

# New Europe College

## Yearbook 2008-2009



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EVELINE CIOFLEC  
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ADRIAN MURARU  
ALEXANDRU SIMON  
ANCA ŞINCAN  
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# NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION

## NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

*New Europe College (NEC)* is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997–1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 500 members. In 1998 New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on individual research at an advanced level, NEC offers to young Romanian scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences, and to the foreign scholars invited as fellows appropriate working conditions, and provides an institutional framework with strong

international links, acting as a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates, and the events it organizes aim at strengthening research in the humanities and social sciences and at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide.

## **Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:**

### ***NEC Fellowships (since 1994)***

Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships open both to Romanian and international outstanding young scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year, or one term. They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend, and are given the opportunity of a research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of their stay, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the New Europe College Yearbooks.

### ***Stefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)***

The fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships, targeting young Romanian researchers, is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the Odobleja Fellowships are integrated.

### ***The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (since October 2009)***

This program, supported by the Getty Foundation, started in 2009. It proposes a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows.

As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program also includes a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence is meant to ensure a comparative dimension, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

***The Black Sea Link (since October 2010)***

This Fellowship Program, sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung, invites young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College organizes within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of the Black Sea region.

**Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of  
New Europe College:**

***RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)***

The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach actives involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

### ***The NEC-LINK Program (2003 - 2009)***

Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

### ***The GE-NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)***

New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10-month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE-NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend, and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE-NEC Yearbooks series.

### ***NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)***

In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova,

Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one-month research trip abroad. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

***The Britannia–NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)***

This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

***The Petre Tufea Fellowships (2006 – 2008, 2009 - 2010)***

In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government though its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College's community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Tufea* Program publications.

***Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)***

This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*, Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South-Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

### ***Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)***

This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

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Beside the above-described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

### **In the past:**

#### ***The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)***

Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different

confessions within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

***The Septuagint Translation Project (2002 - 2011)***

This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul*. Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

***The Excellency Network Germany – South-Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***

The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South-Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

***The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research***

*An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources (2006-2008)*

The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for Education and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility, connectedness and exploitation of some of the most

prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the “Constantin Brăiloiu” Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

***DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology*** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (starting July 2010)

***UEFISCCDI–CNCS(PD–Projects):Federalism or Intergovernmentalism? Normative Perspectives on the Democratic Model of the European Union (Dr. Dan LAZEA); The Political Radicalization of the Kantian Idea of Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense (Dr. Áron TELELDI-CSETRI)***, Timeframe: August 1, 2010 – July 31, 2012 (2 Years)

### **Ongoing projects:**

***The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon*** (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (since December 2009)

***Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances***. This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled ***Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and***

**eastern Europe**, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (since December 2009)

**Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development** (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (starting October 2010)

**The EURIAS Fellowship Programme**, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-sponsored by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar. The College will host the second EURIAS Fellow in October 2012.

**UEFISCDI – CNCS (TE – Project): Critical Foundations of Contemporary Cosmopolitanism (Dr. Tamara CĂRĂUŞ)**, Timeframe: October 5, 2011 – October 5, 2014 (3 years)

**UEFISCDI – CNCS (IDEI-Project): Models of Producing and Disseminating Knowledge in Early Modern Europe: The Cartesian Framework (Dr. Vlad ALEXANDRESCU)**,

Timeframe: January 1, 2012 – December 31, 2014 (3 years)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

***Present Financial Support***

The State Secretariat for Education and Research of Switzerland (Center for Governance and Culture in Europe, University of St. Gallen)  
The Federal Ministry for Education and Research of Germany  
The Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Culture of Austria  
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The Ministry of Education, Research and Innovation – the Executive Agency for Higher Education and Research Funding, Romania  
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Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (DaimlerChrysler–Fonds, Marga und Kurt Möllgaard–Stiftung), Essen, Germany  
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*Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, Köln, Germany  
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, The Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden

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## EVELINE CIOFLEC

geb. 1976 in Bukarest

Promotion im Mai 2008, an der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg i. Brsg. Mit der Arbeit: „Die Prägung des Begriffs *Zwischen* in Martin Heideggers. Eine Analyse ausgehend von relationalen Strukturen in ‘Sein und Zeit’“

Forschungsaufenthalte in Kyoto (Japan), in New York (USA) am *Hannah Arendt Center for Ethical and Political Thinking* des Bard College, sowie an der New School for Social Research, und in Berlin.

Lehre an der Babeş-Bolyai Universität in Cluj-Napoca, an der Eberhard-Karls Universität in Tübingen, sowie an der University of Fort Hare in East London (Südafrika).

Derzeit Postdoc-Stipendiatin der University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban (Südafrika).

Veröffentlichungen und Übersetzungen im Bereich der Philosophie. Teilnahme an Projekten im Bereich der Psychologie



# VERSTEHEN UND HANDELN

## EIN ANSATZ MIT MARTIN HEIDEGGER UND HANNAH ARENDT

Arendt zu Folge gibt es ohne menschliche Tätigkeit keine Welt. Die Welt „verdankt wesentlich dem Menschen ihre Existenz, seinem Herstellen von Dingen, seiner pflegenden Fürsorge des Bodens und seiner Landschaft, seinem handelnden Organisieren der politischen Bezüge in menschlichen Gemeinschaften.“<sup>1</sup> Aus dem Herstellen geht eine künstliche Welt hervor, die von den Sterblichen bewohnt wird. Im Handeln hingegen kommt die menschliche Freiheit zum Ausdruck und erhält jenen Aspekt der Welt in der ein Neuanfang möglich ist.

Von den vier menschlichen Tätigkeiten, die Arendt in *Vita activa* erwähnt, nämlich Denken, Arbeiten, Herstellen und Handeln, sind Herstellen und Handeln für das Erhalten der Welt zuständig.<sup>2</sup> Weil das Denken Arendt zu Folge nicht „innerhalb des Erfahrungshorizontes jedes Menschen liegt“, in ihrem Buch *Vita activa* aber nur jene Tätigkeiten für die allgemeine menschliche Bedingtheit ausschlaggebend sind, die jeden Menschen charakterisieren, werden nur das Arbeiten, das Herstellen und das Handeln eingehend untersucht. Dabei ist das Arbeiten jene Tätigkeit, durch welche die Lebenserhaltung gesichert wird, das Herstellen jene Tätigkeit, durch die Gebrauchsgegenstände erzeugt werden, und das Handeln die politische Tätigkeit, d. h. aber die Tätigkeit, in der die Zwischenmenschlichkeit zu Tage tritt.

Zwischenmenschlichkeit ist erst da möglich wo es Pluralität gibt, d. h., wo nicht vom Menschen die Rede ist, sondern von den Menschen.<sup>3</sup> Pluralität meint, dass der Einzelne als Person verstanden wird,<sup>4</sup> wobei das Personhafte der Person die moralische oder ethische Dimension ausmacht, wie Arendt in einer späteren Vorlesung festhält:

„Das Personhafte eines Individuums ist genau seine »moralische« Eigenschaft, wenn wir moralisch weder in seinem etymologischen noch in seinem konventionellen Sinne, sondern im Sinne der Moralphilosophie verstehen.“<sup>5</sup>

Die Pluralität der Menschen ist Bedingung des Handelns und Sprechens<sup>6</sup>, die ihrerseits moralisch und weltbildend sind. Zwar betrachtet Arendt das Sprechen ebenfalls als zentrales Motiv für die Weltbildung, aber es wird nicht als eine Tätigkeit angeführt, sondern als eine Grundbedingung der Zwischenmenschlichkeit. So ist das Sprechen, wie das Handeln auch, weltbildend, aber erst im Zusammenhang mit dem Handeln, wobei das Handeln der Sprache bedarf:

„Es gibt keine menschliche Verrichtung, welche des Wortes in dem gleichen Maße bedarf wie das Handeln.“<sup>7</sup>

Arendts Ausarbeitungen zum tätigen Leben zielen darauf, das Handeln als ausgezeichnete Tätigkeit hervorzuheben. Mit Arendt werde ich im Folgenden die Situation (als Handlungssituation oder politische Situation im Sinne der zwischenmenschlichen Situation) als Angelpunkt wählen und daran orientiert, die Strukturen des Handelns ableiten.

Die Schriften Arendts beziehen sich häufig auf die jeweils „gegenwärtige Situation“, den historischen Zusammenhang in politischer, zwischenmenschlicher Hinsicht.<sup>8</sup> Das Handeln wird so zu einem zentralen Thema in Bezug auf die Möglichkeit menschlicher Freiheit und menschlichen Zusammenlebens, d. h. in Bezug auf die als „gegenwärtige Situation“ betrachtete Politik.

Somit hebt Arendt eine gesonderte Tätigkeit, die nur im öffentlichen Raum, also nur unter den Menschen überhaupt möglich ist, für das Politische hervor. Das Politische gehört in Arendts Auffassung nicht zum Wesen des Menschen, wie bei Aristoteles, der den Menschen als *zoon politikon* bestimmt:

„Zoon politikon: als ob es im Menschen etwas Politisches gäbe, das zu seiner Essenz gehöre. Dies gerade stimmt nicht; der Mensch ist a-politisch. Politik entsteht in dem *Zwischen-den-Menschen*, also durchaus *außerhalb* des Menschen. Es gibt daher keine eigentlich politische Substanz. Politik entsteht im Zwischen und etabliert sich als der Bezug.“<sup>9</sup>

Werden die Analysen zu den menschlichen Tätigkeiten aus dieser Perspektive einer ‘gegenwärtigen Situation’ gelesen, so wird ersichtlich, dass das Handeln bei Arendt nicht für eine Erörterung des Wesens des Menschen vorrangig wird, sondern für die Erörterung des menschlichen

Miteinanders. Ihre Frage ist nicht so sehr, was der Mensch ist, sondern vielmehr unter welchen Bedingungen der Mensch lebt.

Das Handeln ist situiert, es findet nicht nur unter gegebenen Umständen statt, sondern ist auch selbstgestaltend. Anders gesagt, müssen für eine gewisse Handlung die Details der Umstände, unter denen sie stattfindet, berücksichtigt werden. Diese Details werden aber gerade durch die Handlung auch wieder modifiziert. In einem nächsten Schritt ist der Handlungsablauf dann dementsprechend von dem bereits vollzogenen Ablauf abhängig, und somit kann der gesamte Handlungsablauf nicht von vornherein erkannt oder projiziert werden. Handlungen sind somit im Einzelnen anhand von vorgegebenen Modellen kaum zu verstehen. Wer Handlungen verstehen will, muss einzelne Handlungssituationen lesen und erkennen können.

Um diesen Zusammenhang näher zu bestimmen, werde ich zunächst Heideggers Konzeption der hermeneutischen Situation hinzuziehen. Anschließend werde ich, ebenfalls ausgehend von Heidegger, die faktische Situation analysieren. Um die faktische Situation noch konkreter fassen zu können werde ich mit Hannah Arendt auf die Situation als politische Situation eingehen. Hierbei ist Situation im Hinblick auf zwischenmenschliches Handeln zu verstehen. Zu zeigen ist, dass bei Arendt mit Situation nicht Kontingenz gemeint ist, sonder vielmehr die bestimmenden und entscheidenden Sachverhalte in Bezug auf menschliches Handeln und menschliche Freiheit. Eine Handlungssituation ist bei Arendt zwar im Verstehen erschlossen, ähnlich wie bei Heidegger, fasst jedoch nur als Möglichkeit eines Neuanfangs Konturen.

Natalität und Pluralität sind die Stichworte für Hannah Arendts Auffassung vom Handeln. Sie bezeichnen zugleich dasjenige, was eine *politische Situation* genannt werden kann. Bei Heidegger hingegen lesen wir von einer *hermeneutischen Situation*, welche weniger das Handeln meint als das philosophische Verstehen. So eigenwillig die Gegenüberstellung von *politischer Situation* und *hermeneutischer Situation* auch erscheint, wird sich im Weiteren die Sinnverwandtschaft der beiden Ansätze zeigen.

Sowohl für Heidegger als auch für Arendt ist das Verstehen zentral. Wenn für Heidegger das Verstehen für die Möglichkeit der Philosophie zentral ist, so ist für Arendt das Verstehen ausschlaggebend für die Möglichkeit zu handeln. Allerdings weist die Motivation der Überlegungen in verschiedene Richtungen: während Heideggers Überlegungen davon motiviert sind, eine Möglichkeit der Philosophie zu bestimmen, sind

Arendts Überlegungen dadurch motiviert, zu zeigen, wann und unter welchen Bedingungen das menschliche Handeln möglich ist.

## Hermeneutische Situation und politische Situation

In *Sein und Zeit* wird die Umsicht, das Erfassen einer Handlungssituation, als ein Bezug von *phrónesis* (praktischer Vernunft)<sup>10</sup> und Lebenswelt (als Umwelt, Mitwelt, Selbstwelt) aufgefasst.<sup>11</sup> Darin widerspiegelt sich die Zurückweisung des Theoretischen, die mit der Problematisierung des Gegenstandes der Philosophie durchleuchtet wird.<sup>12</sup> Diese Zurückweisung kann als Grundzug der heideggerschen Auseinandersetzung mit der überlieferten sowie zeitgenössischen Philosophie – und somit auch mit der Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft – gesehen werden und ist in der Ausarbeitung der hermeneutischen Situation verankert. Kritik und Zurückweisung des Theoretischen, der „Generalherrschaft des Theoretischen“<sup>13</sup> besagt nicht eine gänzliche Absetzung von der Philosophie, sondern das Bestreben, die Philosophie umzuarbeiten, nämlich anhand der Frage nach dem Sein und ausgehend vom alltäglichen Leben. Der Versuch einen hermeneutischen Zugang zu der gegenwärtigen Lage der Philosophie zu finden, führt auch dazu, das Verstehen im Alltag nicht im Theoretischen zu verankern, sondern in der *phrónesis*, in der praktischen Vernünftigkeit.

Die politische Situation scheint hingegen einen gänzlich anderen Charakter zu haben, als die hermeneutische Situation der Philosophie: Während es sich bei der hermeneutischen Situation um die Analyse der Begrifflichkeiten der Überlieferung handelt, gemessen an den zu bedenkenden Tatsachen, ist die politische Situation offensichtlich eine des Jetzt und Hier. Sie hat den Charakter des Plötzlichen, des Unmittelbaren. Zwar muss in der Politik auch gedeutet werden, jedoch spricht man von zwischenmenschlichen, von Moral geprägten Situationen vorwiegend anhand gegenwärtiger Zusammenhänge.

„Unter den vielen Dingen, von denen man zu Beginn des Jahrhunderts immer noch annahm, daß sie ‘dauerhaft und lebenswichtig’ wären, und die noch nicht überdauert haben, habe ich die moralischen ausgewählt. Auf sie wollen wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit richten (...) Und zwar solange, bis all dies ohne große Vorwarnung über Nacht zusammenbrach, als die

Situation eintrat, daß die Moral plötzlich ohne Hüllen im ursprünglichen Sinn des Wortes dastand (...).<sup>14</sup>

Der Unterschied zwischen den genannten Zusammenhängen, in denen von einer Situation gesprochen wird, ist allerdings nicht ganz so hervorstechend, wie es zunächst erscheinen mag: Eine politische Situation muss auch interpretiert werden, trotz der Möglichkeit, dass sie plötzlich eintritt, und somit gehört sie auch in einen hermeneutischen Zusammenhang, wird Teil einer hermeneutischen Situation. Mit Sicherheit hat Hannah Arendt gerade um diesen Aspekt gekämpft, nämlich zu zeigen, dass eine zwischenmenschliche Situation im öffentlichen Bereich und somit eine politische Situation interpretiert oder beurteilt werden muss, und wie wichtig es ist, eine politische Situation überhaupt als solche zu erkennen.

Arendt spricht in der Einleitung zur Schrift *Vita Activa* von einer 'gegenwärtigen Situation' und meint damit die Moderne, wobei sie den Übergang von der Neuzeit, die sie analysiert, zur gegenwärtigen Zeit im Beginn des 20-ten Jahrhunderts sieht. In ihren Analysen geht es ihr demnach nicht nur darum, schlicht die Neuzeit zu beschreiben, sondern darum, zu zeigen, dass eine politische Situation davon abhängt, wie das Handeln in ihr bestimmt ist: Eine politische Situation ist nicht schlichtweg gegeben, sondern sie ist durch menschliches Handeln geschaffen. Zwar entsteht sie auf dem Hintergrund historischer Gegebenheiten, ist in die Geschichte eingebunden, und gerade weil sie im geschichtlich-interpretativen Zusammenhang den Charakter des Plötzlichen oder des Neuanfangs hat, kann sie zu einer Änderung des Gegebenen führen, und zwar nicht nur im Verstehen, sondern auch in den Sachverhalten. Für Arendt ist die Neuzeit gerade deswegen eine Zeit der Weltentfremdung geworden,<sup>15</sup> weil das Handeln, als weltbildendes, in den Hintergrund getreten ist.

Ist von einem Neuanfang die Rede, so handelt es sich, trotz des plötzlichen und unmittelbaren Charakters, nicht um Revolution, sondern vielmehr um die Möglichkeit der Freiheit im Einverständnis mit der Tradition. Gerade die Revolutionen, etwa jene von Lenin und Trotzki, betrachtet Arendt mit Skepsis, da sie die Werte der Überlieferung vorausgesetzt haben, darauf gebaut haben, und zwar ohne davon ausdrücklich Kenntnis zu nehmen: „Wenn irgend etwas von Lenin oder Trotzki als Vertreter des Berufsstandes der Revolutionäre kennzeichnend ist, so der naive Glaube, daß die Menschheit automatisch die wenigen

seit Anbeginn der Geschichte bekannten und wiederholten moralischen Vorschriften befolgen werde, wenn erst einmal die gesellschaftlichen Zustände durch die Revolution verändert seien.“<sup>16</sup> Der Neuanfang besteht in der anfänglichen, gebürtigen Möglichkeit des Individuums zu handeln, und zwar ohne den Anspruch, die Tradition umzuwerfen, sondern mit der Kraft neue Zeichen zu setzen, im Einzelnen Veränderungen zu bewirken und die eigene Freiheit kundzutun.

### **a. Die hermeneutische Situation und die Faktizität des Lebens**

Die hermeneutische Situation, von welcher Heidegger in seinen frühen Freiburger Vorlesungen spricht, erhebt – wie die politische Handlungssituation bei Arendt – den Anspruch, die Gegenwärtigkeit in Abhebung von Analysen der Vergangenheit zu durchleuchten. Es geht beiden Denkern um ein besseres Verstehen, darum, wie das Verstehen des Jetzt und Hier überhaupt möglich ist. Diese Gegenwärtigkeit wird in beiden Fällen im Praktischen verankert. Bei Heidegger tritt das Verstehen in Anlehnung an das praktische Verstehen in den Vordergrund, wie bereits erwähnt, primär um die Möglichkeit der Philosophie zu erörtern.

Der Zusammenhang, in dem Philosophie möglich ist, wird in Heideggers Entwurf *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)* als ‘hermeneutische Situation’ dargestellt.<sup>17</sup> Interpretationen „stehen unter bestimmten Bedingungen des Auslegens und Verstehens“. Der „thematische Gegenstand im Wie seines Ausgelegteins“ ist nur dann zugänglich, wenn die hermeneutische Situation deutlich gemacht wurde.

„Die Situation der Auslegung, als der verstehenden Aneignung des Vergangenen, ist immer eine solche der lebendigen Gegenwart. Die Geschichte selbst als im Verstehen zugeeignete Vergangenheit, wächst hinsichtlich ihrer Erfassbarkeit mit der Ursprünglichkeit der entscheidenden Wahl der hermeneutischen Situation.“<sup>18</sup>

Diese Auffassung der Auslegung des geschichtlichen Zusammenhangs ist für das Verständnis von Begriffen der Philosophie ausschlaggebend. Die hermeneutische Situation gliedert sich in Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorriff.<sup>19</sup> Jede Interpretation ist in einer solchen Situation gegeben. Dabei ist die Vorhabe das bereits Verstandene, der Bezug zu einem Sein, der bereits mitgebracht wird. Die Vorsicht ist derjenige umfassende Bezug,

der vorweggenommen wird, d. h. dasjenige, woraufhin die Interpretation abzielt. Der Vorgriff hingegen, ist die Begrifflichkeit, die bei der Auslegung angewendet wird, die Entscheidung, wie die Auslegung durchgeführt wird.

Allerdings muss zwischen dem vorgängigen Verständnis und dem ausdrücklichen Verstehen, ein Unterschied liegen, denn etwas zu suchen, was in aller Form schon vorliegt, wäre obsolet. Es handelt sich dabei nicht darum, etwas gänzlich Neues aufzudecken, sondern darum, ein Verständnis, welches bereits vorliegt zu vertiefen, zu entfalten, zu erweitern.<sup>20</sup>

Das Vorverständnis umfasst auch das vorontologische Seinsverständnis, das noch nicht ausdrücklich in einer Auslegung gegeben ist, das „durchschnittliche und vage Seinsverständis“, das als „Faktum“ gilt.<sup>21</sup> Bei diesem Seinsverständnis ist das „ist“ nicht begrifflich festgehalten. In *Sein und Zeit* wird das Verstehen so, wie es ausgehend vom Leben aufgefasst wird, in einer Auslegung des ‘Apriori’ festgehalten. Letzteres bezeichnet nämlich nicht dasjenige, was vor aller Erfahrung gegeben ist, wie etwa bei Kant<sup>22</sup>, sondern es bezeichnet die Faktizität. Indem Heidegger das Apriori ausgehend von dem Vor-verständnis auffasst, also bei der Faktizität ansetzt, bleibt es nicht länger eine Bezeichnung, welche die Erkenntnis vor aller Erfahrung ausmachen soll, sondern es bezeichnet diejenige Gegebenheit, die noch nicht ausdrücklich dem Verstehen zugeeignet ist, und somit ein Vorverständnis vor aller Philosophie, das aber durchaus aus Erfahrung entstanden ist. Nicht die Erfahrung bleibt das Kriterium nach welchem das Apriori bestimmt wird, sondern die philosophische Ausdrücklichkeit oder Unausdrücklichkeit.

„Wie ist der Charakter dieses »Vor-« zu begreifen? Ist es damit getan, wenn man formal »apriori« sagt?“<sup>23</sup>

Und ferner:

„Das als Vor-Struktur des Verstehens und qua als-Struktur der Auslegung Sichtbare“, macht ein einheitliches Phänomen aus, „davon zwar in der philosophischen Problematik ausgiebig Gebrauch gemacht wird, ohne dass dem so universal Gebrauchten die Ursprünglichkeit der ontologischen Explikation entsprechen will.“<sup>24</sup>

Ersichtlich ist, dass es sich beim Verstehen gerade nicht um den Verstand, das Urteilen, handelt. Es geht vielmehr um eine Einsicht, welche dem Modell des Handelns entnommen wird: die Einsicht in die Situation des

Handelns, die dem Urteil vorgängig ist. Es geht Heidegger offensichtlich gerade darum, das Verstehen, als einsichtiges, vernünftiges Verstehen, das dem Handeln dient, in den Mittelpunkt der Analysen zu stellen. Dieses vernünftige Verstehen ist schon bei Aristoteles im Werk *De anima* zu finden, wo zwischen praktischem und theoretischem *nous* unterschieden wird.<sup>25</sup> Der praktische *nous* ist dabei vom Zweck geleitet und meint, im richtigen Augenblick wissen, was zu tun ist.<sup>26</sup>

Somit könnte hervorgehoben werden, dass es Heidegger nicht darum geht, die letztgültige Wahrheit jenseits der Gewohnheit zu finden, sondern die Wahrheit ausgehend von dieser.<sup>27</sup> Die Philosophie wurzelt in der Gewohnheit, dem gewohnten Umfeld. Daher ist die Umsicht nicht auf Evidenz zurückzuführen, und auch nicht auf eine Art Betrachtung, sondern auf ein Verstehen als Erfassen einer Handlungssituation. Das Verstehen ist aber nicht auf den Verstand, sondern auf die praktische Vernunft zurückzuführen.<sup>28</sup>

Gleichzeitig ist eine Handlungssituation aber auch nicht anders gegeben, als in der Umsicht. Eine Situation zeigt sich als Situation gerade darin, dass sie vernommen, erfasst wird. Wird die Situation nicht erfasst, dann kann auch nicht gehandelt werden. In seinen Analysen geht Heidegger allerdings von gelingenden Handlungen aus. Die Umsicht erfasst die Situation und das jeweilige Handeln, und so kann jeweiliges Dasein sich verhalten, handeln.<sup>29</sup>

Das begrenzte Umfeld, in das eine Handlung sich fügt, ist als Ganzes gegeben. Eine Handlungssituation wird von Heidegger anhand des Modells einer Werkstatt interpretiert, die ein Ganzes ausmacht, weil ich mich darin zurechtfinde und in der Arbeit aufgehen kann, nicht aber ein totum.<sup>30</sup> Handlungssituationen sind nie geschlossene Situationen, sie sind nur abgerundet um handeln zu können.

In den späten 20-er Jahren<sup>31</sup>, vor allem in *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt. Endlichkeit. Einsamkeit*<sup>32</sup> greift Heidegger die Erörterung der hermeneutischen Situation erneut auf, und zwar in Zusammenhang mit dem Problem des Mitseins mit den Anderen oder der Gemeinschaft, wenn zugleich das Handeln erörtert wird. Im Anschluss an Aristoteles bestimmt Heidegger das Miteinandersein ausgehend von der Rede: „Die Worte erwachsen aus jener wesenhaften Übereinkunft der Menschen miteinander, gemäß deren sie in ihrem Miteinandersein offen sind für das sie umgebende Seiende worüber sie im einzelnen übereinstimmen und d. h. zugleich nicht übereinstimmen können.“<sup>33</sup> Dieser Aspekt wird auch bei Hannah Arendt in *Vita Activa* unterstrichen.<sup>34</sup>

In dem hier erörterten Zusammenhang von Arendts und Heideggers Auffassungen, bleibt jedoch die Bestimmung der hermeneutischen Situation, die das Verstehen auf die praktische Dimension zurückführt und zugleich festhält, dass das Verstehen nur in einem gewissen Horizont möglich ist, aussagekräftiger. Diese Konzeption Heideggers kann in Arendts Versuch, die Freiheit des Menschen in seinen Tätigkeiten zu verankern, wieder gefunden werden. Die Hervorhebung der politischen Sphäre, d. h. des zwischenmenschlichen freien Lebens und Handelns, ist eine Ausarbeitung und eine Konsequenz der von Heidegger schon skizzierten Möglichkeit zu verstehen, in der die menschliche Freiheit wurzelt, diesmal aber in konkreter Ausarbeitung anhand politischer Phänomene.

### **b. Die politische Situation und das Handeln bei Arendt**

Hannah Arendts Schrift *Vita activa oder vom tätigen Leben* und ihre Auffassung von der Handlung kann ausgehend von Heideggers Analysen verstanden werden, wobei in dieser Schrift das Phänomen des Handelns ausdifferenziert wird, nämlich in der Unterscheidung von öffentlichem und privatem Raum, von Arbeit, Herstellen und Handlung.

Für Hannah Arendt ist der Ort für die Tätigkeit, die vollzogen wird, bestimmd. Sie zeigt in ihren Analysen der Öffentlichkeit und des Privaten „wie sehr der Sinn von dem Ort abhängt, an dem er sich vollzieht.“<sup>35</sup> So durchleuchtet sie die strukturelle Bestimmung des Handelns aus der neuen Perspektive des Zusammenhangs, in dem diese sich vollzieht. Zugleich bestimmt sie das Handeln als „die einzige Tätigkeit der Vita activa, die sich ohne Vermittlung von Materie, Material und Dingen direkt zwischen Menschen abspielt“<sup>36</sup>, was eine nähere Bestimmung der Verortung der Handlung als Frage aufwirft und so den Ort als Situation oder Lage ins Blickfeld rückt.<sup>37</sup> Wird die Handlung ausgehend vom Ort aufgefasst, so geht es um die Geschichtlichkeit des Menschen, seine Eingebundenheit in eine immer schon verstandene Welt. Einer der wichtigsten Aspekte des menschlichen Miteinanderseins ist zugleich Grundbedingung der Welt: das Sprechen, die Sprache, die Möglichkeit sich sinnvoll mitzuteilen ist der Grundstein von Pluralität, welche ihrerseits die Welt ausmacht.

„Sofern wir im Plural existieren, und das heißt, sofern wir in dieser Welt leben, uns bewegen und handeln, hat nur das Sinn, worüber wir miteinander oder wohl auch mit uns selbst sprechen können, was im Sprechen einen Sinn ergibt.“<sup>38</sup>

Die Sprache wird bei Arendt zu einem Phänomen, das nicht nur Pluralität zulässt, sondern diese sogar ermöglicht und sie uns zur Kenntnis bringt. Die Sprache wird hier somit als eine Mitte aufgefasst, in der Pluralität sich entfaltet und zugleich festgehalten wird. Dabei hat die Sprache eine doppelte Funktion: sie vermittelt zwischen den die Pluralität ausmachenden Individuen und gibt die Einheit einer sinnvollen, verstehbaren Welt.

Diese vom Sinn geprägte von der Pluralität bestimmte Welt ist bei Arendt nicht nur als eine Welt des Handelns aufgefasst, sondern auch als eine Welt des Herstellens. Die Tendenz einer von den Menschen errichtete Welt zu begründen, zeigt sich in den Ansätzen der Menschen die Erde als Lebensraum zu übersteigen<sup>39</sup> oder gar Leben herzustellen, was an sich ein Paradox ist, da Leben nicht herstellbar ist.

„Die Welt als ein Gebilde von Menschenhand ist, im Unterschied zur tierischen Umwelt, der Natur nicht absolut verpflichtet, aber das Leben als solches geht in diese künstliche Welt nie ganz und gar ein, wie es auch nie ganz und gar in ihr aufgehen kann; als ein lebendes Wesen bleibt der Mensch dem Reich des Lebendigen verhaftet, von dem er sich doch dauernd auf eine künstliche, von ihm selbst her errichtete Welt hin entfernt.“<sup>40</sup>

Die Frage danach, wie weit die Wissenschaft im „Reich des Lebendigen“ gehen darf, ist eine politische Frage. Arendts Argument hierfür lautet:

„Die Frage kann nur sein, ob wir unsere neue wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis und unsere ungeheueren technischen Fähigkeiten in dieser Richtung zu betätigen wünschen; und diese Frage ist im Rahmen der Wissenschaften schlechthin nicht zu beantworten, ja sie ist in ihrem Rahmen noch nicht einmal sinnvoll gestellt, weil es im Wesen der Wissenschaft liegt, jeden einmal eingeschlagenen Weg, bis an sein Ende zu verfolgen.“<sup>41</sup>

Die Begründung des politischen Denkens sieht Arendt in einer Grundlagenkrise der Wissenschaften – analog zu Heideggers Zurückweisung des Theoretischen.

„Sollte sich herausstellen, daß Erkennen und Denken nichts mehr miteinander zu tun haben, daß wir erheblich mehr erkennen und daher auch herstellen können, als wir denkend zu verstehen vermögen, so würden wir wirklich uns selbst gleichsam in die Falle gegangen sein, bzw. Sklaven – zwar nicht, wie man gemeinhin glaubt unserer Maschinen, aber –

unseres eigenen Erkenntnisvermögens geworden sein, von allem Geist und allen guten Geistern verlassene Kreaturen, die sich hilflos jedem Apparat ausgeliefert sehen, den sie überhaupt nur herstellen können, ganz gleich wie verrückt oder wie mörderisch er sich auswirken möge.“<sup>42</sup>

Arendt unterscheidet, wie Husserl auch, zwischen Tatsachenwahrheit und Vernunftwahrheit, wobei es ihr in der Theorie der Handlung, um die Tatsachenwahrheit geht.<sup>43</sup> Mit Tatsachen meint sie dabei nicht Befunde der Erfahrungswissenschaften, sondern vielmehr Ereignisse aus dem politischen Leben. Für Arendt gilt: „Die Tatsachenwahrheit ist von Natur aus politisch.“<sup>44</sup> Im den Vernunftwahrheiten, verhalten sich Tatsachenwahrheiten nicht notwendigerweise „antagonistisch“ zu den Meinungen: „Tatsachen sind der Gegenstand von Meinungen.“<sup>45</sup> Im Vordergrund steht für Arendt das politische Leben und die Wahrheiten in Bezug auf dieses sind eher am Gemeinsinn der Menschen ausgerichtet als an den Wahrheiten der Vernunft.

So plädiert Arendt dafür, dass die Sprache in ihrer Vielfältigkeit, jenseits der wissenschaftlichen Sprache gepflegt werden muss: „Wo immer es um die Relevanz von Sprache geht, kommt Politik notwendigerweise ins Spiel; denn Menschen sind nur darum zur Politik begabte Wesen, weil sie mit Sprache begabte Wesen sind.“ Und ferner: „Die Wissenschaftler leben (...) bereits in einer sprach-losen Welt, aus der sie qua Wissenschaftler nicht mehr herausfinden.“<sup>46</sup> Gemeint ist hier sicherlich die wissenschaftlich auf Formeln verkürzte Sprache. Zwar ist diese Verkürzung durchaus förderlich und erlaubt zuweilen auch die interdisziplinäre Übersetzung von Forschungsergebnissen, jedoch kann sie die Vielfältigkeit nicht ersetzen. Es ist Arendt zuzustimmen, dass die Individualität und Vielfalt der Sprache beibehalten werden muss, auch wenn hinzuzufügen ist, dass die wissenschaftliche Sprache nicht nur eine Verkürzung ist, sondern auch ein durchaus fruchtbare Versuch einander zu verstehen. Allerdings geht es Arendt nicht darum, die Sprache in Bezug auf menschliche Erkenntnis zu erforschen, sondern vielmehr darum, die Sprache als zwischenmenschliches Kommunikations- und Ausdrucksmittel zu betrachten, die Sprache als Ermöglichung von Pluralität und politischem Handeln. Treffend fasst Sheila Benhabib wie folgt zusammen:

„Zu den elementaren Beiträgen, die Arendt zur Philosophiegeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts leistete, gehört die These, daß der menschliche Raum der Erscheinungen vom »Bezugsgewebe menschlicher Angelegenheiten

und [der] in ihm dargestellten Geschichten« gebildet wird. Sprechen und Handeln geht zwischen den Menschen vor sich, und fast »alles Handeln und Reden betrifft diesen Zwischenraum« (VA, S. 173). Dieses Zwischen schließt zwar die Welt der Dinge ein, hat jedoch eine ungreifbare Dimension, »da es nicht aus Dinghaftem besteht und sich in keiner Weise verdinglichen oder objektivieren lässt; Handeln und Sprechen sind Vorgänge, die von sich aus keine greifbaren Resultate und Endprodukte hinterlassen. Aber dieses Zwischen ist in seiner Ungreifbarkeit nicht weniger wirklich als die Dingwelt unserer sichtbaren Umgebung- Wir nennen diese Wirklichkeit das Bezugsgewebe menschlicher Angelegenheiten, wobei die Metapher des Gewebes versucht, der physischen Ungreifbarkeit des Phänomens gerecht zu werden.« (VA, S. 173)<sup>47</sup>

Die politische Situation kann so als ein Zwischen bestimmt werden. Vor allem das Handlungsgefüge oder das Sprechen machen eine politische Situation aus, die nie abgeschlossen, sondern offen für weitere Handlungen oder dafür, das Wort zu ergreifen. Nicht allein die Fakten machen die Situation aus, sondern die Dynamik des Handelns und Sprechens. Daher ist die Bezeichnung mit „Zwischen“ zutreffend: dieses erinnert zwar an Fakten, ist aber eher durch Offenheit für Möglichkeiten und Dynamik charakterisiert ist.

## **Heidegger und Arendt zum Handeln**

Heidegger schreibt keine Handlungstheorie, auch wenn seine Philosophie sich dem Handeln zuwendet.<sup>48</sup> Für Heidegger steht das Verstehen der Welt im Mittelpunkt seiner Analysen. In *Sein und Zeit* lesen wir einen Ansatz den Menschen in seiner Umwelt zu betrachten. Die Welt wird allerdings wie eine Werkstatt aufgefasst. Dabei wird dasjenige, mit dem der Mensch zu tun hat eher berücksichtigt als das Zwischenmenschliche. Dieses tritt in einer eher negativen Bestimmung des Man hervor, wobei es unbestimmt bleibt, wie das Mitsein im positiven Sinne aufzufassen ist.<sup>49</sup> Arendt hingegen geht auf die letzteren Zusammenhänge genauer ein und beschreibt die Zwischenmenschlichkeit als einen politischen Aspekt.

Die Zwischenmenschlichkeit ist für Arendt anhand der Tätigkeiten, des Menschen aufgebaut. So sind Arbeit, Tun und Handeln mögliche Tätigkeiten des Menschen, in denen die Zwischenmenschlichkeit zu Tage tritt. Die einzige Tätigkeit in welcher der Mensch frei ist und in

der somit auch die zwischenmenschliche Dimension eine der Freiheit ist, ist das Handeln: Im Handeln ist der Mensch zwar notwendig auf andere bezogen, da das Handeln immer ein politisches Handeln ist, jedoch so, dass der Bezug nicht einschränkend ist, sondern vielmehr die Möglichkeit eines Neuanfangs bietet. Die Pluralität ist keine Einschränkung der individuellen Freiheit, sondern eine Bedingung der Möglichkeit von individueller Freiheit. Anders gesagt, erfährt jedermann seine Freiheit in seinem Bezug auf andere.

In diesem Sinne ist die Freiheit nicht jene des individuellen Willens, sondern vielmehr eine Freiheit des Handelns, eine Freiheit die immer schon die Anderen voraussetzt. In ihrem Essay *On Freedom* geht Arendt auf die Geschichte der Auffassung von Freiheit ein und zugleich belebt sie die antike Auffassung von Freiheit wieder: Bei Paulus ist der freie Wille getrennt vom intellektuellen Willen zu finden. Die christliche Tradition entdeckt somit den Willen als eigenständige Fakultät des Geistes.<sup>50</sup> Arendt geht einen Schritt zurück in die antike Welt und belebt die Auffassung wieder, laut welcher politische Freiheit die Freiheit zu Handeln meint und demnach nicht allein auf die Willensfreiheit zurückzuführen ist. Dennoch ist bei Paulus der Gedanke der Situation, des Kairos, hervorzuheben: die Freiheit des Willens ist nicht eine frei schwebende, sondern ist die Freiheit, in einer erfassten Situation den Willen einzusetzen.<sup>51</sup>

Die beiden Aspekte treffen hier aufeinander und Arendt schlägt diese Brücke: es geht darum, Freiheit im Handeln zu finden, die Freiheit in einer bestimmten Situation zu handeln, und, wie gesehen, impliziert Handeln, das ja zwischenmenschlich ist, immer auch den Anderen. Wenn die Freiheit für Paulus eine innere Freiheit in einer gewissen Situation meint, so greift Arendt dieses situative Moment auf, beharrt aber darauf, dass die Freiheit eine Freiheit des Handelns im Vollzug ist. Das situative Denken hat die Verknüpfung von Handeln und Freiheit nicht aufzuheben, sondern zu verstärken.

Für Arendt weist das Handeln eine ethische Dimension auf, die den Anderen berücksichtigt. Bei Heidegger bezieht sich diese ethische Komponente nicht zwangsläufig auf die Anderen, sondern eher auf die Dimension des Selbst. Zwar ist der Andere auch berücksichtigt, jedoch nicht als ein Grundstein der Pluralität, sondern vielmehr als dem Selbst zugehörig. Wie die Pluralität sich ausgehend von dieser Konzeption überhaupt bildet, ist bei Heidegger wenig berücksichtigt. Damit bleibt auch die ethische Frage nur teilweise beantwortet: Wenn die ethische

Frage die Frage nach dem Anderen mit einbeschließt, so ist mit Arendt eher eine Antwort darauf zu finden.

Heidegger hat mit seiner Auffassung von Jemeinigkeit die Frage nach der Individualität gestellt – danach, wie die Vereinzelung überhaupt möglich ist.<sup>52</sup> Er setzt dabei eine zwischenmenschliche Sphäre der Gemeinsamkeit voraus, welche grundsätzlich im Sein des Menschen beruht. Arendt hingegen versucht entgegen dieser Auffassung, die das Beisammensein der Menschen im Sein begründet, eine Konzeption der Pluralität hervorzuheben, in der die Gemeinschaft aktiv im Handeln begründet wird. Zwar meint Heidegger mit der Konzeption des Entwurfs auch eine aktive Weltbildung, die im Handeln beruht, aber dieses erklärt nicht, wie das Handeln unter den Menschen, zwischen den Menschen möglich sein soll.<sup>53</sup>

Für Heidegger ist das Handeln eher die Sache einer einzelnen Person<sup>54</sup> und es beginnt mit einer Entscheidung, die aus einer bestimmten Offenheit heraus getroffen werden muss, aus einem individuellen Verständnis des eigenen Lebens, der eigenen Bedürfnisse und Verpflichtungen. Die Verantwortung dem „Ruf des Gewissens“ zu folgen, fordert jeden Einzelnen dazu auf, sich seiner eigenen Freiheit bewusst zu sein und dementsprechend zu leben.<sup>55</sup> In *Sein und Zeit* bietet Heidegger keine konkretere Ausarbeitung seiner Konzeption zum Handeln. Erst in späteren Schriften heißt es:

„Man kennt das Handeln nur als das Bewirken einer Wirkung. Deren Wirklichkeit wird nach ihrem Nutzen eingeschätzt. Aber das Wesen des Handelns ist das Vollbringen. Vollbringen heißt: etwas in die Fülle seines Wesens zu entfalten, in diese hervorgeleiten, producere.“<sup>56</sup> (GA 9, S. 313)

Heideggers Zuwendung zur griechischen Philosophie, die Analyse der praktischen Vernunft bei Aristoteles, sowie sein Ansatz zur Destruktion aus der gegenwärtigen Perspektive haben auf Arendt großen Einfluss ausgeübt. Während Heidegger jedoch seine Untersuchungen ausgehend vom Umgang mit Werkzeug ansetzt, ist Arendt eher der zwischenmenschlichen Dimension zugewandt. Auf diese Weise entwickelt sie die heideggersche Auffassung der individuellen, jemeinigen Freiheit – oder Erschlossenheit – zu einer Konzeption der Freiheit des Menschen als Pluralität.<sup>57</sup>

In *Vita Activa* bestimmt Arendt das Handeln als Neuanfang, der jedem zusteht, ein Neuanfang, der zwar in einer Welt, die jeder mit anderen teilt, stattfindet, aber dennoch nicht den individuellen Charakter verliert. Diesen

Neuanfang sieht Arendt in der Geburt bestätigt, die nicht lediglich zur-Welt-kommen bedeutet, sondern als solche auch schon die Möglichkeit etwas Neues in die Welt zu bringen birgt:

„Sprechend und handelnd schalten wir uns in die Welt der Menschen ein, die existierte, bevor wir in sie geboren wurden, und diese Einschaltung ist wie eine zweite Geburt, in der wir die nackte Tatsache des Geboreneins bestätigen, gleichsam die Verantwortung dafür auf uns nehmen. (...) In diesem ursprünglichsten und allgemeinsten Sinne ist Handeln und etwas Neues Anfangen dasselbe; jede Aktion setzt vorerst etwas in Bewegung, sie agiert im Sinne des lateinischen *agere*, und sie beginnt und führt etwas an im Sinne des griechischen *archein*. Weil jeder Mensch auf Grund seines Geboreneins ein *initium*, ein Anfang und Neuankömmling in der Welt ist, können Menschen Initiative ergreifen, Anfänger werden und Neues in Bewegung setzen.“<sup>58</sup>

Das Zur-Welt-kommen ist nicht schlicht eintreten in die Welt oder Ankunft in der Welt, sondern es ist zugleich ein als Neuanfang bestimmtes Eintreten in die Welt, welche die Verantwortung zu Handeln mit sich trägt, d. h. aber sich entsprechend der bei der Geburt mitgegebenen Möglichkeit zu verhalten.

Ohne den Unterschied zwischen öffentlichem Raum und Privatsphäre, kann Arendts Ansatz die Handlung als Neuanfang aufzufassen nicht wirklich nachvollzogen werden. Als Modell für diesen Unterschied zieht Arendt die griechische Polis in Betracht.<sup>59</sup> Wir werden sogleich sehen, dass mit dieser Entscheidung fest steht, dass die Freiheit eines der Hauptanliegen der gesamten Untersuchung ist und somit die Freiheit der eigentliche Grund der Handlungstheorie bei Arendt ist. Im antiken Griechenland, tritt zugleich mit der Polis die Auffassung von öffentlicher und privater Sphäre hervor. Öffentlich ist dasjenige, was in der Agora geschieht, während das Private zum Hause, dem Haushalt, gehört.<sup>60</sup> Während die Arbeit die Tätigkeiten des Hauses, die der Lebenserhaltung dienen Charakterisiert, wird das Herstellen und die Handlung eine Sache des öffentlichen Lebens. Damit scheint die Privatsphäre von unfreier Tätigkeit bestimmt zu werden, womit auch schon eine Grenze zum öffentlichen Raum gezogen ist.

Jedoch ist auch das Herstellen nicht wirklich eine freie Tätigkeit, weil sie auf die Hervorbringung von Gegenständen gerichtet ist und somit diesem Prozess verschrieben bleibt – gebunden an Bestimmungen und Vorbilder, die selbst nicht mehr zum Herstellen gehören.<sup>61</sup> Das wären die vier Gründe, oder *causae*, nämlich *causa finalis*, *formalis*, *materialis* und

causa efficiens.<sup>62</sup> Da das Herstellen diesen Gründen verschrieben bleibt und solange sie als Tätigkeit fungiert dem Endprodukt verschrieben ist d. h., sobald dieser aber hergestellt endet, keine freie Tätigkeit. Allerdings handelt es sich hierbei um eine andere Form von Unfreiheit, als beim Arbeiten, da im Herstellen der kreative Aspekt dennoch eine Freiheit in sich trägt<sup>63</sup> und die Tätigkeit nicht wie die Arbeit schlichtweg für die Erhaltung des Lebens verbraucht wird, und somit „destruktiv-verzehrend“ ist.<sup>64</sup>

Mit dieser Unterscheidung von Arbeit und Herstellen ist anhand der verschiedenen Formen der Unfreiheit die Abgrenzung des öffentlichen Raums von der Privatsphäre vollzogen. Ist aber im Herstellen schon eine gewisse Freiheit beinhaltet, so ist die Handlung die einzige tatsächlich freie Tätigkeit des Menschen und darin besteht der wirklich öffentliche Raum. Der Übergang von privatem zum öffentlichen Raum besteht somit in Schritten zur Freiheit hin. Diese wiederum lassen sich an den menschlichen Tätigkeiten erkennen.

Arendts Handlungstheorie gilt demnach der Unterscheidung der Tätigkeiten um herauszufinden, in welchen der Tätigkeiten der Mensch frei ist. Öffentlicher Raum und Privatsphäre dienen dabei der Veranschaulichung. Zugleich unterstreicht Arendt damit aber auch, dass Freiheit nur im öffentlichen, d. h. aber in jenem Raum, wo auch andere zugegen sind, überhaupt stattfinden kann.<sup>65</sup> Der Schritt zur Freiheit hin ist der Schritt zu einem freien Verhältnis mit anderen hin, d. h. aber, von der Privatsphäre (die von Kind auf den Menschen als erste bestimmt) zum öffentlichen Raum, in dem die Handlung erst möglich wird.

Wir haben gesehen, dass die Handlung zugleich die Möglichkeit des Neuanfangs bedeutet und nun bleibt zu klären, was es im Weiteren bedeutet, dass in der Handlung ein Neuanfang möglich ist. Um dieses zu tun, schlage ich vor, den Begriff der ‘Situation’ in Betracht zu ziehen. Dieser Begriff wird uns behilflich sein, nicht nur die Privatsphäre vom öffentlichen Raum zu unterscheiden, sondern auch einen qualitativ spezifischen ‘Raum’ zu finden, in dem Handlung stattfindet und wo der Neuanfang ansetzt. Während der öffentliche Raum nicht nur Handlung, sondern auch, wie gesehen, das Herstellen beherbergt, ist mit der Bestimmung einer Situation, in der eine Tätigkeit ansetzt, die Handlung noch genauer eingeführt.

Der Ausgangspunkt für Arendts Betrachtungen zum Handeln, ist, dass der öffentliche Raum zunehmend entfremdet ist, dass dieser keine Möglichkeit mehr bietet, neue Möglichkeiten an den Tag treten

zu lassen, sondern vielmehr bedeutungslos geworden ist, nämlich ein Raum in welchem Menschen zwar miteinander weilen, jedoch gar nicht aufeinander bezogen sind:

„Der öffentliche Raum wie die uns gemeinsame Welt versammelt Menschen und verhindert gleichzeitig, daß sie gleichsam über- und ineinanderfallen. Was die Verhältnisse in einer Massengesellschaft für alle Beteiligten so schwer erträglich macht, liegt nicht eigentlich, jedenfalls nicht primär, in der Massenhaftigkeit selbst; es handelt sich vielmehr darum, daß in ihr die Welt die Kraft verloren hat, zu versammeln, das heißt zu trennen und zu verbinden. Diese Situation ähnelt in ihrer Unheimlichkeit einer spiritistischen Séance, bei der eine um einen Tisch versammelte Anzahl von Menschen plötzlich durch irgendeinen magischen Trick den Tisch aus ihrer Mitte verschwinden sieht, so daß nur zwei sich gegenüber sitzende Personen durch nichts mehr getrennt, aber auch durch nichts Greifbares mehr verbunden sind.“<sup>66</sup>

Eine andere Form der Auffassung der Öffentlichkeit geht von der Privatsphäre aus und bildet sich als eine Erweiterung des Privaten, so dass die „kleinen Dinge“ plötzlich im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit stehen.<sup>67</sup> Auch ist das frühchristliche oder urchristliche Modell der Öffentlichkeit verbreitet, wenn die Öffentlichkeit ausgehend von der Familie aufgefasst wird. Die Kritik, die Arendt an diesem Modell übt ist, dass es nicht nur keine Möglichkeit für das Politische, d. h. aber das freie Handeln zulässt, sondern sogar anti-politisch konstituiert wird.

„Der unpolitische, unweltliche Charakter der Gemeinschaft der christlichen Gläubigen äußerte sich im Urchristentum in der Forderung, daß die Gemeinde einen corpus bilden solle, einen »Körper« dessen Glieder sich wie Brüder der gleichen Familie verhalten. (...) Das Leben in der Gemeinde folgte strukturell dem Leben in der Familie, und die Forderungen, die an dieses Leben gestellt wurden, orientierten sich an den Beziehungen, die in der Familie vorwalteten, und zwar gerade darum, weil man es hier mit einem Modell nicht- und sogar antipolitischen Zusammenlebens zu tun hatte.“<sup>68</sup>

Entgegen dieser Modelle, in denen Arendt auch eine gewisse Erklärung für den Verlust des öffentlichen, politischen Raum, sieht, geht es Arendt darum, einen solchen Raum erneut positiv zu bestimmen und damit zugleich die menschliche Freiheit im Politischen zu erörtern. Hierfür

greift sie die aristotelische Unterscheidung von *Praxis* und *Poiesis* auf: Die *Praxis*, als das freie Handeln im griechischen Staat wurde zunächst vom Herstellen und dann von der Arbeit ersetzt. Die *Praxis*, das Handeln hat dabei unter den menschlichen Tätigkeiten ihre zentrale Stellung, die ihr in Bezug auf die Freiheit zukommt, eingebüßt. Auch wenn das Handeln, das Herstellen und die Arbeit als menschliche Tätigkeiten nicht allgemein ersetzt werden können, d. h. aber nötig sind, gibt es eine Hierarchie zwischen ihnen, die ausgehend von dem Gedanken der Freiheit festzustellen ist: Das Herstellen impliziert, an die Dinge, die hergestellt werden müssen, gebunden zu bleiben, während die Arbeit darum bemüht ist, das Leben zu erhalten. Allein das Handeln hat die Möglichkeit einen ganz unbefangenen Neuanfang zu setzen, d. h. eine freie Tätigkeit zu sein.

Die Abstumpfung der Unterscheidung menschlicher Aktivitäten in der modernen Welt bewegt Arendt dazu, die Handlung als freie Tätigkeit erneut hervorzuheben. Es geht nicht zuletzt darum, für die Moderne Welt eine Möglichkeit der Freiheit zu beschreiben und entgegen der Politik im 20-sten Jahrhundert, die von totalitären Systemen geprägt war, ein politisches Modell zu finden, welches die menschliche Freiheit so berücksichtigt, dass wir nicht mehr mögliche Opfer der „Banalität des Bösen“ werden.<sup>69</sup>

Hannah Arendt hat sich in ihrem Buch *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft* mit den totalitären Regimes systematisch auseinandergesetzt,<sup>70</sup> wobei es ihr nicht nur um die geschichtlichen Tatsachen ging, sondern zugleich auch um die Würde des Menschen, oder, wie es anderenorts heißt, um „das Recht Rechte zu haben“.<sup>71</sup> Mit dem sehr umstrittenen Begriff der „Banalität des Bösen“ warnt Arendt davor, dass sich gerade in den scheinbar unverfänglichen Situationen des Alltags das Böse einschleichen kann.<sup>72</sup> Eine Situation erkennen meint demnach nicht, nur gewisse Zusammenhänge als ausschlaggebend zu definieren, sondern auch den Mut zu haben, immer wieder zu hinterfragen, was die gegebene Situation definiert, als dass man darin zu freier Handlung fähig ist.

Auch wenn Arendt oftmals in begrifflicher Erläuterung historisch verfährt, so ist das Hauptthema ihrer Untersuchungen doch die Moderne. Es geht darum, ein besseres Verständnis unserer Zeiten an den Tag zu legen. Aber auch das ist noch nicht ganz treffend – denn Arendts Analysen sind nicht schlicht in beschreibender Absicht formuliert. Ihr Interesse gilt vorwiegend dem besseren Verständnis und, wie wir ausgehend von *Vita activa* gesehen haben, der Möglichkeit zu handeln:

„Die Absicht der historischen Analysen ist, die neuzeitliche Weltentfremdung in ihrem doppelten Aspekt: der Flucht von der Erde in das Universum und der Flucht aus der Welt in das Selbstbewusstsein, in ihre Ursprünge zu verfolgen, um so vielleicht zu einem besseren Verständnis des neuzeitlichen Gesellschaftsphänomens zu kommen, bzw. der Situation der europäischen Menschheit in dem Augenblick, als für sie und damit für alle Menschen der Erde ein neues Zeitalter anbrach.“<sup>73</sup>

Arendt versucht demnach einen Zusammenhang zu erfassen, der für die mögliche Handlung als bestimmd betrachtet werden kann: Diesen Zusammenhang bezeichnet sie im angeführten Zitat als Situation. Das Zusammenspiel von verschiedensten historisch auszumachenden Faktoren hat das Hervortreten einer neuen Weltordnung ermöglicht. Wovon die neue Weltordnung, die zugleich unsere heutige Weltordnung ist, bestimmt ist, ist Arendts unausgesprochene, aber aus ihren Texten hervorgehende Leitfrage. Dieses aber, weil in ihrer Auffassung, Handeln nur möglich ist, wenn die Situation in der wir uns befinden erfasst wurde. Dabei ist mit ‘Situation’ ein sehr breit gefasstes Zusammenspiel gemeint – alles, was für unsere politisch-geschichtliche gesellschaftliche Lage bestimmd sein könnte und ist. War weiter oben von ‘politischer Situation’ die Rede, so nicht in diesem Sinne der breit gefassten Situation der Menschheit und der Welt, sondern, wie gezeigt, im Sinne der spezifischen Handlungssituation für den Einzelnen. Dieser weitere Begriff der Situation, umfasst die einzelnen Handlungssituationen und bezeichnet die verschiedenen Etappen der Geschichte, wie Neuzeit oder Moderne, die für Arendts Untersuchung ausschlaggebend wurden:

„Die Neuzeit und die moderne Welt sind nicht dasselbe. Was die wissenschaftliche Entwicklung betrifft, so ist die Neuzeit, die mit dem siebzehnten Jahrhundert anhob, bereits an ihr Ende gekommen; was das Politische anlangt, so dürfte die Welt, in der wir nun leben, angebrochen sein, als die erste atomare Explosion auf der Erde stattfand. Aber diese moderne Welt bleibt im Hintergrund meiner Erwägungen, die noch voraussetzen, daß die Grundvermögen des Menschen, die den Grundbedingtheiten menschlicher Existenz auf der Erde entsprechen, sich nicht ändern; sie können so lange nicht unwiderruflich verloren gehen, als diese Grundbedingtheit nicht radikal durch andere ersetzt wird.“<sup>74</sup>

Wenn Sheila Benhabib Arendt als „melancholische Denkerin der Moderne“<sup>75</sup> bezeichnet, wie es in der deutschen Übersetzung ihrer

Monographie schon im Titel heißt, so ist damit auf Arendts Versuch, im Menschen und für den Menschen, einen Grundzug, bzw. eine Bestimmung zu finden, die eine Möglichkeit der Freiheit, aber auch der menschlichen Würde zulassen. Diesen Versuch unternimmt Arendt trotz der Weltentfremdung, die Neuzeit mit sich gebracht hat, und der Moderne, die Errungenschaften der Neuzeit bis zur Gefährdung der menschlichen Existenz hinaus getrieben hat.

Weder geht es Martin Heidegger nur um das Verstehen oder um die Philosophie, noch ist Hannah Arendt lediglich am Handeln als Tätigkeit interessiert. Vielmehr ist Arendt darum bedacht, wie verstehend gehandelt werden kann, wobei Heideggers Überlegungen dahin führen, zu erörtern, wie das Denken ein Handeln ist.<sup>76</sup> Der enge Zusammenhang von Handeln und Verstehen, Auslegen, Denken, hat diese Gegenüberstellung motiviert.<sup>77</sup> Jede politische oder zwischenmenschliche Situation, in der ein Neuanfang möglich ist, ist zugleich eine hermeneutische Situation: sie muss verstanden werden und ist erst dann, wenn sie nicht als zufällig, sondern in ihrem Freiheit stiftenden Charakter verstanden wird, eine politische Situation.

## NOTES

- \* Marga und Kurt Moellgaard Stipendium, New Europe College 2008 /2009.
- <sup>1</sup> Arendt, H., *Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben* (fortan VA), Piper Verlag, München / Zürich 2007, S. 33.
- <sup>2</sup> VA, S. 14.
- <sup>3</sup> VA, 213 f.
- <sup>4</sup> Vgl. VA, S. 219 f.
- <sup>5</sup> Arendt, H., *Über das Böse: Eine Vorlesung zu Fragen der Ethik*, Piper, München / Zürich 2003, S. 53.
- <sup>6</sup> VA, S. 213.
- <sup>7</sup> VA, S. 218.
- <sup>8</sup> VA, S. 13.
- <sup>9</sup> Arendt, H., *Was ist Politik? Fragmente aus dem Nachlaß*, Piper, München / Zürich 2007 (1. Auflage 2003), S. 11.
- <sup>10</sup> Vgl. Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik, VI 2, 1139 b 5-14: „Die wahre Überlegung ist das Werk (ergon) der praktischen Vernünftigkeit (phronesis)“.
- <sup>11</sup> Der Kürze halber kann ich diese Aspekte hier nicht ausarbeiten, möchte aber auf einen aufschlussreichen Aufsatz verweisen: Volpi, F., *Dasein comme praxis: L'assimilation et la radicalisation heideggerienne de la philosophie pratique d'Aristote*, in: *Heidegger et l'idée de la phénoménologie*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1988, S. 1-42.
- <sup>12</sup> Vgl. Heidegger, M., Gesamtausgabe (fortan GA) 56 / 57, Klostermann Verlag, Frankfurt a. M.; die Ausarbeitung des Fragerlebnisses „Gibt es etwas?“ (S.69) wird aus eben diesem Blickwinkel angegangen: „Gibt es überhaupt eine einzige Sache, wenn es nur Sachen gibt? Dann gibt es überhaupt keine Sachen; es gibt nicht einmal nichts, weil es bei einer Allherrschaft der Sachosphäre auch kein »es gibt« gibt.“ (S. 62)
- <sup>13</sup> GA 56/ 57, S. 87.
- <sup>14</sup> Arendt, H., *Über das Böse: Eine Vorlesung zu Fragen der Ethik*, Piper, München / Zürich 2003, S. 11.
- <sup>15</sup> VA, S. 15.
- <sup>16</sup> Arendt, H. *Über das Böse: Eine Vorlesung zu Fragen der Ethik*, Piper, München / Zürich 2003, S. 15.
- <sup>17</sup> GA 62, S. 341-391.
- <sup>18</sup> GA 62, S. 347. Die hermeneutische Situation wird durchaus in Anlehnung an die umgangssprachliche Auffassung von Situation herausgearbeitet: „»Situation« trägt in der gewöhnlichen Sprache eine Bedeutung des Statischen an sich; dieser Nebensinn muß beseitigt werden. Aber ebenso verkennt eine »dynamische« Auffassung die Situation, in der man den Phänomenzusammenhang als ein »Fließen« auffasst und vom Fluß der Phänomene spricht. Von da aus gesehen bedeutet »Situation« eine

»Stillstellung«. Aber der Zusammenhang der Situation steht jenseits der Alternative »statisch-dynamisch«.“ (GA 60, S. 92).

- <sup>19</sup> Heidegger, M., *Sein und Zeit* (SuZ), GA 2, S. 150. In *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles* (1922) gliedert sich diese Struktur noch in Blickstand, Blickhabe, Blickbahn (GA 62, S. 345), wobei Blickhabe und Blickbahn als Blickrichtung und Sichtweite erläutert werden (GA 62, S. 346 f.) – in der Bestimmung der prinzipiellen Forschung als „*phänomenologische Hermeneutik der Faktizität*“ werden hier schon Vorhabe und Vorriff angeführt (PhIA, GA 62, S. 364 f.). Heidegger wendet immer wieder die dreifache Struktur an, um die philosophische Vorgehensweise anzuzeigen. Schon in der Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1921/22, wenn es heißt „Philosophieren ist (formal angezeigt) ein Verhalten“ (GA 61, S. 53) wird diese Struktur angeführt, hier als Vollzugssinn, Bezugssinn und Gehaltsinn des Verhaltens (ebd.).
- <sup>20</sup> Diese Unterscheidung von explizit und unexplizit, ausdrücklich und unausdrücklich motiviert Heideggers Phänomenologie insbesondere *Sein und Zeit*.
- <sup>21</sup> SuZ, S. 5; und weiter: „[...] wir bewegen uns immer schon in einem Seinsverständnis. Aus ihm heraus erwächst die ausdrückliche Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein und die Tendenz zu dessen Begriff.“ (ebd.)
- <sup>22</sup> In der Einleitung zur zweiten Auflage der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1787) stellt Kant die Frage „ob es ein dergleichen von der Erfahrung und selbst von allen Eindrücken der Sinne unabhängiges Erkenntnis gebe. Man nennt solche *Erkenntnisse a priori*, und unterscheidet sie von dem *empirischen*, die ihre Quellen *a posteriori*, nämlich in der Erfahrung haben.“ (KRV, B 2)
- <sup>23</sup> SuZ, S. 150.
- <sup>24</sup> SuZ, S. 151.
- <sup>25</sup> Aristoteles, *De anima* III, 10. 433 a 9ff; für eine Analyse des bei Aristoteles, vgl. Annette Hildt, *Ousia-Psyche-Nous*, Aristoteles' Philosophie der Lebendigkeit, Verlag Alber, Freiburg/München, 2005, S. 315f.
- <sup>26</sup> Zur Hervorhebung des *nous*-Aspekts in der *phronesis* vgl. auch Roberto Rubio, *Zur Möglichkeit einer Philosophie des Verstehens*, Verlag Attempto, Tübingen, 2006, S. 45.
- <sup>27</sup> Es handelt sich hier um das Verhältnis von *œqoj* und *›xij*. Während das erstere als Gewohnheit bezeichnet wird, übersetzt Heidegger letzteres mit Haltung, Haben. (Vgl. GA 18., S. 171f. insbes. S. 181; vgl. auch GA 62, S. 386.)
- <sup>28</sup> Zur Bestimmung der Umsicht ausgehend von der Erfahrung vgl. GA 22, S. 210 – 211, S. 224- 225; Hier wird die Umsicht, was Heideggers Übersetzung der *phronesis* ist, in Zusammenhang mit *empeiria*, Erfahrung im Aristotelischen Sinne gebracht.
- <sup>29</sup> Gerold Prauss spricht von einem Primat des Handelns insofern, als „bereits das Erkennen, wenn auch nur metaphorisch, als ein Handeln zu

kennzeichnen ist, als Erkenntnis- oder Urteilsakt.“ (Prauss, G., *Erkennen und Handeln in Heideggers „Sein und Zeit“*, Verlag Karl Alber Freiburg/München, 1996 [2. unveränd. Auflage; 1. Auflage 1977], S. 8)

<sup>30</sup> Vgl. SuZ, §15; Von diesem nicht abgeschlossenen, wenn auch Grenzen aufweisenden Charakter der Situation zeugt die Entdeckbarkeit des Zuhgendenen, welches darin erfasst wird: „Es gehört zum Wesen der Entdeckungsfunktion des jeweiligen besorgenden Aufgehens in der nächsten Werkwelt, daß je nach der Art des Aufgehens darin das im Werk, d. h. seinen konstitutiven Verweisungen, mit beigebrachte innerweltliche Seiende in verschiedenen Graden der Ausdrücklichkeit, in verschiedener Weite des umsichtigen Vordringens entdeckbar bleibt.“ (SuZ, S. 71)

<sup>31</sup> In *Sein und Zeit* konzentriert Heidegger sich auf den Umgang mit Zuhandenem um den Ansatz beim praktischen Verstehen aufzuzeigen. Die Welt wird ausgehend von einem „praktischen“ Verhalten“ und dem instrumentellen Umgang interpretiert. Zum einen wird dabei der Vorrang der Praxis vor der Theorie, in dem Sinne angenommen, dass das Verständnis auf ein praktisches Vorverständnis aufbaut, zum anderen ist die Verkürzung der praktischen Sphäre auf das Herstellen, d. h. von *Praxis* auf *Poiesis* zu erkennen, d. h. der Zugang zur Welt über das Seiende, welches Korrelat eines Besorgens sein kann. Nach *Sein und Zeit* greift Heidegger die Frage nach dem Mitsein jedoch gezielt auf. Der Mensch wird als solcher bedacht.

<sup>32</sup> GA 29/30.

<sup>33</sup> GA 29/ 30, S. 447.

<sup>34</sup> VA, S. 213 f.

<sup>35</sup> VA, S. 96.

<sup>36</sup> VA, S.17.

<sup>37</sup> Heidegger bezeichnet eine Situation auch als Lage: GA 29/30, S. 104.

<sup>38</sup> VA, S. 12.

<sup>39</sup> Vgl. Klaus Helds Erörterungen zur Lebenswelt und zu der Notwendigkeit die eine Welt als die Welt auf der Erde zu erkennen. Held bezieht sich auf Husserl und zeigt, dass Husserl schon das Problematische des erzeugten Außenhorizontes, aufgezeigt hat. Held, K., *Heimwelt. Fremdwelt. Die eine Welt*, in: Ernst Wolfgang Orth (Hrsg.), *Perspektiven und Probleme der Husserlschen Phänomenologie*, *Phänomenologische Forschungen* 24 (1991), S. 305-337.

<sup>40</sup> VA, S. 9.

<sup>41</sup> VA, S. 10.

<sup>42</sup> VA, S. 11.

<sup>43</sup> Zur Unterscheidung von Tatsachenwissenschaft und Vernunftwissenschaft vgl. Husserl, E., Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, erstes Buch, Felix Meiner Verlag Hamburg 1992, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 5, Text nach Husserliana III/1, S. 6.

- <sup>44</sup> Arendt, H., *Wahrheit und Lüge in der Politik: Zwei Essays*, Piper&Co. Verlag, München1972, S. 57.
- <sup>45</sup> Ebd.
- <sup>46</sup> VA, S. 11.
- <sup>47</sup> Benhabib, S., Hannah Arendt: Die melancholische Denkerin der Moderne, Rotbuch Verlag, Berlin 1998 (Übers. Karin Wördemann), S. 182 f.
- <sup>48</sup> Vor allem im *Brief über den Humanismus* (GA 9, S. 311-360) befasst Heidegger sich mit der Frage nach dem Handeln.
- <sup>49</sup> Wie gesehen, greift Heidegger in seiner Vorlesung *Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* diese Frage noch auf, ohne sie allerdings bezüglich der politischen Dimension auszuarbeiten. (GA 29/30)
- <sup>50</sup> Vgl. Arendt, H., *On Freedom*, in: *Between Past and Future. Eight Exercises in Political Thought*, Viking Press, New York 1973 (4. Aufl.; 1. Aufl. 1961), S. 167.
- <sup>51</sup> Vgl. Heidegger, M., *Phänomenologie des Religiösen Lebens*, GA 60, Frankfurt a. M. 1978.
- <sup>52</sup> SuZ, S. 7.
- <sup>53</sup> Zum Handeln als Sichverhalten und der Weltbildung s. GA 29/30, S. 344 f., 525 ff. Zur Gegenüberstellung von Heidegger und Arendt mit Bezug auf das Handeln, vgl. Hinchmann, L. P.: „Against Heidegger, Arendt tried to show that the core values of human rights and dignity cannot be sustained unless one explicitly recognizes the „plurality“ of human life and the importance of the public realm in revealing who we are as individuals.“ (L. P. Hinchman, S. K. Hinchman, Heidegger's Shadow: Hannah Arendt's phenomenological humanism, in: *Rewiew of politics*, 46/2, 1984, S. 183) Für Arendts Kommentare zu Heidegger sind zwei Essays hervorzuheben 'What is existential philosophy?' (1946) und die spätere Vorlesung 'Concern with politics in European thought' (1969).
- <sup>54</sup> Heidegger spricht zwar auch von der Gemeinschaft oder vom Volk, insbesondere in späteren Schriften, aber auch schon in *Sein und Zeit*. (SuZ, 384) Dennoch bleibt diese Auffassung mit Bezug auf das Handeln an der Analyse des Selbst ausgerichtet, da die Pluralität der Gemeinschaft nicht betont wird. Das „Geschick“, das „Geschehen der Gemeinschaft und des Volkes“ leitet allerdings dieses Handeln im „Miteinandersein in derselben Welt.“ (a. a. O.)
- <sup>55</sup> SuZ, S. 268 f.
- <sup>56</sup> GA 9 (Holzwege), S. 313.
- <sup>57</sup> Vgl. Michael Lessnoff, *Political Philosophers of the Twentieth Century*, Oxford 1999, p. 63: "By reason of this with-like Being-in-the-World, the world is always the one I share with Others. The world of *Dasein* is a with-world (*Mitsein*). Heidegger thus recognized, correctly, the worldly and social (or plural) condition of human life, but immediately went on to devalue it. For Heidegger, interpretation of existence is subjective, singular and – above

all – finite. Death – human mortality or finitude – is for Heidegger the ultimate reality. All authentic being therefore is an utterly lonely being-unto-death.(...) Arendt's quarrel with Heidegger is that, for all the profoundity of his thought, and despite his rejection of the universalism of the Western philosophical tradition a misplaced scorn for, or at least neglect of, the political dimension of human existence."

<sup>58</sup> VA, S. 125.

<sup>59</sup> VA, S. 22 f.

<sup>60</sup> VA, S. 42 f.

<sup>61</sup> Das Bedingen ist hier ähnlich wie im Falle der Arbeit: „In jedem Fall findet sich das Vorbild, das das Herstellen leitet, außerhalb des Herstellenden selbst; es geht dem Werkprozeß voraus und bedingt ihn auf eine ganz ähnliche Weise, wie die drängenden Antriebe des Lebensprozesses im Arbeiter der eigentlichen Arbeit vorangehen und sie bedingen.“ (VA, S. 167).

<sup>62</sup> Vgl. hierfür: Heidegger, M., *Die Frage nach der Technik*, GA 7 (Vorträge und Aufsätze), S. 7 „Seit Jahrhunderten lehrt die Philosophie, es gäbe vier Ursachen: 1. die causa materialis, das Material, der Stoff, woraus z. B. eine silberne Schale verfertigt wird; 2. die causa formalis, die Form, die Gestalt, in die das Material eingeht; 3. die causa finalis, der Zweck, z.B. der Opferdienst, durch den die benötigte Schale nach Form und Stoff bestimmt wird; 4. die causa efficiens, die den Effekt, die fertige wirkliche Schale erwirkt, der Silberschmied.“

<sup>63</sup> Diesen Aspekt der Kreativität unterstreicht Arendt sogar mit ziemlich großer Emphase: „In jedem Herstellen liegt etwas Prometheisches, weil es eine Welt errichtet, die auf der gewalttätigen Vergewaltigung eines Teils der von Gott geschaffenen Natur sich gründet.“ (VA, S. 165)

<sup>64</sup> VA, S. 118.

<sup>65</sup> In Epochen der Gewaltherrscher oder in Massengesellschaften bleibt ein jeder nur „eingesperrt in seine Subjektivität“ weil dieser gemeinsame, öffentliche Raum nicht existiert. (VA, S. 72 f.)

<sup>66</sup> VA, S. 66.

<sup>67</sup> VA, S. 64.

<sup>68</sup> VA, S. 67.

<sup>69</sup> Vgl. Arendt, H., *Über das Böse. Eine Vorlesung zu Fragen der Ethik*, aus dem Engl. von Ursula Ludz, Piper, München/Zürich, 2006.

<sup>70</sup> Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft: Antisemitismus, Imperialismus, totale Herrschaft, Piper München / Zürich, 2008 (8.. Auflage), 1. Aufl. 1986.

<sup>71</sup> Mit dieser Aussage, „the right to have rights“, bezieht Arendt sich auf die Möglichkeit universaler Rechte, gemäß derer jeder Mensch das Recht hat einer Gemeinschaft anzugehören; vgl. Arendt, H., *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich [1951] 1968, p. 177; vgl auch: Benhabib, S., *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 49 f.

<sup>72</sup> Die „Banalität des Bösen“, welches dem Begriff des „radikalen Bösen“ entgegengehalten wird, der seinen Ursprung in Kants Schrift *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* aus dem Jahr 1793 hat, in welcher der Königsberger ein Vermittlungsprogramm zwischen Religions- und Kirchenglaube entwerfen wollte, indem er die Moraltheorie der *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* auf die Hauptlehrten der christlichen Religion projizierte, hat heftige Kontroversen hervorgerufen. (Vgl. auch Bozzaro, C., Hannah Arendt und die Banalität des Bösen, mit einem Vorwort von Lore Hünn, FwPF, Freiburg 2007, S. 22) „Das Böse, das durch die totale Herrschaft heraufbeschworen wurde, ist für Arendt ein ‘radikal Böses’. Es ist ‘radikal’, weil es nicht nur auf die physische und die psychische Zerstörung eines Individuums, sondern auf die Idee selbst des Individuums, sozusagen seine metaphysische Ausschaltung, die Opfer und Täter gleichsam umfasst. Das ‘radikal böse’ visiert die Vernichtung der menschlichen ‘Spontaneität’ und Pluralität an, welche nach Hannah Arendt die ‘Wurzeln’ der Menschlichkeit konstituieren. Dieses von der totalen Herrschaft bewirkte ‘radikal Böse’ stellt ein ‘Noch-Nie-Dagewesenes’ in der Geschichte dar.“ (a. a. O., S. 99)

<sup>73</sup> VA, S. 15.

<sup>74</sup> VA, S. 14.

<sup>75</sup> A. a. O.

<sup>76</sup> Vgl. Heideggers *Brief über den Humanismus*, GA 9 S. 311 ff.

<sup>77</sup> Wie das Urteilen im Näheren bei Arendt in einer spezifischen Weise aufgefasst wird, die dem Vernehmen bei Heidegger oder der Umsicht nahe steht, gehört nicht mehr in den Rahmen dieser Untersuchung, da dieses Thema vielmehr den Schwerpunkt in einer Ausarbeitung der Rolle des Urteils bei Arendt hat und das Gewicht der hier vorgeschlagenen Gegenüberstellung zu sehr verlagern würde.



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# L'ESPACE DANS LE TESTAMENT DE SALOMON ET LES MANIFESTATIONS D'UNE POLÉMIQUE IDENTITAIRE DANS L'ANTIQUITÉ TARDIVE

Pour un lecteur de la littérature judéo-chrétienne apocryphe ou bien de la littérature gnostique, accoutumé à une certaine vision verticale de l'espace, le *Testament de Salomon* pourrait être une déception partielle. Il n'y trouvera la structure cosmologique classique des révélations célestes des Livres d'Hénoch, du Testament de Lévi, de l'Apocalypse d'Abraham, de l'Ascension d'Isaïe, du Troisième Livre de Baruch et ainsi de suite, ni les mystérieuses hiérarchies des ennemis transcendants du genre humain qui peuplent les sept sphères planétaires du cosmos tout en séparant la terre hylique du Plérôme divin. La raison semble claire d'emblée: Salomon n'est ni un voyageur privilégié de Dieu, ni le destinataire explicite de la 'vraie' science divine. En tant que détenteur de la sagesse de Dieu, dont le seul indice matériel est l'anneau magique, instrument tout-puissant contre les actions nuisibles des démons individuels, le roi est plutôt le relais des informations fragmentaires fournies par des créatures maléfiques contraintes à leur tour de dire la vérité sur leurs fonctions particulières qui, en somme, n'arrivent pas à articuler une vision holiste de l'univers qui les contient.

C'est pour ça que *Le Testament de Salomon* est généralement considéré un produit de la pensée 'populaire', une sorte de 'vademecum magique', dont le mérite fondamental serait de recueillir un nombre appréciable de recettes utiles contre les afflictions et les maladies humaines dont les agents sont les démons<sup>1</sup>. La structure même du Testament plaide pour une telle interprétation: l'ouvrage se présente sous la forme d'un long interrogatoire qui répète *ad nauseam* un protocole fixe: Salomon intime un démon quelconque, qui ne s'attarde pas à se manifester, il demande son nom, son occupation, le nom de l'ange qui le persécute et, finalement, lui ordonne de s'adonner à un tel ou tel travail au Temple que le roi est en train de bâtir<sup>2</sup>.

