

# New Europe College Yearbook 2011-2012



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# CONTENTS

## **NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION NEW EUROPE COLLEGE**

7

### **DANIEL BRETT**

NORMAL POLITICS IN A NORMAL COUNTRY?  
COMPARING AGRARIAN PARTY ORGANIZATION IN ROMANIA,  
SWEDEN AND POLAND BEFORE 1947

19

### **ȘTEFANIA COSTACHE**

WESTERNIZATION AS TOOL OF INTER-IMPERIAL RIVALRY:  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN WALLACHIA BETWEEN OTTOMAN  
CONTROL AND RUSSIAN PROTECTION (1829-1848)

53

### **ANDREY DEVYATKOV**

CONFIGURATION OF THE  
“BESSARABIAN QUESTION” IN TODAY’S  
ROMANIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

93

### **FLORIAN GASSNER**

GIACOMO CASANOVA:  
LOVE IN THE TIME OF INDIVIDUALITY

119

### **SORIN GOG**

ATHEISM, RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY  
OF RELIGION AND THE ISSUE OF EMERGENT SECULARIZATION  
IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA

143

**ILYA N. KHARIN**  
ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY, SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE  
AND THE JAPANESE CHURCH:  
THE FIRST CENTURY OF A RELATIONSHIP  
181

**HYLARIE OURANIA DELYS KOCHIRAS**  
NEWTON'S QUANDARY ABOUT  
ACTION AT A DISTANCE  
223

**RICCARDO NANINI**  
FROM THE *IDEALTYPUS* TO THE *ARCHÉTYPE*:  
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN GERARDUS VAN DER LEEUW'S  
RELIGIOUS PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY AND  
MIRCEA ELIADE'S MORPHOLOGY?  
257

**BUKOLA ADEYEMI OYENIYI**  
THE POLITICS OF POWER AND RESISTANCE IN YORUBA DRESS  
293

**ZSUZSA PLAINER**  
ON "IDEOLOGICAL VIGILANCE": CONTROLLING DAILY  
NEWSPAPERS IN ORADEA DURING THE FIRST YEARS OF  
CEAUȘESCU'S SYSTEM (1966-1970)  
327

**KATALIN PRAJDA**  
THE BIOGRAPHIES OF PIPPO SCOLARI,  
CALLED LO SPANO  
(19<sup>TH</sup>-21<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES)  
361

**AMY SAMUELSON**  
YOUTH AND ENVIRONMENTALISM IN  
POST-SOCIALIST ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA  
385



# NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

*New Europe College (NEC)* is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997–1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 500 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong

international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

### **Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:**

- ***NEC Fellowships (since 1994)***

Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

- ***Ștefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)***

The fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the Odobleja Fellowships are integrated.

- ***The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (since October 2009)***

This program, supported by the Getty Foundation, started in 2009. It proposes a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming

from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows. As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program also includes a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence is meant to ensure a comparative dimension, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

- ***The Black Sea Link (since October 2010)***

This Fellowship Program, sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung, invites young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of the Black Sea region.

### **Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of New Europe College:**

- ***RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)***

The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach activities involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

- ***The NEC–LINK Program (2003 - 2009)***

Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj–Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

- ***The GE–NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)***

New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10–month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend, and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE–NEC Yearbooks series.

- ***NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)***

In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South–Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at

integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one-month research trip abroad. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

- ***The Britannia-NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)***

This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

- ***The Petre Țuțea Fellowships (2006 – 2008, 2009 - 2010)***

In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government through its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College's community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Țuțea* Program publications.

- ***Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)***

This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*, Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South-Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

- ***Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)***

This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

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Beside the above-described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

**In the past:**

- ***The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)***

Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different

confessions within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

- ***The Septuagint Translation Project (2002 - 2011)***

This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul*. Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

- ***The Excellency Network Germany – South–Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***

The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South–Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

- ***The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research***

*An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources (2006-2008)*

The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for Education and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility, connectedness and exploitation of some of the most

prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the “Constantin Brăiloiu” Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

- ***DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (starting July 2010)
- ***UEFISCCDI–CNCS (PD–Projects): Federalism or Intergovernmentalism? Normative Perspectives on the Democratic Model of the European Union (Dr. Dan LAZEA); The Political Radicalization of the Kantian Idea of Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense (Dr. Áron TELEGDI-CSETRI)***, Timeframe: August 1, 2010 – July 31, 2012 (2 Years)

### **Ongoing projects:**

***The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon*** (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (since December 2009)

***Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances.*** This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled ***Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and***



**eastern Europe**, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (since December 2009)

***Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (starting October 2010)

***The EURIAS Fellowship Programme***, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-sponsored by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar. The College will host the second *EURIAS* Fellow in October 2012.

***UEFISCDI – CNCS (TE – Project): Critical Foundations of Contemporary Cosmopolitanism (Dr. Tamara CĂRĂUȘ)***, Timeframe: October 5, 2011 – October 5, 2014 (3 years)

***UEFISCDI – CNCS (IDEI-Project): Models of Producing and Disseminating Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: The Cartesian Framework (Dr. Vlad ALEXANDRESCU)***,  
Timeframe: January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2014 (3 years)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

***Present Financial Support***

The State Secretariat for Education and Research of Switzerland (Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University of St. Gallen)

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# NORMAL POLITICS IN A NORMAL COUNTRY? COMPARING AGRARIAN PARTY ORGANIZATION IN ROMANIA, SWEDEN AND POLAND BEFORE 1947

## Introduction

In 1917 following the occupation of Bucharest by German forces, the flight of the Romanian government to Iași, and fearing the spread of Bolshevism, King Ferdinand attempted to rally support among the peasantry by offering two promises: land reform and a larger role in political life.<sup>1</sup> In 1918 legislation was passed granting full male suffrage including the peasantry. Romania was, however, not unique among European nations with universal suffrage and land reform programs taking place across Eastern and Western Europe.

Scant attention has been given to the political life of rural society after 1918. What happens when a social group previously excluded from electoral politics is rapidly granted the vote? What does politics look like within the local environment of that social group? How do established and newly emergent organizations operate and institutionalize themselves? What strategies of recruitment, co-option, assimilation and voice are deployed to ensure loyalty among the new voters? Did parties see the peasants as potatoes in a sack of potatoes to be gathered up or were parties interested in granting peasants voice and agency, did such attempts succeed or did they fail in the face of peasant indifference? Furthermore, what did the timing of the party organization have upon the functioning of the party, were parties that were established earlier more or less successful than those parties that established themselves after 1918? With the parties founded before 1918 under narrow electoral franchises what role did the organization structures established play upon the functioning of these parties after the granting of universal suffrage? To

this end this paper will study three examples: *Partidul Național Țărănesc* (PNȚ) (and its precursors) in Romania, *Stronnictwo Ludowe* (SL) in Poland and the *Centerpartiet* (C) in Sweden. Finally, how does the experience of Romania compare with other European states? Is Romania as exceptional as Romanian historiography often claims?

The historiography of interwar Romania is framed through the prism of nationalism/nation building and nationalism studies which is perhaps unsurprising given the use of nationalist discourses by many key political actors.<sup>2</sup> However, this emphasis presents a monochrome view of political life during this period where national/ethnic/identity issues were the only issues under discussion and that all other questions were subordinated to them. I draw on Tara Zahra's call to reclaim Central and East European history and political science from nationalism studies.<sup>3</sup> Party politics in Eastern Europe during this period is widely viewed as embodying 'sham democracy'<sup>4</sup> where elections were rigged and voters bribed with *țuică* and *salami* and hence a 'game' that had no real meaning or importance in the greater scheme of things and is not therefore worthy of study. Irrespective of this, all political movements and organizations endeavored to establish formal institutions within the village. Recently political science has sought to re-appraise interwar politics through the prism of historical democratization studies which has thus far focused primarily upon Western Europe during this period.<sup>5</sup> The literature on party formation, organization, strategy and recruitment within periods of socio-economic transformation and how parties dealt with the expanding franchise is extensive<sup>6</sup> but similarly built upon an examination of West European parties, however, the political division of Europe only occurred after 1947 and so it is not unreasonable to apply the framework devised to explain West European parties in the interwar period to East European parties of the same period.<sup>7</sup>

## Research Problems

A leitmotif in the literature on rural politics is that the material is rather limited.<sup>8</sup> This is especially so in Romania, contemporary accounts and records are few and far between, the reasons for this are threefold, firstly, in 1912 illiteracy in the Romanian lands ranged from 80.6% in Bessarabia to 48.9% in Transylvania,<sup>9</sup> to expect a rich well developed written archive from a group where many of the protagonists were illiterate is unlikely. Contemporary activists who were literate noted that they were not in the



habit of recording discussions on paper.<sup>10</sup> Finally, political suppression after 1937 and repression after 1947 meant that records may well have been destroyed by either actors fearful of material being used against them, or by the security forces themselves.<sup>11</sup> The record that does survive is fragmentary and partial; to this extent it provides snapshots into some political activity in the villages in the interwar period. Hopefully, as the archives are explored in more detail and more material is discovered the picture will become fuller. As a result these limitations the secondary literature has tended to focus upon elite rather than grassroots activity.

With the limited sources of evidence from villages and handling this material we take our lead from Clifford Geertz who noted when describing villages in Bali:

Villages are peculiar, complicated, and extraordinarily diverse. There is no simple uniformity [...] to be found over the whole of the small, crowded countryside, no straightforward form of village organization easily pictured in terms of single typological construction, no "average" village, a description of which may well stand for the whole. Rather, there is a set of marvellously complex [...] systems, no one of which is quite like any other, no one of which fails to show some marked peculiarity of form. [...] Yet all these small-scale systems are clearly of a family. They represent variations, however intricate, on a common set of organizational themes, so that what is constant in Balinese village structure is the set of components out of which it is constructed, not the structure itself.<sup>12</sup>

Thus the case studies are representative in and of themselves but at a broader level indicative of villages in their diversity.

## Theoretical Framework

1918-30 represents a period of critical juncture in the development of political life across Europe. The Unification of Romania on the 1<sup>st</sup> December 1918 joined the old Kingdom of Romania (Moldavia and Wallachia which had been independent since 1859 and Dobrogea after 1878) with the former Austrian area of Bukovina, the Hungarian provinces of Transylvania and the Banat, and Bessarabia which had been under Russian control. *România Mare* had to develop a system of government, political organization and administration out of three different political and administrative cultures and systems (Russian, Habsburg and Ottoman).

There were two further measures which profoundly altered the social, economic and political life of the Romanian state. The first was the promise of a greater political voice for the peasantry through the expansion of the franchise. Although the franchise had been limited in the Regat and the Hungarian parts of Austria-Hungary, in Bukovina universal male suffrage in elections to the Austrian Diet had existed since 1905. The peasantry as the largest social group in Romania was expected to become the most politically important. In response a new parties sprang up seeking to claim this electorate as their own. Established parties which had purported to represent the peasantry now had to actually deal with an electorate who had a political voice, as did parties which had previously ignored the peasantry.

The second related change was the promise of extensive land reform to expropriate the Great Estates and to redistribute the land to the previously landless or dwarf-holding peasants. The intention of this policy was to grant the peasants enough land to allow them to produce a surplus of production which could then be sold either internally or externally. This would (in theory) improve the economic conditions of the peasantry, while supplying the new cities and towns of Romania with food, or the Romanian state with export revenue, both of which could then be invested in modernizing Romania.<sup>13</sup> Thus there was a major re-orientation of economic power within the Romanian state. The Great Landlords who had dominated political life in the Regat and Austria-Hungary were economically (but not necessarily politically) weakened. It was expected the peasantry who made up 72.3% of the population<sup>14</sup> would become the economically dominant class. As a result there was an incentive to either represent or capture their votes. Political organizations had significant choices to make in interacting with a social group that had previously had no economic or political power but who was now potentially poised to play a key role in the future of the newly unified state.

The choices made and implications of these decisions can be best explained by reference to theories of path dependency which argues that once an institution or state starts on a given path the choices available to it later are constrained by the decisions made at earlier moments of critical juncture. The reasons why choices are limited are explained by Margaret Levi,

Once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments

of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice. [...] From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other – and essential if the chosen branch dies – the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow.<sup>15</sup>

Paul Pierson argues the idea of material returns. Once a party or state starts to follow one path, the choices made available and the ability to change paths are limited because of the costs of reversal.<sup>16</sup> Critical juncture represent moments where opportunities arise for actors to make choices. These choices do not take place on a blank canvas but instead are structured by decisions made earlier. The ‘locking in’ process that results from decisions made during moments of critical juncture can serve as causal explanations of broader political outcomes.

A crucial point of analysis therefore has to be the foundation period. Angelo Panebianco’s analysis of the development of party organization in Western Europe emphasizes that the:

fundamental intuition of classical sociology, in particular Weberian, concerning the importance of the founding moment of institutions. The way in which the cards are dealt out and the outcomes of the different rounds played out in the formative phase of an organization, continue in many ways to condition the life of an organization even decades afterwards. [...] The crucial political choices made by its founding fathers, the first struggles for organizational control, and the way in which the organization was formed, will leave an indelible mark. Few aspects of an organization’s functioning and current tensions appear comprehensible if not traced to its formative phase.<sup>17</sup>

Panebianco chooses not to consider any of the parties of Eastern Europe. I apply the basic conceptual framework (in terms of the subject of investigation, and the centrality of founding moments and party organization) to Agrarian parties across Europe.

## **Theorizing Party Organization**

The analytical framework draws upon classical West European party literature. The parties analyzed by in the initial studies are contemporary to those discussed in this paper. The same processes of socio-economic

transformation and the expansion of the franchise were common to Eastern and Western Europe. Does the theory fit in Eastern Europe and what is the role of organizational reform? In Western Europe parties that organizationally reformed were better able to respond to the changing political, economic and social environment. Why are some parties able to reform while others cannot?

Maurice Duverger's analysis into the organizational structure of parties argues that different electoral conditions produce different forms of party organization. The structure of institutions within the party influences the way in which the party operates and behaves in its interactions with the wider political world. He offers a typology of different forms of party organization. For this study the main distinction we are looking at is between a cadre party with its caucus organization, and a mass party with its branch organization.<sup>18</sup>

A cadre party is associated with parties operating within a limited electoral franchise where there are relatively few voters and gaining power is dependent upon obtaining the votes of key individuals. The organizational structure and strategy is designed to maximise the potential to do this. A mass party, in contrast, is associated with an expanded electoral franchise where number of voters and maximising turnout is the main objective of the party. Duverger notes that:

this distinction between cadre and mass parties is not based on their dimensions, upon the number of their members: the difference involved is not one of size but of structure.<sup>19</sup>

The organization of a cadre party consists of:

[...] grouping of notabilities for the preparation of elections, conducting campaigns and maintaining contact with the candidates. Influential persons, in the first place, whose name, prestige, or connections can provide a backing for the candidate and secure him votes; experts, in the second place, who know how to handle the electors and how to organize and campaign; last of all financiers who can bring the sinews of war. Quality is the most important factor: extent of prestige, skill in technique, size of fortune.<sup>20</sup>

This can be contrasted with the mass party where the recruiting of members is a fundamental activity, both politically and financially. The

central objective of the mass party is the political education of the class it is representing to enable it to develop an elite capable of governing and administering the country. The members are 'the very substance of the party.'<sup>21</sup> The second objective is financial; the branch organization and mass membership enables the party to collect subscriptions from the members, this then enables the party to fund its daily activity and its education and election campaigns.

In terms of central control over cadre parties and their caucus organization are decentralized and weakly knit, while mass parties with their branch type of organization and are much more centralized and closely knit.<sup>22</sup> Duverger notes:

This distinction, though clear in theory, is not always easy to make in practice. [...] cadre parties sometimes admit ordinary members in imitation of mass parties. In fact, this practice is fairly widespread: there are few purely cadre parties. The others are not in practice far removed from them, but their outward form is likely to mislead the observer who must look beyond the official clauses laid down in the constitution or the declarations of the leaders. The absence of any system of registration of members or of any regular collection of subscriptions is a fairly reliable criterion; no true membership is conceivable in their absence.<sup>23</sup>

The next step is to explain the development and evolution of party organizations, drawing on Panebianco and emphasizing the importance of founding periods. This is when the basic organization structures of the party are laid out as well as the distribution of power and mechanisms for domination and legitimacy. It is, moreover, at this point that institutionalization takes place. Institutionalization is:

the consolidation of the organization, the passage from an initial, structurally fluid phase, when the new-born organization is still forming, to a phase in which the organization stabilizes, develops stable survival interests and just as stable organizational loyalties. Institutionalization is the process which marks this transition from one phase to the other.<sup>24</sup>

The degree of institutionalization depends upon the combination of organizational factors in the first phase. This shapes the degree of institutionalization, some parties become strong institutions, others hardly institutionalize at all, and the *forms* of this institutionalization.<sup>25</sup>

Some of parties active immediately after the First World War had already institutionalized themselves and their recruitment strategies, while others were still 'soft' and institutionalizing or had yet to start the process. Thus we have a range of parties dealing with a moment of critical juncture as the franchise expanded and choosing their organizational and recruitment/membership strategies. What is important for our analysis is the implications of institutionalization in a transitional society. The party 'freezes' once institutionalised and further reform becomes harder. The form of party organization institutionalized may become problematic for the party if it is designed for the old forms and style of politics and fails to keep in step with social and political changes within society.

However, this idea of non-reform does not fit with the traditional image of a political party as a goal orientated rational movement that seeks office in order to achieve its goals. Panebianco responds that this misunderstands the nature of a political party. He argues that we can look at parties as just 'organizations'. Organizations have their own lives, power dynamics and actors have their own internal interests. These may not necessarily intersect with the expressed interests of the party.

Actors may subvert the party organization to further or to defend their personal interests and positions within the party. This has implications for non-reform. Actors may resist organizational changes to the party in order to protect their position and power within it.<sup>26</sup>

## **Developing Duverger and Panebianco**

Anu-Mai Kõll,<sup>27</sup> using the Baltic Agrarians as examples argues that the type of party that emerges depends on the ethno-class configuration during the foundation period. Where the dominant class is a different ethnicity to the peasantry then the party uses nationalist discourses to mobilise voters. Where the dominant class is the same ethnicity as the peasantry then the party mobilises around a class discourse. This potentially provides us with an insight into the types of mobilizing discourses deployed and whether this typology applies to the Romania, Polish and Swedish cases.

## Methodology: Asymmetrical Comparison

As a result of the gaps within the secondary literature and the difficulties in finding documentary evidence to fill those gaps, this paper uses asymmetrical comparison, with the Romanian case constituting the primary focus of research and analysis, and Poland and Sweden acting as control cases. As a methodological basis is needed<sup>28</sup> for thus restricting the scope of comparison, I shall account for this particular choice.

The question may be posed as to why in the face of so many difficulties associated with locating the primary material for an analysis of PNȚ, I nevertheless decided to dwell on the Romanian Agrarian movement. To echo the theory of path-dependency once I had started investigating the Romanian case, the material costs were too great to abandon my investigation half-finished and start an investigation of the Polish or Swedish case, with no guarantee that I would not find myself in the same position. Although the Romanian case is foregrounded as a result of the research process, I seek to avoid the issue of exceptionalism and so compare as control cases with Poland and Sweden.

Jürgen Kocka notes there are inevitable downsides to using this type of comparison: the instrumentalizing of comparison, by favouring of one case study over another. However, even in its asymmetric form, comparison can lead to 'questions that cannot otherwise be posed and to answers that cannot otherwise be given'.<sup>29</sup> Asymmetric comparison works as a self-correcting device by motivating further empirical research.<sup>30</sup> It combines comparison and case study, which, 'can well be mutually reinforcing and complementary undertakings'.<sup>31</sup>

Kocka lists several functions of the asymmetrical comparative method: heuristic, analytical, and 'deprovincializing' (*Verfremdung*).<sup>32</sup> My use of asymmetrical comparison covers these three but adds a fourth: the compensatory, ancillary function. The Swedish and Polish cases provide cognate cases on the basis of which analogies can be drawn and extrapolations can be made in order to compensate for bibliographical and archival gaps regarding Romanian Agrarianism.

The use of comparison avoids the potential danger of omitting concomitant variables, which may not have been recognized due to gaps within the literature. In analytical terms, the comparison will be used to highlight potential causal variables, by pointing out both similarities and differences between the two cases. In the case of differences, this will be used to generate potential hypotheses explaining divergences between the cases.

## **Agrarianism in Romania: From Foundation to Unification: Agrarianism in Three Regions 1869-1926.**

An analysis of party politics in Romania has to adopt a regional focus because prior to 1918 parties developed in response to local conditions. What was to become Greater Romania was divided between Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Kingdom of Romania and party politics developed along these regional lines. The parties of Austria-Hungary sending representatives to the Vienna or Budapest diets, those in Bessarabia operated under the specific conditions of late Tsarist Russia, and in the Regat new parties emerged under difficult conditions. In each case the local political, social and economic conditions shaped the new parties. Therefore I will provide an overview of organizational development treating the three separately to compare and contrast the respective foundation periods. This helps to explain the dynamics and internal divisions of PNȚ after the fusion of 1926 between *Partidul Național Român* (PNR) from the former Habsburg lands, and *Partidul Țărănesc* (PȚ) from the Regat.

### **Rural Politics in Austria-Hungary before 1918**

PNR was formed in 1881 when *Partidul Național al Românilor din Transilvania* and *Partidul Național al Românilor din Banat și Ungaria* merged. Both had been formed in 1869 following the *Ausgleich* in 1867. It opposed Hungarian centralization and was principally a national movement dominated by the clerical and lay elite. The Romanian elite, because of the ethno-class structure of Transylvania, was relatively small which facilitated the extensive use of personal and familial networks as a way of holding the movement together. The Hungarian Electoral Law of 1874 granted franchise to a small percentage of the total population of Hungary on a complex basis of property, taxation, and ancient rights.<sup>33</sup> This meant that the ethnic electoral franchise was itself largely limited to the members of the Romanian elite. PNR meets Duverger's criteria of a cadre party in terms of recruitment and organization. The early foundation meant that the organizational structures had become institutionalized by 1926 when the merger with PȚ took place.

From this over-view a number of points emerge. The ethno-class dynamics outlined by Köll are reflected in the discourses deployed by the party. The Hungarian domination meant that the use of nation rather than



class as a mobilisation device. Although the majority of the Romanian population were peasants the party had limited to no interest in class issues. It did not have strong competition from Socialists or other movements that sought to 'capture' the support of the Romanian peasantry. PNR policies conflated the national and social based on the assumption that securing improved political rights would, at the same time, improve the condition of the peasantry. PNR tended to explain the plight of the Romanian peasantry not as a consequence of economic and social conditions but rather as the result of a specific political configuration created by Hungarian domination. They believed that large landholdings should be broken up, the land redistributed amongst the peasants and peasants should be moved from over-populated to under-populated areas. However, they opposed the implementation of the policy believing that the Hungarian government was using it to promote Magyarization rather than economic and social development.<sup>34</sup> The inability of the PNR elite to represent the peasantry was a reoccurring theme in criticism of the party.

### **Agrarianism in the Regat and Bessarabia**

There several differences between Regat and Bessarabia and Austria-Hungary. Following the failure of the 'Going to the People' campaign by the Narodniks in 1874-5 many activists fled to the Regat including Constantin Stere. These activists would form and influence the nascent Agrarian movement. One of the legacies of Russian rule for the Romanian and Polish movements was that the repressiveness of the regime served to radicalize and revolutionize the movements.<sup>35</sup> While there was early activism, the formal establishment of *Partidul Țărănesc* (PȚ) did not occur until after 1918. This is late in contrast to other movements in the region such as the Bulgarian Agrarian Union (BANU). Earlier attempts at establishing a party had been undermined by the Liberal and Conservative elite. Constantin Dobrescu-Argeș,<sup>36</sup> militated for the representation of the peasantry in parliament and the establishment of peasant committees.<sup>37</sup> He established *Partida Țărănească* in 1895 as the first Agrarian party in Romania. Dobrescu-Argeș, similar to his Polish contemporary Bolesław Wysłouch, sought to improve the cultural life of the peasantry. This early attempt was suppressed by the Liberals in 1899.<sup>38</sup> A second attempt in 1906 was suppressed after the 1907 Peasant Uprising. Although Dobrescu-Argeș retired from politics after his harassment and arrest in

1898, continuity was maintained by the active involvement of many former members in PȚ.

### **The Peasant Uprising of 1907**

The 1907 Peasant Uprising had profound implications for Agrarianism in Romania. Unlike 1905 in Russia, 1907 was an uprising rather than a revolution, the origins of which were economic and social rather than political. Although unprecedented in scale, the 1907 uprising was not, however, substantially different in its causality from previous uprisings which had plagued the Old Kingdom during the 19<sup>th</sup> century (the 1888 peasant uprisings, for instance). It began as a localized dispute over agricultural contracts that the peasants were due to sign with the local *arendăși* and quickly spread. The revolt was eventually crushed after bringing down the Conservative government of Gheorghe Grigore Cantacuzino, which was replaced by the Liberal government of Dimitrie Sturdza. There are three points to be made about the uprising. Firstly, it was not political in character, nor did it stem from political agitation and, as such, did not spawn a revolutionary movement. Secondly, the result of the uprising and its suppression was to bring the situation of the peasantry into public and political consciousness and spark off intellectual debates. The third point is that, paradoxically, what did not spring from the uprising and the debate about the plight of the peasantry was a coherent political movement seeking to represent the peasantry.

### **Formation of PȚ 1918-1926**

*Partidul Țărănesc* came into being after 1918 and built upon the earlier work of *Partida Țărănească*. Ion Mihalache had started efforts in 1913 but had been interrupted by the start of the First World War.<sup>39</sup> The new party developed and grew through a series of mergers with smaller regional groups. In July 1921 the party merged with the *Partidul Țărănesc din Basarabia* of Constantin Stere and Pantelimon Halippa. This strengthened the radical and left wing tendencies of the party. This was followed by fusions with Agrarian groups from Bukovina (June 1922), Transylvania (October 1922) and *Partidul Socialist-Țărănesc* (Sept 1922).<sup>40</sup> The party did not have a single internal core but instead a number of cores that orientated

themselves around particular individuals namely Stere, Nicolae Lupu and Mihalache. This gave the party an inherent instability and imbued it with strongly centrifugal tendencies. The newly emerged political entity would embark on an ongoing, and never quite successful, quest for legitimation and political strategy.<sup>41</sup>

Three points emerge, although the party did not formally establish itself, the continuity of activists and their personal connections within the parties reflects the cadre form of party organization. Institutionalization is about practice rather than formal or official statutes. Secondly Köll's argument about ethno-class dynamics also appear to fit. In the Regat the dominant class was ethnically Romanian and so the Agrarians used class discourses to mobilize support. Finally, the repressive atmosphere, and the influence of the Narodniks resulted in a movement that was more socially radical than their Transylvanian colleagues.

### **After 1926 National, Intermediary and Local Level**

This paper has thus far addressed the foundation period. In 1926, PNR and PTJ merged to form PNȚ. Iuliu Maniu of PNR became leader, while Ion Mihalache of PTJ acted as his deputy. PNR and PTJ merge in 1926. Writers such as Hugh Seton-Watson argue PNR would have been better suited to merging with the Liberals.<sup>42</sup> This was because the Liberals and PNR were both formed from the same social strata of the new Romanian urban middle class who were socially and economically conservative but also nationalist. However, PNR with its powerbase in Transylvania and the Banat could not reconcile itself with the centralizing tendencies of the Liberals. In a Cadre organization where members need to be rewarded for their services, the centralization of power would have resulted in fewer material rewards to be distributed within Transylvania to members of the caucus. The merger can be viewed as a marriage of convenience. Due to its late foundation PTJ lacked experienced parliamentarians and administrators gained by merging with it gain access to a well-developed cadre party organization. PNR by merging with PTJ was able to transcend its narrow regional base in the former Habsburg lands and tap into the mass of peasant voters who aligned or were thought to themselves with PTJ. There were thus material political benefits for both organizations.

There were inevitable consequences from the merger. The new party was dominated by the Transylvanian wing. Their conservatism was

blamed for the inability of PNȚ to get to grips with the problems of running a party in post-unification Romania.

A second unusual feature emerged from the merger which reflected the ideological and organizational problems facing the new party. In some areas there were already existing PNR, PȚ and former Partidul Conservator (PC)<sup>43</sup> organizations at the time of the merger. At the local level there were pre-existing tensions between the Agrarians, the Nationalists and the Conservatives both ideological and personal. Former local enemies were now supposed to unite within PNȚ. There was unwillingness by the local leaderships to cede any power and this presented a problem for the new party in terms of its organization. The solution at the level of the town and village was to maintain parallel organizations within the party, one for the nationalists and one for the Agrarians. At the local level there were two presidents appointed – one honorary and the other ‘actual’, as a compromise to satisfy all camps. This situation existed in Argeș, Iași, Muscel, Buzău<sup>44</sup> and elsewhere.<sup>45</sup> This reflects the haphazard way in which the new PNȚ party structures, rather than being developed from the ground up, were in fact built upon the old party organization of PNR, PC and PȚ. The structures that emerged after 1926 were designed to keep the local elite who already held power in power, rather to reform.

The party is very unstable experiencing mass defections on several occasions. The table below, while not exhaustive, shows the loss of high-ranking and important members of the PNR/PNȚ from 1920 onwards.

**Table 2: Defections and Splits within the PNR/PȚ/PNȚ leadership 1920-1946**

Name	Date Left PNR/PȚ/PNȚ	Position within PNR/PNȚ Political Leaning	Reason/Where to
Octavian Goga	1920	Poet and Future Prime Minister (during the Carolist period) Right-Wing Nationalist	Joined Partidul Poporului
Nicolae Iorga	1926	Historian and Future Prime Minister Right-Wing Nationalist	Never joined – refused to support fusion between PNR and PȚ

# DANIEL BRETT

Alexandru Vaida-Voevod	1935	Former Prime Minister Right Wing Nationalist	To establish his own party – Frontul Românesc (FR)
Emil Hațieganu	1935	Influential regional politician in Cluj. Former Labour Minister.	Joined FR – later rejoined PNȚ
Mihail Șerban	1935	Former Agriculture Minister	Joined FR – later joined FRN. Did not rejoin PNȚ
Demetru I. Dobrescu	1935	Mayor of Bucharest. Left Wing	Established his own party.
Armand Călinescu	1938	Former Deputy Interior Minister Member of the PNȚ Study Circle Left-Wing	Became Prime Minister in the FRN government until murdered by the Iron Guard in September 1939
Ernest Ene	1938	Left-Wing Student leader and influential in the Youth Wing of the Party. Member of the PNȚ Study Circle	Left to join FRN
Constantin Rădulescu-Motru	1938	Head of the Romanian Academy Member of the PNȚ Study Circle Centre-Left	Left to join FRN
Nicolae Lupu	1927	Radical Poporanist Left	Left to establish own party. Rejoined in 1933
Nicolae Lupu	1946		Left to establish Partidul Țărănesc-Democrat – a front party allied with the Communists

The table also demonstrates that, far from being one single break, it was rather a continuous process. Ion Hudiță, Maniu's private secretary, suggests that both Virgil Madgearu and Mihalache were at one time seriously considering abandoning PNȚ in favour of the FRN, which indicates the appeal of power even to some of the most loyal members of PNȚ as well as their disenchantment with the direction of PNȚ under Maniu in 1938.<sup>46</sup>

In terms of policy and political approach the party remained an ethnic 'Romanian' party and did not make any attempt to become a pan-ethnic 'peasant party'. Nor did it shift its policy positions to reflect growing social radicalism from the younger generation after 1929. The question then becomes why? At what point are younger peasants losing their agentive power within the party organization, and does organizational analysis explain reasons why this might occur?

We have thus far dealt with macro level politics and the wider historical development of the party at the national level. To get a sense of the wider party it is necessary to look at the micro level of the village and the intermediary level of the party administration. The latter played a crucial role as interlocutors between the represented and their representatives. The grassroots had to go through this level of administration in order to communicate their views to the leadership, and the leadership had to rely upon these mid-level actors to disseminate their message to the local level, to mobilize and organize local activists.

The material for this analysis is drawn from the Mihai Șerban archive. Șerban's political trajectory reflects the administrative instability highlighted earlier. He began his career in PNR, he joined PNȚ with the merger. In 1935 he defected with his godfather Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, to Vaida-Voevod's quasi-Fascist *Frontul Romanesc*. Finally with the creation of the Royal dictatorship 1938, he followed Vaida-Voevod in joining Carol II's *Frontul Renașterii Naționale*. With each move his position within the parties increased. His defections seems to have not been driven by ideology but rather by a personal loyalty to his godfather, and careerism.<sup>47</sup>

By virtue of his role in PNȚ party administration in the Cluj area, the archive provides a reach source of internal party correspondence. From this we gain a snap shot of life within PNȚ. The archive portrays a party which is run on an informal ad-hoc basis in line with Duverger's characterisation of a cadre party. Communications between local party organizations and the regional administration are poor, leading to fragmentation. This results

in confusion within the party administration. The lack of organization is highlighted in a series of cross-country *Siguranță* reports on PNȚ from 1946:

Radiogram deciphered by the **Oradea** centre, 25 October 1946

[...]

10. The school youth are in their majority with P.N.Ț. they do propaganda on a person-to-person basis organized at district level. //

**Constanța**

7 November 1946

[...]

The youth from 'historical' parties do propaganda in the villages, without being organized in teams, only one by one and on their own initiative (*pe cont propriu*), also bringing electoral leaflets.- //

Oil centre

Note

The situation of the political parties in **Moreni**

[...]

The National Peasant Party – Maniu wing: They continue to have the same weak influence as before, they don't gather at the organization headquarters and they don't do propaganda.-

The interaction between its members is made on a person-to-person basis.<sup>48</sup>

Mirroring the national level the intermediary level is also subject to splits and mass defections by whole branches of the organization. This is best illustrated by the case in 1920 when the whole of the Făgăraș PNR party defected to Averescu's Party, the incident being recorded in a message to PNR in Cluj thus:

Făgăraș county

Almost all the members of the county committee of the National Party together with other notables have crossed over to the Averescu Party. We cannot be sure even of the president of the committee, Mr Mateiu Ziga, as he did not attend the Congress although he had promised to do so.

Consequently, I the undersigned will see to it that the voters in the County are summoned to a meeting where we will regroup, make decisions as to the organization of the party in the county, put together the list of candidates and plan the electoral battle.

A Iulia 25 IV 920

Iacob Popa<sup>49</sup>

The party relies on personalised networks to function. From Şerban's correspondence both professional and personal it is clear that very many members of the party are related to one another, either directly, or through marriage. Extensive use is made of baptismal relations as a means of linking actors together within a reciprocal relationship. Şerban was godfather to a number of people who would write to him asking him to intercede on their behalf with the Romanian state. In turn they remained political loyal to him. Şerban's relationship with Vaida-Voevod mirrors this. He wrote on several occasions asking Vaida-Voevod to intercede on his behalf, and in return he remained loyal to Vaida-Voevod throughout his political career. Similarly the editors of the main party newspaper in Transylvania were the nephews of Maniu which ensured the loyalty of the paper to Maniu at all times. In the absence of a unifying party ideology, personal relations seem to act at this level as the glue that holds the party together and enables it to function. It is clear that such a system rewards those already in PNȚ. Loyalty to your patron can ensure protection and promotion, in turn by providing protection and rewards to your clients, an actor can ensure through material rewards the loyalty of subordinate actors. Any attempt at organizing the party differently would have certainly have run into resistance as reform would have meant the erosion of these networks and in turn the foundation upon which the power of many within the party administration rested.

The party at this intermediary level reflects a cadre party organization within Transylvania that has become institutionalized by the interwar period. The usage of familial networks allows the party to function, however, the deep personal ties between actors mean that when leading figures defect they often take with them their political dependents. The lack of any ideological glue rendered the party unstable and volatile making it vulnerable to those who wished to undermine the party.

### **Politics in the Village: The Banat and Bessarabia**

Having so far seen an upper and intermediate party organization that reflects a cadre organization which seems to be institutionalized and entrenched we now move to the grassroots level. Here, formal party organization was relatively new. As noted, with the exception of Bukovina, the peasant masses had been excluded from electoral politics before 1918. Thus institutionally, there existed a *tabula rasa* upon which



the parties could build. We might expect to see the characteristics of mass parties primarily branch organizations seeking to involve as many people as possible. While electoral politics was new; politics, hierarchy and power within the village had always existed. However, these were being challenged by the structural changes in rural society outlined earlier. Land reform had resulted in peasants gaining land and thus increased economic differentiation within the village, educational modernization had increased literacy reducing the dependence of illiterate peasants upon the literate within the village in their interactions with the state, and the experience of military mobilisation during the First World War had broken the rigid structures of the village for younger peasants.

Reports of local party activity in the countryside are rare. Two collections have been located and will form the core of this analysis. The first is from the village of Berliște in the Banat.<sup>50</sup> The second are reports from the Județ of Tighina and Soroca in Bessarabia.<sup>51</sup> The reports reveal some important regional differences but also similarities. Despite having the lowest levels of literacy in Romania the Bessarabian reports are more detailed and complete than those from the Banat. Although the local party has some features of a mass party as outlined by Duverger, in particular the interest in recruiting large numbers of people into the party, the party still functions as a cadre organization, with limited activity between elections, or political crises. In Berliște the party leadership is dominated by the village elite.

Unlike the party leadership which made no attempts in the press or party literature to reach out to non-Romanians the party in Bessarabia welcomed and recruited ethnic Russians, Jews and women.<sup>52</sup> In Berliște the party remains both ethnically Romanian and male. In Tighina PNT kept membership lists in both Romanian and Russian. These decisions appear to have been made locally.

At the local level, the primary interest of the party remains local power and in particular control of the social space. Throughout the 21 year period covered by the Berliște notes, the dominant concern is the party fanfară. As Jan Słomka explains, the importance of the fanfare was that it would play at every public event in the village.<sup>53</sup> Controlling the fanfare enabled the party to control public space within the village. In addition it was an important symbol of prestige and hence recruitment. In Berliște and Bessarabia, local activists note the importance of having prestige auxiliary organizations attached to the local party to recruit members.

The requests for intercession that appear in the Șerban archive, also appear in the Berliște reports. The party in Berliște is involved in a dispute with the local mayor and the notary both of whom belong to the Liberals. The party writes to the local MP and asks him to intercede on the behalf of the party leader who claims he is being persecuted by the mayor and notary.<sup>54</sup>

In both the Banat and Bessarabia we get a sense of dissatisfaction from younger peasants with the direction of the party. In Soroca, the youth wing of the party write an extensive memo condemning the Maniu-Codreanu of 1937.<sup>55</sup> They argue eloquently that Maniu cannot defend democracy by aligning with an opponent of democracy and that the Guard represent as much of a threat to democracy as Carol II. In Berliște we do not have explicit reports as to what the younger peasants were demanding, but we know that the intermediary level party was concerned enough to instruct the local party not to give radical young peasants prominent positions within the party or during election campaigns but instead to adopt a conservative approach.

What follows here is a brief comparison between the Romanian lands with Sweden and the Polish lands.

## **Poland**

In Poland the earliest attempts at organizing the peasants begins among exiles after the failure of the 1831 uprising. This early start was also reflected within the Polish lands. The most profound influence upon Polish Agrarianism in Galicia was the relatively benign Habsburg administrative and governmental system. Although the electoral system for the Sejm was flawed and structured against the peasants, it did allow some peasant political representation. Politics in Galicia was largely a Polish affair with the Polish conservative landlords seeking to protect their political and economic status. Thus it was class politics which dominated the debates within the region, unlike the nationality politics which dominated in Transylvania.

A second difference stemmed from higher levels of socio-economic development within the Polish lands of the Habsburg Monarchy compared to Transylvania. As a result there was more industrialization and urbanization. Stemming from this the Social Democratic movement in Galicia was very much stronger and provided electoral competition for

the Polish Agrarians. The Social Democrats sought to appeal to peasants, in this way directly competing with the Agrarians for support. The SL, unlike PNR, could not 'take for granted' the support of the peasantry.

There was a three-stage evolution<sup>56</sup> in the types of people who led the SL. The first stage is embodied by Wysłouch and other leaders from the elite. As their influence waned, they were replaced by the second generation led by Jakub Bojko. Unlike the first wave of Agrarian leaders, Bojko was a peasant whose parents had fled the Congress Kingdom to escape serfdom. He considered himself inferior to the gentry and had no desire to upset the social order. His radicalism was a reaction against reactionary landlords.<sup>57</sup> He cannot be considered to represent a change in approach from Wysłouch. However, he can be seen as representing a bridge from the non-radical elite leaders of the first generation to the more radical peasant leaders of the third generation. This third generation was represented by Wincenty Witos, who was also a peasant but, unlike Bojko, radical in his opinions.<sup>58</sup> In order to make these changes SL however, underwent a period of internecine fighting before the First World War which resulted in the party splitting. What emerged from these splits was a party that was more radical than before and that had a peasant rather than intellectual leadership.

### **Polish Agrarianism in the German and Russian Partitions**

The political, economic and cultural situation of the Polish peasants was radically different in the Prussian and Russian partitions of Poland. For this reason Agrarian politics in the two regions was orientated and structured differently to the developing Agrarian politics in Galicia.

In the Prussian (later German) partition of Poland the structure of society differed from Galicia. Serfdom had been abolished gradually by 1848, earlier than in the other Polish lands. Agriculturally the region was far more advanced than elsewhere in the Poland and as a result a different social structure emerged. Land reform had created very prosperous big farms but also a large rural proletariat.<sup>59</sup> Although the region was ethnically mixed between Germans and Poles it was not until the *Kulturkampf* of 1871 that any attempt at Germanization was made. Until that point the dominant political discourses did not revolve around the ethnic cleavage. Instead peasant activity took the form of economic associations which sought to strengthen the economic position of Polish peasants and

farmers. The *Kulturkampf* triggered the addition of a political dimension to Agrarian politics. It targeted peasants and wealthier land owning Poles. Nationalist German groups such as the H.K.T (Hansenann, Kennemann and Tiedemann) sought to strengthen the German rural middle class by buying up land in the province; it was this that posed the greatest threat to the economic position of the Poles. The efforts of the Polish economic associations were thus aimed at trying to defend Polish land holdings within the region rather than developing the political and economic situation of Polish peasants.<sup>60</sup>

National and social movements were subject to severe political repression in Russian Poland. This was especially harsh following the failed uprisings of 1848 and 1863. Paradoxically, the peasants benefited from the failure of the uprisings. These had been led by the Polish gentry and the abolition of serfdom which followed in 1868 was designed to weaken the power of the gentry. The repressiveness of the regime served to radicalize and revolutionize the nascent movements involved. Unlike in Galicia, parliamentary tactics could not be developed because there was no parliamentary forum. Repression forced the Agrarians to adopt a clandestine organizational structure and also made the elite materially dependent upon their supporters. It was not until after 1904-5 that Polish peasants in the Congress Kingdom were able to organize themselves with the foundation of Polski Związek Ludowy (PZL). Parallel to this, other movements emerged and, like those in Galicia, they were prone to splitting.

In all three regions of Poland Agrarians were forced to respond to the interests of the peasantry by the development of alternative ideologies. Additionally, they had to react to the development of nationalism and also socialism. The strength of these rival movements depended upon the political circumstances. Thus socialism was stronger in the Congress Kingdom and Galicia than in the Prussian partition, since in Prussia socialism was seen as a 'German' ideology. These two movements posed significant challenges to the Agrarian movements, and at various times the Agrarian movements allied themselves with nationalists and socialists, in addition appropriating elements from these ideologies in order to enhance their appeal to the peasantry. The threat posed by socialism and nationalism forced the Agrarians to be responsive to the peasantry, thus the potential for peasants to serve as effective agents in articulating their demands was greater.

An important element in the development of Agrarianism in Poland was the contacts between the Agrarians within the partitions of Poland. These contacts allowed Agrarians from each area to serve as active agents and to exchange ideas.<sup>61</sup> Despite the partitions, Agrarianism in Poland did not develop in isolation, but rather in informed and influenced parallel. However, Agrarianism was narrow in the sense that it considered itself to be specifically Polish. It did not consider that class cut across national issues. They did not forge alliances with German, Ukrainian and Russian Agrarian movements. Indeed, in Galicia the Polish Agrarians sought to undermine the Ukrainian peasant representatives. Class existed as a subset of the Polish polity. It was only when Witos was jailed with Ukrainian peasants by Pilsudski after 1926 that he realized the folly of this 'narrow' conception of Agrarianism.<sup>62</sup> However, by then it was too late to develop Agrarianism which went beyond the old ethnic political parameters. However, unlike in Romania where PNȚ was a fusion between a middle class regional party and an agrarian movement, in Poland, the fusion was between agrarian parties who were all committed to the peasant issue, but who differed only in their nationalism and radicalism. The SL was much more of a 'peasant' movement than in Romania and politically became more radical during the interwar years as peasant radicalism grew suggesting a stronger sense of peasant agency and a more responsive political organization.

### **Swedish Agrarianism – Late Start and Early Reform**

The first Swedish agrarian parties were established in 1914-15. Although initially rivals the *Bondeförbundet* (Farmers' League (BF)) and the *Jordbrukarnas Riksförbund* (Agrarian League (JR)) merged in 1921. The new party kept the name *Bondeförbundet*, changing to *Landsbygdspartiet Bondeförbundet* (Rural Party Farmers' League) in 1943 in an attempt to broaden its appeal to all in rural society and not just farmers. Finally in 1958 the party adopted the name *Centerpartiet*.<sup>63</sup> The changes in name reflect the process of transformation that the movement underwent from a narrow party into attempting to become a catch-all party.<sup>64</sup>

The party organization demonstrates the forms of a cadre party organization before 1921. However, after the merger and during the interwar period the party undergoes organizational reform and its features particularly in terms of power structures but organizational reform takes

place early before the cadre structures had a chance to institutionalise themselves. This change is reflected in policy as the party shifts across time and the party membership changes. This therefore reflects the success of the organizational structures in allowing supporters agency over party policy which did not exist in PNȚ. Thus reforming and moving to new organization structures appears to be crucial in allowing the party to transform itself.

## **Wider Analysis**

PNȚ's problems have their roots in the foundation period. The domination of the Transylvanian wing meant that the party did not shift its mobilising discourse from nationalism to class issues. The party had no unifying ideology and it was instead held together by personal links. Power was distributed on the basis on interpersonal relations. The party could not abandon its cadre mechanisms of recruitment without fundamentally undermining the power structures of the party. It was not in the interests of actors at all levels to weaken their own positions within the party hierarchy. This organizational sclerosis resulted in a lack of policy innovation and in turn this weakened the party further as it dealt with political rivals on the radical left and right.

## **Conclusions**

There was a vibrant mainstream political life beneath the level of elite politics which had a strong emphasis on social, economic interests. Peasants were active within the party and a grassroots analysis brings to life a very different view of the party than a top-down elite centred approach. The question then becomes why did this not transform itself into policy innovation? PNȚ along with the other Agrarian parties fits into Duverger's model of European party development. The organizational forms and mobilizational discourses adopted reflect the structural conditions in which they were operating. These organizational forms were successful in the short term before 1918 but once institutionalised ultimately made reform of PNȚ impossible. By comparing with Sweden and Poland we can see that the sequencing of organizational reform is crucial in party development – not when the party is established. Even if a party is

established relatively late, if institutional reform takes place early then a party is better equipped to cope with socio-economic changes taking place within society, and to adjust their policies and politics accordingly. In contrast to other Agrarian movements, PNȚ did not reform organizationally because of vested internal party interests and thus village activists were denied agentive power within the party.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> David Mitrany, *The Land & the Peasant in Rumania: The War and Agrarian Reform (1917-21)*, Oxford University Press, London, 1930, pp. 101-102.
- <sup>2</sup> See Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania. Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle 1918-1930*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1995.
- <sup>3</sup> Tara Zahra "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis", *Slavic Review*, 69.1 2010, pp. 93-119.
- <sup>4</sup> Livezeanu p. 22 – the best accounts of rural interwar politics that take into account grassroots political life in Romania remain Mitrany (*op. cit.*), Hugh Seton-Watson *Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941*, Harper Row, London and New York, 1964 and Henry L. Roberts *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1951.
- <sup>5</sup> See Giovanni Capoccia, "The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond", *Comparative Political Studies*, 43.8/9, 2010 pp. 931-968 and Giovanni Capoccia, *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2005.
- <sup>6</sup> See Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, Methuen, London, 1954, Joseph LaPalombara, and Myron Weiner, *Political Parties and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966, Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, Free Press, New York, 1967 and Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988.
- <sup>7</sup> The distinction to some extent exists purely because when the literature on party politics in this period was being developed the Cold War was at its height limiting access for Western researchers and the parties that could have been studied were suppressed making them unable to be studied.
- <sup>8</sup> A comment echoed by Anders Widfeldt in relation to discussions of rural politics in Scandinavia. See Anders Widfeldt, "The Swedish Centre Party: The Poor Relations of the Family", in David Arter (ed), *From the Farmyard to City Square? The Electoral Adaptation of the Nordic Agrarian Parties*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001 p. 2.
- <sup>9</sup> Livezeanu p. 36.
- <sup>10</sup> Conversations between Dennis Deletant and Corneliu Coposu and Constantin (Ticu) Dumitrescu. We are grateful to Dennis Deletant for providing us with this information.
- <sup>11</sup> ACNSAS, FOND D, dos. 8827/2, pp. 245-246. This is a report about the documents relating to PNȚ found when requisitioning the house of Dr Victor Macavei. A note from Căpitan de Securitate Manon Badea dated 10<sup>th</sup> November 1948 reads: "Întrucât materialul de mai sus nu poate fi exploatat



deoarece este vechi și fără importanță, suntem de părere să fie distrus prin ardere.”

*“Because the above-mentioned material cannot be used as it is old and without importance, we are of the opinion that it should be destroyed by burning.”*

<sup>12</sup> Clifford Geertz, “Form and Variation in Balinese Village Structure”, *American Anthropologist*, 1959, 61.6 pp. 991-1012 p. 991.

<sup>13</sup> See Virgil Madgearu, *Agrarianism, Capitalism, Imperialism: Contribuții la studiul evoluției sociale românești*, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1999.

<sup>14</sup> Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars*, Washington University Press, Seattle, 1992 p. 285.

**Table 1: Employment in Romania 1930**

Romanian Population by Economic Sectors based on Romanian Census of 29<sup>th</sup> December 1930

Occupation	Number	Percentage of Population
Agriculture	13,063,213	72.3
Mining	153,423	0.9
Industry	1,560,061	8.6
Commerce, banking	749,508	4.2
Transportation, Communications	508,620	2.8
Public Services (Civil and Military)	863,572	4.8
Free Professions and Others	1,158,1631	6.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>18,057,028</b>	<b>100</b>

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, *American Political Science Review*, 94.2, 2000, p. 252.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 252-253.

<sup>17</sup> Panebianco, pp. xiii – xiv.

<sup>18</sup> Duverger, p. 63.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>24</sup> Panebianco p. 18.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>27</sup> Anu-Mai Köll, “Agrarianism and Ethnicity”, in Helga Schultz and Eduard Kubû, *History and Culture of Economic Nationalism in East Central Europe*, Berliner Wissernschafts-Verlag, Berlin, 2006, pp. 141-160.

- 28 James Mahoney and Larkin Terrie, "Comparative-Historical in Contemporary Political Science", *Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series*, 13, 2007 p. 8.
- 29 Jürgen Kocka, "Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg", *History and Theory*, 38.1, 1999 p. 49.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 49.
- 31 Giovanni Sartori, "Comparing and Miscomparing", *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 3:3 1991, p. 252.
- 32 Jürgen Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond", *History and Theory* 42.1, 2003, pp. 40-41.
- 33 Irina Marin, *The Formation and Allegiance of the Romanian Military Elite Originating from the Banat Military Border*, UCL PhD, London, 2009 p. 197.
- 34 Keith Hitchins, *A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1860-1914*, Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999 pp. 165-166.
- 35 M.K. Dziewanowski, "Polish Populism", in Joseph Held, *Populism in Eastern Europe: Racism, Nationalism and Society*, Columbia University Press, New York 1996, p. 166.
- 36 For a complete biography of Dobrescu-Argeș, see Romus Dima, *Constantin Dobrescu-Argeș: Întemeietorul țărănismului*, Fundația Culturală Gheorghe Marin Speteanu, Bucharest, 2001.
- 37 Zigu Ornea, *Țărănismul*, Editura Politică, Bucharest, 1969, p. 28.
- 38 <http://www.pntcd.ro/istorie/partidul-taranesc> (Date Accessed 30th September 2007).
- 39 Keith Hitchins, *The Romanians 1774-1866*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 126.
- 40 [http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partidul\\_%C5%A2%C4%83r%C4%83nesc](http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partidul_%C5%A2%C4%83r%C4%83nesc) (Date Accessed 21<sup>st</sup> Sept 2008).
- 41 Ornea, *Țărănismul*, p. 36.
- 42 Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, Methuen, London, 1956. p. 32.
- 43 PC had split in 1918-19. A faction from this split called *Partidul Conservator-Democrat* then merged in with PNR in 1922.
- 44 Iași and Buzău in particular were both former strongholds of PC.
- 45 Ioan Scurtu, *Istoria Partidului Național Țărănesc*, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1994, p. 64.
- 46 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virgil\\_Madgearu](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virgil_Madgearu) (date accessed 20th June 2009)
- 47 This is exemplified in his academic writings. Before 1931 Șerban has a strong and clear interest in agricultural matters. After 1931 he abandons this and addresses ethnic politics only in his writings.
- 48 Bucharest National Archives, Fond Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri, S.S.I., 97/1945.

"Radiogramă descifrată dela centrul ORADEA, 25 Octombrie 1946 [...] 10. Tineretul școlar în majoritate încadrat P.N.Ț. activează propaganda om la om sistem pe raion organizat.", p. 89.

"Constanța, 7 Noiembrie 1946, [...] Tineretul din partidele „istorice” se duc în propagandă la sate, neorganizați în echipe, ci numai câte unul singur și pe cont propriu, ducând totodată și manifeste electorale." pp. 134-135.

"Centrul petrolifer – Notă - Situația partidelor politice în regiunea Moreni: [...] Partidul Naț. Țărănesc-Maniu:- Se bucură de aceeași influență slabă ca și până acum, nu se adună la sediul organizației și nu fac nici o propagandă.", p. 32.

49 Uncatalogued Șerban Archive, Muzeul Național de Istorie al Transilvaniei, Cluj:

"Județul Făgăraș

*Aproape toți membrii comitetului județian al partidului național împreună cu alți notabili din Făgăraș au trecut la Partidul Averescu. Chiar de Președintele comitetul Dl. Mateiu Ziga? nu putem fi siguri, după-ce n'a venit la Congres, deși promisese că va veni.*

*În consecuență, subsemnatul mă voi îngriji conchেমarea alegătorilor din Județ la o consfătuire în care ne vom constitui din nou, vom lua dispoziții pentru organizarea partidului în întreg județul, vom face candidaturile și vom pune la cale lupta electorală.*

*A Iulia 25 IV 920*

Iacob Popa"

50 Arhivele Naționale Caraș-Severin, Partidul Național Țărănesc - organizația comuna Berliște, Fond 526 No.1 1928-46.

51 Arhiva Națională a Republicii Moldova, Chișinău, Partidul Național-Țărănesc Filiala Soroca Fond 1752, 1-27, 1932-1936, Partidul Național-Țărănesc Filiala Tighina Fond 1643, 2-3, 1934.

52 For examples see Arhiva Națională a Republicii Moldova, Chișinău, Partidul Național-Țărănesc Filiala Tighina Fond 1643, 1.2 and Partidul Național-Țărănesc Filiala Soroca Fond 1752, 1.3.

53 Jan Słomka, *From Serfdom to Self-Government: Memoirs of a Polish Village Mayor, 1842-1927*, Minerva Publishing Co, London, 1941, p. 274.

54 Arhivele Naționale Caraș-Severin, Partidul Național Țărănesc - organizația comuna Berliște, Fond 526 No.1 1928-46, Report dated 15 February 1928.

55 Chișinău, Partidul Național-Țărănesc Filiala Soroca Fond 1752, 1.10. Organizația T.N.Ț din orașul Soroca, Proces-verbal 8 decembrie 1937.

56 Olga A. Narkiewicz, *The Green Flag Polish Populist Politics, 1867-1970* Croom Helm London, 1976, pp. 38-58.

57 *Ibid.*, p. 50.

58 *Ibid.*, pp. 50-58.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>62</sup> Richard Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century - and After*, Routledge, London, 1997, p. 51.

<sup>63</sup> Widfeldt pp. 4-7.

<sup>64</sup> See Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems", in LaPalombara and Weiner pp.177–200. This is despite Kirchheimer himself claiming that Agrarian parties could not become catch-all parties writing:

"Neither a small, strictly regional party such as the South Tyrolean People's party, nor a party built around the espousal of harsh and limited ideological claims, like the Dutch Calvinists; or transitory group claims, such as the German refugees; or a specific professional category's claims, such as the Swedish Agrarians; or a limited action program, such as the Danish single-tax Justice Party, can aspire to a catch-all performance."

Otto Kirchheimer, "The Catch-All Party", in Peter Mair (ed), *The West European Party System*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 52-60; p. 55.

This view has been challenged by David Arter. See David Arter, "From Class Party to Catchall Party?: The Adaptation of the Finnish Agrarian-Center Party", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 22.2, 1999 pp. 157-190.

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# WESTERNIZATION AS TOOL OF INTER- IMPERIAL RIVALRY: LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN WALLACHIA BETWEEN OTTOMAN CONTROL AND RUSSIAN PROTECTION (1829-1848)

The Treaty of Adrianople, which concluded the Russian-Ottoman war of 1828-1829, was crucial to the Ottoman Empire's position among the European powers and to the European dispute for influence in the Ottoman territories. After a period during which the Habsburg Empire managed to prevent the materialization of Russia's ambitions for the Ottoman European lands, the Treaty of Adrianople exposed the Ottoman Empire to Russian authority and influence for years to come. The settlement also translated Ottoman domestic issues into a vocabulary of sovereignty, suzerainty and rights that clearly interfered with imperial rule. This was particularly visible in the case of Walachia and Moldavia. In 1829 the two Ottoman tributaries on the Danube passed under Russian authority until the Porte paid the war indemnity and became the setting in which Russia proceeded to implement a Western-type institutionalization. How did the Russian-sponsored institutionalization change the type of politics that underlay Ottoman rule in these lands? Unless we retrace the intricate interaction between Russia's deliberate projects of modernization with the Ottoman political system in Walachia, and the resulting complex reorganization of politics, the analysis about these lands in the nineteenth century is confined to two approaches that reiterate local exceptionalism. The first approach would be to reiterate the usual assessment of a "delayed Europeanization" of the Balkans.<sup>1</sup> The other would be to postulate the model of a local type of modernity, by merely reiterating local specificity and without detailing the complex of local and imperial dynamics that triggered it. Answering this question can also provide a case study useful in imperial history,

and particularly about how a non-Western Empire that had undergone repeated reforms for self-modernization used “Westernization” as an instrument of imperial expansion, to undermine a neighboring empire’s control over its provinces.

To address this question I will recreate the way in which Alexandru Samurçaş, an actor in the Ottoman networks of rule in Walachia, engaged with the changes that the Russian reforms and protectorate fostered in the leadership of this province between 1829 and 1848. Alexandru Samurçaş was the nephew and heir of the power holder and official (*boier*) Constantin Samurçaş,<sup>2</sup> former administrator (*kaymakam*) of Little Walachia and treasurer of Walachia, administrator and judge (*vornic*) and correspondent of the Habsburg knight von Gentz in the aftermath of the Greek Revolt. After the death of Alexandru’s father, Constantin took his nephew under his protection and endeavored to find him a place in the information and political networks that functioned between Habsburg and Ottoman diplomacies and which underlay the imperial rule of Walachia. The promotion of the officials’ descendants in the political networks was not an exceptional practice in Walachia during the rule of the Phanariots, Ottoman Greek Orthodox bureaucrats that the sultan appointed to rule this Christian Orthodox tributary on the Danube until the Greek uprising of 1821, and in the subsequent period. This practice was particularly useful for individuals who had recently arrived from Constantinople and who still lacked the necessary connections in the Ottoman tributary. However, Constantin and Alexandru also faced different historical contexts that elicited particular strategies and aims. Constantin, who fled to Habsburg Transylvania after the Uprising in 1821 and the dismantlement of the Phanariot high bureaucracy, lobbied for his return to Walachia and the re-appointment in his old position while he also identified with the emerging Greek nation. After a brief period spent in Transylvania under the guidance of his uncle, Alexandru built his entire career in Walachia where the Russian Empire was on the way to implement administrative and political reforms aimed at transforming this Ottoman province into a Russian satellite.

Balkan and Romanian historiographies have long regarded Russia’s “civilizing” presence in the Ottoman tributaries of Walachia and Moldavia between 1829 and 1832 as a necessary milestone for their modernization and national emancipation. Reportedly, the Russian administration intervened and regulated all aspects of life in the local society that feared the possibility of being assimilated in the Empire but in so doing, it also

popularized the French ideas of freedom and nationhood.<sup>3</sup> Identifying how institutions, norms and culture from Western Europe were transplanted in less prepared, non-European environments, these studies reproduce the meta-narrative of modernity that assumes Europe is the “sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories”, even those of non-European areas. However, despite this problematic epistemological genealogy, Eisenstadt also suggested that “modernity” is salvageable as a concept. In this respect, he argued that instead of assuming the Eurocentric model of modernity based on a particular historical case, scholars should consider the possibility of “multiple modernities”. These are “the multiple institutional and ideological patterns carried forward by social movements pursuing different programs of modernity, holding very different view of what makes societies modern”,<sup>4</sup> but which all share a basic assumption about the role of human agency in history. Richard Wolin, who noted Eisenstadt’s observation that “modernity” is a concept that stirs debate and political activism, pointed out that “modernity” cannot be expelled from historical study because “modernity” has been an active category of practice.<sup>5</sup> The application of the European colonial projects and the non-European societies’ response to “modernity” and appropriation of some of its norms transformed “modernity” into an active historical presence.

In this paper I subscribe to Eisenstadt’s and Wolin’s argument that “modernity” is a category of imperialist thought and practice, which has been crucial to imperialist and anti-imperialist agendas, political order and collective identities. Following their critical stance I will not follow the Eurocentric model of interpreting to what extent Walachia and Moldavia fit the European model of modernity, but instead question how “modernity” worked as an imperial instrument in the Russian-Ottoman conflict on the Danube borderland. More specifically, I will study the interplay of what the Russian authorities perceived as “modernity” and “civilizing mission” with Ottoman rule in Walachia, by examining the political participation in the Russian-endorsed government of individuals who took their political roots in Ottoman rule. But before I begin the analysis of how the Russian Empire unfolded “modernization”, i.e. the deliberate projects to bring a society to date with Europe, to counter the Ottoman Empire, I will refer to “modernity” in the history of the Ottoman Empire and as a principle of effective intervention that the Russian military leadership used against the Ottoman Empire.

Revisionist Ottoman historians pointed out that the construction of the Ottoman history as separate from that of Europe relies on the adoption

by historians of the Ottoman Empire of approaches that assume the preeminence of the West or the complete isolation of the Empire from processes that took place in Europe, and its corresponding backwardness.<sup>6</sup> The revisionist historians did not reject the concept of “modernity” but instead endeavored to construct “Ottoman modernities” by abandoning perspectives that privileged the center for approaches of the peripheries and their relation to the center. They also emphasized the synchronicity in the eighteenth century, the century of modernity, of transformations that occurred in taxation,<sup>7</sup> economy, political action in the Ottoman Empire and parallel changes that occurred in Europe.

The political history of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, during which the sultans became promoters of reforms that prompted various reactions within the elite and society, also offered the object for new proposals in favor of an Ottoman modernity. Focusing on the rise of autonomous power holders in the Ottoman Balkans at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ali Yaycioglu explained that in 1804 these actors compelled the sultan and his bureaucracy to redefine the Ottoman polity as a common establishment. The result was the creation of a document that specified the nature of the relations between the sultan and the power holders and among the power holders themselves, which certified the participation of different sectors of the Ottoman society in the imperial rule.<sup>8</sup> Although short lived, this was a civic project that emerged in political circumstances specific to the Ottoman Empire.

A historian of nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, Selim Deringil addressed the way in which “modernity”, an epistemological instrument that Western Europe used to deal with a dwindling, Muslim empire that epitomized “otherness”, became a category of practice that the Ottomans used to counter Europe’s unrelenting pursuit of its territories. Focusing on the changes in provincial administration in regions inhabited by nomadic populations, Deringil noticed that the Ottoman ruling elites adopted their arch-enemies’ colonial mindset and began to treat peripheries as colonies that needed modernization to provide the empire with the manpower necessary to resist the European powers’ intrusions.<sup>9</sup> Deringil’s analysis is significant to this article not only because it matches the reflections about the theoretical relevance of “modernity” but also because it brings out the issue that “modernity” also served as an instrument of inter-imperial rivalry. The rivalry at stake was that between Western colonial and modern

empires and a non-Western Empire that had begun to adopt Western rules and methods in one of its institutions – the military.

Another rivalry, which unfolded in the Caucasus and the Danube borderland, pitted the Russian and the Ottoman Empires against each other. Although both empires were non-Western and non-colonial, the Russian Empire had been implementing, for the last hundred years, projects of Westernization that endeavored to order imperial politics and society, create a civil society and pave the way to progress,<sup>10</sup> the very ingredients of modernization. The bureaucratic and political reforms implemented by the eighteenth century Russian autocrats are relevant to this analysis to the extent that count Pavel Kiseleff, one of the most important Russian commanders at the beginning of the nineteenth century, found these measures necessary to the success of future Russian offensives against the Ottomans. When the Russian-Ottoman war began in 1828, general Kiseleff, the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, occupied Walachia and Moldavia, attacked the Ottoman fortresses on the Danube and made significant headway into Ottoman territory before the Ottoman Empire declared defeat. Following the Peace Treaty of Adrianople (1829) the Russian military was stationed in Walachia and Moldavia until the Ottomans would have paid war indemnities.

The fact that Russia agreed to a Treaty with the Ottoman Empire, which enhanced the Russian influence in the Ottoman European lands is indicative of the type of foreign policy that Saint Petersburg favored. Instead of deploying an offensive that would have dismantled the Ottoman Empire, the Russian decision makers preferred the policy of the “weak neighbor”. According to this policy, Russia would create on the Ottoman European border a string of Christian principalities under Russian protectorate where the Russian authorities could easily interfere.<sup>11</sup> In consequence, in 1829 Russia inaugurated its protectorate over Walachia and Moldavia and a project of administrative re-organization<sup>12</sup> to which the Ottomans had agreed in the Treaty of Akkerman of 1826.<sup>13</sup> Under the supervision of General Kiseleff, the Russian authorities began to deploy a Westernization project that would have facilitated Russian control in the provinces and potential military campaigns against the Ottoman Empire. Kiseleff combined the task that he received from the Court in Sankt Petersburg with his personal mission of bringing these provinces that featured a Turkish, oriental political culture to the “European family”.<sup>14</sup> This evaluation was indicative of Kiseleff’s manifest “cultural imperialism” towards the local elites and condescendence towards their Ottoman, oriental masters, who

had been unable to reform and preserve their preeminence in Europe. This stance was a matter of personal view but it was widely shared among regional Russian governors who aimed to emulate their modernizing sovereign while serving their imperial task. His “Westernization” pivoted on institutionalization, i.e. the transformation of the existing leadership into a unit to collect and channel the taxes to the upkeep of the Russian military and to manage domestic affairs. The subsequent break-up of networks in Walachia and Moldavia that intricately combined political action and judiciary, fiscal and diplomatic tasks into administrative branches and a legislative and political assembly interfered in the relation with politics of numerous agents in the Ottoman rule.

This paper is organized in three sections. In the first section I study the way in which the removal of the Phanariot rulers (*hospodars*) and the rapports between the Ottoman, Habsburg and Russian Empires influenced the networks of Ottoman control in the Danube provinces between 1821 and 1829. A significant milestone of this period was the conclusion of the Treaty of Adrianople that propelled Russia on a hegemonic position in relation to the Ottoman Empire and as a main agent of change for the political networks and leadership in the Ottoman tributaries Walachia and Moldavia. In the second part I will analyze the way in which the Organic Regulations that Russia implemented in the 1830s in Walachia altered the meaning and role of existing political categories to confine local politics to the activity of a legislative assembly that comprised several power holders from the old regime. In the third section, I will explain how the breakdown of the Phanariot political networks did not entirely institutionalize politics but multiplied the contexts where politics was exercised.

## **1. Between Ottoman reactionary rule and inter-imperial politics - Political networks in Walachia from the Greek Revolution to the Treaty of Adrianople**

The sultan’s suspicions against the Ottoman Phanariot bureaucrats, religious leaders and rulers of Walachia and Moldavia, after the organization for Greek emancipation Philiki Hetairia stirred rebellions in Walachia, led to the execution or exile of members of this Greek-speaking, ethnically mixed group of Ottoman political elites. The purges of 1821 targeted the Patriarch, the dragomans, the *hospodars* of Walachia and Moldavia and their associates in Constantinople but did not eradicate all

members of this political caste. Some of them, who were related to the power holders in Walachia and Moldavia through family and political ties, lived in these provinces. But when the sultan dispatched troops in Walachia and Moldavia, to put out the uprisings, scores of local notables, among whom the *vornic* Constantin Samurçaș, took refuge in neighboring Habsburg Transylvania. Remnants of the Phanariot networks survived but the demolition of the Phanariot complex and inter-imperial rivalry altered significantly the old mechanisms of political power in the region.

The flight to Transylvania was a wise choice: while safe from the Ottoman army's punishments, the refugees could not be considered deserters given that the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires developed strong diplomatic and economic ties, which the Habsburg Empire used to stifle any potential expansionist tendencies of Russia. In 1813 the Habsburg chancellor Metternich had the initiative of creating a complex system of information dealing between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, which comprised the Habsburg diplomat Friedrich von Gentz, *boieri*, merchants and *hospodars* of Walachia such as Scarlat Callimachi, the Ottoman chancellor (*reis effendi*) and the vizier. Through its diplomatic activity during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the Viennese Court enlisted the admiration and cooperation of many *boieri* and merchants from Walachia and Moldavia. Several *boieri* in Walachia continued to be supporters of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires at the beginning of the Russian occupation in 1829. Among them were descendants of the Bălăceanu, Ghica and Filipescu families. Their ancestors were powerful *boieri* at the beginning of the century, during the Russian occupation of 1806-1812, and competitors of Constantin Samurçaș for office and power.<sup>15</sup> The merchants active in this network were Ottoman Greek Orthodox subjects from various Ottoman lands, who had brought their businesses in Walachia and Moldavia, became *boieri* in these provinces and also acquired the protection of the Habsburg Empire. They welcomed and helped Constantin Samurçaș during the first years of his exile.

The Ottoman military intervention in Walachia and Moldavia in 1821 contravened to previous agreements with Russia. To avert the risk of a war with Russia and to preserve the support of Habsburg Empire against potential hostilities from Russia, the Ottoman Porte used remnants of the Phanariot system as mediators with Russia. The prince of Moldavia and the imperial dragoman Scarlat Callimachi, who was also a contact of the Habsburg diplomat von Gentz, was called to serve as Ottoman plenipotentiary in the discussions with the Russian ambassador about

the Ottoman occupation of Walachia and Moldavia. Since the prince of Walachia Alexadru Sutzu had died shortly before the beginning of the rebellion and the throne was vacant, the Porte appointed Callimachi as ruler of Walachia. Following the custom<sup>16</sup>, he sent delegates from his retinue to prepare his arrival to the province. Among them was Ioan Samurcaș, the father of this article's main character. The Ottomans' appeal to Callimachi in the encounters with Russia after 1821 and the preservation of the diplomatic channels with the Habsburg Empire indicate that the elimination or marginalization of the main Phanariot leaders in Constantinople did not alter the basic mechanisms of information gathering of the Porte, which also overlapped with the political networks in Walachia and Moldavia.

The appointment of new rulers, Grigore IV Ghica in Walachia and Ioan Sturdza in Moldavia, marked only a partial break with the tradition of appointing Phanariots from Constantinople. Grigore Ghica was a descendant in Walachia of a family that had been at the center of the Phanariot circles for decades. Ioan Sturdza also came from a family with strong ties to the Phanariot circles as well as to the Russian nobility.<sup>17</sup> The two princes took over their predecessors' task of supervising the collection of taxes and also benefitted from the customary revenues coming from the sale of offices and the exploitation of public services and sources (mining, customs, etc.). As many of the leading *boieri* and power holders were in exile, Ghica and Sturdza had the pretext and freedom to sell extensively *boieri* positions to individuals from the most humble ranks of the society, who became their main supporters.

The notables in exile protested the *hospodars'* abusive nominations. Their opposition was symptomatic of the less perceivable political transformations that occurred with the elimination of the Phanariot complex. In the last years before 1821 the rule of Walachia and Moldavia circulated among members of the same four families of Moruzi, Ipsilanti, Callimachi and Sutzu, this practice being formalized by the sultan in 1819.<sup>18</sup> Each of the rulers from these families had particular supporters at Constantinople and the province where he ruled: *boieri*, creditors, their relatives and protégés who aspired to an appointment. As the *hospodars* rotated in power depending on politics at Constantinople and the diplomatic game of the Napoleonic Wars, so were the political factions that supported them. When the rulers from the four families were eliminated in 1821, the rotation in power of their political supporters also stopped. After 1821, as the new *hospodars* sold out high and low positions that



the *boieri* were, by virtue of their appointment, entitled to sell, the *boieri* who had already gained a privileged political and social position under the Phanariot rulers were deprived of an important means to exert their political clout. The elimination of the Phanariots from being considered to appointments as *hospodars* also fragmented the old *boieri* factions whose members now hoped they would be nominated for the rule. As per the sultan's order of 1802, the Appointment of the current rulers was made for seven years<sup>19</sup> but certain *boieri*, hoped that with the help of Russia they could depose the appointed princes and impose themselves as eligible "hospodars". For several years after 1821, the political tensions between the "old" *boieri* and the new *hospodars* and the "recent" *boieri* unfolded in letters from the old *boieri* to the neighboring powers that hosted them and to the Ottoman commanders, and in the responding warnings from the *hospodars*.<sup>20</sup>

In 1821 Alexandru Samurcaș arrived in Kronstadt to live with his uncle, the controversial *vornic* Constantin Samurcaș who was a correspondent of the Habsburg diplomat Friedrich von Gentz. Alexandru Samurcaș was the son of Ioan Samurcaș, the chargé with the foreign correspondence (*postelnic*) of Scarlat Callimachi, and of Catherine Rallet, the descendent of a Phanariot-Walachian family. Ioan Samurcaș had arrived in Walachia in 1821 as delegate of the appointed *hospodar* Callimachi. When the Porte cancelled the appointment of this Phanariot bureaucrat the same year, Ioan Samurcaș and two other delegates of Callimachi and former *boieri* in Moldavia became administrators of the provinces under the Ottoman occupation. In 1821 Ioan Samurcaș was executed by the Ottoman military commander on suspicion of maintaining correspondence with the Phanariot fugitives. Alexandru, aged sixteen, relocated to Kronstadt, home to a large community of Greek Orthodox Ottoman merchants and *boieri* who were involved in the Ottoman-Habsburg diplomatic networks and shelter to his uncle Constantin. During those years Constantin became receptive to Russia's political projects for Greece and the other Ottoman Christian lands but continued his correspondence with von Gentz and strove to re-gain his appointment in Walachia. He also introduced Alexandru to the knight. In 1825, shortly after the death of Constantin Samurcaș, Alexandru attempted to win the knight's support for his endeavors. Gentz reassured the young Alexandru of his sympathy and availability to give him advice but emphasized that he lacked the practical means to offer him service or protection.<sup>21</sup>

At the level of inter-imperial relations, the Ottomans' harsh response to the Greek revolts threatened the European equilibrium, as more powers pondered whether they should intervene. The Russian tsar Alexander I, who was committed to the preservation of the European concert, resisted the temptation of declaring war on account of the Ottomans' violations of previous treaties through their occupation of Walachia and Moldavia. Instead, he accepted the diplomatic discussions with the Porte that Scarlat Callimachi mediated. The Habsburg Empire, whose goal was to prevent any Russian advancement in the Near East, also sought to appease the English, French and Russian leaders. However, in 1825 the tsar Alexander died and was replaced by his brother Nicholas I who adopted a harsher approach towards the Ottoman Empire. In 1826 Russia pressed for a convention with the Ottomans, which strengthened its influence in Walachia and Moldavia. Through the Convention of Ackerman the Ottoman Empire acknowledged that Walachia and Moldavia needed a more stable government, for which purpose the local councils of the *boieri* were entrusted to elect the *hospodars* for seven-year mandates, pending the approval of both courts. In addition, the Ottomans were supposed to withdraw the contingents from the fortresses on the left bank of the Danube, based on the capitulations to which they agreed in the eighteenth century and which requested that no Muslim should settle in Walachia and Moldavia. Finally, the Ottoman troops that intervened to quell the uprisings of 1821 were to withdraw from Walachia and Moldavia.

Despite this agreement, after the naval disaster of Navarino in 1827, when the allied British, French and Russian vessels completely destroyed the Ottoman fleet, the Ottoman-Russian war was unavoidable. In 1828 and 1829 the Russian troops crossed the river Pruth, occupied Walachia and Moldavia and besieged the Ottoman fortresses on the Danube before a rapid march across the Balkans.<sup>22</sup> The Ottoman sultan had to acknowledge defeat. The two Empires concluded the Treaty of Adrianople that favored Russia to the extent that the European powers preferred the defeat and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire to Russia's gain of so much influence and concessions.<sup>23</sup>

The Treaty sorted an issue of maximum interest in the context of the Eastern Question – the access on the Danube and the Black Sea was completely open to Russia whose ships had immunity against any Ottoman checks. The Ottomans confirmed Russia's possessions in the Caucasus. Russia agreed to return to the Ottoman Empire Dobrudja, lands in Bulgaria and the "principalities" of Walachia and Moldavia, the frontier with the

Ottomans being set on the river Pruth.<sup>24</sup> Serbia, Walachia and Moldavia became “autonomous”. The terms that defined the autonomy of Walachia and Moldavia were particularly significant because they imposed an unprecedented translation of their relations with the Ottoman Empire, which drew on Western concepts of sovereignty, suzerainty, autonomy and which significantly curtailed the Ottomans’ imperial rule in these lands.

Article 5 of the Treaty formally stipulated that the “principalities” Walachia and Moldavia were under the “suzerainty” of the Porte. Since Russia was the guarantor of their prosperity, they preserved all the immunities that had been acknowledged to them through past capitulations, sultan’s decrees and treaties. By way of consequence, they were entitled to freedom of worship, freedom of commerce and “independent national government”.<sup>25</sup> The provisions in article 5 were further detailed in an additional act. The two empires renewed their commitment to the welfare of the “principalities”, for which reason they provided that the seven-year terms for the rules of the *hospodars* chosen by the local councils, a stipulation in the Treaty of Ackerman, should be replaced by life-terms. The *hospodars* were completely entrusted with the management of the affairs in Walachia and Moldavia, in consultation with the *boieri* councils (*divan*). Drawing on the Porte’s commitment to the welfare and prosperity of the two principalities, and the Porte’s agreement to pay the war indemnity by placing the principalities under Russian occupation, the treaty also specified that the Ottoman Empire would agree to the regulations that Russia planned to implement in Walachia and Moldavia. If the regulations gained the approval of the local councils, they were to become the foundations of the new government.

The Porte committed again to the capitulations that Russia imposed in the eighteenth century, through which it restricted Muslims to settle in Walachia and Moldavia and forbade the Ottoman commanders in charge of the neighboring provinces to mingle in Walachian and Moldavian affairs.<sup>26</sup> The aim of this provision was to force the Ottomans to dismantle their fortresses on the left bank of the Danube that had opposed a staunch resistance against the Russian attacks during the Ottoman-Russian wars. To reinforce this stipulation, the territory of the tributaries Walachia and Moldavia needed to be delimited on the Danube from that of the neighboring Ottoman provinces, a task that would be carried out by a mixed Ottoman-Russian commission. Further, the additional act mentioned that the two provinces’ obligations to the Porte were limited to the payment of the yearly tribute and an additional sum equivalent to the

tribute in case of change of the *hospodar*. The replacement of the custom that the sultan should appoint the *hospodar* with the election by the *boieri*, the simplification of the monetary circuit with Constantinople and the ban on the supplies trade between the principalities and the other Ottoman provinces and the capital, ended tax-farming – a major component of the eighteenth century Ottoman rule of Walachia and Moldavia.

The treaty impinged heavily on the Ottoman Empire's authority in its domains. The formal reference to Walachia and Moldavia as "principalities" was not unprecedented in their history. Several *boieri* from the end of the eighteenth century mentioned the concept "principalities",<sup>27</sup> but most of the political agents in Walachia and Moldavia referred to them as "countries". In Ottoman imperial parlance, Walachia and Moldavia were counted among the "sultan's well protected domains".<sup>28</sup> However, their definition as "principalities" in the Treaty of Adrianople, together with the terms about their administration in relation to the Porte created the fiction that these provinces were distinctive from the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was their "suzerain", a term suggesting that the imperial control in local affairs was devolved to rulers selected from Walachia and Moldavia, with the approval of another Empire, and that the management of local affairs was detached from Ottoman politics and bureaucracy. Delegating the selection of the *hospodar*, i.e. "prince", to the local *boieri* was allegedly a consequence of the privileges of Walachia and Moldavia, which the Porte had admitted through the capitulations of 1774. The Porte accepted these terms under the pretext that they promoted the well-being of the two countries, a reference that echoed the old imperial discourse about the sultan's concern with the welfare of his subjects.<sup>29</sup> As the Ottoman central elites and the sultan Mahmud II also became adept of the implementation of Westernization measures, the terms concerning the "independent national government" of Walachia and Moldavia, i.e. the administration by the local *boieri*, did not immediately denote a major concession.

However, the changes introduced in the definition of Walachia and Moldavia and the mechanisms of control by the Porte of their possessions illustrated that the Russian Empire interfered with Ottoman governance and took over a hegemonic position in the Near East that caused the disgruntlement of the European powers. The creation of the "Principalities" as former Ottoman provinces, where Russia could redefine social and political relations and administration, showed that the Court in Saint Petersburg had opted for the diplomatic alternative of turning the Ottoman

Empire into a “weak neighbor” instead of dismantlement. Following the conclusion of the treaty and the installation of the Russian administration under Kiseleff’s observation, the last *boieri* in exile returned to Walachia and Moldavia. Among them was also Alexandru Samurçaș who was hopeful to find an appointment in the administration of Walachia given that he was the son and uncle of two prominent *boieri* such as Ioan and Constantin Samurçaș.

## 2. Politics and leadership through the Organic Regulations

### 2.1. Continuities with the *ancien régime* at the beginning of the Russian administration (1829-1835)

The phrase “Organic Regulations” designates the body of rules that *boieri* in the “principalities” and the authorities of the Russian occupation and in Saint Petersburg compiled for the re-organization of Walachia and Moldavia after 1829. The constant Russian intervention in the drafting of the “Regulations” was meant to secure Kiseleff’s project to “Westernize” these provinces and to minimize Ottoman authority and “oriental” influence in Walachia and Moldavia. However, at the beginning of the occupation and of the drafting of the Regulations, the Russian authorities faced the complex political networks and strong power holders that survived from the time of the Phanariot rules. While committed to the creation of an apparatus of power ruled by the principles of division of powers and efficient bureaucracy, the Russian occupation had to co-opt the cronies of the old regime.

