionuț EPURESCU-PASCOVICI**

Timeframe: May 1, 2015 – April 30, 2020 (5 years)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

***Present Financial Support***

The State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation of Switzerland  
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Education and Research Funding, Romania

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VolkswagenStiftung, Hanover, Germany

Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and  
Social Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden

European Research Council (ERC)

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# IMAGINING PUBLIC [SPACE]: SOCIALLY ENGAGED INTERVENTIONS AND TRANSFORMATION IN BUCHAREST<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

This research explores the role of increasing creative urban interventions in and about the transformation of Bucharest. Various aspects of post-socialist public space are seen together as complexity, the starting point of placing interventions and their role in the city. Theoretical discussions about connections between anthropology and contemporary art practices illustrate how these notions extend to creations in other disciplines. The research of these discussions together with interventions in Bucharest, studied through ethnographic engagement, shows how public space, participation and Bucharest's makeover is imagined and contested by creative actors working in this direction.

**Keywords:** post-socialist city, public space, creative interventions, social engagement, participation, collaboration.

## Introduction

In previous years we have witnessed growing number of artistic interventions concerning public space in a lot of post-socialist urban centers, which are usually directed at including public in urban transformation processes. For few years now, I have been researching artistic creations in and about post-socialist cities, mostly Tbilisi, as well as participating in creation of some of similar projects myself. As I started researching the context of Bucharest, it was a surprise to see a big number of initiatives from various backgrounds, not only arts, which work actively with public space issues.

The study below discusses two major things. Firstly, I explore the character of socially engaged creative interventions and discourse

surrounding traffic between anthropological and art practices to see how it has expanded to other fields. Secondly, I analyze how interventions in Bucharest contest, imagine and engage socially with the transformation of the city.

The paper is constructed through ethnographic engagement with creative scene in Bucharest, including the attendance and participation in some of the workshops, events and interviews, especially with those dealing with urban topics creatively. To the projects discussed here I refer as “creative urban interventions”, in order to have umbrella term for such activities. This is not meant to undermine or avoid some key terms currently present in arts, but rather to see the expansion of socially engaged art practices and their role in urban realms.

Initially, I will discuss the general case of post-socialist urban changes and public space interventions in them. It will be followed by more theoretical discussion on participation and social engagement with two examples. Later, the presence of few recent projects in Bucharest will be analyzed for finding their role in its makeover.

## **Post-Socialist Urban Complexity and Responses of Interventions**

One of the first events that I attended in Bucharest concerning urban issues was the workshop called *Focus: Bucharest. A transforming city* organized by local NGO *Odaia Creativă / The Creative Room* in collaboration with LSE.<sup>2</sup> Next to visiting and local student workshops and urban explorations, meetings with several professionals dealing with Bucharest’s transformation took place. The last day was dedicated to nine organizations briefly presenting their works, mostly about urban projects and citizens’ involvement. There were some more initiatives I already knew who worked on similar issues and some that I discovered afterwards. Generally, majority of them are based on the idea that there are public space and participation issues in the transformation of cities after socialism and urban interventions should be directed towards reclaiming public space for citizens.

Cities in Eastern Europe are usually said to be stuck between the involuntary inheritances from the socialist past, while dealing with rapid development process brought by capitalism, hence, new establishments which often erase historic urban fabric. As Buden argues, nationalism naturally emerged after communism in respective countries, as the



response to the communist past, the unknown power.<sup>3</sup> It is also quite evidently manifested in respective urban areas by emphasizing “national urban elements” in the opposition of both, socialist remnants and new establishments.

Dmitrieva and Kliems propose that urban planning was intensively politicized during socialism and so was the understanding of art and after the transformation from one system to another, legacy of the previous regime is to be seen in the transformation of cities and the artistic reflections of these processes.<sup>4</sup> However, the idea of imagined public space does not solely arise in opposition to the socialist legacy, although it plays a big role here, but also opposes the rapid developments brought under capitalism. As Connerton proposes, modernity, under capitalist world, causes “cultural amnesia” and transforms cities by rapid urban changes and erases public spaces.<sup>5</sup>

Like this idea, most of the people who deal with urban interventions argue that current trends of urban development support the alienation of citizens, as opposed to the idea of common public making decisions on their urban living. Moreover, creative actors in post-socialist urban areas argue that on the one hand, the unwillingness of citizens to actively participate in transformation of their cities is due to the socialist legacy and on the other hand, new spaces that are produced do not allow dealing with these issues. Hence, the projects and interventions they produce are at some level dealing with both issues, in addition with emphasizing the erasure of traditional urban fabric in some cases, also present in Bucharest.

Particular cases within this category of cities offer different contexts, with some similarities and this generalization should also be looked through these particularities, however, general aspects should be addressed as well. Transformation is yet another key term in this discourse which can have several understandings. Being said to be “in transformation” all the time, post-socialist cities are in the state of constant transformation where tracing their current state becomes vague, if not impossible, especially considering that every society, hence, every city is always transforming.

Instead, I propose that the post-socialist state of these places, with the complexity addressed above should be seen as the wider context, the starting point for understanding current state of post-socialist cities’ transformation. This way it also becomes feasible to place artistic interventions in the context they address and see their role as not dealing with “transformation” that has been going on after socialism per se, but to

see how they reflect and constitute to the transformation that is happening to these cities.

Bucharest, which is characterized as the urban “*battle ground*” from 1989 is compared to patchwork without much professional policies of the city.<sup>6</sup> Like other post-socialist cities, it also carries mentioned symptomatic characteristics and becomes an important case study, as urban development processes before 1989 and afterwards was most intensively present here and it is proposed that control over public space by totalitarian regimes caused people appreciating indoor life and that urban development processes in post-communist areas continue supporting domination of private areas over public among citizens.<sup>7</sup>

The latter can also be applied to current situations in other places. However, this issue together with the challenges of post-socialist public sphere is the starting point for a lot of urban interventions not only in Bucharest, but in other post-socialist cities. When I was hearing about different projects from their authors in Bucharest, the scenario seemed similar - Bucharest could have easily been replaced by Tbilisi, or few other cities in Eastern Europe that I am familiar of. When studying these urban interventions in the context of a particular place, more contextual information becomes evident, although starting point usually remains the same: reclaiming public space for citizens.

As Darieva and Kaschuba propose a lot of research has been done on the macro-level addressing the change of cities to post-socialism while not much has been said about everyday life culture in the face of intensive changes.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, they argue that “*one would be mistaken, however, to see these developments solely associated with the structural change and linear transition from the totalitarian to the democratic society and a radical break with the past.*”<sup>9</sup> This idea can be seen alongside the complexity that characterizes general state of post-socialist cities mentioned above. However, this also means that the general context must be considered when analyzing each case.

While a lot has been already written about various aspects of post-socialist urban transformation and the notion of public space therein, mostly it has been argued that what is missing in these processes is citizen participation. We notice increasing number of cultural projects in Eastern European cities initiated and implemented by artists, initiatives and NGOs which are directed towards actions in public spaces for raising awareness of urban issues among dwellers.

A good example of public art activities and the aims they usually have can be seen in the project *Spațiul Public București | Public Art Bucharest 2007*, curated by Marius Babias and Sabine Hentzsch. In the description of the project we read:

...project represents a trans-disciplinary discourse on art, architecture, urban development, education, and youth culture, in society and the public sphere. *Spațiul Public București | Public Art Bucharest 2007* includes a series of artistic projects, public debates, and media interventions, and it aims at confronting the public with social developments, initiating discussions, and emphasizing the cultural contribution to the development of democracy. Influenced in Romania by both globalization and post-communism, public space is an indicator of the state of society and democracy, as well as of the social relations between the inhabitants of a city or country.<sup>10</sup>

Starting from the streets to public transportation, a lot of urban elements have been used for artistically thinking about various socio-cultural issues in Bucharest within the project. Babias, co-curator of the project mentions that with the project they wanted to show the importance of public sphere as this is where citizens should get involved to shape their city, while putting in question the state of democracy in Romania at that time and also address with the project the question of art's role in making public engagement stronger.<sup>11</sup> The project and its discussion presented here can also be seen as the post-socialist context in which a lot of urban interventions are developed in Bucharest, not solely from the artists' perspective.

In general, as Hammond argues, interventions ask the question of ownership and represent city's belonging to public, hence they elaborate on the problematic of civic sphere and propose changing and rethinking of the city.<sup>12</sup> Urban interventions become the manifestations of conflicts over public space in the city where such public does not exist intensively. Moreover, by their frequent existence, similar actions become important in seeing what they communicate and how they participate in the transformation of the cities:

The example of the post-socialist city shows once again that buildings as well as the artistic response to what is built are imaginative acts. Building is no less an act of imagination as is the reflection on what is built... All of this practices have to do with the human imagination, with the ability to

respond artistically and creatively to the world, to cities, and, in this case, to the transformation of cities after the end of socialism.<sup>13</sup>

It is also important to find out how artistic responses can reflect and participate in the transformation. This becomes particularly interesting in the context of Bucharest, where we witness so many initiatives and creative urban projects, aimed at informing and activating citizens, providing public space as such, where public opinion and free expression can exist.

With majority of the projects arising from the mentioned concerns, Bucharest becomes a “contested city” – urban anthropological image that implies a city where contestation exists over the control and imagination of cities.<sup>14</sup> There is evidential contestation on public space in Bucharest as the protest from civil society towards state-governed transformation, however, it becomes contested on another level as well, within the creative scene criticizing the methodology, engagement and representations, as well as mentioning possible side-effects of interventions. The NGO sector representatives mention that “*art projects about the city could be too artistic*”, while the art scene usually mentioned “*that is NGO work*”, or even sometimes some art projects were said to engage well with social topics, but having low artistic quality. This does not mean that there is no collaboration in different disciplines in Bucharest, the tendency seems to be quite the contrary, but the cross-sectoral discussions and harsh criticism exist nevertheless.

GAP (*Gazeta De Artă Politică*) argues that there is a chance that making creative projects in impoverished areas can bring interest of investors there, hence, support gentrification.<sup>15</sup> They even refer to a simple formula “*artistic activity + derelict industrial area = gentrification*”.<sup>16</sup> While this is not the issues to be addressed directly in this paper, it is important to see that the critical discourse within the creative scene exists on possible developments of such activities in the context of Bucharest.

Therefore, contestation of Bucharests’ makeover in this case becomes on the one hand, by control over public space in the post-socialist complexity and on the other hand, also by inner conflict regarding the quality of projects in these processes; nevertheless, this contestation describes the state of transformation and public space in today’s Bucharest by creative scene actors.

Post-socialist urban complexity becomes the context for creative interventions in Bucharest. These activities are becoming tools for transforming and contesting public spaces and imagine the creation of

public which will be in control of the city. Therefore, social engagement and participation turn to be important aspects in such creative interventions in urban realms. Accordingly, for seeing city's contested nature through creative interventions, we need to elaborate on theoretical notions of such practices first and then analyze few examples and their role in the makeover of Bucharest.

### **From Socially Engaged Art to Socially Engaged Urban Activities**

Projects in public space can be put in four categories: "Tidying-up projects", being functional; technical works of urban planning; "projects that collectivize", as actions of mental strategies having political values; "projects that invent", which do not follow specific types and have the possibility of risk and errors, having artistic value.<sup>17</sup> Creative interventions that exist in and about Bucharest, with their social character oppose the first two categories, while they fall somewhere in between the last two.

Despite the fact that collaboration is said to be one of the key aspects of such activities, usually it is art scene from where such initiatives come. However, when looking at projects which can be characterized as "creative participatory interventions" in contemporary Bucharest, it is a surprisingly emerging initiatives of architects and urban planners. Emergence of socially engaged activities can be seen from the discussions between artistic and anthropological endeavors and to see how concepts have extended to other creative activities, we need to first explore theoretical discussions.

Thompson argues that *"in recent years, we have seen increased growth in 'participatory art': art that requires some action on behalf of the viewer in order to complete the work"*.<sup>18</sup> There can be various terms referring to similar practices from different perspectives, but my aim is not to discuss terminological differences. Instead I will use general term "socially engaged". This way it has the risk of methodological vagueness, but as we will see it is also characteristic of public space interventions in Bucharest.

I argue that the "ethnographic turn" discussion in contemporary art is key to see the characteristics behind the emergence of such activities, although not often elaborated in a lot of projects today; introducing this turn, Foster asked the question concerning "the artist as ethnographer" and argued about the envy that anthropologists and artists have towards each other.<sup>19</sup> Author proposes that the significance of anthropology in contemporary art is due to following:

First, anthropology is prized as the science of alterity; in this regard it is only second to psychoanalysis as a lingua franca in artistic practice and critical discourse alike. Second, it is the discipline that takes culture as its object, and it is this expended field of reference that postmodernist art and criticism have long sought to make their own. Third, ethnography is considered contextual, the rote demand for which contemporary artists share with many other practitioners today, some of whom aspire to fieldwork in the everyday. Fourth, anthropology is thought to arbitrate the interdisciplinary, another rote value in contemporary art and theory. Finally, fifth, it is the self-critique of anthropology that renders it so attractive, for this critical ethnography invites a reflexivity at the center even as it preserves a romanticism of the margins.<sup>20</sup>

Five aspects mentioned above are theoretically important in seeing the emergence of similar practices, and as socially engaged activities grow larger it becomes the frameworks for other projects. Foster somehow predicts that this “pseudoethnographic” approach can become “franchised” with the risk that *“the show becomes the spectacle where cultural capital collects”*.<sup>21</sup> It is interesting to know the development of such activities and see their presence in the city.

Abovementioned discussion does not mean the superiority of anthropology, but rather can be seen as the quest for collaboration.<sup>22</sup> As Schneider and Wright, initiators of various discussions on the connections between art and anthropology argue, experimentation in both fields has existed rather separately.<sup>23</sup> However, attempts of collaboration are increasing.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, in the last edition of collaborative works they discuss “ways of working” being vital in collaborative projects with different outcomes, meaning that next to anthropology’s critical engagement with contemporary art, it should also imply *“approaching creativity and meaning as something often emergent, rather than prefigured or planned”*.<sup>25</sup>

Likewise, the idea of fieldwork and ways of working are core parallels between the two disciplines, linking to contextuality mentioned above. It also intersects with another key term – “site-specificity” implying art rooted in the social context, addressing a particular problem while art object and visual aspects are not central, but the process becomes as such.<sup>26</sup> Usually the creative aspect of projects develops as one enters the context, which itself also becomes part of it, requiring reflexivity and openness.

The framework of prefigured projects within the funding structure might not always allow process-based openness, but the idea of the context and

social issues within are becoming key in other creative projects linking to these notions - *"We are not just interested in architecture, but more making it with people"* or *"we wanted to activate communities, so that they would claim public space for them"* or *"we want to make projects interactive and create the spaces for discussions"* – the pathos of these statements can be said to be underlying majority of initiatives that exist in Bucharest nowadays and deal with the city.

By placing these projects in particular settings, they are aimed at involving public, but what is implied in public for such projects in general? There are two sides of public proposed: *"first the naive or insensible public that enters the gallery space; and second the newly reflective and compassionate public that emerges after the exposure to the work of art."*<sup>27</sup> The divide from another perspective can be seen in art and architecture, wherein one side argues for the *"apolitical formalism, made of hyper-aesthetics for the sake of aesthetics"* and others, who leave this approach and engage with socio-economic issues.<sup>28</sup> The latter can be said a starting point of projects that have emerged with similar methodologies beyond strictly defined contemporary art boundaries.

Those projects that I got to know here usually mention that the work they do is "participatory", another key term under debate in contemporary art. Indeed it is one of the catchwords of today's creative scene in the West; hence, some of its key characteristics should be defined. Participatory art, which is also strongly linked with the "social turn" and collaboration in art is based on the assumption that artists are working with participants and communicating through them, deriving from the idea of "the self-sacrifice" that art goes beyond aesthetic domain and combines with social aspects.<sup>29</sup> In strictly defined terms, participatory art denies a passive spectator and *"suggests a new understanding of art without audiences, one in which everyone is a producer"*.<sup>30</sup> The medium in this case become transformed situations and people, who are participants and spectators, involved in the two-level communication otherwise not present in everyday life and support rethinking and imagining our relations to the world.<sup>31</sup>

However, even in here distinction with public's engagement is argued: there are projects which are created by artists requiring engagement in a wider sense and there are projects which are developed together with participants, through dialogues and processes.<sup>32</sup> At this point I want to discuss two projects from Bucharest, exemplifying these approaches in the explosion of "participatory" in the city. One of them being a rather

unique case, the other underlying predominant contemporary works discussed in this paper.

The first case is the community-based project in the Rahova-Uranus area by artist initiative called *Ofensiva Generozității / Generosity Offensive*.<sup>33</sup> This area is quite centrally located in the southwest of Bucharest. In this industrial area developed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, properties went to the state ownership during the Communism and in recent decades evictions also took place, while attempts to its upgrading were made.<sup>34</sup> This area did not have a very positive image for other parts of the city as well.

The initiative of young artists went to this area for experimenting community-art, while such practices did not exist in Romania. They remained open to local voices in finding the ways of developing the project. Starting in 2006 with the *Sensitive Map* project, they wanted to discover linkage between the inhabitants of Rahova and their neighborhood with two main components of documentary video and local square transformation. Taking interdisciplinarity and collaborative aspects, the project developed with locals and they continued their work through different initiatives including *Mobile Urban Laboratory* as the space of creation and workshops, including famous “Biluna Jam Session”, children’s musical project, as well as establishing locally-based community cultural center *La Bomba*.<sup>35</sup>

Also, *Rahova Delivery* as part of the larger *Street Delivery* discussed later, was held in the neighborhood and a lot of people talk about the criticism that surrounded the project, mostly in relation with the risks for its gentrification mentioned earlier. Apart from the critique of the practice, the project description shows that it was quite open and process-based, for testing the notions of community art, as well as supporting community in bringing their voices.

Arguably, this is the pioneering project with its character in the Romanian context, if not one of the rare examples in post-socialist cities, where artists came to the chosen neighborhood with certain ideas and developed a project together with local community, while engaging in social problems surrounding them and representing the neighborhood in another way together with locals. One can also tell that the project is done by rather general methods of contemporary Western artistic practices, but the contextual presence of the project seems quite evident as well and it could be said to have participatory characteristics addressed above.

For the second example I discuss the intervention made in Bucharest by young collective called *Urban2020*. During the presentation of their



work, where I first got to know about this project, their representative quite openly discussed the unsuccessful case as community's dissatisfaction by the interventions they had made. Like a lot of others, this initiative of few young professionals came from the architecture and urban planning background, inspired by 'new architecture' with social dimensions, as there were also funds available in this direction.

As one of the project initiators described, their interest was mainly utilization of public space in former Communist neighborhoods and the research phase of the project was followed by the idea of interventions with outdoor furniture in the project *Bucharest Pop-up*. The aim was to make these places usable for neighbors and bring people together, as according to them there seems to be very individualistic approach to the spaces in common neighborhoods and communities depend on local administrations to take care of these spaces. The group announced the contest on making objects from used material and had some architects and artists who got involved. After facing the challenges with local administration, they changed locations and made interventions not in the original places identified, almost abandoned with the non-use, but instead in the neighborhood which already had some of basic outdoor furniture.

The surprise to project team came when the local community did not appreciate new, rather unknown objects that appeared in their neighborhood at night, even leaving the note asking for taking "this rubbish" away, as one of the project initiators described. Afterwards, they had to talk with locals and describe what these "strange" objects were and that they could have used it, which community later accepted and started using them.

The project scheme looks as follows: organizers come up with the idea of revitalizing public space in neighborhoods where they believe public space is not used, they do research, later decide to do physical interventions and involve more actors from the creative scene to make object. After negotiations and permits, they place them in the neighborhood which is rather critical to what is "popping up" and only after that they go and explain why it is there. Intervention is very temporal and locals, who according to project initiators are expecting everything from the outside, get yet another physical transformation from the outside, this time by young professionals. The methodology of this project can more or less be seen as the one which is utilized in a lot of projects in Bucharest, discussed here – projects are mostly developed by the creative actor, based in the city and then asking participation, which nevertheless could also foster

different understanding of the city, however, cannot be strictly defined as participatory.

“Participatory” in here does not imply development of projects with locals for whom the project is made, but rather intervening for them. They tend to be critical, reflections happen usually afterwards, not while developing the project, which links to the closed framework these projects are most likely to have. Creativity becomes the tool for protests and comes closer to the “Activist Art”, where:

Artists recognize that the process of shared dialogue can proceed most effectively if they function not as privileged outsiders, but as coparticipants who are intimately involved in the concerns of the community or constituency with which they work. This “community” may be defined by such factors as geographic location, commitment to a specific political issue or movement, or identity based on race, gender, sexuality or class.<sup>36</sup>

The idea of activist art can be seen parallel to general social engagement of art, as both offer creative intervention in specific context and try to create and represent environment where various social issues are being discussed, addressed in a way. Aspect of interdisciplinarity in this discourse, is usually mentioned, but nevertheless more collaboration is required in similar actions, especially when created with the agency of social change through artistic interventions. Collaboration does not anymore concern only artists and anthropologists, but different cultural actors, researchers, etc. with shared goals, however, it is usually the opposite. As Kester argues, to establish knowledge about social makeover and art’s role in it, together with elaborations of preceding theoretical concepts, it “*requires a process of both learning and un-learning via practice*”.<sup>37</sup>

The issue might not be the “learning”, as much as the “un-learning” side of the collaboration, that makes it sometimes so difficult to cross disciplinary boundaries, especially when such projects and the funding for them is based on competition. This causes further challenges of the practice, as reflections on the topics mostly happen within one particular field, as well as does not actively involve communities that are asked to participate. Theoretical discussion above show the emergence of such activities and their characteristics, however, criticism of the forms they utilize is beyond the direct scope of this paper. Creative interventions that exist outside the art scene with socially engaged aspect can be said to be taking some of key characteristics of “participatory” and socially-engaged

practices, as frameworks to work in, usually not taking theoretical notions into reflexive discussions. Being rather generally socially engaged and activist in their character, they have more political value of projects as acts of imagination having those “mental strategies” to inform citizens, while tackling with the artistic notions most of the time.

### **Urban Interventions – “Soon in Your City!”**

Regardless of their specific character, these interventions participate in the makeover of the city while dealing with this topic. As Ramoneda argues *“public space is the place of conflict and conflicts aren’t resolved but they metamorphose and are transformed”*.<sup>38</sup> Creative interventions in Bucharest are becoming contestations for imaginations and empowering critical cultural actors. For seeing this, I will discuss three examples I studied in Bucharest – one created from the art scene, the other one from the joint initiative of mostly existing types and the third one as a mix of activities around public space in Bucharest, where the dynamics of interventions unveil.

As one arrives in Bucharest from the airport, on the way they will pass the “Free Press Square”, with the massive building that can easily be identified as the socialist remnant. Having had Lenin’s statue in front, after the revolution, in 1990 it was removed publicly from this place and although the decision was made for instead putting up a new monument of “Wings” as referred, the new project is still not implemented.<sup>39</sup> The pedestal remained empty as in other countries that “got rid” of regime’s monuments and most of them gradually disappeared mostly with the emergence of “new” symbols instead. However, Bucharest is one of the exceptions as in 2014 the pedestal still stands in front of the building.

In 2009, Romanian artist Ioana Ciocan decided to work around the pedestal as *“due to its emptiness, visibility and historical importance, it seemed like a perfect place to run an art program for temporary public art”*.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, she was aiming at having local artists to exhibit there, who otherwise would not have the possibility of working in public space. Her attempt resulted in *Proiect 1990*, which started with her own project *Ciocan VS. Ulyanov* in 2010. Obtaining temporary rights for each project, as the high budget “Wings” were due to be put there every year, she managed to have 20 projects in total around the pedestal addressing different issues.<sup>41</sup>

The topics that projects surrounded were diverse. By the time I arrived in Bucharest, the pedestal was hosting 19<sup>th</sup> project, statue of a girl in a red dress without a head and instead holding a big golden ball in her hands. Later, after the discussion with the author, I got to know that it was dedicated to the campaign of “*Salvați Roșia Montană! / Save Rosia Montana*” against the gold mining company’s mega investment in Romania, which is said to be the biggest public protest and movement in Romania’s recent history. The newspapers that were covering legs and hands of the statue became understandable then, as they were the ones about the ongoing issue.



*Proiect 1990*

It is right to argue that “iconoclasm” of post-socialist statues can be seen as an easy way of getting rid of unwanted past, but instead this action prolongs the memory of the former regime, rather than makes us forget it.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, if we argue that a more successful example in rethinking the past is changing the agency of such places,<sup>43</sup> *Proiect 1990* can be said to be successful with its goals. But we also need to see social

engagement aspect it has, as well as the purpose of its creation, relating to other interventions in Bucharest.

Generally criticizing the lack of social engagement and public existence of art in Romania, as well as Bucharest's makeover in a way that it is not functional to its citizens, Ioana mentioned that she was happy that the project got media coverage, as she wanted to also let wider public know that different kind of public art can exist.

Deriving from its goals, it was predominantly art scene involved in making each project around the pedestal and it had the public dimension of creating something and bringing it to the citizens to perceive it. Even though it did not have strictly speaking "participatory" aims, it still asked for the critical, yet passive engagement of the public in rethinking recent history through what happened in that public space. From the aims of the project we can see that together with the social issues it addressed, it also wanted making opportunities for artists to work in public space and address the issue of critical socially engaged public art.

The latter links to the idea of other creative projects in public space of Bucharest – they ask for critical public and engagement, but projects come from creative scene, representing transformation-related conflicts and utilizing public space with creative activism. With this character they also come close to the notion of "eventwork", <sup>44</sup> which incorporates at least four aspects: critical research, participatory art, networking strategies and self-organized collaboration; being "contemporary social movement", this term implies the combinations of *"Art, theory, media and politics into a mobile force that oversteps the limits of any professional sphere or disciplinary field..."*<sup>45</sup>

This term interestingly links to another temporary intervention that I attended to study. The event called *Urban\_Dream\_Scapes* was developed in the end of April 2014 by Bucharest-based *Komunitas Association*, a group of young researchers in urban anthropology, in collaboration with their Estonian partners *Linnalabor* and the support of another Bucharest-based group of architects called *studioBASAR*, renowned for their social architectural interventions. Official description of the event says:

The theme is urban development through active involvement of young European citizens having the aim to reactivate public urban spaces and build a sense of community around them. The project wants to bring together young people from 2 very different cultural and historical evolution

of the urban environment from EU extremities (north and east), and through empirical observations and teamwork, to bring a contribution to coherent urban planning with a strong social approach. The activities will involve urban walks, a creative workshop for building a temporary installation in the public space and will end with a community event in Carol Park from Bucharest, where the participants will have a direct contact with the local community, promoting volunteering and active European citizenship.<sup>46</sup>

The project was funded by the European Commission's *Youth in Action* Programme. One can easily characterize the language of the description as that of NGO terminology, which usually has been mentioned with suspicion by art scene representatives in Bucharest.

The project resulted in one day intervention in Carol Park (*Parcul Carol*) of Bucharest, which was argued to have the manifestation of political and state ideas in every period of Romanian history from the previous century. There is a significant diversity of symbols in the park, where central hill is represented by tall monument, grave of the Unknown Soldier and the mausoleum.

In the project, initially the discussion about Bucharest's transformation and the development of the park took place, where the history of this park was discussed, as well as generally the issue of green spaces in Bucharest was addressed. Theoretically the questions of "what is a park?" was asked and we left to explore the park with the understanding that it is a green space in the city, intervention in itself that should oppose the notion of regulations and allow "wilderness" in the highly controlled urban setting. With its rather "sacred" understanding and monument status, Carol Park was said to be the manifestation of power, rather than the everyday usage for citizens.

Walks in this and neighboring Youth Park (*Parcul Tineretului*) took place as to see the differences between more ideologised and relatively free parks. Carol Park was discussed to be one of the most controlled public spaces in Bucharest. Moreover, the fact that walking and sitting on the grass in the parks was only allowed few years ago in Bucharest, organizers believed that it is not yet in the culture of the visitors of the park, hence, decided to make interventions of making park more friendly where people would utilize green areas, rather than solely walk on pavements and designated areas.

When one walks in beautiful parks of Bucharest, it is noticeable that areas made specifically for walking and sitting are more utilized, than green

landscapes. In some areas, like on Piața Unirii one can also notice the sign mentioning that accessing areas with grass is allowed. In Carol Park we also witness a lot of signs, regulating what one can do when visiting it. The regulations become stricter the closer visitor goes to the hill and the memorial, where one of the signs calls it “a sacred area”, saying that it is not a playground and should not be accessed with bicycles, scooters, etc. which is due to the tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

Project participants explored the environment, saw the green area by the water where they wanted to do an intervention and headed back to the workshop place. After group works and discussions, few ideas were chosen for the intervention – alternative signs to be put on the green area leading to the hill, next to the stairs telling visitors that this areas can also be utilized; wooden platforms for making picnic on green areas; ordinary swings on random trees in the park.

After few days of working on the material in the workshop area, objects for the intervention were created and taken to the park to have a community event, invite and educate visiting public in using green areas of the city. Event did not go as it was planned, organizers were not able to put objects and intervene in the green area where initially intended, as they were prohibited to do so. Even though they had permission for the temporary intervention, turned out they lacked that special permit for intervening in green landscapes of the park. Instead, they put together all the objects on the asphalted walking area next to it and activities took place around it. Major activity still surrounded drawing and other fun activities for children, as well as a map of that part of Bucharest where people were invited to identify and map different areas and aspects, which organizers could address with future interventions. Simple swings that were hanging on trees were quite popular both for children and adults. The area where “picnic” could have been held was mostly used by people involved in the project and few people who stopped by the event, mentioned that it was important to have such happenings in different areas, as there should be more entertainment activities in the city.



*Urban\_Dream\_Scapes* event

Even though the event did not go exactly the way it was planned due to mentioned reason, a skeptic to such practices could ask – but could they not bring some cheap furniture and have same kind of activities for children? – Perhaps, yes. But we need to look at this kind of activities in their making. Said to be participatory, its temporal character was also acknowledged and importance was based on the participation of other actors engaging with public through intervention and showing the possibility of transforming the space through cheap, or used material. European partners' dimension only highlights the significance of participation of civil society actors across countries, carrying the risk of having similar frameworks and remaining closed processes.

All characteristics of eventwork are present here – they start with some prior research of the problem or site, it is based on the network of different actors. Participation is taken as educating public in a general understanding and self-organized groups thinking what else could be done, where and how can public space be transformed based on what ideas they had before and sometimes what public being there proposed. Event exists for the sake of imagining what could be further and what civil society can do about it, about an expandable public space which is not there, manifested in the last example which brings it all together.



In 2014 it was already the 9<sup>th</sup> edition of *Street Delivery*,<sup>47</sup> an annual urban event that takes place in Bucharest, Timișoara and Iași organized by Fundația Cărturești and Architects' Chamber of Romania. In Bucharest the idea of the event is to block Verona Street during few days for the cars and make it accessible for pedestrians to see other ideas and creations that could exist. Started as *Art Delivery* in 2006, the name later changed to *Street Delivery* as according to one of the organizers there's more than art happening there; because it is where social networks develop within the city oriented towards the development of driving facilities, as opposed to pedestrian areas and the big idea is to have annual national public space weekend in June. This event becomes an eventwork, an arena for activism and civil society engagement with the city, while trying to work with young professionals, mostly architects and city planners, who are more interested in making city for people and not just buildings.

This year it took place during June 13-15, Verona Street was blocked for the cars and an urban festival was held there: from the beginning of the street, from Magheru Boulevard area was starting to be crowded, the statue of the girl in the red dress holding a golden ball, from *Proiect 1990* was standing on the pedestal made by the pallets, surrounded by relatively smaller garden gnomes "discussing" various issues, created by landscape designers, walking on the street one could notice stands similar to an open air expo, where different initiatives were presenting their projects in an interactive way, selling some of their products, having educational urban activities for children, even tango for adults, some craft making, information about social movements, city biking, etc. ended with the stage for concerts.



*Street Delivery 2014*

Festival composed of different sections – architecture, arts, music and even sports which was added this year to another space not far, in the parking lot next to Athenaeum, for which organizers did not get permit and had to buy all the parking tickets (5400 in total) for three days. Guided tours of the neighborhood and the festival were also available during which guides said few times “this is an event by the civil society for the civil society” and invited me (only person on the first tour) to the specially constructed discussion area made of pallets opposite the street, as the first time extension of the festival from Verona Street. Extension of the festival was always aimed but did not happen until this year, this is probably why the description of the event lists three cities where it takes place and says “soon in your city!”.<sup>48</sup>

The nature of the festival is to present and empower initiatives dealing with transforming urban space for citizens, predominantly happening in Bucharest and the festival happens exactly for the reason of giving platform to different initiatives and by showing what they do and what can be done, hence, wider public is invited to know about this and imagine that they could also get involved in making similar initiatives in their neighborhoods. However, having the public which is to accept the product and participate this way, which looks at these activities as an elements of fun, opposes to bigger ideas this kind of initiatives are bringing.

*Street Delivery* also composed of other activities such as workshop (*Becoming Local: The Atomising Society and Public Space. The Case of Post-Socialist Territories*)<sup>49</sup> on urban issues in Bucharest and involvement of young professionals in them. On the last day of the workshop which I attended, projects were presented based on few days of fieldwork, thought in the similar manner characteristic to current creative interventions. Participants worked around the University Square and Verona Street in thinking about the ways of creatively transforming these areas, where ideas concerned “testing of space” which predominantly came again from the organizers and participants, though aimed at activating public. While discussing Verona Street and its development apart from *Street Delivery*, the position of the Architects’ Chamber, among others, was that it is a pilot project, which should support the emergence of other projects.

*Street Delivery* can be seen as that eventwork in Bucharest which unites vastly existing urban interventions as civil society engagements, as well as a lot of them emerge from there. Deriving from the notions under debate in contemporary art, the festival also utilizes some concepts, however, mostly remaining with the political value of projects in public space with collectivizing people who would like to work around same ideas. Bucharest becomes a “contested city” where civil society is emerging

with interventions as conflicts with how it is changing and could be changed. With their characters, these eventworks at this point intervene for not emerging wider critical public, but more actors in creative scene, more networking and collaboration as to imagine what else can be done for “passive” wider public. In other words, creativity becomes the tool of activism contesting the transformation of Bucharest and moreover, gets involved in this transformation by temporary interventions and mobilization of civil society for possible makeover of the city.

### **Towards the conclusion**

As I went on the other side of the street from *Street Delivery*, on the constructed place of discussions and screenings, there was a discussion about interventions in Bucharest, speakers and public were almost the same I had met during the research, some of active participants in these processes, discussing what they had done and imagining what else could be done in public space. Although the participatory methodology of these projects can be critically discussed, I think they still are part of transforming and contesting Bucharest.

I have started the discussion by the general condition of post-socialist cities in Eastern Europe, where several characteristics are usually arbitrarily argued in relation to public space and proposed looking at this situation in whole, as a post-socialist context for starting analysis of happenings within them. Discussions around the ethnographic turn, social engagement, collaboration and participatory notions in contemporary art usually referred in urban interventions, have shown us that some of the characteristics are present in projects outside the discipline, however, in an altered form. While addressing particular issues and spaces, they call for participation but from a passive spectator, as opposed to developing projects with them.

Moreover, frequent turn of discussed notions into mere frameworks for project development has shown that these interventions have more political and activism value by being imaginative acts of possible transformation, while openness, reflexivity and collaboration are crucial for their artistic aspects, often being mixed in their aims. However, discussion of particular examples and theoretical elaborations showed us that initiatives from different perspectives are present in the transformation of Bucharest very actively through temporary projects and become rather eventworks which utilize creative tools to mobilize more and more actors to participate in and contest challenging makeover of Bucharest, usually the case in Eastern European cities nowadays.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> I would like to express my gratitude to various people in Bucharest for interviews, discussions and allowing my presence at different occasions during the fieldwork. Images used in the paper are taken by the author.
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### **Books:**

#### **Academic books**

*Controlul cărții. Cenzura literaturii în regimul comunist din România (Control of the book. Censorship of literature in the communist regime in Romania)*, Cartea Românească Publishing House, Bucharest, 2014

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# CENSORSHIP INSTITUTIONS IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC

## Abstract

Since the establishment of communist power in the countries of the Soviet bloc, the newly-founded institutions of censorship were aimed at creating or training the “new man” and developing self-censorship among artists. Their aims were also to consolidate and then to maintain communist power. The censors had to approve all artistic or scientific publications, radio or television broadcasts, theater and film scenarios as well as exhibitions, they could supervise even the work from ministries, including decisions on the state secrets. Knowledge of the operating mechanism of communist censorship contributes to the profound understanding of social and cultural life from that period.

**Keywords:** Censorship, Communism, Glavlit, Purge of Books, Soviet Bloc, State Secret.

In the Soviet Union, censorship, as an independent organization, was formed on June 6, 1922. From 1917 to 1922, in the first years of Soviet-bolshevik power, in Russia there were several institutions dealing with censorship, like: Military Censorship, Revolutionary Court of the Press, State Publishing House, the Party Soviet Press, General Directorate of Political Education of the Central Committee of Communist Party, the Comintern (for foreign Press and Literature). Their activity was difficult to coordinate and the authors banned in one city by a Publishing House or a magazine could publish elsewhere. This was the main reason that led to the establishment of Glavlit.

In the communist regime, censorship was not exercised only by the censorship institution. There are editorial censorship, accomplished by employees of magazines, publishing houses, radio and television, etc.;

repressive censorship, executed by the political department (political control) of the security organs, ideological censorship, performed by the party leadership, which have first and last word, deciding what and how should appear or be banned (The Party gave indications to the censorship institution), "inside" censorship (or self-censorship) which is expressed by the intention of authors to guess ideological, aesthetic, political pretensions to their work over numerous stages of the control. But the main institution of censorship (Glavlit in the USSR) exercises the most important and the largest operations of censorship and control. An army of censors was actually in charge of the whole process of banning, discovering of "anti-Soviet" authors and harmful works.

In 1944, with the advance of the Soviet troops to the west, special officers from the Soviet state censorship body began to implement the Communist system of censorship in all "liberated" countries. As a rule, this process has been made taking into account specific peculiarities of each country or the Soviet interest and this did not involve, as binding, the general establishment everywhere of the Glavlit institutions.

While the existence of such state structure was possible only in the Communist regime (Nazis and democratic regimes have not known institutions like Glavlit), the Communist system in some countries of the Soviet bloc has dispensed of services of this institutions, operating generally without cracks. In any case, book burning, ban and control of manuscripts and of all publications, guiding or manipulation of writers took place almost identical in all socialist countries. Structurally, however, there were two types of censorship systems: 1) with a central institution dealing only with censorship (in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria – and in the Soviet Union, of course) and 2) without such an institution, when the functions and tasks of censorship were assimilated by publishers, party organs, etc. Hungary and the German Democratic Republic, for example, did not have such institutions. But everything that was being published in these countries was supervised by special departments of the Party's Central Committee and "all cultural institutions throughout the country, from the editorial offices of political journals to the publishing houses of children's books, theatre managements, scientific as well as artistic institutions have the prime duty of exercising censorship."<sup>1</sup> The abolition of censorship institution in Bulgaria (1956) and Romania (1977) did not coincide with the liberalization of their Communist (censorship) system.

In the countries of the Communist bloc, censorship began its existence repeating or imitating the stages of Soviet censorship formation: banning

and blocking the press (non-communist, opposition, i.e. nearly all media), purge of books, closure of the private bookstores or their nationalization, punitive measures against public figures, etc. For example, the same as in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the books and media purge started in all countries of Soviet bloc before the official establishment of the institution of censorship: 1949 in Romania and 1952 in Bulgaria, when this institution was founded, it was already reaching the third wave of purges. What the USSR developed over decades (e.g. books purge), was made in only a few years in Romania. The Soviet's indications were very accurate because of their vast experience.

Based on the documents from a single socialist state (the censorship in Romania, for example), we will be able to reconstruct the whole system. The access to information about the main fund of the institution of censorship (recently declassified in Romania) and this study can provide more unpublished and important information on the subject for examination within the wider academic context.

## **The Evolution of the Institutions to Pursue Social and Political Changes**

One should note that these institutions were the most conservative structures of the communist regime. However, certain political or social events, like Stalin's death in 1953, the 20th Congress organized by Khrushchev in 1956, Ceausescu's coming to power in 1965, in Romania, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1980, etc. influenced the activity of censorship institutions, sometimes until their abolition.

In the Soviet Union, Glavlit changed the name 11 times from 1922 to 1991. But we will mention two important moments: For the first ten years (1922-1933), the Soviet institution was called *Главное управление по делам литературы и издательств Народного комиссариата просвещения РСФСР* - Main Administration for Literature and Publishing Affairs under the People's Commissariat of Education of the RSFSR. From here comes the famous abbreviation – Glavlit – although later the word "Literature" disappears and common phrase in all names of Glavlit will be "Protection of State Secrets in the Press". It's interesting that the countries of the Soviet bloc have not assumed this phrase, although the preoccupations for the protection of State Secrets were similar to the Soviet institution.

One of the most important moments that affected the institutional status of the Soviet Glavlit was the death of Stalin. From the early years of its existence until 1991, Glavlit was subordinated to the Council of People's Commissars which was converted to the Council of Ministers, the censorship institution having the status of a ministry. Over the years, security organs have tried to subordinate Glavlit to their interests, but this was possible only once for a very short time: from March to October 1953, the censorship institution became *Управление Уполномоченного по охране военных и государственных тайн в печати Министерства внутренних дел СССР* - Administration for the Protection of Military and State Secrets in the Press under the USSR Ministry of Home Affairs. Immediately after the death of Joseph Stalin, Lavrentiy Beria, head of the Soviet security and secret police apparatus (NKVD) and Deputy Premier in the postwar years, managed to turn Glavlit in Department 11 of the NKVD. But Beria quickly fell out of favor, reaching himself an enemy of the people and was executed. Glavlit returned to its baseline status and continued to operate under the USSR Council of Ministers. Perestroika initiated by Gorbachev affected censorial hierarchy only in April, 1991, when Glavlit becomes *Главное управление по охране государственных тайн в печати и других средствах массовой информации Министерства информации и печати СССР* - General Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press and Other Media under the USSR Ministry of Information and Press. After a few months, the institution will disappear completely. On December 27, 1991, in the Russian Federation there was adopted the law "On Mass Media Information", in which censorship has been officially annulled.

After Stalin's death, a further important event that influenced the whole Soviet bloc was Nikita Khrushchev's speech at the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU. While in some countries changes weren't too radical, in Bulgaria this event caused the closing of the recently established Glavlit. The activity of the Bulgarian censorship body was so short, that encyclopedias in the field did not mention it. After September 9, 1944, Bulgaria goes through several stages like those from Romania and other countries of the former Communist bloc. The Bulgarian censorship institution, *Главно управление по въпросите на литературата и издателства* - General Directorate for Literature and Press, was called Glavlit, as in the USSR, and founded in 1952. The first stage of the work of Glavlit was under strict supervision of the Deputy Director of the Soviet Glavlit, Viktor Katishev. The first employees, personally approved by Chervenkov, were named political editors (*politredaktory* – as in the USSR). In the Glavlit worked 200-300

censors, a number considered an exaggeration, as long as in 1956, the year of the closing, the Glavlit had 137 employees, including the technical, administrative staff and the editors from over the country.<sup>2</sup> Since its establishment until the dissolution, the new structure was coordinated directly by Vâlko Veliov Chervenkov, leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party. In 1956, Chervenkov himself falls under the blows of censorship. He made some references to the work of Beria, just when it was purged from libraries and Beria accused of crimes. From this year, the political career of the Bulgarian leader went into decline. The abolition of the Bulgarian Glavlit occurred as a reaction to the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress from the Soviet Union.

After Stalin's death and Khrushchev's speech there begins a time of liberalization of the censorship in Czechoslovakia. Actually, the censorship in this country was the most affected one by the social events in comparison with other countries of the Soviet bloc. Once the communists took over power, between 1948 and 1953 there was party censorship in Czechoslovakia "and officials tended to delegate the responsibility to individual editors, who were given their position by the party".<sup>3</sup> Beside the section for Agitation and Propaganda of the Czechoslovak Communist Party the Ministry of Culture also had competence of censorship.<sup>4</sup> A decree from April 22, 1953, set up the Main Board of Press Control - *Hlavní Správa Tiskového Dohledu*, that was incorporated in 1954 into the Ministry of Interior. Like the other institutions from the Soviet bloc, the office controlled the mass media and all cultural and artistic activities. In the 1960s, a strong liberalization process causes the reorganization of the institution with 300 employees, 118 of them working in the central bureau from Prague. In 1966, the Main Board of Press Control was re-named Central Publication Office. It became a civilian institution with very limited competence and tasks, a unique instance in the Communist bloc. As an expert in this field noticed, "the process of late 1960s liberation left traces in the censor's office but was too short and too weak to radically divorce the cultural sphere from the practices of central control".<sup>5</sup> In June 1968, a new Czechoslovak government abolished the Central Publication Office. But after the Soviet invasion in August 1968 there's established a harsh regime and there are revived the methods of brutal censorship, that will function until the end of the 1980s. For a more efficient activity, there were created two new separate censorship offices: *Český úřad pro tisk a informace* (ČÚTI) - Czech Office for Press and Information and *Slovenský úrad pre tlač a informácie* (SÚTI) - Slovak Office for Press and Information. These were amalgamated in December 1980 into *Federální výbor pro tisk*

*a informace* – the Federal Office for Press and Information, an institution that functioned till 1990.

The Polish Censorship was closest to the Soviet model. At the end of 1944, two employees of Glavlit were delegated to the Workers' Party to help to set up a centralized office, which became known in July 1946 as *Główny Urząd Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk* - Main Office for Control of the Press, Publications and Public Performances. Being considered from the very beginning as an instrument of Sovietization, the institution of censorship and its local organs didn't control only printings and published works, but also the production of seals, stamps and type molds.<sup>6</sup> The process of liberalization in the mid-fifties affected the mechanism of the Polish censorship so much, that "in September 1956, GUKP employees appealed for the abolition of censorship".<sup>7</sup> But this period was a short one, being followed by the repression of the liberal leaders and purges inside the institution of censorship. The 1960s are marked by protests and confrontations, followed by the consolidation of the authority of censorship and its bureaucratization. The popular discontent led to the appearance of the labor union federation "Solidarity" (*Solidarność*, full name: *Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy "Solidarność"* - Independent Self-governing Labor Union "Solidarity"). Accountability and transparency of censorship were one of the 21 demands made by Solidarity in the Gdańsk Agreement of August 1980.

Among Solidarity's major, if short-lived, achievements was the new Act on Censorship of July 1981. A reduction in censorship had been one of the Solidarity's main demands and although the act survived only three months in its original form, before the imposition of the State of War in December 1981 cut it off short of a proper assessment, it introduced several revolutionary clauses.<sup>8</sup>

The period of liberalization and the Solidarity movement was abruptly cut off on December 1981, when a military government under General Wojciech Jaruzelski was imposed on Poland under Soviet order. Polish censorship body, renamed in 1981 as *Główny Urząd Kontroli Publikacji i Widowisk* - Main Office for Control of the Publications and Performances, intensified its power and all broadcasting media were proclaimed military institutions. The reaction of artists and writers was "to boycott the official media and devote their energies to a variety of underground ventures,

including publishing, educational courses, and clandestine cassette recordings".<sup>9</sup> The *GUKPW* was abolished in April 1990.

In Romania, *Direcția Generală a Presei și Tipăriturilor* - General Department for Press and Publications activated 28 years (1949-1977) and had a very similar structure to Soviet Glavlit. The great changes in the Communist bloc in 1956 didn't have the same impact on the institution of censorship in Romania. One of the most notable peculiarities of *DGPT* was its deeply conservative character (without big changes, disorders, significant resignations). Even with the coming to power of Nicolae Ceausescu, in the period of relative liberalization in 1965-1971 the Romanian censorship body has not changed its way of activity. In 1975, the General Department for Press and Publications has been turned into the Committee for Press and Publications (*Comitetul pentru Presă și Tipărituri*) and it was subordinated not only to the Council of Ministers, but also to the Communist Party. In 1977, when this committee was dissolved, the most important tasks for censorship of publications will be taken over by the Council of Culture and Socialist Education (established in 1971), which will continue to coordinate censorship activity until 1989.

## Structure of the Censorship Institutions and their Main Tasks

If we follow the structure of the Glavlit and of the similar institutions from the Soviet bloc over the years, we can see three stages of their evolution:

I. The first was the stage of training and experimentation. The ambitions of the institution were modest, including the control of books and media. In 1922, the year of establishment, Glavlit had four sections:

- 1) Literature: which carried out political and military censorship of all publications; made lists of Russian and foreign prohibited books (arriving in country).
- 2) Administration and Training: it had functions of the control of publishers, printers, booksellers, libraries, the training of the provincial departments; it sent orders and notes in the province, requesting activity reports from local authorities.