Bien qu'éparse, l'information spatiale ne s'absente pas complètement des dépositions des démons, puisqu'ils ajoutent à maintes occasions les lieux qu'ils habitent où qu'ils hantent en règle générale. D.C. Duling a ainsi décelé un schéma approximatif de la cosmologie suggérée dans l'ouvrage: il s'agirait des trois niveaux généralement acceptés dans les cosmologies méditerranéennes de l'époque: le monde souterrain, le monde sublunaire et le monde céleste<sup>3</sup>. Les démons habitent soit le Tartare (Belzébul) et les profondeurs marines (Pterodrakon, Ephippas), qui constituent le premier niveau du schéma, soit les caves, les ravines et les ruines (Onoskelis), les cimetières (Le mort), l'Olympe, la Lydie ou une mystérieuse Grande Montagne (les Sept Esprits), l'air et la petite étoile voisine du corne de la lune (Lix Tetras) ou la lune même, qui leur sert de véhicule, et les régions reculées de l'ouest (Obyzouth, Enepsigos), paysages qui appartiennent au deuxième niveau du cosmos tracé par le professeur américain. La seule région qui leur est refusée se trouve apparemment au-dessus de la lune, bien que certains démons soient associés aux constellations du Zodiaque. A ce propos, le grand démon Ornias semble parler d'une certaine limite, au-delà de laquelle ni les plus importants des démons ne bénéficient de libre accès. En effet, dit-il, les grands démons n'arrivent pas à habiter les étoiles fixes. Par contre, ils montent, en volant, vers les régions les plus hautes du monde, où ils peuvent entendre les voix des créatures célestes et contempler les puissances éternelles, mais, à cause d'une fatigue étourdissante, ils se précipitent vers la terre pour châtier les hommes, selon les renseignements des voix célestes<sup>4</sup>.

Sans insister ici sur le rôle que les démons jouent dans l'économie de l'Univers, on observe que l'idée d'une limite infranchissable qui sépare les deux mondes (terre et ciel) n'est pas du tout originale et qu'elle remonte aux vieilles traditions proche orientales portant sur le firmament<sup>5</sup>. Une expression plus proche de l'idéologie développée dans le Testament de Salomon 20 se trouve dans le traité talmudique *Haggigah* 16a où Rabbi Nathan dit que les démons entendent la voix de la Providence divine tout en s'approchant du mur qui sépare les deux niveaux. La vision plus permissive du traité *Gittin* fait du grand démon Ashmedai un fréquenteur assidu de l'Académie céleste où il reçoit les renseignements divins concernant l'humanité<sup>6</sup>.

Nous nous sommes penchés sur les deux derniers renvois talmudiques qui n'ont pas été invoqué par les exégètes du Testament, mais qui pourraient s'ajouter sans embarras à une multitudes d'interprétations, disons, topiques des créatures démoniaques. Les solutions livresques

trouvées pour comprendre chaque démon, qui proviennent des horizons culturels assez variés, risquent de donner à la démarche interprétative une tendance centrifuge, dont le résultat est soit trop particularisé soit indistinctement général. C'est notamment le cas du problème de l'espace dans le T.Sal. : on pourrait ajouter des renvois concernant tel ou tel démon, mais, tout à la fin, on ne saurait dessiner qu'un schéma simpliste de l'ensemble.

## Le Temple comme point de repère

La question de l'espace dans le *Testament de Salomon* ne serait plus tellement compliquée si l'on tenait compte d'un indice omniprésent dans l'ouvrage, mais qui a mystérieusement échappé aux interprétations dont on dispose jusqu'à présent. Tous les chapitres du TSol contiennent le mot clé de notre problème: *naos theou*, le Temple de Dieu. Peter Busch en parle dans son commentaire tout récent, mais seulement pour établir le lieu de provenance du pseudépigraphe, donc pour des raisons archéologiques<sup>7</sup>. A son tour, Todd Klutz qui se préoccupe de ce qu'il appelle 'rewritten Bible' dans la deuxième partie du *Testament de Salomon* (T.Sal. 19-26) étudie le problème de la construction du Temple du point de vue philologique et textuel<sup>8</sup>.

L'insistance de l'auteur du *Testament de Salomon* sur le motif du premier Temple de Jérusalem nous convainc que l'édifice attribué à Salomon n'est pas simplement un artifice, un bon prétexte pour un rabbin quelconque de ranger et d'adapter des contes et des légendes sur le pouvoir surnaturel du roi d'Israël. Plutôt qu'un motif littéraire, le Temple de Jérusalem maintient, dans le *Testament de Salomon*, le rôle fondamental qu'il a joué toujours dans la pensée juive: il sert comme principal point de repère du cosmos, il oriente le monde et lui confère légitimité. Pourtant, on verra plus bas que, si le rôle du Temple est le même aussi bien dans la pensée juive la plus ancienne que dans l'ouvrage qui nous préoccupe, la signification de sa spatialité change d'une époque à l'autre.

Mais voyons d'emblée quel était le rôle symbolique classique que le Temple de Salomon jouait dans la mentalité juive commune. On sait intuitivement depuis toujours et conceptuellement depuis la publication de l'essai célèbre *Le sacré et le profane* de Mircea Eliade que pour l'homme religieux, l'espace n'est pas une catégorie homogène, une simple étendue infinie et indistincte. L'homme religieux a l'intuition d'un au-delà qui règle

son existence terrestre. Mais pour que l'influence du monde qui transcende l'expérience commune soit réelle, l'espace présente une certaine rupture de niveau, qui rend possible la manifestation du sacré dans ce monde même. Le lieu même qui reçoit l'incision du sacré devient (ou, à vrai dire, l'est depuis toujours) le point privilégié qui permet la rencontre des deux mondes et, grâce à la supériorité qualitative de l'espace sacré, le degré zéro de la légitimité spatiale du monde humain en son ensemble. Or, un tel point régulateur devait être signalé : le Temple de Jérusalem est, pour le monde juif, l'indice sur de la croisée de deux réalités, le lieu où l'éternel sacré et le terrestre profane se superposaient. Le mystère de l'hérophanie ne se borne pas à un certain endroit, mais il a des conséquences cosmiques, puisque l'espace terrestre limité qui devient la porte vers l'au-delà contient le sacré en tant que présence plénier. C'est pour ça qu'une surface de quatre cent mètres carrés représente et contient le monde entier : le Temple est la garantie de la fondation divine du monde et il reprend dans sa structure architecturale la structure du monde<sup>9</sup>. L'acte de fondation est l'expression indéniable d'une conscience spatiale aigue, puisqu'elle rend possible l'orientation dans l'espace autrement indistinct. Le Temple est, selon l'expression célèbre de Neusner, le nombril du monde humain, le centre énergétique du cosmos autour duquel se dispose en cercles concentriques toute existence visible et invisible. La phrase la plus fameuse qui résume ce type de pensée cosmographique se trouve dans le Midrash Tanhuma Kedoshim :

« Tout comme le nombril est le centre du corps humain, de même le pays d'Israël se trouve au centre du monde... et est la fondation du monde. Jérusalem est au centre du pays d'Israël, le Temple est au centre de Jérusalem, le Saint des Saints est au centre du Temple, l'Arche de l'Alliance est au centre du Saint des Saints et la Pierre de Fondation est devant l'Arche qui est la fondation du monde. »<sup>10</sup>

Une fois accomplie la construction du Temple de Jérusalem, le peuple jusqu'à ce moment errant d'Israël acquiert une conscience territoriale qu'il veut et croit définitive et une légitimité qui le place tout au centre du monde, mais qui lui impose une responsabilité inouïe. Si la tendance de l'homme religieux est de se tenir aussi proche que possible du centre sacré qui est le sens même de son existence, il doit connaître et respecter, afin qu'il y arrive, les normes de pureté qui ont le rôle de préserver le lieu le plus important du monde hors de toute souillure:

« ce sera une loi perpétuelle parmi vos descendants, afin que vous puissiez distinguer ce qui est saint de ce qui est profane, ce qui est impur de ce qui est pur »<sup>11</sup> (Lév. 10, 9-10).

La logique concentrique du cosmos suppose une délimitation stricte et graduelle, exprimée dans des termes rituels, qui ne doit être affranchie d'aucune façon. Le cas échéant, le transgresseur meurt sur le champ (cf. le cas d'Uzza, un lévite du cortège du roi David qui touche l'Arche sur le chemin vers Jérusalem). Le mouvement général du monde juif est par excellence convergent et dépend du degré de pureté des membres de la communauté, ce qui implique une dialectique vive des deux notions fondamentales: *sacralité* et *pureté*, dont le rapport a été brillamment expliqué par Mary Douglas dans son étude déjà classique: *De la souillure. Essai sur les notions de pollution et de tabou*, auquel nous reviendrons plus bas.

Le rapport que l'humanité entretient avec le sacré est pourtant assez fragile: l'homme religieux risque à chaque moment de perdre le contact qu'il a avec la divinité et la moindre errance au dehors des rythmes rituels établis par Dieu même le met en danger de mort. Au dehors des murs du pays qui lui est désigné par volonté divine, se trouve le désert, métaphore précise du chaos, de l'indistinct et de l'impur. Mais le désert-chaos juif n'est pas, comme le supposait Mircea Eliade, une contrée neutre, dépourvue de toute sacralité et, donc, indifférente. Il est plutôt, selon l'analyse pertinente de Jonathan Z. Smith, une région qui s'inscrit dans la catégorie du sacré, mais à l'inverse : « desert is also sacred land, but sacred in the ‘wrong way’ »<sup>12</sup>. Entouré par le désert où résident toutes les puissances de l'inconcevable, de l'Autre menaçant, soit-il matérialisé dans l'image de l'étranger païen qui défie la Loi de Dieu, soit-il imaginé sous la forme des démons repoussés par l'ordre que Dieu a établi pour son peuple aimé, le juif comprend que son identité dépend de sa proximité du Temple de Dieu. Or cette pensée cosmologique qui prétend que le monde est de tous ses coins menacé par l'immonde est une pensée d'enclave.

## Les démons et la carte

De ce point de vue, la démonologie du *Testament de Salomon* semble être un cas typique de liminalité menaçante. Tous les démons que le roi appelle viennent des contrées éloignées, qui se trouvent en grande majorité au dehors de l'espace de la Terre Sainte, ce qui correspond en

quelque sorte à l'image idéale de l'eretz Israël conçue par la littérature rabbinique tardive: « avant que le Temple soit bâti, les esprits mauvais hantaient le peuple partout, mais après la construction du Sanctuaire, ils ont été bannis du monde ».

Le Temple est lui-même l'expression de la victoire que Dieu a remportée contre les puissances du chaos. Une légende affirme que la pierre de fondation du Temple empêche les eaux du chaos primordial (*tehom*) de jaillir sur terre et d'abîmer l'ordre établi par Dieu. Dans ce contexte, le Temple de Jérusalem devient ce que Jonathan Smith nommait, en utilisant une expression courante pendant la Guerre de Vietnam, « un hameau stratégique », une zone complètement isolée, assaillie par l'ennemi, mais qui ne doit jamais céder.

Si l'ordre sacré refuse l'existence des démons, ceux-ci doivent se trouver aux marges du monde 'civilisé', sur les cercles périphériques de la Création. Le cas le plus explicite est celui d'Onoskelis, un démon-femelle qui habite sur des rochers solitaires, dans des caves, ravines et antres, loin des villes et villages<sup>13</sup>. Tous ces lieux désolés correspondent, selon Gilbert Durand, à la catégorie qui s'oppose à toute habitation humaine, une image en relief du désert sans espoir.

Plus proche des habitations humaines, mais toujours en marges dangereuses sont placées les nécropoles. Le démon du 17<sup>e</sup> chapitre le confirme: souvenir de l'archaïque peur des esprits des morts, le démon attend ses victimes humaines en se cachant dans les habitations des défunt. Le même symbolisme du trou fatal, une métaphore active du paysage désolé, revient à ce propos. De surcroît, il affirme que les cimetières ne sont que ses champs de chasse, puisque sa vraie demeure se trouve dans des lieux inaccessibles et très éloignés, tout comme sa provenance temporelle reculée et anormale : il est, de fait, l'esprit impur d'un héros, mort dans un massacre à l'âge des géants, renvoi limpide à l'épisode de la Gen. 6,1-6.

De la même sorte, Asmodaios est un démon assez connu dans l'espace proche oriental<sup>14</sup>. Probablement d'origine perse, il gagne son renom grâce au Livre apocryphe de Tobit, une *novella* biblique intertestamentaire qui a connu un succès fulminant. Asmodaios, le démon qui empêche une jeune fille de se marier, est finalement vaincu par Tobias, un jeune juif, et par son protecteur, l'archange Raphaël. Défait, le démon s'enfuit dans le désert d'Egypte, sa patrie légitime. Asmodaios revient dans le *Testament de Salomon* de ses contrées désertes et éloignées et, pour confirmer qu'il est l'image de l'Autre inquiétant, il désigne sa demeure préférée: les rivières d'Assyrie, allusion transparente au roman de Tobit, dont l'action

se développe à Ninive, et à l'éternel ennemi du peuple d'Israël, l'étranger par excellence menaçant, maintes fois équivaut par la littérature biblique postexilique aux puissances diaboliques<sup>15</sup>.

L'image effrayante de l'étranger ne se borne pas à cet exemple. Le démon à visage de lion du onzième chapitre dit qu'il est d'origine arabe, tout comme le démon-vent Ephippas du vingt-deuxième. Dans la même série s'inscrit, sans doute, la mystérieuse Reine de Saba, nommée ici la Reine du Sud, que la tradition rabbinique diabolise jusqu'à la confondre avec la pan-diabolesse juive Lilith<sup>16</sup>. Par conséquent, il serait superflu de rappeler ici les femmes étrangères, notamment la jébusénne, présente dans le dernier chapitre de l'ouvrage, qui causent la chute du royaume de Salomon. L'énumération des lieux maudits continue : le démon le plus important des sept esprits mauvais du huitième chapitre affirme qu'ils résident ensemble parfois en Lydie, parfois sur l'Oympe ou bien sur la Grande Montagne, dont le nom n'est pas dévoilé, mais que l'exégèse comparative a identifié au Mont Garizim. Il est absolument clair que les montagnes en cause représentaient, pour la pensée classique du Temple, une menace directe contre le prestige du Mont sacré de Jérusalem, en d'autres termes, plus frustes, la concurrence. Le mouvement général du monde juif n'est pas seulement convergent, mais à la fois ascendant. Tout juif qui se dirige vers Jérusalem, monte nécessairement le Mont du Temple de Dieu, qui est symboliquement conçu comme le point le plus haut de la terre. Or, le Mont Garizim, qui se trouve dans le Royaume apostat du Nord, a revendiqué depuis la période de la double monarchie israélite le même titre que le Mont du Temple de Jérusalem. Bien que plus récente, la concurrence avec l'Olympe, le mont sacré de l'espace traditionnel grec, s'inscrit dans une polémique pareille<sup>17</sup>.

Si le seul mouvement acceptable est l'ascension, l'abîme ne peut être que la région habitée par les monstres primordiaux, vaincus et emprisonnés par Dieu au début du monde. A l'encontre du Livre d'Hénoch, qui est ambigu à ce propos, le *Testament de Salomon* a le mérite d'établir une relation directe entre les démons qui habitent le royaume souterrain (nommé ici Tartare, mais qui devrait être l'adaptation de l'hébreu Abbadôn) et les abîmes marins: Belzébul, habitant solitaire (!) du monde souterrain dit qu'il lui est associé un grand démon résidant dans les profondeurs de la Mer Rouge. Bien que le nom du dernier soit inédit – il s'appelle Abezethibou – le renvoi au Léviathan, le monstre marin nous semble transparent<sup>18</sup>. Dans le *Livre des Paraboles d'Hénoch* il est dit que « le monstre femelle nommé Léviathan habite dans l'Abîme des mers, au-dessus des sources des eaux (...) ou il est nourri (où nourrira) afin que

ne vienne en vain le châtiment de Dieu” (Hén. 60, 7-9; 24) ». Ce qui frappe d’emblée est le contexte verbal commun des deux ouvrage (*LPH* et *TSa*). De même, Belzébul du *Testament de Salomon* dit que le démon marin Abézethibou *nourrira* dans les profondeurs de la Mer Rouge, ce qui implique que l’auteur du *Testament de Salomon* connaissait la tradition légendaire qui fonde le *LPH*. Pourtant, il y a une certaine différence entre les deux récits. Si le Léviathan est associé à l’autre monstre primordial Béhémoth, dont le lieu propre est un désert à l’est d’Eden, Dendaïin<sup>19</sup>, Abézethibou, le démon de l’abîme marin, est associé à Belzébul, le démon de l’abîme terrestre. Dans ce cas, la seule explication devrait être liée à la tradition juive qui soutient que les eaux infernales, la mythique *tehom*, sont tenues sous contrôle par la pierre de fondation qui se trouve dans le Temple de Salomon. Bien qu’une telle interprétation semble assez risquée, un indice cosmographique est clair en tout cas: la Mer Rouge abrite un démon puissant, dont la mission est de mettre en danger, tout comme le Léviathan au début du monde, l’ordre divine dont l’expression symbolique la plus haute est l’édifice du Mont de Jérusalem<sup>20</sup>.

Si l’on assume à ce point une vue générale de l’espace décrit dans le Testament de Salomon, on constate que les suppositions que nous avons avancées au début de notre démarche se confirment. Le Temple de Salomon se trouve au centre du monde habité, son rôle étant d’ordonner l’univers, de lui conférer une cohérence et une stabilité bien orientées. Ce qui est étonnant dans le cas du *TSol* est le sens cosmographique précis. Si l’on écoute les témoignages des démons, on peut retracer à l’inverse une carte horizontale de l’espace sacré en fonction de l’espace maudit hanté ou habité par les puissances mauvaises. On découpe ainsi une zone centrale, exempte de toute activité démoniaque, notamment le Temple de Salomon, entourée par des zones néfastes, bien connues comme étrangères et désignées par des termes géographiques précis: le sud d’où vient Saba Reine sous-tend l’Arabie, la Mer Rouge et l’Egypte, le nord est représenté par le mont Garizim et bien sur par l’Assyrie et l’ouest, généralement conçu comme direction néfaste, par la mer de Kynopegos, l’autre démon marin, probablement une figure cachée de Poséidon, le mont Olympe et la nuit perpétuelle d’Obyzouth. Les démons indiquent toujours qu’ils convergent vers Jérusalem à partir des contrées éloignées, inaccessibles, désertes. Tout ce scénario spatial s’inscrirait dans ce que Jonathan Z. Smith nomme « l’idéologie locative », qui suppose que l’ordre cosmologique est instauré par la divinité essentiellement bonne, qui tient l’élément chaotique à l’écart de l’espace conçu comme civilisé, pur et

sain et qui prête au territoire la garantie de sa sacralité éternelle et de sa fondation solide : le Temple de Jérusalem, le centre en fonction duquel le monde devient ce qu'il est à jamais.

## Centralité du Temple et *rewritten Bible*

Pourtant, si l'on se bornait à ces traits symboliques généraux du monde démoniaque qui décrivent à l'inverse une carte idéale, on risquerait de négliger le message plus profond concernant le rôle « positif » du Temple dans le Testament de Salomon.

A l'époque où l'on a rédigé le Testament de Salomon, le Temple de Jérusalem, n'était qu'un souvenir douloureux d'un peuple qui avait perdu son centre vital et qui se trouvait dans la situation paradoxale d'être tenu à l'écart de son lieu sacré par une loi impériale. Dépourvu de leur repère spatial fixe, les fils d'Israël ont développé un complexe de nostalgie pour l'ordre qui leur avait été refusé à partir de la chute du Temple d'Hérode et, par conséquent, ont commencé à idéaliser le Temple incomparable de Salomon : la littérature rabbinique est une source inépuisable de l'importance et de la magnificence du Temple. Si l'on prêtait l'oreille aux voix talmudiques, l'énigme de la provenance du *Testament de Salomon* serait résolue. En ce qui concerne le sujet de l'édification de la Maison de Dieu, il y a une tradition mystique qui a été suivie et développée par certains milieux rabbiniques antiques et médiévaux et adoptée par des importants exégètes modernes du judaïsme<sup>21</sup>.

Selon les sources modernes mentionnées, le point de départ du thème de la construction miraculeuse du Temple de Salomon serait le verset de 1Sam. 6,7 (TM) / 3R.6,7 (LXX) : « Lorsqu'on bâtit (gr. *oikodomethē*) la maison, on se servit de pierres toutes taillées, et ni marteau, ni hache, ni aucun instrument de fer, ne furent entendus dans la maison pendant qu'on la construisait ». Flave Josèphe interprète la forme passive du verbe grec *oikodomeo* (i.e. *oikodomethē*) comme ayant une nuance réflexive. Donc le Temple « se construisait » par soi-même. C'est à dire que la maison de Dieu a été construite par des puissances surhumaines sans aucun effort de la part des hommes<sup>22</sup>. Dans un passage ultérieur, l'historien juif montre que le *primum movens* de la construction a été Dieu (*Theou sunergountos*)<sup>23</sup>. La littérature rabbinique adopte le point de vue de Flave Josèphe et affirme que Dieu a enlevé les grands blocs de pierre et les a mis à leur place<sup>24</sup>. De surcroît, une autre source talmudique ajoute que l'Eternel a mobilisé

toutes les puissances invisibles de l’Univers, anges et démons à la fois, afin que l’édification du Temple soit finie plus vite<sup>25</sup>. Tout en s’appropriant une autre tradition légendaire, dont le témoignage est la thèse de Flave Josèphe selon laquelle le roi Salomon était le maître des démons<sup>26</sup>, les auteurs du traité talmudique bGittin tirent une conclusion savoureuse du point de vue de la démarche inductive, mais extrêmement dangereuse du côté théologique: là il est dit explicitement que Salomon a fait bâtir le Temple à l’aide des démons<sup>27</sup>. Pourtant, la mission démoniaque se réduit à la découverte et au transport du *chamir* chez Salomon.

Dans ce cas, le *Testament de Salomon* ne serait qu’un développement fulminant de la tradition légendaire juive<sup>28</sup>. Bien que plausible, une telle interprétation n’explique pas la complexité des travaux gratuits entrepris par les démons à l’édification du Temple dans le Testament. Puis, à l’exception du traité Gittin, dont le protagoniste est Asmodaos, les démons mentionnés par les autres sources rabbiniques ne sont pas individualisés. Par contre, le *Testament de Salomon* ne fait pas mention de la contribution divine à la construction du Temple. Pour mieux comprendre rôle des démons, le message profond du *Testament* et ses compliquées rapports intertextuels il faudrait adopter une autre voie interprétative.

La centralité spatiale de l’édifice peut être déduite à partir du premier chapitre de l’ouvrage qui renvoie au double récit biblique de la construction légendaire (3R. 3,2-15 / 2Par. 1,2/13 LXX). Une comparaison contrastive des deux récits scripturaires confirme la tendance plus favorable du Chroniste à l’idée de centralité symbolique. Par rapport au récit deutéronomique qui insiste sur la magnificence de Salomon en tant que détenteur temporaire de la sagesse divine, l’auteur des Paralipomènes propose un plaidoyer nostalgique en faveur de l’unité parfaite dont Israël bénéficiait avant le schisme de Jéroboam<sup>29</sup>. Dans ce scénario délibérément centralisant, Salomon jouait le rôle de l’architecte sans tâche de la maison unique d’un seul Dieu, qui avait élu un seul peuple, qui vivait dans un seul pays<sup>30</sup>.

Tout en suivant le programme idéologique des Paralipomènes, l’auteur du *Testament de Salomon* recourt à une double compression du scénario scripturaire sans lui modifier la signification : il s’agit d’un côté d’une réduction sans précédent de l’espace et d’un autre côté d’une compression temporelle sévère. Dans le premier chapitre du Testament, le Temple est déjà la scène unique d’un spectacle inédit. Ainsi, le Temple est, à la fois, bien qu’inachevé, le centre de la prière du roi et de la révélation divine (cf. la prière du Mont Gabaon), le lieu où convergent les maîtres de Salomon

(cf. l’assemblé du peuple à Jérusalem avant le départ au Mont Gabaon) et le centre unique des préparatifs de la construction (cf. le bois de Liban, les carrières d’Israël et les fonderies de Succoth 3R., 4,46/2 Par.4,17) et, bien entendu, le centre de la construction effective. Sur le plan temporel, le dialogue liminaire de Salomon avec son jeune maître, torturé chaque nuit par le démon Ornias, et le scène de la révélation nocturne compriment dans un seul mouvement scénique les épisodes successifs, bien plus lents, du double récit biblique (assemblé du peuple à Jérusalem – prière et révélation nocturne sur le Mont Gabaon – retour à Jérusalem – échange de lettres avec Hiram, le roi de Tyre – préparatifs).

La concentration de tous ces détails qui correspondent à l’information des deux récits bibliques n’est pas du tout accidentelle. Bien au contraire, la compression logique du scénario et les minces modifications du contenu narratif sont intentionnelles, n’affectent pas la structure épique et servent, finalement, à donner un sens complémentaire au récit-source. Dans le contexte précis du premier chapitre du *Testament de Salomon*, c’est hors de doute que l’attitude favorable de l’auteur à l’égard du roi-architecte perpétue et enrichit la tradition centralisante des Paralipomènes. En d’autres mots, le premier chapitre de notre ouvrage a toutes les caractéristiques du genre nommé « rewritten Bible »<sup>31</sup>.

Mais la subtilité d’une telle démarche intertextuelle ne se borne pas au premier chapitre du pseudépigraphe : si l’on tient compte de la « spécialisation » des maîtres qui travaillent au Temple on constate qu’il y a deux classes bien déterminées : les humains qui sont rétribués, dont le représentant est le jeune serviteur de Salomon<sup>32</sup> et les démons qui ne sont pas rétribués<sup>33</sup>. Pareillement, deux classes ont contribué à la construction du Temple dans le deuxième livre des Paralipomènes : les maîtres étrangers de Liban (rétribués)<sup>34</sup> et les autochtones recrutés parmi les prosélytes, et non pas parmi les Israélites libres (non rétribués)<sup>35</sup>. L’idée de démoniser les prosélytes est abondamment documentée dans la littérature rabbinique<sup>36</sup>.

De surcroît, les prosélytes soumis aux travaux pénibles, dont les Israélites étaient exempts, ont été subdivisés par Salomon en deux classes : il y avait d’un côté les tailleurs de pierre et de l’autre les porteurs, chaque équipe avec ses surveillants<sup>37</sup>. Une lecture attentive de la section démonologique du Testament (T.Sal. 2-18) et notamment des sentences prononcées par le roi contre chaque démon confirme la même logique d’organisation, malgré la diversité apparente des manifestations démoniaques. Les travaux pénibles auxquels sont soumis les démons se réduisent à deux types : taille des pierres et transport des fardeaux.

Bien que réductionniste, la division a le mérite de structurer ce qui refuse toute structure rationnelle, de donner un sens précis à ce qui est dépourvu du sens, de dompter l'indomptable, donc d'attribuer au monde démoniaque du *Testament* un ordre interne maintes fois contestée ou bien négligée par l'exégèse moderne. La première série des démons-travailleurs (les tailleurs de pierre) regroupe cinq spectres : Ornias<sup>37</sup>, Belzébul<sup>39</sup>, l'Acéphale<sup>40</sup>, le Chien<sup>41</sup> et le Dragon Ailé<sup>42</sup>. La deuxième comprend six démons : Asmodaïos<sup>43</sup>, Lix Tetrax<sup>44</sup>, Leontophoros (et sa Légion de porteurs)<sup>45</sup>, Tribolaios<sup>46</sup>, le groupe des trente-six Décans<sup>47</sup> et le groupe des Sept Esprits<sup>48</sup>. Chaque des deux catégories bénéficie d'un archidémon surveillant – Belzébul pour les tailleurs de pierre, et Asmodaïos pour les porteurs – auxquels les autres individus sont mystérieusement liés. Leur supériorité s'appuie sur trois traits spéciaux : la capacité prophétique<sup>49</sup>, l'origine angélique<sup>50</sup> et la notoriété intertextuelle.

On pourrait, donc, affirmer que le principe sériel est fondamental pour la compréhension intertextuelle et co-textuelle de la première partie du pseudépigraphe. Il ne fait qu'éclaircir le rapport d'ailleurs très vague entre le petit précis de démonologie et le récit biblique de la construction du Temple (notamment 2Par.). Au niveau du co-texte, il a le mérite de donner à l'information apparemment confuse fournie par les dépositions démoniaques le sens de la hiérarchie.

Mais le rôle majeur du principe devient évident au niveau contextuel, puisque les deux séries se perpétuent dans la deuxième partie du *Testament*, qui prétend « raconter » les événements qui précèdent la chute du roi. La section finale est ouverte, tout comme la partie « démonologique » initiale, par l'apparition du grand *tailleur* Ornias, qui montre que les prophéties sombres des grands démons concernant la destinée lamentable de Salomon, mais que le roi avait jusqu'ici négligées, sont véridiques<sup>51</sup>. L'apparition sinistre des démons Ephippas et Abezethibou, *porteurs tout-puissants* de la colonne de pourpre, confirme à la fois les présages de Belzébul sur le triomphe final des démons contre Salomon et la « théorie » d'Ornias concernant les principes de la mantique démoniaque. En d'autre mots la deuxième section du *Testament* devrait être lue selon les règles de la typologie allégorique : tous les démons de la première partie livrent des messages inquiétants et explicites (les prophéties ouvertes d'Asmodaïos et de Belzébul) ou implicites (les catégories des travailleurs), sur la chute finale du héros-architecte. Leur simple participation à la construction du Temple signale l'existence cachée d'une conspiration active dont la victime est le grand roi de Jérusalem. Sans tenir compte des avertissements

répétés des démons, Salomon commet inconsciemment des erreurs importantes dont l'effet va se dévoiler vers la fin de l'ouvrage. Possédé par la manie centralisante de l'édification du Temple, le roi néglige les conséquences fatales des sentences qu'il prononce contre les démons. Tout en les condamnant aux travaux, il n'observe pas que les créatures infernales, bien que liées, gardent leur force surhumaine et s'approchent imperceptiblement du centre sacro-saint. A partir des places indéterminées où ils taillent la pierre ou ils préparent les briques, situées pourtant à l'intérieur de l'enceinte sacrée, les démons occupent, au fur et à mesure de leurs apparitions, la Forêt du Liban, ils creusent la fondation du Temple, planent autour les murs de l'édifice, en jetant de grands blocs de pierre aux ouvriers humains qui travaillent sur l'échafaudage ou en illuminant le chantier à l'aide de la pierre verte (qu'il faudrait être équivalue au mystérieux *chamir*) et, finalement, s'installent dans la cour intérieure de l'édifice pour soutenir la Mer d'Airain, le grand bassin rempli d'eau lustrale.

Il est vrai qu'ainsi faisant, les travaux du Temple avancent avec rapidité et l'édifice est presque fini lors de la visite de Saba, la Reine du Sud, présentée ici comme une sorcière perverse (T.Sol. 19 ;21). Bien que les démons travaillent sans être rétribués, le prix de la hâte royale est finalement très élevé.

Le Temple est bâti rapidement, mais le bâtiment est incongru. Ses dimensions ne concordent pas avec les dimensions indiquées par les passages bibliques correspondants : dans le *Testament de Salomon*, la fondation du Temple mesure deux cents cinquante coudées<sup>52</sup>, tandis que le « même » édifice biblique a, *in extremis*, un périmètre de deux cents coudées<sup>53</sup>. A notre avis la modification introduite par l'auteur du *Testament* est intentionnelle et signale avec subtilité le dérapage du grand architecte royal<sup>54</sup>.

De même, la structure d'un des plus importants objets rituels du Temple, la Mer d'Airain, est modifiée à dessein. Tandis que les passages bibliques montrent que le grand bassin situé dans la cour intérieure du Temple est soutenu par quatre groupes de trois *boeufs* de bronze, orientés vers les quatre points cardinaux<sup>55</sup>, dans le *Testament de Salomon* le même objet est porté par *trente-six taureaux*<sup>56</sup>, qui ne sont que les décans, les démons astraux au visage de taureau apparemment domptés par le roi. En tant que puissances astrales, les trente-six décans-taureaux renvoient aux cultes idolâtres dédiés à l'Armée des cieux dans le Royaume apostat du Nord<sup>57</sup>. Selon le récit biblique, le même culte idolâtre a été adopté temporairement par un roi de Juda, Manassé, qui « a bâti des autels à toute

l'armée des cieux dans les deux parvis de la maison de l'Eternel ». Bien entendu, l'initiative « oecuménique » de Manassé a attiré la colère divine : le roi apostat a été dépourvu de son trône et condamné à l'exil. L'idée de Salomon de remplacer les douze boeufs légitimes avec les trente-six démons célestes est donc suspecte : la figure royale du Testament renvoie plutôt à Manassé qu'au grand architecte sans tâche des *Paralipomènes*.

## Le Temple décentré

Les deux derniers arguments ont le mérite d'introduire une nuance particulière et inédite aux récits triomphalistes concernant l'édification du Temple. Il y a quelque chose qui nous empêche d'affirmer que l'édifice de Salomon a été une réussite absolue. Le doute devient certitude si l'on prend en considération la deuxième coordonnée fonctionnelle du Temple : la pureté rituelle.

Dans son livre relativement récent, *La pensée du Temple. De Jérusalem à Qoumran*, Francis Schmidt se penche, entre autres, sur le problème extrêmement compliquée de la liminalité rituelle des trois Temples de Jérusalem qui devient, à tour de rôle, plus sévère ou plus lâche, en fonction des conditions historiques que le peuple d'Israël traversait. Nous n'insisterons ici sur les arguments détaillés de l'auteur, mais nous en retiendrons l'idée générale, à vrai dire un lieu commun: la sacralité du Temple dépend du degré de pureté rituelle des participants aux rites et l'espace même du Temple régit socialement ce degré de pureté. La succession des cours du Temple, tout comme son orientation est-ouest, sa place centrale et élevée, le symbolisme des marches vers le sanctuaire, le système sacrificiel fondent du point de vue religieux et une discrimination sociale nette qui n'accepte pas de transgression. Il y a toute une dynamique entre la notion de pureté et celle de sacré qui doit être connue (cf. Lév. 10,10) et respectée afin que les hommes puissent s'approcher du centre de leur univers religieux<sup>58</sup>.

A cause de son caractère infiniment interprétable, cette dynamique a suscité beaucoup de controverses pendant les différentes périodes de l'histoire d'Israël, dont peut-être la plus fameuse reste la contestation de la pureté du personnel du Temple et implicitement de sa fonction, venue du côté de la communauté de Qoumran, qui s'est rompu effectivement du culte pratiqué au Temple, tout en le remplaçant avec une observance nouvelle et isolationniste. Le phénomène n'est pas singulier dans le judaïsme ancien, qui est loin d'être un bloc idéologique unitaire. Un

deuxième exemple, qui nous est plus familier, est celui de la mystérieuse communauté religieuse « orthodoxe » de Jérusalem, au sein de laquelle ont été rédigés les *Psaumes de Salomon*, un recueil de dix-huit poèmes avec un prononcé caractère polémique envers l’élite sacerdotale de Jérusalem<sup>59</sup>. Si la notion de pureté rituelle est l’une des plus compliquées questions de la société juive ancienne<sup>60</sup>, nous nous bornerons aux considérations fondamentales de Mary Douglas sur la notion de pureté dans le Lévitique. On considère pur tout objet entier et appartenant avec certitude à une seule classe bien déterminée, qui représente la norme ontologique. **Le mixte, l’incomplète, l’hybride** sont, a contrario, les expressions de **l’anormal, de l’accidentel, de l’intersticiel** qui, à cause de leur double détermination ontologique, ne peuvent pas entrer en contact avec le sacré – qui est, comme nous l’avons dit tout au début de notre exposé, une présence complète, plénière. De surcroît, l’auteur remarque que ce type de pensée est inévitablement lié au schéma corporel<sup>61</sup>.

D’ailleurs une légende talmudique prétend que, pendant l’édification du Temple, aucun ouvrier n’est tombé malade. Personne n’est mort. Aucun instrument ne s’est rompu. Au contraire, tout a été parfait (hommes, instruments et matériaux de construction) dès le commencement du travail jusqu’à la mise en place de la dernière pierre<sup>62</sup>.

Si l’on revient maintenant au *Testament de Salomon*, qui semble avoir été rédigé en pleine controverse concernant la nature des corps des démons, on constate que l’indice le plus clair de l’impureté des démons est leur absolue ‘incohérence’ corporelle, qui brise tout schéma du monde, donc les normes de pureté<sup>63</sup>. Et si les constructeurs du Temple sont des créatures inachevées, comment songerait-on qu’une fois achevée la construction, elle sera le degré zéro de la pureté de l’Univers, ou, pour utiliser le schéma corporel qui a consacré le Temple, comment serait-elle le nombril du grand corps qu’est le monde?

## Chimères impures

Parmi les démons du *Testament de Salomon* il y a bon nombre de chimères. Ceux d’entre eux qui ni le sont pas, ont un certain handicap physique, une incompatibilité quelconque avec l’idée de « normalité » : on y trouve un escargot volant (Lix Tetrax, TSol. 7,1), un dragon ailé à visage humain (TSol 14,1), un cheval à queue de poisson<sup>64</sup> (Kynopegos, TSol 16,1), un sphinx et des taureaux ailés (18,1), un dragon tricéphale (12,1).

L'espace limité de notre essai ne nous permet pas d'analyser chaque créature à son tour. Il suffirait de constater que leur hybridisme manifeste est incompatible avec la sacralité de l'espace du Temple. Pourtant, le cas de l'ainsi dit « escargot volant » suscite un intérêt particulier. Lix Tetrax se présente sous la forme d'un monstre qui porte son visage (*prosopon*) très haut dans l'air et traîne par terre la partie inférieure de son corps, enroulée comme un escargot (gr. *eiloumenon hosei kokhlias*)<sup>65</sup>. Il a la capacité formidable d'enlever la poussière à des hauteurs inconcevables et de déclencher des tempêtes furieuses<sup>66</sup>.

Bien qu'il ne figure pas dans la liste des animaux impurs du Lévitique 11, l'escargot entre dans la catégorie générique des animaux qui se traînent sur le ventre<sup>67</sup>. Certaines de ces abominations sont exemplifiées au Lév. 11,29-30 (TM) : la belette (hébr. *holedh*), la souris (hébr. *akhēbar*), les grands lézards (hébr. *tsabh*), le hérisson (hébr. *anaqah*), le lézard *koah*, le lézard *leta'ah*, le lézard *homet* et le caméléon (hébr. *tinēšameth*). Dans la version grecque de la Septante, l'ordre des correspondances est relatif : ainsi le *tsabh* devient *ho krokodeilos ho khersaios* (le crocodile de terre), le lézard *koah* – *ho khamaileon* (le caméléon) et le *tinēšameth* – *he aspalax* (la taupe). Certaines versions modernes ont traduit erronément le lézard *homet* par « limace » (Darby / « snail » King James / « melc » Cornilescu)<sup>68</sup>. Si l'on suivait ces remarques on comprendrait que l'accès d'un démon-escargot dans l'enceinte sacrée est au moins suspect.

Pourtant, Lix Tetrax n'est pas vraiment un escargot, mais une créature exotique dont la partie inférieure *ressemble* à un escargot (***hosei*** *kokhlias*). Il faudrait donc penser à un animal aérien (*en to prosopon epipheron en toi aerī*) « doué » d'une longue queue enroulée. A notre avis, il s'agit d'un caméléon gigantesque. Notre supposition est affermie par un détail apparemment sans importance : la capacité du démon de déclencher des tourbillons monstrueux. Or, l'étymologie du mot hébreu qui désigne le caméléon (*tinēšameth*) est le radical *nšm* « souffler, respirer ». Donc le caméléon est « celui qui souffle ». Selon une croyance ancienne, attestée aussi chez Pline, le petit reptile qui mène sa vie dans les arbres méditerranéens, se nourrit de l'air<sup>69</sup> (probablement à cause de l'impressionnante capacité pulmonaire qui fait gonfler le jabot sémitransparent de l'animal<sup>70</sup>). Un parallélisme intéressant est fourni par la dénomination talmudique du caméléon : *zekitah* « le tourbillon », dont l'étymologie populaire est le mot *zika* « vent »<sup>71</sup>. Donc, Lix Tetrax, le démon qui porte son visage dans l'air, traîne sa queue enroulée comme un escargot et déclenche des tourbillons dangereux, a toutes les

caractéristique d'un caméléon. En tant que tel, il est normalement exclu de l'espace sacré du Temple (Lev. 11,30).

## Animaux impurs

L'inquiétude concernant le statut de pureté des constructeurs du Temple ne se limite pas aux chimères démoniaques : parmi les maîtres de Salomon il y a un démon qui prend la forme d'un énorme chien parlant<sup>72</sup> et un autre qui se présente comme un lion enragé, accompagné d'une multitude innombrable de serviteurs, nommée, hélas !, « La Légion »<sup>73</sup>. Bien que les listes des animaux impurs du Lévitique ne mentionnent pas *expressis verbis* le chien ou le lion, le principe énoncé au Lév. 11,27 ne laisse planer aucun doute à cet égard : « Vous regarderez comme impurs tous ceux des animaux à quatre pieds qui marchent sur leurs pattes ». De surcroît, le récit biblique et la littérature parabiblique juive réservent une place spéciale à l'impureté intrinsèque des deux animaux.

Dans le système sacrificiel, le chien a le même statut d'impureté que le porc : il est donc l'abomination par excellence<sup>74</sup>. L'espèce désignée dans le TM par le nom *kelebh* est celle du chien sauvage, vagabond et vorace<sup>75</sup>, imprévisible et extrêmement violent<sup>76</sup>, sale et impudent<sup>77</sup> qui doit être tenu à l'écart du camp d'Israël<sup>78</sup>. Le chien est, tout comme le lion, l'image de l'adversaire éternel du croyant<sup>79</sup>. Dans le même registre métaphorique, le terme « chien » désigne les hommes qui pratiquaient la prostitution sacrée dans les temples païens de la déesse Astarté<sup>80</sup>. Dans la littérature rabbinique, « chien » est synonyme de « païen »<sup>81</sup>. Dans longue liste des animaux impurs qui représentent les adversaires étrangers d'Israël (fournie par l'*Apocalypse des animaux*) les chiens sont associés aux Philistins<sup>82</sup>. Chez Saint Paul, les judaïsants et les faux circoncis qui doivent être tenus à l'écart du « camp » chrétien, sont des chiens ; de même, l'apostat qui « est retourné à ce qu'il a vomi »<sup>83</sup>. La métaphore du chien impur est amplifiée par les Pères de l'Eglise<sup>84</sup>.

Dans l'*Apocalypse des animaux*, les lions impurs qui attaquent le camp d'Israël représentent les assyro-babyloniens. Ils envahissent la Maison (Jérusalem) et la Tour (le Temple) du Maître (Dieu) et dévorent les brebis abandonnés (Israël)<sup>85</sup>. Dans les Psaumes, le lion est déjà l'image du persécuteur souverain, soit-il humain ou surhumain<sup>86</sup>. A l'époque séleucide, le lion désigne maintes fois le persécuteur politique (notamment Antioche IV Epiphanès<sup>87</sup>). Le passage le plus cité comme

source de l'épisode de T.Sal. 11 est 1Pierre 5,8 : « Soyez sobres, veillez. Votre adversaire, le diable, rôde comme un lion rugissant, cherchant qui il dévore »<sup>88</sup>. Le verset devrait donc être compris comme la dernière étape d'une longue tradition martyrologique qui commence avec l'image ambiguë du persécuteur léonin des Psaumes, continue avec le thème de la persécution politique dont le protagoniste est Antioche IV et explose comme leitmotiv dans des circonstances pareilles pendant les premiers siècles chrétiens : le tyran de ce monde, initialement politique, est associé à l'Adversaire éternel de la communauté des croyants et du genre humain<sup>89</sup>. La compagnie du Lion de T.Sal. 11, la Légion, renvoie sans doute à l'épisode néotestamentaire du possédé du pays des Gadaréniens<sup>90</sup>. S. Eitrem remarque que le nom collectif des démons (« Légion ») est une allusion transparente au persécuteur politique de l'époque de Jésus (les Romains) et un autre avatar de l'Adversaire de ce monde<sup>91</sup>. De surcroît, il faut observer que la majorité des termes qui désignent la Légion et qui décrivent la scène, provient de la sphère sémantique de la pureté<sup>92</sup>. L'action de Jésus d'envoyer les démons dans un troupeau de porcs est à ce propos édificatrice : il ne fait que reloger la Légion dans un endroit qui lui convient. Or, le porc était associé dans le judaïsme primitif à l'étranger impur<sup>93</sup>. Ainsi, la Légion biblique est une double métaphore : elle désigne, d'un côté, le persécuteur politique et, de l'autre, l'impureté des païens. L'idée de l'auteur du T.Sal. de mettre ensemble le Lion et la Légion est donc liée au double thème traditionnel de la persécution et de l'impureté du persécuteur. Le deuxième aspect, sinon les deux à la fois, signale une incompatibilité ouverte entre les « maîtres » de Salomon et la sacralité de la Maison qu'il sont en train de bâtir.

## **Humains impurs**

Cinq des démons qui participent à l'édification du Temple rappellent le schéma corporel humain. Malheureusement (pour Salomon), ils sont sans exception des humains inachevés : le Crime est un démon sans tête, doué pourtant d'une voix merveilleuse et polyphonique<sup>94</sup> ; le Mort aux yeux brillants « vit » dans des cimetières éloignés et se déguise en cadavre ambulant<sup>95</sup> ; Obyzouth est une grande tête de femme dépourvue de membres, extrêmement laide, dont l'occupation principale est de tuer les nouveaux-nés ; Enepsigos, la grande sorcière habitant la lune, est un apparition féminine tricéphale ; Onoskelis est la séductrice fatale aux

sabots d'âne. Comme on verra, les trois apparitions féminines occupent une place essentielle dans l'ensemble de l'ouvrage, similaire du point de vue structurel aux deux catégories des démons-constructeurs. Avant d'en dire plus, revenons au Crime et au Mort.

Selon tous les exégètes du *Testament*, le Crime est un avatar du célèbre *Aképhalos Daimon* invoqué dans un rituel d'exorcisme attesté dans les *Papyri Magicae*<sup>96</sup>. Bien que nécessaire, l'archéologie du démon n'arrive pas à éclaircir la signification d'une telle apparition. Seul le contexte de l'édification du Temple donne la juste mesure de l'apparition du démon. L'accès du Crime au Temple de Dieu est une abomination sans pareil. Tout comme dans l'espace grec<sup>97</sup>, dans le code sacerdotal juif le Crime représente une transgression des principes moraux et, hélas, une transgression des lois de la pureté : « Vous ne souillerez point le pays où vous serez, car le sang souille le pays »<sup>98</sup>. Le sang versé et les abominations de nature sexuelle souillent également<sup>99</sup> la terre qui peut finalement rejeter ses habitants : « Le pays en a été souillé; je punirai son iniquité, et le pays vomira ses habitants »<sup>100</sup>. L'effusion de sang est une des plus importantes sources d'impureté<sup>101</sup>. Le démon appelé « Le Crime » est donc doublement incompatible avec l'espace sacro-saint du Temple : en tant que constructeur inachevé (il est acéphale) et tant que source directe d'impureté (l'impureté du sang versé).

Quant au Mort, l'esprit désincarné d'un guerrier mort à l'époque des géants, qui hante sans repos les nécropoles et tue les solitaires visiteurs nocturnes, les choses semblent claires : il a toutes les caractéristiques d'un *biaiothanatos*<sup>102</sup>. Pourtant, sa capacité divinatoire fait penser aux bibliques 'ôbôt, les esprits des ancêtres, dont le culte nécromantique était banni par la loi mosaique<sup>103</sup>. L'incompatibilité de la nécromancie avec le culte de YHWH est exprimée dans les termes de l'impureté : « Ne vous tournez point vers ceux qui évoquent les esprits ('ôb), ni vers les devins; ne les recherchez point, de peur de vous souiller (*tāmē*) avec eux. Je suis l'Éternel, votre Dieu »<sup>104</sup>. En ce qui concerne le déguisement habituel du démon (afin de terrifier ses victimes, il se transforme en cadavre), le renvoi au thème de l'impureté funéraire est évident<sup>105</sup>.

Avec les trois démons-femmes on entre dans le domaine fulminant de l'impureté sexuelle, racine du démonisme selon certains exégètes<sup>106</sup>. L'apparition surprenante (même pour Salomon) des spectres féminins est l'expression de la diabolisation radicale d'une catégorie sociale marginale<sup>107</sup>. La femme démoniaque est présentée en trois « hypostases » dans la première partie du *Testament* : l'infanticide vindicative (Obyzouth),

la séductrice fatale (Onoskelis) et la sorcière (Enepsigos). Par rapport au schéma corporel, il est évident que la présence des trois diablesse dans l'enceinte sacrée du Temple est indésirable. Mais leur incompatibilité avec l'espace sacro-saint ne se borne pas aux traits extérieurs évidents. Chaque démon « matérialise » un certain inconvénient de nature fonctionnel.

La diablesse Obyzouth, associée par Duling à la Méduse grecque, par Scholem – à Lilith et par Busch aux Onocentraux bibliques<sup>108</sup>, est sans doute un avatar du type universel de la mère infanticide<sup>109</sup>. En tant que telle, Obyzouth attaque et tue les nouveaux-nés et les mères en couches. Du côté anthropologique, le problème se présente dans les termes de souillure et de liminalité. La connotation négative de l'acte d'accouchement est directement liée au dégoût du sang menstruel, mystère qui impose aux hommes des tabous stricts. La société juive des temps bibliques n'y fait pas exception (voir Lév. 12,1-5), où il est dit que l'impureté du nouveau-né dépend aussi de son sexe, la fillette étant, bien sur, beaucoup plus impure que le garçon). Mary Douglas explique que la souillure attachée également aux femmes en train d'accoucher et à leurs nouveaux-nés est la marque qu'on attribue généralement aux créatures marginales, dont le statut est ambigu, à cause de leur appartenance à deux domaines, donc à deux taxa, autrement bien délimités (la mort et la vie)<sup>110</sup>. L'enfant qui naît est considéré comme passant miraculeusement de l'état de non vie à l'état d'être humain. Or, le passage d'une catégorie taxinomique à l'autre est bien dangereux, parce que la démarche est sous le coup de la menace d'échouer à tout moment. Un éventuel échec est directement attribué à la femme, devenue ainsi la victime des interstices qu'elle n'a pu dépasser. La crainte que produit l'accouchement d'un avorton est issue du péril potentiel qu'un tel acte représente pour les limites bien définies du monde. Dans les sociétés patriarcales, la femme qui ne réussit pas à accoucher est rejetée de l'ordre normal de la vie, parce qu'elle a trahi justement son unique rôle social, la parturition. Marquée d'emblée par son altérité sexuelle, qui lui assure une place secondaire dans les hiérarchies sociales, la mère ratée subit, immédiatement une deuxième démarcation négative qui la place hors du taxon qui, jusqu'à ce moment, la contenait normalement, en l'acceptant faute de mieux. L'archétype de la mère dangereuse réunit dans une première phase la mère qui accouche un enfant mort, la femme stérile et la vierge morte prématurément. Une fois bannies, par l'instauration de la deuxième marque, ces types de femmes sont démonisés : elles perdent toutes les vertus de leur genre et les traits qui les rendaient une fois plus qu'acceptables. Elles deviennent laides, dévorent leurs propres enfants

et sont condamnées à hanter à jamais les marges terribles En tant que « démon de parturition » (voir aussi le sa chevelure sauvage, renvoi clair au symbolisme du sang menstruel<sup>111</sup>), Obyzouth est souillée de sang impur : la demande qu'elle adresse à Salomon de laver ses mains avant qu'elle dévoile son 'identité' démoniaque, est à ce propos un indice fondamental et une ironie sans limites.

Le *Testament de Salomon* amène au premier une autre diablesse, dont le nom et apparition sont célèbres à l'époque de la rédaction du traité. Elle s'appelle Onoskelis, se présente sous la forme d'une femme très belle, mais aux pieds d'âne et ses fonctions principales sont de séduire les hommes et de les étrangler<sup>112</sup>. La légende de la naissance d'Onoskelis est racontée par Aristokles, dans ses *Paradoxa*, qui est, à son tour, cité par Plutarque<sup>113</sup>. Un certain Aristonymos d'Ephèse entretient des relations sexuelles anormales avec une ânesse. Le fruit de cette union interdite est Onoskelis, une fille aux jambes d'âne. Mais la vraie diabolisation d'Onoskelis se produit dans le récit parodique de Lucien, *Verae Historiae*, où il est dit que les femmes d'une île fabuleuse, Kabbalusa, dont les traits sont ceux d'Onoskelis, mais qui parlent parfaitement le grec, séduisent les visiteurs, les enivrent et, finalement, les dévorent<sup>114</sup>.

Les milieux chrétiens connaissent, eux aussi, la figure d'Onoskelis. Théodore de Cyr, établit la correspondance entre les *onocentaures* (traduction grecque du mot hébreu *lilin*, dans la Septante !) et les *onoskelides*, diablesse qui peuplent les ruines de Babylone et les lieux déserts (*onokentauros, tas para tinon onoskelidas kaloumenas*)<sup>115</sup>. Sozomène raconte, dans son *Histoire ecclésiastique* que Gérontios, évêque de Nicomédie, a été révoqué parce qu'il affirmait qu'une nuit, il avait vu une Onoskelis quadrupède dont il avait coupé les cheveux et la tête<sup>116</sup>.

Tout en suivant la tradition aristophanesque, qui assimilait l'Empouse des *Grenouilles* à une Onoskelis (cf. Scholie), la *Suda* renforce l'ancienne équivalence : « Empousa : Oinopole; Onokole hoti onou poda ekhei ». (s.v Empousa).

K. Preisendanz décrit dans son article « Onoskelis » la fortune impressionnante que la figure de la diablesse du *Testament de Salomon* a eue dans les ouvrages byzantins et dans les croyances populaires du Moyen Âge et il serait superflu de reprendre ses arguments érudits<sup>117</sup>. Nous nous bornerons à constater que dans tous les développements de l'archétype, Onoskelis, la diablesse aux sabots d'âne, conserve son caractère de séductrice des hommes. Toutefois, Peter Busch n'admet pas le principe, mais il confère à la séduction de la diablesse un caractère

plutôt spirituel<sup>118</sup>. Néanmoins les données textuelles confirment la thèse de Preisendanz : voir la beauté concrète du démon, ses préférences pour un certain type d'hommes (notamment pour les *melikhrooi*), les illusions charnelles qu'elle donne et le signe astral qu'elle partage avec ses victimes (une allusion zodiacale subtile à la constellation du Capricorne<sup>119</sup>).

Si l'on tient compte du contexte général de l'apparition démoniaque, Onoskelis représente un cas flagrant de transgression du code sacerdotal juif. Son hybridisme suspect renvoie à l'interdiction ferme concernant les relations sexuelles anormales du Lév. 18, 23 : « Tu ne coucheras point avec une bête, pour te souiller avec elle. La femme ne s'approchera point d'une bête, pour se prostituer à elle. C'est une confusion ». Un indice supplémentaire de l'impureté d'Onoskelis est contenu dans l'information sur la naissance de la diablesse : elle est la fille d'une « voix sans age, l'écho du Plomb ». Le plomb, métal aux propriétés magiques associé à la planète Saturne, était considéré impur par les milieux légalistes juifs<sup>120</sup>. Il est très important de souligner à ce propos le symbolisme saturnien de l'âne<sup>121</sup> et la relation particulière entre la constellation du Capricorne et la planète de la mélancolie<sup>122</sup>.

L'apparition d'Enepsigos rappelle sans doute la figure sombre de la déesse sorcière, Hécate<sup>123</sup> : elle est tricéphale et trimorphe, habite dans la lune, elle est invoquée par les sages sous le nom de Kronos et « tirée » en bas par certains mortels, le pouvoir de son vrai astre est illimité, sa capacité prophétique terrible. Selon P. Busch, les deux types d'invocations mentionnés par « l'ainsi dite déesse » renvoient à la double fonction magique dont bénéficiait Hécate dans l'Antiquité tardive : il s'agit d'un côté de sa réputation particulière au sein des milieux théurgiques (« les sages »), qui la considéraient une hypostase de l'Ame du Monde et, de l'autre côté, de sa fonction traditionnelle de maîtresse de la magie noire donc de la sorcellerie lunaire<sup>124</sup>. Ce qui semble pourtant curieux dans la déposition de la diablesse est sa relation avec Kronos. Tenant compte du contexte prophétique du chapitre – Enepsigos annonce la chute de Salomon et la ruine de son royaume –, Busch considère que l'association étrange soit une allusion au mythe plutarquien de l'enchaînement de Kronos sur une île éloignée<sup>125</sup>. A notre avis, la solution est un peu plus compliquée. En tant que déesse théurgique, Hécate est la souveraine de la douzième région du monde sensible<sup>126</sup>. Selon la division ancienne des cartes astreiales, la douzième maison est gouvernée par Saturne-Kronos, surnommé *Kakos Daimon*<sup>127</sup>. L'auteur du Testament ne fait donc que

superposer deux traditions astrologiques, tout en gardant le sens prévalent de l'interprétation théurgique.

Quant à la prophétie sombre d'Enepsigos, elle est étonnamment semblable à la prédiction de Samuel après l'épisode de la consultation illicite de la sorcière d'En-Dor :

« 13 Samuel dit à Saül: Tu as agi en insensé, tu n'as pas observé le commandement que l'Éternel, ton Dieu, t'avait donné. L'Éternel *auroit affermi pour toujours ton règne sur Israël : 14. et maintenant ton règne ne durera point. L'Éternel s'est choisi un homme selon son coeur, et l'Éternel l'a destiné à être le chef de son peuple, parce que tu n'as pas observé ce que l'Éternel t'avait commandé* »<sup>128</sup>

Il serait superflu de rappeler le caractère impur des sorciers et de la sorcellerie dans le monde biblique<sup>129</sup>. En outre, à partir des données différentes, J. Rabinowitz remarque que la sorcière d'En-Dor a toutes les fonctions traditionnelles de la déesse Hécate<sup>130</sup>.

A part la question essentielle de l'impureté des diables, il faudrait remarquer qu'elles constituent une série fonctionnelle organisée selon les mêmes critères que les séries des démons travailleurs : Enepsigos occupe la première position (elle est d'origine céleste, a une remarquable capacité prophétique et bénéficie d'une indiscutable notoriété intertextuelle). Tout comme les deux autres séries, la catégorie des démons-femelles annonce l'avènement des femmes diaboliques de la deuxième partie du Testament : Saba, la reine du Sud, qui est présentée comme une sorcière perverse (cf. Enepsigos)<sup>131</sup> et la jeune Jébuséenne, un avatar terrible de la séductrice éternelle, qui oblige Salomon à sacrifier cinq sauterelles au nom de ses dieux Raphan et Moloch avant qu'il puisse l'amener à Jérusalem (cf. Onoskelis)<sup>132</sup>.

## Les démons comme sources d'impureté corporelle

A l'encontre des Evangiles Synoptiques où le rapport entre maladie, impureté et affliction démoniaque est ambigu<sup>133</sup>, dans le Testament de Salomon toute maladie humaine est liée à l'activité des démons (voir T.Sal. 18 et le mystère de l'expression 'onze pères': à notre avis, allusion aux 'pères d'impureté' de la tradition rabbinique). Beaucoup plus qu'un traité de médecine populaire, comme il a été maintes fois considéré<sup>134</sup>,

T.Sol. insiste sur les afflictions qui, selon le code sacerdotal juif et son interprétation tardive (le Mishna), rendent les humains impurs. Les démons provoquent les **maladies impures ‘classiques’**: lèpre (T.Sal. 12,1, voire gr. *phoberokhroos*, cf. b.*Arakhin* 16a), épilepsie (T.Sal. 17,3), fièvre hémiteritaire (T.Sal. 7,6) et kynanthropie (T.Sal. 10,3)<sup>135</sup>.

## Les dernières erreurs de l'architecte

Si l'on néglige tous ces indices suspects, un seul argument peut sauver le scénario locatif, donc l'idée que le Temple du Testament de Salomon est le centre valable de l'ordre terrestre qui fonde et oriente le monde et repousse et persécute les puissances négatives du chaos: Salomon lie et force les démons de travailler, grâce au pouvoir qui lui avait été donné par Dieu (l'anneau magique). Cette thèse, défendue par David Frankfurter dans son livre récent (*Evil Incarnate. Rumors of Demonic Conspiracy and Ritual Abuse in History*) serait légitime si les démons, torturés ou impertinents, ne parlaient eux-mêmes de la fragilité du Temple et si le *Testament* se terminait avec l'achèvement du Temple. Mais le *Testament* a, pour les juifs, un dénouement pessimiste: bien qu'il finisse le Temple, le roi tombe en idolâtrie et devient la risée des démons. La cause apparente est son insatiable désir sexuel, dont les démons lui ont parlé maintes fois. Mais l'auteur semble accréditer une autre raison de l'abîme du roi, toujours liée à la construction du Temple à l'aide des démons.

La conspiration démoniaque dont la victime est le roi de Jérusalem est dévoilée dans la deuxième partie du *Testament* par deux gestes suspects de Salomon : premièrement, il fait des concessions inédites à la Reine du Sud<sup>136</sup>. Bien que le Temple ne soit pas encore fini, la sorcière perverse entre dans le sanctuaire de l'édifice et parcourt l'espace du Temple à l'inverse : *debir – hekhal – ulam*<sup>137</sup>. Or la présence d'une femme, de surcroît d'une femme diabolique, dans le sanctuaire est une abomination sans pareil. Son parcours anormal est peut-être la plus subtile expression du renversement du monde : la Maison de Dieu devient une maison des démons, le centre est decentré.

Deuxièmement, l'acte final de l'édification est confié au plus fort des démons, Ephippas, originaire de l'Arabie, le seul travailleur de Salomon qui peut enlever et mettre en place la pierre de l'angle<sup>138</sup>. Or la pierre de l'angle est le symbole messianique par excellence. D'ailleurs, après que le démon accomplisse sa mission, Salomon cite le célèbre verset du

Psaume 118 : « La pierre qu'ont rejetée ceux qui bâissaient est devenue la principale de l'angle »<sup>139</sup>. Mais la citation est déplacée dans ce contexte démoniaque et Salomon – un exégète raté de l'Ecriture<sup>140</sup>. La chute du roi devient ainsi une certitude, qui s'inscrit dans la même logique du monde renversé. D'ailleurs, Ephippas dit que son activité préférée est l'anéantissement des rois<sup>141</sup>.

## La chute et le message

L'épisode final du Testament réunit et matérialise tous les avertissements démoniaques sombres que Salomon a négligés auparavant. Le roi tombe amoureux d'une jeune étrangère, la Shumanite, fille des Jébuséens. Pressée par les prêtres de son peuple, elle refuse de suivre Salomon à Jérusalem si le roi ne sacrifie cinq sauterelles au nom de Raphan et Moloch, ses dieux. Bouleversée par la beauté de la vierge, Salomon obéit à la demande, tue les petits insectes et apostasie.

Ainsi s'accomplissent les prophéties des grands démons de la première partie de l'ouvrage (Belzébul, Asmodaios, Enepsigos). De même, la jeune jébuséenne n'est qu'une hypostase humanisée de la diablesse séductrice Onoskelis. Mais la clé du passage réside dans les noms des idoles étrangers Raiphane et Moloch. Pour un lecteur de la Bible grecque, le couple fatidique est bien connu (voir *Molchol* et *Raiphan* : Amos 5,26 et Actes 7,43).

Dans le TM, *Molchol* et *Raiphan* correspondent à *sikkût* et *kiyyûn*, dont la reprononciation originelle aurait du être *sakkut* et *kaiwan*<sup>142</sup> (le TM contient la vocalisation pour les idoles *i-û*). La version *raiphan* au lieu de *kaiwan* de la LXX s'explique par une erreur du copiste, qui remplace *r* par *k*. Pour *Molchol* la situation est une peu plus compliquée : les traducteurs de la LXX ont interprété le syntagme *sikkût melekh* « *sikkût*[votre] roi » comme *sukkat molekh* (« la tente de Moloch »). La provenance des deux noms est assyro-babylonienne : *kaiwan* est un translittération de *kajjamanu*, le nom divin de la planète **Saturne**. A son tour, *Sakkut*, maintes fois associé à Ninurta, l'échanson des dieux, était le nom de la planète **Venus**<sup>143</sup>. On comprend donc aisément que le prophète Amos critique dans ce passage les tendances du peuple élu d'abandonner le culte de YHWH et de s'adonner aux cultes païens, notamment à l'idolâtrie astrale<sup>144</sup>.

Si l'on regarde de ce point de vue, l'auteur du Testament semble accuser Salomon d'avoir commis la même erreur : il n'est pas un idolâtre quelconque, mais un pratiquant de l'idolâtrie astrale. L'accusation est

d'autant plus grave que le roi en avait été averti par les démons. Tout en collaborant avec les puissances astrales démoniaques à l'édification du Temple (voir les sept esprits planétaires et les trente-six décans) et tout en négligeant leurs relations cachées avec la planète sinistre de la mélancolie, Saturne-Kaiwan, (voir Enepsigos et Onoskelis), il finit par devenir leur victime.

Une polémique pareille, mais plus nuancée, est reprise par le protomartyre Etienne lorsqu'il cite le verset d'Amos tout en le rattachant au thème de l'édification du Temple de Salomon (Act.7, 43-48) :

« Vous avez porté la tente de Moloch Et l'étoile du dieu Remphan, Ces images que vous avez faites pour les adorer! Aussi vous transporterai-je au delà de Babylone.<sup>44</sup> Nos pères avaient au désert le tabernacle du témoignage, comme l'avait ordonné celui qui dit à Moïse de le faire d'après le modèle qu'il avait vu.<sup>45</sup> Et nos pères, l'ayant reçu, l'introduisirent, sous la conduite de Josué, dans le pays qui était possédé par les nations que Dieu chassa devant eux, et il y resta jusqu'aux jours de David.<sup>46</sup> David trouva grâce devant Dieu, et demanda d'élever une demeure pour le Dieu de Jacob;<sup>47</sup> et ce fut Salomon qui lui bâtit une maison.<sup>48</sup> **Mais le Très Haut n'habite pas dans ce qui est fait de main d'homme (en *kheiropoietois*<sup>45</sup>)** ».

Dans l'épître aux Galates, Paul soutient que le Temple de Jérusalem était fréquenté par ceux qui continuaient de vivre selon la loi terrestre, tandis que ceux qui avaient accepté et qui suivaient Jésus étaient les fils de la Jérusalem céleste et les adorateurs du vrai Temple immatériel de Dieu. Pour ceux-ci, les fonctions du Temple matériel ont été remplacées par les fonctions de la communauté des croyants, en tant que nouveau Temple de Dieu sur terre, un édifice spirituel sans mort. (1Cor. 3,16; Ef. 2,19-22; 1Petr. 2,4-6). Par contre, le Temple matériel sera, à la fin du monde, le lieu où sera couronné le grand Adversaire du genre humain, l'Antéchrist (2Thes. 2,4).

La destruction du Temple par les romains en 70 ap. J.C., a modifié d'une manière décisive les conceptions juives et chrétiennes à l'égard de l'édifice de Jérusalem. Les chrétiens la percevaient comme l'accomplissement de la prophétie de Jésus, selon laquelle le Temple sera détruit (Mc. 13,1-2; Mt. 24,1-2, cf. Jn. 2,19)<sup>46</sup>. De surcroît, elle a été interprétée comme un signe de la colère divine adressé aux juifs qui avaient rejeté Jésus et persécuté ses *akolouthai*. Une fois détruite, la structure de pierre, édifiée par la main des hommes a été finalement remplacée *in actu* par la communauté

des croyants, dont le grand pasteur et prêtre était le Fils ressuscité de Dieu. Pourtant, les chrétiens, tout comme les juifs pratiquants, n'ont pas cessé de croire que le Temple serait reconstruit à la fin du monde. Mais l'interprétation chrétienne était tout à fait différente de la vision eschatologique juive, qui soutenait que l'édification du troisième Temple coïncidera avec l'avènement du Messie. Hippolyte de Rome l'attribuait à l'avènement de l'Antéchrist, qui allait bâtir un nouveau Temple de pierre à Jérusalem. La même vision est partagée par Irénée de Lyon, qui était convaincu que le Temple physique de Jérusalem serait rebâti par les armées rebelles du Diable afin de tromper les naïfs sans parti pris religieux, notamment les descendants de ceux qui avaient immolé Jésus<sup>147</sup>.

Ce qui fait du T.Sal. un ouvrage étrange est la logique inédite de l'argumentation. A part la tradition de la polémique ouverte, l'auteur chrétien n'utilise que les arguments de l' 'adversaire' juif afin de démolir la conception sur la magnificence du Temple. D'un côté, Salomon bâtit le Temple de Jérusalem, qui devrait être le plus pur lieu du monde et le fondement symbolique de l'idéologie locative juive. De l'autre côté, il adopte la tradition ésotérique juive (cf. Flave Josèphe, *AI* 8,45), qui fait du roi Salomon le maître des démons, créatures impures, dont le contact avec la Maison du Dieu est, selon le code sacerdotal, inconcevable. A l'époque de la rédaction finale du T.Sal., ces deux arguments-ci coexistaient à l'intérieur du judaïsme talmudique, **bien que dépourvus d'objet**: le Temple de Jérusalem n'était plus qu'un souvenir reculé et, par conséquent, les lois de pureté un code invalide. Le *Testament* signale cette crise de la pensée juive et propose une explication: les Juifs se trompent lorsqu'ils affirment que le Temple de Jérusalem a été la Maison de Dieu, puisqu'il a été bâti par Salomon à l'aide des démons, source de toute souillure. Salomon est devenu finalement la victime et la risée des démons et le Temple vénéré - une ruine.

L'alternative va de soi: Jésus, le fils incorruptible de la Vierge, est le vrai vainqueur des démons. Le temple qu'il bâtit est un édifice durable, situé à l'intérieur de chacun des croyants, et la seule loi de pureté valide – la pureté du cœur. Les allusions transparentes des démons au **vrai** Rédempteur du genre humain, dont le nom est Emmanuel, fils d'une vierge, qui sera (la perspective temporelle est celle du judaïsme salomonien) crucifié pour le salut de l'humanité et qui bannira les démons à jamais, toutes ces allusions représentent la clé du message d'un ouvrage généralement perçu comme marginal et confus.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> D.C. Duling, "The Testament of Solomon", in J.H. Charlesworth, *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*. Vol. I. *Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments*, New York 1983, p. 933 sq.; P. Busch, *Das Testament Salomos. Die älteste christliche Dämonologie kommentiert und in deutscher Erstübersetzung*, Berlin –New York, 2006, pp. 51-53.
- <sup>2</sup> Pour une interprétation du rôle structurel de la l'interrogatoire, voir P. Torijano, *Solomon, the Esoteric King. From King to Magus, Development of a Tradition*, Leiden- Boston-Köln, 2002, pp. 53-67.
- <sup>3</sup> Duling, *op.cit.*, p. 972.
- <sup>4</sup> T.Sal. 20,11-17.
- <sup>5</sup> L. Jacobs, "Jewish Cosmology", in C. Blacker & M. Loewe (eds.), *Ancient Cosmologies*, London 1975, pp. 66-86.
- <sup>6</sup> bGittin 68ab.
- <sup>7</sup> P. Busch, *op. cit.*, pp 20-30..
- <sup>8</sup> T. Klutz, *Rewriting the Testament of Solomon. Tradition, Conflict, and Identity in a late Antique Pseudepigraphon*, London, 2005, pp.
- <sup>9</sup> M.Barker, *The Gate of Heaven. The History and Symbolism of the Temple in Jerusalem*, London 1991, pp. 57 sq.
- <sup>10</sup> Midrash Tanhuma Kedushim 10.
- <sup>11</sup> Lév 10,9-10
- <sup>12</sup> J.Z. Smith, "Earth and Gods", in *Map Is Not Territory. Studies in the History of Religions*, Leiden, 1978, p. 109.
- <sup>13</sup> T.Sal. 4,4.
- <sup>14</sup> T.Sal. 5.
- <sup>15</sup> Pour une excellente analyse intertextuelle, voir P. Busch, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-129.
- <sup>16</sup> Cf. Targoum Hiob 1,15.
- <sup>17</sup> Cf. J. Frey, "Temple and Rival Temple – The Cases of Elephantine, Mt. Gerizim, and Leontopolis", in B. Ego, A. Lange & P. Pilhofer, *Gemeinde ohne Tempel. Zur Substituierung und Transformation des Jerusalemer Tempels und seines Kults im Alten Testament, antiken Judentum und frühen Christentum*, Tübingen 1999, pp. 171-204.
- <sup>18</sup> T.Sal. 6,1.3.6
- <sup>19</sup> Cf. B. Teyssedre, *La naissance du Diable. De Babylone aux grottes de la Mer Morte*, Paris, 2000, p.83.
- <sup>20</sup> T.Sal. 25,3.
- <sup>21</sup> G.Salzberger, *Salomos Tempelbau und Thron in der semitischen Sagenliteratur*, Berlin 1907 et notamment, S. Giversen, „Salomo und die Daemonen”, in Martin Krause (ed.), *Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts in Honour of H. Bohlig*, 3<sup>e</sup> vol., Brill, Leiden, 1972, pp. 16-21.

- 22 Flave Josèphe, *Antiquités juives* 8,3,2. Cf. Salzberger, *Salomos Tempelbau und Thron in der semitischen Sagenliteratur*, Berlin 1907, pp. 10-11
- 23 Flave Josèphe, *Antiquités juives* 8,5,1.
- 24 Pessahim Rabbah 25a, Schir. Rabbah 1c.
- 25 Shem. Rabbah Par.60,2.
- 26 Flave Josèphe, *Antiquités Juives* 8,45.
- 27 bGittin 68 a-b.
- 28 Salzberger, op. cit., p. 11.
- 29 H.G.M. Williamson, "The Temple in the Book of Chronicles", in W. Horbury (éd.), *Templum amicitiae. Essays on the Second Temple presented to Ernst Bammel*, Sheffield 1991, pp. 16-27.
- 30 L.C. Allen, *The First and Second Book of Chronicles*, Nashville, 1999, pp.145-150. S. Japhet, *I&II Chronicles: A Commentary*, London, 1993, pp. 23-25; A. Noordzij, "Les intentions du Chroniste", in *Revue biblique* 1940, p. 167.
- 31 Pour une définition du genre « rewritten Bible », voir B.N. Fisk, "Rewritten Bible in Pseudepigrapha and Qumran", in C.A. Evans Porter (ed.), *Dictionary of the New Testament Background*, Downers InterVarsity Press 2000, pp. 947-948.
- 32 T.Sol. 1,3 ; 21 , 3
- 33 T.Sal. 5,9 ;21, 3
- 34 2Par. 2,9 .
- 35 2Par. 2,16.
- 36 Voir par.ex. bBaba Metzgia 59b, bYebamoth 109b.
- 37 2Par. 2,17.
- 38 T.Sal. 2,8.
- 39 T.Sal. 6,9.
- 40 T.Sal. 10,10.
- 41 T.Sal. 10,10.
- 42 T.Sal. 14,8.
- 43 T.Sal. 5,12.
- 44 T.Sal. 7,8.
- 45 T.Sal. 11,7.
- 46 T.Sal. 12,6.
- 47 T.Sal. 18,41.
- 48 T.Sal. 8,12.
- 49 Asmodaïos prédit la chute du roi, la ruine de son royaume et la dissémination universelle des démons (T.Sal. 5,5). De même, Belzébul annonce le triomphe total des derniers démons (Abezethibou et Ephippas) dont Salomon sera la victime (T.Sal. 6,3,6).
- 50 Asmodaïos, fils d'un ange déchu et d'une fille des hommes, dit que le trône de son père se trouve encore aux cieux (T.Sal. 5,4) et que les hommes

l'appellent La Grande Ourse (T.Sal. 5,3 Pour une discussion approfondie sur la tradition majeure des anges déchus, voir **Yoshiko-Reed, A.**, *Fallen Angels and the History of Judaism and Christianity. The Reception of Enochic Literature*, Cambridge, 2005 et l'étude classique de M. Delcor, „Le mythe de la chute des anges et de l'origine de géants comme explication du mal dans le monde dans l'apocalyptique juive. Histoire des traditions.“, in *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 190, 1976, pp. 3-53). A son tour, Belzébul dit qu'il est le seul survivant des anges déchus (T.Sal. 6,2).

- 51 Voir l'épisode triste de la mort du jeune homme prédict par Ornias. T.Sal. 20.
- 52 T.Sal. 8,12.
- 53 1R. 6,2 (TM) et 2 Cr. 3,3 (TM) /2Par. 3,3 (LXX) : 2 x 60 coudées (longueur) + 2 x 20 coudées (largeur) = 200 coudées (périmètre)
- 54 Tous les manuscrits du pseudépigraphe maintiennent la même information.
- 55 3R. 7,13 (LXX) /2Par. 4, 3-4 (LXX).
- 56 T.Sal. 21,3. La correspondance numérique a été remarquée par Todd Klutz, *op.cit.*, pp. 70-71
- 57 4R. 17,16 (LXX), cf. Deut. 17,3.
- 58 Fr. Schmidt, *La pensée du Temple de Jérusalem à Qoumran. Identité et lien social dans le judaïsme ancien*, Paris 1994, pp. 81-85. Voir aussi P.P. Jenson, *Graded Holiness. A Key to the Priestly Conception of the World*, Sheffield, 1992, pp. 46-48, C. Wahlen, *Jesus and the Impurity of Spirits in the Synoptic Gospels*. Tübingen 2004, pp. 9-14
- 59 K. Atkinson, *I Cried to the Lord. A Study of the Psalms of Solomon's Historical Background and Social Setting*, Leiden-Boston, 2004, pp. 211-222
- 60 Cf. J. Neusner, *The Notion of Purity in Ancient Israël*, Brill 1978.
- 61 Mary Douglas, *De la souillure. Essais sur les notions de pollution et de tabou*, préface de L.Heusch, postface inédite de l'auteur, traduit de l'anglais par A. Guérin, 2<sup>e</sup> édition, Paris 2001, pp. 69-76.
- 62 *Pessahim Rabba* 25a.
- 63 Consacrés comme des créatures intermédiaires entre la sphère céleste et le monde humain par le célèbre passage de *Symposion* 202<sup>e</sup>, les démons grecs sont traités à tour de rôle comme une race aérienne, douée d'une intelligence divine et maîtrisant l'espace sublunaire (*Epinomis* 986d, cf. L. Taran, *Academia : Plato, Philip of Opus and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis*, Philadelphia 1975, pp. 42-47), des esprits désincarnés qui gardent les traits moraux de la vie terrestre (Xénocrate, fr. 23-25 Heinze), des entités spirituelles douées de sentiments et d'affects (chez les premiers stoïciens, cf. L. Babut, *Plutarque et le stoïcisme*, Paris, 1969, pp. 388-440) ou des esprits intellectifs (chez Marc Aurèle, *Eis heauton* III,6). La démonologie occupe une place importante dans les systèmes cosmologiques médioplatoniciens et néopythagoriciens. Ainsi, Plutarque distingue trois catégories de démons, par rapport à leur participation à la matière sensible : les esprits purs, qui

n'ont eu aucun contact avec la matière, les esprits désincarnés des morts et les esprits incarnés, *De Iside et Osiride* 360e). Pourtant il maintient et développe la thèse de Xénocrate concernant la nature mixte des démons (esprits immatériels doué d'affects), thèse reprise par tous les auteurs médioplatoniciens importants (cf. Maxime de Tyr, *Dissertationes* 14f ; 26,8 ; Apulée, *De deo Socratis* 9 etc., cf. J.Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, Londres 1977.). Les penseurs néoplatoniciens favorisent le thème de la corporalité démoniaque : Plotin considère que les démons sont des créatures mixtes, engendrées par l'Ame du Monde, dont la nature intime est l'ainsi dite matière intelligible, ce qui explique leur corporalité ignée ou aérienne (*Ennéades*, 3,5,1-3). Enfin, chez Porphyre, la corporalité devient le critère fondamental qui distingue les démons des dieux : les premiers bénéficient d'un corps matériel (bien entendu formé d'une matière raréfiée, visible ou invisible à volonté), tandis que les dieux sont complètement dépourvus de corps (*De abstinentia* 2,39). Pour une excellente étude sur les 'démons grecs', voir F. Brenk, "In the Light of the Moon : Demonology in the Early Imperial Period" in *ANRWII*, 16,3, pp. 2064-2145. Dans l'espace de la culture juive, la vision démonologique classique exclut toute corporalité. A l'exception notable du mythe des géants (Gen. 6,1-6), les démons sont plutôt absents ou bien réduits au statut d'esprits immatériels (E. Ferguson, *Demonology of the Early Christian World*, pp. 69-75). Pourtant ils sont associés à l'idée d'impureté (cf. Num. 5, 11-31 ; Os. 2,12 ; Zac. 13,2). Dans la littérature intertestamentaire (notamment dans *Les Testaments des Douze Patriarches* et dans la *Règle de la Communauté* de Qoumran) une première distinction est opérée selon des critères éthiques : il y a donc des esprits bons et des esprits mauvais, qui interviennent dans le monde humain, sans que l'idée de corporalité entre en discussion (Wahlen, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-51). Pour Philon et pour Flave Josèphe les démons sont des esprits dépourvus de corps. Mais tandis que Josèphe reste fidèle aux « croyances populaires » qui favorisaient l'interprétation négative du phénomène démoniaque (possession, crime *Bell. Iud.* 7,185 ; charmes maléfiques, *Ant. Iud.* 6,166-169 ; manie, hantise *Bell. Iud.* 6,47), Philon adopte la voie platonicienne, en postulant que les démons, en tant que créatures intermédiaires, ne participent pas à la dispute éthique et ne s'impliquent pas dans le monde humain. (*De gigantibus* 4,6). La question de la corporalité démoniaque est entamée d'une manière systématique seulement dans la littérature rabbinique tardive. Il est dit, par exemple, dans le traité talmudique *Hagigah* que les démons partagent avec les anges trois caractéristiques (les ailes, la capacité de voler autour du monde et préscience de l'avenir) et trois avec les hommes (le besoin de se nourrir, la sexualité et la mort, *bHagigah* 16a). Selon l'apparence corporelle, il y a trois classes de démons : les démons au visage d'ange, les démons au visage d'homme et les démons au corps d'animal (*bBerakhot* 6a). En tant qu'esprits matériels,

ils sont invisibles, mais peuvent prendre n'importe quelle forme à volonté (Abot de R. Nathan 37,9a).