The *boieri* who were recruited in the Russian authorities’ administration of Walachia and Moldavia and in drafting the Regulations were power holders from the time of the Ottoman-appointed rulers, whose influence could not be ignored even though they were detractors of Russia. Among them were members of the families Rosetti, Filipescu, Arghiropol, Balș, Bălăceanu, Băleanu, and the Hrisoverghi, who had occupied positions in the proximity of the *hospodar* and at the core of the country’s management, such as treasurers of Walachia or Moldavia or administrators and judges of Little Walachia.<sup>30</sup> The research about political rule, infrastructure, and the Ottoman-Russian wars in Walachia and Moldavia, which Kiseleff commissioned in 1819 to reform Russian military thought and strategy in relation to the Ottoman Empire,<sup>31</sup> emphasized the political power of the

*boieri* as individuals who could have prevented or assisted the Russia in transforming the provinces into its satellites.

One of the main problems associated with relying on the *boieri* was the fact that they had the social, political and economic capital and good relations with the Ottoman officials and the representatives of other empires to oppose or sabotage the measures that the Russian authorities wanted to implement. Furthermore, following the system of governance inaugurated by the Phanariots, the *boieri* received, for their tenants, important exemptions from the public taxes, and could create taxes at will, for their own remuneration. These prerogatives diverted local taxes to private pockets instead of the maintenance of the Russian troops. To curb this authority and selective tax collection, in May 1829 the Russian administration divided the council into judiciary and executive branches and placed them both under the Russian commander-in-chief.<sup>32</sup> The two councils were further remodeled and by 1831, they were divided in three branches: each "principality" had an executive council, a judicial council and a "princely" council, even though the *boieri* had not elected the princes. During this period, selected *boieri* from Walachia and Moldavia studied the texts proposed from Saint Petersburg and brought amendments to the texts. Subsequently, the Russian authorities called representatives from the three councils in each province to participate in a special commission for the revision and approval of the Regulations.<sup>33</sup>

Alexandru Samurcaș participated in the works of the *boieri* commission from Walachia as a translator of Greek and French and received a merit certificate for his performance.<sup>34</sup> Simultaneously, he held the position of *second postelnic*, an office entrusted with the contact with foreign correspondents.<sup>35</sup> The position matched the activity of translator that he had deployed for the commission and it also used to be the appointment of his father Ioan, during the rule of Scarlat Callimachi. On the other hand, given that on the eve of the Russian occupation the princes had multiplied the number of posts in the service of higher offices, Alexandru's nomination as *second postelnic* might have been a sinecure that brought him tax exemptions. After completing his work as an interpreter for the commission, Alexandru served as the secretary to the Commission for the delimitation of the islands and border on the Danube,<sup>36</sup> which was composed of a Russian representative, Raigent, the Ottoman delegate Mohammed Arif Efendi and a local official, Mihai Ghica.<sup>37</sup>

In 1832 the Revision Assemblies of Walachia and Moldavia approved the Organic Regulations that set up the administration and

politics of Walachia and Moldavia on principles of division of power and administrative efficiency. According to the Regulations, the rule of Walachia and Moldavia was assigned to a prince elected by an extraordinary assembly. The princes worked with administrative councils consisting of the minister of internal affairs, the minister of finances and a state secretary (*postelnic*) for the effective rule of the principalities. They could also prepare proposals that were submitted to the vote by the legislative assembly. This assembly was made of grand *boieri* and deputies selected by land owners from the districts and drew the attention of the prince to proposals that it deemed necessary or to the petitions from the countries.<sup>38</sup> The third branch of rule was the judiciary, which was organized according to a hierarchy of territorial instances of law and appeal.

## **2.2. Institutionalization and the break of power networks (1832-1834s)**

Power holders from Moldavia and Walachia, who had opposed the massive appointments of the princes Grigore IV Ghica and Ioan Sturdza, participated in the administration of occupation and the drafting of the Organic Regulations between 1829 and 1832. Although Russia needed their political support and administrative cooperation, it also strove to curtail the restoration of the old political networks that controlled the public offices and taxation in the principalities. The Organic Regulations assignment of the *boieri* to specific administrative bodies and tasks redefined the political field in the “principalities”, created new hierarchies and marked the power shift of the Ottoman and Russian Empires in Walachia and Moldavia. A major component of the reforms of 1831-1832 was the construction of new categories of leadership, which separated political authority from administrative appointment, while preserving some of the old power holders in high political and administrative positions. This political reform overlapped with the division of governance into the administration, the judiciary and the military. Thus, the Russian administration replaced the category of *boier* with that of *noble* and the bodies that materialized the interests and relations of the *boieri* with tasks within separate bodies that epitomized the ‘division of powers.’

Before the Russian occupation, being a “boier” did not merely refer to belonging to a group of political and social leaders but participating in the

multi-faceted relations of power that connected individuals to the ruler appointed by the sultan and that underlay the collection and re-distribution of public taxes. Thus, the "*boieri*" was a composite group made of relatives of the *hospodar*, creditors, owners of great land estates and individuals who claimed prestigious ancestry, each of whom developed his own retinue of subordinates and helpers.<sup>39</sup> Their power derived from the position they held in relation to the rulers and from the connections they could entertain with other notables or rising political figures in Constantinople or Walachia and Moldavia who could uphold their agendas in the future. Among the instruments to strike political relations were one's sale of positions that entitled the appointee to a share of the collected taxes and tax-exemptions, and one's family and personal relations. The complexity of the relations between *boieri* and between the *boieri* and the rulers was well known to the *hospodars* themselves. In 1740 and 1741 Constantin Mavrocordat, who ruled successively Walachia and Moldavia, introduced the first measures to regulate the recruitment of the *boieri* in office and thus, in the imperial governance of the provinces. Mavrocordat drew two intersecting distinctions between those who served in high administrative positions and those who had less important appointments, and between those who were in service and those who did not occupy any position but whose ancestors had been grand *boieri*.<sup>40</sup> Depending on whether they were *boieri* active in the administration or descendants of grand *boieri* these individuals received tax exemptions for the tenants on their land estates.<sup>41</sup>

While it becomes apparent that "*boier*" referred to one's position in the Phanariot power networks and factions, it is less clear to what extent they were active in the daily functions of administration. The "*boierie*" referred to one's quality of being involved in the political networks but also to exerting tasks that comprised ceremonial functions at the *hospodars'* court, the collection of taxes and administration of justice at district level, maintaining correspondence with the Ottoman officials and foreign representatives, the preservation of documents and decisions of the council, *hospodar* and sultan, and the recording and surveillance of tax collection. But since the grand *boieri* could sell positions in their subordination to increase their gains and obtain loyal supporters, the functions associated with lower rank positions were nominal. The *boierie* became an eminently political category and the *boieri*, a politically active leadership.



The massive appointments that Ioan Sturdza and Grigore Ghica made during the Ottoman occupation of 1821-1828 were mostly to nominal positions of *boier* of lower rank.<sup>42</sup> Before 1821 these appointments would have been the prerogative of the high *boieri*, but the new princes used this device to demonstrate to the *boieri* in exile that they were politically replaceable. Nevertheless, Sturdza and Ghica's measures had an unexpected consequence. Since the rotation of political factions came to a halt because of the elimination of the Phanariot rulers, the temporary divisions between *boieri* who supported rival rulers turned into permanent divisions between the "old" and "new" *boieri* and between *boieri* orders. The "old" *boieri*, who had composed the political elite of Walachia and Moldavia and who had strong social and economic capital, denounced the "new" *boieri*, who lacked protectors, experience and resources. The Russian authorities would enlist the "old" *boieri* to set up the administrations of Walachia and Moldavia to supply the Russian troops and to support Kiseleff's project of transforming these provinces into subordinate principalities and potential bases for military operations. Approved and implemented with the help of these *boieri*, the Organic Regulations significantly changed the definition of the political leadership. They completely redesigned the categories of *boieri* and *boierie*, stipulated conditions for the awarding of "ranks", defined the composition of the legislative assembly and controlled the intersection between the legislative assembly and the bureaucracy. The Regulations also redefined the councils of *boieri*, i.e. *divans*, which were no longer consultative bodies for the prince and an institution expressing *boieri* interests but judiciary instances.

The arrangement for the division of powers and for the composition of the legislative assembly laid important political prerogatives in the hands of those who had already been power holders, despite the dismantlement of the *boieri* councils in Moldavia, Walachia and Little Walachia. The majority of the members of the legislative assemblies and the administrative council belonged to the grand *boieri* who were the descendants of power holders during the Phanariot rule, and who now composed the hereditary nobility. The political activity of the members in the legislative assembly consisted of initiating administrative measures and of deciding the award of nobility titles to bureaucrats. More importantly, the nobles in the assembly were eligible for the position of prince. The nobles and landowners (categories that did not overlap) who lived in the districts had the right to vote for district deputies, nobles and/or bureaucrats, in the legislative assembly.

The reforms restricted the political agency of those individuals who had not been grand *boieri* and who could aspire to participate in the assemblies for the election of the prince or the legislative assembly only after starting a career in one of the three fields of government created by the Organic Regulations and obtaining a noble title from the prince. Two sections in the Regulations were dedicated to explaining that the numerous second rank positions, which did not perform effective jobs, had to be replaced by bureaucratic appointments, which entailed specific tasks and job hierarchies. Specifically, the section "About ranks" specified that one's promotion to "noble rank" depended exclusively on one's execution of the task assigned to him. The prince could nominate "Romanians" to positions in the local militias, judiciary and district administration. After several years of service, which varied depending on the branch in which they were active, these bureaucrats were eligible to be selected by the prince for higher positions and even for noble title. Their nomination to title was to be approved by the legislative assembly, with the specification whether the noble title was life-long or for posterity.<sup>43</sup> The quality of "Romanian" was an unprecedented distinction that the Regulations introduced in the stipulations about the creation of bureaucrats and potential nobles. I suggest that this category was meant to overcome the distinction "pămâteni" – "Greeks" that was frequently used during the Phanariot rule to locate an individual in relation to the existing power networks. The naturalization as Romanian concerned specifically those who aspired to rank and position. It was a requirement that could have been fulfilled rather easily. One who was a new comer to the principalities needed to certify relations to the "local" families through blood relations, marriage or adoption and received naturalization within seven years from the request.

The section about the "appointment to various positions" detailed how each of the three branches of government had specific methods to recruit bureaucrats who could have been ennobled thanks to their professional service. The staff of the military and the judiciary was to be selected by the prince, while the bureaucratic positions in the local administration were to be filled with individuals selected by the "nobles" and land owners from the districts.<sup>44</sup> In other words, these two sections transformed the second rank *boieri* into bureaucrats and potentially, nobility of service. The prince's assignment of noble title to bureaucrats and the legislative assemblies' prerogative to vote for the proposal are indicative of the

fact that the new regime allowed that family relations and interest could interfere to a significant extent with the assignment of offices and titles.

A measure that affected nobles and bureaucrats alike was the fact that the Russian authorities cancelled the tax exemptions that used to accompany the appointment of *boieri* during the old regime. To compensate for the elimination of tax exemptions, the Russian administration offered pensions to the former incumbents or heirs of incumbents of office. Moreover, the Organic Regulations provided for the increase of labor obligations of the tenants to their landowners and the decrease of their obligations to the treasury.

Telling of the way in which the Regulations transformed old political networks and institutions and the leverage of former *boieri* is the metamorphosis of the *divan* of Craiova into a judiciary body in the justice system. Originally, the *divan* was an assembly of *boieri* entrusted with the local application of justice. At the end of the eighteenth century, its members also began to claim participation in the collection of taxes and administrative authority, and thus, a share from the prerogatives of the *kaymakam*, i.e. the *hospodar's* representative in the region. When the Russian administration stripped the *divan* in Bucharest of its political agency and assigned executive and judicial tasks to it, the *divan* in Craiova was dismantled and its members were directed towards judicial tasks. Only a few local power holders, such as members of the families Băleanu or the Filipescu, who collaborated with the Russian authorities, preserved their titles and became nobles in the legislative assemblies. The others, among whom individuals who at the beginning of the nineteenth century had been staunch opponents of the *kaymakam* Constantin Samurçaș, Alexandru's uncle, became servants of the judiciary in Little Walachia and Walachia.

The justice apparatus was organized along three levels of authority. The primary level was that of the law-court in the local districts, which dealt with cases pertaining to civil, criminal and commercial law.<sup>45</sup> The staff of the court consisted of a president, two judges named for three years and a prosecutor. The second level judicial court was that of the Law Councils (*Divans*) of Bucharest and Craiova, which took over the judicial functions of the previous *boieri divans*. These two *divans*, which dealt with civil and criminal cases,<sup>46</sup> and a third, the Commercial Court,<sup>47</sup> were the courts to appeal litigations already heard in the district courts.<sup>48</sup> The Council from Bucharest was staffed with seven judges for the civil cases and five for criminal law and a prosecutor, while the Council in Craiova had five judges for civil law, three judges for criminal law and a

prosecutor. The judges were all nobles who exerted official duties,<sup>49</sup> while the prosecutors, together with the rest of the staff of the court, were officials who could aspire to receive noble title based on their service.<sup>50</sup> The highest instance of appeal was that of the *High Divan* that comprised six nobles who acted as judges and one prosecutor, and which was presided by a first rank noble, the great *ban*. The judges in all the courts were named by the prince, except for the judges of the Commercial Courts, who were appointed by the most notable tradesmen.<sup>51</sup> After serving as an interpreter and secretary during the drafting of the Regulations, in 1832, Alexandru Samurcaș, the nephew of the *kaymakam* of Craiova Constantin Samurcaș, took the position of prosecutor in the criminal court of the district of Ilfov, nearby Bucharest.

### 2.3. Crossings between bureaucracy and politics (1834-1840s)

In 1834, the Ottoman and Russian representatives signed at Saint Petersburg the convention through which the Ottoman Empire acknowledged the territorial delimitation of Walachia and Moldavia and the Organic Regulations and Russia committed to the evacuation of its troops from the “principalities”. In the decree for the confirmation of the convention, the sultan also announced that he would nominate again the princes of Walachia and Moldavia but only as an exceptional case.<sup>52</sup> Alexandru Ghica, the brother of the former *hospodar* Grigore IV Ghica became prince of Walachia and Mihail Sturdza, the son of a Moldavian *boier* and a descendent of the Callimachis, became prince of Moldavia. The family connection between these new rulers and the former *hospodars* marked the continuity of the Ottoman control over the principalities. On the other hand, Russia intervened in 1835 to strengthen the influence it had gained in the principalities by imposing an additional article to the Organic Regulations through which the princes and the assemblies could not change the original stipulations of these programs. For the following years, the running of the principalities was left to the newly created political and bureaucratic hierarchies, with the more or less overt intervention of Russian agents.

The *boier* Alexandru Samurcaș, who lacked important support because of the death of his father and uncle and who only had his skill and a few acquaintances to rely on, could not avoid engaging these transformations. He pursued promotion in the bureaucracy while keeping an eye on the possibilities to receive a noble title and thus to occupy a politically

significant but stable position that would have also secure the future of his offspring. In 1834 Samurcaș was introducing himself as *comis*, an honorary title that had nothing in common with the apparatus of justice<sup>53</sup> in which he worked as a prosecutor, but which was a starting point for advancing in the hierarchy of nobility. Although Alexandru Samurcaș was the son of a *boier* who had arrived from Constantinople and of a “local” woman from Moldavia, apparently he did not qualify as a Romanian, which was a condition for promotion in office and nobility. To receive naturalization and renew relations of support, in 1834 Samurcaș married Zoe Ghiul Beyazi, a woman of Walachian-Phanariot origin but who was referred to as Romanian, and whose father, Nicola Ghiul Beiazi, was related to Ioan Ghiulbeiazi, an old acquaintance of Alexandru’s uncle.<sup>54</sup> The witness at the wedding was the great *ban* Alexandru Filipescu, a first rank noble, who in his turn had been a contact of Constantinos Samurcaș. Within seven years from the wedding, Samurcaș was entitled to the status of “local” too. The Samurcaș family soon grew with the birth of two daughters, Elisabeth and Helen and of a son, Ioan (who was born in the early 1840s).<sup>55</sup>

To speed up his naturalization and also to acquire new support for official promotion and title, Alexandru maintained close connection with his aunt Zoe Samurcaș, a “Romanian” woman. The reason for Alexandru’s haste to obtain naturalization might have been the fact that in 1835 the Walachian legislative assembly was considering the creation of a Table of the noble titles and ranks that corresponded to grades in the bureaucratic hierarchy.<sup>56</sup> The Table, which was meant to regulate the noble hierarchy and limit the noble titles to which bureaucrats were entitled, resembled the Russian Tables of Ranks that the tsars Peter I and Catherine II imposed in eighteenth century Russia to create a group of trained bureaucrats.

In 1836, shortly before she passed away, Zoe helped Alexandru’s ambitions by formally petitioning through the Great Chancellery of Justice to adopt her adult nephew because she had lost her natural children and was deprived of any other family and support. The prince approved the adoption request and confirmed that Alexandru Samurcaș, a married adult hired in civil employment, could be considered Zoe’s “adopted son”.<sup>57</sup> The adoption meant that Samurcaș became Zoe’s heir and the administrator of her possessions, the several land estates in the proximity of Bucharest, as well as of her debts.<sup>58</sup> The land possessions of Zoe Samurcaș were rather small by the time’s standards. However, they were an asset that Alexandru could evoke to testify for his family’s nobility and to support his own claims

to become a “noble”. The documents concerning the adoption also make plain that in 1836 Alexandru was still considered a bureaucrat.

In 1837 the legislative assembly passed the supplement to the article “About Ranks” from the Organic Regulations, which established nine noble ranks, the classes in which they were fitting, the new and old noble titles that corresponded to them and also the military ranks that were eligible for each noble rank.<sup>59</sup> According to the article, the numerous noble titles, which reprised the nominal functions that used to be bestowed on the *boieri* during the Phanariot rule, were organized in a hierarchy of nine ranks and three classes. The highest, first class and first rank office was that of great *ban* (in the 1830s a nominal title of the administrator of Little Walachia, a function that the Phanariot princes had transferred to the *kaymakam*, while the *ban* became an actor in politics in Bucharest)<sup>60</sup> while the ninth rank in third class comprised titles from *pitar* (responsible with the bread supply of the court) and below. Alexandru, still a prosecutor, was proposed by the prince Alexandru Ghica for a title of *serdar*, which was a title of the eighth rank and third class. Being a land owner and also holding a noble title made Alexandru Samurcaş eligible for the district elections in 1841 as a delegate to the Legislative Assembly of Walachia.<sup>61</sup> His promotion through the bureaucratic and title hierarchies was slow: it was only in 1842 that he advanced from being a prosecutor to becoming the president of the Commercial Law Court in Craiova and to receive the seventh rank title of *paharnic* (cup bearer). Thanks to his service in the judiciary, he was propelled to a sixth rank title of *clucer* but without promotion in office.<sup>62</sup>

### 3. New political fields

The significant attention paid by scholars of Romanian history to the dispute for positions between the princes, the members of their council and the legislative suggests that the competition for positions, and especially that of the prince, was the unique political field active in the principalities. After all, it was the liberal nobles, who comprised nobles of lower rank or young nobles educated in the West and supporters of the new emancipatory ideals, who would make the widening of the political sphere and the political involvement of other social categories an item of their revolutionary agenda in 1848. The historiography accurately noticed the tensions that animated the political establishment, built around certain

institutions created during the Russian occupation, and the adoption of conservative and liberal ideologies by the participants in this establishment. Nevertheless, political conflict in the institutionalized political arena did not exhaust the areas of political activity in the principalities.

In this section I will point at another dimension of politics in Walachia - the local networks of support built around land owners, nobles and bureaucrats at the local level, which became active during elections and promotions in ranks. As I have previously mentioned, the Russian-endorsed institutionalization and division of powers were aimed at reducing the political to a circumscribed arena and controlling the channels between the political assembly and the rank and file of bureaucracy. Even though these individuals were not at the forefront of the political conflict, they acted as political agents that had their own agendas and support from their peers. Further, although the lower rank nobles and bureaucrats developed political relations, their field of action was not separate from that of the "high politics" on which the existing literature has focused. The mechanisms through which a bureaucrat could gain noble title also stimulated him to collaborate with certain nobles or the prince and thus enhance his local prestige and position, political acts that mirrored the relations within the Phanariot networks. Equally reminiscent of the Phanariot politics was the fact that the lower rank nobles and the bureaucrats often upheld the prince and high nobles against their political adversaries, even though these activities did not necessarily repute high rewards. Alexandru Samurcaș was one such individual. He was well positioned in the district bureaucracy and political networks; he also received noble rank according to the Table of ranks in Walachia and fostered good relations with the successive princes of Walachia Alexandru II Ghica and Gheorghe Bibescu who were political rivals. The revolutionary year 1848 threatened his position temporarily. During that particular moment of crisis he and his colleagues acted in a fashion that is indicative of how politics functioned at the intersection of bureaucracy and the legislative, and drawing on practices that the Ottoman rule fostered in Walachia and Moldavia.

Soon after the withdrawal of the Russian troops and the beginning of the "autonomous administration" in Walachia and Moldavia, the relation between the newly appointed princes, the members of their council and the legislative assembly became tense. The princes appointed by the sultan in 1834, Alexandru II Ghica and Mihail Sturdza, found themselves increasingly at odds with the legislative assemblies. Even though they

proceeded to promote individuals from their entourage to higher ranks and bring trustworthy or at least innocuous individuals in the executive, several high nobles proved to be particularly at odds with their rule.<sup>63</sup> The princes' fears were accurate as some of the political opponents to their measures indeed aspired to become *hospodars*. The prince of Moldavia Mihai Sturdza skillfully manipulated and sabotaged any manifestation of dissent.<sup>64</sup> Unlike him, the prince Alexandru II Ghica of Walachia entered conflict with the members of the assembly who suspected the prince of collaboration with Russia. In 1841 the discontent in the assembly and the shifting attitude of the Russian authorities towards Ghica were maneuvered by the noble Gheorghe Bibescu,<sup>65</sup> the son of a high official from Little Walachia, a bureaucrat and later as a *vornic* during the Russian administration, and the spouse of a descendent of the Mavrocordat family. Bibescu mobilized members of the assembly across political divisions to submit a petition to the two Courts asking for the dismissal of Alexandru Ghica. The prince was deposed, and Bibescu won the elections that were held according to the Organic Regulations.

Alexandru Samurçaş, who had received from the prince Alexandru Ghica the office of president of the Commercial Law Court in Craiova and a promotion in noble rank with the title of cup bearer, did not suffer any drawback when Bibescu was elected to the throne in 1842. I could not find information as to whether Samurçaş participated to the extraordinary assembly entrusted with the election of the prince, or if he became a supporter of the new candidate to the rule.<sup>66</sup> But given that Alexandru Filipescu, the noble who was a witness at the wedding of Samurçaş and implicitly his protector, was a first class *boier* under Alexandru Ghica, Samurçaş might have been a supporter of Ghica too.<sup>67</sup> The association with supporters of the former prince might account for the fact that although prince Bibescu awarded the title of *clucer* to Samurçaş in 1845, the prince did not promote him in the judiciary hierarchy to a position in the appeal courts in Craiova or in Bucharest. The rise in the bureaucratic hierarchy was important to Samurçaş who hoped to receive higher salary and to relocate to Bucharest where he owned the land estate bestowed on him by his aunt Zoe. Alexandru began to pay attention to the estate in Ciorogârla (Samurcăşeşti) and to the monastery that his uncle and aunt had built there, without bequeathing revenues for its maintenance. In 1847, Alexandru and Zoe Samurçaş decided that they could not leave the monastery that preserved the name and the memory of the family without endowment



and decided to award to the ecclesiastical settlement the land on which the church was built and the surrounding plots.<sup>68</sup>

Unlike the early 1840s, when Samurçaș slowly acquired titles and positions that gave him a stable position in the context of the high nobles' rivalry for the throne, 1848 endangered his carefully planned career and life. The ideological frictions between the followers of the European liberalism and the other nobles, combined with local conflicts concerning the rule of the princes Bibescu and Sturdza led to radical political actions in 1848. Contemporary observers and Romanian historiography extensively analyzed the national and social program of the events in 1848 and strove to identify the groups that participated in the uprising.<sup>69</sup> The fact remains, however, that the events in 1848 in Walachia triggered the hostility of the Russian Empire and after a while, the intervention of the Ottoman Empire as well. The two empires stationed troops in Wallachia for the following two years, under the command of general Omar Pasha and general and count Alexander von Lüders. In 1849, the Porte and the Russian Court appointed Barbu Știrbei, the brother of Gheorghe Bibescu, as prince of Walachia.

Whether and to what extent Alexandru Samurçaș participated in the events during the spring of 1848 in Craiova is unknown but, similarly to Constantin Samurçaș who fled the uprising of 1821, he took refuge in Transylvania. At some point in the fall of 1848, when the revolution had been suppressed, the authorities of the military occupation dismissed Samurçaș from the position of president of the Commercial Law Court in Craiova. The measure dealt a heavy blow to Samurçaș who feared imprisonment or permanent exile and who lacked the financial means to live abroad for a long period of time. Even if he was pardoned and could return to Walachia, he could not secure a future for his family solely with the revenues from the rather small properties that he owned. It was under these difficult circumstances that he relied on the political and support networks in Little Walachia, of which he had been a member. His associates wrote a petition to the occupation authorities and pleaded for his return to Little Walachia. Soon after coming back to the province, he also wrote a petition-cum-biography for the commander of the Russian troops, general Lüders, in which he alluded to his relations to the nobles and bureaucrats of Craiova and to his service to request a promotion in the bureaucracy. Both documents illustrate that the endeavor of the Russian occupation from 1829-1834 of creating a bureaucracy in Walachia, intended to serve the Russian administration and create a culture of public

service, popularized the themes of bureaucratic effectiveness and public service. Their submission is also evocative of the fact that political networks and practices survived or mimicked those during the Phanariot rule on matters pertaining to bureaucratic career and local politics.

In October 1848 “inhabitants and owners” of Craiova wrote in French an “endorsement” for Alexandru Samurcaș who had been recently dismissed from the Commercial Court, on allegations of participation in the “revolution”. Even though the letter does not specify the addressee, this document was obviously meant to be read by someone in a decision-making position, most likely the Russian commander in Walachia. Nobles, merchants and a few leading clergymen rejected the denigrations against Samurcaș on account that he had been openly disgruntled with the revolutionary events that forced him to take refuge in Habsburg Transylvania at his own expense.<sup>70</sup> The signatories emphasized that the “inhabitants and owners” of Craiova, those who benefitted from Samurcaș’s activity, evaluated his service in the most positive terms. Reportedly, Samurcaș fulfilled his official duties impeccably and with great attention while also being a pleasant member of the local “society”.<sup>71</sup> Presenting a positive evaluation of Samurcaș’s bureaucratic service jointly with an assessment of his public persona was meant to show that the president of the Commercial Court corresponded entirely to the model for the officials’ behavior that the Russian authorities aimed to introduce through the Organic Regulations.

On the other hand, the letter also discloses connections that went beyond professional solidarity. The writers included the *clucer* (a sixth rank title in second class) George Coțofeanu,<sup>72</sup> the *clucer* Grigore Racoviță, the son of a Walachian-Phanariot family and a judge of the Criminal Court, and the fourth rank chancellor of customs the *logofăt al credinței* (or chancellor of customs, which was a first class, fourth title) Dimitrie Haralamb.<sup>73</sup> With the exception of Racoviță who had relocated from Moldavia to Walachia, Coțofeanu and Haralamb were natives of Little Walachia and descendants of members of the local council of officials, who, at the beginning of the century, had competed for power in the Western districts with the *kaymakam* Constantin Samurcaș, Alexandru’s uncle. After the Organic Regulations dissolved the political structures of the *boieri* council and the office of *kaymakam* and created instead a local judiciary institution, Coțofeanu served, similarly to Samurcaș as a judge of the Civil Court in Craiova and the two became close acquaintances. The same relation also connected Samurcaș and Grigore Racoviță.<sup>74</sup> Constantin

Haralamb, who had exerted judicial functions before 1830, but was active in the Law Courts after this date, had the same noble title like Samurçaș. However, unlike Samurçaș he owned large properties in Little Walachia.<sup>75</sup> These individuals were brought together by common activity within the same local judiciary institution and noble rank. Their group, underlain by office and title, branched out to merchants and a few clergymen from the town. The signing of the letter by descendants of former political rivals of Alexander's ancestor shows that the transformation of the local divan from a political forum into a judiciary institution alleviated the political tensions that had opposed the notables in Little Walachia to each other and to the notables in Bucharest at the beginning of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, it also shows that the members in the judiciary institution, who held noble titles, developed a network of mutual support relevant for politics at the local level and in Bucharest.

The Russian authorities must have heeded the certification of good behavior signed by the jurists and inhabitants of Craiova, as Alexander Samurçaș soon returned to the city and gathered the courage to write to general Lüders asking for a promotion to the office of judge in the court of appeal in Bucharest or in the parallel court in Craiova. His letter in French from December 1848 reviews the "political career" that he had developed since 1830 to show that he followed the itinerary of official service and nomination in rank drawn by the Organic Regulations and that his performance to date recommended him for promotion.

It is only to the Russian protection that I owe my political career. In 1832, under the administration of His Excellency General Kisselef (sic!) I was appointed prosecutor of the Criminal Court in Bucharest.<sup>76</sup> At the same time he recommended the future administration of the country to offer me a noble rank. In 1837 prince Ghica named me *serdar* but he did not promote me in office. It was in 1841, after my ninth year of service, that I was appointed judge in the Commercial Court in Bucharest. [...] Since 1842 I have constantly served as president (of the Commercial Court in Craiova) without having received any promotion in my office. Only in 1845 prince Bibesco (sic!) gave me the rank of *clucer* although he had repeatedly promised to appoint me to a more important office given my professional performance that he acknowledged and the attention with which I fulfilled the duties of the post assigned to me. [...] I believe I am entitled to aspire to a higher position as there are many individuals who, not having any of the above mentioned titles, are currently appointed judges in both courts of appeal in Craiova.

My wish, which I deliver to you, is none other but to be appointed judge in one of the Appeal Courts in Bucharest because hence I would be in the proximity of my estate, which is only two hours away from the city, and I would be able to oversee my family's affairs that I need to consider more, especially since my eldest daughter is of marriage age. If it is not feasible at present to receive such a job in Bucharest, I would be content with a comparable job here, in Craiova. Such a job would not be difficult to find for me because there is one more vacancy at the Appeal Civil Court. It is disheartening, my General, to have served for so long and without receiving promotion and at the same time to see others who, without having so many years in the job, overtook us.<sup>77</sup>

Particular about the letter is the fact that it does not contain any mentions about the service that the father and uncle of Samurcaș carried for the Phanariot princes or about the protection that his uncle offered him during the exile in Kronstadt between 1821 and 1825. This silence was meant to obscure the connection of Samurcaș with the ancient regime, which in the Russian authorities' opinion was "Asiatic" and "patrimonial".<sup>78</sup> He also aimed to show that he was entirely a servant and upholder of the modern principles of bureaucracy and government applied by the Russian authorities.

Samurcaș's attempt to distance himself from the ancient regime of the Phanariot rules might also explain why he did not mention his recent naturalization as a "local Romanian" through adoption and marriage. On the other hand it is also possible that the "naturalization" stipulated by the Organic Regulations, jointly with the way in which the Russian authorities redefined leadership and politics facilitated the inclusion in the local political groups of those whose ancestors were considered "Greek" or rallied to the Greek cause. Whereas Constantin Samurcaș, his uncle, was often called "Greek" or "new-comer" by his political rivals in Little Walachia, their heirs, Alexandru and the other bureaucrats and nobles from Little Walachia rallied to each other's help, with no mention about Alexandru's "foreign" ancestry.

Also particular about the document is the fact that although Samurcaș was not one of the major power players in Walachia, and although he was pleading for a rise in office, he referred to his past promotions in the bureaucracy and noble rank as his "political career". In this fashion Samurcaș might have intended to exaggerate the position that he actually held in the government of Walachia. Samurcaș used key-words that would have resonated with the letter's addressee and improved his chances of

receiving a higher position in the judiciary and a corresponding promotion in noble rank. His plight for promotion in office, and implicitly better pay, and for higher noble status was not motivated by the ambition to become a leading political figure in Walachia but by a more modest purpose. Samurcaș was aware that his advancement in the administrative and noble hierarchies was bound to end at some point, as he lacked the leverage of the high nobles. But at the same time he was committed not to miss any opportunity at promotion and secure a stable and well regarded position for his family, which would have later helped his offspring to accede to the first ranks of the nobility and public service.

The direct intervention near an individual who held power and could act as a patron, which was the way in which Samurcaș had received his promotions from the princes and in which he approached the Russian general, the references to family responsibilities together with mentions of his service are evocative of the patronage relations under the Ottoman ancient regime combined with discursive tropes alluring to the Russian authorities. To show his compliance with the mechanisms that the Organic Regulations introduced to rule administration and leadership, Alexandru counted scrupulously his appointments, the years of service in each of them and the individuals, all in positions of leadership, who could have assigned him to office and rank.<sup>79</sup> In addition, he emphasized that he accomplished each of the assignments with diligence and efficiency, conditions that would have warranted a promotion in office. The fact that Samurcaș believed his Russian addressee was receptive to issues such as “political career”, “service”, “competence” and hierarchy is revealed in the last paragraphs of the letter where he denounced those who did not qualify for the higher positions in the judicial apparatus but received high offices nonetheless. The rise of individuals without experience was, as the Russian authorities endeavored to make known, a menace to both the quality of the public service as well as to the hierarchy and order that allegedly featured the new administration in Walachia.

The letter also hints at the pursuit of a noble title of Samurcaș. This undisclosed purpose complements the open request for a better official appointment. In addition, it can also be detected in the references about the care for his family and land possessions, assets that only increased one’s prestige as a noble. Specifically, Samurcaș made the case that he preferred an appointment as president of the Court in Bucharest to be close to his estate that needed overseeing. Expressing care for his family could potentially add to his portrait as a noble who had to make sure that

the alliances his family would forge through the marriage of his daughters enhanced the family's prestige and status. Further, family was important to claim and bequeath hereditary noble title. Samurcaş hoped to find suitable matches for his daughters and bestow a noble rank to his son in addition to preparing him to launch a bureaucratic career. The two letters that I analyzed are therefore important testimonies for the way in which the discourse about bureaucratic efficiency was appropriated by Alexandru Samurcaş who continued to rely on local political networks and old practices such as interventions near patrons or family relations to enhance his position in the complex institutional-political hierarchy set up during the Organic Regulations.

Either because the Russian general did not heed the letter or because his reply was lost, the result of the plight of Alexandru Samurcaş remains unknown. Within the following decade, new international developments triggered another adjustment of the political leadership in Walachia and Moldavia. In 1857, the local temporary assemblies created by the Congress of Paris for the reorganization of the Principalities abolished the "noble" titles in administration and politics and made political participation dependent on property. We can assume that at this stage Samurcaş, similarly to other bureaucrats who held noble title, preserved the prestige associated with his position in the administration and that based on the ownership of properties, he obtained the right to political participation and representation.

## **Conclusion**

In this article I recreated the biography of Alexandru Samurcaş who was the political heir of an Ottoman-Phanariot official in Walachia and who became an official and noble in the Russian reformed administration, to discuss how the Russian active intervention in this Ottoman tributary affected local politics. With this question, my aim was to place the so-called "modernization" of Walachia in a broader theoretical perspective and to open it to comparative approaches. To achieve this aim, I looked at "modernization" as a method of imperial expansion that involves particular imperial measures and their interaction with the practices and relations in the society where they were applied. In its turn, this approach is also relevant for imperial history and particularly the history of Ottoman-Russian rivalry and Russian penetration in Ottoman territories.

I organized my analysis around two intersecting narratives. On the one hand I followed the unfolding of the Russian occupation, the recruitment of existing power holders in the administration, and the way in which the Russian-endorsed reforms, aimed at replacing the “Ottoman political culture” in Walachia, strove to circumscribe and control the political field by separating politics from bureaucracy and by re-defining leadership. On the other hand, the biography of Alexandru Samurçaș exposed the ways in which members or descendants of the old Walachian-Phanariot elites engaged with the re-conceptualization of their power and recovered the methods from their Ottoman past to create political networks based on patronage, locality and family relations.

This political-administrative organization survived the revolution of 1848 but it did not survive the changes that the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War and the Congress of Paris ending this war brought to the status of the Danube provinces and in local government. In 1857 the European Concert of Powers called for local Walachian and Moldavian assemblies to decide on the organization of the principalities under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. These assemblies, which paved the way to the union of Walachia and Moldavia under the name of the United Principalities, spelled the abolition of “nobility” by cancelling privileges, regulating taxation, making administrative employment public and by imposing mandatory military service.<sup>80</sup> However, the abolition of “nobility” did not entail the removal of the former “nobles” from political leadership. Although ranks were abolished, property ownership, which was a defining component of the “nobles” status, became the condition for political participation. On the other hand, the abolition of “nobility” led to reconsiderations of the past and of claims to ancestry among the Phanariot *boieri* and the Organic Regulations’ nobles in the effort of recreating distinctions of social status and prestige.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> About the widely discussed political backwardness of the Balkans, see Maria Todorova, "The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism", *Slavic Review*, 64, no. 1 (2005): 148-149; and Suraiya Faruqi and Fikret Adanir, "Introduction" in *The Ottomans and the Balkans – A Discussion of Historiography*, Suraiya Faruqi and Fikret Adanir (ed.), (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 42.
- <sup>2</sup> The names of the characters in this paper had different spellings in Romanian, Greek and the languages of foreign observers and diplomats. For consistency, I used exclusively the Romanian spelling.
- <sup>3</sup> Barbara Jelavich, *Russia and the formation of the Romanian national state 1821-1878*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 32-33; Neagu Djuvara, *Între Orient și Occident – Țările Române la începutul epocii moderne*, (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2009), 353-354; Nevill Forbes, Arnold J. Toynbee, D. Mitraby and D.G. Hogarth, *The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria-Serbia-Greece-Romania-Turkey*, (Oxford, Clarendon Press New York, 1915), 225-226.
- <sup>4</sup> S.N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus* 129, no. 1(2000):2.
- <sup>5</sup> Richard Wolin, "'Modernity': The Peregrinations of a Contested Historiographical Concept," *American Historical Review* 116, no. 3(2011): 748-749.
- <sup>6</sup> Suraiya Faruqi and Fikret Adanir, "Introduction," in *The Ottomans and the Balkans – A Discussion of Historiography* edited by Suraiya Faruqi and Fikret Adanir, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 21-24.
- <sup>7</sup> Ariel Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire, Rival Paths to the Modern State*, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 4-5, 11.
- <sup>8</sup> Ali Yaycioglu, "The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, Crisis and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1789-1812)", Ph.D. Thesis (Harvard University, 2008), 292-293, 456-457.
- <sup>9</sup> Selim Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 2(2003):311-312.
- <sup>10</sup> James Cracraft, *The Petrine Revolution in Russian Culture*, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 154-159; John P. LeDonne, *Absolutism and Ruling Class – The Formation of the Russian Political Order 1700-1825*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 74-75, 146-151; Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, *The Play of Ideas in Russian Enlightenment Theatre*, (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004).
- <sup>11</sup> Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 658-660.
- <sup>12</sup> Alexander Bitis, *Russia and the Eastern Question: Army, Government, and Society 1815-1833*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 442.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 429.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 443.



- 15 Marcel Suveică, "Starea de spirit a boierilor din Principate în ajunul războiului ruso-turc din 1828-1829. Date din arhivele rusești," *Analele Științifice ale Universității Al. I. Cuza din Iași (Serie Nouă)* XLII-XLIII, (1996-1997): 15.
- 16 Dionisie Fotino, *Istoria Generală a Daciei sau a Transilvaniei, Țării Muntenesi și a Moldovei*, (Bucharest, Valahia, 2008), 651-652.
- 17 Octav-George Lecca, *Familiiile boierești române* (Bucharest: Libra, 2001), 301, 549, 550.
- 18 Christine Philliou, *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 57.
- 19 Mustafa A. Mehmet, *Documente turcești privind istoria României*, (Bucharest: Editura Academiei R.S.România, 1986), vol. III, 174.
- 20 See the letters and memoirs of Mihail Sturdza, the representative of the exiled boieri from Moldavia, Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor*, (Bucharest: Soccec, 1882), vol. IV, supl. I, 7, 22-23, 28-29, 35.
- 21 BAR Fondul Alexandru Tzigara- Samurcaș, S43/DCXC, f.2. recto.
- 22 Alexander Bitis, *Russia and the Eastern Question...*, 317.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 362.
- 24 E.S. Creasy, "Appendix A: Treaty of Adrianople," in *History of Ottoman Turks: from the beginning of their empire to the present time. Chiefly founded on Von Hammer*, (London R. Bentley, 1854), 516.
- 25 *Ibid.*, 517.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 522-523.
- 27 Memoire of Mihai Cantacuzino from 1772, Memoire of several boieri from Walachia from 1789 in *Mémoires et projets de réforme dans les principautés roumaines 1769-1830*, edited by Vlad Georgescu, (Bucharest: Association internationale d'études du Sud-Est européen, 1970), 37, 42.
- 28 Viorel Panaite, "Wallachia and Moldavia from the Ottoman Juridical and Political Viewpoint 1774-1829," in *Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850. Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation*, edited by Antonis Anastasopoulos and Elias Kolovos, (Rethymno: Department of History and Archaeology of the University of Crete, 2007)31-32, 40.
- 29 Florin Constantiniu, "Sărmanele raiale": factorul otoman în geneza politici de reformă a domnilor fanarioți," *Caietul Laboratorului de Studii Otomane* 1, (1989) 1990, 189-199.
- 30 Specifically, Ștefan Bălăceanu, Grigore Filipescu, M. Băleanu, Constantin and Lupu Balș, V. Hrisorverghi, see Ioan C. Filitti, *Les Principautés Roumaines sous l'Occupation Russe (1828-1834)*, (Bucharest: L'Indépendance Roumaine, 1904), 59-60, 76, 79.
- 31 Alexander Bitis, *Russia and the Eastern Question...*, 145.
- 32 Ioan C. Filitti, *Les Principautés Roumaines ...*, 59-60.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 72.
- 34 ANIC, Documente istorice 2270, Pachet MDXII, No. 3.
- 35 ANIC, Documente istorice 2270, Pachet MDXII, No. 3, 20.
- 36 Ioan C. Filitti, *Les Principautés Roumaines ...*, 68.

- 37 He was the brother of a former prince of Walachia, Grigore IV Ghica, whom the Ottomans appointed after the dismantlement of the Phanariots, and of a future prince of Walachia, Alexander II Ghica, Eugène Rizo-Rangabé, *Livre d'or de la noblesse phanariote en Grèce, en Roumanie, en Russie et en Turquie*, (Athens: Imprimerie S.C. Vlastos, 1892), 47-48.
- 38 Ioan C. Filitti, *Les Principautés Roumaines ...*, 90.
- 39 Mihai Cantacuzino, *Istoria politică și geografică a Țării Românești de la cea mai veche a sa întemeiere până la anul 1774*, trans. George Sion, (Bucharest: Tipografia Națională a lui Stephan Rassidescu, 1863), 15-16; Marc-Philippe Zallony, *Essai sur les Phanariotes*, (Marseilles: Imprimerie d'Antoine Ricard, 1824), 49-53.
- 40 Paul Cernovodeanu and Irina Gavrilă, *Arhondologiile Țării Românești de la 1837*, (Brăila: Muzeul Brăilei, Editura Istros, 2002), 3-5.
- 41 Paul Cernovodeanu, "Mobility and traditionalism: the evolution of the boyar class in the Romanian principalities in the 18th century," *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, 24, no. 3 (1986):250.
- 42 Gheorghe Platon and Alexandru Florin Platon, *Boierimea din Moldova în secolul XIX*, (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 1995), 92-93.
- 43 *Regulamentul Organic*, (Bucharest: Eliad, 1832), Chapter VIII, Section 1, art. 350 - art. 351, 187
- 44 *Ibid*, Chapter VIII, Section 1, art. 352-356, 188-189.
- 45 The first level courts for Bucharest and Craiova were those of the corresponding districts of Dolj and Ilfov, *Regulament Judicătoresc: coprinzător de capul al șaptelea din Regulamentul organic...* (Bucharest: Tipografia I. Eliad, 1839), 14.
- 46 Art. 267, *Ibid.*, 38-39.
- 47 Art. 299; Art 300, *Ibid.*, 55.
- 48 *Ibid.*, 39.
- 49 *Ibid.*, 39.
- 50 *Ibid.*, 4.
- 51 *Ibid.*, 3.
- 52 Ioan. C. Filitti, *Les Principautés Roumaines...*, 233-234.
- 53 In fact the comis was the name of the official that oversaw the hospodar's stables and who occupied a leading place in the traditional ceremony for the hospodar's arrival in the province.
- 54 ANIC, Documente istorice 2270, Pachet MDXV/no. 63.
- 55 For lack of documentation, I could not date precisely the birth of the three children of Zoe and Alexandru Samurcaș. Finding letters that the daughters and son wrote in the 1850s and 1860s (BAR, Fondul Alexandru Tzigara Samurcas, S 26, S 27, S 28 (1-4), S 37, S 39 (1-3, 6)/DCXCI) I inferred the approximate years of their birth as the 1830s and 1840s respectively.
- 56 Paul Cernovodeanu and Irina Gavrilă, *Arhondologiile Țării Românești de la 1837*, 5.
- 57 ANIC, Documente istorice 2270, Pachet MDXII/ No. 81-82, 90, 94.

- 58 ANIC, Documente istorice 2270, Pachet MDXII/ No 112, 159, 171.  
 59 Paul Cernovodeanu and Irina Gavrilă, *Arhondologiile Țării Românești de la 1837*, 5.  
 60 Ioan C. Filitti, *Banii și Caimacamii Craiovei*, (Craiova: Scrisul Românesc, 1924), 16.  
 61 ANIC, Documente istorice 2270, Pachet MDXIII/No. 42.  
 62 ANIC, Documente istorice 2270, Pachet MDXII/No. 162.  
 63 Panaioti Rizos, *Mémoires du prince Nicolas Soutzo, Grand Logothète de Moldavie, 1798-1871*, (Vienna: Gerold&Co., 1899), 112-113, 123; A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Traiană*, (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1925), vol. XI, 137-138.  
 64 Panaioti Rizos, *Mémoires du prince Nicolas Soutzo...*, 109-110, 112, 115.  
 65 A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Traiană*, 145.  
 66 The participation in this assembly was limited to 50 first class nobles, 73 second class nobles (nobles in both classes being chosen by their peers), 36 nobles from the districts and 27 deputies of corporations. Alexandru As a paharnic. Samurcaș would have qualified for being elected to the assembly.  
 67 Ion Filipescu, the son of Alexandru Filipescu, even served in the prince's executive council and was in charge of foreign affairs and chancellery. See Octav-George Lecca, *Familiile boierești române*, 280.  
 68 Alexandru Tzigara-Samurcaș, *Memorii*, (Bucharest: Editura "Grai și suflet – cultura națională, 1991), vol. I, 25.  
 69 Panaioti Rizos, *Mémoires du prince Nicolas Soutzo...*, 153-155; A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria Românilor din Dacia Traiană*, 50-52, 55, 60.  
 70 ANIC, Documente istorice 2270, Pachet MDXIII/no. 159, f. 1 verso.  
 71 ANIC, Documente istorice, 2270, Pachet MDXIII/no. 159.  
 72 Paul Cernovodeanu and Irina Gavrilă, *Arhondologiile Țării Românești...*, 80.  
 73 *Ibid.*, 104.  
 74 Ilie I. Vulpe, *Divanul Craiovei*, (Craiova: Scrisul Românesc, 2002), 250-251.  
 75 Octav-George Lecca, *Familiile boierești române*, 601.  
 76 In fact, Samurcaș exaggerated his position – he did not serve as prosecutor of the Criminal Court of Bucharest but of the district of Ilfov, a court inferior to that of Bucharest, see above.  
 77 ANIC, Documente istorice 2270, Pachet MDXII/No. 162.  
 78 Alexander Bitis, *Russia and the Eastern Question...*, 443.  
 79 The *Regulamentul Organic* stipulated that the Ordinary Assembly had decided the offices that came with a title and the steps for advancement, but the prince was the one to appoint the incumbents of offices in the administration and judicial apparatus, 188.  
 80 Gheorghe Platon and Alexandru Florin Platon, *Boierimea din Moldova în secolul XIX*, 141.

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# CONFIGURATION OF THE “BESSARABIAN QUESTION” IN TODAY’S ROMANIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

## Introduction

May 16 was an important date for Moldovan-Romanian history: 200 years ago, the Russian-Ottoman Bucharest treaty opened the way for cession of Bessarabia to the Russian Empire. This historical event is nowadays embedded in political tensions between Russia, Romania and Moldova (as well as within Moldova), thus adding much fervor to the historical debate. In fact, this situation leads to securitization of history, when historical narrative from a dialogue between various research approaches turns into instruments for particular national projects.

There are two dominating paradigms in the historical debate in this region of Europe: one claims that Russia and Moldova have been mostly partners and share a common legacy, while another portrays Russian imperialism as a tragedy for all Romanians. Zealots of both approaches on May 16 have organized political actions and conferences, which instead of providing opportunities for discussions, became more like playgrounds for transmitting the well-known over-ideologized positions.

The results of such a polarization are enhanced stereotypes in all countries involved. For example, the relatively liberal Russian internet portal Lenta.ru tends to publish normally news from Moldova which overemphasizes marginal political events, misrepresenting them as a position of official Moldova. For example, on the May 15 it reported about an initiative of the Young wing of Moldova’s Liberal Party, which sent a letter to the Russian president with the request to withdraw troops from Moldova. This piece was entitled “The Moldovans requested Putin to correct mistakes of Alexander I,”<sup>1</sup> yet the Liberal Party which tries to exploit anti-Russian sentiments is far from influential at all.

Consequently, policy approaches of Russia and Romania toward Republic of Moldova could be treated as an important subject for scientific investigation due to two main reasons. Firstly, the so called “Bessarabian issue” which is by itself a historical issue is still being taken up, predominantly in Moldova and partially by both Moscow and Bucharest. Nevertheless, overcoming the history (*Geschichtsbewaeltigung*) is a key aim of the “European project” and preservation of such issues damages the advance of European idea in the Eastern part of the continent. Secondly, the Russian-Romanian cooperation is a very important factor which would favor the formation of civic identity in Moldova. Moldova remains a society with dramatically split identity and if external powers will not contribute to the end of identity wars in Chisinau, Moldova will further be a state with a high internal conflict potential.

Methodologically, the author tries to deconstruct Russian and Romanian policy agendas not through geopolitical categories but from the poststructuralist perspective. Such concepts as “Transnistrianization” and “Romanization” which are being used to describe what the counteragent is doing in Moldova are not sufficient and they also hide the fact that the so called “Bessarabian issue” is today being sponsored first of all by some political forces in Moldova and not in Bucharest or Moscow. The foreign policy interests of both countries are a far more difficult subject of analysis than it usually seems to be. In the comparative perspective the approaches of two powers will be analyzed in order to find out similarities and differences in their political motivations and practices regarding Republic of Moldova.

### **Russia: Foreign policy mismanagement**

In order to understand specific policies of two countries in Moldova we should begin with analyzing a more general framework of national foreign policies. If to look at Moscow’s approach, it seems to be that Russia has a pro-active strategy of regaining a status of great (or at least regional) power and is very obstructive toward pro-European course of Newly Independent States including Moldova. But an alternative methodological approach brings us to the idea that “near abroad” (and also Moldova) is a great “ideological illusion” of the post-Soviet Russian society, which remains traumatized after all the events happened with Russia in the twentieth century. Russian foreign policy is fixed on “near abroad”, this

fixation is quite important for Russian public opinion, in which the “great power” feelings are very desirable. All the sociological studies show that Putin’s foreign policy has been very popular among Russians; he skillfully manipulated these psychological needs of citizens of the former empire.<sup>2</sup>

But because of such a psychological burden the Russian foreign policy is rather reactive than pro-active.<sup>3</sup> It means that Russian decision-makers simply react on external events which seem to be hostile to them. The Russian national fears of the post-Soviet period have been NATO enlargement, which is being perceived as an instrument of exclusion of Russia from Europe, and so called color revolutions, being portrayed as a complot of external forces to oust local governments. Besides, the Russian “ideological illusion” needed a great historical event which could be showed as a moment of maximal greatness of Russia in Europe and the whole world. The heritage of the Second World War became such a moment and for Moscow the treatment of this heritage by other nations is key criteria for evaluating them as hostile or friendly. All these discursive elements have played a very important role in defining the Russian priorities in Moldova.

But the Russian state is facing a great challenge of poor institutional capacity. The state institutions in Russia are in crisis, first of all because of dominating clan politics, ever-augmenting corruption and intransparency. Besides, the unstable socio-economic situation and shrinking of national economy do not favor the active foreign policy. All these factors lead to the limitation of Russian foreign policy resources, and, first of all, the inability to use the potential for soft power which is present in the post-soviet area. Consequently, two main institutional elements in the Russian foreign policy are interests of specific actors like Gazprom and emotions of key decision-maker like Putin. These institutional misbalances are very acute for the Russian approach toward Moldova. They make it negative, intrasparent and unpredictable for external audiences.

Russia has a “red line” in Moldova, namely the integration of this country into NATO. Romania is being perceived in this regard as the main driver of this process. Romania has still very ambiguous relations with Moscow, what is caused not only through Bucharest’s readiness to provide its territory for stationing the anti-missile defense system of the United States, but also through contradictory position of Romanian president T. Basescu on Moldovan statehood. Consequently, Russia is aware of Romanian attempts to gain cultural and political influence in Moldova and calls all related processes “Romanization”. This is a tremendous

oversimplification and politicization of identity issues on the Moscow's part, and it makes Russian position vulnerable. Social interactions between Romania and Moldova are growing on the basis of economic reasons and linguistic and cultural proximity. And Russia tries here to operate with inappropriate geopolitical categories.

Second problem of Russian foreign policy, also caused by "NATO background", is a story with the ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Moscow's distrust toward NATO brings Russian decision-makers to the idea about the necessity to guarantee Moldova's (and to some extent Ukrainian) neutrality through further stationing of the 14<sup>th</sup> Army's remnants in Transnistria. This fact also contributes to the stalemate in Transnistrian conflict settlement. But we should also stress that the Western position linking the ratification of Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova is also tough.

There are also other contexts in which Russia perceives Moldova. Firstly, the Moscow's stance toward events in April 2009 in Chisinau should be mentioned. Looking at the reaction of Russian state mass-media we could see that Moscow interpreted these events as the latest in a series of "color revolutions".<sup>4</sup> Much time was needed before Russian perception of the Alliance for European Integration ceased to be negative and related to the idea that the Moldovan government is a mechanism imposed by US and the EU. The second context is the politicization of heritage of the World War II. It is well-known that short-term Russian sanctions in 2010 were caused by provocative behavior of the Moldovan president M. Gimpu who tried to establish a new commemoration day – a day of Soviet occupation. Besides, Liberal Party of M. Gimpu, a part of the governing Alliance, has been openly speaking about Russian imperialism and occupation of Moldovan territory. Despite the fact that Moscow does not trust Vladimir Voronin (particularly after the story with the Kozak Memorandum and Voronin's "pro-Russian" orientation in 2001) the Party of Communists became the least evil for Moscow which understand very good that Mr. Voronin is simply manipulating the pro-Russian stance in the struggle with other Moldovan political forces.

At the end Russian foreign policy toward Moldova is not consistent. Such steps as the visit of Mr. Naryshkin (the Head of Russian Presidential Administration who tried after the elections in December 2010 to influence the formation of the Moldovan government), visits of representatives of the Russian parliament (who tried to convince Moldovans not to give up their statehood), short-term sanctions have been tremendously disturbing the

Russian image in Moldova and the EU and, most importantly, they were not successful. Russia gives by itself enough reasons to think about it as a neo-imperial power. But in the reality it is simply a failure to produce a long-term strategy and transparent instruments for gaining the positive influence in the country. Consequently, Russia fails to spread the message about today's pragmatic relations with Chisinau, which were interrupted but not undermined by sanctions and political misunderstandings.

Some analysts even come to the conclusion that Russia has been strongly opposing the Moldovan integration into the EU. It is rather an exaggeration. In Russian foreign policy practices no measures for curbing the EU integration of Moldova could be indicated. As it has been mentioned above, Russia is opposing only the military integration of Moldova into the West. Moldova's European integration could cause concern only if it would lead to the total destruction of integrationist regimes which already exist between Moldova and Russia within the CIS system. Moldova is pursuing the path of gradual integration into the EU and for example it has already been confirmed that Moldova's participation in the CIS Free Trade Area does not contradict with the regime of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU.<sup>5</sup>

Let us briefly characterize the Moldovan-Russian relations in their material dimension. In the 1990s, Moldova did not take part in any of the illusory projects within the Commonwealth of Independent States (like the Economic Union) and it was neither politicized nor securitized by Moscow, just acknowledged as a reality. In order to further the withdrawal of Russian forces from its territory, Chisinau declared constitutional neutrality as the basic principle of its national security identity. Like Azerbaijan, Moldova abstained from any substantial military cooperation with Moscow.<sup>6</sup>

Moldova also rejected any participation in Russian-led political integration. In this area, Chisinau has been more loyal to the GU(U)AM project, which is an expression of the ideological orientation of its member countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Uzbekistan which participated in this organization till 2005) toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration. When the "Concept on Further Development of the CIS" was worked out in 2007, Moldova made a reservation stating that the country would not participate in political cooperation among member states. Political cooperation was planned only at the level of exchanging views on major issues of world politics and cooperation in monitoring elections, without any further ambitions.<sup>7</sup> The conversations about eventual Moldovan participation in institutions like The Union of

Russia and Belarus were held in the context of the domestic pre-election agendas of certain politicians including Vladimir Voronin elected to the Moldovan Presidency in 2001 with some pro-Russian slogans, and they did not lead to any serious changes in the Moldovan stance towards Russia.

All these circumstances contributed to changes in how Moldova has been perceived by Moscow. Unlike Belarus or Ukraine, Moldova began to outgrow the status of the “Russian near abroad” early.

Regimes of a common free trade area and visa liberalization let Moldova take great advantage of economic cooperation with Moscow during its own ongoing economic instability – without any substantial political concessions. The transfer of migrant workers provided an existential ground for the Moldovan society. The Russian market still remains one of the top priorities for Moldovan exports.

On the other side, this interconnectedness does not mean that a situation of asymmetrical dependence can be identified. Trade with Russia amounted in the last few years only to 14–16 percent of total Moldovan trade turnover with foreign countries.<sup>8</sup> The visible politicization of bilateral trade relations began after the deterioration in bilateral relations in 2005. In 2006 Russia banned the import of alcohol produced in Moldova, mainly in response to the change of the border regime for Transnistrian exports, in what was perceived by Moscow as “political action” aimed at “bringing the whole of Transnistrian external economic activity under control of Chisinau, undermining the regional budget, and causing social unrest there.”<sup>9</sup> In 2010 Russia restricted the import of vegetables and fruits from Moldova, supposedly because Moscow could not tolerate any more explicitly anti-Russian rhetoric of the interim Moldovan President Mihai Ghimpu.<sup>10</sup> But in all the cases both sides were interested in normalization of the situation as soon as possible (the price stability of the Russian market also depends on the relatively cheap import from Moldova). In a strategic perspective it brought even some advantages to Chisinau: despite short-term economic damages, Chisinau was motivated to improve the quality of its exported goods and get rid of any kind of “special” treatment from the Russian side. This special treatment was there when Moldova was provided with unproblematic access to the Russian market in exchange of the symbolic strategic partnership demonstrated towards Moscow. The commercial logic of “just doing business” is one of the main results of all the trade sanctions and restrictions.

One of main external instruments to influence Moldovan policy is the allocation of credit. The country needs foreign loans because its integration

into world economy after dissolution of the Soviet Union brought many extreme challenges to its economy and social sphere. This instrument is fully controlled by the Western institutions like International Monetary Fund and World Bank. During 2009–2012 the country will receive \$588 million from the IMF, according to the agreement signed on October 28, 2009.<sup>11</sup> Financial assistance of €273.1 million is going to be transferred to Moldova from 2011–2013 by the EU.<sup>12</sup>

In 2009 Russia tried to negotiate the allocation of a \$500 million loan to Moldova. It was even reported that the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the federal law regulating this operation.<sup>13</sup> But the agreement was not consummated and in the end the Moldovan authorities managed to receive funding from IMF.

Moldova's almost complete dependence on gas deliveries from Russia is a sensitive issue for both Moscow and Chisinau. Some criticize Russia for using gas prices in order to influence the political process in Moldova.<sup>14</sup> This analysis is without solid empirical evidence, yet nevertheless it attempts to calculate moment by moment what Russia might have gotten politically from increasing gas prices. For example, it is an exaggeration to say that Gazprom increased prices for Moldova from 1998–2000 in order to influence the destabilized political situation. The policy of Gazprom was based instead on fiscal logic – the Russian government was seeking to fill out the budget in order to overcome the critical socio-economic situation in Russia and it dramatically restricted its tax policy toward the gas giant, putting it under the threat of non-profitability.<sup>15</sup>

It can be said, however, that the Russian government later used the energy dependence of Moldova as a political carrot and as a means to acquire energy transmission networks. For example, in the period of "strategic partnership" from 2001–2003 the gas prices for Chisinau were frozen and Moldova even received the right to delay payments. This carrot policy better illustrates the additional motivation on the Moldovan side to deepen relations – and it is as legitimate as the EU policy in the sphere of integration. Derek Averre speaks in this regard about structural power logic, according to which Russia should be involved with the events happening in its neighborhood, and try to influence them in order to have "friendly" relations with neighboring countries.<sup>16</sup>

The gradual increase of gas prices can be better understood in the Moldovan case through commercial logic. In contrast with Ukraine, the issue looks more economic than political. In the case of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin officially acknowledged the political

motivation of Russian foreign policy standing behind the gas crisis in 2006: "Our European and American partners decided to support the "Orange Revolution" even to the point of breaking the constitution. They supported this. First, the political result is problematic enough and we see how the situation developed there. Second, if you supported this political outcome and want it supported further, you pay for it. You want to have the political dividends, but we should pay for it. This cannot be tolerated".<sup>17</sup>

That is why Moscow insisted on such a tremendous increase of gas prices for Ukraine and showed for such a long time no readiness to find a compromise in giving Kiev enough time to get accustomed to high energy costs. Moldova did not face this kind of treatment.

Contradictory policy is also demonstrated by Russia within the Transnistrian conflict settlement. On one hand, Russia is manipulating this conflict with the aim to keep its political influence in the whole Moldova. But on the other side, Russian motivation also contains the idea that Russian leadership in the conflict settlement could be demonstrated as positive contribution to the European security. If we look at the history of Russian participation in the conflict settlement, we can find not only Kozak Memorandum, but also Kiev Document (2002) and Memorandum on Normalization of Moldovan-Transnnistrian relations (1997) which were two attempts of conflict resolution rather in the internationalized format.

Yes, after 2003 Russian policy became one-sided, obstructive and oriented on status quo, but it does not mean that no progress with Russia as a leading actor in the Transnistrian conflict settlement is possible. Signing of the Russian-German Meseberg memorandum in June 2010 was a good step forward, as well as contribution to the power change in Tiraspol. To our mind, foreign policy of President Medvedev was more open toward cooperation initiatives in relations with the West. It was driven by understanding of objective factors which does not favor the existing Russian position in Moldova and even Transnistria anymore. As factors gradual integration of Moldova with the EU (leading to marginalization of Transnistria and consequently Russian role in Moldova) and also the price which Russia should pay for Transnistrian de-facto independence should be mentioned. But Putin's return to the Kremlin means now that the Kremlin will perceive all "experiments" in relations with the West as dangerous games but the structural factors described will push Russia toward understanding that the status quo in Moldova should be reformed.

The appointment of Dmitry Rogozin, former representative of Russia in NATO and nowadays deputy prime-minister responsible for military



industry, has blown up the information space around Transnistria. Experts and politicians – Russian, Moldovan, and Romanian – tend to see in this nomination a symbol of Moscow's readiness to initiate some kind of triumphal return to Moldovan politics and, more generally, one of the means to regain dominant positions within the post-soviet space. These comments are also being voiced in the context of Russian domestic politics: it is expected that the new-old president Putin will try to show new dynamism in both foreign and internal affairs. At least, the Customs Union project was one of his key pre-election moves.

It should be noted that the official job title of Rogozin is "special representative on Transnistria," and the appointment took place alongside the similar appointments of "representatives" for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Yet Transnistria, unlike these Caucasian territories, is not recognized by any state, including Russia itself. But in the context of these appointments the Transnistrian issue was problematized in the same logic and with analogous formulations. This shows that Moscow draws parallels between all cases of secession, and looks for more or less similar mechanisms for conflict settlement which would take into due consideration the interests of Georgia and Moldova.

All three quasi-states have been going through their own election campaigns, yet by now the Kremlin-promoted scenarios turned out to be unsuccessful. In the Transnistrian election of December 2011 the pro-Kremlin candidate Anatoly Kaminsky failed. Evgeny Shevchuk, who was not associated with any political or financial organization in the region, won the overwhelming majority of the votes. During the pre-election campaign vast PR resources, including those coming from Moscow, were used for accusing Shevchuk in pro-Western or pro-Moldavian positions. Political distance between Shevchuk and Moscow was evident: in the Kremlin he was perceived rather as an unwelcome challenger of the officialdom and as an unpredictable politician. It is noteworthy that Shevchuk was the first local political figure who officially blamed former president of Transnistria Igor Smirnov for "monarchical ambitions" in 2009.

Besides these political circumstances, Transnistria is being now in the situation of permanent socio-economic crisis. Since 2006 it managed to preserve its autonomy only thanks to (in)direct support from Russia. The payment for the Russian gas has been reallocated to the Transnistrian budget in order to cover its enormous deficit. Russian financial help has been aimed at stabilizing social and financial situation. The mass media

has already announced that a new Russian tranche for Transnistria (150 billion dollars) is going to be transferred in the nearest future.

Yet Russia's control over political processes in Transnistria is far from certain. For Moscow, the close relationship with Tiraspol is a key instrument to prevent any serious (geo)political changes in and around Moldova, first of all its hypothetical NATO accession. It does not mean that Moscow is categorically against Moldova's reintegration to the West, but it wants it to happen only under Russian auspices and be conditioned by a gradual confederalization of Moldova.

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the Kremlin decided to find a coordinator for Russian policies toward this unrecognized republic with sufficient political and administrative resources to implement such an understanding of Russian national interests. However, Rogozin's appointment does not mean that Russia tries to contrive a new proactive strategy towards the Transnistrian conflict settlement or Moldova in general. There is no evidence that Moscow will again (as it was the case in 2006-2007) come up with the sovereignization strategy towards Transnistria through recognizing it *de facto*. Currently Russia is short of economic and financial possibilities to accomplish an efficient integration of Transnistria (which even lacks a common border with Russia) into the Customs Union or on a bilateral track.

In the meantime, during his stay in Brussels Rogozin had been a clear symbol of Russia's distancing from the West. For his future counterparts from Moldova, Romania and the EU he appears to be a much less convenient interlocutor that, for example, Sergey Gubarev, Russian Foreign Ministry's coordinator of the Russian position in the Transnistrian settlement. However, Rogozin's appointment does not mean that Russia prefers to let the Meseberg process fail. Perhaps he will try to add some dynamism into the negotiations, but he will have to act in the multilateral context. Unilateral activities, like those related to the so-called Kozak Memorandum in 2003, are not possible any more, taking into account the Moldovan realities: the Alliance for European Integration seems to be rather successful in overcoming the internal political crisis, and the EU is more engaged now into Moldovan affairs. But due to his image of Russian intransigent nationalist, Rogozin is a rather questionable appointee for multilateral diplomacy. Rogozin got his new job for keeping the status quo and Russian role in Moldova as it is, despite all its ambivalence. It is premature to await any serious changes in the situation around Transnistria with his new role.

## **Romania: unfinished transition and hidden meanings of political language**

While speaking on Romania we can say that the main tendency of the Romanian politics is gradual deactualization of the “Bessarabian issue” because of tremendous mental, socio-economic and political transformation which by its success should lead to: de-nationalization of the public opinion in Romania and its turn toward pragmatic issues and, secondly, to contextualization of Romanian national priorities according to norms, institutions and practices of European and Euro-Atlantic community.

The greatest politicization of the Moldovan topic took place in Romania in 1992 in connection with the activity of 14th Army in the Transnistrian issue which was perceived as Russian interference into Moldovan/Romanian affairs. Once again shadow of Russian imperialism appeared and a “rich” historical heritage of Russian-Romanian history, written in Romania as a history of complots against Romania, was activated. For example, during the Soviet era a Romanian historian in exile G. Cioranescu found out three such complots of Russia against Romania, aimed at depriving the Romanian state of Bessarabia as its integral part: that of Alexander I. with Napoleon, Alexander II. with other European great powers and that agreed between fascist Germany and Soviet Union in 1940.<sup>18</sup> In 1992 a new commander-in-chief of the Russian 14<sup>th</sup> Army Alexander Lebed had many times threatened rhetorically not only Moldova, but also Romania. One of his most “hot” sentences was:

If Romania does not stop its belligerent rhetoric, Russian armor will stay in Bucharest in two days... If we will have to do it, we will have a breakfast in Tiraspol, have a lunch in Chisinau and have a dinner in Bucharest.<sup>19</sup>

Nevertheless, many factors curbed any active engagement of Romania in Moldova. Firstly, a pragmatic position of the Romanian president Ion Iliescu toward Russia was a critical point for many observers. A more important factor had been the fear to create the precedent for the Transylvanian issue. Instead of appeals to support Chisinau at any price the key Romanian nationalistic parties – Greater Romania Party and Vatra Romaneasca – preferred to prioritize Transylvania. It was understandable first of all in the context of deteriorating Hungarian-Romanian relations at the beginning of 1990s.<sup>20</sup> Besides, any adventurism of Romania in

Moldova would not have been supported by the West which at that time was challenged by other issues like Middle East, Africa and integration of Central Europe. The pragmatic decision-makers in Bucharest should have made concessions to the public, but their support for Chisinau did not go beyond limited military assistance and diplomatic statements.

The Transnistrian problem, understood also in connection with the Transylvanian issue, created an insurmountable hurdle for the reunification movement, which had the biggest amount of supporters among the Moldovan National Front. But the external factor should not be overestimated: pro-Romanian forces in Moldova began to loose their popularity very soon and in 1994 a "Moldavenist" Agrarian-Democratic Party came to power. A "public opinion poll" was held on 6 March 1994 on the future status of Moldova. Although the nationalistic opposition had called for a boycott of this non-binding referendum, the turnout was 75% of the total population, of whom more than 95% expressed their support for the continued independence of Moldova.<sup>21</sup> The behavior of the Moldovan President Mircea Snegur had shown the tendencies very good: the Moldovan elites together with the de-nationalizing electorate decided to preserve the independent Moldova, despite all its economic and political perturbations.

In 1990s a gradual political distancing of Chisinau and Bucharest from each other took place. The Romanian society went through a difficult process of social, mental and economic transformation. The public opinion turned rather to daily issues. And Moldova learnt to cope with its dramatic socio-economic problems alone, loosing illusions about any massive external support. The same processes could be indicated in Russia: while in 1992-1996 the rights of compatriots in the "near abroad" were a big political issue, since 1997 it became a marginal problem. Such a "collective forgetting" is still there: during Putin's times the incoherent politicization of minorities' rights could be registered only regarding the Baltic countries.

To the end of 1990s in Romania a societal consensus about the priority of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the country was reached. The main countries of the European Union and USA invested many resources, material and non-material, into processes of normalization of international relations in Central and Eastern Europe. Overcoming of historical contradictions is one of the key elements of the European political project, that's why if Romania had wanted to join the EU and NATO, it should have searched for mutual understanding with the

neighbors (Hungary and Ukraine in particular) and started to work on such controversial historical problem as the Romanian Holocaust (including in Bessarabia and Ukraine during the Second World War). Conversations about Bessarabia as a Romanian soil which should be returned became inappropriate in the wider international context. As the Romanian political scientist S. Bocancea pointed out, "new status of Romania urged it to rethink its foreign policy and the approach to the relations with Republic of Moldova in particular".<sup>22</sup> About the priority of the European political framework for the Romanian foreign policy the first (after Ceausescu's overthrow) Romanian foreign minister S. Celac also spoke in the interview with the author.<sup>23</sup>

Due to the president Basescu the Bessarabian issue has been politicized again since 2004. A new leader announced the policy of "one nation - two states", which was explained in the following way: "A part of the Romanian people is living in Moldova. We are the one nation in the framework of two independent states".<sup>24</sup> On one side, Basescu should have acknowledged the fact that Moldova and Romania are two independent states. But on the other side, his logic was aimed at demonstrating Moldova as a part of the Romanian nation, which sooner or later has to reunify with Romania.

In April 2010 the Romanian president promised to Chisinau to grant 100 Mio. Euro of economic assistance. The priorities in the framework of bilateral partnership were also determined: the construction of gas pipeline Iasi – Ungheni (which is aimed at helping Moldova to reach energy independence) and of some trans-border electricity lines. Not to forget about 5000 scholarships per year which Moldovan students have been getting for the study in Romania. During the visit of the newly elected Moldovan president N. Timofti to Bucharest at the beginning of May 2012 T. Basescu has confirmed the importance of aforementioned projects and his commitment to assist Chisinau financially.<sup>25</sup>

Nevertheless, the unionism of the Romanian president should not be overestimated. As one of the memos of the American Embassy in Bucharest, published by WikiLeaks, is saying:

We have learned not to pay too much heed to the shifting rhetorical winds across this border, which blow hot and cold according to the exigencies of domestic politics in both countries.<sup>26</sup>

Actually the rhetoric about the defense of national interests, including in Moldova, has become like a political credo of the President Basescu.

From the point of view of pragmatic politics the engagement in Moldova was aimed at creating political support and electoral basis for the Romanian leadership. The seriousness of Basescu's popularity among some Moldovans who obtained the Romanian citizenship can also be illustrated due to the visit of the Basescu's main political rival prime-minister V. Ponta to Chisinau on 17. July 2012. It was a message to the Basescu's supporters that no change will happen in the Romanian policy toward Moldova if Basescu will resign. No new projects, initiatives or statements going beyond those reconfirmed by Basescu in May 2012 during the visit of N. Timofti were mentioned.<sup>27</sup> Such a populist approach of Basescu only increased while it became clear that the Romanian president was losing the electoral support inside the country. Gallup has found out at the end of 2011 that among the EU leaders the Romanian president rates at the worst level: only 11 % of Romanians still support Basescu and this rating had taken shape even before Basescu announced unpopular reforms.<sup>28</sup>

The experts drew attention to the instrumental usage of the Moldovan issue in Romania long time ago. The experts of the influential Romanian Center for European policies (CRPE) have described the substance of the Moldovan-Romanian relations in their report: "Currently there is no public call, no plan, not to mention a project actually started. The only money effectively spent is the almost 8 million EUR worth of emergency aid after the floods in 2010".<sup>29</sup> S. Secrieru, the associate expert of the same Center, was more concrete in his conclusions: he appealed to the Romanian political elite to put attention firstly not to the problems of identity, what leads only to the polarization of the Moldovan society, but to the Europeanization of Moldova through the development of various concrete projects, which would bring Chisinau into the European space at the practical level.<sup>30</sup>

Of course speaking about Basescu's policy toward Moldova, we should take into consideration that there is a team of experts around him which has been working for the re-actualization of the "Bessarabian issue" and, more generally, for making conflict-driven relations with Moscow. I. Chifu, political advisor of the President, and D. Dungaciu, the head of the Institute of International Relations (Romanian Academy of Sciences) have clearly belonged to this circle. To present their discourse, the following part of one of the latest interviews with D. Dungaciu can be cited: "A European Russia in Russian formula would clearly be no Denmark, and it will turn into the biggest enemy of the East, including of Romania". In order to make his thoughts clearer he added:

We have got used with an aggressive Russia. Actually, we have the strategic partnership with the USA, very importantly, and we are NATO members, so we have maximum protection. But what about a European Russia? It would attract all investments to it, and so Romania, Ukraine and of course the Republic of Moldova, the entire area will be dismantled. At that moment, we can read this scenario by means of Putin's agenda, for he is the candidate of the West.<sup>31</sup>

Because T. Basescu is only a part of the Romanian political landscape and is now de facto in the difficult situation of cohabitation, messages of other political forces in Romania should be carefully observed. The key Romanian parties perceive Moldova as one of the foreign policy priorities for Bucharest but no unionist formulations are visible in their approaches. For example, the political program of the National Liberal Party contains the following ideas:

Romania supports the sovereignty, real independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and sees the basis of bilateral relations in a special partnership and common identity and also the determination to integrate with the European Union, what should be followed by consistency of reforms and realistic hopes.<sup>32</sup>

Actually such a formula presents the consensus within Romania regarding Moldova.

The explicit unionism is a marginal phenomenon in modern Romania. Actively this kind of political program is being supported by some non-governmental organizations (student unions, political foundations). S. Popa, by himself a pro-unionist young researcher, described them in the following way:

Non-governmental organizations with which I have been worked with are represented by those structures as "Basarabia – pamant romanesc" and "New hooligans". They have *hundreds* of adherents in Romania and Moldova and they are active in various regions. The main part of their members is formed of Moldovan citizens who are studying in Romania. They also have strong connections with the Moldovan diaspora in the whole Europe.<sup>33</sup>

The majority of pro-unionist organizations organized 2011 a civic platform "Actiune 2012", whose main and actually exclusive achievement was

spreading of stickers and inscriptions with the slogan "Bessarabia is Romania" in the main Romanian towns.<sup>34</sup> Besides, in Romania various elitist pro-unionist organizations are created. The Unification Council established in 2012 is one of them, but it consists predominantly of Moldovan politicians and intellectuals (M. Druc and A. Mosanu, key political figures in Moldova at the beginning of 1990s, V. Pavlicenco, the head of the Moldovan National Liberal Party, some Moldovan writers, musicians, etc.).

Nevertheless, the Bessarabian issue still exists at the level of "hidden meanings" of Romanian national discourse. The concept of "hidden meanings" belongs to the French philosopher Jacques Derrida, who understood under them political meanings, still persisting in our textual reality in a changed form while they had been inherited from discourses in the past. Unionist ideas are existing in today's Romania at the level of such hidden meanings, which are not expressed clearly but they implicitly contain the substance coming from earlier periods of national history. A concrete example is a popular thesis that Romania and Moldova will reunify in the framework of the European Union, where borders will be for them symbolic despite they will remain independent states. Such meanings are present in the statement of the Romanian prime-minister V. Ponta, who is the representative of Party of Social Democrats. This statement was made on 16. May 2012 in connection with the bicentenary of the Bucharest Treaty (according to its conditions Bessarabia was ceded to the Russian Empire). V. Ponta said that this treaty is still influencing the fate of both states, that it had divided families, disrupted common linguistic, cultural and social connections. Nevertheless, the Romanian prime-minister was very moderate in his political conclusions: he confined himself to expressing support for a difficult way of Moldova into Europe, in which borders between two countries will become symbolic.<sup>35</sup>

"Hidden meanings" exist first of all because processes of socio-political and economic transformation in Romania are still underway. One interesting research project, figured out by order of the Soros Foundation Romania, demonstrated that around 52 % of Romanians think of a reunification of Romania and Moldova as of an indispensable national priority for the country. Besides, the survey has also showed that the opinion of the interviewed persons depended on the type of nationalism specific for them. People with a moderate distancing from people of other nationalities (38 % from the total amount of the participants) supported the idea of reunification at the level of 56 %, while people with a moderate



national self-identification (around 15 %) expressed the support already to 40 %. Among less “nationalistic” citizens the reunification idea is even less popular.<sup>36</sup>

In Romania there are supporters of unionism, who can be politically inactive, but provide substantial intellectual contribution. First of all, we can speak about a part of Romanian historians. It should be noted that historians have always had a special status in the Romanian society because of enhanced demand for the construction of national history. Taking into consideration the bicentennial of the Bucharest Treaty the historical community published some materials on Bessarabian history. For example, “Magazin Istoric” made an issue with a leading article entitled “Bessarabia, victim of the European diplomacy”.<sup>37</sup> On the cover page of “Historia”, published monthly by influential Adevarul Holding, a Russian soldier with spiteful face capturing a young girl dressed in national costume was represented. The subscription was “May 1812. 200 years since Russian Empire has stolen Bessarabia”.<sup>38</sup> The Romanian National History Museum and Romanian cultural institute (key sponsor of Romanian culture and language abroad) have organized an exposition titled “Bessarabia 1812-1947: people, places, borders”, where some important documents and materials were presented: the decision of Sfatul Tarii (Council of the Country, key power institution in Bessarabia in 1917-1918) about accession to Romania; the Soviet ultimatum about returning Bessarabia in 1940; various maps, including Bessarabia into Romanian national history.<sup>39</sup>

“Hidden meanings” are a good resource for Basescu to initiate political practices which are ambiguous in terms of their content. Firstly, this is a principal unwillingness of the Romanian president to sign a Basic Treaty with Moldova, which would mean the definitive mutual acknowledgement of each other sovereignty and territorial integrity. Basescu called such form of agreements an outdated way of making international relations. But there are such treaties among the majority of Eastern European countries, their relations have been historically overburdened with territorial issues, political contradictions, etc., so basic treaty would be useful also in the Romanian-Moldovan case. Even those Moldovan experts who do not have anything in common with the so called Moldavenists and the Moldovan Party of Communists (like for example V. Chirilla, the executive director of the Moldovan Foreign Policy Association) share the opinion that the Basic Treaty should have been discussed in order to put all the identity issues away from the political agenda.<sup>40</sup>

The second example of ambiguous political practice is an active granting of Romanian citizenship to Moldovans. On one side, Bucharest has acted in this case symmetrically to Russia, which on its part provided more than 100 000 Transnistrians with Russian passports. Nevertheless, Moscow can not be blamed for the wish to “annex” Transnistria, because in fact influence in the reunified Moldova seems to be a much more attractive political goal for Moscow. Through the so called passportization Russia manages to keep its soft power potential in Transnistria. The results of the active Romanian soft power promotion could also be perceived beyond geopolitics: “Romanization”, the main fear in some “patriotic” Russian and Romanian mass-media, is based first of all on close ethnic, linguistic and cultural proximity of Moldovans and Romanians. It is a far more complicated process which does not mean the disappearance of Moldova as a political community. The fact, that people get the Romanian passport (which gives them opportunities for free traveling within the European Union) with instrumental motivation should not be underestimated.

But the dynamic of Romanian citizenship policy is astonishing: 22 000 passports in 2009, 41 800 in 2010 and around 100 000 in 2011.<sup>41</sup> De facto it is a paradoxical situation: the majority of Moldovans are crossing the EU border with passports of another country. To some extent , it undermines the stateness of Moldova.

Making a conclusion about hidden meanings in the Romanian political language we can say that they are not positive phenomenon but they can be “jugulated”, isolated, if all actors involved can agree on a positive agenda. Russia also has such a hidden meaning with the Crimean, but after Basic Treaty was signed between Moscow and Kiev no serious Russian politician dares to take up the question about Crimean.