The other two departments, Secretary and Libraries and Archives, had secondary and bureaucratic duties.<sup>10</sup>

According to the Decree no. 218 (given in Bucharest on the 20<sup>th</sup> of May, 1949) for organizing the "General Department for Press and Publications"

(DGPT), subordinated to the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People's Republic, the censorship institution had the following obligations:

- a) to edit the Official Bulletin of the Romanian People's Republic;
- b) to authorize the publishing of any publications: newspapers, magazines, programs, posters, etc., taking measures to meet legal requirements for printing;
- c) to authorize the printing of all kinds of books, in the Capital and the Province;
- d) to authorize the distribution and promotion of books, newspapers and any other publications, as well as the import or export of newspapers, books or art objects;
- e) to regulate the work conditions for bookstores, secondhand bookshops, public libraries, newspapers depositories, books depositories, etc.;
- f) to prepare and distribute for the press official communications of the Council of Ministers and to coordinate the work of press services of ministries, public departments and institutions.<sup>11</sup>

In 1949, the first year of its activity, the Romanian institution had the following central organs:

- Department of Periodical Press and Publications
- Department for Books Authorization
- Foreign Press Service
- Secretarial Service
- Staff and Learning Professional Service
- Administrative Service
- Accountancy Service.<sup>12</sup>

In the first years of establishing the censorship institutions the main difficulties laid in the training of personnel. The employees working in the beginning as censors were often lacking not only college, but even high school education. For example, in 1940 in the USSR out of five thousand censors (Glavlit plus local organs) only 506 had college education. The main requirement was to possess an irreproachable social origin, if possible a proletarian one. The chiefs of censorship were constantly complaining that they had no "qualified personnel". But gradually things changed and the requirements concerning the censors were growing. They had to possess "skills of analysis und synthesis of the reviewed material", the ability to draw conclusions concerning the general tendencies in a given



domain, the political experience of 10 years (or 5 years for the foreign group), and the employees from the department "Protection of State Secrets" – no political deviations whatsoever in the past.<sup>13</sup>

II. The extension of power and attributions, the second stage, follows very quickly. In 1927, Soviet Censorship institution was interested also in radio and television activity, having the task of approval of editorial plans and periodicals; statistical evidence of the import and export of literature; visa for the conferences, debates; authorization for establishment and dissolution of publishing houses; the advance and post-control of the literature, etc. In 1938, at the height of its activity, Glavlit included 15 divisions:

- "the division for the protection of the military and state secrets;
- the division for the control of foreign literature;
- the division for the control of shows and radio broadcasting;
- the division for the control of socio-political literature;
- the division for the control of artistic literature;
- the division for the control of scientific and technical literature;
- the division for the control of literature on agricultural and rural themes;
- the division for the control of newspapers;
- the division for the purge of forbidden works;
- the division for planning and finance;
- the commercial department;
- the personnel department;
- the special department;
- the general inspection;
- the office for general and legal affairs".<sup>14</sup>

In Romania, in 1961 there worked 317 employees in the central apparatus of the *DGPT*, other 109 were commissioners of the *DGPT* in the province, altogether 426. In this year, the Romanian censorship institution had the following departments:

Department I: Central Printing Press, Control of departmental and factory newspapers and other Printed, Radio Television, Science and technology;

Department II: Import-Export, Literature;

Department III: Control training, Theaters-Movies-Exhibitions;

Department IV: Ideology, Libraries-Antique store-Museums, Documentation and Information in Hungarian publications, Supporting Units, College Secretariat, Staff Department, Publications-Planning-Accounting Department, Administrative Service, Empowered Regions-Districts.<sup>15</sup>

Accumulation of functions by the Glavlit occurred in parallel with the organization of a union system, including and coordinating the censorship work of all Soviet republics. Moreover, all the similar institutions of the Soviet bloc had local bodies, as well as a department to coordinate them.

**III.** The last stage, specific for the institutions with longer life, was one of decline and crisis. The censorship decline was motivated also by an intense self-censorship after years of terror and repression and by the periods of political liberalization. In the case of the Soviet Union and Poland, the crisis lasted until the fall of the communist regime. In Romania's case, a brief crisis led to dissolution in 1977. This period is characterized by reducing the number of departments and employees, as well as of the censorship duties and tasks. Thus, in 1955, for the central apparatus and the local organs of the Soviet Glavlit worked altogether 6,708 employees, (alone) 305 of them in the central apparatus (in comparison, at the beginning of the century in Sankt Petersburg there activated only 13 employees in the field of censorship and in 1939, in the *Gublīt* from Leningrad, 119). In 1991, the Agency for the Protection of State Secrets in the Media under the USSR Ministry of Information and Press (the former Glavlit) has 120 employees, out of 435 shortly before.<sup>16</sup>

In 1991, in the last year of its existence, the Soviet censorship institution had two main sections:

**Department of Publications and Publishing Institutions**

The scientific and technical literature;

The economic and socio-political literature;

The Publications post-control;

Department for the activity with printing companies.

**Foreign Literature Department**

The U.S., Great Britain and countries of oriental languages

Department of the Roman-Germanic languages;

The preparation of normative documents;

Section of inter-republican coordinating;

The newspapers, radio and television;

The study of publications for export;

Department for advisory of press law and other mass media of the USSR.<sup>17</sup>

Even if the structure of the institutions suffered in time various changes, the principle of organization remained the same: the divisions were divided in sub-divisions or units, where activated employees specialized in certain domains: technics, natural sciences, agriculture, etc. The subordinated structures (the republican, the regional, the local censorship) mimicked the structure of the central institution. The establishing of the Glavlit and the similar institutions in the Communist bloc took place just before or immediately after a war (World War I and the Civil War in Russia, World War II) and that's why the structure of the institution imitated a military organization (in Romania too, the divisions of the censorship were called units). During World War II, the Soviet censors (from the Glavlit, the republics of the union, the regions and counties) were considered as active military service members (based on a decree from June 2, 1942).<sup>18</sup> The militarization of the structures of the state wasn't due only to the armed conflicts, but also to the dream of the leaders to amplify their power (especially in Stalin's era, when the devoted *nomenklatura* members obtained quite high military ranks).<sup>19</sup>

## **Some Aspects of the Activity of the Censorship Institution**

### **Purge of Books**

The first major action of censorship was the books and media purge, a process starting before the official establishment of the censorship institution. Thousands of authors and tens of thousands of books, including national and international classics, were declared enemies of the new regime and banned. The first ban criteria were in 1922, in Russia: a) publications containing agitation against Soviet power, b) disclosing the state secrets; c) disturbing the public opinion by communicating false information, d) the pornographic nature.<sup>20</sup> In the years 1945-1950, in Communist bloc countries the first ban criteria were: the fascist, Nazi, chauvinist, racist character of the publications. Of course, the Soviet criteria from the 1920s remained valid till the collapse of communism all over the Soviet bloc. In a short time, the criteria have multiplied, reaching the absurd. The books were banned or destroyed because they contained

sympathies for the West, idealistic philosophy, pessimism, unhealthy love, which aims incitement of the senses, books that do not evoke with enough enthusiasm the achievements of socialism, etc. After this stage, in Romania, for example, giving up the term “*defascizare*” (defascistization), the lists with books removed from circulation will reflect the evolution of political life. Over the years, there will be purged “papers, brochures, wrote by antiparty elements, exposed at the Plenary of CC of Romanian Communist Party”, “the papers of antiparty group exposed in the USSR”, “papers, brochures of the group of traitors from Hungary and counterrevolutionaries writers” (after the revolution in Hungary in 1956); “speeches of leaders of the CPSU, PMR and of fraternal parties, held during the festive days, imbued with the cult of personality”, “works including anti-Titoist citations or references”, “books and brochures devoted entirely to glorification of a leader and especially of Stalin”<sup>21</sup> (after his death), etc. The books of writers or scholars who fled abroad were also purged.

Alone by following the delicate themes from Polish history one gets a panorama of the excesses of censorship that could ban at discretion everything it considered necessary:

Among the taboo or falsified topics, called *białe plamy* (blank spots or areas of darkness), were the following: the history of aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, and the Catholic Church; the reign and person of Marshal Józef Piłsudski (1897-1935); the Soviet-German relations after the 1922 Rapallo Treaty; the history of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP; 1948-90) and its predecessors KPP (1918-38) and PPR (1941-48); the history of the USSR and of Russian-and-Soviet-Polish relations (including the 1918 rebirth of Poland; the Polish-Soviet war of 1919-1921; the secret protocols of the 23 August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop nonaggression pact, officially denied by the Soviet authorities until February 1990; the Soviet annexation of eastern Poland on 17 September 1939; the massive deportation from Polish territories seized by the USSR in 1939-41; the 1940 Katyń Forest massacre; the Polish military effort on the western front, the Polish government-in-exile in London.<sup>22</sup>

In parallel with the purge of books there existed lists with authors who hadn’t the right to publish or to be mentioned in the media, in works of specialized literature. The communist regimes always had *personae non gratae* who had to disappear from the public’s conscience for some time or for ever. Thus, in Czechoslovakia names of authors that should not be

mentioned in connection with the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party were of

those who have emigrated, those who have organized opposition against party, those who have taken up anti-party position and have been struck out or expelled from the party and have not yet changed their point of view, those who have been criticized.<sup>23</sup>

What we can not find studying documents from the archives is the number of purged books. According to some opinions, it results that in Romania

only in the period of 1944-1948 were removed from circulation 8,779 works, plus an unidentified number of works whose authors were only nominated between prohibited, which was equalized with the banning of all their creations.<sup>24</sup>

It is an approximate figure because, firstly, in many localities the libraries have been destroyed without taking into account any list and secondly, the censors were encouraged to ban books which were not on their list:

The purge after brochures was done previously, but I still blocked 160 volumes, susceptible to purge and other unforeseen in the list, that I have browsed and I found that they are harmful of all point of view.<sup>25</sup>

Or:

The purge was made by various commissions established by the Cultural Committee, to the extracted books me adding also some.<sup>26</sup>

There are hundreds of reports accompanied by the annexes of books removed from circulation (made by censors during the purges) and comparing these lists with official (published) lists of forbidden books, we can find dozens of authors and titles which were not listed anywhere as being banned.

Among the obligations of censorship entered also the establishment of special fund of books. The exact establishment datum of the special funds in Soviet Russia hasn't been yet determined, but documents and

testimonies reveal that these funds existed already since the beginning of the 1920s.<sup>27</sup> The books were divided into three categories: free fund, with access for all the readers; documentary and special funds with restricted access.

In Romania, such a fund was established in 1951, under the guidance of a Soviet counselor. In the archives there can be consulted "The Project for the Organization und Functioning of the Libraries Special Fund, Prepared Conformable to the Instructions of Comr. Soviet Counselor Maria H. Râtaia".<sup>28</sup> According to it,

the special fund of books from the libraries are founded to the end to preserve from destroying some copies of the purgeable books and put at the disposal of certain scientific researchers, well checked persons and eventually at the disposal of the prosecutor's office in case of ongoing investigations referring to a former high official, writer, journalist, etc.<sup>29</sup>

Similar processes took place in all countries of the Communist bloc, with variable intensity.

As an important task of the censorship, the purge of books will disappear only together with the institution. Though, the last period that closes this long and dramatic process is connected to the miserly and still mean decisions of the superior officials to reintroduce into the libraries some of the banned books, to republish some of the exile authors. If the lists with purged authors are inexhaustible over the years, at some moment there also appear a number of lists with "rehabilitated" authors who will be put back into libraries or republished. In the Soviet Union, in April 1988, after several instructions concerning the return to the free access fund of the Russian literature, there were also given some orders concerning the foreign literature; all instructions referring to the keeping and using of foreign literature will become invalid only on June 18, 1990.

Deposits of these special funds had reached gigantic figures: in 1987, the special fund of a library from the Soviet Union contained more than a million and a half of banned books and periodicals.<sup>30</sup> Arlen Bljum, one of the best analysts of the Soviet censorship, stated in a volume about the forbidden books in the USSR, that the politics of total "bibliocide" that was committed unflagging since 1917, over three quarters of the century, led to a devastation of the book funds so far unknown in history and the result of it was an essential diminution of the intellectual and spiritual potential of the country.<sup>31</sup>

The process of book purge in the Soviet bloc allowed the American secrets services to initiate a successful operation of book distribution that aimed to erode the communist system. Initiated in the midyear of 1956, the operation lasted till September 1991. There were sent over ten million books to Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. The first recipients were the cultural and political elites, then the books were also sent to the research centers, cultural organizations, higher education institutions. The realization of this program implied several institution and beside the radio stations Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Voice of America there also contributed to the distribution of books the International Advisory Council (IAC), later transformed into the International Literary Center (both of them being structures of the CIA). John P.C. Matthews, the first researcher who wrote about this operation (in 2003), called it "the Secret Marshall Plan for the Mind".<sup>32</sup> This secret program aimed to influence the perceptions, beliefs and expectations of the political and intellectual elite that had directly or indirectly the capacity of decision in the communist regime.

Studying the situation in the Soviet bloc by reference to an American report written during the second half of 1957, the Free Europe Committee, one of the coordinating institutions of this program,

concluded that the main thing it was up against was not Marxist obstruction, but a vacuum. Instead of being taught how to fight back Communism and counter Party arguments, East Europeans "needed something that would compensate for the sterility of satellite cultural life [...] and the ban on encyclopedic education imposed by the Communists [...] and the lack of humanistic thinking". To combat frustration and stultification, the banned Western sources of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic life should be made available. To achieve this, the book mailing program had to concentrate on four main objectives: to correct thinking from intelligent speculation to simple logic and factual information; to promote a minimum of Western values through psychology, literature, the theatre, and visual arts; to achieve basic linguistic understanding by increasing the share of French and German material and translations, and by sending anthologies in national languages as well as means of learning English; and to send certain publications of current and paramount interest unavailable in Eastern Europe.<sup>33</sup>

The operation was to a great extent a successful one, it wasn't discovered by the secret services and the censorship of the Communist

bloc. The reading of the same books in the East and the West built up a strong spiritual bonding between the European intellectuals that led to a peaceful end of the Cold War. The distribution of books over 35 years was a decisive issue in the ideological victory of the West over communism.

### **State Secret**

Another aspect, common to all censorship institutions from the Communist bloc, also very important, was the protection of state secrets and its relation to censorship. In archival documents we will find, quite often, statements such as: "The general task of the delegates D.G.P.T. [Romania], and of instructors and lecturers is to defend state security on the ideological plan, strict preservation of the state and party secrets, defense of the party line purity";<sup>34</sup> "The Central Publishing Board [Czechoslovakia] will ensure that no material is published in the mass information media which contains facts constituting a state secret, economic secret or public service secret. The Board will suspend the publication or distribution of any material containing such facts."<sup>35</sup> Censorships attempt to monopolize the "State secrecy" must be explained by the influence which the Soviet censorship had on similar institutions from the Communist bloc. Thus, a Bulgarian specialist considered that the "Soviet officials were the main factors that have established data constituting state secrets for all Eastern bloc".<sup>36</sup> The main state structures, formed after the Soviet model and with the help of the Soviet specialists, have inherited also the Soviet system for safeguarding the secrecy. In Bulgaria, for example, "the *List of state secrets* has been elaborated by a commission consisting of El. Gavrilova,<sup>37</sup> V. Katishev, officials of the State Security, and of the Ministry of National Defense", Viktor Katishev being the deputy director of Soviet Glavlit.<sup>38</sup>

The operating system of state secrets was based on laws about espionage. In 1892, in Czarist Russia, spying was defined as a form of state treason, and in 1912 there was elaborated a new law, accompanied by the first lists of espionage and punishment for such acts. Lists of secret data were developed by the military authorities, police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, making the difference between the concepts of military treason and diplomatic treason. At that time, there was not used the notion of "state secrets", but "secret documents", "National defense" or "territorial defense" and there did not exist yet a centralized system that could be coordinated as a whole. The creation of the Soviet Union (December 30, 1922) led to the unification and reviewing of the legislation as well as of



the lists with secret data. The operating principles of secrecy have been made in the years 1920-1930, and, thereafter, the important documents were drafted and reformulated, only the names of organs for the protection of information being changed. One of the most important moments in the creation of state secrets was in 1924, when the definition of "military secret" was extended until it came to the concept of "state secret", which included economic data and of other nature. For the first time, secrecy was passed from military organs to civil authorities: from the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Republic to the security organs – OGPU (KGB), then to Glavlit.

These lists, elaborated for "proper arming of workers in defense of state secrets" do not contain, in fact, secrets, but only abstract concepts and general categories, for example: "military activity", "number and technical condition of locomotives and wagons", "number of planes, pilots and paratroopers", "indicators of depreciation", "establishment of the central fund for agricultural products", "complete distribution of income and budgetary spending", "real income per capita", "biological products for treatment of dangerous diseases", "amounts and persons who are granted financial support of the Red Cross", "the number of crimes and prisoners", "fatal collective accidents per enterprises and accidents dynamic",<sup>39</sup> etc. without specifying in what they consist, without providing concrete details or explanations. Because of this, censors faced many difficulties in their use.

Based on documents from the archives, we can see how Romanian officials from the D.G.P.T. regularly completed the statistics and tables about state secrets entered in the press. In "Statistics of Censorship During the Month February 1952", there is stated that the number of censorship performed was 642, of which 328 are censorship of state secrets.<sup>40</sup>

In 1964, according to the Council of Ministers Decision 310/1964, there is established the list of the most important data and documents constituting state secrets, which will be sent for approval to the Ministry of Interior: "A commission composed of delegates from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Armed Forces, the State Planning Committee, the Central Bureau of Statistics, and the General Department for Press and Publications, will analyze the lists, doing proposals for approval to the Ministry of Interior."<sup>41</sup> In this document, the secrets have been categorized in "Top Secret", "Secret", "Confidential" and they were divided into the following general categories ("several groups of matters subject to state secrecy"):

1. Military data and documents;
2. Mobilization in case of war;
3. State Material Reserves;
4. Transport and telecommunications;
5. Economical data and documents;
6. The standard of living;
7. Sanitary;
8. Science;
9. Foreign policy;
10. Other state secrets and documents.<sup>42</sup>

Until 1971, when the coordination system of state secrets was completed, about 60 institutions were obliged to send their lists of secret data to the DGPT: from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Committee, the State Committee for Prices, the State General Inspectorate for Control of Products Quality, the Ministry of Electricity, the Ministry of Chemical Industry, the Ministry of Mines, Petroleum and Geology, etc. to the Council for Culture and Socialist Education, the Union of Association of the Medical Sciences, the Romanian Radio Television, the Romanian Agency for Artistic Managing, the Religious Affairs Department, etc.<sup>43</sup> In the course of time, secret lists became longer: for example, the lists with information, data and documents which are “state secrets” issued by ministries and other central bodies from 1971 contain a total of 245 pages.

A category of prohibitions refers to “natural disasters, catastrophes (air, rail, etc..) serious accidents or explosions (in the national energy system, industrial installations, etc.)”, in their case it was not allowed to publish “statements and information on damage” or “other information than officially communicated”.<sup>44</sup> A few days after the earthquake of 1977 in Romania, the censorship institution issues, under “Restricted” status,<sup>45</sup> the following communiqué (No. S/476 of 9.III.1977):

Until new provisions, do not advise for publication or (broadcast) any data and information of physical or value balance sheet, on the evaluation of material losses caused by earthquake, on the country, branches of national economy, sub-branches, activity sectors, counties, localities (including sectors of the capital), economic and social units (buildings, destroyed or damaged houses, companies, machines, equipment, installations, transportation networks, railway, automotive, telecommunications, electric, of water, natural gas, shops, schools, hospitals, etc.). About the

victims (dead and wounded) there can be published only the official data of balance sheet.<sup>46</sup>

Also in Poland,

information on direct threat to the life or health of people caused by industry or chemical agents used in agriculture should be eliminated from works on the subject of environmental protection or the threats to the natural environment in Poland. The prohibition applies to concrete examples of air, water, soil, and food pollution which endanger the life or health of people. This prohibition above all covers information on contamination caused by pesticides.<sup>47</sup>

Referring to this type of ban that existed also in communist Bulgaria, researcher Vesela Chichovska emphasizes “the total indifference to the lives of ordinary citizens that guarantees in totalitarian society the peace of dominant elite” and notes that this “annulled the personal freedoms of citizens and their basic human rights. [...] In case of disasters, the citizen was deprived of the possibility of self-defense and survival.”<sup>48</sup>

The institution of censorship supported with all its actions the activity of the communist party. It was all over the Soviet bloc a faithful Cerberus of the state power, duplicating sometimes the competence of the security services. The repression of the freedom of thinking and creating led to revolts, to the appearance of dissidence and the samizdat. The abolition of the institutions of censorship along with the fall of the communist regimes unfortunately did not coincide with the abolition of the censorship system in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. But these bureaucratic and repressive institutions actually disappeared and represent a unique and miserable experience in the history of communism and censorship in general.

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# CLASH OF RUSSIAN-AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

## Abstract

The central question asked in the paper is that; what are the motivations behind the United States and Russia's clash with each other in the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions? Why as external great power the U.S. intervene into regions where Russia sees its sphere of influence. I try to give an answer to the question what are the major determinants of the great power behavior in the SC and CA regions. It is argued that weakened Russia has used mostly indirect measures in the post-Cold war period to balance the American unilateralist hegemony, first in its neighborhood and then in the international affairs. I explain the causal determinants of the great powers clash-in this case Russia and the U.S. – in the post-Soviet space.

**Keywords:** Russia, United States, South Caucasus, Foreign Policy, neo-imperialism.

## Introduction

One of the turning points in international politics of the last century obviously was the end of the Cold War. The unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and communist regimes in the eastern part of Europe and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact had led to the birth of new international system. The starting point of the new system, which is frequently called *the new world order*, was the thaw in the post-Cold War relations between the two superpowers. Hopes for international cooperation, new era peace and respect for human rights were on the rise. The U.S. President George Bush described the new world order, in his speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1991, as

an order in which no nation must surrender one iota of its own sovereignty; an order characterized by the rule of law rather than the resort to force; the cooperative settlement of disputes, rather than anarchy and bloodshed, and an unstinting belief in human rights.<sup>1</sup>

But soon post-Cold War period events, during the last decade of the twentieth century and in the beginning of the twenty-first century, dampened the optimistic expectations. An epoch of universal concord, which was idealistically prophesied by the political analysts,<sup>2</sup> no longer portrays existent realities or the immediate future. By the collapse of the Soviet Union, a bipolar international system was abruptly transformed to a system dominated by the only superpower USA or it was called as *unipolar system*<sup>3</sup> by the neo-realists of international relations. In the early 1990s, the West was free to prosecute its traditional values such as democracy, human rights, justice and freedom unhampered by East-West rivalry. But realists of International Relations (IR) theory have warned that “in granting idealism a near exclusive hold on the foreign policy, the West might harm its interests”.<sup>4</sup>

Struggle between two superpowers for control over the world was replaced by the de-facto global hegemony of the USA. The first Gulf War was ended with the victory of the United States. No one was in a situation to interrogate American intervention to the war against Iraq. All over it was Pax Americana, despite the President George Bush had refused in his UN GA speech that U.S has no intention of striving for a Pax Americana.<sup>5</sup> It is true that there are scholars like Mearsheimer who argues that the USA is only a regional hegemon, and in order to become a global hegemon, the White House should be the only power in Asia and Europe, and in that case the U.S. does not possess that power.

The notion of strategic rivalry between the USA and the SU, popular during the cold war, has made a comeback in recent years in a new form, namely between Soviet Union's successor state Russia and the U.S., especially since the Russia's resurgence under Vladimir Putin. In comparison to the last decade of the twentieth century, the Kremlin came again on the world scene as a power, since the 2000s. For Russian President Vladimir Putin the collapse of the Soviet Empire was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20<sup>th</sup> century”.<sup>6</sup> The former Soviet republics became a battleground for regional supremacy between the White House and the Kremlin. The Kremlin remains still mistrustful to the U.S. motives and sees White House as the main foreign threat to its

great power status. For Kremlin it was extremely hard to give-in the fact that Russia cannot be anymore the only major power in the post-Soviet area. The post-Soviet sphere is seen from Moscow as its own backyard. Russia strives to reestablish itself as a regional and global superpower and to re-enunciate its interests in the international arena.

By the day, relations between Russia and the USA have been worsening. Political elites in the White House and in the Kremlin look at each other through the old Cold War prism. Continuing tensions in security relations between the two former enemies constitute a disaster in the international politics. It is incontestable fact that the White House's attitude toward the Kremlin is not different than the U.S. behavior was toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War years. Moreover, White House criticizes Russia because of the Kremlin's anti-American rhetoric. For Washington, Putin's efforts to promote greater economic integration mainly in the post-Soviet area are deemed as "a move to re-Sovietize the region".<sup>7</sup> Russia was called the "number one geopolitical foe"<sup>8</sup> for the United States.

Further expansion of NATO to the east, American strategic plans toward Syria and Iran, and the alliance itself are considered as a threat to the Kremlin's ambitions. For the Kremlin these attempts have a clear explanation: The United States tries to regain a clear strategic advantage over Russia, as it was in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. With the last presidential elections in Russia in March 2012, which ended with the victory of Vladimir Putin to a new term, the new geopolitical game started between the global powers. Russian inconclusive behavior, during the American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, was changed dramatically since the second term presidency of Vladimir Putin. Russia's re-involvement in Middle East politics and clear strategic gains in its post-Soviet neighborhood evinced that the Kremlin is not going anymore to follow pacifist or non-effective policy, which could paralyze its superior status in its relations with the United States. Polar opposite positions of the U.S. and Russia on the major international problems, which examples are abound, prognosticate that since the end of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the world entered to the new Cold War confrontation. Continuation of the confrontation appears in the placement of the missile defense in Europe and in divided positions regarding Iran's nuclear program, NATO's expansion toward the Russian borders, confrontation in the Middle East or currently in Syria, and Ukraine crisis are only few examples of the clash of Russian and American global interests.

The central question asked in the paper is that; *what* are the motivations behind the United States and Russia's clash with each other in the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions? In the case of the U.S. it should be clarified, why as external great power the U.S. intervene into regions where Russia sees its sphere of influence. I try to give an answer to the question what are the major determinants of the great power behavior in the SC and CA regions. It is argued that weakened Russia has used mostly indirect measures in the post-Cold war period to balance the American unilateralist hegemony, first in its neighborhood and then in the international affairs. I explain the causal determinants of the great powers clash-in this case Russia and the U.S. – in the post-Soviet space. The period after 2000 is the characteristic of this research. Because since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century Russia under Vladimir Putin clearly has described its ambitions of regaining its super power status as it was during the Cold war period.

This paper's stated hypothesis is that both the United States and Russia pursue neo-imperialist political strategy in their foreign policies towards the Central Asian and South Caucasus regions. The paper explores the main strategies of the U.S. and Russia by explaining their interference to the post-Soviet geographies. By analyzing the Kremlin's and the White House's strategic goals and their tactical measures, it would be possible to set several propositions about the instruments and character of neo-imperialist politics. As Mann argues, states exercise different power logics in the international system. These power logics are military, economic, political and ideological.<sup>9</sup> Both powers use different sources of social power and in this study the sources will be analyzed from the military, political and economic prism.

Russia and the United States provide the best opportunity to examine great power politics and specifically the concept of neo-imperialism in great power foreign policy strategies. Both of these states are considered as great powers in traditional meaning, because of their military power, territory, and influence possibilities in the international affairs. Thereto, in global politics great powers behavior, and explaining their clash over regions are still important for contemporary International Relations (IR). By analyzing American and Russian political, economic and military power in the post-Soviet regions, the research thesis will evaluate how great powers relations with the region states vary.

## Theoretical Overview

The collapse of the Soviet Union and transformation of the bipolar world system into one polarity reopened a new discussion among the International Relations scholars on the character of the new world order. There were scholars who argued that with the ending the ideological and military confrontation between the two systems, the post-Cold war era would become more stable. At the same time some scholars like John Mearsheimer defended the thesis that compared to the previous bipolarity, new world order will become more imbalanced.<sup>10</sup> Mearsheimer argued that the main reason of the international stability during the cold war period could be explained only with the bipolar distribution of the military power and military equality between the West and East blocs. So, by the disappearance of the one poles and emergence of the others the international system will become less stable and ultimately more inclined to instability.<sup>11</sup> Questions like, which countries will become major players, how will the White House and the Kremlin act as a result of the global polarity changes also made the international relations scholar think on the new political environment. Not only stability issue but also the character of the new international system was one of the main discussion points between scholars and politicians.

Henry Kissinger described the new world order as “the European system of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries than the rigid patterns of the Cold War”, by arguing that it will be multipolar.<sup>12</sup> For Samuel Huntington, a uni-multipolar system should be evolved into multipolar world as a result of regionals’ power challenges to American hegemony.<sup>13</sup> Glenn Snyder argued that with the fall of the Soviet Union, the character of the international system appears to be unipolar, though incipiently multipolar.<sup>14</sup> Kenneth Waltz predicted that great powers, which are not ally with the White House, would form coalitions to balance their power against the United States with the aim to design the new multipolar world order.<sup>15</sup> Despite of its collapse, Russia still was the second nuclear power after the United States. As Kissinger in his *Diplomacy* noted, the Kremlin will always be essential to the new world order.<sup>16</sup>

Analysis of the foreign policy of any country is a complex phenomenon in the international politics. As Cox argues, there are a lot of complexities and ambiguities in the foreign policy process that many influences are likely to be found in any explanation of any particular shift.<sup>17</sup> To answer the question how Russia as a great power reacted to the American

hegemony following the fall years of the Soviet Union and explaining it from the theoretical point of view would help to analyze the motives of the research question. The IR scholars for analysis states' security behavior use the concept of ontological security.<sup>18</sup> The concept means the formation of relationships between states in sustainable and consistent ways that provide a sense of continuity. Which aims to realize state's identity and a sense of agency in relation to surroundings.<sup>19</sup> Steele argues that, states are not dependent on material ends, but also on ideational incentives.<sup>20</sup>

Despite some scholars, like Vasquez and Moravcsik until recently criticize realist school in a meeting with failure to predict relations between great powers,<sup>21</sup> realist theory still remains one of the main international relations theories, which explains more clearly the foreign policy behavior of the two super global powers in this research thesis. In each stream of the realist theory there are some general assumptions, which could be applied to the Russian and American foreign policy analyses. Most of the realist theory scholars predict that great powers, with the aim to seek balance against the hegemony of the other super power, follow retaliation policies, especially if a hegemonic power poaches on great powers territory or its sphere of influence.<sup>22</sup> For a long period the classical realism, neoclassical and neo-realistic theoretical approaches were applied into foreign policy analyses. The analysis of the foreign policy activities in the neorealist school will be discussed from two perspectives: Kenneth Waltz's structural realist theory and Robert Gilpin's hegemonic war theory, as well as hegemonic rivalry theory.

The concept of the state's central role in the international politics, the goal of its power and importance of its national interests as well as the nature of the foreign policy are the main characteristic points of the classical realism.<sup>23</sup> To understand state's motivation in its foreign policy, the comprehensive way is to analyze state's national interests in relation with others. The nature of the international relations is still explained with richness of conflicts, in which great powers shape the world politics by focusing on the zero-sum games and the clash over the sphere of influences. Another fundamental thesis of the classical realism is about the anarchic nature of the international order, which negates any existence of a world central power that could enforce other sovereign states for accepting its rules. Importance of the national interests is a fundamental criterion for effectiveness of the foreign policy of the any state. The priority of national interests for the U.S. and Russia are reflected in their state's documents such as the Foreign Policy, Military and National Security doctrines. Rationally



thinking, neither the White House nor the Kremlin could be interested in any cooperation in the world affairs, which are against their national interests. Concerning to the anarchic nature of the international world order, the lack of mutual confidence among the international players, where it is described mainly as an external threat to its own national interests or political intervention in its national interests, forces the states to confide only in their own power and security guaranty. In this regard, NATO's enlargement policy towards the post-Soviet countries or the United States' policy of deployment missile shields in the territories of the East European states are the best examples for the explanation above mentioned thesis from the Russian foreign policy prism.

In classical realism theory, power politics is explained as a law of human nature, as Thucydides argues in his famous book the Peloponnesian War. In the real world principles are subordinated to policies of the state, as Machiavelli had argued in the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

According to classical realists the effectiveness of the state's foreign policy is measured mainly with its military power. The state tries to increase its capability in the military sphere. Russian foreign policy strategies in some steps could be analyzed from its military might paradigm or military threat policies. For example, Russian foreign policy intention to deploy its nuclear missiles in its Kaliningrad enclave was a simple example of the Kremlin's military threat against the NATO's enlargement and missile shield deployment plans.<sup>24</sup> Russian military intervention to Georgia during the August war could also be explained as a threat message to the other pro-Western governments in its neighborhood. The Kremlin's military muscle show was not only restricted towards its neighborhood; also as it was during the Cold War years, Moscow demonstrated its power with flights of its strategic bombers close to the United States and Canadian territorial waters over the Atlantic ocean,<sup>25</sup> as well as visit of its fleet of warships, headed by the nuclear powered Peter the Great cruiser to Venezuela.<sup>26</sup>

Kenneth Waltz's structural realist theory, also known as defensive realism, primarily focuses on the analysis of the structure international relations system, and state's foreign policy behavior in the international affairs is the main determinant of this system. Waltz argues that the anarchy defines the international system, not the "lust for power", as Morgenthau claims. The reason of aggressiveness of great powers is because of their need to survive in the international system, but not because of their lust for power. Waltz claims also that the structure of the international system

pushes the states to accentuate the balance of power. Lack of central global government in the international system engenders the inter-state conflicts and wars, and also the security competition among states.

During the cold war period the structural realism had focused on the bipolar world order and behavior of the blocs and their leaders in the international scene, as well as distribution of power was one of the main theses within this school. Different approach to the bipolar order and the role of the state's military and foreign policies were also main discussion points of the offensive and defensive realist schools. The main goal of the scholars of the defensive realism is the state's survival, while offensive realist theory argues that based on the anarchist character of the international system, states tries to maximize their power and military capabilities. Unlike Mearsheimer, Waltz claims that the structure of international system does not provide state with incentives to maximize their power. According to Waltz, when great powers behave aggressively and maximize their power they will encourage their potential victims to come together and balance against the aggressive state.<sup>27</sup> That's why states try to achieve security rather than to maximize their power, and also they follow strategies, which would maintain the balance of power.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world order, the structural realist theory was criticized because of its non-ability to predict the collapse of the SU or the end of the Cold War period, in which Waltz strongly supported the idea of endless confrontation between two camps of the bipolar world. But Russia's return to the international system in the beginning of the 2000s with ambitions to be again one of the main political arbiters of the world system made the views of the structural realism again discussible in the post-cold war period. Russian foreign policy behavior, particularly in the context of global aspirations of the Kremlin and its imperialist nostalgia feelings in the post-Soviet space are the main tools for the analyses by the structural realist scholars. Especially new Russian-American confrontation, the Kremlin's global ambitions and its counter-deterrence to the American global hegemony could be the best examples for these analyses. The distribution of power thesis of the structural realism in the international system could be also analyzed from the Russian foreign policy behavior, mainly against the US. After the 9/11 events the presence of the U.S. military bases in the post-Soviet states has changed the power balance in favor of the United States, which it was perceived in the Kremlin as a threat for its national

interests, despite the fact that Putin directly following the terrorist attacks had agreed for deployment of the American military forces.

Structural realists tried to give answer why external powers choose the policy of intervention into other great power's sphere of influence? From the adherents' of this school point of view, one of the main causes for such kind of regional intervention is an existence of the peer rival power. An intervention by a hegemonic power in one region is the way of checking the rise of potential hegemon in another region.<sup>28</sup> Mearsheimer explains the behavior of regional hegemons and argues that there is an attempt to check other competitor hegemon(s) in other regions because they fear that a rival power will be powerful foe. Regional hegemons prefer that there be at least two great powers located together in other regions, thus as a result of their proximity they will concentrate themselves to each other rather than a distant hegemon.<sup>29</sup> The hegemonic rivalry theories, and particularly hegemonic war theory developed by Robert Gilpin also analyzes international relations from the perspective of the international system's structure. On the contrary to the Waltz's theory scholars of the hegemonic rivalry theories make allowance for the dynamical changes in the international system. According to Gilpin, a hegemonic conflict results from the uneven and differential growth of power among the political actors of the international system. Gilpin points out that the existence of a clear power hierarchy in the international system is the main guaranty for its stability and the stability could not be drastically changed even if there is minor power distribution. An important point in Gilpin's thesis is that if fundamental interests of a hegemon state are not violated or threatened, then unproportioned increase of power in the international system would not cause the instability. The status quo in the system would be undermined by the growth of power of the rival, which has potential to attenuate the power of a hegemon. According to Gilpin, a major objective of states was to increase their influence over each other to fulfill political, economic and ideological interests.<sup>30</sup> During the post- World War II order the Soviet –American hegemonic rivalry was changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and thus, the only hegemon of the new world order the USA could strengthen its position.

Miller argues that there are two variables that could explain the reason of intervention by a great power into regions outside of its geographical area.<sup>31</sup> These variables are called as constraints and incentives. If constraints are low and incentives are high, then great powers follow the policy of intervention; when incentives are low and constraints are

high, then for great powers any intervention is unlikely; in the case of high levels of the both variables, non-intervention or limited intervention is preferable; and in the case of low level of both variables, for great powers intervention is unnecessary.<sup>32</sup> For a long time after the Soviet collapse, because of economical and political turmoil in Russia, no one was expected the Kremlin's return back as a new challenger to the US global hegemonic ambitions in the world politics. These expectations were changed especially with the Russian-Georgian war in 2008. Vladimir Putin's foreign policy ambitions evolving Russian international influence militarily and economically could clearly explain the hegemonic rivalry theories approaches in the last decade.

As a consequence, it should be mentioned that to analyze the Russian foreign policy behavior is not an easy task, taking into account the imperialist legacy of the Soviet Union. It is based mainly on multifarious and complex factors. Even so, contemporary Russia's foreign policy behavior could be explained mainly with the classical realist approach, which focuses on national interests of a state and have connection to the foreign policy aims, its political, economic power and especially its military potential. But the hegemonic rivalry theories of the neorealist school also explain the role of the Russia in the contemporary international relations.

Neorealist and neoclassical realist theories of the international relations also explain state's foreign policy behavior in the international scene. Focusing on the systemic level of analysis, neorealist theory, and by focusing on a level of a state, neoclassical realist theory tries to explain the foreign policy as a result both external and internal factors that could be strengthen or weaken the influence of structural factors. Despite some differences, neoclassical realism shares not a few similarities with the traditional realists. These similarities are: state behavior mainly is affected by the international system; acceptance of the anarchic character of the international system; an assumption on international politics, which are competitive and on states that are egoistic.

But the main difference between neoclassical scholars and adherents of the classical or neorealist schools are based on the assumption that the use of the military force in the case of any threat to ensure its objective is the state's main primary aim and the balance of military capability plays an important role in the state's behavior. Neoclassical scholars refuse to accept this assumption by arguing that there are other strategies, which could be used by the state to respond threat, and despite that military

capability is one of the major components of the state's power, it can not be always the primary option.<sup>33</sup>

According to Mearsheimer, "the essence of the security dilemma is that the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states".<sup>34</sup> The best way to secure survival is domination, and hereby great powers attempt to dominate their regions, which generally is called sphere of influences or backyards. But hegemony itself could cause a security dilemma, when regional hegemon attempts to check other regional hegemon because of the fear that a rival great power will be a powerful foe, as Mearsheimer argues.<sup>35</sup> Russia with its imperialistic ambitions would be problematic for the post-Soviet countries. But on the other hand decline of Russian imperialist power could trigger new ethnic and territorial conflicts, which easily could spill out to the territories of the South Caucasus and CA states. At the same time, the strengthening of the region countries from Russian point of view could pose a threat for the Kremlin.

Russian foreign policy could be also analyzed from the prism of the strategy of coercive diplomacy since the collapse of the SU in the former satellite republics. In opposition to "supportive strategy of suasion", Lynch uses the term "coercive strategy of suasion",<sup>36</sup> which he focuses on Russian use of peacekeeping forces in the conflict zones in the context of coercive interference in the internal affairs of the state. Russia uses tools like political and diplomatic pressure, coercive intervention and "peacekeeping" operations. Lynch, who developed the concept of coercive suasion, distinguishes three levels in the Russian suasion strategy: forms of behavior, targets of strategy and objectives.<sup>37</sup> To the forms of behavior belong: coercive interventions in the conflicts by Russian forces on ground; actions of Russian forces to protect the border zones; deployment of the Russian "peacekeeping" forces or exert pressure for the deployment of the Russian troops; economic and military assistance to the separatist movements, and political pressure to reach conflict resolution on Russian terms.<sup>38</sup>

As mentioned above, the realist theories are the most closely connected with the study of neo-imperialism and great power politics. For explaining of Russian and American security environment and foreign policy strategies of both great powers in the SC and CA, I utilize applying theory of offensive realism. Russia, because of its huge size and population, and as a nuclear power is perceived still a potential danger. According to the theory of offensive realism, Russia will always remain dangerous to the West and

vice versa the United States will be remain as a threat to the superpower ambitions of the Kremlin. If we analyze the National Security Concepts, the Foreign Policy Doctrines and statements and theories of many Russian and American political scientists, then we should agree with Mearsheimer's views. So, following this assumption in my research I endeavor to explain that the White House's and the Kremlin's foreign policy strategies in the post-Soviet geography are shaped by the nature of the international political system under the principles of the offensive realism theory. According to Mearsheimer, there are five bedrock assumptions of the offensive realism.<sup>39</sup>

First assumption is about the anarchic status of the international system. Mearsheimer does not interpret the term anarchic as engulfed or chaotic by wars and conflicts. Anarchic means that states are sovereign and do not comply with any higher authority. So, one of the main arguments of the theory is that international system lacks a central or supranational government.<sup>40</sup> The same explanation is affirmed by Waltz, who argues that wars and conflicts occur in an anarchic system, where nothing exists to prevent states from entering into conflict.

The second principle is: states as the main actors of the system own certain military powers and this power is used for interfering or destroying each other for their own survival. If there is no any other power, which could threat the existence of a state, then it means that the state has reached its hegemony status. States confides in self-help, and also figure their national interests and powers concurrently with the interests and powers of other states with the aim to ensure their existence in the anarchic system. Among the states exist fear, and that's why the states try to eliminate any perceived or existing danger. Mearsheimer defines great powers as states, and also argues that great powers have to have sufficient military power for engaging in conventional war against the most powerful rival in the world. But, a great power does not need any capabilities to defeat its main rival. Just, the great power should have enough power to turn conflict into a war.<sup>41</sup> According to the father of the offensive realism, the theory focuses mostly on great powers because "the fortunes of all states are determined primarily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability".<sup>42</sup>

The third principle of the offensive realism is about the distrust and fear between the states. Great powers are suspicious of their rivals' intentions. Potentially, there is no guaranty; the states that possess military strength and capability would not attack to other state's sphere of influence or territory.

The fourth assumption explains the survival as the main goal of any state. According to Mearsheimer, states can also pursue non-security goals “as long as the requisite behavior does not conflict with the balance of power logic”.<sup>43</sup> Unlike defensive realism theory supporters, who although share the same view with offensive realists in emphasizing the need of the state to ensure their survival, offensive realist school argues that the survival of a state can be guaranteed by reaching the hegemony status, while defensive realist school supports balance of power idea as the best strategy to ensure the survival.

The last fifth principle of the bedrock assumptions is about the rationality of the states. Mearsheimer argues that; states behavior is based on their need to survive and on constraints afforded to them by the international system. In his theory Mearsheimer explains that states get involved in game theory through which “they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of other states is likely to affects their own strategy for survival”.<sup>44</sup>

So, the main aim of this research is explained by the realist school theories, particularly by the offensive realism theory of the IR. The research thesis argues that principles of the above mentioned theory would be applied as a main theory to the events presented through case studies. As already mentioned, multiple case studies will give an opportunity to explain the findings and to test the hypothesis. Applying a rigorous theoretical approach will give a possibility to understand the Kremlin’s and the White House’s foreign policy strategies. Thereby, the importance of this research bases not only on the emphasis on the methodological and theoretical framework; but also it will make a contribution with its predictions on the behavior of the both neo-imperialist powers in the future.

## **A Background of U.S.-Russian Rivalry in the Region**

In a unipolar era, geographical regions are considered as *poles of power* where great powers can banish other hegemonic interventions.<sup>45</sup> Russia tries to be a gateway for the West towards the former Soviet republics.<sup>46</sup> Acceptance of the Kremlin as an only hegemon of the former Soviet republics by the West is one of the main foreign policy strategy of Russia. By this way, Russia tries to use economic leverages for its political success.

Its economy depends mainly on natural resources, but at the same time, Russia tries to secure an access to the significant economic resources in its neighborhood. And in this context could be analyzed Russian energy diplomacy in the Caspian Sea. Because of that in the last decades a term like economic expansion entered to the Russian political literature. From the Russian prism, comparing to the militarily expansion, economic expansion would be tolerable for the Western countries. On the other hand, the Caspian region and its resources have already become an issue of misunderstanding not only between Moscow and Washington, but also the EU states became already part of the geopolitical game over the region. As a member of the most international organizations, Russia uses its diplomatic capabilities to negotiate with other powers in the world. Taking into account the idea that negotiation is the main instrument of diplomacy,<sup>47</sup> Russia needs to negotiate with the U.S. for securing its influence in the SC and CA. From diplomatic prism, since the Putin period Russian strategy mainly is based on the supporting the White House's policies and campaigns in the world where it doesn't cross with Russian red lines on the one hand, and with the aim to legitimate its national interests the Kremlin utilizes own version of narratives in the international relations on the other hand.

Some foreign policy analysts explain the reason of the deterioration in the relationship between Washington and Moscow, especially in the last years, with the fact that neither has much to gain from cooperation.<sup>48</sup> Russia is starting to throw its weight around.<sup>49</sup> It is obvious that Russia gets suspicious about the American intentions and policies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, which could undermine its security interests, and that is the main obstacle for further cooperation between Russia and the U.S. If thinking realistically, then Russia acts with reason. In exchange Russian support to the U.S., after the terrorist attacks, in its war in Afghanistan, the White House supported the color revolutions in the post-Soviet regions, which was interpreted by the Kremlin as directed at Russian national interests in its sphere of influence.

But relations between the White House and the Kremlin since the Crimea annexation can be explained as fundamental change in Russia's objectives, according to the former American Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle.<sup>50</sup> The coup in Ukraine in February 2014 triggered one of the dangerous international crises in the international relations in the last two decades. For some political experts it was the most dangerous crisis between Russia and the United States since the Cuban missile crisis.<sup>51</sup>



The Crimea annexation is seen from the West as a response to the fall of pro-Russian Yanukovich regime and installation of anti-Russian regime in Ukraine. Probably Putin's main aim was not an extension of its territory through annexation of Crimea. It was continuation of Putin's policy on direction to revive Russia as a great country.

In Washington it is better understood that if the U.S. is still interested in securing its national security interests in the mentioned regions, then it must be ready to play a game in the strategic contest with the traditional powers like Russia and Iran. The United States should not maintain Russia in its pressure against the post-Soviet countries. As Robert Kagan argues, the United States should lead forcefully and be hegemonic power, if is not interested in ensuing of chaos in the world.<sup>52</sup>

The Kremlin's initial allowance to the deployment of the American military forces in Central Asia was related with the realistic attitude of Russia. In Moscow it was clear that only the USA could effectively fight Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorist forces along its borders. But later with the color revolutions in the post-Soviet space, Moscow saw the American presence in the region as a major source of instability than any benefits for its national security. Also China was against any kind of American intervention in Central Asia, and the government in Beijing has officially expressed that the White House presence in the region should be only short term and related with economic developments in the region. China and Russia could strengthen their positions, to certain degree, against the American presence in the CA, and also any pressure to the regional regimes by the U.S.

There are supporters of an idea that, Russian military must continue to have NATO as a primordial enemy.<sup>53</sup> Russia should oppose constantly to CIS members' joining NATO. The Kremlin should take into account the NATO's enlargement strategy towards the countries neighboring Russia and should not make any concessions by pursuing a pragmatic and effective foreign policy.<sup>54</sup>

The United States' decision pulling out the American and NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2014 is clear sign that the White House indirectly owns up to its geostrategic defeat in the Central Asia against the Kremlin. The region turns again into the less important place for the United States, as it was in the pre-9/11 years. It can be seen as an end of a brief experiment to extend power and influence in the Central Asia.<sup>55</sup>

But the New Great Game between the U.S. and Russia will move from the Central Asia to the western Pacific and East Asian waters. The

United States will try to secure naval supply route from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean.