<sup>64</sup> Probablement un hippocampe. Cf. P. Busch, *op.cit.*, pp. 213-214.

<sup>65</sup> T.Sal. 7,1.

<sup>66</sup> T.Sal. 7,4.

<sup>67</sup> Lév. 11,42.

<sup>68</sup> Probablement par contamination.

<sup>69</sup> Pline, *Naturalis Historia* 8,33. Cf. Rabbi David Kimchi, apud S. Bochart, *Hierozoicon* IV,6.

<sup>70</sup> H.B. Tristram, *The Natural History of the Bible*, 2<sup>e</sup> éd, London, 2002 pp. 267-269.

<sup>71</sup> bShabbat 108a.

<sup>72</sup> T.Sal. 10,1

<sup>73</sup> T.Sal. 11,1,3

<sup>74</sup> Is. 66,3.

<sup>75</sup> Ps. 59,7,14

<sup>76</sup> Is. 56,11

<sup>77</sup> Prov. 26,11: « Comme un chien qui retourne à ce qu'il a vomi, ainsi est un insensé qui revient à sa folie ».

<sup>78</sup> G. Cansdale, « Animalele in Biblie », en *Dictionar biblic*, trad. de L. Pup et J. Tipei, Oradea 1995, p. 41.

<sup>79</sup> Ps. 21,21.

<sup>80</sup> Deut. 23,19.

<sup>81</sup> Genesis Rabbah 81,3; Midrash Teh. Ps. 4,8, apud Kohler, en *Jewish Encyclopaedia* s.v. "dog".

<sup>82</sup> 1Hénoch 89,42-43. 47-48. Pour une interprétation du concept d'impureté dans l'*Apocalypse des Animaux*, voir D.Bryan, *Cosmos, Chaos and Kosher Mentality*, Sheffield 1995, pp. 99-102. Voir aussi J.J. Collins, *Apocalyptic Imagination : An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature*, Grand Rapids, Cambrdrige 1998, p. 54 sq., et J. Nickelsburg, *Jewish Literature Between the Bible and the Mishnah*, New York 1981, p. 96.

<sup>83</sup> Phil. 3,2; 2Pierre 2,22.

<sup>84</sup> Ignace d'Antioche, *Epître aux Ephésiens* 7,1 ; Tertullien, *Adversus Marcionem* 2,5 ; Augustin, *Sermones* 77.6.10, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 58,15, *De fide et operibus* 5,10-13,7 ; Cassiodore, *Expositio Psalmorum* II.1, Ps. 21,17 et 58,17.Jean Cassien, *Liber formularum spiritualis intelligentiae* 5 etc. Cf. A. Ferreiro, « Simon Magus, Dogs and Simon Peter », in A. Ferreiro (éd.), *The Devil, Heresy, and Witchcraft in the Middle Ages. Essays in Honor of J.B. Russel*, pp.45-91.

<sup>85</sup> 1Hénoch 89, 54-56

<sup>86</sup> Ps. 21,14; 90,13. Cf. Ps. 7,2-3; 9,30; 16,12; 34,17; 56,5; 57,7.

- <sup>87</sup> Voir les allusions au roi séleucide de Dan. 6,20; 1Macc. 2,60; Esther C 4,17. Pour une analyse approfondie du thème du tyran dans le Livre de Daniel, voir C. Badilita, *Les métamorphoses de l'Antéchrist chez les Pères de l'Eglise*, Paris, 2005, pp. 1-92. De même, la littérature de Qoumran maintient le symbolisme léonin à l'égard du persécuteur politique (1QH 5,9-19).
- <sup>88</sup> Cf. P. Busch, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-171.
- <sup>89</sup> A. Jackson, *The Lion Becomes Man. The Gnostic Leontomorphic Creator and the Tradition*, Claremont 1983, pp. 44-47.
- <sup>90</sup> Mc. 5,1-17. Cf. Lc. 8,26-36. MacCown, *op. cit.*, p. 69; Duling, *op. cit.*, pp. 955, 972, note c; Busch, *op. cit.*, p. 168; Betz, "Legion" en *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible*, pp. 507-508.
- <sup>91</sup> S. Eitrem, *Some Notes on the Demonology in the New Testament*, Oslo 1966, pp. 71-72. Cf. G. Theissen, *The Gospels in Context: Social and Political History in the Synoptic Tradition* (trad. F. MacDonagh), Edinburg 1992, p. 109.
- <sup>92</sup> Les démons sont des *pneumata akatharta*, le possédé est nu, il vit dans des endroits impurs (les tombes). Les démons sont envoyés dans un grand troupeau de pourceaux (animaux impurs). C. Wahlen, *Jesus and the Impurity of Spirits*, 2002, pp.97-98.
- <sup>93</sup> F. Annen, *Heil für den Heiden. Zur Bedeutung und Geschichte der Tradition vom besessenen Gerasener* (Mk. 5,1-20 parr.), Frankfurt 1976, p. 173.
- <sup>94</sup> T.Sal. 9,1,5
- <sup>95</sup> T.Sal. 17, 1-2.
- <sup>96</sup> PGM V, 100-160 (édition Preisendanz, vol. I., 1973, pp. 184-189. Cf. Mac Cown, *op. cit.*, p. 67; Preisendanz, *Akephalos. Der Kopflose Gott*, Leipzig 1926, pp. 84-86 et "Akephalos", en RAC I, 1950, coll. 211-216; Eitrem, *Papyri Osloenses: Magical Papyri*, Oslo 1925, p. 48; Duling, *op. cit.*, 971, note 9a. Busch, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-157 qui rajoute une information fondamentale sur la secte chrétienne des "Acéphales".
- <sup>97</sup> E.Rohde, *Psyché*, 1985, pp. 184 sq. et notamment R. Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion*, Oxford, 1983, pp. 104-143.
- <sup>98</sup> Nom. 35,33.
- <sup>99</sup> *mNiddah* 7,1.
- <sup>100</sup> Lév. 18,25.
- <sup>101</sup> Neusner, *The Idea of Purity in Ancient Israël*, p. 21.
- <sup>102</sup> Pour une analyse exhaustive du concept dans l'espace grec, voir J. Waszink, « Biothanati », en RAC 2<sup>e</sup> vol., coll. 391-412. Voir aussi J. Bremmer, *The Rise and Fall of Afterlife*, London-New York, 2002, pp. 78-84; S. Illes-Johnston, *Restless Dead: Encounters Between the Living and the Dead in Ancient Greece*, Berkeley- Los Angeles- London, 1999, pp. 77-80, 83-84, 127-160.
- <sup>103</sup> Voir l'épisode célèbre de la sorcière d'En-Dor, 1Rg. 28,7-25. Cf J. Tropper, "Spirits of the Dead", in *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible*,

pp. 806-808; A. Jeffers, *Magic and Divination in Ancient Israël and Palestine*, Leiden-New York- Koln 1992, pp. 172 sq. , E. Bloch-Smith, *Juhadite Burial Practices and Beliefs about the Dead*, Sheffield 1992, pp. 45-64, N.J. Tromp, *Primitive Conceptions of Death and the Netherworld in the Old Testament*, Rome, 1969, pp. 22-23, 102-107.

<sup>104</sup> Lév. 19,31.

<sup>105</sup> Pour une analyse systématique du sujet, voir J. Neusner, *The Halakha. An Encyclopaedia of the Law of Judaism*, vol. Vb *Inside the Walls of the Israelite Household*, Leiden 2000, pp.258-289.

<sup>106</sup> O. Böcher, *Dämonenfurcht und Dämonenabwehr. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte der christlichen Taufe*, Stuttgart 1970, pp. 33-35.

<sup>107</sup> Pour une analyse du statut marginal de la femme dans la société juive ancienne, voir T. Ilan, *Jewish Women in Greco-Roman Palestine. An Inquiry into Image and Status*, Tübingen, 1995, p 226 sq.

<sup>108</sup> Duling, op. cit., p. ; G.Scholem, *La kabbale. Une introduction. Origines, thèmes et biographies*, Paris, 1998, pp. 539-545; Busch, op. cit., pp.183-188.

<sup>109</sup> Pour la description du type dans la pensée grecque, voir S. Iles Johnston, "The Child-Killing Demon", in M. Meyer & S. Mirecki (éds.), *Ancient Magic and Ritual Power*, Leiden-New York- Koln 1995, pp. 361-387; pour le monde byzantin, le même type est analysé par I. Sorlin, « Striges et geloudes. Histoire d'une croyance et d'une tradition », in *MCB* 11, 1991, pp. 101-120. Du coté juif, voir R. Patai, *The Hebrew Goddess*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 1990. Aussi S. Hurwitz, *Lilith, die erste Eva. Studie über die dunkle Aspekte des Weiblichen*, Zürich 1980 et J. Bril, *La mère obscure*, Paris 1998.

<sup>110</sup> M. Douglas, *op.cit.*, pp. 58-59, apud I. Sorlin, op. cit, p. 432.

<sup>111</sup> Voir la description talmudique de Lilith, comme un avorton entièrement couvert de poils en désordre *bNiddah* 24b. Cf.

<sup>112</sup> T.Sal. 4,1,5.

<sup>113</sup> Plutarque, *Paral. Min.* 29.

<sup>114</sup> Lucien, Ver. Hist. 2,46.

<sup>115</sup> Théodoret de Cyr, *Comm. Es.* 13,21.

<sup>116</sup> Sozomène, *Hist. Eccl.* 8,6

<sup>117</sup> K. Preisendanz, s.v. 'Onoskelis', in *RE* 1960, 8, coll. 120-123

<sup>118</sup> P.Busch, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

<sup>119</sup> T. Klutz, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-50.

<sup>120</sup> Neusner, *Halakha*, pp. 40-52.

<sup>121</sup> Voir le célèbre jeux de mots : *Kronos-Onos*, qui circulait dans les milieux ésotériques de l'époque impériale (Diogène Laerce, *Vies des philosophes* II,112, apud, Bouché-Leclercq, *L'astrologie grecque*, Paris 1890, p. 318

<sup>122</sup> Le Capricorne est la résidence prédictive de Saturne. Cf. Bouché-Leclercq, *op. cit.*, pp. 96, 185, 188, 190, 204, 208, 373.

- <sup>123</sup> MacCown, *op. cit.*, p.67; Duling, *op. cit.*, p. 975 note 15a.; Busch, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-205.
- <sup>124</sup> Busch, *op. cit.*, p. 204. Pour une analyse exhaustive du rôle de la déesse dans les rituels théurgiques, voir S. Iles-Johnston, *Hekate Soteira. A Study of Hekate's Role in the Chaldean Oracles and Related Literature*, Atlanta 1990.
- <sup>125</sup> Plutarque, *De Defectu Oraculorum* 419 f-420a, *De Facie in Orbe Lunae* 941 f-942a. Cf. Busch, *op. cit.*, p 207.
- <sup>126</sup> Proclo, *In Rem Publicam* II, 121,8.
- <sup>127</sup> Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Astologos* pp. 340-341, apud Bouché-Leclercq, *op. cit.* p. 285.
- <sup>128</sup> 1Sam. 13,13-14.
- <sup>129</sup> Deut. 18, 9-10. Pour la condamnation rabbinique de la sorcellerie comme pratique impure attribuée seulement aux femmes, voir *ySanhedrin* 25b, *bSanhedrin* 67a, *mAbot* 2,7, *yKiddushim* 66c et la fameuse liste de *bShabbat* 6-7.
- <sup>130</sup> J. Rabinowitz, *The Rotting Goddess. The Origin of the Witch in Classical Antiquity*, New York 1998, pp. 125-135.
- <sup>131</sup> T.Sal. 19,3.
- <sup>132</sup> T.Sal. 26,3-5.
- <sup>133</sup> Cf. H. C. Kee, *Medicine, Miracle, and Magic in New Testament Times*, Cambridge 1986.
- <sup>134</sup> Pour une excellente analyse du 18<sup>e</sup> chapitre, voir H.S.. Gundel, *Dekane und Dekansternbilder. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Sternbilder der Kulturvölker*, Hamburg, 1936, pp. 77 sq. Voir aussi K. von Stuckrad, *Das Ringen um die Astrologie. Jüdische und christliche Beiträge zum antiken Zeitverständnis*, Berlin- New York, pp. 407sq.
- <sup>135</sup> W. H. Roscher, "Das von der Kynanthropie handelnde Fragment von Marcellinus von Side" , in *Abhandlungen der Philologisch-Historischen Klasse der Koeniglich-Saechsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften* 39, 1897, pp.1-92, notamment 23-27, apud Busch, *op. cit.*, p. 164.
- <sup>136</sup> Dans le récit biblique de la visite de l'**anonyme** reine de Saba à Jérusalem, il n'y pas de mention de son accès au Temple.
- <sup>137</sup> T.Sal. 21,1-3. Pour une interprétation de l'identité de la mystérieuse Reine du Sud, voir J.-Cl. Haelewyck, « La reine de Saba et les apocryphes solomoniens » , in *La reine de Saba*, Graphè 11, 2004, pp. 83-100. Pour la démonisation de la Reine de Saba, J. Lassner, *Demonizing the Queen of Sheba. Boundaries of Gender and Culture in Postbiblical Judaism and Medieval Islam*, Chicago 1993; M. Delcor, « La reine de Saba et Salomon. Quelques aspects de l'origine de la légende et de sa formation, principalement dans le monde juif et éthiopien, à partir des textes bibliques » , in *Tradicio I traduccio de la paraula. Miscellania Guiu Camps*, Monserrat 1993, pp. 307-324.

- <sup>138</sup> T.Sal. 23,1-4.
- <sup>139</sup> Ps. 118,16. Cf. Es. 28,16; Jer. 51,26; Mt. 21,42; Mc. 12,10sq.; Lc. 20,17;Act. 4,11;1Pi. 2,4.7, Eph. 2,20.
- <sup>140</sup> Klutz, op. cit., p. 72.
- <sup>141</sup> T.Sal. 23,1.
- <sup>142</sup> Cf. syr. *Keywan*, M. Stol “*kaiwan*”, in *Dictionary and Deities and Demons in the Bible* , p. 899.
- <sup>143</sup> R. Borger, “Amos 5,26, Apostelgeschichte 7,43 un Shurpu II, 180”, in *Zeitschrift fur alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 100, 1988, pp. 74-76.
- <sup>144</sup> J. Niehaus, *Amos*, in T.E. Cominskey (ed.), *The Minor Prophets: An Exegetical and Expository Commentary*, vol. I, Grand Rapids, 1992, pp. 434, apud *Septuaginta 5* (NEC), *Amos*, traduction de C. Gaspar, introduction et notes par O. Veres, p.142.
- <sup>145</sup> C.K. Barret, “Attitudes Towards the Temple in Acts”, in W. Horbury (ed.), *Templum Amicitiae...*, pp. 352 sq. Pour la signification du terme *akheiropoietos*, voir H.Ganser-Kerperin, *Das Zeugnis des Temples. Studien zur Bedeutung des Tempelmotivs im lukanischen Doppelwerk*, Münster 2000, pp. 245-248. Voir aussi A. Sweet, “A House Not Made with Hands”, in W. Horbury (ed.), *Templum Amicitiae*, pp. 370-371.
- <sup>146</sup> Pour une analyse exhaustive des réactions chrétiennes et juives à la chute du Temple voir H.M. Döpp, *Die Deutung der Zerstörung Jerusalems und des Zweiten Tempels im Jahre 70 in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten n. Chr.*, Tübingen-Basel, 1998
- <sup>147</sup> Pour une analyse du symbolisme du Temple dans le christianisme primitif, voir, G. Fassbeck, *Der Tempel der Christen. Traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Aufnahme des Tempelkonzepts im frühen Christentum*, Tübingen-Basel, 1999; pour le développement de la polémique chrétienne anti-juive concernant le Temple, voir C.P. Bammel, “Law and Temple in Origen”, in W. Horbury (ed.) *Templum Amicitiae*, pp. 464-476.

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# FILMBEWUSSTSEIN UND ZUSCHAUER IM BILD. EIN HUSSERLSCHER ANSATZ ZUM KINEMATOGRAPHEN

## 1. Film und Phänomenologie

In seiner bekannten Einteilung der filmtheoretischen Paradigmen der Nachkriegszeit erwähnt Francesco Casetti (1993) die Phänomenologie kaum. Der Ausdruck „Phänomenologie des Films“ erscheint in seinem Buch ein einziges Mal, in Anführungszeichen, und bezeichnet dort ein der Psychologie des Films untergeordnetes Bestreben der gegenwärtigen Filmstudien, die Filmkunst aus Sicht der Zuschauererfahrung zu deuten. Die Auffassung der „Filmphänomenologie“ als Psychologie trifft in der Tat einen bedeutsamen Punkt, denn trotz der verworrenen Geschichte des Terminus, kam es im Bereich der Filmstudien eigentlich nie zu einer strengen Unterscheidung von Filmpychologie und Phänomenologie. Die bedeutendsten Ansätze der vierziger und fünfziger Jahre zu einer „phänomenologischen Analyse des Films“, wie jene Etienne Souriaus, Gilbert Coen-Séats oder Jean Mitrys bezeugen dies in eigentümlicher Weise. Merleau-Ponty selbst, der 1945 in einem berühmten Vortrag die Verwandtschaft von Film und Phänomenologie<sup>1</sup> berührte, erwähnt eigentlich auch durchgehend bloß die „neuere Psychologie“.

Diese Unklarheit stellt bloß die eine Seite eines allgemeinen Ekklektismus<sup>2</sup> dar, der die gesamte vorstrukturalistische und vorwissenschaftliche Filmtheorie in hohem Masse kennzeichnet. Aus derselben Zeit stammt die scharfe Opposition zwischen einer angeblich „phänomenologischen“ Deutung des Films und seiner „semiotischen“ Interpretation. In seinem Artikel, *The Neglected Tradition of Phenomenology in Film Theory*, will Dudley Andrew (1978) eben diese „phänomenologische Perspektive“ durch folgende Punkte von der strukturalistisch-semiotischen unterschieden wissen: Sie ist deskriptiv und nicht explikativ, diakronisch und nicht synkronisch, immersiv und nicht distanziert-objektiv, am Ausdruck und nicht an der Kommunikation orientiert, synthetisch und nicht analytisch usw. Auf Grund dieser Einteilung können nun die verschiedensten Autoren

als „Phänomenologen“ bezeichnet werden: Bazin, Cohen-Séat, Ayfre, Munier, Morin, Cavell, Merleau-Ponty, Metz, Laffay usw.

Der unklaren Bestimmung dessen, was auf „phänomenologischer“ Seite eine „Phänomenologie des Films“ zu bedeuten hat, entspricht auf „strukturalistischer“ Seite eine ähnliche, wenn nicht gerade gleiche Unklarheit. Merkwürdig ist vor allem die Tatsache, dass sich gewisse „Semiotiker“ der sechziger und siebziger Jahren mit dieser phänomenologischen Richtung der Filmtheorie intensiv auseinandersetzen und sie als vermeintlichen Idealismus bekämpfen<sup>3</sup>. Ihren Einwänden antworten einige der heutigen Vertreter der „Filmphänomenologie“ – wie z.B. Allan Casebier in seinem von Husserl geprägten Buch *Film and Phenomenology* (1991) – dadurch, dass sie den phänomenologischen Ansatz im Gegenteil als Realismus deuten.

Man könnte zunächst geneigt sein die Opposition der „phänomenologischen“ und „semiotischen“ Filmstudien auf jenen allgemeineren Streit der heutigen Bildtheorie um den Zeichencharakter des Bildes<sup>4</sup> zu reduzieren. Tatsächlich spielt die Frage ob Film als Bilderfolge oder als Sprache zu verstehen ist auch eine gewisse Rolle in dieser Debatte, doch ist die Sachlage bei weitem nicht so einfach. Denn einerseits ist hier der „phänomenologische“ Ansatz keineswegs um einen kohärenten Bildbegriff konzentriert und verfällt demnach vielfachen Unklarheiten, und andererseits leidet die „semiotische“ Filmtheorie ebenfalls an einem massiven Ekklettismus, in dem Linguistik, Psychoanalyse und vieles andere zusammenschmelzen. Dieser Synkretismus ist heute schon so fortgeschritten, dass man glaubt mit Hilfe einer „semiotischen Phänomenologie“<sup>5</sup> den Streit gelöst zu haben.

Ohne entscheiden zu wollen, ob ein „Filmwerk“, so wie es heute aus Sicht einer durchschnittlichen Filmästhetik auffasst wird, tatsächlich eher als Bilderfolge oder als „Sprache“ zu deuten wäre, wollen wir uns im folgenden Beitrag ein beschränkteres Ziel setzen: Wir wollen, im Ausgang von dem bestimmt motivierten phänomenologischen Bildbegriff Husserls, etliche Komplikationen des Bildphänomens aufzeigen, die sich einigen Grundelementen der Filmkunst verdanken: Beweglichkeit im Bild, Kamerabewegung und Schnitt. Dabei gilt es zunächst „Husserls Bildbegriff“ festzulegen. Denn, wenn Casebier in seinem Versuch scheitert eine husserlsche Phänomenologie der Filmkunst durchzuführen, so ist daran nicht bloß die Tatsache Schuld, dass er Husserls Gedanken in einem unangemessenen Fragehorizont – die Realismus/Idealismus Debatte – bespricht, sondern auch seine mangelhafte Auslegung des husserlschen

Bildbegriffs selbst. Casebier, und später auch Spencer Shaw (2008), richten sich nämlich in ihren Werken bloß an den knappen Paragraphen zum Bildbewusstsein, die in Husserls *Logischen Untersuchungen* und in seinen *Ideen* zu finden sind. Dabei lassen sie beide seinen Nachlass, und insbesondere den schon veröffentlichten Band XXIII der Husserliana, *Phantasie, Bildbewußtsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen* (1980), ganz ausser Betracht. Husserls Auslegung des Bildbewusstseins findet jedoch zweifelslos erst in den Forschungsmanuskripten jenes Bandes ihre eigentliche Ausformung und ihre ausdrückliche Darstellung. Da aber die Aufzeichnungen jener Manuskripte oft schwankend und eher problematisch sind, muss zunächst Husserls eigentliche Bildlehre deutlich heraugearbeitet werden. Von da aus werden wir, in weiterer Folge, ein paar Bemerkungen Husserls zum Kinematographen besprechen können, um schliesslich, im Ausgang von ihnen, den Versuch zu wagen, den elementaren Umriss einer streng phänomenologischen Untersuchung des Filmbilds auszuzeichnen.

## 2. Husserls Analyse des Bildbewusstseins

Husserls Bildauffassung unterscheidet sich von der traditionellen zunächst dadurch, dass das Bild bei ihm nicht mehr als „reales“ Verhältnis (etwa zwischen Vorbild und Abbild), sondern als „intentionale“ Beziehung verstanden wird. Des weiteren setzt Husserl nicht zwei sondern *drei* aufeinandergebaute gegenständliche Auffassungen ins Spiel, die, in verschiedener Zuwendung, verschiedene Gegenständlichkeiten ergeben<sup>6</sup>. Wir haben, zum ersten, das *Bildding*, z.B. bei einer Photographie das glänzende photographische Papier, welches das Bild trägt; des weiteren ist mittels einer neuen darauf gebauten Intention, das *Bildobjekt* gegeben, d.h. die kleinen farbigen oder schwarz-weissen Figuren, die sich auf der einen Seiten der Photographie gestalten; schliesslich wird, bei einer normalen Bildbetrachtung, durch das photographische Bildobjekt hindurch ein *Bildsujet*, also eine im Bild dargestellte Szene gemeint.

Mit der Grundunterscheidung von Bildobjekt und Bildsujet hängt die Feststellung zusammen, dass Bilder Dinge sind deren realen Prädikate zum Teil nich als solche fungieren, um eben der Verbildlichung dienen zu können. Ein einsichtiges Beispiel bietet die Farbe<sup>7</sup>: Wenn wir, z.B. einen grünen Baum auf einem Blatt Papier gezeichnet sehen, so ist das Grün offensichtlich ein reales Prädikat des Papiers, dass aber keinesfalls als

normale Eigenschaft des aktuellen Blattes fungiert, sondern der inaktuellen, rein intentionalen Baumfigur zugeschrieben wird. Unter diesen Umständen entsteht also ein Bild erst dann, wenn *ein und derselbe* Gegenstand mittels einiger seiner Momente als bildlicher Darsteller fungiert, während er mittels der anderen sich dieser Funktion widersetzt, was Husserl mit Hilfe der Unterscheidung *analogisierender* und *nicht-analogisierender* Momente zu klären versucht. In der normalen Bildbetrachtung sind wir freilich vorzugsweise den analogisierenden Momenten zugewendet: Bei einer Platobüste z.B. prätendiert die plastische Gestalt die Gestalt Platos zu offenbaren, während die Farbe der Büste oder ihre Grösse (im Falle einer Miniatur) nichts an Plato darstellt. Die analogisierenden Momente stellen somit Deckungsmomente dar zwischen dem *was gegeben*, aber *nicht gemeint* und dem *dem was gemeint, aber nicht gegeben* ist. Sie gehören *de facto* dem Bildobjekt, da sie „reale“ Teile der Erscheinung am Bildding sind, aber zugleich *de jure* dem Bildsujet, da es „durch sie“ dargestellt wird und sie somit als seine intentionalen Teile fungieren.

Ein weiterer Grundbegriff der Husserlschen Bildauffassung ist jener des „*Widerstreits*“; der Terminus bezeichnet eine bestimmte Unverträglichkeit im Bereich der Intentionserfüllungen. Ein intentionaler Gegenstand ist im Allgemeinen, laut Husserl, bloß zum Teil eigentlich gegeben, während er zum Teil von Intentionen konstituiert ist, die Nichtgegebenes bloß vermeinen. Ein Wahrnehmungsding z.B. ist grundsätzlich nur von einer einzigen Seite gesehen, wobei die anderen in „bloßen Intentionen“ appräsentiert sind, deren Erfüllung erst mit unserer Stellungsänderung zum Ding erfolgt. Intentionen können nun einerseits in eigentlichen „Erfüllungen“, andererseits aber auch in deren Gegensatz, d.h. in „Intentionsentäuschungen“<sup>8</sup> und damit in ein *Widerstreitsbewusstsein* synthetisch übergehen. Das *Widerstreitsbewusstsein* der Bilder kann sowohl aus Sicht der Bildumgebung als auch aus jener des Bildes selbst beschrieben werden. Aus der ersten Perspektive ist zunächst ersichtlich, dass das Bildding (und nicht das Bildobjekt) die naturgemäße Ergänzung der erfahrungsmäßigen Bildumgebung darstellt<sup>9</sup>, wobei die Ergänzungsinentionen der Bildumgebung durch das Erscheinen eines Bildobjekts – das der erfahrungsmäßigen Umgebung nicht widerspruchslös einverlebt werden kann – anstelle des eigentlichen Bilddings, enttäuscht sind. Aus der Sicht des Bildes, andererseits, kommt es abermals zu Widerstreit, da die Ergänzungsinentionen des Bildobjektes ihre naturgemäße Erfüllung nur im Rahmen des Bildes selbst finden können<sup>10</sup>. Während der Raum den ich z.B. durch ein Fenster sehe, zusätzliche

Aussichten kennt, die ich durch Annäherung an das Fenster aktualisieren kann, führt jeder Versuch ähnliche Umgebungsintentionen des Bildes zu realisieren zu Enttäuschung und Widerstreit.

Dabei muss beachtet werden, dass Husserl, zumindest in seinem späteren Nachlass, nicht von einem *wirklichen* Widerstreit des Bildbewusstseins spricht, wie bei durchstrichenen Illusionen, sondern bloß von einem *potentiellen*, der erst mit der „Aufwickelung“ jener Umgebungsintentionen<sup>11</sup> und mit dem *Übergang* zur erfahrungsmäßigen Bildumgebung entsteht<sup>12</sup>. Als potentielles kommt nun aber das Widerstreitsbewusstsein in normaler Bildbetrachtung eben nicht zum Austrag<sup>13</sup>, da die Bilder in husserlscher Sicht, und zwar immer deutlicher in den zwanziger Jahren, eben nicht am Boden der Erfahrung angegangen werden, sondern auf dem einer besonderen Einstellung, die Husserl „Phantasie im weitesten Sinne“ oder „Als-ob-Abwandlung“ nennt. Ein Bild betrachten bedeutet demnach für Husserl zunächst die Welt der Erfahrung ausser Geltung setzen und bloß das abgebildete Bildsujet im Modus des Als-ob perzeptiv aber setzungslos als Dargestelltes vermeinen.

### 3. Der Kinematograph bei Husserl: das bewegliche Bild

Im Band XXIII der Husserliana sind nun, in diesem Horizont, *fünf* kurze Bemerkungen zum Thema Film aufgezeichnet, die aus der Periode 1904-1921 stammen und den Film ausdrücklich als eine Bildart, neben Holzschnitt, Gemälde, Photographie usw. besprechen. Sie gehen alle von der Feststellung der zwei grundverschiedenen Weisen aus, in denen eine Bewegung bildlich dargestellt werden kann: entweder *adäquat*, d.h. durch Bewegung wie im Kino, oder *inadäquat*, durch eine statische Bildfigur, wie bei einer Plastik oder Photographie. Das statische Bild stellt somit die Bewegung nicht mittels eines analogisierenden Momentes dar, während der Kinematograph Bewegung durch Bewegung wiedergibt, und das heißt eben durch einen analogen Repräsentanten. Für Husserl hängt damit folgende Frage zusammen: Wie kann eine sich wandelnde Bildfigur in stabiler Weise ein Bildsujet darstellen?

Die Antwort liegt für Husserl in der Tatsache, dass die filmische Bilderfolge nicht einfach von einem Gegenstand zum anderen unstetig überspringt, sondern einen einheitlichen Bildzusammenhang ins Spiel bringt. Das sich ändernde Bildobjekt ist entlang aller seiner Änderungen als „dasselbe“ synthetisch identifiziert und vermeint, und es erlaubt dadurch

eine identische *Verbildlichung* desselben Bildsjets. Im Gegenteil, wenn wir ein statisches Bild umdrehen, so erhalten wir laut Husserl<sup>14</sup> zwei verschiedene Erscheinungsreihen: jene des Bilddinges, einerseits, die in kontinuierlicher Synthesis denselben Gegenstand aus verschiedenen Sichten zeigen, und jene des Bildobjektes, andererseits, die eine einzige „normale“ Erscheinung bieten, während alle anderen nicht andere Seiten des Bildobjekts, sondern bloß seine Verzerrungen darstellen. Im Unterschied zu dieser unmöglichen Synthetisierung der statischen Bildobjekte bilden nun die beweglichen Erscheinungsreihen im Kino Erscheinungen eines selben Gegenstandes, der sich in kontinuierlicher Synthesis als einheitlicher konstituiert: Bei der Filmaufnahme eines Ritters der sich entfernt und am Horizont verschwindet, sind die Modifikationen des Bildobjekts stets zu einer einzigen gegenständlichen Einheit synthetisiert, die dadurch ein und dieselbe Person bildlich darstellt.

In einer Aufzeichnung aus 1917 führt Husserl diesen Gedanken einen Schritt weiter. Er geht von der Feststellung aus, dass die kleine Bildfigur eines Holzschnittes eine *feste* Erscheinungsweise hat. Ähnliches trifft auch bei einer Plastik zu, denn obwohl wir da nicht eine einzige feste Erscheinung haben, so besteht dennoch ein *festes System* möglicher Erscheinungsweisen, und zwar jene, die wir erhalten, wenn wir uns rund um die Statue bewegen. Aus dieser Sicht kann Husserl nun folgende erstaunliche Behauptung aufstellen: „Zu einem Bild gehört, dass das Abbild als Bildobjekt verstanden, ein verharrendes, ein bleibendes « Sein » hat“<sup>15</sup>. Nur, so setzt er hinzu, diese Unveränderlichkeit muss keineswegs so verstanden werden, als ob das Bildobjekt schlechthin unbeweglich und unverändert sei, denn es kann sich sehr wohl um ein kinematographisches Bild, d.h. um eine Filmaufnahme handeln. Bei der letzteren findet ebenfalls ein Ablauf von Erscheinungsweisen statt, die an sich ein wesentlich festes und verharrendes System bilden, da das Bildobjekt auch hier nicht gewisse vorgezeichnete Grenzen seiner Beweglichkeit überschreiten kann.

Laut Husserl besteht die adäquate Erfassung dieser Unveränderlichkeit in der *wiederholten* Betrachtung der Filmaufnahme. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass eine Filmaufnahme, in der z.B. eine Person sich bemüht eine Entscheidung zu fassen, eine Szene darstellt, die, gemäss ihrem eigenen Sinn, offen und unentschlossen ist, trotz der Tatsache, dass der Ablauf der filmischen Aufnahme (als Bildobjekt) feststeht und sich in der erneuten Betrachtung als fest erweist. Der Ablauf der Filmaufnahme selbst ist ein unerbittlicher und geschlossener Bilderablauf, während die dargestellten Szene im Sinne ihres Handlungsablaufs offen bleibt. So wie

ein gemalter Läufer als beweglicher dargestellt ist, obwohl das Bildobjekt seiner Bewegung nur eine dessen Zeitlicher Phasen zeigt, so führt auch die Filmaufnahme gewöhnlich offene Situationen, Unentschiedenheiten, Alternativen usw. vor, d.h. eine Welt die an sich nicht fest und vorgezeichnet ist, und zwar mittels eines Ablaufs von Erscheinungsweisen, die als solche stets fest liegen.

Husserls Aufzeichnungen zum Film sind zwar verständlicherweise spärlich. Eine „husserlsche“ Filmtheorie hat aber damit keineswegs sein Bewenden. Wir wollen nun zwei wesentliche Bildphänomene – *Kamerabewegung* und *Montage* – anhand der oben dargestellten Bildtheorie Husserls phänomenologisch erläutern und dabei zugleich den Versuch machen, ein weitverbreitetes „Dogma“ der Filmtheorie in Frage zu stellen: den Gedanken der „Identifizierung“ des Zuschauers mit der Kamera.

#### **4. Kamerabewegung als Ereignis im Bild**

Der Begriff „Kamerabewegung“ nennt gewöhnlich sowohl die vom Kameramann vollzogenen Bewegungen des Aufnahmeapparates als auch ihr Ergebnis auf der Leinwand, ein besonderes „Ereignis im Bild“. Unsere Fragestellung bezieht sich nur auf letzteres und lautet wie folgt: Was bewegt sich eigentlich im Bilde einer „Kamerabewegung“? Dabei werden wir von zwei traditionellen Antworten ausgehen, die beide ihren Ursprung in Schriften der dreißiger Jahre haben. *Die erste* davon identifiziert den Blick des Zuschauers mit der Kamera und interpretiert somit die Kamerabewegungen als kinästhetische Illusionen. Diese Theorie erhält ihre erste Prägung bei Bela Balazs<sup>16</sup> und ist seither bei den verschiedensten Filmtheoretikern zu finden, von Walter Benjamin bis zu den sogenannten „Phänomenologen“, wie Jean Mitry oder Vivian Sobchack, bei Semiotiker und Strukturalisten wie Jean-Louis Baudry oder Christian Metz, und gleichermassen bei Psychologen wie James Jerome Gibson, Kritiker wie André Bazin, Filmphilosophen wie Gilles Deleuze oder zeitgenössischen Filmästhetikern wie Alain Bergala oder Jacques Aumont. *Die zweite* erwähnte Antwort bestreitet hingegen eine solche Identifizierung, die von keiner leiblichen Empfindung bestätigt wird: Der Zuschauer kann nicht die Illusion einer Bewegung haben ohne sie zugleich als solche zu empfinden. Demnach deuten die Anhänger dieser zweiten Auslegung die Kamerabewegungen einfach als Bewegungen abgebildeter

Gegenstände, die vor dem Zuschauer gleiten. Diese Auffassung hat ihren Ursprung bei Rudolf Arnheim<sup>17</sup>, aber sie ist noch heute, z.B. bei Joel Magny<sup>18</sup>, erhalten.

Wenn wir nun von Husserls dreistufigem Bildbewusstseins ausgehen, so ist deutlich, dass bei einer Kamerabewegung tatsächlich die Bildobjekte als Figuren über die Bildfläche gleiten. Im Falle einer Kamerafahrt seitwärts entlang eines Hauses, z.B., haben wir das Bild eines Hauses links auf der Leinwand auftaucht, die Leinwand durchquert und rechts verschwindet. Somit bewegt sich hier tatsächlich „das Bild des Hauses“, doch damit ist der eigentliche Sinn der Aufnahme keineswegs getroffen, da die Kamerafahrt eben nicht die Bewegung des Hauses sondern eine Bewegung *entlang* des Hauses als Bildsubjekt zeigt.

Andererseits besteht einer der wichtigsten Punkte der husserlischen Bildauffassung gerade in der prinzipiellen Unterscheidung von Bild und Illusion. Im wesentlichen ist die Illusion eines Aktes nichts anderes als ein normaler Akt, der sich nachträglich als „bloßer Schein“ erweist; Husserl nennt dies auch „Schein dem wir unterliegen“. Eine kinästhetische Illusion ist demnach zunächst eine eigentliche Kinästhese; dazu gehört nun, wenn wir die Frage der willkürlichen subjektiven Kontrolle der Bewegung ausschliessen, zumindest ein *leibliches Bewusstsein* jener Bewegung, wie z.B. bei Bewegungen im Fahrzeug oder anderen „passiven Kinästhesen“ (wie sie J.J. Gibson nennt) wo Empfindungen der Inärtie, der Geschwindigkeitsunterschiede, der leiblichen Lageänderung usw. auftreten. Nun ist in der Tat deutlich, dass im Kino niemals, oder vielleicht bloß in den seltensten Fällen ein leibliches Bewusstsein der Lageänderung entsteht, wobei dann natürlich die Illusion der Bewegung die unvergleichbar häufigeren Fälle nicht erklären kann, wo der Zuschauer eben keine solche „Illusion“ erlebt. Ein Bild ist hingegen bloß mittels einer modifizierten Wahrnehmung zugänglich, in der die uns wirklich vorgegebenen Gegenstände nicht sich selbst (wie bei Illusionen) sondern ein Anderes darstellen, und zwar mittels einer komplexen Intentionalität, die es erlaubt einen Gegenstand zu betrachten und dabei eben damit einen anderen zu meinen. Demnach wären Kamerabewegungen im Bild eben Bilder und nicht Illusionen einer Bewegung durch den filmischen Raum.

Ein und derselbe Gegenstand kann laut Husserl in verschiedenen anschaulichen Akten gegeben werden: Ich kann dasselbe Glas in einer Wahrnehmung, in einer Phantasie, in einer Erinnerung oder eben in einer Bildbetrachtung anschauen. Eine ähnliche Reihe von Modifikationen entspricht den Akten selbst in reflexiver Einstellung: Ich kann das Bewusstsein

einer schlichten Wahrnehmung, der Erinnerung einer Wahrnehmung oder der Phantasie einer Wahrnehmung haben. Hingegen kann ich aber offenbar das *Erlebnis* der Wahrnehmung selbst nicht verbildlichen. Ein Akt kann nur im eigenen, wenn auch modifizierten, Vollzug gegeben werden. Was sind nun aber Kinästhesen? Soweit sie eigentliche Akte, d.h. Erlebnisse der Bewegung sind, kann ich sie nicht verbildlichen. Hingegen haben sie ein genaues gegenständliches Korrelat in gewisse entsprechende Erscheinungsweisen, die selbst ohne weiteres abzubilden sind.

Nehmen wir zunächst das Beispiel einer, mit der unbeweglichen Kamera aufgenommenen, gegenständlichen Bewegung, z.B. ein Ritter der sich entfernt und am Horizont verschwindet, so haben wir hier folgende Sachlage im Bild: Als *Bildobjekt* erscheint eine Ritterfigur, die ihre Stellung auf der Leinwand ändert und dabei immer kleiner wird. Diese Veränderung ist aber nicht als solche betrachtet, sondern sie wird als eine Fortbewegung des bildsujetlichen Ritters in die „Tiefe“ der Leinwand, d.h. also als eine Entfernung von der Bildfläche ausgelegt. Was wir „eigentlich“ sehen ist die Veränderung der Bildfigur auf der Bildfläche, was wir aber darin apperzipieren ist eine Bewegung des dargestellten Bildsujets in die „Tiefe“ der Bildfläche. Bei einer Kamerabewegung, hingegen – etwa beim entsprechenden Fall einer rückwärtigen Kamerafahrt – durchläuft das Bildobjekt eine ähnliche Veränderung, bloß ist diesmal nicht mehr eine Bewegung des Gegenstandes im Bezug zur Bildfläche, sondern eben *eine Bewegung der Bildfläche im Bezug zum Gegenstand* gemeint. Das Eigentümliche dieser Bewegung besteht nun darin, dass sich die Bildfläche nur im Bezug zum dargestellten Bildsujet, nicht aber auch zum Zuschauer, und das heißt zur „Wirklichkeit“ bewegt. Wenn sich die „Kamera“ einem dargestellten Gegenstand nähert oder ihm entlangläuft, so ändert die Bildfläche keineswegs ihre Stellung zum Zuschauer. Diese Feststellung könnte uns dazu verleiten die Bewegung als eine des gesamten „Dispositivs“<sup>19</sup> aufzufassen, der Zuschauer und projizierte Bildfläche umfasst, wobei wir wiederum zu einer kinästhetischen Deutung der Kamerabewegungen kämen. Dabei muss aber die Tatsache beachtet werden, dass sich Entfernungen zwischen Gegenständen der Filmwelt nicht mit Entfernungen zwischen Gegenständen des wirklichen Raumes zusammensetzen können, da sie verschiedenen Sphären angehören und als solche radikal inkommensurabel sind. Wenn ich mich im Kino eine Reihe weiter vorwärts setze, so sitze ich keineswegs näher an dem dargestellten Bildsujet, sondern nur an der projizierten Bildfigur und somit an der Bildfläche selbst. Mit anderen Worten: Die Entfernung des Zuschauer zur Bildfläche ist nicht kummensurabel mit der Pseudo-Entfernung der Bildfläche

zum dargestellten Bildsujet. Die erste ist eine wirkliche Entfernung, während die zweite rein intentional ist; so wie eine Veränderung im Bereich der zweiten die Verhältnisse der ersten nicht berührt, so auch nicht umgekehrt. Die beiden Entfernungen können nicht zusammengerechnet die Entfernung des Zuschauers zu einem Gegenstand der Filmwelt ergeben.

Wir sprachen von einer „wirklichen“ Entfernung des Zuschauers zur Bildfläche und von einer bloß intentionalen des filmischen Gegenstandes zur Bildfläche. Dabei bedeutet die Rede von „Bildfläche“ jedes Mal etwas Verschiedenes. Jene „Bildfläche“, die sich im Bezug zu einem Bildsujet bewegt und jene andere „Bildfläche“, die für uns fest bleibt, gehören nicht zu derselben intentionalen Stufe des filmischen Bildbewusstseins. Die Bildfläche ist einerseits die physische Leinwand, die sich im Kinosaal befindet und am ehesten sichtbar ist, wenn der Film nicht projiziert wird. Auf dieser physischen Bildfläche wird der Film als eine Reihe von Bewegungen und Veränderungen der Bildobjekt-Figuren, abgespielt. Diese Figuren sind nun in modifizierter Perzeption auf jener Bildfläche vernommen. Die Bewegungen der Bildfiguren stellen aber Bewegungen des Bildsujets dar, die, gemäss ihrer bildlichen Auffassung, in einer anderen Räumlichkeit, und zwar jener des Filmes, verlaufen. Wenn wir z.B. *Tod in Venedig* sehen, so bewegen sich tatsächlich auf der Leinwand aktuelle Figuren, aber sie verbildlichen eben inaktuelle Bewegungen von Personen, die sich in Venedig befinden. Somit sind die Bewegungen „auf“ der Bildfläche bildlich aufgefasst als Bewegungen, die in einer grösseren oder kleineren, deutlicher oder undeutlicher bestimmten Entfernung „hinter“ der Bildfläche verlaufen. Diesmal ist aber nicht mehr die als Leinwand verstandenen Bildfläche gemeint, sondern das intentionale Korrelat der neuen Auffassung, die jener zuteil geworden ist. Genauer: Die Bildfiguren, die auf der Bildfläche der physischen Leinwand erscheinen, sind als Personen und Geschehen „jenseits“ der „filmweltlichen Bildfläche“ aufgefasst, die ein Teil der Filmwelt selbst als Bildsujet darstellt. In der Filmwelt ist die Bildfläche eine ideale Oberfläche – die in der Filmauffassung intentional fundiert ist – „hinter“ der sich die Handlung des Films abspielt. Sie bezeichnet eine Grenze oder genauer einen Querschnitt des Filmraums (d.h. des „Venedig“ in dem *Tod in Venedig* spielt) und stellt als solche ein intentionales Moment jenes Raumes, nicht aber ein wirkliches Teil des reellen Kinosaal-Raumes dar.

Den wirklichen Bewegungen der Kamera entsprechen somit im Film Bewegungen jener Bildfläche, die den Personen nachjagt, sich von ihnen entfernt oder komplizierte stilistische Bewegungen vollzieht, und dadurch

eine gewisse ästhetische, plastische oder grammatische Funktion im Film erhält. Das scheinbar Paradoxe an dieser Bewegungen liegt daran, dass zwischen den beiden Bildflächen keine Verschiebung entsteht, obwohl nur eine von ihnen sich bewegt; wenn sich etwa die filmische Bildfläche bei einer Kamerafahrt vorwärts in die Tiefe bewegt, so entfernt sie sich keinesfalls von der verharrenden wirklichen Bildfläche, sondern sie deckt sich immerfort mit ihr. Dies ist freilich ein falsches Paradoxon, da die zwei „Bildflächen“ natürlich nicht verschiedene Gegenstände sind, so dass zwischen ihnen eine Verschiebung auch nur entstehen könnte. Ihre Bewegungen sind somit ihrerseits radikal inkommensurabel, da sie einfach verschiedenen Dimensionen angehören. Die unbewegliche physische Bildfläche ist nichts anderes als die Auffassungsgrundlage der filmweltlichen Bildfläche, die sich im Bild *quasi*-bewegt.

Diese doppelte Auffassung desselben Bestandes an sinnlichen Empfindungen – als unbewegliche Bildfläche, einerseits, und als bewegliche filmweltliche Bildfläche andererseits – bildet eine der Grundformen des Widerstreitsbewusstseins des filmischen Bildes. Die Sachlage ist nämlich gerade jene, die Husserl bezüglich der verschiedenen Formen des Widerstreits bei Bildern im Allgemeinen erläutert hat: Das Bildding, d.h. die physische Bildfläche, steht in Einstimmung mit unseren kinästhetischen undstellungsmäßigen Empfindungen, sowie auch mit unserem gesamten Hintergrundbewusstsein des Saales. Bei einer normalen Filmbetrachtung üben wir uns aber keinesfalls in jener setzenden erfahrungsmäßigen Auffassung, sondern wir schalten sie aus und vollziehen bloß die bildliche Auffassung einer beweglichen Bildfläche, die somit den Sinn einer bildlichen *Als-ob-Bewegung* der filmweltlichen Bildfläche erhält. Damit ist aber bloß die Grundstufe dieses Bildphänomens angezeigt. Sie eröffnet wenigstens drei Wege weiterer phänomenologischer Untersuchung:

1) Es ist deutlich, zum ersten, dass Kamerabewegungen eine eigenartige Erfüllung der bildlichen Umgebungsintentionen ins Spiel bringen. Bei einer einfachen Photographie erlaubt die in Leerintentionen vermeinte Räumlichkeit ausserhalb des Bildes grundsätzlich keine Erfüllung: Das Bild selbst kann nur das zeigen was in ihrer einzigen Ansicht liegt. Im Kino werden aber durch Kamerabewegungen gerade diese Intentionen erfüllt. Was früher ausserhalb des Bildes leer als unbestimmte räumliche Verlängerung intendiert war, kann nun durch eine einfache Schwenkbewegung ins Bild rücken. Dabei muss festgehalten werden, dass diese Erfüllungen ihrerseits beschränkt sind: Die Kamerabewegungen zeigen selbst bloß einen bestimmten

Erscheinungsablauf, ein bestimmtes zusätzliches Stück filmweltlicher Räumlichkeit, jenseits derer ebenfalls prinzipiell unlieferbare Erfüllungen liegen, und dadurch abermals Widerstreit zwischen dem, was die Synthesis des bildlichen Gegenstandes verlangt und dem, was die Erscheinungen bieten. Dieser Ablauf der Erscheinungsweisen ist also an sich wesentlich vorgezeichnet, somit unfrei und stets auch „verharrlich derselbe“. Somit sind die Umgebungsintentionen des Filmbildes natürlich nicht eigentlich aktualisierbar im Sinne einer freien Möglichkeit der Erfüllung, so wie bei der wirklichen Aussicht durch ein Fenster.

2) Wenn wir nun den Unterschied zwischen dem was im Bildfeld und dem was ausserhalb des Feldes liegt beachten, so sehen wir dass die Kamerabewegung die Bestimmung der filmischen Bildfläche eigentlich zum Problem macht. Denn die Bildfläche ist natürlich im Film nicht „da“, wie eine Wand, die die gespielten Personen unter Umständen bemerkten könnten. Im Gegenteil, das gesamte Bildfeld ist in der Filmwelt eigentlich nicht umgrenzt; so wie es im Bild keine seitliche Grenze gibt zum bloß vermeinten Raum ausserhalb des Bildes („*hors-champ*“), so verläuft die Räumlichkeit des Verbildlichten auch diesseits der Bildfläche eigentlich schrankenlos. Das bedeutet aber, dass die Bildfläche selbst keinen gegenständlichen Sinn im Film hat: Wenn die „Kamera“ sich zwischen zwei sich unterhaltenden Personen stellt und nur den einen aufnimmt so „zeigt“ die Bildfläche selbst keinesfalls „etwas“ im Bilde, was zwischen den zwei Personen liegt, sondern es ist ein im Bilde selbst unsichtbares Nichts, das bloß eine anschaulich-verbildlichte von einer bildlich-leer-vermeinten oder „uneigentlich mitgegenwärtigen“ Räumlichkeit scheidet. Die Bildfläche ist somit nicht eigentlich eine Randfläche des Bildraumes, wie im Theater, sondern eher, wie schon gesagt, ein beweglicher, unsichtbarer Querschnitt, der sich unendlich nach allen Richtungen, und das heisst auch rückwärts bewegen kann, denn so wie es eigentlich zwei Bildflächen gibt, eine physische und eine filmweltliche, so gibt es auch zwei Räumlichkeiten „diesseits“ der Bildfläche: ein wirkliches Diesseits, in dem sich die Zuschauer befinden, und ein filmweltliches, das die Rückfahrt der Kamera ins Bild bringen kann.

3) Zuletzt können wir anhand der Kamerabewegungen, die merkwürdige Tatsache feststellen dass die filmweltliche Bildfläche, gemäss ihrer eigenen Auffassung, keine stabile Grösse hat. Die Bildfläche hängt von der Grösse des Bildsujets ab: Wenn wir eine weite, massiv bevölkerte Landschaft sehen, so hat die „Öffnung“ der Bildfläche die Grösse eines riesigen Fensters; wenn sich hingegen die Kamera stark einem Gegenstand

oder einem Gesicht nähert, so dass wir z.B. nur noch ein Paar Augen sehen, so erreicht die Bildfläche die auffassungsmäßige Grösse einer Postkarte. Diese merkwürdige Feststellung ist freilich dadurch erklärbar, dass die filmische Projektion von zwei Grössenregister abhängt: Zum einen, vom System des Kinosaals, wo die Leinwand in ihrer „natürlichen Grösse“ eine riesige Wand ist, und zum anderen vom System der Kamera, wobei der Leinwandoberfläche die „natürliche Grösse“ der kleinen Öffnung der Linse entspricht. Doch diese genetische Erklärung ist aus phänomenologischer Sicht weniger bedeutsam als die deskriptive Feststellung der seltsamen Tatsache selbst.

## 5. Montage und Bilderzusammenhänge

Auf den Spuren Eisensteins, Pudowkins, Wertoffs, Kuleschows u.a., wird das Thema „Montage“ heute gewöhnlich aus einer technisch-ästhetischen Perspektive behandelt, in Hinsicht auf Prinzipien und Funktionen seiner künstgerechten Ausnutzung im Film. Aus dieser Sicht ist man oft bestrebt die weitmögliche Definition des Montagebegriffs zu erreichen. Ihre schlichteste Form ist z.B. bei Rudolf Arnheim zu finden. Montage ist laut Arnheim „das Aneinanderkleben von Aufnahmen mit verschiedener räumlicher und zeitlicher Situation“<sup>20</sup>. Nach J. Aumont ist aber damit bloß der engere Begriff der Montage getroffen; seine erweiterte Definition lautet wie folgt: „Le montage est le principe qui régit l’organisation d’éléments filmiques visuels et sonores, ou d’assemblages de tels éléments, en les juxtaposant, en les enchaînant, et /ou en réglant leur durée.“<sup>21</sup>. Damit stimmt die semiologische Definition von Christian Metz überein, die Montage als „l’organisation concertée des co-occurrences syntagmatiques sur la chaîne filmique“<sup>22</sup> betrachtet. Gemäss einer solchen weiten Definition gehören allerdings auch die Kamerabewegungen zur „Montage“. Da aber, so wie auch Metz andererseits bemerkt, der Grundunterschied zwischen Kamerabewegung und Montage (im engeren Sinn) darin besteht, dass die ersten eine einfache „zusätzliche Modalität des Bildes“, die letzteren aber eine „Aufeinanderfolge mehrerer Bilder“<sup>23</sup> darstellen, so können sie aus phänomenologischer Sicht keineswegs unter demselben Begriff fallen. Dementsprechend werden wir hier bloß auf den engeren, als Bilderverknüpfung verstandenen Montagebegriff eingehen.

Unter den Bilderverknüpfungen können wir sogleich mehrere Grundformen unterscheiden. Zwei Bilder können zunächst denselben

Träger haben oder einen verschiedenen, wobei aber offensichtlich *ein gemeinsamer Bildträger nicht unbedingt eine intentionalen Verknüpfung der Bilder bedeutet*, so wie sich andererseits *auch zwei Bilder ohne gemeinsamen Träger zu einer Einheit verbinden können*. Unter den Bildern mit gemeinsamen Träger können demnächst die verschiedensten Formen der *Kollagebilder* unterschieden werden, die keineswegs eine einfache Zusammenstellung mehrerer Bilder auf demselben Träger sind, sondern eine einheitliche bildliche Komposition, d.h. ein einziges „Bild“, dessen Teile verschiedener Bildobjekte entstammen. Kollage ist demnach grundverschieden von Montage, denn während letztere aus streng abgesonderten Bildern besteht, so haben wir bei ersteren ein einziges (obzwahr nicht widerstreitslos zusammenhängendes) komplexes Bildobjekt.

Was nun die Verknüpfungen zwischen abgesonderte Bilder betrifft, so können wir sie zunächst in *direkte* und *indirekte* einteilen, wobei die „direkten“ jene Verknüpfungen bezeichnen, die zu einem einzigen Bildsujet führen, während die „indirekten“ rein analogische Verbindungen zwischen unterschiedlichen Bildsujets herstellen. Der Unterschied ist für Husserls Bildauffassung grundlegend, da sie seiner wesentlichen Unterscheidung zwischen einem *immanenten* und einem *transeunten* Bildbewusstsein entspricht. Wenn wir in normaler Bildbetrachtung eine Photographie oder ein Gemälde ansehen und, im Bild versunken, bloß dem Dargestellten zugewendet sind, so haben wir laut Husserl einen „immanenten“ Bezug zum Bild. Wenn wir aber das Bild nicht in schlichter Bildapperzeption hinnehmen, sondern dank einer weiteren Intention den Gegenstand symbolisch-äußerlich mittels des Bildes meinen, so haben wir eine transeunte oder symbolische Bildbetrachtung. Husserls Beispiele zur letzteren sind einleuchtend: „ein illustratives Inhaltsverzeichnis für eine Sammlung von Kunstwerken (die das eigentlich Gemeinte und Bezeichnete sind), eine Hieroglyphe usw.“<sup>24</sup> Hieroglyphen fungieren tatsächlich zunächst als Bilder, aber ihre Bedeutung ist nicht bildlich darin dargestellt, sondern „sie lenken das Interesse von sich ab“<sup>25</sup> und verweisen in unanschaulicher Weise auf ihren Gegenstand: Sie „verbildlichen“ ihn eigentlich nicht, sondern sie „bezeichnen“ ihn.

Die beiden von uns besprochenen Formen der Bilderverknüpfung drücken nun denselben Unterschied aus: Die Verknüpfung liegt das eine Mal in den Bildern selbst, das andere Mal ausserhalb der Bilder, in einer symbolischen Intention. Zwei analogisch verbundene Bilder können freilich einzeln auch immanent betrachtet werden, aber die Verbindung zwischen ihnen ist deshalb dennoch bloß transeunt, wie bei Hieroglyphen.

Es hat offensichtlich keinen Sinn, bei einer Hieroglyphe, uns in die Bilder hineinzusehen, um dort den Sinn des Geschriebenen zu suchen, sondern es gilt im Gegenteil von ihnen abzusehen und ihre „Bedeutung“ zu vergegenwärtigen. Dabei ist die Verbindung zwischen den bildlichen Komponenten der Hieroglyphe selbst nicht immanent-bildlich sondern transeunt, da ihre Gestalten offensichtlich nicht *demselben Bildraum* angehören: die Verknüpfung führt nicht zu einer *einheitlichen Bildlichkeit* sondern zu einer *gegliederten Bedeutung*.

Dabei muss allerdings unterstrichen werden dass alle erwähnten Verknüpfungsarten entweder in der Form des „Nebeneinander“ oder in jener des „Nacheinander“ stattfinden können; dabei bleibt eine transeunte Verknüpfung von nebeneinander gestellten Bildern vermutlich auch in der Aufeinanderfolge derselben Art, d.h. transeunt bzw. immanent. Da sich die gegenwärtige Untersuchung bloß auf das immanente Bildbewusstsein bezieht, so werden wir auch hier die symbolischen Verknüpfungen ausschliessen müssen, trotz der Tatsache, dass sie in der Geschichte des Films eine unbestreitbar entscheidende Rolle gespielt haben.

Nehmen wir nun das Beispiel eines Diptychons, z.B der *Kreuzigung* des Rogier van der Weyden. Wir haben hier zwei abgesonderte Bilder die inhaltlich kommunizieren: Das linke Bild läuft stetig in das rechte über. Die beiden Gemälde bilden als Bilddinge unabhängige Gegenstände, die aber einen gemeinsamen Raum darstellen, so als ob wir eine einzige Szene durch zwei benachbarte Fenster sehen würden. Wenn wir nun bloß das linke Bild betrachten, so fassen wir ihr Bildsjtet nicht nur nach dem auf, was im Bild *eigentlich anschaulich* gegeben ist, sondern auch nach dem, was darin *bloß intensional*, und das heisst leer oder unbestimmt, *vermeint* wird: Die Personen im ersten Bild sind bloß von einer Seite sichtbar, während wir offenbar auch ihre andere Seite leer mit-gegenwärtigen; die Räumlichkeit des Bildes wird auch jenseits des Bildrahmen als unbestimmter Horizont in Umgebungsintentionen vermeint usw. Das eine Bild setzt damit schon selbst weitere Bilder als Ergänzungen voraus, die eben das zeigen würden, was das erste leer und unbestimmt ausserhalb ihres Rahmens schon mitmeint. Dieses Ergänzungsbedürfnis ist aber nicht nur eine leere formale Möglichkeit, sondern sie ist durch gewisse Elemente des Bildes nachdrücklich abgehoben.

Wenn wir nun zum zweiten Bild übergehen, so können wir feststellen, dass ein Teil der leeren Umgebungsintentionen des ersten hier ihre anschauliche Erfüllung finden. Dabei ist nicht das Verhältnis der Bilddinge, die näher oder ferner an einander gestellt werden können,

sondern die intentionale Beziehung zwischen den Bildsujets von Belang. Denn sobald wir dieselben Bilder, als eine Bilderfolge, hintereinander projizieren, entsteht gerade dasselbe einheitliche Bildsujet; wir erhalten, im gegebenen Fall, – wenn wir die beiden Bilder als Filmaufnahmen betrachten – nichts anderes als eine „POV“ (*point of view*) Montage, die den Blick der Personen in der ersten Aufnahme an das Erblickte der zweiten verknüpft. Dabei würde auch hier das erste Bild als Aufnahme auf der Stufe seines Bildsujets einen Horizont von Leerintentionen als mögliche Bilder vorzeichnen, die das zweite Bild im Übergang intentionell erfüllt.

Der Übergang zwischen den beiden muss jedoch im ausdrückliches Bewusstsein zweier abgesonderter Bilder erfolgen. In einer berühmten Szene des *Kreuzschiffs Potemkin* verbindet Eisenstein drei verschieden Aufnahmen von Löwenstatuen und vermittelt so den Eindruck eines einzigen sich bewegenden Löwen. Wenn aber Montage als eine intentionale Leistung der Vereinheitlichung abgesonderter Bilder ist, dann ist ein solches Verfahren eigentlich keine Montage<sup>26</sup>. Zwei abgesonderte Bilder können jedoch sowohl dieselbe Unterlage als auch dasselbe Bildsujet haben, solange eine Trennung auf der Stufe des Bildobjekts besteht. Dabei reicht es keineswegs hin, mehrere Bildfiguren zu unterscheiden, sondern es geht gerade darum, *dass die verschiedenen Bildobjekte nicht zu einem einzigen Bild verschmelzen*. Dasselbe gilt auch für die Aufeinanderfolgen von Bilder oder Aufnahmen, denn solange wir eine kontinuierlich-einheitliche Transformation des Bildobjekts vernehmen (wie bei den Löwen Eisensteins), haben wir streng genommen ein einziges Bild vor uns und somit keine Montage. Nebeneinanderstehende Bilder trennen sich demnach durch räumliche Diskontinuität ihrer Bildobjekte, während sich aufeinanderfolgende Bilder durch zeitliche Diskontinuität abheben.

Laut Husserl hat jeder perzeptive Gegenstand – und darunter freilich auch Bilder und Bildobjekte – nicht nur einen anschaulich bestimmten Gehalt, sondern damit verwoben auch einen Horizont bestimmbarer Unbestimmbarkeit, der gleichermassen zu seinem intentionalen Gehalt gehört. Husserl unterscheidet, genauer, zwischen einem *inneren* und einem *äußeren* Horizont des Gegenstandes<sup>27</sup>. Die anschauliche Erfüllung dieser Horizonte hat die Form einer passiven Synthese. Bei einem unbeweglichen Bild gibt es nun gewöhnlich eine sehr begrenzte Freiheit zur kontinuierlichen Synthese. Bezüglich des Bilddinges besteht dieses Problem allerdings nicht, da wir es ohne weiteres von alle Seiten betrachten können, doch beim Bildobjekt können wir schon bemerken dass es nur

aus einer gewissen Stellung und in einer bestimmten Erscheinungsweise gegeben ist. Diese Bemerkung überträgt sich umso mehr auf das Bildsujet, da dessen vermeinte Bildwelt als solche nur in der Vermittlung jenes begrenzten Bildfigurzusammenhangs gegeben ist. Eben deshalb können aber die intentionalen Horizonte, die in der Konstitution des Bildsujets mitspielen, *prinzipiell nicht ausserhalb des Bildes selbst erfüllt werden*. Wenn es dabei sein Bewenden hätte, so könnte freilich von Montage gar nicht mehr die Rede sein.

Im Band XXIII der Husserliana bemerkt Husserl als eine wesentliche Charakteristik der Konstitution von phantasierten Gegenständen die Tatsache, dass die Phantasie von ihrem gegenständlichen Sinn, d.h. von ihrer Richtung auf einen bestimmten Gegenstand, einfach „abfallen“ kann, um zu einen anderen überzuspringen, ohne jeden Zwang eines einheitlichen noematischen Sinns. Ich kann in der Phantasie einen blonden Mann vorstellen, der zu einem rothaarigen Kind wird, ohne dass diese Änderung einstimmig als ein Sinnwandel aufgefasst wird: Der Sinn wird einfach ersetzt oder umgefärbt. Das bedeutet aber nicht, dass wir in der Phantasie schlechthin keine einstimmigen Gegenstände konstituieren können, sondern bloß, dass die Horizonte der Unbestimmbarkeit hier keine *Vorzeichnungen* zu ihrer notwendigen Erfüllung enthalten, wie im Falle der wirklichen Erfahrung; alles erfolgt in der freien Willkür der reinen Erfindung. Die Synthesis der Weiterbestimmung ist also in der Phantasie wesentlich eine *Konstruktion* oder eine Quasi-Konstitution.

Bei Bilder verhält es sich nicht anders, denn *kein Bild kann streng genommen das Bildsujet eines anderen erreichen*. Es kann freilich denselben wirklichen Gegenstand zeigen, doch damit ist das synthetisch Konstituierte eben nicht als bloßes Bildsujet sondern als Erfahrungsding gemeint, wobei die Bilder erst durch dessen Vermittlung in Verbindung treten. Bilder allein könnten niemals von selbst eine konstitutive Synthesis wirklich eingehen, um ein gemeinsames Bildsujet aktuell zu bilden. Wie ist dann aber ein fiktiver Bilderzusammenhang möglich? In derselben Weise wie im Falle der Phantasie: im Modus einer Synthesis „Als-ob“ und somit einer Pseudo-Konstitution des gemeinsamen Sujets.

Kehren wir kurz zu dem früher erwähnten Diptychon zurück: Offenbar ist hier die intendierte Kontinuität zwischen den zwei Tafeln bloß eine prätendierte Kontinuität, „als ob wir dasselbe Geschehen durch zwei benachbarte Fenster sähen“. Somit gründet die Kontinuität auf einer „Als-ob-Intention“: Sie vermeint die Tatsache, dass die dargestellte Landschaft auch hinter dem trennenden Rahmen fortläuft, was natürlich nicht der Fall

ist. Die Kontinuität ist hier also keinesfalls wirklich vorhanden sondern bloß prätendiert und im Modus des *Als-ob* vermeint. Diese Feststellung ist grundlegend, wenn man etliche Probleme der Montage eigentlich in ihrem konstitutiven Aufbau verstehen will. Zunächst aber muss die Tatsache festgehalten werden, dass die Sachlage bei aufeinanderfolgenden Bildern analog verläuft: Wenn wir in einem Bild den Anfang einer Bewegung und im nächsten ihr Ende sehen, so nehmen wir im Modus des *Als-ob* an – denn ernstlich könnten wir dies nicht tun – dass die Bewegung „hinter“ dem Schnitt in ihrer Gänze abgelaufen ist, so wie wir im Falle des Diptychon angenommen haben, dass die zwei Bildräume hinter dem Rahmen miteinander verbunden sind.

Fassen wir das Dargestellte kurz zusammen. Wir gingen von der Feststellung aus dass jedes Bildsujet, so wie auch jeder Wahrnehmungsgegenstand sonst, einen Horizont bestimbarer Unbestimmtheit mit sich trägt. Diese Horizontintentionalität kennzeichnet sich bei Bildern durch eine eigentümlichere Weise ihrer Erfüllung, denn hier bestehen zwei Möglichkeiten: *Entweder* das Bildsujet ist erfahrungsmäßig gesetzt (wie im Falle einer wirklichen Landschaft) und dann hat das Bildsujet keine eigene Bestimmungssynthesis, sondern es wird zu einer Teil-Ansicht in der Bestimmung jenes Erfahrungsgegenstandes; *oder aber* das Bildsujet ist nicht gesetzt, und dann ist jede seiner zwischenbildlichen konstitutiven Synthesen bloß ein prätendierter, d.h. eine Synthesis im Modus des „*Als-ob*“. Bilder verknüpfen sich also entweder dank einer vermeinten kontinuierlichen Wirklichkeit oder dank einer vermeinten kontinuierlichen Pseudo-Wirklichkeit. Zwei aneinandergeklebte Aufnahmen, die Anfang und Ende einer Bewegung darstellen, haben als Bildsujet eine kontinuierlich vermeinte, wirkliche oder unwirkliche Bewegung, die „hinter“ dem Schnitt abläuft. Auf der Stufe des Bildobjekts *sehen* wir zwar nur Anfang und Ende der Bewegung, doch damit wird die gesamte kontinuierliche Bewegung als Bildsujet *gemeint*. Das Nicht-gezeigte kann nun unwesentlich sein, und dann haben wir eine einfache Abbreviatur, aber es kann ebensogut Wesentliches fehlen, und dann haben wir z.B. eine dramatisch bedeutsame Ellipse.

Diese Bemerkungen führen allerdings zu einer strengen Unterscheidung von Kamerabewegung und Montage aus Sicht der Intentionserfüllungen. Während die Kamerabewegungen eine eigentliche Erfüllung der Ergänzungsintentionen des anfänglichen Bildes darstellen und somit eine wahrhafte Erweiterung des bildlich-anschaulichen Raumes und seine kontinuierliche konstitutive Synthesis im Bild, kann die Montage

im Gegenteil bloß eine prätendierte Intentionserfüllung bieten, da ein neues Bild stets nur eine Kontinuität des Bildsujets *vermeint*, aber nicht eigentlich im Bild *erfüllt*.

Aus dieser Sicht kann nun die berühmte Auseinandersetzung der fünfziger und sechziger Jahren, um den Wert der Montage für die Filmkunst, in ein schärferes Licht gerückt werden. Die Debatte wurde von einer Stellungnahme André Bazins angespornt, der in seinem Artikel *Schneiden verboten!* folgendes Gesetz aufstellte: „Wenn das Wesentliche eines Ereignisses von der gleichzeitigen Anwesenheit zweier oder mehrerer Handlungsfaktoren abhängt, ist es verboten zu schneiden“<sup>28</sup>. Der bazinschen Entwertung der Montage, zu Gunsten der langen Einstellungen und der Tiefenschärfe, widersetzten sich damals alle diejenigen, die, als Erben Eisensteins, die Montage für das eigentliche Kunstmittel der Filmkunst hielten. Der Streit liegt offenbar in der unterschiedlichen ästhetischen Orientierung der beiden Seiten<sup>29</sup>, denn die Frage ist bloß: Auf was zeit der Film denn eigentlich hin? Auf einen Zeit-Raum der eigentlich gezeigt wird, oder im Gegenteil auf das was rein suggestiv durch Montage angedeutet werden kann? An bildlicher Intentionserfüllung, einerseits, und an andeutender Suggestion, andererseits, binden sich aber offensichtlich grundverschiedene ästhetische Programme.

## 6. Schluss: der Zuschauer im Bild

Montage und Kamerabewegung werden beide gewöhnlich anhand derselben Idee, der „Identifizierung“ des Zuschauers mit der Kamera, ausgelegt. Die gesamte filmtheoretische Problematik der dreißiger Jahre ist daher nachdrücklich von einem Gedanken geprägt,<sup>30</sup> der auch seither oft stillschweigend vorausgesetzt wird: Der Gedanke, dass der Einstellungswechsel der Montage den Zuschauer durch den Filmraum versetzt. Edgar Morin bezieht sich z.B. offenbar darauf, wenn er in seinem berühmten Buch, *Le cinéma ou l'homme imaginaire*, von der Allgegenwart des Zuschauers spricht. Dasselbe gilt auch für Bela Balazs, wenn er behauptet, dass der Zuschauer, der einer rythmischen Montage beiwohnt, innerlich tanzt: „Die Blickrichtung der Aufnahme wird aber zur Blickrichtung des Zuschauers. Wenn sie sich ändert, ändert der Zuschauer seine Position, auch wenn er sich nicht vom Flecke ruht. Er bewegt sich *innerlich*. Und wenn solche Richtungsmontage einen suggestiven Rythmus hat, so suggeriert sie das Gefühl des Tanzes.“<sup>31</sup>.

Derselbe Gedanke findet sich, schliesslich, auch bei Gilles Deleuze wieder und stellt die Grundlage seiner Kritik einer „Phänomenologie des Films“ dar. Es ist zwar nicht deutlich, an wen genau sich die deleuzesche Kritik richtet, da er merkwürdigerweise bald Husserl, bald Merleau-Ponty und bald Albert Laffay im Blick hat, doch sein Einwand betrifft eindeutig das Vorurteil der „Phänomenologie“ in der Auslegung des Kinos von der natürlichen Wahrnehmung und von der in der Welt verankerten Subjektivität auszugehen. Laut Deleuze bringt das Kino indessen – eben durch den „Einstellungswechsel“ – ein unverankertes Subjekt ins Spiel: „Or le cinéma a beau nous approcher ou nous éloigner des choses, et tourner autour d'elles, il supprime l'ancre du sujet autant que l'horizon du monde, si bien qu'il substitue un savoir implicite et une intentionnalité seconde aux conditions de la perception naturelle“<sup>32</sup>. Die Idee wird weiter unten nachdrücklich betont: „Mais le cinéma présente peut-être un grand avantage: justement parce qu'il manque de centre d'ancre et d'horizon, les coupes qu'il opère ne l'empêcheraient pas de remonter le chemin que la perception naturelle descend.“<sup>33</sup>.

Der Zuschauer richtet sich bei der Montage, wie gesehen, auf eine Kontinuität des Bildsjets mittels einer ihm im Bildobjekt gegebenen Diskontinuität. Dabei würde die Auffassung Deleuzes *entweder* bedeuten, dass eine ähnliche Kontinuität bezüglich der subjektiven Blickpunkte der montierten Aufnahmen entsteht, d.h. ein kontinuierliches, allgegenwärtiges Subjekt, dass jenseits der abgesonderten montierten Blickpunkte als einheitliches vermeint wird, *oder aber*, dass hier die Diskontinuität analogisierend wirkt und eben ein diskontinuierliches Subjekt gezeigt wird. Letzteres ist gewiss ausser Frage.

Was die erste Deutungsmöglichkeit betrifft, so ist sie umso bedeutender als ein Detail der Husserlschen Bildlehre tatsächlich die Idee einer optischen Identifizierung des Zuschauers mit der Kamera zu bekräftigen scheint. Es handelt sich um den Gedanken eines „Bild-Ich“, den Husserl in einer Aufzeichnung aus 1912 anführt<sup>34</sup>. Husserl erwägt hier die Möglichkeit des bildbetrachtenden Ich, sich ganz in das Bild „hineinzusehen“ und somit rein „im Bild zu leben“. Das geschieht, laut Husserl, wenn die Bildbetrachtung jede symbolische Bezugnahme auf die „Bedeutung“ des Bildes ausschaltet und wenn dazu jeder Versuch ausbleibt, das Bild in die normale Bildumgebung einzuschreiben. Auf Grund dieser beiden Umstände, kann ich mich als Betrachter in das Bild versenken, indem ich „den Bildraum über mich und meinen Umgebungsraum ausdehne und mich selbst unter Ausschluss der wirklichen Dinge, die ich sehe, mit ins

Bild aufnehme“<sup>35</sup>. Dadurch schaltet der Betrachter, laut Husserl, seine eigene Aktualität aus und wird zu einem modifizierten, setzungslosen „Ich im Bild“. Seine Teilnahme ist dabei die eines „bildlichen Zuschauers“, der derselben Ebene angehört wie ein *verbildlicher* Zuschauer der dargestellten Szene. In einer Randbemerkung radikalisiert Husserl diese Bemerkung um einen weiteren Schritt: „Da die sinnliche Erscheinung *eo ipso* einen Ichstandpunkt voraussetzt, so bin ich irgendwie *immer* als Bild-Ich im Bild.“<sup>36</sup>. Was kann diese Behauptung aber anders bedeuten als, dass die Bilder, im Falle photographischer Abbildungen, die optische Identifizierung von Zuschauer und Kamera voraussetzen? Doch da sind einige Berichtigungen unumgänglich:

1) Husserl bezieht sich zunächst bloß auf einen *räumlichen Bezugspunkt* der Erscheinungen auf der Leinwand, was eigentlich noch nichts bezüglich der Immersion des Zuschauers in die filmischen Situation besagt. Es geht im Gegenteil bloß darum, dass der Zuschauer, sobald er die räumlichen Verhältnisse des Bildsjets deutet, sich selbst implizite als Nullpunkt des gegenständlichen Orientierungssystems nimmt, was im Falle einer abstrakten Pyramide genauso steht wie im Falle eines packenden Thrillers. Das Bild-Ich von dem Husserl sprich ist zunächst nichts als dieser abstrakte Referenzpunkt auf den das Bild in seiner inneren Anordnung bezogen ist. So wie das normale perzeptive Ich die räumliche Anordnung der Gegenstände um ihn in Bezug auf seine eigene Stellung als Richtpunkt deutet, so dient er ebenfalls als impliziter Richtpunkt für die Auslegung der räumlichen Anordnung der Gegenstände im Bild. Da aber letztere bloß vermeint sind, so ist auch seine eigene „Lage im Bild“ eine bloß vermeinte.