## **Conclusion**

It can be concluded that both Romania and Russia are strongly engaged in Moldovan affairs but notions like “Transnistrianization” or “Romanization” can hardly describe the foreign policy goals of both actors. They have various motivations: Russia is trying to keep NATO away from its borders and pursues in fact the way of reactive foreign policy mismanagement. Romania also has contradictory aims but its goals cannot be described as fulfillment of any reunification agenda. The Romanian decision-makers can make references to “hidden meanings” but the European and Euro-

Atlantic context seems to be now more important for Bucharest than any external adventurism. Identity issues are politicized in this framework but they are not key contradictions.

What is absent both in Romania and Russia is a clear political will of the governing elites to “reset” bilateral relations, which nowadays can be described as “neither conflict, nor cooperation.” This ambiguity is a fertile ground for politicians to freeload on the conflictual rhetoric, instead of formulating and implementing cooperative policies. Arguably, nowadays there are all prerequisites for ironing out many contradictions between Moscow and Bucharest, using economic tools, as well as taking advantage of mutual interest in fostering academic and educational exchanges. The Romanian-Russian “reset” in the near future could be also a good chance for the Kremlin to reinvigorate its policy in Moldova, particularly in the Transnistrian conflict settlement, which had been perceived some time ago as a test-case for the EU-Russia common neighborhood concept.

The context of Russian-Romanian relations is quite important for Moldova’s future. If Russia and Romania will find a way toward “reset” (through economic and political interests of both countries), as it happened between Poland and Russia, the Bessarabian issue can be solved once for all through applying for example an Austrian-German model. In this framework a civic, not an ethnic identity of Moldovan citizens should be a subject of intensive political construction. Romania and Russia can substantially contribute to this process.

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# GIACOMO CASANOVA: LOVE IN THE TIME OF INDIVIDUALITY

## Introduction

Academic research on the life and works of Giacomo Casanova (1725-1798) most often kicks off with a justification and/or rehabilitation of the object of investigation. Most recently Helmut Bertram expounded that “down to the present day the world is passing on an incorrect image of Casanova” (154), and that the self-proclaimed Chevalier de Seingalt was far more than an erotomaniac: namely, a sophisticated man of letters whose interests were “more far-reaching and whose knowledge was far more comprehensive than we can imagine” (148). This has been a general tendency of Casanova scholarship ever since Gustav Gugitz’ attempt to debunk the *History of my Life* as a concoction of lies (Gugitz 1921): to prove not just the veracity of the Chevalier’s memoirs, but also their poetic and intellectual value. The German author Stefan Zweig (1881-1942), for one, identified the *History of my Life* as Europe’s “most valuable record of eighteenth century life” (9). This became the creed of the so-called Casanovists and a key incentive for their continuing publishing efforts.<sup>1</sup>

These efforts are admirable, and the results are both fascinating and insightful. At the same time, this battle against the “incorrect image” of the Chevalier raises an intriguing question: If Casanova’s memoirs are indeed a literary work of the first rank, then why have they been consistently ‘misconstrued’ as the confessions of an incorrigible philanderer, as pulp fiction? The answer seems self-evident: Because the *History of my Life* does in fact detail a wide variety of erotic exploits. Yet to leave it at that would mean cutting short a significantly more complex and quite interesting reception process. To be sure: The ‘lover’ Casanova has been the focus of most representations of the Chevalier since he first began to publish his memoirs. But just as ‘love’ has taken on a variety of meanings in modern European history, so has the idea of the ‘lover’ – and it appears

that 'Casanova' was able to make meaningful these changing ideas. Or rather: The theme was able to adapt to these shifting paradigms and thus maintain its prominent place in European cultural memory. This, in turn, means that the 'Casanova' theme has great potential to serve as a heuristic tool for the field of cultural history: By analyzing the theme's reception history one can gain detailed insight into changing attitudes towards love in modern European history.

The following analysis will thoroughly investigate the historical changes in the Casanova theme and consider their respective significance from a socio-historical point of view. But even before engaging in this discussion, one may conjecture in which way the motif had to be adapted after the publication of the *History of my Life* in the early nineteenth century (a first, abridged edition appeared in German 1822-1828). The fact of the matter is that the historical Casanova is an elusive figure when it comes to socio-historical categorizations. It is impossible to consider him a member of the feudal world, as his actions – not least his unmerited adoption of a noble title – subvert the status of this caste. Yet one would be equally hard pressed to co-opt the Chevalier de Seingalt for the emerging burgher class: The gambler, adventurer and promiscuous womanizer stands too much at odds with bourgeois ideals of industry, steadfastness and marital fidelity. The latter group nevertheless went on to canonize the Italian adventurer. One may assume that this to a certain extent presupposed 'taming' the unruly character. Tellingly, Casanova shared this fate with the other great erotomaniac of Europe's literary tradition: Don Juan.

### **An Approximation: Casanova and Don Juan**

The past two centuries have witnessed numerous intersections of the traditions of Don Juan and Casanova. Hermann Hesse's *Casanovas Bekehrung* (1906) is a particularly remarkable example. The short story recounts an episode from the *History of my Life* (Vol. VI, Ch. 3 and 4) and opens with the Chevalier's advances on a young chambermaid at a Zurich inn. She shows herself wary of the stranger's advances, to which Casanova replies: "But child! Do I look like a Don Juan? At my age, I could be your father" (498). The irony in this scene is evident, and the reader cannot but ask if Casanova's motives at all differ from those of the notorious Spaniard. But this seeming congeniality of Casanova and Don Juan is in fact not inherent to the respective motif. Rather, the conflation of the two

is owed to the reception process leading to their respective canonization. Even if one disregards the fact that Casanova is an historical character whereas Don Juan sprang from the literary imagination of the Siglo de Oro: Considered in their original manifestations, both are worlds apart.

Until the late eighteenth century, viz. until the end of Giacomo Casanova's lifetime, Don Juan was principally conceived as a moral and physical threat to society in general and to women in particular. Cases in point are Molina's *El Burlador de Sevilla* (ca. 1620), Molière's *Dom Juan* (1660), and da Ponte's libretto to Mozart's *Don Giovanni* (1787). In each of these texts, the hero surreptitiously obtains access to a young lady's bedroom and subsequently kills her guardian in a duel. In Molière's play, Don Juan's servant Sganarelle declares his master to be "the greatest scoundrel who ever walked the earth, a mad dog, a demon, a Turk, a heretic who doesn't believe in Heaven, or Hell, [who] lives like a brute beast [...] closing his ears to all reproaches and treating all our noblest credences as nonsense" (9-10). Don Juan's indifference to social norms is particularly strong when it precipitates an amorous encounter. "You mention", Sganarelle lectures a servant of the betrayed Doña Elvira, "that he has married your mistress; believe you me, he'd have done more than that if necessary. For the sake of his passion, he'd have married you too" (10). Any sign of affection coming from Don Juan is but a means to bend others to his will.

The historical Giacomo Casanova in this regard makes for a stark contrast. In love, he promises nothing but gives everything – although he does draw the line at marriage. Yet this is not out of the ordinary for an epoch that considered love and marriage discrete concepts (cf. Garnot). Accordingly, the *History of my Life* distinguishes the sober companionship of spouses from the excess of lovers. "What if you do not love him?" Casanova asks of Miss Roman, who is convinced that, "to be happy", she requires but "a kind husband well enough off for me not to go without anything I need". "If he is honourable and kind", the Roman explains, "how could I help loving him?" – "I see that you do not know love", Casanova retorts as he abandons hope to gain the lady's favor (7: 41-42). Similarly, the Chevalier reproaches Veronica for turning him down on the grounds that "neither of us can be sure of anything about the other." This kind of petit-bourgeois thinking reaffirms the Chevalier's decision to "never marry until I shall have become my mistress's friend". – "In other words, when you have ceased to be her lover." – "Precisely" (7: 124-125).

In the context of the eighteenth century, love, to reach its full potential, must be detached from everyday considerations.

Lovers, unlike spouses, must disregard the mundane problems of their existence in order to become generous to the point of spiritual and material exhaustion. Casanova, as Zweig nicely observes, “gives himself to the uttermost, to the last drop of lust in his body, to the last ducat in his purse; always and unhesitatingly, he is ready to sacrifice everything else to a woman” – not because he is obliged, but “because she is a woman” (56). These women know that the Chevalier de Seingalt drives a fair bargain, that he “exchanges pleasure for pleasure, the bodily for the bodily, and never runs into debt in the spiritual sphere” (58). His material generosity equally transcends the boundaries of bourgeois courtship, and Casanova more than once makes the fortune of a former lover: Mariucca receives a generous dowry that enables her to marry and to open a small shop (Vol. VII, Ch. 9); Mademoiselle P. P. is rescued from an ill-fated elopement and reconciled with her family (Vol. VIII, Ch. 10 and Vol. IX, Ch. 1 to 3); and Mariucca, who had foolishly run off with Casanova’s brother Gaetano, is secured an honorable return to Venice (Vol. IX, Ch. 5).

Giacomo Casanova and Don Juan, although both notorious seducers, could not have been more differently engaged in the art of seduction. When the Spanish rogue leaves his lovers, they feel that they have been victimized.

They are ashamed of their weakness; they rail at the villain who has deceived them; and in his person they loathe the whole male sex. Doña Anna, Doña Elvira, and all the rest, having once yielded to his calculated impetuosity, remain thenceforward embittered, poisoned in spirit. The women, on the other hand, who have given themselves to Casanova, thank him as if he were a god, glad to remember his ardent embraces, for he has done nothing to wound their feelings, nothing to mortify them in their womanhood; he has bestowed upon them a new confidence in their own personality (Zweig 66).

Casanova and Don Juan – in their original manifestations – seem as distinct as Jekyll and Hyde. There may be similarities in appearance, yet it would be impossible to attribute the actions of the one to the other.

Nevertheless the two traditions began to overlap in the course of the nineteenth century, as for instance in the legend of Casanova’s contribution to Mozart’s *Don Giovanni*. This legend took its lead from the historically

verified friendship between Casanova and da Ponte,<sup>2</sup> and received further fuel from the discovery that the Italian adventurer indeed resided in Prague in the weeks leading up to the opera's premiere. Famously, *Don Giovanni* was completed mere days (some argue: hours) before its first staging in the Bohemian capital. The librettist was hard pressed for time to finish the text when, suddenly, Antonio Salieri recalled him to Vienna. The story then goes that da Ponte "asked his friend, Casanova, to give Mozart any assistance he could" (Hussey 472).<sup>3</sup> Other variants of this legend suggest a less immediate, but in no way less significant influence of the Chevalier on the libretto. Assuming that da Ponte was quite familiar with Casanova's personal anecdotes,<sup>4</sup> scholars have sought to discover considerable similarities between *Don Giovanni* and the *History of my Life*. "The memoirs", Stoneham for example explains, "describe two incidents which have significant parallels to the opera. It seems a serious possibility that Da Ponte based key sections of his libretto on these two events in Casanova's life" (531). In the end, the truth of the matter is for others to decide and of no heuristic value for the investigation at hand. Rather, the popularity of this legend – of this connection between Casanova and Don Juan – is in itself significant.

The two traditions again appear conflated in Lord Byron's *Don Juan* (1819-1824), in this instance on a structural rather than a biographical level. To begin with, Byron's hero is no longer confined to the world of the Western Mediterranean. Like Casanova, Juan has become a cosmopolitan traveller who explores Constantinople, St Petersburg, and London.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, he no longer embodies the stereotypically arrogant Spaniard who sacrifices the happiness of others for his own pleasure. Quite the contrary:

His manner was perhaps the more seductive,  
Because he ne'er seem'd anxious to seduce;  
Nothing affected, studied, or constructive  
Of coxcombry or conquest: no abuse  
Of his attractions marr'd the fair perspective,  
To indicate a Cupidon broke loose,  
And seem to say, "resist us if you can" –  
Which makes a dandy while it spoils a man (Canto XV, Stanza XIII).

Don Juan's desire no longer appears an unruly force that dovetails with aggression and violence; and to seduce for him no longer means to

dominate. At times – and this is easily the most remarkable shift in the tradition – Juan even emphatically resists seduction. This occurs, for instance, when he is summoned before the Sultana Gulbeyaz, a woman “so fair/As even in a much humbler lot had made/A kingdom or confusion any where” (Canto V, Stanza CXXIX). The lady is certain that the young man will instantly submit to her charms. But Juan’s character has evolved since it first emerged as a stock piece of burlesque comedies. Byron replaces the erotomaniac with a tragic hero who alternately seeks and mourns the loss of his “beau ideal” (Canto II, Stanza CCXI). Until the final canto, the island beauty Haidée remains the focal point for Juan’s affection, so that when Gulbeyaz makes her advances,

Juan, who had still his mind o’erflowing  
 With Haidée’s isle and soft Ionian face,  
 Felt warm blood, which in his face was glowing,  
 Rush back upon his heart, which fill’d apace,  
 And left his cheeks as pale as snowdrops blowing:  
 These words went through his soul like Arab-spears  
 So that he spoke not, but burst into tears (Canto V, Stanza CXVII).

Only towards the end of the epic poem will young Aurora Raby reawaken in Juan “some feelings he had lately lost/Or hardened; feelings which, perhaps ideal,/Are so divine, that I [the narrator] must deem them real” (Canto XVI, Stanza CVII). Thus, Byron’s *Don Juan* modifies the principal theme of the literary tradition: The singular lover expresses himself no longer in a haphazard sexuality but in his search for an equally singular love.

Maybe surprisingly, this focus on a love which transcends all others can also be found in the *History of my Life*. In the same way that the loss of Haidée shatters Juan’s world, the forced separation from the mysterious Henriette leaves Casanova without the “slightest ability to do anything toward living” (3: 78-79). For a while, he withdraws from life, feeling that he has forfeited his one chance for happiness. Of course, such hyperboles are characteristic for eighteenth century *amour passion*, and the Chevalier might simply be following rhetorical convention.<sup>6</sup> Still, Henriette is the one lover Casanova frequently recalls throughout the memoirs. “No, I have not forgotten her”, the old man reminisces, “and it is balm to my soul every time I remember her” (3: 77). To be sure, this is not the central theme of the *History of my Life*. The text is neither an elegy on the loss



of Henriette, nor is the search for bourgeois happiness its structuring principle. The nineteenth century, however, will increasingly focus of this thematic potential, both in Don Juan and Casanova.

A case in point is Albert Lortzing's operetta *Casanova* (1841), in which the Chevalier no longer appears a serial, but a very bourgeois lover.<sup>7</sup> The object of his affection, young Rosaura, is to be married to the wealthy Gambetto. This scenario would hardly have troubled the Casanova of the *History of my Life*, seeing that he was always well pleased to see former lovers well provided for. Lortzing's hero, in contrast, takes offence at the thought of Rosaura in the arms of another, especially since – unlike her fiancée – he truly loves the girl. In the end, Casanova manages to break off the wedding, although it remains unclear whether he indeed intends to stay with Rosaura. Foremost, this seems eloquent of the librettist's desire not to raise the question, given that the literary tradition would force an inconvenient answer.

This gradual transfiguration of Casanova and Don Juan, but in particular the seeming convergence of the two themes raises the question of influence: Was the libretto for Mozart's opera inspired by the Venetian adventurer? Does the spirit of Casanova breathe through Byron's Juan? Did Lortzing amalgamate contemporary developments of both traditions? Ultimately, the pursuit of these questions is interesting only for the literary historian. As indicated above, for a discussion of Casanova's canonization it is far more important to investigate the socio-historical factors that induced and made meaningful this shift in the literary tradition. By exploring the respective changes in the audience's 'horizon of expectations' (Jauß), one can fully appreciate how the motif maintained its relevance as part of the canon by adjusting its pragmatic nexus.

The evidence surveyed thus far suggests that, in the course of the nineteenth century, the Casanova motif adjusted to innovations in the coding of love. Most generally speaking, one can attest a shift from seduction to commitment: It is no longer the quest for perpetual orgasmic excitement, but the longing for enduring intimacy that drives the hero. Of course, this is a momentous break with tradition, a break Stefan Zweig fervently rejected. "Nothing", he declared, "could be more fallacious than the way in which many of our imaginative writers who choose Casanova as a hero of a play or a novel depict him as endowed with a thoroughly alert intelligence, as being a reflective type" (44). Zweig will not allow for variations for fear of forfeiting the essence of the Chevalier: "Instil no more than a drop or two of sentimentality in his blood, burden him with

self-knowledge and a sense of responsibility, and he will no longer be Casanova" (44). Yet it would appear that this essence – or at least parts of it – had gradually lost its appeal. The unreflecting erotomaniac, it seems, no longer resonated with audience expectations. Rather, the focus shifted on the motif's potential to discuss the problems of initiating and maintaining intimacy.

### **Modern Aporias of Love**

With this novel focus, Casanova gradually evolved into a metaphor that effectively conceptualizes modern aporias of love. Conceptual metaphors fundamentally structure social perception and thus enable communication. In fact, communication itself is largely understood in metaphorical terms. The ubiquitous concept COMMUNICATION IS A CONDUIT suggests that "the speaker puts ideas (objects) into words (containers) and sends them (along a conduit) to a hearer who takes the idea/objects out of the word/containers" (Lakoff and Johnson 10). Of course, communication is a significantly more complex process than the simile allows for.<sup>8</sup> The purpose of the metaphor, however, is simply to help conceptualize the action in everyday discourse. ARGUMENT IS WAR, TIME IS MONEY, and THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS are just a few of nearly infinite possibilities to structure one area of experience with the help of another. Admittedly, the concept LOVE IS CASANOVA is less intuitive, not least due to the elusiveness of both parts of the equation. Love, in particular, in the modern era has taken on the air of something that is wholly subjective, meaning that it cannot be articulated in an objective, generally intelligible manner. It is precisely this kind of ambiguity that calls for metaphorical conceptualization.

From a sociological point of view, then, love today presents itself as a communication problem, as the challenge to communicate subjectivity. This became a pressing matter with the functional differentiation<sup>9</sup> of European society in the modern period. In this context, love developed into a self-contained system that generates its own code. This meant that, as a social phenomenon, love no longer found its expression in valorizations that are not specific to love. Rather, it evolved into a reflexive process that followed its own logic: "Love", Luhmann explains this shift, now "targets an I and a You, *inasmuch* as both are connected through love, meaning that they reciprocally enable such a relationship – and not because they are good, or beautiful, or noble, or wealthy" (175). Thus, love becomes

a matter of reciprocated 'feeling.' For a person to love means "that a corresponding feeling is emotionally sought and confirmed; that one loves oneself as lover and beloved, and that one also loves the other as lover and beloved, meaning that one's feelings are directed precisely at the coincidence of this feeling" (Luhmann 175). Love, then, is the reciprocal amplification of the self and the other.

Giacomo Casanova in his memoirs already encodes love within these novel parameters. The Chevalier's reflections on his affair with Tonina, for example, indicate that he was as much in love with the girl as with the feelings she inspired in him. "Considering her at once my wife, my mistress, and my servant", Casanova recalls, "I congratulated myself on being happy so easily" (4: 153-154). In a similar tone, the memoirist muses on his adventures with the Hanoverian sisters. As always, the Chevalier had overextended himself to please the young ladies. The recompense, however, was plentiful: "The rays which shone from the faces of the two girls in the intoxication of their delight were fiery", Casanova recalls. "I adored them and adored myself" (10: 18). This kind of love, we see, is not a reaction to objective qualities of the beloved. It is a process in which feeling is reciprocally valorized and amplified.

In Europe's modern era, this new potential of love evolves into a vital means to consolidate self-hood. Hitherto, a stratified superstructure had organized the relationship between society and the individual. Functional differentiation, in contrast, perpetually challenges the individual to synthesize the distinct roles it plays within discrete social systems into a coherent narrative. The result is a contingent self-projection that love, however, may legitimize. "If self-projection as formation [*Bildung*] of one's own identity is given free reign by society, viz. if it is contingent, it is precisely this self-projection that requires social bracing" (Luhmann 208). This brings about the search for a significant other, for "someone who believes in the unity of appearance and reality or at least makes this part of his own self-projection which, in turn, the other must believe" (Luhmann 208). This, then, is the socially formative function of love: to consolidate self-hood by enabling individuals to mutually validate and uphold their respective interpretation of the world and their place therein.

This makes for a precarious equilibrium between lovers, given that every communication of the beloved is scrutinized in light of an elusive ideal of complete correspondence – even if (or maybe precisely because) a communication has no discernible relevance for the relationship. Indeed, it is a hallmark of modernity that "personal relationships are overburdened

by expectations for correspondence with the other, which precipitates the breakup of, but at the same time intensifies the quest for personal relationships" (Luhmann 205). In extreme cases, love may even seem to offer compensation for other aspects of existence that are found wanting. Such "hopes and expectations to find something that is missing in life, to fulfill something that has remained unfulfilled can create expectations that are impossible or unlikely to be met" (Luhmann 196). Arguably, this is why love in the modern era has become a hot topic. Success or failure in love may decide over success or failure of the individual self-projection.

### Love is Casanova

This problem, the struggle to consolidate self-hood by establishing enduring personal relationships, has gradually emerged as the dominant feature of the Casanova motif. Or rather: The fact that the motif was open for a discussion of this problem as it proliferated in the nineteenth and twentieth century secured for Casanova a place in the functional memory of European society. This thematic potential was already present in the *History of my Life*. Tellingly, it is brought to bear at the height of Casanova's love to Henriette: "Enduring happiness", the Chevalier muses, "could be realized only in the case of two people who, living together, were in love with each other, healthy, intelligent, sufficiently wealthy, with no duties except to themselves, and having the same tastes, more or less the same character, and the same temperament" (3: 59). These considerations quite unmistakably invoke the ideal of complete correspondence. To be happy means to be 'the same,' and Casanova was "happy with Henriette, and she no less happy with me; never a moment of ill-humor, never a yawn, never did a folded rose petal come to trouble our content" (3: 59). Bearing in mind Casanova's later exchange with Miss Roman,<sup>10</sup> it may come as a surprise to hear him express such bourgeois sentiments. And to be sure, in the grand scheme of the polyphonic *History of my Life* this is but an undertone that is easily absorbed by larger themes. However, over the course of the past two centuries, the search for lasting intimacy has gradually moved to the center of the Casanova motif.

Modern aporias of love determine, for example, the pragmatic nexus of Hugo von Hofmannsthal's play *Der Abenteurer und die Sngerin* (1899). This pastiche of various episodes from the *History of my Life* opens with the Chevalier's secret return to Venice. A chance encounter reunites him

with his former lover Vittoria who sixteen years ago, as Casanova now learns, had borne him a son. Vittoria's husband Lorenzo begins to suspect as much and fears that his wife's love for him is not uncontested. In the end, Casanova and Vittoria dissuade him and thus salvage the marriage. At the same time, they must acknowledge that their shared happiness is lost to an irretrievable past.

Another case in point for the shift in the tradition is Arthur Schnitzler's treatment of the Casanova theme in this short story masterpiece *Casanovas Heimfahrt* (1918). After spending years in exile, Casanova is about to receive his pardon and return to Venice when he encounters Olivo, whose fortune he had made by providing him with the means to marry and found a household. Olivo insists that his benefactor spend some time on his estate, not knowing that the Chevalier in fact was the first lover of his wife Amalia. The lady is still very much infatuated with Casanova who, however, desires only to lie in the arms of her niece Marcolina. When the young lady proves insusceptible to his advances, Casanova transforms into a Don Juan of the old tradition.<sup>11</sup> Disguised as Marcolina's lover Lorenzi he enjoys her caresses, but must flee after being discovered and killing his rival.

Hofmannsthal's play and Schnitzler's novella have been convincingly described as expressions of fin de siècle decadence. On the eve of the First World War, an increasingly neurasthenic Europe (cf. Radkau) reinterpreted Casanova's existence as a final, ill-fated uprising against the spiritual desolation caused by social standardization. "For the authors of the turn of the century, he represented the antithesis to the calculating bourgeois and his struggle for security within the rising industrial order [...]. For the rationally structured and elaborately organized world of modernity, those who [like Casanova] lived for the moment became objects of longing" (Pankau 137-138). Like Salomé or the syphilitic dandy, it seemed, the Chevalier celebrates excess in the face of social decay. Both in *Casanovas Heimfahrt* and *Der Abenteurer und die Sängerin* he embodies the intellectual struggles of a society that feels it has passed its zenith and is due to expire.

At the same time, both texts adapt the motif to review the modern aporias of love. Already in the exposition of Schnitzler's novella, the central significance of these problems is evident: Amalia tellingly juxtaposes her marital commitment to Olivo – she considers it "duty", maybe "even pleasure" – to the "bliss" she once experienced with Casanova, and which she longs to experience once again (171). Similar musings befall Casanova

when he finally consummates his love for Marcolina: "Here at last was the reality which he had often falsely imagined himself to be on the point of attaining, and which had always eluded his grasp. Fulfilment was here at Marcolina's heart" (231). The signal words here are 'bliss' and 'fulfillment:' They connote complete correspondence, and thus the transcendence of the modern individual's dissociation. The experience of love instates the self as the absolute point of reference for its environment. "Were not life and death, time and eternity, one upon [Marcolina's] lips? Was he not a god? [...] Home and exile, splendor and misery, renown and oblivion [...]; had not these words become senseless to one who was Casanova, and who had found Marcolina?" (231). Love, as Luhmann points out, offers the modern individual a transcendental home.

In order to fully achieve this potential, however, love must be amplified through reciprocation. Casanova's triumph is incomplete as long as Marcolina is ignorant of her bedfellow's identity, whom she in fact believes to be Lorenzi. Therefore, although fully aware that this is a desperate attempt, the Chevalier decides to gamble for the highest wager: He has Marcolina discover his identity, hoping that – in the aftermath of their bodily union – she will validate his love and, by extension, his person. "With the infallible conviction that he must be the bringer of delight even as he was the receiver, he felt prepared for the venture of disclosing his name, even though he knew all the time that he would thus play for a great stake, the loss of which he would have to pay for with his very existence" (231). Casanova is certain that this moment of anagnorisis will decide not only the outcome of the night, but indeed "his fate, even his life" (231). Thus, Schnitzler's novella considers 'homecoming' – *Heimfahrt* – in more than one way. The story is just as much about the Chevalier's return to his native Venice as it is about finding a transcendental home in love. Ultimately, both endeavours fail to meet the challenge of temporality. After more than two decades spent in exile, Casanova returns to the Most Serene Republic as an outsider, unable to recognize the home town of his youth. And when Marcolina awakens in the morning, she is not infuriated by the audacity of the Chevalier, but simply repulsed by the old man lying in her bed.

The problematic nexus between love and identity similarly structures Hofmannsthal's play *Der Abenteurer und die Sängerin*. The plot develops from two interrelated areas of conflict: The first is Vittoria's sustained attraction to Casanova, and the second is Vittoria's precarious relationship to her husband Lorenzo. The arrival of the mysterious newcomer makes

Lorenzo not simply jealous, but painfully aware of his spiritual dependence on Vittoria: "You are everything to me", he implores his wife, "in this or that way, for better or for worse. You are the only gift life has given to me, a gift that includes all others" (147). Vittoria safeguards nothing less than the coherence of Lorenzo's identity. "You are the reality of my life", he asseverates, "the stronghold upon which I build my world" (147). As Luhmann would correctly predict, this is a most precarious construction.<sup>12</sup> To be sustainable, it must establish and maintain the illusion of perfect congruence. To both the lover and the beloved it must appear that the other is not simply responding and adjusting to one's own behaviour – a therapist may perform this task –, but that one's own world view is already included in that of the other. Paradoxically, this precludes communication about self-hood, given that such communication by nature creates a sense of difference: Communication that fails to account for the world view of the other is an affront to the code of modern love (Luhmann 154-156).

For the spouses in *Der Abenteurer und die Sängerin*, Casanova's intrusion makes this Achilles' heel of love painfully evident. With only a few words, Lorenzo manages to put into question the very essence of his marriage to Vittoria: "You are my wife", he states, "and husband and wife, people say, are one. It seems to me that this isn't so." Vittoria gloomily replies: "You are a whole and I am also a whole, and I can only give myself as a whole; I cannot dissolve the wreath that is my being" (145). In effect, love cannot transcend the incommensurability of individualities. To displace this fact is costly and painstaking, yet it is even more distressing to face it headfirst. "Why do you torture yourself and me with such words?" (145), Vittoria finally reprimands Lorenzo. Better, it seems, he had not considered the matter at all.

## Alternative Approaches

This raises the question of whether Schnitzler and Hofmannsthal offer their heroes alternative and viable means to consolidate self-hood. Hofmannsthal's Vittoria, it seems, copes with love's inadequacies by propagating an aesthetic existence and, ultimately, withdrawing into the world of art. This denouement is initiated in the central ballroom scene, when Vittoria observes a once great composer who has since degenerated into a geriatric simpleton. Although the *doter* is no longer moved even by his own music, Vittoria contends that the heartfelt passion he first

put into the compositions is preserved by and eternally realized in their performance. Analogously, Vittoria is certain that “wherever we love we create such an invisible, magical island” (155). Though the renewed departure of Casanova leaves her world in shambles, Vittoria’s existence as lover and beloved may carry on in a transcendental, aesthetic realm. “Am not I the music he [Casanova] created”, she asks. “Is there not a fire in me that once was the fire of his soul? Of what importance is the log on which it ignites itself – the flame is allied to the highest gods!” (176). With these words Vittoria bursts into a song more beautiful, her son attests, than anything she has sung in years. Only sublimation, it appears, can make love timeless.

An even more fatalistic tone pervades Schnitzler’s novella. From the start it is evident to the Chevalier that any attempt to win over Marcolina will be futile. Even as his “desires grew beyond measure, [...] the recognition that these desires were utterly foolish and futile reduced him almost to despair” (179). Still, the temptation to consolidate self-hood through love is too strong, which is why Casanova cannot content himself with Marcolina’s bed. He needs her to reciprocate, spiritually as well as physically. Thus, Casanova is certain, Marcolina’s love will conclude his struggle for an identity that is both complete and enduring. This, he imagines, will be the “the crown of his life”: That “he, by the overwhelming power of his unconquerable personality, would have won for himself and forever the youngest, the most beautiful, the most gifted of all women” (232). Yet the Chevalier’s own dreams of ‘bliss’ and ‘fulfillment’ are precluded as his ‘unconquerable personality’ is rejected and thus negated. For Schnitzler’s Casanova, love becomes a tragedy in the most literal sense. Fate has presented the hero with a decision situation in which either course of action will lead to disaster. No matter how Casanova proceeds – either he abandons the bedroom before sunrise or he reveals himself – his yearning for reciprocal love will remain unfulfilled. In a sense, this persistence in the face of inevitable failure may be understood as a heroic act. Casanova is willing to sacrifice everything, his pride, his honour, and, in the final duel with Lorenzi, even his life to attain the unattainable. At the conclusion of *Casanovas Heimfahrt*, the Chevalier leaves the stage as the tragic hero of modern love.

This notion has become a hallmark of the Casanova theme. The Chevalier, in a heroic and exemplary manner, traces the problematic nexus between love and self-hood. He is a modern Ahasuerus, relentlessly wandering the earth as a cautionary tale of love’s snares. *Fellini’s Casanova*



(1976) is a paradigmatic example for this development. The film's loosely connected episodes – each of them based on the *History of my Life* – are brought together by the hero's tragicomic struggle to find his place in the world, to formulate a meaningful identity. This desire is met with condescension, ridicule, and disbelief. In response, the Chevalier more and more vigorously echoes the mantra of the Casanovists: that he is not just an erotomaniac, but in fact "a philosopher, a man of letters". This aspect of his existence, however, fails to meet with social recognition. It may express itself only in the hero's ill-fated love to Henriette.<sup>13</sup> Notably, this spiritual, 'philosophical' love is not consummated on screen, as if to not conflate it with the aggressive and grotesque ('Casanovian') carnality that recurs throughout the film. In Henriette, Casanova finds and tragically forfeits the transcendent existence he craves for.

Tellingly, the only time Fellini's Casanova may indeed prove himself to the grande monde of the eighteenth century, he is reduced to his sexuality: The illustrious guests of a party coax the Chevalier into settling a wager that he can outperform a coachman in the boudoir. The following scene's exaggerated choreography, which may stand in for all depictions of coitus in the film, reveals the mechanical nature of Casanova's sexus. It is a public spectacle that, although an expression of superhuman virility, cannot create or sustain enduring personal relations. This impression is reinforced by the mechanical bird that accompanies the Chevalier on his erotic adventures and that springs to life with the beginning of the 'procedure.' It is therefore a cruel yet fitting irony that Casanova ultimately finds bliss in the arms of a female robot. The film's eerie closing scene places the pair on a frozen canal in Venice, alone in the dark, oblivious of their surroundings, unmoving, but still turning in circles like figurines of a music box. The hero has found his significant other, but this resolution is twice removed from reality: by its artificial nature and by the fact that it is but a dream vision of the disillusioned, old Casanova.

An elegiac undertone has come to pervade the Casanova theme. This, however, should not lead to the assumption that the motif simply expresses resignation over the fact that love, in the modern era, succumbs to exacerbating social pressures. To reach such a conclusion would mean falling short of the motif's full pragmatic potential. To begin with, one must bear in mind that love, like all social systems, is not an ontological given. It is not something that can exist outside of, and therefore fall victim to society. Love is generated by, and thus a function of society. Social functions cannot be conceived of as timeless and immutable ideas, as

objective goods that are threatened by external social pressures. Rather, they need to be considered the result of adaptations, of evolutionary, open-ended processes. They are not the source of conflict, but (albeit often incomplete) tools for problem solving. Love, in the context of modern Europe, has evolved into a means to alleviate the strains of functional differentiation on the individual. It is an imperfect means that nevertheless holds the promise to ease the burden of modernity. This notion is the heart and soul of the Casanova theme: It suggests that notwithstanding the troubles love entails, there is an inherent reward to intimacy, a reward that outweighs the setbacks and disappointments intimacy almost necessarily entails.

Meanwhile, poetological considerations preclude a conciliatory denouement for Casanova. The focus on the failure of intimacy in modern emulations of the motif is a structural necessity, due to the abstract nature of the subject. The spiritual remuneration of love can be explored but indirectly, most palpably by considering the sacrifices the hero is willing to make in its pursuit. Perseverance in the face of certain failure most emphatically testifies to the worth of the cause. This is, for instance, the structural logic of Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*: To prove that love is worth dying for, Juliet and her lover must indeed die for love. This is one way in which metaphors are born, metaphors which – as Lakoff and Johnson elucidated – are necessary to conceptualize complex social interactions. This doesn't necessarily rule out a happy ending for Casanova, although such an ending would dispossess the theme of the metaphorical potential it has accumulated over the years and which secured for the motif a place in European cultural memory. It has become difficult to imagine the Chevalier de Seingalt as other than the tragic hero of romantic love. Arguably, here lay the greatest challenge for Lasse Hallström's effort to integrate the motif into a Hollywood style narrative for a romantic comedy with blockbuster appeal. And indeed, *Casanova* (2005) – although anything but a future classic – is remarkable for how the film reconciles the complexity of the motif with a generic rom-com dramaturgy, granting to Casanova a happy ending without having to sacrifice the ideas that are central to the theme.

As typical for modern emulations, *Casanova* sees the hero deviate from his prototypical erotomania to pursue his significant other. In Francesca, he unexpectedly discovers the woman who may fulfill not just his sensual, but also his spiritual desires. The literary tradition naturally raises the question of the potential longevity of this relationship. This question is intentionally

reinforced by the film's opening scene, in which old Casanova reminisces about the 'Francesca episode' as he pens his memoirs. By thus aligning with the original tradition, the exposition seemingly precludes a positive outcome for the romance. However, this is but a narratological strategy to enhance the moment of surprise in which the happy ending is salvaged by a metafictional operation.

In the film's diegetic world, the Chevalier has already been transfigured into a motif that exists quite independent of the individual. A telling scene shows an ignorant Venetian assure Casanova that he would without fail recognize that famous adventurer, whom he, by the way, knew "very well." At the end of the story, this dissociation of signifier and signified makes it possible for the hero to pass on his literary identity to a friend who henceforth embodies the ideals associated with the name and who will later author the *History of my Life*. Meanwhile, Casanova and Francesca retreat to the countryside and become actors: professionals who assume different characters – characters like Casanova – in order to entertain, instruct, and edify their audience. Such moments of metafictional self-reflexivity pervade Hallström's film: His Venice is overflowing with theatre troupes that re-enact the amorous adventures of the Chevalier who, in turn, perpetually shifts roles to evade legal prosecution, to appease his debtors, and to win his bride. All the world's a stage, Hallström underscores, and Casanova has become one of its stock figures.

## Conclusion

The continuing attraction of Giacomo Casanova in part surely stems from his renown as a lover, from his potential to serve as a sensual inspiration. Yet "the interest in the eroticist alone", Pankau, too, insists, "cannot fully account for this fascination" (137). This is not to deny the central importance of these qualities for representations of Casanova in European cultural memory. Rather, it is an invitation to look beyond the evident manifestations of this fascination, and to explore their socio-historical foundations. The evidence presented here emphatically suggests that the Chevalier de Seingalt was canonized not only because of his formidable feats in the boudoir. The appeal of the Casanova theme not least lay in its suitability to conceptualize the problems arising from the modern nexus of intimacy and identity. The motif expounds the virtual incommensurability of the two while implicitly perpetuating the social

incentives for their concatenation. In Europe's functionally differentiated societies, intimacy has become a most powerful means to consolidate an otherwise dissociated individuality. In this context, Casanova has come to embody the tragic hero that heroically faces this challenge, the challenge of love in the time of individuality.

This challenge should not be taken lightly, but considered in light of the very real pressures under which intimacy has come in the modern era. Foucault, for one, argues that in the modern discourse on sexuality a vast array of social, economic, and political interests coalesce. In his *History of Sexuality*, he concludes that the individual today in part substantiates its social existence by coming to terms with his or her sexuality. "It is through sex", Foucault asserts, "that each individual has to pass in order to have access to his own intelligibility [...], to the whole of his body [...], to his identity [...]" (155-56). These are immense expectations. Therefore, it might not surprise to see an increasing number refuse to submit to these demands.

Luhmann in particular addresses the growing tendency to dismiss institutionalized forms of love, above all the tendency "to reject marriage and to simply live together" (214). This sober approach to intimacy, Luhmann observes, is eloquent of an "overdetermined scepticism which results from knowing the problems and from taking them seriously" (214). These problems, of course, arise from the need to uphold the illusion of complete correspondence between lovers.<sup>14</sup> By doing away with marriage, lovers alleviate their relationship of hyperbolic expectations – 'oneness,' 'eternity,' etc. – and thus neutralize potential areas of conflict, yet without calling into question the institution of love itself. "Not to marry expresses a kind of reservation – but in a way, that avoids symbolizing the reservation against the bonding symbol of love that induces this rejection" (Luhmann 214). Still, this means that certain aspects of love are beginning to succumb to excessive social pressures. As a result, the search for alternatives that minimize these strains is in full effect. But while some welcome the move to what one could term a 'strategic model,' others may argue that this shift precipitates the loss of a fundamental aspect of the human experience.

Hermann Hesse, for one, would join ranks with the latter group. Hesse, who in works like *Demian* (1919) and *Narcissus and Goldmund* (1930) explores individual self-realization through art, love, and spirituality, would excoriate the callousness of the strategic model, strike a blow for romantic love, and insist that society desperately needs figures like Casanova, as a model and as an inspiration. More than once the author committed

these convictions to paper, yet rarely as concisely and emphatically as in his 1925 review of the *History of my Life*. “Something”, Hesse cautions, “seems to have gone missing and become a thing of the past, something that Casanova had, and that our parents had, and that our own youth had and which infused our youth with magic: the veneration for love [...]. Today, neither the tragic, nor the virtuosic lovers seem to exist anymore, only the base marriage imposter and the psychopath [...]. From boring bourgeois America to the reddest Soviet socialism – in no truly ‘modern’ worldview does love play any other part than that of a minor, peripheral source of pleasure in life, which may be perfectly well organized by a few hygienic recipes” (“Über Casanova” 474-475). Hesse wishes for modern society not to shy away from the challenges of love and to embrace this essential experience of the human condition. Or, in other words: Hesse believes that modern society needs a little more Casanova.

Seen in this light, the title of Hesse’s short story *Casanovas Bekehrung* appears less ironic. The Chevalier, weary from a series of misadventures he suffered in Cologne and Stuttgart, has just arrived in Zurich when he decides to renounce the world and enter the Order of Saint Benedict at the Einsiedeln Abbey. However, a few hours before he is to commence his noviciate, a chance encounter with a female traveller brings this plan to nought. This, and not Casanova’s passing sanctimony, is the story’s eponymous conversion. By conceding that it is not for him to say, “farewell, goddess of fortune, I have reached the port” (“Casanovas Bekehrung” 521), the Chevalier accepts his fate as an Ahasuerus of love, destined to eternally wander the earth in search of redemption. This dramatic focus on the struggle for self-knowledge places *Casanovas Bekehrung* in the tradition of the modern novella. In an almost allegorical concentration the existence of the hero is put to trial and decided. The Chevalier is pushed to a point where he must finally come to terms with his place in the world, with his individuality. Much to the satisfaction of the reader, Casanova converts to his ‘true self’ – for whom else could the reader look to, if the hero had simply given up?

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The *Pages Casanoviennes* (1925-1926) were followed first by the *Casanova Gleanings* (1958-81) and then by the *Intermédiaires des Casanovistes* (1984-present).
- <sup>2</sup> The two men probably first became acquainted during Casanova's 1752 stay in Vienna (Vol 3, Ch. 12). Their last meeting at Dux in 1792 da Ponte recounts in his *Memorie* (Vol. 2, Pt. 1, 6-23).
- <sup>3</sup> Hussey bases his analysis on admittedly intriguing sketches that were found in Casanova's estate and that show significant similarities with the opening of Act II: "The only other thing that seems to be certain about these extracts is that they are not merely copies in Casanova's handwriting of a scene from 'Don Giovanni.' He would, indeed, hardly have copied them out as pieces of poetry worth recording. Their incompleteness, the fact that they are variants of the same scene, and above all, the numerous alterations in the same writing prove that they are sketches for a scene in the opera. That they are intended for the 'Don Giovanni,' which we know as Mozart's, and not for some other libretto, can hardly be doubted, since the sense of the words and the situation coincide so closely with what stands in the actual score. It is clear, then, that Casanova did some work on this scene, and it is highly improbable that he made the sketches for his own amusement and without any practical purpose" (471).
- <sup>4</sup> In 1787, Casanova had yet to begin work on his memoirs.
- <sup>5</sup> Compare volumes I, IX, and X of the *History of my Life*.
- <sup>6</sup> Indeed, Casanova quickly finds solace in the arms of a woman whose love is for hire.
- <sup>7</sup> The libretto for the operetta is largely based on the Vaudeville *Casanova au fort Saint-André* (1836) by Arago, Varin and Desverges.
- <sup>8</sup> Communication can only be fully understood when also considering factors such as prior knowledge, pragmatic understanding, emotional intelligence, etc. (Lakoff and Johnson 11).
- <sup>9</sup> This section relies on the work of Niklas Luhmann, who provides a circumstantial discussion of functional differentiation in Luhmann, Niklas. *Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik*. Vol. 1. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1980.
- <sup>10</sup> See above, p. 5.
- <sup>11</sup> Stock was the first to point out this overlap of the two traditions in Schnitzler's novella.
- <sup>12</sup> See above, p. 5.
- <sup>13</sup> Fellini's *Henriette* is modelled after the character in the *History of my Life*. See above pp. 8 and 13.
- <sup>14</sup> See above, p. 12.

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# ATHEISM, RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY OF RELIGION AND THE ISSUE OF EMERGENT SECULARIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA

## 1. Introduction

In the past two decades the secularization theory has been the focus of important cross-disciplinary research: anthropology, sociology, political science, history, religious studies have all strived to put forth a comprehensive theory of the relationship between religion and modernity (Taylor, 2007). By challenging the classical theoretical corpus of secularization, under the heading of multiple modernities, these studies focus on the different path dependencies of religious practices and subjectivities in the context of the social transformations advanced by the expanding globalization process (Appadurai, 2001).

Within this contemporary debate, two dominant critiques of the classical theory of secularization have emerged: a weak *culturalist critique* and a strong *economicist critique*. The culturalist critique points out that secularization is not the byproduct of a modernization process (understood here as social differentiation, rationalization and pluralization of world-views), but is rather the byproduct of specific cultural factors that are peculiar to Western European countries (Berger, 2008). This means that Euro-secularism cannot be extrapolated to other social settings and can be traced back to specific cultural features of Western Europe such as the consolidation of a secular intelligentsia starting with the Enlightenment, social functions of the church, political culture, etc.

The economicist critique of secularization is informed by a rational choice theory of religion (RCTR) that analyzes religion as a symbolic product that acts as a social compensator for certain needs and goals (Young, 1997). In this paradigm religion is analyzed not from a demand-

side perspective (the way religious needs are structured by an increasing social rationalization of individual consciousness) but from a supply-side perspective, namely in terms of how religious agents are producing *different religious goods* and the way they are *supplied to religious consumers*.

Romania, an Orthodox country that has recently joined E.U. (2007), has experienced a strong restructuring of its religious mentalities in the past twenty years. After the fall of communism, religion was once again an important factor in shaping the public sphere of life. Some researchers, defending the rational choice theory of religion (Stark, 1999; Iannaccone 1992,), argued that after the fall of the communist regimes the post-socialist countries have shown an increasing interest toward religion, which reveals a so called religious revival pattern that proves the secularization theory wrong. In this theoretical framework, Eastern Europe counts as a religious plural market only because atheism is re-interpreted as a religious-ideology (Froese, 2004). Post-socialist Romanian Orthodoxy by challenging this secular world-view is able to generate a competing religious market and so to bring forth a religious revival.

My paper focuses on how this debate has integrated the case of Eastern-Europe and the post-communist transformations that followed after the communist attempt to implement state organized secularism. Using an Weberian and phenomenological model of analyzing religion, I criticize the shortcoming of the RCTR model (Bruce, 1999) by showing that Eastern-Europe in general and Romania in particular is developing a new pattern of secularization and that this is neither the outcome of specific cultural factors (cultural critique of secularization) nor of the way religious markets are regulated (economist critique of secularization).

At the same time in my paper I show the inconsistencies of the "religious revival" thesis by analyzing the limited impact the atheist project had on the Romanian society and by showing that atheism in Eastern Europe was not the by-product of a genuine modernization process but a top-to-bottom ideology that did not manage to dislocate religious beliefs; during communist period the Romanian society was still very religious in spite the atheist regulations and persecutions.

## **2. Sociological epistemologies of religion and secularization**

An important aspect in analyzing the secularization / religious revival issue, which remains largely unaddressed in the field of sociology and anthropology of religion, is the strong dependency of the various theories of religious change on the specific social epistemology that the researcher assumes. By this I mean the necessity of a meta-theoretical discussion of what it means to research religion and what are the main epistemological axioms that inform social research. When we analyze the issue of secularization we have to differentiate not only between the locus where this process takes place (as Doebelaere, 2002) does, when he differentiates between societal, organizational, individual secularization) or the major consequences secularization has on the field of society and every-day life (as Tschannen, 1991) does, when he identifies core aspects of modernization and their impact on religion), I argue that we need a deeper critique of the social epistemologies that are implicitly used when religion is conceptualized as an sociological and anthropological category of investigation.

Social epistemologies are not constitutive of the empirical data we analyze; they are rather paradigmatical juxtapositions (Kuhn, 2008) or axioms regarding the chosen strategies of explaining and understanding social reality and social action. Social epistemologies are grounded on ultimate ontological assumptions regarding the nature of social reality and the methodological principles that guide social research. Religion, as a sociological category, is not an exception to this and it is always analyzed in terms of a specific social paradigm that establishes the main epistemic coordinates of approaching this form of (social) interaction. Secularization is first of all a distance-concept that aims at capturing the social transformations of the “religious” processes into “non-religious” ones: the catalyzing structures that trigger these transformations and the way the categories of “religion” and “non-religion” are used are always determined by the specific social paradigm that informs the research.

In the past two decades the field of sociology of religion has been dominated by the rational choice theory of religion which has been acclaimed by many sociologists and political scientists as the most comprehensive paradigm of researching religion. In what follows I would like to underline some of the epistemological assumptions that informs the supply side approach to religion in post-communist Eastern Europe and

the way this research program has focused on the religious transformations of this region.

The sociological study of religion using a rational choice framework has its genealogy in the application of the micro-economic approach to human behavior which analyzes religion in terms of a commodity that is produced and consumed just like any other commodity (Iannaccone, 1990, 1997, 2005). The distribution of the fluxes of “religious capital” (Iannaccone, 1998) follows the economical laws of demand of supply and this is why the central theoretical device of RCTR is that of the “religious markets” and the emphasis set on the impact that religious pluralization (supply) has on religious consumption (demand).

A novel thing that is advanced by the RCTR paradigm is the shift from a “demand-side” perspective of religion to a “supply-side” perspective. Religion isn’t anymore analyzed in terms of how subjective religious needs are structured by an increasing social rationalization of individual consciousness; now it is analyzed in terms of how religious agents are producing different religious goods and they way they are offered to religious consumers. It is not the demand that counts but the supply.

An important concept for RCTR is the concept of religious market and religious goods. A diversified religious market where there is a strong religious competition between the different religious suppliers will result in better quality of religious goods and so in a positive stimulation of religious consumption which increases religiosity. This is how RCTR explains the difference between the United the States and Western Europe in terms of the degree of religiosity. In the US, in spite the fact that this is one of the most modern countries in the world, there is an institutionalized religious pluralism that stimulates the production of religious goods. In Europe the religious markets are monopolized by one religion that is supported by the state, which controls all religious activities. Religious monopolization leads to low structural competition and to low quality of religious goods and services and eventuality to a decrease of religiosity. RCTR argues that secularization is not an irreversible process but rather a temporary situation that has to do with the way religious markets are regulated and not with an erosion of religious needs triggered by social modernization.

This argument is further employed to show that Western Europe is an exceptional case and that the secularization of Western countries is not due to the modernization process, but due to this particular way of organizing the religious market (Finke, 1992; Iannaccone, 1992, 1998; Stark, 1999). The monopolization of the local religious markets by a dominant religion

(Catholicism or Protestantism) which is supported by the state blocks the institutionalization of genuine religious competition and so the possibility of religious vitality.

The RCTR approach represents an important shift in the field of sociology of religion in terms of the theoretical paradigm used to research religion. A Weberian-phenomenological paradigm has been replaced with a rational choice theory of religion. The RCTR approach to religious studies has been informed largely by an economicist approach that is based on an ethnocentric concept of instrumental-rationality. This represents an important departure from Weber's analysis of purposive rationality and the relationship it has with religious practices and subjectivities. For Weber the emergence and institutionalization of purposive-rationality led to a social pluralisation that had as a main consequence the disenchantment of the world (Schluchter, 1989). This allows us to put the concept of pluralism advanced by rational choice theory of religion in a different perspective.

Weber's methodological individualism and his emphasis set on understanding the rational motives of action does not overlap with the rational choice theory agenda as RCTR claims. Weber's view on the rationality of action is much more complex than the one supported by the RCTR and draws on a distinct social epistemology that views the generalization of purposive rationality and the institutionalization of societal rationalization as a specific historical and cultural process. Paradoxically these process have a religious origin and are responsible as well for what Weber labels as the "*disenchantment of the world*" (Weber, 2003).

The differentiation of distinct spheres of values and the emergence of various cultural systems of action has generated according to Weber a permanent conflict between the religious system and the other sub-systems. The institutionalization of the purposive rationality that has been popularized through the Protestant ethic has led to an abnormal societal rationalization and to the transformation of the capitalist culture and institutions into the "iron cage" of modern life-world (Gog, 2007). This approach enables us to formulate an important critique of the rational choice theory of religion: the pluralization of values spheres leads according to Weber to a decline of the religious forms of structuring social reality and not to a religious revitalization, as RCTR claims.

The emphasis on the specific logic and rationality of the religious sphere that cannot be reduced to instrumental rational action has been later on developed by the social phenomenological approach of religion.

Following Alfred Schutz (Schutz, 1990), Berger (1990) and Luckmann (1991) have developed a distinct social epistemology that emphasizes the various aspects of the inter-subjective constituted religious life-world. The Schutzian phenomenological approach proceeds from the epistemological assumption of the uniqueness of the religious finite province of meaning and of the way meaningful action is constituted in relation to specific structures of the life-world (Schutz, 1990).

This distinct social epistemology represents a radical break from the classical phenomenological tradition which draws on a pre-Husserlian concept of phenomenology (Ryba, 2009) that is not sensitive to the social and cultural embeddedness of religion and most of all to the inter-subjective structures of the social life-world in which religious subjectivities and practices are articulated. The post-Husserlian phenomenological theories have enabled the development of a new paradigm of analyzing social action that informed as well the sociological study of religion and secularization. In this social paradigm, the concept of secularization has to be related to the general de-coupling of the religious finite province of meaning from the ever-day life-world. The religious finite province of meaning is not capable anymore of providing religious motives for action and religious interpretation of every-day life (Schutz, 1990, 1990b). Secularization does not mean the vanishing of the religious finite province of meaning but its generalized incapacity to structure all other spheres of life. Both Berger's and Luckmann approaches to the issue of secularization emphasized how religion is a social constructed category and how the transformations induced by modern pluralism generates deep socio-structural changes of the religious sphere of life.

It is clear now to see the shift that is taking place in recent sociology of religion: one of the main differences between the various social epistemologies of secularization has to be related to the way the impact of social pluralism on religion is conceptualized. In the Weberian and phenomenological approaches post-modernity and social pluralism leads to the emergence of multiple plausibility structures and so to an erosion of religion; in the rational choice paradigm social pluralism generates a pluralization of the religious markets and so to an increased religiosity. The way relationship between pluralism and secularization is imagined within the new dominating social epistemology has changed dramatically.

We have to point out that RCTR it is based on a narrow definition of rationality and reduces all motives of action to instrumental cost/benefit analysis. Religion is analyzed in terms of rational actors that seek to



maximize their utility and the impact this has on the production of various religious goods and services - this model starts to inform more and more research of religion in Eastern Europe as well. According to this economical paradigm of religion, secularization is the outcome of the monopolization of the religious markets, a process that is reversible when religious deregulation occurs and when religious pluralization is institutionalized. As we have seen in this section, RCTR argues that in those societies where there are more religions competing with each other for followers there is a positive stimulation of the consumption of religiosity because competition generates higher quality of religious goods and services.

The religious transformations in Eastern Europe are interpreted as the emergence of new type of religious pluralism. But most the post-communist Eastern European countries (Romania including) have a religious market that is dominated by a single religion (in the case of Romania, Orthodox Christianity). RCTR explains the religious revival by pointing out that in Eastern Europe the competition has been not among different religious suppliers, but between world-views. Atheism is seen as a sort of secular religion that is challenged during the post-socialist period by different religious world-views. This leads to a diversification of religious market (religious competition generates a higher quality of religious goods) and later to religious revival.

The “supply-side” theories of religion consider the Eastern-European region as a conglomerate of social spaces where religious world-views are increasingly marketed and where religion and religious leaders dominate the public sphere of life. According to RCTR this shows that secularization has nothing to do with the enfolding of a modernization process, but with the way the “religious market” is organized. By looking at the Romanian case I want to criticize the “supply-side” perspective and the rational choice theory of religion by arguing that the RCTR assumption that within communist societies atheism had the status of a secular religion that replaced traditional religions is wrong (section 3) and by pointing out that pluralism has rather the opposite effect: it generates an erosion of the traditional religious world-view and institutes a new logic of secularization (section 4).

### 3. Atheism in Eastern Europe: The De-regulation of the Religious Market and the Issue of Pluralism

One of the main issues regarding the application of RCTR's theory of religious pluralism to Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries is that most of these countries are dominated by religious monopolies (either Roman Catholic or Orthodox). At the same time the majority of RCTR theorists claim to have identified in CEE a clear pattern of religious revival. The empirical research carried in these countries made them advocate the thesis (which in the mean time has become a common place in the field of religious studies of the CEE region and underlies many programs of research) that after the fall of communism these countries experienced a massive religious revival. The atheist ideology that secularized the entire social system was allegedly replaced by a strong return of religion in both public and private life.

How is the RCTR making sense of this theoretical paradox of the simultaneity of monopoly of the religious market and religious growth? How can it explain the post-communist religious revival of a CEE countries that are to a great extend mono-religious? More than this, most of the CEE countries underwent after the fall of communism an intensive process of religious regulation: the post-communist states have generally supported the establishment of national religions and various ethno-religious ideologies. This, together with religious monopolization of the market, should lead, according to RCTR, to a general secularization (or decrease of religious consumption) and not to a pattern of religious revival.

On the other hand RCTR theorists are puzzled by the fact that religious pluralism (in those countries where this is encountered) does not lead to an increase of religiosity in most of the ex-communist countries. In spite the RCTR theoretical prediction the correlation is negative: the more religious pluralist a country is the more likely a secularization trend can be identified (Froese, 2004:58-59). The same applies to religious regulations of the market. A correlation between various religious freedom indexes and levels of religiosity reveals again a contradicting image: the less religious freedom exists in a country and the stronger the monopoly is, the more likely that in that country a religious revival is taking place (Froese, 2004:58-59). These findings contradict the RCTR of religion regarding the impact religious pluralism has on religious consumption.

An important element for explaining away this theoretical failure is to **re-define atheism as a religious ideology**. By codifying the atheist

philosophy as a secular religion which displays the same structural marks as any other religion, the RCTR emphasizes that the religious monopolization of CEE religious market is only apparent and that at a deeper level a stronger competition exists: that between the atheist and the emerging religious worldview (Froese, 2004:58, 73):

Nevertheless, I contend that post-communist religious revivals follow predictable patterns when one accounts for two important factors in the religious economy. First, post-Soviet societies contained an inordinate number of atheists and agnostics. This was due to decades of religious repression and continuous attempts to convert the Soviet public to atheism. Therefore, religious competition in post-Soviet society should take into account competition with atheism. Second, post-Soviet countries are implementing their own religious regulations -ones that tend to favor certain religious groups. When one considers the impact of atheism in tandem with these new religious laws, religious growth follows the expectations of supply-side theory. (Froese, 2004:58)

This competition between atheism and emerging religious worldview explains as well, according to RCTR, why usually former communist Catholic countries as Lithuania and Poland are more religious than Orthodox and Muslim countries (Froese, 2004:64).

The Catholic Church was during the communist period an active institution that resisted the communist regimes (Froese, 2005:269). It generated a religious counter-culture that helped coagulate various opponents of the communist regimes. This builds up not only to political resistance, but to religious resistance as well and hence it generated a pluralist culture that amounted to a gradual religious revival. The fact that some ex-communist Catholic countries have developed patterns of religious revivals is due, according to the supply-side model, to the pluralist culture and the structural opposition between a secular and religious world-view (Froese, 2004:64, 71).

In the communist countries where Islam was the religion of the majority no real religious counter-culture could be established that could challenge the atheist ideology because of the over-fragmentation of the Muslim groups (Froese, 2004:65). The same lack of religious resistance could be encountered in Orthodox countries, but this had other reasons, namely the fact that the Orthodox Church had allowed itself to be transformed into a national symbol of the communist regimes (Froese, 2004:65). The Orthodox Churches have been known, according to RCTR, for

collaborating with the communist regimes and lending their support for the establishment of national identities.

This elaborates a theme that has been increasingly advocated in the past years that emphasizes the important role of the Byzantine theological legacy in shaping church – state relationships in communist countries (Gillet, 2001:28). The symphony principle (Gillet, 2001:70) was genuinely embedded in the Orthodox political ideology and acted as the base of continuous collaboration between the church and state representatives. In spite the fact that the atheist propaganda aimed at eradicating outdated religious thinking it never publicly attacked the Orthodox Church; it aimed at transforming it into an important ally (Gillet, 2001:70).

This was done through the establishment of a communist pan-orthodoxy around the Russian Church that aimed at re-constructing the unity of the Byzantine Church and the collaborative effort to halt the Catholic advancement into Orthodox territories (Gillet, 2001:122). In fact what is paramount of the suppression of the Greek-Catholic churches by the communist regimes is the active collaboration of the Orthodox Church in picturing the Greek Catholics as enemies of the nations (Gillet, 2001:191-205). A different religious affiliation meant disloyalty to the nation-state – this could be conceived only by implicitly using a particular religious definition of what it meant to be a member of the national state (Gillet, 2001:175-178).

In contrast to the “Catholic imperialism” that doubled the “Capitalist imperialism”, the Orthodox Churches were called to be churches of the people that served their country (Gillet 2001:123). The anti-clericalism that have developed in Catholic countries have managed to alienate Western people from the Church; this could not be let happen in Orthodox countries and because of this the Orthodox establishment had to adapt itself to the needs of the people of their respective national countries. The most authentic expression of the will of the people was, according to Gillet, the Communist State, so being a Church of the people implied most of all being a Church of the State (Gillet, 2001:124-125).<sup>1</sup>

RCTR conceptualizes the lack of religious resistance to the communist ideology as one of the most important reasons why Orthodox communist countries have not developed a religious plural system: the absence of religious pluralism explains religious consumption is low in communist Orthodox countries - structurally the religious market was during the communist period not a competitive one (as allegedly was in Catholic Poland).

The post-communist period meant first of all a re-establishment of traditional churches and an alliance between national churches and state structures in almost all Eastern-European countries. Most of the post-communist states introduced religious laws and various other religious regulations that aimed at strengthening the local churches and inhibiting religious pluralism. State subsidies, symbolic presence in national media and state institutions and the involvement of national church representatives in public ceremonies enabled the various national churches to establish a powerful position within the post-communist period and halt any advance of minority religions. The post-communist period in almost each individual country case was synonymous with the emergence of monopolized religious markets (Froese, 2008:155-158). The same monopolization of religious market exists not only in former Eastern European communist countries but in former Soviet republics as well. The Islamic resurgence meant the re-establishment of religiously informed laws that were not very open to other types of religious ideas and practices (Froese, 2008:154).

At the same time RCTR theorists agree with the fact that these countries have underwent a genuine religious revival (Froese, 2008:152) and that precisely the countries that have least religious pluralism and the stronger religious regulation are the ones that have the highest religious values. Paradoxically it is not the pluralization of religious market that generates religious vitality, but the strong monopolization (Froese, 2008:160-161). This contradicts the general rational choice theory of religion and demands an explanation.

The RCTR explanatory device is elaborated through the re-interpretation of atheism as a political ideology that fulfils specific religious functions. The existing religious monopolization is only a surface appearance - in fact, the supply side model claims, at a deeper level we deal with a strong institutionalized challenge to atheism as a world-view (Froese, 2008:160). At a structural level there is not a monopolist situation but rather a (bi) pluralist one: different world-views compete with each other after the fall of the communist regime. On one side there is an atheistic secular world-view and on the other side the re-emergence of a new religious world-view: this generates the pluralistic situation (an important element for RCTR, as we have already seen) need in order explain the religious revival of Eastern-Europe.

The alleged religious revival is due to the dissolution of atheist regulation of the (secular and religious) world-view market and the

increased diversification of religious offers all over Eastern Europe (Froese & Pfaff, 2001:482). The Eastern European case, rational choice theorists of religion claim, acts as a general proof of the theory that secularization is not related to modern and post-modern transformations but to monopolization of religious markets. The post-communist changes led to overall religious revival, simply because various religious agents were free to actively marketize their religious goods (Froese & Pfaff, 2001:483) against a prevailing secular-atheist world-view.

We can see how this re-interpretation of atheism as a secular religion works within the RCTR model by analyzing a few of the studies that theorists subscribing to this paradigm have dedicated to Eastern-European countries. Poland is invoked by a lot of studies as one of the most religious country of Eastern Europe (Froese & Pfaff, 2001). Analyzing the discourse of RCTR regarding Poland represents a good case of how RCTR works when faced with difficulties accommodating empirical findings with general theoretical predictions. Catholicism holds monopoly in Poland just like in the other European countries: in Italy, Spain and France (Catholic monopolies) underwent a secularization process as a result of this religious monopolization of the market, as the RCTR theorists are well aware.

The reason why this Catholic monopoly has not led to the same situation in Poland is the fact that during the communist period the Church has allegedly turned from a state-church to a national-church (Froese & Pfaff, 2001:485-486). The difference between the two lays in the degree of autonomy of the church in relationship to the national-state. As we noticed, RCTR claims that in most Orthodox countries churches became allies of the communist regimes and as such they were transformed into state-churches, a status they have tried to maintain during the post-communist period as well.

Catholicism was since long time an important element of national identity (Froese & Pfaff, 2001:487) (but this is the case of most Orthodox Balkan countries as well, which RCTR model fails to acknowledge) and during the communist period it managed to act as the sole major institution of the opposition to the Soviet communist rule (Froese & Pfaff, 2001:488). As such they became national churches (i.e. achieved autonomy from the state).

The Catholic Church was able to act as a platform of people dissatisfied with the communist ideology and culture and developed a strong resistance movement. These institutional developments were instrumental in articulating an anti-communist counter-culture that was at the same time

impregnated by strong religious legitimations. Because of the massiveness of this movement, communists learned how to accommodate it within Polish society without allowing it to become a mainstream movement. This nevertheless created the pre-condition of social and religious pluralism (social pluralism because it generated alternative social and cultural spaces that were not institutionally controlled by communist propaganda bureaucracy) (Froese & Pfaff, 2001:488). Although the competition here is at the level of political ideologies (communism versus Catholic inspired nationalism) the same world-view conflict between atheism and religion is implicitly assumed (Froese & Pfaff, 2001:489).

RCTR claims that the massive Catholic adhesions during the communist period are a consequence of the existence of a vital ideological market that allowed for an open world-view competition. This ideological competition created as well, according to RCTR, the institutional and social means to express this word-view at the level of the entire social system. This explains within RCTR why in Poland in spite of the communist propaganda there was still a very high level of religiosity. The communist atheist monopoly should have led to a forced secularization, but this did not happen because Poland experienced during the communist period a plural religious market.

Various other Eastern-European countries tried to reproduce the Polish model (Froese, 2005). Countries like Hungary, Slovakia and Lithuania (Froese, 2005:269) retain their religious vitality during the post-communist period because religion here managed to generate a national counter-culture as a reaction to the Soviet communist ideology. Interestingly enough all these countries are Catholic and the implicit idea here is that the trans-national bureaucratic structure of this church helped subvert the communist geo-politics. After communism and its atheistic ideology was swept away by the political changes in the early 90's the world-view market has altered considerably, leaving Catholicism as the sole supplier of religious meanings and goods. RCTR claims that this has created a monopoly situation and in very short time (1990-1996, *sic*) has led to a gradual secularization. The new monopoly situation explains within RCTR why in Poland in spite a very high religiosity there is a gradual trend towards secularization.

But RCTR is inconsistent with this claim. Analyzing the difference between secular Czech Republic and devout Slovakia (Froese, 2005), the RCTR theorists claim that sometimes the secularization of a specific Eastern European countries is the lack of continuous fusion between nationalism and religion. If during the communist period this would make sense

because of the alleged generation of a religious counter-culture, during the post-communist period this alliance between a particular religious group and national politics leads to a monopolization of the religious market. It creates the pre-condition of even a fiercer monopolization because it is enforced by the national state. In spite of this fact RCTR theorists claim that this monopolization rather leading to a decrease of religiosity (as the supply-model claims) it leads paradoxically to an increase.

The post-communist separation of Czechoslovakia led to two distinct trajectories of relating Catholicism with the newly emerged nations (Froese, 2005:275-280). In the Czech Republic under the pressure of Jan Hus reform legacy there was a trend of de-legitimizing the Catholic Church and keeping it from attaining an important place in the national political scene. In Slovakia on the other side, Catholicism was at the center of the national project and was promoted as the religious ideology that could embody the Slovakian post-communist national project. This fusion of the national project with a religious ideology explains why Slovakia still has a high religiosity compared to the Czech Republic which is one of the most secular countries of Europe (Froese, 2005:270-271). An easier explanation than of differences in modernization processes between the two countries is dropped in favor of a contradicting thesis that a specific instance of religious monopoly (nationalism reinforced by a unique religion) generates higher religious values and not lowers as the general rational choice theory of religion predicts. In the case of Poland the post-communist Catholic monopolization was seen as being the factor of secularization, in the case of Slovakia the same monopolization is seen as leading to a religious revival.

Strong inconsistencies can be noted as well in the analysis of those Eastern European countries that are not religiously monopolized by one church, as is the case of Hungary (Froese, 2001). RCTR predicts that religious pluralization should lead to an increase in religious demand, but in the case of Hungary the opposite is the case. Hungary is a country where both Catholicism and Protestantism (Calvinism and Lutheranism) have a great share of the religious believers; it qualifies as a religious plural country within the RCTR theoretical framework. As most of other communist European countries Hungary experienced a fierce process of atheization that led not only to the implementation of a new ideology but also to harsh religious persecutions (Froese, 2001:252-256). This religious persecution had only a limited impact on Hungarians and in spite the fact that the historical churches accepted to collaborate with the communist



authorities (and did not generate an alternative religious counter-culture as in Poland) the religious values remained high compared to the previous periods (church attendance dropped<sup>2</sup> only slightly (Froese, 2001:254).

The comparison of the 1980 and 1990 world-value survey revealed that the fall of communism led to a slight rise of religious values (Froese, 2001:258, 266) but this is hard to be labeled as a religious revival. It is rather the effect of a general religious euphoria that emerged after the removal of religious oppression and disappearance of the agents of atheization. But the fact that immediately after the fall of communism Hungarians manifest a deep religiosity shows in my opinion that the atheization process could not eliminate the religious structure and religious mentalities but only impede the public manifestation of it.

The most problematic issue is that the Hungarian post-socialist religious revival was only shortly lived and soon an abrupt secularization followed. The fact that religious pluralization has not led to a religious revival, but to secularization is extremely problematic for RCTR. Trying to explain that this is due to the fact that all the historical churches receive subsidies from the government (Froese, 2001:265-267) is not a viable argument because unlike other ex-communist countries, in Hungary there isn't only one church that monopolized the market with the help of the national state but there are several churches (religious minorities included) that were in the same position – state subsidies allocated to all religion should only reinforce religious pluralism, and not weaken it. Additionally, the harsh atheist regulations have not managed to secularize the country as post-socialist pluralism did. The fact that religious values are continuing to drop during the post-communist period and reach values much lower than in the communist atheist period is rather a confirmation of the general secularization theory that links the process of modernization with that of secularization.

The idea that post-communist religious revivals are due to a deep-level religious pluralism is based on the argument that atheism in-itself was a religion. In spite the fact that most ex-communist countries are dominated, as we have seen, by a single national religion that continues to be strongly supported by the state (so that a high level of regulations of the religious market exists), the alleged Eastern European religious revivals are explained using the same RCTR conceptual framework of competition and pluralism. But this is based on a semantic shift of what pluralism means: pluralism in this case refers to a world-view competition

between the religion of atheism and the rebirth of the oppressed traditional religion. This pluralism does not take place as RCTR predicts, between various religions, but between a religiously assumed atheistic world-view and a dominating state religion.

Atheism is re-interpreted by RCTR as a religion mainly because the communist intended to transform it into an ultimate world-view that was meant to replace traditional religions (Froese, 2004:66). As such it attained the status of a religious doctrine that was spread through the secular networks of the State. The communist political party and the ideologization of the educational system were the two most common means of spreading atheism through the masses.

The RCTR theorists think that they are able to establish several similarities between the ideology of atheism and the fundamental structure of religion. First of all RCTR argues that atheism marginalized religious communities by trying to establish secular churches that were meant to take over the main function of traditional churches (Froese, 2008:55). This was done through the creation of mass organizations that had the purpose of systematically generating proselytes within the communist established societies. Allegedly, according to RCTR, this was achieved in an almost religious fashion using newly established factories as parishes where the atheist dogma was preached (Froese, 2008:56).

The resemblance between atheism and religion can be seen, according to RCTR, also by the fact that the communist ideologists managed to replace all religious holidays with secular ones that were molded after a religious holidays and rituals (Froese, 2008:60). This was done either through changes in the secular calendar and the enforcement of special communist events that were meant to obstruct participation in religious services (especially during Christmas and Easter time) or through the creation of secular events that had the same structure as the religious ones only devoid of their traditional meanings (Froese, 2008:61).

RCTR claims that in order to make atheism more appealing to the masses secular rituals were invented that aimed at replacing the traditional religious rituals for baptisms, weddings and funerals. These rituals had a clear religious structure that aimed at establishing a new world-view an integrated moral community based on humanistic and atheistic values (Froese, 2004:66). Communist youth rites of passage were especially designed in order to replace their religious prevailing ones (Froese, 2008:61).

Another important resemblance that RCTR theorists claim to see is the replacement of religious saints and icons with the cult of communist leaders (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin) which had not only the function of political mobilization, but a religious one as well (Froese 2008:63). The images of communist leaders and the political processions are seen as public religious rituals and pilgrimages that have at centerfold human semi-gods that are worshiped by the population like saints (Froese, 2004:43; 2008:64).

The Marxist-Leninist doctrine is more or less conceptualized as a religious doctrine (Froese, 2008:58, 66-67) that penetrates all spheres of life and reinterprets the life-world based on the dialectical materialism principles. The ideological orthodoxy and the brutal force used to repress all deviations it is seen as resembling the relationship between religious dogmatism and sects: i.e. the communist doctrine was propagated as a new religious dogma.

This analogy between religion and atheist ideology is so strong stated within RCTR that is postulated as functioning as such not only at the level of political discourse (the way indoctrinators perceived their ideology), but being assumed as such by the population as well. The communists managed not only to replace religion with the atheist ideology by transforming it into a secular substitute it managed, according to RCTR, to generate as well religious followers (*sic*):

[...] scientific atheism replicated religious ceremonies, rituals, and produced a new Communist sense of the sacred as an alternative to religion. This simply confused the population, many of whom mistook scientific atheism for a new religion and not an exit from religious belief altogether so that even those few who wanted to believe in the ideals of atheistic communism simply ended up praying to the gods of Lenin and Stalin (Froese, 2004:48)

According to RCTR, atheists were in fact strong religious believers! Another important feature of the equation of the atheist ideology with religion is the Marxist utopia of an end of History and the establishment of a Messianic society where equality, the proletarian control of all means of production and the re-distribution of surplus-value could establish a classless society and where conflict and exploitation will cease. In essence this political ideology resembles, according to RCTR, very much the

Christian eschatology and addresses the religious hope of a new humanity and the expectation of abolishment of all evil and suffering.

RCTR considers that atheism was successful during the communist period (Froese 2004:59; Froese, 2008:144; Froese and Pfaff, 2005:414-417) because it generated a high number of religious unaffiliated people and it impeded the mechanisms of religious socialization (Froese, 2008:147). In fact RCTR postulates that religious monopolies were established after the fall of communism precisely because the long-lasting atheist repression created a genuine "religious vacuum" (Froese, 2008:162).

Sometimes the successfulness of this religious ideology is ambiguous assumed within the RCTR and is portrayed as failing at the end of communism because it was an unsuccessful top-to bottom imposed world-view that was not propagated in a truly scientific manner (Froese, 2004b:46-48). Other times is seen as failing precisely because it was very successful and it led to the monopolization of the world-view market (within RCTR monopolization and regulation always leads to failure of the supplied religious world-view):

Many of these problems stem from the fact that scientific atheism was an ideology imposed on a population from official channels. Communists did not attempt to engage the hearts and minds of would-be converts but expected individuals to simply bend to patently superficial belief [...] In this, scientific atheism closely resembles the weakness and impotence of monopoly religion that rely on political favoritism for subsistence and become apathetic to the needs of their congregations. (Froese, 2004f:48)

The idea here is that because atheism as an ideology had the status of an exclusive belief system (Froese, 2008:65) it consequently had only a limited impact on the masses because it was assumed as a sacred world-view that had to be imposed in a fundamentalist manner in every-day life (Froese, 2008:66). Communist states, according to RCTR, resemble religious fundamentalist states that established regulated and monopolized religious markets.

The internal structure of the atheist ideology has within the RCTR a complete religious meaning. This resemblance is not assumed as being merely metaphorical; within RCTR atheism is perceived as being a genuine religion:

Within this context, the symbols, rituals, and moral codes produced by Communist Party elites appear ironic. But in trying to destroy religion, Marxist-Leninists discovered an unforeseen obstacle – religious demand. In trying to unravel the mystery of religious persistence, Communist Party officials recognized the powerful allure of ritual activity and charismatic authority, which they hoped to bend to their own ends. In pursuit of secularization, the Communist Party ended up creating a sacred church, homily, and liturgy of its very own (Froese, 2008:65)

Religious demand does never disappear and this is the case within an atheist state as well (Froese, 2008:142). This is consistent with RCTR theoretical axioms. Atheism could halt religious supply and regulate churches, but could never eradicate the demand for religion. In doing this RCTR claims that atheism had to become a religion in order to supply this demand, and so was *de facto* transformed into a secular religion.

The main reason for the equivalence between religion and atheism is that this is the only way the religious transformations all over Eastern Europe can be explained theoretically by RCT. Religious growth can take place within RCTR only if there are various religious competitors available on the religious market i.e. the social system enables religious pluralism. The post-communist societies are in fact religiously monopolized and regulated by the state – by reinterpreting atheism as a religious ideology this allows to RCTR to maintain its theoretical framework in analyzing the religious developments in Eastern Europe. We can see here very clearly the way a specific assumed epistemology of religion and secularization constitutes its object of research and forces data to fit its model.

In what follows I would like to challenge this functionalist definition of religion and the equation of atheist ideology with religion. My argument is that atheism represented a forced instrumental control of the worldview that was dictated from top to bottom through the existing official networks. It was imposed on the Romanian population by force (sometimes through religious persecutions and imprisonment) and acted as the official language that codified a radical separation of State and Church. The assumption of RCTR that this form of political secularism through forced atheization of the population was successful in terms of secularizing the life-world is gratuitous. In spite of the persecutions and strong regulations imposed on the religious system, religion never actually disappeared from the private sphere of life.

Looking at various sociological studies that try to monitor the impact of the atheist ideology on Soviet population, Martin (1978) argues that the level of atheization was very low in those regions that had a low educational capital, were not part of the state imposed industrialization and urbanization process and had few Party members (Martin, 1978: 209-244). This enables us to see the specific top-to-bottom strategy that the Communist Party employed and the strong link with the bureaucratic network the atheist ideology had. Rather than being a process that generated a wide acceptance of a secular atheistic world-view it was more an official political ideology that tried to impose itself dogmatically and acted as an official language of the Party.

The two main environments that were instrumental for the Communist Party in order to implement atheism were the work environment (emerging factories and industries) and education. Out of this, the educational system was most critical because it enabled communists to control the formation of ultimate values and socialization process of the entire future generations of Romanians. In what follows I would like to take a look at this and at the communist studies of that period that were preoccupied with the implementation of Atheism in Romanian society and show why the strategy employed by the communists was incapable of achieving its aims.

At the heart of instrumentalizing the educational establishments lies a strategy to overcome the Marxist contradiction between theory and praxis regarding religion. Marxism claims to be the expression of rigorous social science and as such it conceives itself as totally opposite to ideological reification of reality through religion (Berar, 1980:122). The dialectical materialist worldview needs to be strongly rooted in the lives of teenagers so that it can ground the ethical imperatives that follow from the communist revolution and the practical requirements that are a pre-requisite of any industrialized society (Berar, 1980:126). Although the superiority of the dialectical-materialism is beyond any doubt and although it has been theoretically justified as the highest form of philosophy it stills need to be transformed into a practical reality (Berar, 1980:126): the new superior human is *"at the same time an ideal and a developing reality"* (Berar, 1980:121). This is why although theoretically religion has been made ineffective by the advent of the empowered proletarian forces (through the seizing of the means of the production that generated during the pre-communist phase the religious alienation) and by the institutionalization of the only true world-view (dialectical materialism) its disappearance

had to be achieved practically, through state coordinated interventions in the life-world of the communist society.<sup>3</sup>

The secular educational system was an important device that has been developed in order to overcome this contradiction between theory and praxis. The educational establishments were transformed into the most important sites of atheist education and disciplination of teenagers so that they could develop a communist ethic and a dialectical-materialist worldview. The ultimate scope of this atheist educational project was a moral outcome: that of an every-day ethics based on a materialist worldview (Stefanescu and Stanciu, 1972:399).

The development of communist ethics would assure the construction of a just and free society that is realized through productive labor: this is why work should be an opportunity to affirm the essence of personality (Stefanescu and Stanciu, 1972:400) and to serve as a reminder of the dialectical-materialist world-view. The communist youth would engage in different labor activities that would prepare them for adult life, but this would always have a philosophical twist: that of acculturating them into adult atheist and communist member of the new society.

The communist authorities developed for this reason the Communist Youth Union that would have to assure the perpetuation of the atheist education (Spiridon, 2005: 257) and the dialectical-materialist world-view that they have promoted in the curricula of the secular education system. One of the main reason for this was the need for a better ideological control of the free time of teen-agers and of their entertainment spaces (Stefanescu and Stanciu, 1972:400). For the communist authorities this time was perceived as a valuable "capital" that was not always invested the right way by their parents, so the communist ideologists were struggling to find ways of taking a share of this "capital" in order to organize different activities that would contribute to the generation of a scientific-atheist worldview (Dunstan, 1993:167-171).

The ideological control of free time of young people was also aiming to make sure that they do not use their free time to engage in religious activities that were organized at the same days of public holidays (Sundays) or expose themselves to "*mystical practices of different religions and religious sects* (Stefanescu and Stanciu, 1972:401)". This shows the externality of the atheization process and how this was implanted through the governmentalization of time, institutionalization and control of socialization mechanisms.

The educational system was very important for the communist authorities because here they could easily exercise the nude forms of political secularism in order to re-convert a rural religiosity into an urban workforce that was realizing its authenticity through productive work and a socialist ethic. The school as an institution was part of a vast educational strategy that was meant to “*continuously improve the political ideology*” (Stefanescu and Stanciu, 1972:393) by encircling categories of society into “practical” institutional frames that would easily allow for a conversion to the dialectical-materialist world-view. This way they developed the controlled social spaces that would permit “*to address them with ever new messages, rich in content, through specific means: press, radio, television programs, cinematography and through the greatest numbers of theaters, museums, libraries, clubs, cultural houses, cultural institutions that Romania ever knew*” (Stefanescu and Stanciu, 1972:393).

The school and the university was the most focalized and powerful environment to discipline children and teenagers into developed members of the communist society. The ideologization of the educational system was the solution to this and it became an important instrument of atheization in the hands of the communist regime:

Our educative system, that has as a foundation the educative force of the entire society and the strength of the normative activities of its opinion, contains a multitude of ways and a network with a variety and area of reach, unprecedented in the history of learning and education of our nation (Stefanescu and Stanciu, 1972:393).

In terms of educational content the atheist project should develop in two steps: first, it should focus on the primary notions of a scientific view of the world and elaborate the basic “scientific notions” needed for a materialistic understanding of life; second, the late study of philosophy should enable the student to acquire the “*categories and fundamental principles of the dialectical-materialist philosophy*” (Stefanescu and Stanciu, 1972: 396) that would allow them to have a critical perspective on social and religious realities.

It is only when these two levels of education are connected on a profound level that atheistic worldviews are developed and the genuine rejection of religions can be generated in the lives of the students. Then why the atheization attempts sometimes fail according the communists intelligentsia? The reason is that the ideological critique of religion that is



not backed up by scientific arguments doesn't have the force to penetrate the religious "mysticism" (Stefanescu and Stanciu, 1972:397). Only when students are brought in touch with science can they develop a genuine world-view that frees them from religious backwardness.