Anyway there is also different approach in debates on remote possibility for existence of a new Cold War between Russia and the West. As Obama argues, Russia is not anymore a global military power and is not an evil Empire unlike the SU. The Kremlin is not and cannot be global competitor as it was during the Cold War period. Russia is not in a position to match American power theater-for-theater worldwide.<sup>56</sup>

### **Russian Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus and Central Asia**

With the demise of the Soviet Union, its successor state Russia, in comparison to other new regional and non-regional external powers, has decisive influence on the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions. It can be explained with the 200 years historic legacies of the Kremlin in the regions, and also with the economic dependence as well as political and military pressure used by Moscow towards the region states since the beginning of the 1990s. Despite the fact that Russia was profoundly languished on military, economic and political levels in the beginning of the 1990s, the Kremlin is still of great importance in these Southern peripheries. As Kissinger argued, the collapse of empires engenders two contrary trends.<sup>57</sup> The first one is that the periphery states of former empire attempt to take advantage over the weakened imperial power, and the second trend is that the imperial power tries to restore its authority in the former political geography. These two regions in the former Soviet Union are the best examples for the explanation of the Kremlin's neo-imperial behavior towards the region countries since the demise of the Soviet empire. It might be explained with the "existence of a level of structural dependency that will not be overcome overnight".<sup>58</sup>

Garnett also argued that, in the mid of 1990s, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, with all the constraints on Russian economic and military policies, were two regions where the Kremlin could appear for realization its activities.<sup>59</sup> He described the region states as a "belt of weak states".<sup>60</sup> Because of little international support, particularly Tajikistan and Georgia were vulnerable for the weakened Russia. Hyman argued that Soviet policy mainly in the CA has aimed to destroy of the pre-Soviet identity of the region ethnic nations.<sup>61</sup>

Since the beginning of the 1990s until today, Moscow's foreign policy strategies toward these geographical areas, and national interests in the region states were neither one-lined nor monotonous, rather have passed through many phases. A document signed in Belorussian Belavezhsкая Pushcha between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine on 8 December 1991, was declaration on the dissolution of the Soviet Union and on establishment of a new organization named as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).<sup>62</sup> Later other post-Soviet republics, except three Baltic states, joined to the CIS.<sup>63</sup> In the following 5 years after the collapse of the SU, the position of the Western world can be explained with the abstaining from involving into the regional conflicts. At the same time Russia was also economic and political weak in realization its hegemonic ambitions toward the post-Soviet republics. In the last five years of 1990s, Russia started to force the CIS countries for the economic integration, but the countries interests were divergent in their approaches to Russia's offer. The closest allies of the RF in the post-Soviet area were mainly Belorussia, Tajikistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and other states were interested in integration and establishment of closer cooperation with the Western political, economic and military institutions.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, as an important geostrategic area for the Russian Federation remained the South Caucasus where nationalist movements were growing among the ethnic minorities, and the Kremlin could manage the situation for the use of its own interests. Russia has implemented different strategies toward the region countries. Already in 1991, when the nationalist governments in the South Caucasus republics decided on secession from the Soviet empire and declared their independence, the Gorbachev's administration blackmailed these region countries by threatening them with the problems in the autonomous regions.<sup>64</sup> The Kremlin tried to pressure Georgia and has planned to disassociate the South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia.<sup>65</sup> Military aid to the separatist movements in Azerbaijan and Georgia in the war against the central authorities and pressure to the South Caucasus republics to accept the mediator role of the Kremlin in the negotiations between the conflicting parties were main similarities of Russian strategy against the region countries. Since the beginning of the Putin's period, Russia continued its policy to establish predominant influence in these regions. The main approach was that these regions are the least costly economically, politically and internationally for Russia.<sup>66</sup>

Armenia remains the main strategic ally of the Kremlin in the South Caucasus. The strategic partnership between Erivan and Moscow was deep rooted in a history, and during the independency years it was formalized with the Russian-Armenian treaty of friendship from 1997.<sup>67</sup> Since 2000, treaty of friendship between two countries was transformed into a strategic alliance within the CSTO.<sup>68</sup> As a result of political and economic influence, Russia could secure its economic domination in Armenia, and industry and main key services became dependent from Russian economy giants.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Russia in the 1990s can be characterized as cooled, and it was replaced with the mutual friendship agreement during the Russian president Vladimir Putin's two-day Baku visit in 2001. Agreements on dividing the Caspian Sea and its resources, and allowing the Kremlin using the Gabala radar station<sup>69</sup>, the only military base of Russia in Azerbaijan were the main achievements of those warmed relations. Putin's visit was clear indication of the Russia's new attempts in its active South Caucasus policy. It would be fair to say that the visit gave more advantages to Azerbaijan than Russia. Azerbaijan could get everything, as it was possible from the Kremlin. It is also interesting to mention that during the meeting with Azeri President Aliyev, Putin has not touched upon to issues like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and demand to station Russian military forces on the Azerbaijan-Iran border.<sup>70</sup>

For Russia, the actions of the religious extremists and fundamentalists in the CA, was seen as a chance to strengthen its position in the region.<sup>71</sup> The influence and existence of the United States in the former Soviet area was one of the main worries of the Russian leadership. For Russia, any kind of policies of the U.S. and the West in general in the FSU states are analyzed as "methods from the Cold War arsenal", as once an official from the Putin cabinet, Sergei Yastrzhembsky had stated, accusing the Europeans "in interference in the affairs of a sovereign states".<sup>72</sup> Especially, following the events of September 11, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia deranged the Kremlin. Russia used the pressure policy on the former Soviet countries, and especially on the South Caucasus states to reverse their pro-Western course. Following the color revolutions in Georgia in 2003, in Ukraine in 2004, and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, the new leadership in those countries started to strengthen ties with the West. As a result of these developments in the region, the Kremlin toughened its policy towards the region states, as well as towards the outside powers engaging in the post-Soviet space.

Russia is regularly alleged of new imperialism in its policy concerning to the former Soviet countries. From time to time, Russia is accused of using oil and other energy resources as tools of intimidation and blackmail.<sup>73</sup> Viktor Khristenko, Russian Energy Minister, responding to these critics by the U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, explained that "Russia is deeply puzzled by recent commentary in the West that distorts Russian energy policies. Russia has moved away from Soviet era arrangements of subsidizing energy prices to our neighbors and turned to market based pricing mechanisms. We are aware that old impressions fade slowly, but it is time for the West to recognize and acknowledge the maturing role and state progress that Russia has achieved."<sup>74</sup>

Not only the White House, but also the post-socialist countries' politicians criticize the Kremlin in using the energy resources as a tool against those states. Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, the former head of Special Security Service of Poland has imputed Russia by claiming that "what Russia does in the Eastern Europe is a new economic imperialism. Yesterday tanks, today oil and gas!"<sup>75</sup>

Contrarily, Russian politicians and official representatives disclaim arraignments against the Kremlin based on imperialist foreign policy towards former Soviet countries, and explain that the West must "bury Cold War ghosts"<sup>76</sup> and accept Russia as a democracy. Dmitri Trenin explains that "Russia today is not, and is not likely to become a second Soviet Union. It is not revanchist and imperialist aggressor bent on absorbing its former provinces."<sup>77</sup>

On the other hand, Russia's foreign policy concept (2000) clearly defined the relation between Moscow's political and economic interests: "Russia must be prepared to utilize all its available economic levers and resources for upholding its national interests."<sup>78</sup> That is the reason why Russian economic policies are presumed as a political instrument in the West. Hydrocarbon resources were used as a political tool and the Kremlin with the aim to penalize the pro-Western governments in its neighborhood has increased gas prices.

The national security strategies of the South Caucasus states during the first independency decade in their relation with the Kremlin had passed through three phases.<sup>79</sup> These phases had started with the radical independence demands from Moscow already in the end of 1980s. The Kremlin was seen as a major threat for the states political sovereignty. But at the same time Russia was acknowledged a strategic neighbor. It was understood primarily in Armenian attitude to the Russian presence

in the region. For Armenia, the Kremlin is considered as a counterweight against Turkey's political or military influence. Baku and Tbilisi were still against the Kremlin's involvement into the regional issues. The last phase, as Aves argues, was characteristic in Azerbaijan's position, which was the only country that resisted, become a close partner of the Kremlin, while Armenia's and Georgia's foreign policy strategies were based on strategic considerations.

In the abstract, Russia's strategic interests in the Central Asia could be defined as follows: - reassert its influence and maintain strategic control over pipeline routes for transportation of energy reserves from the Caspian Sea basin; - to be militarily only hegemon and to have only its own military bases in the region; - to avoid any other military, economic and political alliance among the region states or between the region states and any other third power.

Russia's foreign policy strategy could also be characterized between defensive and aggressive realism, as Tsygankov argued that both of these schools of thought supported the Kremlin's power constellation.<sup>80</sup> At the same time, foreign policy strategy of the Kremlin towards the post-Soviet countries is indoctrinated with imperialism and the syndrome of greatness.<sup>81</sup> Politicians of the Euro-Atlanticist school in the Russian foreign policy supported an idea of integration to the Western community by adopting the Western values and following the policy of rapprochement with the United States after the fall of the Soviet Union. Representatives of the neo Euro-Asian school in their political views supported the idea of becoming an independent political pole in the international politics to balance the Western dominance. Calling any region, as its sphere of influence and having imperial pretensions toward these regions are one of the characters of the neo-imperialist foreign policy.

If the Kremlin Administration in previous years had tried to reestablish the control over the post-Soviet countries mainly by political and economic ways, increasingly Moscow uses military pressure for achieving its goal in these regions. In its relations with the post-Soviet countries, Russia has mostly relied on coercion policy, which in the last years it was substantially successful for the Kremlin. Compared to the Yeltsin's years, there is no doubt that Russian foreign policy under Putin in the South Caucasus and Central Asia since the beginning of the 2000s has better coordinated by the Kremlin.

The Kremlin's involvement in the post-Soviet regions during the first years of independence was in subjection to Russia's hegemonic efforts.

During the post-1993 years, until the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century, Russia under Yeltsin administration followed more ideological and military power in its relations with the region countries. Economic, ideological and political power logic was characteristic in Russia's foreign policy behavior during Putin's first two terms presidency. With the August war in 2008, Russia dropped a hint to the international society that military power of the Kremlin will be used against any other state, which will not recognize and respect its great power status in the region.

Russia has no respect to the independence of the region countries. In the case of Armenia, the Kremlin displays without stint how it disdains Armenia's independence and sovereignty. As Giragosian argues, the problem in Russia-Armenia relations is not in the partnership or relationship, but the lack of respect from Moscow, and imbalance between two countries in any alliance.<sup>82</sup>

The August war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 is one of the best examples of the Russian neo-imperialist policies, which the Kremlin administration decided to intervene in the Georgian territories, annexed them and violated the international law principles. One of the main reasons behind the intervention was the foreign policy priority of the Georgian governments, which have followed well nigh the same policies since the gaining independence: to diminish Russian dependency and turn to the West, aiming the secure of protection from Russia. Especially, the Saakashvili government in Georgia after the Rose Revolution without stint intensified the integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures, established the security ties with the U.S. and criticized the Russian imperialist policies in its territory.

In consideration of this, Moscow has evinced with the August war that she is not going to share sphere of influence with any other third power, and is ready to procure its influence over the post-Soviet space by using hard and soft powers. Aim of the Kremlin is to pull all the post-Soviet countries to its orbit, including mainly both in political and economic spheres. In other words, based on its neo-imperialist foreign policy Russia aims to intensify and accelerate creation of union in the post-Soviet space.

Use of separatism in the South Caucasus conflicts by the Kremlin was aimed at preserving its declined influence over its former satellites. The secessionist conflicts which some of them called as frozen conflicts are still unresolved, and one of the main reasons is the Kremlin's lack of interest for any solution under international law principles. Russia tries to balance its strategic attitude against the USA in the SC and CA. And

neo-imperialist character of the Kremlin's foreign policy forces itself to keep under control any country in its sphere of influences. In his third period as President of Russia, Putin tries to institutionalize the Kremlin's gains by enduring territorial-political structures, as Blank argues.<sup>83</sup>

With its military bases in abroad Russia aims to coerce the local governments. In Georgia's case three Russian military bases were located in the separatist regions and through these bases the Kremlin established its relations with the ethnic minorities and used the relations as leverage against the Tbilisi government. And by this way tried to maintain its military presence in the South Caucasus region. Russia's war with Georgia in August 2008 ended with the recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia by the Kremlin. By signing a treaty Russia announced that it is going to recognize the borders between Abkhazia and South Ossetia on one side and Russia on the other hand.<sup>84</sup> These moves of the Kremlin are against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, which could be explained as neo-imperialist foreign policy action on the way to create satellite states in the neighborhood that could influence and enforce post-Soviet countries to be dependent on Russia.

## **Foreign Policy Interests of the USA in the South Caucasus and Central Asia**

The United States was one of the first states, which recognized the independence of the region states and established diplomatic relations with them. Over the last twenty years four main objectives defined foreign policy of the United States in the South Caucasus region: newly independent South Caucasian states should stay independent and sovereign; to support for the integration of the region states into the Euro-Atlantic community and global market economy; help the conflicting parties to solve their problems and promote free and open market democracy.<sup>85</sup>

Strategically importance of the South Caucasus region for the U.S. was mentioned by the Department of Defense in 1994, with the aim to form the South Caucasus region as an area of secular, independent, and friendly states to the West.<sup>86</sup> Michael McFaul argued that "states such as Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Georgia have encouraged American involvement to balance hegemonic presence of the Kremlin in the region."<sup>87</sup>

But still in essence, Russia-centric or *Russia first policy* in the American foreign relations was characteristic towards the South Caucasus states.<sup>88</sup>



According to Brzezinski, this policy was characteristic only for first two years of the Clinton administration. But since 1994 the administration “pursues a policy of promoting of geopolitical pluralism” in the former Soviet states.<sup>89</sup>

Establishment of a regional organization GUAM<sup>90</sup> in 1997 was a first attempt in the former Soviet space, which has aimed to rival against the dominance of Russia in economic, political and military spheres. It was not a secret that one of the main purposes of this alliance was with support of the U.S. to secure transportation of the Caspian energy supplies and in consequence they could pull off Russian dominance.<sup>91</sup> In the Russian media the organization was accused as an anti-Russian regional group, and also it was characterized as group united by their complaints against the Kremlin. The GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) project in the post-Soviet space was characterized in the Kremlin as a U.S. backed organization. It was seen as an important strategic alliance that has ever formed without participation of Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the beginning of 2000, GUAM members has developed significant principles that serve for the interests of the members on the one hand, and has harassed Russian interests in the region on the other hand. Member states agreed a strategy for the joint efforts on behalf of energy production; support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the members; cooperate in security issues; work with the international and regional institutions and cooperate with the United States. It is important to mention that the GUUAM has not declared any military issues, and only economic and strategic cooperation was stressed among the member states.

In 1998, according to Stephen Sestanovich, an American Ambassador for the new independent countries, the U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus and Central Asia could be described by four factors: <sup>92</sup>strengthening modern political and economic institutions; energy development and the creation of an east-west energy transport corridor; regional cooperation and conflict resolution; security cooperation and the establishment of security dialogues.

The Caspian Sea natural gas and oil reserves have pointed emphasis for the U.S. as an alternative to the Persian Gulf energy resources in the 1990s. Geostrategic position of the Caspian Sea basin and CA make them an important location where the great powers meet each other. The White House recognizes that these regions where Russia aspires to be the only main player would lead the Kremlin to establish monopoly

of energy supplies and transportation and then to use it as a political tool against the West. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the White House had determined its economic goal as development of the natural gas supply from the Caspian Sea basin as an alternative to the Persian Gulf energy resources, and to guarantee the control of the transportation of these energy reserves to the world markets without passing through Iranian and Russian territories. Attempts to agree with the region countries on the determination of the natural gas pipeline routes were also main issues of the negotiations between American and region countries officials.<sup>93</sup>

In its relations with the Central Asian states, the Bush administration also focused on cooperation in the economic and energy issues, which could be characterized as sticks in the American energy diplomacy. In the National Energy Policy Report, which was issued by the President of the USA George Bush, in May 2001, was suggested that "greater oil production in the region would not only benefit regional economies, but would also help mitigate possible world supply disruptions and transmit liberal ideas."<sup>94</sup> It was a kind of pressure for cooperation on energy issues against the energy rich countries of the region.

The Clinton administration prepared a Silk Road Strategic Act project of 1999,<sup>95</sup> which Moscow had interpreted it as the blueprint of a new American empire's involvement into the Central Asian and the South Caucasus regions.<sup>96</sup> All eight countries of both regions were covered by Senator Sam Brownback's act. According to section 2.6 of the act, which has proposed that the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions could produce oil and gas in sufficient quantities and it could reduce the dependence of the U.S. on energy from the Persian Gulf region.<sup>97</sup> In the wide sense, Brownback's intention was to assert control over the regions in order to prevent Russia, China and Iran from dominating it.<sup>98</sup> The act has contained also message to the U.S., which called the White House to encourage and assist the development of regional military cooperation among the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia through programs such as the Central Asian Battalion and the Partnership for Peace of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.<sup>99</sup>

Respectively soft power and hard power politics describe better the Bill Clinton's and the George Bush's foreign policy concepts towards the South Caucasus region. Under the Barack Obama's administration foreign policy strategies of the United States in the region, and particularly bilateral relations with the region states was explained as smart power policy.<sup>100</sup> But in the reality compared to the previous two administrations, the last

one has already lost the most political and economic advantages in the region and lets an opportunity slip because of its passive involvement to the region.

For some American foreign policy analysts it seemed as a late decision in fully recovering the ground lost during the first years of Bill Clinton's presidency.<sup>101</sup> By analyzing reasons why the U.S. decided to change its foreign policy towards the Caucasus republics, by mid 1994, Hunter argues that it could be explained as Western fears about Russian ambitions in the region.<sup>102</sup> Until 1994, it could be interpreted so that the West had accepted the Kremlin's hegemony in Georgia and Armenia. In Azerbaijan, the West had pursued a doubtful policy, which it stemmed from the fact that the West was not interested in committing necessary resources including military assets.<sup>103</sup>

Charap and Peterson described the U.S. foreign policy toward the region states as a derivative of Russia policy. "The White House failed to forge long-term partnerships and instead sought leverage, neglecting engagement that provided no benefit."<sup>104</sup>

Thomas de Waal is one of the region experts, who also criticizes Washington stating that "no one in the White House is thinking how to approach the South Caucasus as a region, whose economic needs and security problems inter-connected and best resolved by a holistic approach."<sup>105</sup>

The U.S. was interested since the collapse of the SU, in ensuring not to allow Russia to become again hegemony in the post-Soviet region. For this purpose, the White House's aim was to estrange former empire republics from the Russian influence and to create a belt of pro-American regimes. Especially after the signing an agreement in Istanbul on BTC pipeline project in 1999, which was mainly supported by the United States, with the goal to oppose against the sabotage of the Kremlin, the White House tried to be sure on nature of the governments by pressuring them to be pro-western. Heydar Aliyev and Eduard Shevardnadze governments, respectively in Azerbaijan and in Georgia, have followed more pro-western policies than pro-Russian. And in that case the Kremlin has tried to destabilize political situation in this geography by assassination attempts against Shevardnadze, as well as by supporting secessionist movements in the South Caucasus. Permanent smoldering in the South Caucasus states of Azerbaijan and Georgia was suited Russian neo-imperialist strategy.

During the George W. Bush period, the U.S Administration increased its foreign policy strategies and interests towards the South Caucasus states. It

was the time when there were discussions on the possible membership of Georgia and Azerbaijan to the NATO and Washington increased military aid programs to the region countries.

According to Sussman and Krader, color revolutions were realized as a result of four types of foreign assistance: political, financial, technical and propaganda methods.<sup>106</sup> "Democracy promotion" became part of new imperialism in the foreign policy of the United States.

Because of its geostrategic position, the Caspian Sea basin was one of the important issues in the U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s. Just with the goal to avoid Russia from recovering its great power status the White House supported the realization of the new pipeline projects, which conflicted to the Kremlin's interests, and had aimed to weaken Russian influence in the mentioned geographies.

Although during the election campaign in the end of the 1990s, George Bush has occasionally criticized the Clinton administration in failing to develop a comprehensive energy policy. One of the main features of the U.S. foreign policy towards the South Caucasus and particularly the Caspian region was the support for the construction of a new oil pipeline running from Azerbaijan's Caspian coast through Georgia to Turkey's Mediterranean coast. An American strategist Brzezinski had proposed this project by arguing that new east-west pipeline project should oppose Iranian and Russian south and north pipeline projects, and also should bypass Iranian and Russian territories,<sup>107</sup> even though the proposed pipeline by the White House was the most expensive project in comparison to the Iranian Baku-Kharg project.<sup>108</sup> As Dick Cheney once avouched at U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce Conference, "Azerbaijan is of great significance not only to the future of the region, but to the future of a diversified and balanced global oil market. But the realization of this potential depends...on politics, as the struggle to get these resources to market involves various countries with competing interests."<sup>109</sup>

Debates on the probable involvement of the United States in Central Asia were one of the significant discussed topics throughout the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and early 21<sup>st</sup> century among the both academic and politic communities. Among the region experts were politicians who argued that because of the small contribution of the Caspian region states to the global energy market, as well as implausible possible natural gas export from the Caspian basin to the West are not enough for attracting the region to the U.S. foreign policy interests in the beginning of the 1990s. It should not be understood that the Caspian basin and the region states were totally

far from the White House's interest, but only policymakers could not decide for the region and its countries as a top priority for Washington. Few economic interests of the U.S. in the region played an important role in the White House's position toward the post-Soviet Central Asia. It can be explained with a geographical and economic position of the region countries in the new world community.

From geostrategic prism, Henry Kissinger called for the creation of the pro-Western Central Asian buffer zone between two regional powers – Russia and China.<sup>110</sup> This part examines the United States interests and policies toward Central Asia with emphasis on its political, economic, military and strategic interests since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Geostrategic and geographical distance of the CA region from Washington during the Soviet Union has made the region frivolous for the White House. Only after the fall of the SU the region became one of the markets of American capital and later Washington slowly began to open the region for its military and political objectives. The world is divided into main concern areas in American strategic thinking.<sup>111</sup> The place of Central Asia had been shifting from post-Soviet Eurasia to either Greater Middle East or South Asia.<sup>112</sup> Laruelle explains the reason of separation of Central Asia from rest of the post-Soviet space as aim to promote a new attitude of regionalization by reducing a traditional Russia-centered focus. Since 1999 the region is with Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan and Afghanistan, part of the Central Command at the U.S. Defense Department. In 2006, Central Asia moved from the Europe and Eurasia Bureau into the new Central and South Asia Bureau at the State Department of the United States.

Although the region itself with its full of transnational threats such as terrorism, narcotic trafficking and organized crime were important political issues which engendered disquiet for Washington in the 1990s, the White House changed its little attention only after the September 11 terrorist attacks. And since these events the mentioned security problems of the region were understood as directly security threat to the United States foreign policy and national interests. It became clear that if the first years of the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Washington's policy was explained with the destitution of the solution of the problems in the Central Asian region; then post-9/11 foreign policy objectives of the United States could be characterized with the actively political and military involvement in the region, which especially during the Bush's Administration period American goals turned to be hard rather than soft.

It is true that energy reservation in the Caspian Sea does not have considerably importance for the United States for the purposes of energy supply and national security. So, one of the primary goals of the U.S. in supporting multiple pipeline projects and in getting influence on the pipeline route in the Caspian basin, beyond any doubt was avoiding Moscow and Tehran as transit states from the project. Also, to support American industrial firms in involving Caspian region was part of American foreign policy interests. Some political analysts in Washington, in the beginning of the 2000s were troubled about the lack of interests of the U.S. in the Caspian region, arguing that if the White House would not help to realize the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project, then it would not be perceived only as a failure of the U.S. foreign policy, but also Washington will lose its friends and allies in the region.<sup>113</sup>

Even foreign policy-makers of Clinton Administration were not interested in irritating the Kremlin by interference in its backyard, military cooperation and multiple pipeline project interests have caused changes in its relations toward Russia and other regional powers in the U.S. foreign policy approach. An American Congress has passed bills, which supported diversification of energy supplies from the Caspian region and the Central Asia in the late 1990s.<sup>114</sup>

An energy policy report, which was released by the Bush administration, has indicated that the exploitation of the Caspian basin energy resources could benefit the economies of the region states and could help mitigate world supply directions, which was one of the White House's security goals in the region.<sup>115</sup> Support of the building BTC oil pipeline was also highly recommended in the report, by facilitating American oil companies in the region to use the pipeline.<sup>116</sup>

In February 2008, Secretary of State of the US Condoleezza Rice informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Secretary does "intend to appoint...a special energy coordinator who could especially spend time on the Central Asia and Caspian region."<sup>117</sup> Rice stated that a key job of the coordinator would be to encourage the establishment of oil and gas pipelines that bypass Russia, thus decreasing its control over the regional flow of energy. Fear from the restoration of Russia's great power status and its growing control over oil and gas distribution in the Caspian basin that could undercut the White House's influence in the region compelled the United States to appoint a special coordinator.

There are some foreign policy experts who criticized the Bush administration and argued that the aim of the U.S. should be seeking

working relationship and cooperation with other regional powers of the region, and by focusing on anti-terror goals, the White House should not be interested in taking control the energy resources of the Caspian basin.<sup>118</sup> During the war in Afghanistan, in the American media was mentioned that “the State Department is exploring the potential for post-Taliban energy projects in the region, which has more than six percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and almost 40 percent of its gas reserves.”<sup>119</sup>

Oil factor also played a decisive role in the agreement on ceasefire in the territorial conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Mountainous Karabakh in 1994.<sup>120</sup> Former Advisor to Azerbaijani President Vafa Guluzade argued that during the Azerbaijani-Armenian war in the early 1990s, the Armenian troops with support of Russia would have occupied major part of Azerbaijan, if there were no any strategic interest of the U.S. towards Azerbaijan and indirectly to the oil reserves in the Caspian Sea.<sup>121</sup> Energy resources and transit opportunities of Azerbaijan were main factors, which the West and especially the U.S. interest towards the region and particularly Azerbaijan could protect its independence from the Russian imperialist policies. So, analyzing these arguments it becomes clear how the oil and gas resources could be important for the country’s independence and security.

In 1997, the Deputy Secretary of the United States Strobe Talbott, in his speech stated the goal of the U.S. in CA as “not to become dominant of the region, but to make it free of other power’s domination”, so making it possible for the region states to be stable and peaceful.<sup>122</sup> But geopolitical realities forced the United States to fill vacuum in the region by deploying its military forces and increasing amount of its financial aid to the region countries in the following of 9/11.

There were politicians and diplomats who argued that because of the historically few interests and policies of the U.S. toward the region, allies of the White House, like Turkey and the EU states could also be contacted for ensuring the White House’s strategic and economic interests in CA.<sup>123</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that for the maintaining its global primacy the White House has to prevent any possible threat and competitor from containing these regions. According him, the U.S. strategy towards CA could not be implemented “except in the circumstance of a truly massive and widely perceived direct external threat.”<sup>124</sup>

Stephen Blank argues that Washington still lacks a South Caucasus strategy.<sup>125</sup> He criticizes also since the Obama period the United States accepts the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions as the Kremlin’s

sphere of influence.<sup>126</sup> One of the negative aspects of the Obama's region policy is the decreased attention to the South Caucasus. Although there is no any specified South Caucasus strategy on the Washington's agenda, the USA tries to keep balance in the region- no war and no peace along pipelines.<sup>127</sup>

## Conclusion

As mentioned in the Introduction part of this paper, one of the main goals of the research was to examine whether the foreign policy strategies of the United States and Russia in the South Caucasus and Central Asia in the post- Cold war period could be characterized as neo-imperialist or not? The research evaluated the foreign policy strategies and underscored the influenced determinants that have influences on formation of those policies.

Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century and in the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century the nature of imperialist and neo-imperialist policies was one of the controversial subjects, which not only historians, but also IR scholars, and scholars of other fields tried to explain motives behind of those policies. Pointing the specific foreign policy patterns, as an analytical part of the paper, I analyzed Russian foreign policy strategies under Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, Dmitri Medvedev and then again under Putin's new presidency. I have argued that the current phase of Russian neo-imperialist foreign policies in the mentioned regions aims to restructure its great power status not only economically, but also in the political, military and security spheres with the aim to be in the right place in the international affairs.

The research has yielded several conclusions. The case studies analyzed in the previous parts of the paper indicate that Russian and American foreign policies in the South Caucasus and Central Asian region are driven by its need for survival. If for the Kremlin it means to be the only hegemon in the region by preventing any influence of the United States, then for the White House need for survival bases on the principle not to let Russia again become the only hegemon and main regional power in the mentioned regions.

First, during the first decade of the independency, the Kremlin had pursued a foreign policy strategy that aimed to strengthen its influence in its neighborhood and attached importance to integrationist policies within the CIS. One of the aims of the Kremlin was the creation of buffer states in



the near of its borders. Later, this integrationist policy was replaced with the Russian dependency strategy, which aimed to make the region states dependent on Moscow, when the Kremlin realized that its integrationist strategy came to grief. Second, starting with Putin's rise to power Russia attempted to secure the regional status quo. Any change of the status quo, especially by any neighbor state's action was considered as a threat against the Kremlin. At the same time, Russia dictated that any close relations between the post-Soviet countries and any foreign regional or great power that directly or indirectly might have jeopardized Russian geopolitical interests would be interpreted as a threat. In his second term as a President, Putin and later Medvedev have pursued foreign policy toward the mentioned regions' states that has only strengthened the same strategy.

The nature of international politics still remains conflictual. Russia is continuing to consolidate its own influence on the former Soviet republics, which for the Kremlin are the zone of the exclusive interests. Especially, since the Vladimir Putin's presidency Russia regardless of the international consequences, strongly comes out against to any interference made by the West, mainly by the U.S. into these areas. The case of the August War with Georgia in 2008, serves as a model in this attempt of the Kremlin.

Whether we argue Russia and the United States to be a neo-imperialist power or an empire, both the White House and the Kremlin demonstrate neo-imperialistic behavior. The last two decades demonstrate how neo-imperialism in Russian and American foreign policy strategies grows through military coups, political interventions, and also by transforming economic cooperationists into their political proponents for the aim to ensure their neo-imperialist military-political domination. It is true that historically all empires have presented similar characters or neo-imperialist behavior is common feature for all the neo-imperialist powers, to differentiate American empire or neo-imperialist foreign policy from Russian empire and neo-imperialist foreign policy is one of the main aspect of this research. Although foreign policy approaches of the White House and the Kremlin to the regions seem different, both of them follow the strategy, which should be ended with gaining influence and eradicating the rival power out of the regions. This course of conduct arose from the need to protect their national, political, and economic and security interests.

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# HOLOCAUST IN A TRANSNISTRIAN TOWN: DEATH AND SURVIVAL IN RYBNITSA (1941-1944)

## Abstract

The publication of *Neighbors* by Jan Gross generated a wide debate in Poland about the participation of the Poles in the Holocaust. Jedwabne was a Polish village where the titular nationality massacred the Jewish population. The name of this village became a generic name for the participation of the other Eastern European nations in the Holocaust. In this paper, I examine the particularities of the Holocaust in Rybnitsa- a small town in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.

**Keywords:** Transnistria; Holocaust; Rybnitsa; Republic of Moldova; Memory; Jedwabne; Romania; USSR; Nazi Germany; World War II.

## Historical Context

Throughout its history, Rybnitsa has experienced numerous changes of borders. Founded in 1628, Rybnitsa is a small town which today lies in the contested Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova. From its foundation to the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Rybnitsa was inside the Polish Kingdom. In 1793, after the second partition of Poland, this town passed to Russia. Then, after the October Revolution of 1917, it was involved in the Civil War, which made it practically a no man's land for several years. In 1924 it became a part of The Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) inside the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which was a part of USSR. During the interwar period, Rybnitsa was on the Soviet-Romanian border. This border was highly militarized, and the town was under a special border regime.

In 1940, MASSR was dissolved, and a part of it was ceded to Ukraine, while the other part united with a part of Bessarabia to become Moldovan

Socialist Republic (MSSR). During World War II, Transnistria became a venue of the Holocaust. From 1941-1944, Rybnitsa was occupied by Romania, which was an ally of Nazi Germany. From 1944 to 1990, it was again a part of MSSR, inside USSR. Finally, from 1990 until the present, it is situated in Transnistria, which in 1990 proclaimed its independence from Republic of Moldova, though this independence is not recognized by international community.

The name Transnistria was used for the first time in 1941, by the Romanian administration. At that time, Transnistria was totally different from what we know today as the secessionist region of Transnistria, inside the Republic of Moldova. Then, between 1941 and 1944, Transnistria was a territorial entity, which stretched from Nistru to Bug. This territory was not incorporated inside Romania, but it was governed by the Romanian administration. To a certain extent, the only issue which can be brought up in relation to the contemporary Transnistria is the fact that both territorial entities have had an unclear international status.

## **Research Questions and Methodology**

This paper will show that Rybnitsa deserves a special place in the historiography of the Holocaust. First of all, during the World War II, it was the only place in Transnistria to host both a Jewish ghetto and a prison for Jewish political prisoners. This fact allows for a multilateral evaluation of the Holocaust in this region. In contrast to the studies of the Holocaust from other regions, there is not much information on the Holocaust in Transnistria.

Irina Livezeanu, a scholar who surveyed the historiography on the subject of the Holocaust in Transnistria, suggested that there is a need for a local study of the Transnistrian Holocaust. This need grows from the necessity to catch up with the Western scholarship of the Holocaust.<sup>1</sup> The most famous local study of the Holocaust was conducted in the Polish village of Jedwabne by Jan Gross.<sup>2</sup>

At the moment when Germany invaded Poland, Jews represented half of the population in Jedwabne. The other half of the population was Polish. In his book, Gross argues that, before the arrival of Germans in the village, the Polish half of the village massacred the Jewish half. At the beginning of this project, I suspected that Rybnitsa would be another Jedwabne, but throughout the research I concluded that Rybnitsa is different.



Prior to World War II, Jews represented a third of the population, in this small town. In 1941, joint Romanian and German forces were approaching very fast. Nevertheless, the dynamics of violence followed different patterns. First of all, Rybnitsa was occupied by joint Romanian and German efforts. When Romanians entered the town they sought contact with the local Moldavian population, whom they regarded as being Romanians.

In fact, the Moldavians who spoke both Russian and Romanian were employed by the Romanian administration. According to Alexander Dallin, "the Moldavian minority was transformed into ethnic elite by the new regime".<sup>3</sup> Apart from Moldavians, Rybnitsa had a large Ukrainian and Russian speaking population. In this sense, Rybnitsa is a good case study of a multicultural community, which at a certain point in time, experienced waves of violence.

Taking into consideration the remarks from above, my paper will provide a more nuanced representation of the Holocaust in Eastern Europe. It will try to answer the following questions: Which were the main stages of the Holocaust in Transnistria and how they were implemented in Rybnitsa? How was the daily life in a Jewish ghetto under the Romanian administration? What was the role of the locals in the Holocaust?

After the War, the Soviets held trials to prosecute all the instances of the collaboration with the Romanian and Nazi authorities. It is important to state that although these trials refer to the post-war developments, they shed some light on the local history during the war. In fact, the existence of the detailed records from the Soviet trials provided a major impetus for this research. The collection on "The War Crimes Investigation and Trial Records from the Republic of Moldova, 1944-1955" consists of sixty one trials organized by the Moldavian Soviet authorities in order to investigate the war crimes and enemy collaboration in Moldova and Transnistria.

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) obtained the records in this collection from the Archives of the State Security and Information Service of the Republic of Moldova, in June 2004. The interesting issue is that these documents are still not accessible in Moldova. Looking at these documents I realized that they comprise the detailed proceedings of the trials concerning most of the leaders of the Jewish ghetto in Rybnitsa. Nevertheless, in order to grasp some useful information from the proceedings of these trials, one has to understand the context in which these trials took place.

On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of November, 1942, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, one of the Soviet central governing authorities, issued a decree “On the establishment of the Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Crimes of the Fascist German Invaders and Their Accomplices, and of the Damage They Caused to Citizens, Collective Farms, Public Organizations, State Enterprises, and Institutions of the USSR (ChGK)”.<sup>4</sup>

According to Sorokina,

the commission had broad powers: it had the right to conduct investigations of Hitler’s war crimes and to determine the material damage suffered by the USSR, to coordinate the activities of all Soviet organizations in this field, to reveal the names of war criminals, and to publish official reports on their findings.<sup>5</sup>

ChGK was a central authority but it had multiple subdivisions in each district of the USSR. In order to gain more credibility, the central office of the Commission was staffed with scholars from the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Although members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences offered their prestige, most of the fieldwork was conducted by more than 100 local subdivisions of the ChGK, which operated in various administrative-territorial units of the USSR. The fact that the local branches of the ChGK had to perform most of the work had a direct impact on their structure. In this sense, each local branch consisted of three members: the first secretary of the regional party committee, plus the heads of the corresponding local Council of People’s Commissars and the NKVD-KGB. Sorokina argues that most of the work was done by the NKVD-KGB because the party and state institutions were busy with other matters.<sup>6</sup>

The materials provided by ChGK were used by the Soviet authorities not only to publicize the material losses inflicted by the Nazi invasion. The Soviet prosecutors relied on these materials to initiate a series of post-war trials of former Nazi collaborators. Like all the victors’ trials, these trials were accompanied by a triumphant rhetoric. However, the most important element is that the trials used the materials provided by the NKVD to ChGK. Due to the participation of NKVD in the Soviet repressive campaigns many historians are still reluctant to use the proceedings of these trials as historical documents. As Sorokina dully acknowledges:

Nearly a half-century later, it must be recognized that the Stalinist plan to create the phantom of a “public prosecutor” of fascism was a success. The ChGK fulfilled its representational function during the war years, and in the postwar years faithfully kept the topic of “war crimes” sealed off from Soviet society. The documentary materials it created and collected, however, have turned out to be the latest Russian mass grave. In the process of excavating it historians will for a long time come to be faced with the sometimes fruitless task of distinguishing “ours” from “others”, and executioners from victims.<sup>7</sup>

On the methodological level, I am focusing on a close reading of the materials from the four trials, which involved former chiefs or deputy chiefs of Rybnitsa ghetto. Although they were victims of the Romanian administration, these Jewish leaders were prosecuted as war criminals by the Soviets. In this sense, the proceedings of these trials are oversaturated with Soviet ideological content. Nevertheless, through a very careful reading it is possible to extract some basic patterns of the daily life in a Jewish ghetto. These materials are corroborated with the survivors’ accounts, either in the forms of memoirs or oral interviews. The oral interviews belong to the collection of USC Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and Education.

In terms of published sources, there have been published numerous collections of primary documents on the Holocaust in Transnistria. Jean Ancel is among the most prolific authors of the collections of primary documents.<sup>8</sup> The problem is that the documents in these collections are not contextualized. They are just documents concerning the Romanian administration in Transnistria.

## **History and Memory of the Holocaust in Moldova**

Along with the Great Wars, the Holocaust has probably become one of the most popular historiographical themes of the twentieth century. In fact, there is a whole discipline dedicated to The Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Nevertheless, in the post-communist Eastern Europe, the Holocaust has become subject to intensive historical research only in the last decade. Throughout the communist period, the ruling regimes sought to shape a class-centered historical narrative. In this sense, they discouraged any reference to instances of genocide.

In relation to the historiography of the Transnistrian Holocaust, it is interesting that there has been much more work on the historiography of the Holocaust, than on the Holocaust proper. It was not difficult to find articles on the historiography in general. It was difficult to find some publications on the Holocaust in Transnistria. In the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century four articles were however published on the Holocaust in Moldova: three of them in English.<sup>9</sup>

In contrast to the Soviet period, when they served class interests, after 1991, “many Moldovan historians simply chose to serve a new ‘master’: nationalism”.<sup>10</sup> If during the Soviet period, Holocaust was ignored due to the necessity to preserve the unity of the Soviet working class, then during the post-Soviet period, Holocaust is ignored due to the necessity to preserve national unity.

In the Moldovan context, “national unity” has two different interpretations. The Republic of Moldova emerged as the successor of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) -one of the fifteen Soviet republics. After the end of World War II, the boundaries of MSSR were arbitrarily drawn by Soviet authorities to comprise Bessarabia- the eastern part of Greater Romania-and a slice of Transnistria – a Ukrainian territory, which during the World War II was governed by Romania.

With some exceptions, after 1991, some Moldovan citizens sought to preserve the boundaries of the post-Soviet Republic of Moldova, while others pleaded for the (re)unification with Romania. The former are known as Moldovanists, while the later as Romanianists. Both categories display an ethnic understanding of the nation, and do not leave a place for national minorities in their nationalist discourses. Accustomed to the politicization of history, most of the Moldovan historians belong either to the Moldovanist or to the Romanianist camp. In this sense, they avoid the evidence which contradicts their national credo. At the same time, some historians let the documents speak for themselves and do not provide a contextual narrative.

In his article on the historiography of the Holocaust in Moldova, Dmitry Tartakovsky shows how the Romanianist historians employed similar samples of thinking as the Romanian extreme right from the interwar period.<sup>11</sup> The main idea of the extreme right was that Jews were to blame for the Holocaust, because most of the Romanian Communists were Jews and they undermined the existence of the Romanian state.

Referring to this narrative of victimization, Vladimir Solonari, states that:

Running through this account is a theme of victimization: Romania was forced to renounce ancient territories, its subjects were exposed to foreign, malign rule, and it was abandoned by its Western allies and Communized against its own will.<sup>12</sup>

One example of this narrative is that most of the Romanianist historians still argue that the Tatarbuniar uprising of 1924 was inspired by the Soviet Union through its Russian and Jewish agents.<sup>13</sup> In fact, it emerged out of the failed policies of the Romanian administration, which could not help the local farmers to sell their products on the markets of Odessa.

Another instance of politicized history is provided by the story that claims that only Jews welcomed the Soviet authorities in June 1940.<sup>14</sup> According to Tartakovsky, the increasing popularity of this myth, especially inside the Romanian Army, contributed to the policy of ethnic cleansing.<sup>15</sup> In fact, contrary to this belief, dissatisfaction with the Romanian administration was displayed by many Bessarabians irrespective of their ethnic background.

An important dimension of Tartakovsky's argument is the fact that Moldovan identity is so fragile that the issue of Holocaust serves to strengthen it and to justify the self-victimization of the local community. Along with other contested historiographical topics, Holocaust serves as a gradient with which to assess the loyalty or disloyalty of the Moldovan citizens. Any individual, from any ethnic group is expected to confirm his or her loyalty to the Moldovan state by blaming the Jews for Holocaust. Otherwise, if ethnic minorities do not agree with this point of view, they confirm their status as "foreigners".

Romanianist historians were very influential in the early 1990's, when the idea of the (re)unification with Romania was dominant among the Moldovan political elite. Afterwards, they were still influential, but their influence has diminished in the first decade of the current century. In 2001, the rejuvenated Moldovan Communist Party (MCP) came to power. Immediately, it started to promote the inclusion of national minorities into the definition of Moldovan identity. The new authorities started to pay more attention to the issue of Holocaust. For example, in January 2006, Ministry of Education required secondary school teachers to organize activities of Holocaust commemoration.<sup>16</sup>

At the same time, MCP promoted a concept of aggressive Moldovan nationalism, which denied any common history to Republic of Moldova and Romania. In this sense, Dumitru shows how some Moldovanist

historians blamed only the Romanian administration for the crimes associated with the Holocaust.<sup>17</sup> In this part of the story, the central figure is “the Romanian policeman” who equally repressed all the population, not just Jewish people, in what is now the Republic of Moldova.

## **Participation of the Locals in the Holocaust**

Before proceeding to the understanding of the local participation in the Holocaust, one needs to understand the ethnic background of the local population. According to Shachan, “there is no evidence as how many Jews were in Transnistria before the invasion. The last census was in 1926, and this had some results on the national minorities and their concentration”.<sup>18</sup> Referring to the census of 1926, Galushchenko mentions that the district of Rybnitsa had a total population of 47,731.<sup>19</sup> Among them: 23,064 Ukrainians (48.32%), 17,023 Moldovans (35.66%), 4,422 Jews (9.26%), 1,809 Russians (3.78%), 1,138 Poles, 28 Germans and 15 Bulgarians.<sup>20</sup>

Concerning the number of Jews during the first months of the Nazi invasion into the USSR, it is difficult to provide some estimates, because some of the local Jews, in particular industrial workers and Party members, were evacuated by the Soviet authorities. Others came to Rybnitsa while trying to escape from the Nazi invasion of Bessarabia. Still others were deported by the Romanian army, which sought to get rid of the Jews and to send them to the territory occupied by the German army. Moreover, the deported Jews brought with them a different understanding of Jewish identity, while the local Soviet Jews had a more secular perception of their identity. Thus, despite of the fact that I use a common denominator for all the Jews in the area, to be a Jew in Romania was rather different from being a Jew in the Soviet Union.

With all the details from above it is still relevant that both Romanianists and Moldovanists ignore a very important issue. They do not ask a fundamental question: “What the local population was doing during the Holocaust?” As Solonari claims:

The majority of today’s citizens of the Republic of Moldova either witnessed or participated in the events referred to above or are descendents of those who did. Mass killings of civilians, their incarceration and deportation, confiscation of property and its distribution among locals (the policy

of “Romanization”), then the partial return of those evacuated—these extraordinary events could not but implicate directly or indirectly many of the locals, whether Jews or not, and no one could have escaped knowledge of what went on.<sup>21</sup>

The fact that historians avoid this question has a direct impact on the ways in which Moldovan society remembers, or rather forgets, its participation in the Holocaust. For his article, Tartakovsky conducted some interviews among the Moldovan college students. As a result he claims that most of them are not familiar with the Holocaust and very few of those who are familiar know that the current territory of Moldova was one of the Holocaust venues.<sup>22</sup>

Moreover, even those few Moldovans who know about the Holocaust deny any share of responsibility for the participation of the local population. In order to improve this situation Dumitru suggests that:

It would therefore be important to study the role of the local Bessarabian and Transnistrian populations during the Holocaust, as this could help clarify the choices that individuals faced.<sup>23</sup>

One of the main questions of my research paper is to study how the population of Rybnitsa was involved in the Holocaust, on the local level.

In relation to the participation of the locals in the destruction of the Jews, Dallin suggests that most of the local population was neutral toward the Romanian administration. He states that “there was no implicit endorsement of the new regime, but also no rejection of it”.<sup>24</sup> This opinion is also endorsed by the authors of a recent article, which compares the behavior of the local population in Bessarabia and Transnistria.<sup>25</sup> According to them, the population of Transnistria was less likely to be involved in violent actions against Jews. Moreover, Transnistrians were more likely to help the Jews. The authors were very surprised to discover that:

One of the most remarkable findings from all our research in Transnistria was actually a nonevent: we did not find evidence of a single anti-Jewish pogrom anywhere in Transnistria. Pogroms in Bessarabia were reported by survivors and are referenced in archival material and secondary sources, but the same cannot be said for Transnistria, as we found no evidence of such activities in survivors’ testimonies, government records, or the secondary sources we consulted.<sup>26</sup>

Referring to the paragraph above, my research seems to confirm the fact that the participation of the local non-Jewish population in the destruction of their Jewish neighbors was more a result of a passive observation rather than to active participation. In comparison with the trials of the Jewish leaders from Transnistria, the same trials from Bessarabia mentioned actions of mass killings. For example, in the trial of Pavel Sergienko, a policeman from Rezina, a Bessarabian town across Rybnitsa, reveals that in July 1941, several hundreds of Jews were buried alive on the outskirts of the town.<sup>27</sup> So, it seems that in Rezina, the destruction of the local Jews was more in line with the events from Gross's study of Jedwabne in Poland.

Dumitru and Johnson claim that the distinction between the patterns of violence in Bessarabia and Transnistria is related to different nationality policies conducted by the Romanian and Soviet state in these provinces. On the one hand, during the interwar period, Bessarabia, being a Romanian territory, was subjected to the Romanian right-wing administration. In these circumstances, local popular anti-Semitism was reinforced by the Romanian state and its policies.

On the other hand, Transnistria was a part of Soviet state, and in this sense, the local population was involved in a policy where all Soviet nationalities were treated equally.<sup>28</sup> The same opinion is shared by Alexander Dallin, who mentions that:

this area, especially its southern part, was closer to a "melting pot" of nationalities than most parts of the USSR; settled entirely from the outside, it had no "indigenous stock". As a result, the nationality question played a rather "subordinate role in this area."<sup>29</sup>

A different picture emerges out of the testimonies provided by the Holocaust survivors. In this sense, Shachan, whose book is based primarily on the interviews conducted with the Holocaust survivors, mentions that: "Many of the local non-Jewish residents of Transnistria treated the deportees with hostility, and there were frequent cases of locals who were directly involved in murdering deportees."<sup>30</sup>

Moreover, Shachan profoundly doubts the pacifist character of the local population, which was raised in the spirit of Soviet friendship of peoples. He states that:

What is astonishing is that those involved in killing and torturing the Jews were primarily groups of Ukrainian youths who had been educated under



the Soviet regime and who had no doubt been friends with Jews in the Komsomol-the Communist youth organization.<sup>31</sup>

## **Stages of the Holocaust in Transnistria**

Referring to the different stages of violence in Rybnitsa, it is crucial to compare it with the developments on the whole territory of Transnistria. Transnistria has experienced three main periods in which considerable changes occurred:

### **1. July-August 1941**

During this period, Einsatzgruppe D-led by Colonel Otto Ohlendorf-together with the German Eleventh Army and the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies marched through the territory of Transnistria and engaged in what is known as “the Holocaust by bullets”. As a basic pattern emerged in which Jews were ordered to gather somewhere in the locality. They were then executed on the outskirts of the localities, preferably in wooded locations. At this stage, Romanians started to deport Jews across Nistru, but Germans refused to accept them on the premises that the Jewish question would be solved at the end of the war. At that time, the Blitzkrieg was supposed to last only for several weeks.

### **2. September 1941- February 1942**

On August 30, 1941, Germans and Romanians signed the Tighina Agreement. This Agreement laid the basis for the Romanian administration in Transnistria. A point from this document clearly denied to the Romanian side the possibility of deporting Jews beyond the borders of Transnistria. As a consequence, the Romanian government issued Order 23, which stipulated the necessity to gather all the Jews in ghettos or concentration camps. At the same time, Jews were to be put to work, and they would receive a minimum wage. Jews were mostly employed for various construction works, including restoring bridges and building roads. Despite the small amount of their wages, most of the testimonies suggest that Jews did not receive any payments.