2) Damit ist aber nirgends von einer Identifizierung mit der Kamera gesprochen. Nehmen wir das Beispiel einer von oben aufgenommenen Photographie: auf der Stufe des Bilddinges ist das Bild an der Wand vor uns ausgehängt und wir schauen es horizontal an. Auf der Stufe des Bildsjets, aber, wird der abgebildete Gegenstand von oben gesehen, d.h. wir schauen, in der Räumlichkeit des Bildes, vertikal von oben nach unten. Das Bild selbst bestimmt dabei keinen eigentlichen „Referenzpunkt“, sondern es geht bloß darum, dass das Verhältnis von Bildfläche und Bildsjet als ein Übereinander gedeutet wird. Da wir uns als Betrachter bildsjetlich diesseits der „fensterhaften“ Bildfläche befinden, so schauen wir von oben durch jenes „Fenster“ herunter – es sind einfach zwei gleichmögliche, aufeinander fundierte Einstellungen des Bildbewusstseins. Dabei besteht hier natürlich ebenfalls Inkonsistenz zwischen der wirklichen und der bildlichen Lage zum Bild: Die bildlichen Stellungen sind nur bis

zur Bildfläche definiert, während man sich sonst im Kinosaal, und d.h. „diesseits“ der „Fensterfläche“ wo immer setzen kann, da diese Lage im Saal nicht mehr zur Bestimmung des „Bild-Ich“ relevant ist.

3) Schliesslich könnte aber diese *implizite*, im Film bloß räumlich-allgemein definierte Subjektivität, im Bild *gar nicht expliziert* werden. In der normalen Bildbetrachtung ist die erwähnte Rückbeziehung erst wirksam, sobald ich die Bildräumlichkeit festhalte und mich somit selbst implizite als irgendwie dazu gestellt deute. Wenn ich jedoch meine vermeinte Stellung zum Bildsjet näher explizieren wollte, so müsste ich feststellen, dass das Bild diese Intention gar nicht einlösen kann, denn es müsste mich dazu eben *im Bild zeigen*, was aus offensichtlichen Gründen gewöhnlich unmöglich ist<sup>37</sup>. Meine „Lage“ im Bildraum (und allgemeiner meine „Situation“ im Film) stellt somit bloß ein Moment dar, das notwendig latent bleiben muss. Sobald ich den Versuch mache diese Latenz zu explizieren, entsteht schon ein Widerstreit, nur komme ich eigentlich als normaler Zuschauer nie dazu mich im Film ausdrücklich bestimmen zu wollen. Andernfalls müsste der Filmzuschauer seine Stellung im Filmraum bei jeder Einstellungsänderung tatsächlich ausdrücklicherweise umdeuten müssen, was offensichtlich zu einer ganz anderen Raumerfahrung führen würde als jene, die er im Kino eben hat; das „Bild-Ich“ ist ja letztendlich doch nur eine unerfüllbare Leerintention.

Es ist somit deutlich, dass die Einstellungsunterschiede zweier verschiedenen Aufnahmen kein einheitliches Bild-Ich konstituieren können, da das Bildich gar nicht eigentlich vermeint, sonder bloß unbestimmt mitvermeint ist, als nichtanalogisierendes Moment des Filmbildes. Wenn übrigens die Diskontinuitäten zwischen den Aufnahmen, und damit einschliesslich jene zwischen den „Blickpunkten“ des Zuschauers im Bild, analogisierend gelten würden, so könnten wir eigentlich gar kein Kontinuum des Bildsjets darin vermeinen.

Es gibt demnach keinen „montierten Zuschauer“, so wie es auch kein entankertes Film-Ich gibt, das „innerlich“ der Montage nachtanzt oder durch den Film virtuell gleitet. All dies – und einige andere der filmtheoretischen Grundbegriffe – sind nichts als reine Konstruktionen, die seit Jahrzehnten ohne Bedenken in den verschiedensten Werken dieses Gebietes weitergesponnen werden. Ihre systematische phänomenologische Ausweisung, am Leitfaden einer rein deskriptiven Analyse der filmischen Situation und auf Grund der hier angefangenen Elementaruntersuchungen zum filmischen Bild, stellt die grösstere Aufgabe dar, der die gegenwärtige Studie dienen soll.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Die Idee findet bei A. Bazin (2004, S. 384) und A. Ayfre ihre Vorläufer, doch sie ist auch noch in unseren Tagen wirksam. Siehe auch D. Chateau, 1996, S. 112-121.
- <sup>2</sup> Vgl. D. Chateau, 1996, S. 117.
- <sup>3</sup> Vgl. z.B. *Sur la theorie idealiste du cinema*, in Metz, 1984, S. 73-75.
- <sup>4</sup> Eine schlagkräftige Analyse dieses Streites kann in Lambert Wiesings Artikel, *Wenn Bilder Zeichen sind: das Bildobjekt als Signifikant*, gefunden werden; vgl. Wiesing, 2005, S. 37-80.
- <sup>5</sup> Vgl. z.B. Sobchack, 1991, oder M. Wahlberg, 2008.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*, S. 18-19.
- <sup>7</sup> Vgl. auch Marbach, 1993, S. 139.
- <sup>8</sup> Vgl. Hua XIX/2, S. 574.
- <sup>9</sup> Hua XXIII, S. 49.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, S. 48.
- <sup>11</sup> Vgl. z.B., *Ibidem*, S. 518.
- <sup>12</sup> Siehe z.B. *Ibidem*, S. 511.
- <sup>13</sup> Vgl. *Ibidem*, S. 516-517.
- <sup>14</sup> Hua XXIII, S. 492.
- <sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*, S. 536.
- <sup>16</sup> „Die Kamera nimmt mein Auge mit. Mitten ins Bild hinein. Ich sehe die Dinge aus dem Raum des Films. Ich bin umzingelt und verwickelt in seine Handlung, die ich von allen Seiten sehe.“, Balazs, 2001, S. 15.
- <sup>17</sup> „Wurde bei der Aufnahme die Kamera gedreht, so ziehen nachher bei der Vorführung Tür, Bücherschrank, Esstisch, Fenster auf dem Bilde vorüber – sie bewegen sich!“, Arnheim, 2002, S. 42.
- <sup>18</sup> Magny, 2001, S. 20.
- <sup>19</sup> Der Begriff wurde von Jean-Louis Baudry geprägt, vgl. Baudry, 1975.
- <sup>20</sup> Arnheim, 2002, S. 95.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, S. 44.
- <sup>22</sup> C. Metz, *Montage et discours dans le film*, in Metz, 1986, S. 95.
- <sup>23</sup> *Idem*.
- <sup>24</sup> Hua XXIII, S. 53.
- <sup>25</sup> *Idem*.
- <sup>26</sup> Aus demselben Grund kann nicht behauptet werden, dass das Kino im Grunde „Montage“ ist, weil es die Illusion der Kontinuität mittels der Diskontinuität von einfachen Photogrammen ergibt. Vgl. Arnheim, 2002, S. 106.
- <sup>27</sup> Vgl. Hua XXIII, S. 548-549.
- <sup>28</sup> A. Bazin, *Schneiden verboten!*, in Bazin, 2004, S. 84.

- <sup>29</sup> J. Aumont spricht hier geradewegs von „Ideologien“ vgl. Aumont, Bergala, Marie & Vernet, 1983, S. 50.
- <sup>30</sup> Walter Benjamin (Benjamin, 1991, S. 503) spricht z.B. von einer optischen „Chockwirkung“ des Einstellungswechsels, während Arnheim (2002, S. 39) beschäftigt ist zu zeigen, weshalb der Filmzuschauer bei all den Sprüngen der Montage nicht seekrank wird.
- <sup>31</sup> B. Balazs, 2001, S. 52.
- <sup>32</sup> G. Deleuze, 1983, S. 84.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*, S. 85.
- <sup>34</sup> Hua XXIII, S. 467-469.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, S. 467.
- <sup>36</sup> *Idem*.
- <sup>37</sup> Man kann als *live*-Zuschauer eines gefilmten Schauspiels natürlich doch ins Bild kommen, aber da ist die Sachlage eine radikal andere als im Kino.

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# SECULAR MUSIC AT THE ROMANIAN PRINCELY COURTS DURING THE PHANARIOT EPOCH (1711 – 1821)

## Introduction

Having commenced as early as the latter half of the fifteenth century, the process of “vassalisation”,<sup>1</sup> which was later to become one of Ottoman domination over Wallachia and Moldavia,<sup>2</sup> led to the princes of the two north-Danube provinces being appointed and deposed at short intervals, either according to the wishes of the Sultan,<sup>3</sup> or at the “intervention” of high-ranking Ottoman dignitaries at the Sublime Porte.<sup>4</sup> Gradually, the Principalities would become mere provinces or “rāyās” of the Ottoman Empire,<sup>5</sup> and their rulers would enjoy the title of “Christian pasha”, sometimes with privileges greater than those of the high dignitaries of the imperial administration.<sup>6</sup>

However, the Turkish hegemony or Turcocracy (1453 – 1821) also contained a special chapter that was to have a separate history in the Romanian Principalities, from the early decades of the eighteenth century until the year of the Balkan revolution (1821): the Phanariot epoch. The failure of the military alliance between Moldavian Prince Dimitrie Cantemir (b. 1673 – d. 1723) and Peter the Great (b. 1672 – d. 1725), in their attempt to rid the land of Ottoman rule (at the Battle of Stăniileşti, 1711), caused the Sublime Porte’s trust in its Latin subjects of Orthodox religion to evaporate. From then onward, the princes of the two Romanian provinces would be appointed by the Sultan himself, and they would be chosen from among the foremost non-Muslim *millet* of Constantinople: the Greeks of the famous Phanar quarter.<sup>7</sup> According to the statistics gathered by historian Neagu Djuvara, no less than thirty-one Phanariot princes, from eleven families, occupied, for a total of seventy-five reigns, the thrones of Wallachia (or Hungro-Wallachia) and Moldavia.<sup>8</sup>

## 1. Constantinople, the Phanariots, and the Danubian Principalities at the end of the Turcocracy: The Musical Background

But what were the motives of the administration of the Ottoman Empire in appointing princes of Greek origin to the thrones of the two Romanian provinces? The Sublime Porte's choice of political leaders from the aristocratic Levantine quarter was by no means arbitrary. The historical argument according to which the Greek community of Istanbul, or more correctly speaking Constantinople, preceded the Ottoman population and the fact that it represented, under the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch (*Milet al-Rūm*), the most numerous non-Muslim community of the former capital, combined with the economic, intellectual and political-administrative status attained by Greeks. The name they bore entitled the Phanariots to regard themselves as the rightful descendants of the great families of the Byzantine *basileis*<sup>9</sup> and "descendants of the Palaeologus and Cantacuzino families",<sup>10</sup> while the education they had acquired in western universities (Vienna, Padua, Paris, etc.) would offer them the opportunity to occupy, from the middle of the seventeenth century onward, essential positions in the mechanism of the Ottoman administration. The positions of *Dragoman* (from the Turkish *terjûmen*), or official translator to the Sublime Porte<sup>11</sup> in relations with the other "pagan" nations, that of personal physician to the Sultan,<sup>12</sup> and that of *Kaptan pasha* or Admiral of the Imperial Fleet would be eclipsed by the much-coveted position of Prince of one of the two north-Danube provinces, Moldavia and Wallachia.<sup>13</sup>

It should also be mentioned that, in the Ottoman eighteenth century, Constantinopolitan society was composite, one in which a number of religions and ethnic groups, including Turks, Greeks, Jews, Armenians and even Christianised Arabs, lived together, even after Mehmet II (b. 1432 – d. 1481) conquered Constantinople (29 May 1453). It was natural that in this multi-ethnic atmosphere there should be mutual influences. At the musical level, this meant that Greek musicians were familiar with both Ottoman courtly music and Byzantine ecclesiastical music, especially from the mid-seventeenth century onwards.<sup>14</sup> In this context, the adoption by Wallachia and Moldavia of the religious and secular ceremonials existing in the former Byzantine capital on the banks of the Bosphorus<sup>15</sup> resulted in the orientalisation of a major part of the musical repertoire of the princely and boyar courts of the two capitals. Thus, as Lazăr Șâineanu

would argue more than a century ago, the princely courts of Bucharest and Iași in the Phanariot period exuded

“an absolutely oriental atmosphere and not only with regard to administrative matters and official ceremony, but also in the day-to-day life, in the costumes and cuisine, in the boyar class’s way of living and feeling”.<sup>16</sup>

The present study sets out to analyse the phenomenon of urban secular music of Constantinopolitan influence at the princely and boyar courts of the Danube Principalities during the reign of the Phanariots (1711 – 1821).

## 2. Sources

**a)** The historical documents of the time are an extremely important source whereby the musical practices of the Principalities in the Phanariot epoch may be reconstructed, in particular the accounts and descriptions (in journals, memoirs, etc.) of foreign travellers who visited the Romanian Lands,<sup>17</sup> to which might also be added princely (Wallachian and Moldavian) and Ottoman official records,<sup>18</sup> as well as chronicles, countless letters, folkloric and pictorial sources. Although they do not have the persuasive power of a musical score, these accounts allow us to form quite a coherent image of the music and society of the time. The music of the princely courts, perhaps more than the other arts, was present in the field of vision of the contemporary chroniclers, be they simple travellers through the lands north of the Danube, be they ambassadors, consuls or special envoys from other European states. The political status of the latter allowed them to take part in and gain access to the rituals and pomp of princely coronations in the two Romanian capitals, to weddings and balls, and to receptions held in honour of these foreign guests, usually from Western Europe, but also from the Orient, as well as to meetings organised by the “first lady” in particular, but also by generous boyars.

**b)** The sources that supply the most persuasive evidence are, however, the manuscripts, treatises and printed works written in Byzantine and Ottoman musical notation.<sup>19</sup> Written mainly in Greek, Turkish or Romanian, these documents in effect constitute the most authoritative sources, which speak directly about the musical life of the Romanian princely courts, at a time when the codex and the book, regardless of

content and means of distribution, were held in high esteem, both in the Orient<sup>20</sup> and in the Occident.<sup>21</sup>

### **3. The *Mehterhâne* and *Tabl-Khâne*, or on Ottoman Music at the Princely Courts**

Operating by means of rigorous selection within a domain that is necessarily fluid, it must be said that as regards the musical milieu of the princely and boyar courts of the Danube Principalities, the above-mentioned documents reveal to us the fact that the spectrum of musical life was heterogeneous, in which the ritual of Byzantine ceremonial chant and the *taraf*(ensemble) of the prince's fiddlers successfully cohabited with orchestras in the Turkish or European ("German" – "muzica nemtească" or "European" – "européană") style<sup>22</sup> (**Illustration 1**).

In effect, this mélange of sound is merely a consequence of the fact that under the Phanariots Romanian society itself was composite and motley in its cultural expression, a society that brought together often very different peoples, languages, intellectual backgrounds, aspirations, and structures of thought.

In this jigsaw of vocal and instrumental ensembles, the most important influence "imported" from Istanbul to be active at the princely courts of Bucharest and Iași in the Phanariot period was the ceremonial band or the so-called "prince's Turkish music",<sup>23</sup> which was made up of two ensembles: the *mehterhâne* or courtly music (the princely orchestra) and *tabl-khâne* or the military band of the Janissaries<sup>24</sup> (**Illustrations 2a, β, γ, δ**). Received as a gift from the Sublime Porte<sup>25</sup> together with the familiar insignia of power<sup>26</sup> from the mid-seventeenth century onwards<sup>27</sup> or perhaps even earlier,<sup>28</sup> these musical groups were made up of singers and instrumentalists, mainly Ottomans, from all over the Orient,<sup>29</sup> and almost always under the musical authority of a Turkish *mehter-başî* (Kapellmeister),<sup>30</sup> and later that of a *tufeci-başa*.<sup>31</sup> Sometimes, alongside the Ottoman musicians, contemporary documents also mention the existence of Wallachian<sup>32</sup> and Moldavian<sup>33</sup> *mehters*, and Evliyâ Çelebi (b. 1611 – d. after 1682), the celebrated Ottoman traveller and former professional singer at the court of Sultan Murat IV Ghazi (d. 1640), also confirms the fact that at the princely courts of the Romanian Lands the Turkish *mehterhâne* played "behind the flag" while in front of it "played the trumpets and *tambûrs* of the *giaours*".<sup>34</sup> In the extra-Carpathian space

we are therefore dealing with two *mehterhânes*: one of the Ottomans and a “*mehterhâne* of the accursed (*afurisitilor*)”.<sup>35</sup>

With regard to the musical performances of Romanians beyond the borders of the Principalities, towards the end of the eighteenth century there is mention of a Moldavian named Miron, who was one of the leading virtuosi of the *viola d'amore* (*sine kemani*) at the Court of Sultan Selim III (b. 1761 – d. 1808), a celebrated composer of the time and a patron of the arts. According to Walter Feldman, Miron “probably did more than any other single individual to develop the *ala Turca* style of violin-playing”,<sup>36</sup> and was the highest paid musician at the Sultan’s court between 1795 and 1806.<sup>37</sup> In a poem that describes an imperial celebration in 1834, the Moldavian musician is characterised as “the venerable violinist Miron (*Koca kemâni Mîrum*)”.<sup>38</sup> It is important to note that, according to the Turkish musicologists, the *viola d'amore* arrived in Turkish musical circles from Western Europe via the Romanian Lands and Serbia in the late eighteenth century.<sup>39</sup>

Regarding the history of the term *mehterhâne* (*house of mehter*) in the Ottoman Empire, it should be pointed out that this refers to ensembles of musicians formed for military and ceremonial purposes. In Ottoman Turkey and also the Romanian Principalities, the *mehterhâne* was sometimes called the *mehter* orchestra or *tabl-khâne* (*T'abilhâne/Nevbet-hâne* or “house of drums”)<sup>40</sup> and included wind and percussion instruments.<sup>41</sup> The Janissaries (*Yeniçeri* – new troop) were the élite troops of the Ottoman Empire (most of them were slaves of Christian origins), who appear to have first formed official *mehter* ensembles around the year 1330,<sup>42</sup> and the *mehterhâne* was very closely associated with the Janissaries throughout the Ottoman period. It should be noted that this was definitely not the earliest use of music by the Turkish military. There are earlier records showing that military bands were a traditional gift from one Turkish ruler to another, and a Chinese chronicle of a general’s visit to a Turkish monarch in 200 BC includes a description of a *Tuğ* (drum) team – a mostly-percussion ensemble that also included a *zurna*-like instrument and a kind of trumpet – and the general’s subsequent formation of a similar ensemble for his own military.<sup>43</sup> So it can be assumed that even in 1329/30, the *mehter* inherited an already-established tradition of military music.<sup>44</sup>

Unfortunately, in their journals and notes, the foreign travellers and officials that passed through the Romanian Lands frequently confuse the names of these ensembles, as it is not very clear to them when it is a matter of the *mehterhâne* or the *tabl-khâne*. The first to distinguish between the

prince's "chamber" ensemble (*mehterhâne*) and the princely orchestra or *tabl-khâne* was Franz-Joseph Sulzer (b. 1735 – d. 1797) a Swiss born in Laufenburg<sup>45</sup> and present around the autumn of 1774<sup>46</sup> at the Wallachian Court of Alexandros Hypsélantès (b. c. 1724 – d. 1807).

In the Romanian terminology we meet these ceremonial ensembles with the name *chindie* (Turkish *ikindi*),<sup>47</sup> hence the expression *de cântat pe la chindii* (*to be sung at dusk*), because one of the times of day when the band of Janissaries played was at sunset.<sup>48</sup> The two ensembles (*mehterhâne* and *tabl-khâne*) would be in the service of the imperial Ottoman court until the year 1826, when they were abolished by Sultan Mahmud II (b. 1785 – d. 1839) together with the Janissary corps,<sup>49</sup> while in the Romanian Lands the Turkish band would be replaced by a European-style brass band a few years later, in 1830, on the establishment of the modern land army (*Straja pământească*).<sup>50</sup>

In conclusion, it can be stated that these ceremonial ensembles, which came to the Principalities, as I have said, from Istanbul, represented not only one of the most important privileges that the princes of these lands enjoyed<sup>51</sup> but also, in a symbolic form, the sovereignty of the Crescent Moon over the Romanian space.<sup>52</sup>

The Sultan's protocol<sup>53</sup> laid down that these ceremonial orchestras should attend in the first place the official ceremonies of the 'beys' of Moldavia and Wallachia, as well as at the coronation of a new prince,<sup>54</sup> in accordance with a ritual inherited from the pomp of the coronation of the Byzantine emperors,<sup>55</sup> the reconfirmation of the prince's reign,<sup>56</sup> the most important religious festivals (Easter, Christmas, the Feast of St Basil, and Epiphany),<sup>57</sup> the individual feast days of churches,<sup>58</sup> the reception of foreign ambassadors<sup>59</sup> and Ottoman dignitaries,<sup>60</sup> the funerals of princes,<sup>61</sup> the private feasts and revels organised by princes<sup>62</sup> and, sometimes, the appointment of dignitaries.<sup>63</sup>

Apart from religious festivals and secular ceremonies such as those mentioned above, the *mehterhâne* and *tabl-khâne* had to perform daily, in the morning, after the Mohammedan call to prayer,<sup>64</sup> and in the afternoon, more often than not before the Prince<sup>65</sup> or beneath his windows.<sup>66</sup> We may, indeed, speak of orchestras with a set timetable, which gave veritable "concert tours" of the courts and palaces of the Principalities.

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What can be said of the instrumentation employed by the orchestras of the Ottoman Court and the Turkish musical ensembles? Contemporary musicology underlines the fact that this was highly complex and had over

the centuries undergone countless transformations, adjustments, and improvements, with some instruments disappearing and being replaced by others, and with new instruments being introduced.<sup>67</sup> According to musicological statistics, it seems that since the times of the Huns in the military band of the Ottoman Empire there were six basic instruments: four percussion and two wind instruments. The wind instruments were called *zurna*, *boru* (*nefir* or *şahnay*), and percussion instruments *çevgan*, *zil*, *davul* and *yurağ*, *boygur*, *çöken*, *çanğ*, *tümrük* and *küvrük*, all of which were later collectively known as *kös*. But the number of instruments used in the Ottoman music increased over time, since numbers of individual instruments could be multiplied according to requirements. While the historian Şükrullah who lived in the time of Murad II listed only nine instruments, Lâdikli Mehmed counted eighteen, and Kâtip Çelebi (1609 – 1657) nineteen. Evliyâ Çelebi, who was at the same time a musician, mentions some seventy-six instruments.<sup>68</sup> However, it seems that the most extensive ensemble of military musicians at the Ottoman Court can be found at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the *mehterhâne* of the Grand Vizier was made up of sixty-two instrumentalists and that of the Sultan was twice as large.<sup>69</sup>

Since the swarming oriental courts of the Principalities remind the western traveller of a smaller version of the Seraglio in Constantinople, it should come as no surprise that we also find here a significant number of musical instruments that are Ottoman in origin. The same Swiss, Fr. J. Sulzer, who, let it be said in passing, was also an instrumentalist in the chamber orchestra of A. Hypsélantēs, gives us many essential details about the number and type of instruments that made up the *mehterhâne*:

"Turkish chamber music is wholly different in its make-up. A long, thick reed-flute with seven holes and a large orifice for the mouth, called a *ney*, a *tambura*, i.e. a kind of lute with a long neck; a *tzambal* (*Hackbrett*) which they strike with short wooden sticks and call it *santur*. Another instrument of the same kind, called the *müküm*, which they pluck with the fingers, like we pluck our zither (*Zimbel*) is similar to a harp; the *muskal* or *nai* (*Syringa Panos*); the *keman* is held on the thigh and played using a bow; then the common four-stringed violin, which is called the *sînekeman*, along with another wind instrument, which is similar in form and sound to a bassoon; all these are their chamber instruments".<sup>70</sup>

Prince Dimitrie Cantemir (in Turkish *Kantemiroğlu*), a well-known theoretician, who invented a system of notation and created the most influential theory of Ottoman music,<sup>71</sup> an amazing virtuoso of the *tanbûr* (long-necked lute) which he says is “the most perfect instrument”, and at the same time who revolutionised the composition of the *peşrev* (prelude) (**Illustration 3**), tells us the following about the band of the Janissaries or *tabl-khâne*:

“The *Tabl* is a drum, whence the name *tabulkana*, the military insignia the Turkish emperors give to the higher generals in their service. The *tabulkana* of a vizier comprises nine drums; nine *zurnazeni* or those who play the *zurna*, i.e. the flute; seven *boruxeni* or trumpeters; four *zilldzani*, who clash the *zil*, a kind of brass disk, which when clashed make a clear and sharp sound.”<sup>72</sup>

On the information presented by the Moldavian prince, Fr. J. Sulzer offers a number of details, in the same didactic tone:

“The main instruments of Turkish war music are from nine to ten large drums (in Turkish called the *da* and in Wallachian the *toba*), almost as many *zurnale* (*surnä*), a kind of reed flute, the “Schalmeyen” (on which the first player sometimes plays a solo or rather a recitative, while the others play a monotone accompaniment at an octave), from six to nine trumpets or the so-called *boruşı* (the name by which Prussian trumpets are known in Turkey n.n.), four *dairale* (*Dairée*) or tambourines (*Schellensiebe*) and *talgere* or brass cymbals (*Sill*). And if I have also mentioned an un-tuned tenor drum (*verstimmte Wirbeltrommel*), then it should be known that it is replaced by a number of small timpani, with a very muffled but penetrating sound, which they call *nagarale* (*Sadée Nakkara*), which does not play any tremolos, but rather is struck to the cadence of the beat”.<sup>73</sup>

In conclusion, the chronicles and documents of the epoch record variations as regards the number of Ottoman musicians in the Principalities, which ranged between six at the court of Wallachia in the reigns of Gregory I Ghika (1660-1664 and 1672-1673) in the year 1660,<sup>74</sup> thirty at the court of Moldavia in 1776, and twenty in Wallachia in the year 1818.<sup>75</sup> Although these figures seem low, in reality the number of musicians at the princely and boyar courts was much greater. The same chroniclers reveal to us that besides the *mehterhâne* there were also other musical ensembles, under the command of the Grand Provost Marshal (*Armaş*).<sup>76</sup>

Relying on the registers of ceremonials that lay down the order in which the princely military corps accompanied by their musical bands entered the Wallachian capital in the period 1775 – 1819 (i.e. from the coronation of A. Hypsēlantēs up until the investiture of Alexandros Nicholas Soutzou [b. 1758 – d. 1821] as prince),<sup>77</sup> it is possible to gain a coherent picture of all the orchestras active in Iași and Bucharest. Thus, at the ceremonial entry into the capital (3 February 1775) of the new prince of Wallachia, A. Hypsēlantēs, the procession was accompanied by ensembles of infantry soldiers (*dorobanți*), Cossacks (*cazaci*) and armed thief-catchers (*potașii*) of the Police station guild (*Agie*),<sup>78</sup> then by the ensemble of *seğmens* (*seimeni* or body of pedestrian mercenaries) and mercenaries (*lefegii*) of the *Spatharios* guild,<sup>79</sup> then the land army bandsmen (*läutarii pământeni*), the “European music”, and the “princely trumpeters” (*trâmbițașii domnești*), with the *mehterhâne* bringing up the rear.<sup>80</sup> Dionysios Photenios (b. 1777 – d. 1821), a historian and musician of high standing (he played the *tambûr*, piano and *kemânce*),<sup>81</sup> mentions more or less the same musical scene at the ceremonials at the enthronement of princes, where the high dignitaries took part in solemn processions, accompanied by their musical ensembles: those who headed the procession were the infantry soldiers (*dorobanți*) with their band and standard, the Cossacks from the foot *Agia* with their band, then the mounted armed thief-catchers (*potașii*) with their band, the *seğmens* and mercenaries (*lefegii*) with their bands, all the land army bands, the European music, and finally the *mehterhâne*.<sup>82</sup> Sometimes German trumpeters<sup>83</sup> also took part, as well as the Italian orchestra.<sup>84</sup> And the examples might continue.

In conclusion, the fact that they benefited from such bands was for the princes of the two north-Danube provinces and for the dignitaries and boyars a matter of honour and pride, and something not easily maintained from a financial point of view. And given that the number of these musicians, be they Ottoman, Greek, German, Polish, Italian, Romanian, or, above all, Gypsies, at any given time might number more than even five hundred, as happened in the reign of Gheorghe Caragea,<sup>85</sup> the financial effort the princes had to make in order to maintain such luxury, appreciated and beloved both in Istanbul and in the West, is self-evident.

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What can be said of the musical repertoire promoted by the Ottoman ensembles at the courts of the Phanariot princes and of other local dignitaries?

Unfortunately, we do not possess musical scores or manuscripts to confirm with any certainty what music was played in the Romanian Lands, what level of professionalism the musicians attained, or what pieces were most liked by the native elites. We do, however, know with certainty that the most important centres for the promotion of Ottoman musical culture outside Istanbul were the two Romanian capitals, Bucharest and Iași, and that the music of the Seraglio was exported with great success to the Principalities. This claim is confirmed by the chronicles of the time, which point to the fact that the Ottoman orchestras adopted the vocal and instrumental genres and forms of the Imperial Court and sometimes even produced versions of Turkish music unique to the north-Danube space.<sup>86</sup>

Thus, it might be said that in the first place what was promoted was a vocal and instrumental repertoire of strictly Ottoman provenance, very much appreciated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,<sup>87</sup> not only by Romanians but also at the Court of the Sultan:<sup>88</sup> marches (*nübets*),<sup>89</sup> preludes (*taksıms*), overtures/preludes (*peşrevs*),<sup>90</sup> slow vocal music (*manes*, *samaeles*) and lively tunes (*bestes*). When Michael Soutzou (b. c. 1730 – d. 1803) received the Russian Ambassador, Michael Kutuzov, in Iași on 24 June 1793, I. C. Struve said that it was “to the deafening sound of *mehterhâne*, whose chosen *mehters* made the hills resound to the tunes of the *nübets* and *peşrevs*, which they played with pride”.<sup>91</sup> Another interesting episode that describes the repertoire performed by the Ottoman musical ensembles and tells us of the appreciation enjoyed by this music is that which took place in July 1762, on the naming of the new Pasha of Hotin, in the person of Hamza Bey, the son-in-law of Sultan Mustafa III (b. 1717 – d. 1774), as follows:

“For as many days as the Pasha stayed here, the *mehterhâne* of the Prince, according to the custom to beat every day the *nübet*, which is called the *chindie*, did not drum, except only the *mehterhâne* of the Pasha drummed on one day. After the Pasha came out of his tent, in front of the Prince and all the boyars, as well as some *pehlivâns*, he demanded to hear the skill of the Prince’s *mehter-başı*, and told the Prince to order his *mehter-başı* to say a *peşrev*; and when the *mehter-başı* began and recited that song, his skill and singing pleased the Pasha very much. And after he finished singing, the Pasha ordered him to be garbed in a long boyar’s coat there before him.”<sup>92</sup>

The princely and boyar courts also resounded by orientalised and balkanised music and dances such as the *năframa*, *muşama*, *zoralia*, *arkan*, *ciauş*, *kindia*, *giambara*, *irmilik*, etc.<sup>93</sup> One of the most fashionable dances in Moldavian society in the late eighteenth century was the “Greek dance” imported from Constantinople. Around 1790, Count Alexandre de Langeron describes this dance, as follows:

“It starts off slowly and ends at such a fast rhythm that one would think that all the dancers were stampeding. One man leads the dance, and all the women, linked together in a chain, holding onto scarves, follow a dancer”.<sup>94</sup>

Another dance of Greek origin fashionable in the Phanariot age and “performed by married women”<sup>95</sup> is the *romeika*, described by English physician James Dalaway in 1794:

“as being wholly performed by women, one of whom fluttered an embroidered kerchief, moving gracefully apart from the rest of the women whirling around her. The melodies, he says, were played on two lutes, as many *kobsas* with catgut strings and an uneven flute, like those he had seen in statues of Pan or the Satyrs, played with extraordinary dexterity and producing sweet and piercing sounds”.<sup>96</sup>

Auguste de Lagarde, a French émigré in the service of Imperial Russia, also speaks of the same dance, in 1813:

“The women dance in a circle, without changing their facial expression or bodily movements, and then a single pair dance, raising their hands over the heads, somewhat in the manner of Russian dance steps, but without grace or variation”.<sup>97</sup>

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As for the aesthetic of this music, the chronicles almost in unison demonstrate that the reference points of the western travellers are radically different from those of the Orientals. One of the most plastic images provided by the documents of the time, with regard to the sound of the official Ottoman orchestra at the courts of the Danube princes, is supplied by Lady Elisabeth Craven, who was received with all pomp and ceremony

by Nicolas Mavrogenēs (b. 1735/1738 – d. 1790), the Prince of Wallachia. She is perplexed on hearing the unusual sounds of the ensemble: “My ears were assailed by the most diabolical noise I ever heard.” Made up of “trumpeters of all kinds, brass plates striking together, and drums of all sizes, some of which, not larger than breakfast cups”, the princely orchestra brought together instrumentalists who each endeavoured, according to Lady Craven, “to drown out the noise of his neighbour, by making a louder noise if possible”.<sup>98</sup> In spite of the secretary telling her “c'est pour vous Madam – c'est la musique du Prince”, the respectable lady could barely contain her laughter, thereby alarming her companion, who implored her to refrain, saying, “For God's sake do not laugh.” Unfortunately, not even during the meal offered by the wife of the Phanariot prince in her honour was Lady Craven able to escape the Turkish music, which alternated with the more palatable music of gypsy minstrels:

“Detestable Turkish music was played during the whole supper, but relieved now and then by gipsies, whose tunes were quite delightful, and might have made the heaviest clod of earth desire to dance. The Prince saw the impression this music made upon me, and desired they might play oftener than the Turks”.<sup>99</sup>

Nor is the account of Johann Wendel Bardili, an Italian chronicler who was in Iași in the year 1709, any more favourable. Describing the call to prayer of the Ottoman faithful at which the *mehterhâne* performed each morning, the traveller cannot refrain from commenting on the auditory discomfort created by the ensemble, characterising it as “a music indeed barbarous and dreadful”.<sup>100</sup> Struve, mentioned above, describes how the Turkish orchestra, when performing slower pieces, could produce in the audience not only reactions of disgust but also “a deep sleep, which overcame the entire escort of the Russian ambassador”.<sup>101</sup>

In conclusion, the Ottoman orchestras and their musical performances constituted in the Phanariot epoch one of the most “exotic” presences at the courts of the Danube Principalities, and, as we have seen above, fully took part in the orientalisation of Romanian musical culture. In parallel, however, we should not forget the other side of Romanian musical culture of Constantinopolitan influence: Phanariot literary and musical works, which enjoyed phenomenal success among the princes, nobility, boyars

and youth of Wallachia and Moldavia, and which we shall describe in the following.

#### **4. Phanariot Music at the Princely and Boyar Courts of the Romanian Principalities**

It is a well-known fact that the Phanariot Princes were highly educated, often having studied in Western Europe. They spoke foreign languages and were concerned not only with political and administrative matters but also with supporting and promoting the arts and sciences, in which music occupied an important place. The existing cultural background in the Principalities,<sup>102</sup> cultivated above all at the Wallachian court during the reign of Constantine Brâncoveanu (b. 1654 – d. 1714) or Altîn Bey (“Golden Prince”), as he was named by the Turks, provided fertile ground for the reforms initiated by the new princes from Phanar. And with the founding of the two Princely Academies in Bucharest and Iași, institutions with an important word to say in Romanian higher education,<sup>103</sup> musical culture in all its forms was to gain an increasingly important position in everyday life at the courts of the local elites.

But what is Phanariot music? It is a “worldly” musical repertoire, melancholy („*de inimă albastră*”) and non-religious (*εζωτερικά ἀσματα*), that originated in the cultural milieu of Constantinople, and was brought to the Principalities by the musicians who arrived together with the Phanariot princes. Familiar both with the ecclesiastical music promoted within the Patriarchate and with Ottoman music, some of these were famous composers,<sup>104</sup> and vocal and instrumental performers of the Seraglio. It was these remarkable musicians who inspired Romanian fiddlers and church singers to disseminate the so-called “worldly songs”, songs of love and revelry, at the courts of the princes and boyars, and in towns and cities. And just as ecclesiastical chant was adopted by the Romanian Lands in sign of unconditional respect toward the authority of Constantinople – the supreme liturgical centre of Eastern Christendom – so too Phanariot music was adopted by Romanian society beyond the Carpathian arc, in order to be like those in the *Polis*. For, as the saying of boyar lordache Golescu (1768-1848), goes, “Fashion rules, fashion dictates, fashion makes you her slave.”<sup>105</sup>

Any attempt to evoke Phanariot secular songs and repertoire reminds us of life in the two capitals of Wallachia and Moldavia, with their artisans’

quarters, markets and bazaars redolent of oriental tastes and fashions brought from the periphery of the western world. If we speak of Bucharest as the most faithful imitator of Constantinople in music, most foreign travellers who passed through the city on the banks of the Dâmbovița define the capital as a city of contrasts – village and city, poverty and luxury, primitive architecture and buildings in the Constantinopolitan style – situated at the crossroads of civilisations and epochs. The interior of the houses was the first aspect that astonished. From the peasant chair and table to the oriental sofas, divans and mattresses, “on which the masters eat and sleep”, the boyar residences amazed foreigners with their atmosphere of perfumed idleness and “debauched revelry”.<sup>106</sup> Sometimes, upon this mixture were superimposed western elements, such as European-style ball attire for the ladies, and English gardens, such as those of the Dudescu palace.

It seems that the idea of good living and merriment was also shared by the Romanians. Nicolae Filimon, in his novel *Ciocoii vechi și noi* (*Boyars Old and New*), provides precious information about the musical atmosphere in the Bucharest of those times:

“Its middle-class inhabitants, long used to the oriental life, a life full of idleness and poetry, in the summer gathered in the gardens of Breslea, Barbălată, Cișmegiu and Giafer. There, each *isnaf* or paterfamilias laid out the meal, and together with wives and friends they would drink and eat. Then they would begin an ancestral ring dance (*hora strămoșească*) and other merry dances (...). When the fury of the dance had abated, the whole company would once again begin to drink beer and to eat (...). During all this time, the minstrels did not cease to play the fiddle or sing love songs full of sweetness, designed to create yearning and passion in the hearts of the listeners, or they would play dance tunes, gay and lively”.<sup>107</sup>

From the children of the boyars to the poor, passing through the middle classes, Levantine habits would monopolise almost all of daily life in the epoch of the Phanariots:

“At a time when our boyars, garbed in Turkish large trousers (*ceacșiruri*) and surplices (*anterie*), sat in Turkish fashion, cross-legged on divans, sipping from *filcans* (*felegeane*) of coffee and puffing on the perfumed smoke of hookahs, when the conversation was mostly in Greek, sometimes in Turkish, when, along with so many oriental customs, the Turkish *mehterhâne*, which entertained the populace of the capitals, had reached

these parts, it should be no surprise that Greek and Turkish songs were fashionable not only in the boyar salons but also in other social strata of Bucharest".<sup>108</sup>

As can be observed from this short preamble, the leitmotifs of this repertoire were generally the celebrated and mostly unrequited loves of high society, but not only. The poetry of Ienăchiță Văcărescu (b. 1740 – d. 1797), written, probably, for the Lady of Wallachia, Zoe Moruzi,<sup>109</sup> that of Costache Conachi (b. 1777 – d. 1849), dedicated to Zulnia Negri, and that of Anton Pann (b. 1796 – d. 1854), for the nun Anica, as well as that of other poets and people who were quite simply in love, are but a few examples expressive of the melancholy and intimate circumstances that their authors wished to reveal to the whole world. More than the Eros, they describe the sufferings and the flame of the love that consumed both the body and the soul of the sufferers:

*"Spune inimioară, spune / Ce durere te răpune / Arată ce te muncește / Ce boală te chinuiește? / Fă-o cunoscută mie, / Ca să-ți cauă dohtorie! / Te rog, fă-mă a pricepe / Boala din ce și se-ncepe."*<sup>110</sup>  
(Say, little heart, say / What pain afflicts thee / Reveal what torments thee, / What sickness afflicts thee? / Make it known to me, / Let me seek thy cure! / Please, make me see / Whence the sickness springs from thee).

In this atmosphere of consuming love, the minstrels and their music were often not only the sons of the boyar class but also the bourgeoisie. Let us examine the excellent description given by Vasile Alecsandri concerning the effect of the Levantine musical repertoire on the inhabitants of Bucharest in the early nineteenth century:

"The worldly songs were well received in particular, sometimes at meals, at weddings, at parties, in parks and in vineyards. Consequently, the *lăutar* (*fiddler*) class had gained great importance. The boyar fiddlers and *kobsa* players (*cobzarii*) competed with each other to compose the most various melodies and to emit the longest, most piercing sighs, in the service of their masters' love, for they served at the time as a kind of secret courier for the heart. Declarations of love were made via their mouths. A drawn-out 'ah!' or 'oh!' paid bags of money at the beginning of our century and enriched the lucky fiddler (*lăutar*) who had a stout chest and deep lungs. Although it seems to us rather queer, such was the old custom and we have

to respect it, especially given that it brought happiness to our parents and has preserved for us to this day the poems of the previous generation".<sup>111</sup>

**4.1.** But who was it that composed and disseminated these lyrical-erotic creations of oriental flavour? In the first place the fiddlers (*lăutarii*) – or the *alăutari* as they are called in contemporary documents. The *lăutari* were either freemen or, above all, gypsy slaves from the princely, boyar and monastery estates. Some of them were even Turkish, and came from the Danube *răyăsi*. Among these, not all were *lăutari*, but only those who originated from among the "bear leaders" (*ursari*)<sup>112</sup> and "vătrași" (settled, rather than nomadic, gypsies),<sup>113</sup> because they had an innate facility and remarkable rapidity in acquiring this craft and in improvisation.<sup>114</sup> To these must be added a percentage of singers and instrumentalists from among the serving girls of Constantinople, who were in the personal service of the ladies,<sup>115</sup> as well as the south-Danube Christian and Ottoman mercenaries employed in the retinues of the princes. In any case, it seems that the *lăutari* were much sought-after, not only at the courts of the princes and native boyars but also in the former capital of the Byzantine Empire, because around the year 1800 "the best *lăutari* in Istanbul were gypsies from Wallachia".<sup>116</sup>

From the administrative point of view, the *lăutari* do not begin to organise themselves into a guild until the eighteenth century,<sup>117</sup> as a reaction to the invasion of foreign musicians, in particular those from Western Europe. Until then, the local *lăutari* had been subordinate to the Grand Provost Marshal (*Armas*) in Wallachia.<sup>118</sup> From the seventeenth century onwards, in Moldavia, the *lăutari* were subordinate to the Grand Hetman (*hatman*)<sup>119</sup> or to an abbot appointed by a bishop or metropolitan.<sup>120</sup>

As the princes and almost every boyar had at their court a *taraf* of *lăutari* (known as princely or boyar *lăutari*), the structure of the ensemble was flexible, and depended on the financial possibilities of their masters. The *taraf* was made up of at least three basic instruments: the violin, Pan pipes and *kobza*<sup>121</sup> (**Illustration. 4**), and from the reign of Alexandros Hypsēlantēs onward, the *tzambal* would be added to these.<sup>122</sup> Sometimes the *taraf* might include instruments of both Ottoman (mainly the *tanbûr* and *kemân*)<sup>123</sup> and western origin,<sup>124</sup> and thus the *taraf* might number six,<sup>125</sup> eighteen<sup>126</sup> or even twenty instrumentalists, such as was the case of the orchestra of celebrated boyar Dinicu Golescu (b. 1777 – d. 1830) at the beginning of the nineteen century.<sup>127</sup>

With regard to their names, contemporary documents are rather lacking in information, due to the shadow of quasi-anonymity under which these admirable musicians lived. It seems that the oldest *alăutar* attested in Wallachia was called Ruste, who lived during the reign of Mircea the Shepherd (died 1559).<sup>128</sup> In the Phanriot period there is mention of a "Dumitru *lăutar* gypsy, called Țăra" on 28 September 1797 in the Scaune quarter of the city,<sup>129</sup> "Gheorghe Țiganu *lăutar*" from the village of Țăța in Dîmbovița county,<sup>130</sup> "Ene Lăutarul" and "Niculai Lăutarul", both slaves at Nucet Monastery in the same county,<sup>131</sup> etc. Towards the end of the Phanriot epoch, among the most celebrated *lăutari* of Wallachia were Drăgan, Marinică, Dumitrache White-Eye (*Ochi Albă*) (**Illustration 5**), Andreiaș of Puiu and Radu Ciolac of Bucharest, Stănică from Craiova and Dobrică from Ploiești.<sup>132</sup> Ion Ghika also mentions Petrache Nănescu, of whom he reports, "he composed the songs of the *lăutari* from Scaune" during the time of Anton Pann.<sup>133</sup>

All these, whether gypsies or not, were never absent from the princely banquets and revels,<sup>134</sup> the boyar weddings and the important public ceremonies.<sup>135</sup> Sometimes, to earn a living or extra money, we find them performing in cafés, taverns and inns, at the crossroads of major commercial thoroughfares or in places where local markets were held. Their well-known musical mastery aroused the admiration of chroniclers and foreign travellers, and their "stagecraft" impressed not only the foreign but also the Romanian onlookers. An account to this effect is given by Constantin Obedeanul, who tells us that during their performance, the *lăutari*

"inclined their body toward the part whence the sound of the instrument came, sometimes lifting their right or left leg depending on how they held the instrument, on the right or on the left, thereby simulating more feeling and expression and always bowing toward the master or the one to whom they were singing, or towards some guest".<sup>136</sup>

They were just as well appreciated at princely weddings. Vasile A. Urechia tells us that at the wedding of Ienăchiță Văcărescu to Ecaterina Caragea, the most celebrated *lăutari* in Bucharest performed,<sup>137</sup> and in 1816, in the salons of court treasurer (*vistiernic*) lordache Roset Roznovanu, "many rounds of musicians" played at the celebration of his saint's day, the Feast of St George, including the celebrated "*taraf* of Angheluță". We cannot close this chapter without mentioning the *taraf* conducted by the

famous Barbu Lăutarul, who performed with the same Angheluță Lăutarul on the evening of the feast of St Stephen (25 December) in 1816 at the residence of the Grand Hetman Costaki Ghika<sup>138</sup> and of whose musical skill the German writer Wilhelm de Kotzebue has left us the following poetic description:

"Strauss and Lanner live on in the memory of those who have listened to them, and German dance music did not fall silent on the death of these two virtuosi. But when the gypsy fiddlers Barbu and Angheluță played, then your feet moved to a different beat! Look at that wonderful band... Look at those swarthy, expressive faces! The jet black hair tossing wildly on every side, for the head assists in beating the rhythm; and not only the head, but also the eyes are always rolling, the corners of the mouth are moving and even the nostrils flare like a stallion's on sighting a mare. Three or four play the violin, three or four draw a plectrum across the strings of the *kobza*, others blow furiously into Pan pipes, and another creates a harmony so unusual and so rousing that the young man must dance like it or not, the seated man lifts his legs to the rhythm and recalls his youth, when he held his darling in his arms, and the old man taps his toes a little and looks smilingly at the lively young folk."

And the author concludes: "And what is more, these gypsies have no idea about musical notes: they play everything by ear!"<sup>139</sup>

**4.2.** Another important class of musicians that originated from the Levantine quarter and that promoted secular music were church cantors (*οἱ ψάλτες*). Eminently Orthodox, from the Byzantine branch of Christianity, and for the most part laymen, these fulfilled a well defined function within the Church of the Patriarchate, and were responsible for the secular or non-ecclesiastical repertoire promoted more often than not even within the Seraglio.

For the period under study and even before then,<sup>140</sup> the musical manuscripts record a larger number of Greek composers and musicians than Romanians. One of the many leading figures in the Constantinopolitan musical world who came to the Romanian provinces with the Princes elected by the Sublime Porte was the sword bearer (*spatharios*) Iancu Malaxa, former *kanonarchis* in Constantinople, who arrived together with Prince Michael Gregorios Soutzou II (b. 1784 – d. 1864) to Iași,<sup>141</sup> taking over the position of First Chanter at the prince's court in 1819,<sup>142</sup> and becoming the best known singer of Iași. Besides the church chanting, he was famous as a *chanende* (singer) of secular music.<sup>143</sup> He was

accompanied on the *tanbûr* by the *kaminarios* Grigore Avram<sup>144</sup> and on the *ney* by the cupbearer (*paharnic*) Andreas (Andricu) Vizantios (Vizanti) Terzi-başa,<sup>145</sup> one of the virtuosi of this instrument, who would seem to have been the son of Gregorios Protopsaltēs Byzantios.<sup>146</sup> Along with Grigore Avram, it is also mentioned “Toader the Cup Bearer, grammarian to Andronaki Donici”, who together performed “the most beautiful *manes*, *samaes*, *peşrevs* and *taxîms* with unprecedented skill”.<sup>147</sup>

Regarding the musical mastery of the celebrated *chanende* Iancu Malaxa, Romanian musicologist Teodor T. Burada relates the following episode:

“The old folk tell us that one day, at St George’s, lordaki Drăghici the *Vornic* (i.e. high official at the princely courts) invited to lunch all the courtiers of Prince Michael Soutzou and according to the custom of the time when the boyars had sat down to the meal Iancu Malaxa began to sing the song *Χορίς με πικρόν φαρμάκι* (*Without me bitter poison*), the most requested and beloved of the time... His voice had such an effect on the boyars and especially upon the wife of Dumitrake Plagino the Postelnik that she swooned, interrupting the meal.”

T. Burada also elucidates the reason for the incident: “The song sung by Malaxa had been composed by Dragoumanaki, a Greek boyar from Constantinople, on the occasion of the death of her daughter, the niece of the wife of Dumitraki Plagino the Postelnik, who died in Constantinople”.<sup>148</sup>

Other accounts of the melange of Levantine music at the boyar houses of the late eighteenth century mention Michael the private singer of Charalambos the Lord Steward (*clucer*),<sup>149</sup> as well as an episode in which a monk had been invited to the home of Ienăchiță Văcărescu and on his arrival heard within an ensemble made up of “violins, *ney* and *tanbûrs*” and “sweet and piercing women’s voices”, upon which he decided to leave the place of temptation as quickly as possible.<sup>150</sup>

Alongside the Greek singers who promoted the Phanariot musical repertoire in the Principalities there were also Romanian ecclesiastical singers, among whom the name of Anton Pann is pre-eminent. Ion Ghika, placing him at the head of the list, tells us that “Anton Pann, Nănescu and Chiosea – the son were the delight of the gardens of Deșliu, Pană Breslea and Giafer” and that “Iancu of Ralită Muruzoaie, Bărbucică of Tiță Văcăreski, the Bărcănești brothers, Costaki Faka and other young people of

good breeding always invited them without fail".<sup>151</sup> It is known that for *the revelry of the inhabitants* (*petrecerea vietuitorilor*), Anton Pann collected and published a series of *delightful songs* (*cântece desfătătoare*), a type of music to which he felt attracted, and which would be published with the title *The Hospital of Love or the Singer of Yearning* (*Spitalul amorului sau Cîntătorul dorului*).<sup>152</sup> In the book there are four stylistic categories: folk music, songs influenced by Greco-Oriental music and the Byzantine *melos* style, songs influenced by European music, and Christmas carols and moral songs.<sup>153</sup> The selection constitutes a unique document, in which the musical atmosphere of the Bucharest of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century is reflected in the most authentic manner. The repertoire brings together a host of poetic and musical directions, songs old and new that circulated, in part, not only in Moldavia and Wallachia but also in Transylvania. In spite of the impression of great thematic variety, most of the songs are imbued with the oriental perfume of love poetry, with anacreontic allusions, echoes of Balkan folklore, Italian opera arias, urban ballads, and also native Romanian songs of peasant origin, including the so called "cântece de mahala" ("songs of the artisans' quarter"). The diversity demonstrates that Pann mastered all these registers in equal measure, and his biography, as much as it is known, confirms the astonishing facility with which the musician performed in the most surprising circumstances and contexts. Chanting or singing in bands of revellers, in the free and libertine ambience of the frequent wassails with *lăutari* that took place in the Bucharest of that time, or collecting all kinds of songs from the *lăutari* of the artisans' quarter, from the fairs and soirées, Pann sang a motley music in which can be found outlawry refrains, semi-religious compositions, motifs from western music, and famous amours.

George Sion, praising the innate musical talent and charismatic figure of his uncle in the Bucharest of the early nineteenth century, describes the best-known connoisseur of secular music of his day in *Contemporary Memoirs*:

"On summer evenings, my uncle would go outside with his *tanbûr* and play Turkish *manes* of the kind he had learnt in childhood in Constantinople. Not half an hour would pass before hundreds of people, passers-by or neighbours, would gather around the house to listen to that rapturous music, which only in the Orient can still be composed and heard with great pleasure, because my uncle possessed a wonderful baritone voice. One man alone there was in the Bucharest of that time who still knew oriental music, sacred and profane, as well as my uncle: that man was Anton Pann,

who distinguished himself in that he knew how to write music and knew how to compose worldly songs that became popular".<sup>154</sup>

This memoir indirectly reveals one of the first-hand sources used by Pann in collecting his *Hospital of Love*: the profane music of the Constantinopolitan world. The Phanariot repertoire of lyrical songs from the *mahala* was known to him thanks to the manuscripts that circulated with great success in the Greek-speaking world and which disseminated this *melos* from as early as the latter half of the eighteenth century, but also due to the fact that he had been an apprentice alongside Dionysios Photeinos, who was schooled in the musical milieu of Constantinople. A more even dissemination of Phanariot music was achieved above all thanks to the three anthologies printed in Constantinople: *Euterpe* (1830), *Pandora* (1843) and *Harmonia* (1848). *Pandora*, for example, presents, alongside Greek and Turkish songs of a profane character, European songs from operas or popular compositions. As regards the literary content, such anthologies include cultured lyrics imbued with Modern Greek poetry.

In conclusion, we are justified in seeing in Anton Pann a Wallachian counterpart of the musicians of Constantinople who "collected" the works of many generations of eastern composers and whose work was inspired by the urban folklore of the former imperial capital, a folklore situated at the boundary between the spirit of the European world and Oriental sensibility. Even when he uses the texts of well-known poets, such as Iancu Văcărescu, Costache Conachi, or Grigore Alexandrescu,<sup>155</sup> Pann gives as an argument his intention to disseminate their verses and to make them immortal:

"Do not think that it was in order to take ownership of your poems that I have adjoined them to this book, but rather I do so only to make them immortal, composing melodies for them, for the time being to ecclesiastical notes, so that the modes shall remain unforgotten over the centuries, for which, in my opinion, I think you will not blame me. And if I do not signal the name of each under his poem, it is not my fault, but that of those who like to plagiarise and in place of the poet's name undersign their own to fool the credulous."

**4.3.** Who was it that wrote the texts of these lyric songs from the Phanariot manuscripts and musical collections? In the first place, Levantine intellectuals, be they poets, diplomats, physicians, officers, Phanariot

nobles of varying education, clerics, those close to the princely families, and even the princes themselves.

One of the most important names among the poets whose verses Phanariot composers set to melancholy music (“*inimă albastră*”) – and in effect the most important poet of the time – was Athanasios Christopoulos of Kastoria (b. 1772 – d. 1847).<sup>156</sup> Born in Greece, but educated in Bucharest, Budapest and finally at the celebrated University of Padua, Christopoulos was to settle at the courts of the Danubian princes, becoming a kind of adviser and publishing a significant number of books.<sup>157</sup> Nikephoros Kantouniarēs (b. c. 1770 – d. c. 1830), one of the most representative composers and collectors of Phanariot music in Iași, is the one who uses his poems in most of his pieces.

To these can also be added nobles, such as the *çelebi* (gentleman in Turkish) Theodoros Negris (b. 1790 – d. 1824), a Phanariot polyglot who lived in Bucharest and who for a time occupied the post of *chargé d'affaires* of the Sublime Porte at the Turkish Embassy in Paris<sup>158</sup> (MS 784, f. 146v, 147r), Alekos Balasidis (MS 1428, p. 346), as well as other minor poets, such as Iakovos Roizos Neroulos (b. 1778 – d. 1850), an officer at the courts of the Phanariot nobles. Sometimes, the musical manuscripts record poems by leading intellectuals from the Principalities, such as the case of poems by Alexander Sophianos (MS 1428, p. 250) and Demetrios Govdela the Philosopher (MS 1428, p. 349), both of them professors at the celebrated Princely Academies in Bucharest and Iași,<sup>159</sup> but also churchmen such as Manuel of Galipoli, “upon his kind request” (MS 1428, p. 269).

One of the most interesting figures among the Greek dignitaries preoccupied with the Phanariot musical repertoire was former *postelnik* (= boyar of the privy chamber)<sup>160</sup> Georgios Soutzou (b. 1745 – d. 1816), uncle of the Prince of Moldavia, Michael G. Soutzou II. His lyrics include numerous poems in Greek, as well as in Turkish (but written in the Greek alphabet, the so-called *karamanlidika*), for some of which he even composed music (see, for example, MS 784, f. 1r, 161v). Appreciated by literary critics as an amateur in music and literature,<sup>161</sup> Georgios Soutzou provides a good example that throws into especial relief the relationship that existed between Greek musicians and nobles in the Phanariot period in the Danubian Principalities. Nikephoros Kantouniarēs, the celebrated arch-deacon of Antioch who taught at the school of Byzantine music at Golia Monastery in Iași recorded a part of his musical compositions, considering himself to be at the same time a “pupil of this poet” (MS 1428,

p. 339). One of the most representative compositions in the repertoire of this noble Phanariot, one deserving of mention here, is a *beste* (*Tι μεγάλη συμφορά – What a Great Misfortune*) written in the *makam nisaburek* mode, and composed at a tragic moment in his life, “at the event of the death of his much beloved daughter” Ralu, the youngest of his five children (MS 784, f. 168r and MS 1428, p. 16) (**Illustration 6**).

In parallel, we can also observe the preoccupation of **Romanian intellectuals** with writing lyrical texts of Phanariot inspiration. Nicolae Iliescu (MS 784, f. 69v, 81v, 91v; MS 1428, p. 34) is a good example, for, as a graduate of the Princely Academy in Bucharest, he had a good knowledge of Greek and, at the same time, was probably quite familiar with the Neogreek poetry that was widely spread in the Principalities.<sup>162</sup>

The local boyars were another segment of society much preoccupied with the literature of love. As we have mentioned above, the boyars had their own singers, with whom they “spent the day in Cișmigiu Park ... on the green grass, and as the moon rose, they would go with guitars and with flutes to serenade under the windows of beautiful maids and wives”.<sup>163</sup> It is also Ion Ghika who tells us that Grigore Ghika, on hearing Nicolae Alexandrescu sing, “took him into his home, rode with him in his barouche in front, to sing him worldly songs”.<sup>164</sup> With the increasingly deeper penetration of oriental musical culture into urban folklore, Levantine collections of love songs (the so-called *mecmu'a*) were joined by the compositions (translations and imitations) of local poets, such as the Văcărescu dynasty of boyar scholars (lenăchiță and Alecu), Constantin A. Rosetti, Costache Conachi the Chancellor, Ioan Cantacuzino, et al., as well as anonymous authors. The boyar Alecu Văcărescu (b. c. 1767 – d. 1799) confesses that he was among the first to compose worldly songs for the Bucharest *lăutari* around 1795, to be exact a little book with “a few Greek and Romanian verses, which I have composed myself”,<sup>165</sup> and Ovidiu Densușianu says that the boyar in question composed his poems “at parties full of passion and sweetness”.<sup>166</sup> Nicolae Iorga tells us that a poem by lenăchiță Văcărescu, probably in Turkish, circulated to an Ottoman melody (“an aria of Hassan”).<sup>167</sup>

In conclusion, the lyrical literature of love written by these Moldavian and Wallachian poets combines motifs from universal poetry, old and new. It is a literature situated at the intersection of worldly songs and urban literature.<sup>168</sup>

**4.4.** Who are the authors that composed and notated the Phanariot musical repertoire from the Principalities and beyond? Apart from a few

noble names, the Greek or Romanian literati and dignitaries mentioned above, the musical manuscripts written and disseminated within the Principalities, Istanbul and Greece record eight Greek composers of Phanariot music, most active as chanters and composers of ecclesiastical music within the Patriarchate in Constantinople: Petros Lampadarios Peloponnesios (b. 1735 – d. 1778), the Patriarchal Precentor, but also the most prolific composer, who wrote around one third of the Phanariot musical repertoire (approx. 102 compositions); Iakovos Protopsaltēs (b. 1740 – d. 1800), with eleven compositions; Petros Byzantios (b. 1760 – d. 1808) (ten compositions), an apprentice in Ottoman music of Ismail Dede Efendi (b. 1778 – d. 1846), the most famous Turkish musician (royal *chanende*) of the early nineteenth century; Gregorios Protopsaltēs (b. 1778 – d. 1821), a great composer of Byzantine ecclesiastical music and lover of Armenian church music; Ioannes Trapezountios Protopsaltēs (b. c. 1736 – d. 1771); and Manuil Byzantios (b. mid-eighteenth century – d. 1819).<sup>169</sup>

It is self-evident that these composers were financially dependent upon the goodwill of the Patriarch of Constantinople or other ecclesiastical authorities, a goodwill that could be “ecumenically” extended to princes, boyars, Phanariot nobles and high society from the two capitals. The proof is that many composers dedicated to them numerous pieces: Gregorios Protopsaltēs, the head singer of Constantinople, dedicates a prayer (*polychronion*), encomiastic verses and secular songs to Michael Soutzou, the Prince of Moldavia (Gr. MS 370, BARB, f. 147v; Rom. MS 2238, BARB, f. 13r, 17v, 21r), Ioannes Protopsaltēs Precentor of the Greek Patriarchate (1738-1769) dedicates this type of laudatory literature to Samuel Chantzeri, Patriarch of Constantinople (1763-1768 and 1773-1774; Gr. MS 784, f. 20r), Iakovos Protopsaltēs dedicates the same type of secular music to Prince Nicholas Mavrogenis (1738-1790; Gr. MS 784, f. 52r: *προς τὸν αὐθέντη Μαυρογένη*; MS 1428, p. 257), but also Patriarch Gerasimos of Cyprus, calling him “my spiritual father” (MS 1428, p. 109) etc., Nikephoros Kantouniaries writes a song “in praise of the Right Reverend Lord Gregorios of Eirinoupolis, abbot of Golia monastery, Iași” (MS 1428, p. 347), and the examples can go on. Sometimes, Constantinopolitan composers do not flinch from dedicating works of an encomiastic character, if need be, even to the Sultan.

In the Romanian Lands, however, the most important chapter in Phanariot and Ottoman musical history will be written by Nikephoros Kantouniarēs, whom we have mentioned above. Born on the island of Chios and schooled in Constantinople under the patriarchal cantor (*psaltēs*)

Iakobos Protopsaltēs, Kantouniarēs was a Greek polyglot (he spoke Turkish, Arabic, and maybe Romanian, French and Italian), an important *psaltēs*, and a composer of both ecclesiastical and secular music, a pedagogue, scribe, and exegete. After first working in Damascus and Constantinople, he settled in Iași around 1814, where he was based at Golia Monastery, employed as a full-time *psaltēs*, and taught Byzantine music in the Holy Metropolitan Church. He was on friendly terms with the Metropolitan of Moldavia, Veniamin Costake (b. 1768 – d. 1846), to whom he dedicated a number of religious pieces, but his major contribution was a remarkable collection in the Arabic/Persian Ottoman tradition, which can be classified in three main categories: **a.**) settings composed at his initiative, using works of several Greek poets of his time; **b.**) settings produced at the request of Phanariot noblemen and high authorities; **c.**) settings in which both music and text are by Nikephoros. We can conclude that Kantouniarēs was the only Greek musician in Romania to compose collections of secular songs, using both the Greek alphabet (*karamanlidike*) and Byzantine musical notations.<sup>170</sup>

**4.5.** As regards the languages in which the collections of secular music were written, including those of Kantouniarēs, it can be said that the repertoire is mixed, with Greek verses mixed with Turkish, Arabic and Romanian. Another phenomenon ascertained in the musical documents is the emergence of compositions of western influence, written either in Italian (*Ιταλικόν*, MS 784, f. 81v; **Illustration 7**) or French language (*Γαλικόν*, MS 784, f. 93r; **Illustration 8**), probably as a result of the greater openness toward Europe on the part of the nobles of the Principalities, especially after the French Revolution of 1789. Sometimes, the manuscripts also disseminate a repertoire with gypsy texts (MS 925, f. 27).<sup>171</sup> Greek accounts for the greatest percentage, although sometimes certain poems are translated from the Ottoman repertoire, such as “the verses from a Turkish poem written by Sultan Selim (Selim III, b. 1761 – d. 1808) at his downfall, translated and set to music by someone unknown” (MS 1428, p. 348).

Another interesting element that the musical manuscripts reveal relates to the compositional technique of Phanariot lyrics. It is known that the acrostic was fashionable in this period, and so we find a host of songs composed using verses written using this technique. Acrostics of the *Panagiotaiki*, *Eufrosini*, *Tarsitza*, *Sofita*, which were probably dedicated to Greek women, are accompanied by others, such as *Mărioara*, *Victorița* or *Alexandra*, dedicated to Romanian women. Who were the love-struck

poets that composed these verses? With certainty, they were both Greek and Romanian noblemen.


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After A. Hypsēlantēs launched a war against the Turks on 6 March 1821, the history of the Romanian provinces and of the Phanar Greeks was to change considerably. The reaction of the Turks from Istanbul would culminate in the ostracism of the Greeks and the murder of Patriarch Gregorios V on the Night of the Resurrection in 1821, and in Iași and Bucharest there was to be a gradual abandonment of all that signified oriental tradition, including music. The *mehterhâne* and Ottoman music would disappear, giving way to modern brass bands of the European type, and the Phanariot repertoire of love would battle for the supremacy it had held for more than a century with chansonettes, waltzes and mazurkas imported to the Principalities by Italian and German troops.

We may thus speak of the end of an era with its own special perfume and fascinating history, when the princely and boyar courts were the stage-set for the felicitous encounter of not only the most important musicians of the Orthodox and Muslim Orient, but also the most varied styles and genres of European and Oriental music.



**Illustration 1:** A banquet at the Princely Court of Nicolaos Magvrogenes  
(Rom. MS no. 3514, f. 12, dated 1787; Library of Romanian Academy,  
Bucharest [BARB])



**Illustration 2a:** *Mehterhâne* (Ottoman Military Band), 1839.  
Official Costumes of the Ottoman Empire (at the begin. of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century). Ankara, National Library, Painted by Arif Pasha



**Illustration 2β:** *Mehterhâne* (miniature), 1839.  
Istanbul, Topkapi Museum




**Illustration 2γ:** Player of *kemânçe* (in Mihail Gh. Poslușnicu, *Istoria Muzicei la Români. De la Renaștere până-n epoca de consolidare a culturii artistice*, Bucharest, 1928, p. 521).



**Illustration 2δ:** Ottoman Musicians (in H. Dj. Siruni, *Domnii români la Poarta Otomană*, Bucharest, 1941, pl. XXI)





**Illustration 3:** Peşrev by Dimitrie Cantemir, MS no. 3, f. 14r, 43v, Fund Panagiotes Gritzanes, Metropolitan Church Library, Zakynthos Island, Greece, mid.-18th c. Autograph Petros Lampadarios Peloponnesios



**Illustration 4:** The *taraf* (violin, Pan pipes and *kobza*)



**Illustration 5:** Ochi-Albi and his *taraf*,  
Painting by Carol Popp de Szathmáry (1860)




Illustration 6: Gr. MS no. 784, f. 168r, BARB

81<sup>v</sup>

οὐ ὁ πόρυνα μετέπει,  
 ναὶ χαράκην φύγει.  
 ἀνταργήτης τὸν κακούνα,  
 στῆτος αὐτοῖς μέσον γέγει,  
 τοῦτον δὲ ταῦτα παρέπει  
 τὸν τρικλίνον τὸν δέοντον,  
 τοῦτον τὸν ταῦτα παρέπει,  
 τοῦτον τὸν ταῦτα παρέπει.  
 Πλευραίν. Ρόνιμα πικρόνα  
 μεταξὺ δρυσῶν τούτων ποστόν




Illustration 7: Gr. MS no. 784, f. 81v, BARB

γεγονέσιας τοι στοι εραστές,  
 να οδήγησε πάναροντα.  
 Βραχίονες η αναστολή,  
 σε την καρφούσα,  
 Η γέλη δια πέδαιος,  
 στην αύλην να βασιών,  
 φεγγάρια πέρα, καθώς πάροχαιρε,  
 ο απεριόρος. Έχει ο σουγγρεός,  
 γεννήσια δική, η γηνετή,  
 σε την ανθηνά παστούκανες.  
 ανθηνά παναγιάχι,  
 αρχιδέποδη να μένει,  
 επιφυτός παν σωμάτων,  
 η ανθηγένεια να μένει.  
 Τα μικρά δονιάρια νικηφόροι  
 μεταγένεστι πάντα πάντα  
 ——————  
 Ο νεός νεός παντες εις την παραγένετο  
 παντες παντες παντες παντες  
 δέκαον πήγε σαν αγανάκτη παντες



Illustration 8: Gr. MS no. 784, f. 93r, BARB

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> VEINSTEIN, G., *Provinciile balcanice (1606-1774)*, in *Istoria Imperiului Otoman*, ed. R. Mantran, Bucharest, 2001, p. 245.
- <sup>2</sup> MURGESCU, B., *Istorie românească – istorie universală (600-1800)*, Bucharest, 1999, pp. 146-186.
- <sup>3</sup> ANONYMOUS ENGLISH WRITER, *Descrierea Tării Românești (1664)*, in *Călători străini despre Tările Române*, vol. VII, Bucharest, 1980, p. 511; PASTIS OF CANDIA, F., *Informațiuni despre Țara Românească și Moldova*, in *Călători străini...*, vol. III, Bucharest, 1971, pp. 638-639.
- <sup>4</sup> RUSSO, D., *Studii greco-române. Opere postume*, vol. I, Bucharest, 1939, p. 38; CANTACUZINO, I., M., *O mie de ani în Balcani. O cronică a Cantacuzinilor în vîltoarea secolelor*, trans. Maria Șerbănescu & Sabina Drăgoi, Bucharest, 1996, pp. 114-117.
- <sup>5</sup> PEYSSONNEL, Ch.-C. de, *Comerțul Mării Negre*, in: *Călători străini...*, vol. IX, Bucharest, 1997, pp. 394, 400.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 407.
- <sup>7</sup> The quarter is situated in the European part of the south shore of the Golden horn, and was inaugurated in 1303, during the reign of Byzantine Emperor Andronikos Paleologos II (b. 1282 – d. 1328).
- <sup>8</sup> DJUVARA, N., *Între Orient și Occident. Tările Române la începutul epocii moderne (1800 – 1848)*, Bucharest, 1995, p. 32.
- <sup>9</sup> PĂUN, R., “Încoronarea în Țara Românească și Moldova în secolul al XVIII-lea. Principii, atitudini, simboluri”, in *Revista Iсторică*, s. n., t. 5, no. 7-8, 1994, p. 743.
- <sup>10</sup> GRENVILLE, H., *Observații asupra stării de față a Imperiului Otoman (1765-1766)*, in *Călători străini...*, vol. IX, p. 652.
- <sup>11</sup> For a discussion of the derivation of the word *Dragoman* and the role of Dragomans over the long course of history, see B. LEWIS, “From Babel to Dragomans”, in *From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 18-32. For more on dragomans in the Ottoman Empire, see F. HITZEL (ed.), *Istanbul et les langues orientales: Actes du colloque organisé par l’IFEA et l’INALCO à l’occasion du bicentenaire de l’École des Langues Orientales*. Varia Turcica XXXI, L’Harmattan, Inc., Paris, 1997.
- <sup>12</sup> See, for example, the case of Athanasios and Antonios Photineos, father and son, the former being the physician of Sultan Abdul Hamit in Constantinople, the latter the physician to the Phanariot princes of Iași. For details, see my PhD thesis (in progress) titled Ο Διονύσιος Φωτεινός (1777 – 1821) στην Ελληνική και Ρουμανική παράδοση της Βυζαντινής Μουσικής, University of Makedonias, Thessaloniki, Greece; idem, “The Anastasimatarion of Dionysios Photineos”, *Acta Musicae Byzantinae* (hereafter AMB) IV, *Centrul*

- de *Studii Bizantine Iași (CSBI)*, May 2002, pp. 99 – 109; *idem*, “Dionysios Photeinos”, entry in *The Canterbury Dictionary of Hymnology* (forthcoming).
- <sup>13</sup> DJUVARA, N., *op. cit.*, p. 80.
- <sup>14</sup> PLEMMENOS, G., J., *Voices of love. Phanariot music and musicians in the Greek “Erotos Apotelesmata”*. St Edmund’s College, Cambridge, 1994, Master Thesis, p. 7.
- <sup>15</sup> For details, see GEORGESCU, M., “Influențe orientale în desfășurarea unor ceremonii de la Curtea domnească din Tîrgoviște”, in *Archiva Valachica*, VIII, 1978, pp. 249-252; GHEORGACHI, *Condica ce are în sine obiceiuri vechi și noă a prea înălțătilor domni ai Moldovei*, redactată la 5 noiembrie 1762, din porunca lui Grigore vodă Callimachi (1761-1764), de către logoșatul Gheorgachi, in KOGĂLNICEANU, M., *Cronicile României sau Letopisetele Moldovei și Valahiei*, vol. III, Ed. Imprimerie Nationale, Bucharest, 1874, pp. 301, 303, 305, 309-313, 322-323, 328, 332-333; PAPAZOGLU, D., *Istoria fondării orașului București, capitala Regatului Român de la 1330 pînă la 1850*, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 74-75; ȘÂINEANU, L., *Influența orientală asupra limbei și culturii române*, vol. I (*Introducerea*) și II (*Vocabularul*), Bucharest, 1900, pp. CLXI-CLXIII.
- <sup>16</sup> ȘÂINEANU, L., *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. LXXVII.
- <sup>17</sup> See the 10 volumes: α. *Călători străini despre Țările Române*, vol. I-IV, Bucharest, 1968-1972; vol. VI-VIII, Bucharest, 1976-1983; vol. IX, Bucharest, 1997; vol. X (part I and part II), Bucharest, 2000-2001. β. *Călători străini despre Țările Române în secolul al XIX-lea*, new series, vol. I (1801-1821), Bucharest, 2004; vol. II (1822-1830), Bucharest, 2005; vol. III (1831-1840), Bucharest, 2006.
- <sup>18</sup> α. URECHIA, V. A., *Istoria românilor*, vol. I (1774-1786), Bucharest, 1891, pp. 283-284; vol. II (1774-1786), Bucharest, 1892, pp. 10-13; vol. III (1786-1800), Bucharest, 1892, pp. 19-22; vol. XII (1800-1830), Bucharest, 1898, pp. 461-463; *Idem, Din Domnia lui Ioan Caragea. Venirea la tron. Mișcări contra grecilor. Finanțe. 1812-1818*, in “Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice”, s. II, t. XXII, 1897-1898 [1899], pp. 11-14; etc.. β. KOGĂLNICEANU, M., *op. cit.*
- <sup>19</sup> For Phanariot music, I have used the following collections of manuscripts and printed books: Monastery of Vatopedi – Mount of Athos: ms. no. 1426 (Anthology – *Hierographikē Harmonia* [*Hierographic Harmony*], dated 1806 – 1808); ms. no. 1427 (Anthology – *Hiera Apechēmata* [*Sacred Intonations*], dated 1810); ms. no. 1428 (*Melpomenē*, dated 1818); ms. no. 1429 (Anthology – *Terpsichorēs paignion* [*Play of Terpsichore*], dated 1818); the National Library in Bucharest: ms. no. 17.476 (Anthology of ecclesiastical chants, dated 1820); The Romanian Academy Library in Bucharest: Gr. ms. no. 370 (begin. 19th c.); Gr. ms. no. 653 (begin. 19th c.); Gr. ms. no. 784 (Anthology of secular songs, begin. of the 19th century); Gr. ms. no. 925 (second half of 18th c.); Gr. ms. no. 927 (before 1778); Gr. ms. no. 1349

- (19th c.); Gr. ms. no. 1561 (first half of 19th c.); Rom. ms. no. 2238 (first half of 19th c.); the Metropolitan Church Library of Moldavia and Suceava, Iași: no. 129 (Anthology of secular songs, dated 1813); *Euterpe* (Constantinople, 1830), *Pandora* (Constantinople, 1843) and *Armonia* (Constantinople, 1848).
- <sup>20</sup> Speaking of the noble and profitable book trade in the Levant, in which were engaged ambassadors, consuls, churchmen, booksellers, merchants, etc., the attaché of the French Embassy to Constantinople and "antiquarian to the King" Antoine Galland mentions the following in the seventh decade of the seventeenth century: "In Constantinople and in the adjacent areas there are many Greek manuscripts, either in the hands of the Turks, who have taken them from the Christians, or the Greeks, in particular monks and priests and their heirs, and both the one and the other are desirous to sell", in A. GALLAND, *Journal ... pendant son séjour à Constantinoples* (1672 – 1673), publié et adnoté par Charles Schefer, t. I, Paris, 1881, p. 275.
- <sup>21</sup> See, in this respect, the chapter *Indicii intelectuali ai Turcocratiei: cartea, in CÂNDEA, V., Răjiunea dominantă. Contribuții la istoria umanismului românesc*, Ed. Dacia – Cluj – Napoca, 1979, pp. 244 – 248.
- <sup>22</sup> COSMA, - L., O., *Hronicul muziciei românești* (1784-1823), vol. II, Ed. Muzicală a Uniunii Compozitorilor, Bucharest, 1974, p. 101.
- <sup>23</sup> THORTON, Th. calls this ensemble "the prince's military music", in Idem, *The Present State of Turkey; or a Description of the Political, Civil, and Religion Constitution, Government, and Laws, of the Ottoman Empire ... Together with Geographical, Political and Civil State of the Principalities of Moldavia and Walachia...*, London, Printed for J. Mawman, 1807, p. 410.
- <sup>24</sup> BEZVICONI, C., Gh., *Călători ruși în Moldova și Muntenia*, Bucharest, 1947, p. 131; SĂINEANU, L., *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. CLXII, n. 2.
- <sup>25</sup> "The Prince (Ioan Gheorghe Caragea – author's note) has his own music which was presented to him by the Porte as a sign of honour..." in L. von STÜRMER, *Călătoria prin Transilvania și Tara Românească (1816)*, in *Călători străini despre Tările Române în secolul al XIX-lea*, vol. I (1801-1821), Bucharest, 2004, p. 715.
- <sup>26</sup> For details and bibliographic references, see C. NEAGOE, *Muzică și societate în Tara Românească și Moldova (1550-1830)*, Ed. Istros, Brăila, 2008, pp. 34-37 and in particular footnote 29.
- <sup>27</sup> Although Evliyâ ÇELEBI mentions the fact that the Prince of Wallachia, Gregorios I Ghica (1660-1664; 1672-1673), was the first prince appointed by the Sublime Porte to receive the gift of a *mehterhâne*, it seems that the same privilege had been granted to princes since the time of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1494-1566). Idem, *Cartea de călătorii (Seyahâtnâme)*, in *Călători străini...*, vol. VI, part II, Bucharest, 1976, pp. 630-632, 712. C. NEAGOE proposes a date prior even to this sultan: 1485, in idem, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

- <sup>28</sup> COSMA V. gives even the fourteenth to fifteenth century, in Idem, *Două milenii de muzică pe pământul României. Introducere în istoria muzicii românești*, Bucharest, 1977, p. 28.
- <sup>29</sup> Certainly, most of the performers were of Ottoman origin, and some were even gypsies from the Danube *rāyās*, such as the “three gypsy *surlariDocumenta Romaniae Historica, B. Tara Românească*, vol. XXXII, Bucharest, 2001, p. 40. To these must be added a percentage that originated from the slave women brought from Istanbul and in the personal service of the princes’ wives (IFTIMI, S., *Roabele orientale de la curtea doamnei [sec. XVI-XVIII]*, in *Omagiu istoricului Dan BERINDEI*, ed. H. Dumitrescu, Focșani, 2001, pp. 20-35), as well as from the south-Danube Christian and Ottoman mercenaries employed in the princes’ retinues (RAZACHEVICI, C., “Mercenarii în oștile românești în evul mediu”, in *Revista de istorie*, t. 34, no. 1, 1981, pp. 37-73).
- <sup>30</sup> HURMUZAKI, E., *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor. Rapoarte consulare prusiene din Iași și București*, vol. X (1763-1844), N. IORGĂ ed., Bucharest, 1897, p. 537. See also footnote 29.
- <sup>31</sup> PAPAZOGLU, D., *op. cit.*, p. 74.
- <sup>32</sup> In KREUCHELEY L., *Explications des boyars Valaques. Muzica turcească a domnului*, in HURMUZAKI, E., *op. cit.*, vol. X, p. 537.
- <sup>33</sup> CANTEMIR, D., *Descrierea Moldovei*, Iași, 1858, pp. 184, 190. See also the comments of O. L. Cosma on this problem in *Hronicul muzicii românești*, vol. II, pp. 105-106.
- <sup>34</sup> ÇELEBI, E., *op. cit.*, p. 713.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 719.
- <sup>36</sup> FELDMAN, W., *Music of the Ottoman Court: Makam, Composition and the early Ottoman Instrumental Repertoire*, in the collection *Intercultural Music Studies* 10. Ed. by Max Peter Baumann. International Institute for Traditional Music, Berlin, Verlag für Wissenschaft und Bildung, 1996, p. 49.
- <sup>37</sup> In this period, Miron was paid eighty *kuruş* per month. In FELDMAN, W., *op. cit.*, p. 131.
- <sup>38</sup> AND, M., *Osmanlı Şenliklerde Türk Sanatları (Turkish Arts in Ottoman Festivities)*. Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1982, p. 166.
- <sup>39</sup> YEKTA, R., “La Musique Turque”. In *Encyclopédie de la Musique et Dictionnaire de Conservatoire (Lavignac)*, vol. 5. Delgrave, Paris, 1921, p. 3014.
- <sup>40</sup> RICE, E., “Representations of Janissary Music (Mehter) as Musical Exoticism in Western Compositions (1670-1824)”, in *Journal of Musicological Research*, no. 19, 1999, p. 3. In the West, Mehter music and its imitations are also sometimes called Janissary music.
- <sup>41</sup> INALCIC, H. states that Ottoman ceremonial music was made up of two categories of instrumentalist “flag-bearers (*alem mehterleri*)” and “those

that stretch out the tents (*çadir mehterleri*)” (Idem, *Imperiul Otoman. Epoca clasică, 1300-1600*, Bucharest, 1996, p. 117). See also VEINSTEIN G. who calls them “musicians of the standard (*mehterân-i alem*)” and “musicians of the tent (*mehterân-i khayme*)” (Idem, *Imperiul în secolul de aur: secolul al XVIII-lea*, in *Istoria Imperiului Otoman...*, p. 159).