At this point it easily becomes visible that the communist ideologists are aware of the fact that for the past two decades atheism has functioned as an empty ideology and only when this is doubled by the inoculation of scientific perspective on life can they succeed in eradicating religion. We can clearly see here the naivety, scientificism and positivism that underline these communists programs of atheization. It relies on an Enlightenment view of religion codified as an obscure force of humanism that will naturally disappear once exposed to the rigorosity of scientific thinking encouraged by dialectical materialism.<sup>4</sup>

In the specific case of Romania this ideology had a limited impact on the religious mentality of the population and on children that were socialized within rural proletarian families forced to migrate to cities by the industrialization process. This is not the case of all communist countries: in some of them secularization advanced to Western European comparative levels. Eastern Germany (57.41%), Check Republic (55.95%), Bulgaria (53.48%), Slovenia (32.66%) reached and surpassed in the early 90's levels of unbelief similar to some of the western countries such as Sweden (46.04), France (35.13%), Netherlands (33.33%) and Denmark (32.62%). But countries as Romania (5.98%) and Poland (2.44%) remained highly religious only similar to Malta (0.51%) and Ireland (2.40%).<sup>5</sup> When asked if they considered themselves religious persons (**Table 1**) we can see that in spite the fact that people in ex-communist countries tend to see themselves as less religious than those in Western European countries, the level of convinced atheists is almost similar (except the two outlier cases: France – 10.58% and East Germany 18.41%).

**Table 1. Are you a religious person?**

	<b>Religious</b>	<b>Not Religious</b>	<b>Convinced Atheist</b>
Malta	74.30 %	23.92 %	0.51 %
Ireland	71.50 %	26.60 %	0.60 %
Northern Ireland	70.72 %	27.30 %	0.66 %
Poland	90.02 %	2.55 %	0.92 %
USA	81.29 %	14.57 %	1.20 %

Romania	73.35 %	23.84 %	1.27 %
Austria	71.30 %	14.59 %	1.85 %
Finland	50.00 %	32.82 %	2.21 %
Latvia	34.44 %	26.69 %	2.21 %
Iceland	73.93 %	22.65 %	2.42 %
West Germany	53.50 %	26.89 %	2.43 %
Lithuania	46.50 %	35.30 %	2.60 %
Canada	68.84 %	25.72 %	2.66 %
Norway	45.04 %	46.97 %	2.74 %
Estonia	18.65 %	66.57 %	2.78 %
Italy	80.57 %	11.60 %	3.22 %
Slovakia	69.10 %	16.11 %	3.43 %
Hungary	54.25 %	37.64 %	3.60 %
Portugal	72.91 %	20.68 %	3.97 %
Great Britain	54.99 %	36.66 %	4.11 %
Denmark	67.96 %	21.55 %	4.17 %
Spain	61.51 %	29.20 %	4.25 %
Czech Republic	37.41 %	47.37 %	4.93 %
Netherlands	59.59 %	33.33 %	5.11 %
Sweden	28.46 %	56.06 %	6.49 %
Belgium	61.64 %	20.49 %	6.81 %
Slovenia	60.19 %	15.27 %	6.86 %
Bulgaria	31.82 %	49.23 %	7.16 %
France	48.10 %	36.13 %	10.58 %
East Germany	33.31 %	36.68 %	18.41 %

In the early 90's Romania was by far one of the least secularized country and with one of the least number of convinced atheists from Europe. If we look closer we can see that the Party managed to impose atheism specifically on the younger generations that were socialized within the communist society (**Table 2a**) and that it had a greater impact in the urban area of Romania (**Table 2b**). But is very hard to asses to what degree this levels of unbelief are due to the communist atheization efforts or to enfolding urbanization and industrialization. We can see that in urban areas the level of religious socialization within families is lower

from one generation to the other (**Table 3a and 2b**) but overall this does not necessary lead to less religiosity. Out of the total people that state that they have not been brought up religiously at home 69.3% believe in God (**Table 4a**) and 35.8% declare that they are religious people (**Table 4b**). Still, there is a big percentage of people that were not religiously socialized in their families that tend to not consider themselves religious people (59.1%) that show that the lack of religious socialization is an important factor that accounts for the degree of religiosity (**Table 4b**). What is hard to tell from the data is to what extent the absence of religious socialization was due to atheist propaganda or to an enfolding secularization process. Further future research needs to be done in order to settle this issue, but at a general level it is clear that Romania was in the early 90's a country in which religious socialization in families was still very high in comparison with other Eastern and Western European countries (77 % of respondents declaring that they have received a religious upbringing).

**Table 2a. Are you a religious person? (year of birth)**

	<b>Born before 1939</b>	<b>1940-1969</b>	<b>1960-1975</b>
Religious person	85.3%	72.3%	62.1%
Not a religious person	13.3%	24.9%	33.6%
Convinced Atheist	.8%	1.0%	2.0%
Don't know	0.6%	1.8%	2.3%

**Table 2b. Are you a religious person? (rural-urban)**

	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Urban</b>
Religious person	80.0%	65.2%
Not a religious person	17.5%	31.6%
Convinced Atheist	1.2%	1.4%
Don't know	1.3%	1.8%

**Table 3a. Were you brought up religiously at home?  
(rural population)**

	<b>Born before 1939</b>	<b>1940-1969</b>	<b>1960-1975</b>
Yes	96.3%	86.5%	73.1%
No	3.7%	13.5%	26.9%

**Table 3b. Were you brought up religiously at home?  
(urban population)**

	<b>Born before 1939</b>	<b>1940-1969</b>	<b>1960-1975</b>
Yes	83.1%	69.0%	49.5%
No	16.9%	31.0%	50.5%

**Table 4a. „Belief in God”: and „Were you brought up religiously at home?”**

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
Belief in God	95.1%	69.3%
No belief in God	2.5%	17.7%
Don't know	2.5%	13.0%

**Table 4b. „Are you a religious person?” and „Were you brought up religiously at home?”**

	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Urban</b>
Religious person	84.6%	35.8%
Not a religious person	13.3%	59.1%
Convinced Atheist	.6%	3.5%
Don't know	1.5%	1.6%

In Romania, the specific form of political secularism that the communist authorities advanced managed to generate a societal secularization (separating the State from the Church and generating an political, economical and social system that could function without the legitimization provided by the religious system) but this has not led as well to a individual secularization (the replacement of a religious frame of codifying the practices of the self with an immanent secular one) (Dobbelaere, 2002). This is why right after the fall of communism we can see in Romania a very low level of atheism. To consider atheism a religion, as RCTR does, that managed to replace traditional religion is simply misleading. Even considered as a secular world-view, atheism in the early 90's had little currency within the Romanian society and there was little or no competition among world-views, as RCTR claims. After the fall of communism, atheist secularism lost its force and legitimacy in regulating the religious discourse and practices of the self. This made way for the possibility of a re-enchantment process and a religious structuring of every-day life on one hand, but my argument is that at the same time this

has lead to a new logic of secularization: after a short religious euphoria post-socialism has lead to the institutionalization of new secular narratives of self-identity.

#### **4. Pluralism, religion and secularization in post-communist Romania**

In the past two decades the secularization theory has been strongly criticized and denounced by sociological and anthropological research alike. Under the heading of multiple-modernities these studies have tried to show that secularization is not the byproduct of a modernization process (understood as social differentiation, rationalization and pluralization of world-views), but is rather the result of specific cultural factors that are peculiar to Western European countries. Peter Berger for example, a sociologist that in the 70's and 80's has put forward one of the most comprehensive phenomenological theories of secularization has retracted in recent years most of his theses and regards now secularism as weak concept that can be traced back to specific cultural features of Western Europe. Peter Berger and Grace Davie (2008) argue that secularism is embedded in the structures of European Union and that it is related to specific institutional factors and not to structural features of modernization.

Most of the present-day criticism of secularization theory draws on empirical data that comes from two different socio-cultural areas. The first one is North America, where these studies point out that one of the most post-modernized countries of the world is at the same time a very religious society. This is so not because of the neo-conservative religious right that has controlled the political American scene in the past decade, but because of the high church attendance rates, diversification of new religious movements and most of all the explosion of the Evangelical communities. This allegedly shows that modernity does not have to bring forth secularism as has happened in Western Europe.

The second socio-cultural area on which these criticisms rely is Eastern Europe. Here these studies point out that after several decades of state organized secularism, ideological atheism and marginalization of religious life, Eastern Europe is undergoing now a strong religious revival. There is an increasing alliance between religion and politics and massive religious attendance across Eastern Europe. This shows in their opinion that there is an alternative modernization route that does not have to follow the secular path dependency of Western Europe. In these studies there are always two

countries that are mentioned as being strongly religious: Catholic Poland and Orthodox Romania.

Romania is an important case that can help us test these theories. Just like most other Eastern European countries, Romania is dominated by a single religion and so according to RCTR this represents a case of religious monopoly. In spite of this, RCTR argues, as we have seen in the previous section, that in the countries of Eastern Europe a religious revival followed because post-communism brought forth not so much a competition between different religions, but between a secular atheist world-view and a re-born religious world-view. Atheism is re-interpreted as a secular religion that imposed secular holidays and rituals and acted at a popular level as a genuine religion. This allows RCTR to postulate that the post-communist Eastern European religious revival has been the outcome of a religious competition.

In previous papers (Gog, 2007) I have tried to show that in the new post-socialist world, under the pressure of pluralization of life-worlds several tendencies towards secularization can be noticed: de-Christianization of religious beliefs (the post-communist generations increasingly give up the belief in Christian eschatological narratives such as the belief in heaven, hell and life-after-death in favor of diffuse and impersonal religious ideas), de-institutionalization of religious experience (low church attendance rates and the de-legitimation of the involvement of the Church in political, social, and familial issues) and most of all de-moralization of the practical sphere of life (the decoupling of religion from ethical matters such as sexual identities and the refusal to internalize the social norms advocated by the Church). In the previous section I have argued that atheism cannot be interpreted as a religious ideology and that it had a limited impact on the Romanian society. In what follows I would like to show how in Romania, regions that are more plural in terms of religiosity are usually more secular than the regions that have a monopolized "religious market". This way I would like to focus on the RCTR claim that pluralism generates higher religiosity.

I am using in the analysis the four historical regions of Romania: Transylvania (that includes as well the adjacent regions of Banat, Crisana and Maramures), Moldova, Dobrogea and Muntenia (Old Kingdom), plus the metropolis of Bucharest that has to be analyzed as a separate case (due to the fact that here the entire population is living an urbanized area and both in terms of education and economical income it scores higher than the mean values of the rest of the countries). With the help of the Herfindahl index we can measure the degree of religious monopolization

of these region and establish were the “religious market” is more vital and so more competitive, in order to test the RCTR predictions.<sup>6</sup>

What we can see from **Table 5** is that by far the region that has a “religious market” that is least monopolized by one single religion is Transylvania. This was predictable since this region was always marked by a great degree of religious and ethnic diversity. According to RCTR this should be the area that should be the most religious, but in fact the data show a completely different picture.

**Table 5. Herfindahl index (the degree of religious monopoly)**

Transylvania	Muntenia	Moldova	Dobrogea	Bucuresti
0.49	0.91	0.89	0.93	0.89

When we take a look at the main religious beliefs we can notice that Transylvania has the lowest religious degree of religious values: both general religious values and specific Christian ones (**Table 6**). The belief in hell and in heaven, two important religious ideas for the Christian eschatology are the most eroded in Transylvania (63.9%, 69.8%) compared to Muntenia for example (77.7%, 80.0%) or Moldova (76.4%, 79.4%). The values are only comparable to Bucharest (68.4%, 70.2%), where although the pluralisation index is low there is the highest level of modernization in terms of urban population, industrialization, educational capital, etc. This is the case not only of specific Christian beliefs, but also of general religious beliefs such as the belief in God and moral culpability (understood as a religious concept - sin) and non-Christian ones such as the belief in reincarnation. This Oriental belief is usually spread in urban cultures: in Bucharest 34.8% believe in it, while in Transylvania only 26.5% (the lowest).

**Table 6. General and specific religious beliefs**

	Transylvania	Muntenia	Moldova	Dobrogea	Bucuresti
Belief in God	95.8%	96.9%	96.9%	98.0%	94.2%
Belief in hell	63.9%	77.7%	76.4%	62.5%	68.4%
Belief in heaven	69.8%	80.0%	79.4%	70.0%	70.2%
Belief in sin	89.1%	93.8%	92.9%	98.0%	77.1%
Belief in reincarnation	26.5%	26.0%	26.2%	37.1%	34.8%

The low values of general and religious beliefs are consistent with the way people perceive themselves. 83.1% of Transylvanians declare that they consider themselves religious people in comparison with 87.6% in Muntenia, 88.9% in Moldova and 68.9% in Bucharest. The same can be noticed when it comes to the degree of comfort and strength from religion that people declare they have (**Table 7**). Transylvania ranks again lower than the other historical regions (except Bucharest).

**Table 7. Religious self-evaluations**

	Transylvania	Muntenia	Moldova	Dobrogea	Bucuresti
Are you a religious person?	83.1%	87.6%	88.9%	92.0%	68.9%
Comfort and strength from religion	85.7%	88.6%	89.8%	83.0%	77.6%

The only variables where this is not the case is that of the perception of the divine being and church attendance (**Table 8 and 9**). When it comes to the way Transylvanians that believe in God (lower than in the other historical regions) perceive their object of faith, they affirm the traditional idea of a personal divine being (44.8%) and not of an abstract spirit or life-force (38.3%) in comparison with Moldova (39.3%, 41.7%) or Bucharest (23.1%, 68.5%). The same can be said about church attendance. People from Transylvania are still attached to institutional expression of religiosity and go to church a bit more often than people from other regions. In comparison with Moldova (which has a very high index of religious monopoly) though, the differences are almost insignificant.

**Table 8. Church attendance and church functions**

	Transylvania	Muntenia	Moldova	Dobrogea	Bucuresti
Church attendance	57.87	30.72	55.43	50	30.56
Church and morality	78.8%	83.1%	85.2%	82.4%	68.6%
Church and family	77.0%	79.4%	84.6%	86.3%	61.9%
Church and social problems	51.9%	51.2%	56.8%	69.6%	38.5%



**Table 9. Religion and Politics**

	Transylvania	Muntenia	Moldova	Dobrogea	Bucuresti
Politicians and God	47.66	53.62	58.61	55.32	44.95
Religion and public office	63.90	63.40	69.27	70.46	58.33
Religious leaders should not influence voting	78.80	72.91	80.33	87.23	79.63
Religious leaders should not influence government decisions	76.75	74.087	81.81	91.11	74.07

But the level of church attendance has only a limited predictive value: when we analyze the way people relate to the church and the way they legitimize their distinct functions (the involvement in moral, familial and social issues) we can see again that Transylvania is the region most secularized (after Bucharest). The tendency to limit the involvement of the Church (**Table 9**) to strictly spiritual issues and to decline its competency to matters related to morality, family, society and politics is higher in Transylvania than in the other regions). Although Transylvanians go often to church, they think less of the Church as a total institution that has to provide the legitimizing narratives of the other spheres of life (moral, familial, social). This is consistent also with the Church-State and religion-politics separation: Transylvanians are generally against the idea that politicians should be only people that believe in God and that persons that hold public offices should be religious. There is also a high degree of support (but not the highest) for the idea that religious leaders should not influence voting or government decisions.

## Conclusion

In the previous pages I have argued that the rational choice theory of religion that informs most of the current research in the field of sociology of religion has several epistemological and methodological

limits. The reduction of all social action (including the religious one) to maximization of subjective utility and cost/benefit optimization represent an economicist reductionism which has its genealogy in an ethnocentric definition of rationality.

I have showed that the rational choice theory of religion is inconsistent and inadequate when it is applied to Eastern Europe in general and Romania in particular and that the main conceptual devices used in order to argue the existence of a vigorous religious revival are not paying dividends. The establishment of a democratic society and the advancement of an Europeanization process have generated new types of social spaces and narratives of identities, but most of all it created the structural conditions for the emergence of a genuine social and religious pluralism. The communist institutionalized control of every-day life and the monopolization of social reality had a strong impact on practices of the self and on the development of cultural means of subjectivization. The ideologization of every-day life-world prevented the creation of a plural society because this was considered subversive and threatening to the communist social order.

In the previous pages I have elaborated on various theoretical frameworks that allow us to capture the impact pluralism has on religious identities. The structures of religious practices and beliefs cease being taken-for-granted (Berger, 1990) and have to be articulated in an environment where the institutionalization of various modes of identities generated by the pluralization of life-worlds are challenging the traditional religious establishments. I have developed several arguments to show that the RCTR approach is not accurate and then in Romania and other Eastern European countries we can identify the emergence of a post-communist secular culture. The RCTR line of reasoning is not sociological accurate and that this rooted a) in the way atheism is conceptualized as a religious world-view (this leads to the failure to see that this secular ideologies were top-to-bottom state organized attempts to secularized the society that had only a limited impact on the religious mentalities) and b) in the way religiosity is conceptualized (this leads to the failure to see the big structural changes that are taking place at the level of the new Europeanized young generations and the increasingly secularization trend that Romania is experiencing).

The RCTR argument that the communist atheization process was a successful one and that this was reversed by the post-socialist emergence of a religious market means to overestimate the power of secularism and

the impact that the atheist ideologization had on every-day religious mentalities. I have showed that in Romania atheism was only an official ideological worldview that was expressed through the bureaucratic networks of the Communist Party and that this strategy of secularizing the society was a failure. My argument is that atheism in spite of its political secularism failed in achieving a wide secularization of the society, but post-socialist pluralism managed to do just that.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> This type of discourse represents in my opinion a specific instance of Balkanization (Todorova) of Eastern-Christianity that sees in it a political power that is most of all concerned with the affirmation of a "Byzantine" religious control of state structures. I regard this approach as an over-simplification and Orientalisation (Said) of the Orthodox religion.
- <sup>2</sup> In this case church attendance is not a good indicator of religiosity. During the Communist period public manifestations of religiosities were inhibited through the official atheist ideology, all religious data regarding participation have to be read with a grain of salt.
- <sup>3</sup> As one of the Romanian atheist ideologist phrase it: *"without any doubt, the most advanced philosophy does not impose itself freely to the consciousnesses, including those [consciousnesses] of teenagers that have a highly psychical sensibility. The philosophical worldview has to be scientifically and ethically argued and proven. In order to **influence** the behavior of individual, philosophy has to be **not only understood, but accepted: not only theoretically assimilated but lived** as well"* (Berar, 1980:128)."
- <sup>4</sup> An example of how this positivist form of atheism was informing social sciences from Romania at that time can be seen in the way arguments from psychology were employed against religion. An important tool used for the spread of atheism was the construction of child psychology narratives and the illustration of the irremediable damages done to a child by a religious upbringing. For example: through religious education the child's spiritual and moral development is blocked (Stefanescu and Stanciu, 1972:387); it inoculates fear and deep anxiety towards the social environment because of the idea of divine punishment (Stefanescu and Stanciu, 1972:388); it generates a family space where love and affection is missing (388); is not stimulating their eagerness to learn (398); and leads to socialization problems and distrust toward other children that do not share their religious values: this means that later on in life they will not be capable of integrating themselves into a community where working is the main value of the Communist horizontal society (389). The new communist psychology could not be much clearer in depicting the irremediable consequences that religion has on a child's psyche and its future development; this discourse was amplified by the implicit claim that the infallible modern science could demonstrate these consequences and illustrate beyond any doubt that religion was holding humanity back
- <sup>5</sup> The data is provided by European Values Survey 1990-1993. The numbers in this paragraph indicate the percentage of people that have declared that they do not believe in God.
- <sup>6</sup> The data used in this analysis are taken from the European Values Survey 1999/2000. The Herfindahl index has been computed based on the data from the EVS sample for Romania and has used also the percentage of population that declared it had no religion (this overlaps to a certain extent with people that declare themselves atheists.)

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# ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY, SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AND THE JAPANESE CHURCH: THE FIRST CENTURY OF A RELATIONSHIP

## **Introduction**

The history of the Japanese Orthodox Church's relationship with Southeastern Europe from 1860's to 1950's is both the central subject and the central object of the present inquiry. The details and progression of this relationship offer one of the earliest illustrations of what one might call "globalization-as-catholicity" – the refraction of the modern globalization processes in the framework of Orthodox Christianity. However, perhaps even more importantly, the fact that such a relationship existed at all compels a reexamination of some powerful commonplace stereotypes about the composition, geography and character of the Orthodox Church, as well as about the relations among Japan, Russia and Southeastern Europe. These stereotypes include first of all the idea of modern Orthodox Christianity as a parochial and introverted faith, strongly bound to the narrow ethno-political interests of its traditional carriers; the perception that the emergence and experience of Orthodoxy in Japan is wholly a function of the bilateral Russo-Japanese relationship; the notion that the early ties between Japan and Southeastern Europe were largely limited to diplomatic, mercantile and intellectual encounters. Extant historiography does little to challenge these concepts, for which reason this paper also has had to address these wider discursive fields. What is the Orthodox Church's composition and organization in the modern world? Why does the distinctive notion of the "Church" define and structure the worldwide collective of Orthodox Christians? Whence Christianity – and particularly Orthodox Christianity – in Japan? Which functions did Orthodoxy play in the early contacts between Japan and Southeastern Europe? And finally,

how did the Japanese Orthodox Church become aware and engaged with coreligionists in Southeastern Europe? These are the questions considered below.

I became aware and interested in these topics during my dissertation research about the history of the Japanese Orthodox Church. As part of my research, I investigated the archives of the Orthodox Church in Moscow; in New York and Stanford; in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and Sendai. One of the surprising issues that came to light was the religious dimension of the relations between the Japanese and Orthodox Southeastern Europeans – the representatives of Greek, South Slavic and Romanian states and peoples. I then pursued this question as a fellow of the New Europe College in Bucharest, where I was privileged to conduct research from October 2011 to July 2012. Under its auspices I furthered my investigations – most fruitfully at the National Archives of Romania; the Libraries of the Romanian Patriarchy, and of the Theological Faculties in Sofia and Thessaloniki; the collection of the St. Panteleimon Monastery on Mount Athos. The ongoing work on this project has been presented at a Japanese studies symposium at the University of Bucharest (March 4, 2012) and a weekly symposium at the New Europe College (March 28, 2012).

The primary data for this study was gathered from the official and semi-official publications of the Orthodox Church, from private diaries and letters, from official government communications. The majority of this data has not been previously introduced into scholarly discourse. Among the highlights, one must single out the official ecclesiastical periodicals as the most important layer of sources – above all *Seikyō Jihō* (Japanese Orthodox Church); *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* (Romanian Orthodox Church); *Ekklesiastikē Alētheia* (Constantinopolitan Orthodox Church); *Ekklēsia* (Greek Orthodox Church); *Tsurkoven Vestnik* (Bulgarian Orthodox Church). Various occasional materials published by the Japanese Orthodox Church, including the minutes of the annual Church Councils and the histories of local churches, were also significant. Extensive diaries of Archbishop of Japan Nicholas<sup>1</sup> (Kasatkin) furnished a uniquely detailed perspective on the pre-revolutionary experience of the Japanese Church's external relations. Finally, the Royal House collection at the National Archives of Romania yielded official letters and reports which helped illustrate the bridging function of Orthodoxy on the diplomatic and discursive level. Of course, this study can lay no claim comprehensiveness, but is rather only a first attempt to discern and contextualize one of the most

remarkable developments in the early phase of the modern globalization of Orthodox Christianity.

## 1. Orthodox ecumene mapped

Foundational facts and figures on the global state of Orthodox Christianity in the modern world are sufficiently obscure to render the otherwise respectable reference sources suspect. This is especially true with regard to the scope and limits of the communion's diversification and globalization. Believers outside the historic Orthodox habitat remain off most global religious survey maps, while claims about the total number of followers vary widely. Therefore, a survey of Orthodox Christian adherents,<sup>2</sup> geography and leadership appears necessary to anchor the subsequent discussion. Data from *The Catholic Encyclopedia* of 1912 will provide the necessary contrast to place present-day trends in perspective.

First, one may consider the number and distribution of Orthodox Christian adherents. A century ago *The Catholic Encyclopedia* listed about 127.5 million Orthodox,<sup>3</sup> a sizeable 7 % of the world. However, this population was overwhelmingly concentrated in its historic heartland – the young nation-states of Southeastern Europe surrounded by the three continental empires. Even in the country with the least density of Orthodox adherents, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they formed a rather significant 8.5% of the population.<sup>4</sup> The hegemonic pole of attraction inside this Orthodox space was Russia – some four-fifths of all Orthodox adherents were subjects of the vast Russian empire, members of its state Church, and even the non-Russian Orthodox establishments relied considerably on Russian aid. Meanwhile, outside the traditional Orthodox habitat missions and diaspora together amounted to a negligible population within the margin of statistical error.

At present, after the revolutions and persecutions of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, one finds Orthodox Christian membership significantly dispersed, somewhat numerically grown, and significantly shrunk in percentage terms. Most contemporary independent estimates of "Orthodox" adherents – e.g. 4.03% of the world population according to the current CIA World Factbook<sup>5</sup> or 260.4 million adherents according to the latest Pew Research Center report,<sup>6</sup> – confusingly conflate three distinct communions under this umbrella term. In fact, one needs to subtract the anti-Chalcedonian and anti-Ephesian "Oriental Orthodox" to arrive at

a realistic estimate of “Eastern Orthodox” – slightly above 200 million. Thus, even if one accepts the high-end estimate of Orthodox adherents in Russia, – around 100 million, – this makes for barely half of the world’s Orthodox, highlighting Russia’s antireligious turn and imperial collapse in the intervening century. In line with this weakening of the center, the most important global demographic shift has been the growth of diaspora (mostly in the “Global North”) and mission (more notable in the “Global South”). The Western world is now home to a vast and increasingly rooted Orthodox community, with Germany and Italy hosting over a million adherents each.<sup>7</sup> With regard to the “Global South”, missionary advances are usually acknowledged without quantification, so one must largely rely for statistics on fragmentary self-reporting – like the 2004 claim by Patriarch of Alexandria Peter VII that the number of Orthodox in Africa has reached 5 million,<sup>8</sup> or the April 7, 2010 press-release by the Church of Constantinople’s Mexican Metropolis reporting the reception of over 0.5 million converts in Guatemala.<sup>9</sup> An attempt to pull together scattered data suggests that the aggregate number of Orthodox outside their historic habitat has grown well above 10 million, surpassing such a traditional power-house of Orthodoxy as the Greek Church.

A look at the institutional organization of Orthodoxy opens up another perspective. The single worldwide communion is divided into largely independent administrative jurisdictions – technically called “autocephalous Churches”, with defined territory and, usually, corresponding ethno-political units. In 1912 the traditional Orthodox lands in the Near East, Eastern Europe and Northern Asia were split among 14 such bodies.<sup>10</sup> Beyond this familiar geography, only the Russian Church maintained organized missions – in Japan, Korea, China, Persia, Canada and the US, – while many of the world’s regions remained devoid of any Orthodox presence.

At present the “Old world” remains divided into 14 jurisdictions, but a new unit with a claim to North America has burst the boundaries of the habitat. Most of the globe, in fact, remains a “gray zone” in which almost all the autocephalous Churches have joined (and challenged) the Russian Church in maintaining their own institutions. As a result, the list of states without an Orthodox presence has been shrinking steadily,<sup>11</sup> but local administrative coordination remained elusive outside the historic Orthodox homeland. Only in 2009 the Fourth Pan-Orthodox Conference in Chambésy took a major step in ordering the administration of the now-globalized communion by demarcating most of the jurisdictionally

contested parts of the globe into 12 regions, each with its own coordinating assembly of bishops.<sup>12</sup>

Profiling bishops, – the small leading core of the Church, – offers a third way to apprehend the composition of Orthodox Christendom. The special significance of bishops (literally “overseers”) stems from their exclusive canonically-secured powers to govern, teach, and perform the full array of sacred functions. At the start of the 20<sup>th</sup> century one would be hard-pressed to find a single bishop with an exotic background in this elite cadre of some 350 persons.<sup>13</sup> Born and bred in the thickness of Orthodox ethno-cultural space, they were overwhelmingly Slavs and Greeks, with a small selection of other traditionally Orthodox contingents. Only in the Russian Church, with its distinctive ethno-cultural diversity and missionary activity, could one systemically expect occasional figures which stood out from the rank-and-file. In 1912 there may have been only one such “outsider” – the Assyrian bishop Elias (Gevargizov) of Urmia, a convert to Orthodoxy serving the Russian mission in Persia.

As of late March 2012, judging by the names and biographies of today’s 850 Orthodox bishops, the most represented ethno-cultural groups remain unchanged. However, the “outsiders” have grown into a much bigger presence, representing an array of ethnic origins, religious traditions and birth-places.<sup>14</sup> As many as 84 contemporary Orthodox bishops have an “exotic” background by at least one of these parameters, while 22 probably combine all three markers of originality.<sup>15</sup> The majority of the “outsiders” are Western-born diaspora figures or Western converts with Christian roots, but over a dozen bishops confound this stereotype.<sup>16</sup> With nearly 10% of Orthodox bishops deriving from unusual backgrounds, it may be argued that diversification and globalization have been most pronounced in the upper echelons of Orthodoxy.

The Pew Research Center’s 2011 report on *Global Christianity* drives home the point that “Christianity today – unlike a century ago – is truly a global faith”.<sup>17</sup> The starkest testimony to this is the postcolonial decentering of Europe, home to some two-thirds of all Christians a century ago and only a quarter of the total at present. The verities behind these statistics are gradually being digested with regard to Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, but it has yet to become widely accepted that Orthodoxy – with the collapse of European land empires, decentering of Russia, diasporic spread, and missionary reach, – has been undergoing a similar, albeit delayed, trend. Quickened expansion and intensified exchanges among Orthodox communities – including those of Japan and Southeastern

Europe – have restated with new poignancy the basic questions of personal and collective identity, problematizing what it meant to belong with and be the Orthodox Church.

## 2. Church as analytical tool

“Church” is the primary collective self-description used by Orthodox believers. Their community is conceived, structured and given theological sense as a “Church”. As a hierarchical institution, the “Church” can legitimately assume diverse configurations which can be described as theocratic, conciliar, monarchical, collegial or democratic with some degree of accuracy. The entire communion as well as its subdivisions at various levels – down to a single parish – may be considered both “complete” and “partial” manifestations of the “Church”. The “Church” is likewise an object of faith, an immutable dogma, and a sought-for ideal. All this renders the “Church” into a basic analytical term and an elusively complex concept. Here we will consider only the primary aspects which have surfaced in the modern East Asian and Southeastern European Orthodox Christian discourses.

Biblical terms for the “Church” – the Hebrew *kahal* and the Greek *ecclesia* – mean literally an “assembly”, that is people gathered together. Middle-of-the-road Orthodox definitions of the term today share this sociological focus on the human community. The most influential formulation is likely that of St. Philaret (Drozdov), the Metropolitan of Moscow. His *Extensive Catechism* has been the basic catechism of the Russian Church from 1827, is widely available even in today’s Romania, and has been periodically issued in Japanese since 1881. In his simple definition, the Church is “a divinely instituted community of men, united by the orthodox faith, the law of God, the hierarchy, and the Sacraments”.<sup>18</sup> While much criticized for its narrowness from various quarters, this definition retains considerable common-sense appeal to the present day.

The most readily apparent challenge to this definition comes from the fact that many of the European peoples which embraced Christianity have encoded the “Church” to mean something else. Most Germanic (*church*; *kirche*) and Slavic (*tserkov’*; *crkva*) terms derive from the Greek *kiriakon*, which means the “house of the Lord”. The Romanian *biserică* (from Gk. *basilike*, “imperial house”), Polish *kościół* (from Lat. *castellum*, “small fortress”), Lithuanian *bažnyčia* (from Slav. *bozhnitsa*, “God’s house”)

or Hungarian *egyház* (native for “holy house”) all stem from various words, but uniformly refer to buildings. In all these cases the religious community is identified by the same term as its worship-space. Among the many writers which have tried to provide a definition that would explain this identification was the most prominent Japanese Orthodox priest of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Protopresbyter Symeon Mii Michirō. In one of his introductory treatises he writes: “The Orthodox Church of Christ is a place where Orthodox Christians practice and transmit eternally and universally fixed and immutable principles of purity and right”.<sup>19</sup> There are many similar definitions which describe the Church in terms of a temple which one enters or a treasure-house from which one draws goods. These metaphysical statements link the notion of spiritual space to the consecrated physical building which anchors the liturgical and social life of the local community.

Since modern Orthodox were hardly uncontested masters of their language, popular usage has also been shaped by powerful Western influences – most notably Roman Catholic and Communist. Both generated an emphasis on the Church as a two-tier hierarchical polity, run and defined by the clerical elite. Since Roman Catholic terminology forms the basic layer of the contemporary Christian idiom in East Asia, this influence is transparent in the Chinese and Japanese terms for “Church” – *jiàohuì* and *kyōkai*. An invention of Counter-Reformation Jesuit missionaries in 16<sup>th</sup> century China, these terms literally mean the “teaching assembly” and originally referred only to the clergy, as opposed to the “learning assembly” composed of laymen.<sup>20</sup> As for the Communist perspective, one can refer to the basic compendium of late Soviet knowledge – the final edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*. According the article on “Church”, it is a type of religious organization distinguished by “a more or less developed system of dogma and cult; hierarchical character; centralization of governance; division of everyone belonging to the Church into professional ministers of cult (clergy) and ordinary believers (laymen)”.<sup>21</sup> Such pervasive labels have widely entered the popular conception of the Church across Eurasia.

Yet, the buildup of alien influences and outright persecution of Orthodox Christianity generated a powerful reaction in the last century – a new theological quest spurred by mysticism and martyrdom. The 20<sup>th</sup> century produced more officially canonized Orthodox saints than all previous centuries combined. In East Asia the most famous of them is St. John (Maksimovich), the Russian émigré bishop who was formed in interwar Yugoslavia and became the senior Orthodox pastor of Shanghai

in the 1930's and 1940's. Known as an ascetic miracle-worker, he stands as an exceptionally influential exponent of the characteristic mystical theology of the persecuted. His most elaborated statement on the Church defines it as: "unity in Christ, the closest union with Christ of all those who rightly believe and love Him, and the union of them all through Christ."<sup>22</sup> Unlike the previous definitions, this statement leaves no room for meaning outside of Christ, who figures as the sole center, space and agent of the Church.

In this manner, contemporary Orthodox answers to the question of: "What is the Church?" outline a field of meanings which includes a human community, a sacred space, a hierarchical polity, and Christ-centered union. These may be considered, respectively, as a sociological, metaphysical, institutional and mystical perspective on the same phenomenon. This diversity of approaches is discursively anchored in what remains the sole dogmatically mandated Orthodox description of the Church – "One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic". This formula from the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, the basic confession of Christian Orthodoxy since the 4<sup>th</sup> century, specifically addresses the global quality of the Church in its third term. Derived from the Greek *cath ola* – "throughout the whole" – catholicity can only be approximated by a translation like "all-pertinence". Standard catechisms explain this as transcendence of the temporal, spatial, and ethno-cultural boundaries to unite all believers.<sup>23</sup> Although this concept is frequently equated with universality, crafters of the original Christian terminology consistently set aside similar contemporary words – derived from *cosmos* ("the world") or *ecumene* ("the inhabited earth") – in favor of the more comprehensive and intimate catholicity.<sup>24</sup> Thus, no matter what one's perspective on the Church, a claim to catholicity amounts to a categorical inevitability of relevance and impossibility of isolation in intra-Church relations.

In light of such a bold assertion, it is remarkable that catholicity finds only a pale reflection in the historiography of the modern experience of the Orthodox Church. In contrast to the statement of the Creed, what the authors mostly write about are the many, fractious, particular and ethnic Churches. There are hundreds of books and thousands of articles devoted to the modern and contemporary Orthodox history, but they are primarily concerned with individual autocephalous Churches in the plural. Even when presenting a single treatment, they are likely to follow the approach characteristically formulated by an English Roman Catholic Priest Adrian Fortescue, who wrote in 1908 that:



The Orthodox Church consists of sixteen separate independent bodies [...] It is with no malicious pleasure that one has to record the fact that, in spite of their inter-communion, the dominant note of these sixteen bodies in our time is their extreme quarrelsomeness [...] It is the cause of nearly all their activity.<sup>25</sup>

Due to the focus on divisive isolationism, very few works analyze the comprehensive contemporary experience of the worldwide Orthodox Church as a single entity,<sup>26</sup> and there is still no scholarly monograph on the subject. When volumes promise such a treatment, they turn out to be compilations of poorly-integrated articles about individual local Churches and diasporas, or else topical collections bound by the themes of communism and nationalism.<sup>27</sup> As a result of this particularist preoccupation, increasing globalization and integration of the Orthodox Church in the 20<sup>th</sup> century have remained on the margins of scholarly inquiry. However, if catholic interchange and outreach had indeed been as invisible as they are in the literature, Orthodox Christianity would not have emerged as a factor in the relations between Japan and Southeastern Europe, nor would there be a Japanese Orthodox Church at all.

### **3. Christianity in Japan**

To appreciate the distinctive position of Japanese Orthodoxy one must first grasp the general condition of Christianity in the Land of the Rising Sun. Japan was already a deeply rooted and sophisticated member of the Sinitic cultural sphere when its sustained contact with Christianity began in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Since then this country's tortuous engagement with what became known as the "Jesus-teaching" has taken dramatic swings, often narrated as three periods of Christian boom and two periods of official persecution.<sup>28</sup> Such conceptual frameworks as antagonism, mission and syncretism offer the primary avenues to access this history.

Perhaps the most important influence of Japan's early Roman Catholic mission, run by Portuguese Jesuits from the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century and brutally suppressed by the Tokugawa shogunate in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century, has been the elaboration of the characteristic Japanese antagonism to Christianity. Anti-Christianity gave to the syncretic and multi-religious Japan its first unifying ideology and its first comprehensive thought-police network – which included an obligation for every subject to

regularly trample on Christian sacred images and maintain registration with a Buddhist temple. For some thirteen generations, Japanese masses were instructed to fear and despise unknown Christianity as “the evil creed”, while the elites studied the Western world as a premier strategic challenge. By the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as Japan’s leading thinkers considered the underpinnings of Western strength, they decided to combat the Christian threat by borrowing for the Japanese emperor the qualities ascribed to the Christian God – those of a direct personal lord and father over each individual. When a new Japanese “national polity” was being elaborated in the course of Japan’s precipitous defensive Westernization in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, this seminal adaptation from Christianity largely defined the ideological and institutional architecture of the emperor-centered system of State Shintoism under which Japan was run until 1945. Such borrowing, however, occurred under the cover of a traditionalist revival, and was accompanied by the vocal continuity of the refurbished anti-Christian ideological rhetoric.<sup>29</sup> Enduring suspicion of Christians’ loyalty paved the way for draconian official control, isolation, and near-strangulation of Christian activity during World War II.<sup>30</sup> In sum, much of the Japanese Christian experience had to do with hostile alienation.

The above history of conflict went hand in hand with the history of contact, as Japan’s broadening international engagements allowed for the transplantation of Christian missions and their development on new soil. Since Western pressure gradually compelled Japanese authorities to tacitly lift the ban on Christianity, the 1860’s and 1870’s saw the institutionalization of dozens of Western missionary bodies which continue to define the organizational landscape of Japanese Christianity at present. By the time Japan’s first constitution formally granted religious freedom in 1889, three missionary tracks took shape. An abundance of mostly Anglo-American Protestant missionaries focused on developing a high-profile activist and elite ex-samurai urbanite following. A smaller number of mostly French Roman Catholic missionaries and monastics concentrated on a less publicized build-up of core communities which included a major peasant contingent. Finally, a minute Russian Orthodox missionary presence relied on native catechists to carry out Japan’s most locally-attuned mission of the day. Numerical and material superiority of the missionary cadre combined with the choice of Germany, England and the US as new civilizational models to assure for Protestantism the role of Japan’s normative Christianity. Activism in the educational, medical and social fields helped propel Christians into limelight as agents of

“modernity”, securing for them a place in the broader state-sanctioned sphere of normalcy. However, Japan’s two modern “Christian booms” – the period of radical Westernization in 1870’s and 1880’s followed by the period of American occupation in 1940’s and 1950’s – netted no more than 1% of the population into Christian groups. While Christianity did carve out for itself a legal and cultural space in modern Japan, the core of its mainline adherents remained narrowly circumscribed to elite intellectual Western-leaning and leftist Protestants.<sup>31</sup>

Dominant in the academic discourse, the account of established confessional groups often obscures the most dynamic generative force in Japan’s modern religious history – syncretism, whereby Christian elements became infused into the melting pot of popular faith. Despite opposition from state authorities and established religious leaders, the central protagonists on Japan’s popular religious scene since the 19<sup>th</sup> century have been the syncretic “new religions” centered on charismatic founders. A digest of folk religiosity, organized lay Buddhism, and Confucian moral self-cultivation, this diverse phenomenon began to actively embrace and remake Christian elements in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In fact, rudiments of Christianity have entered the mix even earlier via the so-called “hidden Christians” – isolated descendants of 17<sup>th</sup> century Roman Catholics, whose distinctive faith both endured and evolved behind the façade of official Buddhism.<sup>32</sup> Starting from Uchimura Kanzō’s celebrated No-Church movement in 1901, Japan’s own Christian “new religions” began to take shape around charismatic teachers who broke with mainline Protestantism in the name of deeper indigenization and new revelation.<sup>33</sup> Highest circles were likewise no strangers to syncretic adaptations in their efforts to elaborate potent para-religious ritual and ideology for the masses. Perhaps most visibly, observances like St. Valentine’s Day, Christmas, and especially Christian-style marriage, – buoyed by the appeal of American popular culture in the post-war era, – gradually became matter-of-fact fixtures among the Japanese of many persuasions. The common byword which epitomizes this routine syncretism in the rites of passage remarks that today’s Japanese are “born as Shintoists, married as Christians, and buried as Buddhists”.

Submerged amid these contexts, Japanese Orthodoxy had received little attention until recently due to being out of step with the prevailing dynamics of Japanese Christianity. Its endemic theology and attitude often placed it closer to Japanese traditional faith-culture than to Protestant currents which became identified with normative Christianity in Japan.

Focus and dependence on a central charismatic founder aligns the Japanese Orthodox Church more with Japanese syncretic “new religions” than with mainline groups. Close links to Russia charted an external institutional history radically divergent from that of Western-aligned groups. Indeed, the emergence of a “Japanese Orthodox Church” was a doubly unexpected event. This was so firstly because in Northeast Asia Orthodoxy figured solely as a “Russian religion”, advancing apace with the expansion of the Russian state. Secondly, even in the few cases when the Russian Church did maintain a foreign presence in mid-19<sup>th</sup> century – as in China or Palestine – its religious activities were largely limited to sustaining the religious life of preexisting Orthodox communities, not building up a new local Church out of converts. Yet, the latter was precisely the vision which animated the young Russian hieromonk St. Nicholas (Kasatkin) when he was appointed chaplain to the newly-opened Russian consulate in Hakodate, Japan. It is above all to his personality that the Japanese Orthodox Church owes its origin.<sup>34</sup>

Upon arrival to Japan in 1861 Nicholas devoted himself to the study of the Japanese language and heritage. In 1865, after surviving an assassination attempt, he became a missionary by converting his would-be murderer – an ultra-patriotic samurai and subsequently the first Japanese Orthodox priest, Paul Sawabe Takuma. Having procured sponsorship from Russia in 1870, Nicholas went on to serve as a charismatic preacher, effective coordinator and tireless translator for the growing Japanese mission. Much of his success was due to his deeply personal engagement with the overwhelmingly native cadre, who formed as Christians and preachers under his close tutelage. Unlike in Western denominations, almost all missionary work in the field was done by the locally-attuned Japanese converts themselves. For example, in 1877 foreign missionaries in Japan numbered 99 Protestants, 45 Roman Catholics, 4 Orthodox,<sup>35</sup> – a ratio in which the proportion of the Orthodox would only decline in the following years. Nicholas was, in fact, the sole Russian who remained in Japan during the trying period of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, pastoring both the young native Church and the vast number of Russian POWs scattered in camps across Japan. Upon his death in 1912, Archbishop Nicholas left behind a major establishment – a grand cathedral in Tokyo, an array of ecclesiastical schools and publications, a rich store of liturgical and theological translations, 43 clergymen, 118 preachers, and 33,377 believers.<sup>36</sup> A Japanese Orthodox Church had come into being.

Nicholas' death robbed the young Church of an irreplaceable leader, who had been venerated as a saint already during his lifetime. However, while his demise had been foreseen, the collapse of Russia's Church-state condominium amid revolutionary violence in 1917 had not. Up to that time Russia remained an indispensable support for the young Japanese Orthodox Church. The bishop himself and a few of his aides were Russian, Japanese theological students received their higher education in Russia, and, most importantly, over 90% of the money for the operation of the mission came from Russia. A constellation of influential figures, – most importantly Constantine Pobedonostsev, the mastermind of the Russian Church for much of the later 19<sup>th</sup> century, – were committed sponsors of the Japanese mission. Thus, when all links with Russia were suddenly severed, the Japanese Church faced a life-or-death struggle. The poorly known interwar history of the Japanese Orthodox community was one of precarious self-support, unavoidable self-rule and intensive self-reflection. With the collapse of old verities, challenges of defining and enacting collective identity forced an intensive search for meaning. The feat of rebuilding of the Tokyo Orthodox cathedral, once constructed with Russian funds and severely damaged in the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, demanded unprecedented sacrificial giving from the Japanese flock who could no longer count on generous foreign aid. The strain of World War II, by removing the community's sole universally recognized legitimate bishop, rent the Church into quarrelling factions and nearly destroyed it as an institution. Only after the war did the Japanese Orthodox believers begin to restore effective connections with other branches of the Orthodox communion and to receive much-needed support from abroad. Indeed, it has often been asserted by outside observers and later commentators, that, given the Church's interwar isolation, "it is a miracle for it to have survived at all".<sup>37</sup>

The present work aims to show that the "isolation" of Japanese Orthodoxy was primarily isolation from Moscow, not from the entire Orthodox communion. Just as the history of other Christian denominations in Japan, the history of the Orthodox Church must be seen in global terms which go beyond the bounds of Russo-Japanese bilateral relations. The maturation of the Japanese Orthodox community, greatly stimulated by the collapse of Russia, was intimately bound up with the deepening involvement with non-Russian coreligionists – primarily those from Southeastern Europe.

#### 4. Bridging Japan and Southeastern Europe

The Orthodox Church – in its many guises – assumed a variety of bridging functions from the outset of the relations between Japan and Southeastern Europe. The development of these relations from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century is usually seen as driven by diplomacy, trade and intelligentsia, but religion would appear to be another force to be added to the list. Indeed, in the case of Romania, the letters sent by the Bessarabian missionary Hieromonk Anatolius (Tihai) may have been the first direct correspondence between this country and Japan.<sup>38</sup> The Orthodox Church provided a two-way channel for information and personnel through its institutional structures. As a community it anchored an increasing trickle of visiting and resident Southeastern Europeans in Japan. A shared space of cultures and meanings, it became for the Japanese an access-point to European ways, and for Europeans – a conceptual tool-box for apprehending Japanese realities. The spiritual union embodied by Orthodox concepts and edifices gave an added dimension to high-level diplomatic and symbolic exchanges. All major existential aspects of the “Church” combined to give Orthodoxy an important presence in the emerging relationship between Japan and Southeastern Europe.

The intermediary function of the Church is perhaps most plainly seen in its publications. Official press organs of the Orthodox Church – both in Southeastern Europe and in Japan – were important sources about each other’s countries. From the time when such press organs began to appear in 1870’s and 1880’s, they featured sections dedicated to chronicling the events in other parts of the global Orthodox communion. Reportage was irregular – for instance, in the 1920’s the Greek Church’s *Ekklēsia* carried only two or three mentions of Orthodoxy in the Japanese Empire, while in the 1930’s the Romanian *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* devoted as many as 18 articles and reports to the subject.<sup>39</sup> The leading subject of such publications was, of course, the Orthodox Church itself, but occasional updates also dealt with the general condition of Christianity and religion in a given country, on relations between the state and religious bodies, on discoveries, catastrophes, and political developments. The material was overwhelmingly derived from Russian and “post-Russian” sources – the leading Russian pre-revolutionary ecclesiastical journals like *Pravoslavnyi Blagovestnik* and *Khristianskoe Chtenie*, and a variety of post-revolutionary periodicals published by the diaspora in Belgrade, Harbin, Warsaw, Riga, Paris and elsewhere.<sup>40</sup> The mediators were also likely to have a link to

Russia – as graduates of Russian theological schools, former Russian subjects, or simply ethnic Russians. But occasional original data can also be found, thanks primarily to direct correspondence between hierarchs and missionaries. Thus, the apparent leadership of Romania in Southeastern European coverage of the Japanese Orthodox Church – reports begin already in 1875 and the first monograph on Japanese Orthodoxy in Romanian appears in 1937,<sup>41</sup> – is partly explainable by the fact that there were in Japan as many as three Bessarabian missionaries, which provided added data and interest to the Romanian public.

This opens the discussion of the Orthodox community as a factor in human networking between Japan and Southeastern Europe. First, it should be noted that many figures who ostensibly cut their ties to this community remained, in fact, enmeshed in its life. For instance, one notable Southeastern European religionist who had left the Orthodox Church, the Bulgarian esotericist Peter Dunov, was a cause for a major expose of the Japanese Omoto sect in the 1931 Bulgarian Church's *Tsurkoven Vestnik*.<sup>42</sup> Another well-known figure, the Romanian Roman Catholic Priest Vladimir Ghica, during his stay in Japan in January 1933 stormed into the Tokyo Orthodox cathedral and tried to convert the Orthodox Metropolitan of Japan, Sergius (Tikhomirov).<sup>43</sup> Since the majority of Southeastern Europeans who made their way to Japan were not as alienated from Orthodox Christianity as these outlying personages, many found time to visit local Orthodox churches – especially the Tokyo cathedral compound, whose notable pre-war guests ranged from a Greek Orthodox metropolitan<sup>44</sup> to a Croatian Communist spy.<sup>45</sup> Transitory diasporas of Southeastern Europeans in Japan – most notably the Greek merchant colony in Kōbe, Bessarabian POWs during the Russo-Japanese war, and Greek troops during the post-WWII reconstruction period, – likewise made an imprint on the local Orthodox ecclesiastical scene, most poignantly in the form of Greek sections in two cemeteries.<sup>46</sup> Finally, full-time Orthodox missionaries from Southeastern Europe included one Serb – Archimandrite George (Kozić), who served in Japan from 1914 to about 1920,<sup>47</sup> – and the Bessarabians Archimandrite Anatolius (Tihai) (in Japan from 1871 to 1892), his brother James Tihai (from 1873 to 1886), and Protodeacon Demetrius L'vovskii (from 1880 to 1921). In this remarkable threesome Fr. Anatolius was the second most significant early Orthodox missionary in Japan after Archbishop Nicholas (Kasatkin); his brother James married a Japanese woman, forming the first known Romanian-Japanese family; and Protodeacon Demetrius was the longest-serving non-bishop in the

Japanese Orthodox missionary staff.<sup>48</sup> These three Bessarabians are mostly noted for their engagement in one field – musical education, – which led to the emergence of Japan’s four-part singing.

Indeed, in addition to textual and personal bridges, Orthodox Christianity furnished a space which allowed for the circulation of cultural production. Characteristically, the most visible and renowned monument of Orthodoxy in Japan, – the grand Tokyo Resurrection cathedral which had become a nationally renowned landmark of the capital already before its completion in 1891, – was a domed edifice in the neo-Byzantine style, quite unlike the typically Russian parish churches built in other Japanese locales.<sup>49</sup> Owing in part to this influence, when the Tokyo University dispatched Doctor Itō Shūta to study the remains Greek classical architecture in 1904, the academic emissary contacted the Patriarchy in Constantinople and made special efforts to investigate the major Orthodox shrines of the Greek world.<sup>50</sup> In addition to architecture, Orthodoxy opened the door for a variety of novel artifacts to enter Japan from Southeastern Europe – these included church furnishings, personal devotional items, vestments, books, and above all treasured icons from Mount Athos.<sup>51</sup> These were not only munitions, but a thick deposit of material and spiritual culture which shaped the environment of Japanese believers and served as models for imitation. However, probably the most notable Southeastern European cultural import was intangible. As noted above, the three Bessarabian teachers transposed Japanese liturgical texts unto Franco-Italian-style chants, characteristic of Russian Orthodox music, and trained Japan’s first professional four-part choirs. For many years the Tokyo Orthodox choirs were rated among the best Western-style choirs in the country, helping swell attendance at the cathedral services.<sup>52</sup>

At a deeper level, familiar Orthodox Christian realities – its history, objects, practices and beliefs – helped form cognitive scenarios for Southeastern Europeans facing Japan. Thus, the 1912 Greek article on the history of Orthodoxy in Japan characteristically attempted to draw extended historical parallels from the annals Christian Hellenism. Here, the initial intolerance of the Japanese to Christianity and their subsequent openness to it after the 1860’s are explained by the gap in the “progress of civilization” between the two eras, comparable to the gap between other Greek cities and the enlightened Athens, which welcomed St. Paul’s message at the Areopagus.<sup>53</sup> Much more common were the casual parallels, effortlessly drawn by visitors to Japan – like General C. Găvănescu’s 1920 comparison of the line-up of Japanese royalty to



"icons".<sup>54</sup> Above all, the idiom of Orthodoxy systemically emerged in Southeastern European discourse on Japanese religion, wherein novel faith traditions were presented through the Christian lens. The detailed 1928 report on the Japanese imperial coronation ceremony by the Romanian plenipotentiary minister in Tokyo, Vafil, may serve as a characteristic attempt to interpret the refurbished neo-Shintoist practices through contrasts with Christianity. Here, Vafil points out that, unlike the European count of years from the birth of Christ, Japanese periodization restarts with each new emperor's reign.<sup>55</sup> Instead of a European-type "sovereign by Divine right", the Japanese emperor is himself considered divine – but, Vafil rushes to affirm, this is not "idolatry".<sup>56</sup> Shintoism is then defined through a series of reflexive negations of Christian notions – it is "without dogma, without morality, without Holy Books [...] doesn't have priests in the proper sense [...] has no liturgy, does not know mysteries, nor initiates",<sup>57</sup> etc. This typical approach relied heavily on the explanatory power of the Orthodox Christian background in order to portray its exotic "other".

Yet, the emerging relationship between Japan and Southeastern Europe was far from the characteristic Western-Oriental binary – the West served as the paramount object of authority and anxiety for both, and Japan was a far more consequential power than the states Southeastern Europe. One of the few distinctive structural traits which bonded the pre-World War II Japanese and Southeastern European polities was their model of monarchy which, while constitutional, retained some grounding in spiritual notions. This made Orthodoxy an important presence in the symbolic diplomacy between the Japanese and Southeastern European royal houses. While Vafil's above-cited text highlighted the contrast between the "Divine right" of European monarchs and the "divinity" of their Japanese counterpart, in practice the latter also used formulas calqued from Christian usage – thus, the letters from Emperor Hirohito addressed "Emperor Mihai of Romania" "by the grace of Heaven".<sup>58</sup> Symbolic parity and rootedness in spiritual authority ensured that religiously defined rites of passage, – including baptisms, marriages, and funerals, – played an important part in royal-house relationships.<sup>59</sup> And while correspondence went both ways, the Japanese side capitalized on the presence of an Orthodox cathedral in Tokyo to show its special consideration for Orthodox royals in a religious metaphor. Since at least the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – and until the abolition of monarchy in Greece – on the occasion of the death of an Orthodox king the Japanese imperial house would organize a solemn

memorial service at the Tokyo Resurrection cathedral, attended by a host of illustrious figures starting from the Japanese Crown Prince himself.<sup>60</sup> In some cases similar honors would be extended even to non-royals – thus the Romanian plenipotentiary ambassador to Japan, Nicholas Xenopol, who died in Tokyo on 18 December 1917, received a similar state-sponsored funeral at the local Orthodox cathedral, with Japanese imperial family representatives in attendance.<sup>61</sup> In this way Orthodox Christianity occupied the shared field of religious reality which made the Tokyo Resurrection cathedral into a “spiritual embassy” of Southeastern Europe and a portal for Japan’s ritual diplomacy.

The various linkages outlined above concentrated on the single community which was inextricably tied both to the national Japanese and to the global Orthodox identity. It was only in this context that Orthodoxy could furnish central meaning-making principles in structuring the relationship between Japan and Southeastern Europe. This was rarely a missionary-convert relationship, but rather a gradual mutual approach and appropriation, in which the Japanese Orthodox Church wielded much of the agency. Indeed, this process corresponded to the Japanese community’s emergence out of its regional Russian cocoon into the shared space of the worldwide Orthodox communion.

## **5. Japanese Orthodoxy on the global stage**

The engagement of the nascent Japanese Orthodox community with the Churches of Southeastern Europe underwent three distinct phases before the 1960’s. During the first half-century this engagement was largely orchestrated and dominated by the visionary founder of the Japanese Church, Archbishop Nicholas. The interwar years – the period of the Japanese community’s isolation from the Russian Church – saw the development of a broader and increasingly proactive Japanese Orthodox discourse of Orthodoxy in Southeastern Europe. The wartime and post-war reconstruction years were marked by repeated attempts at large-scale institutional linkage between Japanese and Southeastern European coreligionists. Beneath this progression one can trace the gradual realization and embrace by the Japanese believers of their membership in the single global communion of the Orthodox Church.

The future Archbishop of Japan, Nicholas (Kasatkin) came of age in the era when the worldwide Orthodox Church was divided almost without

remainder into just two large units – inside the Russian empire there was the vast Russian Church and outside it a variety of jurisdictions – the Churches of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Cyprus and Greece – dominated by the Greek ecclesiastical elite.<sup>62</sup> He thus spoke of the collective “Greek Church” as the primary ecclesiastical “other”, the basic illustration of a non-Russian Orthodoxy.<sup>63</sup> Such an illustration was crucial because, as Nicholas realized well, in the Japanese environment Russian links needed to be balanced by a global network to deflect the widespread anti-Russian sentiment. Another reason for Greek prominence can be found in the fact that Nicholas led a community of first-generation converts, who were encountering Biblical geography for the first time and thus showed a special interest in the life of the Christian Church in the lands of its origin. Therefore, Nicholas did not miss a chance to establish and foreground ties with Greek Orthodox communities. During the turning-point year of 1880, when Nicholas became bishop and secured enlarged sponsorship from Russia, he attempted for the first time to recruit a Greek missionary to serve in Japan.<sup>64</sup> Upon returning to Japan after his circumnavigation of the globe, in a November 1880 sermon to the Japanese believers Nicholas highlighted his encounter with the most eminent Orthodox prelate in the world, Patriarch Joachim III of Constantinople, emphasizing that “there was no place in the world that did not know about the Orthodox Church in Japan, [...] However small our Japanese Church may be, we should know that it has already joined the One Holy Apostolic Church, become one of its members”.<sup>65</sup>

Proof that the Orthodox Church was not merely a Russian agency was most acutely needed in Japan during the decade of intense imperial rivalry leading up to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Unsurprisingly, during this period Nicholas made special efforts to give national resonance to each notable Greek liaison. Thus, in early 1894 an unexpected visit to the Tokyo Orthodox cathedral by a Greek Metropolitan, Dionysius (Latas) of Zante, was transformed into a vindication of Orthodoxy’s global character. To commemorate this event, Dionysius’ sermon, spoken in Tokyo, was translated and widely distributed as a booklet throughout Japanese Orthodox parishes.<sup>66</sup> Through connections with the Jerusalem Orthodox Church, in 1895-1897 Nicholas received and publicized a number of letters and hallowed objects from the Holy Land, making as many as 500 copies of the portrait of the Greek Patriarch Gerasimus II of Jerusalem for distribution.<sup>67</sup> As anti-Russianism mounted, the standard Japanese Orthodox response was to retrace the historical track of

Christianity – through Russia back to Greece and thence to Judea – pointing out the age-old Orthodox presence in each of these lands.<sup>68</sup> Compared to the otherwise common usage of Russian vignettes, the lavishly decorated 1905 album celebrating Japanese Orthodox soldiers of the Russo-Japanese War was striking by the abundance of Greek inscriptions.<sup>69</sup> In sum, even if the Russian Church was the proximate “Mother” of the Japanese Church, it was vital in this period for the young community to assert familial links worldwide, averring that even the “Jerusalem Church, the Mother of Christian Churches... accepts our Church into the number of its Daughters”.<sup>70</sup>

The above events occurred on the background of a permanent exposure to non-Russian Orthodoxy in more subdued forms outlined in the previous section – regular reportage on the state of the worldwide communion in the Japanese Church’s official *Seikyō Shinpō*; the work of Bessarabian missionary-musicians; the expansion of the Greek merchant presence in Kōbe; the trickle of visitors to the Tokyo Orthodox cathedral compound. These occasional visitors, while total strangers, at times evoked from the rather sober-minded Archbishop some of his more poignant affirmations of universal Orthodox brotherhood. “We both rejoiced over our meeting as if we were family”, – he wrote of one such encounter with a Greek in 1901, – “behold the bonds of Orthodox faith!”.<sup>71</sup> However, the most stable and consequential channel of Greek-Japanese ecclesiastical communications was no doubt regular correspondence with Mount Athos, which continued uninterrupted from early 1870’s to the end of Nicholas’ life. As many as three Japanese missionaries developed over time a ramified network of contacts on the Holy Mountain – Nicholas himself, after befriending a number of Athonites during his 1879-1880 visit to Russia; Fr. Anatolius (Tihai), who was at one time a monk of the Mt. Athos Zographou Monastery; and Fr. George (Chudnovskii), who came from Mount Athos to serve in Japan during 1884-1889.<sup>72</sup> These channels not only attracted to Japan a diverse flow of contributions, – including both ecclesiastical objects and considerable sums of money,<sup>73</sup> – but also sustained the perennial plans to lay the foundation for Orthodox monasticism in Japan. However, these plans – along with almost all other educational, publishing, artistic and missionary projects of the Japanese Orthodox Church – were disrupted by Nicholas’ death in 1912, and terminally undercut by the Russian revolution of 1917, which toppled the entire system of external relationships of the young community.

As Russian ecclesiastical structures collapsed, the first reaction of the Japanese Orthodox community was to distance itself from Russia's conflagration, band together, and attempt to arrange a system of self-reliance. Bishop (later Metropolitan) Sergius (Tikhomirov) who succeeded Nicholas at the helm of the Japanese Church found himself marginalized by the rising native elite of the Japanese Orthodox community. Indeed, since he possessed neither the backing of Russia nor the charisma of Nicholas, the stability of his position depended on the Japanese believers' voluntary support for the authority of the bishop's office and, in general, for proper ecclesiastical governance. As a result, being the most internationally-exposed figure in the suddenly isolated community, Sergius endeavored to confirm his standing by raising the Japanese awareness of the global Orthodox communion and its interconnectedness. At the annual Councils of the Japanese Church he would explain the need to seek recognition from the world's peer autocephalous Churches,<sup>74</sup> fault the Japanese Orthodox establishment for being a "Greek Church that doesn't know Greek",<sup>75</sup> and expound on the contemporary Church-state relationships in the Orthodox world.<sup>76</sup> After the Great Kantō Earthquake ravaged the Tokyo Orthodox headquarters in 1923, Sergius reached out for aid beyond the Russian diaspora – for instance, an appeal to help the distressed Japanese Church came through to the Bulgarian Church in 1924,<sup>77</sup> while in 1933 Metropolitan Chrysostom (Papadopoulos) of Athens responded to a similar plea by contributing an icon for the restored Tokyo cathedral.<sup>78</sup> Finally, Sergius' most noticeable step in "globalizing" the Japanese Church was to introduce the commemoration of the supreme hierarchs of the world's autocephalous Orthodox Churches at liturgy.<sup>79</sup> This practice, – normally reserved for independent autocephalous Churches, – proclaimed the coexistence of the mutually-recognizing Orthodox jurisdictions within a single common spiritual space.

Sergius' efforts against introversion were not supported by parallel activity radiating from Southeastern Europe – interwar ecclesiastical outreach to Japan was largely limited to occasional travelers or seekers, like a monk from Mount Athos who came to Tokyo to gather donations in 1931.<sup>80</sup> For this reason it is doubly significant that, despite Sergius' weak standing, Japanese Orthodox reportage on the Churches of Southeastern Europe gradually expanded in the 1920's and 1930's. After the official Japanese Orthodox periodical, *Seikyō Jihō*, could once again expand its format to the size of a regular journal in the mid-1920's, it resumed the chronicling of the major developments in the Orthodox world. On the

wave of discussions about the impending union with the Anglican Church and the convocation of a new Ecumenical Council not only reprints from foreign press, but extensive original articles by Japanese authors on the theme of Southeastern European Churches appeared for the first time in the late 1920's.<sup>81</sup> In the 1930's the Japanese authors began to reference the ecclesiastical situation in Southeastern Europe to make proposals for domestic reform, citing, for example, the Romanian Church's experience of shifting to the Gregorian calendar.<sup>82</sup> By the end of the 1930's, in the context of Japan's grandiose plans to split the control of Eurasia with Germany, one author even argued for the Japanese to assert patronage and leadership over the global Orthodox communion.<sup>83</sup> One can discern in this progression an increasing realization and acceptance on the part of the Japanese believers of their membership in the wider Orthodox world. While yesterday's greatest autocephalous Church was being exterminated inside the USSR, Orthodoxy's tomorrow appeared to lie with the Churches of Southeastern Europe.

This gradual turn was crucial to addressing the dilemma of jurisdictional reordering of the world's ecclesiastical polities – one of the main questions dogging Orthodox intra-Church relations after the tectonic post-World War I political reconfiguration. After 1918, once the headquarters of the Russian Church in Moscow largely lost its capacity to communicate with territories outside Soviet control, each extra-Soviet fragment of the Russian Orthodox unity faced a corporate existential choice. Some simply attempted to put off the decision as long as they could; a few, like Poland, asserted de-facto independence as new autocephalous Churches; others, like Estonia, joined non-Russian Orthodox jurisdictions; those which remained faithful to the Russian Church eventually had to choose between Moscow and to the newly-established Synod of Russian émigré bishops, which tried to organize a "Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia" centered on the Serbian Sremski Karlovci. Japan's Metropolitan Sergius made his stand with Moscow, but, due to the widening discussion of the dilemma, each of the five above options gained followers among the Japanese Orthodox. The matter came to a head in 1939, as the Japanese state declared "national mobilization" and assumed minute and invasive control of the country's religious bodies. Both Sergius and his allegiance soon proved unacceptable to the Japanese officials, and, under heavy state pressure, the Japanese Orthodox Church embarked on a new round of "globalization". In jurisdictional terms this meant alignment with the militantly anti-Soviet Yugoslavia-based Church of the Russian émigrés – the

Japanese authorities intimidated ecclesiastical opponents and facilitated the correspondence flows between Sremski Karlovci, Harbin and Tokyo to ensure the ordination of a new Japanese Orthodox bishop, Nicholas (Ono), on April 6, 1941.<sup>84</sup> Escalation of the global conflict largely prevented further development of Orthodox ecclesiastical exchanges between Japan and Yugoslavia, but the deepening wartime relationship inside the Axis camp brought closer contact with Bulgaria and Romania. On the occasion of the establishment of the official Japanese-Bulgarian Society at the start of 1943, *Seikyō Jihō* foregrounded the intermediary function of Japanese Orthodox believers in Japan's cooperation with Southeastern Europe.<sup>85</sup> In line with the rising profile of Southeastern Europe in Japan, a visit by the Romanian ambassador to the Tokyo Orthodox cathedral now figured as a newsworthy event.<sup>86</sup> New bridges were being forged even as the tragedy of war rent the world, – and the Japanese Orthodox community itself, – into opposed camps.

Japan's total defeat in 1945 marked the beginning of a decade, – the years of American occupation and Korean War, – which radically reshaped the life of the country and its people. The Japanese Orthodox community likewise faced new horizons and challenges, personified by the thousands of foreign coreligionists who flooded Japan – mostly hyphenated Americans of Eastern European extraction, new Russian émigré refugees from China, and members of the international UN forces from the Korean front. Leading contingents of new parishioners at the Tokyo cathedral were listed in 1951 as "Greeks, Greek-Americans, White Russians, Serbs, Armenians".<sup>87</sup> The sponsorship offered to the Japanese believers by the occupation personnel, the engagement of American and Greek military clergy in the local liturgical life, international marriages and lively cultural-exchange activities all became fixtures of the Japanese Orthodox scene. The variety of backgrounds, connections and agendas brought by these international forces was unprecedented in the annals of the Japanese Church, but the most consequential new presence was probably the Greek one. While Greek-American occupation personnel figured in Japanese Orthodox life since early post-war years, the Greeks' profile rose markedly with the arrival of Greek UN troops to the Korean War front in 1950. Soon the Greeks surpassed the Russians as the dominant foreign group in the Tokyo Orthodox community.<sup>88</sup> Throughout 1951 news of deepening sympathetic Greek involvement in the local Orthodox community were regularly featured in Japanese Orthodox press – the topics included Greek aid to the Japanese Church, service of Greek military chaplains

at the Japanese Church's headquarters, ecclesiastical celebration of the Greek Independence Day in Tokyo, speeches and church-attendance by Greek troops.<sup>89</sup> The Greeks personified the diverse Orthodox world, which descended upon Japan at the time when the impoverished and disorganized Japanese Orthodox believers eagerly sought to build "close ties with an overseas Church and advance evangelism".<sup>90</sup>

To be sure, the leaders of the Japanese Orthodox communities at first directed their quest for renewed foreign links toward their historic roots, the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church, but the US occupation authorities blocked the entry of Soviet clergy into Japan. Instead, General MacArthur's occupation administration placed the Japanese believers under the authority of the Russian-American Metropolia, relatively isolated and maximally American of all extant Orthodox jurisdictions. Yet, since the Metropolia was slow to involve itself in aiding its Japanese flock during the first years of the new affiliation, discontent riddled the Japanese Orthodox community. In the meantime, the Greeks appeared to exhibit both the capacity and the willingness to become precisely the kind of international patrons the Japanese believers sought. One of the transitory Greek chaplains in Tokyo promised in 1951 to "relate [Japanese conditions] to the Greek authorities in order to help you thrive".<sup>91</sup> Soon afterwards Archbishop of Athens Spyridon (Vlachos) began gathering data on the Japanese Church and established indirect contact with the Kyoto University classics professor, Tanaka Hideo.<sup>92</sup> By 1953 this gradual approach progressed toward a program of correspondence between Greek Sunday-school children and their Japanese peers.<sup>93</sup> In that year this dynamic was suddenly interrupted by a decisive turn in the policy of the Russian-American Metropolia, whose new charismatic Bishop of Tokyo, Irenaeus (Bekish), was able to quickly energize and mobilize the Japanese Orthodox community behind himself. However, the developments in the neighboring Korea, – which was at the time also subordinate to the Japanese Orthodox diocese, – continued along the earlier trajectory. There the Greek Expeditionary Force contributed generously to the restoration, provisioning and expansion of the devastated native Orthodox community, helping build a new church, establish a school, and send two Korean believers for theological education to Greece. As a result, in 1956 the Korean believers were received, per their request, into the jurisdiction of the Church of Constantinople.<sup>94</sup> As the Orthodox community of Japan's former colony submitted to a Southeastern European Patriarch, Orthodoxy in East Asia definitively emerged into the shared context of the worldwide Church.



## Conclusion

It is perhaps now possible to recapitulate the argument of this work. Since the inception of the Japanese Orthodox mission in the 1860's, but especially in the course of the last century, the Orthodox Church has undergone considerable globalization and diversification. While operational definitions of what this Orthodox "Church" is differ, these various perspectives agree on the built-in factor of "catholicity" – the impossibility for one part of the "Church" to become irrelevant or unrelated to another part. The emergence of a distinctive native Japanese Church was, therefore, a globally significant event for the Orthodox communion, a major factor in linking Japan not only to Russia, but also to the heartland of the Orthodox habitat in Southeastern Europe. This bridging function of Orthodoxy had many strands, which converge on the gradual experience of the Japanese Orthodox Church's deepening engagement with Southeastern European coreligionists. Especially at the time when Russian Orthodoxy appeared headed for destruction, Southeastern Europe appeared to the Japanese believers as a testament to the viability of Orthodox Christianity outside and apart from Russia. The course of discovery, whereby the Japanese Orthodox learned about Southeastern Europe, identified with its Churches, and reached out for deeper contact, is one of the key manifestations of catholicity in the modern global reconfiguration of Orthodoxy.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> In this work all Orthodox Christian names have been standardized to their traditional English-language forms.
- <sup>2</sup> "Adherents" here refers to those identified by the respective surveys and does not imply active adherence.
- <sup>3</sup> Krose, Hermann, "Statistics of Religions", *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 14, New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14275a.htm> (accessed July 3, 2012).
- <sup>4</sup> Wolfsgrüber, Cölestin, "The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy", *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 2, New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1907, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02121b.htm> (accessed July 3, 2012).
- <sup>5</sup> "Field listing: Religions", Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html?countryName=&countryCode=&regionCode=%C2%A6> (accessed July 3, 2012).
- <sup>6</sup> *Global Christianity. A report on the size and distribution of the world's Christian population*, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2011, 31.
- <sup>7</sup> *Global Christianity. A report on the size and distribution of the world's Christian population*, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2011, 79-81, 83. Of the major Orthodox populations in the Western world the otherwise credible estimates of the Pew Research Center appear grossly off in the cases of the US and Italy. In the first instance, a recent comprehensive parish-by-parish survey yielded only 0.8 million Orthodox adherents, according to Krindatch, Alexei, "Results of 2010 Census of Orthodox Christian Churches in the USA," 4, website of the Hartford Institute for Religion Research, <http://www.hartfordinstitute.org/research/2010-USOrthodox-Census.pdf> (accessed July 3, 2012). In case of Italy, ongoing mass immigration of Orthodox believers has already driven up the numbers to 1.3 million by early 2010, according to Tosatti, Marco, "Italia: Ortodossia supera Islam", *La Stampa*, 08.03.2010, [http://www.lastampa.it/\\_web/CMSTP/tmplrubiche/giornalisti/grubrica.asp?ID\\_blog=196&ID\\_articolo=712&ID\\_sezione=396&sezione=](http://www.lastampa.it/_web/CMSTP/tmplrubiche/giornalisti/grubrica.asp?ID_blog=196&ID_articolo=712&ID_sezione=396&sezione=) (accessed July 3, 2012).
- <sup>8</sup> Lipich, Ol'ga, "V Afrike prozhivaiut piat' millionov pravoslavnykh khristian", *RIA-Novosti*, 21.01.2004, <http://www.ria.ru/society/20040121/511422.html> (accessed July 3, 2012).
- <sup>9</sup> "Press release from the office of the Holy Metropolis [of Mexico], Mexico City, April 7<sup>th</sup> 2010", official website of the General Secretariat for Pan-Orthodox Ministries of the Mexican Metropolis, September 29, 2012: [http://www.secretariat.orthodoxtheologicalinstitute.org/index.php?option=com\\_ly](http://www.secretariat.orthodoxtheologicalinstitute.org/index.php?option=com_ly)

- ftenbloggie&view=lyftenbloggie&category=secretariat%20news&Itemid=50 (accessed July 3, 2012).
- <sup>10</sup> See, for instance, the breakdown and short presentations in Vailhé, Siméon, "Greek Church", *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 6, New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06752a.htm> (accessed July 3, 2012).
- <sup>11</sup> For example, the countries which witnessed the inauguration of their first Orthodox parish in 2012 include Pakistan, Rwanda and Tonga. See "Pakistan Church Breaks Ground for a New Parish", missionary website *Orthodox Pakistan*, 02.05.2012, <http://orthodoxpakistan.org/pakistan-church-breaks-ground-for-a-new-parish/> (accessed July 3, 2012); "The first Orthodox Church in Rwanda", website of the Moscow Sretensky monastery *Pravoslavie.ru* (English version), 29.03.2012, <http://www.pravoslavie.ru/english/52548.htm> (accessed July 3, 2012); "A New Mission Established in the Kingdom of Tonga," official website of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, 21.02.2012, [http://russianorthodoxchurch.ws/synod/eng2012/20120222\\_enausdiocese.html](http://russianorthodoxchurch.ws/synod/eng2012/20120222_enausdiocese.html) (accessed July 3, 2012).
- <sup>12</sup> The Fourth Pre-Conciliar Pan-Orthodox Conference, *Decision*, Chambésy, 6-13 June 2009, The Orthodox Center of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, website of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, <http://www.goarch.org/archdiocese/documents/chambesy/decision> (accessed July 3, 2012).
- <sup>13</sup> Estimated number based on Vailhé, Siméon, "Greek Church", *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 6, New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06752a.htm> (accessed July 3, 2012) and Fortescue, Adrian, "Eastern Churches", *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 5, New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05230a.htm> (accessed July 3, 2012).
- <sup>14</sup> The basic reference on contemporary Orthodox bishops is the website maintained by Mark Markou. For the 2012 listings see <http://users.sch.gr/markmarkou/2012/2012.htm> (accessed July 3, 2012).
- <sup>15</sup> Classified by each parameter, there are some 76 bishops born outside Orthodox homelands (as defined by the 1912 boundaries), some 33 converts from another religious tradition, and some 26 members of ethnicities not commonly affiliated with Orthodoxy.
- <sup>16</sup> John (Pelushi) and Anthony (Merdani) come from Bektashi backgrounds; Daniel (Nushiro) and Seraphim (Tsujie) are both Japanese converts from the Buddhist-Shintoist tradition; Herman (Kamalov) is an Uzbek convert from Islam; Jonah (Lwanga) and Jerome (Muzeeyi) are Africans from Uganda; Theophanes (Kim) is of Korean origin; Alexis (Pacheco y Vera) is a Native American; Jeremiah (Ferens), Nicandrus (Kovalenko), Silouan (Mousa) and Stephan (Charalampides) have been born in Brazil, Mongolia, Venezuela and the Belgian Congo respectively.