During the same period, Antonescu started the deportations of Jews from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the ghettos of Transnistria.

Some deportees were transported on carts, while the vast majority had to walk. Those who could not walk were shot on the spot. In this sense, Transnistria became a place of death marches. During this stage, most of the Jews died of exhaustion on their way to the ghettos. As a matter of fact, the deportees could enter Transnistria only through five crossing points. Rybnitsa was one of these crossing points. Approximately 25,000 Jews crossed into Transnistria through Rybnitsa.<sup>32</sup>

### **3. March 1942- March 1944**

To a certain extent, this stage witnessed a decrease of violent deaths. Most of the detainees died of disease or hunger. The Romanian administration referred to these instances of death as to “the deaths of natural causes”. Only at the end of the period, in March 1944, when the Soviet army was rapidly advancing, did the retreating German units occasionally gather Jews and shot them.

### **Stages of the Holocaust in Rybnitsa**

Now, it will be interesting to consider how the stages of violence in Transnistria were implemented in Rybnitsa. Referring to the first stage, there is not much information about the fate of the local Jews, who were shot in July-August 1941. As a matter of fact, this stage of the Holocaust is the least documented. The only certainty is that the majority of the Jews, shot during these two months, were local Ukrainian Jews. In terms of numbers, Ancel points to the fact that: “out of 3,500 local Jews, only 1,467 were still in Rybnitsa as of December 1941. The remainder had been inducted into the Soviet army or killed by the Nazis, or they had escaped”.<sup>33</sup>

Because of the fact that Rybnitsa was on the bank of Nistru, and it was one of the main crossing points for the deportees from Bessarabia and Bukovina, it was regarded as a town of salvation for the deportees. Some of the deportees managed to bribe local officials in order to get their names on the local registration lists. In this sense, they avoided being sent to the so-called death camps, which were concentrated closer to Bug. If the deportees did not succeed in saving themselves, many left their children with sympathetic local families.

According to Ancel, some of the deportees managed to leave their children with the local Christian families while others married their

daughters to local Romanians. Furthermore, Ancel argues that: "This phenomenon, described in gendarmerie reports, was apparently unique to Rybnitsa and the Balta district, because the convoys passing through this area were bound for the Bug."<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, despite these sporadic instances of survival, most of the Jews, who crossed into Transnistria through Rybnitsa, died in the death camps of the Southern Transnistria.<sup>35</sup>

In comparison to the Jews from the concentration camps, Jews from the ghetto were in a privileged position. If in the concentration camps, the fate of the inmates was entirely in the hands of the local police, then, in the ghettos, Jews had a share of local autonomy. Undoubtedly, police had a big influence on the developments in the ghetto, but local Jewish leaders had their share of power. The authority of the local Jewish leaders increased throughout the years of the Romanian occupation. The main reason for this increase in the influence of the local Jewish leaders was that the Romanian administration did not know the realities on the ground.

In this sense, it was simpler to appoint some locals who knew the local context. In addition, the fact that the Jewish ghettos did not have a coordinating authority added to the chaos in the region. Yitzhak Arad argues that the Transnistrian ghettos were subordinated to three authorities: gendarmerie or the Romanian police, the army and the praetors (local administrators).<sup>36</sup> He also states that as a consequence of the existence of multiple authorities, there was a high level of corruption.

Indeed, the evidence from the Soviet post-war trials of the Jewish leaders confirms the existence of corruption. All the four leaders of the Rybnitsa ghetto subscribed to the claim that they bribed the local chief of the police in order to register new persons in the ghetto or to save women and children from hard labor. Sometimes, during the proceedings of the trials, they recognized the fact that they took a share of the goods, which were to be brought to the Romanian administration. For instance, in September 1944, Shtrahman Nahim, the Deputy Chief of Rybnitsa ghetto from 1941 to 1944, confessed that he took a watch from a Jew who wanted to be registered in the ghetto.<sup>37</sup>

Because of the high concentration of Jews, Rybnitsa was regarded with suspicion by the Romanian authorities. A report by the Secretary-General Gelep of the Interior Ministry is illustrative of this suspicion. On March 31, 1942 he sent to the administration a Siguranza report, which stated that 1,500 Jews deported to the Rybnitsa ghetto were roaming the streets and marketplaces. He concludes, that "The Christian population is enraged

and requests the authorities' intervention."<sup>38</sup> In this case, the authorities did not postpone their intervention.

According to Radu Ioanid, the number of Jews in Rybnitsa decreased steadily. If in April 1942, there were 1,371 Jews, then in March 1943 there were 600, and in November 1943, there were 462 Jews.<sup>39</sup> At this point, I am not sure about the reasons for such a decrease in the population. One possible reason could be the fact that some of the Jews from the ghetto were deported to the concentration camps. In the testimonies of Samuil Vainshtok, the chief of the Jewish ghetto from September 1941 to April 1942, he mentioned the deportation of 500 Jews from Rybnitsa to the concentration camps.<sup>40</sup>

The proceedings of the trial did not mention any specific locations for the concentration camps. They generally are present in the text as "German concentration camps". It is highly likely that these German concentration camps were situated in the Southern Transnistria, which was an area with compact German population. It is also possible that these camps were situated on the Eastern shore of Bug, on the territory which was under the administration of the German state.

Nevertheless, he mentioned that these deportations occurred in the fall of 1941. The file of Samuil Boshernitsan, the next chief of the ghetto from April 1942 to December 1943, does not refer to the fate of some 700 missing Jews.<sup>41</sup> Finally, the file of Shtrahman Nahim, the deputy chief of the ghetto from 1941 to 1944 mentioned that in November 1943, he participated in the deportation of 100 Jews to a concentration camp. Out of one hundred, only 54 survived until the end of Romanian administration.

Another likely explanation for the decrease in the population of the ghetto can be the worsening of the epidemic situation or the lack of food. As in any other ghetto, the local population suffered from a constant lack of food. On the other hand, the witnesses to the trials of the ghetto's chiefs refer to the aid, which arrived from the international Jewish organizations in 1943.

Yet other factors also accounted for the decrease in the Jewish population. The local authorities did not wait for the orders from the center. As often happens, local authorities engaged in some type of preemptive reprisal. They ordered the verification of registration papers among the detainees of the ghetto. Those who did not have papers, or could not bribe the authorities to get the papers, were shot. Thus, according to the proceedings of Shtrachman trial, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 1942, 48 Jews from the ghetto were shot. The files of the Romanian gendarmerie provide more

details on this subject. An analysis of these files shows that Benditer Ihiel mentions that 48 Jews were gathered in the central square of the town and shot at the order of Captain Gheorghe Botoroaga, because they left the ghetto in search of food.<sup>42</sup>

The last instance of recorded violence in Rybnitsa, under the Romanian administration, was witnessed on March 19, 1944. On this date, some 50 Jews from the prison of Rybnitsa, were shot by a retreating SS unit. These prisoners had a special status: they were brought to Transnistria, as political prisoners from all the territory of Romania. This story is remarkable not only because it was the last instance of recorded violence in Rybnitsa. It became known in the literature of the Holocaust as “the massacre of Rybnitsa”. Matei Gal was one of the three Jewish survivors of the massacre. In 1996, Gal gave an interview to the Shoah Foundation. In this interview, he briefly recollects some details of the massacre.<sup>43</sup>

According to Gal,

The morning of March 19, 1944, appeared to be the same as other numerous days in the prison. There was no sign of a future massacre. Moreover, on that morning, prisoners were brought into the courtyard and told that, due to the rapid advancement of the Soviet army, soon all of them will be transferred to Romania. So, all of us [prisoners] were preparing for our departure. Then, the administration of the prison told us that we will have to wait until evening, because there were no trains for us. First of all, the Romanian administration had to evacuate the Romanians and the local collaborators... In the evening, we heard some noise in the basement. It was the sound of shooting and shouting. At a certain point, the door of our cell opened, and I saw a couple of men in SS uniforms. Then we aligned at the wall and the officer ordered the shooting. It was a miracle that I survived as all my cellmates perished.<sup>44</sup>

## Conclusion

When I started the research for this paper I thought that I would be able to confirm the model, provided by Jan Gross in his analysis of Jedwabne. However, this paper illustrates a different scenario. If in the case of Jedwabne, the Polish half of the population massacred the Jewish half, then in the case of Rybnitsa, the vast majority of the massacres were conducted by the Romanian or German armies. The locals from Rybnitsa were passive observers to these instances of violence. This passivity

was expressed not only in relation to the participation in the massacres. Locals were also reluctant to help the Jewish population. So, in contrast to Jedwabne, where locals were active participants, in Rybnitsa, the local population was a passive participant of the Holocaust.

It is important to notice that, to a certain extent, Rybnitsa is a symbolic site, which illustrates the ways in which the destruction of Jews could have evolved in Romania. In July-August 1941, Einsatzgruppe D and Romanian army units were involved in the massacre of the local Ukrainian Jews. Then, Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina were deported to Transnistria. Finally, with the massacre from the local prison, Rybnitsa signaled what could have happened to all the Romanian Jewry if Soviet troops had not entered Romania. Nevertheless, this is not to conclude that the Soviet army was a liberator for all the Eastern European nations. What at the beginning seemed like a liberation, was soon to be perceived as an occupation. In other words, all liberations come at a price.

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# WE AND OUR NEIGHBOURS: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT EACH OTHER. HISTORY TEACHING AND TEXTBOOKS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND ROMANIA

## Abstract

The aim of this work is to evaluate the post-socialist history taught in secondary schools, giving particular attention to the content of the history textbooks in two neighbouring countries. So, the main research question is *what do we know about each other from history classes and textbooks from the Republic of Moldova and Romania?* The issue of treating each other in history textbooks in different historical periods in Moldova and Romania is analyzed in a comparative perspective in two different parts. The paper ends with conclusions and some recommendations addressed to the Governments of both countries that could be useful in building an open and durable partnership on history teaching.

**Keywords:** 'We', Others, Neighbours, History teaching, Textbooks, Moldova, Romania.

## Introduction

In most countries history is considered a fundamental discipline for promoting intellectual development and creating cultural and social identity.<sup>1</sup> It is true that history helps us develop critical skills, understand historical dimensions of the present and see differences and similarities between cultures, ethnicities and civilizations. Nevertheless, today history as a science and as school discipline is very much politicized. In Western and Central Europe the issue of *depolitization* of school subjects has always found a considerable resonance. Numerous studies have been published on this topic, providing comparisons between different countries

and historical periods. In Eastern Europe the culture of *depolitization* of school subjects, in particular 'History', has not evolved so much. On the contrary, every 'differently' oriented government of the Republic of Moldova or Romania has had different approaches in what concerns the structure and organization of this school subject. Both countries inherited from the communist era the tendency for glorification. The process of rewriting history and school textbooks had been dominated during the soviet era by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, interpretation and invention of historical facts. History was used to accuse, to defame, to mobilize or to justify; it was repeatedly used as a mobilization resource in the political struggle to control the masses.

The collapse of the totalitarian regimes at the end of 1980s and of the USSR in 1991 provoked a lot of changes in all former socialist countries and Soviet republics, which became independent states. The educational reform was one of the democratic changes that took place. With the help of different international organizations (World Bank, Council of Europe, OSCE, etc.) a process of fundamental educational reforms has begun, including history as a school discipline. The formation of the democratic societies took place at a highway speed. The intensity of the political, economic and social reforms had direct impact on the educational restructuring. After the events from 1991 most of the Soviet citizens, who became post-Soviet ones, underwent a kind of a cultural shock that provoked an identity crisis. Some of them are refusing to accept these changes until today. After two decades of democratic transformations many questions regarding their efficiency were raised:

## Sources

History teaching and textbook production is now influenced by various factors, not only conventional ones, such as educational policies, educational ideas, academic knowledge, editorial exercise, production quality and costs but also increasing teachers', parents', pupils' expectations, media pressure and public requirements of what kind of history should be taught in schools. The main research sources for my project were the school history curricula and textbooks from Moldova and Romania approved and published in the last 20 years. Most of textbooks give the impression of neutral teaching, but it is not true, they are more or less influenced and used as ideological tools for legitimizing the political

order.<sup>2</sup> This situation is more visible in the countries where the state controls the education and where the government decides what to be included in or excluded from the curricula and textbooks. So, the research and evaluation of school curricula and textbooks is more than welcome as it aims to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the textbooks, and to eliminate “negative” features (errors, distortions, prejudices, clichés, etc.).<sup>3</sup> This is why textbook analysis ought to become an integral part of the reform and development of educational systems.

## Methodology

A variety of methods regarding textbook analysis are used in practice; a combined approach is frequently used, which ensures a higher level of objectivity of the results. Textbook analysis should include all the components of a textbook; not only its textual side, since the didactic, pictorial, graphical and technical aspects of textbooks represent a whole, a message the textbook communicates to students and teachers.<sup>4</sup> The quality of a textbook depends to a large extent on the political and socio-economic realities in a specific country. The quality of textbooks also depends on a number of factors which are part of the development, selection, approval and recommendation of a textbook to be used, disseminated, analysed, etc.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the quality of a textbook is dependent on the quality and attitude of the people involved in the process. So, during my research two main methods were used – quantitative and qualitative. The quantity methods include data collection on curriculum and textbooks contents (how many changes in the school curricula; how many books) or (how often is presented each country in other neighbouring history textbook, “We” and “Others”, etc.). The qualitative methods provided the analysis of the development of transformation process of history curricula, textbooks writing, textbook content (descriptive parts, pictures, maps, documents), etc. based on a list of criteria,<sup>6</sup> for example – how the concepts of “hostile”,<sup>7</sup> “neighbour”, “alien”, etc. are presented or how controversial issues (unsolved political problems: borders, minority rights, wars, ethnogenesis, statehood, etc.) are treated. Other important method which was used during my research is the interviews with teachers, inspectors from Public Administration, from the Ministry of Education, textbook authors, editors, etc.

## REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

The Education in Moldova nowadays is divided in two: one is national, according to the Republic of Moldova legal framework, and the other is in Transnistria, under the separatist regime's rules. The educational system in the Republic of Moldova is based on three main stages: elementary school (1-4 grades, 6/7 - 10/11 ages), secondary school/gymnasium (5-9 grades, 11/12-15/16 ages) and high school/lyceum (10-12 grades, 16/17-19/20 ages). The first two stages are compulsory (elementary and secondary school, 1-9 grades).

Following the collapse of USSR, history education in Moldova has been characterised by permanent public debates, including street protests (1995, 2002, 2006).<sup>8</sup> The national movement (1989-1991) culminated with the declaration of independence of the Republic of Moldova, the transition to the Latin alphabet, and the replacement of *History of the USSR* and *History of the MSSR* courses with *World History* and *History of the Romanians*. But, the accession to power of the Agrarian Party in 1994 resuscitated the discussion around language and history. The Agrarians' promotion of the "Moldovenism" policy led to increased tensions inside the country and a change in the Constitution, declaring the Moldovan (as opposed to Romanian) language as the official language of Moldova. During this period, the political debate around the school subjects of Romanian language and history became extremely intense. In March 1995, the Government of the Republic of Moldova made the decision to exclude the *History of the Romanians* course from schools. This provoked huge street demonstrations that lasted for two months. After long negotiations, the president issued a decree that established a moratorium on this issue. The *World History* and *History of the Romanians* disciplines were reinstated into the national curriculum. Later, the Government of the Republic of Moldova approved national curricula for the two subjects of history and the corresponding school textbooks. After the general elections of February 2001, the Communist Party came to power, reigniting the debate around history education between historians and the government and bringing this issue again into public view. The communist government has been trying hard to change the name and content of the *History of the Romanians* course into *History of Moldova*; after new street demonstrations (January-February 2002) and seminars (in September 2002 and February and October 2003), organized by the Ministry of Education in cooperation with the Council of Europe, the idea of an *Integrated History* course, which



would include a balanced representation of national and world history in a single discipline, reappeared. The idea of a course of integrated history is not new in Moldova: in 1994, a textbook of (integrated) ancient history was published for the 5th grade which was full with conceptual, scientific, and methodological errors and triggered severe criticism in academic circles, schools, and mass media. Even though the Ministry of Education distributed this textbook, it remained practically unused because it was largely plagiarized from other history textbooks and because the topic of ancient national history, in the context of ancient world history was allotted only a few pages.

Therefore, many historians from Moldova were sceptical about the resurrection of an integrated history textbook and viewed this as an attempt by the Communist Party to continue the tradition of Soviet historiography concerning the Moldovan nation and language – an effort to further develop the fabricated identity of the Moldovan state and nation as separate from the Romanian one. The new administration's policy included both internal and external measures to promote a Moldovan identity. As a result, the relations between Moldova and Romania chilled between 2001 and 2004 and the Chișinău government refused to sign agreements of cultural cooperation and ignored scholarships offered by Romania to Moldovan children and students. Internally, the focus of this campaign was the opposition towards the *History of the Romanians* course, using arguments such as "this is the history of another country", that teaching it "undermines Moldova's statehood", that "our children don't study enough of the history of their native communities", etc.<sup>9</sup> With these arguments, the communist authorities tried to gain support from various international governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to justify changes to the history curricula and textbooks.

Civil society, in general, and the academic community, in particular, have opposed political involvement in history education. Therefore, at the Congress of the Historians of Moldova, held on July 1 2001 in Chișinău, university professors, schoolteachers of history, scientists, intellectuals, and students from various universities protested against the communist government's attempt to replace the *History of the Romanians* course. The Congress adopted the declaration *For the Defence of National Dignity, Cessation of Romanophobia and Vilification of the History of the Romanians*. The participants at the Congress also asked the leadership of Moldova to stop their campaign against the course of *History of the Romanians* and stop exercising political pressure on historians. In this

way, the intellectual community of Moldova tried to defend the legitimacy of its Romanian history and identity. In November 2001, the leadership of the Historians' Association of Moldova published also a declaration condemning the pressure from central authorities to introduce a course on the *History of Moldova*. They drew the public's attention to the fact that such actions were pursued with the only aim to use history for the promotion of the ideological interests of the Communist Party of Moldova.

In another controversial decision in the late 2001, the communist government reintroduced Russian language as a compulsory school subject, to be taught starting from the second grade. This triggered major protests by parents, teachers, pupils, and the public. During this period of rallies in downtown Chişinău, a small group of people demanded the president of Moldova to introduce without delay the *History of Moldova* course as, according to them, the *History of the Romanians* contributed to the "destruction of the Republic of Moldova".<sup>10</sup> Under these circumstances, on February 1, 2002, the Historians' Association of Moldova addressed a memorandum to the authorities in which historians and scholars expressed their concern about what they referred to as attempts to institute a dictatorial regime and resume

the old practices of indoctrinating the population with false and distorted ideas regarding the past of the Romanian people, and especially regarding Romanians living in Bessarabia as a component part of the Romanian nation.

The authors of the memorandum asked Moldovan authorities to respect and to promote the scientific truth when dealing with issues of national language, literature, and history, and stop the Romanophobia campaign and the vilification of Romanian language and history. The memorandum echoed the opinion of the participants at the Congress of the Historians of Moldova held on July 1, 2001.<sup>11</sup>

Despite the mass protests from the main square in Chişinău on February 12, 2002, the Minister of Education fully endorsed a resolution on the introduction of the *History of Moldova* as a subject matter in schools, high schools, universities and post-graduate institutions as of September 1, 2002. On February 15, this resolution was approved at a governmental meeting. This decision provoked even stronger protests by teachers, students, and other social and professional groups. The Prime Minister, Vasile Tarlev, considered the adoption of those decisions to be his personal

responsibility because “most of the independent states have their own histories”. For a “smooth” implementation of this course, a decision was taken to develop a textbook on the *History of Moldova*. This was an initiative of President Voronin, who in 2001 appointed Vladimir Țaranov, one of the champions of “Moldovenism”, as editor of the textbook.

As a result of street protests and criticism from the academic community, on February 22, 2002, the Government of the Republic of Moldova approved a resolution *On steps to improve the study of history*, which revoked the decision of February 15, 2002 concerning the implementation of the *History of Moldova* as a discipline to be taught in educational institutions of Moldova. This resolution, however, also authorized the Vice Prime Minister Valerian Cristea to create a state commission for the development of the concept of the *History of Moldova*. It represented a clear sign of the communists’ decision indicating at their will to force the *History of the Romanians* out of schools, they had not given it up although the protests delayed the immediate implementation of the project.

On March 20, 2002, the Scientific Council of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova adopted a decision *On the teaching and study of the History of the Romanians in the educational and academic systems of Moldova*. On March 26, 2002, the Academy of Sciences of Moldova voted to preserve the *History of the Romanians* course in schools.

In agreement with other academic institutions, the Historians’ Association of Moldova continued expressing support for the preservation of the *History of the Romanians* and *World History* courses in schools and other educational institutions of the country. The historians of this organization pointed out repeatedly that Moldova’s national history was undergoing essential changes, which were fully justified in a period in which the historical discourse was evolving, and that it was totally against the professional ethics of historians to harness those changes for purposes dictated by politics.

In the wake of visits paid by European experts, and as a reaction to the rallies in Chișinău, on April 24, 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted the Resolution 1280 (2002) *On the functioning of democratic institutions in the Republic of Moldova*, which provided an extension of the existing moratorium on the reforms concerning the study and status of the Russian language, as well as the changes in the history curricula.

On September 26, 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted the Resolution 1303 (2002), whereby the Assembly

expressed its satisfaction with the fact that Moldovan authorities had maintained the moratorium on the reforms concerning the study of Russian, its status, and changes to the history curricula. The moratorium, according to the Resolution, permitted the preservation of stability in the country. However, Russian language has been a mandatory discipline in Moldovan schools starting with the 5<sup>th</sup> grade, and new textbooks for history have been elaborated.

In 2002, the Government of the Republic of Moldova launched a competition for the best concept of history teaching for Moldova and, through Moldovan embassies, asked European countries to provide suggestions for reforming the teaching of history in Moldova. In February 2003, the Moldovan government collected 42 concepts and transmitted them to the Secretariat of the Council of Europe. Out of the 42, the Committee of Experts selected just five; these were approved by the Council of Europe's delegation, which also suggested that these five concepts should be further developed into possibly one or two concepts which would be acceptable to all the parties involved. In February 2003, the Ministry of Education of Moldova sent a set of Moldovan history textbooks to the Secretariat of the Council Europe, via the Permanent Representation of Moldova. The Secretariat was asked to see whether the German Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Analysis could evaluate them. The Council of Europe decided to provide the necessary support to the Georg Eckert Institute to carry out an evaluation of existing history school textbooks and also to invite the authors of Moldovan textbook and curriculum outlines to the Institute to discuss the analysis and make recommendations. During 2003, the Council of Europe supported the foundation of the Teacher's Training Centre and became a member of its board. The Council of Europe agreed with the Moldovan government that the Centre will be a non-governmental entity but that members of the Board can be members of the government (e.g. Mrs. V. Haheu and V. Cristea, who in fact opposed the Moldovan law on NGOs and the principles of activity of NGOs).

In April 2003, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress of Historians of the Republic of Moldova condemned the interference of the Communist Government in the field of history education and endorsed the existing concept of teaching the *History of the Romanians* and *World History* courses "as a scientific foundation for the education of young generations". The participants also called on all history teachers from the Republic of Moldova to support them in their attempts to educate cultured citizens, making them aware

of their historical identity and place in contemporary world society and their profound European roots.

During 2002-2003, the Council of Europe and the European Association of History Educators (EUROCLIO) were actively involved in the development of a new history education concept for Moldova. Representatives of these international organizations have often visited Moldova to support and participate in training seminars. Through their presence at such meetings, they managed to introduce a multilateral and objective approach regarding history education in Moldova. During the meeting of the Council of Europe's experts with the president of the Republic, V. Voronin, which was held in Chișinău on February 18, 2003, the president said that "the government had decided to renounce at its initial plan to change the name of the course on national history to the *History of Moldova* and proceed instead with an integrated course for history".<sup>12</sup> According to Voronin's statement "only a depoliticised history can reveal the historical truth". The new history curriculum should be based on the principles laid down in the Council of Europe's *Recommendation, on history teaching in the twenty-first-century (Rec (2001) 15)* and should reflect the multicultural composition of Moldovan society. He emphasized that such an approach to the teaching of history would also be helpful in the integration process of Moldova into Europe. During the meeting, Ms. Cardwel Alison, representative of the Council of Europe, said that

both the experts and President Vladimir Voronin have agreed on the necessity to have a single course of history that would include all of the materials and would reflect the multiple cultures in Moldova. We must do what has been done in other European countries.

The support shown by these organizations for the *Integrated History* course provoked disagreement among Moldovan historians, who stated that this change contrasts with the current educational realities of the country. Some foreign experts responded by insisting on a single course of history, branding local historians who were pleading for the preservation of the two courses of history, the *History of the Romanians* and *World History*, as Romanian nationalists.

The discussions that took place in Germany at the Georg-Eckert Institute during 2003-2006 between historians from Moldova and other countries led to the identification of some elements of the national history

curriculum and textbooks that needed to be improved. However, there were no suggestions to replace the textbooks. Participants of a seminar held in Braunschweig on June 25-29, 2003, mentioned that the intention to replace history curricula and textbooks in Moldova would constitute a revitalization of "the Stalinist concept of the creation of the nation, language, and history of Moldovans as different from Romanians",<sup>13</sup> which contradicts the Council of Europe's Recommendation 15 (2001).

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education started an experiment whereby a new course, titled *Integrated History*, was introduced on September 1, 2003, in 50 schools across the country. Neither the method by which schools had been selected nor the list of schools chosen was made public. According to the Ministry of Education, the number of schools involved in the experiment increased to 150 in the 2004-2005 school year; in the 2005-2006 school year, the number increased to 400. Thus, this "secret" experiment with a course of integrated history revealed the political opposition of the communist government to the *History of the Romanians* course. The lack of a concept, strategy, and transparency in the realization of the experiment, as well as the selection of the textbook for this course by the Ministry of Education, reveals the political nature of the decision to implement the *Integrated History* course. The communist authorities have distorted the concept of an integrated history by adjusting it to their political ideology. During 2002 and 2003, some Moldovan officials declared that the teaching of the *History of the Romanians* creates barriers for the integration of Moldova into the EU and the resolution of the conflict with Transnistria. This experiment and these declarations provoked new tensions in Moldovan society.<sup>14</sup>

In July 2004, the Minister of Education, Mr. V. Beniuc, declared that new textbook authors were nominated in April 2004 by the Ministry and that the textbooks would be ready for the beginning of the upcoming school year (September 1, 2004).<sup>15</sup> In 2004, the Ministry of Education indeed announced a competition for writing new history textbooks, but most historians and publishing houses refused to participate in this process as they considered it to be both undemocratic and unscientific. Thus, Minister V. Beniuc simply selected the people he wanted to lead the textbook writing project. It is difficult to assert that this was a real democratic and transparent process.

In 2005, the Ministry of Education excluded final exams in the subjects of *History of the Romanians* and *World History* from the list of exams for Moldovan high schools. The Ministry proposed that high schools conduct

an exam in geography instead and that other schools offer an exam in history as an optional exam. These changes once again provoked a public outcry. Leaders of professional associations (A. Petrencu and L. Stavinschi) asserted that history teachers' associations did not support this decision and viewed it as a political interference by the communist government in history education. This position was supported by the participants at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress of Historians of Moldova, which was held on November 5, 2005 in Chişinău.

On November 30, 2005, President Voronin convoked a meeting with members of the government and parliament and discussed the problem of implementing an *Integrated History* course based on the Council of Europe's recommendations. Voronin mentioned that the introduction of this course is part of Moldova's efforts to raise national educational standards to European standards. He also said that new textbooks should have better quality and price, and that the commercial factor should be excluded from the process of evaluation, editing, and distribution of books to schools.

**Table 1. Actual structure of the history education in Moldova**

No.	Secondary school		Lyceum	
1.	5 <sup>th</sup> grade	Antiquity	10 <sup>th</sup> grade	Antiquity and Middle Ages
2.	6 <sup>th</sup> grade	Middle Ages	11 <sup>th</sup> grade	Modernity
3.	7 <sup>th</sup> grade	Modern period, part I	12 <sup>th</sup> grade	Contemporary
4.	8 <sup>th</sup> grade	Modern period, part II		
5.	9 <sup>th</sup> grade	Contemporary period		

On July 27, 2006, the Ministry of Education approved the decision to introduce the *Integrated History* course and textbooks into pre-university education starting that September. Hence, following September 1, 2006, the Ministry of Education introduced new curricula for history education in all secondary schools with one course titled *History*,<sup>16</sup> excluding the two previously taught courses on *History of the Romanians* and *World History* from the curricula. Also, the Ministry of Education distributed new history textbooks in all schools and demanded that schools stop using other textbooks. This situation again generated opposition from teachers, professional organizations, and NGOs. Opponents pointed out multiple mistakes in the content of the new books. Many national

newspapers published articles complaining about the quality of the new textbooks. The most criticized textbooks were for the 9<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> grade, which contained numerous pictures of and comments from communist government leaders.

In this very difficult situation, President Voronin convened another meeting on September 29, 2006, with some of the best known historians from the Republic of Moldova. He said that for the first time, he was getting involved in the discussions of teaching integrated history in Moldovan schools.

During this meeting, Voronin said:

educating through history is our first step in the process to attend the general-human values, accepted by the European Union. The introduction of the integrated course of history in our educational institutions is just a small step in the process of integrating our country into Europe – a very important step.

Voronin also mentioned, that

a school is not a polygon for battles and exercises of scholars. The teacher's chair cannot be a political tribune. During the last 15 years, the Republic of Moldova has been a subject of international law, and our country is not a Gubernia or province of some others states; it has its own contemporary state symbols with multi-century old traditions, culture, and history.<sup>17</sup>

The President's declaration about political involvement in history research and teaching is contradictory, because the Communist Government promoted exactly the opposite thing. Most historians who participated at this meeting criticized the new history textbooks, and at the end of the discussion, President Voronin asked them to correct all the mistakes from these textbooks as urgently as possible. He also suggested that a group of experts under the Institute of History and Law of the Academy of Sciences should develop the second edition of integrated history textbooks, and he invited all interested institutions and organizations to participate in the editing process. Hence, after this meeting, in November 2006, a 35-member commission for scientific expertise of history textbooks was created at the Academy of Sciences of Moldova.



Since the decision by the Ministry of Education to introduce a new curriculum and new textbooks on integrated history in Moldova, we have seen a new wave of activism in Moldovan society against this decision. There were hundreds of declarations in local mass media from diverse institutions and groups of people (political parties, professional organizations, mass media organizations, group of teachers and parents, parliamentary debates, etc.) criticizing the new curriculum.

On December 22, 2006, after two months of evaluating the content of these new history textbooks, a state commission approved the evaluation report. But at the final meeting, only 19 of the 35 members participated, and just 8 of them voted for the final decision. Most historians left the meeting because they thought that while many of the reviews (cca. 40) criticized the new textbooks, the leaders of the commission tried to push for a positive decision, which finally prevailed. Chiril Stratievski, chair of the commission, declared that the final decision had been approved by a vote of the majority of the members of the commission. The commission admitted that the textbooks contained various mistakes (conceptual, linguistic, factual, and technical) which should be removed during the course of the following two years. The commission held the Ministry of Education responsible for these mistakes but recommended that teachers use the textbooks while being critical of the controversial issues. The Ministry of Education was to elaborate and distribute appendices to these books (as *errata*) in all of the schools.

V. Țvircun, Moldova's Minister of Education, declared that the introduction of a new curriculum and the publication of new textbooks were accomplished based on the recommendations of the Georg Eckert Institute for Textbook Analysis in Braunschweig, Germany. This, however, was untrue. As mentioned earlier, the Government asked the Council of Europe and the Georg Eckert Institute to offer these authors their expertise in textbook research. The Georg Eckert Institute stressed that its role in the process of textbook development was to help improve the didactic quality of the work and support the textbook authors in their efforts towards an integrated approach to the teaching and learning of history.

The Georg Eckert Institute's press release from December 15, 2006, mentions that

the Georg Eckert Institute has no mandate to approve textbooks neither in the German nor in the international context.<sup>18</sup> The Georg Eckert Institute's role is that of a consultant body. Thus, its expertise does not substitute

the comprehensive internal process of review and approval of textbooks. The Georg Eckert Institute has supported the Moldovan Government in its undertaking to improve history teaching and textbook writing, yet the Georg Eckert Institute has *not approved* the textbooks and their content.

The German Institute's experts reviewed the manuscripts of the new textbooks and stated that "none of the manuscripts fully reached the goals set by the Moldovan curriculum. Some were still far from meeting the new methodological standards at all". The experts recommended "a serious reworking of all of these books" and did not suggest that they should be published in the form they were submitted for review. Additionally, the Georg Eckert Institute was

not of the opinion that the new textbooks should exclusively replace the previous ones. On the contrary, given the shortcomings of the new textbooks, use of the previous textbooks in addition to the new ones seems to be a beneficial approach.

**Table 11. History teaching in the Republic of Moldova since 2006**

Educational level	Grade	Age	Content	Discipline	Hour/Week		Total hours/year			
							before 2006		after 2006	
Primary	4 <sup>th</sup>	10-11	History		1		34		34	
Secondary	5 <sup>th</sup>	12-13	Prehistory. Antiquity	History	2		46 + 22*		68	
	6 <sup>th</sup>	13-14	Middle Ages	History	2		36 + 32		68	
	7 <sup>th</sup>	14-15	Modernity, part I	History	2		38 + 30		68	
	8 <sup>th</sup>	15-16	Modernity, part II	History	2		36 + 32		68	
	9 <sup>th</sup>	16-17	Contemporary	History	2		36 + 32		68	
Lyceum	10 <sup>th</sup>	17-18	Antiquity and Middle Age	History	3**	2***	102	68	102	68
	11 <sup>th</sup>	18-19	Modern period	History	3	2	102	68	102	68
	12 <sup>th</sup>	19-20	Contemporary period		3	2	102	68	102	68

\* first figure shows the hours designated for World History and the next figure for History of Romanians (1995-2006); \*\* - Lyceum (section of humanities);

\*\*\* - Lyceum (section of sciences)

As a result of the double general elections in 2009, the new democratic parties (Alliance for European Integration) came to power and established the integration of the Republic of Moldova into the European Union as their government's main goal. This, however, did not end the public debate on history education in Moldova. In 2010, the Ministry of Education approved a new, modernised curriculum for a single subject called *History*.<sup>19</sup>

This decision did not satisfy some historians, who asked the Ministry to reinstate the two history courses taught in Moldovan schools until 2006 – *History of the Romanians* and *World History*. After long debates and a new commission, established in March 2012, the Ministry of Education decided to maintain one course, but with different title, which is changed from *History* to the *History of the Romanians and World History*. This decision provoked new debates and a new controversy, prompting some politicians and NGOs leaders to quit the Ministry of Education due to what they perceived to be an antipatriotic decision.

In the majority of West European countries, history education goes beyond the national framework, and the trend is now moving towards teaching a common European history. Moldova has not embraced this approach yet. Now, the Republic of Moldova has an opportunity to start teaching its own history again, to get rid of the remnants of the false version of history that was promoted during Soviet times, and to develop a comprehensive, accurate history curriculum that incorporates both regional and European elements. More importantly, as the community of historians of Moldova stated, the process of creating a single history course for Moldovan schools should evolve naturally and be based on democratic principles and supported by public debate. So, as we can see from Moldovan last decades experience history teaching is an expression of the current ideological crisis in most of the former soviet republics where the weak state of school history education reflects a crisis in academic history. J. Seim, the Norwegian researcher is pointing very the situation in Moldova concerned history – Moldova: a young state - where is the history?<sup>20</sup> In the divided societies, such as it is Republic of Moldova, history curriculum is a conflict issue and is danger to be an open teacher, in special in history in the conflict regions. But, by teaching conflicts is possible to build a non-violent World.

Nowadays, history is a compulsory discipline since 4<sup>th</sup> grade and continues until end of the secondary and high school. So, during following pages we will analyse the situation of treating neighbours in Moldovan history textbooks.

### **Primary school, 4<sup>th</sup> grade**

The first history textbook for 4<sup>th</sup> grade was more focused on national history, it includes more themes on patriotic issues from the Ancient until today.<sup>21</sup> As part of *History of Romanians*, the textbook contents obviously

themes directly linked with history of Romania. The textbook from 2006 differs from the previous one, because as it was written according to another curriculum, which is more focused on the history of Republic of Moldova. Some episodes are linked with History of Romania but not so much as it was before. The neighbours of the Republic of Moldova could be observed on the maps of Europe from p. 24, 69 and 71.<sup>22</sup> A similar situation can be found in the complementary materials for the 4<sup>th</sup> grade.<sup>23</sup>

### **5<sup>th</sup> grade**

The 5<sup>th</sup> grade history textbooks published by Lumina publishing house in 2000 includes prehistory and Antiquity: the first part is focused on World History while the second part on national history.<sup>24</sup> Prehistory and Antiquity include quite well the knowledge about actual territories of Romania and Moldova. Greek colonization and contacts with the barbarian is treated from a larger perspective. In some cases the textbooks presents more facts on regions which are now parts of Romania than territories of the Republic of Moldova. The eastern neighbours are presented in the context of migrations only: Sarmathians, Germanics, Huns, Avars, Slavs, Bulgarians.<sup>25</sup> Generally, this textbook is considered very complicated for the 5<sup>th</sup> grade.

The alternative textbook for the 5<sup>th</sup> grade is more accessible than that mentioned above, but the issue concerning neighbouring territories and people account similar problems.<sup>26</sup> The authors of the textbooks recognised that the theme of the life in Ancient time is better presented in the 5<sup>th</sup> grade textbook than in the 4<sup>th</sup> grade textbook.<sup>27</sup> G. Gonta and N. Petrovski mentioned in 2000 that:

V Respublike Moldova prozivajut rjedom s moldavanami i ljudi drugih nacional'nostej. Oni sostavljajut 35% naselenija: russkie, ukraincy, gagauzy, bolgary i dr. Vot pocemu osoboe znacenie imeet oznakomlenie ucenikov s povsednevnoj zizn'ju predstavitelj vsech nacional'noej Respubliki Moldova.<sup>28</sup>

### **6<sup>th</sup> grade**

The Middle Ages for 6<sup>th</sup> grade was presented in the textbooks before 2006 in two separated courses: World History and History of Romanians, after 2006 – in one integrated course. The textbook published by Știința

publishing house contains various information about neighbouring territories from Middle Age, such as Western and Southern Slavs, Kievan Rus', Mongols etc.<sup>29</sup> In the second part among themes of Medieval Moldova are treated events and facts from Medieval Valachia, Transylvania, but nothing is mentioned about relations between Moldova and Eastern regions. We can see on some maps that Moldova bordered with Lithuania during Ștefan cel Mare's rule, later with Poland and Crimean Khanate, but no more details about historical context of these realities.<sup>30</sup> The textbook published according the integrated history curricula from 2006 contains 12 chapters focused on Middle Ages.<sup>31</sup> The quality of this textbook was debated by various scholars, but it includes various themes on neighbours: Hungary, Kievan Rus', Valachia.

### **7<sup>th</sup> grade**

One of the best written history textbook from the Republic of Moldova is the work done by Știința publishing house in 2002.<sup>32</sup> The first part is entirely dedicated to the Modern World History, including a theme on Russian Empire during 19<sup>th</sup> c. The second part contains themes from the national history, combining different aspects of the Modern history of Moldova, Valachia, Transylvania, Banat, Oltenia, Bukovina, Dobrogea and Transnistria. It is quite well presented the situation of Bessarabia and Transnistria after annexation by the Russian Empire ("autonomy", colonization, economy, society, culture, etc.).<sup>33</sup> The 1848 Revolution in Moldova is reflected in a comparative perspective with the similar events from Transylvania, Bukovina and Banat: this is a good example of a balanced treatment of such events.<sup>34</sup>

The integrated history textbook for the 7<sup>th</sup> grade debates the Modern History period (1640-1850). The authors tried to integrate the history of principality of Moldova into the European context, but this purpose was not always achieved. Sometimes, the authors try to highlight Moldova but not always successfully, for example, "Economy in the Northern Moldova after its annexation by Habsburg Empire" or "Culture in Moldova between Prut and Dniester (Bessarabia) and Moldovan territories from the left side of the Dniester" during 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> c. In that period the mentioned territories were part of the Austrian-Hungarian and Russian Empires and it would have been better to mentioned the real administrative names used at that time.<sup>35</sup>

### 8<sup>th</sup> grade

The textbooks published in 2002 and 2003 for the Modern World History (1850-1918) treat different aspects of the history of Europe, USA, Asia and Africa.<sup>36</sup> Considering the fact that for the 8<sup>th</sup> grade there is a separate course on national history (History of Romanians), nothing is mentioned about Romania or Bessarabia in this textbook.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, the national history textbooks discuss many common aspects of Moldova as part of Modern Romania, and Bessarabia as part of the Russian Empire.

The integrated history textbook published in 2006 includes only one theme on Romanian Modern History. The history of Bessarabia is presented from different perspectives (agrarian reforms, social-economic development, ethnic minorities, liberal reforms, social-political life, education and science, architecture, etc.), but it is written in the traditions of the Soviet historiography.

### 9<sup>th</sup> grade

The World History textbook published by Știința publishing house argues three main periods: the World during 1918-1945, post-war period, and the European contemporary construction.<sup>38</sup> If the Romania is briefly described on p. 89 as result of the collapse of the totalitarian regimes. The national history (History of Romanians) textbook includes many aspects of history of Romania and Moldavian SSR during the 20<sup>th</sup> c., a chapter is dedicated to Transnistrian region in the period 1918-1940. The last chapter is dedicated to independent Moldova, but nothing is mentioned about the relations with Romania. The problem of the separatist region Transnistria is presented only as part of the Russian-Moldovan war from 1992.

The integrated history textbook written by the team of S. Nazaria has been highly criticized<sup>39</sup> because of its Soviet historiography style and was removed by the Ministry of Education from schools in 2009. Romania is viewed as one of the causes that provoked the Transnistrian conflict. Completely different is the textbook signed by I. Cașu *et al.*, where the World and National history are treated in two separated parts.<sup>40</sup> The history of Bessarabia is treated as part of Great Romania, and history of Moldavian SSR as part of USSR. The first part ends with a chapter regarding the Romanians from abroad Romania and from the Republic of Moldova.<sup>41</sup>

### **High School (Lyceum) 10<sup>th</sup> grade**

The Ancient World and Medieval History textbook for the 10<sup>th</sup> grade treats the Eastern and South-Eastern European regions very poor, Russia is shortly presented in two sections only: Formation of Kievan Rus' and Centralization of Russia.<sup>42</sup> The national ancient and medieval history (History of Romania) is treated in two separate textbooks published by Prut International and Civitas publishing houses.<sup>43</sup> Both textbooks are done according the 1999 school curriculum and have a similar structure. Antiquity is presented from Romanian narrative and includes mostly the Carpathian-Danube regions, not so much is mentioned about other neighbouring territories. The Slavs are mentioned in the context of migrations and their contribution to the Romanian ethno genesis. The same situation is found in the Middle Ages chapters, where we discover information about Transylvania, Valachia, Moldova, Bulgaria, Dobrogea, the Ottoman Empire, Poland, but very little about Hungary and Russia. The Great Lithuanian Ducat is mentioned just on the maps.<sup>44</sup> There is an exception represented by a case study on "Cossacks campaigns in Moldova during the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> c." and the syntheses lecture "The settlements of Moldovans on the left side Dniester during Middle Ages". The narrative from these themes is different: the Cossacks are treated as invaders and Moldovans as the victims of different foreign powers.<sup>45</sup> In the context of the culture and art theme from the end of the textbook is mentioned the well-known Kievan Metropolitan of Moldovan origin, Petru Movila.<sup>46</sup>

The integrated history textbook for the 10<sup>th</sup> grade includes various aspects of Ancient and Medieval Age.<sup>47</sup> Getae-Dacians are presented shortly in a large perspective including the Carpathian-Danube regions. The Greek colonies are only accounted but not discussed as a large phenomenon. The Christianity and Romanization is treated from a wrong perspective and does not link it with the territories between rivers Prut and Dniester. Migrations in the Carpathian-Danubian space mention expressly the Sarmathians, Carps, Goths who arrived in these territories. Moldova is discussed among other medieval entities of Valachia and Transylvania, but nothing is mentioned about medieval Russia. A special these is dedicated to other ethnicities living in medieval Moldova.

### **11<sup>th</sup> grade**

During the last two decades in the Republic of Moldova were published five history textbooks for the 11<sup>th</sup> grade. Two of them are for National



History (History of Romanians),<sup>48</sup> two for World History<sup>49</sup> and one for the integrated course<sup>50</sup>. All of them are debating the Modern History. The Modern World History debates diverse problems which refer to the Western Europe and the USA: economy, social life, every day life, revolutions, nation formation, genesis of democracy, colonial system, international relations and culture. The Eastern and South-Eastern Europe is practically absent. Exceptions are two short themes on "Oriental Problem" and "Black Sea – a zone of confrontations".<sup>51</sup> The National History textbooks are treating many common modern Romanian history facts and phenomena from the middle of the 17<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> c. A separate chapter is dedicated to Bessarabia as part of Russian Empire (1812-1917) and Transylvania as part of the Austro-Hungarian. Civitas's textbook is presenting this issue along with Transnistria. Poland and Tatars are mentioned as the Eastern neighbours just on the maps. Russia is often present in the textbook as an important player in the 18<sup>th</sup> – 19<sup>th</sup> cc. European history as very interested in the Black Sea and Balkan regions. The problem of Bessarabia is treated from the perspective of the Russian occupation/annexation policy. The 1918 Unification of Great Romania is view from the perspective of the national movements from Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania. It is shortly presented the reaction and attitude of Soviet Russia regarding these movements.<sup>52</sup>

The integrated version of Modern History textbook for the 11<sup>th</sup> grade is the best results of this project, however it has been criticized by the Communist Government.<sup>53</sup> The authors are trying to undertake a balanced problematic analysis of similar questions, by integrating the national history in World History. Bessarabia as a Russian Gubernia and Romanian Principalities/Romania are described separately, practically in each chapter among other Modern European states and USA. Unfortunately, but Russian Empire is not discussed separately.

### 12<sup>th</sup> grade

The 12<sup>th</sup> grade students are learning the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> - beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> cc. The textbook *History of Romanians* published by Prut International publishing House the first time in 2002 and republished several times afterwards is trying to present a balanced national history from Moldovan and Romanian perspectives.<sup>54</sup> First five chapters are dedicated to history of Great Romania during inter-war period: new geopolitical frame; political life, economy, international relations; education, science and culture. During the first 50 pages, Eastern neighbours and USSR are

present on the political maps and only on p. 51 is described the fact that USSR did not recognize the 1918 Unification of Romania and on p. 53 the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. However, the synthesis lecture of the 4<sup>th</sup> chapter is dedicated to "The problem of Bessarabia and Romanian-Soviet relations".<sup>55</sup> Chapter 6 is focused on the political and social-economic situation in Transnistria (1924-1940) as part of USSR. Chapter 7 debates the situation of Romania during WW II, while the Holocaust is mentioned in only one sentence.<sup>56</sup> Recently, additional teaching materials have been published by the International Centre of Training and Professional Development of the Jews Centre from Chişinău, which includes a book, CD, map and few pictures in high resolution.<sup>57</sup> At the beginning of chapter 7 is mentioned the problem lost territories: occupation by USSR of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Herţa region, Transylvania by Hungary and Southern part of Dobrogea by Bulgaria. The following three chapters (8-10) are dedicated to communist regimes in Moldavian SSR and Romania. The last two chapters debate the situation of Romania after 1989 and development of the Republic of Moldova as an independent country. The theme "Relations with neighbours" presents Romania as the main partner of Moldova. Very few words are spoken about the partnership between Romania and Ukraine and about three-lateral cross-border projects (Romania-Ukraine-Moldova). Two articles from the bilateral agreement are an appendix to this theme.<sup>58</sup> The theme of the Moldovan foreign policy is dedicated in its half to the Transnistrian conflict while the relations with the neighbours are briefly mentioned in two sentences.<sup>59</sup>

The textbook concerned World History written by a historian from Moldova and another one from Romania focuses more on European and Global problems, some information about Romania and Moldova could be found in a few themes, such as "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" or "European Assembly of the Council of Europe".

The integrated course of history published by the team of S. Nazaria was highly criticized and withdrawn by the Ministry of Education from schools in 2009.<sup>60</sup> The authors tried to highlight the statehood and the importance of the Republic of Moldova. Romania is viewed as an aggressor country and USSR as a liberator in the context of WW II.

An alternative textbook to the above mentioned one was elaborated by N. Enciu, it combines national and World history.<sup>61</sup> The textbook is too big (360 p.), it is full of texts, and very hard to work with. But, in comparison with Nazaria's textbook, this pays more attention to history of Romania, includes Bessarabia as part of this country during the interwar

period, WWII, the socialist period and post-totalitarian development. N. Enciu debates the problems of Moldavian ASSR as part of USSR and then Moldavian SSR. In what concerns the present neighbours of the Republic of Moldova, Romania is mentioned a couple of times.

So, we can clearly see in the history textbooks from the Republic of Moldova that the history of Romania is presented very well in this textbook, while that of Ukraine is mentioned occasionally, only in a general context.