<sup>42</sup> WRIGHT, Al. G., and Stanley NEWCOMB, *Bands of the World*. The Instrumentalist Co. Evanston, IL 1970, p. 31.

<sup>43</sup> *Mehterhâne: The Military Band of the Turkish Army*. Anonymous. (Turkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu. Istanbul, 1971), p. 30.

<sup>44</sup> There are two possible derivations for the word *mehter* itself: some have it coming from the Persian word *mahi-ter*, which means new moon or crescent, while others trace the word from the Persian *mihter*, for footman (*Mehterhâne*, *op. cit.* p. 25). The word *mehter* is now used to refer both to the ensemble itself as well as to the genre of music it plays (RICE, E., *op. cit.* p. 46).

<sup>45</sup> SULZER, F., J., *Geschichte des transalpinischen Daciens, das ist, der Walachey, Moldau und Bessarabiens im Zusammenhange mit der Geschichte des übrigen Daciens als ein Versuch einer allgemeinen Dacischen Geschichte, mit kritischer Freiheit entworfen*, von F. I. Sulzer, ehemalingen K. K. Hauptmann und Auditor. See the Romanian translation by Gemma Zinveliu, with the title *Fr. J. Sulzer în Dacia Cisalpină și Transalpină*, Ed. Uniunii Compozitorilor și Muzicologilor din România, Bucharest, 1995, p. 155.

<sup>46</sup> METEŞ, ř., *Emigrări româneşti în Transilvania din secolul XII până în secolul XX*, Bucharest, Ed. Știinţifică și Enciclopedică, 1973, p. 161.

<sup>47</sup> SULZER, F., J., *op. cit.*, p. 155. See, also, BURADA, T., *op. cit.*, p. 238.

<sup>48</sup> ALEXANDRU, T., *Instrumentele populare ale poporului român*, E.S.P.L.A., Bucharest, 1956, p. 256.

<sup>49</sup> *Military Museum (Askeri Müze)*, Askeri Müze Ve Kültür Sitesi Komutanglığı, İstanbul, 1993, p. 142. See, also, *Encyclopédie de L' Islam*, n.e., vol. VI, établie avec le concours de principaux orientalistes par C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, B. Lewis et Ch. Pellat, Leiden – Paris, 1991, p. 999. For details regarding the history of this formation in the Ottoman Empire see *Encyclopédie de L' Islam*, p. 1000; C. NEAGOE, pp. 70-71.

<sup>50</sup> BURADA, T., “Cercetări asupra muzicii ostăşeşti la români”, in Idem, *Opere*, vol. I, part I, Ed. Muzicală a Uniunii Compozitorilor și Muzicologilor, Bucharest, 1974, p. 243. In fact, the efforts to modify the structure of court music, to reorganise the *mehterhâne* and to introduce European-style brass bands within military garrisons began in 1823, when Pietro Ferlendis (1800-1848) received authorisation from the princely court of Wallachia (COSMA, O.-L., *Hronicul muzicii româneşti*, vol. III, *Preromantismul [1823-1859]*, Ed. Muzicală, Bucharest, 1975, pp. 154-155). The final decision was, however, taken by Prince Alexandru Ghika, who in 1838 issued an *oukase*

to replace the *mehterhâne* with “music of the Stab and the palace orchestra” (G. BREAZUL, *Pagini din istoria muzicii românești*, vol. I, Ed. Muzicală, Bucharest, 1966, p. 100).

51 BREAZUL, G., *op. cit.*, p. 100.

52 COSMA, - L., O., *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 101.

53 MAXIM, M., “Cristalizarea instituției sultanele în Imperiul otoman (sec. XIV-XVI)”, in *Studii și articole de istorie*, LVII-LVIII, 1988, p. 184.

54 SIMONESCU, D., *Literatura românească de ceremonial. Condica lui Gheorgachi* (1762). *Studiu și text*, Bucharest, 1939, p. 266. Likewise, see the appointment of Grigore Callimaki (1761-1764; 1767-1769) to the throne of Moldavia: “And as he sat upon the throne, they began to fire canons and the *mehterhâne* played”, in PSEUDO-KOGĂLNICEANU, E., *Letopisul Tării Moldovei de la domnia întâi și până la a patra domnie a lui Constantin Mavrocordat Voevod* (1733-1774), in *Cronici moldovenești* (Aurora Ilieș & Ioana Zmeu eds.), Bucharest, 1987, p. 1.

55 DJUVARA, N., *op. cit.*, p. 41.

56 SIMONESCU, D., *op. cit.*, pp. 270-271.

57 *Ibid.*, pp. 294; 278, 280-283; 270-271; 285-286. DE LA CROIX, *Relație despre provinciile Moldova și Valahia, 1676, mai 4, Constantinopol*, in *Călători străini...*, vol. VII, Bucharest, 1980, p. 265.

58 BURADA, T., *op. cit.*, pp. 238-239.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 306.

60 *Ibid.*, p. 308.

61 CANTEMIR, D., *Descrierea Moldovei*, Iași, 1858, p. 200.

62 RÂMNICEANU, N., *Corespondența moldoveanului cu munteanul (Scrisoarea moldoveanului, august 1818)*, in *Izvoare narrative interne privind revoluția din 1821 condusă de Tudor Vladimirescu*, Craiova, 1987, p. 31.

63 CORFUS, I., *Cronica androneștilor*, Bucharest, 1947, p. 39.

64 BARDILI, J., W., *Călătorie prin Moldova* (1709), in *Călători străini...*, vol. VIII, Bucharest, 1983, p. 270.

65 See, for example, the account of an anonymous Ottoman traveller to the Court of Wallachia during the second reign of Constantine Mavrocordat (1735-1741), in *Relație anonimă turcă despre Țara Românească, Moldova și Buceag, 1740*, in *Călători străini...*, vol. IX, p. 263.

66 NEAGOE, C., *op. cit.*, p. 70.

67 See, for example, REINHARD, K., “Turkish Miniatures as Sources of Music History”. In *East and West. Essays in Honor of Walter Kaufman*. Festschrift Series 3, 1981, pp. 143-166; P. LAWRENCE, *Folk Musical Instruments of Turkey*. Oxford University Press, New York, 1975.

68 The old musical forms and instruments in the Ottoman music went out of fashion and new ones came into vogue. For instance, the lifetime of the *kopuz* which was the ancestor of all string instruments in classical and folk

music lasted only up until the eighteenth century. The *ud*, which was so popular between the tenth and the sixteenth centuries, was, by and large, replaced by *tanbur* at the end of the seventeenth century, only to re-emerge two centuries later. The historical Turkish harp, *çeng*, and the Turkish Pan pipes, the *miskal*, became obsolete in the nineteenth century, whereas the *santur* faced the same fate in the twentieth century. Among those instruments which entered the classical music in the twentieth century, we can see the *keman* as a *viola d' amore* which was imported from the West under the name of *sînekemanı*, the viola, cello and bass, and the *kemençe* and *lavta* which were accompanying instruments for the palace dances, called *köçekçe* and *tavşanca*.

<sup>69</sup> NEAGOE, C., *op. cit.*, p. 70.

<sup>70</sup> SULZER, F., J., *op. cit.*, p. 158.

<sup>71</sup> In Romanian, see POPESCU-JUDET, E., *Dimitrie Cantemir. Cartea științei muzicii*, Ed. Muzicală, Bucharest, 1974.

<sup>72</sup> CANTEMIR, D., *Istoria Imperiului Otomanu. Crescerea și scăderea lui*, in *Operele principelui Demetru Cantemir*, vol. III, trans. I. Hodosiu, Bucharest, 1876, p. 13, footnote 8.

<sup>73</sup> SULZER, F., J., *op. cit.*, pp. 156-157.

<sup>74</sup> ÇELEBI, E., *op. cit.*, p. 475.

<sup>75</sup> MARCO, I., *Raport despre ceremoniile obișnuite la sosirea și intrarea oficială a unui domn al Țării Românești, 1819*, în *Călători străini...*, Sec. XIX, vol. I, p. 798.

<sup>76</sup> SIMONESCU, D., *op. cit.*, p. 282; MARCO, I., *op. cit.*, pp. 797-798.

<sup>77</sup> NEAGOE, C., *op. cit.*, p. 81.

<sup>78</sup> Alaiul la intrarea lui Ipsilante, 3 februarie 1775, in V. A. URECHIA, *Istoria românilor*, vol. II (1774-1786), Bucharest, 1892, p. 10.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>81</sup> See footnote 12 and the bibliography cited there.

<sup>82</sup> FOTINO, D., *Istoria generală a Daciei sau a Transilvaniei, Țerei Muntenești și a Moldovei*. Trans. G. Sion, Bucharest, 1859, p. 98.

<sup>83</sup> *Istoria Țării Românești*, Bucharest, 1859, pp. 254-259, 306 și 311.

<sup>84</sup> BELDIMAN, A., "Eterie sau jalnicele scene prilejuite în Moldova din răsvrătirile Grecilor, prin șeful lor Alexandru Ipsilanti, venit din Rusia la anul 1821", in *Buciumul Român*, Iași, 1861, p. 16.

<sup>85</sup> NEAGOE, C., *op. cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>86</sup> GARFIAS, Robert, "Survivals of Turkish characteristics in Romanian *muzica lăutărească*", in *Yearbook for traditional music* (1981), pp. 97-107.

<sup>87</sup> The vocal/instrumental compositions of the music of the Ottoman court come under the term *fasıl*, which in effect designates a suite of compositions whose structure fluctuated from one century to another. Thus, the *fasıl* of the later

seventeenth century included: 1. a *taksîm instrumental* (*an improvisatory form for both voice and instruments*); 2. one or two *peşrevs* (*a prelude*); 3. A vocal *taksîm*; 4. A *beste* (*vocal genre*); 5. A *nakş* (*vocal genre*); 6. A *kâr* (*vocal genre*); 7. A *semâ'î* (*vocal form*); 8. An *instrumental semâ'î*; 9. A vocal *taksîm*. From the late eighteenth century, the order and structure of the *fasıl* changed, and we find the following Ottoman musical terminology: 1. An *instrumental taksâm*; 2. a *peşrev*; 3. a *vocal taksâm* (*optional*); 4. a *birinci beste* or *kâr*; 5. a *ikinci beste*; 6. an *ağır semâ'î*; 7. a *small suite* (*taksîm*) of *şarkı*; 8. a *yürük semâ'î*; 9. an *instrumental semâ'î* (*saz semâ'î*); 10. a *vocal taksîm* (*optional*). W. FELDMAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 180, 183.

- 88 FELDMAN, W., *op. cit.*, p. 10.  
89 POSLUŞNICU, M., *op. cit.*, p. 548.  
90 ŞÂINEANU, L., *op. cit.*, p. CLXIV  
91 BEZVICONI, C., G., *op. cit.*, p. 131.  
92 SIMONESCU, D., *op. cit.*, p. 311.  
93 ŞÂINEANU, L., *op. cit.*, p. CXX.  
94 LANGERON, A.-de, *Jurnalul campaniilor făcute în serviciul Rusiei în 1790, in Călători străini...*, vol. X, Part II, Bucharest, 2001, p. 939.  
95 SIBTHORP, J., *Călătoria prin Banat, Transilvania și Țara Românească (1794)*, in *Călători străini...*, vol. X, Part II, p. 1208.  
96 DALAWAY, J., *Călătoria prin Banat, Transilvania și Țara Românească (1794)*, in *Călători străini...*, vol. X, Part II, p. 1216.  
97 LAGARDE, A.-de, *Scrisori către Jules Griffith (1813)*, in *Călători străini... Sec. XIX*, vol. I, p. 570.  
98 CRAVEN, E., *Trecerea prin Țara Românească*, in *Călători străini...*, vol. X, Part I, Bucharest, 2000, p. 721.  
99 *Ibid.*  
100 BARDILI, J., W., *Călătorie prin Moldova (1709)*, in *Călători străini...*, vol. VIII, p. 270.  
101 BEZVICONI, C., G., *op. cit.*, p. 134.  
102 See in this respect the excellent studies of A. DUȚU, *Coordonate ale culturii românești în secolul al XVIII-lea*, Bucharest, 1968, and Idem, *Sinteză și originalitate în cultura română (1650-1848)*, Bucharest, 1972.  
103 See the excellent book by CAMARIANO – CIORAN, A., *Academiiile Domnești din București și Iași*, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, Bucharest, 1971.  
104 The best-known Greek composers of Ottoman music are *hoça Angeli* [*professor in Turkish*] (1610 - 1690), who taught D. Cantemir for approximately fifteen years; *Stravogeorgis*, or *Blind George* (c. 1680 – d. 1760), and, above all, *Zacharya Chanende* [*singer in Turkish*] (c. 1680 – d. 1740).  
105 GOLESCU, I., *Povătuiri pentru buna-cuvîință*, Bucharest, 1975, p. 128.

- <sup>106</sup> CHRISTMAS, F., S., apud. O. PAPADIMA, "Viața socială a Bucureștilor în prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea și folclorul bucureștean", in: *Studii și cercetări de istorie literară și folclor*, no. 3-4, year 7, Bucharest, 1959, p. 446.
- <sup>107</sup> FILIMON, N., *Ciocoi vechi și noi sau ce naște din pisică șoarici mănâncă*, Ed. ErcPress, Bucharest, 2009, pp. 112-113.
- <sup>108</sup> CARTOJAN, N., "Contribuționi privitoare la originile liricii românești în Principate", in: *Revista filologică*, year 1, Czernowitz, 1927, p. 195.
- <sup>109</sup> See PIRU, A., *Poeții Văcărești*, Bucharest, 1967, pp. 32-33.
- <sup>110</sup> PAPADIMA, O., *Ipostaze ale Iluminismului românesc*, Bucharest, 1975, p. 122.
- <sup>111</sup> ALECSANDRI, V., *Zimbrul*, I (1850 – 1851), Iași, p. 249.
- <sup>112</sup> CAMPENHAUSEN, L., P., B.-von, *Despre cele văzute, trăite sau auzite în Moldova (1790-1791)*, in *Călători străini...*, vol. X, part II, p. 883.
- <sup>113</sup> KOGĂLNICEANU, M., *Schijă despre tigani*, trans. Gh. Ghibănescu, Iași, 1900, pp. 19-20.
- <sup>114</sup> SULZER, F., J., *op. cit.*, p. 92.
- <sup>115</sup> As a matter of information, it can be pointed out that the dancers, instrumentalists and singers of the Sultan's Palace and, in particular, the Seraglio, were slave girls of non-Muslim origin. Of the category of women who composed music, the sources record Dilhayât Hanim or Dilhayât Kalfa (b. 1710? – d. 1780) as the most important woman composer in the entire history of Ottoman music. FELDMAN, W., *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.
- <sup>116</sup> BĂNESCU, N., *Viața și opera lui Daniel (Dimitrie) Philippide. Cartea sa despre pământul românesc*, Cartea Românească, Bucharest, 1924, p. 164.
- <sup>117</sup> GIURĂSCU, C., G., *Istoria românilor*, vol. III, Bucharest, 2003, p. 405. See, also, the study by ȘERBAN, C., "Despre vătășia lăutarilor din Țara Românească în secolul al XVIII-lea", in *Studii și cercetări de istoria artei (SCIA)* VII, no. 2, 1960, pp. 226-228.
- <sup>118</sup> DIDOV, G., P., *Scurte însemnări despre Tara Românească. Cu privire la numărul populației, venituri, dări, fertilitatea și comerțul acestei țări (1808)*, in *Călători străini.... Sec. XIX*, vol. I, p. 445.
- <sup>119</sup> ACHIM, V., *Tiganii în istoria României*, Bucharest, 1998, p. 61.
- <sup>120</sup> SAVA, S., "Însemnări privitoare la condiția socială a lăutarilor la sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea și începutul secolului al XIX-lea", in *SCIA*, I, nos. 1-2, 1954, p. 234.
- <sup>121</sup> WILKINSON, W., *Relațiile despre Principatele Țării Românești și Moldovei (1820)*, in *Călători străini.... Sec. XIX*, vol. I, p. 640.
- <sup>122</sup> ALEXANDRU, T., *op. cit.*, p. 98.
- <sup>123</sup> SĂINEANU, L., *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. CLXIV.
- <sup>124</sup> From the eighteenth century onward, in particular. See, R. CHIRCOIAȘIU, *Contribuții la istoria muzicii românești*, vol. I, Bucharest, 1963, p. 203.

- <sup>125</sup> IORGA, N., "O gospodărie moldovenească la 1777, după socotelile cronica-  
rului Ionită Canta", in *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii  
Istorice*, s. III, t. VIII, 1927-1928, p. 113.
- <sup>126</sup> The celebrated *taraf* of Niculescu at the court of Karatzea Vodă, made up,  
it seems, partly of Transylvanians. See A. ALEXIANU, *Mode și veșminte din  
trecut. Cinci secole de istorie costumară românească*, vol. II, Bucharest,  
1971, p. 151.
- <sup>127</sup> RECORDON, F., *Scrisori despre Tara Românească (1815-1821)*, in *Călători  
străini.... Sec. XIX.*, vol. I, p. 673.
- <sup>128</sup> OBEDEANUL, C., V., *Grecii în Tara Românească, cu o privire generală  
asupra stării culturale până la 1717*, Bucharest, 1900, p. 908.
- <sup>129</sup> POTRA, G., *Documente privitoare la istoria orașului București (1634-1800)*,  
Bucharest, 1982, p. 431, document no. 358.
- <sup>130</sup> Direcția Județeană a Arhivelor Naționale Dâmbovița, *Colecția de documente*,  
f. 1-2, doc. 189.
- <sup>131</sup> *Documente privind istoria României. Răscoala din 1821. Documente interne*,  
vol. III, Bucharest, 1960, p. 144.
- <sup>132</sup> OLĂNESCU, C., D., *Teatrul la români*, Bucharest, 1981, pp. 91-92.
- <sup>133</sup> GHICA, I., *Opere*, vol. I, *Clasicii români*, ESPLA, Bucharest, 1956, p. 145.
- <sup>134</sup> REIMERS, H.-von, *Scrisoarea a VII-a, Iași, 25 iunie, 1793*, in *Călători străini....*  
vol. X, Part II, pp. 1153.
- <sup>135</sup> URECHIA, V. A., *Istoria românilor*, vol. II (1774-1786), pp. 11-12.
- <sup>136</sup> OBEDEANUL, C., V., *op. cit.*, p. 909.
- <sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 460-461.
- <sup>138</sup> GANE, A., *Trecute vieți de doamne și domnite*, vol. II, Kishinev, 1991, pp.  
232-233.
- <sup>139</sup> KOTZBUE, W.-de, *Lascăr Viorescu, roman din viața Moldovei (1851)*, p.  
212 ff.
- <sup>140</sup> I would like to mention here, for example, musicians such as Antonios  
Dirmitzoglou – a protopsaltēs in Wallachia in the seventeenth century,  
Dimitrios Ioannou, Bishop Germanos Neon Patron, who arrived in Bucharest,  
accompanied by his apprentice Iovașcu Vlachos, the protopsaltēs of the  
Wallachian Court (πρωτοψάλτης της Ονυγροβιλαχίας Κούρτης) - he would  
also die there, Ioannēs Kampazourna – pupil of Chrysaphes the Younger,  
Damianos Hieromonk Vatopedinos who would occupy for a long time the  
position of First Chanter at the Moldavian Metropolitan Church, Athanasios  
the Ecumenical Patriarch, Nikēphoros Marthales, Anastasios Rapsaniotēs,  
Chourmouzios the Priest, Evgenios Hieromonk Peloponnesios – psaltēs of  
the Metropolitan Church in Wallachia in 1787, Gerasimos Hieromonk –  
didaskalos at the Princely Academy of St Sabbas in Iași (year 1813) during  
the reign of Prince George Karatza, Agapios Paliermos of Chios (+1815)  
– one of the first reformers of the church music, Athanasios Photineos  
that took the position of Domestikos of the Great Church during 1784 –

1785, and then the role of personal physician to the sultan Abdul Hamit in Constantinople until the Sultan's death in 1789, together with his two sons Dionysios Photeinos and Antonios Photeinos, Petros Byzantios Fygas and Nikēphoros Kantouniarēs in Iași, Petros Manuēl Ephesios, Theodorakis Kastrino, Panagiotis (Pangratie) Eggiurliu etc. For details, see my article "The Byzantine Chant in the Romanian Principalities during the Phanariot Period (1711-1821)", in *Composing and Chanting in Orthodox Church, Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Orthodox Church Music*, The International Society of Orthodox Church Music & University of Joensuu, Finland, 2009, pp. 65-97.

- <sup>141</sup> PĂLTINESCU, Ș., "Musichia", in: *Buciumul Romanu, anul I*, ed. Theodor Codrescu, Iași, 1875, p. 465.
- <sup>142</sup> BURADA T. T., "Cronica muzicală a orașului Iași (1780 – 1860)", in: *Convorbiri literare*, Iași, 21, no. 12, March, 1888, pp. 1061-1101; republished in *Idem, OPERE* vol. I, Part I, Ed. Muzicală a Uniunii Compozitorilor, Bucharest, 1974, p. 142.
- <sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 142.
- <sup>144</sup> This musician studied the tambura in Constantinople. Cf. T. T. BURADA, *op. cit.*, pp. 141 – 142; M. Gr. POSLUŞNICU, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
- <sup>145</sup> BURADA, T., *op. cit.*, p. 142.
- <sup>146</sup> VIZANTI, A., *Veniamin Costaki. Mitropolit Moldovei și Sucevei. Epoca, viață și operile sale (1768 – 1846)*. Iași, 1881, p. 110.
- <sup>147</sup> BURADA T. T., "Cercetări asupra danțurilor și instrumentelor de muzică ale românilor", in *Idem, Opere*, vol. I, Part I, p. 114.
- <sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.
- <sup>149</sup> CARTOJAN, N., *op. cit.*, p. 195.
- <sup>150</sup> ODOBESCU, AL. I., *Opere*, I, Ed. pentru Literatură și Artă, Bucharest, 1955, p. 247, note 2.
- <sup>151</sup> GHICA, I., "Școala acum 50 de ani", in *Convorbiri literare*, no. 6, 1st September, 1880, republished in *Anton Pann – între spiritul balcanic și mirajul Europei*, ed. C. Mohanu, Ed. Ager, Bucharest, 2005, p. 43.
- <sup>152</sup> The collection was published in two editions: the first contains eighty-eight pieces, divided into two brochures, of which only sixty have the melody notated (Bucharest, 1850), the second comprising six brochures containing one hundred and sixty-six melodies (Bucharest, 1852). See also the new edition of *Spitalului amorului sau cântătorul dorului* by A. Pann, Ed. Compania, Bucharest, 2009. Foreword by Nicolae Gheorghită.
- <sup>153</sup> CIOBANU, G., *Anton Pann. Cîntece de lume*, trans. into staff notation by Gh. Ciobanu, Ed. de Stat pentru Literatură și Artă, Bucharest, 1955, p. 6.
- <sup>154</sup> SION, G., *Suvenire contimpurane*, Ed. Minerva, Bucharest, 1973, vol. II, pp. 214 – 215.

- <sup>155</sup> For more details, see O. PAPADIMA, *Anton Pann – “Cântece de lume” și folclorul Bucureștilor. Studiu istorico-critic*. Ed. Academiei Republicii Populare Române, Bucharest, 1963.
- <sup>156</sup> DEMARAS, C., *History of Modern Greek Literature*, London, 1974, p. 176.
- <sup>157</sup> ΤΣΑΝΤΣΑΝΟΓΛΟΥ, Ε., *Αθανάσιος Χρηστόπουλος: Λυρικά*, in *Νέα Ελληνική Βιβλιοθήκη* II, Athens, 1970, pp. 7-32.
- <sup>158</sup> PLEMMENOS, J., G., “Micro-music of the Ottoman Empire: the case of the Phanariot Greeks of Istanbul”, PhD, St Edmund’s College, Cambridge, July 2001, p. 90.
- <sup>159</sup> CAMARIANO, A., *Academile domnești...*, pp. 82-85.
- <sup>160</sup> Postelnik was the office of minister and master of ceremonies at court in Danubian Principalities, in W. WILKINSON, *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia*, London, 1820, p. 48.
- <sup>161</sup> ΒΡΑΝΟΥΣΗΣ, Λ., *Oι Πρόδρομοι*, in *Βασική Βιβλιοθήκη*, vol. XI, Athens, 1956, p. 42.
- <sup>162</sup> CAMARIANO, A., *Influența poeziei lirice grecești asupra celei românești*, Bucharest, 1935.
- <sup>163</sup> GHICA, I., *Din vremea lui Caragea*, in *Scrisori către Vasile Alecsandri*, Bucharest, 1997, p. 56.
- <sup>164</sup> Idem, *Scrieri alese*, ESPLA, Bucharest, 1950, p. 75.
- <sup>165</sup> Rom. ms. no. 421 (mid. 19th c.), Library of Romanian Academy. In PAPADIMA, O., *Anton Pann...*, p. 42, footnote 27.
- <sup>166</sup> DENSUȘIANU, O., *Literatura română modernă*, Bucharest, 1943, p. 431.
- <sup>167</sup> IORGA, N., *Două poezii necunoscute ale lui Ienăchiță Văcărescu*, in vol. *Omagiu lui I. Bianu*, Bucharest, 1927, p. 228.
- <sup>168</sup> PAPADIMA, O., *Ipostaze...*, p. 119.
- <sup>169</sup> PLEMMENOS, G., J., “Micro-music of the Ottoman Empire...”.
- <sup>170</sup> For details, see N., GHEORGHIȚĂ, “Nikephoros Kantouniaries”, entry in *The Canterbury Dictionary of Hymnology* (forthcoming); Idem, “The Byzantine Chant in the Romanian Principalities ...”; G., J., PLEMMENOS, “The Greek Contribution to the Development of Romanian Music: the Case of Nikephoros Kantouniaries of Chios”, in *AMB IX, CSBI*, May 2006, pp. 135 – 154; Idem, “*Micro-music* of the Ottoman Empire...”.
- <sup>171</sup> Among the non-Greek secular compositions that probably circulated at the Romanian courts, the collections assembled by N. Kantouniaries contain twenty-five such works, as follows: twelve Turkish, eight Arabic, four French, and one Italian.



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## THE RECENT HISTORY OF THE AROMANIANS FROM ROMANIA

The request of an Aromanian association for the recognition of the Aromanian as a national minority in 2005 was really surprising. This request generated a kind of “war” in the Aromanian world. It was again a surprise, because many people are thinking that Aromanians are a monolithic structure.

Generally, the authors who wrote about the Aromanians noticed the difficulty to distinguish them from their neighbors. One reason, according to Irina Nicolau, is that they developed a kind of strategy of ethnic dissimulation. A different opinion, not necessarily divergent, is suggested by Nicolae Șerban Tanașoca. He considers Aromanians the *Homo balcanicus* prototype because of their ties and affinities with all the Balkan populations along the history (and this is why it is difficult to distinguish them from their neighbors). Thede Kahl describes the Aromanians as a “minority that behaves like a majority”, which explains the misunderstanding concerning their identification.

Almost all scholars agree that Aromanians have a hidden identity. The visibility of the Aromanians acquired by the afore-mentioned 2005 request is in contrast with their hidden way of life.

The aim of this study is to explain the strong connection between the settlement of the Aromanians in Romania starting with 1925, and the request for the recognition, made four years ago. We will analyze also how some Aromanians joined the Iron Guard, but only in connection with the aim of the study. All these three events will be revealed through different documents, some of them recently published. The study ends with some conclusions regarding this subject.

I think it would be appropriate to close this introductory passage with an opinion of the great scholar Max Demeter Peyfuss (see Peyfuss 1994: 122) regarding the problem of how the historians can help in the debated issue: “if the Aromanians from Romania are an ethnical/national minority or not”. Peyfuss concludes that “beside his own conscience, there is no scientific way to establish someone’s nationality”.

## Dreaming for a country: How the Aromanian colonization in Romania took place

*"It was the returning way to their homeland, from which they were pulled out since immemorial time by a step-motherly fate"* (Mușă 1935, 2005: 94).<sup>1</sup>

This is the motivation that is usually put into the light when one has to explain the reason why Aromanians came to Romania starting with 1925. In the following, we investigate this cliché in order to see if the main reason of the colonization of the Aromanians in Romania was patriotically motivated. We discover that the economical pressure endured by Aromanians in Greece, was the main reason for their emigration. Even the nationalistic historians are considering the economical motivation strong enough, but not stronger than the patriotic one.

The war between Greece and Turkey (1919-1922) ended with the Lausanne Conference (January 20<sup>th</sup> 1923) that made possible the following population exchange: 380,000 Turks left Greece for Turkey and 1,100,000 Greeks moved from Turkey to Greece. We also have to add to this number another 100,000 Greeks who came to Greece from Russia and Bulgaria. Therefore, the population of Greece increased with approximately 820,000 people (according to Clogg 2006: 112).<sup>2</sup> These people were mainly settled in the region of Macedonia, where many Aromanians lived. According to Clogg (2006: 116), the census carried out in 1928 in Greece showed that almost half of the population of Macedonia was composed of refugees. The economical pressure on the Aromanian shepherds was huge due to the new issue that emerged: the pasture lands rented from the Turks for sheep rising were not available anymore. Tanaşoca (2001: 163-164) describes the process as follows:

*"The Turkish-Greek War that ended with the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 entailed the resettlement in Greek Macedonia of over one million Greeks from Asia Minor.*

*This act was a truly finishing stroke for Macedonian Aromanianism. Aromanian shepherding was destroyed by the parceling of the large pastures so that all the newcomers could receive a piece of land. The latter were protected in the practice of the liberal professions and in trade through a process perceived as a threat by Aromanians who suddenly faced competition."*

Beginning with 1923, some Aromanians from Greece started to ask permission from the Romanian authorities to emigrate in Romania. An Aromanian Congress was held in Veria (Greece) on November 30<sup>th</sup> 1924 and the participants arrived to the conclusion that it was very difficult to live in Greece because of the pastureland issue.

A Committee was created in Bucharest on January 3rd 1925 in order to lobby the Romanian authorities in their favor to accept the emigration of the Aromanians in Romania. The Romanian Government decided on June 13<sup>th</sup> 1925 (Journal No. 1698) to colonize Southern Dobruja.<sup>3</sup> The available land had to be distributed like this: half to the Aromanians and half to the Romanians, only that in the end the Aromanians received approximately one third of the available land and the Romanians two thirds of it.

What did the Aromanians ask as conditions for their emigration? They asked at least 15 hectares for each family, free transportation from their places to Romania, long-term credits for building houses and the intervention of the Romanian authorities to the Greek Government, to compensate the Aromanians for the goods they had left in Greece. What did they get? Every family received 15 hectares on the border region and 10 hectares inside the region of the Southern Dobruja.

There is a debate about the number of the Aromanians who came to Romania during this process (lasting from 1925 to 1943). Many scholars asserted that after 1932 only a few Aromanians emigrated to Romania. Probably they were around 30,000 (approximately 6,000 families).<sup>4</sup> Although the emigration process began in Greece, the first group of Aromanians coming in Romania was from Albania: Bațu family came on July 20<sup>th</sup> 1925 and other 70 families came from Pleasa (Albania)<sup>5</sup> on August 1925.

Surprisingly enough, almost half of the Aromanians who arrived in Romania during that period were from Bulgaria and not from Greece, as we might expect.<sup>6</sup> The fact that Romania earned Southern Dobruja from Bulgaria was the reason that worsened to a great degree the relation between the two countries. Therefore, the pressure endured by the Aromanians from Bulgaria was bigger than the pressure applied by the other Balkan states.

The most important (and reliable) sources describing the emigration process are: Hagigogu S.<sup>7</sup> (1927, 2005), Muști V.<sup>8</sup> (1935, 2005) and Noe C.<sup>9</sup> (1938, 2005), all the three of them being involved in these events.<sup>10</sup>

Although they had been close friends, some disagreements between them are revealed by their writings. After the process of emigration began, another Congress was held in Veria on December 27<sup>th</sup>, 1925.

The Congress appointed Hagigogu as their representative towards the Romanian authorities. Muști (1935, 2005: 114) described this Congress as useless and suggested that mean reasons were behind this meeting, without saying which these mean reasons were. This kind of attitude expressed the rivalry between the Aromanians who were charged with coordinating the colonization process. Concerning the dimension of emigration, for Hagigogu (1927, 2005: 19), as he mentioned, it was a disagreement between him, on one side, and Celea, Muști and Noe, on the other side.

Hagigogu supported the idea of a huge emigration. The other side supported only a restricted colonization. Hagigogu justified his option with economical reasons. The other side sustained its position because the Romanian authorities did not support the emigration as they expected and did not keep their promises concerning the colonization. These points of view generated a discussion on January 1926 and the Muști-Noe-Celea's side won. A communique was released, which stated that it was established that the number of colonized families would be no more than 1,500 in two years. It was the most important disagreement within the Aromanian Committee who promoted the colonization.

The Aromanians who had been living in Romania strongly opposed this emigration. On one side, there were the older Aromanians who left Macedonia when they were young. They were saying that the "fight" must go on and that the Romanian State should support the Aromanians (who at that time lived in the Balkan states) by the old methods (schools, banks, priests and a bishopric). On the other side, there were the young Aromanians born in Romania who were against the colonization process because they thought that Romania needs the Aromanians from the Balkan states for a future enlargement.<sup>11</sup>

Another type of opposition came from the Aromanian journals in Romania: for example, the journal *Macedonia*, published by Naum Nance raised the idea of a future federalist state named "Macedonia"<sup>12</sup> (following the example of Switzerland). Having this as a purpose, it was natural that Nance supported the idea that the Aromanians should remain in their homelands (for this information see Dobrogeanu I., 1994: 23). The following text was written in the journal *Peninsula Balcanică*:

"Did you realize? Do you know what an emigration is? Do you know what to leave forever your homeland means? Your homeland is the place where your parents were born in, the place you have your own houses in. Going to another land is the same as going into the unknown. Do you know

that the land in Romania was given to the peasants and to all those who struggled in war? Do you know that the land is very expensive?<sup>13</sup> There is no more land and no more pastures to be distributed. Did you think well of this decision you are about to make? Do those families have enough money to settle down and live? Are you sure that arriving there, you will not curse the hour when you left?"<sup>14</sup>

The paragraph quoted above is to be found in an article entitled "Around the emigration's stream" and signed by the author with the penname of Turnus. Noe said that the author put these words in the mouth of a politician, only to disguise his ideas. Noe was also thinking that "Turnus" was the penname of Apostol Hagigogu, the director of the journal. Sterie Hagigogu and Apostol Hagigogu were first cousins. If Noe's information is accurate, we are discovering here two cousins with very different ideas.

Founded in 1879, the Macedo-Romanian Cultural Society is the oldest Aromanian Society. While at first the Society showed no enthusiasm for the emigration action, in 1925 it decided to encourage the colonization process.

The Representative of Romania to Athens and some teachers in the Romanian schools in the Balkans (see Noe C. 1938, 2005: 43) unexpectedly opposed the colonization.

During the colonization process, Aromanians complained with regard to the behavior of the Romanian authorities. On their turn, the Romanian authorities complained about the behavior of the Aromanian leaders. We can see this in Drăghicescu A., Petre M. (2004: 432; document no. 145, dated May 27<sup>th</sup> 1927). The document is a report of the Minister of Instruction addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding the harsh situation of the Macedo-Romanians in Greece who lost the pastures to the Greek Refugees of Asia Minor.

In this report one can find accusations against unnamed Aromanian leaders saying that they had malicious goals and second thoughts when describing Romania as the "Promised Land". The document also describes the case of two Aromanians (Dimitrie Cațara and Costa Gheorghită) who came to Romania to prospect the conditions offered. They saw what the real situation was and they decided to return to Greece. The Minister of Instruction asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs to help the aforementioned Aromanians to return to Greece (the problem was that they already had signed a paper in order to leave Greece for Romania).

Regarding the situation of the Macedo-Romanians of Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria, we found proposals for the future concerning the

Aromanian Question in a document (Drăghicescu A., Petre M. 2004: 454-475; document no. 153) which consists of excerpts of the report presented by the inspectors I. Max Popovici<sup>15</sup> and Victor Brabeteanu.<sup>16</sup> They wrote this report after a trip they made in 1929 to the afore-mentioned countries.

The report also comprises the accusation against two Aromanian leaders (G. Celea and D. Kehaia) that they described Romania as the "Promised Land" (p. 459). At page 466 we find the recommendation that such unofficial persons be removed from the emigration process. At the same page, there is a quotation of Langa Răscănu, the Romanian Minister to Athens, who asked for prudence and patience regarding the colonization in Romania. He also warned against pushing Aromanians from Greece to emigrate to Romania.<sup>17</sup>

The Popovici and Brabeteanu report includes a strange accusation against Kehaia by Brabeteanu – strange because Brabeteanu assisted Kehaia in his mission to help Aromanians emigrate from Greece to Romania (see details in Noe C. 1938, 2005: 56-59).

A very interesting remark (p. 459) is that the Aromanians who came to Romania belonged to both sides: to those who thought that the Aromanians are Romanians and to those who thought that the Aromanians are Greeks. This questions the thesis that only "those Aromanian who were still keen on their Romania decided to emigrate to Romania." (Tanașoca Ș. N. 2001: 164).

In the conclusive chapter, Popovici and Brabeteanu recommended an economical approach to the Aromanian Issue and also the giving up of the nationalistic approach. They imagined a future commercial expansion of Romania with the Aromanians from Balkans playing a major role. According to this goal, it was desirable that the wealthy Aromanians (and those with a good situation) remain in their native places.

For the poorest of them (and those who sold their goods and expected to come to Romania), the Romanian Government had the duty to bring them to Romania. Popovici and Brabeteanu counted 2,000 families in Greece, 500 in Bulgaria and 200 in Yugoslavia that were in this situation (in 1929). They estimated a period of 10-15 years for this action and demanded proper plans to fulfill the colonization.

A very interesting document<sup>18</sup> (Heinen A. 2006: 184, note 48) sheds some light on the 1929 mission of Popovici and Brabeteanu:

"...with this travel, the Romanian Government aims to organize better the emigration of Aromanians ('Cutso-Vlachs' in the text) in Romania, untidy until now, but also to slow down this process. [...] The experiences of the

Romanian Government with the Cutso-Vlachs weren't good. Generally, they kept their violent Macedonian habits, wearing often weapons and troubling the Romanian authorities."

The same type of remarks is found in a memoir written at Siliстра (Durostor County) in 1925 and signed by 33 intellectuals. The memoir warns the Romanian authorities about the mistake of bringing the Aromanians to Romania.

"The Macedo-Romanians, born and grown in Southern Balkans, having Balkan habits, not knowing the Romanian language, with a different character, if we are comparing them with the Romanians from Romania, are not able to develop here any activity to correspond to Romanian national interests. [...] The Aromanians, living so many centuries under the Turks, Greeks and Bulgarians, are nervous, hostile and vengeful."<sup>19</sup>

There were many of quarrels between the Aromanians who wanted to emigrate and the Aromanians who decided to remain in their native places. For example, in a document (Drăghicescu A., Petre M. 2006: 227-228; document no. 76), an incident is related which ends with a trial between the Aromanians who wanted to emigrate and those who decided to remain in Doleani (a village near Veria in Greece); the first side "won".

The author of the document<sup>20</sup> noticed that the Aromanians who wanted to emigrate preferred to give their houses to the Greek Refugees (for almost nothing) instead of Aromanians who wanted to remain in Doleani. This was a result of their will to convince the whole community to leave Doleani and to go to Romania.

Two attempts of the Aromanians who emigrated to Romania to return to their native places are mentioned in the documents. Both of them took place in 1926, the first in August when 84 poor families from Durostor County decided to return to Greece. These families were encouraged by I. Ghibănescu, the County President,<sup>21</sup> who promised them free transport for their return. Noe C. (1938, 2005: 70) describes the event and its psychological mechanism:

"The disappointed colonizers started to regret the decision to come to Romania. The native places with high mountains, green hills and clear waters, seem to them like paradise now. It is human nature to forget the troubles from the past and to focus only on the present problems. Therefore,

some colonizers started to think about returning home, mainly those who were not involved in the national movement."

The returning attempt failed since colonizers, with a nationalistic past, organized a meeting and stopped the returning action. The second attempt took place on November 8<sup>th</sup> of the same year, when 120 Aromanian families left their villages and gathered in Siliстра for returning to their native places. This time it was the Romanian Government which stopped the action and tried after that to improve the life of the colonizers.

An unpleasant event (with consequences further on, as we will see) took place in the spring of 1927: 100 Aromanian families expected more than two months in the harbor of Salonika to receive the approval of coming to Romania. Finally, they arrived to Constanța, on July 17<sup>th</sup> 1927, only after they had signed a paper in which they declared that they didn't come to Romania as colonizers, but as simple citizens. This meant that they would not receive land and assistance of any kind (see Muști V. 1935, 2005: 128).

We will end this chapter with three testimonials. The first one is a popular song which describes the emigration to Romania:

"Armânl'i ditu Vâryârii  
Nchisirâ ti tu-Armânii,  
Ta ș-l'ea locu di vâsilii,  
Ta ș-bâneadzâ isihii." <sup>22</sup>

The song suggests that having and receiving land were the purposes of this emigration. The ambiguous expression "*Ta ș-l'ea locu di vâsilii*" could also mean that, in this way, they will create their own country.

"Our old men are saying that life in Greece was better. They were free; they had 500-1000 sheep..."

This testimony is from 1970 and belongs to an Aromanian from Romania.<sup>23</sup> We feel the regret of this man for the native place of his parents. This regret was born, probably, by the lack of freedom and the lack of property in Romania during the communist regime.

"There were some people who said that in Romania the dogs walk with pretzels on their tails. They left the mountains; they left everything for a better life. This was lying propaganda. I regret that I came to Romania".<sup>24</sup>

This testimony is from 2003. It belongs to an 82 years old man, Vasile Bardu,<sup>25</sup> from M. Kogălniceanu (Constanța County). Interesting enough, when asked about “what Aromanians are in fact?” he answered “Aromanians? Romanians. This is what they are.”

## The Aromanians and the Iron Guard

“Every Aromanian is a legionnaire.”

First we will try to outline a short history for the events which led some Aromanians to join the Iron Guard. The second aim is to see the connection between the emigration process and the adhesion of some Aromanians to the Legion. The third goal of this chapter is to question the cliché that “every Aromanian was a legionnaire”. We will also discuss the problem of the violence of some Aromanians involved in the Legionary Movement.

“All those grown in the national fights from Macedonia, we had in mind the image of a spotless Great Romania (as you can only see from distance). Once arrived in the country, we felt disappointed.”<sup>26</sup>

We can find an interesting (and subjective) description of the reasons why many Aromanians joined the Iron Guard in Papanace C., 1999 (especially the chapter “The Macedo-Romanians in the Legionary Movement”, pp. 66-103; this chapter was originally a conference held in 1960 to commemorate 30 years from the moment when the first Aromanian joined the Iron Guard). We will sketch only the main events.

The above quotation is from Papanace and suggests that the disappointment felt by many Aromanians was the first step in their future commitment. It was a difference between what the students from the Romanian schools from Macedonia learned about Romania and what they found when they arrived in the “Promised Land”. Papanace arrived to Romania in 1925 at the age of 21. He and his colleagues started to attend the Romanian universities and got involved in supporting the Aromanian colonizers who arrived in Romania beginning with the summer of 1925. At first they refused to join any political party.

In the spring of 1927, a delegation of students was for ten days in Sothern Dobruja to show its support for the Aromanian colonizers who settled in the area for the last two years. The delegation was led by Tudose

Popescu (a close friend of Corneliu Codreanu and one of the leaders of the student movement from 1922), Constantin Papanace (at that time Vice-President of the “Association of the Macedo-Romanians students”) and Iancu Caranica (secretary of the afore-mentioned association). A meeting against I. Ghibănescu, the County-President of Durostor, was organized in Silistra. Another meeting against Ghibănescu organized by students was held in Bucharest. In June 1927 Popescu and Papanace were jailed in Jilava prison for two weeks (see Papanace C. 1997: 191-203).

The adhesion of the first Aromanian group to the Legionary Movement took place in the summer of 1930 and it was directly connected with the problem of the Aromanian colonizer in Southern Dobruja. The most common form of property of the land during the Ottoman regime was *mirie*: this was a property of the state which was rented to the people. The problem of land property was not settled during the period when the Southern Dobruja was under the Bulgarian rule (1878-1913).

On April 1<sup>st</sup> 1914, the Romanian state passed the “Law for organizing the New Dobruja (Southern Dobruja)”. Some changes to the law were made on April 22<sup>th</sup> 1924. The main change was that a people who possessed a *mirie* property could own an absolute property only by giving one third of the land to the state (and remaining an absolute owner of the other two thirds) or by paying the value of one third of his land with the maximal price of the market. This is how the Romanian state acquired land for the colonization.

On June 30<sup>th</sup> 1930, the Romanian Parliament voted a change to the afore-mentioned law. This change was perceived by the Aromanians as a violation of their rights. This feeling was strengthened by the fact that the person who proposed this change of the law, Constantin Angelescu, was the Deputy for Caliacra County (and also a State-Secretary in the Ministry for Internal Affairs).

Angelescu was deputy of the National Peasant Party (PNȚ), which was in power at that moment. The National Peasant Party had a strategy to acquire the support of the Bulgarians from Southern Dobruja. The feeling was that the Bulgarians could get back “the third” (of the land) which had been given to the state. In this way the colonizers were in danger to loose their land.

As a result, on July 21<sup>th</sup> 1930, the half-Aromanian student George Beza attempted to the life of C. Angelescu. The attempt failed, Angelescu being only wounded. Beza had leaflets of the Legionary Movement with him. As a consequence, the Police put Corneliu Codreanu in prison, considering

him the moral author of the attempt. He denied any connection with Beza's attempt. He was released. Some articles appeared in the press the next day announced that Codreanu rejected Beza's attempt. Codreanu asserted that he would support Beza and defend him in court. Codreanu was put again in jail.

During these events, a group of seven Aromanians signed a leaflet asserting that Beza's attempt was justified. They were put in prison, too. On July 24<sup>th</sup> 1930, while being transported to the Văcărești jail, they met C. Codreanu. They spent together forty days in prison. The Aromanian group was composed by Constantin Papanace, Iancu Caranica, Grigore Pihu, Anton Ciumenti, Gheorghe Ghitea, Stere Ficăta, and Mamali. After these events they joined the Iron Guard. According to Papanace (1997: 177), Codreanu was impressed by the behavior of those seven Aromanians in jail and said:

"Your moral health is from the source. In the mountains you kept all the treasures of your race. Once, my people were like you. Nowadays they are adulterated in a lot of parts. I would like to heal our people, to have legionnaires like you."

In his book (*Pentru legionari*, Editura Gordian, Timișoara, 1994, p. 438), Codreanu speaks about the problem of the adhesion of many Aromanians to his movement:

"The Macedonians approach us by brave, healthy youngsters who are clean like tears, nevertheless, we think that it is not a good thing that the mass of Macedonians from Quadrilateral join the Legion, since we do not want to expose them to too much oppression. But all the [Aromanian] students joined us".

We have to mention here three conclusions:

- 1) The disappointment was part of the mental process which ended with the adhesion of some Aromanians to the Legionary Movement. This disappointment was connected with the bad management of the colonization process performed by the Romanian authorities.
- 2) Many Aromanians thought that their ethical sense was similar to the ethical sense promoted by the Legion. Many leaders of the Legion thought also that the Aromanians could be a prototype for the "new man" they were looking for.
- 3) The adhesion was important in the world of the Aromanian students.

Next, we will debate the problem of the Aromanian violence. Let us remember that, for some people, the image of the Aromanian was that they are “nervous, hostilely and revengefully”. The same idea was expressed by Emil Cioran in 1972.

*“The Guards of the Dead were mainly uprooted Macedonians; generally, in this Movement the periphery was well represented.”<sup>27</sup>*

In what follows we will analyze the violence of the Aromanians who joined the Iron Guard. We mentioned above Beza’s unsuccessful attempt on Angelescu’s life. Beza was put in jail for one year. After the trial, he was released in July 1931. George Beza (1907-1995) joined the Iron Guard. He acquired the title of “commander” of the Legion, but nevertheless he was excluded from the organization (see Heinen A. 2006: 254). He co-operated for a while with Mihail Stelescu (excluded from the Iron Guard on September 25<sup>th</sup> 1934) in editing the journal *Cruciada Românișmului*, in which they criticized the Legion. In April 1936 he was put (together with Stelescu) on the list of those who had to be punished for their betrayal (Heinen A. 2006: 278).

Beza joined PNT and had an important role during the Second World War (a monument was built in Jerusalem, to honor Beza). His wife, Vasilichia Beza, wrote a book about their life (Beza V. 1993). In this book she spoke about her husband’s career without mentioning his legionnaire past.

On December 29<sup>th</sup> 1933, the Prime Minister of Romania, I. G. Duca, was killed by a group of three legionnaires. Two of them were Aromanians: Doru Belimace and Iancu Caranica. In fact, Nicolae Constantinescu, the third member of the group, was the one who killed Duca. All the three assumed responsibility for this murder. In the night of December 29/30<sup>th</sup> 1933, the Aromanian Sterie Ciumetti, cashier of the Legion, was killed by the Police (for not telling where Codreanu was; this was the version of the legionnaires). Belimace, Caranica and Constantinescu were convicted to life in prison. They were killed on November 30<sup>th</sup> 1938 together with Codreanu.

We mentioned in the section concerning the emigration of the Aromanians in Romania the case of the 100 Aromanian families expecting to emigrate that spent more than two months in the Salonika harbor in 1927. Iancu Caranica together with C. Papanace asked for an audience with I. G. Duca, at that moment the Minister for Internal Affairs, in their quest to

solve the problem. Duca sent them to a subaltern. Instead, they preferred to pay a visit to the Prime Minister, I. Brătianu, who, according to Papanace (see Papanace C. 1999: 119-124), immediately solved the problem. But Muști maintains that things were rather different (see Muști V.: 1935, 2005: 128). Papanace suggested that the event from Salonika in 1927 and Duca's opinion against the colonization of the Aromanians (1925) played an important role in the tragedy which took place in December 1933.

On July 16<sup>th</sup> 1936, Mihail Stelescu was killed by ten of his former colleagues. One of these ten men was an Aromanian, Ion Carătanase, who was the leader of the group. According to Bordeiu (p. 20, note 18), Carătanase was born in 1909, in Hârșova, Constanța County, and he received the grade of Legionary Commander on July 4<sup>th</sup> 1934. He was killed on November 30<sup>th</sup> 1938.

On September 21<sup>th</sup> 1939, the Prime Minister Armand Călinescu was killed by a group of nine Iron Guard members. One of them, Ovidiu Isaia, was Aromanian. All nine were killed in the same day.

64 people were killed by the legionnaires in November 1940. Not one of the murderers was Aromanian. Instead, five of the victims were Aromanians: Cola Bileca, Mita Bileca, Marius Bațu, Costa Culețu and Spiru Dumitrescu.

If we count the number of Aromanians involved in these Iron Guard crimes, we observe that they were four: Belimace, Caranica, Carătanase, and Isaia. Therefore, it is very difficult to assert that the Aromanians were the killers of the Legionary Movement. But, at the same time, we can not deny the potential violence among Aromanians.

In my opinion, the image of the violent Aromanians emerges not from the violence of the Aromanians involved in the Iron Guard but rather from the violence in Southern Dobruja, which were related to the violence of the Bulgarian *comitadji*.

Meanwhile, I should also mention that many Aromanian legionnaires were involved in the anticommunist resistance (see documents in Cojoc M., 2004; we can find very interesting oral histories in Conovici M, Iliescu S., Silivestru O., 2008 and in Mișa-Caragheorghe S.). The most important figures were Nicolae and Dumitru Fudulea, Nicolae Ciolacu, and Gogu Puiu. Many of them were imprisoned during the communist regime. Some of the Aromanian legionnaires, who succeeded to escape from Romania, were involved in the so-called "third Aromanian rebirth".

We are now questioning the cliché that "every Aromanian was a legionnaire". We first have to use the 1938 census, which recorded

108,404<sup>28</sup> Romanians in Southern Dobruja, about 29% of the population (let us mention that in 1912 there were 6,602 Romanians in Southern Dobruja, representing 2.3% of the population). If we consider that there were at most 30,000 Aromanians in Southern Dobruja in 1938, we reach the conclusion that the Aromanians were at most 8% of the population of the Southern Dobruja in 1938.

In the election of December 1937, the party which represented the Iron Guard, "Totul pentru Țară (All for the Country)", obtained 15.58% of the votes at the level of whole Romania (for these data see Bordeiu P.D. 2003: 351-352 and Heinen A. 2006: 466-467). In Caliacra they obtained<sup>29</sup> 9.86% of the votes and in Durostor 8.80%. This means that the legionnaires obtained in Southern Dobruja half of their national score.

Supposing that all the Aromanians were legionnaires, the only possibility was (taking into account that the Aromanians were at that moment at most 8% percent of the population of Southern Dobruja) that the "Totul pentru Țară" party did not get any vote from the more than 78,000 Romanians of the region.

In fact, there were many Aromanians who were liberals. They had two reasons for that: the first one was that many Aromanians were skilled merchants and traders and it was natural for them to support a liberal party; the second reason was that the National Liberal Party (PNL), led by Ionel Brătianu, decided the settlement of the Aromanians in Southern Dobruja.

I am very indebted to the historian researcher Raluca Tomi, who showed me an interesting document (CNSAS, the operative Archives, Gheorghe Brătianu file, file No. 10176, volume no. 2, leaf 14), which is an informative note from February 17<sup>th</sup> 1935:

"The PNL-Gh. Brătianu leaders, V. Papacostea<sup>30</sup> and C. Giurescu, presented to Gheorghe Brătianu an action plan for gathering the Macedonian colonizers in the ranks of the party. This plan has the following points:

- 1) To make a "Macedonian section" inside the youth organization of the party, having as a duty only to make propaganda in Dobruja.
- 2) To edit in Bazargic a newspaper in the Aromanian dialect, in order to acquire influence over the Macedo-Romanian Cultural Society.
- 3) The Study Department of the party has to analyze the Macedo-Romanian problems.
- 4) The adoption of a policy for the emigration of the Macedo-Romanians to Romania."<sup>31</sup>

If we look again at what Bordeiu (2003: 351-352) and Heinen (2006: 466-467) wrote, we notice that the PNL-Gh. Brătianu obtained 3.89% of the votes at the national level. In Caliacra County they obtained 1.55% and in Durostor County they obtained 8.68%. The percentage obtained in Durostor was amazing. It was 2.23 times greater than the national score.

We have to note that approximately 3,500 Aromanian families were settled in Durostor County and 2,500 were settled in Caliacra County (it is also to mention that the density of the population was greater in Durostor than in Caliacra). We can conclude that the Iron Guard had more sympathy inside the Aromanians in Caliacra County and that the PNL-Gh. Brătianu had more support among the Aromanians in Durostor County.

In connection with the third point of the above-mentioned document, let us observe that Vasile Muști was in 1935 a member of the PNL-Gh. Brătianu party<sup>32</sup> (after he had been a member of the PNȚ). The very important study of Muști *Un deceniu de colonizare în Dobrogea-Nouă 1925-1935* could be seen as a part of this plan.

We notice that in Muști (1935, 2005) Gheorghe Brătianu is mentioned in two places: at page 129 we find the description of Gheorghe Brătianu's visit to Southern Dobruja on August 1927. There are two quotations from Gheorghe Brătianu in which he praised the qualities of the Aromanians and promised support for them.

The second place where Muști mentions Brătianu is at the very end of the book (p. 171). The book ends with a quotation from Gheorghe Brătianu. He praised once again the skills of the Aromanians for trade and considered that the Aromanians should be brought to Romania in order to become the economical elite of the country.

## **The great quarrel.**

### **What is the status of the Aromanians in Romania?**

Generally, the opinion is that the reopening of the Aromanian issue was a result of the activity of some Aromanians who had left Romania during the communist regime. For example, we can find in Tanașoca (2001: 164) the following opinion on this subject:

"The reopening of the Aromanian issue was recently initiated by certain groups of extremely active Aromanian émigrés in Western Europe. For the time being, it is too early to venture an opinion as to these attempts.

However, it is noticeable that the goal of these efforts is different from the earlier efforts. These partisans insist upon the separateness of Aromanians in regard to the Romanian state and its citizens. To them, Aromanians are ethnically different from Romanians, and they view the Aromanian dialect as a separate language.

These points of view, however, are not innovations derived from accurate study. Rather, they are dictated by political opportunism. In major national issues, such distractions can only be detrimental. At any rate, they are out of place."

We will try first to provide an outline of the evolution of the third Aromanian rebirth. Somehow unexpected, the idea of the segregation of the Aromanians from the Romanians appeared earlier than people thought. In Romania "*Alexandru D. Xenopol [...] adopted an extreme point of view whereby he questioned – with certain contradiction and second thoughts – the whole hypothesis concerning the Romanianity of the Vlach people and their language. He was tempted to identify them as an ethnic group, and their language, as Romance language, not as Romanian.*" (see Tanaşoca N. ř. 2001: 102). The second thoughts, mentioned by Tanaşoca above, refers probably to the fact that Xenopol was trying to oppose some arguments against those (especially Rösler) who questioned the fact that Romanians are autochthonous north of Danube (for this question see Boia L. 2005: 192-194). In Xenopol (1998: 173) we find this opinion:

"Daco-Romanians and Macedo-Romanians are two different people by their origin. They resemble very much since they are a mix of the same elements."

Even if we put aside Xenopol's opinion, we will find that it was not "groups of extremely active Aromanian émigrés in Western Europe" which had given birth to the idea of segregation between Aromanians and Romanians.

We have to speak now about Taşcu Ionescu, an Aromanian who lived in Sofia and who was born in Gopeş (a region that belongs now to the Republic of Macedonia). We will use documents no. 27, no. 188, and no. 311 from Drăghicescu A. and Petre M. (2006). Document no. 188 is a "report of the Romanian Embassy in Sofia to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Grigore Gafencu, containing comments on a memorandum of Taşcu Ionescu [...] who requested that the Aromanians should be acknowledged as a distinct nation, and the Aromanian dialect should be implemented

in the schools financed by the Romanian state in the Balkan Peninsula". In this document (pp. 384-385) we find the following phrase:

"M. Ionescu, the one who disputes the ethnical identity between the Romanians and Aromanians, criticizes the policy of the Romanian state regarding the Aromanian issue and the policy of the Macedo-Romanian Cultural Society. He also criticizes the trend of "imposing" to the Aromanians to learn in "Romanian dialect" and to encourage their settlement in Romania."

In the same document, dated March 28<sup>th</sup> 1940, we find that Tașcu Ionescu supported the old idea of a future federalist autonomous state "Macedonia" under the Italian protection (or, if not possible, of an Aromanian canton).

Document no. 311 (pp. 601-605) is a "Memorandum drawn up by Tașcu Ionescu [...] regarding the situation of the Aromanians in the Balkan Peninsula. He proposed the creation of a Macedo-Romania (Aromania) with a church head subordinated to the Romanian Patriarchy, placed under the protection of the League of Nations". This Memorandum (dated August 26<sup>th</sup> 1945) is addressed to the leaders of the Great Britain, USA, USSR, France, Italy and Romania. He asked the same thing as he asked in 1940 but, for obvious reasons, he proposed for the future state Aromania to be under the protection of the League of Nations. He also requested that the Aromanians should participate to the Peace Conference and Salonika should be a *porto franco*.

Document no 27 (pp. 160-161), is an earlier one, from January 20<sup>th</sup>, 1926 , and it is a "report of the Romanian Legation in Sofia to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I. G. Duca, regarding the conflict between a part of the Aromanian community and priest Stelian Iliescu of the Romanian church in Sofia. Parts of the members of the community requested the sermon be conducted in the dialect, a Macedonian priest, compliance with the old calendar, the obtaining of profits from the use of the church land". Tașcu Ionescu is mentioned as a member of the above group which was fighting against the priest. He even started to collect signatures for a complaint against the priest, a complaint which had to be send to the Romanian Government.

After Tașcu Ionescu, it was Constantin Papanace (1904-1985) who suggested another approach for the Aromanian issue. Although he was a Romanian nationalist and although he thought that the Aromanians are Romanians, he was a political realist. After the Second World War, he went to live to Italy. He realized two things: the first one was that the

communist regime in Romania will give up the support to the Aromanians. The second one was that the plan of a future United Europe (imagined in 1949 in Western Europe) will be the best solution to obtain rights for the Aromanians, especially for those from Greece. The Aromanian group in Greece is the largest one in the Balkans and it had the opportunity of not being under a communist regime (Greece was the only Balkan state in this situation).

"In any situation that you will be in, you have to find your way guided by the Aromanian perspective."<sup>33</sup>

Papanace sent two memoirs to the United Nations: one in 1951 and the other in 1952 (the second one can be found in Brezeanu S., Zbuchea G., pp. 357-359, document no. 167). He asked for a UN inquiry regarding the situation of the Aromanian minority in the Balkans. He asked for the Aromanian people the right to have their own schools and churches, as well as the right of administrative autonomy in the regions where they are a majority.

On May 10<sup>th</sup> 1954, he attended the fourth Congress of the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN) held in Rome, where he gave a talk about the Aromanian issue. He recounted his demands in the memoranda he had submitted in 1951 and 1952 to the UN.

In 1975 the Helsinki Treaty was signed by the member states of Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe (today the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE). The Treaty included, among other things, a commitment that the Human Rights will be respected in those states who signed the document. This was the starting point of the third Aromanian rebirth.

In 1978, Vasile Barba (1918-2007) wrote an article in the journal *Noi Tracii* (no. 2, 1978), published by the controversial Iosif Constantin Drăgan in Italy. At that moment Barba (who was born in Greece) lived in Romania. The paper was titled "The Aromanians: A forgotten national minority which claims its rights". In this paper, Barba demands the recognition of the Aromanians as a distinct national minority in the states where they lived. Also he demands for the Aromanians the right to education in their mother tongue, to religious services in Aromanian language in their churches, support for their cultural associations, newspapers, magazines, radio and television programmes in Aromanian. This was the plan followed by Barba during his life.

In 1981 he was at the UN headquarters in New York (with a group of Aromanians from all the parts of the world). He submitted a memoir with the above demands.

In a book appeared in Romania in 1982 (Barba C., Barba. V, 1982), Barba published many Aromanian texts with their translation in German. Strangely enough, one of the texts (pp. 82-83), which is a sort of letter sent by an old man to his nephew, is not translated into German. All the political demands we mentioned above appeared in this text written only in Aromanian language. In the same book there is a picture of the Aromanian group in front of the UN headquarters in 1981.

It is strange that all these actions took place while Barba lived in communist Romania. In 1983, when he retired, he left Romania for West Germany. What was the attitude of the communist authorities? We cannot answer. We can only say that they allowed Barba's activities (which contradicted the official communist policy not to interfere with the internal affairs of another state). Did the authorities agree with his demands? Did they want only to prospect for a future action? It is possible that the communist authorities allowed Barba to go to West Germany for not involving the Romanian state by his actions concerning the Aromanian issue.

On October 1980, the Association of the Aromanians from France (AFA), sent a memoir to CSCE Conference in Madrid. The name of the memoir was "Une nation européenne sans droits nationaux". The President of AFA, Iancu Perifan, sent a text which is very similar with Barba's paper of 1978.

On January 1<sup>st</sup> 1981, after Greece joined the EEC (the European Economic Community), the first Aromanian associations appeared in Greece.

After he left Romania, Barba created in West Germany the Union for the Aromanian Language and Culture (ULCA). This society organized five Aromanian Congresses in 1985, 1988, 1993, 1996 and 1999. The first one was held in Mannheim and the others in Freiburg.

Starting with 1984, he published the Aromanian review *Zborlu a Nostru* (Our Word). In order to make the printing easier, he operated some changes in the "traditional" alphabet. This was the starting point for a long quarrel, "the alphabet quarrel". He was accused that, by changing the alphabet, he wanted to separate the Aromanians from the Romanians. His alphabet was named "the barbarian alphabet". It was a mockery which used the name Barba and the word "barbarian". Let us mention that the some impolite

mockery was used against Tiberiu Cunia, the most important Aromanian publisher ever: his alphabet was named “cuneiform”.

Barba was tenacious in following his plan. By his efforts, on May 30<sup>th</sup> 1994, a proposal concerning the Aromanians was presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The proposal was presented by a group led by the Italian M. Ferrarini (for this text see Brezeanu S., Zbuc̄ea G., document no. 176, pp. 368-369). Besides Barba’s demands mentioned in his 1978 paper, the group asked for a report concerning the Aromanian issue. The Committee on Culture and Education appointed Luis Maria de Puig as rapporteur. A preliminary form of the report can be found in Brezeanu and Zbuc̄ea (document no. 181, pp. 374-376).

On June 24<sup>th</sup> 1997, the report (Document 7728) was presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for debate (18<sup>th</sup> Sitting). In the same day, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe voted *Recommendation 1333 (1997) on the Aromanian culture and language*, the most important achievement for the Aromanians ever. Point 8 (i and ii) of the document states the following:

“The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers:

- i) encourage Balkan states which comprise Aromanian communities to sign, ratify and implement the European Charter of regional or Minority languages and invite them to support the Aromanians, particularly in the following fields:
  - a) education in their mother tongue;
  - b) religious services in Aromanian in their churches;
  - c) newspapers, magazines and radio and television programmes in Aromanian;
  - d) support for their cultural associations;
- ii) invite the other member states to support the Aromanian language, for instance by creating university professorships in the subject and disseminating the most interesting products of Aromanian culture throughout Europe by means of translations, anthologies, courses, exhibitions and theatrical productions.”<sup>34</sup>

It is noteworthy that the above document did not request recognition of the Aromanians as a distinct national minority. L. M. de Puig assumed this fact and said that he wanted to avoid all the political implications, to put his report in a cultural perspective.

A violent debate followed in Romania. Some wanted to see whether the Recommendation also applied to Romania or not.<sup>35</sup> Another point of debate was related to the concession made by de Puig and Barba regarding the canceling of the minority issue from the recommendation.

A very good analysis of the Aromanians in Romania after 1989 can be found in Trifon N., 2007. We will try to outline the process which reached its climax on April 16<sup>th</sup> 2005, when the Aromanian Community in Romania (CAR) asked for recognition as a national minority.

The first one who spoke openly in Romania about the recognition of the Aromanians in Romania as a national minority was Dumitru Piceava (born in 1941, in Romania), director of the Aromanian review *Bana Armânească*. The review is written entirely in Aromanian language. Its first issue appeared in 1996.

In Romania, before 1996, only one voice was heard: the voice of those who asserted the traditional thesis that the Aromanians are Romanians. This "voice" also spoke about the other thesis and warned of the danger of "segregation".

In his Ph.D. thesis, Thede Kahl (Kahl T. 1999: 128-132) published the results of his research during the years 1996-1998 concerning the Aromanians. For the Aromanians in Romania, the results were: 41% of them considered themselves as an ethnical minority and 59% thought the opposite; 66% of them considered themselves as a linguistic minority and 34% thought the opposite; 5% of them felt discriminated, 85% considered that they are not discriminated and 10% did not answer to this question; 29% of them considered Aromanian as a separate language, 69% considered Aromanian as the dialect of the Romanian language and 2% considered Aromanian as a mixed idiom. Since the number of those who were interviewed was small,<sup>36</sup> we can not say very much about this data beyond the fact that the results are quite interesting.

On April 16<sup>th</sup> 2005, the Aromanian Community in Romania (CAR) asked for the recognition of the Aromanians as a national minority. This decision was taken by vote. There were 524 people at this meeting. With one exception (an abstention), all the participants voted for recognition.

CAR was created in 1991. It was reactivated<sup>37</sup> in 2003-2004. The President of CAR is Costică Canacheu (born in 1958), a very well-known politician<sup>38</sup> in Romania. Today the Association has approximately 7,000 members (in 2003, CAR had 3,300 members). The some position (that Aromanians should be recognized as national minority) is shared by the League of the Aromanians of Romania (LAR). The Macedo-Romanian

Cultural Society (the oldest Aromanian organization in Romania) encourages the traditional opinion that the Aromanians are Romanians with some specific features which must be preserved. The same position is shared by "Picurarlu de la Pind" (Shepherd of the Pindus) society. In a press release on June 6<sup>th</sup> 2005, the Romanian Academy strongly criticized the request of CAR:

"We have in front of us a diversion which springs from the mercantile interests of some groups inside and outside the country, a diversion which ignores the true history of this branch of the Eastern Romania and of the Aromanian dialect... [...] The Aromanians from Romania came to this country by their will, especially in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, since they considered themselves Romanians. They came for having a country of their own, for not being any more the subject of injustices in the place where they were born and where they were autochthonous. [...] Admitting an Aromanian minority in Romania will be the greatest absurdity in the contemporary history of the Aromanians."

In turn, the other side did not resist accusing the opponents. The accusations are almost the same: the "others" have interests, the "others" want to keep their good positions in the Romanian society, the "others" broke the links with the community and, therefore, they are traitors. We can notice that neither side showed restraint in its approach. It is quite likely that an outside observer would think the Aromanians are indeed violent.

A serene debate about this subject did not take place. Some people tried to explain which the motivations of this unexpected event were. For example, there were some attempts to highlight the cleavages: old/young, elite/ordinary Aromanians, *fărserot/grămustean* (Aromanian sub-groups: Farsharotsi hail from southern Albania, while Gramushteani come from the area of Mt. Grammos). The portrait of the Aromanian who wants to be considered different in Romania according to these cleavages is the following: he is young, or he is an ordinary Aromanian, or he is *grămustean*. As for the portrait of the Aromanians who considered themselves as Romanians, this could be the following: he is old, or he has a good position in the Romanian society (or he is even part of the elite), or he is *fărserot*. While there may be an element of truth in these facile stereotypes, we should be cautious about taking this type of approach too seriously.

## Conclusions

This article ends with some conclusions by means of which I explain the great “quarrel” which took place in the last years.

Most Aromanians had powerful economic motivations when they decided to settle in Romania.

A heterogeneous and mixed Aromanian population came to Romania. One of the Aromanians considered themselves Romanians; others considered themselves being different from the Romanians. Generally, today, most Aromanians continue the self-identification tradition of their families.

Nevertheless, the settlement in Romania led to some changes. For example, those who suffered in the War or in prisons together with their families become closer to the Romanian identity. On the other side, there were a lot of Aromanians who were disappointed by different reasons. They felt that the settlement in Romania was poorly managed by the Romanian authorities. They felt that their ancestors took a wrong decision when they came to Romania (especially those from Greece who had not lived under a communist regime).

Also it is clear that the settlement in Romania was based on an illusion (for some Aromanians): the Romanian answer to the Aromanian question. On the other side, the Romanian state gave to the Aromanians who settled in Southern Dobruja the opportunity to live together. The fact that in a small region different Aromanian groups had to live together strengthened their Aromanian identity. For this reason, the Aromanians of both sides should be grateful to the Romanian state.

A very important role in this “quarrel” was played by the competition which exists in the Aromanian world. This competition can be very well described by an Aromanian proverb: “two Aromanians, two chiefs”. This quarrel may be also understood as a competition between two teams, each team willing to find the best solution for the survival of the Aromanians. In this way, they are recovering now the lost solidarity.

Probably the Aromanians should accept that there are more than one answer to their identity issue: a plural model of auto-identification is also possible.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> When we quote Muș V., 1935, 2005, p.94 we refer to the republished version HAGIGOGU, S., MUȘI, V., NOE, C., 2005. The same is the case for Noe C., 1938, 2005 and Hagigogu S., 1927, 2005.
- <sup>2</sup> We have to mention that from most of the Romanian sources, it follows that the population of Greece increased with approximately 1,000,000 people (this number results from the 1,500,000 Greeks who came to Greece and from the 500,000 Turks who left Greece).
- <sup>3</sup> This region was obtained by Romania from Bulgaria in 1913, after the Second Balkan War. The region consists of two counties: Durostor and Caliacra.
- <sup>4</sup> Noe C. (1938, 2005: 73) says that there were 4,946 Aromanian families in Southern Dobruja in 1932. Muș V. (1935, 2005: 168) asserts that in 1932 there were 6,553 Aromanian families in Southern Dobruja in 1932.
- <sup>5</sup> We can find in CUȘA, N., 1996 and in LASCU, S., 2002 data about the emigration process (in Coosa's book we can find the names of the Romanians who emigrated to Romania).
- <sup>6</sup> According to Saramandu N., 2007, p. XXVI, in 1968 in Constanța and Tulcea counties there were 29,400 Aromanians. 15,100 of them have their roots in Bulgaria, 11,530 of them in Greece, 1,720 of them in Albania and 1,050 of them in R. Macedonia. In this "census" did not count the Aromanians who do not live in Dobruja. Saramandu estimates that nowadays, there are 60,000-70,000 Aromanians in Romania. From the above mentioned 29,400 Aromanians, 17,700 were "grămosteni", 10,200 were "făreroți", 1,300 were "pindeni" and 200 were "moscopoleni" (these are Aromanian sub-groups). The 2002 census recorded 25,053 Aromanians and 1,334 Macedo-Romanians.
- <sup>7</sup> Sterie Hagigogu lived between 1888 and 1957. He was a member of a very important family from Veria, Greece. He arrived in Romania before the emigration process. He had liberal likings.
- <sup>8</sup> Muș was born in 1895 in Pleasa, Albania and died in 1969 in the USA.
- <sup>9</sup> Noe lived between 1883 and 1939. He was a Meglenit (and president of the "Meglenia Society").
- <sup>10</sup> Gheorghe Celea was the fourth member of what we can call the "kernel of the action" which ended with this emigration process.
- <sup>11</sup> For this description see Hagigogu, S., 1927, 2005: 15.
- <sup>12</sup> This idea was not new. Some Aromanians supported this idea in the years of the Balkan Wars.
- <sup>13</sup> At that moment it was supposed that the Aromanians would pay for the land they would receive. But, in the end the emigrated Aromanians received the land for free.
- <sup>14</sup> For this text see Noe C., 1938, 2005: 42. The original text appeared in *Peninsula Balcanică*, no. 8, January 1925.