- 17 *Global Christianity. A report on the size and distribution of the world's Christian population*, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2011, 10.
- 18 Philaret (Drozdov), Met. of Moscow, *The Longer Catechism of the Orthodox, Catholic, Eastern Church*, trans. R. W. Blackmore, I-252, in Schaff, Philip, *Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical notes*, vol. II, Harper and Row, Publishers, 1877 (1919 reprint), 483.
- 19 Mii Michirō Symeon, Prot., *Harisutosu Seikyōkai oyobi sono kyōgi daiyō*, Tokyo: Tōhō-shoin, Nihon shūkyō kōgi № 8, 1934, 1.
- 20 Cf. *Nihon Kirisuto-kyō rekishi daijiten*, Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 1988, 378.
- 21 Ugrinovich, D. M., "Tserkov'," *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, vol. 28, 1978, <http://bse.sci-lib.com/article120763.html> (accessed July 3, 2012).
- 22 John (Maksimovich), Abp. of San Francisco, *Slova izhe vo sviatykh otssa nashego Ioanna arkhiepiskopa Shankhaiskogo i San-Frantsisskogo. Sbornik propovedei, pouchenii, poslanii, nastavlenii i ukazov*, ed. Prot. Peter Perekrestov, San Francisco: Russky pastyr, 1994, internet edition, p. 101, [http://rocor-library.info/books/Slova\\_loann\\_Shanh/Slova\\_loann\\_Shanh.pdf.zip](http://rocor-library.info/books/Slova_loann_Shanh/Slova_loann_Shanh.pdf.zip) (accessed July 3, 2012).
- 23 Cf. Philaret (Drozdov), Met. of Moscow, *The Longer Catechism of the Orthodox, Catholic, Eastern Church*, trans. R. W. Blackmore, I-270, in Schaff, Philip, *Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical notes*, vol. II, Harper and Row, Publishers, 1877 (1919 reprint), 488.
- 24 Pomazansky, Michael, Prot., *Orthodox Dogmatic Theology*, trans., ed. Seraphim (Rose), hieromonk, Platina, CA: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 2005, 245.
- 25 Fortescue, Adrian, Priest, *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, London: Catholic Truth Society, 1908, 273-274. For a contemporary example of this fragmented approach see Binns, John, *An introduction to the Christian Orthodox churches*, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- 26 One exception is the field of theological dialogue, where Orthodoxy has been represented – and treated – as a more coherent single entity. An example of such work is Geffert, Bryn, *Eastern Orthodox and Anglicans: diplomacy, theology, and the politics of interwar ecumenism*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010.
- 27 Cf. Ramet, Pedro, ed., *Eastern Christianity and politics in the twentieth century*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988; Chaillot, Christine, ed., *L'Eglise orthodoxe en Europe occidentale au XXe siècle*, Paris: Cerf, 2009; Leustean, Lucian N., *Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, 1945-91*, London and New York: Routledge, 2010.
- 28 Basic references on the history of Christianity in Japan are the thorough edited volume by Mullins, Mark R., ed., *Handbook of Christianity in Japan*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003; the encyclopedic *Nihon Kirisuto-kyō rekishi daijiten*,

- Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 1988; and the dated but still valuable monograph by Drummond, R. H., *A History of Christianity in Japan*, Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publ. Co., 1971.
- 29 The pioneering work in elucidating the constructive significance of Japan's Tokugawa-Meiji anti-Christianity is Paramore, Kiri, *Ideology and Christianity in Japan*, London and New York: Routledge, 2009. For an influential description of the practical process of the modern rearticulation of the Japanese emperor see Fujitani, Takashi, *Splendid monarchy: power and pageantry in modern Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
- 30 The wartime experience of Japan's Christian groups vis-à-vis the state is extensively documented by the Special higher police materials in Wada Yōichi, Sugii Rokurō, Ōta Masao, eds., *Senjika no Kirisuto-kyō undō – Tokkō shiryō ni yoru* (3rd ed.), Tokyo: Shinkyō shuppansha, 1981.
- 31 The most notable work on the sociology of "Meiji Christianity", which has become an iconic reference for Japanese Protestantism, has been carried out by Morioka Kiyomi. See especially his *Nihon no kindai shakai to Kirisuto-kyō*, Tokyo: Hyōronsha, 1976; *Meiji Kirisuto-kyōkai keisei no shakaishi*, Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 2005. Systemic study of missionaries began more recently, most notably by Hamish Ion in *The cross and the rising sun*, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, vol. 1, 1990; vol. 2, 1993.
- 32 As hidden Christians began to emerge after 1850's, some entered into communion with the restored Roman Catholic structures in Japan, but others found that their faith was too different to be identified with the kind of Roman Catholicism they encountered. For one study of these much-discussed groups see Turnbull, Stephen, *The Kakure Kirishitan of Japan: a study of their development, beliefs and rituals to the present day*, Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 1998.
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- 39 *Biserica Ortodoxă Română*, mai 1930, XLVIII, № 5, 491-492; ian.-febr. 1934, LII, № 1-2, 76; mart.-apr. 1934, LII, № 3-4, 218-219; 224; iul.-aug. 1934, LII, № 7-8, 434; mart.-apr. 1935, LIII, № 3-4, 194; mart.-apr. 1936, LIV, № 3-4, 217-219; mai-iun. 1936, LIV, № 5-6, 356; 356-357; 357 (3x); iul.-aug. 1936, LIV, 7-8, 621-622; iul.-aug. 1937, LV, № 7-10, 561-563; 604-605; ian.-apr. 1938, LVI, № 1-4, 283; iul.-aug. 1938, LVI, № 7-8, 477; mart.-apr. 1939, LVII, № 3-4, 354.
- 40 When footnotes are given, one often finds references to *Voskresnoe Chtenie*, *Tserkovnaia Zhizn'*, *Pravoslavnyi Sobesednik*, *Glasnik*, *Khleb Nebesnyi*. Less frequent are *Pravoslavnaia Rus'*, the Bulgarian *Pastirsko Delo*, the Polish *Słowo*, the Estonian *Usk ja Elu*.
- 41 The earliest report on Japan in a Southeastern European ecclesiastical organ was probably Bălănescu, Silvestru, Prot., "Misiunea ortodoxă rusă în Japonia", *Biserica Ortodoxă Română*, sept. 1875, I, № 12, 954-955, with a follow-up in *Biserica Ortodoxă Română*, febr. 1876, II, № 5, 365-366. The book in question is Sorocovschi, Vladimir, Priest, *Misiunea ortodoxă în Japonia*, revista *Misionarul*, 1937, IX, 363-463.
- 42 D., "P. Dunov v Iaponiia", *Tsurkoven Vestnik*, 1931, XXXII, № 6, 64-66.
- 43 Senuma Kakusaburō John, "Fushukyō Serigii-shi no shin-cho 'Jūnii-ittai no seishito' ni suite", *Seikyō Jihō*, 01.06.1938, № 27-6, 5. Notably, this outburst led to the appearance of the only sizeable anti-Catholic polemical monograph to be produced by the Japanese Orthodox Church in the interwar period – see the Russian-language original published in Sergius (Tikhomirov), Met. of Japan, *Dvoenadesiatnitsa Sviatykh Apostolov*, Paris: YMCA-Press, 1935.
- 44 Metropolitan Dionysius (Latas) of Zante in 1894. See more on him in the next section.
- 45 Branko Vukelić in the late 1930's. His involvement with the famous Soviet spy in Japan, Richard Sorge, was perhaps partly responsible for dragging the Japanese Orthodox Metropolitan Sergius into Japanese prison in 1945. On Vukelić see the numerous publications of his wife, Yamazaki Yoshiko, as well as a recent book by Katashima Norio, *Zoruge jiken – Vukericchi no tsuma Yoshiko*, Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 2006.
- 46 At the start of 1980's the Kōbe Foreign cemetery contained 22 Greek graves, according to *Kōbe Seibo shūshin seidō* "seidō seisei 30-shū nen kinen-shi,

- Kōbe: Kōbe Harisutosu seikyōkai, 1983, 27. By 1951 a Greek section was set up in the Tama cemetery in Tokyo, for the burial of Greek soldiers who died in the Korean War, according to *Seikyō Jihō*, 25.02.1951, № 739, 1.
- 47 See on him Sukitaretzu, "Serubia fūzoku no ippen (tsuki sinraichō Georugii-shi no den)", *Seikyō Jihō*, 05.02.1914, № 3-3, 18-19; Ushimaru Yasuo Proclus, Prot., *Osaka seikyōkai hyakunen-shi*, Suita: Osaka Harisutosu seikyōkai, 1978, 32; Tōhei Kazuo Basil, *Taishō kara Shōwa-shoki no Osaka seikyōkai no tsuioku*, Private publication, 1976, 2-3.
- 48 An attempt to collect and systematize the vast amount of scattered writings about these three figures has been undertaken by the Moldovan politician Vlad Cubreacov on his website, <http://cubreacov.wordpress.com/>. The first major research piece on Fr. Anatolius was the candidate's dissertation by Gurius (Egorov), hieromonk, *Iaponskii missioner arkhim. Anatolii (Tikhai)*, Petrograd Theological Academy, 1917.
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- 51 For one report of such a diverse donation from Mt. Athos to the Japanese Church see Nicholas (Kasatkin), Abp. of Japan, *Senkyōshi Nikorai no zennikki*, Nakamura Kennosuke, ed., vol. 9, Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 2007, 141 (entry for 18(31).05.1910).
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- 53 H. F., "O Archiepiskopos tēs Iapōnias Nikolaos," *Ekklesiastikē Alētheia*, 24.03.1912, № 32-13, 99.
- 54 Epure, Mihai, *Din Carpați până la Fuji*, Editura Cartega în colaborare cu Editura Nipponica: București, 2000, 229.
- 55 *Copie depe raportul Legațiunei României la Tokio № 640 din 20 Noembrie 1928*, Arhivele Naționale ale României, 728 Casa Regala – Oficiale Vol. IV, № 38/1928, 3.
- 56 *Copie depe raportul Legațiunei României la Tokio № 640 din 20 Noembrie 1928*, Arhivele Naționale ale României, 728 Casa Regala – Oficiale Vol. IV, № 38/1928, 4.
- 57 *Copie depe raportul Legațiunei României la Tokio № 640 din 20 Noembrie 1928*, Arhivele Naționale ale României, 728 Casa Regala – Oficiale Vol. IV, № 38/1928, 4.
- 58 Letter from Emperor Hirohito of Japan to King Mihai of Romania from 07.11.1940, Arhivele Naționale ale României, 728 Casa Regala – Oficiale Vol. IV, № 35/1940, 1. "King" was a title which, in Japanese domestic

- nomenclature, functioned like a princely rank, and was apparently deemed too lowly for fellow sovereigns.
- 59 Epure, Mihai, *Din Carpați până la Fuji*, Editura Cartega în colaborare cu Editura Nipponica: București, 2000, 103.
- 60 For an early case see the description of the 1913 Tokyo memorial service for the Greek King George I in *Seikyō Jihō*, 1913, № 2-8, 21-22. The last such memorial service was probably the one for the Greek King Paul in 1964, attended by Crown Prince (now Emperor) Akihito.
- 61 Epure, Mihai, *Din Carpați până la Fuji*, Editura Cartega în colaborare cu Editura Nipponica: București, 2000, 81-82.
- 62 The only exceptions were the Serbian-dominated jurisdictions outside Ottoman control – the Churches of Karlowitz and Montenegro.
- 63 For an illustration of such usage see Nicholas (Kasatkin), Abp. of Japan, *Senkyōshi Nikorai no zennikki*, Nakamura Kennosuke, ed., vol. 3, Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 2007, 367 (entry for 22.09(04.10).1894).
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- 69 Mizushima Yukiyasu Isaiah, *Gunkoku Seikyōto kenshin jikki*, Tokyo: Dainippon Seikyōkai Henshū-jo, 1905.
- 70 Nicholas (Kasatkin), Abp. of Japan, *Senkyōshi Nikorai no zennikki*, Nakamura Kennosuke, ed., vol. 4, Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 2007, 132 (entry for 31.12.1895 (12.01.1896)).
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- 72 An extensive collection of correspondence from all these three figures is preserved in the library of the Mt. Athos St. Panteleimon’s Monastery.



- 73 For example, in 1888 Archimandrite Macarius and Fr. Michael of the Mt. Athos St. Panteleimon's Monastery contributed a large sum of 1335 yen for construction of the Orthodox church in Sendai. See *Seidō kenchiku kenzaimeibō. Sendai Fukuin-kai*, 1888, n/n, Sendai Orthodox church archive.
- 74 Nihon Seikyōkai Sōmukyoku, ed., *Nihon Seikyōkai Kōkai gijiroku*, Tokyo: Seikyō-Honkai jimusho, 1923, 10-11.
- 75 Nihon Seikyōkai Sōmukyoku, ed., *Kōkai gijiroku*, Tokyo: Seikyō-Honkai jimusho, 1926, 118.
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- 77 *Tsurkoven Vestnik*, 26.01.1924, XXV, № 4, 11.
- 78 *Tsurkoven Vestnik*, 04.02.1933, XXXIV, № 6, 67.
- 79 Sergius (Tikhomirov), Abp. of Japan, *Osviaschenie Voskresenskogo kafedral'nogo sobora v Tookyo. S istoricheskim predisloviem*, Tokyo, 1930, reprinted in Sablina, E. B., 150 let Pravoslaviia v Iaponii. Istoriia Iaponskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi i ee osnovatel' Sviatitel' Nikolai, Moscow: AIRO-XXI; St. Petersburg: "Dmitrii Bulanin", 2006, 462. The Bulgarian Church, – eager to secure for itself international recognition by other Orthodox bodies, – also reported on this development in *Tsurkoven Vestnik*, 07.04.1923, XXIV, № 15-16, 15.
- 80 *Seikyō Jihō*, 20.03.1931, № 20-3, 20-21.
- 81 Bohan, D., trans. Takeoka Takeo Basil, "Kako oyobi genzai ni okeru Eikoku Kyōkai to Seikyōkai", *Seikyō Jihō*, 10.09.1928, № 17-9, 4-7; 10.10.1928, № 17-10, 9-12; 10.11.1928, № 17-11, 5-9; Saikaishi Shizuka Mark, "Ei-Ro ryō-Kyōkai seishoku no kaigō", *Seikyō Jihō*, 15.10.1929, № 18-10, 7-9; Saikaishi Shizuka Mark, "Barukan-hantō no Seikyō-koku", *Seikyō Jihō*, 15.11.1929, № 18-11, 15-18; 15.12.1929, № 18-12, 1-3.
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- 83 Yamamoto Kazuo Nicholas, "Hitotsu, warera nasu beki koto (Nihon Seikyōkai hatten-saku ni tsuite)", *Seikyō Jihō*, 01.10.1939, № 28-10, 25-26.
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- 85 Kitamura Kanzō, "Nihon-Burugaria kyōkai hakkai ni yosete", *Seikyō Jihō*, 01.02.1943, № 33-2, 15.
- 86 *Seikyō Jihō*, 01.04.1942, № 32-4, 23.
- 87 *Seikyō Jihō*, 20.06.1951, № 743, 1.
- 88 Judging by the proportion of names in the Tokyo Orthodox "Three nations committee" in early 1951, as reported in *Seikyō Jihō*, 25.02.1951, № 739, 1.

- <sup>89</sup> *Seikyō Jihō*, 25.01.1951, № 738, 1; 20.04.1951, № 741, 2; 20.05.1951, № 742, 4; 25.08.1951, № 745, 2.
- <sup>90</sup> In the expression of an article from the August 26 1952 edition of *Chūgai Nippō* reproduced in *Seikyō Jihō*, 25.09.1952, № 758, 1.
- <sup>91</sup> *Seikyō Jihō*, 20.05.1951, № 742, 4.
- <sup>92</sup> *Seikyō Jihō*, 25.09.1952, № 758, 1.
- <sup>93</sup> *Seikyō Jihō*, 25.09.1953, № 769, 1.
- <sup>94</sup> The best account of the Korean Orthodox mission's condition during the period in question is probably Rutt, Richard, "The Orthodox Church in Korea", *Sobornost*, summer 1957, № 3-21, 480-490. For other useful contemporary reports see *Ekklēsia*, 1-15.10.1954, № 31-19/20, 342; 15.08.1956, № 33-16, 296.

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# NEWTON'S QUANDARY ABOUT ACTION AT A DISTANCE\*

## 1. Introduction

In a well known passage of his fifth letter to Samuel Clarke, written in 1716, Leibniz upbraids Newton for having revived scholastic occult qualities “under the specious name of forces”. For unless Newton supposes God himself to effect the earth’s movement toward the sun through empty space (“a miracle if ever there was any”, Leibniz expostulates), he has resorted to attractions properly so called, that is to say, actions at a distance without any intervening means, which are nothing but “absurdities”.<sup>1</sup> In a passage that today is even better known, Newton at least appears to share Leibniz’s appraisal of unmediated distant action. Writing to Richard Bentley in the early 1690’s, some five years after his *Principia* was first published, Newton declares,

It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else, which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must be, if gravitation in the sense of Epicurus, be essential and inherent in it. And this is one reason why I desired you would not ascribe innate gravity to me. That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.<sup>2</sup>

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Although some of these remarks appear to presage Leibniz's own words, there is no interpretive consensus about Newton's meaning. More generally, there is no consensus about the stance he took on the possibility of unmediated distant action, at this time or at any other, and accordingly about whether he was sincere when disavowing knowledge of gravity's cause, most famously in his General Scholium remarks, "I have not yet assigned a cause to gravity", and "I have not as yet been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for these properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses."<sup>3</sup>

Elsewhere, I have argued that Newton was sincere in denying knowledge of gravity's cause; while he entertained various hypotheses about gravity's cause—including the hypothesis of unmediated distant action—he never endorsed any of them. His lack of confidence in the hypothesis of unmediated distant action by matter is explained by an inclination toward such metaphysical principles as a principle of local causation. This interpretation is a conservative one, which resembles that of Ernan McMullin in some respects.<sup>4</sup> My basis for it includes negative evidence—what Newton's writings do not contain—as well as positive evidence. The positive evidence includes an overlooked but critical substitution that Newton makes to Bentley's words, in a paraphrase contained in the passage quoted above. Because Newton's method prohibits the use of metaphysical principles or other hypotheses when drawing conclusions in physics, I have also addressed the question of whether his inclination to such principles violates his method, arguing that it does not since by its nature, induction leaves room for such principles to play a certain motivational role, which is the only role that Newton allows them.

This paper extends those arguments. After sketching both the debate and the position I have previously taken in it, I extend my arguments by focusing upon the original version of the *Principia*'s third book published posthumously as *A Treatise of the System of the World*. That text has recently been interpreted as advancing what I shall call a 'scandalous hypothesis': the view that matter has robustly active powers of increasing the universe's scalar quantity of motion, and of doing so at a distance, without any spatially intervening medium.<sup>5</sup> Despite that interpretation's initial plausibility, it cannot be sustained. For as I shall show, it requires that Query 31's robust sense of activity be identical to the sense that matter possesses through its *vis inertiae* in Definition 3. Yet these turn out to be

very different sorts of activity, one drawn from the Cartesian tradition, the other from the Aristotelian.

To sketch what is to come, the next section provides an overview of debate about unmediated distant action, while sections 3 and 4 provide some negative and positive evidence, respectively, for a scandalous interpretation of Newton, reviewing some of my arguments given elsewhere. The remaining sections focus upon Newton's *System of the World*, and I rebut Schliesser's recent scandalous interpretation of that text.

## **2. The debate about unmediated distant action and gravity's cause**

One way to frame the debate about what conclusion Newton may have reached about gravity's cause and the possibility of unmediated distant action is to begin with this question: Why does he disavow knowledge of gravity's cause? Four main responses to that question may be distinguished in the debate, and I set them out here, noting the difficulties I see with the first three positions and defending the fourth.<sup>6</sup>

According to one position in the debate, when Newton disavows knowledge of gravity's cause, he is not sincere, for he has privately reached the conclusion that Leibniz called "a miracle if ever there was any", namely, that God causes gravitational effects directly.<sup>7</sup> Although certain passages do suggest that Newton considered this view,<sup>8</sup> he does not seem to have embraced it. For he repeatedly treats the gravitational force as something that requires only divine concurrence, and that otherwise operates independently of God. In Query 31, for instance, gravity is one of God's tools. The active principles that Newton associates with gravity and also the speculative, short-range distance forces are "general laws of nature, by which the things themselves are formed", and, he writes, with respect to the speculative force of cohesion, it is "by the help of these principles" that God composes bodies.<sup>9</sup> Even more telling, at various points Newton infers the existence of a designer from the fact that the stars do not aggregate together or collapse into the sun.<sup>10</sup> If God were causing gravitational effects directly, there would not be any physical gravitational force to oppose, and preventing collapse would require only that he refrain from pushing the stars into the sun. By treating the force as something that God must oppose, Newton implies that it is distinct from God.

A second answer also takes Newton's protestations of ignorance to be insincere, but interprets him as accepting the direct variant of the hypothesis that matter has powers of unmediated distant action.<sup>11</sup> According to this view, observable bodies such as the sun and earth causally act upon one another from a distance and directly, without any intermediary such as the Query 21 aether. There are texts that do initially appear to support this interpretation, including some much-discussed remarks in Query 31 that speculatively attribute short-range distance forces to particles, and also a passage from the aforementioned text, *A Treatise of the System of the World*, which employs causal language in connection with the gravitational force. As I argue in a subsequent section, however, the *System of the World* does not in fact advance any causal hypothesis at all, nor does Newton attribute physical powers of attraction to particles in Query 31, despite initial appearances. In general, his proposals about attractive and repulsive distance forces are accompanied by caveats and qualifications. An unequivocal, confident attribution of powers to attract from a distance, such as we find with Bentley and Locke, is absent from Newton's writings, and in his manuscripts he instead seems perplexed by the nature and location of the active principles that he suggests are gravity's cause.

According to a third response, defended by John Henry,<sup>12</sup> Newton believes matter to possess powers of unmediated distant action, and yet speaks sincerely when disavowing knowledge of gravity's cause because he not certain which type of matter possesses those powers. Although he is confident that some sort of matter can act distantly, he is not sure whether those powers belong to ordinary, observable bodies, such that the celestial bodies can attract one another across separations of millions of miles, or only to the material particles of the *Opticks* aether, which repel one another at shorter ranges. Yet in Newton's struggles to understand the nature and location of the active principles that he associates with gravity, notably in the drafts related to Query 31, it is not the question of which sort of matter possesses active principles that confounds him, but rather the question of the relationship of active principles to matter *simpliciter*. "What that Principle is", he writes, and "how it stands related to matter is...difficult to explain."<sup>13</sup> An additional problem with this third response is that it may take the Query 21 hypothesis more seriously than Newton himself took it. I do not think the hypothesis was a mere ruse, in part because its reliance upon unmediated distant action among the aether particles meant that it could not be expected to silence critics sharing

Leibniz's concerns. But while I do think that Newton took the Query 21 hypothesis, and thus unmediated distant action, seriously enough to include it among his published speculations, I do not think he ever really endorsed it, for it is notoriously problematic. There is no reason to think that this rare and particulate aether is immaterial, and to suppose that Newton truly endorsed the Query 21 hypothesis for a material aether is to allow that he was willing to abandon either his second rule of reasoning or his conclusion that gravitation is universal. For the aether hypothesis holds that the planets are driven toward the sun by the aether's pressure, as its particles repel one another. Yet this provides no explanation for the gravitational attraction of any matter—whether observable bodies or aetheral particles—lying perpendicular to the density gradient rather than along it. And to require a distinct explanation for the gravitation of that matter is to violate Rule 2's tenet that "the causes assigned to natural effects of the same kind must be, so far as possible, the same".<sup>14</sup> Yet to avoid such a distinct explanation by supposing that the aether does not gravitate would be to abandon universal gravitation. In light of this, it is unlikely that Newton went beyond allowing the Query 21 hypothesis as a possibility.

The fourth answer to the question of why Newton lacks confidence in the hypothesis of unmediated distant action, instead considering himself ignorant of gravity's cause, is that he is inclined to think that matter is passive (in the sense of being incapable of initiating motions that would increase the universe's quantity of scalar motion) and that causation operates locally, which is to say by contact. In other words, an inclination to metaphysical principles prevents him from believing in unmediated action at a distance. Yet since that hypothesis seems the likeliest among secondary causes, Newton remains in a quandary about action at a distance, never embracing any explanation of gravity's cause. It is this fourth response that I defend. My conclusion is based upon both the negative evidence of what is absent in his writings as well as the positive evidence of what his writings do contain. In a brief reprise of arguments given elsewhere, sections 3 and 4 review, respectively, the negative and positive evidence.

### 3. Against the scandalous interpretation: negative evidence

Although Newton does not have the grounds to assert, as a demonstrated proposition, that spatially separated material bodies have the power to attract one another without any intervening medium, that hypothesis is the most probable one among secondary causes. And Newton does for the most part expect that gravity operates by secondary causes.<sup>15</sup> Since he proved in *Principia* Book 2 that the secondary cause cannot be a dense material medium, and since finding empirical support for an immaterial medium is a vexed problem,<sup>16</sup> the likeliest secondary cause on the table is a robust, active power of matter to accelerate other matter from a distance, without any spatially intervening medium. Newton does entertain the possibility of unmediated distant action, according to Query 21 of his *Opticks*. the planets are propelled inward toward the sun by the pressure of a very rare aether, whose density increases with distance from the sun, and whose pressure derives from the tremendous force with which the aethereal particles repel one another. Since these particles are almost certainly material, this aether operates by repulsive action at a distance by matter.

Yet neither Query 21's hypothesis about gravity, which poses the distantly-acting aether particles as a medium among observable bodies, nor a hypothesis attributing powers of distant action directly to observable bodies, wins Newton's confidence. The latter sort of hypothesis arguably has considerable appeal. It would serve as a causal explanation of gravity, and without the considerable problems facing the Query 21 hypothesis. Additionally, it offers the promise of resolving such long-standing problems as the mystery of cohesion, for which Newton speculatively introduces short-range distance forces in Query 31. We might therefore expect Newton's published speculations or else his private manuscripts to express confidence in the causal hypothesis of unmediated distant action. Even as Richard Bentley and John Locke come to accept unmediated distant action, and do so because of his gravitational theory, Newton remains uncommitted, denying knowledge of gravity's cause in his second letter to Bentley and much later in the General Scholium. Even his unpublished manuscripts do not contain any consistent, unqualified expectation that gravity is caused by a robustly active power possessed by matter for unmediated distant action.

Might the explanation be that he remains cautious when engaging in any speculations? Query 31 indicates that it is not. For some of his



speculations there are advanced with considerable confidence. The most notable example, perhaps, is his attack upon Descartes' conservation principle, a principle holding the (scalar) quantity of motion in the universe to constant. "It is very certain that there is not always the same quantity of motion in the world," he writes in Query 31.<sup>17</sup> He then proceeds to argue with similar confidence for the existence of some motion-generating active principles. Clearly, then, Newton has confidence in some speculations; and so the speculative status of a hypothesis of unmediated distant action is not, then, sufficient to explain Newton's failure to endorse it clearly and unequivocally.

#### **4. Against the scandalous interpretation: positive evidence**

Two points are in order before reviewing some of the positive evidence, points which I have noted elsewhere but reiterate here. The first one concerns Newton's epistemic attitude. As I interpret the texts discussed below, Newton's remarks evince an inclination toward certain metaphysical principles—and I do mean inclination. I do not take him to be indefeasibly committed to those principles; speculations such as the Query 21 aether hypothesis indicate that he did consider abandoning those principles, and did consider the possibility that matter has the capacity for unmediated distant action.<sup>18</sup> The second point concerns the question of whether Newton's inclination toward metaphysical principles constitutes a violation of his own method. As I have argued elsewhere, it does not. For although his method prohibits metaphysical principles from grounding physical conclusions, the nature of induction is such that those principles may play a certain motivational role. There is no decisive point at which the failure to find a sought-after entity constitutes reason to conclude that it probably does not exist; and this means that a suspicion about unmediated distant action could motivate an ongoing search for gravity's cause without constituting a violation of his method.<sup>19</sup>

A focal text in the debate about Newton's stance toward unmediated distant action is his fourth letter to Richard Bentley (25 February, 1692/93), the following passage in particular, which begins with Newton's mention and approving paraphrase of Bentley's own words.

The last clause...I like very well. Tis unconceivable that inanimate brute matter should (without ye mediation of something else wch is not material)

operate upon & affect other matter without mutual contact; as it must if gravitation in the sense of Epicurus be essential and innate in it. And this is one reason why I desired you would not ascribe innate gravity to me. That gravity should be innate inherent & essential to matter so yt one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of any thing else by & through wch their action or force may be conveyed from one to another is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man wh has in philosophical matters any competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws, but whether this agent be material or immaterial is a question I have left to ye consideration of my readers.<sup>20</sup>

As I read this passage, Newton is making two objections.<sup>21</sup> He is not only objecting to the notion that gravity is essential to matter, but also to the notion that bodies are capable of unmediated distant action upon one another. If he meant to agree with Bentley's view—the view that God has superadded the capacity for such action to matter—we could expect him to refer to God clearly and directly, as Bentley does. Bentley uses the phrase “divine impression” to explain his view that God has superadded to matter the power for unmediated distant action. Yet when Newton paraphrases Bentley's words, he neither retains that phrase nor substitutes one of his own earlier, clear references to God. Instead, he substitutes this phrase, “ye mediation of something else wch is not material”, which is imprecise in that its range of possible referents include not only God but also minds and, notably, perhaps an immaterial medium. Thus his substitution produces a statement with a very different meaning, one which, because it avoids any clear reference to God, seems to object to action at a distance. Newton's subsequent remarks are yet clearer. He writes, “That gravity should be innate inherent & essential to matter so yt one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of any thing else by & through wch their action or force may be conveyed from one to another is to me...an absurdity.” As I have emphasized elsewhere, this remark could not easily be construed as referring to a divine sense of ‘mediation’, since it speaks of something that conveys the force or action from one body, at one region of space, to another body at another region of space. Newton is thus referring to something that is spatially intermediate between the bodies, which indicates an inclination toward the principle that causation is local.<sup>22</sup>

If we consider Query 31 and related draft passages, they too suggest an inclination to the aforementioned metaphysical principles.<sup>23</sup> The query's

opening sentence does seem to advance a causal hypothesis involving unmediated distant action, for there Newton asks whether the particles of bodies possess powers or forces by which they “act at a distance”. Yet soon he qualifies that suggestion, first disclaiming any knowledge of how the forces operate, and then stating that the operation could involve impulse or something yet unknown. He also refrains from locating the active principles to which he attributes those speculative forces in matter. Whereas he clearly attributes the *vis inertiae* to the particles of matter—they “have” that passive principle—he adopts a locution that remains agnostic about location when discussing active principles; the particles of matter “are moved by” active principles. Some passages in related drafts show a similar uncertainty; instead of clearly asserting that matter possesses the power to act robustly, for instance, he instead writes, “Matter is a passive principle & cannot move itself.”<sup>24</sup> All of this suggests that Newton’s talk of distant action in Query 31 reflects the investigatory procedure he recommends in the *Principia*, in which the first questions to answer are whether the speculated forces actually exist and what their mathematical proportions are, with questions about physical causes being postponed until those first stages are accomplished.<sup>25</sup>

Yet in another text, Newton uses some causal language that has recently been interpreted as advancing a scandalous hypothesis. The next sections consider how that text should be interpreted.

## 5. Newton’s description of gravity in the *System of the World*

In his remarks about forces that act between spatially separated bodies, Newton frequently includes caveats of the sort noted earlier, in connection with Query 31. This is certainly the case in the published *Principia*. It is therefore very interesting that the unpublished predecessor of the material published as the *Principia*’s third book, Newton discusses the gravitational force in a freer style. That original version—the aforementioned *A Treatise of the System of the World*, as it was published posthumously—was written in “popular form, so that it might be more widely read”. Yet before publication, Newton thought better of making his ideas so accessible. He replaced it with a technical version, and he did not conceal his reason for doing so. He wished “to avoid lengthy disputations”, by excluding those readers unable to “lay aside the preconceptions to which they have become accustomed”.<sup>26</sup> And indeed, the *System of the World* contains

a description of gravity that might be construed as suggesting that matter has the capacity to act robustly and at a distance, without any intervening medium. Although he initially declares that he will consider the force only in a “mathematical way”, avoiding all questions about its “nature or quality”,<sup>27</sup> he seems to abandon that intention with an extended description of gravity that includes the following remarks.

There is a double cause of action, to wit, the disposition of both bodies, as well as a double action in so far as the action is considered as upon two bodies. But as betwixt two bodies it is but one single one. ‘Tis not one action by which the sun attracts Jupiter, and another by which Jupiter attracts the sun. But it is one action by which the sun and Jupiter mutually endeavor to approach each the other. By the action with which the sun attracts Jupiter, Jupiter and the sun endeavor to come nearer together, and by the action, with which Jupiter attracts the sun, likewise Jupiter and the sun endeavor to come nearer together. But the sun is not attracted towards Jupiter by a two-fold action, nor Jupiter by a two-fold action towards the sun: but ‘tis one single intermediate action, by which both approach nearer together.<sup>28</sup>

After remarking upon that “double cause of action”, Newton goes on to suggest that the single action of the force between two bodies arises “from the conspiring natures of both”<sup>29</sup> indeed, from “the universal nature of matter”.<sup>30</sup> These remarks lack the caution that so frequently characterizes his tone, and they might even seem to lend themselves to a scandalous interpretation.

## **6. A scandalous interpretation of the *System of the World***

Two claims are required for the hypothesis that gravitation operates by robust and unmediated distant action. The first is the positive claim that matter possesses the power to attract other matter, such that new motion is generated. The second is the negative claim that no medium is required for that attraction to be initiated or conveyed. The remarks quoted in the previous section seem to suggest the positive claim that matter possesses a power of attraction, for Newton speaks of the “disposition” of the bodies as being “the double cause” of the action.

It must be noted that it would be a very different thing to say that matter’s nature possesses the disposition to attract than to say it possess

the gravitational force itself. Newton consistently holds that gravity is not essential to matter.<sup>31</sup> But that consistent view would be compatible with a claim that matter possesses, by its essence or nature, the disposition to attract. This point is made clearly in Schliesser's explanation of the scandalous interpretation that he defends: "The cause of gravity is the disposition inherent in any individual body, but that the force of gravity is the actualization of that disposition."<sup>32</sup>

Although I will eventually consider Schliesser's interpretation more directly, at the moment I want to see what sort of case might be made for it by looking to some texts in which Newton discusses matter's nature or characteristic quality on the one hand, and gravity's cause on the other. Proceeding in this manner will better enable us to identify a requirement that the scandalous interpretation depends upon.

Since the passages considered above provide *prima facie* support for a scandalous interpretation, and since the *System of the World* was originally intended to be part of the *Principia*, perhaps further support for the interpretation can be found in the *Principia* itself. Although the *Principia* contains no definition of matter—Definition 1 specifying quantity of matter rather than defining matter itself—Definition 3 appears promising. Definition 3 sets out the 'inherent force' of matter, also called its *vis inertiae* ('force of inertia'), which underwrites matter's resistance. The *vis inertiae* is of particular interest because Newton takes this quality to be characteristic of and essential to matter.<sup>33</sup> So if Newton attributed a power of robust activity to matter in virtue of the *vis inertiae*, the attribution would help establish the positive claim needed for the interpretation under consideration. As Definition 3 makes clear, matter is capable of some sort of activity in virtue of its *vis inertiae*, or more accurately, its exerted *vis inertiae*.

Inherent force may also be called by the very significant name of force of inertia. Moreover, a body exerts this force only during a change of its state, caused by another force impressed upon it, and this exercise of force is, depending on the viewpoint, both resistance and impetus: resistance insofar as the body, in order to maintain its state, strives against the impressed force, and impetus insofar as the same body, yielding only with difficulty to the force of a resisting obstacle, endeavors to change the state of that obstacle.<sup>34</sup>

Although in the absence of any impressed forces, a body's *vis inertiae* remains unexerted (the unexerted *vis inertiae* being the cause of the body's persistence of state<sup>35</sup>), in the presence of an impressed force the body exerts its *vis inertiae*. The exerted *vis inertiae*, Newton explains, may be seen either as resistance or as impetus, for these are only rationally distinct; differing only in how we view or conceive them, they are really identical to one another. As a number of commentators have noted, the exertion seems to amount to an impressed force.<sup>36</sup> In virtue of its exerted *vis inertiae*, then, a body is capable of acting to change the state of a body that impresses a force upon it by reciprocating with an impressed force; it is capable of delivering the reaction required by Law 3.

This characterisation of the exerted *vis inertiae* appears promising, then, but it could support the positive claim needed for the interpretation under consideration only given a certain requirement. The interpretation requires that the sense of activity that Newton attributes to matter in Definition 3 be identical to the robust sense of activity appearing in Query 31. This assumption is necessary to the scandalous interpretation for the following reason. It is only Query 31's sense of activity that Newton casts as robustly active, and as gravity's cause. Whereas Query 31's sense of activity increases the universe's scalar quantity of motion (as seen in more detail in the next section), the *Principia* does not explicitly suggest either that Descartes' conservation principle is false or that the universe must contain robustly active powers.<sup>37</sup> And it is only Query 31's sense of activity that Newton cites as gravity's cause: 'Seeing therefore the variety of motion which we find in the world is always decreasing, there is a necessity of conserving and recruiting it by active principles, *such as are the cause of gravity*'.<sup>38</sup> Meanwhile, it is only Definition 3's sense of activity that Newton clearly attributes to matter; at no point in Query 31 does he clearly locate 'active principles', the robust sense of activity, in matter.<sup>39</sup> Yet an identity between the two senses of activity could secure the positive claim. If Newton identified Definition 3's sense of activity, which belongs to the *vis inertiae* and thus to matter, with Query 31's sense of activity, which generates new motion, he would thereby attribute the robust power of generating new motion to the very nature of matter; and since in Query 31 he cites active principles as being gravity's cause, he would be grounding gravity's cause in the essence of matter.

The claim that Newton employs a single sense of activity both in Definition 3 and in Query 31 has been suggested recently by Eric Schliesser, 2011, who defends a version of the scandalous interpretation

developed in this section. Focusing his attention first upon the *System of the World*, Schliesser argues that Newton understood gravity as a relation arising from the dispositions in material bodies. Of particular interest here is the robustly active nature of the dispositions giving rise to the gravitational force. As Schliesser understands Newton, bodies have both passive and active dispositions, the former being codified in the second law of motion and the latter in the third law; and the active disposition including a disposition to produce the gravitational force.

The action is i) twofold as it is *upon* two bodies, and ii) single as *between* two bodies. A way to capture this is to say that a body has two dispositions: a 'passive' disposition to respond to impressed forces is codified in the second law of motion, whereas an 'active' disposition to produce gravitational force is treated as a distinct interaction codified in the third law of motion.<sup>40</sup>

Continuing, Schliesser emphasises that in his view, Newton thinks matter can be 'viewed' as either active or passive, which is to say that activity and passivity are only rationally, that is, conceptually distinct: "I should emphasize that in my position Newton neither asserts that matter is altogether active nor passive. It depends on the way we are conceiving things."<sup>41</sup>

That Schliesser takes Newton to consider matter to have powers of activity and passivity that are only rationally distinct, and really identical, should not mislead us into thinking that he has a thin sense of activity in mind here. Query 31's sense of activity is robust, as Schliesser acknowledges by quoting the passage in which Newton cites active principles as the cause of gravity and fermentation.<sup>42</sup> Then in an explanatory footnote, Schliesser seems to suggest that he considers the sense of activity operating in Query 31 to be identical to that appearing in Newton's definition of the *vis inertiae*, that is, the 'force of inertia' or 'inherent force' of Definition 3:

While this may sound strange, it is by no means unique in Newton. See, for example, Newton's treatment of the 'inherent force' of inertia. Newton claims that this force can sometimes be viewed 'passively': 'Inherent force of matter is the power of resisting'; but sometimes it is more 'active': 'a body exerts this force...during a change of its state, caused by another force impressed upon it' (quoted from the third definition).<sup>43</sup>

Broadening his focus beyond the *System of the World*, he then reinterprets Newton's fourth letter to Bentley in a way that permits the unmediated distant action interpretation of Newton to extend at least into the post-*Principia* period. Newton is not objecting to unmediated distant action per se, but to the Epicurean version of it, Schliesser argues, which as he construes it contains not only the claim that gravity is essential to matter, but also the internally inconsistent position that passive matter can act.

[What Newton rejects is] the 'absurd' *Epicurean* position in which *passive* matter can *act* at a distance.... But it does not follow from this....that Newton rules out action at a distance *tout court*. For, Newton's position in the [fourth] Letter to Bentley permits us to understand that in the right circumstances matter can be viewed as 'active'.<sup>44</sup>

Once again, the 'right circumstances', Schliesser suggests, are those described in Query 31, an essay that introduces a clearly robust sense of activity, being associated with Newton's (speculative) assault on Descartes' conservation of motion principle.

Might I have misunderstood Schliesser? Perhaps he does not mean to say that a single sense of activity is operating in both Definition 3 and in Query 31, but rather means to say that Definition 3 provides an example in which Newton takes *some* sort of activity to be only rationally distinct from passivity; but that that is a thin sort of activity, one different from Query 31's robust activity. If so, that would not advance Schliesser's argument for the claim that Newton is endorsing unmediated distant action. For again, since Newton clearly attributes only Definition 3's sense of activity to matter, and clearly cites only Query 31's sense as gravity's cause, the interpretation at issue requires that they be identical. The main order of business, then, is to determine whether the senses of activity appearing in Definition 3 and in Query 31 are one and the same.

## **7. Against the scandalous interpretation of the *System of the World*: two senses of activity and an alternative interpretation**

It is clear that Newton attributes a certain sense of activity to matter, for as we saw in connection with the discussion of Definition 3, a body's *vis inertiae*, when exerted, endeavors to change the state of that body impressing a force upon it. It is also clear that the sense of activity



possessed by the 'active principles' of Query 31 are robustly active, and that Newton cites them, albeit speculatively, as gravity's cause. But is the robust sense of activity appearing in Query 31 really identical to the sense that Newton attributes to matter in Definition 3? A consideration of Newton's reasoning in Query 31 will provide the answer.

As we saw in some brief passages quoted earlier, Newton attacks Descartes' conservation principle in Query 31; and whatever his position may have been earlier, it is evident that in Query 31 he is thinking in terms of a very robust sort of activity. Let us now consider his reasoning. As is well known, Newton is profoundly struck by processes that appear to destroy and to generate motion. In Query 31, he speculatively but strenuously contests two related Cartesian claims: (a) a body can lose motion only by transferring that motion to other bodies; and (b) the universe's total scalar quantity of motion remains constant (the Cartesian conservation principle). In contesting them, he first invokes a thought experiment involving a system of two globes connected by a rod, which rotates as its centre of gravity moves in a right line.

For from the various composition of two motions, it is very certain that there is not always the same quantity of motion in the world. For if two globes joined by a slender rod revolve about their common centre of gravity in an uniform motion, while that centre moves on uniformly in a right line drawn in the plane of their circular motion, the sum of the motions of the two globes, as often as the globes are in the right line described by their common centre of gravity, will be bigger than the sum of their motions, when they are in a line perpendicular to that right line. By this instance it appears that motion may be got or lost.<sup>45</sup>

As Newton analyses the case, both of Descartes' claims are disproved. Contra (b), the quantity of motion in the universe does not remain constant, since contra (a), each globe loses motion at various points in the rotation, but does so without communicating that motion to another body. It is notable that Newton takes this position, because he is not driven to it. Neither is he precluded from it, of course; his analysis of the case is consistent with his own conservation principle, Corollary 3 to Law 3, which states, 'The quantity of motion, which is determined by adding the motions made in one direction and subtracting the motions made in the opposite direction, is not changed by the action of bodies on one another.'<sup>46</sup> His own conservation principle is not violated because

the losses and gains of motions in this case do not result from any action between the bodies, resulting instead from the 'composition of two motions'. But again, he is not driven to conclude from this case that motion may be gained and lost, for unlike Descartes, he has the vector concept. If he were inclined to believe that the scalar quantity of motion remained constant rather than varying, he could consider the vector sum to be the relevant one for the case, which gives equal results for both orientations.<sup>47</sup> Instead, he takes the numerical sum. That he does so is evident, because taking the numerical sum is the only way to obtain his conclusion that the sum of the motions differs for the two orientations.<sup>48</sup>

The same preference for the conclusion that motions are genuinely lost and then generated anew is evident in his discussion of collision cases. Unlike the two-globe case, in which he sees an internal means by which losses of motion are compensated by gains, natural processes such as friction and the 'weakness of elasticity in solids'<sup>49</sup> in collisions actually destroy motion, Newton suggests. In support of his speculation that 'motion is always on the decay',<sup>50</sup> he points to cases of bodies that do not rebound from one another in collision, because they are 'either absolutely hard, or so soft as to be void of elasticity', such that 'impenetrability makes them only stop'.<sup>51</sup> While the pre- and post-collision momenta are equal—in accordance, again, with Newton's own principle that the vector quantity of motion is conserved—the world is nonetheless very different after the collision than it was before. Newton's propensity to believe in a robust sort of activity is underscored by the fact that there are ways of avoiding the conclusion that motion can be genuinely lost, and that he does not avail himself of them. Just as one might avoid that conclusion in the two-globe case by taking the vector rather than the numerical sum to be relevant, one might avoid the conclusion for friction and collision cases. Instead of concluding that motion is genuinely destroyed, Newton could have supposed that motion lost at the macro level is simply transferred to the micro level, as heat.<sup>52</sup> This supposition, which favors the Cartesian conservation principle, had precedents, for instance in Boyle. Newton's sympathies lie elsewhere, however. In thinking reminiscent of Aristotle, and having vitalist roots in his alchemical and chemical experiments and readings,<sup>53</sup> Newton speculatively concludes that such losses create an explanatory demand for some replenishing, generative source of new motion—some 'active principles', as he calls them. The actions of these active principles collectively function to keep the quantity of motion more

or less stable, but individually, they alter that quantity, increasing it to make up for the losses caused by processes such as friction.

Newton leaves no doubt in Query 31, then, about the robust, motion-generating nature of his active principles. But he also leaves no doubt there about the nature and limitations of the *vis inertiae*'s capacities. Far from identifying the robust sense of activity with that of the *vis inertiae*, he explicitly contrasts active principles against matter's *vis inertiae* and against the three laws of motion resulting from it—all of which he now labels 'passive'.

The *vis inertiae* is a passive principle by which bodies persist in their motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted. By this principle alone there never could have been any motion in the world. Some other principle was necessary for putting bodies into motion; and now [that] they are in motion, some other principle is necessary for conserving the motion.<sup>54</sup>

By contrasting the 'passive' *vis inertiae*, and the laws of motion resulting from it, against principles which are 'active' in the sense that they generate new motion, Newton clearly indicates what it means to be passive: to be unable to increase the universe's scalar quantity of motion. Matter's essential quality, the *vis inertiae*, is passive in that it can only redirect or redistribute existing motion, and never generate new motion. This point is reinforced in a draft related to the published Query, in which Newton writes that bodies 'are passive', and 'without some other principle than the *vis inertiae* there could be no motion in the world.'<sup>55</sup>

Since the *vis inertiae* has the capacity only to redirect or redistribute existing motion, it can be construed as a kind of activity only in a thin sense. Indeed, it is a sense of activity that is only rationally distinct from, but really identical to, passivity.<sup>56</sup> Since this thin sense of activity is associated with Descartes' conservation principle, we may say that it belongs to the Cartesian tradition; if the universe contains only this thin sense of activity, Descartes' conservation principle will be true. The robust sense of activity, meanwhile, is most assuredly not just another way of conceiving passivity. If the universe contains this robust sort of activity, Descartes' conservation principle will be false. We may say that robust activity belongs to the Aristotelian tradition because it evokes Aristotle's belief that absent some generative source, all motion would eventually cease and the universe would reach stasis.

The suggestion that robust powers of activity belong to the *vis inertiae* and thus to matter's very nature receives no support, then, from the late text we have been considering, Query 31. The *vis inertiae* is capable only of the thin, Cartesian sense of activity; and yet as we saw earlier, it is the robust, Aristotelian sense of activity that Newton cites as gravity's cause.<sup>57</sup>

So things stand in Query 31, but Newton wrote that essay long after first formulating Definition 3 for the *Principia* (and that may be said even if we take into account its earlier versions, Query 23 of the 1706 *Optice*, in particular). When he first defined the *vis inertiae* for the *Principia*, did he have only the thin, Cartesian sense of activity in mind, or might he at that time have associated robust activity with the *vis inertiae*, as needed for the scandalous interpretation? Newton's remarks in Definition 3 indicate that in one important respect, he is thinking in terms of the Cartesian tradition. Recall that in explaining the exerted *vis inertiae*, Newton stated that it may be considered as either resistance or impetus, since there is no real distinction between them, only a rational distinction, that is, a difference in viewpoint. Consider two colliding bodies, A and B. Body A's exerted *vis inertiae* may be considered either in terms of its effect upon body A itself or in terms of its effect upon body B. Considered in terms of its effect upon A itself, it is resistance, which is to say a striving to preserve its state such that it will not, say, be accelerated to infinite speed when it encounters B's impressed force. Considered in terms of its effect upon body B, however, body A's exerted *vis inertiae* is impetus, which is to say an endeavor to change B's state.

While this seems plausible for the case of colliding bodies, it seems plausible for only that case; and that suggests that Newton developed his ideas about the exerted *vis inertiae* with contact action in mind. If we consider the case of an attractive force acting between spatially distant bodies, it is difficult to sustain the notion that a body's resistance to an impressed force is only rationally distinct from, and really identical to, its endeavor to change the state of another body. When attracted by the sun, Jupiter exerts resistance, and therefore will not accelerate to infinite speed. Yet Jupiter's resistance, its failure to accelerate to infinite speed, cannot easily be seen as really identical to its endeavor to change the sun's state by exerting an attraction upon it. Jupiter's resistance to being accelerated and the attraction it exerts upon the sun instead seem really distinct.<sup>58</sup> This suggests that the sense of activity appearing in Definition 3 was developed with contact action in mind, and it accordingly seems

associated with the Cartesian tradition, in which motion can be only transferred among colliding bodies, never destroyed or generated anew.

The suggestion that Newton associated the robust sense of activity with the *vis inertiae* gains no support, then, from the *Principia*'s definition of it. The scandalous interpretation thus fails for the *Principia* as for Query 31, because the requirement needed to sustain it fails.

Yet what of the *System of the World*, the text whose description of gravity most strongly seemed to support the scandalous interpretation's positive claim? Here I briefly summarize the interpretation I have defended elsewhere.<sup>59</sup> Throughout that text, Newton remains focused upon establishing that gravitation is universal, and that the force's structure is a single, mutual endeavor. The language that employs causal terms indeed appears, at first glance, to present a causal hypothesis. Yet if we follow Newton's reasoning carefully, his aim turns out to be something quite different. He aims to show that although we might conceive the attraction between two bodies as if it consisted in two, unidirectional forces, that is only a mathematical convenience, not a representation of the force's actual structure. The structure of the physical force itself is singular; it does not consist in multiple endeavors, but is one, mutual endeavor. It might be mathematically convenient to consider either of two gravitating bodies as if it were only a body that is attracted; this is his point when he speaks of the "double action" upon two bodies. Similarly, however, we could think of either of two gravitating bodies as if it were only a body that attracts; and *that* is his point when he speaks of the "double cause" of the action. For when he speaks of the "double cause", he is still explaining how we might consider the force; and those ways of considering the force, however useful for mathematical purposes, are to be contrasted against the structure of the physical force itself. Contrary to initial appearances, then, Newton's use of the word 'cause' actually belongs to a description of mathematical ways of considering things, and the remark does not advance the positive claim needed for the scandalous interpretation.

## **8. Against the scandalous interpretation of the *System of the World*: the question about a medium**

The last question to consider is whether the *System of the World* advances the scandalous interpretation's negative claim, the claim that no medium is required for producing or conveying the gravitational force. If it

could be shown that Newton endorses the negative claim in the *System of the World*, perhaps the scandalous interpretation could be established after all. For though Newton does not directly consider or endorse the positive thesis in the *System of the World*, neither does he directly deny it. What better reason to think that he accepted the positive claim than to find in the *System of the World* evidence that he endorsed the negative claim? After all, the most obvious reason for arguing that no medium is required for producing or conveying the gravitational force is that one believes matter capable of acting robustly and distantly. We therefore might take any indication that Newton's *System of the World* endorses the negative claim as reason to believe that he endorsed the positive claim too—and so accepted a scandalous interpretation.

I see two possible grounds on which one might think that Newton accepts the negative claim. First, most obviously and convincingly, we will think he endorsed the negative claim if we find that he directly addresses the question of whether the medium exists and concludes that it does not. Does Newton's *System of the World* deny that a medium exists? It does not. He never addresses the question in that text, so the first way of attributing the negative claim to him fails. So let us consider the second way. We might think that Newton endorsed the negative claim if we find that he is fully silent on the question of a medium; a deafening silence on such a momentous question would perhaps indicate a tacit belief that no medium exists. Schliesser argues that Newton advances the negative claim in this manner, denying the existence of a medium tacitly, through silence. Schliesser writes,

In the *Treatise*, Newton is entirely silent on...the invisible medium, if any, to explain in what way momentum could be exchanged between two bodies. *Given that he uses the language of 'action' and is completely silent on the possibility of a medium of transmission, the natural reading of this passage is I) Newton's endorsement of action at a distance with II) the start of an explanation of the cause of gravity in terms of some of the qualities of matter.*<sup>60</sup>

Yet it turns out that Newton is not fully silent. In concluding his discussion of aggregate bodies, he states that the parts of the other planets mutually attract, just as the parts of the Earth do, causing all of these bodies to have spherical shapes. Their parts cohere, he continues, '*and are not dispersed through the Ether*'.<sup>61</sup> Instead of maintaining silence on the question of a

medium, which might have suggested belief in the negative claim, Newton treats the ether as something whose existence may be casually assumed. The reason, evidently, is that a medium is simply not relevant to the questions he is addressing. Thus Newton gives no indication in the *System of the World* of accepting either the positive or the negative claim, nor indeed of giving the causal question about gravity any consideration at all.

## 9. Conclusion

I do not take Newton to assert any metaphysical principles, such as the principle that causation is local, nor do I interpret him as being defeasibly committed to any such principles in private. As I have emphasized at various points, he does sometimes consider the possibility that matter has the capacity for unmediated distant action. I do, however, interpret him as being inclined to the principles that causation is local, and matter incapable of the robust sort of activity that generates new motion, in the sense of increasing the universe's scalar quantity of motion. This most certainly does not commit me to the view that Newton attributed gravitational effects to God. I have explicitly rejected that conclusion in other writings. It would be a mistake to suppose that the only interpretive positions available are occasionalism, on the one hand, and unmediated distant action on the other. Such a supposition overlooks the claim that Newton was genuinely uncertain about gravity's cause, and that while he speculated about a number of possibilities, he never really endorsed any of them. The question about gravity's cause remained open, for him. That is not the question that captured his attention in the *System of the World*, however. As many commentators have remarked, Newton was able to set certain questions aside while pursuing others with zeal. That ability is seen, as I have argued, in the *System of the World*, which focuses not upon the causal question but upon gravity's scope and structure.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Leibniz, 5.113; 5.118; in Ariew.

<sup>2</sup> Newton's fourth letter to Bentley, Feb. 25, 1692/3, in *Philosophical Writings*, 102-103.

<sup>3</sup> *Principia*, 943.

<sup>4</sup> See *Newton on Matter and Activity*, chapters 2 and 4, especially p. 84.

<sup>5</sup> The term 'scandalous interpretation', though a bit flippant, provides a label for any interpretation that takes him to attribute both of the following capacities to matter: the capacity to act robustly, such that the universe's scalar quantity of motion is increased; and the capacity to act distantly, such that spatially separated bodies can interact causally without any spatially intervening medium. Although Newton does tend to associate the bearer of robustly active principles (whatever that may be) with the cause of forces acting between spatially separated bodies, there is no necessary connection between a capacity for robust action on the one hand and a capacity for unmediated distant action on the other.

<sup>6</sup> This section reviews the explanation given in §5 of Kochiras, 2011.

<sup>7</sup> Among commentators holding some variant of this view, Richard S. Westfall interprets Newton as attributing a broad range of phenomena, including gravitational effects, to God, and as doing so consistently. (See Westfall, 1971, *Force in Newton's Physics*, pp. 396-400.) J.E. McGuire sees the period during which Newton accepted primary causation as limited, arguing that although Newton attributed phenomena involving distance forces to God during the post-*Principia* period, he sought secondary causes following but after the 1706 *Optice*. (See McGuire, 1968, "Force, Active Principles, and Newton's Invisible Realm", pp. 207-208.) Joan Hawes takes Newton to attribute gravitational effects consistently to God, but argues that he allowed unmediated distant action for electrical effects. (See Hawes, "Newton's Revival of the Aether Hypothesis and the Explanation of Gravitational Attraction", p. 205.)

<sup>8</sup> See in particular ULC Ad. 3965.6 f.269, discussed by Westfall in *Force*, pp. 397-98 and by McGuire in "Force, Active Principles, and Newton's Invisible Realm", p. 196; and ULC, Add MS 396.6, f. 266v, in Westfall, *Never at Rest*, p. 509.

<sup>9</sup> Query 31, *Opticks*, 401.

<sup>10</sup> «What hinders the fix'd Stars from falling upon one another?...Does it not appear from phenomena that there is a Being incorporeal, intelligent[?]» (Query 28, *Opticks*, 369.) See §3 of Kochiras, 2009 for a somewhat more detailed discussion of this and other passages.

<sup>11</sup> Although I mention the scandalous hypothesis here in connection with an interpretation that takes Newton's disavowals of gravity's cause to be insincere, this is simply a possible interpretation. Eric Schliesser has argued



that Newton accepts the scandalous hypothesis, however his interpretation does not quite represent the possibility I mention here, because he takes Newton's General Scholium remarks to be sincere. Although Schliesser's attribution of the scandalous hypothesis focuses mainly upon Newton's *System of the World*, he tries to extend it to later texts, including Newton's correspondence with Bentley in the 1690's and also the 1713 General Scholium. In doing so, he argues that it is not gravity's *cause* that Newton is uncertain of, in the General Scholium, but rather the *reason* for gravity's particular properties. See Schliesser, 2011, 'Without God: Gravity as a relational quality of matter in Newton's *Treatise*'. See also my assessment in §6.1 of Kochiras, 2011, "Gravity's Cause and Substance Counting: Contextualizing the Problems",

<sup>12</sup> See Henry, «Pray do not ascribe that notion to me: God and Newton's gravity», p. 133 in Force (ed.)

<sup>13</sup> Newton, Cambridge University Library, Additional Ms. 3970.3, ff. 618v; *Draft Versions of 'The Queries'*, The Newton Project. Newton does cross this sentence out, however he does so without attempting to explicate the relationship between active principles and matter, which suggests continued uncertainty. (Further, he crosses out other thoughts from the drafts that he clearly did not disown, for instance the claim that the laws associated with our power of moving our bodies remain unknown to us; see Cambridge University Library, Additional Ms. 3970.3, ff. 618v; *Draft Versions of 'The Queries'*, The Newton Project.)

<sup>14</sup> *Principia*, p. 795.

<sup>15</sup> See §3 of Kochiras, 2009. John Henry seriously misrepresents me on this point, first attempting to amalgamate my view with that of Andrew Janiak and then attributing *p* to me, even though I explicitly asserted  $\sim p$  in the paper that he cites. On pp. 17-18 of his 2011 paper, Henry writes, "Although they are careful to avoid saying so, it seems hard to resist the conclusion that Janiak and Kochiras are offering us a picture of a Newton who believes in occasionalism." This misrepresentation of my view is in fact easy to resist, since in the 2009 paper that Henry cites, I devoted an entire section of that paper to arguing *against* an occasionalist interpretation of Newton. My abstract states, "The causal problem remains vexing, for *he neither invokes primary causation*, nor accepts action at a distance by locating active powers in matter" (Kochiras, 2009, p. 267, emphasis added); and I end §3 with the following words: "Even during the 1690s, then (the period to which McGuire's chronology dates Newton's strongest attraction to the primary causation hypothesis), *Newton takes the gravitational force to operate independently of God*. In other words, *he expects the gravitational force to operate by secondary causes*." (Kochiras, 2009, p. 272, emphasis added). In misrepresenting my view as he does, Henry seems to allow for only two interpretive positions, namely, occasionalism and unmediated distant action;

yet the claim that Newton is genuinely uncertain about gravity's cause is a third interpretive position, and that is the one I hold.

16 See §6 of Kochiras, 2009.

17 Query 31, *Opticks*, 397.

18 I explain my view at length in §4 of Kochiras, 2011, correcting various misrepresentations of it; see also Kochiras, 2009, p. 275, including note 64, and p. 278.

19 See the end of §4, Kochiras, 2011.

20 Newton to Bentley, 25 February, 1692/3 (Letter 4), p. 253-254 in *The Correspondence of Isaac Newton*, Vol. III.

21 For my extended analysis of the letter, see §6.3 of Kochiras, 2011.

22 See Kochiras, 2009, p. 275; Kochiras 2011, pp. 180-181.

23 My extended analysis appears in Kochiras, 2011, §6.4.

24 ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 619r], in McGuire, "Force, Active Principles, and Newton's Invisible Realm", p. 171; c. 1705, according to McGuire's dating.

25 The general recommendation appears in *Principia*, Scholium to Book I, Section 11; p. 588. Newton seems to have the same recommendation in mind in a draft of the *Conclusio* (initially intended to be published with the *Principia*'s first edition, but ultimately remaining unpublished), because there too he focuses upon the goal of proving "that forces of this kind do exist", and though he calls them "attractive and repulsive", he qualifies this by noting that he means the term 'attraction' to refer to any forces "by which bodies are impelled towards each other, come together and cohere, whatever the causes be." See *Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton*, p. 345.

26 *Principia*, 793. Newton states his reason at the outset of the published third book.

27 *System of the World*, p. 5.

28 *A Treatise of the System of the World*, anonymous translation, believed to be by Andrew Motte; first published: 1728; this edition, with an introduction with by I. Bernard Cohen (Dawsons of Pall Mall, London 1969), pp. 38-39.

29 *System of the World*, 40.

30 *System of the World*, 44-45.

31 The best known statements to this effect include Newton's concluding remarks to Rule 3, (*Principia*, 795-96), and his second letter to Bentley (*Philosophical Writings*, 100).

32 Schliesser, 2011, p. 80.

33 In his explanatory remarks following Rule 3 (the rules being added for the *Principia*'s second edition), Newton cites the *vis inertiae* as the quality that is inherent and essential to matter. He does so by way of contrasting it to gravity, which, as noted, he consistently maintains is not essential to matter.

34 *Principia*, 404-405.

- <sup>35</sup> For an alternative view, see Collingwood ([1938] 1991), 'On the So-called Idea of Causation'; Hulswit (2007), 'A Short History of Causation', §3.2.2.
- <sup>36</sup> In connection with this point, see Howard Stein ('Newton's Metaphysics', 284), and Alan Gabbey ('Force and Inertia in the Seventeenth Century: Descartes and Newton', in *Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics, and Physics*, ed. S. Gaukroger; Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980, p. 275.)
- <sup>37</sup> If Newton thinks that the world contains such a robust sense of activity, he gives no direct indication of that in the *Principia*. However, some commentators (notably McMullin, 1978, pp. 53-55) hold that the robust sense of activity also appears in the *Principia*, though indirectly, via Newton's suggestion that comet vapors replenish the fluids needed for life on Earth. Yet to my mind, it is not certain that Newton's suggestion that fluids need to be replenished implies the claim that he speculatively advances in Query 31, namely, that without some generative source of new motions, motion in the universe would eventually cease. While it is likely that Newton is thinking along the same lines as he does later, in Query 31, it also seems possible that he is not; for the claim that without comet vapors, fluids would be depleted and life thereby extinguished does not by itself imply that without comet vapors, the universe would not retain a constant scalar quantity of motion.

For representative remarks about comet vapors, see *Principia*, Book III, Proposition 41, p. 926 (emphasis added):

'Just as the seas are absolutely necessary for the constitution of this earth, so that vapors may be abundantly enough aroused from them by the heat of the sun, which vapors either—being gathered into clouds—fall in rains and irrigate and nourish the whole earth for the propagation of vegetables, or—being condensed in the cold peaks of mountains (as some philosophize with good reason)—run down into springs and rivers; so for the conservation of the seas and fluids on the planets, comets seem to be required, so that from the condensation of their exhalations and vapors, there can be a continual supply and renewal of whatever liquid is consumed by vegetation and putrefaction and converted into dry earth. For all vegetables grow entirely from fluids and afterward, in great part, change into dry earth by putrefaction, and slime is continually deposited from putrefied liquids. Hence the bulk of dry earth is increased from day to day, *and fluids—if they did not have an outside source of increase—would have to decrease continually and finally to fail*. Further, I suspect that that spirit which is the smallest but most subtle and most excellent part of our air, and which is required for the life of all things, comes chiefly from comets.'

For a classic discussion of the role of comets in Newton's thinking, see David Kubrin (1967).

- <sup>38</sup> Query 31, *Opticks*, p. 399.

- 39 In Query 31, Newton follows his suggestion that the particles of bodies have “certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, by which they act at a distance” which the caveat that the question of how those attractions are performed is a question “I do not here consider.” (Query 31, *Opticks*, 375-76). Later, he refrains from locating active principles in matter, as noted in an earlier section.
- 40 Schliesser, 2011, p. 85.
- 41 Schliesser, 2011, 90.
- 42 See Schliesser, 90, citing *Opticks*, 400-401.
- 43 Schliesser, 2011, p. 97, n. 30.
- 44 Schliesser, 2011, p. 90. See also pp. 91-92: “It would, of course, be a contradiction in terms for ‘passive’ matter to be an ‘agent’; but Newton never claims in his own voice that matter must always be passive.”
- 45 *Opticks*, pp. 397- 399.
- 46 Corollary 3 to Law 3, *Principia*, 420.
- 47 That he takes the numerical sum, and concludes that by the composition of motions, motion can be ‘got is lost’, is especially striking in light of the following. It opens him to the same charge he leveled at Descartes, as a reason for rejecting his doctrine of relative motion: ‘It follows from the Cartesian doctrine that motion can be generated where there is no force acting.’ Yet with Query 31’s two-globe case, Newton seems to abjure that criticism; since the result of a changing quantity of motion is generated by the composition of motions, Newton implies that motion can be generated without force. See *De gravitatione*: ‘It follows from the Cartesian doctrine that motion can be generated where there is no force acting. For example, if God should suddenly cause the spinning of our vortex to stop, without applying any force to the earth which could stop it at the same time, Descartes would say that the earth is moving in a philosophical sense—on account of its translation from the vicinity of the contiguous fluid—whereas before he said it was at rest, in the same philosophical sense....It also follows from the same doctrine that God himself could not generate motion in some bodies even though he impelled them with the greatest force. For example, if God impelled the starry heaven together with all the most remote part of creation with any very great force so as to cause it to revolve around the earth (suppose with a diurnal motion): yet by this, according to Descartes, the earth alone and not the sky would be truly said to move (Part III, article 38), as if it would be the same whether, with a tremendous force, he would cause the skies to turn from east to west, or with a small force turn the earth in the opposite direction. But who will suppose that the parts of the earth endeavor to recede from its center on account only of a force impressed upon the heavens?’ (*Philosophical Writings*, 18.)
- 48 My thanks again to Lon Becker for this point.
- 49 398, *Opticks*

50 398, *Opticks*

51 'But by reason of the Tenacity of Fluids, and Attrition of their Parts, and the Weakness of Elasticity in Solids, Motion is much more apt to be lost than got, and is always on the Decay. For bodies which are either absolutely hard, or so soft as to be void of elasticity, will not rebound from one another. Impenetrability makes them only stop. If two equal bodies meet directly in a vacuum, they will by the laws of motion stop where they meet and lose all their motion, and remain in rest, unless they be elastic and receive some new motion from their spring....This may be tried, by letting two equal pendulums fall against one another from equal heights...if of elastic bodies, they will lose all but what they recover from their elasticity. If it be said that they can lose no motion but what they communicate to other bodies, the consequence is that in a vacuum they lose no motion, but when they meet they must go on and penetrate one another's dimensions....'(Query 31, 398 *Opticks*)

52 As for heat, he associates it with forces that appear to act at a distance, and concomitantly with active principles.

53 The vitalist strain of Newton's thought is strongly evident in the closing line of the following manuscript, a draft for Query 23(31) of the 1706 *Optice*, dated by McGuire as c. 1705:

By their vis inertiae they continue in their state of moving or resting & receive motion proportional to ye force impressing it & resist as much as they are resisted; but they cannot move themselves; & without some other principle than the vis inertiae there could be no motion in the world. (And what that Principle is & by (means of) laws it acts on matter is a mystery or how it stands related to matter is difficult to explain). And if there be another Principle of motion there must be other laws of motion depending on that Principle. And the first thing to be done in Philosophy is to find out all the general laws of motion (so far as they can be discovered) on wch the frame of nature depends. (For the powers of nature are not in vain [two words are illegible]. And in this search metaphysical arguments are very slippery. A man must argue from phenomena). We find in o'selves a power of moving our bodies by o' thoughts (but the laws of this power we do not know) & see ye same power in other living creatures but how this is done & by what laws we do not know. And by this instance & that of gravity it appears that there are other laws of motion (unknown to us) than those wch arise from Vis inertiae (unknown to us) wch is enough to justify & encourage o' search after them. We cannot say that all nature is not alive. (ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 620r; see McGuire, (1968), pp. 170-171.)

54 Query 31, *Opticks*, 397-399.

55 ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 620r, quoted by McGuire (1968), pp. 170-171.

56

On this point, see McMullin:

"In his account of *vis inertiae*, Newton appears to attribute to the 'impulse' elicited by way of opposition to impressed force a surprisingly active role in affecting the state of motion of the agent body. Yet *vis inertiae* could not be the ultimate source of material agency. There is a world of difference between 'action' and 'reaction', between the attraction the sun, for example, exerts upon the earth (when considered as attraction, i.e., as rooted in some 'active principle' initiating motion) and the reaction of the earth upon the sun (considered as reaction, i.e., as rooted in the *vis inertiae* of the earth):

The *vis inertiae* is a passive principle by which bodies...resist as much as they are resisted. By this principle alone there never could have been any motion in the world. Some other principle was necessary for putting bodies into motion, and now that they are in motion, some other principle is necessary for conserving the motion.[Query 31]

Otherwise, all motion would rapidly come to an end, he notes, for it is 'always on the decay' in inelastic or only partially elastic impacts, in motion through viscous media, and so forth." (McMullin, 1978, p. 45; and quoting Newton, Query 31 (23))

57

In a passage quoted earlier, Newton mentions 'gravity's cause' as one instance of an active principle. In the following passage, however, where he speaks of 'active principles, such as is that of gravity', it is not fully clear whether he means to identify gravity's cause, or gravity itself as an active principle:

....It seems to me farther, that these particles have not only a *vis inertiae*, accompanied with such passive laws of motion as naturally result from that force, but also that they are moved by certain active principles, such as is that of gravity, and that which causes fermentation, and the cohesion of bodies. These principles I consider, not as occult qualities, supposed to result from the specific form of things, but as general laws of nature, by which the things themselves are formed; their truth appearing to us by phenomena, though their causes be not yet discovered.....(Query 31, *Opticks*, 401.)

Given the highly speculative nature of active principles, perhaps the rather obscure locution reflects Newton's own uncertainty about whether the active principle is the force or its cause. (If Newton means gravity's cause, rather than gravity itself, as the active principle, that would support the "two-tiered" ontology that McMullin considers and rejects, on which active principles cause forces and forces cause motions. On this point, see McMullin, 1978, p. 82. McGuire takes the opposite view; 1968, p. 172.)

58

See McMullin's discussion of this point, 1978, p. 45.

59

Kochiras, "Causal Language and the Structure of Force in Newton's *System of the World*" (manuscript, n.d.)

- <sup>60</sup> Schliesser, 2011, p. 86; emphasis added. Surprisingly, though Schliesser clearly suggests here that Newton denies the existence of a medium and endorses distant action, he also allows at one point in the same paper that Newton allows the possibility of a medium. Specifically, he indicates that there are reasons for remaining agnostic about ‘how this view should be fully squared with other, potentially competing proposals that Newton entertained on such matters (for example, the role and nature of God or a *very subtle ether in supplying the mechanism for attraction*)’(p. 82, emphasis added). And in detailing the advantageous features of his view, he indicates that his view is ‘theologically neutral’, in that ‘Newton leaves room for a possible role for God (for example, *as the medium, or as cause of the world.*’(p. 88, emphasis added.) Perhaps Schliesser’s position is that (a) Newton did advance a hypothesis of unmediated distant action in the *System of the World*, but (b) he at other points considered other hypotheses, such as a subtle ether. For to concede that Newton allowed the possibility of an ether in the *System of the World* would amount to conceding that he is not there advancing the negative claim that gravitational effects do not depend upon any medium; and that concession would undermine Schliesser’s conclusion that Newton is endorsing unmediated distant action in *A Treatise of the System of the World*.
- <sup>61</sup> Newton’s more extended remarks read as follows: ‘As the parts of the Earth attract one another, so do those of all the planets. If Jupiter and its satellites were brought together, and formed into one globe; without doubt, they would continue mutually to attract one another as before. And on the other hand, if the body of Jupiter was broke into more globes, to be sure, these would no less attract one another than they do the satellites now. From these attractions it is that the bodies of the Earth, and all the planets affect a spherical figure, and that their parts cohere, *and are not dispersed through the Ether*. But we have before proved that these forces arise from the universal nature of matter, and that therefore the force of any whole globe is made up of the several forces of all its parts. And from thence it follows, that the force of every particle decreases in the duplicate proportion of the distance from that particle...’ (*System of the World*, pp. 44-45; emphasis added)

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# FROM THE *IDEALTYPUS* TO THE *ARCHÉTYPE*: SIMILARITIES BETWEEN GERARDUS VAN DER LEEUW'S RELIGIOUS PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY AND MIRCEA ELIADE'S MORPHOLOGY?

As it is generally known, the so-called “religionist” approach within the study of religions refers to Friedrich Schleiermacher and his *Reden über die Religion* from 1799, where religion is defined as “Sinn und Geschmack fürs Unendliche” and placed on the same level of rational knowledge and morality, as a cognitive modality proceeding not through reason, but intuition and sentiment.<sup>1</sup> On the one hand, the scientific study of religion – namely history of religions – gradually develops as a secular discipline in the wake of historical and philological sciences and inspired by Auguste Comte's, Émile Durkheim's and Marcel Mauss' sociology and anthropology; on the other hand, a trend enhancing the vital and irrational dimension of human existence in all its historicity spread between 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century: think of the thought of a Henri Bergson or of Georg Simmel's and Wilhelm Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophie*.<sup>2</sup>

In particular, Dilthey intends to affirm the autonomy of the *Geisteswissenschaften*: the genetic explanation characterizing natural sciences, named *Erklären*, is totally inadequate in order to work within human sciences; these pretend a deep and sympathetic understanding, the *Verstehen*. The goal is “das Leben aus ihm selber verstehen zu wollen”,<sup>3</sup> with a methodic rigour setting life as all-embracing horizon, as a totality that can only be interpreted.<sup>4</sup> The “religionist” approach within *Religionswissenschaft* is grafted onto this trunk; Ernesto de Martino, an Italian ethnologist with Marxist bents, went as far as calling this school, in the phase of its acme, “equivocal family”, an ambiguous scholars group having, in his opinion, scientifically questionable claims.

History of religions enjoys an enormous development beginning from the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the philological and the historical critical method becomes successful and contributes creating, thanks to comparison, imposing systematisations of religious phenomena in many respects of evolutionistic (more rarely involutionistic) character: monotheism, myth, rite, sacrifice, etc., without either sparing Christianity, with the rise of biblical exegesis. Nevertheless, the attempts to systematically describe religious phenomena resorting to comparison fail for want of a coherent methodology and because of consequent philosophical difficulties; at least Schleiermacher's "Sinn und Geschmack fürs Unendliche" as well as Dilthey's historicism pave the way for a discipline that will declare itself "phenomenology of religion", a "science of phenomena" applied to religions, in the same logic as life is to be comprehended on the basis of itself.<sup>5</sup>

The extent of the "Schule des Verstehens",<sup>6</sup> the religionist approach more or less directly referring to a "phenomenology of religion", as well as the question whether and to what extent its currents are compatible urged us in this paper to liken the actually original tendency, Gerardus van der Leeuw's one, with Mircea Eliade's "religious morphology", that going a innovative way and doomed to great success and great discussions.<sup>7</sup> This comparison concerns a central aspect in the methodology both of the one and of the other, namely the construction and use of typologies, ideal types and archetypes respectively; here, the main question we will try to answer is whether Eliade conceives his *archétypes* – at least in so far as he considers them as instruments of his methodology – in a similar way as Van der Leeuw conceives his *Idealtypen*. In order to do this, we will treat the approaches of both authors by stressing the conformation of the ideal types and the archetypes in the light of the underlying epistemologies and influences and finally detecting continuity as well as discontinuity elements.<sup>8</sup>

## Gerardus van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion

The proper phenomenology of religion rises thanks to the talent of a Dutch *Religionswissenschaftler* (and reformed pastor), Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890-1950).<sup>9</sup> In 1925, he publishes an *Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*,<sup>10</sup> followed eight years later by his masterpiece *Phänomenologie der Religion*.<sup>11</sup> In the wake of scholars like Nathan Söderblom and Rudolf Otto, which raise the sacred to an

almost ontological category and emphasize the centrality of religious experience as a lived one, Van der Leeuw first of all intends to understand this experience. Influenced by *Gestaltpsychologie*, above all where this tendency affirms the importance of the structural element and of the whole, by Max Weber's understanding sociology and particularly by Dilthey's hermeneutics through Karl Jaspers' work, with its emphasis on the need of a sympathetic comprehension, based on the capacity of *nacherleben*, reliving what it tries to interpret, Van der Leeuw applies to religion the "science of phenomena" even because religion is par excellence a dimension escaping purely rational, objectivistic explanations.

The name of the new discipline refers to Edmund Husserl's philosophical phenomenology, the gnoseologic approach that wants to go "zurück zu den Sachen", with an anti-metaphysical and realistic effort aiming at investigating reality through the suspension of judgment called *epoché* as well as the grasping of the essence of things (eidetic vision), in the conviction that this method gives best reasons for the complexity of what exists, also and above all for human life and history. However, there is a widespread consent among scholars about considering Van der Leeuw's phenomenology only indirectly close, on the epistemological level, to transcendental phenomenology and thus seeing it as something autonomous.<sup>12</sup> Someone even contests as wrong and deceptive every similarity between the one and the other.<sup>13</sup> We will discuss afterwards this question, also with reference to Eliade.

What is in fact, according to Van der Leeuw, this "science of phenomena"? Etymologically, the phenomenon is "was sich zeigt", and this implies 1) that something exists, 2) that this something shows itself, and 3) that this something, even because it shows itself to someone, is a phenomenon. Therefore, the phenomenon is not a mere object, something existing objectively and independently of us, nor something purely subjective, namely an impression of consciousness: it is the meeting between object and subject or, as Van der Leeuw explains, "ein subjektbezogenes Objekt und ein objektbezogenes Subjekt".<sup>14</sup>

Even because the phenomenon is not a simple object, it is not immediately and completely knowable; on the contrary, it is relatively hidden, and comes progressively to manifest itself, until it becomes relatively transparent. The phenomenologist, on his part, experiences this process in a similar way: he or she has a lived experience, an *Erlebnis*, of the phenomenon, tries to understand and to relive it – *Verstehen*, *Nacherleben* – and gives finally a testimony of it (*Bezeugen*). As Van der

Leeuw explains with a metaphor, the phenomenologist is like a skilled swimmer, profoundly knowing of the river of life and therefore able to dive and swim without passively being carried away by the power of stream.<sup>15</sup>

The first level is classification, *Namegebung*: phenomena are 'baptised' and put in a certain category: sacrifice, purification, myth etc. The second stage is the *Einschaltung*, the insert of such phenomena in my own life: in fact, it is impossible to give any interpretation of a phenomenon, of what appears, without having lived it, and this process, as Van der Leeuw recognizes, is "mehr eine Kunst als eine Wissenschaft". The third level is the *epoché*, the suspension of judgement. Phenomena are never perfectly transparent, so it is necessary to put in brackets everything else than the phenomenon and to just consider what appears without falling in metaphysics on the one hand and without restricting the process to the mere empirical observation on the other hand: to stay in the middle between object and subject, where the phenomenon even takes place. Subsequently, there is the *Klärung*: putting together what is similar and pulling apart what has a different nature, on the basis not of causal or genetic links, but of *Sinnzusammenhänge* showing the relations of phenomena among each other within a broader whole.<sup>16</sup>

These four stages form together the *Verstehen* process. As Van der Leeuw makes clear:

Die chaotische, starre 'Wirklichkeit' wird damit zu einer Kundgebung, einer Offenbarung. Das empirische, ontische und metaphysische *Faktum* wird zu einem *Datum*, das *Ding* zu einer lebendigen *Rede*, die *Starrheit* zum *Ausdruck*.<sup>17</sup>

According to Van der Leeuw, science is and cannot but be hermeneutics: in itself, understanding the Egyptians of the first dynasty, he writes, is not more difficult than understanding our neighbour. Very important is moreover that the phenomenologist should always have an attitude of humility, for the understanding process always needs constant adjustments, above all by means of the philological and archaeological sciences. The goal of the *Verstehen* is in fact the "reine Sachlichkeit", an objectivity then excluding every metaphysical 'infiltration'.<sup>18</sup>

[Phenomenology] steht ab vom modernen Denken, das uns lehren möchte, 'die Welt als ungeformten Stoff zu betrachten, den wir erst zu formen haben, und uns als die Herren der Welt aufzuspielen'. Sie will nur Eins:



*Zeugnis ablegen* von dem, was ihr gezeigt worden ist. Sie kann das nur auf indirektem Wege, durch ein zweites Erlebnis des Geschehenen, durch eine Rekonstruktion hindurch.<sup>19</sup>

Therefore, making phenomenology does not mean just compiling a catalogue of phenomena, classifying them as they appear in space and time, but realizing a psychological description, and here the adjective 'psychological' is to understand in an extensive sense, since it has even to do with the *Erlebnis* and the ability to comprehend it by reliving and reconstructing it.<sup>20</sup> Beginning from the single understanding experiences he has by observing phenomena, the phenomenologist tries to insert them in broad structures and typologies having their own autonomy and general, ideal meaning. These ideal types have an intrinsic normative character, because they are to some extent the patterns, the archetypes or prototypes on which the empiric reality of religious phenomena turns; they are the way leading the phenomenologist to the goal of his research, i.e. grasping the essence of religion.<sup>21</sup>

Religion is a phenomenon par excellence. Of course, phenomenology deals with religion not in so far as it is revelation, but inasmuch as it is "verständliches Erlebnis" needing to be reconstructed, a visible answer man gives to an actually invisible revelation. According to Van der Leeuw, religion is an universal and coherent phenomenon, deep-rooted in human life, determined not so much by its content but by the attitude it presupposes in human beings.<sup>22</sup>

Religion ist Ausweitung des Lebens bis zu seiner äußersten Grenze. Der religiöse Mensch wünscht sich ein reicheres, tieferes, weiteres Leben, er wünscht sich Macht. M. a. W.: der Mensch sucht in und an seinem Leben eine Überlegenheit, sei es, daß er sich dieser zu bedienen, sei es, daß er sie anzubeten begehrt.<sup>23</sup>

Man looks for *power*, he tries to find in life a sense, and in order to do it he "wirft über die Buntheit des Gegebenen sein regelmäßig gearbeitetes Netz", "aus dem Stein macht er sich ein Bild, aus dem Trieb ein Gebot, aus der Wildnis einen Acker", without ceasing to look for "einen immer tieferen, weiteren *Sinn*", the religious sense of things, their extreme sense, "der Sinn des Ganzen", "das letzte Wort".<sup>24</sup> This is the reason why, to use Jan Hermelink's words, Van der Leeuw's hermeneutics can be

summarized in this sentence, taken and adapted from one of the principles of Protestantism: *religio suae ipsius interpret*.<sup>25</sup>

### Van der Leeuw's *Idealtypen*

As Jürgen Kehnscherper with reason argues, Van der Leeuw's methodology is fundamentally "verstehend", "idealtypisch" and "hermeneutisch", and the second adjective, "ideal typical", is here central on the conceptual level as well. Van der Leeuw makes use of ideal types in order to understand the inert mass of reality, and does it with a philosophically prophetic hermeneutic approach, given the success it will enjoy from the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century on.<sup>26</sup>

Original reality, the thing in itself, as we saw, is impossible to reach: we can approach a phenomenon only by applying the understanding method, that is to say, we try to make experience of a phenomenon – and this is the *Erlebnis* – and to relive it putting it in a broad structure, a *Sinnzusammenhang*.<sup>27</sup> With this 'bath' in the sense, we are able to identify categories, types, even ideal types that are not real in themselves, but have nevertheless their own life and their own laws.<sup>28</sup> Van der Leeuw shows it with an example:

Die 'Seele' kommt als solche nie und nirgends vor. Es wird immer nur eine bestimmte Art der Seele geglaubt, die, in dieser ihrer Bestimmtheit, einzig ist. Ich kann sogar sagen, daß die Seelenvorstellungen zweier Menschen, sogar im selben Kultur- und Religionskreis, nie ganz und gar dieselben sind. Es gibt aber einen Typus der Seele, einen verständlichen Zusammenhang verschiedener Seelenstrukturen. Dieser Typus ist zeitlos. Er ist nicht wirklich. Aber er ist lebendig und zeigt sich uns.<sup>29</sup>

Therefore, the *Idealtypus* is a creation of the human thought, aiming to disclose the sense of the single *Erlebnisse* as well as of the broad context where they are put, the *Sinnzusammenhänge* or *verständliche Zusammenhänge*. They are based on experience, but do not coincide with it. On the other side, they are neither metaphysical elements, having an ontological or dogmatic consistency. Nonetheless, they are universal and have universal validity.<sup>30</sup> Van der Leeuw's phenomenology is indeed a "bewusste und methodisch kontrollierte Anwendung der idealtypischen Methode in der Religionsgeschichte"; without such an application there is no historical research.<sup>31</sup>

Van der Leeuw relies explicitly on Weber's and Jaspers' ideal types, although, on the strictly religious scientific level, he honours Rudolf Otto as the inventor of typology.<sup>32</sup> To be precise, we have to consider Jaspers' theoretics as the most important source of Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion and to notice the transition of the *Idealtypen* from the Weberian understanding sociology to the Jaspersian understanding psychology.<sup>33</sup> Weber makes clear that the ideal type, far from being the goal of knowledge, is just an instrument, not utilized for describing empirical reality, but for utopically constructing a reflection of it in our imagination in order to help such description:<sup>34</sup> "Um die wirklichen Kausalzusammenhänge zu durchschauen, konstruieren wir unwirkliche", he says.<sup>35</sup> With the *Idealtypus*, Weber intends to solve the aporetic problem arising from the necessity to bring together the generalizing (systematic) knowledge and the individualizing (historical) one within science, namely to reconcile the study of the universal with that of the particular. The ideal type is a pattern, a scheme, a way to think and to organize though, first of all, although not exclusively, based on the rationality principle.<sup>36</sup>

On his part, Jaspers conforms to Weber and adopts his notion of *Idealtypus*,<sup>37</sup> by emphasizing its aspect as unit of measurement meant to 'photograph' that "endloses Gewebe von Sinnhaftem und Sinnfremdem" which reality is.<sup>38</sup> Whereas the Weberian ideal type, employed on the sociological level, investigates in the first place acting, with its essentially rational structure and open to the sense, and stops where the evidence (i.e. the rational grasping) and the *Verstehen* diverge, the Jaspersian one, put in a psychological context, aims to grasp "das Seelische", and it does it not only by understanding "Zustände", that is thanks to a "statisches Verstehen", but also by understanding "Zusammenhänge", that is thanks to a "genetisches Verstehen".<sup>39</sup> In the wake of Dilthey and his notions of *Erlebnis* as "gestaltgewordenes Leben" as well as of *Strukturzusammenhang*, Jaspers 'de-empirizes' and renders dynamic the understanding structures constructed both by Dilthey and Weber, and does it in order to get to the heart of the "seelische Zusammenhänge":<sup>40</sup> "Verstehen, wie Seelisches aus Seelischem hervorgeht, wie Handlungen aus Motiven entspringen, wie Stimmungen und Affekte aus Situationen und Erlebnissen hervorgehen", he writes.<sup>41</sup>

Therefore, Van der Leeuw appropriates Weber's ideal types 'dipped' in Jaspers' understanding psychology and turns again to history by bearing in mind Dilthey's lesson. In an essay from 1926, Van der Leeuw associates psychology and *Religionswissenschaft*, asserting that in both disciplines

are present similar tendencies and both have to face similar problems; nevertheless, psychology is a few steps further than history of religions.<sup>42</sup> By involving also the theoretics of another psychologist, Ludwig Binswanger,<sup>43</sup> Van der Leeuw establishes the basis of the religious phenomenological method and speaks on the one hand of the analysis and 'cataloguing' of phenomena – "zur Gegebenheit bringen" –, which corresponds to the "statisches Verstehen", and on the other hand of "Einfühlung"/"Einschaltung in das eigene Leben" through the identification of "verständliche Zusammenhänge" à la Jaspers,<sup>44</sup> identified with the "genetisches Verstehen": the *Idealtypen* have the task to subsume the *verständliche Zusammenhänge* in "ein lebendiges Ganzes", to render them "zu einem Erlebnis [...], das der 'Wirklichkeit' als Norm gegenüber steht".<sup>45</sup>

Nevertheless, Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion evolves – its height is represented by the *Epilegomena* at the end of his masterpiece – towards a form privileging the methodological unity, so that both these stages, the static and the genetic one, are founded in a phenomenological whole stressing above all the ideal typical character of every phenomenon.<sup>46</sup> The phenomenologist realizes he cannot keep apart the different steps of his analysis, since everything manifesting itself is already permeated of sense and is already reconstructed. Speaking of essence or sense of the phenomenon, of structure, of a *verständlicher Zusammenhang* or of an *Idealtypus* means ultimately speaking of the same thing or at least putting these different steps in a sort of simultaneity, what is closely related to the hermeneutic circle and its working.<sup>47</sup>

Thus, Van der Leeuw's ideal type is characterized as a *Doppelerlebnis*, a lived experience made *a posteriori* within the *Nacherleben* and the reconstruction, tasked with the support of phenomenology of religion by taking seriously the unicity and individuality of human beings as well as of their history, but without giving up systematics. The matter is the solving of the "aporetisches Problem" subsisting between the study of the general and that of the particular; like the Weberian one, Van der Leeuw's ideal type tries to reach this conciliation being individualizing without being arbitrary and generalizing without being abstract.<sup>48</sup>

Within *Phänomenologie der Religion*, then, *Idealtypen* of various kind arise: the different forms assumed by the *power*, which according to Van der Leeuw is the drive of religious life; the human attitudes toward the sacred (worship, faith, conversion, mission etc.); the concrete manners through which man organizes his own religiosity and regards the world. The ideal types of the various universal religions are particularly interesting:

the religion of distance and escape (for instance Confucianism); the religion of fight (Zoroastrianism); the religion of quietness (mysticism); the religion of restlessness (in same respects, the Old Testament religion); the religion of compulsion and form (the Greek polytheism); the religion of infinity and asceticism (Indian religions); the religion of the nothing and of piety (Buddhism); the religion of will and obedience (Judaism); the religion of majesty and humility (Islam); finally, the religion of love, i.e. Christianity, structurally considered by Van der Leeuw the acme, the accomplishment, the central *Gestalt* of all historical religions.<sup>49</sup>

### **Mircea Eliade's religious morphology**

Mircea Eliade (1907-1986)<sup>50</sup> is often considered as an eminent representative of phenomenology of religion or at least as a notable exponent of the *Schule des Verstehens*. His disciple Ioan Petru Culianu calls him "one of the mythical figures of history of religions", an insuperable barrier laying in front of every new attempt to study religious facts. On his part, Eliade considers himself as a "morphologist",<sup>51</sup> a scholar of religious forms at the centre of which is situated, like in Otto's opinion, the famous-notorious "sacred". The sacred is scattered in man's history, in his myths, rites and symbols, and in particular within the so-called archaic societies. At the beginning of his most famous book, *Traité d'Histoire des religions*, Eliade writes:

[...] Un phénomène religieux ne se révélera comme tel qu'à condition d'être appréhendé dans sa propre modalité, c'est-à-dire d'être étudié à l'échelle religieuse. Vouloir cerner ce phénomène par la physiologie, la psychologie, la sociologie, l'économique, la linguistique, l'art, etc... c'est le trahir ; c'est laisser échapper justement ce qu'il y a d'unique et d'irréductible en lui, nous voulons dire son caractère sacré.<sup>52</sup>

As in Van der Leeuw's opinion, also according to Eliade there are not pure religious phenomena, that is existing out of history. But it is fundamental to consider them in themselves, in their irreducibility and originality, even in their sacred character; in their nature as expressions of the sacred. Though, what is the sacred (or holy)? Eliade qualifies it as "an element in the structure of consciousness, not a stage in the history of consciousness".<sup>53</sup> This means that the sacred represents a perceptive

modality of human being to some extent of primordial nature, based on concrete and widespread forms. These forms are called "hierophanies" and consist always of three elements: a natural object, an invisible reality and an intermediary object, filled with sacrality. A sacred stone, a sacred source are hierophanies, but also the Son of God, the Word Incarnate in Christianity or even the cosmos in itself are hierophanies. Eliade says:

Der Mensch erhält Kenntnis vom Heiligen, weil dieses sich manifestiert, weil es sich als etwas vom Profanen völlig Verschiedenes erweist. [...] Man könnte sagen, daß die Geschichte der Religionen – von den primitivsten bis zu den hochentwickelten – sich aus einer großen Anzahl von Hierophanien, d. h. Manifestationen heiliger Realitäten, zusammensetzt. [...] Wir stehen immer demselben geheimnisvollen Vorgang gegenüber: das 'ganz andere', eine Realität, die nicht von unserer Welt ist, manifestiert sich in Gegenständen, die integrierende Bestandteile unserer 'natürlichen', 'profanen' Welt sind.<sup>54</sup>

The sacred is antithetical to the profane, and this dialectics characterizes the so-called archaic ontology, the way being, thinking and acting within the 'primitive' societies, societies without history inasmuch as they want to escape it, by resorting to myths, rituals and symbols. On the contrary, in Eliade's opinion the modern man is the historical man par excellence, the man having left myths and symbols, fundamentally irreligious or at least convicted to be it.<sup>55</sup>

Like Van der Leeuw, Eliade thinks that *Religionswissenschaft* should make use of comparison: the presupposition is that the similarity among religious phenomena is to refer on the one hand to the identity among the human beings making the experience of the sacred – such a human being is *homo religiosus* – and on the other hand to the identity of the sacred manifesting itself in such experience. In Culianu's opinion, Eliade's religious morphology adds to Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion (as well as to Otto's idea of the sacred/holy) a hermeneutic dimension that 'transfigures', so to speak, the phenomenological analysis: Eliade aims at acting on several levels, in several dimensions, ultimately in order to reach an original philosophical anthropology, although he does not explicitly intend to create it.<sup>56</sup> His hermeneutics is not so much a method, but above all an attitude, a way of thinking, consisting in considering religion as a whole, as something undivided, primordial, and in seeing

the sacred/holy not only as an object of knowledge, but also as a subject and instrument of knowledge.