## Romania

Since 1989 the educational system in Romania is in the process of continuous reformation.<sup>62</sup> It is based on the national legal framework, such as the Constitution (1991), Education Law (1995-2011), and the new law on National Education in force since January 2011. The earliest changes of the educational system were concerned with eliminating the ideological influences from school programs and textbooks. A comprehensive reform in education started in 1993-1994. These transformations were made with the support of the World Bank, Council of Europe and European Union. Between 1992 and 1997 an “interim” curriculum was developed, which was a basis for future development of the National curricula and textbooks. The World Bank offered Romanian Government’s an important loan for educational reforms. So, during 1996-2002 were developed the new curriculum for all grades (1-12).<sup>63</sup> The National Curriculum was developed through consultation of organizations, including experts from teacher’s organizations, universities, etc. Nowadays, History and Civics as teaching topics are a part of “Man and Society” curricular thematic area. History as independent discipline is compulsory course between 10 and 18 years (4-12 grades).

Before 1989 history teaching and textbook publishing in Romania as in other socialist countries had been controlled by the Central Committee of Communist Party and was just a single textbook for each grade. At the beginning of 1970’ the History was excluded from the school program, but in 1976 after the Congress of Socialist Culture and Education reintroduced the history as an important ideological and propagandistic tool of the Romanian Communist Party. The content of the textbooks were influenced by communist ideology and strong nationalistic view on history.<sup>64</sup>

After December 1989 in Romania started the debates around the title of the national history: History of Romania (Istoria României) or History of Romanians (Istoria Românilor), which has a political and historical

background. During the socialist time it was used the title of History of Romania, but before World War II it had the title History of Romanians. The idea was to include in the course of history all Romanians, including from lost territories (Bessarabia and Bukovina) or from Diasporas.<sup>65</sup> Most of the teachers, historians and politicians supported this idea and it was included in the Education Law in 1995, which has direct impact in preparing the new national curriculum in 1995-1996 (applied since 1997).<sup>66</sup> So, history teaching in Romania was under the process of educational transformations and since 1989 the educational plans (1990, 1995 1998, 1999 și 2001, 2003 2005)<sup>67</sup> and history programs (1991, 1993 și 1995-2001, 2003-2006) have changed a couple of times.<sup>68</sup>

During the first decade of Romanian democracy the re-writing process of the history textbooks have passed too. After December 1989 the Ministry of Education introduced in school reprinted without any changes the history textbook written by P.P. Panaitescu in 1940s. But this book was practically not used by teachers and later, after few months, it was accepted to use the old textbook published in late 1980s avoiding the parts affected by communist ideology.<sup>69</sup> The textbooks for World history were just revised, expelling ideological elements and republished. The new history textbooks were written and published just in 1996-1997 as result of the WB and Romanian Government project.<sup>70</sup> Printing of the new history textbooks began in 1992-1993 with textbooks for high school for grade 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> and continued after 1995 with alternative textbooks published with Word Bank support. The textbooks for 11 and 12 grades present the national history (Istoria românilor) from prehistoric times to 1989.<sup>71</sup> The intentions of the authors and authorities were to give a primary didactical support for school teachers and the results as M. Murgescu mentioned “were long and rather boring narratives, the textbooks of this generation, besides methodological shortcomings, contain plenty of factual errors and are nationally biased”.<sup>72</sup>

The new textbooks have designed as a *replique* to the old ones, in terms of quality of paper, printing and content. But with support of World Bank the textbook became more attractive in terms of format, quality of the paper and colour printing, etc. During 1995-2001 among Education Reform Project in Romania, the textbooks were co-funded by the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the Government of Romania. This project had two main components:

- I. Raising quality of basic and secondary education and
- II. Improving education financing and monitoring.

In fact, the first component was dedicated to the curriculum and textbook development. It contains five elements:

- a. curriculum development;
- b. teacher training;
- c. assessment and examinations;
- d. occupational standards and assessment;
- e. textbooks.

The total costs of the project was 47,1 million USD, and 64% of the total budget were for textbooks (28 mil. USD). The main contribution was through IBRD loan and 19,1 million USD was the Romanian Government contribution. The project planned to cover textbooks for all 12 grades, but according to the new policy of WB it supported only the textbooks for compulsory education 1-8 grades. The aim and objectives of the textbook component were following:

- a. to improve the quality of textbooks for all pupils in compulsory grades 1-8 and grades 9-12 (the high-school sector);
- b. to provide teachers with a real choice of books to match theory teaching style and theory students needs;
- c. to stimulate the growth of a professional and dynamic publishing industry;
- d. to introduce to a free market in textbook supply.

One title for each subject at each grade was published with support of the Ministry of Education and then distributed in schools. The state textbook publishing house "Editura Didactică și Pedagogică" had a priority in publishing textbooks.<sup>73</sup> The implementation of the project was according to the established steps; each year the Ministry of Education would invite publishers to submit sample textbooks for all subjects for two grades: in 1995 for grades 2 and 5, in 1996 for grades 3 and 6, in 1997 for grades 4 and 7, etc. By the end of the project cca. 210 titles had been published and distributed in the schools, a total number of the books published by the project was over 20 million books at the cost of about 35 million USD, or 1,75 USD per copy.<sup>74</sup> So, after such investment in the Romanian Educational System some scholars are asking whether it was a modernization or pseudo-modernisation?<sup>75</sup>

The first history textbook was for 4<sup>th</sup> grade in 1996-1997, which represented a booklet on national history. But the 5<sup>th</sup> grade history textbook published in 1998 became a model for other grades. What is clear is that the new generation of the history textbooks in Romania for gymnasium appeared according to the new curriculum programmes in 1994-1995 and then for high schools in 1997-1998, which are much better than

old textbooks. Another positive aspect was beginning of the alternative textbooks authorization by state body. The National Commission for Schoolbook Approval has to select according quality criteria 3 history textbook for each grade for gymnasium level, and an unlimited number of textbooks for high school.<sup>76</sup>

During Minister Andrei Marga the questions on history teaching and publishing new textbooks were urged by renewal of the history program for the 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>, and 7<sup>th</sup> grades and to prepare new textbooks for high school (8<sup>th</sup> – 12<sup>th</sup> grades).<sup>77</sup> The World History for high school grades was enlarged from 2 to 3 years and History of Romanians was reduced from 2 to 1 year. According to new curricula the history of Romanians for 12<sup>th</sup> grade should provide a thematic vision focused on the mains aspects of national history. The authors of the curricula considered that pupils studied enough national history during gymnasium grade and it is not necessary to repeat this course in high school. From this reason they established a new structure of history teaching in Romania.<sup>78</sup> In August-September 1999 the National Commission for the Schoolbook Approval-CNAM approved 6 textbooks for the 9<sup>th</sup> grade, 5 textbooks for the 10<sup>th</sup> grade, 1 textbook for the 11<sup>th</sup> grade and 5 textbooks for the 12<sup>th</sup> grade.<sup>79</sup> So, in 1999 were published the new textbooks for the entire high school based on new curricula. The textbook offers were selected in 1<sup>st</sup> stage by the Commission on 8 factors of the technical quality:

- a. curriculum coverage;
- b. quality of content;
- c. language level;
- d. pedagogical approach;
- e. quality of presentation and design;
- f. illustrations;
- g. originality and
- h. quality of printing materials.

For each factor was allocated points ranking 5, 10 and 15. The maximum score that may be awarded a textbooks offer was 65, but be qualify for the 2<sup>nd</sup> stage every offer must receive a minimum 40% of the total points under each of 8 factors and 45 points of all (69%) for its technical quality.

In the same year (1999) occurred the so-called “textbook scandal” or “schoolbook war” around one history textbook for 12<sup>th</sup> grade published by Sigma publishing house by the team of young historians from Cluj Napoca.<sup>80</sup> The textbook signed by Sorin Mitu, Lucia Copoeru, Ovidiu

Pecican, Virgiliu Tarau, Liviu Tirau, *Istoria Romanilor, Manual pentru clasa a XII-a*, București, Sigma, 1999, offers other view of some sensitive historical problems on issues of national history (identity, ethnicity etc.). Authors used the titles, which were not accepted by some historians and politicians, such as the “invention” of the modern nation, Ethnogenesis: how the Romanians imagine the origins of their people, etc. The scandal began in the Romanian Senate on October 5<sup>th</sup>, 1999 and involved political, historical and mass media communities in about 1,5 month of debates/battle. Politicians and parliamentarians from both chambers of Romanian Parliament had two special meetings of the united education committees, which led a motion against the government demanding the revision of the history curricula and the withdrawal of incriminated textbook. The motion had to be discussed in the plenum of the Chamber Deputies, and was rejected by vote on November 15<sup>th</sup>, 1999.<sup>81</sup> Sergiu Nicolaescu, well know film producer, at that time was a member of the Romanian Senate and he said “This textbook should be burnt in a public square!”.<sup>82</sup>

The historians were divided in those who supported the authors of the textbook and vote for freedom of opinions in writing history and those who criticized the authors, school curricula and Ministry of Education. The group of people, who was against this textbook, considered that it was an attack on Romanian national identity. They said that authors reduced the ancient and medieval history and too much focused on Modern and contemporary history of Romanians. The school teachers were in particular against the new curricula, because it cut teaching hours and gave a new vision on history teaching. The critics were concentrated on the content of new history curricula for high school where the authors reduced considerably the subjects on national history.

In mass media the subject of history teaching and textbooks was a main issue for couple of weeks. Most of them were against Minister A. Marga and alternative textbooks.<sup>83</sup> Sigma publishing house after this scandal revised its textbook for 12<sup>th</sup> grade and mentioned 29 names of university professor who contributed by different recommendations or debates. Finally, the book was uncomfortable for the public. The authors were forced to come back to the old tradition of presenting history in textbooks. They changed the discussed titles, “invention of the modern nation” became “The Modern Nation”, was introduced a new lesson “Crusade Politics of the Romanian Rulers: Mircea the Old, Alexandru the Good, Iancu of Hunedoara, Vlad the Empaler, Stephen the Great, Michael the Brave”. On cover they paced he portraits of Al.I. Cuza and King Ferdinand as symbols of Romanian unification, etc.<sup>84</sup>

Similar work has been done by other group of authors coordinated by I. Scurtu.<sup>85</sup> In the new edition of the textbook they inserted the new topic on "The Romanians in Europe", but rest of the book is in old style presenting such issues as "Romanians are one of the most ancient peoples in Europe", "the Romanians are born Christians", etc. So, we could see that part of Romanian society is very much affected by ideas of "glorious and heroic past of the nation" and the history textbook should contain exactly these issues, because excluding them is treated as diminishing national values. But, after these debates, history and textbooks changes, the issue of identity remains very sensitive in Romanian society.<sup>86</sup> These conflicts and debates in Romanian society show us how difficult is to find the balance between national, European and World history. This was probably one of the reasons for revising the article 4 of Law of Education (no. 84/1995) in 1999 where was written "schooling guarantees the cultivation of love towards the country, towards the historic past and the tradition of the Romanian people".<sup>87</sup> After these textbooks scandal, three alternative history textbooks for 8<sup>th</sup> grade were published without any public reaction or critics. We consider that in a period of writing new curricula and textbooks, debating the content, etc. the responsibility of textbook authors is more important than ever before.

In July 2001, the Romanian Ministry of Education restrained the free-market for textbooks for high school up to 3 (before it was unlimited). This decision provoked another round of debates among the publishers and teachers.<sup>88</sup>

#### **During 2001- 2006 were approved new Educational Plans:**

No.	Grade	No. Hours/week	Perspectives	In force since
1	IV	1	1	2006-2007
2	V-VII VIII	1-2 2	2	2001-2002
3	IX X	1/2 1/3	1/2 1/3	2004-2005
4	XI	1/3	1/3	2001-2002
5	XII	2/3	2/3	2001-2002



The discipline programs have been done according to the new curricula principles, including in history field (flexibility, efficiency, coherent, etc.). Integration of national history and world history in one common course was also under debate in the Romanian society. Initially, the idea to include Romanian history in world history was not supported by Romanian cultural and political media. This initiative was treated as an assault against the “sacred” value of the national past.<sup>89</sup> Because the idea of “Romanian history and language represent the most important support of identity” and still now part of Romanians consider that through history of Romanians they have to be educate the national identity.

Now, in Romania history is taught from the last year of the primary school (4<sup>th</sup> grade) and continues until last year of the high school (12<sup>th</sup> grade). During the Communist times the history was taught in two main subjects: Romanian History and World History. The national history was studied in 4<sup>th</sup> grade and then as other course from 8<sup>th</sup> to 10<sup>th</sup> grades. The World History was studied in the secondary school in 5<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> grades and then again in high schools as “Basic Problems of World History” during 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> grades. After transformations of the educational system in Romania in the early 1990s the compulsory school became to be from 1<sup>st</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> grades and not up to 10<sup>th</sup> grades as it was before. The Romanian Ministry of Education moved the History of Romanians to 7<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> grades and World History was compresses to the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> grades. In the high school level the World History was taught during 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> grades and Romanian History in 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> grades.<sup>90</sup>

According to the new curricula, in the secondary school the part of world history was enlarged to the 7<sup>th</sup> grade, and Romanian History compressed to the 8<sup>th</sup> grade. For high school level was also introduced a new scheme of World History focused on European history, including some topics on national history for 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> grades. The History of Romanians as a separate course focused on 19<sup>th</sup> - 20<sup>th</sup> cc. was concentrated in 12<sup>th</sup> grade. During these structural changes happened and conceptual ones. Hence, the presentation of history according to traditional chronology (AD 476, 1492/1642, 1917/1918) was shifted to more general limits (AD 1000 and 1800)<sup>91</sup>.

**Structure of history teaching in Romania since 2000<sup>92</sup>**

No.	Type of school	Grade	Course title	Type of history	Historical period	H/ week
1.	Primary	4 <sup>th</sup> (10 years)	History of Romanians	Local/ National History	All periods	1
2.	Gymnasium	5 <sup>th</sup> (11 years)	History	European/ World History	History from the earliest times to AD 1000	1
No.	Type of school	Grade	Course title	Type of history	Historical period	H/ week
3.	Gymnasium	6 <sup>th</sup> (12 years)	History	European/ World History	History from AD 1000 to the French Revolution	1-2
4.	Gymnasium	7 <sup>th</sup> (13 years)	History	European/ World History	History in the 19 <sup>th</sup> –20 <sup>th</sup> c.	1-2
5.	Gymnasium	8 <sup>th</sup> (14 years)	History of Romanians	National history	All periods	1-2
6.	High School	9 <sup>th</sup> (15 years)	History	History of European Civilization	European and Romanian history from the beginnings of the European Civilization to the 16 <sup>th</sup> c.	1-2
7.	High School	10 <sup>th</sup> (16 years)	History	European/ World History	16 <sup>th</sup> c. - 1900	1-2
8.	High School	11 <sup>th</sup> (17 years)	History	European/ World History	19 <sup>th</sup> – 20 <sup>th</sup> c.	1-2
9.	High School	12 <sup>th</sup> (18 years)	History of Romanians	National history	All periods	1-2

Today the ethnic minorities are not just a political question, but an educational one also.<sup>93</sup> The new curricula introduced some specific subjects on history of the ethnic groups living in Romania. It is very important that the national curricula states that each minority group should be provided with basic knowledge on their own history and culture. Students from minority ethnic groups have an hour per week in the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> grades devoted to their own history and culture. The Ministry of Education approved and recommended the programs and textbooks for optional course such as *History of European integration* (2000); *History and Traditions of Roma* (2003); *History of Jews. Holocaust* (2004, 2005); *Memory of Holocaust* (2005); *History and traditions of German minority* (2005); *Contemporary migrations 20-21 cc.* (2006), etc. Many textbooks were published according to this program.<sup>94</sup> One optional textbook is dedicated to the *History of Communism in Romania*, which is very well done and is helping teachers and students to understand better this political regime and impact on Romanian society.<sup>95</sup>

In the following pages we will make a short analysis of neighbours' presentation in the history textbook starting with 4<sup>th</sup> grade and finishing with 12<sup>th</sup> grade. All textbooks are elaborated according to the National Curricula and school programs and are approved by National Council for Textbooks Approval of the Ministry of Education.

### **Primary school, 4<sup>th</sup> grade**

The textbooks published before 2005 according to the old program were focused more on national issues, as the Ukrainian textbooks, often being noticed the affirmation "We as Romanians", etc.<sup>96</sup> But, after 2005, the situation changed for better. One of the history textbooks for 4<sup>th</sup> grade is printed by Humanitas publishing house, according the 2005 analytic program.<sup>97</sup> The textbook contains the official anthem of Romania *Deșteaptă-te române!* The 2<sup>nd</sup> chapter *Popoare de ieri și de azi* (People from yesterday and today) contains files about neighbours, such as "Bulgarians – our southern neighbours", "Hungarians – our western neighbours".<sup>98</sup> The theme is followed by files "Other neighbours of Romanians – Serbs, Russians and their history".<sup>99</sup> However, the Ukrainians are absent from this scheme. Similar situation is found in the textbook published by Vasile Dinu and Paul Didiță, which in general is very difficult for pupils from 4<sup>th</sup> grade.<sup>100</sup> The Republic of Moldova is shown just on some maps, as it is in the textbook published by Corint or Ana publishing houses.<sup>101</sup> Last

two textbooks content theme on “Neighbours and community”, but it is treated very general, from the local point of view, and nothing is mentioned about actual neighbours of Romania as a country.

### **Secondary school, 5<sup>th</sup> grade**

The textbook for 5<sup>th</sup> grade present in general the history from the earliest times to AD 1000 and practically mentions nothing about neighbour regions. A similar situation is found in all textbooks published by ALL, Teora, etc. publishing houses.<sup>102</sup> Just in theme about Thracians is briefly mentioned that they lived in North until Bug River (actual territory of Ukraine).<sup>103</sup> At the end of textbook, in context of 1<sup>st</sup> Millennium AD, are presented Slavs as population leaved in Eastern and Central Europe who migrated in 7<sup>th</sup> c. in Balkan Peninsula. From the table reflecting Slavic World could be seen the Russians, Belarusian and Ukrainian as part of Eastern Slavs, but for pupils from 5<sup>th</sup> grade I think this is very confused information.

### **6<sup>th</sup> grade**

The 6<sup>th</sup> grade history textbooks discus integrated version of Medieval and Modern History. The textbook edited by ALL Education publishing house in 2000 presents in a few themes the history of Romanian Medieval and Modern states (Valachia and Moldova).<sup>104</sup> In what concerns Eastern Europe, only at the end of the textbook are analysed the new powers: Russia and Austria during 18<sup>th</sup> c.<sup>105</sup> and the impact of the Russian-Turkish war (1806-1812) for Romanian countries.<sup>106</sup> The textbook debates more issues on culture, town development, everyday life, gender, etc., but not so much about eastern neighbours. Another textbook published by ALL Educational publishing house has a similar content as the previous one and focuses more on Western Europe.<sup>107</sup> The Medieval and Modern history of the states from Central and Eastern Europe is shown in a separate theme where are shortly presented Bulgaria, Serbia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Russia.<sup>108</sup> The Russian-Turkish war (1806-1812) is presented in only a few lines, with the mention that as result of Bucharest Peace Treaty the territory between Prut and Dniester (Bessarabia), as “old Romanian territory”, came under foreign administration.<sup>109</sup>

### 7<sup>th</sup> grade

In the 7<sup>th</sup> grade, the pupils study the Modern and Contemporary periods. The textbook published by Corint publishing house is very colourful; sometimes the pictures are too small and not very clear.<sup>110</sup> Most of themes are focused on Western European and USA history, with a brief presentation of some aspects of Romanian history, such as “Regulamentele organice”, Al.I. Cuza reforms, etc. At the end of theme regarding WWI is shown the everyday life during the war, which is very interesting.<sup>111</sup> During the second part, the authors present the history of 20<sup>th</sup> c. (totalitarian regimes, international relations, WWII, post-war period, etc.). The Bessarabian question is discussed shortly in context of the German-Soviet Pact.<sup>112</sup> The Republic of Moldova as independent countries, after the collapse of USSR, are mentioned only in a table from p. 111, where we can see the area and population of the newly independent states. The recent textbook published by Humanitas publishing house dedicated to the Modern and Contemporary World History is much better designed with a good balance between texts and pictures.<sup>113</sup> Treating the neighbours remains problematic, because nothing is mentioned about actual eastern independent countries: the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. For example, Bessarabia first appears on map from p. 41 and Ukraine on map from p. 79.

### 8<sup>th</sup> grade

In most of the cases the maps from the textbook coordinated by Al. Vulpe shows actual borders of Romania and nothing about neighbours.<sup>114</sup> Just on p. 27 we can see a map on migrations from a larger perspective (2<sup>nd</sup> – 8<sup>th</sup> cc.). In the next pages, the authors describe the Hungarians settlement in Pannonia, colonization of Székelys and Saxons in Transylvania.<sup>115</sup> A similar situation is attested in the textbook published by Humanitas, where some themes stress more about geography than history.<sup>116</sup> The main ideas are focused on national issues, like *Spațiul românesc văzut de istorici* (Romanian space seen by historians).<sup>117</sup> The textbook printed by Teora publishing house in 2000 and reprinted in 2006 is concerned with History of Romanians since prehistoric time until the end of 20<sup>th</sup> c.<sup>118</sup> Cucuteni-Trypillia culture is said to be spread on a large area, including territories of few contemporary states: Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine.<sup>119</sup> The Greek colonization is treated in a very modest way

with mentions of Greek towns of Histria, Tomis and Callatis.<sup>120</sup> In the theme *Locals and Foreigners from confrontation to leaving together* is shortly discussed the issue concerning the relationships with Slavs.<sup>121</sup> The relations of Moldova with Russia during Middle Age is briefly mentioned when talking about D. Cantemir and Piter I Luck agreement form 1711.<sup>122</sup> In the Russian-Austrian-Turkish wars is analysed the impact of these confrontations on Valachia and Moldova, and the occupation of Bessarabia in 1812.<sup>123</sup> Bessarabia is also discussed in context of unification of Romania in 1918<sup>124</sup> and then in context of its occupation by USSR in 1940.<sup>125</sup> Nothing is mentioned in these textbooks about Ukrainians as eastern neighbours.

### **9<sup>th</sup> grade**

The 9<sup>th</sup> grade textbook signed by S. Brezeanu discusses a very large period of history from Antiquity until 17<sup>th</sup> c.<sup>126</sup> In context of indoeuropenization on the map from p. 10 is present the Ukrainian language as part of the Slavic World and on the page before it is a picture of a Scythian vase discovered in Crimea. The following information about Eastern Europe can be seen on p. 77 where Slavs are briefly mentioned as part of the migrations, but the map "Romanian space during migration period" from p. 86 represents just territory of contemporary Romania and nothing is mentioned about neighbouring regions that underwent the same big process. The formation of the Medieval Romanian states, institutions and culture are about Valachia and Moldova, but the map from p. 120 has very poor quality and it is practically impossible to work with it. So, the medieval period is more focused on Western Europe, few information about Arabs, Ottomans, and nothing about Eastern Europe. Russia appeared on the map "Confessions in Europe at the end of 16<sup>th</sup> c." from p. 177.

### **10<sup>th</sup> grade**

The 10<sup>th</sup> grade history textbooks are concerned with the Modern and Contemporary periods. The textbook from the Didactic and Pedagogic publishing house is well done, but it is based on the edition dedicated to the complementary year.<sup>127</sup> The question of treating neighbouring people and territories remains to be revised. Bessarabia is mentioned on map from p. 32 and nothing is mentioned about its annexation by the Russian Empire

and the impact on the population of this region. Russia is presented in context of multinational countries among Austro-Hungarian.<sup>128</sup> For the first time, we find a theme dedicated to Holocaust in general, and Holocaust in Romania in particular, including about victims from Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transnistria.<sup>129</sup> No mentions is found about the Republic of Moldova in the chapters dedicated to the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> and beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> cc. Another textbook edited by Niculescu publishing house includes most of themes as the previous one and accounts the same problems, because they are both elaborated basing on the school program.<sup>130</sup> But, here we can see more information about 19<sup>th</sup> c. Moldova, some personalities (A.M. Kogălniceanu, Al.I. Ciza); Bukovina and Bessarabia; Banat and Transylvania are presented shortly as Romanian provinces on p. 60. Both textbooks are discussing the 1918 Unification of Romania, but little information about the situation of the incorporated provinces in the inter-war period and the reaction of Soviet Russia to the unification. The Holocaust is discussed shortly, but well pointed on p. 107. The Republic of Moldova appears in context of USSR collapse on p. 123.

### **11<sup>th</sup> grade**

Sigma's textbook is elaborated according the 2006 analytical program and is about history of 20<sup>th</sup> c.<sup>131</sup> It is better designed, has a good colour printed quality, the distribution of texts and pictures is well balanced, etc. In 1<sup>st</sup> part "Europe and the World in the 20<sup>th</sup> c.", the Eastern Europe is present mostly of a few maps as part of USSR, Ukrainian language is shown in the map "Linguistic groups in Modern Europe". Bessarabia appears three times: on p. 6, 11 and 27, but no information about its inter-war period. The theme "European Unity and Diversity" is very well pointed, but contains very general information. The textbook is much better elaborated than other textbooks from many perspectives, it contains different historical aspects (private and public life, development of economical and political ideas, Romanian diasporas, technological development, freedom, political regimes, resistance and dissidents, cooperation and conflict, religious diversity, etc.), but it should pay more attention to neighbours of Romania. The Republic of Moldova, as important Eastern neighbours are mentioned only on the map from p. 85. Similar problems are accounted in the textbook for the complementary year signed by V. Băluțoiu.<sup>132</sup> The textbook published by the team coordinated by prof. I. Scurtu focuses, as the previous textbooks, on five main directions: people

and historic spaces; people, society and the world of ideas; state and politics; international relations; religion and religious life, most of the information is presented from Romanian perspective and perspective of Romanian History.<sup>133</sup> This textbook is very general and simple for 11<sup>th</sup> grade high school students. Concerning neighbours, the authors show in brief the question of Romanians along borders and Romanians over "Seas and states", but nothing about those countries in which they live.<sup>134</sup> In the theme "Romania and regional conflicts during 20<sup>th</sup> c.", no words are spoken about USSR occupation of Bessarabia and Bukovina in 1940 and Transnistrian military conflict from 1992, when Romania supported the Republic of Moldova.<sup>135</sup> Another textbook published by Humanitas publishing house in 2011 is much better organised and designed as the previous ones.<sup>136</sup> For the first time in the Romanian history textbooks we can see a paragraph entitled "Romania and its neighbours", very short and general. The main idea of this paragraph is that Romania signed partnership agreements with all neighbours, but no more details about these relations.<sup>137</sup> A few ideas are mentioned about the Republic of Moldova at point "Geopolitical changes after 1989", where it is said that Romania has new Eastern neighbours after the collapse of the USSR. The Republic of Moldova is presented as a second Romanian state and that it has special relations with Romania, despite Transnistria protest against it.

### **12<sup>th</sup> grade**

The textbook published by ALL Educational publishing house entitled History depicts the History of Romania as part of European History from Antiquity until 20<sup>th</sup> c.<sup>138</sup> Moldova is presented as a medieval Romanian state, and then as part of Modern Romania. A special theme is dedicated to the Romanians from abroad from a national perspective: Romanians from Transylvania (1849-1914); Romanians from Bukovina (1775-1914); Romanians from Bessarabia (1812-1914),<sup>139</sup> and then the process of Unification of Romania from 1918.<sup>140</sup> In context of the last theme "Options in the foreign policy of Romania after 1989" are mentioned the agreements between Romania and Hungary, Romania and Ukraine, with an appendix of articles from these official documents and historical sources.<sup>141</sup>

The textbook signed by Nicoleta Dumitrescu et al. was published the first time in 2000 according to the 1999 curricula changes and it was reprinted in 2004<sup>142</sup>. In 2005 this textbook was the most used by high-school teachers.<sup>143</sup> Another textbook for 12<sup>th</sup> grade was elaborated



under the coordination of prof. Z. Petre in 2008. It contains similar chapters as the previous mentioned textbook, because it is entirely based on the school program, but the content is more problematic and includes many interesting case studies.<sup>144</sup> During the 2<sup>nd</sup> chapter is presented the issue of Romanians from abroad, ethnic and confessional diversity in Modern Romania, national minorities in Romania in the 20<sup>th</sup> c., Romania and the Holocaust, but nothing about actual Eastern neighbours: Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.<sup>145</sup>

Romanian history textbooks are encouraging two sets of attitudes: national and pro-European/Western, ignoring the historical links of Romania with South-eastern and Eastern Europe. Hence, the Romanian history textbooks are more focused on Western European History than near neighbour regions. The neighbour countries appear in brief in the textbooks, they are better presented on maps.<sup>146</sup> It is not possible to write history that satisfies everyone especially where manipulation of ethnic identities is set as tradition during political crisis,<sup>147</sup> but the historians, in virtue of their profession, have to pursue the professional mission to produce an objective account of the historical facts.<sup>148</sup>

Recently, Romania established a new system of evaluation, including history as an independent discipline, history teachers and pupils from secondary and high schools,<sup>149</sup> which will probably make a real contribution to improving history teaching and textbook elaboration.

## Conclusions

Political changes at the end of the last century in Eastern European countries have a direct influence on the development of education in these states. After two decades of democratic transformation in all socialist and soviet countries, students can discover much more information in their history textbooks that was forbidden during totalitarian regimes. Example of such topics could be Stalin's Terror, collectivization, deportations, the effect of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, etc.

The process of transformation from Marxists-Lenin's ideology to the pluralist democracy is long and difficult in both countries. Romania did more steps in reforming education, including history teaching. This reality is probably directly linked with accession of Romania to EU. As long as Moldovan society remains in a state of ideological crisis and therefore

sensitive to history as it is in other post-soviet countries, history education will continue to provide fractured understanding of the past.

The Ukrainian national history textbooks devoted a lot of space to the national heroes. In some textbooks we found galleries of national heroes and leaders. Presenting such kind of pictures in the history textbooks is one of the most powerful identity construction tools.

In the last two decades historiography became more open and diverse both countries, and for solving all problems without prejudices and stereotypes there is a need to work more closely with each other. The relationship between national and European/World history remains until today a very much debated topic in our societies. In Romania, already a full-member of EU, this question is not solved entirely. The principles of tolerance and respect of "others" should be common not just for history but also for literature, geography, foreign languages, etc.

A considerable number of events in the 20<sup>th</sup> century influence the modern society and this period should be very carefully presented in the history textbooks. Hence, the History of 20<sup>th</sup> century is very important in the process of training critical thinking, tolerance and democratic citizenship. Pupils should be helped to find roots, preconditions, inter-connections of the events, for better understanding of modern historical processes which have a basis in 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The textbooks edited in both countries are used local textbooks produced by state and private publishing houses. Most textbooks are curriculum-based and are developed according the guidelines issued by Ministries of Education. Through their textbook publishing policy the Ministry of Education controls the content and quality of textbooks. It is difficult to describe and to have an ideal textbook,<sup>150</sup> but textbook writers should try to do better textbooks taking into account the actual needs and opportunities. Nonetheless there are certain circumstances, conditions and characteristics that influence the development and quality of textbooks. In most cases the quality of textbooks depends on general political, social and economic situation from each country. T. Hunt in his report on textbook development in Romania, Macedonia, Sri Lanka, Azerbaijan and China observed exactly that for a successful outcome we should have simultaneously three main broad areas:

- a. funding, policy, and management;
- b. publishing, curriculum design and textbook development;
- c. textbook manufacture and distribution.

The history curricula and textbooks in both countries have progressed, but we still encounter a lot of problems. Among them, are following general aspects:

- improving the design of textbooks and including more colour pictures and maps makes the books more attractive but the text is not always understood;
- the content of curricula and history textbooks places too much emphasis on national aspects at the detriment of international, regional and local dimensions of history;
- reflection of the history of wars and violence instead of giving more space to periods of peaceful coexistence, cooperation and cultural exchange, of mutual enrichment between different groups as well as between nations;<sup>151</sup>
- neglecting the regional history, cultural and historical links with neighbour countries;
- existing problems on history teaching and ethnic identity, as well as relationship between "We" and "Others".

There are some historical personalities from one country that make links with the history of another country, but they are not so well presented in the history textbooks in Moldova, and Romania. A good example of this approach is explored in the Georgian textbooks (eg. Antim Ivoreanul and his role in Georgian-Romanian relations, David Guramishvili and his role in Ukrainian-Georgian relations, etc.).<sup>152</sup>

So, for improving the situation in the field of history teaching, presenting and treating each other in history textbook the Governments of Moldova and Romania have to do a lot of things, some of them are described in the following.

Finally, it cannot be expected a quick solution in history teaching in each country separately. This is a long process of partnership linked with principles of democracy and tolerance which should be open and continuously sustained. Governments have to initiate dialogs on fundamental principles, in order to facilitate educational policy development and provide assistance in areas of greatest need; assist in the development of national publishing industries, support textbook research, disseminate and exchange information, etc.

## NOTES

- 1 BENNETT 1999, 8.
- 2 APPLE 1991, 10.
- 3 FRITZSCHE 1992.
- 4 SLATER 1992, 14.
- 5 WEINREICH 1995, 134.
- 6 Some details about research methods and criteria are discussed in my work MUSTEAȚĂ 2006a.
- 7 See more details about notion “hostile” in KOSELLECK 2009, 232-242.
- 8 See the detailed analysis of the debates around history teaching in the Republic of Moldova in MUSTEAȚĂ 2010a.
- 9 *La baza statalității trebuie să se afle adevărata istorie a Republicii Moldova*. In: Moldova Suverană, nr. 26-26, 19 februarie 2003, p. 1.
- 10 Hotărârea Guvernului Republicii Moldova (nr. 180) cu privire la implementarea „Istoriei Moldovei” ca disciplină de predare în instituțiile de învățământ. In: Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, nr. 27-28, 18 februarie 2002, art. 252.
- 11 *Apelul Congresului Istoricilor din Republica Moldova „Pentru apărarea demnității naționale, pentru stoparea campaniei de românofobie și denigrare a Istoriei Românilor (1 iulie 2003)”*. In: În apărarea istoriei și demnității naționale, Chișinău, 2003, p. 33-35.
- 12 <http://www.prezident.md/search.php?id=902&lang=rom> (accessed 21.06.2008). Tatiana Roșca, Viorica Bivol, *Integrarea Republicii Moldova în Europa – prin educația istorică*. In: Moldova Suverană, nr. 206 (20154), 13 noiembrie 2002, pp. 1, 3.
- 13 Wim van Meurs, *History Textbooks in Moldova*, Expert Report, Braunschweig 26-27 June 2003, p. 5.
- 14 In Transnistria, schools continue using the standards of the Russian Federation for history education (use of the same teaching program, with the same number of hours and history textbooks). The school program includes two courses, World history and History of the Fatherland, which referred to the history of Russia, the USSR, and Transnistria.
- 15 In 2006, the new Minister of Education, Mr. V. Țvircun said that these authors had participated in a competition and had been selected through a legitimate selection process; however, this was a false statement.
- 16 DOBZEU/GAVRILIȚĂ/NAGNIBEDA-TVERDOHLEB/GAIBU 2007.
- 17 *Voronin cere returnarea manualelor de istorie integrate*. In: Gazeta liberă, Nr. 34 (75), 5 octombrie 2006, <http://gazeta.md/75-3.php> (accessed 24.06.2008).
- 18 Georg-Eckert-Institut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung, Press Release “The Moldova Project and the Controversies about the New History Textbooks in the Republic of Moldova”, December 15, 2006.

- 19 CERBUȘCĂ/DOBZEU 2010.LUNGU/GAVRILIȚĂ/NAGNIBEDA-TVERDOHLEB/DOBZEU/BALAN/  
NEGREI/BÎRLĂDEANU/IACONI 2011.
- 20 SEIM 2005.
- 21 CERBUȘCĂ/GONȚA/HAHEU/PETROVSKI 1999.
- 22 GAVRILIȚĂ/DOBZEU/HAHEU/NAGNIBEDA-TVERDOHLEB/VEVERIȚĂ 2006.
- 23 NEGRU 2005; CERBUȘCĂ 2007.
- 24 NICULIȚĂ/POTLOG/ARNĂUT 2000.
- 25 *Ibidem*, p. 210-213.
- 26 GONȚA/PARASCA/CERBUȘCĂ/HAHEU/PETROVSKI 2000.
- 27 GONȚA/PETROVSKI 2000, p. 150.
- 28 *Ibidem*, p. 153.
- 29 DRAGNEV/GONȚA/COCÎRLĂ/DRAGNEV 2001.
- 30 *Ibidem*, p. 174, 188, 193, 202, 206, 210, 214.
- 31 POPOVICI/POPOVICI 2006.
- 32 DRAGNEV/DRACHNEBERG/OJOG/DRAGNEV/GONȚA/VARTA 2002.
- 33 *Ibidem*, p. 168-179, 200-203.
- 34 *Ibidem*, 180-182.
- 35 CERTAN/MOISEEV/VEVERIȚĂ 2006, p. 40-41 and p. 196-197.
- 36 OJOG/TURLIUC 2002; DRACHNEBERG/CERTAN/COZMA/CERBUȘCĂ 2003.
- 37 CHICUȘ/DANU/DRAGNEV/NEGRI 2003; VARTA/ȘAROV 2003.
- 38 PETRENCU/DOBZEU 2004.
- 39 NAZARIA/ROMAN/SPRÎNCEANĂ/BARBUS/ALBU-MACHEDON/DUMBRAVĂ 2006.
- 40 CAȘU/PALADE/ȘAROV 2009.
- 41 *Ibidem*, p. 106.
- 42 BERCIU-DRAGHICESCU/OFRIM/PREDA 2007, p. 121, 127-128.
- 43 PARASCA/NEGRI/GONȚA/GAVRILIȚĂ/DOBZEU 2007; DRAGNEV/POSTICĂ 2011.
- 44 PARASCA u. a. 2007, p. 53, 71, 75.
- 45 DRAGNEV/POSTICĂ 2011, p. 151 and p. 181-182.
- 46 *Ibidem*, p. 192.
- 47 POPOVICI/POPOVICI 2008.
- 48 CHICUȘ/CIUBOTARU/GONȚA/NEGRI/DOBZEU/GAVRILIȚĂ 2006; VARTA/DRAGNEV 2001.
- 49 COJESCU/MAMINA/DRACHNEBERG 2007; VARTA/VARTA 2007.
- 50 CHICUȘ/ȘAROV/OJOG/CERBUȘCĂ/PĂSLARIUC/DOBZEU/NAGNIBEDA-TVERDOHLEB 2007.
- 51 COJESCU u. a. 2007, p. 122-126 and 146. VARTA/VARTA 2007, p. 154-158.
- 52 CHICUȘ u. a. 2006, 162-163.
- 53 CHICUȘ u. a. 2007.
- 54 SCURTU/ȘIȘCANU/CURCULESCU/DINCĂ/SOARE 2007
- 55 *Ibidem*, p. 60-61.
- 56 *Ibidem*, p. 108.
- 57 KARGER 2012.
- 58 *Ibidem*, p. 179, 183.
- 59 *Ibidem*, 198-200.

- 60 NAZARIA/ROMAN/SPRÎNCEANĂ/ALBU-MACHEDON/DUMBRAVĂ/BARBUS 2006.
- 61 ENCIU 2008. This textbook is based on previous edition *History of Romanians*: ENCIU 2002.
- 62 See more about reformation of the educational system in Romania in BIRZEA 1994; KOLAR 1997; KOLAR 2003; STEFANESCU 2005; GEORGESCU/PALADE 2003, etc.
- 63 For more details on educational system see: *Reviews of National Policies for Education. South Eastern Europe. FYROM, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia*. Vol. 2. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-OECD, 2003, pp. 267-334; GEORGESCU/PALADE 2003.
- 64 For more details see OLOGEANU 1997.
- 65 In the first textbooks of History of Romanians the authors did not includ the information regarding Romanians around the World. Nothing is mentioned about Romanians from Bessarabia, Bukovina, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, etc. See for example the following textbook: MANEA/PASCU/TEODORESCU 1992. MURGESCU 2002, 279-280.
- 66 MURGESCU 1999b, 112; MURGESCU 2001a, 230.
- 67 The Educational Plan (Plan de învățământ) is a complex educational tool elaborated by the Institute of Educational Sciences, inspectors from the Ministry of Education and working group. The plan contains 7 curricular areas, including study programs, textbooks, guides, methodological supports, etc.
- 68 Discipline programs are elaborated by working groups under National Commission, independent experts, university professors, experts from the National Curriculum Council and Institute of Educational Sciences.
- 69 MURGESCU 1999a, 65-66; MURGESCU 2001b, 22-23; MURGESCU/GHEORGHE/CALTIA 2001.
- 70 CĂPIȚĂ/CĂPIȚĂ 2001, 233.
- 71 MANEA u. a. 1992; MANEA/PASCU/TEODORESCU 1993.
- 72 MURGESCU 1999a, 66; MURGESCU 2001b, 23; MURGESCU u. a. 2001.
- 73 HUNT 2006, 213.
- 74 HUNT 2006, 213.
- 75 See: ROTH 2005.
- 76 MURGESCU 1999a, 66; MURGESCU 2001b, 23; MURGESCU u. a. 2001.
- 77 MURGESCU 1999a, 66; MURGESCU u. a. 2001.
- 78 MURGESCU 2001b, 23.
- 79 MURGESCU 2001b, 23.
- 80 MURGESCU 1999b, 113; HEINEN 2000, 92-104.
- 81 MURGESCU 2001b, 23; MURGESCU u. a. 2001.
- 82 SZAKÁCS 2007, 23. See more about S. Nicolaescu involvement in history textbook scandal in October, 1999: HEINEN 2000.
- 83 See a few articles from main newspapers of that time: Adevărul, 6.10.1999; 16.10.1999; Cotidianul, 22.10.1999; România Literară, Dilema, Revista 22, etc. ȚURCANU 1999; MURGESCU 2001b, 24; MURGESCU u. a. 2001.
- 84 MURGESCU 2001b, 24; MURGESCU u. a. 2001.

- 85 SCURTU/CURCULESCU/DINCA 2000.
- 86 SZAKÁCS 2007, 24.
- 87 Law of Education (no. 84/1995) modified and republished in Monitorul  
Official of Romania no. 606, part I, December 10, 1999.
- 88 MURGESCU u. a. 2001.
- 89 MURGESCU 2001b, 22; MURGESCU u. a. 2001, 3.
- 90 MURGESCU 1999a, 65; MURGESCU u. a. 2001.
- 91 MURGESCU 1999a, 65; MURGESCU u. a. 2001
- 92 The table was developed on data from articles published by M. Murgescu  
and information offered by M. Manea. MURGESCU 2001b, 22; MURGESCU u.  
a. 2001.
- 93 KOLAR 1997; KOLAR 2003; MIHAYLOVA 2006.
- 94 IONESCU/DUMITRESCU/FOCȘENIANU 2001; PETCUȚ/GRIGORE/SANDU 2003. BAIER/  
BOTTESCH/NOWAK/WIECKEN/ZIEGLER 2005; PETRESCU 2005, 2007; GRIGORE/PETCUȚ/  
SANDU 2005; GRIGORE u. a. 2005; BĂLUȚOIU 2009; BĂLUȚOIU 2010, etc.
- 95 STAMATESCU 2008; STAMATESCU/GRODESCU/DOBRINCU/MURARU/PLEȘA/ANDREESCU  
2009.
- 96 GRIGORE/BERCIU-DRAGHICESCU/CRISEA 1999; BUREC/LAZAR/TEODORESCU 1997;  
OCHESCU/OANE 2003; MIHĂELESCU/PIȚILĂ 2003.
- 97 The analytical program approved by Order of Ministry of Education and  
Research no. 3919 from 20 April 2005.
- 98 OANE/OCHESCU 2008, p. 34-35 (Dosar thematic Bulgarii – vecinii noștri de  
la sud de Dunăre/ Ungurii – vecini de la apus).
- 99 *Ibidem*, p. 36 (Dosar tematic *Alți vecini ai românilor – sârbi/ rușii și istoria lor*).
- 100 DINU/DIDIȚĂ 2006.
- 101 PETRE/BERCEA/SELEVET/STĂNESCU/TACHE 2006, p. 85. PENEȘ/TRONCOTĂ 2006, p. 24, 86.
- 102 BALUTOIU/VLAD 1997; CAPIȚA/PETRE/DVORSKI/GROSU/CAPIȚA 1997; GRIGORIȚĂ/OANE  
1997, 2003, etc.
- 103 BALUTOIU/VLAD 1997, 74.
- 104 BURLEAC/LAZĂR/TEODORESCU 2000.
- 105 BURLEAC u. a. 2000, p. 150-152.
- 106 BURLEAC u. a. 2000, p. 187-188 (Occupation of Bessarabia).
- 107 BALUTOIU/VLAD 2005.
- 108 *Ibidem*, p. 61-63 and p. 128-129.
- 109 *Ibidem*, p. 187.
- 110 CONSTANTINIU/COJESCU/MAMINA 2008.
- 111 *Ibidem*, p. 62.
- 112 *Ibidem*, p. 77.
- 113 OANE/OCHESCU 2011.
- 114 VULPE/PĂUN/BĂJENARU/GROSU 2000, p. 9, 10, 21, 144.
- 115 *Ibidem*, p. 32-33.
- 116 OANE/OCHESCU 2003, see the theme *Mediul și oamenii* (Environment and people).

- 117 *Ibidem*, p. 14.
- 118 LAZĂR/LUPU 2006.
- 119 *Ibidem*, p. 19, 21.
- 120 *Ibidem*, p. 23.
- 121 *Ibidem*, p. 42.
- 122 *Ibidem*, p. 85.
- 123 *Ibidem*, p. 113.
- 124 *Ibidem*, p. 139.
- 125 *Ibidem*, 172-173.
- 126 BREZEANU 2004.
- 127 BĂLUȚOIU 2011; BĂLUȚOIU 2005.
- 128 *Ibidem*, p. 50.
- 129 *Ibidem*, p. 113-116.
- 130 STAN/VORNICU 2011.
- 131 BUDICI/STĂNESCU/ȚIGĂU 2006.
- 132 BĂLUȚOIU 2005.
- 133 SCURTU/CURCULESCU/DINCA/SOARE 2006.
- 134 SCURTU u. a. 2006 *Ibidem*, p. 56-57.
- 135 *Ibidem*, 111-114.
- 136 OANE/STRAT 2011.
- 137 *Ibidem*, p. 92.
- 138 BOZGAN/LAZĂR/STĂNESCU/TEODORESCU 1999.
- 139 *Ibidem*, p. 59-61.
- 140 *Ibidem*, p. 89-96.
- 141 *Ibidem*, p. 166.
- 142 DUMITRESCU/MANEA/NITA/PASCU/TRABDAFIR/TRANDAFIR 2000, 2004.
- 143 SZAKÁCS 2007, 26.
- 144 PETRE/CĂPIȚĂ/STĂNESCU/LUNG/LIVADĂ-CADESCHI/CIUPALĂ/ȚURCANU/VLAD/ANDREESCU 2008.
- 145 *Ibidem*, p. 48-55.
- 146 MURGESCU u. a. 2001.
- 147 See the case of Polish and Slovaks from Bukovina during inter-war period. ANGHEL 2003.
- 148 N. Nicolae's speech at the *Conference on "History textbooks and teaching resources in South East Europe?"*, Sinaia, Romania, 6-8 June 2002. Report by Dr. Robert Stradling, DGIV/EDU/HIST (2002), 03, Strasbourg, 2002, 7.
- 149 DUMITRESCU/BERCEA/DOICESCU/MANEA/POPESCU 2011.
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- 151 *Disarming History. International Conference on Combating Stereotypes and Prejudice in History Textbooks of South-East Europe*. Visby, Gotland (Sweden), 23-25 September 1999, Stockholm, 1999, 11.
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# “NATIONNESS” IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE: APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF THE PHENOMENON

## Abstract

During the last two decades, we can observe a large and growing body of writing on different aspects of Russian nationalism and national identity. Now we find ourselves in a need to systematize different approaches in historiography to the problem of Russian nationhood, and this is the main concern of this article. It will proceed along two tracks. Firstly, it will try to depict the entire range of views presented in a historiography on Russian nationalism and national identity in the imperial period. We admit that this is a quite ambitious task, not to say utopian, that is why it will dwell specifically on those works, which most distinctly represent the main paradigms that have largely shaped historical discussions on our question over the last decades. Secondly, it will offer a general examination of the critical factors, which influenced theoretical and methodological development of these paradigms.

**Keywords:** nationalism theory, Russian national identity, Russian nationalism.

## Introduction

It is obvious that in recent years, few subjects have produced a greater amount of scholarship than the study of nationalism and national identity. Until recently, however, Russia was “often left out of Western European stories of ‘nationalism’ and ‘nationhood’”, as the editors of one of the publications on Russian national identity noted.<sup>1</sup> Although, as a result of the resurgent interest in Russian history, which followed the breakup of the USSR, was an emergence of a considerable amount of general works and specialized monographs on the “national question” in the Russian empire, USSR and contemporary Russia, the scholars have been more

concerned with the nationality policy and the notion of “Russification”, or nationalist movements of the non-Russian peoples in it and problems of their national development,<sup>2</sup> while hardly any of them focused on Russian nationalism and national identity. This situation has changed in late 1990s, when Geoffrey Hosking appealed “to redress the balance in favor of the Russians, whose nationhood has probably been even more blighted by the empire which bore their name”.<sup>3</sup> During the last two decades, we can observe a large and growing body of writing on different aspects of Russian nationalism and national identity. A variety of views and approaches presented in these studies ranges between two extremes: from statements about Russian national identity as overdeveloped and domineering, and Russian nationalism as the main factor of tsarist nationality policy, on one pole, to vision of the Russians as “the victims of the empire”, with its extreme expression in statements that Russian nationalism and national identity did not exist altogether.