- 15 Max Popovici was inspector general in the Ministry of Agriculture.
- 16 Brabeteanu worked for a while at the Romanian Legation (Embassy).
- 17 Noe explains that this behavior can be explained by the fact the emigration process was a blame for Rășcanu since one of the reason of the emigration was that the Aromanians of Greece were subject of many injustices.
- 18 The document is a political report of the German Consul in Galați.
- 19 Noe (1938, 2005: 69) explains that the memoir was a result of the quarrels between these people with some Aromanian intellectuals who already lived in Romania.
- 20 Stere Papatanașa, the director of the Romanian school in Doleani.
- 21 We have to note that a few days later, Ghibănescu got a box on the ears from Hențescu, a Romanian lawyer from Silistra. After a few months, on May 30<sup>th</sup> 1927, Captain Al. Popescu attempted to Ghibănescu's life. Fortunately, Ghibănescu was not killed.
- 22 This is a part of a song recorded in Caraiani N., Saramandu N., 1982, p. 360. The song was recorded in 1966 in Bucharest. The informer was Gheorghe Lila, a 59 years old man, born in Bachita, Bulgaria.
- 23 Damu Nicolae, a 36 years old man from Stejaru, Tulcea County. This testimony can be found in Saramandu N., 2007, p. 99.
- 24 Tîrcomnicu E., 2004, p. 190.
- 25 He was born in Papadia, Greece.
- 26 Papanace C., 1999, p. 70.
- 27 Cioran E., *Tara mea*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1996, p. 32. This is part of an interview took by François Bondy to Emil Cioran in 1972.
- 28 For this data see Lascu S., 2002, p. 45.
- 29 These are the scores for the Deputy Assembly. Heinen indicates only the data for the Deputy Assembly. Bordeiu mentioned also the results for the Senate. In Caliacra "Total pentru Țară" obtained 8.78% and in Durostor they had no candidates.
- 30 The well-known Professor Victor Papacostea was Aromanian and member of the Romanian Parliament.
- 31 Since we consider this document very important, we will give here the original version of the document entitled *Notă informativă din 17 februarie 1935*: "Fruntașii georgiști V. Papacostea și C. Giurescu au înfățișat lui Gheorghe Brătianu un plan de acțiune pentru atragerea coloniștilor macedoneni în partid. Acest plan cuprinde următoarele puncte:
- 1) O "secțiune macedoneană" în sănul organizației tineretului georgist, însărcinată exclusive cu propaganda în Dobrogea.
  - 2) Pentru dobândirea influenței asupra "Societății de cultură macedo-română", se va edita un ziar în dialectal aromân la Bazargic.
  - 3) Cercul de studii al partidului va lua în studiu problemele macedo-române.
  - 4) Adoptarea unei politici de imigratie a românilor macedoneni în țară."

- <sup>32</sup> See Papanace C., *Fără Căpitän*, Editura Elisavaroș, Bucharest, 1997: 150.
- <sup>33</sup> See Papanace C., 1999: 100. It is the first urge from a list of 26 urges for the Aromanians.
- <sup>34</sup> The whole text of the recommendation can be found in *Zborlu a Nostru*, No. 56, 1997, pp. 17-19.
- <sup>35</sup> Let us notice that Hans Heinrich Hansen, the President of FUEN, came to Bucharest on May 24<sup>th</sup> 2009 invited by CAR. He promised that FUEN will support CAR in its action for obtaining the recognition of the Aromanians as a national minority in Romania.
- <sup>36</sup> There were 26 people interviewed from Romania; 6 from Constanța, 6 from M. Kogălniceanu, 5 from Ovidiu, 2 from Techirghiol, 5 from Cobadin and 2 from Ceamurlia S.
- <sup>37</sup> It is interesting to notice that this association is organized following the old *fara* and *fălcarea* structures. For an analysis of what *fălcarea* means nowadays, see for example Iosif Sîrbu C., 2004.
- <sup>38</sup> He is member of the Liberal Democrat Party (PDL).

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# ORIGENIAN INTERPRETATION UPON NUMBERS: CONTEXT AND SPIRITUAL EXEGESIS. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS FOR AN ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION

The discussion regarding the Origenian exegesis, its spiritual layer, founded on the allegorical procedure, is one as venerable as it is irrelevant, perhaps, for a modern man.<sup>1</sup> And at a close look, even the advantage given by its venerable character transforms into disadvantage. Not only the modern bibliography of the subject casts in temerity any attempt of clarification (when the author does not reproduce, cacophonously, previous results), not only the delicate situation of Origen's literary work (kept mostly in Latin translation and not in the original Greek), but also the scale through which, inevitably, the Alexandrian author is read.

The Medieval interlude, in which Origen has been read, quoted, copied, imitated, gives us a great mystic, a good exegete of the Bible, an admirable preacher. In opposition, modernity discovers a systematic Origen, a thinker who lays the basis of Christian Dogmatic, who adds to the biblical, Judaic element, the specifically Greek rationality.<sup>2</sup> So that, the two competitive figures, 'Origen the mystic' and 'Origen the scholar' can be found in the current bibliography, being mixed in different proportions. Naturally, some Origenian subjects are preferentially attached to Origen the 'mystic' (ascetic advices identified in the literary work that has been kept, elements of applied ethics), and others can rather be found in the lot of Origen 'the scholar' (the problem of freedom, of intratrinitarian relations). Predictably, the discussions around these different subjects are limited: the Origenian asceticism, for example, is regarded from the perspective of Christian theories (unfortunately subsequent) of a life spent in spiritual struggle, while the Origenian trinitarian doctrine, for example, is reconstructed following Middle-Platonic and Neo-Platonic models.

The Origenian exegesis, from the perspective of its belonging to these 'types' of explanation ('theological' or 'philosophical') is rather approached from a 'theological' angle: being part of a history of Christian

allegory, the Origenian exegesis has a privileged position, as being the first complex, explicit, and theorized interpretation. Of course, the necessary contextualization compels to a broader discussion: the allegorical ‘Greek’ tradition is often mentioned when there is a discussion about the spiritual interpretation, the allegorical tradition being already very consistent in Origen’s time, there are sometimes discussions about the allegorized procedures and methods from the Judaic area, often in order to remark similarities, which may explain the Origenian interpretation. The aim of the research is, most of the times, that of building up some filiations to explain Origen’s exegetic model. The confidence in the ‘genetic’ explanation, in spite of the risks thus assumed, exhausts the issue of Origenian allegory. The circumstances of the research (which often practice the arbitrary selection of sources, which survived most of the times randomly, debatable dating, comparisons which cannot support themselves in a geographic, linguistic, cultural context) seem to be eluded by research and a subject, once it is ‘settled’ in an area, can hardly transcend its limits.

In this frequently simplified scenery, the allegorical exegesis practiced by Origen can hardly gain the approval of moderns. The allegory, as an interpretation procedure, is already repudiated by modernity, which cannot see the stake of a ‘second’ interpretation. Then, the arbitrary of allegory, which seems to be the result of an overflowing imagination, opposes itself to the modern strictness, represented by the mathematical model of knowledge. Thus, most of the times, it is precisely the absence of a base of the procedure that is accused. Of course, one can notice that Late Antiquity is haunted by the mania of interpretation, that some books are privileged, seen as ‘inspired’ and thus suspected that they say more than it is written. Allegorism is often equated with ‘a disease of the century’: the allegory undermines Late Antiquity, corrupting literary men, philosophers, theologians, and thus contaminating the entire Middle Age. Most of the times, the lack of the base of procedure is accused, and its results are listed only under an inventory title.

The present study aims at discussing the Origenian exegesis applied to the book of *Numbers*,<sup>3</sup> regarded in the context, privileging the allegorical procedures applied by the interpreter to a text that is not easy at all. As this text is a part of a broader project, which aims at discussing the Origenian exegesis by following the interpretation given to the Hexateuch, its framing within the context compels us first of all to a briefly recall of the obtained results in the previous research. Then, there will be discussed the places

with theoretical value from the Origenian exegesis upon the Numbers treatise, places that denote a careful reflection on allegory, on its stimuli.

But above all, the context that must be discussed is the one regarding the circumstances in which Origen resorts to the allegorical exegesis: he is not the only author who resorts to this, and the motivation of his gesture must be explained. This means that not only classical reasons, less elaborated, will be important, but also the reasons that can be discovered in the Origenian literary works, reasons that are not connected so much to the ‘theological’ explanations of the gesture, but to the ‘philosophical’ ones.

## 1. Why Allegory?

In a famous treatise of the third century, a Neo-Platonic one, while explaining some lines, rather dull, which were describing a common cave, discovered there a whole story of the soul, of its pilgrimages, of its moods and more over, a symbol of the entire cosmos. The author of this allegorical exegesis, Porphyry, gave, besides this treatise (*De atro nympharum*<sup>4</sup>), a publication of Plotinus’ *Enneads* (the only one that we can read today), as well as many other philosophical writings. The allegorical practice was, therefore, a common one during the time, and in the first lines of his treatise, Porphyry revealed to us the cause of applying the allegorical reading: the cave described with details by Homer, localized by the poet in Ithaca, cannot be find in any place on this island, and therefore a ‘historical’ reading (in a philological meaning, namely a real semantically one) is not possible. On the other hand, Porphyry maintains that not even literary demands cannot explain the publication of this description within the given context: Kronos, a philosopher of the second century A.D., was the one noticing this. And the conclusion, both for Kronos and Porphyry, was only one: “It is thus clear, not only for the wise, but also for those with no education, that the Poet allegorizes (*allegorein*) and says something else in an enigmatic way (*ainittesthai*)” (*De atro nympharum*, 3).

The lines above show not only the ‘allegorical state’ of the cultural context, but also a subjacent theory of the allegory. Thus, the exegete must check the verisimilitude (in the sense of adjusting to the sensible reality) of a writing in order to detect the author’s intention. At the same time, the research must check the adjustment of the text to the laws of ‘poetical verisimilitude’: if not even these are followed, then it is clear that the text has allegorical vocation. The essential effort is to decode, if the

"verisimilitude" from the two registers ('historical' and 'literary') cannot be detected, the message that the author allegorically transmits. From these few lines, one can notice that the ancient allegory, far from being a free game of an inventive mind, is a technical procedure adopted by an author who wants to transmit to a minimally experienced reader something else than what the text says *de plano*.

One can suspect, observing the arguments brought by Porphyry (which actually belong to the predecessor Kronos), that there was an elaborate theory of the allegory, of its 'detection', of the types of public to whom the allegory was addressed. Unfortunately, theoretical texts that should present the ancient theories of the allegory do not exist today: we only have remains of a construction that otherwise seems to have been impressive.<sup>5</sup> For the time being, the first positive result of researching the context in which Origen allegorizes is the finding of a theoretical preoccupation for allegory, obvious in the first centuries AD.

From this point of view, Origen would be one of the allegorists who applies to the Christian Bible the typical procedures of the philology of his time. It is in this way that Origen is read by Porphyry who had personally met the Christian exegete and about whom he did not have a very good opinion: the blame brought to the latter was that he uses the Greek method of understanding in the case of Christian, Barbarian Scriptures. The neoplatonic argument relies on the contrast between the exegetic, elevated method and the poor content of the writings interpreted by Origen. The discussion about the stylistic level of the Greek Scriptures related to the Alexandrian canon will be forgotten in time, but the affiliation of the Origenian allegory to the Greek allegorical tradition can be rediscovered in many subsequent discussions. And modernity noticed this influence bared by the Origenian exegesis, trying to reveal common interpretative practices.

But placing in the allegorical Hellenistic context is not the only possibility. Reading the Origenian interpretations for the Bible offers clues about practicing some *topoi* of the allegory, about using some exegetic techniques typical for that century. But in this way, one cannot obtain an answer to the question: why is the literal interpretation not enough and one must recur to an allegorical one? Is there any argument, besides the text – method combination of interpreting, which can connect any reading method to a given piece of writing? The answer to this question is difficult. The classical arguments in favor of the allegorical exegesis (adapting the text to the "inspired" status of its author, noticing the inadvertences in

the case of applying the text to the reality assumed to be described by him, in contrast with the confidence in the text's 'coherence', written by a 'divinely' inspired author) rather seem circumstantial. Of course, the allegorical Greek tradition, which goes back to the fifth century BC, is important and can explain many things, but for today's reader, the ancient reason of resorting to allegory, as it can be noticed in the ancient discussions on this topic, preserved till nowadays, is rather superficial: modernity does no longer recognize the difference of an ontological level, so that the ancient 'inspiration' is hard to explain, and the internal inadvertences of a writing do not mobilize to an allegorical interpretation, but to clarifying it by using modern literary methods, in the absence of the exigency of an omniscient narrator who would refuse self-contradiction, confusion. It would be nevertheless interesting to observe if, beyond the things that we have noticed, the taste of Late Antiquity for allegory possibly had other explanations. Of course, the experiences assumed by the people from those times (considered to be different from ours, moderns), experiences that could have offered ground for the allegorical option, cannot be known at all. The only answer is to use the few available sources on this topic, many of which have not been efficiently exploited. As we already mentioned, the ancient works that theorize the allegory offer us only insignificant clues and reasons for practicing it: most pieces of information which are briefly presented, can be read in textbooks of rhetoric, where allegory is seen as a figure of speech. The theoretical works about allegory, those that integrated it in the philological practice and the philosophical preoccupations, can no longer be read. Therefore, the foundation that may explain to a modern man the passion of Late Antiquity for allegory, is missing.

Fortunately, the author himself who is the focus of this study, Origen, could help us to better understand the competences of the call to allegory, in this obvious lack of sources. In a fragment that discusses a biblical passage, the exegete gives us a solution of a famous paradox, that of the liar. We must say that Origen's solution is not pointed out either in the treatises of the history of Logic, or in the theological compendiums: one more symptom of the still dominating dichotomy in the field of Origenian studies. Origen's solution, in its consequences, can offer us another perspective on the reasons for which an ancient was inclined, even forced, to practice allegory. Since I have broadly discussed this solution given to the paradox of the liar by Origen somewhere else, and since this matter is not the focus of the present study, I will offer a summary of the

Origenian discussion, conclusive for the way in which an ancient solved an everlasting difficulty, that of self-referential sentences which undermine the consistency / coherence of our language.

### **1.1. An origenian solution to the Liar Paradox<sup>6</sup>**

Origen discusses the liar paradox in connexion with a biblical passage from a Pauline epistle (*Rom* 3. 4): "But let God be true but every man is a liar", *fiat autem Deus verax omnis autem homo mendax*.<sup>7</sup> After a brief philological note about the non imperative meaning of the first verb cited, a desiderative, Origen separates the second part of the citation, observing that it occurs in another biblical writing (*Ps* 115. 11): "I said in my alarm, Every man is a liar", *ego dixi in excessu meo: 'omnis homo mendax'*. As a philosophically exercised mind, Origen reads here the famous liar paradox, vividly discussed in Antiquity,

It is superfluous to discuss about the importance of the liar's paradox for the philosophical enquiry: the response, the solution of the philosopher describes his epistemology, telling us about the possibility and the meaning of philosophy, as a language-based human exercise. For a believer, for a thinker who adopted another epistemological perspective, for Origen, the presence of the affirmation *omnis homo mendax* in the divine books, as revealed sentence, implies another problem. We can observe that the affirmation *omnis homo mendax* is paradoxical: if something implies its own negation, we can infer that the argument is annulled in both senses (we are in the reign of bivalent logic, the only one suitable for Origen). But there is another problem, more serious from Origen's perspective: he considers we can discover the truth because we start our enquiry using the divine word. This is the only one true, as emerging from the sole *magister*, God. If this word is true, all the revealed books communicate us the truth, the semantic one, in each sentence, including the affirmation *omnis homo mendax*.

So if the divine author tells us every man is a liar, this must be true, because of the veracity of the divine word conveyed by the sacred writer. But the writer is a man too and, as a man, he cannot tell the truth, being a liar. Origen had to stop here and the reason is manifest. For a believer it is impossible to affirm the next logical conclusion of the enquiry of the liar paradox (the sentence *omnis homo mendax* is not true, for the man who enunciates it is a liar), the belief in the truth of each revealed sentence giving the very possibility of research. If one affirms that the sentence *omnis*

*homo mendax* is not true, the knowledge is no longer possible, if the aim of our knowledge is the truth. So the contradiction is here between the truth of the revealed writings, affirmed by the divine word, and the falsity of the same writings, affirmed by the same divine word when telling that every man, including the writer of the inspired books, is a liar. It is annulled, in this contradiction of revealed writing, the truthful and consistent character of the divine word. Therefore we cannot start our enquiry practicing a belief in the truth of revealed writings; the epistemological way, proposed by Origen has no fundament, the *incipit*, and the truthfulness of the belief, has disappeared. We can start our enquiry about the truth without hope to find it. The knowledge is no longer a dialogue, is a solitary experience.

However Origen is a believer: the truth of each sentence from the revealed writings is an unquestionable *datum*. Therefore it is true that every man is a liar. As the problem is now located in the area of biblical texts, he will try to understand the revealed sentence *omnis homo mendax*. The origenian text runs as following:

*Sed si redeamus ad interiorem scripturae intellectum inueniemus quod omnes profetae uel apostoli ex illis sint ad quos sermo Dei fit, sicut scriptum est: 'Et factum est uerbum Domini ad illum uel illum profetam'. Hos ergo ad quos sermo Dei fit Dominus in euangelio non homines pronuntiat esse, sed deos. Sic enim dicit: 'quod si illos dicit deos ad quos sermo Dei fit, et non potest solui scriptura'. Quia ergo et ad Dauid tamquam profetam et ad Paulum tamquam apostolum sermo Dei factus est sine dubio non erant homines, sed di ad quos sermo Dei factus est. Igitur quia non erant homines sed di uerum est quod de hominibus ceteris pronuntiat ad quos sermo Dei factus non est quia *omnis homo mendax* sit.<sup>8</sup>*

The Origenian logical solution of the liar's paradox can be easily observed, but is worth noting that this solution is the result of the explanatory effort dedicated to the divine inspired word. No end of confusion, no solution, seems to affirm Origen, without the revealed word. Consequently the solution is uncovered only when the Books are consulted: *si redeamus ad interiorem scripturae intellectum, inueniemus...* To uncover the solution means to find the meaning of the revealed word.

Fundamentally, the lines quoted above try to solve the contradiction that seems to destroy the entire Origenian effort of knowledge. Therefore Origen will start using another revealed sentence that communicates us the same divine word. Using a quotation from the Gospels, from the revelation

produced by the coming of the Word, Origen will affirm the super-human condition of the biblical writers. They were not human beings, following these revealed words, but gods, because the divine word was through them (*factum est uerbum Dei ad illum*). As gods they affirmed that every man is a liar, and this affirmation is true for all the people. We will not discuss here the Origenian understanding of the act of revelation; our subject is different. It is sufficient to understand the logical mechanism of the Origenian solution, because of its applicability: the Origenian solution offers not only the understanding of a revealed affirmation, but also a logical solution to the liar paradox.

In logical terms, Origen recognizes epistemological pessimistic consequences of the existence of paradoxes in the natural language. The paradox, here the liar's, is not a sophism for our author, but a sign of the inconsistency of our language. No solution can be found using this language. Thus, a metalanguage is needed that would decide for our language. A different language, offered by means of the divine word, will be this metalanguage: in this language we will find the solution of our paradoxes. As the Truth created this second revealed and true language, the natural language is deemed inappropriate for the search of the truth. The logical follows the ontological.

On the other hand, we have to point out that the Origenian solution has an advantage, in comparison to modern similar solutions. If it is necessary to add a different language to the first one, a language that decides what is true or false in the previous language, the modern metalanguage is, in one respect, identical with the language. The metalanguage cannot express the truth or falsity of its sentences. Therefore it is needed a third language, the metametalanguage, in order to decide about the logical values of the metalanguage. And for the metametalanguage the problem will be the same: the indeterminate internal character of the true and false for each language is the essential objection opposed to the solution of logical types. The *regressus ad infinitum* can be hardly avoided when the "theology" of difference is the sign for its obliteration. For Origen, the metalanguage is not isomorphic, as are the modern ones, with the first one: it is semantically true because the Truth gave us, deciding about the truth values of sentences formulated in the natural language. There is no need of a third language, a meta-metalanguage that should decide over the true and false values of the metalanguage.

Consequently, the Origenian option is to solve the inherent paradoxical character of our language, to avoid the incoherence of our knowledge,

assuming the sole coherent, consistent language, i.e. the language of the divine word. That seems to be the Origenian conclusion: the thinker believes in the divine word because only this can offer the consistency required by a rigorous philosophical enquiry. The philosophical exigency, the discovery of the truth, will be the reason for the Origenian research that starts from the revealed word. From it only, as we know now that every man is a liar, unable to teach us. The affirmation *omnis homo mendax* is true: all human attempts to find the truth failed. The confusion, the incoherence are generated by the ignorance of the true word. The opinions, expressed in common language, cannot give satisfaction, from Origen's point of view, because of the ubiquity of the contradiction, of the paradox. We will rightly use the second language, the revealed one, as we want to know the truth.

Now perhaps it would be easier to understand, from another perspective than the classical one, Origen's insistence on the divinely revealed writings: if we want to find the truth, we have to practice a logically appropriated search. The minimal logical exigencies have to be revered; otherwise the philosophical inquiry will be exposed to the gravest objections. The liar paradox is one of the indicia for the inappropriate character of our language when used for philosophical purposes. The very existence of this paradox of the natural language in the revealed books offered to Origen the opportunity to argue about the necessity, for us, and the existence, for him, of a coherent and complete language, in contrast with the language used in philosophical and religious discourses. This logical solution will be rediscovered in modern times, in a different ontological scenario.

Therefore the problem will be, from Origen's point of view, not to compose a logically coherent doctrine starting from the natural language: this exercise cannot be completed. Origen's preoccupation will be to understand the sole philosophically relevant language, the revealed one, starting from the vernacular language. The peculiar presuppositions of this philosophical option are different by those of modernity.

In sum, the Origenian option for an inspired text is the only one possible, following the observation of the consequences of the existence of the paradoxes in the natural language. The truth, as a reachable goal, can be received only by acknowledging a revelation, that *datum* that eludes the human fallibility and the aporetics of the fallen creature. The cognitive reconstruction of the world will be possible only by taking upon ourselves a revelation, i.e. that what transcends us: the Origenian theory

of interpretation has this very axiom as its starting point. Aside from the generally acknowledged causality, which brings together, psychologically or sociologically, the man of Late Antiquity and a revealed text, there were other, epistemological reasons to appropriate a text in Late Antiquity, as the Origenian fragments discussed above have tried to argue.

### **1.2. Allegory in the Christian Context: Origen's Case**

Allegory, as an exegesis procedure, is directly or indirectly supportive with a certain conception of language, with epistemological assumptions. The desideratum of a complete and coherent “language”, the option for “epistemological optimism” that makes truth an aim that can and must be reached, offers additional arguments for allegory. If the “first” level of signification, common, must be surpassed (and we are convinced about this, for example, by the existence of paradoxes in the common language), then it is obvious that the text “tells us something else”, *all-egorein*. If we consider that any natural language bears the burden of confusion, contradiction, insufficiency, then the truth cannot be given by it. It is, therefore, necessary of another language, a language that would offer the guarantee of veracity: it gives the possibility to the truth because its nature is different from that of common language. Consequently, the language will be an inspired one: it is not incomprehensible (because otherwise it would no longer be language for us, human beings), but neither comprehensible in current order. Thus, everybody will be able to read the inspired text in common register, but in this register, it will bear all the defects of our language. We will discover contradictions, inadvertences, confusions in the inspired message (this is what Kronos does as well in the case of the Homeric text: the lines cannot point out a cave in Ithaca since they do not describe a place that would exist, in the semantic applying of the sentence, and the sentence is not plausible from a literary perspective either, because it does not adjust to the aesthetic demands). The insufficiency of the text, in its common reading, with common significant and following the common rules of approach, indicates the necessity of another reading. An allegorical reading.

The lines above offer a reason both to the practiced allegory in the Non-Christian society, as well as to the one assumed by the Christians. For the latter, who took the Greek Bible as an inspired writing, there was an additional argument. And it started right from an accusation often practiced against Christians: from the point of view of the aesthetic canon of Late

Greece, the Christian Bible was a very modest writing. The loan translations from Hebrew, the popular syntax, the frequently careless language, outside the canon, disqualified the inspired writing of the Christians in the eyes of the educated people. From the Christian point of view, this contrast is one more argument for the necessity of the use of allegory: affected by contradictions, confusions, inadvertences, the Christian Bible also takes on the burden of the aesthetic inadequateness to the common codes. For a Christian, this aesthetic discrepancy, by relating it to the aesthetic norm of Late Antiquity, is an additional argument for allegory and it was a good answer in front of the accusations of "naivety" brought to the authors of revealed writings.

But the inspired text, like any other text, appeared in front of the reader in order to communicate a content. From a semantic or syntactic perspective, the truth of the Bible was assumed by any reader. This is how Origen as well will read the scriptural text: even when the difficulty is obvious (in the case of Noah's ark, of apparently modest sizes, which managed to host all species of living beings<sup>9</sup>), the exegete will do his best to prove the verisimilitude of the biblical episode, vehemently and ironically disputed by some readers of the Genesis. To Origen, the dimensions of the ark, insignificant according to the Greek mathematic canon, must be read from the point of view of Moses' training, the author of the biblical treatise of Genesis, who had been trained in the Egyptian sciences and arts: reading the dimensions mentioned by the Scripture in the Egyptian register, the dimensions of the ark were enough in order to build a floating object that should host all species of animals. Thus, this detail, that of the dimensions of the ark, cannot be read as suggesting the improbability of the biblical episode about saving all animals on Noah's ark.

And yet the biblical episode of the rescue through the ark must be read from an allegorical perspective: one mention, within the context, about Noah's father comes in contradiction with what the same biblical treatise asserts about the same character. This internal contradiction of the Scripture, read from the generic point of view of the contradiction that the natural language inherently contains, forces us to resort to a second reading, of an allegorical type.

Consequently, there will be in the Writing assumed as inspired by Christians, passages that can be read in a "historical" register: the internal non-contradictory sequences (or which do not refuse the application to a common corpus of knowledge) indicate what really had happened and thus it is kept the exigency of applying the biblical narrations to reality. This

note of the Origenian interpretation must be pronounced emphatically, since posterity disputed Origen's exegesis precisely on the grounds of the disregard that he showed towards biblical narrations (presenting a history of salvation, assuming the stories included in the Bible is a condition for assuming faith). Better known for his "allegory", Origen is neglected in his attempt, of an amazing minuteness, of rendering credible disputed narrative biblical episodes and considered as incredible. The proof is exactly the passage just mentioned, that of saving all species with the help of Noah's ark: few exegetes strived that much to reply to the challengers of this biblical episode.<sup>10</sup> What Origen offers to us is a complete exegesis: in order to found his allegory, but to also defend the "reality" of some biblical episodes, Origen makes a great effort.

Yet there are some passages which cannot obviously be applied to the sensitive reality: Origen himself notices this and insists on it, mentioning some passages which are apparently lacking the real application. This means, to Origen, that the Scripture itself indicates, indirectly, the necessity of another reading that should not take into account the current rules of interpretation. These passages, obvious to any reader in their vagueness, will help Origen support in front of the heterogeneous Christian auditorium, the necessity for allegory.

But a new objection could have been raised in front of the Origenian option for allegory: not only the writing considered by Christians as being inspired had the vocation of the allegorical reading. The "inspired" authors of Greece, Homer first of all, could also claim an allegorical reading. Origen himself mentions the allegorical readings practiced in the philosophical environment of the second century AD, and his tone is an admiring one. This would mean that the allegory is the vocation of any writing: inapplicable to a common referent (as they inevitably contain *impossibilia*, contradictions, and inadvertences), they demand a second reading, which can be found through allegory. The Jewish exegetes had already applied allegory to biblical writings, and the results were accessible to the Greek speaking world as well. And if so, does the Origenian allegory have a specific legitimacy?

Origen will strive to legitimate the Christian allegory and he will manage to do this by using exactly the inspired book which is being interpreted: being a unique book of its kind (revealed by the divinity), the Bible must be read according to the rules that it contains. Or, a passage in a Pauline epistle allegorically interprets a narrative passage from the Old Testament (Gal. 4. 22-27). Abraham's two sons, who certainly existed

in reality for the faithful Origen, and Abraham's two wives also suggest something else than what the applying to the sensitive reality suggests, and this because the episode is narrated as an allegory, it also says something else (*allegoroumena*). And Paul actually explains what the OT episode means, in allegory: it does not only say the story of a family who once lived in Canaan, but of the two testaments (*diathekai*). Agar gives birth "according to flesh" (*kata sarka*) to a nation destined to slavery, Agar being assimilated to the present Jerusalem (*te nun Ierousalem*), while Sarah gives birth "according to promise" (*kata epaggelias*), being the Jerusalem from above (*he...ano Ierousalem*), which is "free" (*eleuthera*). A few lines further (Gal. 4.29), Paul differentiates between the one born "according to flesh" (*kata sarka*) from the one born "according to spirit" (*kata pneuma*).

Therefore, for Origen, the allegory is a legitimate procedure of interpretation. The Bible, a document inspired by divinity, recommends and practices it. The argument was used by the exegete especially in relation to the internal disputes, inside the Christian Church, which set under discussion the legitimacy of the applied allegorical practice to the Scripture. But the conclusion should not be a rushed one: it is true that Origen uses the argument in the internal disputes of the Christian church because he published (and we were handed over in this way) only what he published for his coreligionists. The argument must have been very efficient in the *ad extra* disputes as well, which set under discussion the legitimacy of using, in the case of Christian Scriptures: in the third century, Porphyry already accused Origen of illicitly adopting the interpretative practices of the Greece in order to apply them to a Barbarian writing, the Christian Bible. To this retort, Origen had a strong argument: among the writings that were read allegorically in Antiquity (Homer, Hesiod, Plato, the Oracles and so on), only the Christian Scriptures contain the suggestion regarding the use of allegory for understanding. The argument was a strong one: since other writings, which were by tradition received with an allegorical key, do not contain recommendations that guide the reader towards an allegorical reading, and yet they are thus assumed, the Christian Bible is the only writing that clarifies itself through the explicit call to allegory (the episode deciphered through this procedure is in the Old Testament, but the allegorical "scale of reading" is suggested by a Pauline epistle, in the New Testament). Thus, from the Christian point of view, practicing allegory, in the case of the Bible, is legitimate: this reading key is recommended by the revealed writing itself, it is not imposed arbitrarily by the reader's will, even if he is well-intended.

There is an obvious correlation between the way of reading chosen by the ancient and a theory on language: the discussion about the paradox of the liar, presented in the section 1.1, tried to convince about this. The limits of natural language, obvious when you encounter paradoxes, as the one of the liar, determine, in an optimistic epistemological scenario, where the truth is an aim that can be reached through language, the search of another language. This second language, which avoids the disadvantages of common language (since it is inspired), says something else, *alla agoreuei*: its reading is not the common one, but another one, for which this language actually exists. Paul, in correlation with deciphering a passage that "says something else" (Gal. 4.22-27), differentiates between what is "according to flesh" (*kata sarka*) and what is "according to spirit" (*kata pneuma*). The two categories are solitary both to the conception on language, as well as to the exegetic Origenian theory: natural, common language offers only a description of the somatic, of what is grasped through senses, and this type of reading is "historical". And the failure of natural language is obvious: applied to a precarious ontological instance, it goes down together with it, and the "literal" reading, of a "historical" type, cannot surpass the confusion, the lack of precision, the contradiction. This register must be surpassed by the one who aims at reaching the truth: another language is necessary, the inspired one, which should have as significant another reality, the spiritual one, and as reading instrument, allegory will be necessary.

Consequently, the allegorical reading is the one assuring the reader of receiving the message of the revealed writing: it does not only tell stories of the old days, referring to those lived in a time and place commonly perceptible, but it tells another story, of what is not somatic, of what does not have sensitive determination. For it is exactly the sensitive determination which made a failure out of the reading in a literal sense: having the consistency of the "matter" which is its reader, natural language, following "history", cannot offer guarantees about the truth. Of course, there were, for the Christian Origen, all the censuses described by the Numbers Book, and their results are in all respects credible. But the revealed language, the one included in the Bible, has as decoding instrument the allegory: it tells a history of the old days, but at the same time it also speaks about what it is not physical, of what it is not material. Therefore, in allegorical key, the Christian Scripture tells us about soul, its tribulations, its "falls", but also about spirit, the one that is closest to God, Who is Spirit.

Of course, the Origenian claim of the existence of a language with a multiple reading (the term “allegory” already indicates a speech that *also* says something else than what is obvious *de plano*) may hardly be accepted today. It rather seems an artifice the appeal to allegory: simplicity tries to wear the clothes of civility. And the exegete’s claim, of reading a biblical passage from multiple perspectives, is usually placed in the category of unsuccessful literary attempts. The triple signification of a biblical sentence, first read in the “historical” register, applied to the mundane, corporal reality, then in an allegorical register, once as a “story of the soul” and then as “saga of the spirit”, cannot but vex us. From the point of view of common logic, of the one that precisely the mundane imposes and bears. Regarded from the point of view of a classical logic, of the bivalent one, the Origenian claim of a double reading with a triple sense is extravagant. But the bivalent logic, of the truth and the false, of excluding the third possibility, is the result of the meeting between the objects of common perception and our thinking. Or, for the ancient exegete, the logic is determined by the ontological horizon that gives it even the possibility of existing: the logic founded on distinction, typical for the ancient paradigm, is related to the area of the sensitive, of the spirit *embedded* in sensitive. The logic of distinction, of differentiation (without the elementary distinction between A, B and C there would be no sentence, nor demonstrative syllogism), specific to “historical” reading (let us remember that what does not pass the test of non-contradiction cannot be admitted in this register) must be seen as a counterpart of an “unifying logic”, given by the allegorical reading, in which the soul gets closer, through virtuous life, to divinity, and what is spirit unites with the Spirit.

In this way, from an Origenian point of view, the hesitation of the modern in front of allegory rather suggests opacity. Knowing no other kingdom except for the sensitive one (the only one that is equipped, subject to control, to the modern experiment), the modern applies his own categories to the Origenian allegorical proposal. Hence the accusations regarding the “lack of reason” of allegory, to the “hazard” of procedure: in a homogenous world, without perceiving any other ontological instance, the claim of the allegory of saying other “narration” can only be excessive. Yet, to Origen, it is this precisely this second narration that is important.

This means that also the “narrative line” is other, in allegorical reading: the interested passages, beyond their “historical” counterpart, indicate a saving history, of the union between man and God. From a moral perspective, what matters is the way in which every individual assumes

this second history: the ethical tint, founded on the individual, on his moral gesticulation, is unavoidable. But the same allegorically founded narration describes us as individuals united in one body, as a whole searching for its completion in God. The simultaneity of the readings, outraging to the modern sensitivity, is natural for the one assuming the Scripture as a revealed document, for the one using allegory, suggested by the same Scripture, for understanding the inspired message, which differentiates among flesh, soul and spirit.

And the revealed Scripture indicates its peculiarity exactly through this triple signification, legitimate from the perspective of Origen the exegete: what is narrated in the “historical” register suits the non-historical, non-sensitive register. It is a correspondence that a good interpreter knows where to find it again and to communicate it to his public: in the “popular” form of the homily, Origen knows how to teach his auditorium this very lesson, of the signification of the Scripture.

## **2. The Origenian Exegesis to the *Book of Numbers***

In the second part of this study, I will exemplify, following the Origenian interpretation applied to the biblical book of Numbers, the way in which the Origenian exegetic doctrine is applied to its texts. One must mention, from the beginning, that the Origenian exegesis to Numbers can be rediscovered today under the form of homilies (preaches addressed to the Christian public in church) and scholia. It is missing, in the case of Numbers, a commentary, great interpretative work, following a classical model, dedicated by Origen to other biblical treatises. Therefore we will not be able to read the Origenian exegesis in its most comprehensive hypostasis, but only preaches addressed to a public who is obviously heteroclite, as well as short reading notes, which briefly clarify issues of great interest. Unfortunately, only these short Origenian reading notes have reached up to nowadays in their Greek original: the homilies of Numbers have only survived in Latin, in the translation made by Rufinus.

### **2.1. The Historical Reading**

Several times in his homilies (but also in some of his scholia), Origen mentions that what he offers is a “historical” reading. An example from a homily (25, 3): explaining a biblical episode narrating the fights between

Hebrews and Midianites, as well as the plunders taken by Hebrews, Origen is first of all preoccupied with the “historical” signification, namely with the plausibility of the narrative segment, as well as of its agreement with the rest of the biblical narration. In section 3.6 of the homily 25, Origen briefly narrates the sequences from Numbers 31.9-12 and 31.21-47, summarizing the biblical narration (*haec est historiae continentia*). Another passage explicitly indicated from a “historical” perspective is the one in Homily 12: in its fourth section, it is presented the content of a message sent by Moses to the king of the Amorites. Since nothing can vex common sense, the message has a clear “historical” signification: *historia quidem manifesta est*. This does not prevent Origen from looking for a second spiritual signification of the passage: *sed deprecemur Dominum ut aliquid dignum possimus in interioribus eius sensibus pervidere*.

Of course, the “historical” interpretation seems naïve to the reader today, but it was related to the philological tradition of the Antiquity. Understanding a text implied, before any “allegorical” interpretation, the determination of the common signification of the text, of its coherence (internal, but also external). The “historical” reading has therefore the task to clarify a text by following the common signification of words (or, in case where it does not exist, to offer signification to the words considered obscure), to contextualize, to check the respecting of the conventions of the literary genre, to testing the application of the text to the common rules of logic.

The non-“historical” exegesis can be released by any lack of plausibility of the interpreted text. Coming back to the first mentioned homily in this section of the text, Origen notices that a detail narrated by the Scripture can be considered superfluous (from the perspective of the biblical narration), and the lack of purpose of listing names of Midianites emperors killed by the Jewish reinforces his option for a non-“historical” reading of the biblical passage. First of all, the names of the five kings are mentioned: *Sed et nomina eorum curae fuit Scripturae divinae memorare. Evin inquit et Rocon et sur et Ur et Roboc*. And then Origen explains the appearance of these names, which cannot be plausibly justified in a “historical” register: *Ego puto quod nomina haec Scriptura divina non pro historia narraverit, sed pro causis et rebus aptaverit* (25, 3.1).

But it is not only from a narrative point of view the mentioning of names is implausible (since these names are mentioned only once here, this thing being apparently useless), but also the signification of one of these names. For Origen explains the signification of one of these: *Evin* means “wild”, or this name would have been the last option of a parent

who was looking for a name for his son. And this observation legitimates the attempt at a non-“historical” reading:

*Nam putas fuerit aliquis ita stultus qui filio suo nomen Beluinus imponeret?  
Sed hoc arbitror magis quod institutioni animarum prospexerit sermo  
divinus, volens nobis ostendere quod adversum huiusmodi vitia militare  
debeamus et de habitaculis ea carnis nostrae depellere, istos reges fugare  
de regno corporis nostri (25, 3.1).*

Therefore, the exegete notices the absence of plausibility in mentioning the names of Madianites kings, and this is a sign for teaching a second reading, of a non-“historical” type. Such a competence allows the second reading, allegorical.

## 2.2. The Allegorical Reading

After finishing the “historical” reading of the revealed fragment, Origen suggests looking for another significant that should fulfill the conditions of a satisfying reading. Abandoning “history” implies, before all, the capacity of receiving another ontological, non-material, non-somatic level. The referent of the biblical text aims at the soul, the spirit, at improving the individual, at bringing him closer to divinity. Thus, after noticing, while commenting the just mentioned biblical passage, in which the names of the Madianites kings killed by the Hebrews are mentioned, that the passage cannot be received in “historical” reading, Origen will explain the signification of these ancient names: if Evin means “wild”, then Rocon means “vanity”, Ur suggests “urge”. The five kings, therefore, cannot mean something in the “history” of this world, but in a “history” of the soul: in fact, according to Origen, the five human vices are mentioned here. The five kings are the five dominant vices of the soul: *Denique hi qui in vitiis  
regnant, quinque reges esse dicuntur, ut evidentissime doceamur quia  
omne vitium quod regnat in corpore ex quinque sensibus pendet (25, 3.5).*

Assimilating the five kinds of vices with the senses, which must be repressed by the virtuous one, is a classical theme. And at this point of his exegesis, Origen offers another famous theme, which will give birth to tradition: through analogy, our soul has five spiritual senses that help the virtuous one to go closer to God. In fact, there is a sublimation of the senses attached to the flesh:

*... non utique effodiendum praecipit oculum corporis nostri nec manum aut pedem abscidendum, sed sensum carnalia sentientem et concupiscentiis carnalibus lascivientem mandat abscidi, ut oculi nostri recta videant et aures nostrae recta audiant et gustus noster verbum Dei gustet manusque nostrae palpent et contingent de Verbo vitae (25, 3.5).*

It is not about senses in their common meaning that the revealed Writing speaks, but about the internal, non-material senses, about perceiving the spiritual by the spiritual.

Another place, from the same homily of Numbers, notices an internal contradiction between the things narrated by the revealed Scripture. The Jewish nation, chosen by God and praised by Him, is presented as “drinking the blood of those wounded” (Num. 23.24). The cruelty placed next to the mildness, often asserted, of the Jewish nation, makes Origen challenge the advocate of “history”:

*In his verbis quis ita erit historiae narrationis contentiosus adsertor, immo quis ita brutus invenietur, qui non horrescens sonum litterae ad allegoriae dulcedinem ipsa necessitate configuat? Quomodo enim iste populus tam laudabilis, tam magnificus, de quo tanta praeconia sermo dinumerat, in hoc veniet, ut sanguinem vulnerorum bibat... (16, 9.1)*

And the passage is debatable not only from the point of view of the qualities of the Jewish people, but also by noticing the strict prohibition concerning blood consumption, asserted in the Old Testament and enhanced in the New Testament:

*cum tam validis praeceptis cibus sanguinis interdicatur a Deo, ut etiam nos, qui ex gentibus vocati sumus, necessario iubeamur abstinere nos, sicut ab his quae idolis immolantur, ita et a sanguine? (16, 9.1)*

Further on, Origen will do his best to identify that “nation” that will drink blood, following the biblical text. As one may notice, any inconsistency perceived in the “historical” reading, or discrepancy, its implausibility, noticed through reference to the context of the passage or to the reader, is formed, for Origen, in the justification of allegorical reading. Therefore, the “syntax” of the text, its consistency and internal coherence are important, as well as its “semantics”, its plausibility or even the possibility of the existence of a reader that would correspond to the “letter” of the text, to its common

signification. When the “syntax” or “semantics” are missed by the biblical text, the necessity of a second, allegorical reading becomes obvious.

To Origen however, the allegorical exegesis, which indicates the second, non-material significant of the Bible, was triggered not only by the carefully observing of the text, its coherence, its adjustment to the common significant, but also by the author’s status. Even in a homily of Numbers (26, 3), meant for the general public, Origen tries to legitimize his allegorical practice by using another argument too: not only the observation of the text, of its inconsistencies that force us to discover another reader, constrains to allegorical exegesis, but also the author of the writing. Beyond the brief explanations given by Origen, one can see an elaborate conception about language, its functions, a conception that is similar to that which differentiates among syntax, semantics and pragmatics.

After mentioning the episode of the plunders taken by Midianites, seeing it in the historical register, Origen considers that the second signification of the text is not only imposed by the analysis of discourse (i.e. of its conformity with reality, of its plausibility, of its compliance with the usages of the genre of which it is a part). Therefore, it is not only the analysis of the “syntax”, of the internal coherence of the discourse, of respecting the stylistic “code” to which is subject, that is important, not only noticing the “semantics” of the discourse, of the involved reader. Important is also the “pragmatics” of this discourse, its relation both with the author, as well as with its receiver. First of all, Origen analyses the biblical discourse from the perspective of its author, noticing that a message is taken into consideration by observing its sender: *Omnia qua dicuntur, non solum ex ipso qui dicitur sermone pensanda sunt, sed et persona dicentis magnopere consideranda est* (26, 3.1). It is then the exegete’s explanation: a child’s message is received in a different register from that where an adult’s message is received, as well as a scholar’s discourse, which is intercepted in another register of expectations than the one emitted by an illiterate (26, 3.1). Or the biblical narrator is neither a child nor an adult, not even a man or an angel, since tradition bestows the narration on the Holy Spirit:

*Qui haec gesta narrat quae legimus, neque puer est, qualem supra descripsimus, neque vir talis aliquis neque senior nec omnino aliquis homo est; et ut amplius aliquid dicam, nec angelorum aliquis aut virtutum caelestium est, sed, sicut traditio maiorum tenet, Spiritus sanctus haec narrat* (26, 3.2).

Genesis' narration couldn't have been told by Moses who was not a witness to it, in the same way in which the Old Testament' prophecies about Jesus couldn't have been uttered by a man. Besides, the revealed Writing itself suggests its author, therefore Origen notices:

*Constat ergo ea per Spiritum Sanctum dicta et ideo conveniens videtur haec secundum dignitatem, immo potius secundum maiestatem loquentis intelligi* (26, 3.2).

Therefore, the revealed writing must be read from the point of view of that who wrote it.

But the "pragmatics" of the biblical text also imposes observing the relation between receiver and text, and this must be analyzed by taking into account the usefulness brought by the text to the receiver. In an extended discussion that corroborates several biblical episodes, Origen shows that the biblical message, the Old Testament's one, aims at saving, rescuing from the fire of the bottomless pit. Or, it is difficult to understand how the minutely, insignificant detail, present everywhere in the Pentateuch, could help at saving the reader. The examples used by Origen (26, 3.3), all present in the Treatise of *Numbers*, convince us of their lack of relevance, from the point of view of the aim meant by the same writing.

The conclusion, to Origen, is obvious: the narrated events in the revealed writing are secret and have a signification that sends to divine things, and in order to understand them, it is necessary to become closer to the Bible's author. Understanding the message implies knowing the sender, Origen suggests further on in his example:

*Et quidem quod haec mystica sint et divinum aliquem sensum contineant, puto quod ex his quae superius asserta sunt, nullus possit ambigere, quamvis sit ille iudaicis fabulis insatiabiliter deditus; tamen sicut hoc neminem negare puto, ita quae sint illa quae ex istis narrationibus indicentur et quae rerum facies sub hoc velamine contegatur, ad liquidum scire ipsius puto esse sancti Spiritus qui haec scribi inspiravit* (26, 3.5).

The allegory remains, therefore, the privileged method of reading for Origen, and this is because the biblical message is regarded as "pragmatic", from the point of view of its usefulness for the receiver. This does not mean that the entire biblical text must be allegorized. It is still in a homily (11, 1) on Numbers that Origen will discuss about the use of allegory, which

becomes unavoidable in the case in which the benefit of the reader is not obvious in a “literal” reading. In the case of moral prescriptions, of biblical commandments, their usefulness is obvious, so that the allegory is not necessary:

*Et ideo haec [i.e. mandata] nobis secundum litteram custodienda sunt. Item alibi: iuste, inquit, sectare quod iustum est. Quid opus est in his allegoriam quaerere, cum aedificet litteram? (11, 1.8)*

Analyzing then the texts of the Pentateuch, Origen will notice that some prescriptions must not be followed by Christians, others must be followed literally, and others have their use in improving one’s behavior, but must be also assumed allegorically:

*Ostendimus, ut opinor, auctoritate Scripturae divinae ex his quae in lege scripta sunt, aliqua penitus refugienda esse et cavenda ne secundum litteram ab Evangelii discipulis observentur, quaedam vero omnimodis ut scripta sunt obtinenda, alia autem habere quidem et secundum litteram veritatem sui, recipere tamen utiliter et necessario etiam allegoricum sensum (11, 1.11).*

### 3. Conclusions

Read especially through the mediaeval scale, and often understood from the point of view of subsequent biblical interpretation, Origen the interpreter is received as an ecclesiastic author, who is understood within an ecclesiastic context. Without denying this perspective (Origen’s Christian option is fundamental for his interpretation), one must mention that to a Christian of the third century AD, the context is a multiform one. Educated in the cultural capital of the Roman Empire, accustomed to the philological practice of the time, listener of philosophical lectures, Origen owes a lot to the cultural and philosophical context of his time. His allegorical exegesis is, therefore, less the whim of a theologian who finds himself in difficulty or the product of a poetical mind, as it is a scholar’s deliberate option.

The difficulty in perceiving Origen within the context is, mainly, because of a cultural accident: the philosophical, philological writings of the first Christian centuries can no longer be read today. This is also

because, after the third century AD, it becomes harder and harder to acknowledge, even in the educated environments, the intellectual acquisitions of the period that is context for Origen. We cannot read the treatises of language theory, the works of logic published in this time are not available, we cannot understand the competences of the allegory practiced by a Christian exegete. The only “heritage” of the century that interests us is the dichotomy material-intelligible, within platonic scheme, with all the difficulties arising from its suggestion.

This text tried to convince its readers, using Origenian texts, that the option for allegory hides a whole series of reasons: a theory of language, of its limits from a logical perspective, is associated to a doctrine about the functions of natural language, as well as to a distinction between self-sufficiency (logical, ontological) and insufficiency.

Allegory is not just the product of perceiving an ontological divide, which compels to find a new signification. It is also the result of studying natural language, its limits within an optimistic epistemological scenario, which, surpassing the lesson of skepticism, considers possible reaching the truth. It is also the result of the logical exercise, as proven by the Origenian solution offered to the paradox of the liar. It is also the result of philological practice belonging to the Alexandrian tradition, which clarifies a text by using techniques and methods refined for centuries. It is also the result of observing language functions, which is understood as an act that involves the sender, the receiver and the con-text. All these results become parts of the file of Origenian allegory, often read unilaterally from the point of view of the “systematic” passage in *De principiis*. Of course, dealing with the issue of allegory in this Origenian writing is important, but one must mention the fact that the author offers there an explanation addressed to a certain kind of public that is not specialized, too little interested in the theoretical structure sustaining the option for allegory. The arguments there are fundamentally biblical, because the author is addressing to a community of Christians: what is beyond its presumed interest of it, is not, naturally, discussed here. But Origen discretely mixes, as noticed, in his comments, but also in his “popular” homilies, technical arguments of the allegorized option. And it seems he does not offer a writing that would gather all these arguments because the heteroclite public of the homilies would have felt uncomfortable listening to a technical discourse. What is remarkable is that sometimes, from the desire to explain the option for allegory, the exegete brings arguments that seem to suggest a theoretical,

elaborate source (see section 2.2, especially the discussion about the “sender” and the “receiver” of the revealed message).

Unfortunately, the theoretical sources used by Origen (if there are such sources) cannot be identified: they succumbed, leaving just a few traces. Their detection is possible, although searching without knowing what one should find is a temerarious attempt. The Origenian writings use, as it seems, current arguments of allegory, projected in a Christian environment. Identifying these arguments could clarify the context in which Origen chooses the allegory for a second reading of the book revealed to Christians. Even if is kept, mostly, in Latin translation, the interpretative Origenian practice is worth studying in order to understand the reasons for which the exegete resorts to allegory. This research, still ongoing, will be able to offer coherence to a puzzle that has here presented some of its elements.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> A general bibliography of the origenian studies is offered by Henri Crouzel, *Bibliographie critique d'Origène* (Instrumenta Patristica, 8), Nijhoff, 1971, pp. 685, *Bibliographie critique d'Origène. Supplement 1* (Instrumenta patristica, 8.A), Kluwer, 1983, pp. 339, *Bibliographie critique d'Origène. Supplement 2* (Instrumenta patristica 8.B), Brepols, 1996, pp. 262. The bibliography dedicated to the origenian allegory is also extensive (see, for example, Hanson R. P. C., *Allegory and event. A study of the sources and significance of Origen's interpretation of Scripture*, John Knox Press, Richmond, 1959, Hanson, R. P. C., *Origen's interpretation of Scripture exemplified from his Philocalia*, în *Hermathena*, 63 (1944), pp. 47-58, Dublin, \* \* \* *Origeniana Sexta. Origène et la Bible* (Actes du Colloquium Origenianum Sextum, Chantilly, 30 august - 3 septembrie 1993), ed. Gilles Dorival, Alain le Boulluec, (Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium CXVIII), Leuven University Press, 1995).
- <sup>2</sup> There are few exceptions from this general trend (see Heine, Ronald E. – *Stoic logic as handmaid to exegesis and theology in Origen's Commentary on the Gospel of John*, în *Journal of Theological Studies*, 44 (1993), pp. 90-117, Clarendon Press, Oxford, Rist, John – *Platonism and its Christian Heritage*, Variorum, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, reprinted, 1997, Edwards, M.J., *Origen Against Plato* (Ashgate Studies in Philosophy and Theology in Late Antiquity), Ashgate, 2002).
- <sup>3</sup> The Origenian editions used in this paper: Origenes, *Adnotationes in Numeros*, în **Patrologiae cursus completus** (series Graeca), vol. XVII, col. 21-24, Migne, Paris, 1857-1866, Origenes, *Selecta in Numeros*, în **Patrologiae cursus completus** (series Graeca), vol. XII, col. 576-584, Migne, Paris, 1857-1866, and Origenes Werke VII, *Homilien zum Hexateuch*, hg. v. W. A. Baehrens (GCS 30), Leipzig 1921, pp. 3-285.
- <sup>4</sup> Porphyry, *The cave of the nymphs in the Odyssey* (Arethusa Monographs), Department of Classics, State University of New York, Buffalo, 1969.
- <sup>5</sup> For some hints on ancient allegory, see *Allégorie des poètes. Allégorie des philosophes* (Textes et traditions 10), ed. Gilbert Dahan, Richard Goulet, Vrin, Paris, 2005 and Coulter, James A., *The Literary Microcosm. Theories of Interpretation of the Later Neoplatonists*, Brill, Leiden, 1976.
- <sup>6</sup> The next lines offer the conclusions of an extensive study on origenian discussion on the liar paradox ("Intellectus quaerens revelationem: Origen's Solution to the 'Liar Paradox'", forthcoming).
- <sup>7</sup> See In Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos explanationum libri, II, 10, in Hammond Bammel, Caroline, Der Roemerbriefkommentar des Origenes: kritische Ausgabe der Uebersetzung Rufins, Buch 1-3, (Vetus Latina: Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel. Aus der Geschichte der lateinischen Bibel, 16) Herder, Freiburg, 1990, p. 185. 189-190. I used also Origen, *Commentarii in Epistula*

ad Romanos (Fontes Christiani 2/1), Liber I, II, uebersetzt und engeleitet von Theresia Heither OSB, Herder, Freiburg, 1990. Unfortunately, the origenian discussion of the liar paradox can be read today in Latin, in an abridged version of his Commentary on Romans. The Greek version is sought to be lost.

- <sup>8</sup> Origen, *In Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos explanationum libri, II, 10*, in Hammond Bammel, C., *Der Roemerbriefkommentar des Origenes: kritische Ausgabe der Uebersetzung Rufins, Buch 1-3* (Vetus Latina: Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel. Aus der Geschichte der lateinischen Bibel, 16), p.188.249. The Origenian commentary continues with a discussion about the next words of the Pauline epistle: "ut iustificeris in sermonibus tuis, et uincas cum iudicaris", another quotation from *Psalmi* (50, 6).
- <sup>9</sup> See Origenes Werke VI, *Homilien zum Hexateuch*, hg. v. W. A. Baehrens (GCS 29), Leipzig, 1920, pp. 22-29.
- <sup>10</sup> See the origenian argument in Origenes Werke VI, *Homilien zum Hexateuch*, hg. v. W. A. Baehrens (GCS 29), Leipzig, 1920, pp. 25-26.

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## THE SAINT AND THE JEWS

In July 1504, Stephen III of Moldavia, the only Greek rite crusader of Rome and Venice after the fall of Byzantium, died (by the 1570s, he was worshiped as a purely Orthodox saint). The combats with Mehmed II had born his fame. In the early 1520s, a well-trained Jewish scholar and administrator from Venetian Crete, Elijah Capsali (c. 1485-c. 1550), wrote that the Jews had actually been the cause of the (first) war between Stephen and Mehmed (1473/1474-1479/1480). Persecuted by Stephen, they had turned to the sultan, who immediately left again the Moldavian *tyrant*. Capsali however did not explicitly mention the source of the dispute between Stephen and the Jews (dated 1475).

[Educated in Padua and Venice, well-learnt in the political art of hiding history behind words, but also with a significant Venetian administrative experience (he was *condestable* of the Jews of Crete on several occasions), Elijah Capsali only wrote that Stephen III had tried to force his Jewish subjects (especially the merchants) to ransom themselves. According to Capsali's main work *Seder Elijahu Zuta* (Elijah's Minor Chronology), written around 1523, which developed, in a much more analytical and less descriptive manner, the data in *Dibrey ha-Yamim le Malkhut Venezia* (The Chronicle of the Venetian Realm), authored some six years earlier, Stephen III of had imprisoned all Jews from a settlement (probably one of his Pontic or Danubian harbors) and demanded each of them to pay 1.000 gold pieces], *for if not, I will take out the right eye of each of you and shame all the sons of Israel* [The Jews responded vigorously]. We are Turkish citizens [in the Romanian translation; i.e. subjects] and you will not be able to treat us as slaves and neither will you be able to touch our fortunes. [The ruler of Moldavia won however the dispute, angered moreover by the fact that the Jews, alike (several) Genoese living in Moldavia did not regard themselves as his subjects, but as the subjects of another – greater – (foreign) authority: the Ottoman sultan, respectively the Crimean city of Caffa].

This history apparently completed the sensibly negative inter-confessional and inter-religious contemporary image of Stephen III of Moldavia (who, in return, was never directly accused during his life of

being a *schismatic*, a rarity both for a *Greek* rite Christian monarch and for a ruler who had spent a significant part of his first year of reign in the anti-unionist camp). During his main 'crusader period' (mid 1470s-mid 1480s), he was accused of (mainly financial) oppression by the Hussites (initially sheltered by Stephen III) and – seemingly also – by the Armenians (in 1476 they formed a special military unit in Stephen's host facing Mehmed II's invading army; in 1479 the Armenians had to turn to the sultan against the ruler; Mehmed intervened in their favor and Stephen immediately stopped his abuses, at least according to ecumenical patriarch Maximos III Manases in his letter to the republic, which – after the conclusion of the Ottoman-Venetian peace – he tried to impress with the sultan's tolerance and force). In fact the conflict narrated by Capsali completed another image of Stephen III, glorious in particular in the Latin rite worlds, that of (*Greek* rite) crusader arm. The victories of the Turks had 'converted' the Jews in another fifth column of the new power. After 1453, they were viewed even as Ottoman guardians of Constantinople, where, under Mehmed II, their chief-rabi was Elijah's uncle, Moses Capsali. Stephen, the new hope of the Cross, could not be cut-off from the Jewish problem, furthered by holy wars and Muslim and Christian administrations. The new and old crusaders needed money. Not all costs could be covered through booty and monarchical promises. Crusader financing was further complicated by the disputes between Venice, Stephen III and Mathias Corvinus, the official holder' of the crusader mission in the East. Fiscal pressure could not grow indefinitely, even for a holy cause (the tyranny, often synonymous in medieval speech with excessive fiscality, significantly contributed to the domestic abandonments that Stephen overcame with great difficulty in 1476 when Moldavia was invaded by Mehmed II)<sup>1</sup>.

In mid spring 1475, the impact of Stephen's victory of Vaslui over the army sent by Mehmed against him grew daily. The experienced diplomat Paolo Morosini was sent by Venice to Rome. He was instructed not only to present (realist) military options, but also financial solutions (as basis for the negotiations in view of the crusade) for the anti-Ottoman support of Matthias and Stephen, *the voivode of Serbia and Moldavia*. Like throughout Christendom, the Jews of Hungary and Moldavia represented a very useful financial option, as neither the Italian powers, nor the Latin rite neighbors of Matthias and Stephen appeared willing, in spite of previous engagements, to substantially participate in the holy war of the Cross. Fifteen years earlier, at the Diet of Mantua, Venice, still anxious to avoid war with Mehmed II, had requested her representative to explain to pope Pius II that she could barely

raise 5.000 ducats from the Jews in her lands, which was not worth the effort. Her position had radically changed, probably due also to Morosini. He knew Hebrew, had worked as an administrator of Venetian finances, and had written, a few years earlier, a treatise against the *perfidy of the Jews*, dedicated to Paul II. His recent missions in the Orient, especially to Usun Hassan, who, apparently, used Jewish resources and networks on a large scale, had strengthened Morosini's conviction that the Jews had to be extensively exploited for the greater cause of the Cross.

[Passages from the 'military half' of Morosini's instructions in Latin, form in which they were presented in front of the papal curia, after the discussions based on the 'financial half' of the instructions, issued by the republic in Italian in order to facilitate the negotiations]. [...] *Exercitus igitur hoc ordine conficiendus/ bellumque quatripartito inferrendum opera precium arbitrantur, quo celerrime maxima/ Europae parte pellendum hostem non dubitant. Polonous namque Serenissimus Rex [Casimir IV Jagiello] facile ex-/pertioribus bello Polonis ac Boemis vigintiquinque millium conflabit exercitum,/ sumptoque simul Stephano Servie sive Mundavie Vayvoda [Stephen IV of Moldavia] cum quinque millibus,/ transacto Danubio per Bulgariam per hostem invadant. Ungarie vero Serenissimus Rex [Matthias Corvinus]/cum vigintiquinque millibus ex suis militia aptioribus et experist per Serviam/ et iuxta Bossinam partier aggrediantur hostem [...].* [Morosini did not talk of immense military figures, defining for other projects from the same year 1475, according to which, Matthias 'commanded' over 100.000 soldiers from Hungary, Walachia and Moldavia. From this point of view too, the Venetian project of 1475 featured several of the coordinates presented in her name, again by Morosini, at the Reichstag of Regensburg in 1471, when also the idea of using the *Walachians* against the sultan had resurfaced. The major difference between the two presentations was that in 1475, following king Matthias' recent anti-Ottoman actions, emperor Frederick III of Habsburg lost his crusader front-seat. In parallel, Venice fueled the tensions between Matthias (*her strange ally*) and Stephen (whom she had promoted as eastern crusader alternative) by further 'overlapping' their areas of interest (Serbia, 'given' to Stephen was an old Hunyadi target of Matthias and father John, to whom Bulgaria had been promised as well, a Bulgaria now 'granted', though less publicly, by the republic to Stephen). There were grounds enough for the project's success and for the project's failure. Morosini knew that even if only because he had passed through Moldavia at the time of the battle of Vaslui and his testimony on the combats had fortified the credibility of the victory in *Italia*, used with Venetian exaggeration and disinformation (a year earlier, she had even invented 'crusader victories' for her new favorite Stephen III of Moldavia)].

[Passages from the ‘financial half’ of the instructions received by Morosini, at some moment between the end of March and the beginning of April 1475] [...] *Et perche stante le firmitra fra la Maiesta Imperiale [Frederick III of Habsburg], li Re de Polana [Casimir IV Jagiello] et de Boemia [Wladislaw II Jagiello], et il Re de Ungaria [Matthias Corvinus] et/ temendo loro, che ogni auctione et grandeza de forze che li habea ad dare el pon. Luy le habea ad/ volgrie contro de loro, non e da credere ch’el dicto Re [Matthias] posse may usire del suo regno per andare contro el/ Turco, se ad questo non sia facto debito proveditione.* Se ricorda che a casone, ch’el dicto Re de Ungaria/ possi andare ad resistere allo inimicho et sucorere alle cose cristiane con gente utile et experta/ ch’el pontifice [Sixtus IV] li provedi, et manda quanto havera ricevuto delle decime de Chiexesi [i.e. the members of the clergy] et vigessime de Zudei in/ Italia. Mediante li quali, et le decime et vigessime de <Chiexesi et de> Zudei del suo regno, el [Matthias] possi fare quello pui numero de bona et experta gente <proveniente [?] del suo stato et de Valachia [i.e. Moldavia], ch’el potra/ al meno fin al numero de 25<sup>m</sup> in zoia [...] dale contributione de decime et vigessime de Zudei, drino contradire li Signori de Italia, essendo [...] ci fermo de loro questa pocha summa, et essendo loro subvenuti dal pon delle vigessime de li seculari dell’loro stati [...]. [Morosini knew that financing the crusade was at least as difficult as politically supporting it, and that it implied most often a political double-game, which he himself practiced and which was quite familiar to the Walachians. At Regensburg in 1471, where Frederick III had appointed Morosini imperial councilor, the crusader involvement of the Walachians had been re-discussed, an involvement dependent however on Matthias’ return to the anti-Ottoman front, as Matthias was – as Venice too was forced to admit – the only one who the Walachians would have followed. Yet Matthias was in open conflict with Frederick. Meanwhile, John Vitez and Janus Pannonius, the Hungarian friends of cardinal Bessarion, Morosini’s old patron, prepared, together with Casimir IV, Matthias’ dethronement. Nonetheless, Matthias withstood the attack and Venice had to reconsider her position (a rather substantial part in this decision was played by the fact that, though at the end of Frederick III still considered Stephen III, who had aid Matthias against the conspirators in 1471, his *captain* for Walachia, Stephen chose to support the king and not the emperor). In 1475, Morosini and Venice presented the dispute between Matthias and Frederick as virtually settled, but kept on engulfing Matthias in western and eastern tensions, especially after the latter had reached a matrimonial agreement with Ferdinand of Aragon, king of Naples, Venice’s main Italian adversary. The same ‘duplicitous’ coordinates applied in the ‘crusader case’ of the Jews. The major political effects of working with the Jews (both favorable – in Usun Hassan’s case – and unfavorable – in Mehmed II’s case – for the republic) were obvious and accepted. However there was the need of money, money most easy to get through violent pressures, and also a

'more modern' Humanist anti-Semitism, embraced by Morosini as well. Furthermore, in the case of the Jews there existed neither a basic Christian common ground, nor a Union of Florence that could have justified, on the grounds of the *Turkish* problem, a rapprochement and a compromise, like those that turned Stephen III (and then Bogdan III and Stephen IV) and his Walachian subjects into Rome's only Greek rite crusaders after 1453. Though the practical conditions, of which the Christian side was aware, justified a different approach, in the crusader relation to the Jews matters were – pushed in equally conscientious manner – to the limit. The only one who most likely refrained himself was Matthias, a monarch otherwise in great financial need, whereas Venice and – apparently – Stephen (violently) went after the money. It was therefore perhaps not an accident that a pogrom took place in Venice in 1480, a few months after the official announcement of the peace between the Porte and the Republic that left Venice with her pride wounded – since then she began calling herself the *Serenissima* – and with finances bleeding – which was at least as important as the injured pride].

In 1475, the Roman money that Matthias should have received for Hungary and Moldavia (as whose suzerain, even if only in crusader matters, he was perceived – by Venice's as well – already prior to the Moldavian-Hungarian treaty of Iași of July 1475) should have been (at least) supplemented through the contributions of the Jews in the areas under his (nominal and real) authority. These contributions were significant and justified enough for the *lords of Italy*, reluctant towards such 'co-financements', to keep their lay subjects' *vigessimae*. At average Hungarian wages (the regular monthly wages were 2 florins for a foot-soldier and 3 florins for a rider), the sum required for the – at least three months long (in order to be successful) – campaign of a host commanded by the king' (with a minimal effective of 25.000 men – as proposed by Morosini –, mostly riders in such endeavors) went beyond 170.000 florins (1 Hungarian florin was the equivalent of 1 Venetian ducat). Given the expenses involved – over the same time span – by 5.000 Moldavian riders (most often earning Hungarian wages or similar, yet smaller wages; one of the reasons for the increase of crusader attention given to the Walachians in the 1460s and early 1470s was the fact that the Walachians costed far less, up to 50%, than other – mainly Western, and especially German – soldiers that should have joined the Hungarians against the *Turk*), the sum eventually rose above 200.000 florins<sup>2</sup>.

This was solid crusader expeditionary construct, well calculated and motivated. Stephen III belonged to it, not only by name or common

purpose, but also through the fiscal edifice sustaining the expeditionary construct. More than the use of the tithes, the use of the Jewish taxes for the support of Stephen's riders indicates that he was legally (at least from Rome's and Venice's perspective) a member of the judicial and military structure of Western Christendom, as the Oriental spearhead of her crusader organism. The Venetian calculus further reveals that the Jews in Moldavia were a non-neglectable financial (and perhaps demographic) reality. If we use in this crusader "Jewish funded" context the Venetian proportions (5/1) established between Matthias' and Stephen's armies (proportions that roughly reflect those between the populations of Hungary, of at best 3.000.000 inhabitants, and Moldavia, of around 500.000 before the Ottoman campaign of 1476), the result is a far more numerous Jewish population than previously admitted (in Hungary the tendency was to limit number of the Jews to approximately 5.000, which would have been impossible as Matthias had a Jewish military core, made up from 500 to 1.000 men, and as the minimal proportion between community members and soldiers in non-military communities – such as those of Szeklers and Walachians – was 1/10). The minimal figures for the Jew would therefore be 10.000 in Hungary and 1.500 in Moldavia (the maximal estimates would be 2.5 times greater). An important part of the Jews in Moldavia consisted of the Jews that had fled Hungary due to Louis I of Anjou's persecutions in the 1360s (basically they had come to Moldavia together with the 'founder' of the local state: Bogdan I). More Jews apparently came however from the East and the South, from territories dominated by Muslim powers (in particular the Tartars, with whom the Jews collaborated and who controlled for at least half a century the urban centers at the Danube and Dniestr Mounds). Another significant Jewish contingent came from Poland, moving south with their traditional Armenian rivals (the old protégés of the Moldavian rulers). The largely urban Jewish communities represented up to the 20% of the population of Moldavian boroughs, towns and cities (an 'urban' population that, like in the rest of the region, in Hungary too, stood for 5, as in the Western "more developed" parts of the continent, to 10% of the total population of Moldavia). Such a percentage placed the Jews at the same level of commercial urban power with the Armenians, the Germans (Saxons) and Italians (mainly Genoese), and probably above the Walachians and the Hungarians. Elijah Capsali's text thus has a different weight<sup>3</sup>.

The Jews were not at the origin of the confrontations between Stephen III of Moldavia and Mehmed II (the decisive factors were the Pontic-Genose

and Danubian-Walachian disputes of the Moldavian ruler, Venice's anti-Ottoman failures, the plans of the papacy and the Byzantine emigration in *Italia* and Usun Hassan's Oriental actions). In return, given also the Venetian calculations drawn after Vaslui, we have to accept that the Jews (too), their money, gave substance to the conflict between the ruler and the sultan on the eve of their direct clash of summer 1476 (Capsali emphasized the link between Stephen's persecution and Mehmed's Moldavian campaign, substantiating the 'personalization' of the conflict between the two, marked by human and financial sacrifices and excesses, beyond the limits of the pragmatism specific to both rivals: in 1475 and especially in 1476, in the months preceding Mehmed's Moldavian campaign, both Mehmed and Stephen sacrificed family members, lives and money, as none of them was willing to actually settle their conflict and as both were under the growing influence and pressure of their *Latin* and *Greek* Christian and Muslim contemporaries – to be found on Stephen's crusader, as well as on Mehmed's imperial side – calling for more blood). The Moldavian domestic consequences of the conflict are difficult to estimate. Due to the urban position of the Jews they directly touch the fate of the Moldavian harbors. In winter 1474-1475, the harbors welcomed in the *Turks*. Stephen III re-took them shortly after Vaslui. In the summers of 1475 and 1476, the harbors withstood the Ottoman attacks. In 1484, they fell forever to the *Turks*. The list of the accused for this disaster was long from beginning. Venice too featured on the list. In late 1492, the Ottoman fears of the republic and the growth of Stephen's regional importance after Matthias' death in 1490, officialized however the reconciliation between the *Serenissima* and the ruler, who (re)became Venice's *captain-general* in the East. He was paid by her with at least 70.000 ducats to represent her interests at the European borders of the *Turk* (with this money, in the memory of the crusader failures of 1476 and 1484 and under their influence, Stephen built and re-built princely courts and churches). The restoration of the relations between Suceava and Venice determined the republic not to 'release' anymore delicate information on the ruler's actions (like she had done in 1477 when Stephen had tried to coerce her to grant him more subsidies). Consequently, in all likeliness, Elijah Capsali's voice remained isolated, although the attitude of the republic towards the Jews had gradually evolved over the last decades, becoming more tolerant in its hostility towards the Jews, who lived for generations or only since recently in the vast lands of Saint Mark<sup>4</sup>.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Mayer J. Halévy, 'Les guerres de Etienne le Grand et d'Uzun Hasan d'après la *Chronique de la Turquie* du candote Elie Capsali (1523)', *Studia et Acta Orientalia* (Bucharest), I (1957), pp. 189-198 (initially the voivode of Walachia in Capsali's text was erroneously identified with Vlad III the Impaler/ Dracula of Walachia by Moses Gaster, 'Vlad Țepeș și evreii' [Vlad the Impaler and the Jews], *Anuar pentru Israeliti* [Yearbook for Israelites] (Bucharest), VIII (1885), pp. 160-162; the passages were re-published in *Izvoare și mărturii referitoare la evreii din România* (Sources and Testimonies on the Jews of Romania), I, edited by Victor Eskenazy (Bucharest, 1986), no. 15, pp. 16-17). For the life and work of Capsali: Elia Capsali, *Seder Eliyahu Zuta*, edited by Aryeh Shmuelovitz, Shlomo Simonsohn and Meir Benayahu (Tel Aviv, 1983); Nathan Porgès. 'Elia Capsali et sa chronique de Venise' (I-III), *Revue des Études Juives* (Paris), LXXVII (1922), pp. 20-40; LXXVIII (1923), pp. 15-34; LXXIX (1924), pp. 28-60; Martin Jacobs, 'Das ambivalente Islambild eines Venezianischen Juden des 16. Jahrhunderts: Capsali's Osmanische Chronik', *Judaica* (Berlin), LVIII (2002), pp. 2-17; Giacomo Corazzoli, 'Sulla Cronaca dei So-vrani di Venezia (*Divre' ha-yamim le-malke' Wenesis'yah*) di Rabbi Elia Capsali da Candia', *Studi Veneziani* (Venezia), XLVII (2004), pp. 313-330; Aleida Paudice: *Between Several Worlds. The Life and Writings of Elia Capsali. The Historical Works of a 16<sup>th</sup>-Century Cretan Rabbi* (Munich, 2009), pp. 20-23, 44-45, 57-64, 112-118. For Venice and her relations to the Eastern Churches, as well as for Stephen III's relations to the Hussites and the Armenians (with emphasis on the potential conflict between him and the Armenians of 1478-1479 when it had become clear that Venice would not continue her war with the Porte, in spite of the 10.000 ducats she had secured for Stephen from Rome just a couple of months before the conclusion of the Ottoman-Venetian peace): Petre Ș. Năsturel, 'L'attitude du Patriarcat oecuménique envers les Arméniens des Pays Roumains (fin XIV<sup>e</sup>-début XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle', in *L'Arménie et Byzance. Histoire et culture (=Byzantina Sorbonensis, XII)* (Paris, 1996), pp. 145-158 (p. 150, note 27); Andrei Pippidi, *Byzantins, Ottomans, Roumains: le Sud-Est européen entre l'héritage impérial et les influences occidentales* (Paris, 2006), pp. 36-37; Al. Simon, 'The Relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and Venice in a Venetian Document of 1480', in *România în Europa medievală (între Orientul bizantin și Occidentul latin). Studii în onoarea Profesorului Victor Spinei* [The Romanians in Medieval Europe between the Byzantine Orient and the Latin West: *Festschrift* <for Professor> Victor Spinei <on his 65<sup>th</sup> Birthday>] edited by Ionel Cândeа, Dumitru Teicu (Brăila, 2008), pp. 587-600. For the problem of Moldavian authority over the Genoese during Stephen III's rule, see in general: Ștefan Andreeescu, 'Date noi despre Teodorcha de Telicha' [New Information on Teodorcha de Telicha], in *Prinos lui Petre Diaconu la 80 de ani* [Festschrift Petre Diaconu on his 80<sup>th</sup>

Birthday], edited by I. Cândeа, Valeriu Sîrbu, Marian Neagu (Brăila, 2004), pp. 625-634; Idem, ‘Un nou act genovez cu privire la Ștefan cel Mare’ [A New Genoese Document regarding Stephen the Great], *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie* [Studies and Materials in Medieval History] (Bucharest-Brăila), XXII (2004), pp. 132-136. For the Jews in crusader contexts after 1453: Steven J. Mc Michael, ‘The End of the World, Antichrist, and the Final Conversion of the Jews in the *Fortalitium Fidei* of Friar Alonso de Espina (d. 1464)’, *Medieval Encounters* (Leiden), XII (2006), 2, pp. 224-273; Christian Gastgeber, ‘Die Rede des Iacobus Camp(h)ora an Kaiser Friedrich III. und Ladislaus Posthumus über die Situation im Osten (1456)’, in *The Age of the Jagiellonians (=Eastern and Central European Studies*, IV), edited by Florin Ardelean, Christopher Nicholson, Johannes Preiser-Kapeller, Al. Simon (New York-Oxford-Frankfurt-Basel-Vienna, 2011), in press; Al. Simon, ‘Ways to Liberate Constantinople after 1453: Notes on a Document in the State Archives of Milan’, *Bizantinistica* (Bologna), NS, XI (2011), pp. 277-286. In Ottoman comparison, see also: Franz Babinger, ‘Ja’aqûb Pascha, ein Leibarzt Mehmeds II., Leben und Schicksal des Jacopo aus Gaeta’, *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* (Napoli), XXVI (1951), pp. 87-113. Crusader promises and profits (the Moldavian case): Al. Simon, ‘Anti-Ottoman Warfare and Crusader Propaganda in 1474: New Evidences from the Archives of Milan’, *Revue Roumaine d’Histoire* (Bucharest), XLVI (2007), 1-4, pp. 25-39; Idem, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Anti-Ottoman Warfare: Documents on the Case of Moldavia (1475-1477)’, *Revue Roumaine d’Histoire*, XLVIII (2009), 1-2, pp. 37-53 (in May 1477, Stephen asked Venice again for money in order not to make peace with the Turk and she ‘reminded’ him that in the summer of 1475 he had made over 100.000 ducats in profit from the Christian prisoners and goods from Crimean Caffa, just conquered by the Ottomans). In comparison, to Stephen III’s Moldavia, one must also note the unexpectedly favorable conditions enjoyed by the Jews in Hungary during Matthias’ reign. unlike during the reigns of most of his predecessor, mainly since the end of the 13<sup>th</sup> century (Nora Berend, *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and ‘Pagans’ in Medieval Hungary c. 1000- c. 1300* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 39-40, 91-100). King Matthias Corvinus further had a Jewish army core, ‘similar’ to Stephen III’s Armenian military core of 1476 (the existence of such ethnic-religious military cores, in particular in the cases of well-defined communities, consisting especially of merchants/ traders, such as the Armenians and the Jews, implied the existence of a Armenian/ Jewish population of at least 5.000 souls). This Jewish army core was part of Matthias triumphant parade through Vienna taken from emperor Frederick III of Habsburg in the summer of 1485 (see also Al. Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin. O coexistență medievală* [Stephen the Great and Matthias Corvinus: A Medieval Coexistence] (Cluj-Napoca, 2007), pp. 279-280).