Therefore, a hierophany is the main place where the sacred manifests itself. Its main vehicle is the symbol, a *locus* revealing and hiding at the same time, the place that only by hiding can do a revelation. The symbol has always a religious character, since it always refers to the 'true' reality, that is the sacred one, and has always an existential value, since it involves man in his whole being.<sup>57</sup> Eliade affirms:

The religious symbol translates a human situation into cosmological terms and vice versa; more precisely, it reveals the continuity between the structures of human existence and cosmic structures. This means that man does not feel himself 'isolated' in the cosmos, but that he 'opens out' to a world which, thanks to a symbol, proves 'familiar'.<sup>58</sup>

The comparative method used by Eliade strives to describe – for instance in the *Traité* – basic religious phenomena, that is to say hierophanies: sky, water, earth, stones; moon, sun, vegetation, sacred time and sacred space, chosen because of their ability to reveal a structure referred to the relation between man and cosmos; later, he lists some examples in the different cultures and stresses their similar structure. The structure of phenomena is then identified with an archetype, put in the dialectics between sacred and profane,<sup>59</sup> as we will see.

According to Eliade, history of religions is a total hermeneutics. It is the key permitting to access to the existential structures belonging to human being, among whose characteristics there is always – even if it seems to be lost, like in modern times – religiosity. Man is ever *homo religiosus*, he is always involved in the dialectics between sacred and profane, between the earthly, mortal, finite dimension and the one opening to him the doors of a Further, of a dimension that – to use Otto's well-known definition – shows him the *ganz Anderes*. The "authentic" man – authentic because religious – is therefore the "archaic", the unhistorical man. History of religions has a humanistic function; it is a sort of spiritual propaedeutics for modern man.<sup>60</sup> Eliade argues:

It is solely insofar as it will perform this task [i.e. understanding the meaning of a religious form] – particularly by making the meanings of religious documents intelligible to the mind of modern man – that the science of religions will fulfill its true cultural function.<sup>61</sup>

## Eliade's archétypes

Eliade begins to systematically employ the notion of archetype quite early, and he does it in a very ambiguous way, although it is a central one in his religious scientific approach. In fact, this notion remains indefinite and equivocal, based on the idea that "behind religious phenomena there are symbolic nets", structures associating religious phenomena besides their relation of historical kind; like the sacred and the symbol, the archetype is "at the beginning and at the end of comparison".<sup>62</sup>

Natale Spineto explains that Eliade's systematic use of the notion of archetype begins after reading *Einführung in das Wesen der Mythologie* by Carl Gustav Jung and Károly Kerényi, published in 1941,<sup>63</sup> a book having him probably stimulated and encouraged: the *Religionswissenschaftler* and mythologist Kerényi shows to Eliade the applicability of the Jungian arguments to religious facts, although without accepting every psychological or psychoanalytic implication of them, in order to emphasize their unicity and universality elements.<sup>64</sup> The influence of the Spanish art historian Eugenio d'Ors, promoter of a morphologically intended historical science charged with the attempt to reconcile historical facts and meta-historical constants by using the notion of archetype as a meeting point between real and ideal, is particularly relevant as well.<sup>65</sup>

The Eliadian concept of archetype has a conflicting and obscure relation with the one developed by Jung. On the one hand, Eliade stresses the distance between him and Jung, so that in *Le Mythe de l'éternel retour* (subtitle: *Archétypes et répétition*)<sup>66</sup> he wants to specify that with this term he does not intend to refer "to the archetypes described by Professor C. G. Jung" and to use it "in an entirely different meaning".<sup>67</sup> On the other hand, according to Culianu there is a unquestionable closeness between both notions: inasmuch as it is possible to distinguish, within the Jungian archetype, between an objective and a subjective aspect, the objective one has the same meaning for both Eliade and Jung, namely being "a performative pattern of consciousness, a categorial possibility of consciousness".<sup>68</sup> In Spineto's opinion, this is a open-ended question; the only thing we can reasonably say is that both scholars follow hermeneutically "parallel lines".<sup>69</sup>

In Eliade's writings, the notion of archetype has basically three meanings. In the first one, it qualifies the "exemplary model", the pattern which, within archaic ontology, men and things have to conform to. Thus, it is a descriptive concept, ascertaining within archaic societies the



presence of a “Platonic” structure. According to Culianu, this concept should be rendered with the term “prototype”. Eliade writes for example in *Comentarii la legenda Mesterului Manole* (1943): “For the archaic man, a thing or an action possess significance as long as they partake in a prototype, or repeat a primeval act”. This notion is therefore limited to the archaic man and cannot be extended to *homo religiosus* nor to human beings at all nor to the historian nor to Eliade himself.<sup>70</sup>

In its second signification, the notion of archetype is not a merely describing one, but a component of human existence. In this sense, an archetype is a historical product, a cultural reaction to natural facts assuming an existential value. To some extent, this meaning associates Eliade – at least according to Angelo Brelich – to Kerényi.<sup>71</sup>

The third Eliadian sense of archetype has a more epistemological character and is to see as “a structural and structuring element of the religious fact”, seeming to be on the one hand an effective structure of reality, but to have on the other hand a methodological function: being “an auxiliary concept that accounts for the similarities among several religious forms”.<sup>72</sup> In Culianu’s opinion, it is a “preformal and preformative unhistorical category, a model which something refers or conforms to”, contrasting thus with history.<sup>73</sup> Spineto remarks:

If [...] archetype is no longer a useful word to describe the religious reality of ‘archaic’ civilizations and becomes the very structure of phenomena, as well as the conceptual net with which we apprehend it, the ‘Platonic structure’ of the ‘archaic ontology’ expressed by the archetypes becomes a ‘Platonic’ structure of a *tout-court* reality.<sup>74</sup>

Therefore, referring to this third Eliadian meaning of archetype it would be crucial trying to keep separate its strictly methodological function from its quality as “Platonic” element of reality. Is it possible to make such distinction? In order to do it, Spineto attempts to reconstruct Eliade’s epistemological debts.

The most important author to mention here is Goethe. In his *naturwissenschaftlich* writings, he deals with the *Urpflanze* and supposes that in the variety of the plant kingdom it is even possible to find the original plant as a model or picture summarizing the ideal and the sensible level, drawn from the ability to observe phenomena and to reconstruct them. Eliade connects the Goethian morphology with the works of intellectuals like Vladimir Propp and his countryman Lucian Blaga and is convicted

that the historian of religions “pour y voir clair dans cet océan de faits, de figures, de rites” should “en son domaine chercher ‘la plante originelle’, l’image primordiale, c’est-à-dire ce qui résulte de la rencontre de l’homme et du sacré”.<sup>75</sup> Goethe’s influence, consequently, is exerted on Eliade both directly (Jonathan Z. Smith and Mac Linscott Ricketts stress that Eliade’s young production, although implicitly and ambiguously, is permeated by Goethe’s thought) and indirectly, i.e. through Blaga’s writings as well as Goethian morphological notions such “original phenomenon”.<sup>76</sup>

Nonetheless, Eliade studies philosophy at the University of Bucharest and is thus disciple of Nae Ionescu, a thinker having studied at the University of Munich, where Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology was very influential. In Spineto’s opinion, Goethe’s method, aiming at looking for a pattern or an image able to put together the ideal and the real, shows several analogies with the Husserlian phenomenology, particularly the sixth *Logische Untersuchung*. Ionescu thinks that the *Logische Untersuchungen* are “an epoch-making book”<sup>77</sup> and puts transcendental phenomenology – at least in the background and in a mediate way – in Eliade’s methodological horizon, since he is convicted that the essences, a crucial Husserlian notion, can be known both on the logical level, with the use of categories, and on the mystic one, with the use of general forms, independent on space and time, forms Ionescu considers stable. Thus, the phenomenological method, according to Ionescu, looks for the “immutable essence” of phenomena.<sup>78</sup>

Not actually unexpectedly, the relation between Eliade and Husserl’s phenomenology is quite ambiguous. While Eliade accurately avoids openly espousing the Husserlian approach, he appears to need its help when it is necessary to react to the historicistic criticism.<sup>79</sup> In *The Quest*, Eliade writes: “For the historicists [...] to seek for ‘essences’ is tantamount to falling back to the old Platonic error”; however, “the historicists have, of course, neglected Husserl”.<sup>80</sup> According to Spineto, Eliade answers to those criticizing him for running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, i.e. referring the archetype both to the interpretative method and to the interpreted object, by disavowing every metaphysical or Platonic interpretation of his work as well as by reconnecting the concept of essence – on its part linked with the concept of archetype – to the Husserlian one.<sup>81</sup> Eliade shows in this manner a certain proximity to Van der Leeuw, particularly when this one argues that “die Struktur ist sinnvoll gegliederte Wirklichkeit” and “der Sinn [...] gehört teilweise der Wirklichkeit selbst an, teilweise dem ‘jemand’, der sie zu verstehen sucht”.<sup>82</sup>

Spineto's conclusion is that "there is a fundamental coherence amongst the morphology" of Eliade, a coherence involving not only Goethe's and Husserl's approaches, but also post-Gadamerian, especially Ricœurian hermeneutics, although it remains very vague as well as different both from each one of these approaches and from their systematic synthesis.<sup>83</sup>

## Ambiguities

It seems then that Eliade takes very seriously Van der Leeuw's phenomenological approach, with its merging, within the phenomenon, of the subjective and the objective dimension. His review of the revised and extended French edition of *Phänomenologie der Religion*,<sup>84</sup> despite its criticism of the Leeuwian notion of *Macht*, considered too simplistic,<sup>85</sup> is enthusiastic about the book ("nous ne connaissons pas une meilleure introduction à l'histoire générale des religions que la Phénoménologie du savant hollandais"),<sup>86</sup> above all because of its efficacy in showing the whole epistemological and methodological validity of the "religionist" approach, that is of the use, against historicist, sociologistic, psychologistic reductions, of a genuine "échelle religieuse".<sup>87</sup> Eliade significantly writes in this review:

Avant de pouvoir prétendre connaître telle ou telle religion, l'on devrait se sentir tenu de bien se rendre compte de ce qu'est un phénomène religieux. C'est seulement après avoir compris ce que 'veut dire' un mythe, que l'on peut attaquer un problème précis dans le cadre d'une mythologie quelconque.<sup>88</sup>

But, as he explains elsewhere, Van der Leeuw "sometimes" is content with an "impressionistic approach"<sup>89</sup> and tends to a more general reductionism (seeing dynamism, animism and deism as three *Grundstrukturen* of religious phenomena)<sup>90</sup> disinterested in the historical conformation characterizing every structure.<sup>91</sup> "As a matter of fact, van der Leeuw never attempted a religious morphology or a genetical phenomenology of religion", he argues.<sup>92</sup>

On his part, Van der Leeuw reviews early Eliade's works and calls *Yoga*<sup>93</sup> already in 1939 "a very original, well-informed and fascinating survey" of such phenomenon.<sup>94</sup> About the *Traité* he writes in 1950: "This is a phenomenology in the best sense of the word", an "extremely important

book" showing an in-depth understanding of religious phenomena both in particular and in general; "hierophany", he remarks, is by all means an "useful general notion";<sup>95</sup> the *Traité* is to understand in the light of *Le Mythe de l'éternel retour*, similar, according to Van der Leeuw, to Karl Löwith's *Meaning in History*.<sup>96</sup>

Whilst Van der Leeuw's words of course restrict themselves to a concise presentation as well as to a generic, although firm, praise of Eliade's first books – already a *sui generis* historicist like Raffaele Pettazzoni will put the Romanian scholar, at least at the beginning, in a methodological continuity with Van der Leeuw, although with several reservation<sup>97</sup> –, from the Eliadian words dedicated to *Phänomenologie der Religion* emerges the need to go on the way started by the Dutch scientist. On the one hand, Eliade's goal is giving back to the historical dimension what belongs to it, with at the same time, as Kurt Rudolph observes, a remarkable philosophical increase of the notion of history;<sup>98</sup> on the other hand, he develops so to speak a defining urgency *de facto* 'substantializing' the essences and structures, though without feeling the need to characterize them with some precision.

In fact, if we compare, as Carl Olson does, Van der Leeuw's and Eliade's notion of power, we see that both scientists fundamentally "disagree [...] on the extent to which *homo religiosus* can manipulate the symbols and myths to gain control over the world", that is to freely make use of the contact points with the sacred. According to Van der Leeuw, power is "the central organizing principle" of the religious dimension, it provides access to it and accounts for it, while Eliade's conception is underlain by the distinction between sacred and profane and, within it, by the "accommodation of *homo religiosus* to power by conforming to the sacred archetypes".<sup>99</sup> Van der Leeuw thinks, as mentioned above, that "Religion ist Ausweitung des Lebens bis zu seiner äußersten Grenze" and the human being is constantly looking for a power disclosing to him the "Sinn des Ganzen", "das letzte Wort"; in Eliade's opinion, on the contrary, *homo religiosus* has to some extent to 'suffer' the presence of a sacred reality moulding everything.

The concept of history, even more than the one of structure or typology, is in my view the point distinguishing Eliade from Van der Leeuw. According to the latter, history has first of all to do with sense and value, with the spirit, and is characterized as the "divinatory" ability to interpret reality, or rather to approach as close as possible – through the *Nacherleben* – something primordial got lost for ever (as it happens with

everything being there), but that should be to some extent recuperated.<sup>100</sup> “Das ‘Leben’ selbst ist unfaßbar”, as Van der Leeuw writes in his *Phänomenologie*.<sup>101</sup> The centre of such reality is religious experience as lived by man in his existential quest.<sup>102</sup>

Instead, in Eliade’s view history is characterized as the culturally determined ‘covering’ of structures, typologies, categories, mechanisms being in themselves basically unhistorical and primordial.<sup>103</sup> Of course, such cultural covering is not less pervading and inherent to human being and his identity, but it is even what marks it and stimulates his creativity; with all its variations, such creativity is then a testimony of the fact that under the historical covering there is a sort of transcendent fundament.<sup>104</sup> This is the reason why, as a well-known Eliadian statement states, “the historicity of a religious experience does not tell us what a religious experience ultimately *is*”.<sup>105</sup>

The lack of historical sense Eliade reproaches Van der Leeuw with, in reality, is the reproach to limit the hermeneutic work to purely human quest for sense, while it is on the contrary necessary, according to Eliade, interpreting history in the light of the underlying original structures. Emphasizing the so-called “archaic ontology” encourages the contrastive analysis of man as *homo religiosus*: comparing such ontology, defined by Culianu as “a world which *reality* is not given by the simple being of things, but by their participation to paradigmatic patterns, to celestial archetypes”,<sup>106</sup> with the situation of modern man implies a sort of ‘meta-historization’, inasmuch as the modern man is bearer of a historicist reductionism that is on its part to historicize: modern man’s areligiosity, if regarded in the right light, is in Eliade’s conviction a substantial exception, magnified by a warped perspective.

It is quite unquestioned that Eliade, in general, prefers not to be too bound to certain thought tendencies; on the contrary, he is inclined to leave wrapped in mystery, so to speak, the philosophical choices he directly or indirectly does. On this subject, Liviu Bordaş speaks, referring to Culianu, of “Eliadian irony”.<sup>107</sup> Spineto points it out as well: Eliade’s methodological reluctance, probably practiced in order to make ‘invulnerable’ his own work by avoiding to ground it to particular currents, runs the risk, for want of “strong theoretical choices”, of opening a door to every kind of interpretations, even the most incoherent or deceptive.<sup>108</sup>

Calling it a “creative hermeneutics”, completely open to the sense as well as to the interplays of the most different “logical hypotheses” and projected on dimensions variously exceeding the hard facts – a sort of ‘meta-

hermeneutics', if we may – as Culianu does,<sup>109</sup> continues, in my opinion, Eliade's ambiguity legitimization's work. Indeed, Culianu follows closely the behaviour patterns of his master and resorts to Husserl's phenomenology for the purpose of philosophical ennobling and interpretative 'discharge': since the hierophanic structures "represent 'primordial phenomena' moulding consciousness instead of being moulded by them", he argues, although he ignores "whether Husserl would consider phenomenologically correct such a position", it is "undeniable" that "the premises of Eliade's conclusion lie in the *Logische Untersuchungen*".<sup>110</sup>

Recurring to Husserl by dealing with phenomenology of religion or, in general, with religionist tendencies, is always a quite sensitive subject. Although there are in Leeuw, as we said, some Husserlian inspiration motives (and it is also worth here mentioning Husserl's well-known letter to Otto from 1919, stating that *Das Heilige* is the beginning of a, of course still deficient, phenomenology of the religious),<sup>111</sup> the attempts to put together transcendental phenomenology and phenomenology of religion seem sometimes – notwithstanding the good will and the rigour – keen but in a way inadequate,<sup>112</sup> particularly when, as in Leeuw's case, Husserl is mentioned in an unsystematic way.<sup>113</sup> Kehnscherper argues that, while in his essay of 1926 Van der Leeuw seems to be sensitive to the use of the Husserlian notion of *Wesen* as well as to its derivatives, in his following works it is laid aside and replaced, at least partially, even with the concept of *Idealtypus*; the same can be said about *epoché*, assumed from Husserl by Van der Leeuw in a reduced way.<sup>114</sup>

In Eliade's case, where the Husserlian notion of *Wesen* is involved as well, such a recourse seems particularly inappropriate. In fact, it is not sufficient putting together the notions of sacred and consciousness in order to magically get a Husserliantly understood essence; an operation like this would contribute by no means to dissipate the methodological fog surrounding Eliade's concept of archetype. Saying, as Eliade does, that the sacred is "an element in the structure of consciousness, not a stage in the history of consciousness" does not automatically render at all the sacred and its structures transcendental categories, since within the hierophanies and their conformation the sacred and its structures are anchored to metaphysical objectification. The Eliadian ambiguity is not accidental, but a deliberate and substantial one. Indicative of this is the remark Eliade makes in *Fragments d'un Journal*, asserting that Husserl's phenomenology "implique l'abolition de l'expérience profane, de 'l'homme naturel'", so that the phenomenological method is elevated to a door aiming the access

from the “état profane” to the sacred, to ‘authentic’ reality, as it happens within initiations.<sup>115</sup>

On his part, Van der Leeuw is not completely free of ambiguity either. Nonetheless, his ambiguity is differently shaped, since it lies, so to speak, in the splitting of his scientific personality. Van der Leeuw, in fact, is both *Religionswissenschaftler* and theologian and sees phenomenology and theology as two different ways to reach the same end:

For the theologian, who exists between the two realities of Revelation and world, there open two roads which lead him to the goal and which he travels all through his life: the road from Revelation to the world, thus the road going down; and the road from the world to Revelation, going up. These two ways are not one way which is traversed in different directions. There are two of them, and both are equally necessary and lead to the goal, where God and Divine matters can be discussed. The two ways neither cross nor run parallel [...] The first road is the properly theological one. [...] Only from the event of Revelation can we direct ourselves to the happenings of the world. [...] The second road we call that of the science of religion, that is, human knowledge concerning religion [...].<sup>116</sup>

Van der Leeuw calls both roads the “vertical” and the “horizontal” ones. The latter is gone by phenomenology by contemplating the religious effort of human being, the quest of power, life and sense. But parallel to it is the vertical way, the way of theology as science of revelation. The one is the way of understanding, the other the way of being understood.<sup>117</sup> Although the revelation is invisible and indemonstrable, although it is not a phenomenon (Van der Leeuw writes: “Die Rede Gottes können wir nicht verstehen”; “was wir verstehen können, ist nur unsre Antwort”),<sup>118</sup> it is the drive of the whole phenomonic world; it is something unquestionably real and objective, as religion and *homo religiosus* real and objective are.<sup>119</sup> Van der Leeuw explains:

Der Mensch, der im Leben die Macht sucht, gelangt nicht nur zur Grenze, er weiß sich auch in fremde Gegend versetzt. Er erreicht nicht nur die Stelle, von wo sich ihm eine Aussicht in unendliche Fernen auftut, – er weiß sich auch während er noch auf dem Wege ist, jeden Augenblick von wunderbaren, fernen Dingen umringt. Er ahnt nicht nur das Überlegene, er wird auch direkt von ihm ergriffen. Er hat nicht nur *von ferne* den Thron des Herrn erblickt, und hätte gerne sein Herz vorausgeschickt, – er weiß auch, daß *diese* Stätte furchtbar ist, weil sie ein Haus Gottes und eine

Pforte des Himmels ist. Vielleicht sind es Engel, die auf seine Lagerstatt hinuntersteigen, vielleicht sind es Dämonen, die seinen Weg einengen. Er weiß aber ganz bestimmt, *daß etwas ihm in den Weg tritt*. Es kann der Engel sein, der vor seinem Angesicht geht, der ihn sicher geleiten wird. Es kann der Engel mit dem Blitzenden Schwerte sein, der ihm den Weg verlegt. – Aber ganz sicher ist, daß etwas Fremdartiges den Weg seiner eigenen Mächtigkeit durchquert.<sup>120</sup>

Jacques Waardenburg actually argues that the Leeuwian phenomenology of religion “should not be seen as an empirical, inductive and verifiable science”, but as “a method determined by theology and philosophy, for describing human experience in general and religious experience in particular”;<sup>121</sup> moreover, Hubertus G. Hubbeling stresses that in Van der Leeuw’s thought structure it is necessary to distinguish between an “Anfang” and a “Mitte”, where the former is historical and phenomenological and the latter, that is the heart, is “rein theologisch” and to identify with Jesus Christ’s incarnation, although interpreted in a inclusive and not exclusive sense.<sup>122</sup> An illustrative example of this is Van der Leeuw’s most mature theological work, *Sacramentstheologie* from 1949, structured in three levels (historical, phenomenological and theological).<sup>123</sup>

## Conclusion

In this context, not without reason considered by Paul Ricœur as a sort of eschatology of the subject,<sup>124</sup> Van der Leeuw’s ideal type is characterized as the bridge connecting the horizontal and the vertical way: it is not only an investigative structure, a hermeneutic instrument, but also a trace, a flash of this *Fremdartiges* that gets in the way of man.<sup>125</sup> This means that, seen in the context it intrinsically belongs to – i.e. theology –, the Leeuwian phenomenology of religion shows several ‘hidden’ contact points with Eliade’s morphology, and within it the notion of ideal type with the one of archetype. By the way, Leeuw’s conception of the so-called primitive mentality – notoriously inspired by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl –, postulating in a way the ‘holism’ of the primitives (a “considerably shorter distance between subject and object”; a possible “unity in the deepest fundament” of the beings) got irreparably lost in modern man,<sup>126</sup> seems from another point of view to round off all this.



Van der Leeuw's theology is always founded on revelation, on a sort of primordial revelation not coinciding with the Christian one; rather, the Christian revelation is, so to speak, the ideal type of revelation.<sup>127</sup> And Van der Leeuw reaffirms categorically the unknowableness of revelation, whose presence can be perceived only indirectly and thus hardly comparable to Eliade's archaic ontology. The only possible access, in fact, is not phenomenological, but theological: in a way, in order to get the "Rede Gottes", "unsre Antwort" has to already be within a faith context. So, Pietro Angelini, a scholar belonging to a historicist current, can argue, comparing Leeuw's *Phänomenologie* and Eliade's *Traité*, that the former, by following "a fan-shaped outline" reflecting the progressive intensity degree of the relation between man and power, "offers a dizzily consistent survey", whilst the latter, by sketching out "a sequence of 'stalactites' illustrating the 'descending' history" of the hierophanies, limits itself to tell "the metamorphoses of the sacred as if they were myths", so that the "history of the sacred" and the "sacred history" become identical.<sup>128</sup>

This is the reason why on the one hand Leeuw's *Idealtypen* can at most show the *Fremdartiges* overwhelming the consciousness of *homo religiosus*, but on the other hand Eliade's archetypes solidify, ontologize this *Fremdartiges* till it comes out of the consciousness of *homo religiosus* and conditions even the instruments measuring them. And this is the reason why it is not possible to affirm, in conclusion, that Eliade conceives his archetypes – at least inasmuch as he considers them as instruments of his morphological approach – analogously to Leeuw's conception of the ideal types. Eliade writes:

C'est cette même tendance vers l'archétype, vers la restauration de la *forme parfaite* – dont un rite, un mythe ou une divinité quelconque ne sont que des variantes, souvent assez pâles – qui rend possible l'histoire des religions. Sans elle, l'expérience magico-religieuse créerait continuellement des formes fulgurantes ou évanescences de dieux, de mythes, de dogmes, etc., et l'observateur se trouverait devant un foisonnement de types sans cesse nouveaux, qui ne permettraient aucune mise en ordre. Mais, une fois 'réalisée', 'historicisée', la forme religieuse tend à se dégager de ses conditions de temps et de lieu et à devenir universelle, à retrouver l'archétype.<sup>129</sup>

According to Eliade, the archetype is even the possibility condition of a history of religions or *Religionswissenschaft*; otherwise, religious

phenomena would only be changing and evanescent forms, impossible not only to understand, but also to grasp. Nevertheless, it is a possibility condition intrinsic to the phenomenon itself, and so it should be sought, identified, comprehended, interpreted on the basis of the structure where it manifests itself. Eliade's defining urgency issues from here, the more it is willing, so to speak, to remove every encrustation from the archetype, so that it can shine in all its pureness and eternity, the more it is forced to shut up the archetype in a methodological labyrinth without any way out.<sup>130</sup>

The sacred tree, treated both in the *Phänomenologie* and in the *Traité*, is a good instance of all this. Van der Leeuw emphasizes first of all the fact that the tree is "Machträger" and has then "ein ganz eigenes Verhältnis" with human life. He writes:

[...] Es [ist] das Erlebnis der Baumacht, in ihrer immer wiederholten Überwindung des Todes, welches sich dem Menschen aufdrängt und ihn sich der festen gesicherten Baumexistenz als der mächtigeren anschließen macht. Der 'Miteinanderwuchs' des Baumes und des Menschen [...] ist somit keine rationelle Parallele, sondern ein mystisches Band [...].<sup>131</sup>

The examples he gives illustrate these ideas: in the Greek mythology, the Amadryads, vegetation nymphs living the same life of the trees; in old Egypt, the sycamore containing gods; the newborn placenta buried near to a young tree in Northern Germany; the lindens planted on the occasion of the birth of the king's son; everywhere speaking or bleeding trees; the cross of Christ as life tree; Yggdrasill, the world tree in the Old Norse mythology, representing "den mächtigsten Ausdruck" of the ideal type "heiligen Baum".<sup>132</sup> In short, Van der Leeuw creates the ideal type of the sacred tree on the basis of functional analogies, stressed through the *Verstehen* and the *Nacherleben*; it is not only the lighting and adding up of several specific aspects of the "sacred tree" type, but the building of multidimensional sense connections.

On his part, Eliade wonders from the beginning:

Par quelle synthèse mentale de l'humanité archaïque, et à partir de quelles particularités de la structure de l'arbre comme tel, un symbolisme si vaste et si cohérent [i.e. that one of the sacred tree] s'est-il établi? Il n'est pas question ici de préciser la genèse d'une valeur religieuse, mais de découvrir les plus anciennes et par conséquent les plus pures intuitions de cette valeur.<sup>133</sup>

Also in Eliade's view the tree represents a power, due both to the tree in itself and to its cosmological implications. He continues:

Un arbre s'impose à la conscience religieuse par sa propre substance et par sa forme, mais cette substance et cette forme doivent leur valeur au fait qu'elles se sont imposées à la conscience religieuse, qu'elles ont été 'choisies', c'est-à-dire qu'elles se sont 'révélées'.<sup>134</sup>

Thus, it is "en vertu de sa *puissance*", "en vertu de ce qu'il *manifeste* (et qui le dépasse), que l'arbre devient un objet religieux".<sup>135</sup> Eliade perceives first of all the archetype and makes sure to obtain from it its purest form, present somewhere and sometime – *in illo tempore* – within the history of mankind, representing something manifesting itself in it and exceeding it.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Schleiermacher (1958), p. 30.
- <sup>2</sup> Cf. Filoramo (1984), pp. 35-36.
- <sup>3</sup> W. Dilthey, *Abhandlungen zur Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften*, G. Misch (Ed.), "Gesammelte Schriften" 5, Teubner, Leipzig 1924, p. 4, quoted in Kehnscherper (1998), p. 31.
- <sup>4</sup> Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 31-34.
- <sup>5</sup> Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), p. 32.
- <sup>6</sup> Expression adopted from Hermelink (1960), p. 15.
- <sup>7</sup> About this supposed compatibility cf. for instance Festa (1986), p. 212 and, from the point of view of Raffaele Pettazzoni's historicist criticism, Spineto (1994), p. 54.
- <sup>8</sup> I wish to cordially thank Dr. Liviu Bordaș for his helpful advices and tips as well as Dr. Hylarie Kochiras for her kind and attentive revision of the manuscript.
- <sup>9</sup> About Van der Leeuw's biography cf. Waardenburg (1978), pp. 187-192.
- <sup>10</sup> Van der Leeuw (1961<sup>3</sup>).
- <sup>11</sup> Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>).
- <sup>12</sup> Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), p. 3; Filoramo (1984), pp. 36-37.
- <sup>13</sup> Cf. Becke (1999).
- <sup>14</sup> Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), p. 768.
- <sup>15</sup> Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), pp. 768-769; Van der Leeuw (1961<sup>3</sup>), pp. 8-11; Van der Leeuw (1926), p. 6.
- <sup>16</sup> Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), pp. 772-775.
- <sup>17</sup> Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), pp. 775-776.
- <sup>18</sup> Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), pp. 775-777.
- <sup>19</sup> Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), p. 777; Van der Leeuw quotes from E. Brunner, *Gott und Mensch. Vier Untersuchungen über das personhafte Sein*, Zwingli-Verlag, Zürich 1930, p. 40.
- <sup>20</sup> He remarks in retrospect, on the occasion of the awarding of a honours' degree: "Je me suis aperçu que cette phénoménologie de la religion comportait non seulement une inventarisation et une classification des phénomènes comme ils se montrent dans l'histoire, mais aussi une description psychologique qui nécessitait non seulement une observation méticuleuse de la réalité religieuse, mais aussi bien une introspection systématique; non seulement la description de ce qui est visible du dehors, mais avant tout l'expérience vécue de ce qui ne devient réalité qu'après avoir été admis dans la vie propre de l'observateur." (Van der Leeuw [1954], p. 10).
- <sup>21</sup> Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), p. 771.
- <sup>22</sup> Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), p. 778.
- <sup>23</sup> Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), p. 778.

- 24 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), pp. 778-779. Cf. on this Hirschmann (1940), p. 100.
- 25 Cf. Hermelink (1960), p. 60.
- 26 Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 3-4.
- 27 Eva Hirschmann speaks here of "ein Vordringen vom subjektiven zum objektiven Geist" (Hirschmann [1940], p. 97).
- 28 Cf. Hirschmann (1940), p. 98.
- 29 Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), p. 772. Hermelink's commentary: "Mit der Bestimmung des Phänomens in seiner eigenartigen Mittelstellung zwischen Objekt und Subjekt, zwischen gegenständlicher Erforschung von Daten und schöpferischer Phantasie des Individuums, un in seiner Zugehörigkeit zu einem dritten Bereich, dem des Sinnes, präzisiert van der Leeuw die Stelle, auf die sich das Verstehen richtet. Gleichfalls ist hierdurch noch einmal in subtiler Form deutlich gemacht, wie schlechthin alles zum Phänomen werden kann und wie auf der anderen Seite das Phänomen als verstandenes, d. h. eingeordnet in seinen Strukturzusammenhang und rekonstruiert nach seinem Typus, so etwas wie eine universale Gültigkeit besitzt. Es zeigt sich an dieser Stelle die besondere Umsicht van der Leeuws, der durch seine Bestimmung dessen, was ein Phänomen ist, jede ontologische oder auch theologische Festlegung unter allen Umständen zu vermeiden bestrebt ist" (Hermelink [1960], p. 31).
- 30 Cf. Festa (1986), pp. 207-208. Filoramo does not agree and argue that Van der Leeuw's *Idealtypen* are "ideal realities corresponding to the hypostatized ideas the Ottian Sacred manifests in history" (Filoramo [1985], p. 283).
- 31 Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 73-74.
- 32 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1974), p. 81.
- 33 Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), p. 42.
- 34 Cf. Pfister (1928), p. 166.
- 35 M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Mohr, Tübingen 1922, p. 287, quoted in Pfister (1928), p. 164.
- 36 Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 58-59.
- 37 Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), p. 60.
- 38 Cf. Jaspers (1958), p. 53.
- 39 Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 54-64.
- 40 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), p. 769, Van der Leeuw (1926), p. 11. Cf. on this Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 11-12, 73, Miegge (1964), p. 1022, Filoramo (1984), pp. 38-39, Kippenberg (1997), p. 191.
- 41 K. Jaspers, "Kausale und 'verständliche' Zusammenhänge zwischen Schicksal und Psychose bei der Dementia praecox (Schizophrenie)", *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie* XIV, Berlin 1913, p. 160, quoted in Kehnscherper (1998), p. 56.
- 42 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1926), p. 1. Cf. on this Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 44-45.

- 43 In particular *Einführung in die Probleme der allgemeinen Psychologie*,  
Bonset, Amsterdam 1965 (orig. 1922), especially pp. 30-102.
- 44 Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 67-68.
- 45 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1926), pp. 8, 10.
- 46 Cf. Hirschmann (1940), p. 99.
- 47 Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 68-69. With this aspect is connected Becke's  
criticism. He wonders whether the "Grundriß", the structure arising  
thanks to the *Nacherleben* is "schon vor der 'Einzeichnung' vorhanden"  
or emerges "erst durch die Arbeit des Religionsphänomenologen". "Van  
der Leeuws Formulierungen – he argues – sind vage, manche sogar unklar:  
der Leser weiß letztlich nicht, ob der Religionsphänomenologe den  
'Grundriß' hineinkonstruiert oder bloß nachzeichnet; ob die Wirklichkeit  
an sich schon gegliedert ist, oder ob der Religionsphänomenologe diese  
'Gliederung' erst vornimmt; o die Struktur tatsächlich erlebbar ist, oder vom  
Religionsphänomenologen einfach erfunden wird" (Becke [1999], p. 18).
- 48 Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 74-75.
- 49 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), *Gestalten*, pp. 669-767; Van der Leeuw (1930<sup>2</sup>),  
p. 1894.
- 50 About Eliade's biography cf. for example, very synthetically, Berner (2004<sup>2</sup>),  
pp. 343-344. About the 'character' Mircea Eliade – called "Faustian",  
"Odysseic" and "Dionysiac" – cf. the very enjoyable Casadio (2011).
- 51 Eliade says it explicitly answering to Ernesto de Martino: cf. M. Eliade,  
*Mémoires*, vol. II, 1937-1960. *Les moissons du solstice*, Fr. trans. by A.  
Paruit, Gallimard, Paris 1988, p. 135, quoted in Eliade-Pettazzoni (1994),  
p. 201, footnote 1.
- 52 Eliade (1986), p. 11.
- 53 Cf. Eliade (1969), p. i.
- 54 Eliade (1957), p. 8.
- 55 Cf. Eliade (1957), pp. 10-11.
- 56 Cf. Culianu (1978), pp. 116-117, 160. Richard Reschika remarks: "Im  
Unterschied zu den reinen Phänomenologen, die sich der Arbeit des  
Vergleichens versagen, um das Wesen, den Sinn eines Phänomens zu  
erfassen, bedient sich Eliade einer komparatistischen Vorgehensweise,  
vergleicht religiöse Phänomene mit möglichst vielen anderen, um so auch das  
'Transhistorische' eines religiösen Faktums zu entziffern. Für Eliade vereinigt  
die Religionsgeschichte mithin historische, religionsphänomenologische  
und religionsphilosophische Methoden" (Reschika [1997], p. 83).
- 57 Cf. Eliade (1959), pp. 98-103.
- 58 Eliade (1959), p. 103.
- 59 Cf. Eliade (1986), pp. 46-343.
- 60 Cf. Eliade (1969), pp. 1-3.
- 61 Eliade (1969), p. 2.

- 62 Cf. Spineto (2006), p. 179.  
 63 Cf. Jung-Kerényi (1941).  
 64 Cf. Spineto (2008), p. 367.  
 65 Cf. Spineto (2006), pp. 184-185; Spineto (2008), p. 367.  
 66 Cf. Eliade (1949a).  
 67 Cf. Spineto (2008), p. 368. This note is put beginning from the English translation of the book (1959).  
 68 Cf. Culianu (1978), pp. 56-57. Reschika (1997), p. 41, agrees.  
 69 Cf. Spineto (2008), p. 369.  
 70 Cf. Eliade (1949a), pp. 207-240; Eliade (2004), p. 9. Cf. on this Spineto (2006), p. 188; Spineto (2008), p. 369; Culianu (1978), p. 56.  
 71 Cf. Spineto (2008), pp. 369-370.  
 72 Cf. Spineto (2006), p. 192; Spineto (2008), p. 370.  
 73 Cf. Culianu (1978), pp. 56-57.  
 74 Spineto (2008), p. 370.  
 75 Cf. Eliade (1978), p. 162; cf. on this Spineto (2006), p. 194; Spineto (2008), pp. 370-371. Kerényi, in the *Einführung* written with Jung, refers on his part to Goethe's *Urpflanze* in connection with the relation between the historical multiplicity of reality and the unity of its forms and structures (cf. Kerényi in Jung-Kerényi [1941], pp. 37-38; cf. on this Spineto [2008], p. 371).  
 76 Cf. Spineto (2008), pp. 371-372.  
 77 Cf. M. Vulcanescu, *Nae Ionescu. Așa cum l-am cunoscut*, Humanitas, București 1992, p. 24, quoted in Spineto (2008), p. 372. E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, Niemeyer, Halle 1900; *Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, Niemeyer, Halle 1901.  
 78 Cf. Spineto (2008), p. 372.  
 79 Cf. Spineto (2006), pp. 197-198.  
 80 Eliade (1969), pp. 37-38.  
 81 Cf. Spineto (2006), p. 199; Spineto (2008), p. 372; Bianchi (1970), p. 156.  
 82 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), p. 770.  
 83 Cf. Spineto (2008), pp. 372-373.  
 84 G. van der Leeuw, *La religion dans son essence et ses manifestations. Phénoménologie de la religion*, Fr. trans. by J. Marty, Payot, Paris 1948. The second posthumous German edition (Van der Leeuw [1956<sup>2</sup>] is based on this French version.  
 85 Cf. on this Olson (1988), p. 43: "Eliade does not [...] share van der Leeuw's conviction about the universality of power and its manifestation as the essence of religion". Afterwards, this article became a chapter of C. Olson, *The Theology and Philosophy of Eliade. A Search for the Centre*, St. Martin's Press, New York 1992, pp. 122-138 ("The Phenomenon of Power").  
 86 Eliade (1949b), p. 110.

- 87 Cf. Eliade (1949b), p. 109. Spineto remarks: "Eliade [...] ne lit l'ouvrage principal de Van der Leeuw qu'en 1939; dans une lettre du 14 mai 1939, où il remercie le savant hollandaise de son compte rendu de *Yoga* [see below], il écrit: *J'ai reçu de votre éditeur anglais Religion in Essence and Manifestation* [sc. the English edition of *Phänomenologie der Religion*], *ouvrage que je connaissais seulement par ouï-dire. Je vous félicite sincèrement. C'est un livre magnifique, que je lis avec un vif intérêt*" (Eliade, Pettazzoni [1994], p. 177, footnote 5).
- 88 Eliade (1949b), p. 110.
- 89 Cf. Eliade (1969), p. 29.
- 90 This approach is especially visible in *De primitieve mensch en de religie* (cf. Van der Leeuw [1937]); according to Culianu, this book is, more than *Phänomenologie*, Leeuw's one "having given rise in Eliade to the most profound and enduring interest" (Culianu [1978], p. 148).
- 91 Cf. Eliade (1969), p. 35.
- 92 Eliade (1969), p. 35.
- 93 M. Eliade, *Yoga. Essai sur l'origine de la mystique indienne*, Geuthner, Paris – Fundatia regala Carol I, București.
- 94 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1939), p. 114.
- 95 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1950), p. 113.
- 96 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1950), p.114. K. Löwith, *Meaning in History. The theological Implications of the Philosophy of History*, Chicago University Press, Chicago 1950.
- 97 Cfr. Nanini (2003), pp. 89-96.
- 98 Cf. Rudolph (1984), p. 56.
- 99 Cf. Olson (1988), pp. 47, 49, 45.
- 100 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1926), pp. 12-13, 20-21.
- 101 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), p. 769.
- 102 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1937), pp. 159-160.
- 103 Cf. Allen (1984), pp. 112-114; Culianu (1978), p. 128.
- 104 Cf. Eliade (1969), pp. 51-53.
- 105 Eliade (1969), p. 53.
- 106 Culianu (1978), p. 107.
- 107 Cf. Bordaș (2012), pp. 86-87.
- 108 Cf. Spineto (2006), p. 200; Spineto (2008), pp. 372-373. Cf. also Reschika (1997), p. 93.
- 109 Cf. Culianu (1978), pp. 116-117. Cf. also Berner (2004<sup>2</sup>), p. 347.
- 110 Cf. Culianu (1978), p. 129. However, the fundamental question remains topical, formulated by Dario Rei in this way: "Is the consciousness of such structures [i.e. the archetypes and, in general, all religious forms] a mere heuristic and operative hypothesis or rather do they stress and show, beyond



- the historical, social, and cultural conditioning where religious phenomena are situated, a meta-historical 'more'?" (Rei [1972], p. 556).
- 111 Cf. Becke (1999), pp. 9-10; Terrin (1978), pp. 77-78.
- 112 Cf. for instance Terrin (1983), in particular pp. 170-177; Nanini (2000), for which I now wish to 'repent of my fault'.
- 113 Cf. Nanini (2000), p. 697, footnote 67.
- 114 Cf. Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 95-98. Cf. also Hubbeling (1983), pp. 4-5; Hirschmann (1940), pp. 126-129.
- 115 Cf. Eliade (1973), p. 222.
- 116 G. van der Leeuw, *Inleiding tot de theologie*, H. J. Paris, Amsterdam 1935, pp. 163-165, quoted in Waardenburg (1978), pp. 205-206, footnote 1. Cf. also Van der Leeuw (1961<sup>3</sup>), pp. 11-12.
- 117 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1928), pp. 335-336. Cf. on this Hirschmann (1940), pp. 101-102.
- 118 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), p. 780.
- 119 Cf. Nanini (2000), pp. 698-700; Hermelink (1960), pp. 29-30; Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 109-111. Italo Mancini stresses that both roads, in reality, on the religious philosophical level cannot be considered as completely independent (cf. Mancini [1983], pp. 452-453).
- 120 Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), p. 780.
- 121 Cf. Waardenburg (1978), p. 224; Waardenburg (2004<sup>2</sup>), p. 270; see his reproach to Van der Leeuw to practice "a natural theology" (Waardenburg [1978], p. 234; Waardenburg [2004<sup>2</sup>], pp. 273-274; cf. also Filoramo [1984], p. 42).
- 122 Cf. Hubbeling (1983), p. 6. About the problematic relations between *Religionswissenschaft* and theology cf. for instance Antes (1979), pp. 278-282.
- 123 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1959); cf. on this Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 107-108.
- 124 Cf. Ricœur (1965), pp. 547-554; cf. on this Kehnscherper (1998), pp. 116-117; see also Ricœur's notion of symbol (cf. Ricœur [1965], pp. 19-29; cf. on this Nanini [2000], p. 703, footnote 80).
- 125 Cf. Nanini (2000), p. 699.
- 126 Cf. Van der Leeuw (1937), pp. 31, 50; cf. on this Nanini (2000), p. 447, footnote 34; Kippenberg (1997), pp. 257-258.
- 127 Cf. Hirschmann (1940), p. 106.
- 128 Cf. Angelini (2001), p. 35. Another historicist *Religionswissenschaftler*, Dario Sabbatucci, argues about the difference between Leeuw's and Eliade's masterpieces: "[...] Both Van der Leeuw's *Phänomenologie* and Eliade's *Traité* tend to an objectification of religion [...], but whilst Van der Leeuw does it by objectifying 'religious experience' [...], Eliade does it by objectifying the character and the functions of the 'hierophanies' [...]" (Sabbatucci [1987], p. 93).

- <sup>129</sup> Eliade (1952), p. 159; cf. also pp. 227-228.
- <sup>130</sup> In his review of *Le Mythe de l'éternel retour*, de Martino speaks regarding this of a "'subtractive' method" (cf. de Martino [1951-1952], p. 151).
- <sup>131</sup> Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), pp. 43-44.
- <sup>132</sup> Cf. Van der Leeuw (1956<sup>2</sup>), pp. 42-46.
- <sup>133</sup> Eliade (1986), p. 231.
- <sup>134</sup> Eliade (1986), p. 231.
- <sup>135</sup> Eliade (1986), p. 232.

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# THE POLITICS OF POWER AND RESISTANCE IN YORUBA DRESS

## Introduction

This study examines how Yoruba people of southwest Nigeria express power and resistance to power through dress. Although scientists have not come up with a single definition of power that is capable of any systematic use, most people however have an intuitive understanding of what power is.<sup>1</sup> The word power and its synonyms such as authority, influence, control, etc., which are sometimes used interchangeably in most literature, connotes the ability a person exercises over others by making them do his or her will, request or command against their wills. Conceived in this way, power therefore cannot exist in a vacuum except in relation to humans. Although power is also used in relation to inanimate things, the objective conceptualization of power is only measurable in human relation. A pack of lions may demonstrate or show recognition for a fellow lion as a leader within the park; however we may never know whether or not this demonstration of recognition constitutes power for the recognized lion or if such lion actually exercises any power or influence over others. Similarly, we may never know whether or not others in the park obey the lion with or without their consents. The same applies to when a lion easily overpower a deer. In such a case, we may never know if the overpowered deer surrenders freely or willingly in recognition of the lion's power. Invariably, power is immeasurable only in human community.

As a concept, especially in Politics and International Relations, power has been classified into two broad categories – hard and soft power.<sup>2</sup> Hard power describes the influence a particular actor (and this could be an individual, a group or a nation) exerts on others in order to obtain the other party's obedience. Essentially, this involves coercion, which could be either the threat to use or actual use of military might or economic sanction. Soft power, on the other hand, describes obedience obtained

via diplomacy, culture and history.<sup>3</sup> Unlike military action, which is overtly or covertly aggressive, economic power oftentimes involves the threat to use or actual use of economic sanctions. Such sanctions can be in the form of trade embargoes, offer of inducements or aid as well as withdrawal of aid, etc.

As shown in the literature, power, whether soft or hard, must have (i) a source, domain or base; (ii) the means or instruments of its expression, (iii) amount or extent of its influence over others, (iv) and a range or scope.<sup>4</sup> Even in primeval times, individuals and groups derived their powers from different sources. This could be their societies or a segment thereof. It could also be cultural capitals such as societal ethos, cultural practices, religious beliefs, etc. Individually and collectively, these sources give legitimacy to power. As of necessity, legitimate power must not only have ways through which it is used, expressed or exercised, but also have an extent to which it could be deployed. In addition to the above, power has a bound, which could be spatial or otherwise. No matter how powerful an actor is, its power is limited to where it derives legitimacy. However, this last part or characteristic of power demonstrates that power differs markedly from some of its synonyms, especially influence. For instance, while the power of Mahatma Gandhi's non-violence policy may be limited to India, its influences stretch to different parts of the world.

Among the Yoruba, power has variety of meanings; ranging from strength (*agbara*) and position (*ipo*) to command (*Aase*). *Agbara* differs markedly from *ipo* in the same way as it differs from *Aase*, another English equivalent of which is "Amen". Power when used to describe strength, concerns brute force, another synonym of which is "*ipa*". When used as position, you often heard "*won n lo ipo*" – a show or demonstration of power that is associated with an office. When used to denote a command or an "Amen", "*Aase gun*" is the usual statement. In Yoruba cosmology, power can be divided into two: secular and esoteric. This conceptualization differs from what obtains in Politics and International Relations. Whether as strength or position, Yoruba believe that all forms of power have both the esoteric and secular components. As *Aase*, power becomes a command, which can be esoterically or secularly-mediated. As position, a member of a king-in-council may deploy his power to avail himself or his or her supporter the good wishes of a government. While this exemplifies secular use of power, a seemingly innocuous gadfly may use esoteric power to obtain what a chief may never obtain. What appears as a seemingly innocent three year old girl may, at the same time, be a sixty year old witch in the spiritual realm

and could also be a leader in a coven. Such a kid is usually described as *Emere* and *Abiku* or, at the very best, as “*Alagbara omo*” – a powerful kid. Extremely fair-in-complexioned young girl is often thought of as a witch or *Emere* while an exceptionally witty, gifted or a talented fellow is also believed to be imbued with powers of different kinds.

For Yoruba people, powers are either derived from spiritual sources or from secular sources. Yoruba people also believe that an overlap of one into the other is also possible. Hence, powers are either invested on individuals by the gods or by the society or by the combination of both. Twins, for instance, are believed to have been invested with powers by the gods on account of being born twins. When a newly born baby displays any special physical appearance or characteristics, for instance, having dread-locked hairs, unconventionally positioned in the mother's womb, etc; they are often regarded as powerful. To demonstrate this, special names that reflected these special attributes are given them. Deformities are also seen in the same light; hence an albino is regarded as not just powerful, but also specially selected by the deities either for their worships or as special sacrificial materials to appease the deities. Some communities, for reasons that may be associated with geography, are also believed to have been imbued with special powers by the gods and these powers were believed to be reasons behind some of the special features associated with them. Dexterity in making or performing a task is also seen in this light and it is common to see exceptionally talented ones as endowed with special powers by the gods. Sango, to consider another example, was reputed to be an irritable terror and that when he was in a feat of rage, he belched smoke and sometimes fire. Besides been a king in Old Oyo, he was, on account of his exceptional powers, deified in death.

Societies also invest people with powers. Kings, chiefs and other office holders are either carefully selected on mutually comprehensible criteria or are believed to have been specially ordained by the gods for their secular or religious roles in society. Kings, like priests and priestesses, may be selected among other equally qualified candidates; they were however regarded as specially “selected” by the gods for their offices. The same applies to priests and priestesses, as most of them were believed to have been specially selected, sometimes before birth.

Generally, Yoruba believe that all human beings possess one form of power or another; however it is not in all cases that individual realizes and deploys these powers. Even where individual realizes his or her powers, he or she is still required by the society to be discrete, as these adages make

clear: "*Alagbara ma mo ero, Baba olee*" and "*Ile n yo; alagbara ro ra se*". As a measure of control, excesses of power are curtailed, first, through individual's discretion, and secondly, through other means and measures put in place by society. In most cases, sources of power also prescribe the means and measures through which office holders are checked against arbitrary or abuse of power. This also applies to esoteric or spiritual powers.

As a measurable objective value, power is tutelary and is often reposed in individuals such as kings and chiefs, priests and priestesses, police and tax-collectors, judges and queens, etc. Although the Oyo-Mesi, a body of seven chiefs headed by the Bashorun, is the kingmaker in Oyo, it also functions as an effective check on the excesses of the king, Alaafin. Given this example, it can be argued that not only power is tutelary, but so also resistance to power. Collectively or singularly, power and resistance play fundamental roles in the day-to-day administration of Yoruba societies.

Given this eclectic conceptualization, Yoruba people tend to be tactful in their use of power in relating with themselves and with strangers. This is because everybody is believed to be powerful and those who may appear powerless may, in reality, turn-out to be most powerful. Without great caution, one can find himself or herself at the wrong end of the stick.

Resistance to power described in the literature as how individuals or groups within a particular space (source of power) resist authoritarian use of (legitimate) power by a constituted authority, is often seen as disobedience to power, which could be on natural and legal rights, self-defense, or religious grounds. In Yorubaland, resistance is a form of negotiation, which, like power, could also entail the use of aggression, cohesion, or overt violence. In this way, resistance is associated with change and, like power; it could be soft or hard.

As the following adages make clear, the use of symbolism for identity is commonplace among Yoruba people: "*Ade la fi n mo Oba, ileke ni ti awon Ijoye*" (kings are known by their crowns and chiefs by their beads), "*Ori Ade a gbe o*" (You are blessed by the power of the crown). The above also tie to sayings such as *Ijoba Alagbada* and *Ijoba oni Khaki*. While the first describes civil rule, the other describes military autocracy. The symbols – Agbada, a flowing gown commonly used by Yoruba males, and Khaki, a military uniform, are used to denote so many things. Agbada, as used here, encompasses not just governmental procedure that thrives on deliberations and elections, but also free market and open choices. Khaki describes force and brutality, death and pains, command economy and restrictions. In these examples, "crowns" and "beads" "Agbada"

and “Khaki” are objective representations or symbols of state power, as expressed by the political class and state actors. In themselves, these items are mere signs and symbols (staff of office, dress and uniforms); however they denote not just the offices of their users, but also their powers, their essences, especially as state-actors. The use of icons and symbols to express objective categories is not limited to power alone, but also to different other things, resistance to power inclusive. Using oral interviews and archival documents, archaeological excavations and photographs, this study explores these different ways through which Yoruba people of southwest Nigeria have expressed power and resistance (to power) through dress. This is important given the role of dress in the construction and establishment of Yoruba individual and group identity.

Structurally, the study is divided into four sections, with this introductory section as the first. The second section briefly traces the provenance and purposes of dress among Yoruba people. Using examples drawn from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Yorubaland, the third section looks at different uses of dress and how these relate to power and resistance. Also included in this section is the politics associated with the use of symbolism for identity, especially in Yorubaland. The fourth section, which concludes the study, draws out the basic arguments in the study.

## **Yoruba Dress: Origins and Purposes**

Yorubaland, with a southern boundary along the Bight of Benin, which extends from the eastern limit of Republic of Benin on the west to the Western border of Edo kingdom and the Niger River up to Etobe in the east, at about 7.3°, “... lies between the parallels 5.36° and 9.22° north, and between 2.65° and 5.72° east”. From this point, the boundary is in a north-westerly direction, along a straight line drawn rather arbitrarily to meet 9° of latitude immediately due south of Jebba.<sup>5</sup> Falola, using Nigeria’s colonial inherited map as a reference, described the same areas thus: *to the south of this map is a coast, followed by a dense equatorial forest that stretched west for about fifty miles, and also broadening eastward. And there is the savanna to the north.* He noted further that “the Yoruba are located within the long stretch of the river Niger in the east and the river Mono in the west, which is bigger than the representation in the modern map”.<sup>6</sup>

The peoples who found themselves within the above geographical areas include the Egbado, Awori, Ijebu, Ilaro, Igbokoda, etc. of Abeokuta

and Ijebu divisions; the Gbongan, Ife, Oyo, Ijesha, Ekiti, etc. of Oyo division; the Otun, Ado, Ikole, Efon, Ikale, Ondo, Idoko, Ilaje, etc. of Ondo division; the Yagba, Igbomina, Ilorin, etc. of Ilorin and Kabba divisions.<sup>7</sup> Traditional accounts have mentioned the Edo people as also a stock of Yoruba, especially those collected by Jacob Egharevba.<sup>8</sup> Also included in the list of Yoruba areas are the territories of Kaba, Bunu, Owe, Igala, and Nupe peoples. In fact, Saburi Biobaku argued that it was from Nupe that the Yoruba spread to the southwestern parts of Nigeria.<sup>9</sup> Other areas included are Ebira (Igbira), Egun, the Ewe, the Aja or the Arada (all in the Republic of Benin), the Gaa, the Krobo and the Adangbe (all in Ghana).<sup>10</sup>

Although Fadipe, earlier cited, noted that this geographical boundary is not absolute and that there are many Yoruba peoples in different villages and towns outside these geographical areas, this study limits its scope to Yoruba people in southwest Nigeria.

To this Yoruba people, dress is conceptualized as an assemblage of modifications and/or supplements to the human body. This includes coiffed hair, coloured skin, pierced ears, and scented breath, as well as garments, jewelry, accessories, and other items. Also classified as dress are cloth and clothing traditions, tattooing and facial marking, hair-dressing and barbing.<sup>11</sup> As this folksong shows, Yoruba people regard dress as a *sine qua non* to living itself:

<i>Adaba ti ko l'apa; kini yo fi fo?</i>	A wingless dove; with what will it fly?
<i>Olomoge ti ko l'aso;</i>	A lady without dress;
<i>Kini yo fi lo'gba?</i> <sup>12</sup>	How will she survive the season?

In addition to folksongs, Yoruba cultural practices such as eponymous names (*Oriki*), chants, and other customs demonstrate the importance of dress in the construction and establishment of Yoruba individual and group identity. For instance, integral to *Opomulero* family's eponymous names are these lines:

<i>Keke ta didun;</i>	The spindle spurns beauty;
<i>Aso l'edidi eniyan,</i>	Cloth beautifies the human body,
<i>Bi ko si Aso, Bi kosi egbigba</i>	If not for cloths, If not for the big
<i>Ileke;</i>	beads;
<i>Oniruru Idi la ba ri.</i> <sup>13</sup>	We would have seen varying sizes
	of Buttocks.

Almost as a paradox, Yoruba people also say; “*Aso Nla, ko ni Eniyan Nla*” i.e. a well-dressed person is not necessarily a well-placed or highly remarkable person. Without prejudice to the first sayings, which emphasize the place of dress in establishing and constructing individual identity, the second serves as a caveat that the reality dress espouses may differ markedly from an objective reality of an individual and, as such, individuals should separate a person’s paraphernalia from his or her objective identity. Compared to the earlier position, the second subsumes a paradox, if not a contradiction. This paradox or contradiction is made more pronounced in contemporary Yoruba society, where clerics of religious organizations loudly admonish their followers to “dress the way you want to be addressed”.

Unarguably, Yoruba society makes distinctions between identity and dress. In the praise-names of Obas, the political heads of Yoruba kingdoms and states, Yoruba revered the Oba’s dress in the following words: *Kabiyesi, Alase Ekeji Orisa, Ki Ade pe l’Ori, ki Bata pe l’Ese*.<sup>14</sup> In this instance, the Oba’s personality is fused with his dress, as symbols of authority and units of identity. The mere presence of the Oba’s staff (or any of his instruments of office) in any occasion signifies not just the Oba’s approval of such occasion, but also his presence.

In addition, Obas are regarded as the reflection of their kingdoms’ wealth. Hence, the dress, behaviour, and carriage of an Oba must reflect the richness or riches of his kingdom. Invariably, Obas, chiefs and notable individuals in Yorubaland are usually clad in dresses that reflect their positions, statuses, and wealth. The commoners, in the same vein, also dress to reflect their stations in life, as can be seen in the following witty sayings; “*Ibere Osi, bi Oloro lori; ti nwo Aso Ile r’Oko*” (The commencement of poverty is usually like wealth, which compels a poor man to wear his best cloth (dress) to the farm) and also “*Aifi Eni p’Eni, ai f’Eniyan p’ Eniyan, lo mu Ara Oko san Bante wo’lu*” (It is sheer incontinence that makes a peasant to dress poorly into the town). In these two sayings, Yoruba’s conceptualization of dress is such that dress must not only suit the occasion and fashion of the time but also be commensurate with one’s status or estate in life.

It is difficult to trace the origin of dress among Yoruba people. This difficulty cannot be dissociated from the temporal nature of dress, especially cloth and clothing tradition. The sheer fact that not until the closing periods of the nineteenth century, Yoruba people were orally literate also made reconstruction for eras where no written record exists difficult.

Samuel Johnson, author of the first seminal book on Yoruba, said nothing about the origin of dress. N.A. Fadipe, who wrote on Yoruba sociology, equally said nothing on the origin of dress. Today, reconstructing events and phenomena associated with periods before written records is made all the more complex because early historians failed to engage witnesses to periods before the advent of writing on matters such as dress. Attesting to this difficulty, T.M. Akinwumi noted that despite increasing interests in dress study, “not much is known about the pre-twentieth century period on its form, use, and production in many African communities...beyond glimpses from travelogues”.<sup>15</sup> In his attempt to reconstruct dress history, he suggested the use of photo albums (of succeeding generations), eyewitness accounts (as found in diaries, memoirs, calendars, etc.), *Ifa* corpus and oral traditions. Besides not using all of these, he also focused primarily on praise poems and *Ifa* corpus without as much as checking correspondences of these sources with others, even those that he recommended. Notwithstanding this and other inadequacies, Akinwumi’s reconstruction of “women’s bosom coverings, the introduction of certain Arab-styled men’s robes and trousers, and the development of characteristic dress items associated with certain political and religious leaders such as Obatala and Osun”<sup>16</sup> is informative.

Besides Akinwumi, Colleen Kriger<sup>17</sup> also attempted a narrative on the history of cotton textile production in pre-colonial and colonial West Africa. Although Kriger focused on cotton textile, her work proved to be far more useful than Akinwumi in shedding useful lights on the origin of cloth in Yorubaland. Perhaps the most comprehensive and scientific work on provenance of Yoruba dress and dress history in Yorubaland is done by Oyeniyi, who combined photo albums, eyewitness accounts, *Ifa* corpus, oral traditions, archaeological sources and early Muslim and European trade accounts to weave a narrative that traces not just cloth, but other forms of dress.<sup>18</sup> In this work, Oyeniyi used archaeological remains such as stone images, terracotta heads, brass and bronze life-size figures, which were excavated first by Leo Frobenius, Thurstan Shaw, Bernard Fage and others between 1910 and 1945, and dated through radio-carbon dating system to between 900 to 500 BC to show that dress and dress-use among Yoruba people can be dated to periods before 900BC.

Oyeniyi, depending on archaeology, and Kruger, citing slave trade records, argued that bark-cloth was perhaps the first cloth to be used across West Africa. This, both argued, was replaced by *Kijipa*, a type of cotton cloth. As far as Yorubaland is concerned, Oyeniyi traced the use of *Kijipa*



to Ila-Orangun, also known as Akoko, in the Igbomina province.<sup>19</sup> He argued that *kijipa* cloths were imported from this area into other parts of Yorubaland, both by inhabitants of the area and traders from other parts of Yorubaland, thousands of years ago. Among Oyo people, this earliest Yoruba cloth, because they were made by Akoko women, was known as “Akoko cloth”.<sup>20</sup> Among the Egba and Ijebu, the cloth was known as *Egbedi Aso Ila*<sup>21</sup> while among the Igbomina, from where the cloth emanated, it was called *Kijipa*.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to *Kijipa*, other Yoruba clothes include *Ofi*, *Sanyan*, *Etu*, *Alari* or *Petuje* all of which, as Adeyinka Ajayi argued, originated from different parts of Yorubaland.<sup>23</sup> For instance, *Ofi*, known today as *Aso-Oke*, originated from Iseyin, Oyo-Ile, and Ilorin. *Alari*, as noted by Osaro Edo, originated from Ondo.<sup>24</sup> It must be emphasized that *Sanyan*, *Etu*, *Alari* and *Petuje* are different kinds of *Ofi*.

Olaoye asserted that cloth-use and production developed at different times in Yorubaland but that peoples from Ijebu, Owo, and Osogbo have distinguished themselves as good cloth weavers before the European intrusion. The Ijebu communities produced high quality and durable textile, which from the seventeenth century were exported to Benin where they were bought by the Europeans. Hugh Clapperton recorded concerning Owo in the 1820s that

we have observed several looms going here: in one house we saw eight or ten – in fact – a regular manufactory. Their cloth is good in texture and some very fine.<sup>25</sup>

Osogbo dyers were particularly famous for their varied and intricate techniques; Iseyin had been known as an important center of men’s weaving in Yorubaland. In Shaki, Kishi, Igbeti, and Igboho the art of cloth making was elaborately known long before 1800. In Okene, Yagba, and Oyi, cloth weaving and therefore cloth-use, were in use as early as the 1500 AD.<sup>26</sup> Despite that various centers have emerged as cloth-weaving centers, some of which are notable for specific cloth-production, it must be stated that *Kijipa* is regarded generally as the first Yoruba cloth.

Origins of other items of dress abound in different literature and this study, for constraints of space, shall spare itself any discussion of them. As C.L. Adeoye had noted, dress is an important part of Yoruba people’s life and Yoruba people would stop at nothing in order to dress well.<sup>27</sup>

Earliest explorers (and later the missionaries and colonial administrators) attested to the rich dress culture of Yoruba people. Sir Richard Burton, one of the earliest explorers, noted that Yoruba people

are tolerably well clothed...men wore shogoto (Sokoto), or loose cotton drawers fastened above the hips...and extending to the knee. The body was covered with cloth gracefully thrown...over the body.<sup>28</sup>

William Clarke observed that in Yorubaland, which he visited between 1854 and 1858, men and women took great care to dress and were very proud of their dress. He noted that among Yoruba, dress is not just a collection of cloths and accessories but that men and women exercised great care in selection of styles and colours.<sup>29</sup>

Yoruba dress, in pre-colonial, pre-Christian and pre-Islamic periods, served two important purposes: to protect the human body from vagaries of nature and to project individual and group identity. The first, which includes covering human nakedness from unwanted and unsolicited visual intrusion or gaze, is perhaps the most visible and could be termed the biological function of Yoruba dress. The second, which deals with the existential values of identity formation and reinforcement, projects age, status, sex, occupational, socio-political and religious affiliations. This is the social function of dress.

All over the world, the need to protect human body, especially from nature necessitated the use of different dresses for different weathers. During dry season, Yoruba people wore light cloths, which were often flung across the body. Essentially, these cloths were made of very light materials and were usually wrapped around lower body, leaving upper body bare in order to allow air to go around the body. In wet season, cloths were mostly thick, so as to give warmth.

Based on their functions, Yoruba cloths could be classified broadly into four: work or professional cloth, casual cloth, ceremonial cloth, and fashion cloth. This classification is for analytical purposes and has nothing to do with style, mode, design, material, and seasons.

Irrespective of functions, Yoruba dress aims at projecting the value of being an *Omoluabi*. *Omoluabi*, described by Abimbola as “to exhibit and demonstrate the inherent virtue and value of *iwapele*”,<sup>30</sup> where *iwapele*, a contraption of two words – “*iwa*”, character or behaviour, and “*pele*”, gentleness – means a gentle person with lofty character. Oluwole defined an *Omoluabi* as “a person that is given to deep knowledge, wisdom, and

self-discipline"<sup>31</sup>, a combination of which gave such individual a high sense of responsibility, which showed in his or her private and public actions and which earned the individual moral and social integrity and socio-political personality, in the society. To Abiodun, "an *Omoluwabi* is someone who has been well brought up or a person who is highly cultured".<sup>32</sup>

Oyeniya, earlier cited, noted that Yoruba ethical value of being an *Omoluabi* is the underlying principle behind Yoruba dress and whether as office holder or an ordinary member of community, Yoruba people strive to be or appear as *Omoluabi*. This is premised on the fact that only such a person can function in any office without bias, let or hindrance.

As a basic requirement, only *Omoluabi* can aspire to office, whether secular or religious. The following popular sayings make clear the importance of being an *Omoluabi* in Yoruba culture: "*iwa rere l'eso eniyan*" (the pride of any human being is a lofty conduct) and also "*iwa l'ewa omo eniyan*" (the beauty of any human being is a lofty conduct). Among the Yoruba, a rich and well-dressed person with questionable character is usually described as wearing "*aso ete*" (ridiculous dress) and "*aso abuku*" (contemptuous cloths) as against "*aso iyi*" (glorious cloths) and "*aso eye*" (cloths of honour) of a poor man with lofty character. In support of the above is also the saying that underscores the values of an *Omoluabi*, even in a state of penury: "*b'eniyan ja'le l'ekan, bo ba d'aran b'ori; aso ole lo da bo'ra*" (no matter how richly-dressed is a thief, he remains a thief).

From the above, it has been argued that Yoruba social and political thoughts revolved around being an *Omoluabi*, which combined strict moral qualities with being urbane. The combination of all these constituted what Yoruba people considered as their very essence, the soul of their peoplehood. Therefore, to be a Yoruba man or woman is to be well-behaved, to be well-behaved is, among other things, to be well-dressed. A poorly-dressed Yoruba man or woman, not minding if he or she dwelt in the city or farm-village, was regarded as a second-rate citizen; hence, the saying: "*Aifini pe ni, aif'eniyan p'eniyan; lon mu Ara-Okò san Bante wo'lu*"<sup>33</sup>. With respect to the above saying, it was not uncommon for parents to scold or ask a child rhetorically: "*Bawo lo se mu'ra bi ara oko yi?*" (Why are you dressed like a country bumpkin?) This can only happen when such a person dresses poorly. Immodest dress, most especially body-revealing or body-hugging cloths, was frowned at completely. In such instances, Yoruba were wont to say: "*Omoluabi kan ki mura be yen*" or "*Omo Yoruba kan ki mura be yen*" (no cultured Yoruba man or woman would dress that way). So, by implication, one can reason that

while dwelling in the city is believed to be associated with knowing and using new fashion trend, behaving in a cultured or civilized manner; a city dweller may lack these refined and much-sought characteristic and a village dweller may possess them.

Essentially, being well-behaved entails also being well-dressed, as material expression of being an *Omoluabi* is not limited to manner of speech, lofty conduct, and a high sense of moral rectitude alone, but also to bodily expression such as gait and dress. The emphasis on bodily expression was premised on Yoruba's belief that the outer person mirrored the inner one, as makes clear in these sayings: "*ara la mo, a o mo inu*" (the body is visible, not the mind) and also "*b'inu se ri, ni obi nyan*" (oracular divination usually tallies with one's inner man). On the face value, these Yoruba sayings appear to run counter to the English aphorism that appearance is deceptive and misleading (same as "not all that glitter are gold"), it must however be noted that the Yoruba also say that "*Oju ba'ni re, ore o de'kun*", which is the same as the aforementioned English aphorism. From the above, it can be argued that the symbolism of dress, as expression of power and resistance, derives from this essence – the value of being an *Omoluabi*.

### **Politics of Power and Resistance in Yoruba Dress**

For the Yoruba, both the spiritual and physical components of power are intertwined. However, Yoruba people believe that the greatest power is the spiritual power. Secular power, such as those wield by political office-holders, is regarded as having a secular component and spiritual components. While the secular component is bestowed by communities; the deities, gods, and goddesses bestow spiritual power. In addition, individuals can also seek spiritual powers through magic. Obas, chiefs, especially high chiefs, priests and priestesses, are believed to possess spiritual powers which are bestowed on them by the gods and goddesses. Others, who may have been appointed into office by the community, are believed to possess only secular powers. More often than not, those that hold spiritual powers often have hereditary offices, as the spiritual power associated with their offices are believed to be transferrable from father or mother to sons or daughters.

Intricately tied to the power of Obas, chiefs, priests, and priestesses in Yorubaland is their respective dress, as some of these items are regarded

not just as dress, but also symbols of authority, which aid effective and efficient functioning of state officials. For the Obas, the crown is not just a head-dress with which a king is distinguished from other state officials, but also an instrument of office. The *Akun*, beads worn by chiefs, decorate and beautify the chiefs just like the crown, but also serve as an instrument of office without which a chief is no more than a mere commoner. The role of an *Ad'osu Sango* – Sango Priest – is not solely to inter-mediate between worshippers and the deity, but also only an *Ad'osu* can stand before *Sango*. It must be re-emphasized that both farmers and hunters barbed *Osu* hair style; hence, the strict adherence to *Osu* by Sango worshippers not only reinforces the belief in the deity, but also the primary importance placed on the nexus between the deity, its worship, and its votaries by *Sango* worshippers.

Although this duality does not apply to all dresses, dress that are exclusively tied to the worship of specific gods, goddesses, and deities are believed to have secular and spiritual components. In most instances, dresses that are regarded as integral to religious worship are set aside only for religious worship, while others serve as everyday dress.

In addition to the above, there are elaborate spiritual and secular ceremonies associated with the production and usage of some clothes. For example, *ashigbo*, a cloth of black and white warp stripes, and one of the five clothes use for funerary purposes in *Owo*, has an elaborate rituals associated not just with its production, but also its use. *Ashigbo* is perhaps the most important funerary cloth in *Owo*. Generally, the production of all funerary cloths in *Owo* involves elaborate rituals; but *ashigbo* requires more specific rituals and more prescriptions are placed on the cloth-weaver, his or her people, and the wearer. Soon after the death of the *Olowo* or any of the other important chiefs, funerary cloths must be commissioned. As part of the production processes, parts of the loom are carried shoulder-high by the women as (funeral) ceremonial accessories. In particular, the women carry the *apasaa* (beaters or swords), as they sing, dance, and parade around the city. Also as part of the production processes, the women's clothes are folded and, as they go along the street, the clothes are pounded rhythmically to serve as accompaniment for women's singing groups.

Another dimension of power of dress deals with belief that major centers of dress production are imbued with spiritual essence and that the very act of dress making is controlled by the gods. As such, dress is considered to have shared in the spiritual powers and qualities of the gods associated with these centers. For instance, tie-and-dye, which is

the major craft in Abeokuta and Oshogbo, is believed to be controlled by *Orisa Osun*, *Iya Mopo*, and *Obalufon*. These two goddess and a deity are believed to be behind the dexterity in crafts and dress-making by men and women all over Yorubaland.

Oshogbo's eponymous name, *Oshogbo ilu aro, oroki asala*,<sup>34</sup> reveals two important things about Oshogbo. One, it is believed to be the birthplace of tie and dye and it could be argued that the production of tie and dye spread from Oshogbo to other Yoruba towns and cities, as no other Yoruba towns and cities is given such appellation. The second thing in the eponymous name is Oshogbo's place as a city of refuge, especially for displaced people, fugitive and criminals.

The story of the founding of Oshogbo is also illustrative of the role of Oshogbo in dress-making in general. The story was told that a certain Laro, accompanied by the hunter, Timenyin, set out from Ile-Ife to find water for their people at a time of a great drought and they came to a lush river surrounded by much vegetation and many trees. Laro and Timenyin considered the place an ideal location to settle their people and began clearing the bush and cutting down the trees. One of the trees fell across the river and, as it fell, a voice rose from the river, the voice of Osun, saying, among other things, "You bad people! You have broken all my pots of dye! You have spilled them all!"<sup>35</sup> Osun therefore warned them to move away from her territory to a not-too distant place near the river. She promised to reward them with abundance and protection should they do this. She argued that they would be disturbing her solitude should they stay at the river bank. She ordered that, in turn for protection and abundance, they have to worship her yearly at the river bank. Laro and Timeyin agreed and Oshogbo was born.<sup>36</sup>

It was believed that tie and dye was first introduced to the Oshogbo women by Osun after their settlement, and that the spread of the craft was as a result of trade relations, labour migration (in and out of Oshogbo), and craft training.<sup>37</sup>

In yet another account, *Iya Moopo*, the ancient supreme trinity of the female, which bore the totemic features of *Iyamowo*, *Iyalooode*, and Nana Ibukun, was believed to be the patron goddess of all female's crafts and trades. Represented by the *Edon*, the sacred bronze casting, *Iya Moopo*, holds one child close to her breast while tying the other one on her back with a sash and with the child's head downward and the feet pointing upward. *Iya Moopo* is a potter woman, reputable for moulding forms around pre-existing holes or spaces. The story is told about Orisa Ajagemo,

whose core ritual takes place in Ede. Ajagemo was said to have seen a potter woman at work and painfully asked: "Which is older, the pot or the hole inside it?" The simple answer given by the potter woman was: "Don't ask what you know: it is the hole."<sup>38</sup>

To *Iya Moopo*, all bodies are pots and form is a latter addition. In Yoruba cosmogony, the potter-wheel, which is represented by the navel, stands still while the potter woman circles round it with all her body in controlled relaxation preserving the idea of form. *Iya Moopo* is also in-charge of all women's trades, childbearing and birth. She is consequently a sister to another deity, *Iyemowo* and close to *Odu* with thought and word formation. She is a cotton spinner and weaver (cloth and hair) as she also cooks (black) soap and palm-oil. In addition and more absurd, she is also the patron goddess of robbers and thieves as she owns indigo dye, which is black and obscure in darkness.<sup>39</sup>

Far and above *Osun* and *Iya Moopo* is *Obalufon*, the legendary early ruler of Ile-Ife who is credited with the invention of brass-casting. *Obalufon*, in consonance with the *Ogboni*, are the principal patrons of the arts, especially brass-casting, bead-works and cloth-weaving in Yorubaland. *Obalufon*, who ruled Ile-Ife briefly before he was deposed, resumed his rule after intense battle with Oranmiyan. The peace that characterised his second tenure and his death was so eventful that it not only gave the inhabitants the enabling environment to practice their crafts, but also enabled the *Ogboni*, which was believed to have been founded under *Obalufon*, to flourish and gain legitimacy and considerable power at the palace. Their arts – bronze-casting, weaving (hair and cloths) and bead-works – flourished during this period that there is no mentioning of any of these arts without any reference to *Obalufon* and the *Ogboni* in Yoruba history.