Now we find ourselves in a need to systematize different approaches in historiography to the problem of Russian nationhood, and this is the main concern of this article. It will proceed along two tracks. Firstly, it will try to depict the entire range of views presented in a historiography on Russian nationalism and national identity in the imperial period. We admit that this is a quite ambitious task, not to say utopian, that is why it will dwell specifically on those works, which most distinctly represent the main paradigms that have largely shaped historical discussions on our question over the last decades. Secondly, it will offer a general examination of the critical factors, which influenced theoretical and methodological development of these paradigms.

### **Pre-1990s historiography of the Russian empire**

The first approach, which dominated historical writing on the question almost until early 1990s, asserted that Russian nationalism was closely connected with imperialism and thus the process of Russian nation-building was bound to the process of empire-building. We must note, however, that in these studies issues of Russian national identity and nationality in general were rarely addressed straightly, as the historians concentrated much of their attention primarily on Russian state-building. As Geoffrey Hosking noted, “few western historians have taken the notion

seriously, preferring to dismiss the Russian obsession with the national problem as an excuse for imperial domination or reactionary politics".<sup>4</sup>

This paradigm generally saw Russian nationalism as identical (or at least very close) to the doctrine of "Official nationality" of the ruling elites and, usually in a radically negative perspective, as the main reason for the Russian empire for becoming a "prison of peoples". We can distinguish at least two reasons that caused such a perception. First of all, until 1990s, the study of imperial Russia and the Soviet Union was often treated as if these ethnically and religiously heterogeneous states were homogeneously Russian. Nor was the category of Russianness considered worthy of analysis. The second reason stems from what Hugh Seton-Watson called a "Kadet view on the Russian history":

Because it was left that triumphed in 1917, and because almost all historians of Russia, whether Russian or foreign, have disliked nationalism, the view that Russian nationalism and russification were confined to the ruling clique has prevailed. In particular, the Russian working class, "the most revolutionary in history", was presumed immune to this odious infection.<sup>5</sup>

While in a Western literature we can find some notable exceptions from this paradigm, this approach is intrinsic especially to the Soviet historiography. This approach is also akin to the new national or 'official' histories that blossomed on the ruins of the former Soviet Union.<sup>6</sup>

### **"Discovery" of the Russian *Empire* and the "Official Nationalism"**

However, two significant changes in historiography have called this paradigm into question. The first one was the shift in the theoretical literature on nationalism and nations that commenced in the 1980s and 1990s with the works of Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Miroslav Hroch and many others, and since then had become the prevalent view among specialists.<sup>7</sup> The thesis of two authors had a particular resonance for the historiography on Russia: it concerns the "discovery"<sup>8</sup> of the "official nationalism" by Hugh Seton-Watson and Benedict Anderson, who remain, perhaps, the only well-known authors of a classical theoretical work on nationalism who used examples from the Russian history.

Hugh Seton-Watson in his book "Nations and States" developed the thesis about the difference between the nationalism of the so-called "dominant" nations and the "official nationalism" of the ruling dynasties.<sup>9</sup> According to him, Pan-Slavism and Russian nationalism were the ideologies of unofficial though influential groups, and did not necessarily coincide with the official line.<sup>10</sup> Benedict Anderson, in his turn, further developed and popularized this thesis. The most important for us is his statement that this "official nationalism" was reactive in the sense that in many cases it served as a response to the development of nationalistic sentiments among the subjects of the old dynastic realms and served as "a means of combining of naturalization with retention of dynastic power, in particular over huge polyglot domains accumulated since the Middle Ages, or, to put it another way, for stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire".<sup>11</sup>

It is worth noting that already in 1962 Hans Rogger proposed the similar thesis that the Russian nationalism "was not merely different from official nationality, it was its antithesis."<sup>12</sup> But only after the breakup of the USSR, when the general and domineering paradigm of the Russian empire as a Russian nation-state was shattered and the multinational character of the Russian states was finally "discovered",<sup>13</sup> came the general acknowledgment of the fact that though Russian nationalism as a public sentiment and the 'official nationalism' of the autocracy were closely connected, nevertheless these were "independent phenomena, sometimes going side by side, but no less often entering into conflict with each other."<sup>14</sup>

This discrediting of the conceptual constructs of older or Soviet historiography had one important effect: the new historical approaches on the Russian history have called into question the traditional black and white perception of the Russian Empire as 'the prison of peoples', which in its turn has led to the emergence of a more attractive image of the Russian empire's nationality policy, as well as of Russian nationalism. In the following decades, historians turned their attention to studies of the development and dynamics of Russian nationhood in the imperial context.

## **Russians as the "Victims of Empire"**

Historians and their colleagues from other fields of humanities have started to consider the relevance of the imperial context for the



development of the Russian national identity. As a result, another major paradigm developed, which insists that Russian nationhood had to be generated mainly in opposition to the empire and that the national identity of Russians was underdeveloped and suppressed because of the predominance of the imperial mode in the formation of the Russian state.

Geoffrey Hosking, one of the creators of this paradigm, was one of the first to argue against the vision of Russian nationalism as overdeveloped and domineering, which he called "an understandable optical illusion".<sup>15</sup> With his study "Russia: People and Empire" (1997), he, from the point of view of many researchers, has broken new ground in the scholarship of the Russian empire by focusing primarily on Russians. Hosking based his argument on the peculiar character of relationships between Russians and empire: "Russians have identified with their empire to a greater extent than any other European people... The empire is not just an aspect of Russian history, it is Russian history."<sup>16</sup> He offered a provocative idea that in Russia empire-building obstructed nation-building, and thus the "imperial" and "ethnic" nations in the Russian empire seriously weakened each other. That is why the Russian nation has never been able to develop to the full its own political, economic or cultural institutions, since these have been distorted or emasculated for the needs of the empire. Moreover, Hosking concludes that the sort of "national imagining", necessary for the development of the national identity, did not occur in Russia, for the dynasty did not promote a sense of belonging to the Russian nation and the lack of literacy obstructed the majority of the population from creating an alternative national vision.<sup>17</sup>

Hosking's work had a huge impact on the scholarly debate over Russian national identity, where until recently the dominant assumption was that at least before 1917 Russians were not a nation and had a weak, underdeveloped or "inarticulate" sense of national identity, and that in the era of modern nationalism Russians continued to think in pre-national terms. For example, Hubertus Jahn in his book, devoted to the examination of the Russian patriotic culture during the World War I, comes to a conclusion that

patriotic imagery reveals that Russians had a pretty clear idea against whom they are fighting in the war, but not for whom and for what. If a nation is a community imagined by its members, as Benedict Anderson convincingly argues, then Russia was not a nation during World War I.<sup>18</sup>

Scholarly literature within this paradigm offers different explanations of this phenomenon, most of them concentrated around the absence of the necessary preconditions and particularities, which would favor its development in Russia.

Some scholars, for example, suggest that part of this problem lies in the “wrong-timing” (or “the misfortune of timing”, in R. Suny’s words) of the creation of the Russian empire, i.e., that no Russian nation existed before the creation of the empire; in other words, the early imperial expansion meant that Russia had acquired an imperial identity before it developed a national individuality. Ronald Suny, for instance, concluded that by the time of the First World War, when elsewhere in Europe a nation was imagined as independent from the state, Russian elites could not imagine the nation separately from the religious community and from the state.<sup>19</sup>

However, most of the scholars follow Hosking in stressing that the most important reason for the failure of Russian nation-building was the dilemma between nation and empire. According to them, the Tsarist government did not succeed in establishing a strong link with the Russian nation, because the process of “naturalization” of the Russian empire was retarded and incomplete: “The state itself didn’t ‘nationalize’ on a massive scale; unlike its Western European counterparts, which used nation-building and nationalism to unify and strengthen the state, the tsarist monarchy failed to cultivate ‘an imagined community’ of Russians”.<sup>20</sup> David Brandenberger also concluded that the “amorphous nature of national identity” in late imperial Russia meant that this sense of nationhood was weak, and this weakness was a result of the tsarist government’s lack of interest for fostering nationalism.<sup>21</sup> Thus, according to this approach, the main problem was that the Russian rulers hesitated to apply nationalism for consolidation of their rule and unification of the state.

In general, the problem of Russian identity in this literature is commonly framed as the elemental tension between imperial (or dynastic) and national identities within an often repeated argument that the Russians did not differentiate between “nation” and “empire”. This thesis was developed, for example, by Vera Tolz in her “Russia: Inventing the Nation” (2001) and her other studies. As she argues, it was not only the policies of the autocratic regime, which hampered the creation of the Russian nation. “Russians’ failure to form a full-fledged nation” also stemmed, as Tolz claims, from the overwhelming tendency of the majority of intellectuals to blur the line between Russia proper and the empire as a whole: “It seems that a crucial difference of the Russians was that, in their case, a state which

could have offered a framework for nation-building was also absent, but this absence was not realized by the majority of nation-builders, including those opposed to the existing autocratic regime." Thus, she concludes, "the goals of Russian nation-building were not clearly defined".<sup>22</sup>

As we can see, most of the adherents of this approach conclude that the key issue lies in the issue of "problematic" Russian identity, or, to be more precise, its ambiguous self-definition:

One of the enduring paradoxes of the Russian historic experience is that while the Russian people have a strong belief in a Russian civilization and a clear association of the concept of that civilization with the concept of empire, when it comes to a distinct Russian national identity, the notion of 'Russianness' becomes vague and uncertain.<sup>23</sup>

They stress that there was no clear agreement even among "Russian nationalists" on the question of who was to be considered a "Russian", though the discussions over this notion constituted an important element in the Russian public discourse, especially since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The big variety of criteria, such as religion, language, administration, customs, political loyalty, race, and history, has been employed to define the category of "Russian". Different versions combined those elements in various ways. The only point of agreement was that religion played a far more central role in defining nationality than language or "ethnicity" and in practice the defining criterion for being Russian was the membership of the Russian Orthodox Church.<sup>24</sup>

While some of historians admit that Russian national identity was relatively well developed among the upper or educated strata of society, the major trend of this dominant paradigm insists on the lack of a sense of national identity among the greater part of Russian population, and that the traditional "pre-national" or regional mentality of the peasant masses predominated.<sup>25</sup>

Despite the diversity of views presented above, a number of key themes dominate. Framing the entire approach is the idea that the supranational (or pre-national) policies of the Russian empire hindered the formation of a Russian nation. The regime treated and suppressed Russians just like all other subject nationalities. However, for Russians, unlike other ethnic groups within the empire, it proved difficult to distinguish themselves from the empire, even symbolically. Another characteristic feature of this approach is the continuous attempt of the scholars to find out the ways

and possibilities for Russia to become a fully European-type nation-state.<sup>26</sup> Undeniably, Hosking's thesis has shaped recent debates on the issue of Russian nationhood. As a result, the image of Russians has cardinally changed – from authoritarian oppressors and aggressive imperialists to the “victims of empire”. In general, this approach sees Russian nationhood in a very pessimistic way: “After a thousand years of history, Russia finds itself a country without a national identity, whose future is uncertain and whose past full of suffering and tragedy.”<sup>27</sup>

While devoting much attention to the issues of national identity and its development, less attention within this approach was devoted to the Russian nationalism as a political movement. We can list here some of the largely accepted views and assumptions in this literature: Russian nationalism was either “artificial, confined to the politicians of the extreme right but not genuinely acceptable to the Russian people”,<sup>28</sup> or it was a “manipulated state ideology”<sup>29</sup>, it was simply “dysfunctional” either because of its foreign origin, inapplicable to the realities of the Russian empire<sup>30</sup> or because of it did not represent a “monolithic movement”, and “there was no lasting agreement (among Russian nationalists – E.P.) about the tasks of the national community, their order of priorities or the manner of their solution”.<sup>31</sup> And finally, the most radical assumption is that “Russian ‘nationalists’ were really Russian imperialists, who still saw the mission of the Russian people as being not the creation of a nation-state, but continued hegemony in a multi-ethnic state with a worldwide mission.”<sup>32</sup>

The most illustrative example of the latter approach is David Rowley's article “Imperial versus National Discourse: The Case of Russia”, where he states that “it is inaccurate and misleading to use the terms ‘nationalist’ and ‘nationalism’, in their generally accepted meanings, to refer to individuals and movements in Russian history before the present day.” Just like Hosking, he argues that “the term ‘Russian nationalism’ has been carelessly used to apply to a style of thought that is in fact ‘imperialism’.” He offers his own explanation to this “absence of Russian nationalism”. According to Rowley, the main reason why Russians were unable to develop a nationalist movement is that they in principle “failed to grasp the arguments of nationalism”, as their “discursive universe” did not include the concepts that are inherent to nationalist thought. That is why their political elites were not able to conceptualize nationalist demands, as “the particularism and secularism of nationalism were incomprehensible to the

Russian elite.”<sup>33</sup> Rowley considers the Russian nationalist project utopian and argues that “since an empire is a state that administers a number of different nations, the Russian empire could not follow a programme of nationalism (even of Russian nationalism) without undermining its own existence.”<sup>34</sup> Rowley was so ambitious as to suggest that the failure of Russian nationalist project casts new light on our understanding of the origins and preconditions of nationalism in general. The basic point of the article is that Russia possessed all the characteristics (social, political and cultural) that have been adduced as “causes” of nationalism, yet Russia failed to develop a nationalist movement. Therefore, he concludes, all the “causes” that classical theories of nationalism use to explain the appearance of nationalism are not, in themselves, sufficient to produce national movements. He concludes that the major factor that produces nationalism is “Europe’s modern discursive domain”, that is, the discourse of particularism and secularism, while these generally accepted “causes” are nothing more than preconditions.<sup>35</sup>

### **“Modernization Paradigm” in the Studies of Nationalism and the Russian Case**

As we can see, this argument generally coincides with the thesis that Russians did not differentiate between “nation” and “empire”, repeated endlessly by historians who study the nature of nation-building in the Russian empire basing their research within the assumptions of the so-called “modernist” theories of nationalism. In sum, these theories define nationalism as a modern phenomenon, a result/or cause (depending on the particular theory) of modernisation/industrialization, and perceive it as an instrument used for nation-building or for acquiring independence. In other words, according to most these theories, ideally, nationalist movements envision the construction of ethnically homogeneous nation-state, that is, the state where “the political and the national unit are congruent”, using the classical definition by Ernest Gellner.<sup>36</sup>

While these historians were busy solving the “empire/nation” puzzle, among some part of the scholarly society, influenced by post-structuralism and discourse analysis, appeared doubts concerning validity of the modernization paradigm in studies of nationalism in general and its applicability to the Russian case (or any non-Western European) in particular, providing an argument against their unconditional application

when studying Russian nationhood and national identity. This doubts stemmed from what Rogers Brubaker called “an emergent post-modernist theoretical sensibility”, which “emphasizes the fragmentary, the ephemeral, and the erosion of fixed forms and clear boundaries”.<sup>37</sup> In the Russian case, this reconsideration was also stimulated by a considerably widened source base after the collapse of the Soviet regime.

One of the first voices of the criticism of the modernist paradigm was that of John Hall, who stressed that “no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible. As the historical record is diverse, so too must be our concepts.” According to him, “any specification of the different types of nationalism needs to be fairly close to historical reality if it is to fulfill its purpose, that of helping general thought and the understanding of particular cases.”<sup>38</sup> This article is not the place for a detailed overview of this criticism, that is why we will concentrate here only on those conclusions, which had an impact on the further studies of Russian nationhood.

As the first came the criticism of a classical Hans Kohn’s dichotomy between “good” civic Western and “bad” ethnic Eastern nationalism<sup>39</sup> from those, who argued that this rather strict division between these two types is problematic because both of them have occurred in Western and Eastern Europe.<sup>40</sup> Besides, as some authors argued, it is a mistake to regard Russian nationalism as exclusively “ethnic”, as is often done, as it could combine cultural (ethnic) and political (civic) elements.<sup>41</sup>

As the second object of reconsideration came those theories, according to which nationalism was perceived exclusively as a political demand for creation of a nation-state, and as we have noted above, provide the theoretical justification for much recent theorization of the “nation”. Many authors criticized the universal application of the widely accepted this approach to nationalism, most clearly expressed in Ernest Gellner’s theory, from many angles. For the Russian case, perhaps, the most important was the criticism of Rogers Brubaker, who provides an argument against the vision of nationalism as primarily “nation-based, state-seeking activity”, which causes most of the difficulties in conceptualizing Russian nationalism.

If this understanding of nationalism were correct, then one might indeed expect the reorganization of political space along national lines to resolve national conflicts by fulfilling nationalist demands. The imagery here is that nationalism has a self-limiting political career ... When nationalist

demands for statehood are fulfilled, the nationalist programme is satisfied; it exhausts itself in the attainment of its ends.

That is why he argues, that nationalism should not be conceived as essentially or even as primarily state-seeking. According to Brubaker,

to focus narrowly on state-seeking nationalist movements is to ignore the infinitely protean nature of nationalist politics; it is to ignore the manner in which the interests of a putative 'nation' can be seen as requiring many kinds of actions other than, or in addition to, formal independence; it is to be unprepared for the kinds of nationalist politics that can flourish after the reorganization of political space along national lines, after the breakup of multinational states into would-be nation-states.<sup>42</sup>

Lastly, it is stressed that most of the "modernist" theories rarely include an *imperial dimension* into the analyses of national development. Only recently they have started to regard empire as a framework for nation-building. Nowadays, with the rise of interest to the imperial problematic in general formed within so-called "Empire studies", a new perspective arose, which has challenged some broadly accepted perspectives on relations between empires and nationalism. As a result of these researches, came the awareness that empires played much more complex roles in the process of shaping of national identity and vice versa, how nationalism influenced the functioning of empire.<sup>43</sup> Previously, as we saw it on the previous pages, especially in the Russian case, the basic assumption for the Hosking-like theories was the perception of an *empire as a "burden"*: as Dominic Lieven stressed, "the burdens of sustaining imperial power contributed to weakening the solidarity of the Russian community and its loyalty to the tsarist state."<sup>44</sup> Now, in a scholarship we can see that the largely pejorative perception of the empire lessened, it stopped being viewed necessarily as a "burden". In this light, the situation casts doubts on previous theorizing on Russian national identity and the relationship between "national" and "imperial" in it.<sup>45</sup>

With this "imperial turn", especially comparative studies within it, also came the awareness of the fact that the nation/state nexus in the Russian empire might have differed from relations existing in other European states. Theorists have become increasingly uncomfortable with the modernist paradigm while studying Russian nationhood, mainly because of the fact that they do not always reflect in their analysis some important features

of the Russian history, as most of these theories have been shaped by Western European historical experience and thus implicitly apply Western style criteria to a non-Western political system. In this regard, the first obvious problem is connected with the *notion of "modernity"*, which is the basic point of the "modernist" theories. Many scholars point that though modernizing tendencies could be observed in Russia since the end of the nineteenth century, the situation there can hardly be described as an industrialized and modernized mass society with universal education. Therefore, the conditions that were required for a successful development of nationalism according to the "modernist" theories, in Russian case were at least relatively different from those in the Western or Central European societies.

The next issue concerns Russia's specific position as a *continental (or "contiguous") empire*. The problem here is caused by the very fact that the Russian empire, in contrast to the European "maritime" empires, was a single land mass without clear constitutional or territorial borders between peoples, and thus it made it very difficult to define (or "imagine") the core of the ethnic (Great-)Russian population.<sup>46</sup>

Thus, while many authors recognize that "modernist" theories of nationalism can help us in understanding the connection between Russian nation-building and modernization, they nevertheless insist that neither of them can be accepted without qualification in relation to the Russian realities, and that in the case of Russian empire this model is more suitable for major non-Russian nationalities rather than to the Russians. What was clearly illustrated by David Rowley's article, discussed above, the radical versions of these modernist and structuralist approaches find themselves in a blind alley when trying to explain the nature of Russian nationalism. It became widely acknowledged that, as these theories failed to adequately explain Russian attitudes in the era of modern nationalism, they need modification when being applied for the Russian case and beyond the West-European context in general; that is, we need to redefine the very concept of and our approach to such notions as "nationalism", "nationhood", and "national identity", as well as the methods of their investigation. On the following pages, I will analyze some of the recent studies, which view these phenomena on their own terms and suggest new and original approaches.



## **Empire/Nation Nexus Reconsidered**

As the editors of *Ab Imperio* journal suggested,

Given the uneven relationship between Russian history and modernity, the field of Russian nationalism studies may benefit from the current turn in theories of nationalism from classical modernist (and ontological) assumptions about nation-formation as a process leading to materially entrenched social and political bodies of nations to studies of nationhood as a system of discourses and practices that frame and change social relations in the national locus.

This new approach conceives Russian nationalism as a modern phenomenon developing in the context of a multinational empire and often in opposition to challenges of non-Russian national projects and, what is the most important, closely resembled them. It perceives Russian nationalism as one of the actors in imperial history, and makes it possible to reflect the paradoxes of Russian nation-building and its context. Besides, this theoretical turn gives us an opportunity to offer alternative and different conceptions of Russian nationhood.<sup>47</sup>

One of the factors that influenced the turn in the studies of Russian nationhood were doubts concerning Russians' dominant position which was reconsidered within the previous paradigm. Some historians have criticized the use of the term "dominant national group" with reference to the Russians, who, as Dominic Lieven argued, "actually had more in common with that of the native peoples in European overseas colonies than with these 'empires' 'master races'."<sup>48</sup> This finding caused reconsideration of empire/nation nexus in the Russian empire putting under question Hosking's thesis, which, as we saw, until recently dominated historiography.

One of the first original analyses of the empire-nation relationship in Russia comes from Mark Bassin, who, rather than simplified dichotomy of imperialists versus nationalists, suggests a rather different framework. Although Bassin acknowledges that "without any question, this has been a critical distinction for Russia", he nevertheless argues that

national discourses in pre-revolutionary Russia stood not in contradiction to an imperial identity, but rather were subsumed almost without exception within a broader and more fundamental geopolitical vision of Russia as an empire. Indeed, one must search very hard to find any significant subjective

sense of mutual exclusivity between the two. Identity was of course problematic and contested, in Russia as everywhere. This contestation was not, however, expressed through the nation-empire juxtaposition, but rather through alternative visions of Russia as an empire.

In his study, Bassin singles out three major types of these visions in the Russian society: Russia as a European empire, Russia as an anti-European empire, and, finally, Russia as a national empire. He concludes that, despite the appearance of the extreme rightist nationalist parties and organizations in the beginning of the twentieth century with their slogan "Russia for Russians", the multiethnic national framework was prevailing among the wide spectrum of Russian public and the crystallization of the multiethnic nation was becoming a resonant ideology.<sup>49</sup> Therefore, from his point of view, "nationalism and imperial vision were joined in a common project and could not be divorced."<sup>50</sup>

A quite different framework for the research of nationalism in Russian imperial conditions was also offered by Alexei Miller, one of the leading specialists in the politics of the multinational Russian Empire. First of all, he argues against the general applicability of the Ernest Gellner's definition of nationalism in the case of the Russian empire and points out that it often leads to a misuse of this term in many researches. Miller argues that the two main categories of Gellner's definition, the "national territory" and the "space of political control", which are often congruent in the case of non-imperial nations, may differ significantly in the case of imperial nations:

The point is that an effort to consolidate the nation, including the definition of the 'national territory' within the empire, does not necessarily signal an intention to 'disband' the empire. [...] At the same time, for Russian nationalism, just as for French, British, or Spanish nationalisms, an attempt to consolidate the nation was far from irreconcilable with an attempt to preserve and, given the opportunity, to expand the empire.

Thus, he concludes, Gellner's formula of nationalism "fits the experiences of the movements that tried to 'cut' new states out of existing ones, but it does not work in cases when a particular nationalism could adopt as its "own" an already existing state, including an empire."<sup>51</sup> The second point of his argument concerns the thesis that Russians did not differentiate between the empire that "leads many writers to conclude

that the Russian nationalist program was limited to the clearly unrealistic project of transforming the empire into a nation-state." Stressing the need of a more detailed and sensitive use of the sources in order to avoid misinterpretations, Miller tries to prove that Russian nationalism was selective in its project and argues against the statement that "its discursively predominant versions contained an attempt to encompass the whole empire as the "national territory." He points to an obvious fact that "the very tension of the debates on the limits of Russian-ness and the criteria of belonging to it serve as a convincing proof that the Russian project of nation building, while expansionist, was not aimed at encompassing the whole empire and all its subjects". Under these conditions, he concludes, "the Russian nationalists' desire to "russify" the empire was not at all utopian in the sense that the Russians, as a nation, were supposed to occupy a dominant position in the Russian empire, similar to the position of the French and the British in theirs."<sup>52</sup>

Further criticism of Hosking's thesis was developed in some recent writings of Russian historians. Olga Maiorova, for example, argues that close examination of divergent expressions of Russian nationhood calls into question an assumption that Russian national identity was totally subsumed under that of the empire. She points out to the fact that the "*rossiiskii/russkii*" dichotomy, as one of the pillars of this assumption, is misleading as "these two words, and hence the two concepts of Russianness they implied, overlapped and could even be used interchangeably in many contexts". While acknowledging that 'finding' the nation in the empire proved difficult, since the edges of Russia's core were undefined, the boundaries between the center and periphery were porous, and the state's outward growth seemed unstoppable", she nevertheless stresses that "these challenges did not necessarily prevent drawing a line between the two, much less imply a strict subordination of the national to the imperial." She points that while the participants of the Russian nationalist discourse "celebrated the empire"; at the same time, they

produced a constellation of aspirations, attitudes, and impulses aimed at fostering a vivid sense of national belonging. For them, the empire was a stage where the Russian people's historical drama unfolded, and as such, it served to reinforce rather than to obliterate Russian national identity. Indeed, many expressions of Russianness symbolically plucked the nation from the shadow of empire, assigning central significance to the nation itself.<sup>53</sup>

Another argument against Hosking's thesis was expressed by Mikhail Dolbilov, who points out to the fact that it "implicitly counterposes nation-building to empire-building as an emerging, at least potentially dynamic force to an irrevocably static, nearly frozen structure (with territorial expansion as the only exception)." From his point of view, this is hardly true:

Archaic though the Russian empire might seem, empire-building was certainly not stagnant, even as late as the 1860s. And it is precisely the nation-building efforts that, in some respects, came to obstruct the completion of the empire's edifice, or the internal power structure of the empire. In other words, the relationship between empire-building and nation-building included both mutual support and mutual weakening.

Without denying the conflict of nation and empire in Russian history, Dolbilov argues that it had a more complex dynamic and points to the fact that not infrequently, it "was a clash of two streams of discourse in the mind of the same person."<sup>54</sup>

### **"Soft Theories" of National Identity and the Studies of Russian Nationhood**

The next reconsideration in a scholarship concerns the nature of the Russian national identity, particularly, the thesis about its weakness and underdeveloped character. Most of these new researches agree that the manner in which we have conceptualized national identities is fundamentally problematic and that the interpretational turn can be accomplished only by posing different questions about the formation of the Russian nation than were common within "modernist" theories of nationalism. This recent approaches, which have been favored in theoretical discussions of national identity in recent years and had an impact on the further scholarship on Russian nationhood, generally coincide with what Rogers Brubaker and Frederic Cooper called "the soft conceptions of identity."<sup>55</sup> They have moved away from viewing the nation as a timeless, substantive reality and have come to focus more on the process by which nationalist ways of thinking and behaving come into being and multiply, in other words, see national rhetorics "as plural", and stress that "national identities are not completely consistent, stable

and immutable" but, to the contrary, must be understood "as dynamic, fragile, 'vulnerable' and often incoherent"<sup>56</sup>

Thus, Katherine Verdery views nation "anthropologically as a basic operator in a widespread system of social organization", as "an aspect of the political and symbolic/ideological order and also of the world of social interaction and feeling", and a kind of a "sorting device".<sup>57</sup> Particularly useful for explaining paradoxes of Russian nationhood is her suggestion to take "nation" as a symbol that

has come to legitimate numerous social actions and movements, often having very diverse aims. It works as a symbol for two reasons. First, like all symbols, its meaning is ambiguous. Therefore, people who use it differently can mobilize disparate audiences ... who think that they understand the same thing by it. Second, its use evokes sentiments and dispositions that have been formed in relation to it throughout decades of so-called nation-building.

Her approach sees nation as "a construct, whose meaning is never stable but shifts with the changing balance of social forces." According to this perspective, nationalism can be perceived as "the political utilization of the symbol nation through discourse and political activity, as well as the sentiment that draws people into responding to this symbol's use." Hence, it has "multiple meanings, offered as alternatives and competed over by different groups maneuvering to capture the symbol's definition and its legitimating effects".<sup>58</sup>

Similarly, Prasenjit Duara states that a particular convergence of factors may crystallize various conceptualizations of a "nation" at different points of time or among different social groups. The main criteria for defining every particular concept of nation may also vary, although these variations tend to stay within parameters consistent with a particular cultural and historical setting: "The way in which the nation is imagined, viewed, and voiced by different self-conscious groups can indeed be very different. Indeed we may speak of different 'nation-views', as we do 'world-views', which are not overridden by the nation, but actually define or constitute it." Thus, "in place of the harmonized, monologic voice of the Nation, we find a polyphony of voices, overlapping and criss-crossing; contradictory and ambiguous; opposing, affirming, and negotiating their views of the nation."<sup>59</sup>

The similar view was expressed by Rogers Brubaker, who called to concentrate more upon the nation as a “category of practice” than upon states of consciousness or properties of collectivities. His approach is completely critical of modernist theories that viewed the “nation” primarily as a product of industrialization and modernization. Brubaker, on the contrary, proposed to view “nationness” as an event, “something that suddenly crystallizes rather than gradually develops, as a contingent, conjecturally fluctuating, and precarious frame of vision and basis for individual and collective action, rather than as a relatively stable product of deep developmental trends in economy, polity, or culture”. Nationalism in this perspective is a “heterogeneous set of ‘nation’-oriented idioms, practices, and possibilities”, and, in order to understand it, we “have to understand the practical uses of the category ‘nation’, the ways it can come to structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organize discourse and political action”.<sup>60</sup>

Nowadays, these approaches, which highlight the multiplicity and heterogeneous quality of national identity, have finally started penetrating into writings about Russian national identity and allowed to get out of the blind alley of the previous paradigm. The fact that in the Russian case it is almost impossible to offer a precise theoretical definition of a “nation” or even of “Russian” that was problematic for the scholarship, which’s methodological and theoretical apparatus was not able to deal with this “puzzle”, within this approach ceased being problematic and is perceived as a natural state of any national identity. As Stephen Norris argues, “this ‘amorphousness’ describes any national identity and sense of nationhood”.<sup>61</sup>

This general theoretical turn had several impacts on the studies of Russian nationhood: firstly, its stress on variability and plurality of Russianness allowed to challenge the thesis about weakness of Russian national identity, and, consequently, in admitting that the heterogeneous nature of Russian nationalism is in fact a “normality”, to concentrate on analyzes of its different versions and factors of their empowerment throughout history. Here I will cite examples from several of the most recent publications.

One of the most interesting attempts was made by Joshua Sanborn, who proposed a vision of Russian nationalism as a “space of contestation” that allows for competing concepts of the nature of the Russian nation. Sanborn argues against the modernist outlook and states that “the nation neither brings about nor is dependent upon homogenous thought or unified

action. Instead, it provides a systematic structure for negotiating power in a world of multiple subjectivities and multiple political behaviors."<sup>62</sup> As he suggests, "segments of the population do not need to 'devour' each other to be co-national; neither do they have to 'share more common interests' than they have sources of conflict. Unity is a national desire, not a precondition for the nation itself." Sanborn views the nation as "an arena where multiple subjectivities and multiple behaviors interact within certain parameters" and argues that we must concentrate on the question of how political action is framed in order to get to the heart of questions relating to the nation. Sanborn further developed Brubaker's conception with the thesis that "nationness is an event, but it "is a kinetic event that requires the building up of potential energy beforehand. Nationness is both an event that suddenly crystallizes and one that is the product of deep developmental trends".<sup>63</sup> As for Russia, all those processes that built up "national potential" happened there as they did in Western Europe, though, maybe, later and not quite as comprehensively. He agrees here with Steve Smith, who argued that a Russian ethnic identity developed over a long period of time. This development "allowed the Russian people to imagine themselves as a community with its own history, territory, and particular beliefs and practices, and [was] capable of becoming politicized in times of war or foreign invasion."<sup>64</sup>

The similar approach can be traced in Dominic Lieven's writing about the development of Russian national identity. He points out that in history we can find many examples of communities "whose sense of solidarity, mutual commitment and collective identity wax and wane over time". The same happened in Russia, who, due to various factors, had a weaker sense of national identity in 1914 than in 1550, but it does not necessarily mean that this identity did not exist altogether.<sup>65</sup>

A view on the national identity as a "field of possibilities" is the framework for the collection of essays "National Identity in Russian Culture". Its editors Simon Franklin and Emma Widdis criticized the previous discussion of Russian identity, which was driven by the assumption that "Russianness is a 'thing' to be located, described, and explained". Instead, they argued that "identity is not a 'thing' to be objectively described. It is a field of cultural discourse". Hence,

Russian identity is and has been a topic of continual argument, of conflicting claims, competing images, contradictory criteria. ... The multiple cultural expressions and constructs *are* the identity, or the identities.<sup>66</sup>

They observed that the theme of national identity in Russian cultural discourse reveals the “varied, contrasted, perhaps contradictory ways in which Russia and Russianness have been imagined and represented”. What is most important in their work is their proposition that national identity should be viewed as “a process rather than a result” and that “Russian national identity lies not in the resolution but in the nature of the discussion and argument”.<sup>67</sup>

The next revision in historiography concerned national identity among Russian masses. While almost nobody rejects the fact that regional consciousness was stronger in Russia than “national feelings” and, without a doubt, at the beginning of the twentieth century the Russian nation was hardly a political community, the recent scholarship has started criticizing the traditional interpretation. It has begun to deal with the issue of national identity among the Russian masses insisting that

the many ways in which Russians articulated a sense of belonging to a Russian nation, however varied this imaginings may be and despite the fact that Russia was not a nation-state in the European sense, points more toward the existing of a Russian nation than against it.<sup>68</sup>

Analogically, David Moon insists that for articulation of national identity “action” is more important than “awareness” or “consciousness”. Therefore, he states, what is most important is not whether Russian peasants were aware of events of national significance but whether they would act as “members of a wider, national society with which they felt they shared more common interests than they had sources of conflict”.<sup>69</sup>

## **Variability of Russian Nationalism and the Widening of its Spectrum**

As we saw on the previous pages, many researchers who have discussed in their work Russian nationalism have paid attention to the fact that these notion is used to denote a whole group of diverse views and practices. Nevertheless, they never applied this thesis as a methodological premise and later in a text continued to speak about RN as one unified subject. Although some authors operate with such types as “ethnic”, “statist”, or “traditionalist”, “dissident”, “prestige” Russian nationalism, or distinguish between its “benign” and “malevolent” (or extremist) forms,



we can nevertheless state that these are not established terms with clearly defined meaning in a scholarly literature.<sup>70</sup> Firstly, many authors put different content into these terms. Secondly, these studies generally do not explain the fault lines amongst different trends of Russian nationalism, tending to treat it as monolithic. Indeed, it is indubitably the case that a fully satisfactory method of classifying these different types of nationalism has proved to be very difficult for scholars. Only recently have different versions of Russian nationalism started acting as independent actors in analyzes, though we still can find just a few works developing this approach.<sup>71</sup>

On of the most recent “discoveries” in the field of Russian nationalism studies is the discovery of its *liberal forms*, which became particularly articulate after the events of the 1905 Revolution. We can see that historians have moved from traditional interpretations of Russian nationalism as exclusively a rightwing ideology, in contrast to the previous studies that limited their attention to political radicals, that is, purely on its rightist or chauvinist forms, thus widening the spectrum of Russian nationalist vision. Although this topic is still largely underresearched, we still can find a few insightful studies, one of them being Olga Malinova’s book on Russian liberal nationalism that presents a liberal alternative to its familiar right-wing and anti-Semitic versions.<sup>72</sup>

Some of the works discussed here are essentially case studies, while others attempt at presenting a broader overview of different issues concerning Russian national identity. Historians thus far have not come to a consensus regarding methodology of the research, neither have they described in detail all the sides of the issue and have not solved all the relevant problems. We found out that the very questions “Who are the Russians?” or “What constitutes Russianness?” offer no simple answer and has yet to receive adequate attention in the otherwise vast literature on the topic.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Franklin, S. and E. Widdis, eds. *National Identity in Russian Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 4.
- <sup>2</sup> To name just a few recent studies: Gorizontov, L. *Paradoksy imperskoi politiki: Poliaki v Rossii i russkie v Pol'she*. Moscow: Indik, 1999; Crews, R. D. *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006 Geraci, R. P. *Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001; Nathans, B. *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002; Dolbilov, M., ed. *Zapadnye okrainy Rossijskoj imperii*. Moskva: NLO, 2006; Plokhly, S. *Unmaking imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the writing of Ukrainian history*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005; Staliūnas, D. *Making Russians: meaning and practice of russification in Lithuania and Belarus after 1863*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007.
- <sup>3</sup> Hosking, G. *Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, c1997.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>5</sup> Seton-Watson, H. "Russian Nationalism in Historical Perspective". In *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future*, ed. by R. Conquest, 14-29. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986, p. 23.
- <sup>6</sup> For a detailed critical review of this approach, see Kappeler, A. "The Russian Empire and Its Nationalities in Post-Soviet Historiographies". In *The Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia*. Slavic Research Center, 2003.
- <sup>7</sup> Gellner, E. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983; Hobsbawm, E. *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. N.Y., 1990; Hroch, M. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1985; Smith, A. D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers 1986.
- <sup>8</sup> Or, probably, it would be better to say "rediscovery", as this notion already existed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russian public discourse.
- <sup>9</sup> Seton-Watson, H. *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*. London, Methuen 1977, p. 148.
- <sup>10</sup> Seton-Watson, H. *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 449. 673.
- <sup>11</sup> Anderson, B. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, New York: Verso, c2006, p. 110. For the most recent work developing the theme of "nationalization" of Russian empire, see Wortman, R. *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy from Peter the Great to the Abdication of Nicholas II*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

- 12 Rogger, H. "Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma". *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4, no. 3 (April 1962): 253-264, pp. 257-258.
- 13 In historiography, this thesis was fixed by a groundbreaking work of Andreas Kappeler, which in fact was the first attempt to write a history of Russia as a multiethnic state. See, Kappeler, A. *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich. Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall*. München, Beck, 1992. English translation: Kappeler, A. *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History*. London: Longman, 2001.
- 14 Miller, A. *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003, p. 5.
- 15 Hosking, G. *Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, c1997.
- 16 Hosking, G. *Empire and Nation in Russian History*. Waco, TX.: Baylor University Press, 1993, p. 6.
- 17 Hosking, G. *Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917*. pp. xxv-xxvi.
- 18 Jahn, H. *Russian Patriotic Culture in the First World War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 173. See also Hudson, H. "An Unimaginable Community: The Failure of Nationalism in Russia during the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries". *Russian History*, no. 26/3 (Fall 1999): 299-314; Greenfeld, L. "The Formation of the Russian National Identity: The Role of Status Insecurity and Resentment". *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32, no. 3 (Jul. 1990): 549-591; Knight, N. "Ethnicity, Nationality and the Masses: Narodnost' and Modernity in Imperial Russia". In *Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices*, ed. by D. L. Hoffmann and Y. Kotsonis, 41-65. N. Y., 2000; Kaiser, R. J. *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994; Slezkine, Y. "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism". *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 414-452; Luks, L. "Was the emergence of Russian national identity merely a historical accident?". *Nationalities Papers* 39, no. 1 (2011): 135-140; Löwe, H.-D. "Russian Nationalism and Tsarist Nationality Policies in Semi-Constitutional Russia", in: R. B. McKean(ed.): *New Perspectives in Modern Russian History*. Basingstoke, London 1992, S. 250-277.
- 19 Suny, R. G. "The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, 'National' National Identity, and Theories of Empire", p. 44, 48. See also Dawisha, K., and B. Parrott. *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- 20 Tuminez, A. S. *Russian Nationalism Since 1856: Ideology and the Making of the Foreign Policy*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p.30. See also Roshwald, A. *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914-1923*. London: Routledge, 2001; Weeks, Th. R. *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification*

- on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996, pp. 3-4, 7.
- 21 Brandenberger, D. *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 3.
- 22 Tolz, V. "Russia: Empire or a Nation-State-in-the-Making?". In *What is Nation? Europe 1789-1914*, ed. by T. and Hewitson, M. Baycroft, 293-311. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.295. See also, Tolz, V. *Russia: Inventing the Nation*. London: Edward Arnold, 2001.
- 23 Prizel, I. *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 61-62.
- 24 Weeks, Th. R. "Managing Empire: Tsarist Nationalities Policies". In *The Cambridge History of Russia. Vol. 2, Imperial Russia, 1689-1917*, 27-44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 27. See also, Slocum, John W. "Who and When, Were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the Category of 'Aliens' in Imperial Russia", *The Russian Review*, no. 57 (1998): 173-190.
- 25 See, for example, Pipes, R. *The Russian Revolution*. New York, Knopf, 1990, pp. 203-210.
- 26 The most notable example of this attempts is Hosking, G. "Can Russia Become a Nation-State?". *Nations and Nationalism* 4, no. 4 (1998): 449-462.
- 27 Guroff, G. and Guroff, A. "The Paradox of Russian National Identity". In *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, R. Szporluk, ed. 78-100. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, 1994, pp.79-80.
- 28 Westwood, J. N. *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History, 1812-2001*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, c2002, p.120.
- 29 Prizel, I. *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*, p.165.
- 30 Tolz, V. "Russia: Empire or a Nation-State-in-the-Making?", p. 297.
- 31 Rogger, H. "Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma", pp. 253-254, see also Kappeler, Andreas. *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History*, p. 242.
- 32 Hosking, G. "The State and Russian National Identity". In *Power and the Nation in European History*, ed. by L. Scales and O. Zimmer, 195-211. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 208.
- 33 Rowley, D. G. "Imperial Versus National Discourse: The Case of Russia". *Nations and Nationalism* 6, no. 1 (2000): 23-42, pp. 23-24.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- 36 Gellner, E. *Nations and Nationalism*. 1983, p. 1. Until recently, Gellner's theory has been particularly popular among students of the Russian nationhood. One of the leading specialist in this area, Theodore Weeks, for example, sees Gellner's concept "as most appropriate for the condition

- in the Russian empire before 1914". Weeks, Theodore R. *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia*, p. 7.
- 37 Brubaker, R. "Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism". In *National Self-Determination and Secession*, M. Moore, ed., 233-265. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 251.
- 38 Hall, J. A. "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained". *Daedalus* 122, no. 3 (1993): 1-28, pp. 1, 14.
- 39 Kohn, H. *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background*. New York: Collier Books, 1944.
- 40 See, Auer, Stefan. *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe*. London: Routledge Curzon, 2004; Brubaker, R. "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction Between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism", pp. 55 -71. in *Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective*, ed. H. Kriesi et al., Zurich: Ruegger, 1999.
- 41 For perceptions of Russian nationalism as ethnic see, for example, Greenfeld, L. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1992; Carter, S. *Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1990. For the criticism of this approach, see Rabow-Edling, S. "The Relevance of Kohn's Dichotomy to the Russian Nineteenth-Century Concept of Nationalism". *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 8, no. 3 (2008): 560-578.
- 42 Brubaker, R. "Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism", pp. 236-238. For his typology of different types of "non-state" nationalisms, see Brubaker, R. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- 43 See, for example, Hroch, M. *Národy nejsou dílem náhody: Příčiny a předpoklady utváření moderních evropských národů*. Prague: Sociologické nakladatelství, 2009, pp. 55-60; Barkey, K. and Von Hagen, M., eds. *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*. Boulder Co: Westview Press, 1997; Becker, S. "Russia and the concept of empire". *Ab Imperio*, no. 3-4 (2000). For a one of the most recent and insightful examples of this analysis, see Berger, S. and A. Miller. "Nation-building and Regional Integration, c.1800–1914: The Role of Empires". *European Review of History — Revue européenne d'histoire* 15, no. 3 (June 2008): 317–330.
- 44 Lieven, D. *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001, p. 254.
- 45 On general theoretical turn in studies of nation/empire relationships, see Pavleeva, E. "Russian National Identity: Beyond 'Empire' versus 'Nation' Dichotomy". *The Annual of Language & Politics and Politics of Identity* 5 (2011): 41-56.
- 46 Miller, A. "The Empire and the Nation in the Imagination of the Russian Nationalism". In *Imperial Rule*, edited by A. J. and Miller, A. Rieber, 9-26.

- Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004, p. 13. On the Russian Empire as a land-based power, see also Lieven, D. "Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity". *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol. 34, no. 2 (Apr. 1999): 163-200.
- 47 Gerasimov, I., Glebov, S. *et al.* "From the Editors. How Many Centres Does Russian Nationalism Have?". *Ab Imperio*, no. 3 (2003): 15-20. *Ab Imperio* became the main stage for the development of the new paradigm in studies of Russian nationhood within its imperial context, as well as Empire studies in general.
- 48 Lieven, D. *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals*, p. 257. See also Roshwald, A. *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914-1923*, p. 21.
- 49 Bassin, M. "Geographies of Imperial Identity". In *The Cambridge history of Russia Vol. 2: Imperial Russia 1689-1917*, ed. by D. Lieven, 45-63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 45.
- 50 Bassin, M. *Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840-1865*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp.12-13.
- 51 Miller, A. "The Empire and the Nation in the Imagination of the Russian Nationalism", pp. 11-12.
- 52 *Ibid.*, p.14.
- 53 Maiorova, O. *From the Shadow of Empire: Defining the Russian Nation Through Cultural Mythology, 1855-1870*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010, pp. 4-6.
- 54 Dolbilov, M. "Russian Nationalism and the Nineteenth-Century Policy of Russification in the Russian Empire's Western Region". In *Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire*, 141-158. Slavic Research Center, 2007, pp. 141-142.
- 55 Brubaker, R. and F. Cooper. "Beyond 'Identity'". *Theory and Society* 29, no. 1 (2000): 1-47.
- 56 Wodak, R., R. De Cillia, and M. Reisigl. "The discursive construction of national identities". *Discourse & Society* 10, no. 2 (1999): 149-173, p. 154. See also Miller, A. "O diskursivnoj prirode nacionalizmov". *Pro et contra* 2, no. 4 (1997).
- 57 Verdery, K. "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'?", *Daedalus* 122, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 37-46.
- 58 *Ibid.*, p. 37-39, 41.
- 59 Duara, P. "Historicizing National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When". In *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. by R. G. Suny and G. Eley. 1996. pp.161-162.
- 60 Brubaker, R. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, pp. 7-19.

- <sup>61</sup> Norris, S. M. *A War of Images: Russian Popular Prints, Wartime Culture, and National Identity*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006, p. 193.
- <sup>62</sup> Sanborn, J. "More Than Imagined: A Few Notes on Modern Identities". *Slavic Review* 59, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 330-335, pp. 331-332.
- <sup>63</sup> Sanborn, J. "The Mobilization of 1914 and the Question of the Russian Nation: A Reexamination". *Slavic Review* 59, no. 2 (2000): 267-289, pp. 280, 282-283.
- <sup>64</sup> Smith, S. A. "Citizenship and the Russian Nation during World War I: A Comment". *Slavic Review* 59, no.2 (Summer, 2000), 316-329, p. 318.
- <sup>65</sup> Lieven, D. *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals*, p. 254.
- <sup>66</sup> Franklin, S. and E. Widdis, eds. *National Identity in Russian Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. xii.
- <sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4.
- <sup>68</sup> Norris, S. M. *A War of Images: Russian Popular Prints, Wartime Culture, and National Identity*, p. 194.
- <sup>69</sup> Moon, D., "Peasants into Russian Citizens? A Comparative Perspective". *Revolutionary Russia* 9, no. 1 (June 1996): 43-81. P.44. See also, Brooks, J. *When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861-1917*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985; Hellberg-Hirn, E. *Soil and Soul: The Symbolic World of Russianness*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998.
- <sup>70</sup> See, for example, Carter, S. *Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*. London: Pinter Publishers, 1990.
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# POST-SOVIET DIASPORA- BUILDING PROCESSES AND THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF THE POLITICS OF MEMORY

## Abstract

In the last two decades ethnic Azeris living in USA, EU and CIS countries started to organize into a united ethno-national diaspora, with political, ideological and also financial support from the political leadership of the Azerbaijani Republic. A major component of the process of construction of diaspora was the creation by ethnic activists of a large number of diaspora organizations. The Azerbaijani political regime pursues various goals in its aspiration to influence the activity of diaspora organizations and networks. Special place in the policy is given to the holding of collective events on the occasion of various memorable dates and symbolic practices of interstate monument swaps.