- <sup>2</sup> The cited passages: Archivio di Stato di Milano, Milan (ASM), Archivio Ducale Sfozesco/ Archivio Visconteo-Sforeesco (A.D.S.), Potenze Estere, Venezia, cart. 381, *Giugno-Dicembre 1493*, fasc. 4, *Settembre*, nn. [March-April 1475; the ‘second half’ in Italian of the instructions for Morosini; the ‘first part’ too of Venice’s instructions of spring 1475 for Morosini, a close collaborator of cardinal Bessarion, apparently the uncle of Stephen III’s second wife, since September 1472, Mary of Mangop/ Crimean Theodoro, was misplaced and erroneously labeled; for the ‘first half’, in Latin: ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Illiria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. 2, nn; see Al. Simon, Cristian Luca, „Documentary Perspectives on Matthias Corvinus and Stephen the Great”, *Transylvanian Review* (Cluj-Napoca), XVII (2008), 3, pp. 85-112, pp. 87-88). The Jews of Walachia and Moldavia: Ţerban Papacostea, ‘Jews in the Romanian Principalities during the Middle Ages’, *Shvut: Studies in Russian and East European Jewish History and Culture* (Tel Aviv), XVI (1993), pp. 59-71 (pp. 61-65). Military costs, ‘European co-financing’ and demographic-military proportions: Gyula Rázsó, ‘Military Reforms in the Fifteenth Century’, in *A Millennium of Hungarian Military History*, edited by László Veszprémy, Béla K. Király (New-York, 2002), pp. 54-82 (pp. 70, 76); Benjamin Weber, *Lutter contre les Turcs. Les formes nouvelles de la croisade pontificale au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, PhD Thesis (Toulouse, 2009), pp. 296-297, 376-377; Al. Simon, ‘Between the Adriatic and the Black Sea: Matthias Corvinus and the Ottoman Empire after the Fall of Negroponte’, *Radovi Zavoda za Hrvatsku Povijest* [The Proceedings of the Croatian Institute of History] (Zagreb), XLII (2010), 2, pp. 359-375. For Venice’s earlier stand (at Mantua) towards the Jewish financing of the crusade: G[iovanni]. B[attista]. Picotti, *La Dieta di Mantova e la politica de Veneziani* (=Monumenti Storici Publicati dalla Deputazione Veneta di Storia patria, III, 4) (Venice, 1912), Appendix, no. 28, p. 469. Morosini and the impact of his actions: Margaret L. King, *Venetian Humanism in an Age of Patrician Dominance* (New Haven, 1986), pp. 412-413; Marino Zorzi, *La libreria di San Marco. Libri, lettori, società nella Venezia dei Dogi* (Milan, 1987), pp. 35-36; Gian Maria Varanini, ‘Tra fisco e credito: notte sulle camere degli pegni nelle città venete del Quattrocento’, and ‘La Terraferma al tempo della crisi della lega di Cambrai. Proposte per una rilettura del caso veronese’, in Idem, *Comuni cittadini e stato regionale. Ricerche sulla Terraferma veneta nel Quattrocento* (Verona, 1992), pp. 125-161, 397-435. For the crusader projects of the 1470s: Mihai Berza, ‘Der Kreuzzug gegen die Türken: ein europäisches Problem’, *Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen* (Bucharest), XIX (1942), pp. 42-74 (pp. 70-72); Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant. 1204-1571* (=Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, CXIV, CXXVII, CLI, CLII), II, *The Fifteenth Century* (Philadelphia, 1978), pp. 320-325, 381-382. With emphasis on the double-deals in which Morosini was involved (he was also a good friend of Gregor Heimburg, probably the

main councilor of George Podiebrad, the *Heretic king* of Bohemia, Matthias' former father-in-law and the target of his 'northern crusade'), see also Paul Joachim-sohn, *Gregor Heimburg* (Berlin, 1891), pp. 107, 241-250, 275; Paul-Joachim Heinig, *Kaiser Friedrich III. (1440-1493) - Hof, Regierung und Politik*, II (Cologne-Weimar-Vienna, 1997), pp. 536-537; Ingrid Baumgärtner, 'Bartolomeo Cipolla, Venezia e il potere imperiale: politica e diritto nel contesto della Dieta di Ratisbona (1471)', in *Bartolomeo Cipolla: un giurista veronese del Quattrocento tra cattedra, foro e luoghi del potere. Atti del convegno internazionale di studi (Verona, 14-16 ottobre 2004)*, edited by Giovanni Rossi (Padua, 2009), pp. 277-316 (among those elevated to the rank of eques and imperial count by Frederick III during his Italian visit of 1469 was Gentile Bellini, the future court artist of Mehmed II; similar good relations with emperor were enjoyed by Zaccaria Barbaro, then sent by the republic to Usun Hassan, and Giovanni Erno, the Venetian negotiator of the alliance between the republic and Matthias in 1471, who, like the future Serenissima, took in 1471 the side of the emperor).

- <sup>3</sup> For the questions of medieval Walachian demography: Ș. Papacostea, 'Populație și fiscalitate în Țara Românească în secolul al XV-lea: un nou izvor' [Population and Fiscality in Walachia in the 15<sup>th</sup> Century: A New Sources], *Revista de Istorie* [History Review] (Bucharest), XXXIII (1980), 9, pp. 1779-1786; Idem, 'Din nou cu privire la demografia Țării Românești în secolul XV' [Again on the Demography of Walachia in the 15<sup>th</sup> Century], *Revista de Istorie*, XXXVII (1984), 6, pp. 577-581. For the Jews and the other urban communities in the Walachias: Matei Cazacu, 'La tolérance religieuse en Valachie et en Moldavie depuis le XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle', in *Histoire des idées politiques de l'Europe centrale*, edited by Chantal Millon Delsol, Michel Maslowski, Paris, 1998 (pp. 109-125) (p. 114; unfortunately the source for the refugiation of the Jews of Hungary to Moldavia and Walachia in the 1360s is not clearly indicated); Laurențiu Răduan, *At Europe's Borders: Medieval Towns in the Romanian Principalities* (Leiden-Cologne-Boston, 2010), pp. 439-442. For the Jews of Hungary in the late 1400s, an overview: András Kubinyi, 'Ethnische Minderheiten in den ungarischen Städte des Mittelalters', in *Städtische Randgruppen und Minderheiten*, edited by Bernhard Kirchgässner, Fritz Reuter (Sigmaringen, 1986), pp. 183-199; Idem, 'Zur Frage der Toleranz im mittelalterlichen Königreich Ungarn', in *Toleranz im Mittelalter*, edited by Alexander Patschovsky, Harald Zimmermann (Sigmaringen, 1998), pp. 187-206 (pp. 191-196). Po-pulations and social structures: Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, pp. 238-246, 279-280. The 'exchange rates' of the age: Şevket Pamuk, 'Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914', in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, edited by Halil Inalcik, with David Quataert (Cambridge, 1994<sup>1</sup>), pp. 947-980 (pp. 951-956). For the medieval 'urbanization', see also Wijnand W. Mijnhardt, 'Urbanization, Culture and the Dutch Origins of the

European Enlightenment', in *The International Relevance of Dutch History* (= *The Low Countries Historical Review*, CXXV, 2-3), edited by Klaas van Berkel, Leonie de Goei (Amsterdam, 2010), pp. 141-177 (in these matters: pp. 143-144). For the Walachias in the 1470s, in case of a 'general crusader mobilization', we must accept a fraction of 1/15 between the population of the state and its 'great army', like in the case of other projects from that same year 1475. Walachia was listed with 38.000 soldiers and Moldavia with 32.000. In effect, the 'professional army' of Moldavia consisted at best of 12.000 men, out of which about half could have been regarded as the real standing army of Moldavia, including the troops stationed in Moldavia's fortresses (under Peter IV Rareş, in the 1530s, 3.000 soldiers were in the permanent paid service of the ruler and apparently formed a sort of personal guard of the ruler). In Hungary the number most likely fluctuated between 20.000, maybe even 25.000, in the 1460s, and around 40.000 including the approximately 8.000 border soldier stationed at the Ottoman frontier of the realm, as well as different paid auxiliaries of the Holy Crown of Hungary. In the age of the Jagiellonians the number of soldiers in the paid annual service of the kingship did not exceed 8.000 and, at best, in the years to come, the king could rely on up to 25.000 soliders, if the troops of the barons joined him (in these matters, starting with various case studies of the confrontations and military decisions of the 1460s and 1470s: A. Kubyini, 'Die südlichen Grenzfestungen Ungarns am Ende des Mittelalters', in Idem, *Matthias Corvinus. Die Regierung eines Königreiches in Ostmitteleuropa 1458-1490* (Herne, 1999), pp. 188-201; Pál Fodor, 'The Simurg and the Dragon. The Ottoman Empire and Hungary (1390-1533)', in *Fight against the Turk in Central-Europe in the First Half of the 16<sup>th</sup> Century*, edited by István Zombori (Budapest, 2004), pp. 9-35 (pp. 19-24); Al. Simon, 'The Arms of the Cross: Stephen the Great's and Matthias Corvinus' Christian Policies', in *Between Worlds*, I, *Stephen the Great, Matthias Corvinus and their Time* (= *Mélanges d'Histoire Générale*, NS, I, 1), edited by László Koszta, Ovidiu Mureşan, Al. Simon (Cluj-Napoca, 2007), pp. 45-86 (pp. 62-65); ); Idem, 'Brancho's Son and the Walachians: A Milanese Perspective on the Battle of Baia' (I-II), *Historical Yearbook* (Bucharest), VII (2009), pp. 187-200; VIII (2010), pp. 195-220). As for the Jews, a possible method of estimating the number of the Jews in Moldavia should start from the 1.000 gold pieces per person that, according to Capsali, Stephen III had demanded as ransom from the Jewish merchants. The sum was most likely expressed in Turkish aspers. In ducats or florins it would represented a small fortune that at times not even wealthier Moldavian boyars were able to take out of the country. The sum was rather small: 20-25 ducats (in the 1470s the exchange rates between ducats and aspers fluctuated between 1/40 and 1/50). Depending on the duration of their involvement in the campaign (from 3 to 6 months), and on the wages paid to these riders (probably smaller than the 3 ducats/

florins paid to a Hungarian rider, yet no below 2 ducats/florins), the 5.000 men strong crusader army core commanded by Stephen III in Morosini's project would have costed between (at least) 30.000 and (at most) around 80.000 ducats (the last figure is strikingly similar to sum sent by Venice to her captain Stephen III of Moldavia at the end of 1492 in order to represent her interests at the border of the Ottoman Empire who the republic feared was about to go to war with her). Assuming that Capsali referred to a tax for all of Stephen III's Jewish subjects, the number of the members of the Jewish communities of Moldavia would have fluctuated between (at least) 1.500 and (at most) 4.000 souls, i.e. between roughly 0.3 and 0.9% of the population of the state, but between around 3 to 8% (in case the 'urban population' stood for 10% of the total population of the state) and 6 to 16% (if the 'urban population' represented only 5% of all the inhabitants of Moldavia) of the 'urban population' of Moldavia in the mid 1470s. From an interpretative point of view, this would be the safest option, however questioned by the almost five decades elapsed between Capsali's chronicle and the narrated Moldavian events, by the currency usually used in Venetian Crete (naturally the Venetian ducat), by the fact that in general such medieval taxation were per family, not per subject (yet the so-called *Opferpfennig* was collected in the Roman-German empire from all Jews above the age of 12; Peter Rauscher, 'Widerspenstige Kammerknechte. Die kaiserlichen Maßnahmen zur Erhebung von Kronsteuer und Goldenem Opferpfennig in der Frühen Neuzeit', *Aschkenas. Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der Juden* (Vienna), XIV (2004), pp. 313-363), and also by existence, since the 14<sup>th</sup> century, in a city, like Cetatea Albă (the main harbor at the Dniestr Mounds), inhabited by around 10.000 people, of a Jewish quarter (Gheorghe I. Brătianu, *Marea Neagră* [The Black Sea], edited by Victor Spinei, II (Bucharest, 1988), p. 89). In the end, we must stress out the fact that (only) in the 1930s the Jews represented (at least) 4 % (the percentage was probably double in the eastern parts of the state) of the total population of 'Great Romania' (see 'Populația României' [The Population of Romania], in *Enciclopedia României* [The Encyclopedia of Romania], I (Bucharest, 1938), p. 148).

<sup>4</sup> For an overview: Al. Simon, 'The Limits of the Moldavian Crusade (1474, 1484)', *Annuario del Istituto Romano di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica* (Venice), IX (2007), pp. 193-244; Idem, 'Să nu ucizi o pasăre cântătoare: soarta unui *fortissimus rei Christiane athleta* în ochii Venetiei' [To Kill a Mocking Bird: The Venetian Fate of a *fortissimus rei Christiane athleta*], in *Pe urmele trecutului. Profesorului Nicolae Edroiu la 70 de ani* [On the Tracks of the Past: Festschrift for Professor Nicolae Edroiu on his 70<sup>th</sup> Birthday], edited by Susana Andea, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Al. Simon (Cluj-Napoca, 2009), pp. 159-169; Idem, 'De la Porturile Italiei la porturile ungurului. Drumurile valahe ale cruciadei în secolul XV' [From the Italian Harbors to the Harbors

*of the Hungarian: The Walachian Roads of the Crusade in the 15<sup>th</sup> Century], in *Istoriografie și politică în estul și vestul spațiului românesc* [Historiography and History East and West of the Romanian Space], edited by Svetlana Suceică, Ion Eremia, Sergiu Matveev, Sorin Šipoš (Kishinev – Oradea, 2009), pp. 107-133. For the (controversial, especially in reference of the actual events occurred during the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and to the Islamic turn of the state under Bayezid II) relation between the Jews and the sultans (up to the 16<sup>th</sup> century): H. Inalcik, ‘The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City’, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* (Washington DC), XXIII (1969), pp. 229-249 (here pp. 235-236); Joseph Hacker, ‘Ottoman policies towards the Jews and Jewish attitudes towards Ottomans during the Fifteenth Century’, in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, edited by Benjamin Braude, Bernard Lewis (New York, 1982), pp. 117-126; Idem, ‘The Sergen System and Jewish Society in the Ottoman Empire During the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries’, in *Ottoman and Turkish Jewry: Community and Leadership*, edited by Aron Rodrigue (Bloomington, 1992), pp. 1-66; B. Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (New York, 1984), pp. 135-136; M.R. Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1994), pp. 3-8; **Minna Rozen**, *History of the Jewish Community in Istanbul: The Formative Years, 1453-1566* (Leiden-Boston, 2002), pp. 27-33 (at the end of 15<sup>th</sup> century, following especially the expulsion of the Jews and Moors from Spain after 1492, the Jewish population of Istanbul had risen to 30.000); M. Jacobs, *Islamische Geschichte in Jüdischen Chroniken* (Tübingen, 2004), passim (underlines Capsali’s repeated pro-Ottoman overtones). For Venice and the Jews in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, see in general: Riccardo Calimani, *Storia del ghetto di Venezia* (Milan, 1985), pp. 9-12 (the first Jewish ghetto was established in Venice in 1516; the name *ghetto* comes from the Venetian dialect); *Gli ebrei e Venezia, secoli XIV-XVIII. Atti del Convegno internazionale organizzato dall’Istituto di storia della società e dello stato veneziano della fondazione Giorgio Cini. Venezia, Isola di San Giorgio Maggiore, 5-10 giugno 1983*, edited by Gaetano Cozzi (Milan, 1987); with emphasis on the crusader problem in Venice’s relation to the Jews: Robert Chazan, *Medieval Stereotypes and Modern Antisemitism* (Berkeley, 1997), pp. 10-14; Reinhold C. Mueller, ‘Lo status degli ebrei nella Terraferma veneta del Quattrocento: tra politica, religione, cultura ed economia. Saggio introduttivo’, in *Ebrei nella Terraferma veneta del Quattrocento: atti del convegno di Studi. Verona, 14 novembre 2003 (=Reti Medievali. Quaderni di Rivista, II)*, edited by G.M. Varanini, R.C. Mueller (Florence, 2005), pp. 9-30 (pp. 20-23). Venice’s attitude evolved from open hostility (since the 1420s, the Jews could not own land or build synagogues in Venice), passing through a pogrom in 1480 (after the Venetian-Ottoman peace of 1490; the pogrom was however reduced in comparison to other parts of Europe) to*

'hostile tolerance' (professor Papacostea formula for the Walachian attitude towards the Jews can be applied in this case as well), and Venice, like Rome, began to shelter more and more Jews who fled from Germany (1470s-1480s) or from Spain (1490s). Passing to Moldavia, three aspects have to be underlined. First the 15<sup>th</sup> century urban Moldavia proportion of the Jews, as derived from Morosini's presentation of 1475 and Capsali's chronicle from the early 1520s, is more suiting for 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> century relations (when the Jews represented, in different Moldavian towns and cities, even up to 50% of their population) than for the conventional images of medieval Moldavia (e.g. Andrei Oișteanu, *Inventing the Jew. Antisemitic Stereotypes in Romanian and Other Central-East European Cultures* (Lincoln-London, 2009), *passim*, and the explicitly modern anti-Semitic references in relation to Stephen's 'thinking' in Maria-Magdalena Székely, Ștefan Sorin Gorovei, 'Semne și minuni pentru Ștefan cel Mare' [Signs and Miracles for Stephen the Great], *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie* [Studies and Materials in Medieval History] (Bucharest), XVI (1998), pp. 47-66, pp. 63-64). Second, other than in Stephen III of Moldavia's case, Matthias Corvinus' relation with the Jews did not deteriorate following their anti-Ottoman taxation, most likely because of the way in which the taxation was implemented/ ransomed with the king's approval, as well as under the influence of one of Matthias' most trusted councilors, the treasurer, Johann Ernuszt, a converted Jew (he greatly helped organize the Jews under the authority and protection of the crown, especially from the late 1460s on e.g. László Zolnay, *Buda kozépkori zsidósága* [The Jews of Medieval Buda] (Budapest, 1968), pp. 23-26). Thirdly, we thus draw the attention to the fact that Stephen III's treasurer in the last third of his rule (after the Ottoman conquest of the harbors in 1484 and the Moldavian-Ottoman peace of 1486) was Isaac, one of the most influential Moldavian magnates (in power until the 1510s), without any known ascendancy (his non-Moldavian origins – either Jewish or Greek Crimean – are rather obvious like in the – Hungarian – case of Stephen's brother-in-law and castellan of Suceava, Șandru/ Șendrea/ Sándor Ștefan Andreescu, 'Amintirea lui Ștefan cel Mare în Tara Românească' [Stephen the Great's Memory in Walachia], *Revista Iсторică*, NS, XV (2004), 3-4, pp. 5-10, here p. 7, nota 13, based on the analysis of N[icolae]. A[lexandru]. Constantinescu, *Dictionar onomastic românesc* [Romanian Onomastic Dictionary] (Bucharest, 1963), p. 7). Consequently the Jewish problem in Stephen III's Moldavia as an anti-Semitic problem must be submitted to a prudent and balanced analysis, and, further, cannot be separated from the problem of Stephen III's and Evdochia Olekovic of Kyiv's daughter, Helena; she married in 1482 Ivan Ivanovic, the son of heir of Ivan III of Moscow, and was later accused of being a key-member of the influential 'sect' of the so-called *Judaizers* (George Vernadsky, 'The Heresy of the Judaizers and the Policies of Ivan III of Moscow', *Speculum* (Oxford), VIII (1933), 3, pp. 436-454;

Dmitrij Cyzevskij, 'Die Judaisierenden und Hussiten Litterarische Lesefrüchte', *Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie* (Heidelberg), XVII (1940), 1, pp. 120-122; John V.A. Fine Jr., 'Feodor Kuritsyn's *Lao-dikijskoe Poslanie* and the Heresy of the Judaizers', *Speculum*, XLI (1966), 3, pp. 500-504; it should also be noted that Feodor Kuritsyn, Ivan III's envoy to Buda and Suceava for the conclusion of the Hungarian-Moldavian-Muscovite alliance of 1483, played an essential part in the spread in the Greek rite environment of the Hungarian-Moldavian stories on Vlad III *Dracula* of Wallachia). It is possible that after 1484, anti-Semitic feelings spread (this might be the possible interpretation of a Moldavian monastical representation from Putna, Stephen III's necropolis, from the spring of year following the Ottoman conquest of the harbors in southern Moldavia; see in this respect the image and the information in *Repertoriul monumentelor și obiectelor de artă din timpul lui Ștefan cel Mare* [The Repertory of Monument and Artifacts from the Time of Stephen the Great], edited by M. Berza (Bucharest, 1958), no. 89, pp. 295-296). It is (equally) possible that such feelings were quite rapidly neutralized after the Ottoman-Moldavian peace of 1486 (this is the possible meaning of Stephen III's reglementations in favor of the Armenians, Greeks and Jews, 'the main non-Muslim associates of the *Tuk'*, reglementations mentioned under his nephew Stephen IV in 1526; see the source in *Izvoare și mărturii*, I, pp. 155-156).



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# DIALOGUES AND MONOLOGUES: HOW TO WRITE THE HISTORY OF THE GREEK CATHOLICS UNDER COMMUNISM

The history of the relationship between the two Romanian churches in Transylvania,<sup>1</sup> the Orthodox and the Greek Catholic, is a complicated account of entanglements, collaborations, negotiations, ruptures, conflict, dialogue and its absence. The relationship was constantly refashioned, and influenced by each new social, economic or political context. Since its inception, the political, rather than religious project of the Habsburgs<sup>2</sup> in their newly acquired province redesigned its religious landscape to favour the Catholics. Applying the counterreformation pattern already functional in L'viv (at the time known as Lemberg),<sup>3</sup> the Austrian monarchy redrew the confessional map of Transylvania by unifying a part of the Orthodox Church with the Roman Catholic Church. The clear lines of ethnic segregation based on religious affiliation became murkier, with a large part<sup>4</sup> of the Romanian community of Transylvania now inside a larger Catholic community. The now religiously segregated Romanian community developed differently within the bounds of the two churches: the old Orthodox and the new Greek Catholic. The Greek Catholic community played an important role in the modernization of the Romanian community in Transylvania from its inception in the eighteen century to 1918 and the unification of the country especially in the national awakening process during the nineteenth century; the Greek Catholic personalities, for example, had an important role in the unification process with the Romanian Kingdom in 1918.

The expectation was that after the unification of the country in 1918, the Romanian churches would also unite to reach the concept of 'one church one nation'.<sup>5</sup> Instead, in the 1923 Constitution, the state compromised and sanctioned both churches as national churches. A competition between the two Romanian elites in Transylvania for legitimacy in the newly created state ensued, and with it a competition for survival for both these churches in the 1920s and 1930s. For the Greek Catholics it was

about surviving in the bounds of a different structure that legitimized and formed the national elite. For the Transylvanian Orthodox the legitimacy fight was around entering in a Romanian structure, a discursive corpus where the highest authority was represented by the Orthodox Romanians, where the authenticity of their orthodoxy was discussed and questioned. For the Transylvanian Orthodox as well this was a strategy for survival in a foreign (albeit Romanian) ensemble with different norms and religious practices, a distinct hierarchy and a new decision-making centre. The Greek Catholics, meanwhile, had to integrate their history into a larger national narrative. The Transylvanian Orthodox strove to save their history from being engulfed by the history of the mother institution (the Romanian Orthodox Church) they joined after the union of 1918. Both the Greek Catholics and the Transylvanian Orthodox competed in Transylvania to offer their own solution to constructing the nation at the regional level.<sup>6</sup>

The Greek Catholics drew on their particularities in the process of constructing the Romanian nation in Transylvania, a process they helped jumpstart. Their discourse used motifs like the Latin base of the language and the Roman origin of the Romanian people as arguments for what should describe the nation thus making use of their connection to Rome. The Orthodox elite looked towards integration into the mother church, the one religion that represented Romanians working on a link between ethnicity and religion that was developed discursively around the same period in the Orthodox environments of the Old Kingdom.<sup>7</sup> The Greek Catholics brought in their specificity: a Latin Church that would offer a strong boost to the *Latin heritage* of the Romanians, a particular and unique church singular in the East Central Europe that would better serve the task of defining the nation. They argued that the Orthodox Church would not be able to help define the nation in opposition to Romania's neighbours (Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, Russians), with which the Orthodox shared religious affiliation.

After the unification of the country, the Transylvanian Orthodox put forward several offers and designed a number of plans for the unification of the two churches, as a *natural return to the mother church*. The unification of the nation meant that the church serving the nation had *to become one again*. The response was a Greek Catholic unification project: by making Greek Catholicism the sole valid means of unifying the two churches.<sup>8</sup> Variants of unifications were circulated between the two communities throughout the whole interwar period, and articulated by historians coming from within the church environments. Most of the arguments in support

of the unification projects came from the history of the two churches and were included in a larger historiographical debate between historians of the two confessions. The debates were predictably fierce. A positivist turn with regard to research and the use of the historical document as ‘proof’ in the dialogue of the two historiographical sides was brought in the Transylvanian public debate by a young historiographical school educated abroad (Rome, Vienna, and Budapest). This Transylvanian history school regionalized the subject. While discussing integration and constructing the nations and arguing for change within the national historiographical canon, one that advocated including of the history of both Transylvanian churches, all the same neither side involved the other’s legitimating institutions at the national level.

The present essay follows this historiographical debate after the forceful reunification of the two churches in 1948 and the influence that this *unification* had on the historiography of the Greek Catholic Church. It is based on an analysis of the texts produced in the communist period by Church and lay historians on the history of the Greek Catholic Church in several religious journals (*Mitropolia Ardealului* (MA), *Ortodoxia*, *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* (BOR), *Studii Teologice* (ST)) and in various books and collections of articles. This analysis is supplemented by archival research in the archives of the State Secretary for Religious Denominations in Bucharest.

In observing this process of writing and re-writing history I will also offer an insight into the complicated relationship between the communist state and the Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches in Romania. The association between the communist state and majority/ national religious denomination, adopting the soviet model of compromise and instrumentation of the Church in solving the national problem, the use of the Church as *port-parole* for the state’s policies, was the model on which the relationship between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Romanian communist state was based. It is this model of compromise and association that was adopted by the new ‘people’s democracies’ with variations that respond to specific contexts.<sup>9</sup> An interesting side of the relationship between the communist state and the majority Orthodox Church was the Greek Catholic solution. As Pedro Ramet notices the Greek Catholics and Jews were particularly targeted for suppression and extirpation.<sup>10</sup> In the Greek Catholic case, he notices that the policy towards them in Ukraine and Romania is closely connected to their respective nationalist policy. The forceful unification with the Orthodox

Churches could be seen as part of the compromise and association type of relationship between the communist administration and the Orthodox Church as recompense for the Church's compromise with the demands of the new regime. The involvement and cooperation of the state administration and the Orthodox Church in bringing the Greek Catholics inside the mother church is notable even in this exercise of writing and re-writing their history to fit the new situation.

The historiographical process of writing and canonizing Greek Catholic history by Orthodox Church historians can be seen more broadly as an exercise in re-writing history to serve numerous purposes. First, it was used to legitimize and prepare for the November 1948 act of *unification*. This process evinced a need to justify historically the religious return of the Greek Catholic believers to the mother Church (the Romanian Orthodox Church). Throughout the communist period it also served a propaganda purpose in helping integrate the former Greek Catholic believers. Secondly, one can also see in this historiographical endeavour a chance for Orthodox Church historians to settle the interwar debate with Greek Catholic historians. Themes and figures from this period were transferred to the present-day historiographical canon, but of course without being challenged by the erstwhile opponent. The third but not least important reason was the attempt to centralise the position of the Transylvanian Orthodox Church for the Romanian community in Transylvania, especially when this position was challenged by the Greek Catholic Church. This was done by emphasizing certain subjects over others. The focus was now on the reactions to the 1678 union, the rebellions against it, the preservation of the Orthodox faith. It was also done by bringing out certain Orthodox personalities in the foreground thus counterbalancing Greek Catholic ones.<sup>11</sup>

## **After the union**

Following the Soviet model of dealing with the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine by offering the Romanian Orthodox Church national status, the unification of the Romanian Orthodox Church with the Romanian Greek Catholic Church had a significant impact on the religious scene in communist Romania.

While talking about the religious denominations in Transylvania during communism, many of the churchmen I interviewed drew attention to

an intriguing situation: the overlap between religious denomination and ethnicity.<sup>12</sup> Transylvania was and still is a place where several cultural, religious and ethnic identities “clash.” This is a region where the branches of traditional Christianity confronted each other throughout centuries. Orthodoxy, Protestantism and Catholicism responded to the pressures of history with segregation. Traditionally the relationship between these three Christian churches in Transylvania was based on the characteristics of the relationship between their ethnic components. The term ‘national church’ could in fact be used for several of the denominations in Transylvania. When employing the term “national” church, I am not referring only to the same ethnic background the believers of a specific denomination share but also to the contributions that a church has in preserving the cultural, historical, and political traditions of their believers. With two exceptions the spiritual patronage of the churches in Transylvania was directed towards specific nationalities. The Unitarian Church administered Hungarian believers, as did the Reformed and the Evangelical Synod Presbyterian Churches. The Evangelical Augustan Confession Church (Lutheran) administered the German believers.<sup>13</sup> The exceptions were the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic Churches. The former shared believers from the three ethnic groups; and while the number of Romanian adherents to this faith was rather small in Transylvania, the Catholic Church administered a larger community of Romanians in Moldavia and the Southern part of the country. Their believers were thus Romanians, Hungarians and Germans. The Greek Catholic Church segregated the Romanian community, which was placed under the spiritual supervision of two Churches.

The communist regime regarded the Greek Catholics as a potential problem for several key reasons: important among these were the subordination to the external administration body of a large part of Romanians from Transylvania, and the relative political independence of the hierarchy of the Greek Catholic Church, part of the Romanian elite in Transylvania. The solution of the union with the Romanian Orthodox Church had Soviet lineage yet it brought important local gains. It provided the Romanian state with a united and compact group of Romanian believers, subject to one church and one discourse.

The unification of the two churches, prepared for several years, was predictable in light of the propaganda issued by the state. The Orthodox Church, which had been engaged for several decades in the pro-union debate with the Greek Catholic elite, realized that the state might become

involved with the Greek Catholic problem from 1946 onwards, once the dissolution option had been applied to the Greek Catholic Church in West Ukraine.

In applying its policy, the State co-opted the Orthodox Church, which had in turn advertised the dissolution of the Greek Catholic Church as a long-awaited reunion between the two Romanian churches, thereby conforming to the state's line of propaganda that focused on nationalist ideals. The unification project was labelled *Revenirea Bisericii Greco Catolice în sănul bisericii mame – Biserica Ortodoxă* (The Return of the Greek Catholic Church to the Mother Orthodox Church).

A serious campaign to bring the Greek Catholic Church 'back to the bosom of the mother Church' was organized only after the L'viv synod act of 1946. In reaction, that same year Iasi-based university professor Milan řesan (1910-1981) published an article,<sup>14</sup> later included in a book with the same title, *De ce Unia?* (Why did Unification Happen?). Already in the preamble, he states that one of the reasons for writing the book was the denunciation by the Greek Catholic Archbishop of Western Ukraine of the 'confessional union with Rome, realized at the famous Brest-Litovsk synod in 1596.'<sup>15</sup> The article is a *histoire evenementielle* of Greek Catholicism in general with just a few mostly incidental references to the Transylvanian case. řesan describes the different types of church unions, plus the motives behind them and their sponsors. He carefully inserts biblical and canonical precepts in his argumentation for the religious union that solicit the existence of one united church and one truth. However, there are some remarks with obviously tendentious implications. For instance, he talks of the unification of the two churches at the local level and states that:

Every act of union is connected in almost every case with a moral violation, as objectively historiographical monographs should record. Dissatisfaction and splits between believers accumulate and Greek Catholicism becomes a refuge for the crowd of those dissatisfied with the Orthodox believers, and is left by all those embittered by *equivoque*.<sup>16</sup>

This particular type of article that prepared the religious union can be found throughout 1947, though most of them lose their propaganda hint seen in řesan's article.

Following these developments and debates, the constitution of 1948 stipulated that the state guaranteed freedom of religion and conscience and that all religious denominations were free and equal under the law.

The same was stipulated in the Law of Religious Denomination issued in August 1948. The Greek Catholic Church complied with this law's requirement that all religious denominations submit a statute of faith, and the church was thereby recognized by the Romanian state. Events unfolded rapidly thereafter, beginning with the Autumn 1948 gathering of 38 Greek Catholic archpriests [protopopi] in Cluj-Napoca to sign the act returning the Greek Catholic Church to the Orthodox Church. This date coincided with the anniversary of the Greek Catholic Church, marking 250 years since the 1698 unification signed by 38 Transylvanian archpriests. The act of *reunification* was therefore laden with symbolism: signed on the same date and by as many archpriests as the union with the Roman Catholic Church in 1698 which helped create an aura of legitimacy for the Romanian Orthodox Church's actions. Six days later, the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church blessed the reunification of the Romanian Church from Transylvania and signed the synod act that made official the re-uniting of the two churches. On 21 November in Alba Iulia, a religious ceremony was to bestow a divine and popular blessing on the event, and notably large numbers participated: 100,000 and 150,000 according to estimates in official reports and Orthodox Church documents.<sup>17</sup>

At the end of the year, the communist regime used the union to dissolve the Greek Catholic Church on the basis of its alleged obsolescence: supposedly now lacking believers and priests, all its material patrimony had in any case already been entrusted to the Orthodox Church.<sup>18</sup> The Greek Catholic hierarchy that had opposed unification was imprisoned, and believers that remained faithful to their religion were either forced to practice it in secret or to join the Roman Catholic Church.

The events, which had indisputably important consequences for the mass of Transylvanian believers, were followed on the pages of Orthodox religious journals, and the Romanian Orthodox Church dedicated several books to the November 1948 event. The articles were pitched somewhere between straightforward apologetics, more subtle justifications and historical research aspiring to wider credibility. Published by religious journals such as *Biserica Ortodoxă Română*, [The Romanian Orthodox Church] *Ortodoxia*, [Orthodoxy] *Studii Teologice* [Theological Studies] and *Revista Teologică* [Theological Journal] these articles offer a broad understanding of the discourse within the Orthodox Church at the time. They can be divided into three categories: articles that celebrate the event, articles that tried to understand Romanian Greek Catholicism both from a theological and a historical perspective, and articles that criticize Greek

Catholicism and Roman Catholicism. The religious journals depicted the reunification moments with surprising accuracy and an almost complete lack of interpretative gloss. The authors behaved like field reporters. The text of speeches they delivered and documents cited as evidence were presented in full; events were treated chronologically, impregnated with biblical quotations.<sup>19</sup>

Resistance to the union is not mentioned since “the population met unification with their Orthodox brothers with a spiritual openness”. Still, it was D. V. Sădeanu, a Greek Catholic priest who after unification mentioned the the Greek Catholic Hierarchy’s resistance to the union. He based this resistance on the promises of material gains made by the Vatican. His article discussed the Vatican propaganda in the Romanian People’s Republic.<sup>20</sup> Religious journals were deployed to explain these events, which had an impact not only on the religious hierarchy of both these churches, but also on the vast majority of the population.

Throughout the 1950s, the Romanian Orthodox Church worked alongside the state to strengthen the union. In practice, the process of turning the Greek Catholic believers and clergy into Orthodox ones required consistent efforts both at the local and at central level. Satisfied in 1948 with simply a name change, representing only a superficial union, the Romanian Orthodox Church became increasingly aware of the complications as time passed. In the 1960s, the Romanian Orthodox Church was still in the process of strengthening the *religious union*. The process of “publicizing the *re-unification act*” was part of a complex activity of bringing the Greek Catholics back into the fold that was sometimes jointly designed by the Romanian Patriarchate and the Ministry for Religious Denominations. This process included schooling former Greek Catholic priests and swapping parishes with Orthodox priests in the Old Kingdom. The result was an influx of young theology graduates in former Greek Catholic parishes. These were corroborated with a brutal campaign of destroying the Greek Catholic opposition, involving the imprisonment of hierarchs, priests and believers. The historiographical project<sup>21</sup> was thus part of a larger set of activities that took place throughout the 1940s and 1950s. The project preceded, paralleled and followed the events that took place at the end of the 1940s.

The authors that were entrusted with writing the new history of the Romanian Church came from different backgrounds. The first principal group comprised historians that made the transition from the interwar period. They were Church historians, specialists on the history of the

Church in Transylvania part of the interwar historiographical debate with the Greek Catholic historians like Ștefan Lupșa or Silviu Dragomir. They continued an existing body of research that was done after 1918. Other contributions came from Transylvanian Orthodox Hierarchs like Archbishop Nicolae Bălan, Bishop Nicolae Mladin, and former Greek Catholic priests turned Orthodox in 1948 like Traian Man. Other authors came with distinct interpretations that differed from the work they had carried out previously, as for instance in the case of father Dumitru Stăniloiae; others came to the subject accidentally, as with the writing on *Scoala Ardeleană* [The Transylvanian School] or the contribution to the subject by historian David Prodan.<sup>22</sup>

Several documents in the archives of the State Secretary for Religious Denominations highlight the central role of ministry personnel in setting the content and directing the tone of the research articles, allowing various church historians to publish their articles. Interference in the research findings, creating agendas for research and censoring findings were familiar to researchers in the period. The compromise that allowed them to write on their topics had in many cases to do with national/ regional policy requirements that the communist administration wanted to put in practice. By way of illustration, in a report issued by the Department for religious denominations on the state of affairs regarding the unification of the two churches, one could clearly see the direct involvement of the department in the unification process in painstaking detail.

Taking into consideration the research done in history, literature and culture in general, to eliminate those old tendencies that wanted to give the impression that the Greek Catholic Church played an *avant garde* role in some Romanian actions of national importance. More attention should therefore be given to how the cultural activity in Transylvania between the 18<sup>th</sup> and the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries is researched. There is a tendency to consider that all the contribution of the Greek Catholic intellectuals or of those that studied at Greek Catholic schools would not be dues to their patriotism and realism but to the Greek Catholic Church and their allegiance to Rome. The fact that they studied in Greek Catholic schools does not mean that their political and social attitude was borrowed from there. Through journal articles one should point out clearly that the Greek Catholic Church opposed the tendency of national awakening and of national independence of the Transylvanian Romanians, that many of the Transylvanian intellectuals of Greek Catholic belief were persecuted, sometimes by their church for the way in which they supported the noble

interests of the Romanian people. It is not difficult to point out that Rome – and via Rome the Greek Catholic Church – came against that Romanian people – although this was not always visible in every decisive moment of our history, in 1848, in 1918 and more recently during the 1940 Vienna Diktat.<sup>23</sup>

The religious journals were controlled by the ministry. The subject of the articles was decided in the ministry as seen in the above policy document. Themes including the idea that ‘we were all once as one’, the preservation of the Orthodox faith throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries even by the Greek Catholic Church personalities, the infamous role of the Roman Catholic Church and Vatican, the fight for Orthodoxy by Romanian believers in eighteenth century Transylvania, repairing a wrong doing were all first introduced in the speeches of Orthodox Church hierarchs immediately before and after the 1948 event. They were immediately picked up by articles in the religious journals and later translated into research articles by historians with their focus on subjects like the Orthodox rebellions in the 18<sup>th</sup> century Transylvania,<sup>24</sup> Greek Catholic personalities fighters for Orthodoxy<sup>25</sup> and so on.

Several favoured themes dominate studies on the history of Greek Catholicism. There is a concentration of articles dedicated to the history of the union. These range from simple narrative histories that take the reader through the events of the 1697/1698 – 1701 unification process, biographies of the main characters, to controversial research themes like the exact date of the unification. Silviu Dragomir is probably the most important historian that worked on this topic. He used the new situation created after the *unification* with the hierarchy and public figures of the Greek Catholic Church imprisoned or extinct to settle maybe one of the most incendiary controversies in the interwar historiographical debate: who came first in the unification process, Bishop Atanasie Anghel or Bishop Teofil. Settling the debate is used here ironically since the debate is no longer live given that the interlocutors are all deceased or imprisoned by the communists, and the findings of Silviu Dragomir are canonized used without critical examination by Orthodox historiography afterwards.<sup>26</sup> To Dragomir’s credit, although Augustin Bunea was no longer alive and Zenobie Pâclişanu was imprisoned, they are still present in a false debate through his arguments. They are quoted, argued with, and contradicted in something that is more than a mere use of secondary sources and rather a continuation of a historiographical battle. Dragomir won the ‘debate’, or,

put differently, the false monologue, but only because the former partner never challenges his findings. Some challenges occur later in the 1960s from secular historians that treat his conclusions carefully.<sup>27</sup>

Silviu Dragomir's study *Istoria desrobirei religioase a românilor din Ardeal* (The history of the religious emancipation of the Romanians in Transylvania) published in the 1920s and 1930s was used as bibliography for any study on the religious union of 1687/1698–1701 published between 1947 and 1960. Some used the documents published in the book many still for his interpretations on the religious union. Dragomir could be considered as a standard source of reference. *Istoria desrobirii religioase* is an interpretation of the events of the eighteenth century based on original sources that he presents in their entirety in the second part of the book, a partisan interpretation that doubts the authenticity of documentation of the union and that he moulds in support of his own ideas. Talking for instance about religious union in the period of Bishop Teofil (this would have placed the act of unification a year earlier than Dragomir and other church historians), and about the acts of the 1697 Sinod, he states: 'but it is so obvious that these acts were forged [ticluite] by the Jesuits that it is not worth wasting time with them.'<sup>28</sup> And indeed he does not do so. His style is also highly specific. Dragomir is ever-present in the text; he also uses an abundance of rhetorical questions,<sup>29</sup> has romantic interpretations and poetic passages.<sup>30</sup> Despite its oddities, the book marks an important moment in the historiography of the union.

When Dragomir resurfaced in the late 1950s with two studies on the religious union only a few years after his release from communist prison, he rounds up a decade of historiographical legitimization of the 1948 act. One can suspect also a manipulation on the part of the communists in using his name and reputation to give their venture the gloss of legitimacy by publishing his articles. Two of his studies, one published in a historical journal and the other in a religious one, also mark the subject's introduction into secular historiography, where it followed an intriguing path during the 1960s. The first of these works, 'Transylvanian Romanians and the union with the Church of Rome' which appeared in 1958 in *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medievală* [Studies and Materials in Medieval History] is dedicated to the revolt by the Romanian population of Transylvania in the years following the religious union 'against the Habsburgs and against the clergy that betrayed its own people'.<sup>31</sup> It discusses the 1744 – 1762 events arguing that without the religious movements one could no longer talk about the later social movements. Dragomir pointed out the anti-feudal, anti-

Catholic and anti-royalist traits of the religious movement in Transylvania and named the period as the one in which the Transylvanian Romanians woke up from ‘their illusions of the “*good Emperor*”.<sup>32</sup> The conclusion, naturally, reads as follows: ‘in the light of so much new information the **historic truth** [underlined by author] becomes evident, the union with the Church of Rome was executed through force, terror and lies, it never was accepted by the population and therefore was removed through violence by the masses as a foreign element in close connection with the interests of the occupiers.’<sup>33</sup>

The second study published by *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* [The Romanian Orthodox Church] in 1962, and republished in 1990, *Români din Transilvania și unirea cu Biserica Romei* (The Transylvanian Romanians and the Union with the Church of Rome) became a landmark for the historiography of the Romanian Orthodox Church regarding the union with the Roman Catholic Church. It continues to be used as a bibliography on history courses, for further research in the history of the Greek Catholic Church, and it unarguably constitutes the official version of the history of the Greek Catholic Church, as written by an Orthodox Church historian. The study is based to a not insubstantial part on documents relating to the period 1697-1701. The documents fall into three distinct categories: the acts of Bishop Teofil’s Sinod, the Book of Confession of the Romanian clergy, signed on 7 October 1698, and the documents of the Sinod on 5 September 1700.<sup>34</sup> After comparing signatures, writing samples or invoking the lack of original documents, Dragomir concluded that the first category comprises entirely false documentation, with some of the documents in other categories being partly falsified. Concluding, he places the union in the time of Bishop Atanasie Anghel (?-1713) metaphorically speaking, so ends a chapter on the religious union in Orthodox historiography that, from that point on, accepted his findings without questioning. Moving the event of the union one year forwards or backwards, placing Teofil or Atanasie in the foreground of the unification, were contested in the interwar debate by an array of historians, using the same documents, reaching opposing conclusions. The version of the Orthodox Church historians became official only well into the 1950s.

And yet there were historians that contested Silviu Dragomir’s conclusions. They were expressed in the 1964 *History of Romania* by David Prodan in his chapter on the religious union. Prodan challenged Dragomir’s interpretation of the official documents of the union and brought the union back one year to Teofil’s age.<sup>35</sup> Prodan’s interpretation

on the union included in both editions of his book *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* (1948, 1964) is considerably more subtle than that of his colleagues. He integrated the union into a larger political, social, cultural and religious context. He challenged in a concise version in 1948 and then in a more extensive historiographical exercise in 1964 the interpretations of various church historians that talked about an 'Orthodox conscience legitimating the Transylvanian Romanian peasants' rebellions in the eighteenth century, their acceptance or refusal of the union with the Roman Catholic Church.' He also considers the explanation of peasant resistance to the union on the grounds of their basic incapacity to foresee its benefits to be an exaggeration, a deep ignorance.<sup>36</sup> The religious union of the eighteenth century is part of a larger web of diplomatic activity. 'Greek Catholicism is', Prodan suggested, 'placed between two Empires with different political interests. The union becomes part of a European political movement as well as a religious one.'<sup>37</sup>

This period also witnessed a change in the interpretations offered by Orthodox Church historians. A change of interpretation regarding several Greek Catholic personalities, admitting that there were positive aspects related to the activity of the Greek Catholic Church in Transylvania. All these make for a more nuanced version though the major breakthroughs remained unchallenged by the new research (the interpretation of Silviu Dragomir for instance). I argue that this refinement in interpretation responded to the external influence of the development of national communism. The change in the national historiographical canon of Romania<sup>38</sup> brought changes in the Orthodox one. Having been received into Orthodox historiography, the Transylvanian Greek Catholic prelates who were contested personalities in the 1950s were able to enter historical discussion. The figures of the Greek Catholic pantheon, Petru Maior, Ion Inochentie Klein, Gheorghe Şincai, and many others became national heroes, fighters for Orthodoxy, forerunners in the future unification of the Church in Transylvania. Against the backdrop of this refinement of interpretation one still finds the Romanian Orthodox Church struggling to integrate the former Greek Catholics, some twenty years after the 1948 reunification.

## Conclusion

The segregationist Transylvanian debate during the interwar period on which was the best suited religion to serve the new nation turned into a strict historiographical monologue controlled by the communist state and designed from within the Ministry for Religious Denominations, whose task was to legitimize the new Romanian Church of Transylvania. During the 1960s this regional debate became national when the history of this particular church entered a rewritten national historiographical canon. Paradoxically, this happened when the communist historiography of the 1960s, responding to various external stimuli, especially with regard to national policy, introduced the subject into the national canon via the Orthodox Church interpretation.<sup>39</sup> The Greek Catholic historical pantheon was thereby engulfed by the Orthodox one. The controversies were settled and the new hypothesis tested. The return to the ‘mother church’ was the finitude of its historical existence.

The historiographical canon as set at the end of the 1960s is still preserved today. One can observe a closing of the canon and its institutionalization (it is taught in the Church history courses in the Theology faculties in the country). The debate was no longer rekindled after 1990 and the new historiographical input brought about by various historians is ignored. Maybe the best example of this attitude is the republication in the early 1990s of Teodor M Popescu’s 1948 article on the Greek Catholic Church, ‘Uniația în lumina adevărului istoric. Cauzele ei sociale și politice’ (The Union in the Light of Historical Truth. Its Social and Political Causes) in *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* [The Romanian Orthodox Church] highlighting the reluctance to re-interpret the historical narrative developed after the union by the communist regime.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The Greek Catholic Church in Transylvania has a rich history. It was created mainly for political reasons by the Austrian monarchy as a response to the Protestant majority of the Hungarians in Transylvania at the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The Church comprised a large part of the Romanian population. Less an ecumenical act of Christian unity - though several attempts to argue this approach were made - and more a political and a national one from the Romanian part the Greek Catholic Church this act was the instrument for the national revival of the Romanians in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century. Also an important factor in the unification of the country in 1918 the Greek Catholic Church was recognised alongside the Orthodox as a "national" church during the inter war period.
- <sup>2</sup> For a look into the history of the Transylvanian Romanian religious and political life in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries see Mathias Bernath, *Habsburg und die Anfänge der rumänischen Nationalbildung* (Leiden: Brill, 1972); Keith Hitchins, *A Nation Discovered: Romanian Intellectuals in Transylvania and the Idea of Nation, 1700-1848* (Bucharest: Encyclopaedic Publishing House, 1999)
- <sup>3</sup> Research into the unification of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches in 18<sup>th</sup> century concludes that the counter-reformation actions in the spirit of church union innitiated by the Council of Florence in 1439 in Eastern Europe that were finalized with the partial unification of Brest in 1596 was used as model by the Habsburgs for the union in Transylvania, see Pompiliu Teodor, 'Introducere,' (Introduction) in Mathias Bernath, *Habsburgii și începuturile formării Națiunii Române*, Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1991, p. 5-7.
- <sup>4</sup> A statistic of the Romanian clergy in Transylvania in 1716 registers over 2200 Uniate and 456 Orthodox priests, but this is to be carefully read since most of the population could not tell the difference between the two churches the Greek Catholics having preserved the Byzantine rite and the calendar, see David Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum*, Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 1998, p. 179; In the interwar period the Romanian statistic yearbook finds 58,2% Orthodox and the rest Greek Catholics among the Transylvanian Romanians, see Irina Livezeanu, *Cultura și nationalism în Romania Mare, 1918-1930*, (Clutural Politics in Greater Romania, 1918-1930) Bucharest: Humanitas, 1998, p. 164.
- <sup>5</sup> Cristian Vasile, *Între Vatican și Kremlin. Biserică Greco-Catolică în timpul regimului comunist*, (Between the Vatican and Kremlin, The Greek Catholic Church during the communist regime), Bucharest: Curtea Veche publishing house, 2004, pp. 68-76.
- <sup>6</sup> See Keith Hitchins, *A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian Movement in Transylvania 1860-1914*, Bucharest: Encyclopedia Publishing House, 1999
- <sup>7</sup> Several key intellectuals argued in the period for a link between religion and nation leading to the famous quotation by Nae Ionescu that to be a Romanian is to be Orthodox, and to be Orthodox is to be Romanian. Ionescu was not the only one to develop arguments for a *theology of the nation*. See Ionuț

- Biliuță, 'Nichifor Crainic and „Gîndirea”. Nationalism and Orthodoxy in Interwar Romania' (I), in *Historical yearbook Romanian Academy „Nicolae Iorga”* History Institute, Volume IV (2007), pp. 86-96, and 'Nichifor Crainic and „Gîndirea”. Nationalism and Orthodoxy in Interwar Romania' (II), in *Historical yearbook Romanian Academy „Nicolae Iorga”* History Institute, Volume V (2008), pp. 67-84. See also the chapter on the grand debate in Keith Hitchins, *Romania 1866-1947*, Bucharest: Humanitas, 1998, pp. 297-317.
- <sup>8</sup> Cristian Vasile, 2004, pp. 68-76.
- <sup>9</sup> See Tatiana A. Chumachenko's interpretation in Tatiana A. Chumachenko, *Church and state in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev years* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).
- <sup>10</sup> Pedro Ramet, *Cross and Commissar. The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987, p. 17.
- <sup>11</sup> An emphasis on the Orthodox Archbishop Andrei Șaguna's activity in the nineteen century in Transylvania to counterbalance the Greek Catholic Archbishop Alexandru Șterca Șuluțiu, the sanctification of three Transylvanians that fought against the union with the Greek Catholics in the early 1950s all show the effort put into finding Orthodox Transylvanians that would stand in for the Greek Catholics that were on the wrong side of history.
- <sup>12</sup> Conversation with the Secretary of the Romanian Orthodox Church Patriarchy Synod, 26 January 2005, Antim monastery, Bucharest, Romania. During the interview, the churchman implied that the entire policy of the Romanian Orthodox Church during communism was founded on the ethnic and religious segregation Transylvania's populace.
- <sup>13</sup> With regard to the two Evangelical confessions the documents found in the Archives of the Department for Religious Denominations noticed that the two Churches are different only in the language they practice their confession in (Hungarian or German). Still these two Churches in Transylvania have a separate hierarchy and administration. They are also structured differently and in the 1960's they even split their educational centres.
- <sup>14</sup> Milan Șesan, 'De ce Uniația?', in *Candela* (The candle), Year LVI, 1946, pp. 273 – 293.
- <sup>15</sup> Milan Sesan, *De ce Uniatiția?*, (Iasi, 1946), p. 3.
- <sup>16</sup> Sesan, p. 21
- <sup>17</sup> Nicolae M Popescu, "In Alba Iulia odinioara 1698 si acum 1948"(In Alba Iulia then 1698 and now 1948), *Biserica Ortodoxa Romana* (The Romanian Orthodox Church), Issue 11-12 (November-December 1948) p. 613.
- <sup>18</sup> The decree that dissolved the Greek Catholic Church stated: "After the reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Romanian Orthodox Church and according to the Article 13 of the Decree No. 177/1948 the central and statutory organisations of this denomination, such as metropolitan sees, bishoprics, orders, congregations, archpriests, monasteries, foundations, associations and any other institutions under any other name shall cease to exist." *Monitorul Oficial*, Issue 281, Bucharest, (December 2, 1948).

- <sup>19</sup> See Nicolae M Popescu, p. 608.
- <sup>20</sup> D.V. Sadeanu, "Aniversarea unui an de la actul Reintregirii bisericii romanesti din Ardeal", in *Biserica Ortodoxa Romana*, issue 11-12 (November-Decemer 1949) p. 309
- <sup>21</sup> I use the term project because in retrospect the articles and books, the work of the Church historians followed a planned pattern.
- <sup>22</sup> David Prodan (1902-1992), important Romanian historian specialized in social history and in the history of Transylvania. While working on the eighteenth century Romanian political revival in Transylvania he offers in the 1960s a new look into the Transylvanian Greek Catholic elite that is later used in the larger project started by the Romanian Academy on the History of Romania. He points out the importance of the Greek Catholics in the history of Transylvania. None of the general histories of Romania during the communist regime include parts acknowledging the Greek Catholic Church except as consequence of an imperialist act of the Habsburgs designed to keep the Romanian peasants as serfs and attract with material goods the Orthodox Church, see Mihail Roller, *Istoria României, manual unic pentru clasa a XI-a medie*, (The History of Romania, textbook for the ninth grade) Bucharest, 1948, p. 107.
- <sup>23</sup> Departament Culte, Direcția Studii, File Bartolomeu Anania/ The Patriarchal Administration, not processed in the archives, 1966, Arhivele Secretariatului de Stat Culte, Bucharest, Romania, pp. 11.
- <sup>24</sup> See Liviu Patachi and his interpretation of the Romanian presence in the Rakoczy rebellion. Being interested in the religious aspects of their collaboration with the Hungarians and arguing that it is the fight against Roman Catholicism and the preservation of the Orthodox faith that joins the Romanians to the Rakoczy army he used Marki's interpretations that allowed him, much like Lupșa to present the Habsburgs as the *guilty party* in the unification process. He gives precedence in his arguments to religious motives over economic or social ones in the Transylvanian Romanians joining the Rakoczy rebellion thus emphasizing the injustice and the enforcement of the Religious Union act in the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Among the causes of the participation Patachi highlights the fight against the religious union of the Orthodox Transylvanian Romanians. Liviu Patachi, 'Românii ortodocși în revoluția rakocziană - cauzele religioase ale participării lor,' (The Orthodox Romanians in the Rakoczy revolution – the religious causes behind their participation) in *Revista Teologică*, Year XXXVII, Issue 1 - 2, (Jan - Feb 1947), p. 421.
- <sup>25</sup> See for instance Grigore T. Marcu, *Lupta lui Petru Maior împotriva papalității*, (Petru Maior's fight against the Papacy) in *Ortodoxia*, Issue 3-4, July – December 1952; or *Petru Maior precursor al unificării bisericești a românilor din Ardeal*, (Petru Maior, forerunner of the religious union of the Transylvanian Romanians) in *Mitropolia Ardealului*, Issue 9 - 10, (September - October, 1958)

- <sup>26</sup> See how Silviu Dragomir was used by Mircea Păcurariu, one of the official church historians in the 1970s and 1980s, Mircea Păcurariu, *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Române.*, *Manual pentru Seminarile Teologice*, (The History of the Romanian Orthodox Church. Textbook for the Theological Seminaries), Sibiu, 1972, pp. 202-224.
- <sup>27</sup> See for instance David Prodan's contesting Dragomir's findings and requesting a more neutral tone in discarding the importance of the Greek Catholic Church for the history of Transylvanian Romanians in \*\*\*, *Istoria României*, vol. III, Bucharest, 1964, p. 240.
- <sup>28</sup> Silviu Dragomir, *Istoria desrboirii religioase a românilor din Ardeal în secolul XVIII*, vol. I, (Sibiu, 1920), p. 11.
- <sup>29</sup> „Ce să facă? Încotro s-o apuce? Să rămână pe o cale veche a nevoii și umiliinții? Ori călcându-și jurământul să prindă norocul privilegiilor și onorurilor?”, [What to do? Where to go? Stay on an old path of needs and humiliations? Or going back on their word to catch up with fortune and honours?] in Dragomir, 1920 p. 12.
- <sup>30</sup> „Activitatea episcopului Ion Inochentie Klein nu se strecoară deci lin și pașnic, ci în mers grăbit ca apa râului de munte care trece prin satul său natal,” [The activity of Bishop Ion Inochentie Klein does not smoothly and peacefully envelopes but, as the waters in his native village it is rushed] in Dragomir, 1920, p. 127.
- <sup>31</sup> Silviu Dragomir, *Români din Transilvania și unirea cu Biserica Romei*, (The Transylvanian Romanians and the union with the Church of Rome) în SMIM, vol. III, Bucharest, 1959, p. 324.
- <sup>32</sup> Dragomir, 1959, p. 332.
- <sup>33</sup> Dragomir, 1959, p. 335.
- <sup>34</sup> Silviu Dragomir, *Români din Transilvania și unirea cu Biserica Romei*, (Cluj, 1990), pp. 5 – 6.
- <sup>35</sup> \*\*\*, *Istoria României*, (History of Romania) vol. III, (Bucharest, 1964), p. 240.
- <sup>36</sup> David Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Vallachorum*, (Cluj - Napoca, 1948), p. 123.
- <sup>37</sup> David Prodan, 1948, p. 124.
- <sup>38</sup> The most important historiographical project undertaken under the academic umbrella of the Romanian Academy of Sciences, the history of Romania witnesses this national turn in the history writing.
- <sup>39</sup> After the Greek Catholic Church re-entered among the topics of research either by a focus on its personalities, intellectual elite, the Transylvanian national movement in the nineteen century, research carried on by the church historians, the subject appears in the Romanian newspapers for the Diaspora signalling a slight liberalization of the historical writing in the 1960s. It is tangentially touched upon in research on the Transylvanian School, the 1918 unification of the country, economic history (see Mihai Drecin, *Banca Albina din Sibiu*, Cluj Napoca: 1982), Transylvanian political history. The third volume of the History of Romania offers an official interpretation on the history of the Greek Catholic Church written by David Prodan.



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# PHENOMENOLOGY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF EMBODIED INTERSUBJECTIVITY

In philosophy of mind and cognitive science, intersubjectivity or social cognition – the question of how we experience and understand others – has been explained, beginning with the 1980's, with the concept of *theory of mind*. Theory of mind refers to our ability to attribute mental states (intentions, beliefs, desires) to others, and to explain and predict their behavior in terms of these mental states. The main problem of social cognition, within this framework, is this: how do we get to represent, based on their publicly observable, external bodily behavior, other people's unobservable inner mental states? How can we "read" the hidden minds of others? Contrary to "theory of mind"-approaches, classical and contemporary phenomenology of intersubjectivity claims that we can directly perceive and understand the meaning of the mental states, intentions and emotions of others, because they are not hidden, but explicitly expressed in their embodied actions and expressive behaviors. Theories of theory of mind have been also challenged in recent years by an increasing number of empirical findings about the embodied nature of social cognition (e.g. mirror neurons in cognitive neuroscience, infant imitation in developmental psychology, etc.). Based on such empirical evidences, proponents of *embodied intersubjectivity* are now arguing that social cognition is grounded in and shaped by the perception, expression and understanding of embodied actions, emotions and intentions.

The aim of my paper is to demonstrate that the phenomenology of intersubjectivity can complement and inform – both at the descriptive and at the theoretical-conceptual level – the ongoing work in the field of *embodied social cognition* in a more productive way than "theory of mind"-approaches in analytical philosophy of mind. I thereby follow those recent proposals, which are arguing that phenomenology can contribute significantly to current empirical research in cognitive science and the scientific study of consciousness, and are trying to establish a mutual

exchange between phenomenology, cognitive science and analytical philosophy of mind. Phenomenology is understood here not just as the textual corpus of one of the dominant philosophical movements of the last century, but also as a philosophical methodology for discovering the invariant structures of various types of experience as experienced in the subjective or first-person point of view, and then intersubjectively corroborated. The methodological assumption of the research is that the biobehavioral processes discovered in the cognitive sciences can also be experienced and described from the phenomenological perspective of first-person experience. Therefore the first-person or second-person data obtained from phenomenological or developmental accounts, and the third-person data about neural processes and behavior could reciprocally enlighten and constrain each other.<sup>1</sup>

The paper is structured as follows: in the first part I present the phenomenological account of embodied experience and the new paradigm of embodied cognitive science, with the intention to highlight their points of convergences and their common theoretical and methodological assumptions; in the second part I first outline the phenomenological critique of theories of theory of mind and then I demonstrate the relevance of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity for the interpretation of current empirical findings about the embodied nature of social cognition (mirror neurons and infant imitation).

## **1. The body: embodied experience in phenomenology and cognitive science**

I distinguish here between three meanings of the body: 1. the physical-biological body; 2. the subjective phenomenal experience of the lived body, and 3. the historically-socially-culturally constructed body. I don't intend to deny the relevance of the third meaning, but in the present context I am mainly interested in the constitutive role of the second, i.e. the subjective phenomenal experience of the lived body. It is quite obvious that there has been, from the 1980s, a certain boom of body and embodiment studies in sociology, anthropology and other social and cultural studies (B. Turner, M. Featherstone, C. Schilling)<sup>2</sup>, with important predecessors like Foucault (with his history of the effects of power or discursive formations on the body, i.e. the discipline or the government of the body), Bourdieu (with his concept of *habitus*, which refers to the

body as invested with symbolic capital, the body as an expression of the hierarchies of social power), or the feminist theories about the social construction of gender roles and sexual identities. But there is a persistent problem, from the phenomenological point of view, with all this social and cultural studies of the body: the conception of the body as a historically, socially, culturally constructed representation, discourse or text neglects the constitutive dimension of the experience of the lived body.<sup>3</sup>

### 1.1. The lived body

If we turn now to the phenomenological meaning of the body, or more precisely, to the phenomenal experience and the phenomenological description of the lived body, we should start with a basic phenomenological distinction between two different ways we can experience and understand the body: the *objective body* and the *lived (animated or living) body*.<sup>4</sup> (This corresponds to Husserl's original distinction between *Körper* and *Leib*, reiterated in French phenomenology, by – among others – Merleau-Ponty, as the difference between, on the one hand, "le corps objectif" and on the other hand "le corps propre", "le corps vécu" or "la chair"). The lived body (*Leib*) refers to the body experienced from the subjective, first-person perspective of the embodied subject, whereas the objective body (*Körper*) can have two different, but interrelated senses: 1. the body as a material thing perceived from an observer's third-person perspective (for example the biological, i.e. neurological, physiological or anatomical body). 2. the objectification of my own body in bodily self-exploration, which allows to experience it – to a certain degree – as an objective body, as from the outside, for example when my left hand touches my right, or when I perceive another part of my body.

Following mainly Husserl's phenomenological descriptions, I'll present in what follows three different dimensions of the subjective phenomenal experience of the body, which are also playing a central role in the husserlian phenomenology of embodied intersubjective experience: 1. the lived body as the "null centre" of orientation, 2. the kinaesthetical, actively perceiving, and 3. the sensing body.<sup>5</sup>

1. The body as the "*null centre*" of orientation. My body is the "null centre" or the "zero point" of my orientation toward the world, the absolute "here" in relation to which every other object is situated "there", i.e. "near" or "far", "within or beyond reach", "in front" or "behind", "to the

left or to the right" etc.<sup>6</sup> For example, on this table before me, the perceived monitor of the laptop is "in front" of me, the perceived coffee cup is "to the right" of me etc. – that is, I am the center, the absolute indexical "here" in relation to with every perceived object is oriented. This absolute "here" of orientation is not a position or a point in the objective geometrical space, but a center in relation to which a pre-objective, bodily or sensorimotor (that is: constituted in active perception, see below), an "egocentric" space unfolds. Whereas I can approach or move away from any object in the world, the body itself is always present as my very perspective on the world, I can never move out of my own central "hereness". Rather than being another perspectively given object, the body itself is the perceptual origin, the embodiment of the first-person, subjective perspective which allows me to perceive objects perspectively and to interact with them. I do not have a consciousness *of* my body as an intentional object, I don't perceive it, but *I am it*.

2. The *kinaesthetical, actively perceiving* body. The lived body is not just the "null centre" of orientation, but also a moving or potentially moving body. If I reach for the coffee mug, I know where to reach not just because I have a sense of where it is in relation to myself, but also because I sense that I will be able to reach it, or that I will have to take two steps towards it. My perception of the coffee mug must involve *kinaesthetic awareness* (our awareness of lived bodily movements and positions) of my bodily situation, otherwise I would not be able to reach for it or use it. This kinaesthetic awareness of the body is not a type of object-consciousness, but a form of pre-reflective bodily self-awareness, in which my body is experienced as a potentiality of mobility and volition, as an "I do" and "I can".

In his lectures about the experience of space and spatial objects from 1907,<sup>7</sup> Husserl calls attention to the importance of bodily movements (the kinaesthetic experiences of movements of the eye or of the head, of manipulations by the hand, of the locomotion of the body etc.) for the constitution of space and spatial objects. Perception is constantly correlated to *kinaesthesia*<sup>8</sup> or kinaesthetic experiencing, that is, to the self-sensation of the moving body. Every visual or tactile appearance is given in correlation to a kinaesthesia, a sensation of a particular movement of our body: when I touch the coffee mug, it is given in conjunction with a sensation of finger movements; when I watch a moving car, the moving car is given in conjunction with the kinaesthetic sensations of eye and/ or head movement.

But there is more: Husserl also describes a motivational correlation, an intentional “if-then” connection between the motivating kinaesthetic systems of possible movements and the motivated sequences of perceptual appearances: if I move in a particular way, if kinaesthesia K1 changes in K2, then the perceptual appearance A1 also changes into A2.<sup>9</sup> In order to illustrate how this intentional “if-then” connection works, I will take here the problem of perceptual presence in object-perception.

When I perceive an object, say a coffee mug, the object is never given intuitively in its totality but always incompletely, in a certain restricted profile. Despite this, perception always gives us a full object-consciousness, a sense of the perceptual presence of the whole object: it seems to us at once as if we only see part of the coffee mug and as if the three-dimensional, voluminous, material thing, the whole coffee-mug is also somehow perceptually present. If this perceptual sense of seeing without seeing, of the presence in absence (of the intuitively not given profiles of the object) is obviously not the result of a judgment or of an inference, then how is it possible? Husserl’s preliminary answer is that every perception of an object has a *horizontal* structure: whenever a present profile of an object is actually given, we are simultaneously horizontally aware of the co-existing absent, but potentially present, perceptually accessible profiles of the object. But this perceptual horizon of the co-intended profiles is ultimately connected to a kinaesthetic horizon. If I am looking at the coffee mug, whereas the present profile is correlated with my particular bodily position, the horizon of the co-intended but momentarily absent profiles of the coffee mug (its back or bottom, etc.) are correlated with my kinaesthetic horizon, i.e. with my capacity for possible movement. The absent profiles are linked to an intentional kinaesthetic “if-then” connection: *if I move in this or that way, then this or that profile of the coffee mug will become visually or tactually accessible.*

Perception and kinaesthetic experience (the actual and possible sense of movement) are thus intrinsically intertwined: perception presupposes movement, it is intrinsically active, it is a form of action.<sup>10</sup> In regard to the perceived objects or the perceptual world, this implies that the objective, experience-independent world of the natural attitude becomes a world brought forth, enacted by the active perception of the lived body, a world not of objective things (of *what* things are), but of potentialities for bodily actions and interactions (of *how* they are perceived in active perception).

3. The *sensing body*. The lived body is also a locus of felt sensations: in exploring the tactile qualities of anything within reach, I also

experience my own body through special sensations, the feelings of contact, pressure, weight, warmth or cold, tension, etc. are localized in my body. Husserl points out that one and the same sensation can be apprehended in two different ways: when I touch the hot surface of the coffee mug, the sensation of the hotness can be apprehended either as a sensuous property of the touched object (in this case we're experiencing *sensations* – *Empfindungen*) or as a localized sensation of hotness in the touching hand (these are *sensings* – *Empfindnisse*).<sup>11</sup> But tactful experience reveals not just the lived body of sensings, but also the tactually appearing exteriority of the body, as in the case of one hand touching the other. The touching hand (the perceiving organ) has a series of sensations of the touched hand (the perceived organ); in the same time this touched hand is not given as a mere object, since it also feels the touch itself as a localized sensing. The difference between the tactile experience of objects and the tactile bodily self-exploration is that in the latter case we are dealing with a *double-sensation*, a kind of reversibility of the sensings in the two hands: the touching hand is also touched, and the touched is also touching. This reversibility reveals that the tactually given interiority (the touching) and the tactually given exteriority (the touched), the lived and the objectified body are different manifestations of the same body.<sup>12</sup> This self-objectivation or self-constitution of the body, his two-sidedness as lived and objective body has a crucial importance for the husserlian description of intersubjective experience, as we will see later. In the tactile (or visual) self-constitution I am experiencing myself in a manner that anticipates both the way in which another person would experience me and the way in which I would experience him or her.

## 1.2. Embodied cognitive science

Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary study of mind, cognition and intelligence, embracing psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, linguistics, philosophy, and anthropology.<sup>13</sup> Cognitivism (from the mid-1950s to the mid 1980s), encompassing both the classical *computationalist* and the *connectionist* research programs (the first based on the metaphor of the mind as a computer, the second on the metaphor of the mind as a neural network), was based on the following assumptions:

1. The mind is disembodied, atemporal and separated from the world.

2. Cognition is a central module, sharply distinct from the peripheral sensorimotor processes (perception and action), processing internal representations (symbols or neural processes) that are mirroring an external, mind-independent, objective world.

Starting with the mid-1980s and in the 1990s a new paradigm emerged, that of the *embodied* or *enactive mind*<sup>14</sup>, proposing several new ideas:

1. Cognition is the exercise of skillful know-how (not of theoretical know-what) in real-time embodied interaction with the world.

2. Cognitive structures are shaped by this sensorimotor interaction with the world, and also by emotions.

Thus, in the last two decades, the view of mind and cognition as something that cut across the divide between brain, body and environment, as essentially embodied and *embedded* (*situated* or *extended*) in the natural and socio-cultural environment, has become increasingly dominant in several fields: in philosophy<sup>15</sup>, psychology<sup>16</sup>, cognitive neuroscience<sup>17</sup>, artificial intelligence<sup>18</sup>, cognitive linguistics<sup>19</sup> and cognitive anthropology<sup>20</sup>.

Two other ideas, reminding – and sometimes influenced by – previous conceptions of the continental phenomenology, are shared only by the proponents of the so-called enactive cognitive science<sup>21</sup> (Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and others):

3. The world is not an external objective realm, represented internally by the brain, but a relational domain enacted or brought forth by sensorimotor activity;

4. It is the phenomenological lived body (*Leib*) that shapes cognition, and therefore embodied experience needs to be investigated with the method of the phenomenological description of first-person, subjective experience.

In order to briefly illustrate what embodied cognition means, I'll focus here on the trend of which is sometimes called *radical* or *full embodiment*. This trend claims that the body is crucially involved not just in actual sensorimotor interaction with the world, but in all forms of human cognition, including such abstract activities, as language, thinking or mathematical cognition. To put it in another way, the thesis of radical embodiment would be that the mind (or the body-mind continuum) is literally embodied action – we are in a sense also thinking through our moving bodies. The cognitive linguistics of the embodied mind<sup>22</sup> holds for example that our “higher-level” cognitive processes, like conceptualization and reasoning, are grounded in our pre-linguistic embodied experience, that is, our bodily orientations and movements, manipulation of objects

and perceptual interactions as we act in the world. Embodied sensorimotor experience is schematized in *image schemas*, which are pre-conceptual, recurring, crossmodal – at once visual, kinaesthetic, tactile, auditory etc. – patterns, that emerge throughout sensorimotor interaction with the environment (e. g. containers, paths, contact, balance, centrality). Our more abstract concepts are developed via metaphorical projections of these basic sensorimotor structures and our abstract reasoning involves inferences that are basically structure-preserving projections of sensorimotor inferences.

A conceptual metaphor is a conceptual mapping, through sensorimotor schemas, of entities and structure from the source domain (concrete concepts) to the target domain (abstract concepts).<sup>23</sup> For instance, the “source-path-goal” schema, which develops as we learn to track moving objects throughout our visual field and as we move our bodies in the world (reaching for objects or moving our entire bodies from one location to another), can be metaphorically projected onto more abstract domains of understanding and reasoning. Thereby it gives rise to conceptual metaphors such as “Purposes are destinations”, which preserve the main structural characteristics of the source domain (i.e. source-path-goal); it serves for example as the source domain for the pervasive conceptual metaphor “Life is a journey”. Another schema, the “balance” schema is something that is learned emerges through our experiences of bodily equilibrium/disequilibrium and maintaining our bodily systems and functions in states of equilibrium and also through our perception of balance. The “balance” image schema is metaphorically elaborated in a large number of abstract domains of experience (e.g. psychological states, legal relationships, and formal systems): we talk of balanced personalities, balanced views, balanced systems, balanced equilibrium, the balance of power, the balance of justice, and so on.

There are several common methodological and theoretical assumptions (and also historical connections, influences) between the phenomenological tradition and the embodied cognitive science, but for the present purpose I point out only the most important point of convergence: both in phenomenology and in embodied cognitive science meaning is experienced and constituted in embodied, pre-linguistic and pre-cultural perception and action, which also means that embodied experience precedes and constitutes the cultural-social-historical experiences of meaning.

In the second part of the paper I try to demonstrate how this common assumption can be productively applied in the phenomenological interpretation of embodied social cognition.

## 2. Embodied intersubjectivity

In this part of my paper I first outline a phenomenological critique of theories of other minds and then I'll try to demonstrate the relevance of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity for the interpretation of current empirical findings about the embodied nature of social cognition (mirror neurons and infant imitation). My method is that of a mutual illumination and correction between, on the one hand, the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, and on the other hand cognitive neuroscience and developmental science. Mutuality means here that even phenomenology can be challenged to correct previous descriptions, as it will be case with the interpretation of infant imitation.

### 2.1. A phenomenological critique of theories of theory of mind

There are two main approaches in the analytical philosophy of mind for explaining what they consider to be the basis of social cognition, that is, the capacity to have a theory of (other) mind(s). According to the first approach, *theory-theory* (TT), we use an innate or acquired theory of how people behave and of the unobservable mental states which cause their behavior (folk psychology), in order to infer ("mindread" or mentalize) the mental states of others.<sup>24</sup> According to the second approach, *simulation-theory* (ST), we don't need a folk psychological theory, because we are able to use our own mind as an inner model with which we simulate another person's mind, creating pretend off-line mental and emotional states and projecting oneself imaginatively into his or her situation.<sup>25</sup>

Despite the differences and the ongoing debates between them, both of these accounts are committed, from a phenomenological point of view, to several problematic presuppositions<sup>26</sup>:

1. First, there is an obvious *mind-body dualism* here: an epistemic gap separates the essentially inner, private and externally unobservable mind and the neither expressive nor significant outwardly observable bodily behavior (a kind of bare physical movement), intentional or expressive

behavior arising from a purely contingent and causal connection between these two spheres.

2. Therefore, secondly, in the absence of a direct experiential access to others social experience is a two-step process: first we perceive (present) other's external bodily behavior, and then we ascribe mental entities to them, relying on *linguistic-conceptual representations* (theoretical inferences or imaginative simulations).

3. Finally, all this process is performed from a *third-person perspective* (on his or her behavior or mind), with the intention to explain and predict other's behavior.

In opposition to theories of theory of mind, the phenomenological tradition argues that social cognition is constituted by an essentially direct an embodied intersubjective experience, a direct, non-mentalizing and non-inferential perceptual access to others. Phenomenology denies the dualist conception of an inner mind and an outer body, and reveals the strong continuity and intricacy of mind and body: mind and body are not just related by a contingent causal connection, but they are given in an expressive relation or unity constituted in embodied action and expressive behavior (both in us and in others). Therefore, as the contemporary phenomenological proposal of *direct perception*<sup>27</sup> – drawing on arguments from classical phenomenology – holds, we don't have to represent the mental states and emotions of others, because they are explicitly embodied in intentional actions, gestures and expressions, and as such, we can directly perceive and understand their meaning in a non-conceptual and non-linguistic presentation, without any further representational step of ascribing mental states.

It seems then that the correct understanding of the nature of social cognition requires the correct understanding of the relation between mind and body, that is, a conception of the mind which overcomes the dualism and the mentalism of theories of theory of mind. Phenomenology insists that in describing the experience of others, we begin from the recognition that the body of others presents itself as radically different from a neither expressive nor significant outwardly observable bodily behavior. Phenomenologists describe an embodied intersubjectivity, stressing the fundamental role of the inter-bodily experience in understanding others. In order to illustrate this, I resume in the following Husserl's account about embodied intersubjective experience.