From the above, it can be argued that all over Yorubaland, *Osun*, *Iya Mopo*, and *Obalufon* are believed to be the goddesses and deity in-charge of tie and dye, bronze-casting, bead-works, weaving, pottery making, etc. Invariably, the worship of these goddesses and deity is common in major centers of production of dress such as *Adire*, *Ofi*, *Alari*, *Ide*, etc.

It must be added that the worship of gods, goddesses and deities associated with dress-production is not limited to these three; elaborate worship is also offered to *Olokun*, *Sango*, *Ogun*, *Oya*, among many others. Thompson, writing about the relationship between *Obalufon* and bead-making, noted that like other men desirous of being noticed, *Obalufon* invented the beads and strung them in different colours on bracelets and necklaces so that gods, and men who follow them, might stand out with

pride and distinction in a crowd. Although *Obalufon* is credited with bead-making, it must be noted that beadwork is also associated with *Olokun*.<sup>40</sup>

One of the factors determining which of the gods, goddesses, and deities is deserving of worship in relation to any dress is the relationship between these spiritual beings and the implements or tools used in the production of such dress. For instance, *Ogun*, god of iron, is important not only to hunters and blacksmiths, but also farmers, weavers, and bronze-casters. This is so because implements and tools used in these professions depend on iron. As such, each centers of dress production have gods, goddesses and deities associated with their crafts and these divinities enjoyed daily and periodic worship in return for success and dexterity in the production of the crafts.

Yoruba people also believe that there is a tenuous link between individuals' spirituality and his or her physical materials. Oba Oyewale Matanmi III, the late Ataoja of Oshogbo, described it in these words:

I found it difficult to separate the two. The physical materials enhanced the spiritual and the spiritual is deepened by the physical materials. Traditional religion is also your culture. It is a synthesis of culture and religion. The physical is one continuous though physical materials melds culture and religion or the physical materials and spiritual ones together; thereby making physical materials and spiritual ones inseparable.<sup>41</sup>

Owing to the above, it is believed that individuals' dresses are imbued with their owners' spiritual essences. As such, Yoruba people would rather burn an old cloth than give such cloth out to other people, especially when these are not members of the immediate family. Religious votaries, herbalists, seers, and diviners believe in the potency of their dresses so much so that the presence of the dresses is believed to confer potency on any action being undertaken and also confirm the presence of specific deities, gods, and goddesses in the event. In most cases, kings and chiefs are believed to be physically present not because they may have one or two person representing them at a ceremony, but when one of their instruments of office, such as the staff, the crown, or the king's wife, is in attendance.

Another dimension to this is that the different deities, gods, and goddesses have specific colour and other dress items that are culturally assigned to them. While red colour is regarded as *Ogun's* colour, black is considered as *Sango's* colour. White belongs to *Osun*, *Olokun*, *Obatala*, etc. While devotees of any of the deities, gods, and goddesses may use any colour for



their secular enterprises, they are duty-bound to use the colour of dress that is associated with their deities, gods, and goddesses for religious ceremonies. However, in secular existence, black is synonymous with death, sadness, and sorrow. Red is synonymous with life and vitality while other bright colours are also imbued with different meanings. Notwithstanding this, black and red are regarded as also symbol of age. So, it is common to find some Yoruba communities venerating red and black dress.

In some cases, diviners, seers, and herbalists often prescribed the use of certain dress by worshippers to propitiate the gods and goddesses. Black dress is used mainly for funeral, although cults and secret societies also use black dress. Funerary rites, especially of members of secret societies and cults, involve the wearing and displaying of dresses of different colour, with black as the predominant colour. In this way, the Yoruba differentiates between religious dress and secular dress. Religious dress is believed to have imbibed the spiritual power of the gods, and is, as such, treated with reference.

Among the *Ogboni*, *Oososi*, and other secret societies and cults in Yorubaland, specific dress is regarded as exclusive. For instance, no other person can use the *Itagbe* (Ogboni's shoulder cloth), no matter how highly placed or wealthy. In addition to the above, some dresses are forbidden to people on account of religion. For instance, beads, such as *kele*, *sese-efun*, and many others are exclusively used by Sango and Osun worshippers. While these may not have been codified, they were however mutually understandable cultural norms among the Yoruba.

From the above, power is located in dress in two distinct ways: power inherent in a particular dress due to its close association with a particular deity, gods, and goddesses; or power associated with exclusive utilization of certain dress. While priests and priestesses of deities, gods, and goddesses may use dress that are exclusive to their deities, gods, and goddesses and therefore are separated from other worshippers and believers; both the votaries and the worshippers may use dress that are considered laden with spiritual powers.

In spite of the above, it must also be emphasized that nudity, understood simply as the condition of being nude or being semi-nude, or a state of not wearing cloth, is also a form of dress and this is highly venerated among Yoruba people. Although this practice is not limited to Yoruba people alone, as it is a common practice across Africa, however, in Yorubaland, nudity is a form of protest dress deployed as a tool of last resort in engaging with political power.

Nudity as dress takes two forms: (i) as a political tool, usually wielded by the females, to ensure that the political class accede to a particular request, not necessarily requests made by the female folks, but those made by the society, especially when there is a stalemate between popular demands and political class preferences; (ii) as a sign of sacredness of the human body. Here oath-taking and other (sacred or) religious activities, which placed unflinching importance on honesty, chastity, truthfulness, and absolute loyalty on the females are involved. For the most part, in establishing cases of adultery, a woman may be compelled to dance naked before a shrine. This often occurs when material evidence points to the woman as being guilty. So, in order to establish her innocence, such a woman may be asked to dance naked at the shrine. In some instances, women have, uncompelled, strip naked before the deity, gods, or goddesses as a way of establishing their innocence. At yet another level, parents often threaten to or actually strip before their children, most especially when such children are incorrigible and behave, almost inconsolably, errantly. This is regarded as a curse in Yorubaland. The essence of such a practice is to force the erring children to adjust.

Historically, Yoruba women have traditionally used access to and denial of their bodies, the threat or actual act of nakedness/undress, and denial of sexual/conjugal relation as a tool for effective political engagement with the male.

Undoubtedly, nude protests had a long history in Yorubaland. The examples of the Abeokuta Women Riots and *Ekiti Women For Peace* clearly illustrate this. The import of these examples is primarily to examine what nude-protest connotes to the Yoruba and how Yoruba women have used nudity to express resistance to power.

Between 1920 and 1936, Abeokuta, like other Yoruba towns and cities, was integrated into the international economy both as an exporter of cash crops and importer of manufactured products. It became one of the primary producing areas of cocoa and kola nuts in western Nigeria.<sup>42</sup> Abeokuta's integration into the international economy had a profound effect on its local textile industry. As weavers gained access to European threads and dyers gained access to European cloth, relations of production were transformed. Both sets of producers became dependent on European trading firms for their raw materials and were thus brought squarely into the nexus of international trade. Dyeing, predominantly women's industry, benefited substantially from this economic relationship. Dyers' access to cloth as well as credit from the European firms allowed them to become

autonomous producers of tie-dyed cloth, *adire*, which was in great demand across Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Senegal and the Belgian Congo.

However, from the mid-1920s, the *adire* industry experienced a dramatic decline which was largely shaped by falling commodity prices and the cycles of recession and depression that characterized the years between the First and Second World Wars. The prolonged economic crisis redefined the social and economic world of dyers and dyeing. Competing social groups, such as European traders and Egba men, used privileges based on class and gender to enhance or protect their economic positions. As a result, dyers were left vulnerable and the gains they had made as producers and women since the end of the nineteenth century became increasingly threatened. Conflicts also surfaced among dyers as those who shared the privilege of age and wealth tried to assert their control over the industry.

The most far-reaching initiative was the incorporation of new technologies, caustic soda and synthetic dyes, which had a dramatic impact on the dyeing industry. It exacerbated old tensions and created new ones while allowing dyers to increase production and cut costs. As the crisis deepened, many realized that these efforts did not improve their economic situation and called on the local government to intervene. Even without the dyers' encouragement, the Alake, the head of the local government, was motivated to take action because of consumer complaints about the quality of Abeokuta's *adire*.<sup>43</sup>

As the crisis deepened and the industry floundered, it became clear that individual approaches were hurting more than they were helping. As early as 1925, some dyers turned to the Alake, requesting help to regulate the industry.<sup>44</sup> The European firms also approached the Alake at the same time to encourage him to intervene in the industry. In the matter, the king was helpless, as he had to do the biddings of not just the European traders but also those of the colonial government, both of which ran counter to the wishes of Abeokuta women. The Alake could not take action against the trading firms, but he could take action against the dyers. He, at the urging of the Resident, banned the use of caustic soda in an attempt to regulate the trade. The ban, rather than alleviating the pains of the traders, exacerbated it and the women refused to obey the ban. Desirous of enforcing his rule; the Alake summoned a meeting with the women, with the Resident in attendance. The Alake not only insulted and cajoled the women to obey the ban, but also went as far as calling them stubborn and lazy, "unlike our industrious mothers of old".<sup>45</sup> He likened them to a son who refused to heed his father's direction and was therefore on the

road to ruin. The Resident, who was also present, compared the adire industry to the goose that laid the golden egg, and suggested that dyers were like the town's people in the fable who, overcome by their greed and selfish interest, killed the goose.<sup>46</sup>

Despite all the intimidation and cajoling, the women refused to obey the Alake. In reaction, on 12 February 1936, police began to arrest the dyers in large numbers and confiscated their cloths. On the following day, 1,500 dyers marched to the palace. During their confrontation, the Alake ordered the women to comply with the law and stop holding meetings about the issues. Yet, once again they ignored his orders. They continued to meet, and to do so without the senior chiefs from their quarters. Instead, they hired several male letter-writers and lawyers to represent them.<sup>47</sup> As these men began the process of publicizing the dyer's grievances, the Chief Secretary of the Government tried to downplay the dispute, but his efforts were hampered by the numerous letters and petitions the dyers' lawyers sent to each branch of government and the press.<sup>48</sup>

By April, it was quite clear that the dyers were not going to abide by Alake's ruling. In order to resolve the conflict, either the Alake had to accept the women's claims that the new technologies were not the problem and lift the ban, or the women had to accept the Alake's rights to act unilaterally. Once it was obvious that the Alake was not ready to yield, the women took to the street naked; demanding that the Alake should abdicated the throne, as he had become not just ineffectual, but a stooge of a foreign power, which made him to rule against the wishes of his people. Although protected by the colonial government, the Alake however understood that his reign had ended, as the women had deployed the sacred, traditional tool against him.

The most recent women's involvement in political protest and struggle in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Nigeria is the Ekiti Women for Peace nude protest of 29<sup>th</sup> April 2009. Following the nullification of the electoral victory of Mr. Segun Oni of the ruling Peoples' Democratic Party at the Electoral Petition Tribunal, the Ekiti people were set for a re-run election in ten wards. Penultimate week to the election, politicians from different parts of Nigeria converged on Ekiti to ensure adequate preparation for the re-run election. As the day of the re-run drew closer, the atmosphere became tense, as the ruling party and its main contender, the Action Congress Party, jostled for support. Midway into the election, the Resident Electoral Officer, Mrs. Aduke Adebayo, disappeared and the process was halted. Government initially reported that she took ill. Later, she sent in a resignation letter

refuting government's claim that she was ill but also that she had gone underground as she was being forced to declare an unpopular candidate, which was against the wishes of Ekiti people, as expressed in the voting. For resigning and going underground; the police declared her wanted.

On the 29<sup>th</sup> April, 2009, half-naked Ekiti women marched on the streets of Ado-Ekiti and other parts of the state to protest an alleged attempt to subvert the electoral will of the people. They deplored the delay in announcing the winner of the April 25 governorship election rerun. They invoked the spirits of their ancestors against those *"who planned to announce the loser of the election as the winner."*<sup>49</sup> The peaceful protest by the placard-carrying women, under the aegis of Ekiti Women for Peace, paralyzed traffic on the major streets of Ado-Ekiti. Some of their placards read: "INEC, Announce Election Result Now", "Prof Iwu, Be Warned", "We Salute Mrs. Ayoka Adebayo's Courage", "Dr. Fayemi Won, No Magomago", "Iwu, Stop Your Antics", "VP Jonathan, Stop Your Imposition", "Ayoka Adebayo, Heroine of Democracy" and "Prof Iwu, Fear God"<sup>50</sup>, among others.

The women, numbering about 300, and comprising of young mothers, school girls and aged women, also sang:

<i>Magbe, magbe o,</i>	Don't steal it, don't steal it,
<i>Ibo Fayemi ko see gbe,</i>	Fayemi's votes cannot be stolen,
<i>Magbe, magbe</i>	Don't steal it, don't steal it.
<i>Mayi, mayi o,</i>	Don't manipulate it, don't manipulate it,
<i>Ibo Fayemi ko see yi,</i>	Fayemi's votes cannot be manipulated,
<i>Mayi, mayi</i>	Don't manipulate it, don't manipulate it.

Majority of the protesters wore white apparel and held white handkerchiefs, and their heads were uncovered. They said the Action Congress (AC) candidate, Dr. Kayode Fayemi, won the election and demanded that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should declare him as the winner.

The nude protest was organized by a group comprising of women from all the 16 local government areas in Ekiti State. They were led by Mrs. Ronke Okusanya, the President of Ekiti Women for Peace. Also in the group was the wife of the AC candidate, Mrs. Olabisi Fayemi and the Governorship candidate's running mate, Mrs. Funmilayo Olayinka.

According to Mrs. Okusanya, the women decided to go half-naked to press home the demand for the sanctity of their votes.<sup>51</sup> She added that the protest was a warning to election riggers and manipulators of the electoral will of the people that they could no longer get away with fraud.

Another expression of the politics of power and resistance as expressed through dress is the equalization of European/western dress with Christianity, which played out in Yorubaland during the colonial period. To achieve this, Christian missions in Nigeria, ably assisted by the colonial administration, attempted an imposition of European culture, most especially dress and language, on Yoruba people. In Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, as in other cities, missionaries mandated Yoruba converts not only to speak English language, but also to wear European shirts and trousers as marks of Christianity and civilization.

While Yoruba converts accepted this quietly, especially from the 1840s, protests of different kind however followed as from the 1860s and by the 1900s, agitation for cultural renaissance both in language and in dress coalesced into agitation for self-rule, which received substantial boost after the World War II and led to independence in 1960. Yoruba elite, especially those in Lagos, Abeokuta, and Ibadan spearheaded this agitation. Not only were they wearing Yoruba dress in public and private functions, but were also dumping their Christian names given to them at conversion and reverting to their original Yoruba names. In addition, they agitated for the teaching of Yoruba language and culture in schools. Two notable individuals championing this cause include Mojola Agbebi and Sapara Williams who both reverted from their Christian names to their old, Yoruba names.

Although these converts were not denied membership in their various churches for not wearing European dress, they were however regarded as “counterfeit” Christians. New converts who would not wear European dress were denied Baptism and, including the old ones, were also denied the Holy Communion.<sup>52</sup>

Among many others, Agbebi (formerly David Vincent Brown), decried the imposition of European dress and European culture on Africans. “The introduction of the usages and institutions of European life into the African social system”, Agbebi contended, “has resulted in a disordering and dislocation of the latter which threaten to overthrow the system altogether and produce a state of social anarchy”. Some of the major ill effects of such an introduction of European usages and institutions included the “total breakdown of parental control” and the “advent of a life of wild

license mistakenly taken to mean the rightful exercise of the rights and prerogatives of individual liberty, as defined and permitted under the customs and usages of European life".<sup>53</sup>

These Yoruba ethno-nationalist Christians posited that "every African bearing a foreign name is like a ship sailing under false colours, and every African wearing a foreign dress in his country is like the jackdaw in peacock's feathers".<sup>54</sup> Like Agbebi, others also denounced their Christian names and reverted to their original Yoruba names. In addition, majority took to wearing of Yoruba dress and there also emerged a curious combination of Yoruba dress with European ones.<sup>55</sup>

Agbebi, leader of the agitators, went further to challenge missionaries' rights to name tunes, language, drums, dresses, and songs which should be used in worshipping God in Yorubaland; noting that choice of dress, tunes, and songs should depend on "the frame of mind, breadth of soul, experiences of life, attitude of faith, and latitude of love of individuals..." He averred that Yoruba culture rather than English/European should be permitted to dictate dress, songs, language, etc. of Yoruba Christian experience. He asked if the Israelites of old who used their own native dress, songs, and musical instruments in their religious worships ever knew European dress, harmonium, organ, and piano musical instruments and why were these being imposed on Yoruba people as the only and best dress and instruments for serving God. He insisted that Yoruba converts should be allowed to use "our *Dundun* and *Batakoto*, our *Gese* and *Kerikeri*, our *Fajakis* and *Sambas*" which "would serve admirable purposes of joy and praise if properly directed and wisely brought into play".<sup>56</sup> He went further to advocate that "in carrying out the function of singing therefore, let us always remember that we are Africans, and that we ought to sing African songs, and that in African style and fashion".<sup>57</sup> By African style and fashion, Mojola Agbebi excluded the use of "surplices, European dress, and structures for sitting during religious worship", which he described as non-essentials of religion.

... The joys are one, Redemption is one, Christ is one, God is one, but our tongues are various and our styles innumerable. Hymn-books, therefore, are one of the non-essentials of worship. Prayer-books and hymn-books, harmonium-dedications, pew constructions, surpliced choir, the white man's style, the white man's name, the white man's dress, are so many non-essentials, so many props and crutches affecting the religious manhood of the Christian African.<sup>58</sup>(Emphasis added)

To the extent that Christianity and Imperial rule sought to supplant Yoruba culture, Agbebi compared Christianity to Islam and declared:

The African Moslem, our co-religionist, though he reads the Koran in Arabic and counts his beads as our Christian brother the Roman Catholic does, and though he repeats the same formula of prayer in an unknown tongue from mosques and minarets five times a day throughout Africa, yet he spreads no common prayer before him in his devotions and carries no hymn-book in his worship of the Almighty. His dress is after the manner of the Apostles and Prophets, and his name, though indicating his faith, was never put on in a way to denationalize or degrade him.<sup>59</sup> (Emphasis added)

Agbebi further declared that “European Christianity is a dangerous thing”; that “Islam is the religion of Africa” and finally that “Christianity lives here by sufferance”. He then asked:

What do you think of a religion which holds a bottle of gin in one hand and a Common Prayer in another? Which carries a glass of rum as a vademecum to a “Holy” book? A religion which points with one hand to the skies, bidding you “lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven”, and while you are looking up grasps all your worldly goods with the other hand, seizes your ancestral lands, labels your forests, and places your patrimony under inexplicable legislations?<sup>60</sup>

## Conclusion

Dress, in Yoruba belief, has power. It takes on power either from the processes of production or when it is used. The major centers of dress production were also believed to have special favour of the deities, gods, and goddesses and that these supernatural beings also infuse these centers with special powers. Dexterity in dress production, it is believed, is one manifestation of these powers. The king’s staff of office or his crown is conceptualized as embodying the power and essence of the king himself in much the same way as the maze, say of a National Assembly, embodies the power of the nation’s National Assembly and the constitution embodying the power of a state. Dress, conceptualized in this way, could therefore express individual’s power, e.g. that of a king, or that of a group, e.g. a chorister’s robe.



With colonialism and the introduction of European dress came another layer of dress and power. Offices and positions had their respective dresses with various insignia of office and power. Although the imposition of European dress by both the church and the colonial administrators on Yoruba people vis-à-vis other Nigerians, as a measure of modernizing Yorubaland and Nigeria, was initially received by the Yoruba and other Nigerian peoples, however, when European cultural superiority and hegemony began to take the center stage in dress, religion, and government administration; European sartorial culture was resisted.

This resistance can be understood in two ways: (i) hegemony or power and (ii) its failure to exemplify the kernel of Yoruba dress culture, the value of being an *Omoluabi*. On the first, the initial acceptance of European religion, culture, and values among Yoruba people gave way to socio-political protests of different kinds across Yorubaland because Christianity presented European sartorial tradition and language as superior to other traditions. So, as forms of protest, the wearing of native dress and the speaking of Yoruba language became icons “in this ideological rejection of colonialism”. Many educated Christians who did not change their names however made the wearing of native dress and the speaking of Yoruba language significant ways of expressing support “of the cultural movement and critique” of the time. As they argued, native language and dress “spoke of the <<traditional>>, the truly African, uncontaminated by Western mores and materialism”.<sup>61</sup> The agitators argued that Yoruba dress not only allowed for a cultural rebirth and a renewed affinity to those who still lived by “traditional” values, but also became a wearable text, described by Chatterjee as existing in “adversarial relationship” to the discourse of colonialism.

By their actions and words, Yoruba elite argued that that European dress has nothing to do with Christianity and colonial administration. A closer look at this argument however shows some fault lines. As shown above, Yoruba sartorial tradition exemplifies values, identity and power; why cannot European tradition do same? To the Yoruba, one can be a Christian or work in colonial establishment wearing Yoruba or any other dress. This position turns logic on its head and therefore is faulty. Yoruba elite and nationalists were denying to Christianity what they allowed their indigenous religion and socio-political articulation. In my view, this reasoning lacks depth and, by all intents and purposes, it is simply a nationalistic agitation that has nothing practical to do with any existential value of Yoruba dress. A clue to this is that no sooner than Nigeria gained

independence that Nigerians, most especially Yoruba people, took to European dresses more than any other groups in Nigeria.

On the existential value of being an *Omoluabi*, it can be safely argued that the underlying principle behind symbolism of power and resistance to power through dress is the need to assert the kernel of Yoruba dress, i.e. the establishment and projection of the value of being an *Omoluabi*. From the examples of nude protests in Abeokuta and Ekiti, dress not only shows power, but also resistance. It can be argued that being an *Omoluabi* in dress also applies to being same in expressing power. Wrapping and unwrapping of human bodies derived from the general belief that human bodies, most notably those of aged-women, young and old mother, are to be revered, another form of expressing the value of being an *Omoluabi*. As such, it is a taboo for a woman, and particularly a married or older woman, to choose to disrobe in public in reaction to a social/political situation. As already shown, although the Ekiti example did not lead to abdication, but the Abeokuta case forced the king into exile. From these examples and others across Nigeria and Africa, it goes without saying that bodies, whether wrapped or unwrapped, hold particular meanings to Yoruba people. However, unwrapping is an unconventional tool in the expression of dissents among Yoruba people. While dress may embody power, unwrapping signifies resistance to power and, in its own right, constitutes another layer of power. Hence, this study considers it as a weapon of the weak, especially in the face of continued injustice by/of the powerful. Women, as it is generally believed, can unwrap either when bathing or in the inner recesses of their homes with their husbands, as part of their conjugal duties. Hence, only insanity and conquest associated with war would warrant a sane Yoruba woman to unwrap in the public. Under any other circumstance, unwrapping by women in full public glare is an indirect protest against an imposed situation. Among the Yoruba, it is the worst form of protest, as it signifies that the state is perpetrating a war against its own people and the people, by protesting nude, are declaring themselves as victims in a situation of war and molested in the full glare of the public by making public what should remain in the private domain. It signifies absolute lack of confidence in the state and the king is expected to abdicate the throne. As noted by Mrs. Fayemi, the nude protest in Ekiti State derived from the need to let the women's voices be heard, it is premised on Yoruba belief that it is a

taboo to see the naked body of an old woman in the public. These women are protesting against the injustice in the land and they are insisting that their votes must count.<sup>62</sup>

As a measure to de-legitimize state power, nude protest is not commonly used in Africa, as it was considered a thing of shame and a taboo. It derives from a cultural milieu which regarded woman's nakedness as a virtue not only of the woman or her husband, but also of her community. Hence, virginity is celebrated to the highest degree not only by brides, but also by the bride's relations and community. Consequently, nude protest is treated as a rape and sexual violence, an assault not only on the woman but also on the community.

By using the metaphor of dress, whether its actual usage or its lack of it, Yoruba people emphasize that being an *Omoluabi* is a *sine qua non* to being a Yoruba man or woman and that Yoruba people are expected to abide by this moral and ethical requirement not just in politics, but also in religion and other aspects of their social lives. Therefore, for Yoruba people, Yoruba sartorial tradition bespeaks of good governance, uncorrupted and undefiled religious devotion and personality while other sartorial traditions bespeak of a lack of the internal value of being an *Omoluabi*. European dress, as far as the Yoruba are concerned, is seen as emphasizing sensuality and sexuality. Yoruba culture would rather restrict these features, especially in females, to the private space or private domain. Hence, with increasing number of women wearing European dress, European sartorial tradition was daubed as immoral and the wearers are considered as morally bankrupt and religious apostates.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Dahl A. R., "The Concept of Power", in *Behavioral Science*, vol. 2, No. 3, 1957, p. 201.
- <sup>2</sup> Nye S. Joseph, *The Power to Lead*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.
- <sup>3</sup> Nye S. Joseph, "The Future of American Power", in Chari Chandra, (ed.) *War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World: The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-First Century*. Routledge, UK, 2008, Pp. 36-49.
- <sup>4</sup> Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-03.
- <sup>5</sup> Fadipe N.A., *The Sociology of the Yoruba*, Ibadan University Press, Ibadan, 1991, p. 21.
- <sup>6</sup> Falola, T., "The Yoruba Nation", in Toyin Falola and Ann Genova (eds.), *Yoruba Identity and Power Politics*, University of Rochester Press, USA, 2006, p. 29.
- <sup>7</sup> Fadipe, *ibid*, p. 29.
- <sup>8</sup> Egharevba, J., *A Short History of Benin*, Ibadan University Press, Ibadan, 1960.
- <sup>9</sup> Akinjogbin, I.A., *Milestones and Concepts in Yoruba History and Culture*, Olu-Akin Publishers, Ibadan, 2002, p. 10.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, 10.
- <sup>11</sup> Adeoye, C.L., *Asa ati Ise Yoruba*, Ibadan University Press, Ibadan, 2005, pp. 179-218.
- <sup>12</sup> Just as a wingless dove cannot fly, so a young lady without dress cannot survive a season.
- <sup>13</sup> It must be noted that every Yoruba person has *Oriki*. The one used above belongs to the Opomulero family, which could be found in different parts of Yorubaland, most notably amongst the Oyo, Ilorin, Oke-Ogun, Ijesha, etc. in Western Nigeria.
- <sup>14</sup> Kabiyesi, the Commander and the Vice-Regent of the gods; May the crown and the royal shoes stay long on the king's head and legs. This is generally a prayer for longevity for the king and his kingdom.
- <sup>15</sup> Akinwumi, T. M., 'Oral Tradition and the Construction of Yoruba Dress', in Toyin Falola and Ann Genova (eds.), *Yoruba Identity and Power Politics*, Rochester University Press, USA, 2006, p. 49.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, p. 50.
- <sup>17</sup> Kriger, C., *Cloth in West African History*, AltaMira, Oxford, 2006.
- <sup>18</sup> Oyeniyi, B. A., *Dress and Identity in Yorubaland, 1896-1986*, Carolina Academic Press, USA, 2012.
- <sup>19</sup> Oyeniyi, *Ibid*.
- <sup>20</sup> Johnson, S., *The History of the Yorubas from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate*, CMS, London, 1921, p. 110.
- <sup>21</sup> Interview with Baba Fatimoh, Sagamu, 12 June 2010.
- <sup>22</sup> Interview with Oba Lamidi Adeyemi Olayiwola, Oyo, 12 April, 2010.
- <sup>23</sup> Ajayi, A., *The Economics of Cloth Weaving in Eastern Yorubaland in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*, unpublished Ph. D thesis, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, 2005, p. 45.

- 24 Interview with Osaro Victor Edo, Ibadan, 13 November, 2010.
- 25 Adepegba, C., "Yoruba Art and Art History" in Ogunremi, D., and Adediran, B., (eds.), *Culture and Society in Yorubaland*, Charles/Connel Publications, Ibadan, 1998, p. 6.
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- 31 Oluwole, B. S., "Who are (we) the Yoruba?" A Key Note paper delivered at Pre-World Philosophy Day Conference, June 12, at the National Theatre, Lagos, 2007, Pp. 12-15.
- 32 Abiodun, R., "Identity and the artistic process in the Yoruba aesthetic concept of Iwa", in *Journal of Cultures and Ideas*, vol. 1, no.1 , 1983, p. 14.
- 33 It is crass incivility that makes a country bumpkin enter the City in his *Bante*. Bante is a covering around the waist made from either cloth or leather.
- 34 Jones, J. L., "Performing Osun without Bodies: Documenting the Osun Festival in Print", in *Text and Performance Quarterly*, vol. 17, 1997, p. 73.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 75.
- 36 *Ibid.*, 75.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 75.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 75.
- 39 *Ibid.*, 75.
- 40 Thompson, R. F., *Black Gods and Kings: Yoruba Art at UCLA*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1976, Pp. 1-8.
- 41 Jones, J. L., *op. cit.*, Pp. 83-84.
- 42 Agiri, B. A., "Kola in Western Nigeria, 1850-1950: A History of the Cultivation of Cola Nitida in Egba-Owode, Ijebu-Remo, Iwo and Ota Areas" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1972), and Berry, S., *Cocoa, Custom and Socio-Economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1975.
- 43 In 1898, the Lagos governor helped restructure the Egba political system and centralized power in the Alake, one of the town's four senior kings. The Alake in theory ruled in consultation with a Council comprised of the other senior kings, military and non-military titled men. This structure was largely retained when Abeokuta lost its independence in 1914. See Pallinder-Law, A., "Government in Abeokuta 1830-1914: with special reference to the Egba

United Government, 1898-1914", (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Goteborg University, 1973). For more on the pre-colonial Egba political structure see Biobaku, S. O., "An Historical Sketch of Egba Traditional Authorities", in *Africa*, vol. XXII, 1952, Pp. 35-49, and Biobaku, S. O., *The Egba and Their Neighbours, 1842-1872*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1957.

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National Archive Ibadan, (NAI), ECR 1/1/42, vol. II, Extract from Egba Native Authority's Minutes of Council Meeting, 8 Aug. 1935, p. 1.

*Ibid.*, p. 4.

Their representatives are Oladipo Somoye, a former clerk for UAC; M. A. Egberongbe, a former clerk for one of the Native Courts and John Holt and Co.; J. K. Doherty, a disbarred lawyer from Abeokuta; and William Geary, an English lawyer practicing in Lagos. See National Archive Ibadan, (NAI), ECR I/ 1/46, Letter from Resident to Secretary, Southern Provinces, 24th Apr. 1936.

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## ON “IDEOLOGICAL VIGILANCE”: CONTROLLING DAILY NEWSPAPERS IN ORADEA DURING THE FIRST YEARS OF CEAUȘESCU’S SYSTEM (1966-1970)<sup>1</sup>

Though elite groups and culture consumers in Ceaușescu’s Romania have experienced censorship, its complete history is not yet written. By stock-tacking some techniques of the General Directorate for Press and Printing – Direcția Generală pentru Presă și Tipărituri, the longest-living institution for censoring in the socialist Romania<sup>2</sup> – my study tries to add pieces to this unfinished puzzle. Analyzing mechanisms of control on local newspapers in the 1960s and 1970 (1966-1970), through national and local archive sources and interviews, has three main objectives: to reveal techniques of censoring daily newspapers, to place these strategies in a complex world of the state- communist power and to identify similarities and differences in controlling majority (Romanian) and minority (Hungarian) daily newspapers from Oradea during the above-mentioned decade.

First two issues (describing mechanisms of control and placing them in a matrix of power) are strongly interrelated in the following sections. Though enlisting all aspects of the broader network of control is incomplete, it clearly indicates what an institution of censorship in state-socialist Romania was set up for. As it has already been stated, the GDPP was – by its constitutive act – subordinated to the Communist Party (Kiss, manuscript), being responsible only for effecting the control, not for elaborating its principles, or applying refined techniques of sanctions to the elites. Hence, this paper cannot bring into light the nuanced and sophisticated set of devices used to control citizens of the ceaușist Romania; it describes functions of a mechanical machinery (the GDPP), which – in lack of basic researches on the topic – are still partly unfolded up till now.

A second pillar for my analysis – ethnicizing censorship – claims to contrast the overwhelming idea of minority victimization, related by many members of the Hungarian cultural elite (see for instance Cseke in Petcu, ed. 2005). As repression towards ethnic Hungarians in Ceaușescu's Romania was embedded in assimilationist politics and therefore experienced by almost each member of the minority group, the aim of my paper is not to reject but to nuance this phenomenon.

## **Approaching censorship**

However Romanian censorship-literature proposes to reveal its societal aspects, except one paper (Kiss, manuscript) it has no other aim than mere description of control, in lack of solid theoretical frame (Petcu, 1999; Petcu ed. 2005; Györffy, 2007; Marino, 2000, etc.).<sup>3</sup> Moreover – in many cases –, data collection is rather unsystematic: Ion Zainea, for instance, in his study on the local branch of the General Directorate of Press and Printing from Oradea, selects archive documents without revealing his sampling methods (Zainea, in Petcu 2005). It could be so, as investigations on controlling high culture and public sphere in Romanian state socialism are obstructed by the lack of basic researches and the scanty preservation of documents especially on the last decades of Ceaușescu's regime.

Out of describing – in a, hopefully, systematic way – general mechanisms of controlling daily newspapers, aspects of minority studies' were chosen as theoretical framework for approaching censorship. During state-communism, similarly to the 1920s and 1930s, the Hungarian minority nationalism in Romania was, too, strongly connected with public discourses; it implied not just setting up own institutions but also a textual representation of national aspirations and launching such imagery in the public sphere (Bárdi, 2004; Gáll, 1995; Domokos, 2004). Being in a framework of the (Romanian) nationalizing state, Hungarian cultural nationalism implicitly entailed a minority condition: members of the group had smaller chances to have their nation-building projects accepted, compared to the majority elite. Albeit some scholars deal with minority aspects of censoring, (Lázok in Olti-Gidó eds. 2009; Györffy, 2007 Cseke in Petcu eds. 2005) – except Klára Lázok – they regard controlling Hungarian culture and public sphere through an "isolationist" approach. The above-mentioned authors focus on specificities of the minority censorship and give less stress to its stately designed framework,

common for both Romanian and Hungarian institutions. In order to adjust such empirical insularity, my work proposes a comparison between the censor-interventions on local Hungarian and Romanian newspapers, to avoid a taken for granted approach of minority and majority conditions. Subsequently, this comparison aims to understand whether the sociological term of minority group can be applied to the investigated archive material: according to the literature (for a collection of relevant bibliography see Horváth 2006) minority groups, including ethno-national ones, are not necessarily smaller in number compared to a majoritarian counterpart, their inequality consists in limited access to resources. Contrasting Hungarian and Romanian censored materials (both belonging to the same genre, both being subjected to interventions of the same agents) meant to answer whether the Hungarian press had undergone to a different, more severe treatment compared to the Romanian one.

As it had already been mentioned, the purpose of my study is to compare censor-interventions on the Romanian (*Crișana*) and Hungarian (*Fáklya*) newspapers from Oradea in the first years of Ceaușescu's regime. Out of the availability of data (local archives in Oradea preserved documents on GDPP only from 1966 to 1977, till GDPP and CPP ceased to function), the period for investigation was meaningfully assigned: it meant to complete the contributions of Kiss Ágnes, who has been doing censorship in the Groza and Dej-periods (Kiss, manuscript).

Analyzing local dailies in Oradea has many other reasons: together with a difficult and sophisticated control of *Familia* literary journal, the two newspapers represented a major activity for the local GDPP branch. Though, stock-taking and analyzing interventions on *Familia* would bring into light many nuanced aspects of censorship (see the section on unjustified interventions), I had to renounce its complete presentation. This is due to my limited knowledge on a general framework of the Romanian literature, as well as a lack of a local Hungarian counterpart for the journal.

Two types of methods were used in this paper: the use of local and national archive sources, completed by interviews with former journalists. Added to some unrecorded talks, there were also conducted two recorded interviews: one with a former column-editor in the central Hungarian newspaper in the 1960s and 1970s and his wife, the other with a former woman journalist from the Hungarian daily published in Oradea; in lack of respondents, I have no interviews with the old local Romanian editorial stuff.

Before beginning to picture a larger framework for the ideological control and the mechanisms of censorship, my paper offers some details about the field, the GDPP local branch in Oradea. The local institution of censorship in the town had four members: Teodor Copil, as president of the team, Emilia Bölönyi, Andrei Opriș and Vasile Nagyari, the latter replaced after his emigration in 1970 by Ioan Lenghel. The local institution is responsible for controlling the local periodicals, like *Familia* cultural journal, as well as other publications (brochures, including those of the town museum, secondary-school newspapers). It also controlled the local TV and radio-stations, the import and export of printed matter. Two of the censors were controlling *Familia*, the other two the newspapers.

In accordance with Order 113/1966, the control of literary journals was assigned to local censors, instead of those at the center, in Bucharest. As the archive documents show, for the censors in Oradea it was a difficult task to accomplish:

Though *Familia* journal, is paralelly studied by the Regional Party Committee, there are still some faults in the control. (ANR-DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 3/1967, p. 13)

Or:

It is widely acknowledged that *Familia* is the richest a most difficult domain, I'd say. (ANR-DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 12/1968, p. 8)

## A general context

### 1. Ideological work, or the Party being everywhere

The role and place of the Communist Party is important for understanding censorship. Similarly to the situation in other communist states, the Romanian public sphere was officially subordinated to the party ideology. In order to make citizens familiar with the "true" line, the system set up occasions to "socialize" its people. In the first years of Ceaușescu's rule, party ideologies were conveyed through three main channels: schools and courses, arts, and mass media.

Schools and courses for adult citizens (organized by local party organizations and UTM, the Union of Working Class Youth) was the first

item of this series; in regular school curricula, as well as in the evening “party schools” (*școala de partid*), courses on political economy, dialectical materialism and scientific socialism were organized. Art and literature were equally “charged” with ideological values, which meant that they had to echo the ideological expectations of the system. Subsequently

Writers and fine artists, composers, architects, cinema and theatre people, young and old critics, regardless of national background are active participants together with the whole people in works of art that construct the socialist society. [...] The creators of art in the socialist society have to identify themselves with the aspirations of the working people, to serve the lofty aim of achieving a happier life for all. (9<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, 1965, 95).

Mass-media was the third of these channels responsible for ideological socialization. As the official documents stated:

The Radio and the Television play an important role in disseminating the party politics among the masses, in educating them in the spirit of patriotism and socialist internationalism, in promoting the virtues of our national culture and of the universal one. The Radio-television should permanently enrich the quality of programs, should present a larger variety of topics encompassing all aspects of social life [...]. It has to show an increasing awareness in structuring the programs, in deepening their contribution to the widening of the political and cultural horizon of the masses. (*idem*, 94)

The printed media should have as a central concern (*preocupare*) the mirroring of the of the Party’s internal and external politics [...]. In its pages [the printed media] has to offer systematically large exchanges of opinions on problems regarding the activities of the Party, on state-upbuilding, on economy, on culture and education, as well as on other topics of interest to the community (*interes obșteșc*); [the printed media] has to analyze critically, through a constructive spirit the faults and the deficiencies that occur in different domains (*sectoare*) of our activity, to reveal their causes, and to show ways to avert them. (*ibidem*, 846)

The ideological dependence of the local dailies was even more emphasized, as they were formally declared official fora of the Communist Party. Therefore, they had to express its official viewpoint.

Beyond its claim for ideological subordination, the Communist Party developed a more sophisticated way to control. It even acted as a pre-censorship (Györfy, 2007):

During the reaping or sowing, we had to go to the county branch of the party, not we, I mean the editor-in-chief. (D., former woman-journalist at the Hungarian daily in Oradea)

There was a party activist, called Koppándi, assigned with the Hungarian press from the 1970s to the end. He came to our meetings, told us what to do, and, many times, he just called the editor-in-chief drawing his attention to certain themes. But editors-in-chief, themselves, had often personally visited Ceaușescu, having meetings with him every two weeks, about the current topics. (M., former editor at the Hungarian central daily)

Party guidance and control was sometimes carried out through a complex network of formal and informal, top-down relations between journalists and party bureaucrats:

We had a daily meeting, when L.L. was editor-in-chief. He had no experience in editing, being named by the party, but had good intentions and assigned the work to others [...]. There was a topic for each day, assigned by the party to write an editorial on it. While the local party branch preferred to let the Romanian newspaper know about this assigned topic, we, the Hungarian daily were somehow forgotten. When I.F. was appointed editor-in-chief, our situation became easier, as his brother was working at the Press Committee of the Party in Bucharest. He used to call his brother there, in order to ask, what was the current topic assigned for the editorial column. [...] Then we had to wait for Ceaușescu's daily speech, sent by Agerpress for editing and publishing. Sometimes the speech was translated into Hungarian, I suppose, from the central Hungarian newspaper, but we had to wait for it each day, even for the translated version. Many times I arrived home in the morning, when trams started their service [because I had to wait the speech to arrive]. (D., former woman-journalist from the Hungarian daily)

Or:

It was a day for celebrating the local teaching stuff and the event was observed at the theatre, attended by a party leader, too, who held an endless speech, beginning with Adam and Eve, and finally, reaching the



topic itself: teachers. I didn't know, I wasn't told that his speech should be entirely published in the newspaper, so I took notes only on the part about the teachers. Next day he sent after me, and started yelling: where is my speech? Well, I said, seeing the newspaper on his desk, I didn't know about printing the entire speech, so I didn't take notes. One editor came with me, as we were afraid of a scandal, and yes, I was sanctioned for this; on that moment I promised I'd always take notes on the whole. (D., former woman-journalist from the Hungarian daily)

## **2. Local dailies in the mid-1960s: duplicity in themes**

In order to understand the range and place of the GDPP in the mid-1960s, other aspects of the larger framework should be investigated: the ideological role of the newspapers in those times, as well as the nature of the officially set themes.

One semestrial report submitted by the Oradea GDPP branch describes the two local dailies, whose description could be seen as a general feature for all the Romanian counterparts:

The main domain for the two dailies is the achievement in industry and agriculture. Having a high number of factories with national interest, the two newspapers debate various aspects connected to a good development of production and work, etc. There is a high number of articles on the scientific organization of production, dealing with factories from different areas: light-, heavy, and local industry. (ANR-DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 3/1967, p. 30)

So the two dailies are dealing with the following topics: operative planning (of production), efficient use of work capacities, extension of modern working methods, application of scientific researches in production, formation of working collectives, importance of saving materials, the Central Committee's reglementation of the working time, higher efficiency in work, investments, increasing local productivity, reducing local production costs, mobilizing tools for accelerating agricultural work, activity of commercial units, highlighting negative aspects in purchasing and serving the population (ANR-DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 3/1967, p. 30-32).

The above stock-taking clearly shows the role of mass media, which has to mirror (the local) industrial and agricultural achievements, in line with the official party ideologies. Still, a more detailed analysis may show

how such themes had to – and synchronically did not – follow the official ideologies. The annexes contain a database with a description of themes from the two dailies in Oradea, based on all the articles published during a week time. In doing so I tried to preserve their original place in the newspaper, having in mind that the positioning on the page should be relevant (most important columns are on page 1, and so on). Even though the two dailies follow the ideological line set up by the Communist Party, dealing with “transposing into life” of official political line, they convey some credibility to their readers, due to:

- a relatively open treatment of the themes assigned by party documents: in a interview with freshly graduated students, future teachers in rural schools, one respondent openly affirms: “I don’t run from the village, but I would if I could.” (Annex nr. 1). Similarly, from an article on problems regarding the young generation in Sântimreu (a village in Bihor county), local parents are astound because, at the initiative of the local leader of the Communist Youth Organization, their children are forbidden to attend the dancing-balls in the village. It is unfair – affirm the parents – as kids from the neighboring village can participate to such events. Besides presenting all viewpoints, the article gives a description of the local school, draws mini-portraits of the parents and the youth-leader (*Fáklya*, 6<sup>th</sup> of July/1968, p. 2). Other article reveals opinions of teachers, who declare, they cannot serve as a positive example for the future generations (*Fáklya*, 3<sup>rd</sup> of July/1968, p. 2). Many social problems are presented relatively open in newsprint, true, in a moralizing tone: the *Crișana* publishes a reader’s letter, a mother of two children, who has been abandoned by her husband. In order to solve the problem, journalists leave for Tulcea to find and talk to the father, pursuing him to return. Though, their task remains unaccomplished, the article concludes: “Being a party-member [the father], we wait for the local party branch from Tulcea to communicate us the communists’ viewpoint on a runaway father.” (*Crișana*, 9<sup>th</sup> of January, 1968, p. 3).

- Some credibility of the local newspapers is given by their initial role, that of publishing news of interest to the general public: cultural events, TV, radio or movie programs, news on the latest goods purchasable in the stores (clothes, shoes, etc.). Newspapers also share information about the production of such goods, interviews with engineers and workers contributing to their manufacture, etc. (see for instance a presentation of a new factory in Marghita in Annexes).

- Personalizing figures involved in agricultural and industrial achievements also put ideological line aside. Many articles use a familiar tone to present such (official) themes, depicting portraits of the local engineers, peasants, workers, agents of new technical achievements, as well as their conflicts with colleagues. József Bráta from Ciocaia, “who tries to find some time each day to visit the tomato-seedlings” applies innovative methods in the agricultural co-operative. First results of implementing new technologies bring a decrease in the number of seedlings, causing suspicion among the colleagues. At the request of engineer Bráta, implementation goes on, seedlings are recalculated and – finally – their number increases. (*Fáklya*, 6<sup>th</sup> of July/1968, p. 1). Though newspapers are frequently presenting new decisions and events from the assemblies and plenaries of different party and youth organizations, readers can also learn, how these activists spent New Year’s Eve: where were they partying, what dishes were served, etc. (*Crișana*, 1<sup>st</sup> of January/1969).

On the other hand, one has to mention the limitations of such a liberty of speech and expression: portraits conferring familiarity to political activists, stories of agricultural achievements with their human sides and stories told, all these sometimes replaced the publishing of important problems and topics:

When I was assigned with topics of mass-culture, I had to follow in the county the performances held in the rural community arts center: *Cântarea României* and *Nuntașii din Bihor*. There were no Hungarian poems, occasionally one Hungarian folk dance among many Romanian ones, and there was no heating in the hall. But during my stay I talked a lot with the local teachers, who told me about their condition. That they had to do many extra work: operator for the census, organizer of festivities for children with poems and dances. And no one pays them. Their condition was worse than that of the local engineers or doctors who were allocated apartments to live in, or liquefied gas bottles of propane-butane, but these people were given nothing. Of course, it was impossible to write about such topics, and I did not want to lie them, by writing something false, so I wrote about local families, local balls, local portraits, this is how I proceeded. (D., former woman-journalist at the Hungarian daily)

An important theme for the local newspapers in the 1960s was the “reveling” of insufficiencies in serving the citizens. Albeit, it was a topic in line with the official ideologies (see above the role of the printed media as in the Congress documents), to criticize the shortage in supply and services

was of interest for the readers, too. Articles on bad purchase of goods in local stores describe not only problems and needs of either shop-keepers or customers, but their preferences and suggestions, too. (*Fáklya*, 6<sup>th</sup> of July/1968, p. 3). Critics on bad quality provision and services present either in articles or in reader's letters addressed to the newspapers. In *Moral Satisfaction*, a reader relates, how he was attended in a local butchery:

The butcher seemed quite keen to attend me under one condition, if he attaches to my one kilogram of pork meet another one kilo of lamb. At the end of our quarrel, he invoked even God himself, to whom each consumer can address his complains [...]. Well, in my view, it wasn't quite proper mentioning God, as in Oradea He is not in charge with supplying goods. (*Fáklya*, 5<sup>th</sup> of July/1968, p. 1).

In some, supposingly not too many, cases quality of allocation increases due to the newspaper's intervention: after an article on bad supplying of fresh vegetables in a grocery from Episcopia Bihor, according to a new article, the shopkeeper resigns. (*Fáklya*, 5<sup>th</sup> of July/1968, p. 2)

As stock-taking of newspaper themes may show, in the first years of Ceaușescu's regime, it was the official ideology itself that left a niche for system critics and, somehow, free speech (embedded in complains about supply with goods). True, levels of such "liberty" are questionable, still, it is worth to be mentioned. On the other hand, personalizing official agents and events was a technique that conveyed certain familiarity and credibility to the newspapers, and helped the readers to "swallow" their ideological framework.

### **3. The Directorate as a sophisticated institution in a complex system of power**

Beyond the above-mentioned reasons (complexity of an external framework for control, sophisticated implementation of ideological themes), the Directorate itself was an institution difficult to grasp for a scholarly analysis. Though, there are many aspects of its refined functioning, I shall mention now just two, both referring to the same period of time and field of activity, both dealing with problems in discerning the GDPP institutional borders. Due to such overarching presence, duty of control is (almost) equally performed either by official censors or (outside the institution) by producers of culture:

Censorship was in fact the last link. First, there was the column editor, who looked through the manuscript, then he discussed with the editor-in-chief, whether it could or not be published, then came the “clear head”, the last to read the whole page after the newspaper was done, and then came the censor. Normally, responsibility was taken by the editor-in-chief. Thus, the literary column was edited by him, who knew exactly what to keep in and what to filter out. (M., former editor at the Hungarian central newspaper)

Second in this line is complicity of censors; this “we know and they know” – attitude that conveyed a flexibility of the borders between cultural producers and censors, representatives and critics of the system:

In those times I was editor at the weekly *A Hét*. [...] Censors were, too, human beings, up to a certain moment. There was for instance, Rosi, not a girl, but a censor, Rosenberg, on duty with controlling the press. We played ping-pong with him, in a shift, as we knew he likes playing ping-pong, and the more we play, the less time he has for control. He knew it and we knew it. (Láng in Balázs ed. 1998, 120)

Such difficulties in grasping institutions of control made – in my opinion – possible its relatively soft reframing in 1977, the year when – as ideology stated – censorship in Romania disappeared:

Censorship had not been vanished after 1977, only the framework was changed, as censors of the 1960s and 1970s were transferred to daily newspapers. Well, not everyone, some started a new life, some remained. Our censor, for instance, was a guy from Oradea, who, after 1977, had been appointed as editor to our newspaper; we shared the same office and got along well. His work there was, in fact, a good thing for the editor-in-chief, who, hereby, acquired an external person within the newspaper. At the beginning, R. was “tested”: your tasks remain unchanged – said the editor to him – You would come, as usual, a bit later than the others and look through the manuscripts, and signal to me the most important problems. And so it was, R. went to the editor and informed him. Well, the editor did not convey such things to us directly at the meetings, but pointed out some issues: themes from industry and agriculture, numbers of production, he suggested some directions. After three months R. became a real editor, he worked as a political responsible, a sort of a weekly editor, like many of us. (M., former journalist at the central Hungarian daily)

## Stages in the activity of control

By and large, a local GDPP branch, settled at the (Western) border, had the following duties: controlling the local press, the local publishing houses, the customs (import-export of printed matter), local cultural journals, school newspapers and newsletters, local mass media.

The daily activity of censoring newspapers in the counties had the following phases (according to the official documents): acquiring necessary knowledge on the party-line in order to become ideologically “vigilant” enough, having discussions with the editors (guiding them in order to know what to filter out), controlling the freshly outprinted proof sheets in the publishing house and filtering out banned topics, reporting unclear cases to the center in Bucharest or to the local party branch, in order to ask their advice, analyzing the interventions of the previous day, submitting notes of interventions and undergoing the overall supervision in accordance with the Directorate for Instructing and Controlling in Bucharest.

Most of the archive documents stress on the ideological training, regarded as a highly important phase of a censors’ work:

Being aware that only a permanent political and ideological training, as well as an industrious familiarization with the working dispositions can make us efficient, our team gave special attention to acquiring the Romanian Communist Party’s documents on the 10<sup>th</sup> Congress, likewise other party materials issued before that. (ANR-DJ BH, fond DGPT, d.20/1969, p. 1)

Documents that “needed an industrious study and acquiring” (ANR-DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 3/1966, p. 2.), in order to “raise the level of ideological training” (ANR, fond CPT, d.3/1966, p. 7), in other words to make justified interventions, are in fact of three types: book of dispositions with all its changes (containing state, military and industrial secrets under the form of a quantified, factual information). Second type: party and state documents, meant to help in familiarization with the “right” ideological line: Congress materials, Central Committee decisions, Ceaușescu’s speeches, political-ideological journals like *Lupta de clasă*, *Scânteia*, *Analele Institutului de Istorie*, studies on different moments of national history. A third type, rare for controlling newspapers, but frequent in censoring high culture, comprised literary journals with ideological articles on rules to be followed in the literary creation, literary genres: *Contemporanul*, *Gazeta Literară*. It is worth to be mentioned, that the lectures were following a certain script, in order to increase efficiency of purchasing and reading all the materials:

To assure lecturing for all important materials, we have a book of notes with all the articles recommended from the central press. We put down article title, newspaper, date of issuing and a cell for signatures. If a comrade have read the material, puts his signature in the right cell. (ANR, fond CPT, d.1966-1969, p. 136)

Beside an individual procession of dispositions and other ideological materials, these were subjected to common discussions within the local branches. Such discussions served to standardize the possible questions and answers on the margins of the ideological texts in order to increase (and thus make efficient) the control itself:

Thus, for the analyzed period, we had studied individually and discussed collectively, in close relation to documents of the 9<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Romanian Communist Party [the following documents]. (ANR – DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 3/1967, p. 2)

Processing ideological materials is followed by the second stage, the proper work of controlling, distinguishable into three types:

- Consulting newspaper editors, who ask for censors' "help" in publishing or not certain manuscripts:

When unusual issues appear, editors consult us, thus we can prevent possible problems with the printing houses. Thus, editors have consulted us with issues like: building a new, 12-levelled hotel in Arad. Does it go? Yes! Can we right about day nurseries? What do you want to write? How are toys used there. We'd consult the GDPP. We talked to comrade Blegoiev, yes, go on. School workshops? NO, if it's about theoretical high schools, though it was not recorded in the book of dispositions. (ANR, fond CPT, d.1966-1969, p. 136)

- The mere process of controlling has, starting with daily interventions on the proofsheets each night, in the printing house:

Now we have a separate office at the printing house for a better efficiency in our work. We also have collections of newspapers, brochures, dictionaries, the book of dispositions, the GDPP documentary, etc. Work usually starts at 9 p.m. and ends at 1 or 2 a.m. (ANR, fond CPT, d.1966-1969, p. 136)

A similar process was revealed in one of my interviews:

The editorial staff had its own censors, who were in the printing house each night. He had a notebook, containing forbidden and free issues to publish. He checked his notebook and decided whether to filter out something or not. If his answer was negative, we had to replace the article in question, so we were always prepared for that; thus sending more than one article was a common practice. The aim of this process was to hide the existence of censorship, not to leave a blank hole in the newspaper. (D., former woman-journalist from the local Hungarian daily)

- Verifying the *Agerpress* news, as these were the grounds for writing the domestic and external news:

The most important *Agerpress* stuff – party and state leader’s speeches – are usually confronted; the Hungarian text with its Romanian original, word by word. In a few cases, as a result of co-reading, the Romanian text was corrected in *Flacăra Roșie*, the article being sent incorrectly from *Agerpress*. Examples: Romanian version of *Agerpress* news – speaking about a visit of our leaders to the Mureș–Hungarian Autonomous Region, in Târnăveni: what was achieved in a factory in one year-time, now it’s achieved in a month. They’d omitted, what year are they talking about. When the text was faced in the two newspapers, they made a correction and wrote: what was achieved in a year in 1938, now is achieved in a month. (ANR, fond CPT, d.1966-1969, p. 137).

Naturally, the process of control is full of unpredictable events. In solving difficult cases, censors have the following options:

- Discussing with their local colleagues, in order to decide about the fate of an intervention and find solutions for correcting it:

We have different methods for a more efficient control. If problems occur, the comrades are consulting each other, be it a political matter or a problem with the GDPP dispositions. (ANR, fond CPT, d.1966-1969, p. 136).

- Consulting the GDPP superiors from Bucharest:

Delay is, too, used as a working method. We have few of such cases, but still, there are some. So was with the article entitled “Friend and false attorney”, related in our meeting in Bucharest. After reading the article, I



consulted comrade Becuța [responsible in Bucharest for the region], then asked for delaying the publication. The case was reported to Bucharest during a phone call. Then I sent the article at once, through rapid mail, and the GDPP confirmed, I was right. It is quite seldom for an article to be delayed. The GDPP intervenes at once and tells us what to do. (ANR, fond CPT, d.1966-1969, p. 136-137).

- Consulting the local party branch: "in the most important issues, being at the core of the propaganda, we were helped by the County Cabinet of the Party, who suggested us themes regarding the socialist state". (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 20/1969, p. 8) or: "we were given assistance by the County Cabinet of the Party in solving some difficult issues". (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 20/1969, p. 2.)

After filtering out banned themes, and making the interventions, these are discussed within the local staff, submitted to the Directorate for Instruction and Control in Bucharest and to the local party branch. Through submitting, the local GDPP branch fulfils a self-control and standardizes techniques and solutions:

Each Monday we hold a meeting, where interventions are analyzed and problems debated. [...] By doing so, each comrade finds out his tasks. (*ibidem*, p. 138)

Or more exactly:

Delayed articles are studiously debated within the team. In the evening these are discussed between the comrades on duty, next day by the whole team. Otherwise, this procedure is also used for solving smaller problems, thus all comrades know all the issues and can solve them in accordance with decisions taken. (ANR, fond CPT, d.1966-1969, p. 138)

The process of sending interventions to Bucharest and the analysis of the local censor's activity performed by the Directorate of Instructing and Control are materialized in periodical notes on interventions, semestrial and trimestrial reports, observations, referata (see for instance ANR-DJ BH, fond DGPT, d.3/1967, p. 32; *Dare de seamă* II/1966, d.3/1967, p. 16-30). The importance of the DIC shows, in fact, the existence of supercontrol within the institutions (see details in the section on wrong interventions).

Transmitting the important interventions to the local party branch has many functions: on one hand, it can lead to sanctioning the journalists. Secondly, by submitting the notes on interventions, the local GDPP branch is controlled:

When special situations occur, we inform comrade Moț, secretary on propaganda matters in the town committee. We did so, with a delayed article from a theatrical program [...]. At the end of each month we submit a written report on interventions in the local newspapers and on problems with other institutions. (ANR, fond CPT, d.1966-1969, p. 138)

## Interventions and types of interventions

Archive materials give evidence to three types of interventions operated in the newspaper proofsheets: political-ideological, on working dispositions and on state secrets; in a different classification there are “good” and unjustified interventions (*intervenții bune și nejustificate*). But a careful analysis may inform about the formality of such categories. Though – in accordance with official sources – interventions “on political-ideological matters [deal with cases when a] biased treatment on our party’s position [occurred] (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d.12/1968, p.11), understanding this category needs additional investigations. According to one fragment from notes of interventions: “One, of the political-ideological interventions made on the daily *Făclia*, nr. 146 of 23<sup>th</sup> of July [1967], refers to the recruitment of students for a vocational school of hotel business in France. [...]. Important to mention that two delegates of the local branch, having in mind that there is impossible to publish such and advertisement, consulted the permanent service of the GDPP in Bucharest, where a decision was made on filtering out the add, signing similar ones in the future, as it is impossible to publish such information in the press.” (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d.3/1967, p. 17)

Not only this advert, but a letter from a reader is, too, stopped from publishing. The author of the letter wants to know “whether the years spent in the USSR with work of reconstruction, could be accepted as years in service”. The censors argue that “as the citizen is of German origin [who spent years in working camps in the USSR after 1945, as a punishment because of his ethnic belonging, similar to the Nazi war-enemies], both

the question and the answer are eliminated.” (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d.16/1968, p. 19-20)

A similar type can be traced in the case of interventions, which meant to preserve state secrets or follow working dispositions; most of these issues refer to simple, quantifiable information, like military ranks, location of industrial objectives, location of sport camps (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 12/1968, p. 10). But in some cases, relevant information should be filtered out through censoring: “From *Crișana* nr. 51, of 1<sup>st</sup> of March [1968] it was taken out the article *And Still, There is a Chance* by Florica Maștei, dealing with the functioning of a school for children with special needs. The article is generally negativist, presenting the miserable conditions of the children. Intervention was made as of page 34, point 3 in the book of dispositions.” (ANR-DJ BH, fond DGPT, d.16/1968, p.19). The disposition in question informs: “The organization and the functioning of educational institutions for children with physical, sensorial and mental deficiencies are published with permission of the leaders from Ministry of Education.” (ANR, fond CPT, d.69/1968, p. 34)

As the four fragments above reveal, the classification of the interventions given by the censors has a more formal logic. In my view, a relevant distinction of interventions should be made in accordance with their meaning and importance: some omissions are not compromising the whole newspaper article, meanwhile many others do (those about working camps in the USSR, or not mentioning poor conditions in schools). Thus, two main categories of interventions should be named: meaningful or less meaningful ones.

### **Local interventions**

In lack of relevant statistics for a longer period of time, I tried to make up one for the single complete year of 1968, when records of interventions on the two newspapers were complete. As Annexes 2 clearly show, the majority of the interventions are meaningless, more exactly, they are not compromising the meaning of the entire article. Omissions of this kind refer to “*Minierul* soccer team, which played in Petru Groza town” (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 3/1968, p.12), or the omission of a location, where the Romanian Railways’ patriotic guard is settled (*ibidem*, p. 80).

In accordance with my database, there are no significant differences in the number of the occurrences of mechanical (less meaningful) or

meaningful interventions made on the two newspapers. In 1968 there were made 28 mechanical and 11 meaningful interventions in *Crișana*, 27 and 16 in *Fáklya*.

Based on archive documents, I discerned the meaningful interventions into six main categories: those on party issues, the social ones, ethnic (Hungarian or Romanian) ones, historical ones, and those referring to external politics. The first category contains “biased” (from the official viewpoint) interventions on the history of communism, on the role of the Communist Party, on the role of state-communism, etc. With regard to an interview given by the Romanian poet Mihai Beniuc, it is said: “We have to achieve our liberty. Omitted, argument: our liberty has been achieved 30 years ago [when the state-communist system was settled in Romania].” (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 30/1970, p. 62). Social interventions are omissions of socially relevant topics: social phenomena, social categories. In an article published by the Hungarian newspaper, references to a trial of a person, condemned for sexual perversions was omitted: “In *Fáklya* of the 31<sup>st</sup> of July, the article *Beyond the Trial*, by Implon Irén, which dealt with a closed trial of a citizen, accused with sexually pervert behavior. The author gives an analysis on youth education, to prevent people from these situations. As a result of consulting comrades Copil Teodor and Fodor Alexandru, secretary of the County Committee of the Party, it was decided the elimination of the article.” (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 30/1970, p. 57). In *Crișana*, the mentioning of a night-shift of women and young people was omitted, as such a topic was banned by the working dispositions (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 16/1968, p. 38).

Historical interventions imply omitting representations of the past, different from the official ones: “Robotos Imre’s article, dealing with the moral problem of making tests on living humans, by alluding to the book of the local physician Nyiszli, who condemns the tests on human beings effectuated by Mengele.” (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 16/1968, p. 61)

Interventions of ethnic values contain omissions of ethno-cultural themes, banned by the official representations of inter-ethnic relations and past: In an article in *Fáklya* – evoking the life of Gheorghe Barițiu – it is specified: “1867, the year of setting up the Austrian-Hungarian dualism, was a turning point in Barițiu’s life: from then on, his attention focused on history. The fragment was eliminated, as it presents in a positive light the dualism, that in fact deepened the Romanians’ subordination in Transylvania.” (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 16/1968, p. 51)

Interventions on Hungarian ethnic themes are quite various and rich, containing different representations of the minority group. From an article in *Crișana* a reference is omitted on the first Hungarian presence in the 19<sup>th</sup> century on the current territory of Romania (ANR-DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 16/1968, p. 17). From a series in *Fáklya*, entitled *Portraits from Bihor*, a fragment is eliminated in an article on the most important figure of the 17<sup>th</sup> century Hungarian literature, Pázmány Péter: "In introduction the author wrote: He was a sun, lifegiver of the planet, for the indigenous homeland of the 17<sup>th</sup> century [...]. On our recommendation, the fragment is omitted." (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 16/1968, p. 39). Other intervention on *Crișana* states: "In administrative-territorial units inhabited by ethnics other than Romanians, citizens of non-Romanian nationalities are elected for the local state organs. To our suggestion the fragment was replaced by: citizens of non-Romanian nationalities were, too, elected." (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT , d. 16/1968, p. 67).

The last type of interventions refers to external politics. Though, as Lázok points out, "the Transylvanian problem", as well as that of Bessarabia, were ethno-political taboos, here the foreign policy denotes a relation to states with which Romania had no territorial disputes: "Ioan Antoniu Vanica, foreman at Înfrățirea factory from Oradea, recalls the dramatic experience lived during his illegal stay in Austria, during a trip made in the summer of 1966. Vanica relates of his twelve months abroad, when – during his illegal stay – he was submitted to the severe lager regime, under police control. [...]. As we find ourselves close to comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu's visit in Austria, the publishing of the article seemed to be improper." (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT , d. 30/1970, p. 75).

## **Wrong or unjustified interventions**

Discussing unjustified interventions is essential for understanding the system itself. According to the archive documents, in 1966 only, 44 interventions were made by the censors in the two dailies and the local literary journal, out of which, 6 were unjustified: one in *Fáklya*, the other five in *Familia*. In the case of *Fáklya* "comrade Opriș intervened to eliminate the assumption that cultural entertainment are exclusively for men. Obviously, the author referred to it figuratively, without restricting women's right for entertainment." (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT , d. 3/1967 p. 20).

The five unjustified interventions in *Familia* are of a different content, due to the complex summary of the journal. Thus, censors eliminated – without the consent of the Directorate for Instruction and Control – a fragment stating that “a contemporary historian started revealing the truth from Goethe” (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT , d. 3/1967 p.22). In a different article, the local censors filtered out that “effects of industrialization would cease differentiation between village and city”, though – as the supercontrollers remark – “there is no allusion to it in the text. [In the same manner, local censors claimed one article] to reveal, what is made for people in socialist states, similarly to our one, though the author did not propose such a thing. [...]„ I have to point out that we have approached some documents with an insufficient level of documentation. [...] In nr. 9 of the journal comrade Copil has stopped upon the last rows of the poem *The Shadow* by I. Covaci, which seemed to him prophetic in the negative sense (*profetic in sens negativ*) “as we will always live in dark, as we are followed by a fear, that rolls over.”

In the same number of the journal, comrade Copil marked

[the article] *A voice losing its singer* by D. Solomon that – in a discussion between the author and his friend – plays down, or misses to notice the literary production from our country; [... literature in the author's view] is sinking into simplicity since 16 years; [he also thinks] that everything can be written today, as the past is regarded like the ash. I have to underline that all the delegates have stopped upon this problem.

So, an industrious training on political, ideological and cultural issues has to be the central focus of our attention, each delegate having the duty to learn as much as possible in the field he considers to have insufficiencies (*goluri*). (AJ-BH, fond DGPT, d3-1967, p. 22)

Other sources of mistakes are the limited knowledge on working dispositions:

Comradine Bölönyi could not resolve the news on the issuing of journals at the secondary school in Sebiş. The dispositions indicate to mention the news about them, but the fact that they are printed is hidden or remains unclear. A similar case happened to comrade Opreş Andrei with an item of news on the *Alumina* factory, relating the directorate's initiative to produce steel for its own needs. [...]. Comrade Opreş, in lack of enough loyalty, applied to this article a disposition on new industrial objectives [banned mentioning their production of steel] (ANR- DJ BH, fond DGPT, d. 3/1967 p. 8).

Since the misuse of the working dispositions is a broader issue, some clarifications should be added to explain this local case. As archive documents clearly show, a book of dispositions contains a set of formal, quantifiable, usually meaningless restrictions (the filtering out of references to industrial objectives, to soccer camps, etc.). Such data are not just difficult to memorize but subjected to a permanent change (nullified or completed with new ones) by the center. It is no wonder that local censors skip some of them during their work. Moreover, the book requires partial banning for some dispositions and total banning for others: e.g., printed matters are free to mention power plants on the Olt, Siret, Râul Mare, Sebeș and other rivers, but total restriction is applied for the thermal power station in Deva (ANR, fond CPT, d.20/1966, p. 9). As concerns the additions for the book: in 1966 the GDPP leaders had issued 27 documents, with 10-15 pages each, to modify it. Subsequently, it is clear that the misuse of the book reveals systemic insufficiencies and not simply mistakes of the censors.

## Conclusions

First conclusion refers to the complexity in the mechanisms of control. The institution of censorship is but one piece in a complex of power, having the Communist Party (and, probably the Securitate) in its core. Moreover, banning and freedom of speech is connected not just to censorship, but also to the way official ideologies are set up: speaking about the real living conditions, appraising the purchasing of and allocation with goods were in fact a niche encouraged by the official party-line, not a proper initiative of the journalists. In this sense, the institution of censorship is nothing but a machinery, observing the party rules; subsequently, analyzing institutions of censorship – alone – can but partly relate how freedom of speech was restricted in Ceaușescu's Romania: it can only tell, how *one unit* responsible for control was functioning.

Top-bottom construction and subjectivity are core features for the GDPP and its local branch, whose delegates are permanently asking for the advice of their superiors in Bucharest; meanwhile, the letters re-evaluate their interventions. But the supercontrol (so common for other censoring institutions, see Leftwich – Curry for Poland) is accompanied by subjectivity during the activity of control; discerning good interventions from unjustified ones is a decision of a few people, as it is highlighted

from archive fragments on controlling dailies and the literary review. And introducing subjectivity in the process of control has two faces: on one hand it increases the central core of censorship, filtering out individual decisions and power of local branches, on the other hand it gives a certain fragility to the system: in the case of interventions on literary issues, subjective selection of right and wrong makes room for unjustified interventions. The misuse of working dispositions, as well as the sophisticated upbuilding of the GDPP, underline the above-mentioned systemic fragility of censorship, and give more solid grounds to regard it as a powerful, but similarly brittle construction. Due to its dichotomy, the institution of censorship embodies and reinforces state-communist duplicity (Kligman, 1998, Verdery, 1994): claiming to totalize power, but unable to stop “leaking” strains of freedom of speech and expression.

My second conclusion is on ethnicizing censorship, as it comes out from a – more or less – comparative database of newspaper-interventions. Though, it is quite clear, “the Hungarian themes” are marginalized, the representation of the Hungarian minority subordinated to the framework of the nation-state, this inferiority is a contextual one. It is so, as many “Hungarian topics”, such as ethnic past, representation of minorities in local councils, are not just ethnic, but political taboos, equally banned for either a Romanian, or a Hungarian editorial staff. Secondly, the database clearly shows that the number and frequency of interventions are not significantly different in Romanian and Hungarian newspapers, which – as Annexes 1 may reveal – do not have relevant differences in their themes.

Taking a local cultural field as a research unit may nuance the understanding of ethnicity in censorship. Though the following argument needs further clarifications, it is worth mentioning that, from the censors’ viewpoint, controlling *Familia* is “the big issue”, bigger and harder to comprehend than the issue of the Hungarian daily. In other words: a mechanical approach to a more severe control for the Hungarian field does not help us to get a nuanced comprehension of censorship and, implicitly, of the political power in Ceaușescu’s Romania.



## ANNEXES

**Annex 1.** A comparative analysis of Romanian and Hungarian daily newspaper contents (same year, same period of time).

**1<sup>st</sup> of July, 1969**

○ **Page 1.**

➤ *Fáklya*

- *Székelyhíd pártszervezeteinek konferenciája* – Conference of the local party organizations in Săcuieni

- *Bihar megyei termékek hírneve*: Bihar megyei vállalatok exportja: ki, hova exportál? – interjú az Exportcikkeket Ellenőrző Hivatal váradi vezetőjével – Goods exported by local factories – interview with the director of the Office for Controlling the Exported Goods.

- *Tanerők ünnepi ülése* (tudósítás) – Festive assembly of the local teaching staff.

- *Betakarítás Remetén*. Interjú az mgtsz elnökével, utána, megjegyzés: “Tehát két hektárnyi aratnivaló jut egy-egy csoportra. Ez nem sok, de ha figyelembe vesszük, hogy esett az eső ...” – Harvesting campaign at Remete. Interview with the agricultural-cooperative leader, followed by a journalist remark: “So each group had to harvest two hectares. Not much, but if we have in mind the rain ...”

- *Eminescu emlékünnepe* a Színházban (csak román résztvevőkkel). Tudósítás. – Eminescu commemoration at the local theatre, report. Romanian participants only.

- *Jó elmondani*: hogy valósítják meg a Ruhagyárban a kongresszus követelményeit: “milyen jó, hogy szóba kerülnek, hogy a textilgyáriak elmondhatják, a száz szövőgép helyett ma 320 automata és félautomata zakatol, (...), évi 100 000 m2 szőttes helyett 1968-ban 7 738 m2-t adtak a nemzetgazdaságnak” – *Good to Speak Out*: how Congress goals are “achieved” in the local light industry: “it is good to speak out that the textile factory instead of 100 sewing machine, today 320 automatic and semi-automatic ones are clattering (...), instead of a 100 000 m2 material, produced per year, in 1968 were woven 7 738 m2.”

➤ *Crișana*

- Două materiale despre realizările locale ale Congresului X – Two articles on local congress achievements.

- Produse bihorene: material identic. Local products exported: identical document.

- *Posibilități sporite pentru valorificarea rezervelor în agricultură: realizări locale în agricultură. Increased possibilities for valorifying agricultural resources: local achievements in agriculture.*

- *Adunarea festivă a cadrelor didactice: identical.*

- *Comemorarea lui Eminescu, identical - Commemorating Eminescu (Obituary to Eminescu): identical.*

- *Două știri pe scurt despre industrie – two short news about industry.*

- *Cântec pentru țară – însemnări. – Song for Motherland – notes.*

o **Page 1.**

➤ *Fáklya*

- *Krónika* (elégedetlenségek): “Vasárnap a strand pénztáránál minden halandó egy lejt fizetett, mivel bent barátságos vízilabda-mérkőzést játszottak - vala. (...) Már rég otthon ebédeltek a játékosok, amikor Kriza néni Kalangyafalváról még mindig köteles volt 1 lej fizetni. Hogy lássa, ímhol az a híres váradi medence, ahol pár órája még javában pólóztak.”

- *Cronicle*: (on complains): “Each mortal had to pay one lei at the cash desk of the pool, as a polo game took place there – couple of hours ago. (...) The players had already begun their lunch when aunt Kriza from Kalangyafalva was still obliged to pay one leu. In order to see where this famous pool from Oradea could be, where the polo game took place – a couple of hours ago.”

- *Sport, mozi, Tvműsor, gyászjelentés, apróhirdetés. Štiri de sport, program de cinema și tv, mica publicitate, decese - Sport news, TV and movie programs, obituaries, classified advertisements.*

- *Jól sikerült szakmai vetélkedő: beszámoló Szatmár, Bihar, Kolozs megye KISZ tagjainak vetélkedőjéről “a legjobb szabó” címért. Színes közbeszólások: “A zsúfolásig telt teremben végig jó hangulat uralkodott. Régen láttunk már ilyen magasszintű vetélkedőt, s a fiatalok ilyen sportszerű viselkedését.” - A Successful Competition: presentation on the professional contest for “the best tailor” – award, between Young Communist Organization Members of Bihor, Cluj, Satu-Mare counties. “The atmosphere in the crowded hall was tensioned. Such a good competition and such a sportsmen-attitude of the youngsters couldn’t be seen for ages.”*

- *Értelmetlen halál a közutakon: moralizáló írás a gyorsajtásról - Senseless death on the roads: value-set article on exceeding speed limits.*

➤ *Crișana*

- Sport, emisiuni TV, mică publicitate – sports, tv program, classified advertisements.

- *Reuniunea de cântări*: ansamblul Hilaria, și spectacolul său de vechi cântece bihorene. Reportaj: cine ce cântă. *Gathering with songs*: Hilaria singing assembly performing old songs from Bihor region. News on titles of performances, names of performers.

- *Note de spectator*: evaluarea performanței SC Crișul. *Notes of supporters*: evaluation of the performance of Crișul FC.

○ **Page 2.**

➤ *Fáklya*

- Eminescu-ünnepség, folytatás – Eminescu Commemoration, continuation.

- Székelyhídi pártszervezet, folytatás – Săcuieni local party branch, continuation.

- Tanerők gyűlése, folytatás – Teacher's meeting, continuation.

- Bihari termékek, folytatás – Local products from Bihor, continuation.

- Képzőművészeti kiállítás Székelyhídon: művész és műtárgy neve – fine art exhibition at Săcuieni, names of artists and titles of works of art.

- Diószegi téesz: mennyit termelnek – CAP din Diosig – The Agricultural Production Co-operative from Diosig, how much they produce.

➤ *Crișana*

- Produse bihorene, continuare – local products, continuation.

- Posibilități ale agriculturii, IAS Oradea – Possibilities in agriculture, the State Agricultural Enterprise of Oradea.

- Olimpiada Croitorului – Competition of “the best tailor”.

- Eminescu, continuare – Eminescu, continuation.

- Cadre didactice, continuare – Teachers, continuation.

- *Viața de partid*: rubrică, organizația din Petru Groza – *Party Life*: column, the party branch in Petru Groza.

○ **Page 3.**

Știri interne și externe Agerpres, identic – Domestic and international news based on Agerpress sources, identical.

**2<sup>nd</sup> of July, 1969**

○ **Page 1.**

➤ *Fáklya*

- Publicarea documentelor de partid scoase cu ocazia congresului X – party documents issued on the occasion of the 10<sup>th</sup> Congress.

- NC la Constanța – NC in Constanța.

- Local news: *Arta* factory (tan-yard) produced 24 000 bags. The beginning of raffia production at *Arta*.

- Concertul Hilaria – the Hilaria concert: 50-100 words.

- Congresul cosmeticienelor în Viena – the congress of cosmeticians in Viena

➤ *Crișana*

- Publicarea documentelor de partid scoase cu ocazia congresului X – party documents published on the occasion of the 10<sup>th</sup> Congress.

- NC la Constanța – NC in Constanța.

- Grădini de legume: lucrări de sezon – seasonal works at the vegetable gardens.

- Reportaj despre IASuri, începuturile însămânțării – report about the State Agricultural Enterprises: the beginning of seeding.

- Nouă fabrică la Marghita: cum arată, ce va produce, interviu cu angajați – new factory in Marghita: outlook, future products, interview with future employees.

○ **Page 2.**

➤ *Fáklya*

- *Cronica (Krónika)*: neajunsuri, plângeri. În locuința magazinierului clubului sportiv *Recolta*, din Săcuieni, cade ploaia. – *Cronica*: complain. In the dwelling of the storeman of sports club *Recolta*, from Săcuieni, it's raining.

- Sfaturi juridice – legal advice.

- Programe, decese, mica publicitate – programs, obituaries, classified advertisements.

- *Csendes delelott (Amiază silențioasă)*: doi copii din Aleșd se joacă cu o piatră în fața cofetăriei – two kids from Aleșd are rolling a stone in front of the sweetshop.

➤ *Crișana*

- Documente de congres, continuare – congress documents, continuation.

- Noutățile Editurii Politice – new titles at Editura Politică.

- Sport news, programs.
- Tabără în Nucet (interviuri): “Cu toată oboseala determinată de zeci de kilometri parcurși pe jos, copiii erau veseli, manifestându-și bucuria că au ajuns la cantină, unde li s-a pregătit o mâncare gustoasă.” – Camping in Nucet (interviews) “With all their fatigue caused by walking tens of kilometers, the children were happy, expressing their joy for reaching the canteen, where they had a tasty meal.”

- Sfârșit de stagiune la Filarmonică, cine ce a realizat, câteva rânduri de critică – end of the stage-year at the local philharmonic orchestra, achievements and some critical remarks.

- o **Page 3.**

- *Fáklya*

- *Viața de partid* (rubrică): ședința de partid a filialei Transilvania – *Party Life* (column): meeting of the party branch in Transylvania.

- *Telex din străinătate*: știri mondiale pe scurt – *Telex from Abroad*: international news in brief.

- Realizările așteptate ale Congresului X în industrie – Expected Congress 10 achievements in industry

- *Pe meleagurile noastre* (*Szép hazánk tájai*) – on old Arad schools and landscapes.

- *Kár mindenképpen* (*Pácat, de tot*): “Szerettem volna működésben látni az üres gépeket. Sajnos nem láthattam, kár, mindenképpen kár” – Notes on the authors’ attempt to see wood-cutting machines at work. It was not possible, as they were not in use.

- *Tanulság 2000 lejért* – A moral for 2000 lei: a retired person sues the *Metalica* factory, which did not allocate him the right amount of pension. He wins.

- *Crișana*

- Material de congres – congress document

### 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, 1969

- o **Page 1.**

- *Fáklya*

- NC visiting factories.

- Congress documents.

- Achievements in agriculture, numbers.

➤ *Crișana*

- Vizită NC în fabrici – NC visiting factories.
- Documente de congres – congress documents.
- Procesul continuu în ocrotirea sănătății publice – The continuous process of public health care.

○ **Page 2.**

➤ *Fáklya*

- Programs, obituaries, medical advice.
- Content of the literary journals *Korunk* and *Igaz Szó*.
- *Tudja, hogy mire vállalkozott (Știe la ce s-a angajat) – (He Knows what He Had Assumed)* interviews with university graduates who will work in education at rural schools (four Romanians and one Hungarian): “I’m not running away from the village, although I would do it if I could.”; “During my contractual time I would try to make up a serious basis for a local soccer team.”

➤ *Crișana*

- Programs.
- *Familia* – cuprins – *Familia*, contents.
- Recital Nicolae Labiș – Performance with Nicolae Labiș’ poems.
- *Poșta juridică* – *Law Correspondence*.
- *Pentru posesori de Dacia 1100: mecanici auto specializați. For owners of Dacia 1100: specialized car mechanics.*
- *Știri despre industrie* – News on local industry.

○ **Page 3.**

➤ *Fáklya*

- Materiale de congres, vizita NC la Constanța, CAP-urile, probleme și realizări – Congress documents, NC’s visit to Constanța, problems and achievements of the Agricultural Production Co-operatives.
- Realizări între perioada celor două congrese (IX și X) – Achievements in the four years between Congress 9 and Congress 10.

➤ *Crișana*

- Identic – the same.

**4<sup>th</sup> of July, 1969**

○ **Page 1.**

➤ *Fáklya*

- Congress documents.
- Local economic news.

- Local agricultural news, critical tone: "Elkönyvetük a tényt: a gazdaságban is kevés a munkaerő. Ám úgy véljük, azt a keveset, ami van, jobban ki kellene használni. Akaratlanul célzott erre egyik termelőségvetkezeti tag is, amikor a székház előtti kis placcon a régi nehéz időkről beszélt: hajnalban háromkor keltek, éjszakába nyúlóan dolgoztak. Most van mindenkinek betevő falatja, pedig egyszerre kelnek a napsugarakkal. Itt lenne tennivalója a vezetőségnek: megértetni a tagsággal, korábban álljon munkába, este ne siessen haza, hiszen saját kenyerének előállításán dolgozik." – "We have understood: there is a shortage in the industrial workforce. Still, we think, those few should have been used better. It is exactly, what a CAP [Agricultural Production Co-operative] member had willy-nilly mentioned in his remembering the hard, old times, in the small place in front of the headquarters. We had been woken up at three a.m. and had worked till dawn. Nowadays each of us has food, even though we woke up after the break of dawn. Leaders could make improvements here: to make the workers understand to wake up earlier, not to hurry home, as they have been working for their own bread."