**Keywords:** Diaspora, Transnationalism, Commemoration.

## Introduction: State Diaspora-Building and Commemorations

In the 1990s, the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, ethnic Azeris living in France, England, Germany, Russia or any other EU and CIS countries and USA started to organize into a united ethno-national community – a diaspora – with political, ideological and also financial support from the political leadership of the Azerbaijani Republic (i.e., nation state, which, according to Rogers Brubaker, “becomes an external national ‘homeland’” for the all ethnic Azeris, living outside it). A major component of the process of construction of diaspora was the creation by ethnic activists in emigration of a large number of diaspora organizations.<sup>1</sup>

In the context of this policy outside the “historical motherland” special importance is attached to “Azeri diasporas” in those countries which, in the opinion of the authorities in Azerbaijan, play a leading role in the world political arena. For instance, among the EU countries, special significance is attached to Germany and France where currently by official statistics living hundreds of thousands of ethnic Azeris. In addition, in the case with Germany and France, special hopes are pinned on the establishment of close contact with Turkish diaspora too.

The Azerbaijani political regime pursues various goals in its aspiration to influence the activity of diaspora organizations and networks. For example, the regime is trying to use the diaspora as a tool for a wide promotion of the Azerbaijani version of reasons for and results of the Karabakh conflict (1988-1994). Thus, for example, ethnic activists and diaspora organizations in Germany mobilize to inform as widely as possible about ethnic cleansing carried out against Azerbaijani civilians in the course of the conflict. Various collective events are held to this end – rallies, pickets, forums, etc.

Influence is also exerted on diaspora organizations with the aim of getting them actively involved in the movement against recognition by governments of different countries of the events of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in Ottoman Empire as Armenian genocide. In this context, Azeris diaspora activity in France, country where located one of the biggest and famous Armenian community, becomes very important for both, Azerbaijanis authorities and ethnic activists in emigration. Here of importance is also the support for the official position of the Turkish authorities, who are Azerbaijan’s key political and military ally. With the aim of holding all these events (and various others), the Azerbaijani authorities provide direct (including financial) support to ethnic organizations of Azeris in France, Germany and many others EU countries.

Special place in the diaspora policy is given to the holding of collective events on the occasion of various memorable dates. These events are described in the context of the diaspora discourse as facts that confirm the invariable unity of the large community of Azeris of the world. It should be stressed that collective events in the “diaspora” that are of interest to the Azerbaijani regime, are also held, in addition to marking events of the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation, on the occasion of symbolic dates of the establishment of independent Azerbaijan, and are also connected with the propagation of the activities of the former president (and the father of the incumbent), Heydar Aliyev.



The conflict over control of the Karabakh region (1988-94) resulted to the Azerbaijani-Armenian confrontation becoming retrospectively translated onto many events that had occurred much longer before it. These include the events of March 1918 in Baku, when pogroms took place in Muslim neighbourhoods in the city as a result of a political confrontation between Bolsheviks, who had attracted to their side troops controlled by Armenian nationalists (Dashnaks), and Musavatists (Turkic nationalists). As a result, about 10,000 people were killed. This event has been referred to in the post-Soviet period. After Heydar Aliyev's decree of 1996, the events of March 1918 started to be interpreted as genocide. Currently the authorities call on ethnic activists to hold collective events on 31 March. The idea of this genocide of Azeris also becomes some kind of a counter-theory against the Armenian genocide in Anatolia in 1915-18. The Azerbaijani authorities actively lobby the idea of the need to back the Turkish authorities and Turkish diaspora organizations that deny the genocide.

Among other events, the events of 20 January 1990, when, according to official reports, up to 132 people were killed when Soviet troops were deployed to Baku which the USSR authorities were practically not in control of (after 13 January when in the city started Armenians pogroms), have acquired the greatest significance.

Ethnic activists and organizations of Azeris in USA, EU and CIS countries are increasingly intensively joining this activity. More and more often various holidays that have received the status of national ones (the Independence Day, Day of Solidarity of Azeris of the World, etc.) in the post-Soviet Azerbaijan are held in emigration. Including holidays dedicated to the former president Heydar Aliyev (his birthday and death day, different anniversaries, etc.). After 2003, when president of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliev passed away collective events (concerts, conferences, rallies, etc) linked with events of the policy to commemorate the activities of the previous president – Heydar Aliyev – gain an ever-increasing significance. After his death in 2003, he, largely similarly to Atatürk, becomes in the context of the official discourse the symbolic “national leader” (ideal politician and ethnic Azeri) for the entire nation. Therefore, not only anniversaries but even simply the days he was born and died, etc, and dates linked to his rule (“Day of Salvation of the Nation”, etc) are hailed to be marked within the diaspora.

Conditions are created for the holding of various lectures, discussions, conferences, etc., with the participation of emissaries from the political

homeland, and increasingly more actively various kinds of literature are disseminated (for example, history textbooks designed in post-Soviet Azerbaijan for secondary schools and universities gain particular importance).

And here it is important to underline that nearly two decades that have passed since the collapse of the Soviet political bloc allow a researcher to think about the tendency of symbols of the socialist past being superseded from urban space. In addition, a researcher can also talk about the meanings and practices of the post-Soviet policy of commemorations. In my view, the specific features of this tendency do not always constitute only rethinking of the national past or the fact that Soviet symbols and monuments are replaced with national and counter-Soviet symbols. The current policy of commemorations (monuments, street names) reflects, among other things, the specific features of post-Soviet political relations among the states that used to be part of the Soviet bloc.

Thus, exchange of national brands becomes a habitual practice of “policy of reciprocal curtsies”. The political and economic friendship is accompanied by a cultural policy of reciprocal exchange of monuments which fill the public space in the capitals of Eastern European states. However, these kinds of practices of reciprocal exchange of monuments as symbols of “eternal friendship” and cultural and historical closeness of various national communities are neither a Soviet or post-Soviet invention. At the moment one can rather observe the process of re-actualization of these practices.

Within the context of this “policy of reciprocal curtsy” various debates are held from “we are historically and culturally closely connected” to “invasion by monuments” and “we do not need such friends!”. I think that this policy becomes especially topical in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century when in Kiev and Sankt Petersburg, for example, monuments are erected to an Azerbaijani national brand – poet Nizami, or in Kiev to a Georgian one – poet Shota Rustaveli, and streets bearing the same names appear, etc. Correspondingly, Pushkins and Taras Shevchenkos made of stone and bronze appear in Baku and Tbilisi.

And here one should understand that this policy is being implemented in a different situation from the Soviet times. The former hierarchy of the status of the capital cities of socialist states has considerably changed. From Baku’s perspective, Moscow – the capital of now “not our” motherland – can still be perceived as a city enjoying a special status. However, Kiev, Chisinau or Tbilisi are now also independent political and cultural capitals

whose status has become much higher. Besides, the status of a city is also determined by the activity of ethno-national “diasporas” which emerged as a result of Soviet and post-Soviet migrations, the collapse of the USSR and the entire Soviet bloc and the fast diasporization of urban population. Ethnic communities become increasingly active actors that independently initiate or actively support the intervention of monuments into the space of the recipient cities.

This intervention in the case with, for example, the Azerbaijani diaspora, is quite often some kind of *deja vu* from the Soviet past. In the post-Soviet situation, Heydar Aliyev, formerly a KGB general, the secretary-general of the Azerbaijani Communist Party etc, came to be not only president but also the founder of a dynasty which is still in power, and after he passed away he was transformed into national leader too. As a result, a new national brand has come into being in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. This brand contains a very significant Soviet background. However, this does not prevent ideal images of Heydar Aliyev as the national leader of all Azerbaijanis from being currently exported into the space of the capitals of neighbouring countries. These countries may claim the role of forerunners of democratic changes or even be members of the EU. However, this does not interfere with their active participation in the policy aimed at idealizing the memory of the authoritarian ruler, a known Soviet political figure in the past.

As a result of this policy, monuments of Heydar Aliyev are appearing in many cities of Eastern Europe (Moscow, Kiev, Chisinau, Bucharest, etc). These monuments, around which various events take place, may also become symbols of the ambiguity of the process of democratization. Presidents who declare themselves democrats are the sponsors of and personally welcome the appearance in many countries of such symbols of post-Soviet “friendship of peoples”. At the same time, radical nationalists, who are a typical element of many post-Soviet cities – are quite often the only group that protests against those monuments appearing.

## **Diaspora as a Political Project**

Prior to embarking on this analysis, it should be noted that the most widespread criteria for defining the phenomenon of the (ethno-national) diaspora do not appear relevant when describing the social networks and ethnic organizations of Azerbaijanis in emigration. Thus, one of the

best-known researchers into diaspora communities, William Safran (1991: 83-84) in identifying six major features that define a diaspora, pays great attention to the concept of the homeland.<sup>2</sup>

Robin Cohen expands the list of criteria which define a diaspora to nine. Among these he includes movement away from the homeland in search of work, in view of commercial interests or with colonial ambitions; a strong ethnic group consciousness; etc. (Cohen 2008: 17). Based on these criteria, he puts forward his own typology of diaspora communities. In his opinion, it is possible to talk of the existence of victim, labour, imperial, trade and deterritorialized diasporas. However, Cohen himself emphasizes that, in this instance, he is, in the spirit of Weber, indicating ideal types of diaspora communities (*Ibid.*: 16). Cohen's cautious stipulation is undoubtedly important in the case under consideration here. If just the first type is excluded: the victim diaspora (*Ibid.*: 17), which Cohen labels as the classical type (*Ibid.*: 2), then many traits shared by the other four types and by the post-Soviet Azerbaijani diaspora can be found, as well as contrasts between them. For example, when dealing with Azerbaijani migration, there is value in talking of a possible nature which is determined within the contexts of both colonial and postcolonial (post-imperial) worlds.<sup>3</sup> This will be discussed in more detail below. At this point, it should be noted that the territory on which Azerbaijani Turks made their primary compact settlement was located at the point where two empires met: the Persian empire (and, later, its direct descendant the Islamic Republic of Iran) and the Russian/Soviet empire. The migration into which Azerbaijani Turks were drawn in the twentieth century was undoubtedly determined both by their location in the composition of these empires and by the absence of an independent nation-state.

However, even if this article leaves to one side the justifiable mistrust aroused by an excessively elastic interpretation of the term diaspora,<sup>4</sup> it is nevertheless useful to approach the very possibility of applying the term to Azerbaijanis in emigration with great scepticism. At this point it is worth remembering yet another famous definition, offered by Gabriel Sheffer. Instead of criteria for describing diaspora communities or defining their types, he suggested his own version of the term:

An ethno-national diaspora is a social-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or several host countries. Members of such

entities maintain regular or occasional contacts with what they regard as their homelands and with individuals and groups of the same background residing in other host countries, etc. (Sheffer 2003: 9-10).

The concept of homeland in this definition is of somewhat less importance. The more important features of this definition are the shared sense of ethno-national identity and also Sheffer's addition (albeit cautiously accentuated) of the preservation of group solidarity, i.e. in this case the diaspora is understood as a real, united group which, once formed, subsequently stays to a greater or lesser degree unchanged. This is an approach which Valerii Tishkov has rightly criticized:

The main weakness in the interpretations in contemporary literature of the historical phenomenon of the diaspora lies in an essentialist reification of the diaspora as collective bodies ('stable populations'!); moreover, not only as statistical sets but also as culturally homogenous groups, which is almost impossible to sustain in a more sensitive analysis (Tishkov 2003: 440).

Putting to one side the question of how it might be possible to measure degrees of group solidarity, in the definitions set forth so far there are no perceptible attempts to describe the diaspora phenomenon as a process; a process during which there may be rises and falls in the political, cultural and/or other activities of ethnic entrepreneurs in emigration. Or there may be varying degrees of intensity in implementing a policy of diaspora building that is supported or even directly sponsored by the country of origin (assuming any such policy exists). This was what happened when many Azerbaijani emigrés began to take an interest in the political situation in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, for example, which interest rapidly declined towards the end of that decade and the start of the next. Or what happened in the case of the gradual rise in interest in the process of diaspora building within the political regime which took power in 1993 in Azerbaijan, which then adopted an energetic and determined state policy at the start of the new millennium.

And still, despite such a wide interpretation of the term, there is value in talking of a "new" Azerbaijani diaspora.<sup>5</sup> According to Valerii Tishkov, who is very often sceptically inclined towards the relevance of the term diaspora in describing new emigrant communities:

It is, of course, difficult to call the one million Azerbaijanis or the 500 thousand Georgians who circulate between Russia and Azerbaijan, or between Russia and Georgia (I do not include the long-standing populations of Azerbaijanis and Georgians in Russia) a diaspora; there is, however, indisputably a certain flavour of the diaspora in their culture and social practice, especially among those who have been residing in Russia for some considerable time. [...] this is a diaspora very new in its nature, which, perhaps, deserves a new name (Tishkov, *Ibid*: 464).

It should be emphasized that even if many of the criteria suggested by Safran, Cohen and Sheffer can indeed be applied to describe the social networks and structures of the ethnic organizations created by Azerbaijanis in emigration, none of these definitions are capable of assisting in explaining the diaspora building policy being pursued by the political regime in Azerbaijan. But it is specifically the content of this policy, along with the practices incorporated within it, that to a significant extent determines the exact nature of the social, political and cultural phenomenon that the authorities in Azerbaijan themselves label as the “Azerbaijani diaspora”.

This article will attempt to argue the case that the main distinguishing feature of the Azerbaijani diaspora is the attitude of the Azerbaijani ruling regime towards its existence. To be precise, that it is the regime which in fact is creating the diaspora. In turn, the attitude of the majority of ethnic activists in emigration should be described as varying degrees of expectation aimed at the regime which rules the political homeland of all Azerbaijani Turks. These relationships between the state and the emigrés makes it possible to talk of a post-Soviet bureaucratic diaspora.

Key factors in the relatively rapid appearance of this diaspora were determined by the fact that the territory of present-day Azerbaijan was part of the Russian Empire and the USSR. Both of these empires regarded what is now Azerbaijan as their Orient.<sup>6</sup> With varying degrees of intensity, they sought to modernize it (which was understood to mean making it more European), sponsoring a process of constructing a “European” (i.e. in the context of imperial discourse, a “modern”) national elite (Altstadt 1992: 50-73; Swietochowski 1985: 23-36; Baberowski 2003: 316-348).

The representatives of this new European elite in the Russian imperial era received their education in Petersburg and Moscow, or in Paris and Berlin. Later on, of course, in Soviet times, to a large extent they did so only in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and other Soviet cities. Frequently (and

especially in the USSR years), once they had completed their studies, they ceased to return to the republic at all. Another route for emigration from the republic was offered by the development of the oil extraction industry in Siberia in the second half of the twentieth century: many Azerbaijani oil workers, both novice and experienced, departed in this direction.

These were just the two most important exit routes from the republic. In reality, many Soviet institutions (for example, the army, or the appearance of an informal economy in the 'era of stagnation') provided the first steps up and out of the Azerbaijani Soviet republic. In this way, as the result of a long-standing and deliberate policy, many ethnic Azerbaijanis were to be found outside Azerbaijan by the time of the Union's collapse.

But of yet more importance is the fact that, by the time the USSR collapsed, Azerbaijanis had had what Rogers Brubaker terms a 'quasi-nation-state' (Brubaker 2000: 41-42) for over seventy years – the Azerbaijani Soviet republic, which very soon began to lay claim to the title of political homeland for all the world's Azerbaijanis.

Of course, active political emigration by Azerbaijani Turks<sup>7</sup> in the twentieth century occurred for a whole host of other reasons as well. But these reasons were likewise determined by the nature of imperial influence on the region. During the period when Soviet power was being established in Azerbaijan (April 1920), many members of the anti-Bolshevik section of the elite were forced to leave the country. Prior to the Second World War, emigré organizations were active in a number of European countries (France, Poland, and certain others) and also in Turkey. Political parties had in some sense survived, and these united many emigrés, particularly the party *Musavat* (Equality).

During the Second World War, the ranks of the emigrés who had fled Sovietization were swollen by prisoners-of-war: Azerbaijani Turks who had collaborated with the Nazis and had served in the foreign legions of the SS. A few of these emigrés lived to see the collapse of the USSR. However, by this stage, the emigré organizations and, still more, the political parties in emigration had long since ceased to exist. In practice, they did not outlive their founding fathers. The potential interest of a few descendants of political emigrés in events in Soviet Azerbaijan did not provide sufficient stimulus for the preservation or formation of any sort of new diasporic structures,<sup>8</sup> as had been the case, for example, with the second or third generations of Russian or Georgian emigrés who were living abroad for the same reasons of enforced flight from the Bolsheviks.

The reasons why the first wave of Azerbaijani political emigrés were unable to found a long-lived diaspora community require further examination and research. Although even at this stage it is possible to cite the relatively low numbers of emigrés in the first wave as one such reason. Another reason is the fear and unwillingness of the majority of former Nazi foreign legionaries to engage in any form of active public life, considering that fascism had lost the war and deportation to the USSR might be awaiting many of their number. Finally, belief in the durability of the Soviet regime played no small role. However, it is more important to emphasize that, precisely as a result of this absence of any diaspora community prior to the collapse of the USSR and the appearance of the independent Azerbaijani republic in 1991, it is necessary to talk in terms of a “post-Soviet diaspora”.<sup>9</sup> Although this is only one of the reasons. Another, still more important reason for this label should be sought in the nature of the ruling regime in Azerbaijan. But this will be discussed later.

Here, it should be underlined that, in view of everything mentioned so far, when studying the phenomenon of the Azerbaijani post-Soviet bureaucratic diaspora it seems most constructive to proceed from the perspective offered by Rogers Brubaker:

Rather than speak of ‘a diaspora’ or ‘the diaspora’ as an entity, a bounded group, an ethnodemographic or ethnocultural fact, it may be more fruitful, and certainly more precise, to speak of diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices, and so on (Brubaker 2005: 13).

Proceeding from this position, this article takes the diaspora to be first and foremost the result of a political project. The results of this diaspora building project should be analysed from the perspective of the practices and styles of its implementation, which shape the present condition of the Azerbaijani diaspora.<sup>10</sup> The diaspora itself – and this idea is lodged at the heart of the construction project – is represented as a community that unites all the ethnic Azerbaijanis who live outside the historical homeland. This article’s central research question can be formulated thus: how, through which practices, does the political regime in Azerbaijan create this imagined vision of a united and populous diaspora? Furthermore, the practices and styles of the construction of this community owe much in terms of their design to the biographies of the people who began and are implementing the project. These practices and styles lend a further specific – bureaucratic – nature to the Azerbaijani diaspora.



Finally, it should be emphasized that the most important factor driving the interest of the Azerbaijani political regime in its policy of diaspora building is the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. As often happens, the conflict led to the mobilization of many Azerbaijanis who had emigrated from what by this stage was already formerly Soviet Azerbaijan<sup>11</sup> and were living in Russia, Germany or the USA at the time of the USSR's collapse (Demmers 2005: 11-12). In the early 1990s<sup>12</sup> the regime that had established itself in the political homeland was already trying, with ever-increasing levels of intensity, to take advantage of this activity that had arisen spontaneously, thus supporting the thesis that "the formation of diaspora is therefore an issue of social mobilization" (Sökefeld 2006: 268). Throughout the 1990s, the Azerbaijani political regime was acutely in need of international platforms and foreign actors in order to represent the Azerbaijani version of the conflict in EU countries, the USA and Russia.

The regime had particular hopes of the emigrés, and this was no coincidence. It had by now become commonly accepted that the existence of a large and influential Armenian diaspora had been of substantial help to the political regime established in post-Soviet Armenia in its victory in the information war that had unfolded in parallel with the military conflict. It seemed vital to create a diaspora 'of one's own' in order to overcome the adversary. If this perspective is adopted, it is necessary to acknowledge that the researchers who maintained that "diaspora politics may be more a result of conflict than its cause" were right (King & Melvin 1999-2000: 137). It was through these politics that the Azerbaijani diaspora was created in the first decade of the new century, from when its record of successful opposition to the Armenian diaspora can be measured.

However, this incentive to intensify the diaspora building process was constantly being supplemented with others. Thus the widest possible publicity for the history, culture and economic achievements of Azerbaijan soon became publicity for the governing regime as well. Discourse about the need to strengthen the position of post-Soviet Azerbaijan in the international community ("They know us better and better") is likewise inextricable from the constant striving to reinforce the position of the ruling regime. In this context, the diaspora's real success on international platforms is not as important as the demonstration to Azerbaijani citizens of the achievements of the diaspora building policy, or, put another way, of the successful policy of gathering Azerbaijanis scattered throughout the world into a single and united transnational community.

The politico-patriotic myth of the existence of such global unity is a major component of official ideology, which tells of the long, tragic, yet at the same time heroic struggle of the Azerbaijani people for independence. Like a fairy-tale with a happy ending, the result of this centuries-long struggle has been the appearance on the world map of an independent nation-state. The creator of this national happiness is held to be the, now late, former president, Heidar Aliev. Thanks specifically to his genius, if the official ideology is to be believed, the people were able to acquire (or restore) their independent nation-statehood.

Accordingly, this same Heidar Aliev became the main hero, the face of the global unity of the entire Azerbaijani people (the diaspora and the political homeland), their National Leader.<sup>13</sup> According to the official chronicle, at the most difficult moment in the twilight of the USSR's existence, it was none other than:

Heidar Aliev [who] raised all the world's Azerbaijanis to their feet, embodying and declaring the political will of the people. This declaration gave impetus to the organization of the world's Azerbaijanis as a nation, and united our compatriots around a single politician, a national leader capable of bearing the historic responsibility of the people's fate.<sup>14</sup>

The transnational unity within the community and the success of the diaspora building policy are gauged by the growing number of organizations, and also by their amalgamation into a single hierarchy. In this way, on the basis of everything so far discussed, it should be emphasized that the "political homeland" is the key factor in the existence of a post-Soviet Azerbaijani diaspora.

### **The "Political Homeland" as the Key Criterion in Describing a Diaspora**

The modern Azerbaijani republic is not the country of origin (homeland) for all emigrés. For Azerbaijanis, several countries, as opposed to just one, are the homelands from which emigration occurred. Apart from post-Soviet Azerbaijan, in fact, there are also Iran, Turkey and Georgia, where many groups of ethnic Azerbaijanis live in close proximity (Swietochowski 1995; Shaffer 2002; Nodia 2003: 59-93). This means that any attempt to describe the Azerbaijani diaspora from a perspective that demands

the presence of what Tishkov describes as a “conditional category” – the homeland – acquires additional difficulty.

The criteria of belief in the inevitable return to the homeland and of the sense of a tie to it are not relevant, considering that there is not one such homeland, but several. Of course, Azerbaijani nationalists construe their imagined homeland to be a unified “historical Azerbaijan”, which includes a part of modern Georgia and some of north-western Iran within its borders.<sup>15</sup> But even in the minds of nationalist emigrés this imaginary unified ‘historical homeland’ inevitably breaks up into unequal parts, i.e. this myth of a unified “historical homeland” does not threaten the existence of borders between Iranian, Turkish, Georgian and former Soviet Azerbaijanis.

And now, after two decades of diaspora building, Iranian Azerbaijani activists in nationalist parties and other kinds of association are more concerned with events in Iran than in Azerbaijan. They proclaim their main aim to be the drive for cultural autonomy or for an exit from the composition of Iran (which is typical of the radicals’ position). For Turkish Azerbaijanis, any kind of separatist ideas do not seem relevant in principle: the homeland for them is modern Turkey. Russian-speaking (or not) Azerbaijanis who grew up in Soviet Azerbaijan, of course, may be tempted by the idea of a big “historical homeland”, but the options for return or for “loyalty” are always linked to post-Soviet Azerbaijan.

The majority of Iranian, Turkish and Georgian Azerbaijanis do not perceive the post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan to be a single homeland for all. However, at the same time, this circumstance does not prevent the majority of ethnic entrepreneurs in emigration from seeing modern Azerbaijan as their ‘political homeland,’ i.e. they take the political regime ruling Azerbaijan to be the single wielder of what Bourdieu termed the symbolic capital of recognized authority, and the sole sponsor, inspiration and manager of the diaspora building project. Moreover, any group form of cross-border Azerbaijani solidarity only exists in the context of the authorities’ diaspora discourse. Not that this prevents the ethnic entrepreneurs from either competing to receive support from the political homeland or from participating in joint actions and sundry other events organized under the patronage of, and with financial support from, the authorities in the political homeland.

Summarizing it should be said, that: *with such an approach, the project for constructing a diaspora should be studied primarily as a*

*process of bureaucratic and discursive homogenization of networks and organizations which ethnic Azeris in emigration participate in and create, also considering the fact that diaspora organizations and networks are created with the active ideological, political and financial support from the ruling regime in the Azerbaijani Republic.*

## **Bureaucratization of Social Networks**

Fast bureaucratization of social networks in USA, EU and CIS countries takes places in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and its goal is to construct a single vertical organizational structure of the diaspora. Officials from Azerbaijan's increasingly more active "State Committee for Work with the Azeri diaspora" seek in this way to control the process of construction of the diaspora. Ethnic activists in emigration, however, hope for funding from the Azerbaijani authorities, creation of transnational business networks or any other support from Azerbaijan. To this end, more and more new diaspora organizational structures "including transnational ethnic and hometown associations" (Henry, et al., 2004: 841) are produced within the context of actualization of contacts with political homeland. With an ever increasing intensiveness, during almost all post-Soviet years ethnic activists have been making attempts, as Benedict Andersen put it, with the support of the state machine of the country of origin, to construct an ethno-national Azeri diaspora in USA, EU and CIS countries, as "collective subjectivity" (Anderson 1998b: 44-45). Given this implementation of the project of diaspora construction, ethnic Azeris who temporarily or constantly live in emigration are increasingly often referred to as "a homogenous group" (Brubaker 2002: 163-167) – the "Azerbaijani diaspora in Germany" (or in France, Romania, Russia, etc.).

At the same time, it is diaspora organizations that act in USA, EU and CIS countries as the main partners of the Azerbaijani authorities. One of the main centers of diasporic activity – this is Germany. "The Congress of Azeris of Europe" (CAE) (president N. Agamirov) was established in Berlin in April 2004. This is an organizational structure which aims to unite all ethnic Azeris living in EU countries. The Coordination Centre of Azeris of FRG was set up under the CAE, permanently operating in Cologne. In addition, Cologne is the city where annual meetings of the World Azerbaijanis' Congress (WAC) are held. The latest ones of them were held in Cologne in July 2007 and in June 2008. Besides, the increasingly

more active embassy of Azerbaijan in Germany (Berlin, Ambassador P. Sahbazov) is acting as a coordination centre providing for cooperation between diaspora organizations in Germany and the authorities of the political motherland.

*This bureaucratic structure should be understood not as a static one but in the process of its construction and homogenization, i.e. construction of a single co-subordinated system of the diaspora with as many arms as possible. Focusing on the bureaucratic structure of the diaspora will also make it possible to study the aspects and practice of the selection of symbolic dates (mourning, holidays, etc) and holding of collective events.*

### **Discursive Homogenization as a Practice of Constructing a Diaspora**

The diasporic discourse is produced by both the authorities in Azerbaijan (political homeland) and ethnic activists in USA, EU and CIS countries. It is in a discursive manner (tests of articles and books, Azerbaijani president's addresses to the diaspora, various speeches, reports at forums and congresses, numerous interviews to the media, etc) that the Azerbaijani diaspora in USA, EU and CIS countries is endowed with features of a joint and homogenous ethno-national community.

Within the space of the diasporic discourse, for example, statistics on the number of Azeris in Germany (or any other country) gains special significance. Thus, according to estimates by ethnic activists, there is a total of about 100,000 Azeris in Germany, of whom about 20,000 live in Berlin. However, there is no precise statistics on the number of Azeris in Germany (like in any other country).

Within the context of the political project of constructing the diaspora, its significance and influence<sup>16</sup> in the host country are directly linked to the number of members of the diaspora. This is one of the reasons of the disposition for a maximum possible increase in the number of statistical members of the community and inclusion of Turkish and Iranian Azeris into the composition of the diaspora.

Another reason is official Azerbaijani nationalism. One of its most important elements is an ethno-historical myth about the division of the formerly united Azerbaijani nation. Responsibility for this division is placed on the Russian and Persian empires. What is more, Azerbaijani

nationalism appeals to the idea of an invariably united, continuous (since ancient time to date), and culturally uniform (despite dividing state borders) ethno-nation. The certain success of the project for such unity could be linked to the fact that a language common to all ethnic Azeris (the various dialects in Iran, Turkey or Azerbaijan are no serious obstacle to free communication) is wide-spread and the fact that they have a common religion (an absolute majority of ethnic Azeris are said to be Shi'is. In addition, the possible success of such a national project has to do with the existence of an independent nation state (Azerbaijani Republic) whose authorities sponsor the spread of ideas of Azeri nationalism. However, within this context the project for diaspora construction contains certain contradictions. Thus, a policy of unification with the Turkish diaspora is declared, which, in the opinion of William Safran, can, with a certain degree of proximity, be described as an ideal type of diaspora.<sup>17</sup>

It is declared that unification of the Azeri diaspora with the large Turkish diaspora in EU countries and USA will considerably increase its significance. At the same time, the very idea of the feasibility of such unification is based on the proximity of the language (Turkish and Azeri) and the policy of nationalism in the countries of origin that contains the idea of "One nation – two states".<sup>18</sup> It is this element of the diaspora politics that can be especially topical for the community of Azeris in EU and USA. However, the project for an Azeri diaspora supposes, at the same time, the construction of borders between ethnic Azeris from Turkey (so-called Turkish Azeris) and actual Turks.

## **The Specific Features of the Post-Soviet Cultural Policy of Commemorations**

This active diasporic policy is bringing to the phenomenon of transnationalization (or diasporization) of the post-Soviet politics of commemorations. Here it should be mention that Azerbaijan was the outskirts of Asia and not Europe from the perspective of the geography of the Soviet Union. And now, in many publications in Russia, the South Caucasus region is still referred to as not Europe. However, from the political perspective of the European Union, the South Caucasus region is now the southeastern outskirts of Europe. The fact that it is within European borders is confirmed by membership of different European institutions. Thus, all the three republics in the region – Azerbaijan, Armenia and

Georgia – have now long been members of the Council of Europe. They participate in different programmes to get closer to the European Union, and so on. Although these are outskirts that are the most distant from Central Europe, they are still sort of southeastern European outskirts.

At the same time, although the South Caucasus region is located on the very edge of Europe, it has “long arms” which easily reach up to Kiev, Chisinau, Moscow or Sankt Petersburg, that is to say, to the political and cultural urban centers of the former Soviet Union, and they would not mind reaching out even farther. These long arms are reaching out not without a purpose. They reach out towards other cities with symbolic gifts, for example, monuments. And here, it is important to understand that this is not about monuments or symbols of any ideas – like, for example, the Statue of Liberty in New-York city. These are depictions, made of bronze and marble, of “national brands” that are symbolically significant only for one or another imaginary community. Mainly, these are, of course, monuments to poets, who are, as Eric Hobsbawm said, “literary and not existential” (1990, p. 57) idealized symbols of nations. In turn, Baku is also open for the installation of these kinds of “national brands” from other imaginary communities. That is to say, kind of a fourth “institution of power” (Anderson, 1998, p. 163). The power to fill the public space of the urban centers of one’s nation state with the monuments as symbols of political and economic alliances.

All this quite intensive swap of not only monuments but parks, street names and so on, I will call a “policy of reciprocal curtsies”. Rephrasing Pierre Bourdieu, I will mainly be talking about a policy of manifestation of signs of respect and curtsies which is implemented based on allied relations between some countries. It is from this perspective that I find it interesting to talk about the meanings and practices of the post-Soviet policy of commemorations. Paraphrasing John R. Gillis it is possible to say, that the commemorations “as national memory practices” in the post-Soviet space still did not become “more democratic” and “more impersonal” (1994: 11). I also think that the specific features of these tendencies do not always constitute only a rethinking of the national past or the fact that Soviet symbols and monuments are replaced with national and counter-Soviet symbols. This is not only the problem of “the potentially (though not inexorably) charged symbolic nature of public monuments – particularly statues of historical figures – as well as the potential that they offer for ‘historical populism’” (Burch & Smith 2007: 934). The post-Soviet

cultural policy of commemorations also reflects the specific features of current political, cultural and economical interstate relations.

This symbolic monument swap is certainly not a post-Soviet invention. Here, I could recall for example the old practice of monument swap between twin towns. However, in post-Soviet years, especially in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, one can observe the process of these practices becoming topical again and new meanings being added to them. I cannot rule out, however, that the process of them becoming topical again is happening for the time being mainly in the former Soviet republics. In some cases such a policy of swaps is undoubtedly determined by the specific features of the political regime. This can be observed for example in the case with the political regime in Azerbaijan. But attempts are still being made, as I will actually try to demonstrate, to go beyond the borders of the former USSR. The meaning of these attempts to put monuments whenever an opportunity to do so arises is certainly not a symbolic demonstration of warm interstate relations and political or economic alliances. One of the meanings can also be a demonstration of independence that was achieved not so long ago. For example, a very noteworthy feature of public discourse in Azerbaijan is the idea that few people in the world at large know about this country and nation existing. In the course of this discourse the appearance of every new monument to an Azeri person is perceived as another important event leading out of the boundaries of being unknown.

As a rule, these monuments, parks, or streets appear in the capitals of states, in urban centers which occupy, as Paperny put it, a special location in the hierarchy of towns (Paperny 2007: 109-111). The political leadership, apart from everything else, seems to be also demonstrating its right to use the public space of their capitals at their own direction. As a result, monuments, parks or street names dedicated to culture figures or politicians that have nothing specific to do with the country or the history of the city may appear in Sankt Petersburg, Kiev, Chisinau or Tbilisi. Effectively, these are practices of commemoration of economic and political projects that an ordinary person might even fail to remember a couple of dozens of years later on.

However, in the post-Soviet situation a category of townsmen has taken shape, for whom a monument, a plaque or a park named after some figure may also become a place for periodical collective events. These are activists of ethno-national diasporas and diasporic organizations. Precisely the diaspora ethnic activists become increasingly more active actors who



independently initiate or actively support the intervention of monuments into the space of receiving cities. It is diasporas that are frequently mentioned as collective actors of the idea of erecting a monument or implement a larger cultural or political project. However, I think that in the case with monument swap between capitals, diaspora activists more often than not fulfill the role of crowd in an unveiling ceremony.

Such monuments appearing in the capital are rather projects backed by the political leadership of the two countries – the one that presents the gift and the other that receives it. The installation of these kinds of monuments are political projects representing political alliances. As for the participation of the diasporas, this is rather a curtsy by the political leadership of the receiving country towards this conditional category of citizens and one more occasion to underline the interstate proximity. However the foregoing applies rather to capitals. The appearance of monuments in provincial towns is probably to a large extent initiated and implemented by diaspora activists.

At the same time I find it necessary to talk about this “policy if reciprocal curtsies” also based on the context of symbols of the socialist past being ousted from the space of post-Soviet towns. This process of the Soviet being ousted is very unequivocal and within the context of policy of reciprocal curtsies, a feeling of *déjà vu*, a feeling of the return of the Soviet past, albeit somewhat modernized past, may also arise. Thus, this is also a situation within the context of which one can observe the entire ambiguity of democratization processes in the post-Soviet space.

## **Practices and Rituals of Interstate Monument Swaps**

I will now try to demonstrate all that I have said above using specific examples. In this article I will mainly be analyzing a case of such swaps which is being initiated and in which the Azerbaijan political regime is actively involved. Naturally, I am best familiar with this case but, in addition, I find it to be the most interesting and ambiguous one.

The late president of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev conducted a flexible foreign policy and strove to preserve good relations with all neighbors and political actors important for the region. However, the relations with Russia were quite complicated for a long time. Only during Putin’s presidency did interstate relations experience something like a renaissance. And I would risk asserting that this situation was largely determined by the background

of the two presidents. Both had previously served in the KGB. And as everyone knows, there can't be a former KGB officer. The two, especially Putin, had very warm feelings towards each other, which probably were even sincere. The political and economic results of these feelings were, for example, the visa-free regime between the two countries, which is important for Azerbaijan given the number of its emigrants in Russia and money flows from them to Azerbaijan. The uninterrupted operation of the Novorossiysk oil pipeline is important for both countries. There were no problems in the process of extension of the operation of the Russian radar station in Azerbaijan, which is more important for Russia, and there is a lot more.

The very first result of the symbolism of these warm feelings was a monument to the well-known Russian poet Aleksandr Pushkin in Baku. It was installed on 12 October 2001 in a public garden on the crossing of streets named after Pushkin and Azerbaijani composer Uzeyir Hacibayov. As conceived by the authors of the project, this street crossing, already symbolized the proximity of Russian and Azerbaijani cultures. Besides the monument by sculptor Yuriy Orekhov was a present from Russia on the occasion of the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Azerbaijan's independence. In the case with Baku the sculptor did not make particular efforts to implement his creative ideas. For this reason the Baku Pushkin is effectively a spitting image of the bronze Pushkin made by the same Orekhov which is installed in Vienna.

A return present from Azerbaijan was a monument to poet Nizami. This is poet who lived in the 12<sup>th</sup> century in Ganca, now the second important and second largest city in the country. This gift was timed to coincide with the 300<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Sankt Petersburg. The selection of the city was not accidental I think. Besides the stereotypical idea about Petersburg in the spirit of "northern capital" or "cultural capital" of Russia, the idea that this is Putin's home town was of rather greater significance. Besides, a monument to Nizami had long been standing in Moscow since the Soviet times. The significance of the all improving relations was underlined by the presence of both presidents – Vladimir Putin and Heydar Aliyev – at the opening ceremony for the monument. This event happened on 9 June 2002. At the opening of the monument, Putin, wishing to please the guest, rephrased a phrase from Nizami's works – "a word said from the heart hits right in the heart". Putin was speaking in the spirit of "all that we are doing today comes from our heart and we want this to reach the hearts of the Azerbaijani people".

These kinds of official ceremonies and speeches on the occasion of monument swaps are designed to publicly represent the nature of interstate relations. Thus, a temporary warming in the relations between Russia and Ukraine was also accompanied by the opening in Petersburg of a monument to the chief and well-known Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko. This happened on 22 December 2000. Both presidents, Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma, were present at the symbolic opening ceremony in order to give it special significance. Here, thing did not go without a symbolic undertone, which was not very profound but still was present. The public garden where the monument to Shevchenko was installed in Petersburg is located in a square which the Ukrainian diaspora suggested naming Slavyanskaya (Slavic).

However, the speeches during the ceremony were far from being as warm as those in the case with the Nizami monument. The presidents were far more reserved in their statements. For example, Putin called for that event not to be politicized and in this way he, on the contrary, underlined its political significance. The complicated relations are underlined in this case also by the background of the appearance of the Shevchenko monument in Petersburg. If we believe Anatoliy Sobchak, during his visit to Kiev in 1995, the Russian ambassador to that country told him about a monument to czar Aleksandr II. This monument outlived the USSR and was gathering dust in the yard of the city museum. Sobchak proposed giving the monument to Russia so that it was installed in Petersburg. In return he promised to install a monument to Shevchenko in the city centre. However, subsequently the Ukrainian side also demanded the handover of archive documents and also some items from the Ermitage. As a result, although Shevchenko did appear in Petersburg, Aleksandr II is still in Kiev, as far as I know.

The relations between Ukraine and Russia never improved afterwards and the monument in each other's capitals were later on unveiled by representatives of a different political alliance – incumbent Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Especially warm relations were established between the two countries in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Symbolic monument swaps have, naturally, resulted from this alliance.

A monument to the chief Georgian poet Shota Rustaveli, who lived in the 12<sup>th</sup> century too, appeared in Kiev on 7 June 2007. Under a tradition taking shape, the monument was installed on the crossing of the streets named after the very same Shota Rustaveli and Ukraine's known playwright

and theatre director Panas Sagsaganskiy. Naturally, both presidents attended the ceremony. A Georgian choir which performed the anthems of Georgia and Ukraine without accompaniment added exoticness to this event. Already on 2 March 2007 a monument to Taras Shevchenko was installed in Tbilisi too.

In both cases the emotional speeches made by President Saakashvili expressed his accentuated respect to the Ukrainian nation. Here, the language in which he said those words was of greater importance than the words themselves. In Kiev Saakashvili was speaking in Ukrainian. In Tbilisi, also in Ukrainian, he read out without looking at any notes Shevchenko's poem "Zapovit". Here it is worth recalling that previously, Mikheil Saakashvili had lived in Ukraine for some time. Yushchenko failed to do the same in response. But his speeches on both occasions were more specific and reflected the meaning and goals of the political alliance of the two states. Besides the "deep friendly ties" and "the history that unites us", this alliance is reinforced by political prospects. In Yushchenko's words, both countries are "united by the future" which should manifest itself in a full membership of the EU and NATO. So, the meanings of a symbolic monument swap can be quite different sometimes. This can well be seen in the difference in speeches by Yushchenko at the opening ceremony for another monument to Taras Shevchenko in the summer of 2008, this time in Baku.

Azerbaijan is an important and necessary partner. It is Azerbaijan with whom great hopes are connected for diversification of delivery of energy resources from the post-Soviet areas. I should recall that for the time being the project for the only oil pipeline on the territory of the former Soviet Union bypassing Russia – the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline – has been implemented largely owing to the position of the Azerbaijani leadership. But this is not an undoubted partners with which one could jump into fire and water. Yushchenko said that the installation of the monument in Baku was a "great gesture of respect for Ukraine and Ukrainian-Azerbaijani relations". "This is a tribute to the values that make us closer to each other". But he did not call on Azerbaijan to go to Europe together with Ukraine. However, President Ilham Aliyev too refrained from reproducing the Ukrainian poet's poems. Though, he did mention that many of them had long been translated into Azeri.

## **Déjà vu or Returning of the Soviet Past**

Usually all this policy of monument swap pays no attention to the wishes of townsmen themselves. However, one could assert that, as a rule, townspeople themselves quite often do not show a noticeable interest in the installation of those monuments. At the same time, some events around the intervention of these monuments into the space of post-soviet capitals demonstrate not only the fact of appearance of ethnic diasporas but also growth of xenophobia. For example, paint has been poured on Nizami's monuments in both Petersburg and Kiev. The quick spread of monuments to the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev causes even more mixed reaction.

Here I should say a few words about this political figure. He was born in 1923 and already in 1944 he started his career in the then KGB. He made it to the title of major-general and for about two years – from 1967 to 1969 – he held the post of chairman of the KGB in Azerbaijan. Then, from 1969 to 1982 he was invariably led the republic as secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party in Azerbaijan. For his good work he was awarded the title of hero socialist labour in 1979. In 1982 he became the only Azerbaijani member of the Politburo of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and up until 1987 he held the post of deputy chairman of the supreme council of the Soviet Union. This is one of the most prominent representatives of the top leadership of the Soviet Union. From 1993 he became the president of Azerbaijan and stayed in this post up until his death in 2003. During the years of his rule he managed to create an authoritarian political system of management of the country with some elements of totalitarianism. He managed to leave this system in legacy to his son Ilham Aliyev. Not counting Chechnya this is the only success story of creation of a ruling dynasty. In principle, back in his lifetime, some kind of a personality cult was established in the country which only strengthened after his death. Now not one single more or less large population centre or institution in Azerbaijan is without a monument of bust to Heydar Aliyev. This spread of clone monuments inevitably causes a feeling of déjà vu from the Soviet past.

When monuments to Heydar Aliyev were already installed across the republic, the turn of his wife Zarifa Aliyeva arrived. She was a doctor of sciences, quite a known ophthalmologist in the republic. However, it is clear that her monuments are being installed not because of her professional activity but because of her husband.

Finally it was after his death that Heydar Aliyev became the main exported national brand, noticeably pushing poet Nizami aside. The disposition for a wide spread of his monuments, parks named after him and branches of the Heydar Aliyev Foundation is now an example of going beyond the logic of “policy of reciprocal curtsies”. Certainly, doing something nice to an ally continues to make sense. Political and economic alliances are preserved too. However, the spread of countless pictures of the late president is already some kind of an end in itself too.

Here, one cannot but view a certain process of return of the Soviet in a somewhat modernized form. And here it is a very illustrative thing that the main monument in Baku contains a symbolic reproduction of the Soviet background of the former president. Attempts to install monuments to him and his wife in the capitals of different countries are opposed not by democrats and opponents of the return of the Soviet but radical nationalists, as was the case in Moscow, for example.

This situation demonstrates, I think, the whole ambiguity of the post-Soviet democratization. This is rather a process of imitation of democratic changes. Since this is an imitation, residents of the capital are effectively deprived of the right, and often of the will too, to influence the process of filling of public space of their towns with monuments. The ideology of this spread of monuments to Heydar Aliyev is presented by the country's chief ideologist Ramiz Mehdiyev, in the following way: “An independent and self-sufficient Azerbaijan is a monument to Heydar Aliyev”. Nowadays these symbols of independence and self-sufficiency are appearing in increasing numbers and this process is gaining momentum. Monuments to the former KGB general, a prominent communist party bureaucrat and post-Soviet authoritarian president have already been installed in Kiev and Tbilisi.

That is to say, in republics “whose future lies in a full integration into the Europe Union”, as president Yushenko said. However, there is now a monument in one of the capitals of the European Union too – in Bucharest – and no major protests have been voiced against its installation.

## **Conclusion**

Summarizing the foregoing, one can draw the following conclusions. The official ideology of the policy monument swaps in the post-Soviet space is to spread as widely as possible symbols of the independence of

one or another state. These are no longer gifts from twin towns but symbols of economic and political alliances. Their significance is confirmed by participation in opening ceremonies by leaders of independent nation states. Besides, the significance is stressed also in the context of hierarchy of cities and urban space. As a rule, that is the centre in a country's main city, in the capital. Here it is important to remember that "the capital cities in Central and Eastern Europe played an essential role in national movements and in the creation of new political identities" (Kolbe 2007: 79). However, although monuments are placed in the centre of the capitals these are as a rule not spaces where townsmen love to go for a stroll. These are rather although central but little visited parks and public gardens. And in this sense monuments representing the national brands of other imaginary communities occupier rather a subordinate position in relation to own brands.

The rituals of installation of such monuments look like established ones. On the whole, the ritual of ceremonies, the meaning of speeches and must-visits by president have already been established. The ceremonies are often timed to coincide with some significant dates, for example, culture days. An addition to the monuments are always a park, a public garden and a street with an appropriate name. Monuments are to be created by ethnic specialists even if they are installed on the money of the city itself, like was the case with the Shevchenko monument in Sankt Petersburg. Besides, this process is also ethnicized owing to the active participation of diaspora activists in the ceremonies.

The aims and meanings of these swaps can quite strongly differ. However, this, in all cases, is a process of influence of political relations on the filling of the urban space with monuments. This is also always some kind of a symbolic curtsy too. Actually the depth to which back bends demonstrates the boundaries from "let's be friends" to "we are such close friends that we can't be any closer".

And so, as regards the political activities of Azerbaijani diasporic organizations, it is possible to talk in terms of, if not a commanding role, then certainly a regulating and co-ordinating role emanating from the political homeland. This co-ordination is not always managed directly through the embassies and the State Committee. In Germany, the Co-ordinating Centre for the Azerbaijani diaspora in Germany has existed for several years now; it was created by the Azerbaijani embassy in that country, and is financed from state sources. The Centre exists as a nominally independent organization. This means that the Azerbaijani

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Committee can officially distance themselves from the activities of emigré organizations. All the political actions organized—pickets, protests and the like—are represented as voluntary activity undertaken independently from the government in the political homeland.

The policy of memory and the ideology of post-Soviet nationalism (or ‘Azerbaijanism’) is also re-transmitted to the diaspora. Such events as the genocide of the Azerbaijanis, which is commemorated on 31 March each year in the diaspora, too, only appeared on the calendar in the post-Soviet period. Exactly the same applies to the holiday celebrated on 15 June as the “Azerbaijani People’s Day of National Salvation”, which is linked to the commemoration of Heidar Aliiev. In fact these commemorative dates are observed in the diaspora as well, including those of its members who emigrated from Azerbaijan long before these dates appeared on the calendar. The first holiday to be officially accepted by Heidar Aliiev – the ‘Day of World Azerbaijani Solidarity’ (31 December – has also taken root in the diaspora. These dates and holidays were introduced by the regime into the diaspora’s festive activity, which had previously only revolved around celebrating *Novruz Bairama* (the coming of Spring) or the Muslim-wide *Kurban Bairami* (Greater Eid).

These (and certain other) goals of diaspora building are subordinated to the most important – the fight in the diaspora to have the Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolved in favour of Azerbaijan. A variety of exhibitions, concerts, Azerbaijani cultural days, and also pickets and protests, are organized with the aim of realising these goals. As a rule, a small number of activists, businessmen and intellectuals take real part in these collective actions. Their ability to influence the expansion of EU and US citizens’ viewpoints appears doubtful. It is more likely to concern attempts to find new means of influencing the popularity of the regime in the country which it governs.

In Azerbaijan itself, the political regime, in the context of diaspora policy, has tried to encompass all Azerbaijanis. In a populist spirit, the regime also represents itself both as taking care of the problems and needs of all Azerbaijanis, and as a successful opponent of “World Armenianism”. The construction of the diaspora and a cross-border Azerbaijani unity has become the great triumph of Heidar Aliiev, which everyone should remember. And in order that no-one in the country does forget about it, the media constantly report on news from the diaspora and on the successes of diaspora building.



## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> For example, the following could be named among the ever growing number of organizations of Azeris in Germany: The "Meints - Azerbaijan" Society (chaired by B. Kemur), "Azeri House" (Berlin, chaired by T. Karayev); The Nizami Ganjavi Institute (Berlin, director N. Ateshi), 'Friends of German-Azerbaijani culture' (Berlin, head I. Ibragim), the culture and education society Odlar Yurdu (Berlin, chaired by J. Jafarzade), etc. One of the organizations set up most lately is the "Union of Azeri students and scientific workers of the FRG" established in January 2009 (Berlin, chaired by S. Abbasov). Or, in France: Association "Azerbaijan House", (Paris); "Azerbaijanis – France Youth Association" (Paris); France – Azerbaijan Association "ARAZ" (Paris); Strasbourg "Azerbaijan House" (Strasbourg); "Azeri – Turk Centre" (Strasbourg), etc.
- <sup>2</sup> Both the term 'diaspora' and the concept of 'homeland' have recently been subjected to serious revision. "In the older vocabulary, 'homeland' was commonly depicted as a sacred place filled with memories of past glory and bathed in visions of nobility and renaissance. Paradoxically, in the new discourse 'homelands' sometimes fade out of view entirely, or [...] they become nation-states that by definition repress minorities and place limits upon their cultural and other freedoms" (Weingrod, A., Levy, A., eds., 2005: 4-5).
- <sup>3</sup> Even if it is acknowledged that the concept of postcoloniality is poorly suited to describing the networks and communities created by Azerbaijanis in, for example, post-Soviet Russia, looking at the contrasts from this perspective allows them to be better understood. This means it allows the phenomenon of the post-Soviet Azerbaijani diaspora to be more accurately described (on post-colonial diasporas, see: Keown, M., Murphy, D., Procter, J., eds., 2009).
- <sup>4</sup> Rogers Brubaker argues, that "if everyone is Diasporic, then no one is distinctively so. The term loses its discriminating power – its ability to pick out phenomena, to make distinctions. The universalization of diaspora, paradoxically, means the disappearance of diaspora" (Brubaker 2005: 3).
- <sup>5</sup> In this context, 'new' seems to act as a counterpoint to 'old', 'classical' diasporas. As Alex Weingrod and Andre Levy put it, "today's new diasporas are considerably different. Depending upon the particular definition and usage, there are likely to be many more of them, and they are scattered about as a result of the global trends that shape the contemporary world. As we know these new diasporas have emerged from the world-wide movement of millions of persons, which in turn has been caused by global inequalities, modern information and production technologies, powerful multi-national corporations that frequently shift production across the world, as well as the more familiar 'old-fashioned' reasons of famine and war" (Weingrod & Levy 2005: 4).
- <sup>6</sup> The Tsarist empire and the Soviet authorities undoubtedly differed in their judgement of the importance of the Transcaucasian region to them. For Tsarist Russia, this importance had arisen in the context of its strategic location on

- the border with the competing Persian and, especially, Ottoman empires. Nor did the title of ‘Defenders of the Christian Faith’ play an insignificant role for the Russian Emperors, particularly as it was their protectorate over the Georgians and Armenians which bestowed this honorific upon them. The economic importance of the region only began to grow as the oil boom took off in the second half of the nineteenth century. For the Bolsheviks, in contrast, Azerbaijan had become ‘a stronghold of socialism in the East’, while its capital Baku was perceived as a city which showcased the achievements of the Soviet authorities to the whole of the Near East (Bretanitskii 1970: 117-118; Baberowski 2003: 217-394).
- 7 Discussions about what to call the nation began at the end of the nineteenth century and have continued, with the occasional pause, to the present day (Shnirelman 2001: 94-96). Taking the most common features, it can be stated that a proportion of nationalists (and particularly, to a greater or lesser degree, of radical pan-Turkists) consider the correct name to be Azerbaijani Turks [translator’s note: in Russian, this may be spelt *turk* or *tiurk*] (Azəri-Türklər). The official version, established during Heidar Aliyev’s presidency, prefers the name accepted in the USSR from the end of the 1930s: Azerbaijanis (Azərbaycanlılar). In general, both in daily life and in academic studies, both names are used in parallel.
- 8 It is striking that Azerbaijani historians studying this first wave of emigration as a rule avoid the label diaspora, talking instead of political emigration (Balaev 2009: 207-277; Guliev 2011: 4-10). Meanwhile, specialists involved in the policy of diaspora building describe the history of this wave of emigration as one of the stages in the formation of the Azerbaijani diaspora, the roots of which are now being sought in the middle ages, if not even earlier (Rizvan 2002; Əliyev 2009: 14-46).
- 9 This article does not consider the organizations formed by Iranian Azerbaijanis in emigration. These few organizations had no links with Soviet Azerbaijan; they are, effectively, part of the Iranian diaspora. The only exception is emigrants who were representatives of the Democratic party. This party, which headed the nationalists seeking autonomy for Azerbaijanis in Iran, was created in line with a Soviet policy aimed at increasing Soviet influence in Iran during the Second World War, at a time when the USSR was counting on being involved in the extraction of Iranian oil. However, following the departure of Soviet forces from Iran, the party and the regional government founded by its activists soon ceased to exist. Incidentally, some of these Azerbaijanis who left Iran in 1946 continued work in emigré structures that were created and operated under the patronage of Soviet security services (for more on these events, see: (Hasanli 2006).
- 10 In a wider sense, this article shares the position that Weingrod and Levy set up in contrast to the approaches of Cohen, Safran and Tölölyan, who prefer to begin by a definition of diaspora or by a catalogue of its types. “In

contrast, Clifford, Appadurai, Bhabha, Hall, and many others tend to use the term in a looser, more metaphoric sense and consequently they may discover 'diasporic features' among a wider range of migrating groups. For these scholars certain historical moments, social contexts, and political-cultural processes are more important than whether a specific community neatly fits the type." (Weingrod & Levy, *Ibid*: 7).

11 It should not be forgotten that this specifically concerns emigrés from the Republic of Azerbaijan. And now that many years of diaspora building have passed, ethnic activists frequently complain in interviews that the majority of Iranian Azerbaijanis lack any genuine interest in the problem of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, that they know nothing of the basic facts and events of the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation, etc.

12 To be precise, from the moment when Heidar Aliev returned to power in 1993. More on this below.

13 This title of 'National Leader' was established while he was still in power. For example, among an array of official holidays. every June 15 since 1998 has been celebrated as 'Azerbaijani National Salvation Day.' This was the date of Heidar Aliev's return to power in 1993. Since 2000, while he was still alive, 'Flower Day' has been celebrated, the date coinciding with the President's birthday. Every year on December 12, the anniversary of the death of the 'Great Leader' is widely commemorated, although this date is not on the official list of days of mourning.

14 The Azerbaijani Diaspora [[http://www.azerbaijan.az/portal/Society/Diaspora/diaspora\\_r.html](http://www.azerbaijan.az/portal/Society/Diaspora/diaspora_r.html)]

15 For a more detailed account, see: (Rumyantsev 2010: 415-461).

16 The Azerbaijani authorities officially declare a policy of creation of an "Azerbaijani lobby" in countries that are the world's leading political and economic centres. The main idea behind the creation of such a lobby is to exert influence on the policy of host countries with the aim of getting them to make decisions, on a variety of issues, that would suit the Azerbaijani political regime. From "confrontation to the Armenian lobby" to support for Azerbaijan in the sphere of its integration into the European space. See: *Formirovanie Lobbi*. Available at the official site of the "First Forum of World Azerbaijanis" (<http://www.diaspora.az/qurultay/d-ru.htm>).

17 Safran singles out six main characteristics of such diasporas: dispersion from the original "centre", to at least two "periferical" places; presence of memory or a myth about homeland; the belief that members of diaspora will not be completely accepted by the new country; ideas about homeland as a place of inevitable return; commitment to support or restore homeland; presence of group solidarity and feeling of connection to homeland (*Ibid*: 83-84).

18 A phrase by former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev that has become a phrase used by everyone. The phrase reflects the ideal model that implies that Turks and Azeris are one nation that has created two states owing to various circumstances.

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# EUROPEAN WORKERS' FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE IN THE EUROPEAN COURTS

## Abstract

By comparing the jurisprudence of the two European Courts this article seeks to find an acceptable level of trade union rights in Europe. The focus is on the proportionality test introduced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the process of finding a balance between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms and also on the extension of the content of article 11 of the European Convention by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

**Keywords:** European Court of Justice; European Court of Human Rights; EU fundamental freedoms of movement; right to strike; collective bargaining; collective agreement.

## Introduction

The following article is designed to shed light on the issue of protection of freedom of association as a trade union right in the European context. By analyzing and comparing the case law of the two European Courts (the ECJ and ECHR) the paper intends to answer the following question: what is the acceptable level of freedom of association in Europe? The issue became relevant after the two courts have developed their jurisprudence in different directions. Even though the court of the European Union also protects freedom of association as a trade union right, it gives privilege to the rules on freedom of movement of the EU when they come into clash with those trade union rights. On the opposite, the ECHR has expanded the traditional content of freedom of association and eventually the margin of appreciation of the member states in relation to this value has been shrunk.

The two Courts operate in the same region and the same countries are subject to their jurisdiction. Therefore, it is essential to analyze what are the standards in relation to freedom of association established by the Courts.

## European Union Chapter

The idea behind the creation of the European Union was to avoid further military confrontation in the region. For that purpose it was decided to integrate strategically important sectors of the economy.<sup>1</sup> Treaties created in the framework of the Union aimed at deepening general economic cooperation in Europe by establishing a common market of goods, workers, services and capital.<sup>2</sup>

The ECJ has contributed to this process. Through Article 258 TFEU and by relying on the *direct effect doctrine* the Court has interpreted the Treaties in support of single market (*Cassis de Dijon*, 1979).<sup>3</sup> The human rights discourse appeared in the judgments of the ECJ on a relatively later stage.<sup>4</sup>

## Freedom of Association in the ECJ Jurisprudence

The ECJ started its case law on freedom of association with the case of *Bosman* where the Court has recognized freedom of association as a general principle of EU law.<sup>5</sup> A following case was *Albany* where the right to form and join trade unions and the right to collective action were also recognized as general principles of EC Law.<sup>6</sup> In the case of *Commission v Germany*, the court further recognized the right to *collective bargaining*.<sup>7</sup>

These developments seemed promising. However, the situation has changed in 2007 when the Court was asked to strike a balance between the two confronting values – economic freedoms and trade union rights. The first such case was a *Viking Line*.

### *Viking Line Case*

In this case,<sup>8</sup> the company (*Viking Line*) wanted to reflag one of its vessels (Rosella) operating under finish flag. Trade unions feared that reflagging would cause deterioration of the working conditions of the crew and threatened with the strike action. *Viking Line* took the case to the UK court alleging the violation of rights on freedom of movement of workers, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services guaranteed under Articles 39, 43, 49 EC under the Community law. The case was referred to the ECJ for preliminary ruling (Para 6-27).

The ECJ explicitly recognized the *right to strike* as a fundamental right, however, stated that exercise of this right nonetheless may be subject to

certain restrictions. Referring to the previous cases of *Schmidberger*<sup>9</sup> and *Omega*<sup>10</sup> the court noted that even though protection of fundamental rights can justify restrictions on the fundamental freedoms (“freedom of establishment and provision of services”) it does not mean that fundamental rights are out of scope of EC law and in this particular case out of scope of article 43 EC (Para 42-47).

The Court rejected an idea to apply reasoning in *Albany*<sup>11</sup> by analogy.<sup>12</sup> In the opinion of the Court the fact that agreement or activity is excluded from the competition rules does not mean that it is also excluded from the free movement provisions, as these two sets of provisions are applicable in different circumstances (Para 48-54).

Regarding the issue on horizontal direct effect the Court was of the opinion that article 43 EC confers rights on private undertakings that can be relied on against trade unions. The Court did not take into account the argument that trade unions are not public entities and therefore, article 43 EC should not create any obligations for them, as the Treaty creates obligations only for member states. According to the Court for the realization of the freedom of provision of services it does not matter if the obstacles are resulting from the acts made by public entities or by associations and organizations not governed by public law (Para 56-66).

The Advocate General<sup>13</sup> explained that private actors, while being now subject to the Treaty rules on freedom of movement are not necessarily held to exactly the same standards as state authorities; instead,

the court may apply different levels of scrutiny, depending on the source and seriousness of the impediment to the exercise of the right to freedom of movement, and on the force and validity of competing claims of private autonomy (Para 49).

The Court decided that the action of the trade unions in the present case constituted restriction on the freedom of establishment; however, that restriction might be justified if there is an “overriding reason of public interest, such as the protection of workers” and only if the “restriction is suitable for ensuring the attainment of the legitimate objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective”. The final conclusion whether the actions of the trade unions were justified or not the ECJ has left to the national court.

Interestingly, the Court makes referral to the ECHR case law (*National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium*, no. 4464/70, ECHR, 1975; *Wilson*,

*National Union of Journalists and Others v. United Kingdom*, ECHR, 2002). It emphasize that under ECHR the right to strike, right to collective agreement and collective bargaining are considered as “one of the main ways” in which trade unions can protect their members, but not necessarily the only (Para 86-87).

The case of *Viking* was returned to the Court of Appeal and the parties settled the case (probably, because of the uncertainties generated by the judgment). Though, the terms of settlement remains confidential, it is known that *Rosella* is now registered in Sweden.<sup>14</sup>

### ***Commentaries on Viking Line***

According to Catherine Barnard the test of proportionality established by the Court for the national judiciaries will cause significant problems for trade unions in future. It does actually suggest that industrial action is the last resort and national courts have to check if the union has exhausted all other avenues under national law, before finding the industrial action proportionate. She also criticized the fact that trade unions are now in the same position as states, with the same responsibilities. They are now subject to the same obligations as states, while at the same time they cannot invoke any of the defenses provided by article 46 EC (now, Article 52 TFEU), such as public policy, because these provisions were drafted with states in mind.<sup>15</sup>

Alan Dashwood agrees with the Court that free movement provisions certainly do apply directly in some cases but the problem is to know which these cases are. This is the question the answer to which is not provided by the Advocate General and that must be decided on a case by case bases. It is also problematic to strike a balance between the need of subjection of certain private actors to the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement and the need to respect the private autonomy of these actors as protected under domestic law.<sup>16</sup>

According to Tonia Novitz the term “protection of workers”, which can be used to justify restrictions on freedom of movement provisions of the EU is very restrictive and narrow. Only if jobs and conditions of employment are seriously under threat can trade union’s action be considered as protection of workers. Opposite to this, the ILO provides wider interpretation. In the Digest of Decisions the Freedom of Association Committee of the ILO states that the exercise of the right to strike cannot be used only for defense of occupational and economic interests, but also for

“seeking solutions to economic and social policy questions and problems facing the undertakings which are of direct concern to the workers”.<sup>17</sup>

### ***The Laval Case***

*Laval* was a case<sup>18</sup> on the same issues decided right after the *Viking Line*. In this case a Latvian construction company (Laval) posted 35 Latvian Workers to Sweden to fulfill the contract. Posted workers were earning 40% less per hour than comparable Swedish workers. Even though Laval was in a collective agreement with the Latvian trade unions the major Swedish construction trade union wanted Laval to apply the Swedish national agreement. The agreement covered number of issues, including the obligation for Laval to pay a special building supplement to an insurance company to finance group life insurance contracts. Importantly, the pay to the workers was not defined and was left to be negotiated on local level between the local trade union (*Byggettan*) and the employer on a case-by-case basis after the tie in to the Swedish collective agreement. The negotiations were unsuccessful.

Swedish trade unions initiated strike action and blockaded the building site. The Latvian company eventually went bankrupt. Latvian workers returned to Latvia (Para 27-38).

Laval commenced proceedings in the Swedish national court. While the issues under consideration involved EU law, the Swedish Court referred the case to the ECJ for preliminary ruling.

The Advocate General reaffirmed that right to strike is a fundamental right and a general principle of the community law. However, this is not an absolute right and certain restrictions can be put on it. Here he cites the case law of the ECHR where it is recognized that the right to strike can be one of the means that the states might or might not choose to guarantee the right to freedom of association for trade unions protected under article 11 ECHR. It is stressed that the right to strike is not upheld by article 11 and might be subject to national laws and regulations that limits its exercise (Para 72, 78).

Advocate General suggested that with regard to the particular situation in *Laval* exercise of the trade unions' right of collective action falls within the scope of Community law, namely, provisions on freedom of providing services. The court shared the opinion of the Advocate General and stated that Community law is applicable to the strike action taken by the trade unions in Laval (Para 86-95).

According to the Court trade union action which is designed to force service providers to sign the contract, which contains more favorable terms and conditions than the Directive 96/71 article 3(1)

is liable to make it less attractive or more difficult for such undertakings to carry out construction work in Sweden and therefore constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the meaning of article 49 EC (Para 99).

After deciding that the trade union action was a restriction on the freedom of provision of services, the Court dealt with the question if that restriction was justified or not. The Court started with the statement that activities of the Community include not only creation of the internal market without boundaries but also a policy in the social sphere and that these two activities should be balanced against each other. According to the Court the restriction on fundamental freedoms is justified by application of the right to take collective action for the protection of the workers of the host state against possible social dumping, because it may constitute an overriding reason of public interest within the meaning of the case law of the Court. In the present case of *Laval* the Court observes that the blockading action by trade unions aimed at ensuring that posted workers have their terms and conditions of employment fixed at a certain level, falls within the objective of protecting workers. However, according to the Court forcing foreign undertaking to sign the collective agreement creates such an obstacle that cannot be justified by such an objective. The level of protection guaranteed by the Directive 96/71 is limited to that is provided by article 3(1), unless the foreign undertaking itself voluntarily signs a collective agreement in the host member state which provides more favorable terms and conditions of employment. The Court then makes a referral to public policy provisions under article 3(10) of the Directive explaining that if there are issues other than that provided under article 3(1) (in present case these were the pecuniary obligations mentioned in the Swedish collective agreement) of the Directive that the host state wants to apply under public policy provisions it is necessary that the state first opt to article 3(10) which Sweden in the present case did not do (Para 81-84). Therefore, *Laval* is only required to observe nucleus mandatory rules for minimum protection in the host member state (Para 99-108).

The Court separately mentions the imposition of negotiations on minimum pay by trade unions on the foreign undertaking and states that

in general such action is not prohibited by the Community law; however, in the particular circumstances of the case the collective action cannot be justified in the light of the public interest objective where the host state does not have on place any laws or regulations that are sufficiently precise and accessible and do render it possible for the undertaking to determine the obligations with which it is required to comply as regards minimum pay.

### ***Commentaries on Laval***

The strict reading of the Directive 96/71 was criticized by Catherine Barnard. Referring to article 3(7) ("Paragraphs 1 to 6 shall not prevent application of terms and conditions of employment which are more favorable to workers.") as to the saving clause *Barnard* is of the opinion that this provision was always thought to be meant that Directive provided the floor of the rights, while the states (usually assumed host state) could go further by imposing higher standards, subject to the ceiling of article 49. She criticized the position of the court that article 3(7) applies to the situation of foreign service providers only if they voluntarily sign a collective agreement in the host state which offers superior terms and conditions for their employees, a scenario which is very unlikely. Therefore, she thinks that the court came very close to making article 3(1) not a floor but a ceiling.<sup>19</sup>

Mia Rönnmar shares the view of Barnard about the Directive 96/71. She agrees that after *Laval* the Directive has become not only a minimum Directive as it is stated in article 3(7) and recital 17 of the Preamble, but also – a maximum Directive that is "establishing a ceiling for the terms and conditions of employment that a trade union or a state may require foreign service providers to apply to employees".<sup>20</sup>

### **Following Cases**

The strict reading of the Directive 96/71 was supported by the ECJ also in other cases. In *Ruffert* the Court reiterated the idea developed in *Laval* that level of protection guaranteed to posted workers is limited to that provided for in article 3(1), first subparagraph (a) to (g) of Posting Directive, unless it is provided otherwise by host state laws or collective agreements and unless the posting undertaking commits itself to voluntarily sign the

collective agreement in the host state guarantying the posted workers more favorable conditions of work.<sup>21</sup>

In the case of the *Commission v. Luxemburg*, the state was accused in a wider interpretation of the Directive 96/71 and namely article 10. According to the Commission the public policy provision under article 10 was interpreted by the national legislation of Luxemburg too broadly, inclusive of the requirement of a written employment contract or a written document established in accordance with directive 91/533;<sup>22</sup> automatic indexation of remuneration to the cost of living; the regulation of part time work and fixed-term work; and respect for collective agreements. The provisions of the national law obliging foreign companies to provide additional information on posted workers and also assign representative in Luxemburg for labor inspection purposes were considered by the Court as unjustified restriction on freedom to provide services.<sup>23</sup>

## Conclusion

The developments of the ECJ case law were criticized by the ILO and also by the European Trade Union Confederation. According to the ILO Committee of Experts the doctrine the ECJ has elaborated in the *Laval* and *Viking* cases is very likely to have a significant restrictive effect on the exercise of the right to strike, the manner that is contrary to the ILO Convention 87.<sup>24</sup>

The European Trade Union Confederation prepared a draft amendment to the Lisbon Treaty – *Protocol on the Relation between Economic Freedoms and Fundamental Social Rights in the Light of Social Progress*. The Protocol states that highly competitive social market economy is not an end in itself but should be used to serve the welfare of all (article 1). Therefore, neither economic freedoms, nor competition rules shall have priority over fundamental social rights and in case of conflict the later shall take precedence (article 3(1)). This approach however was criticized in the Monti report, where it was stated that Treaty changes does not seem realistic in the short term.<sup>25</sup>

For professor Simon Deakin, *Viking* and *Laval* cases are the result that followed the shift of the EU economic constitution from ordoliberal to neoclassical model. Both models oppose the direct state intervention in the economy. However, neoclassical thought is more extreme and see markets as essentially self-equilibrating. Neoclassical approaches view



the labor law rules and collective bargaining practices as inherently inefficient and therefore in the neoclassical approach the principal role of the courts is to remove legislative interventions through deregulation. The view that labor regulations are inherently restrictive is what lies on the bottom of the *Viking* and *Laval* cases. The author also refers to the term “social market economy” mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty and considers it as an echo from the 1950 ordoliberal thought. However, *Deakin* thinks that this cannot be used as a “bulwark against further deregulation” and suggests that there is a need for alternative law-market relationship to be considered.<sup>26</sup>

## Council of Europe Chapter

The outrages of the Second World War stimulated the establishment of one more international organization – the Council of Europe (hereinafter COE). Unlike the European Union which became concerned with human rights issues on a relatively later stage of their existence, the COE was seen from the very beginning as an organization created for the purposes of human rights protection. According to the Statute the aim of the organization, is “... to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress” (COE Statute, article 1.b). It was believed that one of the key elements for achieving this aim stated above was “... the maintenance and further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (COE Statute, article 1.b).

The European Convention on Human Rights was created in the framework of the Council. With the help of the European Court of Human Rights the Convention guarantees the most essential human rights in the region, including trade union freedoms. Article 11 of the Convention states everyone’s right to freedom of association, including “the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”

Even though the Convention is brief on trade union freedoms<sup>27</sup> and does not mention specific trade union rights, the position of the Court is that “the Convention is a “living instrument” which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”.<sup>28</sup> This enables the Court not only to bypass the *Travaux préparatoires* but also to adapt and re-state its case law.<sup>29</sup>

## Freedom of Association in the ECHR Jurisprudence

The first case where the Court deliberated about the content of the right to form and join trade union for the protection of workers interests was *National union of Belgian Police v. Belgium* 1975.<sup>30</sup> The issue was a right of trade unions to be consulted. The Court stated that the right to consult is “not an element necessarily inherent” in Article 11. The Court did not take into account international practice, namely the European Social Charter 1961 which guarantees such right (Para 38).

According to the Court trade unions should enjoy a “right to be heard” in order to protect their interests. In order to achieve this end states are free to choose the means. According to the Court, “while consultation is one of these means, there are others” (Para 39).

In the Case of *Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v Sweden* 1976<sup>31</sup> trade unions claimed a right to enter into collective agreement. The Court again disregarded article 6.2 of the European Social Charter and in the same vain as in the *National Union of Belgian Police* case stated that trade unions have the right to be heard and that Article 11.1 leaves states a choice to choose the means for attaining that purpose. In the opinion of the Court “while the concluding of collective agreements is one of these means, there are others” (Para 40).

In the case of *Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden* 1976<sup>32</sup> the issue was a right to strike. The Court recognized that right to strike constitutes one of the most important means for trade unions to protect occupational interests of their members. However, the Court was of the opinion that there are also other means for protection of occupational interests and states are free to choose (Para 36).

This conclusion of the Court on a right to strike was challenged in the case of *Unison v The United Kingdom* 2002,<sup>33</sup> which was declared inadmissible. Applicants argued that prohibition of strike affected the very core of the right to organize. For proving the close link between the right to organize and the right to strike the applicant pointed to the reports and conclusions of the ILO and the ESC. The Court did not accept the challenge and repeated its previous case law that the strike action is one of the means and states have wide margin of appreciation in choosing the means. However, interesting is to observe that the Court explicitly reviewed such restriction against principles governing restrictions in Article 11.2. Such a review was taking place in the previous case law only in

relation to core/essential aspects of freedom of association, which the right to strike was not that time.<sup>34</sup>

In the case of *Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v The United Kingdom 2002*<sup>35</sup> the issue was a right to bargaining. The Court again stated that the right to collective bargaining might be one of the means by which trade unions protect the interests of their members, but it is not indispensable for the effective enjoyment of trade union freedoms (Para 44). Important is the fact that in this case the Court takes note of European Social Charter 1961 and the ILO Conventions (Para 48).

### ***Demir and Baykara v. Turkey***

The position of the Court in regard the elements of trade unions freedom to associate remained unchanged until 2008. In *Demir and Baykara v. Turkey 2008*<sup>36</sup> civil servants' trade union started litigation against a local government claiming that the latter did not fulfill certain obligations derived from the collective agreement signed between them.

The Court of Cassation of Turkey noted that the legislation at that time when the trade union was founded did not permit civil servants to form a trade union and bargain collectively. The union never enjoyed a legal personality since its foundation and therefore did not have a capacity to take or defend court proceedings. According to the Audit Court the members of the trade union had to reimburse the additional income they received as a result of defunct collective agreement (Para 26-29).

The Cassation Court explained that even though certain rights and freedoms are mentioned in the Constitution, some of them are not directly applicable and requires the enactment of further legislation. Without such specific legislation these rights (including the freedom to join a trade union and to bargain collectively) could not be exercised. In the view of the Court the trade union could not rely on the ILO Conventions either, while they were not incorporated into domestic law and there was no implementing legislation enacted.

The case was referred to the ECHR. In 2006 the Chamber judgment was delivered where the Court established a violation of Article 11 on account of the domestic courts' refusal to recognize the legal personality of the applicants' trade union and the annulment by those courts of the collective agreement between the trade union and its members' employers. The case was referred to the Grand Chamber which upholds the Chamber judgment.

The Court mentions two guiding principles that mark the evolution of case law as to the substance of the right of association: firstly, the Court takes into account the totality of the measures taken by the state in order to secure freedom of association, subject to its margin of appreciation; and secondly, the Court does not accept restrictions on the essential elements of the freedom of association, without which that freedom would become devoid of substance. This said the Court enumerates already established essential elements of the right of association: the right to form and join a trade union, the prohibition of closed shop agreements (*Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark*, 2006) and the right of a trade union to seek to persuade the employer to hear what it has to say on behalf of its members. The Court makes it clear that the list is not finite. It emphasizes a “living” nature of the Convention and the importance of the development of the international law. (Para 140-146)

The Court makes reference to number of international instruments (ILO Conventions 98 and 151; ESC Article 6.2; EU Charter, Article 28) and also the common practice of the member states that guarantee a right to collective bargaining and right to enter into collective agreement for workers, including those public servants. Based on these developments in the international and national law the Court thinks that its previous case law, where the right to bargain collectively and right to enter into collective agreements was considered to be just means should be reconsidered and these two rights should constitute essential elements of the freedom of association protected under Article 11. The Court pays due regard to the principles of legal certainty and foreseeability not to depart from the precedents, however, the Court is of the opinion that sometimes it is a necessary step in order to embrace reforms and improvements (Para 147-153).

While applying the mentioned principles to the present case, the Court decided that the annulment of the collective agreement constituted interference with the applicants’ trade union freedom (Para 157). According to the Court the refusal to accept the applicants’ right to enjoy the right to bargain collectively and persuade the authority to enter into a collective agreement did not correspond to a “pressing social need” and was not “necessary in a democratic society”. This conclusion was based on several factors: the collective bargaining and the right to enter into collective agreement are recognized by the international instruments which Turkey was party to at that time (ILO Convention 98); there is no evidence that supports that public servants in the present case were belonging to the

category of the public servants (officials whose activities are specific for the administration of the state) in relation to which ILO allows restrictions; omission of the law, caused by the delay of the legislator, cannot be accepted as a justification for the annulment of a collective agreement. Therefore, the Court established a violation of Article 11 on account of the annulment *ex tunc* of the collective agreement entered into by the trade union Tum Bel Sen following collective bargaining with the employing authority. (Para 162-170)

Judge Zagrebelsky wrote a separate opinion. He did not accept the argument of the Court that recognition of the right to collective bargaining as essential element of the freedom of association was caused by “the perceptible evolution in such matters, in both international law and domestic legal systems”. He correctly mentions that the new and recent fact that may be regarded as indicating an evolution internationally is only the proclamation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000.<sup>37</sup> As for the evolution of the domestic legislation the Judge is of the opinion that it is difficult to assess the time and period from which a significant change became perceptible. Therefore, the conclusion of the judge is that

the Court’s departure from precedent represents a correction of its previous case-law rather than an adaptation of case-law to a real change, at European or domestic level, in the legislative framework or in the relevant social and cultural ethos (Para 2).

### ***Commentaries on Demir***

In the article by Ewing and Hendy, the authors offered a detailed analysis of the *Demir and Baykara* judgment. In the view of the authors while interpreting the rights under article 11 the Court abandoned the “original intentions of the drafters” and embraced an idea of a “living document”. According to the authors the Court also considered the other treaties (ILO Conventions, ESC) as living instruments because it has relied not only on the texts of those treaties but also the respective interpretations of the supervisory bodies.<sup>38</sup>

For some scholars with reconciliation of multiple conceptions of the right to collective bargaining the Court in *Demir and Baykara* underlines the convergence of international and European sources. Because of the comparative method it applies the Court also makes it compulsory for the states to comply with the obligations emanating from the ILO standards

and ESC. By writing the *Demir*, the Strasbourg Court explicitly embraces the international context of the right to collective bargaining which is intended to safeguard domestic labor law and social guarantees against economic values and international competition.<sup>39</sup>

In the opinion of Barnard one of the striking features of the *Demir* is the extensive reference made to the international sources, particularly the ILO Conventions and EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in justifying the reversal of its previous case law on the scope of Article 11. She makes comparison with the ECJ rulings in *Viking* and *Laval*, which disregarded international instruments and thinks that ECHR is more open to international sources than ECJ.<sup>40</sup>

Some of the commentators are rather skeptical to this new interpretative approach of the ECHR. Jacobs is writing on the harmonization issue regarding the right to bargain collectively. He is of the opinion that the ECHR should not go further in harmonizing national laws in regard to collective bargaining because these laws have their roots in historical development of collective bargaining (different from one country to another) and are expression of power relations touching upon which will disturb the power balance in the states.<sup>41</sup>

### ***Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey***

One more case that came soon after *Demir and Baykara* and caused much of the disagreement between scholars and commentators was a case of *Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey 2009*.<sup>42</sup> The case concerned a right to strike of civil servants who were banned from taking part in a national one day strike planned by trade unions in order to secure the right to a collective bargaining agreement. The circular prohibiting public sector employee from such action was published by the Prime Minister's Public-Service Staff Directorate. Some of the trade union members still took part in the strike action and received disciplinary sanctions as a result (Para 6-15).

In this case, the Court established a violation of Article 11.1. The Court disapproved the general character of the circular, prohibiting all public servants to take part in the strike action. According to the Court these sanctions are likely to discourage union members and anyone else wishing to participate legitimately in such a day of strike or action to defend the interests of their members (Para 32).

The Court repeated itself that strike action which enables a trade union to be heard constitutes an **important aspect** for the protection of trade union members' interests (*Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden* 1976, §36). However, unlike its previous case law on the right to strike the Court makes reference to the ILO and ESC instruments stating that ILO supervisory bodies recognize the right to strike as an indissociable corollary of the right of trade union association protected under ILO Convention 87 (here the Court makes notice of *Demir and Baykara* which mentions in detail the International Law instruments in this regard). The Court also recalls ESC which recognizes a link between the collective bargaining and the right to strike and considers the right to strike as a mean for ensuring effective exercise of the right to collective bargaining (Para 24).

### ***Commentaries on Enerji***

According to Ewing and Hendy, the fact that the Court referred to the ILO and ESC and recognized strike action as a corollary to the right to bargain collectively (which on its part is recognized as an essential element of freedom of association protected under Article 11, *Demir and Baykara*, §153) strongly suggests that the Court has recognized the right to strike, in so far as it is exercised in furtherance of collective bargaining, as equally essential. The commentators also paid attention to the fact that the Court in this case did not mention that the right to strike was one of the important means and that there are others at the disposal of the states. Instead, by using the ration in *Demir and Baykara*, the Court stated that the government interfered with the applicant's right to strike and only this interference was enough to establish a violation of article 11.1. The authors also made emphasis on the fact that the linkage between the collective bargaining and strike is long recognized in international law and therefore the conclusion of the Court in this case was logical.<sup>43</sup>

Dorsemont shares the view that the Court in *Enerji* implicitly recognized the right to strike as an essential element of the trade union freedom. He finds it unfortunate that the language of the Court in *Enerji* is not the same as in *Demir and Baykara* and right to strike is still formulated as an important mean only, instead of essential. However, he pays attention to the fact that the Court prefers to tackle the justified character of the prohibition under the angle of proportionality. The prohibition of strike was not justified because of its generic character.<sup>44</sup>

In her article published in 2013, Catherine Barnard compares *Enerji* and *Viking* judgments and emphasizes a very important fact: in *Viking* the Court adopted an essentially single-market approach and found strike action unlawful unless justified and proportionate. While in *Enerji* the ECHR adopts a human rights perspective according to which strike action is lawful and any restriction to it must be narrowly construed.<sup>45</sup>

### ***Following Cases***

An interesting judgment delivered by the Grand Chamber in 2013 was case of *Sindicatul "PĂSTORUL CEL BUN" v. Romania, 2013*.<sup>46</sup> The case concerns a refusal of the Romanian authorities to register a trade union formed by priests of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Grand Chamber in this case quashed the Chamber judgment and decided that the refusal of the authorities to register the trade union was a direct consequence of the right of the religious communities to organize their activities in accordance with the provisions of their own statute.

In its assessment the Court made a reference to the ILO Conventions and *Demir and Baykara* only in that part of judgment where it has established that clergy men were involved in the employment relationship and therefore they fall within the scope of Article 11 (Para 142). This way Court established interference in the right of applicants to form trade unions. There was no mention of *Demir and Baykara* and ILO Conventions when the Court was deciding whether such interference was necessary in a democratic society.

One intriguing aspect that this judgment offers is found in the paragraphs where the Court speaks about general principles on the right to form and join the trade union. The Court lists the essential elements of the right to organize: the right to form and join trade unions; the prohibition of closed-shop agreements; the right for a trade union to seek to persuade the employer to hear what it has to say on behalf of its members; and the right to bargain collectively. The Court does not mention the right to strike among the enumerated essential elements. However, noticeable is the fact that the Court refers to this list as "non-exhaustive" (Para 135).

The very recent case concerning the violation of the right to strike was a case of *The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. The United Kingdom 2014*.<sup>47</sup> The case concerned a right to secondary strike action where the applicant was a representative of a very small number of employees in the workplace, organizing striking action among which



would not have any disruptive effect on the work and eventually would not lead to any results. According to the applicant it could better protect the interests of its members if it was allowed to organize a secondary strike action in support of the workers concerned (Para 16). Secondary action is expressly excluded from statutory protection by Section 224 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

For the first time in its jurisprudence the Court recognized that the secondary strike action is a right protected under the article 11.1. The reference was made to *Demir and Baykara*, acknowledging the importance of the established international norms (ILO, ESC) in the interpretation process of the Convention rights (Para 76, 77).

The Court, however, did not establish a violation of article 11.1. The Court distinguished this case from *Demir and Baykara*. Unlike the latter, in this case the core elements of freedom of association (which, according to the Court, can be a primary strike action) were not at stake and therefore state enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation (Para 88).

If the restriction upon the secondary strike action was justified by the fact that it was not core but secondary or accessory aspect of the trade union activity, it follows logically that in case of primary strike action states should enjoy a very narrow margin of appreciation because they deal with the core element of freedom of association.

## Conclusion

From the above discussion, we see that the ECHR has broadened the content of freedom of association. Some of the rights, not considered as essential elements for the realization of trade unions freedom under article 11 before are now considered as such. Interestingly, this development in the ECHR case law started right after the ECJ cases. If *Demir* and *Enerji* are response to the *Viking* and *Laval* or is it just a coincidence is a matter of speculation, which I am not going to discuss here. The fact is that the ECHR has started a new cycle on freedom of association and it is not certain how far it can go.

### ***Comparative Analysis of the ECJ and ECHR Jurisprudence***

The main idea of the Schuman Plan was to create an organization which would mobilize control over the natural resources (steel and coal) of

the member states of this organization and in this way make sure that one state cannot wage a war without others knowing about it. This is how the idea of the European Union emerged. The idea was realized in a number of Treaties which united the certain number of European states and set internal rules. The rules were mainly concerned with deepening general economic cooperation by establishing common market among member states, where goods, persons, services and capital can flow freely without any custom control. The human rights agenda appeared in the Treaties on a relatively later stage. The first EU Treaty that explicitly mentioned human rights was the Maastricht Treaty 1992.

This was not a case with the Council of Europe. From the very beginning the Council was seen as an organization the main purpose of which was to protect human rights.

I believe that this difference between the EU and COE has shaped the approach that the institutions under their structure have developed with time towards human rights. From the very beginning the main challenge for the ECJ was to guarantee proper functioning of the EU law. In the last decades its task became more complicated because now it has to protect human rights as well. The ECHR, on the other hand, was always concerned with human rights protection and only.

Speaking of freedom of association it should be mentioned that the issues related to freedom of association is scattered in the EU among different documents and judgments, including EU Treaties, EU Charter and ECJ jurisprudence. On the opposite, the COE is more systematic in this regard. It is guaranteed by three major articles in the two major human rights instruments (ECHR, ESC). Both instruments are backed by the supervisory institutions (the European Court, the ECSR) which consistently interpret the provisions of the right. This makes it easier to identify the content of the freedom of association and the ways to guarantee it.

The case law of the ECJ regarding the freedom of association takes start in the case of *Bosman*<sup>48</sup> where the Court established that that freedom of association constitutes a general principle of the EU law. In the case of *Albany*<sup>49</sup> the Advocate General upholds the right to form and join trade unions as a core element of freedom of association. The case of *Werhof*<sup>50</sup> offers recognition of a negative right of employees to organize. In the *Viking*<sup>51</sup> case the ECJ explicitly recognized the right to strike as a fundamental right. Finally, the right to bargain collectively and the right to conclude collective agreement were also recognized by the ECJ in the case of *Commission v. Germany*.<sup>52</sup>

On its hand, the ECHR also recognize all the mentioned elements of freedom of association as *inherent in the right to form and join* trade unions guaranteed under article 11. In the case of *Sindicatul* the Court lists the essential elements of the right to organize: the right to form and join trade unions; the prohibition of closed-shop agreements; the right for a trade union to seek to persuade the employer to hear what it has to say on behalf of its members; and the right to bargain collectively. The Court was not very explicit in recognition of the right to strike. However, it is still noticeable that the European Court distanced itself from its previous case law on this matter.

At one glance it seems that the case law of the ECJ and ECHR equally recognize the freedom of workers and employers to associate and that there is no much divergence in their positions. The impression has a valid basis because freedom to associate was step by step recognized by the ECJ. The same was also happening in the ECHR, which in the beginning did not recognize the inherent elements of the freedom of association. Even though the language of the two courts is not exactly the same (the ECHR uses the terms “inherent right”, while the ECJ speaks about general principles of the EU) the content is very similar.

However, as it is well established in the legal scholarship the recognition of the legal norms is one thing and the application of them in practice is another. As we already saw the balancing exercise that the Court had to deal in the *Viking Line* ended up with introduction of the proportionality test, according to which the national courts must first assess if the jobs of the workers were “jeopardized or under serious threat” and only if the answer is positive to assess whether the trade union action “was suitable for ensuring the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective”. This proportionality test was considered to be very strict by legal scholars, putting trade unions in a very difficult situation when strike becomes a last resort.

ECJ references to the ECHR case law is an issue deserving attention. In the beginning the ECJ was using the ECHR jurisprudence in order to justify its approach. In *Viking Line* the reference was made for supporting the idea that some elements of the freedom of association are not recognized as inherent by the ECHR and therefore ECJ has no obligation to take them into account. However, after the ECHR recognized these elements as inherent in the cases of *Demir* and *Enerji* the ECJ did not accept it. In the case of *Commission v. Germany*, the Court makes reference to the *Viking* case and the proportionality test introduced by the Court therein. According

to the Court the exercise of the fundamental right to bargain collectively must be reconciled with the EU freedoms of movement stemming from the EU Treaties. The Federal Republic of Germany was said to violate the EU Directives (92/50 and 2004/18) on freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services in the field of public procurement.

It is very true that freedom of association is not an absolute right and its restriction is allowed by all international and regional instruments. However, the restrictions upon it should be strictly limited and justified on a case by case basis. The proportionality test enacted by the ECJ in the *Viking* does not offer sufficient protection for the freedom of association. The test is very strict and does not leave much room for the maneuver for trade unions.

ECHR on the other hand does not have to deal with the economic issues and the fundamental freedoms of movement of the EU. The task of the ECHR is simpler compare to its counterpart; it is only concerned with human rights protection. Not surprisingly, the approach of the ECHR is more human rights oriented.

There is also a similarity between the courts case law; both of them provide a detailed definition of the rights that constitute elements of the freedom of association. ECHR explicitly refers to the ESC and the ILO and takes note of the definitions they provide. The ECJ also refers to the international instruments, including the ECHR. The language of the ECJ is not as explicit as the language of the ECHR but the fact itself that they refer to the international instruments suggests that they are willing to take their interpretations into consideration.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, it can be said that the EU went for a long journey to establish human rights discourse in its institutions, including and probably most importantly in the ECJ. Human rights gradually became concern of the EU. It took some time before the recognition of the trade union freedoms actually happened. It can be said that human rights, including freedom of association is protected under the EU law and the ECJ jurisprudence. The problem arises when these human rights are in contradiction with the EU's fundamental freedoms of movement. In these cases the ECJ, though trying to introduce balance between these competing freedoms, in fact

abandons human rights approach and focuses more on the interests of the internal market.

The fact that EU Charter has acquired legally binding force did not change the attitude of the ECJ. The last bastion is the EU's accession to the ECHR, provided by article 6.2 TEU. Professor Filip Dorssemount thinks that a shift in the ECJ case law is likely to take place in case of EU accession to the ECHR. In that case the ECHR which puts genuine fundamental workers' rights at the heart of the matter will force EU institutions, including ECJ to abide by the judgments delivered in Strasbourg.<sup>53</sup> Catherine Barnard also thinks that accession will be a significant move in terms of protection of social rights.<sup>54</sup>

Indeed, accession of the EU to the ECHR has a potential to shed light on many aspects regarding human rights, including trade union freedoms. If the Europe becomes more human rights focused, remains to be seen.

## NOTES

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- <sup>2</sup> D. Chalmers, G. Davis, G. Monti, *European Union Law, Cases and Materials*, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 12-13.
- <sup>3</sup> P. Craig and G. de Burca, *EU Law, Text, Cases, And Material*, Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press, p. 583.
- <sup>4</sup> Case 29/69 *Erich Stauder v City of Ulm - Sozialamt* [1969]; Case C-60/00 *Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department*, [2002]; Case C-112/00, *Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich* [2003].
- <sup>5</sup> C-415/93 *Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman* [1995]; § 79-80.
- <sup>6</sup> C-67/96 *Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie* [1999]; Opinion of AG Jacobs: § 139, 158.
- <sup>7</sup> Case C-271/08 *European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany* [2010]; Para. 37.
- <sup>8</sup> Case C-438/05 *International Transport Workers' Federation, Finish Seamen's Union v Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti* [2007].
- <sup>9</sup> In Case C-112/00 *Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich* [2003] the ECJ made a balancing exercise between the free movement of goods on the one hand and the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly on the other hand and reached the conclusion that because of the overriding public interest freedom of expression and the assembly prevail over the EC rules on free movement of goods; Para. 77-94.
- <sup>10</sup> In Case C-36/02 *Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn* [2004] the ECJ had to use a balancing tool between the freedom of provision of services on the one hand and the respect for human dignity as a general principle of EC law on the other. Here the court stated that protection of human dignity ensured by the national constitution can justify restriction on the provision of services; Para. 34-41.
- <sup>11</sup> Case C-67/96 *Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie* [1999].
- <sup>12</sup> In *Albany* the ECJ found that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements between workers and employers organizations and the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements can seriously be undermined if subjected to the rules on competition under article 85(1) EC (now, article 101(1) TFEU).

- 13 Case C-438/05 *International Transport Workers' Federation, Finish Seamen's Union v Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti* [2007], Opinion of AG Maduro.
- 14 C. Barnard, *Viking and Laval: An Introduction* in the Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Volume 10, 2007-2008, Ed. C. Barnard, Hart Publishing, 2008, P. 484.
- 15 C. Barnard, *Viking and Laval: An Introduction* in the Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Volume 10, 2007-2008, Ed. C. Barnard, Hart Publishing, 2008, P. 472, 483.
- 16 A. Dashwood, *Viking and Laval: Issues of Horizontal Direct Effect* in the Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Volume 10, 2007-2008, Ed. C. Barnard, Hart Publishing, 2008, P. 533-534.
- 17 T. Novitz, *A Human Rights Analyses of the Viking and Laval Judgments* in the Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Volume 10, 2007-2008, Ed. C. Barnard, Hart Publishing, 2008, P. 557-559.
- 18 Case C-341/05 *Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets, avd. 1, Byggettan, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet* [2007].
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- 21 Case C-346/06 *Rechtsanwalt Dr. Dirk Rüffert, in his capacity as liquidator of Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co. KG v Land Niedersachsen* [2008]; Para 34.
- 22 Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an employer's obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship.
- 23 Case C-319/06 *Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg* [2008] Opinion of AG Trstenjak, Para 20-32.
- 24 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, ilolex No. 062010GBR087, 2010.
- 25 *A New Strategy for the Single Market at the Service of Europe's Economy and Society, Report to the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso*, by M. Monti, 9 May 2010, p. 70.
- 26 S. Deakin, *The Lisbon Treaty, the Viking and Laval Judgments and the Financial Crisis: In Search of New Foundations for Europe's "Social Market Economy"* in *The Lisbon Treaty and Social Europe*, edited by N. Bruun, K. Lorcher and I. Schoman, Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 29-31.

- 27 Article 11 does not specify the identity of the holder of the rights concerned,  
but mentions “everyone” instead; the objective of the article 11 is also  
structured in general terms: protection of interests.
- 28 *Sigurdur A. Sigurjonsson v. Iceland*, application no. 16130/90, §35, ECHR  
1993.
- 29 F. Dorssemont, *The Right to Form and Join Trade Unions for the protection  
of His Interests under Article 11 ECHR, An Attempt “to Digest” the Case  
Law (1975-2009) of the European Court of Human Rights*, European Labor  
Law Journal, Volume 1 (2010). No. 2, p. 197.
- 30 *National union of Belgian Police v. Belgium*, application no. 4464/70, ECHR,  
1975.
- 31 *Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden*, application no. 5614/72, ECHR,  
1976.
- 32 *Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden*, application no. 5589/72, ECHR, 1976.
- 33 *Unison v. The United Kingdom*, application no. 53574/99, ECHR, 2002.
- 34 F. Dorssemont, *The Right to Form and Join Trade Unions for the protection  
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Law (1975-2009) of the European Court of Human Rights*, European Labor  
Law Journal, Volume 1 (2010). No. 2, p. 227.
- 35 *Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v. The United Kingdom*,  
applications nos. 30668/96, 30671/96, 30678/96, ECHR, 2002.
- 36 *Demir and Baykara v. Turkey*, application no. 34503/97, Grand Chamber,  
ECHR, 2008.
- 37 It’s difficult to disagree with the Italian Judge on this point as the international  
documents on the basis of which the Court derives the conclusions in the  
judgment (ILO Conventions, ESC, ICESCR, ICCPR) date back to 1950’s and  
1960’s.
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Baykara*, Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2010, p. 6-8.
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- 40 C. Barnard, *The Protection of Fundamental Social Rights in Europe after  
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S. Weatherill (eds.) *The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU after  
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European Convention on Human Rights and the Employment Relations*,  
Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 314-315.
- 42 *Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey*, application no. 68959/01, ECHR, 2009.



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- 46 *Sindicatul “PĂSTORUL CEL BUN” v. Romania*, application no. 2330/09, ECHR, 2013.
- 47 *The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. The United Kingdom*, application no. 31045/10, ECHR, 2014.
- 48 C-415/93 *Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman* [1995].
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- 50 C-499/04, *Hans Werhof v Freeway Traffic Systems GmbH & Co. KG* [2006].
- 51 Case C-438/05 *International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti* [2007].
- 52 Case C-271/08 *European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany* [2010].
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