## 2.2. Embodied intersubjectivity

In the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* of Husserl the constitutive moment of intersubjective experience is precisely the empathetical experience of the other as another lived body, i.e. as another null centre of orientation, and as another kinaesthetical, sensing and feeling body. A specific intersubjective phenomenological reduction is at work here: after suspending all forms of objective, already constituted intersubjective formations (linguistic-cultural-historical social realities), we can reveal that they are all grounded in and shaped by the constitutional dimension of embodied intersubjectivity, the pre-linguistic and pre-cultural inter-bodily experience of others. The central problem of the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* is that of explaining how an objective body could come to be perceived as another lived body, i.e. as another null centre of orientation and another kinaesthetical and sensing body. Husserl's preliminary answer is this: "Since, in this Nature and this world, my live body is the only body that is or can be constituted originally as a lived body (a functioning organ), the objective body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as a lived body, must have derived this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my lived body [...] only a similarity connecting [...] that objective body over there with my objective body can serve as the motivational basis for the '*analogizing*' apprehension of that body as another lived body."<sup>28</sup>

What is the intentional structure of this analogizing apprehension based on the similarity between two objective bodies? Husserl terms this intentionality an *appresentation*. On the one hand, appresenting the other means that the other is given to me in a presentation, not in a re-presentation (as if we would experience a sign or a memory of the other). In a general sense, every object-perception implies appresentation: being horizontally aware of the absent profiles of an object through the presentation of the actually given profile means to co-intend them in an appresentation. Appresentation amounts to intending as co-present, motivated by an original presentation, something which is not present in itself (not given in an original presentation). But on the other hand, if in the case of the object-perception the appresented profile can be fulfilled intuitively by a subsequent presentation, in the case of the appresentation of others this presentation or intuitive fulfillment is a priori excluded, that is, the first-person, subjective embodied experience itself which belongs to them (*their own* null centre of orientation, *their own* kinaesthetical, sensing and feeling lived body) obviously cannot be given in an original

presentation. (In this sense, the experiential gap or asymmetry between the presentation of my own lived body and the appresentation of the other's lived body remains unbridgeable.) In short, in the case of the appresentation of the other, it is his/her lived body which is intended as co-present through the originary presentation of his/her objective body.

The other's objective body then is appresented as another lived body based on a similarity, an analogy between my objective body – which is always also given to me as my own lived body – and the other's objective body. But this analogizing appresentation has nothing to do with an inference from analogy, it is not a „thinking act”, but a direct – performed „at a glance” – analogizing *transfer of the sense* of my lived body to the other's objective body.<sup>29</sup>

This analogizing transfer of sense is, on the one hand, a passive synthesis of a *reproductive association*, which is at work in all everyday object-experience when we transfer the originally constituted sense of an object (say the smell of the coffee experienced for the first time) to another actual experience of the same object (the visual perception of a cup filled with coffee). In the present case, I can perceive the other's objective body – which is similar to mine – as a lived body by transferring to it the „primarily insituted” (*Urstiftung*) sense of an objective body as being in the same time a lived body. The analogizing transfer of the sense is in the same time a passive synthesis of another type of association, called by Husserl *pairing* or *coupling* (*Paarung*)<sup>30</sup>. In a pairing association two (or more) intuitually distinctively given data form, in a passive synthesis, the phenomenological unity of similarity and thus are constituted as a pair. Pairing leads to a kind of “[...] intentional overreaching [...] a living mutual awakening and an overlaying of each with the objective sense of the other. As the result of this overlaying, there takes place in the paired data a mutual transfer of sense that is to say : an apperception of each according to the sense of the other [...]”<sup>31</sup> Applied to our case, the objective body of the other form a phenomenological unity of similarity with my objective body, it is constituted as a pair, and as a consequence a transfer of sense takes place: the sense which belongs to my objective body, that of being always also a lived body, is transferred to the similar objective body of the other, which will thereby be appresented as another lived body.

To sum up, in Husserl's account the constitutive moment of intersubjective experience is the direct analogizing perception – through a passive, always already accomplished associative transfer of sense – of the other's objective body as another lived body, i.e. as another null

centre of orientation and another kinaesthetical, sensing and feeling body. This experience of the other as another lived body, as another embodied subjectivity is the precondition of experiencing the meaning of his intentional action, expressive behavior, emotional and mental states.

### **2.3. Embodied social cognition**

If the embodiment of cognition means that mind and cognition is not disembodied and separated from the world, but it manifests itself in a continuous sensorimotor interaction with the world, then embodied social cognition would mean, by analogy, that social cognition neither can be equated with a disembodied mentalizing, but on the contrary, it is embodied in the sense that it manifests itself in the world, it can be directly perceived in embodied actions and expressive behaviors. In opposition to theory-based or simulation-based theories of mindreading, current alternative accounts of social cognition highlights the grounding role of embodied perception and interaction for social understanding. Proponents of *embodied intersubjectivity/social cognition* are arguing that social cognition is grounded in and shaped by – both ontogenetically and phylogenetically, before and below any representational mindreading – the perception, expression and understanding of embodied actions, emotions and intentions. An important related topic in current empirical and philosophical work is the role of the perception and imitation of embodied actions and intentions for the acquisition and evolution of language and culture<sup>32</sup> (language and cultural learning, and the capacity of human communication is grounded in intersubjective-perceptual *joint attentional situations*<sup>33</sup>; embodied, sensorimotor *mimesis* has a crucial role in cultural evolution<sup>34</sup>). In what follows, I'll present a phenomenological interpretation of the two most important empirical evidences sustaining the thesis of embodied intersubjectivity/social cognition: mirror neurons in cognitive neuroscience and infant imitation in developmental psychology.

#### **2.3.1. Mirror neurons**

Discovered in 1992 by a group of neuroscientists in Parma (Giacomo Rizzolatti, Vittorio Gallese and others), mirror neurons had a deep impact on cognitive neuroscience, leading even to predictions like „mirror neurons would do for psychology what DNA did for biology”.<sup>35</sup> Originally discovered in the area F5 of the monkey's ventral pre-motor cortex, and

subsequently identified also in the pre-motor cortex and in Broca's area of the human brain, mirror neurons respond both when a particular action is executed by the subject and when the subject observes the same goal-directed, purposeful action (e. g. goal-related hand actions, such as grasping, holding and manipulating objects) performed by another individual.<sup>36</sup> It has been proposed that mirror neurons form a mirror system matching the execution and the observation of goal-related motor actions, a matching mechanism whose primary function is the direct, immediate understanding, relying only on our own motor or kinaesthetic knowledge – without any conceptual-linguistic mediation – of the meaning of other's actions. When we perceive another person's actions or emotions, our motor or emotional system is activated, it resonates along with that of the observed agent; the corresponding internal motor or emotional representations are evoked or simulated, „as if” we were performing the same action or experiencing a similar emotion. (As if it there would be no difference between seeing and doing or feeling something.) Mirror neurons thus provide a direct internal experience, and therefore understanding of another person's act, intention or emotion. (A few examples can illustrate that mirror neurons can be experienced also in first-person, subjective experience: think of instinctively moving legs or heads while watching a football game; when we see someone laugh, cry, show disgust, or experience pain, in some sense we have a co-feeling of that emotion.) Mirror neuron may underlie a variety of functions like imitation and thereby learning, intention understanding, mindreading, empathy and intersubjectivity,<sup>37</sup> and could also represent the basic neural mechanism from which language evolved.<sup>38</sup>

Understanding the meaning of the actions of others is not a two-step process – as in theories of theory of mind – in which we would first perceive a neither significant, nor expressive bodily behavior, followed by a theoretical inference or simulation which attributes meaning to it. Mirror neurons are receptive not to the physical or biological structure, but to the *teleological structure of the movement*, to the *meaning of purposive, goal-directed actions*. Mirror neurons thus seems to justify Husserl's upholding that our empathic experience of the other implies an actualization of the kinaesthetic sensations corresponding to the movement in question (not its effective execution), through a transfer of sense accomplished by an inter-kinaesthetic coupling.<sup>39</sup>

Mirror neurons constitute an intermodal link (linking different sensory modalities) between the visual perception of others movement and the first-

person experience of one's own capabilities for kinaesthetic movement. The question is: how this intermodal link comes to be established, or – phenomenologically – how it is constituted?

Some current functional-level explanations, in terms of implicit predictive simulation of action,<sup>40</sup> suggests that this intermodal link is constituted from "inside out", from self to the other: it must be first established in one's own case, and then transferable by analogy to the perception of the action of others. The main point of their proposal is that the predictive simulation of the so-called forward models can be bi-directional, can run in reverse. When for example I'm watching my own hand movements, associations are formed between copies of motor outputs for such movements (on the phenomenological level: my own kinaesthetic possibilities or "I can"-s) and visual inputs (appearances) from such movements. This is why copies of motor signals can evoke, or predictively simulate input signals in forward models. (On the phenomenological level this corresponds to the motivational "if-then" correlation between the motivating kinaesthetic systems of possible movements and the motivated sequences of perceptual appearances). But this predictive simulation can also run in reverse: when I see another person moving his hand in a similar manner, the same visual inputs (appearances) can evoke motor outputs (the kinaesthetical possibilities, "I can"-s associated to these movements.) But what about my unperceived movements, like those of my face, were it is impossible to establish these intermodal links between my own kinaesthetically felt and visually perceived movements? (The typical answer is: we use mirrors; but as we will see below in the case of infant imitation, there are no mirrors in the crib, but infants still imitate.)

The same problem arises in the husserlian account of the intersubjective experience: the analogizing perception of the other's lived body is based on the similarity between two objective bodies, between the other's physical body and the visual representation of my own objective body. In order to experience another lived body, I must possess a kind of memory of my own outward physical appearance or of my own moving body from an external perspective. But even if the tactile self-constitution of the body (as in the case of one hand touching the other, discussed before) leads to a certain self-objectivation of my body, I can never move out from my „null centre” of orientation, from my embodied first-person, subjective perspective, in order to perceive visually my own body from an external, third-person perspective. I cannot, as in the case of the other's objective body, walk around my own body and see it from all sides, I cannot perceive some

profiles of it (my head, my eyes, etc.). The adequate, intuitively fulfilled self-constitution of the objective body, especially in the case of visual self-constitution required here, is impossible; as Husserl also acknowledges it in a famous passage from *Ideen II*, the body is a „remarkably imperfectly constituted thing”<sup>41</sup>. But if the self-constitution of my own objective body is imperfect and I cannot possess a visual representation of my outward physical appearance or of my own movements from a third-person perspective, then the necessary precondition for the experience of another lived body, that is, the analogizing perception based on a similarity between the two objective bodies, cannot be performed.

In conclusion, both of the accounts, the predictive simulation model and the husserlian description, are facing the same unsurmountable experiential asymmetry: my body is experienced primarily in a kinaesthetical way than through visual perception, while the body of another person is experienced primarily through visual perception. Therefore it is highly questionable that I would able to establish first in my own case an intermodal link between the kinaesthetically felt and the visually perceived movements (simply because I cannot experience visually all my movements), in order to transfer it after through analogy to the perception of the movements of others.

A possible solution for this puzzle comes from developmental science: there is evidence now that an ability to appreciate similarities or equivalences between the others movements and unperceived, but felt and executed bodily movements is innate.

### **2.3.2. Infant imitation**

Thanks to the ground-breaking experiments of Andrew Meltzoff, there is now a large amount of evidence showing that newborns (less than an hour old in some cases) can imitate the facial gestures – tongue protrusion, mouth opening, lip protrusion – of another person.<sup>42</sup> But how do they do this? How do they know that the perceived facial action of the other corresponds to the action performed and felt with their own mouth and tongue which they have never seen before (in order to establish an equivalence between the visual image and the felt action)? For this kind of “invisible imitation” (the infant uses parts of his body invisible to himself to imitate the other’s movements) to be possible, the infant must be capable to match the others facial gestures to his or her own proprioceptive-kinaesthetic experience, that is, he must already

have a developed proprioceptive-kinaesthetic body schema, which is not just *supramodal* (linking vision, proprioception, and action) but also *interpersonal* from the start. There is no need to learn first the intermodal equivalences between the kinaesthetically felt and visually perceived movements, and transfer it after by analogy to the perception of the movements of others, because from the start these senses are linked to each other and to possibilities of action in a supramodal and inter-personal body schema.<sup>43</sup> As Gopnik and Meltzoff puts it: "We innately map the visually perceived motions of others onto our own kinesthetic sensations"<sup>44</sup> If there is indeed an analogy here, this cannot be based on the similarity of two objective bodies (the infant never saw his own face), but more likely on some kind of similarity between the purely *kinematic properties* of the other's visually perceived movements and our own internally perceived movements through kinaesthesia.<sup>45</sup> We somehow directly co-perceive (co-feel) through our own kinaesthetical possibilities the meaning of the others kinaesthetical movement.

Both Husserl and the contemporary functionalist accounts of mirror neurons seems to follow the same solipsistic logic of constitution: our own self-experience (self-consciousness), which takes place in isolation from others, must foundationally (that is: in the order of constitution) and genetically (or ontogenetically) precede the experience of others. But the phenomenology of neonate imitation requires us to reconsider this solipsistic logic: our own self-experience is in a sense from the start intersubjective. The constitution of others and the constitution of our selves are reciprocally conditioning. In neonate imitation we can literally see our own possibilities in the faces of others, which means that *the intrasubjective (intracorporeal) self-experience is from the beginning intersubjective (intercorporeal)*. In intersubjective situations my own lived body experiences oneself through the relation with another lived body: *bodily auto-affection is in the same time a hetero-affection by another lived body*. The constitutive basis of social experience is thus a direct embodied social perception: we directly co-perceive or co-feel through our own kinaesthetical or emotional possibilities the meaning of the others kinaesthetical movements or emotions. And this intersubjective embodied perception is grounded, constituted in the fact that bodily self-experience is from the beginning intersubjective: my own body is experienced from the beginning as relational, as responsive to the other.

Before concluding, I have to mention that recently not just theories of theory of mind, but to some extent the phenomenology of intersubjectivity

too, have been criticized for neglecting the pervasive dimension of second-person interaction in intersubjective experience, by focusing only on the understanding, prediction and explanation of other's behavior from a third-person observational perspective (his or her behavior or mind).<sup>46</sup> In opposition, the more recent trend of *embodied* or *social interactionism* emphasizes the *mutual bodily and affective responsiveness in second-person, pre-linguistic dialogical interaction*.<sup>47</sup> Developmental evidence about pre-linguistic dialogical interactions in infancy support this view: six- to eight weeks olds already engage in *proto-conversations* with their caregivers, a non-verbal dyadic exchange of vocal, facial, and gestural expressions, which is rhythmically timed and follows a turn-taking pattern (*primary intersubjectivity*)<sup>48</sup>; there is a selective and cross-modal matching between these expressions in infant-mother *affect attunement* for sharing emotional states.<sup>49</sup> More recently, describing different experiences of emotional second-person engagement in infancy (like experiencing attention, teasing or communicative deception), Reddy suggested that emotions are not pre-given internal states, but relational or interactional affects ("self-other-conscious affects"), whose meaning is constantly changing in the emotional interaction.<sup>50</sup> In a similar vein, the *enactive theory of intersubjectivity* emphasizes the emergent and autonomous process of "embodied social interaction" (the process of mutual coordination of two embodied subjects coupled to each other), which can generate, by influencing the interactors individual sense-making, a *common or participatory sense-making*.<sup>51</sup> This idea of interactional meaning is an important theoretical innovation of embodied interactionist views, in comparison with previous theories of mindreading or even theories of embodied intersubjectivity.

It seems that both phenomenological and empirical accounts of embodied intersubjectivity are now facing the same theoretical challenge: to step out effectively in the "inter" of intersubjectivity, in that "in-between" which is neither localizable in the brain, nor reducible to mine or the other's intersubjective intentional experience, and where the intersubjective meanings and intentions are not static and pre-given (in interacting individuals), but can be co-created (co-constituted), generated and transformed in the process of embodied interaction itself.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The initial proposal for a productive dialogue between phenomenology and cognitive science was formulated by Francisco Varela in his working hypothesis of “neurophenomenology”: embodied experience is a locus of epistemological reciprocity between the lived body (the subjective, phenomenal experience of the body) and the objective, scientifically investigated body, a reciprocity which can give place to dynamic reciprocal constraints and to a productive communication between the third-person methodologies and the empirical results of cognitive science and the first-person methodologies and descriptions of phenomenology. For the initial “neurophenomenological” proposal see: Varela, F. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy to the hard problem. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 3(4), 330–350.; Varela, F. (1997). The naturalization of phenomenology as the transcendence of nature. Searching for generative mutual constraints, *Alter*, 5(4), 355–381. For recent introductions in the neurophenomenological research program see: Lutz, A., & Thompson, E. (2003). Neurophenomenology: Integrating subjective experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 10(9–10), 31–52. There is an ongoing debate about how to “naturalize” phenomenology, whether in the form of neurophenomenology, a front-loaded phenomenology or an indirect phenomenology, etc. See: Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B., & Roy, J.-M. (Eds.). (1999). *Naturalizing phenomenology*. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Gallagher, S. (1997). Mutual enlightenment: Recent phenomenology in cognitive science. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 4, 195–214.; Zahavi, D. (2004). Phenomenology and the project of naturalization, *Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences*, 3, 331–347.; For a recent introduction in the field see: Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2008). *The Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science*, London: Routledge. See also the issues of the interdisciplinary journal *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*.
- <sup>2</sup> Turner, B., *The Body and Society*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1984. Featherstone, M., Hepworth, M., Turner, B. (eds.), *The Body. Social Process and Cultural Theory*, London, Sage, 1991. Schilling, C., *The Body and Social Theory*, London, Sage, 1993.
- <sup>3</sup> As Bryan Turner, one of the leading figures of the recent turn to the sociology of the body recently stated there is a persistent tension in the anthropology and sociological study of the body between the body as a representation (that is: cultural decoding of the body as a system of meaning that has a definite structure existing separately from the intentions and conceptions of social actors) and embodiment as practice and experience, the phenomenological study of the lived body. As he puts out concretely: “By treating the body

as a representation, discourse, or text, it becomes difficult to develop an adequate sociology of performance. For example, if sociologists wanted to study ballet as performance rather than as representation, they would need to pay attention to the performing body. The need for an understanding of embodiment and lived experience is crucial in understanding performing arts, but also for the study of the body in sport. While choreography is in one sense the text of the dance, performance takes place outside the strict directions of the choreographic work, and has an immediacy, which cannot be captured by the idea of the body as text. It is important to re-capture the intellectual contribution of the phenomenology of human embodiment in order to avoid the reduction of bodies to cultural texts. The social differences between men and women are consequences of culture, but understanding two people doing the tango requires some attention to bodily performances." Turner, B., *Body*, in: *The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology*, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 44.

- <sup>4</sup> Husserl, E. (1973a), *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Husserliana I (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff), § 44.
- <sup>5</sup> See also: Zahavi, D., *Self-awareness and alterity*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 91-109. Zahavi, D., First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology, *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 1: 7–26, 2002. Gallagher, Shaun, Zahavi, Dan, "Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/>>.
- <sup>6</sup> Husserl, E. (1952), *Husserliana IV. Ideen II.*, Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 18. §, a), 56. ; 41. §, a), 158-159; Husserl, E. (1966), *Husserliana XI. Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, Haye, Martinus Nijhoff Husserl, 1966, 298.
- <sup>7</sup> Husserl, E. (1973), *Husserliana XVI. Ding und Raum*, Haye, Martinus Nijhoff.
- <sup>8</sup> Husserl, E. (1973), *Husserliana XVI. Ding und Raum*, Haye, Martinus Nijhoff., chap. VIII.
- <sup>9</sup> Husserl, E. (1973), *Husserliana XVI. Ding und Raum*, Haye, Martinus Nijhoff., chaps. IX, X.
- <sup>10</sup> The phenomenological conception of active perception has been revived by current enactive, or dynamique sensorimotor theories of perception, which are arguing for the constitutive interdependence of perception and action. Their central claim is that perceptual experience acquires both qualitative character (the subjective feeling of vision, touch, hearing etc) and perceptual content (concerning space, color, shape etc) thanks to a perceiver's implicit (tacit, know-how) knowledge of "sensorimotor contingencies", that is, of the effects of movement on sensory stimulation. Perception is not a process in the brain whereby the perceptual system constructs an internal representation

of the world, but a temporally extended, dynamic activity of skillful bodily interaction with the world. See: Hurley, S. (1998) *Consciousness in Action*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.; Noë, A. (2004) *Action in Perception*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.; O'Regan, J.K. et Noë, A (2001), A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*.

<sup>11</sup> Husserl, E. (1952), *Husserliana IV. Ideen II.*, Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 36. §, 146-147.

<sup>12</sup> Husserl, E. (1952), *Husserliana IV. Ideen II.*, Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 36. §, 145.

<sup>13</sup> For a philosophical introduction to the field, see: Clark, A., *Mindware. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001.

<sup>14</sup> Two now "classical" and highly influential introductions in the embodied or enactive cognitive science are: the groundbreaking opus of Varela, F., Thompson, E. et Rosch, E. (1991) *The Embodied Mind*, Cambridge MA., MIT Press.; and Clark, A. (1997) *Being There : Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. For useful reviews see: Clark, A., An embodied cognitive science?, *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 1999, 3 (9), 345-351. Wilson, M. (2002), Six views of embodied cognition. *Psychonomic Bulletin and Review*. 9, 625–636.

<sup>15</sup> Clark 1997, op. cit. ; Gallagher, S. (2005) *How the Body Shapes the Mind*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005; Hurley, S. (1998) *Consciousness in Action*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press; Haugeland, J. (1995), Mind Embodied and Embedded, in Y.-H. Houng et J. – C. Ho (ed.), *Mind and Cognition*, Taipei, Taiwan: Academica Sinica.; Lakoff, G. et Johnson, M. (1999) *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, New York, Basic Books; Noë, A. (2004) *Action in Perception*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.; Varela, Thompson, Rosch, 1991, op. cit.; Thompson, E. (2007) *Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

<sup>16</sup> Thelen, E. and Smith, L. (1994), *A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and Action*, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.

<sup>17</sup> Damasio, A.R. (1994) *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*, New York, Grosset/Putnam.

<sup>18</sup> Brooks, R. (1991) Intelligence without representation, *Artificial Intelligence*. 47,139–159.

<sup>19</sup> Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. (1980) *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago, University of Chicago. Lakoff and Johnson 1999, op. cit.

<sup>20</sup> Hutchins, E., *Cognition in the Wild*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1995.

<sup>21</sup> Varela et al. 1991, op. cit. Thompson, 2007, op. cit.

<sup>22</sup> Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999 op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> An example for a conceptual metaphor: The mind (target domain) is a body (source domain). Mappings of the metaphor "Thinking is moving": Thinking

- is moving (e.g., "My mind was racing"); Ideas are locations (e.g., "How did you reach that conclusion?"); Being unable to think is being unable to move (e.g., "I'm stuck"); Understanding is following (e.g., "I follow what you are saying").
- <sup>24</sup> See for example: Gopnik, A. (1993). "How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality". *Behavioural and Brain Sciences* 16, 1-14. See also: Ravenscroft, Ian, „Folk Psychology as a Theory”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/folkpsych-theory/>>.
- <sup>25</sup> See: Goldman, A. (2006), *Simulating Minds*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.; Gordon, R. M. és Cruz, J. (2003) "Simulation Theory" in *Encyclopaedia of Cognitive Science*, London, Nature Publishing.; Gordon, Robert M., "Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/folkpsych-simulation/>>.
- <sup>26</sup> For the following phenomenological critique of theories of theory of mind see: Gallagher, S., 2005, op. cit., chap. 9.; Thompson, E. (2001). „Empathy and consciousness”. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 8/5-7, 1-32.;
- <sup>27</sup> Gallagher and Zahavi, op. cit., chap. 9.; Zahavi, D., *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective*, Bradford Books, The MIT Press. Cambridge, MA, 2008, chap. 6.
- <sup>28</sup> Husserl, E. (1973a), *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Husserliana I (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 141. I replaced Cairns translation of Leib as "animate organism" with lived body and that of Körper as "body" with "objective body".
- <sup>29</sup> Husserl, E. (1973a), *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Husserliana I (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 141.
- <sup>30</sup> Husserl, E. (1973a), *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Husserliana I (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, § 51.
- <sup>31</sup> Husserl, E. (1973a), *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Husserliana I (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 143.
- <sup>32</sup> For a comprehensive survey see: Hurley, S. et Chater, N. (2005), *Perspectives on Imitation : From Neuroscience to Social Science* vol I-II, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
- <sup>33</sup> Tomasello, M. (1999), *The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.
- <sup>34</sup> Donald, M. (1991), *Origins of the Modern Mind*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.
- <sup>35</sup> Ramachandran, V.S. (2004). Mirror neurons and imitation learning as the driving force behind "the great leap forward" in human evolution. [http://www.edge.org/3rd\\_culture/ramachandran/ramachandran\\_p1.html](http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/ramachandran/ramachandran_p1.html).
- <sup>36</sup> For reviews see Gallese, V., Keysers, C., Rizzolatti, G. (2004). "A unifying view of the basis of social cognition". *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 8, 9,

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- <sup>51</sup> De Jaegher and Di Paolo, op. cit.



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# GENERAL REFLECTIONS ON PRIVATIZATION OF DEATH IN LATE MODERNITY: WHEN DOES LONELINESS COME INTO PICTURE AND WHY?

*The crucified ones talked among  
themselves, full of faith and hope.  
But nobody talked to Barabbas.*

(Pär Lagerkvist, **Barabbas**)

The aim of this study is simultaneously modest and implausibly adventurous. We will make an attempt to bring to your attention a few underrated theoretical obstacles in late modern sociological research of death and dying. For doing so, we are obliged to put up with an uncomfortable procedure: that of discerning between correctly rated, underrated and overrated “truths” in a multi-determined yet accurately up-dated academic field.

First, let us explain the “self-accusation” of implausibility: approaching different kinds of loneliness and/or solitude, as a collateral, but decisive concern meant to further explain late modern approach of death and dying, led to a seeming taking over of the secondary “problem” over the primary “problem”. In our yet-to-come book we have taken our time and space to explain the overlapping of “loneliness” and “death” in late modernity; however the present study, aiming to capture major aspects of both “problems” without always displaying thoroughly enough the reasoning behind, may suggest, at times, a certain modesty of researching tools and a certain uncertainty of researching questions. We hope we will succeed to honestly deal with both disadvantages.

Among the honest (research) questions one may raise could be the following: how should sociology and thanatology deal with death without overlooking its fundamentally *existential* nature? What should we take into account? What should we leave aside? Could one actually claim firm theoretical standpoints? What would we call “legitimate” methodological

procedures when it comes to studying death and dying? And eventually, would they be relevant for leading to minimally decent (and entirely honest) conclusions?

## I. “Privatization of death” might not always be what it seems

The connection, in modernity and late modernity, between the public irrelevance of death (*tabooing of death*<sup>1</sup>) and its inherent visibility in private contexts induced the idea of “*subjective*” death (the modern and late modern sense for privately dealing with death<sup>2</sup>) which has rapidly become one of the taken for granted truths in sociology of death and dying. Therefore any contemporary theoretical approach may rightfully emphasize *death as a socio-psychological phenomenon*, while downplaying its existential and religious nuances that naturally circumscribed the matter in traditional societies.<sup>3</sup>

What we will try to debate further on is where the abusive theoretic use of “privatization of death” starts. We will also try to suggest an essentially different way of looking at private death. Rooted in our previous studies and book on death and dying<sup>4</sup> as well as in our empirical research we have conducted in the latest 3 years in Sweden, our reasoning will invite the readers to see in “privatization of death” something else/more than a “four-wall-funeral” or a typically modern solitary experience of dying in a hospital room. These are, of course, obvious cases to capture and discuss in theoretical writings, but are they the only ones?

It could be helpful to circumscribe modern private death (exclusively subjected to sociological management and therefore defined as a social phenomenon, described in sociological terms, and “solved” with the help of medicine and/or psychotherapy) by setting it in contrast with the traditional, “mainstream” death (usually contained, defined and justified by traditional religion). In our opinion, *private death should be mostly referred as a label for any form of discontinuity in meaning, regulation, location and form with the traditional manners of handling death, mourning and burial, presumably public and presumably shared and largely accepted as “reliable”*. Three years ago, the Swedish Church made unintentional allusion to such contrast by writing that all burials not taking place in the church could increase the “risk” for privatization of death.<sup>5</sup>

As we have often noted, privatization of death as circumscribed by recent works within social sciences is mostly based on half a century old

suggestions coming from the history of ideas field.<sup>6</sup> The works of Philippe Ariès or Michel Vovelle came to justify the lack of continuity between traditional attitudes and modern attitudes, and they were not purposefully designed to explain modern arrangements for dealing (or not dealing) with death. Contextualizing late modern death representations in a world that found itself in the process of privatization of *all* meanings should be more than setting a contrast between "then" and "now", between "public death" and "private death". In the latest decades we witnessed a chaotic disintegration<sup>7</sup> of all previous cultural forms and social values so that it has become difficult to discern (existentially and scientifically) between the "problem" of death and the concrete problems of the dying, of the hospital staff etc. Subjective solutions of coping with death (those having nothing to do with general explanations offered by largely-accepted systems like traditional religions), are obviously less efficient even if only because they are, at any time, disputable by other mortals. After all, the problem of death – so unequivocal and objective – does not have much in common with the favorite "states" and "sayings" of late modernity: role taking, individual ambition, personal responsibility, momentary-identities.<sup>8</sup>

There should be a correlation between the growing need of *defining* death in one's *own* terms and keeping death away from the public space, which is considered to be one of the main traits of our society.<sup>9</sup> We are witnessing not only *the reducing of the public relevance of death, but also the blocking of the access of any kind of shared knowledge on death and dying that could make other's experience more significant (in the sense of producing and reproducing anticipated or already recognized meanings) for the community as a whole.*

## II. Loneliness of the dying?

Discovering *researchable* connections (causal connections, filiations, or reciprocal determination) between loneliness and death in late modernity is more difficult than one may expect. It even tends to be an extravagant research step as long as both are rather "extra-scientific" matters. We did our best to show in our PhD thesis that loneliness can be considered the prevalent emotional state of late modernity.<sup>10</sup> But *how* should we deal with the relation between the absence of death at the public level and its compelling presence at the individual level? We believe that answering this question will lead us to the "problem" of loneliness.

Perhaps Norbert Elias<sup>11</sup> was the first scholar to explicitly advance and establish an empirical connection between modern death and loneliness by simply stating that those who die are left alone these days. However, the French sociologist Yves-Hugues Déchaux believe that Elias' observations were excessively dramatic. In a study entitled "La mort dans les sociétés modernes. La thèse de Norbert Elias à l'épreuve" as well as in the collective article "Comment les familles entourent leur morts"<sup>12</sup> it is suggested "solitude" and "loneliness" in connection with dying should be both replaced with an optimistic word: „subjectivity".

Elias' conclusions can be of course tempered in many others way. The British sociologist Clive Seale showed in a practical study called "Dying Alone"<sup>13</sup> that his interviewees made obvious efforts to *Maintain* the ideal image of an empathic community meeting, whenever possible, the psycho-social needs of the terminally-ill, and feeling tremendously responsible for those (neighbors, relatives) who ended up dying alone. We are also remembered the tremendous importance of the "professional management of love"<sup>14</sup> in the Western hospices<sup>15</sup> and hospitals, embodied by well-prepared staff in the art of accompanying the dying: reliability and intersubjectivity defining a true *profession de foi*.<sup>16</sup>

Yet we would like to stress the contradictory nature of the qualified care: one of the terminally-ill interviewees says: "[the hospital] sent terminal care nurses – but they were just girls"<sup>17</sup>. Ulla Qvarnström writes that there is little chance for the patients to actually maintain a deep and meaningful relationship with the care-takers.<sup>18</sup> The "charitable elite" of late modernity has successfully professionalized compassion and has properly indexed it in the classified lists of professions; yet, the "psychodrama"<sup>19</sup> of the dying supposed to be directed with notable success by care-professionals, is still an expression of two *unmet* needs: **1.** the strong desire of being surrounded by friends and family,<sup>20</sup> and **2.** the desire to adopt a *safe and previously efficient "dying role"*. The more we emphasize the importance of the expert management of dying in late modernity as well as the decline of the "community inspired rituals",<sup>21</sup> the more attention we should pay to the new types of accords between subjectivities which are called to reinvent the classic concept of "la bonne mort";<sup>22</sup> along with it, the "classic concept" of loneliness should also be called into question. In Sweden, for instance, more than 85% die with professional assistance in an institution of some kind;<sup>23</sup> invoking Elias' "loneliness of the dying" for understanding what institutionalized death is all about, cannot be a workable option. A

re-considering of the privatization of meanings of death and dying should be of great help, but first, we should finish what we have started:

### **III. Why/what loneliness?**

#### **III.1 Why loneliness?**

Our interest for loneliness and aging is, as showed, tangential and has to do with a certain stage of our empirical research when we came across a socio-psychological “banality”: more stable answers to our questions about what happens after one dies were given by interviewees in their 50s; unlike the discourses of the young (often displaying rhetoric bravery) or that of the old (often positive clichés), middle-aged people’s accounts seemed to pay little tribute to oratorical skills, and more to a compelling need to justify their existential route, to legitimate themselves and their choices, and to discuss death and eventual afterlife according to such self-legitimateness. Even if asked about their option for death as a doorway or death as a final stop, the key-element in many stories seemed to be loneliness. The more our discussions have been perceived as “everyday talk” about how death was supposed to be, the more cultural scripts of loneliness have been displayed. There are many interesting perspectives on loneliness as understood by our interviewees worthy of being explored in comprehensive studies, but perhaps the most striking one was that of *loneliness being more feared than death*, social isolation being more feared than physical disappearance.

Loneliness seems to be the measure for “everything” in our late modern world: from the most glorious life to the most pathetic death. If each one dies on one’s own, then it is also safe to say that, while alive, each one has to deal with one’s own measure of loneliness. Loneliness tends to be the substructure of the (Western) world, and our society is fatally and naturally built from a complex scaffold of such loneliness-es. From the mystical (or monastic) well-articulated isolation to the unbearable loneliness of the immigrant, passing through the claustrophobic feeling of the white collar worker all the way through the loneliness of the artist and the existential isolation as described by existentialists, we would discern innumerable shades and innumerable cultural and psychological conditionings, intimate failures, social frustration, spiritual decantation, self-gratifications, self-flagellation, in short, the entire banality, the bizarreness, the sublime

and the derisory of the world; however nothing (or too little) seem to lead to a “primary” feeling or to the “fundamental” meaning of loneliness.

A study on loneliness will never be a “profitable” scientific business, because “Loneliness” is, just like “Death”, in irritating generality and a generality. Apart from an enormous medical and psychotherapeutic literature, all metaphors have been imagined, all essays have been written and all theoretic speculations have been already created – some brilliant, some embarrassing, but most of them just sentimental. It is not our intention to insist on what loneliness has irremediably banal or grossly metaphorical; however, if loneliness in the Western world can take infinity of forms, one may say that the Swedish society successfully resumes “all” of them.

The Swede talks about his or her loneliness with the nonchalance of a Latin talking about minor extra-martial escapades. 8 of our 10 interviewees provided extensive explanations about benefits of solitude, unwanted loneliness, social failure or fear of isolation. Unfortunately, an extremely rich set of empirical data on loneliness will not be considered in our present discussion. Nonetheless, by the end of this study, we will shortly explore some aspects of loneliness that reflect themselves in the late modern death and dying approaches. By their notorious and acutely-felt presence, such aspects of loneliness have given form and meaning to our ontological “texture”, precisely where the sting of death once used to be felt.

### III. 2 What loneliness?

We suggested that privatization of death in late modernity could be something else than the simple spatial reduction of the event between the four walls of a hospital room. What if the same “logic” were applied to the “loneliness of the dying”? We know that death poses the problem of *individual meaning* whose coherence and consistency define (or weaken) ontological security<sup>24</sup>, but living in a society that does not facilitate the awareness of death and, moreover, make the importance of a reliable *savoir mourir* seem minimal and relative, the experience of death, dying and grief comes down to personal taste. *Bringing death and loneliness together in late modernity does not only mean reinforcing the classic image of the old dying man alone in the hospital bed, but to people – especially aged ones – that die on their own, being aware of the relativity of the solution they have improvised for urgently solving the “unexpected” problem of their mortal destiny; the feeling of loneliness*

*grows proportionally with aging and with the awareness of the crisis of the solutions for favorably solving the problem of death.*

The fact that “living a solitary existence in old age is associated with a more negative or fearful concept of death”<sup>25</sup> remains one of the most reasonable and widely spread assumption to be found in studies on later life. We will therefore not discuss it further. We would assume instead that *the feeling of loneliness grows proportionally with the degree of indecision regarding that what happens when one dies*. The strong belief in either posthumous life or nothingness could be seen as an antidote for the loneliness of the aged because, once the social isolation (and therefore the social death occurs), the prospect of death seems to be getting closer, and which inherently leads to a growing anxiety about „the future”.<sup>26</sup> A coherent, *trusted* discourse on death (ranging from a religious story to a highly rational explanation) on death could determine a more acceptant (and even forward-looking) attitude toward an otherwise nebulous experience. In other words, it makes sense to talk about the feeling of isolation of an aged person who becomes aware of his or her inability to rely on a largely accepted and reliable *savoir mourir*’s: a *symbolic isolation comes to enforce the physical isolation of the aged*. This is when both nature and culture collapse in an unexpected and terrifying *don’t-know-how*.

Of course, such “symbolic isolation” when it comes to signifying one’s own death could be seen as a banal, well-documented vice of individualism, the inherent waste material that comes with the excess of autonomy and with those “precarious freedoms” that Ulrich Beck has warned us about. In other words, it should not be unusual to have late modern people not looking at death from a certain angle, but rather juggling with philosophical, religious or logic adjustments, thinking up ambiguous hypotheses, or, as it is often the case, indeterminately postponing the matter. And if it is so, then death as a research matter in late modernity is not at all different from any other research matter with minor or major social impact. The attitudes toward death, the perceiving of dying experiences, as well as the infinite number of nuances that human loneliness can take in relation to these experiences do not make “more” sense than other social problems of late modernity: isolation due to unemployment, the role of cultural scripts in maintaining certain memberships, etc. So what happens when death and loneliness become no more than “trivial” social problems requiring *nothing more than* proper social solutions and elaborated sociological corrections?

#### **IV. Where does thanatology “end” and why?**

There is a risk to collect fresh, distinct data on death and dying, but to analyze them in the light of the theoretical truths that were formulated a few decades ago. Such theoretical revelations were born out of certain cultural concerns and social circumstances that are not always directly connected with our late modern sensibilities. Let us give an example: rationalizing, professionalizing and institutionalizing death – one of the biggest “thanatologic truths” of the 70s – is not a hot social and/or sociological issue nowadays. Its social and sociological consequences are “used up”<sup>27</sup> and one may say that, even if they are still part of the contemporary “death system”,<sup>28</sup> it is not them shaping the late modern individual approach of death and dying. More concerned with the inner life than ever, today’s man tends to give death a much more personal touch,<sup>29</sup> be it in the sense of a more tragic grief (especially when death of the young occurs), or a more openly indifferent approach (when the old pass away). The relationship of the late modern man with death is obviously far beyond its institutionalization aspects. 50 years ago, the *individual duty* of fulfilling one’s life purposes and the *personal meaning* of social success were not seen as urgent tasks. Half a century ago, the world was “freshly” disenchanted. The sudden lack of intelligibility of life stirred and justified certain nostalgia for a lost religious order and revealed a turning point in modern attitudes toward death: the lack of “symbolic authority” of a certain recipe of good death that has encouraged the reliable truth (today taken for granted) about the exclusion of death from public debates. However, today, such public debates are not expressly meant to be “off-death-topic”, but to do what it takes so that *social success* of individuals to be encouraged and stimulated: be it in the sense of death denial or in the sense death “hyperawareness” as a driving force behind their everyday success.

Perhaps too many studies approaching the *concrete* social and problems raised by death and dying start by announcing the *unproblematic nature* of their research questions as part of their introductory theoretic protocol. We do not intend to doubt the practicality of the information they provide nor do we believe that the role of such punctual studies in the mainframe of disciplinary and interdisciplinary projects on death should be decreased. We only want to take a further step and note that the potentially crucial aspects of a study are too often and too easily downplayed by their “default” placement in the category of “predictable

truths”; the investigative practices are actually conducted within this frame, and the research questions have been, at their turn, formulated and determined by it. If one is genuinely interested in various aspects of late modern death one will sooner or later have to deal with the practical impossibility of gaining access to some “new intuition”. Once we agreed upon the fact that death denial is an important trait of today’s society, we would immediately acknowledge innumerable paths (read “research questions”) leading to the same Rome. So we *do* have the required local details for providing the best novelty and relevance of the new death studies, and we *did* inherit a number of precious frames of discussion as well as a number of interpretive filters that sort out and pertinently signify the new bodies of information in relevant, coherent manners. It is, then, not surprising that no one can deny the specific ways in which an “invincible” truth has been one more time reinforced. The applicability of such filters seems to be unlimited as long as the entire problematic of death and dying has become strictly social and sociological. And why would anyone want to ask more from an extremely vivid and correctly updated academic field? For sure, we are reading a correctly revised and agreed-upon “edition” of death.

## V. Zygmunt Bauman is helping us out

In the subchapter above, we made an attempt to show that the predominant focus across the entire field of death studies is maintained by a number of “harmonizing elements” that have been formulated throughout the latest 50 years. They have remained the safest interpreting keys because of two obvious reasons. The first one has to do with the nature of death itself which is a rigid and perennial “problem” that does not easily validate a new interpreting model,<sup>30</sup> while the second reason has to do with the nature of today’s world going through a “terminal phase” of modernity that Giddens called “high modernity”. In spite of the highly sophisticated manners of validating innumerable existential modes, it is said that contemporary society approaches death in a simplified manner: negation, avoidance, and other “life strategies”.<sup>31</sup> The desire to openly deal with *the one and only issue* of death is obviously not on the agenda of those sitting in the public markets small talking relativism and Human Rights. But here we come across a little illogicality. Since social sciences have been trained to loyally reflect the position and the discourse of the

"project of modernity",<sup>32</sup> then, as both Phillip Mellor and Eva Åhrén Snickare<sup>33</sup> show, the treatment our society applies to death is *inherently mirrored in the academic treatment of death and dying* because the idea itself of *researching* death has to do with the theme of modernity. But can we really say that social sciences "undermine" or "marginalize" death? Apparently not. Let us begin from somewhere else.

In 1992, Bauman engaged himself in writing a provoking essay using different "techniques" of finding less notorious hiding places of death. His approach is not to be found in other academic works on death and dying. He even calls it "a detectivistic adventure of a psychoanalytic kind".<sup>34</sup>

His hypothesis is that our everyday cultural solutions are "sediments of the processes which have been set in motion by the fact of human mortality and motivated by the need to cope with the issues that fact posits; as well as by the parallel need to repress the awareness of the true motives of such arrangements".<sup>35</sup> Everything, from institutions to cultural rhetoric, from self-identities to ideological agendas, from technological progress to monthly medical check, all those "global powers and stubbornly local meanings"<sup>36</sup> are "elaborate subterfuges"<sup>37</sup> built as fortresses against death. Under multicultural circumstances, such cultural scripts have been diabolically refined. These symbolic routes to immortality, because (multi) culturally determined, have proliferated to the point of meaninglessness. Today, innumerable paths lead to a most wanted Immortal Rome and Zygmunt Bauman made a brilliant cartography of these paths, with an excellent "geographical" flair.

One should start one's approach of death in high modernity *by problematizing its absence*. And this is precisely what social sciences fail to do. They take this absence for granted, and the majority of studies are rather concerned with the *consequences* of the lack of public visibility of death.<sup>38</sup> So there was no "illogicality" in the beginning of our subchapter because *death studies pay their tribute to late modern society by only showing interest in the social problems of death*: insurance policies for funeral homes, professional staff in hospitals, support of elderly, etc. Hospices, hospitals, funeral homes and cemeteries seem to be the only "legal" places for death to be looked for. But Bauman believes that the perfume of death is more intense outside such liminal spaces, and therefore attention should be paid to various symptoms of a culture that suppresses its "mortality connections"<sup>39</sup> through various life strategies practiced on a large scale. After all, it is not in vain that Robert Burt<sup>40</sup> named his book on death in today's America *Death is That Man Taking Names*. We believe

that building relevant interrogations around the problem of the absence of death from the public space cannot be "just" a topic for sociological essays, but a research pursuit in its own right. By *not* doing so, theoretical attention shown to concrete death circumstances easily observable, countable and/or statistically processable will actually contribute to *disguising* death. A theoretical trick is displayed here: the artificial growth of death's social visibility, for merely analytical reasons; and a life strategy: the easiest way to repress a problem is that of turning it into a research problem.

*The social consequences* of the absence of death from the public space are indeed *over-exposed*, and, by all means, they receive all the deserved attention<sup>41</sup> from both journalists and scholars, displaying nothing more than the late modernity's obsession with social problems which never has it been more obvious than it is when connected with death. When having to serve the social moment becomes the exclusive duty of specialists, it will inherently lead to an exaggerated devotion for current, punctual consequences and to a deliberate neglecting of the "perennial" problems which happen to be less involved in concrete contexts of modernity. A comprehensive study on death and dying would not fit in the scientific picture because of its inherent eclecticism,<sup>42</sup> therefore few care about *the issue* of death nowadays. Its social aspects have been however indexed and, whenever possible, solved; so that we now have all qualified tools for successfully impending death to become ontologically alarming. The benefits of science, the economic structures, the cult for *loisir* and "botox", the professionalization of death made their contribution to minifying the public solutions for dying; it depends on each of us how and if we decide to counterattack, solve, and give up to death; and it depends on each of us, the researchers, how and if we decide to deal with the following paradox: *we research death while overlooking its absence*.

## **VI. "Biographical solutions to systemic contradictions"**

Zygmunt Bauman has come to write the above brilliant sentence in the foreword of Ulrich Beck's study, *Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences*. The context of discussion was no other than the *individualization as a duty* in which we can easily guess a precondition for *death as a duty*. The parallelism – already discussed above – is convincing. They are both highly personal constraints asking for an immediate (positive!) solution, in spite of obvious

late-modern systemic impediments. Death calls us by our name, but we live in a phonically isolated society. When asked to say something about the death they would expect to have, our Swedish interviewees ended up in storytelling, and, more precisely, in depicting their existential routes. *The story of death tends to become the story of life.* Somewhat unexpectedly, asking questions about one's death leads to a *biographical narrative*.

Two years ago, after transcribing a couple of revelatory interviews, we asked ourselves whether we could indeed go on with grounding our study on "common" life stories which cannot be "judged", generalized, hypothesized, or intabulated. The stories in question seemed to have minimal relevance for what was then our theoretical ambition (of circumscribing attitudes toward death with the help of the distinction between death as a doorway to a new life, and death as a definite end). What could be then the main gain of "biographical solutions" in a study on death? And what is a "biographical solution" after all?

Not every problem of old age, loneliness or death is (or should be), in fact, a "problem". And not even a problem taken as a "problem" can be explored through a research model. If however one feels a very special methodological "calling" and would dare making an investigation of a carefully chosen "problem", he or she will soon realize that a "problem" in connection with personal aging, loneliness or dying will seldom (if ever) prove extraordinary relevant in a wider research context. People's ways of reacting to questions about aging, loneliness or/and dying use up their relevance at a certain discussion level: a certain age group, social status, family history, socio-economical features of the population within a territory, etc. If we keep in mind the fact that approaching death, old age and/or loneliness inherently involves a variety of disciplines, the last thing we need to deal with is scale confusion.

However, the need for reasonable approaches of death is universal; the avoidance of death, the decline of traditional rites and the individual struggle for conquering various kinds of immortality are present all over the Western world.<sup>43</sup> We have also gotten used to talking and writing about *cultural interdependency* in late modernity. For theoreticians, this is both a privilege and a fatality; the fact that the cultures "flow" into one another (Bauman thinks we live in "liquid times"), the fact that we witness the agglutination or superposition of subcultures and spiritual practices led to bizarre sociological hypotheses and even raised the suspicion of our times being simply non-researchable.<sup>44</sup>

Given the above reasons and in spite of huge theoretical risks, studying death at a large scale could by all odds be a conceivable attempt. A study as such would distinct itself less through a substantial consistency and more through *the coherence of the investigatory practice that will not attempt to circumscribe death, but to follow its avatars, while in constant movement and adjustment*. We believe that the “problem” of death is naturally placed between nature and culture, and that its more general features are unequally absorbed in its particular circumstances, while the particular features tend to dilate themselves, necessarily emerging and proliferating until becoming more or less *general trends of savoir mourir* determining, short-circuiting,<sup>45</sup> counterbalancing or nurturing the mechanisms of modernity. Without any doubt, the autonomy of unreflecting Western individual lies at the heart of the global social dynamics, and many subtle aspects of this interconnection are to be found via the “problem” of death.

We have already shown that privatization of the meanings of death is a problematic privatization and this is precisely why he or she who dies on his or her own is anxiously alone. The need for a shared knowledge on death within certain culture in certain times has been called by us “the mainstream death” and we believe it to contain *in nuce* all the required “data” for a “project of humanity” that guarantees little disputable connections between that which is temporary and that which is out of the times. Everyone has a personal “sense” of death and, in spite of dying being a subjectively perceived experience, a “*like-mindedness* concerning death is to be guessed among the mortals”; and we know from the history that such like-mindedness will sooner or later produce a *common idiom*.

The public absence of death may imply that the late moderns are not able to discern its basic (and therefore sharable) meanings. Today, when traditionally religious times are over, capturing and then revalidating the meanings of death at a personal and public level or, in other words, approaching the *problem of death as a circulating medium between individuality and community* sounds too much like a utopian project; which does not mean it should not be given a thought. When writing about “biographical solutions to systemic contradictions”, Bauman reminds us about our personal lives having become the stage for unfolding the risks and the systemic contradictions of late modernity that have to be surmounted more or less successfully by personal efforts. His statement may also justify the pertinence of studying life stories for investigating one of the most useless opportunities implied by late modern excess

of autonomy: dying on one's own; an ill-fated opportunity which have brought to man nothing but troubles.

## VII. Back to loneliness: does a heart beat by itself?

The disgraceful inability to connect to social network is perceived as one of the most devaluating personal experiences. The "interpersonal isolation"<sup>46</sup> is taken so seriously, it ends up being a matter of "life and death". As implied in the first part of our study, he who fails to connect to the social world does not "fall" directly into death, but fatally slides into loneliness. In the steps of Heideggerian existential philosophy, existential psychotherapy showed constant and specific interest in all forms of isolation (interpersonal, intrapersonal and existential) and problematized their connections with death. Erich Fromm wrote that isolation is the primary source of anxiety<sup>47</sup>, while Irvin Yalom explains that a strong feeling of existential isolation is often the background (and the driving force) behind social success;<sup>48</sup> at the same time it is the entire existential philosophy drawing attention toward the awareness of an essential aloneness of the mortal, the awareness that there is a limit for all forms of belongingness, and here is precisely where death starts.

From a strictly medical point of view, the interpersonal isolation *has been* already mentioned among the most serious threats to life. By the middle of the previous century, death caused by cardiac diseases has known an alarming growth, so that in the 1950, 55% of annual deaths were caused by heart illnesses.<sup>49</sup> Since cardiac risk factors needed to be reconsidered, the newly elaborated "discourse of the heart" contained surprising data concerning the high mortality rate among the unmarried, widows and widowers which proved to be up to five times bigger than among married people.<sup>50</sup> Sedentary life, smoking and hypercholesterolemia seemed to be less damaging than loneliness.<sup>51</sup> However, 46% of the Swedish hearts beat alone,<sup>52</sup> therefore, three years ago, at a conference held in Lund, at the University Hospital's library, professor Bengt Fridlung showed that "getting together" can guarantee a longer, more meaningful life – a true shield against heart attacks.

Social integration, cohesion, long-term marriages can keep death away because they are infallible signifiers and signified-s of the life norm. Unlike hygienic solitude, sheer isolation is the opposite of life. At the long last, late modern man is essentially alone, and essentially not ready to be so.

## VIII. Notorious faces of loneliness

Let us take a look at some of some factors involved in the dynamic relationship between late modern individualism, loneliness and the subjective approach of death and dying.

### VIII. 1 What happened to the monk?

The apparent lack of relevance of the monastic solitude in reading the non-assumed types of modern loneliness intrigued us right from the start. Statistically speaking, social sciences can easily pretend that intentional isolation (beautifully called “solitude” and always understood as a religious or artistic “caprice”) does not even exist. However our Swedish interlocutors did speak about the need of being “left in peace” and labeled themselves as “lonely wolf”, “lonely as a monk”, and “reflexive”, willing to take long solitary nocturne walks on the shoreline or simply insisting on the miraculously benefic nature of the aloneness on the mind and the soul.

Nurtured by a long tradition<sup>53</sup> the monastic ideal remained somewhat intact in the Eastern Europe and from the Saint Simon The New Theologian all the way up to Saint *Silouan the Athonit*, the “isiham” was the subtle means of propulsion of Orthodox tradition, its most intimate, most profound, and most responsible discourse.<sup>54</sup> The chief importance of the prayer of the heart<sup>55</sup> it is just one of the key-criteria meant to preserve and restore a certain Orthodox sensitivity that would exclude the disdain of the need for being alone, when spiritually grounded. However our Swedish interlocutors were not at all familiar with Orthodoxy, while our Romanian Orthodox interlocutors did not seem too keen to the idea of solitude, regardless of its nature and origin. Therefore, apart from a vaguely spiritual connotation of the alliance between “some kind of believer” (as one of our Swedish interlocutors put it) and the silent night, the spiritual privilege of isolation is more than modest and, when present, its main stake resides in condemning the daily noise of the modern world.

Our intermittent readings concerning theological thinking of late modernity do not allow us to say to what extent the contemporary spiritual attitudes still hold traces of the ascetic value of solitude. One may nevertheless suppose that exercising a non-ego-centered isolation could be a valuable exercise for dying well. Andrei Plesu wrote about the formative experience of the wilderness<sup>56</sup>; he who is alone is he without anyone “of a kind”, which is another way of acknowledging the solitary moments

as being about one inherently facing one's own death.<sup>57</sup> Isolation – be it wanted or unwanted – has to do with nullifying the (social) convention between *this* particular human being and all the rest (of human beings). We may safely say that isolation *fatally* precedes and *pathetically* calls death: if something can anticipate death, meet it halfway and prepare it, then it is loneliness. If Robinson would have died, he would have died well.

### **VIII.2 The thousand-faced individualism and the “free-style dying”**

Never mind the monks; the late modern individual is constantly seduced by “dynamic” and “surprising” spiritual movements. Danièle Hervieu-Léger believes that a seduction as such is part of the preoccupation for the self and for the “authentic”,<sup>58</sup> first-hand experiences in general. With typical subtlety, Hervieu-Léger<sup>59</sup> approaches religious individualism in the context of late modern individualism *and not the other way around*.

For a start, it is important to understand individualism manifested in the late modern religious beliefs and practices as being opposed to those beliefs and practices having been prescribed in the traditional society: religion of interiority as opposed to religion of dogmatic contingencies, spiritual initiative as opposed to prescribed rules of the Church. The new religious movements ask for a flexible approach of the religious “truths”, meeting each and every one’s need for highly personalized (and ego-centered) spiritual adventure. Such adventures are obviously less intended to improve the relationship with Providence or with a similar other, but as a side-kick for individual performance, a vital requirement for the social perfectionism of the Self.

We had a couple of Swedish interviewees invoking yoga techniques when asked to talk about “self-improvement”. In general, a laborious religious traditional discourse has been almost entirely replaced with improvised spiritual discourses displaying logical contradictions and even theoretical enormities. Logics and “the letter” are not the priorities of today’s spiritual men and women. It often looks like the supreme goal of the individual is self-perfection facilitated, among others, by bodily and psycho-practices<sup>60</sup> chaotically borrowed from different spiritual traditions of the world, and often ignoring or repressing the “teachings” of a certain familiar religious context which should improve the feeling of belonging. It is often more than what Davie implied by “believing without belonging”,<sup>61</sup> it is “*insisting* on believing without belonging” which would of course sooner or later influence the “dying role” one will make one’s option for.

Setting up and “polishing” a highly modern subjectivity – the more autonomous and disciplined, the more competitive and self-competitive – surprisingly leads to what Hervieu-Léger calls „la plus haute conscience possible du soi“:<sup>62</sup> *the mystic experience, the experience of being one with The One.* And so we are brought back to the monks.

If hastily analyzed, the “high standards” of the loneliness of the mystic would entitle us to talk about a solitude of excellence, about a safe path to a fully individualized religion that could be after all noticed on a large scale in late modernity; and, consequently about the “safest” way to meet one’s death. But the problem at stake is *not* the progressive individualization of religion in general, but the ways in which such individualization is *articulated by* and *confronts* our times. It is precisely this articulation that Hervieu-Léger calls into question. Indeed, late modernity pays a lot of respect to “*superior* states of being in the world”, but it is the religious individualism to be absorbed into modern individualism, and *not* the other way around. Finally, we could proudly label ourselves a “mystical society” but simply because we have the awareness of our Selves as being the ultimate reality;<sup>63</sup> and death of the ultimate Self is, by default, excluded.

## **IX. Swedish systemic contradictions**

Individual performance is meaningless outside competitive milieus. The need for delimiting one’s self from other individualities which are also looking for new, efficient truths for marking and refining their own uniqueness requires some kind of strategy. Hervieu-Léger suggests we should go back in time and consider the traditional religious individualism of ethic type.

Even though researchers have not yet agreed on the manners in which connections between people are reflected in social structures and the other way around,<sup>64</sup> we can at least safely rely on Weber’s explanations about the importance of intra-mundane Protestant ethic in encouraging individual performance.<sup>65</sup> The biggest danger encountered by the Puritan believer who cares about spiritual growth is the danger of relaxation. Before converting time into money, time is supposed to be converted into a *working routine*: the more socialization, the more occasions for surrendering to sin.

During the last three centuries, *homo economicus* has not been decisively reformulated (nor was he ready for initiating a substantial change

in perceiving welfare), even though the temptation of losing control over one's time has ceased to be seen through a religious lens. The Western world still carefully manages its daily minutes taking punctual and rapid decisions leading to immediate positive outcomes, while the spare time (*loisir*) is almost exclusively intended for diverting the attention from time matters. Swedish media for instance associate distraction with flirt, infidelity, clubbing and alcohol abuse. Scandinavian life frenetically slides between effervescence and lethargy.

In his book about Swedish<sup>66</sup> mentality Åke Daun comments typically Swedish ways of "letting loose" and underlines the strong contrast between the austerity of the work-periods and the lack of (moral, social, affective) scruple of the Swede in vacation. There is a typically Swedish inability of socially valuing one's inner availabilities, of perceiving one's self as a coherent unit. He or she usually fails to behave and feel himself or herself *simultaneously* citizen and human being. Many of the Swedes we have met live with the secret conviction that they cannot be incriminated for their "vacation behavior", and even less for their drinking behavior. Such difficulty in accepting themselves as they are must have something to do with the inherent contradictions implied by a fully repressed protestant background still manifesting itself under disguise, even in the absence of religious motivations. Protestantism in Sweden is an "operating system" assuring the invisible platform for various – still in use – "software applications" like the acquisition of tangible goods, the chronic lack of time, and irresistible attraction and fear<sup>67</sup> toward *loisir* and togetherness; the same "operating system" provides with a subtle blend of humility and practicality.

Going back to Hervieu-Leger's observation about the modern conception of the world that favors Protestant ethics on one hand and mystical approach on the other hand, we would have to underline that, unlike Lutheran, Calvinist or mystical individualism, the late modernity bets on the *the autonomy of the mundane realities*.<sup>68</sup> The feeling of being *dependent* is a strong feeling within the Protestant world and it is admirably exemplified by perennial Swedish socio-political realities: the citizen's dependence of the State, the painful problem of the "tithe", the strong awareness of public responsibility of each individual, etc. On the other hand, Sweden has an infinite number of regulated freedoms and "good laws" from which the Swede is allowed to pick, becoming the only human being free *exclusively* in his or her own way.

And here we can find a Swedish “systemic contradiction” between late modern requirements (valuing autonomy) and those instilled and repressed rules of the Protestant operating system (valuing dependence). Such systemic contradiction could only lead to an inherent state of conflict of the autonomies and, in the long run, to inherently fragile biographical solutions. The fact that the problem of death slides between public and private, means that it mirrors *simultaneously* the conflict of autonomies, systemic contradictions, and biographical (dis)solutions. As expected, the obtained image is extremely nebulous.

## X. “Am I my father’s keeper?”

The conflict of autonomies implies competition, and consequently the look for success to the detriment of all else. Such need for social fulfillment and self-improvement has become one of the highest anxiogenic individual duties; and – paradoxically? – one of the most valuable sources of “existential welfare”. The Ph.D. thesis of the existential psychotherapist Rollo May<sup>69</sup> was built around the problem of anxiety, as perceived in the ‘70s. May thinks that modern man’s daily mental pressure comes from an exaggerate need for social prestige.<sup>70</sup>

The man of success is a man of solitude, walking lonely on “mined ground”. “Enemies”, “rivals” and “vassals” are to be found everywhere in his way, as we have learned not only from May, but also from Hollywood movies. And there is one more consequence of social success to be acknowledged: success is not only the *notorious face of solitude, but also the favorite reverse of death* (if taken *ad litteram*, Michael Jackson’s recent passing away is a unfortunate example).

The social theories of the body<sup>71</sup> obviously identify the body as the main source of social identity:<sup>72</sup> biologically deceased still have an influential social presence in the lives of the others<sup>73</sup> and this presence is more meaningful than that of the “vegetables” lying unconsciously in hospital beds. The old body is a never ending source of “negative self-identity”<sup>74</sup> and once the social expression and expressivity are inhibited by the physical boundaries of old, the middle-aged modern is – already – exposed to a series of “pre-mortal states”.<sup>75</sup> *Such social death, often slow and perceived as terrible, is a process of (self-)marginalization which shakes the very ground he or she stands on.* When the famous man or woman is constrained by biological shortcomings to limit his or her public

appearances, a mass-mediated moment of failure is perceived as being more painful than biological death. In fact, physical death is the only one able to restore the glory he or she lost when the social death occurred.

One may safely say that such difficult process of *social* death is part of the *existential* protocol of any modern aged person, and it has more to do with being lonely than with being nearly dead. Peter Jupp cynically notes that the detaching of the young from the old comes as a consequence of their economic independency, as well as because of the physical death occurring long after the social death took place. Therefore, from the point of view of the young, the process of social death of the old becomes the opportunity to learn how to emotionally, socially and financially manage without the future dead.<sup>76</sup>

## XI. “Am I my brother’s keeper?”

The lack of spontaneous compassion (as opposed to what Seale called the management of love) as well as of the fear of not violating the private space of the other has reached worrying proportions<sup>77</sup> in Sweden. There is a fear of not being labeled “intrusive” or “indiscrete” that led to what Daun calls “a culture of withdrawal”,<sup>78</sup> but we will even call it a new paradoxical ethic denying the responsibility for the other while taking the fight for a responsible community to extremes. The Swede does his or her best not to diminish the autonomy of others. The Samaritan is the aggressor. The spontaneous charity shocks. The good-will deeds are done “with papers”, and the charity man officially stands for his charity deeds. The love for another (self-enclosed one) has become a sort of “esoteric luxury” that many Swedish people systematically reject.

Using Richard Lynn’s terms,<sup>79</sup> Daun writes about “low (emotional) reactivity” and “lack of compassion”,<sup>80</sup> severe shyness and fear of conflict<sup>81</sup> that have been systematically encouraged by a social culture which is rhetorically based on the extreme autonomy of the individual, but actually regulated by neurotically authoritarian and oversimplified mechanisms of social control.

## XII. Swedish biographical solutions?

“Gråt behöver inte vara privat” (“The crying does not necessarily have to be private”) is the title that researcher Anna Bremborg gave to her newspaper article<sup>82</sup> on the decision of a national television channel (SVT) of directly broadcasting the burial of a little girl sexually molested and killed by a seemingly harmless, timid, simple man in his 30s whose case was excessively mass-mediated during the spring of 2008. How come that a good neighbor, uncle and brother in law could kill innocent children? As it is often the case, specific answers cannot be produced at the level of public debate. The public Swedish culture is often perceived as pragmatic culture, profoundly incurious about under-documentable matters, but constantly preoccupied by immediate repercussions of social facts. The social and cultural debates are exclusively born *in situ* and *in concretu*, they have practical appearances and practical goals, as for predictions and extrapolations, they are rare, wisely regulated and, whenever possible, underestimated.

By contrast, the ever growing Swedish “private culture” has never been more exposed via social media, and it pays considerable tribute to loneliness and melancholic monotony. We have commented a couple of case studies in our recent Ph.D. thesis and, as far as we are aware of, the empirically confirmed truth is that the common Swede lives and blogs in the tension between his or her obsession for ultimate questions and a regrettable poorness of restorative answers. The lonely Swede seems to actively refuse reflexivity. For most Swedish people, life is a synonym for summer, and summer is the supreme call to non-reflexivity (concretized in fishing and beer), and a state of supreme consolation for a long winter’s journey that we dare call metaphorically a somnambulist walking in the cold shadow of death, always half a step behind one’s self.

There are wide shifts between public Swedish lifestyle (always responsibly assumed, but lacking vigor), and the intimate Swedish lifestyle (hardly assumed, but tragically and vigorously underlined by open-ended personal accounts) displaying a lack of “existential strategy”. The Swedish biographical solutions for death are often complex and highly personal because they are articulated and preceded by strong and merely positive attitudes toward loneliness; but just as often they are inhibited by the self-abandon in the merging of one’s inner need to react to severe matters (like life and death) with the strictly-guarded individual social duty to keep such matters at distance.

## Replacing a conclusion

Obviously, the reactions to death of a certain society, culture or person are too complex for being properly indexed. Indeed, our interviewees often use fashionable scripts for life and death instead of “workable” biographical solutions, but this should not be seen as a flaw of the study, but rather as a symptomatic relevance of the need for largely accepted prescriptions of (good) dying. The enormous corpus of information provided by social sciences is infinitely updatable, yet inert by its *intentional* lack of normative potential; it fails to provide a meaning, to open perspectives, to save, sedate, educate, integrate, evaluate or restore human lives, but however manages to solve a social problem and, if correctly analyzed, to re-confirm the known truth about late modernity’s low tolerance for death matters.

We are generously offered a large amount of data on death coming from academic milieus and mass media, and we are told that this is the discourse of death from which we, the late moderns, should claim ourselves. Eventually, both the theoretical and the newsworthy “package” of death prove to be perfectly dispensable. The biologic “solution” to a systemic contradiction as such is radical, and comes like a thief at night.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> FULTON, R. (ed.), *Death and Identity*, John Wiley & Sons, New York/London/ Sidney, 1965, p. 5.
- <sup>2</sup> CLARK, D. (ed.), *The Sociology of Death*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993, especially MELLOR, P., "Death in High Modernity: the Contemporary presence and absence of death", but also FINCH, J., WALLIS, L., "Death, Inheritance and the Life Course", pp. 50-68, in the same collective volume *The Sociology of Death*, and DÉCHAUX, J. – H., "La mort dans les sociétés modernes: la these de Norbert Elias à l'épreuve", pp. 161-183, in *L'année sociologique – Études* vol. 51, no. 1, 2001, p. 161; and finally, BURT, R. A., *Death is That Man Taking Names: Intersections of American Medicine, Law, and Culture*, University of California Press, L.A., Berkley, London, N. Y., 2002, stressing the "ratification of the cultural "denial of death", p. 45.
- <sup>3</sup> FULTON R., GEIS G., "Death and Social Values", p. 73, in FULTON R. (ed.), *op. cit.*
- <sup>4</sup> TOPLEAN, A., "On Personal Ways of Dying: New Troubles, Old Means", *Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift*, Wallin & Dallholm Boktryckeri AB, Lund, 2007, TOPLEAN, A., "Crossroads between Modern Death and the Secular Sacred", *Religionssociologi i brytningstider*, Lunds Universitet Tryckeri, Lund, 2009, TOPLEAN, A., *Pragul și neantul. Încercări de circumscriere a morții*, Polirom, Iași, 2006.
- <sup>5</sup> *Begravningen – ett brev från Svenska kyrkans biskopar*, Svenska Kyrkan, Uppsala, 2007, p. 28. Please see also the work on funeral houses written by BREMBORG, A., *Yrke : begravningsentreprenör. Om utanförskap, döda kroppar, riter och professionalisering*, Lunds Universitet Tryckeri, Lund, 2002, esp. pp. 115-117.
- <sup>6</sup> ARIÈS, Ph., *Omul în fața morții*, vol. I, II, Meridiane, București, 1996, and ARIÈS, Ph., *Essais sur l'histoire de la mort en Occident au moyen âge à nos jours*, Seuil, Paris, 1975.
- <sup>7</sup> BECK, U., BECK, E. - G., *Individualization. Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political Consequences*, Sage, London, 2002, p. 2.
- <sup>8</sup> BAUMAN, Z., *Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies*, Polity Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 167.
- <sup>9</sup> See also BURT, *the quoted work*, pp. 2, 45, 46.
- <sup>10</sup> TOPLEAN, A., *Pragul și neantul* (PhD thesis) Universitatea din București, București, 2009, pp. 140-156.
- <sup>11</sup> ELIAS, N., *La solitude des mourants*, Christian Bourgois, Paris, 1998.
- <sup>12</sup> DÉCHAUX, J. – H., HANUS, M., FRÉDÉRIC, J., "Comment les familles entourent leurs morts", pp. 81-102, in *Esprit*, November, n° 247, 1998; and DÉCHAUX, J. – H., "La mort dans les sociétés modernes: la these de Norbert Elias à l'épreuve", pp. 161-183, in *L'année sociologique – Études*, vol. 51, no. 1, 2001.

- <sup>13</sup> SEALE, C., "Dying Alone", pp. 376-392, in *Sociology of Health and Illness*, vol. 17, no. 3, 1995.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 377. The same idea is thoroughly treated in SEALE, C., *Constructing Death. The Sociology of Dying and Bereavement*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
- <sup>15</sup> See PARKER, C. M., PARKER, J., ""Hospice" versus "Hospital" care: reevaluation after ten years as seen by surviving spouses", in *Postgraduate Medical Journal*, no. 60, 1984. "Hospice" wins against "Hospital" when it comes to psycho-social care. See also SEALE, C., *Constructing Death*, esp. pp. 117, 118.
- <sup>16</sup> YOLOTH, L., CHARON, R., "Like an Open Book: Reliability, Intersubjectivity, and Textuality in Bioethics", in CHARON, R. And MONTELLO, M. (ed.), *Stories Matter: The Role of Narrative in Medical Ethics*, Routledge, New York, 2002, p. 24.
- <sup>17</sup> SEALE, C., *Constructing Death. The Sociology of Dying and Bereavement*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 177 (the account of a patient, quoted by Seale.)
- <sup>18</sup> QVARNSTRÖM, U., *Upplevelser inför döden. Samtal vid livets slut*, Natur och kultur, Ronzo Boktryckeri, Stockholm, 1979, p. 17.
- <sup>19</sup> KÜBLER-ROSS, E., *On Death and Dying*, Scribner, New York, 1969, reed. 1997, p. 259.
- <sup>20</sup> FULTON, R., "Attitudes and Responses toward Death", p. 81, *the quoted work*.
- <sup>21</sup> SEALE, C., *Constructing Death*, p. 53.
- <sup>22</sup> We used the adjective "classic" because it was launched by Ariès in connection with the traditional death, always assisted by relatives, neighbors, friends etc. Also VOVELLE, M., *La mort en Occident de 1300 à nos jours*, Gallimard, Paris, 1983, and THOMAS, L. – V., *L'anthropologie de la mort*, Payot, Paris, 1975, THOMAS, L. – V., *Les rites de mort. Pour la paix des vivants*, Fayard, Paris, 1985.
- <sup>23</sup> QVARNSTRÖM, U., *the quoted work*, p. 14.
- <sup>24</sup> "Ontological security" is one of Anthony Giddens's most interesting concepts and refers to the need for coherence, continuity and meaning in everyday life. We have discussed it largely in our PhD thesis. See GIDDENS, A., *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1990.
- <sup>25</sup> SWENSON, W. M., "Attitudes toward Death Among the Aged" in FULTON, R., *the quoted work*, p. 110.
- <sup>26</sup> SEALE, C., *Constructing Death*, pp. 209, 210.
- <sup>27</sup> ÅHRÉN SNICKARE, E., *Döden, kroppen och moderniteten*, Carlsson Bokförlag, Stockholm, 2002, esp. pp. 34, 35.
- <sup>28</sup> This is how Michel Vovelle calls the way death is handled in a certain culture.

- <sup>29</sup> SEALE, C., *Constructing Death*, pp. 200, 201.
- <sup>30</sup> Ariès was among the first scholars to note the great inertia of the meanings and representations of death . See the quoted works, *Omul în fața morții*, p. 66.
- <sup>31</sup> BAUMAN, *Mortality...*, p. 8.
- <sup>32</sup> MELLOR, *the quoted work*, p. 12.
- <sup>33</sup> ÅHRÉN SNICKARE, E., *the quoted work*, pp. 34, 35.
- <sup>34</sup> BAUMAN, *Mortality...*, p. 8.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>36</sup> BAUMAN, Z., *Liquid Times. Living in an Age of Uncertainty*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 81.
- <sup>37</sup> BAUMAN, *Mortality...*, p. 16.
- <sup>38</sup> We have no choice but leaving aside the discussion concerning “death revival” in the late modern public space because it would require significant space and detailed information. It is in the logic of the present study to present the wider context of death studies without mentioning the recent tendencies of death awareness.
- <sup>39</sup> BAUMAN, *Mortality...*, p. 9.
- <sup>40</sup> BURT, R. A., *Death is That Man Taking Names: Intersections of American Medicine, Law, and Culture*, University of California Press, L.A., Berkley, London, N. Y., 2002.
- <sup>41</sup> See KELLEHEAR, A., *Dying of Cancer: The Final Year of Life*, Harwood, London, 1990, mentioned by LITTLEWOOD, J. in “The Denial of Death and Rites of Passage in Contemporary Societies”, in CLARK, *the quoted work*, p. 73.
- <sup>42</sup> ÅHRÉN SNICKARE, E., *the quoted work*, p. 35.
- <sup>43</sup> See the excellent study edited by DAVIES, D. and LEWIS, M., *Encyclopedia of Cremation*, Ashgate Publishing, Hants, Burlington, 2005.
- <sup>44</sup> LUCKMANN, T., “The New and the Old in Religion” in BOURDIEU, P., COLEMAN, J. S. (ed.), *Social Theory for a Changing Society*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991, p. 176.
- <sup>45</sup> Mellor thinks that the shock of a reflexive modernity when facing “a real” death is concretized in various deficiencies in organizing self-identity. See MELLOR, *the quoted work*, p. 19.
- <sup>46</sup> YALOM, I. D., *Existential Psychotherapy*, Basic Books, New York, 1980, esp. pp. 353, 354.
- <sup>47</sup> FROMM, E., *The Art of Loving*, Bantam Books, New York, 1956.
- <sup>48</sup> YALOM, I., *the quoted work*, pp. 359-361.
- <sup>49</sup> LYNCH, J., *The Broken Heart: The Medical Consequences of Loneliness*, Basic Books, New York, 1977, p. 33.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35. See also AIKEN, L. R., *Dying, Death and Bereavement*, Pepperdine University, Mahwah New Jersey, London, 2001, esp. pp. 26, 27.

- <sup>51</sup> Lynch describes the outcome of an extremely relevant survey among the Irish people living in Boston and respectively Ireland. *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 35.
- <sup>52</sup> This is how the Swedish publishing house Optimal presents the Swedish translation of Florence Falk's bestseller *On My Own* (*Kvinna, Ensam och Stark*, Optimal Förlag, 2007, tr. by Lena Källberg): „46 percent of the Swedes, that is, 2.3 million of people live alone. It is the highest percentage in Europe. (...) *Kvinna, ensam och stark* is a book for those women living on their own because they wanted to, or in spite of their will. To live alone is often shameful in our society. But living alone is not the sign of unfortune, on the contrary, being independent and free brings up innumerable opportunities for leading a autonomous, rich life. (...)"
- <sup>53</sup> We recommend ICA, I. I. jr. study, „Biserică, societate, gândire în Răsărit, Occident și în Europa de azi" in ICA, I. I. jr., MARANI, G. (ed.), *Gândirea socială a Bisericii*, Deisis, Sibiu, 2002.
- <sup>54</sup> See for a proper introduction the 2<sup>nd</sup> volume of DAVY, M. – M., *Enciclopedia doctrinelor mistice*, Amarcord, Timișoara, 1998.
- <sup>55</sup> See *ibid.* pp. 35, 39, 40. 41 for a concise description of prayer techniques.
- <sup>56</sup> PLEŞU, *the quoted work*, p. 124.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 127.
- <sup>58</sup> HERVIEU-LÉGER, D., *Le pèlerin et le converti. La religion en mouvement*, Flammarion, Paris, 1999, p. 177.
- <sup>59</sup> HERVIEU-LÉGER, *the quoted work*, pp. 158, 159.
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.
- <sup>61</sup> DAVIE, G., *Religion in Modern Europe*. A Memory Mutates, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 5, 6 and DAVIE, G., *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing Without Belonging (Making Contemporary Britain)*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1994, repr. 1995, pp. 2, 3.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 158.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162.
- <sup>64</sup> PAHL, R., *On Friendship*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000.
- <sup>65</sup> WEBER, M., *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and other Writings*, Penguin Books, New York, 2002.
- <sup>66</sup> To everyone's surprise, this book has been indeed translated into Romanian: DAUN, Å., *Mentalitatea suedeza*, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1995, tr. by Liliana Donose Samuelsson. Without always being considered a remarkable work (the lack of scientific intransigence is a common blame), Daun's study on Swedish mentality does contain valuable insights about major psycho-social traits of the Swedish nation, perhaps less spectacular but more reliable than those to be found in HENDIN, H., *Suicide and Scandinavia*, Anchor Books, New York, 1964.

- <sup>67</sup> The study made by Karolinska Institutet in 2006 shows that 13% of the Swedes suffer from social phobia: <http://ki.se/ki/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=130&a=12629&l=sv&newsdep=130>
- <sup>68</sup> HERVIEU-LÉGER, *the quoted work*, p. 160.
- <sup>69</sup> MAY, R., *The Meaning of Anxiety*, Pocket Books, New York, 1977.
- <sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 206.
- <sup>71</sup> SHILLING, C., *The Body and Social Theory*, Sage, London, 1993.
- <sup>72</sup> HALLAM, E., HOCKEY, J., HOWARTH, G., *Beyond the Body. Death and Social Identity*, Routledge, London, New York, 1999.
- <sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. ix.
- <sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>76</sup> JUPP, P., "Cremation or Burial? Contemporary Choice in City and Village" in CLARK (ed.), *the quoted work*, esp. pp. 192 and the following. See also le BRAS, H., "Les politiques de l'âge", pp. 25-47, in *L'Homme.Revue française d'anthropologie: Passages à l'âge d'homme*, no. 167-168 juillet-décembre, 2003, esp. pp. 42-47.
- <sup>77</sup> DAUN, *the quoted work*, pp. 81, 82.
- <sup>78</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 80-100.
- <sup>79</sup> LYNN, R., *Personality and National Character*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1971.
- <sup>80</sup> DAUN, Å., *the quoted work*, esp. p. 122.
- <sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, esp. pp. 68-71, 117-130.
- <sup>82</sup> BREMBORG, A., "Gråt behöver inte vara privat" in *Sydsvenskan*, the 9th of May, 2008.

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