➤ *Crișana*

- Materiale de congres – Congress documents.
- Pentru recolta 1969 – For the 1969 crops.
- Serbare în Poiana Mailor, la Pociovești, în cinstea a celei de a 25-a aniversări a patriei, 500 de cuvinte – Celebrating the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the motherland (1944), 500 words.
- Arta: colecții pentru expoziții – Fine arts: a new exhibition.
- Anchetă: "Realizări" pe șantier. Ce va fi pe acest șantier în 10 ani
- Achievements: Reports from construction sites. What will be here in 10 years?

○ **Page 2.**

➤ *Fáklya*

- *Krónika (Cronică)*: – *Chronicle*: the sidewalk in front of the post office is not swept tidy, the bank of the river is full of bicycle riders who impede pedestrians to walk.
- Sport, programe, mica publicitate – News on sports, adverts.
- News on the local radio station from Cluj, the recording of an operetta from the local Hungarian theatre.
- Interview with an architect from Bucharest.

➤ *Crișana*

- Sport, programe, mica publicitate – News on sports, programs, adverts.
- Concert Hilaria: cântece populare bihorene în Beiuș –Hilaria concert (folk music assembly): folk songs from Bihor in Beiuș.
- Expoziție Marosi Adalbert la Beiuș – Marosi Adalbert exhibition in Beiuș.

**Annex 2.** Table on types and frequencies of interventions made on the two local newspapers in 1968.

Name of the daily newspaper	No. of mechanical interventions	No. of meaningful interventions	Missing	Ethnic-Hungarian	Party	Social	History	International politics	Ethnic - Romanian
<i>Crișana</i>	28	11	11	3	2	5	1		
<i>Fáklya</i>	27	16	7	6	2	3	3	1	1



## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> This research paper is the outcome of a NECSOC Fellowship granted by New Europe College within the project DOCSOC, *Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology* (contract POSDRU/21/1.5/G/27059), a project co-financed by the European Social Fund through the Operational Sectorial Program for the Development of Human Resources 2007 – 2013. A previous version of the paper has been published in Romanian language by the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities. It is available at: <http://www.ispmn.gov.ro/node/controlul-presei-locale-ordene-n-primii-ani-ai-sistemului-ceauist-descriere-general-i-aspecte-minoritare>.
- <sup>2</sup> Direcția Generală de Presă și Tipărituri, was set up in the 1940s, being subordinated to the Council of Ministers (Kiss, manuscript). Renamed as Comitetul pentru Presă și Tipărituri (Committee for Press and Printing in 1975), the Directorate was dismissed in 1977, and replaced by Comitetul de Cultură și a Educație Socialistă (the Committee of Culture and Socialist Education).
- <sup>3</sup> Understanding the place of censorship within the local society of Oradea needs a research based on more carefully archived material than the files available at the Oradea archives.

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## THE BIOGRAPHIES OF PIPPO SCOLARI, CALLED LO SPANO (19<sup>TH</sup>-21<sup>TH</sup> CENTURIES)

In 2009, Szilárd Süttő in his short article regarding the latest Hungarian biographies on military captains of merchant origins, among them Pippo Scolari, called the attention to the fact that – due to their partiality – there is a need for new interpretation of the baron's activity.<sup>1</sup> The aim of the present study is to analyze - in the light of emerging sources housed by the Florentine National Archives - the modern biographies of Pippo di Stefano Scolari (1368/69-1426), called Lo Spano, produced since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in order to open up new research perspectives.

Interpretations of Pippo Scolari's life story have militated - starting from the 19<sup>th</sup> century until recent years - against becoming an international topic even though the topic is imbedded in the late Middle Ages, at the time when the meaning of the Florentine term "nazione" was very different from its modern one.<sup>2</sup> The identity of Pippo Scolari could probably be best described by contemporary political terms. He was on the one hand citizen of the Republic of Florence and on the other hand subject of the Hungarian crown. He was born in 1368/69, at the time when the majority of the inhabitants of the city of Florence were Florentines; they were born either in the city or in the neighboring countryside and they spoke the local vernacular language. This was not the case in many other states of late medieval Europe, including the Kingdom of Hungary. Persons called "ungheri" or "ungari" in Florentine sources were not necessary of Hungarian ethnicity.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, this category might have included all subjects of the Hungarian crown, regardless of their ethnic backgrounds. There were indeed – besides Hungarians – many other ethnic groups leaving in the Kingdom, such as Slavs, Latins, Germans, Jews and Turkish ethnic groups; including the ancestors of the neighboring nations of present day Hungary.

Why did Pippo Scolari's history inspire a number of authors over the centuries? It is probably due to the impressive career he built in the Kingdom of Hungary; from an assistant of a Florentine merchant in Buda he became one of the most influential barons at Sigismund of Luxemburg's (1387-1437) royal court.<sup>4</sup> Besides, scholars might be interested in his biography because of the multiple types of activities - merchant, military captain, patron - in which he got involved during his life and because of the multiple activity areas, including various parts of the Italian Peninsula, the Kingdom of Hungary and other neighboring regions where he operated.

Therefore the main question of the present inquiry is concerned with the general context of Pippo Scolari's history in which the authors of the modern biographies have interpreted his life. This might also provide us with an answer to the question why Pippo's career became a topic of their works. The second question regards the national historiographies represented by these authors, showing in this way Pippo Scolari's importance from various angles and tracing also the image of the baron reconstructed by these biographies. It is also going to be analyzed - in the light of emerging evidences from the Florentine National Archives - the documentary basis of these works.

Since all of the modern authors took advantage of the already existing secondary literature for their own interpretation, I will examine the biographies in chronological order; starting with Giuseppe Canestrini (1843), through Gusztáv Wenzel (1863), Curzio Ugurgeri Della Berardenga (1963), Pál Engel (1987), Franco Cardini (1994), Ioan Hătegan (1995) until Gizella and Adriano Papo (2006).

By analyzing their biographies a few similarities can be traced in the ways of reconstructing Pippo Scolari's activity. It is common in all of these works that the authors looked at Pippo's life story from the point of view of their own national history.<sup>5</sup> Italian authors considered him an important figure of the history of the Florentine communities resident abroad and therefore interpreted his story in the context of Florentine or Italian history. Hungarian scholars analyzed the topic in the framework of the history of the Kingdom of Hungary, emphasizing Pippo's importance as one of the most influential barons of the royal court. Ioan Hătegan instead incorporated his story into the history of Romanians, thanks to Pippo's connections to the Banat region and to Transylvania, located in present day Romania. Generally speaking, the authors when taking into account Pippo's career and his multiple personal connections, made no distinction between medieval ethnic groups and modern nations.<sup>6</sup> This phenomenon

is also reflected by how the authors of the biographies mentioned Pippo Scolari in various languages and how they used the names of places back then belonging to the Hungarian crown.<sup>78</sup>

Another common feature in these works is that regarding the period covered until the time of the earliest document on Pippo's activity, found in Hungary and dated to 1399, their authors relied exclusively on a 15<sup>th</sup>-century biography written by Jacopo di Poggio Bracciolini. Jacopo di Poggio (1442-1478) was a Florentine-born humanist who had probably only completed Pippo's biography started by his father, Poggio (1380-1459). Poggio – leading humanist of his time - had the occasion to meet Pippo at the Council of Constance (1414-1418) and he might have obtained information from the baron himself. The Bracciolini were even distant relatives to the Scolari, since Poggio's wife, Vaggia came from the Buondelmonti family, ancient lineage of the Scolari. It is also plausible that Poggio and Jacopo knew Pippo's nephew, Lorenzo di Rinieri Scolari or his niece, Francesca di Matteo Scolari who in the 1470s had still been living in Florence. Therefore Jacopo di Poggio's biography is the most reliable, almost contemporary narrative source on Pippo Scolari. Thanks to the lack of extensive research at the Florentine National Archives, it has become commonplace to refer to the Bracciolinis' work as primary source. A closer look at the archival documents though reveals that the information transmitted by the biography is need to be verified at several points.

According to Poggio, Pippo was born in 1369 in Tizzano, in the Florentine countryside and spent his childhood in poverty, sharing the same household with his father Stefano, his mother Antonia and his brother, Matteo.<sup>9</sup> The census of the settlement of Tizzano written in 1371/72 instead informs us that shortly after Pippo's birth in 1368/69, his family was composed, besides Pippo, by his father Stefano, his mother called Caterina, his two sisters Ricca and Balda and their brothers, the eldest Francesco, and the youngest, Matteo.<sup>10</sup> There is no other information about the family in the censuses of Tizzano until 1393 when we learn that Pippo's father, Stefano had already been died and his sons had already moved to the Kingdom of Hungary. At that time Pippo was 24/25 years old and Matteo was 22/23 years old. The archival source also reveals that the Scolari brothers, Pippo and Matteo arrived to Hungary together, meanwhile Jacopo di Poggio does not even mention the cooperation of the brothers at this early stage of their career. Jacopo refers though to another important detail about Pippo's youth, that he worked as a adolescent in

another Florentine's shop in Buda.<sup>11</sup> A Florentine citizen, called Luca di Giovanni del Pecchia was indeed involved in long distance trade between Florence and Buda as early as the 1380s. Since he had connections both in the royal court in Buda and in Naples, he might have even played some kind of intermediary role in the struggle for the Hungarian crown between the Durazzo and the rebellion barons in Hungary.<sup>12</sup> By taking into account Luca's connections to King Sigismund's opposition, one could find an explanation of why Pippo became castellan of the rebellion Lackfi family's former castle.<sup>13</sup> If Pippo's nomination happened before or after 1397, the date of the owner's, István Lackfi's decapitation, we do not know. But two years later, Pippo, the newly-made officer of royal gold mines, was already in King Sigismund's service.

Besides Pippo's chronology and personal connections it is also Jacopo di Poggio who provides us with a description of Pippo's physical appearance and character. The description – which is definitely partial and cannot be verified by archival documents – has been used by most of the authors as primary source.<sup>14</sup>

Another topic brought up by Jacopo di Poggio's biography concerns the fact that Lo Spano helped his fellow-Florentines in obtaining offices in the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>15</sup> Indeed many primary sources talk about Pippo supporting other Florentines who worked in Hungary during the first three decades of the 15<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>16</sup> Jacopo di Poggio also acclaimed Pippo's military skills as captain of the anti-Ottoman troops.<sup>17</sup> This image was later elaborated by Pippo's other biographer, Domenico di Guido Mellini.

Mellini (1531-1620) was a Florentine humanist patronized by the Medici family who dedicated his Pippo biography to the Grand duke. As distinguished scholar of his time, Mellini's main idea was to show the glory of the Florentine *nazione* abroad, through the example of the successful military captain, Lo Spano. He did not rely exclusively on Jacopo di Poggio's work, but he conducted archival researches as well, investigating a number of family documents which were kept by the Venetian branch of the Scolari family.<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately due to the lack of extensive researches carried out in the Archives of Venice regarding the Scolari's history, these documents are not available for further analysis. Not only the Venetian sources are special in this regard, there has been similarly no in-depth research carried out in Florence since the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Giuseppe Canestrini (1807- 1870) was the first scholar in modern times who devoted his study appeared in 1843 and entitled "Discorso sopra alcune relazioni della repubblica Fiorentina col Re d'Ungheria,



e con Filippo Scolari", to Lo Spano's history. He moved to Florence in order to study archival materials connected to the city's history. Canestrini thus became an expert of Florentine medieval history and therefore reconstructed Pippo's life on the basis of the former biographies as well as of primary documents and placed it in the context of Florentine and Italian history.<sup>19</sup> As we learn from the title, the main topic of his essay is not Pippo Scolari himself, but the Florentine foreign affairs; the Venetian wars, the schism, the connections to the Durazzo of Naples and to the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>20</sup> He retains that Lo Spano was a mediator between Sigismund and Florentines in Hungary.<sup>21</sup> Canestrini's intention was probably to show that Florence gave many military captains and powerful landlords to history.<sup>22</sup> He also unearthed sources on the Scolari in general, among them the ones concerning the Oratory commissioned in Florence by Pippo's brother and cousin.<sup>23</sup> Thus his essay became a clear manifestation of local patriotism and the social and the moral values of the author.<sup>24</sup>

Twenty years after Canestrini's work - appeared in the *Archivio Storico Italiano*, together with Jacopo di Poggio's and Domenico Mellini's biographies - in 1863, a Hungarian jurist, named Gusztáv Wenzel (1812-1891) published Pippo Scolari's first modern biography, entitled "Ozorai Pipó. Magyar történelmi jellemrajz Zsigmond király korából". In spite of the fact that the later Hungarian biographer, Pál Engel praises Wenzel's work for his knowledge of Italian sources, we learn in fact that he did not conduct researches in any of the corresponding Italian archives.<sup>25</sup> He only republished and investigated those sources which had already been transcribed and edited by Canestrini and Polidori in the *Archivio Storico Italiano*. Besides these evidences, the documentary basis of his work was provided only by a handful of secondary literature and Hungarian sources, published by György Fejér and Wenzel himself.<sup>26</sup> Wenzel - as he has stated on the first page of the book - was interested in Pippo's life because of the role he played in the history of medieval Hungary.<sup>27</sup> According to him, Pippo was not an extraordinary figure, only someone who made the most of his fortune.<sup>28</sup> Wenzel's biography embraces seven aspects of Pippo's life; his origins, his activity in Sigismund's service, his activity in the Kingdom of Hungary, his achievements, family background, his last military campaign and his personality. Wenzel's work of course is characterized by romantic descriptions and repeated evaluations of Pippo's life and importance. Alongside the publication of a number of Hungarian documents concerning the baron, the novelty of Wenzel's work lies in

the fact that he was the first scholar who set the biography in the context of the history of the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>29</sup>

Hundred years later, in 1963, published the Italian count, Curzio Ugurgieri Della Berardenga his volume entitled "*Avventurieri alla conquista di feudi e di corone (1356-1429)*". Meanwhile the first part of the book is dedicated to the Florentine Niccolò Acciaiuoli who made a notable career in the royal court of Naples, the second part instead is concerned with Pippo Scolari's history. Della Berardenga knew and used Wenzel's book for his essay, but did not mention any of the Latin sources edited by the Hungarian author. Therefore the documentary basis of his work is provided mainly by the sources and studies appeared in the volume of the Archivio Storico Italiano, combined with other secondary literature.<sup>30</sup>

Della Berardenga's biography – in a similar way to Canestrini's work – is more about Hungarian politics and Florentine history than about Pippo himself.<sup>31</sup> When he talks about the baron, he uses long descriptions of sentiments and thoughts and sometimes we have the general impression that he invented the major part of the story without any evidences, reconstructing in this way for example Pippo's childhood.<sup>32</sup> According to him, Luca del Pecchia – a textile merchant working in Buda – was a friend to the Scolari family who in 1382 on his way back from Florence to Buda, took the young Pippo with him.<sup>33</sup> The main points of his essay are the struggle for the Hungarian crown in 1401-3, the Ottoman conflicts, Pippo's ambassadorship in Florence in 1410 and the Venetian wars. Della Berardenga identified Pippo as a Florentine "*condottiero*", that is mercenary captain and accused him of fighting against "*Italians*" in foreign service.<sup>34</sup>

Thanks to the many generalizations, dubious details and to the almost complete absence of references, Della Berardenga's work is not of scholarly nature and provides us with little novelty on the empirical level. On the theoretical level though the comparison between Pippo Scolari's service in the Hungarian court and that of Niccolò Acciaiuoli in the court of Naples might open up new perspectives in the evaluation of the baron's career.

Probably thanks to its informing style, Della Berardenga's work was not included in Pál Engel's biography. Engel (1938-2001), important Hungarian medievalist of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, published his study in 1987, in an essay collection dedicated to Pippo Scolari and entitled: "*Ozorai Pipo emlékezete*". The volume includes also the Hungarian translation of Jacopo di Poggio's and Domenico Mellini's biographies and a study of

Pippo's castle located in Ozora, Hungary.<sup>35</sup> Besides these works, Engel analyzed also the documents published by Wenzel.<sup>36</sup> He was also the first and until recently the only scholar who conducted a very extensive research at the Hungarian National Archives in order to explore Pippo Scolari's activity in the Kingdom of Hungary, starting from 1399 - date of the earliest document in Hungary - until his death in 1426.

As Szilárd Süttő has already noted, Engel to a certain extent romanticized Pippo's character and the career he built in the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>37</sup> The mystification of Pippo's achievements and general tone of the article, aimed at picturing Pippo as the prototype of a Hungarian nobleman rather than a Florentine merchant, are probably due to the absence of researches in Florence preceding Engel's work.<sup>38</sup> Given no Florentine sources at his disposal, Engel did not find any explanation to the fact of why and how Pippo was promoted to the court of Sigismund of Luxemburg. Therefore he attributed Pippo's success essentially to his fortune and talent.<sup>39</sup> New studies however suggest that – besides these factors - there might have been also others in play which considerably helped him in building a notable career in Hungary. The primary sources at our disposal show that several members of Pippo's family – including his uncles – worked as *condottieri*, that is mercenary captains in Northern Italy. Thanks to their profession, the Scolari already in the 1370's had established connections to the high nobility in Hungary which might have facilitated Pippo's career as well.<sup>40</sup>

Engel also misinterpreted Jacopo di Poggio's description about Pippo's childhood and family, assuming that Pippo's family became poor and it was not among the notable lineages of Florence.<sup>41</sup> Engel left aside many other information provided Jacopo di Poggio, that is the members of the original lineage, the Buondelmonti were powerful landlords in the countryside before the guelf-ghibellin conflicts and their descents, the Scolari still had a reputation in Florence for their participation in the urban conflicts. The family was also noted by Sigismund of Luxemburg's father, Emperor Charles IV who intervened at the Florentine Signoria for the restitution of the Scolaris' estates.<sup>42</sup>

Since Engel had no information about Pippo's *condottieri* relatives, he presumed that Pippo became a military captain without any previous experience or specialized training.<sup>43</sup> Both the history of Pippo's uncles and the fact that he served his master as a castellan seem to contradict to Engel's theory. Instead, he might have had far more connections to the art of war than we have imagined and it is probably not by accident that he became the first castellan of foreign origins in medieval Hungary.

According to Engel, Pippo probably served his master, János Kanizsai, the archbishop of Esztergom as castellan, after 1397, when the rebellion István Lackfi had already lost the castle of Simontornya.<sup>44</sup> Jacopo di Poggio – the only source on Pippo's service in Simontornya – did not mention the date of the event. It must be noted however that the former owner of the castle, the Lackfi family were acquainted with Pippo's uncles already in the 1370's. Indeed Pippo's uncles fought together with the voivoda of Transylvania, István Lackfi, cousin of the owner of Simontornya.<sup>45</sup> It is therefore possible that Pippo was appointed to castellan in Simontornya before 1397, during the time of the Lackfi.

The general context of Engel's Pippo-biography is not military history, rather Engel's major field of expertise: history of administration of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary, including the history of castles, noble estates, counties, offices and the feudal system in general.<sup>46</sup> Engel by concluding his discourse on Pippo's network of servants and „familiares” states that the baron did not surround himself with many Florentines, but he hired his fellow-citizens only for administrative purposes.<sup>47</sup> He also retained that Pippo - besides his brother, Matteo - did not give inheritance to other members of the family.<sup>48</sup> Florentine sources however entirely contradict to Engel's hypothesis. Pippo actually helped many Florentines in obtaining offices in Hungary – administrative and church offices as well – and he gave a considerable part of his properties, inherited from his brother, Matteo and from his cousin, Andrea to his Florentine relatives.

It is also misleading the image designed by Engel according to which Pippo did not have any financial ventures in Hungary and he had no interest in long distance trade, due to his social position as baron of the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>49</sup> This affirmation might have something to do with the generally disapproving tone used by Engel in referring to Pippo's training as merchant.<sup>50</sup> This profession instead was one of the most distinguished ones in Florence; all the important art patrons and politicians came from merchant families.

Engel's article – in spite of its partiality which leaves aside Pippo's connections in the Republic of Florence and the use of a vocabulary specific to studies appearing in the communist area – is still the most well-researched and historically cemented interpretation of Pippo Scolari's activity.<sup>51</sup>

Surprisingly Engel's landmark article was not noted by Franco Cardini (1940-) – professor of medieval history at the University of Florence – who published in 1994, two times in the same year, his essay on Pippo

Scolari; first in his book entitled “Storie fiorentine” and once again in the essay collection “Italia e Ungheria all’epoca dell’umanesimo corviniano”, edited by Cesare Vasoli. Cardini did not produce a new contribution to Pippo’s biography, instead he provides us with a shorter version of Della Berardenga’s work, including the same bibliography and sometimes even the same errors.<sup>52</sup> He also describes Pippo character often with the Romantic tone, one can trace at Della Berardenga’s work.<sup>53</sup> Even though the article is concerned – besides the ambassadorship to Florence - mainly with Pippo’s military campaigns against Venice, the Ottomans and the Hussites, Cardini’s general conclusion is that Pippo was not a talented military captain, only a loyal servant to King Sigismund.<sup>54</sup>

In a similar way also the general context of Ioan Hațegan’s biography – entitled “Filippo Scolari. Un condottier italian pe meleaguri dunărene” and appeared in 1997 – is Pippo’s military campaigns, especially against the Ottomans, alongside the history of the Banat region, now belonging to Romania.<sup>55</sup> Hațegan’s interpretation is therefore a continuous dialogue between Pippo’s activity and the settlement of Vlachs in the Banat and their participation in the anti-Ottoman wars. Hațegan’s book at some points even gives us the impression that Transylvania in the 15<sup>th</sup> century was mainly inhabited by Vlachs who governed themselves independently from the Hungarian crown.<sup>56</sup> Engel in his article only mentioned the fact that a good number of Vlachs were fighting from time to time in Pippo’s service, but he did not give us any further details due to the lack of extensive written evidences.<sup>57</sup> The contacts between Vlachs and Florentines is well-reflected by a letter, written by a Florentine merchant, called Giovanni di messer Niccolò Falcucci, resident in Hermannstadt (Szeben, Sibiu, RO) on August 9, 1414. He mentions in this document, addressed to the bishop of Várad (Oradea, RO), Andrea Scolari that according to the information provided by a Vlach coming to Hermannstadt, Lo Spano had already arrived to the region and was waiting for the Ottomans’ attack.<sup>58</sup> Jacopo di Poggio also underlines Pippo’s connection to the Vlachs by mentioning that he spoke “valacca lingua”.<sup>59</sup>

It was also Hațegan who advanced the hypothesis that Pippo’s father, Stefano di Francesco was a soldier and died in 1406 or 1407 in Buda.<sup>60</sup> His hypothesis is very plausible though we do not have any evidences at our disposal in this regard. Hațegan was also the first among Pippo’s biographers who looked at the baron’s activity in its complexity, emphasizing his patronage and his activity in the construction of defense systems against the Ottomans in the Temes (Timiș, RO) region.<sup>61</sup>

Hátegan – with critical revision – uses a wide range of secondary sources for his study, including the previous biographies as well. Even though he did not discover new archival sources on Pippo Scolari's history, the questions raised by his book, provide us with new ideas on further research possibilities, including Pippo's family and genealogical tree, his personal connections, his participation in the Italian wars and his patronage.

The most recent work dedicated to the history of Pippo Scolari is the book of Adriano Papo and Gizella Németh-Papo. Even though they have used a very vast bibliography and references, they included into their work also non-contemporary narrations, such as the chronicles of Antonio Bonfini and János Thuróczy, literary works and non-contemporary images, without applying any further critical revision.<sup>62</sup> Besides the previous biographies, the authors also studied the transcriptions of sources prepared by the Hungarian Ernő Simonyi in the Florentine National Archives in the 19th century.<sup>63</sup> His collection today is available for research at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and other researchers also take advantage of them as a primary sources, in spite of the fact that their documentary basis has never been verified by original documents.<sup>64</sup> The Papos' work also gives us the misleading impression that they carried out archival research both in Venice and in Hungary. A closer look at the archival sources cited in the footnotes shows that all these documents have already been transcribed and previously published.<sup>65</sup>

Also the language applied in their book is essentially characterized by the romantic tone borrowed from the earlier Italian biographies. Also their evaluation of Pippo's activity and his place in the history of the Kingdom of Hungary is based on Gusztáv Wenzel's view.<sup>66</sup> Meanwhile Pippo's questionable image as mediator of the Florentine Renaissance in Hungary was inspired by Jolán Balogh's article.<sup>67</sup> Since the book of Gizella Németh and Adriano Papo has received much publicity as scholarly work in Hungary, I am going to analyze it more in details.

The first chapter of the book - dedicated to Pippo as historical figure and to his family – is based, without any critical revision, on Pippo's anonym biography, Jacopo di Poggio's, and on Mellini's works. The authors also made use of the non-contemporary Anea Silvio Piccolini's writings. They also incorporated into this chapter the Scolari-genealogy of Pompeo Litta and Luigi Passerini, composed in the 19th century.<sup>68</sup> Meanwhile their interpretation of the origins of the Scolari-Buondelmonti lineage is basically identical with Giuseppe Canestrini's work.<sup>69</sup>

Interestingly, among the modern biographers, only the Papos took into consideration the abovementioned genealogical trees, in spite of the fact that until recently only Passerini researched extensively the Scolari family in Florence. The main author, Pompeo Litta (1781-1852) was a count of Milanese origins who dedicated his activity to the composition of a series of genealogical tables which appeared under the title of “La storia delle famiglie celebri italiane”. He was the one who invited Luigi Passerini to participate in his project. Passerini (1816-1877) was born in Florence and devoted his professional activity to the study of Florentine history and genealogy. His Scolari-Buondelmonti genealogy is therefore until recently the most complete family tree.<sup>70</sup>

Following the history of Pippo's family, the Papos – using mainly Jacopo di Poggio – intended to reconstruct the baron's personality, using the romanticized vocabulary known from Wenzel's and Della Berardenga's works.<sup>71</sup> The chapter continues with a detailed list of Pippo's portraits which the authors were trying to compare to the surviving non-contemporary descriptions of his physical character and personality. At this point, scholars might question the authenticity and the importance of non-contemporary narratives and images in the history of the baron. The other chapters of the book are dedicated to Pippo's career until 1401 – based on the previous biographies – and to his intimate relatives, his wife, Borbála Ozorai (Barbara de Ozora), his younger brother, Matteo di Stefano Scolari (1370/71-1426) and his cousin, Andrea di Filippo Scolari (†1426). Meanwhile the fragmentary details on Bobála's life are coming from the earliest biographies, the interpretation of Matteo's life is based on Litta's and Passerini's work, including also the misleading information according to which Matteo arrived to Hungary as late as 1412.<sup>72</sup> They concluded the chapter with the figure of Andrea Scolari, tracing his activity in Hungary through Jolán Balogh's short article published in 1926.<sup>73</sup>

Chapter V of the Papos' work – dealing with the Venetian wars – presents some novelty on the empirical level about Pippo's participation. The two registers they studied from the Venetian National Archives have already been mentioned in connection with Pippo by Michael Mallett in his book on the Venetian military system. These documents have also been partially transcribed and published in a collection of medieval documents concerning the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>74</sup> Nevertheless the chapter calls the attention once again to the fact that many documents may lay unexamined until now in the Venetian National Archives regarding Pippo's participation in the Venetian wars in the early 1410s.

The Papos concluded their book with stating that Pippo was a prominent personality of his time and he played an important role as military captain in Hungary during Sigismund of Luxemburg's reign.<sup>75</sup> They also made a comparison between Pippo Scolari's career and that of Lodovico Gritti (1480?- 1534), calling them "Princes of the Renaissance".<sup>76</sup>

In spite of the fact that the Papos' work is not a scholarly publication, it has several merits. Besides the reinterpretation of Gusztáv Wenzel and Pál Engel's studies, they collected an impressive number of secondary literature on Pippo Scolari.<sup>77</sup> The book includes also a chapter on the Scolari's patronage, the most important building projects and once again calls the attention – in a similar way to Hațegan's book - to the complexity of Pippo Scolari's and his family's activities both in Florence and in the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>78</sup>

The analysis of the modern biographies of Pippo Scolari has pointed out that the life story of the baron has attracted the interest of generations of scholars of various national backgrounds. Even though the majority of the existing literature is not of scholarly nature and show little novelty on the empirical level, they have raised many questions to be answered through further archival research. Since 1843, the appearance of Jacopo di Poggio's and Domenico Mellini's biographies in the Archivio Storico Italiano, there have been no systematic archival researches carried out on Pippo Scolari in any of the corresponding Italian archives, neither in Florence nor in Venice. There has been similarly no in-depth research conducted since 1987 – since the appearance of Engel's work – in the Hungarian National Archives which, in spite of Engel's encyclopedic study, might still house new evidences on the Florentine-born baron. As Szilárd Süttő has already underlined in his article, there is a clear need for the re-interpretation of Pippo Scolari's activity. The new history of the baron could be reformulated within the context of European history, putting into consideration the many important questions raised by the previous biographies.



## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Süttő p. 17-18.
- <sup>2</sup> The term “nazione” referred to a certain type of corporation into which Florentine merchants organized themselves abroad. Goldthwaite p. 108.
- <sup>3</sup> For subjects of the Hungarian crown living in Florence see: Prajda 2014.
- <sup>4</sup> For the Scolari family see: Prajda 2010.
- <sup>5</sup> This phenomenon has already been noticed by Agostino Sagredo. Sagredo p.131.
- <sup>6</sup> See for example Della Berardenga who talks about the “Hungarian nation” in his biography on Pippo Scolari. “Era una splendida nazione (l’Ungheria)... dormiva ancora, in grande parte, sotto le nebbie dell’inverno medievale.” Berardenga p.124. “...nell’armata di Sigismondo il dissidio regnava tra i comandanti, che per orgoglio nazionale...” Berardenga p. 148. “La nazione ungherese rispose magnificamente all’appello...” Berardenga p. 147. “Il confronto con i re Angioini, i quali, stranieri anch’essi, erano riusciti a divenire dei veri e completi ungheresi...” Berardenga p. 150. Della Berardenga also refers to “ungheresi, transilvani, serbi, cumani”. Berardenga p.209. Also Pál Engel uses the term “olasz” rather than “itáliai”, in spite of the fact that the term “olasz” refers to citizens of the modern State of Italy. Engel therefore established Pippo’s identity as an “olasz” and he mentioned only in the second place that he came from Florence. “Ő (Pippo) születésére nézve ugyanis olasz volt, közelebbről firenzei... és kivált mély benyomást tehetett Pipo olasz honfitársaira...” Engel p. 53. See also Hațegan: “...participării comune la lupta antiotomană a popoarelor din cuprinsul regatului: români, maghiari, sârbi, slovaci, cumani...” Hațegan p. 83.
- <sup>7</sup> The variations of Pippo’s name include the following: Pippo Scolari, Pippo Spano, Ozorai Pipó, Pippo de Ozora. But also the name of the so-called Count of Signa and Modrus is mentioned in three different forms in the biographies. Since his family was probably of Venetian origins, Italian scholars talk about Niccolò Frangipane. Hungarian scholars instead refer to him as Frangepán Miklós even though he was not Hungarian of ethnicity, but only a subject of the Hungarian crown. Hațegan instead uses the Latin version of his name and calls him Nicolae de Frankapan(i). Hațegan p. 46.
- <sup>8</sup> Canestrini in 1843 Della Berardenga in 1863 and Cardini in 1994 used in their works the vernacular names of the towns in medieval Hungary. Cardini p. 49, Berardenga p. 206, 212. For example Fehérvár’s (Székesfehérvár, HU) Latin name was Alba Regia which was transformed in Florentine vernacular language to Alba Reale. Thus became Varadinum/Várad (Oradea, RO) in vernacular Varadino Szeben (Sibiu, RO), Sibino and Esztergom/Strigonium Strigonia. Other authors instead used the modern versions of names of places which did not exist in the Middle Ages. For example Hațegan used the name Bratislava instead of the medieval names of the city such as Posonium,

- Pressburg or Pozsony. He used in a similar way the term „Slovakia”. Hațegan p. 11, 46. Also the Papos referred to Székesfehérvár instead of Fehérvár. Papo, p. 50, 169.
- 9 Jacopo di Poggio p. 163-164, Mellini p.12.
- 10 Prajda 2011. p.115.
- 11 Jacopo di Poggio p. 164.
- 12 Prajda 2011. p.33.
- 13 Jacopo di Poggio p. 164.
- 14 Jacopo di Poggio p. 176. “Appassionato cacciatore, buon cavaliere, esperto nel maneggio delle armi e nel torneare, lo Spano fu anche un ottimo padrone di casa. Parco nel cibo, ma buongustaio, preferì sempre che sulla sua mensa comparissero poche vivande, ma cucinate con cura e servite in piatti d’oro e d’argento. Curò che il personale di servizio facesse bella presenza, fosse ben vestito, rispettoso e pratico del mestiere.” Berardenga p. 221. “...il buono e continente Pippo Spano, mancava talvolta, non solo di continenza, ma anche, e soprattutto, di cuore.” Berardenga p. 225. “Filippo, detto effettuosamente Pippo dai familiari e dagli amici, era un ragazzo piuttosto minuto, dagli occhi scuri intelligenti, amante della vita all’aria libera, ma al tempo stesso studioso e particolarmente portato per i numeri e l’arimerica, della quale il padre, fin da piccolo, gli andava insegnando le regole fondamentali....era dotato di una intelligenza e di una maturità di sentimenti e di pensiero superiori alla sua età...” Berardenga p. 122. , 124. For Pippo’s character see: Wenzel p. 68-70, Papo p. 35-38.
- 15 Jacopo di Poggio p. 179.
- 16 Prajda 2011. p. 103.
- 17 Jacopo di Poggio p. 175, 179.
- 18 Mellini p. 42. The Venetian branch of the Scolari family was founded by one of Pippo’s nephews, Branca di Rinieri Scolari.
- 19 Canestrini p. 196-203. He used primary sources housed by the Florentine National Archives from the fond of Signori regarding ambassadorships conducted by Florentines to Sigismund in 1413, 1426 and 1427-28.
- 20 “La biografia dello Spano è un periodo di Storia ungherese; e perché tale, ella deve elevarsi all’altezza e alla gravità delle vicende politiche e degli avvenimenti contemporanei, sul quali lo Spano esercitò ... un’influenza...” “la vita dei quali (per esempio di Pippo) è inseparabile dalla storia del loro tempo.” Canestrini p. 185.
- 21 Canestrini p. 193.
- 22 Canestrini p. 211-212.
- 23 Canestrini p. 209-210.
- 24 Canestrini p. 213.
- 25 Engel p. 54.

- <sup>26</sup> The appendix of his book contains documents published in the Archivio Storico Italiano and a few sources from the Hungarian National Archives. Wenzel p. 75-101.
- <sup>27</sup> Wenzel p.1.
- <sup>28</sup> "Ilyen kor tehát képes ugyan egyes szerencsés személyek emelkedését felmutatni, de történeti nagyságokat nem. Ozorai Pipo ezeknek sorába tartozott Magyarországon." Wenzel p. 4. "Legyünk tehát méltányosak Ozorai Pipóra nézve; de igazságosak is. Ő történetileg nevezetes férfi, tehát históriai notabilitás volt; de nem nagy férfi, nem históriai nagyság." Wenzel p. 74.
- <sup>29</sup> Engel p. 54.
- <sup>30</sup> The main sources of Berardenga's study are the three early biographies and other narrative sources produced after Pippo's time, like Luca di Simone della Robbia (1400-1482), "Vita di Bartolommeo Valori" and Enea Silvio Piccolomini (1405-1464) "Le istorie de' Boemi tradotte", Vincenzo Borghini (1515-1580), "Discorsi storici con annotazioni di Domenico Manni".
- <sup>31</sup> Berardenga p. 165.
- <sup>32</sup> "Stefano vide la mano di Dio nell'affetto dell'amico (Luca del Pecchia) verso Filippo..." Berardenga p. 124. "I genitori, consci della non comune intelligenza di Filippo, si angustiavano, pensando che egli avrebbe dovuto trascorrere l'intera vita nel contado, soffocando dalla mediocrità e dalle preoccupazioni finanziarie." Berardenga p. 123. "La maschia avvenenza e la parlantina del fiorentino fecero breccia nel cuore della contessa Barbara..." Berardenga p. 156. "Il padre (di Pippo) era un maestro esigente... lo affidarono (gli genitori di Pippo) a un prete di campagna, uomo di notevole dottrina...". Berardenga p. 123.
- <sup>33</sup> Berardenga p. 123-124.
- <sup>34</sup> Berardenga p. 163. "...può accusare il conte di Ozora di molte cose, non ultima quella di aver combattuto al servizio dello straniero contro gli Italiani (benché al suo tempo il sentimento di italianità, in un'Italia divisa in tanti stati spesso nemici fra loro, fosse assai nebuloso." Berardenga p. 224.
- <sup>35</sup> Feld-Koppány, *Az ozorai vár*
- <sup>36</sup> Süttő p. 12-13.
- <sup>37</sup> Süttő p. 14, Engel p. 73-74.
- <sup>38</sup> "Noha Pipo sokkal inkább magyar országnagy volt, mint firenzei kereskedő, az olaszok mindig is a magukénak tekintették..." Engel p. 54.
- <sup>39</sup> "Ki tudja, az évszázadok során szerte a világon hány suhanc ábrándozott már arról, hogy egyszer majd dúsgazdag, híres-nevezetes nagyúrként tér vissza oda, ahol született, és a nép ámulattal fog tódulni elébe, hogy messziről, egy pillanatra láthassa őt, akinek hajdan a nevét sem ismerte. Elképzelni könnyű, de millióból talán ha egynek sikerült el is érnie. Pipo mindenesetre egy volt a milliók közül, és higgyük, hogy ifjúkori álmai teljessedtek be..." Engel p. 54.

- 40 Prajda 2011. p. 18, 35, 121.
- 41 "Családja valamikor, a guelf-ghibellin harcok idején jobb napokat is látott, de ekkorra bizony, semmi kétség, már elszegényedett, és a nevét hiába keressük a kor nevezetesebb firenzei famíliái között." Engel p. 54. "...allevato col padre e madre poveramente..." Jacopo di Poggio p. 164.
- 42 Canestrini p. 187.
- 43 "Elég különös, de a hajdani kereskedősegédből a korabeli Magyarország legismertebb és legeredményesebb hadvezére lett, ami arra mutat, hogy ez a mesterség akkoriban inkább csak veleszületett kvalitásokat kívánt meg, semmint szakismeretet Természetes intelligencia, határozottság, egyéni bátorság kellett hozzá, egyéb azonban nem." Engel p. 63.
- 44 Engel p. 55-56.
- 45 Jacopo di Poggio p.164.
- 46 Engel p. 56.
- 47 "A sókamaraigazgatás volt az egyetlen terület, ahol Pipo olaszokat is foglalkoztatott. Nevéből ítélve olasz volt az a Pero (Piero?), aki 1407-1412 között a tordai kamarát vezette, és közben átmenetileg Pipo saját birtokán, Sárvárott volt vámagy. Olasz lehetett az egyébként szebeni polgárnak mondott Baldi Mátyás vízaknai sókamarás (1408) is, és biztosan az volt Byank Jinus lippai polgár és ottani alkamarás (1410). Kétségtelenül Pipo idején jött Magyarországra Firenzéből Gasparo da Colle, Filippo és Jacopo del Bene, Papé Manini és testvérei, akik egészen az 1440-es évekig kezükben tartották a legtöbb fontos sókamara tényleges vezetését. Külön kell megemlékezni Pipo legfontosabb olasz pénzügyi alkalmazottjáról, Onofrio Bárdíró, a 14. század egyik legnevezetesebb firenzei bankárcsaládjának budai polgárrá lett saljáról, aki márjával Pipo előtt Magyarországon élt, de 1409-1415 táján már őt szolgálta, és egyidőben budai kamarásként nemcsak a sóregálét kezelte, hanem „az összes királyi jövedelem behajtója” is volt. Fiai később Bajmóc vár uraként nagybirtokos urakká emelkedtek fel.” Engel p. 72-73.
- 48 "...Pipo kömyezetében, állandó kíséretében egyetlen olasszal sem találkozunk, s egyetlen édestestvérén kívül atyafiságát sem részesítette javaiban.” Engel p. 73, 76.
- 49 "...minden ízében magyar úr kívánt lenni... Tudatos asszimilációja érthető,... és azt is megmagyarázza, miért vált meg teljesen egykori szakmájától. Arról sem tudunk, hogy pénzügyekkel, kereskedelmi vállalkozásokkal foglalkozott volna. Mindez nyilván nem fért össze a magyar országnagy mimikrijével, amit - mint az eddigiekben is láttuk - oly tökéletesen magára öltött.” Engel p. 73.
- 50 "...nem igen számíthatott többre, mint hogy más polgáritokhoz hasonlóan az üzleti életben próbál majd érvényesülni.” Engel p. 55.
- 51 "A történet egyebekben is összevág mindazzal, amit Zsigmond egyéniségéről és „káderfejlesztési” gyakorlatáról tudunk.” Engel p. 57.

- 52 Short reference to Florentines who operated in Hungary as merchants, mentioning in all of the three works the same merchants and their families. Canestrini 187-188. Dell Berardenga p. 123. Cardini p.44. The original source, Rinaldo degli Albizzi only mentions the fact that they are soon to becoming relatives to Lo Spano. Della Berardenga p. 216. Cardini p. 49-50.
- 53 "Cortesìa, generosità, amor di patria, senso di solidarietà consortile, mecenatismo, gusto per il bello; questi sono gli ingredienti della fama di Filippo Scolari, una fama che dovette il suo carattere anche guerriero e cavalleresco al riflesso di molte e indubbie qualità spirituali e culturali che, in lui si sposarono a un'indubbia capacità prima amministrativa, quindi politica, infine diplomatica." Cardini p. 43. "In fondo questo generoso mecenate, questo gran signore, questo perfetto vassallo, questo soldato non sempre fortunato ma sempre valoroso e fedele..." Cardini p. 50.
- 54 Cardini p. 50.
- 55 Hațegan p.1-2.
- 56 "La înțetăierea celor două veacuri, XIV și XV, se reliefează în cadrul regatului rolul activ al populației românești. Voievodatul autonom al Transilvaniei, Maramureșul, Bihorul și Banatul progresează în formele lor specifice, atât pe plan economico-social cât și politico-militar. Situate în părțile sud-estice ale regatului ținuturile românești vor avea de înfruntat încă din ultimul deceniu al sec. XIV primejdia otomană. Participarea masivă a românilor la campaniile regale s-a concretizat prin diverse forme, contribuind substanțial la stăvilirea invaziei pe linia Dunării....Formele specifice de organizare românească – obște sătești, cnezatele și districtele – se manifestă pregnant în zonă, deși li se suprapune instituția feudală a comitatului." Hațegan p. 4.
- 57 "A familiárisokon kívűl voltak olyan népelemek is Pipo tartományában, akiknek kötelessége volt háború idején hadba szállni. A lugosi, karánsebesi és a többi vlach kerület hadakozó szabadjai, a kenézek voltak ezek, és noha valószínű, hogy harcértékük viszonylag csekély volt, a számuk nem volt jelentéktelen." Engel p. 71.
- 58 "...E di turchi per ora non si ragiono. I Dio dia loro d'affare tanto non si richordino di chrispiani. Sentendo d'avisarne lo farò di presente. Un valaccho venuto da Sangnia (Segna?) dice questa mattina chome messer lo Spano à tratto di là Piero e Niccolò Lamberteschi ..." Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Corporazioni Religiose Soppresses dal Governo Francese 78. 326. 277r. A month later, in September started the war against the Ottomans, headed by Pippo. Engel p. 66.
- 59 Jacopo di Poggio p. 176.
- 60 Hațegan p.8.
- 61 Hațegan p. 70-78.
- 62 Among them we can find the book of Bálint Hóman and Gyula Szegfű on medieval Hungary, written in 1936. They also used as primary sources non-contemporary narrative sources, like János Thúröczy's *Chronica Hungarorum*

- written in 1476 and Antonio Bonfini's, *Rerum Ungaricarum decades*, (1497). Papo p. 21.
- 63 Papo p. 26.
- 64 Papo p. 28.
- 65 Among the abbreviations and bibliography they also list the Hungarian National Archives (MOL) but they never refer to original sources from that archives, only to those ones which have already been published. Papo p. 187.
- 66 "Ozorai Pipo nem tartozik multunk azon nagy jellemei közé, kiknek neveit az örök dicsőség fénykoszorúja körülsugározza. Sőt mindjárt eleve megjegyzem, hogy ő sem személyisége és tetteivel, sem kora jelentékenysége miatt fogva a középszerűség színvonalánál magasra nem emelkedett. Mindamellett nevéhez történetünknek oly fontos visszaemlékezései vannak köve, sorsa pedig és szereplése Zsigmond király személyes viszonyaiba és mindazon eseményekbe, melyek ennek ötven éves uralkodása alatt hazánk politikai hatalmának hanyatlását vonták magok után, oly mélyen be volt szöve, hogy történelmi ismereteink teljessége szempontjából életírása nem csekély érdekel bir." Wenzel p. 1. "Filippo Scolari, alias Pippo Spano, alias Ozorai Pipo, non fa parte di quei grandi personaggi della storia d'Ungheria che sono stati circondati da un'aura di gloria eterna; anzi, è addirittura rimasto nella mediocrità ed è tuttora poco conosciuto sia in Ungheria che in Italia, pur avendo avuto un peso considerevole nelle vicende storiche e politiche del regno magiaro in virtù del suo rapporto di collaborazione col re Sigismondo di Lussemburgo, di cui s'era guadagnato la benevolenza e la fiducia." Papo p. 15.
- 67 "...lo sviluppo dell'umanesimo e dell'arte del primo Rinascimento, della cui diffusione - come vedremo - il nostro Filippo Scolari si farà promotore nel Regno d'Ungheria." Papo, p. 20.
- 68 Papo p. 31.
- 69 Canestrini p.185-188, Papo p. 31-33.
- 70 In spite of the serious research he probably carried out at the Florentine Archives he never referred to his sources, therefore the information cannot be checked. See Passerini's manuscript at Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Fondo Passerini 156. Tables 14-15.
- 71 "... fu sempre in buona salute...Era eloquente e di eccezionale intelletto, e apprendeva con molta facilità le lingue straniere... Era previdente e coraggioso; era umano, amabile e d'indole mansueta, tollerava le critiche..." Papo, p. 35-36. "Filippo amava il lusso anche a pranzo: esigeva poche portate, purché buone e nella porzione giusta, siccome era molto misurato sia nel mangiare che nel bere. Studiava però il menù a disposizione prima di farsi servire cibi e non voleva che nessuno assaggiasse le vivande che gli venivano servite, né amava farsi circondare di guardie del corpo. Pretendeva che anche i suoi servitori fossero modesti, educati e di buona presenza, che

- vestissero in modo decoroso, che ognuno facesse il proprio compito e che regnasse la concordia tra di loro." Papo p. 37-38.
- 72 "La buona fortuna del fratello Spano lo invitò facilmente in Ungheria ove anch'egli prese le armi contro i turchi, in benemerenza in suoi buoni servigi l'imperatore Sigismondo nel 1416 lo nominò despota di Roscia, che da poco tempo lo Spano aveva riconquistata ai regi domini contro i turchi, i fiorentini volendo onorare un loro concittadino, che in lontano straniero contrade loro faceva tanto onore, e ad un tempo fare cosa grata a Sigismondo, con decreto 1416, 19 giugno ordinarono, che fosse armato cavaliere con dono di targa e pennone, e coll'arme del popolo." Litta table III.
- 73 Papo p. 58. Balogh, *Andrea Scolari váradi püspök mecénási tevékenysége*
- 74 Papo p. 121-136, 157, 158, 160-163, ASV Senati Secreti Regesti 4, 5. Mallett p.40-42. They were partly published in the Zsigmond kori okelvéltár III, docs. 1286, 1301, 1330, 2123, 2264.
- 75 "È indiscutibile, infatti, che Filippo Scolari abbia svolto un ruolo di grande peso nella politica ungherese in virtù dell'influenza che esercitava sullo stesso re Sigismondo, il quale poneva nel toscano una cieca fiducia..." He also cites the affirmations of many secondary literature on Pippo – from Bálint Hóman to Frigyes Bánfi – trying to underline in this way his affirmation. Papo p. 179.
- 76 "I punti in comune tra questi due personaggi sono molteplici: la carriera mercantile agli esordi, l'intelligenza, l'abilità, la versatilità, il mecenatismo, la religiosità, la generosità, il fascino esercitato sui loro contemporanei, la benevolenza acquisita da parte del popolo minuto, ma anche la brama di potere, l'amore per il lusso e la pompa, la crudeltà, un certo cinismo, l'ambizione, l'opportunismo, il nepotismo... E al pari di Gritti anche Filippo Scolari potrebbe essere definito un'principe del Rinascimento': avido di potere e amante del lusso e della bellezza, uomo dal gran talento e indubbiamente dalla spiccata mentalità economica, crudele e spregiudicato, ma altresì religioso e magnanimo oltre misura, amante e protettore dell'arte e degli artisti. " Papo. p. 183.
- 77 On Pippo's family see Wenzel p. 57-60. Papo p. 57-61.
- 78 See Chapter VI. Papo p. 165-178.

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# YOUTH AND ENVIRONMENTALISM IN POST-SOCIALIST ROMANIA AND MOLDOVA

## Introduction

During consecutive trips to Chişinău, Moldova and Cluj, Romania in the spring of 2012, I observed a sharp contrast between the forms of environmental activism present in these neighboring countries. In Chişinău, I attended a worldwide Earth Hour event with young environmentalists, officials from the Ministry of Environment, and community members, featuring educational activities and an upbeat candlelit concert. Several days later, I met with a group of young people planning a project to address what they termed a “lack of environmental consciousness” in Moldova by teaching young people about sustainable development. They aimed to create a network of government institutions, NGOs, private companies, and experts that could find “economically sound solutions” to environmental challenges in Moldova.

In Cluj, I attended a demonstration marking six months since a small group of activists had occupied a local hotel in order to bring attention to the Roşia Montană mining project. I talked to young activists involved in the campaign, which has been fighting since the year 2000 to stop a Canadian corporation and the Romanian government from creating the largest opencast gold mine in Europe. The campaign not only stages protests but also makes legal challenges against the company in an attempt to ensure the protection of the environment as well as several villages close to the mining site and pre-Roman mining galleries that would be destroyed by the mine.

My understanding of these two projects builds on my experiences during fourteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Moldova and twelve months in Romania between 2009 and 2012. In this paper, I argue that while young environmentalists in Moldova in some ways embrace a green neoliberal paradigm, those involved in the Save Roşia

Montană (*Salvați Roșia Montană*, or SRM) campaign in Romania utilize narratives of endangerment – of the environment as well as the people and national heritage of Roșia Montană – to critique this same paradigm. Both approaches resonate with their respective larger societies; the former reflects young Moldovans' lack of confidence in the government, commitment to modernization, and tendency to search for solutions outside of Moldova, while the latter reflects young Romanians' anger with the government and its ties to industry, as well as uncertainty about the effects of Europeanization and globalization on their country.

To understand these differences, it is essential to consider the particular contexts in which the movements have emerged. I start by giving a brief overview of the similarities and differences between the environmental communities in the two countries, examining the influence of historical, environmental, economic, and political variables. Then I focus on two specific groups, Green Moldova and the Save Roșia Montană campaign, in order to illustrate how the ideologies, discourses, and practices of the groups reflect two different approaches to environmentalism. In particular, I focus on the movements' differing attitudes toward political engagement and neoliberal capitalism, and I consider how these attitudes contribute to their divergent narratives and actions.

## **Overview of environmentalism in Moldova and Romania**

Anthropologist Kay Milton (1996: 33) defines environmentalists broadly as people who have a “concern to protect the environment through human effort and responsibility” and are therefore labeled, by themselves and others, as environmentalists. Most individuals that I encountered matching this description in both Romania and Moldova were under 35, with the notable exception of a group of middle-aged male scientists who head the five strongest environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Chișinău.<sup>1</sup> These groups arguably make up what Steven Sampson (2002) classifies as an elite class of NGOs, as they control much of the aid that comes to Moldova for environmental projects. Smaller and rural groups in Moldova complained that it is difficult to compete with these powerful organizations for funding. Many environmentalists in both countries are affiliated with NGOs, most of which are urban-based or at least have urban connections even if they focus on rural projects. Many base themselves in Chișinău and Bucharest in particular, as NGOs in the capital enjoy greater access to funding (Cellarius 2004).<sup>2</sup>

Environmentalists in Romania and Moldova expressed similar complaints related to the contexts in which they work; the perception of widespread corruption, a lack of media attention, and low public awareness about environmental problems are common concerns. They have also adopted some similar approaches, such as a focus on educating young people about the importance of protecting the environment. Projects carried out by the NGOs tend to follow the environmental narratives preferred by Western donors, particularly those related to sustainable development and green neoliberalism, discussed further below (Goldman 2005, Harper 2001, Schwartz 2006). In both Romania and Moldova, urban projects tend to focus on individual actions such as recycling and riding bicycles, while rural projects often focus on the protection of biodiversity and saving endangered or unique species.

Beyond these similarities, there are many differences between the environmental movements in Romania and Moldova. In Moldova, the environmental community is small and fragmented by age, urban or rural location, and Romanian or Russian language use, mirroring divisions within Moldovan society more generally. Nonetheless, nearly all projects are embedded in the country's modernization strategy. The Romanian movement is larger and more developed, but also divided. The most prominent groups in Bucharest depend significantly on corporate funding, while others, including the Save Roşia Montană campaign, critique this approach and use international funding and donations to fight against corporate power and its effects on the environment and the Romanian people.

### ***Environmental history***

Contrasting environmental histories have helped to shape the emergence of the Moldovan and Romanian environmental movements. During the Soviet period, Moldova underwent very little industrialization and remained primarily an agricultural country; thus its current problems relate mainly to agriculture, specifically the overuse of chemicals. The Soviet government provided large amounts of chemicals, which encouraged farmers to over-apply them, leading to run-off into surface water and eventually groundwater. Although chemical usage dropped after 1991, it has recently increased again as Western organizations have encouraged agricultural intensification, so drinking water continues to be contaminated in many rural communities. In Romania, large-scale industrialization led to widespread ecological destruction in some areas,

such as air and water contamination from mining projects, soil pollution due to industrial projects in agricultural areas, and water pollution from agricultural projects in the Danube Delta (Schmidt 2001, Turnock 1996).

Neither country saw the emergence of a serious environmental movement during the communist period, although such movements did emerge elsewhere in the region. In the Soviet Union during perestroika, various environmental movements appeared, but as Jane Dawson (2000: 33) argues, these groups “represented far more than simple crusades for environmental purity”, being “in fact political movements aimed at protesting Moscow’s imperial control over the periphery”. In various places across the USSR, groups of activists came together to protest the effects of industrialization, focusing on issues such as nuclear energy and the disappearance of the Aral Sea due to large-scale irrigation projects (Feshbach and Friendly 1992). The anti-nuclear movements in particular had strong nationalist undertones and thus largely disappeared when the Soviet Republics regained sovereignty (Dawson 1996). As Moldova did not have a nuclear industry or other large-scale, environmentally destructive projects, a strong environmental movement did not emerge here. However, during the late Soviet period in Moldova, concerned ecologists worked on combatting problems such as the overuse of chemicals in agriculture. Jane Dawson (2000) points out in her discussion of environmental clubs in the USSR that “rather than focusing on broad environmental demands...these associations tended to focus on specific threats to their local communities”. Ecologists in Moldova, a largely agricultural republic, thus focused on chemical use and its consequences for human health. Like the ecologists in Soviet Moldova, many present-day Moldovan environmentalists continue to focus on small-scale local problems, often related to agriculture and rural modernization.

In Central and Eastern Europe, communist regimes in countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia largely overlooked environmentalists as harmless nature lovers or mushroom collectors. Environmental activism thus became a space in which diverse groups could come together to protest not only environmental neglect and destruction by those in power but also communism more generally (Snajdr 2008). As in the USSR, most of these groups disappeared or changed significantly after the fall of communism, though this history of environmental activism created a space for such activities to reemerge after 1989. In Romania, by contrast, the Ceaușescu regime strictly controlled even environmental groups, so true grassroots movements did not emerge during the communist



period (O'Brien 2005). Simina Dragomirescu et al. (1998: 171) point out that "immediately after the revolution conservationists came out of the woodwork and many ecological groups arose" in Romania. Two ecological parties gained seats in the 1990 parliamentary election, but this initial enthusiasm dwindled as the dire economic situation led people to favor job creation over environmental protection. Thomas O'Brien (2005: 6) adds that the popularity of the environment as a topic of concern during the early "transition" years at least in part reflects the fact that "general opposition to the regime was still limited through state control of the media and the continued existence of the *Securitate*", the Romanian secret police. As a result, environmentalism became a safe arena in which to express concerns during the early post-communist years, as it had elsewhere before 1989. Without a strong history of environmentalism, Romania's environmental movement grew more slowly than in many neighboring countries; nevertheless, resistance movements have built steadily in opposition to destructive large-scale projects.

### ***Funding acquisition and EU integration***

An examination of funding and relationships to Europe highlights further differences between Romanian and Moldovan environmentalism. Most environmental NGOs in Moldova rely heavily on funds from international environmental or development organizations, discussed further below. In Romania, most groups also rely at least partially on such funding; however, some also receive funding from private Romanian corporations. In fact, two of the most active NGOs in Bucharest rely almost exclusively on funding from companies such as oil and beer producers, banks, and cell phone providers. Leaders of these NGOs explained to me that corporate funding is preferable to funding from national or European sources, which they consider scarce and too difficult to obtain due to bureaucracy. By contrast, they find private companies – often large polluters – eager to contribute money to environmental causes through their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. Such programs have been criticized for distracting the public from questioning firms' operations, and as ways for companies to profit commercially by boosting their image without making significant environmental improvements (Benson, 2008, Welker, 2009).<sup>3</sup>

These particular Bucharest-based NGOs reported both positive and negative aspects of using private funding for projects. Although the initial proposal might have to be rewritten several times, once they acquire the

money, they can use it as they wish without having to request permission for changes or submit detailed spending reports. Such funding, however, often forces groups to narrow their focus to events such as tree planting and river cleanup days, as corporate employees can easily participate in these activities and promote their company's "green" image. Nevertheless, they expressed satisfaction with the freedom to carry out diverse projects while avoiding the paperwork required by other funders. Larger sums may be available from European funds, which would allow for a broader vision and longer-term projects, but the relative ease of obtaining corporate funding has so far been too tempting to resist. One group told me they might resort to European funds in the future if private funding decreases due to the economic crisis.

Environmentalists in Romania had mixed feelings about the impact of EU integration and regulations on their work. While they complained that European funding requires too much paperwork and places too many constraints on their projects, they also listed a lack of enforcement of EU regulations as an obstacle to environmental protection. One activist told me that the EU had been more powerful before Romania joined the EU in 2007, in that they could threaten to deny the country's accession if they did not meet expectations. Now EU interference is limited, as breaking environmental laws is considered an internal affair.<sup>4</sup> Only if a project involves EU funds can the EU impose sanctions for broken rules. Some thus see EU rules as potentially helpful, if only the government had the capacity and the will to enforce them.

In Moldova, due to the poor local economy and a perception that Moldovan companies are uninterested in investing in the environment, environmental groups have not attempted to obtain private funding, preferring to look elsewhere. Romanian environmentalists commonly perceive that much of the European funding available before 2007 to help Romania meet EU standards "moved east" after accession. As part of the European Neighborhood, Moldova does attract some funding from European sources, and they are working on adopting European regulations with the intention of one day joining the EU. However, the inconsistent availability of European funds, combined with a lack of sufficient funding from their own National Environment Fund, leads most Moldovan environmental NGOs to apply for external funding from international or foreign organizations. By forming partnerships directly with international entities, local NGOs can bypass what they see as a weak, corrupt state; one NGO director told me that securing foreign funds "forces the government to cooperate". This

arrangement illustrates what James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta (2002: 994) call a new transnational governmentality in which local NGOs, states, and international organizations can be considered “horizontal contemporaries”. The weakness of the Moldovan state has led to the destabilization of “existing hierarchies of spatial scales”, so that local actors can connect directly to global entities (Gille and Ó Riain 2002: 278). Zsuzsa Gille (2000: 261) argues that due to this new arrangement, “global forces...are less constraining and more enabling than they once were”, so that “local actors can use their imaginations to put those global forces to work on their behalf”.

While direct access to international funders has created new opportunities, Moldovan activists, echoing their Romanian counterparts, reported that sometimes the priorities of their donors do not match local needs, a common scenario in NGO work (Ghodsee 2005, Phillips 2008). For example, the leader of an NGO working to install dry EcoSan toilets in villages with insufficient access to running water described problems she had had working with a particular for-profit funder, which tried to treat the NGO as a service provider and impose certain criteria. The project stalled for a whole year while she fought with the funder, refusing to change practices she knew were effective, such as listening to local ideas and conducting follow-up visits. Her persistence paid off, as the NGO’s relationship with the funder had improved. Others have found creative ways to reconcile local needs and donor expectations.<sup>5</sup> For instance, a rural NGO working through the Chişinău branch of an international development program wanted to obtain money to test well water quality in several villages whose groundwater had been polluted with nitrates from fertilizers. As the funder, another international organization, did not support sanitation projects, the NGO focused its application on the negative impact of water pollution on biodiversity in a nearby river. The NGO then used the money to test drinking water and develop a remediation plan. The representative managing the funds told me that the only reason the organization granted Moldova the funding was that the affected river flows into international waters. By appealing to donor expectations, the NGO managed to tap into and inventively use otherwise unattainable funds. These examples illustrate both the frustrations and benefits of being located in a small country generally overlooked by international entities. Although they sometimes feel invisible, some Moldovan environmentalists also feel more freedom to use funds creatively than do many of their Romanian counterparts, who often feel beholden to the demands of corporate funders or stifled by EU bureaucracy.

Divergent environmental histories and political and economic variables in Moldova and Romania have clearly resulted in the emergence of two distinct environmental communities. The case studies presented below further illustrate these differences while also demonstrating the diversity within both communities. In Moldova, as in the examples above, a group of activists focuses on local, small-scale projects and displays a willingness to follow donor narratives. The young environmentalists depart from the traditional focus on rural agricultural issues by bringing environmental awareness to the city. In Romania, evoking the radical environmental groups at the end of communism elsewhere in the region, a campaign fights against a large-scale, environmentally destructive project as well as the larger political-economic system. Their critical approach contrasts with the corporate sponsored projects in Bucharest described above.

The next section explores how a weak state, a dire economic situation, and a globally-connected youth generation have given rise to an environmental movement that is firmly embedded in a Moldovan modernization project. I focus on the ideologies expressed by the participants in a project called Ecoweek, and how well these correspond to their discourses and practices.

### **Ecoweek and Green Moldova: Political engagement and green neoliberalism**

In April 2010, a group of young, urban Moldovans carried out a project called Ecoweek. Led by Violeta,<sup>6</sup> a 21-year-old Moldovan woman, Ecoweek involved about 30 high school and college students who had applied to participate in the project and were chosen through a group interview process. Along with Violeta's colleague Irina, an economics student, I helped to interview the applicants for the project. I also participated in the week's events, including educational sessions, a trip to the local wastewater treatment plant, a movie and networking night, and the planning and execution of small environmental projects.

According to Violeta, Ecoweek aimed to impart global and local environmental information to young people, to give participants a chance to plan and carry out practical activities, and to create networking opportunities. The larger aim of the project was to start an environmental movement of young people, which the organizers felt did not exist in Moldova. At the end of Ecoweek, Violeta and others formed a Facebook group called

Green Moldova in order to maintain the ties created during Ecoweek and to attract new members. Several meetings and events, such as annual Earth Hour celebrations, took place in the two years following Ecoweek. Violeta and Green Moldova then began to plan a new, larger project, which aims to continue to raise environmental awareness in Moldova as well as to encourage the development of a green economy in Moldova.

***Ideology: weak state, individual actions***

During educational sessions that took place on the first two days of Ecoweek, Violeta expressed her view that political engagement is a waste of time. Like many Moldovans, she sees the state as weak and its politicians as corrupt, leading her to conclude that any involvement in politics would be ineffective.<sup>7</sup> Violeta thus stressed to Ecoweek participants the importance of seeking ways to effect change without going through political channels. She argued that working with the Ministry of Environment makes no sense because of its small budget; demanding that the state pay attention to environmental issues makes no sense either, because the state is so corrupt and incompetent that it will not listen. As a group of students, she went on, they had no way to influence politics in Moldova. The students often expressed similar views. In discussing ways to address pollution, one participant suggested that the government could impose new standards and collect taxes from polluters. In response, Adrian, a high school senior, asked where the tax money would go. "You get corruption out of this", he insisted. During an Ecoweek follow-up meeting with a handful of participants, I asked if they agreed with Violeta's view of politics. They did. Vova, for example, said that politics "is a power world, and we can't go there".

During the Ecoweek educational sessions, a pessimistic attitude about the incompetence of the Moldovan state often contributed to a defeatism when discussing ways to protect Moldova's environment. At a certain point Violeta became frustrated, saying,

I am not a person who does believe a lot in politics. Politics is one ruling force of the world. But politics is created by people, right? Who are those politicians who sit in the Duma, in the Parliament? They are just people... who have their own understanding of the world. And those politicians are not doing the things we like; they're not doing the things that are sustainable. Okay, so let them do what they want. We are also people with our own

will, our own power, and we can also change something. Although we are still students...we are the way. We [are] the people who in five, maybe ten years [will] be the decision makers, okay? And it all starts from us.

In accordance with their views on the inefficacy of political engagement, Violeta and the Ecoweek participants based their activities on the premise that change must come from them rather than from the top. They decided to educate themselves about environmental problems and then teach others, especially other young people, and lead by example, a decision that guided the projects they carried out. These included an art project for children, handing out stickers listing ways to “save the planet”, distributing recycling information, bicycling through Chişinău to promote an alternative means of transportation, and encouraging people to trade their disposable plastic bags for reusable canvas ones.

The participants’ choice of projects reflects not only a response to the perceived uselessness of engaging in politics, but also a desire to connect to the global environmental movement. During the second day of Ecoweek, participants expressed satisfaction that they were finally learning about “real” environmentalism, in contrast to the local environmental messages they considered inferior, such as “Don’t throw trash on the streets”. In planning the project, Violeta looked for assistance, ideas, and expertise from outside of Moldova. She acquired German and American funding to support the project, and she recruited one American and one German ecologist to lead educational sessions. In virtually all of the environmental projects I came across in Moldova, planners sought international funding, expertise, or both. I found throughout my research more generally that Moldovans tend to seek solutions outside their borders, often by necessity, as evidenced by the high rate of emigration in response to a weak economy at home. Many who stay in Moldova also have an international outlook; young people in Chişinău especially have a strong global awareness. In discussing their motivations to apply for Ecoweek, many participants mentioned a desire to make connections and practice their English in addition to learning about the environment.

### ***Discourse: green neoliberalism and ecological modernization***

Young Moldovan environmentalists’ focus on outside solutions has contributed to the tendency of many to follow a green neoliberal framework. As detailed by Michael Goldman (2005:7), the “green

neoliberal” paradigm emerged in the 1990s when the World Bank adopted a sustainable development framework and incorporated it into its neoliberal economic agenda focusing on economic growth. This paradigm, and its neoliberal conservation approach that ostensibly seeks to protect nature by commodifying it, has since become the dominant approach to development, despite the difficulties inherent in using a capitalist paradigm to solve the very problems that it created (Büscher et al. 2012, Heynen et al. 2007).

Despite Moldovans’ often-ambivalent attitudes toward Western development, a sense of how “the West” judges them encourages at times a relatively uncritical acceptance of Western ideas and “expert” advice. Positive attitudes about Western approaches certainly affected the choice of narratives used by Ecoweek participants. Most strikingly, especially in comparison to the Romanian environmentalists I discuss below, these narratives often followed the ecological modernization framework favored by the European Union (EU). This approach, related to green neoliberalism, assumes that further economic development can be undertaken to improve ecological outcomes (Baker 2007). With a preference for market-based strategies and technological solutions, it “uses cost-benefit analysis rather than moral argument” and “eschews biocentrism and other more radical strands of environmentalism in favor of accommodating capitalism” (Guldbrandsen and Holland 2001: 126). Thaddeus Guldbrandsen and Dorothy Holland (2001: 132) argue further that

the spread of ecological modernization and its accommodation to corporate environmentalism (and its deployment of ‘sustainable development’)... threatens to undermine the possibility of grassroots politics. It threatens as well the moral and political standpoint of social justice issues and more critical versions of environmentalism.

During Ecoweek, which included many economics students, some discussions revolved around the development of a green economy based on neoliberal principles. While Violeta herself expressed doubts about the ability of capitalism to result in environmental protection, the American expert and most of the students agreed that this was possible. During a networking event during Ecoweek, in which Violeta hoped to bring together people from different parts of the environmental community, two industry representatives presented their companies. One was trying to introduce wind turbines into Moldova, and the other talked about the great potential for alternative energy in Moldova.

Two years after Ecoweek, when I returned to Moldova to participate in Earth Hour, I found that even Violeta had adopted narratives relating to building a green economy. In a funding application for a new, larger project Violeta had conceived, she wrote, "Environmental consciousness and action are perfectly compatible with economic development". Several factors help to explain this shift. In Moldova, where international aid organizations have a strong presence and much public discourse focuses on economic development, a form of environmentalism that fits with neoliberal capitalism may seem like the path of least resistance. Furthermore, the ecological modernization approach attracts Violeta and others because of its claim to be "apolitical". By masking the role of political forces, it presents the creation of a green economy as a neutral way to initiate change without having to become involved in politics. By contrast, according to this framework, "forms of environmentalism not encompassed by ecological modernization are 'political' and so must temper their positions", a view that further threatens critical forms of environmentalism (Guldbrandsen and Holland 2001: 132).

### ***Practice: political engagement***

While participants' ideology about the futility of political engagement strongly influenced the dialogue during Ecoweek's planning meetings as well as the educational sessions, in fact the project did involve the Ministry of Environment. Violeta invited her friend, a new vice-minister of the environment, to give a presentation during a networking event midweek. While Ecoweek participants complained the next day that the vice-minister had said nothing to demonstrate any action taken by the Ministry, his participation had nonetheless presented political involvement as a real possibility. Indeed, as suggested in her speech, above, while Violeta feels that young people cannot have an impact on politics at present, she also feels confident that they will get this chance in the future. This contrasts strongly with the views of Romanian environmentalists, described below, who protest against the government and see no possibility of breaking into what they consider a strong, corrupt political system, or even meaningfully engaging with politicians. Of course, Moldova's much smaller size plays an important role here; that Violeta has a good friend in the Ministry of Environment indicates that participation in government is within reach here, while in Romania the political class is seen as much further removed from society.



Dragoș, another friend of Violeta's, also presented at the Ecoweek networking event, telling the audience that "everything is possible", and that constantly complaining and protesting does nothing. "We should instead promote actions in favor of the environment", he insisted. Dragoș had worked for environmental NGOs before starting the first environmental consulting firm in Moldova. In 2011, Dragoș also became a vice-minister of the environment. When I saw him in April 2011, he described to me the challenges he was having integrating into the Ministry, where "the Communists" seemed intent on making his life difficult, but he also maintained some optimism. Several Ecoweek participants later took part in government-sponsored projects, such as Hai Moldova, a countrywide trash cleanup day, and Youth Parliament, a program affiliated with the Moldovan Parliament that sometimes debates environmental issues. Thus, although Moldovans view their government officials as corrupt, and talk about their rejection of political engagement, in practice they do not treat the system as so impenetrable that they cannot find ways to participate. Moreover, many have confidence that, like Dragoș, they will eventually have the opportunity to participate directly in politics.

Although Violeta, the driving force behind Ecoweek, talked about the need to completely ignore politics and the inability of capitalism to solve ecological problems, the activities carried out during the week and beyond did not always follow these ideas. In addition to the focus on changing individual behavior, the Green Moldova activists engaged with the Ministry of Environment and to some extent accepted green neoliberal ideas, at least for the sake of attracting funding. The next section describes a much different approach to environmentalism appearing in Romania, illustrated by the Save Roșia Montană campaign. As discussed above, while the environmental community in Romania does include those who obtain support from private companies' corporate social responsibility programs, another more radical type of environmentalism has also developed. Like the Green Moldova activists, the activists involved in the SRM campaign feel a particular solidarity with the global environmental movement, but they identify more strongly with the revolutionary, anti-capitalist branch of this movement.

### **Save Roșia Montană: Endangerment and nostalgia in Romania**

The Save Roșia Montană campaign aims to stop Gabriel Resources, a Canadian mining firm, from opening Europe's largest opencast gold

mine near Roșia Montană, a group of 16 villages in Romania's Apuseni Mountains in the Western Carpathians. Roșia Montană's history as a mining settlement reaches back to pre-Roman times, and mining occurred here on and off for hundreds of years. In 1948, the mine was nationalized by the Romanian socialist state, and in 1970 opencast mining began, lasting until 2006 when the mine was closed (Alexandrescu 2011). The Roșia Montană Gold Corporation (RMGC), which formed when Gabriel Resources combined with the state firm Minvest Deva, has been trying since 1997 to re-open and expand the mine (Alexandrescu 2011), which would use cyanide leaching to extract gold and necessitate the creation of a large tailings facility, or cyanide lake, in a nearby valley (Szombati n.d.). Alburnus Maior, a local NGO, formed in 2000 in opposition to the mine. Activists headquartered in nearby regional center Cluj as well as Bucharest support the NGO, using protests to gain public support and collaborating with lawyers to make legal challenges against the RMGC. As in Moldova, activists have sought international funding and connections to the global environmental community, receiving financial support from various international environmental groups and help with campaign coordination from a Swiss activist (Alexandrescu 2011). These environmentalists focus not only on protecting the natural environment from destruction, but also on protecting villagers from being displaced from their homes. Many local residents have already moved or have agreed to move in exchange for compensation from RMGC, while others refuse to leave. Finally, the campaign aims to protect the pre-Roman mining galleries from destruction by attempting to have the site placed on the UNESCO heritage list, thus protecting it from mining indefinitely.

### ***Ideology: corrupt state***

In May 2012, I traveled to Cluj to carry out interviews with several activists involved in the SRM campaign. The campaign's basic view toward politics is that politicians are corrupt and dialogue with them is impossible. Simona, one of the movement's key proponents based in Cluj, echoed Violeta's views that trying to engage in politics is a waste of time.<sup>8</sup> For example, trying to build a new political party, she told me during an interview, would be virtually impossible given the strength of political networks in Romania as well as their strong ties to industry. Furthermore, unsuccessful attempts to secure political support had proven to Simona and the other activists that politicians are untrustworthy. For instance, at one

point several campaign members had met with the Minister of Culture, who promised to support their UNESCO aspirations. However, he then refused to take the steps necessary to advance this project, prompting Simona to conclude that he had only made promises “to shut us up”. Corina, another activist who has designed artwork for the campaign, told me that she had some hope that the new government would support their campaign, but that she and the other activists knew all too well that politicians often make promises only to break them when they come to power. Indeed, while the new Prime Minister, Victor Ponta, initially expressed his opposition to the mine, his economic minister quickly expressed his support for the project (David 2012).

Activists expressed anger not only toward the Romanian government, but toward the EU and the RMGC as well. They feel that the EU has abandoned them, for although the European Parliament voted in 2010 to ban the use of cyanide in mining, the European Commission refused to enforce this. Movement participants also mentioned the RMGC’s close ties to Romanian politicians who have financial interests in the projects. For example, Simona told me that the RMGC had been giving money to political campaigns for ten years. I heard various stories from activists in Bucharest about the company’s control of the Romanian media, which is prevented from covering protests against the RMGC. During the general protests that erupted in Bucharest’s University Square in January 2012, the Roșia Montană protesters finally enjoyed some television coverage by integrating themselves with the other protesters; however, they found out later that the cameras had been instructed to cut away any time SRM protesters appeared in the shot.

The Save Roșia Montană campaign enjoys significant public support (Szombati n.d.), and it received a boost during the general protests against austerity measures and governmental corruption in Bucharest and across the country. As many others shared the SRM activists’ critical views about the EU and the strong ties between politics and industry, the general protesters quickly embraced the Save Roșia Montană campaign (Bucata 2012). The campaign’s aims also echoed many of the ideas being expressed by protesters related to democracy building, bringing down a corrupt government, and preventing the sale of Romania to international corporations. Finally, expressions of nationalism were common during the protests, with many people waving Romanian flags. The SRM campaign again fit in nicely, as Romanian flags appeared with the SRM logo in the center, suggesting that Roșia Montană “is” Romania, and thus to save one is to save the other.

***Discourse: endangerment and anticipatory nostalgia***

The campaign's views about the futility of engaging in politics and its aim to protect Roșia Montană from those who support the mining project, namely the Romanian government and the RMGC, lead the activists to use particular narratives. As mentioned above, the campaign stresses the importance of protecting not only nature, but also cultural heritage and the way of life of village residents. As a result, the narratives they use generally follow what Timothy Choy (2011) calls a politics of endangerment. Choy (2011: 26) argues that

as environmentalists grapple increasingly with the tight bonds that can be formed between people and places, between situated practices and specific landscapes, and between what are commonly glossed as culture and nature, discourses of endangerment have come to structure not only narrowly construed environmental politics, but also politics of cultural survival.

Endangerment here can be seen as an “anticipatory nostalgia” in which “the past is to be protected from the present, while the present is to be protected from the future; both are to be sheltered from the movement of history” (Choy 2011: 38). In Roșia Montană, activists want to protect the pre-Roman galleries, save the environment from destruction and ensure that the villagers can maintain their way of life. Anca, a young activist in Cluj, told me that the residents of Roșia Montană just want to be left alone to grow their own food and live a simple, peaceful life. Instead they live with constant uncertainty about the future, in which they may be forced to leave their villages. The endangerment discourse is also helpful in relation to displacement, as endangerment can be spatial in addition to being temporal. After all, nostalgia merely denotes “a kind of painful homesickness”; thus, “nostalgic discourses of endangerment do not simply bemoan the passage of time, but are sick, instead, from the loss of specific, meaningful spaces” (Choy 2011: 48-9). Activists appeal to Romanians’ sense of nostalgia by using narratives that focus on the connection of villagers to their land and the possibility that this connection will be broken by forced displacement.

It is important to realize that this endangerment is produced; that is, certain environments, places, and beings come to be seen as endangered through narratives. Moreover, despite the coherence of these narratives, not all actors see things the same way. While Romanian environmental activists stress the endangerment of a traditional way of life that involves

subsistence farming, Filip Alexandrescu (2011) argues that this narrative does not accurately reflect the lives of most villagers. Roșia Montană has always been a mining town, and many of its residents do not even have gardens, let alone consider themselves farmers. Nonetheless, the powerful image of a “traditional” way of life being threatened resonates with a more widespread uncertainty about Romania’s future. Indeed, Choy (2011: 49) argues further that “endangerment positions its subjects in the future, looking backward, watching with dismay at the ruining of our present. And because it proffers this clairvoyant view, it can engender politics - because with foresight, the future can be changed”. By casting Roșia Montană’s nature, people, and cultural heritage as endangered, the activists create powerful political tools, inspiring those who want to protect these things to protest against the RMGC and the politicians who support the mine.

### ***Practice: protests and legal challenges***

Following their ideological views about the impossibility of having a dialogue with politicians, the SRM campaign’s most visible actions are protests against the Romanian government, which has for the most part expressed support for the mine. When I visited Cluj, the campaign held a small demonstration in front of the Continental Hotel to commemorate six months since they had occupied the hotel. After the demonstration, Simona and a couple of other activists told me the story of “Occupy Conti”, which they had staged to bring attention to the Roșia Montană issue. After months of planning, early one November morning in 2011 six activists broke into the abandoned hotel. Once inside, they unfurled banners, played loud music, and led chants with the help of a growing crowd outside. Local law enforcement was alerted to the occupation, and after several hours the activists were forced out. However, due to the large crowd that gathered, the support displayed by passersby, and the buzz the event created, they considered the occupation a success. As mentioned above, the SRM campaign also participated in the protests in Bucharest in January 2012, and they held their own protest on a bitterly cold day that same winter in front of the parliament building, even bussing in activists and local residents from Roșia Montană.

While protests are the most visible form of action taken by the SRM campaign, Simona told me that in fact most of their time and energy goes into “access to justice” work, or bringing court cases against the RMGC. They have several lawyers, some working pro bono, who work to prove

that the company is in violation of regulations or that certain permits are null and void, for example (Wolf-Murray 2012). These activities in the courtroom may not be as exciting or attention grabbing as the protests, whose main purpose is to maintain public support for the campaign, but they have kept the mining project at a stalemate for over a decade.

In sum, the Save Roșia Montană campaign views the government as a corrupt body that is selling Roșia Montană to a foreign company. Activists' most visible approach is to protest the project, demanding that the government stop it. They use narratives of endangerment, portraying Roșia Montană as a place whose environment, people, and history must be protected, especially because of their national importance. They use these narratives to gain public support and to argue for the designation of Roșia Montană as a UNESCO heritage site. However, their more active, less visible approach is to seek justice through the court system, tying the project up in legal red tape to delay it until a permanent stop, such as a UNESCO designation, can be obtained.

## Conclusion

This paper has shown that despite some similarities, the environmental communities in Moldova and Romania have emerged in distinct ways. Factors contributing to these contrasts include funding availability from the private and public sectors, relationships to the European Union, and different environmental histories. An examination of two groups of environmental activists, Green Moldova and the Save Roșia Montană campaign, illustrates how divergent contexts can give rise to very different approaches. While both groups express an aversion to political engagement, the activists in Moldova ultimately worked with the Ministry of Environment and envision a future in which they can actively participate in politics, while the Romanian activists maintained a commitment to fighting the government, participating in protests, and making legal challenges against the Roșia Montană Gold Corporation. Moreover, the Moldovan activists have in some ways embraced a neoliberal, ecological modernization paradigm, which they feel can benefit both the environment and the economy, while in Romania the Save Roșia Montană activists represent part of a growing segment of the population willing to speak out against a neoliberal capitalist system that they view as threatening their environment and their people.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> After the fall of communism, Western aid organizations filtered much of their funding to such organizations, which they saw as essential to the growth of “civil society” and thus the promotion of democracy in the region (Mandel 2002, Verdery 1996, Wedel 2001). NGOs multiplied rapidly during this period, and although many have since disappeared, Western donors continue to target such groups.
- <sup>2</sup> However, such an arrangement also means that the NGO is farther away from the people and places it protects (Cellarius 2004).
- <sup>3</sup> The activists I talked to expressed some discomfort about receiving corporate money; one group compromised by refusing to take money from cigarette companies.
- <sup>4</sup> For a wider discussion of post-accession conditionality, see Sedelmeier (2008) and Trauner (2009).
- <sup>5</sup> Various anthropologists have documented the ways that local communities and local knowledge can transform development projects (e.g. Arce and Long 2000, Crewe and Harrison 1998, Lewis and Mosse 2006).
- <sup>6</sup> All of the names in this paper are pseudonyms.
- <sup>7</sup> This perception is not surprising, since Moldova is listed at 66th on the 2011 Failed States Index, falling into the second-worst category, “in danger” (Foreign Policy 2012).
- <sup>8</sup> These views about politics evoke the complaints of activists who have participated in recent protests worldwide (e.g. Juris 2012, Collins 2012). One common thread tying these protests together involves protesters’ frustrations related to a lack of political representation, leading to calls for “real” democracy (Butler 2011, Hardt and Negri 2011, Nugent 2012).

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